Cross on evidence [10th Australian edition.] 9780409339581, 040933958X
575 48 24MB
English Pages [3500] Year 2014
Full Title
Copyright
Preface
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
Table of Contents
Chapter One — Introduction
1 Development of the Law of Evidence
A History and controversial nature of evidence
Seventeenth-nineteenth centuries
Pre-twentieth century history
Controversies as to the nature of the law of evidence
Two views
Australian developments
The work of the Law Reform Commission and its results
2 Range of the Law of Evidence
A The diversity of the law
Procedure, form, witnesses, exclusionary rules and proof
B Proceedings in courts
Dispensing with evidence rules
Power of courts to order, and of the parties to agree, that the rules of evidence be dispensed with
Different types of jurisdiction
Criminal/civil jurisdiction; paternal jurisdiction; administrative function
Different types of court
Statutory modification of evidence rules in particular courts
Different stages of proceedings
Decisions before trial and on the voir dire
Decisions after the trial
C Proceedings in other Tribunals
Varieties of fact-finding tribunals
The nature of the problem
The role of statute
The role of natural justice
Nature of issues and consequences of finding
Subpoenas, oaths and privileges
3 Principal Items of Judicial Evidence
Evidence classified
Testimony, hearsay, documents, real evidence and circumstantial evidence
A Facts in issue
Main facts
Examples of main facts in issue
Cases with multiple issues
Subordinate or collateral facts
Subordinate or collateral facts defined and illustrated
Relationship of testimony to the other items of evidence
Testimony as central to, but as distinguished from, hearsay, documents, real evidence and circumstantial evidence
B Facts as evidence of other facts: circumstantial evidence
The nature of circumstantial evidence
Circumstantial evidence defined
Means of proving circumstantial evidence
The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence
C Examples of circumstantial evidence
Classifying circumstantial evidence
Wigmore’s classifications
Prospectant evidence
Justification for reception of prospectant evidence
Continuance
Course of business
Habit
Motive or plan
Knowledge or capacity
Concomitant evidence
Justification for reception of concomitant evidence
Opportunity
Res gestae
Standards of comparison
Retrospectant evidence
Justification for reception of retrospectant evidence
Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta
Mechanical instruments
Possession as evidence of ownership
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: general
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: possession of recently stolen goods
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: general illustrations
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: key factors
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: the significance of a prima facie case
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: Jones v Dunkel
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: criminal cases
Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: belated explanation
Fingerprints
Blood tests
Blood, urine and breath tests
Tracker dogs
Corpus delicti
D Means of proof
Testimony
The nature of testimony
Hearsay
Preliminary account of hearsay
The status of documentary evidence
Things or real evidence
The nature of real evidence
Material objects
Appearance of persons, objects and scenes
Demeanour or conduct of witness
Views, demonstrations, reconstructions: in court/out of court distinction
Views, demonstrations, reconstructions: procedure on practical aspects
Automatic recordings: status as real evidence
Automatic recordings: the limits of admissibility
Automatic recordings: other issues
Automatic recordings: complex illustrations
Charts
Documents as real evidence
Conclusion
E Evidence of identity
Evidence of identity: General
Categories of identification evidence
Direct evidence of identity
Background
Miscarriages of justice
Experiments
Reasons for errors in identification
Identification parades
Errors in police procedure
Photographs and films: general
Photographs: precautions
Photographs: “rogues gallery effect” and “displacement effect”
Discretion to warn juries: background
Devlin Report
Domican warning
Content of Domican warning
Mutual corroboration
Dock identification
Identification from photographs
Identification parades
Identification parades and photographic identification
Restrictions on identifying witness’s role
Object identification
Content of jury warning
Voice identification
The principles at common law and under the Acts
Uniform Acts
The structure, the provisions and the authorities
Circumstantial evidence of identity
Similar facts and other probative circumstances
4 The Best Evidence Rule
A Definition and statement of rule
Definitions
Primary and secondary evidence
Statement of rule
Lord Hardwicke’s definition
B The inclusionary aspect
Limits on inclusionary aspect
Examples of limited inclusionary aspect
C The exclusionary aspect
Limits on exclusionary aspect
Examples of limited exclusionary aspect
D The remains of the rule
The decline of the rule
Remaining instances of the rule
5 Relevance, Admissibility and Weight of Evidence
A The structure of the issues
Admissibility of relevant evidence and inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence
B The admissibility of relevant evidence
Definition of relevance
Common law and statutory definitions
Exceptions
General
Hearsay
Opinion
Character
Conduct on other occasions
Multiple relevance and admissibility
Multiple relevance and limited admissibility
C The inadmissibility of irrelevant, and insufficiently relevant, evidence
Illustrations
The plan
Remoteness
Multiplicity of issues
Danger of manufactured evidence
Alternative statements of the rule
Issues of judgment
Apparent exceptions
Three suggested exceptions
Facts affecting the admissibility of evidence
Curative admissibility
Conditional admissibility
D Relevance and admissibility
The distinction between relevance and admissibility
Stephen’s terminology
Problems with Stephen’s approach
The demand for more basic concepts
“Materiality” and “receivability”
E Admissibility and weight of evidence
Distinguishing weight and admissibility
Significance of admissibility/weight distinction
F Terminology
Cogency issues
Cogency issues: introduction
Insufficient evidence
Incapacity to persuade a reasonable person
Prima facie evidence: first sense
Not obligatory for reasonable person to decide in proponent’s favour
Prima facie evidence: second sense (presumptive evidence)
Reasonable person must decide in favour of proponent in the absence of further evidence
Conclusive evidence
Court must find the fact proved
Presumptions
Various meanings of “presumption”
6 Res Inter Alios Acta
An obscure maxim
Meanings of the maxim
7 Evidence in Federal Courts and Courts Exercising Federal Jurisdiction
Federal evidence law
Purpose of section
A The High Court of Australia
Original jurisdiction of High Court
Section 79 of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): High Court
B Other Federal courts and State courts exercising Federal jurisdiction
Section 79 of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): other federal courts and State courts
C Courts of Territories
Relevant legislation
8 The Status of Evidence not Objected to
The consequences of failure to object
The process and consequences of objection
The doctrine of waiver
Use of evidence not objected to, if admissible for one purpose, is limited to that purpose
Conduct of parties may make hearsay admissible
Completely inadmissible evidence usable to the extent of its rational persuasive power
Admission tendered without objection receivable to prove self-serving parts
Duties of criminal courts to exclude inadmissible evidence not objected to
Rules which parties have an option to take advantage of or not
9 General Aspects and Problems of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT)
A Application of the Acts
Extent of the Acts
Application to courts
Provisions unique to Commonwealth
Legislation not affected by Acts
Differential application of s 9
Sections 9 and 10
Excluded topics, other statutes, internal differences
Excluded topics
Statutory rules of evidence not found in the Acts
Internal differences in the Acts
B Codification in relation to the Commonwealth Act
What is a code?
First pointer to codification: inferences from concurrent or adjacent operation of general evidence law
Second pointer to codification: inferences from fundamental provisions that cover the field
Third pointer to codification: s 56
First pointer against codification: the terms of the Act
Second pointer against codification: the legislative history
Third pointer against codification: principle of legality
Illustrations of principle of legality
C Codification in relation to the NSW Act, the Vic Act, the Tas Act, the ACT Act and the NT Act
Mini codes
D Judicial development
Forms of judicial development
E Recourse to the former law
Lord Herschell’s approach
Capacity to resort to former law
F Law reform and other preparatory materials
Use of extrinsic materials
Statutory avenues
G Characteristic features of the Acts
Notices, requests, discretions
Three features
Notice requirements
Requests facility
Discretions and indeterminate criteria
Power to excuse failure
Miscellaneous powers
Appropriateness
Pre-trial consequences
H Topics omitted by the legislation
Omissions
Evidential topics omitted
I Inconsistency of State Laws and Cth: Evidence Act
Means of precluding inconsistency
10 The Record of Trial
A Content of record
Definition, disputes and resolution
Incompleteness of record and its consequences
11 The Treatment of Wrongly Received Evidence
A Wrongly received evidence
Dealing with changed rulings
Means of handling consequences of changed rulings
12 The Treatment of Agreements between Counsel
A Agreement not to pursue issues
Miscarriage of justice caused by agreements between counsel
Appeals
Chapter Two — Facts which Need not be Proved by Evidence
1 Judicial Notice
A Introduction
Relationship of judicial notice to other instances of non-compliance with rules of evidence
Structure of law
Adjudicative facts and legislative fact
The categories of judicial notice
B Judicial notice of notorious facts
The categories of notorious facts
Distinction between facts noticed without inquiry and facts noticed after inquiry
Notorious facts judicially noticed without inquiry
Categories of facts judicially noticed without inquiry
Notorious facts judicially noticed after inquiry
Function of category
Permissible sources
Natural justice
Historical facts
Custom
Professional practice
Economic conditions
Local conditions
Scientific matters and instruments
C Judicial notice of domestic law
Common law and statute law
Special senses of judicial notice
D Judicial notice of state matters
Governmental issues
Basis of rule
Political matters
Acts of Parliament
Subordinate legislation
Other public documents
E Theoretical questions
Principal conceptual issues
Outline
Judicial notice and notorious facts
Judicial notice and reception of evidence
Differences between taking judicial notice and receiving evidence
Judicial notice and personal knowledge
Use by specialist tribunals of their specialist knowledge
Disclosure by judge or juror of personal knowledge
Rationale
Tacit application
Some differences between adjudicative and legislative facts
F Legislative facts
Constitutional facts
Constitutional validity of enactments and executive conduct
Construction of non-constitutional statutes
Legislative facts as part of statutory context
Construction of constitutional statutes
Legislative facts as part of constitutional context
Development of common law
Legislative facts establishing the common law
G Evidence Acts
Section 144 of Evidence Acts
Construction and illustrations
2 Formal Admissions
A Civil cases
Methods of admitting facts
Pleadings, notice to admit, agreement
B Criminal cases
Methods of admitting facts
Plea of guilty only permissible common law method
Explanation for common law rule
Statutory methods
Methods open to Crown
Victorian position
Effect of formal admission made in one proceeding in others
3 The Teachings of Ordinary Experience
A General
Significance of problem
Reception of empirical material not complying with rules of evidence
General experience and relevancy
Examples of general experience in use
Introduction
Language and arithmetic
Simple physical and scientific phenomena
Human behaviour and motor vehicles
Human behaviour and railways
Physical activities
General practice
Presumptions of continuance and death
Community standards
Human mental and emotional states
Motives
Deception
Inference of knowledge
Admissions by conduct
Silence
Ordinary human nature
Assessment of credibility and weight
B General problems
Key conceptual issues
Legal control of the generalisations
Relationship with expert opinion evidence
Mixture of elements
4 Further Categories
Background facts, colouring-book facts and visual aids
Suggested additions
Judge Posner’s practice
Chapter Three — Estoppels
1 Estoppel by Record
A Introduction
Status of estoppel by record
Character of estoppels
Underlying principles
B Effect of judgments on all persons
Conclusiveness of judgments
Conclusiveness against all persons
Judgments in rem
C Effect of judgments on parties: civil cases
General effect
Outline
Specific rules
Final judgment
Competent tribunal
Foreign judgments
Identity of parties
Identity of capacity
Privity: general
Identity of parties and privity of interest
Interests in goods
No application to findings in criminal proceedings
Res judicata
Issue estoppel
Issue estoppel: legal indispensability
Issue estoppel: identity of issues
Issue estoppels in propositions of law
Issue estoppels and negligence
Issue estoppel: role of pleadings, evidence and argument
Issue estoppel: prior criminal proceedings
Issue estoppels: prior finding taken with evidence
Issue estoppel: policy limitations
Need for estoppels to be specially pleaded
Effect of judgments on parties: matrimonial and children’s cases
D Effect of judgments on parties: criminal cases
Autrefois acquit and autrefois convict
Cause of action estoppel
Restriction of issues by previous convictions or acquittals
Discretion to stay second trial
Issue estoppel
Identifying the “issue”
Double jeopardy
Evidentiary rulings
Acquittal in first proceedings no defence to charge of perjury in second
E Extended doctrines of estoppel by record
Policy behind estoppel by record
Introduction
Arguments not raised
Different parties
F The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn
Judgments as evidence against strangers
The problem stated
Authorities before Hollington v Hewthorn
Justifications for the rule
Scope of the decision in Hollington v Hewthorn
The admissibility of the previous convictions and acquittals of the parties in subsequent cases
Previous convictions in civil cases
Previous convictions in criminal cases
Previous acquittals
Suggestions for reforming the law
Legislative reform
English authority
Defamation
2 The Place of Estoppels in the Law
Estoppels characterised
Estoppel as a rule of evidence
The controversy
Chapter Four — The Burden of Proof and Presumptions
1 Different Types of Burden of Proof
A Introduction
Preliminary
Structure of chapter
The meanings of “burden of proof”
B Legal burden
Definition — Legal burden
Range of usages
C Evidential burden
Definition — Evidential burden
Range of usages
D Illustrations of confusion
Types of confusion and their sources
Consent in rape
Insanity of testator
“Defences” other than denial of essential element in a criminal charge
2 Incidence of the Burden of Proof
A General rules
Evidential burden
Structure of the section
Taylor’s test
General rule
Criminal “defences”
Civil defences
Legal burden
Normally burden on moving party
Walsh J’s formulation
Burden of proving a negative
Assertion essential to whose case?
B Presumptions expressing the incidence of the burden of proof
Linguistic shifts
Describing burden of proof in the language of presumption
Presumption of innocence
Meaning and consequences
Presumption of sanity
Meaning and consequences
C Some statutes affecting the incidence of the burden of proof
Representative examples
Deeming provisions
Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) s 35(2)
Averment provisions
Statutory interpretation in criminal cases
Summary trials
Examples
Trials on indictment: exceptions and provisos
No Crown burden to negative exceptions and provisos
Trials on indictment: Dowling v Bowie
Trials on indictment: Vines v Djordjevitch
Trials on indictment: exculpatory provision in separate statute
Trials on indictment: facts peculiarly within knowledge of accused
Trials on indictment: criticism of English cases
Trials on indictment: R v Edwards
Trials on indictment: impact of Woolmington v DPP
Trials on indictment: impact of human rights charters
D The interpretation of agreements affecting the burden of proof
Agreement in civil cases
Legal burden generally affected
Perils of the sea: The Glendarroch
Legal burden of proving negligence
Insurance exceptions
War loss and theft
3 Shifting Burdens of Proof
A General
An illusory conception
Non-shifting burden
Circumstances in which burdens may “shift”
B The shifting of the evidential burden
Tactical shifting
Provisional burdens
Basic facts and presumed facts
Legal shifting
Tactical considerations
C The shifting of the legal burden
Can the legal burden shift?
The nature of the controversy
D Distribution of issues
Different location of legal burden on different issues
“Ultimate burden”
4 Presumptions: General
A Introduction
General problems
Causes of problems
Main senses of “presumption”
B The classifications of presumptions
Types of presumptions
Sources of difficulty
Facts presumed from basic facts
Presumptions of fact
Nature and illustrations
Presumptions of law
Nature and illustrations
Irrebuttable presumptions of law
Nature and illustrations
Rebuttable presumptions of law
Nature and illustrations
Relationship between presumption and probative value of basic fact
Absence of inherent weight in presumptions
Limitations on presumptions in criminal cases
Quantum of rebutting evidence
The new classifications
“Evidential” presumptions
“Persuasive” or “compelling” presumptions
Lord Denning’s analysis
Other classifications
C Conflicting presumptions
Mutually cancelling presumptions
Instances
D Conclusion
Specific presumptions and statutory provisions
Specific presumptions
Criminal Code Act
Chapter Five — Degrees of Proof
1 Civil and Criminal Standards — Degrees of Proof
A General
Non-circumstantial evidence
Introduction
The distinction between the criminal and civil standards
Degrees of proof within each standard
Failure to meet a standard on an issue does not establish the contrary
Difficulties of formulating a “reasonable doubt”
Set form of words?
Set formula in Australia
Circumstantial evidence
No higher standard for circumstantial evidence
Standard does not apply to each item of evidence
Standard of proof where accused bears legal burden
Balance of probabilities
B Proof of crime in civil proceedings
A dilemma
Civil standard
Distinction between inference and conjecture
C Standard of proof in matrimonial causes
Adultery
Civil standard
D Miscellaneous
Contempt of court
Criminal standard
Sentencing
Differential standards of proof
Professional disciplinary and other proceedings
Civil standard
2 The Question of a Third Standard and the Possibility of Anomalies — Degrees of Proof
Multiple standards?
A controversy
Two standards, with a qualification
3 Mathematics and the Standard of Proof — Degrees of Proof
Mathematical techniques
An emerging field
Marginal significance
Useful applications and dangers
4 Standard of Proof Relating to Sufficiency of Evidence: Discharge of Evidential Burden
Sufficiency issues
Different stages
Test on appeal
Test at close of evidence
No-case submission
Criminal standard in criminal cases
Assumption that evidence favouring proponent is to be accepted
5 The Process of Fact Finding
Fact finding
Unexplored issues
Evaluation of factual findings
6 Statutory Reform
Evidence Acts and Criminal Code
Degrees of proof
Reflection of common law
Chapter Six — The Functions of Judge and Jury
1 The General Rule—The Functions of Judge and Jury
A Introduction
Significance of distinct roles
General
Law/fact distinction
B Some special cases
Construction
Contracts and statutes
Defamation
A compromise
C Exceptions
Foreign law
Foreign law as a question of fact
Reasonableness
Where reasonableness is for the judge
Facts affecting the admissibility of evidence
Conditions precedent to admissibility
Absence of the jury
Identity of preliminary fact with fact in issue
Confessions
Confessions: the problem of the voir dire
Confessions: permissibility of question on voir dire as to the truth of the confession
Cross-examination at trial about admission on voir dire
Confessions: procedure on voir dire
Confessions: role of prosecution counsel in seeking voir dire
The burden and standard of proof at a trial within a trial
2 Judicial Control of the Jury
A Withdrawal of an issue from the jury
Need for sufficiency of evidence
Structure of section
Consequences of insufficiency
Civil cases
Criminal cases: “no case” submission
Criminal cases: “unsafe” submission
Criminal cases: “Prasad invitation”
Magistrates
B Discretion to exclude evidence
Overriding rules of admissibility
Development of common law discretion
Nature of the discretion
Discretion to exclude relevant evidence in criminal proceedings
Discretion to exclude relevant evidence in civil proceedings
C The summing up
Judicial control of jury
Directions and comments
D Appeals
Varieties of process
Criminal cases tried with a jury
Civil cases tried with a jury
Civil cases tried by a judge alone
Effect of wrongful rejection or admission of evidence
Effect of denial of natural justice
Chapter Seven — The Competence and Compellability of Witnesses
1 Introduction
A Structure
Key distinctions
Competence, compellability and privilege distinguished
B History
Non-Christians, convicts, interested persons, parties, spouses of parties
Non-Christians
Convicts
Interested persons
Parties in civil cases
The accused
Spouses of the parties: the common law disability
Spouses of parties: exceptions to common law disability
Statutes affecting spouses
2 Competence and Compellability under the Modern Law
A Preliminary
Structure of this section
Introduction
B Children
Sworn evidence
Necessary understanding
Procedure on inquiry as to understanding
Unsworn evidence
Tests for capacity to give unsworn evidence
C Disabled persons
Competence to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or unsworn
Tests for competence
Vulnerable witnesses
Evidence in protected environment
D The accused
As a witness for the prosecution
Substantial preservation of common law rule of non-competence
Non-competence of co-accused
Rendering a participant competent and compellable
As a witness for the defence
Accused competent for the defence
Evidence in chief
Evidence elicited in cross-examination
As a witness for a co-accused
Accused competent for, but not compellable against, co-accused
E The accused’s spouse
Rule of incompetence
Modification of common law of non-competence
The accused’s spouse as a witness for the prosecution
Preservation of common law exceptions
Compellability of competent spouse
Dangers in joinder of counts
Statutory competence in England does not imply compellability
Australian statutory equivalents to English Act of 1898
Queensland
New South Wales
Victoria
Tasmania
South Australia
Western Australia
Northern Territory
Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory
The accused’s spouse as a witness for the accused or a co-accused
Queensland
New South Wales
Victoria
Tasmania
South Australia
Western Australia
Northern Territory
Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory
Spouses and civil proceedings
Former spouse testifying to matters occurring during the marriage
Statutory change in relation to divorced spouses
Criminal cases
Civil cases
F Sovereigns, diplomats, members of parliament
Competence and non-compellability
Statutory regimes
G Bankers
Competence and non-compellability
Statutory regimes
H Experts
Competence, compellability and discretion
Rule of practice
I Absent witnesses
Video-link evidence
Statutory regimes and questions of principle
3 Oath, Affirmation and Unsworn Evidence
A Oath and affirmation
Facilities and procedures
Statutory regimes
B Unsworn evidence
The accused’s unsworn statement at a criminal trial
General abolition
Unsworn evidence of children
Comparison with sworn evidence
Informal evidence of adults and children
Comparison with sworn evidence
Miscellaneous
Counsel and others
Chapter Eight — Corroboration
1 When Corroboration is Required
A Introduction
Background
Preliminary
Contrast with canon and civil law
B Statutory provisions
Range of enactments
Preliminary
Statutes requiring two or more witnesses
Perjury
Procuration
Unsworn evidence of children: reliability?
Unsworn evidence of children: corroboration
Unsworn evidence of children: ban on mutual corroboration?
Affiliation: general
Affiliation: alleged father’s letters
Breach of promise of marriage
Bigamy
Miscellaneous statutory provisions
C Rules of practice
Duties to warn
General
Accomplices
Peremptory warning
Evidence of co-accused
Who is an accomplice?
Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions
Non-accomplices
Functions of judge and jury
Corroboration of an accomplice’s evidence
Mutual corroboration of accomplices
Statutory relaxation of peremptory rule
Adultery
Caution to be exercised
Sexual offences
Common law duty to give direction
Implication in material particular
Abolition of duty to warn
Sworn evidence of children
Common law requirement and its statutory abrogation
Mutual corroboration
Claims against the estates of deceased persons
Corroboration desirable but not essential
Matrimonial causes
No corroboration requirement
Disputed confessions and other possible cases
Confessions, witnesses with purposes of their own, identification, potentially unreliable evidence
2 The Nature of Corroboration
A Introduction
Definitional issues
Definition
Significance of issues
Circumstantial evidence as corroboration
“Intrinsically credible” evidence
B Conduct or condition of the person whose testimony requires corroboration
Self-corroboration compared with physical condition
Common law rule against self-corroboration
Statutory rule against self-corroboration
Physical condition and distress
C Conduct of the party against whom corroboration is required
Range of conduct
Admissions
Evidence of defendant or accused
Falsity of evidence
Failure to give evidence
False statements out of court
Silence when charged
Conduct on previous occasions
Previous conduct to show specific propensity
Previous conduct to corroborate accused’s statement to witness
D Functions of judge and jury
Range of problems
Is evidence capable of corroborating, and does it do so?
Where there is no corroboration
Summing up
3 Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011
General
Contrast between s 164 and s 165
Sections 164 and 165
Chapter Nine —The Course of Evidence
1 Miscellaneous Procedural Matters
A Introduction
Structure of the chapter
The role of counsel
B Evidence before trial
Civil cases
Summary
Affidavits
Commissions
Letters of request
Interrogatories
Perpetuation of testimony
Criminal cases
Summary
The preliminary examination
Coronial and other depositions
Victorian pre-trial criminal procedures
C Ordering witnesses out of court
Right to stay in court until contrary order
Orders and consequences of breach
D The right to begin
Opening addresses
The function of an opening
Order of speeches
E The calling of witnesses and the role of the judge
Essential feature of adversary system
Outline
Order of calling witnesses
Power of judge to call witnesses in civil cases
Power of judge to call witnesses in criminal cases
Exceptional nature of power
Time of calling witness
Evidence in chief and cross-examination
Power to elucidate evidence
Jury questions
Crown prosecutor’s responsibility for calling witnesses
Content of prosecutor’s duty
Court control of prosecutor
Additional principles
Powers of and restraints on the judge
2 Examination in Chief
A Introduction
Character testimony
General
Question-and-answer system
B Leading questions
The ban and its exceptions
Definition and illustration
Primary exceptions to the prohibition
Further exceptions to the prohibition
Leading questions in cross-examination
C Refreshing memory
The principle of orality
Orality and refreshing memory
Hypnotically induced evidence
Conditions on which memory may be refreshed by reference to a document
Summary
Contemporaneity: general
Contemporaneity: depositions
Qualifications to contemporaneity rule
Documents read over or accepted as accurate by witness
Production of the document
The original
Distinction between those cases in which memory is refreshed and those in which it is not refreshed
Present recollection revived/past recollection recorded
Present recollection revived
Past recollection recorded
Hearsay rule
Consequences of document being in evidence
Calling for and inspecting document
Statutory changes
D Previous consistent statements
The rule against previous consistent statements
Statement and justification for the rule
Difficulties with the rule
Complaints in sexual cases
Development of the law
Admissible in criminal prosecutions for sexual offences; voluntariness
Speed
Proof of particulars of complaint
Complaint must relate to sexual character of offence
Complaint not provable by complainant alone
Statutory changes
The effect of delay in complaint on fairness of trial
Previous consistent statements admitted as part of the res gestae
Meaning of “res gestae”
Previous consistent statements admitted to rebut afterthought
Rebutting suggestion of afterthought
Examples
Statutory position
Statements admissible under statute
Australian equivalents to Evidence Act 1938 (Eng)
Limited effect of statutes
Other possible exceptions
Three further examples
Statements on being taxed with incriminating facts
Statements made on recovery of incriminating articles
Previous identification of the accused
Statements validated by scientific means
Lie detectors and truth drugs
Conclusions
Consideration of rule against prior consistent statements
E Unfavourable and hostile witnesses
Common law
Introduction
The prohibition on impeaching a party’s own witness
Unfavourable witnesses
Hostile witnesses
Statutory provisions
Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (Eng) s 3
Unfavourable witnesses
Evidential value of previous inconsistent statements
Jury direction
Common law approach: merits
Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT)
Evidence Act 1938 (Eng)
Effect on hostile witnesses
Effect on unfavourable witnesses
Leading questions to witness not formally declared hostile
3 Cross-examination and Re-examination
A Introduction
Purposes, limitations and examples
Purposes, limitations and examples
B The rule in Browne v Dunn
Definition and operation
Definition
Operation
Exceptions and consequences of non-compliance
Exceptions: notice in other ways
Exceptions: a lack of necessity and delicacy
Exceptions: challenges to general credit
Consequences of non-compliance
C General issues in connection with cross-examination
Rights to conduct and exposure to cross-examination
Leading questions and advocacy
Who may be cross-examined
Who may cross-examine
Loss of right to cross-examine
Nature and consequences of questions
Imputations must have a basis, but not necessarily an evidentiary basis
Cross-examination can widen admissibility
Control of lengthy cross-examination
Width of questions and finality of answers
Form of questions
Cross-examination as to credit
Cross-examination of co-accused
Cross-examination after judicial questioning
Divergence between instructions and evidence
D Previous inconsistent statements
General
Introduction
Proof of previous statements
Previous statements in writing: The Queen’s Case
Previous statements in writing: the current legislation
Particular problems
Documents which are not those of the witness
Depositions
Tape recordings
Previous inconsistent statements as evidence of facts stated
E Cross-examination on documents generally
Calling for documents
Calling party to tender document if required to
Rule in Walker v Walker and its abolition
F Finality of answers to collateral questions
The general rule
The rule: statement and illustrations
The rule: justifications
The rule: evaluation
Exceptions to the general rule
Convictions, bias, inconsistent statements and tendency to untruth
G The distinction between cross-examination as to the issue and cross-examination as to credit
General
Effect of distinction
H Re-examination
Object and limits
Object
Limits
Admission of further evidence
Illustrations
4 Evidence in Rebuttal
A Introduction
The rule
General
B Criminal cases
Introduction
The rule
Effect of High Court cases
Particular elements
Discretion
Exceptional circumstances
Special cases
Reasonable foreseeability
Credit issues
Formal, technical or non-contentious matter
Unavailable evidence
Relevance in chief
Evidence after summing up
Evidence before commencement of defence case
Jury request
Accused’s good character
Reasons for rule
Rule of fairness
Questions in cross-examination permissible
Immediate tender of documents
Particular points
C Civil cases
Introduction
The rule
Exceptions
A special problem
Differential allocation of burden of proof
Chapter Ten — Character and Credibility
1 Credibility of Party’s Own Witness
A “Disposition” distributed
Key distinctions
Character of witness, similar fact evidence, cross-examination of accused
B Supporting own witness
Good character evidence party’s own witness
The bolster rule
C Impeaching own witness
Rule against impeachment
Hostile witnesses
2 Credibility of Opponent’s Witness
A Discrediting techniques — Summary
Avoiding irrelevance and vexation
General considerations
B Convictions
Development of the modern law
History
Relevance and spent convictions
C Discreditable acts
Questions going only to credit
Limits on cross-examination and finality of answers
D Bias, interest and corruption
The categories defined
Distinctions and illustrations
Special rules
E Lack of veracity
General character as a ground for disbelief
History and survival of anomalous rule
F Medical or physical disability
Lack of reliability on medical grounds
Testimony and confessions
G Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 103, 106 and 108C
Exceptions to statutory “credibility” rule
Limits of the exceptions
3 Character of Party
A Miscellaneous exceptions
The exceptions outlined
Summary
B Prosecution witnesses
Persons other than complainants in sex cases
General
Complainants in sex cases
The nature of the problem
The common law rules
Statutory change: outline
Prohibition on evidence of complainant’s sexual activity or experience: introduction
Prohibition on evidence of complainant’s sexual activity or experience: local variations
Miscellaneous instances where character of prosecutor/victim is relevant
Common law and statutory position
C Accused
Accused’s adduction of good character
General
Evidence of good character
The issues distributed
Common law
Statute
The purpose and effect of good character evidence
Purpose
Effect
Application of character evidence
The judge’s direction
Common law and statutory possibilities
Rebuttal
Common law: putting character in issue
Common law: modes of rebuttal
Statute
Co-accused
Common law
Statute
D Parties to civil proceedings
Relevance of character
Varieties of relevance
4 Rehabilitation of a Witness
A Modes of supporting credibility
Common law and statute
Common law
Statute
Chapter Eleven — Similar Fact Evidence
1 Exclusion at Common Law in Criminal Proceedings
A Introduction
The nature of the problem
An exclusionary rule
Structure
B Statement and history of the rule
Statement of the rule
Definitional issues
History of the rule
Makin’s case and its significance
C Scope of the rule
An exclusionary rule
Rule excluding relevant evidence, subject to exceptions
Relevance
Probative force and prejudicial effect
Relevance via disposition
Impermissible chain of reasoning
The common law rule in Pfennig’s case
Crimes inherent in the background
Irrelevance of disposition to guilt
Res gestae and relationship evidence
Corroboration
Rebutting suggestion of coincidence
Misconduct of the accused
No limitation to criminality
The role of similarity
Conclusion
The test summarised
The role of the exclusionary discretion
D The degree of probative force
Probative force
Strong probative force
Balancing probative force and prejudicial effect
Factors relevant to probative force
Cogency of evidence showing bad disposition
Strength of the inference from evidence of bad disposition that criminal conduct took place
Strength of the inference from evidence of bad disposition that accused was criminal
Relevance of similar fact evidence to fact in issue
The role of similarity
Effect of narrow defence on admissibility
Cumulative testimony
Prejudicial effect
Examples of non-prejudicial evidence
Institutional perils in prejudicial evidence
Trial level
Secondary prejudice
E Application of the rule
A variety of contexts
Occasions for application of rule
Preliminary considerations
To prove commission of crime
Proof of actus reus
Need for increased strength in evidence
To prove commission by the accused
Lack of direct testimony
Direct testimony
“Hallmark” principle
To prove voluntary act of the accused
Inference of voluntariness put in issue
To prove intention of the accused
Purpose
Automatism
Accused’s state of knowledge
Similar fact evidence by the accused
Misconduct of person not accused
Tender by accused against co-accused
F Role of discretion
Does the discretion have any role?
Origins of discretion
Trifling probative value/disproportion between probative force and prejudicial effect
Limited role of discretion
Meaning of discretion
Discretion or rule
G Jury direction
Invariable requirement
Varieties of direction
2 Statutory Provisions — Similar Fact Evidence
A The Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011
The “uniform” model
The terms of the provisions
B Other State statutes
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and others
The Queensland, Western Australian and South Australian provisions
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas)
Proof of knowledge
3 Civil Cases — Similar Fact Evidence
A Principle
Similar fact rule or rule of relevance
History
Survival of similar fact rule
Oppression and unfairness
Formulations of test
B Practical questions and statute
Practical problems
Irrelevance of surprise
Statutes
Statutes
Chapter Twelve — Evidence by Accused Persons
1 The Silent Accused
A Introduction
The accused’s position
Two options
History
From Tudor times to 1836
The 1898 compromise
B Problems raised by the silent accused
Possible courses
The background
Four courses
Comment
No prosecution comment
The content of judicial comment
The importance of the particular circumstances
No comment
Prohibition on direct and indirect references
Duties of counsel
2 The Unsworn Statement of the Accused
Abolition of the right
3 The Accused as a Witness
A Introduction
A compromise
The statutory shield
Similarities with and differences from other witnesses
The peculiar position of the accused
B The statutory provisions
The terms of the section
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)-(4)
The structure of the section
The section analysed
Plan of exposition
C The prohibition
Section 15(2)
The provision
The “uniform” provision
Evidence in chief permissible
Identifying the prohibited subjects
High Court approach to “bad character”
The “literal” and “broad” views
The meaning of “tending to show”: Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions
“Charged in court”
The need for relevance
D First exception: The matter is relevant
Section 15(2)
The text expounded
South Australia
Federal Courts, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory
Some problems in s 15(2)(a)
Character relevant to credit only
Offences and convictions/bad character
The purpose of the cross-examination allowed under the first exception
E Second exception: The accused’s good character
Section 15(2)
The text
The “uniform” position
Examples of what is not “good character”
Examples of what is “good character”
The meaning of “character”
Reputation or disposition
The divisibility of the character of the accused
Putting half a character in issue
The purpose of cross-examination under the second exception
Credit or issue
F Third exception: Imputations on the character of crown witnesses
Section 15(2)
The provision
The “uniform” provision
South Australia
Imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses of the prosecutor
A constructional problem
Examples
“Unnecessary” or “unjustifiable” imputations?
Curwood v R
Selvey v Director of Public Prosecutions
Phillips v R
The discretion of the court
Specific discretion
No bias in favour of accused
Discretion to admit or exclude
Judicial warning
Practice of Crown counsel
Purpose of cross-examination under the third exception
Tit for tat
G Fourth exception: witness against a co-accused
Section 15(2)
A difficulty and its palliative
The provision
The rationale for s 15(2)(d)
“Evidence against”
Six propositions
Who is a co-accused?
“Same offence”
Co-accused’s rights of cross-examination
Purpose of cross-examination under the fourth exception
Co-accused and prosecution in same position
H Fifth exception: Relevant to the defence of a co-accused
Difficulties in cross-examining to show innocence
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(b)
I The role of the judge
Statutory provisions
Statutory provisions
Role of counsel
J Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 ss 110–112 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 110-112
“Uniform” provisions
Special features
Chapter Thirteen — Privilege
1 General — Privilege
A Introduction
A non-discretionary exemption
No discretion
Exemption from answering, not from attending
B Waiver
Waiver defined
Waiver illustrated
Width of waiver
Extent of waiver
Inadvertent disclosure
C Proof by other evidence
Other witnesses
Means of obtaining evidence
Impropriety, equity and inadvertence
Discretion
D Personal nature of privilege
Appeal rights
Limited to parties
E No adverse inference available
Adverse inferences and failures of proof
No adverse inference
F Effect of upholding the claim
The need for justification
Damaging effect of successful claim
G Protection of confidential nature of disclosed material
A middle way
Two accommodations
The Harman principle
Abuse of process
2 Privilege against Self-incrimination
A Statement and history of the rule
Statement of the rule
The rule
History of the rule
A variety of origins
B The operation of the rule
Persons who may claim privilege
Natural persons
Corporations
Non-judicial inquiries
Extension of the privilege
“To answer any question or to produce any document”
Privilege against oral and documentary disclosures
No privilege for real evidence
“If the answer or the document would have the tendency to expose…”
Test for claim
Warnings and judicial role
Protection against damning disclosures
“To the imposition of a civil penalty or to conviction for a crime”
Penalties
Direct and indirect crimination
Penalties, discovery and witness statements
Forfeiture
Adultery
C Rationale of the rule
Rationale
Justifications
D Miscellaneous points
Other matters
Plan of exposition
Incrimination of spouse
No privilege against spousal incrimination
Incrimination under foreign law
Foreign law
Conduct in same proceedings as those in which privilege is claimed
Perjury and contempt
E Statutory provisions
Abolition of privilege in curial proceedings
Abrogation for curial proceedings: general
Immunity certificates
Executive powers not subject to privilege
Clear legislative intention required
Other problems
3 Marital Privilege
A Privileges abolished
Adultery and bastardy
Privilege for matrimonial communications
Communications during marriage
Western Australia, Family Law Act and Queensland
B No common law privilege
Common law; statutory limitations
Common law, statutory limitations
4 Legal Professional Privilege
A Statement and history of the rule
Statement of the rule
The rule
History and rationale of the rule
The history
The rationale
B Operation of the rule
Communications
Protection of communications
Lawyer-client communications
Third party communications
Purpose
Dominant purpose
Legal adviser
External and in-house lawyers
Non-judicial investigations
Modern extension of the privilege
Confidential communications
The rule
Presence of third party
Shared privileges
Common interest and joint interest privilege
Establishing the privilege
Onus
Copy documents
Copies and translations
C Exceptions to the rule
Enactments
Need for clear words or necessary implication
Other exceptions
Preliminary
Communications to facilitate crime or fraud
Facts discovered in the course of the relationship and other exemptions
D Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011
Client legal privilege
The “uniform” legislation
E Extending the privilege
Other relationships
Other relationships
5 Other Confidential Relationships — Privilege
A Priests and doctors
Priest and penitent
Statute
Common law
Reluctance to compel answers
Physician and patient
Common law
Statute
Waiver
B Other relationships
Professionals, journalists and sexual assault communications
New statutory privileges
6 Title Deeds — Privilege
A Title deeds
Documents of title
Common law and statute
7 Statements Made without Prejudice — Privilege
A Common law
The rule and its illustrations
The rule
Illustrations
Special categories of the privilege
“Without prejudice save as to costs”
Mediators in family litigation: common law
Mediators in family law: statute
Limits of the privilege
General
Contracts and vitiating factors
Objective facts having legal consequences
B Statute
South Australia
Statutory privilege and its exceptions
Cth, NSW, Tas, Vic and ACT Evidence Acts and NT Evidence (NUL) Act
“Uniform” legislation
Judicial warning
8 Rules of Court
Rules of court — General
Procedural issues
General
New South Wales Civil Procedure Rules r 1.9
New South Wales Civil Procedure Rules Pt 21
Chapter Fourteen — Public Interest
1 Matters of Public Interest
A Introduction
Definitional issues
Preliminary distinctions
Nomenclature, waiver, secondary evidence
Class claims and contents claims distinguished
The problems of public interest claims
Damaging effects of successful claim
Intermediate courses
Persons objecting
B Statement and scope of the rule
Statement
The rule
Contexts in which the rule is applied
Scope
Real and oral evidence
Documents not in possession of executive
Communications between informants and the state
State interest
C National security
Particular documents and classes of document
Military secrets
Classes of vital documents
Miscellaneous issues
Irrelevance of foreign governmental interests
Defamation
D Other interests of state
Public service
Impact on public service
Other topics
Trading interests
Inspection
E Parliamentary privilege
Evidence of parliamentary proceedings
Common law and statutory protections
F Police matters
Internal documents
Conway v Rimmer
Material received from the public
Informers and non-informers
“Drying up” argument
G Local government matters
Local authorities
Distinctions among local authority roles
H Confidential matters
The relevance of confidentiality: principles
Principles
The relevance of confidentiality: authorities
Some cases
I Criminal proceedings
Informers and other issues
Interests of accused; informers
Prosecution witness statements
Defence access to prosecution witness statements
J Statutory prohibitions
Secrecy, statute and public policy
Protection for public servants
K Determining the validity of a claim to exclude evidence under the rule
Disposition of analysis
Three questions
The manner of making claim to immunity
Procedures for claiming immunity
The determination of the claim
The court’s duty
Court inspection of documents
Principles which govern the determination
A balancing but not a discretionary judgment
For production
Against production
L Some uncertain points
Procedural questions
Miscellaneous problems
M Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 130
Statutory regimes
“Uniform” legislation
2 Miscellaneous Matters Connected with Previous Litigation
A Plan of analysis
Judges, arbitrators, jurors, advocates
Special rules
B The evidence of judges of the superior courts
Non-compellability of judges
Non-compellability, privilege or public policy?
C The evidence of arbitrators
Arbitrators
Compellability and privilege
D The evidence of jurors
Ban on evidence of jury discussions
Jury discussions and other events
E The evidence of advocates
Advocates
Advocates
F Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011, Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 16 and s 129
Judges and jurors
“Uniform” legislation
3 Illegally Obtained Evidence
A A dilemna
The Problem
What is the law?
Solutions
The English and Scottish solutions
The Australian solution
Reasons for the Australian solution
Australian unfairness discretion for confessions
Relevant factors in Australian law
Admissions obtained in unlawful custody
Admissions obtained from persons under disability
Civil cases
B Facts discovered in consequence of inadmissible confessions
Subsequently confirmed confessions
The relevant questions
R v Warickshall
Other authorities
Confessions as real evidence
C Evidence procured in consequence of illegal searches and other unlawful acts
Illegally obtained evidence
Illegal searches
Illegalities other than illegal searches
D Evidence that is not obtained illegally
Improperly obtained evidence
Underhand or sharp practices
E Evidence of agents provocateurs
Entrapment and the like
Undercover agents
F Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011, Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 138
Weighing process
“Uniform” legislation
Chapter Fifteen — Opinion
1 Nature of the Exclusionary Rule
A History, statement and limits of the rule
Introduction
History of the rule
Statement of the Rule
Meaning of opinion
Double character of opinion evidence
Non-opinion expert evidence
Non-expert opinion evidence
2 Expert Opinion in Evidence
A Antiquity, criticisms and value of expert opinion evidence
Nature of expert opinion evidence
General aspects
B Aspect of specialised knowledge
Fields in which expert opinion evidence can be called
Exclusion of ordinary experience and unreliable material
General acceptance not necessary
C Expertise of witness
Special study or experience
Skill
D Identification of assumed facts on which expert opinion is based
Assumptions of primary fact
Assumption identification rule
E Proof of assumed facts on which expert opinion is based
Proof of assumptions of primary fact
Basis rule
F Intellectual basis of opinion
Demonstration how opinion was propounded
Expert’s reasoning
G Other matters
Legal practitioner role, expert bias and reliability
Function of legal practitioner and expert
3 Non-expert Opinion in Evidence
A The rule and its justification
The rule
The rule and its justification
B Examples
Illustrations, identification, value
Instances of the rule
Identification
Value
4 Ultimate Issues — Opinion
A Expert witnesses
The rule propounded
The rule and its justification
Illustrations of rule
Effects of publication
Intellectual property
Insurance
Reformulation of rule
Controversies over rule
B Non-expert witnesses
Non-expert opinion on ultimate issue
The rule and its justification
5 Reasons for the Exclusion of Certain Kinds of Evidence of Opinion
Explanations for opinion rule
Rationale
Justifications for opinion rule
6 The Rule Against Hearsay and Evidence of Opinion
A The basis rule — General
General
Non-compliance with the basis rule
B The basis rule — Hearsay
Non-compliance with hearsay rule
Impermissible hearsay elements
Permissible hearsay elements
Public opinion polls and market surveys
Relaxation of hearsay rule
7 Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 77–80
A General
Structure of legislation
Meaning of “opinion”
B Section 77
Non-opinion purpose
Role of s 136
C Section 78
Non-expert opinion
Opinion necessary to understand witness’s perception
D Section 79
Specialised knowledge
Structure of s 79
Is there a field of specialised knowledge?
Does the witness have specialised knowledge?
Is the opinion wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge?
Assumption rule, basis rule and intellectual foundation of opinion
E Section 80
Exceptions to opinion rule
Fact in issue, ultimate issue, common knowledge
F Other matters
Section 135
Discretionary exclusion
Aids to the admissibility of expert reports
Form of expert reports
Procedural requirements
Rules of court and practice notes
Certificates
Chapter Sixteen —The Rule against Hearsay
1 Statement, Illustration, Development and Rationale of the Rule against Hearsay
A Introduction
Preliminary
Plan of the chapter
Plan of the section
B Statement of the rule
The rule defined
Definition of rule against hearsay
C History of the rule
Hearsay history
The origins of the hearsay rule
D Rationale of the rule
Justifications for the rule
Analysis
E Formulation of the rule
Competing formulations
The formulation propounded
Other formulations
F Hearsay and implied assertions
The implied assertion problem
Implied assertions illustrated
First view: all implied assertions are hearsay
Second view: all implied assertions are hearsay and new exceptions should be created
Third view: conduct not intended to be assertive is not hearsay
Fourth view: no implied assertion is hearsay
Fifth view: statements not intended to be assertive are not hearsay unless the statement is about the declarant’s conduct
Sixth view: statements or conduct containing an assertion admissible if tendered as a relevant fact or fact relevant to an issue
McLelland J’s test and the “uniform” legislation
G Hearsay and machine information
Calculating devices
Analysis
H Statements as original evidence
Original evidence
Definition of original evidence
Statements as facts in issue
Miscellaneous
Operative words
Statements as facts relevant to the issue
Miscellaneous
Statements accompanying a relevant act or event
Statements indicative of treatment
Statements affecting the weight or credibility of evidence
Previous consistent and inconsistent statements
2 Application of the Rule against Hearsay
A Introduction
Modes of assertion
Plan of analysis
B Written assertions
Express assertions
The hearsay ban on express assertions
Implications from writing
Circumstantial inferences
R v Rice
Wright v Doe d Tatham
Old books, labels, stamps
Negative inferences
“Negative hearsay”
C Oral assertions
Introduction
Outline of problem
Express assertions
Examples
Implications from statements
Examples
D Conduct
Conduct as hearsay
Examples and analysis
E Proof by combined testimony of two witnesses
Introduction
Outline of problem
Primary evidence is lacking
Car identification
Human identification
Multiple identification evidence
Extent of reception
“Photofit” identification
The primary witness cannot give intelligible evidence
Interpreters
3 Jury Direction —The Rule against Hearsay
Requirement for jury direction
Need for and content of direction
Privy Council position
Chapter Seventeen — The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law
1 Statements of Deceased Persons
A Introduction
Preliminary
Structure of chapter
Structure of section
B Declarations against interest
Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
Illustrations: (a) statements against pecuniary interest
Illustrations: (b) statements against proprietary interest
Illustrations: (c) no derogation from superior title
Rationale
Conditions of admissibility
Death of declarant
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: general
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (a) the nature of the interest
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (b) statement must be presently against interest
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (c) Prima facie against interest
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (d) to declarant’s knowledge
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (e) personal knowledge of facts stated
Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (f) collateral matters
Conclusions
Possible reform of the law
Effect of statute
C Declarations in the course of duty
Statements, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
Illustrations
Rationale
Conditions of admissibility
The conditions stated
Fact not opinion
Duty to act and record or report
(a) Specific duty to another
(b) Duty must relate to acts of declarant
(c) Acts recorded must have been performed
Contemporaneity
Absence of motive to misrepresent
Contrast with declarations against interest
Conclusions
Possible reform of the law
D Declarations as to public or general rights
Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
Illustrations: (a) public rights
Illustrations: (b) general rights
Rationale
Conditions of admissibility
Summary
Death of declarant
Public or general rights
Declarations must concern reputed existence of right
Declarations must have been made before dispute
Competency of declarant’s knowledge
Conclusions
Preservation in “uniform” legislation
E Pedigree declarations
Statements, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
Discussion and illustrations
Rationale
Conditions of admissibility
Summary
Death of declarant
Question of pedigree
Blood relationship
Questions of legitimacy and illegitimate relationship generally
Legitimation
Declaration ante litem motam
Conclusions
Statute
F Dying declarations
Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
Illustrations
Rationale
Conditions of admissibility
Summary
Death of declarant
Trial for murder or manslaughter
Statement must relate to cause of declarant’s death
Declarant’s settled hopeless expectation of death
Competence of declarant
Hearsay upon hearsay
Conclusions
Impact of statute
G Post-testamentary declarations of testators concerning the contents of their wills
Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
Rationale
Conditions of admissibility
Death of declarant
No proof of execution
Conclusions
Impact of statute
H Extra-testamentary statements of testators and testator’s family maintenance
Reasons for disinheritance
General law and statute
2 Statements in Public Documents
A Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Statement
The rule
Illustrations
Registers
Returns and maps
Certificates
Rationale
Necessity
Reliability
B Conditions of admissibility
Plan of analysis
Variety of conditions
The definition of a public document
Sturla v Freccia
Public duty to inquire and record
Public matter
Retention
Public inspection
Personal knowledge
The different categories of public documents
Registers, returns and certificates
Conclusions
Statute
3 Admissions of the Parties — The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law
A Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception
Background
The place of informal admissions in the law
Statement
The rule
Illustrations
Admissions by words
Admissions by conduct
Rationale
Likely reliability
Conditions of admissibility
Outline of plan
B Capacity of party
Personal and representative capacities
Consequences of the distinction
C Reception of the entire statement
Connected material
The rule
D Personal knowledge
Condition of admissibility?
Knowledge and expertise
E Statements of mixed law and fact
Mixed law and fact
A controversy
F Implied admissions
Response to allegations
Statements in the presence of a party
Two pre-1914 tendencies
Role of judge and jury
Silence
Direction to the jury
Co-accused’s statement
Nature of the reply
The danger of the mechanical approach
Documents in the possession or control of a party
The principles
G Vicarious admissions
Introduction
General principles
Cases in which there is no privity
Co-parties
Party and witness in former proceedings
Cases in which there is privity
Predecessors in title
Referees
Agents
Agents’ admissions in general
Employer and employee; partners
Legal representatives
Miscellaneous cases
Non-agents
Admissions by a deceased
Conspirators: general
Conspirators: particular rules
Extension beyond conspiracy
Nominal defendants
Husband and wife
Infants
4 Confessions in Criminal Proceedings
A Statement of the exception
Express admissions
Two strict rules and three “discretions”
Implied admissions
B General requirements for admissibility
Pressure and inducements
Overview
Special rules
Illustrations of the common law rule
C History and rationale of the common law rule
Background
The pre-1975 law
The modern basis of exclusion
D Voluntariness
General
Range of issues
Person in authority
The inducement
Duration of the inducement
Queensland: presumed inducement
Not obtained by oppression
Doctrine and illustrations
State of mind of accused
Basal involuntariness
Other factors affecting voluntariness
Coercion, misrepresentation, misunderstandings
Challenging truth of confession
Burden and standard of proof
E Discretionary rejection
General
“Discretionary” inclusions
The nature of unfairness
Judges’ Rules
The history of the Judges’ Rules
Untruth of confession
Likelihood of untruth
Eavesdropping
Relevance of trickery
Confession implicating co-accused or implicating accused in other offences
Use of confessions involving other accused in other offences
Misleading statements
Misrepresentations
Ill health of accused
Weakened physical or mental health
Asking a suspect about another’s motives
Motive to lie
Traps
Undisclosed subject of questioning
Oppressive questioning
Unduly persistent questioning
Unsigned records of interview
Unsigned records of interview
Right to a lawyer
Refusal of access to lawyer
Interrogation of Aboriginal people
Aboriginal suspects
Interrogation of children
Children
General
Miscellaneous
Discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained confessions
Instances of exclusion
Summary
F Silence as a confession
The problem of silence
Difficulty distinctions
G Statutory modifications
The jurisdictions classified and summarised
Statutory standards
Consequences for admissibility of not complying with the statutory standard
“Uniform” legislation
5 Miscellaneous —The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law
Further exceptions
Summary
Testimony on former occasions
Modes of tendering earlier evidence
Previous statements of witnesses
Prior inconsistent statements
Evidence through interpreters
Problems arising from interpretation
Evidence of age
Avenues to admissibility
Ancient documents
Reception of ancient documents
Reputation
Establishment and relevance of reputation
Expert witnesses
Experts and hearsay
Signs on buildings
Proof of ownership
Postmarks
Role of postmarks
Identity of telephone callers
A developing hearsay exception
Proceedings in which the rule against hearsay does not apply
Non-application of rule
Conclusion
Historical works
Chapter Eighteen — The Rule against Hearsay: Statutory Exceptions
1 Statutes Equivalent to the Evidence Act 1938 (Eng)
A Introduction
Plan of chapter
Summary
B South Australia
General
The terms of the legislation
Exceptions to evidentiary rules other than hearsay rule
Exceptions to hearsay rule
Definitions
Analysis of provisions
“Business” and “undertaking”
“Document”
Duty
Personal knowledge
Statement of fact
Statement of opinion
Unavailability of maker or supplier
Dispensing with calling maker
The “maker of the statement”
“Continuous record”
“Person interested”
Bias and material interest
Complete absence of bias
Substantial material interest
When proceedings are “pending or anticipated”
Actual anticipation or reasonable person test?
The authentication of the statement
Production of original document
Inference from form or contents
Discretion to exclude
Withholding from jury room
Weight
Corroboration
Credibility of maker
Inconsistent statements: no leave needed
Time of tender
Pedigree
Conclusions
2 Business and Computer Records —The Rule against Hearsay: Statutory Exceptions
A Western Australia
Introduction
Plan of the section
Function and terms of legislation
NSW origins of WA statute
The function of the legislation
The terms of the legislation
Definition of key expressions
Examples
Negative hearsay
Some definitions
“Business”
“Derived”
“Document”
“Qualified person”
“Statement”
Safeguards
Statements made in relation to criminal proceedings
Estimating weight
Credibility
Discretionary exclusion
Corroboration
Ancillary provisions
Inferences from form or contents
Reception notwithstanding other rules
Argument against admissibility
Survival of other rules of law
B Queensland
Bankers’ books and business records
The provisions
Width of provisions
Computer evidence
The principal provisions
Application of ss 96(1), 97–100 and 102
C South Australia
Business records
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45A
Computer evidence
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) Pt VIA
3 Miscellaneous Statutory Exceptions to the Rule against Hearsay
Further statutory exceptions
Taking evidence before trial
Pre-trial procedural provisions
Copy public documents
Statutory removal of common law limitations
Convictions
Proof of conviction by certificate
Other documentary evidence: South Australia
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45B
Out of court statements by unavailable witnesses: South Australia
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34KA
Previous consistent and inconsistent statements: Queensland
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 101
Statement by child
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 94–100 and 102
Transportation and shipment documents: South Australia
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45
Evidence of depositions or earlier statements
Pre-trial statements
4 Documentary Evidence: Criminal Proceedings
Queensland
Introduction
General
Record relating to any trade or business
Trade or business and related issues
General exceptions
Non-application of hearsay rule
5 Ch 3 Pts 3.2 and 3.4 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) and Ch 3 Pts 2 and 4 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas)
A The Scope of Hearsay
The definition of hearsay as an exclusionary rule
Definition of hearsay
Effect of s 60
Competence
B Exceptions other than admissions
Part 3.2: Division 2 — “First-hand” hearsay exceptions
Personal knowledge
Outline
First group of exceptions: civil cases, unavailable representor
Evidence of unavailable representor in civil cases
Second group of exceptions: civil cases, available representor
Outline
Section 64(2)
Section 64(3)
Third group of exceptions: criminal cases, unavailable representor
Application of s 65
Section 65(2) in outline
Origins of s 65(2)(a)
Structure of s 65(2)(b)
Structure of s 65(2)(c)
Structure of s 65(2)(d)
Exceptions in s 65(3)-(6)
Exceptions in s 65(8)-(9)
Fourth group of exceptions: criminal cases, available representor
Terms of s 66
Effect of s 66(1)-(2A)
Effect of s 66(3)
Fifth exception: contemporaneous statements about a person’s health
Section 66A
Part 3.2: Division 3 — Other exceptions to the hearsay rule
Business records
Outline
Origins and evaluation
Avenues of admissibility
Definitions
Asserted facts and opinions
Computer and other machine-generated information
Safeguards
Tags, labels and writing attached to or on objects
Section 70
Statements in electronic messages as to sender, recipient, date, time and destination
Section 71
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs
Section 72
Reputation
Section 73
Section 74
Interlocutory proceedings
Section 75
C Admissions
Scope
Definition
First hand proof of admissions
Sections 81 and 82
Exclusion of admissions against third parties
Section 83
Violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct
Section 84
Unreliable admissions in criminal proceedings
Section 85
Unsigned records of interview
Section 86
Preservation of other legislation
Non-repeal of other legislation
Admissions made with authority
Section 87
Proof of admissions
Section 88
Out of court silence
Section 89 and related provisions in NSW
Exclusionary discretion
Section 90
Related provisions
Sections 135–136 and 165
6 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld): ss 93B and 93C
First hand hearsay of unavailable person
Unavailable persons
Structure of ss 93B and 93C
7 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic)
Available complainant
Previous representations by complainant under 18
Section 377
Chapter Nineteen —The Doctrine of Res Gestae
1 Introduction
Organisation of chapter
Summary
Outline
2 Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co v Carlyle
Issues in the case
A divergence
The facts and the reasoning
Starke J and Dixon J compared
Ambiguity
3 Four Suggested Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Associated with the Doctrine
A Introduction
Summary
Outline and underlying basis
B Statement accompanying and explaining relevant acts
Statement and illustrations of the exception
Statement and examples
Accompanying statements must be in issue or relevant to the issue
Statement must relate to the act it accompanies
Contemporaneity
Statement must be by the actor
C Spontaneous statements relating to an event in issue made by participants or observers
Introduction
Statement and illustrations of the exception
Defects of the traditional law
The effect of Ratten’s case
Conditions of admissibility
Summary
Directness
Other evidence
Rationale and utility
D Statements concerning the maker’s contemporaneous state of mind or emotion
Statement, illustrations and requirements of the exception
The terms and illustration of the rule
The requirement of contemporaneity
Limited purpose of reception
Relevance of intention
Prospectant continuance of intention: analysis
Prospectant continuance of intention: concoction
Previous declarations of intention as evidence of the performance of a subsequent act
The Hillmon problem
Reported assertions of mental state: original or hearsay evidence?
E Statements of contemporaneous physical sensation
Principles underlying and examples of the exception
Statement and illustrations of the exception
The requirement of contemporaneity
Miscellaneous
Other matters
4 Res Gestae as Original Evidence
Original evidence
Problems of res gestae and original evidence
Examples of original evidence
Evidence of opinion received as part of the res gestae
Facts received as part of the res gestae
Res gestae and other exclusionary rules
5 Statutory Exceptions and Conclusions
Statutes and conclusions
Statutory exceptions
“Uniform” legislation
Conclusions
Concluding analysis
Chapter Twenty — Documentary Evidence
1 Proof of the Contents of a Document
A The general rule
Introduction
Plan of the chapter
Statement and illustrations of the general rule
Statement
Illustrations
Types of primary evidence of the contents of a document
The original
Copy of document requiring enrolment
Deemed originals
Admission of a party
Types of secondary evidence of the contents of a document
Secondary evidence
B Exceptions to the general rule
Exceptions
Summary
Opponent’s failure to produce document after notice
Nature and purpose of notice to produce
When service of notice is excused
Stranger’s lawful refusal to produce document
Stranger’s failure to produce
Lost document
Failure to find after due search
Production of original impossible
Physical or legal impossibility
Public documents
Categories of public document
Statutory provisions
Statutes other than the “uniform” legislation
The “uniform” legislation
2 Proof of the Execution of Private Documents
A Proof of handwriting
Modes of proof
Plan of the section
Categories of handwriting evidence summarised
Testimonial or hearsay evidence
Opinion
Comparison
B Proof of attestation
Attestation
Organisation
Wills
Other documents required by law to be attested
History of the present law
C Presumptions relating to documents
A variety of presumptions
Presumptions relating to execution
D The Stamp Acts
Stamp objections
Consequences of non-stamping
3 The Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence Affecting the Contents of a Document
A The conclusiveness of a document as evidence of the terms of the transaction it embodies
Adding to, varying or contradicting a document
Plan
Statement of the rule
Various formulations
Illustrations of the rule
Judicial records
Transactions required by law to be in writing
Written contracts
Exceptions to and cases falling outside the rule
Summary
Public registers
Cases on validity or effectiveness of a document
Consideration
The real nature of the transaction
Capacity of parties
Contracts which are collateral, partly oral, or subject to usage
Memoranda
Proceedings between strangers
B Extrinsic evidence in aid of interpretation
The problem
Resort to circumstances extrinsic to the document being construed
Wigmore’s four standards
The principal rules of interpretation
Plan
Wigram’s propositions
The inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to make document
The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to translate a document
The “matrix” rule
The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of persons and things mentioned in the document
The inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to displace a sensible legal or commonly accepted meaning
The preference for legitimate relationship
The plain meaning rule illustrated
The plain meaning rule today
The admissibility of extrinsic circumstantial evidence of the author’s intended meaning
The admissibility of the author’s extrinsic declarations of intention
Equivocation
Rebutting certain equitable presumptions
Subsequent conduct
Admissibility of extrinsic evidence: wills
C Conclusions
Miscellaneous points
Plan
Relationship of interpretation to evidence
Objects of the rules of interpretation
Capricious results
Chapter Twenty-One — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters
1 Foreign Law — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters
A The Principal rules at common law
General rules
Summary of chapter
The rules
Judicial notice and previous decisions
Does the decision of a court on foreign law bind later courts?
B Statutory provisions
Commonwealth and State legislation
Constitutional and general provisions
Recognition of statutory, judicial and other official acts
Recognition of documents and certificates admissible in other courts
The “uniform” legislation
C Expert witness
Qualifications, necessity, role
The rules
2 Birth, Age, Death, Marriage and Legitimacy — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters
Birth, age, death, marriage, legitimacy
Birth
Statutory and common law methods of proof
Age
Summary of methods of proof
Direct evidence
Hearsay
Certificates other than birth certificates
Hearsay exceptions: common law and statutory
Death
Eight methods of proof
Marriage
Five methods of proving a marriage ceremony
Proof of formal validity
Expert witnesses and certificates
Legitimacy
Presumption of legitimacy and hearsay exceptions
3 Judgments and Convictions — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters
Civil and criminal cases
Common law and statute
Summary
Civil cases
The “uniform” legislation
Criminal cases
The “uniform” legislation
Proof of identity
4 Miscellaneous — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters
Other matters
General
Plan of section
Custom and usage
Four methods of proof
Ownership
Four methods of proof
Proof of what occurred at meetings
Admissions, witnesses, minutes
Index
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Cross on Evidence Tenth Australian Edition
J D Heydon
LexisNexis Butterworths Australia 2015
LexisNexis AUSTRALIA
ARGENTINA AUSTRIA BRAZIL CANADA CHILE CHINA CZECH REPUBLIC FRANCE GERMANY HONG KONG HUNGARY INDIA ITALY JAPAN KOREA MALAYSIA NEW ZEALAND POLAND SINGAPORE SOUTH AFRICA SWITZERLAND TAIWAN UNITED KINGDOM USA
LexisNexis Butterworths 475–495 Victoria Avenue, Chatswood NSW 2067 On the internet at: www.lexisnexis.com.au LexisNexis Argentina, BUENOS AIRES LexisNexis Verlag ARD Orac GmbH & Co KG, VIENNA LexisNexis Latin America, SAO PAULO LexisNexis Canada, Markham, ONTARIO LexisNexis Chile, SANTIAGO LexisNexis China, BEIJING, SHANGHAI Nakladatelství Orac sro, PRAGUE LexisNexis SA, PARIS LexisNexis Germany, FRANKFURT LexisNexis Hong Kong, HONG KONG HVG-Orac, BUDAPEST LexisNexis, NEW DELHI Dott A Giuffrè Editore SpA, MILAN LexisNexis Japan KK, TOKYO LexisNexis, SEOUL LexisNexis Malaysia Sdn Bhd, PETALING JAYA, SELANGOR LexisNexis, WELLINGTON Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis, WARSAW LexisNexis, SINGAPORE LexisNexis Butterworths, DURBAN Staempfli Verlag AG, BERNE LexisNexis, TAIWAN LexisNexis UK, LONDON, EDINBURGH LexisNexis Group, New York, NEW YORK
LexisNexis, Miamisburg, OHIO National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Heydon, J. D. (John Dyson), author Cross on evidence / J D Heydon 10th Australian edition. ISBN 978 0 409 33956 7 (limp). ISBN 978 0 409 33957 4 (hbk). ISBN 978 0 409 33958 1 (ebook). Includes index. 1. Evidence (Law) — Australia. 347.9406 ©2015 Reed International Books Australia Pty Limited trading as LexisNexis First Australian edition 1970; Second Australian edition 1979; Reprintd with supplement 1980; Cumulative supplement 1984; Reprinted with cumulative supplement 1984; Third Australian edition 1986; Fourth Australian edition 1991; Fifth Australian edition 1996; Sixth Australian edition 2000; Seventh Australian edition 2004; Eighth Australian edition 2010; Ninth Australian edition 2013. This book is copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may be reproduced by any process, electronic or otherwise, without the specific written permission of the copyright owner. Neither may information be stored electronically in any form whatsoever without such permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Typeset in Plantin. Printed in China. Visit LexisNexis Butterworths at www.lexisnexis.com.au
Preface This edition, the 10th Australian edition, follows quite closely on the heels of the 9th. The decision to publish it responds to popular demand that this ought to be done. The law of evidence receives much greater attention from the courts than most other areas of law. In the nature of the subject it is more closely linked to the litigation process than any other, with the possible exception of procedure. In consequence many parts of the law of evidence undergo steady and constant development. The principal fields of activity since the last edition include the interaction between the uniform legislation and the common law, judicial notice and related matters, the exclusion of evidence the prejudicial effect of which outweighs its probative value, the operation of legislation in relation to tendency and coincidence evidence, privilege, illegally obtained evidence, expert opinion evidence, and the use of extrinsic evidence in construing contracts. The target audience continues to include law students, their teachers, solicitors, barristers and judges. It is hoped that many sectors of that target audience will find useful two innovations in point of form. The first innovation is that the Table of Contents is now much more detailed. The goal is to enable a reader dealing with a particular problem to find more quickly the particular passages relevant to the solution of that problem. The second innovation is that in the footnotes there is only one citation per case. This in turn has shortened the footnotes.The purpose of this change is to enable the reasoning in the text to emerge more clearly. Barbara Price and Sophie Waples have carried out a great deal of work in preparing, typing and checking the text.To them a great debt is owed. The staff of LexisNexis have as always been cooperative and efficient. Sydney 28 October 2014 J D Heydon
Table of Cases “Aegis Blaze”, The [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 203 …. [25265] “Saudi Prince”, The (No 2) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 …. [41030] (Firth) v Epping Magistrates’ Court; R v [2011] 1 Cr App R 32 …. [33540] 3.meg.com Pty Ltd v TM & SM Pike Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 350 …. [17460] 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne, Re [1969] VR 293 …. [5195] 789 TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 131 …. [25225], [25235], [25240] A v Boulton (2004) 136 FCR 420 …. [25175] — v — (2004) 204 ALR 598 …. [25175] — v Hayden (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 532; 56 ALR 82 …. [27065] — v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 1 All ER 575 …. [33640] A Petition of Right, Re [1915] 3 KB 649 …. [3020] A, GP; R v (2012) 113 SASR 146 …. [17290] A/S Rendal v Arcos Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 623 …. [3020] — v — [1937] 3 All ER 577 …. [3020] A/S Tallina Laevanhisus v Estonian State Steamship Line (1946) 80 Ll L Rep 99 …. [41005], [41035] A/S Tank of Oslo and Agence Maritime L Strauss of Paris, Re an Arbitration Between [1940] 1 All ER 40 …. [41005] AAPT Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd (1999) 32 ACSR 63 …. [29185], [29205] AB; R v [1974] 2 NZLR 425 …. [39105]
Abadom v Abadom (1857) 24 Beav 243; 53 ER 351 …. [17480] Abadom; R v [1983] 1 All ER 364; [1983] 1 WLR 126 …. [29070], [29150], [31145], [33825], [33845], [35425] Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; 96 ALR 354 …. [11150] Abbey National Mortgages Plc v Key Surveyors Nationwide Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 184; [1996] 1 WLR 1534 …. [29070] Abbey; R v [1982] 2 SCR 24; (1982) 39 DLR (3d) 202 …. [29070], [31010] Abbot v Massie (1796) 3 Ves 148; 30 ER 941 …. [39230], [39270] Abbott; R v [1955] 2 QB 497; [1955] 2 All ER 899 …. [9015], [11095] Abdallah; R v (2001) 127 A Crim R 46 …. [17460] Abdul-Kader v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 281 …. [17315] Abdula v — [2012] 1 NZLR 534 …. [33805] Abdulla; R v (2010) 200 A Crim R 365 …. [7085], [9005] Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; 162 ALR 1 …. [17435] Abela; R v (2007) 17 VR 1 …. [17285] Abernethy v Deitz (1996) 39 NSWLR 701 …. [1215] Abigroup Ltd v Akins (1997) 42 NSWLR 623 …. [1730], [25010] Abinger v Ashton, Lord (1873) LR17 Eq 358 …. [29045] Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104; 65 ALR 247 …. [27035], [27080] Abraham; R v (1848) 3 Cox CC 430 …. [17335], [17340] — (1998) 70 SASR 575 …. [7085] — [1973] 3 All ER 694; [1973] 1 WLR 1270 …. [7030] Abrahamson v R (1994) 63 SASR 139 …. [31040], [31090] Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440; [1881] All ER Rep 614 …. [7040], [7070], [7140]
— v — (1886) 11 App Cas 247; [1886] All ER Rep 179 …. [7070] Absolam; R v (1989) 88 Cr App R 332 …. [33740] Acaster; R v (1912) 7 Cr App R 187 …. [13185] Accident Compensation Commission v Detar [1989] VR 931 …. [5030] Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 …. [25010], [25065], [25090], [25100], [25120], [35005], [35075], [35090] Accused (CA 406/92); R v [1994] 3 NZLR 157 …. [3159] Accused; R v [1989] 1 NZLR 714 …. [29050] — [1992] 1 NZLR 257 …. [13270] Acemount Pty Ltd v Sunlong Holdings Pty Ltd (2009) 77 ATR 647 …. [39135] Acerro v Petroni (1815) 1 Stark 100; 171 ER 414 …. [17155] Acott; R v [1997] 1 All ER 706; [1997] 1 WLR 306 …. [7030] Actaeon, The (1853) 1 Ecc & Ad 176; 164 ER 102 …. [33540], [37050] Action Waste Collections Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [1981] VR 691 …. [29001], [31120], [35335], [35340] Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169; 40 ALR 609 …. [7105], [7275] Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96; 183 ALR 625 …. [1520], [11125], [17255], [17375], [17405], [19005] Adam; R v (1999) 106 A Crim R 510 …. [15220], [21050], [21252] — (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 …. [17375], [17405], [17530], [35440], [35525] Adami v R (1959) 108 CLR 605 …. [39105] Adamiczka; R v (1993) 33 NSWLR 68 …. [17040] Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1991) 25 NSWLR 75 …. [33805] Adams v Anthony Bryant & Co Pty Ltd (1986) 15 FCR 513; 67 ALR 616 …. [25225], [25295]
— v Bankart (1835) 1 Cr M & R 681; 149 ER 1254 …. [17620] — v Batley (1887) 18 QBD 625 …. [25125] — v Canon (1621) 1 Dyer 53bn; 73 ER 117n …. [29135] — v City of Thief River Falls 86 NW 767 (Minn, 1901) …. [1295] — v Lloyd (1858) 3 H & N 351; 157 ER 506 …. [25345] — v Naylor [1946] AC 543 …. [3165] Adams (No 2); R v [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 …. [9095] Adams, Re; Benton v Powell [1922] P 240 …. [33055], [33070] Adams; R v (1829) 3 C & P 600; 172 ER 563 …. [1195] — (1923) 17 Cr App R 77 …. [33490] — [1965] Qd R 255 …. [15255], [17265] — [1965] VR 563 …. [23140], [39045] — [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 …. [9095] Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 …. [9085] Adamson; R v (1843) 2 Mood 286; 169 ER 114 …. [39205] Adaras Developments Ltd v Marcona Corporation [1975] 1 NZLR 324 …. [39290] Addabbo; R v (1982) 33 SASR 84 …. [27255], [33760] Addington v Texas (1979) 441 US 418 …. [9085] Addstone Pty Ltd (in liq), Re; ex parte Macks (1998) 30 ACSR 162 …. [25055] Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v A-G (Palestine) [1944] AC 156; [1944] 2 All ER 139 …. [17120], [17125] Adelaide Brighton Cement v South Australia (1999) 75 SASR 209 …. [27190] Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514; [1941] ALR 10 …. [37001], [37005], [37010], [37050] Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360; 152 ALR 418
…. [25010], [25300] Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538; [1941] ALR 212 …. [3200] Adey; R v (1831) 1 M & Rob 94; 174 ER 32 …. [25075] ADJ; R v (2005) 153 A Crim R 324 …. [21050] Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 …. [1215], [1220], [17115], [29185], [29200], [29205] Adler; R v (2001) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38 …. [1445] Admar Computers Pty Ltd v Ezy Systems Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 659 …. [1520] Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 …. [5030], [39290] Admiral Management Services Ltd v Para-Protect Europe Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 1017; [2002] 1 WLR 2722 …. [25380] Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement & Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127 …. [25155], [41035] — v The Queensland Cement and Lime Co Ltd (No 2) [1984] 2 Qd R 366 …. [27155] Aetna Factors Corp Ltd v Breau (1957) 10 DLR (2d) 100 …. [39160] AG (NSW) v Lipton (2012) 224 A Crim R 177 …. [25105], [27130], [27195] AG (X) v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464 …. [41035] AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464; 58 IPR 268 …. [25025] Agar; R v [1990] 2 All ER 442 …. [27130] Agassiz v London Tramway Co (1872) 27 LT 492; 21 WR 199 …. [1535] Agbaba v Witter (1977) 14 ALR 187; 51 ALJR 503 …. [11150] Agbim; R v [1979] Crim LR 171 …. [9040]
AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 590 …. [39185] Age; R v (2011) 257 FLR 85 …. [33660] Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322 …. [39290] Ah Chuck v Needham [1931] NZLR 559 …. [1280] Ah Foo; R v (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 343 …. [13275] Ah Wong; R v (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 347 …. [33805] Ah-See v Heilpern (2000) 115 A Crim R 1 …. [33775], [35532] AH; R v (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 …. [7085], [21252] Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87; 80 ALR 161 …. [1520], [33565], [33570] Ahmadi v — (2011) 254 FLR 174 …. [17065] Ahmed v Brumfitt (1967) 112 Sol Jo 32 …. [17305] Ahmed Din; R v [1962] 2 All ER 123; [1962] 1 WLR 680 …. [29070], [29075] Ahmed, Re (1979) 24 ALR 621 …. [33840] Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23 NSWLR 288 …. [11150] Ahmet; R v (2009) 22 VR 203 …. [17265] Aickles; R v (1784) 1 Leach 294; 168 ER 250 …. [39050] Aiken; R v [1925] VLR 265; (1925) 31 ALR 143 …. [21185] Aikman v Arnold (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 205 …. [33420] Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155 …. [25055] — v Wilding [1900] 2 Ch 315 …. [25225], [25255] Ainsworth; R v (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 …. [33760] Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 1 All ER 161 …. [27085], [27165] — v — [1983] 2 AC 394; [1983] 1 All ER 910 …. [27005], [27065], [27120], [27155], [27165]
Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309 …. [39145], [39160], [39185] Air New Zealand Ltd v Nippon Credit Bank Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 218 …. [39240] Aird; R v [1949] VLR 1 …. [33640], [33665] Aitchison v DPP (1996) 135 FLR 217 …. [15260] Aitken; R v (1991) 94 Cr App R 85 …. [1305] AJ v R (2011) 32 VR 614 …. [17130] Ajami v Comptroller of Customs [1954] 1 WLR 1405 …. [29060], [41035] Ajax; R v (1977) 17 SASR 88 …. [33745] AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242 …. [21257] Ajit Singh Sat-Bhambra; R v (1988) 88 Cr App R 60 …. [33775] Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204; [1981] 2 All ER 193 …. [11045], [11065], [33610], [33665] AJS; R v (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327 …. [17615] Ajum Goolam Hossen & Co v Union Marine Insurance Co [1901] AC 362 …. [1605], [7220] AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; 243 ALR 409 …. [1335], [11140] Akaidere; R v [1990] Crim LR 808 …. [11100] Akerele v R [1943] AC 255; [1943] 1 All ER 367 …. [1535] Akgul; R v (2002) 5 VR 537 …. [1400] Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 …. [25010], [25055] — v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 …. [11150] Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411; 194 ALR 385 …. [1645], [29070] Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [2011] 2 AC 338 …. [25245]
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Alivon v Furnival [1824] All ER Rep 705; (1834) 149 ER 1084; 1 Cr M & R 277 …. [39015], [39065] ALJ; R v (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 …. [7085], [9030] All States Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v FCT (1990) 21 FCR 457; 92 ALR 511 …. [3015] Alladice; R v (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 …. [33740] Allan & Co Pty Ltd v Reed [1913] VLR 422; (1913) 19 ALR 472 …. [1455] Allan; R v [1969] 1 All ER 91; [1969] 1 WLR 33 …. [9025] Allchurch v Healey [1927] SASR 370 …. [3020] Allen v Allen [1894] P 248 …. [17475] — v Bone (1841) 4 Beav 493; 49 ER 429 …. [7070] — v Dundas [1775] All ER Rep 398; (1789) 100 ER 490; 3 TR 125 …. [5015] — v Hay (1922) 64 SCR 76; 69 DLR 193 …. [41035] — v Pink (1838) 4 M & W 140; 150 ER 1376 …. [39200] — v R (1984) 16 A Crim R 441 …. [1395], [1400] — v Roughley (1955) 94 CLR 98; [1955] ALR 1017 …. [1185], [33460], [33465] — v Tobias (1958) 98 CLR 367 …. [33435] Allen Allen & Hemsley v DCT (NSW) (1988) 81 ALR 617 …. [25225] — v — (1989) 86 ALR 597 …. [25225] Allen Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd v McCallum & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 IPR 400 …. [29115] Allen, Re [1988] 1 Qd R 1 …. [39235] Allen; R v (1994) 77 A Crim R 99 …. [1220], [23040] — [1937] St R Qd 32 (CCA) …. [21050] — [1977] Crim LR 163 …. [33740]
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(No 2) (1992) 26 NSWLR 114 …. [27095] Australian Medical Imaging Pty Ltd v Marconi Medical Systems Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 1 …. [17055] Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Lea [1928] VLR 29; [1927] ALR 446 …. [39185] Australian Mid-Eastern Club Ltd v Elbakht (1988) 13 NSWLR 697 …. [5025] Australian Mutual Provident Society v Overseas Telecommunications Commission (Aust) [1972] 2 NSWLR 806 …. [39240] Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth (1975) 132 CLR 582; 6 ALR 433 …. [1315], [27040], [27045], [27175], [27180], [35030] Australian Oil Refining Pty Ltd v Bourne (1980) 28 ALR 529; 54 ALJR 192 …. [3235] Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537; 159 ALR 477 …. [35565] Australian Provincial Assurance Assn Ltd v E T Taylor & Co Ltd [1947] NZLR 793 …. [39145], [39290] Australian Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Metcalf (1961) 106 CLR 177; [1962] ALR 217 …. [3225] Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446; 228 ALR 28 …. [29200] Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253 …. [25010], [25235] Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Gorman [1973] VR 570 …. [9110], [33540], [33830] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers (2001) 39 ACSR 443 …. [25040] — v Adler (No 1) (2002) 20 ACLC 222 …. [29190] — v Australian Lending Centre Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 283 ALR 299 …. [25235], [25255], [25300]
— v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 2) (2009) 176 FCR 529 …. [35605] — v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; 83 ACSR 484 …. [11090], [29185], [29200] — v Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (2002) 217 ALR 716 …. [13050] — v Lindberg (2009) 25 VR 398; 261 ALR 207 …. [25025], [25250], [25300] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Mac Donald (2008) 68 ACSR 126 …. [11125] — v Mining Projects Group Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 32 …. [25010], [25125] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 227; 247 ALR 646 …. [27130] — v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168 …. [25075] — v Perpetual Trustee Co (Aust) Ltd (1999) 30 ACSR 532 …. [39240] — v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320 …. [11125], [17115], [35205], [35440], [35545], [35555], [41130] — v — (2005) 218 ALR 764 …. [29045], [29200] — v — (2005) 53 ACSR 110 …. [29020], [29045], [29065], [29070], [29080], [29165], [29185], [29200], [29205], [39010] — v — (2006) 201 FLR 207 …. [1755], [17145], [17550] — v — (2006) 235 ALR 587 …. [17720] — v — (2009) 75 ACSR 1 …. [1215], [1220], [9130], [17115], [17435], [17500], [41130] — v — (2004) 213 ALR 338 …. [11035] — v Sigalla (No 4) (2011) 80 NSWLR 113 …. [9130] — v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 438 …. [25235] — v Vines (2003) 176 FLR 106 …. [25125] — v — (2003) 48 ACSR 282 …. [1490], [1520]
— v — (2003) 48 ACSR 291 …. [29165], [29185], [29190], [29200], [29205] — v Whitlam (2002) 42 ACSR 143 …. [17495] Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201 …. [1215], [1220], [9130] — v Hellicar (2012) 286 ALR 501; 86 ALJR 522 …. [1215], [9130], [17115] Australian Securities Commission v Fairlie (1993) 11 ACLC 669 …. [1175] — v Macleod (1993) 40 FCR 155; 113 ALR 525 …. [9120] — v McLeod (2000) 22 WAR 255 …. [29085] — v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485; 112 ALR 627 …. [5055] — v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427 …. [27005], [27155], [27165] Australian Statistician, The v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 83 …. [27055] Australian Trade Commission v McMahon (1997) 73 FCR 211 …. [25055] Australian Tramways Employés Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (1913) 17 CLR 680; 19 ALR 573 …. [3158] Australian Transport Officers Federation v State Public Services Federation (1981) 34 ALR 406 …. [5025] Auten v Rayner [1958] 3 All ER 566 …. [27105] Authors Workshop v Bileru Pty Ltd (1989) 88 ALR 211 …. [25105] Automobiles Renault Canada Ltd v Maritime Import Autos Ltd (1962) 31 DLR (2d) 592 …. [39160] Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd v Beehive Spinning (A Firm) [1995] RPC 683 …. [29080] Auxil Pty Ltd v Terranova (2009) 260 ALR 164 …. [29070]
Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88; 97 ALR 19 …. [7150], [31090] Aves; R v [1950] 2 All ER 330 …. [1195] Aveson v Lord Kinnaird (1805) 6 East 188; 102 ER 1258 …. [37130], [37135], [37140] AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 7 ACSR 463 …. [25375] AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382 …. [25225], [25235], [25240], [25280] — v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; 234 ALR 651 …. [25010], [25240], [25290] AWF; R v (2000) 2 VR 1 …. [1610] Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395; [1938] ALR 89 …. [1125], [3245], [7305] Aydin v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 684 …. [25240], [25255] Ayensu; R v [1982] Crim LR 764 …. [1045] Aylen; R v (1987) 49 SASR 254 …. [35360] Aylesford Peerage Case, Re (1885) 11 App Cas 1 …. [31060], [31095], [33240], [37025] Ayoub; R v [1984] 2 NSWLR 511 …. [9120] Ayton; Nouvelle Banque de L’Union, The v (1891) 7 TLR 377 …. [41005] Aytugrul v R (2010) 205 A Crim R 157 …. [9095], [11125] — v — (2012) 247 CLR 170; 286 ALR 441 …. [1732], [3005], [3157], [3160], [11125] Azar; R v (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 …. [33660], [33665], [33690] Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 …. [1170], [1675], [7085], [15195], [17265] Aziz; R v [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 …. [1380], [1395]
— [1996] 1 AC 41; [1995] 3 All ER 149 …. [19135], [33455] Azizi v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 325 …. [33805], [35460], [35495], [35500] Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183 …. [5095] — v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; 179 ALR 349 …. [1220], [3295], [11135], [23020], [23030], [25070], [25110] B v A-G [1965] P 278; [1965] 1 All ER 62 …. [31095], [33240] — v A-G (B intervening) [1966] 2 All ER 145; [1967] 1 WLR 776 …. [1235] — v Auckland District Law Society [2003] 2 AC 736; [2004] 4 All ER 269 …. [25010], [25280], [25295] — v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 …. [13270] — v Linnane (1979) 32 SASR 72 …. [33665], [33710] — v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140 …. [27120], [27180] — v R (1992) 175 CLR 599; 110 ALR 432 …. [1520], [15235], [21050], [21210] — v — (1995) 127 FLR 438 …. [29180] — v — [2012] 2 NZLR 606 …. [29080] B & B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Brian A Cheeseman and Associates Pty Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 227 …. [39240] B (a child) v Potts (1992) 59 A Crim R 136 …. [33730] B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria), Re [2013] 3 All ER 929; [2013] 1 WLR 1911 …. [11150] B (A Minor) (Care: Expert Witnesses), Re [1996] 1 FLR 667 …. [29075] B (C); R v [2004] 2 Cr App R 34 …. [19155] B (children) (sexual abuse: standard of proof), Re [2009] 1 AC 11; [2008] 4 All ER 1 …. [9050] B (M) v B (R) [1968] 3 All ER 170; [1968] 1 WLR 1182 …. [17080]
B (minors) (care proceedings: issue estoppel), Re [1997] Fam 117; [1997] 2 All ER 29 …. [5080], [5125] B (RA); R v [1997] 2 Cr App R 88 …. [21100] B (T); R v [2006] 2 Cr App R 22 …. [29080] B, FG; R v (2013) 115 SASR 499 …. [15220] B, In the Marriage of (1987) 91 FLR 105 …. [35100], [35550] B; R v [1979] 3 All ER 460; [1979] 1 WLR 1185 …. [19140], [19145] — [1987] 1 NZLR 362 …. [29050] — [1987] VR 276 …. [15135] — [2003] 1 WLR 2809 …. [7085] — [2006] Crim LR 54 …. [17495] BA; R v [2013] 1 All ER 280 …. [13030] Babatsikos v Car Owners’ Mutual Insurance Co Ltd [1970] VR 297 …. [29120] Bacash; R v (2001) 3 VR 428 …. [11075], [33570] Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd (in liq) v Joseph Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (1919) 26 CLR 410 …. [39145] Backhouse v Jones (1839) 6 Bing NC 65; 133 ER 26 …. [29145], [31040], [31135] Baden’s Deed Trusts, Re; Baden v Smith [1967] 3 All ER 159; [1967] 1 WLR 1457 …. [17475] Badjan; R v (1966) 50 Cr App R 141 …. [11135] Badraie v Commonwealth (2005) 195 FLR 119 …. [5170] Baffigo; R v [1957] VR 303 …. [17180] Baggs v London Graving Dock Ltd [1943] KB 291; [1943] 1 All ER 426 …. [35060] Bagley; R v [1926] 3 DLR 717 …. [1375] Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd v Fudge [1949] SASR 297 ….
[33015] Bagshaw; R v [1984] 1 All ER 971; [1984] 1 WLR 477 …. [13065], [15070] Bagwell & Stewart Inc v Bennett (1959) 107 SE 2d 824 …. [31165] BAH; R v (2002) 5 VR 517 …. [35410] Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v R (2011) 203 IR 396 …. [11010] — v — (2012) 246 CLR 92; 286 ALR 421 …. [11140] Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476 …. [25055] — v City Smash Repairs (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) 27 MVR 545 …. [3030], [3065] — v Dept of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333 …. [25010], [25015], [25240], [25295], [25300] Bailey; R v (1977) 66 Cr App R 31 …. [29075] — [1924] 2 KB 300; [1924] All ER Rep 466 …. [21145] — [1956] SASR 153 …. [33505] — [1983] 2 All ER 503; [1983] 1 WLR 760 …. [9120] Bain v Moss Hutchinson Line Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 294 …. [35090] Baines v State Bank of New South Wales (1985) 2 NSWLR 729 …. [5025] Baini v R (2012) 293 ALR 472; 87 ALJR 180 …. [11140] Bains v Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd (1963) 38 DLR (2d) 417 …. [33430] Baird’s Trustees v Baird and Co (1877) 4 R 1005 …. [39240] Bajic; R v (2005) 12 VR 155 …. [7085], [17485] Baker v Australian Asbestos Insulations Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 595 …. [33825] — v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; 49 ALR 385 …. [25025], [25030], [25220], [25225], [25235], [25240], [25245], [25250], [25280], [27035], [27300]
— v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565 …. [25265], [25290] — v London & South Western Ry Co (1867) LR 3 QB 91 …. [25255] — v Market Harborough Industrial Co-op Society [1953] 1 WLR 1472 …. [1200] — v Palm Bay Island Resort Pty Ltd (No 1) [1970] QWN 25 …. [17725] — v R (2012) 245 CLR 632; 289 ALR 614 …. [33045] — v Sweet [1966] Crim LR 51 …. [7120] — v Thorpe (1985) 62 ACTR 1 …. [11150] Baker; R v (1837) 2 M & Rob 53; 174 ER 211 …. [33290] — (1912) 7 Cr App R 217 …. [23275] — (2000) 78 SASR 103 …. [1220], [15255] — [1895] 1 QB 797 …. [19020] — [1989] 1 NZLR 738 …. [31045] — [1989] 3 NZLR 635 …. [1290], [11125] Bakhuis; R v (2012) 112 SASR 536 …. [17295] Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden’s Ltd [1972] VR 732 …. [19035], [19040] — v General Motors Holdens Pty Ltd [1973] VR 190 …. [19035], [19040] Baksh v R [1958] AC 167 …. [17130], [27135] Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317; [1988] 2 All ER 246 …. [25210], [25225] Baldock v Douglas (1953) 56 WALR 82 …. [33690] Baldry; R v (1852) 2 Den 430; 169 ER 568 …. [33615], [33620] Baldwin & Francis Ltd v Patent Appeal Tribunal [1959] AC 663; [1959] 2 All ER 433 …. [3120], [29150] Baldwin; R v (1925) 19 Cr App R 175 …. [17505] — [1925] All ER Rep 402; (1925) 18 Cr App R 175 …. [17165],
[19005], [23145] Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; 282 ALR 336 …. [9050], [9130], [17435], [17460] Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226; [1959] ALR 283 …. [11145], [11155] Balfour v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [1994] 2 All ER 588; [1994] 1 WLR 681 …. [27065] Balfour Centre Pty Ltd, Re [1998] 2 Qd R 112 …. [5085] Balkis Consolidated Co Ltd, Re (1888) 58 LT 300 …. [39130] Ball; R v (1839) 8 C & P 745; 173 ER 699 …. [19010] — (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 605 …. [1880] — (1983) 77 Cr App R 131 …. [1195] — [1911] AC 47; (1910) 6 Cr App R 31 …. [1140], [21035], [21050], [21065], [21105], [21165] Ballantyne v Mackinnon [1896] 2 QB 455 …. [5185] Ballard v Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co (1967) 148 NW 2d 65 …. [1215] Balnaves v Smith [2008] 2 Qd R 413 …. [25010] Baltensperger; R v (2004) 90 SASR 129 …. [17275] Baltic Shipping Co v Merchant (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1994) 36 NSWLR 361 …. [5070] Bamfield v Massey (1808) 1 Camp 460; 170 ER 1021 …. [19005], [19170] Bamford v Barton, Doe d (1837) 2 M & Rob 28; 174 ER 203 …. [33240] Bamford; R v [1978] Crim LR 752 …. [33640] Banco de Bilbao v Sancha [1938] 2 KB 176; [1938] 2 All ER 253 …. [3085] Bangaru v R (2012) 297 ALR 108; 269 FLR 367 …. [21252] Banjima People v Western Australia (2011) 200 FCR 138 …. [11035]
Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540 …. [39145], [39200] — v Pollard (1882) 8 VLR (L) 66 …. [35335] Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251; [2001] 1 All ER 961 …. [39240] Bank of Crete SA v Koskotas (No 2) [1993] 1 All ER 748; [1992] 1 WLR 919 …. [25055] Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107; [1891] All ER Rep 93 …. [1760] Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1; [1948] 2 ALR 89 …. [3156], [3158] — v Signorini; Ex parte Signorini [1966] Qd R 322 …. [11090] Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182 …. [39145], [39250] — v Wilson (1886) 5 NZLR (SC) 215 …. [39290] Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Assn (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 540 …. [25015], [25265] Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd [1998] SC 657 …. [39240] — v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957 …. [39240] Bank of Valletta Plc v National Crime Authority (1999) 164 ALR 45 …. [41035] Bank of Valletta plc v — (1999) 90 FCR 565 …. [29165] Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co of New York v Liverpool Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1926) 24 Ll LR 85 …. [41035] Bankowski; R v (1971) 18 FLR 179 …. [33690] Banks; R v [1916] All ER Rep 356; (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 …. [17550], [17560] Bankway Properties Ltd v Pensfold-Dunsford [2001] 1 WLR 1369 …. [39290] Banner; R v [1970] VR 240 …. [11060], [33690], [33695]
Bannister v Bowen (1985) 65 ACTR 3 …. [7145] — v R (1993) 10 WAR 484 …. [17580], [19030], [19090] — v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699 …. [9075] Bannon v R (1995) 185 CLR 1; 132 ALR 87 …. [31045], [33045] Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; 92 ALR 53 …. [7150] Banque des Merchands de Moscou, Re [1958] Ch 182; [1957] 3 All ER 182 …. [41035] Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 336 …. [25290] — v — [1990] 1 QB 665; [1987] 2 All ER 923 …. [1165] BAR; R v (2005) 152 A Crim R 428 …. [21035] Barba v Gas & Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120; 12 ALR 649 …. [39180] Barbaro v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 30 …. [33455] Barbaro; R v (1993) 32 NSWLR 619 …. [1425], [31185] — (2000) 112 A Crim R 551 …. [35525], [35532] Barber v Staffordshire County Council [1996] 2 All ER 748 …. [5025] Barbery; R v (1975) 62 Cr App R 248 …. [17335] Barbour; R v [1939] 1 DLR 65; [1938] SCR 465 …. [21050] Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82; 7 ALR 78 …. [9035], [9040], [33480] Barclays Bank Ltd v Cole [1967] 2 QB 738; [1966] 3 All ER 948 …. [5180] Barclays Bank plc v Eustice [1995] 4 All ER 511; [1995] 1 WLR 1238 …. [25290] Barden v Barden (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 588; 38 WN (NSW) 115 …. [25375] Barford v Barford and McLeod [1918] P 140 …. [41035]
Barger; R v (1908) 6 CLR 41; 14 ALR 374 …. [3158] Barilla v James (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 457 …. [25010] Baring; R v (2005) 92 SASR 117 …. [15220], [17460] Barings plc (in liq) v Coopers & Lybrand [2000] 3 All ER 910; [2000] 1 WLR 2353 …. [25255] Barings Plc, Re (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433 …. [29125] Barker v Charley (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 296; 78 WN (NSW) 1142 …. [17370], [33455] — v Fauser [1962] SASR 176 …. [3070] — v Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172 …. [17725] — v Gifford (2005) 192 FLR 347 …. [3160] — v R (1994) 54 FCR 451; 127 ALR 280 …. [27270], [33655], [33700], [33725] — v Wilson [1980] 2 All ER 81; [1980] 1 WLR 884 …. [35340] Barker; R v (1829) 3 C & P 589; 172 ER 558 …. [19075], [19085] — (1975) 65 Cr App R 287 …. [11100] — (1978) 19 SASR 488 …. [33760] — (1988) 34 A Crim R 141 …. [29015] — [1941] 2 KB 381; [1941] 3 All ER 33 …. [27280], [27285] — [1954] Crim LR 423 …. [17350], [19005] — [1967] Crim LR 310 …. [17135] — [1976] Tas SR 52 …. [35025], [35050], [35205] — [1986] 1 NZLR 252 …. [15020] — [1989] 2 NZLR 635 …. [1295] Barklimore; R v (2007) 167 A Crim R 377 …. [33775], [33780] Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 54; [1948] 2 All ER 460 …. [35065], [35075], [35090]
Barkwell v Barkwell [1928] P 91; [1927] All ER Rep 138 …. [33330] Barnard v Sully (1931) 47 TLR 557 …. [1175] Barnes v Allied Interstate Transport [1969] Qd R 244 …. [33545] — v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2007) 242 ALR 601 …. [25210], [25240] — v PBC (Business Forms) Ltd [1976] 1 All ER 237; [1975] 1 WLR 1565 …. [17075] Barnes & Co Ltd v Sharpe (1910) 11 CLR 462; 17 ALR 1 …. [31010] Barnes; R v (1942) 28 Cr App R 141 …. [11140] — [1994] Crim LR 691 …. [19090] Barnetson v Framlington Group Ltd [2007] 3 All ER 1054; [2007] 1 WLR 2443 …. [25350] Barnett v Cohen [1921] 2 KB 461; [1921] All ER Rep 528 …. [5190] — v McGregor; Ex parte McGregor [1959] Qd R 296 …. [17645], [33505] Barnett; R v [1983] 1 VR 319 …. [31010], [33520] Barnowski; R v [1969] SASR 386 …. [23270], [23275] Barnsley; R v [1972] 2 NSWLR 220 …. [1240] Barnstaple Second Annuitant Society, Re (1884) 50 LT 424 …. [39180] Barnswell; R v [1995] 2 Cr App R 491 …. [21180] Baron de Bode’s Case (1845) 8 QB 208; 154 ER 854 …. [41035] Baron von Rijssen; R v (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 …. [31095] Baronian v Potter Constructions Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 215 …. [7120] Barratt; R v [2000] Crim LR 847 …. [23345] Barrett v Kemp, Doe d (1835) 2 Bing NC 102; 132 ER 40 …. [1185] — v Steel Products Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 981 …. [33540] Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd v Dennis Family Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 193 FCR 479 …. [25395]
Barrett; R v (2007) 16 VR 240; 171 A Crim R 315 …. [15220], [17120], [17615], [29070], [29140], [33435], [33455], [33485], [33770], [37145] — [1995] 1 SCR 752 …. [1645] Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647 …. [39290] Barrington; R v [1981] 1 All ER 1132; [1981] 1 WLR 419 …. [21065], [21170] Barristers’ Board of WA v Tranter Corp Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 65 …. [33510] Barritt v Baker [1948] VLR 491; [1949] ALR 144 …. [7125], [7150] Barron; R v [1975] VR 496 …. [23040], [33485] Barrow v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 981; [1996] 1 WLR 257 …. [5170] — v State [1998] AC 846 …. [19135] Barrow; R v [2001] 2 Qd R 525 …. [15170], [15175] Barry v News Group Newspapers Ltd (1999) SLT 590 …. [1560] — v Police (SA) (2009) 197 A Crim R 445 …. [17120], [17335] Barry; R v [1984] 1 Qd R 74 …. [29050], [33660] Bartels; R v (1986) 44 SASR 260 …. [1395] Barten v Williams (1978) 20 ACTR 10 …. [9050] Bartho v R (1978) 19 ALR 418; 52 ALJR 520 …. [9020], [9030] Bartle; R v (2003) 181 FLR 1 …. [19150], [23270] Bartleman; R v (1984) 12 DLR (4th) 73 …. [3040] Bartlett v Lewis (1862) 12 CB (NS) 249; 142 ER 1139 …. [25075] — v Sage (No 2) (2011) 193 FCR 466 …. [27035] — v Smith (1843) 11 M & W 483; 152 ER 895 …. [11030] Bartlett; R v [1996] 2 VR 687 …. [29050]
Barton v Bank of New South Wales (1890) 15 App Cas 379 …. [39185] — v Csidei [1979] 1 NSWLR 524 …. [27155] — v Official Receiver (1977) 13 ALR 283 …. [25165] Barton; R v (1986) 85 Cr App R 5 …. [19030], [19090] — [1972] 2 All ER 1192; [1973] 1 WLR 115 …. [25295] Barty-King v Ministry of Defence [1979] 2 All ER 80 …. [27165] Basheer & De Conno Pty Ltd v Corani (2005) 92 SASR 468 …. [29070] Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 366; 204 ALR 193 …. [3159] Bashir; R v [1969] 3 All ER 692; [1969] 1 WLR 1303 …. [19075] Baskerville; R v [1916] 2 KB 658; [1916] All ER Rep 38 …. [15105], [15110], [15165] Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 161 ALR 399 …. [5025] Bass; R v [1953] 1 QB 680; [1953] 1 All ER 1064 …. [11050], [17200], [17205], [17240], [33620], [33680], [33690] Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953 …. [5130] Bassett v Ferguson [1952] VLR 481; [1952] ALR 869 …. [17375] — v Host [1982] 1 NSWLR 206 …. [17080] Bassett; R v [1952] VLR 535; [1952] ALR 1035 …. [15215], [17055] Basson; R v 1965 (1) SA 697 …. [31060] Bastin v Carew (1824) Ry & M 127; 171 ER 966 …. [17165], [17375], [17385] Bastin; R v [1971] Crim LR 529 …. [33610] Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628 …. [11050], [11135], [33620] Bataillard v — (1907) 4 CLR 1282; 13 ALR 408 …. [23040] Batchelor v Honeywood (1799) 2 Esp 714; 170 ER 506 …. [39100] Bate v Hill (1823) 1 Car & P 100; 171 ER 1118 …. [19170]
Bate; R v (1871) 11 Cox CC 686 …. [33645] Bateman v Bailey (1794) 5 TR 512; 101 ER 288 …. [37025] — v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553 …. [39160] Bateman; R v (1845) 1 Cox CC 186 …. [3175] — (1946) 31 Cr App R 106 …. [17135] — [1989] Crim LR 590 …. [25105] Bater v Bater [1951] P 35; [1950] 2 All ER 458 …. [9010] Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149 …. [35025], [35050], [35205], [35360] Bates; R v [1973] 2 All ER 509; [1973] 1 WLR 718 …. [11135] Bath; R v [1990] Crim LR 716 …. [1395] Bathurst; R v [1968] 2 QB 99; [1968] 1 All ER 1175 …. [23030] Batista v Citra Constructions Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 351 …. [37135], [37140] Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Rural Co-Op Society Ltd v Commonwealth & Dominion Line (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314 …. [33385] Batt; R v [1994] Crim LR 592 …. [21065] Batte; R v (2000) 49 OR (3d) 321 …. [3260] Batten (LG) Pty Ltd, Re [1962] QWN 2 …. [35335] Batthews v Galindo (1828) 4 Bing 610; 130 ER 904 …. [13030] Battie-Wrightson, Re [1920] 2 Ch 330; [1920] All ER Rep 597 …. [39020], [39280] Battle v A-G [1949] P 358 …. [33245] Batty; R v [1963] VR 451 …. [33675], [33765] Bauer; R v [2006] 1 Qd R 420 …. [19085] Baugh v Cradocke (1832) 1 M & Rob 182; 174 ER 62 …. [25245] Baulch v Lyndoch Warrnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VCSA 30
…. [17460] Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 …. [25175] Baxter v Ah Way (1909) 10 CLR 212; 17 ALR 102 …. [7105] — v British Airways plc (1988) 82 ALR 298 …. [33465] — v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 …. [3158] Baxter; R v [1927] SASR 321 …. [23245] Bayer AG v Minister for Health (Cth) (1988) 13 IPR 225; 96 FLR 50 …. [13270] Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd v Farbenfabriken Bayer AG (1965) 120 CLR 285 …. [17150], [17170] Baylis v A-G (1741) 2 Atk 239; 26 ER 548 …. [39230] Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464 …. [25010] Bayly v Vaughan [1989] VR 364 …. [33690] Baynon; R v [1960] NZLR 1012 …. [15255] BBGP Managing General Partner Ltd v Babcock & Brown Global Partners [2011] Ch 296; [2011] 2 All ER 297 …. [25265], [25290] BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; 286 ALR 89 …. [1490], [1880], [11125], [21035], [21230] BBR; R v [2010] 1 Qd R 546 …. [11140], [13050], [13060] BD; R v (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 …. [11125], [17290], [17315], [35440], [35525] BDX; R v (2009) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57 …. [17590], [19045], [29050] Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411 …. [1630] Beames v R (1980) 1 A Crim R 239 …. [1305] Beamish v — [1962] WAR 85 …. [33640], [33690] Beamon v Ellice (1831) 4 Car & P 585; 172 ER 836 …. [17055] Beard v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 …. [3020]
Beardsall; R v (1859) 1 F & F 529; 175 ER 839 …. [33435] Beare v Garrod (1915) 113 LT 673 …. [31010], [37130] — v — (1915) 85 LJKB 717 …. [17430] Bearmans Ltd v Metropolitan Police District Receiver [1961] 1 All ER 384; [1961] 1 WLR 634 …. [35075], [35090] Beasley v McGrath (1804) 2 Sch & Lef 31 …. [33450] Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 …. [1280] Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1 …. [17460] Beattie; R v (1989) 89 Cr App R 302 …. [17545] — (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 …. [1520], [15260], [19055] — (2001) 127 A Crim R 250 …. [1370] Beatty v Beatty [1924] 1 KB 807 …. [41005], [41035] Beatty, In the Estate of [1919] VLR 81 …. [33350] Beauchamp; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 40 …. [1830] Beaufort v Crawshay, Duke of (1866) LR 1 CP 699 …. [1040], [11030] — v Smith, Duke of (1849) 4 Exch 450; 154 ER 1290 …. [33355] Beble; R v [1979] Qd R 278 …. [9040], [33730] Beck v Cavaiulo (1972) 8 SASR 288 …. [7070] — v R [1984] WAR 127 …. [19085], [19090] Beck; R v [1982] 1 All ER 807; [1982] 1 WLR 461 …. [15160], [15170] — [1990] 1 Qd R 30 …. [33455] Beckett; R v (1913) 8 Cr App R 204 …. [29100], [29130] — [1966] Qd R 170 …. [17705], [17715] — [2011] 1 Qd R 259 …. [19155] Beckford v R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409 …. [1400] Beckford; R v [1991] Crim LR 833 …. [33595], [33610] Bede v Commonwealth Hostels Ltd (1980) 4 NTR 31 …. [5030]
Bedford; R v (1986) 28 A Crim R 311 …. [1400] Bedfordshire (Inhabitants); R v (1855) 4 E & B 535; 119 ER 196 …. [33165] Bedingfield; R v (1879) 14 Cox CC 341 …. [37055], [37060] Bedington; R v [1970] Qd R 353 …. [17550] Bednikov; R v (1997) 95 A Crim R 200 …. [19135] Beech v Jones (1848) 5 CB 696; 136 ER 1052 …. [17205] Beech; R v (1978) 20 SASR 410 …. [23255], [23345], [23360] Beecham; R v [1921] 3 KB 464 …. [23275] Beedie; R v [1998] QB 356 …. [5130], [5140] Beedle v Thomas (1862) 2 W & W (L) 89 …. [1645] Beere; R v [1965] Qd R 370 …. [27285], [33640], [33675] Beese v Governor of Ashford Remand Centre [1973] 3 All ER 689; [1973] 1 WLR 1426 …. [33690] Beeston; R v (1854) Dears CC 405; 169 ER 782 …. [33795] Beevis v Dawson [1957] 1 QB 195; [1956] 3 All ER 837 …. [17725] Begum; R v (1985) 93 Cr App R 96 …. [33495], [33805] Belford; R v (2011) 208 A Crim R 256 …. [27305] Belhaven and Stenton Peerage, Re (1875) 1 App Cas 278 …. [9040] Beljajev; R v [1984] VR 657 …. [1195], [33485], [33770] Bell v Bell [1970] SASR 3101 …. [25365] — v David Jones Ltd (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 223; 66 WN (NSW) 62 …. [25025], [25255], [39055] — v FS & U Industrial Benefit Society Ltd BC8701164 …. [29065] — v Hobbs [1956] NZLR 1005 …. [39145] — v Holmes [1956] 3 All ER 449; [1956] 1 WLR 1359 …. [5095] — v R (1985) 7 FCR 555; 63 ALR 433 …. [19045], [21050]
Bell (EL) Packaging Pty Ltd v Allied Seafoods Ltd (1990) 4 ACSR 85 …. [25125] Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (No 9) (2008) 39 WAR 1 …. [25010], [39290] Bell Telephone Co of Canada; “Peterborough”, The v [1952] Ex CR 462; [1952] 4 DLR 699 …. [37050] Bell, Re [1969] VR 597 …. [39280] Bell, Re; Bell v Bell [1964] NZLR 912 …. [39260] Bell; Ex parte Lees; R v (1980) 146 CLR 141; 30 ALR 489 …. [25225], [25295] Bellamy v R [1981] 2 NSWLR 727; (1981) 3 A Crim R 432 …. [1195], [7255] Bellamy; R v (1985) 82 Cr App R 222 …. [13050], [13065] Bellanto, Ex parte; Re Prior [1963] NSWR 1556 …. [17135] Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 …. [17065], [17275], [17290], [17445], [17495], [21050], [25340], [29045], [29050], [29180] Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 43 NSWLR 364 …. [3040], [29180] Bellia v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 401; 78 WN (NSW) 238 …. [1290], [7160] Bellino; R v [1993] 1 Qd R 521 …. [15255] Bellis; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 283 …. [33810] — [1966] 1 All ER 552n; [1966] 1 WLR 234 …. [19120], [19130] Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593 …. [9030], [11010], [21252], [33565] Benbrika (Ruling No 11); R v (2007) 183 A Crim R 454 …. [1320] Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401; [1944] ALR 42 …. [3020], [3050], [11010] Benecke v National Australia Bank (1993) 35 NSWLR 110 …. [25010]
Benecke; R v (1999) 106 A Crim R 282 …. [1245] Benedetto v R [2003] 1 WLR 1545 …. [15160] Beneficial Finance Corp v Australian Federal Police Cmr (1991) 31 FCR 523; 103 ALR 167 …. [27165] Beneficial Finance Corp Co Ltd v Conway [1970] VR 321 …. [1300], [1315], [33455], [35030] Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider (2005) 91 SASR 544 …. [5025] Beneke v Franklin [1975] 1 NSWLR 571 …. [3020] Benfield; R v [1997] 2 VR 491 …. [15220] Benjamin Developments Ltd v Robt Jones (Pacific) Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 189 …. [39240] Benjamin; R v (1913) 8 Cr App R 146 …. [17305], [17310], [17315] Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370; [1955] 1 All ER 326 …. [11150] Bennett v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 210 ALR 220 …. [25010] — v Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd (1980) Tas R 177 …. [1210] — v Marshall (1856) 2 K & J 740; 69 ER 980 …. [39280] — v R (1998) 100 A Crim R 228 …. [29060] — v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419 …. [5135], [5180], [5210], [21257] Bennett (A) & Co v Connors [1953] St R Qd 14 …. [1645] Bennett; R v (1903) 6 WAR 60 …. [33615] — (1912) 8 Cr App R 10 …. [11140] — (1978) 68 Cr App R 168 …. [7010], [7030], [7050] — (1986) 44 SASR 164 …. [33760] — (2004) 88 SASR 6 …. [1405] Benney v Dowling [1959] VR 237; [1959] ALR 644 …. [1240], [9110],
[11105], [33610] Bennison v Cartwright (1864) 5 B & S 1; 122 ER 733 …. [37105] Benson; R v [1985] 2 Qd R 117 …. [21205] Bentham v Triggs Pastoral Estates Pty Ltd (1946) 25 LVR 6 …. [33090] Bentley v Cooke (1784) 3 Doug KB 422; 99 ER 729 …. [13030] — v Nelson [1963] WAR 89 …. [25355], [25380] Bentley; R v (1991) 99 Cr App R 342 …. [1400] — [1963] QWN 10 …. [33640] — [2001] 1 Cr App R 307; [1999] Crim LR 330 …. [9030] Benz; R v (1989) 168 CLR 110; 89 ALR 339 …. [1395], [31045], [31065], [31095], [37025], [37170] Bercove v Hermes (No 3) (1983) 51 ALR 109 …. [1070], [25005], [27300] Bercovitz, In the Estate of; Canning v Enever [1962] 1 All ER 552; [1962] 1 WLR 321 …. [1175] Beresford v St Albans Justices (1905) 22 TLR 1 …. [1125], [1170] Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625 …. [11130] Berger; R v [1894] 1 QB 823 …. [33185] Bergin v Stack (1953) 88 CLR 248; [1953] ALR 805 …. [7030] Berjak (Vic) Pty Ltd v Peerless Processing Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 515 …. [35070] Berkeley Peerage Case [1803] All ER Rep 201; (1811) 171 ER 128; 4 Camp 401 …. [31020], [33190], [33235], [33250] Berlyn v Brouskos (2002) 134 A Crim R 111 …. [9035] Bermingham v Overlack [1961] QWN 10 …. [33485] Bernadotti; R v (1869) 11 Cox CC 316 …. [33295] Bernard-Chapdelaine v R [1935] SCR 53; [1935] 2 DLR 132 …. [37150] Bernard; R v (1858) 1 F & F 240; 175 ER 709 …. [17510]
Berrill; R v [1982] Qd R 508 …. [15165], [15170], [15195] Berriman; R v (1854) 6 Cox CC 388 …. [27285] Berry v Berry (1898) 78 LT 688 …. [17265] — v R [1992] 2 AC 364; [1992] 3 All ER 881 …. [17130], [19135] Berry (TJ) Estates Pty Ltd v Mangalore Homestead Pty Ltd [1984] ATPR 40-489 …. [39160] Berry; R v (2007) 17 VR 153 …. [15220], [29010], [29070], [33455] — [1993] Crim LR 973 …. [23035] Berryman v Wise (1791) 4 TR 366; 100 ER 1067 …. [1175] Berthon v Loughman (1817) 2 Stark 258; 171 ER 639 …. [1165], [29050] Bertrand; R v (1867) LR 1 PC 520 …. [1675] — (2008) 20 VR 222 …. [17285], [33640] Berwick-upon-Tweed Corp v Murray (1850) 19 LJ Ch 281; 14 Jur 659 …. [17475] Berwick-upon-Tweed Corporation v — (1850) 19 LJ Ch 281 …. [17500] Beserick; R v (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 …. [1215], [19085], [19090], [21050], [21243] Bessela v Stern (1877) 2 CPD 265 …. [15055], [15225], [31165], [33470], [33485] Best; R v [1909] 1 KB 692 …. [33680] — [1998] 4 VR 603 …. [21050], [21070], [21085], [21243] Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 30 …. [25010] Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (No 7) (2009) 181 FCR 66; 260 ALR 538 …. [25210], [25385], [27010], [27065] — v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418; 244 ALR 32 …. [3158] Betts v Hardcastle (2001) 23 WAR 559 …. [15115], [15135] — v Whittingslowe (No 1) [1944] SASR 163 …. [17725]
Bevan v Western Australia (2010) 202 A Crim R 27 …. [3070], [31090] — v — (2012) 43 WAR 233 …. [17630] Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall & Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97 …. [29070], [31095] Bevan; R v (1993) 98 Cr App R 354 …. [23050] Beveridge v Minter (1824) 1 C & P 364; 171 ER 1232 …. [13030] Beveridge; R v (1987) 85 Cr App R 255 …. [1390] Bey; R v [1993] 3 All ER 253; [1994] 1 WLR 39 …. [33435] BFB; R v (2003) 87 SASR 278 …. [17295], [21050] BG v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 34 …. [19085] Bhandari v Advocates Committee [1956] 3 All ER 742; [1956] 1 WLR 1442 …. [9075], [9085] Bhimji v Chatwani (No 3) [1992] 4 All ER 912; [1992] 1 WLR 1158 …. [25125] BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council [2007] ATPR 42-141 …. [11010] — v NCC (2007) 162 FCR 234 …. [3015], [29065], [29200] BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; 211 ALR 523 …. [41005] BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd v Bluestone Apartments Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 586 …. [25225] Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Pty Ltd [1990] WAR 174 …. [25380] Bibby Bulk Carriers Ltd v Cansulex Ltd [1989] QB 155; [1988] 2 All ER 820 …. [25055] Bicanin; R v (1976) 15 SASR 20 …. [17055] Bickel v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 …. [17505], [17510], [19020], [19165] Bickley; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 53 …. [15095] Bierkowski v Pearson (1971) 18 FLR 110 …. [9070], [13015], [17180]
Biggin; R v [1920] 1 KB 213; [1918] All ER Rep 501 …. [1135], [19095], [23310] Bigsby v Dickinson (1876) 4 Ch D 24 …. [17720], [17725] Bijkerk; R v (2000) 111 A Crim R 443 …. [27310] Bilick; R v (1984) 36 SASR 321 …. [9110], [9115], [11085], [11095], [11100], [33575] Billings; R v [1961] VR 127 …. [23310], [23315], [23325] Bindon v Bishop [2003] 2 NZLR 136 …. [29125] Bingapore; R v (1975) 11 SASR 469 …. [11140] Bingham; R v [1999] 1 WLR 598 …. [17475] Bingley v Marshall (1862) 1 LT 682 …. [17480] Binning v Lehman (2002) 133 A Crim R 294 …. [27305] Biogen Inc v Medeva plc (1996) 36 IPR 438; [1997] RPC 1 …. [11150] Birch v R (1924) 18 Cr App R 26 …. [17545] Birch; R v (1924) 93 LJKB 385 …. [17375], [17390] Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 …. [17225], [17245], [17550] Bircham; R v [1972] Crim LR 430 …. [17460] Birchler v Police [2011] 1 NZLR 169; [2010] NZSC 109 …. [1645] Bird v Adams [1972] Crim LR 174 …. [33460] — v Keep [1918] 2 KB 692 …. [5190], [33345] Birkby; R v [1994] 2 NZLR 38 …. [17375], [31185] Birkett v AF Little Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 492 …. [17390] — v James [1978] AC 297; [1977] 2 All ER 801 …. [5025] Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; 168 A Crim R 350 …. [1290], [11140], [15160] Birks; R v (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 …. [1675], [17435], [17445], [17460], [17480]
— [2003] 2 Cr App R 7 …. [17270] Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666 …. [15150] Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Company Ltd v London and North Western Railway Company [1913] 3 KB 850 …. [25235], [25240], [35260] Birmingham; R v (1829) 8 LJSMC 41 …. [1475] Birrell v Australian Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526; 55 ALR 211 …. [25125] — v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 5 FCR 447 …. [17170] — v Dryer (1884) 9 App Cas 345 …. [3030] Birth v Ridgway (1858) 1 F & F 270; 175 ER 722 …. [39105] Birtles; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 177 …. [1455] Bisaillon v Keable [1983] 2 SCR 60; (1983) 2 DLR (4th) 193 …. [1070], [27105], [27130] Biseja Pty Ltd v NSI Group Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1496; BC200611427 …. [29200] Bishop of Meath v Marquess of Winchester (1836) 3 Bing NC 183; 132 ER 380 …. [39130] Bishop; R v (1913) 15 WALR 70 …. [13035] — [1975] QB 274; [1974] 2 All ER 1206 …. [23315] Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell [1993] Ch 1; [1992] 2 All ER 856 …. [25075], [25165] Bispham; R v (1830) 4 C & P 392; 172 ER 754 …. [19045] Bitossi; R v [1984] 2 Qd R 51 …. [33435] BJC; R v (2005) 13 VR 407 …. [7085], [21050] Bjordal; R v (2005) 93 SASR 237 …. [29045], [29050], [29070] Black v Mount [1965] SASR 167 …. [5095] — v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co [1926] 2 DLR 985 …. [25350]
— v R (1993) 179 CLR 44; 118 ALR 209 …. [15160], [33735] — v Slee [1934] NZLR 108 …. [39185] — v Tung [1953] VLR 629; [1953] ALR 1012 …. [1210], [1215] — v Turner (1895) 6 QLJ 153 …. [1675] Black & Decker Inc v Flymo Ltd [1991] 3 All ER 158; [1991] 1 WLR 753 …. [25010] Black; R v (1909) 74 JP 71 …. [17045] — (1922) 16 Cr App R 118 …. [33505], [37130], [37135], [37145] — [1989] 2 SCR 138 …. [27285] Blackburn; R v (1853) 6 Cox CC 333 …. [1410], [33640] — (1955) 39 Cr App R 84n …. [9020] — [2005] 2 Cr App R 440 …. [29050] Blacker v R (1910) 10 CLR 604 …. [1230] Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 …. [13015], [29105], [29130] Blackledge; R v [1965] VR 397 …. [21185] Blackman v Gant (2010) 29 VR 29; 86 IPR 331 …. [1215] Blackmore v Glamorganshire Canal Co (1835) 2 Cr M & R 133; 150 ER 57 …. [5185] Blackpool Corporation v Locker [1948] 1 KB 349; [1948] 1 All ER 85 …. [25245], [27115] Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] Aust Torts Rep 81-956 …. [1280] Blackwell; R v (1996) 87 A Crim R 289 …. [1135], [21050] — BC9702967 …. [29015] Blades; Ex parte AG; R v (2001) 124 A Crim R 415 …. [11045] Blagojevic v HM Advocate (1995) SLT 1189 …. [29070] Blaikie v Blaikie [1950] SASR 247 …. [5120]
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 …. [5070], [5075], [5080], [5090] Blaise v Blaise [1969] P 54; [1969] 2 All ER 1032 …. [17475] Blake v Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 CPD 94 …. [21275] Blake and Tye; R v (1844) 6 QB 126; 115 ER 49 …. [33565] Blakely v De Lambert [1959] 2 NZLR 356 …. [39240] Blanch t/as Hicksons v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 653 …. [7070] Blanchard; R v [1952] 1 All ER 114 …. [13115] Blandy-Jenkins v Earl Dunraven [1899] 2 Ch 121 …. [33025], [33815] Blastland; R v [1986] AC 41; [1985] 2 All ER 1095 …. [31040], [31055], [31065], [31095], [31155], [33045], [37060], [37115] Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969 …. [1215], [1220], [7160], [7165] Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285 …. [3065] Blenkinsop; R v [1995] 1 Cr App R 7 …. [1370] Bleta v R [1964] SCR 561 …. [29105] Blewitt v — (1988) 80 ALR 353; 62 ALJR 503 …. [17375] — v Tregonning (1835) 3 Ad & E 554; 111 ER 524 …. [17615] Blick; R v (1830) 4 C & P 377; 172 ER 747 …. [5210] — (1966) 50 Cr App R 280 …. [3140] — (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 …. [1380], [11125] Bliss Hill; R v (1918) 13 Cr App R 125 …. [19125] Bliss; R v (1837) 2 Nev & PKB 464 …. [33155] — [1835] All ER Rep 372; (1837) 112 ER 577; 7 Ad & El 550 …. [33185], [37035] Blundell v A-G [1968] NZLR 341 …. [11025] — v Guerin [1968] SASR 38 …. [27105]
Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253; [1942] 2 All ER 187 …. [25115], [25135] Blyth v Blyth [1966] AC 643; [1966] 1 All ER 524 …. [9010] — v Carter [1933] VLR 433; [1933] ALR 434 …. [1455] BM and PA McCauley, In the Marriage of (1996) 22 Fam LR 538 …. [1685] Boag (J) & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 …. [17535] Boal; R v [1965] 1 QB 402; [1964] 3 All ER 269 …. [13105] Board of Visitors of Hull Prison; Ex parte St Germain (No 2); R v [1979] 3 All ER 545; [1979] 1 WLR 1401 …. [1065] Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421; [1974] 3 All ER 887 …. [3150], [15180], [21005], [21015], [21030], [21035], [21045], [21085], [21090], [21100], [21110], [21155], [21185] Boardman; R v [1969] VR 151 …. [1360], [1400] Bodechon v R (1964) 50 MPR 184 …. [17270] Bodi; R v [1969] VR 36 …. [17095], [17650], [17675], [17685] Bodna v Deller and Public Service Appeals Tribunal [1981] VR 183 …. [5130] Bodnar v Townsend (2003) 12 Tas R 232 …. [27315] Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; 249 ALR 300 …. [29020], [29200] Bodsworth; R v [1968] 2 NSWR 132; [1968] 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 290 …. [33640], [33675] Bogaards v McMahon (1988) 23 FCR 472; 80 ALR 342 …. [5030] Bogdal v Hall [1987] Crim LR 500 …. [1170] Boileau v Rutlin (1848) 2 Ex D 665; 154 ER 657 …. [33550] Boland v Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 575 …. [29080] Boland; R v [1974] VR 849 …. [17305], [17315]
Boldron v Widdows (1824) 1 C & P 65; 171 ER 1104 …. [1535] Boles v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666 …. [5170] Bollen v Hickson [1980] Qd R 327 …. [5095] — v — [1981] Qd R 249 …. [5095] Bolton v Corporation of Liverpool (1833) 1 My & K 88; 39 ER 614 …. [25230] — v Dance [1968] VR 631 …. [1175] — v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191 …. [19090], [37100], [37115] Bond v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) (1988) 19 FCR 494; 84 ALR 646 …. [17075] — v Beresford [1931] SASR 285 …. [37155] — v Mac Farlane (1990) 102 FLR 38 …. [1440] — v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92; 128 ALR 595 …. [25025], [25075] Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 …. [33460], [33540] — v — (1988 unreported) …. [17495] Bond, Re; Ex parte Ramsay (1994) 54 FCR 394 …. [25165] Bond; R v [1906] 2 KB 389; [1904] All ER Rep 24 …. [1495], [1520], [21195] Bondareff; R v (1999) 74 SASR 353 …. [33690] Bone; R v [1968] 2 All ER 644; [1968] 1 WLR 983 …. [7030], [7050] Bonelli, In The Goods of (1875) LR 1 PD 69 …. [41035] Bonin; R v (1989) 47 CCC (3d) 230 …. [3156] Bonkowsky v Bonkowsky [1960] NSWR 251 …. [41035] Bonnick; R v (1977) 66 Cr App R 266 …. [1155], [7015] Bonnor; R v [1957] VR 227; [1957] ALR 187 …. [7030], [7140], [7280] Bonollo; R v [1981] VR 633 …. [11010]
Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177; [1969] ALR 741 …. [3158] Bonython; R v (1984) 38 SASR 45 …. [29050], [29060], [29075], [29185] Booher; R v [1928] 4 DLR 795 …. [33660], [33675] Bookbinder v Tebbitt (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 217 …. [27080] Booker; R v (1924) 18 Cr App R 47 …. [33680] — (1924) 88 JP 75 …. [11075] Boonudnoon v R (2002) 172 FLR 111 …. [9030] Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39 …. [9130] Booth; R v (1910) 5 Cr App R 177 …. [33680] — (1981) 74 Cr App R 123 …. [17380], [17385], [17535] — [1982] 2 NSWLR 847; (1982) 8 A Crim R 81 …. [15100], [19005] — [1983] 1 VR 39 …. [1220] Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374; 195 ALR 609 …. [11010] Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd v Donnelly [1988] 1 Qd R 506 …. [39240] Boranga v Flintoff (1997) 19 WAR 1 …. [39290] Borg v Barnes (1987) 10 NSWLR 734 …. [27050], [27120] Borg; R v (2012) 220 A Crim R 522 …. [27315] Bormann; R v (2010) 244 FLR 105 …. [27315] Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 …. [11010], [29150] Borsellino; R v [1978] Qd R 507 …. [33740] Bosman; R v (1989) 50 SASR 365 …. [33640] Bostock v Bostock [1950] P 154; [1950] 1 All ER 25 …. [25365] Boston v W S Bagshaw & Sons [1967] 2 All ER 87n; [1966] 1 WLR 1135n …. [27215]
Boston Clothing Co Pty Ltd v Margaronis (1992) 27 NSWLR 580 …. [17435] Boston; R v (1923) 33 CLR 386; 30 ALR 185 …. [3020] Botes v Van Deventer 1966 (3) SA 182 …. [33545] Bottomley, Ex parte [1909] 2 KB 14; [1908] All ER Rep 958 …. [17155] Bottrill; Ex parte Kuechenmeister; R v [1947] KB 41; [1946] 2 All ER 434 …. [3085] Boucher; R v (1952) 36 Cr App R 152 …. [13110] Bouhsass; R v (2002) 169 CCC (3d) 444 …. [17505] Boulet v R [1978] 1 SCR 332; (1978) 75 DLR (3d) 223 …. [33610] Bouquet; R v [1962] SR (NSW) 563; (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 423 …. [1375], [1420], [33485], [33770] Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1988) 22 FCR 378; 85 ALR 61 …. [3157] Bourke; R v (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 793 …. [7030] Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211 …. [1275], [3265] Bourns Inc v Raychem Corp [1999] 1 All ER 908 [18] …. [25055] — v — [1999] 3 All ER 154 …. [25010], [25015], [25055], [25210], [25235] Bouvy, Ex parte (1900) 18 NZLR 593 …. [41035] Bovis Construction (Scotland) Ltd v Whatlings Construction Ltd (1995) SC 351 …. [39240] Bowden Bros & Co v Imperial Marine & Transport Insurance Co (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 614 …. [41005] Bowden; R v [1999] 4 All ER 43; [1999] 1 WLR 823 …. [25010] Bowen; R v [1972] Crim LR 312 …. [33520] Bowesco Pty Ltd v Zohar (2007) 156 FCR 129 …. [39290] Bowker v Williamson (1889) 5 TLR 382 …. [39135]
Bowles; R v [1992] Crim LR 726 …. [17690] Bowman v DPP [1990] Crim LR 600 …. [3035], [3065], [3140] — v Hodgson (1867) LR 1 P & D 362 …. [39115] Bowron v Bowron (1982) 8 Fam LR 651 …. [1630] Bowskill v Dawson [1954] 1 QB 288; [1953] 2 All ER 1393 …. [35060], [35075] Box; R v [1964] 1 QB 430; [1963] 3 All ER 240 …. [27215] Boxer v R (1995) 14 WAR 505 …. [23020], [23030] Boxshall; R v [1956] QWN 45 …. [1295] Boyce v Cafred Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 367 …. [21280] Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123 …. [25225] — v Cook (1880) 14 Ch D 53 …. [39250] Boyes; R v [1861] All ER Rep 172; [1861] 121 ER 730; (1861) 1 B & S 310 …. [25100], [25105] Boykovski; R v (1991) 58 A Crim R 436 …. [17135] Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Exch 647; 156 ER 598 …. [1210] — v — (1855) 11 Exch 360; 156 ER 870 …. [11040], [33540], [39010] Boyle; R v (2009) 26 VR 219 …. [9030] Bozatsis; R v (1997) 97 A Crim R 296 …. [27315] BP Australia Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 442 …. [39240] BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1980] 1 NSWLR (L) 496 …. [41005] BPA Industries Ltd v Black (1987) 11 NSWLR 609 …. [25075] Brace, Re; Ex parte Debtor v Gabriel [1966] 2 All ER 38; [1966] 1 WLR 595 …. [17450], [17460] Bracegirdle v Apter (1951) 49 LGR 790 …. [39050] — v Bailey (1859) 1 F & F 536; 175 ER 842 …. [17475]
Bracewell; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 44 …. [9095], [19145], [19155], [23275] Brackenbury; R v [1965] 1 All ER 960; [1965] 1 WLR 1475 …. [33690] Bradford & Bingley Building Society v Seddon [1999] 4 All ER 217; [1999] 1 WLR 1482 …. [5170] Bradford & Bingley plc v Rashid [2006] 4 All ER 705; [2006] 1 WLR 2066 …. [25350], [25355], [25385] Bradford City Metropolitan Council v K [1990] Fam 140 …. [11130] Bradford, In the Marriage of (1995) 120 FLR 75 …. [25395] Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557; 1 ALR 241 …. [3085], [3156] — v James (1853) 13 CB 822; 138 ER 1426 …. [33015] — v Ricardo (1831) 8 Bing 57; 31 ER 321 …. [17370] Bradley (No 2); R v (1986) 85 FLR 111 …. [9045] Bradley; R v (1989) 41 A Crim R 297 …. [21050] Bradpiece v South British Insurance Co Ltd 1966 (2) SA 629 …. [31175] Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 …. [3280], [9055] Bradshaw; R v (1978) 18 SASR 83 …. [11070], [33660] — (1985) 82 Cr App R 79 …. [29070] Brady v Group Lotus Car Cos plc [1987] 2 All ER 674 …. [7015] — v — [1987] 3 All ER 1050 …. [7210], [7230] — v Mazurak [1983] WAR 291 …. [3095], [17660] — v Thornton (1947) 75 CLR 140; [1947] ALR 438 …. [7105] Brady; R v (1980) 2 A Crim R 42 …. [33460] — (2005) 92 SASR 135 …. [11095] Bragg; R v (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 436 …. [17560] Braham; R v [1976] VR 547 …. [25260]
Brailey v Rhodesia Consolidated Ltd [1910] 2 Ch 95 …. [41035] Brain v Froude (1992) 61 SASR 65 …. [27255] — v Preece (1843) 11 M & W 773; 152 ER 1016 …. [33120], [33360] Braithwaite v Kearns (1865) 34 Beav 202; 55 ER 612 …. [17480] Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153 …. [39290] — v Trade Practices Commission (No 3) (1981) 58 FLR 452 …. [25010], [25240], [25275] Brambles Holdings Ltd (t/as Oilfield & General Transport Co) v WMC Engineering Services Pty Ltd (1995) 14 WAR 239; 21 MVR 238 …. [25240] Bramhill; R v (1933) 24 Cr App R 79 …. [15095] Bramwell v Repatriation Commission (1998) 158 ALR 623 …. [5030] Brandao v Barnett [1843] All ER Rep 719; (1846) 8 ER 1622; 12 Cl & Fin 787 …. [3050] Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551; 51 ALJR 207 …. [1215] Brandon; R v (1969) 53 Cr App R 466 …. [27215] Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 …. [11150], [39160], [39185], [39240] Brannan v R (1834) 6 Car & P 326; 172 ER 1261 …. [31145] Brannigan v Davison [1997] AC 238 …. [25155] Branscombe; R v (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 363 …. [1675] Bransden; R v (1981) 27 SASR 474 …. [23345] Brasier; R v (1779) 1 Leach 199; 168 ER 202 …. [13050] Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 All ER 523 …. [7005], [7010], [7030], [7050], [7090], [9120], [21200] Brauer; R v [1937] QWN 18 …. [33730] Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1; 190 ALR 1 …. [1025], [35595]
— v Palmer [1953] 2 All ER 1449; [1953] 1 WLR 1455 …. [1200] Bray; R v (1988) 88 Cr App R 354 …. [35425] Braye-Jones; R v [1966] Qd R 295 …. [17280] Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434; 276 ALR 451 …. [1215] BRB v JB [1968] P 466; [1968] 2 All ER 1023 …. [1235] Brdarovski; R v (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 …. [15195], [17135], [17280] Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161; [1950] ALR 811 …. [3095] — v Perry [1961] SASR 177 …. [25005], [25100], [25105] Breedon v Kongras (1996) 16 WAR 66 …. [3070] Breen v Minister for Environment and Planning (1981) 48 LGRA 275 …. [27010] — v R (1976) 180 CLR 233 …. [17270], [17285] — v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406; [1962] ALR 340 …. [3156] Bremer v Freeman (1857) 10 Moo PC 306; 14 ER 508 …. [41010], [41035] Brenan and Galen’s Case (1847) 10 QB 492; 116 ER 188 …. [41005] Brennan v Kinjella (1993) 6 BPR 13,168 …. [39240] Brennan; R v [1999] 2 Qd R 529 …. [15220] Brent; R v [1973] Crim LR 295 …. [9120], [17370] Breslin; R v (1984) 80 Cr App R 226 …. [1390] Bresnehan v R (1992) 1 Tas R 234 …. [9070] Bressington v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1947) 75 CLR 339; 48 SR (NSW) 142; 65 WN (NSW) 69 …. [3230], [9120] Brett v Beales (1830) 10 B & C 508; 109 ER 539 …. [33155] Brett; R v BC9102525 …. [1295] Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541 …. [1295], [3135]
Brewer v Brewer (1953) 88 CLR 1 …. [5080] Brewer; R v (1942) 66 CLR 535; [1942] ALR 353 …. [1175] Brewster v Sewell (1820) 3 B & Ald 296; 106 ER 672 …. [39060] Briamore Manufacturing Ltd (in liq), Re [1986] 3 All ER 132; [1986] 1 WLR 1429 …. [25020] Brian Gardner Motors Pty Ltd v Bembridge (2000) 120 A Crim R 53 …. [1675], [3285], [33540] Brice; R v (1819) 2 B & Ald 606; 106 ER 487 …. [13300] Brickell v Hulse (1837) 7 Ad & E 454; 112 ER 541 …. [33510] Brickworks Ltd v Council of the Shire of Warringah (1963) 108 CLR 568 …. [31145] Bridal Fashions Pty Ltd v Comptroller General of Customs (1996) 17 WAR 499; 140 ALR 681 …. [25080], [25180] Bridge v R (1964) 118 CLR 600; [1965] ALR 815 …. [1220] Bridger; R v (2003) 141 A Crim R 287 …. [21100] Bridges v North London Railway Co (1874) LR 7 HL 213 …. [3230], [3250], [3260], [9110] Bridgewater, In the Estate of [1965] 1 All ER 717; [1965] 1 WLR 416 …. [33325], [37105] Bridgewater; R v [1905] 1 KB 131 …. [23315] Bridgman; R v (1980) 24 SASR 278 …. [33435] Bridlington Relay Ltd v Yorkshire Electricity Board [1965] Ch 436; [1965] 1 All ER 264 …. [3020] Brien; R v (1965) 50 DLR (2d) 92 …. [7160] Brierly v Brierly and Williams [1918] P 257 …. [33345] Briggs v Wilson (1854) 5 De G M & G 12; 43 ER 772 …. [33015] Briggs; R v (1930) 22 Cr App R 68 …. [17055] — (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 …. [9115]
Bright v Legerton (1861) 2 De G F & J 606; 45 ER 755 …. [1175] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] ALR 334 …. [1050], [9005], [9015], [9050], [9060], [9085], [9130], [15155], [25290] Brilliant Gold Mining Co v Craven (1898) 9 QLJ 144 …. [3055] Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 …. [7030] Brinkley v Brinkley [1965] P 75; [1963] 1 All ER 493 …. [35065] Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General (Qld) [1979] AC 411; (1978) 19 ALR 681; [1978] 3 All ER 30 …. [3020], [11010] Brisbane City Council and White, Re (1972) 50 LGRA 275 …. [25355] Brisbane Unit Development Corp Pty Ltd v Robertson [1983] 2 Qd R 105 …. [39160] Brisco v Lomax [1835] All ER Rep 610; (1838) 112 ER 812; 8 Ad & El 198 …. [5190], [33155] Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501; [1966] 1 All ER 465 …. [17075] Bristol Corp v Great Western Railway Co [1916] WN 47 …. [17620] Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co Ltd v Fiat Motors Ltd [1910] 2 KB 831; [1908] All ER Rep 113 …. [39195] Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3) (2012) 298 ALR 137 …. [25010] Bristow v Cormican (1878) 3 App Cas 641 …. [1185], [31140], [33815] — v Sequeville (1850) 5 Exch 275; 155 ER 118 …. [41035] British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aging (2011) 281 ALR 75 …. [25010], [27095] British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (2002) 7 VR 524 …. [25010] — v Cowell (No 2) (2003) 8 VR 571 …. [25055] — v Eubanks for the United States of America (2004) 60 NSWLR 483 …. [17020]
— v Laurie (2011) 273 ALR 429; 85 ALJR 348 …. [25300] British Celanese Ltd v Courtaulds Ltd (1935) 152 LT 537 …. [29045] — v — (1935) 52 RPC 171 …. [29115], [29205] British Coal Corp v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 816; [1988] 1 WLR 1113 …. [25010], [25015], [25020] British Columbia Medical Assn v R (1983) 42 BCLR 240; 144 DLR (3d) 374 …. [27065] British Franco Electric Pty Ltd v Dowling Plastics Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 448 …. [35280] British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877; [1972] 1 All ER 749 …. [1210] British Sky Broadcasting Group plc v Virgin Media Communications Ltd (formerly NTL Communications Ltd) [2008] 4 All ER 1026 (CA) …. [25055] British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096; [1981] 1 All ER 417 …. [11130], [25305] British Thomson-Houston Co Ltd v British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 2 Ch 160; [1924] All ER Rep 446 …. [33525] Britten v F H Pilcher & Sons [1969] 1 All ER 491 …. [25245] Britten; R v (1988) 51 SASR 567; 148 LSJS 1 …. [1380], [1410] Brittle; R v (1965) 109 Sol Jo 1028 …. [19125] Britton v Cmr for Road Transport (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 249; 64 WN (NSW) 16 …. [17305] Britton; R v [1987] 2 All ER 512; [1987] 1 WLR 539 …. [17240] Britzman; R v [1983] 1 All ER 369; [1983] 1 WLR 350 …. [11120], [21130], [23315] Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Car & P 518; 172 ER 528 …. [25320] Broadbent; R v [1964] VR 733 …. [33610] Broadhurst v R [1964] AC 441; [1964] 1 All ER 111 …. [11135], [33435]
Brocklebank v Thompson [1903] 2 Ch 344 …. [33190] Brodie v Brodie (1861) 4 LT 307 …. [37025] — v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 180 ALR 145 …. [3235], [29125] Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Waugh (1988) 14 NSWLR 360 …. [17600] Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v FCT (1999) 99 ATC 5193 …. [41005] Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315; 67 ALR 12 …. [15140], [15160], [17175], [19050], [29050], [33660] Bromley Investments Pty Ltd v Elkington (2002) 43 ACSR 584 …. [29070] Bromley Magistrates; Ex parte Smith; R v [1995] 4 All ER 146; [1995] 1 WLR 944 …. [17130] Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros [1937] 1 KB 534; [1936] 3 All ER 696 …. [7075] Brooke; R v (1819) 2 Stark 472; 171 ER 709 …. [17470], [17475] Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 2) (2009) 180 FCR 1; 256 ALR 416 …. [25210], [25230] Brooks v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1969) 121 CLR 432; [1969] ALR 321 …. [7185] — v Medical Defence Union of Western Australia (1999) 94 FCR 164 …. [25225] — v Police (2013) 116 SASR 234; 64 MVR 105 …. [1220], [9035] — v R (2012) 36 VR 84 …. [15220] Brooks; R v (1989) 7 WCB (2d) 170 …. [21170] — (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 …. [13050], [13060], [13275] Broome v Broome [1955] P 190; [1955] 1 All ER 201 …. [25365], [27190] Brophy; R v [1982] AC 476; [1981] 2 All ER 705 …. [11060], [33675]
Brotherton; R v (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 …. [1445], [7085], [17040] Brounker (Lord) v Atkyns (1682) Skinner 14; 90 ER 8 …. [3040] Brown v Alyta [1970] ALR 897; (1970) 44 ALJR 341 …. [3135] — v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483 …. [3005] — v Byrne (1854) 3 E & B 703; 118 ER 1304 …. [39195] — v Churchill (2006) 31 WAR 246 …. [11145] — v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 119 FCR 269 …. [11035], [25350], [25395] — v Eastern and Midlands Rail Co (1889) 22 QBD 391 …. [1515], [21275] — v FCT (2001) 187 ALR 714 …. [25395] — v Foster (1857) 1 H & N 736; 156 ER 1397 …. [25295] — v — (1873) 113 Mass 136 …. [1295] — v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance plc [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325 …. [25265] — v Iontask Pty Ltd (2002) 24 NSWCCR 231 …. [29200] — v Lethbridge (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 315 …. [17060] — v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592 …. [17580] — v Matthews [1990] Ch 662; [1990] 2 All ER 155 …. [27115] — v Petranker (1991) 22 NSWLR 717 …. [17075], [17680], [35090] — v R (1913) 17 CLR 570; 20 ALR 197 …. [9020], [37055] — v — (1986) 160 CLR 171; 64 ALR 161 …. [3158] — v — [1980] Tas R 61 …. [17435], [17460], [17690]Q — v — [1971] Tas SR 57 …. [17135] — v Rolls Royce Ltd [1960] 1 All ER 577 …. [7005] — v Western Australia (2011) 207 A Crim R 533 …. [33045] — v Wren Bros [1895] 1 QB 390 …. [1125]
Brown (Nigel) v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2012] 1 WLR 1577 …. [19135] Brown and Hedley; R v [1861] All ER Rep Ext 2151; (1867) LR 1 CCR 70; (1867) 10 Cox CC 453 …. [19045] Brown, Ex parte; Re Morris (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 165 …. [15045] Brown, Ex parte; Re Tunstall (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 1; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 13 …. [27180] Brown; R v (1831) 4 Car & P 588n; 172 ER 837 …. [17055] — (1931) 23 Cr App R 56 …. [33680], [33730] — (1960) 44 Cr App R 181 …. [23315], [23360] — (1975) 10 SASR 139 …. [7020], [7030] — (1987) 87 Cr App R 52 …. [27130] — (1988) 89 Cr App R 97 …. [19090] — [1960] VR 382 …. [23325], [23340], [23345] — [1977] Qd R 220 …. [13275] — [1983] Crim LR 38 …. [23040] — [1985] 2 Qd R 126 …. [17660] — [1991] Crim LR 835 …. [31140] — [1995] 1 Qd R 287 …. [7085] — [1996] 1 WLR 1599 …. [17130] — [1998] 2 Cr App R 364 …. [17495] — [1998] AC 367; [1997] 3 All ER 769 …. [17130] — [2002] 1 Cr App R 46 …. [11100] Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 …. [1742], [17065], [17435], [17445], [17450], [17455], [17460], [17525], [17720] — v Murray (1825) Ry & M 254; 171 ER 1012 …. [17725] — v Smith (1974) 4 ALR 114 …. [9070]
Browne-Kerr; R v [1990] VR 78 …. [11075], [39105] Browne; R v (1906) 70 JP 472 …. [11035] — (1943) 29 Cr App R 106 …. [17650] — (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 …. [1360] Browning; R v (1991) 103 FLR 425 …. [11095], [39105] — (1991) 94 Cr App R 109 …. [1440] — [1995] Crim LR 227 …. [17175] Brownlow; R v (2003) 86 SASR 114 …. [23290], [23405] Brownlowe; R v (1986) 7 NSWLR 461 …. [1445] Broyles; R v [1991] 3 SCR 595 …. [27305] BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275; 148 ALR 101 …. [11125], [1520], [15170], [17295], [19145], [21243] Bruce v Grocon Ltd (1995) 11 NSWCCR 247 …. [5030] — v Ligar (1869) 6 WW & A’B (E) 240 …. [25255] — v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697; [1936] 1 All ER 287 …. [17580] — v R (1987) 74 ALR 219; 61 ALJR 603 …. [1195], [3270], [7255], [33770] — v Waldron [1963] VR 3 …. [27105] Bruce; R v (1986) 23 A Crim R 123 …. [1195] — [1965] QWN 48 …. [33690] — [1975] 3 All ER 277; [1975] 1 WLR 1252 …. [23380] — [1988] VR 579 …. [33770] Bruff v Great Northern Rail Co (1858) 1 F & F 344; 175 ER 757 …. [33545] Bruinsma v Menczer (1995) 40 NSWLR 716 …. [1730], [25395] Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141 …. [5070]
Brunsgard v Jennings [1974] WAR 36 …. [13055] Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53; 59 ALJR 842 …. [11150] Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106 …. [25010] Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 128 ALR 163 …. [3159] Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287; 130 ALR 129 …. [5170] — v Foot (1867) LR 2 QB 161 …. [3060] — v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 531 …. [33775] Bryant (No 2); R v [1956] St R Qd 570 …. [1645], [1650] Bryant; R v (1946) 31 Cr App R 146 …. [17130], [17185], [17225], [27135] — [1979] QB 108; [1978] 2 All ER 689 …. [19120], [19130] — [1980] 1 NZLR 264 …. [1045] Bryce v Bryce [1933] P 83; [1932] All ER Rep 788 …. [37025], [37040], [37110] Bryce; R v [1994] 1 Qd R 77 …. [15165], [15170] Bryer v Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 321 …. [3135] Brysh v Davidson (1963) 42 DLR (2d) 673 …. [25365] BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475 …. [21252] BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 7) (1998) 153 ALR 722 …. [25010], [25300] — v New South Wales (No 8) (1998) 154 ALR 202 …. [25300] BTR Engineering (Aust) (formerly Borg-Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724 …. [25010], [25100], [25105] Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works, Duke of (1870) LR 5 Ex 221 …. [5030] Buccleuch (Duke) v Metropolitan Board of Works [1861] All ER Rep
654; (1872) LR 5 HL 418 …. [27205], [27210] Buchan; R v [1964] 1 All ER 502; [1964] 1 WLR 365 …. [33690] Buchanan v Jennings (AG of NZ intervening) [2005] 1 AC 115; [2005] 2 All ER 273 …. [27095] — v Moore [1963] NI 194 …. [7165] Buchanan, Re (1964) 65 SR (NSW) 9; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 83 …. [11130], [25305], [25340] Buchanan; R v (2004) 152 A Crim R 302 …. [1450] — [1966] VR 9 …. [1125], [1530], [33660], [33690] Buck v R [1983] WAR 372 …. [15165], [15220] Buck; R v [1940] OR 444; [1941] 1 DLR 302 …. [33290] Bucker v Jarratt (1802) 3 Bos & Pul 143; 127 ER 78 …. [39010] Buckett; R v (1995) 132 ALR 669 …. [1305] Buckingham v Daily News Ltd [1956] 2 QB 534; [1956] 2 All ER 904 …. [1290], [1480] Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623; [1989] 2 All ER 225 …. [25355] Buckland v R (1983) 9 A Crim R 132 …. [11065] Buckland; R v [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 …. [1220] Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1; 19 ALR 257 …. [3135] — v Cooke (1854) 1 K & J 29; 69 ER 356 …. [17375] — v Inland Revenue Cmr [1962] NZLR 29 …. [31155] — v Law Society (No 2) [1984] 3 All ER 313; [1984] 1 WLR 1101 …. [27050] — v Macken [1961] NZLR 46 …. [39015] — v Thomas (1554) 1 Pl Com 118; 75 ER 182 …. [29045] — v Wathen [1973] VR 511 …. [3285], [29050], [29110]
Buckley; R v (1873) 13 Cox CC 293 …. [33125], [37115], [37120] — (2004) 10 VR 215 …. [17485] Buckman v Button [1943] KB 405; [1943] 2 All ER 82 …. [7120] Buckmaster v Meiklejohn (1853) 8 Ex D 634; 155 ER 1506 …. [33550] Buckskin; R v (1974) 10 SASR 1 …. [33765] Budd v Davison (1880) 29 WR 192 …. [17725] Buehler AG v Chronos Richardson Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 960 …. [5025] Buerger v New York Life Assurance Co (1927) 137 LT 431 …. [41035] Bueti; R v (1997) 70 SASR 370 …. [1445], [33690] Bufalo Corporation Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apptd) (in liq), Re (2002) 7 VR 350 …. [25375], [35400], [35595] Bugeja v R (2010) 30 VR 493 …. [17065], [17460] Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 …. [19020], [29060], [29065] Buggy; R v (1961) 45 Cr App R 298 …. [33520] Bui v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 93 …. [15170], [15220] Buiks v Western Australia (2008) 188 A Crim R 362 …. [21252] Builders Licensing Board v Mahoney (1986) 5 NSWLR 96 …. [1830] Buisson; R v [1990] 2 NZLR 542 …. [29115] Bukvic; R v (2010) 107 SASR 405 …. [9070] Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375; 135 ALR 517 …. [1310], [1335], [1445], [17675] Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 …. [25010], [25265] Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443; 171 ALR 613 …. [1520], [19085], [19090], [31010], [31065], [33340] Bull, Re [1998] 2 Qd R 224 …. [25100] Bullard v R [1957] AC 635; [1961] 3 All ER 470 …. [7015], [9030]
Bullen v — [1998] 4 VR 621 …. [21050] Buller v Cripps (1703) 6 Mod 29; 87 ER 793 …. [3159] Bulley v Bulley (1884) LR 9 Ch App 739 …. [33460] Bulley’s Settlement, Re [1886] WN 80 …. [33810] Bullivant v A-G (Vic) [1901] AC 196; [1900] All ER Rep 812 …. [25235], [25265], [25270], [25290] Bullock v Borrett [1939] 1 All ER 505 …. [35065], [35105] — v Kennedy (1988) 12 NSWLR 200 …. [33750] Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 …. [17460] Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 244; 157 ALR 193 …. [1490] Bulurru Australia Pty Ltd v Oliver (2000) 49 IPR 384 …. [5075] Bumper Development Corp Ltd v Cmr of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 4 All ER 638; [1991] 1 WLR 1362 …. [41005], [41010], [41030], [41035] Bunbury v Bunbury (1839) 2 Beav 173; 48 ER 1146 …. [25210] Bundy; R v (1910) 5 Cr App R 270 …. [1360], [1365] Bunker v Mahoney [1917] VLR 65; (1917) 23 ALR 41 …. [1605] Bunn v British Broadcasting Corp [1998] 3 All ER 552 …. [25055] Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; 19 ALR 641 …. [1765], [1360], [3159], [25030], [27240], [27245], [27255], [27285], [27305], [33625], [33680], [33745], [33760], [33775] Bunting; R v (2002) 84 SASR 378 …. [25245], [25295] — (2004) 92 SASR 146 …. [11125] Burch v Farrows Bank Ltd [1917] 1 Ch 606 …. [3055] Burchielli; R v [1981] VR 611 …. [1360], [1365], [1395], [1400], [1405] Burden v Ainsworth (2004) 59 NSWLR 506 …. [5185] — v New South Wales Crime Commission (1993) 68 A Crim R 410 ….
[25105], [25115] Burdett; R v [1814] All ER Rep 80; (1820) 106 ER 873; 4 B & Ald 95 …. [1125], [1215], [1220], [3275], [7160] — (1855) Dears 431; 169 ER 792 …. [13095] Burg Design Pty Ltd v Wolki (1999) 162 ALR 639 …. [25395] Burge; R v [1996] 1 Cr App R 163 …. [15220] Burger King v Registrar of Trademarks (1973) 128 CLR 417; [1972] ALR 1361 …. [29050] Burges v Wickham (1863) 3 B & S 669; 122 ER 251 …. [39175], [39250] Burgess v Burgess [1958] 2 All ER 63; [1958] 1 WLR 608 …. [17620] Burgess; Ex parte Henry; R v (1936) 55 CLR 608; [1936] ALR 482 …. [3158] Burgess; R v (1956) 40 Cr App R 144 …. [15125] — [1968] 2 QB 112; [1968] 2 All ER 54 …. [11050], [33620] Burhop, In the Marriage of (1979) 5 Fam LR 345 …. [33840] Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612 …. [1215], [7160], [17001] Burke; R v (1847) 2 Cox CC 295 …. [31180], [31185] — (1858) 8 Cox CC 44 …. [17590], [33805] — (1912) 47 ILT 111 …. [17275] — (1985) 82 Cr App R 156 …. [23345] Burles; R v [1964] Tas SR 256 …. [1295] Burlinson v Police (1994) 75 A Crim R 258 …. [9020] Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; [1979] 3 All ER 700 …. [27010], [27035], [27065], [27085], [27120], [27160], [27165], [27190] Burman v Woolf [1939] VLR 402 …. [17200]
Burnaby v Bailie (1889) 42 Ch D 282 …. [1280], [31095] Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187; [1955] 3 All ER 822 …. [17415], [17535], [17565], [25015] Burnett & South Burnett Primary Producers’ Co-op Assn Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1939] QWN 17; (1939) 33 QJPR 57 …. [33385] Burnett; R v [1944] VLR 115; [1944] ALR 247 …. [33660] Burney; R v [1989] 1 NZLR 732 …. [27215] Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 120 ALR 42 …. [3159] Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541; [1970] 1 All ER 886 …. [3020] — v Joseph [1969] Qd R 130 …. [17080], [17105] — v Lipman (1975) 132 CLR 157 …. [3225] — v R (1975) 132 CLR 258; 6 ALR 95 …. [11045], [11055], [11060] Burns Philp Hardware Ltd v Howard Chia Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 642 …. [39240] Burns; R v (1883) 9 VLR (L) 191 …. [1880] — (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 …. [17460], [17485], [17630], [21050] — (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 …. [15220], [21050], [39105] — (2003) 137 A Crim R 557 …. [19055] — [2006] 2 Cr App R 264 …. [41110] Burnside Sub-branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324 …. [35360], [39130] Burr v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 220 …. [15220] — v Ware Rural District Council [1939] 2 All ER 688 …. [33545] Burrell v R (2007) 190 A Crim R 148 …. [9035], [17405], [27215] — v — (2009) 196 A Crim R 199 …. [9040], [17405] Burrough v Martin (1809) 2 Camp 112; 170 ER 1098 …. [17200]
Burrows v Hanlin [1930] SASR 54 …. [29130] — v R (1937) 58 CLR 249 …. [23210] Burrows; R v (1988) 36 A Crim R 408 …. [17305] — (2003) 140 A Crim R 533 …. [33435] Bursill v Tanner (1885) 16 QBD 1; [1881] All ER Rep Ext 1203 …. [25225], [25295] Burt; R v (1851) 5 Cox CC 284 …. [19120] — [2000] 1 Qd R 28 …. [27305], [33635], [33650] Burton v Laycock; Ex parte Laycock [1930] St R Qd 312 …. [15045] — v Plummer (1834) 2 Ad & El 341; 111 ER 132 …. [17200] Burton; R v (1854) Dears CC 282; 169 ER 728 …. [1250] Burut v Public Prosecutor of Brunei [1995] 2 AC 579; [1959] 4 All ER 300 …. [33655] Burwood Municipal Council v Harvey (1995) 86 LGERA 389 …. [17135] BUSB v R (2011) 248 FLR 368; 209 A Crim R 390 …. [13070], [17155] Busby v Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd (1984) 2 IPR 304; [1984] 1 NZLR 461 …. [25075] Busby; R v (1982) 75 Cr App R 79 …. [17590], [19030] Bush v R (1993) 43 FCR 549; 115 ALR 654 …. [17440] Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75; [1980] 2 All ER 608 …. [1065] Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty [2002] ATPR (Digest) 46-225 …. [1700] — v Longwarry and District Dairymen’s Co-operative Association Ltd [1939] VLR 263; [1939] ALR 329 …. [1645], [33540] Butcher; R v (1900) 64 JP 808 …. [17045] Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 76 ALR 45 …. [1300], [1305], [1315], [1320], [13270], [17170], [29020], [29185], [31075], [39035]
Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680; [1970] 3 All ER 593 …. [25025], [25290] — v Butler [1894] P 25; (1894) 63 LJP 1; 69 LT 545; 1 R 535 …. [5025] — v Mountgarret (1859) 7 HLC 633; 11 ER 252 …. [33250] — v R (2011) 216 A Crim R 215 …. [1220] Butler (No 1); R v (1991) 102 FLR 341 …. [33495], [33745] Butler (No 2); R v (1991) 1 NTLR 166 …. [15160] Butler; R v (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 328; 70 WN (NSW) 222 …. [17135] — (1986) 84 Cr App R 12 …. [21065] — [2010] 1 Qd R 325 …. [9030], [29080] Butterley Co Ltd v New Hucknall Colliery Co Ltd [1910] AC 381 …. [39240] Butterwasser; R v [1948] 1 KB 4; [1947] 2 All ER 415 …. [1045], [19110], [19120], [19140] Buttery & Co v Inglis (1877) 5 R 58 …. [39240] Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1981] 1 QB 223; [1980] 3 All ER 475 …. [25010], [25265], [25275], [25300], [27065], [27070], [27155] Button v R (2002) 25 WAR 382 …. [21210], [33045] Button; R v [1992] 1 Qd R 552 …. [15100] Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 …. [21050] Buzzacott; R v (2010) 107 SASR 564 …. [33295] Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia (2009) 74 NSWLR 469 …. [25010], [25300] BWT; R v (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 …. [17295] By-Law made by Prospect District Council, Re; Ex parte Hill [1926] SASR 326 …. [3020] Byast; R v [1999] 2 Qd R 384 …. [13030]
Byczko (No 1); R v (1977) 16 SASR 506 …. [15170], [19080], [19085], [19090] Byczko (No 2); R v (1977) 17 SASR 460 …. [17450] Byczko; R v (1982) 30 SASR 578 …. [33760] Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010); R v (2010) 107 SASR 517 …. [17290] Byers v Dorotea Pty Ltd (1986) 69 ALR 715 …. [39160] Byrne; R v [1972] 1 NSWLR 264 …. [33705] Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253; 279 ALR 212 …. [39240] Byrnes; R v (1996) 20 ACSR 260 …. [21050] C v C [1972] 3 All ER 577; [1972] 1 WLR 1335 …. [1280] — v C (Privilege: Criminal Communications) [2002] Fam 42 …. [25225], [25290] — v DPP [1996] 1 AC 1; [1995] 2 All ER 43 …. [7240] — v National Crime Authority (1987) 78 ALR 338 …. [25005] — v R (1991) 59 A Crim R 46 …. [19080] — v T (1995) 58 FCR 1; 136 ALR 703 …. [25040] C & C, Re (1995) 20 Fam LR 24 …. [17520] C (a minor) v Hackney London Borough Council [1996] 1 All ER 973; [1996] 1 WLR 789 …. [5055], [5170] C plc v P [2008] Ch 1; [2007] 3 All ER 1034 …. [25090] — v P (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) [2006] Ch 549; [2006] 4 All ER 311 …. [25075] C van der Lely NV v Bamfords (1962) 1 A IPR 86; [1963] RPC 61 …. [1280] C-C Bottlers Ltd v Lion Nathan Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 445 …. [25010] C, CN; R v (2013) 117 SASR 64 …. [21257] C, G; R v (2013) 117 SASR 162 …. [1680], [21257]
C; R v (1993) 60 SASR 467 …. [13165], [19170], [29050] — (1997) 93 A Crim R 81 …. [27315] — [1976] Qd R 341 …. [33750] — [2000] 2 Qd R 54 …. [35410] — [2005] 3 NZLR 92 …. [27215] CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1999) 47 IPR 63 …. [29190] Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311 …. [1690] Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130; [1941] ALR 33 …. [25165] Caceres-Moreira; R v [1995] Crim LR 489 …. [21205] Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 …. [5030], [5070] Cacic; R v (2001) 124 A Crim R 598 …. [35417] — (2002) 5 VR 446 …. [35417] Cackett v Keswick [1902] 2 Ch 456 …. [11150] Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Ltd (2008) 246 ALR 137 …. [25010], [25210], [27085] — v — [2008] ATPR 42-224 …. [25055] — v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719 …. [29050], [29200] — v — (2007) 159 FCR 397; 239 ALR 662 …. [29050], [29185], [29200] — v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] ATPR 42-113 …. [1680], [35532] — v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 3) (2006) 229 ALR 179 …. [35440] — v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 4) (2006) 229 ALR 136 …. [1215] — v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 8) (2008) 75 IPR 557 …. [17445]
Caddy v Beattie [1908] VLR 17 …. [1255] Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 269 ALR 204; 84 ALJR 588 …. [3157], [3159] Cadle Co, The v Hearley [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 143 …. [25350] Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 370 …. [29185], [29190], [29205] Cafaro v R (2002) 132 A Crim R 142 …. [1380] Cafe v Australian Portland Cement Pty Ltd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 280 …. [1215] Caffoor v Cmr of Income Tax, Colombo [1961] AC 584; [1961] 2 All ER 436 …. [5030] Cahalane v Hop Kee [1926] St R Qd 73 …. [1675] Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 357; 250 ALR 223 …. [11090] Cahill (No 2); R v [1999] 2 VR 387 …. [21035] Cahill; Ex parte McGregor; R v (1985) 61 ACTR 7 …. [25295] Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39 …. [25295] — v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 …. [27105], [27130] Cain; R v (1936) 25 Cr App R 204 …. [17135] — [1994] 2 All ER 398; [1994] 1 WLR 1449 …. [19135] Caine v Palace Steam Shipping Co [1907] 1 KB 670 …. [5185] Caine; R v (1993) 68 A Crim R 233 …. [11035] Cairns; R v [2003] 1 WLR 796 …. [17120], [17370] Cakovski; R v (2002) 133 A Crim R 18 …. [17405] Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd [1995] FSR 818 …. [29080] Calabria v R (1983) 151 CLR 670; 49 ALR 187 …. [19120] Calabria; R v (1982) 31 SASR 423 …. [19120], [35400]
Calcedo; R v [1986] VR 499 …. [5025], [5135], [5155] Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759; [1895] All ER Rep 346 …. [25025], [25030], [25250], [25265], [27300] Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313 …. [3040], [33845] Calder & Boyars Ltd; R v [1969] 1 QB 151; [1968] 3 All ER 644 …. [29110] Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93; [1975] 3 All ER 333 …. [25360] Calderwood v R (2007) 172 A Crim R 208 …. [33755] — v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 456 …. [25080] Caldwell v JA Neilson Investments Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 120 …. [17460] Caldwell; R v (1993) 99 Cr App R 73 …. [1370] Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202 …. [1530] Calides; R v (1983) 34 SASR 355 …. [9020] Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 100 ALR 746 …. [11145] Callaghan; R v (1979) 69 Cr App R 88 …. [17485] — (2001) 4 VR 79 …. [1440], [1445] — [1994] 2 Qd R 300 …. [17065], [17120], [17335], [33455] Callanan v B [2005] 1 Qd R 348 …. [25150] Callander v R (2004) 144 NTR 1 …. [33770] Callender; R v [1998] Crim LR 337 …. [37060] Calley v Richards (1854) 19 Beav 401; 52 ER 406 …. [25245] Callis v Gunn [1964] 1 QB 495; [1963] 3 All ER 677 …. [1230], [27305], [33595], [33620], [33640], [33655] Callum; R v [1975] RTR 415 …. [19120]
— [1976] Crim LR 257 …. [17205] Callwood v Callwood [1960] AC 659 …. [41005] Calmenson v Merchants’Warehousing Co (1921) 90 LJPC 134 …. [5190] Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1991) 25 NSWLR 118 …. [39045] Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242; 56 ALR 483 …. [7275], [17250] Calvert v Flower (1836) 7 C & P 386; 173 ER 172 …. [17240], [17570] Calvin v Carr [1977] 2 NSWLR 308 …. [17600] Calway; R v (2005) 157 A Crim R 322 …. [15220] Cambridge; R v [1994] 2 All ER 760; [1994] 1 WLR 971 …. [9120] Camelleri; R v [1922] 2 KB 122 …. [17275] Cameron v Holt (1980) 142 CLR 342; 28 ALR 490 …. [7210] — v James [1945] VLR 113; [1945] ALR 162 …. [5105] — v R (1990) 2 WAR 1 …. [29050] Cameron (RW) & Co v L Slutzkin Pty Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 81 …. [39145] Camille & Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v IRC [1954] Ch 672; [1954] 2 All ER 466; [1954] 3 WLR 167; (1954) 36 TC 126 …. [41005] Camilleri; R v (2001) 119 A Crim R 106 …. [15220] — (2001) 127 A Crim R 290 …. [1450] — (2007) 68 NSWLR 720 …. [27315] Camm; R v (1883) 1 QLJ 136 …. [41050] Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 181 FCR 152 …. [17055], [35470] Campbell v Burrows Engineering (2002) 82 SASR 75 …. [17305], [33540] — v Hamlet [2005] 3 All ER 1116 …. [9075]
— v Inkley [1960] SASR 273 …. [1605] — v Rickards (1833) 5 B & Ad 840; 110 ER 1001 …. [29105] — v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1982] QB 1065; [1982] 2 All ER 791 …. [27005], [27115], [27180] — v Wallsend Slipway and Engineering Co Ltd [1977] Crim LR 351 …. [1175] Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Gall [1961] 1 QB 431; [1961] 2 All ER 104 …. [39175] Campbell, Ex parte; Re Cathcart (1870) LR 5 Ch App 703; [1861] All ER Rep 469 …. [25225], [25295] Campbell; R v (1978) 69 Cr App R 221 …. [17690], [17715] — (1986) 84 Cr App R 255 …. [7015] — (2007) 175 A Crim R 79 …. [1375] — [1956] 2 QB 432; [1956] 2 All ER 272 …. [15035], [15140], [15145] — [1970] VR 120 …. [17135] — [1993] Crim LR 448 …. [33595], [33705] Canada and Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd [1947] AC 46 …. [5240] Canadian National Railway v Canadian Pacific Ltd (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 242 …. [39290] Canadian Pacific Tobacco Co Ltd v Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 1; [1953] ALR 603 …. [27140] Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd v Canada’s Manitoba Distillery Ltd (1975) 25 CPR (2d) 1 …. [31095] Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140; 273 ALR 601 …. [17510] Candacal Pty Ltd v Industry Research & Development Board (2005) 223 ALR 284 …. [25245] Cannan; R v [1998] Crim LR 284 …. [17460]
Canning v Brown (1867) 6 SCR (NSW) (L) 169 …. [41035] Canning’s case (1754) 19 St Tr 283 …. [33835] Cannings; R v [2004] 1 FCR (UK) 193; [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] 1 WLR 2607 …. [29080] Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317 …. [17130] Capar v Police Cmr (1994) 34 NSWLR 715 …. [25235], [25290] Cape; R v (1996) 1 Cr App R 191 …. [1400] Capner; R v [1975] 1 NZLR 411 …. [27235], [27310] Capobianco; R v (1978) 20 ACTR 29 …. [9070], [33455] Cappers Pty Ltd v L & M Newman Pty Ltd (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 379 …. [33540] Captain J A Cates Tug and Wharfage Co Ltd v Franklin Insurance Co) [1927] AC 698 …. [3135] Carabott; R v (2002) 83 SASR 293 …. [15160] Caracella; R v [1958] VR 382; [1958] ALR 827 …. [17375] Caratti v R (2000) 22 WAR 527 …. [1320], [29060], [41130] Carberry v Cook (1906) 3 CLR 995; 12 ALR 265 …. [3065] Carbone v National Crime Authority (1994) 52 FCR 516; 126 ALR 79 …. [25010], [25245] Carbone; R v (1989) 50 SASR 495 …. [9020] Carbury v Measures (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 569; 21 WN (NSW) 169 …. [17535] Cardamone; R v (2007) 171 A Crim R 207 …. [15220] Carey v Korda (2011) 85 ACSR 331 …. [25010], [25225], [25240] Carey; R v (1968) 52 Cr App R 305 …. [17130], [19005], [23365] Cargill; R v [1913] 2 KB 271; (1913) 8 Cr App R 224 …. [1560], [11115], [17580], [19015], [19075] Cargo Owners of SS Ardennes v Owners of SS Ardennes (The Ardennes)
[1951] 1 KB 55; [1950] 2 All ER 517 …. [39200] Carian v Elton (2000) 31 MVR 421 …. [1125] Cariboo Observer Ltd v Carson Lines and Tyrell (1962) 32 DLR (2d) 36 …. [17370] Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853; [1966] 2 All ER 536 …. [3085], [5025], [5030], [5035], [5040], [5050], [5055], [5170], [41005], [41010] — v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506; [1969] 3 All ER 897 …. [5025], [5055], [5070], [5075] Carlos v Brook (1804) 10 Ves Jun 49; 32 ER 761 …. [19045] Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Cassin [1956] VLR 186; [1956] ALR 628 …. [31155], [33345], [33810], [41040], [41055], [41060] Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] 4 All ER 897; [1999] 1 WLR 2042 (HL) …. [39290] Carn; R v (1982) 5 A Crim R 466 …. [29050] Carnall; R v [1995] Crim LR 944 …. [37060] Carnduff v Rock [2001] 1 WLR 1786 …. [27105] Carne; R v (1997) 94 A Crim R 249 …. [21035] Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247; 159 ALR 647 …. [25275], [25300] Carpenter v Carpenter Grazing Co Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 506 …. [1175] — v Wall (1840) 11 Ad & El 803; 113 ER 619 …. [17535] Carpenter (No 2); R v (1982) 142 DLR (3d) 237 …. [21110] Carpenter and Lunn, Re [2008] FLC 93-377 …. [29200] Carpenter; R v (2011) 249 FLR 432 …. [1375] Carpmael v Powis (1846) 1 Ph 687; 41 ER 794 …. [25225] Carr v Mostyn (1850) 5 Ex 69; 155 ER 30 …. [33185] — v R (1988) 165 CLR 314; 81 ALR 236 …. [11140], [15160], [33735]
— v — (2002) 11 Tas R 362 …. [15100], [15255], [33775] — v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138; 239 ALR 415 …. [33690], [33740], [33775] Carr-Briant; R v [1943] KB 607; [1943] 1 All ER 156 …. [9045] Carr; R v (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 …. [1400], [15160], [17295] — [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 …. [1230] Carranceja; R v (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 …. [15085], [21215] Carroll v R [1956] Tas SR 91 …. [23315] — v — [1964] Tas SR 76 …. [23270], [23355] Carroll; R v (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 …. [21065], [21110], [29055] — (1993) 99 Cr App R 381 …. [15020] — (2002) 213 CLR 635; 194 ALR 1 …. [5150] Carruthers v Griffis (2000) 111 A Crim R 477 …. [17435] Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905; 97 ER 1162 …. [29105] — v James (1844) 13 M & W 137; 153 ER 57 …. [5115] — v Managing Partner, Northmore, Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121; 129 ALR 593 …. [1730], [25220], [25285], [25295], [25300] Carter; Ex parte A-G; R v [1990] 2 Qd R 371 …. [5210] Carter; Ex parte Gray; R v [1991] Tas R 174 …. [29095] Carter; R v (2000) 1 VR 175 …. [27305] — [1959] VR 105; [1959] ALR 335 …. [7030] — [1984] 3 NSWLR 635 …. [33735] — [1997] Crim LR 505 …. [23155] Cartledge; R v [1959] VR 221 …. [17105] Cartwright v Cartwright and Anderson (1878) 26 WR 684 …. [41035] — v Green (1803) 8 Ves Jun 405; 32 ER 412 …. [25150] — v WRichardson & Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 742; [1955] 1 WLR 340 ….
[17420], [35010], [35080], [35090] Cartwright; R v (1914) 10 Cr App R 219 …. [1360], [1410] Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215 …. [25335], [35005] Carusi; R v (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 …. [1380], [1400], [11125] CAS (Nominees) Ltd v Nottingham Forest plc [2001] 1 All ER 954 …. [25265] Case of St Katherine’s Hospital, The (1672) 1 Vent 149; 86 ER 102 …. [3040] Case Stated by Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 70 A Crim R 323 …. [9120] Casey v Casey [1949] P 420; [1949] 2 All ER 110 …. [41005] Casley-Smith v F S Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 …. [29050] —v F S Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332 …. [11035] —v F S Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 4) (1988) 49 SASR 339 …. [3030] — v Stirling District Council (1989) 51 SASR 447 …. [27160] Cassaniti v Paragalli (2006) 229 ALR 416 …. [25420] Cassebohm; R v (2011) 109 SASR 465 …. [17295] Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (2013) 305 ALR 648 …. [5075] Cassell v R (2000) 201 CLR 189; 169 ALR 439; 74 ALJR 535 …. [1175] Cassell; R v (1998) 45 NSWLR 325 …. [1175], [1305] Cassidy v Engwirda Construction Co [1967] QWN 16 …. [1315], [35030] Cassidy; R v (1858) 1 F & F 79; 175 ER 634 …. [17115], [17120] Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v Roshiba Singapore Pte Ltd (2011) 192 FCR 445; 277 ALR 116 …. [29165] Castillon v P & O Ports Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 219 …. [5025]
Castle v Cross [1985] 1 All ER 87; [1984] 1 WLR 1372 …. [1180], [1315], [35425] Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v Queen Street Hotels Pty Ltd (No 2) [1969] Qd R 397 …. [25125] Castleton; R v (1909) 3 Cr App R 74 …. [1230] Castrique v Imrie (1870) LR 4 HL 414 …. [5185], [41035] Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152; [1939] 3 All ER 722 …. [1600], [9040] Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 …. [35455], [35460], [35470] Catford v Kearney [1920] SALR 294 …. [3065] Catherina Maria, The (1866) LR 1 A & E 53 …. [33350] Catt v Howard (1820) 3 Stark 3; 171 ER 747 …. [17200] Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 199 ALR 131 …. [3159] Cattermole v Millar [1977] Crim LR 553 …. [17715], [31175], [31185] Cattlin v Barker (1847) 5 CB 201; 136 ER 853 …. [17620] Causevic v R (2008) 190 A Crim R 416 …. [17065] Causton v Mann Egerton Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 453; [1974] 1 WLR 162 …. [25255] Cavalli; R v (2010) 206 A Crim R 306 …. [27305] Cavanagh v Nominal Defendant (1958) 100 CLR 375; [1959] ALR 172 …. [31085] Cavanagh; R v [1972] 2 All ER 704; [1972] 1 WLR 676 …. [17125], [17130] Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 …. [3020], [3035] Cave; R v [1963] Crim LR 371 …. [11075] Cavkic (No 2); R v (2009) 28 VR 341 …. [1395], [1440], [9030], [9040], [11125], [15220] Cavkic; R v (2005) 12 VR 136 …. [9030]
CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304 …. [7085], [17535] CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172; 157 ALR 686 …. [11130], [11150] CDR (No 2); R v [1996] 1 Qd R 183 …. [17690] Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344 …. [15160] Cedenco Foods Ltd v State Insurance Ltd [1996] 3 NZLR 205 …. [25380] Cengiz; R v [1998] 3 VR 720 …. [1220] Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis; R v [1989] AC 346; [1988] 3 All ER 775 …. [25290] Central Queensland Cement Pty Ltd v Hardie [1989] 2 Qd R 509 …. [25055] Central Queensland Speleological Society Inc v Central Queensland Cement Pty Ltd (No 2) [1989] 2 Qd R 537 …. [25095] Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 257 …. [1175] Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc; R v (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 649 …. [3075] Cervelli; R v [1998] 3 VR 776 …. [1220] Cesan v DPP (Cth) (2007) 174 A Crim R 385 …. [15220] — v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; 250 ALR 192 …. [11140] Cf Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 204 ALR 258; 78 ALJR 394 …. [3160] Cf R v Roughan (2007) 179 A Crim R 389 …. [21215] CGL v DPP (2010) 24 VR 486 …. [21252] Chadwick v Bowman (1886) 16 QBD 561; [1886] All ER Rep Ext 1699 …. [25225], [25275] — v Chadwick (1852) 22 LJ Ch 329 …. [25075] Chadwick; R v (1934) 24 Cr App R 138 …. [1380], [11030] Chahoud v Koleda (2008) 72 NSWLR 740 …. [25165]
Chai; R v (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 …. [11125], [13085], [15160], [33570] Chairman, National Crime Authority v Flack (1998) 86 FCR 16; 156 ALR 501 …. [1215] Challenger Property Asset Management Pty Ltd v Stonnington City Council (2011) 34 VR 445 …. [1215], [29065], [29075], [29080] Challinger; R v [1989] 2 Qd R 352 …. [27215] Challinor; R v (1982) 76 Cr App R 229 …. [33615], [33690] Challita; R v (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 …. [15220], [23020] Chalmers v HM Advocate (1954) SC (J) 66 …. [27285] — v Shackell (1834) 6 C & P 475; 172 ER 1326 …. [9050] Chalmers; R v [2013] 2 Qd R 175 …. [13050] Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502; 78 ALR 271 …. [5070], [5170] — v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 21; 98 ALR 617 …. [5170] — v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 51 ALR 225 …. [1140], [1250], [11100], [11140], [17600], [9040], [29075], [33435] Chamberlain; R v [1983] 2 VR 511 …. [9070] Chambers v Bernasconi (1834) 1 Cr M & R 347; 149 ER 1114 …. [33140] — v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 …. [11150] — v Mississippi (1973) 410 US 295 …. [31165] — v Murphy [1953] 2 DLR 705 …. [1290] Chambers; R v (1848) 3 Cox CC 92 …. [17605], [17615] Chamilos; R v (1985 unreported) …. [21050] Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245 …. [5170] Chan Kau v R [1955] AC 206; [1955] 1 All ER 266 …. [7030], [7050]
Chan Kwok-keung; R v [1990] 1 HKLR 359 …. [33435] Chan Wai-Keung v R [1995] 2 All ER 438; [1995] 1 WLR 251 …. [13085] Chan Wei Keung v — [1967] 2 AC 160; [1967] 1 All ER 948 …. [11050], [33620] Chan; R v (2002) 131 A Crim R 66 …. [15260], [21050] Chance; R v [1988] QB 932; [1988] 3 All ER 225 …. [1400], [15125] Chandler v Horne (1842) 2 M & Rob 423; 174 ER 338 …. [17055] Chandler & Co v Collector of Customs (1907) 4 CLR 1719; 13 ALR 617 …. [11010] Chandler; R v [1976] 3 All ER 105; [1976] 1 WLR 585 …. [33485] Chandra Kunwar v Narpat Singh (1906) LR 34 Ind App 27 …. [33420] Chandrasekera (alias Alisandiri) v R [1937] AC 220; [1936] 3 All ER 865 …. [31010], [31035], [31165], [35045] Chandu Nagrecha; R v [1997] 2 Cr App R 401 …. [19030] Chang; R v (2003) 7 VR 236; 140 A Crim R 573 …. [15220], [33435] Chant v Brown (1852) 9 Hare 790; 68 ER 735 …. [25225] Chantler v Bromley (1921) 14 BWCC 14 …. [33470], [33480] Chantrey Martin & Co v Martin [1953] 2 QB 286; [1953] 2 All ER 691 …. [25305] Chapman v Allan & Draper (1999) 74 SASR 274 …. [25390] — v Amos (1959) 42 MPR 137; 18 DLR (2d) 140 …. [33345] — v Kirke [1948] 2 KB 450; [1948] 2 All ER 556 …. [3020] — v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 FCR 229 …. [1820], [27195], [39035] — v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 3) (2000) 104 FCR 368; 179 ALR 702 …. [39045] — v Rogers; Ex parte Chapman [1984] 1 Qd R 542 …. [13300]
— v Walton [1824] All ER Rep 384; (1833) 131 ER 826; 10 Bing 57 …. [1165] Chapman; R v (1838) 8 Car & P 558; 173 ER 617 …. [17090], [19010] — (1911) 7 Cr App R 53 …. [1360], [1365] — (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 61 …. [1410] — (2001) 79 SASR 342 …. [27255] — [1969] 2 QB 436; [1969] 2 All ER 321 …. [31085] — [1973] QB 774; [1973] 2 All ER 624 …. [15210], [15220] — [1980] Crim LR 42 …. [13275] Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; 156 ALR 517 …. [11150] Chappell v A Ross & Sons Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376 …. [33540] Charara v Commissioner of Police (2008) 182 A Crim R 64 …. [17150], [25095] Charavanmuttu; R v (1930) 22 Cr App R 1 …. [15225], [33770] Chard v Chard [1956] P 259; [1955] 3 All ER 721 …. [1125] Chard; R v (1971) 56 Cr App R 286 …. [29050] Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353 …. [17250], [37040] Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v FCT (1956) 95 CLR 344; [1957] ALR 68 …. [3020] Charles Osenton & Co v Johnston [1942] AC 130; [1941] 2 All ER 245 …. [11120] Charles; R v [2010] Crim LR 303 (CA) …. [7170] Charlie v R (1998) 119 NTR 1 …. [7255], [21050] Charlie; R v (1995) 121 FLR 306 …. [33775] Charlton v Rogers; Ex parte Charlton (1985) 82 FLR 40 …. [7105] Charlton; R v [1972] VR 758 …. [27135] Charman v Charman [2006] 1 WLR 1053 …. [17020]
Charnock v Dewings (1853) 3 Car & K 378; 175 ER 597 …. [17055] Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101; [2009] 4 All ER 677 …. [39240] Charter v Charter (1874) LR 7 HL 364 …. [39270], [39295] Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, The v Rich (1863) 32 LJQB 300 …. [25235] Chase Securities Ltd v GSH Finance Pty Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 481 …. [39240] Chastleton Corp v Sinclair 264 US 543 …. [3159] Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 79; [1886] All ER Rep 1135; (1890) 60 LJQB 295; 63 LT 739 …. [11010], [29020] Chatterton v Secretary of State for India in Council [1895] 2 QB 189; [1895] All ER Rep 1035 …. [27075] Chatwood; R v [1980] 1 All ER 467; [1980] 1 WLR 874 …. [33460] Chatzidimitriou; R v (2000) 1 VR 493 …. [9030], [11010] CHC Software Care Ltd v Hopkins & Ward [1993] FSR 241 …. [25235] Cheadle (Inhabitants); R v (1832) 3 B & Ad 833; 110 ER 306 …. [39205] Cheatle v Considine [1965] SASR 281 …. [3070] — v R (1993) 177 CLR 541; 116 ALR 1 …. [3158] Cheatley v — [1981] Tas R 123 …. [7085], [19125], [19130] Checconi; R v (1988) 34 A Crim R 160 …. [15090], [15100] Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 942; [1994] 1 WLR 820 …. [25355] Chedzey; R v (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 …. [9030], [9095] Chee; R v [1980] VR 303 …. [21020], [21185] Cheema; R v [1994] 1 All ER 639; [1994] 1 WLR 147 …. [15080], [15160], [15255]
Cheers v Porter (1931) 46 CLR 521; [1932] ALR 153 …. [13005], [13055] Cheikho v R (2008) 75 NSWLR 323; 261 ALR 57 …. [7275] Chekeri; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 422 …. [5150] Chen; R v (2002) 130 A Crim R 300 …. [15115], [19005] — [1993] 2 VR 139 …. [1305], [15175] Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103; 99 ALR 360 …. [17375], [17535], [17655], [21210] Cheng; R v (1976) 63 Cr App R 20 …. [17200], [17220] — (1999) 48 NSWLR 616 …. [11140] Chenia; R v [2003] 2 Cr App R 6 …. [1445] — [2004] 1 All ER 543 (CA) …. [1445] Chernoff; R v (1973) 4 SASR 422 …. [17130] Cherrington; R v [1984] 2 NZLR 369 …. [33435] Chesney v Newsholme [1908] P 301 …. [17280] Chester v Council of Municipality of Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1; [1939] ALR 294 …. [3020] Chevalley v Morrison (2011) 288 ALR 761; 217 A Crim R 240 …. [5225] Chevathen; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 …. [15220], [21050], [21257], [33435] Chew v R (1991) 4 WAR 21 …. [15115] Chicago & EIR Co v Beaver (1902) 65 NE 144 …. [3260] Chichester v Oxenden, Doe d (1810) 3 Taunt 147; 128 ER 58 …. [39265], [39295] — v — (1816) 4 Dow 65; 3 ER 1091 …. [39265] Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432; 98 ALR 368 …. [11125], [11140], [13085], [15255]
Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police v McNally [2002] 2 Cr App Rep 617 …. [27130] Chief Constable of West Midlands Police; Ex parte Wiley; R v [1995] 1 AC 274; [1994] 3 All ER 420 …. [27005], [27105], [27190] Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; 201 ALR 1 …. [1630], [7001], [7105] — v Neate (1998) 144 FLR 373 …. [25010] Child (A) v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 …. [1675] Child, Ex parte; Re Ottaway (1882) 20 Ch D 126 …. [17475] Chilton v Saga Holidays plc [1986] 1 All ER 841 …. [1050] Chimirri; R v (2002) 136 A Crim R 381 …. [27305] Chin; R v (1985) 157 CLR 671; 59 ALR 1 …. [17500], [17630], [17635], [17640], [17645], [17660], [17670], [17700], [17705], [17710], [31010], [39105] Ching; R v (1976) 63 Cr App R 7 …. [3020], [9025] Chinmaya; R v [1995] 1 Qd R 542 …. [23290], [23345] Chiorny v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 73 FCR 238; 154 ALR 191 …. [27225] Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris (1987) 46 NTR 1 …. [1180], [3070] Chippendale v Masson (1815) 4 Camp 174; 171 ER 56 …. [17510] Chiron; R v [1980] 1 NSWLR 218 …. [3170] Chitson; R v [1909] 2 KB 945 …. [21055], [23200], [23240] Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprungli AG v The Nestlé Co Ltd [1978] RPC 287 …. [25355], [25385] Choney; R v (1908) 17 Man R 467 …. [33665] Choo Cheng Kui v Quinn (1984) 11 FCR 217; 67 ALR 231 …. [25225] Chrimes; R v (1959) 43 Cr App R 149 …. [15100] Christensen; R v (2005) 156 A Crim R 397 …. [27255]
— [1923] 2 DLR 379 …. [11040] Christiansen v JW Simpson & Co Pty Ltd [1971] SASR 412 …. [33455] Christie v Christie [1922] WLD 109 …. [5185] — v Ford (1957) 2 FLR 202 …. [27105], [39055] Christie (DA) Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 …. [5025], [5170] Christie; R v (1914) 10 Cr App R 141 …. [11115] — [1914] AC 545; [1914] All ER Rep 63 …. [1030], [1085], [1480], [1565], [11115], [11130], [15185], [17260], [21220], [31185], [31190], [33470], [33480], [37010] Christmas v Nicol Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 317 …. [11135] Christophers v R (2000) 23 WAR 106 …. [15135], [17175] Chrystall v Ehrhorn [1917] NZLR 733 …. [39195] Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1; 110 ALR 97; 67 ALJR 125 …. [41005] Chubb v Salomons (1852) 3 Car & Kir 75; 175 ER 469 …. [27095] Chubb; R v (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 282 …. [17165] Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249; 95 ALR 481 …. [7150], [7180] Church and Phillips v Perkins, Doe d (1790) 3 TR 749; 100 ER 838 …. [17210] Church of Scientology of California Inc v Dept of Health and Social Security [1979] 3 All ER 97; [1979] 1 WLR 723 …. [25060], [27165] — v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 522; [1972] 1 All ER 378 …. [27095] Church of the New Faith v Pay-Roll Tax Cmr (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120; 49 ALR 65 …. [3040] — v — [1983] 1 VR 97 …. [11010], [29050] Churchwardens, Overseers and Guardians of the Poor of the Parish of Birmingham; R v (1861) 1 B & S 763; 121 ER 897 …. [1005],
[33020] CIA Barca de Panama SA v George Wimpey & Co Ltd [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 598 …. [25265] Ciantar; R v (2006) 16 VR 26 …. [1315], [3070], [15220] Ciesielski; R v [1972] 1 NSWLR 504 …. [21050], [33705] Citibank Ltd, Re [1989] 1 Qd R 516 …. [25245] Citizens’ St R Co of Indianapolis v Willoeby 33 NE 627 (Ind, 1893) …. [1295] Cittadini; R v (2008) 189 A Crim R 492 …. [21252] City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129; [1958] 2 All ER 733 …. [39195] City of Doncaster & Templestowe; Ex parte Mayor; R v [1971] VR 466 …. [1175], [7070], [31145] City of Westminster Assessment Committee; Ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd; R v [1941] 1 KB 53 …. [3135] CL v Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (NSW) (2011) 81 NSWLR 375 …. [33775] Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394 …. [1025], [29150] Clare; R v [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 …. [1370], [29060] Clarecastle Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2011) 251 FLR 225 …. [25055] Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239 …. [1215] Clark v Boden (2004) 13 Tas R 198 …. [25235] — v CA Kruger & Sons Pty Ltd [1946] St R Qd 206 …. [33540], [33545] — v Flanagan (1934) 52 CLR 416 …. [7125], [9050] — v New South Wales (2006) 66 NSWLR 640 …. [33435] — v NZI Life Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 11 …. [9050] — v R (2008) 185 A Crim R 1 …. [13070], [17145]
— v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; [1960] ALR 524 …. [29005], [29025], [29045], [29050], [29055], [29060], [29075] Clark (H) (Doncaster) Ltd v Wilkinson [1965] Ch 694; [1965] 1 All ER 934 …. [3165], [33550] Clark Equipment Australia Ltd v Covcat Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ALR 367 …. [39160] Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511; [1965] ALR 344 …. [3020] Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 …. [17080] Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120; 21 ALR 1 …. [3156] Clark, Son & Morland Ltd’s Trade Mark, Re (1937) 54 RPC 134 …. [29155], [29160], [37090] Clark; R v (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 …. [1410] — (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 …. [11125], [15085], [15160], [15260], [17460], [17525], [21050], [35532] — (2005) 13 VR 75; 158 A Crim R 278 …. [1660], [29070] — [1955] 2 QB 469; [1955] 3 All ER 29 …. [23315], [23345] — [1962] VR 657 …. [23325], [23345] — [1970] 1 NSWR 289 …. [33500], [33645] Clarke v Clarke (1879) 5 LR Ir 47 …. [39115] — v Edinburgh and District Railways Co (1919) SC (HL) 35 …. [11150] — v FCT (2009) 240 CLR 272; 258 ALR 623 …. [3156] — v Law (1855) 2 K & J 28; 69 ER 680 …. [17475] Clarke Boyce v Mowat [1994] 1 AC 428; [1993] 4 All ER 268 …. [11150] Clarke, Son & Morland Ltd’s Trade Mark, Re [1938] AC 557; [1938] 2 All ER 377; (1938) 55 RPC 253 …. [29155], [37090]
Clarke; R v (1817) 2 Stark 241; 171 ER 633 …. [19075], [19170] — (1930) 22 Cr App R 58 …. [17130], [27135] — (1977) 67 Cr App R 398 …. [21170] — (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 …. [1390], [1395] — (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 …. [9030] — (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 …. [1380], [1450], [33690], [33730] — (2005) 159 A Crim R 281 …. [9030] — [1959] VR 645 …. [33455] — [1964] QWN 8 …. [33690] — [1969] 2 All ER 1008; [1969] 1 WLR 1109 …. [1240] — [1969] 2 QB 91; [1969] 1 All ER 924 …. [33380] — [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 …. [1370] Clarkson (No 2); R v [1982] VR 522 …. [27140] Clarkson; R v [1971] 3 All ER 344; [1971] 1 WLR 1402 …. [15095] Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd [1915] WN 395 …. [3020] — v Lord Nugent (1844) 13 M & W 200; 153 ER 83 …. [39230], [39235], [39295] Cleal; R v [1942] 1 All ER 203 …. [1385], [15140] Cleary; R v (1963) 48 Cr App R 116 …. [33615], [33620], [33635] Cleave v Jones (1852) 7 Ex 421; 155 ER 1013 …. [11030] Cleaver (dec’d), Re; Cleaver v Insley [1981] 2 All ER 1018; [1981] 1 WLR 939 …. [9085] Cleghorn; R v [1967] 2 QB 584; [1967] 1 All ER 996 …. [17090], [17095], [17650] Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1; 43 ALR 619 …. [11070], [27240], [27245], [27280], [33595], [33610], [33625], [33665], [33680], [33685], [33760] Cleland; R v (1901) 20 NZLR 509 …. [15020]
Clement v Clement (No 3) (2012) 262 FLR 47 …. [17135] Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2001) 188 ALR 515 …. [25290] Clermont; R v [1986] 2 SCR 130 …. [21170] Clevens; R v (1981) 37 ACTR 57 …. [33745], [33750] Clewer; R v (1953) 37 Cr App R 37 …. [17135] Clewes; R v (1830) 4 C & P 221; 172 ER 678 …. [1140] Clifford v Burton (1823) 1 Bing 199; 130 ER 81 …. [33585] — v Clifford [1961] 3 All ER 231; [1961] 1 WLR 1274 …. [17510], [19020] — v Hunter (1827) 3 Car & P 16; 172 ER 303 …. [17470] — v R (2004) 12 Tas R 415 …. [1450] — v Turrell (1841) 1 Y & CCC 138; 62 ER 826 …. [39180] — v — (1845) 14 LJ Ch 390 …. [39180] — v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 182 FCR 448 …. [25010] Climas (Question of Law Reserved); R v (1999) 74 SASR 411 …. [13060], [13275] Clodumar v Nauru Lands Committee (2012) 288 ALR 208 …. [11150] Closmadeuc v Carrel (1856) 18 CB 26; 139 ER 1276 …. [39135] Clough v Tameside & Glossop Health Authority [1998] 2 All ER 971; [1998] 1 WLR 1478 …. [25010], [25235], [29080] Clough; R v (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 …. [15160], [33435] — (1992) 64 A Crim R 451 …. [9020] Clouston & Co Ltd v Corry [1906] AC 122 …. [11135] Clout; R v (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 …. [1440] Cloutier v R [1940] SCR 131 …. [1645] Cloverdell Lumber Co Pty Ltd v Abbott (1924) 34 CLR 122; 30 ALR 109 …. [1185]
Clowes; R v [1992] 3 All ER 440 …. [27130], [27180] Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447 …. [3020] Clune v Collins Angus & Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 246 …. [15150] Clune (No 1); R v [1975] VR 723 …. [17615], [19170] Clune (No 2); R v [1996] 1 VR 1 …. [1360] Clune; R v (1999) 72 SASR 420 …. [17605] — [1982] VR 1 …. [1365], [1380], [1400], [1420], [1445] — [1989] VR 567 …. [33760] — [1995] 1 VR 489 …. [1400] Clutterbuck v Curry (1885) 11 VLR 810 …. [1175] Clyne v FCT (No 2) (1981) 57 FLR 198 …. [41035] — v R (1985) 81 FLR 197 …. [33640] — v The New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186; [1960] ALR 574 …. [17065], [17485] — v Yardley [1959] NZLR 617 …. [5095] Clyne, Re; Ex parte DCT (1986) 15 FCR 128; 68 ALR 603 …. [25165] Clyne; R v (1985) 2 NSWLR 740 …. [25005], [27300], [33610], [33760] Clynes; R v (1961) 44 Cr App R 158 …. [15220], [15255] CMA Corporation Ltd v Rowe (2010) 277 ALR 163 …. [25300] Cmr for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535; [1962] ALR 406 …. [1480], [39010] Cmrs of Inland Revenue; Ex parte T C Coombs & Co; R v [1991] 2 AC 283; [1991] 3 All ER 623 …. [1210] Coates v R (1957) 96 CLR 353 …. [17040] Coats; R v [1932] NZLR 401 …. [17335] Cobbett v Hudson (1852) 1 El & Bl 11; 118 ER 341 …. [13300],
[17055] — v Kilminster (1865) 4 F & F 490; 176 ER 659 …. [1295], [39105] Cobbett; R v (1831) 2 St Tr (NS) 789 …. [27130] Cobby; R v (1883) 4 LR (NSW) L 355 …. [13030] Cobcroft; R v (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 608 …. [37155] Cobden v Kendrick (1791) 4 TR 431; 100 ER 1102 …. [25210] Cobden; R v (1862) 3 F & F 833; 176 ER 381 …. [21040], [21090] Cobra Golf Inc v Rata [1998] 2 Ch 109; [1997] 2 All ER 150 …. [25125], [25160] Cobra Gulf v — [1996] FSR 819 …. [25055] Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137 …. [17020] Cochrane (EH) Ltd v Ministry of Transport [1987] 1 NZLR 146 …. [17135] Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26 …. [25280] Cockerill (C) & Sons (Vic) Pty Ltd v County Court of Victoria (2007) 18 VR 222 …. [27255] Cockley; R v (1984) 79 Cr App R 181 …. [11095] Cockroft; R v (1870) 11 Cox CC 410 …. [19075] Cocks v Juncken (1947) 74 CLR 277; [1949] ALR 293 …. [7225] — v Purday (1846) 2 Car & Kir 269; 175 ER 111 …. [41035] Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427; 120 ALR 415 …. [1730] — v Shaw [1994] 1 Qd R 469; [1994] 102 ALR 75 …. [1030] Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337; 41 ALR 367 …. [39240] Coe; R v [1967] VR 712 …. [9005] Coffin v United States (1895) 156 US 432 …. [7085] Cofield v Waterloo Case Co Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 363 …. [9120], [11085]
Coghlan v Cumberland [1898] 1 Ch 704 …. [11150] Cohen and Rudelier v Bates and Sanser & Sons Ltd (1962) 32 DLR (2d) 763 …. [5220] Cohen, Re [1924] 2 Ch 515 …. [17475] Cohen; R v (1909) 3 Cr App R 234 …. [15025] — (1914) 10 Cr App R 91 …. [23320] — [1951] 1 KB 505; [1951] 1 All ER 203 …. [1195], [7160] Cohn, Re [1945] Ch 5 …. [41035] Cokar; R v [1960] 2 QB 207; [1960] 2 All ER 175 …. [23200], [23240] Colbert v Tocumwal Trading Co Pty Ltd [1964] VR 820 …. [7145] Colby Corporation Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 165 FCR 133; 244 ALR 71 …. [39240] Colby; R v [1999] NSWCCA 261; BC9906404 …. [21252] Coldman v Hill [1919] 1 KB 443; [1918] All ER Rep 434 …. [7075], [7230] Coldwell v Municipal Tramways Trust [1928] SASR 234 …. [1295] Cole v Commonwealth (1962) 62 SR (NSW) 700; 79 WN (NSW) 453 …. [1610] — v Dick (1979) Tas R 14 …. [17660] — v Elders Finance & Investment Co Ltd [1993] 2 VR 356 …. [25275] — v Manning (1877) 2 QBD 611 …. [15045], [15235] — v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; 207 ALR 52 …. [3159] — v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360; 78 ALR 42 …. [3158] Cole & Knowles, Re [1927] 3 DLR 950 …. [1645] Cole; R v (1941) 28 Cr App R 43 …. [17065], [21100], [21220] — (1810 unreported) …. [21015] Coleman v Haywood; Ex parte Coleman [1978] Qd R 411 …. [7120]
— v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 225 …. [29070] — v Zanker (1991) 58 SASR 7 …. [27255] Coleman (No 2); R v (1901) 27 VLR 294; 7 ALR 216 …. [33345], [41060] Coles v Coles (1866) LR 1 P & D 70 …. [17375], [17475] Coles (GJ) & Co Ltd v McDonald [1998] 2 VR 218 …. [17310] — v Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal (1986) 7 NSWLR 503 …. [1175] Coley; R v (1868) 10 Cox CC 536 …. [33640] Colgan; R v (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 96; 76 WN (NSW) 41 …. [1280] Coll; R v (1889) 24 LR Ir 522 …. [17250], [17305], [17315] Collaton v Correll [1926] SASR 87 …. [17170], [17210], [17590] Colle; R v (1991) 95 Cr App R 67 …. [7170] Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389; 141 ALR 59 …. [11010] — v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280; 115 ALR 1 …. [11010] Colless; R v [1964] NSWR 1243; (1964) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 55 …. [15175], [15220] Colley; R v (1829) Mood & M 329; 173 ER 1178 …. [17055] Collie v Police (2013) 115 SASR 281 …. [1220] Collie; R v (1991) 56 SASR 302 …. [15160] — (2005) 91 SASR 339 …. [21050] Collier v Nokes (1849) 2 Car & Kir 1012; 175 ER 426 …. [17570] — v Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt 855; 163 ER 608 …. [41010] — v Simpson (1831) 5 Car & P 73; 172 ER 883 …. [29150] Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett Pty Ltd (1990) 97 ALR 460 …. [29115] Collier; R v [1965] 3 All ER 136; [1965] 1 WLR 1470 …. [33690]
Colling v Treweek [1824] All ER Rep 586; (1827) 108 ER 497; 6 B & C 394 …. [39015] Collings v Day [1925] NZLR 280 …. [39250] Collings; R v [1976] 2 NZLR 104 …. [1400], [15210], [31185], [31190] Collins v Blantern [1558] All ER Rep 33; (1767) 95 ER 847; 2 Wils 341 …. [39175] — v Carnegie (1834) 1 Ad & E 695; 110 ER 1373 …. [33350] — v London General Omnibus Co (1893) 68 LT 831 …. [25235] — v Morgan [1972] Tas SR 277 …. [1675] — v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549; 243 ALR 483 …. [3020] — v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 …. [1290], [27245], [31165], [33435], [33595], [33605], [33640], [33675], [33745], [33750], [33760] Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd v Henjo Investments Pty Ltd (1987) 72 ALR 601 …. [39160] Collins Thomson Pty Ltd (in liq) v Clayton [2002] NSWSC 366; BC200202507 …. [29080] Collins, In the Marriage of (1991) 14 Fam LR 162 …. [17495] Collins; R v (1960) 44 Cr App R 170 …. [39035] — (1975) 12 SASR 501 …. [29050], [33740], [33765] — (1986) 44 SASR 214 …. [1320] — [1907] VLR 292; (1907) 13 ALR 184 …. [17090], [17095] — [1986] VR 37 …. [11125] — [2004] 1 WLR 1705 …. [33485] Collister and Warhurst; R v (1955) 39 Cr App R 100 …. [17130], [19005], [23365] Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Donnelly (1998) 82 FCR 418; 154 ALR 417 …. [17405] Colorado, The [1923] P 102 …. [41005]
Colpoys v Colpoys (1822) Jac 451; 37 ER 921 …. [39210], [39270] Coltress; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 193 …. [23215] Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 78 FLR 449 …. [27095] Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) (2011) 195 FCR 43; 283 ALR 111 …. [13300] — v Maganga (2008) 101 ALD 68 …. [17495] Comcare Australia v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60; 33 ALD 548; 121 ALR 485 …. [5030] Comet Products UK Ltd v Hawkex Plastics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 67; [1971] 1 All ER 1141 …. [25125] Comfort Hotels Ltd v Wembley Stadium Ltd [1988] 3 All ER 53; [1988] 1 WLR 872 …. [25010], [25020], [25245] Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; 46 ALR 402 …. [25010] — v G H Dean & Co Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 204 …. [39290] Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Beard (1999) 47 NSWLR 735 …. [7070] — v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 …. [1215] Commercial Union Assurance Co plc v Mander [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 640 …. [25265] Commission for Racial Equality; Ex parte Cottrell & Rothon (a firm); R v [1980] 3 All ER 265; [1980] 1 WLR 1580 …. [1055], [1065] Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VR 505 …. [9115] Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292; [1961] ALR 892 …. [29045], [29055], [29070], [29150] Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier- Moat Ltd (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 238; 77 WN (NSW) 12 …. [31120], [31145], [33385] Commissioner for Railways v Murphy [1967] ALR 706; (1967) 41 ALJR 77 …. [1290]
— v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 …. [25240], [39055] Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220; [1935] ALR 304 …. [5025] Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Butler (1989) 91 ALR 293 …. [5205] — v Cox (1986) 14 FCR 279; 70 ALR 509 …. [25180] — v — (1989) 87 ALR 163 …. [25155] — v McMillan (1986) 13 FCR 7; 70 ALR 203 …. [25180] Commissioner of Inland Revenue v West-Walker [1954] NZLR 191 …. [25210], [25220] Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394 …. [1695], [29190], [29200] Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Caldwell [1982] AC 341; [1981] 1 All ER 961 …. [11010] Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250; 243 ALR 448 …. [5025] — v De Vonk (1995) 61 FCR 564; 133 ALR 303 …. [25180] — v Karageorge (1996) 22 ACSR 199 …. [1785] — v Lamesa Holdings BV (1997) 77 FCR 597; 157 ALR 290; 97 ATC 4752 …. [41005] — v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 195 ALR 717 …. [25235] — v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 304 …. [25010] — v SNF (Aust) Pty Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 199 …. [1680] Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240; 164 ALR 131 …. [25015], [25225] — v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 266; 60 ATR 466 …. [25240] Commissioner of the Police Service v Cornack [2004] 1 Qd R 627 …. [27130]
— v Nirta [2002] 1 Qd R 364 …. [25020] Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Harz [1967] 1 AC 760; [1967] 1 All ER 177 …. [33595], [33620], [33625], [33640] Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 104 ALR 1 …. [9085] — v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tas) (2008) 169 FCR 85; 248 ALR 494 …. [1175] — v Bourne (1960) 104 CLR 32; [1960] ALR 496 …. [3020] — v Cleary (1898) 172 Mass 175 …. [17285] — v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2000) 98 FCR 31; 171 ALR 379 …. [27065] — v Flynn (1988) 7 MVR 377 …. [29050] — v Griffiths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; 245 ALR 172 …. [25165] — v Jennings Construction Ltd [1985] VR 586 …. [5170] — v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 393; [1926] ALR 161 …. [3158] — v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 …. [35655] — v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners (1922) 31 CLR 1; 28 ALR 325 …. [7275] — v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1; 103 ALR 267 …. [3159] — v — (1993) 176 CLR 604; 112 ALR 409 …. [27065], [27165] — v Oceantalk Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 79 FCR 520; 151 ALR 567 …. [33460] — v Pilt (1974) 3 ALR 236 …. [7105] — v Sciacca (1988) 17 FCR 476; 78 ALR 279 …. [5030] — v Stenhach (1986) 514 A 2d 114 …. [25225] — v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; 46 ALR 625 …. [3156] — v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd (2001) 25 WAR 31 …. [25055]
— v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; 224 FLR 243 …. [25245], [25300], [27095] — v Vita-Nut Products Pty Ltd [1957] VR 688; [1958] ALR 83 …. [7185] — v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; 184 ALR 113 …. [29195] Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke [2000] 1 Qd R 7 …. [25010] — v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84 …. [11150] — v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134; 102 ALR 487; 65 ALJR 674 …. [11150] Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow & Co; R v (1910) 11 CLR 1; 16 ALR 373 …. [3158] Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 …. [13235], [13240] Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280; [1959] ALR 550 …. [3156] Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527; [1938] ALR 258 …. [5215] Commonwealth v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8; 57 ALR 249 …. [17145] Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v Hollins [1956] VLR 169; [1956] ALR 560 …. [25015] Commonwealth Shipping Representative v Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service [1923] AC 191; [1922] All ER Rep 207 …. [3015], [3020], [3155] Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v ACCC (2007) 162 FCR 466 …. [1220], [9130] Compafina Bank v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 409 …. [35070], [35205], [35280], [35295] Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 …. [9120], [11090]
Compass Airlines Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 35 FCR 447; 109 ALR 119 …. [25240], [25280], [25290] Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Aust) Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 125; 124 ALR 493 …. [25010], [25055], [25245], [29080] Composite Buyers Ltd v J CTaylor Constructions [1983] 2 VR 311 …. [11150] Comptroller of Customs v Western Lectric Co Ltd [1966] AC 367; [1965] 3 All ER 599 …. [31140], [33460], [33835] Comptroller-General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466; 107 ALR 480 …. [25085], [25240] Computer Machinery Co Ltd v Drescher [1983] 3 All ER 153; [1983] 1 WLR 1379 …. [25360] Concha v Murieta (1889) 40 Ch D 543 …. [29150], [41035] Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers & Gasfitters Employees’ Union of Australia (No 2) (1987) 15 FCR 64; 72 ALR 415 …. [31065], [37060] Conde; R v (1867) 10 Cox CC 547 …. [37130] Condo; R v (1992) 62 A Crim R 11 …. [9030] Condon; R v (1995) 83 A Crim R 335 …. [11135] — [1980] Crim LR 721 …. [1435] Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General; R v [1991] 1 Qd R 574 …. [17325] Condren; R v (1987) 28 A Crim R 261 …. [29050] — [2003] 3 NZLR 702 …. [13085] Condron; R v [1997] 1 WLR 827 …. [25010] Congressi; R v (1974) 9 SASR 257 …. [23205], [23380] Coniglio v Compressed Yeast Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 667 …. [1530] Conley v Conley [1968] 2 OR 677; (1968) 70 DLR (2d) 352 …. [33015], [33115]
Conley; R v (1979) 21 SASR 166 …. [27295] Conlon v Conlons Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 462 …. [25295], [25300] — v Simms [2006] 2 All ER 1024 …. [5175], [5190] — v — [2007] 3 All ER 802; [2008] 1 WLR 484 …. [5175] Connell v R (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 …. [5210], [17075], [17605], [23215], [33570], [35240], [35335], [39015] Connell, Lucas & Carter (No 4); R v (1992) 9 WAR 567 …. [27180] Connell; R v (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 360 …. [1045] — (1995) 14 ACLC 32 …. [41130] Connelly v Allan (2011) 212 A Crim R 320 …. [1395], [1450] — v DPP [1964] AC 1254; [1964] 2 All ER 401 …. [5130], [5140], [21100] Connolly v Dale [1996] QB 120; [1996] 1 All ER 224 …. [13265] Connolly; R v [1991] 2 Qd R 171 …. [17250], [21180] Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 …. [1130], [3240] Connor; R v (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 225 …. [1045] Connors; R v (1990) 20 NSWLR 438 …. [33620] Conolan v Broken Hill & Suburban Gas Co Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 555 …. [1210] Conquer v Boot [1928] 2 KB 336; [1928] All ER Rep 120 …. [5070] Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39 …. [7105], [9110] Constable v Constable [1964] SASR 68 …. [25365] Constantine, In the Estate of [1960] SASR 19 …. [35090] Constantinou v Frederick Hotels Ltd [1965] 3 All ER 847; [1966] 1 WLR 75 …. [35090] Constantinou; R v (1989) 91 Cr App R 74 …. [31195] Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Pilbara Iron
Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 521 …. [35435] Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373; 5 ALR 231 …. [33435] Contenanza; R v [1958] Tas SR 3 …. [33690] Continental Reinsurance Corp (UK) Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 8 …. [27085] Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Cmr for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 57 ALR 751 …. [25090] — v — [1984] VR 137 …. [25070], [25090], [25105] Conway v Hotten [1976] 2 All ER 213 …. [33690] — v R (2000) 98 FCR 204; 172 ALR 185 …. [15260], [21050], [21252], [35495], [35500] — v — (2002) 209 CLR 203; 186 ALR 328 …. [11140], [15260] — v Rimmer [1968] AC 910; [1968] 1 All ER 874 …. [27045], [27065], [27085], [27100], [27110], [27130], [27155], [27165], [27185], [27190] Conway; R v (1979) 70 Cr App R 4 …. [17545] Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595 …. [1305] Cook v Carroll [1945] IR 515 …. [25315] — v Leonard [1954] VLR 591; [1954] ALR 987 …. [25225], [25295] — v Nethercote (1835) 6 Car & P 741; 172 ER 1443 …. [17055] — v Pasminco Ltd (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 44; 179 ALR 462 …. [25225] — v R (1998) 126 NTR 17 …. [1370], [1380], [1410] — v Rodgers (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 229 …. [3020] — v Union Steamship Co (1904) 23 NZLR 933 …. [25235] — v Ward (1830) 4 Moo & P 99 …. [37085] Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Brown (2004) 49 ACSR 62 …. [1215] Cook; Ex parte Twigg; R v (1980) 147 CLR 15; 31 ALR 353 ….
[25370], [33840] Cook; R v (1918) 34 TLR 515 …. [33680] — (1980) 71 Cr App R 205 …. [31140], [35425] — (1998) 130 NTR 28 …. [1370] — (2000) 22 WAR 67 …. [11035], [17290], [21050] — [1959] 2 QB 340; [1959] 2 All ER 97 …. [23315], [23340], [23345], [23355], [23360] — [1987] QB 417; [1987] 1 All ER 1049 …. [17255], [31195] Cooke v FCT (2002) 51 ATR 223 …. [29200] — v Maxwell (1817) 2 Stark 183; 171 ER 614 …. [27005] — v Tanswell (1818) 8 Taunt 450; 129 ER 458 …. [39085] Cooke; R v (1986) 84 Cr App R 286 …. [5215], [17510], [19030] Cooksley; R v [1982] Qd R 405 …. [1045] Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556; [1978] 2 All ER 604 …. [11120] Cooley v Western Australia (2005) 155 A Crim R 528 …. [17130] Coolgardie Goldfields Ltd, Re [1900] 1 Ch 475 …. [39135] Coombe v Bessell (1994) 4 Tas R 149 …. [19005] Coomber, Re; Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 …. [25010] Coombes v Roads and Traffic Authority (2006) 46 MVR 215 …. [3295] Coombes; R v (1960) 45 Cr App R 36 …. [21190] Coombs; R v [1983] NZLR 748 …. [33770] — [1985] 1 NZLR 318 …. [27215] Coonan v Richardson [1947] QWN 19 …. [27140] Cooper v Bech (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151 …. [29050] — v Chief Cmr of Land Tax (1988) 12 NSWLR 660 …. [1175] — v R (1961) 105 CLR 177; [1961] ALR 725 …. [1880], [11055], [21025]
— v — (2012) 293 ALR 17 …. [9040], [11140], [17460], [33435] — v Slade (1858) 6 HLC 746; 10 ER 1488 …. [9005] — v van Heeren [2007] 3 NZLR 783 …. [25350] Cooper (No 2); R v (1974) 51 DLR (3d) 315 …. [13240] Cooper (WH) and Repatriation Commission, Re (1995) 38 ALD 164 …. [5030] Cooper-King v Cooper-King [1900] P 65 …. [41035] Cooper; R v (1833) 5 Car & P 534; 172 ER 1087 …. [33645] — (1979) 69 Cr App R 229 …. [1155] — (1985) 82 Cr App R 74 …. [17560] — (1995) 14 WAR 416 …. [17175] — (2007) 175 A Crim R 94 …. [13050], [37060] — [1978] SCR 860; (1978) 74 DLR (3d) 731 …. [9035] — [2010] 2 Cr App R 13 …. [15020] Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 …. [3165] Coote; R v [1861] All ER Rep Ext 1113; (1873) LR 4 PC 599 …. [25005], [25105], [33640] Copland v Bourke [1963] P & NGLR 45 …. [15150] Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt (2005) 140 LGERA 333; 44 MVR 119 …. [17460] Copper Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 …. [11090], [39180] Corak; R v (1982) 30 SASR 404 …. [23250], [23375], [23395] Corby District Council v Holst & Co Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 321; [1985] 1 WLR 427 …. [25360] Cordingley; R v [2008] Crim LR 299 …. [17135] Cordoba Shipping Co Ltd v National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey
(The “Albaforth”) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91 …. [41005] Cordon Bleu International Ltd v F G Bradley Co Ltd (1979) 60 CPR (2d) 71 …. [31095] Corelli; R v [2001] Crim LR 913 …. [17430], [33595] Corfield v Hodgson [1966] 2 All ER 205; [1966] 1 WLR 590 …. [15045], [15210] Corish; R v (2006) 96 SASR 207 …. [1220] Corke v Corke [1958] P 93; [1958] 1 All ER 224 …. [1540], [17255], [19005] Corke; R v (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 …. [1445] Corkin (No 2); R v (1988) 50 SASR 285 …. [15135] Cormack; R v (1979) 1 A Crim R 471 …. [23040] Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235; [1936] ALR 278 …. [11030], [11045], [33620], [33665] Cornwall v Richardson (1825) 1 Ry & M305; 171 ER 1029 …. [19165] Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260; 234 ALR 51 …. [3157], [23140], [25175] Conwell; R v (2003) 57 NSWLR 82 …. [1305], [27315] Coroner; Ex parte Alexander; R v [1982] VR 731 …. [25005], [25105] Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley [1973] 1 NSWLR 382 …. [3085] Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319; 109 ALR 609 …. [25280] Corporate Affairs Commission (WA) v Eastoe [1989] 1 WAR 271 …. [25010] Corporate Group Holdings Ltd v Corporate Resources Group Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 115 …. [25020] Corporations and Securities Panel v Bristile Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 152 FLR 469 …. [25280]
Correia; R v (1996) 15 WAR 95 …. [21050] Corrigan v Commvault Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (2011) 192 FCR 71 …. [17055] Corrigan; R v (1998) 74 SASR 454 …. [15135] Corris; R v (1931) TPD 471 …. [31155], [33810] Corry v Dorron; Ex parte Corry [1985] 1 Qd R 31 …. [9045] Cory v Bretton (1830) 4 Car & P 462; 172 ER 783 …. [25355] Cosgrove; R v (1988) 34 A Crim R 299 …. [9040] Coshott v Sakic (1998) 44 NSWLR 667 …. [7075] Costa v Costa (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 20 …. [35090] Costello v Random House Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 137 ACTR 1 …. [29185] Costi; R v (1987) 48 SASR 269 …. [17445] Costin; R v [1998] 3 VR 659 …. [7085] Cotic; R v (2000) 118 A Crim R 393 …. [11045] Cotton v Cmr for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66; 60 WN (NSW) 42 …. [17535] Cotton; R v (1990) 19 NSWLR 593 …. [33750] Couchman v Hill [1947] KB 554; [1947] 1 All ER 103 …. [39195] Coughlan; R v (1976) 63 Cr App R 33 …. [1040], [7045] Coulman; R v (1927) 20 Cr App R 106 …. [19005], [23275] Coulson v Disborough [1894] 2 QB 316 …. [17080] Coulstock; R v (1998) 99 A Crim R 143 …. [27315] Coulston; R v [1997] 2 VR 446 …. [7085] Coulter v R (1926) 29 WALR 40 …. [15075] Coulthard v Steer (1981) 12 NTR 13 …. [33745] Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Archer (2008) 72
NSWLR 236 …. [25010] Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451 …. [1220], [33770] Countess Dowager of Shelburne v Earl of Inchiquin (1784) 1 Bro CC 338; 28 ER 1166 …. [9085] Countess of Rutland’s Case (1604) 5 Co Rep 25b; 77 ER 89 …. [39145] County (S) Council v B [2000] Fam 76 …. [25245] Couper; R v (1985) 18 A Crim R 1 …. [23205] Court; R v (1836) 7 C & P 486; 173 ER 216 …. [33640] — (1960) 44 Cr App R 242 …. [1230] Courteen v Touse (1807) 1 Camp 43; 170 ER 869 …. [17155] Courtnell; R v [1990] Crim LR 115 …. [1395] Courtney-Smith (No 2) v R (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 …. [11135], [19125] Courtney; R v (1956) 74 WN (NSW) 204 …. [1375] — [1995] Crim LR 63 …. [23350] Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 …. [3159] Coventry Justices; Ex parte Bullard; R v (1992) 95 Cr App R 175 …. [1315], [31075] Coventry Newspapers Ltd, Ex parte [1993] QB 278; [1993] 1 All ER 86 …. [27105] Coventry; R v (1997) 7 Tas R 199 …. [17380] Covill; R v (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 …. [7085], [15260] Cowan v Stanhill Estates Pty Ltd [1966] VR 604 …. [27140] Coward v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1963] 1 QB 259; [1962] 1 All ER 531 …. [33015], [33045] Cowell; R v (1985) 24 A Crim R 47 …. [5210] — [1940] 2 KB 49; [1940] 2 All ER 599 …. [1040], [11045], [13090] Cowen v Truefitt Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 309 …. [39175]
Cowie; Ex parte A-G; R v [1994] 1 Qd R 326 …. [13060] Cowle; R v (1907) 71 JP Jo 152 …. [17045], [33795] Cowpe; R v (1892) 13 LR (NSW) (L) 265 …. [31120] Cowper; R v (1699) 13 St Tr 1106 …. [37125] Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225 …. [35455] — v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12 …. [9115], [9120] — v Smail [1912] VLR 274 …. [1110] — v Western Australia (2011) 205 A Crim R 503 …. [33780] Cox; R v (1858) 1 F & F 90; 175 ER 639 …. [33475] — (1884) 14 QBD 153; [1881] All ER Rep 68 …. [25110], [25285], [25290] — (1986) 84 Cr App R 132 …. [19090] — [1898] 1 QB 179; [1895] All ER Rep 1285 …. [29090], [41050] — [1972] Qd R 366 …. [17545], [17580] — [1986] 2 Qd R 55 …. [1665], [15100], [33455] Coxon; R v (2002) 82 SASR 412 …. [1400] Coyne; R v [1996] 1 Qd R 512 …. [33770] Coysh v Elliott [1963] VR 114 …. [17060] Cozens v Brutus [1973] AC 854; [1972] 2 All ER 1297; (1972) 56 Cr App Rep 799 …. [11010] Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1; 56 ALR 733 …. [23275] Cracknell v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 569; [1960] 1 WLR 1239 …. [15045], [15215] Craddock Bros v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136; [1923] All ER Rep 394 …. [39175] Craddock’s Transport Ltd v Stuart [1970] NZLR 499 …. [5055], [5095] Crafter v Kelly [1941] SASR 237 …. [25180]
Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429 …. [1355], [1360] Craig Hargreaves Investments Pty Ltd v Australian Business Insurance Advisors Pty Ltd (2011) 111 SASR 506 …. [29075], [29150] Craig; R v (1982) 1 CCC (3d) 416 …. [21080] — [1975] 1 NZLR 597 …. [25295] Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 …. [25020] Cramp; R v (1880) 14 Cox CC 390 …. [15225], [33470] Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161; 176 ALR 369 …. [15135], [17295] Crane v Gething (2000) 97 FCR 9; 169 ALR 727 …. [27095] Cranney: Re Lindfield, Ex parte (1930) 47 WN (NSW) 57 …. [41105] Cratchley; R v (1913) 9 Cr App R 232 …. [15095] Crawcour v Salter (1881) 18 Ch D 30 …. [3050] Crawford Earthmovers Pty Ltd v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 116 …. [7100], [33380] Crawford; R v [1965] VR 586 …. [23325], [23345] — [1985] 2 Qd R 22 …. [33750] — [1997] 1 WLR 1329 …. [23380] Crawley v Laidlaw [1930] VLR 370; [1930] ALR 311 …. [3070], [31075] Crayden; R v [1978] 2 All ER 700; [1978] 1 WLR 604 …. [33825], [35360], [35425] Creamer; R v (1984) 80 Cr App R 248 …. [1420] — (1989) 43 A Crim R 92 …. [33735] Crease v Barrett [1835] All ER Rep 30; (1835) 149 ER 1353; 1 Cr M & R 919 …. [33025], [33065], [33160], [33195] Credland v Knowler (1951) 35 Cr App R 48 …. [15210], [15220] Creevy v Carr (1835) 7 Car & P 64; 173 ER 29 …. [17470]
Crema v Cenkos Securities plc [2010] All ER (D) 212 (Dec); [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 676; [2011] 1 WLR 2066 …. [39240] Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553; [1971] 3 All ER 1192 …. [25265], [25290] Crest Homes plc v Marks [1987] AC 829; [1987] 2 All ER 1074 …. [25055], [25160] Criminal Justice Commission v Connolly [1997] 2 Qd R 586 …. [25275] — v Parliamentary Civil Justice Commissioner [2002] 2 Qd R 8 …. [27095] Crippen (dec’d), In the Estate of [1911] P 108; [1911] All ER Rep 207 …. [5180], [5185], [5205] Crippen; R v [1911] 1 KB 149; [1908] All ER Rep 390 …. [17650] Crisafio v R (2003) 27 WAR 169 …. [17295] Crisfield v Frost [1919] VLR 149 …. [17205] Crisologo; R v (1997) 99 A Crim R 178 …. [35525] Crispin v Doglioni (1863) 32 LJPM & A 109 …. [33240] Crnisanin v Logan (1972) 4 SASR 340 …. [17200] Crocker; R v [1922] All ER Rep 775; (1922) 92 LJKB 428 …. [15125] Croft v R (1917) 19 WALR 49 …. [15035] Crofts v — (1996) 186 CLR 427; 139 ALR 455 …. [17290], [17295] Croker v Croker [1932] P 173 …. [11145] Croll v McRae (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 137 …. [17505] Cromack v Heathcote (1820) 2 Brod & B 4; 129 ER 857 …. [25245] Crooks; R v (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 390 …. [11100] — [2001] 2 Qd R 541 …. [33690] Cropper v Smith (1884) 26 Ch D 700; 51 LT 729; 1 RPC 81 …. [3165] Crosdale v R [1995] 2 All ER 500 …. [11095] Cross; R v (1990) 91 Cr App R 115 …. [17430]
Crosthwaite v Elizabeth City Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 105 …. [17460] — v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348 …. [3070] Crouch; R v (1850) 4 Cox CC 163 …. [39105] Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375; [1968] ALR 524 …. [3250], [29050] Crowe; R v (1917) 81 JP 288 …. [33680] Crowley v Glissan (No 2) (1905) 2 CLR 744; 12 ALR 74 …. [7070] — v Page (1837) 7 C & P 789; 173 ER 344 …. [17535], [17595] — v Willis (1992) 110 FLR 194 …. [19125] Crown Court at Harrow; Ex parte Dave; R v [1994] 1 All ER 315; [1994] 1 WLR 98 …. [19005] Crown Estate Cmrs v Dorset County Council [1990] Ch 297; [1990] 1 All ER 19 …. [5025], [5030] Crown Prosecution Service; Ex parte Warby; R v (1993) 158 JP 190 …. [1030] Crupi; R v (1995) 86 A Crim R 229 …. [1440] Crutchfield v Lee [1934] VLR 146; [1934] ALR 175 …. [15050] CSR Ltd v Eddy (2008) 70 NSWLR 725 …. [1685], [25225] CTM v R (2008) 236 CLR 440; 247 ALR 1 …. [7030], [11140] Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1; 174 ALR 97 …. [1215], [9050], [11135], [21252] Cudgington v Cooney [1902] St R Qd 176 …. [1675] Cuenco; R v (2007) 16 VR 118 …. [15220], [33435], [33770] Cullen v Ampol Petroleum Ltd (1970 unreported) …. [17440] — v Welsbach Light Co of Australasia Ltd (1907) 4 CLR 990; 13 ALR 194 …. [1200], [7160] Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1970] WAR 170 …. [35045]
Cumberbatch (No 5); R v (2002) 130 A Crim R 599 …. [19135] Cummings; R v [1948] 1 All ER 551 …. [17270], [17285] — [1978] Qd R 49 …. [23315] Cummins (dec’d); R v [1972] Ch 62; [1971] 3 All ER 782 …. [15150] Cummins; R v (2004) 10 VR 15 …. [1140], [1170], [9040] Cumper v Pothecary [1941] 2 KB 58; [1941] 2 All ER 516; (1941) 110 LJKB 577; 165 LT 243 …. [3165] Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272; 124 ALR 120 …. [3156] Cunliffe-Owen v Teather & Greenwood [1967] 3 All ER 561; [1967] 1 WLR 1421 …. [39195] Cunningham; R v (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 …. [17135] — [1959] 1 QB 288; [1958] 3 All ER 711 …. [23315] Cupit; R v [1978] Tas SR 95 …. [17245] CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (2012) 83 NSWLR 385 …. [27225] Curgerwen; R v (1865) LR 1 CCR 1; [1861] All ER Rep 1368 …. [7280] Curlex Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 335 …. [25015], [25240] Curnock; R v (1914) 111 LT 816 …. [33490] Curran; R v (2008) 100 SASR 71 …. [17460] — [1983] 2 VR 133 …. [1300], [27305], [33760] Currie v Chief Constable of Surrey [1982] 1 All ER 89; [1982] 1 WLR 215 …. [1070] — v Dempsey (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 116; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 460 …. [7065] Curry v Walter (1796) 1 Esp 456; 170 ER 418 …. [13045] Curry; R v [1983] Crim LR 737 …. [1390]
Curtis v Beaney [1911] P 181 …. [25265] — v R [1972] Tas SR 21 …. [33735] Curtis; R v [1957] VR 306; [1957] ALR 578 …. [17180] Curwen v Vanbreck (2009) 26 VR 335 …. [17445] Curwood v R (1944) 69 CLR 561; [1945] ALR 25 …. [23320], [23325], [23335] Cushing v — [1977] WAR 7 …. [23145], [23330] Cushway; R v (1968) 62 QJPR 90 …. [17090] Cusmano v Pinner (1998) 157 ALR 61 …. [29125] Customglass Boats Pty Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36; [1976] RPC 589 …. [29155], [31095], [37090] Customs and Excise Commissioners v A E Hamlin & Co (a firm) [1983] 3 All ER 654; [1984] 1 WLR 509 …. [25055] Cuthill v State Electricity Commission of Victoria [1981] VR 908 …. [33825] Cutts v Buckley (1933) 49 CLR 189 …. [39195] — v Head [1984] Ch 290; [1984] 1 All ER 597 …. [25360] Czerwinski; R v [1954] VLR 483; [1954] ALR 621 …. [11050], [33690] D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171; [1977] 1 All ER 589 …. [11130], [25325], [25365], [27005], [27055], [27105], [27115], [27120] — v Western Australia (2007) 179 A Crim R 377 …. [17130] D (a child), Re [2011] Fam Law 926; [2011] 4 All ER 434 …. [25010] D (infants), Re [1970] 1 All ER 1088; [1970] 1 WLR 599 …. [27115] D (Minors), Re [1993] Fam 231; [1993] 2 All ER 693 …. [25365], [25380] D’Arrigo; R v [1994] 1 Qd R 603 …. [15095], [27300], [27310] D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91 …. [3156]
D’Israeli v Forest (1795) 1 Esp 427; 170 ER 408 …. [33350] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 214 ALR 92 …. [3159], [25165] D’Orta-Ekenaike; R v [1998] 2 VR 140 …. [11045], [33605], [33610] D(P); R v [2012] 1 Cr App R 33 …. [19110], [19135] D; R v (1996) 86 A Crim R 41 …. [19125] — (1998) 71 SASR 99 …. [9040] — (2003) 141 A Crim R 471 …. [13060] — (2008) 220 FLR 169 …. [1450] — [1996] QB 283; [1996] 1 All ER 881 …. [5180] Da Costa v Cockburn Salvage and Trading Pty Ltd (1970) 124 CLR 192; [1971] ALR 97 …. [11150] Da Silva; R v [1990] 1 All ER 29; [1990] 1 WLR 31 …. [17185], [17195] Dadson; R v (1983) 77 Cr App R 91 …. [35340] Dagi v The Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1996] 2 VR 567 …. [25055] DAH; R v (2004) 150 A Crim R 14 …. [1220], [23055] Daily Express (1908) Ltd v Mountain (1916) 32 TLR 592 …. [25225] Daily Mirror; Ex parte Smith; R v [1927] 1 KB 845; [1927] All ER Rep 503 …. [1375] Dainer; Ex parte Pullen; R v (1988) 78 ACTR 25 …. [25245] Dainford Ltd v Yulora Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 546 …. [1645] Daintrey, Re; Ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 116; [1891] All ER Rep 209 …. [25355], [25385] Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 …. [1370], [1395], [21120], [21252], [21257] Daire v O’Malley (1986) 41 SASR 583 …. [7150] Dairy Containers Ltd v Tasman Orient Line CV [2005] 1 WLR 215 …. [39240]
Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458; [1964] ALR 333 …. [11145], [17205], [17240], [33805] Dale v Western Australia (2009) 261 ALR 21 …. [5040] Daley v R [1994] 1 AC 117; [1993] 4 All ER 86 …. [1400], [11100] Daley; R v [1979] Tas R 75 …. [39105] Dalgety Spillers Foods Ltd v Food Brokers Ltd [1994] FSR 504 …. [29050] Dallagher; R v [2003] 1 Cr App R 12 …. [29050] Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 4 WAR 325 …. [25225] Dalley; R v (2002) 132 A Crim R 169 …. [27315] Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd, Re (1994) 53 FCR 339; 130 ALR 287 …. [25010], [25240] Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 2 All ER 610 …. [1420], [17130], [27135] Dalloz; R v (1908) 1 Cr App R 258 …. [1170] Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd’s LR 223 …. [41030] Dalrymple v Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hag Con 54; 161 ER 665 …. [41035] Dalton v Higgins (1964) 51 MPR 52; 43 DLR (2d) 574 …. [1165] — v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 279 …. [9040] Dam; R v (1986) 43 SASR 422 …. [9030] Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492 …. [3075], [3165], [17250], [41005] Damic; R v [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 …. [17080], [17090], [17095], [17100], [17125] Damon v Snyder [1970] VR 81 …. [17305], [17315] Daniel v Guy (1861) 23 Ark 50 …. [1295] — v Pitt (1806) 1 Camp 366n; 170 ER 988n …. [33535]
— v Western Australia (1999) 94 FCR 537 …. [25010], [25235], [27080] — v — (2000) 173 ALR 51 …. [35470], [35550], [35570], [35635], [35655] — v — (2000) 178 ALR 542 …. [29070], [29150], [29175], [29195], [29200] — v — (2001) 186 ALR 369 …. [29225], [35600], [35605], [35635] — v Wilkin (1852) 7 Exch 429; 155 ER 1016 …. [33385] Daniel; R v (2010) 207 A Crim R 449 …. [9020] Daniels v R (1989) 1 WAR 435 …. [17270] Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd, The v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; 192 ALR 561 …. [25070], [25075], [25115], [25125], [25180], [25240], [25280], [25290] Danine; R v (2004) 145 A Crim R 278 …. [15170], [15195] Dansie v Kelly [1981] Qd R 1 …. [33690] Danvers; R v [1984] Crim LR 182 …. [1045] Danziger v Thompson [1944] KB 654; [1944] 2 All ER 151 …. [39190] DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568 …. [21252] Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1; 156 ER 1093 …. [3040], [17510], [17550], [17560] Darby; R v (1982) 148 CLR 668; 40 ALR 594 …. [5150] — [1989] Crim LR 817 …. [17375] Daren; R v [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 …. [17535], [17645], [17650], [17690], [33770] Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373; 228 ALR 334 …. [9030], [11140] Darlaston v Parker (2010) 189 FCR 1 …. [35460] Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Jacobsen (1945) 70 CLR 635; [1946] ALR 119 …. [7125], [7150]
Darmody; R v (2010) 25 VR 209 …. [35455], [35460] Darrington; R v [1980] VR 353 …. [21215], [29050] Dart Industries Inc v Decor Corporation Pty Ltd (1989) 15 IPR 403 …. [29115] Darvall (CB) & Darvall v Moloney (2006) 236 ALR 796; [2006] QSC 345 …. [5055] Darwiche; R v (2006) 166 A Crim R 28 …. [1450], [31195] Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 277 ALR 611 …. [1645], [3135], [29065], [29070], [29075], [29200] Dass v Masih [1968] 2 All ER 226; [1968] 1 WLR 756 …. [35050], [35195] Dastagir; R v (2013) 118 SASR 83 …. [1370], [29075] Dat; R v [1998] Crim LR 488 …. [17375] Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd (1994) AIPC 91-112 …. [25010] Dau v Emanuele (1995) 60 FCR 270 …. [27310] Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 509 US 579; 125 L Ed 2d 469 …. [29055], [29185] Davey v Harrow Corporation [1958] 1 QB 60; [1957] 2 All ER 305 …. [3055] Davey; R v (1970) 2 CCC 351 …. [31175] David Agmashenebeli, The [2001] CLC 942 …. [25290] David Jones (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Zapasnik (1982) 42 ACTR 6 …. [5030] David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 …. [11130] Davidovic; R v (1990) 51 A Crim R 197 …. [33575] Davids v Brooklands Car Sales (1956) (1) 1 SA 745 …. [39205] Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v A-G (Cth) (1994) 49 FCR 211; 121 ALR 241 …. [11150]
Davidson v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 316 …. [3285] — v Quirke (1923) 42 NZLR 552 …. [31090] Davidson; Ex parte A-G; R v [1996] 2 Qd R 505 …. [27305], [33700], [33725] Davidson; R v (1934) 25 Cr App R 21 …. [1250] — (1996) 92 A Crim R 1 …. [27305], [33700] — (2009) 75 NSWLR 150 …. [9040] Davie v Edinburgh Magistrates (1953) SC 34 …. [29075], [29150] Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378; [1954] 1 All ER 507 …. [15075] — v Fortior Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 1359 …. [37050], [37055] — v Gatacre, Doe d (1838) 8 Car & P 578; 173 ER 625 …. [33410] — v Humphreys [1835] All ER Rep 101; (1840) 151 ER 361; 6 M & W 153 …. [33070] — v Jones (1856) 17 CB 625; 139 ER 1222 …. [39175] — v Lowndes (1843) 6 Man & G 471; 134 ER 978 …. [33250] — v Morgan (1831) 1 Cr & J 587; 148 ER 1557 …. [33160] — v Nyland (1974) 10 SASR 76 …. [25380] — v — (1975) 10 SASR 76 …. [25355], [33435] — v Otty (No 2) (1865) 35 Beav 208; 55 ER 875 …. [17480] — v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; [1937] ALR 321 …. [1360], [1365], [1380], [1395], [1410], [1420] — v Taylor [1974] AC 207; [1972] 3 All ER 836 …. [9005] — v The National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1912] VLR 397 …. [17250] — v Waters (1842) 9 M & W 608; 152 ER 257 …. [25345] Davies; R v (1985) 3 NSWLR 276 …. [17290], [17295] — (2005) 11 VR 314 …. [1420]
— [1962] 3 All ER 97; [1962] 1 WLR 1111 …. [29060], [29090], [29105], [29130] — [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 …. [17135] Davis v FCT (1989) 86 ALR 195 …. [39135] — v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; 31 ALR 49 …. [5215] — v Hardy (1827) 6 B & C 225; 108 ER 436 …. [1610] — v Hedges (1871) LR 6 QB 687 …. [5170] — v Lambert & Bain Pty Ltd [1989] Tas R 274 …. [25275] — v Langdon (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 149 …. [1530] — v R (1974) 60 Cr App R 157 …. [23380] Davis; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 133 …. [1675] — (1959) 43 Cr App R 215 …. [33770] — (1993) 97 Cr App R 110 …. [27105] — [1975] 1 All ER 233; [1975] 1 WLR 345 …. [23380] — [1979] Crim LR 167 …. [19050], [33660] — [1980] 1 NZLR 257 …. [5210] — [1982] 1 NZLR 584 …. [5150], [5155], [21100] — [1990] Crim LR 860 …. [11035], [11065] — [1993] 2 All ER 643; [1993] 1 WLR 613 …. [17130] — [2008] 1 AC 1128; [2008] 3 All ER 461 …. [17155] Davison v Vickery’s Motors Ltd (in liq) (1925) 37 CLR 1 …. [3165] Davison; R v (1954) 90 CLR 353; [1954] ALR 877 …. [3158] — [1972] 3 All ER 1121; [1972] 1 WLR 1540 …. [23035] Davissen v Dias; Ex parte Dias [1944] QWN 20 …. [15095] Davy, Re [1935] P 1; [1934] All ER Rep 176 …. [33245] Davy; R v [1964] NSWR 40; (1964) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 42 …. [15175], [17305], [17315]
Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389 …. [35440], [35545] Dawes; R v [1992] 2 Qd R 435 …. [17300], [17595], [17655] Dawson v Dawson (1905) 22 TLR 52 …. [33115] — v Great Central Railway (1919) 12 BWCC 163; 121 LT 263; 88 LJKB 1177 …. [3155], [3165] — v M’Kenzie (1908) 45 Sc LR 473 …. [15220] — v R (1961) 106 CLR 1; [1962] ALR 365 …. [9030], [23315], [23320], [23325], [23345] — v — (1990) 2 WAR 458 …. [1375], [1380] — v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 104 ALR 295; 66 ALJR 94 …. [1175], [11150] — v Zammit; Ex parte Zammit [1936] St R Qd 322 …. [17090] Dawson; R v [1961] VR 773 …. [5210] Day v Dalton [1981] WAR 316 …. [25290] — v Dyson [1965] VR 165 …. [33455] — v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 731 …. [17170] — v R (1984) 153 CLR 475; 51 ALR 353 …. [1175] Day, In the Marriage of (1994) 115 FLR 172 …. [25380] Day; R v (1841) 9 Car & P 722; 173 ER 1026 …. [31155], [33810] — (2000) 115 A Crim R 80 …. [23410] — [1940] 1 All ER 402 …. [17620], [17650], [17700], [39105] Daye; R v [1908] 2 KB 333 …. [1315] Daylight; R v (1989) 41 A Crim R 354 …. [31045] Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320 …. [17460] DBA; R v (2012) 219 A Crim R 408 …. [17290] DBG; R v (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 …. [17255], [17315]
DBY; R v (2006) 94 SASR 489 …. [21050], [33435] DCC; R v (2004) 11 VR 129 …. [21050], [21243] DCT; Ex parte Briggs; R v (1987) 13 FCR 389; 71 ALR 86 …. [25075], [25125] DD; R v (2007) 19 VR 143 …. [17305], [19135] DDR; R v [1998] 3 VR 580 …. [17065] De Angelis; R v (1979) 20 SASR 288 …. [19035], [19090] De B v De B [1950] VLR 242; [1950] ALR 547 …. [17265], [17280] De Beéche v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd [1935] AC 148; [1934] All ER Rep 284 …. [41035] De Berenger; R v (1814) 3 M & S 67; 105 ER 536 …. [3040], [33845] De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (2011) 200 FCR 253; 281 ALR 454 …. [11125], [35545], [35595] De Clerq v R [1968] SCR 902 …. [11055] De Filippo v De Filippo (1963) 108 Sol Jo 56 …. [11110] De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1; 59 WN (NSW) 22 …. [1210], [7160], [9120], [11085], [13055] De Grey; Ex parte Fitzgerald; R v (1913) 109 LT 871 …. [1290] De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85; 190 ALR 441 …. [1140], [3260] De Jesus v — (1986) 68 ALR 1; 61 ALJR 1 …. [21155] De Kruiff v Smith [1971] VR 761 …. [1125] de la Espriella-Velasco v R (2006) 31 WAR 291 …. [17130], [33805] De Lam; R v (1999) 108 A Crim R 440 …. [15220] De Lassalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215; [1900] All ER Rep 495 …. [39195] De Reneville v De Reneville [1948] P 100 …. [41005] De Rosa v Western Australia (2006) 32 WAR 136; 162 A Crim R 344 ….
[7085] De Rosaz, In the Goods of (1877) 2 PD 66 …. [39270] De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338; 193 ALR 130 …. [3159] De Stempel v Dunkels [1938] 1 All ER 238 …. [33435] De Vere; R v [1982] QB 75; [1981] 3 All ER 473 …. [17690], [17715] De-Cressac; R v (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 …. [1395] Deaboyer; R v (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 198 …. [3200] Deacon v R [1947] SCR 531; [1947] 3 DLR 772 …. [17395] Deacon; R v [1973] 2 All ER 1145; [1973] 1 WLR 696 …. [13130] Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585 …. [3158] Deakin; R v [1994] 4 All ER 769 …. [11035] Dean v More than a Morsel Pty Ltd (2002) 170 FLR 432 …. [25010] — v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 …. [9035], [11105] Dean (No 2); R v (1896) 17 LR (NSW) (L) 224 …. [33640] Dean and Chapter of Ely v Stewart (1740) 2 Atk 44; 26 ER 423 …. [17500] Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 45 ACSR 564 …. [29205] Dean, In the Marriage of (1988) 94 FLR 32 …. [3035] Dean; R v (1981) 26 SASR 437 …. [33760] Dear v Knight (1859) 1 F & F 433; 175 ER 796 …. [17375] Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549; 15 ALR 287 …. [11150] Deathe; R v [1962] VR 650 …. [11045], [11065], [33675] Debs; R v (2008) 191 A Crim R 231 …. [21180] Decha-Iamsakun; R v [1993] 1 NZLR 141 …. [11010] Decker v State Coroner of New South Wales (1999) 46 NSWLR 415 …. [1685]
Dee v Dall [1919] SALR 167 …. [25200] Deenik; R v [1992] Crim LR 578 …. [25095] Deep v Wood (1983) 33 CPC 256; 143 DLR (3d) 246 …. [19165] Deering; R v (1986) 43 SASR 252 …. [1380] Degnan; R v [2001] 1 NZLR 280 …. [21025] Del Mare v Rebello (1792) 1 Ves Jun 412; 30 ER 412 …. [39265] Delahunty v Delahunty (Nobes cited) [1961] 1 All ER 923; [1961] 1 WLR 515 …. [33520] Delgado-Guerra; R v [2002] 2 Qd R 384 …. [21050], [21180], [21185], [33550] Dellapatrona; R v (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 …. [15160], [15220], [33570] Dellow’s Will Trusts, Re; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Institute of Cancer Research [1964] 1 All ER 771; [1964] 1 WLR 451 …. [9050] Delon; R v (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 …. [1295], [17095] Demasi v Fraser [1965] SASR 284 …. [29050] Demeter v British Pacific Life Insurance (1984) 48 OR (2d) 266; 13 DLR (4th) 318 …. [5180] — v R [1978] 1 SCR 538; (1977) 75 DLR (3d) 251 …. [31155], [33045] Demeter; R v [1995] 2 Qd R 626 …. [1410] Demir; R v [1990] 2 Qd R 433 …. [27130] Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20; 14 ALR 199 …. [11035] Dempster; R v [2001] Crim LR 567 …. [23410] Den Norske Bank ASA v Antonatos [1999] QB 271; [1998] 3 All ER 74 …. [25040], [25075], [25100], [25120] Dendron Gmb H v Regents of the University of California (Boston Scientific Ltd, Part 20 Claimant) [2005] 1 WLR 200 …. [25055] Dener; R v [1969] NZLR 763 …. [9040] Denley; R v [1970] Crim LR 583 …. [19035]
Dennis v A J White & Co [1916] 2 KB 1 …. [3020] — v — [1917] AC 479 …. [3020] — v Davis (2010) 204 A Crim R 1 …. [1395] Dennis (W) & Sons Ltd v West Norfolk Farmers’ Manure and Chemical Co-Op Co Ltd [1943] Ch 220 …. [25265] Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 25 ALR 437 …. [39030], [39135] Dent; R v [1943] 2 All ER 596 …. [11140] Denton v Auckland City [1969] NZLR 256 …. [3135] Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130 …. [1295], [3065] Deokinanan v R [1969] 1 AC 20; [1968] 2 All ER 346 …. [33620], [33635], [33640], [33700] Deppro Pty Ltd v Hannah [2009] 1 Qd R 1 …. [25245], [25290] Deputy Cmr of Taxation v Ahern (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 158; (1986) 87 FLR 112 …. [33840] — v Capron (1993) 25 ATR 142; 93 ATC 4144 …. [1635], [35350] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 8) [2013] FCA 494; BC201302614 …. [5070], [5080] — v Currockbilly Pty Ltd (2002) 172 FLR 99; 21 ACLC 136 …. [1685] — v Law Institute of Victoria Ltd (2010) 27 VR 51; 267 ALR 127 …. [27010] — v Meredith (2007) 245 ALR 150; 229 FLR 243 …. [1130] — v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168; 127 ALR 21 …. [7275] — v Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 518 …. [11010] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Robinswood Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 284 …. [33795] Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735; [1939] ALR 357 …. [3015], [3156] Deputy Industrial Injuries Cmr; Ex parte Moore; R v [1965] 1 QB 456;
[1965] 1 All ER 81 …. [1055], [1065] Derbas v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 13 …. [27130] Derbas; R v (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 …. [15160] Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 7) [1990] 3 All ER 161; [1990] 1 WLR 1156 …. [25270], [25290] — v Weldon (No 8) [1990] 3 All ER 762; [1991] 1 WLR 73 …. [25020], [25025] — v Weldon (No 9) [1991] 2 All ER 901; [1991] 1 WLR 652 …. [1315], [39015] — v Weldon (No 10) [1991] 2 All ER 908; [1991] 1 WLR 660 …. [25010] Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B; R v [1996] AC 487; [1995] 4 All ER 526 …. [25215], [25220], [25265], [25295] Deriz v R (1999) 109 A Crim R 329 …. [7085] Derwentside Justices; Ex parte Heaviside; R v [1996] RTR 384 …. [41105] Descoteaux v Mierzwinski [1982] 1 SCR 860; [1982] 141 DLR (3d) 590 …. [25250] Desert Sun Loan Corporation v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847 …. [5025] Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 700; [2000] 1 WLR 2416 …. [11150] Desmond; R v [1999] Crim LR 313 …. [23315] Dessent v Commonwealth (1977) 13 ALR 437; 51 ALJR 482 …. [3135] Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft v Banque des Marchands de Moscou (1932) 107 LJKB 386 …. [17080] Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 181; [1995] 1 WLR 1017 …. [1040], [33840] Devala Provident Gold Mining Co Ltd, Re (1883) 22 Ch D 593 …. [33540] Devenish; R v [1969] VR 737 …. [17130], [39105]
Deverell; R v [1969] Tas SR 106 …. [33500], [33690] Devine; R v (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 …. [23335], [33735] Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; 112 ALR 641 …. [11150] Dewdney v Palmer (1839) 4 M & W664; 150 ER 1587 …. [13055] Dewhirst; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 …. [33765] Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1; 199 ALR 547 …. [1015], [1395], [1450], [1680], [1755], [15220] Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482 …. [3180], [21257] Di Pietrantonio v Austin Hospital - Heidelberg [1958] VR 325; [1958] ALR 720 …. [25245] Di Sora v Phillipps (1863) 10 HL Cas 624; 11 ER 1168 …. [41005], [41035] Diane; R v [2010] 2 Cr App R 1 …. [13270], [17055], [17170] Diaz v United States (1912) 223 US 442 …. [1650] Dibble v Aidan Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] ATPR 40-693 …. [39160] Dibble; R v (1908) 1 Cr App R 155 …. [17375], [17390] Dicas v Lord Brougham (1833) 6 C & P 249; 172 ER 1228 …. [17615] Dick; R v (1982) Tas R 252 …. [19030] — [1966] Qd R 301 …. [29075] Dickinson v Coward (1818) 1 B & A 677; 106 ER 249 …. [33435] — v Minister of Pensions [1953] 1 QB 228; [1952] 2 All ER 1031 …. [7060] — v Shee (1801) 4 Esp 67; 170 ER 644 …. [17165] Dickman; R v (1910) 5 Cr App R 135 …. [1360] Dickson; R v [1983] 1 VR 227 …. [1395], [1400], [9040], [33435] Diehm v DPP (Nauru) (2013) 88 ALJR 34 …. [17085], [17120]
Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292; 109 ALR 385 …. [11125], [33805] Dillon v Gange (1941) 64 CLR 253; [1941] ALR 94 …. [1175], [39130] — v Macdonald (1902) 21 NZLR 375 …. [5070] — v Nash [1950] VLR 293; [1950] ALR 629 …. [39190] — v R [1982] AC 484; [1982] 1 All ER 1017 …. [1175], [7285] Dillon; R v (1983) 85 Cr App R 29 …. [17240] — [1983] 2 Qd R 627 …. [33460] Dilosa v Latec Finance Pty Ltd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 557 …. [1215] Dimian v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 …. [19090] Dimmock v Whymark (1964) 65 SR (NSW) 194; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 69 …. [39135] Dimond Manufacturing Co Ltd v Hamilton [1969] NZLR 609 …. [39240] Dinch v Dinch [1987] 1 All ER 818; [1987] 1 WLR 252 …. [5025] Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1960] 2 QB 405; [1960] 1 All ER 294 …. [27095] — v — [1961] 2 QB 162; [1960] 1 All ER 897 …. [23280] — v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63; 91 ALR 239 …. [25225], [25245] Dingwall v Commonwealth (1992) 39 FCR 521 …. [25010] — v F Wharton (Shipping) Ltd [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 213 …. [9085], [15215] Dinh; R v (2000) 120 A Crim R 42 …. [33575] Direct Winters Transport Ltd v Duplate Canada Ltd [1962] OR 360; (1962) 32 DLR (2d) 278 …. [41035] Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Midas Trading (Aust) Pty Ltd (2009) 25 VR 1 …. [29190] Director of Public Prosecution v Alexander (1993) 33 NSWLR 482; 120
ALR 673 …. [1125] — v Camplin [1978] AC 705; [1978] 2 All ER 168 …. [29050] Director of Public Prosecutions v A and BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159; [1967] 2 All ER 504 …. [3285], [29050], [29110], [29125] — v Blady [1912] 2 KB 89 …. [13035], [13115] — v Carey [1970] AC 1072; [1969] 3 All ER 1662 …. [1240] — v Carr (2002) 127 A Crim R 151 …. [27315] — v Hester [1973] AC 296; [1972] 3 All ER 1056 …. [15035], [15040], [15110], [15145], [15165], [15180], [15250], [15255] — v Humphrys [1977] AC 1; [1976] 2 All ER 497 …. [5150], [5160] — v Hynde [1998] 1 All ER 649; [1998] 1 WLR 1222 …. [3020] — v Jordan [1977] AC 699; [1976] 3 All ER 775 …. [3285], [29110] — v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729; [1973] 1 All ER 440 …. [15070], [15110], [15180], [15235], [21085], [21100] — v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227 …. [27315], [33775] — v Losurdo (1998) 44 NSWLR 618; 103 A Crim R 189 …. [17170] — v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49 …. [1450], [11125] — v Morgan [1976] AC 182; [1975] 2 All ER 347 …. [7005], [7010], [7020], [7050], [7200], [7210] — v Nicholls (2001) 123 A Crim R 66 …. [27315], [35525], [35532] — v Nieser [1959] 1 QB 254; [1958] 3 All ER 662 …. [1195] — v P [1991] 2 AC 447; [1991] 3 All ER 337 …. [21085], [21170] — v Parsons [1993] 1 VR 1 …. [33460] — v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574; [1975] 3 All ER 175 …. [11045], [33605], [33615], [33620], [33625], [33640], [33660], [33675] — v Selway (No 2) (2007) 16 VR 508 …. [27130] — v Shannon [1975] AC 717 …. [33610] — v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308 …. [27130], [27195]
— v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909 …. [11135] — v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594; 91 ALR 1 …. [3020], [3200], [3250], [7180], [29050] — v Walker [1974] 1 WLR 1090 …. [7050] Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Hiep (1998) 86 FCR 33; 156 ALR 110 …. [35595] Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468 …. [25030], [25300] Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33 …. [1420], [11125] Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (NSW) v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19 …. [1645], [17175] Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v AM (2006) 161 A Crim R 219 …. [27315] — v Singh (2006) 164 A Crim R 284 …. [33435] — v Walford (2011) 221 A Crim R 331 …. [1450] Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234 …. [33775] Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Donnelly (2006) 166 A Crim R 534 …. [33775] — v McEwan (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 421 …. [3190] — v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440 …. [27315] — v MD (2010) 29 VR 434 …. [27315], [33780] — v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430 …. [27240] — v Riley (2007) 16 VR 519 …. [27240] — v T (2006) 163 A Crim R 192 …. [33750] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379 …. [29070], [29075] Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 1 of 1984) [1984] VR 727
…. [27300], [33760] Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v Virtosu [2008] 3 All ER 637 …. [5205] Director-General Department of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582 …. [25340] Discon; R v (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 619 …. [29070] Disher v Disher [1965] P 31; [1963] 3 All ER 933 …. [11110] Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [1975] QB 613; [1975] 1 All ER 41 …. [25055] Distributori Automatici Italia Sp A v Holford General Trading Co Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 750; [1985] 1 WLR 1066 …. [25160] District Council of Mallala v Livestock Markets Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 258 …. [25240], [25390] Ditford, Re; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347; 83 ALR 265 …. [3085] Ditroia; R v [1981] VR 247 …. [23375] Dix; R v (1982) 74 Cr App R 306 …. [7045], [9120] Dixon v City of Glenorchy (1968) 15 LGRA 407 …. [29070] — v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617 …. [11035], [33675], [33750] Dixon; R v (1925) 19 Cr App R 36 …. [15085] — (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 …. [33635], [33650] Dixons Stores Group Ltd v Thames Television plc [1993] 1 All ER 349 …. [25355] Djambi (Sumatra) Rubber Estates Ltd, Re (1912) 107 LT 631 …. [33105], [33130], [33540] DJF v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 412 …. [1645], [13225], [15220] DJT; R v [1998] 4 VR 784 …. [7085], [17305], [17315] DJV v R (2008) 200 A Crim R 206 …. [21252] DJX; R v (1990) 91 Cr App R 36 …. [13070]
Dlugosz; R v [2013] 1 Cr App R 32 …. [9095] Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234; 52 ALR 231 …. [5070] Do; R v (1990) 54 SASR 543 …. [15135] Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643; [1935] ALR 360 …. [1025], [7185], [7265] Dobell v Stevens (1825) 3 B & C 623; 107 ER 864 …. [39175] Dobson v Morris (1985) 4 NSWLR 681 …. [31065], [37105] Dodd v Norris (1814) 3 Camp 519; 170 ER 1467 …. [19170] Dodd; R v (1981) 74 Cr App R 50 …. [11120], [33740] — (2002) 135 A Crim R 32 …. [1355] — [1960] WAR 42 …. [37010] — [1985] 2 Qd R 277 …. [3065] Dodds v R (2009) 194 A Crim R 408 …. [29185] Dodson; R v [1984] 1 WLR 971 …. [1370] Doe v R (2008) 187 A Crim R 328 …. [7085] — v Roe (1809) 2 Camp 280; 170 ER 1155 …. [17510] Doe d Bamford v Barton (1837) 2 M & Rob 28; 174 ER 203 …. [33240] Doe d Barrett v Kemp (1835) 2 Bing NC 102; 132 ER 40 …. [1185] Doe d Chichester v Oxenden (1810) 3 Taunt 147; 128 ER 58 …. [39265], [39295] — v — (1816) 4 Dow 65; 3 ER 1091 …. [39265] Doe d Church and Phillips v Perkins (1790) 3 TR 749; 100 ER 838 …. [17210] Doe d Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PC 502; 14 ER 581 …. [1295], [9050], [39105] Doe d Earl of Ashburnham v Michael (1851) 17 QB 276; 117 ER 1286 …. [33035]
Doe d Ellis v Hardy (1836) 1 M & Rob 525; 174 ER 181 …. [33325] Doe d France v Andrews (1850) 15 QB 756; 117 ER 644 …. [33385] Doe d Good v Cox (1790) 6 Car & P 743n; 172 ER 1444n …. [17055] Doe d Gord v Needs (1836) 2 M & W 129; 150 ER 698 …. [39280], [39295] Doe d Hindly v Rickarby (1803) 5 Esp 4; 170 ER 718 …. [33035] Doe d Hopley v Young (1845) 8 QB 63; 115 ER 798 …. [1125] Doe d Johnson v Earl Pembroke (1809) 11 East 503; 103 ER 1098 …. [33510] Doe d Kinglake v Beviss (1849) 7 CB 456; 137 ER 181 …. [1645], [33070] Doe d Lord Arundel v Fowler (1850) 14 QB 700; 117 ER 270 …. [39130] Doe d Lumsdaine v Bollard (1847) 1 Legge 404 …. [17725] Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331 …. [39100], [39105] Doe d Nicoll v Bower (1851) 16 QB 805; 117 ER 1090 …. [17725] Doe d Pattershall v Turford (1832) 3 B & Ad 890; 110 ER 327 …. [33115] Doe d Reed v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 330; 173 ER 147 …. [19170] Doe d Rowlandson v Wainwright (1838) 8 A & E 691; 112 ER 1000 …. [33055] Doe d Shallcross v Palmer (1851) 16 QB 747; [1843] All ER Rep 139; (1851) 117 ER 1067 …. [33315], [33325] Doe d Small v Allen (1799) 8 TR 147; 101 ER 1314 …. [31095] Doe d Smelt v Fuchau (1812) 15 East 286; 104 ER 852 …. [1125] Doe d Stansbury v Arkwright (1833) 5 C & P 575; 172 ER 1105 …. [33020], [37025] Doe d Strode v Seato (1834) 2 Ad & E 171; 111 ER 66 …. [33355]
Doe d Tatum v Catomore (1851) 16 QB 745; 117 ER 1066 …. [39130] Doe d Thompson v Hodgson (1840) 12 Ad & E 135; 113 ER 762 …. [39045] Doe d Tilman v Tarver (1824) Ry & M 141; 171 ER 972 …. [33250] Doe d Warren v Bray (1828) 8 B & C 813; 108 ER 1245 …. [33410] Doe d Westlake v Westlake (1820) 4 B & A 57; 106 ER 859 …. [39265] Doe d Wetherell v Bird (1835) 7 C & P 6; 173 ER 3 …. [3165] Doe, Lessee of Banning v Griffin (1812) 15 East 293; 104 ER 855 …. [33210] Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343; 182 ALR 1 …. [15135], [15170], [17295] Doheny; R v [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 …. [9095] Doherty; R v (1874) 13 Cox CC 23 …. [33645] — (2003) 6 VR 393 …. [1220] Doker v Hasler (1824) Ry & Mood 198; 171 ER 992 …. [13030] Doklu v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 333 …. [33775], [35620], [35650] Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp (1993) 42 FCR 206; 114 ALR 231; 17 AAR 355 …. [17435], [17445], [25040] Dolan; R v (1992) 58 SASR 501 …. [21050], [21243], [33690] — [2003] 1 Cr App R 18 …. [21050] Dolder v Huntingfield (Lord) (1805) 11 Ves Jun 283; 32 ER 1097 …. [3040] Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Ltd (2004) 139 FCR 215 …. [3160] Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555; 106 ALR 203 …. [1380], [1395], [1400], [1450], [11135] Domican (No 3); R v (1990) 46 A Crim R 428 …. [23345] Dominguez v R (1985) 63 ALR 181 …. [9040]
Dominion Trust Co v New York Life Insurance Co [1919] AC 254 …. [11150] Domokos; R v (2005) 92 SASR 258 …. [15160], [21050] Domonic v R (1985) 14 A Crim R 418 …. [13050] — v — (1985) 14 A Crim R 419 …. [13050] Donald; R v (1982) 7 A Crim R 474 …. [15195], [15255] Donaldson v Freeson (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 113 …. [1170] — v Harris (1973) 4 SASR 299 …. [25245] — v Police [1963] NZLR 750 …. [33455] — v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122 …. [1880], [21257] — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 488 …. [19110] Donaldson; R v (1976) 64 Cr App R 59 …. [17335], [33455] Donat; R v (1985) 82 Cr App R 173 …. [15110], [33570] Doncaster Corporation v Day (1810) 3 Taunt 262; 128 ER 104 …. [33795] Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; 96 ALR 539 …. [1380], [1450], [1880], [3200], [9105], [11100], [11125], [15165] Doney; R v (1988) 37 A Crim R 288 …. [15165], [15180] Donnelly v United States (1913) 228 US 243 …. [33045] Donnelly; R v (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 …. [33775], [35620], [35620], [35650] Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114; [1972] ALR 1093 …. [1520], [19145], [23205], [23290], [23345], [23360] Donnini; R v [1973] VR 67 …. [1360], [21210], [29095], [33720] Donoghue v St Luke’s Hospital Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 674 …. [1125] — v Terry [1939] VLR 165; [1939] ALR 215 …. [7125] Donohoe v Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (WA) (2011) 215 A Crim R 1 …. [35195], [35200], [35210], [35315]
Donohoe; R v (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 38; 79 WN (NSW) 693 …. [11030], [11040], [11075], [33295] — [1979] Crim LR 382 …. [33740] Donovan v DCT (1992) 34 FCR 355; 106 ALR 661 …. [25180] Donovan’s Application, Re [1957] VR 333 …. [27215] Donovan; R v [1934] 2 KB 498; [1934] All ER Rep 207 …. [7070] Doogan; R v (2005) 158 ACTR 1 …. [29080] Doolan; R v [1962] Qd R 449 …. [33495] Dooley; R v [1964] 1 All ER 178; [1964] 1 WLR 648 …. [1240] Doolin; R v (1832) 1 Jebb CC 123 …. [17480] Doosti; R v (1985) 82 Cr App R 181 …. [17615], [19030] Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 394 …. [29050] Doran v Gray (1917) 13 Tas LR 36 …. [15045] Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2002) 194 ALR 101 …. [1685], [25245], [25265], [25270], [25300], [29065], [35595] Doran; R v (1972) 56 Cr App R 429 …. [17630], [17665] Dorin v Dorin [1874] All ER Rep 71; (1875) LR 7 HL 568 …. [39255] Dormeuil Trade Mark, Re [1983] RPC 131 …. [25245] Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufos Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91 …. [39160] Dossi; R v (1918) 13 Cr App R 158 …. [15140], [15205] Dost Ali Khan, In the Goods of (1880) 6 PD 6 …. [41035] Doubikin Holdings Pty Ltd v Grail Pty Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 563 …. [29080] Doucet v Geoghegan (1878) 9 Ch D 441 …. [37025] Dougherty; R v (1973 unreported) …. [1410] Douglas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 77 FCR 112 ….
[3020] — v Muscat (2005) 189 FLR 188 …. [1305] — v R (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 184 …. [31120], [33385] — v Tiernan (1931) 32 SR (NSW) 149 …. [7100], [11030] Douglas, The (1882) 7 PD 151 …. [1620], [31085] Douglass v R (2012) 290 ALR 699; 86 ALJR 1086 …. [9005], [15140], [17290] Douglass; R v (1989) 89 Cr App R 264 …. [19155], [21215] Dover v Doyle (2012) 34 VR 295; 60 MVR 261 …. [7255] Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; 201 ALR 139 …. [33465] Dowden and Pook Ltd v Pook [1904] 1 KB 45 …. [11025] Dowe v R (2009) 193 A Crim R 220 …. [27315] Dowell; R v [1960] Crim LR 436 …. [17135] Dowley; R v [1983] Crim LR 168 …. [33435] Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; [1952] ALR 1001 …. [7125], [7145], [7150] — v Dowling (1860) 10 ICLR 236 …. [1145] — v Pontypool, Caerleon and Newport Railway Co (1874) LR 18 Eq 714 …. [11010] Dowling; R v (1883) 9 VLR (L) 79 …. [25200] Downer; R v (1880) 14 Cox CC 486 …. [33540], [33550] Downes; R v [1981] Crim LR 174 …. [21170] Downey; R v [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 …. [1370], [21180] Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 …. [17720], [17725], [17730] — v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1983] 1 Qd R 475 …. [1025], [35055]
Doyle v Boston & A Ry Co (1888) 14 NE 461 …. [3230], [3260] Doyle; Ex parte A-G; R v [1987] 2 Qd R 732 …. [33650] Doyle; R v [1967] VR 698 …. [1375], [1380], [1415] DPM; R v [1998] 3 VR 705 …. [15220] DPP v Butay (2001) 124 A Crim R 41 …. [33770] — v Faure [1993] 2 VR 497 …. [15160] — v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15 …. [17405] — v Walker (2011) 176 ACTR 1 …. [35525] DPP (NSW) v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526 …. [33640] — v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350 …. [27315] DPP (Vic) v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; 204 A Crim R 85 …. [11125], [17040], [33795], [33805], [35510] — v Nicholls (2010) 204 A Crim R 306 …. [35455] DPP; Ex parte Lee; R v [1999] 2 All ER 737 …. [17130] Drakos v Smith [1958] VR 536; [1959] ALR 78 …. [17315], [17595] Draper v Crofts (1846) 15 M & W 166; 153 ER 807 …. [33435] — v Jacklyn [1970] SCR 92 …. [1280] Drew v Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219 …. [29075] Drinkwater v Porter (1835) 7 Car & P 181; 173 ER 80 …. [33155] Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517; 15 ALR 47 …. [11125], [17200], [17225], [17395], [21180], [33500], [33735], [33740] Driver v War Service Homes Cmr (No 2) [1924] VLR 535; (1924) 30 ALR 379 …. [39145] Druett v R (1994) 123 FLR 249 …. [15160] Drummond; R v (1784) 1 Leach 337; 168 ER 271 …. [33300] Dryburgh v R (1961) 105 CLR 532 …. [17675] Dryden v Dryden (1876) 2 VLR (E) 74 …. [41005]
— v Surrey County Council [1936] 2 All ER 535 …. [17475] DS v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 235 …. [7085] DS; R v [1999] Crim LR 911 …. [17155] DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499 …. [25010] — v Inter TAN Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151; 203 ALR 348 …. [25225], [25235] DSJ v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 758 …. [21252] DSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mb H v Owners of The Sennar;The Sennar [1985] 2 All ER 104; [1985] 1 WLR 490 …. [5025] DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423; 19 ALR 223 …. [39240] DTS v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 204 …. [15160] Du (EI) Pont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries plc (2007) 163 FCR 381 …. [5080], [5085] Du Barre v Livette (1791) Peake 109; 170 ER 96 …. [25215] Du Bost v Beresford [1803] All ER Rep 697; (1810) 170 ER 1235; 2 Camp 511 …. [37085] Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Al Alawi [1999] 1 All ER 703; [1999] 1 WLR 1964 …. [25290] Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98; [1989] 3 All ER 769 …. [25275] — v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 All ER 658; [1992] 1 WLR 106 …. [1315], [25275] Dublin Wicklow and Wexford Rail Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155; [1874] All ER Rep 529 …. [9120], [11135] Dubois; R v [1966] QWN 25 …. [17270] Duchess of Kingston’s Case [1776] All ER Rep 623; (1776) 168 ER 175; 1 Leach 146; 20 St Tr 355 …. [5005], [5015], [25305], [25325] Duchess of Kingston; R v (1776) 20 St Tr 578 …. [1620]
Ducsharm; R v [1955] OR 824; (1956) 1 DLR (2d) 732 …. [21045] Dudko; R v (2002) 132 A Crim R 371 …. [35545] Duell; R v [1964] Qd R 451 …. [17155], [17285] Duff v R (1979) 28 ALR 663; 39 FLR 315 …. [1380], [19065], [21280], [33680] Duff Development Co Ltd v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797; [1924] All ER Rep 1 …. [3085], [3120] Duffin v Markham (1918) 88 LJKB 581 …. [17660] Duffus v Collins [1966] 1 NSWR 464; (1966) 40 ALJR 62; 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 399 …. [1125] Duffy; R v [1979] 2 NZLR 432 …. [33485], [33490] — [1999] QB 919 …. [33805] Dugan; R v [1984] 2 NSWLR 554 …. [27310], [33760] Dugdale v Kraft Foods Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 454; [1976] 1 WLR 1288 …. [3135] Duhamel v R (No 2) (1981) 131 DLR (3d) 352 …. [5025] Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106 …. [39100] — v R (1989) 180 CLR 508; 83 ALR 650 …. [15160], [33730], [33760] — v — (2002) 137 A Crim R 296 …. [1220] Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 1) (1990) 54 SASR 498 …. [35400] Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) v Arthur Young (No 2) (1991) 4 ACSR 355 …. [33550] Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 3) (1990) 55 SASR 11 …. [35360] — v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 …. [11130], [27270], [33390], [35400], [41130] — v — (1998) 27 ACSR 1; 144 FLR 1 …. [1215]
— v — (1998) 27 ACSR 1 …. [1215] Duke of Beaufort v Crawshay (1866) LR 1 CP 699 …. [1040], [11030] — v Smith (1849) 4 Exch 450; 154 ER 1290 …. [33355] Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works (1870) LR 5 Ex 221 …. [5030] Duke of Marlborough, Re; Davis v Whitehead [1894] 2 Ch 133; [1891] All ER Rep Ext 1457 …. [39185] Duke of Newcastle v The Hundred of Broxtowe (1832) 4 B & Ad 273; 110 ER 458 …. [33195] Duke of Wellington, Re [1947] Ch 506; [1947] 2 All ER 854 …. [41035] Duke; R v (1979) 22 SASR 46 …. [15175], [15255], [29075] Dumoo v Garner (1997) 7 NTLR 129 …. [33660] Dun v Macintosh (1906) 3 CLR 1134; 12 ALR 581 …. [1645] Dunbar; R v [1958] 1 QB 1; [1957] 2 All ER 737 …. [9045] Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624; [1942] 1 All ER 587 …. [27005], [27040], [27050], [27060], [27155] — v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 513 …. [21001] Duncan (dec’d), Re [1968] P 306; [1968] 2 All ER 395 …. [25210] Duncan Davis Pty Ltd v Hurstbridge Abattoirs (Aust) Pty Ltd [1995] 1 VR 279 …. [35340] Duncan; R v (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 150 …. [29060] — (1981) 73 Cr App R 359 …. [33455] — (2011) 109 SASR 479 …. [9035] — [1944] KB 713 …. [1290] — [1992] 1 NZLR 528 …. [11075] Dunesky v Elder (1992) 35 FCR 429; 107 ALR 573 …. [25245], [25265] Dungay; R v (2001) 126 A Crim R 216 …. [27315]
Dunkley; R v [1927] 1 KB 323; [1926] All ER Rep 187 …. [19145], [23190], [23280], [23315], [23320] Dunlop Holdings Ltd’s Application, Re [1979] RPC 523 …. [7055], [7160], [7200] Dunn v Aslett (1838) 2 Mood & R 122; 174 ER 235 …. [19010] — v Brown (1911) 12 SR (NSW) 22 …. [3165] — v Dunn [1949] P 98; [1948] 2 All ER 822 …. [7005] — v Littlejohn (1900) 2 WALR 138 …. [15095] Dunn; R v (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 423 …. [23315] Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq 524 …. [17480] — v J Connolly Ltd [1963] AR (NSW) 873 …. [25105] Dunne; R v (1929) 99 LJKB 117 …. [11035] Dunning v FCT (1972) 3 SASR 210 …. [35065] Dunning; R v [1965] Crim LR 372 …. [19050] Dunraven v Llewellyn, Earl of (1850) 15 QB 791; 117 ER 657 …. [33180], [33190] Dunsmore v Elliott (1981) 26 SASR 496 …. [3070] Dunstan v Orr (2008) 217 FCR 559 …. [25300] Dunwoody; R v (2004) 212 ALR 103 …. [17705], [25265] Duong; R v (2011) 110 SASR 291; 210 A Crim R 452 …. [37060] — (2011) 110 SASR 296 …. [9035], [37060] Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507 …. [21252] Dupas (No 3); R v (2009) 28 VR 380 …. [1400], [15220] Dupas; R v (2011) 211 A Crim R 81 …. [29050] Dura (Aust) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 3) (2013) 29 BCL 19 …. [29200] Durbin v R [1995] 2 Cr App R 84 …. [19125], [19135]
Durston v Mercuri [1969] VR 507 …. [1240], [39015] Duryea; R v (2008) 192 A Crim R 286 …. [1125] Duthie v Brebner [1961] SASR 183 …. [33485] Duvivier; R v (1982) 29 SASR 217 …. [1880], [23145] DWB; R v (2006) 163 A Crim R 71 …. [21050] — (2008) 20 VR 112 …. [21050] Dwyer v Bridges; Ex parte Bridges [1951] St R Qd 90 …. [41050] — v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124; 244 ALR 257 …. [3135] — v Collins (1852) 7 Exch 639; 155 ER 1104 …. [25295], [39045], [39050] Dwyer; R v [1925] 2 KB 799; [1924] All ER Rep 272 …. [1375], [1380], [1425] Dyce Sombre, Re (1849) 1 Mac & G 116; 41 ER 1207 …. [29045], [29070] Dyer v Best (1866) 4 H & C 189 …. [17200] Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181 …. [1220], [11135], [17130], [17295] Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 …. [17715], [23165], [25130] Dyke; R v (2009) 197 A Crim R 558 …. [1290] Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 NZLR 289 …. [41005] Dysart Peerage Case (1881) 6 App Cas 489 …. [31060], [31095], [37145] Dyson t/as Pharmacy Plus v Pharmacy Board of New South Wales (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 …. [11010] Dytche; R v (1890) 17 Cox CC 39 …. [1155] E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299; 105 ALR 53 …. [29050]
E & J Gallo Winery and Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 265 ALR 645 …. [35545] EMMurray (dec’d), Re; Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales v Salwey [1964] NSWR 121 …. [3020] E, DJ; R v (2012) 112 SASR 225 …. [15140], [15170], [15220], [17290] E, In the Marriage of (1978) 31 FLR 171 …. [17265] E; R v (1995) 89 A Crim R 325 …. [17135] — (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 …. [7085], [15185], [17275] — [2012] Crim LR 383 …. [17135] — [2012] Crim LR 563 …. [13070], [17435] Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154; 30 ALR 257 …. [15035], [15165], [15185], [15220], [15245], [17275], [33435] Eades; R v [1972] Crim LR 99 …. [17175], [19050] Eagle Hill Ltd v F Needham (Builders) Ltd [1973] AC 992; [1972] 3 All ER 895 …. [1175] Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 …. [29050], [29055] Eagleton v Kingston (1803) 8 Ves Jun 438; 32 ER 425 …. [39105] Earl v Hector Whaling Ltd [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 459 …. [9085] Earl Nelson v Lord Bridport [1843] All ER Rep 1032; 8 Beav 527; (1845) 50 ER 207 …. [41035] Earl of Dumfries, The (1885) 10 PD 31 …. [33545] Earl of Lonsdale v A-G [1982] 3 All ER 579; [1982] 1 WLR 887 …. [39240] Earl of Mexborough v Whitwood Urban District Council [1897] 2 QB 111; [1895] All ER Rep Ext 1820 …. [25115], [25130] Earldom of Perth, The (1848) 2 HLC 865; 9 ER 1322 …. [41035] Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 …. [1215] Earnshaw v Loy (No 1) [1959] VR 248 …. [5065]
Easom; R v (1981) 28 SASR 134 …. [1365], [17130] East India Co v Atkins (1728) 1 Stra 168; 93 ER 452 …. [25075] East London Rail Co v Thames Conservators (1904) 90 LT 347 …. [33185] East London Railway Co v Conservators of the River Thames (1904) 90 LT 346 …. [3040], [33845] East Tennessee, V & GR Co v Daniel (1893) 18 SE 22 …. [17590] East; R v (2003) 154 A Crim R 1 …. [27305] Easterday v R (2003) 143 A Crim R 154 …. [17130] Eastern Express Pty Ltd v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 43; 106 ALR 297 …. [3200], [33465] Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 …. [1305], [11035], [17435], [19150], [19160], [21050], [23270], [23275], [27195], [29185], [31010], [31080], [35515], [35615] — v — (2000) 203 CLR 1; 172 ALR 39 …. [3155], [11140] Eastwood; R v [1973] VR 709 …. [17125] Eather v Jones [1974] 2 NSWLR 19 …. [17600] Eaton v Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1995) 21 MVR 357 …. [37060] Ebanks v R [2006] 1 WLR 1827 …. [17485], [17505], [23050] Ebatarinja v Deland (1998) 194 CLR 444; 157 ALR 385 …. [33805] Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150 …. [5070] Ebner, Re; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2003) 196 ALR 533 …. [5080] Eckersley v Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR 1 …. [29075] Eckroyd v Coulthard (1897) 32 L Jo 161 …. [33115] Eclipse Sleep Products Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1957) 99 CLR 300 …. [3135] Edelsten v Investigating Committee of New South Wales (1986) 7 NSWLR 222; 80 ALR 85 …. [27255]
Edelsten; R v (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 …. [9120], [11120], [11125], [27255] Edgerton v Edgerton [2012] All ER (D) 172 (Feb); [2012] 1 FCR(UK) 421; [2012] 1 WLR 2655 …. [5005], [5025] Edmonds v Edmonds [1947] P 67 …. [35065] — v Walter (1820) 3 Stark 7; 171 ER 749 …. [17155] Edmunds v Edmunds [1935] VLR 177 …. [15210], [17600] Edmunds; R v (1833) 6 Car & P 164; 172 ER 1191 …. [31095] — (1909) 2 Cr App R 257 …. [33795] Edwards v Brookes (Milk) Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 62; [1963] 1 WLR 795 …. [31130], [33540] — v DPP [1992] Crim LR 576 …. [37060] — v Joyce [1954] VLR 216; [1954] ALR 484 …. [5095] — v O’Connor [1991] 2 NZLR 542 …. [39145] — v R (1993) 178 CLR 193; 117 ALR 600 …. [3295], [9040], [15220], [33435] Edwards; R v (1837) 8 C & P 26; 173 ER 384 …. [17190] — (1848) 3 Cox CC 82 …. [17090], [17120] — (1872) 12 Cox CC 230 …. [37025] — (1973) 1 QL 365 …. [33690] — (1983) 77 Cr App R 5 …. [9025] — (1986) 20 A Crim R 463 …. [19050], [29050] — [1975] 1 NZLR 402 …. [15100] — [1975] QB 27; [1974] 2 All ER 1085 …. [7170], [7180] — [1983] Crim LR 539 …. [33435] — [1991] 2 All ER 266; [1991] 1 WLR 207 …. [17510], [19030] — [1998] 2 VR 354 …. [1200], [5155]
— [1998] Crim LR 207 …. [21065] Edwin (No 2); R v (2013) 277 FLR 14 …. [27315] EF; R v (2008) 189 A Crim R 463 …. [17265] Efandis; R v (2008) 186 A Crim R 302 …. [27130] Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (1993) 43 FCR 510; 115 ALR 377 …. [5055], [5070], [5120] Eftoda; R v (1963) 37 DLR (2d) 269 …. [33635] Eg R v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218 …. [29190] Egan v Bott [1985] VR 787 …. [11045] — v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563 …. [25250], [27065] — v Harradine (1975) 6 ALR 507 …. [41130] Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 …. [15160] Egg v Barnett (1800) 3 Esp 196; 170 ER 586 …. [1170] Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board v K H Korp Tocumwal Trading Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 378 …. [25125] Egglishaw v ACC (2007) 164 FCR 224; 243 ALR 177 …. [5170] Egremont v Date, Doe d (1842) 3 QB 609; 114 ER 641 …. [25035] Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 …. [5030], [5075], [5095] EI Dupont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (2002) 54 IPR 304; (2002) AIPC 91-788 …. [1730] Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1960] Qd R 487 …. [1135] Eidinow; R v (1932) 23 Cr App R 145 …. [23145], [23315] Eisenlord v Clum (1891) 27 NE 1024 …. [33230] El Adl; R v [1993] 2 Qd R 195 …. [15220], [33435] El Alam v Northcote City Council [1996] 2 VR 672 …. [5105] El-Zarw; R v [1994] 2 Qd R 67 …. [5150], [5160]
Elbe Shipping SA v Giant Marine Shipping SA (2007) 159 FCR 518 …. [7275] Elbourne v Troon Pty Ltd [1978] VR 171 …. [25335] Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins (1963) 113 CLR 426; [1964] ALR 408 …. [3030] Elders IXL Ltd v Lindgren Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 411 …. [41005] Electricity Trust of SA v Mitsubishi Australia Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 48 …. [25240] Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Re Anderson (1970) 72 SR (NSW) 532; 92 WN (NSW) 672 …. [27205] Eleftheriou; R v [1993] Crim LR 947 …. [17200] Elfie A Issaias v Marine Insurance Co Ltd (1923) 15 LI L Rep 186 …. [9050] Eli Lilly and Co v Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals (2004) 137 FCR 573 …. [25245] Elias v Griffith (1877) 47 LJ Ch 806 …. [17480] — v Pasmore [1934] 2 KB 164 …. [27295] Elikins v US (1960) 364 US 206 …. [27230] Elkin v Janson (1845) 13 M& W655; 153 ER 274 …. [7100], [7160] Elkington v Shell Australia Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 11 …. [17460], [29075] Ell v Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Board (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 437 …. [3165] Ella; R v (1990) 100 FLR 442 …. [11075] Ellem (No 1); R v [1995] 2 Qd R 542 …. [19095] Ellem (No 2); R v [1995] 2 Qd R 549 …. [7085] Elliot v Loake [1983] Crim LR 36 …. [1200] Elliott v Albert [1934] 1 KB 650; [1934] All ER Rep 391 …. [25135] — v Boyles (1857) 31 Pa 65 …. [17505]
— v R (2007) 239 ALR 651; 82 ALJR 82 …. [1130] — v Tippett (2008) 20 VR 195 …. [25335] Elliott; R v [1977] Crim LR 557 …. [33740] Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113; [1922] All ER Rep 451 …. [27215] — v Houston (1878) 10 Ch D 236 …. [39255] — v R (2010) 30 VR 428 …. [15220], [21050], [33435] — v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 …. [11150], [17460] Ellis; R v (1826) 6 B & C 145; 108 ER 406 …. [21040] — (2001) 125 A Crim R 419 …. [27310] — (2003) 58 NSWLR 700 …. [1765], [21035], [21235], [21252] — (2010) 107 SASR 94 …. [21100] — [1910] 2 KB 746; [1908] All ER Rep 488 …. [23145], [23270] — [1961] 2 All ER 928; [1961] 1 WLR 1064 …. [23375] — [1990] Crim LR 717 …. [19090] Ellor v Selfridge and Co (1930) 46 TLR 236 …. [1200] Ellwood; R v (1908) 1 Cr App R 181 …. [1140] Elomar (No 6); R v (2008) 233 FLR 230 …. [27315] Elrick v Terjesen [1948] VLR 184 …. [3065] Elsey v FCT (1969) 121 CLR 99 …. [35340] Elton v Larkins (1832) 5 C & P 385; 172 ER 1020 …. [17580] Eltran Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1990) 25 FCR 322; 98 ALR 141 …. [25055] Elworthy; R v (1867) LR 1 CCR 103 …. [39010] Ely JJ; Ex parte Burgess; R v [1992] Crim LR 888 …. [1295] Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; 239 ALR 204 …. [27315], [35650] — v The Queen” (2008) 30 Syd L Rev 715 …. [35650]
Emanuel v Emanuel [1982] 2 All ER 342; [1982] 1 WLR 669 …. [25160] Emele, Re [1941] 4 DLR 197 …. [5215] Emery v R (1999) 9 Tas R 120 …. [21050] EMI Records Ltd v Spillane [1986] 2 All ER 1016; [1986] 1 WLR 967 …. [25055] Emmanuel v Emmanuel [1946] P 115; [1945] 2 All ER 494 …. [7005], [7225] Emmett; R v (1988) 14 NSWLR 327 …. [27215] — [1905] VLR 718; (1905) 11 ALR 484 …. [21200] Empire Shipping Co Inc v Owners of the Ship Shin Kobe Maru (1991) 32 FCR 78; 104 ALR 489 …. [1040] Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20; 185 ALR 590 …. [9130], [27315] Endeavour Wines Ltd v Martin & Martin [1948] WN 338 …. [17370] Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; 169 ALR 400 …. [3135] Engebretson v Bartlett (2007) 16 VR 417; 172 A Crim R 304 …. [1645] Engelke v Musmann [1928] AC 433; [1928] All ER Rep 18 …. [3085] England v England [1953] P 16; [1952] 2 All ER 784 …. [1155] England; R v (2013) 116 SASR 589 …. [17290] — [1978] Tas SR 79 …. [35045] English and American Insurance Co Ltd v Herbert-Smith [1988] FSR 232 …. [25025] English and Laing v Richmond [1956] SCR 383 …. [1645] English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] Ch 415; [1973] 1 All ER 726 …. [29070], [29150], [33825] Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock & Co’s Arbitration, Re [1910] 1 KB 327; [1908] All ER Rep 625 …. [1050], [17080]
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— v Professional Gymnasium Equipment Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R 129 …. [25125] Exall; R v (1866) 4 F & F 922; 176 ER 850 …. [1110], [17335], [17340] Exchange Hotel Ltd v Murphy [1947] SASR 112 …. [9050] Executive Director of Health v Lily Creek International Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 510 …. [29050] Executor Trustee and Agency Co of South Australia Ltd v Insurance Office of Australia [1949] SASR 337 …. [33055] Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; 209 ALR 568 …. [11150] Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199; 88 ALJR 76 …. [25020] Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785; 12 ACLC 669 …. [15150] Eyre v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 180 …. [33455] F v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 …. [7085], [19170], [29050] F (A); R v (1996) 1 CR (5th) 382 …. [17505] F and M Chehab, In the Marriage of (1993) 113 FLR 94 …. [3140] F(S); R v [2011] 2 Cr App R 28 …. [11100] F; R v [2012] Crim LR 282 …. [11100] Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 …. [1215], [9125] — v Lay (1972) 127 CLR 665; [1972] ALR 885 …. [3158] Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (No 2) [2003] QB 381; [2002] 4 All ER 97 …. [29080] Fagan v City of Newark 188 A 2d 427 (1963) …. [33285] Fagenblat v Feingold Partners Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 454; BC200107393 …. [29080] Fagernes, The [1927] P 311 …. [3085]
Fahad; R v (2004) 146 A Crim R 169 …. [1400] FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v McSweeney (1998) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-400 …. [21252] FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Securities Ltd (1990) 3 ACSR 279 …. [41120] — v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 343 …. [39290] Fair Work Ombudsman v Nerd Group Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 262 FLR 315 …. [1690] Fairbairn; R v (2011) 250 FCR 277 …. [35520] Fairbank v Jones (1975) 10 SASR 367 …. [3035] Fairfield-Mabey Ltd v Shell UK Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 576 …. [25010], [29080] Fairhall, Ex parte (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 178 …. [1830] Fairleigh; R v (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 723 …. [33650] Fairlie v Denton (1828) 3 Car & P 103; 172 ER 343 …. [33435] Fairman v Fairman [1949] P 341; [1949] 1 All ER 938 …. [15120] Faith v M’Intyre (1835) 7 C & P 44; 173 ER 20 …. [17065] Fajkovic; R v [1970] VR 566 …. [33805] Fakisandhla Nkambule v R [1940] AC 760; [1940] 3 All ER 184 …. [1305] Falcon v Famous Players Film Co Ltd [1926] 2 KB 474 …. [33530] Falconer-Atlee; R v (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 …. [11100], [11105], [19120] Falconer; R v (1990) 171 CLR 30; 96 ALR 545 …. [7030], [7090], [7255] Falealili; R v [1996] 3 NZLR 664 …. [19110], [19135] Falkner v Barba [1971] VR 332 …. [5130] Fallon v Calvert [1960] 2 QB 201; [1960] 1 All ER 281 …. [17080], [17105]
Fallon; R v [1975] Crim LR 341 …. [33615], [33690] Fallows v R [1961] WAR 164 …. [33480] Falzon; R v [1990] 2 Qd R 436 …. [13085] Familic; R v (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 …. [9040], [15160], [21085], [33770] Family Housing Association (Manchester) Ltd v Michael Hyde and Partners [1993] 2 All ER 567; [1993] 1 WLR 354 …. [25385] Fan v R [2012] 3 NZLR 29 …. [33740] Fanelli v United States Gypsum Co 141 F 2d 216 (1944) …. [17220] Fankhauser v Mark Dykes Pty Ltd [1960] VR 376 …. [7075] Fannon; R v (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 427; 39 WN (NSW) 130 …. [1375], [1380], [17345], [31185] FAR; R v [1996] 2 Qd R 49 …. [13060] Farah v Australian Postal Corporation (1994) 35 ALD 349 …. [3140] Faraj v R (1980) 31 ALR 472 …. [9030], [9035] Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; 210 ALR 50 …. [7275] Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433; 22 ALR 201 …. [3156] Farid; R v (1945) 30 Cr App R 168 …. [15085] Farmer v Honan (1919) 26 CLR 183 …. [39290] Farooqi; R v [2014] 1 Cr App R 8 …. [17065], [17435], [17495] Farquharson v R (1993) 98 Cr App R …. [1390] — v — (2012) 36 VR 538 …. [33435] Farquharson; R v (2009) 26 VR 410 …. [7085], [15220], [29050], [29055], [29060], [29065], [29070], [29075], [33435], [17130] Farr; R v (2001) 118 A Crim R 399 …. [1335], [27315] Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286; 155 ALR 652 …. [29050] Farrelly v Hircock (No 1) [1971] Qd R 341 …. [33545]
Farrow v Blomfield (1859) 1 F & F 653; 175 ER 892 …. [17560] Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 13 ACLC 1329 …. [25015], [25265] Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v — (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 …. [25010], [25015], [25265] Faulkner v Brine (1858) 1 F & F 254; 175 ER 715 …. [17375] — v Johnson (1843) 11 M & W 581; 152 ER 937 …. [1175] Faulkner; R v [1987] 2 Qd R 263 …. [29050] Faure; R v [1978] VR 246 …. [11095] Fawkes v Shadwell; Ex parte Shadwell [1966] Qd R 20 …. [11095] Fazio; R v (1997) 69 SASR 54 …. [29015], [29150] FDP v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 87 …. [21050] FDP; R v (2008) 74 NSWLR 645 …. [1680] Feather, Re; Harrison v Tapsell [1945] Ch 343; [1945] 1 All ER 552 …. [39280] Federal Cmr of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 85 ALR 588 …. [25250], [25280] — v Grbich (1993) 31 ALD 97; 18 AAR 74 …. [13270] — v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 …. [11010], [29050], [29150] — v ICI Australia Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 529 …. [3120] — v Lamesa Holdings BV (1997) 77 FCR 597; 157 ALR 290 …. [41005] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404; 141 ALR 92; 34 ATR 183 …. [25240], [25300] Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein; R v (1938) 59 CLR 556 …. [3158] Feely; R v [1973] QB 530; [1973] 1 All ER 341 …. [11010] Feigenbaum; R v [1919] 1 KB 431; [1918] All ER Rep 489 …. [15225], [33770]
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Ferrers v Shirley, Lord (1731) Fitzgibbon 195; 94 ER 716 …. [39100] Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593; 185 ALR 394 …. [1100], [1360], [1380], [1395], [1400], [1410], [1420], [1445], [1490], [11125], [21180] Festa; R v (2000) 111 A Crim R 60 …. [1220], [21180] Fetch; R v [1976] 1 ACLD 019 …. [17265] Feuerheerd v London General Omnibus Co Ltd [1918] 2 KB 565; [1918] All ER Rep 955 …. [25255], [25260] Few v Guppy (1835) 13 Beav 457; 51 ER 176 …. [25345] FF Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd v El Ar Initiations (UK) Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 468 …. [25155] Ffrost v Stevenson (1937) 58 CLR 528; [1937] ALR 533 …. [3085], [3155] FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313 …. [15160], [17295] FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33; BC200301715 …. [29080] Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630; [1965] 2 All ER 4 …. [5025], [5030], [5070] Fiefia v Dept of Labour [1983] NZLR 704 …. [35055] Field v Cmr for Railways NSW (1957) 99 CLR 285 …. [1830], [25355], [25375] — v Leeds City Council [2000] 1 EGLR 54 …. [29080] — v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70; (1922) 29 ALR 38 …. [33555] Field; Ex parte White; R v (1895) 64 LJMC 158 …. [3130] Field; R v (1919) 15 Cr App R 129 …. [17515] Fieldhouse; R v (1977) 17 SASR 92 …. [33690], [33725] Fields; R v (1986) 28 CCC (ed) 353 …. [1645] Fielke v Municipal Tramways Trust [1944] SASR 235 …. [1290] Fileman v Liddle (1974) 2 BPR 9192 …. [7070]
Files; R v [1983] 2 Qd R 153 …. [17645] Filios v Morland (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 331; 80 WN (NSW) 501 …. [33805] Filipowski v Nikolaus (2004) 136 LGERA 157; [2004] NSWLEC 432 …. [25295] Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251 …. [39290] — v — (1979) 1 BPR [97023] …. [33420] Finance & Guarantee Co Ltd v FCT (1970) 44 ALJR 368 …. [33540] Finch v Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578 …. [27050], [27120] Finers v Miro [1991] 1 All ER 182; [1991] 1 WLR 35 …. [25290] Fingleton v Lowen (1979) 20 SASR 312 …. [31090] Finlay; R v (2007) 178 A Crim R 373 …. [1395] Finlayson; R v (1912) 14 CLR 675; 18 ALR 313 …. [1880], [21195] Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455 …. [5095] Finn; R v (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 …. [1395], [1400] — [1985] 1 Qd R 212 …. [33570] Finnessey; R v (1906) 11 Ont LR 338 …. [19035] Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Carath (Bullfinch) Pty Ltd [1969] WAR 49 …. [33540] Firebelt Pty Ltd v Brambles Australia Ltd (2002) 188 ALR 280; 76 ALJR 816 …. [1645], [29070] Firmagroup Australia Pty Ltd v Byrne & Davidson Doors (Vic) Pty Ltd (1986) 67 ALR 29 …. [29115] Firman; R v (1989) 52 SASR 391 …. [31090] Firmin v Public Trustee (1889) 7 NZLR 277 …. [39180] First Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Sylvatech Ltd (2004) 186 FLR 266 …. [25395]
Fischer; R v (1996) 23 MVR 507 …. [1125] Fish, Ingham v Rayner, Re [1894] 2 Ch 83 …. [39215], [39255] Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65 …. [29050], [29055], [29060] — v Winch [1939] 1 KB 666; [1939] 2 All ER 144 …. [3055] Fisher (LJ) & Co Ltd v Fabtile Industries Pty Ltd (1978) 1 A IPR 565 …. [29115] Fitz-James v Moys (1663) 1 Sid 133; 82 ER 1014 …. [3140] Fitzgibbon; R v (1885) 11 VLR 232 …. [19075] Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 200; [1936] ALR 29 …. [7005] Fitzpatrick; R v (1926) 19 Cr App R 91 …. [1110] — [1962] 3 All ER 840; [1963] 1 WLR 7 …. [37155] FJB; R v [1999] 2 VR 425 …. [21050], [21243], [21252] Flack v Baldry [1988] 1 All ER 673; [1988] 1 WLR 393 …. [11010] — v Chairperson, National Crime Authority (1997) 80 FCR 137; 150 ALR 153 …. [1215] Flack; R v [1969] 2 All ER 784; [1969] 1 WLR 937 …. [21155] Flaherty v Piva; Ex parte Piva [1960] Qd R 53 …. [3020], [15050] Flanagan v Fahy [1918] 2 IR 361 …. [17305], [17315], [17460] Flanigan; R v (1997) 190 LSJS 499 …. [33435] Flannery v Cohuna Sewerage Authority (1976) 51 ALJR 135 …. [11150] — v Halifax Estate Agencies [2000] 1 All ER 373; [2000] 1 WLR 377 …. [29075] Flannery; R v [1969] VR 586 …. [15195] Flavel v South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 505 …. [29080] — v — (2008) 102 SASR 404 …. [29065], [29070] Fleet v Murton (1871) LR 7 QB 126 …. [1165]
Fleming v R (1998) 197 CLR 250; 158 ALR 379 …. [15135] — v — (2009) 197 A Crim R 282 …. [27315] Flemming; R v (1987) 86 Cr App R 32 …. [1390], [11100] Flesch; R v (1987) 7 NSWLR 554 …. [9030] Fletcher v Fletcher [1952] VLR 541; [1952] ALR 1047 …. [41080] — v T C Whittle Pty Ltd (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 419 …. [9120] Fletcher Timber Ltd v A-G (NZ) [1984] 1 NZLR 290 …. [27155] Fletcher, Re; Barclays Bank Ltd v Ewing [1949] Ch 473; [1949] 1 All ER 732 …. [39255] Fletcher, Re; Reading v Fletcher [1917] 1 Ch 339 …. [37105] Fletcher; R v (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 70 …. [21025] — (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 …. [21252] — [1998] 2 Qd R 437 …. [9040] Flewitt v Horvath [1972] RTR 121 …. [1045] Flexible Steel Lacing Co v Beltraco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331 …. [29205] Flohr v McMahon; Ex parte McMahon [1956] St R Qd 253 …. [15050] Florance v Andrew (1985) 58 ALR 377 …. [11150] — v Hutchinson (1891) 17 VLR 471 …. [41005] Florida Hotels Pty Ltd v Mayo (1965) 113 CLR 588 …. [29125] Flower v Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Co Ltd [1936] AC 206 …. [9005], [11150] Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries Qld Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; 163 ALR 744 …. [17445] Flowers v R (2005) 153 A Crim R 110 …. [33455] Floyd; R v [1972] 1 NSWLR 373 …. [21105] Flynn; R v (1957) 42 Cr App R 15 …. [17645], [17650] — [1967] Crim LR 489 …. [17510]
— [2008] 2 Cr App R 20 …. [1445] Fodare Pty Ltd v Shearn (2010) 240 FLR 187 …. [35545] Foggo; Ex parte A-G (Qld); R v [1989] 2 Qd R 49 …. [17240] Folbigg; R v (2005) 152 A Crim R 35 …. [21252] — [2003] NSWCCA 17; BC200302747 …. [21035] Foletta v Merri Creek Quarry Pty Ltd [1951] VLR 149 …. [33355] Foley; R v (1984) 13 A Crim R 29 …. [17130] — [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (1998) 105 A Crim R 1 …. [17435], [17460], [17485] Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157; 99 ER 589 …. [1535], [29045], [29135] Foll; R v (1956) 64 Man R 198 …. [33430] Follett v Jefferyes (1850) 1 Sim (NS) 1; 61 ER 1 …. [25285] Folley; R v (1896) 60 JP 569 …. [17265] Fong; R v [1981] Qd R 90 …. [3290], [29050] Fontaine Moreau; R v (1848) 11 QB 1028; 116 ER 757 …. [5220] Foo v R (2001) 126 A Crim R 486 …. [15115] Foodco Group Pty Ltd v Northgan Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 356; 41 IPR 138 …. [5170] Footersville Pty Ltd v Miles (1986) 41 SASR 211 …. [17725] Forbes v R (2009) 232 FLR 229 …. [15010] — v Samuel [1913] 3 KB 706 …. [39015] Forbes; R v [1999] 2 Cr App R 501 …. [23405] Ford v De Pontes (1859) 5 Jur NS 993 …. [25265] — v Elliott (1849) 4 Exch 78; 154 ER 1132 …. [33570] Ford; R v (1851) 5 Cox CC 184 …. [17540] — (1913) 32 NZLR 1219 …. [41005], [41035]
— (2009) 273 ALR 286 …. [3285], [21252] Forde; R v (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 …. [3185] Fordham; R v (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 …. [21252] Foreman (No 1); R v 1952 (1) SA 423 …. [31060] Forest Lake, The [1968] P 270; [1966] 3 All ER 833 …. [33795] Forge v ASIC (2004) 213 ALR 574 …. [29205] — v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45; 229 ALR 223 …. [3158] Forgie v Police [1969] NZLR 101 …. [15170] Forgione; R v [1969] SASR 248 …. [15095] Formby Bros v Formby (1910) 102 LT 116 …. [39160] Formica Ltd v Export Credits Guarantee Dept [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 692 …. [25265] Forrest v Normandale (1973) 5 SASR 524 …. [33485] Forrest; R v [1970] NZLR 545 …. [33810] Forrester v H M Advocate (1952) JC 28 …. [29070] — v Harris Farm Pty Ltd (1996) 129 FLR 431 …. [29070] Forrester; R v [1985] 2 NZLR 85 …. [1275] Forshaw v Lewis (1855) 10 Exch 712; 156 ER 626 …. [25225] Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1986] 2 All ER 488 …. [41035] Forster v Forster [1907] VLR 159; (1907) 13 ALR 33 …. [37110] — v Hunter New England Area Health Service (2010) 77 NSWLR 495 …. [9050], [29075] Forsyth v Rodda (1988) 37 A Crim R 50 …. [9120] Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162 …. [29080] Fortunato; R v (2003) 137 A Crim R 453 …. [23410]
Foster v Derby, Doe d (1834) 1 Ad & E 783; 110 ER 1406 …. [33795] — v Globe Venture Syndicate Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 811 …. [3085] — v R (1982) 38 ALR 599 …. [11065] — v — (1993) 113 ALR 1; 67 ALJR 550 …. [33760] Foster and Jamieson v Sisson, Doe d (1810) 12 East 62; 104 ER 25 …. [33160] Foster; R v (1834) 6 Car & P 325; 172 ER 325 …. [37050], [37055], [37065] — (1949) 79 CLR 43; [1949] ALR 493 …. [3156] Fotheringham; R v [1975] Crim LR 710 …. [17185] Fountain; R v (2001) 124 A Crim R 100 …. [15100] Fouyaxis; R v (2007) 99 SASR 233 …. [9030], [15220] Fowden; R v [1982] Crim LR 588 …. [1370], [1380], [31075] Fowke v Berington [1914] 2 Ch 308 …. [3040], [33185] Fowler; R v (1985) 39 SASR 440 …. [29070] — (1985) 39 SASR 441 …. [29065] — (2003) 151 A Crim R 166 …. [1755], [9040], [15260] Fox v Bearblock (1881) 17 Ch D 429 …. [33410] — v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225; [1960] 1 WLR 1017 …. [17250], [17305], [17315], [17485], [17505] — v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 197 ALR 201 …. [11150], [29060], [29080], [29200] — v R (1982) 7 A Crim R 28 …. [15195] Fox (No 2); R v [2000] 1 Qd R 640 …. [1395] Fox; R v [2000] 2 Qd R 334 …. [23240] FP; R v (2007) 169 A Crim R 318 …. [1665], [15255] Fracis Times & Co v Carr (1900) 82 LT 698 …. [5025]
France v Parkinson [1954] 1 All ER 739; [1954] 1 WLR 581 …. [1200] Francis v Flood [1978] 1 NSWLR 113 …. [7120] — v Stevens [1983] 1 VR 260 …. [7030] Francis; R v [1874] All ER Rep Ext 2028; (1874) 43 LJMC 97 …. [1275], [1475], [21205] — (1959) 43 Cr App R 174 …. [11045] — [1991] 1 All ER 225; [1990] 1 WLR 1264 …. [17690] — [1993] 2 Qd R 300 …. [15255] Frank v Police (SA) (2007) 98 SASR 547 …. [33805] Frankcombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139; [1957] ALR 320 …. [17305], [17315] Franklin v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1959) 101 CLR 197 …. [3230] Franklin; R v (2001) 3 VR 9 …. [15220] Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; 264 ALR 15 …. [39240], [39290] Fraser v Jones [1970] 3 NSWR 187 …. [1210] — v R (1995) 65 SASR 260 …. [17305], [17315] — v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44; [1983] 2 All ER 101 …. [1165] Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100; [1945] ALR 186 …. [33540] Fraser; R v (1956) 40 Cr App R 160 …. [17375] — [2004] 2 Qd R 544 …. [27305] Frawley; R v (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 …. [21050], [31100] Fred Drughorn Ltd v Rederiaktiebolaget Trans-Atlantic [1919] AC 203; [1918] All ER Rep 1122 …. [39190] Freebody; R v (1935) 25 Cr App R 69 …. [15125]
Freedlander v London Assurance Co (1832) 4 B & Ad 193; 110 ER 428 …. [17370] Freeman v G J Coles & Co Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 297 …. [11145], [17600] — v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494 …. [3095] — v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91; 157 ALR 339 …. [1215], [25290] — v Phillipps (1816) 4 M & S 486; 105 ER 914 …. [33190] — v Rabinov [1981] VR 539 …. [11150] Freeman, Ex parte (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 73 …. [15055], [15225] Freeman; R v (1895) 6 QLJ 281 …. [33295] — [1980] 17 VR 1 …. [17285] — [1980] VR 1 …. [15130], [15170], [15195], [17265], [17270], [17275], [17285] Freemantle v R [1994] 1 WLR 1437 …. [1400] Freer v Freer [1956] SASR 163 …. [25245] Freight Rail Corporation v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2001) 107 FCR 15 …. [11010] French v Scarman (1979) 20 SASR 333 …. [27240] French; R v (2012) 114 SASR 287 …. [13050] Fricker; R v (1986) 42 SASR 436 …. [23185] Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 194 …. [17495] Friend v Brooker (2009) 255 ALR 601; 83 ALJR 724 …. [3075] — v Civil Aviation Authority [2001] 4 All ER 385 …. [5095] — v Wallman [1946] KB 493; [1946] 2 All ER 237 …. [35060], [35090] Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 …. [11055], [33750], [33760] Frith v Frith [1906] AC 254; [1904] All ER Rep 1281 …. [39180], [39205]
Fritz, Re [1995] 2 Qd R 580 …. [25245] Frixou; R v [1998] Crim LR 352 …. [17135] Frizell; R v (1987) 31 A Crim R 213 …. [29150] Froggatt; R v (1910) 4 Cr App R 115 …. [17645] Fromhold v Fromhold [1952] 1 TLR 1522 …. [15165], [17265] Frontier Finance Ltd v Hynes and Niagara Sewing Machine Co (1956) 10 DLR (2d) 206 …. [39175] Frost; R v (1839) 4 St Tr NS 85 …. [17650] — (1839) 9 C & P 129; 173 ER 771 …. [33570] Fruehauf Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359 …. [25240] Fruet v R [1974] WAR 78 …. [17650], [29105] Frugtniet; R v [1999] 2 VR 297 …. [33780] Fry v Jennings (1983) 25 NTR 19 …. [33675] — v Wood (1737) 1 Atk 445; 26 ER 284 …. [33795] Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (1923) …. [17350], [29055], [29185] Fryer v Gathercole (1849) 13 Jur 542 …. [29095] FTG; R v (2007) 15 VR 685 …. [17590], [21050] Fuge; R v (2001) 123 A Crim R 310 …. [7085] Fuhrer; R v [1961] VR 500 …. [15075], [15175] Fulcher; R v [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 …. [21050] Fuld (dec’d), In the Estate of (No 3); Hartley v Fuld [1968] P 675 …. [9085], [41010] Fuld (dec’d), In the Estate of; Hartley v Fuld (A-G intervening) [1965] P 405; [1965] 2 All ER 657 …. [17475], [33805], [39115] Fuller; R v (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 …. [19140], [23275], [23285] — [1970] 3 NSWR 320 …. [33500]
Funderburk; R v [1990] 2 All ER 482; [1990] 1 WLR 587 …. [17510], [17535], [17580], [17595] Furbert v R [2000] 1 WLR 1716 …. [1140] Furlong v Staniforth (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 364; 42 WN (NSW) 121 …. [17535] Furnell v Betts (1978) 20 SASR 300 …. [33675], [33745] Furney, Re [1964] ALR 814 …. [25245] Fuschillo; R v [1940] 2 All ER 489 …. [1195] Fuzil Deen; R v [1895] QCR 307 …. [13030] Fyffe; R v [1991] 2 VR 72 …. [9040] G v Armellin (2008) 219 FLR 359 …. [33465] — v DPP [1998] QB 919; [1997] 2 All ER 755 …. [13055] — v H (1994) 181 CLR 387; 124 ALR 353 …. [1215], [1235], [3200], [9015], [9050], [33435] G & H Montage Gmb H v Irvani [1990] 2 All ER 225; [1990] 1 WLR 667 …. [41035] G & K Ladenbau (UK) Ltd v Crawley & de Reya [1978] 1 All ER 682; [1978] 1 WLR 266 …. [1165] G (A) v G (T) [1970] 2 QB 643; [1970] 3 All ER 546 …. [33540], [33585], [33590] G (an infant) v Coltart [1967] 1 QB 432; [1967] 1 All ER 271 …. [21025] G (Minor), Re [1987] 1 WLR 1461 …. [9050] G and B; R v [2004] 2 Cr App R 37 …. [27105] G, In the Marriage of (1978) 24 ALR 258 …. [15155] G; R v (1987) 45 SASR 102 …. [15135] — (1997) 42 NSWLR 451 …. [19085], [19090], [29195] — [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 …. [33610], [33650]
— [1981] 2 NZLR 91 …. [25365] — [1994] 1 Qd R 540 …. [7085] — [2004] 2 Cr App R 38 …. [29080] — [2004] 2 Cr App R 638 …. [29060] Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 …. [19150], [23270] — v Williamson (1979) 1 NTR 6 …. [31085] Gabriel; R v (1986) 87 FLR 285 …. [33760] Gadbury; R v (1838) 8 C & P 676; 173 ER 669 …. [19140], [19145] GAE; R v (2000) 1 VR 198 …. [17285], [21050] Gaetani v The Trustees of the Christian Brothers [1988] Aust Torts Rep 80-156 …. [9040] Gaffney; R v [1968] VR 417 …. [1400] Gafford v Trans-Texas Airways 299 F 2d 60 (1962) …. [1215] Gaggin v Moss [1983] 2 Qd R 486 …. [17725], [33400] Gainsborough Justices; Ex parte Green; R v [1983] Crim LR 627 …. [17660] Gaio v R (1960) 104 CLR 419; [1961] ALR 67 …. [31175], [31200], [33805], [35510] Gairy v Attorney-General of Grenada [2002] 1 AC 167 …. [5170] Galanis, Ex parte (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 19 …. [3065] Galbraith; R v [1981] 2 All ER 1060; [1981] 1 WLR 1039 …. [9115], [9120], [11095], [11100] Gale; R v (2012) 217 A Crim R 487 …. [21252] — [1994] Crim LR 208 …. [19030] Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 …. [11150], [17135] Galea; R v (2004) 148 A Crim R 220 …. [17595] Gallagher v Lendak [1988] VR 731 …. [7105]
Gallagher; R v (1986) 41 SASR 73 …. [15195], [17265], [17275], [17285] — [1974] 3 All ER 118; [1974] 1 WLR 1204 …. [1220] — [1986] VR 219 …. [15100] — [1991] 3 NZLR 163 …. [11075] — [1998] 2 VR 671 …. [15220] Galler v Galler [1954] P 252; [1954] 1 All ER 536 …. [15120] — v — [1955] 1 All ER 792; [1955] 1 WLR 400 …. [35090] Galli; R v (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 …. [9095], [9130] Galluzzo; R v (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 …. [15165], [15170], [15175] Galvin; R v (2006) 161 A Crim R 449 …. [21050] Gamble v Jackson [1983] 2 VR 334 …. [25005], [25110] Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 245 ALR 15 …. [29050], [29060], [29200] Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 236; 72 ALR 321 …. [1760] Gamer; R v (1848) 1 Den 329; 169 ER 267 …. [33615], [33625] Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd v Shipping Corporation of India Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 12 …. [7190] Gamlen Chemical Co (UK) Ltd v Rochem Ltd [1983] RPC 1 …. [25290] Gammon; R v (1959) 43 Cr App R 155 …. [15130] Gandfield; R v (1846) 2 Cox CC 43 …. [37085] Gannon v Gannon (1971) 125 CLR 629; [1972] ALR 579 …. [17370], [33420] Garbett; R v (1847) 1 Den 236; 169 ER 227 …. [25110] — (1847) 2 Car & Kir 474; 175 ER 196 …. [25005], [27285] Garbutt v Hazell Watson & Viney Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 359 …. [37085]
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1993) 5 BPR 11, 996 …. [1130] Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisors Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 655; [1991] 1 WLR 1140 …. [13270] Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233 …. [1450], [27130], [27195] Gardiner; R v (1979) 27 ALR 140 …. [17135] — [1982] 2 SCR 368; (1982) 140 DLR (3d) 612 …. [1045], [9070] Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 …. [17335], [33455] — v Kogarah Municipal Council (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 474 …. [27140] Gardner and Hancox; R v (1915) 11 Cr App R 265 …. [33495], [33690], [33730] Gardner’s Will Trusts, Re; Boucher v Horn [1936] 3 All ER 938 …. [33015] Gardner, Re (1967) 13 FLR 345 …. [31130] Gardner; R v (2001) 123 A Crim R 439 …. [1370] — [1932] NZLR 1648 …. [33620] — [1980] Qd R 531 …. [29025], [29070], [29150] Garfath v Garfath [1959] SR (NSW) 362 …. [7225] Garland; R v (1941) 29 Cr App R 46 …. [13095] Garner v Garner (1920) 36 TLR 196 …. [25325] Garner; R v [1964] NSWR 1131; (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 120 …. [21050], [21090] Garnet-Thomas; R v [1974] 1 NSWLR 702 …. [1175] Garnett, Re; Gandy v Macaulay (1885) 31 Ch D 1 …. [15150] Garofalo; R v [1999] 2 VR 625 …. [17130] Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226 …. [17435] — v R (1977) 139 CLR 437; 18 ALR 237 …. [5135], [5145], [21100] Garrett; R v (1988) 50 SASR 392 …. [21050]
Garrod; R v [1997] Crim LR 445 …. [33455] Garth; R v (1990) 49 A Crim R 298 …. [9040] — (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 …. [33660] — [1949] 1 All ER 773 …. [1195] Garton v Hunter [1969] 2 QB 37; [1969] 1 All ER 451 …. [1475] Garvey; R v [1987] 2 Qd R 623 …. [13055] Garvin v Domus Publishing Ltd [1989] Ch 335; [1989] 2 All ER 344 …. [25075], [25125] Gas Corp v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-644 …. [29155] Gaskill v Skene (1850) 14 QB 664; 117 ER 256 …. [33435] Gaskin v Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 1549 …. [27115] Gassy v R (2008) 236 CLR 293; 245 ALR 613 …. [11140] Gately v — (2007) 232 CLR 208; 241 ALR 1 …. [13070], [35410] Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 63 ALR 600 …. [39160] — v — [1982] 43 ALR 313 …. [21280] — v Gaggin (1983) 51 ALR 721 …. [33400] Gatland v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1968] 2 QB 279; [1968] 2 All ER 100 …. [7120] Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 204 ALR 258; 78 ALJR 394 …. [1732], [3160] Gatward v Alley (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 174 …. [1185] Gauci v Cmr of Taxation (Cth) (1975) 135 CLR 81; 8 ALR 155 …. [1110], [17600] Gaudion; R v [1979] VR 57 …. [1305] Gaunt; R v [1964] NSWR 864 …. [1360], [1400], [1410] Gawne v Gawne [1979] 2 NSWLR 449 …. [39105]
Gay; R v [1976] VR 577 …. [1675], [33435] Gazard; R v (1838) 8 Car & P 595; 173 ER 633 …. [27205] GBT v Western Australia (2009) 192 A Crim R 483 …. [15165] GE Capital Corporate Finance Group Ltd v Bankers Trust Co [1995] 2 All ER 993; [1995] 1 WLR 172 …. [25015] GE Trade Mark, Re [1969] RPC 418 …. [37090] GEA; R v (2002) 131 A Crim R 54 …. [17295] Gear, Re [1964] Qd R 528 …. [1610] Gearing; R v (1965) 50 Cr App R 18 …. [17095] Gebert v R (1992) 60 SASR 110 …. [9115], [11100] GEC; R v (2001) 3 VR 344 …. [1215] GED; R v (2003) 141 A Crim R 135 …. [17460] Gee; R v (2000) 113 A Crim R 376 …. [21252], [31185], [35525] Geering; R v (1849) 18 LJMC 215 …. [21015], [21105], [21115] Geesing; R v (1984) 39 SASR 111; 15 A Crim R 297 …. [1680], [1880], [17175] — (1985) 38 SASR 226 …. [27305], [33700] Gellin; R v (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 271 …. [21050] Gelling v Crespin (1917) 23 CLR 443; 24 ALR 41 …. [39145] Gemmel v Mac Niven 1928 SC (J) 5 …. [17475] Gemmill; R v (2004) 8 VR 242 …. [29075] Genardini v Anderton [1969] VR 502 …. [1240] General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp v Cmr of Payroll Tax [1982] 2 NSWLR 52 …. [29050] — v Robertson [1909] AC 404 …. [7160] General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Tanter (The Zephyr) [1984] 1 All ER 35; [1984] 1 WLR 100 …. [25010], [25015]
General Jones Pty Ltd v Wildridge & Sinclair Pty Ltd [1988] Tas R 12 …. [33540] General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627; [1943] 2 All ER 337 …. [1070], [5180], [5190] General Mediterranean Holdings SA v Patel [1999] 3 All ER 673; [2000] 1 WLR 272 …. [25280] Genese, Re; Ex parte Gilbert (1886) 3 Morr 223 …. [25100] Geoffrey W Hill & Associates v King (1992) 27 NSWLR 228 …. [33840] George v Davies [1911] 2 KB 445; [1911] All ER Rep 914 …. [3050] — v R (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 …. [23040] George Doland Ltd v Blackburn Robson Coates & Co [1972] 3 All ER 959; [1972] 1 WLR 1338 …. [25010], [25015] George; R v [2003] Crim LR 283 …. [1360] Georgiadis v R (2002) 11 Tas R 137 …. [33570] Georgiadis; R v [1984] VR 1030 …. [25105] Georgiev; R v (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 …. [1140], [1520], [11045], [21050] Georgiou; R v (2005) 153 A Crim R 288 …. [35435] Gera; R v [1978] 2 NZLR 500 …. [33795] Geraghty v Woodforth [1957] QWN 42 …. [25225], [27140] Geraldton Fishermen’s Co-op v Munro [1963] WAR 129 …. [7030] Gerard & Co Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Re Craig (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 370 …. [33540] Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain (2013) 305 ALR 612 …. [5055] Gerard; R v [1948] 1 All ER 205 …. [33770] Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70; 57 ALR 472 …. [3155], [3156], [3157], [3158], [3159] German; R v [1947] OR 295; [1947] 4 DLR 68 …. [29130]
Gertz v Fitchburg Railroad Co 137 Mass 77 (1884) …. [19020] Gery v Redman (1875) 1 QBD 161 …. [33060] Geschke v Del-Monte Home Furnishers Pty Ltd [1981] VR 856 …. [1035] Geyer v Aguilar (1798) 7 TR 681; 101 ER 1196 …. [5015] GG; R v (2004) 151 A Crim R 92 …. [17270] GGT; R v (2007) 97 SASR 315 …. [15220], [21050] GH; R v (2000) 105 FCR 419 …. [1735], [33610], [33775], [35615], [35620] Ghazal v GIO (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 …. [1215], [17435] Ghebrat v R (2011) 214 A Crim R 140 …. [1230] Ghion; R v [1982] Qd R 781 …. [17650] Ghosh v General Medical Council [2001] 1 WLR 1915 …. [25040] Giaccio; R v (1997) 68 SASR 484 …. [27305], [33725] Giam (No 2); R v (1999) 109 A Crim R 348 …. [3160] Gian; R v [2010] Crim LR 409 (CA) …. [9095] Giankos v SPC Ardmona Operations Ltd (2011) 34 VR 120 …. [29060] Giannarelli v Wraith (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 592; 98 ALR 1 …. [25040] Gibb and McKenzie; R v [1983] 2 VR 155; (1982) 7 A Crim R 385 …. [15160], [19095], [19155], [21150], [21215], [23250] Gibbins v Skinner [1951] 2 KB 379; [1951] 1 All ER 1049 …. [1175] Gibbons v Oliver [1969] WAR 112 …. [1240] Gibbons Holdings Ltd v Wholesale Distributors Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 277 (SC) …. [39290] Gibbons; R v (1823) 1 Car & P 97; 171 ER 1117 …. [25325], [33635] — [1971] VR 79 …. [33420], [33460] — [1973] 1 NZLR 376 …. [33435]
Gibbs v Kinna [1999] 2 VR 19 …. [5170] — v Pike (1842) 9 M & W 351; 152 ER 149 …. [1830] Gibbs; R v (2004) 154 ACTR 1 …. [21252] Gibson v Brooking [1983] WAR 70 …. [33745] — v Mac Carty (1736) Ridg t H 311; 95 ER 202 …. [5185] — v Minet (1791) 1 H Bl 569; 126 ER 326 …. [39230] Gibson, Re (1991) 57 A Crim R 322 …. [27105], [27180] Gibson; R v (1887) 18 QBD 537 …. [1665], [1675], [31155], [31160], [37070] — (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 199 …. [41105] — (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 …. [17135] — (1999) 110 A Crim 180 …. [9040] — [1983] 3 All ER 263; [1983] 1 WLR 1038 …. [9025] — [1993] Crim LR 453 …. [17285] Gidley; R v [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 …. [11065], [11140] Giffin; R v [1971] Qd R 12 …. [17270], [17280] Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 198 ALR 100 …. [3200] Giga; R v [2007] Crim LR 571 …. [1395] Gilbert v Comedy Opera Co (1880) 16 Ch D 594 …. [17720] — v Endean (1878) 9 Ch D 259 …. [1650], [35430], [35595] — v R [2006] 1 WLR 2108 …. [19135] — v Ross, Doe d (1840) 7 M & W 102; 151 ER 696 …. [39035] Gilbert; R v (1907) 38 SCR 284 …. [37055] — (1977) 66 Cr App R 237 …. [33770] — [2002] 2 AC 531 …. [15125] Gilbey v Great Western Railway Co (1910) 102 LT 202 …. [31010],
[37130] Gilchrist v Pine Grove Memorial Park Ltd [1968] AR (NSW) 270 …. [35045], [35245] Gilday; R v [1924] VLR 42; (1923) 30 ALR 218 …. [23285] Giles v Dodds [1947] VLR 465; [1947] ALR 584 …. [3070] — v Warren (1872) LR 2 P & D 401 …. [37105] Gilfoyle; R v [1996] 1 Cr App R 302 …. [37065] — [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 …. [29075] Gilham v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 22 …. [5135] Gilham; R v (1828) 1 Mood CC 186; 168 ER 1235 …. [33640] Gill; R v (2003) 142 A Crim R 22 …. [15170] — [1963] 2 All ER 688; [1963] 1 WLR 841 …. [7005], [7050] Gillan v Police (SA) (2004) 149 A Crim R 354 …. [17460] Gillard v Bates (1840) 6 M & W 547; 151 ER 529 …. [25225] Gillard; R v (1999) 105 A Crim R 479 …. [35525] Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200 …. [17200], [17220], [17225] Gillespie Bros & Co v Cheney, Eggar & Co [1896] 2 QB 59 …. [39145], [39160] Gillespie; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 …. [17550] — (1988) 36 A Crim R 235 …. [27265] Gillet v Abbott (1838) 7 Ad & E 783; 112 ER 665 …. [39030] Gillie v Posho Ltd [1939] 2 All ER 196 …. [17250], [17265] Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 …. [27065], [27160] Gilliland, In the Goods of [1940] NI 125 …. [33335] Gillingham; R v [1939] 4 All ER 122 …. [3150] Gillis; R v (1886) 11 Cox CC 69 …. [33715]
— [1957] VR 91; [1957] ALR 438 …. [23310] Gilmore; R v [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 …. [1445], [29050], [29055], [29075], [29185] Gilmour Holdings Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (1984) 52 LGRA 378 …. [5170] Gilson v R (1991) 172 CLR 353; 100 ALR 729 …. [9005] Ginies; R v [1972] VR 394 …. [17065] GIO General Ltd v ABB Installation & Service Pty Ltd (2000) 19 NSWCCR 720 …. [3135] Gionfriddo v R (1989) 50 A Crim R 327 …. [15210] Giovannone; R v (2002) 140 A Crim R 1 …. [1305] Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106; 155 ALR 15 …. [1140], [1520], [1680], [7085], [17275], [17295], [21050], [21243] Giri; R v (2001) 121 A Crim R 568 …. [1220] Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell (1982) 149 CLR 155; 40 ALR 45 …. [1215] GJH; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 361 …. [17295] GK; R v (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 …. [1880], [5155], [9095], [11125], [29205] Glasby; R v (2000) 115 A Crim R 465 …. [17405] Glasser v United States 315 US 60 (1942) …. [33570] Glastonbury; R v (2012) 115 SASR 37 …. [15100], [15110], [15160] Gleadow v Atkin (1833) 1 Cr & M 401; 149 ER 459 …. [33015] Gleed v Stroud [1962] J Crim LR 161 …. [17170] Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54; [1977] 1 WLR 510 …. [5055], [5060] Gleeson (dec’d), Re (1887) 13 VLR 565 …. [35430] Gleeson; R v [1975] Qd R 399 …. [11045], [11065]
Glen Eira City Council v Kingston City Council (2001) 116 LGERA 292 …. [5080] Glencourse; R v (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 …. [15135], [15160] Glendarroch, The [1894] P 226; [1891] All ER Rep 484 …. [7190] Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233 …. [25245], [25350], [25375] Glenister v Glenister [1945] P 30 …. [3135] Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (No 2) (2000) 79 SASR 185 …. [1290], [25010] Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1; 119 ALR 706 …. [11140], [33770] Glennon (No 2); R v (2001) 7 VR 631 …. [1220], [17295] Glennon; R v [1993] 1 VR 97 …. [33770] Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 1 All ER 696 …. [31155] Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 …. [25015], [25245] Gloster; R v (1888) 16 Cox CC 471 …. [33295], [37130], [37135] Glover v Black (1763) 3 Burr 1394; 97 ER 891 …. [3159] Glover; R v (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 482; 45 WN (NSW) 148 …. [15100] — [1991] Crim LR 48 …. [37060] Gnitrow Ltd v Cape plc [2000] 3 All ER 763; [2000] 1 WLR 2327 …. [25375] Goblet v Beechey (1831) 2 Russ & My 624; 39 ER 532 …. [39235] Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139 …. [5035] — v — (1870) LR6QB 139 …. [5025] Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670; [1986] 3 All ER 264 …. [25025], [25030] Goddard; R v [1962] 3 All ER 582; [1962] 1 WLR 1282; (1962) 46 Cr App R 456 …. [15250], [15255]
Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) (2003) 25 NSWCCR 291 …. [29185] — v Woolworths (WA) Pty Ltd (1998) 103 A Crim R 336 …. [39060], [39065] Godinho; R v (1911) 7 Cr App R 12 …. [33640] Godstone Justices; Ex parte Dickson; R v [1971] Crim LR 602 …. [17095] Goetze, Re; National Provincial Bank Ltd v Mond [1953] Ch 96; [1953] 1 All ER 76 …. [41010] Goguen v Bourgeois (1957) 6 DLR (2d) 19 …. [15205] Gojanovic (No 2); R v (2002) 130 A Crim R 179 …. [21050] Goktas v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 684 …. [1830] Gold v Patman and Fotheringham Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 497; [1958] 1 WLR 697 …. [39250] Goldberg v Ng (1994) 33 NSWLR 639 …. [27130] — v — (1995) 185 CLR 83; 132 ALR 57 …. [25010], [25020] Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang (2007) 229 CLR 498 …. [1465] Golder; R v [1960] 3 All ER 457; [1960] 1 WLR 1169 …. [17395] Goldfoot v Welch [1914] 1 Ch 213; [1911] All ER Rep 652 …. [39160] Golding; R v (2008) 100 SASR 216 …. [33455] Goldman v Hesper [1988] 3 All ER 97; [1988] 1 WLR 1238 …. [25010], [25015] — v The Ferry Kameruka [1971] 1 NSWLR 393 …. [33385] Goldsborough v O’Neill (1996) 131 FLR 104 …. [11010] Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370; 76 ALJR 1024 …. [1490], [1520], [1560], [11160], [17460], [17525], [17580], [17585], [17590], [17595], [17725], [19015], [19030], [19045]
Goldstein; R v (1914) 11 Cr App R 27 …. [15025] — [1983] 1 All ER 434; [1983] 1 WLR 151 …. [11020] Golightly; R v (1997) 17 WAR 401 …. [33295], [37060] Golodetz and Co Inc v Czarnikow-Rionda Co [1979] 2 All ER 726; [1980] 1 WLR 495 …. [7195] Goncalves; R v (1997) 99 A Crim R 193 …. [9030], [17370] Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232 …. [1680], [17065], [17485], [33775] Gonzwa v Commonwealth (1944) 68 CLR 469; [1944] ALR 173 …. [3156] Goodale v Murray (1940) 289 NW 450 …. [31055] Goodall; R v [1982] VR 33 …. [1370], [31185] Goode; R v [1970] SASR 69 …. [1360], [1380], [1400] Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 …. [11150] Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [1999] 1 All ER 896; [1999] 1 WLR 1558 …. [25245], [27105] Goodright v Moss (1777) 2 Cowp 591; 98 ER 1257 …. [25190], [31095], [33210] Goodway; R v [1993] 4 All ER 894 …. [15220], [33435] Goodwin v Nominal Defendant (1979) 54 ALJR 84 …. [9015] Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333; [1966] 3 All ER 369 …. [5180], [5190], [5235], [19165] Goold v Commonwealth (1993) 42 FCR 51; 114 ALR 135 …. [29070] — v Evans & Co [1951] 2 TLR 1189 …. [1290], [1480] Goonan; R v (1993) 69 A Crim R 338 …. [15170] Gordon v Carroll (1975) 6 ALR 579 …. [17155], [17165] — v Mac Gregor (1909) 8 CLR 316; 15 ALR 274 …. [39145], [39160], [39195]
— v R (1982) 41 ALR 64 …. [29070], [29140] Gordon (Lord); R v (1781) 21 St Tr 485 …. [31100] Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd v Coleman (1989) 23 FCR 38; 87 ALR 477 …. [3035] Gordon Martin Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2009) 53 MVR 474 …. [17460] Gordon-King v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 448 …. [35525] Gordon, Re (1988) 18 FCR 366; 80 ALR 289 …. [25165] Gordon; R v (1781) 2 Doug KB 590; 99 ER 372 …. [17510] — (1789) 1 Leach 515; 168 ER 359 …. [1175] — (1958) 42 Cr App R 177 …. [31020], [31130] — (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 …. [21055], [21065] — [1995] 2 Cr App R 61 …. [21050], [21065] Gorham v Brice (1902) 18 TLR 424 …. [3070] Gorham; R v (1997) 68 SASR 505 …. [1400], [1410] Goring; R v [2011] Crim LR 790 …. [11100] Gorman v Matthews (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 224 …. [25355] — v Newton; Ex parte Newton [1958] Qd R 169 …. [17200], [31090], [37025] — v The Hand in Hand Insurance Co (1877) IR 11 CL 224 …. [7195] Goslin v Corry (1844) 7 Mac & G 342; 135 ER 143 …. [1650] Goss v Lord Nugent [1824] All ER Rep 305; [1824] 110 ER 713; (1833) 5 B & Ad 58 …. [39145] Goss; R v (1923) 17 Cr App R 196 …. [1375], [1380], [1425] Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 476 …. [19065] Gosson Industries Pty Ltd v Jordon [1964] NSWR 687 …. [1175] Gotha City v Sotheby’s [1998] 1 WLR 114 …. [25255], [25260]
Gough Bay Holdings v Tyrwhitt-Drake [1976] VR 195 …. [39240] Gough; Ex parte Municipal Officers’ Assn; R v (1975) 133 CLR 59; 6 ALR 411 …. [5025] Gough; R v [1993] AC 646; [1993] 2 All ER 724 …. [27215] Gould v Lakes (1880) 6 PD 1 …. [37105] — v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; 56 ALR 31 …. [7210] Gould; R v (1840) 9 Car & P 364; 173 ER 870 …. [27280] Goulden; R v [1993] 2 Qd R 534 …. [37155] Gouldham v R [1970] WAR 119 …. [17130], [17565], [27135] — v Sharrett [1966] WAR 129 …. [1310] Gouraud v Edison Gower Bell Telephone Co of Europe Ltd (1888) 59 LT 813 …. [25265] Gouroff; R v (1979) 1 A Crim R 367 …. [33570] Gover; R v (2000) 118 A Crim R 8 …. [35495], [35500] Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 …. [17550] Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Burbury (1989) 10 MVR 189 …. [3200] Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 …. [1285], [3140] — v Fredrichberg (1968) 118 CLR 403 …. [1830] Government of the Republic of Spain, The v The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] AC 256; [1939] 1 All ER 719 …. [3085] Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Levin; R v [1997] AC 741; [1997] 3 All ER 289 …. [31090] Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Osman (No 1); R v [1992] 1 All ER 108; [1991] 1 WLR 281 …. [27130], [27180] Governor of Gloucester Prison; Ex parte Miller; R v [1979] 2 All ER 1103; [1979] 1 WLR 537 …. [17185]
Governor of Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co [1983] CLY 1660 …. [17475] Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Osman; R v (1988) 90 Cr App R 281 …. [1480], [35070] — [1989] 3 All ER 701; [1990] 1 WLR 277 …. [33570], [39005] Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Schneider; R v (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 …. [1030] Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Voets; R v [1986] 2 All ER 630; [1986] 1 WLR 470 …. [1030] Governor of the Metropolitan Gaol; R v [1963] VR 61 …. [7105], [33595] Governors and Guardians of Exeter; R v (1869) LR 4 QB 341 …. [33020], [33060] GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 …. [17075], [17155], [17470], [17475], [17495], [17510], [17520] GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 …. [25395] GPP; R v (2001) 129 A Crim R 1 …. [17295] GPT RE Ltd v Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 647 …. [1175] GR; R v [2006] 1 Qd R 185 …. [13060] Grace v Southern [1978] VR 75 …. [29050], [29060] Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414 …. [33805] Grafton; R v [1993] QB 101; [1992] 4 All ER 609 …. [17090] Graham v Badger (1895) 41 NE 61 …. [3250] — v Belfast and Northern Counties Railway Co [1901] 2 IR 13 …. [7140] — v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152 …. [17370] — v R (1998) 195 CLR 606; 157 ALR 404 …. [7085], [17315], [35525], [35645]
Graham; R v (1914) 4 Cr App R 218 …. [15125] — (1972) 7 CCC (2d) 93 …. [17340] — [1973] Crim LR 628 …. [17185], [17245] — [1974] SCR 206; (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 579 …. [17335] Gramanatz; R v [1962] QWN 41 …. [23345] Gramophone Co Ltd v Magazine Holder Co (1911) 28 RPC 221 …. [3165] Grant v Amad [1949] VLR 78; [1948] 2 ALR 420 …. [39170] — v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 11 ALR 577 …. [3159], [25210], [25220], [25225], [25235], [25240], [25245] — v Gorrell (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 142; 88 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 55 …. [5095] — v R (1975) 11 ALR 503 …. [9035] — v South Western and Country Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185; [1974] 2 All ER 465 …. [1315], [25255], [35030] — v The State [2006] Crim LR 837 …. [31205] Grant; R v (1834) 5 B & Ad 1081; 110 ER 1092 …. [1645] — (1865) 4 F & F 322; 176 ER 583 …. [1140] — (1996) 2 Cr App R 272 …. [21180] — (2001) 127 A Crim R 124 …. [1742] — [1964] SASR 331 …. [9040], [13080] — [1996] 1 Cr App R 73 …. [21065] — [2006] QB 60 …. [25025] Grassby; R v (1988) 15 NSWLR 109 …. [33680], [33745] Grasso v Love [1980] VR 163 …. [3065] Grasso; R v [1950] VLR 21; [1950] ALR 131 …. [15125] Gray v BNY Trust Co of Australia Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 586 ….
[25265] — v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 509; 22 ALR 228 …. [5025] — v Kerslake [1958] SCR 3; (1957) 11 DLR (2d) 225 …. [41005] — v La Fleche Saskatchewan Power Corp (1962) 31 DLR (2d) 189 …. [1280] — v Macallum (1892) 2 BCR 104 …. [13055] — v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; 158 ALR 485 …. [11150] — v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd [1952] 3 DLR 1 …. [31095] — v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 WLR 848 …. [25165] — v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2012] 3 WLR 312 …. [25165] Gray; R v (1866) 4 F & F 1102; 176 ER 924 …. [21110] — (1973) 58 Cr App R 177 …. [9020] — (1978) 17 SASR 534 …. [19090] — [1965] Qd R 373 …. [11060], [17545], [25105] — [1995] 2 Cr App R 100 …. [33575] — [1998] Crim LR 570 …. [17430] — [2004] 2 Cr App R 30 …. [19110], [19135] Grayden v R [1989] WAR 208 …. [39105] Graydon v Graydon (1921) 51 OLR 301; 67 DLR 116 …. [17510] Graymarshall Pty Ltd v Director General of the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water (2010) 78 NSWLR 605; 173 LGERA 258 …. [25075], [25125] Grays Justices; Ex parte Tetley; R v (1979) 70 Cr App R 11 …. [17130] Grayson; R v (1921) 16 Cr App R 7 …. [33690] Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95; 110 ALR 577 …. [1395], [1410] — v — (1992) 65 A Crim R 12 …. [1390]
Greasby; R v [1984] Crim LR 488 …. [11120] Greasley v Cooke [1980] 3 All ER 710; [1980] 1 WLR 1306 …. [7210] Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 2 All ER 485; [1981] 1 WLR 529 …. [25010], [25015], [25020], [25210] Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad (1996) 39 NSWLR 683 …. [7190] Great North Eastern Railway Ltd v Avon Insurance [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 649 …. [39290] Great West Uranium Mines Ltd v Rock Hill Uranium Mines Ltd [1955] 4 DLR 307 …. [37125] Great Western Rail Co v Willis (1865) 18 CB NS 748; 144 ER 639 …. [33540] Great Western Railway v Bristol Corporation (1918) 87 LJ Ch 414 …. [39240] Greatbanks; R v [1959] Crim LR 450 …. [19075] Greatorex; R v (1994) 74 A Crim R 496 …. [33045] Greaves v Aikman (1994) 4 Tas R 196; 74 A Crim R 370 …. [1390], [1445] Grech; R v [1997] 2 VR 609 …. [21050], [21243] Greciun-King; R v [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 …. [23040] Green v Georgia (1979) 442 US 95 …. [1045] — v Patten (1894) 15 ALT 254 …. [1650] — v R (1939) 61 CLR 167; [1939] ALR 108 …. [11125], [11140] — v — (1971) 126 CLR 28; [1972] ALR 524 …. [9030] — v — (1999) 161 ALR 648; 73 ALJR 575 …. [15220] — v Sevin (1879) 13 Ch D 589 …. [17620], [17720] — v Tongs (2005) 188 FLR 363 …. [3020] — v Weaver (1827) 1 Sim 404; 57 ER 630 …. [25075]
Green (as liquidator of Arimco Mining Pty Ltd) v CGU Insurance Ltd (2008) 67 ACSR 105 …. [25040] Green (dec’d), Re; Zukerman v Public Trustee [1951] NZLR 135 …. [33340] Green; R v (2001) 78 SASR 463 …. [15135], [17295] — (2002) 4 VR 471 …. [11045] Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav 137; 48 ER 891 …. [25245], [25325] Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786; 141 ER 315 …. [17375], [17380], [17385] — v Gaskell [1824] All ER Rep 767; (1833) 39 ER 618; 1 My & K 98 …. [25210], [25215], [25235] Greenslade; R v (1870) 11 Cox CC 412 …. [17130] Greenwood v Fitts (1961) 29 DLR (2d) 260 …. [25380] Greenwood; R v [1962] Tas SR 319 …. [17275] — [1993] Crim LR 770 …. [17265] — [2005] 2 Cr App R 7 …. [33045] Gregg; R v (1932) 24 Cr App R 13 …. [15145] Gregory v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 123 CLR 547; 45 ALJR 136 …. [29070] — v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455 …. [25355] — v R (1983) 151 CLR 566; 48 ALR 427 …. [19075] — v Tavernor (1833) 6 C & P 280; 172 ER 1241 …. [17240] Gregson; R v [2003] 2 Cr App R 521 …. [17310], [31095] Gresham Hotel Co Ltd v Manning (1867) IR I CL 125 …. [31040], [31135] Greville v Chapman (1844) 5 QB 731; 114 ER 1425 …. [29050] Grew v Cubitt [1951] 2 TLR 305 …. [31175] Grewal; R v [1975] Crim LR 159 …. [33640]
Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 …. [17480], [29125], [33460], [33465] — v R (2001) 184 ALR 593; 75 ALJR 1708 …. [17130] Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592; 67 ALR 93 …. [27005], [27085] Gribbon v Lutton [2002] QB 902 …. [5055], [5175] Grieve v Lewis (1917) 23 CLR 413 …. [3095] Grieves v R [2012] Crim LR 212 …. [1400] Griffin v California (1965) 380 US 609 …. [23020] — v Constantine (1954) 91 CLR 136; [1955] ALR 28 …. [3156] — v London Bank of Australia Ltd (1919) 19 SR (NSW) 154 …. [33455] — v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209; 207 ALR 169 …. [1685], [25165] — v Sogelease Australia Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 257 …. [25090], [25175] Griffin, Re (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 132 …. [25245], [25255] Griffin; R v (1809) Russ & Ry 151; 168 ER 732 …. [27280] — [1998] 1 Qd R 659 …. [13060] Griffis; R v (1996) 67 SASR 170 …. [13070], [17090] Griffith v R (1937) 58 CLR 185 …. [21065] — v — (1995) 79 A Crim R 125 …. [1370] — v Ricketts (1849) 7 Hare 299; 68 ER 122 …. [17470] — v Thrall (1940) 29 N E 2d 345 …. [31040] Griffith; R v [1997] 2 Qd R 524 …. [29050] Griffiths v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1990) 53 SASR 256 …. [35335] — v Errington (1981) 7 NTR 3 …. [1125] — v R (1994) 125 ALR 545; 69 ALJR 77 …. [7030]
— v Rose (2010)190 FCR 173; 273 ALR 612 …. [25285] Griffiths; R v [1930] VLR 204; [1930] ALR 121 …. [1375], [1380] — [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 2 All ER 448 …. [33575] Grills; R v (1910) 11 CLR 400; 17 ALR 313 …. [33470], [33480] — (1954) 73 WN (NSW) 303 …. [21105] Grimer; R v [1982] Crim LR 674 …. [1370], [31075] Grimes; R v [1994] Crim LR 213 …. [27130] — [2013] 1 Qd R 351 …. [11125], [17485] Grimley v R (1995) 121 FLR 282 …. [33775] Grimston v Cunningham [1894] 1 QB 125 …. [39160] Grinham, Ex parte; Re Sneddon (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 862; 78 WN (NSW) 203 …. [25180] Grinstead v Hadrill [1953] 1 All ER 1188 …. [11090] Grismore v Consolidated Products Co (1942) 5 NW (2d) 646 …. [29125], [33465] Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532 …. [21280] Grocott; R v [2012] Crim L Rev 210 …. [17500] Grofam Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 408; 116 ALR 535 …. [25240] — v — (1993) 45 FCR 445; 117 ALR 669 …. [25210], [25245], [25295] — v Macauley (No 2) (1994) 48 FCR 573; 121 ALR 22 …. [25060] Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; 131 ALR 225 …. [5030] Grosser v South Australian Police (1994) 63 SASR 243 …. [1290] Grosser; R v (1999) 73 SASR 584 …. [15220], [21050] Grossman; R v (1981) 73 Cr App R 302 …. [35340] Grosvenor Hotel, London, Re [1964] 1 Ch 464; [1963] 3 All ER 426 …. [27155]
Grotrian, In re; Cox v Grotrian [1955] Ch 501 …. [3040] Grout; R v (1909) 3 Cr App R 64 …. [23315] Grove, Re;Vaucher v Treasury Solicitor (1888) 40 Ch D 216 …. [37025] Groves v Redbart [1975] Crim LR 158 …. [17200] Groves; R v (1981) 58 FLR 18 …. [5150] Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524; 210 A Crim R 457 …. [11140], [15195], [29090] Grundel v Registrar General (1990) 5 BPR 11, 217 …. [15150] Grunther Industrial Developments Ltd v Federation Employers’ Insurance Assn [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 394 …. [17060] Grupo Torras SA v Sheikh Fahad Mohammed Al-Sabah [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 …. [41035] GS Technology Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (2007) 157 FCR 373 …. [5070] GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 …. [25235], [25240], [25245] GTN; R v (2003) 6 VR 150 …. [17295] Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co [1918] 2 KB 623 …. [41010] Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 …. [25220] Guarnaccia v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1976] VR 302 …. [33540] Guay v R [1979] 1 SCR 18 …. [21065] Gudabi v — (1984) 1 FCR 187; 52 ALR 133 …. [27265], [33745] Gudgeon; R v (1995) 133 ALR 379 …. [27310] Guepratte v Young (1851) 4 De G & Sm 217; 64 ER 804 …. [41005] Guerin; R v [1967] 1 NSWR 255 …. [7030] Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Assn Inc v Guide Dog Assn of New South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 …. [29165], [29175],
[29210] Guidice; R v [1964] WAR 129 …. [1195] Guildhall Justices; Ex parte DPP; R v (1983) 78 Cr App R 269 …. [27130] Guinan; R v (2001) 121 A Crim R 196 …. [1220] Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 2 All ER 716; [1987] 1 WLR 1027 …. [25020], [25025], [25235], [25245], [25265] Guiron; R v (1962) 72 WN (NSW) 811 …. [7165] Gulf Consolidated Co for Services and Industries EC (in liq) v Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301 …. [41035] Gulliford; R v (2004) 148 A Crim R 558 …. [15195] Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292 …. [1170], [29020], [35590] Gumbley v Cunningham [1989] AC 281; [1989] 1 All ER 5 …. [1170] Gummerson; R v [1999] Crim LR 680 …. [1445] Gun; R v (1977) 17 SASR 165 …. [19080], [19090] Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206 …. [15095] Gunewardene; R v [1951] 2 KB 600; [1951] 2 All ER 290 …. [19045], [19050], [33705] Guney; R v (1998) 2 Cr App R 242 …. [17130], [17510], [19030], [21065] Gunnell; R v (1886) 16 Cox CC 154 …. [37095] Gunner v Payne [1910] VLR 45 …. [23275] Gunning; R v (1980) 98 Cr App R 303 …. [17135] Gur Corp v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd [1987] QB 599; [1986] 3 All ER 449 …. [3085] Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 …. [39185] Guthridge (N) Ltd v Wilfley Ore Concentrator Syndicate Ltd (1906) 3
CLR 583; 12 ALR 398 …. [11010] Guthridge; Ex parte Campbell; R v (1878) 4 VLR (L) 77 …. [17055] Gutierrez v R [1997] 1 NZLR 192 …. [17435], [17445] Gutteridges; R v (1840) 9 C & P 471; 173 ER 916 …. [17275], [31095] Guy v R [1978] WAR 125 …. [31175] GVV; R v (2008) 20 VR 395 …. [15220] Gwaze; R v [2010] 3 NZLR 734; [2010] NZSC 52 …. [1585], [11005] Gwilliam; R v [1968] 3 All ER 821; [1968] 1 WLR 1839 …. [35425] Gyfford v Woodgate (1806) 11 East 297; 103 ER 1018 …. [33355] H v H (by his guardian intervening) [1966] 1 All ER 356; [1966] 1 WLR 187 …. [1235] — v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849; [1983] 1 WLR 143 …. [29150], [33825], [35070] H & C Smith Ltd v Great Western Railway Co [1921] 2 KB 237 …. [3135] H (a child); R v (1996) 85 A Crim R 481 …. [33750] H (dec’d), Re; Smith v Public Trustee [1956] NZLR 48 …. [39255] H (JR) (Childhood Amnesia); R v [2006] 1 Cr App R 10 …. [29050] H (Minors) (sexual abuse: standard of proof), Re [1996] AC 563; [1996] 1 All ER 1 …. [9050] H, In the Estate of [1949] VLR 197; [1949] ALR 801 …. [33385], [35390] H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547 …. [17290], [33635], [33655], [33730] H, T; R v (2010) 108 SASR 86 …. [17290] H; R v (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 …. [17255], [35440], [35525] — [1993] 1 NZLR 130 …. [11010] — [1995] 2 AC 596; [1995] 2 All ER 865 …. [15110], [15230], [21085],
[21100] — [1997] 1 Qd R 527 …. [1395] — [2004] 2 AC 134; [2004] 1 All ER 1269 …. [17130] Haas v Peterson [1965] Tas SR (NC) 7 …. [35100] Haas; R v (1962) 132 CCC 362; 35 DLR (2d) 172 …. [1245] — (1986) 22 A Crim R 229 …. [11100] — (1997) 90 A Crim R 149 …. [33775] Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299 …. [35615] Hacker v Vereschagin [1973] Qd R 112 …. [15045] Haddad; R v (1988) 33 A Crim R 400 …. [15255] — (2000) 116 A Crim R 312 …. [27315] Haddy; R v [1944] KB 442; [1944] 1 All ER 319 …. [33770] Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2006) 152 FCR 560 …. [17405] Hadid v Redpath (2001) 35 MVR 152 …. [11150] Hadlow; R v [1992] 2 Qd R 440 …. [17375], [17380] Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191; [1982] 1 All ER 1042 …. [1070] Hadwen; R v [1902] 1 KB 882 …. [17475] Hagan; R v [1966] Qd R 219 …. [11030], [11075], [33675] Hagarty; R v (2004) 145 A Crim R 138 …. [21050] Haggag; R v (1998) 101 A Crim R 593 …. [7085] Haggenmacher’s Patents, Re [1898] 2 Ch 280 …. [17580] Haidley and Alford; R v [1984] VR 229 …. [1375], [1400], [1410], [1420], [29050], [29070] Haigh v Belcher (1836) 7 C & P 389; 173 ER 173 …. [1565], [17500] Haines v Guthrie (1884) 13 QBD 818 …. [33230]
Haines; R v [1965] QWN 44 …. [17665] Haj-Ismail v Madigan (1982) 45 ALR 379 …. [27155], [27165] Hajistassi; R v (2010) 107 SASR 67 …. [1135], [19095], [33455] Hakala; R v [2002] Crim LR 578 (CA) …. [17075] Hakeem; R v (2006) 163 A Crim R 549 …. [21170] Halcon International Inc v Shell Transport and Trading Co [1979] RPC 97 …. [25055] Halden; R v (1983) 9 A Crim R 30 …. [9070] Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 …. [1535], [21275] Hales; R v [1924] 1 KB 672 …. [11035] Halford v Sharples [1992] 3 All ER 624; [1992] 1 WLR 736 …. [27105] Halford; R v (1978) 67 Cr App R 318 …. [17655], [33690] Hall v Dunlop [1959] NZLR 1031 …. [7175] — v Featherstone (1858) 3 H & N 284; 157 ER 478 …. [7100] — v Marchant [1914] St R Qd 174 …. [1140] — v Penfold, Doe d (1838) 8 Car & P 536; 173 ER 607 …. [1185] — v R [1971] 1 All ER 322; [1971] 1 WLR 298 …. [15225], [33485], [33770] Hall; R v (1887) 5 NZLR 93 …. [21015] — (1958) 43 Cr App R 29 …. [17130], [27135] — (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 …. [29075] — [1952] 1 KB 302; [1952] 1 All ER 66 …. [21100], [21110], [21115], [21195] — [1973] QB 496; [1973] 1 All ER 1 …. [33795] — [1986] 1 Qd R 462 …. [17325], [17375], [17565] Hallam; R v (1985) 42 SASR 126 …. [1410] Hallett v Cousens (1839) 2 M & Rob 238; 174 ER 275 …. [17155]
Hallett; R v [1986] Crim LR 462 …. [27130] Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (formerly Sacs Group Pty Ltd) (1993) 113 ALR 637 …. [7070] — v Sacs Group Pty Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 678 …. [7070] Halliday; R v (2009) 23 VR 419 …. [21050] Halligan; R v [1973] 2 NZLR 158 …. [33490] Hallocoglu; R v (1992) 29 NSWLR 67 …. [23020] Hally v McDuff [1922] NZLR 1180 …. [39230] — v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 …. [17505], [17510], [19025] Hally; R v [1962] Qd R 214 …. [29050], [29105], [31120], [31145], [39010] Halpin; R v [1975] QB 907; [1975] 2 All ER 1124 …. [31015], [33350], [33385], [33390], [33405] Halse; R v (1980) 25 SASR 510 …. [33760] Halvorsen Boats Pty Ltd v Robinson (1993) 31 NSWLR 1 …. [11150] Hamand; R v (1985) 82 Cr App R 65 …. [7015], [33455] Hamdan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 211 ALR 642 …. [25225] Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316 …. [25055] — v National Competition Council [1999] 164 ALR 203 …. [29205] Hamid; R v (1979) 69 Cr App R 324 …. [15020] Hamilton v Al Fayed [1999] 3 All ER 317; [1999] 1 WLR 1569 …. [27095] — v — [2001] 1 AC 395; [2000] 2 All ER 224 …. [27095] — v Al Fayed (No 2) [2002] 3 All ER 641 …. [29080] — v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486; 85 ALR 1 …. [25060], [25165], [25175] Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551; BC200609455 …. [17145]
Hamilton, Ex parte; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732 …. [11030], [11045], [13090] Hamilton; R v (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 …. [19145], [23290] — [1969] Crim LR 486 …. [17135], [19110] Hamitov; R v (1979) 21 SASR 596 …. [1295] Hammer v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 280 …. [17535] Hammer; R v [1923] 2 KB 786 …. [41030] Hammington v Berker Sport Craft Ltd [1980] ICR 248 …. [3135] Hammond v Commonwealth (1982) 152 CLR 188; 42 ALR 327 …. [25060], [27300] — v Inland Revenue Cmrs [1956] NZLR 690 …. [39195] Hammond; R v (1799) 2 Esp 719; 170 ER 508 …. [33570] — (1941) 28 Cr App R 84 …. [11055] — [1965] NZLR 257 …. [33640] Hamood; R v (1987) 45 SASR 90 …. [1380] Hampshire County Council; Ex parte Ellerton; R v [1985] 1 All ER 599; [1985] 1 WLR 749 …. [9075] Hampshire; R v [1996] QB 1; [1995] 2 All ER 1019 …. [11035], [13055] Hampson v Asher [1960] Qd R 383 …. [15045] — v Powell [1970] 1 All ER 929 …. [31175] Hampson; R v [2014] 1 Cr App R 4 …. [13270], [17170] Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367; 64 ALR 1201 …. [7165] Hamsher v Swift (1992) 33 FCR 545 …. [27095] Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 43; 8 DDCR 399 …. [29045], [29195], [29200], [35555] Handlen v R (2011) 245 CLR 282; 283 ALR 427 …. [33575] Handlen; R v (2010) 207 A Crim R 50; 247 FLR 261 …. [33575]
Handley v Baddock [1987] WAR 98 …. [25235], [25255] Handy; R v [2002] 2 SCR 908 …. [21170] Hanias; R v (1976) 14 SASR 137 …. [33720] Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151 …. [9040], [1220], [1375], [1695], [17160], [17615], [1880], [19145], [29165], [29185], [29200], [39105] Hannes; R v (2000) 158 FLR 359 …. [35435], [35532], [39105] Hanrahan; R v (1964) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 458 …. [19110] — (1964) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 459 …. [19045] Hansen v Dixon (1906) 23 TLR 56 …. [15055] Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Aust) Pty Ltd (2008) 75 IPR 505 …. [35545] Hansen; R v [2007] 3 NZLR 1 …. [3005] Hansford v McMillan [1976] VR 743 …. [17660] Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Norlis Pty Ltd (2010) 79 ACSR 668 …. [3165] Haque v Commissioner of Corrective Services (NSW) (2008) 216 FLR 271 …. [35545] Harawira; R v [1989] 2 NZLR 714 …. [15160] Harbach; R v (1973) 6 SASR 427 …. [11125] Harbour Seafoods Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 381 …. [25010] Harbour; R v [1995] 1 NZLR 440 …. [1295] Harbours Corp of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 60; 67 ALR 100 …. [27065] Harden; R v [1963] 1 QB 8; [1962] 1 All ER 286 …. [39105] Hardess v Beaumont [1953] VLR 315; [1953] ALR 656 …. [1175] Hardgrave v R (1906) 4 CLR 232; 13 ALR 206 …. [21195]
Hardie Finance Corp Pty Ltd v CCD Australia Pty Ltd (1995) 67 FCR 594 …. [25300] Hardie Rubber Co Pty Ltd v General Tyre & Rubber Co (1972) 46 ALJR 326 …. [17020] — v — (1973) 129 CLR 521 …. [33840] Harding v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1917) 23 CLR 119; 23 ALR 137 …. [3158] — v Hayes [1973] Crim LR 714 …. [11010] — v Williams (1880) 14 Ch D 197 …. [35340] Harding; R v [1956] QWN 32 …. [17375] — [1989] 2 Qd R 373 …. [11035] Hardwick v Western Australia (2011) 211 A Crim R 349 …. [11125] Hardy v Gillette [1976] VR 392 …. [1610], [15001] Hardy, In the Goods of (1861) 30 LJPM & A 142 …. [33325] Hardy; R v (1794) 24 Howell State Trials 199 …. [17505] — (1794) 24 St Tr 199 …. [1005], [1540], [17165], [27130], [33565], [37085], [37110] — [1988] Crim LR 687 …. [27130] Hare v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 All ER 578; [1956] 1 WLR 250 …. [1295] — v Riley [1974] VR 577 …. [25010], [25330], [25335] Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13 …. [15070], [15125], [15140] Hargrave v Hargrave (1848) 2 Car & K 701; 175 ER 293 …. [33435] Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; 282 ALR 214 …. [7085], [11135] Haringey Justices; Ex parte DPP; R v [1996] QB 351; [1996] 1 All ER 828 …. [17090], [17130] Harkins v Butcher (2002) 55 NSWLR 558 …. [1730], [33530] Harm; R v (1975) 13 SASR 84 …. [1400], [3095]
Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [1983] 1 AC 280; [1982] 1 All ER 532 …. [25055], [25060], [27165] — v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380 …. [7085], [17370], [33770] Harman; R v [1985] Crim LR 326 …. [17605], [31120] Harmer; R v (1985) 28 A Crim R 35 …. [19030], [19065], [19095] Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 3 All ER 177; [1979] 1 WLR 1380 …. [13265], [25235] Harper v Burton’s Haulage Co Pty Ltd (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 236; 72 WN (NSW) 142 …. [33060], [33070], [33560] — v Victoria (1966) 114 CLR 361; [1966] ALR 731 …. [3156] Harper, Ex parte; Re Rosenfield [1964] NSWR 58 …. [1215] Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590; 88 ALR 161 …. [3240], [11125], [21001], [21035], [21050], [21055], [21060], [21070], [21080], [21085], [21090], [21115], [21230], [33755], [37155] Harrington v Fry (1824) 1 Car & P 289; 171 ER 1199 …. [39100] — v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311; 136 ALR 42 …. [25355] Harrington-Smith v WA (No 4) (2003) 197 ALR 131 …. [35460] — v WA (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483 …. [17075], [35460], [35470] — v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82 …. [13275], [17145] — v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424 …. [1520], [1645], [1680], [29001], [29080], [29195], [29200], [29220] — v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1 …. [1170], [29020] Harrington; R v [1984] Crim LR 487 …. [17665] — [1998] 3 VR 531 …. [17535], [19035], [33455] Harringworth (Inhabitants); R v (1815) 4 M & S 350; 105 ER 863 …. [39125] Harris v Dellaca (1933) 36 WALR 17 …. [15045] — v DPP [1952] AC 694; [1952] 1 All ER 1044 …. [21025], [21100], [21220], [27235]
— v Harris [1931] P 10 …. [25245], [25365] — v Knight (1890) 15 PD 170 …. [1175] — v Macquarie Distributors Pty Ltd [1967] VR 257 …. [7125], [33540] — v Markham [1975] WAR 93 …. [13035] — v Minister for Public Works (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 149; 29 WN (NSW) 33 …. [17375] — v Minister for Public Works (NSW) (1912) 14 CLR 721; 13 SR (NSW) 21 …. [11030] — v Pandava (1975) 14 Tas R 50 …. [9110], [11095], [33460] — v R (1990) 55 SASR 321 …. [15220] — v — (2005) 158 A Crim R 454 …. [35495] — v Rickett (1859) 4 H & N 1; 157 ER 734 …. [39195] — v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 439 …. [11060], [33740] — v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637; 170 ER 1277 …. [1140], [17585], [17590], [19035] Harris (No 2); R v (1975) 12 SASR 270 …. [33565], [33690] Harris (No 3); R v [1990] VR 310 …. [1390], [1445] Harris-Rivett; R v [1956] 1 QB 220; [1955] 3 All ER 567 …. [25180] Harris; R v (1680) 7 St Tr 926 …. [19105] — (1822) 5 B & Ald 926; 106 ER 1430 …. [15020] — (1927) 20 Cr App R 144 …. [17375], [17390], [17395] — (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 720 …. [33500] — (1971) 1 SASR 447 …. [1400], [9020] — (1988) 37 A Crim R 29 …. [23350] — (1997) 7 NTLR 1 …. [29050], [29060] — [1927] 2 KB 587; [1927] All ER Rep 473 …. [17090], [17095], [17650]
— [1946] OR 407; [1946] 3 DLR 520 …. [33455] — [1970] 3 All ER 746; [1970] 1 WLR 1252 …. [25180] — [1972] 2 All ER 699; [1972] 1 WLR 651 …. [11040] — [1988] Tas R 31 …. [33770] — [2006] 1 Cr App R 5 …. [29055], [29080] Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 395 …. [17660] — v Turner (1847) 10 QB 482; 116 ER 184 …. [33455] — v Vallence (1822) 1 Bing 45; 130 ER 19 …. [33535] Harrison-Owen; R v [1951] 2 All ER 726 …. [21100], [21190], [21200] Harrison; R v [1966] VR 72 …. [17105], [17205], [17240], [17575] Harry Parker Ltd v Mason [1940] 2 KB 590 …. [1300] Harry; R v (1988) 86 Cr App R 105 …. [31040], [31090], [31095] Hart v Hall & Pickles Ltd [1969] 1 QB 405; [1968] 3 All ER 291 …. [5025] — v Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 …. [1530], [3295] — v Mac Donald (1910) 10 CLR 417; 16 ALR 585 …. [39160], [39175], [39290] — v Minister of Lands (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 133 …. [35340] Hart (SW) & Co Pty Ltd v Edwards Hot Water Systems (1985) 159 CLR 466; 61 ALR 251 …. [11150] Hart; R v (1898) 9 QLJ 95 …. [29105] — (1914) 10 Cr App R 176 …. [11140] — (1932) 23 Cr App Rep 202 …. [17435], [17460] — (1957) 42 Cr App R 47 …. [17535] — (1977) 17 SASR 100 …. [11075], [33660], [33695], [33725] — (1999) 135 CCC (3d) 377 …. [17480]
— [1979] Qd R 8 …. [11065], [33740] Hartley; R v [1941] 1 KB 5 …. [15235] — [2007] 3 NZLR 299 …. [21215] Hartman v Konig (1933) 50 TLR 114 …. [41005], [41035] Hartogen Energy Ltd (in liq) v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 36 FCR 557; 109 ALR 177 …. [25235], [25240], [25265] Hartwick, Hartwick and Clayton; R v (2005) 14 VR 125 …. [21050] Hartwick; R v BC9503322 …. [1295] Harvey v Hewitt (1840) 8 Dowl 598 …. [27215] — v R [1901] AC 601 …. [5185], [5190] — v Smith-Wood [1964] 2 QB 171; [1963] 2 All ER 127 …. [17420], [35010], [35145] Harvey; R v (1858) 8 Cox CC 99 …. [27205] — (1869) 11 Cox CC 546 …. [17210], [39105] Haslam; R v (1925) 19 Cr App R 59 …. [1375], [1425] — [1983] Crim LR 566 …. [17075] Hassan; R v [1970] 1 QB 423; [1970] 1 All ER 745 …. [1155] Hastie & Jenkerson (a firm) v McMahon [1991] 1 All ER 255; [1990] 1 WLR 1575 …. [1315] Hathaway v Hathaway [1970] 2 All ER 701; [1970] 1 WLR 1156 …. [33485] Hatton; R v (1976) 64 Cr App R 88 …. [23380] Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181 …. [17240] Haughbro; R v (1997) 135 ACTR 15 …. [27315] Hauni-Werke Korber & Co KG’s Application, Re [1982] RPC 327 …. [3135] Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136; [1981] 3 All ER 14
…. [9110], [9115], [9120], [11095], [11140] Hawes; R v (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 …. [1125], [17550] Hawke v Edwards (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 21 …. [39175], [39185] Hawke; R v (1974) 3 OR (2d) 210 …. [17485] Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd; R v (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 453 …. [25220] Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 78 ALR 69 …. [39160] — v Lindsley (1974) 4 ALR 697; 49 ALJR 5 …. [3020] — v Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co Ltd [1911] 1 KB 988 …. [1595] Haworth; R v (1830) 4 Car & P 253; 172 ER 693 …. [39050] Hay v Mitchell [1973] 2 NSWLR 736 …. [39015] Hay; R v (1851) 5 Cox CC 146 …. [19075] — (1860) 2 F & F 4; 175 ER 933 …. [25315] — (1983) 77 Cr App R 70 …. [5215], [19030], [33670] — [1968] Qd R 459 …. [17065] Haycock; R v [1989] 2 Qd R 56 …. [33420] Hayden; R v [1959] VR 102; [1959] ALR 332 …. [17375] Haydon v Magistrates Court (2001) 87 SASR 448 …. [27130] Haydon; R v (2001) 80 SASR 560 …. [9070] Hayes v R (1973) 47 ALJR 603 …. [11140] — v Wagner (1906) 77 NE 211 …. [3290] Hayes; R v [1977] 2 All ER 288; [1977] 1 WLR 234 …. [13050] — [2005] 1 Cr App R 33 …. [33540] Hayler; R v (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 …. [15075], [23155] Hayles; R v (1990) 54 SASR 549 …. [1435] Hayman v Forbes (1975) 13 SASR 225 …. [3015], [3020] Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13; [1895] All ER Rep Ext 1368 …. [29125]
Haynes; R v (1859) 1 F & F 666; 175 ER 898 …. [17095] Hayslep v Gymer (1834) 1 Ad & E 162; 110 ER 1169 …. [31100] Hayter v Howie [1937] SASR 59 …. [15045] Hayter; R v [2003] 1 WLR 1910 …. [33495] — [2005] 2 All ER 209; [2005] 1 WLR 605 …. [5180], [33495] Hayward v Whitbread [1966] SASR 1 …. [7125] Haywood; R v (1994) 73 A Crim R 41 …. [17175] Hazeltine; R v [1967] 2 QB 857; [1967] 2 All ER 671 …. [33605] Hazim; R v (1993) 69 A Crim R 371 …. [33595] He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523; 60 ALR 449 …. [7030], [7050] He; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 …. [15075], [15100] Head; R v (1961) 45 Cr App R 225 …. [9020] Heading; R v (2011) 111 SASR 32 …. [17290] Heagney; Ex parte ACT Employers Federation; R v (1976) 137 CLR 86; 10 ALR 459 …. [3156] Healey; R v [1965] 1 All ER 365; [1965] 1 WLR 1059 …. [11135] Health & Life Care Ltd v Price Waterhouse (1997) 69 SASR 362 …. [25255] Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 …. [5115], [5130] Health Insurance Commission v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544; 158 ALR 267 …. [25245], [25290] Healy; R v (1995) 15 WAR 104 …. [33455] Heane v Rogers (1829) 9 B & C 577; 109 ER 215 …. [33420] Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175 …. [1255] Heaney; R v (2009) 22 VR 164 …. [17445] — [1992] 2 VR 531 …. [33775]
— [1998] 4 VR 636 …. [27305], [33765] Hearley; Cadle Co, The v [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 143 …. [25350] Hearn; R v (1841) Car & M 109; 174 ER 431 …. [33615] Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; 248 ALR 609 …. [9005], [25055] Hearne; R v [1976] Crim LR 753 …. [1045] Heath v Deane [1905] 2 Ch 86 …. [33390] Heath; R v [1991] 2 Qd R 182 …. [1140], [21050], [31100] Heaton v Luczka BC9800798 …. [1742] Hebbert v Purchas (1871) LR 3 PC 605 …. [3040] Hebert; R v [1990] 2 SCR 151 …. [27305] Hector; R v [1953] VLR 543; [1953] ALR 950 …. [1135], [19095] Hedges; R v (1909) 3 Cr App R 262 …. [17270] Hehir v Cmr of Police of the Metropolis [1982] 2 All ER 335; [1982] 1 WLR 715 …. [27005], [27105] Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 628 …. [5170] — v — (1989) 16 NSWLR 629 …. [5100], [5170] Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30; [1911] All ER Rep 83 …. [39195] Heimann v Commonwealth (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 691 …. [39240] Hein; R v (2013) 117 SASR 444 …. [11055], [33710], [33730] Heinze; R v (2005) 153 A Crim R 380 …. [1220], [17305] Helal v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 285 ALR 281 …. [11090] Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd v Harrison (The “Sagheera”) [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 160 …. [25015], [25235], [25265] Hellens (falsely called Densmore) v Densmore [1957] SCR 768; (1957) 10 DLR (2d) 561 …. [41005] Helliwell v Piggott-Sims [1980] FSR 356 …. [11130]
Hellwig; R v [2007] 1 Qd R 17 …. [13070] Helmhout; R v (2000) 112 A Crim R 10 …. [27315] — (2000) 125 A Crim R 10 …. [27315] — (2001) 125 A Crim R 257 …. [27315] Helsham v Blackwood (1851) 11 CB 111; 138 ER 412 …. [5215] Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; [1940] ALR 298 …. [5105], [5130], [5185], [5215], [9005], [9050], [29090] Hembury; R v (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 …. [23410] Hemming v Maddick (1872) LR 7 Ch App 395 …. [17535] Hemmings; R v [1939] 1 All ER 417 …. [7310] Hemp; R v (1835) 5 C & P 468; 172 ER 1057 …. [19045] Hempel v A-G (1987) 77 ALR 641 …. [1065] Henaff v Henaff [1966] 1 WLR 598 …. [33415], [41085] Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (No 1) (1995) 62 FCR 1; 140 ALR 391 …. [29070], [29125] — v Arthur [1907] 1 KB 10 …. [39160] — v Henderson [1843] All ER Rep 378; (1843) 67 ER 313; 3 Hare 100 …. [5075], [5170] — v — [1905] 1 IR 353 …. [39280] — v Henry E Jenkins & Sons [1970] AC 282; [1969] 3 All ER 756 …. [7005] — v Richardson (1996) 5 Tas R 375 …. [1175] — v SBS Realisations Ltd (1992 unreported) …. [13270] Henderson; R v (1984) 37 SASR 82 …. [17375] — [2010] 2 Cr App R 24 …. [29050], [29080] Hendrie; R v (1985) 37 SASR 581 …. [31095], [37110] Hendry; R v (1988) 88 Cr App R 187 …. [11035]
Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 39 FCR 546; 79 ALR 83 …. [39160] Henkle v Royal Exchange Assurance Co [1558] All ER Rep 450; (1749) 27 ER 1055; 1 Ves Sen 317 …. [39175] Henley v Henley [1955] P 202; [1955] 1 All ER 590 …. [25365] Henman v Lester (1862) 12 CB NS 776; 142 ER 1347 …. [17560] Hennessey; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 419 …. [27130], [31010] Hennesseys Self Service Stores Pty Ltd, Re [1965] Qd R 576 …. [35065] Hennessy v Broken Hill Co Pty Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 342 …. [27205] — v Keating [1908] 1 IR 43 …. [1275] — v Wright (1888) 21 QBD 509 …. [27015], [27130] Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254 …. [1240], [17660], [17680] Henning; R v BC9002977 …. [15255] Henriques; R v (1991) 93 Cr App R 237 …. [17040] Henry Coxon, The (1878) 3 PD 156 …. [33120], [33130], [33135] Henry; R v (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 …. [3060], [3159] — [1917] VLR 525 …. [17060] — [1977] Qd R 204 …. [37140] — [1990] Crim LR 574 …. [33485] — [2006] 1 Cr App R 6 …. [29050] Hentschel; R v [1988] VR 362 …. [1445], [31195] Hepworth; R v (1928) AD 265 …. [3180] — [1955] 2 QB 600; [1955] 2 All ER 918 …. [9005], [9020] Her Majesty’s Advocate v HD (1953) SC (J) 65 …. [25200] Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 …. [17445] Herbert v Benson (1942) 44 SR (NSW) 382 …. [33455] Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v FCT (1932) 47 CLR 222 …. [11010]
Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688; [1916] All ER Rep 305 …. [11025] Herd; R v (1973) 57 Cr App R 560 …. [11135] Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (2000) 170 ALR 379; 74 ALJR 698 …. [27205] — v Refugee Review Tribunal (No 2) (2000) 74 ALJR 703 …. [27205] Herman; R v (1904) 6 WALR 89 …. [15095] Hermanowski v United States of America (2005) 149 FCR 93 …. [41005] Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305; [1938] 1 All ER 1 …. [11025] Heron v Baird (1921) 33 WALR 47 …. [37055] Herriott v Crofton Holdings Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 383 …. [39240], [39290] Hersey; R v [1998] Crim LR 281 …. [1445], [29050] Hertfordshire County Council; Ex parte Green Environmental Industries Ltd; R v [2000] 2 AC 412; [2000] 1 All ER 773 …. [25180] Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 …. [17180], [17225] — v Kemp (1815) 4 Camp 193; 191 ER 62 …. [1130] Hetherington; R v [1972] Crim LR 703 …. [3170] Heuston; R v (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 …. [1400] Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington (2005) 2 DDCR 271 …. [1732], [3135], [3160], [29200] Hewitt v Hewitt [1948] P 150; [1948] 1 All ER 242 …. [17060] — v Lenthall [1931] SASR 314 …. [23315] — v Western Australian Newspapers Ltd (1976) 17 ACTR 15 …. [25305] Hewitt; R v (1925) 19 Cr App R 64 …. [21050] — [1998] 4 VR 862 …. [7085], [15135]
Heyde; R v (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 …. [15220], [33435] Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2000) 51 NSWLR 1 …. [29125] — v Perpetual Executors Trustees & Agency Co (WA) Ltd (1930) 45 CLR 111; 37 ALR 65 …. [7075] Heyes; R v (2006) 12 VR 401 …. [15220] Heyne v Fischel & Co (1913) 30 TLR 190 …. [33395] Heywood v Robinson [1975] VR 562 …. [1125] HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414; 160 ALR 554 …. [19080], [19085], [29050], [29065], [29185], [29195], [29200] HG; R v (2007) 171 A Crim R 55 …. [17270] HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd v Davy (2003) 7 VR 512 …. [1215] Hibberd v Kelleher (1901) 27 VLR 474 …. [1175] Hibbins; R v [1999] 2 Qd R 283 …. [35125], [35410] Hickey v R (2002) 136 A Crim R 150 …. [21100] Hickman v Berens [1895] 2 Ch 638 …. [13300] — v Peacey [1945] AC 304; [1945] 2 All ER 215 …. [9015] — v R (1993) 60 SASR 415 …. [15135], [19170] Hickman; R v [1969] Crim LR 502 …. [17135] Hicks v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd (1879) 5 VLR (E) 228 …. [17725] — v R (1920) 28 CLR 36; 26 ALR 109 …. [15070], [15140] Hicks; R v (2010) 210 A Crim R 158 …. [25100] Hide & Skin Trading Pty Ltd v Oceanic Meat Traders (1990) 20 NSWLR 310 …. [39290] Higgins v Dawson [1902] AC 1; [1900] All ER Rep Ext 1470 …. [39260], [39295] — v Dorries [1965] Qd R 389 …. [17305], [17315], [33455] — v Ewing’s Trustees (1925) SC 440 …. [41035]
— v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229 …. [17660] Higgins; R v (1829) 3 Car & P 603; 172 ER 565 …. [33455], [37110] — (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 …. [17495] Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717 …. [33015], [33070] Higham; R v (1857) 7 El & Bl 557; 119 ER 1352 …. [1080] Highgrade Traders Ltd, Re [1984] BCLC 151 …. [25235], [25245] HIH Insurance (in prov liq) and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (in prov liq), Re; ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 …. [1215] Hilder; R v (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 …. [29070], [35440] Hilditch; R v (1832) 5 C & P 299; 172 ER 986 …. [17645] Hill v Arnold (1976) 9 ALR 350 …. [17170] — v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 1 All ER 193 …. [7010] — v Clifford [1907] 2 Ch 236 …. [5015], [5190] — v Cmr of Highways [1966] SASR 316 …. [29075] — v Crook [1874] All ER Rep 62; (1873) LR 6 HL 265 …. [39255] — v Manchester and Salford Waterworks Co (1833) 5 B & Ad 866; 110 ER 1011 …. [33390] — v Minister for Community Services and Health (1991) 30 FCR 272; 102 ALR 661 …. [25325] — v National Bank of New Zealand [1985] 1 NZLR 736 …. [39290] — v R [1953] Tas SR 54 …. [23375] — v Woollahra Municipal Council (2003) 127 LGERA 7 …. [1175] Hill, In the Estate of; Braham v Haslewood [1948] P 341; [1948] 2 All ER 489 …. [35090] Hill; R v (1851) 2 Den 254; 169 ER 495 …. [13065] — (1851) 20 LJMC 222 …. [19050] — (1908) 1 Cr App R 158 …. [37155]
— (2011) 212 A Crim R 359 …. [15175] — (2012) 218 A Crim R 301 …. [27315] Hilliard v Westpac Banking Corporation (2009) 25 VR 119 …. [25145] Hillier v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451 …. [29065], [29070], [35360] Hillier; R v (2004) 154 ACTR 46 …. [21050], [35532] — (2007) 228 CLR 618; 233 ALR 634 …. [9040] Hills; R v (1987) 86 Cr App R 26 …. [15175] Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 769; [1964] 1 WLR 952 …. [17325], [35010], [35150] — v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57; 58 ALR 245 …. [27245] — v — (1985) 5 FCR 296; 59 ALR 281 …. [27130], [27160] Hilton; R v [1972] 1 QB 421; [1971] 3 All ER 541 …. [13105], [17475], [17515], [23390] Hind; R v (1860) 8 Cox CC 300 …. [33285] Hinds; R v [1932] 2 KB 644 …. [1375] — [1979] Crim LR 111 …. [19085] Hindson v Monaghan [1970] VR 84 …. [1475], [39045] Hine, Re (1897) 37 A 384 …. [31040] Hinson v Ashby [1896] 2 Ch 1 …. [1280], [39035] Hinton v Trotter [1931] SASR 123 …. [33485] Hinton; R v (1999) 150 FLR 20 …. [35620] — (2000) 155 FLR 139 …. [21252] — [1961] Qd R 17 …. [17275] Hinz; R v [1972] Qd R 272 …. [7030], [7160] Hircock; R v [1970] 1 QB 67; [1969] 1 All ER 47 …. [17135] Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260; 163 A Crim R 280 …. [1395], [21180]
Hirst; R v (2013) 116 SASR 300 …. [15220], [33435] Hiscocks v Hiscocks, Doe d (1839) 5 M & W364; 151 ER 154 …. [39245], [39270], [39295] Hissey; R v (1973) 6 SASR 280 …. [21050], [31065], [37010], [37090] Histed; R v [1964] 19 Cox CC 16 …. [33690] Hitchins v Eardley (1871) LR 2 P & D 248 …. [11040], [33240] HM Advocate v Docherty (1981) JC 6 …. [33645] — v Doherty (1954) SC (J) 1 …. [7030] — v Milne (1866) 5 Irv 22 …. [17475] — v Olsson (1941) SLT 402 …. [33805] — v Turnbull (1951) SC (J) 96 …. [27235] HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; 245 ALR 204 …. [1215], [17255], [21035], [21050], [21065] Hnedish; R v (1958) 26 WWR 685 …. [11055] Ho v DPP (Cth) (1998) 102 A Crim R 37 …. [27315] — v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 …. [1215], [9005], [17530], [17540], [35440] Ho; R v (2002) 130 A Crim R 545 …. [9030], [33435] Hoad v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 468 …. [25015] — v Swan (1920) 28 CLR 258 …. [33420] Hoare v Allen (1801) 3 Esp 276; 170 ER 614 …. [31095] Hoare; R v [1966] 2 All ER 846; [1966] 1 WLR 762 …. [33770] Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503 …. [29155], [31095], [37090] Hobbins v R [1982] 1 SCR 553; (1982) 135 DLR (3d) 244 …. [33645] Hobbs v C T Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1; [1929] All ER Rep 33 …. [17475], [17510], [17600], [19030], [19165], [23145] — v Davies; Ex parte Davies [1943] St R Qd 131 …. [15200]
— v Hobbs and Cousens [1960] P 112 …. [25235] Hobbs, In the Will of (1931) 48 WN (NSW) 166 …. [39115] Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292; 81 ALR 225 …. [15110], [21035], [21085], [21090], [21100], [21120], [21252], [21257] Hockin v Ahlquist Bros Ltd [1944] KB 120; [1943] 2 All ER 722 …. [1475] Hocking v Bell (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 130; 59 WN (NSW) 79 …. [11145] — v — (1945) 71 CLR 430 …. [9120], [11100], [11145] — v — (1948) 75 CLR 125; [1948] 1 ALR 85 …. [11145] Hocking; R v [1988] 1 Qd R 582 …. [23030] Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489 …. [1290], [1295] Hodge; R v (1838) 3 Lew CC 227; 168 ER 1136 …. [9035], [21035] Hodges; R v [2003] 2 Cr App R 15 …. [29150] Hodgett; R v [1957] NI 1 …. [15095] Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards Mobility Services Ltd [1997] FSR 178 …. [25385] Hodgkinson; R v [1954] VLR 140; [1954] ALR 305 …. [17105] Hodgkiss; R v (1836) 7 C & P 298; 173 ER 132 …. [19145] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (2012) 264 FLR 1 …. [35635] — v Amcor Ltd (No 4) (2011) 32 VR 568 …. [25020], [25300] Hodgson, Re; Beckett v Ramsdale (1885) 31 Ch D 177 …. [15150] Hodgson; R v (1812) Russ & Ry 211; 168 ER 765 …. [19075] — (1924) 18 Cr App R 7 …. [17155] Hoefler v Tomlinson (1995) 60 FCR 452; 133 ALR 625 …. [25395] Hofer; R v (1991) 55 A Crim R 225 …. [21065] Hogan v R (2008) 186 A Crim R 52 …. [9020] Hogan; R v (1873) 12 Cox CC 357 …. [37085]
— [1960] 2 QB 513 …. [5130] Hogg; R v (1833) 6 Car & P 176; 172 ER 1196 …. [33795] Hoggins; R v [1967] 3 All ER 334; [1967] 1 WLR 1223 …. [23375] Hogue v Haines (1977) 29 FLR 186 …. [1030] Holcombe v Hewson (1810) 2 Camp 391; 170 ER 1194 …. [1530], [1620], [21275] Holden; R v (1838) 8 C & P 606; 173 ER 638 …. [17090], [17125] Holdsworth v Mayor of Dartmouth (1838) 2 Mood & R 153; 174 ER 246 …. [17365] Holdsworth; R v [2009] Crim LR 195 …. [29055] Holdway v Arcuri Lawyers [2009] 2 Qd R 18 …. [3165] Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 1 All ER 1054 …. [33690] Holland v Evans [1959] VR 54; [1959] ALR 255 …. [17055] — v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149; 23 ALR 165 …. [3015], [3020], [3080], [3115], [3125], [3145] — v Reeves (1835) 7 C & P 36; 173 ER 16 …. [17240] — v United States (1954) 348 US 121 …. [9035] Holland, Re; Gregg v Holland [1902] 2 Ch 360 …. [39180] Hollingham v Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241 …. [1530] — v — (1858) 4 CBNS 388; 140 ER 1135 …. [21285] Hollingsworth v Hopkins [1967] Qd R 168 …. [29075] Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 27 …. [35095] — v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd [1943] KB 587; [1943] 2 All ER 35 …. [1485], [1722], [5180], [5185], [5190], [5195], [5220], [29135], [33195], [35065], [35075] Hollis v Burton [1892] 3 Ch 226 …. [3165] — v Clark (1981) 40 ALR 179 …. [1635]
Hollis; R v (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 283 …. [39010] Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 …. [3280], [11085], [31035], [31045], [31165], [33580] Holloway, Re (1887) 12 PD 167 …. [25235], [25245] Holloway; R v [1980] 1 NZLR 315 …. [21025], [21170] Holm v Smith [1956] QWN 8 …. [17205] Holman v Holman (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 374 …. [1610] — v R [1970] WAR 2 …. [15170] Holman; R v [1997] 1 Qd R 373 …. [9030] Holmden v Bitar (1987) 47 SASR 509 …. [31140] Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692; 14 ALR 89 …. [17535] Holmes; R v (1871) LR 1 CCR 334 …. [19075] — [1953] 2 All ER 324 …. [29105] Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 576; 103 ALR 684 …. [25055] Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124 …. [1315], [29150] — v Cameron (1979) 22 SASR 321; 27 ALR 311 …. [7030] Holt; R v (1793) 5 TR 436; 101 ER 245 …. [33355] — (1996) 87 A Crim R 82 …. [31085] — [1983] 2 Qd R 462 …. [19090] Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 …. [11150], [29075] Holton v Holton [1946] 2 All ER 534 …. [35090] Holy Trinity, Kingston-upon-Hull (Inhabitants); R v (1827) 7 B & C 611; 108 ER 851 …. [39010] Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Pte Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 625; [2003] 2 All ER 785; [2003] 2 WLR 711 …. [39240] Home v Corbeil [1955] 4 DLR 750 …. [37125]
Home Office v Harman [1981] QB 534; [1981] 2 All ER 349 …. [25055] Homes v Newman [1931] 2 Ch 112; [1931] All ER Rep 85 …. [17300], [33070], [37040], [37170] Homestake Australia Ltd v Metana Minerals NL (1991) 11 WAR 435 …. [39195], [41120] Homeward Bound Gold Mining Co NL v McPherson (1896) 17 NSWR (Eq) 281 …. [41035] Hone v Western Australia (2007) 179 A Crim R 138 …. [29075] Honeybone v Glass [1908] VLR 466; (1908) 14 ALR 345 …. [1645] Honeyghon; R v [1999] Crim LR 221 …. [17375] Hongkong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy (1992) 28 NSWLR 512 …. [25060], [25375] — v — [1993] 2 VR 419 …. [25010], [25020], [25240] Honner; R v [1977] Tas SR 1 …. [29050] Hood v Beauchamp (1836) 8 Sim 26; 59 ER 11 …. [33230] — v Commonwealth [1968] VR 619 …. [5095], [5110], [5240] — v Phillips (1842) 6 Beav 176; 49 ER 793 …. [7070] Hood; R v [1968] 2 All ER 56; [1968] 1 WLR 773 …. [27215] Hoogwerf; R v (1992) 63 A Crim R 302 …. [29050] Hook v Day (1971) 2 SASR 440 …. [33455] Hook; R v (1858) Dears & B 606; 169 ER 1138 …. [15020] Hooker Corp Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538 …. [25020] Hookway; R v [1999] Crim LR 750 …. [1370] Hooper v Bourne (1880) 5 App Cas 1 …. [1170] — v Gorman [1976] 2 NSWLR 431 …. [17510] Hooper; R v (1999) 108 A Crim R 108 …. [21035] Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1; 29 ALR 577 ….
[11010] — v Brash [1897] 2 QB 188; [1895] All ER Rep 343 …. [25060] — v Hope [1893] WN 20 …. [33115] — v RCA Photophone of Australia Pty Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 348 …. [39160] Hope; R v (1955) 39 Cr App R 33 …. [39105] — [1909] VLR 149; (1909) 15 ALR 87 …. [11030], [11075], [33265], [33295], [33310] Hopes v HM Advocate [1960] SC (J) 104 …. [1305] Hopes and Lavery v — (1960) SC (J) 104 …. [29060] Hopetoun Kembla Investments Pty Ltd v JPR Legal Pty Ltd (2011) 286 ALR 768; 87 ACSR 1 …. [25055] Hopkins-Husson; R v (1949) 34 Cr App R 47 …. [11140] Hopkinson v Knapp & Spaulding Co (1894) 60 NW653 …. [3260] — v Lord Burghley (1867) LR 2 Ch App 447 …. [25055] Hopper No 13, The [1925] P 52; [1924] All ER Rep Ext 934 …. [25235] Hopper; R v [1915] 2 KB 431 …. [17135] Horan v Ferguson [1995] 2 Qd R 490 …. [13060] Horan; R v [1951] VLR 249; [1951] ALR 570 …. [17040] Horman v Bingham [1972] VR 29 …. [3035] Horn; R v (1912) 7 Cr App R 200 …. [7070] Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247; [1956] 3 All ER 970 …. [9010], [9050] Horncastle; R v [2010] 2 AC 373; [2009] 4 All ER 183 …. [31010], [31020] Horne v Comino [1966] Qd R 202 …. [33460] — v Mackenzie (1839) 6 Cl & Fin 628; 7 ER 834 …. [17200] — v Milne (1881) 7 VLR (L) 296 …. [1880], [17510]
Horne (dec’d), Re; Guardian Trust and Executors Co of New Zealand Ltd v Horne [1935] NZLR 648 …. [39020] Horne; R v [1990] Crim LR 188 …. [33485] — [1992] Crim LR 304 …. [31135] Horner v Canadian Northern Railway Co (1920) 55 DLR 340 …. [17460] Horowhenua, Subdivision No 14, Re (1898) 16 NZLR 532 …. [27205] Horrell v R (1997) 6 NTLR 125 …. [15220] Horry; R v [1949] NZLR 791 …. [21025] — [1952] NZLR 111 …. [1250] Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court; Ex parte Bennett (No 2); R v [1994] 1 All ER 289 …. [27105] Horseferry Road Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Adams; R v [1978] 1 All ER 373; [1977] 1 WLR 1197 …. [11110] Horsfall v Braye (1908) 7 CLR 629 …. [39145] Horsfall; R v (1989) 51 SASR 489 …. [13055], [13065], [17175] Horsham Justices; Ex parte Bukhari; R v (1982) 74 Cr App R 291 …. [1030], [11120] Horsman v Western Australia (2008) 187 A Crim R 565 …. [21257] Horton; R v (1998) 45 NSWLR 426 …. [33775], [35620] Horvath v R [1979] 2 SCR 376; (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 1 …. [17175], [33655], [33660] Horvath; R v [1972] VR 533 …. [1125], [1530] Horwood; R v [1970] 1 QB 133; [1969] 3 All ER 1156 …. [21100], [21170] Hoskins v Repatriation Commission (1991) 32 FCR 443; 14 AAR 299 …. [17435] Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1979] AC 474; [1978] 2 All ER 136 …. [13035], [13125], [25150]
Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc, Re (1992) 28 ALD 25; 16 AAR 158 …. [5030] Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v Victoria (1953) 87 CLR 1 …. [3158] Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157 …. [1215], [17075] Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia v Hunt (1983) 76 FLR 408 …. [27065] Hough v Ah Sam (1912) 15 CLR 452; 19 ALR 1 …. [33675] Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694; [1962] 2 All ER 159 …. [7075] Houghton v Immer (No 155) Pty Ltd (1997) 44 NSWLR 46 …. [1275] Houghton; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 197 …. [33715] Houlditch v Donegal (1834) 8 Bli (NS) 301; 5 ER 955 …. [5035] House v Dept of Defence (1996) 65 FCR 94; 136 ALR 444 …. [5030] — v Haughton Brothers (Worcester) Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 39; [1967] 1 WLR 148 …. [11150] — v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 …. [11120], [21252], [27130], [27315] House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241; [1990] 2 All ER 990 …. [5035], [5060] House; R v [1994] Crim LR 683 …. [15220] Housen v Nikolaisen [2002] 2 SCR 235; (2002) 211 DLR (4th) 577 …. [11150] Houston v Harwood [1975] VR 698 …. [1240] — v Wittners Pty Ltd (1928) 41 CLR 107; [1928] ALR 356 …. [33830] Houston; R v (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 …. [17160], [17535] Houvardas v Zaravinos (2003) 202 ALR 535 …. [5070], [5170] Hovell; R v [1986] 1 NZLR 500 …. [35065] Howard v Canfield (1836) 1 Jur 71 …. [17210]
Howard Smith & Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68; 14 ALR 169 …. [39290] Howard; R v (1983) 8 A Crim R 109 …. [23405] — (1989) 69 CR (3d) 193 …. [29070] — (2005) 152 A Crim R 7 …. [29175], [29190], [29200] — (2005) 156 A Crim R 343 …. [15220] — [1987] 1 NZLR 347 …. [31185] Howarth; R v (1918) 13 Cr App R 99 …. [17520] — [1973] Qd R 431 …. [33640], [33705] Howe v Malkin (1878) 40 LT 196 …. [37025], [37045] — v R (1980) 32 ALR 478; 55 ALJR 5 …. [7085] Howe; R v (1958) 100 CLR 448; [1958] ALR 753 …. [7015] — [1958] SASR 95 …. [19095] — [1982] 1 NZLR 618 …. [1370], [29060] Howick; R v [1970] Crim LR 403 …. [1410] Howlett; R v (1981) 5 A Crim R 45 …. [15180] Howse; R v [1983] NZLR 246 …. [25310] Howson v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 401 …. [15220], [15235] Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 …. [1685], [3165], [33460], [33510], [35435], [35605], [35635] — v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] ATPR 42-240 …. [3260], [9005] Hoystead v Cmr of Taxation [1926] AC 155; [1925] All ER Rep 56 …. [5030], [5085] Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133; 26 ALR 21 …. [39145], [39160], [39195] HP v R (2011) 32 VR 687; 211 A Crim R 229 …. [5135] HRA; R v (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 …. [7085], [17265], [17270],
[17280] Hrysikos v Mansfield (2002) 5 VR 485 …. [17545] Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Cmr of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26 …. [1295], [25175] — v FCT (No 7) (2013) 217 FCR 1 …. [27315] Huang v University of New South Wales (No 3) (2006) 154 FCR 16 …. [17080] Hubbard; R v (1881) 14 Cox CC 565 …. [33295] Hubbuck, In the Estate of [1905] P 129 …. [39280] Huchison; R v [1972] 1 All ER 936; [1972] 1 WLR 398 …. [1045] Hucks; R v (1816) 1 Stark 521; 171 ER 549 …. [11030] Hudd v R (1987) 75 ALR 143 …. [17535], [19035] Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; 15 ALR 241 …. [25180] Huddleston, Re; Bruno v Eyston [1894] 3 Ch 595 …. [39260] Hudson v Owners of the Barge Swiftsure (1900) 82 LT 389 …. [33070] Hudson; R v (1981) 72 Cr App R 163 …. [33655], [33760] — [1912] 2 KB 464; [1911] All ER Rep Ext 1180 …. [23320], [23325] Hughes v Biddulph (1827) 4 Russ 190; 38 ER 777 …. [25235] — v Bradfield [1949] QWN 46 …. [3020] — v Hill [1937] SASR 285 …. [17725] — v Lancaster Steam Collieries Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 556 …. [3135] — v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 504 …. [37085] — v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257 …. [33340] — v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134; 23 ALR 321 …. [1655], [1660], [31065], [33340]
— v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (1993) 29 NSWLR 653 …. [39290] — v Steel (1908) 5 CLR 755; 14 ALR 466 …. [1175] Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Air Services Australia (No 3) (1997) 80 FCR 276 …. [29165], [29210] Hughes, Re [1986] 2 NZLR 129 …. [27105] Hughes; R v (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 288 …. [17075] — (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 …. [11135] — [1942] SCR 517; [1943] 1 DLR 1 …. [33455] Hugo; R v (2000) 113 A Crim R 484 …. [25175] Hui Chi-Ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34; [1991] 3 All ER 897 …. [5180], [5215] Huijser; R v [1988] 1 NZLR 577 …. [21190] Hulbert; R v (1979) 69 Cr App R 243 …. [1195], [33460] Hulusi; R v (1973) 58 Cr App R 378 …. [17135] Humberside County Council v R [1977] 3 All ER 964; [1977] 1 WLR 1251 …. [1030], [33840] Humble v Hunter (1848) 12 QB 310; [1843] All ER Rep 468; [1843] 116 ER 885 …. [39160] Humble; R v (2009) 193 A Crim R 324 …. [17270] Hume v Higgins (1949) 78 CLR 116; [1949] ALR 273 …. [3156] — v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 …. [1665], [7070] Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664; [1921] All ER Rep 837 …. [1200], [11090] Humphrey v Collier [1946] VLR 391; [1946] ALR 448 …. [11085] Humphries v R (1987) 17 FCR 182; 75 ALR 31 …. [19015], [19030] Humphries; R v [1972] 2 NSWLR 783 …. [23040] Hundal; R v [2004] 2 Cr App R 19 …. [25090] Hunjan; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 99 …. [1390]
Hunnings v Williamson (1883) 10 QBD 459 …. [25125] Hunt v Hort (1791) 3 Bro CC 311; 29 ER 554 …. [39230] — v Wark (1985) 40 SASR 489 …. [27310] Hunt & Winterbotham (West of England) Ltd v BRS Parcels Ltd [1962] 1 QB 617; [1962] 1 All ER 111 …. [7075] Hunt; R v (1820) 3 B & A 566; 106 ER 768 …. [1475], [33565], [39065] — (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 38 …. [33610] — (1994) 76 A Crim R 363 …. [1155] — [1987] AC 352; [1987] 1 All ER 1 …. [7170] Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; [1981] 3 All ER 727 …. [5075], [5175], [5180], [5215], [11050] — v Police (2011) 111 SASR 411 …. [17375] — v Public Trustee [1924] NZLR 882 …. [39250] — v State (1878) 40 NJLaw 495 …. [37170] Hunter; R v (1989) 51 SASR 158 …. [33770] — [1956] VLR 31; [1955] ALR 786 …. [17375], [17380], [17385] — [1969] Crim LR 262 …. [1410] — [1985] 2 All ER 173; [1985] 1 WLR 613 …. [1295] Hunting; R v (1908) 1 Cr App R 177 …. [13095] Huntress v Boston & Me RR Co (1890) 34 A 154 …. [3225], [3260] Hurihanganui; R v [2004] 2 NZLR 1 …. [29050] Hurring, Re; Davidson v Hurring [1950] NZLR 948 …. [39255] Hurst v Beach [1814] All ER Rep 523; [1814] 56 ER 929; (1821) 5 Madd 351 …. [39285] — v Evans [1917] 1 KB 352 …. [7195], [19095] Hurst; R v (1966) 55 WWR 358 …. [17275] — [1995] 1 Cr App R 82 …. [29050]
Hush; Ex parte Devanny; R v (1932) 48 CLR 487 …. [1605], [7105] Hussain; R v [1998] Crim LR 820 …. [31185] Hussey v Home-Payne (1879) 4 App Cas 311; [1874] All ER Rep 716 …. [39290] Hutchings v Clarke (1993) 113 ALR 709 …. [25380] Hutchings; R v (1881) 6 QBD 300 …. [5030] Hutchins, In the Will of (1893) 14 ALT 223 …. [39115] Hutchinson v Davis [1940] NZLR 490 …. [13300] Hutchinson; R v (1985) 82 Cr App R 51 …. [17650], [33755] Hutchison; R v (1990) 53 SASR 587 …. [17375] Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32; [1914] All ER Rep 242 …. [3020] — v Petersen; Ex parte Petersen [1975] Qd R 340 …. [1175] Hutton v Watling [1948] Ch 398; [1948] 1 All ER 803 …. [39200] Hutton; R v (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282 …. [15100] — (1991) 56 A Crim R 211 …. [5210] — (1994) 3 Tas R 225 …. [5140] Huxtable, Re; Huxtable v Crawfurd [1902] 2 Ch 793; [1900] All ER Rep 799 …. [39155] Huynh; R v (2006) 165 A Crim R 586 …. [7085] Huysse v Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority [1975] 1 NSWLR 401 …. [5025] Huyton-with-Roby UDC v Hunter [1955] 2 All ER 398; [1955] 1 WLR 603 …. [7005] Hvalfangerselskapet Polaris A/S v Unilever Ltd (1933) 46 Lloyd’s Rep 29 …. [39240] Hyatt; R v [1998] 4 VR 182 …. [17290] Hyde v Palmer (1863) 3 B & S 657; 122 ER 246 …. [37030] Hydrosan Ltd, Re [1991] BCLC 418 …. [25265]
Hyman Bookbinder; R v (1926) 19 Cr App R 125 …. [11140] Hytch; R v (2000) 114 A Crim R 573 …. [31065] I v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 420 …. [17535] I; R v [2007] 2 Cr App R 316 …. [1390] IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Prima Data International Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 748; [1994] 1 WLR 719 …. [25075] Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599; [1914] All ER Rep 874 …. [11130], [33595], [33605], [33620], [33680] Ibrahim; R v (2003) 7 VR 141 …. [15220] — [2008] 4 All ER 208 …. [33755] ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Work Cover Authority of NSW (2004) 60 NSWLR 18; 1 DDCR 259 …. [1732], [3135], [3160] Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 …. [1730], [1732], [1735], [1765], [29205], [41005], [41030] — v — [2001] NSWSC 123; BC200101607 …. [29045], [29200] IK; R v (2004) 89 SASR 406 …. [21050] Ikram; R v [2009] 1 WLR 1419 …. [17075] Ilich; R v [1935] NZLR 90 …. [41035] Illawarra District County Council, The v Wickham (1959) 101 CLR 467; [1959] ALR 711 …. [3040], [3158] Illingworth; R v (2000) 127 A Crim R 302 …. [7255], [9115] Ilvariy Pty Ltd t/as Craftsman Homes Northern Rivers v Moss (2009) 74 NSWLR 710 …. [5170] IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC (2011) 282 ALR 717 …. [1645] Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Weerasuriya; R v [1983] 1 All ER 195 …. [1070] Impagnatiello v Campbell (2003) 6 VR 416 …. [1175] Imperial Group Plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293 …. [31095]
Imrie; R v (1917) 12 Cr App R 282 …. [33805] In Estate of Hassan (decd) (2008) 100 SASR 464 …. [35360] In Marriage of Chang and Su (2002) 170 FLR 244 …. [1295] In Marriage of Khademollah (2000) 159 FLR 42 …. [41030] In Marriage of Monticone (1989) 98 FLR 460 …. [3060] Inamata; R v (2003) 137 A Crim R 510 …. [1450] Inch; R v (1989) 91 Cr App R 51 …. [29060] Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127; [1928] All ER Rep 189 …. [25010] Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cornwall (1993) 38 NSWLR 207; 116 ALR 97 …. [25340] Inder; R v (1977) 67 Cr App R 143 …. [21170] Industrial Appeals Court; Ex parte Maher; R v [1978] VR 126 …. [3135] Industrial Equity Ltd v DCT (1990) 170 CLR 649; 96 ALR 337 …. [1175] —v G & C Consolidated Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 456 …. [7070] Infields Ltd v P Rosen & Son [1938] 3 All ER 591 …. [25010], [25300] ING Bank (Aust) Ltd v O’Shea (2010) 14 BPR 27, 317; [2010] NSW Conv R 56-259 …. [1295] Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 823 …. [3140] Inglis v Inglis [1968] P 639; [1967] 2 All ER 71 …. [1210] — v John Buttery & Co (1878) 3 App Cas 552 …. [39240] — v Moore (No 2) (1979) 25 ALR 453 …. [7070] Inglis; R v [1917] VLR 672; (1917) 23 ALR 378 …. [17060] Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91 …. [1685], [25210] Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390; [1956] 1 All ER 785 …. [5195], [5205]
— v Percival [1969] 1 QB 548; [1968] 3 All ER 657 …. [3065] Ings; R v (1820) 33 Howell State Trials 957 …. [17505] Inhabitants of All Saints, Worcester; R v (1817) 6 M & S 194; 105 ER 1215 …. [25150] Inhabitants of Bedfordshire; R v (1855) 4 E & B 535; 119 ER 196 …. [33160], [33180] Inhabitants of Erith; R v (1807) 8 East 539; 103 ER 450 …. [31155], [33810] Inhabitants of Harborne; R v (1835) 2 Ad & E 540; 111 ER 209 …. [1125] Inhabitants of Llanfaethly; R v (1853) 2 E & B 940; 118 ER 1018 …. [39055] Inhabitants of Lordsmere; R v (1886) 16 Cox CC 65 …. [33195] Inhabitants of Rishworth; R v (1842) 2 QB 476; 114 ER 187 …. [31155], [33810] Inhabitants of Worth; R v (1843) 4 QB 132; 114 ER 847 …. [33015], [33115] Inland Revenue Board; Ex parte Goldberg; R v [1989] QB 267; [1988] 3 All ER 248 …. [25275] Inland Revenue Commissioners v Raphael [1935] AC 96 …. [39240] Inner London Crown Court; Ex parte Baines & Baines; R v [1988] QB 579; [1987] 3 All ER 1025 …. [25225] Instance v Denny Bros Printing Ltd [2000] FSR 869 …. [25375] Inston; R v (2009) 103 SASR 265 …. [17275], [21100] Insurance Cmr v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39; [1948] 2 ALR 356 …. [1210], [1215] Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 163 …. [25240] — v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141 …. [25010], [25235]
Interchase Corp Ltd, Re (1996) 68 FCR 481; 139 ALR 183 …. [1685], [25280] Intercontinental Development Corporation Pty Ltd, Re (1975) 1 ACLR 253 …. [25105], [25150] Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 …. [29155], [37090] — v — (1992) 39 FCR 348; 111 ALR 577 …. [3265], [29155], [31095], [37090] Interline Hydrocarbon Inc v Brenzil Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 109; BC200502818 …. [29065] International Business Machines Corp v Phoenix International (Computers) Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 413 …. [25020], [25210] International Financetrust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2008) 251 ALR 479 …. [35595] International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v McCorkell [1962] Qd R 256 …. [1645] — v — [1962] Qd R 356 …. [29070] International Tobacco (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Co (South) Ltd 1953 (3) SA 343 …. [31105], [31165] Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 …. [3159] Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98; [1998] 1 WLR 896 …. [39240] Iowa v Menilla (1916) 158 NW 645 …. [31165] Irani v R (2008) 188 A Crim R 125 …. [1370], [11125] Ireland v Chapman (1877) 3 VLR (L) 242 …. [17615] — v Taylor [1949] 1 KB 300 …. [17150] Ireland (No 1); R v [1970] SASR 416 …. [1290], [1295], [1320], [1565], [27305], [33740] Ireland (No 2); R v [1971] SASR 6 …. [1295], [1320], [29090] Ireland; R v (1970) 126 CLR 321; [1970] ALR 727 …. [1320], [27240],
[27245], [27305], [33485], [33690], [33740] Irish Society v Bishop of Derry (1846) 12 Cl & Fin 641; 8 ER 1561 …. [5190], [33345], [33355], [33370] Irish; R v [1995] Crim LR 145 …. [19030] Isaacs v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp Ltd (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 69; 75 WN (NSW) 48 …. [5025] Isaacs; R v (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 …. [9070] Isequilla; R v [1975] 1 All ER 77; [1975] 1 WLR 716 …. [33625], [33660] Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 …. [17055], [17245] Islam; R v (1969) 113 Sol Jo 185 …. [19125] — [1999] 1 Cr App R 22 …. [17275] Istel (AT & T) Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45; [1992] 3 All ER 523 …. [25045], [25060], [25075] ISTIL Group Inc v Zahoor [2003] 2 All ER 252 …. [25025], [25255] Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 40 FCR 303; 114 ALR 21 …. [9035], [31065], [33575] ITC Film Distributors v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431; [1982] 2 All ER 241 …. [11130], [25025], [25030], [27300] Iuliano; R v [1971] VR 412 …. [21050] Ives; R v [1973] Qd R 128 …. [17270] J v R [1989] Tas R 116 …. [15110] J & HTimbers Pty Ltd v Nelson (1972) 126 CLR 625 …. [3135] J (DC); R v [2010] 2 Cr App R 2 …. [1680] J (No 2); R v [1998] 3 VR 602 …. [15135], [15210], [17120], [17285], [21243] J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers - Western Australian Branch (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458;
111 ALR 377 …. [11090] — v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (Western Australian Branch) (No 1) (1992) 38 FCR 452; 110 ALR 510 …. [25225], [25245], [25255] J, AP; R v (2012) 113 SASR 529 …. [13050], [13060] — 2013 SASR 150 …. [17290] J, JA; R v (2009) 105 SASR 563 …. [17290] J, Re [1964] VR 601; [1965] ALR 300 …. [33245] J, SM; R v (2013) 117 SASR 535 …. [19045] J; R v (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 …. [19170], [29050], [29055] — [2012] Crim L Rev 886 …. [29080] Jabarula; R v (1984) 11 A Crim R 131 …. [27265] — (1988) 11 A Crim R 131 …. [33745] Jabbour v Custodian of Absentee’s Property of Israel [1954] 1 All ER 145; [1954] 1 WLR 139 …. [3040], [41005], [41035] Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; 180 ALR 569 …. [1490], [21252] — v — (2000) 185 ALR 463 …. [19055] Jack v Smail (1905) 2 CLR 684; 11 ALR 372 …. [33455] Jack; R v (1894) 15 LR (NSW) (L) 196 …. [17555], [17575] Jacker v International Cable Co (Ltd) (1888) 5 TLR 130 …. [1665] Jackson v Denno (1964) 389 US 368 …. [11050] — v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552 …. [25100], [25105], [25110], [25155] — v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; [1950] ALR 559 …. [5025], [5035], [5070], [5095] — v Jackson and Pavan [1964] P 25; [1960] 3 All ER 621 …. [33345], [41040] — v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312; BC200810414 ….
[35555] — v Marley Davenport Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 2926 …. [25225] — v R (1962) 108 CLR 591 …. [11045], [19050], [33660] — v Thomason (1861) 8 Jur NS 134 …. [19035] — v Williamson (1788) 2 TR 281; 100 ER 153 …. [27215] Jackson & Hakim; R v (1988) 33 A Crim R 413 …. [19125] Jackson, Re; Beattie v Murphy [1933] Ch 237; [1932] All ER Rep 696 …. [39315] Jackson, Re; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 13 …. [5030], [5075] Jackson, Re; Ex parte Dustings [1968] 1 NSWR 257 …. [27135] Jackson; R v (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 477 …. [9020] — (1987) 11 NSWLR 318 …. [33565], [33570], [33575] — (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 …. [27095] — [1953] 1 All ER 872 …. [15215] — [1964] Qd R 26 …. [17395] — [1996] 2 Cr App R 420 …. [29070], [29150] Jacob v Lindsay (1801) 1 East 460; 102 ER 178 …. [17225] Jacobs v Batavia and General Plantations Trust Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 287 …. [39145] — v — [1924] 2 Ch 329 …. [39145] — v Layborn (1843) 11 M & W 685; 152 ER 980 …. [13055], [13065] — v Tarleton (1848) 11 QB 421; 116 ER 534 …. [17720] Jacobsen v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572; 127 ALR 159 …. [27035] Jacobson v Suncorp Insurance and Finance [1991] 2 Qd R 46 …. [17375] Jacobson; R v (1931) AD 466 …. [1605]
Jacono; R v [1911] VLR 326; (1911) 17 ALR 340 …. [13035] Jacquier; R v (1979) 20 SASR 543 …. [15095], [17375], [17380], [17390] Jadwan Pty Ltd v Porter (No 2) (2004) 13 Tas R 219 …. [25350] Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 54 ALR 417 …. [3159] Jaffee v Redmond (1996) 518 US 1 …. [25340] Jagelman v FCT (1995) 31 ATR 467 …. [17445] Jager v Lynch (2003) 12 Tas R 195 …. [27315] Jagger; R v (1796) 1 East PC 455 …. [13115] Jaggers v Binnings (1815) 1 Stark 64; 171 ER 403 …. [33545] Jahree v Mauritius [2005] 1 WLR 1952 …. [17135] Jaldiver Pty Ltd v Nelumbo Pty Ltd [1993] ATPR (Digest) 46-097 …. [21280] Jamal v R (2000) 182 ALR 307 …. [1410] — v — (2012) 223 A Crim R 585 …. [1295] Jambajimba v Svikart (1984) 71 FLR 287 …. [7105] James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1986) 9 FCR 448; 64 ALR 347 …. [11090] — v Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 570; [1935] ALR 275 …. [5080] — v Keogh (2008) 101 SASR 42 …. [29080] — v Launceston City Council (2004) 13 Tas R 89 …. [29185], [29200] — v R (1971) 55 Cr App R 299 …. [15130] — v South Glamorgan County Council (1991) 99 Cr App R 321 …. [17665] — v Twiss [1929] SASR 110 …. [1130] James G Oberg (Sales) Pty Ltd v Oberg (2012) 292 ALR 673 …. [25055] James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Hall (1998) 43 NSWLR 554 …. [41030], [41035]
James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor (1998) 45 NSWLR 20 …. [41005] James Longley & Co Ltd v South West Regional Health Authority (1983) 25 Build LR 56 …. [29080] James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC 583; [1971] 1 All ER 796 …. [39290] James, Re [1965] VR 569 …. [39270] — [1977] Ch 41; [1977] 1 All ER 364 …. [3085] James; R v (1884) 10 VLR (L) 193 …. [17090], [17110] — (1983) 36 SASR 215 …. [15090] — [1902] 1 KB 540 …. [7140] — [1954] Crim LR 55 …. [17375] Jamieson; R v (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 …. [15100], [29055] — (2003) 9 VR 119 …. [27255] Jamison v GIO (NSW) (1988) 7 MVR 209 …. [25255] Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) (2004) 214 ALR 608 …. [1320], [29020], [29050], [29195], [29200] Janov v Morris [1981] 3 All ER 780; [1981] 1 WLR 1389 …. [5025] Jansen; R v (2001) 80 SASR 590 …. [31185] — [1970] SASR 531 …. [3200], [11140], [15250] Jaquith; R v [1989] Crim LR 508 …. [13300] Jarman v Lambert and Cooke (Contractors) Ltd [1951] 2 KB 937; [1951] 2 All ER 255 …. [17320], [35090], [35095], [35100] Jarrett; R v (1994) 62 SASR 443 …. [1315], [9095], [29075] Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] 1 VR 84 …. [17155], [27130] Jarvis; R v (1756) 1 East 643n; 102 ER 249n …. [7130] — (1867) LR 1 CCR 96 …. [33615]
— [1991] Crim LR 374 …. [17265] Jasiewicz v Jasiewicz [1962] 3 All ER 1017; [1962] 1 WLR 1426 …. [41025] Jason Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 8 WAR 13 …. [33840] Jawitz; R v [1962] Crim LR 567 …. [17135] Jawke; R v 1957 (2) SA 187 …. [17460] Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618; [1970] 1 All ER 219 …. [7010], [7030], [7050], [7125], [9120] JB v — (2012) 83 NSWLR 153; 215 A Crim R 380 …. [35650] JDK v — (2009) 194 A Crim R 333 …. [21050] Jeans v Cleary (2004) 196 FLR 1 …. [5055] — v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 327 …. [3165] Jeffery v Johnson [1952] 2 QB 8 …. [15050] Jeffrey v R (1991) Tas R 336 …. [15220], [29150], [33825] Jeffrey; R v [1967] VR 467 …. [11125] Jeffries; R v (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 284 …. [33690] Jellie v Commonwealth [1959] VR 72; [1959] ALR 302 …. [1530] Jendell Australia Pty Ltd v Kesby [1983] 1 NSWLR 127 …. [9130] Jenion, Re; Jenion v Wynne [1952] Ch 454; [1952] 1 All ER 1228 …. [31095], [31105], [31165], [33240], [37145] Jenkin v A-G (Vic) [1921] VLR 79; (1920) 27 ALR 36 …. [1175] Jenkins v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 400; [1947] ALR 558 …. [3156] — v Davies, Doe d (1847) 10 QB 314; 116 ER 122 …. [11030], [11040], [33240] — v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; 79 ALJR 252 …. [15100] — v Repatriation Commission (1996) 137 ALR 729 …. [3160]
— v WMC Resources Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 393; 166 ALR 590 …. [3070] — v Wynen [1992] 1 Qd R 40 …. [7075] Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison; R v [1949] VLR 277; [1949] ALR 468 …. [1235], [17080], [29065], [29075] Jenkins; R v (1845) 1 Cox CC 177 …. [15110] — (1869) LR 1 CCR 187 …. [11075], [33295] — (1869) LR 1 CCR 192 …. [11075] — (1945) 31 Cr App R 1 …. [23315], [23320], [23345], [23360] — (2002) 6 VR 81 …. [15100] — [1970] Tas SR 13 …. [35335], [35425] Jenkyns; R v (1993) 32 NSWLR 712 …. [17175] Jennings; R v (1912) 7 Cr App R 242 …. [15085] Jensen v Ilka [1960] Qd R 274 …. [15045] — v Jensen [1964] 2 All ER 231; [1964] 1 WLR 859 …. [1210] Jensen; R v (2009) 23 VR 591 …. [17120] Jeppe v R [1987] WAR 124 …. [21065] Jessop; R v (1887) 16 Cox CC 204 …. [37125] — [1974] Tas SR 64 …. [23330], [23345] Jetopay Pty Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Assn (Europe) DV (1999) 95 FCR 570 …. [29180] Jewett v United States 1926 15 F 2d 955 …. [17220] JF; R v (2009) 237 FLR 142 …. [35615] JG; R v (2009) 199 A Crim R 299 …. [17175] Jingellic Minerals NL v Beach Petroleum NL (1991) 55 SASR 424 …. [17725] JJB v R (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 …. [17295] JLS v JES (1996) 20 Fam LR 485 …. [3160]
— v R (2010) 28 VR 328 …. [21252] JLT Scaffolding International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Silva BC9402337 …. [3135] JMA Accounting Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 139 FCR 537; 211 ALR 380 …. [25250] JMR; R v (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 …. [9120] Joaquin v Hall [1976] VR 788 …. [7075] Jobson; R v [1989] 2 Qd R 464 …. [9070] Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399 …. [3140] Johannsen; R v (1977) 65 Cr App R 101 …. [21100], [21170] John v Humphreys [1955] 1 All ER 793; [1955] 1 WLR 325 …. [7160], [7165] John Tanner Holdings Pty Ltd v Mortgage Management Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 201 …. [25010] John W; R v [1998] 2 Cr App R 289 …. [21085], [21180] John; R v [1973] Crim LR 113 …. [1410] — [1974] 2 All ER 561; [1974] 1 WLR 624 …. [7050] Johns Perry Industries Pty Ltd v International Rigging (Aust) Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 556 …. [25360] Johnson v Clement F Sculley Construction Co (1959) 95 NW 2d 409 …. [1295] — v Giumelli (2003) 175 FLR 467 …. [1395] — v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1; [2001] 1 All ER 481; [2001] 2 WLR 72 …. [5170] — v Johnson [1916] St R Qd 1 …. [39190] — v Kershaw (1847) 1 De G & Sm 260; 63 ER 1059 …. [1320] — v Lawson (1824) 2 Bing 86; 130 ER 237 …. [33235] — v Lindsay (1889) 53 JP 599 …. [33545]
— v Lyford (1868) LR 1 P & D 546 …. [33335], [37115] — v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467; [1938] ALR 104; (1937) 11 ALJR 344b …. [7001] — v R (1976) 136 CLR 619; 11 ALR 23 …. [7050], [11140] Johnson & Edwards (No 2); R v [1982] Qd R 555 …. [19110] Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326; 101 ALR 700 …. [31095] Johnson Matthey (Aust) Ltd v Dascorp Pty Ltd (2003) 9 VR 171 …. [17445] Johnson Matthey Ltd v A C Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 …. [39160] Johnson; R v (1847) 2 Car & K 354; 175 ER 146 …. [37130] — (1979) 22 SASR 161 …. [11095] — (1987) 25 A Crim R 433 …. [33805] — (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 …. [23020], [23040] — (2004) 147 A Crim R 151 …. [1395], [15160] — [1961] 3 All ER 969; [1961] 1 WLR 1478 …. [7050] — [1962] Crim LR 52 …. [9020] — [1995] 2 Cr App R 41 …. [21110] Johnston v Commonwealth [1974] VR 638 …. [25330] — v Jackson (1880) 6 VLR (L) 1 …. [25010] — v Todd (1843) 5 Beav 597; 49 ER 710 …. [17010], [17505] Johnston; R v (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 …. [7085], [17295] — [1865] IR 60 …. [33665] Johnstone v Commonwealth (1979) 143 CLR 398; 23 ALR 385 …. [1630] — v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 …. [1490] — v R (2011) 31 VR 320 …. [15220]
Johnstone Shire Council v Jessie Tam Sie [1939] St R Qd 74 …. [29070], [33825] Johnstone, O’Shannessy & Co Ltd v Smith (1893) 19 VLR 18 …. [17535] Joiner; R v (1910) 4 Cr App R 64 …. [1250], [11095] — (2002) 133 A Crim R 90 …. [21035] Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530 …. [1410] Jolliffe, In the Will of [1929] St R Qd 189 …. [33340] Jolly; R v [1998] 4 VR 495 …. [15135], [21100] Jonas v Ford (1885) 11 VLR 240 …. [11030], [25245], [25290] Jones v ACCC (2010) 189 FCR 390 …. [1220] — v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 176 ALR 137 …. [3020], [3159] — v Capaldi (1956) 98 CLR 615 …. [11150] — v DPP [1962] AC 635; [1962] 1 All ER 569 …. [21055], [23185], [23190], [23195], [23200], [23205], [23210], [23240], [23245], [23280] — v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1959] ALR 367 …. [1210], [1215], [1220], [1480], [1595], [3280], [9055], [9120], [11090], [11135], [17130], [17525], [23020], [25040], [33435] — v Fort (1828) 1 M & M 196; 173 ER 1129 …. [17480] — v Foxall (1852) 15 Beav 388; 51 ER 588 …. [25385] — v G D Searle & Co Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 654; [1979] 1 WLR 101 …. [25010] — v Godrich (1844) 5 Moore 16; 13 ER 394 …. [25295] — v Great Central Railway Co [1910] AC 4 …. [25235], [25305] — v Great Western Rail Co (1930) 144 LT 194 …. [1600], [11085] — v Harris [1946] SASR 98 …. [1105], [1490] — v Hayes [1953] VLR 363; [1953] ALR 718 …. [7105]
— v Hyde (1989) 85 ALR 23; 63 ALJR 349 …. [11150] — v Jones (1841) 9 M & W 75; 152 ER 33 …. [39095] — v — (1908) 24 TLR 839 …. [17475] — v — (1960) 62 SR (NSW) 377; 79 WN (NSW) 111 …. [11150] — v Metcalfe [1967] 3 All ER 205; [1967] 1 WLR 1286 …. [11110], [17225], [31175] — v Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR 499 …. [1215], [1295], [29060] — v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55; [1957] 2 All ER 155 …. [17135] — v Owen (1870) 34 JP 759 …. [27295] — v R (1997) 143 ALR 52 …. [17275] — v — (1997) 191 CLR 439; 149 ALR 598 …. [3159], [11140], [15255], [17290], [17295] — v — (2009) 254 ALR 626 …. [19155] — v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243 …. [3040] — v South Eastern and Chatham Rail Co’s Managing Committee (1918) 87 LJKB 775 …. [17250], [17265] — v Stroud (1825) 2 C & P 196; 172 ER 89 …. [17200] — v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 …. [1515], [1650], [1665], [1670], [3200], [7070], [9095], [31070], [33465], [33530] — v Thomas [1934] 1 KB 323; [1933] All ER Rep 535 …. [15045] — v University of Warwick [2003] 3 All ER 760; [2003] 1 WLR 954 …. [27270] — v Williams [1835] All ER Rep 423; [1835] 150 ER 781; (1837) 2 M & W 326 …. [1185] Jones, Ex parte; Re Macreadie (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 136 …. [9110] Jones, Re (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 693; 38 WN (NSW) 206 …. [37090] Jones; R v (1809) 31 St Tr 251 …. [19120]
— (1809) Russ & Ry 152; 168 ER 733 …. [33640] — (1883) 11 QBD 118 …. [1125], [7140] — (1909) 3 Cr App R 67 …. [23310], [23315] — (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 …. [23315] — (1925) 19 Cr App R 40 …. [15125] — (1933) 24 Cr App R 55 …. [33460] — (1989) 41 A Crim R 1 …. [1445] — (2006) 161 A Crim R 511 …. [15160], [15205], [31085], [31095] — [1956] VLR 98 …. [11095] — [1961] Crim LR 322 …. [9020] — [1969] 3 All ER 1559; [1970] 1 WLR 16 …. [1175] — [1978] 2 All ER 718; [1978] 1 WLR 195 …. [35205], [35425] — [1993] 1 Qd R 676 …. [9040] — [1997] 2 Cr App R 119 …. [33570] — [2004] 1 Cr App R 5 …. [15255] Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401 …. [17270], [33635] Jordan v G Gosson Industries Pty Ltd (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 157 …. [1175] Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 …. [5180], [5190], [31120] Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1942] AC 154; [1941] 2 All ER 165 …. [7075] Joseph Crosfield and Sons (Ltd) v Techno- Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 …. [11010], [29105] Joseph Lynch Land Co Ltd v Lynch [1995] 1 NZLR 37 …. [5025] Joseph; R v (1971) 56 Cr App R 60 …. [17650] Josifoski; R v [1997] 2 VR 68 …. [21050]
Joske v Dental Cash Order Co Pty Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 172; 22 ALR 47 …. [3020] Jovanovic; R v (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 …. [7085] — (2007) 172 A Crim R 518 …. [15220] Jovanovski v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 372 …. [19055] Joy v Phillips, Mills & Co Ltd [1916] 1 KB 849 …. [1135] Joyce v Baird (2013) 276 FLR 128 …. [41020] — v DPP [1946] AC 347; [1946] 1 All ER 186 …. [7160] — v GIO (NSW) (1976 unreported) …. [17725], [17730] — v Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd (2011) 195 FCR 213; 281 ALR 54 …. [17055] — v Yeomans [1981] 2 All ER 21; [1981] 1 WLR 549 …. [11150] Joyce; R v (2002) 173 FLR 322 …. [25340] — (2005) 153 A Crim R 241 …. [17290], [29050], [35410] — [1957] 3 All ER 623; [1958] 1 WLR 140 …. [33640], [33690] — [1970] SASR 184 …. [7030], [29095] Jozwiak v Sadek [1954] 1 All ER 3; [1954] 1 WLR 275 …. [37085] JS (a minor), Re [1981] Fam 22; [1980] 1 All ER 1061 …. [9010], [9015], [9090] JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2010] 1 Cr App R 9 …. [25105] — v Solodchenko [2012] 1 All ER 735 …. [25225] Judd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1966] 2 QB 580; [1965] 3 All ER 642 …. [9005] — v Sun Newspapers (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 294; 47 WN (NSW) 96 …. [17510] Jude v HM Advocate (2012) SLT 75 …. [33740] Judges of FCA & Adamson; Ex parte WA National Football League (Inc); R v (1979) 143 CLR 190; 23 ALR 439 …. [3156], [3157]
Julian; R v [1918] 1 NZLR 743 …. [21185] Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victoria Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309; 14 ALR 701 …. [41005] Jupp v Andrews, Doe d (1778) 2 Cowp 845; 98 ER 1393 …. [25210] Juric; R v (2002) 4 VR 411 …. [1645], [15210], [27305], [29075] Justice of the Peace for Peterborough; Ex parte Hicks; R v [1978] 1 All ER 225; [1977] 1 WLR 1371 …. [25225] Justices of the Peace at Melbourne and Rowe; Ex parte Herald and Weekly Times Ltd; R v [1935] VLR 377; [1935] ALR 442 …. [17090] K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227 …. [15140] K (A); R v [2010] 1 Cr App R 3 …. [25350] — [2010] QB 343; [2010] 2 All ER 509 …. [25100], [25165], [25375] K, In the Marriage of (1980) 7 Fam LR 85; 49 FLR 70 …. [27180] K, Re; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2002) 132 A Crim R 108 …. [21035], [21165], [33045] K; R v (1984) 14 A Crim R 226 …. [33615] — (1997) 68 SASR 405 …. [17290], [17295] — (2003) 59 NSWLR 431 …. [27215] — [1984] 1 NZLR 264 …. [15160] Kabadanis v Panagiotou (1980) 30 ALR 374; 47 FLR 221 …. [33420] Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; 138 ALR 577 …. [25280] Kabwand Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 721 …. [25020] Kaddour; R v (2005) 156 A Crim R 11 …. [1680] Kadeshevitz; R v [1934] OR 213 …. [17395] Kadkhudayan v British American Tobacco (Aust) Services Ltd (2009) 263 ALR 568 …. [5170]
Kadlunga v Electricity Trust (1986) 39 SASR 410 …. [25240] Kai-Whitewind; R v [2005] 2 Cr App R 31 …. [29080] Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 …. [21050] Kaipiainen; R v [1954] OR 43 …. [33400] Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 …. [1305], [1370], [1480], [31075], [39005] Kakelo; R v [1923] 2 KB 793; [1923] All ER Rep 191 …. [7160] Kalajzich; R v (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 …. [15170] Kalia; R v (1974) 60 Cr App R 200 …. [17495] Kallinicos v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 561 …. [13300] Kallis; R v [1994] 2 Qd R 88 …. [11125] Kalmar v Ballantyne (2006) 95 SASR 42 …. [1220] Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97; 79 ALJR 541 …. [31095] Kanaan; R v (2005) 64 NSWLR 527 …. [15220] Kane; R v (1977) 65 Cr App R 270 …. [17130], [17430], [17705] Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 14 FCR 90; 71 ALR 109 …. [27050], [27080] Kantros v Symons (1978) 20 ALR 126 …. [35055] Kaplan; R v (2005) 14 VR 673 …. [35025] Kappos v State Transit Authority (1995) 11 NSW CCR 386 …. [3140] Karam; R v (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 …. [27310] Karamat v R [1956] AC 256; [1956] 1 All ER 415 …. [1290], [1295] Karan; R v (1980) 26 SASR 408 …. [23410] Karapandzk; R v (2008) 184 A Crim R 320 …. [17065], [17305] Karger; R v (2001) 83 SASR 1 …. [1025], [29055], [29150] — (2002) 83 SASR 135 …. [9040], [9095] Karidis v General Motors-Holdens Pty Ltd [1971] SASR 422 …. [17435]
Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd v Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 560 …. [35205] Karpany; R v [1937] SASR 377 …. [33455] Kassem v Crossley (2000) 32 MVR 179 …. [3140] Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (2009) 257 ALR 336 …. [25175] Katipa; R v [1986] 2 NZLR 121 …. [19065] Katsilis v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181; 52 ALJR 189 …. [7210] Kavanagh v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [1974] QB 624; [1974] 2 All ER 697 …. [1030], [33840] Kay; R v (1887) 16 Cox CC 292 …. [37090] — [1950] OR 235 …. [15100] Kaye v Hulthen [1981] Qd R 289 …. [25275] Kaye; R v (1960) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 39 …. [15220] Kayes, In The Marriage of (1999) 24 Fam LR 512 …. [35460] Kazzi; R v (2003) 140 A Crim R 545 …. [35455], [35495] KC v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 241 …. [17395], [17460] KDY; R v (2008) 185 A Crim R 270 …. [7085], [9035] Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 …. [3135] Keane v Mount Vernon Colliery Co Ltd [1933] AC 309 …. [3135] Keane; R v (1977) 65 Cr App R 247 …. [1390] — [1994] 2 All ER 478; [1994] 1 WLR 746 …. [17130], [27130], [27180] Kearley; R v [1992] 2 AC 228; [1992] 2 All ER 345 …. [31015], [31040], [31055], [31090], [31095], [31165] Kearns; R v [2002] 1 WLR 2815 …. [25090] Kearsley v Phillips (1883) 10 QBD 465 …. [25265] Keast; R v [1998] Crim LR 748 …. [3290], [15195]
Keefe v Crown (1919) 21 WALR 88 …. [33635] Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162; 25 ALR 45 …. [9065] Keeley; R v [1980] VR 571 …. [31185] Keeling; R v [1942] 1 All ER 507 …. [15225], [33770] Keen v Keen (1873) LR 3 P & D 105 …. [37105] — v Priest (1858) 1 F & F 314; 175 ER 743 …. [33435] Keen Mar Corp Pty Ltd v Labrador Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd [1989] ATPR (Digest) 46-048 …. [39160] Keenan; R v (2009) 252 ALR 198; 83 ALJR 243 …. [9040] — [1990] 2 QB 54; [1989] 3 All ER 598 …. [33760] Keeton; R v (1970) 54 Cr App R 267 …. [33655], [33700] Kehagias; R v [1985] VR 107 …. [15110], [15165] Keightley; R v (1893) 14 LR NSW (L) 45; 9 WN (NSW) 145 …. [13055] Keir; R v (2002) 127 A Crim R 198 …. [9095] Kelcey; R v [1985] VR 765 …. [33760] Kell v Charmer (1856) 23 Beav 195; 53 ER 76 …. [39270] Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; 4 ALR 450 …. [1395], [15070], [15125], [15160], [15250] — v TWall and Sons Ltd [1958] 2 QB 346; [1958] 2 All ER 686 …. [35090] Kelly v Battershell [1949] 2 All ER 830 …. [1110] — v Commonwealth (1980) 39 FLR 372 …. [25235] — v Cooper [1993] AC 205 …. [3260] — v Glasgow Corporation (1951) SC (HL) 15 …. [3020] — v London Transport Executive [1982] 2 All ER 842; [1982] 1 WLR 1055 …. [29080] — v R (1994) 12 WAR 405 …. [15160]
— v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 363 …. [1400] — v — (2004) 218 CLR 216; 205 ALR 274 …. [33775], [35620] Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong; R v (1981) 28 SASR 271 …. [17495] Kelly; R v (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 518; 24 WN (NSW) 96 …. [17615] — (1975) 12 SASR 389; 24 FLR 441 …. [33835] — (1988) 78 ACTR 14 …. [33760] — [1958] VR 412 …. [29130] — [1970] 2 All ER 198; [1970] 1 WLR 1050 …. [11135] Kelsey; R v (1981) 74 Cr App R 213 …. [17185], [17200], [31175] — [1982] Crim LR 435 …. [17225] Kelson; R v (1909) 3 Cr App R 230 …. [1200] Kemble; R v [1990] 3 All ER 116; [1990] 1 WLR 1111 …. [13275] Kemp v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 707 …. [3135] — v Elisha [1918] 1 KB 228 …. [39170] — v Pearce [1972] VR 805; [1972] ALR 608 …. [5025] — v R (1951) 83 CLR 341; [1951] ALR 659 …. [5145] — v — [1997] 1 Qd R 383 …. [21050] Kemp (No 2); R v [1998] 2 Qd R 510 …. [21035] Kempley v R [1944] ALR 249; (1944) 18 ALJR 118 …. [33640] Kench v Bailey (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 268; 43 WN (NSW) 81 …. [17680] Kendrick; R v [1997] 2 VR 699 …. [15255] Kennaway; R v [1917] 1 KB 25; [1916] All ER Rep 651 …. [23200], [23205], [23240] Kennedy v Lyell (1883) 23 Ch D 387 …. [25235], [25255] — v Richter [1957] VR 515; [1957] ALR 1053 …. [1210] — v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424 …. [25040], [25210], [25240],
[35595] — v — (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108 …. [17445], [25210], [25225], [25240], [25290] Kennedy; R v (2000) 118 A Crim R 34 …. [17120] — [2004] 3 NZLR 189 …. [13085] Kennelly; R v [1967] Qd R 345 …. [17270] Kennewell; R v [1927] SASR 287 …. [1520] Kenning v Eve Construction Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 1189 …. [25020] Kenny v Hornberg (No 2) (1963) 37 ALJR 162 …. [15045], [31130] Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; 163 ALR 611 …. [3159] Kenny; R v (1886) 12 VLR 816 …. [13035] — [1992] Crim LR 800 …. [21210] Kensington v Inglis (1807) 8 East 273; 103 ER 346 …. [17225] Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74 …. [3065] — v Stamps [1982] RTR 273 …. [1090] — v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd (2006) 15 Tas R 264 …. [3160] Kent County Council v K [1994] 3 All ER 230; [1994] 1 WLR 912 …. [17530] Kerenko; R v (1964) 51 WWR 53; 49 DLR (2d) 760 …. [17170] Kerim; R v [1988] 1 Qd R 426 …. [15165], [15170] Kerin v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee (1996) 67 SASR 149 …. [9075] Kern; R v [1986] 2 Qd R 209 …. [1360], [17655] Kerney v Lewis (2005) 155 A Crim R 95 …. [11125] Kerr v Ayr SS Co [1915] AC 217 …. [1600] — v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409; [1942] 1 All ER 412 …. [11010]
— v R [1980] WAR 21 …. [11035] Kerr (No 1); R v [1951] VLR 211; [1951] ALR 490 …. [33500], [33690] Kerr (No 2); R v [1951] VLR 239 …. [11045] Kerridge v Rotorua Theatres Ltd [1937] NZLR 156 …. [3020] Kerrison v Official Trustee (1990) 27 FCR 272 …. [7050] Kershaw v Whelan [1996] 2 All ER 404; [1996] 1 WLR 358 …. [25010] Kertesz v Kertesz [1954] VLR 195; [1954] ALR 430 …. [41035] Kessing; R v (2008) 73 NSWLR 22 …. [35570] Kessowji Issar v The Great Indian Peninsula Railway Co (1907) 23 TLR 530 …. [1290] Kestrel, The (1881) 6 PD 182 …. [29080] Ketchup; R v [1982] Qd R 732 …. [9035] Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd v Apand Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 152; 119 ALR 156 …. [31095] Key v Thomson (1868) 12 NBR 295 …. [1645] Key International Drilling Co Ltd v TNT Bulkships Operations Pty Ltd [1989] WAR 280 …. [25020] KG; R v (2001) 54 NSWLR 198 …. [17175] Khalil; R v (1987) 44 SASR 23 …. [1195], [33635], [33735] Khamis v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 121 …. [17435], [17460] Khan v Golechha International Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 259; [1980] 1 WLR 1482 …. [5025] — v Khan [1982] 2 All ER 60; [1982] 1 WLR 513 …. [25185] — v R [1971] WAR 44 …. [15085], [15090], [15100] — v State Oil Co (1996) 93 F 3d 1358 …. [29080] Khan; R v (1986) 84 Cr App R 44 …. [13030] — [2008] Crim LR 391 (CA) …. [25105]
Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [1984] AC 74; [1983] 1 All ER 765 …. [9010], [9050] Khoosal; R v (1994) 71 A Crim R 127 …. [15220] Kia Ora Gold Corp NL v Washer [1982] WAR 306 …. [39135] Kiah; R v (2001) 10 NTLR 128; 120 A Crim R 365 …. [27305] Kidd v Reeves [1972] VR 563 …. [7030] Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460; 1 ALR 283 …. [17260], [17275], [17285], [33700] Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600 …. [1200] Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565; 37 ALR 407 …. [17440], [17645], [17670], [17695], [17700] Killick; R v (1979) 21 SASR 321 …. [33760] — (1980) 24 SASR 137 …. [17460] Kilner; R v [1976] Crim LR 740 …. [19050], [33660] Kimberley Mineral Holdings v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210 …. [25060] Kincaid; R v [1991] 2 NZLR 1 …. [17285], [17315] King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 …. [1680], [17170], [17210] — v Deel; Ex parte Deel [1932] QWN 4 …. [15045], [15050] — v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 366 …. [29070] — v Jones (1972) 128 CLR 221; [1972] ALR 449 …. [3158] — v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 619 …. [5070], [5170] — v McLellan [1974] VR 773 …. [25095] — v R (1986) 15 FCR 427; 68 ALR 27 …. [15210], [33770] — v — (1996) 16 WAR 540 …. [27255] — v — [1969] 1 AC 304; [1968] 2 All ER 610 …. [33625] King of The Two Sicilies v Willcox (1851) 1 Sim NS 301; 61 ER 116 …. [25155]
King; R v (1832) 5 Car & P 123; 172 ER 905 …. [31145] — (1914) 10 Cr App R 117 …. [15095] — (1975) 12 SASR 404 …. [1395] — (1984) 12 A Crim R 107 …. [33770] — (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 …. [17270] — [1967] 2 QB 338; [1967] 1 All ER 379 …. [15165], [15210], [21100], [21170] — [1980] Crim LR 40 …. [33740] — [1983] 1 All ER 929; [1983] 1 WLR 411 …. [25225], [25235], [25240], [25275] Kinglake v Beviss, Doe d (1849) 7 CB 456; 137 ER 181 …. [1645], [33070] Kinglake; R v (1870) 11 Cox CC 499 …. [25075] — (1870) 22 LT 335 …. [25035], [25155] Kingsland; R v (1919) 14 Cr App R 8 …. [1375], [1415] Kingston v State Fire Commission (1998) 8 Tas R 152 …. [25020] Kingston’s Case, Duchess of [1776] All ER Rep 623; (1776) 168 ER 175 …. [5005], [5015], [25305], [25325] Kingston; R v [1986] 2 Qd R 114 …. [17575], [25225], [39045] Kinnear v Miller [1959] SASR 41 …. [33580] Kiparli-Ikarum; R v [1967] P & NGLR 119 …. [33270] Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (2012) 288 ALR 601 …. [17055] Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia; R v (1956) 94 CLR 254; [1956] ALR 163 …. [3158] Kirby; R v [2000] NSWCCA 330; BC200006176 …. [1295] Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485; BC200203021 …. [29080] Kirim-Amgen Inc v Hoescht Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] RPC 9 ….
[29045] Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 667 …. [39240] Kirk v Australian Federal Police Cmr (1988) 81 ALR 321 …. [25180] — v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (2010) 239 CLR 531; 262 ALR 569 …. [13075] Kirkby; R v [2000] 2 Qd R 57 …. [5210] Kirkman; R v (2000) 155 FLR 9 …. [35525] Kirkpatrick v Bartlett [1936] SASR 10 …. [7125] — v Commonwealth (1985) 9 FCR 36; 62 ALR 533 …. [11010] Kirkstall Brewery Co v Furness Railway Co (1874) LR 9 QB 468 …. [33540] Kirsch v Kirsch [1958] SASR 258 …. [41005] Kiszko; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 62 …. [29075] Kite; R v (1992) 60 A Crim R 226 …. [5175] Kitto v Gilbert (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 441; 43 WN (NSW) 122 …. [21280] Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG & B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281; 131 ALR 363 …. [1170] Kizlyk v Canadian Pacific Railway (1943) 41 Man R 33; [1943] 3 DLR 194 …. [17465] Kizon v Palmer (1997) 72 FCR 409; 142 ALR 488 …. [7275] Kizon; R v (1985) 18 A Crim R 59 …. [17120] KJ; R v (2005) 154 A Crim R 139 …. [17295], [33455] KJM v R (No 2) (2011) 33 VR 11 …. [21252] Kleeners Pty Ltd v Lee Tim (1959) 78 WN (NSW) 746 …. [33550] Kleimeyer v Clay [1965] QWN 26 …. [27155] Klein; R v (2007) 172 A Crim R 290 …. [17535]
Klemenko v Huffa (1978) 17 SASR 549 …. [33660] Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 …. [31095] KM J v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425 …. [11125] Knapp v Metropolitan Permanent Building Association (1888) 9 NSWLR (L) 468 …. [25380] Kneebone; R v (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 …. [17120], [17405] Knigge; R v (2003) 6 VR 181 …. [17270] Knight v Bell (1887) 13 VLR 639 …. [35430] — v Brown (2004) 183 FLR 135 …. [1380] — v David [1971] 3 All ER 1066; [1971] 1 WLR 1671 …. [35005] — v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98 …. [19065], [21210] — v Porter [1945] VLR 208; [1945] ALR 204 …. [41105] — v R (1992) 175 CLR 495; 109 ALR 225 …. [9035] Knight, Re; Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd v Parker [1957] Ch 441; [1957] 2 All ER 252 …. [39260] Knight; R v (1905) 20 Cox CC 711 …. [33620], [33680] — [1966] 1 All ER 647; [1966] 1 WLR 230; (1966) 50 Cr App R 122 …. [33435] Knightsbridge Crown Court; Ex parte Goonatilleke; R v [1986] QB 1; [1985] 2 All ER 498 …. [19005], [19030] Knightswood Nominees Pty Ltd v Sherwin Pastoral Co Ltd (1989) 15 ACLR 151 …. [33840] Knill; R v (1822) 5 B & Ald 929n; 106 ER 1431n …. [15020] Knowlden; R v (1981) 77 Cr App R 94 …. [15255] Knowles v Knowles [1962] P 161; [1962] 1 All ER 659 …. [7245] Knowles’Trial (1692) 12 H St Tr 1167 …. [27205] Knowles, Re [1984] VR 751 …. [1135], [1675], [19095], [21210]
Knowlton v New York, NH & HR Co (1899) 44 A 8 …. [3020] Knox County v Ninth National Bank (1893) 147 US 91 …. [1175] KNP v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 …. [17065] Knutton; R v (1992) 97 Cr App R 115 …. [19155] Kocak v Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd (2012) 35 VR 324; 295 ALR 730 …. [5025] Kochnieff; R v (1987) 33 A Crim R 1 …. [33420] Koeleman; R v (2000) 2 VR 20 …. [9040] Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993; [1964] 1 All ER 300 …. [5025], [5115], [5170] Kola; R v (2002) 134 A Crim R 310 …. [27255] Kolalich v DPP (NSW) (1991) 173 CLR 222; 103 ALR 630 …. [9120] Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 …. [33840] Kolton; R v [2000] Crim LR 761 …. [3180] Komacha v Orange City Council (1979 unreported) …. [25010], [25275] Komornick; R v [1986] VR 845 …. [17130] Konia v Morley [1976] 1 NZLR 455 …. [27100] Konigsberg (a Bankrupt), Re [1989] 3 All ER 289; [1989] 1 WLR 1257 …. [25015], [25265] Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90; 177 ALR 167 …. [1490], [11125] Konstandopoulos; R v [1998] 4 VR 381 …. [15220], [15255] Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533; [1950] ALR 97 …. [3156] Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1988) 92 FLR 105 …. [27165] Kooyman; R v (1979) 22 SASR 376 …. [15195], [17285] Koppen; R v (1975) 11 SASR 182 …. [1880]
Kops v R; Ex parte Kops [1894] AC 650 …. [1220], [23030] Kops; R v (1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 150 …. [1220] — (1893) 14 NSWLR 150 …. [23030] Korean Air Lines Co Ltd v ACCC (2008) ATPR 42-232 …. [27085] Korean Airlines Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781 …. [25395] Kores; R v (1970) 15 CR (NS) 107 …. [33805] Korgbara v R (2007) 71 NSWLR 187 …. [1445] Korniak; R v (1983) 76 Cr App R 145 …. [1195], [33460] Koro; R v (1950) (3) SA 797 …. [33540] Korp v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board [1964] VR 563 …. [25105] Korwin-Drozynki; R v [1963] Qd R 362 …. [17670], [33805] Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321 …. [5065], [5075], [5105] Koscot Interplanetary (UK) Ltd, Re [1972] 3 All ER 829 …. [35005], [35035], [35070] Kossenberg v Kossenberg (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 358 …. [15120] Kostaras (No 2); R v (2003) 143 A Crim R 254 …. [23040] Kostaras; R v (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 …. [21050] Kostic; R v (2004) 151 A Crim R 10 …. [1420] Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69; [1971] ALR 333 …. [3158] Kotzmann (No 2); R v (2002) 128 A Crim R 479 …. [29050] Kotzmann; R v [1999] 2 VR 123; (1999) 105 A Crim R 243 …. [9040] Kouris v The Prospector’s Motel Pty Ltd (1976) 14 SASR 407 …. [3200] Koushappis v Western Australia (2007) 168 A Crim R 51 …. [29070], [29150] Kovacs; R v (2000) 111 A Crim R 374 …. [11125], [21252], [23030] — [2009] 2 Qd R 51; (2008) 192 A Crim R 345 …. [17265]
Kozul v R (1981) 147 CLR 221; 34 ALR 429 …. [1295], [39105] Kozul; R v [1980] 2 NSWLR 299 …. [1295] Kracher; R v [1995] Crim LR 819 …. [19155] Krahe v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 536 …. [3075] Krajina v Tass Agency [1949] 2 All ER 274; [1949] WN 309 …. [33360] Krakouer v R (1996) 16 WAR 1 …. [1305] Krall v Burnett (1887) 25 WR 305 …. [39195] Krasniqi; R v (1993) 61 SASR 366 …. [9030] Krausz; R v (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 …. [19075] KRI v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 552 …. [21252] Kribs v — [1960] SCR 400 …. [17285] Kriss v South Perth [1966] WAR 210 …. [1530] Kristeff v R [1968] ALR 53; (1968) 42 ALJR 233 …. [1290] Kritz; R v [1950] 1 KB 82; [1949] 2 All ER 406 …. [1085], [9020], [9025] KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221; 178 ALR 385 …. [17295], [21050] Krstin v Concrete Constructions (Canberra) Pty Ltd (1971) 18 FLR 119 …. [33060], [33560], [37050] Krulewitch v United States (1949) 336 US 440 …. [1520] Kruse v Lindner (1978) 19 ALR 85 …. [37085] Krycki v Nominal Defendant (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 552; 79 WN (NSW) 415 …. [17305], [17315], [17545] KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; 273 FLR 1 …. [25340] Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; 276 ALR 375 …. [1215], [3140], [17435], [33435] Kuligowski v Metrobus (2002) 26 WAR 137 …. [5030], [5080] — v — (2004) 220 CLR 363; 208 ALR 1 …. [5030], [5075], [5085], [9015]
Kunnath v State [1993] 4 All ER 30; [1993] 1 WLR 1315 …. [33805] Kuntz v Swart (1924) AD 618 …. [31060] Kurasch; R v [1915] 2 KB 749 …. [23200], [23205] Kurgiel v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 …. [17580] Kurth v Paff; Ex parte Paff [1968] QWN 21 …. [15045] Kurtz & Co v Spence & Sons [1886] All ER Rep Ext 1836; (1887) 58 LT 438 …. [25350] Kuru Waru; R v (1900) 10 QLJ 139 …. [33270] Kuruma v R [1955] AC 197; [1955] 1 All ER 236 …. [27235] Kuster; R v (2008) 21 VR 407; 191 A Crim R 449 …. [11045], [15170], [17160] Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 6) [2005] 1 WLR 2734 …. [25290] Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 3 All ER 209; [2002] 2 WLR 1353 …. [41005] Kuzmanovski v New South Wales Lotteries Corp (2010) 270 ALR 65 …. [11010] Kwabena Poku; R v [1978] Crim LR 488 …. [33610], [33665] Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Office of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532 …. [29200] Kypri; R v (2002) 5 VR 610 …. [15160] Kyshe v Holt, Childs and Brotherton [1888] WN 128 …. [25245] L v K [1985] Fam 144; [1985] 1 All ER 961 …. [7260] — v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381 …. [21252] L (A Minor) (Police Investigation: Privilege), Re [1997] AC 16; [1996] 2 All ER 78 …. [25235] L G Batten Pty Ltd, Re [1962] QWN 2 …. [35335] L’Estrange v R (2011) 214 A Crim R 9 …. [29150]
L, In the Estate of [1919] VLR 17; (1918) 24 ALR 404 …. [33230] L; R v [1998] 2 NZLR 141 …. [25310] — [2009] 1 WLR 626 …. [13135] La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62; 11 ALR 507 …. [9030] La Roche v Armstrong [1922] 1 KB 485; [1922] All ER Rep 311 …. [25355] La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774 …. [29165], [29210] Lace, In the Marriage of (1981) 7 Fam LR 631 …. [25370] Lacey; R v (1982) 29 SASR 525 …. [33700], [33720] Lachmi Parshad v Maharajah Narendro Kishore Singh Bahadur (1891) 19 LR Ind App 9 …. [15150] Lacon v Higgins (1822) 3 Stark 178; 171 ER 813 …. [41035] Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745; [1954] 1 WLR 1489 …. [11150] Lady Ivy’s Trial (1684) 10 How St Tr 555 …. [3040] Lafone v Griffin (1909) 25 TLR 308 …. [39035] Lahrs v Eichsteadt [1961] Qd R 457 …. [1135] Lai v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 28 FCR 346 …. [5190] — v R (2003) 143 A Crim R 111 …. [33775] Lai Ping; R v (1904) 8 CCC 467 …. [33660] Laing v Lanron Shelf Co No 56 Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 562 …. [39180] Laird; R v (1893) 14 LR (NSW) (L) 354 …. [33645] Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1994) 126 ALR 58 …. [25020], [25225], [25265] Lake George Mines Ltd v Gibbs Bright & Co (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 440 …. [39055]
Lake; R v (2007) 174 A Crim R 491 …. [1305] Lakeman v Finlay (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 5; 75 WN (NSW) 479 …. [39010] Lal Khan; R v (1981) 73 Cr App R 190 …. [11035], [13050] Lam (Ruling No 13); R v (2005) 191 FLR 272 …. [33565] Lam Chi-ming v R [1991] 2 AC 212; [1991] 3 All ER 172 …. [27285], [33595] Lam; R v (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 …. [1380], [29050], [29060] — (2002) 135 A Crim R 302 …. [29185] — (2008) 185 A Crim R 453 …. [15220] Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110; [1881] All ER Rep 465 …. [25105] Lamb; R v (1980) 71 Cr App R 198 …. [1365], [1375], [1415] — [1975] Qd R 296 …. [15110] Lambert v Appleby [1969] VR 641 …. [1240] — v Home [1914] 3 KB 86 …. [25275] — v McIntyre [1975] Qd R 349 …. [1240] Lambert; R v [1919] VLR 205 …. [17275] — [1957] SASR 341 …. [23245] Lambidis v Police Cmr (1995) 37 NSWLR 320 …. [5030], [5170] Lamoureux v New York, NH & H (1897) 47 NE 1009 …. [3230], [3260] Lampard v West [1926] SASR 293 …. [1605] Lancaster; R v [1998] 4 VR 550 …. [33775], [33780] Lancey (HR) Shipping Co Pty Ltd v Robson [1938] ALR 429; (1938) 12 ALJ 177 …. [1530] Land Enviro Corp Pty Ltd v HTT Huntley Heritage Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 160 …. [5025] Land Securities Plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 4 All ER 124;
[1993] 1 WLR 286 …. [5180], [5190] Land; R v [1999] QB 65; [1998] 1 All ER 403 …. [1280], [29090], [41050] Lander; R v (1989) 52 SASR 424 …. [17460], [23030], [33435] Landon; R v (2011) 109 SASR 216; [2011] SASCFC 12 …. [29050] — [1995] Crim LR 338 …. [15220] Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708 …. [1695] — v R (1996) 66 FCR 144 …. [15260] Lane; R v (2011) 221 A Crim R 309 …. [15220] Lanfear; R v [1968] 2 QB 77; [1968] 1 All ER 683 …. [11135], [29075] Lanford v General Medical Council [1990] 1 AC 13; [1989] 2 All ER 921 …. [21001] Lang v Beardsmore [1968] 2 NSWR 673 …. [17510] Lang; R v [1965] NSWR 1313 …. [33610] Langbein v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 378 …. [35525] Langdale v Danby [1982] 3 All ER 129; [1982] 1 WLR 1123 …. [3165] Langer; R v [1972] VR 973 …. [17550], [17620], [17675] Langford v Cleary (1998) 8 Tas R 52 …. [25380] Langford; R v [1974] Qd R 67 …. [23345] Langley v Earl of Oxford (1836) 5 LJ Exch (NS) 166; 2 Gale 63 …. [3165] Langmead; R v (1864) Le & Ca 427; 169 ER 1459 …. [1195] Langridge v R (1996) 17 WAR 346 …. [9070] Langton; R v (1876) 2 QBD 296 …. [1175] Langworth Pty Ltd v Metway Bank Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 556; 126 ALR 428 …. [25275] Lanigan; R v [1987] NI 367 …. [29140]
Lapthorne v R [1990] WAR 207 …. [17275] Lapuse; R v [1964] VR 43 …. [9030], [33500], [33690] Lapworth; R v [1931] 1 KB 117; [1930] All ER Rep 340 …. [13035] Laracy; R v (2007) 180 A Crim R 19 …. [33665] Larby v Armement L Hermans SA [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 43 …. [9015] Larnach v Alleyne (1862) 1 W & W (E) 342 …. [25200] Larratt v Bankers & Traders Insurance Co Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 215; 58 WN (NSW) 197 …. [11010] Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 263 ALR 155 …. [11010] Lars; R v (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 …. [17135], [33805] Larson; R v [1984] VR 559 …. [27265], [33760] Lask v Gloucester Health Authority [1991] 2 Med LR 379 …. [25240] Lasseur; R v [1991] Crim LR 53 …. [23330] Latour v R [1951] SCR 19; [1951] 1 DLR 834 …. [7030] Lattouf v Sassen [1968] 3 NSWR 577 …. [39105] Lattouf; R v (1980) 2 A Crim R 65 …. [11045] Lau v R (1991) 6 WAR 30 …. [11035], [15160] Lau Pak Ngam v — [1966] Crim LR 443 …. [17170] Laurance v Katter [2000] 1 Qd R 147 …. [27095] Laurenson v Wellington City Corporation [1927] NZLR 510 …. [25235] Laurie v R [1987] 2 Qd R 762; (1986) 23 A Crim R 219 …. [29050] Laurin; R v (1902) 6 CCC 138 …. [17190] Lavallée; R v [1990] 1 SCR 852 …. [29070] Lavelle v R [1957] Tas SR 162 …. [17305], [17315] Lavery (No 2); R v (1979) 20 SASR 430 …. [17605], [33760] Law v Deed [1970] SASR 374 …. [9070]
Law Institute of Victoria v Irving [1990] VR 429 …. [27120], [27130] Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v DCT (2009) 224 FLR 37 …. [27120], [27130] Law Society of NSW v Weaver [1977] 1 NSWLR 67 …. [5115] Lawcover Pty Ltd v NSW Police Cmr BC9706589 …. [25395] Lawder v Lawder (1855) 5 ICLR 27 …. [17165] Lawes v Reed (1835) 2 Lewin 152; 168 ER 1111 …. [17220] Lawford; R v (1993) 61 SASR 542 …. [7085], [15255] Lawler v Leeder (1981) 1 SR (WA) 389 …. [29025] Lawless v Queale (1845) 8 ILR 382 …. [33430] — v R (1979) 142 CLR 659; 26 ALR 161 …. [11140], [17130] Lawless; R v (1993) 98 Cr App R 342 …. [13085], [17480] — [1974] VR 398 …. [17165], [17615], [37060] Lawrance v Centrelink (2005) 88 ALD 664 …. [17435] Lawrence v Campbell (1859) 4 Drew 485; 62 ER 186 …. [25210] — v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 …. [17650], [17700], [17705] — v — [1933] AC 699; [1933] All ER Rep 196 …. [11035] Lawrence; R v [1968] 1 All ER 579; [1968] 1 WLR 341 …. [17095] — [1980] 1 NSWLR 122; (1980) 32 ALR 72 …. [7050] — [2002] 2 Qd R 400 …. [17590], [19035], [19065] Lawrenson; R v [1961] Crim LR 398 …. [1415] Lawrie v Muir (1950) SC (J) 19 …. [27230], [27235] Lawrie; R v [1986] 2 Qd R 502 …. [17375] Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70; 93 ALR 435 …. [3165], [33550] Laws Holdings Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563 …. [5120] Lawson; R v (1989) 90 Cr App R 107 …. [17130]
— [1960] VR 37 …. [17130] — [1996] 2 Qd R 587 …. [15160], [33735] — [1998] Crim LR 883 …. [33295], [37060] — [2000] NSWCCA 214; BC200003257 …. [35440], [37140] Layton v Walsh (1978) 19 ALR 594 …. [3135] Laz; R v [1998] 1 VR 453 …. [15220], [17460] Lazard Bros & Co v Midland Bank Ltd [1933] AC 289; [1932] All ER Rep 571 …. [41010], [41035] Lazarus-Barlow v Regent Estates Co Ltd [1949] 2 KB 465; [1949] 2 All ER 118 …. [5015] Lazenby v Zammit [1987] Tas SR 54 …. [25240] Lazos; R v (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 …. [17270], [17280] LC and TC, In the Marriage of (1998) 23 Fam LR 75 …. [17445] Le Blowitz; R v [1998] 1 Qd R 303 …. [15170] Le Cocq v McErvale [1908] VLR 69; (1907) 13 ALR 699 …. [3065] Le Meilleur Pty Ltd, Re; Le Meilleur Pty Ltd v Jin Heung Mutual Savings Bank Co Ltd (2011) 256 FLR 240 …. [33420], [33465] Le Mura v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1971] Qd R 198 …. [1610] Le Roux; R v (1897) 14 SC 424 …. [37075] Le; R v (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 …. [1410], [17040] — (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44 …. [1680], [1755], [11125], [17405] — (2007) 173 A Crim R 450 …. [33775] Leach v R [1912] AC 305 …. [13135] Leading Aircraftman F, Re [1998] 1 NZLR 714 …. [25310] Leak; R v [1969] SASR 172 …. [1140], [17485] Leaney; R v (1988) 38 CCC (3d) 263 …. [1370]
Lear; R v [1998] 1 VR 285 …. [19080], [23345] Learmouth Property Investment Co Ltd v Aitken (1971) SLT 349 …. [3135] Leary v FCT (1980) 32 ALR 221 …. [25225] — v R [1975] WAR 133 …. [1360] Leatham; R v (1861) 8 Cox CC 498 …. [27300] Lebanese Moslem Assn v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 11 FCR 543; 67 ALR 195 …. [1215] Leckey; R v [1944] KB 80; [1943] 2 All ER 665 …. [33770] LED Technologies Pty Ltd v Elecspess Pty Ltd (2008) 80 IPR 85 …. [3160] Lederer v Hitchins [1961] WAR 99 …. [29090] Leduc & Co v Ward (1888) 20 QBD 475; [1886] All ER Rep 266 …. [39200] Lee v Napier (2013) 216 FCR 562; 301 ALR 663 …. [7165] — v R (1998) 195 CLR 594; 157 ALR 394 …. [17530], [35440] — v Read (1842) 5 Beav 381; 49 ER 625 …. [25075] — v South West Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] 2 All ER 385; [1985] 1 WLR 345 …. [25265] Lee Chun-Chuen v R [1963] AC 220; [1963] 1 All ER 73 …. [7030] Lee Hing, In the Will of (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 199 …. [41035] Lee Kun; R v [1916] 1 KB 337; [1914] All ER Rep 603; (1915) 11 Cr App Rep 293 …. [33805] Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96 …. [33710], [33730] Lee, Re (2009) 212 A Crim R 442 …. [27315] Lee; R v (1911) 7 Cr App R 31 …. [17285] — (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] ALR 517 …. [33610], [33625], [33660], [33665], [33675], [33680], [33690], [33695], [33765], [35650]
— (1989) 42 A Crim R 393 …. [29070] — (2000) 50 NSWLR 289 …. [25340] — (1952) (2) SA 67 …. [5210] — [1976] 1 All ER 570; [1976] 1 WLR 71 …. [23270] — [1976] 2 NZLR 171 …. [1295], [17625] — [1978] 1 NZLR 481 …. [33690] — [1985] Crim LR 798 …. [33605] Leeder v Ellis (1952) 86 CLR 64; [1953] AC 52; [1952] 2 All ER 814 …. [11150] Leeds v Cook (1803) 4 Esp 256; 170 ER 711 …. [39055] Leeks v XY (2008) 21 VR 118 …. [9050], [17305], [17315] Legal Services Agency v A-G [2002] 1 NZLR 842 …. [25245] Legal Services Commission v JHW (2012) 280 LSJS 255; 223 A Crim R 534; [2012] SASCFC 47 …. [25015] — v Trotter (1990) 54 SASR 74 …. [27050] Legge v Edmonds (1855) 25 LJ Ch 125 …. [33450] Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; 46 ALR 1 …. [39160] Lego v Twomey (1972) 404 US 477 …. [11075], [33675] Lego System Aktieselskab v Lego M Lemelstrich Ltd [1983] FSR 155 …. [31095], [37090] Leif Hoegh & Co A/S v Petrolsea Inc (The World Era) (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 363 …. [25265] Leif Hoegh & Co A/S (No 2) v Petrolsea Inc (The “World Era”) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s LR 363 …. [25010] Leigh; R v (1984) 13 A Crim R 226 …. [33735] Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd; Australian Statistician, The v (2008) 36 WAR 83 …. [27055] Leis v Gardner [1965] Qd R 181 …. [3020], [29070], [37140]
Leiserach v Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 …. [27210] Lek v Matthews (1927) 29 Lloyd LR 141 …. [9050] — v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 43 FCR 100 …. [1215] Leland; R v [1951] OR 12 …. [37050] Lemmer v Bertram (1971) 2 SASR 397 …. [9050] Lemsatef; R v [1977] 2 All ER 835; [1977] 1 WLR 812 …. [33740] Lend Lease Development Pty Ltd v Zemlicka (1985) 3 NSWLR 207 …. [11150] Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 …. [33055], [33385], [35045], [35050] Lennard v District Council of Naracoorte [1924] SASR 407 …. [11090] Lennard; R v [1973] 2 All ER 831; [1973] 1 WLR 483 …. [3180] Lenthall v Mitchell [1933] SASR 231 …. [31090], [37145] Leo Sawrij Ltd v North Cumbria Magistrates’ Court [2010] 1 Cr App R 22 …. [29080] Leonard v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1965) 49 DLR (2d) 422 …. [29070] — v Newell (1983) Tas R 78 …. [3070] Leonard; R v (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 …. [21050], [21252] Leotta v Public Transport Commission (NSW) (1976) 9 ALR 437; 50 ALJR 666 …. [17370] Leroy; R v [1984] 2 NSWLR 441; (1984) 55 ALR 338 …. [31125], [31140], [33835], [39105] Les Affréteurs Réunis Société Anonyme v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd [1919] AC 801 …. [39195] Lesley; R v [1996] 1 Cr App R 39 …. [33435] Leslie v Howship Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 459 …. [29205] Less v Martin (1832) 1 M & Rob 210; 174 ER 71 …. [37040]
Lester; R v (1975) 63 Cr App R 144 …. [1045] — (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 …. [21050], [35660] — (2008) 190 A Crim R 468 …. [21050], [35660] Leung v R (2003) 144 A Crim R 441 …. [21252] Leung Am-Kwok v — (1984) 81 Cr App R 83 …. [33455] Leung; R v (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 …. [1445], [29165], [29185] Lever & Co v Goodwin Bros [1887] WN 107 …. [17465], [17500] Levine v Kelly [1958] Qd R 74 …. [7185] Levinge v Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546 …. [17460] Levis v McDonald (1997) 75 FCR 36; 155 ALR 300 …. [35595] Levy v Assicurazioni Generali [1940] AC 791; [1940] 3 All ER 427 …. [7185] — v Pope (1829) M & M 410; 173 ER 1206 …. [25225] — v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579; 146 ALR 248 …. [3156] Levy; R v (1966) 50 Cr App R 198 …. [17630], [17650], [17670], [23315] Lewendon; R v [2006] 2 Cr App R 294 …. [41110] Lewis v Crafter [1942] SASR 30 …. [33540] — v Great Western Railway Co (1877) 3 QBD 195 …. [39240] — v Lewis [1958] P 193; [1958] 1 All ER 859 …. [17510] — v Mogan [1943] KB 376 …. [5130] — v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) 217 ALR 719 …. [25175] — v R (1998) 20 WAR 1 …. [17120] — v Rucker (1761) 2 Burr 1167; 97 ER 769 …. [3159] — v Sapio (1827) M & M 39; 173 ER 1073 …. [39100] — v Spencer (2007) 179 A Crim R 48 …. [33635], [33665]
Lewis-Hamilton; R v [1998] 1 VR 630 …. [17130] Lewis; R v (1906) 8 WALR 83 …. [15085] — (1971) 55 Cr App R 386 …. [3180] — (1973) 57 Cr App R 860 …. [33770] — (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 …. [21001], [21170], [21195] — (1987) 88 FLR 104 …. [29055], [29075] — (1989) 46 A Crim R 365 …. [21065] — (2000) 1 VR 290 …. [11045], [27305] — (2002) 137 A Crim R 85 …. [35410] — [1913] VLR 227; (1913) 19 ALR 174 …. [1125] — [1969] 2 QB 1; [1969] 1 All ER 79 …. [1155] Ley; R v [2007] 1 Cr App R 25 …. [11100] — [2007] Crim LR 642 …. [1390] Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302 …. [3020], [3095], [17460], [17660] Leyland Justices; Ex parte Hawthorn; R v [1979] QB 283; [1979] 1 All ER 209 …. [17130] Leyman v Latimer (1878) 3 Ex D 352; [1874] All ER Rep 1264 …. [5185] LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy (2002) 26 WAR 517 …. [41130] Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281 …. [1370], [29080], [29185] — v — (2010) 199 A Crim R 419 …. [35435] Li Shu-Ling v — [1989] AC 270; [1988] 3 All ER 138 …. [1290], [33690] Li; R v (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 …. [1285], [33795] — [1993] 2 VR 80 …. [33665], [33780] Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507; 61 ALR 623 …. [7085]
Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 283 …. [25010], [25055] Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; 235 ALR 517 …. [17505] Liddington v Western Australia (2005) 152 A Crim R 502 …. [17295] Liddle v Owen (1978) 21 ALR 286 …. [27130] Liddle; R v (1928) 21 Cr App R 3 …. [17090], [17095], [17645], [17650] Liddy (No 2); R v (2001) 79 SASR 401 …. [25370] Liddy (No 3); R v (2000) 127 A Crim R 309 …. [25340] Liddy; R v (2002) 81 SASR 22 …. [1135], [15220], [33435] Liebling; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 314 …. [33680] Lieske; R v (2006) 166 A Crim R 213 …. [27315], [35620], [35650] Lietzke (Installations) Pty Ltd v E M J Morgan Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 88 …. [1080] Lifchus; R v [1997] 3 SCR 320; (1997) 118 CCC (3d) 1 …. [9030] Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60; 31 ALR 206 …. [39145], [39160] Lilienthal v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2001) 65 ALD 438 …. [5030] Lilley v Pettit [1946] KB 401; [1946] 1 All ER 593 …. [33400], [35420] Lilley (dec’d), Re [1953] VLR 98; [1953] ALR 149 …. [1650], [1680] Lillibridge v McCann (1898) 75 NW 288 …. [3220] Lillicrap v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 All ER 724; [1993] 1 WLR 94 …. [25010] Lillyman; R v [1896] 2 QB 167; [1895] All ER Rep 586 …. [17110], [17260], [17265], [17275] Limerick v Limerick (1863) 4 Sw & Tr 252; 164 ER 1512 …. [41005] Lindley v Lacey (1864) 144 ER 232; 17 CB (NS) 578 …. [39175]
Lindner v Murdock’s Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628; [1950] ALR 927 …. [11025] Lindsay; R v (1977) 18 SASR 103 …. [15165], [15170], [15175] — [1963] Qd R 386 …. [33480], [33505], [33650] — [1970] NZLR 1002 …. [1245] Lindsey, In the Marriage of (1995) 19 Fam LR 649; 128 FLR 46 …. [9065] Line v Taylor (1862) 3 F & F 731; 176 ER 335 …. [1275] Linehan; R v [1921] VLR 582 …. [15020] Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 261 …. [41130] Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180; 139 ALR 159 …. [5170] Ling; R v (1981) 6 A Crim R 429 …. [11095] — [1981] Tas R 250 …. [15085], [15090], [15100] Lingor v Lingor [1955] 1 DLR 719 …. [5215] Link Technology 2000 Ltd v A-G [2006] 1 NZLR 1 [47] …. [5030] Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 …. [5025], [5075] Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 VR 427 …. [5075], [5095], [5170] Linstead v East Sussex, Brighton and Hove Health Authority [2001] PIQR P 356 …. [25235] Lipton; R v (2011) 82 NSWLR 123 …. [17130], [27005], [27195] Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd v Anghie (2003) 7 VR 27 …. [25010] Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd (ACN 007512414) v — (2003) 45 ACSR 450 …. [25240] Liristis; R v (2004) 146 A Crim R 547 …. [17065], [17435], [17460] Lister v Smith (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 282; 164 ER 1282 …. [31090], [37025] Lister; R v [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 …. [17055], [17075]
Liszewski v Thomson (1942) SLT 147 …. [33805] Litchfield v Ready (1850) 5 Exch 939; 155 ER 409 …. [5025] Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 281 ALR 223 …. [1520], [29090], [29165], [29175], [35555] Little; R v (1883) 15 Cox CC 319 …. [17375] — (1976) 14 SASR 556 …. [11030] Littleboy; R v [1934] 2 KB 408; [1934] All ER Rep 434 …. [15225], [33770] Liu v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; 93 ACSR 26 …. [25395] Lively Ltd v City of Munich [1976] 3 All ER 851; [1976] 1 WLR 1004 …. [13265] Livermore; R v (2006) 67 NSWLR 659 …. [17065] Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trustees Inc v Goldberg (No 3) [2001] 4 All ER 950; [2001] 1 WLR 2337 …. [29080] Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 20 VR 377; 66 ACSR 455 …. [41130] Livingston; R v [1933] St R Qd 42 …. [33690] Livingstone; R v (2004) 150 A Crim R 117 …. [15115], [17130] — [1987] 1 Qd R 38 …. [1680], [17580] LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) (1990) 24 NSWLR 499; 74 LGRA 290; (1991) Aust Torts Reports 81-070 …. [1275] Llanover v Homfray (1881) 19 Ch D 224 …. [33795] Llewellyn v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418 …. [31130], [33435], [33510] Lloyd v Freshfield (1826) 2 C & P 325; 172 ER 147 …. [17205], [17240] — v Guibert (1865) LR 1 QB 115 …. [41005] — v Mostyn (1842) 10 M & W 478; 152 ER 558 …. [25025] — v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd [1914] AC 733 …. [31055],
[31060], [31095], [37125] Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven Gmb H v Owners of the Ship Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (1997) 79 FCR 71 …. [41005] Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465 …. [7150], [7180] Lloyd; R v (1834) 6 Car & P 393; 172 ER 1291 …. [33640] LMD v R (2001) 137 A Crim R 1 …. [17295] LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31 …. [13275], [17145] Lo Presti v R (1994) 68 ALJR 477 …. [17110] Lo Presti; R v [1992] 1 VR 696 …. [17110] Lo Tin v R [1964] Crim LR 115 …. [17090] Loader; R v (2004) 89 SASR 204 …. [7085], [33435] Lobban v R [1995] 2 All ER 602; [1995] 1 WLR 877 …. [11125], [17515], [21215], [33455] Lobban; R v (2000) 77 SASR 24 …. [11125], [27240], [27305] — (2001) 80 SASR 550 …. [9070] Lobell; R v [1957] 1 QB 547; [1957] 1 All ER 734 …. [7015], [7030], [7050], [9020] Lock v Lock [1966] SASR 246 …. [25375] Lock; R v (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 272 …. [1170] — (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 …. [21252] Lockard; R v [1968] Tas SR 195 …. [23270] Lockheed-Arabia Corp v Owen [1993] QB 806; [1963] 3 All ER 641 …. [39105] Lockley; R v [1995] 2 Cr App R 554 …. [33795] Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237 …. [7085], [17135] Lockyer; R v (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 …. [11125], [21252] Lodge Partners Pty Ltd v Pegum (2009) 255 ALR 516 …. [39240]
Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470 …. [11125], [21252] Lodhi; R v (2006) 163 A Crim R 526 …. [35500], [35640] Loguancio; R v (2000) 1 VR 235; 110 A Crim R 406 …. [21050] Lohar Corp Pty Ltd v Dibu Pty Ltd (1976) 1 BPR 9177 …. [25380] Lombardo v Stuart Bros Pty Ltd (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 159 …. [5075] London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman [1946] AC 278; [1946] 1 All ER 255 …. [11010] London Chartered Bank v Lavers (1855) Legge 884 …. [17055] London County Council v Henry Boot & Sons Ltd [1959] 1 All ER 77 …. [39250] — v — [1959] 3 All ER 636; [1959] 1 WLR 1069 …. [39200], [39250] London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Lavell [1901] 1 Ch 135 …. [1290] Lonergan v R [1963] Tas SR 158 …. [11005], [15220] Long v Reid (1916) 35 NZLR 1186 …. [17090] Long; Ex parte A-G (Qld); R v (2003) 138 A Crim R 103 …. [33650] Long; R v (1973) 57 Cr App R 871 …. [1385] — (2002) 137 A Crim R 263 …. [15100], [21050] Longford; R v (1970) 17 FLR 37 …. [3180] Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79; 89 ALR 161 …. [15135], [15160] Longman; R v [1969] 1 QB 299; [1968] 2 All ER 761 …. [23360] Lonnkvist v Lonnkvist [1952] WN 88 …. [17475] Lonrho Plc v Fayed (No 4) [1994] QB 775; [1994] 1 All ER 870 …. [27005], [27020] Lonsdale v A-G, Earl of [1982] 3 All ER 579; [1982] 1 WLR 887 …. [39240] Looseley; R v [2001] 4 All ER 897; [2001] 1 WLR 2060 …. [27310] Lopatta; R v (1983) 35 SASR 101 …. [33485], [33770]
Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 …. [1215], [33455] Lord v Cmr of Australian Federal Police (1997) 74 FCR 61; 154 ALR 631 …. [27050] — v Colvin (1855) 3 Drew 222; 61 ER 888 …. [17475] Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) LR17 Eq 358 …. [29045] Lord Arundel v Fowler, Doe d (1850) 14 QB 700; 117 ER 270 …. [39130] Lord Audley’s Case (1631) 3 S Tr 401 …. [13035], [13115] Lord Ferrers v Shirley (1731) Fitzgibbon 195; 94 ER 716 …. [39100] Lord Shaftsbury v Lord Digby (1676) Freem KB 422; 89 ER 314 …. [13275] Lord Talbot de Malahide v Cusack (1864) 17 ICLR 213 …. [17225] Louden; R v (1995) 37 NSWLR 683 …. [33565], [33570] Loughlin; R v [1982] 1 NZLR 236 …. [27235] Loughnan v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1993] 1 VR 685 …. [31010], [35430] Loughran; R v [1999] Crim LR 405 …. [29050] Louis Dreyfus & Co and South Australian Milling and Trading Co (an arbitration), Re [1923] SASR 75 …. [33540] Louizos v R (2009) 194 A Crim R 223 …. [1490] Lourie (dec’d), Re [1968] NZLR 541 …. [39230] Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; 110 ALR 1 …. [3200] Lovat Peerage Case (1885) 10 App Cas 763 …. [1455] Loveday v Ayre [1955] St R Qd 264 …. [7030] Lovegrove; R v [1920] 3 KB 643 …. [21055] Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85 …. [11010] Lovell; R v [1923] All ER Rep 769; (1923) 17 Cr App R 163 …. [17275] Lovelock; R v [1997] Crim LR 821 …. [17435]
Lovett; R v [1972] VR 413 …. [33455] — [1973] 1 All ER 744; [1973] 1 WLR 241 …. [23385] Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82 …. [5240] — v R (1978) 23 ALR 616 …. [11095] Lowe v Goodluck [1985] ACLD 400 …. [11095] Lowe; R v (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 …. [1440], [1445], [1830], [15260] — [1997] 2 VR 465 …. [25325], [33725] Lowery v R [1974] AC 85; [1973] 3 All ER 662 …. [13090], [19005], [19045], [19110], [19145], [19155], [21215], [29050], [29125] Lowery (No 1); R v [1972] VR 554 …. [1290], [33690] Lowery and King (No 3); R v [1972] VR 939 …. [21215] LR; R v [2006] 1 Qd R 435 …. [27305], [33660] LRG; R v (2006) 16 VR 89; 175 A Crim R 404 …. [1650], [21050] LS v Director-General of Family and Community Services (1989) 18 NSWLR 481 …. [1175] — v DPP (NSW) (2011) 81 NSWLR 551 …. [13150] LSS; R v [2000] 1 Qd R 546 …. [19035], [21050] LT & KT Conlon v Lensworth Interstate (Vic) Pty Ltd [1970] VR 293 …. [25290] Ltd; R v [2009] 1 Cr App R 3 …. [11095] Lubrizol Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 957 …. [25275] Lucas v Barking, Havering and Redbridge Hospitals NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 220 …. [25010] — v Novosilieski (1795) 1 Esp 297; 170 ER 363 …. [1130] — v Williams & Sons [1892] 2 QB 113 …. [1475], [29095], [39100] Lucas; R v [1973] VR 693 …. [17090], [17120], [17130] — [1977] Tas SR 53 …. [5135]
— [1981] QB 720; [1981] 2 All ER 1008 …. [3150], [15210], [15220], [31165], [33435] — [1992] 2 VR 109 …. [29055], [29075] — [1993] Crim LR 599 …. [19030] Lucena v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1911) 31 NZLR 481 …. [25330] Lucerne v Collins (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 247 …. [1175] Luckhurst; R v (1853) 6 Cox CC 243 …. [33640] Luczkowski; R v (1990) 54 SASR 169 …. [21050] Luczynski; R v [2003] 2 NZLR 860 …. [33435] Luder v Luder [1964] ALR 3 …. [41035] Ludlow v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1971] AC 29; [1970] 1 All ER 567 …. [21155] Luffe; R v [1803] All ER Rep 726; (1807) 103 ER 316 …. [3020] Lui Mei-lin v R [1989] AC 288; [1989] 1 All ER 359 …. [17430], [33595] Luisi; R v [1964] Crim LR 605 …. [15195] Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd (2008) 249 ALR 663; 83 ALJR 34 …. [1280] Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 …. [25350], [25355] Lumley; R v (1869) LR 1 CCR 196 …. [1125] Lumsdaine v Bollard, Doe d (1847) 1 Legge 404 …. [17725] Lunny; R v (1854) 6 Cox CC 477 …. [37055], [37065] Lunt; R v (1986) 85 Cr App R 241 …. [21170] Lupien; R v [1970] SCR 263; (1970) 9 DLR (3d) 1 …. [29125] Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1935) 54 CLR 134 …. [33460], [33540] Lusty v Finsbury Securities Ltd (1991) 58 Build LR 66 …. [29080] Lusty (W) & Sons Ltd v Morris Wilkinson & Co (Nottingham) Ltd
[1954] 2 All ER 347; [1954] 1 WLR 911 …. [17060] Luther v Ryan (1956) 3 DLR (2d) 693 …. [15045] Lutheran Church of Australia South Australia District Incorp v Farmers’ Co-op Executors & Trustees Ltd (1970) 121 CLR 628 …. [39235] Lutterell v Reynell (1670) 1 Mod 282; 86 ER 887 …. [17250] Luttrell; R v [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 …. [1370], [29050], [29075] Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352; [1952] ALR 308 …. [9040], [9055] Ly, Re; Ex parte Dixon v Ly (1995) 62 FCR 432 …. [3160] Lydon; R v (1986) 85 Cr App R 221 …. [31135] Lyell v Kennedy (1884) 27 Ch D 1 …. [25255], [25275] — v — (1888) 50 LT 730 …. [33455] — v — (1889) 14 App Cas 437 …. [33350] — v Kennedy (No 2) (1883) 9 App Cas 81; [1881] All ER Rep 807 …. [25210], [25235] Lynch v Attwood [1983] 3 NSWLR 1 …. [7150] — v Lynch (1966) 8 FLR 433 …. [29140] Lynch; R v [1954] Tas SR 47 …. [11030], [25310] — [2008] 1 Cr App R 24 …. [37025] Lyne; R v (2003) 140 A Crim R 522 …. [35410] Lyons v Nicholls (No 3) [1958] NZLR 755 …. [5025] — v R (1992) 1 Tas R 193 …. [9035] Lyons (DF) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 28 FCR 597; 100 ALR 468 …. [11130], [21280] Lyons; R v (1889) 15 VLR 15 …. [13055] Lysaght v Police [1965] NZLR 405 …. [29075] Lysnar v National Bank of New Zealand Ltd [1935] NZLR 129 …. [39175]
Lyttle; R v (2004) 180 CCC (3d) 476 …. [17485], [17505] MCA International BV v Northern Star Holdings Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (1991) 4 ACSR 719 …. [39240] Macacek; R v [1960] Qd R 247 …. [17690], [17715] McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 187 …. [1170], [29060] McAloom; R v [1959] OR 441 …. [11050] McAndrews v Leonard (1926) 134 A 710 …. [1295] McAnnalley (dec’d), Re; McAnnalley v Public Trustee [1935] NZLR 106 …. [39230], [39270] Macarone v McKone; Ex parte Macarone [1986] 1 Qd R 284 …. [7105], [7145] Macaskill (No 2); R v (2001) 81 SASR 155 …. [15095], [15160] McBeath (JA) Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corp Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 121 …. [25380] Mac Bride; R v (1983) 34 SASR 433 …. [19110] McCalman v Higgins (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 603 …. [17600] McCann v Parsons (1955) 93 CLR 418; [1955] ALR 14 …. [11150] McCann; R v [1972] Tas SR (NC 3) 269 …. [15230] McCarthy; R v (1980) 70 Cr App R 270 …. [11050] — (1980) 71 Cr App R 142 …. [17335] — (1984) 14 A Crim R 73 …. [17650] — (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 …. [1420] McCartney v R (2006) 31 WAR 416 …. [3235] McCartney; R v (1928) 20 Cr App R 179 …. [39105] — [1976] 1 NZLR 472 …. [1245] McCaskill v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 66 …. [25275] McCaul; R v [1983] 2 VR 419 …. [23345]
McCay; R v [1991] 1 All ER 232; [1990] 1 WLR 645 …. [31185], [37025] McCleary v DPP (1998) 20 WAR 288; 157 ALR 301 …. [5150] McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157; [1951] ALR 422 …. [9050] McClintock v R (1946) 47 WALR 95 …. [15220] McConnon; R v [1951] SASR 22 …. [15170], [15205] McConville v Bayley (1914) 17 CLR 509; 20 ALR 153 …. [15120] McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 284; 23 ALR 583; 53 ALJR 436 …. [11150] M’Cormick v Garnett (1854) 5 De GM& G278; 43 ER 877 …. [41005] McCourt; R v (1993) 69 A Crim R 151 …. [3020] McCuin; R v [1982] 1 NZLR 13 …. [11075] M’Cullough v Munn [1908] 2 IR 194 …. [39105] McCullough v R [1982] Tas R 43 …. [3020], [17065] McCutcheon v Bateman (1985) 62 LGRA 212 …. [39015] — v David Mac Brayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125 …. [39240] Mac Darmaid v A-G [1950] P 218; [1950] 1 All ER 497 …. [1125] McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501; [1948] 2 ALR 466 …. [33635], [33650], [33655], [33660], [33665], [33680], [33690], [33730] McDermott; R v (1990) 49 A Crim R 105 …. [19040] McDonald v Camerotto (1986) 36 SASR 66 …. [17660] — v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) (1915) 20 CLR 231; 22 ALR 35 …. [29070] — v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529; [1966] ALR 496 …. [11150] — v Pless (1915) 238 US 264 …. [27215] Mac Donald v R (1946) 87 CCC 257 …. [15220], [17600] — v Shinko Australia Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 152 …. [39160]
Macdonald v Whitfield (1883) 8 App Cas 733; [1881] All ER Rep Ext 1483 …. [39190] McDonald’s System of Australia Pty Ltd v McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 236 …. [29155], [31095], [37090] McDonald; R v (1983) 50 ALR 471 …. [27300] Mac Donald; R v (1985) 17 A Crim R 297 …. [17290] — (1995) 65 SASR 322 …. [15135] McDonald; R v (2000) 148 CCC (3d) 273 …. [21170] Mac Donald; R v (2002) 128 A Crim R 228 …. [1450] McDonald; R v [1955] NZLR 699 …. [15095] — [1984] 1 NSWLR 428 …. [33435], [33495], [33690], [33735] — [1991] Crim LR 122 …. [9120] McDonell; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 322 …. [17165], [17515] Macdonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742 …. [39010] McDonnell; Ex parte A-G; R v [1988] 2 Qd R 189 …. [25155] McDougall v Henderson [1976] 1 NZLR 59 …. [25330] McDougall; R v [1983] 1 Qd R 89 …. [15195] McDowell v Hirschfield Lipson & Rumney and Smith [1992] 2 FLR 126 …. [25385] McDowell; R v [1997] 1 VR 473 …. [17435], [17460] McE, Re [2009] Crim LR 524 (HL) …. [25280] Macedonia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 18 ATR 929 …. [25235] Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar, The Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand (2006) 66 NSWLR 112 …. [25010], [25300] McEldowney v Forde [1971] AC 632; [1969] 2 All ER 1039 …. [3156]
McEndoo; R v (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 …. [29105] McEwan; R v [1979] 2 NSWLR 926 …. [7020] McFadden v Snow (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 8 …. [3165], [25380] McFadden; R v (1975) 62 Cr App R 187 …. [17495] Macfarlan v Rolt (1872) LR 14 Eq 580 …. [25210] McFarland v Brumby [1966] NZLR 230 …. [39195] Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan and O’Kelly; R v (1923) 32 CLR 518; 29 ALR 353 …. [3158] Mac Farlane; R v [1993] 1 Qd R 202 …. [37155] McFelin; R v [1985] 2 NZLR 750 …. [17175] Macfie (No 2); R v (2004) 11 VR 215 …. [15100], [17120] McGahan v Driver [1936] QWN 45 …. [17535] M’Gahey v Alston (1836) 2 M & W206; 150 ER 731 …. [1175] McGarry v Boonah Clothing Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 284 …. [1630], [1635] McGarvey; R v (1987) 10 NSWLR 632; 34 A Crim R 119 (CCA) …. [19090] McGee; R v (1979) 70 Cr App R 247 …. [23315] McGhee; R v (1993) 61 SASR 208 …. [21050] Macgillivray, In the Estate of [1946] 2 All ER 301 …. [33315] McGinnis; R v [1946] SASR 24 …. [15125] McGlinchey; R v [1983] Crim LR 808 …. [21155] McGookin v R (1986) 20 A Crim R 438 …. [1675] McGovern v Victoria [1984] VR 570 …. [5015] McGowan v Carville [1960] IR 330 …. [7160] McGowan (Procurator Fiscal) v B [2011] All ER (D) 176 (Nov); [2011] 1 WLR 3121 …. [33740]
McGranaghan; R v [1995] 1 Cr App R 559 …. [21180] McGrath; R v (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 460 …. [1045] McGreevy v DPP [1973] 1 All ER 503; [1973] 1 WLR 276 …. [9035] McGregor v Australian Mortgage Land & Finance Co (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 128 …. [1175] — v Keily (1859) 3 Exch 794; 154 ER 1066 …. [1130] — v Potts (2005) 68 NSWLR 109 …. [41005] — v Stokes [1952] VLR 347; [1952] ALR 565 …. [31040], [31090], [37025] McGregor-Lowndes v Collector of Customs (Qld) (1968) 11 FLR 349 …. [1665], [17575] McGregor; R v (1992) 95 Cr App R 240 …. [23190] — [1968] 1 QB 371; [1967] 2 All ER 267 …. [33455], [33605], [33610], [33795] — [1975] Crim LR 514 …. [33655] — [1984] 1 Qd R 256 …. [17240] McGuinness v A-G (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73; [1940] ALR 110 …. [11130], [25305], [25340] — v New South Wales (2009) 73 NSWLR 104 …. [25040] McGuire; R v (1985) 81 Cr App R 323 …. [33105] — [1975] 4 WWR 124 …. [31185] McGuirk; R v (1964) 48 Cr App R 75 …. [23375] McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; [1965] ALR 788 …. [7225], [33435] McHardie; R v [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; (1983) 10 A Crim R 51 …. [1315], [1445], [11035], [29055] Machin v Ash (1950) 49 LGR 87 …. [39050] Machin (No 2); R v (1997) 69 SASR 403 …. [23040]
McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] QB 283; [1980] 2 All ER 227 …. [5030], [5075], [5175], [17265] McIlree; R v (1866) 3 WW & A’B (L) 32 …. [13275] Mac Indoe v Parbery [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-290 …. [29125] McInnis v R (1979) 143 CLR 575; 27 ALR 449 …. [17435] McInroy v — [1979] 1 SCR 588; (1979) 89 DLR (3d) 609 …. [17385], [17390] McIntosh; R v [1968] Qd R 570 …. [37010] — [1992] Crim LR 651 …. [31135] McIntyre; R v [1965] VR 593 …. [17130] McK; R v [1986] 1 Qd R 476 …. [15170], [15195] Mackay v Brice (1979) 25 ALR 597; 53 ALJR 603 …. [39160] McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533 …. [35115] — v Page (1971) 2 SASR 117 …. [29050], [29090] — v R (1935) 54 CLR 1; [1935] ALR 484 …. [33420], [33610] McKay; R v [1965] Qd R 240 …. [33650] — [1967] NZLR 139 …. [17350], [19005], [19050] Mackay; R v [1985] VR 623 …. [1140], [1445] Mac Keigan v Hickman [1989] 2 SCR 796; (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 688 …. [27205] McKellar v Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 950 …. [27265], [33675], [33745], [33750], [33760] McKelliff; R v (2004) 87 SASR 476 …. [27130] McKellin; R v [1998] 4 VR 757 …. [7085] McKelvey v Meagher (1906) 4 CLR 265; 12 ALR 483 …. [41035] McKelvey; R v [1914] St R Qd 42 …. [15225] McKenna v Greco (1981) 33 OR (2d) 595; 125 DLR (3d) 268 …. [21275]
McKenna; R v (1956) 40 Cr App R 65 …. [17650], [17660] — (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 354 …. [33435] — (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 330 …. [9005] Mac Kenney; R v (1981) 72 Cr App R 78 …. [29050], [29070] Mac Kenzie v R (1996) 190 CLR 348; 141 ALR 70 …. [1355] Mackenzie v — (2004) 150 A Crim R 451 …. [33740] McKenzie; R v (1977) 17 SASR 304 …. [33745] Mac Kenzie; R v (1993) 96 Cr App R 98 …. [11100] McKenzie; R v [1993] 1 WLR 453 …. [33660] — [2004] 1 NZLR 181 …. [17430] McKeon; R v (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 …. [15200], [15235] McKern v Burke (1986) 3 MVR 279 …. [3020] M’Kewen v Cotching (1857) 27 LJ Ex 41 …. [33420] Mackie; R v (1973) 57 Cr App R 453 …. [21045], [21145], [21240] McKimmie; R v [1957] VR 93 …. [29090], [29130] McKinley v McKinley [1960] 1 All ER 476; [1960] 1 WLR 120 …. [27205] McKinney v R (1991) 171 CLR 468; 98 ALR 577 …. [15160], [33735] Mackintosh; R v (1982) 76 Cr App R 177 …. [33690] McKnoulty; R v (1995) 80 A Crim R 28 …. [21050] Mackowik v Kansas City St F CBR Co (1906) 94 SW256 …. [7280] Mackrell v Western Australia (2008) 190 A Crim R 43 …. [17605], [33770] McLachlan; R v [1999] 2 VR 553 …. [15085], [15100], [15255], [17460] McLaren v Waikato Regional Council [1993] 1 NZLR 710 …. [39290] McLaughlan; R v (2008) 218 FLR 158 …. [35620]
McLean v Cahill [1932] SASR 359 …. [27290], [39105] Maclean v Nicholson (1878) 4 NZ Jur (NS) 98 …. [17075] Mac Lean (No 1); R v (1979) 49 CCC (2d) 399 …. [1305] McLean and Funk; Ex parte A-G; R v [1991] 1 Qd R 231 …. [11125], [13085] McLean Bros & Rigg Ltd v Grice (1906) 4 CLR 835 …. [1175], [7240], [41130] McLean; R v (1926) 19 Cr App R 104 …. [23145], [23315] — (1967) 52 Cr App R 80 …. [31175], [31185] McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95; [1962] ALR 243 …. [11145], [17360], [17375] McLennan v Taylor [1966] 2 NSWR 685; (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 525 …. [17575] Macleod v Hill [1976] 2 WWR 593 …. [1280] Macleod; R v [1991] Tas R 144 …. [27295] McLeod; R v [1994] 3 All ER 254; [1994] 1 WLR 1500 …. [23345], [23360] McLintock; R v [1962] Crim LR 549 …. [11075] McLure v Mitchell (1974) 6 ALR 471; 24 FLR 115 …. [17475] M’Mahon v Lennard (1858) 6 HL Cas 970; 10 ER 1576 …. [1175] McMahon v National Foods Milk Ltd (2009) 25 VR 251 …. [39240] McMahon; R v (1933) 24 Cr App R 95 …. [17090], [17095], [17650] — (1978) 68 Cr App R 18 …. [11140] — (2004) 8 VR 101 …. [7085] McMillan; R v (2010) 204 A Crim R 98 …. [33775] McMinn v Daire (1981) 5 A Crim R 307 …. [17460] M’Naghten’s Case [1843] All ER Rep 229; (1843) 8 ER 718 …. [7075], [7090]
McNair v Press Offshore Ltd (1997) 17 WAR 191 …. [5075] McNamara v Edwards; Ex parte Edwards [1907] St R Qd 9 …. [33615] McNamara; R v [1917] VLR 407 …. [31120], [31130] — [1987] VR 855 …. [33485], [33770] McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520; [1953] ALR 1060 …. [15090] McNeil v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 202 ALR 35; 54 ATR 1 …. [29200] McNeill v R (2008) 168 FCR 198; 248 ALR 710 …. [1730], [1750] McNeill (Ruling No 1); R v (2007) 209 FLR 124; [2007] NFSC 2 …. [1750], [23055], [27315], [33730], [35620] McNeill; R v [1907] VLR 265; (1907) 13 ALR 99 …. [17265] McPhee v S Bennett Ltd (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 8 …. [1610] McPhee (J) & Son (Aust) Pty Ltd Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532 …. [7085] McPherson v Coupland (1961) SC (J) 74 …. [17435] Mac Pherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; 37 ALR 81 …. [1675], [11045], [11050], [11055], [11060], [11065], [11070], [11075] Mac Pherson; R v [2006] 1 Cr App R 30 …. [13065] McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 861; [2000] 1 WLR 1732 …. [17370] Macplan Logistics Systems Pty Ltd v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 324 …. [1730], [25395] McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687; [1940] 1 All ER 471 …. [3120] Macquarie Bank v B [2006] Fam CA 1052; (2006) 207 FLR 1 …. [25010] Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543 …. [5070] M’Queen v Great Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 QB 569 …. [1210] McQuiston; R v [1998] 1 Cr App R 139 …. [1310]
Macrae; R v (1995) 80 A Crim R 380 …. [31065] Macris; R v (2004) 147 A Crim R 99 …. [1220] McSharry v Railway Cmrs (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 127 …. [35430] McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] P 94; [1948] 2 All ER 754 …. [25365] McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 623; [1962] 1 WLR 295 …. [1135], [21280] M v DPP [2009] 2 Cr App R 12 …. [1295] — v R (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 …. [19085] — v — (1994) 181 CLR 487; 126 ALR 325 …. [11140], [17270], [17275] — v — (1994) 62 SASR 364 …. [33455] M & W Grazebrook Ltd v Wallens [1973] 2 All ER 868 …. [25245] M (CP); R v [2010] Crim LR 232 …. [19120] M(D) v M(S) and G [1969] 2 All ER 243; [1969] 1 WLR 843 …. [1235] M and R (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Expert Evidence), Re [1996] 4 All ER 239 …. [11130] M(CP); R v [2009] 2 Cr App R 3 …. [19135] M, BJ; R v (2011) 110 SASR 1 …. [21257] M, RB; R v (2007) 172 A Crim R 73 …. [21050] M; R v (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 …. [19135], [33455] — (1998) 104 A Crim R 154 …. [19135] — (2000) 109 A Crim R 530 …. [15135], [17270] — (2002) 135 A Crim R 324 …. [27305] — [1976] Qd R 344 …. [33750] — [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 …. [17370] — [1995] 1 Qd R 213 …. [15165] — [2000] 1 All ER 148; [2000] 1 WLR 421 …. [21050]
MA v R [2013] VSCA 20; BC201300538 …. [21252] Maarroui; R v (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757 …. [1400] Mabbott v R [1990] WAR 323 …. [33460] Mabo v Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78 …. [9085], [33160] — v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; 107 ALR 1; 66 ALJR 408 …. [41005] Mack v Lenton (1993) 32 NSWLR 259 …. [39035] Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 76; 184 ALR 473 …. [11150] Maddaford v Brown [1953] SASR 169 …. [33640] Maddison v Coombe (1981) 26 SASR 523 …. [17660] — v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 …. [17545], [17555], [25295], [27135] Madobi; R v (1963) 6 FLR 1 …. [33270], [37055] Madsen, Ex parte; Re Hawes (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 550; 77 WN (NSW) 400 …. [3095] Maes; R v [1975] VR 541 …. [3175], [3185] Maffei; R v [1960] SASR 284 …. [15255] Maganja v Arthur [1984] 3 NSWLR 561 …. [5070] Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 210 CLR 181; 185 ALR 152 …. [39240] Maggs; R v (1990) 91 Cr App R 243 …. [3130] Maginnis; R v [1987] AC 303; [1987] 1 All ER 907 …. [11010] Maguire v Simpson (1977) 139 CLR 362; 18 ALR 469 …. [3158] Maguire; R v [1992] QB 936; [1992] 2 All ER 433 …. [17130] Mahadeo v R [1936] 2 All ER 813 …. [27135] Mahadervan v Mahadervan [1964] P 233; [1962] 3 All ER 1108 …. [9085], [41010]
Mahalingan; R v [2008] 3 SCR 316 …. [5150] Maher v Musson (1934) 52 CLR 100; [1935] ALR 80 …. [7030] Maher-Smith v Gaw [1969] VR 371 …. [9015] Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; 241 ALR 606 …. [1220], [17120], [17715], [33455] Mahon v Rahn [1998] QB 424; [1997] 3 All ER 687 …. [25055] Mahoney v Fielding [1959] Qd R 479 …. [33505] — v Wright [1943] SASR 61 …. [15045] Mahoney-Smith; R v (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249 …. [17485] — [1967] 2 NSWR 154 …. [11045] Maiden; R v (1988) 35 A Crim R 346 …. [23290] Main Mortgages Ltd (in liq) v Cameron Bros (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 46 …. [25015] Maiolo (No 2); R v (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 …. [17290], [21257] Maisel v Financial Times Ltd (No 1) [1914] All ER Rep 671; (1915) 84 LJKB 2145 …. [19165] Maitland; R v [1963] SASR 332 …. [17060] Majeau Carrying Co Pty Ltd v Coastal Rutile Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 48; 1 ALR 1 …. [3050] Majindi v Northern Territory (2012) 31 NTLR 150; 260 FLR 459 …. [5215] Major v Bretherton (1928) 41 CLR 62; [1928] ALR 281; (1928) 2 ALJR 73 …. [39160] Major; R v [1998] 1 Qd R 317 …. [15195] Makanjuola v Cmr of Police of the Metropolis [1992] 3 All ER 617 …. [27105] Makanjuola; R v [1995] 3 All ER 730; [1995] 1 WLR 1348 …. [15125], [15260]
Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 …. [5025] Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57; [1891] All ER Rep 24 …. [21015], [21105], [21145], [21155], [21165], [21205] Makin; R v (1893) 14 LR (NSW) (L) 1 …. [21015] Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 …. [29045], [29065], [29075], [29200], [29220] Maks v Maks (1986) 6 NSWLR 34 …. [39035] Malaysian Airline System v Wood [1988] WAR 294 …. [3035] Malcherek; R v [1981] 2 All ER 422; [1981] 1 WLR 690; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173 …. [17335] Malcolm v DPP [2007] 3 All ER 578 …. [17625], [17720] Malcolm; R v [2012] Crim LR 238 …. [17135] Malcolmson v O’Dea (1863) 10 HLC 593; 11 ER 1155 …. [31140], [33815] Male v Roberts (1800) 3 Esp 163; 170 ER 574 …. [41005] Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 92 ALR 545 …. [3135], [9005], [9085] Maleckas; R v [1991] 1 VR 363 …. [9040] Malik; R v [1968] 1 All ER 582; [1968] 1 WLR 353 …. [21040] — [2000] 2 Cr App R 8 …. [19030] Malindi v R [1967] 1 AC 439; [1966] 3 All ER 285 …. [23195], [23280] Maling v S Bennett Ltd (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 280; 46 WN (NSW) 113 …. [17510] Mallah; R v (2005) 154 A Crim R 150 …. [35650] Mallard v R (2003) 28 WAR 1 …. [11140], [17130], [17350], [19005] — v — (2005) 224 CLR 125; 222 ALR 236 …. [17130] Mallinson v Scottish Australian Investment Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 66; 26 ALR 225 …. [39010]
Mallock v Tabak [1977] VR 78 …. [1175] Mallory; R v (1884) 13 QBD 33 …. [33535], [33585] Mallows, Re (1926) 29 WALR 62 …. [15150] Malone v Smith (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 54 …. [3065] Maloney v Commissioner for Railways (1978) 18 ALR 147; 52 ALJR 292 …. [3200] — v New South Wales National Coursing Assn Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 60 …. [27105] — v R (2013) 298 ALR 308; 87 ALJR 755 …. [3156], [7001] Malouf; R v (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 142 …. [15100] Maltby v Christie (1795) 1 Esp 33; 170 ER 378 …. [33440] Manager; R v (2006) 18 NTLR 206 …. [13070] Manawatu County v Rowe [1956] NZLR 78 …. [1175] Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608; (1901) 82 LT 347 …. [1620] Manchester Crown Court; Ex parte Rogers; R v [1999] 4 All ER 35; [1999] 1 WLR 832 …. [25225] Manchester Liners Ltd v Rea Ltd [1922] 2 AC 74; [1922] All ER Rep 605 …. [39145] Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272 …. [7015], [7050], [7175], [9005], [9020], [9030] Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 …. [17170], [17245], [25010] Manda Pty Ltd, Re [1993] Fam 183; [1993] 1 All ER 733 …. [27125] Mandica; R v (1980) 24 SASR 394 …. [19130] Mandry; R v Wooster; R v [1973] 3 All ER 996; [1973] 1 WLR 1232 …. [7160] Mandzij; R v (1983) 11 A Crim R 209 …. [23340] Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR
115; [1954] ALR 283 …. [1135], [11130], [21290] Mangano v Farleigh Nettheim Pty Ltd (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 228; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 407 …. [3140] Manh; R v (1983) 33 SASR 563 …. [37060] Mankotia; R v BC9803450 …. [35495], [35500] Manley; R v (1962) 46 Cr App R 235 …. [23315] Manly v Shaw (1840) Car & M 361; 174 ER 543 …. [3130] Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 168 ALR 86 …. [25010], [25300] — v Mann (1957) 97 CLR 433 …. [15155] Mann; R v (1972) 56 Cr App R 750 …. [17375], [33485] Manning v R (1923) 17 Cr App R 85 …. [21065], [21180] — v West End St Ry Co (1896) 44 NE 135 …. [3250] Manning; R v (1849) 30 CCC Sess Pap 654 …. [9020] — (1910) 13 WALR 6 …. [17265] — (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 …. [15125] Manprop Ltd v O’Dell [1969] 2 Ch 378; [1969] 2 All ER 849 …. [7185] Mansell v Clements (1874) LR 9 CP 139 …. [29130] Manser v Dix (1855) 1 K & J 451; 69 ER 536 …. [25210] — v London Passenger Transport Board [1948] WN 206 …. [35085] Manser; R v (1934) 25 Cr App R 18 …. [15040], [15110] Mansfield v Australian Crime Commission (2003) 132 FCR 251 …. [25175], [25280] Mansfield; R v [1978] 1 All ER 134; [1977] 1 WLR 1102 …. [9105], [11100], [17065], [21175] Mansour v Standard Telephone and Cables Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 205 …. [35050] Manton v Commonwealth (1981) 34 ALR 342 …. [35055]
Manufacturers’ Mutual Insurance Ltd v Withers (1988) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-853 …. [39240] Manufekai v R (2006) 196 FLR 460 …. [33045] Manunta; R v (1990) 54 SASR 17 …. [17435], [17460] Manwaring; R v [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 …. [17280], [19135] Manwelland Pty Ltd v Dames & Moore Pty Ltd [2001] ATPR 41-845 …. [17725] Manyam v Western Australia (2010) 201 A Crim R 156 …. [17650] Manzano; R v (1860) 2 F & F 64; 175 ER 960 …. [17335], [17340] Mapp v Ohio (1961) 367 US 643 …. [27230] — v Stephens [1965] NSWR 1661 …. [17305], [17315] Maqsud Ali; R v [1966] 1 QB 688; [1965] 2 All ER 464 …. [1300], [1305], [17560], [27305], [31075], [31200], [33430] Marcel v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1992] Ch 225; [1992] 1 All ER 72 …. [25105] March v March (1858) 2 Sw & Tr 49; 164 ER 910 …. [5185] March Cabaret Club and Casino Ltd v The London Assurance [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 169 …. [25065] Marchioness of Huntly v Gaskel [1905] 2 Ch 656; [1904] All ER Rep 625 …. [5025] Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1913) 16 CLR 178 …. [27040], [27155] Marcoux v R [1976] 1 SCR 763; (1976) 60 DLR (3d) 119 …. [1420] Marcus Clark & Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177; [1952] ALR 821 …. [3156] Marcus; R v (1923) 17 Cr App R 187 …. [1195] Marek v Australasian Conference Assn Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 …. [39290] Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437; 121 ALR 114; 18 AAR 392 ….
[17435] Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] 2 KB 426; [1939] 1 All ER 273 …. [5045] Margiotta v Michielan (1981) 26 SASR 356 …. [17725] Maric v R (1978) 20 ALR 513; 52 ALJR 631 …. [1880] Maries v Maries (1853) 23 LJ Ch 154 …. [7070] Marijancevic; R v (1991) 54 A Crim R 431 …. [33775] — (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 …. [1385], [1395], [1440] — (2009) 22 VR 576; 53 MVR 14 …. [29070] — [1982] VR 936 …. [17065] Marinero, The [1955] P 68 …. [41005] Marinovich v R (1990) 46 A Crim R 282 …. [29025], [29150] Maritime Asphalt Products, Re (1966) 52 DLR (2d) 8 …. [5185] Maritime Electric Co Ltd v General Dairies Ltd [1937] AC 610; [1937] 1 All ER 748 …. [5240] Markarian; R v (2003) 137 A Crim R 497 …. [3020] Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108; 21 ALR 448 …. [21015], [21035], [21085], [21280] Markell v Wollaston (1906) 4 CLR 131 …. [11010] Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 …. [1305], [33775], [33780], [39075] — v R (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119 …. [17225], [25035], [25175] Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 …. [27105], [27130] — v Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549; [1965] ALR 25 …. [3040], [3157] — v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304 …. [1520] — v — (1996) 66 FCR 128; 137 ALR 579 …. [25395] — v National and General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416 ….
[5070] — v Portsmouth Corporation (1937) 157 LT 261 …. [33060], [33560], [37050] Marks; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation; R v (1981) 147 CLR 471; 35 ALR 241 …. [5025] Markuleski; R v (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; 125 A Crim R 186 …. [17295] Marlborough Harbour Board v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223 …. [5070] Marley; R v (1932) 47 CLR 618; [1932] ALR 431 …. [33640], [33705] Marlow; R v (2000) 113 A Crim R 118 …. [21243] Marlowe Justices; Ex parte O’Sullivan; R v [1984] QB 381; [1983] 3 All ER 578 …. [9005] Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny [2004] 3 All ER 648 …. [25055] Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 404 …. [29125] Marquard; R v (1993) 85 CCC 3d 193 …. [1880] Marquis Camden v Inland Revenue Cmrs [1914] 1 KB 641; [1911] All ER Rep Ext 1337 …. [29050] Marr (Contracting) Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 425; 104 ALR 181 …. [5095] Marra Development Ltd and the Companies Act, Re [1979] 2 NSWLR 193 …. [35195], [35210], [35240], [35245], [35280], [35295], [35550] Marriott; R v (1911) 75 JP 288 …. [17045] Marsden v Stansfield (1828) 7 B & C 815; 108 ER 927 …. [11075] Marseilles Extension Railway and Land Co, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 598 …. [41010] Marsh; R v (1985) 83 Cr App R 165 …. [19030] Marshall v Crane (1982) Tas R 17 …. [7120]
— v Owners of the SS Wild Rose [1910] AC 486 …. [37115] — v Rennie (1979) 25 ALR 116 …. [7160] — v Watt [1953] Tas SR 1 …. [31040], [31090] — v Wettenhall Bros [1914] VLR 266; (1914) 20 ALR 103 …. [3095] Marshall; R v (1965) 51 WWR 185 …. [17190] — (2000) 113 A Crim R 190 …. [1450] — [1977] Crim LR 106 …. [33460] Marsham; Ex parte Pethick Lawrence; R v [1912] 2 KB 362 …. [13275] Marsson v O’Sullivan [1951] SASR 244 …. [31090] Martelli; R v (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 …. [27310] Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; [1936] ALR 261 …. [21035], [21085], [21165], [21280] — v Police Service Board [1983] 2 VR 357 …. [25070] — v Pyecroft (1852) 2 De G M & G 785; 42 ER 1079 …. [39175] — v R (1981) 4 A Crim R 302 …. [1125] — v — (1990) 48 A Crim R 208 …. [15095] — v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77 …. [11125] — v Treacher (1886) 16 QBD 507 …. [25125] — v White [1910] 1 KB 665 …. [41105] Martin (No 2); R v (1997) 68 SASR 419 …. [17315] Martin (No 7); R v (2000) 78 SASR 140 …. [3140] Martin, Re; Ex parte Amtron Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 62 FCR 438; 141 ALR 117 …. [5025] Martin; R v (1809) 2 Camp 100; 170 ER 1094 …. [33350] — (1834) 6 C & P 562; 172 ER 1364 …. [19075] — (1872) LR 1 CCR 378 …. [1290], [1295] — (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 286; 77 WN (NSW) 4 …. [17135]
— (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 404; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 354 …. [1175] — (1972) 57 Cr App R 279 …. [11135] — (1982) 32 SASR 419 …. [33045] — (1996) 65 SASR 590 …. [17305] — (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 …. [1215], [15220], [33045] — [1956] VLR 87; [1956] ALR 45 …. [1380] — [1963] Tas SR 103 …. [7030] — [1981] 2 NSWLR 640 …. [9070] — [1988] 3 All ER 440; [1988] 1 WLR 655 …. [35425] — [1992] 1 NZLR 313 …. [15225] — [2000] 2 Cr App R 42 …. [19135] Martinelli; R v (1908) 10 WALR 33 …. [23315] Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389 …. [15220] Martinez-Tobon; R v [1994] 2 All ER 90; [1994] 1 WLR 388 …. [23030] MAS; R v (2013) 118 SASR 160 …. [15135] Mash v Darley [1914] 1 KB 1 …. [5195], [5235] — v — [1914] 3 KB 1226; [1914] All ER Rep Ext 1522 …. [5195], [15045], [41105] Masih; R v [1986] Crim LR 395 …. [29050] Maskall’s Trial (1780) 21 St Tr 653 …. [31145] Maslen; R v (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 …. [17495] Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd [1913] AC 724; [1911] All ER Rep 400 …. [11025] — v R (1995) 15 WAR 165 …. [21050] — v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 …. [1185] Mason, Re; Mason v Cattley (1883) 22 Ch D 609 …. [25265] Mason; R v (1911) 76 JP 184; 28 TLR 120; 7 Cr App Rep 67 ….
[29050] — (2000) 77 SASR 105 …. [27105], [27130] — (2003) 140 A Crim R 274 …. [21035], [21252] — [1976] 2 NZLR 122 …. [17130] — [1987] 3 All ER 481; [1988] 1 WLR 139 …. [33710] Masquerade Music Ltd v Springsteen (2001) 51 IPR 650 …. [1480], [39005] Massey v Allen (1879) 13 Ch D 558 …. [33115] Massey; R v (1994) 62 SASR 481 …. [29050] — [1997] 1 Qd R 404 …. [15170], [15230] Massie v R (1993) 3 NTLR 105; 117 FLR 104 …. [23020] Massoud v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1995) 62 NSWLR 657 …. [1125], [7070] Masters (dec’d), In the Estate of; Hill v Plummer (1994) 33 NSWLR 446 …. [33335] Masters; R v (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 …. [33570] — [1987] 2 Qd R 272; (1986) 24 A Crim R 65 …. [1545] Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382 …. [17445], [17460], [39240] Mastipour v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 140 FCR 137 …. [17055] Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 …. [17170], [35205], [35225] Mathers; R v (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 …. [21215] Matheson; R v [1958] 2 All ER 87; [1958] 1 WLR 474 …. [7220], [29075] — [1969] SASR 53 …. [11065] Mathews, Re; Ex parte Powell (1875) 1 Ch D 501 …. [3050] Mathewson v Police [1969] NZLR 218 …. [31090]
Mattey; R v [1995] 2 Cr App R 409 …. [11075] — [1995] Crim LR 308 …. [11075] Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263; [1938] ALR 370 …. [3158] — v Prahran Corporation [1925] VLR 469; (1925) 31 ALR 338 …. [3020] — v R [1973] WAR 110 …. [23315], [23345], [23350] Matthews and Ford, Re [1973] VR 199 …. [27215] Matthews, Re [1993] 2 NZLR 91 …. [7075] Matthews; R v (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 …. [17135] — (1984) 36 SASR 503 …. [21050] — (1990) 58 SASR 19 …. [21050], [31055], [31095], [31100] — [1972] VR 3 …. [1305], [1315], [1680], [15250], [15255], [17375] — [1999] 1 VR 534 …. [17275] Matthey; R v (2007) 17 VR 222 …. [21050] Mattioli v Parker (No 2) [1973] Qd R 499 …. [29005] Mattouk v Massad [1943] AC 588 …. [15125] Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633; 15 ALR 117 …. [11045], [23290], [23360], [23375], [23385], [23405] Maudsley v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 39794 (2002) 24 NSWCCR 101 …. [29075] Maugham v Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14; 108 ER 948 …. [17225] Maurangi; R v (2001) 80 SASR 308 …. [23375] Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown (2011) 242 CLR 647; 277 ALR 654 …. [5025] Mauricia; R v [2002] 2 Cr App R 27 …. [41105] Maves v Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Co (1913) 6 Alta LR 396; 14 DLR 70 …. [17155]
Mavromatis, Ex parte; Re Windsor (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 420 …. [5185] Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454; [1967] 1 All ER 80 …. [13095], [31010], [31095], [33520], [33595] Mawson v Hartsink (1802) 4 Esp 102; 170 ER 656 …. [19045] Mawson; R v [1967] VR 205 …. [17135] Max Cooper & Sons Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1980) 29 ALR 77; 54 ALJR 234 …. [29050] Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309; [1934] All ER Rep 168 …. [19145], [23140], [23200], [23215], [23290] — v Inland Revenue Cmrs [1959] NZLR 708 …. [33540] — v — [1962] NZLR 683 …. [5130] May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; [1955] ALR 671 …. [1220], [7180], [9030], [9110], [9115], [11095], [11110] May; R v (1952) 36 Cr App R 91 …. [33690] — [1959] VR 683; [1959] ALR 1199 …. [23245], [23360] — [1962] Qd R 456 …. [15220] Mayberry; R v [1973] Qd R 211 …. [17275] Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507 …. [39160], [39195] Mayers; R v [2009] 1 Cr App 30 …. [17155] Mayes v Mayes [1971] 2 All ER 397; [1971] 1 WLR 679 …. [11110] Mayet; R v (1957) (1) SA 492 …. [33570] Mayhew; R v (1834) 6 C & P 315; 172 ER 1256 …. [15020] Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 635; [1984] 1 WLR 634 …. [11150] Maynard; R v (1979) 69 Cr App R 309 …. [1375], [17495] Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v Zell (1977) 367 A 2d 14 …. [17255]
Mayor of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678 …. [25235], [25245], [25265] Mayor of Congleton v Pattison (1808) 10 East 130; 103 ER 725 …. [33820] Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 …. [11130], [27270] Mazur; R v (2000) 113 A Crim R 67 …. [15220] Mazzolini; R v [1999] 3 VR 113 …. [7085], [17295] Mazzone; R v (1985) 43 SASR 330 …. [11075], [39105] MB v Protective Commissioner (2000) 217 ALR 631 …. [29125], [29200] MBE; R v (2008) 191 A Crim R 264 …. [13070] Mbonu; R v (2003) 7 VR 273 …. [33570] MD (a child) v McKinlay (1984) 31 NTR 1 …. [27265], [33740], [33745] Mead v Mead (2007) 235 ALR 197; 81 ALJR 1185 …. [25040] Mead; R v (1842) 2 B & C 606; 107 ER 509 …. [33285] Meadon Pty Ltd v Nommack (No 247) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 200 …. [25010] Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2007] 1 All ER 1 …. [25165] Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54; [1982] 2 All ER 865 …. [39290] Meates v A-G [1983] NZLR 308 …. [17250] Mechanical Advantage Group Pty Ltd v George (2003) 25 NSWCCR 368 …. [3135] Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346; [1935] All ER Rep 22 …. [11145], [17495], [17505] Medawar v Grand Hotel Co [1891] All ER Rep 571 …. [7230] — v — [1891] 2 QB 11 …. [7230]
Medcraft v R [1982] WAR 33 …. [15095], [15175] Medical Board of South Australia v Fisher (2000) 76 SASR 242 …. [27120] Medina v R (1990) 3 WAR 21 …. [39105] Medina; R v (1995) 84 A Crim R 316; 126 FLR 368 …. [27310] Medway v Doublelock Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 1261; [1978] 1 WLR 710 …. [25055] Meehan v H M Advocate (1970) JC 11 …. [17350] Meehan; R v [1919] St R Qd 119 …. [17065] Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366; [1961] 3 All ER 148 …. [19005] — v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 940 …. [35070] Meer Houssain, Ex parte (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 286 …. [3065] Meere v City of Sandringham [1956] VLR 638 …. [5015] Mees v Roads Corporation (2003) 128 FCR 418 …. [27095] Megson; R v (1840) 9 C & P 420; 173 ER 894 …. [17275] Mehesz v Redman (1979) 21 SASR 569 …. [1315], [35365] — v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 …. [1315], [35365] Mehrbah (Razia); R v [2002] 1 Cr App R 561 …. [13275] Meier; R v (1982) 30 SASR 126 …. [13060] Meissner; R v (1994) 76 A Crim R 81 …. [27130] Meko v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 131 …. [15220] Melany; R v (1924) 18 Cr App R 2 …. [1375] Melasecca v R (1994) 74 A Crim R 210 …. [27105] Melbourne v — (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465 …. [19135], [21085] Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878; 117 ER 690 …. [17375], [19010], [19035] Mellifont v A-G (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289; 104 ALR 89 …. [1760]
Mellona, The (1846) 10 Jur 992 …. [37050] Mellor v Walmesley [1905] 2 Ch 164 …. [33090] Melrose; R v [1989] 1 Qd R 572 …. [15220], [33435] Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 391 …. [25020] Memory Corp plc v Sidhu [2000] Ch 645; [2000] 1 All ER 434; [2000] 2 WLR 1106 …. [25160] Menck v Dickinson [1924] VLR 131; (1924) 30 ALR 152 …. [33420] Mendham; R v (1993) 71 A Crim R 382 …. [17040] Mendy; R v (1976) 64 Cr App R 4 …. [19035] Meninga; R v (1992) 66 A Crim R 199 …. [25235] Mentor; R v [2005] Crim LR 472 …. [19135] Menzies v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 62; 69 WN (NSW) 68 …. [11085], [11090] Menzies; R v [1982] 1 NZLR 40 …. [1305], [1320], [29185] Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Central Bank of India Ltd [1938] AC 287; [1938] 1 All ER 52 …. [5240] Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor [1893] AC 317 …. [39205] Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co v River Plate Trust, Loan and Agency Co [1894] 1 Ch 578 …. [5055] Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276 …. [25350], [25375], [25385] Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray (2004) 13 ANZ Ins Cases 61-612 …. [25265] Mercer v Denne [1905] 2 Ch 538; [1904] All ER Rep 71 …. [3120], [33115], [33185], [33395] — v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [1968] VR 72 …. [9075] — v Whall (1845) 5 QB 447; 114 ER 1318 …. [17060]
Mercer; R v (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 …. [15210], [15255], [17135] Merchant v R (1971) 126 CLR 414 …. [1240] Merchant Prince, The [1892] P 179; [1891] All ER Rep 396 …. [7225] Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104; 48 WN (NSW) 5 …. [17555], [17575], [17615] Meredith; R v (1943) 29 Cr App R 40 …. [13095] Meres v Ansell (1771) 3 Wils KB 276; 95 ER 1053 …. [39145] Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197; [2006] 3 All ER 1029 …. [5170] Mericka v Mericka [1954] SASR 74 …. [35045], [41075] Merit Finance and Investment Group Ltd, Re [1993] 1 NZLR 152 …. [25225] Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court (NSW) (2009) 263 ALR 556 …. [5170] Merker v Merker [1963] P 283 …. [5025] Merrall v Samuels (1971) 2 SASR 378 …. [33485] Merrick v Wakley (1838) 8 Ad & E 170; 112 ER 802 …. [33385] Merritt; R v (1969) 63 QJPR 53 …. [1240] — (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 …. [33760] Merry; R v (1900) 19 Cox CC 442 …. [17265] Mertens; R v [2005] Crim LR 301 …. [19155] Merwin Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Moolpa Pastoral Pty Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 565; [1933] ALR 401 …. [41015] Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525 …. [25360] Metalworks Ltd v Crooks (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 339 …. [39180] Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588 …. [1700], [1730], [25235], [25280], [25420] Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (1882) 47 LT 29 ….
[1535] Metropolitan Coal Co Ltd v Pye (1934) 50 CLR 614; [1934] ALR 182 …. [7150] — v — (1936) 55 CLR 138; [1936] ALR 237 …. [7150] Metropolitan Police Cmr v Hills [1980] AC 26; [1978] 2 All ER 1105 …. [23385], [23400] Metropolitan Rail Co v Wright (1886) 11 App Cas 152; [1886] All ER Rep 391 …. [11145] Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193; [1874] All ER Rep Ext 1755 …. [9120], [11085], [11090] Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board v Tallow Products Pty Ltd (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 370 …. [9050] Meux v Cobley [1892] 2 Ch 253 …. [3020] Mexborough v Whitwood Urban District Council, Earl of [1897] 2 QB 111; [1895] All ER Rep Ext 1820 …. [25115], [25130] Meyer v Hall (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 309 …. [17480] — v State of Nevada (2003) 80 P 3d; 119 Nev 554 …. [3140] Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90; 19 ALR 537 …. [5025], [5030] Meyers, Re; London Life Assn v St George’s Hospital [1951] Ch 534; [1951] 1 All ER 538 …. [39265] Meyn v Graham (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 16 …. [7120], [7220] Meynell; R v [2004] 1 NZLR 507 …. [17615] Mezzo v R (1986) 27 CCC (3d) 97 …. [11100] MFA v — (2002) 213 CLR 606; 193 ALR 184 …. [11140] MG; R v (2006) 175 A Crim R 342 …. [17435], [17460] — (2007) 69 NSWLR 20 …. [17065] MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236; 135 ALR 743 …. [17170] Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2008) 74 NSWLR 218 ….
[41035] Michael, Re; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25 WAR 511 …. [11010] Michaelides v R (2013) 296 ALR 1; 87 ALJR 456 …. [11140] Michaux; R v [1984] 2 Qd R 159; (1984) 13 A Crim R 173 …. [1300] Michel v R [2010] 1 WLR 879 …. [17135] Michelson v Nicoll (1851) 18 LT OS 198 …. [17075] — v United States (1948) 335 US 469 …. [19145] Mickelberg v Director of the Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365 …. [5180] — v R (1989) 167 CLR 259; 86 ALR 321 …. [11140] — v — [1984] WAR 191 …. [33435], [33565] Micolucco; R v (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 434; 74 WN (NSW) 208 …. [23290] Microsoft Corp v CX Computer Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 372; 187 ALR 362 …. [25105], [25125] Middelkamp v Fraser Valley Real Estate Board (1992) 71 BCLR (2d) 296; 96 DLR (4th) 227 …. [25375] Middendorp v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 286 …. [21252] Middendorp Electric Co Pty Ltd v Law Institute of Victoria [1994] 2 VR 313 …. [27035], [27130] Middlesex Justices; Ex parte Bond; R v [1933] 2 KB 1; [1933] All ER Rep 294 …. [5025] Middleton v Freier [1958] Qd R 351 …. [1290] — v Melton (1829) 10 B & C 317; 109 ER 467 …. [33015] — v R (1998) 19 WAR 179; 100 A Crim R 244 …. [17120], [33455], [33775] — v — (2000) 114 A Crim R 258 …. [29050] — v Rowlett [1954] 2 All ER 277; [1954] 1 WLR 831 …. [17620], [17660]
Middleton; R v (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 …. [17485] — [1975] QB 191; [1974] 2 All ER 1190 …. [33640] Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch 384; [1978] 3 All ER 571 …. [29125] Midland Metals Overseas Ltd v Comptroller- General of Customs (1991) 30 FCR 87 …. [5030] Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149; [1891] All ER Rep 1019 …. [3085] Migliorini; R v [1981] Tas R 80 …. [1300], [1305] Mikhailitchenko v Normand (1993) SLT 1138 …. [33805] Miladinovic; R v (1992) 109 ACTR 11 …. [1305], [1445], [31045] — (1993) 47 FCR 190; 124 ALR 698 …. [1445] Milano Assicurazioni Sp A v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 977 …. [25055] Milat; R v (1996) 87 A Crim R 446 …. [29075] Miles; R v (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198 …. [21205] Miletic; R v [1997] 1 VR 593 …. [17290], [17295] Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307; 6 ALR 1 …. [7275] Milinkovic; R v (1985) 17 A Crim R 122 …. [9035] Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd [1972] ALR 65; (1971) 17 FLR 141 …. [29050], [29060], [29150], [33160] Milk Board; Ex parte Tomkins; R v [1944] VLR 187; [1944] ALR 388 …. [3135] Millar; R v [2000] 1 Qd R 437 …. [19020] Miller v Babu Madho Das (1896) LR 23 Ind App 106 …. [1665] — v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572; [1936] ALR 301 …. [1680] — v Hood [1921] NZLR 998 …. [41050] — v Howe [1969] 3 All ER 451; [1969] 1 WLR 1510 …. [31120],
[31140] — v Inland Revenue Cmrs [1999] 1 NZLR 275 …. [25010] — v Jenkins [1910] VLR 380; (1910) 16 ALR 430 …. [33455] — v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; 22 ALR 119 …. [27270] — v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 …. [9005] — v R (1995) 13 WAR 504 …. [17270] — v Sabinske (1959) 322 SW 2d 941 …. [3220] — v Scorey [1996] 3 All ER 18; [1996] 1 WLR 1122 …. [25055] — v Travers [1824] All ER Rep 233; (1824) 131 ER 395 …. [39270] — v University of New South Wales (2003) 132 FCR 147; 200 ALR 565 …. [5030] Miller (RW) & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152 …. [33540], [35205] — v — (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 …. [29125] Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tank Ship (UK) Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 948 …. [29045] Miller’s Great Northern Hotel Pty Ltd v Fingleton (1974) 7 SASR 35 …. [33540], [37010], [37050] Miller; R v (1901) 65 JP 313 …. [21220] — (1980) 25 SASR 170 …. [1880], [21155], [33760] — (2007) 177 A Crim R 528 …. [19080] — [1952] 2 All ER 667 …. [19155], [21025], [21215], [23205], [23390] — [1986] 3 All ER 119; [1986] 1 WLR 1191 …. [33655], [33660] — [1997] 2 Cr App R 178 …. [23310] Milliken; R v (1969) 53 Cr App R 330 …. [17645], [17650], [17670], [17690] Milliman v Rochester Railway Co (1896) 39 NYS 274 …. [1215] Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459; [1967] 2 All ER 100 …. [5075]
— v Mills (1920) 36 TLR 772 …. [33115] — v — (1938) 60 CLR 150; 11 ALJR 527 …. [11150] — v Oddy (1834) 6 Car & P 728; 172 ER 1438 …. [39055] — v R [1995] 3 All ER 865; [1995] 1 WLR 511 …. [1400], [37060] — v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411 …. [1400] Mills and Lemon; R v [1947] KB 297; [1946] 2 All ER 776 …. [33495], [33690] Mills; R v [1962] 3 All ER 298; [1962] 1 WLR 1152 …. [17200], [17560] — [1975] 2 NSWLR 741 …. [1240] — [1986] 1 Qd R 77 …. [21050], [21175] — [1986] VR 617 …. [33610] — [1998] AC 382; [1997] 3 All ER 780 …. [17130] Milne v Leisler [1861] All ER Rep Ext 2334; (1862) 158 ER 686 …. [17300], [37150], [37160] — v Pope and Belair Cellars Pty Ltd (1972) 4 SASR 45 …. [35005], [35090] Milne (No 1); R v (2010) 260 FLR 166 …. [17020], [29050], [29230] Milner v Anderson (1982) 42 ACTR 23 …. [27255], [27295] Milnes; R v (1983) 33 SASR 211 …. [9120], [33645] Milojevic v ROH Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78 …. [5030] Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240; 130 ALR 659 …. [1490] Minagall v Ayres [1966] SASR 151 …. [3140] Minarowska; R v (1995) 83 A Crim R 78 …. [27215] Mineral Deposits Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Re Claye and Lynch (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 167 …. [1290] Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361 …. [25265]
Minh; R v [1997] 2 Cr App R 12 …. [27215] Minihane; R v (1921) 16 Cr App R 38 …. [25150] Minister v Ryan (1963) 9 LGRA 112 …. [29075] Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 40; 149 ALR 78 …. [1215] Minister for Education v Bailey (2000) 23 WAR 149 …. [25055] Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 10 …. [3165] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649 …. [5190] — v Gungor (1982) 42 ALR 209 …. [5190] — v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193; 92 ALR 93 …. [5030] — v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666 …. [1065] — v Teoh (1995) 39 ALD 206; 183 CLR 273; 128 ALR 353 …. [41005] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507; 178 ALR 421 …. [1215] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59; 77 ALJR 1165 …. [15165] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan (2005) 143 FCR 398 …. [25290] Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Taveli (1990) 23 FCR 162; 94 ALR 177 …. [37025] Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154 …. [1175], [7240] Minnesota v Purdy (1967) 153 NW 2d 254 …. [31095] Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd (2002) 56 IPR 248 …. [17150], [29205] Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beierscorf (Aust) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253; 29 ALR 29 …. [29080]
Minniti v R (2006) 196 FLR 431 …. [9040] Minors; R v [1989] 2 All ER 208; [1989] 1 WLR 441 …. [31075], [35425] Mintech Resources Pty Ltd v Russell-Taylor (2012) 113 SASR 80 …. [1215] Minter v Priest [1929] 1 KB 655 …. [25245] — v — [1930] AC 558; [1930] All ER Rep 431 …. [11030], [25245], [25265] Minuzzo and Williams; R v [1984] VR 417 …. [33570] Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436 …. [33595] Mirbach v McHardy (1889) 8 NZLR 248 …. [33350] Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Fitzpatrick [1984] 1 NSWLR 643 …. [37085] Mirza; R v [2004] 1 AC 1118; [2004] 1 All ER 925 …. [27215] Mister Figgins v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 …. [21280], [21285] Mitchell v Mitchell [1984] FLC 91-526 …. [33840] — v R [1998] AC 695 …. [11070] — v W S Kimpton & Sons Pty Ltd [1971] VR 583 …. [3070] Mitchell Contractors Pty Ltd v Townsville- Thuringowa Water Supply Joint Board [2005] 1 Qd R 373 …. [25280] Mitchell; R v (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 …. [15055], [15225], [17480], [33310], [33485] — (1952) 36 Cr App R 79 …. [15140], [15240], [21115] — (1997) 130 ACTR 48 …. [9090], [29075] — [1970] Crim LR 153 …. [33805] — [1971] VR 46 …. [1320], [3180], [35335] — [2008] 2 Qd R 142 …. [15220] Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v Victorian Work Cover Authority
(2002) 4 VR 332 …. [25235], [25240] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Harbord (1997) 69 SASR 75 …. [5075] Mitten; R v [1966] 1 QB 10; [1965] 2 All ER 59 …. [1240] Mitton v Curl [1922] SASR 282 …. [25105] Mizner v Lohr (1931) 238 NW 584 …. [1295] Mizzi v R (1960) 105 CLR 659; [1961] ALR 137 …. [9045] MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 …. [17535], [19035] MJJ; R v (2013) 117 SASR 81; [2013] SASCFC 51 …. [21050], [21257] Mlaka; R v [1971] VR 385 …. [15035], [17095], [17650], [17675] MLB v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 575 …. [35410] MM v Australian Crime Commission (2007) 244 ALR 452 …. [25250] MM; R v (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 …. [21050] — (2004) 145 A Crim R 148 …. [17065], [17295] MMAL Rentals Pty Ltd v Bruning (2004) 63 NSWLR 167 …. [29070] MMI Workers Compensation (NSW) v Kennedy (1993) 9 NSWCCR 482 …. [3135] MMJ; R v (2006) 166 A Crim R 501 …. [7085], [33480], [33485] MNO v Western Australia (2009) 193 A Crim R 466 …. [11140] Moage Ltd (in liq) v Jagelman (2002) 43 ACSR 173 …. [25055] Moage Ltd (in liq), Re; Sheahan v Pitterino (1998) 82 FCR 10; 163 ALR 65 …. [25280], [25290] Moana; R v [1979] 1 NZLR 181 …. [15195] Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34 …. [25055] Mobil Oil Corp v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25; (1983) 51 ALR 735 …. [31095], [35350], [37090] Moeller; R v (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 613; 30 WN (NSW) 166 …. [15075]
Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601; 13 ALR 225 …. [7050], [9120] Moffatt; R v (2000) 112 A Crim R 201 …. [35620] Mogg; R v (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 …. [11135], [19095] Moghal; R v (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 …. [17200], [17205], [17550], [17560], [37115], [37120] Mokbel v Attorney-General (Cth) (2007) 162 FCR 278; 244 ALR 517 …. [41020] Mokbel; R v (2012) 35 VR 156 …. [27315] Mole v Mole [1951] P 21; [1950] 2 All ER 328 …. [25365] Moller v Bruce Sanders [1962] QWN 12 …. [7160] Mollinson; R v [1977] Crim LR 161 …. [33420] Molloy; R v (2008) 102 SASR 452 …. [9030] — [1997] 2 Cr App R 283 …. [25265] Moloney; R v (1888) 14 VLR 934 …. [19045] Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1; 280 ALR 221 …. [7015], [7085], [7120], [7180] Momcilovic; R v (2010) 265 ALR 751 …. [7180] Momodou; R v [2005] 2 All ER 571; [2005] 1 WLR 3442 …. [17170] Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196; [1949] 1 All ER 1 …. [3020] Monckton v Tarr (1930) 23 BWCC 504 …. [7315] Mond v Berger (2004) 10 VR 534 …. [41035] Mondon; R v (1968) 52 Cr App R 695 …. [17065] — [2003] 1 Qd R 200 …. [15020] Monfries v Municipal Tramways Trust [1970] SASR 521 …. [35090] Mong; R v (2002) 5 VR 565 …. [11135] Monkton v A-G (1831) 2 Russ & M 147; 39 ER 350 …. [33235]
Monroe v Twisleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; 170 ER 250 …. [13030], [13235], [25200] Monroe Australia Pty Ltd v Campbell (1995) 65 SASR 16 …. [29075] Montecatini’s Patent, Re (1973) 47 ALJR 161 …. [29050], [29150], [31120], [35340], [39010] Montgomerie & Co Ltd v Wallace-James [1904] AC 73; [1900] All ER Rep 926 …. [11150] Montgomery v Counsell [1956] St R Qd 120 …. [15205] — v Macpherson (1895) 16 LR (NSW) (Eq) 81 …. [25255] Montgomery; R v [1966] NI 120 …. [1245] Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 119; [1976] 1 All ER 763 …. [21280], [21285], [21290] Moon; R v [1969] 3 All ER 803; [1969] 1 WLR 1705 …. [7030] Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 …. [17160], [17165], [17465], [17495] Moor v Moor [1954] 2 All ER 458; [1954] 1 WLR 927 …. [17150] Moor; R v (1920) 15 Cr App R 31 …. [11140] Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR (CN) 1049 …. [5195] — v Hewitt [1947] KB 831; [1947] 2 All ER 270 …. [15045], [15050] — v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 All ER 782; [1969] 1 WLR 141 …. [17055] — v Mahoney (1901) 27 VLR 166; 7 ALR 107 …. [33455] — v R (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 …. [17575] — v Ransome’s Dock Committee (1898) 14 TLR 539 …. [21275] — v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152 …. [17180] — v Wayne (No 2) (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 570 …. [25200] Moore; R v (1852) 2 Den 522; 169 ER 608 …. [33635] — (1892) 61 LJMC 80 …. [13275] — (1914) 10 Cr App R 54 …. [1160], [37155]
— (1956) 40 Cr App R 50 …. [5210] — (1957) 25 CR 159 …. [17390] — (1972) 56 Cr App R 373 …. [33620], [33635] — (1973) 17 CCC (2d) 348 …. [11125] — (1948) (2) SA 227 …. [19005] — [1982] 1 NZLR 242 …. [19050], [29050] Moorhouse v Lord (1863) 10 HLC 272; 11 ER 1030 …. [9085] Moran v McMahon (1985) 3 NSWLR 700 …. [11150] Moran; R v [1999] 2 VR 87 …. [1220] Mordecai, Re (1982) 8 Fam LR 510 …. [33840] Morekoare; R v [2001] 1 NZLR 318 …. [29050] Moreton v Montrose Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 496 …. [39240] — v Moreton [1937] P 151; [1937] 1 All ER 470 …. [1520] Morey v Transurban City Link Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-571 …. [39045] Morgan v AG (Qld) (1986) 24 A Crim R 342 …. [29050] — v Babcock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163; [1929] ALR 313 …. [7150], [7165], [23030], [39045] — v Brydges (1818) 2 Stark 314; 171 ER 657 …. [17500] — v Evans (1834) 3 Cl & F 159; 6 ER 1397 …. [33435] — v Griffith (1871) LR 6 Exch 70 …. [39195] — v Kazandzis (2010) 206 A Crim R 235 …. [15260], [17375], [17390] — v Morgan [1977] Fam 122; [1977] 2 All ER 515 …. [27120] — v Nicholl (1866) LR 2 CP 117 …. [33795] — v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 33 …. [1645], [29195] — v Shaw (1819) 4 Madd 54; 56 ER 629 …. [25240], [25270] — v Work Cover Corp (2013) 118 SASR 297 …. [5040] Morgan; Ex parte A-G (Qld); R v [1987] 2 Qd R 627 …. [11105],
[29075] Morgan, Ex parte; Re Simpson (1876) 2 Ch D 72 …. [33420] Morgan; R v (1875) 14 Cox CC 337 …. [33295] — (1910) 5 Cr App R 157 …. [23315] — (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 …. [19090] — [1978] 3 All ER 13; [1978] 1 WLR 735 …. [15140] — [1981] 2 NZLR 164 …. [17395] Moriarty v London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1870) LR 5 QB 314 …. [19040], [31165], [33435] Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Levine [1990] VR 205 …. [5070] Morley v ASIC (2010) 274 ALR 205; 247 FLR 140 …. [1215] — v Morley (1855) 5 De GM & G 610; 43 ER 1007 …. [17480] — v National Insurance Co [1967] VR 566 …. [35050] Morley; R v (1999) 107 A Crim R 538 …. [7085] — [1988] QB 601; [1988] 2 All ER 396 …. [17135] Morleys of Brixton v Minott [1982] ICR 444 …. [33430] Morny Ltd’s Trade Marks, Re (1951) 68 RPC 131 …. [29155], [37090] Morrell v Frith (1838) 3 M & W 402; 150 ER 1201 …. [11015] Morris v Baron & Co [1918] AC 1 …. [39165] — v Davies [1835] All ER Rep 270; (1835) 7 ER 365 …. [31095] — v Kanssen [1946] AC 459; [1946] 1 All ER 586 …. [1175] — v Lessees (1833) 32 US 554 …. [33845] — v London Iron & Steel Co Ltd [1988] QB 493; [1987] 2 All ER 496 …. [9015] — v Miller (1767) 4 Burr 2057; 98 ER 73 …. [1480] — v R (1987) 163 CLR 454; 74 ALR 161 …. [11140], [17565], [33660] — v — (2006) 201 FLR 325 …. [7085]
— v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 413 …. [5030] Morris; Ex parte A-G; R v [1996] 2 Qd R 68 …. [11100], [13060] Morris, Re; Ex parte Donnelly v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1997) 77 FCR 303; 148 ALR 349 …. [35655] Morris; R v (1959) 43 Cr App R 206 …. [23285], [23315] — (1995) 2 Cr App R 69 …. [21065] — (1997) 98 A Crim R 408 …. [9120] — [1972] 1 All ER 384; [1972] 1 WLR 228 …. [11135] Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626 …. [1235], [9040] — v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482 …. [9115], [9120] — v R BC9501869 …. [1370] Morrison Rose & Partners v Hillman [1961] 2 QB 266; [1961] 2 All ER 891 …. [5120] Morrison-Knudsen Co Inc v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1973) 31 DLR (3d) 633 …. [17240], [17570] Morrison; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 159 …. [17075], [23360] — (1911) 75 JP 272 …. [17620] — (2002) 136 A Crim 223 …. [29150] — [1999] 1 Qd R 397 …. [9070] Morrissy v Clements (1885) 11 VLR 13 …. [15150] Morrow; R v (2009) 26 VR 526 …. [17440], [17460] Mortimer v Brown (1970) 122 CLR 493; [1972] ALR 723 …. [25060], [25180] — v M’Callan (1840) 6 M & W 58; 151 ER 320 …. [39065], [39070] — v Mortimer (1820) 2 Hag Con 310; 161 ER 559 …. [33625] Mortimer; R v (1936) 25 Cr App R 150 …. [21040], [21190] Morton v Elgin-Stuczynski (2008) 19 VR 294 …. [39240]
Morton; R v (2008) 191 A Crim R 333 …. [35495] Mosey; R v (1784) 1 Leach 265n; 168 ER 235n …. [27280] Mosley v Davies (1822) 11 Price 162; 147 ER 434 …. [33190] Mosley; R v (1825) 1 Mood 97; 168 ER 1200 …. [33265] Moss v Baines [1974] WAR 7 …. [9040], [15095] — v Chesham Urban District Council (1945 unreported) …. [27005] — v Moss [1963] 2 QB 799; [1963] 2 All ER 829 …. [13110], [13240] Mostyn; R v (2004) 145 A Crim R 304 …. [21050] Motchall v Massoud [1926] VLR 273 …. [9050] Mothersdale v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd (1930) 142 LT 541 …. [3135] Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 176 FCR 66 …. [33435] Motor Auction Pty Ltd v John Joyce Wholesale Cars Pty Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 647; 138 FLR 118 …. [7075] Moulang v CSR Chemicals Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 38 …. [11010] Mount v Oldham Corporation [1973] QB 309; [1973] 1 All ER 26 …. [3050] Mount Cook (Northland) Ltd v Swedish Motors Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 720 …. [41005], [41035] Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; [1971] ALR 253 …. [3235] Mount; R v (1934) 24 Cr App R 135 …. [13110] Moussa; R v (2001) 125 A Crim R 505 …. [27315], [33775] Movis; R v (1994) 75 A Crim R 416 …. [21170] Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85 …. [7255] Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162; [2003] 1 WLR 1929 …. [11010]
Mraz v R (No 2) (1956) 96 CLR 62; [1956] ALR 999 …. [5145] MRW; R v (1999) 113 A Crim R 308 …. [17120] MSK; R v (2004) 61 NSWLR 204 …. [13070] Mudd v Suckermore, Doe d (1837) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331 …. [39100], [39105] Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601; 76 ALJR 966 …. [1215] Muir; R v (1983) 79 Cr App R 153 …. [31145] Muise (No 2); R v (1975) 23 CCC (2d) 422 …. [17265] Muldoon v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 105 …. [1245], [29185] Mule v — (2005) 221 ALR 85; 79 ALJR 1573 …. [33455] Mulkearns v Chandos Developments Pty Ltd (No 4) (2005) 12 BPR 22, 993 …. [25395] Mulle; R v (1865) 4 F & F 923n; 176 ER 850n …. [17335], [17340] Mullen v Conoco Ltd [1998] QB 382 …. [5025] — v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 2 All ER 906; [1997] 1 WLR 1103 …. [3025] Mullen; R v [1992] Crim LR 735 …. [21175] — [2004] 2 Cr App R 18 …. [1310] Mullenger v Mullenger [1922] NZLR 510 …. [39180] Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] PNLR 74 …. [25360], [25385] Muller; R v (2013) 178 ACTR 1; 273 FLR 215 …. [13060] Mulligan, Re; Ex parte Isidoro [1979] WAR 198 …. [5130] Mulligan; R v [1955] OR 240 …. [11045] Mullins; R v (1848) 3 Cox CC 526 …. [15095], [15105], [17170] Multi Modal Ltd v Polakow (1987) 78 ALR 553 …. [1025], [1630], [1635] Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Bligh Lobb Pink Pty Ltd (2002) 18
BCL 376 …. [25290] — v HSH Hotels (Aust) Ltd (2003) 20 BCL 321 …. [17445] Mulvena v Kelman [1965] NZLR 656 …. [39250] Mulvy v Henry Berry & Co Pty Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 389 …. [39160] Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99; [1956] ALR 795 …. [7005], [7225] Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 …. [7070] Munday v Gill (1930) 44 CLR 38; [1930] ALR 313 …. [3175] Munday; R v (2003) 7 VR 423 …. [17270] Mundell, Re; Fenton v Cumberlage (1883) 48 LT 776 …. [17505], [19015] Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 …. [27095], [33435] Mundine; R v (2008) 182 A Crim R 302 …. [11125] Mundraby v Commonwealth (2001) 184 ALR 737 …. [25225] Mundy v Bridge Motors Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 125 …. [17370] Municipal Council of Sydney v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 208 …. [3158] Munnery; R v (1990) 94 Cr App R 164 …. [17690] Munnings v Hydro-Electric Commission (1971) 125 CLR 1; [1971] ALR 609 …. [3020] Munro v Dunn (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 209; 42 WN (NSW) 53 …. [33555] Munro Brice and Co v War Risks Assn Ltd [1918] 2 KB 78; [1916] All ER Rep 981n …. [7195], [9005] Munro Machinery Pty Ltd v Scrap Metal Co of Australia Ltd (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 399 …. [35105] Munroe v Tooheys Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 74; 21 IPR 268 …. [3020] Murakami v Wiryadi (2010) 268 ALR 377 …. [41005]
Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329 …. [1410], [29050], [29185] — v Taylor [1965] AC 574; [1965] 1 All ER 406 …. [1030], [13105], [17475], [21215], [23375], [23380] Murdoch (No 1); R v (2005) 195 FLR 362 …. [1360], [1410] Murdoch (No 4); R v (2005) 195 FLR 421 …. [1370], [29050] Murdoch (No 5); R v (2005) 195 FLR 442 …. [1135] Murdoch; R v (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 …. [11125] Murnkami; R v [1951] SCR 801 …. [11120] Murphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 …. [5080] — v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51 …. [1125] — v Haskell [1961] SASR 1 …. [35090] — v Lew [1998] 3 VR 791 …. [35340], [35350] — v Matlock [1926] VLR 170; (1926) 32 ALR 135 …. [1175] — v R (1989) 167 CLR 94; 86 ALR 35 …. [29045], [29050], [29105], [29125], [33660] — v — (1994) 62 SASR 121 …. [31185] — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 523 …. [1375] — v Rae [1967] NZLR 103 …. [39160] — v Stone Wallwork (Charlton) Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 949; [1969] 1 WLR 1023 …. [11150] — v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518; [1997] 1 WLR 1591 …. [5195] Murphy; R v (1753) 19 St Tr 693 …. [19170] — (1837) 8 Car & P 297; 173 ER 502 …. [17055] — (1867) 4 WW & A’B (L) 63 …. [1250] — (1869) LR 2 PC 535 …. [27215] — (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 239 …. [33615]
— (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; 63 ALR 53 …. [9040] — (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 …. [27095] — (1996) 66 SASR 406; 186 LSJS 467 …. [33690] — [1965] NI 138 …. [11045], [27235], [27310] — [1980] QB 434; [1980] 2 All ER 325 …. [29060] Murray v Figge (1974) 4 ALR 612 …. [17725] — v Kickmaier [1979] 1 NSWLR 414 …. [9015] — v Milner (1879) 12 Ch D 845 …. [33210] — v Murray (1960) 33 ALJR 521 …. [9045], [9085] — v R (2002) 211 CLR 193; 189 ALR 40 …. [9030] Murray (EM) (dec’d), Re; Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales v Salwey [1964] NSWR 121 …. [3020] Murray-Oates v JJAD Pty Ltd (1999) 76 SASR 38 …. [35090] Murray; R v (1916) 10 Alta LR 275; 33 DLR 702 …. [1360] — (1916) 33 DLR 702 …. [1385], [1445] — (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 …. [17350], [19005] — (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 …. [17295] — (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 …. [17485] — [1951] 1 KB 391; [1950] 2 All ER 925 …. [11045], [33660] — [1997] 2 Cr App R 136 …. [33575] Murray’s Transport NSW Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd (2013) 118 SASR 11 …. [1215], [7065] Murrell; R v [2005] Crim LR 869 …. [19155] Mursic; R v [1980] Qd R 482 …. [17535] Murtagh and Kennedy; R v (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 …. [9005], [9020] Murton; R v (1862) 3 F & F 492; 176 ER 221 …. [33290] Muscot; R v (1713) 10 Mod 192; 88 ER 689 …. [15020]
Mushtaq; R v [2005] 3 All ER 885; [2005] 1 WLR 1513 …. [11050] Musico; R v (1991) 55 SASR 274 …. [33725] Musolino; R v (2003) 86 SASR 37 …. [17545], [17580] Mustafa; R v (1976) 65 Cr App R 26 …. [21100], [21180] — (2005) 91 SASR 62 …. [17285], [23230] Musterer; R v (1967) 61 WWR 63 …. [17170] Mutch v Country and Suburban Stock Feeds Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 708 …. [37010] — v Sleeman (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 125; 46 WN (NSW) 52 …. [17510] Mutch; R v [1973] 1 All ER 178 …. [23030] Mutchke; R v (1946) AD 874 …. [31200] Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484 …. [3020] Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon (1892) 145 US 285 …. [1140], [37120] Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Moss (1906) 4 CLR 311 …. [3200] MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436; 80 ALJR 329 …. [17460] MWL; R v (2002) 137 A Crim R 282 …. [17295] Myall; R v (1986) 43 SASR 258 …. [1195] Myatt v Myatt and Parker [1962] 2 All ER 247; [1962] 1 WLR 570 …. [33520] Myers v Claudianos (1990) 95 ACTR 1; 100 FLR 362 …. [9120] — v Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] AC 1001; [1964] 2 All ER 881 …. [31015], [31020], [31040], [31045], [31075], [31120] — v Government of Manitoba and Dobrowski (1961) 26 DLR (2d) 550 …. [1290] Myers; R v [1964] 1 All ER 877 …. [31120] — [1996] 2 Cr App R 335 …. [33595]
— [1998] AC 124; [1997] 4 All ER 314 …. [33045], [33595] N, RC; R v (2012) 222 A Crim R 521 …. [17295] N; R v (1992) 95 Cr App R 356 …. [11035] — [1994] 3 NZLR 641 …. [17270] Naa; R v (2009) 76 NSWLR 271 …. [27315], [33775], [35650] Nachsatz v Prout [1959] VR 694; [1959] ALR 1210 …. [35075] Nadler v Police (SA) (2008) 187 A Crim R 347 …. [13165] Nagan v Holloway [1996] 1 Qd R 607 …. [25225] Naguib; R v [1917] 1 KB 359 …. [41005] Nagy; R v [1990] Crim LR 187 …. [15255] Naidanovici; R v [1962] NZLR 334 …. [17205], [17220], [17225], [17230] Naismith v Smith [1954] VLR 567; [1954] ALR 965 …. [33460] Nalder v Dutch-Australian Contracting Co Pty Ltd [1960] VR 458 …. [31010], [37005], [37010], [37130] Nanan v State [1986] AC 860; [1986] 3 All ER 248 …. [27215] Nanette; R v [1982] VR 81 …. [15170], [15175] Naniseni v R [1971] NZLR 269 …. [33660] Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 507 …. [25065] NAR v PPCI (2013) 224 A Crim R 535 …. [25340] Nardozzi; R v [1995] 2 Qd R 87 …. [9070] Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 …. [17535] Narula; R v (1986) 22 A Crim R 409 …. [33745] Nash v Cmr for Railways (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 357 …. [1140] — v — [1963] NSWR 30; [1963] SR (NSW) 357; (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 460 …. [31055]
— v United States (1932) 54 F 2d 1006 …. [1520] Nash; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 225 …. [1200] Nason v Clamp (1864) 12 WR 973 …. [17480] Nast v Nast [1972] Fam 142; [1972] 1 All ER 1171 …. [25135] Nat Bell Liquors Ltd; R v [1922] 2 AC 128; [1922] All ER Rep 335 …. [5025] Natasien; R v [1972] 2 NSWLR 227 …. [17650], [17685] Nathan v MJF Constructions [1986] VR 75 …. [27210] — v Vos [1970] SASR 455 …. [17315] Nation; R v [1954] SASR 189 …. [15095], [17250], [17605], [17615] National Assn of Operative Plasterers v Smithies [1906] AC 434; [1904] All ER Rep 961 …. [25100] National Australia Bank v Saunders (1988) 12 NSWLR 623 …. [27080] National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 …. [1520], [35545], [39080] National Auto Glass Supplies (Aust) Pty Ltd v Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2007] FCA 569; BC200703272 …. [17505] National Bank of Greece & Athens SA v Metliss [1958] AC 509; [1957] 3 All ER 608; [1957] 3 WLR 1056 …. [41005] National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Chapman [1975] 1 NZLR 480 …. [35095], [35100] National Crime Authority v Gould (1989) 23 FCR 191; 90 ALR 489 …. [27155] — v S (1991) 29 FCR 203; 100 ALR 151 …. [25225], [25240], [25295] National Employers Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 …. [25060], [25240] National Employers Mutual General Insurance Assn Ltd v — (1979) 141 CLR 648; 24 ALR 86 …. [25240], [25245], [25275]
National Instruments Pty Ltd v Gilles (1975) 49 ALJR 349 …. [3135] National Insurance Co Ltd v Whirlybird Holdings Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 513 …. [25020] National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 …. [29080] National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209; 87 ALR 539 …. [41005] National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 10 …. [33840] National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Godrich (1909) 10 CLR 1; 16 ALR 110 …. [1645] — v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 …. [5195], [5225] National Provincial Bank of England v Jackson (1886) 33 Ch D 1 …. [39130] National Shipping Corporation v Arab [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 363 …. [41005] National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1915] AC 207 …. [39265] National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth (2001) 111 FCR 583; 188 ALR 614 …. [27065] National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v A-G (Vic) [1973] VR 610 …. [3060], [3125] National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Dwyer (1940) 63 CLR 1; [1940] ALR 86 …. [3020] National Trustees, Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1916) 22 CLR 367; 22 ALR 409 …. [3158] National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd v Powe (1992) 1 Tas R 161 …. [33840] Nationwide Building Society v Various Solicitors [1999] PNLR 52 ….
[25225], [25265] Nationwide News Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (1996) 40 NSWLR 486 …. [1705] Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282; 104 ALR 143 …. [17585], [17590], [19030] Navarolli; R v [2010] 1 Qd R 27; (2009) 194 A Crim R 96 …. [17435] Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269; 162 ALR 540 …. [9120], [11085], [29105], [29125] Naylor v Stephen (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 231 …. [17600] Naylor; Ex parte A-G; R v [2013] 1 Qd R 368 …. [33650] Naylor; R v [1933] 1 KB 685; [1932] All ER Rep 152 …. [15225], [33770] Nazif; R v [1987] 2 NZLR 122 …. [17280], [17285] NBGM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 CLR 52; 231 ALR 380 …. [41005] Nea Karteria Maritime Co Ltd v Atlantic & Great Lakes Steamship Corp (No 2) [1981] Com LR 138 …. [25015] Neagle v Power [1967] SASR 373 …. [29125] Neal v Fior [1968] 3 All ER 865; [1968] 1 WLR 1875 …. [7230] Neal; R v [1947] ALR (CN) 616 …. [17160], [17380], [17425] Neale; R v (1977) 65 Cr App R 304 …. [19155], [21025], [21040], [21165] Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449; 67 ALJR 170 …. [9050] Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow [1995] 1 All ER 976 …. [25010], [25225] Neil v Biggers (1972) 409 US 188 …. [1445] — v Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135 …. [31140], [33815] Neilan; R v [1992] 1 VR 57 …. [1220], [1290], [1295], [9030]
Neile v Jakle (1849) 2 Car & Kir 709; 175 ER 297 …. [33475] Neill v North Antrim Magistrates’ Court [1992] 4 All ER 846; [1992] 1 WLR 1220 …. [31055], [31095], [37085] — v NSW Fresh Food and Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362; [1963] ALR 258 …. [3235] Neilly v R [2012] 2 Cr App R 20 …. [1410], [1420] Neilson v Harford (1841) 8 M & W806; 151 ER 1266 …. [11010] — v Laugharne [1981] QB 736; [1981] 1 All ER 829 …. [27005], [27105], [27110] — v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; 221 ALR 213 …. [41005], [41035] Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 222 ALR 631; 80 ALJR 341 …. [3159] Nelson v John Lysaght (Aust) Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 201; 5 ALR 289 …. [1530] — v Lord Bridport, Earl [1843] All ER Rep 1032; (1845) 50 ER 207 …. [41035] — v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; 132 ALR 133 …. [3159] Nelson, Ex parte (No 1) (1928) 42 CLR 209; [1929] ALR 21 …. [3158] Nelson; R v (1922) 69 DLR 180 …. [3020] — (1978) 68 Cr App R 12 …. [23315] — [1982] Qd R 636 …. [19005] — [1992] Crim LR 653 …. [17390] Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 495; [1948] 54 ALR 145 …. [3156] Nembhard v R [1982] 1 All ER 183; [1981] 1 WLR 1515 …. [1400], [33275] Nemeth v Bayswater Road Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 406 …. [39160] Neowarra v Western Australia (No 1) (2003) 134 FCR 208; 205 ALR 145 …. [29195], [29200]
— v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 134 FCR 261 …. [35520] Neptune Oil Co Pty Ltd v Fowler (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 530; 80 WN (NSW) 971 …. [7120] Nesbitt v Parrett (1902) 18 TLR 510 …. [27215] Ness v Graffen (2003) 60 NSWLR 549 …. [3165] Nessel; R v (1980) 5 A Crim R 374 …. [33570] Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140; [1966] ALR 163 …. [1200] Nestorov v R (2002) 137 A Crim R 310 …. [15220] Netaf Pty Ltd v Bikane Pty Ltd (1990) 92 ALR 490 …. [39160] Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 650 …. [1025] Network Ten Ltd v Capital Television Holdings Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 275 …. [25010], [25020], [25265] Neubecker v R (2012) 34 VR 369; 220 A Crim R 585 …. [21050] Nevill v Fine Art and General Insurance Co [1897] AC 68; [1895] All ER Rep 164 …. [11015] Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108 …. [1370], [1400], [1445], [29185] Neville; R v [1985] 2 Qd R 398 …. [5155], [17375], [17655] New Brunswick Railway Co v British and French Trust Corp Ltd [1939] AC 1; [1938] 4 All ER 737 …. [5025] New England Country Homes Pty Ltd v Moore (1998) 82 FCR 500; 45 IPR 186 …. [29115] New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd (2009) 180 FCR 543; 261 ALR 311 …. [25210] — v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 222 ALR 663 …. [3020] — v Commonwealth (No 1) (1932) 46 CLR 155 …. [3156] — v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 195 ALR 412 …. [3159]
— v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536 …. [3135] — v Ryan (1998) 101 LGERA 246 …. [27065] New South Wales Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 94 CLR 509; [1956] ALR 286 …. [11010] New South Wales Bar Assn v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231 …. [9075] New South Wales Cancer Council v Sarfaty (1992) 28 NSWLR 68 …. [39160] New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties Inc v Classification Review Board (2006) 236 ALR 313 …. [25285] New South Wales Country Press Co-operative Ltd v Stewart (1911) 12 CLR 481; 17 ALR 554 …. [33540] New South Wales Crime Commission v Ahmadi (1997 unreported) …. [25175] — v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448 …. [35545], [35595] New Victoria Hospital v Ryan [1993] ICR 201 …. [25245] New World Alliance Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apptd), Re; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler (1993) 47 FCR 90; 118 ALR 699 …. [25060] New York v Heirs of Phillips [1939] 3 All ER 952 …. [9050] New Zealand Diving Equipment Ltd v Canterbury Lines [1967] NZLR 961 …. [39290] New Zealand Public Service Assn v Lee [1970] NZLR 317 …. [3135] New Zealand Social Credit Political League Inc v O’Brien [1984] 1 NZLR 84 …. [5175] New, Prance and Garrard’s Trustee v Hunting [1897] 1 QB 607 …. [33450] — v — [1897] 2 QB 19 …. [33450] Newall; R v (1984) 5 DLR (4th) 352 …. [17545], [17615] Newbold v R [1983] 2 AC 705 …. [33385]
Newbould v Smith (1885) 29 Ch D 882 …. [33015] Newcastle v The Hundred of Broxtowe, Duke of (1832) 4 B & Ad 273; 110 ER 458 …. [33195] Newcastle Justices; Ex parte Hindle; R v [1984] 1 All ER 770 …. [7050], [9120] Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 …. [1735], [25260], [25300] Newcomen v Corrigan (1880) 1 NSWLR (L) 358 …. [1650] Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 40 FCR 507; 113 ALR 370 …. [25010], [25015] Newell v Cronje (1985) (4) SA 692 …. [3140] — v Radford (1867) LR 3 CP 52 …. [39190] Newell; R v [2012] 2 Cr App R 10 …. [33540] Newey (dec’d), Re [1994] 2 NZLR 590 …. [15150] Newland; R v (1997) 98 A Crim R 455 …. [1220] Newman v Gatti (1907) 24 TLR 18 …. [39160], [39195] Newman, Ex parte; Re Fischer and McInemy [1969] 1 NSWR 538 …. [33435] Newman; R v (1852) 3 Car & K 252; 175 ER 541 …. [17055] Newport; R v [1998] Crim LR 581 …. [37065] Newsome; R v (1980) 71 Cr App R 325 …. [17285], [17335] Newton v Liddiard (1848) 12 QB 925; 116 ER 1117 …. [33420] — v Pieper (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 404 …. [35070], [35105] Newton; R v (1844) 1 Car & Kir 469; 174 ER 896 …. [1175] — (1912) 7 Cr App R 214 …. [27215] — (1983) 77 Cr App R 13 …. [1045] Neylan v Dickens [1987] 1 NZLR 402 …. [5070] Nezovic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs (No 2) (2003) 133 FCR 190; 203 ALR 33 …. [35390], [41040] Ng v R [1958] AC 173 …. [7160] Ng; R v (2002) 5 VR 257 …. [27255] Ngahooro; R v [1982] 2 NZLR 203 …. [31185] Ngatikaura; R v (2006) 161 A Crim R 329 …. [21252] Ngema; R v (1960) (2) SA 263 …. [17460] Ngo; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 …. [19005], [33575], [35510], [35605], [35620] — (2002) 135 A Crim R 550 …. [21050] Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59 …. [1445], [29050] — v — (2007) 180 A Crim R 267 …. [1370], [29185] Nguyen; R v (1995) 78 A Crim R 582 …. [33665] — (2001) 118 A Crim R 479 …. [9040], [15220] — (2002) 127 A Crim R 102 …. [17405] — (2008) 184 A Crim R 207 …. [31040], [31090] — [1989] 2 Qd R 72 …. [17565] — [1999] 1 VR 457 …. [31090] — [2000] 1 Qd R 559 …. [23150] NIAA Corp Ltd (in liq), Re (1993) 33 NSWLR 344 …. [1175] Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47 …. [5180] — v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466; [1950] 2 All ER 89 …. [1180], [3070] — v R (1998) 193 CLR 173; 151 ALR 312 …. [3200], [7275], [27310] Nicholas; R v (1846) 2 Car & K 246; 175 ER 102 …. [37130] — (2000) 1 VR 356 …. [17460], [27255] — [1988] Tas R 155 …. [39105] Nicholl v Jones (1865) 2 H & M 588; 71 ER 592 …. [25255]
Nicholls v Dowding (1815) 1 Stark 81; 171 ER 408 …. [17150], [17155] — v Michael Wilson & Partners Pty Ltd (2010) 243 FLR 177 …. [41005] — v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; 213 ALR 1 …. [17590], [19035], [19040] Nicholls; R v (1976) 63 Cr App R 187 …. [35055], [35425] — (1931) NPD 557 …. [37075] Nichols v Digney [1921] VLR 513 …. [15045] — v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232 …. [13050] Nichols; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 233 …. [33690] — [1965] QWN 10 …. [23140] Nicholson v Icepak Cool Stores Ltd [1999] 3 NZLR 475 …. [25245], [25265] — v Southern Star Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1927) 28 SR (NSW) 124 …. [25385] — v Superior Home Improvements Pty Ltd; Ex parte Nicholson [1987] 2 Qd R 201 …. [11095] Nicholson; R v (1984) 12 A Crim R 231 …. [35360] Nick Scali Ltd v Super A-Mart Pty Ltd (2010) 189 FCR 550; 275 ALR 228 …. [11125] Nickisson v R [1963] WAR 114 …. [29050] Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44 …. [25210], [25235], [25240], [25255], [25275] Nicol v Brisbane City Council [1969] Qd R 371 …. [25055] — v Nicol (1888) 14 VLR 695 …. [11085] Nicola v Ideal Image Development Corp Inc (2009) 261 ALR 1 …. [29200], [41005] Nicolazzo v Harb (2009) 22 VR 220 …. [39160] Nicoletti; R v (2006) 164 A Crim R 81 …. [33775] Nicolia v Cmr for Railways (NSW) [1972] ALR 185; (1970) 45 ALJR
465 …. [41070] Nicoll v Bower, Doe d (1851) 16 QB 805; 117 ER 1090 …. [17725] Nicoloudis; R v (1954) 38 Cr App R 118 …. [23210] Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74 …. [27195] Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Ltd, Re (2008) 222 FLR 21 …. [25420] Nielson; R v [1930] QWN 15 …. [33750] Niemann v Weller (1866) 3 WW & A’B (E) 125 …. [39185] Nieterink; R v (1999) 76 SASR 56; 206 LSJS 135 …. [21050] Nika Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1996) 14 ACLC 326 …. [25265] Nikoloski v Ridge Consolidated Pty Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 192 …. [17725] Nile v Wood (1988) 167 CLR 133; 76 ALR 91 …. [3158] Nilon; R v (1981) 5 A Crim R 385 …. [19135] Nilsen Industrial Electronics Pty Ltd v National Semi-Conductor Corp (1994) 48 FCR 337 …. [25010] Nilson; R v [1968] VR 238 …. [1310], [33690] Nimmo v Alexander Cowan and Sons Ltd [1968] AC 107; [1967] 3 All ER 187 …. [7120], [7170] Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 442 …. [25300] Ninness v Graham (1986) 70 ACTR 1 …. [27105] Nischina Trading Co Ltd v Chiyoda Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 QB 449; [1969] 2 All ER 776 …. [9050] Niven v R (1968) 118 CLR 513; [1969] ALR 187 …. [17625], [17655] Nixon; R v [1968] 2 All ER 33; [1968] 1 WLR 577 …. [17095] Niznick v Johnson (1961) 28 DLR (2d) 541 …. [1280]
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O’Brien; R v (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 146 …. [17165] — (1911) 7 Cr App R 29 …. [39100] — (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 486 …. [1675] — (1996) 66 SASR 396 …. [17120] — [1978] 1 SCR 591; (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 513 …. [31155] — [2008] 2 NZLR 516 …. [17375] O’Callaghan v Murphy (1804) 2 Sch & Lef 158 …. [17480] — v O’Sullivan [1925] 1 IR 90 …. [41035] O’Callaghan; R v [1976] VR 441 …. [3285], [29115] — [1976] VR 676 …. [1230] O’Chee v Rowley [2000] 1 Qd R 207; (1997) 150 ALR 199 …. [27095] O’Coigly; R v (1798) 26 St Tr 1191 …. [19045] O’Connell v Adams [1973] Crim LR 113 …. [17460] O’Connor v Marjoribanks (1842) 4 Man & G 435; 134 ER 179 …. [13030], [13245] O’Connor; R v (1846) 4 St Tr (NS) 935 …. [27130] — (1980) 146 CLR 64; 29 ALR 449 …. [7050], [9120] O’Doherty; R v [2003] 1 Cr App R 5 …. [1445] O’Donel v Cmr for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1938) 59 CLR 744; [1938] ALR 305 …. [5110] O’Donnell v Dakin [1966] Tas SR 87 …. [35025], [35050], [35205] — v Hegarty [1941] IR 538 …. [5215] — v Reichard [1975] VR 916 …. [1215] O’Donnell; R v (1917) 12 Cr App R 219 …. [11135] O’Driscoll; R v (2003) 57 NSWLR 416; 200 ALR 283 …. [17630] O’Farrell v Palicave Pty Ltd (2009) 176 FCR 134 …. [5170] O’Flaherty v McBride (1920) 28 CLR 283 …. [39055]
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Oates; R v [1979] Tas R 203 …. [33655] Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518; 66 ALR 371 …. [17080] Obradovich v Lake View and Star Ltd [1968] WAR 170 …. [17720] Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146 …. [29200] Oceanbulk Shipping and Trading SA v TMT Asia Ltd [2010] 3 All ER 282; [2010] 1 WLR 1 …. [25380] — v — [2011] 1 AC 662; [2010] 4 All ER 1011 …. [25380] Odhiambo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 122 FCR 29 …. [17055] Office of Fair Trading v IBA Healthcare Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 1103 …. [7210] Office of Government Commerce v Information Commissioner (Attorney General Intervening) [2010] QB 98 …. [27095] Official Custodian of Charities v Mackey (No 2) [1985] 2 All ER 1016; [1985] 1 WLR 1308 …. [5060] Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court v K [1965] AC 201; [1963] 3 All ER 191 …. [1030], [33840] Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Alvaro (1996) 66 FCR 372; 138 ALR 341 …. [31065], [37105] Ofner, Re; Samuel v Ofner [1909] 1 Ch 60; [1908] All ER Rep 851 …. [39280], [39305] Ofori (No 2); R v (1994) 99 Cr App R 223 …. [41005] Ofulue v Bossert [2009] 1 AC 990 …. [25350], [25385] OGD (No 2); R v (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 …. [1765], [11125], [21100], [21252] OGD; R v (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 …. [23030] Ogden v People (1989) 25 NE 755 …. [1335] Ohio Bell Telephone Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (1937)
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Olsen v Tyner (1935) 257 NW 538 …. [1295] Olsen; R v (1898) 62 JP 777 …. [17075] Omar v Omar [1995] 3 All ER 571; [1995] 1 WLR 1428 …. [25055] Omar; R v (1991) 58 A Crim R 139 …. [1445] Omarjee; R v (1995) 79 A Crim R 355 …. [17290] Omnia Pelts Inc v Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd (1986) 57 OR (2d) 568 …. [17510] Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21; 26 ER 15 …. [1465], [13005] — v — (1745) Willes 538; 125 ER 1310 …. [33360] Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 …. [11150] One.Tel Ltd (in liq) v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 443 …. [25125] Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1989) 16 NSWLR 730 …. [5070] Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] AC 648 …. [9015] Ong; R v (2001) 80 SASR 537 …. [23145] — (2007) 176 A Crim R 366 …. [1445] Onufrejczyk; R v [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 1 All ER 247 …. [1250], [9020] Oosthuizen v Stanley (1938) AD 322 …. [17690] OPEL Networks Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2010) 77 NSWLR 128 …. [27095] Ophelia, The [1916] 2 AC 206 …. [33435] Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (2011) 197 FCR 67; 283 ALR 78 …. [11150] Oran Park Motor Sport Pty Ltd v Fleissig [2002] NSWCA 371; BC200206805 …. [1215], [33435] Orchard v Orchard (1972) 3 SASR 89; 19 FLR 176 …. [11150] — v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114; 62 A Crim R 184 …. [17170]
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ALJR 844 …. [29045], [29070] — v — [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 …. [17460] Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 …. [13270] Park; R v (1993) 99 Cr App R 270 …. [33595] Parkasho v Singh [1968] P 233; [1967] 1 All ER 737 …. [41030], [41035] Parker v Clayton (1932) 97 JP 14 …. [5215] — v Comptroller-General of Customs (2007) 243 ALR 574 …. [27315] — v — (2009) 252 ALR 619 …. [27315] — v Espinoza (1996) 85 A Crim R 336 …. [1395] — v McWilliam (1830) 6 Bing 683; 130 ER 1444 …. [17055] — v Paton (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 237 …. [7165] — v R (1912) 14 CLR 681; 18 ALR 157 …. [3020] — v — (1963) 111 CLR 610; [1963] ALR 524 …. [7030] — v — (1982) 41 ALR 576 …. [17625] — v South Eastern Rail Co (1877) 2 CPD 416; [1874] All ER Rep 166 …. [39145] Parker; R v (1783) 3 Doug KB 242; 99 ER 634 …. [17250] — (1842) Car & M 639; 174 ER 669 …. [15020] — (1924) 18 Cr App R 14 …. [23275], [23315] — (1983) 8 A Crim R 324 …. [15110] — (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 …. [33660] — [1912] VLR 152; (1912) 18 ALR 150 …. [29115] — [1933] 1 KB 850; [1932] All ER Rep 718 …. [33770] — [1968] NZLR 325 …. [15035] Parkes v R [1976] 3 All ER 380; [1976] 1 WLR 585 …. [33485] Parkes; R v (2003) 147 A Crim R 450 …. [17405], [25400], [35520]
Parkhurst v Lowten (1818) 2 Swans 194; 36 ER 589 …. [25075], [25225] Parkin v Moon (1835) 7 C & P 408; 173 ER 181 …. [17165], [17465] — v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503 …. [27065] Parkin; R v (1922) 37 CCC 35 …. [21050] Parkinson; R v [1965] QWN 31 …. [33690] — [1990] 1 Qd R 382 …. [17565] Parks v Bullock [1982] VR 258 …. [33460] Parks; R v [1961] 3 All ER 633; [1961] 1 WLR 1484 …. [11140] Parr v Bavarian Steak House Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 196 …. [25280] Parratt; R v (1831) 4 Car & P 570; 172 ER 829 …. [33640] Parris; R v (1988) 89 Cr App R 68 …. [33740] Parry v Boyle (1986) 83 Cr App R 310 …. [1295] — v News Group Newspapers Ltd (1990) 140 NLJ 1719 …. [25255] Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1; [1968] 1 All ER 177 …. [1070], [25305] Parry’s Department Store (WA) Pty Ltd v Simpson Pty Ltd (1983) 76 FLR 60 …. [5225] Parson v Tomlin (1956) 120 JP 129 …. [13115] Parsons; R v (1977) 17 OR (2d) 465; 80 DLR (3d) 430 …. [1305] — (2000) 1 VR 161 …. [21050] — (2004) 145 A Crim R 519 …. [15085], [15100] — [1998] 1 VR 471 …. [19080] Partenreederei M/S Karen Oltmann v Scarsdale Shipping Co Ltd (The Karen Oltmann) [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 708 …. [39240] Partington v Partington & Atkinson (Barrow Intervening) [1925] P 34 …. [5180] — v R (2009) 197 A Crim R 380 …. [29175]
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— v — (1986) 8 FCR 408; 65 ALR 83 …. [1025], [29155], [31095], [37090] — v City of Coburg [1973] VR 583; (1973) 28 LGRA 234 …. [1175] — v Foster (1885) 15 QBD 114 …. [25240], [25265] — v Hall (1989) 52 SASR 568 …. [33550] — v Hooper (1810) 3 Taunt 60; 128 ER 25 …. [39085] Pearce, Re; Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v Francis [1914] 1 Ch 254 …. [39255] Pearce; R v (1840) 9 Car & P 667; 173 ER 1003 …. [13115] — (1862) 1 W & W (L) 248 …. [15020] — (1979) 69 Cr App R 365 …. [17335], [33455] — [1999] 3 VR 287 …. [21050] Pearcey; R v (1985) 63 ACTR 12 …. [33760] Pearmine v R [1988] WAR 315 …. [17460] Pearse v Pearse (1846) 1 De G & Sm 12; 63 ER 950 …. [25215] — v Sommers (1992) 28 NSWLR 492 …. [17315] Pearson (S) & Son Ltd v Dublin Corp [1907] AC 351; [1904] All ER Rep 255 …. [39160] Pearson; R v [1964] Qd R 471 …. [17395] Peart v Bolckow, Vaughan & Co Ltd [1925] 1 KB 399 …. [3135] — v R [2006] 1 WLR 970 …. [33690] Peatling v Watson [1909] VLR 198; (1909) 15 ALR 150 …. [17510] Peatling (dec’d), Re [1969] VR 214 …. [1125], [7280], [7315], [9020] Peel; R v (1860) 2 F & F 21; 175 ER 941 …. [33295] Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164 …. [21280] Peete, Re [1952] 2 All ER 599 …. [1125] Peipman v Turner (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 362 …. [37100]
Peirce; R v [1992] 1 VR 273 …. [13085] Pektas; R v [1989] VR 239 …. [33570] Pemberton; R v (1993) 99 Cr App R 228 …. [15210] — [1983] Crim LR 121 …. [1045], [7085] Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107; [1971] ALR 762 …. [11140] Penman; R v (1985) 82 Cr App R 44 …. [33435] Penn v Bibby (1866) LR 2 Ch App 127 …. [1645] — v Jack (1866) LR 2 Eq 314 …. [17720], [17725] Pennant; R v [1998] 2 VR 453 …. [5155] Pennell v Carruthers Bros Pty Ltd (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 896 …. [19020] Pennell; R v [2003] 1 NZLR 289 …. [37060] Penney v R (1998) 155 ALR 605; 72 ALJR 1316 …. [9040] Pennington (dec’d), Re (No 2) [1978] VR 617 …. [33205], [41060] Penno; R v (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 529 …. [31185] Penny; R v (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 …. [1420] People v Alcalde (1944) 149 P 2d 627 …. [37120] — v Aranda (1965) 407 P 2d 265 …. [1520] — v Bush (1921) 133 NE 201 …. [31040] — v Carney [1955] IR 324 …. [15100] — v Collins (1968) 438 P 2d 33 …. [9090] — v De Simone (1919) 121 NE 761 …. [37070] — v Defore (1926) 242 NY 13; 150 NE 585 …. [27230] — v Hayes (2004) 818 NE 2d 916 …. [1295] — v Maragh (2000) 94 NY 2d 569; 729 NE 2d 701 …. [3140] — v Spriggs (1964) 389 P 2d 377 …. [33045] — v Warmack (1980) 413 NE 2d 125 …. [1295]
People (A-G) v Flynn [1963] IR 255 …. [33640] — v Galvin [1964] IR 325 …. [33645] — v O’Brien [1963] IR 65 …. [17095], [17675], [17685] — v Shaw [1960] IR 168 …. [15255] People (Attorney-General) v Byrne [1974] IR 1 …. [9020] — v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33 …. [1385] — v Crosbie [1966] IR 490 (CCA) …. [37055] — v Harrigan [1941] IR 252 …. [17375] — v Keating [1953] IR 200 …. [13065] — v Quinn [1955] IR 57 …. [15225] Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593; [1993] 1 All ER 42 …. [27095] — v Tuomy [1926] ALR 300; (1926) 48 ALT 53 …. [1125] Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v FCT (1995) 62 FCR 289; 132 ALR 632 …. [1735], [11010], [29205] Percerep; R v [1993] 2 VR 109 …. [29075], [33780] Percival v Nanson (1851) 7 Exch 1; 155 ER 830 …. [33065] Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 …. [33805] Perera; R v [1982] VR 901 …. [15210], [33435] — [1986] 1 Qd R 211 …. [9040], [11045] — [1986] 2 Qd R 431 …. [17325] Perfect; R v (1917) 12 Cr App R 273 …. [11140] Perkins v Jeffery [1915] 2 KB 702; [1914] All ER Rep 172 …. [21180], [21195] — v Vaughan (1842) 4 Man & G 988; 134 ER 405 …. [31095] Perkins’s case (1826) 1 Lew CC 99; 168 ER 974 …. [31140] Perkins; R v (1840) 9 Car & P 395; 173 ER 884 …. [33300]
Perks; R v [1973] Crim LR 388 …. [17135] Perlak Petroleum Maatschappij v Deen [1924] 1 KB 111 …. [41035] Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Boulton Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 …. [29125] — v Valeondis (2009) 105 SASR 458 …. [33420] Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett (2004) 145 A Crim R 220 …. [5225], [41100] Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales Ltd v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1960) 105 CLR 401; [1961] ALR 164 …. [3040] Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Fels [1918] AC 879 …. [39010], [39130] Permewan v Ippolito (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 90 …. [33435] Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Wright [1917] VLR 372; (1917) 23 CLR 185; 23 ALR 177 …. [39105] Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Bligh (1940) 41 SR (NSW) 33 …. [39185] Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 164 ALR 606 …. [3159] Perrier (No 1); R v [1991] 1 VR 697 …. [19140] Perrier (No 2); R v [1991] 1 VR 717 …. [23270] Perrin v Drennan [1991] FSR 81 …. [21290] Perry v Gibson (1834) 1 Ad & E 48; 110 ER 1125 …. [13300], [17470] — v R (1982) 150 CLR 580; 44 ALR 449 …. [21020], [21030], [21035], [21085], [21090], [21105], [21115] — v — (1988) 165 CLR 292; 81 ALR 225 …. [21090] — v — (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 …. [29065] — v Smith (1842) 9 M & W 681; 152 ER 288 …. [25245] Perry (No 2); R v (1981) 28 SASR 95 …. [37130], [37140] Perry (No 3); R v (1981) 28 SASR 112 …. [35360], [35400], [35425]
Perry (No 4); R v (1981) 28 SASR 119 …. [29001], [29020], [29165], [35360], [35400], [35425] Perry; R v [1909] 2 KB 697 …. [33295] — [1970] 2 NSWR 501 …. [15085], [15255] Perrylease Ltd v Imecar AG [1987] 2 All ER 373; [1988] 1 WLR 463 …. [39210] Persad v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2007] 1 WLR 2379 …. [33495] Persky v McKeller (1942) 36 QJPR 55 …. [5120] Pertl v Kahl (1976) 13 SASR 433 …. [1175] Perton, Re; Pearson v A-G (1885) 53 LT 707 …. [33045], [33065], [33240] Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76 …. [5170] Pestano; R v [1981] Crim LR 397 …. [17395] Petcherini; R v (1855) 7 Cox CC 79 …. [37110] Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 …. [39160] Peterhaensel v Woodman [1971] SASR 333 …. [11150] Peters v Owners of SS Argol (1912) 5 BWCC 414 …. [17080] — v Perras (1909) 42 SCR 244 …. [17460] Peters; R v (1886) 16 QBD 636 …. [11010], [33845] — (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 …. [33750] — (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 …. [27310] — [1995] 2 Cr App R 77 …. [21065], [21205] Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 91 …. [39160] Peterson v Homes [1927] SASR 419 …. [3070] — v R (1979) 27 ALR 641 …. [15195] Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497 …. [3158]
Pethig; R v [1977] 1 NZLR 448 …. [27235] Pethybridge v Stedikas Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] Aust Contract Reports 90-263 …. [39290] Petition (A) of Right, Re [1915] 3 KB 649 …. [3020] Petkar; R v [2004] 1 Cr App R 22 …. [15255] Petrie v Nuttall (1856) 11 Exch 569; 156 ER 957 …. [5195] Petrofina (Gt Britain) Ltd v Martin [1966] Ch 146; [1966] 1 All ER 126 …. [3020] Petroleum and Chemical Incorporation (Aust) and Australian Gas Light Co, Re (1947) 76 WN (NSW) 230 …. [7185] Petropoulos; R v (1977) 15 SASR 553 …. [33690] Petroulias (No 8); R v (2007) 175 A Crim R 417 …. [9130], [27315] Petroulias (No 22); R v (2007) 176 A Crim R 309 …. [25240], [25295] Pettigrew; R v (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 …. [1315], [31075], [35425] Pettipiece; R v (1972) 7 CCC 2d 133 …. [33665] Petty v R (1991) 173 CLR 95; 102 ALR 129 …. [17445], [17525], [33770] — v — (1994) 13 WAR 372 …. [21050] PFD; R v (2001) 124 A Crim R 418 …. [21050] Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461; 127 ALR 99 …. [21001], [21005], [21035], [21050], [21060], [21065], [21085], [21100], [21150], [21230], [21257] Pfennig (No 1); R v (1992) 57 SASR 507 …. [1245], [1440], [1445], [27305], [29020], [33700], [33725] Pfennig (No 3); R v (1993) 60 SASR 271 …. [1440] Pfitzner; R v (1976) 15 SASR 171 …. [33460] — (1996) 66 SASR 161 …. [33660] Pfizer Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Pty Ltd (1989) 34 FCR 47 …. [25245]
Phair; R v [1986] 1 Qd R 136 …. [17615], [19170] Pham v R (2008) 187 A Crim R 21 …. [17065] Phan; R v (1990) 54 SASR 561 …. [1195] — (2001) 123 A Crim R 30 …. [27315], [35650] Phelan v Back [1972] 1 All ER 901; [1972] 1 WLR 273 …. [17105] Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] 1 Qd R 503 …. [1360] — v Prew (1854) 3 El & Bl 430; 118 ER 1203 …. [25345], [27300] Phibbs, In the Estate of [1917] P 93 …. [39115] Philipson v Chase (1809) 2 Camp 110; 170 ER 1097 …. [39015] Phillion v R [1978] 1 SCR 18; (1977) 74 DLR (3d) 136 …. [17350] Phillips v Cassar [1979] 2 NSWLR 430 …. [7120] — v Eamer (1795) 1 Esp 355; 170 ER 383 …. [17470], [17475] — v Ellinson Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 221; [1941] ALR 340 …. [11090] — v Phillips [1966] 1 NSWR 49; (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 445 …. [17510] — v R (1985) 159 CLR 45; 62 ALR 479 …. [23145], [23325], [23335], [23405] — v — (2006) 225 CLR 303; 224 ALR 216 …. [21035], [21085], [21170] Phillips; R v (1936) 26 Cr App R 17 …. [33800] — [1922] SASR 276 …. [13035] — [1963] NZLR 855 …. [15095] — [1997] 1 VR 558 …. [23040] — [2003] 2 Cr App R 35 …. [21050] — [2003] Crim LR 629 …. [1140] Phillipson; R v (1989) 91 Cr App R 226 …. [17130], [31135]
Philpott v Boon [1968] Tas SR 97 …. [1315] Phosphate Co-operative Co of Australia Ltd v Shears (No 3) (Pivot case) [1989] VR 665; (1988) 14 ACLR 323 …. [29080] Phosphate Resources Ltd v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) (2008) 251 ALR 80 …. [1175] Piche v R [1971] SCR 23; (1971) 11 DLR (3d) 700 …. [33595] Pickering v Edmunds [1994] 63 SASR 357 …. [25010] — v Noyes (1823) 1 B & C 262; 107 ER 98 …. [25345] — v Stephenson (1872) LR 14 Eq 322 …. [41005] Pickering, Re; Pickering v Pickering (1883) 25 Ch D 247 …. [25265] Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries plc [1998] 3 All ER 462; [1998] 1 WLR 1189 …. [9015] Picknell; R v [1970] 1 NSWR 604; (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 731 …. [17650] Pickup v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co (1878) 3 QBD 594 …. [1125], [1605], [7220], [7255], [11135] Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 …. [17590], [19055] Pidduck v Pidduck [1961] 3 All ER 481; [1961] 1 WLR 1313 …. [1210] Pidoto; R v (2006) 14 VR 269 …. [3020] Pierce v Minister for Community Welfare (1987) 27 A Crim R 119 …. [1245] Pierce; R v (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 135 …. [25200] Piercy, Re (1682) T Jones 164; 84 ER 1198 …. [3040] Piermay Shipping Co SA v Chester [1978] 1 All ER 1233; [1978] 1 WLR 411 …. [35055] Piers v Piers [1843] All ER Rep 159; (1849) 9 ER 118 …. [9085] Pieterson; R v [1995] 1 WLR 293 …. [1245] Pihaga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209 …. [25380], [25395]
Pike; R v (1829) 3 Car & P 598; 172 ER 562 …. [33300] Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544 …. [3025], [3120] Pilcher; R v (1974) 60 Cr App R 1 …. [17650] Pilley; R v (1922) 16 Cr App R 138 …. [33490] Pim v Curell (1840) 6 M & W 234; 151 ER 395 …. [5195], [33155] PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489 …. [21257] Pimental; R v (1999) 110 A Crim R 30 …. [27315] Ping; R v [2006] 2 Qd R 69 …. [29070] Pinion (dec’d), Re; Westminster Bank Pty Ltd v Pinion [1965] Ch 85; [1964] 1 All ER 890 …. [29050] Pinkstone v R (2003) 140 A Crim R 83 …. [17460], [31065] Pinner v Knights (1843) 6 Beav 174; 49 ER 792 …. [7070] Pinot Nominees Pty Ltd v Cmr of Taxation (2009) 181 FCR 392 …. [25395] Pioneer Concrete (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd v Cassidy (No 2) [1969] Qd R 290 …. [13300] Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 13 ACLC 1729 …. [25265] — v — (1995) 18 ACSR 418 …. [25015], [25265] Pipe; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 17 …. [13085] Piro v Foster & Co Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 313; [1943] ALR 405 …. [11150] Pisano; R v [1997] 2 VR 342 …. [15170] Piszcyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330 …. [17660] Pitcher v Langford (1991) 23 NSWLR 142 …. [33465] Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35; 69 ALJR 612 …. [1360], [1375], [1450] Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207 …. [15045], [15210] Pitman; R v (1985) 38 SASR 566 …. [15195]
Pitre v R [1933] SCR 69; [1933] 1 DLR 417 …. [39100] Pitt; R v (1967) 68 DLR (2d) 513 …. [17175] — [1983] QB 25; [1982] 3 All ER 63 …. [13165], [17375] Pitts v Adney [1961] NSWR 535; (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 886 …. [25380] Pitts; R v (1912) 8 Cr App R 126 …. [15095] Plaintiff B60 of 2012 v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (2013) 306 ALR 478 …. [27065] Plant v Taylor (1861) 7 H & N 211; 158 ER 453 …. [33250] Plate Glass Holdings Pty Ltd v Fraser Gordon Investments Pty Ltd (2012) 300 ALR 704 …. [25055] Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090; [1961] 1 All ER 876 …. [19165], [23280] Platt; R v [1981] Crim LR 622 …. [33655] Player; R v (2000) 217 ALR 578 …. [21252] Players Pty Ltd (in liq) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547 …. [25290] Playford; R v [2013] 2 Qd R 567 …. [33680] Pledge v Roads and Traffic Authority (2004) 205 ALR 56; 78 ALJR 572 …. [1280], [11150] Plessy v Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537 …. [3005] Plevac; R v (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 …. [33730], [33765] Plimpton v Spiller (1877) 6 Ch D 412 …. [29045] PLK; R v [1999] 3 VR 567 …. [7085], [21050] Plomien Fuel Economiser Co Ltd v National Marketing Co [1941] Ch 248; [1941] 1 All ER 311 …. [35085] Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234; [1964] ALR 267 …. [1140], [9035], [9040], [9100], [9120] Plotzki; R v [1972] Qd R 380 …. [33675]
Plumb v Monck and Bohm (1974) 4 ALR 405 …. [25290] Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 …. [15150] — v Cobbett (1804) 5 Esp 136; 170 ER 763 …. [27095] PLV; R v (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 …. [17595] PMC; R v (2004) 11 VR 175 …. [5215] PML; R v (2001) 121 A Crim R 97 …. [27120] PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146 …. [21252] Poa; R v [1979] 2 NZLR 378 …. [15195] Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Re (1979) 26 ALR 247 …. [9050] Podmore; R v (1930) 22 Cr App R 36 …. [37050] Podola; R v [1960] 1 QB 325; [1959] 3 All ER 418 …. [1040], [7045], [9045] Poggenpoel v Morris (1938) CPD 90 …. [15210] Pohutuhutu; R v [1987] 2 CRNZ 538 …. [17375] Police v Anderson [1972] NZLR 233 …. [11075], [33675] — v Astley (1997) 69 SASR 319 …. [27255] — v Barber (2010) 108 SASR 520; 57 MVR 33 …. [3095], [29015], [29065], [29070], [29075] — v Beck (2001) 79 SASR 98 …. [9005] — v Coward [1976] 2 NZLR 86 …. [33460] — v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130 …. [1445] — v Dorizzi (2000) 84 SASR 403 …. [1370] — v Douglas (2011) 111 SASR 337; 60 MVR 78 …. [29150] — v Dunstall (2013) 118 SASR 233 …. [11125] — v Eiffe (2007) 98 SASR 79; [2007] SASC 178 …. [17460] — v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482 …. [27240]
— v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 …. [27305] — v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243 …. [1220] — v Lavalle [1979] 1 NZLR 45 …. [27310] — v Machirus [1977] 1 NZLR 288 …. [31090] — v Pereira [1977] 1 NZLR 547 …. [9035] — v Short (2012) 112 SASR 463; 60 MVR 320 …. [3095] — v Smith and Herewini [1994] 2 NZLR 306 …. [3157] Police Complaints Board; Ex parte Madden; R v [1983] 2 All ER 353; [1983] 1 WLR 447 …. [9075] Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397; 58 ALR 1 …. [25085], [25125], [25180] Polivitte Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 379 …. [29080] Polkinghorne; R v (1999) 108 A Crim R 189 …. [35495], [35500], [35532] Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177; 110 ALR 385 …. [33775], [33780] — v — (2011) 31 VR 416 …. [33435] Polley; R v (1997) 68 SASR 227 …. [19095] Pollinger; R v (1930) 22 Cr App R 75 …. [23320] Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558; 108 ALR 1 …. [11045], [15090], [15110], [15160], [31015], [31045], [37060] Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 …. [29070] Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 …. [11130], [29060] Polygram Records Inc v Raben Footwear Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 426 …. [39080] Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501; 101 ALR 545 …. [7275] Pomeroy v Baddeley (1826) Ry & Mood 430; 171 ER 1073 …. [17055]
Pomery v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 191 …. [33540] Pommell; R v [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 …. [7050] — [1999] Crim LR 576 …. [23200] Ponifex v Jolly (1839) 9 C & P 202; 173 ER 802 …. [17060] Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1962) 107 CLR 9; [1962] ALR 775 …. [33340] Pook; R v (1871) 13 Cox CC 172 …. [37115] Pool v Pool [1951] P 470; [1951] 2 All ER 563 …. [25365] Poole v Hunt (1979) 22 SASR 293 …. [9050] — v Smith’s Car Sales (Balham) Ltd [1962] 2 All ER 482; [1962] 1 WLR 744 …. [3020] — v Warren (1838) 8 Ad & E 582; 112 ER 959 …. [39085] Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 58 SASR 184 …. [33390] Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 …. [1295], [3065] Popescu; R v (1989) 39 A Crim R 137 …. [17460] Pople v Evans [1969] 2 Ch 255; [1968] 2 All ER 743 …. [5025] Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413 …. [15045], [15220] Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 …. [7210], [17460] Poriotis v Australian Iron and Steel Co Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 991; 80 WN (NSW) 1651 …. [37010], [37055], [37065] Port Augusta Hotel Ltd v Samuels (1971) 5 SASR 139 …. [33540] Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; 36 ALR 3 …. [5070], [5170] Port Swettenham Authority v TWWu and Co (M) Sdn Bhd [1979] AC 580; [1978] 3 All ER 337 …. [7075] Portelli v Port Waratah Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [1959] VR 195 …. [17060]
Porteous v Dorn [1975] 2 SCR 37; (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 596 …. [33230], [33250] Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 …. [3070] — v Oamps Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 635 …. [17445] Porter; R v (1935) 25 Cr App R 59 …. [21200] — (1964) 48 DLR (2d) 277 …. [31120] — (2003) 85 SASR 581 …. [33435] Portland Manufacturers Ltd v Harte [1977] QB 306; [1976] 1 All ER 225 …. [11090] Portus; Ex parte McNeil; R v (1961) 105 CLR 537; [1962] ALR 81 …. [3156] Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (WA) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 350 …. [39290] Post; R v [1982] Qd R 495 …. [25105] Postlethwaite, Re; Postlethwaite v Rickman (1887) 35 Ch D 722 …. [25265] Potter v Potter [2003] 3 NZLR 145; [2003] NZFLR 1035 …. [39240] Potter; R v (1994) 72 A Crim R 108 …. [1520] Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282; 14 ALJR 341; 41 SR (NSW) 58 …. [29020], [31120], [33545], [35340] Poulter; R v (1978) 19 SASR 370 …. [9035] Pound v Wilson (1865) 4 F & F 301; 176 ER 574 …. [17375] Powe, In the Estate of [1956] P 110; [1955] 3 All ER 448 …. [35105] Powell v Battle [1963] WAR 32 …. [1605] — v M’Glynn [1902] 2 IR 154 …. [33435] — v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 …. [25010] — v Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243; [1935] All ER Rep 58 …. [11150]
— v Wiltshire [2005] 1 QB 117; [2004] 3 All ER 235 …. [5060] Powell; R v [1980] Crim LR 39 …. [19050] — [1985] Crim LR 592 …. [17375] — [1986] 1 All ER 193; [1985] 1 WLR 1364 …. [23285], [23345] Power, Ex parte (1888) 5 WN (NSW) 9 …. [3065] Power; R v (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 …. [15220] — [1919] 1 KB 572 …. [11095] — [1940] St R Qd 111 …. [17060], [17135] Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548 …. [1215] Powers; R v (2000) 113 A Crim R 51 …. [1410] Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 …. [29070], [29150] PP; R v (2002) 135 A Crim R 575 …. [19095] PPP v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 533 …. [21050] PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 …. [29150] Practice Note [1962] 1 All ER 448 …. [9110], [9115] Practice Note (Criminal Justice Act 1948) [1950] 1 All ER 37 …. [39050] Practice Note (No 1 of 2004) (2004) 8 VR 475 …. [15220] Practitioners of the Supreme Court, Re (1980) 26 SASR 275 …. [35065] Prager; R v [1972] 1 All ER 1114; [1972] 1 WLR 260 …. [33595], [33655] Prangley v Evans (1896) 17 LR (NSW) (L) 416 …. [33510] Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 101 ALR 109 …. [31145] — v R [1981] 1 All ER 319; [1981] 1 WLR 469 …. [11050] Prasad; R v (1979) 23 SASR 161 …. [9105], [11095], [11100], [11105]
Prashar v R (1988) 1 WAR 190 …. [11095] Prater; R v [1960] 2 QB 464; [1960] 1 All ER 298 …. [15160] Pratt v Hawkins (1991) 32 NSWLR 319 …. [1215] Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 …. [25210], [25215], [25235] Pratt; R v (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 358 …. [33750] — [1966] 2 NSWR 516 …. [11050] Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321; [1994] 3 All ER 407 …. [27095] Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362; 6 ALR 311 …. [17440], [17460] Preece v HM Advocate [1981] Crim LR 783 …. [29075] — v Parry [1983] Crim LR 170 …. [33435] Prefas; R v (1988) 86 Cr App R 111 …. [17375] Preload Co of Canada Ltd v City of Regina (1958) 13 DLR (2d) 305 …. [39145] Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 3 All ER 237; [1971] 1 WLR 1381 …. [39145], [39215], [39240], [39290] Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; 51 ATR 400 …. [3025], [3075], [3155], [3160] — v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 134 FCR 449; 203 ALR 449 …. [1215] Prentis v Atlantic Coastline Co (1908) 211 US 210 …. [3159] Prestage v R [1976] Tas SR 16 …. [17180] Preston v Carr (1826) 1 Y & J 175; 148 ER 634 …. [25215] — v Dowell (1987) 45 SASR 111 …. [11090] — v Preston [1963] P 141; [1962] 3 All ER 1057 …. [3085] — v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347 …. [21257] Preston-Jones v Preston-Jones [1951] AC 391; [1951] 1 All ER 124 ….
[3020] Preston; R v (2013) 116 SASR 522 …. [1360], [1880] — [1909] 1 KB 568 …. [23315], [23360] — [1961] VR 761 …. [1360], [1400], [31185] — [1994] 2 AC 130; [1993] 4 All ER 638 …. [11035], [17130] Pretoria Rent Board (Southern) v Levitt (1953) (3) SA 36 …. [3135] Pretorius; R v [2010] 1 Qd R 67 …. [21185] Preval; R v [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 …. [15220], [17290] Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 …. [17375], [17380], [17655] — v Cornish (1971) 23 LGRA 142 …. [33360] — v Earl of Torrington (1703) 1 Salk 285; 91 ER 252 …. [33090], [33130] — v Humphries [1958] 2 QB 353; [1958] 2 All ER 725 …. [17660] — v McCabe; Ex parte Price (1984) 55 ALR 319 …. [25005], [25125], [25180] — v Manning (1889) 42 Ch D 372 …. [17375] — v Page (1799) 4 Ves 680; 31 ER 351 …. [39230], [39270] — v R [1981] Tas R 306 …. [29060] — v Seaward (1841) Car & M 23; 174 ER 391 …. [17060] — v Woodhouse (1849) 3 Ex 616; 154 ER 991 …. [39030] Price Waterhouse v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] BCLC 583 …. [25235], [25305], [27125] Price Yards Ltd v Tiveron Transport Co Ltd and Barbe (1958) 11 DLR (2d) 669 …. [33545] Price; R v [1969] 1 QB 541; [1968] 2 All ER 282 …. [15075], [15255] — [2005] Crim LR 304 …. [19155] Prichard v Powell (1845) 10 QB 589; 116 ER 224 …. [33160]
Priest; R v (2011) 246 FLR 341 …. [27310], [27315] Priestley; R v (1966) 50 Cr App R 183 …. [33615] — (1967) 51 Cr App R 1 …. [33655] — (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 …. [19155] Priestwood v Shuttleworth (1985) 39 SASR 125 …. [13165] Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & El 627; 112 ER 606 …. [17610] Prinses Juliana, The [1936] P 139; [1936] 1 All ER 685 …. [33540] Pritam Singh; R v [1958] 1 All ER 199 …. [13275] Pritchard v Walker (1827) 3 C & P 212; 172 ER 391 …. [1175] Pritchard; R v [1991] 1 VR 84 …. [33730] Pritt v Fairclough (1812) 3 Camp 305; 170 ER 1391 …. [33090] Process Church of the Final Judgement v Rupert Hart Davis Ltd (1975 unreported) …. [37085], [37125] Propend Finance Pty Ltd v Australian Federal Police Cmr (1995) 58 FCR 224; 128 ALR 657 …. [25275] Prosser’s Case (1784) 1 Leach 290; 168 ER 247 …. [5210] Prosser; R v (1993) 70 A Crim R 391 …. [11100] Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 …. [9120], [11085], [11090], [17620], [17725] Provis v Reed (1829) 5 Bing 435; 130 ER 1129 …. [19170], [33325] Prudential Assurance Co v Edmonds (1877) 2 App Cas 487 …. [7245] Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Fountain Page Ltd [1991] 3 All ER 878; [1991] 1 WLR 756 …. [25010], [25055], [25375] Prus-Grzybowski v Everingham (1986) 44 NTR 7 …. [25015], [25265] Pryor v R (1969) 43 ALJR 388 …. [9030] Ptohopoulos; R v (1967) 52 Cr App R 47 …. [17135] Puaca; R v [2006] Crim LR 341 …. [29080]
Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj [1970] AC 913 …. [9045] Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 63 ALR 559 …. [1215] Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279; 242 ALR 181 …. [25225], [25235] Public Trustee v Fraser (1987) 9 NSWLR 433 …. [5185] — v Wilson [1916] NZLR 798 …. [39250] Pugh (dec’d); Re Pugh v Pugh [1943] Ch 387 …. [33340] Pullman; R v [1942] SASR 262 …. [17605], [17615] Punj; R v (2002) 132 A Crim R 595 …. [9030] Purcell v Macnamara (1807) 9 East 157; 103 ER 533 …. [5010] Purdie v Maxwell [1960] NZLR 599 …. [1220] Purdom v Pavey & Co (1896) 26 SCR 412 …. [41005] Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; [1966] ALR 98 …. [7005], [7015], [7025], [7070], [7125], [7165], [7205], [7210] Purnell v Moon (1991) 22 NSWLR 499 …. [33340] Purser & Co (Hillingdon) Ltd v Jackson [1977] 1 QB 166; [1976] 3 All ER 641 …. [5070] Putland and Sorrell; R v [1946] 1 All ER 85 …. [7165], [7170] PWD; R v (2010) 205 A Crim R 75 …. [21252] Pye v Butterfield (1864) 5 B & S 829; 122 ER 1038 …. [25130] Pyke; R v (1988) 33 A Crim R 322 …. [29050] — (1988) 38 A Crim R 322 …. [11095] Pym v Campbell (1856) 6 El & Bl 370; 119 ER 903 …. [39175] Pyne v Rutherford (1963) 36 ALJR 333 …. [1210] Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; 45 ALR 609 …. [25070], [25075], [25085], [25090], [25115], [25125], [25180]
Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537; 247 ALR 273 …. [9130] — v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (2011) 280 ALR 503 …. [35635] Qantas Airways Ltd, Re [2005] ATPR 42-065; [2005] A Comp T 9 …. [29080] QBE Insurance Australia Ltd v Vasic (2010) 16 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-851 …. [39240] Qiu; R v [2007] 2 NZLR 433 …. [33570] QIW Retailers Ltd & Attorney-General (Cth) v Davids Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (Davids/QIW Merger case) (1993) 42 FCR 255; 114 ALR 579; (1993) ATPR 41-226 …. [29150] Quach v R (2011) 35 VR 71; 216 A Crim R 376 …. [1220] Quach; R v (2002) 137 A Crim R 345 …. [21050] Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd (1991) 27 FCR 86; 98 ALR 659 …. [25010], [25355], [25380] Quainoo v New Zealand Breweries Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 161 …. [39240] Quall v Northern Territory (2009) 180 FCR 528 …. [5040] Qualtieri; R v (2006) 171 A Crim R 463 …. [21252] Quartz Hill & Co, Re; Ex parte Young (1882) 21 Ch D 642 …. [17475] Queanbeyan City Council v ACTEW Corp Ltd (2008) 253 ALR 121 …. [27065] Queen’s Case, The (1820) 2 Br & B 284; 129 ER 976 …. [1742], [13275], [17535], [17540], [17615], [17710], [19040], [33570] Queensland v Commonwealth (Territory Representation Case (No 2)) (1977) 139 CLR 585; 16 ALR 487 …. [5025], [5090] Queensland Law Society Incorporated v Albietz [2000] 1 Qd R 621 …. [25010] Queensland Power Co Ltd v Downer edi Mining Pty Ltd [2010] 1 Qd R 180 …. [39240]
Quesada; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 218 …. [29185] Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 …. [27240] Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 2000) (2000) 77 SASR 344 …. [25340] Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1997) (1998) 98 A Crim R 544 …. [13070] Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 555 …. [33045], [33595], [35360] Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214 …. [15135] Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 …. [11100] Quick v Quick (1864) 3 Sw & Tr 442; 164 ER 1347 …. [33315] — v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; 157 ALR 615 …. [1735], [29001], [29070], [29165], [29195], [29200] Quinlan; R v (2006) 164 A Crim 106 …. [33435] Quinn v United States (1955) 349 US 155 …. [25240] Quinn; R v [1962] 2 QB 245; [1961] 3 All ER 88 …. [1290], [1480], [1585] Quintano v BW Rose Pty Ltd (2008) 186 A Crim R 448 …. [35455] Quirk v Thomas [1916] 1 KB 516 …. [33435] Qureshi; R v [2002] 1 WLR 518 …. [27215] R v (Firth) v Epping Magistrates’ Court [2011] 1 Cr App R 32 …. [33540] — v A, GP (2012) 113 SASR 146 …. [17290] — v AB [1974] 2 NZLR 425 …. [39105] — v Abadom [1983] 1 All ER 364; [1983] 1 WLR 126 …. [29070], [29150], [31145], [33825], [33845], [35425]
— v Abbey [1982] 2 SCR 24; (1982) 39 DLR (3d) 202 …. [29070], [31010] — v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497; [1955] 2 All ER 899 …. [9015], [11095] — v Abdallah (2001) 127 A Crim R 46 …. [17460] — v Abdulla (2010) 200 A Crim R 365 …. [7085], [9005] — v Abela (2007) 17 VR 1 …. [17285] — v Abraham (1848) 3 Cox CC 430 …. [17335], [17340] — v — (1998) 70 SASR 575 …. [7085] — v — [1973] 3 All ER 694; [1973] 1 WLR 1270 …. [7030] — v Absolam (1989) 88 Cr App R 332 …. [33740] — v Acaster (1912) 7 Cr App R 187 …. [13185] — v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 …. [29050] — v — [1992] 1 NZLR 257 …. [13270] — v Accused (CA 406/92) [1994] 3 NZLR 157 …. [3159] — v Acott [1997] 1 All ER 706; [1997] 1 WLR 306 …. [7030] — v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510 …. [15220], [21050], [21252] — v — (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 …. [17375], [17405], [17530], [35440], [35525] — v Adamiczka (1993) 33 NSWLR 68 …. [17040] — v Adams (1829) 3 C & P 600; 172 ER 563 …. [1195] — v — (1923) 17 Cr App R 77 …. [33490] — v — [1965] Qd R 255 …. [15255], [17265] — v — [1965] VR 563 …. [23140], [39045] — v — [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 …. [9095] — v Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 …. [9095] — v Adamson (1843) 2 Mood 286; 169 ER 114 …. [39205] — v Addabbo (1982) 33 SASR 84 …. [27255], [33760]
— v Adey (1831) 1 M & Rob 94; 174 ER 32 …. [25075] — v ADJ (2005) 153 A Crim R 324 …. [21050] — v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38 …. [1445] — v Agar [1990] 2 All ER 442 …. [27130] — v Agbim [1979] Crim LR 171 …. [9040] — v Age (2011) 257 FLR 85 …. [33660] — v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 …. [7085], [21252] — v Ah Foo (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 343 …. [13275] — v Ah Wong (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 347 …. [33805] — v Ahmed Din [1962] 2 All ER 123; [1962] 1 WLR 680 …. [29070], [29075] — v Ahmet (2009) 22 VR 203 …. [17265] — v Aickles (1784) 1 Leach 294; 168 ER 250 …. [39050] — v Aiken [1925] VLR 265; (1925) 31 ALR 143 …. [21185] — v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 …. [33760] — v Aird [1949] VLR 1 …. [33640], [33665] — v Aitken (1991) 94 Cr App R 85 …. [1305] — v Ajax (1977) 17 SASR 88 …. [33745] — v Ajit Singh Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr App R 60 …. [33775] — v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327 …. [17615] — v Akaidere [1990] Crim LR 808 …. [11100] — v Akgul (2002) 5 VR 537 …. [1400] — v Alath Construction Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1255 …. [7170] — v Albarus [1989] Crim LR 905 …. [1295] — v Albu (1995) 84 A Crim R 11 …. [27310] — v Alchin (2006) 200 FLR 204 …. [35455] — v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 …. [19020], [19025], [29130]
— v Alexander (2002) 6 VR 53 …. [1220] — v — (2007) 174 A Crim R 297 …. [33735] — v — [1975] VR 741 …. [1675], [17205], [17225] — v — [1979] VR 615 …. [1290], [1295], [3220], [3225], [31010], [33520] — v — [1994] 2 VR 249 …. [33485] — v — [2013] 1 Cr App R 26 …. [1360], [1370] — v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279; [1953] 2 All ER 1381 …. [1470], [13030], [13240], [25200] — v Ali [1996] 2 VR 49 …. [9070] — v — [2009] Crim LR 40 …. [1360], [1370] — v Ali (H) [2004] 1 Cr App R 39 …. [17315] — v Ali (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257 …. [15220], [17525] — v Aliola (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 699; BC201303007 …. [1490] — v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 …. [7085], [9030] — v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 …. [33740] — v Allan [1969] 1 All ER 91; [1969] 1 WLR 33 …. [9025] — v Allen (1994) 77 A Crim R 99 …. [1220], [23040] — v — [1937] St R Qd 32 (CCA) …. [21050] — v — [1977] Crim LR 163 …. [33740] — v — [1989] VR 736 …. [17435], [17460] — v Allingham [1991] 1 Qd R 429 …. [19085] — v Allsop (1899) 24 VLR 812 …. [15020] — v Aloia [1983] WAR 133 …. [9070] — v Altschuler (1915) 11 Cr App R 243 …. [33490] — v Alward (1976) 15 NBR (2d) 551; 73 DLR (3d) 290 …. [17210] — v Amad [1962] VR 545 …. [27305], [33690], [33695]
— v Amado-Taylor [2000] 2 Cr App R 189 …. [11135] — v Ambrosi (2004) 144 A Crim R 67 …. [13085], [17315] — v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 …. [35495], [35500], [35660] — v Ames [1964] NSWR 1489 …. [1280], [11125] — v Amey [1983] 1 All ER 865; [1983] 1 WLR 345 …. [1045] — v Amo [1963] P & NGLR 22 …. [11055], [33690] — v Amyot [1968] 2 OR 626 …. [1180] — v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176 …. [21252], [27315] — v Anastasiou (1991) 21 NSWLR 394 …. [23040] — v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178 …. [11035], [11045], [11065], [17545] — v — (1984) 14 A Crim R 274 …. [17470] — v — (1991) 1 NTLR 149 …. [33705] — v — (1991) 105 FLR 25 …. [33610] — v — (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 …. [7090] — v — (2000) 1 VR 1; 111 A Crim R 19 …. [1880], [21050], [29050], [29060], [29070] — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 116 …. [9030] — v — (2010) 202 A Crim R 68 …. [17065] — v — [1972] 1 QB 304; [1971] 3 All ER 1152 …. [29050], [29110] — v — [1978] 2 NZLR 363 …. [21100] — v — [1988] QB 678; [1988] 2 All ER 549 …. [23205], [23245] — v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 …. [15165], [21050] — v — (2010) 107 SASR 471; 201 A Crim R 266 …. [17120], [17130], [27105], [27130] — v — [1982] 2 NSWLR 116 …. [19125], [19135] — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 21 …. [17380], [21050]
— v — [1987] AC 281; [1987] 1 All ER 513 …. [37060] — v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442 …. [13165] — v Angeli [1978] 3 All ER 950; [1979] 1 WLR 26 …. [11075], [33675] — v Anic (1993) 61 SASR 223 …. [31095], [31135] — v Anslow [1962] Crim LR 101 …. [15250] — v Anthony [1962] VR 440 …. [11095], [15075], [15100] — v Antrobus (1835) 2 Ad & E 788; 111 ER 304 …. [33180] — v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412 …. [33745] — v Aoukar (2011) 110 SASR 453 …. [23040] — v Apicella (1985) 82 Cr App R 295 …. [25095] — v Apostilides (1983) 11 A Crim R 381 …. [15165] — v — (1984) 154 CLR 563; 53 ALR 445 …. [17090], [17115], [17120], [17125] — v Aristidis [1999] 2 Qd R 629 …. [17295] — v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207 …. [21155], [33770] — v — (2010) 202 A Crim R 478 …. [33775] — v — [1922] 2 KB 555; [1922] All ER Rep 153 …. [21105], [21115], [27215] — v — [1957] Crim LR 198 …. [17515] — v — [1998] 4 VR 533 …. [17120] — v Arnol (1997) 6 Tas R 374 …. [33775] — v Arnott (1992) 79 A Crim R 275 …. [33295] — v — (2009) 26 VR 490 …. [17445], [33660], [33715] — v Arrowsmith [1950] VLR 78; [1950] ALR 264 …. [1175] — v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228; (1998) 104 A Crim R 78 …. [7085], [17295], [15170] — v Asfour (1992) 60 A Crim R 409 …. [15160]
— v Asghar (1995) 1 Cr App R 223 …. [15090], [15160] — v Ash (1981) 81 Cr App R 294 …. [13240] — v Ashcroft [1965] Qd R 81 …. [19050], [29050] — v Ashley [1968] Crim LR 51 …. [17660] — v Ashton (1837) 2 Lew CC 147; 168 ER 1109 …. [33310] — v — (1999) 108 A Crim R 200 …. [17375] — v — (2003) 143 A Crim R 354 …. [17405] — v Askeland (1983) 8 A Crim R 338 …. [1040], [33675] — v Askew [1981] Crim LR 398 …. [17275], [17535] — v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 …. [7085] — v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738; 17 ALR 359 …. [25010], [25070], [25075], [33570] — v — (1911) 14 CLR 387 …. [33565] — v Aston (1991) 94 Cr App R 180 …. [9015] — v Atallah (2001) 3 VR 437 …. [1220], [11075], [33570] — v Ataou [1988] QB 798; [1988] 2 All ER 321 …. [25295] — v Ately (1985) 9 NSWLR 226 …. [7255] — v Atholwood (2000) 110 A Crim R 417 …. [21195] — v Athwal [2009] 1 WLR 2430 …. [17305] — v Atkins (1985) 50 SASR 272 …. [15135] — v — [2010] 1 Cr App R 8 …. [1370] — v Atkinson (1934) 24 Cr App R 123 …. [15020] — v Attard (1958) 43 Cr App R 90 …. [31200], [33805] — v — (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 824 …. [17040], [33605] — v Attfield [1961] 3 All ER 243; [1961] 1 WLR 1135 …. [9020] — v Audley [1907] 1 KB 383; [1904] All ER Rep 1180 …. [7140], [7280]
— v Austin (1912) 8 Cr App R 27 …. [33295], [33300] — v — (1979) 21 SASR 315 …. [33760] — v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; 29 ALR 289 …. [17495], [25105] — v Aves [1950] 2 All ER 330 …. [1195] — v AWF (2000) 2 VR 1 …. [1610] — v Ayensu [1982] Crim LR 764 …. [1045] — v Aylen (1987) 49 SASR 254 …. [35360] — v Ayoub [1984] 2 NSWLR 511 …. [9120] — v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 …. [33660], [33665], [33690] — v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 …. [1380], [1395] — v — [1996] 1 AC 41; [1995] 3 All ER 149 …. [19135], [33455] — v B [1979] 3 All ER 460; [1979] 1 WLR 1185 …. [19140], [19145] — v — [1987] 1 NZLR 362 …. [29050] — v — [1987] VR 276 …. [15135] — v — [2003] 1 WLR 2809 …. [7085] — v — [2006] Crim LR 54 …. [17495] — v B (C) [2004] 2 Cr App R 34 …. [19155] — v B (RA) [1997] 2 Cr App R 88 …. [21100] — v B (T) [2006] 2 Cr App R 22 …. [29080] — v B, FG (2013) 115 SASR 499 …. [15220] — v BA [2013] 1 All ER 280 …. [13030] — v Bacash (2001) 3 VR 428 …. [11075], [33570] — v Badjan (1966) 50 Cr App R 141 …. [11135] — v Baffigo [1957] VR 303 …. [17180] — v Bagley [1926] 3 DLR 717 …. [1375] — v Bagshaw [1984] 1 All ER 971; [1984] 1 WLR 477 …. [13065],
[15070] — v BAH (2002) 5 VR 517 …. [35410] — v Bailey (1977) 66 Cr App R 31 …. [29075] — v — [1924] 2 KB 300; [1924] All ER Rep 466 …. [21145] — v — [1956] SASR 153 …. [33505] — v — [1983] 2 All ER 503; [1983] 1 WLR 760 …. [9120] — v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155 …. [7085], [17485] — v Baker (1837) 2 M & Rob 53; 174 ER 211 …. [33290] — v — (1912) 7 Cr App R 217 …. [23275] — v — (2000) 78 SASR 103 …. [1220], [15255] — v — [1895] 1 QB 797 …. [19020] — v — [1989] 1 NZLR 738 …. [31045] — v — [1989] 3 NZLR 635 …. [1290], [11125] — v Bakhuis (2012) 112 SASR 536 …. [17295] — v Baldry (1852) 2 Den 430; 169 ER 568 …. [33615], [33620] — v Baldwin (1925) 19 Cr App R 175 …. [17505] — v — [1925] All ER Rep 402; (1925) 18 Cr App R 175 …. [17165], [19005], [23145] — v Ball (1839) 8 C & P 745; 173 ER 699 …. [19010] — v — (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 605 …. [1880] — v — (1983) 77 Cr App R 131 …. [1195] — v — [1911] AC 47; (1910) 6 Cr App R 31 …. [1140], [21035], [21050], [21065], [21105], [21165] — v Baltensperger (2004) 90 SASR 129 …. [17275] — v Bamford [1978] Crim LR 752 …. [33640] — v Bankowski (1971) 18 FLR 179 …. [33690] — v Banks [1916] All ER Rep 356; (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 …. [17550],
[17560] — v Banner [1970] VR 240 …. [11060], [33690], [33695] — v Bannister (1993) 10 WAR 484 …. [17580] — v BAR (2005) 152 A Crim R 428 …. [21035] — v Barbaro (1993) 32 NSWLR 619 …. [1425], [31185] — v — (2000) 112 A Crim R 551 …. [35525], [35532] — v Barbery (1975) 62 Cr App R 248 …. [17335] — v Barbour [1939] 1 DLR 65; [1938] SCR 465 …. [21050] — v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41; 14 ALR 374 …. [3158] — v Baring (2005) 92 SASR 117 …. [15220], [17460] — v Barker (1829) 3 C & P 589; 172 ER 558 …. [19075], [19085] — v — (1975) 65 Cr App R 287 …. [11100] — v — (1978) 19 SASR 488 …. [33760] — v — (1988) 34 A Crim R 141 …. [29015] — v — [1941] 2 KB 381; [1941] 3 All ER 33 …. [27280], [27285] — v — [1954] Crim LR 423 …. [17350], [19005] — v — [1967] Crim LR 310 …. [17135] — v — [1976] Tas SR 52 …. [35025], [35050], [35205] — v — [1986] 1 NZLR 252 …. [15020] — v — [1989] 2 NZLR 635 …. [1295] — v Barklimore (2007) 167 A Crim R 377 …. [33775], [33780] — v Barnes (1942) 28 Cr App R 141 …. [11140] — v — [1994] Crim LR 691 …. [19090] — v Barnett [1983] 1 VR 319 …. [31010], [33520] — v Barnowski [1969] SASR 386 …. [23270], [23275] — v Barnsley [1972] 2 NSWLR 220 …. [1240]
— v Barnswell [1995] 2 Cr App R 491 …. [21180] — v Baron von Rijssen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 …. [31095] — v Barratt [2000] Crim LR 847 …. [23345] — v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; 171 A Crim R 315 …. [15220], [17120], [17615], [29070], [29140], [33435], [33455], [33485], [33770], [37145] — v Barrington [1981] 1 All ER 1132; [1981] 1 WLR 419 …. [21065], [21170] — v Barron [1975] VR 496 …. [23040], [33485] — v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 …. [15170], [15175] — v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 …. [29050], [33660] — v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 …. [1395] — v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1 …. [19150], [23270] — v Bartleman (1984) 12 DLR (4th) 73 …. [3040] — v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 …. [29050] — v Barton (1986) 85 Cr App R 5 …. [19030], [19090] — v — [1972] 2 All ER 1192; [1973] 1 WLR 115 …. [25295] — v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692; [1969] 1 WLR 1303 …. [19075] — v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; [1916] All ER Rep 38 …. [15105], [15110], [15165] — v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680; [1953] 1 All ER 1064 …. [11050], [17200], [17205], [17240], [33620], [33680], [33690] — v Bassett [1952] VLR 535; [1952] ALR 1035 …. [15215], [17055] — v Basson (1965) (1) SA 697 …. [31060] — v Bastin [1971] Crim LR 529 …. [33610] — v Bate (1871) 11 Cox CC 686 …. [33645] — v Bateman (1845) 1 Cox CC 186 …. [3175] — v — (1946) 31 Cr App R 106 …. [17135]
— v — [1989] Crim LR 590 …. [25105] — v Bates [1973] 2 All ER 509; [1973] 1 WLR 718 …. [11135] — v Bath [1990] Crim LR 716 …. [1395] — v Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 99; [1968] 1 All ER 1175 …. [23030] — v Batt [1994] Crim LR 592 …. [21065] — v Batte (2000) 49 OR (3d) 321 …. [3260] — v Batty [1963] VR 451 …. [33675], [33765] — v Bauer [2006] 1 Qd R 420 …. [19085] — v Baxter [1927] SASR 321 …. [23245] — v Baynon [1960] NZLR 1012 …. [15255] — v BBR (2009) 195 A Crim R 330 …. [11140], [13050], [13060] — v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 …. [11125], [17290], [17315], [35440], [35525] — v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57 …. [17590], [19045], [29050] — v Beardsall (1859) 1 F & F 529; 175 ER 839 …. [33435] — v Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302 …. [17545] — v — (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 …. [1520], [15260], [19055] — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 250 …. [1370] — v Beauchamp (1909) 2 Cr App R 40 …. [1830] — v Beble [1979] Qd R 278 …. [9040], [33730] — v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807; [1982] 1 WLR 461 …. [15160], [15170] — v — [1990] 1 Qd R 30 …. [33455] — v Beckett (1913) 8 Cr App R 204 …. [29100], [29130] — v — [1966] Qd R 170 …. [17705], [17715] — v — [2011] 1 Qd R 259 …. [19155] — v Beckford [1991] Crim LR 833 …. [33595], [33610]
— v Bedford (1986) 28 A Crim R 311 …. [1400] — v Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 341 …. [37055], [37060] — v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 …. [17550] — v Bednikov (1997) 95 A Crim R 200 …. [19135] — v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 …. [23255], [23345], [23360] — v Beecham [1921] 3 KB 464 …. [23275] — v Beedie [1998] QB 356 …. [5130], [5140] — v Beere [1965] Qd R 370 …. [27285], [33640], [33675] — v Beeston (1854) Dears CC 405; 169 ER 782 …. [33795] — v Begum (1985) 93 Cr App R 96 …. [33495], [33805] — v Belford (2011) 208 A Crim R 256 …. [27305] — v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 …. [1195], [33485], [33770] — v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141; 30 ALR 489 …. [25225], [25295] — v Bellamy (1985) 82 Cr App R 222 …. [13050], [13065] — v Bellino [1993] 1 Qd R 521 …. [15255] — v Bellis (1911) 6 Cr App R 283 …. [33810] — v — [1966] 1 All ER 552n; [1966] 1 WLR 234 …. [19120], [19130] — v Benbrika (Ruling No 11) (2007) 183 A Crim R 454 …. [1320] — v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282 …. [1245] — v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491 …. [15220] — v Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146 …. [17305], [17310], [17315] — v Bennett (1903) 6 WAR 60 …. [33615] — v — (1912) 8 Cr App R 10 …. [11140] — v — (1978) 68 Cr App R 168 …. [7010], [7030], [7050] — v — (1986) 44 SASR 164 …. [33760] — v — (2004) 88 SASR 6 …. [1405]
— v Benson [1985] 2 Qd R 117 …. [21205] — v Bentley (1991) 99 Cr App R 342 …. [1400] — v — [1963] QWN 10 …. [33640] — v — [2001] 1 Cr App R 307; [1999] Crim LR 330 …. [9030] — v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110; 89 ALR 339 …. [1395], [31045], [31065], [31095], [37025], [37170] — v Berger [1894] 1 QB 823 …. [33185] — v Bernadotti (1869) 11 Cox CC 316 …. [33295] — v Bernard (1858) 1 F & F 240; 175 ER 709 …. [17510] — v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 …. [15165], [15170], [15195] — v Berriman (1854) 6 Cox CC 388 …. [27285] — v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153 …. [15220], [29010], [29070], [33455] — v — [1993] Crim LR 973 …. [23035] — v Bertrand (1867) LR 1 PC 520 …. [1675] — v — (2008) 20 VR 222 …. [17285], [33640] — v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 …. [1215], [19085], [19090], [21050], [21243] — v Best [1909] 1 KB 692 …. [33680] — v — [1998] 4 VR 603 …. [21050], [21070], [21085], [21243] — v Bevan (1993) 98 Cr App R 354 …. [23050] — v Beveridge (1987) 85 Cr App R 255 …. [1390] — v Bey [1993] 3 All ER 253; [1994] 1 WLR 39 …. [33435] — v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278 …. [17295], [21050] — v Bicanin (1976) 15 SASR 20 …. [17055] — v Bickley (1909) 2 Cr App R 53 …. [15095] — v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213; [1918] All ER Rep 501 …. [1135], [19095], [23310]
— v Bijkerk (2000) 111 A Crim R 443 …. [27310] — v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321 …. [9110], [9115], [11085], [11095], [11100], [33575] — v Billings [1961] VR 127 …. [23310], [23315], [23325] — v Bingapore (1975) 11 SASR 469 …. [11140] — v Bingham [1999] 1 WLR 598 …. [17475] — v Birch (1924) 93 LJKB 385 …. [17375], [17390] — v Bircham [1972] Crim LR 430 …. [17460] — v Birkby [1994] 2 NZLR 38 …. [17375], [31185] — v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 …. [1675], [17435], [17445], [17460], [17480] — v — [2003] 2 Cr App R 7 …. [17270] — v Birmingham (1829) 8 LJSMC 41 …. [1475] — v Birtles (1911) 6 Cr App R 177 …. [1455] — v Bishop (1913) 15 WALR 70 …. [13035] — v — [1975] QB 274; [1974] 2 All ER 1206 …. [23315] — v Bispham (1830) 4 C & P 392; 172 ER 754 …. [19045] — v Bitossi [1984] 2 Qd R 51 …. [33435] — v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407 …. [7085], [21050] — v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237 …. [29045], [29050], [29070] — v Black (1909) 74 JP 71 …. [17045] — v — (1922) 16 Cr App R 118 …. [33505], [37130], [37135], [37145] — v — [1989] 2 SCR 138 …. [27285] — v Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox CC 333 …. [1410], [33640] — v — (1955) 39 Cr App R 84n …. [9020] — v — [2005] 2 Cr App R 440 …. [29050] — v Blackledge [1965] VR 397 …. [21185]
— v Blackwell (1996) 87 A Crim R 289 …. [1135], [21050], [29015] — v Blades; Ex parte AG (2001) 124 A Crim R 415 …. [11045] — v Blake and Tye (1844) 6 QB 126; 115 ER 49 …. [33565] — v Blanchard [1952] 1 All ER 114 …. [13115] — v Blastland [1986] AC 41; [1985] 2 All ER 1095 …. [31040], [31055], [31065], [31095], [31155], [33045], [37060], [37115] — v Blenkinsop [1995] 1 Cr App R 7 …. [1370] — v Blick (1830) 4 C & P 377; 172 ER 747 …. [5210] — v — (1966) 50 Cr App R 280 …. [3140] — v — (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 …. [1380], [11125] — v Bliss (1837) 2 Nev & PKB 464 …. [33155] — v — [1835] All ER Rep 372; (1837) 112 ER 577; 7 Ad & El 550 …. [33185], [37035] — v Bliss Hill (1918) 13 Cr App R 125 …. [19125] — v Boal [1965] 1 QB 402; [1964] 3 All ER 269 …. [13105] — v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison; Ex parte St Germain (No 2) [1979] 3 All ER 545; [1979] 1 WLR 1401 …. [1065] — v Boardman [1969] VR 151 …. [1360], [1400] — v Bodi [1969] VR 36 …. [17095], [17650], [17675], [17685] — v Bodsworth [1968] 2 NSWR 132; (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 290 …. [33640], [33675] — v Boland [1974] VR 849 …. [17305], [17315] — v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389; [1904] All ER Rep 24 …. [1495], [1520], [21195] — v Bondareff (1999) 74 SASR 353 …. [33690] — v Bone [1968] 2 All ER 644; [1968] 1 WLR 983 …. [7030], [7050] — v Bonin (1989) 47 CCC (3d) 230 …. [3156] — v Bonnick (1977) 66 Cr App R 266 …. [1155], [7015]
— v Bonnor [1957] VR 227; [1957] ALR 187 …. [7030], [7140], [7280] — v Bonollo [1981] VR 633 …. [11010] — v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 …. [29050], [29060], [29075], [29185] — v Booher [1928] 4 DLR 795 …. [33660], [33675] — v Booker (1924) 18 Cr App R 47 …. [33680] — v — (1924) 88 JP 75 …. [11075] — v Booth (1910) 5 Cr App R 177 …. [33680] — v — (1981) 74 Cr App R 123 …. [17380], [17385], [17535] — v —[1982] 2 NSWLR 847; (1982) 8 A Crim R 81 …. [15100], [19005] — v — [1983] 1 VR 39 …. [1220] — v Borg (2012) 220 A Crim R 522 …. [27315] — v Bormann (2010) 244 FLR 105 …. [27315] — v Borsellino [1978] Qd R 507 …. [33740] — v Bosman (1989) 50 SASR 365 …. [33640] — v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386; 30 ALR 185 …. [3020] — v Bottrill; Ex parte Kuechenmeister [1947] KB 41; [1946] 2 All ER 434 …. [3085] — v Boucher (1952) 36 Cr App R 152 …. [13110] — v Bouhsass (2002) 169 CCC (3d) 444 …. [17505] — v Bouquet [1962] SR (NSW) 563; (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 423 …. [1375], [1420], [33485], [33770] — v Bourke (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 793 …. [7030] — v Bowden [1999] 4 All ER 43; [1999] 1 WLR 823 …. [25010] — v Bowen [1972] Crim LR 312 …. [33520] — v Bowles [1992] Crim LR 726 …. [17690]
— v Box [1964] 1 QB 430; [1963] 3 All ER 240 …. [27215] — v Boxshall [1956] QWN 45 …. [1295] — v Boyes [1861] All ER Rep 172; (1861) 121 ER 730; 1 B & S 310 …. [25100], [25105] — v Boykovski (1991) 58 A Crim R 436 …. [17135] — v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219 …. [9030] — v Bozatsis (1997) 97 A Crim R 296 …. [27315] — v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44 …. [9095], [19145], [19155], [23275] — v Brackenbury [1965] 1 All ER 960; [1965] 1 WLR 1475 n …. [33690] — v Bradley (1989) 41 A Crim R 297 …. [21050] — v Bradley (No 2) (1986) 85 FLR 111 …. [9045] — v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 …. [11070], [33660] — v — (1985) 82 Cr App R 79 …. [29070] — v — (1986) 82 Cr App R 79 …. [29070] — v Brady (1980) 2 A Crim R 42 …. [33460] — v — (2005) 92 SASR 135 …. [11095] — v Bragg (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 436 …. [17560] — v Braham [1976] VR 547 …. [25260] — v Bramhill (1933) 24 Cr App R 79 …. [15095] — v Brandon (1969) 53 Cr App R 466 …. [27215] — v Branscombe (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 363 …. [1675] — v Bransden (1981) 27 SASR 474 …. [23345] — v Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199; 168 ER 202 …. [13050] — v Brauer [1937] QWN 18 …. [33730] — v Bray (1988) 88 Cr App R 354 …. [35425]
— v Braye-Jones [1966] Qd R 295 …. [17280] — v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 …. [15195], [17135], [17280] — v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 …. [15220] — v Brent [1973] Crim LR 295 …. [9120], [17370] — v Breslin (1984) 80 Cr App R 226 …. [1390] — v Brett BC9102525 …. [1295] — v Brewer (1942) 66 CLR 535; [1942] ALR 353 …. [1175] — v Brice (1819) 2 B & Ald 606; 106 ER 487 …. [13300] — v Bridger (2003) 141 A Crim R 287 …. [21100] — v Bridgewater [1905] 1 KB 131 …. [23315] — v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 …. [33435] — v Brien (1965) 50 DLR (2d) 92 …. [7160] — v Briggs (1930) 22 Cr App R 68 …. [17055] — v — (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 …. [9115] — v Britten (1988) 51 SASR 567; 148 LSJS 1 …. [1380], [1410] — v Brittle (1965) 109 Sol Jo 1028 …. [19125] — v Britton [1987] 2 All ER 512; [1987] 1 WLR 539 …. [17240] — v Britzman [1983] 1 All ER 369; [1983] 1 WLR 350 …. [11120], [21130], [23315] — v Broadbent [1964] VR 733 …. [33610] — v Bromley Magistrates; Ex parte Smith [1995] 4 All ER 146; [1995] 1 WLR 944 …. [17130] — v Brooke (1819) 2 Stark 472; 171 ER 709 …. [17470], [17475] — v Brooks (1989) 7 WCB (2d) 170 …. [21170] — v — (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 …. [13050], [13060], [13275] — v Brophy [1982] AC 476; [1981] 2 All ER 705 …. [11060], [33675] — v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 …. [1445], [7085], [17040]
— v Brown (1831) 4 Car & P 588n; 172 ER 837 …. [17055] — v — (1931) 23 Cr App R 56 …. [33680], [33730] — v — (1960) 44 Cr App R 181 …. [23315], [23360] — v — (1975) 10 SASR 139 …. [7020], [7030] — v — (1987) 87 Cr App R 52 …. [27130] — v — (1988) 89 Cr App R 97 …. [19090] — v — [1960] VR 382 …. [23325], [23340], [23345] — v — [1977] Qd R 220 …. [13275] — v — [1983] Crim LR 38 …. [23040] — v — [1985] 2 Qd R 126 …. [17660] — v — [1991] Crim LR 835 …. [31140] — v — [1995] 1 Qd R 287 …. [7085] — v — [1996] 1 WLR 1599 …. [17130] — v — [1998] 2 Cr App R 364 …. [17495] — v — [1998] AC 367; [1997] 3 All ER 769 …. [17130] — v — [2002] 1 Cr App R 46 …. [11100] — v Brown and Hedley [1861] All ER Rep Ext 2151; (1867) LR 1 CCR 70; (1867) 10 Cox CC 453 …. [19045] — v Browne (1906) 70 JP 472 …. [11035] — v — (1943) 29 Cr App R 106 …. [17650] — v — (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 …. [1360] — v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 …. [11075], [39105] — v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425 …. [11095], [39105] — v — (1991) 94 Cr App R 109 …. [1440] — v — [1995] Crim LR 227 …. [17175] — v Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114 …. [23290], [23405] — v Brownlowe (1986) 7 NSWLR 461 …. [1445]
— v Broyles [1991] 3 SCR 595 …. [27305] — v Bruce (1986) 23 A Crim R 123 …. [1195] — v — [1965] QWN 48 …. [33690] — v — [1975] 3 All ER 277; [1975] 1 WLR 1252 …. [23380] — v — [1988] VR 579 …. [33770] — v Bryant (1946) 31 Cr App R 146 …. [17130], [17185], [17225], [27135] — v — [1979] QB 108; [1978] 2 All ER 689 …. [19120], [19130] — v — [1980] 1 NZLR 264 …. [1045] — v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 …. [1645], [1650] — v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 …. [15165], [15170] — v Buchan [1964] 1 All ER 502; [1964] 1 WLR 365 …. [33690] — v Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302 …. [1450] — v — [1966] VR 9 …. [1125], [1530], [33660], [33690] — v Buck [1940] OR 444; [1941] 1 DLR 302 …. [33290] — v Buckett (1995) 132 ALR 669 …. [1305] — v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 …. [1220] — v Buckley (1873) 13 Cox CC 293 …. [33125], [37115], [37120] — v — (2004) 10 VR 215 …. [17485] — v Buckskin (1974) 10 SASR 1 …. [33765] — v Bueti (1997) 70 SASR 370 …. [1445], [33690] — v Buggy (1961) 45 Cr App R 298 …. [33520] — v Buisson [1990] 2 NZLR 542 …. [29115] — v Bukvic (2010) 107 SASR 405 …. [9070] — v Bundy (1910) 5 Cr App R 270 …. [1360], [1365] — v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 …. [25245], [25295] — v — (2004) 92 SASR 146 …. [11125]
— v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 …. [1360], [1365], [1395], [1400], [1405] — v Burdett [1814] All ER Rep 80; (1814) 106 ER 873; (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 …. [1125], [1215], [1220], [3275], [7160] — v — (1855) Dears 431; 169 ER 792 …. [13095] — v Burge [1996] 1 Cr App R 163 …. [15220] — v Burgess (1956) 40 Cr App R 144 …. [15125] — v — [1968] 2 QB 112; [1968] 2 All ER 54n …. [11050], [33620] — v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608; [1936] ALR 482 …. [3158] — v Burke (1847) 2 Cox CC 295 …. [31180], [31185] — v — (1858) 8 Cox CC 44 …. [17590], [33805] — v — (1912) 47 ILT 111 …. [17275] — v — (1985) 82 Cr App R 156 …. [23345] — v Burles [1964] Tas SR 256 …. [1295] — v Burnett [1944] VLR 115; [1944] ALR 247 …. [33660] — v Burney [1989] 1 NZLR 732 …. [27215] — v Burns (1883) 9 VLR (L) 191 …. [1880] — v — (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 …. [17460], [17485], [17630], [21050] — v — (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 …. [15220], [21050], [39105] — v — (2003) 137 A Crim R 557 …. [19055] — v — [2006] 2 Cr App R 264 …. [41110] — v Burrows (1988) 36 A Crim R 408 …. [17305] — v — (2003) 140 A Crim R 533 …. [33435] — v Burt (1851) 5 Cox CC 284 …. [19120] — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 28 …. [27305], [33635], [33650] — v Burton (1854) Dears CC 282; 169 ER 728 …. [1250] — v Busby (1982) 75 Cr App R 79 …. [17590], [19030]
— v Butcher (1900) 64 JP 808 …. [17045] — v Butler (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 328; 70 WN (NSW) 222 …. [17135] — v — (1986) 84 Cr App R 12 …. [21065] — v — [2010] 1 Qd R 325 …. [9030], [29080] — v Butler (No 1) (1991) 102 FLR 341 …. [33495], [33745] — v Butler (No 2) (1991) 1 NTLR 166 …. [15160] — v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4; [1947] 2 All ER 415 …. [1045], [19110], [19120], [19140] — v Button [1992] 1 Qd R 552 …. [15100] — v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564 …. [33295] — v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 …. [17295] — v Byast [1999] 2 Qd R 384 …. [13030] — v Byczko (1982) 30 SASR 578 …. [33760] — v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 …. [15170], [19080], [19085], [19090] — v Byczko (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 …. [17450] — v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517 …. [17290] — v Byrne [1972] 1 NSWLR 264 …. [33705] — v Byrnes (1996) 20 ACSR 260 …. [21050] — v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 …. [13165], [29050] — v — (1997) 93 A Crim R 81 …. [27315] — v — [1976] Qd R 341 …. [33750] — v — [2000] 2 Qd R 54 …. [35410] — v — [2005] 3 NZLR 92 …. [27215] — v C, CN (2013) 117 SASR 64 …. [21257] — v C, G (2013) 117 SASR 162 …. [1680], [21257]
— v Caceres-Moreira [1995] Crim LR 489 …. [21205] — v Cacic (2001) 124 A Crim R 598 …. [35417] — v — (2002) 5 VR 446 …. [35417] — v Cahill (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 387 …. [21035] — v Cahill; Ex parte McGregor (1985) 61 ACTR 7 …. [25295] — v Cain (1936) 25 Cr App R 204 …. [17135] — v — [1994] 2 All ER 398; [1994] 1 WLR 1449 …. [19135] — v Caine (1993) 68 A Crim R 233 …. [11035] — v Cairns [2003] 1 WLR 796 …. [17120], [17370] — v Cakovski (2002) 133 A Crim R 18 …. [17405] — v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 …. [19120], [35400] — v Calcedo [1986] VR 499 …. [5025], [5135], [5155] — v Calder & Boyars Ltd [1969] 1 QB 151; [1968] 3 All ER 644 …. [29110] — v Caldwell (1993) 99 Cr App R 73 …. [1370] — v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355 …. [9020] — v Callaghan (1979) 69 Cr App R 88 …. [17485] — v — (2001) 4 VR 79 …. [1440], [1445] — v — [1994] 2 Qd R 300; (1994) 70 A Crim R 350 …. [17065], [17120], [17335], [33455] — v Callender [1998] Crim LR 337 …. [37060] — v Callum [1975] RTR 415 …. [19120] — v — [1976] Crim LR 257 …. [17205] — v Calway (2005) 157 A Crim R 322 …. [15220] — v Cambridge [1994] 2 All ER 760; [1994] 1 WLR 971 …. [9120] — v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122 …. [17275] — v Camilleri (2001) 119 A Crim R 106 …. [15220]
— v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 290 …. [1450] — v — (2007) 68 NSWLR 720 …. [27315] — v Camm (1883) 1 QLJ 136 …. [41050] — v Campbell (1978) 69 Cr App R 221 …. [17690], [17715] — v — (1986) 84 Cr App R 255 …. [7015] — v — (2007) 175 A Crim R 79 …. [1375] — v — [1956] 2 QB 432; [1956] 2 All ER 272 …. [15035], [15140], [15145] — v — [1970] VR 120 …. [17135] — v — [1993] Crim LR 448 …. [33595], [33705] — v Cannan [1998] Crim LR 284 …. [17460] — v Cannings [2004] 1 FCR (UK) 193; [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] 1 WLR 2607 …. [29080] — v Cape (1996) 1 Cr App R 191 …. [1400] — v Capner [1975] 1 NZLR 411 …. [27235], [27310] — v Capobianco (1978) 20 ACTR 29 …. [9070], [33455] — v Carabott (2002) 83 SASR 293 …. [15160] — v Caracella [1958] VR 382; [1958] ALR 827 …. [17375] — v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 …. [9020] — v Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207 …. [15220] — v Carey (1968) 52 Cr App R 305 …. [17130], [19005], [23365] — v Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271; (1913) 8 Cr App R 224 …. [1560], [11115], [17580], [19015], [19075] — v Carn (1982) 5 A Crim R 466 …. [29050] — v Carnall [1995] Crim LR 944 …. [37060] — v Carne (1997) 94 A Crim R 249 …. [21035] — v Carpenter (2011) 249 FLR 432 …. [1375]
— v Carpenter (No 2) (1982) 142 DLR (3d) 237 …. [21110] — v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 …. [1400], [15160], [17295] — v — [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 …. [1230] — v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; [1943] 1 All ER 156 …. [9045] — v Carranceja (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 …. [15085], [21215] — v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 …. [21065], [21110], [29055] — v — (1993) 99 Cr App R 381 …. [15020] — v — (2002) 213 CLR 635; 194 ALR 1 …. [5150] — v Carter (2000) 1 VR 175 …. [27305] — v — [1959] VR 105; [1959] ALR 335 …. [7030] — v — [1984] 3 NSWLR 635 …. [33735] — v — [1997] Crim LR 505 …. [23155] — v Carter; Ex parte A-G [1990] 2 Qd R 371 …. [5210] — v Carter; Ex parte Gray [1991] Tas R 174 …. [29095] — v Cartledge [1959] VR 221 …. [17105] — v Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr App R 219 …. [1360], [1410] — v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 …. [1380], [1400], [11125] — v Cassebohm (2011) 109 SASR 465 …. [17295] — v Cassell (1998) 45 NSWLR 325 …. [1175], [1305] — v Cassidy (1858) 1 F & F 79; 175 ER 634 …. [17115], [17120] — v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74 …. [1230] — v Cavalli (2010) 206 A Crim R 306 …. [27305] — v Cavanagh [1972] 2 All ER 704; [1972] 1 WLR 676 …. [17125], [17130] — v Cave [1963] Crim LR 371 …. [11075] — v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136 …. [9030] — v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 …. [1395], [1440], [9030], [9040],
[11125], [15220] — v CDR (No 2) [1996] 1 Qd R 183 …. [17690] — v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 …. [1220] — v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis and Francis [1989] AC 346; [1988] 3 All ER 775 …. [25290] — v Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 649 …. [3075] — v Cervelli [1998] 3 VR 776 …. [1220] — v Chadwick (1934) 24 Cr App R 138 …. [1380], [11030] — v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 …. [11125], [13085], [15160], [33570] — v Challinger [1989] 2 Qd R 352 …. [27215] — v Challinor (1982) 76 Cr App R 229 …. [33615], [33690] — v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 …. [15220], [23020] — v Chalmers [2013] 2 Qd R 175 …. [13050] — v Chamberlain [1983] 2 VR 511 …. [9070] — v Chambers (1848) 3 Cox CC 92 …. [17605], [17615] — v Chamilos (1985 unreported) …. [21050] — v Chan (2002) 131 A Crim R 66 …. [15260], [21050] — v Chan Kwok-keung [1990] 1 HKLR 359 …. [33435] — v Chance [1988] QB 932; [1988] 3 All ER 225 …. [1400], [15125] — v Chandler [1976] 3 All ER 105; [1976] 1 WLR 585 …. [33485] — v Chandu Nagrecha [1997] 2 Cr App R 401 …. [19030] — v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; 140 A Crim R 573 …. [15220], [33435] — v Chapman (1838) 8 C & P 558; 173 ER 617 …. [17090], [19010] — v — (1911) 7 Cr App R 53 …. [1360], [1365] — v — (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 61 …. [1410] — v — (2001) 79 SASR 342 …. [27255]
— v — [1969] 2 QB 436; [1969] 2 All ER 321 …. [31085] — v — [1973] QB 774; [1973] 2 All ER 624 …. [15210], [15220] — v — [1980] Crim LR 42 …. [13275] — v Charavanmuttu (1930) 22 Cr App R 1 …. [15225], [33770] — v Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 286 …. [29050] — v Charles [2010] Crim LR 303 (CA) …. [7170] — v Charlie (1995) 121 FLR 306 …. [33775] — v Charlton [1972] VR 758 …. [27135] — v Chatwood [1980] 1 All ER 467; [1980] 1 WLR 874 …. [33460] — v Chatzidimitriou (2000) 1 VR 493 …. [9030], [11010] — v Cheadle (Inhabitants) (1832) 3 B & Ad 833; 110 ER 306 …. [39205] — v Checconi (1988) 34 A Crim R 160 …. [15090], [15100] — v Chedzey (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 …. [9030], [9095] — v Chee [1980] VR 303 …. [21020], [21185] — v Cheema [1994] 1 All ER 639; [1994] 1 WLR 147 …. [15080], [15160], [15255] — v Chekeri (2001) 122 A Crim R 422 …. [5150] — v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300 …. [15115], [19005] — v — [1993] 2 VR 139 …. [1305], [15175] — v Cheng (1976) 63 Cr App R 20 …. [17200], [17220] — v — (1999) 48 NSWLR 616 …. [11140] — v Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6 …. [1445] — v — [2004] 1 All ER 543 (CA) …. [1445] — v Chernoff (1973) 4 SASR 422 …. [17130] — v Cherrington [1984] 2 NZLR 369 …. [33435] — v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 …. [15220], [21050], [21257],
[33435] — v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police; Ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274; [1994] 3 All ER 420 …. [27005], [27105], [27190] — v Chimirri (2002) 136 A Crim R 381 …. [27305] — v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; 59 ALR 1 …. [17500], [17630], [17635], [17640], [17645], [17660], [17670], [17700], [17705], [17710], [31010], [39105] — v Ching (1976) 63 Cr App R 7 …. [3020], [9025] — v Chinmaya [1995] 1 Qd R 542 …. [23290], [23345] — v Chiron [1980] 1 NSWLR 218 …. [3170] — v Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 …. [21055], [23200], [23240] — v Choney (1908) 17 Man R 467 …. [33665] — v Chrimes (1959) 43 Cr App R 149 …. [15100] — v Christensen (2005) 156 A Crim R 397 …. [27255] — v — [1923] 2 DLR 379 …. [11040] — v Christie (1914) 10 Cr App R 141 …. [11115] — v — [1914] AC 545; [1914] All ER Rep 63 …. [1030], [1085], [1480], [1565], [11115], [11130], [15185], [17260], [21220], [31185], [31190], [33470], [33480], [37010] — v Chubb (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 282 …. [17165] — v Churchwardens, Overseers and Guardians of the Poor of the Parish of Birmingham (1861) 1 B & S 763; 121 ER 897 …. [1005], [33020] — v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 46 MVR 461 …. [1315], [3070], [15220] — v Ciesielski [1972] 1 NSWLR 504 …. [21050], [33705] — v Cittadini (2008) 189 A Crim R 492 …. [21252] — v City of Doncaster & Templestowe; Ex parte Mayor [1971] VR 466 …. [1175], [7070], [31145] — v City of Westminster Assessment Committee; Ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd [1941] 1 KB 53 …. [3135]
— v Clare [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 …. [1370], [29060] — v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 …. [1410] — v — (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 …. [11125], [15085], [15160], [15260], [17460], [17525], [21050], [35532] — v — (2005) 13 VR 75; 158 A Crim R 278 …. [1660], [29070] — v — [1955] 2 QB 469; [1955] 3 All ER 29 …. [23315], [23345] — v — [1962] VR 657 …. [23325], [23345] — v — [1970] 1 NSWR 289 …. [33500], [33645] — v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; 171 ER 633 …. [19075], [19170] — v — (1930) 22 Cr App R 58 …. [17130], [27135] — v — (1977) 67 Cr App R 398 …. [21170] — v — (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 …. [1390], [1395] — v — (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 …. [9030] — v — (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 …. [1380], [1450], [33690], [33730] — v — (2005) 159 A Crim R 281 …. [9030] — v — [1959] VR 645 …. [33455] — v — [1964] QWN 8 …. [33690] — v —[1969] 2 All ER 1008; [1969] 1 WLR 1109 …. [1240] — v — [1969] 2 QB 91; [1969] 1 All ER 924 …. [33380] — v — [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 …. [1370] — v Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344; [1971] 1 WLR 1402 …. [15095] — v Clarkson (No 2) [1982] VR 522 …. [27140] — v Cleal [1942] 1 All ER 203 …. [1385], [15140] — v Cleary (1963) 48 Cr App R 116 …. [33615], [33620], [33635] — v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584; [1967] 1 All ER 996 …. [17090], [17095], [17650] — v Cleland (1901) 20 NZLR 509 …. [15020]
— v Clermont [1986] 2 SCR 130 …. [21170] — v Clevens (1981) 37 ACTR 57 …. [33745], [33750] — v Clewer (1953) 37 Cr App R 37 …. [17135] — v Clewes (1830) 4 C & P 221; 172 ER 678 …. [1140] — v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 …. [13060], [13275] — v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 …. [15160], [33435] — v — (1992) 64 A Crim R 451 …. [9020] — v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 …. [1440] — v Clowes [1992] 3 All ER 440 …. [27130], [27180] — v Clune (1999) 72 SASR 420 …. [17605] — v — [1982] VR 1 …. [1365], [1380], [1400], [1420], [1445] — v — [1989] VR 567 …. [33760] — v — [1995] 1 VR 489 …. [1400] — v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 …. [17615], [19170] — v Clune (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 …. [1360] — v Clyne (1985) 2 NSWLR 740 …. [25005], [27300], [33610], [33760] — v Clynes (1961) 44 Cr App R 158 …. [15220], [15255] — v Cmrs of Inland Revenue; Ex parte T C Coombs & Co [1991] 2 AC 283; [1991] 3 All ER 623 …. [1210] — v Coats [1932] NZLR 401 …. [17335] — v Cobbett (1831) 2 St Tr (NS) 789 …. [27130] — v Cobby (1883) 4 LR (NSW) L 355 …. [13030] — v Cobcroft (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 608 …. [37155] — v Cobden (1862) 3 F & F 833; 176 ER 381 …. [21040], [21090] — v Cockley (1984) 79 Cr App R 181 …. [11095] — v Cockroft (1870) 11 Cox CC 410 …. [19075]
— v Coe [1967] VR 712 …. [9005] — v Cohen (1909) 3 Cr App R 234 …. [15025] — v — (1914) 10 Cr App R 91 …. [23320] — v — [1951] 1 KB 505; [1951] 1 All ER 203 …. [1195], [7160] — v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207; [1960] 2 All ER 175 …. [23200], [23240] — v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261; BC9906404 …. [21252] — v Cole (1941) 28 Cr App R 43 …. [17065], [21100], [21220] — v — (1810 unreported) …. [21015] — v Coleman (No 2) (1901) 27 VLR 294; 7 ALR 216 …. [33345], [41060] — v Coley (1868) 10 Cox CC 536 …. [33640] — v Colgan (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 96; 76 WN (NSW) 41 …. [1280] — v Coll (1889) 24 LR Ir 522 …. [17250], [17305], [17315] — v Colle (1991) 95 Cr App R 67 …. [7170] — v Colless [1964] NSWR 1243; (1964) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 55 …. [15175], [15220] — v Colley (1829) Mood & M 329; 173 ER 1178 …. [17055] — v Collie (1991) 56 SASR 302 …. [15160] — v — (2005) 91 SASR 339 …. [21050] — v Collier [1965] 3 All ER 136; [1965] 1 WLR 1470 …. [33690] — v Collings [1976] 2 NZLR 104 …. [1400], [15210], [31185], [31190] — v Collins (1960) 44 Cr App R 170 …. [39035] — v — (1975) 12 SASR 501 …. [33740], [33765] — v — (1976) 12 SASR 501 …. [29050] — v — (1986) 44 SASR 214 …. [1320] — v — [1907] VLR 292; (1907) 13 ALR 184 …. [17090], [17095] — v — [1986] VR 37 …. [11125]
— v — [2004] 1 WLR 1705 …. [33485] — v Collister and Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr App R 100 …. [17130], [19005], [23365] — v Coltress (1978) 68 Cr App R 193 …. [23215] — v Commission for Racial Equality; Ex parte Cottrell & Rothon (a firm) [1980] 3 All ER 265; [1980] 1 WLR 1580 …. [1055], [1065] — v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow & Co (1910) 11 CLR 1; 16 ALR 373 …. [3158] — v Conde (1867) 10 Cox CC 547 …. [37130] — v Condo (1992) 62 A Crim R 11 …. [9030] — v Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335 …. [11135] — v — [1980] Crim LR 721 …. [1435] — v Condren (1987) 28 A Crim R 261 …. [29050] — v — [2003] 3 NZLR 702 …. [13085] — v Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 574 …. [17325] — v Condron [1997] 1 WLR 827 …. [25010] — v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 …. [23205], [23380] — v Conley (1979) 21 SASR 166 …. [27295] — v Connell (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 360 …. [1045] — v — (1995) 14 ACLC 32 …. [41130] — v Connell, Lucas & Carter (No 4) (1992) 9 WAR 567 …. [27180] — v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171 …. [17250], [21180] — v Connor (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 225 …. [1045] — v Connors (1990) 20 NSWLR 438 …. [33620] — v Constantinou (1989) 91 Cr App R 74 …. [31195] — v Contenanza [1958] Tas SR 3 …. [33690] — v Conway (1979) 70 Cr App R 4 …. [17545]
— v Cook (1918) 34 TLR 515 …. [33680] — v — (1980) 71 Cr App R 205 …. [31140], [35425] — v — (1998) 130 NTR 28 …. [1370] — v — (2000) 22 WAR 67 …. [21050] — v — [1959] 2 QB 340; [1959] 2 All ER 97 …. [23315], [23340], [23345], [23355], [23360] — v — [1987] QB 417; [1987] 1 All ER 1049 …. [17255], [31195] — v Cook; Ex parte Twigg (1980) 147 CLR 15; 31 ALR 353 …. [25370], [33840] — v Cooke (1986) 84 Cr App R 286 …. [5215], [17510], [19030] — v Cooksley [1982] Qd R 405 …. [1045] — v Coombes (1960) 45 Cr App R 36 …. [21190] — v Coombs [1983] NZLR 748 …. [33770] — v — [1985] 1 NZLR 318 …. [27215] — v Cooper (1833) 5 Car & P 534; 172 ER 1087 …. [33645] — v — (1979) 69 Cr App R 229 …. [1155] — v — (1985) 82 Cr App R 74 …. [17560] — v — (1995) 14 WAR 416 …. [17175] — v — (2007) 175 A Crim R 94 …. [13050], [37060] — v — [1978] SCR 860; (1978) 74 DLR (3d) 731 …. [9035] — v — [2010] 2 Cr App R 13 …. [15020] — v Cooper (No 2) (1974) 51 DLR (3d) 315 …. [13240] — v Coote [1861] All ER Rep Ext 1113; (1873) LR 4 PC 599 …. [25005], [25105], [33640] — v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 …. [23250], [23375], [23395] — v Cordingley [2008] Crim LR 299 …. [17135] — v Corelli [2001] Crim LR 913 …. [17430], [33595]
— v Corish (2006) 96 SASR 207; 70 A Crim R 162 …. [1220] — v Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 …. [1445] — v Corkin (No 2) (1988) 50 SASR 285 …. [15135] — v Cormack (1979) 1 A Crim R 471 …. [23040] — v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82 …. [1305], [27315] — v Coroner; Ex parte Alexander [1982] VR 731 …. [25005], [25105] — v Correia (1996) 15 WAR 95 …. [21050] — v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 …. [15135] — v Corris 1931 TPD 471 …. [31155], [33810] — v Cosgrove (1988) 34 A Crim R 299 …. [9040] — v Costi (1987) 48 SASR 269 …. [17445] — v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659 …. [7085] — v Cotic (2000) 118 A Crim R 393 …. [11045] — v Cotton (1990) 19 NSWLR 593 …. [33750] — v Coughlan (1976) 63 Cr App R 33 …. [1040], [7045] — v Coulman (1927) 20 Cr App R 106 …. [19005], [23275] — v Coulstock (1998) 99 A Crim R 143 …. [27315] — v Coulston [1997] 2 VR 446 …. [7085] — v Couper (1985) 18 A Crim R 1 …. [23205] — v Court (1836) 7 C & P 486; 173 ER 216 …. [33640] — v — (1960) 44 Cr App R 242 …. [1230] — v Courtnell [1990] Crim LR 115 …. [1395] — v Courtney (1956) 74 WN (NSW) 204 …. [1375] — v — [1995] Crim LR 63 …. [23350] — v Coventry (1997) 7 Tas R 199 …. [17380] — v Coventry Justices; Ex parte Bullard (1992) 95 Cr App R 175 …. [1315], [31075]
— v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 …. [7085], [15260] — v Cowell (1985) 24 A Crim R 47 …. [5210] — v — [1940] 2 KB 49; [1940] 2 All ER 599 …. [1040], [11045], [13090] — v Cowie; Ex parte A-G [1994] 1 Qd R 326 …. [13060] — v Cowle (1907) 71 JP Jo 152 …. [17045], [33795] — v Cowpe (1892) 13 LR (NSW) (L) 265 …. [31120] — v Cowper (1699) 13 St Tr 1106 …. [37125] — v Cox (1858) 1 F & F 90; 175 ER 639 …. [33475] — v — (1884) 14 QBD 153; [1881] All ER Rep 68 …. [25110], [25290], [25285] — v — (1986) 84 Cr App R 132 …. [19090] — v —[1898] 1 QB 179; [1895] All ER Rep 1285 …. [29090], [41050] — v — [1972] Qd R 366 …. [17545], [17580] — v — [1986] 2 Qd R 55 …. [1665], [15100], [33455] — v Coxon (2002) 82 SASR 412 …. [1400] — v Coyne [1996] 1 Qd R 512 …. [33770] — v Craig (1982) 1 CCC (3d) 416 …. [21080] — v — [1975] 1 NZLR 597 …. [25295] — v Cramp (1880) 14 Cox CC 390 …. [15225], [33470] — v Cratchley (1913) 9 Cr App R 232 …. [15095] — v Crawford [1965] VR 586 …. [23325], [23345] — v — [1985] 2 Qd R 22 …. [33750] — v — [1997] 1 WLR 1329 …. [23380] — v Crayden [1978] 2 All ER 700; [1978] 1 WLR 604 …. [33825], [35360], [35425] — v Creamer (1984) 80 Cr App R 248 …. [1420]
— v — (1989) 43 A Crim R 92 …. [33735] — v Crippen [1911] 1 KB 149; [1908] All ER Rep 390 …. [17650] — v Crisologo (1997) 99 A Crim R 178 …. [35525] — v Crocker [1922] All ER Rep 775; (1922) 92 LJKB 428 …. [15125] — v Crooks (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 390 …. [11100] — v — [2001] 2 Qd R 541 …. [33690] — v Cross (1990) 91 Cr App R 115 …. [17430] — v Crouch (1850) 4 Cox CC 163 …. [39105] — v Crowe (1917) 81 JP 288 …. [33680] — v Crown Court at Harrow; Ex parte Dave [1994] 1 All ER 315; [1994] 1 WLR 98 …. [19005] — v Crown Prosecution Service; Ex parte Warby (1993) 158 JP 190 …. [1030] — v Crupi (1995) 86 A Crim R 229 …. [1440] — v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118 …. [15220], [33435], [33770] — v Cumberbatch (No 5) (2002) 130 A Crim R 599 …. [19135] — v Cummings [1948] 1 All ER 551 …. [17270], [17285] — v — [1978] Qd R 49 …. [23315] — v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; 147 A Crim R 585 …. [1140], [1170], [9040] — v Cummins (dec’d) [1972] Ch 62; [1971] 3 All ER 782 …. [15150] — v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 …. [17135] — v — [1959] 1 QB 288; [1958] 3 All ER 711 …. [23315] — v Cupit [1978] Tas SR 95 …. [17245] — v Curgerwen (1865) LR 1 CCR 1; [1861] All ER Rep 1368 …. [7280] — v Curnock (1914) 111 LT 816 …. [33490] — v Curran (2008) 100 SASR 71 …. [17460]
— v — [1983] 2 VR 133 …. [1300], [27305], [33760] — v Curry [1983] Crim LR 737 …. [1390] — v Curtis [1957] VR 306; [1957] ALR 578 …. [17180] — v Cushway (1968) 62 QJPR 90 …. [17090] — v Czerwinski [1954] VLR 483; [1954] ALR 621 …. [11050], [33690] — v D (1996) 86 A Crim R 41 …. [19125] — v — (1998) 71 SASR 99 …. [9040] — v — (2003) 141 A Crim R 471 …. [13060] — v — (2008) 220 FLR 169 …. [1450] — v — [1996] QB 283; [1996] 1 All ER 881 …. [5180] — v D’Arrigo [1994] 1 Qd R 603 …. [15095], [27300], [27310] — v D’Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140 …. [11045], [33605], [33610] — v D(P) [2012] 1 Cr App R 33 …. [19110], [19135] — v Da Silva [1990] 1 All ER 29; [1990] 1 WLR 31 …. [17185], [17195] — v Dadson (1983) 77 Cr App R 91 …. [35340] — v DAH (2004) 150 A Crim R 14 …. [1220], [23055] — v Daily Mirror; Ex parte Smith [1927] 1 KB 845; [1927] All ER Rep 503 …. [1375] — v Dainer; Ex parte Pullen (1988) 78 ACTR 25 …. [25245] — v Daley [1979] Tas R 75 …. [39105] — v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12 …. [29050] — v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169 …. [27315] — v Dalloz (1908) 1 Cr App R 258 …. [1170] — v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422 …. [9030] — v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 …. [17080], [17090], [17095], [17100], [17125] — v Daniel (2010) 207 A Crim R 449 …. [9020]
— v Danine (2004) 145 A Crim R 278 …. [15170], [15195] — v Danvers [1984] Crim LR 182 …. [1045] — v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668; 40 ALR 594 …. [5150] — v — [1989] Crim LR 817 …. [17375] — v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 …. [17535], [17645], [17650], [17690], [33770] — v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209 …. [35455], [35460] — v Darrington [1980] VR 353 …. [21215], [29050] — v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28 …. [1450], [31195] — v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83 …. [1370], [29075] — v Dat [1998] Crim LR 488 …. [17375] — v Davey (1970) 2 CCC 351 …. [31175] — v Davidovic (1990) 51 A Crim R 197 …. [33575] — v Davidson (1934) 25 Cr App R 21 …. [1250] — v — (1996) 92 A Crim R 1 …. [27305], [33700] — v — (2009) 75 NSWLR 150 …. [9040] — v Davidson; Ex parte A-G [1996] 2 Qd R 505 …. [27305], [33700], [33725] — v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276 …. [17290], [17295] — v — (2005) 11 VR 314 …. [1420] — v — [1962] 3 All ER 97; [1962] 1 WLR 1111 …. [29060], [29090], [29105], [29130] — v — [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 …. [17135] — v Davis (1909) 2 Cr App R 133 …. [1675] — v — (1959) 43 Cr App R 215 …. [33770] — v — (1993) 97 Cr App R 110 …. [27105] — v — [1975] 1 All ER 233; [1975] 1 WLR 345 …. [23380]
— v — [1979] Crim LR 167 …. [19050], [33660] — v — [1980] 1 NZLR 257 …. [5210] — v — [1982] 1 NZLR 584 …. [5150], [5155], [21100] — v — [1990] Crim LR 860 …. [11035], [11065] — v — [1993] 2 All ER 643; [1993] 1 WLR 613 …. [17130] — v — [2008] 1 AC 1128; [2008] 3 All ER 461 …. [17155] — v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353; [1954] ALR 877 …. [3158] — v —[1972] 3 All ER 1121; [1972] 1 WLR 1540 …. [23035] — v Davy [1964] NSWR 40; (1964) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 42 …. [17305], [17315] — v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 …. [17300], [17595], [17655] — v Dawson [1961] VR 773 …. [5210] — v Day (1841) 9 Car & P 722; 173 ER 1026 …. [31155], [33810] — v — (2000) 115 A Crim R 80 …. [23410] — v — [1940] 1 All ER 402 …. [17620], [17650], [17700], [39105] — v Daye [1908] 2 KB 333 …. [1315] — v Daylight (1989) 41 A Crim R 354 …. [31045] — v DBA (2012) 219 A Crim R 408 …. [17290] — v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 …. [17255], [17315] — v DBY (2006) 94 SASR 489 …. [21050], [33435] — v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129 …. [21050], [21243] — v DCT; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389; 71 ALR 86 …. [25075], [25125] — v DD (2007) 19 VR 143 …. [17305], [19135] — v DDR [1998] 3 VR 580 …. [17065] — v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 …. [19035], [19090] — v De Berenger (1814) 3 M & S 67; 105 ER 536 …. [3040]
— v De Grey; Ex parte Fitzgerald (1913) 109 LT 871 …. [1290] — v De Lam (1999) 108 A Crim R 440 …. [15220] — v De Vere [1982] QB 75; [1981] 3 All ER 473 …. [17690], [17715] — v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 …. [1395] — v Deaboyer (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 198 …. [3200] — v Deacon [1973] 2 All ER 1145; [1973] 1 WLR 696 …. [13130] — v Deakin [1994] 4 All ER 769 …. [11035] — v Dean (1981) 26 SASR 437 …. [33760] — v Dean (No 2) (1896) 17 LR (NSW) (L) 224 …. [33640] — v Deathe [1962] VR 650 …. [11045], [11065], [33675] — v Debs (2008) 191 A Crim R 231 …. [21180] — v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 …. [11010] — v Deenik [1992] Crim LR 578 …. [25095] — v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252 …. [1380] — v Degnan [2001] 1 NZLR 280 …. [21025] — v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 …. [21050], [21180], [21185], [33550] — v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 …. [15160], [15220], [33570] — v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 …. [1295], [17095] — v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 …. [1410] — v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433 …. [27130] — v Dempster [2001] Crim LR 567 …. [23410] — v Dener [1969] NZLR 763 …. [9040] — v Denley [1970] Crim LR 583 …. [19035] — v Dent [1943] 2 All ER 596 …. [11140] — v Deputy Industrial Injuries Cmr; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456; [1965] 1 All ER 81 …. [1055], [1065]
— v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 …. [15160] — v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B [1996] AC 487; [1995] 4 All ER 526 …. [25215], [25220], [25265], [25295] — v Derwentside Justices; Ex parte Heaviside [1996] RTR 384 …. [41105] — v Desmond [1999] Crim LR 313 …. [23315] — v Devenish [1969] VR 737 …. [17130], [39105] — v Deverell [1969] Tas SR 106 …. [33500], [33690] — v Devine (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 …. [23335], [33735] — v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 …. [33765] — v Diane [2010] 2 Cr App R 1 …. [13270], [17055], [17170] — v Dibble (1908) 1 Cr App R 155 …. [17375], [17390] — v Dick 1982 Tas R 252 …. [19030] — v — [1966] Qd R 301 …. [29075] — v Dickman (1910) 5 Cr App R 135 …. [1360] — v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 …. [1395], [1400], [9040], [33435] — v Dillon (1983) 85 Cr App R 29 …. [17240] — v — [1983] 2 Qd R 627 …. [33460] — v Dinh (2000) 120 A Crim R 42 …. [33575] — v Discon (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 619 …. [29070] — v Ditroia [1981] VR 247 …. [23375] — v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306 …. [7045], [9120] — v Dixon (1925) 19 Cr App R 36 …. [15085] — v — (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 …. [33635], [33650] — v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784 …. [7085], [17305], [17315] — v DJX (1990) 91 Cr App R 36 …. [13070] — v Dlugosz [2013] 1 Cr App R 32 …. [9095]
— v Do (1990) 54 SASR 543 …. [15135] — v Dodd (1981) 74 Cr App R 50 …. [11120], [33740] — v — (2002) 135 A Crim R 32 …. [1355] — v — [1960] WAR 42 …. [37010] — v — [1985] 2 Qd R 277 …. [3065] — v Dodson [1984] 1 WLR 971 …. [1370] — v Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 …. [9095] — v Doherty (1874) 13 Cox CC 23 …. [33645] — v — (2003) 6 VR 393 …. [1220] — v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 …. [21050], [21243], [33690] — v — [2003] 1 Cr App R 18 …. [21050] — v Domican (No 3) (1990) 46 A Crim R 428 …. [23345] — v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258 …. [15160], [21050] — v Donald (1982) 7 A Crim R 474 …. [15195], [15255] — v Donaldson (1976) 64 Cr App R 59 …. [17335], [33455] — v Donat (1985) 82 Cr App R 173 …. [15110], [33570] — v Doney (1988) 37 A Crim R 288 …. [15165], [15180] — v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 …. [33775], [35620], [35650] — v Donnini [1973] VR 67 …. [1360], [21210], [29095], [33720] — v Donohoe (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 38; 79 WN (NSW) 693 …. [11030], [11040], [11075], [33295] — v — [1979] Crim LR 382 …. [33740] — v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; [1934] All ER Rep 207 …. [7070] — v Doogan (2005) 158 ACTR 1 …. [29080] — v Doolan [1962] Qd R 449 …. [33495] — v Dooley [1964] 1 All ER 178; [1964] 1 WLR 648 …. [1240] — v Doolin (1832) 1 Jebb CC 123 …. [17480]
— v Doosti (1985) 82 Cr App R 181 …. [17615], [19030] — v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429 …. [17630], [17665] — v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158 …. [15140], [15205] — v Dougherty (1973 unreported) …. [1410] — v Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264 …. [19155], [21215] — v Dowell [1960] Crim LR 436 …. [17135] — v Dowley [1983] Crim LR 168 …. [33435] — v Dowling (1883) 9 VLR (L) 79 …. [25200] — v Downer (1880) 14 Cox CC 486 …. [33540], [33550] — v Downes [1981] Crim LR 174 …. [21170] — v Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 …. [1370], [21180] — v Doyle [1967] VR 698 …. [1375], [1380], [1415] — v Doyle; Ex parte A-G [1987] 2 Qd R 732 …. [33650] — v DPM [1998] 3 VR 705 …. [15220] — v DPP; Ex parte Lee [1999] 2 All ER 737 …. [17130] — v Drummond (1784) 1 Leach 337; 168 ER 271 …. [33300] — v DS [1999] Crim LR 911 …. [17155] — v Dubois [1966] QWN 25 …. [17270] — v Duchess of Kingston (1776) 20 St Tr 578 …. [1620] — v Ducsharm [1955] OR 824; (1956) 1 DLR (2d) 732 …. [21045] — v Dudko (2002) 132 A Crim R 371 …. [35545] — v Duell [1964] Qd R 451 …. [17155], [17285] — v Duffy [1979] 2 NZLR 432 …. [33485], [33490] — v — [1999] QB 919 …. [33805] — v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554 …. [27310], [33760] — v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 …. [15175], [15255], [29075]
— v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1; [1957] 2 All ER 737 …. [9045] — v Duncan (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 150 …. [29060] — v — (1981) 73 Cr App R 359 …. [33455] — v — (2011) 109 SASR 479 …. [9035] — v — [1944] KB 713 …. [1290] — v — [1992] 1 NZLR 528 …. [11075] — v Dungay (2001) 126 A Crim R 216 …. [27315] — v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323; [1926] All ER Rep 187 …. [19145], [23190], [23280], [23315], [23320] — v Dunn (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 423 …. [23315] — v Dunne (1929) 99 LJKB 117 …. [11035] — v Dunning [1965] Crim LR 372 …. [19050] — v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103 …. [17705], [25265] — v Duong (2011) 110 SASR 291; 210 A Crim R 452 …. [37060] — v — (2011) 110 SASR 296 …. [9035], [37060] — v Dupas (2011) 211 A Crim R 81 …. [29050] — v Dupas (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380 …. [1400], [15220] — v Duryea (2008) 192 A Crim R 286 …. [1125] — v Duvivier (1982) 29 SASR 217 …. [1880], [23145] — v DWB (2006) 163 A Crim R 71 …. [21050] — v — (2008) 20 VR 112 …. [21050] — v Dwyer [1925] 2 KB 799; [1924] All ER Rep 272 …. [1375], [1380], [1425] — v Dyke (2009) 197 A Crim R 558 …. [1290] — v Dytche (1890) 17 Cox CC 39 …. [1155] — v E (1995) 89 A Crim R 325 …. [17135] — v — [2012] Crim LR 383 …. [17135]
— v — [2012] Crim LR 563 …. [13070], [17435] — v E J Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 608 …. [17065] — v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225 …. [15140], [15170], [15220], [17290] — v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99 …. [17175], [19050] — v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 …. [1365], [17130] — v East (2003) 154 A Crim R 1 …. [27305] — v Eastwood [1973] VR 709 …. [17125] — v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 …. [9120], [11120], [11125], [27255] — v Edmunds (1833) 6 Car & P 164; 172 ER 1191 …. [31095] — v — (1909) 2 Cr App R 257 …. [33795] — v Edwards (1837) 8 C & P 26; 173 ER 384 …. [17190] — v — (1848) 3 Cox CC 82 …. [17090], [17120] — v — (1872) 12 Cox CC 230 …. [37025] — v — (1973) 1 QL 365 …. [33690] — v — (1983) 77 Cr App R 5 …. [9025] — v — (1986) 20 A Crim R 463 …. [19050], [29050] — v — [1975] 1 NZLR 402 …. [15100] — v — [1975] QB 27; [1974] 2 All ER 1085 …. [7170], [7180] — v — [1983] Crim LR 539 …. [33435] — v — [1991] 2 All ER 266; [1991] 1 WLR 207 …. [17510], [19030] — v — [1998] 2 VR 354 …. [1200], [5155] — v — [1998] Crim LR 207 …. [21065] — v Edwin (No 2) (2013) 277 FLR 14 …. [27315] — v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463 …. [17265] — v Efandis (2008) 186 A Crim R 302 …. [27130] — v Eftoda (1963) 37 DLR (2d) 269 …. [33635]
— v Eidinow (1932) 23 Cr App R 145 …. [23145], [23315] — v El Adl [1993] 2 Qd R 195 …. [15220], [33435] — v El-Zarw [1994] 2 Qd R 67 …. [5150], [5160] — v Eleftheriou [1993] Crim LR 947 …. [17200] — v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442 …. [11075] — v Ellem (No 1) [1995] 2 Qd R 542 …. [19095] — v Ellem (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 549 …. [7085] — v Elliott [1977] Crim LR 557 …. [33740] — v Ellis (1826) 6 B & C 145; 108 ER 406 …. [21040] — v — (2001) 125 A Crim R 419 …. [27310] — v — (2003) 58 NSWLR 700 …. [1765], [21035], [21235], [21252] — v — (2010) 107 SASR 94 …. [21100] — v — [1910] 2 KB 746; [1908] All ER Rep 488 …. [23145], [23270] — v — [1961] 2 All ER 928; [1961] 1 WLR 1064 …. [23375] — v — [1990] Crim LR 717 …. [19090] — v Ellwood (1908) 1 Cr App R 181 …. [1140] — v Elomar (No 6) (2008) 233 FLR 230 …. [27315] — v Elsworthy (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 …. [7085], [15185], [17275] — v Elworthy (1867) LR 1 CCR 103 …. [39010] — v Ely JJ; Ex parte Burgess [1992] Crim LR 888 …. [1295] — v Emmett (1988) 14 NSWLR 327 …. [27215] — v — [1905] VLR 718; (1905) 11 ALR 484 …. [21200] — v England (2013) 116 SASR 589 …. [17290] — v — [1978] Tas SR 79 …. [35045] — v Enoch (1833) 5 Car & P 539; 172 ER 1089 …. [33615] — v Ensor [1989] 2 All ER 586; [1989] 1 WLR 497 …. [15255]
— v EO (2004) 8 VR 154 …. [17135], [17295] — v Epping and Harlow Justices; Ex parte Massaro [1973] QB 433; [1973] 1 All ER 1011 …. [17130] — v Erdei [1998] 2 VR 606 …. [15220] — v ERJ (2010) 200 A Crim R 270 …. [15135], [17290] — v Ernst [1984] VR 593 …. [33570], [35335], [35425] — v Errigo (2005) 91 SASR 80 …. [33045] — v Errington (1838) 2 Lewin 148; 168 ER 1110 …. [33265] — v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 …. [11135], [17135], [35530], [35620] — v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 …. [21050], [21090] — v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1 …. [1395], [1445] — v Evans (1924) 18 Cr App R 123 …. [17275], [17285] — v — (1985) 38 SASR 344 …. [15220] — v — (2006) 164 A Crim R 489 …. [1295], [1450] — v — [1962] SASR 303 …. [33690] — v — [1964] VR 717 …. [17090], [17130] — v — [1965] 2 QB 295; [1964] 3 All ER 401 …. [15110], [15250] — v — [1981] Crim LR 699 …. [33540], [33550], [33570] — v Evans (No 2) [1976] VR 523 …. [21040] — v Everitt [1921] VLR 245; (1921) 27 ALR 183 …. [23310] — v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 322; [1966] 2 All ER 470 …. [7160], [7175] — v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; [1983] 2 All ER 645 …. [11075], [35425], [39105] — v Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922; 176 ER 850 …. [1110], [17335], [17340] — v F [2012] Crim LR 282 …. [11100] — v F (A) (1996) 1 CR (5th) 382 …. [17505]
— v F(S) [2011] 2 Cr App R 28 …. [11100] — v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169 …. [1400] — v Fairbairn (2011) 250 FCR 277 …. [35520] — v Fairleigh (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 723 …. [33650] — v Fajkovic [1970] VR 566 …. [33805] — v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 96 ALR 545 …. [7030], [7090], [7255] — v Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 …. [11100], [11105], [19120] — v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664 …. [19110], [19135] — v Fallon [1975] Crim LR 341 …. [33615], [33690] — v Falzon [1990] 2 Qd R 436 …. [13085] — v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 …. [9040], [15160], [21085], [33770] — v Fannon (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 427; 39 WN (NSW) 130 …. [1375], [1380], [17345], [31185] — v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49 …. [13060] — v Farid (1945) 30 Cr App R 168 …. [15085] — v Farooqi [2014] 1 Cr App R 8 …. [17065], [17435], [17495] — v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410 …. [7085], [15220], [17130], [29050], [29055], [29060], [29065], [29070], [29075], [33435] — v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399 …. [1335], [27315] — v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263 …. [29050] — v Faure [1978] VR 246 …. [11095] — v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54 …. [29015], [29150] — v FDP (2008) 74 NSWLR 645 …. [1680] — v Federal Court of Australia; Ex p WA National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190; 23 ALR 439 …. [3156], [3157]
— v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556 …. [3158] — v Feely [1973] QB 530; [1973] 1 All ER 341 …. [11010] — v Feigenbaum [1919] 1 KB 431; [1918] All ER Rep 489 …. [15225], [33770] — v Felise [1985] 1 NZLR 186 …. [17305] — v Fell (1879) 2 SCR NS (NSW) (L) 109 …. [39010] — v Fellowes [1987] 2 Qd R 606 …. [11100], [23030] — v Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App R 307 …. [17205], [17240], [17435] — v — (1980) 71 Cr App Rep 307 …. [17435] — v Fennell (1881) 7 QBD 147 …. [33640] — v Fenton [2003] 3 NZLR 439 …. [1125] — v Fergus (1994) 98 Cr App R 313 …. [11100] — v — [1992] Crim LR 363 …. [31185] — v Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250 …. [23275] — v — (2009) 24 VR 531 …. [15165], [17435], [29050] — v Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477 …. [1295], [21065] — v Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60 …. [1220], [21180] — v Fetch [1976] 1 ACLD 019 …. [17265] — v Field (1919) 15 Cr App R 129 …. [17515] — v Field; Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 …. [3130] — v Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92 …. [33690], [33725] — v Fields (1986) 28 CCC (ed) 353 …. [1645] — v Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153 …. [17645] — v Finlay (2007) 178 A Crim R 373 …. [1395] — v Finlayson (1912) 14 CLR 675; 18 ALR 313 …. [1880], [21195] — v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 …. [1395], [1400]
— v — [1985] 1 Qd R 212 …. [33570] — v Finnessey (1906) 11 Ont LR 338 …. [19035] — v Firman (1989) 52 SASR 391 …. [31090] — v Fischer (1996) 23 MVR 507 …. [1125] — v Fitzgibbon (1885) 11 VLR 232 …. [19075] — v Fitzpatrick (1926) 19 Cr App R 91 …. [1110] — v — [1962] 3 All ER 840; [1963] 1 WLR 7 …. [37155] — v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 …. [21050], [21243], [21252] — v Flack [1969] 2 All ER 784; [1969] 1 WLR 937 …. [21155] — v Flanigan (1997) 190 LSJS 499 …. [33435] — v Flannery [1969] VR 586 …. [15195] — v Flemming (1987) 86 Cr App R 32 …. [1390], [11100] — v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554 …. [9030] — v Fletcher (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 70 …. [21025] — v — (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 …. [21252] — v — [1998] 2 Qd R 437 …. [9040] — v Floyd [1972] 1 NSWLR 373 …. [21105] — v Flynn (1957) 42 Cr App R 15 …. [17645], [17650] — v — [1967] Crim LR 489 …. [17510] — v — [2008] 2 Cr App R 20 …. [1445] — v Foggo; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [1989] 2 Qd R 49 …. [17240] — v Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35 …. [21252] — v — [2003] NSWCCA 17; BC200302747 …. [21035] — v Foley (1984) 13 A Crim R 29 …. [17130] — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (1998) 105 A Crim R 1 …. [17435], [17460], [17485] — v Foll (1956) 64 Man R 198 …. [33430]
— v Folley (1896) 60 JP 569 …. [17265] — v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 …. [3290], [29050] — v Fontaine Moreau (1848) 11 QB 1028; 116 ER 757 …. [5220] — v Forbes [1999] 2 Cr App R 501 …. [23405] — v Ford (1851) 5 Cox CC 184 …. [17540] — v — (1913) 32 NZLR 1219 …. [41005], [41035] — v — (2009) 273 ALR 286 …. [3285], [21252] — v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 …. [3185] — v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 …. [21252] — v Foreman (No 1) (1952) (1) SA 423 …. [31060] — v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 …. [15095] — v Forrest [1970] NZLR 545 …. [33810] — v Forrester [1985] 2 NZLR 85 …. [1275] — v Fortunato (2003) 137 A Crim R 453 …. [23410] — v Foster (1834) 6 Car & P 325; 172 ER 325 …. [37050], [37055], [37065] — v — (1949) 79 CLR 43; [1949] ALR 493 …. [3156] — v Fotheringham [1975] Crim LR 710 …. [17185] — v Fountain (2001) 124 A Crim R 100 …. [15100] — v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233 …. [9030], [15220] — v Fowden [1982] Crim LR 588 …. [1370], [1380], [31075] — v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 …. [29070] — v — (1985) 39 SASR 441 …. [29065] — v — (2003) 151 A Crim R 166 …. [1755], [9040], [15260] — v Fox [2000] 2 Qd R 334 …. [23240] — v Fox (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 640 …. [1395] — v FP (2007) 169 A Crim R 318 …. [1665], [15255]
— v Francis [1874] All ER Rep Ext 2028; (1874) 43 LJMC 97 …. [1275], [1475], [21205] — v — (1959) 43 Cr App R 174 …. [11045] — v — [1991] 1 All ER 225; [1990] 1 WLR 1264 …. [17690] — v — [1993] 2 Qd R 300 …. [15255] — v Franklin (2001) 3 VR 9 …. [15220] — v Fraser (1956) 40 Cr App R 160 …. [17375] — v — [2004] 2 Qd R 544 …. [27305] — v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 …. [21050], [31100] — v Freebody (1935) 25 Cr App R 69 …. [15125] — v Freeman (1895) 6 QLJ 281 …. [33295] — v — [1980] 17 VR 1 …. [17285] — v — [1980] VR 1 …. [15130], [15170], [15195], [17265], [17270], [17275], [17285] — v French (2012) 114 SASR 287 …. [13050] — v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436 …. [23185] — v Frixou [1998] Crim LR 352 …. [17135] — v Frizell (1987) 31 A Crim R 213 …. [29150] — v Froggatt (1910) 4 Cr App R 115 …. [17645] — v Frost (1839) 4 St Tr NS 85 …. [17650] — v — (1839) 9 C & P 129; 173 ER 771 …. [33570] — v Frugtniet [1999] 2 VR 297 …. [33780] — v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685 …. [17590], [21050] — v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310 …. [7085] — v Fuhrer [1961] VR 500 …. [15075], [15175] — v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 …. [21050] — v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 …. [19140], [23275], [23285]
— v — [1970] 3 NSWR 320 …. [33500] — v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482; [1990] 1 WLR 587 …. [17510], [17535], [17580], [17595] — v Fuschillo [1940] 2 All ER 489 …. [1195] — v Fuzil Deen [1895] QCR 307 …. [13030] — v Fyffe [1991] 2 VR 72 …. [9040] — v G (1987) 45 SASR 102 …. [15135] — v — (1997) 42 NSWLR 451 …. [19085], [19090], [29195] — v — [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 …. [33610], [33650] — v — [1981] 2 NZLR 91 …. [25365] — v — [1994] 1 Qd R 540 …. [7085] — v — [2004] 2 Cr App R 38 …. [29080] — v — [2004] 2 Cr App R 638 …. [29060] — v G and B [2004] 2 Cr App R 37 …. [27105] — v Gabriel (1986) 87 FLR 285 …. [33760] — v Gadbury (1838) 8 C & P 676; 173 ER 669 …. [19140], [19145] — v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198 …. [17285], [21050] — v Gaffney [1968] VR 417 …. [1400] — v Gainsborough Justices; Ex parte Green [1983] Crim LR 627 …. [17660] — v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060; [1981] 1 WLR 1039 …. [9115], [9120], [11095], [11100] — v Gale (2012) 217 A Crim R 487 …. [21252] — v — [1994] Crim LR 208 …. [19030] — v Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220 …. [17595] — v Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73 …. [15195], [17265], [17275], [17285]
— v — [1974] 3 All ER 118; [1974] 1 WLR 1204 …. [1220] — v — [1986] VR 219 …. [15100] — v — [1991] 3 NZLR 163 …. [11075] — v — [1998] 2 VR 671 …. [15220] — v Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 …. [9095], [9130] — v Galluzzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 …. [15165], [15170], [15175] — v Galvin (2006) 161 A Crim R 449 …. [21050] — v Gamer (1848) 1 Den 329; 169 ER 267 …. [33615], [33625] — v Gammon (1959) 43 Cr App R 155 …. [15130] — v Gandfield (1846) 2 Cox CC 43 …. [37085] — v Garbett (1847) 1 Den 236; 169 ER 227 …. [25110] — v — (1847) 2 C & K 474; 175 ER 196 …. [25005], [27285] — v Gardiner (1979) 27 ALR 140 …. [17135] — v — [1982] 2 SCR 368; (1982) 140 DLR (3d) 612 …. [1045], [9070] — v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439 …. [1370] — v — [1932] NZLR 1648 …. [33620] — v — [1980] Qd R 531 …. [29025], [29070], [29150] — v Gardner and Hancox (1915) 11 Cr App R 265 …. [33495], [33690], [33730] — v Garland (1941) 29 Cr App R 46 …. [13095] — v Garner [1964] NSWR 1131; (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 120 …. [21050], [21090] — v Garnet-Thomas [1974] 1 NSWLR 702 …. [1175] — v Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 …. [17130] — v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392 …. [21050] — v Garrod [1997] Crim LR 445 …. [33455] — v Garth (1990) 49 A Crim R 298 …. [9040]
— v — (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 …. [33660] — v — [1949] 1 All ER 773 …. [1195] — v Garvey [1987] 2 Qd R 623 …. [13055] — v Gaudion [1979] VR 57 …. [1305] — v Gaunt [1964] NSWR 864 …. [1360], [1400], [1410] — v Gay [1976] VR 577 …. [1675], [33435] — v Gazard (1838) 8 Car & P 595; 173 ER 633 …. [27205] — v GEA (2002) 131 A Crim R 54 …. [17295] — v Gearing (1965) 50 Cr App R 18 …. [17095] — v GEC (2001) 3 VR 344 …. [1215] — v GED (2003) 141 A Crim R 135 …. [17460] — v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376 …. [21252], [31185], [35525] — v Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215 …. [21015], [21105], [21115] — v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111; 15 A Crim R 297 …. [1680], [1880], [17175] — v — (1985) 38 SASR 226 …. [27305], [33700] — v Gellin (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 271 …. [21050] — v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242 …. [29075] — v George [2003] Crim LR 283 …. [1360] — v Georgiadis [1984] VR 1030 …. [25105] — v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 …. [1140], [1520], [11045], [21050] — v Georgiou (2005) 153 A Crim R 288 …. [35435] — v Gera [1978] 2 NZLR 500 …. [33795] — v Gerard [1948] 1 All ER 205 …. [33770] — v German [1947] OR 295; [1947] 4 DLR 68 …. [29130] — v GG (2004) 151 A Crim R 92 …. [17270]
— v GGT (2007) 97 SASR 315 …. [15220], [21050] — v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 …. [1735], [33610], [33775], [35615], [35620] — v Ghion [1982] Qd R 781 …. [17650] — v Giaccio (1997) 68 SASR 484 …. [27305], [33725] — v Giam (No 2) (1999) 109 A Crim R 348 …. [3160] — v Gian [2010] Crim LR 409 (CA) …. [9095] — v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155; (1982) 7 A Crim R 385 …. [15160], [19095], [19155], [21150], [21215], [23250] — v Gibbons (1823) 1 Car & P 97; 171 ER 1117 …. [25325], [33635] — v — [1971] VR 79 …. [33420], [33460] — v — [1973] 1 NZLR 376 …. [33435] — v Gibbs (2004) 154 ACTR 1 …. [21252] — v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 …. [1665], [1675], [31155], [31160], [37070] — v — (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 199 …. [41105] — v — (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 …. [17135] — v — (1999) 110 A Crim 180 …. [9040] — v — [1983] 3 All ER 263; [1983] 1 WLR 1038 …. [9025] — v — [1993] Crim LR 453 …. [17285] — v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 …. [11065], [11140] — v Giffin [1971] Qd R 12 …. [17270], [17280] — v Giga [2007] Crim LR 571 …. [1395] — v Gilbert (1907) 38 SCR 284 …. [37055] — v — (1977) 66 Cr App R 237 …. [33770] — v — [2002] 2 AC 531 …. [15125] — v Gilday [1924] VLR 42; (1923) 30 ALR 218 …. [23285]
— v Gilfoyle [1996] 1 Cr App R 302 …. [37065] — v — [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 …. [29075] — v Gilham (1828) 1 Mood CC 186; 168 ER 1235 …. [33640] — v Gill (2003) 142 A Crim R 22 …. [15170] — v — [1963] 2 All ER 688; [1963] 1 WLR 841 …. [7005], [7050] — v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479 …. [35525] — v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 …. [17550] — v — (1988) 36 A Crim R 235 …. [27265] — v Gillingham [1939] 4 All ER 122 …. [3150] — v Gillis (1886) 11 Cox CC 69 …. [33715] — v — [1957] VR 91; [1957] ALR 438 …. [23310] — v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 …. [1445], [29050], [29055], [29075], [29185] — v Ginies [1972] VR 394 …. [17065] — v Giovannone (2002) 140 A Crim R 1 …. [1305] — v Giri (2001) 121 A Crim R 568 …. [1220] — v GJH (2001) 122 A Crim R 361 …. [17295] — v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; 125 A Crim R 315 …. [1880], [5155], [9095], [11125], [29205] — v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465 …. [17405] — v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37 …. [15100], [15110], [15160] — v Gleeson [1975] Qd R 399 …. [11045], [11065] — v Glencourse (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 …. [15135], [15160] — v Glennon [1993] 1 VR 97 …. [33770] — v Glennon (No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631 …. [1220], [17295] — v Gloster (1888) 16 Cox CC 471 …. [33295], [37130], [37135] — v Glover (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 482; 45 WN (NSW) 148 …. [15100]
— v — [1991] Crim LR 48 …. [37060] — v Goddard [1962] 3 All ER 582; [1962] 1 WLR 1282; (1962) 46 Cr App R 456 …. [15250], [15255] — v Godinho (1911) 7 Cr App R 12 …. [33640] — v Godstone Justices; Ex parte Dickson [1971] Crim LR 602 …. [17095] — v Gojanovic (No 2) (2002) 130 A Crim R 179 …. [21050] — v Golder [1960] 3 All ER 457; [1960] 1 WLR 1169 …. [17395] — v Golding (2008) 100 SASR 216 …. [33455] — v Goldstein (1914) 11 Cr App R 27 …. [15025] — v — [1983] 1 All ER 434; [1983] 1 WLR 151 …. [11020] — v Golightly (1997) 17 WAR 401 …. [33295], [37060] — v Goncalves (1997) 99 A Crim R 193 …. [9030], [17370] — v Goodall [1982] VR 33 …. [1370], [31185] — v Goode [1970] SASR 69 …. [1360], [1380], [1400] — v Goodway [1993] 4 All ER 894 …. [15220], [33435] — v Goonan (1993) 69 A Crim R 338 …. [15170] — v Gordon (1781) 2 Doug KB 590; 99 ER 372 …. [17510] — v — (1789) 1 Leach 515; 168 ER 359 …. [1175] — v — (1958) 42 Cr App R 177 …. [31020], [31130] — v — (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 …. [21055], [21065] — v — [1995] 2 Cr App R 61 …. [21050], [21065] — v Gordon (Lord) (1781) 21 St Tr 485 …. [31100] — v Gorham (1997) 68 SASR 505 …. [1400], [1410] — v Goring [2011] Crim LR 790 …. [11100] — v Goss (1923) 17 Cr App R 196 …. [1375], [1380], [1425] — v Gough [1993] AC 646; [1993] 2 All ER 724 …. [27215]
— v Gough; Ex parte Municipal Officers’ Assn (1975) 133 CLR 59; 6 ALR 411 …. [5025] — v Gould (1840) 9 Car & P 364; 173 ER 870 …. [27280] — v Goulden [1993] 2 Qd R 534 …. [37155] — v Gouroff (1979) 1 A Crim R 367 …. [33570] — v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8 …. [35495], [35500] — v Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Levin [1997] AC 741; [1997] 3 All ER 289 …. [31090] — v Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Osman (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 108; [1991] 1 WLR 281 …. [27130], [27180] — v Governor of Gloucester Prison; Ex parte Miller [1979] 2 All ER 1103; [1979] 1 WLR 537 …. [17185] — v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Osman (1988) 90 Cr App R 281 …. [1480], [35070] — v — [1989] 3 All ER 701; [1990] 1 WLR 277 …. [33570], [39005] — v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Schneider (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 …. [1030] — v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Voets [1986] 2 All ER 630; [1986] 1 WLR 470 …. [1030] — v Governor of the Metropolitan Gaol [1963] VR 61 …. [7105], [33595] — v Governors and Guardians of Exeter (1869) LR 4 QB 341 …. [33020], [33060] — v GPP (2001) 129 A Crim R 1 …. [17295] — v GR [2006] 1 Qd R 185 …. [13060] — v Grafton [1993] QB 101; [1992] 4 All ER 609 …. [17090] — v Graham (1914) 4 Cr App R 218 …. [15125] — v — (1972) 7 CCC (2d) 93 …. [17340] — v — [1973] Crim LR 628 …. [17185], [17245]
— v — [1974] SCR 206; (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 579 …. [17335] — v Gramanatz [1962] QWN 41 …. [23345] — v Grant (1834) 5 B & Ad 1081; 110 ER 1092 …. [1645] — v — (1865) 4 F & F 322; 176 ER 583 …. [1140] — v — (1996) 2 Cr App R 272 …. [21180] — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 124 …. [1742] — v — [1944] 2 All ER 311 …. [13080] — v — [1964] SASR 331 …. [9040] — v — [1996] 1 Cr App R 73 …. [21065] — v — [2006] QB 60 …. [25025] — v Grassby (1988) 15 NSWLR 109 …. [33680], [33745] — v Grasso [1950] VLR 21; [1950] ALR 131 …. [15125] — v Gray (1866) 4 F & F 1102; 176 ER 924 …. [21110] — v — (1973) 58 Cr App R 177 …. [9020] — v — (1978) 17 SASR 534 …. [19090] — v — [1965] Qd R 373 …. [11060], [17545], [25105] — v — [1995] 2 Cr App R 100 …. [33575] — v — [1998] Crim LR 570 …. [17430] — v — [2004] 2 Cr App R 30 …. [19110], [19135] — v Grays Justices; Ex parte Tetley (1979) 70 Cr App R 11 …. [17130] — v Grayson (1921) 16 Cr App R 7 …. [33690] — v Greasby [1984] Crim LR 488 …. [11120] — v Greatbanks [1959] Crim LR 450 …. [19075] — v Greatorex (1994) 74 A Crim R 496 …. [33045] — v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 …. [21050], [21243] — v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 …. [23040]
— v Green (2001) 78 SASR 463 …. [15135], [17295] — v — (2002) 4 VR 471 …. [11045] — v Greenslade (1870) 11 Cox CC 412 …. [17130] — v Greenwood [1962] Tas SR 319 …. [17275] — v — [1993] Crim LR 770 …. [17265] — v — [2005] 2 Cr App R 7 …. [33045] — v Gregg (1932) 24 Cr App R 13 …. [15145] — v Gregson [2003] 2 Cr App R 521 …. [17310], [31095] — v Grewal [1975] Crim LR 159 …. [33640] — v Griffin (1809) Russ & Ry 151; 168 ER 732 …. [27280] — v — [1998] 1 Qd R 659 …. [13060] — v Griffis (1996) 67 SASR 170 …. [13070], [17090] — v Griffith [1997] 2 Qd R 524 …. [29050] — v Griffiths [1930] VLR 204; [1930] ALR 121 …. [1375], [1380] — v — [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 2 All ER 448 …. [33575] — v Grills (1910) 11 CLR 400; 17 ALR 313 …. [33470], [33480] — v — (1954) 73 WN (NSW) 303 …. [21105] — v Grimer [1982] Crim LR 674 …. [1370], [31075] — v Grimes [1994] Crim LR 213 …. [27130] — v — [2013] 1 Qd R 351 …. [11125], [17485] — v Grocott [2012] Crim L Rev 210 …. [17500] — v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584 …. [15220], [21050] — v Grossman (1981) 73 Cr App R 302 …. [35340] — v Grout (1909) 3 Cr App R 64 …. [23315] — v Groves (1981) 58 FLR 18 …. [5150] — v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150 …. [17295]
— v Gudgeon (1995) 133 ALR 379 …. [27310] — v Guerin [1967] 1 NSWR 255 …. [7030] — v Guidice [1964] WAR 129 …. [1195] — v Guildhall Justices; Ex parte DPP (1983) 78 Cr App R 269 …. [27130] — v Guinan (2001) 121 A Crim R 196 …. [1220] — v Guiron (1962) 72 WN (NSW) 811 …. [7165] — v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558 …. [15195] — v Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680 …. [1445] — v Gun (1977) 17 SASR 165 …. [19080], [19090] — v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600; [1951] 2 All ER 290 …. [19045], [19050], [33705] — v Guney (1998) 2 Cr App R 242 …. [17130], [17510], [19030], [21065] — v Gunnell (1886) 16 Cox CC 154 …. [37095] — v Gunning (1980) 98 Cr App R 303 …. [17135] — v Guthridge; Ex parte Campbell (1878) 4 VLR (L) 77 …. [17055] — v Gutteridges (1840) 9 C & P 471; 173 ER 916 …. [17275], [31095] — v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395 …. [15220] — v Gwaze [2010] 3 NZLR 734; [2010] NZSC 52 …. [1585], [11005] — v Gwilliam [1968] 3 All ER 821; [1968] 1 WLR 1839 …. [35425] — v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 …. [17255], [35440], [35525] — v — [1993] 1 NZLR 130 …. [11010] — v — [1995] 2 AC 596; [1995] 2 All ER 865 …. [15110], [15230], [21085], [21100] — v — [1997] 1 Qd R 527 …. [1395] — v — [1999] 2 Qd R 283 …. [35125], [35410]
— v — [2004] 2 AC 134; [2004] 1 All ER 1269 …. [17130] — v H (a child) (1996) 85 A Crim R 481 …. [33750] — v H (JR) (Childhood Amnesia) [2006] 1 Cr App R 10 …. [29050] — v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86 …. [17290] — v Haas (1962) 132 CCC 362; 35 DLR (2d) 172 …. [1245] — v — (1986) 22 A Crim R 229 …. [11100] — v — (1997) 90 A Crim R 149 …. [33775] — v Haddad (1988) 33 A Crim R 400 …. [15255] — v — (2000) 116 A Crim R 312 …. [27315] — v Haddy [1944] KB 442; [1944] 1 All ER 319 …. [33770] — v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 …. [17375], [17380] — v Hadwen [1902] 1 KB 882 …. [17475] — v Hagan [1966] Qd R 219 …. [11030], [11075], [33675] — v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138 …. [21050] — v Haggag (1998) 101 A Crim R 593 …. [7085] — v Haidley [1984] VR 229 …. [1375], [1400], [1410], [1420], [29050], [29070] — v Haines [1965] QWN 44 …. [17665] — v Hajistassi (2010) 107 SASR 67 …. [1135], [19095], [33455] — v Hakala [2002] Crim LR 578 (CA) …. [17075] — v Hakeem (2006) 163 A Crim R 549 …. [21170] — v Halden (1983) 9 A Crim R 30 …. [9070] — v Hales [1924] 1 KB 672 …. [11035] — v Halford (1978) 67 Cr App R 318 …. [17655], [33690] — v Hall (1887) 5 NZLR 93 …. [21015] — v — (1958) 43 Cr App R 29 …. [17130], [27135] — v — (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 …. [29075]
— v — [1952] 1 KB 302; [1952] 1 All ER 66 …. [21100], [21110], [21115], [21195] — v — [1973] QB 496; [1973] 1 All ER 1 …. [33795] — v — [1986] 1 Qd R 462 …. [17325], [17375], [17565] — v Hallam (1985) 42 SASR 126 …. [1410] — v Hallett [1986] Crim LR 462 …. [27130] — v Halliday (2009) 23 VR 419 …. [21050] — v Halligan [1973] 2 NZLR 158 …. [33490] — v Hallocoglu (1992) 29 NSWLR 67 …. [23020] — v Hally [1962] Qd R 214 …. [29050], [29105], [31120], [31145], [39010] — v Halpin [1975] QB 907; [1975] 2 All ER 1124 …. [31015], [33350], [33385], [33390], [33405] — v Halse (1980) 25 SASR 510 …. [33760] — v Hamand (1985) 82 Cr App R 65 …. [33455] — v — (1985) 82 Cr App Rep 65 …. [7015] — v Hamid (1979) 69 Cr App R 324 …. [15020] — v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 …. [19145], [23290] — v — [1969] Crim LR 486 …. [17135], [19110] — v Hamitov (1979) 21 SASR 596 …. [1295] — v Hammer [1923] 2 KB 786 …. [41030] — v Hammond (1799) 2 Esp 719; 170 ER 508 …. [33570] — v — (1941) 28 Cr App R 84 …. [11055] — v — [1965] NZLR 257 …. [33640] — v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90 …. [1380] — v Hampshire [1996] QB 1; [1995] 2 All ER 1019 …. [11035], [13055] — v Hampshire County Council; Ex parte Ellerton [1985] 1 All ER 599;
[1985] 1 WLR 749 …. [9075] — v Hampson [2014] 1 Cr App R 4 …. [13270], [17170] — v Handlen (2010) 207 A Crim R 50; 247 FLR 261 …. [33575] — v Handy [2002] 2 SCR 908 …. [21170] — v Hanias (1976) 14 SASR 137 …. [33720] — v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 …. [35435], [35532], [39105] — v Hanrahan (1964) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 458 …. [19110] — v — (1964) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 459 …. [19045] — v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 …. [3005] — v Harawira [1989] 2 NZLR 714 …. [15160] — v Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 …. [11125] — v Harbour [1995] 1 NZLR 440 …. [1295] — v Harden [1963] 1 QB 8; [1962] 1 All ER 286 …. [39105] — v Harding [1956] QWN 32 …. [17375] — v — [1989] 2 Qd R 373 …. [11035] — v Hardy (1794) 24 Howell State Trials 199 …. [17505] — v — (1794) 24 St Tr 199 …. [1005], [1540], [17165], [27130], [33565], [37085], [37110] — v — [1988] Crim LR 687 …. [27130] — v Haringey Justices; Ex parte DPP [1996] QB 351; [1996] 1 All ER 828 …. [17090], [17130] — v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 …. [1400], [3095] — v Harman [1985] Crim LR 326 …. [17605], [31120] — v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35 …. [19030], [19065], [19095] — v Harrington [1984] Crim LR 487 …. [17665] — v — [1998] 3 VR 531 …. [17535], [19035], [33455] — v Harringworth (Inhabitants) (1815) 4 M & S 350; 105 ER 863 ….
[39125] — v Harris (1680) 7 St Tr 926 …. [19105] — v — (1822) 5 B & Ald 926; 106 ER 1430 …. [15020] — v — (1927) 20 Cr App R 144 …. [17375], [17390], [17395] — v — (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 720 …. [33500] — v — (1971) 1 SASR 447 …. [1400], [9020] — v — (1988) 37 A Crim R 29 …. [23350] — v — (1997) 7 NTLR 1 …. [29050], [29060] — v — [1927] 2 KB 587; [1927] All ER Rep 473 …. [17090], [17095], [17650] — v — [1946] OR 407; [1946] 3 DLR 520 …. [33455] — v — [1970] 3 All ER 746; [1970] 1 WLR 1252 …. [25180] — v — [1972] 2 All ER 699; [1972] 1 WLR 651 …. [11040] — v — [1988] Tas R 31 …. [33770] — v — [2006] 1 Cr App R 5 …. [29055], [29080] — v Harris (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 270 …. [33565], [33690] — v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 …. [1390], [1445] — v Harris-Rivett [1956] 1 QB 220; [1955] 3 All ER 567 …. [25180] — v Harrison [1966] VR 72 …. [17105], [17205], [17240], [17575] — v Harrison-Owen [1951] 2 All ER 726 …. [21100], [21190], [21200] — v Harry (1988) 86 Cr App R 105 …. [31040], [31090], [31095] — v Hart (1898) 9 QLJ 95 …. [29105] — v — (1914) 10 Cr App R 176 …. [11140] — v — (1932) 23 Cr App R 202 …. [17460] — v — (1932) 23 Cr App Rep 202 …. [17435] — v — (1957) 42 Cr App R 47 …. [17535] — v — (1977) 17 SASR 100 …. [11075], [33660], [33695], [33725]
— v — (1999) 135 CCC (3d) 377 …. [17480] — v — [1979] Qd R 8 …. [11065], [33740] — v Hartley [1941] 1 KB 5 …. [15235] — v — [2007] 3 NZLR 299 …. [21215] — v Hartwick BC9503322 …. [1295] — v Hartwick, Hartwick and Clayton (2005) 14 VR 125 …. [21050] — v Harvey (1858) 8 Cox CC 99 …. [27205] — v — (1869) 11 Cox CC 546 …. [17210], [39105] — v Haslam (1925) 19 Cr App R 59 …. [1375], [1425] — v — [1983] Crim LR 566 …. [17075] — v Hassan [1970] 1 QB 423; [1970] 1 All ER 745 …. [1155] — v Hatton (1976) 64 Cr App R 88 …. [23380] — v Haughbro (1997) 135 ACTR 15 …. [27315] — v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 …. [1125], [17550] — v Hawke (1974) 3 OR (2d) 210 …. [17485] — v Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 453 …. [25220] — v Haworth (1830) 4 Car & P 253; 172 ER 693 …. [39050] — v Hay (1851) 5 Cox CC 146 …. [19075] — v — (1860) 2 F & F 4; 175 ER 933 …. [25315] — v — (1983) 77 Cr App R 70 …. [5215], [19030], [33670] — v — [1968] Qd R 459 …. [17065] — v Haycock [1989] 2 Qd R 56 …. [33420] — v Hayden [1959] VR 102; [1959] ALR 332 …. [17375] — v Haydon (2001) 80 SASR 560 …. [9070] — v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288; [1977] 1 WLR 234 …. [13050] — v — [2005] 1 Cr App R 33 …. [33540]
— v Hayler (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 …. [15075], [23155] — v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549 …. [1435] — v Haynes (1859) 1 F & F 666; 175 ER 898 …. [17095] — v Hayter [2003] 1 WLR 1910 …. [33495] — v — [2005] 2 All ER 209; [2005] 1 WLR 605 …. [5180], [33495] — v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41 …. [17175] — v Hazeltine [1967] 2 QB 857; [1967] 2 All ER 671 …. [33605] — v Hazim (1993) 69 A Crim R 371 …. [33595] — v He (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 …. [15075], [15100] — v Head (1961) 45 Cr App R 225 …. [9020] — v Heading (2011) 111 SASR 32 …. [17290] — v Heagney; Ex parte ACT Employers Federation (1976) 137 CLR 86; 10 ALR 459 …. [3156] — v Healey [1965] 1 All ER 365; [1965] 1 WLR 1059 …. [11135] — v Healy (1995) 15 WAR 104 …. [33455] — v Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164 …. [17445] — v — [1992] 2 VR 531 …. [33775] — v — [1998] 4 VR 636 …. [27305], [33765] — v Hearn (1841) Car & M 109; 174 ER 431 …. [33615] — v Hearne [1976] Crim LR 753 …. [1045] — v Heath [1991] 2 Qd R 182 …. [1140], [21050], [31100] — v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151 …. [27305] — v Hector [1953] VLR 543; [1953] ALR 950 …. [1135], [19095] — v Hedges (1909) 3 Cr App R 262 …. [17270] — v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444 …. [11055], [33710], [33730] — v Heinze (2005) 153 A Crim R 380 …. [1220], [17305] — v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17 …. [13070]
— v Helmhout (2000) 112 A Crim R 10 …. [27315] — v — (2001) 125 A Crim R 257 …. [27315] — v Hembury (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 …. [23410] — v Hemmings [1939] 1 All ER 417 …. [7310] — v Hemp (1835) 5 C & P 468; 172 ER 1057 …. [19045] — v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82 …. [17375] — v — [2010] 2 Cr App R 24 …. [29050], [29080] — v Hendrie (1985) 37 SASR 581 …. [31095], [37110] — v Hendry (1988) 88 Cr App R 187 …. [11035] — v Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App R 419 …. [27130], [31010] — v Henning BC9002977 …. [15255] — v Henriques (1991) 93 Cr App R 237 …. [17040] — v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 …. [3060], [3159] — v — [1917] VLR 525 …. [17060] — v — [1977] Qd R 204 …. [37140] — v — [1990] Crim LR 574 …. [33485] — v — [2006] 1 Cr App R 6 …. [29050] — v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 …. [1445], [31195] — v Hepworth (1928) AD 265 …. [3180] — v — [1955] 2 QB 600; [1955] 2 All ER 918 …. [9005], [9020] — v Herd (1973) 57 Cr App R 560 …. [11135] — v Herman (1904) 6 WALR 89 …. [15095] — v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 …. [1445], [29050] — v Hertfordshire County Council; Ex parte Green Environmental Industries Ltd [2000] 2 AC 412; [2000] 1 All ER 773 …. [25180] — v Hetherington [1972] Crim LR 703 …. [3170] — v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 …. [1400]
— v Hewitt (1925) 19 Cr App R 64 …. [21050] — v — [1998] 4 VR 862 …. [7085], [15135] — v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 …. [15220], [33435] — v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401 …. [15220] — v HG (2007) 171 A Crim R 55 …. [17270] — v Hickman [1969] Crim LR 502 …. [17135] — v Hicks (2010) 210 A Crim R 158 …. [25100] — v Higgins (1829) 3 Car & P 603; 172 ER 565 …. [33455], [37110] — v — (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 …. [17495] — v Higham (1857) 7 El & Bl 557; 119 ER 1352 …. [1080] — v Hilder (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 …. [29070], [35440] — v Hilditch (1832) 5 C & P 299; 172 ER 986 …. [17645] — v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254; 169 ER 495 …. [13065] — v — (1851) 20 LJMC 222 …. [19050] — v — (1908) 1 Cr App R 158 …. [37155] — v — (2011) 212 A Crim R 359 …. [15175] — v — (2012) 218 A Crim R 301 …. [27315] — v Hillier (2004) 154 ACTR 46 …. [21050], [35532] — v — (2007) 228 CLR 618; 233 ALR 634 …. [9040] — v Hills (1987) 86 Cr App R 26 …. [15175] — v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421; [1971] 3 All ER 541 …. [13105], [17475], [17515], [23390] — v Hind (1860) 8 Cox CC 300 …. [33285] — v Hinds [1932] 2 KB 644 …. [1375] — v — [1979] Crim LR 111 …. [19085] — v Hinton (1999) 150 FLR 20 …. [35620] — v — (2000) 155 FLR 139 …. [21252]
— v — [1961] Qd R 17 …. [17275] — v Hinz [1972] Qd R 272 …. [7030], [7160] — v Hircock [1970] 1 QB 67; [1969] 1 All ER 47 …. [17135] — v Hirst (2013) 116 SASR 300 …. [15220], [33435] — v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 …. [21050], [31065], [37010], [37090] — v Histed [1964] 19 Cox CC 16 …. [33690] — v Hnedish (1958) 26 WWR 685 …. [11055] — v Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545 …. [9030], [33435] — v Hoare [1966] 2 All ER 846; [1966] 1 WLR 762 …. [33770] — v Hocking [1988] 1 Qd R 582 …. [23030] — v Hodge (1838) 3 Lew CC 227; 168 ER 1136 …. [9035], [21035] — v Hodges [2003] 2 Cr App R 15 …. [29150] — v Hodgett [1957] NI 1 …. [15095] — v Hodgkinson [1954] VLR 140; [1954] ALR 305 …. [17105] — v Hodgkiss (1836) 7 C & P 298; 173 ER 132 …. [19145] — v Hodgson (1812) Russ & Ry 211; 168 ER 765 …. [19075] — v — (1924) 18 Cr App R 7 …. [17155] — v Hofer (1991) 55 A Crim R 225 …. [21065] — v Hogan (1873) 12 Cox CC 357 …. [37085] — v — [1960] 2 QB 513 …. [5130] — v Hogg (1833) 6 Car & P 176; 172 ER 1196 …. [33795] — v Hoggins [1967] 3 All ER 334; [1967] 1 WLR 1223 …. [23375] — v Holden (1838) 8 C & P 606; 173 ER 638 …. [17090], [17125] — v Holdsworth [2009] Crim LR 195 …. [29055] — v Hollis (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 283 …. [39010] — v Holloway [1980] 1 NZLR 315 …. [21025], [21170]
— v Holman [1997] 1 Qd R 373 …. [9030] — v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334 …. [19075] — v — [1953] 2 All ER 324 …. [29105] — v Holt (1793) 5 TR 436; 101 ER 245 …. [33355] — v — (1996) 87 A Crim R 82 …. [31085] — v — [1983] 2 Qd R 462 …. [19090] — v Holy Trinity, Kingston-upon-Hull (Inhabitants) (1827) 7 B & C 611; 108 ER 851 …. [39010] — v Honeyghon [1999] Crim LR 221 …. [17375] — v Honner [1977] Tas SR 1 …. [29050] — v Hood [1968] 2 All ER 56; [1968] 1 WLR 773 …. [27215] — v Hoogwerf (1992) 63 A Crim R 302 …. [29050] — v Hook (1858) Dears & B 606; 169 ER 1138 …. [15020] — v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750 …. [1370] — v Hooper (1999) 108 A Crim R 108 …. [21035] — v Hope (1955) 39 Cr App R 33 …. [39105] — v — [1909] VLR 149; (1909) 15 ALR 87 …. [11030], [11075], [33265], [33295], [33310] — v Hopkins-Husson (1949) 34 Cr App R 47 …. [11140] — v Hopper [1915] 2 KB 431 …. [17135] — v Horan [1951] VLR 249; [1951] ALR 570 …. [17040] — v Horn (1912) 7 Cr App R 200 …. [7070] — v Horncastle [2010] 2 AC 373; [2009] 4 All ER 183 …. [31010], [31020] — v Horne [1990] Crim LR 188 …. [33485] — v — [1992] Crim LR 304 …. [31135] — v Horry [1949] NZLR 791 …. [21025]
— v — [1952] NZLR 111 …. [1250] — v Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court; Ex parte Bennett (No 2) [1994] 1 All ER 289 …. [27105] — v Horseferry Road Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Adams [1978] 1 All ER 373; [1977] 1 WLR 1197 …. [11110] — v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 …. [13055], [13065], [17175] — v Horsham Justices; Ex parte Bukhari (1982) 74 Cr App R 291 …. [1030], [11120] — v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426 …. [33775], [35620] — v Horvath [1972] VR 533 …. [1125], [1530] — v Horwood [1970] 1 QB 133; [1969] 3 All ER 1156 …. [21100], [21170] — v Houghton (1978) 68 Cr App R 197 …. [33715] — v House [1994] Crim LR 683 …. [15220] — v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 …. [17160], [17535] — v Hovell [1986] 1 NZLR 500 …. [35065] — v Howard (1983) 8 A Crim R 109 …. [23405] — v — (1989) 69 CR (3d) 193 …. [29070] — v — (2005) 152 A Crim R 7 …. [29175], [29190], [29200] — v — (2005) 156 A Crim R 343 …. [15220] — v — [1987] 1 NZLR 347 …. [31185] — v Howarth (1918) 13 Cr App R 99 …. [17520] — v — [1973] Qd R 431 …. [33640], [33705] — v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448; [1958] ALR 753 …. [7015] — v — [1958] SASR 95 …. [19095] — v — [1982] 1 NZLR 618 …. [1370], [29060] — v Howick [1970] Crim LR 403 …. [1410]
— v Howlett (1981) 5 A Crim R 45 …. [15180] — v Howse [1983] NZLR 246 …. [25310] — v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 …. [7085], [17265], [17270], [17280] — v Hubbard (1881) 14 Cox CC 565 …. [33295] — v Huchison [1972] 1 All ER 936; [1972] 1 WLR 398 …. [1045] — v Hucks (1816) 1 Stark 521; 171 ER 549 …. [11030] — v Hudson (1981) 72 Cr App R 163 …. [33655], [33760] — v — [1912] 2 KB 464; [1911] All ER Rep Ext 1180 …. [23320], [23325] — v Hughes (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 288 …. [17075] — v — (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 …. [11135] — v — [1942] SCR 517; [1943] 1 DLR 1 …. [33455] — v Hugo (2000) 113 A Crim R 484 …. [25175] — v Huijser [1988] 1 NZLR 577 …. [21190] — v Hulbert (1979) 69 Cr App R 243 …. [1195], [33460] — v Hulusi (1973) 58 Cr App R 378 …. [17135] — v Humble (2009) 193 A Crim R 324 …. [17270] — v Humphries [1972] 2 NSWLR 783 …. [23040] — v Hundal [2004] 2 Cr App R 19 …. [25090] — v Hunjan (1978) 68 Cr App R 99 …. [1390] — v Hunt (1820) 3 B & A 566; 106 ER 768 …. [1475], [33565], [39065] — v — (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 38 …. [33610] — v — (1994) 76 A Crim R 363 …. [1155] — v — [1987] AC 352; [1987] 1 All ER 1 …. [7170] — v Hunter (1989) 51 SASR 158 …. [33770] — v — [1956] VLR 31; [1955] ALR 786 …. [17375], [17380], [17385]
— v — [1969] Crim LR 262 …. [1410] — v — [1985] 2 All ER 173; [1985] 1 WLR 613 …. [1295] — v Hunting (1908) 1 Cr App R 177 …. [13095] — v Hurihanganui [2004] 2 NZLR 1 …. [29050] — v Hurst (1966) 55 WWR 358 …. [17275] — v — [1995] 1 Cr App R 82 …. [29050] — v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 …. [1605], [7105] — v Hussain [1998] Crim LR 820 …. [31185] — v Hutchings (1881) 6 QBD 300 …. [5030] — v Hutchinson (1985) 82 Cr App R 51 …. [17650], [33755] — v Hutchison (1990) 53 SASR 587 …. [17375] — v Hutton (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282 …. [15100] — v — (1991) 56 A Crim R 211 …. [5210] — v — (1994) 3 Tas R 225 …. [5140] — v Huynh (2006) 165 A Crim R 586 …. [7085] — v Hyatt [1998] 4 VR 182 …. [17290] — v Hyman Bookbinder (1926) 19 Cr App R 125 …. [11140] — v Hytch (2000) 114 A Crim R 573 …. [31065] — v I [2007] 2 Cr App R 316 …. [1390] — v Ibrahim (2003) 7 VR 141 …. [15220] — v — [2008] 4 All ER 208 …. [33755] — v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406 …. [21050] — v Ikram [2009] 1 WLR 1419 …. [17075] — v Ilich [1935] NZLR 90 …. [41035] — v Illingworth (2000) 127 A Crim R 302 …. [7255], [9115] — v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Weerasuriya [1983] 1 All ER 195 …. [1070]
— v Imrie (1917) 12 Cr App R 282 …. [33805] — v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510 …. [1450] — v Inch (1989) 91 Cr App R 51 …. [29060] — v Inder (1977) 67 Cr App R 143 …. [21170] — v Industrial Appeals Court; Ex parte Maher [1978] VR 126 …. [3135] — v Inglis [1917] VLR 672; (1917) 23 ALR 378 …. [17060] — v Ings (1820) 33 Howell State Trials 957 …. [17505] — v Inhabitants of All Saints, Worcester (1817) 6 M & S 194; 105 ER 1215 …. [25150] — v Inhabitants of Bedfordshire (1855) 4 E & B 535; 119 ER 196 …. [33160], [33165], [33180] — v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 TR 707; 100 ER 815 …. [11115], [31020], [31030], [33215], [33235], [33795] — v Inhabitants of Erith (1807) 8 East 539; 103 ER 450 …. [31155], [33810] — v Inhabitants of Harborne (1835) 2 Ad & E 540; 111 ER 209 …. [1125] — v Inhabitants of Llanfaethly (1853) 2 E & B 940; 118 ER 1018 …. [39055] — v Inhabitants of Lordsmere (1886) 16 Cox CC 65 …. [33195] — v Inhabitants of Rishworth (1842) 2 QB 476; 114 ER 187 …. [31155], [33810] — v Inhabitants of Worth (1843) 4 QB 132; 114 ER 847 …. [33015], [33115] — v Inland Revenue Board; Ex parte Goldberg [1989] QB 267; [1988] 3 All ER 248 …. [25275] — v Inner London Crown Court; Ex parte Baines & Baines [1988] QB 579; [1987] 3 All ER 1025 …. [25225] — v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265 …. [17275], [21100]
— v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321; [1970] ALR 727 …. [1320], [27240], [27245], [27305], [33485], [33690], [33740] — v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416 …. [1290], [1295], [1320], [1565], [27305], [33740] — v Ireland (No 2) [1971] SASR 6 …. [1295], [1320], [29090] — v Irish [1995] Crim LR 145 …. [19030] — v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 …. [9070] — v Isequilla [1975] 1 All ER 77; [1975] 1 WLR 716 …. [33625], [33660] — v Islam (1969) 113 Sol Jo 185 …. [19125] — v — [1999] 1 Cr App R 22 …. [17275] — v Iuliano [1971] VR 412 …. [21050] — v Ives [1973] Qd R 128 …. [17270] — v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 …. [19170], [29050], [29055] — v — [2012] Crim L Rev 886 …. [29080] — v J (DC) [2010] 2 Cr App R 2 …. [1680] — v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 …. [15135], [15210], [17120], [17285], [21243] — v J, AP (2012) 113 SASR 529 …. [13050], [13060] — v — (2013) SASR 150 …. [17290] — v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 …. [17290] — v J, SM (2013) 117 SASR 535 …. [19045] — v Jabarula (1984) 11 A Crim R 131 …. [27265] — v — (1988) 11 A Crim R 131 …. [33745] — v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) (L) 196 …. [17555], [17575] — v Jackson (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 477 …. [9020] — v — (1987) 11 NSWLR 318 …. [33565], [33570], [33575]
— v — (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 …. [27095] — v — [1953] 1 All ER 872 …. [15215] — v — [1964] Qd R 26 …. [17395] — v — [1996] 2 Cr App R 420 …. [29070], [29150] — v Jackson & Hakim (1988) 33 A Crim R 413 …. [19125] — v Jacobson (1931) AD 466 …. [1605] — v Jacono [1911] VLR 326; (1911) 17 ALR 340 …. [13035] — v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 …. [15095], [17375], [17380], [17390] — v Jagger (1796) 1 East PC 455 …. [13115] — v James (1884) 10 VLR (L) 193 …. [17090], [17110] — v — (1983) 36 SASR 215 …. [15090] — v — [1902] 1 KB 540 …. [7140] — v — [1954] Crim LR 55 …. [17375] — v Jamieson (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 …. [15100], [29050] — v — (2003) 9 VR 119 …. [27255] — v Jansen (2001) 80 SASR 590 …. [31185] — v — [1970] SASR 531 …. [3200], [11140], [15250] — v Jaquith [1989] Crim LR 508 …. [13300] — v Jarrett (No 1) (1994) 62 SASR 443 …. [1315], [9095], [29075] — v Jarvis (1756) 1 East 643n; 102 ER 249n …. [7130] — v — (1867) LR 1 CCR 96 …. [33615] — v — [1991] Crim LR 374 …. [17265] — v Jawitz [1962] Crim LR 567 …. [17135] — v Jawke (1957) (2) SA 187 …. [17460] — v Jeffrey (1991) Tas R 336 …. [15220] — v — [1967] VR 467 …. [11125]
— v Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 284 …. [33690] — v Jenkins (1845) 1 Cox CC 177 …. [15110] — v — (1869) LR 1 CCR 187 …. [11075], [33295] — v — (1869) LR 1 CCR 192 …. [11075] — v — (1945) 31 Cr App R 1 …. [23315], [23320], [23345], [23360] — v — (2002) 6 VR 81 …. [15100] — v — [1970] Tas SR 13 …. [35335], [35425] — v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277; [1949] ALR 468 …. [1235], [17080], [29065], [29075] — v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712 …. [17175] — v Jennings (1912) 7 Cr App R 242 …. [15085] — v Jensen (2009) 23 VR 591 …. [17120] — v Jessop (1887) 16 Cox CC 204 …. [37125] — v — [1974] Tas SR 64 …. [23330], [23345] — v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142 …. [35615] — v JG (2009) 199 A Crim R 299 …. [17175] — v JMR (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 …. [9120] — v Jobson [1989] 2 Qd R 464 …. [9070] — v Johannsen (1977) 65 Cr App R 101 …. [21100], [21170] — v John [1973] Crim LR 113 …. [1410] — v — [1974] 2 All ER 561; [1974] 1 WLR 624 …. [7050] — v John W [1998] 2 Cr App R 289 …. [21085], [21180] — v Johnson (1847) 2 Car & K 354; 175 ER 146 …. [37130] — v — (1979) 22 SASR 161 …. [11095] — v — (1987) 25 A Crim R 433 …. [33805] — v — (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 …. [23020], [23040] — v — (2004) 89 SASR 294; 147 A Crim R 151 …. [1395], [15160]
— v — [1961] 3 All ER 969; [1961] 1 WLR 1478 …. [7050] — v — [1962] Crim LR 52 …. [9020] — v — [1995] 2 Cr App R 41 …. [21110] — v Johnson & Edwards (No 2) [1982] Qd R 555 …. [19110] — v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 …. [7085], [17295] — v — [1865] IR 60 …. [33665] — v Joiner (1910) 4 Cr App R 64 …. [1250], [11095] — v — (2002) 133 A Crim R 90 …. [21035] — v Jolly [1998] 4 VR 495 …. [15135], [21100] — v Jones (1809) 31 St Tr 251 …. [19120] — v — (1809) Russ & Ry 152; 168 ER 733 …. [33640] — v — (1883) 11 QBD 118 …. [1125], [7140] — v — (1909) 3 Cr App R 67 …. [23310], [23315] — v — (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 …. [23315] — v — (1925) 19 Cr App R 40 …. [15125] — v — (1933) 24 Cr App R 55 …. [33460] — v — (1989) 41 A Crim R 1 …. [1445] — v — (2006) 161 A Crim R 511 …. [15160], [15205], [31085], [31095] — v — [1956] VLR 98 …. [11095] — v — [1961] Crim LR 322 …. [9020] — v — [1969] 3 All ER 1559; [1970] 1 WLR 16 …. [1175] — v — [1978] 2 All ER 718; [1978] 1 WLR 195 …. [35205], [35425] — v — [1993] 1 Qd R 676 …. [9040] — v — [1997] 2 Cr App R 119 …. [33570] — v — [2004] 1 Cr App R 5 …. [15255] — v Joseph (1971) 56 Cr App R 60 …. [17650]
— v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 …. [21050] — v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 …. [7085] — v — (2007) 172 A Crim R 518 …. [15220] — v Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322 …. [25340] — v — (2005) 15 NTLR 134; 153 A Crim R 241 …. [17290], [29050], [35410] — v — [1957] 3 All ER 623; [1958] 1 WLR 140 …. [33640], [33690] — v — [1970] SASR 184 …. [7030], [29095] — v Julian [1918] 1 NZLR 743 …. [21185] — v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411 …. [1645], [15210], [27305], [29075] — v Justice of the Peace for Peterborough; Ex parte Hicks [1978] 1 All ER 225; [1977] 1 WLR 1371 …. [25225] — v Justices of the Peace at Melbourne and Rowe; Ex parte Herald and Weekly Times Ltd [1935] VLR 377; [1935] ALR 442 …. [17090] — v K (1984) 14 A Crim R 226 …. [33615] — v — (1997) 68 SASR 405 …. [17290], [17295] — v — (2003) 59 NSWLR 431 …. [27215] — v — [1984] 1 NZLR 264 …. [15160] — v K (A) [2010] 1 Cr App 3 …. [25180] — v — [2010] 1 Cr App R 3 …. [25350] — v — [2010] QB 343; [2010] 2 All ER 509 …. [25100], [25165], [25375] — v K; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2002) 132 A Crim R 108 …. [3285] — v Kaddour (2005) 156 A Crim R 11 …. [1680] — v Kadeshevitz [1934] OR 213 …. [17395] — v Kai-Whitewind [2005] 2 Cr App R 31 …. [29080] — v Kaipiainen [1954] OR 43 …. [33400]
— v Kakelo [1923] 2 KB 793; [1923] All ER Rep 191 …. [7160] — v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 …. [15170] — v Kalia (1974) 60 Cr App R 200 …. [17495] — v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88 …. [11125] — v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527 …. [15220] — v Kane (1977) 65 Cr App R 270 …. [17130], [17430], [17705] — v Kaplan (2005) 14 VR 673 …. [35025] — v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 …. [27310] — v Karan (1980) 26 SASR 408 …. [23410] — v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320 …. [17065], [17305] — v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1 …. [1025], [29055], [29150] — v — (2002) 83 SASR 135 …. [9040], [9095] — v Karpany [1937] SASR 377 …. [33455] — v Katipa [1986] 2 NZLR 121 …. [19065] — v Kay (1887) 16 Cox CC 292 …. [37090] — v — [1950] OR 235 …. [15100] — v Kaye (1960) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 39 …. [15220] — v Kazzi (2003) 140 A Crim R 545 …. [35455], [35495] — v KDY (2008) 185 A Crim R 270 …. [7085], [9035] — v Keane (1977) 65 Cr App R 247 …. [1390] — v — [1994] 2 All ER 478; [1994] 1 WLR 746 …. [17130], [27130], [27180] — v Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228; [1992] 2 All ER 345 …. [31015], [31040], [31055], [31090], [31095], [31165] — v Kearns [2002] 1 WLR 2815 …. [25090] — v Keast [1998] Crim LR 748 …. [3290], [15195] — v Keeley [1980] VR 571 …. [31185]
— v Keeling [1942] 1 All ER 507 …. [15225], [33770] — v Keenan (2009) 252 ALR 198; 83 ALJR 243 …. [9040] — v — [1990] 2 QB 54; [1989] 3 All ER 598 …. [33760] — v Keeton (1970) 54 Cr App R 267 …. [33655], [33700] — v Kehagias [1985] VR 107 …. [15110], [15165] — v Keightley (1893) 14 LR NSW (L) 45; 9 WN (NSW) 145 …. [13055] — v Keir (2002) 127 A Crim R 198 …. [9095] — v Kelcey [1985] VR 765 …. [33760] — v Kelly (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 518; 24 WN (NSW) 96 …. [17615] — v — (1975) 12 SASR 389; 24 FLR 441 …. [31120], [31140], [33835] — v — (1988) 78 ACTR 14 …. [33760] — v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 363 …. [1360] — v — [1958] VR 412 …. [29130] — v — [1970] 2 All ER 198; [1970] 1 WLR 1050 …. [11135] — v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271 …. [17495] — v Kelsey (1981) 74 Cr App R 213 …. [17185], [17200], [31175] — v — [1982] Crim LR 435 …. [17225] — v Kelson (1909) 3 Cr App R 230 …. [1200] — v Kemble [1990] 3 All ER 116; [1990] 1 WLR 1111 …. [13275] — v Kemp [1997] 1 Qd R 383 …. [21050] — v Kemp (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 510 …. [21035] — v Kendrick [1997] 2 VR 699 …. [15255] — v Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25; [1916] All ER Rep 651 …. [23200], [23205], [23240] — v Kennedy (2000) 118 A Crim R 34 …. [17120] — v — [2004] 3 NZLR 189 …. [13085]
— v Kennelly [1967] Qd R 345 …. [17270] — v Kennewell [1927] SASR 287 …. [1520] — v Kenny (1886) 12 VLR 816 …. [13035] — v — [1992] Crim LR 800 …. [21210] — v Kerenko (1964) 51 WWR 53; 49 DLR (2d) 760 …. [17170] — v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 …. [15165], [15170] — v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209 …. [1360], [17655] — v Kerr (No 1) [1951] VLR 211; [1951] ALR 490 …. [33500], [33690] — v Kerr (No 2) [1951] VLR 239 …. [11045] — v Kessing (2008) 73 NSWLR 22 …. [35570] — v Ketchup [1982] Qd R 732 …. [9035] — v KG (2001) 54 NSWLR 198 …. [17175] — v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 …. [1195], [33635], [33735] — v Khan (1986) 84 Cr App R 44 …. [13030] — v — [2008] Crim LR 391 (CA) …. [25105] — v Khoosal (1994) 71 A Crim R 127 …. [15220] — v Kiah (2001) 10 NTLR 128; 120 A Crim R 365 …. [27305] — v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321 …. [33760] — v — (1980) 24 SASR 137 …. [17460] — v Kilner [1976] Crim LR 740 …. [19050], [33660] — v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1 …. [17285], [17315] — v King (1832) 5 Car & P 123; 172 ER 905 …. [31145] — v — (1914) 10 Cr App R 117 …. [15095] — v — (1975) 12 SASR 404 …. [1395] — v — (1984) 12 A Crim R 107 …. [33770] — v — (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 …. [17270]
— v — [1967] 2 QB 338; [1967] 1 All ER 379 …. [15165], [15210], [21100], [21170] — v — [1980] Crim LR 40 …. [33740] — v — [1983] 1 All ER 929; [1983] 1 WLR 411 …. [25225], [25235], [25240], [25275] — v Kinglake (1870) 11 Cox CC 499 …. [25075] — v — (1870) 22 LT 335 …. [25035], [25155] — v Kingsland (1919) 14 Cr App R 8 …. [1375], [1415] — v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 …. [17575], [25225], [39045] — v Kiparli-Ikarum [1967] P & NGLR 119 …. [33270] — v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330; BC200006176 …. [1295] — v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; [1956] ALR 163 …. [3158] — v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57 …. [5210] — v Kirkman (2000) 155 FLR 9 …. [35525] — v Kiszko (1978) 68 Cr App R 62 …. [29075] — v Kite (1992) 60 A Crim R 226 …. [5175] — v Kizon (1985) 18 A Crim R 59 …. [17120] — v KJ (2005) 154 A Crim R 139 …. [17295], [33455] — v Klein (2007) 172 A Crim R 290 …. [17535] — v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 …. [17120], [17405] — v Knigge (2003) 6 VR 181 …. [17270] — v Knight (1905) 20 Cox CC 711 …. [33620], [33680] — v — (2001) 160 FLR 465 …. [1230] — v — [1966] 1 All ER 647; (1966) 50 Cr App R 122; [1966] 1 WLR 230 …. [15195], [33435] — v Knightsbridge Crown Court; Ex parte Goonatilleke [1986] QB 1; [1985] 2 All ER 498 …. [19005], [19030]
— v Knill (1822) 5 B & Ald 929n; 106 ER 1431n …. [15020] — v Knowlden (1981) 77 Cr App R 94 …. [15255] — v KNP (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 …. [17545] — v Knutton (1992) 97 Cr App R 115 …. [19155] — v Kochnieff (1987) 33 A Crim R 1 …. [33420] — v Koeleman (2000) 2 VR 20 …. [9040], [27305] — v Kola (2002) 134 A Crim R 310 …. [27255] — v Kolton [2000] Crim LR 761 …. [3180] — v Komornick [1986] VR 845 …. [17130] — v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 …. [15220], [15255] — v Kooyman (1979) 22 SASR 376 …. [15195], [17285] — v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182 …. [1880] — v Kops (1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 150 …. [1220] — v — (1893) 14 NSWLR 150 …. [23030] — v Kores (1970) 15 CR (NS) 107 …. [33805] — v Korniak (1983) 76 Cr App R 145 …. [1195], [33460] — v Koro (1950) (3) SA 797 …. [33540] — v Korwin-Drozynki [1963] Qd R 362 …. [17670], [33805] — v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 …. [21050], [23405] — v Kostaras (No 2) (2003) 143 A Crim R 254 …. [23040] — v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10 …. [1420] — v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123; (1999) 105 A Crim R 243 …. [1440], [9040], [29050], [29075] — v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374 …. [11125], [21252], [23030] — v — [2009] 2 Qd R 51; (2008) 192 A Crim R 345 …. [17265] — v Kozul [1980] 2 NSWLR 299 …. [1295] — v Kracher [1995] Crim LR 819 …. [19155]
— v Krasniqi (1993) 61 SASR 366 …. [9030] — v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 …. [19075] — v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82; [1949] 2 All ER 406 …. [1085], [9020], [9025] — v Kurasch [1915] 2 KB 749 …. [23200], [23205] — v Kuru Waru (1900) 10 QLJ 139 …. [33270] — v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407; 191 A Crim R 449 …. [11045], [15160], [15170], [17160] — v Kwabena Poku [1978] Crim LR 488 …. [33610], [33665] — v Kypri (2002) 5 VR 610 …. [15160] — v L [1998] 2 NZLR 141 …. [25310] — v — [2009] 1 WLR 626 …. [13030], [13135] — v Lacey (1982) 29 SASR 525 …. [33700], [33720] — v Lai Ping (1904) 8 CCC 467 …. [33660] — v Laird (1893) 14 LR (NSW) (L) 354 …. [33645] — v Lake (2007) 174 A Crim R 491 …. [1305] — v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190 …. [11035], [13050] — v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 …. [1380], [29050], [29060] — v — (2002) 135 A Crim R 302 …. [29185] — v — (2008) 185 A Crim R 453 …. [15220] — v Lam (Ruling No 13) (2005) 191 FLR 272 …. [33565] — v Lamb (1980) 71 Cr App R 198 …. [1365], [1375], [1415] — v — [1975] Qd R 296 …. [15110] — v Lambert [1919] VLR 205 …. [17275] — v — [1957] SASR 341 …. [23245] — v Lancaster [1998] 4 VR 550 …. [33775], [33780] — v Land [1999] QB 65; [1998] 1 All ER 403 …. [1280], [29090],
[41050] — v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 …. [15205], [17460], [23030], [33435] — v Landon (2011) 109 SASR 216 …. [29050] — v — [1995] Crim LR 338 …. [15220] — v Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309 …. [15220] — v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77; [1968] 1 All ER 683 …. [11135], [29075] — v Lang [1965] NSWR 1313 …. [33610] — v Langer [1972] VR 973 …. [17550], [17620], [17675] — v Langford [1974] Qd R 67 …. [23345] — v Langmead (1864) Le & Ca 427; 169 ER 1459 …. [1195] — v Langton (1876) 2 QBD 296 …. [1175] — v Lanigan [1987] NI 367 …. [29140] — v Lapuse [1964] VR 43 …. [9030], [33500], [33690] — v Lapworth [1931] 1 KB 117; [1930] All ER Rep 340 …. [13035] — v Laracy (2007) 180 A Crim R 19 …. [33665] — v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 …. [17135], [33805] — v Larson [1984] VR 559 …. [27265], [33760] — v Lasseur [1991] Crim LR 53 …. [23330] — v Lattouf (1980) 2 A Crim R 65 …. [11045] — v Laurin (1902) 6 CCC 138 …. [17190] — v Lavallée [1990] 1 SCR 852 …. [29070] — v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 …. [17605], [33760] — v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542 …. [7085], [15255] — v Lawless (1993) 98 Cr App R 342 …. [13085], [17480] — v — [1974] VR 398 …. [17165], [17615], [37060] — v Lawrence [1968] 1 All ER 579; [1968] 1 WLR 341 …. [17095]
— v — [1980] 1 NSWLR 122; (1980) 32 ALR 72 …. [7050], [9035] — v — [2002] 2 Qd R 400 …. [17590], [19035], [19065] — v Lawrenson [1961] Crim LR 398 …. [1415] — v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 …. [17375] — v Lawson (1989) 90 Cr App R 107 …. [17130] — v — [1960] VR 37 …. [17130] — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 587 …. [15160], [33735] — v — [1998] Crim LR 883 …. [33295], [37060] — v — [2000] NSWCCA 214; BC200003257 …. [35440], [37140] — v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 …. [7085], [15220], [17460] — v Lazos (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 …. [17270], [17280] — v Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 …. [1410], [17040] — v — (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44 …. [1680], [1755], [11125], [17405] — v — (2007) 173 A Crim R 450 …. [33775] — v Le Blowitz [1998] 1 Qd R 303 …. [15170] — v Le Roux (1897) 14 SC 424 …. [37075] — v Leak [1969] SASR 172 …. [1140], [17485] — v Leaney (1988) 38 CCC (3d) 263 …. [1370] — v Lear [1998] 1 VR 285 …. [19080], [23345] — v Leatham (1861) 8 Cox CC 498 …. [27300] — v Leckey [1944] KB 80; [1943] 2 All ER 665 …. [33770] — v Lee (1911) 7 Cr App R 31 …. [17285] — v — (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] ALR 517 …. [27240], [33595], [33605], [33610], [33625], [33660], [33665], [33675], [33680], [33690], [33695], [33765], [35650] — v — (1989) 42 A Crim R 393 …. [29070]
— v — (2000) 50 NSWLR 289 …. [25340] — v — (1952) (2) SA 67 …. [5210] — v — [1976] 1 All ER 570; [1976] 1 WLR 71 …. [23270] — v — [1976] 2 NZLR 171 …. [1295], [17625] — v — [1978] 1 NZLR 481 …. [33690] — v — [1985] Crim LR 798 …. [33605] — v Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337; [1914] All ER Rep 603; (1915) 11 Cr App Rep 293 …. [3175], [33805] — v Leigh (1984) 13 A Crim R 226 …. [33735] — v Leland [1951] OR 12 …. [37050] — v Lemsatef [1977] 2 All ER 835; [1977] 1 WLR 812 …. [33740] — v Lennard [1973] 2 All ER 831; [1973] 1 WLR 483 …. [3180] — v Leonard (2006) 164 A Crim R 374 …. [21050], [21252] — v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441; (1984) 55 ALR 338 …. [31125], [31140], [33835], [39105] — v Lesley [1996] 1 Cr App R 39 …. [33435] — v Lester (1975) 63 Cr App R 144 …. [1045] — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 …. [21050], [35660] — v — (2008) 190 A Crim R 468 …. [21050], [35660] — v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 …. [1445], [29165], [29185] — v Levy (1966) 50 Cr App R 198 …. [17630], [17650], [17670], [23315] — v Lewendon [2006] 2 Cr App R 294 …. [41110] — v Lewis (1906) 8 WALR 83 …. [15085] — v — (1971) 55 Cr App R 386 …. [3180] — v — (1973) 57 Cr App R 860 …. [33770] — v — (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 …. [21001], [21170], [21195]
— v — (1987) 88 FLR 104 …. [29055], [29075] — v — (1989) 46 A Crim R 365 …. [21065] — v — (2000) 1 VR 290 …. [11045], [27305] — v — (2002) 137 A Crim R 85 …. [35410] — v — [1913] VLR 227; (1913) 19 ALR 174 …. [1125] — v — [1969] 2 QB 1; [1969] 1 All ER 79 …. [1155] — v Lewis-Hamilton [1998] 1 VR 630 …. [17130] — v Ley [2007] 1 Cr App R 25 …. [11100] — v — [2007] Crim LR 642 …. [1390] — v Leyland Justices; Ex parte Hawthorn [1979] QB 283; [1979] 1 All ER 209 …. [17130] — v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 …. [1285], [33795] — v — [1993] 2 VR 80 …. [33665], [33780] — v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3 …. [17090], [17095], [17645], [17650] — v Liddy (2002) 81 SASR 22 …. [1135], [15220], [33435] — v Liddy (No 2) (2001) 79 SASR 401 …. [25370] — v Liddy (No 3) (2000) 127 A Crim R 309 …. [25340] — v Liebling (1909) 2 Cr App R 314 …. [33680] — v Lieske (2006) 166 A Crim R 213 …. [27315], [35620], [35650] — v Lifchus [1997] 3 SCR 320; (1997) 118 CCC (3d) 1 …. [9030] — v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167; [1895] All ER Rep 586 …. [17110], [17260], [17265], [17275] — v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 …. [15165], [15170], [15175] — v — [1963] Qd R 386 …. [33480], [33505], [33650] — v — [1970] NZLR 1002 …. [1245] — v Linehan [1921] VLR 582 …. [15020]
— v Ling (1981) 6 A Crim R 429 …. [11095] — v — [1981] Tas R 250 …. [15085], [15090], [15100] — v Lipton (2011) 82 NSWLR 123 …. [17130], [27005], [27195] — v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547 …. [17065], [17435], [17460] — v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 …. [17055], [17075] — v Little (1883) 15 Cox CC 319 …. [17375] — v — (1976) 14 SASR 556 …. [11030] — v Littleboy [1934] 2 KB 408; [1934] All ER Rep 434 …. [15225], [33770] — v Livermore (2006) 67 NSWLR 659 …. [17065] — v Livingston [1933] St R Qd 42 …. [33690] — v Livingstone (2004) 150 A Crim R 117 …. [15115], [17130] — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 38 …. [1680], [17580] — v Lloyd (1834) 6 Car & P 393; 172 ER 1291 …. [33640] — v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 …. [17110] — v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 …. [7085], [33435] — v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 …. [11125], [27240], [27305] — v — (2001) 80 SASR 550 …. [9070] — v Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547; [1957] 1 All ER 734 …. [7015], [7030], [7050], [9020] — v Lock (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 272 …. [1170] — v — (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 …. [21252] — v Lockard [1968] Tas SR 195 …. [23270] — v Lockley [1995] 2 Cr App R 554 …. [33795] — v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 …. [11125], [21252] — v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526 …. [35500], [35640] — v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235; 110 A Crim R 406 …. [21050]
— v Long (1973) 57 Cr App R 871 …. [1385] — v — (2002) 137 A Crim R 263 …. [15100], [21050] — v Long; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2003) 138 A Crim R 103 …. [33650] — v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37 …. [3180] — v Longman [1969] 1 QB 299; [1968] 2 All ER 761 …. [23360] — v Looseley [2001] 4 All ER 897; [2001] 1 WLR 2060 …. [27310] — v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101 …. [33485], [33770] — v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683 …. [33565], [33570] — v Loughlin [1982] 1 NZLR 236 …. [27235] — v Loughran [1999] Crim LR 405 …. [29050] — v Lovegrove [1920] 3 KB 643 …. [21055] — v Lovell [1923] All ER Rep 769; (1923) 17 Cr App R 163 …. [17275] — v Lovelock [1997] Crim LR 821 …. [17435] — v Lovett [1972] VR 413 …. [33455] — v — [1973] 1 All ER 744; [1973] 1 WLR 241 …. [23385] — v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 …. [1440], [1445], [1830], [15260] — v — [1997] 2 VR 465 …. [25325], [33725] — v Lowery (No 1) [1972] VR 554 …. [1290], [33690] — v Lowery and King (No 3) [1972] VR 939 …. [21215] — v LR [2006] 1 Qd R 435 …. [27305], [33660] — v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89; 175 A Crim R 404 …. [1650], [21050] — v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 …. [19035], [21050] — v Lucas [1973] VR 693 …. [17090], [17120], [17130] — v — [1977] Tas SR 53 …. [5135] — v — [1981] QB 720; [1981] 2 All ER 1008 …. [3150], [15210], [15220], [31165], [33435] — v — [1992] 2 VR 109 …. [29055], [29075]
— v — [1993] Crim LR 599 …. [19030] — v Luckhurst (1853) 6 Cox CC 243 …. [33640] — v Luczkowski (1990) 54 SASR 169 …. [21050] — v Luczynski [2003] 2 NZLR 860 …. [33435] — v Luffe [1803] All ER Rep 726; (1807) 103 ER 316; 8 East 193 …. [3020] — v Luisi [1964] Crim LR 605 …. [15195] — v Lumley (1869) LR 1 CCR 196 …. [1125] — v Lunny (1854) 6 Cox CC 477 …. [37055], [37065] — v Lunt (1986) 85 Cr App R 241 …. [21170] — v Lupien [1970] SCR 263; (1970) 9 DLR (3d) 1 …. [29125] — v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 …. [1370], [29050], [29075] — v Lydon (1986) 85 Cr App R 221 …. [31135] — v Lynch [1954] Tas SR 47 …. [11030], [25310] — v — [2008] 1 Cr App R 24 …. [37025] — v Lyne (2003) 140 A Crim R 522 …. [35410] — v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15 …. [13055] — v Lyttle (2004) 180 CCC (3d) 476 …. [17485], [17505] — v Macacek [1960] Qd R 247 …. [17690], [17715] — v McAloom [1959] OR 441 …. [11050] — v Macaskill (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155 …. [15095], [15160] — v Mac Bride (1983) 34 SASR 433 …. [19110] — v McCann [1972] Tas SR (NC 3) 269 …. [15230] — v McCarthy (1980) 70 Cr App R 270 …. [11050] — v — (1980) 71 Cr App R 142 …. [17335] — v — (1984) 14 A Crim R 73 …. [17650] — v — (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 …. [1420]
— v McCartney (1928) 20 Cr App R 179 …. [39105] — v — [1976] 1 NZLR 472 …. [1245] — v McCaul [1983] 2 VR 419 …. [23345] — v McCay [1991] 1 All ER 232; [1990] 1 WLR 645 …. [31185], [37025] — v McConnon [1951] SASR 22 …. [15170], [15205] — v McCourt (1993) 69 A Crim R 151 …. [3020] — v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 …. [11075] — v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105 …. [19040] — v McDonald (1983) 50 ALR 471 …. [27300] — v Mac Donald (1985) 17 A Crim R 297 …. [17290] — v — (1995) 65 SASR 322 …. [15135] — v McDonald (2000) 148 CCC (3d) 273 …. [21170] — v Mac Donald (2002) 128 A Crim R 228 …. [1450] — v McDonald [1955] NZLR 699 …. [15095] — v — [1984] 1 NSWLR 428 …. [33435], [33495], [33690], [33735] — v — [1991] Crim LR 122 …. [9120] — v McDonell (1909) 2 Cr App R 322 …. [17165], [17515] — v McDonnell; Ex parte A-G [1988] 2 Qd R 189 …. [25155] — v McDougall [1983] 1 Qd R 89 …. [15195] — v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 …. [17435], [17460] — v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 …. [29105] — v McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926 …. [7020] — v McFadden (1975) 62 Cr App R 187 …. [17495] — v MacFarlane [1993] 1 Qd R 202 …. [37155] — v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan and O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518; 29 ALR 353 …. [3158]
— v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 …. [17175] — v Macfie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215 …. [15100], [17120] — v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632; 34 A Crim R 119 (CCA) …. [1830], [19090] — v McGee (1979) 70 Cr App R 247 …. [23315] — v McGhee (1993) 61 SASR 208 …. [21050] — v McGinnis [1946] SASR 24 …. [15125] — v McGlinchey [1983] Crim LR 808 …. [21155] — v McGranaghan [1995] 1 Cr App R 559 …. [21180] — v McGrath (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 460 …. [1045] — v McGregor (1992) 95 Cr App R 240 …. [23190] — v — [1968] 1 QB 371; [1967] 2 All ER 267 …. [33455], [33605], [33610], [33795] — v — [1975] Crim LR 514 …. [33655] — v — [1984] 1 Qd R 256 …. [17240] — v McGuire (1985) 81 Cr App R 323 …. [33105] — v — [1975] 4 WWR 124 …. [31185] — v McGuirk (1964) 48 Cr App R 75 …. [23375] — v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; (1983) 10 A Crim R 51 …. [1315], [1445], [11035], [29050], [29055] — v Machin (No 2) (1997) 69 SASR 403 …. [23040] — v McIlree (1866) 3 WW & A’B (L) 32 …. [13275] — v McIntosh [1968] Qd R 570 …. [37010] — v — [1992] Crim LR 651 …. [31135] — v McIntyre [1965] VR 593 …. [17130] — v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 …. [15170], [15195] — v McKay [1965] Qd R 240 …. [33650]
— v — [1967] NZLR 139 …. [17350], [19005], [19050] — v Mackay [1985] VR 623 …. [1140], [1445] — v McKelliff (2004) 87 SASR 476 …. [27130] — v McKellin [1998] 4 VR 757 …. [7085] — v McKelvey [1914] St R Qd 42 …. [15225] — v McKenna (1956) 40 Cr App R 65 …. [17650], [17660] — v — (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 354 …. [33435] — v — (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 330 …. [9005] — v Mac Kenney (1981) 72 Cr App R 78 …. [19050], [29050], [29070] — v McKenzie (1977) 17 SASR 304 …. [33745] — v MacKenzie (1993) 96 Cr App R 98 …. [11100] — v McKenzie [1993] 1 WLR 453 …. [33660] — v — [2004] 1 NZLR 181 …. [17430] — v McKeon (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 …. [15200], [15235] — v Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453 …. [21045], [21145], [21240] — v McKimmie [1957] VR 93 …. [29090], [29130] — v Mackintosh (1982) 76 Cr App R 177 …. [33690] — v McKnoulty (1995) 80 A Crim R 28 …. [21050] — v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 …. [15085], [15100], [15255], [17460] — v McLaughlan (2008) 218 FLR 158 …. [35620] — v McLean (1926) 19 Cr App R 104 …. [23145], [23315] — v — (1967) 52 Cr App R 80 …. [31175], [31185] — v MacLean (No 1) (1979) 49 CCC (2d) 399 …. [1305] — v McLean and Funk; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 231 …. [11125], [13085] — v Macleod [1991] Tas R 144 …. [27295], [33675] — v McLeod [1994] 3 All ER 254; [1994] 1 WLR 1500 …. [23345],
[23360] — v McLintock [1962] Crim LR 549 …. [11075] — v McMahon (1933) 24 Cr App R 95 …. [17090], [17095], [17650] — v — (1978) 68 Cr App R 18 …. [11140] — v — (2004) 8 VR 101 …. [7085] — v McMillan (2010) 204 A Crim R 98 …. [33775] — v McNamara [1917] VLR 407 …. [31120], [31130] — v — [1987] VR 855 …. [33485], [33770] — v McNeill [1907] VLR 265; (1907) 13 ALR 99 …. [17265] — v McNeill (Ruling No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124; [2007] NFSC 2 …. [1750], [23055], [27315], [33730], [35620] — v Mac Pherson [2006] 1 Cr App R 30 …. [13065] — v McQuiston [1998] 1 Cr App R 139 …. [1310] — v Macrae (1995) 80 A Crim R 380 …. [31065] — v Macris (2004) 147 A Crim R 99 …. [1220] — v M (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 …. [19135], [33455] — v — (1998) 104 A Crim R 154 …. [19135] — v — (2000) 109 A Crim R 530 …. [15135], [17270] — v — (2002) 135 A Crim R 324 …. [27305] — v — [1976] Qd R 344 …. [33750] — v — [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 …. [17370] — v — [1995] 1 Qd R 213 …. [15165] — v — [2000] 1 All ER 148; [2000] 1 WLR 421 …. [21050] — v M (CP) [2010] Crim LR 232 …. [19120] — v M(CP) [2009] 2 Cr App R 3 …. [19135] — v M, BJ (2011) 110 SASR 1 …. [21257] — v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73 …. [21050]
— v Maarroui (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757 …. [1400] — v Madobi (1963) 6 FLR 1 …. [33270], [37055] — v Maes [1975] VR 541 …. [3175], [3185] — v Maffei [1960] SASR 284 …. [15255] — v Maggs (1990) 91 Cr App R 243 …. [3130] — v Maginnis [1987] AC 303; [1987] 1 All ER 907 …. [11010] — v Maguire [1992] QB 936; [1992] 2 All ER 433 …. [17130] — v Mahalingan [2008] 3 SCR 316 …. [5150] — v Mahoney-Smith (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249 …. [17485] — v — [1967] 2 NSWR 154 …. [11045] — v Maiden (1988) 35 A Crim R 346 …. [23290], [33770] — v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1 …. [17290], [21257] — v Maitland [1963] SASR 332 …. [17060] — v Major [1998] 1 Qd R 317 …. [15195] — v Makanjuola [1995] 3 All ER 730; [1995] 1 WLR 1348 …. [15125], [15260] — v Makin (1893) 14 LR (NSW) (L) 1 …. [21015] — v Malcherek [1981] 2 All ER 422; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173; [1981] 1 WLR 690 …. [1155], [17335] — v Malcolm [2012] Crim LR 238 …. [17135] — v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 …. [9040] — v Malik [1968] 1 All ER 582; [1968] 1 WLR 353 …. [21040] — v — [2000] 2 Cr App R 8 …. [19030] — v Mallah (2005) 154 A Crim R 150 …. [35650] — v Mallory (1884) 13 QBD 33 …. [33535], [33585] — v Malouf (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 142 …. [15100] — v Manager (2006) 18 NTLR 206 …. [13070]
— v Manchester Crown Court; Ex parte Rogers [1999] 4 All ER 35; [1999] 1 WLR 832 …. [25225] — v Mandica (1980) 24 SASR 394 …. [19130] — v Mandry; R v Wooster [1973] 3 All ER 996; [1973] 1 WLR 1232 …. [7160] — v Mandzij (1983) 11 A Crim R 209 …. [23340] — v Manh (1983) 33 SASR 563 …. [37060] — v Mankotia BC9803450 …. [35495], [35500] — v Manley (1962) 46 Cr App R 235 …. [23315] — v Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750 …. [17375], [33485] — v Manning (1849) 30 CCC Sess Pap 654 …. [9020] — v — (1910) 13 WALR 6 …. [17265] — v — (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 …. [15125] — v Manser (1934) 25 Cr App R 18 …. [15040], [15110] — v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134; [1977] 1 WLR 1102 …. [9105], [11100], [17065], [21175] — v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17 …. [17435], [17460] — v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 …. [17280], [19135] — v Manzano (1860) 2 F & F 64; 175 ER 960 …. [17335], [17340] — v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688; [1965] 2 All ER 464 …. [1300], [1305], [17560], [27305], [31075], [31200], [33430] — v Marcus (1923) 17 Cr App R 187 …. [1195] — v Marijancevic (1991) 54 A Crim R 431 …. [33775] — v — (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 …. [1385], [1395], [1440] — v — (2009) 22 VR 576; 53 MVR 14 …. [29070] — v — [1982] VR 936 …. [17065] — v Markarian (2003) 137 A Crim R 497 …. [3020]
— v Marks; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1981) 147 CLR 471; 35 ALR 241 …. [5025] — v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; 125 A Crim R 186 …. [17290], [17295] — v Marley (1932) 47 CLR 618; [1932] ALR 431 …. [33640], [33705] — v Marlow (2000) 113 A Crim R 118 …. [21243] — v Marlowe Justices; Ex parte O’Sullivan [1984] QB 381; [1983] 3 All ER 578 …. [9005] — v Marquard (1993) 85 CCC 3d 193 …. [1880] — v Marriott (1911) 75 JP 288 …. [17045] — v Marsh (1985) 83 Cr App R 165 …. [19030] — v Marshall (1965) 51 WWR 185 …. [17190] — v — (2000) 113 A Crim R 190 …. [1450] — v — [1977] Crim LR 106 …. [33460] — v Marsham; Ex parte Pethick Lawrence [1912] 2 KB 362 …. [13275] — v Martelli (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 …. [27310] — v Martin (1809) 2 Camp 100; 170 ER 1094 …. [33350] — v — (1834) 6 C & P 562; 172 ER 1364 …. [19075] — v — (1872) LR 1 CCR 378 …. [1290], [1295] — v — (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 286; 77 WN (NSW) 4 …. [17135] — v — (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 404; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 354 …. [1175] — v — (1972) 57 Cr App R 279 …. [11135] — v — (1982) 32 SASR 419 …. [33045] — v — (1996) 65 SASR 590 …. [17305] — v — (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 …. [1215], [15220], [33045] — v — [1956] VLR 87; [1956] ALR 45 …. [1380]
— v — [1963] Tas SR 103 …. [7030] — v — [1981] 2 NSWLR 640 …. [9070] — v — [1988] 3 All ER 440; [1988] 1 WLR 655 …. [35425] — v — [1992] 1 NZLR 313 …. [15225] — v — [2000] 2 Cr App R 42 …. [19135] — v Martin (No 2) (1997) 68 SASR 419 …. [17315] — v Martin (No 7) (2000) 78 SASR 140 …. [3140] — v Martinelli (1908) 10 WALR 33 …. [23315] — v Martinez-Tobon [1994] 2 All ER 90; [1994] 1 WLR 388 …. [23030] — v MAS (2013) 118 SASR 160 …. [15135] — v Masih [1986] Crim LR 395 …. [29050] — v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 …. [1560], [17495] — v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67 …. [29105] — v — (1911) 76 JP 184; 28 TLR 120; 7 Cr App Rep 67 …. [29050] — v — (2000) 77 SASR 105 …. [27105], [27130] — v — (2003) 140 A Crim R 274 …. [21035], [21252] — v — [1976] 2 NZLR 122 …. [17130] — v — [1987] 3 All ER 481; [1988] 1 WLR 139 …. [33710] — v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 …. [29050] — v — [1997] 1 Qd R 404 …. [15170], [15230] — v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 …. [33570] — v — [1987] 2 Qd R 272; (1986) 24 A Crim R 65 …. [1545], [17250], [19095] — v Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 …. [21215] — v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; [1958] 1 WLR 474 …. [7220], [29075] — v — [1969] SASR 53 …. [11065]
— v Mattey [1995] 2 Cr App R 409 …. [11075] — v — [1995] Crim LR 308 …. [11075] — v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 …. [17135] — v — (1984) 36 SASR 503 …. [21050] — v — (1990) 58 SASR 19 …. [21050], [31055], [31095], [31100] — v — [1972] VR 3 …. [1305], [1315], [1680], [15250], [15255], [17375] — v — [1999] 1 VR 534 …. [17275] — v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222 …. [21050] — v Maurangi (2001) 80 SASR 308 …. [23375] — v Mauricia [2002] 2 Cr App R 27 …. [41105] — v Mawson [1967] VR 205 …. [17135] — v May (1952) 36 Cr App R 91 …. [33690] — v — [1959] VR 683; [1959] ALR 1199 …. [23240], [23245], [23360] — v — [1962] Qd R 456 …. [15220] — v Mayberry [1973] Qd R 211 …. [17275] — v Mayers [2009] 1 Cr App 30 …. [17155] — v Mayet (1957) (1) SA 492 …. [33570] — v Mayhew (1834) 6 C & P 315; 172 ER 1256 …. [15020] — v Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309 …. [1375], [17495] — v Mazur (2000) 113 A Crim R 67 …. [15220] — v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113 …. [7085], [17295] — v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 …. [11075], [39105] — v MBE (2008) 191 A Crim R 264 …. [13070] — v Mbonu (2003) 7 VR 273 …. [33570] — v Mead (1842) 2 B & C 606; 107 ER 509 …. [33285] — v Medina (1990) 3 WAR 21 …. [39105]
— v — (1995) 84 A Crim R 316; 126 FLR 368 …. [27310] — v Meehan [1919] St R Qd 119 …. [17065] — v Megson (1840) 9 C & P 420; 173 ER 894 …. [17275] — v Mehrbah (Razia) [2002] 1 Cr App R 561 …. [13275] — v Meier (1982) 30 SASR 126 …. [13060] — v Meissner (1994) 76 A Crim R 81 …. [27130] — v Melany (1924) 18 Cr App R 2 …. [1375] — v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572 …. [15220], [33435] — v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382 …. [17040] — v Mendy (1976) 64 Cr App R 4 …. [19035] — v Meninga (1992) 66 A Crim R 199 …. [25235] — v Mentor [2005] Crim LR 472 …. [19135] — v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40 …. [1305], [1320], [29185] — v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 …. [15210], [15255], [17135] — v Meredith (1943) 29 Cr App R 40 …. [13095] — v Merritt (1969) 63 QJPR 53 …. [1240] — v — (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 …. [33760] — v Merry (1900) 19 Cox CC 442 …. [17265] — v Mertens [2005] Crim LR 301 …. [19155] — v Meynell [2004] 1 NZLR 507 …. [17615] — v MG (2006) 175 A Crim R 342 …. [17435], [17460] — v — (2007) 69 NSWLR 20 …. [17065] — v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159; (1984) 13 A Crim R 173 …. [1300] — v Micolucco (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 434; 74 WN (NSW) 208 …. [23290] — v Middlesex Justices; Ex parte Bond [1933] 2 KB 1; [1933] All ER Rep 294 …. [5025]
— v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 …. [17485] — v — [1975] QB 191; [1974] 2 All ER 1190 …. [33640] — v Migliorini [1981] Tas R 80 …. [1300], [1305] — v Miladinovic (1992) 109 ACTR 11 …. [1305], [1445], [31045] — v — (1993) 47 FCR 190; 124 ALR 698 …. [1445] — v Milat (1996) 87 A Crim R 446 …. [29075] — v Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198 …. [21205] — v Miletic [1997] 1 VR 593 …. [17290], [17295] — v Milinkovic (1985) 17 A Crim R 122 …. [9035] — v Milk Board; Ex parte Tomkins [1944] VLR 187; [1944] ALR 388 …. [3135] — v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437 …. [19020] — v Miller (1901) 65 JP 313 …. [21220] — v — (1980) 25 SASR 170 …. [1880], [21155], [33760] — v — (2007) 177 A Crim R 528 …. [19080] — v — [1952] 2 All ER 667 …. [19155], [21025], [21215], [23205], [23390] — v — [1986] 3 All ER 119; [1986] 1 WLR 1191 …. [33655], [33660] — v — [1997] 2 Cr App R 178 …. [23310] — v Milliken (1969) 53 Cr App R 330 …. [17645], [17650], [17670], [17690] — v Mills [1962] 3 All ER 298; [1962] 1 WLR 1152 …. [17200], [17560] — v — [1975] 2 NSWLR 741 …. [1240] — v — [1986] 1 Qd R 77 …. [21050], [21175] — v — [1986] VR 617 …. [33610] — v — [1998] AC 382; [1997] 3 All ER 780 …. [17130]
— v Mills and Lemon [1947] KB 297; [1946] 2 All ER 776 …. [33495], [33690] — v Milne (No 1) (2010) 260 FLR 166 …. [17020], [29050], [29230] — v Milnes (1983) 33 SASR 211 …. [9120], [33645] — v Minarowska (1995) 83 A Crim R 78 …. [27215] — v Minh [1997] 2 Cr App R 12 …. [27215] — v Minihane (1921) 16 Cr App R 38 …. [25150] — v Minniti (2006) 159 A Crim R 394 …. [33435] — v Minors [1989] 2 All ER 208; [1989] 1 WLR 441 …. [31075], [35425] — v Minuzzo and Williams [1984] VR 417 …. [33570] — v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118; [2004] 1 All ER 925 …. [27215] — v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 …. [15055], [15225], [17480], [33310], [33485] — v — (1952) 36 Cr App R 79 …. [15140], [15240], [21115] — v — (1997) 130 ACTR 48 …. [9090], [29075] — v — [1970] Crim LR 153 …. [33805] — v — [1971] VR 46 …. [1320], [3180], [35335] — v — [2008] 2 Qd R 142 …. [15220] — v Mitten [1966] 1 QB 10; [1965] 2 All ER 59 …. [1240] — v MJJ (2013) 117 SASR 81 …. [21050], [21257] — v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 …. [15035], [17095], [17650], [17675] — v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 …. [21050] — v — (2004) 145 A Crim R 148 …. [17065], [17295] — v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501 …. [7085], [33480], [33485] — v Moana [1979] 1 NZLR 181 …. [15195] — v Moeller (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 613; 30 WN (NSW) 166 …. [15075]
— v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201 …. [35620] — v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 …. [11135], [19095] — v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 …. [17200], [17205], [17550], [17560], [37115], [37120] — v Mokbel (2012) 35 VR 156 …. [27315] — v Mollinson [1977] Crim LR 161 …. [33420] — v Molloy (2008) 102 SASR 452 …. [9030] — v — [1997] 2 Cr App R 283 …. [25265] — v Moloney (1888) 14 VLR 934 …. [19045] — v Momcilovic (2010) 265 ALR 751 …. [7180] — v Momodou [2005] 2 All ER 571; [2005] 1 WLR 3442 …. [17170] — v Mondon (1968) 52 Cr App R 695 …. [17065] — v — [2003] 1 Qd R 200 …. [15020] — v Mong (2002) 5 VR 565 …. [11135] — v Montgomery [1966] NI 120 …. [1245] — v Moon [1969] 3 All ER 803; [1969] 1 WLR 1705 …. [7030] — v Moor (1920) 15 Cr App R 31 …. [11140] — v Moore (1852) 2 Den 522; 169 ER 608 …. [33635] — v — (1892) 61 LJMC 80 …. [13275] — v — (1914) 10 Cr App R 54 …. [1160], [37155] — v — (1956) 40 Cr App R 50 …. [5210] — v — (1957) 25 CR 159 …. [17390] — v — (1972) 56 Cr App R 373 …. [33620], [33635] — v — (1973) 17 CCC (2d) 348 …. [11125] — v — (1948) (2) SA 227 …. [19005] — v — [1982] 1 NZLR 242 …. [19050], [29050] — v Moran [1999] 2 VR 87 …. [1220]
— v Morekoare [2001] 1 NZLR 318 …. [29050] — v Morgan (1875) 14 Cox CC 337 …. [33295] — v — (1910) 5 Cr App R 157 …. [23315] — v — (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 …. [19090] — v — [1978] 3 All ER 13; [1978] 1 WLR 735 …. [15140] — v — [1981] 2 NZLR 164 …. [17395] — v Morgan; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [1987] 2 Qd R 627 …. [11105], [29075] — v Morley (1999) 107 A Crim R 538 …. [7085] — v — [1988] QB 601; [1988] 2 All ER 396 …. [17135] — v Morris (1959) 43 Cr App R 206 …. [23285], [23315] — v — (1995) 2 Cr App R 69 …. [21065] — v — (1997) 98 A Crim R 408 …. [9120] — v — [1972] 1 All ER 384; [1972] 1 WLR 228 …. [11135] — v Morris; Ex parte A-G [1996] 2 Qd R 68 …. [11100], [13060] — v Morrison (1911) 6 Cr App R 159 …. [17075], [23360] — v — (1911) 75 JP 272 …. [17620] — v — (2002) 136 A Crim 223 …. [29150] — v — [1999] 1 Qd R 397 …. [9070] — v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526 …. [7085], [17440], [17460] — v Mortimer (1936) 25 Cr App R 150 …. [21040], [21190] — v Morton (2008) 191 A Crim R 333 …. [35495] — v Mosey (1784) 1 Leach 265n; 168 ER 235n …. [27280] — v Mosley (1825) 1 Mood 97; 168 ER 1200 …. [33265] — v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304 …. [21050] — v Mount (1934) 24 Cr App R 135 …. [13110] — v Moussa (2001) 125 A Crim R 505 …. [27315], [33775]
— v Movis (1994) 75 A Crim R 416 …. [21170] — v MRW (1999) 113 A Crim R 308 …. [17120] — v MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204 …. [13070] — v Muir (1983) 79 Cr App R 153 …. [31145] — v Muise (No 2) (1975) 23 CCC (2d) 422 …. [17265] — v Mulle (1865) 4 F & F 923n; 176 ER 850n …. [17335], [17340] — v Mullen [1992] Crim LR 735 …. [21175] — v — [2004] 2 Cr App R 18 …. [1310] — v Muller (2013) 178 ACTR 1; 273 FLR 215 …. [13060] — v Mulligan [1955] OR 240 …. [11045] — v Mullins (1848) 3 Cox CC 526 …. [15095], [15105], [17170] — v Munday (2003) 7 VR 423 …. [17270] — v Mundine (2008) 182 A Crim R 302 …. [11125] — v Munnery (1990) 94 Cr App R 164 …. [17690] — v Murdoch (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 …. [11125] — v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362 …. [1360], [1410] — v Murdoch (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421 …. [1370], [29050] — v Murdoch (No 5) (2005) 195 FLR 442 …. [1135] — v Murnkami [1951] SCR 801 …. [11120] — v Murphy (1753) 19 St Tr 693 …. [19170] — v — (1837) 8 Car & P 297; 173 ER 502 …. [17055], [17165] — v — (1867) 4 WW & A’B (L) 63 …. [1250] — v — (1869) LR 2 PC 535 …. [27215] — v — (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 239 …. [33615] — v — (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; 63 ALR 53 …. [1135], [1140], [9040], [9100], [9115], [19125], [19135], [31010] — v — (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 …. [27095]
— v — (1996) 66 SASR 406; 186 LSJS 467 …. [33690] — v — [1965] NI 138 …. [11045], [27235], [27310] — v — [1980] QB 434; [1980] 2 All ER 325 …. [29060] — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 523 …. [1420] — v Murray (1916) 10 Alta LR 275; 33 DLR 702 …. [1360] — v — (1916) 33 DLR 702 …. [1385], [1445] — v — (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 …. [17350], [19005] — v — (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 …. [15135], [15160], [17290], [17295] — v — (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 …. [17485] — v — [1951] 1 KB 391; [1950] 2 All ER 925 …. [11045], [33660] — v — [1997] 2 Cr App R 136 …. [33575] — v Murrell [2005] Crim LR 869 …. [19155] — v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482 …. [17535] — v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 …. [9005], [9020] — v Murton (1862) 3 F & F 492; 176 ER 221 …. [33290] — v Muscot (1713) 10 Mod 192; 88 ER 689 …. [15020] — v Mushtaq [2005] 3 All ER 885; [2005] 1 WLR 1513 …. [11050] — v Musico (1991) 55 SASR 274 …. [33725] — v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 …. [17545], [17580] — v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26 …. [21100], [21180] — v — (2005) 91 SASR 62 …. [17285], [23230] — v Musterer (1967) 61 WWR 63 …. [17170] — v Mutch [1973] 1 All ER 178 …. [23030] — v Mutchke (1946) AD 874 …. [31200] — v MWL (2002) 137 A Crim R 282 …. [17295] — v Myall (1986) 43 SASR 258 …. [1195]
— v Myers [1964] 1 All ER 877 …. [31120] — v — [1996] 2 Cr App R 335 …. [33595] — v — [1998] AC 124; [1997] 4 All ER 314 …. [33045], [33595] — v N (1992) 95 Cr App R 356 …. [11035] — v — [1994] 3 NZLR 641 …. [17270] — v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3 …. [11095] — v N, RC (2012) 222 A Crim R 521 …. [17295] — v Naa (2009) 197 A Crim R 192 …. [27315], [33775], [35650] — v Naguib [1917] 1 KB 359 …. [41005] — v Nagy [1990] Crim LR 187 …. [15255] — v Naidanovici [1962] NZLR 334 …. [17205], [17220], [17225], [17230] — v Nanette [1982] VR 81 …. [15170], [15175] — v Nardozzi [1995] 2 Qd R 87 …. [9070] — v Narula (1986) 22 A Crim R 409 …. [33745] — v Nash (1911) 6 Cr App R 225 …. [1200] — v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128; [1922] All ER Rep 335 …. [5025] — v Natasien [1972] 2 NSWLR 227 …. [17650], [17685] — v Nation [1954] SASR 189 …. [15095], [17250], [17605], [17615] — v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; (2009) 194 A Crim R 96 …. [1215], [1220], [15220], [17435], [17460] — v Naylor [1933] 1 KB 685; [1932] All ER Rep 152 …. [15225], [33770] — v Naylor; Ex parte A-G [2013] 1 Qd R 368 …. [33650] — v Nazif [1987] 2 NZLR 122 …. [17280], [17285] — v Neal [1947] ALR (CN) 616 …. [17160], [17380], [17425]
— v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304 …. [19155], [21025], [21040], [21165] — v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 …. [1220], [1290], [1295], [9030] — v Nelson (1922) 69 DLR 180 …. [3020] — v — (1978) 68 Cr App R 12 …. [23315] — v — [1982] Qd R 636 …. [19005] — v — [1992] Crim LR 653 …. [17390] — v Nessel (1980) 5 A Crim R 374 …. [33570] — v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 …. [5155], [17375], [17655] — v Newall (1984) 5 DLR (4th) 352 …. [17545], [17615] — v Newcastle Justices; Ex parte Hindle [1984] 1 All ER 770 …. [7050], [9120] — v Newell [2012] 2 Cr App R 10 …. [33540] — v Newland (1997) 98 A Crim R 455 …. [1220] — v Newman (1852) 3 Car & K 252; 175 ER 541 …. [17055] — v Newport [1998] Crim LR 581 …. [37065] — v Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325 …. [17285], [17335] — v Newton (1844) 1 Car & Kir 469; 174 ER 896 …. [1175] — v — (1912) 7 Cr App R 214 …. [27215] — v — (1983) 77 Cr App R 13 …. [1045] — v Ng (2002) 5 VR 257 …. [27255] — v Ngahooro [1982] 2 NZLR 203 …. [31185] — v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329 …. [21252] — v Ngema (1960) (2) SA 263 …. [17460] — v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 …. [19005], [33575], [35510], [35605], [35620] — v — (2002) 135 A Crim R 550 …. [21050]
— v Nguyen (1995) 78 A Crim R 582 …. [33665] — v — (2001) 118 A Crim R 479 …. [9040], [15220] — v — (2002) 127 A Crim R 102 …. [17405] — v — (2008) 184 A Crim R 207 …. [31040], [31090] — v — [1989] 2 Qd R 72 …. [17565] — v — [1999] 1 VR 457 …. [31090] — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 559 …. [23150] — v Nicholas (1846) 2 Car & K 246; 175 ER 102 …. [37130] — v — (2000) 1 VR 356 …. [17460], [27255] — v — [1988] Tas R 155 …. [39105] — v Nicholls (1976) 63 Cr App R 187 …. [35055], [35425] — v — (1931) NPD 557 …. [37075] — v Nichols (1967) 51 Cr App R 233 …. [33690] — v — [1965] QWN 10 …. [23140] — v Nicholson (1984) 12 A Crim R 231 …. [35360] — v Nicoletti (2006) 164 A Crim R 81 …. [33775] — v Nicoloudis (1954) 38 Cr App R 118 …. [23210] — v Nielson [1930] QWN 15 …. [33750] — v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56; 206 LSJS 135 …. [21050] — v Nilon (1981) 5 A Crim R 385 …. [19135] — v Nilson [1968] VR 238 …. [1310], [33690] — v Nixon [1968] 2 All ER 33; [1968] 1 WLR 577 …. [17095] — v Njana (1998) 99 A Crim R 273 …. [33745] — v NM [2013] 1 Qd R 374 …. [17290] — v Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489 …. [25030], [33650], [33710] — v Noble [2002] 1 Qd R 432 …. [17145]
— v Noel (1834) 6 C & P 336; 172 ER 1266 …. [19170] — v — (1903) 6 OLR 385 …. [17615] — v — [1914] 3 KB 848; [1914] All ER Rep 417 …. [25110] — v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704 …. [29150] — v Noonan (2002) 127 A Crim R 599 …. [1125] — v Norcott [1917] 1 KB 347 …. [17265] — v Norfolk (2002) 129 A Crim R 288 …. [23275] — v Norgard (1987) 11 Fam LR 646 …. [1630], [1635] — v Northam (1967) 52 Cr App R 97 …. [33605], [33615], [33640] — v Norton (2001) 121 A Crim R 103 …. [33730], [33765] — v — [1910] 2 KB 496; [1908] All ER Rep 309 …. [33475], [33490] — v — [1987] Crim LR 687 …. [17375] — v Norton (No 2) (2001) 24 WAR 488 …. [33690] — v Norton-Bennett [1990] 1 NZLR 559 …. [3130], [27215] — v Nottingham County Justices; Ex parte Bostock [1970] 2 All ER 641; [1970] 1 WLR 1117 …. [25365] — v Noud; Ex parte Mac Namara [1991] 2 Qd R 86 …. [17505], [19025] — v Novac (1976) 65 Cr App R 107 …. [21170] — v Nowaz [1976] 3 All ER 5; [1976] 1 WLR 830 …. [39055] — v Noyes [2005] 1 Qd R 169 …. [21085] — v NRC [1999] 3 VR 537 …. [11125], [17290], [17295], [17480] — v NRC (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 580 …. [17305] — v Nugent [1977] 3 All ER 662; [1977] 1 WLR 789 …. [17120] — v Nundhirribala (1994) 120 FLR 125 …. [33660] — v Nye and Loan (1977) 66 Cr App R 252 …. [37060] — v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628 …. [13070]
— v O’Brien [1982] Crim LR 746 …. [31195] — v — (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 146 …. [17165] — v — (1911) 7 Cr App R 29 …. [39100] — v — (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 486 …. [1675] — v — (1996) 66 SASR 396 …. [17120] — v — [1978] 1 SCR 591; (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 513 …. [31155], [33045] — v — [2008] 2 NZLR 516 …. [17375] — v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441 …. [3285], [29115] — v — [1976] VR 676 …. [1230] — v O’Coigly (1798) 26 St Tr 1191 …. [19045] — v O’Connor (1846) 4 St Tr (NS) 935 …. [27130] — v — (1980) 146 CLR 64; 29 ALR 449 …. [7050], [9120] — v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5 …. [1445] — v O’Donnell (1917) 12 Cr App R 219 …. [11135] — v O’Driscoll (2003) 57 NSWLR 416; 200 ALR 283 …. [1200], [17630] — v O’Keefe (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 345 …. [33615] — v — [1959] QWN 9 …. [15085] — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 564 …. [21035], [21050] — v O’Leary [1946] SASR 175 …. [11125] — v O’Linn (1960) (1) SA 545 …. [17200] — v O’Loughlin; Ex parte Ralphs (1971) 1 SASR 219 …. [5130] — v O’Malley [1964] Qd R 226 …. [21090], [37155] — v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499; [1952] ALR 877 …. [33085], [33115] — v O’Meally (No 2) [1953] VLR 30; [1953] ALR 60 …. [1520], [21040]
— v O’Neill (1950) 34 Cr App R 108 …. [17065], [17485] — v — (1988) 48 SASR 51 …. [33730], [33760] — v — (2003) 7 VR 408 …. [7085], [19080] — v — [1969] Crim LR 261 …. [17535] — v — [1979] 2 NSWLR 528 …. [9070] — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 326 …. [27305], [33700], [33725] — v O’Regan [1961] Qd R 78 …. [37155] — v O’Reilly (1967) 51 Cr App R 345 …. [15250] — v — [1967] 2 QB 722; [1967] 2 All ER 766 …. [15125], [15255] — v O’Sullivan (1975) 13 SASR 68 …. [3175], [3180], [11125] — v — [1969] 2 All ER 237; [1969] 1 WLR 497 …. [39105] — v O, AE (2007) 172 A Crim R 100 …. [21050] — v Oakley (1979) 70 Cr App R 7 …. [29050] — v Oakwell [1978] 1 All ER 1223; [1978] 1 WLR 32 …. [1390] — v Oates [1979] Tas R 203 …. [33655] — v Ofori (No 2) (1994) 99 Cr App R 223 …. [41005] — v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 …. [23030] — v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 …. [1765], [11125], [21100], [21252] — v Okai [1987] Crim LR 259 …. [17305] — v Okorodu [1982] Crim LR 747 …. [31195] — v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 …. [17135], [21050] — v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; 166 ALR 330 …. [9070] — v Oldroyd (1805) Russ & Ry 88; 168 ER 698 …. [17090] — v Olejarnik (1994) 33 NSWLR 567 …. [1125] — v Olisa [1990] Crim LR 721 …. [31135] — v Oliva [1965] 3 All ER 116; [1965] 1 WLR 1028 …. [17090],
[17120], [17390], [17395] — v Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543 …. [11125], [13085], [15160] — v — [1944] KB 68; [1943] 2 All ER 800 …. [7160] — v — [1968] VR 243 …. [33500] — v Oliverio (1993) 61 SASR 354 …. [23290] — v Ollerton (1989) 40 A Crim R 133 …. [33460] — v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758; [1900] All ER Rep 733 …. [21100], [21110], [21205], [21220] — v Olsen (1898) 62 JP 777 …. [17075] — v Omar (1991) 58 A Crim R 139 …. [1445] — v Omarjee (1995) 79 A Crim R 355 …. [17290] — v Ong (2001) 80 SASR 537 …. [23145] — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 366 …. [1445] — v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 1 All ER 247 …. [1250], [9020] — v Orgles [1993] 4 All ER 533; [1994] 1 WLR 108 …. [27215] — v Ormsby [1985] 1 NZLR 311 …. [1425] — v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251 …. [15220] — v Orton [1922] VLR 469; (1922) 28 ALR 193 …. [17550] — v Osborne (1842) Car & M 622; 174 ER 662 …. [17275] — v — (2003) 11 Tas R 295 …. [27315] — v — [1905] 1 KB 551; [1904] All ER Rep 54 …. [17260], [17265], [17270], [17275], [17285] — v Osbourne [1973] QB 678; [1973] 1 All ER 649 …. [1480], [31165], [31175], [31180], [31185], [31195], [33690] — v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636 …. [7085], [15220] — v Osman (1881) 15 Cox CC 1 …. [33295]
— v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 …. [33660] — v Ousley (1996) 87 A Crim R 326 …. [33565] — v Ovenell [1969] 1 QB 17; [1968] 1 All ER 933 …. [11050], [33640], [33690] — v Owen (1985) 83 Cr App R 100 …. [23345] — v — (1991) 56 SASR 397 …. [9040] — v — (1993) 68 A Crim R 247 …. [5150] — v — [1951] VLR 393; [1951] ALR 852 …. [33640] — v — [1952] 2 QB 362; [1952] 1 All ER 1040 …. [17095], [17650] — v Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240 …. [17305], [17310], [17315], [17545] — v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664 …. [25300], [29070], [29195], [29200] — v — [2008] 2 Cr App R 6 …. [9035] — v PAB [2008] 1 Qd R 184; (2006) 162 A Crim R 449 …. [21050], [21257] — v Pace (1967) 1 CR (NS) 45 …. [1605] — v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86 …. [17170] — v Paddon [1999] 2 Qd R 387 …. [25010] — v Padman [1979] Tas R 37; (1978) 25 ALR 36 …. [27255] — v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 …. [9030], [11105], [15135], [15140] — v Paine [1974] Tas SR (NC) N1 …. [15140] — v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 …. [21045], [21050] — v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99 …. [19130] — v Palmer (1914) 10 Cr App R 77 …. [1380] — v — (1994) 99 Cr App R 83 …. [13085] — v — [1981] 1 NSWLR 209 …. [1370], [29095], [29125] — v Pan [2001] 2 SCR 344; (2001) 200 DLR (4th) 577 …. [27215]
— v Panagiotidis (1990) 55 SASR 172 …. [15180] — v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332 …. [1520], [29090], [29175] — v Pangallo (1989) 51 SASR 254 …. [29070], [29140], [37145] — v Panozzo (2007) 178 A Crim R 323 …. [15220], [33435] — v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 …. [9040], [29055] — v Papadopoulos [1979] 1 NZLR 621 …. [27215] — v Papalia (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 161 …. [1305] — v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375 …. [21243], [21252] — v Papoulias [1988] VR 858 …. [27310] — v Papworth [2008] 1 Cr App R 439 …. [33455] — v Paraskeva (1982) 76 Cr App R 162 …. [17130] — v Park (1993) 99 Cr App R 270 …. [33595] — v Parker (1783) 3 Doug KB 242; 99 ER 634 …. [17250] — v — (1842) Car & M 639; 174 ER 669 …. [15020] — v — (1924) 18 Cr App R 14 …. [23275], [23315] — v — (1983) 8 A Crim R 324 …. [15110] — v — (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 …. [33660] — v — [1912] VLR 152; (1912) 18 ALR 150 …. [29115] — v — [1933] 1 KB 850; [1932] All ER Rep 718 …. [33770] — v — [1968] NZLR 325 …. [15035] — v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450 …. [17405], [25400], [35520] — v Parkin (1922) 37 CCC 35 …. [21050] — v Parkinson [1965] QWN 31 …. [33690] — v — [1990] 1 Qd R 382 …. [17565] — v Parks [1961] 3 All ER 633; [1961] 1 WLR 1484 …. [11140] — v Parratt (1831) 4 Car & P 570; 172 ER 829 …. [33640]
— v Parris (1988) 89 Cr App R 68 …. [33740] — v Parsons (1977) 17 OR (2d) 465; 80 DLR (3d) 430 …. [1305] — v — (2000) 1 VR 161 …. [21050] — v — (2004) 145 A Crim R 519 …. [15085], [15100] — v — [1998] 1 VR 471 …. [19080] — v Partridge (1836) 7 C & P 551; 173 ER 243 …. [1195] — v Pascoe (2004) 90 SASR 505 …. [13060] — v Patel (2009) 205 A Crim R 302 …. [21001], [21275] — v — [1951] 2 All ER 29 …. [1535] — v — [1981] 3 All ER 94 …. [31145], [35425] — v — [1983] 3 All ER 94 …. [31120] — v — [1992] Crim LR 739 …. [17665] — v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312 …. [17645] — v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 …. [17110] — v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; [1962] 1 All ER 340 …. [9045] — v Pattinson (1973) 58 Cr App R 417 …. [33420] — v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183; [1920] All ER Rep 535 …. [13095], [13100], [17475], [17515] — v Pavitt (2007) 169 A Crim R 452 …. [17315], [27305] — v Payne (1872) LR 1 CCR 349 …. [13080] — v — [1950] 1 All ER 102 …. [13085] — v — [1963] 1 All ER 848; [1963] 1 WLR 637 …. [27235] — v Payton [2006] Crim LR 997 …. [19135] — v Peach [1974] Crim LR 245 …. [15100] — v — [1990] 2 All ER 966; [1990] 1 WLR 976 …. [15020] — v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 …. [17270], [17285], [23030] — v — (1996) 67 SASR 297 …. [21050]
— v Pearce (1840) 9 Car & P 667; 173 ER 1003 …. [13115] — v — (1862) 1 W & W (L) 248 …. [15020] — v — (1979) 69 Cr App R 365 …. [17335], [33455] — v — [1999] 3 VR 287 …. [21050] — v Pearcey (1985) 63 ACTR 12 …. [33760] — v Pearson [1964] Qd R 471 …. [17395] — v Peel (1860) 2 F & F 21; 175 ER 941 …. [33295] — v Peirce [1992] 1 VR 273 …. [13085] — v Pektas [1989] VR 239 …. [33570] — v Pemberton (1993) 99 Cr App R 228 …. [15210] — v — [1983] Crim LR 121 …. [1045], [7085] — v Penman (1985) 82 Cr App R 44 …. [33435] — v Pennant [1998] 2 VR 453 …. [5155] — v Pennell [2003] 1 NZLR 289 …. [37060] — v Penno (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 529 …. [31185] — v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 …. [1420] — v Percerep [1993] 2 VR 109 …. [29075], [33780] — v Perera [1982] VR 901 …. [15210], [33435] — v — [1986] 1 Qd R 211 …. [9040], [11045] — v — [1986] 2 Qd R 431 …. [17325] — v Perfect (1917) 12 Cr App R 273 …. [11140] — v Perkins (1840) 9 Car & P 395; 173 ER 884 …. [33300] — v Perks [1973] Crim LR 388 …. [17135] — v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 …. [19140] — v Perrier (No 2) [1991] 1 VR 717 …. [23270] — v Perry (1982) 150 CLR 580; 44 ALR 449 …. [21080]
— v — (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 …. [29070] — v — [1909] 2 KB 697 …. [33295] — v — [1970] 2 NSWR 501 …. [15085], [15255] — v Perry (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 95 …. [37130], [37140] — v Perry (No 3) (1981) 28 SASR 112 …. [35360], [35400], [35425] — v Perry (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 …. [29001], [29020], [29165], [35360], [35400], [35425] — v Pestano [1981] Crim LR 397 …. [17395] — v Petcherini (1855) 7 Cox CC 79 …. [37110] — v Peters (1886) 16 QBD 636 …. [11010], [33845] — v — (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 …. [33750] — v — (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 …. [27310] — v — [1995] 2 Cr App R 77 …. [21065], [21205] — v Pethig [1977] 1 NZLR 448 …. [27235] — v Petkar [2004] 1 Cr App R 22 …. [15255] — v Petropoulos (1977) 15 SASR 553 …. [33690] — v Petroulias (No 8) (2007) 175 A Crim R 417 …. [9130], [27315] — v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; 176 A Crim R 309 …. [17130], [25240], [25295], [25300] — v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 …. [1315], [31075], [35425] — v Pettipiece (1972) 7 CCC 2d 133 …. [33665] — v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418 …. [21050] — v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 …. [1245], [1440], [1445], [27305], [29020], [33700], [33725] — v Pfennig (No 3) (1993) 60 SASR 271 …. [1440] — v Pfitzner (1976) 15 SASR 171 …. [33460] — v — (1996) 66 SASR 161 …. [33660]
— v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 …. [17615], [19170] — v Phan (1990) 54 SASR 561 …. [1195] — v — (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; 123 A Crim R 30 …. [17065], [27315], [33690], [35650] — v Phillips (1936) 26 Cr App R 17 …. [33800] — v — [1922] SASR 276 …. [13035] — v — [1963] NZLR 855 …. [15095] — v — [1997] 1 VR 558 …. [23040] — v — [2003] 2 Cr App R 35 …. [21050] — v — [2003] Crim LR 629 …. [1140] — v Phillipson (1989) 91 Cr App R 226 …. [17130], [31135] — v Picknell [1970] 1 NSWR 604; (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 731 …. [17650], [17685] — v Pidoto (2006) 14 VR 269 …. [3020] — v Pierce (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 135 …. [25200] — v Pieterson [1995] 1 WLR 293 …. [1245] — v Pike (1829) 3 Car & P 598; 172 ER 562 …. [33300] — v Pilcher (1974) 60 Cr App R 1 …. [17650] — v Pilley (1922) 16 Cr App R 138 …. [33490] — v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30 …. [27315] — v Ping [2006] 2 Qd R 69 …. [29070] — v Pipe (1967) 51 Cr App R 17 …. [13085] — v Pisano [1997] 2 VR 342 …. [15170] — v Pitman (1985) 38 SASR 566 …. [15195] — v Pitt (1967) 68 DLR (2d) 513 …. [17175] — v — [1983] QB 25; [1982] 3 All ER 63 …. [13165], [17375] — v Pitts (1912) 8 Cr App R 126 …. [15095]
— v Platt [1981] Crim LR 622 …. [33655] — v Player (2000) 217 ALR 578 …. [21252] — v Playford [2013] 2 Qd R 567 …. [33680] — v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 …. [33730], [33765] — v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567 …. [7085], [21050] — v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 380 …. [33675] — v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 …. [17595] — v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175 …. [5215] — v PML (2001) 121 A Crim R 97; 160 FLR 263 …. [27120], [27180] — v Poa [1979] 2 NZLR 378 …. [15195] — v Podmore (1930) 22 Cr App R 36 …. [37050] — v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325; [1959] 3 All ER 418 …. [1040], [7045], [9045] — v Pohutuhutu [1987] 2 CRNZ 538 …. [17375] — v Police Complaints Board; Ex parte Madden [1983] 2 All ER 353; [1983] 1 WLR 447 …. [9075] — v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189 …. [35495], [35500], [35532] — v Polley (1997) 68 SASR 227 …. [19095] — v Pollinger (1930) 22 Cr App R 75 …. [23320] — v Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 …. [7050] — v — [1999] Crim LR 576 …. [23200] — v Pook (1871) 13 Cox CC 172 …. [37115] — v Popescu (1989) 39 A Crim R 137 …. [17460] — v Porter (1935) 25 Cr App R 59 …. [21200] — v — (1964) 48 DLR (2d) 277 …. [31120] — v — (2003) 85 SASR 581 …. [33435]
— v Portus; Ex parte McNeil (1961) 105 CLR 537; [1962] ALR 81 …. [3156] — v Post [1982] Qd R 495 …. [25105] — v Potter (1994) 72 A Crim R 108 …. [1520] — v Poulter (1978) 19 SASR 370 …. [9035] — v Powell [1980] Crim LR 39 …. [19050] — v — [1985] Crim LR 592 …. [17375] — v — [1986] 1 All ER 193; [1985] 1 WLR 1364 …. [23285], [23345] — v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 …. [15220] — v — [1919] 1 KB 572 …. [11095] — v — [1940] St R Qd 111 …. [17060], [17135] — v Powers (2000) 113 A Crim R 51 …. [1410] — v PP (2002) 135 A Crim R 575 …. [19095] — v Prager [1972] 1 All ER 1114; [1972] 1 WLR 260 …. [33595], [33655] — v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 …. [9105], [11095], [11100], [11105] — v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464; [1960] 1 All ER 298 …. [15160] — v Pratt (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 358 …. [33750] — v — [1966] 2 NSWR 516 …. [11050] — v Prefas (1988) 86 Cr App R 111 …. [17375] — v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522 …. [1360], [1880] — v — [1909] 1 KB 568 …. [23315], [23360] — v — [1961] VR 761 …. [1360], [1400], [31185] — v — [1994] 2 AC 130; [1993] 4 All ER 638 …. [11035], [17130] — v Pretorius [2010] 1 Qd R 67 …. [21185] — v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 …. [15220], [17290] — v Price [1969] 1 QB 541; [1968] 2 All ER 282 …. [15075], [15255]
— v — [2005] Crim LR 304 …. [19155] — v Priest (2011) 246 FLR 341 …. [27310], [27315] — v Priestley (1966) 50 Cr App R 183 …. [33615] — v — (1967) 51 Cr App R 1 …. [33655] — v — (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 …. [19155] — v Pritam Singh [1958] 1 All ER 199 …. [13275] — v Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84 …. [33730] — v Prosser (1993) 70 A Crim R 391 …. [11100] — v Ptohopoulos (1967) 52 Cr App R 47 …. [17135] — v Puaca [2006] Crim LR 341 …. [29080] — v Pullman [1942] SASR 262 …. [17605], [17615] — v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595 …. [9030] — v Putland and Sorrell [1946] 1 All ER 85 …. [7165], [7170] — v PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75 …. [21252] — v Pyke (1988) 33 A Crim R 322 …. [29050] — v — (1988) 38 A Crim R 322 …. [11095] — v Qiu [2007] 2 NZLR 433 …. [33570] — v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345 …. [21050] — v Qualtieri (2006) 171 A Crim R 463 …. [21252] — v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218 …. [29185] — v Quinlan (2006) 164 A Crim 106 …. [33435] — v Quinn [1962] 2 QB 245; [1961] 3 All ER 88 …. [1290], [1295], [1480], [1585] — v Qureshi [2002] 1 WLR 518 …. [27215] — v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74 …. [11100] — v — [1977] 1 WLR 1256 …. [33840] — v — [1994] 4 All ER 260; [1994] 1 WLR 758 …. [25235]
— v R (AJ) (1994) 94 CCC (3d) 168 …. [17505] — v R (No 1) (1972) 9 CCC (2d) 274 …. [33750] — v R, GJ (2009) 105 SASR 506 …. [25340] — v Raabe [1985] 1 Qd R 115 …. [3180] — v Rabbitt (1931) 23 Cr App R 112 …. [17135] — v Rabey (1977) 17 OR (2d) 1; 79 DLR (3d) 414 …. [29050] — v Radbourne (1787) 1 Leach 457; 168 ER 330 …. [33795] — v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 …. [1660], [1675], [15255], [31045] — v Ragen (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 572 …. [33735], [33740] — v Rajakaruna (2004) 8 VR 340 …. [21170] — v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 …. [9035], [17460] — v Ralph (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 …. [11125], [15170] — v Ram [2007] 3 NZLR 322 …. [11060], [33595] — v Ramasamy [1965] AC 1 …. [27285] — v Ramsden (1826) 2 C & P 603; 172 ER 275 …. [17240] — v Rance (1975) 62 Cr App R 118 …. [15110], [21110], [21205] — v Randall [2004] 1 All ER 467; [2004] 1 WLR 56 …. [3205], [19155] — v Rankine [1986] QB 861; [1986] 2 All ER 566 …. [27105] — v Ransom (1979) 22 SASR 283 …. [23375] — v Rappolt (1911) 6 Cr App R 156 …. [23315] — v Raso (1993) 115 FLR 319 …. [33775] — v Ratcliffe (1919) 14 Cr App R 95 …. [23145] — v Rathbone; Ex parte Dikko [1985] QB 630 …. [17020] — v Ratten [1971] VR 87 …. [29095], [31095], [37010], [37060] — v Ravindra [1997] 3 NZLR 242 …. [19110] — v Raviraj (1986) 85 Cr App R 93 …. [1195], [33485], [33770]
— v Rawlings [1995] 1 All ER 580; [1995] 1 WLR 178 …. [1310] — v Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616 …. [7085], [15220] — v Raye (2003) 138 A Crim R 355 …. [21257], [35660] — v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 …. [15165], [15255] — v Reading [1966] 1 All ER 521; [1966] 1 WLR 836 …. [21065], [21180] — v Ready and Manning [1942] VLR 85; [1942] ALR 117 …. [15085] — v Reardon (1864) 4 F & F 76; 176 ER 473 …. [21050] — v — (2002) 186 FLR 1 …. [1755], [11105] — v Reardon (No 2) (2004) 60 NSWLR 454 …. [17130] — v Reci (1997) 70 SASR 78 …. [17130], [25010] — v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104; [1922] All ER Rep 435 …. [19140], [19145], [23270] — v Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr App R 10 …. [19110], [19170] — v Redpath (1962) 46 Cr App R 319 …. [15195] — v Reed [2010] 1 Cr App R 23 …. [29005], [29050] — v Rees (1834) 6 C & P 607; 172 ER 1385 …. [1175] — v Reeve (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 81 …. [15100] — v Reeve and Hancock (1872) LR 1 CCR 362 …. [33615] — v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 …. [9030], [17335], [33770] — v Regan (1887) 16 Cox CC 203 …. [39015] — v Reid [1989] Crim LR 719 …. [23375] — v Reilly (1979) 1 A Crim R 376 …. [17685] — v Reiner (1974) 8 SASR 102 …. [29070] — v Reiter [1954] 2 QB 16; [1954] 1 All ER 741 …. [1165] — v Rennie [1982] 1 All ER 385; [1982] 1 WLR 64 …. [33625] — v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 …. [15220]
— v Revesz (1996) 88 A Crim R 253 …. [11035], [13050] — v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; [1962] ALR 483 …. [7030] — v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606; [1950] 1 All ER 335 …. [11030], [11035] — v RGP (2006) 167 A Crim R 468 …. [1530] — v RH [2005] 1 Qd R 180 …. [19080] — v Rhodes (1999) 104 A Crim R 572 …. [15135] — v — [1899] 1 QB 77 …. [21090], [23025] — v Ria [1994] 2 NZLR 212 …. [37060] — v Riaz (1991) 94 Cr App R 339 …. [1305], [1310] — v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857; [1963] 1 All ER 832 …. [17430], [17620], [17625], [17630], [31130], [33595] — v — [1996] 2 VR 406 …. [15220], [33435] — v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 …. [17485] — v Richards (1967) 51 Cr App R 266 …. [33675] — v — (2001) 123 A Crim R 14 …. [27310] — v — [1918] SALR 315 …. [17075] — v — [1965] Qd R 354 …. [15195], [37155] — v — [1967] 1 All ER 829; [1967] 1 WLR 653 …. [33605], [33615], [33640] — v Richardson (1967) 51 Cr App R 381 …. [13080], [13105] — v — (1994) 98 Cr App R 174 …. [17120] — v — [1969] 1 QB 299; [1968] 2 All ER 761 …. [19030], [19045], [19075], [23290] — v — [1971] 2 QB 484; [1971] 2 All ER 773 …. [17170], [17185] — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 583 …. [19090] — v Richens [1993] 4 All ER 877 …. [15220]
— v — [1994] 4 All ER 877 …. [33435] — v Rickard (1918) 13 Cr App R 140 …. [39105] — v Rickards [1922] SASR 269 …. [1455] — v Rider (1986) 83 Cr App R 207 …. [15020] — v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19 …. [15070] — v Riebold [1965] 1 All ER 653; [1967] 1 WLR 674 …. [23375] — v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 …. [15075], [15090], [15095], [15110] — v Riley (1866) 4 F & F 964; 176 ER 868 …. [17545], [17575] — v — (1887) 18 QBD 481 …. [19075] — v — [1896] 1 QB 309 …. [17060] — v — [1972] QJPR 20 …. [1360] — v — [1991] Crim LR 460 …. [19090] — v Rima (1892) 14 ALT 138 …. [15035] — v — (2003) 145 A Crim R 27 …. [11125] — v Rimmer [1972] 1 All ER 604; [1972] 1 WLR 268 …. [33605], [33610] — v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 …. [27215] — v Rivett (1950) 34 Cr App R 87 …. [29075] — v Roads [1967] 2 QB 108; [1967] 2 All ER 84 …. [27215] — v Roba (2000) 110 A Crim R 245 …. [33765] — v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 …. [1445], [29050], [29055], [29060], [29075], [39105] — v Roberts (1920) 15 Cr App R 65 …. [23315] — v — (1984) 80 Cr App R 89 …. [17090] — v — (2001) 53 NSWLR 138 …. [15135], [17295] — v — (2004) 9 VR 295 …. [19035], [25040], [25100], [27130] — v — (2009) 158 NTR 1 …. [33745]
— v — [1936] 1 All ER 23 …. [23145] — v — [1942] 1 All ER 187 …. [17250], [17305], [17310] — v — [1954] 2 QB 329; [1953] 2 All ER 340 …. [11045] — v — [1967] Crim LR 477 …. [15160] — v — [1970] Crim LR 464 …. [33750] — v — [2000] Crim LR 183 …. [1445] — v Robertson (1978) 17 SASR 479 …. [19090] — v — (1983) 21 NTR 11 …. [27105], [27130], [27135], [27155] — v — (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 …. [21100] — v — [1968] 3 All ER 557; [1968] 1 WLR 1767 …. [1040] — v — [1998] 4 VR 30 …. [11045], [17290] — v Robertson; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 262 …. [17275], [17280], [17285] — v Robinson (1953) 37 Cr App R 95 …. [21165], [21180] — v — (1969) 53 Cr App R 314 …. [1045] — v — (2000) 111 A Crim R 388 …. [19145], [23290] — v — (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 398 …. [17505] — v — [1977] Qd R 387 …. [17460], [17525] — v — [1978] 1 NZLR 709 …. [11010] — v — [1994] 3 All ER 346 …. [19005], [29050] — v — [1998] 1 VR 570 …. [33690] — v — [2001] Crim LR 478 …. [23275] — v — [2006] 1 Cr App R 221 …. [1445] — v — [2006] 1 Cr App R 480 …. [19155] — v Robison [1969] 1 NSWR 229 …. [33690] — v Roble [1997] Crim LR 449 …. [25010] — v Robson [1972] 2 All ER 699; [1972] 1 WLR 651 …. [1040], [1300],
[1305], [11040], [11075] — v Rochford Justices; Ex parte Buck (1978) 68 Cr App R 114 …. [21155] — v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468; [1911] All ER Rep 688 …. [21025], [21115], [21195], [37155] — v Rodriguez [1998] 2 VR 167 …. [7085] — v Rogan and Elliot (1846) 1 Cox CC 291 …. [19145] — v Rogers (1914) 111 LT 1115 …. [31155] — v — [1950] SASR 102 …. [11030], [11075], [33295] — v — [1979] 1 NZLR 307 …. [33690] — v — [1995] 1 Cr App R 374 …. [33015], [33045], [33070], [33080] — v Rogers (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 179 …. [5025] — v Rogerson (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 …. [9040] — v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 …. [1675], [15195], [17270] — v Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr App R 4 …. [15125] — v Rollason and Jenkins, ex p A-G (Qld) [2008] 1 Qd R 85 …. [17130] — v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 …. [17435], [31130] — v — (1987) 25 A Crim R 80 …. [33570] — v — (1987) 45 SASR 212 …. [27310] — v — (1988) 36 A Crim R 212 …. [33435] — v — [2004] 1 Cr App R 30 …. [15195] — v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562 …. [27315], [35545] — v Ronen (No 2) (2004) 211 FLR 268 …. [25175] — v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 …. [17200], [17655], [29050], [29060] — v — (2002) 55 NSWLR 701 …. [1450], [1490], [15260], [35435] — v — [1977] Qd R 280 …. [17390] — v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945 …. [15005], [15110]
— v Rossborough (1985) 81 Cr App R 139 …. [1155], [33435] — v Rosser (1836) 7 C & P 648; 173 ER 284 …. [3130], [3140] — v Rothery (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451 …. [9040], [9120] — v Rothwell (1994) 99 Cr App R 388 …. [31185] — v Roughan (2007) 179 A Crim R 389 …. [19155] — v Roulston [1976] 2 NZLR 644 …. [17065] — v Rouse [1904] 1 KB 184; [1900] All ER Rep Ext 1054 …. [23315] — v Router (1977) 14 ALR 365 …. [33770] — v Rowland (1898) 62 JP 459 …. [17260] — v — [1910] 1 KB 458 …. [17515], [23140] — v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 …. [1390], [11095] — v Rowson [1986] QB 174; [1985] 2 All ER 539 …. [17430], [33595] — v Rowton (1865) 34 LJMC 57 …. [33820] — v — [1861] All ER Rep 549; (1865) 169 ER 1497; (1865) Le & Ca 520 …. [19010], [19120], [19125], [19145], [23190], [29090], [29150], [33820] — v Royce-Bentley [1974] 2 All ER 347; [1974] 1 WLR 535 …. [15100] — v Royle [1993] Crim LR 57 …. [15255] — v Rudd (1948) 32 Cr App R 138 …. [13095] — v — (2009) 23 VR 444 …. [17335], [33455] — v — [1923] SASR 229 …. [33485] — v Rudge (1805) Peake Add Cas 232; 170 ER 255 …. [19045] — v Rugari (2001) 122 A Crim R 1 …. [17065] — v Ruiz [1995] Crim LR 151 …. [21175] — v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 …. [19170], [29050], [29050], [29055] — v Ruptash (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 182 …. [17505]
— v Rusmanto (1997) 6 NTLR 68 …. [27155] — v Russell (1968) 52 Cr App R 147 …. [15160] — v — (2000) 192 DLR (4th) 585; [2000] 2 SCR 731; [2001] 2 WWR 407 …. [9030] — v — [1977] 2 NZLR 20 …. [1375], [1380], [1425] — v Russell-Jones [1995] 3 All ER 239 …. [17120], [17125] — v Russen (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 134 …. [1045] — v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 …. [7085], [33770] — v Rutledge; Ex parte Laidlaw [1923] St R Qd 284 …. [25100] — v RW (2008) 184 A Crim R 388 …. [17295] — v RWB (2010) 202 A Crim R 209 …. [9030], [17460] — v Ryan (1964) 50 Cr App R 144 …. [33770] — v — (1966) 50 Cr App R 144 …. [33770] — v — (1984) 55 ALR 408 …. [1445], [31155], [33570] — v — [1906] St R Qd 15 …. [1250] — v — [2002] VSCA 176; BC200206667 …. [29070] — v Ryan (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384 …. [13070], [17595] — v Ryan and Walker [1966] VR 553 …. [21040] — v Ryder (1993) 98 Cr App R 242 …. [21170] — v Rymer (2005) 156 A Crim R 84 …. [17335], [35440], [35525] — v S (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 460 …. [33635] — v — (1983) 32 SASR 174 …. [33745], [33750] — v — (2000) 113 A Crim R 429 …. [19145] — v — (2001) 125 A Crim R 526 …. [29050] — v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 …. [15230], [17270], [17280] — v — [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 …. [7075] — v — [1992] Crim LR 307 …. [19030]
— v — [1995] 1 Qd R 558 …. [17165] — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 445 …. [21050] — v — [2004] 3 All ER 689; [2004] 1 WLR 2940 …. [17275], [17280] — v — [2007] 2 All ER 974 …. [1255], [29050] — v S (F) (2000) 144 CCC (3d) 466 …. [17505] — v S(F) [2009] 1 WLR 1489 …. [25090] — v S, DD (2010) 109 SASR 46 …. [17290] — v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491 …. [23040] — v S, PC (2008) 102 SASR 199 …. [21065] — v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55 …. [7085], [17485] — v Sadaraka [1981] 2 NSWLR 459 …. [33770] — v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69 …. [17505], [19090], [21050] — v Sahin (2000) 115 A Crim R 413 …. [27310] — v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342 …. [15195], [17270] — v Sainsbury [1993] 1 Qd R 305 …. [1400] — v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 …. [15230], [17280], [17285], [21050] — v Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521 …. [33485], [33495] — v Salameh (1985) 4 NSWLR 369 …. [31175], [31200], [33735], [33805] — v Saleam (1989) 41 A Crim R 108 …. [19170] — v Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 …. [27315] — v Salerno [1973] VR 59 …. [21185] — v Salisbury (1831) 5 C & P 155; 172 ER 919 …. [21040] — v Salvo [1980] VR 401 …. [11010] — v Sambo (1965) (1) SA 640 …. [33690] — v Samson (2011) 221 A Crim R 295 …. [13070] — v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 …. [19145], [23145], [23275],
[23290] — v — [1988] QB 615; [1988] 2 All ER 135 …. [33740] — v Samuels [1962] NZLR 1036 …. [1675] — v Sanders (1961) 46 Cr App R 60 …. [15125] — v — (1991) 93 Cr App R 245 …. [29075] — v Sanderson [1953] 1 All ER 485; [1953] 1 WLR 392 …. [17095] — v Sang [1980] AC 402; [1979] 2 All ER 1222 …. [1030], [11125], [21225], [27235], [27310], [33620], [33625] — v Sanghera [1983] 2 VR 130 …. [1030] — v Sansom [1991] 2 QB 130; [1991] 2 All ER 145 …. [17130] — v Santos (1987) 45 SASR 556 …. [1245] — v SAP; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] 1 Qd R 367 …. [7085] — v Saragozza [1984] VR 187 …. [17280] — v Saraya (1993) 70 A Crim R 515 …. [33805] — v Sardar (Aamir) [2012] Crim LR 618 …. [13070] — v Sarek [1982] VR 971 …. [23205], [23410] — v Sargent (2001) 80 SASR 184 …. [17460], [17525] — v Sargvon (1967) 51 Cr App R 394 …. [23320] — v Sartori [1961] Crim LR 397 …. [11075], [33675] — v Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr App R 55 …. [33595] — v Saunders [1899] 1 QB 490 …. [31155] — v — [1919] 1 KB 550 …. [1675] — v — [1965] Qd R 409 …. [11075], [17265], [17280] — v — [2012] 2 Cr App R 26 …. [17065], [33740] — v Savage (1876) 13 Cox CC 178 …. [41035] — v — [1970] Tas SR 137 …. [33270], [33295] — v Savory (1942) 29 Cr App R 1 …. [19120], [19145]
— v Savundra (1968) 52 Cr App R 637 …. [25180] — v Savvas (1991) 55 A Crim R 241 …. [33735] — v Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 …. [21050] — v Sawyer (1959) 43 Cr App R 187 …. [15140] — v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 …. [1410] — v Saxton [2012] 1 NZLR 331 …. [1680] — v Sbarra [1918] All ER Rep 1453 …. [1195] — v SBB (2007) 175 A Crim R 449 …. [15220] — v Scaife (1836) 2 Lewin 150; 168 ER 1110 …. [33265] — v — (1851) 17 QB 238; 117 ER 1271 …. [33795] — v Scammonden (Inhabitants) (1789) 3 TR 474; 100 ER 685 …. [39180] — v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016; [1978] 1 All ER 672 …. [11120], [21015], [21100], [21145], [21155], [21170] — v Schaeffer (2005) 13 VR 337 …. [11045], [33735] — v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 …. [29105] — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 381 …. [9050] — v Schama; R v Abramovitch [1914] All ER Rep 204; (1914) 84 LJKB 396 …. [1195] — v Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161 …. [35630] — v Schioparlan (1991) 54 A Crim R 294 …. [15100] — v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 …. [15140], [15195] — v — (1992) 57 SASR 423 …. [11035] — v Schmahl [1965] VR 745 …. [17395], [19135] — v Schneidas [1981] 2 NSWLR 713; (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 …. [17435], [17460] — v Schriek [1997] 2 NZLR 139 …. [17375]
— v Schuller [1972] QWN 41 …. [17515] — v Schwarz [1923] SASR 347 …. [33045], [33060] — v Sciretta [1977] VR 139 …. [7160] — v Scobie (2003) 85 SASR 77 …. [33805] — v Scofield (1988) 37 A Crim R 197 …. [33635] — v Scott (1909) 2 Cr App R 214 …. [17155] — v — (1921) 86 JP 69 …. [7160] — v — (1984) 79 Cr App R 49 …. [17650] — v — (2000) 112 A Crim R 543 …. [1220] — v — (2003) 141 A Crim R 323 …. [1125] — v Scott and Downland Publications Ltd [1972] VR 663 …. [1175] — v Scott; Ex parte A-G [1993] 1 Qd R 537 …. [27285] — v Sealby [1965] 1 All ER 701 …. [31120] — v Seaman (1978) 67 Cr App R 234 …. [21065], [21195] — v Seaton [2011] 1 All ER 932 …. [1215], [17315], [25010] — v Secord [1992] 3 NZLR 570 …. [25245] — v Secretary of State for Environment; Ex parte Hackney London Borough Council [1983] 3 All ER 358; [1983] 1 WLR 524 …. [5030] — v Secretary of State for India; Ex parte Ezekiel [1941] 2 KB 169; [1941] 2 All ER 546 …. [13300] — v Secretary of State for the Environment; Ex parte Simms [1991] 2 QB 354; [1990] 3 All ER 490 …. [39170] — v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; [1991] 1 All ER 720 …. [27095] — v Secretary of State for Trade; Ex parte Anderson Strathclyde Pty Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 233 …. [27095] — v See Lun (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 363; 49 WN (NSW) 116 …. [17375] — v Seery (1914) 19 CLR 15 …. [5105], [5185]
— v Seifert (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 358 …. [31120], [39010] — v Seiga (1961) 45 Cr App R 220 …. [1375], [1420] — v Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 …. [17105], [23385] — v Sekhon (1986) 85 Cr App R 19 …. [17240], [17245], [17305] — v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208 …. [11055], [11060], [23140], [25105] — v Senat (1968) 52 Cr App R 282 …. [1300], [1310] — v Sergi [1974] VR 1 …. [17390] — v Serjeant (1826) Ry & Mood 352; 171 ER 1046 …. [13035], [13185] — v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 …. [9120], [11125], [21050], [35495], [35500], [35532] — v SG (2011) 250 FLR 337 …. [13070] — v SH (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; 256 FLR 123 …. [17405] — v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 …. [3190], [17160] — v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 …. [11125], [21252] — v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347 …. [1420] — v Sharmpal Singh [1962] AC 188 …. [1220], [3235] — v Sharp (1983) 33 SASR 366 …. [33710], [33765] — v — (2003) 143 A Crim R 344 …. [25260], [33775] — v — [1988] 1 All ER 65; [1988] 1 WLR 7 …. [31010], [33455] — v — [1994] QB 261; [1993] 3 All ER 225 …. [17135], [33435] — v Sharrock [1948] 1 All ER 145 …. [13080] — v Shaw (1888) 16 Cox CC 503 …. [1140], [19035] — v — (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 383 …. [1140], [3200] — v — [1996] 1 Qd R 641 …. [17155], [33435] — v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591 …. [17205] — v Sheehan (1999) 153 FLR 326 …. [7030]
— v Shellaker [1914] 1 KB 414; [1911] All ER Rep Ext 1391 …. [21065], [21220] — v Shelton [1981] Crim LR 776 …. [1390] — v Shephard [1993] AC 380; [1993] 1 All ER 225 …. [29050], [31075], [35350] — v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120 …. [1520], [5210], [21100] — v — (1988) 16 NSWLR 1 …. [9040] — v — (1988) 86 ALR 387 …. [9040] — v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 …. [15255] — v Shiers (2003) 7 VR 174 …. [15220] — v Shone (1983) 76 Cr App R 72 …. [31145], [35425] — v Shonias (1974) 21 CCC (2d) 301 …. [17280] — v Shore (1988) 89 Cr App R 32 …. [21170] — v Shrimpton (1851) 2 Den 319; 169 ER 521 …. [19140], [19145] — v Shum (1968) 62 QJPR 35 …. [17305], [17315] — v — [1968] QWN 7 …. [17305], [17315] — v Sica (2012) 224 A Crim R 146 …. [33660] — v Sidhu (1992) 98 Cr App R 59 …. [21050] — v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 …. [17325], [17565] — v Sievers [1983] 2 Qd R 170 …. [19090] — v Silley [1964] QWN 45 …. [11060] — v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 …. [29060], [39105] — v Sim [1987] 1 NZLR 356 …. [39105] — v Simmonds (1967) 51 Cr App R 316 …. [17185] — v — [1969] 1 QB 685; [1967] 2 All ER 399 …. [1320], [17180], [17495] — v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81; 93 A Crim R 32 …. [11035],
[13050], [13055], [13275] — v Simons (1834) 6 Car & P 540; 172 ER 1355 …. [33430] — v Simpson (1993) 99 Cr App R 48 …. [21100] — v — [1983] 3 All ER 789; [1983] 1 WLR 1494 …. [3020], [3145] — v Sims [1946] KB 531; [1946] 1 All ER 697 …. [1085], [21015], [21025], [21115], [21170] — v — [1967] Qd R 432 …. [1520], [21040] — v Sinclair (1905) 25 NZLR 266 …. [17090] — v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31 …. [11125], [29200] — v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 …. [17185], [17200] — v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397 …. [11125], [35440] — v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 535 …. [17615], [19170] — v Sioui [1990] 1 SCR 1025; (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 427 …. [33845] — v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 …. [1280], [1300], [33735] — v SJB (2002) 129 A Crim R 572 …. [17295] — v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86 …. [1295] — v Skafte (1940) 58 WN (NSW) 9 …. [15035] — v Skinner (1993) 99 Cr App R 212 …. [17170] — v Skirving [1985] QB 819; [1985] 2 All ER 705 …. [29050], [29110] — v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314 …. [17505], [17510] — v Slaney (1832) 5 C & P 213; 172 ER 944 …. [25120], [39100] — v Slater [1995] 1 Cr App R 584 …. [1390] — v Sleeman (1853) 7 Cox CC 245 …. [33640] — v Slobodian (1982) 30 SASR 161 …. [17580] — v Slocombe [1991] Crim LR 198 …. [27130] — v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 …. [15160], [15220], [15255], [33735]
— v Smallman (1914) 10 Cr App R 1 …. [17505] — v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265 …. [35340] — v Smellie (1919) 14 Cr App R 128 …. [13070] — v Smith (1783) 1 Leach 288; 168 ER 247 …. [5210] — v — (1865) 34 LJMC 153 …. [9115] — v — (1897) 18 Cox CC 470 …. [33475] — v — (1908) 1 Cr App R 203 …. [1360] — v — (1909) 2 Cr App R 86 …. [17375], [39105] — v — (1910) 6 Cr App R 19 …. [7075] — v — (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 …. [21105], [21165] — v — (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268; 65 WN (NSW) 101 …. [17650], [17665], [17700], [17715] — v — (1968) 52 Cr App R 648 …. [39105] — v — (1983) 33 SASR 558 …. [1370] — v — (1985) 20 A Crim R 130 …. [9035] — v — (1985) 81 Cr App R 286 …. [15225], [33435] — v — (1986) 85 Cr App R 197 …. [1380], [1425], [11095] — v — (1987) 7 NSWLR 444 …. [1445] — v — (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 …. [1295], [1305], [33570], [33770] — v — (1992) 58 SASR 491 …. [33660] — v — (1996) 16 WAR 205 …. [27255] — v — (1999) 47 NSWLR 419 …. [29001], [29165] — v — (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 …. [29205] — v — [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 All ER 193 …. [33615], [33640], [33645] — v — [1961] 3 All ER 972 …. [33680] — v — [1964] NSWR 537 …. [15205]
— v — [1964] VR 217 …. [9030] — v — [1964] VR 95 …. [33690], [33765] — v — [1968] 2 All ER 115; [1968] 1 WLR 636 …. [17075] — v — [1976] Crim LR 511 …. [31195] — v — [1979] 3 All ER 605; [1979] 1 WLR 1445 …. [29050] — v — [1981] 1 NSWLR 193 …. [3180] — v — [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 …. [1445], [1450], [31185] — v — [1985] Crim LR 590 …. [25095] — v — [1987] VR 907 …. [1400], [29050] — v — [1989] Crim LR 900 …. [23210] — v — [1992] 2 SCR 915; (1992) 94 DLR (4th) 590 …. [35500] — v — [2005] 2 All ER 29; [2005] 1 WLR 704 …. [27215] — v Smith (No 2) (1994) 64 SASR 1 …. [17380] — v Smith (Peter) [2011] 2 Cr App R 16 …. [1230], [29115] — v Smith, Turner & Altintas (1994) 63 SASR 123 …. [27305], [33570], [33700], [33725] — v SMS [1992] Crim LR 310 …. [19090] — v Smyth [1963] VR 737 …. [7030] — v Snaresbrook Crown Court; Ex parte DPP [1988] QB 532 …. [25290] — v Sneesby [1951] St R Qd 26 …. [15090] — v Snow (1915) 20 CLR 315 …. [3158] — v Sodo (1975) 61 Cr App R 131 …. [29075] — v Solomon (1958) 25 WWR 307 …. [17480] — v — (2005) 92 SASR 331; 192 FLR 421 …. [1305], [1445], [17130], [29185] — v Solomons (1959) (2) SA 352 …. [21115]
— v Soma (2001) 122 A Crim R 537 …. [17535], [17630] — v — (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421 …. [1675], [11140], [17090], [17120], [17530], [17535], [17620], [17650], [17655] — v Somers [1963] 3 All ER 808; [1963] 1 WLR 1306 …. [29060] — v — [1999] Crim LR 744 …. [19030] — v Sopher (1992) 74 A Crim R 21 …. [29075] — v Sorby [1986] VR 753 …. [9035], [9040], [15180], [15255], [33570] — v Sorgenfrie (1981) 51 FLR 147 …. [17545] — v Sossi [1986] WAR 163 …. [13275] — v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119 …. [21035], [21257] — v Sotheren (2001) 122 A Crim R 301 …. [21050] — v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 …. [17405] — v South Ribble Magistrates; Ex parte Cochrane [1996] 2 Cr App R 544 …. [17195] — v South Worcestershire Magistrates; Ex parte Lilley [1995] 4 All ER 186; [1995] 1 WLR 1595 …. [1030] — v Southon (2003) 85 SASR 436; 139 A Crim R 250 …. [1395] — v Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178 …. [17175], [31195] — v Sparrow (2009) 104 SASR 320 …. [1380], [17495] — v — [1973] 2 All ER 129; [1973] 1 WLR 488 …. [17335], [23030], [23035], [33455] — v Speechley [2005] Crim LR 811 …. [11105] — v Spencer (2000) 113 A Crim R 252 …. [33745] — v — [1985] QB 771; [1985] 1 All ER 673 …. [13065], [15070] — v — [1987] 1 AC 128; [1986] 2 All ER 928 …. [15160], [15180] — v Spens [1991] 4 All ER 421; [1991] 1 WLR 624 …. [11010] — v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225 …. [1385], [1400]
— v Sperotto (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334; 92 WN (NSW) 223 …. [7030] — v Spiby (1990) 91 Cr App R 186 …. [1180], [1315] — v Spilsbury (1835) 7 C & P 187; 173 ER 82 …. [33295], [33660] — v Spinks [1982] 1 All ER 587 …. [5210], [33495], [33520] — v Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369 …. [17130] — v Spooner [1957] VR 540; [1957] ALR 1056 …. [29130] — v Spratt [1980] 2 All ER 269; [1980] 1 WLR 554 …. [11140] — v Spring [1958] NZLR 468 …. [33490], [33505] — v Spurge [1961] 2 QB 205; [1961] 2 All ER 688 …. [7160] — v ST (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 …. [15210] — v St George (1840) 9 Car & P 483; 173 ER 921 …. [17615] — v St Louis (1984) 79 Cr App R 53 …. [23315] — v St Martin’s, Leicester (1834) 2 Ad & E 210; 111 ER 81 …. [17225] — v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392 …. [33675], [33740], [33760] — v — [1968] 3 All ER 752 …. [9020] — v Staines (1974) 60 Cr App R 160 …. [1220] — v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 …. [19125], [19130], [19145], [21140], [23275] — v Stamford [1972] 2 QB 391; [1972] 2 All ER 430 …. [29050], [29110] — v Stanbouli (2003) 141 A Crim R 531 …. [3020] — v Stankovich (2004) 149 A Crim R 88 …. [27315] — v Stannard (1837) 7 C & P 673; 173 ER 295 …. [19120] — v — [1965] 2 QB 1; [1964] 1 All ER 34 …. [15160], [23375], [39105] — v Stanton (1911) 6 Cr App R 198 …. [33615] — v — [1994] Crim LR 834 …. [23315], [23355] — v Starecki [1960] VR 141 …. [33660]
— v Starkey [1988] 2 Qd R 294 …. [19090] — v Starr [1969] QWN 23 …. [33485] — v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 …. [13050], [1680], [15030] — v Statutory Visitors to St Lawrence’s Hospital, Caterham; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 2 All ER 766 …. [25305] — v Staub (1909) 2 Cr App R 6 …. [15025] — v Stavrinos (2003) 140 A Crim R 594 …. [33770] — v Stead [1994] 1 Qd R 665 …. [27300], [27310] — v Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633 …. [1880] — v Stehbens (1976) 14 SASR 240 …. [9070] — v Stephens [1999] 3 NZLR 81 …. [39105] — v Stephenson (1978) 18 SASR 381 …. [15170] — v — [1976] VR 376 …. [1530] — v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120 …. [19085] — v Sterk [1972] Crim LR 391 …. [17125] — v Stevens [1995] Crim LR 649 …. [21050] — v Stevenson [1971] 1 All ER 678; [1971] 1 WLR 739 …. [1315] — v Stewart (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 33 …. [17265] — v — (1972) 56 Cr App R 272 …. [33660], [33750] — v — (1986) 83 Cr App R 327 …. [15100] — v — (1989) 89 Cr App R 273 …. [3130] — v — (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 …. [15260] — v — [1970] 1 All ER 689; [1970] 1 WLR 907 …. [33700] — v — [1993] 2 Qd R 322 …. [15125] — v Stewart (Eric) [2009] 3 NZLR 425 …. [17065] — v Stewart; Ex parte A-G [1989] 1 Qd R 590 …. [9110], [11100] — v Stimpson (1826) 2 Car & P 415; 172 ER 188 …. [17650]
— v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326 …. [17130] — v Stipendiary Magistrate [1993] 2 Qd R 687 …. [17155], [27130] — v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 …. [1370], [29050], [29110] — v Stones [1956] SR (NSW) 25 …. [7030] — v Storey (1968) 52 Cr App R 334 …. [17335], [33455] — v — (1978) 140 CLR 364; 22 ALR 47 …. [5135], [5150], [5155], [5215], [23215] — v — [1998] 1 VR 359 …. [9070] — v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370 …. [1360] — v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346 …. [11100] — v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 602 …. [17275] — v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911; [1952] 2 All ER 657 …. [21035], [21040], [21100], [21110], [21165], [21175], [33690] — v Strand Electric [1969] 1 OR 190 …. [33540] — v Stratton (1909) 3 Cr App R 255 …. [23315] — v Strausz (1977) 17 SASR 197 …. [33480] — v Strawbridge [1970] NZLR 909 …. [7030] — v Strawhorn (2008) 185 A Crim R 326 …. [15160] — v Stretton (1986) 86 Cr App R 7 …. [17480] — v Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App R 318 …. [9120] — v Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48 …. [23270] — v Stroner (1845) 1 Car & Kir 650; 174 ER 676 …. [17125] — v Strudwick (1993) 99 Cr App R 326 …. [15220], [33435] — v Stubbs (2009) 228 FLR 221 …. [27310] — v — [1982] 1 All ER 424; [1982] 1 WLR 509 …. [17485] — v Su (2003) 7 VR 13 …. [33780] — v — [1997] 1 VR 1 …. [17120], [21215], [33455], [33565], [33595]
— v Sugarman (1935) 25 Cr App R 109 …. [23145] — v Sullivan (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) (L) 131 …. [1290] — v — (1887) 16 Cox CC 347 …. [33420] — v — (1966) 51 Cr App R 102 …. [33770] — v — [1923] 1 KB 74; [1922] All ER Rep 431 …. [17105], [17650] — v — [1970] Tas SR 284 (NC) 5 …. [39105] — v — [1971] 1 QB 253 …. [1155] — v Sultana (1994) 74 A Crim R 27 …. [21195] — v Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059 …. [9020] — v — [1990] 1 Qd R 92 …. [9030] — v Sumner (2013) 117 SASR 271 …. [37060] — v — [1935] VLR 197; [1935] ALR 350 …. [15020] — v Suratan [2004] Crim LR 943 …. [29075] — v Surgenor [1940] 2 All ER 249 …. [13065] — v Surrey [2005] 2 Qd R 81 …. [1220] — v Suteski (2002) 128 A Crim R 275 …. [31085], [35455], [35505] — v — (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 …. [11125], [35455], [35500], [35505], [35510] — v Sutton (1816) 4 M & S 532; 105 ER 931 …. [33355] — v — (1982) 32 SASR 203 …. [33760] — v — (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 …. [15220], [33435] — v — (1991) 94 Cr App R 70 …. [17245] — v — [1986] 2 Qd R 72 …. [11095], [11100] — v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553 …. [21080] — v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159; 151 ALR 98 …. [11125], [27305], [33595], [33760], [33765] — v Swanston (1982) 33 BCLR (3d) 385 …. [31185]
— v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71 …. [7085], [17435], [17460] — v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 …. [17505], [19020] — v Sykes [1997] Crim LR 752 …. [1245] — v Sykes and Campi (No 1) [1969] VR 631 …. [33660], [33715] — v Syme (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 284 …. [27215] — v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70 …. [23345] — v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504; 2 A Crim R 321 …. [17250], [17605], [17615], [31095], [33710], [33725] — v T (1996) 86 A Crim R 293 …. [21243] — v — (1998) 71 SASR 265 …. [11035], [13055], [13275] — v — (1999) 74 SASR 486 …. [17295] — v — (2001) 122 A Crim R 206 …. [33750] — v — [1993] 1 Qd R 454 …. [13060] — v — [1998] 2 NZLR 257 …. [7085] — v T, T (2004) 90 SASR 567 …. [13165] — v T, Western Australia (2013) 118 SASR 382 …. [17135], [17550] — v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444 …. [1520], [17505] — v Taber (2007) 170 A Crim R 427 …. [35480] — v Taggart (1979) 1 Cr App R 144 …. [9070] — v Taha (2000) 120 A Crim R 161 …. [1125] — v Tait (1979) 46 FLR 386 …. [9070] — v — [1963] VR 520 …. [17055], [17075] — v — [1992] 2 NZLR 666 …. [29050] — v Taka [1992] 2 NZLR 129 …. [3130], [27215] — v Tamblyn [1967] SASR 140 …. [11140] — v Tanda (1986) 43 SASR 161 …. [17270] — v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 …. [1370], [29050], [29185],
[29195], [29200] — v — [1998] 3 VR 508; (1997) 149 ALR 534 …. [27255], [33780] — v Tanner (1977) 66 Cr App R 56 …. [23315] — v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69 …. [27315] — v Tarantino (1993) 67 A Crim R 31 …. [15160] — v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378 …. [9040] — v Tate [1908] 2 KB 680 …. [33770] — v Tatham (1921) 15 Cr App R 132 …. [15095] — v Taufua BC9605430 …. [1450] — v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213 …. [15165], [15170], [15240] — v — (2008) 2 ACTLR 216 …. [1450] — v — (1961) (3) SA 616 …. [37075] — v — [1978] Crim LR 92 …. [33495] — v — [1993] 1 NZLR 647 …. [1305] — v — [1999] 2 Cr App R 163 …. [13085], [23345] — v Te Kira [1993] 3 NZLR 257 …. [11075] — v Te Whiu & Buckton [1964] NZLR 748 …. [1245] — v Teasdale (2004) 145 A Crim R 345 …. [17120] — v Tedjame-Mortty [2011] Crim LR 676 …. [17135] — v Teitler [1959] VR 312 …. [15075] — v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132 …. [19125] — v Templeton [1956] VLR 709; [1956] ALR 706 …. [1175] — v Terry [2005] QB 996 …. [5215] — v Tetlow (1986) 27 A Crim R 198 …. [21035] — v Teys (2001) 161 FLR 44 …. [21252], [33690] — v Thatcher [1969] 1 All ER 998 …. [27135]
— v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte the Western Australian National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190; 23 ALR 439 …. [3156] — v The United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Co (Ltd) (1862) 3 F & F 73; 176 ER 33 …. [1280] — v Theodosi [1993] RTR 179 …. [29070] — v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216 …. [27095], [27255], [27310] — v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 …. [1370], [1440], [21050], [21070], [21180] — v Thomas (1836) 7 Car & P 345; 173 ER 154 …. [33625] — v — (1948) 33 Cr App R 74 …. [21040] — v — (1957) SR (NSW) 292 (CCA) …. [19140] — v — (1988) 40 A Crim R 89 …. [15090] — v — (2006) 14 VR 475 …. [33665], [33780] — v — [1933] 2 KB 489; [1933] All ER Rep 726 …. [27215] — v — [1959] 3 All ER 522; [1959] 1 WLR 1086 …. [11140], [15255] — v — [1970] VR 674 …. [11070], [33480], [33490], [33570] — v — [1986] Crim LR 682 …. [1290] — v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21 …. [1450] — v Thompson (1783) 1 Leach 291; 168 ER 248 …. [33640] — v — (1872) LR 1 CCR 377 …. [13110], [13185] — v — (1974) 16 CCC (2d) 374 …. [33490] — v — (1975) 11 SASR 217 …. [9070] — v — (1976) 64 Cr App R 96 …. [17385] — v — (1992) 57 SASR 397 …. [15110] — v — (2002) 130 A Crim R 24 …. [17135] — v — (2008) 21 VR 135 …. [17460]
— v — [1893] 2 QB 12; [1891] All ER Rep 376 …. [11075], [33620], [33625], [33675] — v — [1962] 1 All ER 65 …. [27215] — v — [1964] QWN 25 …. [17375] — v — [1966] 1 All ER 505; [1966] 1 WLR 405 …. [23270] — v — [1966] QWN 47 …. [19120], [19130], [19135] — v — [1967] Crim LR 62 …. [17055] — v — [1975] Crim LR 34 …. [17335] — v — [1982] QB 647; [1982] 1 All ER 907 …. [33795] — v — [1983] 1 Qd R 224 …. [15195] — v — [1995] 2 Cr App R 589 …. [19155] — v — [1995] 3 NZLR 423 …. [17535], [17545] — v — [2006] 2 NZLR 577 …. [17505] — v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 …. [17430], [37115], [37120] — v Thonemann (1915) 9 QJP 31 …. [17090] — v Thorne (1977) 66 Cr App R 6 …. [19030] — v Thornhill (1838) 8 C & P 575; 173 ER 624 …. [3175] — v Thornton [1995] 1 Cr App R 578 …. [1390] — v — (1967 unreported) …. [7050] — v Threlfall (1914) 10 Cr App R 112 …. [15020] — v Thrower [1934] VLR 292 …. [17045] — v Thynne [1977] VR 98 …. [17160], [17380], [17390], [17425], [17535] — v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462 …. [13070], [17295] — v Tikos (No 2) [1963] VR 306 …. [11135] — v Tilev (1983) 33 SASR 344 …. [27255] — v Tilley [1961] 3 All ER 406; [1961] 1 WLR 1309 …. [39105]
— v — [1985] VR 505 …. [29050] — v Tillott (1991) 53 A Crim R 46 …. [9035] — v — (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 …. [17175] — v Tipene (2001 unreported) …. [1370] — v Tirado (1974) 59 Cr App R 80 …. [35205], [35360], [35425] — v Tissington (1843) 1 Cox CC 48 …. [19075] — v Titijewski [1970] VR 371 …. [17545] — v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 …. [35525] — v TJW [1989] 1 Qd R 108 …. [35425] — v TJW; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 456 …. [1170] — v TM [2000] 2 Cr App R 266 …. [21050] — v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129 …. [15135], [17290] — v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264 …. [1450] — v Tobin [1978] 1 NZLR 423 …. [29075] — v — [2003] Crim LR 408 …. [19005] — v Todd (1980) 72 Cr App R 299 …. [33690] — v Tofilau (2003) 13 VR 1 …. [33635] — v Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 13 VR 28 …. [11055], [27305], [33635] — v Toia [1982] 1 NZLR 555 …. [3150], [15220] — v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 …. [21050], [21252], [35495], [35500], [35532] — v Tolson (1864) 4 F & F 103; 176 ER 488 …. [1280], [29095], [31195] — v Tomes [1917] VLR 78; (1917) 23 ALR 30 …. [41040] — v Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 …. [25025], [27300] — v Ton (2002) 123 A Crim R 340 …. [15160] — v Toner (1991) 93 Cr App R 382 …. [29050]
— v — [1966] QWN 44 …. [11060], [25105] — v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 …. [1645], [17350], [29070], [29105], [29125], [37140] — v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170; 38 ALR 439 …. [27065] — v Tooke (1794) 25 St Tr 344 …. [21210], [37085] — v — (1989) 90 Cr App R 417 …. [17335] — v Tooma [1971] Qd R 212 …. [15215] — v Toomey [1969] Tas SR 99 …. [11060], [23140] — v Townsend [1987] Crim LR 411 …. [31175] — v TQ (2007) 173 A Crim R 385 …. [35410] — v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361; [1970] ALR 449 …. [3158] — v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 …. [29075] — v — (2006) 96 SASR 8 …. [23025] — v — (2009) 198 A Crim R 23 …. [15160] — v — (2011) 109 SASR 595 …. [7085] — v — [2000] 2 Qd R 430 …. [1400] — v Travers (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 85; 74 WN (NSW) 484 …. [1300], [25180], [33640] — v Treacy [1944] 2 All ER 229 …. [11060], [17430], [33595], [33660] — v Tregear [1967] 2 QB 574; [1967] 1 All ER 989 …. [17090], [17095], [17475], [17650] — v Trickett (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 110 …. [17505] — v — [1981] Crim LR 331 …. [33740] — v Tricoglus (1976) 65 Cr App R 16 …. [21025], [21180] — v Triffett (1992) 1 Tas R 293 …. [5210] — v Trigg [1963] 1 All ER 490; [1963] 1 WLR 305 …. [15125]
— v Trimarchi (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451; 49 WN (NSW) 157 …. [17090], [17125] — v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 …. [9035], [19120], [19125], [19130], [19135] — v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 …. [15175], [15210], [15220] — v Tripodina (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 …. [1645] — v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 …. [17175] — v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 …. [15250], [17065], [17240], [17550], [17570], [17575] — v — (1992) 58 SASR 223 …. [33690], [33760] — v — [1977] Tas SR 133 …. [17535] — v Trump (1979) 70 Cr App R 300 …. [33625] — v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 …. [11125], [27315], [35615], [35620] — v Trupedo (1920) AD 58 …. [1245] — v Tsingopoulos [1964] VR 676 …. [1290] — v TSR (2002) 133 A Crim R 54 …. [17130], [17705], [19135] — v Tucker (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 504 …. [1830] — v — [1907] SALR 30 …. [1320] — v — [1994] Crim LR 683 …. [15220] — v Tuegel [2000] 2 All ER 872 …. [17135] — v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 …. [1380], [1880], [11100], [11125] — v Tune (1944) 29 Cr App R 162 …. [33770] — v Turnbull (1984) 80 Cr App R 104 …. [37060] — v — (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 …. [15090], [15095] — v — [1907] VLR 11; (1906) 12 ALR 551 …. [1175] — v — [1958] Tas SR 80 …. [27095]
— v — [1977] QB 224; [1976] 3 All ER 549 …. [1355], [1390], [1395], [11100], [15160], [15210] — v — [1988] 2 Qd R 266 …. [15100] — v Turner (1664) 6 St Tr 565 …. [19105] — v — (1816) 105 ER 1026; 5 M & S 206 …. [7140], [7160], [7180] — v — (1817) 32 St Tr 957 …. [19120], [19145] — v — [1814] All ER Rep 713; (1832) 168 ER 1298; 1 Mood 347 …. [5210] — v — (1975) 12 SASR 373 …. [1240] — v — (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 …. [3200], [13085], [31155], [33045], [33540], [33550] — v — (1975) 61 Cr App Rep 67 …. [3175] — v — (1977) 16 SASR 444 …. [17065] — v — (2000) 76 SASR 163 …. [1400], [31185] — v — (2001) 126 A Crim R 160 …. [33610] — v — [1910] 1 KB 346; [1908] All ER Rep Ext 1206 …. [33460], [39050] — v — [1944] KB 463; [1944] 1 All ER 599 …. [19075], [23320] — v — [1975] QB 834; [1975] 1 All ER 70 …. [3285], [19005], [19045], [19050], [19155], [29045], [29050], [29065], [29070], [29150], [31155], [31165], [33825] — v — [1995] 3 All ER 432; [1995] 1 WLR 264 …. [17130], [27130] — v Turner (No 17) (2002) 10 Tas R 388 …. [41130] — v Turney (1990) 52 SASR 438 …. [21065], [21090] — v Turnsek [1967] VR 610 …. [15125], [15250] — v Tween [1965] VR 687 …. [5065] — v Twiss [1918] 2 KB 853 …. [21065] — v Twist [1954] VLR 121 …. [33485], [33770], [37155]
— v Twitchell [2000] 1 Cr App R 373 …. [19030] — v TY (2006) 12 VR 557 …. [15220] — v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675 …. [15095] — v Tyndale [1999] Crim LR 320 …. [17285] — v TZ (2011) 214 A Crim R 316 …. [19135] — v UB (2007) 178 A Crim R 450 …. [21050] — v Uduma (2013) 115 SASR 318; 63 MVR 130 …. [29050], [29150] — v Ugle (1989) 43 A Crim R 423 …. [17290] — v Ugochukwu (2003) 138 A Crim R 544 …. [15220] — v Ugolini (1989) 51 SASR 303 …. [19085] — v Uittenbusch (2012) 219 A Crim R 562 …. [35660] — v Ul-Haque (2007) 177 A Crim R 348 …. [35615] — v Uljee [1982] 1 NZLR 561 …. [25025] — v Umanski [1961] VR 242 …. [17535], [19035] — v Umbleby (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 154 …. [1680] — v Umoh (1986) 84 Cr App R 138 …. [25245] — v Ung (2000) 173 ALR 287 …. [35435] — v Upchurch (1836) 1 Mood 465; 168 ER 1346 …. [33635] — v Upton (2007) 209 FLR 487 …. [27310] — v Urbano (1983) 9 A Crim R 170 …. [17395], [17545] — v Utans (1982) 29 SASR 592 …. [11095], [17130] — v Uxbridge Justices; Ex parte Sofaer (1986) 85 Cr App R 367 …. [1275] — v Vaitos (1981) 4 A Crim R 238 …. [21020], [21185] — v Vale (2001) 120 A Crim R 322 …. [27305] — v Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 …. [17270] — v Vallance [1955] NZLR 811 …. [15220]
— v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n …. [17180], [17185], [17200] — v — (1973) 4 SASR 353 …. [1320], [9035], [9040], [33485] — v Van den Hoek (1985) 17 A Crim R 191 …. [37060] — v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568 …. [7085] — v Van Vreden (1973) 57 Cr App R 818 …. [31120] — v Vandine [1968] 1 NSWR 417 …. [33500], [33690], [33770] — v Varley (1914) 10 Cr App R 125 …. [1360], [1375], [1380], [1415] — v — [1982] 2 All ER 519 …. [23380] — v Vassilief (1967) 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 445 …. [9005] — v Vaughan (No 2) (2009) 105 SASR 532 …. [1490] — v Vawdrey (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 …. [9020], [15260] — v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420 …. [17405] — v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 …. [17235], [17240], [17245] — v — [1938] St R Qd 289 …. [1360] — v Veneman [1970] SASR 506 …. [33610] — v Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458 …. [27310] — v Verelst (1813) 3 Camp 432; 170 ER 1435 …. [1175] — v Vernell [1953] VLR 590; [1953] ALR 1139 …. [11035] — v Vernon [1962] Crim LR 35 …. [15095] — v Verolla [1963] 1 QB 285; [1962] 2 All ER 426 …. [13115] — v Veverka [1978] 1 NSWLR 478 …. [11135] — v Victor (1965) (1) SA 249 …. [33570] — v Vidic (1986) 43 SASR 176 …. [37155] — v Viljoen (1947) (2) SA 56 …. [15235] — v Vinayagamoorthy (2008) 200 A Crim R 186 …. [29050] — v Vincent (2002) 133 A Crim R 206 …. [9130], [35450]
— v Vincent, Frost and Edwards (1840) 9 Car & P 275; 173 ER 833 …. [37090] — v Vine Street Police Station Superintendent; Ex parte Liebmann [1916] 1 KB 268 …. [3020] — v Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73; [1982] 1 WLR 1138 …. [11120], [19085], [19090], [21235] — v Virgo (1978) 67 Cr App R 323 …. [17245] — v Visser [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 …. [1675] — v Vivian [1979] 1 All ER 48; [1979] 1 WLR 291 …. [1045] — v VN (2006) 15 VR 113; 162 A Crim R 195 …. [1170], [13275], [15220], [21050] — v Vogelle (1970) 3 CCC 171 …. [33460] — v Voisin [1918] 1 KB 531; [1918] All ER Rep 491 …. [23025], [27290], [33680] — v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 …. [21050] — v Von Aspern [1964] VR 91 …. [33715] — v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207 …. [19095], [21065], [29090], [31095] — v Von Rijssen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 …. [17460] — v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 …. [17705], [21050] — v Voss [1963] VR 22 …. [1375] — v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 …. [23150], [23250], [27310] — v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241; [1993] 1 WLR 471 …. [19110], [19135] — v W [1988] 2 Qd R 308 …. [33745], [33750] — v — [1996] 1 Qd R 573 …. [17270] — v — [1998] 2 Qd R 531 …. [21050] — v W, GC (2006) 96 SASR 301 …. [25340] — v Wackerow [1998] 1 Qd R 197 …. [21035], [21050]
— v Wadey (1935) 25 Cr App R 104 …. [23210] — v Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox CC 171 …. [31065], [37115], [37120] — v — (1925) 19 Cr App R 52 …. [1380], [1415] — v — [1998] Crim LR 665 …. [23315] — v Wakefield (1827) 2 Lew CC 279; 168 ER 1154 …. [13035] — v — [1957] VR 547; [1957] ALR 1063 …. [11140] — v Wakeley [1994] 2 Qd R 196 …. [15160] — v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78 …. [11065], [33650] — v Walczuk [1965] QWN 50 …. [15125], [15255] — v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204 …. [19145], [23215] — v Walesby [1919] NZLR 289 …. [17265], [17275] — v Wallace (1931) 23 Cr App R 32 …. [1140], [11140] — v — (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 21 …. [1290] — v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 …. [13060], [17090], [17095], [17275], [17335] — v Walpole (1979) 1 A Crim R 392 …. [39045] — v Walsh [1981] Qd R 589 …. [17715] — v Walshe (1982) 74 Cr App R 85 …. [1390] — v Wang [2005] 1 All ER 782; [2005] 1 WLR 661 …. [11135] — v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433 …. [1195], [7255] — v — (2006) 95 SASR 226 …. [15160] — v Wanhalla [2007] 2 NZLR 573; (2006) 22 CRNZ 843 …. [9030] — v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 …. [17265] — v Wannell (1922) 17 Cr App R 53 …. [17275] — v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228; 39 ALR 533 …. [1010] — v Warasta (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 …. [19125]
— v Ward (1848) 2 Car & Kir 759; 175 ER 319 …. [17130] — v — (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 …. [25235], [29140] — v — [1963] Qd R 56 …. [21115] — v — [1993] 2 All ER 577; [1993] 1 WLR 619 …. [17130], [29050], [29075] — v — [2001] Crim LR 316 …. [31135], [33810] — v Warden of the Fleet (1698) 12 Mod 337; 88 ER 1363 …. [5185] — v Ware (1994) 73 A Crim R 17 …. [15090] — v Warickshall (1783) 1 Leach 263; 168 ER 234 …. [27280], [33620] — v Warner (1988) 48 SASR 79 …. [33640], [33645] — v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671 …. [19090], [33690] — v Warren [1971] SASR 316 …. [23325], [23345] — v — [1982] 2 NSWLR 360 …. [33675], [33750] — v Warsap (2010) 106 SASR 264 …. [15140] — v Washer (1948) 92 CCC 218 …. [33660] — v Wassa (1987) 45 SASR 297 …. [33485], [33770] — v Waters (2002) 129 A Crim R 115 …. [35620] — v Wati [1985] 1 NZLR 236 …. [11095] — v Watson [1814] All ER Rep 334; (1817) 171 ER 591; 2 Stark 116 …. [1410], [17155], [19045], [25040], [27130], [39015] — v — (1913) 8 Cr App R 249 …. [23320] — v — (1944) 81 CCC 212 …. [1415] — v — (1996) 108 CCC (3d) 310 …. [3275] — v — [1980] 2 All ER 293; [1980] 1 WLR 991 …. [1880], [11045] — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 440 …. [29050] — v Watt (1905) 20 Cox CC 852 …. [33435] — v Wattam (1952) 36 Cr App R 72 …. [23270], [33690]
— v Watts (1980) 71 Cr App R 136 …. [1155] — v — [1983] 3 All ER 101 …. [1520], [23285] — v — [1992] 1 Qd R 214 …. [1305] — v Waugh [1983] NZLR 248 …. [1520] — v Waye (1984) 14 A Crim R 391 …. [15195] — v Wayte (1982) 76 Cr App R 110 …. [1090], [39005] — v WB (2009) 23 VR 319 …. [17175], [17270], [17285] — v Weatherall (1981) 27 SASR 238 …. [3070], [35360], [35365] — v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 …. [17555], [17575] — v Weaver (1873) LR 2 CCR 85 …. [33810] — v — [1968] 1 QB 353; [1967] 1 All ER 277 …. [23145] — v WEB (2003) 7 VR 200 …. [17295] — v Webb (1914) 16 DLR 317 …. [1645] — v — (1992) 59 SASR 563 …. [7085] — v — [1975] Crim LR 159 …. [17170] — v Webbe [1926] SASR 108 …. [15100] — v Webster [1974] VR 457 …. [11095] — v Webster (dec’d) [1974] 3 All ER 822; [1974] 1 WLR 1641 …. [39115] — v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 …. [9040], [15220], [19135], [33455] — v Weetra (1993) 93 NTR 8 …. [33745] — v — (2010) 108 SASR 232 …. [33455] — v Wehlow (2001) 122 A Crim R 63 …. [15220] — v Wei Tang (2007) 16 VR 454; 172 A Crim R 224 …. [17135] — v Weighill [1945] 2 DLR 471 …. [11055] — v Weightman (1990) 92 Cr App R 291 …. [29050]
— v — [1978] 1 NZLR 79 …. [13085], [15090] — v Weir [1973] Qd R 496 …. [33760] — v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388 …. [15085], [17135], [33710] — v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93 …. [15255] — v Welch [1992] Crim LR 568 …. [33485] — v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 …. [17370], [17670] — v Wells [1976] Crim LR 518 …. [33460] — v Wells Street Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Deakin [1980] AC 477; [1979] 2 All ER 497 …. [19095] — v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 …. [17290], [35440], [37140] — v — [1983] 1 Qd R 592 …. [9070] — v — [1999] 2 VR 62 …. [5210] — v Welstead [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 59 …. [1305] — v West (1890) 112 CC Ct Cas 725 …. [19145] — v — [1973] Qd R 338 …. [33500] — v — [1992] 1 Qd R 227 …. [13070] — v West London Coroner; Ex parte Gray [1988] QB 467; [1987] 2 All ER 129 …. [1050] — v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Kaminski [1983] Crim LR 40 …. [17660] — v West London Youth Court; Ex parte N [2000] 1 All ER 823 …. [33805] — v Westfall (1912) 7 Cr App R 176 …. [23310], [23315] — v Westfield Freezing Co Ltd [1951] NZLR 456 …. [1515], [11130] — v Weston [1924] VLR 166; (1924) 30 ALR 132 …. [15125] — v Weston-Super-Mare-Justices; Ex parte Townsend [1968] 3 All ER 225n …. [23355] — v Westwell [1976] 2 All ER 812 …. [17170]
— v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 …. [1450] — v Whalley (1847) 2 Car & K 376; 175 ER 155 …. [1295] — v Wharton [1998] Crim LR 668 …. [21180] — v Wheatland (1838) 8 C & P 238; 173 ER 476 …. [15020] — v Wheeler [1917] 1 KB 283; [1916] All ER Rep 1111 …. [13090] — v — [1967] 3 All ER 829; [1967] 1 WLR 1531 …. [7030] — v Whelan (1876) 4 WW & A’B (L) 264 …. [33295] — v — (1881) 14 Cox CC 595 …. [17535] — v Whiley (1804) 2 Leach 983; 168 ER 589 …. [1520], [21040] — v Whitaker [1914] 3 KB 1283 …. [33565] — v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 …. [29050] — v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 …. [1125], [29130] — v White (1908) 18 OLR 640 …. [33660] — v — (1922) 17 Cr App R 60 …. [17390] — v — (1976) 13 SASR 276 …. [11065], [33740] — v — (1987) 49 SASR 154 …. [3140] — v — (1989) 18 NSWLR 332 …. [19085], [19090] — v — (1989) 41 A Crim R 237 …. [37100] — v — (2003) 140 A Crim R 63 …. [17405] — v — (2003) 7 VR 442 …. [1030], [33570] — v — (2008) 188 A Crim R 565 …. [1400] — v — [1964] Crim LR 720 …. [33690] — v — [1969] VR 203 …. [23270], [23345] — v — [1970] QWN 46 …. [17375] — v White (No 5) (2012) 220 A Crim R 294 …. [27315], [33775] — v Whitehead (1848) 3 Car & Kir 202; 175 ER 521 …. [1530]
— v — (1866) LR 1 CCR 33 …. [13055], [13065] — v — (1897) 23 VLR 239 …. [37155] — v — [1929] 1 KB 99; [1928] All ER Rep 186 …. [15185], [15225], [33770] — v Whitford [1980] Tas R 98 …. [33690] — v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim 51 …. [17315], [35525] — v Whittaker [1924] 3 DLR 63 …. [1295], [39105] — v — [1925] 3 DLR 63 …. [1295] — v Whittingham (1988) 49 SASR 67 …. [13290] — v Whitton (1887) 21 SALR 80 …. [33275] — v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75; BC200601962 …. [35555] — v Wickham (1971) 55 Cr App R 199 …. [23025] — v — BC9101334 …. [21050] — v Wignall [1993] Crim LR 62 …. [23315] — v Wilbain (1863) 9 Cox CC 448 …. [39105] — v Wilband [1967] SCR 14 …. [29070] — v Wilbourne (1917) 12 Cr App R 280 …. [17270] — v Wild (1835) 1 Mood 452; 168 ER 1341 …. [33640] — v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189 …. [15220], [33435] — v Wiles [1982] Crim LR 669 …. [1315], [35425] — v Wilkes (1948) 77 CLR 511 …. [5145] — v Wilkins (1849) 4 Cox CC 92 …. [31155] — v Willett (2005) 156 A Crim R 214 …. [15100] — v Williams (1853) 6 Cox CC 343 …. [17190] — v — (1897) 3 ALR (CN) 24 …. [17090] — v — (1912) 8 Cr App R 84 …. [1360] — v — (1913) 8 Cr App R 133 …. [17375], [17395]
— v — (1968) 52 Cr App R 439 …. [33615] — v — (1976) 14 SASR 1 …. [33675], [33690], [33745] — v — (1977) 67 Cr App R 10 …. [33690] — v — (1978) 19 SASR 423 …. [15095] — v — (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 …. [19130], [19135] — v — (1986) 84 Cr App R 299 …. [21050], [21195] — v — (1992) 8 WAR 265 …. [33660], [33675], [33715] — v — (1994) 12 WAR 567 …. [33775] — v — (1999) 104 A Crim R 260 …. [11135] — v — (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 …. [35495], [35500] — v — [1954] SASR 216 …. [11140] — v — [1956] Crim LR 833 …. [1385] — v — [1959] NZLR 502 …. [33660] — v — [1970] 2 NSWR 41 …. [17120] — v — [1978] 1 NSWLR 674 …. [7295] — v — [1983] 2 VR 579 …. [1360], [11100] — v — [1987] 2 Qd R 777 …. [21050], [33435], [33485], [33595] — v — [1988] Crim LR 113 …. [27130] — v — [1988] VR 261 …. [15110] — v — [1993] Crim LR 448 …. [33610] — v — [2001] 1 Qd R 212 …. [15220] — v — [2001] 2 Qd R 442 …. [17375], [17565] — v — [2010] 1 Qd R 276 …. [15195] — v Williamson (1807) 3 C & P 635; 172 ER 579 …. [19145] — v — [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 …. [33455] — v Willie [1960] Qd R 525 …. [11050]
— v Willis (1872) 12 Cox CC 164 …. [1175] — v — [1916] 1 KB 933 …. [15110] — v — [1960] 1 All ER 331; [1960] 1 WLR 55 …. [31010], [31095] — v Willmot; Ex parte A-G [1987] 1 Qd R 53 …. [15020] — v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35 …. [33730] — v — [2012] 1 Cr App R 2 …. [17495] — v — [2012] Crim LR 565 …. [13070], [17435] — v Willshire (1881) 6 QBD 366 …. [1125], [7280] — v Wilmot (1988) 89 Cr App R 341 …. [1215], [17315], [21170], [25040] — v Wilson (1913) 9 Cr App R 124 …. [17150] — v — (1957) 41 Cr App R 226 …. [17095] — v — (1970) 64 QJPR 88 …. [17060] — v — (1973) 58 Cr App 438 …. [21090] — v — (1986) 42 SASR 203 …. [9030], [17270] — v — (1987) 47 SASR 287 …. [27265] — v — (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 …. [1220] — v — [1967] 2 QB 406; [1967] 1 All ER 797 …. [33635], [33640], [33675] — v — [1988] VR 673 …. [35340] — v — [1991] 2 NZLR 707 …. [1490], [5210] — v — [1992] 2 Qd R 174 …. [7085] — v — [1998] 2 Qd R 599 …. [17090] — v — [2009] Crim LR 193 …. [1115] — v Wilton (2013) 116 SASR 392 …. [27215] — v Windass (1988) 89 Cr App R 258 …. [17430] — v Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164; (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 …. [19140],
[19145], [23285] — v Wink (1834) 6 C & P 397; 172 ER 1293 …. [17265] — v Winkel (1911) 76 JP 191 …. [33680] — v Winner (1995) 79 A Crim R 528 …. [21210] — v Winslow (1860) 8 Cox CC 397 …. [21015] — v Winsor (1865) 4 F & F 363; 176 ER 600 …. [9005] — v Winter (1980) 74 Cr App R 16 …. [17485] — v Wishart (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 322 …. [1045] — v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 …. [1170], [15125], [15165], [15235], [21050] — v Woess [1945] VLR 190; [1945] ALR 259 …. [33640] — v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31 …. [33455], [37130] — v Wojtowicz (2005) 148 NTR 24 …. [17265], [35410] — v Wolverhampton Coroner; Ex parte McCurbin [1990] 2 All ER 759; [1990] 1 WLR 719 …. [1050] — v Wong [1977] 1 WWR 1 …. [17350] — v — [1986] Crim LR 683 …. [17375] — v Wood (1841) 5 Jur NS 225 …. [19145] — v — (1911) 7 Cr App Rep 56 …. [1200] — v — (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 …. [1315], [35425] — v — (1983) 76 Cr App R 23 …. [31075], [31120] — v — [1920] 2 KB 179; [1920] All ER Rep 137 …. [23215], [23290] — v — [1951] 2 All ER 112n …. [19170] — v — [1974] VR 117 …. [11095] — v — [1982] 2 NZLR 233 …. [3020], [3255] — v Woodall [1967] QWN 48 …. [33690] — v Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500; 168 ER 352 …. [33265]
— v — [1963] Crim LR 273 …. [17185] — v Woodhead (1847) 175 VR 216; 2 Car & K 520 …. [17115] — v — (1847) 2 Car & Kir 520; 175 ER 216 …. [17120] — v Wooding (1979) 70 Cr App R 256 …. [17135] — v Woods (1840) 1 Craw & D 439 …. [17615] — v — (2008) 102 SASR 422 …. [7085] — v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333; 61 WN (NSW) 219 …. [23275], [23290] — v Woolley (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 …. [15220] — v Workman (2004) 60 NSWLR 471 …. [27305], [27315] — v — [1963] 1 CCC 297 …. [1140] — v Wray [1971] SCR 272; (1970) 11 DLR (3d) 673 …. [27245] — v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 …. [17295], [21035], [21100], [21252] — v Wright (1821) Russ & Ry 456; 168 ER 897 …. [29105] — v — (1866) 4 F & F 967; 176 ER 869 …. [17545] — v — (1910) 5 Cr App R 131 …. [23315] — v — (1934) 25 Cr App R 35 …. [1415], [17130] — v — (1985) 19 A Crim R 17 …. [17145], [21115] — v — (1987) 90 Cr App R 91 …. [13060] — v — (1990) 49 A Crim R 462 …. [33485] — v — (1990) 90 Cr App R 325 …. [21100] — v — (1991) 60 A Crim R 215 …. [1390] — v — (1992) 60 A Crim R 215 …. [1400] — v — [1969] SASR 256 …. [11060], [23140] — v — [1980] VR 593 …. [13075], [25090], [29085], [29095], [29150], [33485], [33770]
— v — [1999] 3 VR 355 …. [1645] — v Wright (No 2) [1968] VR 174 …. [1360], [1400] — v WS (2000) 78 SASR 33 …. [13070] — v Wurch (1932) 40 Man R 328; [1932] 2 WWR 183; (1932) 58 CCC 204 …. [15220], [17600] — v Wurramara (2011) 254 FLR 136; 213 A Crim R 440 …. [33805] — v Wyatt [1972] VR 902 …. [33485], [33710] — v — [1990] Crim LR 343 …. [17480] — v X (1989) 91 Cr App R 36 …. [13050] — v Xinaris (1955) 43 Cr App R 30n …. [17130] — v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629 …. [1490], [17290], [35525] — v — (2013) 84 NSWLR 363 …. [21252] — v Y (1995) 81 A Crim R 446 …. [29050] — v Y, DB [2006] 96 SASR 180 …. [25340] — v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 …. [1040], [1090], [1125], [7280], [11075], [13030] — v Yalman [1998] 2 Cr App R 269 …. [21065] — v Yammine (2002) 132 A Crim R 44 …. [15260] — v Yates (1841) Car & M 132; 174 ER 441 …. [15020] — v — [1970] SASR 302 …. [15170], [15195], [17275], [23190] — v Yeates [1992] 1 NZLR 421 …. [1880] — v Yellow (1932) 96 JP 826 …. [17170] — v Yeo [1951] 1 All ER 864 …. [13115] — v Yewin (1811) 2 Camp 638n …. [1140] — v Yooyen (1991) 57 A Crim R 226 …. [27105] — v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 …. [25325], [27055] — v — [1923] SASR 35 …. [15075], [15170], [31155], [33480], [33810]
— v — [1953] 1 All ER 21 …. [1195], [15220] — v — [1964] 2 All ER 480; [1964] 1 WLR 717 …. [11100], [11105] — v — [1995] QB 324 …. [27215] — v — [1998] 1 VR 402 …. [5135], [5150], [21050] — v Yousry (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 …. [17545], [17550] — v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 …. [7030], [7050] — v Z [1990] 2 QB 355; [1990] 2 All ER 971 …. [13060] — v — [2000] 2 AC 483; [2000] 3 All ER 385 …. [5135], [5150], [21025], [21170] — v — [2003] 1 WLR 1489 …. [33595] — v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 …. [19110] — v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489 …. [11125] — v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 …. [33570], [33575] — v Zampogna (2003) 138 A Crim R 368 …. [33605] — v Zaphir [1978] Qd R 151 …. [1305] — v Zarezadeh [2011] Crim LR 588 …. [17135] — v Zaveckas [1970] 1 All ER 413 …. [33615], [33640] — v Zecevic [1986] VR 797 …. [7050], [19125] — v Zema [1970] VR 566 …. [33805] — v Zerafa [1935] St R Qd 227 …. [11050] — v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504 …. [21252] — v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 …. [15220] — v Zielinksi [1950] 2 All ER 1114 …. [15125], [17065] — v Zielinski (1950) 34 Cr App R 193 …. [15255] — v Zion [1986] VR 609 …. [25165], [33640] — v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 …. [15255], [17435] — v — [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 …. [17275], [17390]
— v Zuber (2010) 175 ACTR 1 …. [13070] — v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572 …. [1395], [33045] — v Zundel (1987) 35 DLR (4th) 338 …. [29150], [33845] R (AJ); R v (1994) 94 CCC (3d) 168 …. [17505] R (AS) v Great Yarmouth Youth Court [2012] Crim LR 478 …. [13070] R (Asif Javed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] QB 129 …. [27095] R (Bradley) v Work and Pensions Secretary (Attorney General Intervening) [2009] QB 114; [2008] 3 All ER 1116 …. [27095] R (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [2011] 2 AC 146 …. [5030] R (Cth) v Baladjam (No 38) (2008) 270 ALR 187 …. [35635] R (Firth) v Epping Justices [2011] 4 All ER 326; [2011] 1 Cr App Rep 387; [2011] 1 WLR 1818 …. [25120], [33755] R (Giant’s Causeway & c Tramway Co) v Justices of Antrim [1895] 2 Ir R 603 …. [3130] — v Justices of Co Antrim [1895] 2 IR 603 …. [3140] R (Hallinan Blackburn Gittings & Nott (a firm)) v Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall [2005] 1 WLR 766 …. [25290] R (Kelly) v Warley Magistrates’ Court (Law Society intervening) [2008] 1 WLR 2001 …. [25210], [25245] R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHSTrust [2004] QB 395 …. [5030] R (No 1); R v (1972) 9 CCC (2d) 274 …. [33750] R (on the application of Ford) v Financial Services Authority [2012] 1 All ER 1238 …. [25265] R (on the application of Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioners of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563; [2002] 3 All ER 1 …. [25280] R (Prudential plc) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2011] QB 669 …. [25245]
— v Special Commissioner of Taxation [2013] 2 All ER 247; [2013] 2 WLR 325 …. [25210], [25215], [25245] R J Winborne Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Re Beale (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 353 …. [7120] R(WV) v Crown Prosecution Service [2012] Crim LR 456 …. [27130] R, GJ; R v (2009) 105 SASR 506 …. [25340] R; R v (1989) 18 NSWLR 74 …. [11100] — [1977] 1 WLR 1256 …. [33840] — [1994] 4 All ER 260; [1994] 1 WLR 758 …. [25235] RA v R (2007) 175 A Crim R 221 …. [13060] Raabe; R v [1985] 1 Qd R 115 …. [3180] Rabbitt; R v (1931) 23 Cr App R 112 …. [17135] Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron BC9302077 …. [29125] Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88; 145 ALR 1 …. [17445] Rabey; R v (1977) 17 OR (2d) 1; 79 DLR (3d) 414 …. [29050] Rabin v Gerson Berger Assn Ltd [1986] 1 All ER 374; [1986] 1 WLR 526 …. [39250], [39295] — v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 All ER 247; [1954] 1 WLR 271 …. [25350], [25355] Racal Communications Ltd, Re [1981] AC 374; [1980] 2 All ER 634 …. [5030] Radakovic v R G Cram & Sons Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 751 …. [3135] Radbourne; R v (1787) 1 Leach 457; 168 ER 330 …. [33795] Radford; R v (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 …. [1660], [1675], [15255], [31045] Radio Ten Pty Ltd v Brisbane TV Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 113; (1984) 75 FLR 1 …. [1315]
Ragen; R v (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 572 …. [33735], [33740] Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300 …. [17130] Rajakaruna (No 2); R v (2006) 15 VR 592 …. [9035], [17460] Rajakaruna; R v (2004) 8 VR 340 …. [21170] Rajveer Singh v R (2011) 33 VR 1 …. [35520], [35525] Rak v Coles Myer Ltd (1996) 68 SASR 272 …. [1025] Rakay v MacFarlane (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 488 …. [5220] Ralph; R v (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 …. [11125], [15170] Ram; R v [2007] 3 NZLR 322 …. [11060], [33595] Ramadge v Ryan (1832) 9 Bing 333; 131 ER 640 …. [29050] Ramasamy; R v [1965] AC 1 …. [27285] Ramey v R (1994) 68 ALJR 917 …. [7085] Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; [1968] ALR 419 …. [5045], [5050], [5055], [5095] — v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; [1963] ALR 134 …. [29070], [29140], [37010], [37130], [37140], [37145] Ramsbotham v Senior (1869) LR 8 Eq 575 …. [25295] Ramsdale v Ramsdale (1945) 173 LT 393 …. [29140] Ramsden; R v (1826) 2 C & P 603; 172 ER 275 …. [17240] Ran v R (1996) 16 WAR 447 …. [27130] Rance; R v (1975) 62 Cr App R 118 …. [15110], [21110], [21205] Randall v Atkinson (1899) 30 OR 242 …. [17480] — v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 197 …. [1220], [17405], [35525] — v — [2002] 1 WLR 2237 [10] …. [17505] — v — [2002] 1 WLR 2237 …. [1645], [17001], [17135], [17505] — v — [2002] 2 Cr App R 17 …. [17505] Randall; R v [2004] 1 All ER 467; [2004] 1 WLR 56 …. [3205], [19155]
Randell v Rockliff (1999) 9 Tas R 85 …. [25010] Randolph v Tuck [1962] 1 QB 175; [1961] 1 All ER 814 …. [5095] Randwick City Council v Minister for the Environment (1998) 54 ALD 682 …. [29080], [29205] Ranieri v Ranieri (1973) 7 SASR 418 …. [13065] Rank Film Distributors Ltd v ENT Ltd (1994) 4 Tas R 281 …. [25265] — v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380; [1981] 2 All ER 76 …. [11130], [25055], [25075], [25100], [25105], [25175] Ranken v Pearce (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 410 …. [17030] Rankine; R v [1986] QB 861; [1986] 2 All ER 566 …. [27105] Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450; 172 ALR 395 …. [7275], [27095] Ransom; R v (1979) 22 SASR 283 …. [23375] Raphael, Re; Raphael v d’Antin [1973] 3 All ER 19; [1973] 1 WLR 998 …. [5230] Rappolt; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 156 …. [23315] Rarot Estate, Re (1958) 27 WWR 136 …. [1645] Ras Behari Lal v King-Emperor [1933] All ER Rep 723; (1933) 102 LJPC 144 …. [27215] Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Bartholomaeus (2012) 114 SASR 448 …. [29125] Raso; R v (1993) 115 FLR 319 …. [33775] Rasomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 216; 144 ALR 497 …. [9120], [11090] Rasool v West Midland Transport Executive [1974] 3 All ER 638 …. [35055] Raspor v R (1958) 99 CLR 346 …. [11140] Rassool v — (1932) NPD 112 …. [31185] Ratcliffe; R v (1919) 14 Cr App R 95 …. [23145]
Rathbone; Ex parte Dikko; R v [1985] QB 630 …. [17020] Ratten v R (1974) 131 CLR 510; 4 ALR 93 …. [11140], [29050] — v — [1972] AC 378; [1971] 3 All ER 801 …. [31040], [31045], [31055], [31090], [31095], [31165], [33470], [37010], [37055], [37060], [37070], [37075], [37125] — v R:Woods v Lowns (1995) 36 NSWLR 344 …. [37060] Ratten; R v [1971] VR 87 …. [29095], [31095], [37010], [37060] Rattray v Roach (1890) 16 VLR 165 …. [3175] Raunio v Hills (2001) 116 FCR 518; 188 ALR 409 …. [25255] Ravennavi Sp A v New Century Shipbuilding Co Ltd [2007] EWCACiv 58; [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 24 …. [39240] Ravindra; R v [1997] 3 NZLR 242 …. [19110] Raviraj; R v (1986) 85 Cr App R 93 …. [1195], [33485], [33770] Rawcliffe v R (2000) 22 WAR 490 …. [17605] Rawlings; R v [1995] 1 All ER 580; [1995] 1 WLR 178 …. [1310] Rawlins v Rickards (1860) 28 Beav 370; 54 ER 408 …. [33115] Rawlinson v Scholes (1898) 15 TLR 8 …. [15150] Rawson v Haig (1824) 2 Bing 99; 130 ER 242 …. [37025] Rawstone v Preston Corporation (1885) 30 Ch D 116 …. [25255] Ray; R v (2003) 57 NSWLR 616 …. [7085], [15220] Raye; R v (2003) 138 A Crim R 355 …. [21257], [35660] Rayner; R v [1998] 4 VR 818 …. [15165], [15255] Re an Arbitration Between A/S Tank of Oslo and Agence Maritime L Strauss of Paris [1940] 1 All ER 40 …. [41005] re D (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland intervening) [2008] 4 All ER 992; [2008] 1 WLR 1499 …. [9050] Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1891] P 9 …. [3040] — v — [1892] AC 644; [1891] All ER Rep 227 …. [3040], [3155],
[33185], [33845] — v Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47 …. [1610] Reading; R v [1966] 1 All ER 521; [1966] 1 WLR 836 …. [21065], [21180] Ready v Brown (1968) 118 CLR 165; [1968] ALR 606 …. [1560], [17580], [17600], [19030] Ready and Manning; R v [1942] VLR 85; [1942] ALR 117 …. [15085] Reardon v Baker [1987] VR 887 …. [33460] Reardon (No 2); R v (2004) 60 NSWLR 454 …. [17130] Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 3 All ER 570; [1976] 1 WLR 989 …. [39240] Reardon; R v (1864) 4 F & F 76; 176 ER 473 …. [21050] — (2002) 186 FLR 1 …. [1755], [11105] Recepta, The (1889) 14 PD 131 …. [39170] Recher & Co v North British and Mercantile Insurance Co [1915] 3 KB 277 …. [27210] Reci; R v (1997) 70 SASR 78 …. [17130], [25010] Redd; R v [1923] 1 KB 104; [1922] All ER Rep 435 …. [19140], [19145], [23270] Reddecliffe v North Canterbury Hospital Board (No 2) [1946] NZLR 368 …. [21285] Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139; [1886] All ER Rep 524 …. [25115], [25135] Redgrave; R v (1982) 74 Cr App R 10 …. [19110], [19170] Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343 …. [3070] Redowood Pty Ltd v ASX-Perpetual Registrars Ltd (2006) 57 ACSR 256 …. [5170] Redpath v Redpath [1950] 1 All ER 600 …. [7030] Redpath; R v (1962) 46 Cr App R 319 …. [15195]
Reece v Trye (1846) 9 Beav 316; 50 ER 365 …. [25305] Reed v Columbia Fur Dressers and Dyers Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 945; [1965] 1 WLR 13 …. [35060] — v Harris, Doe d (1836) 7 C & P 330; 173 ER 147 …. [19170] — v James (1815) 1 Stark 132; 171 ER 424 …. [17470] Reed; R v [2010] 1 Cr App R 23 …. [29005], [29050] Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 …. [17065], [17460], [17485], [17505], [17550] — v Smith (1817) 2 Stark 31; 171 ER 56 …. [17725] Rees, Re; Williams v Hopkins [1950] Ch 204; [1949] 2 All ER 1003 …. [39155] Rees; R v (1834) 6 C & P 607; 172 ER 1385 …. [1175] Reeve v Wood (1864) 5 B & S 364; 122 ER 867 …. [13035], [13115] Reeve and Hancock; R v (1872) LR 1 CCR 362 …. [33615] Reeve; R v (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 81 …. [15100] Reeves; R v (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 …. [9030], [17335], [33770] Reference of a Question of Law (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 106 A Crim R 408 …. [15140] Refrigerated Express Lines (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corp (1979) 42 FLR 204 …. [25070], [25125] Regan; R v (1887) 16 Cox CC 203 …. [39015] Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 187 ALR 1 …. [41005], [41035] Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Ponto (2012) 208 FCR 346 …. [39080] Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations v Murnkurni Women’s Aboriginal Corporation (1995) 137 ALR 404 …. [35595] Registrar of Supreme Court v McPherson [1980] 1 NSWLR 688 …. [25060]
Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668 …. [25010], [25100] Registrar, Supreme Court of South Australia v Zappia (2003) 86 SASR 388 …. [25010], [25090], [25160] Reichelt v Lewis (1986) 23 A Crim R 284 …. [25030], [25260], [27255] Reid v Hesselman [1975] Tas SR 95 …. [7260] — v Howard (1993) 31 NSWLR 298 …. [25010], [25060], [25075], [33640] — v — (1995) 184 CLR 1; 131 ALR 609 …. [25010], [25060], [25075], [25105] — v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 …. [17435], [17460], [29150], [33825] — v New Zealand Trotting Conference [1984] 1 NZLR 8 …. [5175] — v R [1980] AC 343; [1979] 2 All ER 904 …. [1390] Reid (Junior) v — [1990] 1 AC 363; [1993] 4 All ER 95 …. [1395], [1400], [11100] Reid; R v [1989] Crim LR 719 …. [23375] Reilly, In the Marriage of (1995) 124 FLR 358 …. [1685] — (1995) 19 Fam LR 213; FLC 92-616 …. [9130] Reilly; R v (1979) 1 A Crim R 376 …. [17685] Reiner; R v (1974) 8 SASR 102 …. [29070] Reiter; R v [1954] 2 QB 16; [1954] 1 All ER 741 …. [1165] Reitler v NZI Insurance (1992) 1 Tas R 173 …. [25245] Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; [1966] ALR 270 …. [9010], [9050] Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462 …. [1695] Rendell v Paul (1979) 22 SASR 459 …. [3020] Rennie v Clerk (1850) 5 Exch 292; 155 ER 125 …. [41130] Rennie; R v [1982] 1 All ER 385; [1982] 1 WLR 64 …. [33625]
Renworth Ltd v Stephansen [1996] 3 All ER 244 …. [25185] Renzella; R v [1997] 2 VR 88 …. [15220] Repatriation Commission v Reid (1984) 54 ALR 157 …. [1610] Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd [1993] AC 410; [1993] 1 All ER 998 …. [5070] Republica de Guatemala v Nunez (1926) 42 TLR 625 …. [33055] Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54 …. [11090], [33390], [35360], [41130] Restifio v Bernstein (1996) 23 MVR 347 …. [29090] Revesz v Orchard [1969] SASR 336 …. [33455] Revesz; R v (1996) 88 A Crim R 253 …. [11035], [13050] Rex rel Lockhart v Griffith (1959) 127 CCC 209 …. [1645] Reynhoudt; R v (1962) 107 CLR 381; [1962] ALR 483 …. [7030] Reynolds v Bogan Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 36 SASR 193 …. [3095], [17660] — v Godlee (1858) 4 K & J 88; 70 ER 37 …. [25055] — v Llanelly Associated Tinplate Co [1948] 1 All ER 140 …. [3130], [3135] — v Metropolitan Police Cmr (1984) 80 Cr App R 125 …. [11025] — v Reynolds (1973) 1 ALR 318; 47 ALJR 499 …. [33840] Reynolds, Ex parte; Re Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294; [1881] All ER Rep 997 …. [25100] Reynolds; R v [1950] 1 KB 606; [1950] 1 All ER 335 …. [11030], [11035] Reza v General Medical Council [1991] 2 AC 182; [1991] 2 All ER 796 …. [21001] RGP; R v (2006) 167 A Crim R 468 …. [1530] RH; R v [2005] 1 Qd R 180 …. [19080]
Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712; [1985] 1 WLR 948 …. [9015] Rhoden v Wingate (2002) 36 MVR 499 …. [29070], [29200] Rhodes; R v (1999) 104 A Crim R 572 …. [15135] — [1899] 1 QB 77 …. [21090], [23025] Rhone-Poulenc Agrichimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 567; 75 ALR 601 …. [33465] — v — (1986) 12 FCR 477; 68 ALR 77 …. [33465] Ria; R v [1994] 2 NZLR 212 …. [37060] Riaz; R v (1991) 94 Cr App R 339 …. [1305], [1310] Rice v Gordon (1843) 13 Sim 580; 60 ER 225 …. [25160] — v Howard (1886) 16 QBD 681 …. [17375] — v Tricouris (2000) 110 A Crim R 86 …. [27310] Rice; R v [1963] 1 QB 857; [1963] 1 All ER 832 …. [17430], [17620], [17625], [17630], [31130], [33595] — [1996] 2 VR 406 …. [15220], [33435] Rich v ASIC (2003) 203 ALR 671 …. [25125] — v — (2004) 220 CLR 129; 209 ALR 271 …. [25115], [25125] — v — (2005) 54 ACSR 365 …. [35555] — v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106 …. [25245], [25300] — v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35; 176 ER 16 …. [29125] Rich; Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, The v (1863) 32 LJQB 300 …. [25235] Rich; R v (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 …. [17485] Richards v Gellatly (1872) LR 7 CB 127 …. [33435] — v Jager [1909] VLR 140; (1909) 15 ALR 119 …. [1610] — v Kadian (2005) 64 NSWLR 204 …. [25025]
— v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) (2012) 301 ALR 494 …. [21252] — v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 3) (2012) 301 ALR 653 …. [1490], [35610] — v Morgan (1863) 4 B & S 641; 122 ER 600 …. [17370], [33510] Richards; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 266 …. [33675] — (2001) 123 A Crim R 14 …. [27310] — [1918] SALR 315 …. [17075] — [1965] Qd R 354 …. [15195], [37155] — [1967] 1 All ER 829; [1967] 1 WLR 653 …. [33605], [33615], [33640] Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261; 77 ALR 237 …. [3156] — v Hastings (1844) 7 Beav 354; 49 ER 1102 …. [25055] — v R (1974) 131 CLR 116; 3 ALR 115 …. [17090], [17115], [17120], [17125] — v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1 …. [29050] Richardson, Re [1920] SALR 24 …. [3020] Richardson; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 381 …. [13080], [13105] — (1994) 98 Cr App R 174 …. [17120] — [1969] 1 QB 299; [1968] 2 All ER 761 …. [19030], [19045], [19075], [23290] — [1971] 2 QB 484; [1971] 2 All ER 773 …. [17170], [17185] — [1989] 1 Qd R 583 …. [19090] Richens; R v [1993] 4 All ER 877 …. [15220] — [1994] 4 All ER 877 …. [33435] Rickard; R v (1918) 13 Cr App R 140 …. [39105] Rickards v Murdoch (1830) 10 B & C 527; 109 ER 546 …. [29050] Rickards; R v [1922] SASR 269 …. [1455]
Ricketts v R [1998] 1 WLR 1016 …. [1420] Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881; [1977] 3 All ER 677 …. [25055], [27165] Riddle v R (1911) 12 CLR 622; 18 ALR 103 …. [13035], [13165], [25150] — v Riddle (1952) 85 CLR 202; [1952] ALR 167 …. [3020] Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205; [1994] 3 All ER 848 …. [25040] Rider; R v (1986) 83 Cr App R 207 …. [15020] Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19; 129 ALR 41 …. [27160], [27305], [27310], [27315], [33760] Ridgeway; R v [1983] 2 NSWLR 19 …. [15070] Ridley v Gyde (1832) 9 Bing 349; 131 ER 646 …. [37025], [37145] — v Hanney [1962] WAR 157 …. [1240] — v Ridley (1865) 34 Beav 329; 55 ER 662 …. [17480] — v Whipp (1916) 22 CLR 381; 23 ALR 129 …. [15045], [15165], [15185] Ridolfiv Rigato Farms Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 455 …. [3165] Ridsdale v Clifton (1877) 2 PD 276 …. [3040] Riebe v Riebe (1957) 98 CLR 212; [1957] ALR 1033 …. [11150] Riebold; R v [1965] 1 All ER 653; [1967] 1 WLR 674 …. [23375] Riekmann v Thierry (1896) 14 RPC 105 …. [11150] Rigby v Woodward [1957] 1 All ER 391; [1957] 1 WLR 250 …. [13095], [17475] Riggs, Re; Ex parte Cmr of Taxation (1986) 9 FCR 149 …. [35220], [35550] Rigney; R v (1975) 12 SASR 30 …. [15075], [15090], [15095], [15110] Riley; R v (1866) 4 F & F 964; 176 ER 868 …. [17545], [17575] — (1887) 18 QBD 481 …. [19075]
— [1896] 1 QB 309 …. [17060] — [1972] QJPR 20 …. [1360] — [1991] Crim LR 460 …. [19090] Rima; R v (1892) 14 ALT 138 …. [15035] — (2003) 145 A Crim R 27 …. [11125] Rimmer; R v [1972] 1 All ER 604; [1972] 1 WLR 268 …. [33605], [33610] Rinaldi; R v (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 …. [27215] Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569 …. [35545], [35555] Ringstaad v Butler [1978] 1 NSWLR 754 …. [3020] Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 224 ALR 299 …. [25010] — v — (2006) 235 ALR 127; 64 ATR 63 …. [25225], [25240], [25300] Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547; [1978] 1 All ER 434 …. [17020], [25075], [25100], [25105], [25155] Ripley, In the Goods of (1858) 1 Sw & Tr 68; 164 ER 632 …. [33325] Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198 …. [5170] Riseley v R [1970] Tas SR 41 …. [11095] Rishton v Nesbitt (1844) 2 M & Rob 554; 174 ER 378 …. [33230] Ritter v Keatley Real Estate Pty Ltd (2013) 116 SASR 53 …. [39240], [39290] Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158; 88 ALR 217 …. [1650], [1665], [29155], [31070], [37090], [31095] — v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 4) (1987) 14 NSWLR 100 …. [25210] — v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 7) (1987) 14 NSWLR 104 …. [29025] — v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 21) (1988) 14 NSWLR 128 …. [39010] — v Charles of The Ritz Ltd (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132 ….
[25225], [25255] — v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 13, 18 & 19) (1988) 14 NSWLR 116 …. [35205], [35210], [35225], [35240], [35280] — v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16) (1988) 14 NSWLR 107 …. [3040], [35040], [35045], [35060], [35115], [35315] River Wear Cmrs v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743; (1877) 42 JP 244; [1874] All ER Rep 1 …. [39240] Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97 …. [39015] — v Hague (1837 unreported) …. [17155] — v Rivers (2002) 84 SASR 426 …. [5130] Rivett; R v (1950) 34 Cr App R 87 …. [29075] Rizzo v Hanover Insurance Co (1993) 103 DLR (4th) 577 …. [5215] RJ v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 174 …. [13060], [19135] RJE v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 21 VR 526 …. [29075] Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; 239 ALR 1 …. [3158] — v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; 276 ALR 406 …. [11125], [21257] Roads and Traffic Authority v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 238 ALR 761 …. [11150] Roads Corp v Love (2010) 173 LGERA 1; 31 VR 451 …. [29155], [29200] Roads; R v [1967] 2 QB 108; [1967] 2 All ER 84 …. [27215] Roba; R v (2000) 110 A Crim R 245 …. [33765] Robb; R v (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 …. [1445], [29050], [29055], [29060], [29075], [39105] Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476 …. [1650], [1665] Robert Sterling Pty Ltd, Re (No 3) [1979] 2 NSWLR 728 …. [27190]
Roberts v Allatt (1828)M& M192; 173 ER 1128 …. [25105] — v Balancio (1987) 8 NSWLR 436 …. [33840] — v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 …. [33015], [33055], [33065], [33080], [35060], [35095], [35105], [35110] — v Calvert [1937] St R Qd 12 …. [39175] — v Commonwealth (1893) 20 SW 267 …. [19035] — v Doxon (1791) Peake 116; 170 ER 99 …. [29150] — v DPP [1994] Crim LR 926 …. [31135] — v Independent Publishers Ltd [1974] 1 NZLR 459 …. [39240] — v Oppenheim (1884) 26 Ch D 724 …. [25010] — v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 505 …. [5025] — v State (1983) 469 A 2d 442 …. [1245] — v Western Australia (2005) 29 WAR 445; 189 FLR 147 …. [1135], [5195], [5200], [17510], [19015] Roberts & Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555; [1961] 2 All ER 545 …. [9085] Roberts & Ruthven Ltd v Hall (1912) 5 BWCC 331 …. [3135] Roberts; R v (1920) 15 Cr App R 65 …. [23315] — (1984) 80 Cr App R 89 …. [17090] — (2001) 53 NSWLR 138 …. [15135], [17295] — (2004) 9 VR 295 …. [19035], [25040], [25100], [27130] — (2009) 158 NTR 1 …. [33745] — [1936] 1 All ER 23 …. [23145] — [1942] 1 All ER 187 …. [17250], [17305], [17310] — [1954] 2 QB 329; [1953] 2 All ER 340 …. [11045] — [1967] Crim LR 477 …. [15160] — [1970] Crim LR 464 …. [33750]
— [2000] Crim LR 183 …. [1445] Robertson v French [1803] All ER Rep 350; (1803) 102 ER 779; 4 East 130 …. [1185] — v Jackson (1845) 2 CB 412; 135 ER 1006 …. [11010] Robertson; Ex parte A-G; R v [1991] 1 Qd R 262 …. [17275], [17280], [17285] Robertson; R v (1978) 17 SASR 479 …. [19090] — (1983) 21 NTR 11 …. [27105], [27130], [27135], [27155] — (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 …. [21100] — [1968] 3 All ER 557; [1968] 1 WLR 1767 …. [1040] — [1998] 4 VR 30 …. [11045], [17290] Robin v Police (2002) 81 SASR 253 …. [1645] Robinett v — (2000) 78 SASR 85 …. [27305] Robinson v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1995] 1 All ER 824; [1994] 1 WLR 1493 …. [25305] — v Kitchin (1856) 21 Beav 365; 52 ER 900 …. [25075] — v — (1856) 8 De GM & G 88; 44 ER 322 …. [25075] — v Laws [2003] 1 Qd R 81 …. [19025] — v R (1995) 13 WAR 451 …. [15135] — v — (1996) 15 WAR 191 …. [33045] — v — (1999) 197 CLR 162; 165 ALR 226 …. [15135], [15160], [17295] — v — (2006) 162 A Crim 88 …. [15160] — v R (No 2) (1991) 180 CLR 531; 102 ALR 493 …. [7085] — v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd (1924) AD 151 …. [33845] — v Robinson (1859) 1 Sw & Tr 362; 164 ER 815 …. [33520] — v South Australia (No 2) [1931] AC 704 …. [27155], [27160]
— v Stern [1939] 2 KB 260; [1939] 2 All ER 683 …. [17320], [35075], [35085], [35095], [35100] — v Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd [1931] VLR 369 …. [33055] — v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612 …. [27310], [27315] Robinson, Re; Ex parte Geroff v Turner (1993) 40 FCR 151; 117 ALR 131 …. [29150] Robinson; R v (1953) 37 Cr App R 95 …. [21165], [21180] — (1969) 53 Cr App R 314 …. [1045] — (2000) 111 A Crim R 388 …. [19145], [23290] — (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 398 …. [17505] — [1977] Qd R 387 …. [17460], [17525] — [1978] 1 NZLR 709 …. [11010] — [1994] 3 All ER 346 …. [19005], [29050] — [1998] 1 VR 570 …. [33690] — [2001] Crim LR 478 …. [23275] — [2006] 1 Cr App R 221 …. [1445] — [2006] 1 Cr App R 480 …. [19155] Robison; R v [1969] 1 NSWR 229 …. [33690] Roble; R v [1997] Crim LR 449 …. [25010] Robson v Kemp (1802) 4 Esp 233; 170 ER 703 …. [37025], [37105] — v Minister for Education [1964] SASR 308 …. [29075] Robson; R v [1972] 2 All ER 699; [1972] 1 WLR 651 …. [1040], [1300], [1305], [11040], [11075] Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1896) 65 LJ Ch (NS) 794 …. [25265] Rochford Justices; Ex parte Buck; R v (1978) 68 Cr App R 114 …. [21155] Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134; 43 ALR 659 …. [25075]
Rodden v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 227 …. [21050] Roden v Ryde (1843) 4 QB 626; 114 ER 1034 …. [39095] Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608; [1965] ALR 109 …. [25355], [25365] Rodley; R v [1913] 3 KB 468; [1911] All ER Rep 688 …. [21025], [21115], [21195], [37155] Rodrigeuz v Speyer Brothers [1919] AC 59; [1918] All ER Rep 884; (1918) 88 LJKB 147; 119 LT 409 …. [3001] Rodriguez; R v [1998] 2 VR 167 …. [7085] Roe v R A Naylor Ltd (1918) 87 LJKB 958 …. [5025], [39175] Roe d Lord Trimlestown v Kemmis (1843) 9 Cl & Fin 749; 8 ER 601 …. [17620], [17720], [33065], [33460] Roe d West v Davis (1806) 7 East 363; 103 ER 140 …. [39015] Rogan and Elliot; R v (1846) 1 Cox CC 291 …. [19145] Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388; [1972] 2 All ER 1057 …. [27005], [27065], [27105], [27130], [27155], [27160] — v Legal Services Commission of South Australia (1995) 64 SASR 572 …. [5025] — v Manley (1880) 42 LT 584 …. [17720] — v Moore (1993) 41 FCR 301; 115 ALR 347 …. [27035] — v R (1994) 181 CLR 251; 123 ALR 417 …. [1880], [5025], [5075], [5150], [5155] — v Wood (1831) 2 B & Ad 245; 109 ER 1134 …. [33195] Rogers (No 2); R v (1992) 29 NSWLR 179 …. [5025] Rogers; R v (1914) 111 LT 1115 …. [31155] — [1950] SASR 102 …. [11030], [11075], [33295] — [1979] 1 NZLR 307 …. [33690] — [1995] 1 Cr App R 374 …. [33015], [33045], [33070], [33080]
Rogerson; R v (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 …. [9040] Roissetter; R v [1984] 1 Qd R 477 …. [1675], [15195], [17270] Rolf v Webster (1978) 24 ACTR 3 …. [33460] Rolfe; R v (1952) 36 Cr App R 4 …. [15125] Rollason and Jenkins, ex p A-G (Qld); R v [2008] 1 Qd R 85 …. [17130] Rolle v R [1965] 3 All ER 582; [1965] 1 WLR 1841 …. [7015] Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246; [1985] 3 All ER 52 …. [1645] Romeo; R v (1982) 30 SASR 243 …. [17435], [31130] — (1987) 25 A Crim R 80 …. [33570] — (1987) 45 SASR 212 …. [27310] — (1988) 36 A Crim R 212 …. [33435] — [2004] 1 Cr App R 30 …. [15195] Rompiotis v R (1996) 18 WAR 54 …. [5210] Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 …. [27205] Rondo; R v (2001) 126 A Crim R 562 …. [27315], [35545] Ronen (No 2); R v (2004) 211 FLR 268 …. [25175] Roof and Ceiling Construction Co v S AWigan & Co Pty Ltd [1972] QWN 14 …. [1650] Rook v Maynard (1993) 2 Tas R 97; 126 ALR 150 …. [1315], [31075] Rooke v Auckland City Council [1980] 1 NZLR 680 …. [17170] Roper v Taylor’s Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 284 …. [3050] Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Rep 80-121 …. [9090] Rose; R v (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 …. [17200], [17655], [29050], [29060] — (2002) 55 NSWLR 701 …. [1450], [1490], [15260], [35435] — [1977] Qd R 280 …. [17390]
Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 460 …. [25355], [25380] Rosedale Mouldings Ltd v Sibley [1980] ICR 816 …. [11120] Rosemeyer; R v [1985] VR 945 …. [15005], [15110] Rosenberg v Jaine [1983] NZLR 1 …. [25225], [25245], [25250] — v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; 178 ALR 577 …. [11150] Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 …. [1380], [1420], [31185] Rosher, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 801 …. [3055] Ross v Associated Portland Cement Manufactures Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 452; [1964] 1 WLR 768 …. [11135] — v Internet Wines Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 436 …. [25175] — v R (1922) 30 CLR 246; 28 ALR 138 …. [15160] — v Ross [1930] AC 1 …. [1155] — v Smith [1969] VR 411 …. [1240] Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ross (No 1) (1985) 1 NSWLR 233 …. [35195], [35210], [35225], [35545] Rossano v Manufacturers’ Life Insurance Co [1963] 2 QB 352; [1962] 2 All ER 214 …. [41035] Rossborough; R v (1985) 81 Cr App R 139 …. [1155], [33435] Rosser; R v (1836) 7 C & P 648; 173 ER 284 …. [3130], [3140] Rost v Edwards [1990] 2 QB 460; [1990] 2 All ER 641 …. [27095] Rostek v Keegan (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 555 …. [17375] Rota v Tukiri [2001] 1 NZLR 715 …. [27205] Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1972) 46 ALJR 609 …. [11010] Rothery; R v (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451 …. [9040], [9120] Rothmore Farms Pty Ltd (in prov liq) v Belgravia Pty Ltd (1999) 31 ACSR 88 …. [35655]
Rothwell; R v (1994) 99 Cr App R 388 …. [31185] Rothwells Ltd (in liq) v Connell (1993) 119 ALR 538 …. [39135] Rouch v Great Western Rail Co (1841) 1 QB 51; 113 ER 1049 …. [37025] Roughan; R v (2007) 179 A Crim R 389 …. [19155] Roughley v R (1995) 5 Tas R 8 …. [17175] Roulston; R v [1976] 2 NZLR 644 …. [17065] Roupell v Haws (1863) 3 F & F 784; 176 ER 359 …. [1140] Rouse; R v [1904] 1 KB 184; [1900] All ER Rep Ext 1054 …. [23315] Router; R v (1977) 14 ALR 365 …. [33770] Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] VR 577 …. [25240], [25275] Rouyer Guillet et Cie v Rouyer Guillet & Co Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 244 …. [41035] — v — [1949] 1 All ER 344 …. [41035] Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd (No 2) [1987] 3 All ER 986; [1987] 1 WLR 1597 …. [35055] Roviaro v US (1957) 353 US 53 …. [27130] Rowan v Cornwall (No 5) (2002) 82 SASR 152 …. [27095] Rowbottom v Nicolitsi (1986) 41 SASR 576 …. [7180] — v R (2003) 142 A Crim R 513 …. [7085] Rowe v Australian United Steam Navigation Co Ltd (1909) 9 CLR 1; 15 ALR 339 …. [1680] Rowell v Larter (1986) 6 NSWLR 21; 24 A Crim R 222 …. [1215], [25030], [27295], [27300] — v Pratt [1938] AC 101; [1937] 3 All ER 660 …. [27085] Rowland v Police (2001) 79 SASR 569 …. [17135] Rowland; R v (1898) 62 JP 459 …. [17260]
— [1910] 1 KB 458 …. [17515], [23140] Rowlands v De Vecchi (1882) 1 Cab & El 10 …. [33125], [37115] Rowlandson v Wainwright, Doe d (1838) 8 A & E 691; 112 ER 1000 …. [33055] Rowley v London and North Western Rail Co [1861] All ER Rep 823; (1873) LR 8 Ex 21 …. [33845] Rowley; R v (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 …. [1390], [11095] Rowson; R v [1986] QB 174; [1985] 2 All ER 539 …. [17430], [33595] Rowton; R v (1865) 34 LJMC 57 …. [33820] — [1861] All ER Rep 549; (1865) 169 ER 1497; (1865) Le & Ca 520 …. [19010], [19110], [19120], [19125], [19145], [29090], [23190], [29150], [33820] Royal v Prescott-Clarke [1966] 2 All ER 366; [1966] 1 WLR 788 …. [17660] Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] QB 674; [1997] 2 All ER 929 …. [41005] Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 186 ALR 289; 76 ALJR 436 …. [39240] Royal Commission into Certain Crown Leaseholds [1956] St R Qd 225 …. [27095] Royal Insurance Australia Ltd v GIO (NSW) [1994] 1 VR 123 …. [29050] Royal Insurance Co v Duffus (1890) 18 SCR 710 …. [1645] Royal Warrant Holders’ Association v Edward Deane & Beal Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 10 …. [3265] Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22 …. [27055] Royce-Bentley; R v [1974] 2 All ER 347; [1974] 1 WLR 535 …. [15100] Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 311 …. [27215]
Royle; R v [1993] Crim LR 57 …. [15255] Royster v Cavey [1947] KB 204 …. [3165] Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; (1994) 126 ALR 481 …. [11125], [13085] RP Data Ltd v Western Australian Land Information Authority (2010) 272 ALR 332 …. [27005], [27055], [27065] RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620; 168 ALR 729 …. [1220], [11135], [23030] RR v — (2011) 216 A Crim R 489 …. [15220] Rubin v Expandable Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1099 (CA) …. [25010] — v State (1927) 211 NW 926 …. [17505] Rudd; R v (1948) 32 Cr App R 138 …. [13095] — (2009) 23 VR 444 …. [17335], [33455] — [1923] SASR 229 …. [33485] Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269 …. [5170] Ruddock, Re; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 347 …. [17435] Rudge; R v (1805) Peake Add Cas 232; 170 ER 255 …. [19045] Rugari; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 1 …. [17065] Ruiz; R v [1995] Crim LR 151 …. [21175] Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814; [1962] 3 All ER 256 …. [13030], [13240], [13245], [25025], [25200], [33430] Runjanjic; R v (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 …. [19170], [29050], [29055] Ruptash; R v (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 182 …. [17505] Rush v Smith (1834) 3 LJ Ex 355; 1 CM & R 94; 149 ER 1008 …. [17470] Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280; [1988] 3 All ER 737 …. [25350], [25375], [25380], [25390]
Rusmanto; R v (1997) 6 NTLR 68 …. [27155] Russell v Craddock [1985] 1 Qd R 377 …. [35005] — v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) (L) 261 …. [17375] — v H M Advocate (1946) JC 37 …. [29070] — v HM Advocate (1946) SC (J) 37 …. [1040] — v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387; 68 ER 558 …. [25265], [25300], [25325] — v Russell (1923) 129 LT 151 …. [1280] — v — [1924] AC 687 …. [25190], [31105], [33240] — v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538; 30 ALR 75 …. [1185] Russell & Somers (Wellington) Ltd v Wellington Harbour Board [1977] 2 NZLR 158 …. [33540] Russell-Jones; R v [1995] 3 All ER 239 …. [17120], [17125] Russell; R v (1968) 52 Cr App R 147 …. [15160] —(2000) 192 DLR (4th) 585; [2000] 2 SCR 731; [2001] 2 WWR 407 …. [9030] — [1977] 2 NZLR 20 …. [1375], [1380], [1425] Russen; R v (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 134 …. [1045] Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v Comptoir d’Escompte de Mulhouse [1923] 2 KB 630 …. [41035] Russo; R v (2004) 11 VR 1 …. [7085], [33770] Rutherford v Richardson [1923] AC 1; [1922] All ER Rep 13 …. [1520], [33520] Rutledge; Ex parte Laidlaw; R v [1923] St R Qd 284 …. [25100] RW; R v (2008) 184 A Crim R 388 …. [17295] RWB; R v (2010) 202 A Crim R 209 …. [9030], [17460] Ryan v ASIC (2007) 158 FCR 301 …. [25010] — v Elsa (No 1) (1987) 47 SASR 220 …. [1530]
— v ETSA (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239 …. [35360], [35400] — v Hansen t/as Hansens Solicitors (2000) 49 NSWLR 184 …. [1685] — v R (1967) 121 CLR 205; [1967] ALR 577 …. [7050] — v — (2001) 206 CLR 267; 179 ALR 193 …. [3159] — v Textile Clothing & Footwear Union of Australia [1996] 2 VR 235 …. [39290] — v Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1937) 10 ALJ 461 …. [1125] Ryan (No 7); R v (2012) 218 A Crim R 384 …. [13070], [17595] Ryan and Walker; R v [1966] VR 553 …. [21040] Ryan; R v (1964) 50 Cr App R 144 …. [33770] — (1966) 50 Cr App R 144 …. [33770] — (1984) 55 ALR 408 …. [1445], [31155], [33570] — [1906] St R Qd 15 …. [1250] — [2002] VSCA 176; BC200206667 …. [29070] Ryde Municipal Council v Lizzio (1982) 46 LGRA 431 …. [5090], [5105] Ryder v Wombwell (1868) LR 4 Ex 32 …. [3200], [11085] Ryder; R v (1993) 98 Cr App R 242 …. [21170] Rylands v R (2008) 184 A Crim R 534 …. [29200] Rymer; R v (2005) 156 A Crim R 84 …. [17335], [35440], [35525] S v Becker 1968 (1) SA 18 …. [31145] — v Booi 1964 (1) SA 224 …. [17505] — v Boulton (2005) 155 A Crim R 152 …. [25150] — v — (2006) 151 FCR 364; 232 ALR 92 …. [25150], [25175], [27055] — v Christodoulou 1967 (3) SA 269 …. [3195] — v Damalis 1984 (2) SA 105 …. [19015]
— v Langa 1963 (3) SA 941 …. [17475] — v Letsoko 1964 (4) SA 768 …. [19065] — v Lwane 1966 (2) SA 433 …. [25105] — v M 1984 36 SASR 316 …. [11135] — v Makaula 1964 (2) SA 575 …. [17505] — v Mokoena 1967 (1) SA 440 …. [23195] — v Peake 1962 (3) SA 572 …. [1300] — v R (1989) 168 CLR 266; 89 ALR 321 …. [21050], [21085] — v — (1991) 5 WAR 391 …. [1170] — v — (1999) 149 FLR 149 …. [33840] — v S [1972] AC 24; [1970] 3 All ER 107 …. [1235], [7280], [9015], [9095] — v Sinkankanka 1963 (2) SA 531 …. [17580] — v T 1963 (1) SA 484 …. [17265] — v Tuge 1966 (4) SA 565 …. [31175] — v Van Niekerk (1964) (1) SA 729 …. [31035], [31040] — v W 1975 (3) SA 841 …. [1370] S & I Publishing Pty Ltd v Australian Surf Life Saver Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 354; 168 ALR 396 …. [11150] S & M Carpets (London) Ltd v Cornhill Insurance Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 667 …. [9010] S & Y Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co (1986) 82 FLR 130; 21 A Crim R 204 …. [5215], [35545] S (F); R v (2000) 144 CCC (3d) 466 …. [17505] S (Infants), Re [1967] 1 All ER 202; [1967] 1 WLR 396 …. [17080] S and P, In the Marriage of (1990) 14 Fam LR 251 …. [33840] S(F); R v [2009] 1 WLR 1489 …. [25090]
S, DD; R v (2010) 109 SASR 46 …. [17290] S, G; R v (2011) 109 SASR 491 …. [23040] S, PC; R v (2008) 102 SASR 199 …. [21065] S, Re [1948] VLR 11; [1948] 1 VLR 81 …. [25155] S; R v (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 460 …. [33635] — (1983) 32 SASR 174 …. [33745], [33750] — (2000) 113 A Crim R 429 …. [19145] — (2001) 125 A Crim R 526 …. [29050] — (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 …. [15230], [17270], [17280] — [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 …. [7075] — [1992] Crim LR 307 …. [19030] — [1995] 1 Qd R 558 …. [17165] — [2000] 1 Qd R 445 …. [21050] — [2004] 3 All ER 689; [2004] 1 WLR 2940 …. [17275], [17280] — [2007] 2 All ER 974 …. [1255], [29050] SAB; R v (2008) 20 VR 55 …. [7085], [17485] Sadaraka; R v [1981] 2 NSWLR 459 …. [33770] Sadler; R v (2008) 20 VR 69 …. [17505], [19090], [21050] Saffron v Cmr of Taxation (1991) 30 FCR 578; 102 ALR 19 …. [5205] — v — (1992) 109 ALR 695 …. [25105] — v DPP (1989) 16 NSWLR 397 …. [9120] — v R (1988) 17 NSWLR 395 …. [11140], [17075], [35210] Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 4) (2010) 268 ALR 108 …. [29200] Saggers v Sydney Market Authority (1988) 66 LGRA 42 …. [39145] Sahin; R v (2000) 115 A Crim R 413 …. [27310] Sailor; R v [1994] 2 Qd R 342 …. [15195], [17270]
Sainsbury v Allsop (1899) 24 VLR 725 …. [17390] Sainsbury; R v [1993] 1 Qd R 305 …. [1400] Saint v Holmes (2008) 170 FCR 262 …. [27205] Saint Edmundsbury & Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No 2) [1973] 3 All ER 902; [1973] 1 WLR 1572 …. [39290] Sakail; R v [1993] 1 Qd R 312 …. [15230], [17280], [17285], [21050] Salahattin; R v [1983] 1 VR 521 …. [33485], [33495] Salameh; R v (1985) 4 NSWLR 369 …. [31175], [31200], [33735], [33805] Saleam; R v (1989) 41 A Crim R 108 …. [19170] Salem; R v (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 …. [27315] Salerno; R v [1973] VR 59 …. [21185] Salihos v R (1987) 78 ALR 509 …. [33760] Salisbury; R v (1831) 5 C & P 155; 172 ER 919 …. [21040] Salmi v Under Secretary of the Department of Public Works (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 515 …. [3135] Salmon Street Ltd (in liq) v Jorgensen (1991) 56 SASR 158 …. [5030] Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 324; [1969] 3 All ER 863 …. [1295] Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 …. [3020] Salvesen v Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] AC 641; [1927] All ER Rep 78 …. [5015] Salvo; R v [1980] VR 401 …. [11010] Samadi v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 251 …. [21050], [21252] Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458 …. [5135] Sambo; R v 1965 (1) SA 640 …. [33690] Sampson v R (2002) 132 A Crim R 326 …. [17120] Sampson, Ex parte; Re Governor of Her Majesty’s Penitentiary at
Malabar [1966] 1 NSWR 305; (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 …. [29090], [39040], [39105] Sampson, In the Marriage of (1977) 29 FLR 135 …. [25370] Sams v R (1990) 46 A Crim R 468 …. [17110] Samson; R v (2011) 221 A Crim R 295 …. [13070] Samuel; R v (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 …. [19145], [23145], [23275], [23290] — [1988] QB 615; [1988] 2 All ER 135 …. [33740] Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 …. [29075], [29105] — v Linzi Dresses Ltd [1981] QB 115; [1980] 1 All ER 803 …. [5025] — v Stokes (1973) 130 CLR 490; 2 ALR 269 …. [7155] Samuels; R v [1962] NZLR 1036 …. [1675] Sanchez v R (2009) 196 A Crim R 472 …. [33770], [35645] Sanders v Sanders (1881) 19 Ch D 373 …. [1185] Sanders; R v (1961) 46 Cr App R 60 …. [15125] — (1991) 93 Cr App R 245 …. [29075] Sanderson v Nicholson [1906] VLR 371; (1906) 12 ALR 208 …. [1645], [39050] Sanderson; R v [1953] 1 All ER 485; [1953] 1 WLR 392 …. [17095] Sandilands, Re (1871) LR 6 CP 411 …. [39130] Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2009) 104 SASR 452 …. [27105], [31095], [33730], [35090], [35360] Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5 …. [5075] Sanford (GK) Pty Ltd v Jansen (1992) 36 FCR 83 …. [5080] Sang; R v [1980] AC 402; [1979] 2 All ER 1222 …. [1030], [11125], [21225], [27235], [27310], [33620], [33625] Sanghera; R v [1983] 2 VR 130 …. [1030] Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; 21 ALR 505 …. [27005], [27010],
[27030], [27035], [27040], [27065], [27095], [27140], [27155], [27160], [27175], [27180], [27185] Sansom; R v [1991] 2 QB 130; [1991] 2 All ER 145 …. [17130] Santos; R v (1987) 45 SASR 556 …. [1245] SAP; Ex parte A-G (Qld); R v [2006] 1 Qd R 367 …. [7085] Sapporo Maru v Statue of Liberty [1968] 2 All ER 195; [1968] 1 WLR 739 …. [1315], [31075] Saragozza; R v [1984] VR 187 …. [17280] Sarah Getty Trust, Re [1985] QB 956; [1985] 2 All ER 809 …. [25235], [25255] Saraya; R v (1993) 70 A Crim R 515 …. [33805] Sardar (Aamir); R v [2012] Crim LR 618 …. [13070] Sarek; R v [1982] VR 971 …. [23205], [23410] Sargent v Massachusetts Accident Co (1940) 29 NE (2d) 825 …. [9005] Sargent; R v (2001) 80 SASR 184 …. [17460], [17525] Sargvon; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 394 …. [23320] Sartori; R v [1961] Crim LR 397 …. [11075], [33675] Sat-Bhambra; R v (1988) 88 Cr App R 55 …. [33595] Saul v Menon [1980] 2 NSWLR 314 …. [3020], [3120], [3125] Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884 …. [3065], [3130], [11150] — v Australian Federal Police Cmr (1998) 160 ALR 469 …. [25020], [25225] — v Hill [1964] SASR 327 …. [1220] — v Johns [1965] Crim LR 49 …. [17660] — v R (1985) 15 A Crim R 115 …. [17150] — v — (2004) 149 A Crim R 174 …. [35530] — v Saunders [1965] P 499; [1965] 1 All ER 838 …. [33510]
Saunders; R v [1899] 1 QB 490 …. [31155] — [1919] 1 KB 550 …. [1675] — [1965] Qd R 409 …. [11075], [17265], [17280] — [2012] 2 Cr App R 26 …. [33740] Savage v Chief Constable of the Hampshire Constabulary [1997] 2 All ER 631; [1997] 1 WLR 1061 …. [27105] Savage; R v (1876) 13 Cox CC 178 …. [41035] — [1970] Tas SR 137 …. [33270], [33295] Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 …. [17545] Savings and Investment Bank Ltd v Fincken [2004] 1 All ER 1125; [2004] 1 WLR 667 …. [25380] — v Gasco Investment (Netherlands) BV (No 2) [1988] Ch 422; [1988] 1 All ER 975 …. [33840], [35595] — v Gasco Investments (Netherlands) BV [1984] 1 All ER 296; [1984] 1 WLR 271 …. [1040], [5180], [33840], [35070] Savory; R v (1942) 29 Cr App R 1 …. [19120], [19145] Savundra; R v (1968) 52 Cr App R 637 …. [25180] Savvas; R v (1991) 55 A Crim R 241 …. [33735] Sawdon v Dale (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 573 …. [15055] Sawoniuk; R v [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 …. [21050] Sawyer; R v (1959) 43 Cr App R 187 …. [15140] Saxby v Fulton [1909] 2 KB 208 …. [41005] Saxlehner v Appollinaris Co [1897] 1 Ch 893 …. [31105] Saxon; R v [1998] 1 VR 503 …. [1410] Saxton dec’d, Re [1962] 3 All ER 92; [1962] 1 WLR 968 …. [25225], [25255] Saxton; R v [2012] 1 NZLR 331 …. [1680] Sayer v Glossop (1848) 2 Exch 409; 154 ER 552 …. [39070]
— v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 132 …. [27130] Sayers v Perrin [1965] Qd R 221 …. [27165] Sbarra; R v [1918] All ER Rep 1453 …. [1195] SBB; R v (2007) 175 A Crim R 449 …. [15220] SBEG v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 291 ALR 281 …. [27195] Scaffidi v Kuehn (1985) 40 SASR 136 …. [29150] Scaife; R v (1836) 2 Lewin 150; 168 ER 1110 …. [33265] — (1851) 17 QB 238; 117 ER 1271 …. [33795] Scammonden (Inhabitants); R v (1789) 3 TR 474; 100 ER 685 …. [39180] Scanlan v Swan [1984] 1 Qd R 21 …. [25005] Scanlon v Murphy [1920] QWN 13 …. [1675] Scappaticci v A-G [1955] P 47; [1955] 1 All ER 193 …. [33245], [37025] Scarrott; R v [1978] QB 1016; [1978] 1 All ER 672 …. [11120], [21015], [21100], [21145], [21155], [21170] SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri (No 3) [1987] QB 1028; [1987] 1 All ER 194 …. [5025] Schaeffer; R v (2005) 13 VR 337 …. [11045], [33735] Schafferius; R v [1977] Qd R 213 …. [29105] — [1987] 1 Qd R 381 …. [9050] Schama; R v Abramovitch; R v [1914] All ER Rep 204; (1914) 84 LJKB 396 …. [1195] Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 170 ALR 594 …. [1215] Schiavini; R v (1999) 108 A Crim R 161 …. [35630] Schiffmann v Jones (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 780 …. [3060]
Schioparlan; R v (1991) 54 A Crim R 294 …. [15100] Schlaefer; R v (1984) 37 SASR 207 …. [15140], [15195] — (1992) 57 SASR 423 …. [11035] Schlieske v Federal Republic of Germany (1987) 14 FCR 424; 71 ALR 215 …. [1175] Schmahl; R v [1965] VR 745 …. [17395], [19135] Schmidt v Schmidt [1969] QWN 3 …. [1280] Schnaider v Jaffe (1916) 7 CPD 696 …. [41005] Schneidas; R v (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 …. [17435], [17460] Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195; [1955] 2 All ER 173 …. [25265] Schofield, Re; Ex parte Rangott v P & B Barron Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 280; 143 ALR 185 …. [1695] Scholes v Chadwick (1843) 2 M & Rob 507; 174 ER 364 …. [33025] Schreuder v Murray (No 2) (2009) 41 WAR 169; 260 ALR 139 …. [17375], [25265] Schuett v McKenzie [1968] VR 225 …. [3095] Schuler (L) AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235; [1973] 2 All ER 39 …. [39210], [39290] Schuller; R v [1972] QWN 41 …. [17515] Schulmann v Peters [1961] ALR 209 …. [11135] Schultz v R [1982] WAR 171 …. [29050] Schwalbe, The (1861) 4 LT 160 …. [37050], [37055] Schwarz; R v [1923] SASR 347 …. [33045], [33060] Schwerdt, Re [1939] SASR 333 …. [3020] SCI Operations Pty Ltd v TPC (1984) 2 FCR 113; 53 ALR 283 …. [5025], [5030], [5115] Science Research Council v Nassé [1979] QB 144; [1978] 3 All ER 1196 …. [27175]
— v — [1980] AC 1028; [1979] 3 All ER 673 …. [11130], [27005], [27120], [27125], [27185] Sciretta; R v [1977] VR 139 …. [7160] Scobie; R v (2003) 85 SASR 77 …. [33805] Scofield; R v (1988) 37 A Crim R 197 …. [33635] Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (2007) 70 NSWLR 176; 210 FLR 161 …. [1130] Scott v Baker [1969] 1 QB 659; [1968] 2 All ER 993 …. [1175] — v Bradley [1971] Ch 850; [1971] 1 All ER 583 …. [39175] — v Fernhill Stud Poultry Farm Pty Ltd [1963] VR 12 …. [33540] — v l’Anson [1958] VR 204 …. [29090] — v Moses (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 101 …. [11010] — v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; [1954] ALR 373 …. [1290], [1295] — v R [1989] AC 1242; [1989] 2 All ER 305 …. [1400], [11125] — v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 …. [17510], [19165] — v Scott [1913] AC 417; [1911] All ER Rep 1 …. [1030], [27165] Scott and Downland Publications Ltd; R v [1972] VR 663 …. [1175] Scott Fell v Lloyd (1911) 13 CLR 230; 18 ALR 97 …. [17600] Scott; Ex parte A-G; R v [1993] 1 Qd R 537 …. [27285] Scott; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 214 …. [17155] — (1921) 86 JP 69 …. [7160] — (1984) 79 Cr App R 49 …. [17650] — (2000) 112 A Crim R 543 …. [1220] — (2003) 141 A Crim R 323 …. [1125] Scottish Power plc v Britoil (Exploration) Ltd [1997] TLR 616 …. [39240]
Scottish Shire Line Ltd v London & Provincial Marine and General Co Ltd [1912] 3 KB 51 …. [29120] Scruby v R (1952) 55 WALR 1 …. [15035], [15100] Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree and Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315 …. [41005], [41035] Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd v JLW(NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 147 …. [35260] — v — (1991) 29 FCR 415 …. [29025] Seabrook v British Transport Commission [1959] 2 All ER 15; [1959] 1 WLR 509 …. [25235], [25245] Sealby; R v [1965] 1 All ER 701 …. [31120] Seaman v Netherclift (1876) 2 CPD 53 …. [17510] Seaman; R v (1978) 67 Cr App R 234 …. [21065], [21195] Seamen’s Union of Australia Co Ltd v Utah Development Co (1978) 144 CLR 120; 22 ALR 291 …. [3158] Searle v Keayes (1994) 126 ALR 728 …. [17510] Searle, Re; Searle v Siems [1949] Ch 73; [1948] 2 All ER 426 …. [33340] Seaton; R v [2011] 1 All ER 932 …. [1215], [17315], [25010] Sebba, Re; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Hutson [1959] Ch 166; [1958] 3 All ER 393 …. [41010] Sebel (D) & Co Ltd v National Art Medal Co Pty Ltd (1965) 10 FLR 224 …. [29115] Secord; R v [1992] 3 NZLR 570 …. [25245] Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1985] AC 339; [1984] 3 All ER 601 …. [3030] Secretary of State for Environment; Ex parte Hackney London Borough Council; R v [1983] 3 All ER 358; [1983] 1 WLR 524 …. [5030] Secretary of State for India; Ex parte Ezekiel; R v [1941] 2 KB 169; [1941] 2 All ER 546 …. [13300]
Secretary of State for the Environment; Ex parte Simms; R v [1991] 2 QB 354; [1990] 3 All ER 490 …. [39170] Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Brind; R v [1991] 1 AC 696; [1991] 1 All ER 720 …. [27095] Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1; [2004] 4 All ER 325 …. [5175], [5180] — v Baker [1998] Ch 356; [1998] 1 All ER 673 …. [25225], [25235], [25245] Secretary of State for Trade; Ex parte Anderson Strathclyde Pty Ltd; R v [1983] 2 All ER 233 …. [27095] Secretary to the Department of Human Services v Sanding (2011) 36 VR 221 …. [1065] Secretary, Department of Defence v Gorton (2000) 98 FCR 497 …. [17435] Secretary, Department of Infrastructure v Williamstown Bay and River Cruises Pty Ltd (2011) 181 LGERA 195 …. [29070] Secretary, Dept of Justice v Osland (2007) 95 ALD 380 …. [25010], [25225] Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596; 26 ALR 567 …. [39240] Securum Finance Ltd v Ashton [2001] Ch 291 …. [5170] Sedgwick, Collins & Co, Ltd v Highton (1929) 34 LIL Rep 448 …. [41005] See v Cohen (1923) 33 CLR 174 …. [39175] — v Hardman [2002] NSWSC 234; BC200201585 …. [3250] — v Milner (1979) 25 ACTR 21 …. [27295] — v — (1980) 2 A Crim R 210 …. [29150] See Lun; R v (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 363; 49 WN (NSW) 116 …. [17375] Seeney v Seeney [1945] QWN 20 …. [27105]
Seery; R v (1914) 19 CLR 15 …. [5105], [5185] Seifert; R v (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 358 …. [31120], [39010] Seiga; R v (1961) 45 Cr App R 220 …. [1375], [1420] Seigley; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 …. [17105], [23385] Seivers v R (2010) 173 ACTR 19 …. [7085] Sekhon; R v (1986) 85 Cr App R 19 …. [17240], [17245], [17305] Selby v Pennings (1998) 19 WAR 520 …. [1175] Seldon v Davidson [1968] 2 All ER 755; [1968] 1 WLR 1083 …. [7075], [17060] Selfe v Isaacson (1859) 1 F & F 194; 175 ER 688 …. [17055] Selig v Hayes (1989) 52 SASR 169 …. [7085], [9020] Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240 …. [15160] Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 120 ALR 16 …. [9085] Sellen v Norman (1829) 4 CB 80; 172 ER 616 …. [1170] Sells v Hoare (1822) 3 Br & B 232; 129 ER 1272 …. [13055] Selman v Minogue (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 280 …. [1170] Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 …. [1680], [9040], [9130] — v McNeill (2006) 4 DDCR 1 …. [29165] Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304; [1968] 2 All ER 497 …. [1520], [11120], [23280], [23320], [23330], [23340], [23345] Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 …. [1475], [39010] Semyraha; R v [2001] 2 Qd R 208 …. [11055], [11060], [23140], [25105] Senat v Senat [1965] P 172; [1965] 2 All ER 505 …. [15050], [15190], [17240], [17330], [17570] Senat; R v (1968) 52 Cr App R 282 …. [1300], [1310]
Seneviratne v R [1936] 3 All ER 36 …. [7160], [17120] Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News Ltd [1976] QB 23; [1975] 2 All ER 1009 …. [1315] Sepa Waste Water Treatment Pty Ltd v JMT Welding Pty Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 41 …. [25245] Seppelt (B) & Sons Ltd v Cmr for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147 …. [39290] Seres v All States Providores Pty Ltd [1975] WCR 112 …. [3135] Sergi; R v [1974] VR 1 …. [17390] Serjeant; R v (1826) Ry & Mood 352; 171 ER 1046 …. [13035], [13185] Serrao v Noel (1885) 15 QBD 549 …. [5070] Serratore; R v (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 …. [9120], [11125], [21050], [35495], [35500], [35532] Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 672 …. [25245] — v — (2006) 151 FCR 450 …. [25395] — v News Ltd (No 8) (2005) 224 ALR 317 …. [29170] — v News Ltd (No 10) (2005) 227 ALR 704 …. [25010] Severstal Export Gmb H v Bhushan Steel Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 141 …. [41005] Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 …. [25010], [25015], [25300] Seyfang v G D Searle & Co [1973] QB 148; [1973] 1 All ER 290 …. [13265] Seymour v A-G (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416; 53 ALR 513 …. [11120], [33610], [33685], [33695], [33710], [33760] — v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 …. [9075], [17445], [17450], [17460] SG; R v (2011) 250 FLR 337 …. [13070] SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43 …. [13060] SH; R v (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; 256 FLR 123 …. [17405]
Shackell v Macauley (1824) 3 LJ (Ch) 27 …. [25040] Shaddock (L) & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 36 ALR 385 …. [33435] Shaftsbury v Lord Digby, Lord (1676) Freem KB 422; 89 ER 314 …. [13275] Shah v Police [2006] 2 NZLR 425 …. [33810], [41055] Shaker v Al-Bedrawi [2003] Ch 350; [2002] 4 All ER 835 …. [41005] Shalala; R v (2007) 17 VR 133 …. [3190], [17160] Shallcross v Palmer, Doe d (1851) 16 QB 747; [1843] All ER Rep 139; (1851) 117 ER 1067 …. [33315], [33325] Shamouil; R v (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 …. [11125], [21252] Shand v R [1966] 1 All ER 511; [1996] 1 WLR 67 …. [1400] Shannon; R v (1987) 47 SASR 347 …. [1420] Sharif v Azad [1967] 1 QB 605; [1966] 3 All ER 785 …. [41010], [41035] Sharmpal Singh; R v [1962] AC 188 …. [1220], [3235] Sharp v Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federated Union of Workers [1989] WAR 138 …. [25155], [25175] — v Hotel International Ltd [1969] VR 103 …. [33455] — v Loddington Ironstone Co Ltd (1924) 132 LT 229 …. [17430], [37130] — v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; 246 ALR 84 …. [11150], [17080] — v Rodwell [1947] VLR 82; [1947] ALR 57 …. [13035], [13115] Sharp; R v (1983) 33 SASR 366 …. [33710], [33765] — (2003) 143 A Crim R 344 …. [25260], [33775] — [1988] 1 All ER 65; [1988] 1 WLR 7 …. [31010], [33455] — [1994] QB 261; [1993] 3 All ER 225 …. [17135], [33435] Sharrett v Gill (1993) 65 A Crim R 44 …. [1395]
Sharrock; R v [1948] 1 All ER 145 …. [13080] Shaw v Beck (1853) 8 Exch 392; 155 ER 1401 …. [17660], [17725] — v David Syme & Co [1912] VLR 336 …. [25275] — v Glen Falls Insurance Co [1938] 1 DLR 502 …. [5185] — v Harris (No 1) (1992) 3 Tas R 153 …. [25020] — v R (1952) 85 CLR 365; [1952] ALR 257 …. [1675], [17090], [17095], [17105], [17640], [17645], [17650], [17720], [21050] — v Wilson (1842) 9 Cl & Fin 355; 8 ER 450 …. [39235], [39240] — v Wolf (1998) 83 FCR 113; 163 ALR 205 …. [9050] Shaw Savill Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344; [1943] ALR 264 …. [3085] Shaw; R v (1888) 16 Cox CC 503 …. [1140], [19035] — (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 383 …. [1140], [3200] — [1996] 1 Qd R 641 …. [17155], [33435] Shawinigan Engineering Co v Naud [1929] SCR 341; [1929] 4 DLR 57 …. [29075] Shea v Tru Energy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 303 ALR 230 …. [25300] Shea; R v (1978) 18 SASR 591 …. [17205] Sheahan v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 209 …. [29125] — v Northern Australia Land & Agency Co Pty Ltd (1994) 176 LSJS 257 …. [13300] — v Woulfe [1927] St R Qd 128 …. [1610] Shears v Chisholm [1994] 2 VR 535 …. [5050], [5080], [33525] Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 1056; [1988] 1 WLR 946 …. [25020], [27210] Shed People Pty Ltd, The v Turner (2000) 34 ACSR 609 …. [25265] Shedden v A-G (1860) 30 LJPM & A 217; 2 Sw & Tr 170; 164 ER 958
…. [33210], [33250], [33820] Sheehan v R (2006) 163 A Crim R 397 …. [17295] Sheehan; R v (1999) 153 FLR 326 …. [7030] Sheikholeslami v Tolcher (2009) 75 NSWLR 418 …. [25175] Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 …. [21280] — v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 …. [21280], [27270] Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287; (1894) 11 TLR 137 …. [3159] Shellaker; R v [1914] 1 KB 414; [1911] All ER Rep Ext 1391 …. [21065], [21220] Shelton; R v [1981] Crim LR 776 …. [1390] Sheludko v Sheludko [1972] VR 82; [1972] ALR 137 …. [41005] Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620; [1939] 1 All ER 827 …. [13030], [13240], [13245], [25200] Shepard v US (1933) 290 US 96 …. [33295] Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431; [1954] 3 All ER 649 …. [7005], [17250] Shephard, Re; Shephard v — [1953] Ch 728; [1953] 2 All ER 608 …. [7005] Shephard; R v [1993] AC 380; [1993] 1 All ER 225 …. [29050], [31075], [35350] Shepherd v McGivern [1966] 1 NSWR 55 …. [1280] — v R [2012] 2 NZLR 609 …. [1370] — v R (No 5) (1990) 170 CLR 573; 97 ALR 161 …. [9035], [9040], [15220], [21035] — v Shepherd [1954] VLR 514; [1954] ALR 899 …. [17320], [35075], [35085], [35145] Shepherd; R v (1980) 71 Cr App R 120 …. [1520], [5210], [21100] — (1988) 16 NSWLR 1 …. [9040]
— (1988) 86 ALR 387 …. [9040] Sherman v Nymboida Collieries Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 580 …. [29050] Sherman, Re (1980) 72 Cr App R 266 …. [33690] Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NILR 151 …. [1335], [29090], [29130] Sherratt v Mountford (1873) LR 8 Ch App 928 …. [39210] Sherrin (No 2); R v (1979) 21 SASR 250 …. [15255] Sherwood v Haccles (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 61 …. [3065] Shevlin v HM Advocate 2002 SLT 239 …. [23025] Shield v Boucher (1847) 1 De G & Sm 40; 63 ER 962 …. [33230] Shiers; R v (2003) 7 VR 174 …. [15220] Shilling v Accidental Death Insurance Co (1858) 1 F & F 116; 175 ER 651 …. [31085], [37040] Shipping Corp of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142; 32 ALR 609 …. [7190] Shire of Flinders v T W Maw & Sons (Quarries) Pty Ltd [1971] VR 484 …. [1175] Shirt v Wyong Shire Council [1978] 1 NSWLR 631 …. [9110] Shone; R v (1983) 76 Cr App R 72 …. [31145], [35425] Shonias; R v (1974) 21 CCC (2d) 301 …. [17280] Shore; R v (1988) 89 Cr App R 32 …. [21170] Short v Lee (1821) 2 Jac & W 464; 37 ER 705 …. [33015] — v Mercier (1851) 3 Mac & G 205; 42 ER 239 …. [25120] Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 285; 79 ALR 279 …. [31065], [37090] — v — (1987) 79 ALR 299 …. [29155] Showlag v Mansour [1995] 1 AC 431; [1994] 2 All ER 129 …. [5035] Shrewsbury Peerage Case (1858) 7 HLC 1; 11 ER 1 …. [33235]
Shrimpton; R v (1851) 2 Den 319; 169 ER 521 …. [19140], [19145] Shum Yip Properties Development Pty Ltd v Chatswood Investment and Development Co Pty Ltd (2002) 40 ACSR 619 …. [1215] Shum; R v (1968) 62 QJPR 35 …. [17305], [17315] — [1968] QWN 7 …. [17305], [17315] Sibanda v R (2011) 53 VR 67; 213 A Crim R 303 …. [33485] Sica; R v (2012) 224 A Crim R 146 …. [33660] Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 1 All ER 643 …. [1165] Sidebottom v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 6 VR 302 …. [25125] Sidhu; R v (1992) 98 Cr App R 59 …. [21050] Sidmouth v Sidmouth [1835] All ER Rep 339; (1840) 47 ER 252; 2 Beav 447 …. [37040] Siebel v R (1992) 57 SASR 558 …. [23040] Siedofsky; R v [1989] 1 Qd R 655 …. [17325], [17565] Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] 2 WLR 523 …. [3135], [3165] Sievers; R v [1983] 2 Qd R 170 …. [19090] Signorotto v Nicholson [1982] VR 413 …. [27130] Silbermann v CGU Insurance Ltd (2003) 48 ACSR 231 …. [1490] Silley; R v [1964] QWN 45 …. [11060] Sills v Brown (1840) 9 Car & P 601; 173 ER 974 …. [29125] Silver v New York Central Railway Co (1952) 105 NE 2d 923 …. [31055] Silver Fox Co Pty Ltd v Lenard’s Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621 …. [25395] Silvera v Savic (1999) 46 NSWLR 124 …. [1215], [35532] Silverlock; R v [1894] 2 QB 766 …. [29060], [39105] Sim v Powell (1997) 22 Fam LR 243 …. [29190]
Sim; R v [1987] 1 NZLR 356 …. [39105] Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 345; [1987] 1 WLR 516 …. [25355] Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319; 30 ALR 519 …. [19125], [19135] Simmonds; R v (1967) 51 Cr App R 316 …. [17185] — [1969] 1 QB 685; [1967] 2 All ER 399 …. [1320], [17180], [17495] Simmons v London Joint Stock Bank (1890) 62 LT 427 …. [33540] — v Venning (1971) 1 SASR 403 …. [7105] Simmons; R v (1997) 68 SASR 81 …. [11035], [13050], [13055], [13275] Simon v Simon, Hogarth, Preston and Shaw [1936] P 17 …. [33115] Simon-Beecroft v Proprietors “Top of the Mark” Building Units Plan No 3410 [1997] 2 Qd R 635 …. [17325] Simons; R v (1834) 6 Car & P 540; 172 ER 1355 …. [33430] Simpson v Collinson [1964] 2 QB 80; [1964] 1 All ER 262 …. [15045] — v Fogo (1862) 1 H & M 195; 71 ER 85 …. [5035] — v Fraser (1893) 5 QLJ 89 …. [3065] — v Lever [1963] 1 QB 517; [1962] 3 All ER 870 …. [35070] — v Margitson (1847) 11 QB 23; 116 ER 383 …. [11010] — v Mullaly (1871) 2 VR (L) 56 …. [1175] Simpson, Re [1984] 1 NZLR 738 …. [33235], [33345], [33385] Simpson; R v (1993) 99 Cr App R 48 …. [21100] — [1983] 3 All ER 789; [1983] 1 WLR 1494 …. [3020], [3145] Sims v Thomas (2007) 179 A Crim R 412 …. [27255], [27315] Sims; R v [1946] KB 531; [1946] 1 All ER 697 …. [1085], [21015], [21025], [21115], [21170] — [1967] Qd R 432 …. [1520], [21040]
Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316; [1947] ALR 37 …. [11045], [33660], [33675] — v W R Carpenter Australia Pty Ltd (1983) 76 FLR 120 …. [5090] Sinclair Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310; [1929] ALR 336 …. [39290] Sinclair; R v (1905) 25 NZLR 266 …. [17090] Sindoni v R (2011) 211 A Crim R 187 …. [1395], [19135] Sing; R v (2002) 54 NSWLR 31 …. [11125], [29200] Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 152 …. [1215] Singh (Heer) v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4 …. [33730] Singh-Bal; R v (1997) 92 A Crim R 397 …. [11125], [35440] Singh; R v (1977) 15 SASR 591 …. [17185], [17200] Singleton v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 38 …. [33550] — v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (No 1) [1983] 2 NSWLR 722 …. [19165] Singleton; R v [1986] 2 Qd R 535 …. [17615], [19170] Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526 …. [25300], [25420] Sioui; R v [1990] 1 SCR 1025; (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 427 …. [33845] Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118; [1974] 3 All ER 776 …. [27205] Sitek; R v [1988] 2 Qd R 284 …. [1280], [1300], [33735] SJB; R v (2002) 129 A Crim R 572 …. [17295] SK Foods LP (California Ltd Partnership) v SK Foods Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543; 302 ALR 260 …. [5025], [5035] Skaf; R v (2004) 60 NSWLR 86 …. [1295] Skafte; R v (1940) 58 WN (NSW) 9 …. [15035] Skalde v Evans [1966] SASR 176 …. [1180], [1240], [3070]
Skandia Insurance Co Ltd v Skoljarev (1979) 142 CLR 375; 26 ALR 1 …. [7220] Skeate v Slaters [1914] 2 KB 429 …. [11090] Skinner & Co v Shew & Co [1894] 2 Ch 581 …. [37025] Skinner; R v (1993) 99 Cr App R 212 …. [17170] Skirving; R v [1985] QB 819; [1985] 2 All ER 705 …. [29050], [29110] Skone v Skone [1971] 2 All ER 582; [1971] 1 WLR 812 …. [11150], [25135] Skubevski v R [1977] WAR 129 …. [17090], [17125] Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1156 …. [25290] Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61 …. [39160] Slack; R v (2003) 139 A Crim R 314 …. [17505], [17510] Sladden v Sergeant (1858) 1 F & F 322; 175 ER 746 …. [17545] Slade v Tucker (1880) 14 Ch D 824 …. [25305] Slaney; R v (1832) 5 Car & P 213; 172 ER 944 …. [25120], [39100] Slapjums v City of Knox (No 1) [1978] VR 325 …. [3135] Slater; R v [1995] 1 Cr App R 584 …. [1390] Slatterie v Pooley (1840) 6 M & W 664; 151 ER 579 …. [33430], [33440], [39030] Slattery v Mance [1962] 1 QB 676; [1962] 1 All ER 525 …. [7190], [9050] Sleeman; R v (1853) 7 Cox CC 245 …. [33640] Slingsby v A-G (1916) 33 TLR 120 …. [1280] Slinn, In the Goods of (1890) 15 PD 156 …. [37105] Sloan v Pollard (1947) 75 CLR 445; [1948] 1 ALR 1 …. [3156] Slobodian; R v (1982) 30 SASR 161 …. [17580] Slocombe; R v [1991] Crim LR 198 …. [27130]
Sly v Sly (1877) 2 PD 91 …. [33055], [33070] Small v Allen, Doe d (1799) 8 TR 147; 101 ER 1314 …. [31095] Small; R v (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 …. [15160], [15220], [15255], [33735] Smallman; R v (1914) 10 Cr App R 1 …. [17505] Smallwood v Sparling [1982] 2 SCR 686; (1982) 141 DLR (3d) 395 …. [27040], [27065] Smallwood, Re; Smallwood v Martins Bank Ltd [1951] Ch 369; [1951] 1 All ER 372 …. [33340] Smart v Allen (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 241 …. [7070] — v Pepper (1987) 26 A Crim R 140 …. [3175] Smart; R v [1983] 1 VR 265 …. [35340] Smellie; R v (1919) 14 Cr App R 128 …. [13070] Smelt v Fuchau, Doe d (1812) 15 East 286; 104 ER 852 …. [1125] Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 65 …. [17460] — v Andrews [1891] 2 Ch 678 …. [33355] — v Bagias (1978) 21 ALR 435; 52 ALJR 678 …. [1650], [33805] — v Blakey (1867) LR 2 QB 326 …. [33050], [33055], [33115], [33140] — v Blandy (1825) Ry & M 257; 171 ER 1013 …. [33455] — v British Aerospace [1982] ICR 98 …. [17220] — v Butler [1900] 1 QB 694; [1900] All ER Rep Ext 1680 …. [7070] — v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187; [1881] All ER Rep 242 …. [1215] — v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 552; 52 WN (NSW) 180 …. [17275] — v Cornish [1973] Tas SR 108 …. [31085] — v Cramer (1835) 1 Bing NC 585; 131 ER 1242 …. [37025] — v Daniell (1874) LR 18 Eq 649 …. [25235], [25245]
— v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1993] AC 1; [1992] 3 All ER 456 …. [1190], [25075], [25165] — v Douglas (1855) 16 CB 31; 139 ER 665 …. [1290] — v Fell (1841) 2 Curt 667; 163 ER 544 …. [25245] — v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529 …. [33460] — v L A Johnson Pty Ltd [1968] SASR 353 …. [35060] — v Linskills (a firm) [1996] 2 All ER 353; [1996] 1 WLR 763 …. [5175] — v Maddison [1967] VR 307 …. [1125] — v Mansi [1962] 3 All ER 857; [1963] 1 WLR 26 …. [39145], [39175] — v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256; 108 ALR 55 …. [17725] — v Papamihail (1998) 88 FCR 80; 158 ALR 451 …. [25180] — v Police [1969] NZLR 856 …. [31015], [31155], [33810] — v R (1932) 35 WALR 1 …. [1250] — v — (1957) 97 CLR 100 …. [33610] — v — (1970) 121 CLR 572; [1971] ALR 193 …. [1320] — v — (1990) 64 ALJR 588 …. [1395], [29050] — v — (1993) 9 WAR 99 …. [17580], [19035] — v — (2001) 206 CLR 650; 181 ALR 354 …. [1370], [1490], [1520], [29165], [29175] — v — (2003) 138 A Crim R 403 …. [21050] — v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE (2d) 754 …. [9005] — v Read (1737) 1 Atk 526; 26 ER 332 …. [25075] — v Rummens (1807) 1 Camp 9; 170 ER 858 …. [5185] — v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 …. [1215] — v Smith [1957] 2 All ER 397; [1957] 1 WLR 802 …. [33420] — v — [1975] 1 NSWLR 725; (1975) 5 ALR 444 …. [17020]
— v The Midland Railway Co (1887) 57 LT 813 …. [29060] — v Western Australia (2000) 98 FCR 358 …. [27080] — v — (2014) 88 ALJR 384 …. [27215] — v Wilson (1832) 3 B & Ad 728; 110 ER 266 …. [39235] Smith (No 2); R v (1994) 64 SASR 1 …. [17380] Smith (Peter); R v [2011] 2 Cr App R 16 …. [1230], [29115] Smith Bros v Madden Bros [1945] QWN 33 …. [1130], [9010] Smith, Turner & Altintas; R v (1994) 63 SASR 123 …. [27305], [33570], [33700], [33725] Smith; R v (1783) 1 Leach 288; 168 ER 247 …. [5210] — (1865) 34 LJMC 153 …. [9115] — (1897) 18 Cox CC 470 …. [33475] — (1908) 1 Cr App R 203 …. [1360] — (1909) 2 Cr App R 86 …. [17375], [39105] — (1910) 6 Cr App R 19 …. [7075] — (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 …. [21105], [21165] — (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268; 65 WN (NSW) 101 …. [17650], [17665], [17700], [17715] — (1968) 52 Cr App R 648 …. [39105] — (1983) 33 SASR 558 …. [1370] — (1985) 20 A Crim R 130 …. [9035] — (1985) 81 Cr App R 286 …. [15225], [33435] — (1986) 85 Cr App R 197 …. [1380], [1425], [11095] — (1987) 7 NSWLR 444 …. [1445] — (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 …. [1295], [1305], [33570], [33770] — (1992) 58 SASR 491 …. [33660] — (1996) 16 WAR 205 …. [27255]
— (1999) 47 NSWLR 419 …. [29001], [29165] — (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 …. [29205] — [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 All ER 193 …. [33615], [33640], [33645] — [1961] 3 All ER 972 …. [33680] — [1964] NSWR 537 …. [15205] — [1964] VR 217 …. [9030] — [1964] VR 95 …. [33690], [33765] — [1968] 2 All ER 115; [1968] 1 WLR 636 …. [17075] — [1976] Crim LR 511 …. [31195] — [1979] 3 All ER 605; [1979] 1 WLR 1445 …. [29050] — [1981] 1 NSWLR 193 …. [3180] — [1982] 2 NSWLR 608 …. [17065] — [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 …. [1445], [1450], [31185] — [1985] Crim LR 590 …. [25095] — [1987] VR 907 …. [1400], [29050] — [1989] Crim LR 900 …. [23210] — [1992] 2 SCR 915; (1992) 94 DLR (4th) 590 …. [35500] — [2005] 2 All ER 29; [2005] 1 WLR 704 …. [27215] Smithers v Andrews; Ex parte Andrews [1978] Qd R 64 …. [11045] Smith Kline Beecham (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chipman (2003) 131 FCR 500 …. [29080] Smith Kline Beecham plc v Generics (UK) Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 1479 …. [25055] Smithwick v National Coal Board [1950] 2 KB 335 …. [1600], [7005] Smorgon v FCT (1979) 23 ALR 480; 53 ALJR 336 …. [25225] SMS; R v [1992] Crim LR 310 …. [19090] Smyth; R v [1963] VR 737 …. [7030]
Snaresbrook Crown Court; Ex parte DPP; R v [1988] QB 532 …. [25290] Sneddon v Stevenson [1967] 2 All ER 1277; [1967] 1 WLR 1051 …. [15095], [27305] Sneesby; R v [1951] St R Qd 26 …. [15090] Snow v R [1962] Tas SR 271 …. [7030] Snow; R v (1915) 20 CLR 315 …. [3158] Snowden (dec’d), Re [1979] Ch 528; [1979] 2 All ER 172 …. [9085] Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Wholefoods Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 43 …. [5170] Soare v Ashley [1955] VLR 438; [1955] ALR 1001 …. [5065] Sobey v Nicol and Davies (2007) 245 ALR 389 …. [11150] Société Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Compagnie Internationale de Navigation [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 627 …. [41005] Société Française Hoechst v Allied Colloids Ltd [1992] FSR 66 …. [25210], [25235] Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundqvist [1991] 2 QB 310; [1990] 3 All ER 283 …. [25040], [25075], [25105], [25120] Society of Medical Officers of Health v Hope (Valuation Officer) [1960] AC 551; [1960] 1 All ER 317 …. [5085] Sodeman v R (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] 2 All ER 1138 …. [7075], [9045] Sodo; R v (1975) 61 Cr App R 131 …. [29075] Sofilas v Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 196 …. [25055] Solak v Registrar of Titles (2011) 33 VR 40 …. [5170] Solicitor a, Re; Ex parte The Prothonotary (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53 …. [9075] Solicitor-General of Canada v Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of Health Records in Ontario [1981] 2 SCR 494;
(1981) 128 DLR (3d) 193 …. [27130] Solicitor, Re a [1993] QB 69; [1992] 2 All ER 335 …. [5180], [5190], [9075] Solomon; R v (1958) 25 WWR 307 …. [17480] — (2005) 92 SASR 331 …. [1305], [1445], [17130], [29185] Solomons; R v 1959 (2) SA 352 …. [21115] Solosky v R (1979) 105 DLR (3d) 745 …. [25220] Solway, The (1885) 10 PD 137 …. [33540] Soma; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 537 …. [17535], [17630] — (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421 …. [1675], [1742], [11140], [17090], [17120], [17530], [17535], [17620], [17650], [17655] Somanader v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 178 ALR 677 …. [5030] Somatra Ltd v Sinclair Roche & Temperley (a firm) [2000] 1 WLR 2453 …. [25355] Somers; R v [1963] 3 All ER 808; [1963] 1 WLR 1306 …. [29060] — [1999] Crim LR 744 …. [19030] Somerville v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 118 ALR 149 …. [25010] — v — (1995) 60 FCR 319; 131 ALR 517 …. [25265], [27105] Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 305; 77 WN (NSW) 321 …. [5030] — v — (1963) 109 CLR 285 …. [5025], [5030], [5075] Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442; 273 ALR 213 …. [25175] Sonnet v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 220 …. [35417] Sopher; R v (1992) 74 A Crim R 21 …. [29075] Sophocleous v Ringer [1988] RTR 52 …. [31075] Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; 46 ALR 237 …. [1295],
[25060], [25075], [25085], [25095], [25100], [25105], [25120], [25175], [25180], [39105] Sorby; R v [1986] VR 753 …. [9035], [9040], [15180], [15255], [33570] Sorgenfrie; R v (1981) 51 FLR 147 …. [17545] Sornberger v Canadian Pacific Ry (1897) 24 Ont App 263 …. [1295] Sossi; R v [1986] WAR 163 …. [13275] Soteriou; R v (2013) 118 SASR 119 …. [21035], [21257] Sotheren; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 301 …. [21050] Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 …. [1645] Souleyman; R v (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 …. [17405] South American and Mexican Co, Re; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37; [1891] All ER Rep 680 …. [5025] South Australia v Barrett (1995) 64 SASR 73 …. [25265] — v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373; [1942] ALR 186 …. [3156] — v Peat Marwick Mitchell (1995) 65 SASR 72 …. [25265] — v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161; 83 ALR 631 …. [3156] South Australia Co v City of Port Adelaide [1914] SALR 16 …. [33540] South Australia Police v Oakes (1996) 85 A Crim R 209 …. [39075] South Australian Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs v Charles Moore (Aust) Ltd (1977) 139 CLR 449; 14 ALR 485 …. [3158] South Australian Railways Commissioner v Thomas (1951) 84 CLR 84; [1951] ALR 849 …. [1290] South British Fire & Marine Insurance Co v Ackhoonzada (1909) 11 WALR 47 …. [5055] South Ribble Magistrates; Ex parte Cochrane; R v [1996] 2 Cr App R 544 …. [17195] South Shropshire District Council v Amos [1987] 1 All ER 340; [1986] 1
WLR 1271 …. [25355] South Worcestershire Magistrates; Ex parte Lilley; R v [1995] 4 All ER 186; [1995] 1 WLR 1595 …. [1030] South-Sea Co v Bunsted (1720) 1 Eq Ca Abr 77; 21 ER 890 …. [25075] Southern Cross Airlines Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472 …. [25265] Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd v Crinis [1984] VR 697 …. [25220], [25225] Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 145 …. [17485], [17550] Southern Equities Corp Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1 …. [25210], [25225], [25240] Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen (1997) 70 SASR 166 …. [25010] — v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 …. [1025], [11130], [27270], [35065], [35090], [35360], [35400] Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen & Co (No 10) (2002) 82 SASR 53 …. [35360] — v Arthur Andersen & Co (No 11) (2002) 82 SASR 63 …. [35400] Southern Star Group Pty Ltd (t/as KGC Magnetic Tapes) v Taylor (1991) 4 ACSR 133 …. [25125] Southey v Nash (1837) 7 Car & P 632; 173 ER 277 …. [17055] Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec and mgrs apptd) (in liq), Re (2006) 203 FLR 1 …. [25240], [35595] Southon; R v (2003) 85 SASR 436; 139 A Crim R 250 …. [1395] Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 2 All ER 561 …. [7005], [7225] Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 …. [25225], [25235], [25245] Soward v Leggatt (1836) 7 C & P 613; 173 ER 613 …. [7070]
Spaak v Chicago & NW Ry 231 F 2d 279 (7th Circ, 1956) …. [1295] Spain (King of) v Machado (1827) 4 Russ 225; 38 ER 790 …. [41005] Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd (2009) 166 ACTR 14 …. [17170] Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 703 …. [25055] Spargos Mining NL v Standard Chartered Australia Ltd (No 1) (1989) 1 ACSR 311 …. [27105] Sparkes v R (1998) 8 Tas R 21 …. [17175], [31195] Sparkes; R v (1996) 6 Tas R 178 …. [17175], [31195] Sparks v R [1964] AC 964; [1964] 1 All ER 727 …. [17275], [31010], [31155], [31185], [31195], [33615] Sparrow; R v (2009) 104 SASR 320 …. [1380], [17495] — [1973] 2 All ER 129; [1973] 1 WLR 488 …. [17335], [23030], [23035], [33455] Spassked Pty Ltd v FCT (No 2) (2002) 49 ATR 642 …. [39010] Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 …. [5025], [5040] — v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506 …. [7050] Special Minister for State v Quin (1984) 3 FCR 293; 56 ALR 168 …. [27155] Speck v Sarrer 20 Cal 2d 585 (1942) …. [7280] Specktor v Lees [1964] VR 10 …. [39135] Spedley Securities Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711 …. [25010] Speechley; R v [2005] Crim LR 811 …. [11105] Speight, In re; Speight v Gaunt (1883) 22 Ch D 727 …. [3240] Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; 8 MVR 1 …. [1215], [33455] — v Jacob and Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1982] Qd R 748 …. [25240] Spenceley v De Willott (1806) 7 East 108; 103 ER 42 …. [17580],
[21275], [21285] — v Schulenburgh (1806) 7 East 358; 103 ER 138 …. [25255] Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309 …. [27065] Spencer; R v (2000) 113 A Crim R 252 …. [33745] — [1985] QB 771; [1985] 1 All ER 673 …. [13065], [15070] — [1987] AC 128; [1986] 2 All ER 928 …. [15160], [15180] Spens v IRC [1970] 3 All ER 295; [1970] 1 WLR 1173 …. [5025] Spens; R v [1991] 4 All ER 421; [1991] 1 WLR 624 …. [11010] Spero; R v (2006) 13 VR 225 …. [1385], [1400] Sperotto; R v (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334; 92 WN (NSW) 223 …. [7030] Spiby; R v (1990) 91 Cr App R 186 …. [1180], [1315] Spicer v Coppins (1991) 56 SASR 175 …. [35360] Spicers Paper (NZ) Ltd v Whitcoulls Group Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 72 …. [25020] Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance (Aust) Ltd (1985) 3 ANZ Ins Cases 60-663 …. [17495] Spilsbury; R v (1835) 7 C & P 187; 173 ER 82 …. [33295], [33660] Spinks; R v [1982] 1 All ER 587 …. [5210], [33495], [33520] Spiteri; R v (2004) 61 NSWLR 369 …. [17130] Spittle v Spittle [1965] 3 All ER 451; [1965] 1 WLR 1156 …. [17300] Spitzel v Beckx (1890) 16 VLR 661 …. [27070] Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co [1897] 2 QB 124; [1895] All ER Rep Ext 1779 …. [25105] Spooner; R v [1957] VR 540; [1957] ALR 1056 …. [29130] Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2003) 133 FCR 63; 202 ALR 98 …. [3156] Sportsbet Pty Ltd v — (2010) 186 FCR 226; 269 ALR 362 …. [3160]
— v New South Wales (No 3) (2009) 262 ALR 27 …. [25385], [27010], [27095] Sportsvision Australia Pty Ltd v Tallglen Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 103 …. [39290] Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1 …. [25010], [25265] Spratt; R v [1980] 2 All ER 269; [1980] 1 WLR 554 …. [11140] Spring; R v [1958] NZLR 468 …. [33490], [33505] Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217; 110 ALR 685 …. [25055] Spunwill Pty Ltd v BAB Pty Ltd (1994) 36 NSWLR 290 …. [39290] Spurge; R v [1961] 2 QB 205; [1961] 2 All ER 688 …. [7160] SPW v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 301 …. [11140], [17275] SQMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 205 ALR 392 …. [25010] Sreckovic v R [1973] WAR 85 …. [7050] SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporak [1927] AC 37 …. [3135], [11150] SS Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 288 …. [1215] St Barnabas Nominees Pty Ltd v Stallard Corporation Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 477 …. [39135] St George; R v (1840) 9 Car & P 483; 173 ER 921 …. [17615] St John City v Irving Oil Co Ltd [1966] SCR 581; (1966) 58 DLR (2d) 404 …. [29155] St Leger v Bailey [1962] Tas SR 131 …. [3020] St Louis; R v (1984) 79 Cr App R 53 …. [23315] St Martin’s, Leicester; R v (1834) 2 Ad & E 210; 111 ER 81 …. [17225] ST; R v (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 …. [15210] Stace v Griffith (1869) LR 2 PC 420 …. [11030]
Stack v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 526 …. [17165] Staffer v Hanley (1987 unreported) …. [3135] Stafford v DPP [1974] AC 878; [1973] 3 All ER 762 …. [11140] — v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510 …. [7085] Stafford Allen & Sons Ltd v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1956] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 104 …. [41005] Stafford; R v (1976) 13 SASR 392 …. [33675], [33740], [33760] — [1968] 3 All ER 752 …. [9020] Stainer v Burgesses of Droitwich (1696) 1 Salk 281; 91 ER 247 …. [3040] Staines; R v (1974) 60 Cr App R 160 …. [1220] Stalder; R v [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 …. [19125], [19130], [19145], [21140], [23275] Stamford; R v [1972] 2 QB 391; [1972] 2 All ER 430 …. [29050], [29110] Stanbouli; R v (2003) 141 A Crim R 531 …. [3020] Standard Bank of Canada v Wildey (1919) 19 SR (NSW) 384; 36 WN (NSW) 144 …. [41005] Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 35 NSWLR 588 …. [35205], [35225] — v — (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 …. [1215], [25010], [25040], [25235], [25245] Standfield v Byrne [1929] SASR 352 …. [1080], [11005], [15245] Stanfield v Rosin [1966] Qd R 10 …. [17300], [35030], [35105] Stanhill Consolidated Ltd, Re [1967] VR 749 …. [25010] Stanke (H) & Sons Pty Ltd v von Stanke (2006) 95 SASR 425 …. [25020] Stankovich; R v (2004) 149 A Crim R 88 …. [27315] Stannard; R v (1837) 7 C & P 673; 173 ER 295 …. [19120]
— [1965] 2 QB 1; [1964] 1 All ER 34 …. [15160], [23375], [39105] Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115; 177 ALR 285 …. [1755], [19115], [19160], [23415] Stansbury v Arkwright, Doe d (1833) 5 C & P 575; 172 ER 1105 …. [33020], [37025] Stanton v Callaghan [2000] 1 QB 75; [1998] 4 All ER 961 …. [29080] — v Percival (1855) 5 HLC 257; 10 ER 898 …. [33450] — v R [1981] WAR 185 …. [9035] Stanton; R v (1911) 6 Cr App R 198 …. [33615] — [1994] Crim LR 834 …. [23315], [23355] Stapylton v Clough (1853) 23 LJQB (NS) 5 …. [33090] Starecki; R v [1960] VR 141 …. [33660] Starkey; R v [1988] 2 Qd R 294 …. [19090] Starr; R v [1969] QWN 23 …. [33485] Starrett; R v (2002) 82 SASR 115 …. [1680], [13050], [15030] State v Avon Bottle Store Pty Ltd 1963 (2) SA 389 …. [15110] — v Chambers (1938) 280 NW 196 …. [3270], [3290] — v Di Vicenti (1957) 93 S 2d 677 …. [31040] — v Labuzan 37 La Ann 489 (1885); WL 6095 (1885) …. [17505] — v Lincey and Watson Pty Ltd 1965 (1) SA 572 …. [31120] — v R 1965 (2) SA 463 …. [33845] — v Richardson 84 P 2d 699 (SC Wash, 1938) …. [1295] — v Tolisano 70 A 2d 118 (1949) …. [31050], [31090] — v Xoswa 1965 (1) SA 267 …. [17460] State Bank of New South Wales v Muir (1997) 8 BPR 15,483 …. [1130] State Bank of South Australia v Heinrich (1989) 52 SASR 596 …. [1315] — v Smoothdale (No 2) Ltd (1995) 184 LSJS 254 …. [25390]
— v — (1995) 64 SASR 224 …. [25010], [25055] State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Gay [1951] VLR 104; [1951] ALR 301 …. [1530] State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 …. [9090] — v Paneros (1988) 48 SASR 349 …. [25255] — v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 26 ALR 67; 53 ALJR 656 …. [3159] — v Whyatt (1984) 37 SASR 454 …. [1180] State Government Insurance Corp v GIO (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511; 101 ALR 259 …. [29155], [31095], [37090] State Government Insurance Office v Saarinen [1967] QWN 23 …. [33455] State of Alabama (Re Davenport v Alabama), Ex parte 426 So 2d 472 (1982) …. [37155] State of Hawai’i v Sanchez 923 P 2d 934 (1996) …. [17505] State of Norway’s Application, Re (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 723; [1989] 1 All ER 701 …. [5080] State Pollution Control Commission v Tallow Products Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 517 …. [5130] State Rail Authority NSW v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540 …. [17445], [19055] State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588; 73 ALJR 306 …. [11150] — v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 …. [39145], [39160] — v Smith (1998) 45 NSWLR 382 …. [25395] State Rail Authority of NSW v O’Keefe (1995) 21 MVR 63 …. [3020] State Superannuation Board (NSW) v FCT (1988) 82 ALR 63 …. [3020] Stateliner Pty Ltd v Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 16 …. [7190], [17370], [17390], [33420]
Statutory Visitors to St Lawrence’s Hospital, Caterham; Ex parte Pritchard; R v [1953] 2 All ER 766 …. [25305] Staub; R v (1909) 2 Cr App R 6 …. [15025] Stavrinos; R v (2003) 140 A Crim R 594 …. [33770] Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; 67 ALR 21 …. [3140], [11160] Stead; R v [1994] 1 Qd R 665 …. [27300], [27310] Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536; [1974] 2 All ER 977 …. [9085] Steel v Smith (1817) 1 B & A 94; 106 ER 35 …. [7150] Steel, In the Marriage of (1992) 107 FLR 143 …. [25010], [25355], [25365] Steele v HM Advocate 1992 JC 1 …. [1370] — v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 …. [1210], [1215], [17135], [37085] Steele, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Clayton Utz (a firm) (1994) 48 FCR 236; 119 ALR 716 …. [25265], [25280] Steer v R (2008) 191 A Crim R 435 …. [33435] Steffan; R v (1993) 30 NSWLR 633 …. [1880] Steffen v Ruban (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264 …. [29065] — v — [1966] 2 NSWR 622 …. [29070] Stehbens; R v (1976) 14 SASR 240 …. [9070] Steinberg v FCT (1975) 134 CLR 640; 7 ALR 491 …. [17600] Steinhauser v Davies (1994) 3 Tas R 258 …. [1675] Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457; [1945] ALR 8 …. [3156] Stephen v Gwenap (1831) 1 M & Rob 120; 174 ER 41 …. [33035] Stephens v Elliott 92 P 45 (Mont, 1907) …. [1295] — v Foster (1833) 6 Car & P 289; 172 ER 1245 …. [17710] — v R (1977) 18 ALR 245 …. [11010]
— v — (1978) 139 CLR 315; 21 ALR 680 …. [11010] — v — (1985) 156 CLR 664; 58 ALR 753 …. [11125], [33735] Stephens; R v [1999] 3 NZLR 81 …. [39105] Stephenson; R v (1978) 18 SASR 381 …. [15170] — [1976] VR 376 …. [1530] Stergiou; R v (2004) 147 A Crim R 120 …. [19085] Sterk; R v [1972] Crim LR 391 …. [17125] Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277 …. [29155], [31095], [37090] Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 192 …. [17445], [41005] Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68 …. [1680], [11125] Stevens v Gullis (Pile, third party) [2000] 1 All ER 527 …. [29225] — v R (2005) 222 ALR 40; 80 ALJR 91 …. [9035] — v William Nash Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 156; [1966] 1 WLR 1550 …. [1280] Stevens; R v [1995] Crim LR 649 …. [21050] Stevenson v Barham (1977) 136 CLR 190; 12 ALR 175 …. [11090] — v Yasso [2006] 2 Qd R 150 …. [7150] Stevenson (dec’d), Re; Public Trustee v X [1944] NZLR 301 …. [39255] Stevenson; R v [1971] 1 All ER 678; [1971] 1 WLR 739 …. [1315] Stewart v Australian Crime Commission (2012) 206 FCR 347; 294 ALR 505 …. [25210] — v Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd [1974] VR 24 …. [7065] — v GIO (NSW) (1996) 39 NSWLR 531 …. [5055] — v R (1921) 29 CLR 234; 27 ALR 178 …. [19110], [19140], [33610] — v Royal Bank (1930) 1 MPR 302; [1930] 2 DLR 617 …. [17460]
Stewart (Eric); R v [2009] 3 NZLR 425 …. [17065] Stewart; Ex parte A-G; R v [1989] 1 Qd R 590 …. [9110], [11100] Stewart; R v (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 33 …. [17265] — (1972) 56 Cr App R 272 …. [33660], [33750] — (1986) 83 Cr App R 327 …. [15100] — (1989) 89 Cr App R 273 …. [3130] — (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 …. [15260] — [1970] 1 All ER 689; [1970] 1 WLR 907 …. [33700] — [1993] 2 Qd R 322 …. [15125] Stimac v Nicol [1942] VLR 66; [1942] ALR 88 …. [5105] Stimpson; R v (1826) 2 Car & P 415; 172 ER 188 …. [17650] Stinchcombe; R v [1991] 3 SCR 326 …. [17130] Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315; [1944] 2 All ER 13 …. [1675], [23210], [23280], [23285], [23320] Stobart v Dryden (1836) 1 M & W 615; 150 ER 581 …. [1470], [1500], [31020], [31040], [31090], [31135], [31165] Stock v Orcsik [1977] VR 382 …. [33810], [41045] Stocker v Stocker [1966] 2 All ER 147; [1967] 1 WLR 190 …. [1235] Stockfleth v De Tastet (1814) 4 Camp 10; 171 ER 4 …. [27300] Stockwell; R v (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 …. [1370], [29050], [29110] Stoddart v Boulton (2009) 260 ALR 268 …. [25150] Stohl Aviation v Electrum Finance Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 187; 56 ALR 716 …. [33380], [33385], [33390], [33405], [33550] Stokes v R (1960) 105 CLR 279; [1961] ALR 319 …. [17135], [17520], [17615] — v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 …. [1220], [1490], [1520], [3035], [3200], [3205], [37085], [37110], [37170] Stollery, Re;Weir v Treasury Solicitor [1926] Ch 284; [1926] All ER Rep
67 …. [33345], [41060] Stone v Blackburn (1793) 1 Esp 37; 170 ER 272 …. [13055] — v Hume [1948] Tas SR 40 …. [39185] Stones v Byron (1846) 4 Dowl & L 393 …. [13300] Stones; R v [1956] SR (NSW) 25 …. [7030] Storey v Eastbourne Rural District Council [1927] 1 Ch 367 …. [7165] Storey; R v (1968) 52 Cr App R 334 …. [17335], [33455] — (1978) 140 CLR 364; 22 ALR 47 …. [5135], [5150], [5155], [5215], [23215] — [1998] 1 VR 359 …. [9070] Story; R v (2004) 144 A Crim R 370 …. [1360] Stoten v Sage (2005) 144 FCR 487; 222 ALR 451 …. [25150] Stotesbury v Turner [1943] KB 370 …. [25355] Stott; R v (2011) 111 SASR 346 …. [11100] Stoupas; R v [1998] 3 VR 602 …. [17275] Stowe v Querner (1870) LR 5 Ex 155 …. [11040] Straffen; R v [1952] 2 QB 911; [1952] 2 All ER 657 …. [21035], [21040], [21100], [21110], [21165], [21175], [33690] Straker v Graham (1839) 4 M & W 721; 150 ER 1612 …. [27215] — v R (1977) 15 ALR 103; 51 ALJR 690 …. [29010], [33490] Strand Electric; R v [1969] 1 OR 190 …. [33540] Strange v Hybinett [1988] VR 418 …. [17485] Strarch International Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2005) 191 FLR 225 …. [1685] Stratford v Ministry of Transport [1992] 1 NZLR 486 …. [1290], [9040] Stratton; R v (1909) 3 Cr App R 255 …. [23315] Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90 …. [1355], [1360], [1380], [1395] Strausz; R v (1977) 17 SASR 197 …. [33480]
Strawbridge; R v [1970] NZLR 909 …. [7030] Strawhorn; R v (2008) 185 A Crim R 326 …. [15160] Stretton; R v (1986) 86 Cr App R 7 …. [17480] Stringer v Gardiner (1859) 4 De G & J 468; 45 ER 182 …. [39315] Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419 …. [3130], [3135], [3140], [3300] Stripp; R v (1978) 69 Cr App R 318 …. [9120] Strode v Seato, Doe d (1834) 2 Ad & E 171; 111 ER 66 …. [33355] Stronach; R v [1988] Crim LR 48 …. [23270] Stroner; R v (1845) 1 Car & Kir 650; 174 ER 676 …. [17125] Strong v Woolworths Ltd t/as Big W (2012) 285 ALR 420; 86 ALJR 267 …. [3200], [3240], [7210], [9130] Stroud v Stroud [1963] 3 All ER 539; [1963] 1 WLR 1080 …. [17240], [17570] Strudwick; R v (1993) 99 Cr App R 326 …. [15220], [33435] Stuart v Dundon [1963] SASR 134 …. [39200] — v Goldberg Linde (a firm) [2008] 1 WLR 823 …. [5170] — v R (1959) 101 CLR 1 …. [23025], [33690] — v — (1974) 134 CLR 426; 4 ALR 545 …. [1760] — v Sanderson (2000) 100 FCR 150; 175 ALR 681 …. [5170] Stubbs; R v (2009) 228 FLR 221 …. [27310] — [1982] 1 All ER 424; [1982] 1 WLR 509 …. [17485] Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 275 ALR 451 …. [3175], [3180], [21115], [21257] Stuke v ROST Capital Group Pty Ltd (2012) 207 FCR 86 …. [17055] Stunzi Sons Ltd v House of Youth Pty Ltd [1959] 60 SR (NSW) 220; [1959] 77 WN (NSW) 23 …. [1670], [17575] Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 50; [1970] 3 All ER 230
…. [5230], [7275] Sturla v Freccia (1880) 5 App Cas 623; [1874] All ER Rep 657 …. [31015], [33065], [33345], [33350], [33380] Su; R v (2003) 7 VR 13 …. [33780] — [1997] 1 VR 1 …. [17120], [21215], [33455], [33565], [33595] Suarski v Barbarich [1969] WAR 46 …. [39160] Subbotovsky v Waung (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 242; 89 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 155 …. [41005] Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 …. [31010], [31065], [31085] Sugarman; R v (1935) 25 Cr App R 109 …. [23145] Sugden v St Leonards (Lord) (1876) 1 PD 154; [1874] All ER Rep 21 …. [31015], [33315], [33320], [33330], [33335], [37100], [37115], [39060] — v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301 …. [25255], [25300] Sulco Ltd v ES Redit and Co Ltd [1959] NZLR 45 …. [1165] Suleski v Sons of Gwalia Ltd [2005] WASCA 220; BC200509917 …. [17375] Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 …. [3160] — v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 183 ALR 404 …. [3159] Sullivan; R v (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) (L) 131 …. [1290] — (1887) 16 Cox CC 347 …. [33420] — (1966) 51 Cr App R 102 …. [33770] — [1923] 1 KB 74; [1922] All ER Rep 431 …. [17105], [17650] — [1970] Tas SR 284 (NC) 5 …. [39105] — [1971] 1 QB 253 …. [1155] Sullman v Sullman [2002] DFC 95-248 …. [17460] Sultana; R v (1994) 74 A Crim R 27 …. [21195]
Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 68; [2002] 1 WLR 479 …. [25275] Summers v Moorhouse (1884) 13 QBD 388 …. [39270] — v Moseley (1834) 2 Cr & M 477; 149 ER 849 …. [17470] Summers; R v [1952] 1 All ER 1059 …. [9020] — [1990] 1 Qd R 92 …. [9030] Sumner v Booth [1974] 2 NSWLR 174 …. [39105] — v R (2010) 29 VR 398 …. [11045], [15160], [15170], [15175] Sumner and Leivesley v John Brown & Co (1909) 25 TLR 745 …. [17370] Sumner; R v (2013) 117 SASR 271 …. [37060] — [1935] VLR 197; [1935] ALR 350 …. [15020] Sunflower Services Ltd v Unisys New Zealand Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 385 …. [39240] Supetina Pty Ltd v Lombok Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 439; 59 ALR 581 …. [1630], [33825], [35050], [35120], [35205] Suratan; R v [2004] Crim LR 943 …. [29075] Suresh v R (1998) 153 ALR 145; 72 ALJR 769 …. [17270], [17275], [17365] Surface Technology plc v Young [2002] FSR 25 …. [25265] Surgenor; R v [1940] 2 All ER 249 …. [13065] Surrey; R v [2005] 2 Qd R 81 …. [1220] Surujpaul v R [1958] 3 All ER 300; [1958] 1 WLR 1050 …. [33460] Sussex Caravan Parks Ltd v Richardson [1961] 1 All ER 731; [1961] 1 WLR 561 …. [39290] Sussex Peerage Case [1843] All ER Rep 55; (1844) 8 ER 1034; 11 Cl & Fin 85 …. [33045], [33065], [33295], [41035] Sut v Nominal Defendant (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 78; 89 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 26 …. [25290]
Sutcliffe, In the Marriage of (1988) 12 Fam LR 794; 93 FLR 377 …. [7180] Suteski; R v (2002) 128 A Crim R 275 …. [31085], [35455], [35505] — (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 …. [11125], [35455], [35500], [35505], [35510] Sutton v Prenter; Ex parte Prenter [1963] Qd R 401 …. [29070] — v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; 51 ALR 435 …. [11120], [21020], [21035], [21080], [21085], [21090], [21120], [21230], [21280], [23345] — v Sadler (1857) 3 CB(NS) 87; 140 ER 671 …. [7025], [7040], [7090] Sutton (No 2); R v (1983) 32 SASR 553 …. [3200], [21080] Sutton; R v (1816) 4 M & S 532; 105 ER 931 …. [33355] — (1982) 32 SASR 203 …. [33760] — (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 …. [15220], [33435] — (1991) 94 Cr App R 70 …. [17245] — [1986] 2 Qd R 72 …. [11095], [11100] Svajcer v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 587 …. [15135], [17120] Svenska Handelsbanken v Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 84 …. [25265] Swaffer v Mulcahy [1934] 1 KB 608 …. [3090] Swaffield; R v (1998) 192 CLR 159; 151 ALR 98 …. [11125], [27305], [33595], [33760], [33765] Swan v Miller Son and Torrance Ltd [1919] 1 IR 151 …. [33540] Swan, Re (1871) 2 VR (IE & M) 47 …. [41005] Swanston; R v (1982) 33 BCLR (3d) 385 …. [31185] Swarbrick v Swarbrick [1964] WAR 106 …. [3001] SWC; R v (2007) 175 A Crim R 71 …. [7085], [17435], [17460] Sweeney v Denness (1954) 56 WALR 52 …. [33810] Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; [1969] 1 All ER 347 …. [7030]
Sweet-Escott; R v (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 …. [17505], [19020] Sweitzer v R [1982] 1 SCR 949; (1982) 137 DLR (3d) 702 …. [21090] Swinburne v David Syme & Co [1909] VLR 550; (1909) 15 ALR 579 …. [1610] SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd (2006) 201 FLR 238 …. [25395] Sybron Corp v Barclays Bank plc [1985] Ch 299 …. [25055] Sych v Hunter (1974) 8 SASR 118 …. [29070] Sydall v Castings Ltd [1967] 1 QB 302; [1966] 3 All ER 770 …. [39255] Sydleman v Beckwith 43 Conn 12 (1875) …. [29085] Sydney Electricity v Giles (1993) 9 NSWCCR 700 …. [37060] Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354 …. [29200] Sykes and Campi (No 1); R v [1969] VR 631 …. [33660], [33715] Sykes; R v [1997] Crim LR 752 …. [1245] Syme; R v (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 284 …. [27215] Symes, Ex parte (1805) 11 Ves 521; 32 ER 1191 …. [25040] Symonds; R v [2002] 2 Qd R 70 …. [23345] Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179; [1993] 4 All ER 143 …. [5195] Szach; R v (1980) 23 SASR 504; 2 A Crim R 321 …. [17250], [17605], [17615], [31095], [33710], [33725] Szechter (orse Karsov) v Szechter [1971] P 286; [1970] 3 All ER 905 …. [41005] Szekely v R (1978) 19 SASR 431 …. [9035] SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 159 FCR 1 …. [25210], [25250], [25280] T v Medical Board of South Australia (1992) 58 SASR 382 …. [9075] — v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247 …. [27265], [33750]
T (a child) v R (1998) 20 WAR 130 …. [31065], [33775] T and Director of Youth and Community Services, Re [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 …. [19110] T, T; R v (2004) 90 SASR 567 …. [13165] T, WA; R v (2013) 118 SASR 382 …. [17135], [17550] T; R v (1996) 86 A Crim R 293 …. [21243] — (1998) 71 SASR 265 …. [11035], [13055], [13275] — (1999) 74 SASR 486 …. [17295] — (2001) 122 A Crim R 206 …. [33750] — [1993] 1 Qd R 454 …. [13060] — [1998] 2 NZLR 257 …. [7085] Ta Ho Ma Pty Ltd v Allen (1999) 47 NSWLR 1 …. [1215] TA; R v (2003) 57 NSWLR 444 …. [1520], [17505] Taber v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 427 …. [35455], [35480], [35510] Taggart; R v (1979) 1 Cr App R 144 …. [9070] Taha; R v (2000) 120 A Crim R 161 …. [1125] Tait v Phathaisong [2000] FLC 93-049 …. [9050] Tait, Re [1957] VR 405; [1957] ALR 862 …. [39175] Tait; R v (1979) 46 FLR 386 …. [9070] — [1963] VR 520 …. [17055], [17075] — [1992] 2 NZLR 666 …. [29050] Tak Ming Co Ltd v Yee Sang Metal Supplies Co [1973] 1 All ER 569; [1973] 1 WLR 300 …. [5025] Taka; R v [1992] 2 NZLR 129 …. [3130], [27215] Talbot v Berkshire County Council [1994] QB 290; [1993] 4 All ER 9 …. [5055], [5170] — v Lewis (1834) 1 Cr M & R 495; 149 ER 1175 …. [33180]
— v Marshfield (1865) 2 Drew & Sm 549; 62 ER 728 …. [25265] — v Police (2001) 80 SASR 279 …. [17460] — v Von Boris [1911] 1 KB 854 …. [7040], [7100] Talbot de Malahide v Cusack, Lord (1864) 17 ICLR 213 …. [17225] Talyancich v Index Developments Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 28 …. [5080] Tam v Tang [2013] NSWSC 708; BC201302938 …. [15150] Tamblyn; R v [1967] SASR 140 …. [11140] Tame v Commonwealth Collieries Pty Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 269 …. [3135] — v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 191 ALR 449 …. [3159], [3235] Tameshwar v R [1957] AC 476; [1957] 2 All ER 683 …. [1290], [1295] Tan v — (2008) 192 A Crim R 310 …. [35455] Tancred, Arrol & Co v Steel Co of Scotland Ltd (1890) 15 App Cas 125 …. [11010] Tanda; R v (1986) 43 SASR 161 …. [17270] Tanenbaum v Helpvic Ltd (1960) 22 DLR (2d) 333 …. [33355] Tang; R v (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 …. [1370], [29050], [29185], [29195], [29200] — [1998] 3 VR 508; (1997) 149 ALR 534 …. [27255], [33780] Tanham v Nicholson (1872) LR 5 HL 561 …. [1130] Tann v Schild (1990) 54 SASR 523 …. [27255] Tanner v US 483 US 107 (1987) …. [27215] Tanner; R v (1977) 66 Cr App R 56 …. [23315] Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O’Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332; 91 ALR 180 …. [5170] Tanswell v Scurrah (1865) 11 LT 761 …. [17480] Taouk; R v (2005) 154 A Crim R 69 …. [27315]
Tapner v Strange [1964] 3 All ER 747; [1965] 1 WLR 942 …. [35090] Tarantino; R v (1993) 67 A Crim R 31 …. [15160] Target Petroleum NL v Petroz NL (1987) 16 FCR 1; 73 ALR 274 …. [17575] Tartaglia; R v (2011) 110 SASR 378 …. [9040] Tasmania v Cadman (2011) 208 A Crim R 541 …. [33775], [35650] — v Challender (2007) 16 Tas R 339 …. [27315], [33775], [35650] — v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 329 …. [3157], [3158] — v Crane (2004) 148 A Crim R 346 …. [27315] — v Finnegan (2011) 21 Tas R 116; 222 A Crim R 327 …. [5135] — v Martin (No 2) (2011) 20 Tas R 445 …. [3285], [19085], [21252], [29175], [41045] — v Stojakovic (2008) 18 Tas R 96 …. [27315], [35620] — v Y (2007) 178 A Crim R 481 …. [21252] Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v Mac Queen (2004) 12 Tas R 436 …. [17170] Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492; 70 WN (NSW) 302 …. [11090] Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch 512; [1990] 3 All ER 303 …. [25055], [25075] Tate; R v [1908] 2 KB 680 …. [33770] Tatham; R v (1921) 15 Cr App R 132 …. [15095] Tatum v Catomore, Doe d (1851) 16 QB 745; 117 ER 1066 …. [39130] — v Dunne (1900) 6 ALR 58 …. [25245] Taufua; R v BC9605430 …. [1450] Tausz v Elton [1974] 2 NSWLR 163 …. [17575], [33340], [35005] Taylor v Anderton [1995] 2 All ER 420; [1995] 1 WLR 447 …. [27105] — v Ansett Transport Industries Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 342; 72 ALR 188
…. [5030], [5040], [5055] — v Anstis [1940] VLR 300; [1940] ALR 238 …. [39050] — v Armand [1975] Crim LR 227 …. [17200] — v Armour & Co Pty Ltd [1962] VR 346 …. [17645] — v Barclay (1828) 2 Sim 213; 57 ER 769 …. [3085] — v Batten (1878) 4 QBD 85 …. [25240] — v Carmichael [1984] 1 NSWLR 421 …. [25125] — v Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225; [1986] 1 WLR 1479 …. [1300], [1370], [31075] — v Ellis [1956] VLR 457; [1956] ALR 1092 …. [1610], [7120] — v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137 …. [11130], [29050] — v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282 …. [1220] — v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422; 45 ALR 265 …. [11150], [39240] — v Kentucky (1978) 436 US 478 …. [7085] — v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706 …. [9050], [33840] — v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 …. [25085] — v R (1918) 25 CLR 573 …. [17390] — v — (1923) 17 Cr App R 109 …. [21065], [21180] — v — (1978) 22 ALR 599 …. [7090], [17645], [29075] — v — (2009) 200 A Crim R 342 …. [19090] — v Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177; [1998] 4 All ER 801 …. [25055] — v Taylor [1956] Tas SR 84 …. [11030] — v — [1970] 2 All ER 609; [1970] 1 WLR 1148 …. [5230], [35005] — v Witham (1876) 3 Ch D 605 …. [33055], [33060], [33070], [33080], [33140] Taylor (JN) Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Bond (1991) 57 SASR 21 …. [25275]
Taylor, Re [1968] Qd R 385 …. [33340] Taylor; R v (2004) 8 VR 213 …. [15165], [15170], [15240] — (2008) 2 ACTLR 216 …. [1450] — 1961 (3) SA 616 …. [37075] — [1978] Crim LR 92 …. [33495] — [1993] 1 NZLR 647 …. [1305] — [1999] 2 Cr App R 163 …. [13085], [23345] Tchadovitch v Tchadovitch (2010) 79 NSWLR 491 …. [1275] TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333 …. [29200] — v Antoniadis (1998) 44 NSWLR 682 …. [17510] Te Kira; R v [1993] 3 NZLR 257 …. [11075] Te Whiu & Buckton; R v [1964] NZLR 748 …. [1245] Teasdale; R v (2004) 145 A Crim R 345 …. [17120] Tedeschi v Legal Services Cmr (1997) 43 NSWLR 20 …. [5040] — v Singh [1948] Ch 319 …. [17165], [17475] Tedjame-Mortty; R v [2011] Crim LR 676 …. [17135] Teeluck v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 WLR 2421 …. [19135] Teitler; R v [1959] VR 312 …. [15075] Telebooth Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [1994] 1 VR 337 …. [25255] Television New Zealand Ltd v Prebble [1993] 3 NZLR 513 …. [27095] Telfer; R v (2004) 142 A Crim R 132 …. [19125] Telnet Pty Ltd v Takapana Investments Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 520 …. [25055] Telstra Corp Ltd v ACCC (2008) 171 FCR 174; 251 ALR 372 …. [1215] — v — [2008] ATPR 42-259 …. [11010]
— v Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 …. [25300] — v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152; 156 ALR 634 …. [25010], [25300] — v Optus Communications Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 171 …. [29205] Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 …. [1730] — v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd (2000) 102 FCR 517; 178 ALR 707 …. [11010] Temilkovski v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd [1966] 1 NSWR 276; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 211; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 140 …. [41005], [41035] Templeton; R v [1956] VLR 709; [1956] ALR 706 …. [1175] Tennant v Hamilton (1839) 7 Cl & Fin 122; 7 ER 1012 …. [17500] Tenstat Pty Ltd v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 625 …. [25385] Teper v R [1952] AC 480; [1952] 2 All ER 447 …. [1105], [1675], [31020], [31040], [31050], [31160], [31185], [37010], [37020], [37055], [37070] Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634 …. [3020], [3159], [17001] Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256 …. [9115], [11095] — v Kelly (1987) 45 SASR 340 …. [9005] — v — (1988) 47 SASR 271 …. [9005] Termijtelen v Van Arkel [1974] 1 NSWLR 525 …. [3165] Terrell v Secretary of State for the Colonies [1953] 2 QB 482; [1953] 2 All ER 490 …. [41005] Terry v Johnson (2009) 198 A Crim R 128 …. [27240] — v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1995) 6 BPR 14, 091 …. [5170] Terry; R v [2005] QB 996 …. [5215]
Tetlow; R v (1986) 27 A Crim R 198 …. [21035] Teys; R v (2001) 161 FLR 44 …. [21252], [33690] Thackray v Gunns Plantations Ltd (2011) 85 ACSR 144 …. [39080] Thames Borough v Thames Valley Electric Power Board [1957] NZLR 523 …. [39240] Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572; 104 ALR 485 …. [29125] Tharpe v Gisburne (1825) 2 Car & P 21; 172 ER 10 …. [39100] Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57; [1961] ALR 586 …. [15055], [33480], [33505] Thatcher; R v [1969] 1 All ER 998 …. [27135] THD v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 106 …. [1420] The Arantzazu Mendi; Government of the Republic of Spain, The v [1939] AC 256; [1939] 1 All ER 719 …. [3085] The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte the Western Australian National Football League (Inc); R v (1979) 143 CLR 190; 23 ALR 439 …. [3156] The Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson; R v [1993] 2 Qd R 687 …. [17155], [27130] The United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Co (Ltd); R v (1862) 3 F & F 73; 176 ER 33 …. [1280] Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 All ER 229; [1962] 1 WLR 151 …. [3020] Theilmann v Commonwealth [1982] VR 713 …. [1530] Theo v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 70 FCR 317 …. [5080] Theodoropoulas v Theodoropoulas [1964] P 311; [1963] 2 All ER 772 …. [25365] Theodosi; R v [1993] RTR 179 …. [29070] Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; 129
ALR 1 …. [3158] Theophanous; R v (2003) 141 A Crim R 216 …. [27095], [27255], [27310] Theos; R v (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 …. [1370], [1440], [21050], [21070], [21180] Thiess v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd (No 4) [1992] 2 Qd R 549 …. [17560] — v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 …. [9050] Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Terokell Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 341 …. [25010], [25265] Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181; [1964] 1 All ER 341 …. [5020], [5075] Thomas v Balanced Securities Ltd [2012] 2 Qd R 482 …. [5040] — v Connell (1838) 4 M & W267; 150 ER 1429 …. [37085], [37095] — v David (1836) 7 C & P 350; 173 ER 156 …. [1090], [1140], [17055], [19035], [19075] — v Hollier (1984) 156 CLR 152; 53 ALR 39 …. [33435] — v Jenkins (1837) 6 Ad & E 525; 112 ER 201 …. [33180] — v Jones [1921] 1 KB 22; [1920] All ER Rep 462 …. [15045], [15165], [15170], [15175] — v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1997] QB 813; [1997] 1 All ER 747 …. [19025] — v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307; 237 ALR 194 …. [3156] — v Nash (2010) 107 SASR 309 …. [27270], [27295] — v New South Wales (2008) 74 NSWLR 34 …. [35510], [35545] — v R (1960) 102 CLR 584; [1960] ALR 233 …. [9030] — v — [1952] 2 SCR 344; [1952] 4 DLR 306 …. [17275], [17285] — v — [1972] NZLR 34 …. [1110], [9040] — v R (No 2) [1960] WAR 129 …. [17645], [29090] — v Thomas (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 159 …. [33575]
— v — [1961] 1 All ER 19; [1961] 1 WLR 1 …. [3125] — v — [1970] SASR 36 …. [17060] — v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 …. [17435], [17455] Thomas & Agnes Carvel Foundation v Carvel [2008] Ch 395; [2007] 4 All ER 81 …. [5060] Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 1077; [1981] 1 WLR 505 …. [9010] Thomas Cheshire & Co v Vaughan Brothers & Co [1920] 3 KB 240 …. [3135] Thomas, In the Goods of (1871) 41 LJP & M 32 …. [33070], [33115] Thomas, Re [1932] St R Qd 57 …. [33345] Thomas; R v (1836) 7 Car & P 345; 173 ER 154 …. [33625] — (1948) 33 Cr App R 74 …. [21040] — (1957) SR (NSW) 292 (CCA) …. [19140] — (1988) 40 A Crim R 89 …. [15090] — (2006) 14 VR 475 …. [33665], [33780] — [1933] 2 KB 489; [1933] All ER Rep 726 …. [27215] — [1959] 3 All ER 522; [1959] 1 WLR 1086 …. [11140], [15255] — [1970] VR 674 …. [11070], [33480], [33490], [33570] — [1986] Crim LR 682 …. [1290] Thomason v Campbelltown Municipal Council (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347 …. [25010] Thomason; R v (1999) 139 ACTR 21 …. [1450] Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429 …. [25040] — v HM Advocate 1968 JC 61 …. [11050] — v Hodgson, Doe d (1840) 12 Ad & E 135; 113 ER 762 …. [39045] — v Jermyn (1927) 30 WALR 123 …. [37105]
— v Kovacs [1959] VR 229; [1959] ALR 636 …. [3070] — v Manhattan Railway 42 NY Supp 896 (1896) …. [31035], [31040], [31165] — v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 …. [39160] — v R (1968) 117 CLR 313; [1968] ALR 432 …. [3150], [21065], [21180] — v — (1986) 13 FCR 165 …. [1295], [29050] — v — (1989) 169 CLR 1; 86 ALR 1 …. [9005], [21020], [21035], [21085], [21090], [21120] — v — [1918] AC 221; [1918] All ER Rep 521 …. [3150], [21035], [21065], [21110], [21115], [21165], [21175], [21180] — v — [1998] AC 811 …. [11070], [19135] — v Trevanion (1693) Skin 402; 90 ER 179 …. [37050] Thompson (HW) Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 …. [21280], [21285] Thompson, Re; Lloyds Bank Ltd v George [1939] 1 All ER 681 …. [33340] Thompson; R v (1783) 1 Leach 291; 168 ER 248 …. [33640] — (1872) LR 1 CCR 377 …. [13110], [13185] — (1974) 16 CCC (2d) 374 …. [33490] — (1975) 11 SASR 217 …. [9070] — (1976) 64 Cr App R 96 …. [17385] — (1992) 57 SASR 397 …. [15110] — (2002) 130 A Crim R 24 …. [17135] — (2008) 21 VR 135 …. [17460] — [1893] 2 QB 12; [1891] All ER Rep 376 …. [11075], [33620], [33625], [33675] — [1962] 1 All ER 65 …. [27215]
— [1964] QWN 25 …. [17375] — [1966] 1 All ER 505; [1966] 1 WLR 405 …. [23270] — [1966] QWN 47 …. [19120], [19130], [19135] — [1967] Crim LR 62 …. [17055] — [1975] Crim LR 34 …. [17335] — [1982] QB 647; [1982] 1 All ER 907 …. [33795] — [1983] 1 Qd R 224 …. [15195] — [1995] 2 Cr App R 589 …. [19155] — [1995] 3 NZLR 423 …. [17535], [17545] — [2006] 2 NZLR 577 …. [17505] Thomson v Austen (1823) 1 LJOS 99 …. [25355] — v Corporation of Glasgow 1962 SC (HL) 36 …. [17135], [17430] Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150; 37 ALR 66 …. [5025] Thomson; R v [1912] 3 KB 19 …. [17430], [37115], [37120] Thonemann; R v (1915) 9 QJP 31 …. [17090] Thongjai v R [1998] AC 54 …. [11065] Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd v Kitching & Busby [1984] FSR 342 …. [25075] Thorn L & M Appliances Pty Ltd v Claudianos [1970] Qd R 141 …. [39185] Thorne (LG) & Co Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A/asia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81 …. [39145] Thorne; R v (1977) 66 Cr App R 6 …. [19030] Thornhill; R v (1838) 8 C & P 575; 173 ER 624 …. [3175] Thornton v The Royal Exchange Assurance Co (1790) Peake 37; 170 ER 70 …. [29070] Thornton; R v [1995] 1 Cr App R 578 …. [1390]
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Tichowitsch; R v [2007] 2 Qd R 462 …. [13070], [17295] Tickel v Short (1750) 2 Ves Sen 239; 28 ER 154 …. [33435] Tickell v Trifleska (1990) 24 NSWLR 548 …. [25240], [25245] Tickle v Tickle [1968] 2 All ER 154; [1968] 1 WLR 937 …. [37130] Tido v R [2011] 2 Cr App Rep 336; [2012] 1 WLR 115 …. [1410] Tikos (No 2); R v [1963] VR 306 …. [11135] Tilev; R v (1983) 33 SASR 344 …. [27255] Tilk v Parsons (1825) 2 Car & P 201; 172 ER 92 …. [31105], [31165] Tilley v Tilley [1949] P 240; [1948] 2 All ER 1113 …. [7005] Tilley; R v [1961] 3 All ER 406; [1961] 1 WLR 1309 …. [39105] — [1985] VR 505 …. [29050] Tillott; R v (1991) 53 A Crim R 46 …. [9035] — (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 …. [17175] Tilman v Tarver, Doe d (1824) Ry & M 141; 171 ER 972 …. [33250] Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598 …. [35455], [35605] — v — (2009) 75 NSWLR 380 …. [29170], [35545] Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 …. [3070] Times Properties Pty Ltd v Challenge Bank Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-455 …. [25300] Timm v R [1981] 2 SCR 315; [1981] 124 DLR (3d) 582 …. [11075] Timothy v State [2000] 1 WLR 485 …. [11065], [33595] Tiner v — 182 So 2d 859 …. [3020] Tingle Jacobs and Co v Kennedy [1964] 1 All ER 888n; [1964] 1 WLR 638 …. [1180] Tinning v Moran [1939] AR (NSW) 148 …. [25150] Tipene v Apperley [1978] 1 NZLR 761 …. [27105]
Tipene; R v (2001 unreported) …. [1370] Tirado; R v (1974) 59 Cr App R 80 …. [35205], [35360], [35425] Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 397; 156 ALR 364 …. [25010], [25235], [25300] Tissington; R v (1843) 1 Cox CC 48 …. [19075] Titheradge v R (1917) 24 CLR 107; 24 ALR 77 …. [17080], [17090] Titijewski; R v [1970] VR 371 …. [17545] Tito v Waddell [1975] 3 All ER 997; [1975] 1 WLR 1303 …. [1290], [1295], [27165] Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104 …. [5095] TJ v R (2009) 97 A Crim R 508 …. [17295] TJF; R v (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 …. [35525] TJW; Ex parte Attorney-General; R v [1988] 2 Qd R 456 …. [1170] TJW; R v [1989] 1 Qd R 108 …. [35425] TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124; 193 ALR 7 …. [1755], [11035], [11140], [19125] TM; R v [2000] 2 Cr App R 266 …. [21050] TN; R v (2005) 153 A Crim R 129 …. [15135], [17290] TNT Bulk Ships Ltd v Hopkins (1987) 146 NTR 1 …. [1050] TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345; 53 ALJR 267 …. [9090] — v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 47 ALR 693 …. [25235] To; R v (2002) 131 A Crim R 264 …. [1450] Tobi v Nicholas (1987) 86 Cr App R 323 …. [37060] Tobias v Allen (No 2) [1957] VR 221 …. [35045], [35080], [35085], [35090], [35120], [35245], [35315] Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757 …. [33435] Tobin; R v [1978] 1 NZLR 423 …. [29075]
— [2003] Crim LR 408 …. [19005] Todd v Todd [1961] 2 All ER 881; [1961] 1 WLR 951 …. [41085] Todd; R v (1980) 72 Cr App R 299 …. [33690] Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 37 ALR 481 …. [3020], [3159] Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396; 238 ALR 650 …. [33635], [33655], [33660], [33665] Tofilau (No 2); R v (2006) 13 VR 28 …. [11055], [27305], [33635] Tofilau; R v (2003) 13 VR 1 …. [33635] Toia; R v [1982] 1 NZLR 555 …. [3150], [15220] Toki (No 3); R v (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 …. [21050], [21252], [35495], [35500], [35532] Toleman v Portbury (1870) LR 5 QB 288 …. [7070] Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342 …. [1645], [39240] Tollemache, Re; Ex parte Edwards (1884) 14 QBD 415 …. [33050] Tolson; R v (1864) 4 F & F 103; 176 ER 488 …. [1280], [29095], [31195] Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100 …. [17460] Tomes; R v [1917] VLR 78; (1917) 23 ALR 30 …. [41040] Tomic v Limro Pty Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 414 …. [33420] Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 201; [1969] 1 WLR 1378 …. [25350], [25380] Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593; [1980] 1 WLR 322 …. [17055] Tompkins; R v (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 …. [25025], [27300] Ton; R v (2002) 123 A Crim R 340 …. [15160] Tone v Brolly (1891) 17 VLR 467 …. [15150]
Toner; R v (1991) 93 Cr App R 382 …. [29050] — [1966] QWN 44 …. [11060], [25105] Tonkin; R v [1975] Qd R 1 …. [1645], [17350], [29070], [29105], [29125], [37140] Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140 …. [25395] Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595; [1965] 1 All ER 506 …. [17585], [17590], [19015], [19045], [19050], [19095], [29050] Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council; R v (1981) 151 CLR 170; 38 ALR 439 …. [27065] Tooke; R v (1794) 25 St Tr 344 …. [21210], [37085] — (1989) 90 Cr App R 417 …. [17335] Tooma; R v [1971] Qd R 212 …. [15215] Toomey; R v [1969] Tas SR 99 …. [11060], [23140] Topham v McGregor (1844) 1 Car & Kir 320; 174 ER 829 …. [17200], [17210] Torni, The [1932] P 78 …. [41005] Torrance v Cornish (1985) 79 FLR 87 …. [9110], [9120] Toth v Jarman [2006] 4 All ER 1276 …. [29080] Toulmin v Millar (1887) 12 App Cas 746; [1886] All ER Rep Ext 1782 …. [11145] Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 …. [25305] Tousek v Bernat (1959) 61 SR (NSW) 203; 77 WN (NSW) 838 …. [17135] Toussaint v AG of St Vincent and the Grenadines [2007] 1 All ER 1; [2007] 1 WLR 2825 …. [27095] Tovehead Pty Ltd v Freeman (2003) 175 FLR 311 …. [11090] Towers v R (1984) 75 FLR 77 …. [9120]
Towney v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401; 147 ALR 402 …. [25300] Townsend v Bishop [1939] 1 All ER 805 …. [5040] Townsend; R v [1987] Crim LR 411 …. [31175] Townsley v Allan [1985] Tas R 123 …. [27085] Tozer Kemsley & Milbourn (A’Asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384; [1956] ALR 271 …. [1215], [7075] TQ; R v (2007) 173 A Crim R 385 …. [35410] Tracey v Kelly [1929] IR 634 …. [37115] Tracey, Re; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518; 84 ALR 1 …. [3158] Tracius v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 687; 79 WN (NSW) 638 …. [9050] Tracy Peerage Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 154; 8 ER 700 …. [29045] Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Ice Works Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96; 123 ALR 503 …. [25075], [25080] — v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 225; [1981] ATPR 40-237 …. [9120], [11090], [33570], [33575] — v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 174 …. [33540] — v Ampol Petroleum (Vic) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 316; 127 ALR 533 …. [25255] — v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 20 ALR 31 …. [11010] — v Arnotts Ltd (1989) 88 ALR 69 …. [25010], [25350], [25375] — v — (1989) ATPR 40-979 …. [37090] — v — (1990) 21 FCR 324; 92 ALR 527 …. [29065] — v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306 …. [13300] — v Arnotts Ltd (No 3) (1989) 21 FCR 316 …. [17105], [17510]
— v Arnotts Ltd (No 5) (1990) ATPR 41-010 …. [35280] — v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55 …. [11090] — v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1994] ATPR 41-348 …. [25125] — v International Technology Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 466 …. [25245] — v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168; 55 ALR 527 …. [17445], [17450] — v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1978) 40 FLR 74 …. [11090] — v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 26 ALR 609 …. [1215], [9050], [33455], [33540], [33565] — v Queensland Aggregates Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 51 FLR 364; [1981] ATPR 40-233 …. [27120] — v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 …. [25225], [25235], [25240] — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1983) 56 ALR 647 …. [17180], [17545] — v — (1984) 1 FCR 172; 53 ALR 214 …. [39045] — v — (1984) 56 ALR 647 …. [1130], [1635], [17230], [17240], [17245], [17550], [25010], [33385], [33405], [33460], [33540], [33550], [35010], [35050], [35195], [35205], [35210], [35225], [35245], [35315], [35545], [35550], [41130] — v Tooth & Co Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397; 26 ALR 185 …. [3060] — v Vales Wine Co Pty Ltd (1996) 145 ALR 241 …. [15255] Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd; R v (1970) 123 CLR 361; [1970] ALR 449 …. [3158] Trainer v R (1906) 4 CLR 126; 13 ALR 53 …. [1195], [1250], [15210], [15220] Tramountana Armadora SA v Atlantic Shipping Co SA [1978] 2 All ER 870 …. [25355] Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 294 …. [17055], [17120]
— v R [1994] 2 SCR 951 …. [33805] Tran; R v (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 …. [29075] — (2006) 96 SASR 8 …. [23025] — (2009) 198 A Crim R 23 …. [15160] — (2011) 109 SASR 595 …. [7085] — [2000] 2 Qd R 430 …. [1400] Transport & General Insurance v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23; [1963] ALR 315 …. [17305], [17315] Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 …. [1215], [9040], [9055] Transport Minister v Garry [1973] 1 NZLR 120 …. [17460], [31015] Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111; [1958] ALR 177 …. [3285], [29050], [29055], [29060], [29110] Travers; R v (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 85; 74 WN (NSW) 484 …. [1300], [25180], [33640] Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326; (1992) Aust Contract R 90-011 …. [3159], [11150], [39240] Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v — (1992) 36 FCR 406; 108 ALR 335 …. [5055], [5060], [5070] Treacy; R v [1944] 2 All ER 229 …. [11060], [17430], [33595], [33660] Tregear; R v [1967] 2 QB 574; [1967] 1 All ER 989 …. [17090], [17095], [17475], [17650] Tregenza v Bryson (1989) 8 MVR 529 …. [27255] Treharne v Geo McEwin & Son Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 543 …. [11090] Trelawney v Coleman (1817) 1 B & Ald 90; 106 ER 33 …. [37085] Trelford v Samuels (1974) 7 SASR 587 …. [29110] Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529;
[1977] 1 All ER 881; [1977] 2 WLR 356 …. [41005] Trepca Mines Ltd, Re [1959] 3 All ER 798; [1960] 1 WLR 24 …. [33805] Trevorrow v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 94 SASR 1 …. [25020], [25295] — v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64 …. [25025] — v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136 …. [29050] Trewin v Picknoll (1992) 9 WAR 523 …. [35200] Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar (1775) 20 How St Tr 923 …. [19035] Trial of Sir Miles Stapleton (1681) 8 How St Tr 501 …. [19035] Trial of William Viscount Stafford (1680) 7 How St Tr 1293 …. [19035] Trickett v Walker (1931) [1938] SASR 107n …. [1105] Trickett; R v (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 110 …. [17505] — [1981] Crim LR 331 …. [33740] Tricoglus; R v (1976) 65 Cr App R 16 …. [21025], [21180] Triffett; R v (1992) 1 Tas R 293 …. [5210] Trigg; R v [1963] 1 All ER 490; [1963] 1 WLR 305 …. [15125] Trimarchi; R v (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451; 49 WN (NSW) 157 …. [17090], [17125] Trimbey v Vignier (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 151; 131 ER 1075 …. [41035] Trimble v Thorne [1914] VLR 41; (1913) 19 ALR 568 …. [7100] Trimboli; R v (1979) 21 SASR 577 …. [9035], [19120], [19125], [19130], [19135] Trimcoll Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWCA 307; BC200709267 …. [35565] Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335; 83 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 393 …. [5030] Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939]
2 KB 395; [1939] 2 All ER 613 …. [25080], [25100], [25105], [33540] Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1; [1961] ALR 780; (1961) 35 ALJR 72 …. [15100], [15110], [31085], [33565], [33570], [33575] Tripodi; R v [1961] VR 186 …. [15175], [15210], [15220] Tripodina; R v (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 …. [1645] Trochym; R v [2007] 1 SCR 239 …. [17175] Trocko v Renlita Products Pty Ltd (1971) 2 SASR 1 …. [3135] Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd (No 2) (2010) 274 ALR 626 …. [39290] Trotter v McLean (1879) 13 Ch D 574 …. [1130] Trotter; R v (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 …. [15250], [17065], [17240], [17550], [17570], [17575] — (1992) 58 SASR 223 …. [33690], [33760] — [1977] Tas SR 133 …. [17535] Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532 …. [11090] Trudgett v R (2008) 70 NSWLR 696 …. [1450] Trudgian v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 163 …. [25175] Trueman v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2007) 99 SASR 431 …. [1025] Trump; R v (1979) 70 Cr App R 300 …. [33625] Truong; R v (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 …. [11125], [27315], [35615], [35620] Trupedo; R v 1920 AD 58 …. [1245] Trust Houses Ltd v Postlethwaite (1944) 109 JP 12 …. [39045] Trustees of Pencader Presbyterian Church in Pencader Hundred v Gibson 22 A 2d 782 …. [33845] Trustees of the Property of Cummins (a bankrupt) v Cummins (2006)
227 CLR 278; 224 ALR 280 …. [3305], [9055], [17250], [37040] Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Canberra and Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161; 216 ALR 415 …. [3159] Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 …. [13165] Tsang v DPP (Cth) (2011) 35 VR 240 …. [31085], [33565], [33570], [33575], [33805] Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 273 …. [33805], [35460] Tsang King-Nam v R [1981] 1 WLR 1462 …. [7045] TSB Bank plc v Robert Irving & Burns [2000] 2 All ER 826 …. [25265] Tsingopoulos; R v [1964] VR 676 …. [1290] TSR; R v (2002) 5 VR 627 …. [17130], [17705], [19135] TTS Pty Ltd v Griffiths (1991) 105 FLR 255 …. [29060], [33540] Tubby Trout Pty Ltd v Sailbay Pty Ltd (1992) 42 FCR 595; 113 ALR 748 …. [35205], [35545], [41130] Tucker v Oldbury Urban District Council [1912] 2 KB 317 …. [33060] Tucker; R v (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 504 …. [1830] — [1907] SALR 30 …. [1320] — [1994] Crim LR 683 …. [15220] Tuckiar v R (1934) 52 CLR 335 …. [33555] Tucs v Manley (1985) 62 ALR 460 …. [31010] Tudehope v Stewart 1986 JC 88 …. [1275] Tuegel; R v [2000] 2 All ER 872 …. [17135] Tugaga; R v (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 …. [1380], [1880], [11100], [11125] Tugwell v Hooper (1847) 10 Beav 348; 50 ER 616 …. [25265] Tuia v R [1994] 3 NZLR 553 …. [27215] Tulic v — (1999) 91 FCR 222 …. [7085], [9030]
Tully v — (2006) 230 CLR 234; 231 ALR 712 …. [15160], [17295], [21050] Tumahole Bereng v — [1949] AC 253 …. [1220], [15105], [15210] Tune; R v (1944) 29 Cr App R 162 …. [33770] Turbo Tek Enterprises Inc v Sperling Enterprises Pty Ltd (1989) 23 FCR 331; 88 ALR 524 …. [11150] Turf Enterprises Pty Ltd, Re [1975] Qd R 266 …. [25350] Turnbull; R v (1984) 80 Cr App R 104 …. [37060] — (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 …. [15090], [15095] — [1907] VLR 11; (1906) 12 ALR 551 …. [1175] — [1958] Tas SR 80 …. [27095] — [1977] QB 224; [1976] 3 All ER 549 …. [1355], [1390], [1395], [11100], [15160], [15210] — [1988] 2 Qd R 266 …. [15100] Turner v Blunden [1986] Fam 120; [1986] 2 All ER 75 …. [15180] — v Forwood [1951] 1 All ER 746 …. [39160], [39180] — v Jenolan Investments Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 40-571 …. [21280] — v McMann (1882) 22 NBR 391 …. [17615] — v Pearte (1787) 1 TR 717; 99 ER 1339 …. [13055] — v Tsaousis (1974) 7 SASR 488 …. [17660] — v Underwood [1948] 2 KB 284; [1948] 1 All ER 859 …. [33500] Turner (No 17); R v (2002) 10 Tas R 388 …. [41130] Turner, Re; Glenister v Harding (1885) 29 Ch D 985 …. [33210], [33245] Turner; R v (1664) 6 St Tr 565 …. [19105] — (1816) 105 ER 1026; 5 M & S 206 …. [7140], [7160], [7180] — (1817) 32 St Tr 957 …. [19120], [19145]
— [1814] All ER Rep 713; (1832) 168 ER 1298; 1 Mood 347 …. [5210] — (1975) 12 SASR 373 …. [1240] — (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 …. [3200], [13085], [31155], [33045], [33540], [33550] — (1975) 61 Cr App Rep 67 …. [3175] — (1977) 16 SASR 444 …. [17065] — (2000) 76 SASR 163 …. [1400], [31185] — (2001) 126 A Crim R 160 …. [33610] — [1910] 1 KB 346; [1908] All ER Rep Ext 1206 …. [33460], [39050] — [1944] KB 463; [1944] 1 All ER 599 …. [19075], [23320] — [1975] QB 834; [1975] 1 All ER 70 …. [3285], [19005], [19045], [19050], [19155], [29045], [29050], [29065], [29070], [29150], [31155], [31165], [33825] — [1995] 3 All ER 432; [1995] 1 WLR 264 …. [17130], [27130] Turney; R v (1990) 52 SASR 438 …. [21065], [21090] Turnsek; R v [1967] VR 610 …. [15125], [15250] Turton v Barber (1874) LR 17 Eq 329 …. [25225] Tustin v Arnold & Sons (1915) 84 LJKB 2214 …. [37050] Tweed Shire Council v Hancomatic Music Pty Ltd (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-922 …. [17600] Tween; R v [1965] VR 687 …. [5065] Twiss; R v [1918] 2 KB 853 …. [21065] Twist; R v [1954] VLR 121 …. [33485], [33770], [37155] Twitchell; R v [2000] 1 Cr App R 373 …. [19030] TWL v R (2012) 222 A Crim R 445 …. [21050], [21252] Twyman v Knowles (1853) 13 CB 222; 138 ER 1183 …. [39010] TY; R v (2006) 12 VR 557 …. [15220]
Tyler v Thomas (2006) 150 FCR 357 …. [29080] Tyler; R v [1994] 1 Qd R 675 …. [15095] Tyndale; R v [1999] Crim LR 320 …. [17285] TZ; R v (2011) 214 A Crim R 316 …. [19135] Tzagarakis v Stevens (1968) 69 DLR (2d) 466 …. [17590], [17600] Tzouvelis v Victorian Railways Cmrs [1968] VR 112 …. [29050] UB; R v (2007) 178 A Crim R 450 …. [21050] Ubase (ML) Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577 …. [25300] Ucar v Nylex Industrial Products Pty Ltd (2007) 17 VR 492 …. [3140] Uduma; R v (2013) 115 SASR 318; 63 MVR 130 …. [29050], [29150] Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266; 32 ALR 1 …. [3156] Ugle v R (1989) 167 CLR 647; 88 ALR 513 …. [17275] Ugle; R v (1989) 43 A Crim R 423 …. [17290] Ugochukwu; R v (2003) 138 A Crim R 544 …. [15220] Ugolini; R v (1989) 51 SASR 303 …. [19085] Uittenbusch; R v (2012) 219 A Crim R 562 …. [35660] Ujvary v Medwell (No 2) (1985) 39 SASR 418 …. [27255] Ul-Haque; R v (2007) 177 A Crim R 348 …. [35615] Uljee; R v [1982] 1 NZLR 561 …. [25025] Ulrich v Treasury Solicitor [2005] 1 All ER 1059; [2006] 1 WLR 33 …. [3060] ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190 …. [29050], [29115] Umanski; R v [1961] VR 242 …. [17535], [19035] Umbleby; R v (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 154 …. [1680] Umoh; R v (1986) 84 Cr App R 138 …. [25245]
Underwood v Cox (1912) 26 OLR 303; 4 DLR 66 …. [25380] Ung; R v (2000) 173 ALR 287 …. [35435] Unilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [1999] 2 All ER 691; [1999] 1 WLR 1630 …. [25350], [25380] — v The Procter & Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783; [2000] 1 WLR 2436 …. [25350], [25360], [25380], [25385] Union v State 66 SE 24 …. [1335] Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Broom [1904] St R Qd 215 …. [3065] — v Puddy [1949] VLR 242; [1949] ALR 979 …. [11085], [11090] Union Carbide Corp v Naturin Ltd [1987] FSR 538 …. [5180] Union Steamship Co of New Zealand v Wenlock [1959] NZLR 173 …. [35055], [35090] United Cigar Stores Ltd v Buller [1931] 2 DLR 144; (1931) 66 DLR 593 …. [17460] United States v Aluminum Co of America 148 F 2d 416 (1945) …. [3125] — v Cerone 830 F 2d 938 …. [1445] — v Cook 538 F 2d 1000 (1976) …. [21125] — v Feinberg 140 F 2d 592 (1944) …. [9115] — v Green 648 F 2d 587 (1981) …. [1145] — v Greenlee 517 F 2d 889 (1975) …. [7070] — v Grunewald 233 F 2d 556 (1956) …. [1520] — v McRae (1868) LR 3 Ch App 79 …. [25155] — v Madera 574 F 2d 1320 …. [1490] — v Matot 146 F 2d 197 (1944) …. [37170] — v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196; [1923] All ER Rep Ext 773 …. [39175] — v Nixon 418 US 683 (1974) …. [27065]
— v Prout 526 F 2d 380 (1976) …. [9115] — v Rappy 157 F 2d 964 (1946) …. [17220] — v Ross 321 F 2d 61 (1963) …. [31165] — v Shepherd [1977] 2 SCR 1067 …. [9120] — v Taylor 464 F 2d 240 (1972) …. [9115] United States of America v Philip Morris Inc [2004] 1 CLC 811 …. [25235] United States Shipping Board v The Ship St Albans [1931] AC 632 …. [1280], [3030], [29050] United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 766 …. [25010], [25055], [41005] United States Trust Co of New York v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 131; 17 ACSR 697; 13 ACLC 1225 …. [41005], [41035] United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v DPP (1988) 13 NSWLR 478; 89 ALR 591 …. [29050] United Transport Services Pty Ltd v Evans [1992] 1 VR 240 …. [1175] Unity Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Rocco Pezzano Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 603; 154 ALR 361 …. [25010] Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1 …. [29080] — v Sharman Networks Ltd (2006) 150 FCR 110 …. [9005] Universal Steam Navigation Co v J McKelvie & Co [1923] AC 492 …. [39160] University of Warwick, The v Sir Robert McAlpine (1988) 42 Build LR 1 …. [29080], [29150] University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346; 259 ALR 224 …. [3020] Universo Insurance Co of Milan v Merchants Marine Insurance Co [1897] 2 QB 93 …. [3050]
Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 …. [1290], [17435] Unsworth v R [1986] Tas R 173 …. [21215] Unwin v Hanson [1891] 2 QB 115 …. [11010] Upchurch; R v (1836) 1 Mood 465; 168 ER 1346 …. [33635] Upton; R v (2007) 209 FLR 487 …. [27310] Uranerz (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hale (1980) 30 ALR 193; 54 ALJR 378 …. [11150] Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471 …. [17590], [17680], [17725] Urbano; R v (1983) 9 A Crim R 170 …. [17395], [17545] Urquhart v Butterfield (1887) 37 Ch D 357 …. [3165] US v Lewis 902 F 2d 1176 …. [31090] — v Long 905 F 2d 1572 …. [31090] Utans; R v (1982) 29 SASR 592 …. [11095], [17130] Utica City National Bank v Gunn (1918) 118 NE 607 …. [39240] —v—118 NE 607 …. [39240] Utting v Luhtala (1983) 6 Petty Sessions Review 2857 …. [35205], [35550] Uxbridge Justices; Ex parte Sofaer; R v (1986) 85 Cr App R 367 …. [1275] v Hector Whaling Ltd, Earl [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 459 …. [9085] V; R v (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 …. [9020], [15260] Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth and Dominion Line Ltd [1922] VLR 693 …. [1165] Vagulans v Maxwell (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 341 …. [3065] Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 221 ALR 711 …. [3020] Vaise v Delaval (1785) 1 TR 11; 99 ER 944 …. [27215]
Vaitos; R v (1981) 4 A Crim R 238 …. [21020], [21155], [21185] Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 …. [1830] Valantine v Technical and Further Education Commission (2007) 97 ALD 447; 166 IR 459 …. [25125] Vale; R v (2001) 120 A Crim R 322 …. [27305] Valentine; R v [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 …. [17270] Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56; [1963] ALR 461 …. [7255] Vallance; R v [1955] NZLR 811 …. [15220] Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 …. [35550], [41130] Van Amstel v Country Roads Board [1961] VR 780 …. [5070] Van Beelen, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 …. [1110], [1490], [1520], [11140], [17120], [17130], [31010], [31095], [31155], [33045], [33055] Van Beelen; R v (1972) 6 SASR 534n …. [17180], [17185], [17200] — (1973) 4 SASR 353 …. [1320], [9035], [9040], [33485] Van Den Heuvel v Tucker (2003) 85 SASR 512 …. [29125] Van den Hoek v R (1986) 161 CLR 158; 69 ALR 1 …. [7030], [7050] Van den Hoek; R v (1985) 17 A Crim R 191 …. [37060] Van der Donckt v Thelluson (1849) 8 CB 812; 137 ER 727 …. [41035] Van der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10; 62 ALJR 656 …. [33660], [33685], [33690], [33730] Van Der Zyden; R v [2012] 2 Qd R 568 …. [7085] Van Leeuwen v R (1981) 36 ALR 591; 55 ALJR 726 …. [9030] Van Velzen v Robertson (1974) 9 SASR 412 …. [33805] — v Wagener (1975) 10 SASR 549 …. [7070] Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195 …. [1295], [17175], [19005], [29070] Van Vreden; R v (1973) 57 Cr App R 818 …. [31120]
Vance v McCormack (2004) 154 ACTR 12 …. [25245] Vandervell’s Trusts, Re (No 2) [1974] Ch 269; [1974] 1 All ER 47 …. [13300] Vandine; R v [1968] 1 NSWR 417 …. [33500], [33690], [33770] Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382; 16 ALR 526 …. [25290] Vardas v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 652 …. [25275] Varley v R (1977) 12 ALR 347; 51 ALJR 243 …. [17065] Varley; R v (1914) 10 Cr App R 125 …. [1360], [1375], [1380], [1415] — [1982] 2 All ER 519 …. [23380] Vasil v National Australia Bank (1999) 46 NSWLR 207 …. [25075] Vasiliou v Hajigeorgiou [2005] 3 All ER 17; [2005] 1 WLR 2195 …. [25225] Vasquez v R [1994] 3 All ER 674; [1994] 1 WLR 1304 …. [7015], [7030] Vassiliades v Vassiliades (1941) 18 Cyprus LR 10 …. [19015] Vassilief; R v (1967) 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 445 …. [9005] Vassis, Re; Ex parte Leung (1986) 9 FCR 518; 64 ALR 407 …. [33510] Vaughan (No 2); R v (2009) 105 SASR 532 …. [1490] Vaux Peerage, The (1836) 5 Cl & Fin 526; 7 ER 505 …. [3040] Vavasseur v Vavasseur (1909) 25 TLR 250 …. [15150] Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233; 76 ALJR 402 …. [1140], [9040], [15220], [17120], [29050], [29075], [29185], [29205] Velevski (No 2); R v (1997) 93 A Crim R 420 …. [17405] Vella v R (1990) 2 WAR 537 …. [1645], [17485] Vella; R v (2006) 14 VR 592 …. [17235], [17240], [17245] — [1938] St R Qd 289 …. [1360]
Veneman; R v [1970] SASR 506 …. [33610] Vengtas v Nydoo 1963 (3) SA 441 …. [31030] Venn-Brown; R v [1991] 1 Qd R 458 …. [27310] Venning v Chin (1974) 8 SASR 397 …. [7225] Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 3 All ER 472; [1991] 1 WLR 607 …. [25245], [25255], [25275] — v Mountain (No 2) (The Italia Express) [1992] 3 All ER 414; [1992] 1 WLR 887 …. [13270], [35065] Vera Cruz, The (1884) 10 App Cas 59; [1881] All ER Rep 216 …. [33560] Verelst; R v (1813) 3 Camp 432; 170 ER 1435 …. [1175] Verge v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 464 …. [25350], [25395] Vernell; R v [1953] VLR 590; [1953] ALR 1139 …. [11035] Vernon v Bosley [1994] PNLR 337 …. [1490], [17495] — v — [1995] 2 FCR 78 …. [17495] — v Bosley (No 2) [1999] QB 18; [1997] 1 All ER 614 …. [29080] Vernon; R v [1962] Crim LR 35 …. [15095] Verolla; R v [1963] 1 QB 285; [1962] 2 All ER 426 …. [13115] Versteegh v Nurses Board of South Australia (1992) 60 SASR 128 …. [9075] Vetter v Lake Macquarie CC (2001) 202 CLR 439; 178 ALR 1 …. [7160] Veverka; R v [1978] 1 NSWLR 478 …. [11135] VHAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 80; 75 ALD 609 …. [41030] Vickers v ASIC (2011) 196 FCR 479; 283 ALR 271 …. [25010], [25300] — v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195 …. [35440]
Victor; R v 1965 (1) SA 249 …. [33570] Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575; [1957] ALR 761 …. [5025] — v — (1975) 134 CLR 338; 7 ALR 277; 50 ALJR 157 …. [3158] — v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act case) (1996) 187 CLR 416; 138 ALR 129 …. [3158], [41005] — v Seal Rocks Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1 …. [27005] Victorian Women Lawyers’ Association Inc v FCT (2008) 170 FCR 318; 250 ALR 516 …. [3160] Victoria v Brazel (2008) 19 VR 553 …. [27010], [27105], [27175] — v Davies (2003) 6 VR 245 …. [25010] Vidic; R v (1986) 43 SASR 176 …. [37155] Viljoen; R v 1947 (2) SA 56 …. [15235] Village Cay Marina Ltd v Acland [1998] 2 BCLC 327 …. [17435] VIM v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 1; 158 A Crim R 243 …. [21257] Vinall v De Plass [1892] AC 90 …. [35430] Vinayagamoorthy; R v (2008) 200 A Crim R 186 …. [29050] Vincent, Frost and Edwards; R v (1840) 9 Car & P 275; 173 ER 833 …. [37090] Vincent; R v (2002) 133 A Crim R 206 …. [9130], [35450] Vine Street Police Station Superintendent; Ex parte Liebmann; R v [1916] 1 KB 268 …. [3020] Vines v ASIC (2007) 73 NSWLR 451 …. [9130] — v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512; [1955] ALR 431 …. [7150] Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd v Marshall (1981) 5 Petty Sessions Review 2414 …. [35210] Viola; R v [1982] 3 All ER 73; [1982] 1 WLR 1138 …. [11120], [19085], [19090], [21235]
Violi v Berrivale Orchards Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518 …. [1820] Virgo; R v (1978) 67 Cr App R 323 …. [17245] Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88; 18 ALR 257 …. [7050] Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300 …. [11010] Visser; R v [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 …. [1675] Visx Inc v Nidex Co [1999] FSR 91 …. [25255] Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC [2007] ATPR 42-184 …. [1215], [17115], [25235], [25240] Vitkovice Horni a Hutni Tezirstvo v Korner [1951] AC 869; [1951] 2 All ER 334 …. [1040] Vitol BV v Compagnie Europeene des Petroles [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 574 …. [39240] Vitosh v Brisbane City Council (1955) 93 CLR 622; [1955] ALR 887 …. [5025] Vivian; R v [1979] 1 All ER 48; [1979] 1 WLR 291 …. [1045] VN; R v (2006) 15 VR 113 …. [1170], [13275], [15220], [21050] Vo v R (2013) 275 FLR 159 …. [17445] Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267; 3 All ER 97 …. [17375], [17405], [35010], [35065], [35105], [37060] — v Vocisano (No 2) (1973) 1 ACTR 142 …. [17390] Vogelle; R v (1970) 3 CCC 171 …. [33460] Voisin; R v [1918] 1 KB 531; [1918] All ER Rep 491 …. [23025], [27290], [33680] Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 220 FLR 198 …. [3250], [29050] Vollmer; R v [1996] 1 VR 95 …. [21050] Von Aspern; R v [1964] VR 91 …. [33715] Von Einem; R v (1985) 38 SASR 207 …. [19095], [21065], [29090],
[31095] Von Rijssen; R v (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 …. [17460] Vonarx; R v [1999] 3 VR 618 …. [17705], [21050] Vooght v Winch [1814] All ER Rep 270; (1819) 106 ER 507; 2 B & A 662 …. [5120] Voss; R v [1963] VR 22 …. [1375] VOT v Western Australia (2008) 37 WAR 129 …. [19090] Voulis v Kozary (1975) 180 CLR 177; 7 ALR 126 …. [11150], [33420] Vowles v Young (1806) 13 Ves 140; 33 ER 247 …. [33240] Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) 112 CLR 316; [1965] ALR 196 …. [3235] Vrint, Re; Vrint v Swain [1940] Ch 920; [1940] 3 All ER 470 …. [33340] Vuckov; R v (1986) 40 SASR 498 …. [23150], [23250], [27310] Vye; R v [1993] 3 All ER 241; [1993] 1 WLR 471 …. [19110], [19135] W v Edgell [1990] Ch 359; [1990] 1 All ER 835 …. [25235], [27125] — v R (2001) 115 FCR 41; 189 ALR 633 …. [21252] — v — (2006) 16 Tas R 1 …. [9030], [23235] — v S [1905] P 231 …. [1200] — v W (No 4) [1964] P 67; [1963] 2 All ER 841 …. [1235] W and MWood (Haulage) Ltd v Redpath [1967] 2 QB 520; [1966] 3 All ER 556 …. [35075], [35090], [35095] W and W, Re (2001) 164 FLR 18 …. [11150] W J & F Barnes Pty Ltd v FCT (1957) 96 CLR 294; [1957] ALR 339 …. [5030] W, GC; R v (2006) 96 SASR 301 …. [25340] W; R v [1988] 2 Qd R 308 …. [33745], [33750] — [1996] 1 Qd R 573 …. [17270]
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Wakim, Re; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511; 163 ALR 270 …. [5025], [5030] Walbank; R v [1996] 1 Qd R 78 …. [11065], [33650] Walczuk; R v [1965] QWN 50 …. [15125], [15255] Waldman; R v (1934) 24 Cr App R 204 …. [19145], [23215] Waldridge v Kennison (1794) 1 Esp 142; 170 ER 306 …. [25375] Waldron v Ward (1654) Style 449; 82 ER 853 …. [25215] Walesby; R v [1919] NZLR 289 …. [17265], [17275] Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; 297 ALR 174 …. [1450] — v McKinney [1997] 2 VR 353 …. [9040] Walker v Broadstock (1795) 1 Esp 458; 170 ER 419 …. [33035] — v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463 …. [33745] — v R (1993) 61 SASR 260 …. [17545] — v Viney [1965] Tas SR 96 …. [33610] — v WA Pickles Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 281 …. [41005] — v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 …. [1665], [17240], [17330], [17575], [25300], [39045] — v Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335 …. [25355], [25385] Wall v Radford [1991] 2 All ER 741 …. [5055], [5095] Wallaby Grip (BAE) Ltd (in liq) v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17 NSWCCR 355 …. [3135] Wallace Smith Trust Co Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Haskins & Sells (a firm) [1996] 4 All ER 403; [1997] 1 WLR 257 …. [27080] Wallace; R v (1931) 23 Cr App R 32 …. [1140], [11140] — (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 21 …. [1290] Waller v Shayler (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 169; 75 WN (NSW) 72 …. [17315] Wallis v Littell [1861] All ER Rep 853; (1861) 142 ER 840; 11 CBNS
369 …. [39175] Wallwork; R v (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 …. [13060], [17090], [17095], [17275], [17335] Wallworth v Balmer [1965] 3 All ER 721; [1966] 1 WLR 16 …. [41050] Walpole; R v (1979) 1 A Crim R 392 …. [39045] Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62 …. [1300], [1305] Walsh; R v [1981] Qd R 589 …. [17715] Walshe; R v (1982) 74 Cr App R 85 …. [1390] Walt Disney Productions v H John Edwards Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 162 …. [33355] Walters v GIO (NSW) (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 622 …. [35090] — v Lewis (1836) 7 Car & P 344; 173 ER 153 …. [31090] — v R [1969] 2 AC 26 …. [9020], [9025] Walton v Deaton (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 393; 48 WN (NSW) 152 …. [17555] — v R (1989) 166 CLR 283; 84 ALR 59 …. [3020], [31010], [31040], [31045], [31050], [31065], [31095], [31155], [31185], [37010], [37060], [37115], [37120] — v — [1978] AC 788; [1978] 1 All ER 542 …. [29075] Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; 76 ALR 513 …. [3130] Waltson Properties Ltd, Re (1976) 80 DLR (3d) 271 …. [33090] Wan v US 266 US 1 (1924) …. [33620] Wang; R v [2005] 1 All ER 782; [2005] 1 WLR 661 …. [11135] Wanganeen; R v (1988) 50 SASR 433 …. [1195], [7255] — (2006) 95 SASR 226 …. [15160] Wanhalla; R v [2007] 2 NZLR 573; (2006) 22 CRNZ 843 …. [9030] Wannan; R v (2006) 94 SASR 521 …. [17265]
Wannell; R v (1922) 17 Cr App R 53 …. [17275] War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott; R v (1933) 50 CLR 228; 39 ALR 533 …. [1010] Warasta; R v (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 …. [19125] Ward v H S Pitt & Co [1913] 2 KB 130 …. [31095], [33015], [33030], [33045], [33055], [33060], [33065] — v R (1980) 142 CLR 308; 20 ALR 72 …. [3157] — v — [1979] 2 SCR 30; (1979) 94 DLR (3d) 18 …. [33660] — v Roy W Sandford Ltd (1919) 19 SR (NSW) 172; 36 WN (NSW) 71 …. [11135], [17370] — v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd [1952] 1 KB 280; [1951] 2 All ER 904 …. [27205], [27210] — v Sinfield (1880) 49 LJKB (NS) 696 …. [19020] — v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 …. [3040], [29150], [33845] Ward, Ex parte (1855) 2 Legge 872 …. [1650] Ward; R v (1848) 2 Car & Kir 759; 175 ER 319 …. [17130] — (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 …. [25235], [29140] — [1963] Qd R 56 …. [21115] — [1993] 2 All ER 577; [1993] 1 WLR 619 …. [17130], [29050], [29075] — [2001] Crim LR 316 …. [31135], [33810] Warde v Warde (1851) 3 Mac & G 365; 42 ER 301 …. [25245] Warden of Shrewsbury v Hart (1823) 1 Car & P 113; 171 ER 1125 …. [33350] Warden of the Fleet; R v (1698) 12 Mod 337; 88 ER 1363 …. [5185] Wardle, In the Marriage of (1990) 100 FLR 107 …. [25365] Wardrope v Dunne [1996] 1 Qd R 224 …. [25010] Ware; R v (1994) 73 A Crim R 17 …. [15090]
Warea Pty Ltd v Waterloo Industries Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 152; 66 ALR 537 …. [1025] Warickshall; R v (1783) 1 Leach 263; 168 ER 234 …. [27280], [33620] Waring v Administracao Geral do Acucar e do Alcool EP [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45 …. [3135] Warman International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 478; 67 ALR 253 …. [25075] Warming v O’Sullivan [1962] SASR 287 …. [29090], [29130] Warnecke v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States [1906] VLR 482; (1906) 12 ALR 254 …. [25330] — v Pope [1950] SASR 113 …. [25180] Warner v Hung (No 2) (2011) 297 ALR 56 …. [7070], [9130] — v Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410; [1954] ALR 682 …. [25025], [25210], [25235], [25255], [33540], [35050] Warner-Lambert Co v Glaxo Laboratories Ltd [1975] RPC 354 …. [25060] Warner; R v (1988) 48 SASR 79 …. [33640], [33645] Warrell; R v [1993] 1 VR 671 …. [19090], [33690] Warren v A-G (Jersey) [2011] 2 All ER 513 …. [25025] — v Bray, Doe d (1828) 8 B & C 813; 108 ER 1245 …. [33410] — v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 23 ALR 405 …. [11150] — v Gurney [1944] 2 All ER 472 …. [37040] — v Pilkington [1960] Tas SR 6 …. [3020] — v Warren (1834) 1 CM & R 250; 149 ER 1073 …. [1130] — v — [1997] QB 488; [1996] 4 All ER 664 …. [27205] Warren; R v [1971] SASR 316 …. [23325], [23345] — [1982] 2 NSWLR 360 …. [33675], [33750] Warsap; R v (2010) 106 SASR 264 …. [15140]
Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; 239 ALR 610 …. [1520], [5135] Washer; R v (1948) 92 CCC 218 …. [33660] Wassa; R v (1987) 45 SASR 297 …. [33485], [33770] Watcham v Attorney-General of the East Africa Protectorate [1919] AC 533; [1918] All ER Rep 455 …. [39290] Water Authority of Western Australia v AIL Holdings Pty Ltd (1991) 7 WAR 135 …. [25275] Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; 71 ALR 673 …. [25010], [25235], [25240], [25245] Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspaper Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 758; [1961] 1 WLR 967 …. [19165] Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1165 …. [1310], [17560] Waters; R v (2002) 129 A Crim R 115 …. [35620] Wati v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 71 FCR 103 …. [9050] Wati; R v [1985] 1 NZLR 236 …. [11095] Watkins v A JWright (Electrical) Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 31 …. [25055] — v Combes (1922) 30 CLR 180; 28 ALR 158 …. [25010] — v Queensland [2008] 1 Qd R 564 …. [25010] Watkins & Davis Ltd v Legal and General Assurance Co Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 674 …. [9010] Watkins Products Inc v Thomas (1965) 51 MPR 321; 54 DLR (2d) 252 …. [35205] Watkins, Re; Watkins v Watkins [1953] 2 All ER 1113; [1953] 1 WLR 1323 …. [1125] Watson v Cammell Laird & Co [1959] 2 All ER 757; [1959] 1 WLR 702 …. [25275] — v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 …. [3260], [9005]
— v Lee (1979) 144 CLR 374; 26 ALR 461 …. [1175], [3158] — v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust [1965] WAR 88 …. [17725] — v Ramsay (No 2) (1962) 62 SR (NSW) 359 …. [29070] Watson, Re; Ex parte Official Receiver (1890) 25 QBD 27 …. [39185] Watson; R v [1814] All ER Rep 334; (1817) 171 ER 591; 2 Stark 116 …. [1410], [17155], [19045], [25040], [27130], [39015] — (1913) 8 Cr App R 249 …. [23320] — (1944) 81 CCC 212 …. [1415] — (1996) 108 CCC (3d) 310 …. [3275] — [1980] 2 All ER 293; [1980] 1 WLR 991 …. [1880], [11045] — [1987] 1 Qd R 440 …. [29050] Watt v Miller [1950] 3 DLR 709 …. [33045] — v S GWaite Pty Ltd [1963] NSWR 699; (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 137 …. [11085] — v Thomas [1947] AC 484; [1947] 1 All ER 582 …. [11150] Watt; R v (1905) 20 Cox CC 852 …. [33435] Wattam; R v (1952) 36 Cr App R 72 …. [23270], [33690] Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; [1961] ALR 333 …. [7205] — v Vickers Ltd (1916) 86 LJKB 177 …. [1130] — v Watts (1953) 89 CLR 200; [1953] ALR 485 …. [15155] Watts; R v (1980) 71 Cr App R 136 …. [1155] — [1983] 3 All ER 101 …. [1520], [23285] — [1992] 1 Qd R 214 …. [1305] Wauchope v Mordecai [1970] 1 All ER 417; [1970] 1 WLR 317 …. [5230] Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521; [1979] 2 All ER 1169
…. [25220], [25240] — v R [1950] AC 203 …. [23025], [23035], [33310] Waugh; R v [1983] NZLR 248 …. [1520] Waung v Subbotovsky [1968] 3 NSWR 499 …. [29050] Wavish v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1959] VR 57 …. [29050], [29110] Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co v Hanes (1961) 28 DLR (2d) 386 …. [17375] Waxman (I) & Sons Ltd v Texaco Canada Ltd [1968] 2 OR 452 …. [25355] Waye; R v (1984) 14 A Crim R 391 …. [15195] Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044; BC9906782 …. [25040] Wayte; R v (1982) 76 Cr App R 110 …. [1090], [39005] WB; R v (2009) 23 VR 319 …. [17175], [17270], [17285] WEA Records Ltd v Visions Channel 4 Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 589; [1983] 1 WLR 721 …. [27165] Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 …. [29015], [29025] Weare, Re [1893] 2 QB 439 …. [5130], [5180] Weatherall v Whalan (1989) 50 SASR 319 …. [17660] Weatherall; R v (1981) 27 SASR 238 …. [3070], [35360], [35365] Weatherstone; R v (1968) 12 FLR 14 …. [17555], [17575] Weaver v Law Society of NSW (1979) 142 CLR 201; 25 ALR 359 …. [5150], [5160] — v Samuels [1971] SASR 116 …. [9070] Weaver; R v (1873) LR 2 CCR 85 …. [33810] — [1968] 1 QB 353; [1967] 1 All ER 277 …. [23145] WEB; R v (2003) 7 VR 200 …. [17295] Webb v Cain [1966] VR 91 …. [33690]
— v Cmr of Taxation (1993) 44 FCR 312 …. [25010], [25240], [25245] — v Davey [1982] Qd R 356 …. [5055] — v Leadbetter [1966] 2 All ER 114; [1966] 1 WLR 245 …. [17095] — v R (1994) 13 WAR 257 …. [1645], [33745] — v — (1994) 181 CLR 41; 122 ALR 41 …. [7085], [15080], [15255] Webb, Re; Smith v Johnston [1964] 2 All ER 91; [1964] 1 WLR 509 …. [39115] Webb; R v (1914) 16 DLR 317 …. [1645] — (1992) 59 SASR 563 …. [7085] — [1975] Crim LR 159 …. [17170] Webbe; R v [1926] SASR 108 …. [15100] Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 …. [17575] Webster v Burns [1964] NZLR 749 …. [1290] — v James Chapman & Co (A Firm) [1989] 3 All ER 939 …. [25020], [25025] — v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 116 ALR 545 …. [7095] — v Webster (1858) 1 F & F 401; 175 ER 781 …. [33070] — v — [1945] NZLR 537 …. [1155] Webster (dec’d); R v [1974] 3 All ER 822; [1974] 1 WLR 1641 …. [39115] Webster, Re (1975) 132 CLR 270; 6 ALR 65 …. [3158] Webster; R v [1974] VR 457 …. [11095] Webuildem Pty Ltd v Arab Bank Australia Ltd (2013) 300 ALR 99 …. [5025] Wedd; R v (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 …. [9040], [15220], [19135], [33455] Weeder v R (1980) 71 Cr App R 228 …. [1390], [1405], [9040] Weeks v Harbourworks Clough [1985] WAR 327 …. [5025]
— v Sparke (1813) 1 M & S 679; 105 ER 253 …. [33160] Weerts v Daire (1982) 32 SASR 270 …. [3070] Weetra; R v (1993) 93 NTR 8 …. [33745] — (2010) 108 SASR 232 …. [33455] Wehi v Thom [1969] WAR 39 …. [39160] Wehlow; R v (2001) 122 A Crim R 63 …. [15220] Wei Tang; R v (2007) 16 VR 454; 172 A Crim R 224 …. [17135] Weighill; R v [1945] 2 DLR 471 …. [11055] Weightman; R v (1990) 92 Cr App R 291 …. [29050] — [1978] 1 NZLR 79 …. [13085], [15090] Weir v Davidson [1965] VR 506 …. [3065] Weir; R v [1973] Qd R 496 …. [33760] Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300; 223 ALR 662 …. [11140] Weiss; R v (2004) 8 VR 388 …. [15085], [17135], [33710] Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217; 117 ALR 545 …. [1220], [7215], [23020], [23025], [23030] Weisz; R v (2008) 189 A Crim R 93 …. [15255] Welch v Nagy [1950] 1 KB 455; [1949] 2 All ER 868 …. [5115] Welch; R v [1992] Crim LR 568 …. [33485] Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956 …. [3285] Welden; R v (1977) 16 SASR 421 …. [17370], [17670] Wellcome Australia Ltd v Australia Eagle Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 34 NSWLR 269 …. [5170] Weller v O’Brien [1962] 3 All ER 65; [1962] 1 WLR 885 …. [17065], [17235] Wells v D’Amico [1961] VR 672 …. [5070] — v South Australian Railways Cmr (1973) 5 SASR 74 …. [17370]
Wells Street Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Deakin; R v [1980] AC 477; [1979] 2 All ER 497 …. [19095] Wells; R v [1976] Crim LR 518 …. [33460] Welsbach Incandescent Gas Lighting Co v New Sunlight Incandescent Co [1900] 2 Ch 1 …. [33540] Welsh; R v (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 …. [17290], [35440], [37140] — [1983] 1 Qd R 592 …. [9070] — [1999] 2 VR 62 …. [5210] Welstead; R v [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 59 …. [1305] Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559; [1964] ALR 292 …. [1040], [11030], [11075], [21085], [27245], [33295], [33675], [33765] Wendt v Lind; Ex parte Lind [1913] QSR 240 …. [39105] Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 10 HLC 589; 11 ER 1154 …. [1215], [25040] — v — (1864) 33 LJ (Eq) NS 688 …. [1215] — v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 …. [9110], [9115], [9120], [11100] — v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 …. [17305], [17360], [17375], [17510], [17615], [35090] Wesley v Wesley (1998) 71 SASR 1 …. [39295] West v GIO (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62; 35 ALR 437 …. [1215], [9090] — v Hoyle [1972] NZLR 996 …. [39250] — v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24, 431 …. [1742], [17445], [17460] — v Sprinkhuizen; Ex parte Sprinkhuizen [1961] Qd R 313 …. [3020], [3130] West London Coroner; Ex parte Gray; R v [1988] QB 467; [1987] 2 All ER 129 …. [1050] West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Kaminski; R v [1983] Crim LR 40 …. [17660] West London Youth Court; Ex parte N; R v [2000] 1 All ER 823 ….
[33805] West Midlands Passenger Executives v Singh [1988] 2 All ER 873; [1988] 1 WLR 730 …. [21290] West Midlands Probation Board v French [2009] 1 Cr App R 29 …. [33345] West; R v (1890) 112 CC Ct Cas 725 …. [19145] — [1973] Qd R 338 …. [33500] — [1992] 1 Qd R 227 …. [13070] Westaway (JA) & Son Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1996) 7 BPR 14, 773 …. [17405], [17520] Western v DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 474 …. [33455] Western Australia v Atherton (2009) 197 A Crim R 119 …. [21257] — v Bilos (No 2) (2009) 193 A Crim R 165 …. [1370], [29165] — v Commonwealth (Territorial Senators) (1975) 134 CLR 201; 7 ALR 159 …. [3158] — v Fazeldean (No 2) (2013) 211 FCR 150; 299 ALR 180 …. [5025] — v Lovett (2012) 225 A Crim R 363 …. [21257] — v May (2011) 215 A Crim R 199 …. [27305] — v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1994) 54 FCR 144 …. [27080] — v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155 …. [9120] — v Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285 …. [33660] — v Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) (1996) 142 ALR 597; 69 FLR 245 …. [25350], [25380] — v Watson [1990] WAR 248 …. [11150], [17580] Western Australian Museum v Information Cmr (1994) 12 WAR 417 …. [27035] Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 604; 86 ALJR 1 …. [39240]
Western Stores Ltd v Orange City Council (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 353 …. [1175] — v — [1971] 2 NSWLR 36 …. [1175] Westfall; R v (1912) 7 Cr App R 176 …. [23310], [23315] Westfield Freezing Co Ltd; R v [1951] NZLR 456 …. [1515], [11130] Westham Dredging Co Pty Ltd v Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1983) 66 FLR 14 …. [39160] Westinghouse Uranium Contract, Re (No 2) [1978] AC 547; [1977] 3 All ER 717 …. [25075], [25100] Westlake v Westlake, Doe d (1820) 4 B & A 57; 106 ER 859 …. [39265] Westminster Airways Ltd v Kuwait Oil Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 134; [1950] 2 All ER 596 …. [25235], [25240], [25270] Weston-Super-Mare-Justices; Ex parte Townsend; R v [1968] 3 All ER 225n …. [23355] Weston; R v [1924] VLR 166; [1924] 30 ALR 132 …. [15125] Westpac Banking Corporation v 789 TEN Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 519 …. [25235], [25300] — v Bell Group (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 89 ACSR 1 …. [1215], [39240] Westpoint Corp Pty Ltd v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 584 …. [5170] Westwell; R v [1976] 2 All ER 812 …. [17170] Wetherall v Harrison [1976] QB 773; [1976] 1 All ER 241 …. [3130] Wetherell v Bird, Doe d (1835) 7 C & P 6; 173 ER 3 …. [3165] WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406 …. [21050] Whalen; R v (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 …. [1450] Whaley v Carlisle (1866) 17 ICLR 792 …. [3020], [3085] Whalley; R v (1847) 2 Car & K 376; 175 ER 155 …. [1295] Wharam v Routledge (1805) 5 Esp 235; 170 ER 797 …. [17240],
[17570], [39045] Wharton (J) (Shipping), Ltd v Mortleman [1941] 1 KB 340 …. [3020] Wharton; R v [1998] Crim LR 668 …. [21180] Wheatland; R v (1838) 8 C & P 238; 173 ER 476 …. [15020] Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; [1881] All ER Rep Ext 1807 …. [25230], [25235], [25315], [25325] Wheeler; R v [1917] 1 KB 283; [1916] All ER Rep 1111 …. [13090] — [1967] 3 All ER 829; [1967] 1 WLR 1531 …. [7030] Whelan; R v (1876) 4 WW & A’B (L) 264 …. [33295] — (1881) 14 Cox CC 595 …. [17535] Whiffen v Cartwright (1848) 11 Beav 111; 50 ER 759 …. [25350] Whiley; R v (1804) 2 Leach 983; 168 ER 589 …. [1520], [21040] Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; 77 ALJR 1598 …. [11150] Whitaker; R v [1914] 3 KB 1283 …. [33565] Whitbread; R v (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 …. [29050] Whitby; R v (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 …. [1125], [29130] White v Australian and New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 266 …. [39145], [39290] — v Overland (2001) 67 ALD 731 …. [25350] — v R [1956] SCR 709; (1956) 5 DLR (2d) 328 …. [15220] — v — [1999] 1 AC 210 …. [17275], [17285], [17305], [17315] — v Shortall (2006) 60 ACSR 654 …. [7075] — v Taylor [1969] 1 Ch 150; [1967] 3 All ER 349 …. [33180], [33395], [33400] — v Venus [1968] SASR 83 …. [35060] — v Verkouille [1990] 2 Qd R 191 …. [41005]
— v White (1995) 127 FLR 105 …. [1520] White (No 5); R v (2012) 220 A Crim R 294 …. [27315], [33775] White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 …. [1215], [17445], [17460] White; R v (1908) 18 OLR 640 …. [33660] — (1922) 17 Cr App R 60 …. [17390] — (1976) 13 SASR 276 …. [11065], [33740] — (1987) 49 SASR 154 …. [3140] — (1989) 18 NSWLR 332 …. [19085], [19090] — (1989) 41 A Crim R 237 …. [37100] — (2003) 140 A Crim R 63 …. [17405] — (2003) 7 VR 442 …. [1030], [33570] — (2008) 102 SASR 35 …. [1400] — [1964] Crim LR 720 …. [33690] — [1969] VR 203 …. [23270], [23345] — [1970] QWN 46 …. [17375] Whitehall v Whitehall 1957 SC 30 …. [27045] Whitehead v Scott (1830) 1 Mood & R 2; 174 ER 1 …. [39010] Whitehead; R v (1848) 3 Car & Kir 202; 175 ER 521 …. [1530] — (1866) LR 1 CCR 33 …. [13055], [13065] — (1897) 23 VLR 239 …. [37155] — [1929] 1 KB 99; [1928] All ER Rep 186 …. [15185], [15225], [33770] Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657; 49 ALR 448 …. [11095], [11140], [1215], [17090], [17120], [17130], [33420], [33610] Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650 …. [29080] — v — [1981] 1 All ER 267; [1981] 1 WLR 246 …. [11150], [29080]
Whitelegg, In The Goods of [1899] P 267 …. [41035] Whiteley Muir and Zwanenberg Ltd v Kerr (1966) 39 ALJR 505 …. [11150] Whitelock, Ex parte; Re Mac Kenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 …. [11035] Whitelocke v Baker [1803] All ER Rep 592; (1807) 33 ER 385; 13 Ves 510 …. [33210], [33235], [35085] — v Musgrove (1833) 1 Cr & M 511; 149 ER 502 …. [31040], [31050] Whitford v Barbarich [1976] WAR 209 …. [17660] Whitford; R v [1980] Tas R 98 …. [33690] Whiting v Whiting [1947] SASR 363 …. [17575] Whitlam v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1985) 73 FLR 414 …. [27035], [27180] Whitley & Co Ltd v Green [1935] NZLR 360 …. [39290] Whitmore; R v (1999) 109 A Crim 51 …. [17315], [35525] Whittaker v Child Support Registrar (2010) 264 ALR 473 …. [17245] Whittaker; R v [1924] 3 DLR 63 …. [1295], [39105] — [1925] 3 DLR 63 …. [1295] Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146 …. [39160] Whittingham; R v (1988) 49 SASR 67 …. [13290] Whitton v Falkiner (1915) 20 CLR 118; 21 ALR 212 …. [11010] — v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (2007) 161 FCR 20 …. [41130] Whitton; R v (1887) 21 SALR 80 …. [33275] Wholesale Distributors Ltd v Gibbons Holdings Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 277 …. [39290] Whyman v Garth (1853) 8 Exch 803; 155 ER 1578 …. [39125] Whyte; R v [2006] NSWCCA 75; BC200601962 …. [35555] Wickham; Illawarra District County Council, The v (1959) 101 CLR
467; [1959] ALR 711 …. [3158] Wickham; R v (1971) 55 Cr App R 199 …. [23025] — BC9101334 …. [21050] Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 …. [15055], [15225], [33435] Wiest v DPP (1988) 86 ALR 464 (Fed C of AFC) …. [5030] Wiggins, In the Marriage of (1976) 9 ALR 8 …. [15155] Wigglesworth v Dallison (1779) 1 Doug KB 201; 99 ER 132 …. [41120] — v R [1987] 2 SCR 541; (1987) 45 DLR (4th) 235 …. [5130] Wignall; R v [1993] Crim LR 62 …. [23315] Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127 …. [11150] Wilbain; R v (1863) 9 Cox CC 448 …. [39105] Wilband; R v [1967] SCR 14 …. [29070] Wilbourne; R v (1917) 12 Cr App R 280 …. [17270] Wilcox v Gotfrey (1872) 26 LT 481 …. [15055], [15235] Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488; [1952] ALR 281 …. [3156] Wild; R v (1835) 1 Mood 452; 168 ER 1341 …. [33640] Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365; 76 ALR 570 …. [11140] Wilden Pump Engineering Co v Fusfield [1985] FSR 159 …. [25245] — v — [1985] FSR 581 …. [25055] Wilding v Sanderson [1897] 2 Ch 534 …. [13300] Wildman v R [1984] 2 SCR 311; (1984) 12 DLR (4d) 641 …. [31155] Wildy; R v (2011) 111 SASR 189 …. [15220], [33435] Wiles; R v [1982] Crim LR 669 …. [1315], [35425] Wilkes; R v (1948) 77 CLR 511 …. [5145] Wilkie v McCalla (No 3) [1905] VLR 278 …. [41035]
Wilkins v Wilkins [1896] P 108 …. [5025] Wilkins; R v (1849) 4 Cox CC 92 …. [31155] Willcox v Sing [1985] 2 Qd R 66 …. [9050], [9075] Willett; R v (2005) 156 A Crim R 214 …. [15100] Willey v Synan (1937) 57 CLR 200 …. [33450], [37030] William H Muller & Co’s Algemeene v Ebbw Vale Steel Iron & Coal Co Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 1363 …. [11090] Williams v Berini [1960] WAR 21 …. [17660] — v Davies (1833) 1 Cr & M 464; 149 ER 481 …. [17725] — v East India Co (1802) 3 East 192; 102 ER 571 …. [7070] — v Hammersley (1978) 20 ALR 223 …. [41110] — v Home Office [1981] 1 All ER 1151 …. [27165] — v Innes (1808) 1 Camp 364; 170 ER 987 …. [33535] — v McCarthy (1979) 21 SASR 529 …. [1175] — v Macharg (1908) 7 CLR 213; 9 SR (NSW) 116 …. [1175] — v New York 337 US 241 (1949) …. [9070] — v Quebrada Railway Land and Copper Co [1895] 2 Ch 751 …. [25290] — v R (1978) 140 CLR 591; 22 ALR 195; 53 ALJR 101 …. [3020] — v — (1986) 161 CLR 278; 66 ALR 385 …. [33760] — v — [1982] Tas R 266 …. [1305] — v — [1982] WAR 277 …. [11095] — v — [1997] 1 WLR 548 …. [1360] — v Russell (1933) 149 LT 190 …. [7160] — v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 107 ALR 635 …. [25105] — v The Prince of Wales Life, & c, Co (1857) 23 Beav 338; 53 ER 133 …. [25055]
— v Usher (1955) 94 CLR 450; [1955] ALR 983 …. [41035] — v Williams (1798) 1 Hag Con 299; 161 ER 599 …. [33625] — v — [1988] QB 161; [1987] 3 All ER 257 …. [35335] — v Zupps Motors Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 493 …. [5025] Williams, Re (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 383; 43 WN (NSW) 101 …. [17080] Williams, Re; Wiles v Madgin [1985] 1 All ER 964; [1985] 1 WLR 905 …. [39295] Williams; R v (1853) 6 Cox CC 343 …. [17190] — (1897) 3 ALR (CN) 24 …. [17090] — (1912) 8 Cr App R 84 …. [1360] — (1913) 8 Cr App R 133 …. [17375], [17395] — (1968) 52 Cr App R 439 …. [33615] — (1976) 14 SASR 1 …. [33675], [33690], [33745] — (1977) 67 Cr App R 10 …. [33690] — (1978) 19 SASR 423 …. [15095] — (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 …. [19130], [19135] — (1986) 84 Cr App R 299 …. [21050], [21195] — (1992) 8 WAR 265 …. [33660], [33675], [33715] — (1994) 12 WAR 567 …. [33775] — (1999) 104 A Crim R 260 …. [11135] — (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 …. [35495], [35500] — [1954] SASR 216 …. [11140] — [1956] Crim LR 833 …. [1385] — [1959] NZLR 502 …. [33660] — [1970] 2 NSWR 41 …. [17120] — [1978] 1 NSWLR 674 …. [7295] — [1983] 2 VR 579 …. [1360], [11100]
— [1987] 2 Qd R 777 …. [21050], [33435], [33485], [33595] — [1988] Crim LR 113 …. [27130] — [1988] VR 261 …. [15110] — [1993] Crim LR 448 …. [33610] — [2001] 1 Qd R 212 …. [15220] — [2001] 2 Qd R 442 …. [17375], [17565] — [2010] 1 Qd R 276 …. [15195] Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95; [1927] ALR 13 …. [3158], [7275] Williamson, Re (1912) 8 Tas LR 33 …. [41005] Williamson; R v (1807) 3 C & P 635; 172 ER 579 …. [19145] — [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 …. [33455] Willie; R v [1960] Qd R 525 …. [11050] Willing v Ewens (No 2) (1973) 7 SASR 231 …. [3070] Willis v Bernard (1832) 8 Bing 376; 131 ER 439 …. [1520], [37085] — v Magistrate’s Court of Victoria (1996) 89 A Crim R 273 …. [17375] — v R (2001) 25 WAR 217 …. [17120], [33045], [33455] Willis; R v (1872) 12 Cox CC 164 …. [1175] — [1916] 1 KB 933 …. [15110] — [1960] 1 All ER 331; [1960] 1 WLR 55 …. [31010], [31095] Willmot; Ex parte A-G; R v [1987] 1 Qd R 53 …. [15020] Willnett v Harmer (1839) 8 CB 695; 173 ER 678 …. [9050] Willoughby v Clayton Utz (No 2) (2009) 40 WAR 98 …. [5025] Wills; R v (1985) 39 SASR 35 …. [33730] — [2012] 1 Cr App R 2 …. [17495] — [2012] Crim LR 565 …. [13070], [17435] Willshire; R v (1881) 6 QBD 366 …. [1125], [7280]
Wilmot; R v (1988) 89 Cr App R 341 …. [1215], [17315], [21170], [25040] Wilover Nominees Ltd v IRC [1973] 2 All ER 977; [1973] 1 WLR 1393 …. [1175] Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; [1988] 1 All ER 871 …. [11150] Wilson v Bowie (1823) 1 Car & P 8; 171 ER 1079 …. [17570] — v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 …. [9115] — v County Court (Vic) (2006) 14 VR 461 …. [33770] — v Deputy State Coroner (1995) 124 FLR 388 …. [25005] — v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816; [2003] 4 All ER 97 …. [27095] — v Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 713 …. [25355] — v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 …. [9115], [11100] — v Magistrates Court (SA) (2004) 154 A Crim R 537 …. [25340] — v R (1970) 123 CLR 334; [1972] ALR 687 …. [1140], [17130], [21050], [31100] — v — (2011) 33 VR 340 …. [9040], [21050] — v Rastall [1775] All ER Rep 597; (1792) 100 ER 1283; 4 TR 753 …. [25245], [25265], [25325] — v Wilson [1903] P 157 …. [41035] Wilson & Co Inc v Campbell 157 P 2d 465 (Okl, 1945) …. [1295] Wilson; R v (1913) 9 Cr App R 124 …. [17150] — (1957) 41 Cr App R 226 …. [17095] — (1970) 64 QJPR 88 …. [17060] — (1973) 58 Cr App 438 …. [21090] — (1986) 42 SASR 203 …. [9030], [17270]
— (1987) 47 SASR 287 …. [27265] — (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 …. [1220] — [1967] 2 QB 406; [1967] 1 All ER 797 …. [33635], [33640], [33675] — [1988] VR 673 …. [35340] — [1991] 2 NZLR 707 …. [1490], [5210] — [1992] 2 Qd R 174 …. [7085] — [1998] 2 Qd R 599 …. [17090] — [2009] Crim LR 193 …. [1115] Wilton and Co v Phillips (1903) 19 TLR 390 …. [33345], [33810] Wilton; R v (2013) 116 SASR 392 …. [27215] Wily v Lo Presti (1997) 16 ACLC 82 …. [35460] Wimpole v McIlwraith [1923] VLR 553; (1923) 29 ALR 427 …. [33510] Winborne (RJ) Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Re Beale (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 353 …. [7120] Windass; R v (1988) 89 Cr App R 258 …. [17430] Winfield; R v [1939] 4 All ER 164; (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 …. [15125], [19140], [19145], [23285] Wingate’s Registered Design, Re (1934) 52 RPC 126 …. [29115] Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 88 ALJR 52 …. [5025] Wingrave (dec’d), Re [1969] VR 120 …. [41090] Wink; R v (1834) 6 C & P 397; 172 ER 1293 …. [17265] Winkel; R v (1911) 76 JP 191 …. [33680] Winks v WH Heck & Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 226 …. [39290] Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159 …. [1380], [1395], [1400], [1420], [3030], [3159], [3295] Winner; R v (1995) 79 A Crim R 528 …. [21210]
Winship, Re 397 US 358 (1970) …. [7280] Winslow; R v (1860) 8 Cox CC 397 …. [21015] Winsor; R v (1865) 4 F & F 363; 176 ER 600 …. [9005] Winter; R v (1980) 74 Cr App R 16 …. [17485] Winterbotham Gurney & Co v Sibthorp & Cox [1918] 1 KB 625 …. [11145] Wise v Musolino [1936] SASR 447 …. [29100] Wise Bros Pty Ltd v Cmrs for Railways (NSW) (1947) 75 CLR 59; [1948] 1 ALR 97 …. [29060] Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297; [1969] 3 All ER 275 …. [1060] Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470; [1941] ALR 133 …. [5025] Wishart; R v (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 322 …. [1045] Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; 131 ALR 401 …. [9005], [9065], [9130] Witham; R v [1962] Qd R 49 …. [1170], [15125], [15165], [15235], [21050] Witt v Witt and Klindworth (1865) 8 LT 175 …. [37050] Witten v Lombard Australia Ltd (1968) 14 FLR 322 …. [35055] WK v R (2011) 33 VR 516 …. [27305] — v SR (1997) 22 Fam LR 592 …. [9050], [9130] WLC v R (2007) 19 NTLR 136 …. [15165], [15235] WLW, Re [1972] Ch 456; [1972] 2 All ER 433 …. [1030] Wodcock v Nichol (1976) 13 ALR 411 …. [17200], [17205] Woess; R v [1945] VLR 190; [1945] ALR 259 …. [33640] Wogandt; R v (1983) 33 A Crim R 31 …. [33455], [37130] Wohlgemuth, Re; Public Trustee v Wohlgemuth [1949] Ch 12; [1948] 2 All ER 882 …. [39255] Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 …. [17310],
[17315] — v — [1969] VR 323 …. [17615], [19170] Wojtowicz; R v (2005) 148 NTR 24 …. [17265], [35410] Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435; 29 ALJR 36; (1956) SR (NSW) 134 …. [11150] Wolper v Poole (1972) 2 SASR 419 …. [29050] Wolverhampton Coroner; Ex parte McCurbin; R v [1990] 2 All ER 759; [1990] 1 WLR 719 …. [1050] Wombat Nominees Pty Ltd v De Tullio (1990) 98 ALR 307 …. [35055], [35090] Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 146 FCR 10 …. [5170] — v — (2004) 204 ALR 722 …. [5030], [5170] — v R (2001) 159 FLR 328 …. [15115] — v — (2001) 207 CLR 584; 185 ALR 233 …. [3020] Wong Kam-ming v — [1980] AC 247; [1979] 1 All ER 939 …. [11055], [11060], [17430], [17505], [19015], [33625], [33675] Wong; R v [1977] 1 WWR 1 …. [17350] — [1986] Crim LR 683 …. [17375] Wood v Balfour (2011) 15 BPR 29, 773 …. [11150] — v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 67 IR 46 …. [25245] — v Cooper (1845) 1 Car & Kir 645; 174 ER 973 …. [17190] — v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 …. [17065], [17235], [17240], [17545], [17555] — v Luscombe [1966] 1 QB 169; [1964] 3 All ER 972 …. [5095] — v Mackinson (1840) 2 M & Rob 273; 174 ER 286 …. [17470] — v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581 …. [1380], [9035], [9040], [17065], [29080], [29225]
Wood; R v (1841) 5 Jur NS 225 …. [19145] — (1911) 7 Cr App Rep 56 …. [1200] — (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 …. [1315], [35425] — (1983) 76 Cr App R 23 …. [31075], [31120] — [1920] 2 KB 179; [1920] All ER Rep 137 …. [23215], [23290] — [1951] 2 All ER 112n …. [19170] — [1974] VR 117 …. [11095] — [1982] 2 NZLR 233 …. [3020], [3255] Woodall; R v [1967] QWN 48 …. [33690] Woodard v Woodard and Curd [1959] 1 All ER 641; [1959] 1 WLR 493 …. [33520] Woodbridge v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 503 …. [7030] Woodcock; R v (1789) 1 Leach 500; 168 ER 352 …. [33265] — [1963] Crim LR 273 …. [17185] Woodfine, Re (1878) 47 LJ Ch 832 …. [17500] Woodhead; R v (1847) 175 VR 216; 2 Car & K 520 …. [17115], [17120] Woodhouse v Consignia plc [2002] 2 All ER 737; [2002] 1 WLR 2558 …. [5170] — v Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 39 …. [31010], [31095] Woodhouse & Co (Ltd) v Woodhouse (1914) 30 TLR 559 …. [25265] Wooding; R v (1979) 70 Cr App R 256 …. [17135] Woodland v Woodland [1928] P 169 …. [5025] Woodroffe v National Crime Authority (1999) 168 ALR 585 …. [27155], [27195] Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 …. [29070], [29150] — v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 …. [3005], [3060], [3155], [3156], [3157], [3158], [3159], [3200]
— v Rogers; Ex parte Woods [1983] 2 Qd R 212 …. [1645] — v Smith [1976] WAR 13 …. [25175] Woods; R v (1840) 1 Craw & D 439 …. [17615] — (2008) 102 SASR 422 …. [7085] Woodward v Buchanan (1870) LR 5 QB 285 …. [21285] — v Goulstone (1886) 11 App Cas 469; [1886] All ER Rep 234 …. [33315] — v Shea [1952] VLR 313; [1952] ALR 546 …. [17305], [17315] Woodward, Re; Kenway v Kidd [1913] 1 Ch 392 …. [33385] Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 205 ALR 522 …. [3159] Woolcott Forbes; R v (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333; 61 WN (NSW) 219 …. [23275], [23290] Woolf v Masius Wynne-Williams & D’Arcy Macmanus (Aust) Pty Ltd [1975] ACLD DT 98 …. [17015] — v Woolf [1931] P 134; [1931] All ER Rep 196 …. [1155] Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 33 NSWLR 529 …. [25010], [25020], [25240], [27080] Woolley v Dunford (1972) 3 SASR 243 …. [9040], [33435] — v North London Railway Co (1869) LR 4 CP 602 …. [25235] — v Pole (1863) 14 CB NS 538; 143 ER 556 …. [25235] Woolley; R v (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 …. [15220] Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; [1935] All ER Rep 1 …. [7030], [7170], [7175], [7225], [7280], [9005], [9020] Woolway v Rowe (1834) 1 Ad & E 114; 110 ER 1151 …. [33530] Woon v R (1964) 109 CLR 529; [1964] ALR 868 …. [33435], [33485] Work Cover Authority (NSW), (General Manager) v Law Society of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 502 …. [25210], [25225]
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Keelty) v Crown in Right of New South Wales (Police Service of New South Wales) (2000) 50 NSWLR 333; [2000] NSW I R Comm 234 …. [25080] Workers’ Compensation Commission of NSW v FAI Insurances Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 362 …. [27155] Workman; R v (2004) 60 NSWLR 471 …. [27305], [27315] — [1963] 1 CCC 297 …. [1140] Workmen’s Compensation Acts, Re; Cullen v Clarke [1963] IR 368 …. [37025] World Hosts Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 189 …. [37085] Worley v Bentley [1976] 2 All ER 449 …. [17170] Worrall v Reich [1955] 1 QB 296; [1955] 1 All ER 363 …. [25255] Worrell v Woods (1999) 163 ALR 195; 90 FLR 264 …. [25265] Worswick, Re (1887) 38 Ch D 370 …. [25255] Wotta v Haliburton Oil Well Cementing Co Ltd [1955] SCR 377; [1955] 2 DLR 785 …. [1200] Wragg v Downard [1938] ALR (CN) 549 …. [37050] Wran v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1984] 3 NSWLR 241 …. [25340] Wray; R v [1971] SCR 272; (1970) 11 DLR (3d) 673 …. [27245] WRC; R v (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 …. [17295], [21035], [21100], [21252] Wren v Emmett Contractors Pty Ltd (1969) 43 ALJR 213 …. [17430], [17600] Wright v Bastin (No 2) [1979] VR 329 …. [1125], [11095] — v Beckett (1834) 1 Mood & R 414; 174 ER 143 …. [17375] — v Crump (1702) 7 Mod 1; 87 ER 1055 …. [3140] — v Doe d Tatham (1831) 2 Russ & My 1; 39 ER 295 …. [31015]
— v — (1834) 1 Ad & E 3; 110 ER 1108 …. [31015], [33795] — v — (1837) 7 Ad & E 313; 112 ER 488 …. [31015], [31040], [31055], [31135], [31165], [37025], [37030] — v — (1838) 4 Bing NC 489; 132 ER 877 …. [29090], [29145], [31015], [31040] — v Lewis (1990) 53 SASR 416 …. [27095] — v Morton [1998] 3 VR 316 …. [1125] — v R (1977) 15 ALR 305 …. [33610], [33735] — v — [1994] Crim LR 55 …. [21065] — v Sydney Municipal Council (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 348 …. [29070], [33825] — v Tatham (1838) 5 Cl & F 670; 7 ER 559 …. [29070], [31001], [31135] — v Western Australia (2010) 43 WAR 1 …. [33775] — v Wilcox (1850) 9 CB 650; 137 ER 1047 …. [17720], [17725] — v Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191; [1948] 2 ALR 565 …. [9050] Wright (No 2); R v [1968] VR 174 …. [1360], [1400] Wright and Webb v Annandale (1930) 46 TLR 239 …. [31155] Wright d Clymer v Littler (1761) 3 Burr 1244; 97 ER 812 …. [33285] Wright Heaton & Co v Barrett (1892) 13 NSWLR (L) 206 …. [41005] Wright, Re (1888) 5 WN (NSW) 11 …. [3065] Wright, Re; Hegan v Bloor [1920] 1 Ch 108; [1918] All ER Rep 825 …. [31090] Wright; R v (1821) Russ & Ry 456; 168 ER 897 …. [29105] — (1866) 4 F & F 967; 176 ER 869 …. [17545] — (1910) 5 Cr App R 131 …. [23315] — (1934) 25 Cr App R 35 …. [1415], [17130] — (1985) 19 A Crim R 17 …. [17145], [21115]
— (1987) 90 Cr App R 91 …. [13060] — (1990) 49 A Crim R 462 …. [33485] — (1990) 90 Cr App R 325 …. [21100] — (1992) 60 A Crim R 215 …. [1390], [1400] — [1969] SASR 256 …. [11060], [23140] — [1980] VR 593 …. [13075], [25090], [29085], [29095], [29150], [33485], [33770] — [1999] 3 VR 355 …. [1645] WS; R v (2000) 78 SASR 33 …. [13070] Wundowie Foundry Pty Ltd v Milson Foundary Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 474 …. [25245] Wurch; R v (1932) 40 Man R 328; [1932] 2 WWR 183; (1932) 58 CCC 204 …. [15220], [17600] Wurramara; R v (2011) 254 FLR 136; 213 A Crim R 440 …. [33805] Wyatt; R v [1972] VR 902 …. [33485], [33710] — [1990] Crim LR 343 …. [17480] X v Australian Crime Commission (2004) 212 ALR 596 …. [25155] — v McDermott (1994) 51 FCR 1; 123 ALR 226 …. [25180] — v X [2000] FLC 93-017 …. [3160] — v Y [1975] 2 NZLR 524 …. [15050] — v Y (No 1) [1954] VLR 708; [1955] ALR 181 …. [25010], [25330] X and Y (by her tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 …. [11150] X, Re [1992] Fam 124; [1992] 2 All ER 595 …. [27125] X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; 298 ALR 570 …. [25165] X; R v (1989) 91 Cr App R 36 …. [13050] Xinaris; R v (1955) 43 Cr App R 30n …. [17130]
XY; R v (2010) 79 NSWLR 629 …. [1490], [17290], [35525] — (2013) 84 NSWLR 363 …. [21252] XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532; 227 ALR 495 …. [3158] Y, DB; R v [2006] 96 SASR 180 …. [25340] Y; R v (1995) 81 A Crim R 446 …. [29050] Yacoob; R v (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 …. [1040], [1090], [1125], [7280], [11075], [13030] Yager v R (1977) 139 CLR 28; 13 ALR 247 …. [3180] — v — [1977] WAR 17; (1976) 11 ALR 646 …. [3120] Yalman; R v [1998] 2 Cr App R 269 …. [21065] Yamashita, In re (1946) 327 US 1 …. [1055] Yammine; R v (2002) 132 A Crim R 44 …. [15260] Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533; 156 ALR 370 …. [29150] Yaroomba Beach Development Co Pty Ltd v Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 398 …. [39180] Yassim v Australian Mid-Eastern Club Ltd (1989) 15 ACLR 449 …. [5025] Yat Tung Investment Co v Dao Heng Bank [1975] AC 581 …. [5170] Yates v Kyffin-Taylor and Wark [1899] WN 141 …. [5185] Yates Property Corp (in liq) v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84; 157 ALR 30 …. [29125], [29205] Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v —(2000) 179 ALR 664 …. [5055], [5095], [5170] Yates; R v (1841) Car & M 132; 174 ER 441 …. [15020] — [1970] SASR 302 …. [15170], [15195], [17275], [23190] Yeates; R v [1992] 1 NZLR 421 …. [1880] Yellow; R v (1932) 96 JP 826 …. [17170]
Yendall v Smith Mitchell & Co Ltd [1953] VLR 369; [1953] ALR 724 …. [1290] Yeo; R v [1951] 1 All ER 864 …. [13115] Yewin; R v (1811) 2 Camp 638n …. [1140] Yianni v Yianni [1966] 1 All ER 231n; [1966] 1 WLR 120 …. [17080] Yildiz v R (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 …. [29050], [29060] Yisrael v District Court of New South Wales (1996) 87 A Crim R 63 …. [33485] Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd (2009) 262 ALR 378 …. [25010], [25350], [25375] Yooyen; R v (1991) 57 A Crim R 226 …. [27105] Youell v Bland Welch & Co [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 …. [39240] — v Bland Welch & Co Ltd (No 3) [1991] 1 WLR 122 …. [25010] Young v Denton (1927) 21 Sask LR 319; [1927] 1 DLR 426 …. [17235] — v HM Advocate 1932 SC (J) 63 …. [13095], [13100], [17515] — v Lusted (2011) 20 Tas R 98 …. [11125] — v Owen [1972] ALR 671; (1972) 19 FLR 70 …. [3070] — v Public Service Board [1982] 2 NSWLR 456 …. [5060] — v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560; [1956] ALR 939 …. [7075] — v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483; 59 ALR 225 …. [27155] — v R [1978] Crim LR 163 …. [33595] — v Rank [1950] 2 KB 510; [1950] 2 All ER 166 …. [11090] — v Schuler (1883) 11 QBD 651; [1881] All ER Rep Ext 1469 …. [39190], [39280] — v Tibbits (1912) 14 CLR 114 …. [33435] — v Tockassie (1905) 2 CLR 470 …. [39195] Young, Ex parte; Re Kitchin (1881) 17 Ch D 668 …. [5010]
Young; R v (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 …. [25325], [27055] — [1923] SASR 35 …. [15075], [15170], [31155], [33480], [33810] — [1953] 1 All ER 21 …. [1195], [15220] — [1964] 2 All ER 480; [1964] 1 WLR 717 …. [11100], [11105] — [1995] QB 324 …. [27215] — [1998] 1 VR 402 …. [5135], [5150], [15135], [17270], [21050] Youngberry v Heatherington [1977] Qd R 15 …. [17660] Yousry; R v (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 …. [17545], [17550] Youssef; R v (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 …. [7030], [7050] Yuill v Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales (1990) 20 NSWLR 386 …. [25025] — v Yuill [1945] P 15; [1945] 1 All ER 183 …. [11150], [17135] Yunghanns v Elfic Pty Ltd (2000) 1 VR 92 …. [25265], [25290] Z v Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] 1 NZLR 65 …. [9075] — v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee [2009] 1 NZLR 1 …. [9050] — v New South Wales Crime Commission (2007) 231 CLR 75; 233 ALR 17 …. [25225] Z, Re (1996) 134 FLR 40 …. [1520], [1695], [13015] Z; R v [1990] 2 QB 355; [1990] 2 All ER 971 …. [13060] — [2000] 2 AC 483; [2000] 3 All ER 385 …. [5135], [5150], [21025], [21170] — [2003] 1 WLR 1489 …. [33595] Zaidi v Health Care Complaints Commission (1998) 44 NSWLR 82 …. [5190], [21001] Zaidi; R v (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 …. [19110] Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171; 140 ALR 701 …. [11125], [21252]
Zaman Shah, Ex parte (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 343 …. [39010] Zammit; R v (1999) 107 A Crim R 489 …. [11125] Zampaglione; R v (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 …. [33570], [33575] Zampogna; R v (2003) 138 A Crim R 368 …. [33605] Zanatta v McCleary [1976] 1 NSWLR 230 …. [27205] Zanet v Hentschke (1988) 33 A Crim R 51 …. [17660], [27295] Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433; [1963] ALR 165 …. [9110], [9115], [9120], [11110] Zantiotis, In the Marriage of (1993) 113 ALR 441 …. [3140] Zaphir; R v [1978] Qd R 151 …. [1305] Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193 …. [25160] — v Webb [1974] WAR 15 …. [3070] Zarb v Kennedy (1968) 121 CLR 283; [1969] ALR 292 …. [7030] Zarezadeh; R v [2011] Crim LR 588 …. [17135] Zarro v ASC (1992) 36 FCR 40 …. [27005], [27010], [27105], [27155], [27165] Zatorski v South Australian Railways Cmr (1982) 41 ALR 655 …. [5025] Zaveckas; R v [1970] 1 All ER 413 …. [33615], [33640] Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd (2005) 67 NSWLR 457 …. [5070], [5170] Zeccola v Barr (1978) 19 ACTR 1 …. [17460] Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; 71 ALR 641 …. [7050] Zecevic; R v [1986] VR 797 …. [7050], [19125] Zema; R v [1970] VR 566 …. [33805] Zentai v O’Connor (No 2) (2010) 183 FCR 180; 268 ALR 7 …. [25010], [25245] Zerafa; R v [1935] St R Qd 227 …. [11050]
Zhang v Zemin (2008) 251 ALR 707 …. [41020] Zhang; R v (2005) 158 A Crim R 504 …. [21252] Zheng; R v (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 …. [15220] Zielinksi; R v [1950] 2 All ER 1114 …. [15125], [17065] Zielinski; R v (1950) 34 Cr App R 193 …. [15255] Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279; [1957] ALR 620 …. [5195], [17115], [17120] Zion; R v [1986] VR 609 …. [25165], [33640] Zippo Manufacturing Co v Rogers Imports 216 F Supp 670 …. [37090] Zis v Bland [1962] WAR 137 …. [7125] ZL v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 525 …. [35480] Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 23 FCR 282; 91 ALR 341 …. [3140], [29020] Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234; 172 ALR 1 …. [15220], [33435] Zorach v Clauson 343 US 306 …. [3156] Zorad; R v (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 …. [15255], [17435] — [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 …. [17275], [17390] Zotovic v Dobell Boat Hire Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ACTR 29 …. [5045] Zoubek v Zoubek [1951] VLR 386; [1951] ALR 791 …. [41005] Zuber; R v (2010) 175 ACTR 1 …. [13070] Zullo; R v [1993] 2 Qd R 572 …. [1395], [33045] Zundel; R v (1987) 35 DLR (4th) 338 …. [29150], [33845] Zuvela v Cosmarnan Concrete Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 227; 71 ALJR 29 …. [11150]
Table of Statutes CO-OPERATIVE SCHEME LEGISLATION Companies ([State]) Code s 295(1) …. [25280] s 306(3) …. [27080] s 541 …. [35400] Federal Court Rules 2011 r 20.03 …. [25055] r 36.57 …. [11150]
NATIONAL SCHEME LAWS Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 …. [1695]
COMMONWEALTH Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 15AB …. [1770], [3157] s 15AB(1) …. [1770] s 15AB(2) …. [1770] s 16A(a) …. [13255] s 16B …. [13255] s 17(e) …. [13255] s 29 …. [1130] s 61(2) …. [1175]
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 35A …. [13270] Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 Sch 2 …. [27315] Australian Securities And Investments Commission Act 2001 …. [17020], [25115], [25265], [39070] s 80(1) …. [39025] s 192(1) …. [25280] Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 77 …. [25165] s 77(1)(a) …. [25165] s 77AA …. [25280] s 81 …. [1695], [35655] s 81(1B) …. [25165] s 81(11AA) …. [25165] Bills of Exchange Act 1909 s 14 …. [39270] s 35(2) …. [7095], [7100] Competition and Consumer Act 2010 …. [9050] Pt 4 …. [5070] s 50 …. [7070], [11010] s 52 …. [5070], [39160] s 76 …. [25125] s 77 …. [25125]
s 83 …. [5225] s 155 …. [25090], [25255], [25280], [27315], [35470] s 155(7) …. [25115] s 155(7B) …. [25280] s 157 …. [25280] s 159 …. [25175] Sch 2 …. [9085] Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901 Ch 3 …. [25085], [25280] s 5 …. [41015] s 109 …. [3095], [41100], [41105] s 118 …. [41015] Corporations Act 2001 …. [1695], [25115], [39070] Ch 1 …. [17020] Pt 5.9 …. [35545] Div 1 …. [1685] s 576 …. [25265] s 596A …. [35400] s 596B …. [1685], [35400] s 597 …. [25060], [25280] s 597(12) …. [25060], [25175] s 597(12A) …. [25060], [25175] s 1274(4) …. [7265] s 1305 …. [41130] s 1305(1) …. [41130]
s 1305(2) …. [41130] s 1316A …. [25060], [25080] Crimes Act 1914 Pt 1C …. [33780] Pt IAB …. [27310] Pt IIIA …. [41065] s 3ZM …. [1450] s 3ZN …. [1450] s 3ZP …. [1450] s 15X …. [27310] s 15YAB(3) …. [13070] s 15YB …. [19080] s 15YE …. [13070] s 15YF …. [13070] s 15YG …. [13070] s 15YH …. [13070] s 15YI …. [13070] s 15YL …. [13070] s 15YM …. [13070] s 15YN …. [13070] s 15YO …. [13070] s 15YP …. [13070] s 15YQ …. [13070] s 15YQ(a) …. [15140] s 15YR …. [13070] s 15YU …. [17055]
s 23A(6) …. [33750], [33775] s 23C …. [33775] s 23F …. [33775], [33780] s 23G …. [33740], [33775] s 23H …. [33775] s 23K …. [33750], [33775] s 23L …. [33775] s 23M …. [33775] s 23N …. [33775] s 23P …. [33775] s 23V …. [33775] s 23V(1) …. [33775] s 23V(2) …. [33775] s 23V(5) …. [33775] s 23V(6) …. [33775] s 23V(7) …. [33775] s 24AB …. [21260] s 24C …. [15065] s 50EA …. [13270] s 50FA …. [41065] s 85ZZH …. [19025] Criminal Code Act 1995 …. [7325], [9130] Ch 2 Pt 2 Div 13 …. [7325] cl 2.2 …. [7325]
Customs Act 1901 s 243F …. [25180] s 254 …. [25180] s 255 …. [7105] Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 s 52(2) …. [15020] s 144 …. [3160] s 144(4) …. [3160] s 147 …. [3160] Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 …. [13255] Electronic Transactions Act 1999 …. [35575] s 8(1) …. [35575] s 9 …. [35575] s 10 …. [35575] s 11(1) …. [35575] s 11(2) …. [35575] s 12(1) …. [35575] s 12(2) …. [35575] s 14 …. [35575] s 15(1) …. [35575] Evidence Act 1905 …. [1690] Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. [25340] Div 1C …. [25340]
Pt 3A …. [35540] Pt IIIA …. [1630], [35540] s 6 …. [33385] s 7B(1)(c)(ii) …. [35560] s 16(2) …. [27225] s 76 …. [35555] s 126G(1) …. [25340] s 126H …. [25340] s 126H(1) …. [25340] s 131A …. [25340] s 131A(1) …. [25340] s 131A(1A) …. [25340] s 131A(2) …. [25340] Evidence Act 1995 …. [1305], [1320], [1635], [1695], [1770], [3200], [5180], [7320], [11010], [11075], [11125], [13050], [13070], [13075], [13105], [13155], [13240], [13275], [15001], [17460], [19020], [19055], [19080], [21252], [21295], [23295], [23365], [23400], [29150], [29195], [33115], [33255], [33540], [33785], [33805], [35655], [39080], [41015], [41030], [41065] Ch Pt 3.11 …. [11125] Ch 2 …. [1730] Pt 2.1 Div 3 …. [1680] Pt 2.2 …. [1680], [39080] Pt 2.3 …. [1295], [1680] Ch 3 …. [1730], [11030]
Pt 3.2 …. [1680], [1755], [15260], [35001], [35445], [35655] Div 2 …. [35450], [35465], [35480], [35532] Pt 3.4 …. [15260], [33785], [35600], [35655] Pt 3.7 …. [17405] Pt 3.9 …. [1445], [1450] Pt 3.10 …. [25345] Pt 3.11 …. [11125] Ch 4 Pt 4.2 …. [3085] Pt 2.3 …. [1722] Pt 3.5 …. [1722] Pt 3.10 …. [25400] s 3(1) …. [13160] s 3(13) …. [13160] s 3(14) …. [13160] s 4 …. [1685], [25175] s 4(1) …. [1685], [25300] s 4(2) …. [1685], [1800] s 4(3) …. [1685] s 4(4) …. [1685] s 4(5) …. [1685] s 4(6) …. [1685], [25175] s 5 …. [1690], [1820], [3090], [3095], [35545], [35570], [35575], [39080], [39130], [41040], [41100] s 8 …. [1695], [1730], [1742], [1750], [35630] s 8(1) …. [1690], [1695], [1730], [33840] s 8(2) …. [1695]
s 8(3) …. [1695], [1730] s 8(4) …. [1695] s 9 …. [1700], [1722], [1742], [1820], [41030] s 9(1) …. [1690], [1700], [1735], [1742], [1750], [35595] s 9(2) …. [1700] s 9(2)(c) …. [1715] s 9(3) …. [1700] s 9(3)(a) …. [1715], [7320] s 9(3)(c) …. [1715] s 9(3)(d) …. [1820], [3095], [41040], [41100], [41105] s 10 …. [1722], [13255] s 10(1) …. [1705] s 10(2) …. [1705] s 11 …. [1705], [1722] s 11(1) …. [1705], [1730], [17075], [17460] s 11(2) …. [1705] s 12 …. [1725], [1730], [13015], [13020], [13050], [13090], [13230] s 12A …. [15135] s 13 …. [11075], [13065] s 13(1) …. [35445] s 13(3) …. [13050], [13060], [35455] s 13(4) …. [13050], [13060] s 13(5) …. [13060] s 13(6) …. [35445] s 13(8) …. [13050], [27195] s 14 …. [1790], [11075]
s 15 …. [13255] s 15(1) …. [13255] s 15(2) …. [1705], [13255] s 16 …. [27225], [35455] s 16(2) …. [1790], [27225] s 17(2) …. [13075] s 17(3) …. [13105] s 17(4) …. [13105] s 18 …. [1790], [11075], [11125], [13150], [13160], [13175], [13180] s 18(1) …. [13180] s 18(2) …. [13180] s 18(3) …. [13180] s 18(4) …. [13180] s 18(5) …. [11035], [13180] s 18(6) …. [13180] s 18(7) …. [13180] s 18(8) …. [13180] s 19 …. [13150], [13180] s 20 …. [1715], [1815], [13150], [23020] s 20(1) …. [13225] s 20(2) …. [23030] s 20(3) …. [13195], [13200], [13205], [13220], [13225] s 20(4) …. [13225] s 20(5) …. [13225] s 21 …. [13275], [23055] s 21(3) …. [13300]
s 23 …. [13275] s 23(2) …. [13275] s 23(3) …. [1800], [13275] s 24 …. [1725] s 24(2) …. [13275] s 26 …. [1730], [1790], [17080] s 26(a) …. [1730] s 26(c) …. [17405] s 26(d) …. [17055] s 27 …. [17475] s 28 …. [1755], [1790] s 29(1) …. [1755], [1790] s 29(2) …. [17145] s 29(3) …. [17145] s 29(4) …. [1320], [1755], [17170] s 30 …. [33805] s 31 …. [1790] s 31(1) …. [1755] s 31(3) …. [1755] s 32 …. [1790], [17170], [17245] s 32(1) …. [1755] s 32(2) …. [17245] s 32(3) …. [17245] s 32(4) …. [1755], [17245] s 33 …. [17160], [17170], [17180] s 34 …. [1755], [1790], [17170]
s 34(1) …. [17170] s 34(2) …. [17170] s 35 …. [17575] s 36 …. [39045] s 37(1) …. [17160], [17405] s 37(1)(a) …. [1755], [1790] s 37(1)(c) …. [1815] s 37(2) …. [1755], [17160] s 37(3) …. [17160] s 38 …. [17405], [19010] s 38(1) …. [1755], [1790], [17405] s 38(3) …. [1755], [17405], [19010] s 38(4) …. [1755], [17405] s 38(5) …. [17405] s 38(6) …. [17405] s 38(6)(b) …. [17405] s 38(7) …. [17375], [17405] s 39 …. [17615] s 39(a) …. [1790] s 39(b) …. [1755], [1790] s 40 …. [17470] s 41 …. [1800] s 41(1) …. [1730] s 42 …. [1722], [1790], [17165], [17465] s 42(1) …. [1755] s 42(2) …. [17475]
s 42(3) …. [1755], [17165] s 42(4) …. [1722], [17165] s 43 …. [17530], [17565], [19055] s 43(3) …. [17655] s 44 …. [17550] s 45 …. [1800], [17540], [17565] s 45(3)(b) …. [1755] s 45(3)(c) …. [17545] s 45(5) …. [17545] s 46 …. [1742], [1790], [17075], [17460] s 46(1) …. [1742], [1755] s 47 …. [1732], [39080] s 48 …. [35545], [35555] s 48(1) …. [39080] s 48(1)(c) …. [1305], [39080] s 48(4) …. [39080] s 49 …. [1780], [1800] s 49(b) …. [1755] s 50 …. [1780], [1800] s 50(1) …. [1755] s 50(3) …. [29165] s 51 …. [1730], [1732], [3156], [39080] s 52 …. [1295], [1305], [1722] s 53 …. [1290], [1295], [1755], [1790] s 53(1) …. [1295] s 53(3) …. [1295]
s 53(3)(c) …. [1295] s 53(4) …. [1295] s 53(5) …. [1295] s 54 …. [1290], [1295] s 55 …. [1490], [1520], [1730], [21252], [29165], [29195], [29200] s 55(1) …. [1490], [1520], [29185] s 55(2) …. [1520], [1815] s 56 …. [1490], [1645], [1730], [1742], [1750], [29080], [39105], [41030] s 56(1) …. [1520], [1732], [3160], [25190], [25345] s 56(2) …. [1520], [29185], [29195] s 57 …. [1520] s 57(1) …. [9130], [11075] s 58 …. [1520] s 58(1) …. [1815] s 59 …. [1680], [33840], [35435], [35560] s 59(1) …. [31070], [35435], [35555] s 59(2) …. [35435], [35600] s 59(3) …. [35435] s 60 …. [17255], [17290], [17315], [17405], [17530], [17540], [17565], [29195], [31010], [31080], [35435], [35440], [37140] s 60(1) …. [35435] s 60(2) …. [35435] s 60(3) …. [35435], [35440] s 61 …. [35445] s 61(1) …. [35445] s 61(2) …. [35445]
s 61(3) …. [35445] s 62 …. [35440], [35450], [35510], [35532], [35655] s 62(1) …. [35450] s 62(2) …. [35435] s 62(3) …. [35450] s 63 …. [17170], [35460] s 63(2) …. [35460] s 63(2)(a) …. [35460] s 63(2)(b) …. [35460] s 64 …. [17170], [17255], [35460], [35465], [35470], [35475], [35655] s 64(2) …. [1800], [35460], [35465], [35470] s 64(3) …. [17255], [35465], [35475] s 64(4) …. [1790], [17255], [35475] s 65 …. [35460], [35480], [35510] s 65(2) …. [35485], [35510], [35515] s 65(2)(a) …. [35485], [35490] s 65(2)(b) …. [21050], [35485], [35495], [35500], [37165] s 65(2)(c) …. [21050], [35485], [35495], [35500], [37165] s 65(2)(d) …. [35485], [35505] s 65(3) …. [35510], [35605] s 65(3)(b) …. [1800] s 65(4) …. [1800], [35510] s 65(5) …. [35510] s 65(6) …. [35510] s 65(7)(a) …. [35505] s 65(7)(b) …. [35505]
s 65(7)(c) …. [35505] s 65(8) …. [35515] s 65(8)(a) …. [35515] s 65(8)(b) …. [35515] s 65(9) …. [35515] s 66 …. [17255], [17290], [17295], [35520], [35525], [35532] s 66(1) …. [35525] s 66(2) …. [1800], [17255], [35520] s 66(2)(b) …. [35532] s 66(2A) …. [1800], [35525] s 66(3) …. [35520], [35530] s 66(4) …. [1790], [17255], [35520] s 66A …. [17300], [35445], [35450], [35532], [37165] s 67 …. [1780], [1795], [35460], [35470], [35510], [35515] s 67(1) …. [35460] s 67(2) …. [35460] s 67(4) …. [1755], [35460] s 68 …. [35470] s 69 …. [3105], [17170], [35190], [35540], [35545], [35555], [35560], [35565] s 69(1) …. [35545] s 69(1)(a) …. [35545] s 69(1)(b) …. [35545] s 69(2) …. [35545], [35550] s 69(2)(b) …. [35565] s 69(3) …. [35545], [35550] s 69(3)(a) …. [35545]
s 69(4) …. [35545], [35550] s 69(5) …. [35545] s 70 …. [31120] s 70(1) …. [35570] s 70(2) …. [35570] s 71 …. [35575] s 72 …. [21050], [35440], [35532], [35580], [37165] s 73(1) …. [33255], [35585], [41075] s 73(1)(c) …. [41065] s 73(2) …. [33255], [35585] s 73(3) …. [33255], [35585] s 74(1) …. [33200], [35590], [41120] s 74(2) …. [33200], [35590] s 75 …. [33840], [35595] s 76 …. [1680], [29080], [29165], [29170], [29200], [35555] s 76(1) …. [29165] s 76(2) …. [29165] s 77 …. [29165], [29170] s 78 …. [29175] s 78A …. [29175], [35520] s 79 …. [29080], [29180], [29185], [29190], [29200] s 79(1) …. [29180] s 79(2) …. [29180] s 80 …. [29050], [29190], [29195], [29205], [41030] s 81 …. [29165], [35605] s 81(1) …. [35605]
s 81(2) …. [35605] s 82 …. [35605] s 82(b) …. [35605] s 83 …. [35610] s 84 …. [11075], [35615], [35620], [35630] s 84(1) …. [35615] s 84(2) …. [35615] s 85 …. [11075], [35340], [35620] s 85(1) …. [35620] s 85(2) …. [35620] s 85(3)(a) …. [35620] s 85(3)(b) …. [35620] s 85A …. [1717] s 86 …. [33775], [35340], [35625], [35630] s 86(1) …. [35625] s 86(2) …. [35625] s 86(3) …. [35625] s 86(4) …. [35625] s 87 …. [9130], [11075] s 87(1) …. [35635] s 87(1)(a) …. [35635] s 87(1)(b) …. [35635] s 87(1)(c) …. [33575], [35635] s 87(2) …. [35635] s 88 …. [9130], [11075], [35640] s 89 …. [1715], [33770], [35600], [35645]
s 89(1) …. [35645] s 89(2) …. [35645] s 89(3) …. [35645] s 89(4) …. [35645] s 89A …. [33770], [35600], [35645] s 89A(1) …. [35645] s 89A(2) …. [35645] s 89A(2)(c) …. [35645] s 89A(3) …. [35645] s 89A(4) …. [35645] s 89A(5) …. [35645] s 89A(6) …. [35645] s 89A(7) …. [35645] s 89A(9) …. [35645] s 90 …. [11125], [35650] s 90(b) …. [1790] s 91 …. [1722], [5225] s 92 …. [1722], [5225] s 92(2) …. [5225] s 92(3) …. [29165] s 93 …. [1722], [5225] s 93(c) …. [1715] s 94 …. [1722] s 94(1) …. [21252] s 94(2) …. [21252] s 94(3) …. [1722], [19095], [21252]
s 95 …. [21252] s 97 …. [1680], [1780], [21252], [23235] s 97(1) …. [21252] s 98 …. [1680], [1780], [11125], [17295], [21252], [23235] s 98(1) …. [21252] s 99 …. [21252] s 100 …. [1795], [21252] s 100(1) …. [1755] s 101 …. [21252], [23235] s 101(2) …. [1805], [21252] s 101A …. [21252] s 102 …. [1680], [17255], [17500], [17510], [19005], [19010], [19055], [19080] s 103 …. [17255], [17500], [19005], [19055], [19080], [23150] s 103(1) …. [17595], [19020] s 104 …. [19055], [23415] s 104(2) …. [1755], [1790], [23180], [23235], [23300], [23405] s 104(3) …. [23180], [23405] s 104(3)(b) …. [17595] s 104(4) …. [23265], [23300], [23405] s 104(6) …. [23415] s 106 …. [17255], [17500], [17595], [19005], [19055], [19080] s 106(2)(d) …. [17595], [19055] s 108 …. [17255], [19005], [23235] s 108(1) …. [19175] s 108(2)(b) …. [17315] s 108(3) …. [1790], [17255], [17295], [19005], [19175], [35440]
s 108(3)(a) …. [17545] s 108(3)(b) …. [1755], [17290], [17315], [17565], [35495] s 108A …. [35565] s 108A(1) …. [35565] s 108A(2) …. [35565] s 108B …. [35565] s 108B(1) …. [35565] s 108B(2) …. [35565] s 108B(3) …. [35565] s 108B(4) …. [35565] s 108B(5) …. [35565] s 108B(6) …. [35565] s 108C …. [17255], [19005] s 108C(1) …. [19055] s 110 …. [17255], [19005], [23285], [23415], [29165] s 110(1) …. [19005], [19115], [19135], [19150], [23415] s 110(2) …. [19150] s 110(3) …. [19150] s 111 …. [19160], [23415], [29165], [35555] s 112 …. [1755], [1790], [23415] s 113 …. [1450] s 114 …. [1445], [1450], [1680], [15260] s 114(2) …. [1450] s 114(2)(b) …. [1800] s 114(3) …. [1450] s 114(3)(d) …. [1805]
s 114(4) …. [1450] s 114(5) …. [1450] s 114(6) …. [1450] s 115 …. [1445], [1450] s 115(2) …. [1450] s 115(3) …. [1450] s 115(4) …. [1450] s 115(5) …. [1450] s 115(6) …. [1450] s 115(7) …. [1450] s 115(8) …. [1450] s 115(10)(a) …. [1450] s 115(10)(b) …. [1450] s 116 …. [1450] s 116(1)(b) …. [1450] s 116(2) …. [1450] s 117 …. [1730], [25300] s 117(1) …. [25300] s 118 …. [1680], [25300] s 118(a) …. [25300] s 118(c) …. [25300] s 119 …. [25300], [29195] s 119(a) …. [25300] s 120 …. [25245], [25300] s 121 …. [25300] s 121(1) …. [25300]
s 121(2) …. [25295], [25300] s 121(3) …. [25300], [25395] s 122 …. [1690], [25020], [25300] s 122(1) …. [25300] s 122(2) …. [25300] s 122(3) …. [25300] s 122(3)(a) …. [25300] s 122(4) …. [25300] s 122(5) …. [25265], [25300] s 122(6) …. [17245], [25010], [25300] s 123 …. [25295], [25300] s 124 …. [25265], [25300] s 124(1) …. [25300] s 124(2) …. [25300] s 125 …. [25300] s 125(1) …. [25300] s 125(2) …. [9130], [11075], [25300] s 125(3) …. [25300] s 126 …. [25300], [25395] s 127 …. [25310] s 128 …. [25130], [25165], [25175] s 128(1) …. [25175] s 128(2) …. [25175] s 128(3) …. [25175] s 128(4) …. [1755], [25175] s 128(5) …. [25175]
s 128(6) …. [25175] s 128(7) …. [25175] s 128(8) …. [25175] s 128(9) …. [25175] s 128(10) …. [23140], [25175] s 128(12) …. [25175] s 128(13) …. [25175] s 128(14) …. [25175] s 128(14)(a) …. [25175] s 128(15) …. [25175] s 128A …. [25175] s 128A(1) …. [25175] s 128A(2) …. [25175] s 128A(3) …. [25175] s 128A(4) …. [25175] s 128A(5) …. [25175] s 128A(6) …. [1755], [25175] s 128A(6)(a) …. [25175] s 128A(7) …. [25175] s 128A(8) …. [25175] s 128A(9) …. [25175] s 128A(10) …. [25175] s 129(1) …. [27225] s 129(3) …. [27225] s 129(4) …. [27225] s 129(5) …. [27225]
s 129(5)(b) …. [27225] s 129(5)(c) …. [27225] s 130 …. [11125], [27195] s 130(1) …. [1755], [27195] s 130(2) …. [27195] s 130(3) …. [27195] s 130(4) …. [27195] s 130(4)(c) …. [27195] s 130(4)(e) …. [27195] s 130(5) …. [27195] s 131 …. [1730], [25395] s 131(1) …. [25395] s 131(2) …. [25395] s 131(2)(a) …. [25020], [25395] s 131(2)(d) …. [25395] s 131(2)(e) …. [25395] s 131(2)(f) …. [25395] s 131(2)(g) …. [25395] s 131(2)(h) …. [25395] s 131(2)(i) …. [25300], [25395] s 131(2)(j) …. [25395] s 131(2)(k) …. [25395] s 131(3) …. [9130], [11075], [25395] s 131(4) …. [11075] s 131(5) …. [25395] s 131(5)(a) …. [25395]
s 131(5)(b) …. [25395] s 131A …. [25300], [25340], [27195] s 132 …. [25400] s 133 …. [1755], [25300], [25395] s 135 …. [1295], [1490], [1730], [1755], [1790], [11035], [11075], [11125], [17145], [17250], [21252], [29165], [29195], [29200], [29205], [29210], [35510], [35545], [35555], [35650], [35655], [41030], [41130] s 135(c) …. [1490], [11125] s 136 …. [1490], [1520], [1730], [1755], [1790], [11035], [11125], [17250], [17255], [17290], [21252], [29170], [29195], [31010], [31080], [35440], [35655], [41030] s 137 …. [1450], [1490], [1680], [1755], [11035], [11125], [21252] s 138 …. [1680], [1790], [11035], [11075], [11125], [27310], [27315] s 138(1) …. [27315] s 138(1)(a) …. [27315] s 138(1)(b) …. [27315] s 138(2) …. [27315] s 138(3) …. [27315] s 138(3)(c) …. [27315] s 138(3)(d) …. [27315] s 138(3)(e) …. [27315] s 138(3)(f) …. [27315] s 139 …. [11125] s 139(1) …. [27315] s 139(2) …. [27315] s 140 …. [1715], [1725], [9130], [35500] s 140(1) …. [9130]
s 140(2) …. [9130] s 141 …. [1715], [35500] s 141(1) …. [9130] s 141(2) …. [9130] s 142 …. [9130], [11075], [35640] s 142(2) …. [9130] s 143 …. [1722], [1742], [3090], [3095], [41015] s 143(1) …. [3095] s 144 …. [1732], [3156], [3160] s 144(1) …. [3160] s 144(1)(b) …. [1755] s 144(2) …. [3160] s 144(3) …. [3160] s 144(4) …. [3005], [3160], [3200] s 145 …. [1722], [3085] s 146 …. [35545] s 146(2) …. [9130] s 149 …. [39125] s 150 …. [41020] s 150(1) …. [35545] s 152 …. [39130] s 153 …. [1820], [3105], [39070], [41020] s 155 …. [35390], [41040], [41070] s 156 …. [41040], [41070] s 157 …. [1820], [41020], [41100], [41105] s 158 …. [39070]
s 159 …. [29155] s 161 …. [35575] s 162 …. [39015] s 164 …. [13295], [15135], [15140], [15260] s 164(1) …. [1722] s 164(2) …. [15010] s 164(3) …. [13085], [15115], [15260] s 165 …. [1450], [1785], [15260], [17290], [35655] s 165(1) …. [1450], [1722], [15260] s 165(1)(a) …. [35655] s 165(1)(b) …. [1450] s 165(1)(c) …. [15030] s 165(1)(d) …. [15260] s 165(1)(f) …. [35655] s 165(2) …. [1450], [15140], [15260] s 165(2)(b) …. [1450], [15260] s 165(2)(c) …. [15260] s 165(3) …. [1450], [15260] s 165(4) …. [1450] s 165(5) …. [1722], [15115], [15260] s 165(6) …. [15140], [15260] s 165A …. [15030], [15260] s 165B …. [15260], [17295] s 166 …. [5225], [35470], [35565], [39080] s 167 …. [35565] s 167(a) …. [35470], [35565]
s 167(b) …. [5225] s 168 …. [1790] s 168(2) …. [1755] s 168(7) …. [1755] s 169 …. [1790] s 169(1) …. [1755], [35470], [35565] s 169(1)(c) …. [5225] s 169(3) …. [1755] s 169(5)(f) …. [5225] s 170 …. [11120] s 174 …. [1732], [41030] s 175 …. [41030] s 176 …. [41030] s 177 …. [29230] s 178 …. [5225], [41100], [41105] s 178(2) …. [41100] s 178(3) …. [41100] s 178(4) …. [41100] s 178(5) …. [41100] s 178(6) …. [41100] s 179 …. [41100], [41110] s 180 …. [41100] s 182 …. [1690], [1820], [35545], [35570], [39080], [39130] s 182(5) …. [1820] s 183 …. [29200] s 184 …. [3180]
s 185 …. [1685], [41015] s 186 …. [1685] s 187 …. [1685], [25080] s 188 …. [1755], [25220] s 189(1) …. [23140] s 189(2) …. [11035] s 189(3) …. [11060], [35620] s 189(4) …. [11035] s 189(5) …. [11035] s 189(6) …. [23140] s 189(7) …. [11030] s 189(8) …. [11070] s 190 …. [1680], [1755] s 190(1) …. [1680], [1815] s 190(2) …. [1680] s 190(3) …. [1025], [1680], [29155] s 190(4) …. [1680] s 191 …. [1800], [1815], [3165], [3180], [35605] s 191(3)(b) …. [1755] s 192 …. [1755], [11035], [17460] s 192(2) …. [35460] s 192(2)(c) …. [17460] s 192A …. [1755], [11035] s 193(1) …. [1755] s 195 …. [1755] Dictionary 1
Pt 1 …. [25295] Pt 1 …. [1305], [1445], [1450], [1690], [1700], [13225], [25300], [35435], [35520], [35545], [35565], [35575], [35600], [35620], [35625], [39080] Pt 2 cl 1 …. [35545] cl 1(1)(d) …. [35550] cl 3 …. [25300] cl 4(1) …. [35455] cl 4(1)(f) …. [35455] cl 4(2) …. [35455] cl 6 …. [35460] cl 8 …. [35545], [39080] cl 10 …. [13225] Evidence Regulations 1995 reg 5 …. [35460] reg 6 …. [21252] Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 Pt 6 …. [41030] s 40 …. [3090], [41005], [41030] s 41 …. [39070], [41030] s 42 …. [39070], [41030] s 43 …. [39070] Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 r 29(5) …. [41030]
Family Law Act 1975 …. [1685], [1695], [13230], [15155], [25295], [33840] Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. [1685] Div 4 …. [1685] Div 5 …. [1685] Pt 2.2 …. [1685] Pt 2.3 …. [1685] Pt 3.2 …. [1685] Pt 7 …. [33840] s 19N …. [25370] s 48 …. [9060] s 48(2) …. [15155] s 62G(2) …. [33840] s 66W(5) …. [1215] s 66X …. [1235] s 68G …. [33840] s 69W …. [1235] s 69Y(2) …. [1235] s 69ZT …. [1035] s 69ZT(1) …. [1685] s 69ZT(2) …. [1685] s 69ZT(3) …. [1685] s 69ZT(4) …. [1685] s 69ZT(5) …. [1685] s 69ZV …. [1685] s 69ZV(1) …. [1685]
s 69ZV(2) …. [1685] s 69ZV(3) …. [1685] s 69ZX(4) …. [25340] s 99A …. [1235] s 100(1) …. [13230] s 100(2) …. [13230], [25195] s 100A …. [33840] s 100B …. [13055] s 102 …. [41040], [41080] s 112AD …. [9130] Family Law Rules 2004 r 15.71(1) …. [17080] Federal Court Rules O 33 r 2 …. [33840] r 3 …. [29155], [37090] r 30.18 …. [39045] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 …. [1685] s 27 …. [11150], [13270] s 28(1)(f) …. [11140] s 47A …. [17055] s 47A(1) …. [13270] Foreign Evidence Act 1994 Pt 2 …. [17015]
Pt 3 …. [17020] Pt 4 …. [17020] s 34 …. [39070] Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 s 40 …. [3085] High Court Procedure Act 1903 s 21 …. [1630] High Court Rules 1952 O 31 r 2 …. [35030] r 24.01.6 …. [33840] Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 …. [1635], [35350] s 16(3) …. [27140] s 221YH(1) …. [35350] s 264 …. [25180], [25250] Insolvency Practitioners in Australia (December 2011) …. [5030] Judiciary Act 1903 s 38 …. [1630] s 56 …. [1640] s 68 …. [1695], [1730] s 75 …. [35350] s 79 …. [1630], [1635], [1640], [1680], [1695], [1730], [1820], [39135] s 80 …. [1695], [1730]
s 80A …. [1640], [1695], [1730] Marriage Act 1961 s 59(2) …. [41080] s 92 …. [33245] s 94 …. [7140] Migration Act 1958 s 420(2)(a) …. [1690] s 422B …. [25210], [25280] National Security (Prices) Regulations …. [25180] Native Title Act 1993 …. [5025] Navigation Act 1912 …. [41070], [41075] s 171 …. [41040] s 403 …. [41040] s 403A …. [41040] Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 s 14(1) …. [13255] s 16 …. [27095] s 16(2)(c) …. [27095] s 16(3) …. [27095] Patents Act 1990 s 200(2) …. [25245] Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 …. [5150]
Service and Execution of Process Act 1901 …. [35335] State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 …. [1690]
NEW SOUTH WALES Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 s 13 …. [33750] Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 …. [13150] Civil Liability Act 2002 s 5D(3)(b) …. [11150], [35475] Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 30(4) …. [25395] s 70 …. [1025] s 70(1) …. [1680], [39080] s 87 …. [25420] Conveyancing Act 1919 s 35 …. [7275] Coroners Act 1980 s 33 …. [33840] Crime Commission Act 1985 s 18A …. [25310] Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 s 99 …. [5130]
Crimes Act 1900 Pt 2 …. [13180] Pt 15A …. [25340] s 23(4) …. [7050] s 23A(1)(b) …. [29105] s 23A(2) …. [29105] s 327 …. [15010] s 407 …. [11030] s 419 …. [7030] Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 5A …. [11140] s 6 …. [11140] s 7(2) …. [11140] s 12 …. [11140] Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 s 35(1)(c) …. [25280] Criminal Procedure Act 1986 …. [35645] Ch 6 Pt 6 …. [13070] Div 3 …. [13070] Div 4 …. [13070] Pt 6 …. [13070] s 31 …. [23055] s 62 …. [9120] s 70 …. [11125]
s 129(2) …. [15065] s 134 …. [17130] s 138(f) …. [17130] s 141 …. [35645] s 141(1) …. [35645] s 141(1)(a) …. [35645] s 141(2) …. [35645] s 142 …. [35645] s 142(1) …. [35645] s 142(1)(k) …. [17130] s 143 …. [35645] s 143(1)(c) …. [35645] s 144 …. [35645] s 145(1) …. [35645] s 145(2) …. [35645] s 146 …. [35645] s 146A …. [1155] s 147 …. [35645] s 148 …. [35645] s 150 …. [1155], [35645] s 151(1) …. [1155] s 159(1) …. [17065] s 159(3) …. [17065] s 160 …. [17065] s 160(2) …. [17065] s 164 …. [17290]
s 165 …. [17290] s 279 …. [13150] s 281 …. [1680], [1717], [33775] s 281(1) …. [33775] s 281(2) …. [33775] s 281(2)(b) …. [33775] s 281(4) …. [33775] s 284 …. [35417] s 285 …. [17040], [35417] s 288 …. [35417] s 288B …. [17065] s 293 …. [19080] s 293(4) …. [19085], [19090] s 293(4)(a)(i) …. [19090] s 293(4)(b) …. [19090] s 294 …. [13070], [17290], [17295] s 294A …. [13070] s 294B(3)(a) …. [13070] s 294B(3)(b) …. [13070] s 294B(7) …. [13070] s 294C(1) …. [13070] s 294C(2) …. [13070] s 294C(3) …. [13070] s 294C(4) …. [13070] s 294D(1) …. [13070] s 294D(2) …. [13070]
s 294D(6) …. [13070] s 295(1) …. [25340] s 296 …. [25340] s 296(1) …. [25340] s 296(2) …. [25340] s 296(3) …. [25340] s 296(4) …. [25340] s 297(1) …. [25340] s 297(2) …. [25340] s 298 …. [25340] s 298(1) …. [25340] s 298(1)(b)(iii) …. [25340] s 298(2) …. [25340] s 298(3) …. [25340] s 298(4) …. [25340] s 298(4)(c) …. [25340] s 298(5) …. [25340] s 298(6) …. [25340] s 298(7) …. [25340] s 298(8) …. [25340] s 299 …. [25340] s 300 …. [25340] s 301 …. [25340] s 302 …. [25340] s 303 …. [25340] s 304 …. [25340]
s 306S(1) …. [13060], [13070] s 306T(1) …. [13070] s 306U(1) …. [13070] s 306U(2) …. [13070] s 306U(3) …. [13070] s 306V(2) …. [13070] s 306W …. [13070] s 306X …. [13070] s 306Y …. [13070] s 306Y(1) …. [13070] s 306Y(2) …. [13070] s 306ZA …. [13070] s 306ZB …. [13070] s 306ZC …. [13070] s 306ZE …. [13070] s 306ZI …. [13070] s 306ZK …. [13070] s 306ZL …. [13070] s 417 …. [17065] s 417(1) …. [17065] s 418(c)(ii)(B) …. [17065] Criminal Records Act 1991 …. [19025] Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. [5235] Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989
s 25(3) …. [3135] Duties Act 1997 …. [39135] s 304 …. [39135] s 304(1) …. [39135] Evidence (Amendment) Act 1954 …. [25190] Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 …. [17055] Evidence (Children) Act 1997 s 9(1) …. [13060] Evidence (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 1995 …. [1750] Evidence Act 1898 …. [1750] Pt 2C …. [35005], [35070], [35190], [35195], [35280], [35420], [35540] Pt IIC …. [35540] s 14B …. [35005], [35045], [35105] s 14B(1) …. [35105] s 14B(2) …. [35105] s 14B(4) …. [35105] s 14B(5) …. [35105] s 14B(6) …. [35045] s 14CE …. [35210] s 14CE(6)(b)(ii) …. [35560] s 14CP …. [35280] s 14D …. [25190] s 34D(1) …. [35090]
Evidence Act 1994 s 117 …. [25420] s 126B …. [25420] s 126H …. [25420] s 128 …. [25420] s 129 …. [25420] s 131 …. [25420] Evidence Act 1995 …. [1305], [1320], [5180], [7320], [11060], [11070], [11075], [11125], [13050], [13075], [13105], [13240], [13255], [15001], [17290], [17460], [19020], [19055], [19080], [21035], [21295], [23180], [23295], [23300], [23400], [23415], [25175], [29045], [33785], [35645], [37165], [39080], [41030], [41065] Ch 3 Pt 3.2 …. [33115], [35001] Pt 3.10 …. [1685] Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. [25340] Div 1A …. [25340] Div 1B …. [25340] s 4(1) …. [1685] s 8 …. [1695] s 9(1) …. [1700], [1735], [35595] s 9(2) …. [1700] s 9(2)(b) …. [7320] s 11(1) …. [17075] s 12 …. [13015], [13020], [13230] s 12(a) …. [11030]
s 13 …. [13065] s 13(1) …. [13065] s 13(2) …. [13065] s 13(3) …. [13060] s 13(5) …. [13060] s 13(7) …. [13065] s 13(8) …. [13065] s 18(5) …. [11035] s 20 …. [23020] s 20(2) …. [23030] s 21 …. [13275], [23055] s 21(3) …. [13300] s 23 …. [13275] s 24(2) …. [13275] s 26(d) …. [17055] s 27 …. [17475] s 30 …. [33805] s 32 …. [17245] s 33 …. [17180] s 34 …. [17170] s 35 …. [17575] s 36 …. [39045] s 40 …. [17470] s 41 …. [1719] s 42 …. [17465] s 43 …. [17530], [17565]
s 43(3) …. [17655] s 44 …. [17550] s 45 …. [17540] s 45(3)(c) …. [17545] s 45(5) …. [17545] s 53 …. [1290] s 54 …. [1290] s 56 …. [1740], [19135] s 59(1) …. [31070] s 60 …. [37140] s 65(2)(c) …. [35660] s 66A …. [17300] s 69 …. [3105], [35190] s 69(2)(b) …. [41040] s 69(4) …. [31145] s 73(1) …. [33115], [33255], [41075] s 74(1) …. [33200] s 75 …. [33840] s 76 …. [29080] s 86 …. [33775] s 87(2A) …. [25175] s 90 …. [35650] s 94(3) …. [19095] s 97 …. [23235] s 98 …. [23235] s 101 …. [23235]
s 101(2) …. [21235] s 102 …. [17500], [17510], [19005], [19010] s 103 …. [23150] s 104(2) …. [23180], [23235], [23405] s 104(3) …. [23180], [23405] s 104(4) …. [23300], [23405] s 104(5) …. [23365] s 104(6) …. [23415] s 106 …. [17595] s 108 …. [23235] s 108(1) …. [19175] s 108(3)(a) …. [17545] s 108C(1) …. [19055] s 109 …. [19150] s 110 …. [19005], [23285] s 110(1) …. [19115], [19135] s 110(2) …. [19150] s 111 …. [19160] s 112 …. [19115], [19150], [19160] s 117 …. [25010] s 118 …. [25235] s 122(5) …. [25265] s 122(6) …. [17245] s 126A …. [1719] s 126A(1) …. [25340] s 126A(2) …. [25340]
s 126B …. [1790], [25340] s 126B(1) …. [25340] s 126B(2) …. [25340] s 126B(3) …. [25340] s 126B(4) …. [25340] s 126B(5) …. [25340] s 126C …. [25020], [25340] s 126D …. [25340] s 126D(2) …. [25340] s 126E …. [25340] s 126F(1) …. [25340] s 126F(2) …. [25340] s 126F(3) …. [25340] s 126F(4) …. [25340] s 126G …. [1719], [25340] s 126H …. [25340] s 127 …. [25310] s 128 …. [25130], [25175] s 128(10) …. [23140] s 128(12) …. [25175] s 128A …. [25175] s 131 …. [25350] s 131A …. [25300], [25340] s 135 …. [3157], [17115] s 137 …. [3157] s 139 …. [35645]
s 140 …. [9130] s 143 …. [3095] s 144(1) …. [3160] s 145 …. [3085], [3090] s 150 …. [41020] s 152 …. [39130] s 153 …. [39070], [41020] s 155 …. [35390] s 156 …. [41040] s 157 …. [41020], [41100] s 158 …. [39070] s 159 …. [29155] s 162 …. [39015] s 164(2) …. [15010] s 164(3) …. [13085] s 165 …. [1719] s 165A …. [15030] s 165B …. [17295] s 170 …. [11120] s 174(1) …. [41030] s 176 …. [41030] s 177A …. [1719] s 178 …. [41105] s 179 …. [41110] s 187 …. [25080] s 189 …. [11030]
s 189(2) …. [11035] s 189(7) …. [11030] s 190(3) …. [1025], [37090] s 192 …. [19115], [19160] Evidence Regulation 2010 reg 5 …. [21252] reg 6 …. [21252] reg 7A …. [25175] Evidence on Commission Act 1995 …. [17015] s 34 …. [25155] Family Provision Act 1982 …. [33340] s 32(2) …. [33340] Interpretation Act 1987 s 8B …. [1770] s 21C …. [13150] s 34 …. [1770], [3157] s 34(2) …. [1770] s 35 …. [1770] s 45(1) …. [1175] s 62B …. [1770] s 76 …. [1130] s 142 …. [1770] Law Enforcement (Control Operations) Act 1997 …. [27310]
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 s 122 …. [35645] s 122(1) …. [35645] s 109 …. [33775] s 122 …. [33775] s 122(1) …. [33690] s 123 …. [33740], [33775] s 124 …. [33775] s 125 …. [33775] s 126 …. [33775] s 128 …. [33775] Local Government Act 1993 s 697 …. [39070] Oaths Act 1900 s 11A …. [13275] s 12 …. [13275] s 13 …. [13275] Partnership Act 1892 s 15 …. [33545] Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29 …. [39135] Succession Act 2006 s 8 …. [33335] s 8(3)(b) …. [33335]
s 27 …. [39295] s 32 …. [39295] Transport Act 1930 …. [25180] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2004 Pt 24 …. [17015] Pt 34 …. [39045] r 14.14 …. [5120] r 24.18 …. [17030] r 29.9 …. [11085], [11090] r 29.10 …. [11085], [11090] r 31(23) …. [29225] r 31.4 …. [17160] r 31.5 …. [21252], [35460] r 31.14 …. [39135] r 31.20(2)(f) …. [29080] r 31.20(G) …. [29080] r 31.24 …. [29160] r 31.28 …. [29160] r 31.35 …. [29080] r 35.2 …. [17475] Sch 7 …. [29225] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.9 …. [25420] r 1.9(1) …. [25420] r 1.9(2) …. [25420]
r 1.9(3) …. [25420] r 1.9(4) …. [25420] r 1.9(5) …. [25420] r 1.9(6) …. [25420] r 6.44 …. [41005] r 21.3(D) …. [25430] r 21.4(2) …. [25430] r 34.1 …. [25420] Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 s 18A …. [33335] s 27 …. [39295] s 29A …. [39295] Witnesses Examination Act 1900 s 11 …. [17015]
VICTORIA Administration and Probate Act 1958 s 90 …. [33340] s 99A …. [33340] Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 46 …. [41040], [41060] s 60 …. [41060] Children andYoung Persons Act 1989 s 127 …. [7265]
Companies Act 1890 …. [41130] Companies Act 1961 …. [33385] Crimes Act 1891 s 34 …. [23010] Crimes Act 1958 …. [23200] s 6B …. [7160] s 15(1) …. [23200], [23205] s 15(2) …. [23195], [23200], [23205], [23210], [23215], [23245], [23270], [23275], [23280], [23285], [23390] s 15(2)(a) …. [23200], [23240], [23245], [23390] s 15(2)(c) …. [23200], [23270], [23280], [23285], [23290], [23310], [23320], [23325], [23365], [23385] s 15(2)(d) …. [23200], [23375], [23385], [23395] s 23V …. [1717] s 61 …. [15135] s 61(1)(b) …. [17290] s 61(1A) …. [17290] s 61(2) …. [17290] s 314 …. [15010] s 400(2) …. [11035] s 464A …. [33775] s 464A(2) …. [33780] s 464A(2)(a) …. [33775] s 464A(3) …. [33690], [33775], [33780] s 464C …. [33740], [33780]
s 464C(1) …. [33780] s 464C(2) …. [33775] s 464D …. [33775] s 464E …. [33750], [33775] s 464F …. [33775] s 464H …. [1717] s 464H(1) …. [33775] s 464H(1)(d) …. [33775] s 464H(2) …. [33775] s 464U …. [35430] s 465 …. [25250] Criminal Procedure Act 2009 …. [17130] Ch 8 Pt 8.2 …. [25340] Pt 8.2 …. [19080] s 51 …. [1155] s 72 …. [7150] s 142(1)(c) …. [17130] s 142(1)(h) …. [17130] s 146 …. [17130] s 148 …. [17130] s 179 …. [17130] s 182 …. [3190] s 183 …. [3190] s 183(3) …. [3190] s 189 …. [1155]
s 190 …. [1155] s 222(B) …. [3190] s 225 …. [17065] s 231 …. [17065] s 231(4) …. [17075] s 232 …. [1320] s 232(1) …. [17170] s 232(3) …. [17650] s 233 …. [17130] s 233(1) …. [17130] s 234 …. [17065] s 237 …. [17130] s 237(1)(a) …. [3190] s 237(2) …. [17130] s 276 …. [11140] s 277 …. [11140] s 308 …. [11140] s 327A …. [5130] s 336A …. [17055] s 352 …. [3190] s 358 …. [3190] s 377 …. [35525], [35665] s 377(2) …. [35665] s 377(3) …. [35525], [35665] s 377(4) …. [35665] s 377(5) …. [35665]
s 377(6) …. [35665] s 377(7) …. [35665] s 388 …. [29180] Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. [5235] Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 41 …. [17505] Pt 1 Div 1 …. [17015] s 9H …. [13270] s 18 …. [17540] s 21J …. [25370] s 28 …. [25340] s 28(2) …. [25330], [25335] s 28(3) …. [25330] s 28(4) …. [25330] s 28(5) …. [25330] s 30 …. [25175] s 32B(1) …. [25340] s 32B(2) …. [25340] s 32C(1) …. [25340] s 32C(2) …. [25340] s 32C(5) …. [25340] s 32C(6) …. [25340] s 32C(7) …. [25340]
s 32D …. [25340] s 32D(1) …. [25340] s 32D(1)(c) …. [25340] s 32D(2) …. [25340] s 32D(3) …. [25340] s 32D(4) …. [25340] s 32D(5) …. [25340] s 32E(1) …. [25340] s 32E(1)(a) …. [25340] s 32E(1)(d) …. [25340] s 32E(2) …. [25340] s 32E(3) …. [25340] s 32F …. [25340] s 32G …. [25340] s 41G …. [17170] s 42C …. [17055] s 42F …. [13070] s 55(2) …. [35425] s 55(4) …. [35075] s 55AB …. [35417] s 55AC …. [35417] s 61 …. [39125] s 74 …. [41070] s 100 …. [13275] Evidence Act 2008 …. [1520], [3085], [3090], [3160], [3200], [7320], [9130], [11035], [13275], [17145], [17170], [17250], [17290],
[17460], [17480], [21252], [23030], [23140], [23180], [23295], [23300], [23365], [25340], [27195], [29080], [35190], [35665], [41065], [41100] Ch 3 Pt 3.2 …. [35001] Pt 2.2 …. [39080] Pt 3.10 …. [25340] s 9(1) …. [35595] s 9(2)(b) …. [7320] s 11(1) …. [17075] s 12 …. [13015], [13020], [13230] s 20 …. [23020] s 21 …. [13275], [23055] s 21(8) …. [13300] s 23 …. [13275] s 24A(1) …. [13275] s 24A(2) …. [13275] s 26(d) …. [17055] s 27 …. [17475] s 29 …. [17170] s 32 …. [17245] s 33 …. [17160] s 35 …. [17575] s 36 …. [39045] s 37(1) …. [17160] s 39 …. [17615] s 40 …. [17470]
s 41 …. [17505] s 42 …. [17165], [17465] s 43 …. [17180], [17530], [17565] s 44 …. [17550] s 45 …. [17540] s 45(3)(c) …. [17545] s 45(5) …. [17545] s 50 …. [17170] s 53 …. [1290] s 54 …. [1290] s 66A …. [17300] s 69 …. [3105] s 69(2)(b) …. [41040] s 73(1) …. [41075] s 75 …. [33840] s 97 …. [23235] s 98 …. [23235] s 101 …. [23235] s 102 …. [17500], [17510] s 103 …. [25340] s 104(2) …. [23180], [23235], [23405] s 104(3) …. [23180], [23405] s 104(4) …. [23300], [23405] s 104(6) …. [23415] s 106 …. [17595] s 108 …. [23235]
s 110 …. [23285] s 122(5) …. [25265] s 127 …. [25310], [25340] s 128 …. [25130], [25175] s 137 …. [3190] s 143 …. [3095] s 150 …. [41020] s 152 …. [39130] s 153 …. [39070], [41020] s 155 …. [35390] s 156 …. [41040] s 157 …. [41020] s 158 …. [39070] s 159 …. [29155] s 162 …. [39015] s 164 …. [15135] s 164(2) …. [15010] s 164(3) …. [13085] s 165B …. [17295] s 176 …. [41030] s 178 …. [41100] s 179 …. [41110] s 184 …. [3180] s 187 …. [25080] s 190(1)(a) …. [13075] s 190(3) …. [1025]
Fisheries Act 1968 …. [5015] Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 s 35 …. [1770], [3157] s 49 …. [1130] Magistrates Court Act 1989 s 130 …. [7125] s 130(1) …. [7120] Sch 5 …. [9120] Maintenance Act 1965 s 27 …. [15045] Medical Practice Act 1994 …. [25340] Partnership Act 1958 s 19 …. [33545] Property Law Act 1958 s 53 …. [39165] s 184 …. [7275] Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 1928 s 50 …. [41060] Sentencing Act 1991 Pt 6 Div 1A …. [25340] s 5(2C) …. [3190] s 5(2D) …. [3190]
Sch 1 …. [25340] Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 O 40.05 …. [1025] O 44 …. [29225] r 40.13 …. [1290] r 43.03 …. [33840] r 43.05 …. [33840] Supreme Court Act 1986 s 39 …. [41030] Wills Act 1997 s 9(3) …. [33335] s 31 …. [39295] s 33 …. [39295]
QUEENSLAND Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 14B …. [3157] Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 53 …. [25395] Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 s 14(2) …. [25180] Criminal Code Act 1899 s 350 …. [11140]
s 590A …. [1155] s 669A(2) …. [11140] Ch 28 …. [21257], [35660] s 24 …. [7030] s 26 …. [7075], [7090] s 29 …. [7265] s 125 …. [15010] s 193 …. [15010] s 423 …. [11140] s 565(E) …. [7120] s 590AB …. [17130] s 590C …. [35660] s 617 …. [11035] s 618 …. [23055] s 619(1) …. [17065] s 632 …. [15010], [15135] s 632(2) …. [15115], [15140] s 644 …. [3180] s 644A …. [25175] s 668E …. [11140] s 668F(2) …. [11140] s 669A(1) …. [11140] Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 …. [19025] s 5(3)(b) …. [19025] s 6(a) …. [19025] s 8 …. [19025]
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 …. [19080] s 4A …. [17290] s 4A(2) …. [17265], [17290] s 4A(4) …. [17290] s 4A(6) …. [17290] Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 s 10 …. [11065], [33650] Criminal Organisation Act 2009 …. [13070] s 7 …. [13070] Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. [5235] Drugs Misuse Act 1986 s 119 …. [27130] Evidence Act 1977 …. [5225], [35335], [41030] Pt 7 …. [39075] s 6(b) …. [13010] s 6(A) …. [13015] s 7 …. [13020], [13230] s 8 …. [13075] s 8(1) …. [13090] s 8(2) …. [13145], [13190] s 8(3) …. [25195] s 9A …. [15145] s 9A(2) …. [13060]
s 9B(2) …. [13050] s 9C …. [13050], [13055] s 9E …. [13050] s 10 …. [25065] s 12 …. [25190] s 13 …. [25135] s 14(1)(a) …. [25130] s 14(1)(b) …. [25345] s 14(2) …. [25345] s 15(1) …. [23140] s 15(2) …. [23150], [23165], [23260], [23295] s 15(2)(a) …. [23155], [23220] s 15(2)(b) …. [23155], [23400] s 15(2)(c) …. [23155], [23260] s 15(2)(d) …. [23155] s 15(3) …. [23405] s 15A …. [19025] s 16 …. [19020] s 17 …. [17380], [35405] s 18 …. [17530], [17535], [35405] s 19 …. [17540], [17545], [35405] s 21A …. [13070], [27130] s 21A(1) …. [13070] s 21A(1A) …. [13070] s 21A(2) …. [13070] s 21AA …. [13050], [13070]
s 21AB …. [13070] s 21AB(A)(i) …. [13070] s 21AB(A)(ii) …. [13070] s 21AB(B) …. [13070] s 21AD …. [13070] s 21AE …. [13070] s 21AG …. [13070] s 21AI …. [13070] s 21AL …. [13070] s 21AM …. [13070] s 21AP …. [13070] s 21AS …. [13070] s 21AU …. [13070] s 21AW(2) …. [13070] s 21L …. [17470] s 21N …. [13070] s 22 …. [17015] s 38 …. [25155] s 39A …. [17055] s 43 …. [3090] s 44 …. [35390], [39070] s 46 …. [3020], [3090] s 48 …. [3090] s 53 …. [41020], [41105] s 54 …. [41105], [41110] s 59 …. [39105]
s 60 …. [39125] s 62 …. [39130] s 64(3) …. [41070] s 64(4) …. [41070] s 65(1) …. [3065] s 65(2) …. [3065] s 68 …. [3090], [39070], [41020], [41025], [41030] s 69 …. [41100] s 70 …. [39070], [41025] s 72 …. [41020] s 73 …. [41020] s 74 …. [41040] s 75 …. [39015] s 79 …. [5225] s 79(2) …. [5235] s 79(3) …. [5225], [5230] s 80 …. [5235] s 83 …. [13260], [35335], [35340], [39075] s 84 …. [35335], [35340] s 86 …. [35340] s 89 …. [35335] s 92 …. [35005], [35355], [35425] s 92(1)(b) …. [35005], [35035], [35065] s 92(2)(a) …. [35055] s 92(2)(b) …. [35055] s 92(2)(c) …. [35055]
s 92(2)(d) …. [35055] s 92(2)(e) …. [35055] s 92(2)(f) …. [35055] s 92(4) …. [35105] s 93 …. [35420], [35425] s 93(2) …. [35425] s 93A …. [13060], [35410] s 93B …. [35660] s 93B(1)(b) …. [35660] s 93B(2) …. [35660] s 93B(3) …. [35660] s 93B(4) …. [35660] s 93B(5) …. [35660] s 93C …. [35660] s 93C(1) …. [35660] s 93C(2) …. [35660] s 93C(3) …. [35660] s 93C(4) …. [35660] s 94 …. [35005], [35410], [35425] s 94(1) …. [35140], [35405] s 94(2) …. [35140] s 95 …. [35350], [35355] s 95(1) …. [35350] s 95(2) …. [35350] s 95(3) …. [35350] s 95(4) …. [35350]
s 95(5) …. [35350] s 95(6)(a) …. [35350] s 95(6)(b) …. [35350] s 95(7) …. [35350] s 95B …. [35350] s 96 …. [35425] s 96(1) …. [35115], [35350], [35355] s 96(2) …. [35055] s 97 …. [35110], [35355] s 98 …. [13060] s 98(1) …. [35120], [35350] s 99 …. [35125], [35410] s 100 …. [35135] s 101 …. [17325], [17565], [35405] s 102 …. [17565], [35130], [35355], [35410] s 105 …. [39070] s 129A(1)(a)(iv) …. [33540] s 130 …. [13060] s 131A …. [33805] s 132 …. [15055] s 132A …. [21035], [21050], [21257] s 132B …. [21257] s 132C(2) …. [9070] s 132C(3) …. [9070] s 132C(4) …. [9070] Sch 3 …. [35030], [35045]
Justices Act 1886 s 76 …. [7120] s 104(2) …. [9120] s 108(1) …. [9120] s 111 …. [35417] Local Government Act 1993 s 1113 …. [39070] Oaths Act 1867 s 17 …. [13275] s 18 …. [13275] s 19 …. [13275] s 32 …. [13275] s 37 …. [13275] Partnership Act 1891 s 18 …. [33545] Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 …. [33660], [33775] Ch 11 …. [27310] s 254(2) …. [33660] s 415 …. [33775] s 416 …. [33630] s 421 …. [33775] s 431 …. [33690], [33740] s 433 …. [33775] s 434 …. [33775]
s 436 …. [1717], [33775] s 436(2) …. [33775] s 436(4) …. [33775] s 437 …. [33775] s 439 …. [1717], [33775] Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2000 Sch 10 …. [33690], [33740], [33775] Prison Regulation 1959 …. [33760] Reprints Act 1992 s 48 …. [3095] Rules of the Supreme Court r 41.12 …. [17030] Statutory Instruments Act 1992 s 36 …. [3095] Succession Act 1981 s 18(3)(b) …. [33335] s 33 …. [39295] s 33C …. [39295] s 65 …. [7275] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 212(2) …. [25280] r 391 …. [17080] r 396 …. [17015]
r 410 …. [17030] r 430(2) …. [33840] Youth Justice Act 1992 s 22 …. [33750]
WESTERN AUSTRALIA Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 s 49(1) …. [33745] Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1998 s 57 …. [41040] Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 Pt 6 Div 4 …. [27310] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 s 7(2) …. [11140] s 12(2) …. [11140] s 47 …. [11140] Criminal Code 1913 s 26 …. [7090] s 29 …. [7265] s 30(5)(c) …. [11140] s 570D …. [15160] s 689 …. [11140]
Criminal Investigation Act 2006 s 118 …. [1717], [33775] s 118(1) …. [33775] s 118(3) …. [33775] s 137(3)(c) …. [33775] s 138(2)(b) …. [33690], [33775] s 138(2)(c) …. [33740], [33775] s 138(2)(d) …. [33775] s 138(3) …. [33690], [33740] s 138(3)(a) …. [33775] s 138(4) …. [33775] s 139 …. [33775] s 155 …. [1717], [33775] s 155(2) …. [33775] s 155(3) …. [33775] Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s 62 …. [1155] s 63 …. [1155] s 96 …. [1155] s 97 …. [1155] s 108(2) …. [11095] s 143 …. [17065] s 158 …. [35417] s 6 …. [13015] s 7 …. [13020], [13230] s 8 …. [13090]
s 8(1)(a) …. [13075] s 8(1)(c) …. [23020] s 8(1)(d) …. [23140] s 8(1)(e) …. [23165] s 8(1)(e)(i) …. [23220] s 8(1)(e)(ii) …. [23260], [23295] s 8(1)(e)(iii) …. [23370] s 9(1) …. [13170], [13215] s 9(2) …. [13170] s 9(6) …. [13170] s 11 …. [25065], [25175] s 11(2) …. [25175] s 11(2A) …. [25175] s 13 …. [25175] s 15 …. [39045] s 18 …. [13240], [25195] s 19 …. [25190] s 19A …. [25340] s 20 …. [17380] s 20A …. [25340] s 20G …. [25340] s 21 …. [17380], [17530] s 22 …. [17540] s 23(1) …. [19020] s 24 …. [25065] s 27A …. [1320]
s 27B …. [1320] s 30 …. [39125] s 31 …. [39105] s 31A …. [21257] s 31A(2)(b) …. [21257] s 32 …. [3180] s 35 …. [15010] s 36A …. [19080] s 36BA …. [19090] s 36BC …. [19090] s 36BD …. [17290] s 47 …. [41105] s 47(1A) …. [41110] s 47(2) …. [41105] s 50 …. [15115], [15135] s 53 …. [3090], [41020] s 54 …. [41020] s 56 …. [41020] s 58 …. [3090] s 60 …. [39070], [41020] s 62 …. [39070], [41025], [41030] s 65 …. [35390] s 67 …. [35390], [39070] s 69A …. [41040] s 70 …. [41030] s 71 …. [41030]
s 72 …. [3030] s 73A …. [39075] s 73N …. [39075] s 73Q …. [39075] s 73U …. [39075] s 78 …. [39070] s 79A …. [39125] s 79B …. [35005], [35190] s 79C(2)(a) …. [35055] s 79C(2)(b) …. [35055] s 79C(2)(c) …. [35055] s 79C(2)(d) …. [35055] s 79C(2)(e) …. [35055] s 79C(2)(f) …. [35055] s 79C(2)(g) …. [35055] s 79C(2A) …. [35190] s 79C(2A)(a) …. [35065] s 79C(5)(a) …. [35115] s 79C(5)(b) …. [35055] s 79C(6) …. [35120] s 79C(6B) …. [35125] s 79D(1) …. [35130] s 79D(2) …. [35135] s 79E(A) …. [35140] s 79E(B) …. [35140] s 80 …. [41100]
s 82 …. [39015] s 89 …. [13260], [35335], [39075] s 97 …. [13275] s 97(2) …. [23055] s 99 …. [13275] s 100 …. [13275] s 100A …. [11035], [13060] s 100A(1) …. [13065] s 100A(5) …. [13295] s 101 …. [11035] s 106A …. [13070] s 106B(1) …. [13050] s 106B(2) …. [13065] s 106C …. [13060], [13065] s 106D …. [15030], [15140] s 106E …. [13070] s 106F …. [13070] s 106G …. [13070] s 106H …. [13060] s 106HA …. [13070] s 106I …. [13070] s 106K …. [13070] s 106M …. [13070] s 106N …. [13070] s 106N(2) …. [13070] s 106N(4) …. [13070]
s 106R …. [13070] s 106R(3) …. [13070] s 106RA …. [13070] s 106RA(4)(a) …. [13070] s 106T(2B) …. [35417] s 110 …. [13270] s 115 …. [17015] s 118 …. [25155] s 120 …. [17055] Sch 2 …. [13170] Gas Pipelines Access (Western Australia) Act 1998 …. [11010] Interpretation Act 1984 s 43(3) …. [1175] s 75 …. [1130] Justices Act 1902 (repealed) s 72 …. [7120] Partnership Act 1895 s 22 …. [33545] Property Law Act 1969 s 120 …. [7275] Reprints Act 1984 s 8 …. [3095] Rules of the Supreme Court 1971
O 26 r 11 …. [27160] O 29 r 2 …. [1025] O 36 r 2 …. [1025] O 37 r 6(2) …. [33840] Spent Convictions Act 1988 …. [19025] Supreme Court Act 1935 s 172 …. [41030] Wills Act 1970 s 28A …. [39295] s 32(3) …. [33335] s 50 …. [39295]
SOUTH AUSTRALIA Accused Persons Evidence Act 1882 …. [23010] Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 46 …. [41040] Community Welfare Act 1972 …. [13165] Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act 1995 …. [27310] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935
s 8(2) …. [15010] s 76 …. [15010] s 242(5) …. [15010] s 285C …. [1155] s 331 …. [5130] s 353A …. [11140] Evidence Act 1929 Pt 6A …. [35365] Pt 7 Div 9 …. [25340] s 4 …. [35030] s 5 …. [13165] s 6(1) …. [13275] s 6(1)(a) …. [13275] s 6(3) …. [13275] s 9 …. [13050], [17290], [23055] s 9(1) …. [13060] s 9(3) …. [13060] s 12A …. [15140], [17290] s 13 …. [13070] s 13B(1)(a) …. [13070] s 13B(1)(b) …. [13070] s 13D …. [35417] s 14 …. [33805] s 15 …. [13015] s 16 …. [13020], [13230]
s 18 …. [13075], [13090], [13210] s 18(1)(b) …. [13210], [23020] s 18(1)(c) …. [23140], [23150] s 18(1)(d) …. [23150], [23165] s 18(1)(d)(i) …. [23230] s 18(1)(d)(ii) …. [23260] s 18(1)(d)(iv) …. [23370] s 18(2) …. [23305], [23350] s 18(3) …. [23305] s 18A …. [23055] s 21 …. [13165], [13210] s 21(3A) …. [13165] s 25 …. [17505] s 25(b) …. [17455] s 26 …. [19020] s 27 …. [17380] s 28 …. [17530] s 29 …. [17540] s 29A …. [17055] s 29A(2) …. [17055] s 30 …. [39105] s 31 …. [39125] s 33 …. [25175] s 34 …. [3180] s 34A …. [5225] s 34C …. [1630], [35005], [35245], [35315], [35390], [35420]
s 34C(1) …. [35055] s 34C(1)(a)(i) …. [35065] s 34C(1)(a)(ii) …. [35035], [35065] s 34C(1A) …. [35055] s 34C(2) …. [35055], [35060] s 34C(2)(b) …. [35060], [35110] s 34C(3) …. [35015], [35060], [35065], [35075] s 34C(4) …. [35015], [35065], [35105] s 34C(5) …. [35055], [35115], [35120] s 34CA …. [17285], [17290] s 34CA(1) …. [17290] s 34CA(1)(b)(i) …. [17290] s 34CA(1)(b)(ii) …. [17290] s 34CA(2) …. [17290] s 34CA(3) …. [17290] s 34CA(4) …. [17290] s 34CA(5) …. [17290] s 34CB …. [17295] s 34CB(1) …. [17295] s 34CB(2) …. [17295] s 34CB(3) …. [17295] s 34D …. [17290], [35005] s 34D(1) …. [35130] s 34D(2) …. [35135] s 34E …. [39125] s 34F …. [39130]
s 34G …. [35030] s 34G(1) …. [35045] s 34G(2)(b) …. [33255], [35160] s 34H …. [25190] s 34J …. [35417] s 34K …. [35417] s 34KA …. [35402] s 34L …. [19080], [23305] s 34L(5) …. [15135] s 34M …. [17290] s 34M(1) …. [17290] s 34M(2) …. [17290] s 34M(3) …. [17290] s 34M(4) …. [17290] s 34M(4)(a)(ii) …. [17290] s 34M(5) …. [17290] s 35 …. [3095], [41020] s 36 …. [3090] s 37 …. [3090], [3095] s 37A …. [3090] s 38 …. [39070] s 38(1) …. [39070] s 38(2) …. [41100] s 39 …. [35390] s 42 …. [41105] s 43 …. [41105]
s 43A …. [41110] s 45 …. [31120], [35415], [39075] s 45(1) …. [35415] s 45(2) …. [35415] s 45(3) …. [35415] s 45A …. [35360], [39075] s 45A(1) …. [35360] s 45A(2) …. [35360], [35400] s 45A(3) …. [35360], [35400] s 45A(4) …. [35205] s 45B …. [35360], [35400] s 45B(2) …. [35400] s 45B(3) …. [35400] s 45B(3)(a) …. [35400] s 45B(5) …. [35400] s 45C …. [39075] s 46 …. [13260], [35335], [39075] s 47 …. [35335] s 53 …. [39015] s 55(2) …. [35025] s 59 …. [39075] s 59A …. [35365] s 59B …. [35365] s 59B(2) …. [35365] s 59B(3) …. [35365] s 59B(4) …. [35365]
s 59B(5) …. [35365] s 59B(6) …. [35365] s 59E(4) …. [13270] s 59IA …. [13270], [17055] s 59J …. [1025] s 63 …. [3090], [41030] s 63A …. [41030] s 64 …. [3030], [3035] s 65A …. [33810], [41055] s 67A …. [39070], [41025] s 67C …. [25390] s 67D …. [25340] s 67E …. [25340] s 67E(1) …. [25340] s 67E(2) …. [25340] s 67E(3) …. [25340] s 67F …. [25340] s 67F(1) …. [25340] s 79B …. [35025] s 92(1)(b) …. [35025] s 93(1) …. [35025] s 93(2) …. [35025] Family Relationships Act 1975 …. [13165] Family and Community Services Act 1972 s 140 …. [15045]
Partnership Act 1891 s 15 …. [33545] Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 …. [35402] Summary Offences Act 1953 …. [33775] s 74D …. [1717] s 74D(1) …. [33775] s 79A …. [33740], [33775] s 79A(3)(b) …. [33775] s 83A …. [33775] Summary Procedure Act 1921 s 56(2) …. [7120] s 107 …. [9120] s 111(3) …. [3170] Supreme Court Rules 1987 O 31 r 59.03 …. [27160] O 78 r 1 …. [1025] Supreme and District Court Rules r 162.2 …. [33840] Wills Act 1936 s 25AA …. [39295] Young Offenders Act 1993
s 5 …. [7265]
TASMANIA Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 8B …. [1770], [3157] s 30 …. [1130] s 62B …. [1770] s 142 …. [1770] Criminal Code 1924 s 15 …. [7090] s 18(1) …. [7265] s 60(1) …. [15065] s 96 …. [15010] s 136 …. [15135] s 368A …. [1155] s 368B …. [29225] s 371(a) …. [17065] s 371(ab) …. [17065] s 371(c) …. [17065] s 371(d) …. [17065] s 371(d)(i) …. [17065] s 371(i) …. [17625] s 371A …. [17290] s 388AA …. [11140] s 401(2) …. [11140] s 402 …. [11140]
s 402(2) …. [11140] s 403(2) …. [11140] Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 s 4 …. [33775] s 5 …. [33775] s 6 …. [33740], [33775] s 8 …. [33775] Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. [5235] Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 s 4 …. [13070] s 4(1) …. [13070] s 4(2) …. [13070] s 5 …. [13060] s 6(1) …. [13070] s 6(2) …. [13070] s 7 …. [13070] s 7(2) …. [13070] s 8(1) …. [13070] s 8(2)(b) …. [13070] Evidence Act 1910 …. [25190] s 81A(1) …. [35045] s 96 …. [11030] Evidence Act 2001 …. [1025], [1320], [3085], [3090], [3160], [3200],
[5180], [5225], [7320], [11075], [11125], [13050], [13075], [13255], [15001], [17055], [17290], [17460], [19080], [21252], [21295], [23180], [23295], [23415], [31070], [37140] Ch 3 Pt 2 …. [33115], [35001] Pt 4 …. [33785], [35001] s 3 …. [35435], [35600] s 3(1) …. [1305], [13160], [25295], [25300], [35520], [35625], [39080] s 3(6) …. [25300] s 3(10) …. [39080] s 3B(1) …. [35455] s 3B(2) …. [35455] s 3D …. [35460] s 4(1) …. [1685] s 9(2)(b) …. [7320] s 9(2)(c) …. [35595] s 11(1) …. [17075] s 12 …. [13015], [13020], [13090], [13230] s 18 …. [13160] s 18(5) …. [11035] s 21 …. [13275] s 21(3) …. [13300] s 23 …. [13275] s 23(2) …. [13275] s 24(2) …. [13275] s 27 …. [17475] s 30 …. [33805]
s 30A …. [23055] s 32 …. [17245] s 33 …. [17180] s 34 …. [17170] s 35 …. [17575] s 40 …. [17470] s 42 …. [17465] s 43 …. [17530], [17565] s 44 …. [17550] s 45 …. [17540] s 45(3)(c) …. [17545] s 45(5) …. [17545] s 53 …. [1290] s 53(2) …. [1295] s 54 …. [1290] s 55(1) …. [1520] s 60 …. [37140] s 66A …. [17300] s 69 …. [3105], [35190] s 69(2)(b) …. [41040] s 73(1) …. [33255], [41075] s 73(1)(c) …. [41065] s 74(1) …. [33200] s 75 …. [33840] s 76 …. [29080] s 85A …. [33775]
s 85A(1) …. [33775] s 85A(2) …. [33775] s 85A(3) …. [33775] s 86 …. [33775] s 90 …. [39045] s 94(3) …. [19095] s 97 …. [23235] s 98 …. [23235] s 101 …. [23235] s 102 …. [17500], [17510], [19005], [19010] s 102 …. [17275] s 103 …. [23150] s 104(2) …. [23180], [23235], [23405] s 104(3) …. [23180] s 104(4)(b) …. [23265] s 104(4)(c) …. [23295] s 104(5) …. [23415] s 106 …. [17595] s 106(b) …. [19020] s 108 …. [23235] s 108(1) …. [19175] s 108(2) …. [35440] s 108(2)(a) …. [17545] s 108(2)(b) …. [17565] s 108(3)(a) …. [17545] s 110 …. [19005], [23285]
s 110(1) …. [19115], [19135] s 110(2) …. [19150] s 122(5) …. [25265] s 122(6) …. [17245] s 126A …. [25340] s 127 …. [11030], [25310] s 127A …. [11030], [25020], [25330] s 127B …. [25020] s 127B(1) …. [25340] s 127B(2) …. [25340] s 127B(3) …. [25340] s 128 …. [25130], [25175] s 128(10) …. [23140] s 131A …. [25340] s 137 …. [1450] s 138 …. [1450] s 140 …. [9130] s 142A …. [7120] s 143(1) …. [3095] s 150 …. [41020] s 152 …. [39130] s 153 …. [3105], [39070], [41020] s 155 …. [35390] s 156 …. [41040] s 157 …. [41020], [41100] s 158 …. [39070]
s 159 …. [29155] s 162 …. [39015] s 164 …. [15135] s 164(2) …. [15010] s 164(3) …. [13085] s 164(4) …. [15140], [15260] s 165(1)(c) …. [15030] s 170 …. [11120] s 176 …. [41030] s 177B …. [41130] s 177C(2) …. [41070] s 178 …. [41100], [41105] s 178(6) …. [41100] s 178(7) …. [41100] s 178(8) …. [41100] s 179 …. [41110] s 187 …. [25080] s 189(2) …. [11035] s 189(3) …. [11060] s 189(7) …. [11030] s 189(8) …. [11070] s 190(3) …. [1025] s 191 …. [3165] s 194C …. [17015] s 194M …. [19080] s 194M(6) …. [19085]
Evidence Regulations 2002 reg 4 …. [35460] Evidence on Commission Act 2001 …. [17015] Partnership Act 1891 s 20 …. [33545] Presumption of Survivorship Act 1931 s 2 …. [7275] Relationships Act 2003 …. [13160] s 4(1) …. [13160] s 4(3)(b) …. [13160] Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 r 394 …. [27160] Supreme Court Rules 2000 r 502 …. [33840] Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 s 8A …. [33340] Wills Act 1992 s 43 …. [39295] s 47 …. [39295]
NORTHERN TERRITORY Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996
s 56 …. [41040] Criminal Code Act 1983 s 43D …. [7120] s 43K …. [7120] s 411 …. [11140] s 440 …. [7120] s 38 …. [7265] s 47(2) …. [15065] s 98 …. [15010] s 120 …. [15010] s 331 …. [1155] s 360 …. [23055] s 379 …. [3180] s 379(2) …. [3185] s 380 …. [3180] s 414 …. [11140] Defamation Act 2006 s 39 …. [5235] Evidence (Business Records) Interim Arrangements Act 1984 s 4 …. [35550] s 5 …. [35315] s 79C …. [35260], [35285], [35315] s 79C(1) …. [35260] s 79C(1)(a) …. [35240] s 79C(1)(b)(ii) …. [35240]
s 79C(2) …. [35260] s 79C(2)(d) …. [35210] s 79C(2A) …. [35260] s 79C(3) …. [35315] s 79C(3)(a) …. [35315] s 79C(3)(b) …. [35315] s 79C(3)(c) …. [35315] s 79C(3)(d) …. [35245], [35315] s 79C(4) …. [35260] s 79C(5)(a) …. [35295] s 79C(6) …. [35280] s 79D(2) …. [35285] s 79F …. [35220] s 79F(1) …. [35220] s 79F(2) …. [35220] Evidence (National Uniform Legislation 2011 …. [1015], [1130], [1295], [1305], [1320], [1450], [1490], [1680], [1700], [3005], [3090], [3095], [3160], [3200], [7320], [9130], [11035], [11070], [11075], [11125] s 9(2)(b) …. [7320] s 184 …. [3180] s 190(3) …. [1025] s 191 …. [3180] Evidence Act 1939 …. [25190] Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. [27195]
s 7 …. [13020], [13230] s 9 …. [13075], [13090] s 9(2)(a) …. [13075] s 9(3) …. [23020] s 9(7)(b) …. [23295] s 10 …. [25065] s 12(2) …. [25330] s 17 …. [17380] s 21A(2) …. [13070] s 21A(2A) …. [13070] s 21A(3) …. [13070] s 21B …. [13070] s 21D(2) …. [13070] s 21D(3) …. [13070] s 21E …. [13070] s 21E(1) …. [13070] s 21E(4) …. [13070] s 21F …. [13070] s 24 …. [29150] s 26E(1) …. [17290], [35410] s 26E(3) …. [17290], [35410] s 49 …. [17055] s 56 …. [25340] s 79B …. [35045] Family Provision Act 1970 s 22 …. [33340]
Interpretation Act 1978 s 62B …. [3157] Justices Act 1928 s 141(4) …. [3170] s 152 …. [35417] s 153 …. [35417] Juvenile Justice Act 1965 s 25 …. [33750] s 34 …. [33750] Maintenance Act 1926 s 31(1) …. [15045] Oaths Act 1939 s 24 …. [13275] s 24(C) …. [13275] s 25A …. [13060] Police Administration Act 1979 s 140 …. [33690] s 140(a) …. [33775] s 140(b) …. [33775] s 140(c) …. [33775] s 142(1) …. [33775] s 143 …. [33775] Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act 1983 …. [17290]
s 4 …. [19080] s 4(5)(a) …. [15135] s 4(6) …. [17290]
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 s 45 …. [41040] Children and Young People Act 2008 s 423 …. [13180] s 789 …. [13180] s 791 …. [13180] s 803 …. [13180] s 804 …. [13180] Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 39 …. [5235] Court Procedures Act 2004 s 55 …. [13065], [33805] Crimes Act 1900 s 137 …. [33750] s 167 …. [15010] s 187 …. [1717], [33775] s 233 …. [1420] s 235 …. [1375] s 288 …. [1155]
Criminal Code s 25 …. [7265] Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 …. [13180] Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 Pt 4 Div 4 …. [13070] s 9(1) …. [13070] s 9(4) …. [13070] s 13A …. [13070] s 13C …. [13070] s 13D …. [13070] s 13D(1) …. [13070] s 13D(2) …. [13070] s 13D(3) …. [13070] s 13D(4) …. [13070] s 16 …. [17055] s 38C …. [13070] s 38D …. [13070] s 38E …. [13070] s 39(2) …. [13070] s 39(3) …. [13070] s 40F(1) …. [13070] s 40F(3) …. [13070] s 40G …. [13070] s 40J …. [13070]
s 48 …. [19080] s 54 …. [25340] s 69 …. [15135] s 70 …. [15140] s 71 …. [17290] Evidence Act 1971 …. [25190] Evidence Act 2011 …. [3085], [3090], [3160], [3200], [7320], [11030], [11035], [11060], [11070], [11075], [17145], [17170], [17250], [17290], [17315], [17460], [17480], [17545], [21252], [21295], [23180], [29080], [29155], [41075] s 9(1) …. [35595] s 9(2)(b) …. [7320] s 11(1) …. [17075] s 12 …. [13015], [13020], [13230] s 18 …. [13180] s 19 …. [13175] s 20 …. [13225], [23020] s 21 …. [13275] s 21(3) …. [13300] s 23 …. [13275] s 24(2) …. [13275] s 26(d) …. [17055] s 27 …. [17475] s 29(2) …. [17145] s 32 …. [17245] s 33 …. [17160]
s 35 …. [17180], [17575] s 36 …. [39045] s 37(1) …. [17160] s 39 …. [17615] s 40 …. [17470] s 41 …. [17505] s 42 …. [17165], [17465] s 43 …. [17530], [17565] s 44 …. [17550] s 45 …. [17540] s 45(3)(c) …. [17545] s 45(5) …. [17545] s 53 …. [1290] s 54 …. [1290] s 66A …. [17300] s 69(2)(b) …. [41040] s 102 …. [17500], [17510] s 106 …. [17595] s 122(5) …. [25265] s 126A …. [25340] s 127 …. [25310] s 131A …. [25340] s 143 …. [3095] s 150 …. [41020] s 153 …. [39070], [41020] s 155 …. [35390]
s 156 …. [41040] s 157 …. [41020] s 165B …. [17295] s 176 …. [41030] s 179 …. [41110] s 184 …. [3180] s 190(3) …. [1025] s 191 …. [3180] Family Provision Act 1969 s 22 …. [33340] Legislation Act 2001 Pt 1 …. [1305] s 26 …. [3095] s 141 …. [3157] s 142 …. [1770] Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984 s 7 …. [13275] s 14 …. [13275] s 17 …. [13275] Partnership Act 1963 s 19 …. [33545] Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 …. [35595] Supreme Court Act 1933
s 37S …. [11140] s 58A …. [35417] Wills Act 1968 s 11A(2)(b) …. [33335] s 12A …. [39295] s 12B …. [39295]
CANADA Evidence Act 1893 …. [23010]
CEYLON Evidence Ordinance s 27 …. [27285]
INDIA Evidence Act 1872 s 27 …. [27285]
NEW ZEALAND Evidence Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 s 31(1)(b) …. [35055]
NORFOLK ISLAND Norfolk Island Evidence Act 2004 …. [1685] s 8 …. [1750]
s 25 …. [23055]
SINGAPORE American Law Institute’s Model Code of Evidence …. [7235] r 701 …. [7240]
SWAZILAND Criminal Procedure Proclamation s 231 …. [15110]
UNITED KINGDOM Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 21 …. [39295] Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 …. [39075] Bills of Lading Act 1855 …. [39200] Blasphemy Act 1697 …. [15015] Childrens Act 1989 …. [25295] Civil Evidence Act 1968 …. [5230], [41030] s 2(2) …. [35010] s 4(1) …. [35070] s 8 …. [35055] s 13(1) …. [5235] s 14 …. [25155]
Civil Evidence Act 1995 …. [35005] Civil Rights of Convicts Act 1828 …. [13010] Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 …. [1630] Common Law Procedure Act 1854 …. [17385] s 22 …. [17380] Companies Act 1862 …. [17535] Criminal Appeal Act 1907 s 4(1) …. [15075] Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s 2 …. [11100], [11120] s 2(1)(a) …. [11140] Criminal Evidence Act 1898 …. [1005], [1030], [13090], [13120], [13135], [13140], [13240], [19145], [19155], [23001], [23015], [23150], [23190], [23205], [23280], [23285], [23345], [23360], [23385], [25165], [33690] s 1 …. [13105], [13185], [13245], [21055], [23150] s 1(d) …. [13240] s 1(f) …. [1045], [11125], [19155], [21170] s 1(f)(ii) …. [19005], [19155] s 1(f)(iii) …. [17475] s 4(1) …. [13185] Criminal Evidence Act 1965 …. [35001], [35055], [35070], [35205], [35420] s 1(1) …. [35425]
s 1(1)(a) …. [35425] s 1(4) …. [35425] Criminal Justice Act 1982 s 67 …. [1045] Criminal Law Act 1977 s 44 …. [11140] Criminal Procedure Act 1865 s 3 …. [17380], [17385], [17390], [17535] s 4 …. [17390], [17530], [17535] s 5 …. [17390], [17530] s 6 …. [19020] Defence Regulations 1939 …. [7160] European Communities Act 1972 …. [25155] Evidence (Colonial Statutes) Act 1907 …. [41010], [41025] Evidence (Further Amendment) Act 1869 s 3 …. [25135] Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 s 3 …. [25155] Evidence Act 1843 …. [1005], [13010], [19020] Evidence Act 1845 s 1 …. [35390], [39070]
Evidence Act 1851 (14 & 15 Vic c 99) …. [1005], [1210], [13020] s 11 …. [41030] s 14 …. [35390] Evidence Act 1938 …. [17245], [17255], [17320], [17325], [17415], [17420], [17565], [33115], [33145], [33255], [33325], [33340], [33415], [35001], [35005], [35050], [35070], [35180], [35190], [35335], [35405], [35460], [35470], [35490], [35545], [37050], [41005], [41075] s 1(1) …. [17410] s 2(1) …. [17415] Evidence Amendment Act 1953 …. [13240] s 3 …. [13245] Fatal Accidents Act 1846 …. [5045], [33060], [37050] Fox’s Libel Act 1972 …. [11015] Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 s 29 …. [39040] Imprisonment of Fraudulent Debtors Act 1915 …. [21275] Indictable Offences Act 1848 …. [33620], [33690] Judges’ Rules …. [33495], [33595], [33620], [33690], [33740], [33770] r 6 …. [33690] Larceny Act 1861 s 85 …. [25110] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
(24 & 25 GeoV Ch 41) …. [5045], [33560] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1937 …. [37050] Law of Property Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo V c 20) s 184(1) …. [7275] Limitation Act 1939 s 2D …. [25010] s 2D(3) …. [25010] Medical Act 1956 s 33(2) …. [5190] Merchant Shipping Act 1979 Sch 3 …. [7190] National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 …. [27210] Partnership Act s 15 …. [33545] Places of Religious Worship Act 1812 …. [15015] Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 …. [33595] s 58 …. [33740] s 76 …. [33595] s 76(2) …. [33655] s 78 …. [27235], [27310] Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 s 15 …. [21265]
Punishment of Incest Act 1908 …. [21065] Race Relations Act 1976 …. [1065] Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 …. [19025] Road Traffic Act 1930 s 21 …. [35075] Road Traffic Act 1934 …. [1175] Statute of Limitations (3 & 4Wm IV Ch 27) s 7 …. [35055] Tribunals Enquiry Act 1921 …. [1070] Uniform Rules r 63 …. [31030] Wills Act 1832 …. [33325]
UNITED STATES California Evidence Code …. [17175] Constitution …. [23020] s 51(5) …. [1690] s 51(24) …. [1690] s 51(25) …. [1690] s 51(39) …. [1690] s 71 …. [1690] s 109 …. [1630]
Federal Rules of Evidence …. [31045], [31055] r 102 …. [1720] r 301 …. [7310] r 401 …. [1490] r 403 …. [21130] r 501 …. [1720] r 801(a) …. [31055] r 803(1) …. [1720] r 803(24) …. [1720], [31020] r 804(b)(6) …. [31020] r 804(3) …. [33045] Uniform Rules of Evidence r 1.04 …. [7010]
Contents Preface Table of Cases Table of Statutes
Chapter One — Introduction 1
Development of the Law of Evidence A
History and controversial nature of evidence Seventeenth-nineteenth centuries Pre-twentieth century history
Controversies as to the nature of the law of evidence Two views
Australian developments The work of the Law Reform Commission and its results
2
Range of the Law of Evidence A
The diversity of the law Procedure, form, witnesses, exclusionary rules and proof
B
Proceedings in courts Dispensing with evidence rules Power of courts to order, and of the parties to agree, that the rules of evidence be dispensed with
Different types of jurisdiction Criminal/civil jurisdiction; paternal jurisdiction; administrative function
Different types of court Statutory modification of evidence rules in particular courts
Different stages of proceedings Decisions before trial and on the voir dire Decisions after the trial
C
Proceedings in other Tribunals Varieties of fact-finding tribunals The nature of the problem The role of statute The role of natural justice Nature of issues and consequences of finding Subpoenas, oaths and privileges
3
Principal Items of Judicial Evidence Evidence classified Testimony, hearsay, documents, real evidence and circumstantial evidence
A
Facts in issue Main facts Examples of main facts in issue Cases with multiple issues
Subordinate or collateral facts Subordinate or collateral facts defined and illustrated
Relationship of testimony to the other items of evidence Testimony as central to, but as distinguished from, hearsay, documents, real evidence and circumstantial evidence
B
Facts as evidence of other facts: circumstantial evidence The nature of circumstantial evidence Circumstantial evidence defined Means of proving circumstantial evidence The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence
C
Examples of circumstantial evidence Classifying circumstantial evidence Wigmore’s classifications
Prospectant evidence Justification for reception of prospectant evidence Continuance Course of business Habit Motive or plan Knowledge or capacity
Concomitant evidence Justification for reception of concomitant evidence Opportunity Res gestae Standards of comparison
Retrospectant evidence
Justification for reception of retrospectant evidence Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta Mechanical instruments Possession as evidence of ownership Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: general Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: possession of recently stolen goods Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: general illustrations Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: key factors Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: the significance of a prima facie case Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: Jones v Dunkel Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: criminal cases Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: belated explanation Fingerprints Blood tests Blood, urine and breath tests Tracker dogs Corpus delicti
D
Means of proof Testimony The nature of testimony
Hearsay Preliminary account of hearsay The status of documentary evidence
Things or real evidence The nature of real evidence Material objects Appearance of persons, objects and scenes Demeanour or conduct of witness Views, demonstrations, reconstructions: in court/out of court distinction Views, demonstrations, reconstructions: procedure on practical aspects Automatic recordings: status as real evidence Automatic recordings: the limits of admissibility Automatic recordings: other issues Automatic recordings: complex illustrations Charts Documents as real evidence Conclusion
E
Evidence of identity Evidence of identity: General Categories of identification evidence
Direct evidence of identity Background Miscarriages of justice Experiments Reasons for errors in identification Identification parades Errors in police procedure
Photographs and films: general Photographs: precautions Photographs: “rogues gallery effect” and “displacement effect” Discretion to warn juries: background Devlin Report Domican warning Content of Domican warning Mutual corroboration Dock identification Identification from photographs Identification parades Identification parades and photographic identification Restrictions on identifying witness’s role
Object identification Content of jury warning
Voice identification The principles at common law and under the Acts
Uniform Acts The structure, the provisions and the authorities
Circumstantial evidence of identity Similar facts and other probative circumstances
4
The Best Evidence Rule A
Definition and statement of rule Definitions Primary and secondary evidence
Statement of rule Lord Hardwicke’s definition
B
The inclusionary aspect Limits on inclusionary aspect Examples of limited inclusionary aspect
C
The exclusionary aspect Limits on exclusionary aspect Examples of limited exclusionary aspect
D
The remains of the rule The decline of the rule Remaining instances of the rule
5
Relevance, Admissibility and Weight of Evidence A
The structure of the issues Admissibility of relevant evidence and inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence
B
The admissibility of relevant evidence Definition of relevance Common law and statutory definitions
Exceptions General Hearsay Opinion Character Conduct on other occasions
Multiple relevance and admissibility Multiple relevance and limited admissibility
C
The inadmissibility of irrelevant, and insufficiently relevant, evidence Illustrations The plan Remoteness Multiplicity of issues Danger of manufactured evidence
Alternative statements of the rule Issues of judgment
Apparent exceptions Three suggested exceptions Facts affecting the admissibility of evidence Curative admissibility Conditional admissibility
D
Relevance and admissibility The distinction between relevance and admissibility
Stephen’s terminology Problems with Stephen’s approach
The demand for more basic concepts “Materiality” and “receivability”
E
Admissibility and weight of evidence Distinguishing weight and admissibility Significance of admissibility/weight distinction
F
Terminology Cogency issues Cogency issues: introduction
Insufficient evidence Incapacity to persuade a reasonable person
Prima facie evidence: first sense Not obligatory for reasonable person to decide in proponent’s favour
Prima facie evidence: second sense (presumptive evidence) Reasonable person must decide in favour of proponent in the absence of further evidence
Conclusive evidence Court must find the fact proved
Presumptions Various meanings of “presumption”
6
Res Inter Alios Acta An obscure maxim Meanings of the maxim
7
Evidence in Federal Courts and Courts Exercising Federal Jurisdiction Federal evidence law Purpose of section
A
The High Court of Australia Original jurisdiction of High Court
Section 79 of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): High Court
B
Other Federal courts and State courts exercising Federal jurisdiction Section 79 of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): other federal courts and State courts
C
Courts of Territories Relevant legislation
8
The Status of Evidence not Objected to The consequences of failure to object The process and consequences of objection The doctrine of waiver Use of evidence not objected to, if admissible for one purpose, is limited to that purpose Conduct of parties may make hearsay admissible Completely inadmissible evidence usable to the extent of its rational persuasive power Admission tendered without objection receivable to prove self-serving parts Duties of criminal courts to exclude inadmissible evidence not objected to Rules which parties have an option to take advantage of or not
9
General Aspects and Problems of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) A
Application of the Acts
Extent of the Acts Application to courts Provisions unique to Commonwealth Legislation not affected by Acts Differential application of s 9 Sections 9 and 10 Excluded topics, other statutes, internal differences Excluded topics Statutory rules of evidence not found in the Acts Internal differences in the Acts
B
Codification in relation to the Commonwealth Act What is a code? First pointer to codification: inferences from concurrent or adjacent operation of general evidence law Second pointer to codification: inferences from fundamental provisions that cover the field Third pointer to codification: s 56 First pointer against codification: the terms of the Act Second pointer against codification: the legislative history Third pointer against codification: principle of legality Illustrations of principle of legality
C
Codification in relation to the NSW Act, the Vic Act, the Tas Act, the ACT Act and the NT Act Mini codes
D
Judicial development Forms of judicial development
E
Recourse to the former law Lord Herschell’s approach Capacity to resort to former law
F
Law reform and other preparatory materials Use of extrinsic materials Statutory avenues
G
Characteristic features of the Acts Notices, requests, discretions Three features Notice requirements Requests facility Discretions and indeterminate criteria Power to excuse failure Miscellaneous powers Appropriateness Pre-trial consequences
H
Topics omitted by the legislation Omissions Evidential topics omitted
I
Inconsistency of State Laws and Cth: Evidence Act Means of precluding inconsistency
10 The Record of Trial A
Content of record Definition, disputes and resolution
Incompleteness of record and its consequences
11 The Treatment of Wrongly Received Evidence A
Wrongly received evidence Dealing with changed rulings Means of handling consequences of changed rulings
12 The Treatment of Agreements between Counsel A
Agreement not to pursue issues Miscarriage of justice caused by agreements between counsel Appeals
Chapter Two — Facts which Need not be Proved by Evidence 1
Judicial Notice A
Introduction Relationship of judicial notice to other instances of non-compliance with rules of evidence Structure of law Adjudicative facts and legislative fact The categories of judicial notice
B
Judicial notice of notorious facts The categories of notorious facts Distinction between facts noticed without inquiry and facts noticed after inquiry
Notorious facts judicially noticed without inquiry
Categories of facts judicially noticed without inquiry
Notorious facts judicially noticed after inquiry Function of category Permissible sources Natural justice Historical facts Custom Professional practice Economic conditions Local conditions Scientific matters and instruments
C
Judicial notice of domestic law Common law and statute law Special senses of judicial notice
D
Judicial notice of state matters Governmental issues Basis of rule Political matters Acts of Parliament Subordinate legislation Other public documents
E
Theoretical questions Principal conceptual issues Outline Judicial notice and notorious facts
Judicial notice and reception of evidence Differences between taking judicial notice and receiving evidence Judicial notice and personal knowledge Use by specialist tribunals of their specialist knowledge Disclosure by judge or juror of personal knowledge Rationale Tacit application Some differences between adjudicative and legislative facts
F
Legislative facts Constitutional facts Constitutional validity of enactments and executive conduct
Construction of non-constitutional statutes Legislative facts as part of statutory context
Construction of constitutional statutes Legislative facts as part of constitutional context
Development of common law Legislative facts establishing the common law
G
Evidence Acts Section 144 of Evidence Acts Construction and illustrations
2
Formal Admissions A
Civil cases Methods of admitting facts Pleadings, notice to admit, agreement
B
Criminal cases Methods of admitting facts Plea of guilty only permissible common law method Explanation for common law rule Statutory methods Methods open to Crown Victorian position Effect of formal admission made in one proceeding in others
3
The Teachings of Ordinary Experience A
General Significance of problem Reception of empirical material not complying with rules of evidence General experience and relevancy
Examples of general experience in use Introduction Language and arithmetic Simple physical and scientific phenomena Human behaviour and motor vehicles Human behaviour and railways Physical activities General practice Presumptions of continuance and death Community standards Human mental and emotional states Motives
Deception Inference of knowledge Admissions by conduct Silence Ordinary human nature Assessment of credibility and weight
B
General problems Key conceptual issues Legal control of the generalisations Relationship with expert opinion evidence Mixture of elements
4
Further Categories Background facts, colouring-book facts and visual aids Suggested additions Judge Posner’s practice
Chapter Three — Estoppels 1
Estoppel by Record A
Introduction Status of estoppel by record Character of estoppels Underlying principles
B
Effect of judgments on all persons Conclusiveness of judgments Conclusiveness against all persons
Judgments in rem
C
Effect of judgments on parties: civil cases General effect Outline
Specific rules Final judgment Competent tribunal Foreign judgments Identity of parties Identity of capacity Privity: general Identity of parties and privity of interest Interests in goods No application to findings in criminal proceedings Res judicata Issue estoppel Issue estoppel: legal indispensability Issue estoppel: identity of issues Issue estoppels in propositions of law Issue estoppels and negligence Issue estoppel: role of pleadings, evidence and argument Issue estoppel: prior criminal proceedings Issue estoppels: prior finding taken with evidence Issue estoppel: policy limitations Need for estoppels to be specially pleaded Effect of judgments on parties: matrimonial and children’s cases
D
Effect of judgments on parties: criminal cases Autrefois acquit and autrefois convict Cause of action estoppel Restriction of issues by previous convictions or acquittals Discretion to stay second trial
Issue estoppel Identifying the “issue” Double jeopardy Evidentiary rulings Acquittal in first proceedings no defence to charge of perjury in second
E
Extended doctrines of estoppel by record Policy behind estoppel by record Introduction Arguments not raised Different parties
F
The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Judgments as evidence against strangers The problem stated Authorities before Hollington v Hewthorn Justifications for the rule Scope of the decision in Hollington v Hewthorn The admissibility of the previous convictions and acquittals of the parties in subsequent cases Previous convictions in civil cases Previous convictions in criminal cases
Previous acquittals Suggestions for reforming the law Legislative reform English authority Defamation
2
The Place of Estoppels in the Law Estoppels characterised Estoppel as a rule of evidence The controversy
Chapter Four — The Burden of Proof and Presumptions 1
Different Types of Burden of Proof A
Introduction Preliminary Structure of chapter The meanings of “burden of proof”
B
Legal burden Definition — Legal burden Range of usages
C
Evidential burden Definition — Evidential burden Range of usages
D
Illustrations of confusion Types of confusion and their sources
Consent in rape Insanity of testator “Defences” other than denial of essential element in a criminal charge
2
Incidence of the Burden of Proof A
General rules Evidential burden Structure of the section Taylor’s test General rule Criminal “defences” Civil defences
Legal burden Normally burden on moving party Walsh J’s formulation Burden of proving a negative Assertion essential to whose case?
B
Presumptions expressing the incidence of the burden of proof Linguistic shifts Describing burden of proof in the language of presumption
Presumption of innocence Meaning and consequences
Presumption of sanity Meaning and consequences
C
Some statutes affecting the incidence of the burden of proof Representative examples Deeming provisions Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) s 35(2) Averment provisions
Statutory interpretation in criminal cases Summary trials Examples Trials on indictment: exceptions and provisos No Crown burden to negative exceptions and provisos Trials on indictment: Dowling v Bowie Trials on indictment: Vines v Djordjevitch Trials on indictment: exculpatory provision in separate statute Trials on indictment: facts peculiarly within knowledge of accused Trials on indictment: criticism of English cases Trials on indictment: R v Edwards Trials on indictment: impact of Woolmington v DPP Trials on indictment: impact of human rights charters
D
The interpretation of agreements affecting the burden of proof Agreement in civil cases Legal burden generally affected
Perils of the sea: The Glendarroch Legal burden of proving negligence
Insurance exceptions
War loss and theft
3
Shifting Burdens of Proof A
General An illusory conception Non-shifting burden Circumstances in which burdens may “shift”
B
The shifting of the evidential burden Tactical shifting Provisional burdens Basic facts and presumed facts
Legal shifting Tactical considerations
C
The shifting of the legal burden Can the legal burden shift? The nature of the controversy
D
Distribution of issues Different location of legal burden on different issues “Ultimate burden”
4
Presumptions: General A
Introduction General problems Causes of problems Main senses of “presumption”
B
The classifications of presumptions
Types of presumptions Sources of difficulty Facts presumed from basic facts
Presumptions of fact Nature and illustrations
Presumptions of law Nature and illustrations
Irrebuttable presumptions of law Nature and illustrations
Rebuttable presumptions of law Nature and illustrations Relationship between presumption and probative value of basic fact Absence of inherent weight in presumptions Limitations on presumptions in criminal cases Quantum of rebutting evidence
The new classifications “Evidential” presumptions “Persuasive” or “compelling” presumptions Lord Denning’s analysis Other classifications
C
Conflicting presumptions Mutually cancelling presumptions Instances
D
Conclusion Specific presumptions and statutory provisions
Specific presumptions Criminal Code Act
Chapter Five — Degrees of Proof 1
Civil and Criminal Standards — Degrees of Proof A
General Non-circumstantial evidence Introduction The distinction between the criminal and civil standards Degrees of proof within each standard Failure to meet a standard on an issue does not establish the contrary Difficulties of formulating a “reasonable doubt” Set form of words? Set formula in Australia
Circumstantial evidence No higher standard for circumstantial evidence Standard does not apply to each item of evidence
Standard of proof where accused bears legal burden Balance of probabilities
B
Proof of crime in civil proceedings A dilemma Civil standard Distinction between inference and conjecture
C
Standard of proof in matrimonial causes
Adultery Civil standard
D
Miscellaneous Contempt of court Criminal standard
Sentencing Differential standards of proof
Professional disciplinary and other proceedings Civil standard
2
The Question of a Third Standard and the Possibility of Anomalies — Degrees of Proof Multiple standards? A controversy Two standards, with a qualification
3
Mathematics and the Standard of Proof — Degrees of Proof Mathematical techniques An emerging field Marginal significance Useful applications and dangers
4
Standard of Proof Relating to Sufficiency of Evidence: Discharge of Evidential Burden Sufficiency issues
Different stages Test on appeal Test at close of evidence No-case submission Criminal standard in criminal cases Assumption that evidence favouring proponent is to be accepted
5
The Process of Fact Finding Fact finding Unexplored issues Evaluation of factual findings
6
Statutory Reform Evidence Acts and Criminal Code Degrees of proof Reflection of common law
Chapter Six —The Functions of Judge and Jury 1
The General Rule—The Functions of Judge and Jury A
Introduction Significance of distinct roles General Law/fact distinction
B
Some special cases Construction
Contracts and statutes
Defamation A compromise
C
Exceptions Foreign law Foreign law as a question of fact
Reasonableness Where reasonableness is for the judge
Facts affecting the admissibility of evidence Conditions precedent to admissibility Absence of the jury Identity of preliminary fact with fact in issue Confessions Confessions: the problem of the voir dire Confessions: permissibility of question on voir dire as to the truth of the confession Cross-examination at trial about admission on voir dire Confessions: procedure on voir dire Confessions: role of prosecution counsel in seeking voir dire The burden and standard of proof at a trial within a trial
2
Judicial Control of the Jury A
Withdrawal of an issue from the jury Need for sufficiency of evidence Structure of section Consequences of insufficiency
Civil cases Criminal cases: “no case” submission Criminal cases: “unsafe” submission Criminal cases: “Prasad invitation” Magistrates
B
Discretion to exclude evidence Overriding rules of admissibility Development of common law discretion Nature of the discretion Discretion to exclude relevant evidence in criminal proceedings Discretion to exclude relevant evidence in civil proceedings
C
The summing up Judicial control of jury Directions and comments
D
Appeals Varieties of process Criminal cases tried with a jury Civil cases tried with a jury Civil cases tried by a judge alone Effect of wrongful rejection or admission of evidence Effect of denial of natural justice
Chapter Seven — The Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 1
Introduction
A
Structure Key distinctions Competence, compellability and privilege distinguished
B
History Non-Christians, convicts, interested persons, parties, spouses of parties Non-Christians Convicts Interested persons Parties in civil cases The accused Spouses of the parties: the common law disability Spouses of parties: exceptions to common law disability Statutes affecting spouses
2
Competence and Compellability under the Modern Law A
Preliminary Structure of this section Introduction
B
Children Sworn evidence Necessary understanding Procedure on inquiry as to understanding
Unsworn evidence Tests for capacity to give unsworn evidence
C
Disabled persons Competence to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or unsworn Tests for competence
Vulnerable witnesses Evidence in protected environment
D
The accused As a witness for the prosecution Substantial preservation of common law rule of non-competence Non-competence of co-accused Rendering a participant competent and compellable
As a witness for the defence Accused competent for the defence Evidence in chief Evidence elicited in cross-examination
As a witness for a co-accused Accused competent for, but not compellable against, co-accused
E
The accused’s spouse Rule of incompetence Modification of common law of non-competence The accused’s spouse as a witness for the prosecution Preservation of common law exceptions Compellability of competent spouse Dangers in joinder of counts Statutory competence in England does not imply compellability
Australian statutory equivalents to English Act of 1898 Queensland New South Wales Victoria Tasmania South Australia Western Australia Northern Territory Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory The accused’s spouse as a witness for the accused or a co-accused Queensland New South Wales Victoria Tasmania South Australia Western Australia Northern Territory Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory Spouses and civil proceedings
Former spouse testifying to matters occurring during the marriage Statutory change in relation to divorced spouses Criminal cases Civil cases
F
Sovereigns, diplomats, members of parliament Competence and non-compellability
Statutory regimes
G
Bankers Competence and non-compellability Statutory regimes
H
Experts Competence, compellability and discretion Rule of practice
I
Absent witnesses Video-link evidence Statutory regimes and questions of principle
3
Oath, Affirmation and Unsworn Evidence A
Oath and affirmation Facilities and procedures Statutory regimes
B
Unsworn evidence The accused’s unsworn statement at a criminal trial General abolition
Unsworn evidence of children Comparison with sworn evidence
Informal evidence of adults and children Comparison with sworn evidence
Miscellaneous Counsel and others
Chapter Eight — Corroboration 1
When Corroboration is Required A
Introduction Background Preliminary Contrast with canon and civil law
B
Statutory provisions Range of enactments Preliminary Statutes requiring two or more witnesses Perjury Procuration Unsworn evidence of children: reliability? Unsworn evidence of children: corroboration Unsworn evidence of children: ban on mutual corroboration? Affiliation: general Affiliation: alleged father’s letters Breach of promise of marriage Bigamy Miscellaneous statutory provisions
C
Rules of practice Duties to warn General
Accomplices Peremptory warning
Evidence of co-accused Who is an accomplice? Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions Non-accomplices Functions of judge and jury Corroboration of an accomplice’s evidence Mutual corroboration of accomplices Statutory relaxation of peremptory rule
Adultery Caution to be exercised
Sexual offences Common law duty to give direction Implication in material particular Abolition of duty to warn
Sworn evidence of children Common law requirement and its statutory abrogation Mutual corroboration
Claims against the estates of deceased persons Corroboration desirable but not essential
Matrimonial causes No corroboration requirement
Disputed confessions and other possible cases Confessions, witnesses with purposes of their own, identification, potentially unreliable evidence
2
The Nature of Corroboration
A
Introduction Definitional issues Definition Significance of issues Circumstantial evidence as corroboration “Intrinsically credible” evidence
B
Conduct or condition of the person whose testimony requires corroboration Self-corroboration compared with physical condition Common law rule against self-corroboration Statutory rule against self-corroboration Physical condition and distress
C
Conduct of the party against whom corroboration is required Range of conduct Admissions Evidence of defendant or accused Falsity of evidence Failure to give evidence False statements out of court Silence when charged Conduct on previous occasions Previous conduct to show specific propensity Previous conduct to corroborate accused’s statement to witness
D
Functions of judge and jury Range of problems
Is evidence capable of corroborating, and does it do so? Where there is no corroboration Summing up
3
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 General Contrast between s 164 and s 165 Sections 164 and 165
Chapter Nine —The Course of Evidence 1
Miscellaneous Procedural Matters A
Introduction Structure of the chapter The role of counsel
B
Evidence before trial Civil cases Summary Affidavits Commissions Letters of request Interrogatories Perpetuation of testimony
Criminal cases
Summary The preliminary examination Coronial and other depositions Victorian pre-trial criminal procedures
C
Ordering witnesses out of court Right to stay in court until contrary order Orders and consequences of breach
D
The right to begin Opening addresses The function of an opening Order of speeches
E
The calling of witnesses and the role of the judge Essential feature of adversary system Outline Order of calling witnesses Power of judge to call witnesses in civil cases Power of judge to call witnesses in criminal cases Exceptional nature of power Time of calling witness Evidence in chief and cross-examination Power to elucidate evidence Jury questions Crown prosecutor’s responsibility for calling witnesses Content of prosecutor’s duty Court control of prosecutor
Additional principles Powers of and restraints on the judge
2
Examination in Chief A
Introduction Character testimony General Question-and-answer system
B
Leading questions The ban and its exceptions Definition and illustration Primary exceptions to the prohibition Further exceptions to the prohibition Leading questions in cross-examination
C
Refreshing memory The principle of orality Orality and refreshing memory Hypnotically induced evidence
Conditions on which memory may be refreshed by reference to a document Summary Contemporaneity: general Contemporaneity: depositions Qualifications to contemporaneity rule Documents read over or accepted as accurate by witness Production of the document
The original
Distinction between those cases in which memory is refreshed and those in which it is not refreshed Present recollection revived/past recollection recorded Present recollection revived Past recollection recorded Hearsay rule Consequences of document being in evidence Calling for and inspecting document Statutory changes
D
Previous consistent statements The rule against previous consistent statements Statement and justification for the rule Difficulties with the rule
Complaints in sexual cases Development of the law Admissible in criminal prosecutions for sexual offences; voluntariness Speed Proof of particulars of complaint Complaint must relate to sexual character of offence Complaint not provable by complainant alone Statutory changes The effect of delay in complaint on fairness of trial
Previous consistent statements admitted as part of the res gestae Meaning of “res gestae”
Previous consistent statements admitted to rebut afterthought Rebutting suggestion of afterthought Examples Statutory position
Statements admissible under statute Australian equivalents to Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) Limited effect of statutes
Other possible exceptions Three further examples Statements on being taxed with incriminating facts Statements made on recovery of incriminating articles Previous identification of the accused
Statements validated by scientific means Lie detectors and truth drugs
Conclusions Consideration of rule against prior consistent statements
E
Unfavourable and hostile witnesses Common law Introduction The prohibition on impeaching a party’s own witness Unfavourable witnesses Hostile witnesses
Statutory provisions Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (Eng) s 3
Unfavourable witnesses Evidential value of previous inconsistent statements Jury direction Common law approach: merits Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) Effect on hostile witnesses Effect on unfavourable witnesses Leading questions to witness not formally declared hostile
3
Cross-examination and Re-examination A
Introduction Purposes, limitations and examples Purposes, limitations and examples
B
The rule in Browne v Dunn Definition and operation Definition Operation
Exceptions and consequences of non-compliance Exceptions: notice in other ways Exceptions: a lack of necessity and delicacy Exceptions: challenges to general credit Consequences of non-compliance
C
General issues in connection with cross-examination Rights to conduct and exposure to cross-examination
Leading questions and advocacy Who may be cross-examined Who may cross-examine Loss of right to cross-examine
Nature and consequences of questions Imputations must have a basis, but not necessarily an evidentiary basis Cross-examination can widen admissibility Control of lengthy cross-examination Width of questions and finality of answers Form of questions Cross-examination as to credit Cross-examination of co-accused Cross-examination after judicial questioning Divergence between instructions and evidence
D
Previous inconsistent statements General Introduction Proof of previous statements Previous statements in writing: The Queen’s Case Previous statements in writing: the current legislation
Particular problems Documents which are not those of the witness Depositions Tape recordings Previous inconsistent statements as evidence of facts stated
E
Cross-examination on documents generally Calling for documents Calling party to tender document if required to Rule in Walker v Walker and its abolition
F
Finality of answers to collateral questions The general rule The rule: statement and illustrations The rule: justifications The rule: evaluation
Exceptions to the general rule Convictions, bias, inconsistent statements and tendency to untruth
G
The distinction between cross-examination as to the issue and cross-examination as to credit General Effect of distinction
H
Re-examination Object and limits Object Limits
Admission of further evidence Illustrations
4
Evidence in Rebuttal A
Introduction The rule
General
B
Criminal cases Introduction The rule Effect of High Court cases
Particular elements Discretion Exceptional circumstances Special cases Reasonable foreseeability Credit issues Formal, technical or non-contentious matter Unavailable evidence Relevance in chief Evidence after summing up Evidence before commencement of defence case Jury request Accused’s good character Reasons for rule Rule of fairness Questions in cross-examination permissible Immediate tender of documents Particular points
C
Civil cases Introduction The rule
Exceptions
A special problem Differential allocation of burden of proof
Chapter Ten — Character and Credibility 1
Credibility of Party’s Own Witness A
“Disposition” distributed Key distinctions Character of witness, similar fact evidence, cross-examination of accused
B
Supporting own witness Good character evidence party’s own witness The bolster rule
C
Impeaching own witness Rule against impeachment Hostile witnesses
2
Credibility of Opponent’s Witness A
Discrediting techniques — Summary Avoiding irrelevance and vexation General considerations
B
Convictions Development of the modern law History Relevance and spent convictions
C
Discreditable acts
Questions going only to credit Limits on cross-examination and finality of answers
D
Bias, interest and corruption The categories defined Distinctions and illustrations Special rules
E
Lack of veracity General character as a ground for disbelief History and survival of anomalous rule
F
Medical or physical disability Lack of reliability on medical grounds Testimony and confessions
G
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 103, 106 and 108C Exceptions to statutory “credibility” rule Limits of the exceptions
3
Character of Party A
Miscellaneous exceptions The exceptions outlined Summary
B
Prosecution witnesses Persons other than complainants in sex cases General
Complainants in sex cases The nature of the problem The common law rules Statutory change: outline Prohibition on evidence of complainant’s sexual activity or experience: introduction Prohibition on evidence of complainant’s sexual activity or experience: local variations
Miscellaneous instances where character of prosecutor/victim is relevant Common law and statutory position
C
Accused Accused’s adduction of good character General
Evidence of good character The issues distributed Common law Statute
The purpose and effect of good character evidence Purpose Effect Application of character evidence
The judge’s direction Common law and statutory possibilities
Rebuttal Common law: putting character in issue
Common law: modes of rebuttal Statute
Co-accused Common law Statute
D
Parties to civil proceedings Relevance of character Varieties of relevance
4
Rehabilitation of a Witness A
Modes of supporting credibility Common law and statute Common law Statute
Chapter Eleven — Similar Fact Evidence 1
Exclusion at Common Law in Criminal Proceedings A
Introduction The nature of the problem An exclusionary rule Structure
B
Statement and history of the rule Statement of the rule Definitional issues
History of the rule
Makin’s case and its significance
C
Scope of the rule An exclusionary rule Rule excluding relevant evidence, subject to exceptions
Relevance Probative force and prejudicial effect
Relevance via disposition Impermissible chain of reasoning The common law rule in Pfennig’s case Crimes inherent in the background Irrelevance of disposition to guilt Res gestae and relationship evidence Corroboration Rebutting suggestion of coincidence
Misconduct of the accused No limitation to criminality The role of similarity
Conclusion The test summarised The role of the exclusionary discretion
D
The degree of probative force Probative force Strong probative force Balancing probative force and prejudicial effect Factors relevant to probative force
Cogency of evidence showing bad disposition Strength of the inference from evidence of bad disposition that criminal conduct took place Strength of the inference from evidence of bad disposition that accused was criminal Relevance of similar fact evidence to fact in issue The role of similarity Effect of narrow defence on admissibility Cumulative testimony
Prejudicial effect Examples of non-prejudicial evidence Institutional perils in prejudicial evidence Trial level Secondary prejudice
E
Application of the rule A variety of contexts Occasions for application of rule Preliminary considerations
To prove commission of crime Proof of actus reus Need for increased strength in evidence
To prove commission by the accused Lack of direct testimony Direct testimony “Hallmark” principle
To prove voluntary act of the accused
Inference of voluntariness put in issue
To prove intention of the accused Purpose Automatism Accused’s state of knowledge
Similar fact evidence by the accused Misconduct of person not accused Tender by accused against co-accused
F
Role of discretion Does the discretion have any role? Origins of discretion Trifling probative value/disproportion between probative force and prejudicial effect Limited role of discretion Meaning of discretion Discretion or rule
G
Jury direction Invariable requirement Varieties of direction
2
Statutory Provisions — Similar Fact Evidence A
The Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 The “uniform” model The terms of the provisions
B
Other State statutes Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and others The Queensland, Western Australian and South Australian provisions Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) Proof of knowledge
3
Civil Cases — Similar Fact Evidence A
Principle Similar fact rule or rule of relevance History Survival of similar fact rule
Oppression and unfairness Formulations of test
B
Practical questions and statute Practical problems Irrelevance of surprise
Statutes Statutes
Chapter Twelve — Evidence by Accused Persons 1
The Silent Accused A
Introduction The accused’s position
Two options
History From Tudor times to 1836 The 1898 compromise
B
Problems raised by the silent accused Possible courses The background Four courses
Comment No prosecution comment The content of judicial comment The importance of the particular circumstances
No comment Prohibition on direct and indirect references Duties of counsel
2
The Unsworn Statement of the Accused Abolition of the right
3
The Accused as a Witness A
Introduction A compromise The statutory shield
Similarities with and differences from other witnesses The peculiar position of the accused
B
The statutory provisions
The terms of the section Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)-(4)
The structure of the section The section analysed Plan of exposition
C
The prohibition Section 15(2) The provision The “uniform” provision Evidence in chief permissible Identifying the prohibited subjects High Court approach to “bad character” The “literal” and “broad” views The meaning of “tending to show”: Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions “Charged in court” The need for relevance
D
First exception: The matter is relevant Section 15(2) The text expounded South Australia Federal Courts, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory Some problems in s 15(2)(a) Character relevant to credit only Offences and convictions/bad character
The purpose of the cross-examination allowed under the first exception
E
Second exception: The accused’s good character Section 15(2) The text The “uniform” position Examples of what is not “good character” Examples of what is “good character”
The meaning of “character” Reputation or disposition
The divisibility of the character of the accused Putting half a character in issue
The purpose of cross-examination under the second exception Credit or issue
F
Third exception: Imputations on the character of crown witnesses Section 15(2) The provision The “uniform” provision South Australia
Imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses of the prosecutor A constructional problem Examples “Unnecessary” or “unjustifiable” imputations?
Curwood v R Selvey v Director of Public Prosecutions Phillips v R
The discretion of the court Specific discretion No bias in favour of accused Discretion to admit or exclude
Judicial warning Practice of Crown counsel
Purpose of cross-examination under the third exception Tit for tat
G
Fourth exception: witness against a co-accused Section 15(2) A difficulty and its palliative The provision The rationale for s 15(2)(d)
“Evidence against” Six propositions
Who is a co-accused? “Same offence” Co-accused’s rights of cross-examination
Purpose of cross-examination under the fourth exception Co-accused and prosecution in same position
H
Fifth exception: Relevant to the defence of a coaccused Difficulties in cross-examining to show innocence Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(b)
I
The role of the judge Statutory provisions Statutory provisions Role of counsel
J
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 ss 110–112 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 110-112 “Uniform” provisions Special features
Chapter Thirteen — Privilege 1
General — Privilege A
Introduction A non-discretionary exemption No discretion Exemption from answering, not from attending
B
Waiver Waiver defined Waiver illustrated
Width of waiver Extent of waiver
Inadvertent disclosure
C
Proof by other evidence Other witnesses Means of obtaining evidence
Impropriety, equity and inadvertence Discretion
D
Personal nature of privilege Appeal rights Limited to parties
E
No adverse inference available Adverse inferences and failures of proof No adverse inference
F
Effect of upholding the claim The need for justification Damaging effect of successful claim
G
Protection of confidential nature of disclosed material A middle way Two accommodations The Harman principle Abuse of process
2
Privilege against Self-incrimination A
Statement and history of the rule Statement of the rule The rule
History of the rule A variety of origins
B
The operation of the rule Persons who may claim privilege Natural persons Corporations
Non-judicial inquiries Extension of the privilege
“To answer any question or to produce any document” Privilege against oral and documentary disclosures No privilege for real evidence
“If the answer or the document would have the tendency to expose…” Test for claim Warnings and judicial role Protection against damning disclosures
“To the imposition of a civil penalty or to conviction for a crime” Penalties Direct and indirect crimination Penalties, discovery and witness statements Forfeiture Adultery
C
Rationale of the rule Rationale
Justifications
D
Miscellaneous points Other matters Plan of exposition
Incrimination of spouse No privilege against spousal incrimination
Incrimination under foreign law Foreign law
Conduct in same proceedings as those in which privilege is claimed Perjury and contempt
E
Statutory provisions Abolition of privilege in curial proceedings Abrogation for curial proceedings: general Immunity certificates
Executive powers not subject to privilege Clear legislative intention required Other problems
3
Marital Privilege A
Privileges abolished Adultery and bastardy Privilege for matrimonial communications
Communications during marriage Western Australia, Family Law Act and Queensland
B
No common law privilege Common law; statutory limitations Common law, statutory limitations
4
Legal Professional Privilege A
Statement and history of the rule Statement of the rule The rule
History and rationale of the rule The history The rationale
B
Operation of the rule Communications Protection of communications Lawyer-client communications Third party communications
Purpose Dominant purpose
Legal adviser External and in-house lawyers
Non-judicial investigations Modern extension of the privilege
Confidential communications The rule Presence of third party
Shared privileges Common interest and joint interest privilege
Establishing the privilege Onus
Copy documents Copies and translations
C
Exceptions to the rule Enactments Need for clear words or necessary implication
Other exceptions Preliminary Communications to facilitate crime or fraud Facts discovered in the course of the relationship and other exemptions
D
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 Client legal privilege The “uniform” legislation
E
Extending the privilege Other relationships Other relationships
5
Other Confidential Relationships — Privilege A
Priests and doctors
Priest and penitent Statute Common law Reluctance to compel answers
Physician and patient Common law Statute Waiver
B
Other relationships Professionals, journalists and sexual assault communications New statutory privileges
6
Title Deeds — Privilege A
Title deeds Documents of title Common law and statute
7
Statements Made without Prejudice — Privilege A
Common law The rule and its illustrations The rule Illustrations
Special categories of the privilege “Without prejudice save as to costs” Mediators in family litigation: common law
Mediators in family law: statute
Limits of the privilege General Contracts and vitiating factors Objective facts having legal consequences
B
Statute South Australia Statutory privilege and its exceptions
Cth, NSW, Tas, Vic and ACT Evidence Acts and NT Evidence (NUL) Act “Uniform” legislation Judicial warning
8
Rules of Court Rules of court — General Procedural issues General New South Wales Civil Procedure Rules r 1.9 New South Wales Civil Procedure Rules Pt 21
Chapter Fourteen — Public Interest 1
Matters of Public Interest A
Introduction Definitional issues Preliminary distinctions Nomenclature, waiver, secondary evidence
Class claims and contents claims distinguished
The problems of public interest claims Damaging effects of successful claim Intermediate courses Persons objecting
B
Statement and scope of the rule Statement The rule Contexts in which the rule is applied
Scope Real and oral evidence Documents not in possession of executive Communications between informants and the state State interest
C
National security Particular documents and classes of document Military secrets Classes of vital documents
Miscellaneous issues Irrelevance of foreign governmental interests Defamation
D
Other interests of state Public service Impact on public service
Other topics
Trading interests Inspection
E
Parliamentary privilege Evidence of parliamentary proceedings Common law and statutory protections
F
Police matters Internal documents Conway v Rimmer
Material received from the public Informers and non-informers “Drying up” argument
G
Local government matters Local authorities Distinctions among local authority roles
H
Confidential matters The relevance of confidentiality: principles Principles
The relevance of confidentiality: authorities Some cases
I
Criminal proceedings Informers and other issues Interests of accused; informers
Prosecution witness statements Defence access to prosecution witness statements
J
Statutory prohibitions Secrecy, statute and public policy Protection for public servants
K
Determining the validity of a claim to exclude evidence under the rule Disposition of analysis Three questions
The manner of making claim to immunity Procedures for claiming immunity
The determination of the claim The court’s duty Court inspection of documents
Principles which govern the determination A balancing but not a discretionary judgment For production Against production
L
Some uncertain points Procedural questions Miscellaneous problems
M Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 130 Statutory regimes “Uniform” legislation
2
Miscellaneous Matters Connected with Previous Litigation A
Plan of analysis Judges, arbitrators, jurors, advocates Special rules
B
The evidence of judges of the superior courts Non-compellability of judges Non-compellability, privilege or public policy?
C
The evidence of arbitrators Arbitrators Compellability and privilege
D
The evidence of jurors Ban on evidence of jury discussions Jury discussions and other events
E
The evidence of advocates Advocates Advocates
F
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011, Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 16 and s 129 Judges and jurors “Uniform” legislation
3
Illegally Obtained Evidence
A
A dilemna The Problem What is the law?
Solutions The English and Scottish solutions The Australian solution Reasons for the Australian solution Australian unfairness discretion for confessions Relevant factors in Australian law Admissions obtained in unlawful custody Admissions obtained from persons under disability Civil cases
B
Facts discovered in consequence of inadmissible confessions Subsequently confirmed confessions The relevant questions R v Warickshall Other authorities Confessions as real evidence
C
Evidence procured in consequence of illegal searches and other unlawful acts Illegally obtained evidence Illegal searches Illegalities other than illegal searches
D
Evidence that is not obtained illegally
Improperly obtained evidence Underhand or sharp practices
E
Evidence of agents provocateurs Entrapment and the like Undercover agents
F
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011, Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 138 Weighing process “Uniform” legislation
Chapter Fifteen — Opinion 1
Nature of the Exclusionary Rule A
History, statement and limits of the rule Introduction History of the rule Statement of the Rule Meaning of opinion Double character of opinion evidence Non-opinion expert evidence Non-expert opinion evidence
2
Expert Opinion in Evidence A
Antiquity, criticisms and value of expert opinion evidence Nature of expert opinion evidence
General aspects
B
Aspect of specialised knowledge Fields in which expert opinion evidence can be called Exclusion of ordinary experience and unreliable material General acceptance not necessary
C
Expertise of witness Special study or experience Skill
D
Identification of assumed facts on which expert opinion is based Assumptions of primary fact Assumption identification rule
E
Proof of assumed facts on which expert opinion is based Proof of assumptions of primary fact Basis rule
F
Intellectual basis of opinion Demonstration how opinion was propounded Expert’s reasoning
G
Other matters Legal practitioner role, expert bias and reliability Function of legal practitioner and expert
3
Non-expert Opinion in Evidence A
The rule and its justification
The rule The rule and its justification
B
Examples Illustrations, identification, value Instances of the rule Identification Value
4
Ultimate Issues — Opinion A
Expert witnesses The rule propounded The rule and its justification
Illustrations of rule Effects of publication Intellectual property Insurance
Reformulation of rule Controversies over rule
B
Non-expert witnesses Non-expert opinion on ultimate issue The rule and its justification
5
Reasons for the Exclusion of Certain Kinds of Evidence of Opinion Explanations for opinion rule Rationale
Justifications for opinion rule
6
The Rule Against Hearsay and Evidence of Opinion A
The basis rule — General General Non-compliance with the basis rule
B
The basis rule — Hearsay Non-compliance with hearsay rule Impermissible hearsay elements Permissible hearsay elements Public opinion polls and market surveys Relaxation of hearsay rule
7
Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 77–80 A
General Structure of legislation Meaning of “opinion”
B
Section 77 Non-opinion purpose Role of s 136
C
Section 78 Non-expert opinion
Opinion necessary to understand witness’s perception
D
Section 79 Specialised knowledge Structure of s 79 Is there a field of specialised knowledge? Does the witness have specialised knowledge? Is the opinion wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge? Assumption rule, basis rule and intellectual foundation of opinion
E
Section 80 Exceptions to opinion rule Fact in issue, ultimate issue, common knowledge
F
Other matters Section 135 Discretionary exclusion
Aids to the admissibility of expert reports Form of expert reports
Procedural requirements Rules of court and practice notes Certificates
Chapter Sixteen — The Rule against Hearsay 1
Statement, Illustration, Development and Rationale of the Rule against Hearsay A
Introduction
Preliminary Plan of the chapter Plan of the section
B
Statement of the rule The rule defined Definition of rule against hearsay
C
History of the rule Hearsay history The origins of the hearsay rule
D
Rationale of the rule Justifications for the rule Analysis
E
Formulation of the rule Competing formulations The formulation propounded Other formulations
F
Hearsay and implied assertions The implied assertion problem Implied assertions illustrated First view: all implied assertions are hearsay Second view: all implied assertions are hearsay and new exceptions should be created Third view: conduct not intended to be assertive is not hearsay Fourth view: no implied assertion is hearsay Fifth view: statements not intended to be assertive are not hearsay
unless the statement is about the declarant’s conduct Sixth view: statements or conduct containing an assertion admissible if tendered as a relevant fact or fact relevant to an issue McLelland J’s test and the “uniform” legislation
G
Hearsay and machine information Calculating devices Analysis
H
Statements as original evidence Original evidence Definition of original evidence
Statements as facts in issue Miscellaneous Operative words
Statements as facts relevant to the issue Miscellaneous Statements accompanying a relevant act or event Statements indicative of treatment
Statements affecting the weight or credibility of evidence Previous consistent and inconsistent statements
2
Application of the Rule against Hearsay A
Introduction Modes of assertion Plan of analysis
B
Written assertions
Express assertions The hearsay ban on express assertions
Implications from writing Circumstantial inferences R v Rice Wright v Doe d Tatham Old books, labels, stamps
Negative inferences “Negative hearsay”
C
Oral assertions Introduction Outline of problem
Express assertions Examples
Implications from statements Examples
D
Conduct Conduct as hearsay Examples and analysis
E
Proof by combined testimony of two witnesses Introduction Outline of problem
Primary evidence is lacking Car identification
Human identification Multiple identification evidence Extent of reception “Photofit” identification
The primary witness cannot give intelligible evidence Interpreters
3
Jury Direction —The Rule against Hearsay Requirement for jury direction Need for and content of direction Privy Council position
Chapter Seventeen — The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law 1
Statements of Deceased Persons A
Introduction Preliminary Structure of chapter Structure of section
B
Declarations against interest Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement Illustrations: (a) statements against pecuniary interest Illustrations: (b) statements against proprietary interest Illustrations: (c) no derogation from superior title Rationale
Conditions of admissibility Death of declarant Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: general Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (a) the nature of the interest Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (b) statement must be presently against interest Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (c) Prima facie against interest Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (d) to declarant’s knowledge Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (e) personal knowledge of facts stated Against pecuniary or proprietary interest: (f) collateral matters
Conclusions Possible reform of the law Effect of statute
C
Declarations in the course of duty Statements, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement Illustrations Rationale
Conditions of admissibility The conditions stated Fact not opinion Duty to act and record or report (a) Specific duty to another
(b) Duty must relate to acts of declarant (c) Acts recorded must have been performed Contemporaneity Absence of motive to misrepresent Contrast with declarations against interest
Conclusions Possible reform of the law
D
Declarations as to public or general rights Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement Illustrations: (a) public rights Illustrations: (b) general rights Rationale
Conditions of admissibility Summary Death of declarant Public or general rights Declarations must concern reputed existence of right Declarations must have been made before dispute Competency of declarant’s knowledge
Conclusions Preservation in “uniform” legislation
E
Pedigree declarations Statements, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement
Discussion and illustrations Rationale
Conditions of admissibility Summary Death of declarant Question of pedigree Blood relationship Questions of legitimacy and illegitimate relationship generally Legitimation Declaration ante litem motam
Conclusions Statute
F
Dying declarations Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement Illustrations Rationale
Conditions of admissibility Summary Death of declarant Trial for murder or manslaughter Statement must relate to cause of declarant’s death Declarant’s settled hopeless expectation of death Competence of declarant Hearsay upon hearsay
Conclusions Impact of statute
G
Post-testamentary declarations of testators concerning the contents of their wills Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement Rationale
Conditions of admissibility Death of declarant No proof of execution
Conclusions Impact of statute
H
Extra-testamentary statements of testators and testator’s family maintenance Reasons for disinheritance General law and statute
2
Statements in Public Documents A
Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception Statement The rule
Illustrations Registers Returns and maps Certificates
Rationale
Necessity Reliability
B
Conditions of admissibility Plan of analysis Variety of conditions
The definition of a public document Sturla v Freccia Public duty to inquire and record Public matter Retention Public inspection Personal knowledge
The different categories of public documents Registers, returns and certificates
Conclusions Statute
3
Admissions of the Parties — The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law A
Statement, illustrations and rationale of the exception Background The place of informal admissions in the law
Statement The rule
Illustrations
Admissions by words Admissions by conduct
Rationale Likely reliability
Conditions of admissibility Outline of plan
B
Capacity of party Personal and representative capacities Consequences of the distinction
C
Reception of the entire statement Connected material The rule
D
Personal knowledge Condition of admissibility? Knowledge and expertise
E
Statements of mixed law and fact Mixed law and fact A controversy
F
Implied admissions Response to allegations Statements in the presence of a party Two pre-1914 tendencies Role of judge and jury Silence Direction to the jury
Co-accused’s statement Nature of the reply The danger of the mechanical approach
Documents in the possession or control of a party The principles
G
Vicarious admissions Introduction General principles
Cases in which there is no privity Co-parties Party and witness in former proceedings
Cases in which there is privity Predecessors in title Referees
Agents Agents’ admissions in general Employer and employee; partners Legal representatives Miscellaneous cases
Non-agents Admissions by a deceased Conspirators: general Conspirators: particular rules Extension beyond conspiracy Nominal defendants
Husband and wife Infants
4
Confessions in Criminal Proceedings A
Statement of the exception Express admissions Two strict rules and three “discretions” Implied admissions
B
General requirements for admissibility Pressure and inducements Overview Special rules Illustrations of the common law rule
C
History and rationale of the common law rule Background The pre-1975 law The modern basis of exclusion
D
Voluntariness General Range of issues Person in authority The inducement Duration of the inducement Queensland: presumed inducement
Not obtained by oppression
Doctrine and illustrations
State of mind of accused Basal involuntariness
Other factors affecting voluntariness Coercion, misrepresentation, misunderstandings Challenging truth of confession Burden and standard of proof
E
Discretionary rejection General “Discretionary” inclusions The nature of unfairness
Judges’ Rules The history of the Judges’ Rules
Untruth of confession Likelihood of untruth
Eavesdropping Relevance of trickery
Confession implicating co-accused or implicating accused in other offences Use of confessions involving other accused in other offences
Misleading statements Misrepresentations
Ill health of accused Weakened physical or mental health
Asking a suspect about another’s motives
Motive to lie
Traps Undisclosed subject of questioning
Oppressive questioning Unduly persistent questioning
Unsigned records of interview Unsigned records of interview
Right to a lawyer Refusal of access to lawyer
Interrogation of Aboriginal people Aboriginal suspects
Interrogation of children Children
General Miscellaneous
Discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained confessions Instances of exclusion Summary
F
Silence as a confession The problem of silence Difficulty distinctions
G
Statutory modifications The jurisdictions classified and summarised Statutory standards
Consequences for admissibility of not complying with the statutory standard “Uniform” legislation
5
Miscellaneous —The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law Further exceptions Summary
Testimony on former occasions Modes of tendering earlier evidence
Previous statements of witnesses Prior inconsistent statements
Evidence through interpreters Problems arising from interpretation
Evidence of age Avenues to admissibility
Ancient documents Reception of ancient documents
Reputation Establishment and relevance of reputation
Expert witnesses Experts and hearsay
Signs on buildings Proof of ownership
Postmarks
Role of postmarks
Identity of telephone callers A developing hearsay exception
Proceedings in which the rule against hearsay does not apply Non-application of rule
Conclusion Historical works
Chapter Eighteen — The Rule against Hearsay: Statutory Exceptions 1
Statutes Equivalent to the Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) A
Introduction Plan of chapter Summary
B
South Australia General The terms of the legislation Exceptions to evidentiary rules other than hearsay rule Exceptions to hearsay rule Definitions
Analysis of provisions “Business” and “undertaking” “Document”
Duty Personal knowledge Statement of fact Statement of opinion Unavailability of maker or supplier Dispensing with calling maker The “maker of the statement” “Continuous record” “Person interested” Bias and material interest Complete absence of bias Substantial material interest When proceedings are “pending or anticipated” Actual anticipation or reasonable person test? The authentication of the statement Production of original document Inference from form or contents Discretion to exclude Withholding from jury room Weight Corroboration Credibility of maker Inconsistent statements: no leave needed Time of tender Pedigree Conclusions
2
Business and Computer Records —The Rule against Hearsay: Statutory Exceptions A
Western Australia Introduction Plan of the section
Function and terms of legislation NSW origins of WA statute The function of the legislation The terms of the legislation Definition of key expressions Examples Negative hearsay
Some definitions “Business” “Derived” “Document” “Qualified person” “Statement”
Safeguards Statements made in relation to criminal proceedings Estimating weight Credibility Discretionary exclusion Corroboration
Ancillary provisions
Inferences from form or contents Reception notwithstanding other rules Argument against admissibility Survival of other rules of law
B
Queensland Bankers’ books and business records The provisions Width of provisions
Computer evidence The principal provisions Application of ss 96(1), 97–100 and 102
C
South Australia Business records Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45A
Computer evidence Evidence Act 1929 (SA) Pt VIA
3
Miscellaneous Statutory Exceptions to the Rule against Hearsay Further statutory exceptions Taking evidence before trial Pre-trial procedural provisions
Copy public documents Statutory removal of common law limitations
Convictions
Proof of conviction by certificate
Other documentary evidence: South Australia Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45B
Out of court statements by unavailable witnesses: South Australia Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34KA
Previous consistent and inconsistent statements: Queensland Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 101
Statement by child Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 94–100 and 102
Transportation and shipment documents: South Australia Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45
Evidence of depositions or earlier statements Pre-trial statements
4
Documentary Evidence: Criminal Proceedings Queensland Introduction General
Record relating to any trade or business Trade or business and related issues
General exceptions Non-application of hearsay rule
5
Ch 3 Pts 3.2 and 3.4 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) and Ch 3 Pts 2 and 4 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) A
The Scope of Hearsay The definition of hearsay as an exclusionary rule Definition of hearsay Effect of s 60 Competence
B
Exceptions other than admissions Part 3.2: Division 2 — “First-hand” hearsay exceptions Personal knowledge Outline
First group of exceptions: civil cases, unavailable representor Evidence of unavailable representor in civil cases
Second group of exceptions: civil cases, available representor Outline Section 64(2) Section 64(3)
Third group of exceptions: criminal cases, unavailable representor Application of s 65
Section 65(2) in outline Origins of s 65(2)(a) Structure of s 65(2)(b) Structure of s 65(2)(c) Structure of s 65(2)(d) Exceptions in s 65(3)-(6) Exceptions in s 65(8)-(9)
Fourth group of exceptions: criminal cases, available representor Terms of s 66 Effect of s 66(1)-(2A) Effect of s 66(3)
Fifth exception: contemporaneous statements about a person’s health Section 66A
Part 3.2: Division 3 — Other exceptions to the hearsay rule Business records Outline Origins and evaluation Avenues of admissibility Definitions Asserted facts and opinions Computer and other machine-generated information Safeguards
Tags, labels and writing attached to or on objects
Section 70
Statements in electronic messages as to sender, recipient, date, time and destination Section 71
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs Section 72
Reputation Section 73 Section 74
Interlocutory proceedings Section 75
C
Admissions Scope Definition
First hand proof of admissions Sections 81 and 82
Exclusion of admissions against third parties Section 83
Violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct Section 84
Unreliable admissions in criminal proceedings Section 85
Unsigned records of interview Section 86
Preservation of other legislation Non-repeal of other legislation
Admissions made with authority Section 87
Proof of admissions Section 88
Out of court silence Section 89 and related provisions in NSW
Exclusionary discretion Section 90
Related provisions Sections 135–136 and 165
6
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld): ss 93B and 93C First hand hearsay of unavailable person Unavailable persons Structure of ss 93B and 93C
7
Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Available complainant Previous representations by complainant under 18 Section 377
Chapter Nineteen —The Doctrine of Res Gestae 1
Introduction Organisation of chapter
Summary Outline
2
Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co v Carlyle Issues in the case A divergence The facts and the reasoning Starke J and Dixon J compared Ambiguity
3
Four Suggested Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Associated with the Doctrine A
Introduction Summary Outline and underlying basis
B
Statement accompanying and explaining relevant acts Statement and illustrations of the exception Statement and examples Accompanying statements must be in issue or relevant to the issue Statement must relate to the act it accompanies Contemporaneity Statement must be by the actor
C
Spontaneous statements relating to an event in issue made by participants or observers Introduction Statement and illustrations of the exception
Defects of the traditional law The effect of Ratten’s case
Conditions of admissibility Summary Directness Other evidence Rationale and utility
D
Statements concerning the maker’s contemporaneous state of mind or emotion Statement, illustrations and requirements of the exception The terms and illustration of the rule The requirement of contemporaneity Limited purpose of reception Relevance of intention Prospectant continuance of intention: analysis Prospectant continuance of intention: concoction Previous declarations of intention as evidence of the performance of a subsequent act The Hillmon problem Reported assertions of mental state: original or hearsay evidence?
E
Statements of contemporaneous physical sensation Principles underlying and examples of the exception Statement and illustrations of the exception The requirement of contemporaneity
Miscellaneous
Other matters
4
Res Gestae as Original Evidence Original evidence Problems of res gestae and original evidence Examples of original evidence Evidence of opinion received as part of the res gestae Facts received as part of the res gestae Res gestae and other exclusionary rules
5
Statutory Exceptions and Conclusions Statutes and conclusions Statutory exceptions “Uniform” legislation
Conclusions Concluding analysis
Chapter Twenty — Documentary Evidence 1
Proof of the Contents of a Document A
The general rule Introduction Plan of the chapter
Statement and illustrations of the general rule Statement Illustrations
Types of primary evidence of the contents of a
document The original Copy of document requiring enrolment Deemed originals Admission of a party
Types of secondary evidence of the contents of a document Secondary evidence
B
Exceptions to the general rule Exceptions Summary
Opponent’s failure to produce document after notice Nature and purpose of notice to produce When service of notice is excused
Stranger’s lawful refusal to produce document Stranger’s failure to produce
Lost document Failure to find after due search
Production of original impossible Physical or legal impossibility
Public documents Categories of public document
Statutory provisions Statutes other than the “uniform” legislation The “uniform” legislation
2
Proof of the Execution of Private Documents A
Proof of handwriting Modes of proof Plan of the section Categories of handwriting evidence summarised Testimonial or hearsay evidence Opinion Comparison
B
Proof of attestation Attestation Organisation Wills Other documents required by law to be attested History of the present law
C
Presumptions relating to documents A variety of presumptions Presumptions relating to execution
D
The Stamp Acts Stamp objections Consequences of non-stamping
3
The Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence Affecting the Contents of a Document A
The conclusiveness of a document as evidence of the terms of the transaction it embodies
Adding to, varying or contradicting a document Plan
Statement of the rule Various formulations
Illustrations of the rule Judicial records Transactions required by law to be in writing Written contracts
Exceptions to and cases falling outside the rule Summary Public registers Cases on validity or effectiveness of a document Consideration The real nature of the transaction Capacity of parties Contracts which are collateral, partly oral, or subject to usage Memoranda Proceedings between strangers
B
Extrinsic evidence in aid of interpretation The problem Resort to circumstances extrinsic to the document being construed Wigmore’s four standards
The principal rules of interpretation Plan Wigram’s propositions
The inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to make document The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to translate a document The “matrix” rule The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of persons and things mentioned in the document The inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to displace a sensible legal or commonly accepted meaning The preference for legitimate relationship The plain meaning rule illustrated The plain meaning rule today The admissibility of extrinsic circumstantial evidence of the author’s intended meaning The admissibility of the author’s extrinsic declarations of intention Equivocation Rebutting certain equitable presumptions Subsequent conduct Admissibility of extrinsic evidence: wills
C
Conclusions Miscellaneous points Plan Relationship of interpretation to evidence Objects of the rules of interpretation Capricious results
Chapter Twenty-One — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters 1
Foreign Law — Proof of Frequently Recurring
Matters A
The Principal rules at common law General rules Summary of chapter The rules
Judicial notice and previous decisions Does the decision of a court on foreign law bind later courts?
B
Statutory provisions Commonwealth and State legislation Constitutional and general provisions Recognition of statutory, judicial and other official acts Recognition of documents and certificates admissible in other courts The “uniform” legislation
C
Expert witness Qualifications, necessity, role The rules
2
Birth, Age, Death, Marriage and Legitimacy — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters Birth, age, death, marriage, legitimacy Birth Statutory and common law methods of proof
Age Summary of methods of proof Direct evidence
Hearsay Certificates other than birth certificates Hearsay exceptions: common law and statutory
Death Eight methods of proof
Marriage Five methods of proving a marriage ceremony Proof of formal validity Expert witnesses and certificates
Legitimacy Presumption of legitimacy and hearsay exceptions
3
Judgments and Convictions — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters Civil and criminal cases Common law and statute Summary
Civil cases The “uniform” legislation
Criminal cases The “uniform” legislation Proof of identity
4
Miscellaneous — Proof of Frequently Recurring Matters Other matters
General Plan of section
Custom and usage Four methods of proof
Ownership Four methods of proof
Proof of what occurred at meetings Admissions, witnesses, minutes
Index
[page 1]
Chapter One Introduction
Section 1 — Development of the Law of Evidence A — HISTORY AND CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF EVIDENCE Seventeenth-nineteenth centuries [1005] Pre-twentieth century history Although some of the modern rules of evidence can be traced to the Middle Ages, their development really begins with the decisions of the common law judges in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.1 Those decisions were responsible for a complex and now almost defunct body of law concerning the competency of witnesses; responsible, too, for other far from defunct rules, such as the rule against hearsay with its numerous exceptions, the rule excluding evidence of opinion, and the rudiments of the modern law of character evidence. Although a number of statutory reforms have been enacted since the mid nineteenth century, it is the old decisions of the common law judges which dictate the form in which much of the law of evidence must be stated, for this law still consists, to a large extent, of exclusionary rules. By these rules the law of evidence declares that certain matters which might well be accepted as evidence of a fact by other responsible inquirers will not be accepted by the courts. In short, these rules define what is not admissible evidence. There are also, however, signs of an increasing tendency, especially in civil cases, to relax the exclusionary rules relating to evidence and its weight2 and even to elaborate rules relating to the circumstances in which its disclosure can be compelled. A careful non-judicial inquirer into the question whether A had been unfit, through drink, to drive a car on a particular occasion might well attach some importance to the following: (a) the fact that X, since deceased, told a police officer that he had seen A consume six large whiskies before getting into the car;
[page 2] (b) the fact that Y — a publican who says hesitantly, a year after the event, that A was served with six large whiskies — signed a statement to that effect the morning after the occasion in question; (c) the fact that Z, a police officer, spoke to A immediately after A got out of the car, and formed the opinion that A was unfit to drive through drink. Yet all three of the above items of evidence are inadmissible at common law. Three factors that have contributed to the largely exclusionary nature of the law of evidence are the jury, the oath and the adversary system of procedure.3 One reason why Z’s evidence is excluded is the fear that a jury might treat the opinion as conclusive; one reason why Y’s signed statement is excluded is that it was not made on oath; X’s statement is excluded partly for this reason, partly because the jury might attach undue weight to it, but mainly because the statement has never been subject to cross-examination by A’s counsel. Although Y could be cross-examined on his signed statement at the trial, a further reason for excluding it is that Y was not subject to cross-examination when it was made. Allowance must also be made for a deep-seated fear that evidence will be manufactured by or on behalf of the parties: [T]he presumption … is, that no man would declare any thing against himself, unless it were true; but that every man, if he was in a difficulty, or in the view to any difficulty, would make declarations for himself.4
No doubt it was this fear which lay at the root of the extraordinary common law rule that the parties to litigation were incompetent to give evidence. It was abolished for civil cases by the Evidence Act 1851 (Eng), but it was not until the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) and its Australian equivalents (see [23001]) came into force that the accused was allowed to give evidence for the defence in all criminal cases.5 These changes were climacteric, and they had a bearing on other rules of evidence. For example, the case for excluding the statement of X, since deceased, that X saw A drink six large whiskies in the illustration given above is far stronger when A is not allowed to give evidence of the facts
than when this is not so. It was the removal of many of the restrictions and disqualifications upon other witnesses by the Evidence Act 1843 (Eng) which paved the way for the competence of the parties under the Evidence Act 1851, and the anomalies thereby created between civil and criminal proceedings provided much of the impetus towards making the accused generally competent in 1898.
Controversies as to the nature of the law of evidence [1010] Two views One commentator on the law of evidence spoke in the following terms: Founded apparently on the propositions that all jurymen are deaf to reason, that all witnesses are presumptively liars and that all documents are presumptively forgeries, it has been added to, subtracted from and tinkered with for two centuries until it has become less of a structure than a pile of builders’ debris.6
[page 3] This is controversial. Hamilton LJ said:7 … I yield to authority on the law of evidence without reluctance, because I am satisfied that in the main the English rules of evidence are just, and I am satisfied also that there is no portion of the English law which ought more rigidly to be upheld. My experience is that the public have in the result derived great benefit from their strict application.
Australian developments [1015] The work of the Law Reform Commissions and its results The Australian Law Reform Commission, after eight years’ work, including the production of many research papers and an Interim Report on Evidence (ALRC 26), in 1987 published a Report on Evidence (ALRC 38). In 1995 the Commonwealth and New South Wales Parliaments each enacted an Evidence Act based upon, but not the same as, the Bill in ALRC 38. They have substantial but not complete identity. It is the hope of some, but not of all,8 that other jurisdictions will enact equivalent
legislation. Tasmania, in 2001, and Norfolk Island, in 2004, did. In 2005 a joint report of the Australian, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions (ALRC 102) reviewed the legislation. Substantial changes were then made to the Commonwealth and New South Wales Acts; Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory enacted similar but not identical legislation. It is probable that Tasmania will also do so. Similar legislation in the Northern Territory has come into effect: Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) (hereinafter referred to as the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT)). Discussion of the legislation below will concentrate on jurisdictions other than Norfolk Island. Certain general aspects are discussed at [1685]–[1820].
Section 2 — Range of the Law of Evidence A — THE DIVERSITY OF THE LAW [1020] Procedure, form, witnesses, exclusionary rules and proof The law of evidence reveals a wide diversity of topics and rules. Some rules deal with essentially procedural matters, such as those relating to the ability to secure the disclosure of relevant evidence, and the validity of reasons for not doing so, or rules about the form in which questions may be put to a witness; some deal with witnesses, such as the rules relating to their competency and the extent to which their evidence requires corroboration; some deal with the admissibility of particular sorts of evidence, such as evidence of the previous discreditable conduct of the accused or of potentially unreliable evidence such as hearsay or opinion; and some deal with questions of proof, such as rules about judicial notice or the amount of proof required. These various categories overlap and interlock. They can be fitted together into many different patterns. The most significant difference in the patterns is probably that which exists between the rules which apply to judicial proceedings in the courts and those which apply to the determination of facts in other tribunals. [page 4]
B — PROCEEDINGS IN COURTS Dispensing with evidence rules [1025] Power of courts to order, and of the parties to agree, that the rules of evidence be dispensed with
There are important variations in the precise mixture of rules which apply to different types of jurisdiction, to different types of court, and to different stages in the proceedings. The procedure in certain courts confers a discretion to dispense with the rules of evidence with respect to matters and documents which are not genuinely in dispute or where compliance with the rules might involve unreasonable expense or delay.9 The duty to apply the rules of evidence is so fundamental a characteristic of the judicial process that very clear language must be found to authorise departure from them.10 Although it is open to the parties to reach agreements altering the burden of proof11 and giving certificates of particular states of fact conclusive effect,12 to make formal admissions,13 and to waive particular objections,14 it may be doubted whether it is open to them to agree to suspend the totality of the rules of evidence in a particular trial, even in civil cases.
Different types of jurisdiction [1030] Criminal/civil jurisdiction; paternal jurisdiction; administrative function Many rules of evidence are common to both civil and criminal proceedings. But many of the rules are different, and those that are the same are often applied differently. The law is applied less strictly against the accused in a criminal case. In particular evidence more prejudicial to the accused than probative of the prosecution case may be excluded.15 This factor undoubtedly underlies many of the differences between the rules applied in the two types of proceedings. It has, in some areas, been implemented by statutory provisions. Thus the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) and its Australian equivalents import a special regime to apply to the accused as a witness, different from that applying to other witnesses, just because of the greater vulnerability of the former. This can lead to difficulty when the true adversary is not the prosecutor, but a codefendant, for whom similar consideration [page 5]
must be shown, leading to further modification of the rules.16 Another factor which contributes, perhaps even more strongly, to the differences between the rules applying in criminal and civil proceedings is the difference between the form of procedure and method of trial. In criminal cases, pleading (to the extent to which it exists) is generally oral, and there are often no interlocutory hearings. In civil cases there are relatively few juries.17 It cannot be maintained that all of the differences stem from these considerations. For many it is hard to find any rational explanation, for example, why the admissibility of dying declarations by way of exception to the hearsay rule should be limited not only to criminal cases, but to those involving the trial of the accused for the homicide of the declarant. Many statutory differences are equally puzzling. It has been suggested that a trial judge has “considerable discretion” not to apply the rules of evidence against unrepresented accused.18 So far as this permits judicial intervention to reject inadmissible evidence which has not been objected to, it is unexceptionable. So far as it permits suspension of the law of evidence, it is wrong. In general the courts are concerned with a lis, a dispute between the parties before them, which is resolved by the adversarial process so typical of the common law. There are other aspects of their jurisdiction which are of a different character. In considering the paternal jurisdiction exercised in relation to wards of court and lunatics19 Lord Devlin distinguished between those rules which may vary and those which are so fundamental that they have to be observed by everyone who acts judicially, and which constitute the rules of natural justice. He was quite clear that many of the rules of evidence fell into the former category: [t]here are also rules of less importance designed to aid in the administration of justice and to regulate procedure. They are rules of convenience rather than of principle: and the rule against hearsay … is among them. No one would suggest that it is contrary to natural justice to act on hearsay.20
Thus the precise mixture of rules is not fixed, but determined by the nature of the jurisdiction. Lord Evershed said (Lord Reid concurring): [It is] not enough to say that the proceeding is a judicial proceeding. It is necessary to define or to have in mind what is the true character of this judicial proceeding and what is its end or purpose.21
Courts will be cautious to limit their departure from the rules which apply in ordinary cases. Thus a distinction has been drawn between issues arising under the paternal jurisdiction, and the issue of whether the
paternal jurisdiction should continue to be exercised, there being more preparedness to permit cross-examination on the latter.22 A few administrative functions involving the finding of facts (most of which have [page 6] been transferred to special administrative tribunals) have been retained by the ordinary courts. In performing them courts also apply a different set of rules of evidence, including at least one set permitting the admission of hearsay.23 Similarly, when magistrates act in committal proceedings, the rules of evidence differ from those which apply when they are conducting a summary trial.24 It has been said that, in conducting judicial proceedings which have a strong administrative element, a judge is entitled to take into account material of the type which would be accepted by a responsible administrator.25
Different types of court [1035] Statutory modification of evidence rules in particular courts Different courts often apply different mixtures of rules of evidence. This is sometimes accomplished by explicit legislation in the statute establishing the court. Occasionally legislation establishes totally new courts, and sometimes explicitly abridges the rules of evidence to be applied in them. An example is the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZT, discussed in [1685]. Even where those provisions are wide, they do not necessarily exclude such important rules as rules of privilege.26 And they are to be construed narrowly: “the rules of evidence should not be treated as excluded from the proceedings of the court unless the words are clear or the context compelling”.27
Different stages of proceedings [1040] Decisions before trial and on the voir dire
Even if judicial proceedings in the ordinary higher courts alone are considered, deviations are still to be found between the rules which apply to the finding of facts at different stages within those proceedings. This may be illustrated by considering some of the variations which apply, before trial, to issues of fact which arise in relation to the admissibility of evidence, and, after trial, to those which arise on questions of sentence or on appeal. At the pretrial stage such scanty authority as exists suggests that the courts try to follow the rules which apply at the trial stage as far as possible.28 Thus the burden [page 7] of proving unfitness to plead is, like the substantive defence of insanity, on the accused who raises it rather than on the prosecution.29 If raised by the prosecution it must be proved by it beyond reasonable doubt.30 So far as issues of fact relevant to the admissibility of evidence are concerned, the general rule is that such questions should be tried by the judge on the voir dire, at a trial within the trial. Most such trials have dealt with the admissibility of confessions: the prosecution bears the burden of proving voluntariness, though not beyond reasonable doubt31 and witnesses, including the accused,32 can be called, and cross-examined.33 There are a few differences between the rules of evidence applying on the voir dire and those applying in the trial proper. Thus, in one case,34 the court took the view that the proponent of the evidence (in that instance, the prosecution) need make out only a prima facie case to show that a tape-recording satisfied the condition of originality. It must also often be the case, for the very reason that the purpose of the preliminary issue is to determine the admissibility of a disputed piece of evidence or the competency of a witness, that the rules at the preliminary stage must be different from those operating at the trial so as to allow the piece of evidence to be perused, or the witness examined.35 How much further the rules are different is obscure.36 On an application to set aside originating process for want of jurisdiction it is unclear whether the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the facts on the balance of probabilities (or whether it bears
only the lesser burden of showing that the material supports a strong argument for the opinion that the court has jurisdiction).37
[1045] Decisions after the trial There are also significant differences in relation to the mixture of rules which apply to issues of fact arising to be determined after the trial has concluded.38 In criminal cases, issues of fact often arise in relation to the basis for sentencing the [page 8] accused39 or for making some other order.40 The incomplete state of development of evidentiary rules for determining these matters is indicated by a group of cases considering whether or not evidence of the accused’s involvement in other crimes may be admitted after the trial. Some cases can be reconciled on the basis of whether the evidence of the other crimes emanates from a third party — in which case it is, as against the accused, hearsay41 — or from the accused, in which case it would be admissible by way of exception to that rule.42 However, this reasoning has become overlaid with another strand of reasoning more generally concerned with the propriety of admitting evidence of other crimes beyond those of which the accused has been found guilty at the trial, or which the accused has asked to have taken into consideration.43 In evidential terms, this seems closer to the rule excluding evidence of discreditable extrinsic conduct, or similar fact evidence. At present the definition of the issues which it is proper to raise at the sentencing stage is indeterminate, and this precludes precise analysis. Nevertheless the result is exactly the same as would be achieved by the application of the ordinary rules of evidence, namely that evidence may be excluded because it is hearsay,44 or even if it falls under an exception, if it infringes the general rule excluding evidence of discreditable extrinsic conduct.45 Little consideration has been given to such questions as the compellability of an accomplice of the accused,46 or the permissible range of cross-examination.47 So, too, if an inference is to be drawn as to the facts of the offence, either from the facts as stated by the prosecution on a plea of guilty or from the evidence at the trial, any
matters upon which it is proposed to rely for the purposes of sentencing should be indicated to the accused in advance,48 and supported by evidence, including the calling of witnesses,49 if the facts are disputed. It is immaterial that the evidence relied upon for sentencing was erroneously [page 9] admitted at the trial: this applies even though it favours the accused.50 Another disputed question relates to the burden and standard of proof required to establish facts at this stage of the proceedings.51
C — PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER TRIBUNALS52 Varieties of fact-finding tribunals [1050] The nature of the problem There is a very wide variety of proceedings of a quasi-judicial, administrative and legislative nature in which issues of fact require authoritative determination. Many of them are susceptible of control by courts of law. It is sometimes a matter of dispute how far, and how many of, the rules of evidence apply, or should apply, in such proceedings. It is largely because the concerns and purposes of these bodies vary so widely that few general principles can be discerned. In any given tribunal the rules may, as in the case of courts, vary according to the gravity of the issue involved.53 Even when the formal rules of evidence apply to a nonjudicial tribunal — to an arbitration, for example — a more tolerant attitude to the enforcement of the rules is likely to be exhibited.54
[1055] The role of statute Many of the bodies charged with these functions are set up by statute, and it is not uncommon in such cases for some express provision to relate to the procedure to be applied. In some cases where the inquiry is of a formal nature the statute may expressly import rules of evidence as they
apply in the ordinary courts. It is, however, more common for the provision to exclude the strict application of the rules of evidence which apply in ordinary courts. Sometimes the statute contents itself with bestowing a power to prescribe the rules of evidence which are to apply. In a case where there was such a power, but no regulations had been made under it, it was said that the existence of the power indicated that Parliament did not intend the strict rules of evidence to apply.55 It would, however, be rash to construe the non-existence of such a power as indicating any intention in the matter at all. The precise pattern of rules depends upon a very wide range of factors defining the nature of the proceedings: [page 10] [T]here are degrees of judicial hearing, and those degrees run from the borders of pure administration to the borders of the full hearing of the criminal cause or matter in the Crown Court. It does not profit one to try to pigeon-hole the particular circumstances either into the administrative pigeon-hole or into the judicial pigeon-hole. Each case will inevitably differ, and one must ask oneself what is the basic nature of the proceeding …56
Instruments providing that a tribunal is not bound by technical rules of evidence, but may admit that which is of probative value, have not given universal satisfaction. The judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which was governed by a provision (Art 13) to that effect in its Charter, have attracted much criticism for procedural unfairness and inconsistent evidentiary rulings.57
[1060] The role of natural justice The rules of evidence should be adapted to the purposes of the proceedings, and to their circumstances. Where the procedure is in some sense judicial it is common to invoke the rules of natural justice, but this carries the adaptation little further: Natural justice requires that the procedure before any tribunal which is acting judicially shall be fair in all the circumstances, and I would be sorry to see this fundamental general principle degenerate into a series of hard-and-fast rules. For a long time the courts have, without objection from Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose.58
Even if it were possible, it would not be appropriate to specify here all of
the various mixtures of rules of evidence which apply in all of the different tribunals which have to decide issues of fact. It is, however, worth drawing attention to some of the main rules which have been controverted, and to give a few examples of the approaches adopted by the courts in order to resolve them. The rules involved have principally been those dealing with the calling of witnesses, the right to cross-examine, the admissibility of hearsay and the administration of an oath.
[1065] Nature of issues and consequences of finding It is clear that the nature of the issues of fact to be decided and the consequences of the finding must have an important bearing on the nature of the rules which govern that finding. Thus in a case59 where very serious offences were alleged, guilt of which would involve substantial loss of liberty, the requirements were very stringent. Nevertheless they differed quite substantially from those which would have operated in a court. Thus while the court thought it necessary to allow the accused to call witnesses and to cross-examine, it nevertheless permitted discretion to the chairman to limit the number of witnesses upon proper grounds, and to insist upon cross-examination being channelled through him. In view of the notorious difficulty of some of the issues involved — questions of identification at a distance, for example — the court was reluctant to permit disposal simply on the basis of hearsay, but here too its solution was not exclusion, as it might have been at common law, but rather to give the accused an adequate opportunity to deal with it. [page 11] This decision may be compared with that in a case60 where questions of the right to cross-examine and rely upon hearsay were also raised. Here, however, the point arose in relation to the issue of the non-discrimination notice by the Commission for Racial Equality within the statutory framework of the Race Relations Act 1976 (Eng). The allegations did not involve the commission of a criminal offence, nor did an adverse determination involve loss of liberty, nor, at least in the absence of a series of further steps, interference with the business of the discriminator. It was
for these reasons that the court decided that the scheme of the Act neither required to be supplemented by an automatic right to cross-examine, nor excluded the admission of hearsay. Indeed, since the statute made it proper for the Commission to delegate its investigatory functions, the court thought it right for the Commission to act upon the basis of the hearsay necessarily contained in reports by those carrying out such functions. Such statutory support is not, however, necessary. In cases where the statute provides little more than a requirement that a tribunal shall act upon the basis of evidence, the general view is that this entitles it, in the absence of special considerations, to act upon any material, including hearsay, which is logically probative: [T]echnical rules of evidence … form no part of the rules of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means no more than that it must be based upon material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the occurrence of which will be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but he may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some probative value in the sense mentioned above. If it is capable of having any probative value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom Parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp this responsibility and to substitute its own view for his.61
As the issue departs further and further from the model of a criminal prosecution, so the likelihood of importing rules of evidence which apply there diminishes. Indeed, in the case of local inquiries in planning matters, Lord Diplock refused even to adopt the terminology of natural justice as suggesting that “the prototype is only to be found in procedures followed by English courts of law”.62 Instead he referred simply to the need for the procedure to be fair. Indeed, far from finding that rights to cross-examine constitute one of the ingredients of a fair procedure, he suggested that they might make it unfair: To “over-judicialise” the inquiry by insisting on observance of the procedures of a court of justice for which professional lawyers alone are competent to operate effectively in the interests of their clients would not be fair.63
He also drew attention to the totally different conditions of a planning inquiry in relation to the nature of the issues, the number of interested parties, and of their witnesses, and the length of the proceedings. He felt that in determining even so
[page 12] apparently straightforward a matter as the fairness of allowing crossexamination, a multitude of factors needed to be considered, such as, in the case of an expert opinion witness, the nature of the topic on which the opinion was expressed, the qualifications of the witness and the competence of the cross-examiner, and the inspector’s view of whether the report would be more useful if cross-examination were allowed.
[1070] Subpoenas, oaths and privileges In general, powers to compel attendance and to administer an oath must be endowed by statute, though in England it has been held possible for a tribunal recognised by law, even though not set up by statute, to secure a subpoena to procure the attendance of a witness.64 The power to administer an oath does not preclude the reception of unsworn testimony, if appropriate.65 In those cases where a witness can be compelled to give evidence, the normal range of privileges will presumably apply in the absence of specific statutory provision,66 since it would be odd for a court to be in a weaker position than a tribunal in securing relevant evidence. It may finally be noted that the nature of the issue before a tribunal may dictate the application of different, and more restrictive, rules as to the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal.67 The purposes and positions of legislative committees are so far removed from those of the court that quite different sets of rules apply,68 including some abrogating protections so well-established in the ordinary courts as that of the privilege not to disclose communications between solicitor and client. It may also be the case that where the inquiry is essentially governmental — for example, in England, under the Tribunals of Enquiry Act 1921 — there may be no need to claim immunity on the basis of public policy.69
Section 3 — Principal Items of Judicial Evidence Evidence classified [1075] Testimony, hearsay, documents, real evidence and circumstantial evidence Evidence consists of the testimony, hearsay, documents, things and facts which a court will accept as evidence of the facts in issue in a given case. Illustrations of “facts in issue” are given in Part A of this section, the fifth item is discussed in Parts B and C, and the first four are discussed in Part D. [page 13]
A — FACTS IN ISSUE Main facts [1080] Examples of main facts in issue The main facts in issue are all those facts which the plaintiff (or applicant or petitioner) in a civil action, or the prosecutor in criminal proceedings, must prove in order to succeed, together with any further facts that the defendant (or respondent) or accused must prove in order to establish a defence. The main facts in issue in a particular case can only be ascertained by reference to the substantive law and the pleadings. Suppose the plaintiff is claiming damages for personal injuries alleged to be caused by the negligent driving of a motor car by the defendant. The question whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff is the concern of the law of tort; the respects in which the plaintiff contends that the duty was broken are to be gathered from the particulars of negligence
set out in the statement of claim; and, if negligence is denied in the defendant’s defence, the law of evidence indicates how the plaintiff may substantiate, or the defendant disprove, the allegations of negligence. If negligence is not denied in the defence, and there is no plea of contributory negligence, the only issue between the parties will most probably concern the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled; thus the sphere of the law of evidence may be restricted to one issue by the pleadings in a given case. Quite apart from facts which are admitted on the pleadings, and those which are formally admitted ([3165]–[3195]), it is common for the parties silently to agree on or concede various matters. “On all trials much is taken by all parties as assumed, and only those facts really in dispute strictly proved. In such cases what is assumed is in proof.”70
[1085] Cases with multiple issues Most cases involve more than one issue. Even the simplest claims for damages for assault or breach of contract normally give rise to disputes about the amount of damages to be awarded as well as the fact of the assault or the existence of the agreement, while further issues may be raised by the defendant by means of such pleas as those of self defence and contractual incapacity. In criminal cases: whenever there is a plea of not guilty, everything is in issue and the prosecution have to prove the whole of their case, including the identity of the accused, the nature of the act and the existence of any necessary knowledge or intent.71
Failure to discriminate clearly between different issues is one of the most potent, and least recognised, sources of confusion and difficulty in the law of evidence. It is especially acute in criminal proceedings simply for the reason that generally72 no formal pleadings are provided or required in advance. As Thayer has shown,73 failure to recognise the dependence of the law of evidence on the substantive law and rules of procedure has led to the inclusion in [page 14]
textbooks of much that is not comprised in the subject. For example, formal admissions and some branches of estoppel belong to the heading of procedure, while other branches of estoppel and the rules governing the admissibility of evidence of character in civil cases are based on the substantive law. Some of these matters are briefly discussed in this work for the sake of completeness and conformity with tradition, but every endeavour is made to avoid reference to decisions that turn exclusively on the substantive law or questions of pleading. Facts in issue have to be proved to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, as the case may be. The view that it would be unwise to allow the latter body to consider certain matters accounts for many of the exclusionary rules which are a typical feature of the law of evidence, and is controversial.74 Jury trial is becoming increasingly rare in civil cases. Rules which originated when that method of trial was, for all practical purposes, the only one known to the common law, have to be applied in proceedings before a judge alone. Generally speaking, it makes no difference whether the proceedings are civil or criminal, for the rules of evidence are the same in each instance, although they are applied with much greater rigour in criminal cases, and there are a number of important exceptional provisions peculiar to the latter.75
Subordinate or collateral facts [1090] Subordinate or collateral facts defined and illustrated Subordinate or collateral facts which may be in issue are (a) those affecting the credibility of a witness, and (b) those affecting the admissibility of certain items of evidence; they may be in issue in a particular case on account of the law of evidence itself, and not on account of the substantive law or pleadings. An illustration of a fact of the first kind is the existence of a relationship which would tend to make a witness biased in favour of a party calling the witness. The witness may be asked about the relationship in crossexamination and, if denied, the relationship may be proved by the opposite party.76 An illustration of a fact of the second kind — in relation to competency — is provided by a case77 where the competence of the witness depended
on whether she was or was not married to the accused. Another illustration is that of due search for the original of a lost document: the general rule is that a copy may only be produced to the court when the absence of the original has been satisfactorily explained. A further example of a fact relating to the admissibility of an item of evidence is furnished by the normal requirement that a document be shown to be genuine before being produced to the jury.78 The cogency of a piece of evidence may also become a subordinate fact — for example, when a challenge is mounted to the accuracy of a new device for measuring the speed of a motor car.79 [page 15]
Relationship of testimony to the other items of evidence [1095] Testimony as central to, but as distinguished from, hearsay, documents, real evidence and circumstantial evidence Testimony is the assertion of a witness in court, offered as evidence of the truth of that which is asserted. Many of the rules of evidence, such as those concerned with the oath, the competency of witnesses and their cross-examination, are designed to ensure that testimony shall be as reliable as possible. There is a sense in which testimony is the only item of judicial evidence. Oral hearsay, when admissible, has to be narrated to the court; if hearsay is contained in a document, the document must usually, though not invariably, be produced to the court and identified by a witness. The same is true of things, and circumstantial evidence80 can usually only be proved by a witness. In all the other cases, however, testimony is used for a widely different purpose from that of inducing the court to accept the witness’s direct assertion concerning a fact in issue, and that is why hearsay, documents, things, and facts, though normally proved by a witness, may properly be regarded as separate items of evidence.
B — FACTS AS EVIDENCE OF OTHER
FACTS: CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE The nature of circumstantial evidence [1100] Circumstantial evidence defined If the only classes of evidence that could be given of facts in issue were testimony, admissible hearsay, documents and things, many claims would fail from want of adequate proof. The limited scope of the evidence provided by documents and things is obvious enough, and it is not often that every fact in issue was perceived, either by a witness, or else by the maker of a statement which is admissible under an exception to the law against hearsay. At some stage, resort almost always has to be had to “circumstantial evidence”, which may be defined as any fact (sometimes called an “evidentiary fact”, factum probans or “fact relevant to the issue”) from the existence of which the judge or jury may infer the existence of a fact in issue (sometimes called a “principal fact” or factum probandum).81 A typical instance is afforded by the statement of a witness at a trial for murder that the witness saw the accused carrying a blood-stained knife at the door of the house in which the deceased was found mortally wounded. The prosecutor invites the jury, first, to decide that the witness is speaking the truth, and, secondly, to infer that the accused inflicted the mortal wound with the knife.82
[1105] Means of proving circumstantial evidence Evidentiary facts may be proved by testimony, admissible hearsay, documents, things and other evidentiary facts. An example of the proof of one such fact by another is afforded by the statement of a witness at a trial for murder that the witness saw blood on the accused’s coat pocket, in which the accused’s knife was [page 16] found. The jury is asked, first, to decide that the witness is telling the truth; secondly, to infer that the blood on the pocket came from the knife;
and finally to infer that the blood was on the knife because the accused stabbed the deceased with that weapon. This process might be prolonged still further, but as the number of steps which have to be taken from the first evidentiary fact to the ultimate inference of a fact in issue increases, the weaker that evidentiary fact becomes as a means of proving the matter, and the greater the increase in the number of opportunities of adducing evidence in favour of a contrary conclusion. Arguments upon evidence are generally arguments from effects to causes; and in proportion as the number of possible causes of a given effect increases, the force of the argument is diminished. It is impossible to fix the precise point at which the argument becomes so weak as not to be worth noticing.83
The common fear of manufacture in evidence applies, perhaps even more strongly, to circumstantial evidence: “[c]ircumstantial evidence may sometimes be evidence, but it must always be narrowly examined, if only because evidence of this kind may be manufactured to cast suspicion on another”.84 Often the particular “circumstances” constituting circumstantial evidence can be linked with a party by direct evidence; but they need not be, because it may be possible to infer a link from the circumstances themselves.85
[1110] The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence Circumstantial evidence is usually contrasted with “direct evidence” — a term which is employed in two senses. In its first sense “direct evidence” is testimony, as contrasted with hearsay, and may therefore be defined as an assertion made by a witness in court offered as proof of the truth of any fact asserted by the witness, including the witness’s own mental or physical state at a given time. In its second sense, “direct evidence” means a witness’s statement that the witness perceived a fact in issue with one of the five senses,86 or was in a particular mental or physical state87 if that is in issue; and the contrast is with circumstantial evidence. When someone swears to having seen an alleged murderer carrying a blood-stained knife, the evidence is direct in the first sense, but not in the second. No useful purpose is served by comparing the merits of direct and circumstantial evidence. Although, in legal parlance, circumstantial evidence does not mean a detailed account of what happened (as it
formerly did in popular speech), the phrase retains an important element of its original meaning when used by lawyers, because circumstantial evidence derives its main force from the fact that it usually [page 17] consists of a number of items pointing to the same conclusion. The blood on the accused’s knife may not be of much significance, but additional facts, such as the accused’s animosity towards the deceased, benefits to be derived by the accused from the death of the deceased, and the accused’s efforts to conceal the knife may give it a very damning complexion.88 “[E]vidence of opportunity, of motive and of means may tend to persuade [the jury] that X committed a crime if, in relation to its perpetration, it is shown that X possessed any one or two of them – more especially if he possessed all three; human tendencies, accepted as a major premise, suffice.”89
C — EXAMPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Classifying circumstantial evidence [1115] Wigmore’s classifications This section adopts one of the classifications of circumstantial evidence devised by Wigmore.90 His division of the subject into “prospectant”, “concomitant” and “retrospectant” evidence has the merit of stressing the main types of argument by which the relevance of one fact to another may be established. But there are other categories.91
Prospectant evidence [1120] Justification for reception of prospectant evidence In its most general form, the argument for the reception of this kind of evidence is that the occurrence of an act, state of mind or state of affairs in
the past justifies an inference that the act was done, or state of mind or affairs existed, at the moment of time into which the court is inquiring.
[1125] Continuance If the speed at which someone was driving at a particular time is in issue, evidence of the rate at which that person was travelling a few moments earlier is admissible.92 Proof that an act was validly done within the scope of a public duty is evidence that another act done before or after it was done within the scope of that duty.93 The fact that a ship founders through unseaworthiness shortly after leaving port is evidence [page 18] that she was unseaworthy on departure.94 In cases turning on the existence of a partnership, evidence of its existence at a time earlier than that with which the court is concerned is likewise admissible.95 Discovery of a loaded rifle in the car of the suspect three and a half hours after an offence has supported an inference that it was loaded at the time of the offence.96 Receipt of a letter unsealed is evidence that it was posted unsealed.97 Insufficiency of distress on one date has been held evidence of insufficiency at an earlier date.98 Evidence has been received of a person’s theological opinions four years before the time at which their nature was in issue.99 The law presumes the state of a person’s mind to continue until the contrary is shown.100 The inference of continuance has been drawn in the case of an agent’s authority to sell,101 and ownership of land.102 The fact that someone was alive at an antecedent date may support an inference that that person was alive at a subsequent date.103 It may be inferred from the fact that a potential witness implicated in criminal conduct was unwilling to come to Australia at one date, that he remained unwilling a year later.104 Evidence of this sort is given so frequently that it is sometimes said that continuance in general, and the continuance of life in particular, is the subject of a rebuttable presumption of law; but the question is simply one of relevance, depending on common human experience, and it will be best to avoid the use of the word “presumption” altogether in this context, or, if that term must be employed, it should be
qualified by the use of some such expression as a “presumption of fact” or a “provisional presumption”.105 There is a different type of “presumption” of continuance, rebuttable only on the balance of probabilities in a civil case, that a contract once made continues in existence.106 When it was proved that a human being exists at a specified time the proof will support the inference that he was alive at a later time to which, having regard to the circumstances, it
[page 19] is reasonably likely that in the ordinary course of events he would survive. It is not a rigid presumption of law. The greater the length of time the weaker the support for the inference … The presumption of life is but a deduction from probabilities and must always depend on the accompanying facts.107
There are degrees of relevancy when this kind of evidence is being considered. Proof of the theological beliefs entertained by a person 30 years earlier would not support a reasonable inference concerning that person’s beliefs at the time which the court was examining.108 Proof that a drug addict craved narcotics 12 days after a wounding did not support an inference that he was influenced by narcotics at the time of the wounding.109 No test can specify the stage at which such evidence ceases to be of any weight — everything depends upon the facts of the particular case. If it were proved that a husband was in good health the day before his wife married someone else, the inference would be strong, almost irresistible, that he was living on the latter day, and the jury would in all probability find that he was so. If, on the other hand, it were proved that he was then in a dying condition, and nothing else was proved, they would probably decline to draw that inference.110
Thus the presumption of continuance is no more than a convenient way of describing a process of logic or reasoning involving the drawing of inferences from established facts.111 The presumption of continuance has been applied on a charge of driving while exceeding the permitted blood-alcohol level. Legislation typically requires a breath sample to be taken from the driver within a stipulated period after the driving. It then raises the statutory presumption that the blood-alcohol content disclosed on the test was present at the time of the previous driving. The statutory presumption does not arise where the prescribed interval between driving and testing is exceeded.
Holdings that a test taken shortly after the prescribed interval might be received as evidence of the blood-alcohol content at the time of driving112 have been overruled.113 Caution has been expressed114 against the application of the common law presumption of continuance where the fact of continuance is a matter for experts.
[1130] Course of business To prove postage, evidence may be given that a letter was copied in an office letter book and that, according to the practice of the office, all letters dealt with in this way were posted immediately.115 There are statutory provisions in most jurisdictions [page 20] specifying the meaning of service by post.116 Pursuant to s 160(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) it is presumed (unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt about the presumption is adduced) that a postal article sent by prepaid post addressed to a person at a specified address in Australia or in an external Territory was received at that address on the fourth working day after having been posted. Section 160(2) provides that s 160 does not apply if the proceeding relates to a contract, all the parties to the proceedings are parties to the contract, and s 160(1) is inconsistent with a term of the contract. Section 160(3) defines “working day” as meaning a day that is not a Saturday or a Sunday, or a public holiday or a bank holiday in the place to which the postal article was addressed. Section 163(1) of the Cth Evidence Act provides that a letter from a Commonwealth agency addressed to a person at a specified address is presumed (unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt about the presumption is adduced) to have been sent by prepaid post to that address on the fifth business day after the date (if any) that, because of its placement on a letter or otherwise, purports to be the date on which the letter was prepared. This applies to all Australian courts (s 5), as does s 160 in relation to postal articles sent by a Commonwealth agency (s 182(4A)).117 If delivery of the document to a particular individual must be
proved, the jury may be invited to infer that it was handed to him by his servant on proof that it was delivered to the latter, although he was not authorised to receive the document on behalf of his master.118 To prove that an act has been done, it is admissible to prove any general course of business or office, whether public or private, according to which it would ordinarily have been done, there being a probability that the general course will be followed in the particular case.119 Evidence of the regular practice of cleaning was admitted to prove cleaning on a particular day.120 Evidence of the regular practice of paying employees on occasions when a particular employee was present was admitted to prove he was paid.121 Evidence of a regular practice by which an employee accounted to her employer for moneys received on his account was admitted to prove that she did so in a particular period.122 Similarly, evidence that circulars were sent out by the staff of an unincorporated association to its members was admitted to prove that they were received.123 There are, however, shortcomings in evidence of habit when tendered to prove what was said on a particular occasion.124 [page 21]
[1135] Habit The fact that someone was in the habit of acting in a given way is relevant to the question whether that person acted in that way on the occasion into which the court is inquiring. Thus where, in a claim for workman’s compensation on the basis that a horse’s kick killed a stable boy found near the horse, holding a halter, which there was no reason for him to use at that time, it was held that the defendant might call evidence of the boy’s practice of teasing the horses as tending to negative the applicant’s claim that the accident arose out of and in the course of the deceased’s employment. Phillimore LJ said: [w]herever an inquiry has to be made into the cause of the death of a person, and, there being no direct evidence, recourse must be had to circumstantial evidence, any evidence as to the habits and ordinary doings of the deceased which may contribute to the circumstances by throwing light upon the probable cause of death is admissible, even in the case of a prosecution for murder.125
The habit of wheeling a bicycle has been admitted.126 So has the habit of
carrying a silver revolver.127 Evidence of negative habit (eg the particular person never used a safety belt)128 is admissible. It is not always easy to distinguish between the proof of isolated acts and the proof of habit.129 There is no rule against the reception of relevant evidence prejudicial to the character of the deceased when his death, its cause, or the state of mind of the person who brought it about is in issue,130 but, when the evidence of habit refers to the practice of a party to the dispute, the prohibition on evidence which merely goes to show that this disposition is that of a person likely to do the wrongful act in question must always be borne in mind. Evidence of the habits of particular classes of persons may be admissible, eg, evidence of what items a drug user, as distinct from a drug dealer, would normally possess, the purpose of the tender being to establish that in the absence of those items the accused possessed drugs not for the purposes of personal use but for the purposes of dealing.131 To be admissible, evidence of habit must not be so generalised, or so related to circumstances dissimilar from those in issue, as not to have probative value.132 At least in criminal proceedings, evidence of habit may require analysis from the point of view discussed in Chapter Eleven, “Similar Fact Evidence”.
[1140] Motive or plan As many detective stories point out, key elements of circumstantial evidence are motive, means and opportunity. [page 22] [I]t is difficult to argue, except in cases of strict liability or where the offences are committed by persons so drink- or drug-affected as not to know why they have committed particular offences that motive can ever be totally irrelevant. Most crimes are actuated by some motive, some purpose beyond the mere intent to carry them out.133
A proven motive is a matter from which intention, if that is in issue, may be inferred, and in every case is relevant to whether the accused committed the offence charged,134 or whether a particular person who had the motive acted in a particular way. “Evidence of motive necessarily goes
to prove the fact of the homicide by the accused … inasmuch as it is more probable that men are killed by those who have some motive for killing them than by those who have not”.135 Facts which supply a motive for a particular act — such as the impending discovery by the person now deceased that the man now accused of his murder had procured loans from him by means of forged documents,136 or the impecuniosity of an alleged forger,137 or, in an action on a life insurance policy, the facts showing that the deceased had a strong motive to commit suicide138 — are among the items of circumstantial evidence which are most often admitted to prove guilt.139 Less commonly, a “hatred or dislike of a particular bank or other institution, as well as personal envy, may sometimes explain a property offence …”.140 Further examples are afforded by almost any murder trial in which proof is given of facts supplying a motive for revenge, financial or amatory gain;141 or the removal of someone who is in a position to disclose unpleasant information concerning the accused.142 Proof of a craving for drugs, with a view to suggesting that the need to satisfy it was a motive for theft, was not admissible where the only issue was who committed the crime and there were other drug addicts among those who could have committed it.143 It is, however, easy to attach too much weight to evidence of motive: “almost every child has something to gain from the death of his parents, but rarely on the death of the parent is patricide even suspected”.144 The NSW Full Court has said:145 Now, of course, it was no part of the Crown case to be able to assign a motive for the crime. If there was evidence of motive it was proper to be put before the jury to assist them to arrive at a conclusion on the matter, but to suggest that Mr Justice Pring misdirected the jury because he referred to the experience of persons who have had anything to do
[page 23] with criminal cases as to the inadequacy of the motive upon which serious crimes are based, is to my mind a contention that cannot be supported. … [The] direction was almost in identical words with the words used by Lord Campbell in his summing up to the jury in the well-known case of William Palmer, the poisoner. He said: “But, gentlemen, if there be any motive which can be assigned I am bound to tell you that the adequacy of that motive is of little importance. We know from the experience of Criminal Courts that atrocious crimes of this sort have been committed from very slight motives; not merely from malice or revenge, but to gain a small pecuniary advantage, and to drive off for a time pressing difficulties.” … Mr Breckenridge’s contention is that the learned judge was improperly importing into his direction to the jury his own knowledge of criminal affairs. He conceded that the jury were entitled to take into
consideration that knowledge of human nature and human affairs which is common to all of us, and it seems to me that Mr Justice Pring was really doing no more than directing their attention to matters which, as men of the world, they must have been well aware of.
Conversely, though the presence of motive is not essential to a finding of guilt,146 and hence the prosecution bears no burden of proof of motive, its absence can be significant in raising a reasonable doubt.147 It is erroneous to tell the jury that absence of proved motive is irrelevant.148 Yet absence of motive is not essential either.149 Thus facts which tend to show a total absence of motive may be adduced, as where the lack of pecuniary embarrassment on his part is proved by someone accused of arson with intent to defraud an insurance company,150 or where the affection of a husband towards the murdered wife is proved on his trial for murdering her,151 or where the love of a mother towards a deceased child is proved on her trial for murdering the child.152 Ordinarily the jury should be told that proof of motive cannot establish a Crown case beyond reasonable doubt, though it can assist in a significant way.153 So far as lack of motive is concerned “there is a great difference between absence of proved motive and proved absence of motive”.154 The distinction has been called “critical”.155 The absence of evidence of possible motive can be taken into account, particularly in a case based on circumstantial evidence; but if the case is one in which the prosecution does not have to establish motive, the absence of evidence of motive is not a matter of positive significance, unlike the position where there was positive evidence that the accused lacked a motive.156 Facts (such as the purchase of poison by someone who is accused of murder by poison)157 which suggest the existence of the plan or design or preparation for a given course of action may always be proved, and this evidence is of considerable weight because in practice, if not as a matter of law, it calls for the person against [page 24] whom it is given to provide an explanation of his or her conduct. When such evidence consists of declarations of an intention to act in a particular way, the hearsay rule has to be borne in mind. If the declarations are made by a party, they may often be brought within the category of admissions,
and thus be received under a well-recognised exception to the rule: see [33420]. Even if the declarations are not those of the party, they are certainly admissible in civil cases, under statutory exceptions, and probably in criminal cases, under an ill-defined exception to that rule (see [37115]–[37120]); but, assuming that such remarks are admissible, the judges seem to have taken different views about the relevance of the declaration to the question whether an act said to have been intended was, in fact, performed.158 The question whether evidence is sufficiently relevant to be admissible is pre-eminently one on which different views may be taken, and, assuming that a person’s present declaration of intention is admissible as evidence of that fact under an exception to the rule against hearsay, it is probably best not to try to lay down any general principle on the subject of its relevance to the performance of a subsequent act by the defendant. A person’s intention at a particular time may be in issue, as when it is necessary to ascertain with what intention an act was done, and accompanying declarations often tend to establish this fact. It may also be relevant to the question of that person’s intention at a later time on the principle of continuance.159 Questions about relevancy and hearsay when a declaration of intention has been tendered to prove the performance of the act said to have been intended can arise.160 Facts which, while not necessarily establishing a motive, tend to explain the acts alleged against a party, are admissible: for example, a relationship of enmity between a deceased and her spouse, who is accused of her murder.161 Evidence of that kind may not only be evidence of motive, but also provide material from which the fact of killing may be inferred. Motive is relevant not only to the issue, but to credibility. A motive to lie is a fact which may be proved to impeach the credit of a witness. It may be proved either by cross-examination of the witness, or by evidence from other witnesses or other means of facts from which a motive to lie may be inferred,162 by way of exception to the general rule that a witness’s answer in cross-examination to a question going only to credit cannot be contradicted by other evidence: [19035]–[19040]. A lack of knowledge by one party of any motive to lie on the part of a witness called by another does not establish that there is no such motive, and questions about that [page 25]
lack of knowledge are generally irrelevant.163 This is because while proof of motive is material, absence of proof of motive is neutral, and a witness’s lack of knowledge as to why another witness would lie does not prove that there is no motive to lie.164
[1145] Knowledge or capacity Facts which tend to prove or negative a person’s capacity to do an act into which the court is inquiring may be highly relevant. Thus, evidence that the accused knows of the effects of certain drugs, has skill in their application, and has the ability to procure them, would be admissible at a trial for murder by means of their use, and the absence of any of these factors would likewise be admissible for the defence.165 The consistent impecuniosity of the plaintiff extending over a period of seven years up to the date of a loan which the plaintiff allegedly made was received in support of the defendant’s denial that it was ever made.166
Concomitant evidence [1150] Justification for reception of concomitant evidence The general argument for the reception of evidence of this type is that circumstances existing contemporaneously with the transaction into which the court is inquiring render the facts alleged by one or other of the parties more or less probable. Examples are evidence of opportunity, the reception of evidence as part of the res gestae and the use of standards of comparison.
[1155] Opportunity The presence of the accused at the time and place of an alleged crime is something which must be proved by the prosecution on practically every criminal charge, and the establishment of an alibi is conclusive of innocence.167 Any evidence which tends to prove either of the above facts is, therefore, admissible, and, if the defence consists of an allegation that other named persons committed the crime, their alibis in turn become relevant and admissible as part of the case for the prosecution.168 It is,
however, regarded as too remotely relevant that such persons advance a false alibi.169 In some jurisdictions, if the accused is going to raise an alibi, statute requires that due notice of this be given before the case is tried.170 No [page 26] doubt the fact that such a defence is not raised before the trial often prevents the police from making proper inquiries, but the belatedness of an alibi goes to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the accused’s evidence at common law. A false alibi is capable of constituting corroboration in accordance with standard principles relating to lies.171 In New South Wales the failure of an accused person to comply with the duty to give prior notice of an alibi entitles the court, or any other party with the leave of the court, to comment, and the trier of fact may draw such unfavourable inferences as appear proper: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 146A, discussed at [35645]. Opportunity is an important feature in many cases in which adultery is alleged. It has been held172 that the fact that a couple occupied the same bedroom must be treated as clear evidence of adultery in all but the most unusual circumstances. There is, however, no irrebuttable presumption of law to this effect, even if the evidence of opportunity is accompanied by evidence of inclination arising from the previous association of the parties.173
[1160] Res gestae A fact may be relevant to a fact in issue because it throws light on it by reason of proximity in time, place and circumstance. This is frequently expressed by the statement that the relevant fact is part of the res gestae. The doctrines associated with this much criticised expression174 are mainly concerned with the admissibility of statements made contemporaneously with the occurrence of some act or event into which the court is inquiring: see Chapter 19: “The Doctrine of Res Gestae”. The part which contemporaneity may play in the relevance of one fact to another is illustrated by a case where the accused was charged with
obtaining two pounds by false pretences in consequence of a card trick practised on the prosecutor in a railway train. As he alighted, the prosecutor said he would fetch the police, and he caused the accused to be arrested almost immediately. His evidence was that a total stranger handed him two pounds forthwith, and the Court of Criminal Appeal held that this fact was rightly admitted because “it related to part of the res gestae and an inference might fairly be drawn from it”.175 The relevance of the fact to the issue is obvious enough. If one is handed the exact sum of which one says one has been defrauded shortly after making a complaint to this effect, the two events are probably connected with each other. It is likely that the person who handed the money over was acting on behalf of the person against whom the complaint was made, and the payment suggests that the complaint was justified. If one received two pounds from an anonymous donor two days after the railway journey, the fact might still be regarded as relevant to the question whether one was defrauded in the train, but the relevance of such a payment will become more and more remote with the passage of time until it lapsed into insignificance so far as the guilt of the accused was concerned. It is questionable whether anything is gained by using such phrases as pars rei gestae to describe relevancy due to contemporaneity. [page 27]
[1165] Standards of comparison Whenever it is necessary to determine whether someone’s conduct complies with some objective standard, as where negligence is alleged, evidence is admissible to show how others might be expected to behave in similar circumstances. Thus evidence of the method in which similar cargo was usually stowed in similar circumstances has been admitted as tending to show that the defendant, by adopting such methods, used reasonable care in stowage.176 Where the plaintiff claimed that brokers had been negligent in failing to take steps to have the terms upon which goods at sea were insured varied on receipt of a letter concerning their destination which was not clearly expressed, Tindal CJ allowed the defendants to call other brokers to swear what they would have done in a similar situation,
for: [i]f nine brokers of experience out of ten would have done the same as the Defendant under the same circumstances, or even if as many out of a given number would have been of his opinion as against it, he who only stipulates to bring a reasonable degree of skill to the performance of his duty, would be entitled to a verdict in his favour.177
Other authority suggests that the evidence must be of a general practice, not what the witnesses would have done.178 When the issue concerns the practice of a particular trade, evidence of the practice which prevails with regard to the matter in dispute in a similar trade is likewise admissible. Where the question was whether the underwriters were entitled to repudiate liability on an insurance of ship’s cargo because of unreasonable delay in discharging it at Labrador, the court held that evidence of a practice of delaying the discharge of cargo while ships were used for fishing in the Newfoundland trade was admissible in support of the plaintiff’s contention that a similar practice prevailed in the Labrador trade: Buller J said179 “if it can be shown that the time would have been reasonable in one place that is a degree of evidence to prove that it was so in another”. Evidence of a practice under which brokers in the colonial fruit trade were personally liable on contracts into which they entered on behalf of undisclosed principals was admitted in support of the plaintiff’s allegation that the same practice existed in the London fruit trade. [T]he evidence was relevant to this case and admissible, on the ground that, shewing, as it did, what was the custom in other trades, … it tended to shew the probability, that in the fruit trade as well as in the colonial trade the broker did under given circumstances undertake a similar responsibility.180
No special rules apply to such cases beyond those which require the evidence tendered to be more than remotely relevant to the issue, and unlikely to raise a number of collateral questions. It is, however, essential that the point in dispute should concern some matter as to which the argument from analogous situations to [page 28] the situation under inquiry is likely to be of real assistance to the court. For instance, if it becomes necessary to determine whether a book is
obscene, that is, whether it is likely to corrupt the morals of its readers, the court must answer this question by reading the book itself. It has been said that no useful purpose would be served by a perusal of other books in order to compare them with the one under consideration, but if such other books are tendered in evidence, the evidence will be rejected because it is collateral, that is, irrelevant, or insufficiently relevant, to the issue.181 The courts are frequently asked to apply standards of comparison when the identity of handwriting is in issue, but this question is best considered in connection with documentary evidence.182
Retrospectant evidence [1170] Justification for reception of retrospectant evidence The argument for the reception of this kind of evidence is the converse of that which demonstrates the relevance of prospectant evidence: the subsequent occurrence of an act, state of mind or state of affairs justifies an inference that an act was done, or that the state of mind or affairs previously existed.183 Thus, a driver’s excessive speed may be proved to support the conclusion that he was going too fast a short distance further back.184 The volume of railway traffic at a later date can assist in establishing its volume at an earlier date.185 Returning to the example taken from proof of death, it is obviously of great assistance to a court charged with the task of determining whether A was alive on a given date when it is told by admissible evidence that he was alive 10 days or 10 years after that date.186 A person’s anterior intention may also be proved by his subsequent acts, although, as discussed elsewhere,187 this general principle of relevancy has had to give way to precedent based on the dread of manufactured evidence in the advancement cases. It is not easy to infer from a later physical condition, such as is produced by an addiction to drugs, a similar physical condition at an earlier time.188 Similarly, the court may be invited to infer that an event occurred from subsequent events which followed it in the ordinary course of business, as when an endorsed cheque is produced by the drawer to show that a payment was made.189
[page 29] Servants usually claim arrears of salary shortly after their employer has defaulted, so failure to make such a claim is some evidence that no salary was due.190 Quite apart from any question of the course of business, delay in taking action may always have to be explained in order to prevent the conclusion that the circumstances of which complaint is ultimately made did not justify such action. In view of the side-effects of a woman taking a “morning after” contraceptive pill, it is unlikely that she would take it unless an event had taken place which might cause her to become pregnant; hence the fact that she took it is probative that she had sexual intercourse shortly before taking it.191 The court may also be asked to infer from the existence of indigenous customs at a certain date their existence at an earlier date.192 Sexual conduct at a later date may cast light on earlier events.193
[1175] Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta To act as holder of a public office is evidence of title to do so.194 On a charge of assaulting a police officer in the course of his duty, formal proof of his appointment is not essential, as evidence that he acted as a police officer will suffice.195 Similarly, if a solicitor claims damages for words spoken of him in the way of his profession, it is unnecessary for him to produce his practising certificate, or an extract from the roll of solicitors, provided there is evidence that he acted as a solicitor.196 The maxim has been applied to assist in proving the due appointment of an analyst and the validity of her certificate.197 In applying the presumption, no distinction is to be drawn between the exercise of the power by an individual and the exercise of such [page 30] power by a body or group which acts by way of resolution or vote.198 The principle applies to corporations, so proof that a company has acted as such is evidence that it was duly incorporated.199 In short, there is a
rebuttable presumption establishing due appointment and capacity to act — omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. It is called “the presumption of regularity”. Sometimes it operates as a presumption of law.200 Sometimes it is a presumption of fact.201 So far as its application to the validity of appointments is concerned, the presumption is confined to those affecting the public at large. Although the fact that a man is a solicitor may be proved by his having acted in that capacity, retainer by a particular client cannot be proved in this way.202 A letter in his handwriting relating to the client’s affairs will not suffice, any more than the appointment of other private agents can be proved by the fact that they purported to act on behalf of named principals. On the other hand, if a statute provides that trustees of public property shall take an oath before acting, proof of their having acted as trustees dispenses with the necessity of showing compliance with this provision.203 The distinction can be justified on the ground that absence of a right to act in a certain capacity is more likely to be discovered when the capacity is public than when it is private, but the matter has never been fully considered by the courts, and there is no doubt that private authorisation may sometimes be inferred from retrospectant circumstantial evidence. For example, if A is injured by B’s car, B’s ownership of the car is some evidence that it was being driven by B’s servant or agent, and this is because those who drive other people’s cars are, more often than not, authorised to do so.204 Where a council may impose a local rate for works, if of opinion that they would be of special benefit to a particular locality, evidence of making the rate is evidence that the council has formed a requisite opinion.205 Where there was a statutory duty on the council to form an opinion as to possible detriment upon granting a planning permit, there was a presumption that such opinion had been formed, unless evidence to the contrary appeared.206 The presumption is that “statutory duties are duly and properly performed”.207 As has been truly said, “the wheels of business will not go round unless it is assumed that that is in order which appears to be in order”.208 Much trouble and [page 31]
expense is saved when the courts act on this assumption, as where it was held209 that the fact that speed limit signs were erected is prima facie evidence that the local authority had carried out the duties imposed upon it by the Road Traffic Act.210 The maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta must, however, be used with care in criminal cases.211 It cannot be relied upon to prove the existence of facts central to an offence.212 Nor should it be relied upon to presume a fact contrary to the liberty of the subject, such as that a prisoner is being held in lawful custody.213 The presumption cannot be invoked to support the conclusion that a breathalyser was approved by the Secretary of State, in accordance with statutory requirements, from the mere fact that an instrument of that type was issued to the police.214 The presumption arises “where an intention to do some formal act is established, when the evidence is consistent with that intention having carried into effect in a proper way, the observance of the formality has not been proved or disproved and its actual observance can only be inferred as a matter of probability.”215 While the presumption may be applied so as to fill gaps in proof of the steps necessary to prove due appointment, it is impermissible to apply it so as to bestow a power where a statute omits to do so.216 The presumption of regularity will not be applied to the making of regulations, proclamations or ordinances if there is an apparent defect on the face of them.217 Sometimes the maxim involves the presumption that the law will be obeyed. This has been applied to a private person in respect of a municipal by-law,218 and to prove execution by the defendants of certain affidavits bearing their names.219 [page 32] The rule has been put quite broadly: [w]here an act is done which can be done legally only after the performance of some prior act, proof of the later carries with it a presumption of the due performance of the prior act.220
Hence the written record of an extraordinary resolution signed by the chairman of the meeting, which had been registered and had, as required by statute, been published in the Government Gazette, was evidence that a quorum had been present.221
Those who are concerned to establish that things were done in the right order, in the absence of affirmative evidence to that effect, may be able to rely on an extension of the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat even when it is clear that the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta is inapplicable because the evidence shows that at least one act was performed prematurely. This arose where a notice of dishonour of a bill of exchange (which plainly could not be met because it was drawn on a company which had since gone into liquidation) was mistakenly posted on 30 December, the day before, instead of the day after, the bill was presented. The notice was received on 31 December. It was presumed that the bill had already been dishonoured on that day because, if two acts are done, one of which ought to be done after the other, it is presumed that they were done in the right order.222 Another example is the presumption that if regulations are specified in the Gazette to be available at a certain place, they are.223 The presumption of regularity cannot be applied to uphold the validity of a statutorily required statement of Ministerial reasons, for there the “question … is not whether a condition necessary to the exercise of power has been fulfilled but whether the reasons for the exercise of power are as described in a document brought into existence after the power was exercised or should be distilled from an examination of the material before the minister at the time the power was exercised.”224
[1180] Mechanical instruments A presumption which serves the same purpose of saving the time and expense of calling evidence as that served by the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta is the presumption that mechanical instruments were in order when they were used. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that stopwatches and speedometers225 and traffic lights226 were in order at the material time; but the [page 33] instrument must be one of a kind as to which it is common knowledge that they are more often than not in working order.227
[1185] Possession as evidence of ownership There is a rebuttable presumption of law — lawful origin. It lies at the root of the substantive law of acquisitive prescription. Modern possession and user, being prima facie evidence of property and right, the judges attached to them an artificial weight, and held that uninterrupted, uncontradicted, and unexplained, they constituted proof from which a jury ought to infer a prescriptive right, coeval with the time of legal memory.228
Quite apart from any question of prescriptive right, possession is always treated as prima facie evidence of ownership of real property,229 or personal property.230 As Wills put it in a well-known passage: [T]he facts of enjoyment from which the ownership of real property may be inferred, are very various, as for instance, the cutting of timber, the repairing of fences or banks, the perambulation of boundaries of a manor or parish, the taking of wreck on the foreshore, and the granting to others of licences or leases under which possession is taken and held; also the receipt of rents from tenants of the property; for all these acts are fractions of that sum total of enjoyment which characterises dominium.231
Moreover, in disputes concerning the title to a small piece of land, the plaintiff’s possession of other parts of the same property is admissible evidence of a right to possession of the strip in question.232 There must be such a common characteristic of locality as would raise an inference that the place in dispute belonged to the plaintiff if the parts over which the plaintiff has proved to have exercised possession belonged to the plaintiff, and, in modern times, questions of the admissibility of such evidence will normally only arise where the title deeds are not clear. In most cases, the matter is, in the first instance, governed by some such rebuttable presumption of law as the right of riparian owners to the bed of a river up to midstream, or that, where two properties are separated by a hedge and ditch, the ditch is the boundary.
[1190] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: general The evidence against a party may be greatly strengthened by that party’s failure to give an explanation, or by the inadequacy of the explanation which the party does give; these negative facts can, therefore, be regarded as a species of retrospectant evidence. [page 34]
Special consideration of the matter is called for in relation to criminal cases. Failure to give evidence needs to be specially noted, because its effect has been the subject of a good deal of judicial observation in both civil and criminal proceedings.233
[1195] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: possession of recently stolen goods If someone is found in possession of goods soon after they have been missed, and fails to give a credible explanation of the manner in which they were come by, a jury is justified in inferring that the person either was a thief or was guilty of dishonestly handling the goods, knowing or believing them to have been stolen.234 The absence of an explanation is equally significant whether the case is being considered as one of theft or of handling, but it has come into particular prominence in connection with the latter, because persons found in possession of stolen property are apt to say that they acquired it innocently from someone else. Where the only evidence on a charge of handling is that the defendant was in possession of stolen goods, a jury may infer guilty knowledge (i) if the defendant offers no explanation to account for the possession, or (ii) if the jury is satisfied that the explanation offered is untrue. If, however, the explanation offered is one which leaves the jury in doubt as to whether the defendant knew the property was stolen, they should be told that the case has not been proved, and therefore the verdict should be “not guilty”.235 But even if no explanation is given by the receiver, “the jury are entitled, but not compelled, to convict”.236 In the absence of further incriminating circumstances, an inference is not warranted that someone in possession of goods obtained by means of some crime not involving larceny knew of the unlawful obtaining, even if no explanation is forthcoming. Accordingly, no burden lies on the accused to persuade the jury that they should accept the accused’s explanation.237 The inference of guilty knowledge is warranted in the case of recently stolen goods because larceny is by far the most common means of unlawful acquisition. One way of supporting an inference that the accused knew of the unlawful obtaining would be to prove an association with the obtainer, showing that each was in the other’s confidence.238 What constitutes recent possession within the meaning of the above
doctrine is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of the particular case.239 The jury should be told what “recent” means in this context, and that they should have [page 35] regard to the nature of the goods alleged to be stolen or received and the general circumstances of the case: the issue of recency is a matter for the jury, not the judge.240
[1200] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: general illustrations The importance of a party’s failure to give a credible explanation of apparently damning circumstances can be illustrated by numerous isolated instances throughout the whole law of evidence. If someone who is charged with breaking and entering a house with intent to commit a felony was found in the hall without having been asked to come there, it is incumbent on that person — as a practical matter, though not as a matter of law — to give a satisfactory explanation, and, if this is not forthcoming, the jury will be justified in inferring the existence of the requisite guilty intent.241 On a charge of theft, proof of the accused’s possession of a cheque drawn by the receiver in respect of the goods in question, coupled with failure to give evidence, will warrant a conviction.242 Where a mother was convicted of murdering her child, whose body had been found in a well, in whose company she had been seen near the well, for whom she could find no home, and about whose whereabouts she had told lies, the English Court of Criminal Appeal said: “the facts which are proved call for an explanation, and beyond the admittedly untrue statements, none was forthcoming”.243 Where the law does impose a duty to provide an explanation, as in some statutory offences, the inference to be drawn from failure to reply may be stronger still.244 Evidence of wealth not otherwise explained is relevant to prove drug trafficking.245 To turn to civil cases: at the hearing of a husband’s petition for nullity on the ground of the respondent’s impotence, her failure to comply with an order for medical inspection may be taken into account by the court.246
If two cars are involved in a collision, and the passenger in one of them claims damages from both the drivers, it is not the case that “the proof of the collision is held to be sufficient to call on the two defendants for an answer”.247 [page 36] The principle underlying cases in which reliance has been placed on the maxim res ipsa loquitur is based on the importance of the absence of an explanation. Where the plaintiffs were hit by a van which mounted the pavement, Scrutton LJ said: the fact that in the present case the motor-van appeared on the pavement, where it had no business to be, and injured the plaintiffs on the pavement, and the further fact that the defendants offered no explanation why their van was there, seemed to be more consistent with negligence than with the exercise of reasonable care.248 [italics supplied]
As Griffith CJ said: “if the only party in possession of direct evidence withholds it he cannot complain that effect is given to the circumstantial evidence.”249
[1205] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: key factors People react to charges in very different ways and this means that all inferences from silence must be made with caution. The silent party may have been confused or taken by surprise, or may have considered the allegation to be unworthy of an answer, or may have wished to conceal matters which are irrelevant to the case before the court. Hence, before silence is allowed to count against the party, the circumstances must have been such that an explanation was called for, and there must have been no apparent reason apart from a consciousness of guilt, for its absence. The absence of an explanation of facts which tell against a party should only be treated as evidence against the party when the facts in question constitute a prima facie case in the sense that they would justify — without in any way necessitating — a finding of liability. Even then, the absence of an explanation is only significant when the party against whom the prima facie case is proved can reasonably be expected to give an innocent
explanation if there is one. When these requirements are satisfied, the failure to give an explanation will support an inference against the party who does not produce one.
[1210] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: the significance of a prima facie case Where a plaintiff who claimed that his goods had been lost owing to the crime of one of the defendants, could only prove that the goods were delivered to the company, and placed on a truck in a siding to which the public had access, after which they disappeared, it was held that the defendant’s failure to explain the loss did not make the plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to sustain his case. As Cockburn CJ said: [I]f a prima facie case is made out, capable of being displaced, and if the party against whom it is established might by calling particular witnesses and producing particular evidence displace that prima facie case, and he omits to adduce that evidence, then the inference fairly arises, as a matter of inference for the jury and not a matter of legal presumption, that the absence of that evidence is to be accounted for by the fact that even if it were adduced it would not disprove the prima facie case. But that always presupposes that a prima facie case has been established; and unless we can see our way clearly to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been established, the omission to call witnesses who might have been called on the part of the defendant amounts to nothing.250
Very soon after the parties were enabled by the Evidence Act 1851 (Eng) to testify in most civil cases, Alderson B recognised that the failure of one of them to deny a [page 37] fact which it is in that party’s power to deny “gives colour to the evidence against him”.251 Almost a hundred years later the same point was made more forcefully by Rich J when he said: [W]hen circumstances are proved indicating a conclusion and the only party who can give direct evidence of the matter prefers the well of the court to the witness box a court is entitled to be bold.252
But Lord Diplock may be thought to have gone further than Rich J in a case in which the defendants called no evidence: This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if a court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all
reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold.253
It has been held in England that the indication in an acknowledgment of service of an intention not to defend divorce proceedings founded on adultery might be treated as an admission,254 but this has been said to go too far,255 and it has been said that the indication is best regarded as something which can be taken into account together with the other evidence, although not in itself amounting to proof of adultery.256
[1215] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: Jones v Dunkel In Australia the principles under discussion are commonly termed “the rule in Jones v Dunkel”.257 They can be summarised thus. First, unexplained failure by a party to give evidence, to call witnesses,258 or to tender documents259 or other evidence or produce particular material to an expert [page 38] witness260 may (not must)261 in appropriate circumstances lead to an inference that the uncalled evidence or missing material would not have assisted that party’s case.262 The rule can operate against parties not bearing the burden of proof and parties which do bear it as well.263 The appropriate circumstances exist where it was within the power of the party to tender the evidence which was not tendered: the details of this condition, so far as elucidated by the cases, are considered below. The significance to be attributed to the fact that a witness did not give evidence will in the end depend upon whether, in the circumstances, it is to be inferred that the reason why the witness was not called was because the party expected to call him feared to do so. But there are circumstances in which it has been recognised that such an inference is not available or, if available, is of little significance. The party may not be in a position to call the witness. He may not be sufficiently aware of what the witness would say to warrant the inference that, in the relevant sense, he feared to call him. The reason why the witness is not called may have no relevant relationship with the fact in issue: it may be related to, for example, the fact that the party simply does not know what the witness will say. A party is not, under pain of a detrimental inference, required to call a witness “blind”. …A Jones v Dunkel inference may not arise if, for example, the witness has a reason for not telling the truth or refusing to assist and the party who may well call him is aware of this.264
Hence the rule has no application if the failure is explained, for example by a reasonable explanation for not compelling attendance by subpoena, or by illness or other unavailability, or by loss of memory or refusal to waive privilege.265 Other explanations are that the witness not called by the plaintiff is the defendant’s son,266 or that the witness is hostile,267 or that calling the witness would cause jeopardy or grave prejudice to the witness (eg a witness shortly to face a criminal trial).268 But the explanation must be established by evidence and is not merely to be presumed from the passage of time.269 The fact that the proceedings were proceedings for a civil penalty, the fact that they might be followed by other proceedings for a civil penalty, and the contemporaneous conduct of a Royal Commission into the events in issue with power to recommend criminal charges were held not to be satisfactory [page 39] explanations.270 A belief by the defendant that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient is not a satisfactory explanation.271 A legitimate explanation in civil proceedings is not to be found in the fact that an absent party-witness might fear that to give evidence in the civil proceedings would prejudice him in later criminal proceedings.272 A legitimate explanation has been found in the circumstance that the uncalled witness is likely to be favourable to the opposing party.273 An explanation was found where the absent witness had already been subjected to a compulsory examination, at which any relevant question could have been asked, the transcript of which was tendered by the opposing party.274 And failure to call an expert witness may not attract the principle where there is no issue on which the witness’s evidence would assist,275 or where it can be inferred that a legitimate forensic choice was made to use expert material not as evidence but as the basis for submissions and lines of cross-examination in circumstances where the opposing party’s expert evidence had only been admitted to a limited extent.276 The significance of the inference depends on the closeness of the relationship of the absent witness with the party who did not call the witness.277 Hence the inference does not arise where the relationship with the party criticised for not calling the witness has ceased and the relationship with the opposing party has begun.278
Considerable significance may attach if the absent witness is either the party or a senior executive of a corporate party closely engaged in the transactions in question and present in court during the hearing.279 The dominant purpose of the controlling mind of a corporation can ordinarily be established by the testimony of that person, and the relevant inferences can be drawn if it is not proffered.280 A former director of a company may not be in the company’s camp.281 However, failure by a defendant to call a witness likely to be friendly to the interests of the plaintiff (for example, a third party insurer failing to call the plaintiff’s husband or friend responsible for the accident)282 may entitle the court not to draw any adverse inference. It seems that the onus of establishing unavailability is on the party against whom Jones v Dunkel operates.283 [page 40] Secondly, the rule in Jones v Dunkel permits an inference that the untendered evidence would not have helped the party who failed to tender it. It entitles the trier of fact to take that into account in deciding whether to accept any particular evidence which relates to a matter on which the absent witness could have spoken.284 It entitles the trier of fact the more readily to draw any inference fairly to be drawn from the other evidence by reason of the opponent being able to prove the contrary had the party chosen to give or call evidence.285 But the rule does not permit an inference that the untendered evidence would in fact have been damaging to the party not tendering it.286 The rule does not create any admission, unlike deliberately false evidence.287 The rule cannot be employed to fill gaps in the evidence, or to convert conjecture and suspicion into inference.288 Nor does the rule prevent any inference favourable to the party who has failed to call the witness from being drawn: other evidence may justify the drawing of the inference.289 And if the case of a party who fails to call a witness is otherwise proved, the inference that the absent witness would not assist the party’s case does not detract from the proof.290 The absence of the witness can permit the trier of fact to resolve a doubt or ambiguity adversely to the party who did not call the witness.291 Thirdly, the rule only applies where a party is “required to explain or
contradict” something.292 What a party is required to explain or contradict depends on the issues in the case as thrown up in the pleadings and by the course of evidence in the [page 41] case.293 No inference can be drawn unless evidence is given of facts “requiring an answer”.294 If there is no issue between the parties on a matter, there is nothing to answer; and if there is an issue between them, but the party bearing the burden of proof has tendered no evidence of it, the opponent is not required to answer. Fourthly, the rule in Jones v Dunkel does not apply where the witness not called is the party’s solicitor, at least where the evidence which is in consequence not given is privileged and the privilege has not been waived. This is because if the solicitor gave evidence on the subject of privileged communications the privilege would be lost, and the court will not permit the destruction of the privilege by this back door.295 Fifthly, the rule does not operate to require a party to give merely cumulative evidence.296 If five people attended a relevant meeting and some are called, no Jones v Dunkel inference can normally arise in respect of those who are not: the rule does not compel time to be wasted by calling unnecessary witnesses.297 This is particularly so where no challenge is made to the evidence of those who are called. Nor does the rule operate where junior decision-makers are not called so long as the senior decisionmakers have been.298 On the other hand, the desirability of limiting the numbers of expert witnesses “cannot be used by a party as a shield against a justifiable criticism that he is deliberately keeping his less favourable experts out of the witness box”.299 The sixth and most difficult aspect of the rule in Jones v Dunkel turns on the failure to call non-party witnesses. It is easy to apply the principle where it is the party who fails to give evidence.300 But the rule cannot be applied to the non-calling of a witness unless it would be natural for the party to call the witness, or the party might reasonably be expected to call a witness,301 or, as Glass JA said,302 “the missing witness would be expected to be called by one party rather than another.” Glass JA said this condition:
is also described as existing where it will be natural for one party to produce the witness,303 or the witness would be expected to be available to one party rather than the other,304 or where the circumstances excuse one party from calling the witness, but
[page 42] require the other party to call him,305 or where he might be regarded as in the camp of one party, so as to make it unrealistic for the other party to call him,306 or where the witness’ knowledge may be regarded as the knowledge of one party rather than the other,307 or where his absence should be regarded as adverse to the case of one party rather than the other.308 It has been observed that the higher the missing witness stands in the confidence of one party, the more reason there will be for thinking that his knowledge is available to that party rather than to his adversary.309 If the witness is equally available to both parties, for example, a police officer, the condition, generally speaking, stands unsatisfied. There is, however, some judicial opinion that this is not necessarily so.310 Evidence capable of satisfying this condition has been held to exist in relation to a party’s foreman;311 his safety officer;312 his accountant;313 his treating doctor.314
A more liberal test is that the party fails to call evidence “which that party was plainly in a position to have given or called”.315 A party is not necessarily to be expected to call even that party’s own employees,316 though the higher the employee stands in the party’s employment the more reason there is for thinking that the employee’s knowledge is available to his employer rather than any other party.317 Another relevant factor is the likelihood that the knowledge in question is of the kind which an employee would or should be unlikely to disclose to the opposing party. Because the formulation of the Jones v Dunkel inference that the absent witness would not have helped the party’s case is such that the party or his advisers are presumed to know the content of the witness’s evidence, a party may reasonably be expected to call the party’s own medical advisers, but not medical practitioners who examined the party on behalf of other persons and whose reports may not have been available to the party.318 While a third party insurer having the conduct of litigation on behalf of an insured defendant is not technically the defendant, if the insurer is in charge of the litigation and the defendant is in the position only of a potential witness capable of being subpoenaed, the defendant is to be regarded as a non-party witness for the purposes of the above principles.319 Seventhly, the evidence of the missing witness must be such as would
have elucidated a matter. Glass JA said:320 [page 43] [a]ccording to Wigmore321 the … condition is fulfilled where the party or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby be elucidated. Under other formulations, the condition is made out when the witness is presumably able to put a true complexion on the facts,322 might have proved the contrary,323 would have a close knowledge of the facts,324 or where it appears that he had knowledge.325 I would think it insufficient to meet the requirements of principle that one party merely claims that the missing witness has knowledge, or that, upon the evidence, he may have knowledge. Unless, upon the evidence, the tribunal of fact is entitled to conclude that he probably would have knowledge, there would seem to be no basis for any adverse deduction from the failure to call him.
The condition was not satisfied where, in litigation between a regulatory authority and company directors, the company’s solicitor was not shown to be able to give evidence which would have elucidated a matter.326 Eighthly, the principle in Jones v Dunkel may apply to both parties. If so, the operation of the principle is not that the failure of one party excuses the failure of the other, but that competing inferences that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted either side arise, and that the trier of fact must consider the evidence which is before it in the light of those inferences.327 Ninthly, the principles of Jones v Dunkel apply to the failure by a party to ask a witness called by that party questions in chief, at least where the most natural inference is that the party feared to do so.328 Indeed it has been said that the omission to ask questions of a friendly witness is more significant than the failure to call the witness, and that the presumption that the testimony would not have been favourable to the party’s case is stronger than the presumption arising from the failure to call him.329 A fortiori, inferences are not to be drawn in favour of a party calling a witness who could have given direct evidence to that effect, but did not.330 The principle applies to a witness who, though called in the plaintiff’s case in chief, is not called in the case in reply to deal with a fresh matter arising during the defendant’s case.331 [page 44]
Tenthly, while the circumstances in which Jones v Dunkel reasoning may be employed and the limits of it are reasonably clear, it is uncertain whether there is any rule of law compelling the giving of a Jones v Dunkel direction to a jury, at least in New South Wales.332 Finally, a special application of Jones v Dunkel can be made in administrative law. Where a public officer elects not to give evidence as to the reasons why a power was or was not exercised, the court may infer that there was no good reason.333 A Jones v Dunkel inference can be drawn against a Minister who does not give evidence,334 notwithstanding that the difficulties busy Ministers could have in giving evidence frequently might justify a departure from the ordinary application of Jones v Dunkel335 or reduce the frequency with which adverse inferences might be drawn.336 But the inference which might otherwise be drawn may not be open if contradicted by documents in evidence throwing light on the matter, such as a written statement of a Minister’s reasons for a decision.337 Jones v Dunkel does not apply in relation to a member of the Refugee Review Tribunal (an administrative body carrying out adjudicative functions).338 The inferences which may be drawn at common law are not necessarily as extensive as those which may be drawn under statutory power to draw “such inferences as appear just in the circumstances”.339 The principle in Jones v Dunkel is not attracted by the opposition of a party to an application by an opposing party to cross-examine a person whose evidence the first party relies on.340 The rule in Jones v Dunkel is a particular application341 of Lord Mansfield CJ’s “maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted”.342 The maxim goes to the problem that in deciding issues of fact on the civil standard of proof, the court is concerned not just with the question “what are the probabilities on the limited material which the court has, but also whether [page 45] that limited material is an appropriate basis on which to reach a reasonable decision”.343 Lord Mansfield CJ’s maxim is wider than the rule in Jones v Dunkel because the rule is available against a party not bearing the onus of
proof, while the maxim is also available against a party bearing that onus. One way in which the maxim operates against a party bearing the onus is that it permits a conclusion that uncalled evidence would not have helped the case of the party not calling it. Another way in which the maxim operates against a party bearing the onus is that it permits inferences available against the party to be more strongly drawn. A further way in which the maxim operates against the party bearing the onus is that it assists in deciding whether the party bearing the onus has discharged it.344 Whatever the duties of fairness attending the conduct by regulatory bodies of civil litigation, they do not create any special duty to call witnesses which, if broken, results in the discounting of the evidence they do call.345
[1220] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: criminal cases As long ago as 1820 Abbott CJ said: No person is to be required to explain or contradict, until enough has been proved to warrant a reasonable and just conclusion against him, in the absence of explanation or contradiction; but when such proof has been given, and the nature of the case is such as to admit of explanation or contradiction, if the conclusion to which the prima facie case tends be untrue, and the accused offers no explanation or contradiction; can human reason do otherwise than adopt the conclusion to which the proof tends?346
This question took on particular significance when, in the late nineteenth century, the accused was given a general right to testify, and “the power to contradict extended to the power to contradict by sworn testimony of the accused”.347 What a judge should say to a jury about the question is affected in some jurisdictions by statutory provisions,348 and in all jurisdictions by a departure from older cases.349 The High Court350 has distinguished between directions and comments. Juries are obliged to follow directions by trial judges. Directions include warnings about following impermissible processes of reasoning and about the care needed in assessing some types of evidence. But it is not the province of trial judges to direct [page 46]
juries about how they may (as opposed to may not) reason towards a conclusion of guilt: that is the province of juries. Judges may, however, offer comments about how juries may reason towards guilt, including comments on the significance of the accused’s failure to give evidence. Juries may ignore comments and should be told that they may ignore them.351 Because juries may use the failure of the accused to testify detrimentally to the accused, “it will almost always be desirable for the judge to warn the jury that the accused’s silence in court is not evidence against the accused, does not constitute an admission by the accused, may not be used to fill gaps in the evidence tendered by the prosecution, and may not be used as a make-weight in assessing whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt”.352 However, the cases in which comment about the way in which the jury might use the accused’s failure to testify is permissible “will be both rare and exceptional”.353 They will arise where there are “additional facts which would explain or contradict the inference which the prosecution seeks to have the jury draw”, being facts “which (if they exist) would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused”.354 However, “comment will never be warranted merely because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case”.355 The consequence is to render wrong a comment that in assessing the value of the Crown’s evidence the jury could take into account the accused’s failure to deny or contradict it in relation to matters within the accused’s personal knowledge.356 Traditionally it was thought that the trial judge could give a Jones v Dunkel direction about witnesses not called by the accused, being witnesses who might have supported the accused’s testimony357 or some other part of the accused’s case.358 Doubts about this have now been resolved by the High Court against the traditional view. As a general rule the jury should not be directed that they are entitled to infer that evidence of witnesses whom the accused did not call would not have assisted the accused. If it is possible that the jury might think evidence of other witnesses could have been, but was not, called by the accused, the jury should be told not to speculate about what that evidence might have been.359 The principal exceptions are those referred to above.360 It has been said that the same applies to witnesses
[page 47] not called by the prosecution; and that exceptions will only arise where the prosecution’s failure to call the witness was a breach of the prosecution’s duty to call all material witnesses.361 Wells J thought that failure by the prosecution to elicit particular evidence in chief from a witness called by it could justify strong adverse comment by the defence362 — and if the defence, why not the trial judge? The High Court has said that where a witness who might have been expected to be called is not called by the prosecution, the question is not whether the jury may properly reach conclusions about issues of fact but whether, in the circumstances, they should entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.363 The principles just described apply whether the accused fails to testify because of a deliberate choice not to do so or because of having absconded.364 A comment about the accused’s failure to call a particular person as a witness is inappropriate if there is a good reason for that person’s absence, for example, the increased risk of that person being prosecuted if he entered the jurisdiction.365 The following reasoning of the Privy Council appears open in appropriate cases:366 How did he come to squeeze his wife’s throat? When the prisoner, who is given the right to answer this question, chooses not to do so, the court must not be deterred by the incompleteness of the tale from drawing the inferences that properly flow from the evidence it has got nor dissuaded from reaching a firm conclusion by speculating upon what the accused might have said if he had testified.
The above principles do not require a trial judge to tell the jury that the failure to call character witnesses is not evidence against the accused and does not constitute an admission that character witnesses would not be available to the accused.367 Statutory regulation of judicial and prosecution comment on the silence of the accused at the trial is discussed below.368 [page 48] For the purposes of Jones v Dunkel, civil penalty proceedings under statutes such as the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Competition
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) are treated as civil proceedings, not criminal.369
[1225] Absence of explanation and failure to give evidence: belated explanation By contrast to silence in court, a party in a civil case, or an accused person in a criminal case, may advance an explanation belatedly in answer to some earlier accusation made out of court. The limited extent to which inferences may be drawn from the out-ofcourt silence of accused persons is discussed below.370 In civil cases the belatedness of the explanation may affect its weight, may permit corresponding inferences to be drawn from other evidence, and may constitute an admission of the accusation which the relevant party is seeking to explain.371
[1230] Fingerprints A witness testifies, often with the aid of photographs, to having taken the fingerprints of the accused and found them to be identical with those on some object with which the case is concerned. This is very strong retrospectant circumstantial evidence, where the courts take judicial notice of the fact that no two people have identical fingerprints, that is, no proof is required of this fact.372 Convictions have been upheld when there was no other evidence of identity.373 The expert must point out the resemblances which lead to the conclusion that the fingerprints are identical, but the jury has to decide whether the conclusion is correct. Although the identification of the characteristics of fingerprints and their patterns is a matter of expert evidence, it is for the jury to decide whether one set of fingerprints is the same as another and to decide whether they accept the expert evidence.374 No special rules apply to the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. The evidence was admitted although the accused had not been cautioned when asked by a police officer for his prints.375 The ordinary principles governing the judge’s discretion to exclude evidence in a criminal trial will, of course, apply to such a case. There is no rule of law that persons cannot be made to incriminate themselves by giving their fingerprints.376 The parties’ cases on fingerprint evidence must be accurately put to the jury.377
[page 49]
[1235] Blood tests378 No court has power (statute apart) to order adults to undergo a blood test. It may order that a child do so.379 The basis of this jurisdiction is not clear, for except where the court is exercising its custodial jurisdiction, the interests of the child are not necessarily paramount in the making of such an order. And “such inferences as appear just in the circumstances” may be drawn under s 69Y(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) from an unreasonable failure to comply with a parentage testing order under s 69W or a related order under s 69X.380 Such evidence can,381 however, be of the greatest value on issues concerning the paternity of the child and it has been acted on often.382 The fact that the child’s blood belongs to a certain group may exclude the possibility that a particular man is the father. Until judicial notice is taken of this exclusionary effect of a blood test, medical evidence will, of course, be required.
[1240] Blood, urine and breath tests Statutes creating various offences of driving a motor vehicle while unfit to do so through drink or drugs permit the court to have regard to the presence of alcohol or drugs in the body of the accused as ascertained by an examination of samples of the accused’s blood, urine or breath.383
[1245] Tracker dogs Evidence that, after being taken to the scene of a crime, a dog picks up a scent and leads those in charge of it to the accused is admissible.384 It would in every case be necessary for evidence to be received about the training, skill and habits of the particular dog and its handler; evidence or judicial notice of the fact that each human being has a different scent which is liable to be picked up by a well-trained dog would be necessary; evidence is needed that over a period of time the dog’s reactions indicate that it is a reliable pointer to the existence of a scent from a particular individual; and the jury should be warned to look at the evidence of tracker dogs with circumspection in view of the fact that the dog may not always be
[page 50] reliable and cannot be cross-examined.385 The person giving such evidence must not express an opinion about what the dog was thinking at the material time.386 An analogy has been drawn with these authorities in support of the admission of the behaviour of a child alleged to have been sexually abused in relation to dolls.387 To some extent the trier of fact can draw its own conclusions about the likely behaviour of a dog in the light of the general characteristics of dogs; but normally specific evidence is needed, based on experience of the particular dog, or dogs of the breed in question, or scientific studies of dogs.388
[1250] Corpus delicti Every contested criminal case raises two questions, although there may often be no dispute about the first. The questions are: was the crime charged committed? and: was it committed by the accused? The first is often said to be concerned with the “proof of the corpus delicti”.389 On a trial for murder, for example, the courts will be loath to convict unless someone deposes to the death of the deceased, or unless this fact is admitted by the accused, who either denies malice aforethought390 or withdraws a confession at the trial.391 It was once thought that there could not be a conviction for murder or manslaughter in the absence of some direct proof of death. Great caution is obviously required before there can be a conviction for murder without a corpse, but persons have been convicted of murder in the absence of such evidence392 when the facts were such as to render it highly probable that the accused had killed the deceased and disposed of the body. One accused was seen to come out of a warehouse with a quantity of pepper. As there was a great deal of pepper inside the warehouse, none was proved to be missing, but the accused was nevertheless convicted of stealing pepper. If a man goes into the London Docks sober without means of getting drunk, and comes out of one of the cellars very drunk wherein are a million gallons of wine, I think that would be reasonable evidence that he had stolen some of the wine in the cellar though you could not prove
that any wine was stolen, or that any wine was missed.393
[page 51]
D — MEANS OF PROOF Testimony [1255] The nature of testimony In general a witness can only give evidence of a fact of which the witness has personal knowledge, having perceived it with one of the five senses.394 Unless it is clear from the context that the testimony is meaning to say that it proceeds from the witness’s own knowledge, it may be necessary for the witness to aver that it does.395 The evidence must be accepted as prima facie evidence of the witness’s possession of such knowledge, for there would be an infinite regress if this fact had to be proved by another witness. The only exception to the general rule is the expert witness testifying to matters calling for expertise. Parts of the testimony may be based on information derived from textbooks or on what the witness has learned from other people. The party against whom testimony is given has a right to cross-examine the witness and this right, coupled with the personal knowledge rule, lies at the root of the ban on hearsay evidence. The value of a statement is diminished if it is not made by a witness when giving evidence in the proceedings. Since a witness’s testimony will almost always be about past observations, the witness’s capacity to remember them is important. However, the law does not rest on extreme scepticism about the inherent unreliability of memory.396 And it has been said not to be a bar to admissibility (though it is highly material to weight) that a witness has no independent and uncontaminated recollection of the testimony. In particular, the fact that a witness has discussed the events with another does not make the testimony either strictly inadmissible or liable to exclusion on discretionary grounds.397
Hearsay
[1260] Preliminary account of hearsay A fact in issue can be proved by direct testimony (ie by a witness swearing to it) but sometimes the best that can be done is to tender the evidence of what someone else was heard to say or wrote on the subject. The rule against hearsay must then be borne in mind. Succinctly stated, the rule is: “an assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted”. The above formulation fuses two closely connected common law rules which are also fused in a number of other formulations of the hearsay rule.398 Under the first of these rules, the previous assertions of the witness who is testifying are inadmissible as evidence of the facts asserted. If the statement is consistent with the maker’s testimony, it is generally inadmissible, and, even when it is admissible, it is never admissible as evidence of the facts.399 If the assertion is inconsistent with the maker’s testimony, the maker may be asked in cross-examination whether the maker [page 52] made it, and, if the maker denies having done so, it may be proved by another witness, but, at common law, it is only admissible as evidence of the facts asserted if the maker is a party to the proceedings; in all other cases it merely casts doubts on the credibility of the testimony. The second common law rule embodied in the above statement of the rule against hearsay is what may be described as “the rule against hearsay in the strict sense”. The law is that assertions by persons other than the witness who is testifying are inadmissible as evidence of the facts asserted. To this rule there are many common law exceptions.400 The reasons for describing the second rule as the rule against hearsay in the strict sense are that the witness who proves the out-of-court assertion has no personal knowledge of the facts asserted, and the party against whom the assertion is tendered has no opportunity of cross-examining its maker. These are the principal reasons why the probative value of testimony is generally greater than that of hearsay. They are often inapplicable when the maker of the assertion gives evidence. In such cases
the justification for excluding such assertions as evidence of the facts asserted is that it is superfluous if consistent with the testimony of the person who made it, and generally of little probative value if inconsistent with that testimony. When a witness is asked to narrate another’s assertion for some purpose other than that of inducing the court to accept it as true, the evidence is said to be “original”. Original evidence may therefore be defined as evidence of the fact that an assertion was made — evidence tendered without reference to the truth of anything alleged in the assertion. Examples are afforded by a witness’s testimony concerning the terms of an alleged slander, or the words used when one party to a contract was making an offer to the other. These examples are simple enough, but it is not always easy to distinguish original evidence from hearsay. As is the case with so many other problems relating to this subject, it is crucially important to have regard to the purpose for which the evidence is tendered to the court. It is also necessary to be aware of the terminological difficulties which beset the exposition of the entire law of evidence, for the word “hearsay” is occasionally used in a broad non-technical sense to denote all assertions by a witness of that which the witness heard someone else say. From the etymological point of view, this usage is beyond criticism, but it is confusing from the point of view of the lawyer because “hearsay” has acquired a technical meaning on account of the rule which bears its name, and this prohibits only its reception as evidence of the truth of that which was heard or recorded.
[1265] The status of documentary evidence The contents of a document may be incorporated in the evidence of a witness who testifies to having entered into a written contract, and the court may be referred to them because they contain admissible hearsay statements. The same applies when an entry made by a registrar of births, deaths and marriages, is produced to prove one of these occurrences. Strictly speaking, the contents of a document need not be treated as a separate item of judicial evidence, although it is convenient to do so because documents are governed by special rules. A document may be put in evidence either as a chattel — a substance such as a paper or part of it bearing an inscription — or else as a statement
— the inscription on the substance. When treated as a chattel, there is no doubt that it constitutes real evidence, as when a deed alleged to have been stolen is produced to the court in [page 53] order to show that it bears the fingerprints of the accused. When treated as a statement, a document constitutes testimonial evidence in the vast majority of cases; but it may be used as circumstantial evidence, as when ancient leases are tendered to prove that the lessor, through whom the plaintiff claims a prescriptive title, was in possession of the locus in quo: … ancient documents coming out of proper custody, and purporting upon the face of them to show exercise of ownership, such as a lease or license, may be given in evidence … as being in themselves acts of ownership and proof of possession.401
Although it is produced and identified by a witness, such a document is not incorporated in the testimony as having been written or read by the witness, neither are its contents tendered as proof of anything they may assert. It is offered to the court as the final document which would only have been executed by someone in possession. In other words, its existence is a relevant fact proved by real evidence — the production of the material object for examination by the court.
Things or real evidence402 [1270] The nature of real evidence Things are an independent species of evidence, as their production calls upon the court to reach conclusions on the basis of its own perception, and not on that of witnesses directly or indirectly reported to it. If a witness testifies to having seen a knife, and says that it bore blood-stains, the court is asked to assume that those statements are true; but if the witness swears that a blood-stained knife is the one the witness saw on a particular occasion, only one assumption has to be made by the court in order to reach a conclusion as to the condition of the knife. Although it was devised by Bentham and adopted by Best, “real evidence” is not a term which has received the blessing of common judicial usage. It is generally agreed that it covers the production of
material objects for inspection by the judge or jury in court, but it is debatable how much further the term should be extended.
[1275] Material objects If the condition of a material object is among the facts in issue, as where it is alleged that a suit made by a tailor does not fit the customer,403 or that the defendant’s dog is vicious,404 the object may be produced to the judge and jury to enable them to form their own opinion on the matter. Indeed, failure to produce such an object may be the subject of observation by the judge.405 If its value is in issue, a presumption adverse to the case of a party who fails to produce the thing operates.406 In exceptional circumstances the court will accept secondary evidence [page 54] of real objects rather than requiring their physical production (eg photographs of aircraft parts).407 Where one object is tendered, and the jury on their own initiative find in it another, untendered object, they are not to take the latter into account.408 Real evidence may be used as a means of proving facts in issue; it may also be used in an endeavour to establish relevant facts, as where a knife found in the hands of a person accused of murder is produced in order to show the jury that it bears the stains of blood. But, although the production of exhibits is a common enough occurrence, the above example shows that real evidence is of little value unless accompanied by testimony identifying it as the object the qualities of which are in issue, or relevant to the issue. It is common in trademark infringement, registered design and passing off cases for the court to compare allegedly infringing items with those in relation to which the plaintiff is seeking to vindicate rights.409
[1280] Appearance of persons, objects and scenes A person’s physical characteristics are frequently included among the
possible items of real evidence, and these may often serve as a valuable means of proof. For instance, the fact that the accused is left-handed, tall or short, strong or weak, may frequently render it more or less probable that the accused committed the crime charged; physical deformities such as a rupture may lead almost inevitably to the conclusion that a man was not guilty of rape;410 and the resemblance that the child produced to the court bears to its alleged father or mother may be some, though very weak, evidence of parentage.411 If, at the hearing of a claim for damages for personal injuries, the court examines those injuries or their effects, it may be said to be receiving real evidence; but great caution is exercised in allowing wounds to be exhibited — owing, no doubt, to the prejudice which might be excited.412 Again, the court is acting on real evidence when it determines the age of a child by inspection of the child413 or by inspection of photographs of the child.414 The same is true of [page 55] photographs of objects like corpses415 and localities.416 This contrasts with old views that a photograph merely explained oral evidence417 or was testimonial in character, as “a visible representation of the image or impression made upon the minds of the witnesses by the sight of the person or the object it represents.”418 Photographs cannot be relied on as proof in themselves of the dimensions of the objects depicted or their relative proportions.419 Care must be taken to ensure that photographs are not used as the sole source from which a primary fact is inferred where that fact is not revealed on their face.420 It is necessary that there be evidence identifying the thing photographed with the photograph.421 Films taken of a plaintiff without the plaintiff’s knowledge are often shown to establish that claims or incapacity are faked.422
[1285] Demeanour or conduct of witness Nokes includes the demeanour of witnesses among the items of real evidence. If a witness gives evidence in a forthright way, unperturbed under cross-examination, the court may well be more disposed to believe
the evidence than would be the case with a halting and prevaricating witness. So far as its bearing on the facts in issue is concerned, this type of demeanour is analogous to the answers given by a witness who is being cross-examined as to credit, and may rightly be regarded as evidence in the case,423 though from time to time some have suspected the weight of this kind of reasoning.424 When the court acts on the remarks or behaviour of a witness as constituting a contempt, it may be said to accept real evidence because it is not asked to do more than act on its powers of perception in determining the existence of a fact in issue — the contemptuous conduct.
[1290] Views, demonstrations, reconstructions: in court/out of court distinction In the above instances triers of fact are able to employ their own perceptions as [page 56] distinct from those of witnesses. Indeed in some of the instances referred to the evidence of witnesses is either inadmissible or of relative insignificance. The position is different with “views”, “demonstrations” and “reconstructions”.425 (A demonstration is an attempt to show something in issue; a reconstruction is an attempt to construct again or reestablish a previously existing or performed event which is in issue; an experiment is anything done to test a theory.)426 The authorities distinguish between, on the one hand, the examination of exhibits inside the courtroom and, on the other hand, views of scenes outside the court, objects outside the court, and demonstrations, experiments or reconstructions outside the court. In the former category, the court may with its own powers of observation estimate the value of testimony about these articles and if necessary refuse to accept it.427 In the latter category, the orthodox approach in Australia is that, in the absence of contrary agreement between the parties,428 a visit to a scene is not part of the evidence, but merely something which enables the court the better
to understand the evidence given by witnesses.429 In the absence of contrary agreement between the parties,430 the same is true of a demonstration of a process or event.431 If the court proposes to use extraneous evidence in the form of its own observations, it must give the parties an opportunity to comment on that course.432 The admissibility of demonstrations and reconstructions depends on their being [page 57] sufficiently similar to the original event.433 Reconstructions brought into existence in private and filmed for use at the trial have generally been rejected,434 unless they are confessions (ie films of accused persons reenacting the crime).435 A subsequently-made film of the route taken by a recklessly driven car is admissible, being no different from a photograph of the scene of a crime.436
[1295] Views, demonstrations, procedure on practical aspects
reconstructions:
The court has a discretion whether or not to order a view.437 It has been said that if in the appellate court’s opinion a view would have probative value, the refusal by the trial judge of a request for one will be held to have been incorrect.438 The better view is that the trial judge’s decision will not be interfered with unless one of the normal grounds for interfering with a discretionary decision is made out.439 A view may be held without the consent of all parties.440 If a view, or a view with demonstration, is conducted, it should be conducted in the presence of the judge (and if there is a jury, the jury)441 and the parties.442 The court may attend, alone, a public place about which evidence has been given, this being termed a “visit”, though it is undesirable so to act in the absence of the parties lest some feature has changed or some feature impresses the court which the parties did not notice and on which they could have commented,443 and though it is desirable for notice to be given of the court’s intention to do this.444 It is wrong for the court to observe a demonstration in the course of taking a view unless both parties consent.445 It has been said to be essential, before a view, demonstration,
experiment or reconstruction is ordered, that there is agreement between the parties or evidence that the conditions presently existing are as they were at the time in question, or at least that any variations are defined in a manner enabling them to be assessed and accounted for, and are not such as might render the view, demonstration, [page 58] experiment or reconstruction impractical or dangerous.446 It is no objection to a witness attending a view and giving demonstrations that the witness has already testified; it may be just this which makes the view valuable.447 In appropriate cases those who organise demonstrations and reconstructions and experiments must be qualified as experts.448 On a view formal notes may be taken and incorporated in the transcript of evidence.449 If the judge makes notes or sketches, or directs his or her staff to take photographs, they will not be made exhibits, but may be used to enable later comprehension of the formal notes.450 A witness can be required “to speak … so that the jury or another witness may hear his voice”.451 A witness may be required “to write so that the jury or another witness may … compare his handwriting”.452 It has been held permissible, at least with the witness’s consent, for a witness to demonstrate that he could type a record of interview in less than 36 minutes.453 It has been held permissible for a witness, who claimed in the past to have signed his signature upside down and in reverse, to demonstrate this before the jury after also signing his ordinary signature.454 Where an offender is said to have walked with a limp, it is permissible to ask the accused to walk a short distance in front of the jury.455 “Demonstrations are frequently given in the witness box …, both by ordinary witnesses and by professional witnesses such as medical or pathological experts. It is common for an ordinary witness by physical actions … to support oral evidence of an observed action …”.456 Subject to questions of exclusion on grounds of prejudice, it is permissible for injured persons to be invited to show the extent of their injuries457 or for experts to explain them458 or for the evidence of paralysis or numbness to be revealed by inserting pins into injured plaintiffs459 and for injured persons to indicate what their capacity to perform bodily movements was
before the injury and after it.460 A jury has been invited to feel a plaintiff’s skull to assess whether a hole caused by [page 59] trepanning was filled by bone or a softer tissue.461 A witness may be required “to show his face or some other part of his body so that he may be identified”.462 A witness can be compelled “to submit his foot for comparison with a footprint”,463 or to demonstrate its formation.464 Where a tailor claimed payment for making a suit for a customer who resists the claim on the ground that the suit did not fit, the customer, while testifying, was made to try it on in the presence of the jury.465 It is also permissible for an accused to demonstrate his inability to pull two balaclavas left at the scene of a crime over his head.466 Where the defence called evidence that clothing left at the scene of a crime did not fit the accused, it was permissible to require the accused to wear the clothing in order to see whether it fitted him.467 The wearing of a piece of clothing connected with a crime to see if it “fits” is “commonplace” and “entirely unexceptional”.468 It has been held permissible for a witness to leave the witness box in order to demonstrate how the accused committed an act of indecency on him469 or to demonstrate the position a murdered person was found in.470 A witness who gave evidence about the effect of burning the horsehair stuffing of a chair was permitted to demonstrate that effect by setting on fire a hand full of horsehair from the chair.471 “Demonstrating” how a car accident occurred by the use of models,472 “demonstrating” distances by the use of the hands, or “demonstrating” distances by the making of comparisons of the distances between features of the courtroom, “demonstrating” with an arm how high something was, or “demonstrating” what the posture of a person was, or how a knife or a gun was held, or how a blow was struck, or where an organ in the body is, or what kind of blow may have caused a particular kind of injury473 — these are all common forensic events, which are illustrations of witnesses communicating more clearly by actions than they can in words. However, it has been held impermissible, because unfairly prejudicial, to ask the accused in the presence of the jury to put on a balaclava and overalls, being the supposed attire of the offender.474
An application to hypnotise the plaintiff and observe his behaviour in court has been refused.475 [page 60] The law relating to views has been found to have analogies with that relating to the use by juries of exhibits. While it is proper for juries to take exhibits with them into the jury room and to conduct simple experiments with them,476 it is impermissible for them to conduct experiments going beyond mere examination and evaluation leading to the creation of new evidentiary material.477 Section 52 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that the Act (other than Pt 2.3) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced otherwise than by testimonial or documentary means.478 It has been suggested that the giving of evidence by affidavit is not part of the testimony of witnesses elicited in court (governed by Pt 2.1), or the tender of documents (governed by Pt 2.2), or a view (governed by Pt 2.3, ss 53– 54) and hence that adduction will be governed by rules of law or practice found outside the Evidence Act.479 In one sense this is true, but if taken too far this suggestion might have curious results: different rules of admissibility might apply to the affidavit at the time it is read before the deponent enters the witness box from those which would apply to the deponent’s testimony in the witness box. In general an affidavit is not evidence if its maker fails to comply with notice to attend for crossexamination without good reason. It is, though, evidence if no notice is given or notice is given but the time for compliance has not arrived, even though it was not elicited by questioning under Pt 2.1. One method of foreclosing any undesirable consequence in the suggestion is to conclude that Pt 2.1 does not state exhaustively how evidence may be tendered, and an affidavit is a conventional method of doing so. Section 53 regulates the court’s discretionary power to order, on application, the holding of demonstrations, experiments or inspections: s 53(1). There is no need for all parties to consent to anything. No order is to be made unless the court is satisfied that the parties will be given a
reasonable opportunity to be present and the judge (and jury, if any) will be present.480 “Parties”, at least in the case of natural persons, means parties, not their legal representatives.481 Among other factors, the court is to take into account certain listed factors. One is whether the demonstration, experiment or inspection might be unfairly prejudicial, be misleading or confusing, or cause undue waste of time: s 53(3)(c). This almost entirely overlaps with s 135. The court and the jury are not to conduct experiments in the course of their deliberations (s 53(4)). The section does not apply to the inspection of exhibits by the court or the jury: s 53(5).482 Section 53 does not apply to demonstrations, experiments or inspections inside the courtroom, though some of the factors set out [page 61] in s 53(3) are relevant in deciding whether what is proposed should be permitted.483 Section 54 creates a change in the law providing that the court or the jury inference may draw any reasonable inference from what is seen, heard or otherwise noticed during a demonstration, experiment or inspection: under the common law a view can only be treated as an aid to understanding the evidence, not as evidence in itself.484 Attendance by jurors at the scene of an alleged crime, the inspection of it and the conducting of experiments at it amounted to having regard to information that was not in evidence and that was obtained in denial of natural justice in that the accused were unable to test the material, comment on it or call evidence to rebut or qualify it.485 It is standard practice in New South Wales that, after a view, the judge will hand down a draft note of his or her observations at the view, will hear counsel before settling the final version and will then record that note in the transcript or as an exhibit. The purpose of the procedure is to enable everyone to know what matters of fact the judge has taken in as a result of the view.486
[1300] Automatic recordings: status as real evidence Most discussion has hitherto centred on the inadmissibility of tape-
recordings.487 There is also authority on the admissibility of other media such as film, videotape and computer output.488 In all of these cases the evidence is real evidence when it is tendered to show what it was that was recorded. The relevance of what was recorded, and the operation of other exclusionary rules, may determine ultimate admissibility. Thus if a recording were obtained illegally489 or in breach of public policy490 it might be rejected on these grounds, but not because it was a recording. If the matter recorded is itself in issue, then the recording is capable of constituting real evidence of it. A film of a crime is admissible to prove its occurrence.491 A person who views a crime, not directly, but on closed circuit television, can give admissible evidence of it,492 though the principles relating to identification evidence apply.493 When the court permits a tape-recording to be played over, it is acting on real evidence if it treats the intonation of the words as relevant. If the court’s attention is directed solely to the terms of the recording, it may be acting under an exception to the rule against hearsay, as when a recorded conversation is received as [page 62] evidence of an admission by one of the parties. Or the court may receive the recording as original evidence, as when a recording of slanderous words is admitted in order to show that the words were in fact spoken. Tape-recordings have been received in a number of cases. It will usually be necessary for the person relying on the recording to produce evidence identifying the voice recorded, authenticating the tape, indicating how the record was brought into existence494 and defining and prescribing the provenance and history of the recording up to the moment of its production in court.495 If only part of the original recording has been retained, the court may treat that as a very material factor influencing the exercise of any discretion to exclude the part which is tendered.496
[1305] Automatic recordings: the limits of admissibility The general principles are stated by the High Court as follows.497 A tape is not by itself admissible evidence of what is recorded on it, for by
itself it is incapable of proving what is recorded on it. It is only admissible because it is capable of being used to prove what is recorded on it by being played on sound reproduction equipment: that produces evidence of the conversation or other sound recorded, and it is that evidence, aurally received, which is admissible to prove the relevant fact, namely the sounds recorded.498 The issues of what those sounds are should be proved by playing the tape in court if it be available, rather than by tendering evidence, written (eg a transcript of the tape) or oral, of what a witness heard when the tape was played over out of court.499 But if the tape is not available and its absence is accounted for satisfactorily, the evidence of its contents given by a witness who heard it being played over may be received as secondary evidence.500 Though the best evidence rule here excludes oral or written evidence of what a witness heard on the tape if the unavailability of the tape is not accounted for, it does not exclude evidence derived from the playing of a copy tape, provided the provenance of the original tape, the accuracy of the copying process and the provenance of the copy tape are satisfactorily proved.501 Where a tape is played, even though a transcript of it is not admissible as secondary evidence, the transcript may be admitted, not as independent evidence of the conversation or other sounds but as a means of assisting in the perception and understanding of the evidence [page 63] tendered by the playing over of the tape (which may be indistinct or otherwise difficult to understand).502 The jury should be told this, and told that they cannot use the transcript as a substitute for the tape if they are not satisfied that the transcript correctly sets out what they heard on the tape. These principles do not make admissible written translations of what was taped: the contents of a document written in a foreign language or an oral statement in a foreign language cannot be proved without a translation into English of what is written or spoken, and the translation must itself be given as evidence sworn to by the person who makes the translation.503 Exceptionally, the admission of transcripts in English of conversations in foreign languages recorded on tape are admitted where,
had this course not been adopted, it would have been all but impossible for the jury to appreciate the cross-examination of the interpreters.504 It is not necessary that a witness give evidence that that witness heard the conversation said to be on the tapes.505 Nor need there be evidence that the tapes have not been tampered with, doctored, edited or in some way interfered with.506 The test is whether there is sufficient material before the court to allow the tribunal of fact acting reasonably to conclude that the recorded sounds reproduced those originally made by the persons identified by the evidence. There must be evidence, which the tribunal of fact is entitled to accept, that the recording is of a conversation which occurred and which would be admissible if proved by oral testimony. Admissibility does not depend on the party tendering the tapes having removed absolutely any chance that they are inaccurate.507 The fact that tape-recordings can easily be altered may sometimes have to be borne in mind when the weight of the evidence which they provide is under consideration.508 It is no bar to the admissibility of tapes that their quality has been “enhanced”, so long as the methods by which this has been achieved can be effectively examined.509 The fact that not all parts of a taped conversation are clear or strictly relevant does not necessarily mean they should be edited out, unless they are unfairly prejudicial, for the impugned parts may provide a context for the balance.510 Where films have been received into evidence, it is an error of law to uphold a no case submission without viewing them.511 [page 64]
[1310] Automatic recordings: other issues On the facts of a particular case, some general rule of evidence may render a recording inadmissible. Thus, a tape-recording of a confession obtained by a police officer’s threats would be just as inadmissible as a written record of it.512 A tape-recording of conversations in which a witness has participated may be played back during cross-examination.513 In Victoria it has been held that where the interviewing policeman recorded an interview with the
accused both in writing and by means of a tape-recorder, it was not necessary for him to give the accused a second caution in respect to the tape-recorder over and above the usual caution given before the interview commenced.514 A majority of the High Court has held that the jury was entitled to have played, after the summing up, a tape of an unsworn statement of the accused during the trial, with a view to determining whether a voice on another tape was the accused’s; they saw the use of the tape as being refreshment of the jury’s recollections. The minority considered the use went beyond refreshment to use as an instrument of proof — as real evidence, and impermissible unless the unsworn statement were in evidence, which it was not.515 The demise of the unsworn statement may make this decision of very limited application, but it could be relevant to an unrepresented accused who said little, or to a represented accused who did not give evidence but emitted utterances at various stages of the hearing. All justices agreed that a tape of a witness’s sworn evidence could be played to the jury after the summing up in open court.516
[1315] Automatic recordings: complex illustrations A tape-recording is a document for purposes of discovery,517 but it has been held not to be a document for the purposes of the secondary evidence rule,518 nor to be caught by a subpoena duces tecum.519 Exactly the same principles apply to more complex automatic recordings, such as those of a radar trace of the movements of a ship.520 The same principles were not at first applied to automatic recordings made by computers, because of the difficulties arising with the rules governing the exclusion of hearsay.521 It has been held, however, that when the computer was operating as no more than an automatic [page 65] recorder, or calculator, the rules relating to automatic recordings could apply without reference to the hearsay rule.522 In the case of any new and unfamiliar form of automatic recording, the court will require foundation testimony to prove the function, the ordinary working, and the accuracy of
the device, unless it is so well known that its accuracy may be assumed as a matter of common experience.523 “Document” as used in Rules of Court has been held to include documents produced by a fax machine,524 microfiche records,525 photocopiers,526 video-cassettes527 and computer databases.528 Technology has thus moved the law beyond the view that “any written thing capable of being evidence is properly described as a document and … it is immaterial on what the writing may be inscribed”.529
[1320] Charts A chart may be received to assist in the comprehension of evidence. The High Court approved the following statement530 about a chart tendered: The chart was nothing but a convenient record of a series of highly complicated cheque transactions which had been proved by other evidence, and was likely to be of considerable assistance to the jury. Had they all been accountants, doubtless after considerable time they could have prepared such a chart for themselves. The use of such charts and other time-saving devices in complicated trials of this kind is a usual and desirable procedure and is encouraged by the courts.
In appropriate cases the person who prepared the chart must be shown to be an expert.531 But charts which are selective of the evidence of a witness on a particular topic, and which contain errors, may be rejected.532 Section 29(4) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that evidence [page 66] may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid comprehension of the evidence.533
[1325] Documents as real evidence The matter of documents has been discussed: [1265].
[1330] Conclusion
Real evidence, then, is anything other than testimony, admissible hearsay or a document, the contents of which are offered as testimonial evidence, examined by the tribunal as a means of proof. However, most definitions or descriptions of real evidence are considerably narrower than this one.534
E — EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY Evidence of identity: General [1335] Categories of identification evidence Evidence of identity may be given in a great number of different cases, but, in each instance, the proposition in support of which it is tendered is the same, namely, that, contrary to the contention of one of the litigants, two persons or things are identical. The most common form of identification evidence is evidence of visual identification. A less common, but fairly standard, form is identification by sound (by voice, or by distinctive coughing or breathing, for example) — aural identification.535 A possible, though rarer, form of identification is identification by touch, as where the person identified has some peculiar feature — for example, some corrugation or deformity or texture of the skin. Identification by smell or taste is likely to be even rarer, at least in relation to the identification of human beings as distinct from things,536 but it is possible.537 Where a witness gives direct evidence of personal experience, generally that evidence can only be given as a result of experience through one of the five senses in the manner just indicated.538 “Identification” which is merely the result of surmise or inference from unparticularised circumstances is likely to be inadmissible.539
Direct evidence of identity [1340] Background The courts have attempted to isolate circumstances where the mode of identification is not weighty. In some instances it is of so little weight that the trial
[page 67] court in a criminal case must consider whether or not it should be excluded in its discretion on the ground that it is unfairly obtained or that its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. The courts have also considered whether there should be warnings as to the dangers of identification evidence, and what the content of the warnings should be. Why has identification evidence been thought to present a special problem for the courts?
[1345] Miscarriages of justice First, there are a number of famous cases in which identification errors of an astonishing character have apparently occurred. In the affair of the Tichborne claimant a mother wrongly identified the claimant as her son. There have been notorious miscarriages of justice caused by mistakes in identity. Two of them were thought to be so serious as to lead to the development of new legal institutions. Beck’s case led to the establishment of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907. Slater’s case led to the establishment of its Scottish counterpart in 1926. Beck’s case arose in this way. In 1876–77, a certain John Smith committed a number of frauds on women. He would pose as a rich man, offering a woman the opportunity of living with him as his mistress, and obtain valuables from her before vanishing. Smith was convicted. In 1895, years after his release from prison, the frauds began again. Adolf Beck, who had been away from England during the earlier crimes, was identified by women as being the guilty man: 11 women picked him out in identification parades, while only one was sure he was not the man. Beck was convicted, despite some differences of dress, accent and writing capacity between him and the guilty man, and despite his alibi for the earlier crimes. After his release from prison, Beck was convicted again on the evidence of four women; but Smith was then arrested for a further set of frauds committed while Beck was in prison and consequently Beck was released and pardoned.540 In Oscar Slater’s case two persons identified Slater as the man leaving a house after a murder, and 12 others identified him as having earlier kept watch on the house; but only after witnesses had seen him in custody
before identifying him. He was convicted of murder and served 18 years in prison before release.541 The mistakes in identification were less startling than in Beck’s case. In Beck’s case the numbers of witnesses making identifications and the propriety of police conduct in holding identification parades made his guilt seem very likely. These and other cases revealed a belief — as events showed, to some extent a naive one — by police officers, judges and juries in the accuracy of visual identification.
[1350] Experiments Secondly, the experience of actual miscarriages of justice has often been supported by instances where propensity to make wrong identifications has been established in artificially constructed experiments.542 [page 68]
[1355] Reasons for errors in identification Why are mistakes of this kind made, even by persons of good eyesight, who are not very young or very old, whose memory is not made defective by lapse of time, and who are not suffering from shock at the moment of observation? There are numerous possible reasons.543 (1) The reasoning required to support an assertion of recognition is more complex than it appears at first sight. An honest witness who says “The prisoner is the man who drove the car, ” whilst appearing to affirm a simple, clear and impressive proposition, is really asserting: (1) that he observed the driver, (2) that the observation became impressed upon his mind, (3) that he still retains the original impression, (4) that such impression has not been affected, altered or replaced, by published portraits of the prisoner, and (5) that the resemblance between the original impression of the prisoner is sufficient to base a judgment, not of resemblance, but of identity.544
People are to be convicted not because they resemble criminals, but because they are criminals. In charging the jury during the trial of Slater, Lord Guthrie adverted to the danger in saying: “people differ as to the extent of resemblance, or even whether there is any. You may have seen a strong resemblance, but one of your friends says that he can see no resemblance at all, and, when the two people are brought together, you see
that there is nothing but a very general similarity”.545 Accordingly, identification evidence is often “inherently fragile”.546 (2) The witness may have had only a fleeting glimpse of the criminal’s face, or seen it under bad conditions of light and weather for observation, or been too far away, or had the view impaired by passing traffic or a press of people. This difficulty weakens an identification even where the witness knows the person identified well. (3) There are problems of defective memory. An identification may be defective if the witness had no special reason to remember the person identified. It may also be defective if there was a long interval between the time of observation and the time when the witness tells the police of the identification.547 (4) There are problems in relation to recognition. Experiments have shown that a particular face often at once arouses a more or less conventional attitude appropriate to the given type. Thereupon, the attitude actively affected the detail of recognition.548 Faces seem peculiarly likely to set up attitudes and consequent reactions which are largely coloured by feeling. They are very rarely, by the ordinary person, discriminated or analysed in much detail. We rely rather upon a general impression, obtained at the first glance, and issuing in immediate attitudes of like or dislike, of confidence or suspicion, or amusement or gravity.
[page 69] A related difficulty is: [The witness] may expect people who behave in a particular way or belong to a certain class to have some physical characteristic, which he will ascribe to such a person without having verified his belief by observation.549
It may be that factors such as the similarity of the person observed to someone known to the witness, or the emotional significance of a certain cast of features for the witness, constitute an additional obstacle in the recollection of faces.550 (5) Another danger is that identification is a matter about which witnesses are most confident and dogmatic even when their grounds are slight, and in which personal pride, leading to stubbornness, becomes easily involved.551 (6) Witnesses are prone to err in recognising outsiders — those of
another race,552 or age, or class, or dress. To the white, or to the old, or to the rich or to civilians, the black, or the young, or the poor, or the uniformed look alike. (7) Problems arise from “the use by police of methods of identification which, though well suited to the investigation and detection of crime, are not calculated to yield evidence of high probative value in a criminal trial.”553 Persons with criminal records are particularly open to the risk of being mistakenly identified. The police, in showing photographs of suspects to witnesses, will tend necessarily largely to use photographs of persons thought from their records possibly to be involved in the crime: it is a quick and convenient way, often the only way, of getting eye-witnesses to draw the attention of the police to the likely suspects. Any identification by photograph of this kind may be difficult for the accused to attack in practice because of a fear of indirectly revealing a criminal record, and because, unlike the position that arises after an identification parade, the accused will have no first-hand awareness of how the identification occurred, and what safeguards against error there were, since the accused was not present.554 The value of the identification parade can be overrated. It is the experience of the police that at the majority of such parades the witness picks out nobody, or the “wrong” man.555 If a witness fails in this way, he may not be called at the trial, his evidence being useless … It will be obvious that this fact seriously discounts the probative value of a positive identification. Quite apart from this, and even granting a reasonably good memory on the part of the witness, the danger of the identification parade is that the witness expects to find the guilty person present, and therefore points out the man who he thinks is most like the one he remembers. Thus all that an identification parade can really be said to establish is that the accused resembled the criminal more closely than any other members of the parade did, which is not saying very much.556
[page 70] Thus the procedure by which a witness picks out the accused from police photographs, identifies the accused in an identification parade, then identifies the accused at the trial, has pitfalls. There is a tendency “to substitute a photographic image once seen for a hazy recollection of the person initially observed”.557 Further, it must be remembered that photographs can differ from nature: they are two-dimensional, static, often in black and white, and usually give a clear and well-lit view of the
subject.558 Identification evidence is inherently capable of being influenced by suggestion; identification from police photographs or parades obviously carries risks of suggestion, to which should be added the fact that this type of evidence is unusual in that it is artificially brought into existence, not naturally thrown up in the course of human affairs. (8) The value of identification evidence is very difficult to assess by one standard means of overcoming the risk of error — cross-examination. As the Devlin Committee said: A witness says that he recognises the man, and that is that or almost that. There is no story to be dissected, just a simple assertion to be accepted or rejected. If a witness thinks that he has a good memory for faces when in fact he has a poor one, there is no way of detecting the failing. … [E]ye-witnesses of an event can differ widely about the details of it. But normally when the court has to reach a conclusion about an incident or an event, it does not have to make a finding on each detail; it is enough if out of the evidence as a whole there can be extracted as much of the story as it is necessary to know in order to determine the point at issue. But in identification evidence there is no story; the issue rests upon a single piece of observation. The state of the light, the point of observation and the distance from the object are useful if they can show that the witness must be using his imagination; but otherwise where there is a credible and confident assertion, they are of little use in evaluating it. Demeanour in general is quite useless. The capacity to memorise a face differs enormously from one man to another, but there is no way of finding out in the witness box how much of it the witness has got; no-one keeps a record of his successes and failures to submit to scrutiny.559
(9) Further, there is a possibility of repeated error arising. Several identifying witnesses can each make the same mistake, so that the testimony of a second eye-witness does not offer much additional protection. (10) A person may be over-ready to identify from motives of revenge or to find a scapegoat. And a person may be prepared to support an identification made by another on the basis that though if the identification stood alone there would be doubts, they are resolved by the confidence of the other. (11) A witness may be called upon to remember events and people of whom the witness was not taking particular notice. Against all those considerations, it must be remembered that there are doubtless many more correct identifications than incorrect ones. The task of the law has been to apply the general rules of evidence in such a fashion as to minimise the risk of miscarriage of justice in a particular case.
[page 71]
[1360] Identification parades It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of the accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the person in the dock is the one the witness saw coming out of the house at a particular time, or the person who assaulted the witness. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness. This is because of the factors just considered, and in particular because its weight is reduced by the reflection that, if there was any degree of resemblance between the accused and the person previously seen by the witness, the witness may very well think that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if the witness has already described the latter to them, with the result that the witness will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which the witness is by no means certain.560 It has, therefore, been held to be undesirable for the police to do nothing about the question of identification until the accused is brought before the magistrate, and then ask a witness for the prosecution some such question as “Is that the man?”.561 The correct procedure is for the police to hold an identification parade before the trial or preliminary examination, placing the accused with a sufficient number of other people, leaving the witness to attempt an identification, without assistance. This latter requirement is most important and the English Court of Appeal may quash a conviction if the police have attempted to point the accused out beforehand to someone who is then asked to make an identification.562 In Australia, the position is as follows:563 [I]f a witness whose previous knowledge of the accused man has not made him familiar with his appearance has been shown the accused alone as a suspect and has on that occasion identified him, the liability to mistake is so increased as to make it unsafe to convict the accused unless his identity is further proved by other evidence direct or circumstantial.564
An in-dock identification made where there had been no previous positive identification has been held inadmissible.565 There is, however, no general doctrine that a conviction must inevitably be set aside where the only evidence of identity is that of a stranger to the accused.566 Nor is there any general rule (leaving aside cases of
identifications arranged by the police) always excluding identification by a complainant of a single person as the [page 72] offender.567 It has been said that it is absolutely critical to take a full description of alleged offenders at the earliest possible time in an investigation in any case where there may be a question as to their identity, particularly in view of the capacity of modern social media to contaminate evidence.568 Evidence that a person merely resembled the accused is not evidence of positive identification and is, of itself, incapable of sustaining a finding of guilt.569 Evidence of resemblance, whether of humans or animals,570 is, however, admissible. It has been suggested that a discretion similar to that applying to illegally obtained evidence571 may apply where the police or the Crown pursue a practice of obtaining evidence of identification in knowing disregard of the high risk of mistake arising from the impugned procedure pointed out in the quoted passage.572
[1365] Errors in police procedure It is undesirable for the suspect to be fully described to a witness who has only had a very poor view of him.573 It is wrong to isolate the accused or suspect by indicating to the witness that the accused is suspected or charged.574 As the High Court has said:575 A witness who is taken by the police for the purpose of seeing whether he can identify a person who is in custody in relation to a particular crime has in his mind a recollection or impression of the person whom he saw, or, it may be, heard, at the scene of the crime or in relation to some matter which is connected with the crime. The recollection probably relates to the appearance of the person, and possibly to his mode of standing, moving, or speaking or some other characteristic. It is important that this recollection should not be overlaid or in any way affected by suggestions that a particular person in custody is either the person previously seen by the witness or is the person suspected of or charged with the crime. Moreover, inspection of a photograph of the person in custody before viewing him naturally tends to impress on the mind the characteristics shown in the photograph, so that the witness, however honest he may be, tends to identify the person in custody with the person shown in the photograph rather than with the person whom he himself saw previously.
[page 73] Similarly, if a witness is shown a single person, and he knows that that person is suspected of or charged with the crime, his natural inclination to think that there is probably some reason for the arrest will tend to prevent an independent reliance upon his own recollection when he is asked whether he can identify him. This tendency will be greatly increased if he is shown the person actually in the dock charged with the very crime in question.
The weight of admissible out-of-court identifications may be affected if they are such as to suggest that the accused is a suspect.576 An appeal was allowed when the jury were, after retiring and at their request, allowed to see what they described as a “mug-shot” of the appellant; the page on which it appeared included the photographs of 11 other men convicted of crime; the evidence was excluded because it suggested the accused had a criminal record and nothing in the defence case justified what had occurred.577
[1370] Photographs and films: general Sometimes photographs578 or films579 of the criminals taken during the commission of the crime may be adduced in evidence. In such a case the jury may themselves be asked to identify the accused by reference to the photographs.580 They may also be provided with other photographs of the accused so as to guard against subsequent changes of appearance. It is no valid objection to this procedure that the defence is thereby deprived of an identification witness to cross-examine, but the judge should be particularly careful to direct the jury of the dangers of such identification, fortified by a reference to any particular difficulties in the instant case, say of poor lighting or a difficult camera angle. Identification of an accused by a witness with previous experience of the accused from photographs taken during the commission of the crime is inadmissible as irrelevant if it is based only on material not substantially different from that which is before the jury. The High Court has held inadmissible the evidence of police officers that a person depicted in photographs taken by security cameras during a bank robbery was the accused. They said:581 The fact in issue was … “Is the person standing trial the person who is depicted at the
[page 74] right-hand side of some of the photographs tendered in evidence?” Is an assertion, in evidence, by a witness that he now recognises, or has previously recognised, the person who is depicted in those photographs as the accused, relevant evidence? … Because the witness’s assertion of identity was founded on material no different from the material available to the jury from its own observation, the witness’s assertion that he recognised the appellant is not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the jury of the question we have identified…. This is not to say that it will never be relevant for a witness to give evidence that the witness recognises who is depicted in a photograph. The obvious case in which that will be relevant is where the witness deposes to having identified someone from a photograph, or collection of photographs, shown to the witness and the identity of the person depicted is proved in some other way.582 Difficulties may arise, however, when the photograph which is used for identification and is tendered in evidence is, as was the case here, a photograph taken of an incident which is the subject-matter of the proceeding. Even in such a case, a witness’s evidence of recognition of the person depicted may be relevant. Sometimes the facts in issue will extend beyond the narrow question whether the accused is the person depicted in the photograph. In [one case],583 the questions included whether the accused owned a jacket of the kind that the offender depicted in security photographs of a robbery was shown to be wearing. A jacket, which was tendered in evidence, had been found with other incriminating items. Two police officers gave evidence that they had seen the accused wearing this kind of jacket before the robbery. They gave further evidence that the man who was depicted in the security photograph was the accused, and that he was wearing a jacket of the kind they had seen him wearing before the robbery. The evidence was, therefore, relevant to link the accused to the jacket. It went beyond the bare assertion of recognition of the person on trial as the person shown in the photograph. In other cases, the evidence of identification will be relevant because it goes to an issue about the presence or absence of some identifying feature other than one apparent from observing the accused on trial and the photograph which is said to depict the accused. Thus, if it is suggested that the appearance of the accused, at trial, differs in some significant way from the accused’s appearance at the time of the offence, evidence from someone who knew how the accused looked at the time of the offence, that the picture depicted the accused as he or she appeared at that time, would not be irrelevant.584 Or if it is suggested that there is some distinctive feature revealed by the photographs (as, for example, a manner of walking) which would not be apparent to the jury in court, evidence both of that fact and the witness’s conclusion of identity would not be irrelevant.585 Similarly, if, as was the case in [a New Zealand authority]586 there is an issue whether photographs of different incidents depict the same person, evidence given about the identity of the person depicted may not be irrelevant.
The material on which the police officers asserted identity was the same as that available to the jury: the police officers had earlier contacts with the accused, the jury could see him for themselves in the dock, and both the police officers and the jury could view the photographs. Another question is whether evidence of identification from police officers who did not know
the accused but have studied in [page 75] detail tapes of the crime is admissible.587 Yet another is whether a witness qualified in facial mapping can give evidence of identification based on a comparison between images from the scene and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the defendant.588 And another is whether expert lip reading of what was said is admissible.589 If an identification takes place by looking through Facebook, it is incumbent on the police to take steps to obtain, in as much detail as possible, evidence in relation to the initial identification, for example, to obtain the available images that were looked at and a statement in relation to what happened.590
[1375] Photographs: precautions The courts insist on every precaution where photographs are employed as a means of identification before trial.591 It is one thing for a police officer, who is in doubt upon the question who shall be arrested, to show a photograph to persons in order to obtain information or a clue upon that question; it is another thing for a police officer to show beforehand to persons, who are afterwards to be called as identifying witnesses, photographs of those persons whom they are about to be asked to identify. It would be most improper to inform a witness beforehand, who was to be called as an identifying witness, by the process of making the features of the accused person familiar to him through a photograph. But even where photographs are employed for the purpose of obtaining information on the question of arrest, it is fair that all proper precautions should be observed … The fair thing is … to show a series of photographs and to see whether the person who is expected to give information can pick out the appropriate person.592
[page 76]
[1380] Photographs: “rogues gallery effect” and “displacement effect” Even when this last method has been employed, it is desirable that every precaution should be taken against informing the jury that the witness’s identification of the accused before trial had been made possible by means
of a photograph in the possession of the police, for this would indicate some kind of criminal record. This is known as the “rogue’s gallery” effect. Further, there is a “risk that a witness may unconsciously substitute the clear impression gained by looking at a photograph for the perhaps hazy recollection of the face he is trying to recall, and his subsequent identification of the accused may be really the result of a mental comparison with the photograph instead of with the living person”.593 This is known as the “displacement effect”.594 Hence even where a number of photographs are offered the practice may result in a successful appeal.595 The displacement effect relates to the probative value of the evidence. The rogues’ gallery effect — which operates in other circumstances suggesting a criminal background, such as where the identifying witness is asked to attend a police station and look at people reporting in compliance with bail or parole conditions — relates to its potentially prejudicial effect.596 Though a line-up is similar to the offering of a range of photographs including that of the accused, the latter procedure has dangers. The jury must not be led to the belief that the accused is known unfavourably to the police and therefore guilty. In truth a collection of photographs proffered by the police need not be a collection of photographs of convicted criminals at all. It could have been built up from a variety of sources … Sometimes the judge may decide to warn the jury to attach no significance to the fact that the police were in possession of the accused’s photograph; sometimes he may think it wiser to say nothing on the matter at all for fear of highlighting it.597
Accordingly, counsel for the defendant has a difficult decision to make: is the advantage to be gained from attacking the identification on the ground that the witness had previously seen a photograph worth the risk that the jury may thereby be led to suspect that the accused has a criminal record? 598
The Australian law is stated in a case599 in which the High Court dismissed an appeal the ground of which was that the police had shown photographs to witnesses after suspicion had fastened on the accused; the majority denied that any strict rule should be centred on a distinction based on that point of time. Accordingly it [page 77] departed from a line of English cases which deny the admissibility of
identifications made from police photographs after the accused had been taken into custody.600 Identification from police photographs may be excluded if its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value; for an appellate court the essential question is not whether the identification was conducted with propriety and fairness, but whether on the totality of the evidence a verdict should not stand because a miscarriage of justice occurred.601 However, Gibbs CJ stressed that only in exceptional cases should photographs be used at a stage when some particular person is directly suspected by the police and they are able to arrange an identification parade or some satisfactory alternative means whereby the witness can be asked directly to identify the suspected person.602 An identification parade is the preferred means of identification: evidence of identification of a suspect by means of a photograph should only be led where it is unavoidable and where another more preferable form of identification is not practicable. In the absence of an explanation for the failure to hold an identification parade there is a discretion to exclude the identification evidence.603 Thus there is no rule that photographic evidence should always be excluded if at the time the photographs were shown to the witness it was reasonable and practicable to request the suspected person to participate in an identification parade, though these factors may affect the operation of the court’s discretion to exclude the evidence.604 There is no general obligation on the trial judge to tell the jury that an identification parade should have been held and that they are seriously hampered on the question of identification because the only method of identification was from photographs; nor is the trial judge obliged to instruct the jury on the comparison between the process of identifying from photographs and identifying from an identification parade.605 There are well recognised considerations which would incline a trial judge to permit evidence to be given of identification from photographs notwithstanding that the police already knew at that time that he was the person to arrest and charge — such as where it would be inappropriate in relation to the police investigation to reveal to the accused that he is under suspicion; where the accused has refused to participate in an identification parade or has failed to cooperate when the parade is conducted; where, by reason of the unusual physical appearance of the accused it is not reasonably practicable in the circumstances to produce a sufficient number of other persons of a roughly similar physical appearance to stand with the accused in such a parade; where the physical appearance of the accused is materially different to what it was at the time when he is alleged to have committed the offence; where the accused cannot within a reasonable time be located; where there are other exigencies of time which would make it impracticable to conduct an identification parade; where the witness is unwilling to participate in viewing
[page 78] the parade; and where the witness is unable reasonably so to participate. That list is not intended to be exhaustive.606
Identification from a single photograph is likely to be held unsafe; so too identification from a group of photographs of which only one shows a person with a feature which is an identifying feature in the witness’s mind, such as a goatee beard.607 But even if the photographs shown are not of similar-looking people, but of “targets”, ie suspects, a tape-recorded identification may be admitted because the circumstances of an initial outof-court identification can assist in assessing the reliability of later identifications, particularly where the identifying witness has a close familiarity with those identified.608 Not only is the act of identification from photographs admissible; so are the photographs themselves, so long as there is nothing inherently objectionable about them: for example, that they show the accused in prison clothes or handcuffs.609 To permit a jury to see photographs of the accused in prison garb will lead to the quashing of the conviction610 unless the prejudicial effect of the evidence fails to outweigh its probative value.611 It has been held sufficient to warn the jury not to be prejudiced by police possession of the photograph of the accused.612 The revelation to the jury that the accused has been identified from a police photograph is not necessarily a ground of appeal, because the police may carry photographs of persons who have not been convicted, and it is wrong to infer that the accused was convicted.613 Among other warnings614 which it may be desirable to give are warnings referring to the inherent weaknesses of photographic identification and the disadvantage flowing from the fact that the accused was not present when the identification was made and depriving the accused of the benefit of seeing personally the reliability of an eye witness identification; and warnings, where the trial judge is of the view that an identification parade could reasonably be held, that that is the case.615 It is wrong, after an identification is made, for a witness to be given access to video films of the identification with a view to endeavouring to improve the quality of the identification evidence.616 The fact that the value of identification at an identification parade may be impaired by reason of prior identification from photographs does not
mean that there ought not to be an identification parade, for it still has some value. It is valuable for the suspect if the identifying witness cannot identify the suspect at the parade.617 And it gives the identifying witness the opportunity to correct a mistake in the identification from photographs.618 [page 79] There is no universal principle that would exclude the identification evidence of a witness who recognises an accused by reason of the latter’s previous misconduct: the question is simply whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value in particular circumstances.619 If identification evidence is admitted, but its quality is later demonstrated to be such that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the judge may withdraw it from the jury’s consideration.620 If it were the only identification evidence, a verdict of acquittal should be entered.621 If it were not the only identification evidence, and the judge considers a direction to ignore it cannot cure its prejudicial effect, the jury should be discharged and a new trial ordered.622 Where it was not possible to assemble photographs of individuals resembling the suspect (because of a distinctive moustache), evidence of identification after the witness looked at a photograph of the suspect together with images of other persons which had been digitally manipulated to incorporate the distinctive moustache into them was admitted.623
[1385] Discretion to warn juries: background The court has always had a discretion to warn the jury of the dangers of convicting without corroboration in cases involving the identification of the accused by recognition of his physical appearance.624 So great is the need for caution when identity is in issue that the Supreme Court of Eire has held that a cautionary warning must be given to the jury in all cases of visual identification of a stranger, even when there is more than one witness.625 The precaution appeared to have been held unnecessary by the
English Court of Criminal Appeal even when there is only one witness.626 Further, the House of Lords held627 that no special warning need be given where the identifying witness and the accused were previously acquainted with each other,628 leaving open for future consideration the necessity for a special direction where there was no such acquaintance. The English Court of Appeal then held that, even in such a case, the law does not require the judge to give a specific warning about the dangers of convicting on evidence of visual identification, and still less that any particular form of words was necessary.629 The court pointed out, however, that every summing-up must be fair and that it would be difficult for a summing-up to be fair in such a case unless it caused the jury to give careful consideration to the circumstances of identification.
[1390] Devlin Report The approach of the courts to the problem of visual identification evidence has changed drastically in consequence of the Report of the committee under the [page 80] chairmanship of Lord Devlin appointed by the Home Secretary in the United Kingdom to consider evidence of identification in criminal cases, and of a case in the English Court of Appeal.630 A general rule was recommended under which there could not be a conviction in any case in which the prosecution relied wholly or mainly on evidence of visual identification, even if that identification were more than one witness. It was recognised that there should be exceptions to the general rule in special circumstances to be worked out in practice.631 Soon after the publication of the Devlin Report, the English Court of Appeal laid down guidelines on the subject. These were less drastic than the proposals in the Report.632 The court was opposed to a general rule against a conviction on evidence of visual identification alone, being of the opinion that the crucial question was of the quality of the evidence; if this were poor the judge would direct an acquittal in the absence of supporting evidence. The court was also critical of the reference to exceptional
circumstances in the Devlin Report because the conception would lead to a lot of case law, but stress was laid on the necessity of a warning of the special need for caution633 before convicting the accused, together with an instruction concerning the reason why such caution was necessary. The judge must direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances of the identification, and should mention any item of relevance considered capable of supporting it, though this supporting evidence may itself amount to evidence of identification by another witness whose testimony also requires support.634 The jury should be reminded that a mistaken witness may be convincing and that a false alibi supports the identification evidence only if the jury are satisfied that it was advanced in order to deceive them and for no other reason. It is not enough to identify weaknesses in identification evidence without explaining why they are weaknesses.635 A failure to act on these guidelines was said to be likely to cause a conviction to be quashed on the ground that the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory.636 There is dispute as to whether a full direction upon these lines need not be given if the accused admits presence at the scene of the crime, and merely denies the commission of the crime.637 It is generally not appropriate to canvass the above issues on a voir dire.638 [page 81]
[1395] Domican warning The High Court has stated Australian law thus:639 Whatever the defence and however the case is conducted, where evidence as to identification represents any significant part of the proof of guilt of an offence, the judge must warn the jury as to the dangers of convicting on such evidence where its reliability is disputed.640 The terms of the warning need not follow any particular formula.641 But it must be cogent and effective.642 It must be appropriate to the circumstances of the case.643 Consequently, the jury must be instructed “as to the factors which may affect the consideration of [the identification] evidence in the circumstances of the particular case”.644 A warning in general terms is insufficient.645 The attention of the jury “should be drawn to any weaknesses in the identification evidence”.646 Reference to counsel’s arguments is insufficient. The jury must have the benefit of a direction which has the authority of the judge’s office behind it.647 It follows that the trial judge should isolate and identify for the benefit of the jury any matter of significance648 which may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of the identification evidence.
This is often called a “Domican” warning. In addition to whatever other warning was given in identification cases,
trial judges should bear in mind the special need to prevent or counteract any particular prejudicial effect to which photo-identification might give rise.649 In some cases this may best be done by refraining from special comment lest it attract the attention of the jury to a prejudicial matter which would otherwise escape their notice; but generally a warning should be given to the jury. A jury should be warned of the danger of allowing unsatisfactory photo board identification to be bolstered by dock identification.650 The judge is entitled to point out matters supporting the identification as long as weaknesses are also highlighted.651 [page 82] The principles apply in non-jury trials as well as jury trials.652 A direction may be given in relation to identification evidence favouring the accused, provided that appropriate instructions are given in relation to the burden of proof.653 It is probable that the warning should be given even where the defence contends that the identification is dishonest rather than mistaken, because it is usually open to the jury to reject the possibility of dishonesty but accept that of mistake, and a failure to give the direction might entail a failure adequately to leave that possibility as a basis for acquittal.654 McHugh J drew a sharp distinction between “positive-identification evidence” (where a witness claims to recognise a person by comparing recollections of a person with later observations) and “circumstantial identification evidence” (where a witness sees resemblances between two people, or describes characteristics of a person said to be similar to those of the person to be identified, such as general appearance, age, race, stature, colour, or a distinctive mark or gait). He said the duty to give a standard Domican warning did not apply to “most” forms of circumstantial identification evidence, and that the discretion to exclude evidence might operate differently because the dangers of circumstantial identification evidence were less than those of positive-identification evidence.655 For this contention about the different warning there is some other authority.656 However, both Kirby J657 and Hayne J658 denied the utility of erecting different principles on the suggested distinction; though Hayne J accepted that in some cases not every element of the Domican warning
would be needed and gave as an example evidence to the effect that the criminal was a man with a red beard.659 McHugh J also said that because circumstantial identification evidence is usually no more presumptively prejudicial than other forms of circumstantial evidence, the occasions for its discretionary exclusion on unfairness grounds are likely to be fewer than the occasions for excluding positive identification evidence.660 It has been said that a sharp distinction between “recognition” of a person seen by the witness earlier and “identification” of a person not seen by the witness earlier is not helpful.661
[1400] Content of Domican warning There are numerous instances in Australia where failure to warn of the dangers of identity evidence has led to the ordering of new trials or the quashing of [page 83] convictions.662 Older cases663, holding that a warning was not in the particular circumstances called for, require reconsideration in light of the principles quoted at [1395]. What sort of warning should be given? [T]he adequacy of a warning in an identification case must be evaluated in the context of the evidence in the case. But its adequacy is evaluated by reference to the identification evidence and not the other evidence in the case. The adequacy of the warning has to be evaluated by reference to the nature of the relationship between the witness and the person identified, the opportunity to observe the person subsequently identified, the length of time between the incident and the identification, and the nature and circumstances of the first identification — not by reference to other evidence which implicates the accused. A trial judge is not absolved from his or her duty to give general and specific warnings concerning the danger of convicting on identification evidence because there is other evidence, which, if accepted, is sufficient to convict the accused. The judge must direct the jury on the assumption that they may decide to convict solely on the basis of the identification evidence.664
The warning depends on the circumstances of each case, and no set formula need be followed.665 It is necessary to point out that the initial question for the jury is whether there has been a positive identification.666 The warning usually takes the form of pointing out that the evidence of identification is critical (if it is), that mistakes as to identification causing a
miscarriage of justice have occurred in the past, as judges know but members of the jury probably do not,667 that if there is only one witness as to identification the jury must be careful with regard to that witness’s accuracy. The reasons why there may be a risk of inaccuracy should be explained, and the fact that a witness may be quite honest and still be mistaken should also be explained.668 It has been held necessary to point out in relation to each identification witness individually, each matter (which it is apparent from the evidence) is capable of undermining the reliability of the witness’s identification of the accused.669 But it is not necessary to say in every case that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one.670 The warning usually discusses the opportunities of identification which the witness had — the position of the witness and the person identified, the light, the exposure of the witness to stress or fear or the like — and [page 84] the perceptiveness of the witness.671 If the person identified was identified while alone in police hands, or after a photograph had been shown to the witness by the police, critical comment may be made. The absence of an identification parade, or the conduct of any that was held, may be discussed.672 The dangers associated with identification outside the courtroom but in the precincts of the court at the time of the hearing, namely, the element of suggestion by reason of an expectation that the accused will be attending court and the possibility that the accused will be in the presence of persons associated with the case such as fellow accused or counsel, should be pointed out.673 In a case where there was both circumstantial and identification evidence, but the Crown conceded that the circumstantial evidence alone would not support a conviction, it remained open to the jury to consider the circumstantial evidence together with the identification evidence, and it was wrong for the jury to be directed to consider the latter by itself.674 It is wrong to instruct a jury to evaluate the identification evidence in isolation, assign it some weighting and then introduce it to the remainder of the evidence.675 The giving of an identification warning may, in sexual cases where the commission of the offence is not in issue, obviate the need for the type of
warning given in sexual cases, unless the sexual nature of the case may have affected the complainant’s identification evidence.676 What is the position where there is “recognition” of individuals previously known to witnesses, as distinct from the subsequent identification of individuals by witnesses who first saw them at or near crime scenes?677 Similar dangers arise. Whether a warning should be given in a recognition case depends on all the relevant circumstances, including the degree of familiarity of the witness with the accused, the circumstances in which the accused was previously seen by the witness or known to the witness, and the circumstances in which the accused is alleged to have been seen by the witness at or about the time of the crime.678 What is the effect of a failure to give an adequate warning? [U]nless the Court of Criminal Appeal concludes that the jury must inevitably have convicted the accused independently of the identification evidence, the inadequacy of or lack of a warning concerning that evidence constitutes a miscarriage of justice even
[page 85] though the other evidence made a strong case against the accused.679
Expert evidence as to the general problems of eye witness identification has been held inadmissible on the basis that it would not assist the jury more than a full and accurate warning by the judge.680 The effect of stress on one person’s ability to identify another is not so clear that a judge is required to direct upon it.681 But judges should warn juries that delay between observation and identification is a factor to be considered in assessing the accuracy of an identification.682
[1405] Mutual corroboration An identification by one witness may be used to constitute support for an identification by another provided the jury is warned that even a number of honest identification witnesses may be mistaken; at least that is so in England, where there is no rule against mutual corroboration of identification witnesses,683 although opinion is divided in Victoria, for example, on whether there is any such rule in that jurisdiction.684 Opinions differ on whether it is open to the jury to assess the probative
value of identification evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole, or whether its reliability should be assessed at the outset before the other evidence is examined.685
[1410] Dock identification As has been pointed out above, it is unsatisfactory for the accused to be first identified in the dock (“dock identification”).686 Identification in court for the first time has become so suspect that someone who has previously identified the accused is usually asked to depose to that fact without any such preliminaries as “Is the man who did it in court?” The admissibility of a witness’s out-of-court words and actions to confirm the witness’s testimony that the culprit was in the dock raises hearsay problems discussed at [31175]–[31195]. If the identifying witness has no prior knowledge of the accused, the dock identification has no probative value, because “circumstances conspire to compel the witness to identify the accused in the [page 86] dock.”687 “If … there is any sort of similarity between the man [the witness] saw and the man in the dock, he naturally tends to identify the man in the dock as the criminal.”688 It has been said that evidence of identification which is limited to “in-court” identification is particularly unreliable and is usually,689 but not necessarily,690 not sufficient to sustain a conviction. Such identification is admissible,691 but may be excluded in the discretion of the court,692 or made the subject of a direction to disregard it693 or a warning about the dangers of attributing significant positive value to it.694 The propriety of its reception is enhanced where it is given in answer to a question in cross-examination by counsel for the accused designed to exclude the accused as the guilty party.695 However, it has been said that the in-court identification should normally be carried out in every case depending on identification even though the evidence principally relied on is an out of court identification.696 Normally, witnesses are asked to identify the accused at the earliest possible opportunity after the events. Evidence is then tendered of that act of
identification, often by the person making it and by persons who saw it being made. The witness is then usually identified in this way by a leading question; “Is the person you saw the prisoner in the dock?” This is permissible,697 but: it came to be accepted that in cases of disputed identity the answer to such a question was of little evidential value and it was said that the proper question should be: “Do you see the person referred to in Court?”. This is the form now in use. There have been instances of unsophisticated witnesses pointing to someone not in the dock. But it is now generally accepted that the reformed question is just as leading as the one which it replaced.698
Sometimes an attempt is made to avoid the risks of a dock identification by putting the accused among the jurors or elsewhere in the court.699 There are various drawbacks: the accused may be conspicuous because of non-resemblance to neighbouring persons; any security precautions necessary may draw attention to the accused; the accused may have been pointed out as the accused outside the court while witnesses waited for the trial to begin. There are dangers similar to those of dock identification associated with identification outside the courtroom but in the precincts of the court: it is important for the prosecution to lead evidence of all [page 87] relevant circumstances, including the details of any conversation at the time of the identification between the witness and police officers or other persons associated with the prosecution.700 There are similar dangers in confronting the victim with the suspect alone save for police officers, since this suggests the suspect is under suspicion.701 There may be value in dock identification in a case involving multiple accused since it may assist the jury in understanding which accused is alleged to have done what.702 If the only evidence of identification is dock identification, that may justify discharge of the jury.703
[1415] Identification from photographs The jury must not be told by the prosecution that before the witness identified the accused in an identification parade the witness had made an identification from police photographs,704 unless the defence has made it known that it will require the evidence705 or unless the prejudicial effect of
the revelation is outweighed by its probative value.706 The basis for the rule is avoidance of the risk that the jury will infer that the accused has a criminal record. The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that such a revelation does not automatically amount to grounds for a successful appeal, since the police may have in their possession photographs of persons who are not convicted of crimes; but it is advisable for the jury to be warned against permitting themselves to be prejudiced by the revelation.707
[1420] Identification parades It has been said that, if properly carried out,708 an identification parade is the most reliable means of identification. For one thing, it is inevitably held in the presence of the accused, who can observe and later relate any aspect of the parade which weakens the reliability of the identification.709 For another, the parade is constructed on the basis of getting together people as similar looking to the suspect as possible; photographs collected to try and find a suspect cannot be collected with the view to getting persons as similar to the suspect as possible if there are none, and anyway a range of categories of appearance is needed to see if one can be picked out. And thirdly, knowledge that the accused has been identified by an album of photographs may “arouse the suspicions of the jury as to how it came into existence [page 88] and about the sort of men who found their way into it”.710 Hence it is “most undesirable” that a suspect should be identified otherwise than at a properly conducted identification parade, though failure to hold one, even if one could have been held, is not a ground for automatically quashing a conviction: the proper question is whether the conviction can safely be upheld on the whole of the evidence.711 As a general rule a suspect should be given the choice of participating in an identification parade even after that suspect has been identified by other means; but there is no rule that an identification parade must be held or offered as a condition of the admissibility of photographic identification evidence.712
If no parade can be held because the accused refuses to consent to one (and, statute apart, consent is necessary)713 that fact may be proved to meet any adverse comment based on the failure to conduct it,714 and before the accused raises any issue about that failure.715 Where this is done, the judge should direct the jury, when the evidence is given and, if necessary, again in the summing up, that the accused has a fundamental right to decline to participate in an identification parade and exercise of that right must not lead to any conclusion of guilt.716 And a refusal by the accused to participate in an identification parade creates various selfinflicted disadvantages717 such as the increased prospect of photographic identification being admitted. Further, a right to refuse to participate in an identification parade does not carry with it a right to immunity from other attempts by witnesses to identify the accused (for example, while taking exercise with others in prison).718 Identification at an identification parade may be excluded at the discretion of the court as unfairly obtained. An appeal on the ground that the factors going to the discretion had not been properly considered succeeded where the accused declined to participate in an identification parade, and he was detained for the arguably impermissible purpose of having the parade brought to him, which then took place without some of the safeguards that attend conventionally organised identification parades.719 When an identification parade is held, precautions must be taken to ensure that no prompting, suggestion or hint is given to the witness that any particular member of the group is the suspect.720 Under the general law it is permissible to require persons on an identification parade to speak, but it is undesirable to ask them to state their names, since if the witness knows the defendant’s name there is a real risk that the witness will identify the person of that name even if the witness has doubts about the person’s physical appearance.721 Statute apart, there is no rule of law that [page 89] a photo board identification is admissible just because an identification parade has not been arranged, even if a defendant is directly suspected and
the police are able to arrange an identification parade.722 There can be circumstances in which attempts at photo board identification are better than identification parades, for example, where the community is small, and the identifying witness knows personally a high proportion of the persons available for comparison or where it is difficult to assemble at short notice enough persons of similar shape, size, physiognomy and ethnicity to the suspect.723 An identification parade at which a male was identified as the offender was held unfair where the identifying witness had previously told the police that the offender was a woman and there were no women in the line-up.724 Evidence about how the police organised the identification parade is admissible: it is not an impermissible attempt to bolster its reliability, but a means of highlighting any flaw, and it may permissibly anticipate an issue about its fairness.725 A special type of photographic identification can take place when a “digiboard” is used. It is a series of photographs in which a photograph of a suspect appears with a number of “fillers” of similar appearance. Where a digiboard is used, it is desirable for the judge generally to warn the jury that they should take into account the fact that the digiboard is a static and two-dimensional image.726 Whether it is necessary to warn about other possible disadvantages (eg the fact that only the head and not the rest of the body is shown, so that height, build and posture cannot be examined) will depend on the circumstances.727 It is not necessary for juries to be warned about the dangers of the process as compared with an identification parade, or to be told that the process is inherently flawed.728 There is no need to give a warning about the consequences of showing images of persons sequentially or all at once unless something said or done by the identifying witness gives rise to a concern about whether the witness has performed a “relative identification”— selecting the person who most resembles the offender — rather than actually identifying the offender, in which case the jury should be told to take into account that risk.729 And in general there need be no warning arising out of either the absence of any evidence of a prior description given or an identikit photograph generated with input from the identifying witness, or any discrepancy between the description given and the appearance of the person identified.730
[1425] Identification identification
parades
and
photographic
How do the rules as to photographic identification interact with the rules as to [page 90] identification parades? It would be improper to show to a witness, before the identification parade was held, a single photograph of a person said to be the suspect, and it would be unsafe to act on evidence of identification given in those circumstances.731 Where a suspect has been arrested and it is intended to ask a witness to attempt to identify the suspect at an identification parade, it has been held unfair to show the witness, before the parade, a number of photographs including that of the suspect.732 But if, after a police officer has shown a number of photographs to a witness in an attempt to obtain information as to the identity of an offender, as often does and must happen, the witness identifies the offender from the photograph, it will not necessarily be unfair for the witness later to be asked to select the offender from a group at an identification parade, though the fact that the witness had seen the photograph might affect the value of later identification at the parade.733
[1435] Restrictions on identifying witness’s role It seems that a police officer likely to be called as an identifying witness should not be employed to arrest the suspect or have any other dealing with the suspect before an identification parade has been held, including sighting a photograph.734 An identifying witness should not also conduct the investigation; nor should investigating officers arrange for or conduct the parade.735
Object identification [1440] Content of jury warning Kirby P736 has said that, at least where the identification of objects is
not peripheral to the major issues, a warning should be given similar to that given where identification rests on the human physiognomy. The problem is in one sense more acute, since most humans are distinct and unique in appearance, whereas many modern objects are mass produced.737 “Whereas the possibility of mistake plays the greater part in relation to the identification of a person, the lack of distinctiveness will normally play the greater part in relation to the identification of an inanimate object.”738 The warning should bring to the jury’s notice at least the following: (a) the fallibility of human memory; (b) the risks of convicting on the basis of identification evidence and the injustices which have occurred in the past from mistakes; (c) the danger of contamination of memory by facts later discovered; [page 91] (d) the high importance of securing an early record of the uncontaminated recall of the witness to prevent later elaboration or distortion in the retelling of the event; (e) the specific danger that memory may sometimes become enlarged (even quite innocently) to include matters which the observer expects, or is expected, to recall; (f) the witness’s familiarity or otherwise with the object.739 The English Court of Appeal has held that a direction of the type needed in personal identification cases is not needed in relation to a motor car. Rather, what is necessary is to draw the jury’s attention to: the opportunity which the witness had to identify the car; the ability or inability of the witness to distinguish between makes of cars and the characteristics of cars; whether the witness is genuinely recollecting what was seen, or inventing, or absorbing information from elsewhere and transmuting it, so that the witness thinks something has been recollected which has not in fact been recollected.740 Audio tests designed to aid a witness’s description of a sound previously heard (eg the sound of a car)741 or object previously observed are not
governed by the authorities about identification parades and voice identification.
Voice identification [1445] The principles at common law and under the Acts Plainly, voice identification in court will ordinarily be impossible in criminal cases: the identifying witness will be testifying before the accused gives evidence, if ever. Hence the normal evidence of voice identification will be evidence of an out of court identification. New South Wales,742 but not other Australian jurisdictions,743 followed Canadian744 and American745 authority in holding that testimony by a witness of recognising the accused by voice is admissible provided the witness has some basis for comparison of the accused’s voice with the voice identified as that of the accused. This condition can be satisfied if the witness acquires knowledge of the [page 92] accused’s voice after the event to which the witness testifies as well as before that time.746 Evidence of the voice of a person present at a crime as being the same as the voice of the accused can only amount to positive identification where the witness is very familiar with the voice before hearing it at the crime, or where the voice heard at the crime was very distinctive,747 in which case the witness need not have heard the voice before the crime, but may hear it as the voice of the accused for the first time after the crime, then noting it to have the same very distinctive features as the voice at the crime had. Indeed where the witness is familiar with the voice before the crime, it need not have the distinctive characteristics.748 In Victoria these matters have been considered as going to weight rather than to admissibility of the voice identification.749 Furthermore, the content of the recording itself may be relied upon in support of identification where this identifies the speaker.750 While physical appearance lends itself to some extent to objective description, the same is not true of a voice: voices can be distinguished by intonation,
vowel duration, rapidity of speech, cadence, accentuation, timbre, pronunciation and syntax751 but though ordinary people can recognise voices familiar to them, they may lack the capacity to focus on and describe these aspects in the same way as an expert in linguistics or phonetics. While photographic and Identikit techniques permit faces to be recorded, only audio tapes made in good conditions can record a voice. No vocal equivalent to the Identikit exists, and a taped voice is of little use unless the taping was in circumstances similar to those in which the voice was used during the crimes. It is difficult to have a useful “identification parade” of voices, at least where the voice is said to have a distinctive feature: for identification parades depend on assembling persons with voices generally resembling that of the accused, diminishing the possibility that the accused’s voice has distinctive features.752 A further difficulty which exists in connection with voice identification is that voices vary considerably according to the circumstances in which and the purposes for which they are used. Accordingly, the use of identification parades when voice is the means of identification will be of less value than when the means of identification is by appearance: appearances are far less susceptible of modification than voices, and voices reflect emotional and mental attitudes more than appearances. The suspect may not be able or willing to speak as it is alleged the suspect spoke during the crime. The only reliable identification parade will be one where the voice of the suspect is heard by the witness when the suspect is speaking in the relevant abnormal manner. A discretion to exclude unfairly obtained evidence would have to be considered if the suspect were deceived into speaking in [page 93] the manner allegedly used during the crime; but not if the voice were heard in that fashion without any manoeuvre by the investigating officers.753 If the accused refuses to participate in an identification parade, the police may adopt other approaches so long as these do not infringe on the right not to be obliged to enter an identification parade. If the witness’s voice is identified in court, questions analogous to those arising with dock identification arise, and the discretion to exclude the evidence on the ground that its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value may be
enlivened. An expert in the field of voice identification can, having analysed the material coming from a Kay sonograph to the point where it could be fed into a computer properly programmed for the purpose of mathematical analysis of some of the features of the sound spectrograms, express an opinion based on that analysis and state whether the voices were or were not different.754 Non-expert evidence of voice identification is admissible.755 The requirement for a warning as to the dangers of acting on identification evidence applies to voice identification as much as to visual identification.756 The above cases concern voice identification: the question is what use may the jury make of the accused’s voice as heard by them in order to accept or reject a witness’s evidence that a voice heard at the scene of an offence was that of the accused. Toohey and Gaudron JJ have identified a different process, that of voice comparison, where a tape of a voice made for the trial is compared with a tape of the accused’s during the trial:757 Where a witness identifies a voice on the basis of having heard it before, the witness needs to have heard a sufficient amount of the accused’s speech to be familiar with it because, in saying that the voice at the crime scene is that of the accused, the witness is relying on his or her memory of the accused’s voice. Where a witness identifies a voice on the basis of having heard it subsequently, there should be something about the voice at the crime scene to sufficiently embed it in the witness’s memory so as to enable him or her to say that it is the same as a voice which he or she heard subsequently. The greater the distance in time between when the two voices compared were heard, the greater the desirable degree of familiarity or distinctiveness. Where two voices are being heard side-by-side, as occurred in the present case, the concern is not with familiarity or distinctiveness but with whether the quality and quantity of the material is sufficient to enable a useful comparison to be made. By way of analogy, asking a jury to compare a photograph of an accused with a security camera picture of the perpetrator of a robbery involves quite different considerations from asking a witness whether the accused is the person they remember seeing at the robbery. It is in this sense
[page 94] that counsel for the respondent stressed that, notwithstanding that the aim is still to identify the voice on the tape, the exercise is one of voice comparison rather than identification from memory. As to the quality and quantity of the material being compared, clearly the greater the amount of material, the greater the similarity in the circumstances in which the voices were spoken or recorded and the greater the number of similar words used, the more useful the comparison. A
jury would also benefit from hearing the material more than once so as to enable them to concentrate on both similarities and dissimilarities. Counsel for each side should have the opportunity to point out or emphasise particular similarities or dissimilarities to the jury. The defence may wish to call expert evidence where the jury may have difficulty in drawing a distinction between two voices of a particular nationality or dialect.
Toohey and Gaudron JJ then stressed the need for very careful directions as to the considerations rendering a comparison difficult, and as to the dangers involved in making a comparison. The jurors are entitled to embark on a process of comparison for themselves, and there is no need to warn them not to, since voice recognition is not by itself an expert process, but a matter of common experience.758 One matter making comparisons difficult arises where the voices are speaking a foreign language.759 In such cases it can be desirable to warn the jury against uncritical acceptance of expert evidence that the voices are identical.760 The requirement of a Domican warning has been applied to voice identification.761 The New South Wales cases have been overturned by Pt 3.9 of the Evidence Acts (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). Though specific requirements are imposed for the admission of visual identification evidence by s 114 and for the admission of picture identification evidence by s 115 (other than in Tas), none are imposed for the admission of other types of “identification evidence”, which is defined to include aural identification evidence.762
Uniform Acts [1450] The structure, the provisions and the authorities Part 3.9 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) only applies in a criminal proceeding: s 113. It concerns the vexed subject of “identification evidence”.763 The Dictionary, Pt 1, defines identification evidence as evidence that is: (a) an assertion764 by a person to the effect that a defendant was, or resembles765
[page 95] (visually, aurally766 or otherwise)767 a person who was, present at or near a place where:
(i) the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted was committed; or (ii) an act connected to that offence was done; at or about the time at which the offence was committed or the act was done, being an assertion that is based wholly or partly on what the person making the assertion saw, heard or otherwise perceived at that place and time; or (b) a report (whether oral or in writing) of such an assertion.
Hence evidence which does not tend to incriminate an accused person is not identification evidence within the meaning of that definition.768 However, it is “identification evidence” within the meaning of s 165(1) (b).769 And though the identification of inanimate objects is not within the definition, it is within s 165(1)(b).770 That is so not only where “outright identification” takes place, but also where the evidence seeks to establish identity by virtue of similarity of features,771 though not where identification or similarity of features is not a significant part of what the tendering party relies on.772 Evidence of mere description of an offender is not within the definition, unless it contains an assertion that the person described was or resembled the accused.773 Recognition evidence is within the definition.774 Evidence by a witness that he introduced the accused to another person using a particular name is not identification evidence, because although this assists the jury to “identify” the accused, the evidence is not identification evidence by a witness.775 Section 114 deals with visual identification evidence, s 115 with picture identification evidence, and s 116 with all types of identification evidence. The subject of s 114 is visual identification evidence — identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw, but not including picture identification evidence. Picture identification evidence is identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers. “Picture” includes “photograph”: s 115(10)(a). Section 114 is not limited to “in court” identification.776 Section 114(2) provides that visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless an identification parade that included the [page 96]
defendant was held before the identification was made, or it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade, or the defendant refused to take part in such a parade, and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant.777 In s 114(2)(a) “visual identification evidence” includes evidence of an out-of-court identification.778 It also includes in-court identification.779 An example of where it would not have been reasonable to hold a parade arose where the identification was made only a few minutes after the crime and before the police arrived.780 Section 114(2) did not apply merely because two identifying witnesses had been told beforehand that a suspect was in the parade: any person attending an identification parade would expect this to be so.781 Section 114(3) provides that the court is to take into account, on the question of reasonableness, inter alia: the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence concerned; the importance of the evidence; the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard to specified matters; and the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the defendant and the person who made the identification.782 Section 114(4) creates a presumption that it would not have been unreasonable to have held a identification parade if it would have been unfair to the defendant for such a parade to have been held. An instance is presumably where the defendant looks so different from the other persons available to participate in the parade that a misidentification would be likelier. Section 114(5) provides that if the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel acting for the defendant, or another person chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held, and there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such a lawyer or person to be present, it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. Section 114(6) provides that in determining whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court is not to take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications. The references to “presumed” in s 114(4) and (5) are not entirely clear: normally presumptions are rebuttable, but there is no explicit indication that these
two presumptions are. On the other hand, if that is the desired [page 97] intent, it would be normal to use the language of deeming. Reference should be made to ss 3ZM, 3ZN and 3ZP of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for rules governing the conduct of identification parades. Turning to picture identification evidence, s 115(2) provides that picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody.783 Section 115(3) provides that, subject to s 115(4), picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, and a picture of the defendant that was examined was made before the defendant was taken into that police custody. Section 115(4) provides that s 115(3) does not apply if a defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody, or it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the defendant after the defendant was taken into that custody. Section 115(5) provides that picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, unless the defendant refused784 to take part in an identification parade, or the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody, or it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant. That issue of “reasonableness” is to be determined by the application of s 114(3)–(6): s 115(6). Section 115(7) provides that if picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted into evidence, the court must, on the request of the defendant: (a) if the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into that custody — inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into that
custody; or (b) otherwise — warn the jury that they must not assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence.
The making of a picture includes the taking of a photograph: s 115(10)(b). Section 115(8) provides that s 115 does not render inadmissible picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor that contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defendant. Since ss 113–115 do not appear in the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the proper course under s 137 where there has been no s 138 objection is to evaluate the probative value of the evidence without taking into account the fairness of the investigation.785 [page 98] Section 116 of the Evidence Acts (including the Tas Act) provide that if identification evidence has been admitted, the judge is to inform the jury that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence, and to inform the jury of the reasons for that need, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. This is subject to an implied qualification that the warning is only to be given where the reliability of the evidence of identification is disputed.786 No particular form of words need be used: s 116(2). Section 116 applies to aural and other forms of identification as well as visual identification. One other provision deals with warnings about identification evidence: s 165. Section 165(1) provides that the section applies to evidence of a kind that may be unreliable including identification evidence: s 165(1)(b). Section 165(2) provides that if there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable, inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be unreliable, and warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it. There is no need to comply with s 165(2) if there are good reasons for not doing so: s 165(3). No particular form of words need be used: s 165(4). The terms of the warning under both s 116 and s 165 will doubtless continue to be influenced by common law principles,787 and the common law formulation could also be used in a particular case.788 But it has been said that the Evidence Act is far more effective in bringing home
the degree of caution and provides a greater protection against the risk of miscarriages of justice. This is particularly so because s 116 is mandatory (s 165(1)(b) and (2) in fact appear superfluous in light of s 116). The Act does not adopt an ALRC recommendation that there be a judicial power to direct an acquittal where the only evidence supporting a conviction was identification evidence and there were no special circumstances supporting the reliability of the identification.789 That is the law in England as a matter of common law.790 But it is not the law in Australia.791 Under s 137 identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor in criminal proceedings must be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.792 The circumstances in which an identification, including a voice identification, is made can point to a weakness in it, causing the evidence to be unreliable in a s 165(2)(b) sense, creating a reason for caution in a s 116(1)(b) sense, and requiring specification in the warning to the jury.793
Circumstantial evidence of identity [1455] Similar facts and other probative circumstances When there is no doubt that an act has been done, and the question is whether it was the act of a particular person, all relevant evidence is normally admissible in [page 99] order to prove that fact. Obvious instances are afforded by cases in which the criminal has left traces. Facts such as that the crime was probably committed by a left-handed man and that the accused was left-handed, or that any other physical or mental peculiarity exhibited by the criminal may be shown to have been exhibited by the accused, may be admissible evidence. This is, however, a branch of the law in which it is often necessary to have regard to the prohibition on evidence which merely goes to show criminal tendencies, or a disposition to commit particular crimes on the
part of the accused. This is discussed in Chapter 11, “Similar Fact Evidence”. There is, of course, a variety of other factors which will go to prove membership of a restricted class. On a charge of bigamy, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused duly went through a ceremony of marriage with the first spouse. As the latter is a competent witness for the prosecution, the necessary identification can often be accomplished by his or her direct evidence. But, where this is not forthcoming, and where there is no other direct proof of a first marriage, such as that of a witness who was present at its celebration, it may be established by circumstantial evidence of which a material item would be the identity of the accused’s name with that of the person named on a marriage certificate produced by the prosecutor. Standing by itself it would probably be insufficient in any case, but a conviction for bigamy has been upheld on such evidence coupled with the fact that the accused cohabited with a woman of the same name as the other person mentioned in the marriage certificate and referred to her as his wife.794 Personal identity may, of course, be established by many other factors than that of name, and obvious instances are provided by occupation, education and mental or physical idiosyncrasies. The fact that an ancestor was reputed to have been guilty of manslaughter, coupled with the fact that a similar tradition prevailed with regard to the lineage of one of the claimants, has been held795 to be some evidence that the latter was the descendant of the former. The sole question with regard to the admissibility of circumstantial evidence of this nature is whether a particular characteristic is sufficiently rare, or a class sufficiently small, to make it worthwhile for the court to hear evidence tending to show possession of that characteristic, or membership of that class. The question was discussed by Wigmore thus: Where a certain circumstance, feature, or mark, may commonly be found associated with a large number of objects, the presence of that feature or mark in two supposed objects is little indication of their identity, because, on the general principle of Relevancy …, other conceivable hypotheses are so numerous, ie the objects that possess that mark are numerous and therefore any two of them possessing it may well be different. But where the objects possessing the mark are only one or a few, and the mark is found in two supposed instances, the chances of the two being different are “nil” or are comparatively small … Suppose there existed a parent named John Smith, whose heirs are sought; and there is also a claimant whose parent’s name was John Smith. The name John Smith is associated with so many persons that the chances of two supposed persons of that name being different are too numerous to allow us to consider the
common mark as having appreciable probative value. But the chances may be diminished by adding other common circumstances going to form the common mark. Add, for instance, another name circumstance, — as that the name of each supposed person was John Barebones
[page 100] Bonaparte Smith; here the chances of there being two persons of that name, in any district however large, are instantly reduced to the minimum.796
Section 4 — The Best Evidence Rule797 A — DEFINITION AND STATEMENT OF RULE Definitions [1460] Primary and secondary evidence “Primary evidence” is that which does not, by its very nature, suggest that better evidence may be available; “secondary evidence” is that which, by its very nature, does suggest that better evidence may be available. The original of a document is primary evidence, a copy secondary evidence, of its contents. The distinction is now mainly of importance in connection with documents, because their contents must, as a general rule, be proved by production of the original, but it used to be of much greater significance on account of the “best evidence” rule which occupied a prominent place in books on the law of evidence in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Statement of rule [1465] Lord Hardwicke’s definition The classic statement of the best evidence rule is that of Lord Hardwicke: “the judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will allow”.798 Lord Hardwicke held that a Gentoo was a competent witness, although his evidence was not given on the Gospel, and it seems that Lord Hardwicke was thinking of the rule as inclusionary as well as exclusionary. His view appears to have been that, where there was nothing better, recourse might be had to evidence which would be inadmissible in other cases; but the typical illustrations of the rule are provided by cases in
which evidence is excluded because better was available. The modern law of evidence has retreated from both the inclusionary and the exclusionary aspect of the best evidence rule. However, despite criticism, it has not fallen completely into desuetude. One aspect of it which is distinct from admissibility has been said to be that courts should act upon the least speculative and most current admissible evidence available.799
B — THE INCLUSIONARY ASPECT Limits on inclusionary aspect [1470] Examples of limited inclusionary aspect If the only rule really were that a party must produce the best evidence of which [page 101] the nature of the case will allow, hearsay ought to be admitted in many instances in which it is undoubtedly excluded. If A sues B on a deed, and B’s defence is that the deed is improperly altered after execution by the attesting witness (since deceased), letters written by the attesting witness referring to the alteration are inadmissible on B’s behalf, although they are the best evidence of which the nature of B’s case will allow because the witness is dead.800 Again, if there were a rule to the effect that evidence is admissible if it is the best that a person can produce, the rule governing the competency of witnesses should be modified as the occasion demands; but there is no doubt that such rules apply as the one which generally prohibits the prosecutor from calling the wife of the accused, even if no other evidence is available.801
C — THE EXCLUSIONARY ASPECT Limits on exclusionary aspect
[1475] Examples of limited exclusionary aspect It has been held802 that the prosecutor was under no obligation to produce a ring by means of which the accused was alleged to have obtained money by false pretences. Lord Hardwicke’s rule would also seem to require that hearsay should be rejected, even in cases falling within one of the exceptions to the rule excluding it, if direct evidence is available. But, under a recognised exception to the rule against hearsay, a deceased mother’s statement of the time of the birth of her child has been received as evidence of that fact although the child’s father, who may have been present at the birth, was alive, and could have been called as a witness.803
D — THE REMAINS OF THE RULE The decline of the rule [1480] Remaining instances of the rule It is sometimes said that all that is left of the best evidence rule is the requirement that the original of a private document must be produced in order to prove its contents unless its absence can be explained; in fact this rule antedated the best evidence rule. Apart from this, it is said that the rule is merely a counsel of prudence, for the absence of the best evidence may always be the subject of adverse comment by the judge. Thus Thayer said: “the fact that a man does not produce the best evidence in his power must always afford strong ground of suspicion”.804 Even as to documents, it is essential to consider whether the document is not part of a chattel, such as a label on a bottle, and the purpose of the evidence in question. Evidence as to the contents of a label on a bottle is admissible for the purpose of identifying the bottle. The matter was put thus by Menzies J: [page 102] The course being followed was to identify a container by reference to marks upon a label upon it and it is immaterial that those marks were written words. If it were in question whether a person was at a particular time reading a volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports, oral evidence could
be given that he was reading a book with the title “Commonwealth Law Reports Volume 100 1958–1959” without any infringement of the best evidence rule.805
There are a few decisions which can be cited as isolated instances of the continued application of the rule,806 although it has long since lost its title to be regarded as a general principle of law of evidence. Thus a film purporting to be a reconstruction of a strip-tease act on account of which the accused were charged with keeping a disorderly house was held to be inadmissible because it was not the best evidence.807 The case can only be distinguished from those in which a view has been allowed to take place at a factory in order to reconstruct an accident808 on the ground that there was a far greater danger that the performance of the participants in the film (among whom a snake was included) would not have been an accurate reconstruction.809 The best evidence rule is limited to written documents, and does not now apply to tapes or modern films.810 It is losing power.811 In England it has now been said to “have expired”.812 The Evidence Acts have radically modified it: see [39080].
Section 5 — Relevance, Admissibility and Weight of Evidence813 A — THE STRUCTURE OF THE ISSUES [1485] Admissibility of relevant inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence
evidence
and
All evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the issue before the court is admissible and all that is irrelevant, or insufficiently relevant, should be excluded.814 [page 103] The affirmative aspect of this rule (the exceptions to which constitute the bulk of the law of evidence) and its negative aspect (to which there are no exceptions) must be considered separately. When this has been done the distinction between the relevancy, admissibility and weight of evidence will be examined.
B — THE ADMISSIBILITY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE Definition of relevance [1490] Common law and statutory definitions The expression “relevance” refers to a certain relationship between evidence which is tendered and the issues being tried — the matters of factual controversy which in civil cases are isolated by pleadings or
otherwise and in criminal cases are expressed by reference to the elements of the offence charged.815 It is difficult to improve upon Stephen’s definition of relevance when he said that the word “relevant” means that: Any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in conjunction with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the other.816
It has been said that Stephen’s definition is “not materially different” from that in s 55(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT).817 Section 55(1) provides that the evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted (and it may not be), could (not would) rationally affect (not determine) directly or indirectly the assessment of the probability of a fact in issue.818 The threshold for admissibility is thus relatively low.819 Elsewhere Stephen suggested as a test for determining whether one fact should be regarded as evidence of, or relevant to another, that the matter under discussion should be cast into the form of a syllogism in which the alleged evidentiary fact constitutes the minor premise; it is then only necessary to consider whether the major premise is a proposition the truth of which is likely to be accepted by the person who has to draw the conclusion — in the case of a law suit, a reasonable man.820 For example, suppose that goods were found in the possession of the accused shortly after they were missed, and the accused was unable or unwilling to give an adequate explanation of the manner in which they came into the accused’s possession. These would be relevant facts on a charge of stealing because, if the [page 104] matter were cast into the form of a syllogism, it could be stated in the following way: persons found in possession of goods which have recently been missed are frequently guilty of stealing them if they do not give an adequate explanation of their possession (major premise); the accused was found in possession of the goods in question shortly after they were missed, and gave no adequate explanation of this fact (minor premise); therefore the accused may have been guilty of stealing the goods
(conclusion). As the validity of the major premises on which courts are invited to act can usually be taken for granted, the deductive method outlined is seldom used in practice, but the test of the syllogism may be found useful whenever there is any doubt about the relevance of evidence. In applying either the common law or the s 55(1) test, care may have to be taken with regard to the selection of the appropriate major premise. For example, no-one knows whether a majority of those who plan to kill a particular person actually do so, but no-one doubts the relevance in a murder case of the accused’s plan to kill the deceased. The appropriate major premise is not “those who plan to kill a particular person usually do so”, but “those who plan to kill a particular person are more likely to do so than those who have no such plan”. The whole point of a lot of circumstantial evidence is to establish the accused’s membership of a number of different classes of persons more likely than non-members to have done or omitted to do some act: purchasers of poison, those who have a grudge against a certain person and those standing to gain by that person’s death, for instance.821 Some treat relevance as not depending on absolute criteria. On this approach, the question is not whether the evidence makes more probable the existence of a relevant matter, but on whether, bearing in mind the effect on the length of the trial, the raising of collateral issues and other matters, evidence which is relatively remotely connected to the central issues should be rejected.822 McHugh J removed the trend from hiding: In general, evidence of a relevant fact is excluded only when it infringes some policy of the law, one of which (even in civil cases) is that evidence of the relevant fact is not admissible if the probative value of that fact is so low that it cannot justify the time, convenience and cost of litigating its proof.823
On the other hand, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ have said:824 [page 105] “[A]lthough questions of relevance may raise nice questions of judgment, no discretion falls to be exercised. Evidence is relevant or it is not.” And Gleeson CJ has said:825 Questions as to the admissibility of evidence may be related to, but are different from, questions
as to whether the totality of the evidence in a case is sufficient to sustain a jury’s verdict, or questions as to the warnings that need to be given to a jury about the use that may properly be made of the evidence. If evidence is of some, albeit slight, probative value, then it is admissible unless some principle of exclusion comes into play to justify withholding it from a jury’s consideration. It is not enough to say that it is “weak”, and … whether it is weak might depend on what use is made of it. The totality of the evidence may be such as to render a conviction unsafe. But that does not affect admissibility.
There is no limit to the ways in which particular human experience can be relevant, depending on the issues in the case.826 Thus evidence of Aboriginal customary law may be used as a basis for the foundation of rights recognised within the Australian legal system, for example, native title, assessment of damages for breach of copyright likely to cause personal distress, embarrassment and contempt to artists,827 and a possible equitable interest in copyright.828 Relevance can sometimes be established by reason of evidence already admitted, or the pleadings, or an opening, or the plain trend of one side’s case; but sometimes it will be necessary for the court to seek and accept an assurance that counsel will “make it relevant”— that is, the relevance of a particular piece of evidence, though not apparent at the moment of tender, will appear from evidence to be adduced subsequently.829 This is particularly common in cross-examination. For the consequences if the undertaking is not complied with, see [1880]. In order to be relevant it is not necessary for an item of evidence to be capable of proving by itself the fact it is tendered to establish.830 A question can be permissible even though it may elicit inadmissible evidence so long as it is capable of eliciting admissible evidence.831 It is not the case that a question is irrelevant because one possible answer is not relevant.832 And it is not the case that evidence is irrelevant because it may later be qualified, contradicted, withdrawn, construed innocently or disbelieved.833 In assessing questions of relevance in relation to admissibility, it is not for the judge to speculate about possible constructions of and outcomes which may befall evidence which are adverse to the interests of the tendering party. It is necessary to assess relevance by taking the proposed evidence at the highest level it can reasonably be put at from the tendering party’s point of view. It is not correct for judges in jury trials to assess the probative value of the evidence for themselves and reject it as irrelevant if they identify aspects of it which may make it unconvincing or not probative in the fashion which the
tendering party alleges. The possibility or likelihood that evidence is fabricated does not make it irrelevant. When it is said that judges in jury trials in determining the admissibility of evidence [page 106] have regard to the weight of the evidence, what is meant is not that they determine for themselves whether it is to be or may be believed, but that they determine what weight it would have in the case as a whole if it were believed.834 W’s evidence that A did something to B is not rendered irrelevant by the fact that B claims to have no recollection of the incident.835 Ambiguity, or apparent inconsistency with other evidence, is not a sufficient reason for rejection.836 [T]he fact that an accused has no knowledge of any fact from which a motive [to lie] imputed to a complainant in cross-examination might be inferred is generally irrelevant. In general, an accused’s lack of knowledge simply means that his evidence cannot assist in determining whether the complainant has a motive to lie, but if the facts from which an inference of motive might be drawn are facts that the accused would know if they existed, his lack of knowledge could be elicited to disprove those facts.837
It is often said that evidence is admissible against one party but not another. The propriety of this has been questioned where ss 55 and 56 of the Evidence Acts apply. Those sections make relevant evidence in a proceeding. It has been said to follow that once admitted, the evidence is available to be used for any purpose, unless an exclusionary rule applies or the court applies s 135, 136 or 137.838 But the evidence can only be used against the second party if it is relevant against that party.
Exceptions [1495] General This general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible is, however, subject to numerous exceptions because “[o]ur law … undoubtedly excludes evidence of many matters which anyone in his own daily affairs of moment would regard as important in coming to a decision”.839 The four exceptions which follow are frequently stressed, but there are
many others.
[1500] Hearsay Hearsay, which is highly relevant on account of the contents of the statement and because the circumstances in which it was made greatly enhance the probability of its truth, is often excluded (see [1260]), as when an attesting witness’s solemn confession of having altered a deed is rejected in an action on the document.840 See also [33045].
[1505] Opinion Witnesses are generally not allowed to inform the court of the inferences they draw from facts perceived by them, but must confine their statements to accounts of such facts. Opinion is often said to be excluded because it is irrelevant, but [page 107] something more will have to be said on this subject in Chapter 15; expert witnesses may testify to their opinion on matters involving their expertise.
[1510] Character An accused person’s reputation among neighbours as a person likely to have committed the offence charged is usually inadmissible evidence of guilt, although it might be regarded as a relevant fact, and witnesses’ opinions about a person’s disposition to act that particular way are generally excluded.
[1515] Conduct on other occasions It might be thought that the fact that someone behaved in a particular way on one occasion is relevant to the question whether that person behaved in a similar fashion on the occasion which is being considered by the court, merely by reason of the general tendency of human behaviour to repeat itself. Nevertheless, evidence generally may not be given of a party’s
misconduct on other occasions if its sole purpose is to show that that party is a person likely to have behaved in the manner alleged by an adversary on the occasion which is under inquiry. “You must not prove, for example, that a particular engine driver is a careless man in order to prove that a particular accident was caused by his negligence.”841
Multiple relevance and admissibility [1520] Multiple relevance and limited admissibility An item of evidence may be relevant for more than one reason. In other words, the major premise of a syllogism may be altered, although the minor premise and conclusion remain the same. To enlarge upon an example cited in an old case,842 suppose that A is charged with stealing a shirt from B’s house, that shortly before the alleged theft a shirt was stolen from C’s house, and that C’s shirt was found in B’s house in circumstances suggesting that it had been inadvertently left there by the person who stole B’s shirt. Evidence tending to show that A stole C’s shirt might be regarded as relevant on either of the following grounds: (i) people who steal one thing frequently steal another, A stole C’s shirt, therefore A probably stole B’s shirt; (ii) the man who stole B’s shirt probably had C’s shirt in his possession, A stole C’s shirt, therefore A probably stole B’s shirt. The first argument is of a general nature and is based on the tendency of thieves to repeat their conduct; the second is more specific and is based on the particular facts of the case. The evidence would be inadmissible on the first ground because it would merely show bad disposition, but it would be admissible on the second ground as tending to identify the thief of B’s shirt. If evidence is admissible for one purpose, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is inadmissible for another purpose. For example, to take an instance from the former law of divorce, a wife petitions for divorce on the ground of her husband’s adultery with a named woman, and she calls a witness to prove an admission of adultery by the respondent. The evidence is admissible in order to establish the [page 108]
husband’s guilt because admissions may always be proved against their maker under an exception to the rule against hearsay, and the evidence is admissible although that rule prevents it from being used against the named woman. Accordingly a court may find that A’s adultery with B is established although B’s adultery with A is not proved.843 It is desirable in such circumstances that the two purposes are clearly distinguished in the mind of the trier of fact. In criminal cases tried by a jury, the judge should be particularly careful in direction. In criminal cases the jury must be properly instructed as to the use which may be made of the evidence, and hence ordinarily must be warned as to how the evidence may not be used.844 Thus if evidence of the previous convictions of the accused is admitted in the course of cross-examination for the purpose of impugning his credibility as a witness, it is necessary for the judge to instruct the jury that it must not take the evidence into account as showing the guilt of the accused directly.845 Some scepticism may reasonably be expressed as to how effectively such directions can prevent the evidence from being used for the wrong purpose.846 Indeed, in some cases the danger is recognised as being so great as to require this principle of multiple admissibility to be overridden, and the evidence excluded altogether, though only as a matter of discretion.847 An associated point may arise where a party consents to the tender of a document for a limited purpose.848 Wigmore described the principle involved as one of “multiple admissibility”.849 The term is not particularly well chosen, because it suggests that evidence may be admissible for more than one purpose. This is undoubtedly true, but the point of the rule under consideration is that evidence may be admissible for one purpose although it is inadmissible for another. Ormiston JA has therefore suggested “multiple relevance and limited admissibility” as sounder: the evidence is relevant for several purposes, but it is admissible for only one purpose or for a limited number of purposes.850 The doctrine is fraught with danger, but the total exclusion [page 109] of the evidence would be productive of even greater injustice.851 Section 55(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas),
2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that relevant evidence is that which, if it were accepted,852 could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.853 This is “an objective test grounded in human experience, on the application of which minds may differ, but which does not allow for the exercise of discretion.”854 Completely ambiguous evidence may be irrelevant.855 Evidence is not taken to be irrelevant because it relates only to the credibility of a witness, the admissibility of other evidence or a failure to adduce evidence: s 55(2).856 (Equally, credibility evidence is not irrelevant at common law: There is no distinction, so far as relevance is concerned, between the credibility of the witness and the facts to which he or she deposes. The credibility of evidence is locked to the credibility of its deponent.)857
In a case858 in which it was accepted that questions about whether persons in another inquiry or proceedings had made allegations against a police officer were irrelevant, it was held that questions to a police officer as to whether he had on other occasions as a police officer in the company of other police officers illicitly seized sums of money were relevant, since any admission could rationally have affected the probability of the existence of a fact in issue, namely whether the police officer had [page 110] illicitly seized the accused’s money, the existence of that fact being capable of rendering it more probable that the evidence against the accused had been fabricated. The evidence of two police officers that a man depicted in photographs taken by the security cameras of a bank in the course of a robbery was the accused was irrelevant: since their assertion of identity was founded on material no different from that available to the jury from its own observation, the assertion was not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the jury of the probability that the accused was the person depicted in the photographs.859 The opinion of a passenger in a car that another car moving in the opposite direction was travelling at about 10 kilometres per hour in circumstances making observation difficult was irrelevant.860 Section 56(2) renders irrelevant evidence inadmissible and, save as
otherwise provided in the Act, s 56(1) renders relevant evidence admissible in the proceeding.861 Section 56(1) is not limited to evidence tendered at a trial as distinct from pre-trial stages.862 Section 57 deals with “provisional relevance”. It provides that if the relevance of evidence depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the tendering party claims it to be, eg that a document is authentic),863 the court may find that the evidence is relevant if it is reasonably open to make the finding, or subject to further evidence being later admitted which will make it reasonably open to make the finding. Section 57 makes specific provision to the same effect in relation to the proof of common purpose.864 Thus evidence of an arrangement between airlines not necessarily including two respondents was admitted subject to evidence being called later linking the two respondents to the arrangement.865 Section 58 provides that in determining the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity.866 It has been said867 that while s 55 operated adequately in relation to evidence which was proffered to establish facts relevant to adjust an equitable outcome, it did not provide much assistance in determining which facts were actually relevant to adjust an equitable outcome. However, that is not its function. What facts are relevant depends on the issues in the case. [page 111]
C — THE INADMISSIBILITY OF IRRELEVANT, AND INSUFFICIENTLY RELEVANT, EVIDENCE Illustrations [1525] The plan A few illustrations are now given of the exclusion of evidence which is
irrelevant, or insufficiently relevant, to any issue before the court.
[1530] Remoteness The fact that the defendant altered its sidings after an accident was held to be inadmissible as evidence that the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence.868 According to Bramwell B: “people do not furnish evidence against themselves simply by adopting a new plan in order to prevent the recurrence of an accident. I think that a proposition to the contrary would be barbarous. It would be, as I have often had occasion to tell juries, to hold that, because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.” Where the defence to an action for the price of guano was that an express condition in the contract of sale provided that the goods should be equal to Peruvian guano, the defendant wished to call witnesses to swear that the plaintiff had entered into contracts with other customers containing a term similar to that for which he contended. The Court of Common Pleas held that he was not entitled to do so: “it may often be difficult to decide upon the admissibility of evidence, where it is offered for the purpose of establishing probability, but to be admissible it must at least afford a reasonable inference as to the principal matter in dispute”.869 Where a brewer claimed damages for breach of a publican’s covenant to buy beer from him, and the defence was that the plaintiff had supplied bad beer, evidence to the effect that he had supplied other publicans with good beer was rejected.870 As Lord Ellenborough CJ said, he “might deal well with one and not with the others”. Relevancy is a matter of degree. It is as idle to inquire as it is impossible to say whether the evidence was rejected in the latter two cases because it was altogether [page 112] irrelevant, or merely because it was too remotely relevant. But there are decisions in which evidence has been held to be inadmissible on the score of insufficient relevancy when it would, by common consent, have been of
considerable probative value if it had been easy to examine and adequately reliable, for two facts which may affect the relevance of evidence for the purpose of a legal inquiry are the danger that it will give rise to a multiplicity of issues, and the danger that it might have been manufactured. Each danger affects the probabilities because it raises doubts about the reliability of the premises by which it is sought to justify the reception of the item of evidence in question.
[1535] Multiplicity of issues871 Litigants are mortal, and Rolfe B once pertinently observed that: If we lived for a thousand years instead of about sixty or seventy, and every case were of sufficient importance, it might be possible, and perhaps proper … to raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of statements made … [I]n fact, mankind find it to be impossible.872
Evidence which might even be highly relevant in a protracted academic investigation is treated as too remote from the issue under forensic inquiry because the body which has to come to the conclusion is controlled by the time factor, not to mention considerations such as the danger of distracting the jury873 and the undesirability of pronouncing upon matters which are not being litigated. Thus, in one case,874 the plaintiff, a passenger on a tram, claimed damages for personal injuries caused by a collision which she contended was due to the negligence of the driver. She said in evidence that she heard a fellow passenger tell the conductor that the driver ought to be reported, only to be met by the disconcertingly frank reply, “He has already been reported, for he has been off the line five or six times today — he is a new driver”. Kelly CB rejected the evidence, not because it infringed the rule against hearsay, but because it would have given rise to many collateral issues as to whether the driver had been reported, and whether he had been off the line five or six times or was a new driver. The desire to avoid a multiplicity of issues accounts in whole or in part for several of the exclusionary laws of evidence. It accounts in whole for the rule that a witness’s answers in cross-examination to credit are generally final, in part for the hearsay rule and the rules governing evidence of disposition. And it explains the caution with which the courts approach arguments to the effect that A caused B because, whenever A occurred, B followed. Farwell J considered that “the conclusion depends on the universality of the premise, and a negative instance unexplained
breaks the chain”. He added that the reception of evidence in support of such an argument “raises side issues” upon which the court cannot decide “without injustice to other parties”.875 In one case876 the question was whether an [page 113] embankment erected by the plaintiff caused silting in the defendant’s harbour. Smeaton, the distinguished engineer, testified to his opinion as an expert that the silting was not caused by the embankment, and the plaintiff sought to reinforce this opinion by showing silting had occurred in other harbours on the same coast. The additional evidence was held to be admissible in so far as it concerned harbours in which there were no embankments, because it tended to confirm Smeaton’s opinion that the silting arose from some other cause, but it was held by Lord Mansfield to be inadmissible as to harbours in which there were embankments, since litem lite resolvit. Lord O’Hagan took this cryptic remark to mean that, as the existence of embankments “may … [both in] the case in controversy and [in] the case of illustration [be] identical, proof as to the one could scarcely avail to explain, or vary, or confirm the proof as to the other”. The last quotation is from a case877 which was concerned with the effect of a smallpox hospital on the health of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. A majority of the House of Lords was disposed to hold that evidence of the effect of similar institutions on other localities was admissible, although the point was not finally decided. From time to time the courts have admitted evidence of particular instances to show that wherever A has occurred, B has followed, in support of an argument that A caused B, but generally only when a striking coincidence would have to be assumed if A did not cause B. For instance,878 where the plaintiff claimed that he had contracted barber’s itch from the implements used by the defendant, a hairdresser, he was allowed to prove that two other customers of the defendant contracted the same disease in the previous month after he had cut their hair. It certainly would have been a coincidence of some magnitude if three customers of the same barber had not contracted a disease connected with hairdressing from the same source. But an expert on the matter under consideration is often better
equipped to adjudicate on the propriety of the inferences in question, and evidence of opinion is usually taken in such cases. Particular instances may be put to the expert in cross-examination, and the expert can be contradicted by another expert; nevertheless, the court can arrive at a decision more quickly and surely by this means than that of evidence concerning a multitude of isolated occasions.879
[1540] Danger of manufactured evidence The courts rightly take the view that the degree to which an item of evidence is relevant to an issue diminishes in proportion to the likelihood of evidence being manufactured. But it is open to question whether people are as prone to manufacture evidence as some judgments suggest. The bogy has led to certain exclusionary rules, the mechanical application of which may lead to the rejection of evidence of real probative value. For example,880 a husband petitioned for divorce on the grounds of adultery. The wife had been in the co-respondent’s bedroom, and, when challenged by the husband a few minutes later, both the wife and the corespondent denied adultery. Shortly after that, they phoned a doctor with a request that he should examine them in order to certify that recent intercourse had not taken place. The doctor did not perform the examination because, in his view, it would have been useless. A majority of the Court of Appeal considered that evidence of the phone conversation ought not to have been admitted by the trial judge, and this was largely on the ground that [page 114] the wife and co-respondent might have prepared themselves for the examination, or been aware of its inutility, with the result, in either case, that they would simply have been manufacturing evidence. The conclusion of the majority was supported by the following cynical but oftquoted words of Eyre CJ: “the presumption … is, that no man would declare anything against himself, unless it were true, but that every man, if he was in a difficulty, or in the view to any difficulty, would make declarations for himself”.881 These words form the basis of a rigid rule
excluding self-serving statements of parties which is considered in [17250]–[17355].
Alternative statements of the rule [1545] Issues of judgment It is sometimes contended that the rule governing the inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence should simply be stated to be that all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible without any reference to the exclusion of insufficiently relevant evidence. On this view, the exclusion of evidence on the grounds of remoteness, tendency to produce a multiplicity of issues and ease of manufacture is due to special exclusionary rules, for that which is excluded often has a certain degree of relevance. The difference between the two approaches is, like a distinction that is sometimes drawn between logical relevancy and the higher degree of relevancy called “legal relevancy”, devoid of practical importance. Whichever approach is adopted, allowance must be made for a considerable amount of judicial discretion (in a practical sense) with regard to the admissibility of evidence of low, though by no means insignificant, probative value. The words in brackets are intended to cope with the fact that while in strict theory there may be no discretion to exclude relevant evidence,882 even on that approach relevance can in borderline cases pose very difficult questions of judgment and degree on which minds may easily differ, and the observer may be permitted to suspect that in practice a court’s decision to exclude evidence as relevant is affected, in an undisclosed fashion, at least by the tendency of the evidence excluded to have widened the issue and lengthened the case disproportionately.883
Apparent exceptions [1550] Three suggested exceptions Three exceptions to the general prohibition on irrelevant evidence have been suggested, but it is submitted that all of them are only apparent.
[1555] Facts affecting the admissibility of evidence Phipson said Thayer was inaccurate when he asserted that “without any
exception, nothing which is not … logically relevant is admissible”, because numerous facts are legally admissible although they have no logical bearing on the issue the court has to decide.884 He referred to such facts as that a witness was not sworn in a particular way, that a hearsay declarant was dead at the date of the trial, [page 115] and that due search had been made for a lost document. It seems however, that the criticism is a purely verbal one, because it assumes that by “logically relevant” Thayer meant “relevant to the main facts in issue”. His statement might equally well be taken to mean that nothing is admissible which is not relevant, either to the main facts in issue, or else to such subordinate facts as those relating to the credibility and admissibility of evidence, in which case the relevance of the facts mentioned by Phipson is obvious enough.
[1560] Curative admissibility885 It is sometimes said that, if irrelevant evidence is adduced by one party, the opponent may seek to dispel its effect by calling irrelevant evidence. This principle (which Wigmore described as one of “curative admissibility”) is not recognised by Anglo-Australian courts. Thus on a charge of carnal knowledge of a girl between 13 and 16, the prosecutrix swore that she had been chaste before the accused seduced her. This was irrelevant, because absence of consent, and hence the girl’s character, is immaterial in such a case, but it did not entitle the accused to call evidence concerning the girl’s behaviour with other men, because the court was not prepared to say that, if the prosecution introduced a matter irrelevant to the issue, the defence was entitled to call evidence with regard to that irrelevant issue.886
[1565] Conditional admissibility887 One fact may only be relevant to another if it is taken together with some further matter, and it may well be the case that this can only be
proved by a witness who will be called after the one who testifies to the fact the relevancy of which is being considered. In such circumstances, the court allows the evidence to be given conditionally on its turning out to be relevant. If it proves to be irrelevant, the judge will tell the jury to disregard it. An excellent example is provided by the rules governing the admissibility of statements made in the presence of a party. These only have probative value in the light of the conduct of the person to whom they were made. If A confronts B and alleges that B has committed a crime against A, and B is later tried for that offence, evidence of what A said will usually only be relevant if B’s conduct is something other than a stalwart denial of the charge; but there is no doubt that A’s statement may always be proved in the first instance, although the judge may subsequently be obliged to tell the jury to disregard it altogether.888 Such a state of affairs is better regarded as a concession to the fact that the evidence in a case often emerges slowly, and from the mouths of many witnesses, rather than as an exception to the rule prohibiting the reception of irrelevant, or insufficiently relevant, matter.
D — RELEVANCE AND ADMISSIBILITY [1570] The admissibility
distinction
between
relevance
and
The existence of important exceptions to the rule that all sufficiently relevant [page 116] evidence is admissible renders it essential to draw a sharp distinction between the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. The former is a concept arrived at logically from experience, and its applicability can be tested by logical process. It is not primarily dependent on rules of law.889 The admissibility of evidence, on the other hand, depends first on the concept of relevancy of a sufficiently high degree, and secondly, on the fact that the evidence tendered does not infringe any of the exclusionary rules that may be applicable.
Although the distinction between relevancy and admissibility is expressly recognised in many English and Australian judgments, an oversimplification of Stephen’s has exercised a somewhat baneful influence, and, by way of reaction perhaps, demands are sometimes made for the recognition of further basic concepts in the law of evidence.
Stephen’s terminology [1575] Problems with Stephen’s approach In his Digest of the Law of Evidence Stephen attempted to state the rules concerning the matters that may be proved in court wholly in terms of relevancy. The result was that he had to explain the rejection of hearsay on the ground that it was irrelevant or deemed to be irrelevant, while its reception under exceptions to the hearsay rule was based on the fact that it was relevant or deemed to be so. Other exclusionary rules were likewise said to involve a rejection of evidence which is irrelevant or deemed to be irrelevant. The objection to this mode of expression is that much of the evidence which English law rejects is highly relevant.890 No-one would now wish wholeheartedly to adhere to the terminology of the Digest, although its influence has been considerable.891 The problems of Stephen’s approach, and its evolution into his famous definition of relevance discussed at [1490], are described elsewhere.892
The demand for more basic concepts [1580] “Materiality” and “receivability” It is sometimes said that, in addition to the separate concepts of relevancy and admissibility, there are two further concepts: “materiality” and “receivability”.893 If this were so, “relevant” would imply that the evidence tendered tends to prove the fact it purports to establish, “materiality” would mean direct relevance to the fact in issue, “admissibility” would denote that the evidence did not infringe an exclusionary rule, while “receivability” would mean that the evidence was relevant, material and admissible. All that need be said here is that the additional concepts are not employed in practice, and it is by no means certain that their adoption would render the exposition of the law any clearer.
[page 117]
E — ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE Distinguishing weight and admissibility [1585] Significance of admissibility/weight distinction Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence must be distinguished from those relating to its weight. The former is a matter of law for the court (although it may sometimes depend upon a preliminary finding of fact by it894); the weight of evidence, on the other hand, is a question of fact, although, in cases tried with a jury, the summing-up frequently contains observations on the cogency of certain matters, and the judge can always withdraw an issue from the jury because the proponent has not adduced sufficient evidence in support of the claim. The distinction between admissibility and weight does not require further elaboration, but it is not clear-cut. The weight of evidence is sometimes said to affect its admissibility, on the ground that this is to some extent dependent on the degree of relevancy of the matter under consideration.895 The tendency of the modern law is in favour of a broad basis of admissibility.896
F — TERMINOLOGY Cogency issues [1590] Cogency issues: introduction The fact that evidence may be of varying degrees of cogency gives rise to terminological difficulties which have not been solved.
Insufficient evidence [1595] Incapacity to persuade a reasonable person The lowest degree of cogency is where a party’s evidence in support of
an issue is so weak that no reasonable person could properly decide the issue in that party’s favour. An example is where the English Court of Appeal reversed the County Court’s finding that a fatal attack of angina pectoris arose out of a workman’s employment. The workman had been pushing trucks shortly before the attack occurred, but the disease was one of delayed action which might have been brought about by a great variety of causes such as the disordered state of the deceased’s stomach, or a walk in windy weather. The claimant had failed to take the case out of the realm of conjecture. In such circumstances the evidence in support of an issue is best described as “insufficient”.897
Prima facie evidence: first sense [1600] Not obligatory for reasonable person to decide in proponent’s favour The next degree of cogency is where a party’s evidence in support of an issue is sufficiently weighty to entitle a reasonable person to decide the issue in that party’s [page 118] favour, although it is not obligatory to do so. An example is where898 the English Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s finding that a workman’s death had been caused by the defendant’s breach of statutory duty by failing to guard dangerous machinery, on proof that the man’s arm had been caught in the machine with fatal consequences. The catastrophe might have been due to a breach of statutory regulations on the part of the deceased, but the connection between his death and the unguarded machine was closer than that between the angina pectoris and the pushing of the trucks in the previous example. Accordingly, the evidence took the case out of the realm of conjecture into that of permissible inferences.899 In the words of Denning LJ: “one often gets cases where the facts proved in evidence — the primary facts — are such that the tribunal of fact can legitimately draw from them an inference one way or the other, or, equally legitimately, refuse to draw any inference at
all”.900 When this is so, the evidence is most conveniently described as “prima facie” but there is no uniform usage with regard to the matter.
Prima facie evidence: second sense (presumptive evidence) [1605] Reasonable person must decide in favour of proponent in the absence of further evidence The next degree of cogency is where a party’s evidence in support of an issue is so weighty that no reasonable person could help deciding the issue in that party’s favour in the absence of further evidence. If a ship founders shortly after leaving port, and no further evidence appears in the case, the judge should direct the jury that they ought to infer unseaworthiness at the time of departure.901 If the jury were to find to the contrary “it would not be a finding against any principle of law, but it would be such a finding against the reasonable inference from the facts, that it would amount to a verdict against the evidence”.902 It would be convenient to describe evidence of this degree of cogency as “presumptive”,903 but it is usually said to be prima facie. “Prima facie” evidence in its usual sense, is used to mean prima facie proof of an issue the burden of proving which is upon the party giving that evidence. In the absence of further evidence from the other side, the prima facie proof becomes conclusive proof and the party giving it discharges his onus.904
[page 119]
Conclusive evidence905 [1610] Court must find the fact proved The evidence of a fact is sometimes said to be “conclusive” when the court must find that fact to be proved.
Presumptions [1615] Various meanings of “presumption”
The word “presumption” is used in a variety of senses which are fully discussed in Chapter 4. Sometimes it merely means a permissible inference, such as that someone who receives goods shortly after they have been stolen is aware of the theft, in which case it is said to be a “presumption of fact”. Sometimes it means a conclusion which must be drawn as a matter of law unless and until evidence of the requisite degree of cogency is given to the contrary, as where, on proof of marriage, it must be assumed that husband and wife had access to each other, so that any child born to the mother in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate. In such cases there is said to be a “rebuttable presumption of law”. When a conclusion is necessitated by a rule of substantive law, whatever evidence there may be to the contrary, there is sometimes said to be “an irrebuttable presumption of law” to that effect.
Section 6 — Res Inter Alios Acta An obscure maxim [1620] Meanings of the maxim The maxim res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet (no-one should be prejudiced by a transaction between strangers) used to be regarded as one of the principal rules governing the admissibility of evidence. It will, therefore, be convenient to make a few observations on the subject, although the maxim does no more than indicate one among many other grounds for excluding certain items of circumstantial evidence on the score of irrelevancy, and one among many other grounds for excluding hearsay evidence as evidence of the truth of that which was heard. The maxim is, of course, invoked in controversies concerning the substantive law, as well as in those affecting the law of evidence, and Stephen pointed out that it fails as a statement of a general principle: “because it is not true that a man cannot be [page 120] affected by transactions to which he is not a party. Illustrations to the contrary are obvious and innumerable; bankruptcy, marriage, indeed every transaction of life, would supply them”. To quote again from the same author: “the application of the maxim to the law of evidence is obscure, because it does not show how unconnected transactions should be supposed to be relevant to each other”.906 It is sometimes said to lie at the root of the exclusion of a party’s misconduct on other occasions as evidence which merely shows disposition, but it will be seen that such evidence is rejected, either on the ground that it is too remotely relevant, or else because it is too highly prejudicial. The maxim can have no possible bearing on the latter reason for excluding such evidence. So far as the first is concerned, the real basis of exclusion is that an inquiry into other transactions would merely
confuse the court by introducing a multiplicity of side issues. The maxim has been mentioned by the courts in a similar context. For instance,907 Lord Ellenborough spoke of the evidence tendered to show that the plaintiff had supplied other publicans with good beer as res inter alios acta, but he went on to say that he could not hear witnesses to the plaintiff’s general character and habits as a brewer. The evidence of the other publicans would probably have been admitted if it had concerned beer of the same brew as that of which complaint was made by the defendant.908 If this is so, the case illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of the maxim as a test of relevancy. Transactions between strangers, or between one party to litigation and a stranger, may be proved provided they have a real bearing on the issues in a given case. Much evidence which is regularly admitted would have to be excluded if the maxim were applied literally. On prosecutions for theft, evidence is constantly admitted to show how the prosecutor marked the goods or money in question, or put them in some place to which the accused had access. All evidence by which ownership of the locus in quo is proved by acts of possession over adjoining property, or by which custom or usage, or the qualifications of expert witnesses to speak on topics involving special knowledge, is established, involves proof of res inter alios acta. Reference is frequently made to the maxim in connection with the rule against hearsay, the theory being that a person ought not to be adversely affected by statements made, any more than by things done, behind that person’s back. There is no doubt that in the days when parties were incompetent witnesses, the fact that statements tendered in evidence were made in their absence was stressed as a ground for excluding hearsay. But, in modern times, it is impossible to treat the maxim as the general ground for the exclusion of such evidence. The rule against hearsay applies as much to statements made in the presence of a party as to those made in that party’s absence, for, in either event, they are inadmissible to prove the truth of that which they assert unless they can be brought within one of the exceptions to the rule. Moreover, statements made in the absence of a party may sometimes be proved for a purpose which is none the less prejudicial to that party, though it is collateral to the main issues in the case: such as where a complaint is admitted on a sexual charge, or proof is given of a previous inconsistent statement of a witness.
[page 121] The maxim is also invoked as the ground for excluding judgments in former proceedings as evidence of the facts upon which they were based. No doubt it is a sound general principle that: a transaction between two parties, in judicial proceedings, ought not to be binding upon a third; for it would be unjust to bind any person who could not be admitted to make a defence, or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a judgment he might think erroneous …909
But it is difficult to see what force is added to the principle by referring to such a transaction as res inter alios acta. See Chapter 3, “Estoppels”. No one would now treat the maxim as one of the fundamental rules of evidence, and it is best regarded as something which has contributed to the historical development of the modern law. The objection to all such broad maxims is that they tend to draw attention away from the crucial question of the purpose for which evidence is tendered. If it be said that, as a general rule, evidence of things done and statements made behind a person’s back is inadmissible, the result may be a mechanical approach to the question of admissibility, which can lead to the exclusion of highly relevant evidence without any justification on the score of policy. This is well illustrated by the decision of the court of first instance in a case910 in which a ship had sunk in the Thames owing to the fault of its crew, and the mate communicated with the harbour-master, who told him that he would take steps to have the wreck lighted. This was not done, with the result that another vessel collided with the wreck. In the ensuing action for negligence brought against the owner of the wreck, the trial judge excluded evidence of the communications between the mate and the harbour-master, on the ground that they took place behind the back of the plaintiff, the owner of the other vessel. The English Court of Appeal held that the evidence ought to have been received because “it was tendered as relating to an act done and tending to disprove negligence, a competent person having been sent to inform the harbour-master”. It seems almost incredible that such evidence should ever have excluded. But this case is only one among several examples which could be given of the disastrous consequences of a slavish adherence to such statements as that evidence of what took place behind a person’s back is usually inadmissible. These statements are traceable to the application of the useless maxim res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet to the law of evidence.
Section 7 — Evidence in Federal Courts and Courts Exercising Federal Jurisdiction Federal evidence law [1625] Purpose of section In this section it is proposed to examine briefly the evidentiary laws applicable in federal courts such as the High Court, the Federal Court of Australia, the Family Court, the Federal Circuit Court and courts of federal territories and also in state courts exercising federal jurisdiction in its strict sense, such as in considering the operation of Commonwealth statutes. [page 122]
A — THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Original jurisdiction of High Court [1630] Section 79 of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): High Court In exercising its appellate jurisdiction the High Court will not normally be concerned with evidentiary problems in the sense of deciding the admissibility or weight of material which a party seeks to bring before the High Court itself. It has no power to receive fresh evidence. Of course, an appeal from a court may well raise the question whether evidence was properly admitted or rejected, but this is a matter for the High Court to decide in the same way as it decides any other point on an appeal, namely, did the court below correctly apply the law? However, the High Court of
Australia has original jurisdiction in certain matters, though legislative attempts have been made to confer jurisdiction on other courts in areas where the High Court’s original jurisdiction was formerly exclusive,911 and though the modern practice of the High Court is to remit matters within its original jurisdiction to a State or Territorial court or to the Federal Court of Australia.912 Of much more practical significance is the fact that, quite apart from remitted matters, the State courts may exercise extensive federal jurisdiction, and the Territorial courts and, of course, the Federal Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court, also do so. The admissibility of evidence in these courts, and for present purposes the High Court while exercising original jurisdiction, is governed by s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) which provides: The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable.
This is in accordance with the principle of private international law that evidence is a matter for the lex fori. However, it is important to note the qualification in the section, that is, “except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth”. The effect of this was considered in a case913 in which the High Court was sitting in Adelaide in its original jurisdiction, not under the Constitution, but as a Colonial Court of Admiralty under an Imperial Act — the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890.914 It was sought to adduce a statement in writing by a person not called as a witness under s 34c of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Windeyer J took the view that this provision was inconsistent with s 21 of the High Court Procedure Act 1903 [page 123] which requires testimony at the trial of causes to be given orally in open court. Accordingly the statement was not admissible.
B — OTHER FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS EXERCISING FEDERAL
JURISDICTION [1635] Section 79 of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): other federal courts and State courts Provided there is no contrary provision in the Constitution or in the laws of the Commonwealth, the Federal Court of Australia, the Federal Circuit Court, the Family Court and State courts exercising federal jurisdiction s 79 of the Judiciary Act would apply and the evidentiary law applicable is the law of the State in which the action was heard.915 One “contrary provision” is the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which applies in federal courts and the ACT, but does not cover the entire field of evidence: see [1720]–[1745] and [1815].
C — COURTS OF TERRITORIES [1640] Relevant legislation The Northern Territory has legislation relating to evidence which in general deals with the same matters as the Evidence Acts of the various States. Reference should also be made to s 80A of the Judiciary Act which provides that the provisions of the last two sections (that is, including s 79) “apply, in so far as they are capable of application to and in relation to a Court of a Territory exercising jurisdiction in a suit brought by virtue of s 56 of this Act and for that purpose references in the last two preceding sections to a State shall be read as references to a Territory”. Section 56 of the Judiciary Act gives a person making a claim against the Commonwealth in contract or in tort the right to bring a suit in the High Court or in the Supreme Court of the State or Territory in which the claim arose.
Section 8 — The Status of Evidence not Objected to916 The consequences of failure to object [1645] The process and consequences of objection In general, “a criminal trial is not to be run on the basis of some idiosyncratic view of the parties as to the applicable rules of evidence; it is to be run on the basis of the law prescribed by the Parliament.”916 However, it is common for evidence which is inadmissible to be received.917 [page 124] It is common for most evidence in a trial to be tendered without objection and without debate about its admissibility. If a doubt arises, counsel should make it clear that a tender or question is pressed. Hence, not infrequently, when a question is asked by one party’s counsel and the other says “I object”, the first says either “I press it” or “I withdraw it”. If the tender or question is pressed, its legitimacy may then be considered. In short, it is necessary that a party’s counsel protect the party’s interests in relation to an appeal by “formally” tendering the evidence and obtaining a judicial ruling on it.918 When inadmissible evidence is tendered, or a question is asked which may elicit inadmissible evidence, it is the duty of counsel who opposes its reception to object at once.919 Failure to do so may create difficulties on appeal, for it suggests that trial counsel’s view, in the light of the issues of and atmosphere at the trial, was that there was no prejudice to a fair trial.920 The objection should be made with precision, both as to what is objected to and (if the court requires it) what the specific grounds of objection are.921 The tendering party should be equally specific.922 “It is for a party tendering evidence to make clear to the trial judge the purpose for which the evidence is tendered and how it becomes
relevant and admissible.”923 The rejection of evidence can be successfully made a ground of appeal only when the evidence is tendered and unequivocally rejected. “[I]t is not the practice to allow a new trial for rejection of evidence, however adverse the opinion of the Judge, unless a definite question be tendered and rejected.”924 If counsel yields to a suggestion only of the trial Judge, either from deference to the Judge, as a matter of tactics, or for any other reason, and does not require an express rejection or its equivalent, counsel cannot on an appeal successfully contend that his or her evidence is rejected. Counsel may have been wise, but he or she cannot complain: it was the counsel’s choice, not the Judge’s decision, which prevented the evidence being given.925
If an objection prompts, or seems likely to prompt, an extended argument, particularly if it bears on the substantial merits of the case, it should take place in the absence of the jury.926 The mere fact that it seems likely, judging by the success of particular objections, that other tenders will fail, will not permit complaint on appeal about the rejection of evidence unless it has actually been tendered and [page 125] rejected.927 The same goes for evidence given without objection after past unsuccessful objection. But it is common for counsel to protect their clients while saving time by inquiring whether a past unsuccessful objection “covers” the whole of a particular subject being elicited. With the possible exception of objections on grounds of relevance, as to which it is common for the evidence to be admitted provisionally and its relevance determined later, objections should generally be ruled on at once928 and usually before the end of the tendering party’s case, for if the evidence is rejected the tendering party may be able to mend its hand, and the party opposing tender needs to know where it stands.929 It is wrong to admit evidence “subject to objection”.930 Rulings should certainly be made before the evidence closes. “Parties should know, before addresses are taken, the final state of the evidence, whether the trial be by judge and jury or judge alone.”931 Both at common law and under s 56 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and
the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT)932 a party who objects to the admissibility of evidence is entitled to a ruling on the objection. A document has been held to be a satisfactory statement of reasoning despite being styled a “draft outline”.933 It can be necessary “aggressively [to] ‘protect the record’ by pressing the trial judge to make clear whether he has made a ruling and what that ruling is.”934 It is not open to a party to ask and seek to support a question on one basis, which is insufficient, and then, on appeal, put forward another basis which may properly support that question, at least when the latter basis was not in issue in the trial.935 That is particularly so where evidence is rejected as irrelevant. A new explanation of its relevance on appeal cannot ordinarily be given, because there will not have been any “improper” rejection of evidence and [page 126] because of the prejudice to the other parties in one party being permitted to justify the tender on grounds insufficiently argued before the primary judge — particularly where those parties could possibly have addressed the tendered material by further evidence, including cross-examination.936 The uncritical reception of inadmissible evidence, often in written form and prepared in advance of the hearing, is to be strongly discouraged. It tends to distract attention from the real issues, give rise to pointless cross-examination and cause problems on appeal where it may be difficult to know the extent to which the inadmissible material influenced the judgment at first instance.937
It is wrong for counsel to canvass the judge’s ruling in address by stating that evidence ruled by the judge to be admissible should not have been allowed.938 It is difficult to be definite about when reasons should be given for rulings on the admissibility of evidence. “[I]n New South Wales common law judges have long held that they are not obliged to hear argument on the admissibility of every question of evidence let alone give reasons. It all depends on the importance of the point involved and its likely effect on the outcome of the case.”939 One principle may be that reasons need not be given where the basis for the ruling is clear from the circumstances940 (eg where the ruling is either right or wrong because it turns on relevance or the application of a strict rule of law), but should be given where
important rulings on discretionary grounds are given (so that appellate courts can see whether irrelevant matters were taken into account, or any other error relevant to challenging a discretionary decision existed). Short reasons may also be warranted where admissibility depends on the resolution of some intermediate question of fact or law, depending on the perceived importance of the evidence and the likely effect of its rejection or admission on the outcome of the case.941 It is common for short reasons to be given for admitting confessions after a voir dire, since otherwise rights of appeal are rendered nugatory.942 A party wanting to preserve fully the right to challenge a particular ruling on appeal where the basis for rejection or admission is not clear from the argument should press for that basis to be stated, however shortly. If reasons are given, they should be given during the trial or sufficiently soon after it to enable the losing party to assess the prospects of an appeal.943 If evidence is tendered to which objection could successfully have been taken, but no objection is in fact taken and the evidence is admitted, what is its evidentiary status thereafter? The process of objection is normally left to the parties or their counsel. However, there is authority that although witnesses have no privilege to refuse to answer questions which they consider to be irrelevant,944 they may object to irrelevant questions even if the parties have not, and that the judge must rule on the objection.945 [page 127]
[1650] The doctrine of waiver There is a simple view that once a hearsay statement, for example, is admitted without objection, the fact that it is a hearsay statement is relevant only on the question of weight, that is, the statement is in evidence for all purposes.946 In the words of the United States Supreme Court:947 “when evidence of [a hearsay] character is admitted without objection it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible”. That approach has certain practical advantages: “The failure to object is commonly due to tactical reasons948 or to a desire to avoid useless expense … And it seems clear that the intention and understanding of the parties
would ordinarily be defeated in such cases if the judge were to disregard the evidence”.949 One undercurrent in the authorities is that a party who chooses not to object to evidence, hoping it may gain some advantage, cannot later complain if it fails to do this.950 The problem is more complex, however, in the light of the modern authorities. Admissibility may depend upon a doctrine of waiver, as explained by McLelland J:951 The application of [the] rule [against hearsay] may … be waived by the parties. Both parties must join in the waiver since a testimonial statement, properly admitted as such, is available to be used for or against either party … The tender of a statement may amount to a waiver by the tendering party of the application of the hearsay rule to that statement, and the absence of objection to the tender may amount to such a waiver by the party against whom the tender is made, but only in my view where such a waiver on each side can reasonably be inferred from the circumstances, and this will occur only where there is no other apparent explanation of the tender and the absence of objection. The most obvious instance of this is where the statement, as original evidence (that is, otherwise than as evidence of the truth of assertions in it) could not be relevant to any issue. If however the statement would be (or is tendered on the basis that it is) relevant to an issue in the proceedings as original (that is, non-testimonial) evidence, then it is not possible to infer either from the tender or the absence of objection, a waiver of the operation of the hearsay rule.
But admissibility has been explained, not by recourse to waiver, but because it would be difficult to conduct most trials without the reception of some technically inadmissible evidence.952 [page 128] The authorities suggest that the principles to be applied, which are not limited to hearsay evidence, are as listed below.
[1655] Use of evidence not objected to, if admissible for one purpose, is limited to that purpose (1) If evidence, admitted without objection, is legally admissible in proof of some issue in the case, its evidentiary use should be confined to that purpose. Hence if the statement of a deceased testator in testator’s family maintenance proceedings is admitted as original evidence, the mere fact of its admission cannot enable it to be given an additional probative value which the law denies it.953
[1660] Conduct of parties may make hearsay admissible (2) If one party by its conduct at the trial has led the other to believe that evidence, though hearsay, may be treated as evidence of the facts stated, and the other in reliance on that belief has refrained from adducing proper evidence, the former party is precluded from objecting to the use of the evidence to prove the facts stated.954
[1665] Completely inadmissible evidence usable to the extent of its rational persuasive power (3) If evidence, admitted without objection, is “not legally admissible in proof of any issue”, it may, once in, be used “as proof to the extent of whatever rational persuasive power it may have”.955 This produces the curious result that if a document is legitimately usable for one purpose, it can only be used for that purpose, but if it is legitimately usable for no purpose at all, it may be used at least to some extent for all purposes. A justification, if any can be found, for this lies in the following observations of Walsh J: I think that a failure to object may carry more extensive consequences as to the use which can afterwards be made of the document, if it is clear that an objection would have been sustained, than such a failure would carry if the document is admissible, although only upon some limited ground or for some limited purpose. In the former case, the failure to object may more readily be taken as an assent to the full use of the document for whatever probative value it may have.956
Walsh J also denied that the consequence of non-objection to the completely inadmissible document was “a valid general rule of universal application” that “the document then has probative value in relation to everything which it contains”. Indeed McLelland J has explicitly questioned the width of admissibility. Referring to the passage from which the above statement of the rule is taken, he said:957 [page 129] [T]he words “not legally admissible in proof of any issue” … must be interpreted in a limited way. For example, if one party were to tender a copy letter from himself to the other party, which was admitted without objection it might be said that without production, or proof of unavailability, of the original, and proof of execution and receipt, the copy letter was literally “not legally admissible in proof of any issue” or “incompetent”, yet it would ordinarily be wrong for the court by virtue only of the circumstance that the copy letter was tendered and admitted
without objection, to use that letter “as proof to the extent of whatever rational persuasive power it may have” inconsistently with the hearsay rule, that is, as evidence of the truth of an assertion in it. This is because it would not ordinarily be reasonable to infer from the tender of, and absence of objection to, such a copy letter that the parties were waiving the application of the hearsay rule in relation to it, or (to put it another way) that the letter was being tendered otherwise than as original evidence. The absence of objection in such a case could be sensibly understood as a waiver only of a failure to produce or account for the original, and of formal proof of execution and receipt of the letter. Likewise, if a document when tendered is described by the tendering party in a particular way and then admitted without objection, the absence of objection would normally be understood as a waiver only of the necessity for proof that the document is as described.
A similar process of rendering a document admissible for all purposes occurs when a party causes a document to come into evidence, not by not objecting to it but by calling for it and thus permitting the opponent to require the party to tender it.958 A document may come in for all purposes though it is admissible for a limited purpose if no objection to its being used for other purposes is made.959
[1670] Admission tendered without objection receivable to prove self-serving parts (4) Where a document is tendered by one party against the other without objection as an admission, the first party and the court are entitled to rely on it against the tendering party to the extent to which it contains self serving statements, though their weight is another question.960 This does not contradict the reasoning of Walsh J above, for there is no valid ground for objecting to the tender of an admission which satisfies the rules governing admissions. Alternatively, if it is inconsistent,961 it is properly to be treated as a special case; it would not be hard to multiply examples of how the law of admissions operates sui generis and outside general evidentiary principles.
[1675] Duties of criminal courts to exclude inadmissible evidence not objected to (5) There is authority for the view that in the special field of criminal cases, hearsay and other inadmissible evidence should be excluded by the court even if not objected to by the parties.962 If the admission of the evidence amounts to a
[page 130] miscarriage of justice, an appeal may succeed.963 There is obvious force in that view in the case of accused persons who are unrepresented. Certainly there are classical hearsay cases in which the court excluded hearsay evidence even though it had not been objected to.964 That they are criminal cases is the best explanation of them. Thus Lord Coleridge CJ said:965 [T]he true principle … is that it is the duty of the judge in criminal trials to take care that the verdict of the jury is not founded upon any evidence except that which the law allows.966
There are decisions, however, which suggest that there is, in criminal cases as well as civil, a doctrine of waiver: evidence admitted after a conscious decision not to object prevents any point being taken on appeal.967 However, the older cases just referred to and others968 suggest that there is no waiver doctrine in criminal cases, though failure to object may be a sign that the evidence was not prejudicial.969 Under the Acts it is controversial whether there is any duty on a criminal court to exclude inadmissible evidence not objected to, and, if there is, what its contents are.
[1680] Rules which parties have an option to take advantage of or not (6) The above propositions do not apply to evidence which is irrelevant or excluded by an absolute rule of law (for example, an unstamped document)970 but only to evidence in respect of which a party has a privilege or where there exists a rule of evidence which a party has an option to take advantage of or not as it chooses.971 It is, no doubt, unusual to regard the rules of evidence as being waivable in this fashion, though some of them lend themselves comfortably enough to this analysis. Even in the case of evidence which is irrelevant, evidence admitted without objection is admissible if it is relevant to an issue which might have been raised by the pleadings for the purpose of supporting a claim made or a defence raised, particularly where no party is surprised and all have had an opportunity to give evidence on the matter.972 [page 131]
It seems that evidence which, though inadmissible, is admitted may be relied on by the trier of fact to the extent that it shows a witness to be unworthy of credit.973 Harrison974 has contended that the true principle is that, both in civil and in criminal cases, hearsay admitted without objection is strictly inadmissible. He explains the contrary authorities as based on other principles. Thus if a statute lays down one mode of proof, and without objection the fact to be proved is proved by another mode of proof sufficient at common law, the evidence is admissible. In some cases, appeals have failed because there was no miscarriage of justice in the sense that the properly admitted evidence sufficed to support the result. A party may be debarred by the conduct of the case from preventing reliance being placed on hearsay, or other inadmissible evidence not objected to. While some of these considerations retain their force, the modern authorities appear to have moved beyond the conclusion for which Harrison contended.975 Certainly, the mass of hearsay evidence and other technically inadmissible evidence admitted in civil cases by deliberate consent or oversight is such that, if his conclusion were correct, it would be a fertile source of many arguable and some successful appeals. In criminal cases there is more to be said for a different point of view. It is difficult to be dogmatic on this topic at present; it has been sadly underanalysed by both judge and jurist. Where evidence is admitted without objection and then held inadmissible by the trial judge, while it will usually be struck from the record, it may be appropriate for this course not to be taken, as where an opposing party’s case is not unreasonably shaped to meet the wrongly introduced evidence, or as where the party desiring to rely on the evidence is not the party who wrongly introduced it.976 In native title cases, it may be that where the trial has been conducted on the basis that inadmissible evidence should be received, no departure should be permitted on appeal.977 The problem discussed in this section is not specifically dealt with in the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). But s 190 deals with the waiver of any of the provisions of Pt 2.1, Divs 3–5, Pt 2.2, Pt 2.3 and Pts 3.2–3.8. Section 190(1) permits this to be done with the consent of the parties in relation to particular evidence or generally. Section 190(2)
provides that in a criminal proceeding a defendant’s consent is not effective for the purposes of s 190(1) unless the defendant has been advised to give consent by the defendant’s lawyer, or the court is satisfied that the defendant understands the consequences of giving the consent. Section 190(3) provides that in a civil proceeding, the court may order that any one or more of the provisions mentioned in s 190(1) do not apply in relation to evidence if the matter to which the evidence relates is not genuinely in dispute, or the application of those provisions would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay. This order can be made even without one party’s consent. Section 190(3) is like the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 70(1),978 but s 190(3) is more specific both in the rules to which it refers in s 190(1) and the criteria to guide the discretion [page 132] set out non-exhaustively in s 190(4). These are: the importance of the evidence in the proceeding, the nature of the cause of action or defence and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding, the probative value of the evidence, and the powers of the court (if any) to adjourn the hearing, to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence.979 If some of the rules of evidence are dispensed with under s 190 of the Evidence Act (Cth), this will not mean that s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 will cause the law of the State or Territory in which the Federal Court is sitting to apply, since s 190 is a law of the Commonwealth providing otherwise than as the law of the State or Territory provides.980 Although it has been said that s 190, particularly s 190(2), is not at first sight consistent with the view that the provisions of the Act are not applicable if they are not invoked by a party objecting to the evidence, there is authority that in the Act the expression “is not admissible” means “is not admissible over objection”.981 The words “is not admissible” are used in relation to, inter alia, hearsay (s 59), opinion (s 76), tendency evidence (s 97), coincidence evidence (s 98), credibility evidence (s 102) and visual identification evidence (s 114). Those words may be contrasted with “is not to be adduced” in ss 118–119, “must refuse to admit evidence” (s 137) and “is not to be admitted” (s 138). However, s 137
(which is not one of the provisions which s 190 permits to be waived) has been construed as meaning “must refuse to admit evidence, if objected to”.982 The danger in criminal cases in admitting inadmissible evidence which has not been objected to is that it causes unnecessary harm of several kinds and may lead to a miscarriage of justice, and to a setting aside of any conviction on appeal. If in civil cases evidence is received which is inadmissible as irrelevant but has not been objected to, the judge should give it no weight.983 In England it has been said, in a statutory context permitting otherwise inadmissible evidence by agreement, that a court be informed at the outset of the trial, or, thereafter, as soon as the agreement is made, what has been agreed and how it is proposed that the agreed evidence is to be placed before the jury.984 [page 133]
Section 9 — General Aspects and Problems of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) A — APPLICATION OF THE ACTS Extent of the Acts [1685] Application to courts Section 4(1) of the Commonwealth Act provides that the Act applies to all proceedings in a federal court including proceedings that relate to bail, or are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind, or are heard in chambers, or, subject to s 4(2), relate to sentencing. Save where specifically indicated, the regime established by the Commonwealth Act applies in Norfolk Island: Evidence Act 2004 (NI). Section 4(1) of the NSW Act provides that it applies to all proceedings in a New South Wales court, and is otherwise the same as the Commonwealth subsection. Section 4(1) of the Tasmanian, Victorian, ACT and NT Acts is to a like effect. It is a common integer of the definitions of “federal court”, “ACT court”, “NSW court”, “Tasmanian court” and “Victorian court” that the body in question is “required to apply the laws of evidence”. The definition of “proceeding” in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976
(Cth) does not cast light on its meaning in the Commonwealth Act.985 Section 4(2) of each provides that if such a proceeding relates to sentencing, the Evidence Act applies only if the court directs that the law of evidence applies in the proceeding, and if the court specifies in the direction that the law of evidence applies only in relation to specified matters, the direction has effect accordingly. Section 4(3) of each provides that the court must make a direction if a party to the proceeding applies for such a direction in relation to the proof of a fact, and in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of that fact, and that fact is or will be significant in determining a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. Section 4(4) of each also provides that the court must make a direction if the court considers it appropriate to make such a direction in the interests of justice. Section 4(5)–(5A) of the Commonwealth Act, to which there is no NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT or NT counterpart, provides that, in general, the Act does not apply to certain classes of appeal. Section 4(6) of the Commonwealth Act, to which there is no NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT or NT counterpart either, provides that on a day fixed by proclamation, the provisions of the Act (other than ss 185, 186 and 187) will cease to apply in relation to proceedings in an ACT court, except in so far as the provisions apply to proceedings in all Australian courts. The consequence of s 4 is that the Commonwealth Act has been held not to apply to all proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975, since it does not apply to [page 134] proceedings in a court of summary jurisdiction (due to the definition of “federal court” read with s 4(1)).986 The view987 that it applies to examinations in the Federal Court under Pt 5.9 Div 1 of the Corporations Law, notwithstanding that these were unlike normal proceedings and were “in the nature of a facilitated investigation by one party”988 has been held wrong. It was also applied to Corporations Law s 596B examinations in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.989 The NSW Act does not apply to a Coroner’s Court, since it is not a court created by Parliament within the meaning of the definition of “court” in the Dictionary.990 The word “proceedings” includes a step in an action.991 The Acts do not apply to
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal because it is not “required” to apply the laws of evidence.992 The NSW Act does not apply to a costs assessor or to the NSW Costs Review Panel.993 Section 69ZT(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides that the following provisions of the Commonwealth Act do not apply to childrelated proceedings: Pt 2.1 Divs 3, 4 and 5; Pts 2.2, 2.3 and 3.2–3.8. Section 69ZT(2) provides that the court may give such weight (if any) as it thinks fit to evidence admitted as a consequence of a provision of the Evidence Act 1995 not applying because of s 69ZT(1). Section 69ZT(3) provides that despite s 69ZT(1), the court may decide to apply one or more of the provisions of a Division or Part mentioned in that subsection to an issue in the proceedings if the court is satisfied that the circumstances are exceptional; and the court has taken into account (in addition to any other matters the court thinks relevant) the importance of the evidence in the proceedings, the nature of the subject matter of the proceedings, the probative value of the evidence and the powers of the court (if any) to adjourn the hearing, to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence. Section 69ZT(4) provides that if the court decides to apply a provision of a Division or Part mentioned in s 69ZT(1) to an issue in the proceedings, the court may give such weight (if any) as it thinks fit to evidence admitted as a consequence of the provision applying. Section 65ZT(5) provides that s 69ZT(1) does not revive the operation of a rule of the common law, or a rule of a State or Territory, that, but for s 69ZT(1), would have been prevented from operating because of a provision of a Division or Part mentioned in s 69ZT(1). Section 69ZV(1) provides that s 69ZV applies if the court applies the law against hearsay under s 69ZT(2) to child-related proceedings. Section 69ZV(2) provides that evidence of a representation made by a child about a matter that is relevant to the welfare of the child or another child, which would not otherwise be admissible as evidence because of the law against hearsay, is not inadmissible in the proceedings solely because of the law against hearsay. Section 69ZV(3) provides that the court may give such weight (if any) as it thinks fit to evidence admitted under s 69ZV(2). [page 135]
[1690] Provisions unique to Commonwealth There are certain sections in the Commonwealth Act, to which there are no NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT or NT counterparts, applying its provisions to all proceedings in an Australian court. Section 5 provides that the provisions of the Act referred to in the Table in s 5 apply in relation to all proceedings in an Australian court, including proceedings that relate to bail, are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind, are heard in Chambers, or relate to sentencing. The last entry in the Table is s 182, “Commonwealth records, postal articles sent by Commonwealth agencies and certain Commonwealth documents” (an expression defined in the Dictionary, Part 1).994 Section 182 has its own Table of sections which apply in all proceedings in an Australian court if the documents in question are Commonwealth records. The sections listed in these Tables to a large extent have counterparts in, or derive to some extent from, provisions in the now repealed Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) and the State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 (Cth). On what constitutional basis has the Federal Parliament legislated in this way? So far as federal courts and State courts exercising federal jurisdiction are concerned, it has relied on ss 71 and 51(xxxix) of the Constitution. So far as non-federal courts not exercising federal jurisdiction are concerned it has relied on s 51(xxiv) and (xxv) of the Constitution. For the Territories, s 122 also gives power.995 Most of the provisions which apply to non-federal courts not exercising federal jurisdiction are those extended to them by ss 5 and 182, and the powers just listed seem adequate supports for these provisions. Those dealing with postal articles, telexes, lettergrams and telegrams are supported by s 51(v) of the Constituton. The expression “Australian court” includes the Refugee Review Tribunal: since it is not bound by the rules of evidence (Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 420(2)(a)), other than legal professional privilege, the privilege against self incrimination and public interest immunity, it does not fall within para (f) of the definition of “Australian court” in Part 1 of the Dictionary, but it does fall within para (e). However, the provisions tabled in s 5 do not apply to the Refugee Review Tribunal because of the combined effect of ss 8(1) and 9(1), since the Tribunal is not required to observe the rules of evidence.996 One thing the Commonwealth Act does not do is apply its regime to State courts exercising federal jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Act applies in
proceedings for review in the Federal Court of Australia of extradition proceedings before a magistrate even though the magistrate is not exercising judicial power.997
[1695] Legislation not affected by Acts Section 8(1) of the Commonwealth Act provides that the Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act,998 other than ss 68, 79, 80 and 80A of the Judiciary Act 1903. The Evidence Act, being a statute of general application, has been construed as not displacing, or providing a more expansive alternative to, the specific regime created for the admissibility of transcripts by s 81 of the Bankruptcy [page 136] Act 1966 (Cth).999 There is conflict as to whether the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), making the welfare of the child the paramount consideration, overrides the Evidence Act.1000 Section 8(2) provides that the Act does not affect the operation of regulations that are made under an Act other than the Evidence Act and are in force on the commencement of s 8. However, s 8(2) also provides that the subsection ceases to apply to a regulation once it is amended after the commencement of s 8. Section 8(3) provides that the Act is subject to the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. Subsections 8(4)–(6) provide for the continuation of Australian Capital Territory legislation, but are obsolete in view of the enactment of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT). Section 8 of the NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT and NT Acts, on the other hand, merely provides that the Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act. Section 8 does not preserve the operation of delegated legislation (such as the NSW Supreme Court Rules).1001
[1700] Differential application of s 9 Another difference between the Acts appears in s 9. Section 9(1) of the
Commonwealth Act provides that for the avoidance of doubt, the Act does not affect an Australian law so far as the law relates to the power of a court to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding.1002 “Australian law” means a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory: Dictionary, Pt 1. Section 9(2) provides that for the avoidance of doubt, the Evidence Act does not affect the law of a State or Territory so far as the law relates to the admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a member of the jury, or of the deliberations of a member of the jury in relation to such a decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from the judgment, decree, order or sentence of the relevant court; or bail; or any requirement for admission of evidence in support of an alibi. Section 9(3) provides that for the avoidance of doubt the Act does not affect the law of a State or Territory so far as the law provides for: (a) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption (except so far as the Act is, expressly or by necessary intendment,1003 inconsistent with the presumption); or (b) the admissibility of a document to depend on whether stamp duty has been paid; or (c) a requirement that notice must be given before evidence may be adduced; or (d) evidentiary effect to be given to a certificate or other document issued under that or any other law of the State or Territory; or (e) proof of title to property (other than by a means provided for by this Act that is applicable to proof of title to property). [page 137] But s 9(1) of the NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) Acts provides that the Act does not affect the operation of a principle or a rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which the Act applies, except so far as the Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. And s 9(2) provides that without limiting s 9(1), the Act does not affect the operation of such a principle or rule so far as it relates to any of the following: (a) admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a
member of a jury, or of the deliberations of a member of a jury in relation to such a decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a court; (b) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption that is not inconsistent with the Act; (c) a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding. An example of the operation of s 9(1) is the preservation of the law as to admissions by predecessors in title.1004
[1705] Sections 9 and 10 Section 10(1) of each Act provides that the Act does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament or any House of any Australian Parliament. Section 10(2) of each Act provides, in particular, that s 15(2) does not affect, and is in addition to, the law relating to such privileges. See [27095]. Section 11(1) of each Act provides that a power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by the Evidence Act, except in so far as it provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. Section 11(2) of each Act provides, in particular, that the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected.1005
[1710] Excluded topics, other statutes, internal differences Several general questions arise from these provisions of Chapter 1. To what extent does the Act “codify” the rules of evidence? To what extent are the courts able to develop the law so enacted? To what extent is it proper to have recourse to the rules of evidence existing before each Act commenced? To what extent may recourse be had to law reform materials? But before examining these questions, it is necessary to indicate what topics the Acts do not deal with, what statutory rules of evidence are not found in the Acts, and what differences there are between the Acts.
[1715] Excluded topics The Act is non-exhaustive. It does not deal with certain fields of law
sometimes classed as part of the law of evidence. Sometimes it states this expressly. Sometimes its failure to deal with a topic emerges only silently. Thus the Act does not deal with res judicata or issue estoppel (s 93(c)) or estoppel by representation. It does not deal with presumptions (s 9(3)(a)). It does not deal directly with legal or evidential burdens of proof, though ss 140 and 141, which deal with the standard of proof, assume that the plaintiff or cross-claimant in civil proceedings and the prosecution in criminal proceedings always bear a legal burden of proof. It does not deal with methods of gathering and preserving evidence such as obtaining evidence on commission and suits for the perpetuation of testimony. It does not deal with procedural questions like the order in which parties are to tender evidence or to [page 138] address the court, and the ordering of witnesses out of court. It does not deal with the making of submissions that there is no case to answer and what standard of proof applies in that respect. It does not deal with the giving of notice that alibi evidence, or other particular types of evidence, will be called (see s 9(2)(c) and (3)(c)). It does not deal with the power of judges to call evidence or the duty of prosecutors to do so. It does not deal with questions of when evidence will be heard in the absence of the public or with orders preventing the publication of evidence. It does not deal with the parol evidence rule and the admissibility of extrinsic material in the construction of documents. It does not deal with appeals. Other topics on which most or all of the Acts are silent include the following. Can an inference be drawn from a claim of privilege? Can inferences be drawn from the failure of parties to give evidence or call evidence or respond to out-of-court questions in civil cases? (Cf criminal cases: ss 20 and 89.) Can inferences be drawn from the observations which the court makes of the behaviour in court of parties or non-party witnesses while not giving evidence? Indeed the legislation is silent on inferences, and the use of circumstantial evidence, in general. The legislation is not necessarily open to criticism for having drawn the lines it has. Two questions do, however arise. First, if the Act was not thought to be a good idea for the topics it does not deal with, why was it
not equally thought not to be a good idea for the topics it does deal with? Secondly, if the Act was thought to be a good idea for the topics it deals with, why was it not equally a good idea for the topics it does not deal with? In many instances one answer to these questions would rest on the view that the excluded topics relate more to substantive law, or procedure, than evidence. In other instances the answer would rest on the view that including the topics would make the Act unduly bulky (for example, listing every circumstance where the law imposes a legal or evidential burden of proof in a particular way). But some instances may simply have been seen as too hard to deal with.
[1717] Statutory rules of evidence not found in the Acts But in some respects the scope of the Acts is open to criticism. If one agrees with the late Mr Justice Glass’s view that it was convenient for practitioners and courts to have all the rules they needed in one compact place, each Act is unsatisfactory, because there are many rules that affect the admission of evidence and the way it is received that are stated in statutes other than the Acts. These other statutes tend to vary considerably across the country. Three examples may be given. The first example is legislation affecting the admissibility of answers to police interrogation. In the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 23V, and in the legislation of each State and Territory, there are complex provisions regulating how police interrogation is to take place, and setting out the consequences of non-compliance.1006 Only in Tasmania is the legislation in the Evidence Act 2001 (see s 85A). Similarly, the Acts do not contain provisions about a suspect’s right to speak to a lawyer, relative, friend, guardian or independent person. Provisions on these topics are to be found in other legislation. So are provisions about the duration of arrest and questioning; the treatment of Aboriginals; the treatment of children; rights to interpreters; the treatment of requests for information from relatives, friends and legal representatives; and consular access. [page 139] The second example of legislation related to evidence but not found in
the Acts is legislation which concerns the taking of evidence from witnesses who are of tender years or disabled or reluctant to give evidence in the presence of an accused person whom they alleged has committed crimes against them.1007 The third example of evidence legislation in this category is legislation controlling the ways in which persons complaining of sexual crimes may be cross-examined about their sexual histories. Sometimes these provisions appear in the State or Territorial evidence legislation. Sometimes they do not. But they do not appear in the Acts under discussion.1008
[1719] Internal differences in the Acts A different aspect of the problem arises where some of the statutes modelled on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) contain provisions which other statutes otherwise modelled on that Act do not, or where different legislative structures are employed. If uniformity was a goal of the enterprise, it has not been achieved. The primary offender in relation to the employment of formally different legislative structures is Tasmania. For example, it places the definitions at the start, not the end. But there is a lack of uniformity in relation to substantive provisions as well. Unlike the other legislation, the Tasmanian Act does not deal with identification evidence. Tasmania has provisions in relation to the formal proof of certificates, minutes, documents of probate and letters of administration, which no other jurisdiction has (ss 177A–177E). The Tasmanian form of s 165, which deals with warnings about unreliable evidence, is different from its form in other places.1009 New South Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory (and indeed also Western Australia, where the evidence legislation pre-dates and does not follow the Commonwealth model) have a “sexual assault communications privilege” which other statutes do not (ss 126G–126I). But in New South Wales largely, and Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory entirely, this statutory privilege is found in statutes other than an Act modelled on the Commonwealth Act.1010 New South Wales, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia have a “professional confidential relationship privilege” (ss 126A–126F) which Victoria and the Northern Territory do not have.1011 In the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Tasmanian Acts, s 41 creates a
duty on the court to disallow “improper questions”; in Victoria and the Northern Territory the legislation creates only a power to do so.1012 There is a journalist’s privilege in the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victorian Acts, but not in others.1013 In New South Wales s 89A permits inferences to be drawn from silence during official questioning.1014 No other jurisdiction has a provision of this kind. And these are just examples of a marked degree of disconformity. Many of these differences are explicable on the simple ground that they rest on policy choices. Some jurisdictions want to deal with a problem. Others do not. Some jurisdictions want to deal with a problem in one way. Other jurisdictions want to deal with it in another way. In a federation extending over a continent, that is [page 140] perfectly understandable. But ALRC 38 said that “a uniform comprehensive law of evidence is required”.1015 If so, in what sense are the Acts comprehensive when they leave out too much; and why are these Acts sometimes called “Uniform Acts” when they are not uniform? If disconformity is accepted as much as it is, why bother to strive for uniformity at all?
B — CODIFICATION IN RELATION TO THE COMMONWEALTH ACT [1720] What is a code? To what extent do the Acts “codify” the rules of evidence? For the purposes of answering that question, it is necessary to ask: “What is a code?” The expression “code” can have many meanings. On one extreme view a code is legislation which is the sole and fixed source for resolving future problems. Not only is it not permitted to examine pre-code authorities, it is not permitted to follow authorities on the code itself. “[C]ases … may be interesting, persuasive, cogent, but each new case must be referred for decision to the undefiled code
text”.1016 The Acts under consideration are not of that kind. Because they are statutes, the authorities on their meaning are binding until they have been either overruled by a court or abolished by the legislature. On a second extreme view, a code is not fixed: it is a vehicle for facilitating the continued growth of the law. Elements of some American codes are in this category. Thus r 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the rules “shall be construed to secure … promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined”. And r 803(24) permits the courts to create new hearsay exceptions if the evidence has “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” to those stated in r 803(1)–(23), and other conditions are satisfied. Another example is r 501. It provides that the law of privilege “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience”. But the Australian Acts are not generally of this kind. Stephen took up a third position in relation to his Indian Evidence Act 1872. That Act, by s 2, abolished not only all Hindu or Mohamedan laws relating to evidence, but also all rules of common law and the evidence rules created by certain enumerated enactments. Stephen accepted that there would be cases on the Act. But he saw a process of periodical statutory revision as necessary. He thought codes should be re-enacted every 10 years. It is a very laborious business, but it is essential to the real utility of a code and to the maintenance of the simplicity which it is intended to produce. To judge from the notes upon them, the Code Napoleon and the Code Pénal ought to have been re-enacted half a dozen times.1017
Stephen, then, saw the advantages of a code as lying in its capacity to express a mass of case law simply. While the code would generate case law, periodical revision of the code to accommodate the new cases would ensure that the primary recourse of users would be to the words of the code, not to case law. [page 141] Thus he said:1018 “To suppose that any code would go on by itself
forever is like supposing that a railway can be built which will not want repair.” He also said:1019 The process of codification consists in summing up, from time to time, the results of thoughts and experience. One of its principal merits is that in this way it continually supplies, or ought to supply, new points of departure; and this, instead of hampering or fettering the progress of law towards the condition of a science, would contribute to it enormously.
Of course the Indian Evidence Act has in fact never been re-enacted. It has barely been amended. It enjoys great esteem in India. And it has attracted a huge amount of case law over 141 years. The Acts do not fall within these three categories of codes. There are two possible ways in which they may be codes. They may be codes in the sense that each of them is the sole source of law on the topic it deals with. Alternatively, each may only be a partial code in that while each deals with some topics to the exclusion of the pre-enactment law, in relation to other topics the general law co-exists with part of the Act. In determining whether either possibility exists, it is necessary to search for plain indications in the legislative language of what its effect is. The Acts are deficient in these indications.
[1722] First pointer to codification: inferences from concurrent or adjacent operation of general evidence law Those who contend that the Acts are for the most part codes rely on three pointers to identification. One common approach to the first pointer proceeds in two steps. The first is to collect instances where the Act has explicitly preserved the general law, including the common law. These instances reveal that the Act contemplates the concurrent, or adjacent, operation of various fields of general evidence law. The second step is to infer that in all other areas the Act operates in substitution for the common law. On that approach, the Act is a code in the sense that it covers the entire ambit of the fields it deals with, and is an exclusive and self-contained source of the relevant law, save where it contains a contrary indication. One example is ss 9–13. They point to codification since they suggest that if they had not been enacted, the laws in question would have been affected; this is particularly so of ss 10 and 11, which unlike s 9 are not expressed to be for the avoidance of doubt. Another example of a contrary indication is s 42(4).
Section 42(4) provides that s 42 does not limit the power of the court to control leading questions. That implies that the court has a common law power wider than s 42 to control leading questions in cross-examination. It also implies that if s 42(4) had not been enacted, the common law power would have ceased to exist. That in turn would have implied that s 42 would have been an exhaustive statement on the law of evidence. And that would in turn suggest that in the absence of a provision like s 42(4) the Act as a whole is to be taken as an exclusive statement of the law, that is, as a code in a strict sense.1020 Another example is s 52. It is in Pt 2.3, which deals with demonstrations, experiments and inspections. These are all methods of providing information to the court otherwise than through witnesses giving evidence or documentary tenders. [page 142] Section 52 provides that the Act “(other than this Part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence”. That implies that if s 52 had not been enacted, the Australian laws or rules of practice referred to would have ceased to operate or would have operated differently. This in turn suggests that the Act is a code to the extent that provisions like s 52 do not exist.1021 Another example is s 93. It is in Pt 3.5, which provides in s 91 that evidence of a decision or finding of fact in a proceeding is not admissible in another. This is the equivalent of a common law rule.1022 Section 92 creates exceptions to s 91. Section 93 then provides: This Part does not affect the operation of: (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation; or (b) a judgment in rem; or (c) the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.
This suggests that but for s 93 those topics would have been affected by ss 91–92. This in turn suggests that the Act is a code unless a provision like s 93 exists.1023
Section 145 provides that Pt 4.2 does not exclude the application of the principles and rules of the common law and of equity relating to the effect of the certificate given by or on behalf of the Crown with respect to a matter of international affairs. This implies that but for s 145, ss 143–144 might have affected the law on certificates. Another example is s 165(5). In s 165(1)–(4) there are provisions relating to warnings by the judge to the jury of the unreliability of certain types of evidence. Section 165(5) provides: “This section does not affect any other power of the judge to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury.” This implies that if s 165(5) had not been enacted, s 164(1)–(4) would have affected the other powers of a judge. Hence it implies that the Act is a code save where there is a provision like s 165(5).1024 Several other examples of the “does not affect” formula used in ss 42(4), 52, 93, 145 and 165(5) can be seen in ss 9–11. A similar formula suggesting that the Act may be a code is s 94, which provides that Pt 3.6 (on tendency and coincidence evidence) “does not apply” to three categories of evidence. Thus, for example, s 94(3) provides that it “does not apply” to character, reputation, conduct or tendency that is a fact in issue.1025
[1725] Second pointer to codification: inferences from fundamental provisions that cover the field A second approach to the codification inquiry is as follows. There are some provisions in the Act that are central elements of any system of evidence law. They deal with fundamental conceptions at a high level of precision. They seem to cover the field. Examples include the standard of proof provisions (ss 140–142),1026 the [page 143] competence and compellability provisions (ss 12–20),1027 the rules about questioning witnesses (ss 24–46),1028 and the definition of relevance (s 55).1029 The conclusion that the Act is to this extent a code is supported by the fact that some of these provisions are not different from the common law or the pre-existing law. On this approach the legislation
operates as a restatement. It is not to be nibbled away. It does not permit other development. It covers the entirety of the field.
[1730] Third pointer to codification: s 56 Some see s 56 as a third pointer to codification. Section 56 provides that “except as otherwise provided by this Act”, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding, and that evidence that is not relevant in a proceeding is not admissible. The words “except as otherwise provided by this Act” appear to apply only to legislative provisions dealing with the rejection of relevant evidence. That is because it would be absurd if they applied to legislative provisions dealing with the admission of irrelevant evidence. It would be absurd because it is antithetical to the fundamental basis of any system dealing with evidence law. That basis is that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible because it could not rationally affect the decision of the trier of fact. Hence the words “except as otherwise provided by this Act” deprive the courts of power to develop new rules for the exclusion of relevant evidence. That is because they confer that power only on the legislature — either through specific provisions of the Act itself, or through other specific legislation the effect of which is preserved by s 8.1030 Thus Einstein J said: In the light of s 56 it is not legitimate by reference to principles which are extraneous to the Act, to exclude evidence which is relevant under the test provided for in s 55, not otherwise made inadmissible by the provisions of the Act and not the proper subject of an exercise of the discretions contained in ss 135 and 136.1031
Hence, while leaving open the possibility that the courts could create new rules of admissibility on particular topics, unless this would be inconsistent with a particular provision, on its face s 56 appears to take away from the courts any capacity to create new rules of inadmissibility. But some people take a wider view of s 56. Adherents to that view think that Ch 3 is “intended to cover the field in relation to the admissibility of relevant evidence”.1032 The significance of this statement about Ch 3 is that it contains most of the rules which relate to inadmissibility in the strict sense. They are rules like the hearsay rule, the opinion evidence rule, rules about evidence of judgments and convictions, similar fact evidence, evidence going to credibility and character,
[page 144] identification evidence, privilege, and rules dealing with the discretionary and mandatory exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. This wide view of s 56 must be questioned. Section 56 stands for the proposition that all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the Act. That proposition is not inconsistent with the proposition that relevant evidence is admissible if there exists an avenue of admissibility not provided for by the Act, unless that avenue is excluded either expressly, or implicitly by provisions which cover the field. On the other hand, it must be admitted that in Ch 3 there are probably quite a number of provisions which, on their face, do implicitly exclude any avenue to admissibility other than those for which the Act provides. Thus it has been assumed1033 and held1034 that s 131 codifies “without prejudice” privilege.1035 Another example, it has been said, is ss 117–125,1036 dealing with “client legal privilege”— what is at common law called legal professional privilege.1037 That was a view taken by McLelland J in Eq. However, a different view has been taken by other judges.1038 Certainly ss 117–125 seem to depend on complex definitions, and on technical and seemingly precise interlocking provisions. A question arises: What scope is there for any principle relating to the former law of legal professional privilege to apply within this novel, somewhat contorted and apparently complete statutory scheme? That is a reasonable question. The most principled argument for the view that common law rules do survive legislation as complex as ss 117–125 rests on a particular approach to statutory construction. It was identified by a member of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Basten JA. He referred to the approval given by O’Connor J in Potter v Minahan1039 to a proposition stated thus in Maxwell on Statutes:1040 It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.
Since that time, the High Court has said that a statute will not be construed as overriding fundamental principles of the common law unless an intention to do so is “clearly manifested by unmistakeable and
unambiguous language”.1041 It is now fashionable to call this “the principle of legality”. A critic might say that legal professional privilege causes a lot of harm. It tempts practitioners and their clients into false swearing. It leads to timeconsuming interlocutory disputes about privilege claims. But despite that, under the common law of Australia, legal professional privilege has been seen as conferring an almost constitutional right. Thus the High Court has held that there is no exception to the [page 145] privilege even if the material for which privilege is claimed might help in raising a reasonable doubt in favour of an accused person.1042 There are therefore statements in the High Court which would suggest that legal professional privilege is a fundamental principle of the general law only to be overridden by clear words. Now, Basten JA said: “The rules of evidence include principles which may be understood as protective of fundamental rights, freedoms and immunities, but that could not be said of the general law system of evidence as a whole.”1043 But even if that is conceded, legal professional privilege is generally thought to be sufficiently fundamental to attract the principle of legality. Accordingly, Basten JA found that material which would have been privileged under the general law continued to be privileged even though it was not privileged under ss 117–125. There are other examples where parts of Ch 3 have been held not to be a mini-code. One example is Ch 3 Pt 3.2, which deals with hearsay.1044 It has been held not to override or abolish the common law exception to the hearsay rule concerning admissions by predecessors in title.1045 Thus a common law rule of admissibility was held to survive. Whatever the position in relation to Ch 3, it seems unlikely that Ch 2 is a code. Chapter 2 of the Act contains ss 26–46, which are provisions important in relation to the actual conduct of the trial. If Ch 2 is not a code, it does not prevent at least some common law rules of inadmissibility continuing. If Ch 2 is a code, it might not be possible to take the most common of objections to a question in cross-examination — that the question is a double question — for that ground is not listed in s 41(1). It may be that the problem is met by applying s 11(1) or s 26(a).
Section 11(1) provides: “The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.” Section 26(a) provides that the court may make such orders as it considers just “in relation to the way in which witnesses are to be questioned”. But even invocation of ss 11(1) and 26(a) so as to render relevant evidence inadmissible in ways not provided for in the Act is seriously damaging to the idea that it is a code, for ss 11(1) expressly and 26(a) by implication contemplate the existence of court powers in relation to evidence which are independent of the Act. They are also damaging to the idea that the Act operates as a precise aid to practitioners and the courts. That is because ss 11(1) and 26(a) are extremely vague and general. If they can be called into play to solve any particular problem which more specific provisions seem to throw up, they will have preserved considerable judicial power to revive old rules or create new ones. The idea that Ch 2 is not a code may call for qualification in at least two respects. The first qualification arises from Ch 2 Pt 2.1 Div 1. That deals with the competence and compellability of witnesses. It commences with s 12. Section 12 provides: “Except as otherwise provided by this Act” every person is competent to give evidence, and a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence. This strongly suggests that pre-enactment rules rendering witnesses incompetent or non-compellable have not survived, and that it is not open to the courts to create new ones. A second qualification arises from Ch 2 Pt 2.2.1046 It contains s 51, which abolishes the common law rules for proving the contents of documents. [page 146]
[1732] First pointer against codification: the terms of the Act So much for the legislative signs pointing towards codification. There are other signs pointing against codification. One sign pointing against codification is Pt 2.2. That Part deals with proving the contents of documents. Sections 47–50 contain the main
provisions. Section 51 provides: “The principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished.” This implies that but for s 51 the common law rules would have continued alongside those set out in ss 47–50. This points against viewing the Act as a whole as a code, because, if it were, s 51 would not have been necessary. It leaves ss 47–50 as a mini-code on the proof of documents.1047 A different type of example is ss 174–175.1048 These sections provide that certain materials “may be adduced” to prove foreign law. This language implies that foreign law may be proved in other ways, and that it remains open to courts to uphold the validity of doing so in other ways. Thus rules facilitating the reception of evidence of foreign law may continue from the past or be created in the future unless they are inconsistent with the Act.1049 Another example may concern judicial notice. Some courts have assumed that the common law principles of judicial notice operate alongside s 144.1050 The assumption may be supportable as follows. The effect of s 56(1) is to render admissible all evidence that is relevant, except as is otherwise provided by the legislation. Section 144 does not in terms prohibit the reception of evidence judicially noticed at common law. It is facultative, not prohibitory. It permits some forms of judicial notice. It does not in terms forbid others. On this argument, its language does not “cover the field”.
[1735] Second pointer against codification: the legislative history A second pointer against codification is the legislative history. Clause 15(1)(b) of the Bill recommended in ALRC 38, if enacted, would have provided: (1) In proceedings to which this Act applies, the provisions of this Act (other than Division 3 of Part VI) apply to the exclusion of the operation of … (b) the principles and rules of the common law and of equity …
The commentary provided by the ALRC stated: This clause applies the substantive provisions of the Act, with the significant exception of Part VI, Division 3 (which relates to mode of proof of documents) as an exhaustive statement of the law.1051
Had it been enacted, that clause would have rendered the Act a code, subject to any other operative statute.1052 No common law rules of evidence would have survived. An Evidence Bill introduced in New South Wales in 1991 contained a [page 147] clause (cl 7) similar in effect to cl 15. However, the first Evidence Bill introduced by the Commonwealth in 1991 contained a cl 16, which contemplated that the general law would continue except in so far as it was inconsistent with the Act. Mr D Kerr, the Minister for Justice, was the Minister who had carriage of the Bill in the years before its enactment in 1995. He was adamant that the Act is in no sense a code. In a letter of 28 April 1994 to Senator B Cooney, Chairman, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, the Minister said of some remarks by the Hon WAN Wells QC: Many of the criticisms by Mr Wells (and some others) relate to codification. Mr Wells (correctly) identifies clause 7 of the 1991 NSW Bill “… the provisions of this Act … apply to the exclusion of the principles and rules of the common law and of equity” — subject to several exceptions — as the basis for the contention that the (1991 NSW) Bill is a code. Similar provision is in the LRC Bill. It is a conspicuous omission from the Evidence Bill 1993 (as from the 1991 Commonwealth Bill) that there is no provision along the lines of clause 7. Since the Evidence Bill 1993 is not a code all criticisms of it which in any way depend on, or are related to, the question of codification are misconceived and completely irrelevant.
What Mr Kerr was saying was that while cl 15(1) of the ALRC recommendation and cl 7 of the 1991 New South Wales Bill would have made the legislation a code, the 1991 and 1993 Bills prepared by the Commonwealth contained no reference to cl 7 and were not codes. The 1993 Commonwealth Bill was what became the Act as enacted in 1995. Hence what Mr Kerr said demonstrates, for what it is worth, that the Act was not intended to be a code. Instead of the now abandoned cl 7, the Acts other than the Commonwealth Act provide in s 9(1): This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.
There is no equivalent in the Commonwealth Act. Two Commonwealth officers familiar with the final stages of preparing the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) said of s 9(1): Subsection 9(1) of the NSW Act appears to be directed to the question, prominent in some comments on the Evidence Bills before they were passed, whether the Evidence Act is a code. Section 9(1) is intended to indicate that the Act is not, as a whole, a code of the law of evidence. Unfortunately, its effect may be to lead to restrictive interpretation of the Act in some respects. If so, decisions under the NSW Act on the continued application of common law rules which rely on s 9(1) will not provide guidance in relation to the Commonwealth Act.
Implicit in this passage is the proposition that neither the Commonwealth Act nor the other Acts are codes. There is, however, authority that the common law will have more of a role to play in jurisdictions which have s 9(1) in its New South Wales form than it will in relation to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).1053 [page 148] There are also judicial observations that the Act is not,1054 or that particular parts of it are not,1055 a code. On the other hand, it has been said that Ch 3 constitutes a code “in a practical sense”.1056
[1740] Third pointer against codification: principle of legality A third pointer against codification rests on the idea that there are some common law principles which are so fundamental that they survive and co-exist with the Act, despite s 56. As noted earlier, this illustration of the principle of legality appealed to Basten JA in relation to legal professional privilege.
[1742] Illustrations of principle of legality It has been said that certain Queensland legislation did not modify “the underlying principle of the accusatorial and adversarial system that it is for the prosecution to put its case both fully and fairly before the jury, before the accused is called on to announce the course that will be followed at trial.”1057 Nothing in the legislation modifies it, and hence, even though it
is not preserved by ss 8 and 9–11, it must therefore continue. The same must be true of other fundamental principles. One is that quite apart from statutory provisions about the use of prior inconsistent statements to discredit witnesses in cross-examination, when a witness is cross-examined to demonstrate bias and denies it, it is necessary to put the denials of the evidence which it is proposed to call in rebuttal of the denial.1058 The legislation says nothing about this, but it would be strange if so fundamental a rule of fairness did not survive. The question whether, where an objecting party is unable to persuade the court that one of the discretionary avenues of exclusion under the legislation applies, the court still retains a common law discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence where that is necessary to ensure a fair trial, has been left open.1059 The common law discretion is not preserved by ss 8 and 9–11. The survival of any common law discretion would be inconsistent with the legislation being a code. Another area where the common law may survive even though it is not preserved by ss 8 and 9–11 is the area in which the courts rely on matters of common experience outside judicial notice, and also the area in which they conduct inquiries independently of evidence in reaching conclusions about “legislative facts”: see as to the former [3200]–[3305], and as to the latter [3156]–[3160]. These areas do not appear to be covered by ss 143– 144, which deal with judicial notice strictly so-called: [3160]. Hence the common law position may well survive. It would be extraordinarily inconvenient if it did not. Next, there is a common law rule of fairness which has been formulated thus: Unless notice has already clearly been given of the cross-examiner’s intention to rely upon such matters, it is necessary to put to an opponent’s witness in cross-examination the nature of the case upon which it is proposed to rely in contradiction of his evidence,
[page 149] particularly where that case relies on inferences to be drawn from other evidence in the proceedings. [The rule] is necessary both to give the witness the opportunity to deal with that other evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from it, and to allow the other party the opportunity to call evidence either to corroborate that explanation or to contradict the inference sought to be drawn.1060
It is called “the rule in Browne v Dunn”1061 after the House of Lords case in which it was enunciated. At common law various consequences may flow from non-compliance with the rule. Some may be set out as follows: 1) If a witness is not cross-examined on a point, cross-examining counsel may be taken to accept it and may not be permitted to address in a fashion which asks the court not to accept it. 2) If the witness has not been cross-examined on a particular matter, that may be a very good reason for accepting that witness’s evidence, particularly if it is uncontradicted by other evidence. 3) The trial judge may accede to an application by counsel for the party who called the witness who was not questioned in conformity with the rule to call evidence in rebuttal or to have the witness recalled for further cross-examination. 4) A failure to comply with the rule may cause the party in default to become disentitled from relying on evidence against the witness. 5) It is possible that the jury may be discharged, or a curative direction given. 6) The court may be inclined to disregard a submission which was not tested by putting it to the person best able to deal with it. 7) If a party in breach of the rule calls evidence inconsistent with that of the witness who was not cross-examined, it may be open to infer that the inconsistent evidence was not in accordance with instructions given to counsel about how the cross-examination should proceed and should be disbelieved as a recent invention. The proposal in ALRC 26 about the rule was as follows: A cross-examiner should be required to put to each of the opponent’s witnesses so much of the substance of the cross-examiner’s own case as concerns that witness or on which that witness could give evidence. Non-compliance should not result in the exclusion of evidence but the judge should have a discretion to permit recall of the witness.1062
ALRC 38 claimed that this proposal was supported and should be implemented. Section 46(1) of the Act now provides: The Court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence about a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party, being a matter on which the witness was not crossexamined, if the evidence concerned has been admitted and: (a) it contradicts evidence about the matter given by the witness in examination in chief; or
(b) the witness could have given evidence about the matter in examination in chief.
Section 46 relates to the third of the common law consequences of not complying with the rule in Browne v Dunn. It reflects the recommendation that non-compliance with the rule “should not result in the exclusion of evidence”. That is achieved by s 56: if the evidence is relevant it is admissible unless excluded by a positive provision in the Act, and there is no such provision. But the Act is silent on [page 150] other possible consequences at common law of breach of the rule. Do they continue? It has been held that the common law rule in Browne v Dunn continues to exist despite the Act.1063 If so, its consequences survive the Act unless any of them is inconsistent with the Act. And if that is so, this is an instance where the Act is not a code. A technical justification for the survival of these common law consequences of Browne v Dunn would lie in s 9(1) of the New South Wales, Tasmanian, Victorian, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory Acts. It provides: This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.
There is no equivalent to s 9(1) of those Acts in the Commonwealth Act. Under that Act, survival of the fundamental rules of fairness stated in Browne v Dunn, and other fundamental rules of fairness, would therefore seem to depend on the principle of legality.1064
C — CODIFICATION IN RELATION TO THE NSW ACT, THE VIC ACT, THE TAS ACT, THE ACT ACT AND THE NT ACT [1750] Mini codes The inquiry is, at least at the level of principle, a simpler one for the other Acts. As has been seen, s 8 provides that the Acts do not affect the
operation of the provisions of any other Act. However, the Evidence (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 1995 (NSW), for example, repeals or amends many pieces of legislation, most notably the Evidence Act 1898. Section 9(1) provides, as has been noted, that the Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity, except so far as the Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. In short, the legislation is conventional in character. What is not expressly or necessarily abolished or qualified survives. However, evaluating just what contrary provision is made by necessary intendment could in particular circumstances be difficult. In many particular fields the State Acts would appear intended to squeeze out any anterior rules just as corresponding Commonwealth sections do.1065 The inquiry whether any of the Acts as a whole can be characterised as a code, or as a non-code, by reference to particular provisions may have approached the problem from a wrong angle. It may be necessary not to ask that wide question, but instead to concentrate on the particular field under examination. The effect of s 56 is that it is not open to the courts to continue or create rules of exclusion: it says nothing about rules continuing or creating avenues of admissibility. Further, some provisions in the Act make it plain that they cover the field, but only their own particular field. Hence though the Act as a whole is not a code, particular provisions or groups of provision operate so as to exclude the possibility of some common law rules surviving or new ones being created. The Act may be said to contain various mini-codes. [page 151]
D — JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT [1755] Forms of judicial development It seems likely that judicial development of the law will take four forms. (a) Some parts of the legislation are extremely detailed, and here the role of judicial development of the law appears limited merely to engaging in conventional statutory construction. The language may be easy or it may be difficult: but the task of construing it will be a task of judicial
construction, not judicial legislation. (b)(i) Some parts of the law of evidence are expressly preserved as not being affected by the Acts, and here the judicial role in developing the common law and construing other statutes will continue in conventional fashion. (ii) Some parts of the law of evidence, or of areas of law adjoining the law of evidence, are not the subject of provisions, and here too the judicial role continues in conventional fashion. (c) In some areas the legislation does not contain a detailed statement of the applicable rules, but rather a technique of very general language is employed. For example, s 144(1)(b) provides: Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is: … (b) capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned.
Over time it may be expected that a mass of authority will build up about the meaning of “reasonably open to question”, “authority” and “cannot reasonably be questioned”. That is a field in which judges can toil untrammelled and unassisted by the precision of language employed in other parts of the Act (eg Pt 3.2 on hearsay). (d) The legislation creates many discretions, and many areas in which the court can be asked to give leave, grant permission or make a direction to do something.1066 General factors are listed for some of these (eg s 192),1067 and particular factors are listed in particular places, but the tests are normally non-exhaustive. The courts thus have an opportunity to bring to light and isolate the significance of other factors, as well as to evaluate as a whole differing permutations of relevant factors. The decisions are discretionary decisions, but the discretions are controlled by principle, and the courts have some freedom in developing the principles, subject to the constraints imposed by the Act read as a whole. The importance of attending to s 192 has been stressed.1068 However, failure to refer explicitly to the factors set out in s 192 is not itself an error of law; it should be assumed, unless the contrary can be inferred, that the judge would have had [page 152]
regard to them.1069 Section 192A authorises the making of a ruling under s 192 on whether and how a discretionary decision under s 135 or a decision under s 137 will be made in relation to evidence before it is tendered.1070 A conviction may stand even after a failure to attend to s 192 when the Crown can establish that the trial judge could not reasonably have refused to grant the Crown’s application assuming all relevant provisions had been taken into account.1071
E — RECOURSE TO THE FORMER LAW [1760] Lord Herschell’s approach If the legislation were a code, according to Lord Herschell, the statutory words would be construed without either recourse to antecedent authority or any assumption that a particular provision was intended to be a statement of the former law rather than a change in it,1072 unless language is used which had previously acquired a technical meaning,1073 or there is ambiguity.1074
[1765] Capacity to resort to former law The Act to some extent retains the existing law and to some extent changes it. While it is not a code in the sense of a mere restatement in complete form of the existing law, and while it may not be in any sense an exhaustive and exclusive code, for the purposes of the rules stated in the preceding paragraph it does mix restating and reforming elements. Some of those elements are mini-codes, some are not. Reference to the earlier law is permissible in the following circumstances. First, where the law has been changed by the Act, there is no occasion to resort to earlier authorities except to engage in the admittedly important enquiry into what the mischief was. But the enquiry into mischief does not have the result that the meaning of the Act is to be determined in the light of, and in a manner that conforms to, the preexisting common law.1075 Secondly, where the former law is preserved by the Act (so as to operate either without any contribution from the Act, or alongside some provision of the Act), cases on the earlier law may and must obviously be resorted
to, and that law is open to judicial development. Thirdly, where very general language either of a declaratory or of a clarificatory type is employed, it would seem legitimate to resort to earlier case law, at least where the language of the Act is obscure, or so general as not to offer, by itself, practical assistance. [page 153] Fourthly, where the Act has picked up expressions in earlier statutes that have received a settled construction in earlier cases it would appear to be appropriate to refer to them. Fifthly, where the Act re-enacts common law discretions (eg s 135), or common law rules turning on matters of judgment and degree (eg ss 137 and 138), it may be appropriate to examine the leading authorities. It would be peculiar, for example, if the common law were not to be considered in applying ss 138 and 139 in relation to the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence.1076 This is not a question of having resort to the earlier decisions to construe the language of the Act, but rather to find in the analysis of earlier cases lines of reasoning that may assist in resolving future problems. Sixthly, and more generally, there is a further field in which the received common law may play a role, and where judicial choices in relation to the legislation may legitimately be made. A striking feature of the Act is its domination by provisions giving the courts discretions to exclude evidence (or admit it on terms) or power to grant leave or permission to do something, or power to make a direction to do something. General factors relevant to the grant of leave or permission or the making of a direction are listed in s 192, and particular factors are listed in particular places, but the tests are normally non-exhaustive. The courts thus have an opportunity to bring to light and isolate the significance of other factors, as well as to evaluate differing permutations of relevant factors. The decisions are discretionary decisions, but the discretions are controlled by principle, and the courts have some freedom in developing the principles within the general boundaries of the Act. The courts are likely to handle these powers with the common law background in mind.1077
F — LAW REFORM AND OTHER PREPARATORY MATERIALS Use of extrinsic materials [1770] Statutory avenues The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB(1), the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 34, the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s 8B, the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 142 and the Interpretation Act (NT) s 62B permit resort to material not forming part of the Evidence Acts to confirm that the meaning of a provision is the ordinary meaning, or to determine the meaning of a provision when the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or where the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. The Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 35 also permits recourse to the reports of “Law Reform Commissioners”. Categories of material that may be referred to are set out in s 15AB(2), s 34(2), s 8B, s 142 and s 62B, but not exhaustively. The Evidence Act 1995 is the product of many years of work. It is to a significant extent based on a Bill recommended by ALRC 38. ALRC 38 in turn rests in large part on ALRC 26. Not every section in the Evidence Act will permit resort to ALRC 38, because not every section has its origin in it; the same is true to an even greater extent of ALRC 26. And not every section will satisfy s 15AB(1), [page 154] s 34, s 8B, s 35, s 142 or s 62B. But much resort can legitimately be had to ALRC 26 and ALRC 38 as aids to construction, quite apart from what they reveal about the origins of the proposed legislation. The same is true of ALRC 102. As a perusal of ALRC 26 and ALRC 38 will reveal, the ALRC devoted some attention to work on aspects of the law of evidence carried out by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (“NSWLRC”). Further, after ALRC 38 was published, the NSWLRC produced a Report in 1988
(“NSWLRC 56”) which accepted the substance of its recommendations. Officers of the Commonwealth Government and of the New South Wales Government thereafter worked together in an attempt to come up with Bills that were as far as possible identical, so as to achieve uniform legislation on evidence. Other Governments, too, were consulted. And after ALRC 38 was published, extensive work was carried out within the Commonwealth Government. Some of that work consisted of consideration by the Minister for Justice and by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs of various submissions made on the 1991 and 1993 Commonwealth Bills. Some of the observations of the Minister for Justice in the course of that process are instructive aids to understanding of the legislation. The Parliamentary speeches and the Explanatory Memorandum are not, on the whole. In this work extensive reference has been made to ALRC 26 and ALRC 38. Very many of those references would not be justified by s 15AB, s 34, s 8B, s 35, s 142 or s 62B as aids to interpretation, but they do throw light on the background against which the proposals were made which led to the Evidence Act.
G — CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE ACTS Notices, requests, discretions [1775] Three features Three characteristic features of the legislative machinery may be noted.
[1780] Notice requirements The first characteristic feature of the legislative machinery is that the Act often requires notices to be given of evidence to be called, particularly in relation to hearsay (s 67), documents (ss 49 and 50), tendency evidence (s 97) and coincidence evidence (s 98).
[1785] Requests facility The notice provisions relate closely to a second feature of the
machinery: a system by which one party can make requests of the other for particular witnesses to be called or particular documents to be examined and tested: ss 165–168. They apply to the admission of evidence under the Evidence Act itself, and do not “affect the many other mechanisms that … are provided in State and federal legislation for the admission of evidence by the provision of certificates or in various other mechanical manners to enable matter to be put into evidence”.1078
[1790] Discretions and indeterminate criteria A third feature of the machinery is that the Acts create many judicial discretions. In substance these are of three kinds. The first relates to the power to reject or admit particular pieces of evidence. The second relates to the dispensing of parties from the consequences of non-compliance with the stipulated pre-conditions for [page 155] admissibility. A third class which is either “discretionary”, or at least turns on criteria so indeterminate as to give the court powers rather than rules to work with, comprises provisions rendering evidence admissible or inadmissible depending on whether such standards as “undue” or “not reasonably practical” or “fresh” are met. Examples of the first category are discretionary powers to render non-compellable an otherwise compellable witness (ss 14 and 18) or compellable or non-compellable witness (s 16(2)), to make such orders as the court thinks just as to the way in which witnesses are to be questioned, the way in which documents and things are to be produced and used in relation to the questioning of witnesses, the order in which witnesses are to be questioned, and the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses (s 26), to make such orders as the court thinks fit as to the time of crossexamination and re-examination (s 28), to make directions as to how a party may question the witness (s 29(1)), to determine the “appropriate way” in which deaf persons may be questioned and mute persons may give evidence (s 31), to give leave for refreshment of memory in court (s 32), to give directions in relation to documents and things used by a witness to
refresh memory outside court (s 34), to give leave to ask leading questions in examination in chief and re-examination (s 37(1)(a)), to give leave for the cross-examination of “unfavourable” witnesses (s 38(1)), to give leave for the re-examination of witnesses on matters outside s 39(a) (s 39(b)), to disallow questions in cross-examination (s 42), to give leave to recall witnesses for cross-examination (s 46), to order a demonstration, experiment or inspection (s 53), to reject evidence tendered in criminal proceedings against a defendant which it would be “unfair” to use (s 90(b) — see also s 136 (“unfair prejudice”) and s 138 (illegally or improperly obtained evidence)), to give leave about when hearsay statements may be tendered (ss 64(4) and 66(4)), to give leave to cross-examine defendants in criminal cases on their credibility (ss 104(2), 108(3) and 112), to exclude evidence relating to a protected confidence (s 126B of the NSW, Tas and ACT Acts), to exclude evidence the probative value of which is substantially outweighed by the danger that it might be unfairly prejudicial, misleading or confusing, or productive of undue waste of time (s 135, see also s 136) and to exclude evidence after non-compliance with a s 168 request (s 169).
[1795] Power to excuse failure Examples of the second type of discretion include the power in effect to excuse a failure to give reasonable notice in writing of an intention to adduce hearsay evidence (s 67) or tendency or coincidence evidence (s 100).
[1800] Miscellaneous powers The third category is illustrated by the power to direct that the Act applies to sentencing proceedings (s 4(2)), the power to direct a witness to affirm (s 23(3)), the duty to disallow improper questions in crossexamination (s 41 — save in Victoria), the power to order production of documents by cross-examiners (s 45), the power to direct the application of s 48 to documents in a foreign country (s 49), the power to direct that documents be proved in the form of a summary (s 50), various hearsay exceptions turning on whether it would cause undue expense or undue delay or would not be reasonably practicable to call the maker of the representation (s 64(2)). See also s 65(3)(b) and (4) (“reasonable
opportunity to cross-examine”), s 66(2) and (2A) (“fresh in the memory of a person”), s 114(2)(b) (not “reasonable” to hold an identification parade) and s 191 (leave to call evidence in relation to agreed facts). [page 156]
[1805] Appropriateness “Appropriateness” is sometimes a criterion (s 114(3)(d)). An example which may fall either into the third or the first category is that tendency or coincidence evidence adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless its probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have: s 101(2).
[1810] Pre-trial consequences The notice and request procedures require close attention to be paid to preparation well before trial; failure to do so may lead to failure to rebut the presumptions mentioned in the first category above or failure to attract favourable exercise of some of the discretions in the third category.
H — TOPICS OMITTED BY THE LEGISLATION Omissions [1815] Evidential topics omitted Quite apart from areas with which they have expressly not dealt, the Acts appear not to have treated certain matters usually examined in discussions of the law of evidence because they are within or contiguous to the somewhat blurred boundaries of the subject. One area is the duty of the prosecution to call witnesses and the possible right of the judge to do so: [17080]–[17130]. Another is whether inferences may be drawn from the claim of a privilege: [25040]. Another is whether inferences may be drawn from the failure of a party in a civil case to testify, or a witness: this is treated to some extent so far as criminal cases are concerned in s 20, but
apart from possible references in s 55(2) and s 58(1) the topic is not treated — certainly not in the detail which the general law does.1079 Another subject not dealt with is what use the court is to make of what it observes during the proceedings of the behaviour of parties and witnesses while they are not giving evidence: [3140]. There is no section that deals with the problem of evidence admitted without objection, save that s 37(1) (c) permits leading questions on this basis, s 190(1) permits certain rules to be waived, and s 191 permits facts to be agreed: see [1645]–[1680]. The less the Act is a “code”, the less do these omissions matter. It must always be remembered that there is a hinterland beside which the Act operates but on which it casts little or no light.
I — INCONSISTENCY OF STATE LAWS AND CTH: EVIDENCE ACT [1820] Means of precluding inconsistency Since the general application of the Cth: Evidence Act is only to federal courts, and since s 79 of the Judiciary Act is subject to the Act, there is no possibility of a conflict between the Act and State law except where State law purports to affect the giving of evidence in federal courts or in the ACT courts,1080 or except where s 5 operates to apply particular provisions of the Act in all proceedings in Australian courts. There is a theoretical possibility of inconsistency between a provision so [page 157] applied by s 5 and a State or Territorial law on the same subject. The scope for that possibility is narrowed by two specific provisions of the Act. The first is that so far as s 5 applies the provisions listed in s 182 in relation to Commonwealth records to proceedings in all Australian courts, the operation in those courts of applicable State or Territory laws is preserved, since s 182(5) provides that s 182 does not derogate from the operation of a law of a State or Territory that enables evidence of a matter referred to in s 182 to be given. Secondly, so far as the subject matter of
provisions made applicable by s 5 to proceedings in all Australian courts falls within the saving provisions, such as those enacted in ss 9–11, the corresponding provisions of the general law in the States are preserved. In particular, since the subject matter of many of the provisions made applicable by s 5 to proceedings in all Australian courts concerns the evidentiary effects of certificates and documents issued under State or Territory laws (eg ss 153–155 and 157–158), possible inconsistency arguments are precluded by s 9(3)(d).
Section 10 — The Record of Trial A — CONTENT OF RECORD Definition, disputes and resolution [1830] Incompleteness of record and its consequences In modern conditions, at least in superior courts, the “trial record” consists in substance of a group of documents of which the court and the parties have either originals or copies: the initiating process and other documents defining the issues; a transcript recording all the oral evidence (including the objections to it and other evidence and rulings on those objections); all affidavits and other documents received into evidence; all rulings made and all judgments delivered; all matters of fact agreed on between the parties or formally admitted by one party; and any written submissions. The accuracy and completeness of the record is a precondition to the fairness of the trial, and a precondition to the capacity of appellate courts to review the fairness of the trial. That is why it is common for time to be taken at the start of each day’s proceedings in ensuring that the transcript for the previous day is correct. Since it is quite usual for transcripts not to record oral arguments, whether offered on evidentiary rulings, or in relation to procedural questions, or in opening or final address, the incompleteness or inaccuracy of the record can often cause disputes to break out on appeal. Was particular evidence now complained of admitted by consent or over objection or only on conditions or only for a limited purpose? Does the case put on appeal differ from the case presented by the parties at trial? Was a submission put which the trial judge did not deal with? Was an issue decided on a point on which the victorious party did not offer argument or of which the losing party did not receive notice? What facts were judicially noticed? If counsel differ in their recollections, it is the judge who determines whether the transcript should stand or be amended,1081 unless the judge determines that the matter should be left to the jury to decide.1082
In resolving these disputes, an appellate court can only take into account information from five sources, apart from the record as described above, [page 158] un-transcribed shorthand notes or tape recordings prepared by court reporters, and what is recorded in the trial judge’s reasons for judgment.1083 They are, leaving aside powers given by enactments1084 the judge’s note1085 or a report from the trial judge, where this course is permitted;1086 an agreement between the parties; a formal or informal admission by one party; affidavit or oral evidence as to what happened;1087 and a contemporaneous note by counsel, solicitor or other person present.1088 This means that appellate courts will not take into account conflicting statements from the bar table on what happened at the trial. In turn, that makes it important for counsel to request a direction from the judge that particular, potentially crucial, forensic events be recorded1089 and, if that direction is not forthcoming or not complied with, for counsel to ensure that an accurate note is made.
Section 11 — The Treatment of Wrongly Received Evidence A — WRONGLY RECEIVED EVIDENCE Dealing with changed rulings [1880] Means of handling consequences of changed rulings Rulings on evidence made at one point in a trial may be altered at another.1090 What should be done if evidence is admitted, but later in the trial it turns out to be inadmissible (because, for example, the trial judge realises it was admitted in [page 159] error,1091 or an undertaking by counsel to call other evidence which would have made it admissible is not fulfilled,1092 or because it is volunteered or is given inadvertently,1093 or because the rambling answers of a witness are not controlled by a cross-examiner hoping for favourable material amongst unfavourable material,1094 or because it becomes apparent that though the evidence was technically admissible, its probative value is low compared to its prejudicial effect)?1095 In some cases, perhaps rare cases,1096 a judge may decide to intervene even without an application by a party; ordinarily a party will make an application that the problem be solved in some particular way. One solution to the problem of wrongly received evidence is to “strike it out”1097 or “withdraw” it,1098 or ignore it, without saying anything to the jury about it. Leaving aside cases where the withdrawal of the evidence means there is no case to answer (eg if the evidence withdrawn was the only evidence of identification),1099 this course is appropriate where the evidence is of little weight or of little prejudicial effect or unlikely to have
influence on the jury, or where to mention the matter again may simply worsen the situation by impressing the evidence on the jurors’ minds.1100 A second solution is to take the first course, but also to tell the jury that the evidence has been withdrawn,1101 or that it should be disregarded.1102 Thirdly, in certain circumstances it may be that “something more [is] needed as a matter of common fair play than a mere formal and frigid withdrawal of the evidence”.1103 Thus where evidence of past criminal acts was wrongly admitted Griffith CJ said that the jury should have been told “to regard the case as if no such evidence had been given, and to treat the prisoner as a person against whom nothing was known except this charge”.1104 In the same way it may be necessary to tell the jury that indock identification evidence is valueless and should be ignored.1105 A fourth solution is to exercise the court’s discretion to discharge the jury in favour of that course. Although respect will be given to the trial judge’s exercise of [page 160] discretion,1106 the unpalatable step1107 of discharging the jury should be taken if none of the other solutions are capable of remedying the damage done.1108 It has been said that discharge of the jury will be the usual consequence where some (but not all) of the identification evidence has been withdrawn.1109 But this course will not be taken, for example, if in a long trial “the answers complained of were likely to be drowned in the volume of testimony”, the hostility of the witness is obvious and an appropriate warning is given;1110 or if the other evidence is very strong;1111 or if the inadmissible evidence merely anticipates other evidence which will be admissible.1112
Section 12 — The Treatment of Agreements between Counsel A — AGREEMENT NOT TO PURSUE ISSUES Miscarriage of justice caused by agreements between counsel [1890] Appeals The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria has said:1113 In most criminal trials involving experienced counsel agreements will be reached as to what evidence will be led and what will not. These agreements reflect a mix of the strict laws of evidence, pragmatic considerations, goodwill and a measure of trust between the opposing counsel. The benefits of this type of agreement are manifold. Barely relevant side issues are jettisoned and issues that have the potential to derail the trial are either quarantined or massaged into a palatable evidentiary form. The trial will be more efficiently focused and the administration of justice is enhanced. Not every evidentiary issue can be agreed of course, and those that can will still require curial approval, but the process is to be encouraged not discouraged. If opposing trial counsel thought that evidentiary agreements would readily be undone by appellate courts, soon enough the practice of entering such agreements would cease, or be powerfully inhibited. Either way the administration of justice would suffer in a very material way … [A]n appellate court would rarely, and then only in the most exceptional circumstances, interfere with such an agreement. 1 For the equitable contribution, see Michael R T McNair, The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity. 2 “People were formerly frightened out of their wits about admitting evidence, lest juries should go
wrong. In modern times we admit the evidence, and discuss its weight”: Cockburn CJ in R v Churchwardens, Overseers and Guardians of the Poor of the Parish of Birmingham (1861) 1 B & S 763 at 767 (QB). 3 Judicial control of lawyers also played a part: J H Langbein, “The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers” (1978) 45 U of Chi LR 263. 4 R v Hardy (1794) 24 St Tr 199 at 1093–4 per Lord Eyre CJ. 5 C J W Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997. 6 C P Harvey, The Advocate’s Devil, 1958, p 79. 7 Attorney-General v Horner (No 2) [1913] 2 Ch 140 at 156 (CA). See also R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256. 8 W A N Wells QC, “A Critique of the ALRC Draft Evidence Bill” (1992) 9 Aust Bar Rev 185. See also Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1 at [89]. 9 See eg Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 190(3)–(4); NSW: Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 70; Evidence Act 1995 s 190(3)–(4);Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 190(3)–(4); RSC r 40.05; Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s
129A(1)(b); SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 59J; RSC O 78 r 1; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 190(3)– (4);WA: RSC O 29 r 2, and O 36 r 2; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 190(3)–(4); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 190(3)–(4). See generally Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1983] 1 Qd R 475; Pearce v Button (1986) 8 FCR 408 (FC); Warea Pty Ltd v Waterloo Industries Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 152; Multi Modal Ltd v Polakow (1987) 78 ALR 553; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 358–63 (FC); Rak v Coles Myer Ltd (1996) 68 SASR 272 at 278; R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1 at [197]; Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 at [325]–[336]; Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1 at [110]; Trueman v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2007) 99 SASR 431; Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394. See also Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 7) [1993] 4 All ER 114 (CA). 10 Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 650 at 657. 11 See [7185]–[7195]. 12 See Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 at 650–4 and 656–7 (amount and existence of bank customer’s indebtedness to bank; another example is certificates of engineers and architects under engineering and building contracts of facts, approvals or sums to be paid). 13 See [3165]–[3185]. 14 See [1650]. 15 R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 564. 16 See eg Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574. 17 L Dufraimont, “Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment” (2008) 53 McGill LJ 199. 18 R v White (2003) 7 VR 442 at [38]. 19 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417. 20 Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court v K [1965] AC 201 at 238. 21 Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court v K [1965] AC 201 at 217. See also Humberside County Council v R [1977] 3 All ER 964, in relation to the care jurisdiction of magistrates and Hogue v Haines (1977) 29 FLR 186, for a similar approach in Australia. See also [5125] in relation to issue estoppel and [25295] n 724 in relation to legal professional privilege. 22 Re WLW [1972] Ch 456 (Court of Protection). See also Pallin v Dept of Social Welfare [1983] NZLR 266, where rules of statutory privilege were observed, although it was held that hearsay might be admitted in custody proceedings. 23 Kavanagh v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [1974] QB 624 (CA). 24 Compare R v Horsham Justices; Ex parte Bukhari (1982) 74 Cr App R 291 (no discretion to exclude admissible evidence in committal proceedings) with R v Sang [1980] AC 402 (discretion at summary trial affirmed); R v Crown Prosecution Service; Ex parte Warby (1993) 158 JP 190 (DC of QBD) (claim to public interest immunity not to be considered in committal proceedings) with R v South Worcestershire Magistrates; Ex parte Lilley [1995] 4 All ER 186 (claim to be considered in summary trial), and see R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Schneider (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 (DC of QBD) (rules of practice relating to incompetence of co-accused for prosecution not applicable in committal or extradition proceedings before magistrates) and R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Voets [1986] 2 All ER 630 (rules excluding photographs indicating accused has police record inapplicable in extradition proceedings). While evidence which is clearly irrelevant or inadmissible should be rejected, it is not appropriate to make “refined rulings”: Coco v Shaw [1994] 1 Qd R 469 at 484 and 499–500 (FC). 25 R v Sanghera [1983] 2 VR 130 at 131. 26 See E Campbell, “Principles of Evidence and Administrative Tribunals” in E Campbell and L Waller (Eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982, p 36; R D Giles, “Dispensing with the Rules of Evidence” (1991) 7 Aust Bar Rev 233; P M Donohoe “Dispensing with the Rules of Evidence — A Commentary” (1991) 7 Aust Bar Rev 252 and N Rees, “Procedure and evidence in ‘court substitute’ tribunals” (2006) 28 Aust Bar Rev 41.
27 Geschke v Del-Monte Home Furnishers Pty Ltd [1981] VR 856 at 863. 28 In Savings and Investment Bank Ltd v Gasco Investments (Netherlands) BV [1984] 1 All ER 296,
Gibson J in interlocutory proceedings adhered to the rules for admissibility at trial as far as the nature of the issue allowed, and was against using in affidavits “material which cannot be proved because it is mere opinion or is otherwise inadmissible”. This was not followed in Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 181. Rules of Court customarily permit some modification of the hearsay and best evidence rules in interlocutory proceedings. 29 R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325 (CCA). In Russell v HM Advocate 1946 SC (J) 37, a similar issue of fact was determined by the judge, and not by the jury. Unfitness to plead was regarded as a suitable analogy for other pre-trial issues such as autrefois convict or autrefois acquit in R v Coughlan (1976) 63 Cr App R 33, where an accelerated procedure for reading statements was also approved. 30 R v Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557 (CA). 31 Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559. The view that there is an intermediate standard (see R v Askeland (1983) 8 A Crim R 338 (SC Tas)) cannot be correct. 32 R v Cowell [1940] 2 KB 49 (CCA). 33 See C M Maguire and C S S Epstein, “Rules of Evidence and Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility” (1927) 36 Yale LJ 1101. 34 R v Robson [1972] 2 All ER 699. 35 R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 at 317. 36 In Duke of Beaufort v Crawshay (1866) LR 1 CP 699 (CP), an affidavit which would have been inadmissible at the trial seems to have been admitted at this preliminary stage. 37 Empire Shipping Co Inc v Owners of the Ship Shin Kobe Maru (1991) 32 FCR 78 (Gummow J favoured the lower burden, applying Vitkovice Horni a Hutni Tezirstvo v Korner [1951] AC 869 at 883; approved on appeal to the Full Federal Court: Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1992) 38 FCR 227; there are contrary dicta in the High Court: Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404). 38 Such factual issues are preferably to be determined by the judge after conducting a hearing: R v Newton (1983) 77 Cr App R 13. In many cases it will be impracticable to secure a decision from a jury trying the issue of guilt or innocence, and if no evidence is called before the court it must accept the defendant’s version, unless the matter has no relation to the gravity of the offence charged: R v Connell (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 360. 39 See D A Thomas, “Establishing a Factual Basis for Sentencing” [1970] Crim LR 80 and Principles of Sentencing, 2nd ed, 1978, Ch 12. For Australia, see R G Fox and B M O’Brien, “Fact Finding for Sentences” (1975) 10 MULR 163. In Canada the strict rules which govern at the trial do not apply at a sentencing hearing (R v Gardiner [1982] 2 SCR 368 at 414), an attitude in accord with that of the Task Force on the Uniform Rules. 40 Such as a compensation order to which similar principles seem to apply, see R v Vivian [1979] 1 All ER 48 (CA); R v Amey [1983] 1 All ER 865 (CA); and apparently still operative after the passage of Criminal Justice Act 1982 (Eng) s 67 (see R v Danvers [1984] Crim LR 182 (CA)); similar rules also apply to establishing the basis for forfeiture orders: see R v Pemberton [1983] Crim LR 121 (CA). 41 R v Wishart (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 322. See also R v Bryant [1980] 1 NZLR 264 (CA). 42 R v Russen (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 134. 43 R v Connor (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 225 and R v Ayensu [1982] Crim LR 764 (CA). 44 R v Wishart (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 322. 45 R v Connor (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 225 and R v Ayensu [1982] Crim LR 764 (CA). However, it is clear that the exclusionary rules are less strict at this stage: see R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 (CCA). 46 But see R v Huchison [1972] 1 All ER 936, where this was raised in the context of corroboration of allegations made by the victim of a sexual offence. See also R v Cooksley [1982] Qd R 405
(CCA). 47 It seems clear that the provisions as to cross-examination in the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) s 1(f) were inappropriate for proceedings after verdict notwithstanding their terminology. It is generally inappropriate for the judge to cross-examine the accused on the matter: R v McGrath (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 460. 48 R v Lester (1975) 63 Cr App R 144. 49 R v Robinson (1969) 53 Cr App R 314; R v Hearne [1976] Crim LR 753 (CA). 50 Flewitt v Horvath [1972] RTR 121 (DC of QBD), where the evidence admitted at the trial was hearsay, and wrongly taken into account by the magistrates in determining not to disqualify the accused driver. By contrast the Supreme Court of the United States has held it an unconstitutional denial of due process of law to exclude hearsay favouring the accused at the sentencing stage: Green v Georgia 442 US 95 (1979). 51 See [9045]. 52 See the materials referred to in [1035] n 26. For the United States position see Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise, 2nd ed, 1980, Ch 16. 53 R v West London Coroner; Ex parte Gray [1988] QB 467 (coronial jury must find suicide and criminal offence on the beyond reasonable doubt standard); R v Wolverhampton Coroner; Ex parte McCurbin [1990] 2 All ER 759 (CA) (coroner must direct jury to be satisfied of unlawful killing beyond reasonable doubt, but of death by misadventure only on the balance of probabilities); Anderson v Blashki [1993] 2 VR 89 (standard stated in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 applies to coronial findings of criminal conduct). 54 See Re Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock & Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327 (CA). There is a right of cross-examination in arbitrations: Chilton v Saga Holidays plc [1986] 1 All ER 841 (CA). But, in the absence of an agreement between the parties to the contrary, the rules of evidence do apply: TNT Bulk Ships Ltd v Hopkins (1987) 146 NTR 1 at [67] and [75]. 55 R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Cmr; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 474 (CA). 56 R v Commission for Racial Equality; Ex parte Cottrell & Rothon (a firm) [1980] 3 All ER 265 at 271 (DC of QBD). 57 DV A Röling and C F Rüter (Eds), The Tokyo Tribunal: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE) 29 August 1946–12 November 1948 (1977) pp 629–655. See also In re Yamashita (1946) 327 US 1 at 48–56. 58 Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297 at 308 per Lord Reid. 59 R v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison; Ex parte St Germain (No 2) [1979] 3 All ER 545 (DC of QBD). For extradition procedure, see Hempel v A-G (1987) 77 ALR 641 (Fed C of A). 60 R v Commission for Racial Equality; Ex parte Cottrell & Rothon (a firm) [1980] 3 All ER 265 (DC of QBD). 61 R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Cmr; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 488 (CA) per Diplock LJ. See also Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666 (Fed C of A FC). At 689–90 Deane J agreed with and elaborated on Diplock LJ’s reasoning. And see Secretary to the Department of Human Services v Sanding (2011) 36 VR 221 at [132]–[133] and [153]. 62 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 at 95. 63 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 at 97. 64 Currie v Chief Constable of Surrey [1982] 1 WLR 215. 65 General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627. 66 A M & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] 1 QB 878 at 896 (ECJ); but see Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1 at 9 (CA). See further [25160]–[25185] below. 67 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Weerasuriya [1983] 1 All ER 195, distinguishing Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191. 68 Sir William McKay (Ed), Erskine May’s Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 23rd ed, 2004.
69 See L A Hallett, Royal Commissions and Boards of Enquiry, 1982; Bisaillon v Keable [1983] 2 SCR
60; Bercove v Hermes (No 3) (1983) 51 ALR 109 (Fed C of A FC). 70 R v Higham (1857) 7 El & Bl 557 at 563 (KB); Standfield v Byrne [1929] SASR 352 at 357 (FC); Lietzke (Installations) Pty Ltd v E M J Morgan Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 88 at 116 (FC). 71 R v Sims [1946] KB 531 at 539 (CCA) per Lord Goddard CJ. 72 See below at [3190]. 73 A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, pp 390–5 and 511–16. 74 “Juries are not such fools as they are very often thought to be”: per Lord Goddard CJ in R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82 at 89 (CCA). It may well be that the high property qualifications of former times tended to produce a fairly hard-headed and shrewd jury. 75 On the theoretical similarity of the rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases, and their practical differences, see R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 559 and 564: [1030]. 76 Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350. 77 R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313. 78 R v Wayte (1982) 76 Cr App R 110. 79 Kent v Stamps [1982] RTR 273. 80 See [1100]–[1250]. 81 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [5]. 82 For useful analyses of circumstantial evidence, see J F Stephen, “An Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence” in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, pp 14–55 and 57–121, and ss 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15 and 16 of the Act itself. 83 J F Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of England, 1863, p 307. 84 Teper v R [1952] AC 480 at 489 (PC). 85 Trickett v Walker (1931) [1938] SASR 107n (FC); Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98 at 104–5 (FC). 86 For identification evidence, see [1335]. For perception of poison by smell and taste, see J F Stephen, “An Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence” in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, pp 58 n 12 and 62 n 34, discussing R v Donellan (1781), a case also discussed by V R M Gattie and M Krishnamachariar (eds), Wills’s Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 7th ed, 1937, pp 396–400. 87 From time to time it has been suggested that a witness’s evidence of the witness’s own mental state is inadmissible, but it is clearly admissible under the modern law: Cox v Smail [1912] VLR 274; R v Fitzpatrick (1926) 19 Cr App R 91; Kelly v Battershell [1949] 2 All ER 830 at 843 (CA); Pascoe v FCT (1956) 30 ALJ 402; Gauci v Cmr of Taxation (Cth) (1975) 135 CLR 81; Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1; J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1979, vol 2 [581]; J F Stephen, “An Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence” in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, p 16; see also definition of “fact” in s 3 (at p 149). “Direct” evidence, as contrasted with circumstantial evidence, sometimes includes hearsay and real evidence about a fact in issue as well as testimony on the same subject. 88 “It has been said that circumstantial evidence is to be considered as a chain, and each piece of evidence as a link in the chain, but that is not so, for then, if any one link broke, the chain would fall. It is more like the case of a rope comprised of several cords. One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be quite of sufficient strength. Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence — there may be a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction, or more than a mere suspicion; but the whole, taken together, may create a strong conclusion of guilt, that is, with as much certainty as human affairs can require or admit of”: per Pollock CB in R v Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922 at 929. See also Thomas v R [1972] NZLR 34 (CA). 89 Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 193 (FC). 90 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, vol 1A [43]. 91 Thus evidence that crimes of a particular kind associated with the accused ceased after his or her
arrest is admissible to prove that he or she committed the crimes: R v Wilson [2009] Crim LR 193 (CA). 92 Beresford v St Albans Justices (1905) 22 TLR 1 (DC of KBD). See also, for examples relating to the speed or quality of driving, R v Lewis [1913] VLR 227; R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 (FC); Duffus v Collins [1966] 1 NSWR 464 (FC); Donoghue v St Luke’s Hospital Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 674 (CA); R v Horvath [1972] VR 533; Martin v R (1981) 4 A Crim R 302 (Qld FC); R v Fischer (1996) 23 MVR 507 (SACCA); R v Scott (2003) 141 A Crim R 323; R v Fenton [2003] 3 NZLR 439 (CA); R v Duryea (2008) 192 A Crim R 286 (CCA). 93 Doe d Hopley v Young (1845) 8 QB 63. 94 Pickup v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co (1878) 3 QBD 594 at 600 (CA). 95 Brown v Wren Bros [1895] 1 QB 390 (DC of QBD). 96 R v Taha (2000) 120 A Crim R 161 at [32]. 97 R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 at 124 (KB). 98 Doe d Smelt v Fuchau (1812) 15 East 286 (KB). 99 Attorney-General v Bradlaugh (1885) 14 QBD 667 at 711 (CA). On state of mind see also Director of Public Prosecution v Alexander (1993) 33 NSWLR 482 at 495. 100 Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51 at [30]; Owners of Strata Plan No 23007 v Cross (2006) 153 FCR 398 at [66]–[68]. 101 Pepper v Tuomy (1926) 48 ALT 53. 102 Ryan v Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1937) 10 ALJ 461 (HC). 103 In MacDarmaid v A-G [1950] P 218, Hodson J inferred the continuance of life of a healthy woman of 28 for a further three years; in Re Peete [1952] 2 All ER 599 Roxburgh J inferred the continuance of life of a healthy man for three years; in Chard v Chard [1956] P 259 Sachs J inferred the continuance of life of a woman of 26 for a further 16 years. For a case in which death was inferred after a prolonged lapse of time see Re Watkins; Watkins v Watkins [1953] 2 All ER 1113. See also R v Inhabitants of Harborne (1835) 2 Ad & E 540 (KB); R v Lumley (1869) LR 1 CCR 196; R v Willshire (1881) 6 QBD 366 (CCC); R v Jones (1883) 11 QBD 118; R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 (CA). The main Australian cases dealing with the “presumption” of continuance of life are Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 and Re Peatling (dec’d) [1969] VR 214 (where the authorities on this and other presumptions are fully reviewed by McInerney J). See the fourth Australian edition of this work, Ch 4. 104 DPP v Alexander (1993) 33 NSWLR 482 at 495. 105 “[N]othing can be more absurd than the notion, that there is to be any rigid presumption of law on such questions of fact, without reference to accompanying circumstances, such, for instance, as the age or health of the party. There can be no such strict presumption of law … I think that the only questions in such cases are, what evidence is admissible, and what inference may fairly be drawn from it”: per Denman CJ in R v Inhabitants of Harborne (1835) 2 Ad & E 540 at 544–5 (KB). 106 Massoud v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1995) 62 NSWLR 657 at 661 (NSWSC). 107 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 at 404–5; Carian v Elton (2000) 31 MVR 421 at [28]. 108 Attorney-General v Bradlaugh (1885) 14 QBD 667 at 711 (CA). 109 R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 299 (CCA). 110 Per Lush J in R v Lumley (1869) LR 1 CCR 196 at 198. See R v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 at 444 (CCA) for inferences from observed intoxication. 111 R v Noonan (2002) 127 A Crim R 599 at [18]. 112 Smith v Maddison [1967] VR 307; De Kruiff v Smith [1971] VR 761; Heywood v Robinson [1975] VR 562; Wright v Bastin (No 2) [1979] VR 329. 113 Wright v Morton [1998] 3 VR 316 (CA). See also R v Olejarnik (1994) 33 NSWLR 567 at 572 (CCA). 114 Griffiths v Errington (1981) 7 NTR 3.
115 Trotter v McLean (1879) 13 Ch D 574. Cf Hetherington v Kemp (1815) 4 Camp 193 (proof
letter put on office table where letters for posting usually put insufficient). Proof of postage is evidence of delivery to addressee: Warren v Warren (1834) 1 CM & R 250 (Exch); Watts v Vickers Ltd (1916) 86 LJKB 177 (CA). See also Smith Bros v Madden Bros [1945] QWN 33 and James v Twiss [1929] SASR 110. 116 See eg Cth: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 29; NSW: Interpretation Act 1987 s 76; Vic: Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 s 49. In Tasmania, s 30 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 refers only to documents required by some Act to be served. In WA, see Interpretation Act 1984 s 75. 117 See generally Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (2007) 245 ALR 150; Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (2007) 70 NSWLR 176. 118 McGregor v Keily (1859) 3 Exch 794; cf Tanham v Nicholson (1872) LR 5 HL 561 which turned on substantive law. 119 This sentence was cited with approval in Elliott v R (2007) 239 ALR 651 at [28] and in Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31 at [81] (practice of workers’ compensation solicitor). 120 Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 (CA); Olga Investments Pty Ltd v Citi Power Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 (CA) (practice need only be normal, not invariable). 121 Lucas v Novosilieski (1795) 1 Esp 297. 122 Evans v Birch (1811) 3 Camp 10. 123 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 703 (Fed C of A). 124 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1993) 5 BPR 11, 996 at 12, 006–7; State Bank of New South Wales v Muir (1997) 8 BPR 15, 483 at 15, 488; Armstrong v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1999) 9 BPR 17, 035 at [17]. 125 Joy v Phillips, Mills & Co Ltd [1916] 1 KB 849 at 854 (CA). See also R v Liddy (2002) 81 SASR 22 at [479]; Robert v Western Australia (2005) 189 FLR 147 at [94]. 126 Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1960] Qd R 487, affirmed on appeal to the High Court: Lahrs v Eichsteadt [1961] Qd R 457. 127 R v Murdoch (No 5) (2005) 195 FLR 442. 128 McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 623. 129 Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115. 130 The prosecution unsuccessfully contended that such a principle existed in R v Hector [1953] VLR 543. Cf R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213 (CCA). See also Re Knowles [1984] VR 751 (FC); R v Hajistassi (2010) 107 SASR 67 at [15]–[16] (CCA). 131 R v Blackwell (1996) 87 A Crim R 289 at 291–2 (SA FC). 132 R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 63 (CA and CCA) 133 R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 at [24] per Ormiston JA. 134 De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [28]; R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 at [25]. 135 R v Ball [1911] AC 47 at 68. 136 R v Palmer (1856); J F Stephen, A History of Criminal Law of England, 1883, Vol 3, p 389. 137 Roupell v Haws (1863) 3 F & F 784. 138 Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Moss (1906) 4 CLR 311. 139 R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 59–69 (CA and CCA). See also R v Ball [1911] AC 47 at 68; Furbert v R [2000] 1 WLR 1716 at 1723 (PC). 140 R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 at [24]. 141 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234, a decision that refuted the suggestion that evidence of motive is only relevant to mens rea. 142 R v Clewes (1830) 4 C & P 221. 143 R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 at [26]–[27] (if the pool of persons who could have committed
the crime were limited to drug addicts, proof of a craving for drugs is irrelevant). 144 W M Best, Principles of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1922, p 384. See also De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [40]. 145 R v Shaw (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 383 at 387–8 per Street J (Sly and Gordon JJ concurring). Similarly, in De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [57], Kirby J said: “To reasonable and law abiding citizens many serious crimes appear to have been committed upon trivial motives, wholly disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong.” 146 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234; Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [184]. 147 Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [184]; De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [28] (discussing Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 250). 148 De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [60]. 149 De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [119]. 150 R v Grant (1865) 4 F & F 322. 151 R v Wallace (1931) 23 Cr App R 32 at 33; R v Phillips [2003] Crim LR 629 (CA) (claim of happy marriage between accused and victim led to reception of evidence that it was not). 152 Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 565, 572, 595 and 628. 153 R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at [78]. 154 Per Channell J in R v Ellwood (1908) 1 Cr App R 181 at 182. 155 De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [29]. 156 De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [30]. 157 R v Palmer (1856); J F Stephen, A History of Criminal Law of England, 1883, Vol 3, p 389. 158 See [37115]–[37120]. 159 See eg Nash v Cmr for Railways (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 357 (FC). 160 Similar problems have arisen in the United States, where Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon 145 US 285 (1892), in which a deceased’s declarations of his intention to go on a journey were admitted as evidence that he went on it, has attracted extensive literature; see E M Morgan, J M Maguire and J B Weinstein, Cases and Materials on Evidence, 1957, 4th ed, p 668. For the position in Canada, see R v Workman [1963] 1 CCC 297, affirmed on other grounds [1963] SCR 266; criticised in H W A Fuller (1964) 3 Alberta L Rev 299. 161 Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334; R v Mackay [1985] VR 623 (FC); R v Heath [1991] 2 Qd R 182 at 194–6 and 199–209 (CCA); R v Phillips [2003] Crim LR 629 (CA). 162 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [7], citing R v Yewin, noted in Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637 at 638–9 (admission by employee of desire to take revenge on employer and see him in gaol); Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350 (witness called by plaintiff was his mistress); Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 (Exch) (witness bribed); Hall v Marchant [1914] St R Qd 174 (FC) (defendant’s husband refused plaintiff’s witness a reference for honesty and industry, and witness spoke of having got even with the defendant’s husband); R v Shaw (1888) 16 Cox CC 503 (quarrel with accused and threat of revenge). 163 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [7], [102]. Hence the statement in R v Leak [1969] SASR 172 at 173 (CCA) that a witness can be asked “if he knows of any reason why [another] witness should be hostile to him or should tell a false story about him” is wrong. See [17485]. See also Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [25]. 164 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [7], [102]. See [7085]. 165 In the United States such knowledge is often subsumed under a broadened category of opportunity: see United States v Green 648 F 2d 587 (1981) at 592. 166 Dowling v Dowling (1860) 10 ICLR 236. See H H Glass (Ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, p 83. 167 See R N Gooderson, Alibi, 1977. The fact that the defence of alibi is raised does not mean a judge should never leave some other defence such as self-defence to the jury: R v Bonnick (1977) 66 Cr App R 266. 168 R v Dytche (1890) 17 Cox CC 39.
169 R v Malcherek (1981) 73 Cr App R 173 at 186. 170 See eg NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 150; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 51 and
190; Qld: Criminal Code Act 1899 s 590A; Tas: Criminal Code s 368A; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 285C; ACT: Crimes Act 1900 s 288; NT: Criminal Code s 331. In WA, ss 62 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 do not prevent the accused relying on an alibi without notice, but if no notice has been given the Crown has the right to an adjournment to investigate the alibi: ss 63 and 97. See R v Hassan [1970] 1 QB 423 (CA); R v Lewis [1969] 2 QB 1 (CA); R v Sullivan [1971] 1 QB 253 (CA); R v Cooper (1979) 69 Cr App R 229. The prosecution should not put in an alibi notice as part of its case as a matter of course, whether or not the alibi is ultimately relied upon by the accused: R v Watts (1980) 71 Cr App R 136. It has been said that the instances where it would be wrong to do so are rare: R v Rossborough (1985) 81 Cr App R 139 at 144. See also T M S Tosswill, “The Definition of an Alibi Defence” [1978] Crim LR 276. Other types of evidence in relation to which notice of tender is compulsory can include substantial mental impairment (Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 151(1)) and expert evidence (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 189). 171 See [15210], [15220] and R v Hunt (1994) 76 A Crim R 363 (Qld CA). 172 Woolf v Woolf [1931] P 134 (CA); Ross v Ross [1930] AC 1, as applied in Webster v Webster [1945] NZLR 537 (CA). 173 England v England [1953] P 16 (DC of PDA). 174 See [37170] n 185. 175 R v Moore (1914) 10 Cr App R 54 at 56. 176 Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth and Dominion Line Ltd [1922] VLR 693. 177 Chapman v Walton (1833) 10 Bing 57 at 63–4 (CP). The evidence is a species of expert opinion evidence: see [29050]. 178 Sulco Ltd v ES Redit and Co Ltd [1959] NZLR 45 (CA). See also Berthon v Loughman (1817) 2 Stark 258 at 259. 179 Noble v Kennoway (1780) 2 Doug KB 510 at 513 (KB). 180 Fleet v Murton (1871) LR 7 QB 126 at 134–5 per Mellor J. See also G & K Ladenbau (UK) Ltd v Crawley & de Reya [1978] 1 All ER 682 (practice of solicitors in searching); Fraser v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44 (evidence of perceived moral duty from which legal duty could be inferred); Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665 (practice of underwriters on becoming aware broker has deceived principal). 181 R v Reiter [1954] 2 QB 16 (CCA). See Dalton v Higgins (1964) 51 MPR 52 (PEI SC) where evidence of other provinces’ fire prevention regulations were excluded in an action concerning a fire. 182 [39105]. 183 This sentence was approvingly summarised in Astway Pty Ltd v Council of the City of the Gold Coast (2008) 159 LGERA 335 at [43]. 184 R v Dalloz (1908) 1 Cr App R 258. Cf Beresford v St Albans Justices (1905) 22 TLR 1 (DC of KBD). In cases where fraudulent representation by a vendor as to the takings of a business sold was alleged, evidence was admitted of the takings by the purchaser after taking over the business: R v Lock (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 272; Donaldson v Freeson (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 113 at 117 (FC); Selman v Minogue (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 280 (FC); McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 187 at 193–4 (FC) (evidence may be challenged by evidence explaining the fall in takings); Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG & B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281 at 291; cf Page v Watson [1924] VLR 330. In Gumbley v Cunningham [1989] AC 281, an inference was drawn from the blood alcohol level of the accused four hours after an accident to conclude what it was at the time of the accident. 185 Hooper v Bourne (1880) 5 App Cas 1 at 10.
186 This may be without reference to any rebuttable presumption of law. 187 [1540]. 188 R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 at [30]. 189 Egg v Barnett (1800) 3 Esp 196. 190 Sellen v Norman (1829) 4 CB 80. Cf Bogdal v Hall [1987] Crim LR 500 (DC of QBD) (failure
to complain of non-receipt of social security cheques not proof of receipt). 191 Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at [35]. 192 Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia (2005) 141 FCR 457 at [195]–[202]; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1 at [341]–[350]. 193 See R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 (CCA); R v TJW; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 456 (CCA); S v R (1991) 5 WAR 391 (FC); R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113 at [35]–[41]. 194 For a full citation of English authorities, see S L Phipson, Law of Evidence, 2013, 18th ed, [629] and [38-16] to [38-19]. See also R v Rees (1834) 6 C & P 607; M’Gahey v Alston (1836) 2 M & W 206 at 211 (Exch); Faulkner v Johnson (1843) 11 M & W 581 (Exch); R v Newton (1844) 1 Car & Kir 469 at 480; M’Mahon v Lennard (1858) 6 HL Cas 970 at 1000–1; Hibberd v Kelleher (1901) 27 VLR 474; R v Turnbull [1907] VLR 11 at 15; Williams v Macharg (1908) 7 CLR 213; Jenkin v A-G (Vic) [1921] VLR 79 at 88; R v Brewer (1942) 66 CLR 535 at 548; Hardess v Beaumont [1953] VLR 315 at 318–19; Pertl v Kahl (1976) 13 SASR 433; Williams v McCarthy (1979) 21 SASR 529 at 535; G J Coles & Co Ltd v Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal (1986) 7 NSWLR 503 at 525; Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154 (CA); Page v South Australia (1997) 95 A Crim R 25 at 28 (SASC); R v Cassell (1998) 45 NSWLR 325 at 339 (CCA) and Cassell v R (2000) 201 CLR 189 at [17]–[18]; Commonwealth v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tasmania) (2008) 169 FCR 85 at [80]–[82]. The presumption may be excluded by the terms of the legislation: for example where it constitutes a code on procedural and substantive matters, and proof by the prosecution has been facilitated; a presumption designed to overcome difficulties of proof may not exist where proof is simple: Huth v Petersen; Ex parte Petersen [1975] Qd R 340. There are statutory equivalents to the presumption, eg NSW: Interpretation Act 1987 s 45(1); Qld: Statutory Instruments Act 1992 s 20; WA: Interpretation Act 1984 s 43(3); ACT: Legislation Act 2001 s 40; NT: Interpretation Act s 61(2). The presumptions these create often apply “in the absence of evidence to the contrary”. This expression does not shift a burden of proof. It means merely that the presumption does not arise if there is some evidence to the contrary: Selby v Pennings (1998) 19 WAR 520 at 530 (FC). See also GPT RE Ltd v Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 647 at [82]. 195 R v Gordon (1789) 1 Leach 515 (Ex Ch). 196 Berryman v Wise (1791) 4 TR 366. 197 Hardess v Beaumont [1953] VLR 315; Henderson v Richardson (1996) 5 Tas R 375 at 389–90 (authorised operator of breath analysing instrument). 198 Western Stores Ltd v Orange City Council [1971] 2 NSWLR 36 (CA). 199 R v Langton (1876) 2 QBD 296. In Simpson v Mullaly (1871) 2 VR (L) 56 (FC) it was held that a transfer of shares should be presumed to be made regularly. 200 R v Verelst (1813) 3 Camp 432; Mallock v Tabak [1977] VR 78 at 84; Campbell v Wallsend Slipway and Engineering Co Ltd [1977] Crim LR 351 (CA). 201 Hill v Woollahra Municipal Council (2003) 127 LGERA 7 at [52]. (“The presumption is a presumption of fact, associated with a reasonable inference based on what ordinarily happens in the ordinary course of human affairs … In deciding whether the presumption … is rebutted, this inference from the ordinary course of human affairs carries some weight, which may vary according to the proved circumstances.”). 202 Bright v Legerton (1861) 2 De G F & J 606. 203 Pritchard v Walker (1827) 3 C & P 212. 204 Barnard v Sully (1931) 47 TLR 557 (DC of QBD); Manawatu County v Rowe [1956] NZLR 78
(CA). See also Jordan v G Gosson Industries Pty Ltd (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 157; sub nom Gosson Industries Pty Ltd v Jordon [1964] NSWR 687 (FC), and cases there cited. 205 Western Stores Ltd v Orange City Council (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 353. 206 Pearce v City of Coburg [1973] VR 583; Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1986) 67 ALR 282 at 297 (Fed C of A). 207 Wilover Nominees Ltd v IRC [1973] 2 All ER 977 at 983. The presumption extends to the existence of a proper purpose: Industrial Equity Ltd v DCT (1990) 170 CLR 649 at 671–2. 208 Per Lord Simonds in Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459 at 475. 209 Gibbins v Skinner [1951] 2 KB 379 (DC of KBD). 210 See also R v Garnet-Thomas [1974] 1 NSWLR 702 (CCA) where, in spite of the absence of speed limit signs, there was an indication of a speed limit from the presence of street lighting, there being no evidence of a Ministerial exclusion. 211 Hughes v Steel (1908) 5 CLR 755 at 761, 763 and 764; R v Templeton [1956] VLR 709 at 713 (FC); Day v R (1984) 153 CLR 475 at 484–5 and 489; Schlieske v Federal Republic of Germany (1987) 14 FCR 424 at 431–2 (Fed C of A FC); Selby v Pennings (1998) 19 WAR 520 (FC); Cassell v R (2000) 201 CLR 189 at [66]–[69]. 212 R v Willis (1872) 12 Cox CC 164; Scott v Baker [1969] 1 QB 659 (DC of QBD); Dillon v R [1982] AC 484 (PC); Selby v Pennings (1998) 19 WAR 520 (FC). 213 Dillon v R [1982] AC 484 (PC). 214 Scott v Baker [1969] 1 QB 659 (DC of QBD) though there were then so many cases that formal proof of approval of that device was no longer required; R v Jones [1969] 3 All ER 1559. See also R v Martin (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 404; Impagnatiello v Campbell (2003) 6 VR 416 at [27]–[29]. 215 Carpenter v Carpenter Grazing Co Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 506 at 514 (NSW CA), citing Harris v Knight (1890) 15 PD 170 at 179–80; In the Estate of Bercovitz; Canning v Enever [1962] 1 All ER 552 at 559. 216 United Transport Services Pty Ltd v Evans [1992] 1 VR 240 at 247–8. 217 McGregor v Australian Mortgage Land & Finance Co (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 128; Murphy v Matlock [1926] VLR 170; Lucerne v Collins (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 247; Bolton v Dance [1968] VR 631 at 641; Shire of Flinders v TW Maw & Sons (Quarries) Pty Ltd [1971] VR 484 at 491; LS v Director-General of Family and Community Services (1989) 18 NSWLR 481 at 485. 218 Dillon v Gange (1941) 64 CLR 253. See also Clutterbuck v Curry (1885) 11 VLR 810 (FC). 219 R v Arrowsmith [1950] VLR 78; R v City of Doncaster & Templestowe; Ex parte Mayor [1971] VR 466; R v Scott and Downland Publications Ltd [1972] VR 663. 220 Knox County v Ninth National Bank 147 US 91 (1893) at 97, quoted in McLean Bros & Regg Ltd v Grice (1906) 4 CLR 835 at 850. 221 McLean Bros & Rigg Ltd v Grice (1906) 4 CLR 835; Re NIAA Corp Ltd (in liq) (1993) 33 NSWLR 344 at 349. See also Dawson v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 104 ALR 295 at 304–5; Australian Securities Commission v Fairlie (1993) 11 ACLC 669 at 695 (Tas SC). 222 Eagle Hill Ltd v F Needham (Builders) Ltd [1973] AC 992; distinguished in Cooper v Chief Cmr of Land Tax (1988) 12 NSWLR 660. 223 Watson v Lee (1979) 144 CLR 374 at 381–2. For similar reasoning in other contexts, see Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 257 at [59]–[60]. 224 Phosphate Resources Ltd v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) (2008) 251 ALR 80 at [161]. 225 Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466 (DC of KBD); Skalde v Evans [1966] SASR 176; R v Amyot [1968] 2 OR 626; Re Appeal of White (1987) 9 NSWLR 427 (and cases there cited). 226 Tingle Jacobs and Co v Kennedy [1964] 1 All ER 888n (CCA). 227 The qualification was omitted from the endorsement of this passage in Castle v Cross [1985] 1 All ER 87 (DC of QBD). See also R v Spiby (1990) 91 Cr App R 186 at 192–3. See, for the movement of the breathalyser towards satisfaction of that test, State Government Insurance
Commission v Whyatt (1984) 37 SASR 454 (FC). See also Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris (1987) 46 NTR 1 and [3070]. 228 W M Best, Principles of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1922, p 322. For other illustrations of this type of presumptive or inferential reasoning in relation to property, see Bristow v Cormican (1878) 3 App Cas 641; Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538 at 546–7; Cloverdell Lumber Co Pty Ltd v Abbott (1924) 34 CLR 122 at 137–8; Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 at 586–8. See also Sanders v Sanders (1881) 19 Ch D 373 (CA): the payment of rent for nine years is evidence that it was paid in the previous 31 years. 229 Doe d Hall v Penfold (1838) 8 Car & P 536; Allen v Roughley (1955) 94 CLR 98. 230 Robertson v French (1803) 4 East 130 (KB); Gatward v Alley (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 174 (FC). 231 W Wills, Law of Evidence, 3rd ed, 1938, p 62. 232 Doe d Barrett v Kemp (1835) 2 Bing NC 102 (Ex Ch); Jones v Williams (1837) 2 M & W 326. 233 In Smith v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1993] AC 1 at 30–1 Lord Mustill distinguished and analysed six senses of the expression “right to silence”. 234 R v Langmead (1864) Le & Ca 427; Bruce v R (1987) 74 ALR 219. 235 R v Aves [1950] 2 All ER 330 (CCA). This is the effect of R v Schama; R v Abramovitch (1914) 84 LJKB 396 (CCA). See also R v Garth [1949] 1 All ER 773 (CCA). 236 Per Lord Goddard CJ in R v Cohen [1951] 1 KB 505 at 508 (CCA). See R v Ball (1983) 77 Cr App R 131; R v Raviraj (1986) 85 Cr App R 93; R v Bruce (1986) 23 A Crim R 123 (Vic FC); Bruce v R (1987) 74 ALR 219. 237 Bellamy v R [1981] 2 NSWLR 727; R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 at 663 (FC); R v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433(CCA). 238 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nieser [1959] 1 QB 254 (DC of QBD). 239 R v Adams (1829) 3 C & P 600; R v Partridge (1836) 7 C & P 551; R v Marcus (1923) 17 Cr App R 187 (CCA); Bruce v R (1987) 74 ALR 219. The circumstances of the receipt may be relied on as proof that the goods were stolen: R v Sbarra [1918–19] All ER Rep 1453 (CCA); R v Fuschillo [1940] 2 All ER 489; R v Guidice [1964] WAR 129. The accused’s demonstrably false testimony has been said to be evidence to the same effect (R v Young [1953] 1 All ER 21 (CCA)); but see Trainer v R (1906) 4 CLR 126. Statements by third parties that the goods were stolen, even though believed and acted upon by the accused, are inadmissible to show that the goods were in fact stolen, but are admissible to show that the accused believed that they had been: R v Hulbert (1979) 69 Cr App R 243; R v Korniak (1983) 76 Cr App R 145. See generally R v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23. For the difficulties of drawing inferences against one co-habiting spouse from the conduct of another, see R v Myall (1986) 43 SASR 258 (CCA). 240 R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 at 663 (FC). In R v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 at 36–7 (CCA) O’Loughlin J agreed with Starke J in R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 that the jury should be told what “recent” means; at 26 White J said the direction was only necessary where there was some “ambiguity” in the situation. For a detailed account of the desirable jury direction, see R v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433 at 436. See also R v Phan (1990) 54 SASR 561. 241 R v Wood (1911) 7 Cr App Rep 56. 242 R v Kelson (1909) 3 Cr App R 230. 243 R v Nash (1911) 6 Cr App R 225 at 228. 244 Elliot v Loake [1983] Crim LR 36 (DC of QBD). 245 R v Edwards [1998] 2 VR 354; R v O’Driscoll (2003) 182 FLR 242 at [76]–[79]. 246 W v S [1905] P 231. 247 Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-op Society [1953] 1 WLR 1472 at 1476 (CA) per Denning LJ. See also Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664; Bray v Palmer [1953] 2 All ER 1449 (CA) and France v Parkinson [1954] 1 All ER 739 (CA). The effect of these English decisions is that if two cars are in collision on cross-roads of equal status, and there is no further evidence, the correct inference is that both parties were negligent. Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140
said that all these decisions are explicable on narrower grounds and held that the trial judge had rightly dismissed both claim and counter-claim where one of the two cars involved in a collision must have swerved and there was no evidence as to which. See also Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600 at 618–19, 628 and 631 (CA). An inference of joint negligence may not be justified where the collision was not head-on but between rear portions of two vehicles: Wotta v Haliburton Oil Well Cementing Co Ltd [1955] SCR 377. 248 Ellor v Selfridge and Co (1930) 46 TLR 236 (DC of QBD). 249 Cullen v Welsbach Light Co of Australasia Ltd (1907) 4 CLR 990 at 1002. 250 M’Queen v Great Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 QB 569 at 574. 251 Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Exch 647 at 651 (Ex). 252 Insurance Cmr v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 49. See also Black v Tung [1953] VLR 629 (FC) and Albus v Ryder [1956] VLR 56; Kennedy v Richter [1957] VR 515. (Both these last cases are examples of the admission of evidence by the plaintiff that he had been examined by doctors selected by the defendant.) See also De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 (FC); Waddell v Ware [1957] VR 43 (CA); Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 312 and 319; Pyne v Rutherford (1963) 36 ALJR 333; Conolan v Broken Hill & Suburban Gas Co Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 555 (CA); Fraser v Jones [1970] 3 NSWR 187 (CA); Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 (CA); Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 (CA); Bennett v Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd 1980 Tas R 177; Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2009) 187 FCR 293 at [45]. 253 British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 at 930. A similar somewhat loose statement appears in R v Cmrs of Inland Revenue; Ex parte T C Coombs & Co [1991] 2 AC 283 at 300. 254 Pidduck v Pidduck [1961] 3 All ER 481. 255 Inglis v Inglis [1968] P 639. 256 Jensen v Jensen [1964] 2 All ER 231. 257 A legitimate “explanation” in civil proceedings is not to be found in the fact that an absent party-witness might fear that to give evidence in the civil proceedings would prejudice him in later criminal proceedings: Rowell v Larter (1986) 6 NSWLR 21 at 24. A legitimate explanation has been found in the circumstance that the uncalled witness is likely to be favourable to the opposing party: Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536 at 537 and 548 (FC); Ghazal v GIO (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 at 343 (CA); Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1998) 27 ACSR 1 at 15–16. Jones v Dunkel was not applied where the absent witness had already been subjected to a compulsory examination, at which any relevant question could have been asked, the transcript of which was tendered by the opposing party: Chairman, National Crime Authority v Flack (1998) 86 FCR 16 at 28 (FC). 258 Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 498 at 513. 259 Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 187 ALR 612 at [134]; Challenger Property Asset Management Pty Ltd v Stonnington City Council (2011) 34 VR 445 at [124]–[131]. 260 Jones v Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR 499 at 506 (FC). 261 Cafe v Australian Portland Cement Pty Ltd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 280 at 287 (FC). 262 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308, 312 and 320–1; Dilosa v Latec Finance Pty Ltd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 557 at 582; O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 929 (FC); Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559–60 (HC). This sentence was approved in R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27 at [2]. 263 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [16]. 264 Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 449–50 per Mahoney JA, Priestley and Sheller JJA concurring (giving as an example of a witness whose absence might not support a significant Jones v Dunkel inference one who would be asked to admit a serious crime, perhaps rendering the witness liable to indemnify an insurer, the absent witness being of bad character or criminal record, and unlikely to co-operate by offering a prior conference or proof of evidence). See also Australian
Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [265]. 265 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 202 (CA); Shum Yip Properties Development Pty Ltd v Chatswood Investment and Development Co Pty Ltd (2002) 40 ACSR 619 at [65]. An explanation was found where the witness had departed from the employment of the party and was travelling abroad: Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v Next Publishing Pty Ltd (2005) 222 ALR 127 at [111]. 266 Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 at 581 (FC), citing Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65. 267 Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 at 581 (FC). 268 Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 at 581 (FC). 269 West v GIO (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 70. 270 Re HIH Insurance (in prov liq) and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 at [450] and [503]; appeal dismissed in Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 at [664]–[669]. 271 Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 at [663]–[664]. 272 Rowell v Larter (1986) 6 NSWLR 21 at 24. 273 Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536 at 537 and 548 (FC); Ghazal v GIO (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 at 343 (CA); Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1998) 144 FLR 1. 274 Chairman, National Crime Authority v Flack (1988) 86 FCR 16 at 28 (FC). 275 Packer v Cameron (1989) 54 SASR 246 at 253–4 (FC). 276 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [480]. 277 Approved in Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157 at [64]. 278 Shum Yip Properties Development Pty Ltd v Chatswood Investment and Development Co Pty Ltd (2002) 40 ACSR 619 at [64]. 279 Dilosa v Latec Finance Pty Ltd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 557 at 582. See also Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v Hampson [1991] 1 Qd R 508 at 520 (Chairman); Re HIH Insurance (in prov liq) and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 at [448]; O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1 at [68]–[70] (staff of defendant). 280 Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548 at [28]. 281 Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239 at 259. 282 Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536. 283 This flows from the majority in Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 (FC). See also Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [457]. 284 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 929 (FC). 285 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201 at [102]; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [63]; Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2009) 187 FCR 293 at [45]–[48]. See also O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 929 (FC). 286 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559–60 (HC). HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [302]–[303]; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [64]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [232]. In the United States the position is different: Strong (ed), McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed (1999) p 407; Robert H Stier, “Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference — Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair” (1985) 44 Maryland LR 137; for a similar approach see Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 320–1; Katsilisv Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181 at 197; White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 226–7; Blackman v Gant (2010) 29 VR 29 at [183]. However, evidence that a document or chattel or other evidence has been deliberately destroyed or suppressed may be received as an admission by conduct and support the inference that the evidence would have told against the party responsible: see [33435].
287 Oran Park Motor Sport Pty Ltd v Fleissig [2002] NSWCA 371 at [66]. 288 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308, 312 and 320–1; Dilosa v Latec Finance Pty Ltd
(1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 557 at 582; O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 929 (FC); Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559 (HC); Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 194 (CA); West v GIO (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62; Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1 at [2914]. See also Insurance Cmr v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 61; Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 418 and 422; Nuhic v Rail and Road Excavations [1972] 1 NSWLR 204 at 206–7 (CA) per Jacobs JA; Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 26 ALR 609 at 639; Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell (1982) 149 CLR 155; Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 690; Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 43 FCR 100 at 124; Murray’s Transport NSW Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd (2013) 118 SASR 11 at [72]–[73]. The contents of this paragraph were quoted with approval in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 4) (2006) 229 ALR 136 at [50]. 289 Flack v Chairperson, National Crime Authority (1997) 80 FCR 137 at 148–9. 290 Morley v ASIC (2010) 274 ALR 205 at [634]. 291 Tozer Kemsley & Milbourn (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384 at 403; Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 733 (FC); SS Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 288 at 292 and 306 (NSW CA). 292 R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 at 161–2; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 321. 293 Nuhic v Rail and Road Excavations [1972] 1 NSWLR 204 at 221 (CA). This and the next two sentences were approvingly quoted in Mintech Resources Pty Ltd v Russell-Taylor (2012) 113 SASR 80 at [84]. 294 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 322; Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121 at [51] (approving the last three sentences); Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1 at [360]. 295 Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 10 HL Cas 589; Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 at 93–95. Cf R v Wilmot (1988) 89 Cr App R 341, where Wentworth v Lloyd was not cited. The case is further discussed in R v Seaton [2011] 1 All ER 932. See further [25040]. But the issue to which the solicitor’s evidence may be relevant may be raised in circumstances which amount to waiver of privilege, see [25010]. 296 Gafford v Trans-Texas Airways 299 F 2d 60 (1962) (CA, 6th Circ) and cases there cited; Ballard v Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co (1967) 148 NW 2d 65 at 73 (SC Wisc). 297 Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1 at [360]. But to that general rule there may be many qualifications in particular circumstances. If a meeting of directors, for example, is said to be infected by bad faith or an improper motive, at least a majority would have to be called. 298 Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474 at 490 (Fed C of A FC). 299 Packer v Cameron (1989) 54 SASR 246 at 253 (FC) per Cox J. 300 Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 (CA). 301 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 929 (FC). 302 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 201–2 (CA). 303 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1979, vol 2 [286]. 304 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 921 (FC). 305 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 920 (FC). 306 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 920 (FC). See also R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95; Silvera v Savic (1999) 46 NSWLR 124 at [56] (absent witness current or former de facto husband of party); Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31 at [66]–[72] (friend of plaintiff complaining of want of legal advice at a meeting). 307 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 733 (FC). 308 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 734 (FC). 309 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 728 (FC).
310 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 728 (FC). 311 Cafe v Australian Portland Cement Pty Ltd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 280 (FC). 312 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 (FC). 313 Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 (CA). 314 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 921 (FC). 315 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [16]; Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Brown (2004) 49
ACSR 62 at [33] and [41]–[42]. 316 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 734 (FC). 317 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 at 734; see also 728 (FC). 318 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 560 (HC). 319 Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 450–1. 320 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 202 (CA). 321 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1979, vol 2 [286]. 322 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308. 323 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 312. 324 O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 921 (FC). 325 Nuhic v Rail and Road Excavations [1972] 1 NSWLR 204 at 211 (CA). 326 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [169], [248]– [249] and [266]. 327 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 560 (HC). 328 Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 at 418–19 (CA). See also Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187 at 200; Pratt v Hawkins (1991) 32 NSWLR 319 at 322–3; Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91 (FCA); R v GEC (2001) 3 VR 344; R v Martin (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 at [22] (in each of the last two cases applied to silence of prosecution witness in criminal case); HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd v Davy (2003) 7 VR 512 at [31]; Prentice v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 134 FCR 449 at [77]–[80]. Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434 at [57] left open the question whether the reasoning could be employed adversely to the accused in a submission that there was no evidence to support a defence on which the accused bore the burden of proof. 329 Milliman v Rochester Railway Co 39 NYS 274; approved in Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 at 419. 330 Ex parte Harper; Re Rosenfield [1964–5] NSWR 58 at 62; Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 at 419 (CA); R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 532 (CCA); White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 228 (Fed C of A). 331 Ta Ho Ma Pty Ltd v Allen (1999) 47 NSWLR 1 at 4. This paragraph was quoted in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [453]. 332 Compare Nuhic v Rail and Road Excavations [1972] 1 NSWLR 204 (CA) and the division within the Court of Appeal in Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191. In Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 143 (CA) Tadgell JA (Phillips JA concurring) held that in a jury case judicial omission to instruct the jury as to the conclusions which they might draw from the absence of witnesses would be a material non-direction, and judicial omission by a judge sitting alone to give a self-direction along those lines was similarly erroneous; see, to the same effect, Black v Tung [1953] VLR 629 (FC); Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 (FC); O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 (FC). 333 Abernethy v Deitz (1996) 39 NSWLR 701 at 706–7 (CA), citing dicta on failure to give any reasons outside court for a decision: Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 at 1053–4; Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 at 663–4 at 564. 334 Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 40 at
62 (Fed C of A FC). Cf Telstra Corp Ltd v ACCC (2008) 171 FCR 174 at [181] (Jones v Dunkel not applied against ACCC, which was arbitrator of an access dispute and a substantially submitting party). 335 Lebanese Moslem Assn v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 11 FCR 543 at 548 (Fed C of A). 336 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [143], [284]. 337 Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 152 at [71] (Fed C of A). 338 Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 at [25]. 339 G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 at 402 per Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, discussing s 66 W(5) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 340 Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC [2007] ATPR 42-184 at [80]. 341 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [16]. 342 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65. 343 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [14]–[16]. 344 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [438]–[440]. 345 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [155] and [236]–[249]. 346 R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 at 161–2 (KB). See also Purdie v Maxwell [1960] NZLR 599 and Saunders v Hill [1964] SASR 327. See generally G L Davies, “The Prohibition Against Adverse Inferences From Silence: A Rule Without Reason?” (2000) 74 ALJ 26 and 99. 347 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [10] per Gleeson CJ. 348 See [23015]–[23050]. 349 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 227–9, after analysing Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 at 161–2; R v Kops (1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 150; Kops v R; Ex parte Kops [1894] AC 650 at 653 (PC); Morgan v Babcock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 178; Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 (PC); May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658–9; Bridge v R (1964) 118 CLR 600 at 615. Brennan and Toohey JJ concurred in dismissing the appeal after citing many of the same authorities and formulating similar tests. See also R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 at 65–7 (FC); R v Allen (1994) 77 A Crim R 99 (Vic FC); R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 (CA); R v Cervelli [1998] 3 VR 776 (CA); R v Moran [1999] 2 VR 87 at 90 and 96 (CA); R v Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60; R v DAH(2004) 150 A Crim R 14. 350 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [52]; Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397 at [16]–[17]. See also R v Giri (2001) 121 A Crim R 568; G L Davies, “Application of Weissensteiner to Direct Evidence” (2000) 74 ALJ 371; D Hamer, “The privilege of silence and the persistent risk of self-incrimination” (2004) 28 Crim LJ 160 and 200. 351 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [49]–[50]. 352 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [51]. Since the warning is “desirable”, not universally mandatory, in some circumstances not all its ingredients need be stated, and even if all should be stated, it is sufficient to state their substance: R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 at [15]–[25]; R v DAH (2004) 150 A Crim R 14; R v Surrey [2005] 2 Qd R 81; cf R v Macris (2004) 147 A Crim R 99. 353 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [68]. 354 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [64]. See Kalmar v Ballantyne (2006) 95 SASR 42; Collie v Police (2013) 115 SASR 281 at [41]–[46]; Brooks v Police (2013) 116 SASR 234 at [29]. The same applies in disciplinary proceedings against a legal practitioner (Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451 at [22]) and in civil proceedings for a penalty (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442 at [33]). For an example of division on the point stated in the text, see Butler v R (2011) 216 A Crim R 215.
355 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [68]. 356 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [73]. 357 R v Booth [1983] 1 VR 39 at 52 (FC). See also R v Gallagher [1974] 3 All ER 118 (CA); R v
Staines (1974) 60 Cr App R 160. 358 R v Booth [1983] 1 VR 39 at 40, 47 and 52 (FC). 359 Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [5]–[6] and [123]. 360 Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; Duke v R (2002) 137 A Crim R 296; Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151 at [235]–[240] and [252]; R v Corish (2006) 96 SASR 207; Jones v ACCC (2010) 189 FCR 390 at [34] (contempt of court). A slightly wider exception is illustrated by R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27 at [128]. The doubts are seen in R v Newland (1997) 98 A Crim R 455 (NSWCCA); RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [29], [111]; R v Scott (2000) 112 A Crim R 543; R v Baker (2000) 78 SASR 103 at [63]–[74] (FC) and R v Atallah (2001) 3 VR 437 at [26]. 361 Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [6]; R v Alexander (2002) 6 VR 53 at [54]; Randall v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 197 at [31]–[32]; R v Heinze (2005) 153 A Crim R 380 at [77]; R v Corish (2006) 170 A Crim R 162 (CCA); Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243 at [63] (it is open to defence counsel to ask the judge to inquire of the prosecution why a witness is not to be called, and if an acceptable explanation is given, no Jones v Dunkel direction should be given). To the contrary are R v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 at 457–9 and 470–1 (CCA); Taylor v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282 and R v Newland (1997) 98 A Crim R 455 (NSWCCA). In R v Glennon (No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631 at [58]–[59] it was assumed that a direction could be given about witnesses not called by the Crown so long as it did not impinge on the prosecutor’s discretion not to call witnesses (see [17115]–[17130]). 362 Stokes v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 at 53. 363 The statement was made in RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 and referred to in Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397 at [27]. The High Court also said that similar views were expressed in Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [13] and [120]–[123]: the RPS v R passage was quoted, but only in the context of the accused’s failure to call a witness. 364 R v Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60. 365 R v Guinan (2001) 121 A Crim R 196 at [15]. 366 R v Sharmpal Singh [1962] AC 188 at 198 (appeal in case involving trial before a judge and three assessors). This passage was approved in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v ACCC (2007) 162 FCR 466 at [73], discussed in Jones v ACCC (2010) 189 FCR 390 at [24]–[34]. A jury may more readily accept a Crown case where the accused is silent, particularly where the accused alone is able to explain the facts: R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 at 65–6 (FC); R v Doherty (2003) 6 VR 393 at [27]. 367 Quach v R (2011) 35 VR 71 at [53] and [103]. 368 [23015]–[23050]. 369 Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 at [661]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201 at 85]–[100]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [459]–[463]. 370 [33470]–[33505] and [33770]. The accused is at a greater disadvantage in New South Wales under s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 and s 146A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986: see [35645]. 371 See, for example, [15055]. 372 There is growing scepticism about this: Simon A Cole and Andrew Roberts, “Certainty, Individualisation and the Subjective Nature of Expert Fingerprint Evidence” [2012] Crim L Rev 824. 373 R v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74; R v Court (1960) 44 Cr App R 242 (fingerprints on car windscreen insufficient evidence of possession on receiving charge). See generally Blacker v R
(1910) 10 CLR 604; Parker v R (1912) 14 CLR 681. For desirable procedure, see R v Smith (Peter) [2011] 2 Cr App R 16. 374 R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 (FC). See also [29115]. 375 Callis v Gunn [1964] 1 QB 495 (DC of QBD); R v Carr [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 (CCA). See [27305]. 376 R v Carr [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 (CCA). The same applies to a request for handwriting samples: R v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465 at [78]–[81]. 377 Ghebrat v R (2011) 214 A Crim R 140 at [25]. 378 See H J Bartholomew, “The Nature and Use of Blood Group Evidence” (1961) 24 MLR 333 and M Hayes, “The Use of Blood Tests in Pursuit of Truth” (1971) 87 LQR 85. 379 W v W (No 4) [1964] P 67 (CA); S v S [1972] AC 24 at 43. Section 99A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) gives the Family Court power to order any relevant person to have a blood test in proceedings where the paternity of a child is in question. 380 See G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 at 402 per Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ. 381 As to children see R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277; on appeal, Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626 and BRB v JB [1968] P 466 (CA). 382 H v H (by his guardian intervening) [1966] 1 All ER 356 at 357. See also B v A-G (B intervening) [1966] 2 All ER 145; Stocker v Stocker [1966] 2 All ER 147. Cf M (D) v M (S) and G [1969] 2 All ER 243 (CA), where no order was made. 383 Benney v Dowling [1959] VR 237; Ridley v Hanney [1962] WAR 157; R v Dooley [1964] 1 All ER 178; R v Mitten [1966] 1 QB 10 (CCA); R v Clarke [1969] 2 All ER 1008; Skalde v Evans [1966] SASR 176; Lambert v Appleby [1969] VR 641; Durston v Mercuri [1969] VR 507; Genardini v Anderton [1969] VR 502; Ross v Smith [1969] VR 411; Gibbons v Oliver [1969] WAR 112; R v Merritt (1969) 63 QJPR 53; Director of Public Prosecutions v Carey [1970] AC 1072; Merchant v R (1971) 126 CLR 414; R v Barnsley [1972] 2 NSWLR 220 (CCA); Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254; R v Turner (1975) 12 SASR 373 (CCA); Lambert v McIntyre [1975] Qd R 349; Houston v Harwood [1975] VR 698; R v Mills [1975] 2 NSWLR 741 (CCA). 384 Patterson v Nixon 1960 SC (J) 42; R v Montgomery [1966] NI 120; R v Lindsay [1970] NZLR 1002 (CA); R v McCartney [1976] 1 NZLR 472 (CA). See also R v Haas (1962) 132 CCC 362 (BCCA); Roberts v State 469 A 2d 442 (Md, 1983). Cf R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58. 385 R v Pieterson [1995] 1 WLR 293 (CA). See also R v Santos (1987) 45 SASR 556 (CCA); R v Sykes [1997] Crim LR 752 (CA); R v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282; Muldoon v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 105. 386 R v Te Whiu & Buckton [1964] NZLR 748. 387 Pierce v Minister for Community Welfare (1987) 27 A Crim R 119 (SASC). 388 R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 at 512–13. 389 See N Morris, “Corpus Delicti and Circumstantial Evidence” (1952) 68 LQR 391 and V T H Delaney, (1952) 68 LQR 460 (Irish cases), and the judgment of Menzies J in Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234. For Australian cases on the use of circumstantial evidence to prove death, see Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619; R v Ryan [1906] St R Qd 15 (FC); R v Murphy (1867) 4 WW & A’B (L) 63 (FC); Smith v R (1932) 35 WALR 1 (FC). 390 R v Camb (1947) Notable British Trials (admission corpse pushed through porthole, but death alleged to be accidental). 391 R v Davidson (1934) 25 Cr App R 21. 392 R v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388 (CCA). See also R v Horry [1952] NZLR 111, and case note by J F Northey, (1952) 15 MLR 348; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521. 393 R v Burton (1854) Dears CC 282 at 284 (KB). See R v Joiner (1910) 4 Cr App R 64 on the need for caution where the accused is in possession of goods in suspicious circumstances, but there is no evidence that they were stolen. See too Trainer v R (1906) 4 CLR 126. 394 See [1335] n 538.
395 Caddy v Beattie [1908] VLR 17 at 19. 396 R v S [2007] 2 All ER 974 at [19]. 397 Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175 at [50]–[91] (discussion centring on the particular
problems facing police officers operating in pairs and by reference to police records). 398 J F Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, art 15; Z Cowen and P B Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, p 1; US Uniform Rules r 63. 399 Assertions admitted as part of the res gestae may be an exception. 400 See Chapter Seventeen “The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law”. 401 Malcolmson v O’Dea (1863) 10 HL Cas 593 at 614 (HL). 402 On the whole subject, see G D Nokes, “Real Evidence” (1949) 65 LQR 57, and Appendix A in W M Best, Principles of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1922, S L Phipson (Ed). 403 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 263 n 1. 404 Line v Taylor (1862) 3 F & F 731. 405 R v Francis (1874) 43 LJMC 97. 406 Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra 505. See also LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) (1990) 24 NSWLR 499 at 508; Houghton v Immer (No 155) Pty Ltd (1997) 44 NSWLR 46 at 59; Tchadovitch v Tchadovitch (2010) 79 NSWLR 491 at [14] (failure of executors to produce relevant information may lead to the court attributing to estate property the highest value reasonably open on the evidence). 407 R v Uxbridge Justices; Ex parte Sofaer (1986) 85 Cr App R 367 (DC of QBD); Tudehope v Stewart 1986 JC 88. 408 R v Forrester [1985] 2 NZLR 85 (CA). 409 Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211; Payton & Co Ltd v Snelling, Lampard & Co Ltd [1901] AC 308 at 311; Hennessy v Keating [1908] 1 IR 43 (CA). 410 1 Hale PC 635–6. 411 Burnaby v Bailie (1889) 42 Ch D 282; Slingsby v A-G (1916) 33 TLR 120 at 122 (HL), where Lord Loreburn regarded such evidence as of some weight, and Lord Shaw regarded it as worthless except where there was a difference in colour between the alleged parent and child (see Macleod v Hill [1976] 2 WWR 593); Russell v Russell (1923) 129 LT 151 at 153, where the evidence was admitted, but spoken of as unsafe and conjectural; C v C [1972] 3 All ER 577 (photographic evidence of resemblance of child to alleged father admissible). See also Ah Chuck v Needham [1931] NZLR 559 (FC); C Kenny, “Physical Resemblance as Evidence of Consanguinity” (1933) 39 LQR 297. 412 See Gray v Lafleche Saskatchewan Power Corp (1962) 31 DLR (2d) 189, showing that the fact that liability is admitted makes a difference. See also Stevens v William Nash Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 156 (CA); Attorney-General (Jersey) v Norton [1967] 1 AC 464 and Draper v Jacklyn [1970] SCR 92. 413 In R v Colgan (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 96 (CCA), it was held that, subject to the judge’s discretion, it was proper to allow the jury to see a girl alleged to be mentally defective and with whom the accused was charged with having had intercourse although the girl was not called as a witness. See also Shepherd v McGivern [1966] 1 NSWR 55 (CA); Ovens v Laneyrie (1987) 11 NSWLR 207. 414 R v Land [1999] QB 65 (CA). 415 R v Ames [1964–5] NSWR 1489 at 1491 (CCA); R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 (CCA); cf Schmidt v Schmidt [1969] QWN 3 (FC) (a case resting on the theory that photographs could only be employed as an aid to testimony: in Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] Aust Torts Rep 81956 at [13] and [240] it was said that it may require reconsideration). 416 Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 at 142–3. It can be necessary for the court not to attempt to construe the photograph for itself, but to rely on expert evidence and to use the photograph to determine which of the explanations given by the witnesses is worthy of acceptance:
C van der Lely NV v Bamfords [1963] RPC 61 at 71 (HL); Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] Aust Torts Rep 81-956 at [171]–[172]. Where an appellate court does examine photographs, there must be a sufficient basis for it to prefer what it thinks the photographs show to evidence accepted by the trial judge: Pledge v Roads and Traffic Authority (2004) 205 ALR 56 at [47]. And it is necessary to ensure that the copies of the original photographs tendered do not differ from the originals: Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd (2008) 249 ALR 663 at [10]–[19]. 417 R v The United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Co (Ltd) (1862) 3 F & F 73. 418 R v Tolson (1864) 4 F & F 103 at 104. 419 United States Shipping Board v The Ship Albans [1931] AC 632 at 642. But see P W Young, “Evidence: Use of Photographs” (2009) 83 ALJ 231. 420 Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] Aust Torts Rep 81-956 at [170]. 421 Hindson v Ashby [1896] 2 Ch 1 at 27 (CA). 422 Niznick v Johnson (1961) 28 DLR (2d) 541. 423 Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 at 313 (CA); R v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 at [41]–[44]. 424 See M Stone, “Instant Lie Detection? Demeanour and Credibility in Criminal Trials” [1991] Crim LR 821 and [11150] n 327. See also [3290] and [11150]. 425 This matter is fully discussed in a case note on Chambers v Murphy [1953] 2 DLR 705 in J B Milner, (1953) 31 Can B Rev 305. The actual decision in Chambers v Murphy was disapproved in Myers v Government of Manitoba and Dobrowski (1961) 26 DLR (2d) 550, where the authorities are fully reviewed. See also E Solomon, “Views as Evidence” (1960) 34 ALJ 46 and 66. Provision for an inspection or view is made by statute or rules of procedure in each jurisdiction. See eg Cth: Evidence Act 1995 ss 53 and 54; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 ss 53 and 54; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 ss 53 and 54; RSC r 40.13; Juries Act 2000 s 45; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 ss 53 and 54; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 ss 53 and 54; NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 53 and 54. 426 R v Baker [1989] 3 NZLR 635 at 638. 427 Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489 at 493 (FC); R v Tsingopoulos [1964] VR 676 at 686 (FC). 428 Grosser v South Australian Police (1994) 63 SASR 243 at 248. 429 Commissioner for Railways v Murphy [1967] ALR 706. See also Smith v Douglas (1855) 16 CB 31 (CP); R v Sullivan (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) (L) 131 (FC); R v Martin (1872) LR 1 CCR 378; London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Lavell [1901] 1 Ch 135 (CA); Kessowji Issar v The Great Indian Peninsula Railway Co (1907) 23 TLR 530 (PC); R v De Grey; Ex parte Fitzgerald (1913) 109 LT 871 (DC of KBD); R v Wallace (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 21 (FC); South Australian Railways Commissioner v Thomas (1951) 84 CLR 84 at 89; Fielke v Municipal Tramways Trust [1944] SASR 235; Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 (FC); South Australian Railways Commissioner v Thomas (1951) 84 CLR 84 at 89; Yendall v Smith Mitchell & Co Ltd [1953] VLR 369; Middleton v Freier [1958] Qd R 351 at 364–5 (FC); Bellia v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 401 at 403–4 (FC); Kristeff v R [1968] ALR 53. Cf Karamat v R [1956] AC 256 at 264 (PC) (view is “in substitution for or supplemental to plans, photographs and the like”); Tito v Waddell [1975] 3 All ER 997 at 1002. 430 Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; Ex parte Mineral Deposits Pty Ltd; Re Claye and Lynch (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 167 at 178 (FC). 431 Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300. See also Goold v Evans & Co [1951] 2 TLR 1189 at 1192 (CA); R v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416 at 426 (FC). It has been said that if the distinction is not observed an appellate court will not know the basis on which the jury reached its decision, and jurors may take into account extraneous material or see or fail to see in an object some material which is never revealed, but if revealed could have been explained away: R v Alexander [1979] VR 615 at 631 (FC). It is not clear whether the principles stated in the text were intended to be disturbed by statements at 632–3 of that case. Cf Goold v Evans & Co [1951] 2
TLR 1189 at 1191 (CA); Buckingham v Daily News Ltd [1956] 2 QB 534 (CA); Tameshwar v R [1957] AC 476 at 484 (PC); Webster v Burns [1964] NZLR 749; Tito v Waddell [1975] 3 All ER 997. 432 Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (No 2) (2000) 79 SASR 185 at [308] (FC). 433 Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57; Grosser v South Australian Police (1994) 63 SASR 243 at 248; Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; R v Dyke (2009) 197 A Crim R 558. 434 R v Quinn [1962] 2 QB 245 (CCA); Stratford v Ministry of Transport [1992] 1 NZLR 486. Similar difficulties may cause the court to exercise its discretion against permitting a party to demonstrate that that party can do what, it is alleged, that party cannot do: R v Duncan [1944] KB 713 (CCA). 435 R v Lowery (No 1) [1972] VR 554; Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 (Fed C of A FC); Li ShuLing v R [1989] AC 270 (PC). 436 R v Thomas [1986] Crim LR 682. 437 R v Boxshall [1956] QWN 45 (FC); R v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 at 34 (CCA). 438 Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130. 439 R v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 at 34 (CCA) 440 Tito v Waddell [1975] 3 All ER 997. See also R v Whalley (1847) 2 Car & K 376. 441 Tameshwar v R [1957] AC 476 (PC); R v Hunter [1985] 2 All ER 173 (CA); R v Albarus [1989] Crim LR 905 (CA); R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 (FC). Cf Hare v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 All ER 578 at 580. 442 Coldwell v Municipal Tramways Trust [1928] SASR 234 (FC); Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 324 at 343–4 (CA); Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 at 49; R v Ely JJ; Ex parte Burgess [1992] Crim LR 888 (DC of QBD). Cf R v Martin (1872) LR 1 CCR 378. See P W Young, “Observation by Trial Judges Outside Court” (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 199. 443 Parry v Boyle (1986) 83 Cr App R 310 (DC of QBD). 444 Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 324 at 343–4 (CA). 445 Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; R v Alexander [1979] VR 615 at 632 (FC). See also R v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416 at 426 (CCA). 446 R v Alexander [1979] VR 615 at 632–3 (FC). See also Thompson v R (1986) 13 FCR 165 (Fed C of A FC). See further M v DPP [2009] 2 Cr App R 12 at [31] (“What is critical before any court embarks on any view is that there is absolute clarity about precisely what is to happen on such a view, about who is to stand in what position, about what (if any) objects should be placed in a specific position and about who will do what.”). 447 Karamat v R [1956] AC 256 (PC); R v Lee [1976] 2 NZLR 171 (CA). 448 R v Ireland (No 2) [1971] SASR 6 (CCA); Thompson v R (1986) 13 FCR 165 at 172–3 (FC). 449 Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541 at 556. 450 Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541 at 555–6. 451 Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 292. See Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521. 452 Osborne v Hosier (1704) Holt 194; Doe d Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PC 502 at 530; Cobbett v Kilminster (1865) 4 F & F 490; R v Whittaker [1924] 3 DLR 63; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 292. 453 R v Burles [1964] Tas SR 256 at 257. If correct, this is an instance of a witness’s privilege. 454 R v Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477 at 482–4. 455 People v Hayes 818 NE 2d 916 (Ill, 2004). See Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521. 456 R v Barker [1989] 2 NZLR 635 at 638. 457 For example, Mizner v Lohr 238 NW 584 (Iowa, 1931); Olsen v Tyner 257 NW 538 (Iowa, 1935); Patterson v State 39 So 2d 709 (Ala App, 1949); Spaak v Chicago & NW Ry 231 F 2d 279 (7th Circ, 1956); Johnson v Clement F Sculley Construction Co 95 NW 2d 409 (Minn, 1959). 458 For example, Citizens’ St R Co of Indianapolis v Willoeby 33 NE 627 (Ind, 1893); Sornberger v
Canadian Pacific Ry (1897) 24 Ont App 263. 459 Osborne v City of Detroit 32 F 36 (CC Mich, 1886); Stephens v Elliott 92 P 45 (Mont, 1907); Wilson & Co Inc v Campbell 157 P 2d 465 (Okl, 1945). 460 Adams v City of Thief River Falls 86 NW 767 (Minn, 1901); R v Burles [1964] Tas SR 256 at 257 (bending a knee). 461 McAndrews v Leonard 134 A 710 (Vt, 1926). 462 Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 292. 463 R v Whittaker [1924] 3 DLR 63 at 68. 464 Daniel v Guy 23 Ark 50 (1861) (relevant to prove race in a suit for freedom). 465 Brown v Foster 113 Mass 136 at 137 (1873); approved by J BThayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 263, n 2. 466 R v Hartwick (VCA, Crockett, Ashley, Mandie JJ, 5 June 1995, unreported, BC9503322). 467 People v Warmack 413 NE 2d 1254 (Ill, 1980). 468 R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 at [47]: in that case the court assumed that s 53 did not apply where an accused person was asked to put on a hat. 469 R v Brett (QCCA, Thomas, Ambrose, Lee JJ, 19 April 1991, unreported, BC9102525) (preferable that witness consent: if this is correct, this is an instance of a witness’s privilege). 470 State v Richardson 84 P 2d 699 (SCWash, 1938). 471 Tennyson Jesse, (Ed), Trial of Sidney Harry Fox, (Notable British Trials Series 1934) at 147–8. 472 R v Burles [1964] Tas SR 256 at 257. 473 R v Whittaker [1925] 3 DLR 63 at 66. The last four examples were given in R v Evans (2006) 164 A Crim R 489 at 510. See also R v Quinn [1962] 2 QB 245 at 257; R v Brett (QCCA, Thomas, Ambrose, Lee JJ, 19 April 1991, unreported, BC9102525). 474 Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521. 475 Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195. 476 Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489. 477 Kozul v R (1981) 147 CLR 221, explaining R v Kozul [1980] 2 NSWLR 299 (CCA) and R v Hamitov (1979) 21 SASR 596 at 598 (FC). See also R v Harbour [1995] 1 NZLR 440 (CA); Jones v Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR 499 (FC). A tape may be replayed, or a handwritten document re-read in the jury room any number of times: R v Smith (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 at 454 (Vic CCA). 478 Hence rules of court permitting the use of affidavits remain operative: In Marriage of Chang and Su (2002) 170 FLR 244 (Fam C of A FC). 479 Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Cmr of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26 at [8]. 480 The Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 53(2) provides only for the jury, not the judge, to be present. That is because under Tasmanian practice the jury is taken on the view by a “shower”, usually a clerk of the court, not the judge: ALRC 102 [2.33]. 481 Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585 at [30]–[41]. 482 See generally ALRC 26 [1027] and [1029]–[1031], ALRC 38 [243]–[244], Bill clause 144. 483 R v Evans (2006) 164 A Crim R 489 at [173]–[189]; aff’d Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521. 484 See ALRC 26 [1028], Bill clause 139; ALRC 38 [243]–[244], Bill clause 145. 485 R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86. 486 ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O’Shea (2010) 14 BPR 27, 317 at [114]. 487 See T P Radley, “Recording as Testimony to Truth” [1954] Crim LR 96; R E Auld, “The Admissibility of Tape Recordings in Criminal Proceedings: A Comparative Note” [1961] Crim LR 598 and Anon (1977) 51 ALJ 94. Admissibility was recognised early: Harry Parker Ltd v Mason [1940] 2 KB 590 at 599 (CA). Many of the relevant authorities are cited in R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 (CCA). See also R v Travers (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 85 (CCA); Beneficial Finance Corp Co Ltd v Conway [1970] VR 321; R v Robson [1972] 2 All ER 699; Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62. 488 DW Elliott, “Video Tape Evidence: The Risk of Over-Persuasion” [1998] Crim LR 159.
489 See R v Senat (1968) 52 Cr App R 282. 490 R v Migliorini [1981] Tas R 80. 491 R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159 at 161 (CCA). 492 R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 (CCA). 493 Taylor v Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225 (CA). 494 The method of obtaining by the police could give rise to a claim of Crown privilege: see S v
Peake 1962 (3) SA 572. 495 R v Robson [1972] 2 All ER 699; Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 184. 496 R v Curran [1983] 2 VR 133. 497 Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 185–9. See also R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 (CCA); Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62; R v Parsons (1977) 17 OR (2d) 465 (Ont CA); Beames v R (1980) 1 A Crim R 239 (Qld CCA); R v Migliorini [1981] Tas R 80 at 89. These principles appear to be applied less rigorously in England: eg R v Riaz (1991) 94 Cr App R 339, though they were approved in R v Welstead [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 59. In the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), “document” includes tape recordings (para (c) of definition in the Dictionary, Pt 1) and the same is true in the Tas: Evidence Act 2001 (para (c) of definition in s 3(1)) and the ACT: Legislation Act 2001 (para (c) of definition in the Dictionary, Pt 1); hence the principles stated in relation to tape recordings in Butera v DPP (Vic) are not preserved by s 52 of those Evidence Acts and survive, if at all, through other provisions. In fact s 48(1)(c) widens the principles by permitting a transcript of the sounds on the tape, rather than merely the sounds themselves, to be evidence: Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 112 (Fed C of A FC). 498 Approving Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595 at 598 (CCA). 499 Disapproving R v Gaudion [1979] VR 57. 500 R v Cassell (1998) 45 NSWLR 325 at 337 (CCA). 501 Approving R v Matthews [1972] VR 3 (FC); R v Papalia (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 161 at 167–9 (SC Can); Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 (DC of QBD). 502 Approving R v MacLean (No 1) (1979) 49 CCC (2d) 399; Williams v R [1982] Tas R 266 at 274 and 280 and R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40 at 49 (CA) and disapproving Hopes v HM Advocate 1960 SC (J) 104. See also R v Smith (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 at 453 (Vic CCA); R v Miladinovic (1992) 109 ACTR 11 at 18–19; R v Watts [1992] 1 Qd R 214 (CCA); Krakouer v R (1996) 16 WAR 1 at 18 (CCA); R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331 at [72]–[83]; R v Lake (2007) 174 A Crim R 491. Similar principles apply to an agreed summary of the taped material: R v Aitken (1991) 94 Cr App R 85. An analogy has been drawn between transcripts of tape recordings and computer printout of the words and symbols recorded on the computer: Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 at 383 (FC). 503 Fakisandhla Nkambule v R [1940] AC 760 at 771 (PC); Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 189. 504 Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 189. 505 R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 150. 506 R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 150. 507 R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 150. See also R v Zaphir [1978] Qd R 151 (CCA). 508 R v Robson [1972] 2 All ER 699. 509 R v Taylor [1993] 1 NZLR 647 (CA); R v Buckett (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 697 (NSW CCA); R v Giovannone (2002) 140 A Crim R 1. 510 R v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82 at [31]–[35]. 511 Douglas v Muscat (2005) 189 FLR 188. 512 Gouldham v Sharrett [1966] WAR 129 (FC) (tape-recordings obtained by overbearing methods not admitted). In R v Senat (1968) 52 Cr App R 282 tape-recordings of incriminating telephone conversations tapped on behalf of a party to divorce proceedings were held to have been rightly
admitted. If the tapping had been the work of the police a problem relating to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence might have been raised. 513 Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1165. 514 R v Nilson [1968] VR 238 (FC). 515 Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375. 516 Applying R v Riaz (1991) 94 Cr App R 339; R v Rawlings [1995] 1 All ER 580 (CA). See also R v McQuiston [1998] 1 Cr App R 139; R v Mullen [2004] 2 Cr App R 18. 517 Grant v South Western and Country Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185; Cassidy v Engwirda Construction Co [1967] QWN 16; Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth (1975) 132 CLR 582 at 594; Radio Ten Pty Ltd v Brisbane TV Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 113 (video-cassette); Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 193. Cf Beneficial Finance Corp Co Ltd v Conway [1970] VR 321. See also the wide definitions of “document” in enactments such as the Dictionary to the Federal Court Rules. 518 R v Matthews [1972] VR 3 (FC); cf R v Stevenson [1971] 1 All ER 678. 519 Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News Ltd [1976] QB 23 (CA). 520 Sapporo Maru v Statue of Liberty [1968] 2 All ER 195. 521 See R v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 and discussion in J C Smith, “The Admissibility of Statements by Computer” [1981] Crim LR 387; and C Tapper, Computer Law, 3rd ed, 1983, 226. 522 R v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23; Castle v Cross [1985] 1 All ER 87 (DC of QBD); R v Spiby (1990) 91 Cr App R 186; R v Coventry Justices; Ex parte Bullard (1992) 95 Cr App R 175 at 178 (DC of QBD); and see R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 (CCA). For criticism, see [31075]. Reasoning similar to that in Pettigrew’s case seems to have been used in R v Wiles [1982] Crim LR 669, in relation to an automatic record made by a meter in an automatic petrol vending system, even though no computer was involved. 523 Philpott v Boon [1968] Tas SR 97 (FC); Mehesz v Redman (1979) 21 SASR 569; Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124 (CA); Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 (CCA); Castle v Cross [1985] 1 All ER 87 (DC of QBD); Rook v Maynard (1993) 2 Tas R 97; R v Jarrett (No 1) (1994) 62 SASR 443 (SASC). See [3070]. R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [9]. 524 Hastie & Jenkerson (a firm) v McMahon [1991] 1 All ER 255 (CA). 525 State Bank of South Australia v Heinrich (1989) 52 SASR 596. 526 Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 All ER 658. 527 Radio Ten Pty Ltd v Brisbane TV Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 113. 528 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 9) [1991] 2 All ER 901. 529 R v Daye [1908] 2 KB 333 at 340 (DC of KBD). 530 Smith v R (1970) 121 CLR 572 at 577. The statement approved was from R v Mitchell [1971] VR 46 at 59–60 (FC). See also Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; Johnson v Kershaw (1847) 1 De G & Sm 260; R v Tucker [1907] SALR 30; R v Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685 at 690 (“schedules from which the overall position can be readily seen”); R v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416 at 424–5 (CCA); R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40 (CA); R v Collins (1986) 44 SASR 214 at 233–5 (CCA); Caratti v R (2000) 22 WAR 527 at [300]–[347] (CCA). 531 R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321; R v Ireland (No 2) [1971] SASR 6. See also Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) (2004) 214 ALR 608 at [27] (summary of complex or voluminous primary evidence). 532 R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 (CCA); Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon Ltd (No 1) [1996] 2 VR 377. 533 Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 27A is to the same effect. Section 27B permits the court to direct the adducing of evidence in non-narrative form (including in the form of a chart, summary or other explanatory document) if the evidence is so voluminous and complex that it would be difficult to comprehend if adduced in narrative form. See also the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 232: R v Benbrika (Ruling No 11) (2007) 183 A Crim R 454.
534
According to S L Phipson, “real evidence” consists of “[m]aterial objects other than documents, produced for inspection of the court”: Law of Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [1–14]. G D Nokes applies the term to “anything other than a document which is examined by the tribunal as a means of proof”: Introduction to Evidence, 3rd ed, 1962, p 445. 535 Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375. 536 Union v State 66 SE 24 (Ga App, 1909); Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NILR 151 at 160; R v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399. 537 AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 at [66]–[67]. 538 Ogden v People 25 NE 755 (Ill, 1890). 539 AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 at [70]–[75]. 540 Report of Committee of Inquiry into the Case of Mr Adolf Beck (1904) Cd 2315. The Warrant appointing the Committee (Sir Richard Henn Collins MR, Sir Spencer Walpole and Sir John Edge) was dated 9 September 1904. It heard 29 witnesses, some more than once, whose evidence filled over 200 pages, and considered over 100 pages of exhibits. The Committee reported on 14 November 1904: autre temps, autres moeurs. 541 W Roughead (ed), Trial of Oscar Slater, 1913. See also FW Ashley, My Sixty Years in the Law, 1936, Ch IX. 542 G L Williams, The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed, 1963, pp 109–10. 543 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395; ALRC 26, Vol 1, Ch 18; J D Jackson, “The Insufficiency of Identification Evidence Based on Personal Impression” [1986] Crim LR 203. For problems created by Facebook, see Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90 at [12]–[37]. 544 Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 446. 545 The Trial of Oscar Slater, 3rd ed, 1929, p 239. 546 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 426 per Mason J. 547 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 at 228 (CA). 548 See G L Williams, The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed, 1963, pp 107–8. 549 L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 437. 550 Devlin Committee Report, (Report of the Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, 1976 Cmnd 338 42), [4.13]. See [1390]. 551 MacKenzie v R (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 373. 552 But there is no duty to warn about the dangers of cross-racial identification: R v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32 at [31]. 553 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 426. 554 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 409. 555 Devlin Committee Report, Table 1, reveals that in 1973 there were 2116 identification parades in England and Wales. In 944 the suspect was picked out, in 984 no one was, and in 188 some person other than the suspect was. 556 G L Williams, The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed, 1963, pp 120–1. 557 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 426 (and see 409). See G L Williams, The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed, 1963, p 122. 558 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 409. 559 Devlin Committee Report, [1.24] and [4.25]. 560 Identification is a topic, not unique in the law of evidence, on which the volume of authority has become unreasonably swollen. Much that is reported ought not to have been, and is not referred to here. 561 R v Chapman (1911) 7 Cr App R 53; R v Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr App R 219; Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170. 562 R v Dickman (1910) 5 Cr App R 135; R v Bundy (1910) 5 Cr App R 270; R v Varley (1914) 10 Cr App R 125. 563 Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182. See also R v Smith (1908) 1 Cr App R 203; R v Williams
(1912) 8 Cr App R 84 and R v Murray (1916) 10 Alta LR 275. 564 See also Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429; R v Vella [1938] St R Qd 289 (HC); R v Preston [1961] VR 761 (FC); R v Gaunt [1964] NSWR 864 (CCA); R v Boardman [1969] VR 151 (FC); R v Donnini [1973] VR 67 (FC); R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 at 615–16 (FC); R v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209 (CCA); Williams v R [1997] 1 WLR 548 (PC); Al-Hashimi v R (2004) 181 FLR 383. As to use of an Identikit, see R v Riley [1972] QJPR 20. In R v Wright (No 2) [1968] VR 174 (FC) it was suggested that a direction urging special caution was less necessary when the identifying witness and the accused were previously acquainted. See also R v Goode [1970] SASR 69 (CCA); Leary v R [1975] WAR 133 (CCA). 565 R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522 at [34]. 566 R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579 (FC); R v Kelly (2002) 129 A Crim R 363. 567 Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] 1 Qd R 503 (CA). The absence of an identification parade will not in every case render identification evidence unreliable or inadmissible: R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 at 289 (NSWCCA). 568 Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90 at [47]–[48]. See also R v Alexander [2013] 1 Cr App R 26 at [22], discussed at [1370]. 569 Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35; R v Clune (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 at 4 (CA). The same is true of partial or qualified identifications: R v George [2003] Crim LR 283 (CA); R v Ali [2009] Crim LR 40 (CA). The Devlin Committee said: “In practice … we believe that the question [‘Does the accused resemble the criminal?’] would not be asked in chief of a prosecution witness who could not positively identify. Although we have found no authoritative statement on the point in English law, we think that many judges would disallow such a question if it were put. If they did, it would be in the exercise of their general discretion in favour of the accused. It would certainly be open to the defence to suggest to a witness that the man he saw did not resemble the accused or that he did resemble someone other than the accused. It is not, therefore, that evidence of resemblance is of its nature deemed to be irrelevant or valueless”: [4.8]. The absence of an identification parade will not in every case render identification evidence unreliable or inadmissible: R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 at 289 (NSW CCA). 570 R v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522 at [29] (photo board procedure). 571 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54. 572 R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 at 621 (FC). See also Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [24]; R v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370. 573 R v Bundy (1910) 5 Cr App R 270. 574 R v Chapman (1911) 7 Cr App R 53 at 55–6; R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 (FC). 575 Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 181–2. 576 R v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 (FC) (accused identified while reporting to police station under bail conditions); R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (CCA) (accused identified while being charged in court, and when crossing street in custody after remand). 577 R v Lamb (1980) 71 Cr App R 198. 578 R v Dodson [1984] 1 WLR 971 (CA). See also R v Smith (1983) 33 SASR 558 (CCA); R v Blenkinsop [1995] 1 Cr App R 7; R v Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547; R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 497 (Vic CA); Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17 at 20–1 (CCA). 579 Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 (DC of QBD); R v Cook (1998) 130 NTR 28 at 31–2 (SC); affd sub nom Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17, see above [1300]; Police v Dorizzi (2000) 84 SASR 403. Films of an allegedly indecent public performance may also be relied on: eg S v W 1975 (3) SA 841 (TPD). 580 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 21 at [19]; R v Ali [2009] Crim LR 40 (CA); R v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83 at [19]–[22]. 581 Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [10]–[11] and [13]–[15]. ALRC 102 [9.11]–[9.24]
recommended no change. This conclusion had been reached earlier in Griffith v R (1995) 79 A Crim R 125 (Qld CA) on opinion evidence grounds; see the discussion in R v Cook (1998) 130 NTR 28 at 31–2 (SC); affd sub nom Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17. See also R v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; R v Beattie (2001) 127 A Crim R 250; R v Murdoch (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; Nguyen v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 267; Irani v R (2008) 188 A Crim R 125 at [27]–[29]. The law appears to be different in England: Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149; R v Fowden [1982] Crim LR 588 (CA); Taylor v Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225 (DC of QBD); R v Grimer [1982] Crim LR 674 (CA); R v Caldwell (1993) 99 Cr App R 73; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 21 at [19]. 582 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395. 583 R v Goodall [1982] VR 33. 584 R v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209. See also Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108 at [54]–[55]; Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 at [166]; Western Australia v Bilos (No 2) (2009) 193 A Crim R 165 at [52]. 585 Cf Morrison v R (CCA(NSW), Full Court, 30 November 1995, unreported, BC9501869). See Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281 at [106]; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 at [85]; Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 at [166]. 586 R v Tipene (CA(NZ), 30 May 2001, unreported). 587 It was held admissible in R v Clare [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 (citing R v Howe [1982] 1 NZLR 618 (CA); R v Leaney (1988) 38 CCC (3d) 263 (Alb CA); Steele v HM Advocate 1992 JC 1); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 21 at [19]. This is criticised in a note on Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] Crim LR 192 at 194–5. 588 It was held admissible in R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260; R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425; R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750; R v Murdoch (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; aff’d Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329 at [290]. See Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 21 at [19]; R v Atkins [2010] 1 Cr App R 8 (permissible to refer to conventional expressions of strength arranged in a hierarchy, but preferable that they not be allocated numbers) Shepherd v R [2012] 2 NZLR 609 (CA). Cf R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 at [146]. 589 It was held admissible in R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 (which also discusses the possibility of discretionary exclusion and the content of the jury direction). 590 R v Alexander [2013] 1 Cr App R 26 at [22]. 591 R v Varley (1914) 10 Cr App R 125 at 127; R v Dwyer [1925] 2 KB 799 (CCA); R v Haslam (1925) 19 Cr App R 59; R v Daily Mirror; Ex parte Smith [1927] 1 KB 845 at 848–50 (DC of KBD); R v Courtney (1956) 74 WN (NSW) 204 (CCA) (stating that warning of the danger should have been given); R v Seiga (1961) 45 Cr App R 220; R v Russell [1977] 2 NZLR 20 at 27 (CA). The dangers are summarised in Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35 at 38–9; Murphy v R [1996] 2 Qd R 523 (CA). See also Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151 at [169]–[212]; R v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79. 592 R v Dwyer [1925] 2 KB 799 at 802–3 (CCA) per Lord Hewart CJ. See also R v Goss (1923) 17 Cr App R 196; R v Melany (1924) 18 Cr App R 2; R v Haslam (1925) 19 Cr App R 59; R v Hinds [1932] 2 KB 644 (CCA); R v Seiga (1961) 45 Cr App R 220; R v Bouquet [1962] SR (NSW) 563 (FC); R v Voss [1963] VR 22 (FC); R v Doyle [1967] VR 698 (FC); R v Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309; R v Lamb (1980) 71 Cr App R 198; Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395; R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 (FC); Dawson v R (1990) 2 WAR 458 at 460–1 (CCA). See also D F Libling, “The Use of Photographs for the Purpose of Identification” [1978] Crim LR 343; M Weinberg, “The Admissibility of Out-of-court Identification Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1980) 12 MULR 543. On identification parades generally see G Williams, “Identification Parades” [1955] Crim LR 525 and G Williams and H A Hammelmann, “Identification Parades” [1963] Crim LR 479 and 545. See also R v Kingsland (1919) 14 Cr App R 8; R v Fannon (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 427; R v Bagley [1926] 3 DLR 717 (Alb App Div); but see R v Griffiths [1930] VLR 204 (FC). In some
jurisdictions there are special rules for photographic identification, eg Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 235: see R v Carpenter (2011) 249 FLR 432. 593 R v Fannon (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 427 at 430 (CCA); R v Clune [1982] VR 1 at 7–8 (FC) per Crockett J. 594 See R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 55 (NSW CCA), describing these and other dangers. See [1355]. See also Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581 at [410]–[414]. 595 R v Goss (1923) 17 Cr App R 196; R v Chadwick (1934) 24 Cr App R 138; R v Clune [1982] VR 1 at 7 (FC) (suspect only person photographed in non-custodial setting and with moustache: held admissible because of accused’s refusal to participate in an identification parade, but a careful warning as to the dangers of the identification from photographs was called for). 596 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [22]. There is no need to give a warning in relation to a “rogues’ gallery” effect where there is evidence that the photograph was not in the possession of the police before the time of the suspect’s arrest in relation to the crime charged: Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [72]–[73]. 597 R v Goode [1970] SASR 69 at 80 (CCA). 598 Devlin Committee Report, [2.26]. 599 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395. See also Duff v R (1979) 28 ALR 663 (Fed C of A FC); R v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 (CCA); R v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90. 600 R v Wainwright (1925) 19 Cr App R 52. 601 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 430, citing Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 180–1. There is, however, an apparent division among the majority of the court in Alexander’s case as to whether the appropriate discretion is the discretion to exclude unfairly obtained evidence (Gibbs CJ) or the discretion to exclude evidence the prejudicial effect of which exceeds its probative value (Mason and Aickin JJ). The latter approach was applied in Dawson v R (1990) 2 WAR 458 at 463 and 471 (CCA). 602 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 403, citing R v Russell [1977] 2 NZLR 20 at 28 (CA). See also R v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252 (CCA). 603 Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [11], [41], [43] and [87] (FC); Cafaro v R (2002) 132 A Crim R 142. 604 R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 64 (NSW CCA). 605 Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [19], [43] and [64]; Cafaro v R (2002) 132 A Crim R 142. 606 R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 64–5 (NSW CCA). 607 R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 at [28]; Knight v Brown (2004) 183 FLR 135. 608 R v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 at [56]–[57]. 609 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 403. 610 R v Dwyer [1925] 2 KB 799 (CCA); R v Wainwright (1925) 19 Cr App R 52. 611 R v Doyle [1967] VR 698 (FC). See also R v Varley (1914) 10 Cr App R 125 at 127. 612 R v Palmer (1914) 10 Cr App R 77. 613 R v Griffiths [1930] VLR 204 (FC); R v Martin [1956] VLR 87 (FC). 614 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555: see [1395]. 615 Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [19], [36], [44], [88] and [89], citing R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 (NSW SC). See, however, [1420]. 616 R v Smith (1986) 85 Cr App R 197. 617 Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90 at [61]. 618 R v Britten (1988) 51 SASR 567 at 571. 619 Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17 at 22 (CCA); cf R v Fowden [1982] Crim LR 588 (CA). 620 R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 at 193–4 (NSWCCA). 621 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 212; R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 at 193–4 (NSW CCA). 622 R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 at 193–4 (NSW CCA).
623 R v Sparrow (2009) 104 SASR 320. 624 R v Cleal [1942] 1 All ER 203 (CCA). The same applies to voice identification: R v Murray
(1916) 33 DLR 702. 625 People (Attorney-General) v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33. 626 R v Williams [1956] Crim LR 833 (CCA). 627 Arthurs v A-G (Northern Ireland) (1970) 55 Cr App R 161 (HL). 628 The position is the same in Australia: R v Marijancevic (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 (Vic FC); R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225. 629 R v Long (1973) 57 Cr App R 871. 630 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 (CA). There is a helpful bibliography in A N Khan, “Judicial Warning in Identification Cases” (1978) 122 Sol Jo 377. 631 G Williams, “Evidence of Identification” [1976] Crim LR 407. 632 See R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 (CA). 633 Farquharson v R (1993) 98 Cr App R (PC); R v Ley [2007] Crim LR 642 (CA). 634 Weeder v R (1980) 71 Cr App R 228; R v Shelton [1981] Crim LR 776 (CA); R v Breslin (1984) 80 Cr App R 226. 635 R v I [2007] 2 Cr App R 316. 636 See R v Keane (1977) 65 Cr App R 247; R v Hunjan (1978) 68 Cr App R 99; Reid v R [1980] AC 343 (PC). 637 In favour: R v Thornton [1995] 1 Cr App R 578 (unless there is no possibility of a mistake eg because of the wholly unusual size of the accused (R v Slater [1995] 1 Cr App R 584)). Against: R v Oakwell [1978] 1 All ER 1223 (CA); R v Curry [1983] Crim LR 737 (CA) (in such cases it is said to be enough that the direction address the special dangers arising on the particular facts). 638 R v Walshe (1982) 74 Cr App R 85; R v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 at 375 (Vic FC); R v Beveridge (1987) 85 Cr App R 255; R v Flemming (1987) 86 Cr App R 32; R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 at 311 (voice identification); R v Wright (1991) 60 A Crim R 215 at 224 (Tas SC); Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 65 A Crim R 12 at 26 and 38 (Fed C of A FC); R v Clarke (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 at 68 (NSWCCA); Greaves v Aikman (1994) 4 Tas R 196 at 209–10; 74 A Crim R 370 (voice identification). See also K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law, 1997, pp 46–9. 639 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561–2. The principles apply to identification of persons other than the accused: R v Bath [1990] Crim LR 716 (CA). It is not clear whether they apply where the defence does not challenge identity but there is evidence to support the view that identification is mistaken: R v Courtnell [1990] Crim LR 115 (CA); cf R v Bath [1990] Crim LR 716 (CA); Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90 at [158]–[165] 640 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 551; R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 at 228; R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 at 616–19 (FC); R v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 at 270–1 (CCA). The last five words of the sentence in the quotation are important: Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1 at [10] and [19]. 641 R v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 at 384 (CCA); R v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 at 435– 6 (NSW CCA). 642 R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 at 230 (FC); Reid (Junior) v R [1990] 1 AC 363 at 380 (PC). 643 R v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 at 328 (CCA); Allen v R (1984) 16 A Crim R 441 at 444–5 (NSW CCA). 644 Smith v R (1990) 64 ALJR 588. 645 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 551. 646 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 551. 647 Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182–3. No such requirement exists in relation to the uncorroborated evidence of a person complaining of sexual misconduct: R v H [1997] 1 Qd R 527 (CA). 648 In Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [112] it was said that “significance” referred to
“matters which might have a real bearing, in practical terms, upon the jury’s assessment of the identification evidence” and excluded “matters which would have a remote or hypothetical effect only”. 649 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 413. See also R v Clarke (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 (NSW CCA). 650 R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1 at [64]. 651 R v Fox (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 640 at [23]. 652 Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95 (FC); Sharrett v Gill (1993) 65 A Crim R 44 (ACT SC); Parker v Espinoza (1996) 85 A Crim R 336 (WASC); Johnson v Giumelli (2003) 175 FLR 467; Dennis v Davis (2010) 204 A Crim R 1; Connelly v Allan (2011) 212 A Crim R 320 at [136]–[137]; Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90 at [158]–[165]. 653 R v Johnson (2004) 147 A Crim R 151 at [90]. 654 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 570. See R v Giga [2007] Crim LR 571. 655 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [56]–[67]. 656 R v King (1975) 12 SASR 404 (CCA); R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 119, 124–5, 132–3; R v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 at 272–4 (CCA); R v Marijancevic (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 at 278 (Vic FC: object identification); R v Southon (2003) 85 SASR 436 at [44]–[45] (CCA); Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260 at [62]; R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 at [51]–[53] (object identification). 657 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [166]–[167]. 658 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [218]–[219]. 659 This appears to represent agreement with McHugh J’s opinion that R v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572 (CA) (followed in R v Finlay (2007) 178 A Crim R 373) was wrong on this point. 660 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [65]; see also Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 at [154]. 661 Sindoni v R (2011) 211 A Crim R 187 at [63]–[65]. 662 R v Preston [1961] VR 761 (CCA); R v Gaunt [1964] NSWR 864 (CCA); R v Gaffney [1968] VR 417 (CCA); R v Boardman [1969] VR 151 (CCA); R v Maarroui (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757 (CCA); R v Goode [1970] SASR 69 (CCA); R v Harris (1971) 1 SASR 447 (CCA). 663 For example R v Goode [1970] SASR 69 at 77 (CCA); R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 (CCA); R v Collings [1976] 2 NZLR 104 (CA). 664 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 565. 665 Nembhard v R [1982] 1 All ER 183 at 186 (PC); R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (FC); R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 (FC); R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 at 230–1 (FC); R v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 (NSW CCA). For a discussion of the warning in relation to the “displacement effect”, see R v Clune [1995] 1 VR 489 (FC); R v Akgul (2002) 5 VR 537. 666 R v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169 at [21]. 667 R v Clune [1982] VR 1 at 8 (FC); R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 at 231 (FC); Allen v R (1984) 16 A Crim R 441 (NSW CCA). 668 R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 at 231 (FC), approved in Reid (Junior) v R [1990] 1 AC 363 at 380 (PC). See also R v Bentley (1991) 99 Cr App R 342; R v Sainsbury [1993] 1 Qd R 305 (CCA) (desirable, but not a rigid requirement); R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163 (CCA). Indeed the warning does not apply in relation to issues of credit (ie honesty as distinct from reliability): R v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 at 399 (NSW CCA); R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 73 (NSW CCA); R v Tran [2000] 2 Qd R 430 (CA). 669 R v Dupas (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380 at [8]. 670 Mills v R [1995] 3 All ER 865 (PC). 671 R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (FC); R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 (FC). 672 See R v Preston [1961] VR 761 (FC); R v Wright (No 2) [1968] VR 174 at 178–9 (FC); R v Maarroui (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757 (CCA); R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 (FC) and R v Clune
[1982] VR 1 (FC). 673 R v Bedford (1986) 28 A Crim R 311 at 314–15 (NSW CCA); R v Gorham (1997) 68 SASR 505 (CCA). The circumstances may even be such as to justify exclusion of the evidence on the ground that its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value: R v Wright (1992) 60 A Crim R 215 (Tas SC); Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [52]. The danger is particularly great where several identifying witnesses are grouped together, because of the risk of them exchanging impressions and mutually reinforcing their identifications: Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [158] and [245]–[246]. 674 R v Coxon (2002) 82 SASR 412 (CCA); R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; R v White (2008) 188 A Crim R 565. 675 R v White (2008) 102 SASR 35 at [20] (cf R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163). 676 R v Chance [1988] QB 932 (CA). 677 Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411 at [5]. However, where a witness’s previous knowledge of the accused is tenuous, or the witness’s previous sighting of the accused was fleeting, the witness’s evidence of having recognised the accused at or near the crime scene in substance resembles identification evidence: at [73]. 678 R v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 at [61] (Tas CCA); Kelly v R (2002) 129 A Crim R 363 at [38]; Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108; Al-Hashimi v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 186 at [24]– [26]; R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411 at [74]–[88]. 679 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 565–6. The Privy Council has expressed very similar views: Scott v R [1989] AC 1242 at 1261–2; Reid (Junior) v R [1990] 1 AC 363; Beckford v R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409; Amore v R [1994] 1 WLR 547; Daley v R [1994] 1 AC 117. However, in Shand v R [1996] 1 WLR 67 the Privy Council said that in exceptional circumstances the proviso would be applied, following Freemantle v R [1994] 1 WLR 1437. In Shand v R it was said that where the defence challenged the credibility of the identifying witnesses as the sole or principal means of defence, as distinct from a challenge to the accuracy of identification, there might be exceptional cases where the warning was unnecessary or could be given more briefly. That principle had been referred to in Beckford v R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409 at 415 (PC), and was applied in R v Cape (1996) 1 Cr App R 191. See also Grieves v R [2012] Crim LR 212 (PC). 680 R v Smith [1987] VR 907. This approach was criticised by O P Holdenson, “The Admission of Expert Evidence Opinion as to the Potential Unreliability of Evidence of Visual Identification” (1988) 16 MULR 521. 681 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [87]. 682 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [109]. 683 Weeder v R (1980) 71 Cr App R 228. 684 R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 at 616 (FC); cf at 248 and 251–2. 685 R v Bennett (2004) 88 SASR 6 (CCA). 686 R v Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr App R 219; R v Gaunt [1964] NSWR 864 (CCA); Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 399; Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530; cf R v Chapman (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 61 (CCA) at 71–2. See generally [1360]. 687 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 427 per Mason J. See also at 399 per Gibbs CJ; Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 181–2. 688 Devlin Committee Report, [2.24]. 689 Jamal v R (2000) 182 ALR 307 at [44]. 690 R v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 at 513 (CA). 691 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [18]–[21]; Tido v R [2012] 1 WLR 115 (PC) at [21]. 692 R v Hunter [1969] Crim LR 262; R v Howick [1970] Crim LR 403; R v John [1973] Crim LR 113; Devlin Committee Report, [2.25]. See also R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 (FC) at 240–1; R v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 (Vic CA). 693 Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17 at 24 (CCA). 694 R v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 at 629 (CA); Tido v R [2012] 1 WLR 115 (PC) at [21]; Neilly v
R [2012] 2 Cr App R 20 (PC) at [35]–[36]. 695 R v Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 at [87]. 696 R v Britten (1988) 51 SASR 567 at 572; Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95 at 104 (Fed C of A FC); R v Gorham (1997) 68 SASR 505 at 508 (FC). See also R v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; aff’d sub nom Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329 at [110]. 697 R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116 at 128. 698 Devlin Committee Report, [4.99]. Sometimes leading questions can be avoided; see, eg R v Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox CC 333. 699 See R v Dougherty (1973, unreported), discussed in the Devlin Committee Report, [2.27]– [2.29]. The procedure there failed because the witnesses had seen the accused in the dock while being arraigned. 700 R v Gorham (1997) 68 SASR 505 (CCA); R v Powers (2000) 113 A Crim R 51 at [56]–[58] and [64] (NT CCA). 701 R v Hallam (1985) 42 SASR 126 at 130 (CCA). The same danger can arise where the identifying witness sees a photograph of police suspects on the internet: R v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; aff’d sub nom Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329. 702 R v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 at 50 (SA CCA). 703 R v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 at 513 (CA). 704 R v Wainwright (1925) 19 Cr App R 52; cf R v Varley (1914) 10 Cr App R 125; R v Wright (1934) 25 Cr App R 35; R v Lamb (1980) 71 Cr App R 198. 705 R v Lawrenson [1961] Crim LR 398. 706 R v Doyle [1967] VR 698 (FC). The Australian cases generally show a greater readiness to exercise the discretion in favour of admitting identifications based on photographs, even after suspicion has crystallised on a suspect; they were preferred by Mason J in Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 429. 707 R v Watson (1944) 81 CCC 212. See also R v Kingsland (1919) 14 Cr App R 8. 708 For the criteria see R v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 (WASC). For statutory requirements, see Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 233–234 and [1450]. See also Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [50], [154]–[156] and [245]–[246]. 709 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 400. The actual identification need not occur during the parade, however: R v Creamer (1984) 80 Cr App R 248. 710 Devlin Committee Report, [5.21]. 711 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 401 (and 430), citing Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; R v Seiga (1961) 45 Cr App R 220 and R v Bouquet [1962] SR (NSW) 563 (CCA). See also Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 430; Neilly v R [2012] 2 Cr App R 20 (PC) at [31] (identification parade is “the normal and proper practice”). 712 Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [8], [36], [83] and [84]. 713 R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (FC) and cases there cited; R v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347 (CCA); THD v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 106 at [14]; cf Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 (CA). 714 R v Clune [1982] VR 1 at 11 (FC) and 27, all citing Marcoux v R [1976] 1 SCR 763. 715 R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 (NSWCCA); R v Davies (2005) 11 VR 314 at [8]–[12]. 716 R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 at 404 (NSWCCA). 717 R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 (FC). 718 R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 (FC). 719 R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (FC); R v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347 (CCA). 720 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 400. 721 Ricketts v R [1998] 1 WLR 1016 at 1022 (PC). 722 THD v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 106 at [34], citing Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 431– 3. See generally Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33. 723 R v Murphy [1996] 2 Qd R 523 (CA).
724 R v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10 at [33]–[34]. 725 R v Davies (2005) 11 VR 314 at [13]–[18]. 726 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [48]. 727 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [48]. 728 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [55]. Similarly, it is not the case that trial judges should
be readier, in the exercise of their discretion, to exclude digiboard identification than to exclude evidence of identification by other means. 729 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [62]. 730 Winmar v WA (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [70]. 731 R v Russell [1977] 2 NZLR 20 at 27 (CA); R v Ormsby [1985] 1 NZLR 311 (CA). 732 R v Goss (1923) 17 Cr App R 196; R v Haslam (1925) 19 Cr App R 59; R v Smith (1986) 85 Cr App R 197 (video film of crime); R v Barbaro (1993) 32 NSWLR 619 (CCA). 733 R v Dwyer [1925] 2 KB 799 (CCA); Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 400. 734 R v Condon [1980] Crim LR 721 (CA). 735 R v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549 (CCA). 736 R v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 at 321 (CCA). See also R v Marijancevic (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 at 278 (Vic CA); R v Crupi (1995) 86 A Crim R 229 at 241 (Vic CA); R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 495 (Vic CA); R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at 317 (NSW CCA). But statements as to the nature of an object or substance which has been examined or seen in a photograph are not evidence of identification: R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123 at 144. Gun identification is discussed in R v Callaghan (2001) 4 VR 79 at [28]. Gun similarity is discussed in R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 at [51]–[53]. 737 Bond v MacFarlane (1990) 102 FLR 38 at 46 (ACT SC); R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 495 (Vic CA) (guns). 738 R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at 317 (NSW CCA). 739 R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 495 (Vic CA). 740 R v Browning (1991) 94 Cr App R 109 at 122–3. 741 R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 at 511–12; R v Pfennig (No 3) (1993) 60 SASR 271 (CCA). 742 R v Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462; R v Brownlowe (1986) 7 NSWLR 461 (CCA); R v Smith (1987) 7 NSWLR 444 (CCA). This has been assumed to be correct in Queensland: R v Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 at 296 (Qld CA). R v Smith has been overturned by Pt 3.9 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Though specific requirements are imposed for the admission of visual identification evidence by s 114 and for the admission of picture identification evidence by s 115, none are imposed for the admission of other types of “identification evidence”, an expression which is defined in Pt 1 of the Dictionary to include aural identification evidence: R v Adler (2001) 52 NSWLR 451. See also R N Howie, “Identification Evidence under the Evidence Act 1995” (1996) 3 Criminal Law News 13 at 15–16. 743 The NSW position has been held wrong in Victoria (R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310; R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 (FC)), the Australian Capital Territory (R v Omar (1991) 58 A Crim R 139 at 146–7 (ACT SC) (foreign language); R v Miladinovic (1992) 109 ACTR 11), Western Australia (Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108 at [43]) and Tasmania (Greaves v Aikman (1994) 4 Tas R 196). Brennan CJ, and McHugh and Gummow JJ, criticised the New South Wales position in Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 406. Doyle CJ inclined to the Victorian view in R v Bueti (1997) 70 SASR 370 at 380 (CCA); see too Police v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130. See generally C Carracher, “Voice Identification Evidence” (1993) 10 Aust Bar Rev 75; David Ormerod, “Sounds Familiar?—Voice Identification Evidence” [2001] Crim LR 595; David Ormerod, “Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification” [2002] Crim LR 771. The United States authorities applied in R v Smith no longer enjoy favour there: United States v Cerone 830 F 2d 938 (8th Circ, 1987).
744 R v Murray (1916) 33 DLR 702 (Alb App Div). 745 The leading one being Neil v Biggers 409 US 188 (1972). 746
The condition need not be satisfied if the voice identification is associated with visual identification: R v Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 (Qld CA). 747 This is a question to be decided by the jury: R v Smith (1987) 7 NSWLR 444 (CCA). 748 R v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 at 106 (CCA). 749 R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 (FC); R v Jones (1989) 41 A Crim R 1 (Vic FC); R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310; R v Callaghan (2001) 4 VR 79 at [27]; R v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366 at [19]–[21]. In England they apparently go to admissibility: R v Chenia [2004] 1 All ER 543 (CA) at [102] (stating procedural requirements calling for the prosecution to indicate in advance the basis on which police officers identify particular voices); R v Flynn [2008] 2 Cr App R 20 (setting out factors going to exclusion on unfairness grounds). However, in R v Robinson [2006] 1 Cr App R 221 the test was said to be that if a jury properly warned would place some weight on the evidence it was admissible. 750 R v Ryan (1984) 55 ALR 408 (NSW CCA); R v Miladinovic (1993) 47 FCR 190 (FC). 751 R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 at 317. 752 However, their use has been approved in England: R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 (CA); R v Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680 (CA). As to audio identification parades of motor cars, see R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507. 753 Cf R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (FC). 754 R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 (CCA), following R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 (CCA). See also R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161: voice identification by expert using auditory technique not supplemented by acoustic analysis admitted. 755 R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310; R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161. See also R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 (CA); R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 at [44]; R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5 (NICA); R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331 at [66]; Korgbara v R (2007) 71 NSWLR 187 (foreign language). 756 R v Mackay [1985] VR 623 (FC); R v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 at 106 (CCA); R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at 317 (NSWCCA); Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [26], [83]– [85], [178]–[179], [216] and [245]–[246]; R v Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183 (CA) and R v Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6 at [100]–[101] call for an “even more stringent” warning. 757 Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 394–95. Toohey and Gaudron JJ regarded the warning given as inadequate; Brennan CJ thought it adequate; McHugh and Gummow JJ’s reasoning turned on another point. 758 Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59 at [57] and [139]. Cf R v Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6 at [106]–[107] (overruled in R v Flynn [2008] 2 Cr App R 20 at [56]). 759 Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59 at [140]. 760 Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59 at [140]. 761 R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1 at [73]. See also Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 397– 399. 762 R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451. See also R N Howie, “Identification Evidence under the Evidence Act 1995” (1996) 3 Criminal Law News 13 at 15–16. 763 See ALRC 26 [414]–[436] and [824]–[846], Bill clauses 96–101, Appendix C [188]–[194]; ALRC 38 [182]–[192], Bill clauses 102–105; R N Howie, “Identification Evidence under the Evidence Act 1995” (1996) 3 Criminal Law News 13. 764 R v Evans (2006) 164 A Crim R 489 at [211]. 765 Cf Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35: see [1360] n 569. 766 The inclusion of aural identification, read with ss 114, 115, 116 and 165(1)(b), means that the requirements imposed by the line of cases commencing with R v Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 no longer apply in New South Wales: see [1445] n 742. The other considerations discussed in [1445]
apply. 767 This expression in theory includes identification by the three senses other than sight and hearing. It also includes identification by the sound of a person’s particular gait: R N Howie, “Identification Evidence under the Evidence Act 1995” (1996) 3 Criminal Law News 13. 768 R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701. 769 R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701. 770 R v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 at [46]. 771 R v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 at [46]. 772 R v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 at [47]. 773 Clifford v R (2004) 12 Tas R 415 at [19] (CCA). 774 Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233 at [68]–[69]; Trudgett v R (2008) 70 NSWLR 696 at [31]. Connelly v Allan (2011) 212 A Crim R 320 at [150]. 775 Trudgett v R (2008) 70 NSWLR 696 at [35]–[36]. 776 R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21 (SC). See also R v MacDonald (2002) 128 A Crim R 228 (identification witnesses moved towards car containing suspects without police intervention or encouragement). 777 These preconditions were not strict preconditions at common law, though they were relevant to discretion and to weight. The legislative provision “was the result of policy considerations rather than a concern about the reliability of the evidence. Identification evidence becomes no more reliable because the absence of an identification parade was the fault of the accused rather than the police”: R N Howie, “Identification Evidence under the Evidence Act 1995” (1996) 3 Criminal Law News 13 at 14. 778 Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215, not following R v Taylor (2008) 2 ACTLR 216. 779 See Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215 at [31], discussing R v Taufua (NSWC(CA), Priestley AP, No 60079/96, 11 November 1996, unreported; BC9605430). 780 R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21 (SC). See also R v D (2008) 220 FLR 169 (making the point that “identification” means the witness’s identification of the accused as the person that the witness could link to the offence in some way, not the assertion in court that the accused was at the crime scene); Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Walford (2011) 221 A Crim R 331. 781 R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264. 782 For example, the relationship between prisoners likely to have seen each other frequently and to be capable of recognising each other: R v Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302 at [14]–[18]. Another example, which that case (see [19]–[27]) illustrates, is the need to protect a witness to a prison killing in circumstances where the conduct of an identification parade would reveal his identity. Provisions similar to s 114(3) have been inserted into the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as s 3ZM(2A) and s 3Z0(1A). 783 This changes the common law. “The provision is focusing on the point at which the photographs are examined by the witness not the point at which they are tendered as evidence before a jury. It is difficult to see how the police can ever comply with the section. The fact that the police have a photograph of a person at all strongly suggests that it is a photograph of a person in police custody. Even if police compile a selection of photographs from various other sources it is difficult to [imagine] that the photograph of a person in custody would not be obviously different from the rest”: R N Howie, “Identification Evidence under the Evidence Act 1995” (1996) 3 Criminal Law News 13 at 15. 784 Declining to accept an offer to participate in an identification parade is a refusal: R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28 at [34]. 785 Director of Public Prosecutions v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49 at [31] (CCA). 786 Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1 at [19]–[23], [53] and [92]–[94]; Trudgett v R (2008) 70 NSWLR 696 at [43]. This corresponds with the common law position: [1395] n 640. See also R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510.
787 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555; Clifford v R (2004) 12 Tas R 415 at [28]–[31] (CCA). 788 R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 427 (NSW CCA). See also Director of Public Prosecutions
v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49 at [38] (CCA). 789 ALRC 38 Bill clause 105(4). 790 See [11100]. 791 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207. 792 R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327 at [17]–[39]; R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28 at [36]–[39] and [47]–[48]. 793 R v Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290 at [58]. 794 R v Birtles (1911) 6 Cr App R 177. 795 Lovat Peerage Case (1885) 10 App Cas 763 (HL). 796 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1979, vol 2 [411]. As to identity of name, see Allan & Co Pty Ltd v Reed [1913] VLR 422; R v Rickards [1922] SASR 269; Blyth v Carter [1933] VLR 433. 797 On the whole subject see J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, Ch 11. 798 Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21 at 49. For the history see J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, Ch 11. 799 Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang (2007) 229 CLR 498 at [4] (prospective life expectancy tables preferred to historical). 800 Stobart v Dryden (1836) 1 M & W 615. 801 Cf R v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279 (CCA). 802 R v Francis (1874) 43 LJMC 97, followed in Hockin v Ahlquist Bros Ltd [1944] KB 120 (DC of KBD). See also R v Hunt (1820) 3 B & A 566 (KB), Lucas v Williams & Sons [1892] 2 QB 113 (CA) and Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 (CCA). Lord Denning MR said that the best evidence rule no longer exists in Garton v Hunter [1969] 2 QB 37 (CA). See also Hindson v Monaghan [1970] VR 84. 803 R W Baker, The Hearsay Rule, 1950, p 4, citing R v Birmingham (1829) 8 LJSMC 41, from Hubbock’s Evidence of Succession. 804 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 507 — a loose way of putting the rule in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, discussed at [1215]–[1220]. 805 Cmr for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535 at 553. 806 Morris v Miller (1767) 4 Burr 2057 (KB) and R v Christie [1914] AC 545 (so far as the admissibility of the evidence by the mother and policeman and of the boy’s act of identification was concerned); but see R v Osbourne [1973] QB 678 (CA). 807 R v Quinn [1962] 2 QB 245 (CCA). 808 Goold v Evans & Co [1951] 2 TLR 1189 (CA); Buckingham v Daily News Ltd [1956] 2 QB 534 (CA): [1290]. 809 R v Quinn [1962] 2 QB 245 at 257 (CCA). 810 Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 (DC of QBD). 811 R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Osman (1988) 90 Cr App R 281 at 308–9. 812 Masquerade Music Ltd v Springsteen (2001) 51 IPR 650 at [85] per Jonathan Parker LJ, Laws and Waller LJJ concurring. 813 See R Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983, especially Ch 6, and the same author’s earlier papers in H H Glass (Ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, Ch 3, and 4 Melb ULR 180. 814 Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 at 594 (CA). The question whether the rule is best formulated in terms of degrees of relevance is, like the question whether it is proper to distinguish between logical and legal relevancy, of no practical importance. It is sometimes contended that the rule should be stated to be simply that all relevant evidence is generally admissible and all that is irrelevant is inadmissible. On this view, the exclusion of evidence which is
too remote, too likely to lead to a multiplicity of issues, or too easily manufactured, is due to special exclusionary rules: see H L Trautman, “Logical or Legal Relevancy — A Conflict in Theory” (1952) 5 Vand L Rev 385 and G F James, “Relevance, Probability and the Law” (1941) 29 Cal LR 689. 815 Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [7]. 816 Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, Art 1. Stephen’s definition was adopted by McHugh J in Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [31]. Other definitions are collected in the ALRC’s Interim Report on Evidence (ALRC 26) Vol 1, [94]. Stephen’s definition is similar to that adopted in the United States Federal Rules of Evidence r 401. See also Stokes v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 at 48 (FC) (stressing that the question of relevance is “to be resolved by common sense, having regard to the world and community in which we live”); Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 193 (FC). 817 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [2] n 2. 818 See R v Aliola (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 699 at [17]. 819 Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 3) (2012) 301 ALR 653 at [12]–[13], discussing Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [47]. 820 General View of the Criminal Law, 1863, p 236. 821 R Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983, Ch 6. 822 For example R v Wilson [1991] 2 NZLR 707 at 711. And J BThayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 516, said: “The law of evidence undoubtedly requires that evidence to a jury shall be clearly relevant, and not merely slightly so; it must not barely afford a basis for conjecture, but for real belief; it must not merely be remotely relevant, but proximately so. Again, it must not unnecessarily complicate the case, or too much tend to confuse, mislead, or tire the minds of that untrained tribunal, the jury, or to withdraw their attention too much from the real issues of the case.” 823 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [55]. For this he cited s 37(b) of the (then) Evidence Act 1958 (Vic); apart from the fact that a statute is scarcely a decisive guide to the common law, s 37(b) dealt with the cross-examination of witnesses on credit, a very small part of the field of relevance as a whole. However, there are other authorities to the same effect as McHugh J, eg Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90 at [21] (FC), holding that under the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW) s 135(c) permits the same function to be performed and in Vernon v Bosley [1994] PIQR 337 at 340, Hoffmann LJ said that the degree of relevance needed for admissibility “will vary according to the nature of the evidence and in particular the inconvenience, expense, delay or oppression which would attend its reception”, and that this “is in practice indistinguishable from the exercise of a discretion”. He earlier expressed similar ideas in “Similar Facts after Boardman” (1975) 91 LQR 193 at 205. See P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2004, pp 100–8. 824 Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [6]. Cf R v Vaughan (No 2) (2009) 105 SASR 532 at [31]. 825 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [14]. 826 For an example, see R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701. 827 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 277. 828 Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 244 (CCA). 829 Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 194 (CCA). 830 Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98 at 104; United States v Madera 574 F 2d 1320 at 1322 (5th Cir, 1978); Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521 at [177]; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [88]–[91]. 831 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [94]. 832 Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521 at [157]. 833 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [97]. 834 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [99]. See also Louizos v R (2009) 194 A Crim R 223 at [31]–
[32]. 835 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [93]. 836 Louizos v R (2009) 194 A Crim R 223 at [31]; R v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629 at [90]. 837 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [7]. 838 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 282 at [22]; Silbermann v CGU Insurance Ltd (2003) 48 ACSR 231 at [17]; Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at [102]. 839 R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 410 (CCCR) per Darling J. 840 Stobart v Dryden (1836) 1 M & W 615. 841 See Stephen J’s discussion in Brown v Eastern and Midlands Rail Co (1889) 22 QBD 391 at 393 (DC). The context makes it plain that Stephen J was concerned with conduct on other occasions as proof of disposition. See also R v Westfield Freezing Co Ltd [1951] NZLR 456 (CA). The reasoning in this paragraph was approvingly referred to by Mahoney JA in Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 224 (CA). See [21010]. 842 R v Whiley (1804) 2 Leach 983 at 985 (KB). Cf R v O’Meally (No 2) [1953] VLR 30 (FC) (proceeds of robberies left at scene of murder, accused’s participation in the robberies could be proved); R v Sims [1967] Qd R 432 (CCA) (prison boot found near house broken into by escaped prisoner). See also Stokes v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 at 47 (FC). 843 Rutherford v Richardson [1923] AC 1; Moreton v Moreton [1937] P 151 at 154 and 155. 844 Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 123; B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 619; BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 302, 305 and 326; Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [10], [141] and [174]–[183]; Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [69]; R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at [57]–[58] (discussing the application of the principle to convictions, complaints, propensity evidence, hearsay, and consistent statements rebutting suggestions of recent invention) and [85]–[92] (consistent statements rebutting suggestions of recent invention). Formerly there was no rule of practice requiring a warning: R v Kennewell [1927] SASR 287 at 302. 845 The desirability of giving this sort of guidance was emphasised by Lord Pearce in Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 361. For examples of such directions see [23290] below. 846 Some of the strongest expressions have been uttered by American judges. Jackson J described it as “unmitigated fiction” in Krulewitch v United States 336 US 440 (1949) at 453; Judge Learned Hand as “a mental gymnastic” in Nash v United States 54 F 2d 1006 (1932) at 1007; Judge Frank as “a judicial lie” in United States v Grunewald 233 F 2d 556 (1956) at 574; while Traynor CJ remarked that a jury “cannot segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes” in People v Aranda 407 P 2d 265 (1965) at 272. 847 R v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120; R v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101 at 104 (CA), where Lord Lane CJ said the jury was required “to perform difficult feats of intellectual acrobatics” which were “practically impossible”. 848 R v Potter (1994) 72 A Crim R 108 at 115–16 (NSW CCA). 849 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, vol 1 [13]. 850 R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at [54]. 851 “No doubt it renders the administration of justice more difficult when evidence which is offered for one purpose or person, may incidentally apply to another; but that is an infirmity to which all evidence is subject, and exclusion on such a ground would manifestly occasion greater mischief than the reception of the evidence”: Tindal CJ in Willis v Bernard (1832) 8 Bing 376 at 383 (CP). “It often happens, both in civil and criminal cases, that evidence is tendered on several alternative grounds, and yet it is never objected that if on any ground it is admissible, that ground must not prevail, because on some other ground it will be inadmissible and prejudicial. In such cases it is usual for the judge (not always very successfully) to caution the jury against being biased by treating the evidence in the objectionable sense” per Jelf J in R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 411 (CCCR). See cases cited in n 844 above. For an application in the context of statutory rules, see R v Waugh
[1983] NZLR 248 (CA). D P Leonard, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility, 2002, Ch 1, adopts the same approach. 852 Hence the trial judge is not required or permitted to make an assessment of whether the jury would or might accept the evidence: Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [22]. The common law is different: Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 194–7 (FC). There are decisions on s 55 that appear not to give force to the words “if it were accepted”: Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [31] and [52]–[59] (cf at [81]) and perhaps Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [11] and [13]–[15] (see [1370]). 853 This was said by Gleeson CJ in Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [2] n 2 to be not materially different from that given by Sir James Stephen as the common law definition: see [1490], text at n 2. See also Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492 at [5] n 18. 854 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424 at [11]. 855 Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352 at [25]–[26]. 856 See ALRC 26 [638]–[642], Bill clause 43, Appendix C [55]–[60], ALRC 38 [122(a)], Bill clause 50. In Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304 at 316 Einfeld J said: “the Evidence Act has codified the common law in this regard and will not make relevant what is intrinsically irrelevant”. In Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [46] Gaudron and Kirby JJ said s 55 involved no “real departure from the common law”. The words “if it were accepted” indicate that relevance does not depend on reliability, probative value or procedural fairness: per McHugh J at [81]. Sections 55 and 56(1) do not require that the evidence be objectively relevant. Evidence is relevant “if it appears to the court to be relevant at the time it is tendered. If it were necessary to have a voir dire examination to examine the objective facts underlying relevance each time an objection arose, trials would never end”: Nodnara Pty Ltd v DCT (1997) 140 FLR 336 at 340 (NSW SC) per Young J. 857 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [56] per McHugh J. 858 R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 163 (CCA). Other illustrations of the application of s 55 include Admar Computers Pty Ltd v Ezy Systems Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 659 (Fed C of A). 859 Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650. See [1370]. See also R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444. 860 R v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332 (NSWCCA). 861 See ALRC 26 [638]–[640], Bill clause 44; ALRC 30 [125], Bill clause 51. The words “in a proceeding” have been said to mean that once evidence is relevant, it is admissible, and once admitted, it may be used for any purpose unless an exclusionary rule applies or a s 136 order is made: ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 282 at [22]–[24]. This was said to restrict the “old” practice by which evidence might be admitted against one party but not another. Correctly understood, however, that practice related to relatively narrow classes of evidence (eg admissions), which were not significantly, if at all, wider than their statutory equivalents. 862 Re Z (1996) 134 FLR 40 at 68 (Fam C of A FC). 863 ALRC 38 [124] note 4. 864 Cf Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87. See [33565]–[33575]; ALRC 26 [638]–[639], [646] and [979]–[984], Bill clause 45; ALRC 38 [123], Bill clause 52. For a controversy about s 58, compare National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 at 312–18 and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448 at [89]–[107]. 865 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448 at [27]–[28]. 866 See ALRC 26 [979]–[981] and [985]–[986], Bill clause 46; ALRC 38 [123], Bill clause 53. 867 White v White (1995) 127 FLR 105 at 110 (Fam C of A FC). 868 Hart v Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 at 263; see also Davis v Langdon (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 149 (FC), and H H Glass, M H McHugh and F M Douglas, The Liability of Employers, 2nd ed, p 35: “proof of the subsequent adoption of a safeguard is relevant not to what should have been done but to what could have been done”. Cf State Electricity Commission of
Victoria v Gay [1951] VLR 104 at 116 (FC) (change in lighting system after accident admissible to show warning could have been given before accident); Anderson v Morris Wools Pty Ltd [1965] Qd R 65 (evidence of alteration of machine after accident admissible to show precaution which might have been taken); Nelson v John Lysaght (Australia) Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 201. For a case where evidence was admitted of the absence of further accidents after the accident in question, see Coniglio v Compressed Yeast Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 667 (FC). See also Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202 at 224; Oulton v Brisbane Stevedoring and Wool Dumping Co Pty Ltd [1958] QWN 35; Jellie v Commonwealth [1959] VR 72 at 80–1 (FC); Theilmann v Commonwealth [1982] VR 713 (FC); Ryan v Elsa (No 1) (1987) 47 SASR 220 at 222–5. As to relevancy of prior or subsequent accidents generally, see H R Lancey Shipping Co Pty Ltd v Robson [1938] ALR 429 (HC). See D P Leonard, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility, 2002, Ch 2. 869 Hollingham v Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241 at 242 per Willes J. 870 Holcombe v Hewson (1810) 2 Camp 391. Cf R v Whitehead (1848) 3 Car & Kir 202, where on a charge of manslaughter against a doctor, evidence of his skilful treatment of other patients was excluded. See also Wagner v Midland Junction Abattoir Board [1963] WAR 84 at 87; Kriss v South Perth [1966] WAR 210; R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 (FC); R v Horvath [1972] VR 533 (FC); R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 (FC); R v RGP (2006) 167 A Crim R 468 at [12] (false confession to earlier charge of sexual assault relevant to whether a confession to a later charge of sexual assault was false). 871 The extent to which the rules of evidence may be moulded to meet the exigencies of other facts has been examined from a theoretical point of view by R Dworkin in “Principle, Policy, Procedure”, C Tapper (ed), Crime Proof and Punishment, 1981; and from a more practical point of view by Mr Justice Fox in “Expediency and Truth Finding in the Law of Evidence”, L Waller and E Campbell (eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982. 872 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 105 (Ex). 873 “The fewer and simpler the issues left to the jury, the less chance there is of a miscarriage of justice”: per Byrne J in R v Patel [1951] 2 All ER 29 at 30 (CCA). 874 Agassiz v London Tramway Co (1872) 27 LT 492. 875 Attorney-General v Nottingham Corporation [1904] 1 Ch 673 at 680, 682 and 683. 876 Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157 (KB). 877 Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (1882) 47 LT 29 at 32 (HL). 878 Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601; see also Akerele v R [1943] AC 255 (PC). 879 Cf the exclusion of evidence of particular instances in Boldron v Widdows (1824) 1 C & P 65. 880 Corke v Corke [1958] P 93 (CA). 881 R v Hardy (1794) 24 St Tr 199 at 1068. 882 R v Masters [1987] 2 Qd R 272 (CCA). 883 See [1490] nn 822 and 823. On the subject of relevance generally, see H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence, Ch 3; R Eggleston, “Probabilities and Proof” (1963) 4 MULR 180; R Eggleston, Evidence Probability and Proof, 1983, 2nd ed, especially Ch 6; H L Trautman, “Logical or Legal Relevance — A Conflict in Theory” (1952) 5 Vand L Rev 385; G F James, “Relevance, Probability and the Law” (1941) 29 Calif LR 689. 884 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 266. Contrast G D Nokes, Introduction to Evidence, 1962, 3rd ed, pp 6 and 84, notes 17, 18. 885 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, vol 1 [15]. 886 R v Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271 (CCA); Ready v Brown (1968) 118 CLR 165; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [32]. Cf R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 at 204 (NSW CCA) and Barry v News Group Newspapers Ltd 1999 SLT 590. 887 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, vol 1 [14]; Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [7–11] citing Haigh v Belcher (1836) 7 C & P 389. The same notion is
involved in the statement that evidence will be received de bene esse, for the origin of which see F D MacKinnon in (1946) 62 LQR 38, and T FT Plucknett, “De Bene Esse” (1946) 62 LQR 130. See R v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416 at 423 (CCA). 888 R v Christie [1914] AC 545. 889 Thayer sometimes wrote as though the doctrine of precedent was wholly inapplicable to questions of relevance: see J B Thayer, “Law and Logic” (1900) 14 Harv LR 139, answering Fox J “Law and Logic” (1900) 14 Harv LR 39. Wigmore, on the other hand, said: “So long as courts continue to declare in judicial rulings what their notions of logic are, just so long will there be rules of law which must be observed”: 1 [12]. For once the truth really does lie between the two views. Thayer conceded as much when he said decisions concerning relevance may “stand as a precedent to half settle other cases”. 890 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 266 n 1. 891 C J W Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, p 28. 892 J D Heydon, “The Origins of the Indian Evidence Act” (2010) 9 OUCLJ 1 at 29–31; “The influence of Sir James Stephen on the law of evidence” [2011] (Autumn) Bar News 32 at 43–44. 893 J L Montrose, “Basic Concepts of the Law of Evidence” (1954) 70 LQR 527. The concept of materiality is employed by Wigmore; that of receivability is canvassed by Montrose. 894 R v Gwaze [2010] 3 NZLR 734 at [50]. 895 R v Quinn [1962] 2 QB 245 (CCA): [1290]. Sed quaere. 896 See [1005] n 2. 897 Hawkins v Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co Ltd [1911] 1 KB 988 (CA). The High Court has considered the sufficiency of evidence necessary to reach findings as to probability in a number of cases. See in particular Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304 and 305. 898 Smithwick v National Coal Board [1950] 2 KB 335 (CA). 899 “There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had actually been observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture”: Lord Wright in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 at 169. See also Kerr v Ayr SS Co [1915] AC 217 at 233; and Jones v Great Western Rail Co (1930) 144 LT 194 at 202. 900 Smithwick v National Coal Board [1950] 2 KB 335 at 352 (CA). 901 Ajum Goolam Hossen & Co v Union Marine Insurance Co [1901] AC 362 (PC) (where there was much further evidence). 902 Pickup v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co (1878) 3 QBD 594 at 600 (CA) per Brett LJ. 903 The terminology is suggested by N Bridge, “Presumptions and Burdens” (1949) 12 MLR 273 at 277. He would designate as prima facie “that minimum of evidence which must be tendered before the issue can be submitted to the jury”, and as “presumptive such evidence as shall, if believed, be legally conclusive in the absence of further evidence to rebut it.” See [7210] and [7235]–[7310]. 904 Stratford JA in R v Jacobson 1931 AD 466 at 478–9; Lampard v West [1926] SASR 293 (FC). When used in statutes, prima facie evidence usually bears the meaning attributed to it by Stratford JA. See also the treatment of May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 in Campbell v Inkley [1960] SASR 273. See also Bunker v Mahoney [1917] VLR 65; R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 at 507 and 508; Powell v Battle [1963] WAR 32; R v Pace (1967) 1 CR (NS) 45. See [7220]. 905 Courts are free to refuse to accept uncontradicted evidence: Taylor v Ellis [1956] VLR 457; Cole v Commonwealth (1962) 62 SR (NSW) 700 (CCA); Re Gear [1964] Qd R 528 (FC). See also Le Mura v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1971] Qd R 198. A principle is sometimes stated which is not a true exception: “where evidence is given on one side which is conclusive of the matter, which is in
itself inherently probable, and not unreasonable or improbable, and where it is not contradicted by evidence on the other side, the tribunal which hears it is bound to accept it”: Swinburne v David Syme & Co [1909] VLR 550 at 565 (FC) (a more extreme and probably wrong formulation was put in Richards v Jager [1909] VLR 140 at 147 (“the Court is bound to accept it unless that evidence is in itself so incredible and so unreasonable that no reasonable man could accept it”)). See also Sheahan v Woulfe [1927] St R Qd 128 (CCA); Holman v Holman (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 374 at 378 (FC); Read v Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47; Hardy v Gillette [1976] VR 392 at 396–7; Repatriation Commission v Reid (1984) 54 ALR 157 at 162–3; Pankelis v Frankcombe (1988) 14 Tas R 174; R v AWF (2000) 2 VR 1 at [31]. Authorities deciding that at a jury trial, if the evidence is all one way and there is no reason to doubt it, the judge may take the question from the jury and an appellate court may set aside a perverse jury finding if he does not (Davis v Hardy (1827) 6 B & C 225 at 231 (KB)) have been explained as resting on the control of trial judges and appellate courts over a jury’s findings of fact: McPhee v S Bennett Ltd (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 8 at 9 (FC). 906 Digest of The Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, p 189. 907 Holcombe v Hewson (1810) 2 Camp 391. 908 Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608. 909 R v Duchess of Kingston (1776) 20 St Tr 578 per De Grey CJ. 910 The Douglas (1882) 7 PD 151. 911 For example, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 38. 912 Johnstone v Commonwealth (1979) 143 CLR 398. 913 Ferguson v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd [1968] ALR 371. See also McGarry v Boonah Clothing Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 284 at 287–8: the Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) Pt IIIA (now repealed) covered the field of admissibility of business records (Bowron v Bowron (1982) 8 Fam LR 651 and Supetina Pty Ltd v Lombok Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 439), but not the admissibility of other statements in writing; to the same effect are R v Norgard (1987) 11 Fam LR 646; Multi Modal Ltd v Polakow (1987) 78 ALR 553. Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 368–9 preferred to base this result on s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) rather than s 109 of the Constitution. See also Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411 at 438. 914 Ferguson v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd [1968] ALR 371 at 374–5. Quaere whether the High Court could therefore be said to be “exercising Federal jurisdiction” for the purposes of s 79 of the Judiciary Act. The section may therefore have been inapplicable. This point does not appear to have been raised. For other discussion, see Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 at [38]–[39]. 915 Hollis v Clark (1981) 40 ALR 179; Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 700–2; R v Norgard (1987) 11 Fam LR 646; Multi Modal Ltd v Polakow (1987) 78 ALR 553; McGarry v Boonah Clothing Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 284 at 287–8 (Fed C of A); Deputy Cmr of Taxation v Capron (1993) 25 ATR 142 (the operation of Victorian statutory provisions regarding computer and other documentary evidence is not precluded by the evidentiary provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)). 916 M Weinberg, “The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1978) 11 MULR 408; A Samuels, “Failure to Object to an Irregularity” [1968] Crim LR 310 at 312–14; R Eggleston, “Evidence Admitted for a Limited Purpose” Judicial Essays 85; A Lawrence, “Failure to Object: The Death of Evidential Rules” (1997) 15 Aust Bar Rev 137. 917 Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (NSW) v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19 at [79], citing Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [50]–[53], [76] and [114]. 918 Re Rarot Estate (1958) 27 WWR 136 at 139 (Man CA) per Tritschler JA. 919 Woods v Rogers; Ex parte Woods [1983] 2 Qd R 212 at 217 (FC); Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10] (PC). Cf Birchler v Police [2011] 1 NZLR 169 at [21]. 920 R v Tripodina (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 at 191 (NSWCCA); Vella v R (1990) 2 WAR 537 at
557; R v Wright [1999] 3 VR 355 at [2]; Paterson v R (2004) 28 WAR 223 at [228]. 921 A Bennett & Co v Connors [1953] St R Qd 14 at 24–5 (FC); Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10] (PC). 922 R v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 at 575 (CCA); Dainford Ltd v Yulora Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 546 at 553 (CA). See also R v Grant (1834) 5 B & Ad 1081 at 1085–1086 (judge ought to be informed of the purpose of the tender); Key v Thomson (1868) 12 NBR 295 (CA) (same); Royal Insurance Co v Duffus (1890) 18 SCR 710 at 711 (so should opposing counsel). 923 Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 at 292 per Starke J. 924 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Godrich (1909) 10 CLR 1 at 39 per Higgins J. 925 Re Cole & Knowles [1927] 3 DLR 950 at 952 (Ont SC App Div) per Riddell JA (Latchford CJ, Middleton and Masten JJA concurring). 926 Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10] (PC). The same applies where counsel wish to outline a matter on which further directions are sought: DJF v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 412 at [16]. 927 Penn v Bibby (1866) LR 2 Ch App 127 at 137–8. 928 International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v McCorkell [1962] Qd R 256 at 258–9 (FC); Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246 at 309–310; Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10] (PC). See generally J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, Vol 1 at [19]. J R Forbes, “Inadmissible Evidence: Objections Well Taken and Rulings Well Made” (1984) 13 U of QLJ 197. 929 Robin v Police (2002) 81 SASR 253 at [59]–[62]; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at [19] and [135]. 930 Rex rel Lockhart v Griffith (1959) 127 CCC 209 at 213–17 (NB Co Ct); Cloutier v R [1940] SCR 131 at 133–134; English and Laing v Richmond [1956] SCR 383 at 393–394. See M M MacIntyre, “Should a Trial Judge’s Uncertainty as to the Admissibility of Evidence Constitute a Ground for Discharging the Jury?” (1958) 36 Can Bar Rev 74. 931 Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411 at [77], discussing Firebelt Pty Ltd v Brambles Australia Ltd (2002) 188 ALR 280 at [42]. See also IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC (2011) 282 ALR 717 at [218]. 932 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424 at [12]. 933 Morgan v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 33 at [97]–[101]. 934 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, Vol 1 at 855 [19]. 935 Dainford Ltd v Yulora Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 546 at 553 (CA). See also Royal Insurance Co v Duffus (1890) 18 SCR 710 at 711. However, there is authority that where evidence is tendered on an untenable basis and rejected, an appeal may be brought if the evidence is admissible on an alternative basis: Engebretson v Bartlett at [37], relying on Beedle v Thomas (1862) 2 W & W (L) 89 at 95 (FC); Sanderson v Nicholson [1906] VR 371 at 374–5; Butcher v Longwarry and District Dairymen’s Co-operative Association Ltd [1939] VLR 263 at 271–3; R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 at 40; cf Honeybone v Glass [1908] VLR 466 at 476–8. Appeal was made to the injustice of leaving the evidence rejected if it would raise a reasonable doubt about the guilt of an accused person, and to the need to ensure a fair trial. On the other hand, leaving aside the duties of a trial judge where a litigant is unrepresented, or where prejudicial inadmissible evidence is not objected to, the proposition casts a heavy burden on trial judges to inquire whether there is any basis for admitting evidence which is not admissible on the ground assigned for its tender. 936 Doe d Kinglake v Beviss (1849) 7 CB 456 at 507, 508 and 513; Dun v Macintosh (1906) 3 CLR 1134 at 1152 and 1169; National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Godrich (1909) 10 CLR 1 at 12. 937 Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [35]. 938 R v Webb (1914) 16 DLR 317 (Man CA). 939 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 279 (CA).
940 Cf R v Barrett [1995] 1 SCR 752 at 753. 941 Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521 at [34]. 942 Webb v R (1994) 13 WAR 257 at 267–71 (CCA) (and cases there cited). 943 R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411 at [14]. 944 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, McNaughton rev, 1961, Vol 8 at 149–52
[2210]. 945 R v Fields (1986) 28 CCC (ed) 353 at 359, 367 and 376 (Ont CA). 946 Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 212 (CA). A similar view was taken by Barwick CJ in Smith v Bagias (1978) 21 ALR 435 at 440–1 (disagreeing, however, with Hutley JA below and the rest of the court on the weight to be attributed to the evidence which was not objected to). See also Goslin v Corry (1844) 7 Mac & G 342 at 345 and 347; Ex parte Ward (1855) 2 Legge 872; Gilbert v Endean (1878) 9 Ch D 259; Green v Patten (1894) 15 ALT 254; O’Brien v Clegg; Ex parte Clegg [1951] St R Qd 1 at 7 (cf at 13); R v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 at 583; Roof and Ceiling Construction Co v S A Wigan & Co Pty Ltd [1972] QWN 14 (FC); R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89 at [13]; Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476. 947 Diaz v United States 223 US 442 (1912) at 450. In other words, a strict doctrine of waiver operates: see M Weinberg, “The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1978) 11 MULR 408 at 422–4. 948 For a concrete illustration, see Barwick CJ’s observations on why there was no objection in Smith v Bagias (1978) 21 ALR 435 at 441. 949 Re Lilley (dec’d) [1953] VLR 98 at 101. 950 For example Newcomen v Corrigan (1880) 1 NSWLR (L) 358 at 360. 951 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 170. See also Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476 at [46]. 952 R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89 at [13]. 953 Hughes v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 153. 954 Hughes v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 153; see also O’Brien v Clegg; Ex parte Clegg [1951] St R Qd 1 at 13. Instances in criminal proceedings are R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 (Vic CA); R v Clark (2005) 13 VR 75. 955 Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 219 (CA) per Samuels JA, quoting C T McCormick, Law of Evidence, 1st ed, 1954, [54]. See also Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 at 486; McLennan v Taylor (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 525 at 540 (FC); McGregor-Lowndes v Collector of Customs (Qld) (1968) 11 FLR 349; R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 at 64 (CCA); R v FP (2007) 169 A Crim R 318 at [13]. Cf Miller v Babu Madho Das (1896) LR 23 Ind App 106 (which is usually explained as concerned with irrelevant evidence); R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 at 541 (which is only an obiter dictum as to civil cases); Jacker v International Cable Co (Ltd) (1888) 5 TLR 130 (which is too briefly reported to permit the case to be attacked, rationalised or defended). 956 In McLennan v Taylor (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 525 at 528 (FC). 957 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 170–1. 958 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630. This enigmatic decision, though not directly in point, is much relied on in the authorities, sometimes to support conflicting points of view. 959 Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476 at [46]. 960 For example, Stunzi Sons Ltd v House of Youth Pty Ltd (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 220 (FC). 961 As Samuels JA appears to have thought in Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 218 (CA). 962 Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 381; Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 327–8; Collins v Morgan [1972] Tas SR 277 (NC 23); R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 703–4; A Child v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 (detailed survey of authorities); Brian Gardner Motors Pty Ltd v Bembridge (2000) 120 A Crim R 53 at [53]–[54]. Cf Re Knowles [1984] VR 751 at 767 (FC).
963 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [11]; Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at
[20]. See also A Child v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 at 559. 964 For example R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 (which states the rule against admitting hearsay unobjected to as applying in civil cases as well); Teper v R [1952] AC 480 (PC). 965 R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 at 542; see also at 543 per Matthew and Wills JJ. 966 See also Black v Turner (1895) 6 QLJ 153 at 154; Cudgington v Cooney [1902] St R Qd 176 at 182; Scanlon v Murphy [1920] QWN 13; Cahalane v Hop Kee [1926] St R Qd 73; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 524 and 543. 967 R v Alexander [1975] VR 741 (FC) (limited to represented accused); R v Gay [1976] VR 577 (FC); R v Visser [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 (CCA); McGookin v R (1986) 20 A Crim R 438 (Vic FC). See also R v Davis (1909) 2 Cr App R 133; R v Saunders [1919] 1 KB 550 (represented accused); R v Branscombe (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 363 (FC); R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 (CCA); R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 (Vic CA); Steinhauser v Davies (1994) 3 Tas R 258. These decisions were not referred to by Lusher AJ in espousing the contrary view in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 703–4 (CCA). See M Weinberg, “The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1978) 11 MULR 408 at 418-19. 968 R v Bertrand (1867) LR 1 PC 520; R v O’Brien (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 486 (FC); Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315; R v Samuels [1962] NZLR 1036 (CA). 969 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 328. 970 King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 at 582–3. 971 Re Lilley (dec’d) [1953] VLR 98 at 101. There are certainly cases holding that such rules as the secondary evidence rule are not full exclusionary rules but merely confer on the opponent a right to object: R v Umbleby (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 154; R v Matthews [1972] VR 3 (FC). 972 Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572 at 576–7 and 582; Rowe v Australian United Steam Navigation Co Ltd (1909) 9 CLR 1 at 32. 973 R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 at 43. 974 W N Harrison, “Hearsay Admitted Without Objection” (1955) 7 Res Jud 58. 975 See, for example, Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 199 at [25]–[26]. 976 R v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 at 115–16. 977 See R v Saxton [2012] 1 NZLR 331 at [88] and [94]. 978 See [1025] n 9. 979 See ALRC 26 [1025]–[1026], Bill clause 141; ALRC 38 [247]–[248], Bill clause 147. See also Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) (1998) 81 FCR 296 at 301 (Fed C of A). Section 190(3) was applied to render admissible evidence of a market survey despite an absence of evidence from the persons conducting it on the basis that the matter was not genuinely in dispute and to apply the hearsay provisions strictly would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay: Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] ATPR 42-113 at [6]. 980 See ALRC 38 [248]. 981 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [149]; Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1 at [18]–[22]; Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232 at [24]–[26]. See also R v Kaddour (2005) 156 A Crim R 11 at [62]; Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 199 at [26]. The same approach was taken to the expression “is not admissible” in s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) in Gonzales v R. Cf R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474. Another way of putting this approach is to say that it is not “for the trial judge to raise and determine questions of admissibility”: Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424 at [13] per Lindgren J. A similar approach has been taken to some provisions in South Australia (R v C, G (2013) 117 SASR 162 at [45]–[53]: see [21257]) but not others (R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 at [32]–[33]: see [15030]). There is authority that at common law there is a duty operating in favour of unrepresented accused persons to keep out at least some kinds of inadmissible evidence:
Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466 at 473; Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [53]. 982 R v FDP (2008) 74 NSWLR 645. Cf R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68 at [60]. 983 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424 at [13]. 984 R v J (DC) [2010] 2 Cr App R 2 at [21]. 985 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 at [28]–[31]. 986 In the Marriage of Reilly (1995) 124 FLR 358 (Halligan JR). 987 Re Interchase Corp Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 481 at 487. 988 Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209 at [206]. 989 Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) 194 ALR 101 at [96]–[112] (at least in relation to Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)); Re Strarch International Pty Ltd (in liq) (2005) 191 FLR 225 at [27]. See also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Currockbilly Pty Ltd (2002) 172 FLR 99 at [47]–[48]. 990 Decker v State Coroner of New South Wales (1999) 46 NSWLR 415. 991 In the Marriage of BM and PA McCauley (1996) 22 Fam LR 538 at [34]–[37]. 992 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91 at [16]. 993 Ryan v Hansen t/as Hansens Solicitors (2000) 49 NSWLR 184 at [31]–[32] and [38]; CSR Ltd v Eddy (2008) 70 NSWLR 725 at [61]. 994 See Fair Work Ombudsman v Nerd Group Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 262 FLR 315 at [25] and [29]. 995 Issues relating to the constitutional validity of evidence legislation are discussed by E Campbell, “Rules of Evidence and the Constitution” (2000) 26 Mon ULR 312 at 313–21 and 327–8. 996 Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 at 408–9. 997 Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311 at [189] (FC). 998 On the interrelationship of the Evidence Act with the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 160, see Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394 (in opposition proceedings involving appeals to the Federal Court from a delegate of the Commissioner, the Evidence Act does not apply to material admitted before the delegate). 999 Re Schofield; Ex parte Rangott v P & B Barron Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 280 at 285. See also Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553; Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217 at [722]. 1000 Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462 at 470–1 (Fam C of A FC) (Evidence Act prevails); cf Re Z (1996) 134 FLR 40 (Fam C of A FC) (Evidence Act gives way because of s 8(1)). 1001 Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708 at 709. 1002 Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) (1998) 81 FCR 296 at 301 (Fed C of A). 1003 For a discussion of whether the expression “common law or equity” refers to the law as at the time s 9(1) was enacted or to the law as it evolves, see Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at [118]. 1004 Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty [2002] ATPR (Digest) 46-225 at [15]. Cf ALRC 26 [755] n 21. 1005 Section 11 was described in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (1996) 40 NSWLR 486 at 497 (CA) as “almost unintelligible”. 1006 NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 281; Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 464H; Qld: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 ss 436–437 and 439; SA: Summary Offences Act 1953 s 74D; WA: Criminal Investigation Act 2006 ss 118 and 155; ACT: Crimes Act 1900 s 187; NT: Police Administration Act s 142. See [33775]. 1007 See [13070]. 1008 See [19080]–[19090]. 1009 See [15260].
1010 See [25340]. 1011 See [25340]. 1012 See [17505]. 1013 See [25340]. 1014 See [35645]. 1015 ALRC 38 at [4]. 1016 Grant Gilmore, “Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure” 70 Yale LJ 1037 at 1043 (1961). 1017 “Codification in India and England” (1872) 18 Fortnightly Review 644 at 655. 1018 “Codification in India and England” (1872) 18 Fortnightly Review 644 at 668. 1019 “Codification in India and England” (1872) 18 Fortnightly Review 644 at 672. 1020 See [17165]. 1021 See [1295]. 1022 Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 27 (CA). 1023 See [5225]. 1024 See [15260]. 1025 See [19095] and [21252]. 1026 See [9130]. 1027 See Ch 7. 1028 See Ch 9. 1029 See Marks, Kinross, McCullagh & Williamson v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304
at 316. 1030 In New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, s 8 provides: “This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act.” In the Commonwealth Act, however, s 8(1) provides: “This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act, other than sections 68, 79, 80 and 80A of the Judiciary Act 1903.” And s 8(3) of the Commonwealth Act provides: “This Act has effect subject to the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001.” 1031 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [28]. 1032 McNeill v R (2008) 168 FCR 198 at [62] per Black CJ, Lander and Besanko JJ. See also EI Dupont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (2002) 54 IPR 304 at [46]. And see ALRC 102, [2.9]: “Chapter III … governs admissibility issues”. 1033 Macplan Logistics Systems Pty Ltd v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 324 at 329. 1034 Bruinsma v Menczer (1995) 40 NSWLR 716. 1035 See [25395]. 1036 See [25300]. 1037 Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 at 350. 1038 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulations (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 at 392 per Smart AJA; Abigroup Ltd v Akins (1997) 42 NSWLR 623 at 638–9 per Bainton J; Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at [106]–[123] per Basten JA. 1039 (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304. 1040 4th ed, 1905, p 121. 1041 Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 437 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, quoted by Basten JA in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at [114]. 1042 Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121. 1043 Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at [117]. 1044 See [35435]–[35595]. 1045 Harkins v Butcher (2002) 55 NSWLR 558 at [15]. 1046 See [39080]. 1047 See [39080]. 1048 See [41030].
1049 This conclusion is not contradicted by Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50
NSWLR 640 at [28] and [48]. 1050 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [75]–[82]; ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Work Cover Authority of NSW (2004) 60 NSWLR 18 at [219]–[232]; Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington (2005) 2 DDCR 271 at [82]. Cf Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 204 ALR 258 at [17]; Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170 at [21] and [73]. 1051 ALRC 38, Appendix A, 219, at [24]. 1052 See ALRC 38 at [55]. 1053 R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 at [464]. 1054 For example, Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v FCT (1995) 62 FCR 289 at 301; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [26]. 1055 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 at 392 (CA) (Pt 3.10). 1056 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 373 (FC). 1057 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [27] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 1058 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 311–13; Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196. 1059 R v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 124 at [87]. 1060 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 16 per Hunt J. 1061 (1893) 6 R 67. 1062 ALRC 38 at 65 [115](h). 1063 West v Mead (2003) 13 BBR 24, 431 at [94], citing the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in Heaton v Luczka (NSW SC), Cole, Beazley and Stein JJA, No 40827/96, 3 March 1998, unreported, BC9800798. 1064 See generally [17435]–[17460]. 1065 Questions of implied repeal in relation to the Evidence Act 2004 (NI) s 8 are discussed in R v McNeill (Ruling No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124 at [23]–[56]. See also McNeill v R (2008) 168 FCR 198 at [41]–[79]. 1066 Examples of “leave” or “permission” are ss 32(1)–(3), 37(1)(a), 38(1) and (3), 39(b), 46(1), 104(2), 108(3)(b), 112, 168(2) and (7) and 191(3)(b). Examples of “directions” are ss 28, 29(1)– (3), 31(3), 32(4), 34, 37(2), 38(4)–(5), 42(1) and (3), 45(3)(b), 49(b), 50(1), 67(4), 100(1)–(2), 130(1), 136, 169(3), 188 and 192A. Examples of other sections possibly falling under these heads are ss 29(4), 31(1)–(2), 53, 128(4), 128A(6), 133, 135, 169(1), 190, 193(1) and 195. In Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1 at [89], Callinan J criticised the extent to which discretions have been created “in place of earlier, reasonably clear rules which proved generally satisfactory in practice”, as well as the “at best mixed success” of the Acts in clarifying and simplifying the law. 1067 The “orders” which may be made under s 26 are subject to s 192: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 201 FLR 207 at [9]. 1068 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41]–[46], [55] and [67] (a case on leave under s 112). 1069 R v Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1 per Hodgson JA (“To require a bald incantation of regard to the section or to the items referred to would be to promote an empty formality; while to require reasoned discussion of each item on every occasion would be absurdly onerous and productive of delay and injustice”). 1070 It reverses TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124. See ALRC 102 [16.97]–[16.109]. 1071 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115; R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [49]; R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166 at [157]–[161]. 1072 Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107 at 144–5; Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 236 at 243–4. 1073 Stuart v R (1974) 134 CLR 426 at 437. 1074 Mellifont v A-G (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289 at 309 (ambiguity is not to be created by resort to
the antecedent common law or extrinsic materials). 1075 Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [10] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J; see also at [88] per McHugh J (“reference to pre-existing common law concepts will often be unhelpful”). 1076 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54. 1077 Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [10], [47] and [88]; R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [55]–[56]; Idoport Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [29]–[30]; R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700. 1078 Commissioner of Taxation v Karageorge (1996) 22 ACSR 199 (NSW SC) per Hamilton J. 1079 See [1215]. 1080 See Violi v Berrivale Orchards Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 580 at [42]–[45]; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 FCR 229 at [76]–[85]. 1081 Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 at 525. 1082 R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at 314 (NSWCCA). 1083 R v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632 at 634. 1084 For example, Vic: Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules r 64.22(4) (“may have regard to verified notes or other evidence and to such other materials as it thinks fit”). 1085 R v Beauchamp (1909) 2 Cr App R 40 at 41. See Gibbs v Pike (1842) 9 M & W 351 at 360– 361. 1086 Ex parte Fairhall (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 178; R v Tucker (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 504 at 507–9; R v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632 at 634. In Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 at 524–5 McHugh JA said: “If a dispute exists between the parties or the judge as to what was said, the version of the judge must be conclusive. It is difficult to see how the contrary view can prevail without requiring or permitting the judge to give evidence and be cross-examined in the appellate court. Such a course is not merely unthinkable, it is contrary to the function and status of a judge in a court of record. It is to the judge, and not counsel or litigants, that the community has delegated the power of deciding disputed questions of fact. That must include any dispute as to what was said by a witness or even by the judge himself.” 1087 Builders Licensing Board v Mahoney (1986) 5 NSWLR 96 at 98–9; cf Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 at 524. An affidavit can establish what happened either because a trial judge improperly directed that a matter not be recorded or because a court reporter improperly refused to record it: Goktas v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 684 at 699. The same is true where a matter is not recorded because a judge has stopped counsel addressing. 1088 Even the last three were viewed as only exceptionally receivable in Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Fredrichberg (1968) 118 CLR 403 at 410, 422–3. In Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 at 524 McHugh JA said: “when what is in issue is what a trial judge in a court of record has said, an appellate court should not permit evidence to supplement the transcript unless both parties agree as to what was said”. 1089 In Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 at 524 McHugh JA said: “If a matter is being discussed which counsel thinks ought to be recorded, it is his duty to ensure that the statement is recorded. Counsel is entitled to have important discussions recorded. If the trial judge or counsel’s opponent suddenly makes a statement which ought to be recorded, counsel has a duty to insist that the statement be instantly recorded.” See also Field v Cmr for Railways NSW (1957) 99 CLR 285 at 294–295. 1090 R v Watson [1980] 2 All ER 293; R v Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633 at 639 (CCA); Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251 at 268–269; Donaldson v WA (2005) 31 WAR 122 at [17]. 1091 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 643. 1092 Horne v Milne (1881) 7 VLR (L) 296 at 300. 1093 R v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182 at 184 (CCA); R v Miller (1980) 25 SASR 170 at 210 (CCA); R v Yeates [1992] 1 NZLR 421. 1094 R v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182 at 186–7 (CCA).
1095 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 212; R v GK at [74](4). 1096 R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 at 194. 1097 Horne v Milne (1881) 7 VLR (L) 296 at 300 (“it would be the duty of the judge to strike out
such evidence from his notes”); BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [94]. 1098 R v Finlayson (1912) 14 CLR 675. 1099 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 212; R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 at 194. 1100 Maric v R (1978) 20 ALR 513 at 521. 1101 R v Burns (1883) 9 VLR (L) 191. 1102 Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151 at [245]–[247]; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [94]. If a witness is not shown to have expertise in the areas into which his evidence has drifted, the jury must be instructed to disregard the evidence: R v Marquard (1993) 85 CCC 3d 193 at 225. See also R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1 at [59]. 1103 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 643–4. 1104 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 643–4; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [94]. See also R v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 at 115–16. 1105 R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522 at [36]. 1106 R v Ball (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 605 at 608. 1107 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 659. 1108 Maric v R (1978) 20 ALR 513 at 521 (evidence elicited by leading question from judge, central to the issues and highly prejudicial). See also Cooper v R (1961) 105 CLR 177 at 184; BBH v R (2012) 286 ALR 89 at [94]. 1109 R v Tugaga (1990) 74 A Crim R 190 at 194. 1110 R v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182 at 185 (FC). 1111 R v Duvivier (1982) 29 SASR 217 at 230 and 245. 1112 R v Duvivier (1982) 29 SASR 217 at 245. 1113 NJ v R (2012) 36 VR 522 at [47] per T Forrest AJA (Maxwell P and Harper JA concurring).
[page 161]
Chapter Two Facts which Need not be Proved by Evidence
Section 1 — Judicial Notice A — INTRODUCTION Relationship of judicial notice to other instances of non-compliance with rules of evidence [3001] Structure of law The general rule is that all the facts in issue or relevant to the issue in a given case must be proved by evidence: testimony, admissible hearsay, documents, things and relevant facts. If, in a moment of forgetfulness, the plaintiff or prosecutor fails to prove an essential fact, the opponent may succeed even though the evidence was readily available, for the court has a discretion when deciding whether to allow a case to be reopened or a witness to be recalled.1 On the other hand, the court, being no participant in the cause before it, is not permitted to go outside the evidence present and to act upon information privately obtained which the parties have no chance of combating or commenting upon.2 This chapter discusses two obvious exceptions to the general rule: evidence need not be given of facts of which judicial notice is taken or of those that are formally admitted. Evidence is also inappropriate in the case of an estoppel, for once the estoppel is raised the party against whom it operates may not lead evidence in contradiction: Chapter 3, “Estoppels”. It is often said that no proof is required of facts which are presumed, but the basic facts of every presumption have to be proved in the ordinary way and they are tendered as proof of the presumed fact. This is dealt with in Chapter 4, “The Burden of Proof and Presumptions”. This chapter also discusses a less obvious exception concerning the teachings of ordinary experience. It does not discuss the materials used to determine what changes in public policy the courts act on.3 [page 162]
[3005] Adjudicative facts and legislative fact There is a distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts.4 An adjudicative fact is a fact which is either a fact in issue or is relevant to a fact in issue. These are the facts which normally go to the jury in a jury case. A legislative fact, on the other hand, is a fact which helps the court determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its discretion or judgment in determining what course of action to take.5 Legislative facts therefore go beyond the interests of the parties. In the case of adjudicative facts the doctrine of judicial notice has restricted scope, for in the common law system the facts are appropriately determined on the evidence presented by the parties unless the fact is of such notoriety that to call for evidence would be a waste of time. The position with respect to legislative facts is otherwise. It is clear from the cases that judges have felt themselves relatively free to apply their own views of and to make their own enquiries about social ethics, psychology, politics and history where relevant without requiring evidence or other proof. McHugh J has approved6 and Callinan J has disapproved7 the last sentence. Callinan J said that the caution employed by the courts in relation to adjudicative facts should also be employed for legislative facts. There is force in that view, but the fact is that it has not been. He criticised the proposition favoured by McHugh J for two reasons. The first is that the parties must be given an opportunity to deal with all matters which the court regards as material: it would be unfair and unsatisfactory for the loser in litigation to learn after the event that the cause of defeat was the court’s resort to “allegedly notorious” facts with which the loser had had no opportunity to deal. This is a very powerful point,8 but the common law and the relevant statutes require that the parties be notified of the court’s intention to examine extrinsic sources in order to establish controversial matters: see [3035] and s 144(4) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). Callinan J’s second reason for criticism was: rarely is there any universal acceptance of what are true history, politics and social ethics …. [There] is a huge, indeed probably immeasurable, range of differences as to what they legitimately are, and the ways in which they are to be identified, understood and applied …. It is in the light of such wide divergences of modern opinion as to what is historical fact that [a] statement of Dixon J 9 has to be understood today. [His] Honour said that courts may use the general facts of history ascertainable from the accepted writings of serious historians. It would only be if a very large measure of agreement could be obtained and, I would suggest, from the
parties themselves, as to what are accepted and who are serious historians that the court would be entitled to resort to them. [Emphasis in original.]
The suggested course is certainly desirable but not universally followed. It is not clear that McHugh J’s approach is limited to legislative facts: several of the cases he [page 163] referred to10 concerned adjudicative facts. Carter expresses the view that the confusion between these two types of facts is an explanation for the uncertainty as to whether the doctrine of precedent applies to a judicially noticed fact.11 Where a judge has found a legislative fact as part of a statement of legal principle, this finding, as part of the principle, will bind inferior jurisdictions in the usual way. But where the fact so found is an adjudicative fact its impact on subsequent trials stems not from its judicial authority but from its notoriety which is presumably evident to all courts. Selway has suggested a tripartite distinction between the use of history as a fact in issue (eg in relation to native title claims); the use of history as a constitutional fact in issue (in determining legislative validity); and the use of history as an aspect of legal reasoning (to explain the past development, and influence the future development, of the common law, or to ascertain the meaning of a constitution or an enactment). He contends that the rules of evidence do not apply to the third category, that judges can inform themselves about it, and that the parties have only very limited rights to be informed about their inquiries.12 At least the last contention is highly questionable. Another approach would divide factual matters into five categories. The first comprises facts in issue or facts relevant to facts in issue. The second comprises “constitutional facts” or “constitutional-review facts”13 — those going to constitutional validity of statutes, other enactments or executive acts. The third comprises facts going to the construction of nonconstitutional statutes. The fourth concerns facts going to the construction of constitutional statutes.14 The fifth concerns facts going to the content and development of the common law. Four preliminary points can be made about this classification.
One is that the facts in the fourth category are different from those in the second. The second category assumes a clear constitutional provision, but also assumes doubt as to whether particular facts fall within it. The fourth category assumes a clear factual position, but also assumes doubt as to the meaning of a potentially applicable constitutional provision. Of course in a particular controversy both questions may arise. The breadth of the constitutional provision may be in issue; and the facts which would make the legislation supposedly enacted on the faith of it valid may also be in issue. The second preliminary point is that to some extent the last three groups include what might be called “legal facts” internal to the development of the common law, such as the course of precedent, or the history of enactments preceding that under consideration, or the history of legislation which the common law may develop in conformity with, or the history of drafts of constitutional or non-constitutional legislation. But, like the second group, they also include what might be called “general historical facts” — political and social conditions which afford a foothold for statutes to be constitutionally valid, which may cause common law rules to [page 164] operate inconveniently if they develop one way, but more satisfactorily if they develop another way, or which may cast light on the meaning of language used in constitutional or non-constitutional legislation as it would have been understood by contemporaries of the legislators. The third preliminary point is that a given factual controversy can arise under more than one head. Thus in one celebrated case15 the Supreme Court of the United States took into account evidence that the racial segregation of school children harmed the development of black children. That evidence could have been relied on to show that the separate facilities provided were not “separate but equal”, and hence that legislation mandating those facilities violated the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing the “equal protection of the laws” in the sense in which it had been understood since 1896.16 This would have been a fact within the second category. In fact that evidence was relied on
to show that the harm to black children was so general as to require an abandonment of the “separate but equal” test: it was a use of evidence, legitimate or not, to change the meaning of the Constitution, or to correct the meaning as understood from 1896 to 1954 — a use within the fourth category. But the material could have been used for either purpose. Similarly, survey evidence that many consumers were misled by a defendant’s conduct could be used to support a plaintiff’s statutory claim or a claim in passing off (a category one case), as well as to support an allegation that the tort of passing off should be widened (a category five case). Fourthly, in each category it is desirable to bear in mind that there are potentially three issues which arise. One is whether it is permissible to take the historical fact in question into account, and for what purpose. For example, in the third and fourth categories, records of legislative debates can be used for some purposes but not others. The second is whether any evidentiary rules affect admissibility, and how they can be satisfied. The third is the extent to which the court can consider the facts in question without giving the parties notice that they are doing so. Another category, not further discussed here, may emerge in applying “proportionality” analysis in jurisdictions which have a Bill of Rights.17 The first category is discussed in [3010]–[3155]. The second is discussed in [3156]. The third is discussed in [3157]. The fourth is discussed in [3158]. The fifth is discussed in [3159].
[3010] The categories of judicial notice When a court takes judicial notice of a fact, as it may in civil and criminal cases alike, it declares that it will find that the fact exists, or direct the jury to do so, although the existence of the fact has not been established by evidence.18 In this sense judicial notice is the antithesis of the subject matter of this text. Defined in this negative way, judicial notice risks joining res gestae as a convenient basket into which may be thrown a miscellany of proofs which do not conform to the traditional [page 165]
procedures of adversarial evidence-taking. The danger in this course is that these proofs will often have different historical backgrounds and different purposes. Any attempt to treat them as manifestations of the one judicial process is likely to be productive of obscurity and, as will be seen, lead to contradictions and to a lack of consistency in approach. It is useful, therefore, to identify the general classes of proofs which have either been conventionally described as judicial notice or which conform to the definition set out above. The fact that there is some overlapping between these cases is a manifestation of the confusion referred to: (1) The doctrine in its classical application operates to relieve the parties of the burden of proving notorious facts. (2) The expression is used of the process whereby the court informs itself of the domestic law which it must apply. (3) It is said that courts must take judicial notice of certain state matters — governmental, constitutional, administrative, political, international and diplomatic. (4) At common law and by statute the courts must take judicial notice of a myriad of official signatures, certificates and other governmental documents. It is necessary to consider in some detail the first three of these classes of proof.
B — JUDICIAL NOTICE OF NOTORIOUS FACTS The categories of notorious facts [3015] Distinction between facts noticed without inquiry and facts noticed after inquiry If the date of Christmas should be in issue, or relevant to the issue, it will not be necessary for the party who desires to establish that fact to call a witness to swear that the birth of Jesus Christ is celebrated on 25 December, because this is a matter of which judicial notice is taken. There are two classes of case in which the court will act in this way, for, to quote Isaacs J: The only guiding principle — apart from Statute — as to judicial notice which emerges from the
various recorded cases, appears to be that wherever a fact is so generally known that every ordinary person19 may be reasonably presumed to be aware of it, the court “notices” it, either simpliciter if it is at once satisfied of the fact without more, or after such information or investigation as it considers reliable and necessary in order to eliminate any reasonable doubt.20
Speaking in a case in the second category, concerning the question whether [page 166] legislation banning the Australian Communist Party was supported by a constitutional power to make laws about defence, but while citing authorities about taking judicial notice going to facts in issue, Dixon J divided judicially noticeable facts into two categories. He said that the courts were entitled to “take into account” historical events — “the course of open and notorious events of a public nature”, and “with respect to our own country, matters of common knowledge and experience are open to us.” These historical facts could be employed without the need for inquiry. But there was another category: “courts may use the general facts of history as ascertained or ascertainable from the accepted writings of serious historians …, and employ the common knowledge of educated men and for verification refer to standard works of literature and the like ….” The relevant inquiry is not “from the polemics of the subject, but from serious studies and inquiries and historical narratives.”21 The example he gave of the first category was of certain political events of the years just before 1951 which were still well known. The example he gave of the second category was “the general nature and development of the accepted tenets or doctrines of communism as a political philosophy.” In considering this topic, and the innumerable cases which deal with it, three matters must be remembered. First, the cases for the most part deal with no case submissions or appeals where a fact is challenged on the ground of want of evidence at a time when it is too late to call evidence in support. At trial level there is usually little issue: the fact is so obvious that in many cases it is not in contest. Secondly, as a matter of everyday experience a fact which is obvious to one person may not be so to another. The caution of courts means that only facts which are not seriously disputable tend to fall within the doctrine. Thirdly, the readiness of the
court to take judicial notice of any given fact will depend upon the time at which the exercise is undertaken. A fact which was arcane a generation ago may be a commonplace today. This is of particular relevance in the case of scientific facts. The list of judicially noticed facts is therefore continually enlarging. On the other hand, it may be that facts notorious two generations ago are not so widely known today. Notwithstanding this, the courts appear to be reluctant to admit the possibility of judicial amnesia. But facts which were accepted as notorious in the past may be shown to be not only little known, but false today. In this area, therefore, the old cases should be approached with some caution in so far as they are relied upon as authority that a given fact would be judicially noticed by a modern court. It will be convenient to deal in turn with the application of the doctrine to notorious facts in the two classes of case referred to by Isaacs J in the passage set out above.
Notorious facts judicially noticed without inquiry [3020] Categories of facts judicially noticed without inquiry “Judicial knowledge is the knowledge of the ordinary wide-awake man, used by one who is trained to express it in terms of precision.”22 Cases in which judicial notice has been taken without inquiry can be divided into loose categories. [page 167]
Ordinary human behaviour One concerns ordinary human behaviour. Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that young boys have playful habits;23 that there is a “tendency of youth to climb” without lawful authority and in breach of the law;24 that a criminal’s life is an unhappy one;25 that a postcard is the kind of document that might be read by anyone;26 but not that husbands read their wives’ letters;27 and that where a child has been sexually assaulted by
a person in whom the child had trust and confidence, the child may be reluctant to resist, protest or complain for fear of punishment or rejection.28 Normal fortitude is a matter of judicial notice, requiring neither medical evidence nor statistical inquiry.29
Language Another category concerns language. “[A]s the ordinary meaning of English words is notorious and of public knowledge, we must take judicial notice of it, refreshing our minds with dictionaries and generally accepted works, if necessary.”30 Where refreshment takes place, the principles discussed in at [3025]ff apply. Thus where a witness tasted a fluid and called it “whiskey”, the court took judicial notice of the fact that the fluid was intoxicating liquor.31 Where an ordinary English word, as distinct from a term of art requiring interpretation with expert assistance, is construed, the court uses its knowledge of language and its acquaintance with accepted applications of the word to situations arising in the normal life of the community in which the court sits. On similar principles, judicial notice has been taken that a reference to “Peter Sutcliffe” is a reference to a person known as “the Yorkshire ripper”32 and that the Loyal Orange Lodge and the Protestant Alliance Lodge are organisations which draw their memberships from Protestants.33 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that “grass” is commonly used as a synonym for Indian hemp.34
Medical, anatomical and scientific facts Another category concerns elementary medical, anatomical and scientific facts. Judicial notice is taken of the fact that a fortnight is too short a period for human gestation;35 that there is individuality in the corrugations of the skin on the fingers [page 168] of the human hand;36 that cancer is a major health problem and that, despite research, little progress has been made in controlling it;37 that there is a close relationship between bodily disorders and chronic anxiety, emotional disturbances and neurotic conditions;38 and that HIV is a life
threatening disease.39 Judicial notice has not been taken of the differential effect of particular quantities of alcohol on various persons, but judicial notice has been taken of the fact that a person who has drunk 15–20 schooners of beer in a few hours would be drunk;40 and that alcohol, once consumed, is progressively absorbed into and eliminated from the blood.41 Judicial notice about the consequences of a man drinking six standard drinks in five hours was taken so as to create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a breath analysis giving a reading of 0.165 grams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of his blood.42 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that open fires emit smoke (or ash or solid particles of some kind or vapours or odours);43 that cocaine hydrochloride is a kind of cocaine;44 that communication is possible by wireless telegraphy;45 that the capacity of wireless telegraphy apparatus depends on the quantity of power used, and that the wavelengths generated and used vary from a few hundred metres to many thousands.46 While, statute apart,47 judicial notice is not taken of the hours of sunrise and sunset, it has been taken of the fact that sunset is never as late as a certain time.48 Judicial notice has not been taken of the normal yield and current value of cannabis crops,49 or of whether a particular tomato is grafted rather than grown from seed.50
Economics and business Another category concerns economics and business, and associated behaviour. Judicial notice has been taken of the widespread practice by which business corporations sell business premises and take a lease back.51 Judicial notice has been [page 169] taken of the decline in the value of money in relation to share prices.52 Judicial notice has been taken of the following matters because of their “utmost notoriety” — that “during the last 12 months inflation has been running at not less than 15 percent per annum, investment yields on readily realisable securities have not at any time during the period reached this figure, while investments in stock and real estate have during the same period either fallen in value or remained steady.”53 An increase in damages awards made by the Court of Session was approved because of
the decline in the purchasing power of money “which, as a matter of common knowledge, has been gradually steepening during the last 30 years”.54 A judge is entitled to select a rate of interest for the purpose of calculating the present value of future periodic loss without evidence. In selecting a rate of interest, the judge may take judicial notice, in accordance with established principles, of such knowledge as he possesses in common with other members of the community as to general economic trends, the effects of inflation, prevailing rates of interests and returns on investments.55 It is “notorious that an unskilled man does not overall get the same economic reward as a skilled man. Were it otherwise, then why bother acquiring a skill at all?”56 Judicial notice has been taken of unemployment levels.57 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that in Michigan there are important manufacturing centres,58 that in 1946, there was a shortage of skilled workers and houses for them to live in,59 that the demand for cars exceeded the supply, and prices were fixed.60 Judicial notice has been taken of a seasonal decline in the market for second-hand cars61 and of the occurrence of an acute financial crisis in Australia in 1931, coupled with a fall in land values and an inability to borrow on the security of land.62 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that trustees habitually leave securities in the hands of their solicitors.63 Judicial notice has not been taken of how superannuation benefits are provided;64 or of the existence of a tobacco product called “Winfield” sold in red and white packets.65 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that if pop groups are to have success they must have managers.66 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that unmilled timber is a [page 170] staple commercial product.67 Judicial notice has not been taken of the procedures employed in taking securities over thoroughbred racehorses.68 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that liquor is kept in the saloon bar of a hotel.69 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that currencies can be converted for speculative purposes.70 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that travelling vacuum cleaner salesmen have been part of the Australian domestic landscape for a very long time, and that elderly women who purchased from them were aware of that.71
Political events Another category is political events: “the course of open and notorious international events of a public nature”;72 equivalent internal events;73 the political constitution of the government74 (but not the constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics);75 the development of international tension to a point of real danger to Australia by October 1950, so that there was a possibility of war breaking out in the near future.76 But judicial notice has not been taken of the identity of particular ministers.77
Use of the roads A further category relates to the use of the roads. Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that the streets of London are full of traffic78 and that a boy riding a bicycle in them runs a risk of injury.79 Judicial notice has been taken of the mode of conducting traffic on an established system of tramways in a city,80 including the presence of recognised stopping places, but not the location of particular stopping places.81 Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a vehicle equipped with four wheel brakes “[travelling at 80 kph] … can be brought to a complete halt in 82 m [page 171] after allowing two seconds for reaction time.”82 The fact noticed is a conclusion inferred from mathematical conversions of speeds measured in kilometres per hour into speeds measured in metres per second, from empirical observations of the braking capacity of vehicles, and from an assumption not only as to the length of reaction time, but as to the efficacy of the particular brakes of the vehicle in question. Tables of speeds and braking distances are often found in works on motor vehicle law.
Community habits Judicial notice has been taken of many community habits and beliefs. One is the fact that the reception of television has become a very common feature of domestic life.83 Another is “the fact that one of the most popular forms of entertainment nowadays on television is a series of reconstructed trials which have a striking degree of realism”.84 Another is
the fact that there was current a generation ago a custom on the part of cemetery authorities to sell the rights to burial.85 Another is the fact that many important conversations takes place on the telephone.86 Another is the great social consequences that follow from the importation of heroin.87 But judicial notice has not been taken of community drinking habits.88 However, “it is a matter of commonsense and experience that, where liquor is to be sold to large numbers of people at nocturnal entertainments extending over a long period of time, there is a danger of drunkenness and violent and other offensive behaviour”.89 It is notorious that many prisoners are imprisoned because they present a danger, often a physical danger, to the community; that without close supervision some will inflict grave physical injury on others; and that prisoners convicted of sexual offences against minors are at greater risk than others.90 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that “some motorists, maybe erroneously, believe that it is undesirable to mix lubricating oils of different brands”.91
Knowledge in particular localities Local magistrates may be at liberty to take judicial notice of matters in their area of which others are ignorant.92 Similarly, judicial notice has been taken of the fact that particular places are outside other places.93 It has been taken, in New Zealand, [page 172] of the popularity of Rotorua, New Zealand, as a holiday resort and of the propensity of visitors to that town to spend money amusing themselves in the evening;94 in Tasmania of the construction of a crayfish pot;95 and in South Australia of the fact that land can only be cropped once every three years.96
Historical events The next category concerns some rare examples of historical events being treated as notorious. In 1899 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut said that the court below “had the right to take judicial notice of the historic fact that the railroad between New Haven and New York was open on January 1, 1849. The opening of a new railroad for public
use is one of those events of public notoriety which are to be taken as known by the courts because they are known to everybody.”97 In 1966 the Supreme Court of Alabama took judicial notice of the fact that Florida was acquired by purchase from Spain in 1819.98 It is more common for judicial notice to be taken without inquiry into near contemporary or contemporary conditions, usually events just before, during or just after the two World Wars which happened immediately preceding the time when notice was taken — in 1940, that on 11 September 1939 Brest was a war base;99 in 1915, that the coasts of Britain “have been attacked by Zeppelins and other aircraft, and, further, that certain places on the east coast have been subjected to attack by the enemy’s fleet”;100 in 1917, that from early in the First World War individuals and firms in Sweden were extensively engaged in facilitating the transmission into Germany of contraband;101 and in 1916, that during the war, since Germany had no coaling depots, it was very difficult for German vessels to be coaled except by subterfuge.102 In 1916, Bailhache J said that the courts were entitled to take judicial notice of “certain notorious facts”: There are a large number of German subjects in this country. This war is not being carried on by naval and military forces only. Reports, rumours, intrigues play a large part. Methods of communication with the enemy have been entirely altered and largely used. I need only refer to wireless telegraphy, signalling by lights, and the employment on a scale hitherto unknown of carrier pigeons. Spying has become the hall-mark of German “kultur”.103
In 1948 the House of Lords held that on 4 April 1939, the date of a charter party, shipowners ought reasonably to have foreseen the likelihood that a trade embargo could be imposed by reason of war.104 On the other hand, the House of Lords did not take judicial notice of the dates when the Dardanelles were evacuated in late 1915 and early 1916.105 [page 173]
Miscellaneous Among miscellaneous instances of judicial notice being taken are the following: that the advancement of learning is among the purposes for which the University of Oxford exists,106 that cats are kept for domestic purposes,107 that “bottles vary indefinitely in size”108, that flick knives109 and butterfly knives110 are necessarily made for the causing of injury to the
person, that the armed robbery of employees carrying money through the streets was a familiar and well-recognised hazard,111 that it is common to wear woollen undergarments,112 that living in houses unconnected to a water supply is not unusual in Australia,113 and that in the seas bordering Australia, the bather runs risks from sea lice, flotsam and jetsam, weed, blue bottles, stingers, quicksand, sea snakes, crocodiles, unpredictable waves, sandbars, sharks, absence of effective netting, shifting sea beds, broken bottles on the beach or in the water, sunstroke from sunbathing and unpredictable tides and currents.114 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that there are university researchers in the sciences who may carry out research without aiming for or achieving a patentable invention.115 Judicial notice has been taken of the large quantities of grassed land near London, the growth of London in population, the growth of its wants and the supply of them by increased numbers of market gardens.116
A doubtful instance It has been said that “it is common knowledge that the derivatives of lysergic acid are often concealed for transport and sale by putting a drop of the dissolved substance on some absorbent material; when dry it is invisible.”117 This may be knowledge which is common in particular circles, but is the fact so generally known that every ordinary person may reasonably be presumed to be aware of it? In other cases judicial notice is only taken after reference to an extraneous source of information.
Notorious facts judicially noticed after inquiry [3025] Function of category The proposition that judicial notice may be taken of a notorious fact after inquiry is strictly speaking self-contradictory: the fact cannot be notorious if inquiry is necessary. The proposition is seeking to distinguish forbidden inquiries into controversial matters from permitted inquiries into uncontroversial ones. It is relatively rare for judicial notice to be taken after inquiry.118 The principal examples [page 174]
are inquiries into historical facts, customs and professional practices. Others may be court judgments and orders which are matters of historical record.119 Another example is the date of Easter, ascertained from an almanac.120
[3030] Permissible sources The sources consulted by the judge may include reports of previous cases, certificates from various officials, works of reference and oral statements of witnesses. They have included Prime Ministerial statements,121 scholarly texts incorporating the ICC arbitration rules,122 the Commonwealth Year Book,123 material published by the official statistician,124 the memoirs of statesmen,125 Admiralty charts, used to establish the geographical position and general names applied to the districts shown,126 and a Monopolies Commission report,127 They have not included a street directory.128 In two states129 specific legislative provisions enable the court to refer to “such published books maps or charts as the court considers to be of authority on the subjects to which they respectively relate” in matters of public history, literature, science or art. There are dangers in courts, particularly appellate courts, relying on scientific material tendered under this legislation in order to formulate identification warnings. The works placed before it are of necessity only a selection of literature, often from a large field; the assertions in them have not been tested by cross-examination; and the works may often be of a technical nature and open to misinterpretation. There is also, of course, a danger that a court may take a particular view, based on evidence which is before it at a point in time, but that the material placed before it may be demonstrated by subsequent research to be inaccurate or unreliable. Where that occurs in relation to a court of appeal, there is a potential for many trials to be influenced by an erroneous view.130 A work may be considered as “of authority” notwithstanding that it contains contentious statements or opinions. It is sufficient that its overall content is such that it attracts general respect and acceptance in the discipline to which it relates.131 But even at common law the judge may refer to learned works.132 However, even after reference to learned writing, judicial notice has not been taken of the extent to
[page 175] which and the processes by which an accurate topographic plan can be produced from a pictorial delineation of a scene.133
[3035] Natural justice The judge, when undertaking such a reference to works of authority, either pursuant to the statutory provisions or at common law, is not entitled to obtain information on any contentious matter without giving the parties the opportunity to controvert or comment upon the work to which reference has been made.134 It is one thing to use the section [s 64 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA)] for the purpose of discovering or verifying objective facts or figures about which there can be no real dispute, such as historical or geographical data of an uncontroversial nature or mathematical tables of life expectancy or interest calculations…. [E]ven135 there I think … the parties should be given notice of the Court’s intention and an opportunity to be heard on the result of its researches. It is quite another thing for the tribunal of its own motion to seek to inform itself out of court on a question of fact or opinion vital to the issue and by no means free from controversy. This is, of course, doubly objectionable if done without the parties having any opportunity to state their views on the specific authorities consulted. But in my view, even if they are offered this opportunity, the court should not embark on such investigations except by consent. It would be preposterous to suppose, for example, that in a claim for damages for workmen’s compensation where divergent medical opinions have been expressed by expert witnesses on each side, the court should be at liberty without consent to pursue independent inquiries of its own on the point through medical journals or text books not referred to by the witnesses.136
[3040] Historical facts In two states, statute permits the court to refer in matters of public history to works of authority.137 The same is true at common law. Lord Eldon held that judicial notice may not be taken of whether foreign countries are at war.138 On the other hand, Pearson J said in 1953: “the broad facts of the relations between Israel and the Arab States were well known to everybody and could be judicially noticed, although evidence would be required if it were necessary to establish the dates of commencement and cessation of hostilities [or] the proper legal or diplomatic description of the relations at any time between Israel and the Arab States … [T]he defendant’s counsel … for the purpose of clarifying and amplifying the judicial knowledge produced for inspection certain
United Nations documents which supplied the dates and confirmed the facts which had been previously mentioned.”139 Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the [page 176] nation in which the court sits is at war with a foreign country. Sometimes this is based on references to that fact in statutes,140 sometimes it is based on notoriety.141 It follows that it must be possible to take judicial notice of when a particular war started. Danckwerts J decided that the state of war between Britain and Germany was determined, and a state of peace was brought about, by a declaration in a supplement to the London Gazette dated 9 July 1951 that from 4pm that day the formal state of war with Germany was terminated.142 It may be a question whether strictly speaking that illustrates the taking of judicial notice after inquiry or the reception of evidence. If questions concerning the tenets of a political creed arise, Australian courts are prepared to consult the appropriate literature, “not … the polemics of the subject, but … serious studies and inquiries and political narratives”.143 The courts “may use the general facts of history as ascertained or ascertainable from the accepted writings of serious historians … and employ the common knowledge of educated men upon many matters and for verification refer to standard works of literature and the like”.144 A similar practice would no doubt be adopted with regard to general scientific or aesthetic questions. The statements about the establishment of a hotel and a memoir of the proprietor by his widow were held to fall outside these categories.145 Young J limited this doctrine to “the basal facts such as when a particular war broke out or other matters of record”, and did not extend it to “analyses as to why certain things happened and generally how people behaved”, but said judicial notice could be taken, without admitting the works themselves, so far as the works contained “details which are open and apparent and of general knowledge to the whole community”.146 There are other examples of historical facts being judicially noticed after inquiry. Lord Hale CJ used Speed’s Chronicles to establish a particular point of
history in the time of Edward III in the following way. A decision of 1331 relied on to show that Queen Isabel, wife of Edward II and mother of Edward III, had no right to appoint a Master of St Katherine’s Hospital, was explained thus: … it was said, and so shewn out of Speed’s Chronicles, produced in Court, that at that time Queen Isabel was under great calamity and oppression, and what was then determined against her was not so much from the right of the thing, as the iniquity of the times; neither hath it been heard, that one who hath been Queen of England, should be called nuper Regina in her lifetime: so that the authority was much invalidated from the circumstances of the time.147
[page 177] Pemberton CJ also used Speed’s Chronicles to prove the death of Queen Isabel.148 He “said he knew not what better proof could be given”: no doubt for practical purposes the primary sources, if any, on which Speed relied would not be useful evidence because of the difficulty of finding them and bringing them, or copies of them, to court. The date when the Emperor Charles V abdicated was said in one case149 to have been proved by “chronicles”. … a deed was produced to be made …, wherein all the titles were given Philip, which he used after the surrender of Charles the V. Now, though Charles had then surrendered, yet Philip did not take those titles upon him till that surrender had been received by the Council of Spain, which was six months after; so that the deed must needs have been forged; and to prove the time of receiving that surrender, chronicles were produced and admitted as evidence.
In the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the House of Lords, who were advised by the judges, having first determined that it would proceed only upon judicial evidence “such as would be receivable in a court of law, received in evidence … Cantemir’s history of the Turkish Empire”.150 In a case in which there was an issue about what the doctrines of a sect named “Particular Baptists” were, Sir John Romilly MR took into account records of what controversialists, including Bunyan, thought in the 17th century, and what was resolved by various Baptist assemblies in that age, as recorded in historical works.151 However, a tender of Camden’s Britannia on the issue of whether by the custom of Droitwich salt-pits could be sunk in any part of that town was rejected:152 … a general history might be given in evidence to prove a matter relating to the kingdom in
general, because the nature of the thing requires it, but not to prove a particular right or custom …
This principle appears to underlie the later passage: … it was said that in the Exchequer, the question being, whether the Abbey de Sentibus was an inferior abbey, or not? Dugdale’s Monasticon Anglicanum was refused for evidence, because the original records might be had in the augmentation-office.
Other examples of the distinction between matters relating to the kingdom in general and matters relating to particular rights are the rejection in 1682 of Sir William Dugdale’s Baronetage of England to prove that Sir Ingleram Piercy had died without issue153 and the rejection in 1837 of Stowe and Dugdale on the same type of question.154 Yet another is Alderson B’s rejection of Nicholls’ History of Brecknockshire to prove what the boundary of the county was. “The writer of that history probably had the same interest in enlarging the boundaries of the county as [page 178] any other inhabitant of it. It is not like a general history of Wales.”155 The language of these cases suggests that the courts were treating them as failed attempts to prove the reputed existence of a public or general right. Another limitation was stated by Pollock CB when he said that counsel:156 proposed to read from various histories the excommunication by the Popes of heretical Sovereigns, and also to read the bull “In Coena Domini”. The learned Judge very properly ruled that he might refer generally to the fact that Popes have excommunicated Sovereigns, but that he had no right to read the terms of a specific bull, as that was a matter to be proved. It is the same with respect to the “Pontificale Romanum”, and the notes to the Rheims Testament. In short, the defendant’s counsel wanted to prove certain facts: he opened them as facts, and supposed that, because he could find them in certain documents and books, he was relieved from the necessity of calling witnesses to prove them, thereby avoiding a reply. In that notion he was clearly wrong.
The distinction seems to be between general historical facts capable of being judicially noticed and the terms of particular documents. On the other hand, the terms of particular documents were admitted in a case in which the question was whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted against certain operations on the bed of the Thames.157 Whether they were likely to cause damage depended on soil conditions in 1904. Two experts gave evidence based on records going to soil conditions
many years earlier compiled during the construction of the Thames tunnel between Rotherhithe and Wapping in the years 1823–1843. Farwell J appeared to have accepted the tender of those records; indeed, they could not have been capable of reception merely as a basis for the expert’s opinions. Many of the difficulties experienced by Isambard Brunel and his son stemmed from the fact that while it was expected that the soil was clay, it comprised water-bearing soils and gravels.158 Farwell J said: “I am entitled to regard them the same way as any other fact of history which did not take place within living memory, if it is established by authentic records. Inasmuch as all the engineers whom I have seen agree that these records are accessible to engineers and are accepted by them as absolutely accurate, it appears to me that the Court would be very short-sighted to decline to take advantage of whatever benefit may be obtained from the knowledge of the historical fact so authenticated.”159 Many of these cases are old and ill-reported. They do not use the language of judicial notice and they sometimes speak in terms of tenders of historical materials being received. Thus it seems clear that they are not illustrations of the doctrine by which facts are judicially noticed after inquiry, but rather illustrate one or more exceptions to the hearsay rule. One potentially relevant exception concerns statements by deceased persons as to the reputed existence of a public or general right — an exception which was restrictively applied in permitting proof only of the reputation, not the underlying facts from which it might be inferred.160 Another is statements in public documents.161 Another is pedigree declarations.162 Another is [page 179] declarations in the course of duty. The reception of the soil records in the East London Railway Co case could have fallen within the last category. Indeed Astbury J said dogmatically:163 “Brunel’s reports were made in performance of a special duty and the tunnel was made under his direction.” But this is not how Farwell J reasoned, and the application of the exception would depend on analysis of the precise relationship between those who made the soil records and those for whom they were made, an analysis which neither Astbury J nor Farwell J undertook.
Authorities of this kind have been said to support a generalisation by Lord Halsbury LC in a case where the question was whether the mixing of communion wine with water, and various other practices, were contrary to the law of the Church of England. It was held, against an objection to its having done so, that the court might consider historical and ritualistic works on the subject. In the course of his speech in the Privy Council, Lord Halsbury LC made it clear that a judge can rely upon that judge’s own historical learning in such a case. “Where it is important to ascertain ancient facts of a public nature, the law does permit historical facts to be referred to.”164 There are two qualifications to be made to the breadth of Lord Halsbury LC’s statement. The first, discussed above, is that not all historical facts in issue can be judicially noticed if they are not notorious. Since it may be supposed that neither “every educated person”, nor “every well-informed person”, nor even “educated men” would be familiar with the matters disclosed by the court’s researches, it is difficult to rely on this case in support of any general judicial right to resort to history books in matters other than matters of public notoriety. Resort must thus be made to the hearsay exception for the reception of historical facts.165 The second qualification to be made to Lord Halsbury’s statement is that it must be read in the context in which it was made. That context was that an examination of the judgment of the Archbishop’s court166 revealed that, after the formal hearing was concluded, the Archbishop and his assessors undertook substantial historical research into the ancient practices of the Church of England. An objection to that course made by Sir Horace Davey QC was rejected thus by Lord Halsbury. Without considering further how far an ecclesiastical judge has a right to act upon his own historical learning, when it becomes important to ascertain what was the ecclesiastical practice, or what were the views entertained by eminent theologians, in remote times, it is enough to say here, dealing with the objection generally, that it is impossible to contend that if in other respects the Archbishop’s judgment was well founded, it could be invalidated by his having called to his aid for this purpose his own historical researches.167
The court of the Archbishop of Canterbury included, apart from the Archbishop himself, the Vicar-General of the Province, and five assessors, who were Bishops. It was a specialised tribunal. Lord Halsbury’s words, quoted above, hesitant as they were, were limited to the personal historical researches of ecclesiastical judges on ecclesiastical practice and past theological opinions. He referred to the “novelty” of
[page 180] Sir Horace Davey’s objection,168 and this points to the peculiar nature of the procedure in church courts. Lord Halsbury LC’s words do not have general application to the ordinary courts on other issues. That this is so may be supported by the fact that in the late 19th century matters of legislative history to ascertain the meaning of statutes were more freely resorted to in the case of ecclesiastical statutes, or at least old ones, than in the case of other statutes,169 on the ground, it has been said,170 that necessity justifies this course: it would not be possible otherwise to give old ecclesiastical statutes a meaning. Certainly the field is highly specialised. Thus the case is not an authority permitting judicial investigations into historical facts without notice to the parties in conventional litigation. That course was taken, however, in a case171 in which a member of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Lambert JA, examined and took into account various documents relevant to whether the North Saanich Treaty of 1852, made between representatives of the Imperial Government and the Saanich people, conferred on an Indian accused of unlawfully using rim-fired ammunition while hunting for big game the right to do so. The parties agreed on various facts and tendered various documents relating to the treaty. Lambert JA followed up references in those documents to materials which had not been tendered and examined them. Some were published scholarly writings; one was an unpublished scholarly work; some were original documents located in the provincial archives. Lambert JA said he regarded himself as taking judicial notice of “indisputable, relevant, historical facts by reference to a readily obtainable and authoritative source, in accordance with the ordinary principles of judicial notice.”172 In these words Lambert JA was alluding to a common Canadian statement that judicial notice may be taken of facts which are (a) so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable men, or (b) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resorting to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.173 Lambert JA concluded that the accused had made good his defence. Esson JA agreed, but without reference to the material just referred to, which, as he said “was not included in the evidence at trial or the record before this court.”174 Carrothers JA agreed with Esson JA.
What Lambert JA did was highly questionable.175 Historical records discovered from archival research are not notorious within paragraph (a) of the definition just quoted. It is questionable whether they fall within paragraph (b). The existence of documents in archives, museum libraries and private collections, is often unknown, and even if it is known, the documents are often not readily accessible, even to scholars. Nor is their location in archives any guarantee of their indisputable [page 181] accuracy: their survival may have been haphazard, they may have been forged, and in themselves they may signify little except after interpretation by persons possessing the skills of historians and other related skills. In short, primary historical materials are not easy for non-historians to deal with, particularly without assistance from the parties. Lambert JA did not contend that Lord Halsbury’s case justified the course he took, and in truth, because of its specialised context, it did not.
[3050] Custom As a general rule, a court cannot treat a fact as proved on the basis of the evidence in a previous case,176 but this rule does not apply to the proof of custom, for it has been recognised that a time must come when the courts, having had the question of the existence of a custom before them in other cases, are entitled to say that they will take judicial notice of it and will not require proof in each case. This recognition was made by Bray J in the Divisional Court when upholding a County Court judge’s right to take judicial notice of the custom whereby a domestic servant might terminate her employment within the first month of her engagement by less than a full month’s notice,177 but the doctrine he enunciated lies at the root of the court’s recognition of a vast number of mercantile customs.178 It is not always easy to say when a custom has been recognised with sufficient frequency to become the subject of judicial notice.179 While the courts were not prepared to recognise that it was the usual practice of a hotelkeeper to be in possession of furniture under hire-purchase agreements in 1875,180 they were prepared to do so in 1881.181
[3055] Professional practice Where evidence was given before the English Court of Appeal, but not before the trial judge, that the invariable practice of the Ordnance Survey Office was that a certain line on a survey map marked the centre of the existing hedge, so that the encroaching trees were in fact on the defendant’s land, Lord Goddard CJ noted that this practice had been proved by evidence in an earlier case182 and observed, “In our opinion, after that case and this, courts in future can take notice of this practice of the Ordnance Survey as at least prima facie evidence of what a line on the map indicates.”183 Other examples are the practice of conveyancers184 and mining usage.185 [page 182]
[3060] Economic conditions A court will take judicial notice of economic conditions generally prevailing. Standard historical reference works have been referred to to establish that the purchasing power of the shilling in 1189 was greater than it was in 1867.186 While recourse to statistics may demonstrate a decline in the purchasing power of money in the past, it is not possible to infer that there will be a continuous inflationary trend in the future.187 In an application to widen a trustee’s powers of investment on the ground that the fund was becoming eroded by inflation, McInerney J said:188 having regard to the material which exists on various files scattered through the archives of this court, members of this court ought now be presumed to have judicial knowledge of the existence of an overall inflationary trend which, although it has its surges and recessions, is nevertheless, when regard is had to the history of this country in the last 80 years, a trend which is “upward ever upward” ….189
A judge is entitled to select a rate of interest for the purpose of calculating the present value of future periodic loss without evidence. Judicial notice was not correctly taken of a rise in the value of a property over two months to an extent incapable of being compensated for by the payment of interest at 15 per cent: specific evidence of the value of the property was required.190 Judicial notice may be taken of movements in the Consumer Price Index.191 On similar principles, judicial notice may be taken of statistics
relating to sentences,192 and public statistics not in dispute, such as those issued by the official statistician based on the public census, eg concerning life expectancies.193 The assessment of what a capital sum would earn in past periods, and its value compared to wages of those periods, has been conducted by reference to the information obtainable from statutes and law reports of the period.194
[3065] Local conditions The theory behind judicial notice is that judges have a corporate mind which is informed by the experience of each member. An exception to this principle is provided by the rule that local courts are entitled, or even obliged, to have regard to local conditions. This rule is commonly exemplified when a magistrate accepts without proof the distance between the town in which the court is sitting and another,195 the local weather conditions,196 and that a certain place is within the [page 183] local jurisdiction of that magistrate,197 but other cases have required strict proof of the location of the act in question where this is an ingredient of the offence.198 Judicial notice may be taken of the geographical limits of the jurisdiction of a local court,199 of localities within them,200 and of general topographical features of the place where the court sits,201 but not of precise distances between two points on a particular road,202 or particular features of a small section of road of which general knowledge cannot be assumed.203 Judicial notice may be taken of the extent of tidal water,204 the residential character of an area,205 and the use of a building.206 The Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 65(1) provides that where there is a question as to the territorial limits or situation of an area or place, or the distance between the two places, a court may admit in evidence: (a) a published book, map, chart or document that appears to the court to be a reliable source of information in relation to the question; or
(b) a certificate purporting to be given by the chief executive (surveys), or the holder of another office that, in the court’s opinion, qualifies the person to express an opinion about the question. Section 65(2) provides that in any proceeding a map, chart or plan purporting to be issued or published by any department of the Government of the State or of the Commonwealth or by an officer thereof in discharge of the officer’s functions shall, upon its production, be sufficient evidence of the matters stated or delineated thereon until the contrary is proved. Whether a state of local affairs is of sufficient notoriety to be a matter of judicial notice is something which is best decided by a local court.207
[3070] Scientific matters and instruments Dixon J, having informed himself from a text on the subject, made findings on the impact of acute alcoholism on the mental processes of the testator.208 There is a common law rule that the readings of scientific or technical instruments are prima facie evidence of the facts which they purport to register; the rule is sometimes described as the presumption of accuracy of scientific [page 184] instruments: [1180] and [1315]. To determine the scientific or technical nature of the instrument in question the court may rely on judicial notice. But this is permissible only where the experience of the court provides a firm basis for presuming reliability. So, when an instrument is relied on for the first time evidence will normally be required as to its nature and function in order to persuade the court of its reliability.209 After some time the experience and confidence of the courts will be such that this evidence may be dispensed with. Thus a court will thereafter take judicial notice of the nature, function and common use, and hence the trustworthiness, of a clock,210 a speedometer,211 a thermometer,212 a pair of common scales213 or a tape measure.214 These devices are members of:
a class of instruments of a scientific or technical character, which by general experience [are] known to be trustworthy, and are so notorious that the court requires no evidence to the effect that they do fall into such class, before allowing the presumption in question to operate with regard to readings made thereon.215
It is, of course, open to the party against whom this presumption of fact operates to lead evidence to show that the particular instrument in question is not worthy of credit.216
C — JUDICIAL NOTICE OF DOMESTIC LAW Common law and statute law [3075] Special senses of judicial notice It is commonly said that judges take judicial notice of domestic law – common law and statute. This is on any view a misnomer.217 The statement probably derives from the fiction that the judges collectively know the common law and that their task is to search their recollection for its principles in order to expound it. It is also associated with the process of this search and exposition. The task is often undertaken after the evidence is concluded so that the submissions of counsel and the authorities referred to by them cannot be evidence. Moreover, the relatively free [page 185] hand which is accorded to judges to conduct research into the law themselves (subject to fresh points being brought to the attention of the parties218) is inconsistent with the evidentiary process in an adversary system. In these circumstances it is natural enough to place this nonevidentiary material in the same category as judicial notice. But in truth since the material is not factual in nature there is no reason to classify it in this way. The assumption that judges know all the domestic law is merely a convenient method of acknowledging that the law is not a matter for proof or disproof.219 The judge is not obliged to accept the submissions of counsel as to the law, even when both parties make the same submission.220 A quite separate matter, but often rolled up in the
statement that domestic law is the subject of judicial notice, is the means whereby an authoritative text of a source of law is placed before the judge. With respect to common law the acceptance of the differing series of reports as authorities is a matter for the court itself. Nevertheless, a judge will often compare the text of a judgment in the differing series and may have regard to the court documents relating to that case or the transcript of argument where they are relevant. The receipt of this material is treated as part of the research process rather than the reception of evidence. The receipt of authoritative texts of legislation and subordinate legislation is dealt with in [3090] and [3095] below.
D — JUDICIAL NOTICE OF STATE MATTERS Governmental issues [3080] Basis of rule At common law judicial notice will be taken of a large number of matters associated with government.221 The basis for this practice is doubtless an acknowledgment that the judiciary is but one arm of government and that it is sensible that it be aware of the functions of the other arms. Thus, in Australia, it has been held that a state court will take judicial notice of the appointment and powers of the Attorney-General of that state.222
[3085] Political matters A statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Kelantan was a sovereign state and that the Sultan was its ruler has been held conclusive by the House of Lords. It has for some time been the practice of our courts, when such a question is raised, to take judicial notice of the sovereignty of a state, and for that purpose (in any case of uncertainty) to seek information from a Secretary of State; and when information is so obtained the court does not permit it to be questioned by the parties.223
[page 186]
Judicial notice has been taken by an English court that the United Kingdom is at war,224 and that the “Federal Republic of Central America” had not been recognised by the state of the forum, for “it is the duty of a Judge in every Court to take judicial notice of public matters which affect the Government of the country;”225 and by the Irish Court of Common Pleas that in 1803 Lord Hawkesbury was Minister for Foreign Affairs, “the Court taking judicial notice of the great offices of State”.226 This source of information to which the court resorts is treated as one of indisputable accuracy for reasons of public policy — the undesirability of a conflict between the courts and the executive. As in all cases in which the courts renounce their powers of determining facts on the basis of evidence, the practice may be represented as something like a submission to official dictatorship, but, in this instance, it is difficult to see how else a judge should act when confronted with such questions as the sovereignty of a foreign state, the membership of a diplomatic suite, the extent of Australian territorial waters or of the realm or of other territory claimed by the Crown, or the existence of a state of war.227 Moreover, the courts may form their own opinion of the effect of the Secretary of State’s answer,228 and they may differ inter se on this point.229 There is a fundamental question under Chapter III of the Constitution as to whether the Executive is competent to determine conclusively the existence of facts by certificate where they are disputed constitutional facts.230 The judges have reserved to themselves the final decision in matters such as whether a certain vessel was at the material time engaged in warlike operations,231 or whether a foreign power is exercising de facto control of a foreign country,232 for these are matters of fact and not matters of executive opinion. Further, where the issue is not one of fact but of the construction of statutory words, a certificate furnished by the Executive cannot compel the court to an interpretation of statutory words which it believes to be false.233 However, in construing a statutory provision which takes as a “factum for its operation a matter [page 187] pertaining to the conduct of foreign affairs, the communication of information by the Executive may be both helpful and relevant”.234
Section 145 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that Pt 4.2 of each Act (which deals with judicial notice of matters of Australian law and matters of common knowledge) does not exclude the application of the principles and rules of the common law and of equity relating to the effect of a certificate given by or on behalf of the Crown with respect to a matter of international affairs. Section 40(1) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) provides that the Minister for Foreign Affairs may certify in writing (inter alia) that for the purposes of that Act: (a) a specified country is, or was on a specified day, a foreign State; (b) a specified territory is or is not, or was or was not on a specified day, part of a foreign State; (c) a specified person is, or was at a specified time, the head of, or the government or part of the government of, a foreign State or a former foreign State. Section 40(5) provides that a certificate under the section is admissible as evidence of the facts and matters stated in it and is conclusive as to those facts and matters.
[3090] Acts of Parliament A surprising difficulty in this area relates to proof of statutes. It has been seen that a judge does not receive evidence of the law including statute law. In fact the judge will normally refer to the text of the statute in question. The question here relates to the material which may be used for this purpose — a problem in days when copying was less reliable.235 Judicial notice has always been taken of a public Act of Parliament — that is, no evidence has ever been required concerning its passage through Parliament and its contents. But before 1850, such evidence was required in the case of private Acts unless, as was often the case, they contained some special provision about judicial notice. The difficulty has been long overcome by Commonwealth legislation dealing with judicial notice of laws, proclamations, regulations, rules, by-laws and ordinances made by, or having force within, the Commonwealth, the states and territories.236 In so far as there remains power under the Constitution to do so, the states
and territories have also in differing ways made provision for the recognition of government printers’ copies of domestic legislation,237 interstate legislation238 and even certain foreign statutes.239 [page 188]
[3095] Subordinate legislation Special problems have arisen with respect to proof of subordinate legislation or regulations. As is often the case in this area of law, there are two quite separate issues to be addressed: (i) whether the regulation is to be judicially noticed in the sense that it is part of the law of the land so that no proof is required of it; and (ii) where proof is required, whether it is necessary to produce an authenticated or other copy. It is the first aspect which is of interest in this chapter. At common law, proclamations, orders and regulations, unlike public Acts of Parliament, are required to be proved and tendered in evidence.240 Where the legislation under which the regulation is made provides that the regulation shall have effect as if enacted in the statute then the regulation becomes part of the corpus of statutory law to which reference might be made without its being made part of the evidence.241 In such a case it will usually be necessary to produce a copy of the regulation where there is an issue as to its terms, but this is not a tender of the document any more than is the report of a case or the copy of a statute which is handed to the bench. If there is no contest about its terms this production is unnecessary. However, Bray CJ considered that there may well be a general rule permitting and obliging the court to take judicial notice of proclamations and regulations of a general nature affecting the rights of citizens as a whole,242 as distinct from specifying particular individuals243 or the particular time of particular events on a particular day.244 Where proof is required of a subordinate instrument the legislation facilitates this process by requiring the court to take judicial notice of certain copies.245
[3105] Other public documents The common law rule which admits public documents as an exception
to the hearsay rule has been very largely modified by statute. These modifications are found throughout the various Evidence Acts and in the statutes which are concerned with the particular subject matter of the documents in question.246 The Commonwealth and the states and territories have legislated for the receipt into [page 189] evidence of innumerable official documents which bear the signature of government officials or which are produced from the custody of government officers or which are certified by them.247
E — THEORETICAL QUESTIONS Principal conceptual issues [3110] Outline The principal theoretical questions raised by the practice of taking judicial notice of a fact concern its relationship to the notoriety of the facts noticed, the reception of evidence, the use which the court can make of its private knowledge, the rationale of the practice and its scope.
[3115] Judicial notice and notorious facts Judicial notice is taken of general facts which are notorious, either without inquiry or after inquiry ([3010]–[3040]). It is also taken of facts notorious only to a small part of the community — persons residing in a particular locality ([3065]) or members of a particular profession or trade ([3055]). As the class of persons to whom the facts are notorious becomes smaller and smaller and the facts, by reason of their technical nature, become less and less notorious to the community at large, it becomes difficult to distinguish between facts which are noticed in this way and facts which may be proved in the normal way by the evidence of experts. It must, of course, be borne in mind that only facts of a general nature may be
judicially noticed and not the specific facts which experts are normally called upon to support.248
[3120] Judicial notice and reception of evidence No problem arises with regard to the distinction between receiving evidence and taking judicial notice of a fact when the subject of judicial notice is a matter of common knowledge with regard to which no inquiry is made by the court. In such a case the court is acting on its own knowledge and that is a completely different procedure from the reception of evidence. The processes begin to approximate when the court makes inquiries before deciding to take judicial notice.249 If learned treatises are consulted, it is not easy to say whether evidence is being received under an exception to the rule against hearsay or whether the court is equipping itself to take judicial notice.250 When the certificate of a Minister is sought on the question of the sovereignty of a foreign state, Law Lords have said both that evidence is not being taken and that the best evidence is being received.251 [page 190] Speaking of a case in which it was necessary, for jurisdictional purposes, to show that a document contained an erroneous interpretation of an electrical specification, Lord Denning has said: My Lords, whenever the meaning of words arises, however technical or obscure, then, unless there is some dispute about it, it is common practice for the court to inform itself by any means that is reliable and ready to hand. Counsel usually give any necessary explanation: or reference may be made to a dictionary, which may be a general dictionary or even a technical one. If the subject-matter is too difficult to be resolved by such means, the court can always call in aid an assessor specially qualified to explain it, see section 98 of the Judicature Act, 1925, and this has been done from time to time …The one thing that the court ought not to do is to refuse jurisdiction in a case because it does not understand the technical terms employed in it. Scientists and engineers are entitled to have their rights enforced and their wrongs redressed as well as anyone else: and the court must possess itself of whatever information is necessary for the purpose. Some judges may have it already because of their previous experience. Others may have to acquire it for the first time. But in either case the information they glean is not evidence strictly so called. When an assessor explains the technicalities, he does not do it on oath, nor can he be cross-examined. And no one ever calls the author of a dictionary to give evidence. All that happens is that the court is equipping itself for its task by taking judicial notice of all such things as it ought to know in order to do its work properly.252
Lord Denning illustrated the use of assessors in referring to a case where the assistance of an expert was sought by an appellate court to interpret the marks on an ancient chart, even though the parties had led evidence on the matter at trial,253 and to an Admiralty case where the trial judge sought the aid of an expert navigator as assessor.254 The passage illustrates the difficulties facing a judge called upon to construe a technical document. The judge is presumed to know the English language: evidence of the meaning of an ordinary word is not admissible. Where the author is using the word in a peculiar sense, evidence may be led to show this (see [11010] and [39225]). Where the word is part of a technical glossary the normal practice is for the parties to call expert evidence to explain it.255 Common examples are found in patent cases. Despite Lord Denning’s views, it would be very surprising if a judge made personal inquiries about the meaning of a technical term where this meaning was a matter of dispute. The process of taking judicial notice after inquiry was taken to its furthest extreme, according to Clauson LJ, when, after hearing expert evidence on the habits of camels, a judge concluded that they were mansuetae naturae.256 Clauson LJ said that when hearing the witnesses the judge had not been taking evidence in the ordinary sense. The witnesses were simply assisting the judge in “forming his view as to what the ordinary course of nature in this regard in fact is, a matter of which he is supposed to have complete knowledge”. [page 191]
[3125] Differences between taking judicial notice and receiving evidence It seems that, even where the processes of taking judicial notice and receiving evidence approximate most closely, they remain essentially different. It is for this reason that it is very important for the court and the parties to be aware of which process is being implemented. It is unfortunate that none of the cases discussed in [3120] falls clearly into the category properly reserved for judicial notice. The differences between the processes are very significant:
(1) When the court refreshes its judicial memory, it is it which is taking an active role in the process, unlike its more passive role in receiving evidence. As has been seen ([3035]), it must be careful that the parties are aware of what it is doing and of the results of its researches. (2) It is by no means clear that the normal evidentiary safeguards are available. As Lord Denning observes, the author of the dictionary is not called to give evidence. In this respect it may be that the process is similar to that whereby the expert witness obtains information from established authorities: see [29150]. (3)When the court has refreshed its memory, the fact which it notices is added to the store of judicial knowledge. As an essentially factual matter, the noticed fact is not a precedent binding other courts, but it may be expected that courts will readily accept it as proved.257 (4) Theoretically, once a fact is judicially noticed, no evidence in rebuttal should be admissible. This aspect requires some enlargement. In spite of occasional remarks suggesting that taking judicial notice is merely the equivalent of prima facie proof of a fact, it appears that rebutting evidence is inadmissible.258 These remarks turn on the extreme generality of many facts of which judicial notice may be taken. They may also depend upon the very extreme circumstances in which the doctrine operates. If every ordinary person may be presumed to know a fact, it is hardly likely that a party would wish to lead evidence to the contrary. Judicial notice that the seal or signature on a document is that of a particular court or official merely means that the seal or signature is recognised as similar to that of the court or official, and evidence of forgery in a particular case, though plainly admissible, does not rebut the fact of which judicial notice is taken.259 Similarly, evidence that a particular practice was not followed on a particular occasion would not rebut the existence of the practice of which judicial notice is taken; nor, strictly speaking, would evidence of a change of practice, for judicial notice is simply taken of the current practice at a particular time. There are, of course, many cases of judicial notice in which there can be no question of evidence in rebuttal, as when judicial notice is taken of the facts stated in the certificate of a government department.
[page 192] There is something to be said for a practice under which the court could state that it proposed to take notice of the existence of certain facts within its personal knowledge, subject to anything urged upon it to the contrary,260 but this raises the whole question of the extent to which the court can make use of its personal knowledge.
[3130] Judicial notice and personal knowledge The general rule is that neither judges nor jurors may act on their personal knowledge of facts.261 This rule has reference to particular facts; when taking judicial notice a judge makes use of what is generally known262 and triers of fact are expected to use their knowledge of everyday affairs.263 The distinction is clear enough in most cases and does not appear to have given rise to any difficulty. That the distinction can be a very fine one is illustrated by a prosecution in which the justices applied their special knowledge to the question whether cocoa must necessarily contain a quantity of foreign ingredients. Several of the justices had acquired their knowledge in the Navy, but the Divisional Court did not dispute the propriety of their making use of it. Wills J (an experienced mountaineer) said: … in the nature of things, no one in determining a case of this kind can discard his own particular knowledge of a subject of this kind. I might as well be asked to decide a question as to the sufficiency of an Alpine rope without bringing my personal knowledge into play.264
It was seen at [3065] that the courts have been ready to permit a magistrate sitting in a local court to use personal knowledge of the locality. Triers of fact may not apply scientific instruments to exhibits in private by way of experiment,265 though they may use magnifying glasses, rulers or tape measures.266 Nor may they conduct inquiries on their own account.267 A trial judge is not entitled to reach conclusions calling for expertise,268 for it is an error of law to make a finding of fact which there is no evidence to support, unless the matter is one of which the judge is entitled to take judicial notice or which is of common knowledge.269
[page 193]
[3135] Use by specialist tribunals of their specialist knowledge How far can specialist tribunals use their specialist knowledge? These may be composed of persons with professional or technical expertise (such as professional disciplinary tribunals or arbitrators) or they may comprise lawyers whose long experience in the particular field has given them a considerable expertise in technical fields, for example, workers’ compensation, planning or industrial tribunals. It would be to defeat the evident advantages of such tribunals if the law were to prevent them from using their acquired technical expertise in the resolution of the disputes before them. Where an arbitrator is chosen for his special knowledge, eg where a medical question comes before a medical man, or an engineering question before an engineer, such an arbitrator is not bound to accept evidence, even if uncontradicted, which his experience makes him think incredible. In all such cases the special knowledge of the tribunal can not be separated from it and is part of the equipment of the tribunal.270
A patents judge may be able to say a particular technical fact is within that judge’s knowledge without it having to be proved, or to say that a technical term has a particular meaning, but not that it has no precise meaning.271 A divorce judge has taken judicial notice of the fact that gonorrhea may lie dormant for a very long time “because I have had the same thing in evidence on more than one occasion, and there has really never been any dispute about it”.272 These principles are also based on the need, in the worker’s compensation field, to shorten cases in a beneficial jurisdiction.273 They exemplify, not the taking of judicial notice of a notorious and unquestionable fact, but of the tribunal making use of its own knowledge. But again a distinction is drawn between general expertise which enables the specialist tribunal to understand quickly the evidence before it and to draw appropriate inferences from the evidence, and special knowledge which permits it to assert the existence of a particular fact.274 In the latter case it is not proper for the tribunal to act upon such special knowledge without disclosing it to the parties and affording them the opportunity to rebut it or qualify it by argument or by adducing
[page 194] evidence relating to the existence of that particular fact or by assigning a different significance to it,275 particularly where the special knowledge is contrary to the evidence in the case.276 In any given case the distinction between general knowledge and special knowledge may be obscure, but the principle is clear. Similarly, the specialist tribunal ought not to act on an expert report without informing the parties and granting them an opportunity to deal with it.277 It is not entirely clear how far these principles can be extended to judges sitting in the ordinary courts. Like specialist tribunals, they often hear innumerable cases of a particular type, eg involving personal injuries,278 and like the litigants in specialist tribunals, ordinary litigants have an interest in reducing the waste of time and money which might be occasioned in tendering evidence of matters with which an experienced judge may be very familiar. However, a judge, even one sitting in a specialist Division within the court to deal with a particular class of case, is not entitled to choose between competing expert witnesses by acting as an expert in applying expertise gained from hearing earlier cases, at least beyond using it to understand the question and compare the evidence.279 “Juries have long been accorded the right to use their common knowledge in relation to the employment consequences of injuries.”280 There has certainly on occasion been considerable indulgence to trial courts, permitting them, for example, to act on the basis that a solicitor in private practice or employment “is able to earn a considerable income”,281 to arrive at figures for the costs of maintaining children despite a “singular paucity” of evidence,282 to treat the cost of a prosthesis as inevitable for a double amputee,283 to assume that the earnings of a carpenter in civilian life would be not less than those earned by the plaintiff as a carpenter in the Royal Australian Air Force284 and to proceed on the basis that promotions generally carry increased remuneration, that an amputee labourer is at a disadvantage in the labour market and that the level of wages has increased over the years.285 To some extent these approaches may depend on the following factors: usually what is being assessed is a form of general damages for reduced capacity to earn, the assessment of which is in a sense discretionary and the quantum of which is “commonly
very much ‘at large’”;286 what is being estimated is the worth of a lost chance to earn in future, [page 195] which is an exercise in estimating possibilities;287 where it is clear there has been an actual loss of some sort, the law does not permit difficulties of estimating it to lead to the recovery of only nominal sums;288 and though in modern times the task is performed by judges, it was formerly performed by juries to whom considerable deference was given by appellate courts.289 For these reasons the courts have been prepared to award substantial damages despite having scanty evidentiary materials of an orthodox type. Whether they have eked out those materials by treating themselves as being in a position analogous to specialist tribunals, or by taking judicial notice of supposedly notorious facts, or by acting on types of common knowledge and general experience distinct from that which is judicially noticed — these are not questions they have closely analysed.290 A court is not entitled to reject the evidence before it by reason of its preference for other evidence given in other cases, though it is entitled to use the evidence acquired in cases of the relevant class in order to understand and test the evidence called before it in a particular case.291 The conduct of a judge in an ordinary court who was once a member of a specialist court is to be guided by the principles applicable to ordinary courts.292 Sometimes statutory exceptions to the common law rules are created. Thus the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) s 25(3) provides: Historical evidence and general medical evidence concerning dust exposure and dust diseases which has been admitted in any proceedings before the Tribunal may, with the leave of the Tribunal, be received as evidence in any other proceedings before the Tribunal, whether or not the proceedings are between the same parties.
See also s 25B. However, these provisions, and r 9 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Rules (NSW), impose preconditions. These provisions do not justify reliance by a trial judge on his experience as a “specialist tribunal” in other cases to conclude that silicosis is usually caused by very high levels of silica exposure,293 particularly since the parties were given no notice that that course would be adopted.294
The opinion of a specialised tribunal may be accorded particular deference on appeal. An example is a trade mark registrar.295 [page 196] The weight to be given to the opinion of the tribunal in a particular case will depend upon the circumstances. These will include such matters as the field in which the tribunal operates, the criteria for appointment of its members, the materials upon which it acts in exercising its functions and the extent to which its decisions are supported by disclosed processes of reasoning.296 A court hearing a particular case may rely on conclusions unsupported by evidence if the parties agree that findings in other cases support those conclusions.297
[3140] Disclosure by judge or juror of personal knowledge It may, of course, happen that a member of the jury may have expert knowledge over and above general knowledge which any person can bring to the subject. While this of itself is not a ground for discharging the jury, if a juror does disclose knowledge of special factual information that juror should be warned to decide the case only upon the sworn evidence and not to communicate the special knowledge to the other jurors.298 The old cases299 make it clear that, if such disclosure is to be taken into account, the proper course is for the juror to be sworn and examined by the parties.300 With this should be contrasted the observations which the jury301 or the judge302 may properly make of the demeanour and behaviour of witnesses, parties and others303 in court or in its precincts. This is not a matter of judicial or curial notice but rather of real evidence.304 Permissible observation of demeanour includes the manner in which a witness enters and leaves the box.305 It also includes demeanour giving rise to a conclusion that a witness is withholding evidence.306 Where observations of this kind are made, the proper course is for them to be brought to the attention of the parties and the judge so that the parties may have the opportunity of answering or dealing with them,307 unless
reliance on them could [page 197] not “possibly have made any difference”.308 The judge’s obligation to make timeous disclosure arises only where the observations are not observable by counsel and where use is made of those observations in a way which has significant influence on the decision in the case.309 A court which acts on its own understanding of a foreign language in which a document is written without informing the parties contravenes natural justice.310 Where a juror informed the judge that, of his personal knowledge, an explanation unforeseeably advanced by the accused was factually untrue because a building the latter claimed to have entered would have been closed, the judge followed the appropriate course of permitting the prosecution to call evidence rebutting that of the accused.311
[3145] Rationale There are at least two reasons why a doctrine of judicial notice should exist. In the first place, it expedites the hearing of many cases. Much time would be wasted if every fact which was not admitted had to be the subject of evidence which would, in many instances, be costly and difficult to obtain. Secondly, the doctrine tends to produce uniformity of decision on matters of fact where a diversity of findings might sometimes be distinctly embarrassing. Thus, it has been said that the basic essential is that the fact judicially noticed should be of a class that is so generally known as to give rise to the presumption that all persons are aware of it.312 Indeed the general nature of the facts noticed is often such as to render difficult, or even impossible, the normal process of proving or disproving them by legally admissible evidence.313
[3150] Tacit application A great deal is taken for granted when any question of relevance is considered or assumed. For example, evidence is frequently given that
persons accused of burglary were found in possession of jemmies or skeleton keys,314 and that the accused became confused or gave untrue answers when charged. These facts are only relevant provided there is a common practice to use such things in the commission of the crime, or provided that guilty people tend more than innocent ones to become confused or prevaricate when charged;315 but no one ever thinks of calling evidence on such a subject. Sometimes this practice is treated as a tacit application of the doctrine of judicial notice. Sometimes it is analysed as a recourse to general experience independently of that doctrine in a manner discussed in [page 198] [3200]–[3300]. Either way, critics sometimes contend that the courts have permitted themselves to decide cases on unproved assumptions which might today not be accepted as being appropriate.316
[3155] Some differences between adjudicative and legislative facts The traditional reluctance of judges to take judicial notice of all but the plainest commonplaces is doubtless due to a laudable concern that the parties in whose hands the trial lies should know exactly what material the court will be acting upon. Where one of the parties is urging the court to take notice of a given fact the process is not likely to cause difficulty. But in other cases, this concern will best be satisfied where a tribunal makes it clear that it proposes to act upon a fact which is not formally proved and, whether or not the fact is the result of refreshment of the judicial mind, an opportunity is offered to the parties to present argument or to lead evidence in rebuttal.317 Failure to do this has not always been disapproved,318 but is becoming dangerous. Where a submission that there was no case to answer was made, and the party making it was compelled not to call evidence, it was held to be impermissible for the other party to extend an invitation to the court to take judicial notice of particular matters, there having been no prior indication that this would be done.319
It is desirable to note some differences between the first category of facts described in the last paragraph of [3005] — facts in issue and facts relevant to facts in issue – and the second to fifth categories discussed [3156]–[3159]. The first is that once a trial court has found a fact in issue, or a fact relevant to a fact in issue, there are constraints on appellate courts substituting different findings, depending on whether the relevant finding was credit-based, for example. This is not likely to be so in categories two to five. There appellate courts have a freer, and perhaps an entirely free, hand. The second distinction relates to the reception of evidence in higher courts. The rules against the tender of fresh evidence of adjudicative facts on appeal applies also to judicially noticed facts. There appear to be no such inhibitions in category two.320 Thirdly, facts in issue cannot be proved on appeal against a decision on a case stated by an arbitrator.321 That is not true of constitutional facts.322 [page 199] A further distinction between the first category and the others lies in the extent to which the court may or must take the initiative. In category one the court takes no initiative: it is for the parties to plead and prove whatever the facts they contend for. But in categories two to five the court’s role must be more active: the task involves the application of the Constitution, or the construction of a statute, or the construction of the Constitution, or the development of a common law rule. The court’s task is not limited to resolving whatever controversy the parties choose to present. Its role is not to choose between two imperfect positions. It must select the correct legal position and it must make whatever findings of fact the legal position depends on correctly.323
F — LEGISLATIVE FACTS Constitutional facts
[3156] Constitutional validity of enactments and executive conduct Questions about whether an enactment applying to conduct, or under which an executive act is done, are valid, or whether an executive act is sufficiently connected to a constitutionally valid grant by legislation of power to do it can rest on a question of fact. For example, are the facts such as to attract the defence power? But questions of these kinds are not necessarily facts in issue of the kind discussed so far: they are not necessarily related to the circumstances out of which the controversy between the parties arose. They are sometimes called “constitutional facts”. Dixon CJ put the distinction between facts in issue and constitutional facts thus:324 It is the distinction between, on the one hand, ordinary questions of fact which arise between the parties because one asserts and the other denies that events have occurred bringing one of them within some criterion of liability or excuse set up by the law and, on the other hand, matters of fact upon which … the constitutional validity of some general law may depend.
He said that the latter matters do not form issues between the parties to be tried like the former questions. “They simply involve information which the court should have” in order to decide on the constitutional validity of a statute or of an executive act under a statute. He said that “[h]ighly inconvenient as it may be”, constitutional [page 200] facts “must be ascertained by the court as best it can.”325 Sometimes the high inconvenience can be sidestepped. The legislation itself on its face may disclose sufficient incontrovertible factual material to establish the necessary constitutional facts. The parties may rely on a case stated, or on some other document agreeing on all relevant facts.326 The defendant may demur to the plaintiff’s statement of claim, and the validity of the demurrer may then be decided as a preliminary question on the assumption that the facts alleged by the plaintiff are correct. The defendant may admit all or some of the allegations in the Statement of Claim. A party may make other admissions, formal or informal. But sometimes these procedures are not or cannot be used, or matters of fact
later arise which are outside them. The High Court of Australia, for example, adopts a less restrictive approach for constitutional facts than for facts in issue. Thus Brennan J said, speaking about the construction of a non-constitutional statute but extending his remarks to constitutional facts:327 There is a distinction between a judicial finding of a fact in issue between parties upon which a law operates to establish or deny a right or liability and a judicial determination of the validity or scope of a law when its validity or scope turns on a matter of fact. When a court, in ascertaining the validity or scope of a law, considers matters of fact, it is not bound to reach its decision in the same way as it does when it tries an issue of fact between the parties. The validity and scope of a law cannot be made to depend upon the course of private litigation. The legislative will is not surrendered into the hands of litigants.
Why is this so? The courts do not strike down legislation of their own motion, without one party taking the initiative. Statutes and subordinate legislation are presumed to be valid.328 But “to the extent that validity depends on some matter of fact, there is no onus on a challenging party which, being undischarged, will necessarily result in a declaration of validity.”329 Why is the task of factual proof not left in the hands of the party alleging invalidity? Why, if the party which alleges invalidity fails to prove the facts on which invalidity depends, does the court not simply treat the statute as valid and reserve the question of its potential invalidity to a battle to be conducted at another time, in a different field and by a better-prepared litigant? While, apart from that not insignificant fraction of litigation which is conducted in abuse of process, most private litigation is of great importance to the parties, constitutional litigation has a different kind of importance, and to a much wider range of persons. Why is it that conventional private litigation is regulated by the strictness of the conventional rules of evidence, while in constitutional litigation fact finding is subject to a much more liberal regime? One answer advanced in Canada proceeds in three steps. First, “the proper role of the court is to allow considerable leeway to the legislature to make the findings of fact upon which its constitutional power depends.” Secondly: [page 201] While a court must reach a definite conclusion on the adjudicative facts which are relevant to the
disposition of litigation, the court need not be so definite in respect of legislative facts in constitutional cases. The most that the court can ask in respect of legislative facts is whether there is a rational basis for the legislative judgment that the facts exist.
Thirdly, it is said that if: There is significant support among the professionals for the legislative facts which would justify the legislation, then it is plain that the legislators had a rational basis for [their] action [in enacting the impugned legislation, and it must be held valid].330
Whether or not parts of United States or Canadian constitutional law permit the reasoning outlined above, Australian constitutional law does not. The trouble with this reasoning is that it confuses two questions. One is whether courts should invalidate legislation merely because they strongly deny the wisdom of enacting it, or consider that some other method of achieving the goal desired could more appropriately have been employed: the answer is negative, for the court cannot override a legislature acting within power. The other is whether legislation is within power merely because there is significant support for the view that the relevant constitutional fact exists, as opposed to the court experiencing an actual persuasion that the fact exists. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution gives to the Commonwealth Parliament power to legislate with respect to, for example, lighthouses, aliens and corporations, not with respect to things which there is significant support for thinking are lighthouses, aliens and corporations, although they are not in fact so. Brennan J explained the looser approach to constitutional facts thus: “validity is a question of law and questions of law do not depend upon a party’s discharge of an onus of proof of facts.”331 But that is not generally true: for many important and interesting questions of law are posed in ordinary litigation, contingently upon proof of a particular factual state of affairs, and yet the courts do not embark upon the legal question if the necessary factual basis is not laid. A better explanation is that sometimes not dealing with a constitutional question will create worse evils than dealing with it even though the factual foundation laid by the parties may be feeble. For a court to convict and punish an accused person for breach of a statutory provision alleged to be constitutionally invalid without deciding that allegation is a repugnant outcome. It is more repugnant than an inquiry into validity based on a factual examination conducted by the court without effective assistance from the parties and unconstrained by the rules applying to facts in issue.332 This will not, however, explain every application of the doctrine,
for often no question of criminal punishment is involved. The other explanation commonly given is that the court has an overriding duty to enforce the Constitution for all citizens and all other persons within the Queen’s peace which it must fulfil even if the limited class of citizens or other persons who comprise the parties before it will not adequately assist it to do so. From the earliest times the High Court has seen itself as having, in general, a duty to determine the [page 202] validity, one way or the other, of legislation alleged to be unconstitutional.333 Putting on one side the political consequences of a legislature embarking on the enactment of unconstitutional legislation, there is no body other than the judiciary capable of preventing the adverse results of this course by using appropriate legal mechanisms (for example, s 75 of the Constitution). These are factors seen as outweighing the difficulty of finding the facts relevant to validity. Since final constitutional courts have ultimate responsibility for the enforcement of the Constitution, they have ultimate responsibility for the resolution of challenges to the constitutional validity of the legislation, one way or the other, and cannot allow validity of the challenged statutes to remain in limbo. And they have the ultimate responsibility for the determination of issues about constitutional facts which are crucial to validity. This approach has also been said to justify the view that noncompliance with either statutory or common law rules of evidence cannot prevent the court from full inquiry into the existence or non-existence of constitutional facts.334 A simpler justification for that view is that questions in relation to constitutional facts “cannot and do not form issues between the parties to be tried like” ordinary facts in issue.335 That is, for centuries common law and statutory rules have grown up to regulate the proof of facts in issue; there are no equivalent rules for constitutional facts and it is wrong to import them from their proper sphere into a quite different one, to operate there exhaustively. Finally, the court feels obliged to make inquiries of its own into constitutional facts because they depend on: information of a kind that we have come to think almost indispensable to a satisfactory solution
of many of the constitutional problems brought to this Court for decision; though we are bound to say that it is not an opinion commanding much respect among the parties to issues of constitutional validity, not even those interested to support legislation, who, strange as it seems to us, usually prefer to submit such an issue in the abstract without providing any background of information in aid of the presumption of validity and to confine their cases to dialectical arguments and considerations appearing on the face of the legislation.336
But whatever the explanation it seems clear that the courts are not obliged to reject constitutional challenges the makers of which have failed to establish a proper factual foundation: the courts may seek to build a better one for themselves.337 It is probably the case that they are not obliged to, at least where the relief claimed seeks to interrupt proceedings in a lower court before there has been time to investigate the facts,338 or time is short and the remedy is discretionary.339 But they often do. [page 203] Thus Brennan J was correct to say,340 in relation to constitutional facts, that the “validity and scope of a law cannot be made to depend on the course of private litigation.” Similarly Williams J said: “[I]t is the duty of the Court in every constitutional case to be satisfied of every fact, the existence of which is necessary in law to provide a constitutional basis for the [challenged] legislation.”341 And Frankfurter J said that when “constitutional issues turn on facts, it is a strange procedure indeed not to permit the facts to be established.”342 In short, the approach of the courts to constitutional facts is wider than its approach to facts in issue because of a principle of necessity: adoption of that approach is necessary if the court is to fulfil its duty to conduct judicial review of the constitutional validity of legislation. That consideration explains not only the court’s involvement in constitutional fact finding of its own motion; it also accounts for the width of the principles pursuant to which it finds constitutional facts. Constitutional facts “are not readily established by objective methods in curial proceedings”.343 What, then, may the court have regard to? There has been a progressive movement in this respect. In 1944, Dixon J said:344 the existence of [the] state of fact may be proved or disproved by evidence like any other matter of fact. But ordinarily the court does not go beyond matters of which it may take judicial notice. This means that for its facts the court must depend upon matters of general public knowledge. It may be that in this respect the field open to the court is wider than has been commonly
supposed.
That hinted at a wider and different kind of judicial notice than applies in category one. A slightly more liberal approach was stated in 1951 by Williams J:345 … the Court should [not] be confined to notorious public facts of which it can take judicial notice. All the facts which are relevant to the decision of the constitutional issue must be admissible in evidence and the fact that the Court can take judicial notice of some facts merely expedites the manner of their proof. The facts which are not capable of proof in this way must be proved in such other ways as the laws of evidence allow.
This restrictive proposition that the ordinary rules of evidence apply to the proof of constitutional facts has other support.346 However, since then that proposition has become questionable and the following propositions are more widely accepted. First, the court may take judicial notice on conventional principles.347 [T]he “facts” will in many cases be of such a general character as to be difficult or impossible to prove or disprove by legally admissible evidence, while quite capable of
[page 204] being judicially noticed. It is indeed a characteristic of a large class of matters which are judicially noticed that they are of this general character.348
Dixon J spoke of “matters of general public knowledge.”349 Examples of matters of fact relevant to the existence of constitutional facts being judicially noticed without inquiry are Dixon J’s references350 to the following “notorious international events”: [t]he communist seizure of Czecho-Slovakia, the Brussels Pact of Western Union, the blockade of Berlin and the airlift, the Atlantic Pact, the passing of China into communist control, the events in reference to the problem of Formosa, the entry of the North Korean forces into South Korea and the consequent course of action adopted by the United Nations, and the sustained diplomatic conflict between communist powers and the Anglo-American countries and other western powers at meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly …
Examples of judicial notice after taking inquiry can be found in Dixon J’s summary of the “accepted tenets or doctrines of communism … ascertained … from serious studies”:351 … a political theory based upon the supposed irreconcilable antagonisms inherent in a capitalistic system, the inevitability of its decomposition, the necessity of a period of revolutionary transformation from a capitalist to a communist society, the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat during a longer or shorter period
of further evolution, the progressive extension of the revolutionary process over the earth and the need to assist and expedite its spread not merely that its supposed benefits may be more widely enjoyed but for the protection of existing systems of communism from counter action and the revolutionary process of development from delay and temporary defeat …
Other examples are facts about laws prohibiting the sale of certain substances derived from Chambers’ Encyclopaedia, the Encyclopaedia Britannica and past legislation.352 Among the facts “which are known to intelligent persons generally” of which judicial notice has been taken because to accept the contrary “would be incontinently rejected by anyone possessing the most rudimentary acquaintance with affairs”353 is the fact that to levy annual taxes on Canadian banks at 6¼ per cent of paid up capital and 12½ per cent on reserves and undivided profits would be prohibitive and would drive them out of business.354 However, many constitutional facts (and facts falling within at least categories four and five) are incapable of being judicially noticed by recourse either to [page 205] common law principles or to the statutory principles (eg Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 144) applying to adjudicative facts because they are controversial rather than beyond dispute.355 Secondly, the court may take into account whatever the parties tender356 whether it be a document,357 or testimony in the form of oral evidence358 or affidavit evidence359 or draw to its attention.360 Thirdly, the court may rely on what the parties say at the bar table, particularly if they agree, and even if they do not.361 Fourthly, it may seek to draw inferences from the challenged legislation.362 Fifthly, the court may invite the parties to provide better materials than they have,363 or require them to do so.364 Sixthly, “official” sources,365 or sources which are “public or authoritative”,366 may be used. Finally, all relevant material may be brought to the court’s attention, independently of any rules as to admissibility in relation to facts in issue. Thus in 1952 McTiernan J said assistance could be obtained from
judicial “notice, or facts proved … or … any rational considerations.”367 In 1959, Dixon CJ said that constitutional facts must be ascertained by the court “as best it can”.368 In 1975, Jacob J said that the court “reaches the necessary conclusions of fact largely on the basis of its knowledge of the society of which it is a part”, said that the court supplements that knowledge by “a process which does not readily lend itself to the normal procedures for the reception of evidence”, said that the parties need not be confined to the pleadings or the agreed facts, and said that “[a]ll material relevant (in a general, not a technical sense) to the matter under consideration may be brought to the court’s attention”.369 In 1985, Brennan J said370 that the court could invite and receive assistance from the parties “but it is free also to inform itself from other sources”, for “it is difficult and undesirable to impose an a priori restraint on the performance of [the] duty” of the court to ascertain the facts as best [page 206] it can”. In 1994, Mason CJ, after saying that it was not enough simply to assert the necessary facts, said they must “either be agreed or proved or be such that the Court is prepared to take account of them by judicial notice or otherwise”, and referred to the report of a legislative committee.371 As noted above, one explanation for this position rests on the presumed incapacity of statutory and common law rules of evidence to bind the High Court as it seeks to carry out its paramount duty of enforcing the Constitution and resolving decisively challenges to the constitutional validity of particular statutes.372 In short, subject “to the requirements of procedural fairness inherent in the judicial process, the ultimate criterion governing the use of information from any source is that a court is able to consider the material sufficiently probative of the legislative fact to be found.”373 In Canada, too, it has been said in the Supreme Court of constitutional facts that “no general principle of admissibility can or ought to be propounded by this Court”, and that “the questions of resort to extrinsic evidence and what kind of extrinsic evidence may be admitted must depend on the constitutional issues on which it is sought to adduce such evidence.”374
However, since the rules of evidence do not restrict the materials which the courts can consider, “it is obviously desirable that [they] should be previously exchanged between the parties.”375 Underlying the process is perhaps the theory that “the nature and importance of constitutional facts” is such that even if they are not “utterly indisputable”, they may “be regarded as presumptively correct unless the other party, through an assured fair process, takes the opportunity to demonstrate that [they] are incorrect, partial or misused.”376 This is as close as the court has come to the acceptance of “Brandeis briefs”. These go beyond the taking of judicial notice by recourse to accepted works of reference. They can include highly controversial assertions — even “propaganda”.377 If reliance on controversial assertions is to be permitted, it is clear at least that the party against which they are to be used must have an opportunity properly to consider them before argument has closed. It would be astonishing if there were not a duty on the court to advise the parties of any material not tendered or referred to in open court upon which it proposes to rely. It is scarcely satisfactory for a party to learn of some supposed fact by reason of which that party lost the litigation only on reading the court’s reasons for judgment, without having any opportunity to dispute the accuracy of the fact or the trustworthiness of the sources from which it was taken. Callinan J has said that he did not take Brennan J’s remarks378 quoted above:379 to be a warrant for the reception and use of material that has not been properly introduced, received, and made the subject of submission by the parties. What his Honour
[page 207] said cannot mean that the interests of the litigants before the court can be put aside. They retain their right to an adjudication according to law even if other, considerably higher or wider, interests may ultimately be affected.
This is entirely correct, save that if the words “introduced” and “received” call for compliance with the rules of evidence applying to facts in issue, they are out of line with other authority. It follows from the above principles that, whether or not a fact of which a court proposes to take judicial notice in conventional litigation can be the subject of contrary evidence,380 in constitutional litigation the
circumstances that the court proposes to take judicial notice of a fact does not deprive a party of the right to present evidence on the point.381 It is not clear whether this freedom from the restrictive effects of the rules of evidence applies only in ultimate constitutional courts, or also applies in courts to which determination of factual issues have been remitted by ultimate constitutional courts. In principle the latter approach is the sounder. Among the constitutional facts taken into account have been: “the conditions in India” in 1947;382 the expansion of industry after 1945 causing a manpower shortage;383 the existence of the depression in 1932;384 the abundance of a particular wheat harvest;385 the existence of substantial trade in eggs between Victoria and adjacent States;386 the tendency to evade customs laws by dumping;387 “the course of open and notorious international events of a public nature”388 such as the 1965 rebellion in Southern Rhodesia;389 the denaturing of alcohol;390 the history of regulating the issue of shares and debentures in the United States in World War 1;391 the ineffectiveness of wheat price stabilisation measures in stabilising the incomes of growers;392 the operation of an industry;393 the fact that in the Second World War Australia had large armed forces which made a heavy demand on the medical services of qualified persons and caused a deficiency of services available for civilians;394 the fact that one of the most serious consequences of the Second World War was an acute shortage of food in many parts of the world, and the fact that wheat is the most important ingredient in bread.395 Another is the [page 208] fact that in the Second World War numerous fugitives from the advance of Japanese forces entered Australia and were harboured as refugees.396 Unlike the position in relation to facts in issue, once a constitutional fact is found in one case, lower courts are not able to re-examine it in later cases.397 The High Court itself is at liberty to re-examine the earlier decision if the facts have changed.398 The issue does not readily arise with historical facts, which often are, as it were, “permanent”. It arises more with facts relating to contemporary conditions: as those conditions change,
the existence of a constitutional fact on which the validity of legislation depends may wane, or later wax. The analogous difficulty for historical facts is: what if an historical fact is a constitutional fact, and it is found to exist, but later it is contended that it was erroneously found to exist? The answer is that courts below the High Court must accept the fact as found; the High Court can correct the error if it sees fit. A related difficulty may exist in the fifth category ([3159]) with the development of the common law doctrine of native title, which was enunciated on the basis of conclusions about historical facts which, critics have said, are wrong. There is, however, no prospect of the High Court, let alone lower courts, abandoning that doctrine, even if it was based on an erroneous historical understanding, if only because it is now supported by and intertwined with statutes which are highly unlikely to be repealed. It is clear that despite what has been said above, in certain areas the High Court has deferred to factual judgments made by the legislature. This is so in fields where the legislature, being controlled by an executive which is much better informed than the court, is likely to be aware of matters not readily discloseable in court. Examples include the defence power399 and the external affairs power.400 It has been suggested that the High Court should exercise “considerable caution” before finding a constitutional fact, on the ground that the “determination of a constitutional fact has the effect that the relevant fact becomes law, and constitutional law at that.”401 The ground given is unconvincing. The constitutional fact does not become law: it only supports a conclusion of constitutional law, namely that a particular statute is or is not constitutionally valid. The conclusion, however, is correct, for the simple reason that it is a serious thing to declare invalid a statute on constitutional grounds, and a serious thing to validate it if there are real doubts about its validity. A tribunal not exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth cannot be given power to determine a constitutional fact conclusively. 402 [page 209] Similar principles apply to factual conclusions relevant to the characterisation of a State enactment which is impugned as inconsistent
with federal legislation unless it is a “special measure”. 403
Construction of non-constitutional statutes [3157] Legislative facts as part of statutory context Subject to minor modifications, the following words of O’Connor J in 1904 remain a sound account of how statutes should be construed.404 I do not think it can be too strongly stated that our duty in interpreting a Statute is to declare and administer the law according to the intention expressed in the Statute itself …The intention of the enactment is to be gathered from its words. If the words are plain, effect must be given to them; if they are doubtful, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the other provisions of the Statute aided by a consideration of surrounding circumstances. In all cases in order to discover the intention you may have recourse to contemporaneous circumstances—to the history of the law … In considering the history of the law … you must have regard to the historical facts surrounding the bringing the law into existence …You may deduce the intention of the legislature from a consideration of the instrument itself in the light of these facts and circumstances, but you cannot go beyond it.
Thus until the materials which courts could look at in construing legislation were widened recently, in England by the House of Lords and elsewhere by legislation, the materials which the courts took into account in construing statutes comprised the words used, understood in the light of their meanings at the time of enactment and their context (that is, the subject-matter, the mischief dealt with, and the existing state of the law). Other approaches have been advocated, but without general acceptance. In particular, even now, the subjective intentions of legislators are by themselves irrelevant. Even less relevant is the question whether the legislature or the drafter would have been likely to want a provision to be applied in a particular way if the events which have occurred, which were unforeseeable at the time of enactment, had in fact been foreseen.405 A statute, then, is not to be construed in a vacuum. Its historical context can be important, including the common law and statutory background, and what Taney CJ called “the public history of the times in which it was passed.”406 It has also been said that “‘currently held concepts and the intellectual stock of the present’ will ordinarily be more relevant in interpreting a statutory provision than ‘historical investigation of the old forms of action and pleading niceties dependent upon them’.”407 Modern legislation relating to statutory interpretation has directed judges in certain circumstances to have regard to extrinsic material in order to determine the meaning of the statute408 and the intention of
parliament.409 Where this material includes the proceedings before the House difficult questions arise as to the precise [page 210] evidentiary value of this information. If the inquiry is directed to the intention of the Minister introducing the Bill (if that is relevant), the deliberations of the committee upon whose recommendation it was drafted or amendments which were made during debate, little difficulty will be presented. If, however, the information is of a state of facts which is asserted to exist, there is no reason to treat statements in Parliament differently from any other hearsay material. However, the courts appear to place no specific restriction on the facts which may be taken into account or the methods by which they are ascertained. Subject to questions of relevance, such as those affecting the use of legislative debates, the position that applies to statutes is, according to McHugh J,410 the same as that which Brennan J said applied to constitutional facts: the “validity and scope of a law cannot be made to depend on the course of private litigation”.411 One example is Windeyer J’s conclusion that legislation permitting officers to resign in writing on three months’ notice did not mean that the commission was terminated without the Governor-General’s assent. Windeyer J took into account the common law as expounded in some decisions of Lord Mansfield CJ, the facts of which were amplified by recourse to the Cambridge History of British India, a controversy in 1804 on the capacity of volunteers to resign, 19th century military literature, the Queen’s Regulations of 1844, evidence given to a 19th century Royal Commission on the system of selling and buying commissions, and 19th century works on military law.412 The historical background to the Imperial legislation defining the border between New South Wales and Victoria has been examined in construing it.413 The history of the meaning of the terms “pawn” and “pledge”, and of legislation relating to those transactions, was considered in construing modern legislation on the subject.414 So was the history of the accused’s right to testify in construing modern legislation.415 So was the changing nature of trade.416 Since the Family Court of Australia’s jurisdiction is closely regulated by statutes,
albeit statutes conferring wide discretions, it is appropriate to list within this category its reliance on disciplines other than law to assist in determining what is and is not beneficial to children.417 The history of English constitutional development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and of gold mining has been taken into account in assessing the mischief to which seventeenth century legislation was directed.418 So has the fact that in 1977 the business of each State bank was not confined to its own State, and the Australian banking system was highly integrated.419 Affidavit evidence of the very difficult conditions medical practitioners must work under in treating the victims of motor vehicle accidents was taken into account in determining whether a statute permitted persons whose blood alcohol was tested to [page 211] consult a lawyer.420 The difficulty jurors may have in understanding DNA evidence, and in particular in understanding the significance of “exclusion percentages”, as revealed by expert psychological literature, was not taken into account in construing ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) on the ground that the complex and controversial character of the issue made it inappropriate to do so without expert testimony.421
Construction of constitutional statutes [3158] Legislative facts as part of constitutional context Approaches to the construction of the Constitution range from various forms of “originalism” to various forms of “organic” interpretation. Whatever approach is taken, it is clear that, as McHugh J said,422 in the case of a Constitution as much as a statute or a common law rule, the words of Brennan J in relation to constitutional facts apply: the “validity and scope of the law cannot be made to depend on the course of private litigation.”423 There are thus no rules restricting the historical materials to
be examined except for the restrictions mandated by the particular theory of constitutional interpretation adopted, and the refusal of the High Court to use the Convention debates to ascertain the intentions of the framers, as distinct from the contemporary meaning of the language used, the mischief to which it was directed, and the nature and objectives of the federation movement.424 There are many theoretical statements justifying recourse to historical materials.425 In 1910 Isaacs J said that in interpreting a statute, the court could consider “the time when, and the circumstances under which” it was enacted.426 In 1913 Isaacs and Rich JJ said that the question whether a statute exceeded the limits of s 51(xxxv) depended “upon how the expression ‘industrial dispute’ was generally understood in 1900, when the Constitution Act was passed.”427 In 1920 the High Court said that the Constitution should be “read … naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law which preceded it …”.428 In 1975 Barwick CJ said:429 “In case of ambiguity or lack of certainty, resort may be had to the history of the colonies” and Gibbs J said:430 “In construing the Constitution … regard may be had to the state of things existing when [the Constitution] was passed and therefore to historical facts.” In 1978431 Aickin J said that even though the [page 212] Convention Debates could not be referred to, resort could be had to “historical facts as providing background against which to view the Constitution.”432 Among the facts taken into account in construing the Constitution have been: the emergence of responsible government in the Australian colonies in the 19th century and of dominion status thereafter;433 the history of excises;434 the surrender to the Commonwealth by South Australia of what became the Northern Territory and by New South Wales of what became the Australian Capital Territory;435 and the brevity with which particular items in an Appropriation Act are described.436 On the question of whether there is an implied term in the Constitution conferring a freedom of political expression, “books, academic papers, a Senate
Committee Report, and other materials” were referred to437 “to show the realities of the modern publishing, entertainment and media industries.”438 The history of military justice in Britain up to the time of federation was considered in construing s 51(vi) in its interaction with Ch III of the Constitution.439 In order to ascertain the contemporary meaning of “immigration” in s 51(xxvii), in 1923 Isaacs J referred to texts, resolutions passed by interColonial Conferences, communications between the Australian Colonies and London, a United Kingdom Command paper, Colonial, New Zealand and Canadian legislation, Parliamentary Votes and Proceedings and Parliamentary Papers in order to conclude that a visitor to Australia could be an immigrant, and that legislation about such visitors was within the immigration power.440 To ascertain the meaning of “adult person” in s 41 of the Constitution recourse was had in 1972 to Colonial and State electoral laws in the period 1885–1908.441 Since the meaning of the Constitution depends on its meaning in 1900, as Barwick CJ said, regard could be had “to the historical setting in which the Constitution was created … In case of ambiguity or lack of certainty, resort can be had to the history of the Colonies, particularly in the period of and immediately preceding the development of the terms of the Constitution.”442 Hence “regard may be had to the state of things existing when the [Constitution] was passed, and therefore to historical facts and to earlier legislation.”443 Colonial electoral laws in the decade before 1900 were examined to show that s 24 para 1 of the Constitution prohibits unequal electorates.444 The history appealed to can relate to matters of general history. Section 116 of the Constitution prohibits any Commonwealth law “for establishing any religion”. [page 213] In construing these words, reference has been made, without reference to evidence, to the fact that citizens of the Australian colonies at the end of the 19th century were: acutely familiar with the relationship between church and state in England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland. They were aware that the Church of England, the Church of Scotland and the Church of Ireland respectively were referred to as “the Established Church”. And they had
followed the move to disestablish the Church of England, a move which had generated great political controversy in the first half of the century. To them the issue of establishment was by no means remote. It was a burning question because a large proportion of the Australian population in the second half of the nineteenth century consisted of Non-conformists and Roman Catholics who had suffered from religious discrimination in their homelands and were devoutly opposed to its resurgence in the colonies, which were, after all, British colonies where the Church of England had the largest following.445
Apart from reliance by Stephen J on Dibdin’s Establishment in England in relation to English history,446 Murphy J, alone, referred to historical works. One was R Ely’s Unto God and Caesar: Religious Issues in the Emerging Commonwealth 1891–1906.447 The other was W E Gladstone’s The State in its Relations with the Church.448 Generally it is thought that if the meaning of a constitutional provision is plain, there is no occasion to resort to history, but Murphy J said that even where the words were unambiguous “very exceptional circumstances” might justify resort to history.449 It has, of course, not been found hard for courts to detect ambiguity in constitutional provisions. The sources in which history is found are often official documents. Thus history as found in the United Kingdom Royal Commission on Labour of 1894 cast light on the meaning of “industrial dispute” in s 51(xxxv).450 The historical difficulties one colony had in enforcing its process extraterritorially led to the conclusion that legislation under s 51(xxiv), giving power to legislate about service and execution of process, could authorise one State’s officers to assist in the execution of a second State’s process.451 History, in the form of recourse to colonial statutes before 1900, was also used to construe s 51(xxiv) as two grounds, one associated with curial or non-curial process, the other with the courts.452 Historical surveys have extended beyond the colonies, their relations with London, and the legislation of other Dominions to “the scene in the South West Pacific at the time of … federation”: that survey suggested that “representation” in s 122 meant “full representation”, because Fiji, a colony already possessing representative government, would never have contemplated association with the Commonwealth as a Territory except on those terms.453 [page 214]
A common source of the history relied on is the history as recorded in Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth.454 Quick and Garran is an example of a doubly appropriate type of historical reference — not only is it history near the time of federation, it is what a founding father (Quick) and an able contemporary lawyer (Garran), both of whom knew and talked at length with other founding fathers, saw as the relevant history. Further, Quick and Garran is an overflowing storehouse of examples of linguistic usage in 1900. Reference is also made on occasion to another contemporary of federation, W Harrison Moore (The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia)455 and, less commonly, to one of the framers, Andrew Inglis Clark (Studies in Australian Constitutional Law).456 The meaning of the expression “external affairs” has been explored by reference to the linguistic usages of non-Australians, namely British statesmen exceptionally knowledgeable about colonial affairs — Sir Charles Dilke in 1887 and Joseph Chamberlain in 1902.457 Dixon J elucidated the meaning of “excise” in s 90 of the Constitution, giving the Commonwealth exclusive power to impose duties of excise, by reference to numerous works on English history.458 Recourse has been had to contemporary dictionaries.459 Sometimes particular aspects of the path to federation have been relied on. The negotiations in London in 1900 on s 74 of the Constitution relating to Privy Council appeals have been so used.460 The Court has often reminded itself that the Constitution was written against the background of the existing common law, existing international conventions461 and existing colonial and imperial statutes. Thus the meaning of s 44(v) was elucidated by recourse to its imperial precursors in 1696 and 1782.462 The meanings of the expressions “fisheries” and “Australian waters” in s 51(x) were ascertained by examining prefederation Imperial Acts, Acts of the Federal Council of Australasia from 1885 and the Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 (Imp) itself, which established an inter-colonial legislature.463 A statute requiring books of account to be kept for a period preceding bankruptcy was held to fall within the grant by s 51(xvii) to enact legislation respecting bankruptcy because pre-federation colonial statutes had contained such a requirement.464 A statute permitting legitimation by subsequent marriage was held to fall within the power to legislate in relation to marriage (s
51(xxi)) by recourse to Roman, civil and canon law treatises and the [page 215] medieval history of the doctrine in ecclesiastical courts.465 Colonial legislation and United Kingdom statutes were relied on to show that the “arbitration” power in s 51(xxxv) extends to compulsory arbitration,466 to interpret the expression “one subject of taxation” in s 55, para 2467 and to interpret the expression “duties of excise” in s 90.468 The expression “court of a State” in s 77(iii) has been construed by reference to the “long history” of courts before 1900 and “the tradition of the common law” which distinguished the judges from court officials such as registrars.469 The question whether federal jurisdiction can be vested in a State court constituted by an acting judge was resolved, in part, by recourse to the historical fact that there were many instances of acting judges in the Supreme Courts of the colonies before 1900, including two of the framers (Barton J and O’Connor J).470 The construction of s 78 relating to claims by the subject against the Crown was determined in part by reference to “the tradition already established by 1900 in the Australian colonies” by means of legislation providing for claims against the Crown in the period 1857–1876.471 Windeyer J, after examining legislation of 1597 and 1713 relating to the re-establishment of soldiers as civilians and the opinions of Woodward, The Age of Reform, on the post-1815 position, and after saying that the power of the Commonwealth to make laws under the defence power had to be considered against established common law principles about the status of the armed forces in the community, and the status of disbanded soldiers and paid-off seamen as civilians without privileges or immunities not shared by other subjects, held that while the defence power supported legislation re-establishing ex-soldiers as civilians, it did not support legislation creating them as a privileged class among other civilians. 472 The Court has taken into account the history of the following general principles of constitutional law: responsible government in Britain;473 the separation of powers in Britain;474 and trial by jury in England.475 Where provisions of the Australian Constitution are in similar terms to those of the United States Constitution, they have been given the same
construction on the correct assumption that some of the framers of the Australian Constitution were [page 216] familiar with the United States Constitution.476 The general law of the United States as it existed in 1900 has also been employed. Section 114 forbids a State from taxing Commonwealth property; O’Connor J reasoned that this must include State instrumentalities such as municipal corporations because, it seems, the founding fathers (of whom he was one) must be taken to have known the existing United States case law.477 In 1900 the words “trial … should be by jury” in Art III of the United States Constitution required unanimous verdicts; s 80 of the Australian Constitution has for that reason been given the same meaning.478 The same approach has been adopted in a negative way: if the United States counterpart to an Australian provision had no accepted interpretation in 1900, the courts treated themselves as being freer in their approach to the Australian provision.479 And where an Australian provision did not correspond with its United States counterpart, it was presumed that it had a different meaning.480 This use of American authority has been criticised on two grounds — that in fact some of the framers were ignorant of American authority, and that to employ it involves recourse to reasoning which assumes that the subjective intentions of the framers is relevant, contrary to the general High Court approach since 1988.481 Of ignorance, the critic gives only one example, and even it reveals a correction by Andrew Inglis Clark of the supposed ignorance before drafting was complete. As to subjective intentions, recourse to United States law is recourse to the meanings particular expressions did or did not have in the informed legal world of the 1890s, just as much as recourse to English authority would be for the same purpose. It is a process which falls outside the prohibition, and within the permission given by the general High Court approach since 1988.482 Dixon J said his view of s 75(iii) was “completely informed by the history of the provision, which explains … the whole matter.”483 A significant element of that history was the response of the Australian
framers to difficulties experienced with Art III of the United States Constitution. That the post 1988 approach was only to broaden in one respect — recourse to the Convention Debates484 — the approach used continuously from 1904 to 1988 is established by the fact that since 1988, the type of material referred to before 1988 has continued to be examined.485 Thus colonial statutes have been [page 217] considered,486 as have United Kingdom and Colonial Royal Commissions and other governmental reports.487 The terms of a resolution proposed by Parkes to a preliminary meeting of the New South Wales delegates to the 1891 Convention have been considered.488 In assessing the meaning of “external affairs” in s 51(xxix), the following matters of historical fact have been taken into account:489 (a) while before 1900 the Imperial Government negotiated treaties on behalf of itself and the colonies, there was a practice of consulting those colonies that, like the Australian colonies, had advanced towards constitutional independence, before concluding commercial treaties that applied to them; (b) there was also a practice of including in those treaties a clause providing for the voluntary adherence of a colony; (c) the number and range of treaties entered by the Imperial Government had increased and was continuing to increase; (d) there also existed international organisations in which constituent parts of the British Empire like the Australian colonies had the vote; and (e) there was a practice of leaving colonial legislatures free to determine whether it was necessary to legislate to give effect to a treaty entered into by the Imperial Government. A source of particular value in that kind of analysis is to be found in the voluminous works of A Berriedale Keith and other writers of the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries like Alpheus Todd.490 An example of reference to the history of legal procedure and legal institutions arose when, in determining that the words “jury trial” in s 80
of the Constitution require unanimous verdicts, the court took into account the fact that “the history of criminal trial by jury in England and in this country up until the time of Federation establishes that, in 1900, [unanimity] was an essential feature of the institution.”491 Examples of constitutional “facts” which have not been established include the proposition that neither the framers of the Constitution nor anyone else until Keynes had any concept of macroeconomic policy. 492 Sometimes judges are prepared to accept the existence of constitutional facts, but reject them as irrelevant. Thus, though the “arbitrary or capricious” nature of a law restricting the right of a convicted person to vote was held irrelevant, the following facts were accepted as material if it had been relevant: not all crime is detected, not all criminals are prosecuted, sentencing practices vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within jurisdictions, some prisoners have done far less than some [page 218] who are not prisoners, some jurisdictions provide for mandatory sentences in cases where others do not, and the indigenous population is overrepresented in the prison population.493
Development of common law [3159] Legislative facts establishing the common law The freedom which courts have in finding facts in categories two to four exist in this fifth category as well. Holmes J said: “As the judge is bound to declare the law, he must know or discover the facts that establish the law.”494 He also said: “ … [T]he court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for laying down a rule of law …”495 Thus where the issue was whether the measure of recovery under an insurance policy accepted by a jury was sound in law, Lord Mansfield CJ said: “ … I thought a good deal of the point, and endeavoured to get what assistance I could by conversing with some gentlemen of experience in adjustments.”496 The practice was defended thus by Carter:497
… why should a judge, when seeking to make himself better qualified to formulate a rational and policy-orientated proposition of law, be restricted in his relevant factual investigations to consideration of facts which are either notorious or readily ascertainable? Conscientious and worthwhile research knows no such limits. Judicial notice of legislative facts is a misnomer, for it is undesirable that a judge, when surveying what may well be a wide range of facts of possible significance in the law making process, should (and indeed unrealistic to suppose that he could) draw any rigid or clear-cut distinction between facts which, were they in issue or relevant, would have to be proved and those which he would notice without proof. An attempt to clothe legislative fact-finding in the strait-jacket which befits judicial notice of adjudicative facts is not apt and is barely meaningful.
This is forceful reasoning. It is accordingly necessary to disagree with Callinan J’s rejection of the possibility of courts having recourse to works of history unless there is agreement between the parties that the works are the accepted writings of serious historians.498 However, Callinan J was right to insist that the courts were not free to make their own historical inquiries without giving the parties notice, and an [page 219] opportunity to deal with what the court regards as material.499 Compliance with those duties would remove many of the difficulties in judicial reliance on unproved material. It would expose whether the parties do agree on the facts or the means by which they may be discovered or analysed; and if they do not agree, it enables each party to criticise or compensate for the useless, incomplete or erroneous character of the other’s appeal to the facts. So far as the parties agree, the points of agreement are receivable as being in substance agreed facts. So far as they disagree, the nature of the disagreement may be useful to the court. Questions remain about whether the material should be tendered, whether it should be received at trial rather than on appeal, and what other procedures for eliciting it should be employed. There are numerous examples of the fifth category. As part of a decision to endeavour to make a rule of negligence law simple, the fact has been taken into account that most lawyers now charge hundreds of dollars an hour for their services, that legal aid is often not available to litigants in tort cases, and that the cost of lawyers’ services is substantially increased when lawyers believe they cannot confidently advise their clients because the law is complex and unpredictable.500 The possible behaviour of
partially and wholly intoxicated persons501 and the practices of clubs and hotels502 were considered in deciding whether to recognise a duty of care on clubs to their patrons. Predictions about the undesirable effect on human behaviour of the rejection of a duty of care503 or the rejection of an immunity from a duty of care504 or the recognition of a duty of care505 have been relied on. So have police practices and duties.506 Statistics on sentences were taken into account in determining what sentencing principles should be developed for the purposes of a guideline sentencing judgment.507 Statistics supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics revealing that in 1995 16 per cent of the population had an injury or injury-related condition were taken into account in assessing the content of a duty of care owed by the proprietor of a sports centre.508 Medical [page 220] works were taken into account in assessing the causation and foreseeability of psychiatric injury.509 The courts have also taken into account assumptions about or works of psychology in assessing the reliability of identification evidence510 and in explaining why children delay in complaining of sexual assault.511 The courts have also taken into account, in relation to sentencing principles, psychiatric studies on the harm caused to child victims of sexual offences512 and many expert studies on factors relevant to sentencing in father-child incest cases.513 Factual matters relevant to the imposition of a duty of care on auditors514 and landlords515 have been considered. So have factors affecting property valuation in determining rules for the remoteness of damage.516 In deciding on the uniform discount rate to be applied to damages for personal injuries, the extent of injury caused by industrial and road accidents, and the level of average weekly earnings, were taken into account.517 In formulating the now rejected sole purpose test in legal professional privilege, the structure and record-keeping practices of large corporations were considered.518 Modern methods of criminal detection were taken into account in devising an appropriate discretionary rule for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.519 So was the probability that ownership of a dwelling house is the most significant investment a citizen will make.520 So were the risk of fire in medieval English towns compared to those of modern Australia.521
So was the history of Cabinet government in relation to a claim for privilege in relation to Cabinet documents.522 So was the history of English constitutional development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and of gold mining in determining prerogative rights to gold.523 So were the large expansion in and variety of publications in Australian society, including those on specialised subjects of importance and benefit to society like occupational health and safety, in relation to the defence of qualified privilege in defamation.524 So was the increase in social regulation between 1775 and 1995 in relation to the defence of illegality.525 So was the lack of fencing in the infant colony of South Australia in determining whether the common law relating to the duty of an owner of land abutting a highway was applicable to local [page 221] conditions.526 So were the nature, structure, financial basis and consequences of the New Zealand home construction industry.527 So were facts relating to the care of children in relation to liability for assaults on them,528 and in relation to their risk of injury in school playgrounds.529 On the question whether a rule of equity about the grant of damages in lieu of injunctive relief should be changed,530 it was said that in 1895 “England was much less crowded [and] comparatively few people owned property”.531 The range of sources examined is considerable.532 As with the other categories of legislative fact, there are unresolved problems about how far the court can act without evidence (ie by relying on judicial notice, common experience, the experience of the courts, official documents, standard works of reference and expert writings); if there is evidence, about whether it should be tendered at the trial or on appeal; about the lack of coincidence between the parties’ interest in not spending money and the court’s interest in being assisted; about the risk of unduly burdensome material being placed before the court; about how material is to be understood and tested; about the role of amici curiae and interveners; about the capacity of the court to act on its own initiative; about the risks of the court being tempted unduly to move away from its central role in assessing adjudicative facts; and about the dangers of the
court acting as legislator.533
G — EVIDENCE ACTS Section 144 of Evidence Acts [3160] Construction and illustrations Section 144(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides: [page 222] Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is: (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held or generally; or (b) capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned.
The judge may acquire knowledge of that kind in any way the judge thinks fit: s 144(2). The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) is obliged to take knowledge of that kind into account: s 144(3). The judge is to give a party such opportunity to make submissions, and to refer to relevant information, relating to the acquiring or taking into account of knowledge of that kind as is necessary to ensure that the party is not unfairly prejudiced: s 144(4). Under s 144 the age at which children start and finish school, and the times of school hours, have been acted on as matters of common knowledge.534 The court may acquire knowledge of its own proceedings under s 144 by looking at the contents of the court file and earlier reasons for judgment in the matter.535 Section 144 has been applied to the fact that on 25 August 1995 many Federal Court judges were involved in a national conference of the court.536 Section 144 … may well permit the Court to have regard to a wider range of medical facts than are judicially noticeable at common law. That tuberculosis is caused by the tubercle bacillus and that malaria is caused by organisms injected by the bites of certain species of anopheles
mosquitoes are probably facts which a court could accept as true without proof, pursuant to s 144 … even if it could not judicially notice those facts at common law.537
Judicial notice has been taken by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as to how the sole authorised motor vehicle insurer in the Territory manages and settles claims.538 Section 144 does not permit judicial notice to be taken of the medical consequences of genital herpes,539 nor that large banks use a standard form guarantee.540 Notice has not been taken under s 144 of a broad social interest in controlling the reproductive capacity of intellectually disabled persons.541 A bookmaker’s website has not been held to be a source which cannot reasonably be questioned.542 Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that a person exposed to asbestos might not have any detectible medical condition as a result for many years, but still might become ill and die as a result of that exposure.543 It has been taken of the fact that representations of registered designs on a website can be magnified electronically, that being common knowledge to users of computers and the internet.544 It has been taken of the “historical and persisting disadvantage of women in relation to their participation and career advancement within the legal [page 223] profession.”545 It has been taken of the fact that the internet is a “telegraphic” apparatus or system used to transmit and receive electronic communications.546 It has been taken of the fact that at the end of 2011 there were 11 million mobile handset subscribers in Australia.547 Possible examples of what is not reasonably open to question and capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned are court judgments and orders, and the dates when bills are introduced into Parliament, when Bills are rejected in the Senate, and when Parliament is dissolved.548 It has been assumed that the common law principles of judicial notice operate alongside s 144.549 The assumption may be supportable as follows. The effect of s 56(1) is to render admissible all evidence that is relevant, except as is otherwise provided by the legislation. Section 144 does not in terms prohibit the reception of evidence judicially noticed at common law: it is facultative, not prohibitory. Its language does not
“cover the field”. Where a submission that there was no case to answer was made, and the party making it was compelled not to call evidence, it was held, under s 144 as well as at common law, to be impermissible for the other party to extend an invitation to the court to take judicial notice of particular matters, there having been no prior indication that this would be done.550 Judicial notice may also be taken under particular statutes, eg Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 147 (“a service tribunal shall take judicial notice of all matters within the general service knowledge of” the tribunal or the jury). It has been suggested that a conclusion that something is not common knowledge calls for evidence to that effect.551 That is questionable: the court can reach the conclusion for itself out of its own experience. Non-compliance with s 144(4) renders the evidence inadmissible.552 The ALRC suggested that s 144 “may have the effect of limiting the material presently relied on by the courts in constitutional cases”.553 The ALRC contemplated that s 144 would apply to judicial notice of legislative facts.554 If so, and if s 144 excludes the common law, the traditional freedom with which legislative facts are established ([3156]–[3159]) would have been much constricted. However, the language of s 144 does not suggest that it is dealing with legislative facts. Nor does it suggest that it is dealing with the teachings of ordinary experience, discussed at [3200]–[3305]. [page 224]
Section 2 — Formal Admissions A — CIVIL CASES Methods of admitting facts [3165] Pleadings, notice to admit, agreement In civil cases a party may in the pleadings, or in answer to a notice to admit, admit facts for the purposes of the trial. It is also possible for the parties to agree to conduct the litigation on the basis that certain matters are not in issue. The decision to make such an admission is doubtless dictated by forensic considerations, such as the risk that the cost of the issue would be borne by the party in any event or that the evidence which would be led to prove the fact would be otherwise prejudicial. An admission made in the pleadings or pursuant to a notice to admit cannot, until formally retracted by leave, be contradicted by the party who makes it, and evidence relevant only to such an admitted fact will be rejected as not relevant to an issue in the proceedings. Admissions made by agreement between the parties or made by counsel to the court are equally binding, since civil litigants are normally free to choose the issues which they wish to raise before the court.555 They may be retracted if the court gives leave to do so; that depends on whether justice requires it, which in turn depends not only on whether the admission was made in error but also on the efficient administration of justice.556 An admission made for the purposes of one trial is usable at a second trial.557 These admissions must be distinguished from informal admissions that are received under an exception to the rule against hearsay, discussed in Chapter 17, “The Rule against Hearsay: Principal Exceptions at Common Law”. A formal admission when retracted may not be taken into account as part of the evidence or used against the retracting party as an informal admission.558 Formal assertions in pleadings, at least when not verified on oath, do not constitute admissions in other proceedings.559 There is legislative provision for a type of formal admission called an “agreed fact”. An “agreed fact” is defined as meaning a fact that the
parties to a proceeding have agreed is not, for the purposes of the proceeding, to be disputed. If the agreed fact is stated in a written agreement which has been admitted in evidence or, with the leave of the court, is stated by a party before the court with the agreement of all the other parties, two consequences flow — without the leave of the court, evidence [page 225] is not required to prove it, and evidence may not be adduced to contradict or qualify it.560 This does not preclude some or all of the parties from agreeing particular facts in other ways.561 And it does not preclude the court from not accepting the agreed fact because it does not cohere with the balance of the facts or because it is inherently incredible.562 Another type of agreed fact arises when a court hearing a particular case relies on conclusions unsupported by evidence in circumstances where the parties agree that findings in other cases support those conclusions.563 Unlike a formal admission, an informal admission (including an answer to an interrogatory) is an item of evidence. Its maker may endeavour to explain it away at the trial at which it is proved, and reliance can be placed on it by the prosecution in a criminal case as well as by the parties to civil proceedings: [33420]. Admissions obtained upon discovery of documents or by interrogatories in a different action are likewise informal admissions, but their admissibility may be subject to the rule of public policy restraining the use which may be made of information obtained under procedural compulsion: see [25055]. The court is not bound to accept as true any fact merely because it is admitted as between the parties.564
B — CRIMINAL CASES Methods of admitting facts [3170] Plea of guilty only permissible common law method At common law the only formal admission available to an accused is a
plea of guilty when arraigned. Even in such a case the judge is not obliged to accept the plea if not satisfied that the available evidence warrants such a course. Upon a summary hearing, the applicable legislation in most jurisdictions requires the magistrate or justice to convict upon a formal admission of guilt. Where an accused in the charge of a jury or a person charged before a summary tribunal changes the plea to guilty in the course of the hearing, this is technically an informal admission only. The jury must return its verdict on the evidence including this admission.565 The court has a discretion to exclude evidence of the plea of guilty.566 [page 226]
[3175] Explanation for common law rule At common law, formal admissions of particular facts, as opposed to the plea of guilty, are disallowed at a criminal trial because the rules of evidence cannot be waived once it has started.567 Lord Reading CJ attributed this incapacity to waive to the fact that: The prosecution of criminals and the administration of the criminal law are matters which concern the State. Every citizen has an interest in seeing that persons are not convicted of crimes, and do not forfeit life or liberty, except when tried under the safeguards so carefully provided by the law.568
[3180] Statutory methods In all states and territories it is now provided by statute that an accused person may admit facts.569 the Western Australian provision is in the following terms: An accused person, either personally or by his counsel or solicitor, in his presence, may admit on his trial any fact alleged or sought to be proved against him, and such admission shall be sufficient proof of the fact without other evidence.
Having regard to the considerations mentioned by Lord Reading CJ above, judges have taken care to scrutinise such admissions. The sections do not prescribe any procedure for making statutory admissions. But it is desirable that the admission be made in specific terms570 and that it be made in such a way that a clear record is made of its terms.571 Furthermore the admission must be made formally or deliberately, and not by conduct or casually in the course of sworn evidence or in an
unsworn statement.572 An admission of an element of the offence is sufficient to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt.573 Under the legislation it is possible for an accused to admit all the factual ingredients of the charge, in which case the judge ought to direct the jury to convict.574 But it is not clear whether an admission of this type, made by a person charged with an offence such as perjury, which would normally require corroborative evidence, would be sufficient of itself to warrant a conviction. [page 227] The statutory power to make formal admissions is often assumed to be very convenient for accused persons seeking to prevent the tender of prejudicial evidence. In this respect it can cause great difficulties for the prosecution.575 That assumption depends on the proposition that the Crown may not call evidence of the fact admitted unless it goes beyond the fact admitted or is relevant to another issue. Most, but not all, the authorities support the assumption.576 Use of the statutory power has been recommended577 as a contribution by responsible practitioners to shorten trials by admitting non-controversial facts.578 The statutory power to make formal admissions does not, except in Victoria, require the approval of the trial judge. It is submitted that the supervisory role of the judge is such that a formal admission would be accepted only where it was clear that the accused understood the implications of the admission, and that the admission was in all the circumstances a proper one in the interests of justice, as has been held in South Africa.579 Furthermore, it is not clear that an admission of all of the ingredients of a summary offence would relieve the informant of proving the prosecution case, for otherwise the admissions would have greater effect than a plea of guilty.580 In England it has been held that an accused can only retract a formal admission with leave of the judge, which is only likely to be granted if cogent evidence is received from the accused and his or her advisers that the admission was made by mistake or misunderstanding.581 In such a case it would seem that the retracted admission would have evidential value in the same way as a retracted plea of guilty.
[3185] Methods open to Crown This chapter has concerned itself thus far with admissions by an accused. The procedures available to the Crown are the filing of a nolle prosequi or the leading of no evidence at trial. It would also appear that the Crown can make an admission of fact or other concession in favour of an accused.582
[3190] Victorian position In Victoria a concern with the length of criminal trials on indictment has produced substantial legislative changes in the conduct of these proceedings. These changes are primarily directed towards the identification of matters which are in issue in the trial. An accused is permitted583 to admit elements of the offence [page 228] charged. Furthermore, the procedure requires the prosecutor before trial to serve on the accused a summary of the prosecution opening and notice of pre-trial admissions setting out the manner in which the prosecution will put the case against the accused, and the acts, facts, matters and circumstances being relied upon to support a finding of guilt, as well as the matters that, in the opinion of the prosecutor, ought to be admitted as evidence without further proof.584 The accused must respond to these prosecution documents before trial, indicating those acts, facts, matters and circumstances with which issue is taken and replying to any proposition of law included in the prosecution case statements.585 The trial judge may, after the opening speeches made on behalf of the parties, address the jury on the relevance of any admission made in the pre-trial material.586 While the accused may lead evidence inconsistent with an admission made, the judge, and any party, with the leave of the court, may comment on this departure.587 Admissions, therefore, made in the pretrial procedures as well as any made in an opening speech are, for evidentiary purposes, informal admissions,588 but there are obvious powerful tactical reasons for not retracting them. There is no rule that they may only be withdrawn by leave granted in exceptional circumstances:
they may be withdrawn unless withdrawal will result in irreparable unfairness to the other side.589
[3195] Effect of formal admission made in one proceeding in others The effect in other proceedings of a plea of guilty or formal admission by an accused is that of an informal admission. Its weight will depend upon the circumstances in which it was made and any other evidence including any explanation as to why it was made. A plea of guilty is a formal admission of the facts and law constituting the offence charged. It will be seen (in [5150]) that in Australia the Crown may not raise an issue estoppel arising out of findings in other criminal proceedings. Where a person charged with driving with an excessive blood alcohol content pleads guilty, this plea may be tendered in evidence in civil proceedings in which it is necessary to prove that the accused was driving. There is no reason in principle why the Crown could not likewise tender this evidence in criminal proceedings to prove the same fact.590
Section 3 — The Teachings of Ordinary Experience A — GENERAL Significance of problem [3200] Reception of empirical material not complying with rules of evidence Much empirical material is employed in decision making by courts without [page 229] evidence being received, without judicial notice being taken, without admissions being made, and without any specific warning being given to the party against whom that empirical material is used (though commonly the opposing party or the court will, in final addresses or otherwise, indicate how it may be used). It is material which is part of the make-up of the human beings who form courts arising out of their general common experience of life591. That experience has many elements — their personal experiences, what they were taught by their parents and their schools, what others told them about their experiences, and what they learned from newspapers, radio, television, films and books. This general common experience of life causes the minds of courts to be full of many generalisations — right or wrong, crude or subtle, useful or misleading592 — about the behaviour of humans and about the physical and social world they inhabit. A “knowledge of human affairs” is one of the “chief qualifications” of jurors as judges of fact.593 This material is used for two main purposes: by the judge in determining what evidence is to be admitted as relevant, and by the trier of fact in understanding evidence, assessing its truthfulness,594 evaluating it,595 and drawing inferences from
it — for “the drawing of an inference is an exercise of the ordinary powers of human reason in the light of human experience”.596 There is a distinction between a jury using personal knowledge of a matter of fact, which is impermissible and should lead to withdrawal or disqualification from the jury, and the judgment and experience of a juror in analysing testimony. It is utterly impracticable in the administration of courts of justice to secure a juror whose mind is totally blank as to questions involved in the ordinary transactions of life. Triers of fact cannot, in the nature of things, be divested of general knowledge of practical affairs. The court cannot do otherwise than to direct them to use such experiences as are common to all men in the decision of questions of fact. It is part of the jury system which cannot be dispensed with.597 The collective experience of the courts is also a basis for [page 230] recognising legal relationships like duties of care,598 and it underlies many other rules of law.599 The issues relating to the use of this material have not been discussed much;600 and in particular, though it, like judicial notice, is based on what is notorious in the light of human experience, its relationship to judicial notice and its differences from it are obscure.601 There is one important point which makes it necessary to consider how to distinguish this material from material which is judicially noticed. Under the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), a party has a right to make submissions and refer to relevant information about what is judicially noticed: s 144(4). There is authority that a similar position applies in relation to other statutes permitting the taking of judicial notice, and at common law.602. If the material under discussion were not distinct from that which is judicially noticed, an extremely cumbersome and time-consuming process of giving the parties warning as to what material the court was relying on, which is not at present engaged in, would have to be engaged in. Another important distinction between the teachings of common experience and some types of judicial notice is that if judicial notice is taken, the trier of fact must accept the fact as conclusively established.603 A further
distinction is that the teachings of ordinary experience are often controversial, unlike the facts of which judicial notice is taken.604 It must be remembered that if common knowledge is insufficient evidence (and sometimes expert evidence) may be necessary. Thus Barwick CJ said of the elements going to a breach of a duty of care, “evidence is essential except to the extent that some or all of them are within the common knowledge of the ordinary man. The fertile but unqualified imagination of counsel or judge can never be a substitute for such evidence”.605 Sometimes the appeal under consideration is to ordinary human experience; sometimes it is to the experience of the courts; sometimes no distinction is drawn. [page 231] It is a matter of human experience which has long been recognised, that wrongdoers who are about to be revealed for what they are, often find relief from their inner tensions by talking about what they have done. In our judgment and experience this is a common explanation for oral admissions made at or about the time of arrest and later retracted.606
[3205] General experience and relevancy So far as the use of general experience in determining relevancy is concerned, it is sufficient to refer to some famous phrases of Thayer. “The law has no mandamus to the logical faculty ….”607 It “furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logical and general experience, assuming that the principles of reasoning are known to its judges and ministers, just as a vast multitude of other things are assumed as already sufficiently known to them.”608 The proposition of general experience which determines relevance can be cast into the major premise of a syllogism, as explained above.609
Examples of general experience in use [3210] Introduction The succeeding paragraphs give a few examples of how general experience is used in understanding what has been tendered in evidence,
and how far general experience is used to evaluate it and draw conclusions from it.
[3215] Language and arithmetic Triers of fact are assumed to be familiar with, and entitled to employ, an understanding of the ordinary use of the English language and the elements of arithmetic. Without it they could not grasp the evidence presented to them.
[3220] Simple physical and scientific phenomena Common knowledge and experience of physical phenomena may be taken into account. An example is the behaviour of fires — the tendency of brush, stubble or grass fires to flare up and die down, but then to remain smouldering for days before flaring up again;610 the likelihood of a fire being started by a man lighting his pipe and lying down on straw to smoke it.611Another is that depending on the position of the moon, on whether it is waxing or waning, and on the depth of cloud, some nights are darker than others.612 Another is the following statement: “The walls being rigid, it is of course obvious that any shrinkage of the roof beams and rafters, by drawing the top of the walls inwards, might produce the same effects as would be produced by an expansion of the concrete floor forcing the base of the walls outwards.”613 [I]t is a matter of common knowledge that a bullet piercing the brain of a human being will in all likelihood prove fatal. It is common knowledge, also, that a forest tree nearly in two at the butt will fall, if a high wind blows against it. If a witness should testify to the
[page 232] contrary of these ordinary phenomena, the common knowledge of the juror derived from his experience in such matters would naturally compel him to discredit that witness.614
[3225] Human behaviour and motor vehicles Triers of fact are entitled to bring to the resolution of motor accident litigation their knowledge of what usually occurs on a highway. The High Court relied on “the common experience of mankind … that a car
travelling at a very high speed, as these racing cars did, may and frequently does get out of control if, for example, a tyre should burst or the steering gear develop a defect”.615 That case concerned a public road closed on a particular occasion for motor racing, but the same principles apply in relation to public roads generally. Thus general knowledge on whether motorists habitually use the horn “when passing or commencing to pass another vehicle” can also be relied on. The High Court has said that this “knowledge is not properly to be regarded as judicial notice”.616 General knowledge of other road customs, too, can be relied on.617 Common knowledge about changes in the design and positioning of lights, traffic signs and other structures beside arterial roads, and about the nature and timing of tree pruning and lopping near roads, has been taken into account.618
[3230] Human behaviour and railways Another group of examples concerns what normally happens in relation to the operation of the railways — how people commonly react to the sounding of a signal at a railway crossing619 or to a signal that a train has reached a station.620 Similarly, whether “the calling out of the name of the station is [an] intimation that the passengers may, on the stopping of the train, alight [is] a matter of experience of life and habits, which is solely for the determination of the jury”.621 “It is … common experience that trains lurch and sway and jolt and jerk; and their oscillations are not regular or rhythmical.”622 On the other hand, “when the consideration of the questions involved requires technical knowledge and experience, a jury, in the absence of evidence on the matter, is not entitled to find negligence on the basis of its own ideas of what ought to be done. The practicability of providing a hitherto unknown system of warnings in a large railway shunting yard is not a question to be determined in the light only of the common knowledge which is attributable to juries.”623
[3235] Physical activities In considering whether the conviction of a husband for murdering his wife could stand, Dixon CJ took into account the fact that she was a good swimmer, familiar
[page 233] with surfing, and swimming in circumstances not involving danger. He said that in those circumstances “it was not likely that [she] would have been lost unless … her efforts at recovery were in some way obstructed …”.624 Similar assessments are frequently applied to common activities like walking, running and bathing, as well as activities at work. Thus in assessing whether a difference in height between one part of a footpath and another is dangerous, the court is entitled not to accept expert evidence and may rely on its own estimations, which must rest on its own experience of pedestrian behaviour in relation to everyday physical facts of that kind.625 “[D]eaths caused accidentally in sexual intercourse when the wife has ordinary health must be very rare indeed.”626An assessment by the trier of fact of whether conditions at work create a real risk of injury, and what precautions are reasonable and appropriate means of overcoming that risk, can often rest on common knowledge as distinct from trade evidence or expert evidence, 627 provided there is evidence to which that common knowledge can be applied.628 It is within the ordinary experience of people who work with electric current, particularly if it is of high voltage, that it was reasonably foreseeable that the sight of a human being who, as a result of an intense arc, was burning or recently burnt might be mentally disturbing to an employee who witnessed it.629 Similarly it is foreseeable that the parents of a child could suffer psychiatric injury upon hearing that the child was missing in the Western Australian desert, or that his vehicle had been found bogged in a remote place, or that remains and objects likely to be his had been found, or that his skeleton had been found; or upon viewing a photograph of his skeleton, for the loss of a child in a parent’s lifetime is one of the saddest events that a parent can suffer.630 Medical evidence is not needed to establish that having a person of equal or greater weight sitting or lying on one’s chest or abdomen can be an impediment to breathing.631
[3240] General practice To prove that an act has been done it is permissible to prove any general course of business according to which it would ordinarily have been done
in the particular circumstances. [E]vidence of a relevant practice may be given by a person, who on a sufficient number of occasions and over a sufficient period, has regularly and uniformly performed acts, or has observed the regular and uniform performance of acts by others, under the same circumstances and upon the same occasions, so as to make it appear probable in the minds of reasonable men that, given the same circumstances and occasions, the like acts will again be performed.632
[page 234] What is probable to reasonable minds depends on the experiences of those minds. Similarly, the court will bring to bear “the knowledge which every one has of the ordinary transactions of business.”633 This applies to illegal businesses too. Heroin dealing is “a trade notorious for its clandestine organisation, the creation of distribution networks of dealer-users, the payment of large sums of money enforced (if need be) by vicious measures, and the urgent demand by addicts for sources of supply. A person who is shown to have participated to a substantial degree in that trade … is likely to have incentives to continue his participation in the trade and, because of the nature of the trade, is more likely to have done so than one who has not been a substantial participant. Evidence of substantial participation in the heroin trade can support an inference of continued participation…”634 Into this category may be placed the eating habits of shoppers in country shopping centres.635 The same is true of the “basic psychology” of door-to-door selling, “taught by life experience and common sense”.636
[3245] Presumptions of continuance and death When it is proved that a human being exists at a specified time the proof will support the inference that he was alive at a later time to which, having regard to the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that in the ordinary course of affairs he would survive.637
Though the presumption of death is more artificial, it rests on a similar appeal to experience. If, at the time when the issue whether a man is alive or dead must be judicially determined, at least seven years have elapsed since he was last seen or heard of by those who in the circumstances of the case would according to the common course of affairs be likely to have received communications from him or to have learned of his whereabouts, were he living, then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be found that he is dead.638
[3250] Community standards Triers of fact may apply their own knowledge as to community standards in relation to what is honest, what is reasonable,639 and what is obscene.640 Similarly, “[w]hat men of ordinary care and skill would or would not do under certain circumstances is a matter of experience … which a jury only ought to determine”.641 “In ordinary business and social behaviour there is … a very strong expectation that there will not be a secret recording of a conversation”, and to create one is an “impropriety”.642 [page 235]
[3255] Human mental and emotional states General experience may be used to form opinions on matters of intention, knowledge643 and other mental and emotional states.
[3260] Motives It is common to rely on perceptions about standard motivation. One example is the human instinct of self preservation, which drives human beings away from consciously or recklessly putting themselves in peril of death or injury unless there is some particular reason why they would. In deciding whether a man leaped from a stationary train through a door which was not opposite the platform, but was opposite a pile of rubbish on which he suffered mortal injuries, “the jurors were entitled to assume that prima facie the deceased would conduct himself with ordinary prudence and discretion”, and hence that the deceased thought he was stepping onto the platform.644 Inferences from the ordinary instinct of selfpreservation may be negated by evidence of insanity, intoxication, suicidal desires or a failure adequately to assess the risk.645 The selfishness of human motives is often relied on, for example, the motive of proprietary self-interest.646 Where the managing director of a company supplied money to be used for the purpose of bribery in the interests of the company, it was held highly improbable that the managing director personally supplied the funds as distinct from the company: the suggestion was “wild conjecture, and too strongly opposed to the ordinary experience
of life to be accepted without the weightiest proof of such unexampled unselfishness”.647 An inference was drawn from the fact that the defendant had carried passengers between two places that he was doing so for reward: “The famous dictum of the American financier ‘We are not in business for our health’ is so close an approximation to universal truth that it would be absurd not to act upon it in this case ….”648 The proved existence of a motive to kill is relevant not only to establish that a death caused by the accused was caused intentionally, but also that the accused caused the death. “You can give in evidence the enmity of the accused towards the deceased to prove that the accused took the deceased’s life. Evidence of motive necessarily goes to prove the fact of the homicide by the accused, as well as his ‘malice aforethought’, in as much as it is more probable that men are killed by those who have some motive for killing them than by those who have not.”649 Similarly, the proved absence of motive may support the existence of a reasonable doubt, or a conclusion that death resulted from accident rather than suicide.650 Because experience teaches that most people do not concoct allegations against others and perjure themselves in support of the concoction, facts which show a motivation for fabrication or the lack of it are relevant to the [page 236] probability of whether an event occurred.651 If a purchaser is interested in buying two adjoining properties, there is a special market in which the purchaser may pay over the ordinary price to achieve the objective.652 The following facts about human memory have been described as a matter of ordinary human experience:653 … human memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed.
[3265] Deception The general knowledge of triers of fact has particular relevance to the
assessment of other mental states. Thus in litigation relating to whether customers are misled or likely to be misled, evidence to the effect that they “would have been deceived”, as distinct from evidence that they were deceived, is inadmissible. Not only is the issue one for the court rather than for a witness, but it is impossible to call “any individual to give what is in truth expert evidence as to human nature”.654 Rather it is for triers of fact to use their experience of human nature in the light of the particular conduct of the defendant in order to assess the likelihood of the customers being misled.
[3270] Inference of knowledge The existence of a fact may, on the basis of common experience, be used as the source of an inference that a particular person knew that fact. Thus from the existence of liquor in the accused’s house may be inferred the conclusion that the accused’s possession of it was knowing possession.655 Where a person is found in possession of goods soon after the owner has noticed their absence, and fails to give a credible explanation of how the goods were acquired, a trier of fact is justified in inferring that the person either was a thief or was guilty of dishonestly handling the goods, knowing or believing them to have been stolen.656
[3275] Admissions by conduct It is part of human experience that persons who are conscious of their guilt of some crime or their liability for some civil wrong will often, on being accused of the crime or wrong, flee, or remain silent, or answer evasively, or lie, or destroy evidence, or procure witnesses to remain silent or absent themselves or commit perjury, or refuse to supply evidence. For that reason, conduct of this kind may, depending on the circumstances, be treated as an admission or as corroboration.657 Thus O’Connor J, 658 after quoting a statement of Abbott J’s about the fact that [page 237] criminal guilt is determined by “twelve men, conversant with the affairs
and business of life”659 said: Can it be said reasonably that the jury were not entitled to draw the inference of guilt against a doctor, charged as the prisoner has been, who will not explain the death of a patient in his hospital, whom he alone was attending, his secret disposal of her body, his burning of her clothes, and his attempt to remove all evidence of her ever having been in his hospital and under his care?
Similar reasoning applies to the reception of similar fact evidence: “poisonings and fires, though often the result of accident, do not, in ordinary human experience, occur in the same family circle or in the case of the same occupier.”660 Similar fact evidence is a type of circumstantial evidence, and many of the inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence rest on common experience. It is “consistent with human experience and logic” to reason that the “fact that a person is in the habit of doing a certain thing in a given situation suggests that on a specific occasion in which those circumstances arose the person acted in accordance with established practice.”661
[3280] Silence The drawing of inferences can be assisted by the failure of the party against whom they might be drawn to contradict them. Thus an inference of negligence may be drawn where “according to the course of common experience the more probable inference from the circumstances that sufficiently appear by evidence or admission, left unexplained, [is] that the injury arose from the defendant’s negligence.”662 Hence, in a medical negligence case, the failure of the defendant to call another doctor who was present during the impugned procedure may strengthen inferences capable of being drawn against the defendant. The doctor having been present, “the operation of human nature is such that, if the defendant believed he could support the defendant, he would call him; if he believed he would not support the defendant, he would not call him. The reasoning involves a factual judgment as to what is ‘the operation of human nature’ and as such, would presumably lie within the province of the tribunal of fact.”663
[3285] Ordinary human nature “Ordinary human nature, that of people at large, is not a subject of
proof by evidence, whether supposedly expert or not.”664 That is because it is a matter of ordinary experience which the trier of fact does not need the aid of any witness to consider. However, “particular descriptions of persons may conceivably form the subject of study and of special knowledge. This may be because they are abnormal in mentality or abnormal in behaviour as a result of circumstances peculiar to their history or situation.” School children are in general not a “particular description of persons” in this sense when the effect on them of allegedly obscene publications is in issue.665 [page 238] Whether it could be inferred from the terms of certain records of interview that the accused, “an ordinary man, not exhibiting any peculiarities of intelligence or personality … is not likely to have produced … the answers” which the police said he did is not a matter for expertise, because it relates to “the behaviour of ordinary persons”, and is for the trier of fact: “The likelihood or otherwise of the police evidence or the accused’s assertion being true is a matter well within ordinary human experience, and the issue is only one of credibility.”666 Where a psychiatrist’s opinion as to the accused’s personality was tendered, inter alia, to show that the accused was likely to be easily provoked, and to show that the accused’s evidence that he was provoked when he bashed his girlfriend to death was likely to be true, the English Court of Appeal said:667 A man’s personality and mental make-up do have a bearing upon his conduct. A quick-tempered man will react more aggressively to an unpleasing situation than a placid one. Anyone having a florid imagination or a tendency to exaggerate is less likely to be a reliable witness than one who is precise and careful. These are matters of ordinary human experience. Opinions from knowledgeable persons about a man’s personality and mental make-up play a part in many human judgments. In our judgment the psychiatrist’s opinion was relevant… …The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is a danger that they may think it does. What, in plain English, was the psychiatrist in this case intending to say? First, that the defendant was not showing and never had shown any evidence of mental illness, as defined by the Mental Health Act 1959, and did not require any psychiatric treatment; secondly, that he
had had a deep emotional relationship with the girl which was likely to have caused an explosive release of blind rage when she confessed her wantonness to him; thirdly, that after he had killed her he behaved like someone suffering from profound grief. The first part of his opinion was within his expert province and outside the experience of the jury but was of no relevance in the circumstances of this case. The second and third points dealt with matters which are well within ordinary human experience. We all know that both men and women who are deeply in love can, and sometimes do, have outbursts of blind rage when discovering unexpected wantonness on the part of their loved ones; the wife taken in adultery is the classical example of the application of the defence of “provocation”; and when death or serious injury results, profound grief usually follows. Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.668 It follows that the proposed evidence was not admissible to establish that the defendant was likely to have been provoked. The same reasoning applies to its suggested admissibility on the issue of credibility. The jury had to decide what reliance they could put upon the defendant’s evidence. He had to be judged as someone who was not mentally disordered. This is what juries are empanelled to do. The law assumes they can perform their duties properly. The jury in this case did not need, and should not have been offered, the evidence of a psychiatrist to help them decide whether the defendant’s evidence was truthful… … [P]sychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the common sense of juries or magistrates on matters within their experience of life.
[page 239] Among the teachings of common human and judicial experience is the unusualness of a mother inflicting serious injury on her child.669 A conversational aside by a manager to a subordinate has been treated as not being an admission: A manager may feel obliged to make remarks to subordinates or to his colleagues which he does not necessarily regard as true. Such remarks are often made simply to keep the peace at the workplace or in the belief that what is being said represents company policy.670
Lord Sumner said: “we must take men as we find them, and we find them as often bad as good.” Hence, “taking men as we find them, few things are more certain than the repetition of a calumny confidentially communicated, even on an honourable understanding of secrecy.”671 And Hilbery J said: “Nothing about a man travels so fast as that which is to his discredit.”672 He also said: “I cannot imagine anything much more damaging to a credit bookmaker than a statement which suggests that he cannot meet a cheque for £2 15s.8d. If the backer has won from him in bets on a credit basis as much, or as little, as £2 15s.8d. I should think that there was hardly any other business which is more sensitive on the subject of its credit than that of a credit bookmaker.”673
It is in accordance with common human experience that a person who has thoughts (particularly persistent thoughts) about some type of act is more likely to perform an act of that type than a person who has never had such thoughts: hence photographs showing a sexual interest in underage females can be admissible on the issue of whether the accused had a reasonable and honest belief that a female complainant was not under age.674 On the other hand, it has been said that a jury cannot judge from its own experience whether a person is more likely to have a sexual interest in his or her own children or grandchildren if that person had, as a child, a sexual interest in his or her siblings.675
[3290] Assessment of credibility and weight But reasoning based on general experience operates at an even more fundamental level. It operates not only in relation to fact finding employing evidence which is intrinsically non-controversial, such as documentary and real evidence. It also operates in the evaluation of testimony. In assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight of particular items of evidence, the trier of fact is entitled to take into account “such matters of common knowledge and science as may be known to all men of ordinary understanding and intelligence.”676 That is the case for expert witnesses as well as non-experts.677 The law assumes that if a witness gives evidence [page 240] in a forthright, apparently convincing manner, and is unshaken in crossexamination, the testimony may be relied on more than if it had proceeded from a halting and prevaricating witness of unsatisfactory demeanour. This assumption is not regarded by all critics as sound,678 but it underlies rules which make it relatively difficult to appeal against apparently demeanour-based findings of fact. A consequence of this approach is that expert evidence to the effect that when a witness is asked to calculate the time which a particular event took, the estimate is affected by the amount remembered, has been held
inadmissible. “What a person remembers and how they are likely to remember and the manner in which human memory works by reconstruction or suggestion or otherwise are everyday matters well within the field of knowledge of juries.”679
B — GENERAL PROBLEMS Key conceptual issues [3295] Legal control of the generalisations One difficulty which has been little explored is that though some perceived lessons from human experience are doubtless entirely correct — those relating to elementary linguistic, arithmetical and scientific facts — others may not be. Yet others are sometimes expressed at so high a level of generality as not to be useful. It must be remembered that to some extent the teachings of experience and “commonsense” may not always be sound, and the generalisations — the major premises — employed in the type of reasoning under discussion may become modified as human experience changes.680 Indeed at any particular time they may be controversial.681 Further, to some extent the law has developed rules to control the formulation and use of some of the generalisations under discussion. Lies can be admissions or corroboration, but only certain kinds of lies.682 Generally juries may not be given directions about the failure of the accused to give or call evidence.683 The strong inferences which ordinary experience may suggest should justly be drawn against a party by reason of past patterns of misconduct are controlled by the rules of similar fact evidence. While some might think that a defendant who alters conditions at its premises after an accident may have done so out of a consciousness that in their original condition the premises were dangerous, the law does not act on that inference. The change is relevant “not to what should have been done but to what could have been done”.684 To reason otherwise is “to hold that, because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before”.685 But that these rules have been developed merely illustrates the forceful role which the generalisations from human experience can play. It has been suggested that while the lessons of ordinary experience may
be drawn on to make value judgments about matters of fact addressed in evidence, this can [page 241] only be done in respect of proved facts. “A trial judge is not entitled to use personal experience to make findings of fact or to draw inferences unless that personal experience satisfies the prescription for the use of matters of [judicial notice].”686 This formulation may be unduly rigid.
[3300] Relationship with expert opinion evidence Also little explored is the similarity between the use by triers of fact of generalisations derived from common experience as the major premises in arguments in which the minor premises derive from the evidence in the case, and the use by triers of fact or generalisations recounted to them by expert witnesses.687 A personal opinion based on common knowledge must give way to expert evidence.688
[3305] Mixture of elements In particular cases it is possible to detect, or support particular conclusions by reference to, different elements of reasoning. Thus the conclusion that a bankrupt, at the time of particular transfers much earlier than the time of his bankruptcy, had a large taxable income, rested on the fact that he had become senior counsel (it being unlikely that a junior counsel with an insubstantial practice would have been recommended for this office by the President of the New South Wales Bar Association) and had maintained “two sets of chambers, one being generous accommodation in Phillip St”. It would have been possible to call evidence about the rents payable by barristers in the different sets of chambers, the other costs of their practice, and the types of junior barristers who became senior barristers: but the conclusion rested on a mixture of specialist professional knowledge of judges and common experience of professional life, as well as retrospectant inferences from the bankrupt’s later income. 689
Section 4 — Further categories
BACKGROUND FACTS, COLOURINGBOOK FACTS AND VISUAL AIDS Suggested additions [3310] Judge Posner’s practice Judge Posner has added to the categories “adjudicative facts”, “facts capable of being judicially noticed” and “legislative facts” three more categories — background facts, colouring-book facts and visual aids. He defines background facts as facts “designed to increase the reader’s understanding of a case by placing the adjudicative facts in an illuminating context”. He said that “[o]f particular significance are background facts concerning the technological or commercial setting of a case”. He defines colouring-book facts as “facts designed to make a judicial opinion come alive”. He says that visual aids, “such as a map or a photograph … an enhance understanding by clarifying the facts in a case”. It is [page 242] legitimate in his opinion — and his practice is — to refer to material in these categories without prior notice to the parties. He answers criticism of this by saying that lawyers often fail to tender evidence or agree matters of fact which judges want in order to make clearer “the real-world setting of the case” and to make the judgment more attractive. He accepts that “an appeals court should not make its decision turn on a fact found outside the court record unless the fact is incontestable”, but apparently it does not require the parties to be informed of what the fact is. He says: “if judges were required to warn the lawyers, the appellate process would be protracted beyond endurance, depending on how curious, how thirsty for knowledge, the judge was. Appellate judges are permitted to go outside the record without the lawyer’s permission — only adjudicative facts are off limits”. He says that lack of notice to the parties does not matter where facts included for background and colour play “no role in the decision”.690 The problem is that there is a distinction between facts which a judge
thinks play no role in the decision and facts which actually do play no role in the decision. In Australia conventional thinking, surely, requires the parties to be advised of all non-adjudicative facts so that they can judge for themselves what role the facts may play in the decision, and seek to control how that role works out. 1 See [17620]–[17730]. 2 Swarbrick v Swarbrick [1964] WAR 106. See [3035]. 3 See Rodrigeuz v Speyer Brothers [1919] AC 59 at 77–81. 4 K C Davis, “An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process” (1942) 55
Harv L Rev 364; K C Davis, “Judicial Notice” (1955) 55 Col L Rev 945; D M Paciocco, “Judicial Notice in Criminal Cases: Potential and Pitfalls” (1997) 40 Crim LQ 35. 5 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [65]. 6 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [65]. 7 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [165]. See also Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170 at [67]. 8 D M Dorsen, Henry Friendly, 2012, p 326. 9 In Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196. 10 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [65] nn 36 and 37 and [68] n 43. 11 P B Carter, “Judicial Notice: Related and Unrelated Matters”, E Campbell and L Waller (Eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982, p 94. 12 B Selway, “The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia” (2001) 20 U of Tas LR 129. 13 D L Faigman, “‘Normative Constitutional Fact-finding’: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation” (1991) 139 U Pa L Rev 541. 14 These have been called “constitutional-rule” facts: D L Faigman, “‘Normative Constitutional Fact-finding’: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation” (1991) 139 U Pa L Rev 541. 15 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483. See MJ Saks, “Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works” (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011 at 1018 n 26. See also D M Dorsen, Henry Friendly, 2012, p 203, quoting Judge Friendly: “The country would have been better off if the Court had placed the Brown decision on jural considerations which were clearly within its province as the interpreter of the Constitution and which would have yielded readier and more acceptable answers in future controversies rather than on unestablished facts concerning segregation’s psychological effects on public education”. 16 Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896). 17 R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [9], [50], [132]–[133] and [229]–[232]. 18 For theoretical discussion see J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 1898, Ch 7; E M Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation, 1956, p 36; E F Roberts, “Preliminary Notes Towards a Study of Judicial Notice” (1967) 52 Cornell LQ 210. 19 In Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196, Dixon J formulated the test in terms of the knowledge of “educated men”. For Evatt J in Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735 at 806 the question was what “every well-informed person in Australia” was aware of. For discussion as to whether the courts are more ready to notice non-ultimate facts and general facts than ultimate facts and specific facts, see M McConville, “The Doctrine of Judicial Notice and Its Relationship to Evidence” (1979) 1 Liverpool LR 62 at 75–84.
20 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153. See also Commonwealth Shipping Representative v P &
O Branch Service [1923] AC 191 at 212; approved in All States Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v FCT (1990) 21 FCR 457 at 466 (FC); Auckland City Council v Hapimana [1976] 1 NZLR 731. E M Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation, 1956, p 61, says the party who asks that judicial notice be taken of a fact “has the burden of convincing the judge (a) that the matter is so notorious as not to be subject of dispute among reasonable men, or (b) that the matter is capable of immediate accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy”. In Hayman v Forbes (1975) 13 SASR 225 at 235 Zelling J raised a question whether the burden was so high. Other classifications divide the subject into the law and practice of the courts, the government of the country and matters of common or certain knowledge, or else into cases in which judicial notice is required by statute, precedent or common sense. 21 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196. In BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v NCC (2007) 162 FCR 234 at [44], Dixon J’s test was extended from historical works to works dealing with mining, mineral processing and steelmaking; cf at [195]–[196]. 22 Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General (Qld) [1979] AC 411 at 423 (PC) per Lord Wilberforce. 23 Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd [1915] WN 395. 24 Munnings v Hydro-Electric Commission (1971) 125 CLR 1 at 6. 25 Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541. 26 Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 (CA). 27 Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 All ER 229 (CA). 28 M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 515. 29 Page v Smith [1994] 4 All ER 522 at 549 (CA). Cf Chester v Council of Municipality of Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1 at 10. 30 Joske v Dental Cash Order Co Pty Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 172 at 178. See also Chapman v Kirke [1948] 2 KB 450 at 454 (DC of KBD); Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 at 415 and 420; Brisbane City Council v A-G (Qld) [1979] AC 411 at 423 (PC). This may not strictly be an example of judicial notice: [3215]. 31 R v Nelson (1922) 69 DLR 180 at 185 (Alb SC). 32 McCullough v R [1982] Tas R 43 at 58 (CCA). 33 Douglas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 77 FCR 112 at 117. 34 Ringstaad v Butler [1978] 1 NSWLR 754 at 757. 35 R v Luffe (1807) 8 East 193 (KB). The court takes judicial notice of the normal period of human gestation (Preston-Jones v Preston-Jones [1951] AC 391 at 401), but not of the limits of abnormal periods of gestation (Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 at 100; cf Flaherty v Piva; Ex parte Piva [1960] Qd R 53 at 59–60 (FC)). 36 Parker v R (1912) 14 CLR 681. 37 Re E M Murray (dec’d); Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales v Salwey [1964-5] NSWR 121 at 122. 38 Commonwealth v Bourne (1960) 104 CLR 32 at 46–7. 39 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484 at 492. 40 State Rail Authority of NSW v O’Keefe (1995) 21 MVR 63 at 68 (NSWCA). 41 Evans v Benson (1986) 46 SASR 317 at 320 (FC). 42 Green v Tongs (2005) 188 FLR 363. 43 Paull v Munday (1975) 11 SASR 346 at 353 (FC). 44 A-G (Cayman Islands) v Roberts [2002] 1 WLR 1842 at [36] (PC). 45 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 154. 46 Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1913) 16 CLR 178 at 187. 47 The Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 66 provides: (1) Where in a proceeding there is a question as to the time or duration of any
astronomical phenomenon that has occurred or shall occur in relation to a place, a court may admit in evidence a certificate about the question given by the chief executive (surveys). (2) The certificate may include an explanation of the terms used therein, a statement of their recognised practical application, and the basis for calculating the time or duration of the astronomical phenomenon. (3) In this section— astronomical phenomenon includes the rising or setting of the sun or moon, the position of the sun or moon, the phase of the moon and the degree of twilight. 48 Warren v Pilkington [1960] Tas SR 6. 49 R v McCourt (1993) 69 A Crim R 151 (SA CCA). 50 R v Wood [1982] 2 NZLR 233 (CA). 51 Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166 at [283]. 52 Riddle v Riddle (1952) 85 CLR 202 at 223. See also Re Richardson [1920] SALR 24 (FC). 53 Beneke v Franklin [1975] 1 NSWLR 571 at 593 (CA). 54 Kelly v Glasgow Corporation 1951 SC (HL) 15; the quotation is from the court below at 1949 SC
496 at 502. 55 Rendell v Paul (1979) 22 SASR 459 at 465–6 (FC) citing Hawkins v Lindsley (1974) 4 ALR 697. The Privy Council did not disagree: Paul v Rendell (1981) 34 ALR 569; see also Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 at 421, 429–30 and 473 (some resort to inquiry) and Saul v Menon [1980] 2 NSWLR 314 at 325 (CA). 56 Leis v Gardner [1965] Qd R 181 at 187 (FC). Judicial notice cannot be taken of a specific sum as the likely earnings of a professional over a future period: Hayman v Forbes (1975) 13 SASR 225 at 228–9 and 234–5 (FC). 57 Milwaukee Linen Supply Co v Ring 246 NW 567 at 568 (SC Wisc, 1933). 58 Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 at 516. 59 Lindner v Murdock’s Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628 at 641. 60 Cook v Rodgers (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 229 at 233. 61 Poole v Smith’s Car Sales (Balham) Ltd [1962] 2 All ER 482 (CA). 62 National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Dwyer (1940) 63 CLR 1 at 27. 63 Austin v Austin (1906) 3 CLR 516 at 526. 64 State Superannuation Board (NSW) v FCT (1988) 82 ALR 63 at 75 (Fed C of A). 65 Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 at 598–9. 66 Page One Records Ltd v Britton [1967] 3 All ER 822 at 827. See also Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1 at 8 (CA) (people who go to hotels do not like having their nights disturbed, and hotel custom is obtained and kept by recommendation). 67 Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549 at [97]. 68 Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 at 58. 69 Allchurch v Healey [1927] SASR 370. 70 Evans and Associates v European Bank (2009) 255 ALR 171 at [69]. 71 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] ATPR 42-447 at [18]. 72 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196. At 197 and 174–5 Dixon J gave examples quoted below at [3156]. The discussion of judicial notice in that case was in terms of precedents relating to the first category described at the end of [3005] — facts in issue, and facts relating to facts in issue — although the actual controversy in that case concerned facts in the second category — constitutional facts. 73 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 197 (“serious dislocations of industry” caused by the Communist Party).
74 R v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386 at 406. 75 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196, approving A/S Rendal v
Arcos Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 623 at 630–1 (CA); A/S Rendal v Arcos Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 577 at 582– 3 (HL). 76 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 277. 77 Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302 at 311–12; cf Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 154–5 and Whaley v Carlisle (1866) 17 ICLR 792 at 815. 78 Dennis v A J White & Co [1916] 2 KB 1 at 6 (CA). 79 Dennis v A J White & Co [1917] AC 479 at 492. See also Hughes v Bradfield [1949] QWN 46 (volume of traffic at particular locality); cf West v Sprinkhuizen; Ex parte Sprinkhuizen [1961] Qd R 313 at 318 (FC) (judicial notice not taken on the basis of four instances having been observed). 80 Matthews v Prahran Corporation [1925] VLR 469 at 480 (FC); Re By-Law made by Prospect District Council; Ex parte Hill [1926] SASR 326 at 329 (FC). 81 Re By-Law made by Prospect District Council; Ex parte Hill [1926] SASR 326 at 329 (FC). Judicial notice has been taken in Tasmania of the construction of a crayfish pot: St Leger v Bailey [1962] Tas SR 131 at 136. 82 McKern v Burke (1986) 3 MVR 279 at 281 (NSWCA) (where a vehicle struck a steer which was “not trotting but walking with measured bovine tread”). 83 Bridlington Relay Ltd v Yorkshire Electricity Board [1965] Ch 436. 84 R v Ching (1976) 63 Cr App R 7 at 9. 85 Beard v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 at 278. 86 Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 308. See also Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 595. 87 Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [64]; R v Markarian (2003) 137 A Crim R 497 at [23]; R v Stanbouli (2003) 141 A Crim R 531 at [103]. It has been said that judicial notice will not be taken of the relative harmfulness of drugs (a conclusion which may well be generally correct, but in the particular case depended on statutory construction): R v Pidoto (2006) 14 VR 269 at [61]. 88 Munroe v Tooheys Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 74. 89 Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447 at [36]. 90 New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1 at [44]. In Johnson v Glick 481 F 2d 1028 at 1033 (2d Cir 1969) Judge Friendly said: “The management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners, not usually the most gentle or tractable of men and women, may require and justify the occasional use of a degree of intentional force.” 91 Petrofina (Gt Britain) Ltd v Martin [1966] Ch 146 at 190 per Diplock LJ. 92 Paul v DPP (1989) 90 Cr App R 173 at 176–7 (DC of QBD) (a particular area was often frequented by prostitutes and was a heavily populated recreational area). See [3065]. 93 Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 at 516. 94 Kerridge v Rotorua Theatres Ltd [1937] NZLR 156 at 160. 95 St Leger v Bailey [1962] Tas SR 131 at 136. 96 Re Schwerdt [1939] SASR 333 at 338. 97 Knowlton v New York, NH & HR Co (1899) 44 A 8. 98 Tiner v State 182 So 2d 859 at 861 (SC Ala, 1966). 99 J Wharton (Shipping), Ltd v Mortleman [1941] 1 KB 340 at 345. 100 Re A Petition of Right [1915] 3 KB 649 at 658. 101 The Pacific and the San Francisco (1917) 33 TLR 529 at 530–1. 102 The Alwina (1916) 32 TLR 494 at 495. 103 R v Vine Street Police Station Superintendent; Ex parte Liebmann [1916] 1 KB 268 at 275. 104 Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196. 105 Commonwealth Shipping Representative v Peninsular & Oriental Branch Service [1923] AC 191. 106 Re Oxford Poor Rate Case (1857) 8 El & Bl 184. 107 Nye v Niblett [1918] 1 KB 23 (DC of KBD).
108 Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 at 415. 109 R v Simpson [1983] 3 All ER 789 (CA). 110 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hynde [1998] 1 All ER 649 (DC of QBD). 111 Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v FCT (1956) 95 CLR 344 at 351. 112 Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387 at 409. 113 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1 at [165]. 114 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422 at [217]. 115 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [124]. 116 Meux v Cobley [1892] 2 Ch 253 at 261. 117 Williams v R (1978) 140 CLR 591 at 604 per Murphy J. 118 But see Mullen v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 2 All ER
906 at 908–9 (CA) (instances of undertakings or injunctions allegedly contravened by Council on earlier occasions demonstrable by recourse to court records — criticised by C Allen, “Judicial notice extended: Mullen v Hackney London Borough Council” (1998) 2 Int J Evidence and Proof 37). 119 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [76]. 120 Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544 at [11]. 121 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1985] AC 339 at 354 (taking judicial notice of the classification “secret” appearing on a document originating in a government office). 122 Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461 at [9] (CA). 123 National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Dwyer (1940) 63 CLR 1 at 23 (evolution of Premiers’ Plan in 1931). 124 National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Dwyer (1940) 63 CLR 1 at 37 (collapse in prices of greasy wool and wheat between 1926 and 1932–3). 125 Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins (1963) 113 CLR 426 at 455. 126 Birrell v Dryer (1884) 9 App Cas 345 at 352. 127 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269. 128 Bailey v City Smash Repairs (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) 27 MVR 545 at 549 (Vic SC). 129 SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 64; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 72. 130 Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [29]. 131 Casley-Smith v F S Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 4) (1988) 49 SASR 339 at 346. 132 This reference is sometimes called “refreshing the memory of the judge”. See C S Goldman, “The Use of Learned Treatises in Canadian and United States Litigation” (1974) 24 Uni of Toronto LJ 427. 133 United States Shipping Board v The Ship St Albans [1931] AC 632 at 643. 134 In the Marriage of Dean (1988) 94 FLR 32 at 37 (Fam C of A FC); Malaysian Airline System v Wood [1988] WAR 294 at 303 (FC); Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd v Coleman (1989) 23 FCR 38; Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 (FC); Bowman v DPP [1990] Crim LR 600 (DC of QBD); [3140]. In the United States even K C Davis, the foremost advocate of a robust approach to taking judicial notice without prior advice to the parties, appeared to accept that the parties should have a chance to challenge facts judicially noticed which were adjudicative: “Judicial Notice” (1955) 55 Col LR 945 at 953. See also G R Currie, “Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation” [1960] Wisconsin L Rev 39 at 51–3. 135 Arnold v Norris [1936] SASR 287. 136 Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 at 101. See too: Horman v Bingham [1972] VR 29 (position of seeds on cannabis plant); Stokes v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 at 26 (FC); Fairbank v Jones (1975) 10 SASR 367 at 370–1. See [3130]–[3140] below. 137 South Australia and Western Australia. See [3030] above. 138 Dolder v Huntingfield (Lord) (1805) 11 Ves Jun 283 at 292.
139 F & K Jabbour v Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954] 1 WLR 139 at 142–3. 140 R v De Berenger (1814) 3 M & S 67 at 69. 141 Re a Petition of Right [1915] 3 KB 649 at 658. 142 In re Grotrian; Cox v Grotrian [1955] Ch 501 at 506. 143 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196; Illawarra District County
Council v Wickham (1959) 101 CLR 467 at 502–3; Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales Ltd v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1960) 105 CLR 401 at 426; Marks v Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549 at 577 and 581; Church of the New Faith v Pay-Roll Tax Cmr (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 (religious beliefs). 144 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196. 145 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16) (1988) 14 NSWLR 107 at 112–13. 146 Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 43 NSWLR 364 at 371. So far as this case and the Ritz case concern references to books, they may relate more to a possible hearsay exception than to taking judicial notice: see [33845]. Evidence was excluded in Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243 at [85] as polemical (Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) was applicable, but common law was applied). 147 The Case of St Katherine’s Hospital (1672) 1 Vent 149 at 151–2. 148 Brounker (Lord) v Atkyns (1682) Skinner 14 at 15. 149 Neale and Fry, discussed as a note to Stainer v Burgesses of Droitwich (1696) 1 Salk 281. However, if as seems likely the case referred to was Lady Ivy’s Trial (1684) 10 How St Tr 555 at 625, in fact Lord Jeffreys CJ rejected the evidence: “Instead of records, the upshot is a little lousy history … Is a printed History, written by I know not who, an evidence in a court of law?” 150 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 653. 151 Attorney-General v Gould (1860) 28 Beav 485. That the evidence was apparently not objected to does not significantly diminish the persuasive character of the case, in view of the fact that the opposing counsel were the future Lords Cairns and Selborne. 152 Stainer v Burgesses of Droitwich (1696) 1 Salk 281. 153 Re Piercy (1682) T Jones 164. 154 The Vaux Peerage (1836) 5 Cl & Fin 526 at 574–5. 155 Evans v Getting (1835) 6 C & P 586. 156 Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1 at 13. 157 East London Railway Co v Conservators of the River Thames (1904) 90 LT 346. 158 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol 8, p 357. 159 East London Railway Co v Conservators of the River Thames (1904) 90 LT 346 at 347–8. 160 For example, Attorney-General v Horner (No 2) [1913] 2 Ch 140; Fowke v Berington [1914] 2 Ch 308. 161 For example, parish records as evidence of births and marriages, referred to in Stainer v Burgesses of Droitwich (1696) 1 Salk 281. 162 Perhaps illustrated by Stainer v Burgesses of Droitwich (1696) 1 Salk 281. 163 Fowke v Berington [1914] 2 Ch 308 at 319. 164 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 653 (analysed by M H Ogilvie, “Case Notes: Evidence — Judicial Notice — Historical Documents and Historical Facts — Indian Treaty Rights” (1986) 64 Can B Rev 183 at 194–200). See also Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313 at 346; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 at 498. 165 See [33085] ff, [33150] ff, [33205] ff, [33345] ff and [33845] below. 166 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1891] P 9. 167 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 653–4. 168 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 653. 169 Hebbert v Purchas (1871) LR 3 PC 605 at 648–9; Ridsdale v Clifton (1877) 2 PD 276. 170 P Brazil, “Legislative History and the Sure and True Interpretation of Statutes in General and
the Constitution in Particular” (1961) 4 U of Q LJ 1 at 12, citing Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 652–3, quoted below at [33845]. 171 R v Bartleman (1984) 12 DLR (4th) 73. In Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 at 498 Lee J said that Read v Bishop of Lincoln was authority for the proposition that the court could rely on “its own historical knowledge and research” in a native title case: this is highly questionable for the reasons about to be given. 172 R v Bartleman (1984) 12 DLR (4th) 73 at 77. 173 See, for example, J Sopinka, S N Lederman and AW Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 1992, p 976. 174 R v Bartleman (1984) 12 DLR (4th) 73 at 93. 175 See the criticisms made by M H Ogilvie, “Case Notes: Evidence — Judicial Notice — Historical Documents and Historical Facts — Indian Treaty Rights” (1986) 64 Can Bar Rev 183 at 193–205. 176 Roper v Taylor’s Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 284. 177 George v Davies [1911] 2 KB 445 at 447–8. However, in Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 at 415, the rule was said not to apply to inferior courts. 178 Brandao v Barnett (1846) 12 Cl & Fin 787. See too Universo Insurance Co of Milan v Merchants Marine Insurance Co [1897] 2 QB 93; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 64 (particular marine policy widely used by insurance markets in many countries); Mount v Oldham Corporation [1973] QB 309 (CA) (universal usage in English fee paying schools that a parent wishing to withdraw a child must either give a term’s notice or pay a term’s fees in lieu thereof). 179 See Majeau Carrying Co Pty Ltd v Coastal Rutile Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 48 at 54–60. 180 Re Mathews; Ex parte Powell (1875) 1 Ch D 501. 181 Crawcour v Salter (1881) 18 Ch D 30. 182 Fisher v Winch [1939] 1 KB 666 (CA). 183 Davey v Harrow Corporation [1958] 1 QB 60 at 69. 184 Re Rosher (1884) 26 Ch D 801; Burch v Farrows Bank Ltd [1917] 1 Ch 606 at 612. Cf Estates Gazette Ltd v Benjamin Restaurants Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1528 at 1533–4 (CA) (clear contractual words can override practice). 185 Brilliant Gold Mining Co v Craven (1898) 9 QLJ 144 (FC). 186 Bryant v Foot (1867) LR 2 QB 161. 187 Parente v Bell (1967) 116 CLR 528 at 532. 188 National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v A-G (Vic) [1973] VR 610. However, although judicial notice may be taken of the fact of inflation, it cannot be taken of its effect on what would be a fair rent in factual circumstances of which it knows nothing: Trade Practices Commission v Tooth & Co Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397 at 444. 189 National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v A-G (Vic) [1973] VR 610 at 612. 190 In Marriage of Monticone (1989) 98 FLR 460 (Full Fam Ct). 191 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [69]. 192 R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 at [49]–[110]. 193 Schiffmann v Jones (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 780 at 791–2 (CA). 194 Ulrich v Treasury Solicitor [2005] 1 All ER 1059 at [9]–[10]. 195 Carberry v Cook (1906) 3 CLR 995 at 997; Malone v Smith (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 54; Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285; Vagulans v Maxwell (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 341 at 342 (FC); cf Ex parte Meer Houssain (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 286 (FC). 196 Grasso v Love [1980] VR 163 (FC). 197 Le Cocq v McErvale [1908] VLR 69 (FC). Old decisions to the effect that judicial notice will not be taken that Cowra is 150 miles or upwards from Sydney (Ex parte Power (1888) 5 WN (NSW) 9 (FC)) or that George Street, Sydney, is not within the Cooma Petty Sessions District (Re Wright
(1888) 5WN (NSW) 11 (FC)) are questionable. See Sherwood v Haccles (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 61; Catford v Kearney [1920] SALR 294 at 298–9. 198 Weir v Davidson [1965] VR 506 (FC). See also Ex parte Galanis (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 19 (FC); R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277 at 280 (CCA); Bailey v City Smash Repairs (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) 27 MVR 545 at 548–9 (Vic SC). See generally Aust Digest, 2nd ed, Evidence [12]. 199 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Broom [1904] St R Qd 215 (FC). 200 Simpson v Fraser (1893) 5 QLJ 89 at 92 (FC) (“Lennon’s Hotel is in George St … George St is in the municipality of Brisbane, and … Brisbane is in the Colony of Queensland”). 201 Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 at 48. See also Elrick v Terjesen [1948] VLR 184 at 188–189; Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74 at 76 (FC) (nature of only bend in particular road). 202 Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 at 48–9. 203 Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130 at 133. 204 Ingram v Percival [1969] 1 QB 548 (DC of QBD). 205 Paul v DPP (1989) 90 Cr App R 173. 206 Bowman v DPP [1990] Crim LR 600 (DC of QBD) (said not to be judicial notice but “actual local knowledge gained by the justices as local citizens”; it was further said: “It is always wise to make the fact that local knowledge is going to be used known to the parties so as to give an opportunity of commenting upon the knowledge claimed”: see [3035] and [3140]). 207 Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884 at 889 (PC). 208 Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 283–4. 209 See eg R v Weatherall (1981) 27 SASR 238 (Bankcard); Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris (1987) 46 NTR 1 (Satellite Navigation System); Bevan v Western Australia (2010) 202 A Crim R 27 at [35] (downloading data from a mobile phone into a laptop computer). 210 Gorham v Brice (1902) 18 TLR 424. 211 Peterson v Homes [1927] SASR 419; Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466 (DC); Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343 (FC). 212 Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229. 213 Giles v Dodds [1947] VLR 465. 214 Mitchell v W S Kimpton & Sons Pty Ltd [1971] VR 583 (FC). 215 Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 at 78. There the presumption was held not to apply to a breathanalysis instrument (a conclusion questioned in R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [9]): see also Skalde v Evans [1966] SASR 176; Weerts v Daire (1982) 32 SASR 270. The presumption was applied to a weighbridge in Barker v Fauser [1962] SASR 176, to a vernier calliper and scallops gauge in Crosthwaite v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348 (Qld CA), to a loadometer in Cheatle v Considine [1965] SASR 281, to an amphometer in Zappia v Webb [1974] WAR 15 (FC) (cf Young v Owen [1972] ALR 671 (NT SC)), but not to a radar speed measuring device in Leonard v Newell 1983 Tas R 78; Dunsmore v Elliott (1981) 26 SASR 496 (FC). It was not applied to a “loadometer” in Crawley v Laidlaw [1930] VLR 370, nor to a sheridan gauge in Breedon v Kongras (1996) 16 WAR 66, nor to a sulphur dioxide monitor in Jenkins v WMC Resources Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 393 (FC) (at [9] not following Breedon’s case in the result). See generally [1315], text at n 523. 216 Willing v Ewens (No 2) (1973) 7 SASR 231 at 235. 217 As is the statement that all citizens are presumed to know the law: Krahe v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 536 at 546. 218 Friend v Brooker (2009) 255 ALR 601 at [118]. 219 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [77]; P B Carter, “Judicial Notice: Related and Unrelated Matters” in E Campbell and L Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982, pp 90–1; R v Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 649 at 664 (Ont CA). The position is, of course, different in the case of foreign law which must be the subject of evidence and cannot in general be judicially noticed unless notorious: [41005]. 220 See Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492 at [149]; Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia (No 9) (2013) 212 FCR 406 at [31]. 221 See the list in Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [3–8] and [3–10]. 222 Attorney-General v Belsen (1867) 4WW & A’B (E) 57; see too Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149. 223 Duff Development Co Ltd v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797 at 805–6. See also Taylor v Barclay (1828) 2 Sim 213 (judicial notice of non-recognition of a South American republic after consultation with Secretary of State); Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149 (CA); Foster v Globe Venture Syndicate Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 811 (independence of tribes and boundaries of territory); The Fagernes [1927] P 311 (Admiralty’s statement of extent of territorial waters conclusive); Engelke v Musmann [1928] AC 433 (Secretary of State’s letter as to membership of diplomatic suite conclusive); Ffrost v Stevenson (1937) 58 CLR 528 at 549; Banco de Bilbao v Sancha [1938] 2 KB 176 at 195 (CA); The Government of the Republic of Spain v The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] AC 256 at 263–4; R v Bottrill; Ex parte Kuechenmeister [1947] KB 41 (CA) (judicial notice of continuance of war with Germany after consultation with Secretary of State); Gur Corp v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd [1987] QB 599 (CA); Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30 at 51; Re Ditford; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347 at 368. 224 See above [3040] notes 140 and 141. 225 Taylor v Barclay (1828) 2 Sim 213 at 220–1. 226 Whaley v Carlisle (1866) 17 ICLR 792 at 815. 227 Ffrost v Stevenson (1937) 58 CLR 528 at 549; Shaw Savill Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344 at 364; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. 228 Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557. In Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley [1973] 1 NSWLR 382, Sheppard J expressed the view that, in certain cases, while the court would be assisted by such a certificate, it was not necessarily conclusive. 229 See cases cited in n 223 above and Preston v Preston [1963] P 141 at 149. Where the state of war is of sufficient notoriety the judge may, of course, act without executive advice: Shaw Savill Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344 at 357. 230 Attorney-General (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 at [54]. 231 Shaw Savill Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344 at 356. 232 Anglo-Czechoslovak & Prague Credit Bank v Janssen [1943] VLR 185 at 197–9 (FC). 233 Attorney-General (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 at [54], citing Re James [1977] Ch 41 at 71. 234 Attorney-General (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 at [54], citing Re James [1977] Ch 41 at 72. 235 Evidence has been received of the date of an ancient statute: Swaffer v Mulcahy [1934] 1 KB 608 at 614 and 628. 236 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 143. Section 5 (if valid) applies this to all proceedings in an Australian court. See also Evidence Acts 1995 (NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). See Attorney-General v Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582 at [35]. See also Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 43; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 53. 237 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 46–46B and s 48; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 36 and 37A-37B; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 58–61. For equivalent provisions in relation to New Zealand, see Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth) ss 40–45. 238 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 68; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 37; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 53. 239 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 68; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 63; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 53. 240 Ex parte Madsen; Re Hawes (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 550 (FC); Schuett v McKenzie [1968] VR 225 at 228; Reynolds v Bogan Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 36 SASR 193. 241 Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161 at 167. A similar effect is achieved in Western Australia by s 46 of the Interpretation Act 1984: Brady v Mazurak [1983] WAR 291. Cf Marshall v Wettenhall Bros [1914] VLR 266.
242 Freeman v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494 at 498 (FC). 243 R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 at 99 (CCA). See also Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302
at 311. 244 Freeman v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494 at 498–99 (FC). So far as this and other South Australian cases reject the admissibility of Gazette notices, proclamations and regulations, their effect has probably been altered by Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 35. See Police v Barber (2010) 108 SASR 520 at [139]. 245 NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 143; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 143; ACT: Legislation Act 2001 s 26; Evidence Act 2011 s 143; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 143; NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 143. See also Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 143. As to the latter, unless s 9 (3) (d) applies, there is a serious question whether corresponding state and territorial legislation can survive under s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, since s 5 (if constitutionally valid) extends the operation of s 143 (1) to proceedings in all Australian courts. Examples of that legislation include: Qld: Statutory Instruments Act 1992 s 36; Reprints Act 1992 s 48; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 37 (Police v Short (2012) 112 SASR 463 at [16]–[17]); WA: Reprints Act 1984 s 8. If those statutory procedures do survive, they are not exhaustive so that any other available means of proving the regulation may be adopted. See Grieve v Lewis (1917) 23 CLR 413 at 417, where an informal copy was received without objection as part of the material although it was not formally put in or marked as an exhibit. 246 See also [35390] and [39070] below. See also s 69 of Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas) and 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 247 A useful list of these is provided in the ALRC report No 26 (Interim) Appendix C, [273]. The primary provisions are now ss 153-159 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 248 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153. 249 See [3040]. In Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544 at [11] judicial notice of the date of Easter in 2002 was taken after inquiry, but evidence from a witness of his own knowledge was said to be admissible as well. See generally M McConville, “The Doctrine of Judicial Notice and Its Relationship to Evidence” (1979) 1 Liverpool LR 62. 250 The distinction can only be of practical importance in a case tried with a jury. If evidence is being taken the judge must place it before the jury. 251 Contrast Lord Finlay and Lord Sumner in Duff Development Co Ltd v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797 at 813 and 824 respectively. 252 Baldwin & Francis Ltd v Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] AC 663 at 691. 253 Mercer v Denne [1905] 2 Ch 538 (CA). 254 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218. 255 Federal Cmr of Taxation v ICI Aust Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 529 at 544; Yager v R [1977] WAR 17 (CCA). See [29050] below. 256 McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 at 700 (CA). Though often treated as a case involving judicial notice in relation to an adjudicative fact, in truth it is a case more in the category of that type of legislative fact discussed in [3159] — one relevant to the content of a rule of the common law. See also Saul v Menon [1980] 2 NSWLR 314 at 325 (CA). 257 Saul v Menon [1980] 2 NSWLR 314 at 326 (CA); National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v A-G (Vic) [1973] VR 610 at 612. 258 This is the view of Morgan who disagreed on this issue with J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1981, vol 9, [2567]; J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 308; Cardozo J in giving the opinion of the court in Ohio Bell Telephone Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 301 US 292 (1937) at 300–3; and Judge Learned Hand giving the opinion of the court in United States v Aluminum Co of America 148 F 2d 416 (1945) at 446 (2nd Circ). See E M Morgan, “Judicial Notice” (1944) 57 Harv L Rev 269; “The Law of
Evidence, 1941–1945” (1946) 59 Harv L Rev 481 at 482–7. K C Davis, “A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience” in (eds) R Pound et al, Perspectives of Law, 1964, pp 76–93. See also Auckland City Council v Hapimana [1976] 1 NZLR 731 at 733; J T McNaughton, “Judicial Notice — Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy” (1961) 14 Vanderbilt LR 779. 259 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 154. 260 Cf Thomas v Thomas [1961] 1 All ER 19 (DC of PDA) where the magistrates did not give the defendant an opportunity of urging them to take contrary action. 261 R v Rosser (1836) 7 C & P 648. See also Manly v Shaw (1840) Car & M 361; R (Giant’s Causeway & c Tramway Co) v Justices of Antrim [1895] 2 Ir R 603; Palmer v Crone [1927] 1 KB 804; Reynolds v Llanelly Associated Tinplate Co [1948] 1 All ER 140 (CA). 262 For example, a judge sitting in a court exercising equitable jurisdiction will be assumed to have at least a basic knowledge of the ordinary practice of conveyancers: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 435. 263 See [3200]–[3300]. 264 R v Field; Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 at 160. See also Wetherall v Harrison [1976] QB 773, where the Court of Appeal was of opinion that justices and jurors, unlike judges, might properly use their own knowledge to interpret or to understand better the evidence given in court. In West v Sprinkhuizen; Ex parte Sprinkhuizen [1961] Qd R 313 at 317 (FC) Stable J used his personal knowledge of the particular features of a locality to correct statements made below. 265 R v Stewart (1989) 89 Cr App R 273; R v Taka [1992] 2 NZLR 129 (CA). 266 R v Maggs (1990) 91 Cr App R 243. 267 R v Norton-Bennett [1990] 1 NZLR 559 (CA). 268 Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37 at [22]; Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419 at [59]. 269 Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884 at 889 (PC). 270 R v Milk Board; Ex parte Tomkins [1944] VLR 187 at 197. See also Roberts & Ruthven Ltd v Hall (1912) 5 BWCC 331 at 333 (CA) (amount of earnings and probability of obtaining work); Salmi v Under Secretary of the Department of Public Works (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 515 (FC); Peart v Bolckow, Vaughan & Co Ltd [1925] 1 KB 399 at 419–20; Mothersdale v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd (1930) 142 LT 541 at 542 (CA) (knowledge of local labour market); Keane v Mount Vernon Colliery Co Ltd [1933] AC 309 at 317, 329, 337–8 and 341; Bryer v Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 321 at 330 (FC); Tame v Commonwealth Collieries Pty Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 269 at 272 (FC); Kemp v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 707 (FC); Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Elliott (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 87 at 94 (CA); J & H Timbers Pty Ltd v Nelson (1972) 126 CLR 625 at 634 (Commissioner’s “general knowledge and experience”), 643–4 (Commission’s “own knowledge of industrial conditions and wages”) and 651 (Commission’s “judicial knowledge as to such matters as rates of wages and availability of employment”); Seres v All States Providores Pty Ltd [1975] WCR 112 at 116–17 (NSWCA); Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1 at 10–11; New Zealand Public Service Assn v Lee [1970] NZLR 317; MMI Workers Compensation (NSW) v Kennedy (1993) 9 NSWCCR 482 at 489 (CA); Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington (2005) 2 DDCR 271 at [82]. 271 Re Hauni-Werke Korber & Co KG’s Application [1982] RPC 327 at 332 (CA). 272 Glenister v Glenister [1945] P 30 at 36 (PDADC). 273 Salmi v Under Secretary of the Department of Public Works (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 515 at 519 (FC). 274 Reynolds v Llanelly Associated Tinplate Co [1948] 1 All ER 140 at 143–4 (CA) (possibility of very skilled worker of a particular age drawing high wages). See also JLT Scaffolding International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Silva (NSWCA, Kirby P, Mahoney and Priestley JJA, CA 40414 of 1993, 30 March 1994, unreported, BC9402337) discussed in Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419 at [58]; Wallaby Grip (BAE) Ltd (in liq) v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17 NSWCCR 355 at [20] (CA).
275 Pretoria Rent Board (Southern) v Levitt 1953 (3) SA 36 at 41; Denton v Auckland City [1969]
NZLR 256 at 263; Learmouth Property Investment Co Ltd v Aitken 1971 SLT 349 at 356; Dugdale v Kraft Foods Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 454; R v Industrial Appeals Court; Ex parte Maher [1978] VR 126 at 143 (FC); Slapjums v City of Knox (No 1) [1978] VR 325 at 341–2; Waring v Administracao Geral do Acucar e do Alcool EP [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45; quoted in ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2004) 60 NSWLR 18 at [229]. The need to give natural justice was denied in Mechanical Advantage Group Pty Ltd v George (2003) 25 NSWCCR 368 at [63]. 276 Hammington v Berker Sport Craft Ltd [1980] ICR 248 at 250–2 (EAT). 277 R v City of Westminster Assessment Committee; Ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd [1941] 1 KB 53 at 69 (CA). 278 Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 at 734 (CA). 279 Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541 at 544–5 (Land and Valuation Court). 280 Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 at 734 (CA) 281 National Instruments Pty Ltd v Gilles (1975) 49 ALJR 349 at 350. See also the similar cases discussed in State of New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536 at [74]–[84]. 282 Brown v Alyta [1970] ALR 897 at 899 (HC). 283 Layton v Walsh (1978) 19 ALR 594 at 607–8 (Fed C of A FC). 284 Dessent v Commonwealth of Australia (1977) 13 ALR 437 at 447. 285 Staffer v Hanley (CA (NSW), 6 April 1978, unreported) pp 9–10 per Reynolds JA. 286 Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549 at 559. 287 Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 639. 288 State of New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536 at [72]. 289 Radakovic v R G Cram & Sons Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 751 at 761–2 (CA) (jury entitled to apply “their own knowledge and experience”). See also Trocko v Renlita Products Pty Ltd (1971) 2 SASR 1 at 8 (Wells J reluctantly taking judicial notice of “general wage levels”). 290 Examples of cases raising these questions include those concerning the fact that in the collecting offices of some stations the public can walk among the parcels while in others the parcels are behind a counter (H & C Smith Ltd v Great Western Railway Co [1921] 2 KB 237 at 250 (CA)), the significance of pinholes in the margin of an insurance policy (Thomas Cheshire & Co v Vaughan Brothers & Co [1920] 3 KB 240 at 253 (CA)), the ease of recovering a sunken tug in favourable conditions (Captain J A Cates Tug and Wharfage Co Ltd v Franklin Insurance Co) [1927] AC 698 at 703-5 (PC)) and tidal and geographic conditions on the Thames (SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporack [1927] AC 37 at 53 and 56 (HL)). 291 Hughes v Lancaster Steam Collieries Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 556 at 558 (CA). 292 Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419 at [62]–[65]. 293 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588. The majority overruled “earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal concerning the Dust Diseases Tribunal” so far as they hold to the contrary, instancing GIO General Ltd v ABB Installation & Service Pty Ltd (2000) 19 NSWCCR 720 at [34] and ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2004) 60 NSWLR 18 at [232]. It is very doubtful that they do hold to the contrary: see Dasreef’s case at [142]–[143]. 294 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at [139]. 295 Eclipse Sleep Products Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1957) 99 CLR 300 at 321. 296 Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at [47]. The opinion of a county court judge in relation to personal injuries was given no special weight in Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124 at [14]–[16]. 297 For example, Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] 2 AC 229 at [18]–[19]. 298 Mangano v Farleigh Nettheim Pty Ltd (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 228 (FC). For the US position, compare People v Maragh 94 NY 2d 569 (2000) (experts who are jurors may not introduce
evidence not tendered by the parties, but may use their professional skill to assess expert evidence) with Meyer v State of Nevada 119 Nev 554 (2003) (jurors with specialised knowledge or expertise may convey their opinion based on it to fellow jurors, but may not relate the specific information from an outside source, such as quoting from a treatise or research results). 299 R v Rosser (1836) 7 Car & P 648. See also Wright v Crump (1702) 7 Mod 1 at 2. 300 See J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1981, vol 9, [2570]. There are cases permitting the juror, after giving evidence, to join in the jury verdict (Fitz-James v Moys (1663) 1 Sid 133; R (Giant’s Causeway & Tramway Co) v Justices of Co Antrim [1895] 2 IR 603 at 657) but these are unlikely to be followed now: R E Megarry, A New Miscellany-at-Law, p 128 and [13300]. 301 R v White (1987) 49 SASR 154 (CCA). 302 Minagall v Ayres [1966] SASR 151. 303 In the Marriage of Zantiotis (1993) 113 ALR 441 (Fam C of A FC). 304 As to the permissible limits, see P W Young, “Observations by Trial Judges Outside Court” (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 199. 305 Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 (CA). 306 Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [69]–[75]. 307 Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399 (FC). See also Newell v Cronje 1985 (4) SA 692 at 698 (ECD); Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 (CA); In the Marriage of F and M Chehab (1993) 113 FLR 94 (Fam C of A FC); Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437 at 448–50; Bowman v DPP [1990] Crim LR 600 (DC of QBD); Farah v Australian Postal Corporation (1994) 35 ALD 349 (Fed C of A); Kappos v State Transit Authority (1995) 11 NSW CCR 386 at 391 (CA); Kassem v Crossley (2000) 32 MVR 179; Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37 at [27]; Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 823 at [8]–[16]; Ucar v Nylex Industrial Products Pty Ltd (2007) 17 VR 492 at [21]–[27]; Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419 at [57] and [64]–[65]. 308 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145, applied in Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437 at 450 and In the Marriage of Zantiotis (1993) 113 ALR 441 (Fam C of A FC). See also R v Martin (No 7) (2000) 78 SASR 140 (CCA). 309 Angaston & District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177 at 178–9 (FC). 310 Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 23 FCR 282. 311 R v Blick (1966) 50 Cr App R 280. 312 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153. 313 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 256. See generally R v Simpson [1983] 3 All ER 789 (CA). 314 Where they were or might have been used in the commission of the offence: Thompson v R (1968) 117 CLR 313. See further [21180] below. 315 See R v Toia [1982] 1 NZLR 555; R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 (CA). See [15220] below. 316 Critics see this as especially a matter for concern in cases where the events under investigation provoked revulsion or other strong feelings. Examples include assumptions that the possession by a male person of powder puffs and lewd photographs of boys indicates a predisposition to homosexual practices: Thompson v R [1918] AC 221; and that homosexual activity is stimulated by looking at photographs of heterosexual activities: R v Gillingham [1939] 4 All ER 122 (CCA). This may be compared with the refusal by the House of Lords in Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 (especially at 460 and 463) to take judicial notice about the practices of middle aged homosexuals. 317 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 142. See too [3035] above. 318 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 (PC). See [3040] above. 319 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [83]–[84]. 320 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70. Cf Ffrost v Stevenson (1937) 58 CLR 528 at 549 and the contrary assumptions of Kirby J in Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1 at [232] and Callinan J in
Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [168]. Cf Dawson v Great Central Railway (1919) 12 BWCC 163 (CA). 321 Commonwealth Shipping Representative v Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service [1923] AC 191 at 197. 322 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 (the court received an official report dealing with the relationship of Aboriginal peoples with the land vested in them by statute which was not before the South Australian Supreme Court from whose judgment in a case stated on appeal to the South Australian Full Court was removed to the High Court). 323 M J Sacks, “Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works” (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011 at 1017, 1023 and 1028. 324 Breen v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 at 411; Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 142. See generally Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [225]–[228], [523]–[529] and [614]– [649]. See also J D Holmes, “Evidence in Constitutional Cases” (1949) 23 ALJ 235; P Brazil, “The Ascertainment of Facts in Australian Constitutional Cases” (1970–71) 4 Fed L Rev 65; S H Kadish, “Judicial Review in the High Court and the United States Supreme Court” (1959) 2 MULR 127; P H Lane, “Facts in Constitutional Law” (1963) 37 ALJ 108; L Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 5th ed, 2008, pp 644–58;WAWynes, Legislative Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, 5th ed, 1976, pp 46–7; S Kenny, “Constitutional Fact Ascertainment” (1990) 1 Public LR 134; P H Lane, The Australian Federal System, 2nd ed, 1979, pp 1083–1105; E Campbell, “Fact Finding in Constitutional Cases”, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1988, Vol 2, App M, p 1099; K Burns, “It’s just not cricket: The High Court, sport and legislative facts” (2002) 10 Torts LJ 234; K Burns, “the Way the World Is: Social facts in High Court Negligence Cases” (2004) 12 Torts LJ 215. 325 Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 at 292; Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [351]; K Burns, “The Australian High Court and Social Facts: A Content Analysis Study” (2012) 40 Fed LR 317. 326 Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266 at 302. 327 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2. See also 159 CLR 70 at 87–8, 142–3. See further Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 276; Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 at 292; Breen v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 at 411–12; Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 at 598–9; Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v NSW (2003) 133 FCR 63 at [47]–[49]. 328 McEldowney v Forde [1971] AC 632 at 661; South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 at 179. 329 South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 at 179. 330 PW Hogg, “Proof of Facts in Constitutional Cases” (1976) 26 UTLJ 386 at 397. A similar view is advocated by P H Lane, The Australian Federal System, 2nd ed, 1979, p 1096. This is a view which has had some support in the Supreme Court of Canada: for example, Anti-Inflation Reference (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 452 at 495–6. 331 South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 at 179. 332 Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v NSW (2003) 133 FCR 63 at [48]. 333 D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91 at 117. See B Selway, “The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia” (2001) 20 U of Tas LR 129 at 137–8. 334 B Selway, “The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia” (2001) 20 U of Tas LR 129 at 136, especially at n 39 (the authority referred to, AttorneyGeneral (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 at [54] does not support the proposition), and 139. 335 Breen v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 at 411. 336 Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488 at 507. 337 At least this is so now. For an argument that before 1944 the High Court of Australia avoided
making constitutionality turn on questions of fact, see S Kenny, “Constitutional Fact Ascertainment” (1990) 1 PLR 134 at 149–52. See also M J Saks, “Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works” (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011 at 1017-18; Ellie Margolis, “Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs” (2000) 34 University of San Francisco Law Review 197. 338 R v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte the Western Australian National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 207. 339 Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v NSW (2003) 133 FCR 63 at [50]. 340 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2. 341 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 222. 342 Zorach v Clauson 343 US 306 at 322 (1952). 343 Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185 at [124]; Clarke v FCT (2009) 240 CLR 272 at [66]. 344 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457 at 469. See also Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 256. 345 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 225. 346 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 144–5, 149, 151 and 256. 347 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 88. See also Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488 at 507 (“general knowledge and experience of Australian affairs”). And for Canada, see Attorney-General for Alberta v Attorney-General for Canada [1939] AC 117 at 130 per Lord Maugham LC (“the Court must take into account any public knowledge of which the Court would take judicial notice”). 348 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 256. 349 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457 at 469. See also Hume v Higgins (1949) 78 CLR 116 at 136. Similar language was used in A-G for Alberta v A-G for Canada [1939] AC 117 at 130 (PC). In Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735 at 806 Evatt J’s less demanding test was what “every well-informed person in Australia” was aware of. 350 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 197. See also Kitto J at 277. 351 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196–7. See also 208 and 210. 352 Griffin v Constantine (1954) 91 CLR 136 at 140 and 142. 353 The words are those of Sir Lyman Duff CJ in Re Alberta Legislation [1938] 2 DLR 81 at 103 (SC Can), adopted by Evatt J in Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735 at 795–6. 354 Re Alberta Legislation [1938] 2 DLR 81 at 103 (SC Can), approved on appeal: A-G for Alberta v A-G for Canada [1939] AC 117 at 132 (PC). 355 As Callinan J pointed out in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [165]. 356 Jenkins v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 400; Sloan v Pollard (1947) 75 CLR 445. 357 Armstrong v Victoria (No 2) [1957] 99 CLR 28 at 90. 358 Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559. 359 South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373 at 378; Sloan v Pollard (1947) 75 CLR 445 at 449. See also Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 173 and 239; Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 7. 360 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120 at 125, 160–2 and 174–7. See also Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488 at 507. 361 Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488 at 507; Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353]. For example, Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120 at 175. 362 Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488 at 507; Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353].
363 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 142; Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353] 364 Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v NSW (2003) 133 FCR 63 at [48]. 365 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [525]; Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353]. 366 Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353]; cf Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 142
(leaving the matter open). 367 Marcus Clark & Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177 at 227. 368 Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 at 292. 369 North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559 at 622. See also Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [351]. 370 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2. See also Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353]. 371 Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272 at 304. 372 See above n 327. 373 Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [353], citing Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [526] and [613]–[639]. 374 Anti-Inflation Reference (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 452 at 468. 375 North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559 at 622. 376 B L Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, 3rd ed, 1988, p 292, quoted in R v Bonin (1989) 47 CCC (3d) 230 at 248. 377 L Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 5th ed, 2008, p 656. 378 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [164]. 379 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2. 380 See E M Morgan, “Judicial Notice” (1944) 52 Harv LR 269 at 279–87; P B Carter, “Judicial Notice: Related and Unrelated Matters” in E Campbell and L Waller, (Eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982, pp 50–2. 381 S Kenny, “Constitutional Fact Ascertainment” (1990) 1 PLR 134 at 159. Cf Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 142 (leaving the matter open). 382 Jenkins v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 400 at 406. 383 R v Foster (1949) 79 CLR 43 at 88. 384 New South Wales v Commonwealth (No 1) (1932) 46 CLR 155 at 181–2. 385 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 at 442–3 (also, the commonness of sumptuary laws as war measures: 441). 386 Harper v Victoria (1966) 114 CLR 361 at 369. 387 Nott Bros & Co Ltd v Barkley (1925) 36 CLR 20 at 27–8. 388 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196. 389 Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 at 562. 390 Griffin v Constantine (1954) 91 CLR 136 at 140–3. 391 Marcus Clark & Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177 at 217. 392 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120 at 175. 393 Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488 at 507. 394 Gonzwa v Commonwealth (1944) 68 CLR 469 at 477. 395 Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 495 at 504. 396 KoonWing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533 at 579–80. 397 Breen v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 at 413, 421–2 and 424; R v Judges of FCA & Adamson; Ex parte WA National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 202. 398 Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 at 302. 399 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457 at 469. 400 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 125; Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261 at 296.
401 B Selway, “The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of
Australia” (2001) 20 U of Tas LR 129 at 139. 402 R v Portus; Ex parte McNeil (1961) 105 CLR 537 at 540–1; R v Heagney; Ex parte ACT Employers Federation (1976) 137 CLR 86 at 104; O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 at 252. 403 See Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [21], at [45] and [350]–[354] (and [355] — a party arguing that an impugned law is a special measure may assume a persuasive burden of argument, but not a legal burden of proof). 404 Tasmania v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 329 at 358–9. 405 T R S Allen, “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law” (1985) 44 Camb LJ 111 at 123. 406 Aldridge v Williams 44 US (3 How) 9 at 24 (1845). 407 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 260. 408 Cth: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 15AB; NSW: Interpretation Act 1987 s 34; Qld: Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 14B; Tas: Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 8B; WA: Interpretation Act 1984 s 19; ACT: Legislation Act 2001 ss 141–143; NT: Interpretation Act s 62B. 409 Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 35. 410 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [165]. 411 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2. See also MJ Saks, “Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works” (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011 at 1017–18. 412 Marks v Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549 at 577–81. 413 Ward v R (1980) 142 CLR 308. 414 Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd v Gowans (2005) 221 CLR 249 at [10]–[21]. 415 Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260 at [32]–[95]. 416 R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex pWA National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 240. 417 G R Mullane, “Evidence of Social Science Research: Law, Practice and Options in the Family Court of Australia” (1998) 72 ALJ 434. 418 Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 269 ALR 204 at [77]–[104]. 419 Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1988) 22 FCR 378 at 384. 420 Police v Smith and Herewini [1994] 2 NZLR 306 at 317–8 (CA). 421 Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170 at [20]–[22] and [66]–[74]. 422 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [65]. 423 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2. See M J Saks, “Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works” (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011 at 1017–18. 424 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 385. 425 Tasmania v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 329 at 358–9; Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (New South Wales) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 at 1105–8. 426 Evans v Williams (1910) 11 CLR 550 at 571. 427 Australian Tramways Employés Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (1913) 17 CLR 680 at 695. 428 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 at 152. 429 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 17. 430 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 47. 431 Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161 at 187. 432 See also at 174–7; and Watson v Lee (1979) 144 CLR 374 at 399. 433 Commonweatlh v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 393 at 411–14. 434 Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263 at 293–9. 435 Paterson v O’Brien (1978) 138 CLR 276 at 279. 436 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338 at 394 (a statement which, unless it applies only to pre-1901 appropriations, may rest on a fallacy, for the construction of the Constitution cannot
be changed merely because of post 1901 practices, particularly practices well after 1901). 437 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 at [253]. 438 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [166]–[167]. 439 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 554–63. 440 R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan and O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518 at 557–65; see also Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95 at 108 (“our constitutional and legal history”). 441 King v Jones (1972) 128 CLR 221 at 229–30. See also Fabre v Lay (1972) 127 CLR 665 at 669–70 (construing s 31 of the Constitution by reference to the laws of four of the Colonies). 442 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 17. 443 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 47. 444 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 20 and 45–6 and 48. 445 Attorney-General for Victoria; Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 at 616–17 per Mason J. See also at 581–2; 328–9 per Barwick CJ, 597; 340–1 per Gibbs J, 607–8; 348–9 per Stephen J and 624; 362 per Murphy J. 446 Attorney-General for Victoria; Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 at 606–7. 447 Attorney-General for Victoria; Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 at 628. 448 1st ed, 1838; 4th ed, 1841 — at 624. 449 South Australian Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs v Charles Moore (Aust) Ltd (1977) 139 CLR 449 at 479. 450 Australian Tramways Employés Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (1913) 17 CLR 680 at 696–7. 451 Aston v Irvine (1955) 92 CLR 353 at 364. 452 Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415 at 421–2. 453 Western Australia v Commonwealth (Territorial Senators) (1975) 134 CLR 201 at 274. 454 For example, Aston v Irvine (1955) 92 CLR 353 at 364; Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161 at 190-1 (s 74). 455 1st ed 1902, 2nd ed 1910. 456 1st ed 1901, 2nd ed 1905. See Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 173. 457 R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 at 684–5. 458 Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263 at 293–9. 459 Seamen’s Union of Australia Co Ltd v Utah Development Co (1978) 144 CLR 120 at 140. 460 Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585 at 622 and 626–8 (Privy Council); Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (New South Wales) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 at 1114–15 and 1148; Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161 at 190–1. 461 Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employés Union of New South Wales (Union Label case) (1908) 6 CLR 469 at 507–8. 462 Re Webster (1975) 132 CLR 270 at 277–8. 463 Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177 at 191–5. 464 R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556 at 572 and 574. 465 Attorney-General (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529 at 554–5. 466 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow & Co (1910) 11 CLR 1 at 24. 467 National Trustees, Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1916) 22 CLR 367 at 376 (a provision taxing property on death and a provision taxing gifts inter vivos a short time before death both part of one taxation law). 468 Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497 at 509. See also Harding v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1917) 23 CLR 119 at 127–30. 469 Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69 at 75–6 per Barwick CJ and 91; 346 per Windeyer J.
470 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45. 471 Maguire v Simpson (1977) 139 CLR 362 at 371. 472 The Illawarra District County Council v Wickham (1959) 101 CLR 467 at 502–3. 473 Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 393 at 413 (“part of the fabric on
which the written words of the Constitution are superimposed”). 474 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353 at 382; R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361 at 392. 475 R v Snow (1915) 20 CLR 315 at 323. 476 Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v Victoria (1953) 87 CLR 1 at 21; R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 297 (Art III on the federal judiciary); Attorney-General for Victoria; Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 at 609–10 (on s 116 and the establishment of religion). 477 Municipal Council of Sydney v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 208 at 239–41. 478 Cheatle v R (1993) 177 CLR 541 at 557. 479 Brown v R (1986) 160 CLR 171 at 181 (s 80). 480 R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41 at 106 (s 51 (ii)); Ex parte Nelson (No 1) (1928) 42 CLR 209 at 232–3 (s 92); Brown v R (1986) 160 CLR 171 at 182 (s 80). 481 P Schoff, “The High Court and History: It Still Hasn’t Found (ed) What It’s Looking For” (1994) 5 PLR 253 at 267–8. 482 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 385. 483 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 363: see 363–7. 484 For example, Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at [122]–[127]. 485 The extent to which the Convention Debates have in fact been referred to before and after 1988 is traced by Carl McCamish, “The Use of Historical Materials in Interpreting the Commonwealth Constitution” (1996) 70 ALJ 638. 486 Nile v Wood (1988) 167 CLR 133 at 140 (in concluding that s 44 (iii), which provides that an “undischarged bankrupt or insolvent” is incapable of sitting in Parliament, “undischarged” attaches to both “bankrupt” and “insolvent”; Convention Debates also considered); Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 541–3 (United Kingdom statutes also considered). 487 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 385–94 (Report of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations (1849) 35 British Parliamentary Papers 33 at 44; Report of the South Australian Royal Commission on Inter Colonial Free Trade, 1891; Reports of Victorian Board of Inquiry in 1854 and 1895 — to show a contemporary perception that there should be an inter-Colonial free trade area). 488 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 387. 489 XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532 at [156], summarising Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act case) (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 476–84. See also Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418 at [21]–[48]; Pape v Cmr of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 at [187]– [205]. 490 For example, in Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161 at 174 and 179. 491 Cheatle v R (1993) 177 CLR 541 at 552. 492 Pape v Cmr of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 at [426]–[428]. 493 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at [173]. 494 Prentis v Atlantic Coastline Co 211 US 210 at 227 (1908). 495 Chastleton Corp v Sinclair 264 US 543 at 548 (1924). 496 Lewis v Rucker (1761) 2 Burr 1167 at 1172. See also Glover v Black (1763) 3 Burr 1394 at 1401. Holt CJ had taken a similar course in relation to bills of exchange: Buller v Cripps (1703) 6 Mod 29 at 30. 497 P B Carter, “Judicial Notice: Related and Unrelated Matters”, (eds) E Campbell and L Waller,
Well and Truly Tried, 1982, pp 93–94. For similar sentiments expressed by Sir Ivor Richardson, see Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 at 267–8 (CA); “Judges as Lawmakers in the 1990s” (1986) 12 Mon LR 35 at 45–48; and “Public Interest Litigation” (1995) 3 Waikato LR 1 at 9–12 (neatly summarising the problems). See also Robert Chambers, “Current Sources of Law: A Commentary” in (ed) Rick Bigwood, Legal Method in New Zealand: Essays and Commentaries, 2001, pp 134–5. 498 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [165]. McHugh J at [65] is to be preferred: he applied to “a principle or rule of the common law or equity” Brennan J’s statement in Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141 that the “scope of the law cannot be made to depend on the course of private litigation.” See M J Saks, “Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works” (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011 at 1017–18; E Margolis, “Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of NonLegal Materials in Appellate Briefs” (2000) 34 University of San Francisco Law Review 197; J D Heydon, “Developing the Common Law” in (eds) Justin T Gleeson and Ruth C A Higgins, Constituting Law: Legal Argument and Social Values, 2011, p 93. 499 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [165] and [168]. He was also right to point out that Brennan J in Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 141–2 did not suggest the contrary. K C Davis, “Facts in Law Making” (1980) 80 Col LR 931 at 932–3 accepted, in the case of legislative facts, that prior advice should be given to the parties where it was proposed to rely on a legislative fact which is “ (1) narrow and specific, (2) central or critical, (3) controversial, (4) unmixed with judgment or policy, (5) provable and (6) in some degree about the parties or mainly known by them …”. The question remains why prior advice should not be given to the parties where the facts are “ (1) broad and general, (2) background or peripheral, (3) non controversial, (4) mixed with judgment or policy, (5) not easily provable and (6) wholly unrelated to the parties”: at 933. A party may wish to challenge any one of these characterisations, and may wish to be heard on what the relevant “judgment or policy” should be, for example. See also R Traynor, “Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts” (1957) 24 Uni of Chi L Rev 211 at 219. 500 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 at [89]. 501 Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [17] and [125]. 502 Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [35] and [130]. 503 Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [106]. 504 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 at [374]. 505 Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 at [347]. 506 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 at [57]; Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [108]; Tame v NSW (2002) 211 CLR 317 at [26] and [335]; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 at [102]. 507 R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 at [49]–[110]. 508 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [62]–[63]. See also De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338 at [104], [108] and [113] (percentage of widows who remarry); [117] n 140 (increased incidence of de facto relationships); and [153] (2) (increased incidence of divorce). 509 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 600–1. 510 Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 409 and 436; Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35WAR 159 at [29]. 511 Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 at 463. 512 Ryan v R (2001) 206 CLR 267 at [42]. 513 R v Accused (CA 406/92) [1994] 3 NZLR 157 (CA). 514 Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Reg) (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 282–
9. 515 Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166 at [106]–[111]. 516 Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413 at [52]–[56]. 517 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 at 452–3 and 473. 518 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 686. 519 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 75. 520 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 625; criticised in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v
CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 at [217]. See also discussion of facts relating to building design at [17], [81]–[87], [95]–[96], [100], [103], [107]–[108], [110]–[114], [126], [181], [213]–[214], [218] and [223]; and Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1 at [133]. 521 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 at 534. 522 Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1 at 16–21. 523 Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195 at [77]–[90]. 524 Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 366 at [200]. 525 Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 at 611. 526 State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617 at 627. 527 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 at 524–7 (CA). See also, in relation to hazards in domestic houses, Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 222 ALR 631 at [7]–[9], [12], [14], [23], [59], [66], [69], [73], [75], [86], [94], [96], [100]–[101] and [116]. 528 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 at [62]; New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 at [53], [66]–[67], [74], [123], [164]–[165], [204], [215]–[218], [240]–[241], [268], [276], [327] and [342]. 529 Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Canberra and Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161 at [25], [27], [39], [44] and [46]. 530 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. 531 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] AC 822 at [161] per Lord Sumption. 532 Sometimes the relevant facts are discussed without reference to non-legal material and only by reference to decisions in cases and legal writings (eg Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Reg) (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 282–9; Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 at [240] n 454. Sometimes they are discussed with reference to material from disciplines other than law (eg Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 at 348 (CA); Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166 at [106]–[111] and Family Court cases discussed by G R Mullane “Evidence of Social Science Research: Law, Practice and Options in the Family Court of Australia” (1998) 72 ALJ 434 at 440 and 442–7) or statements by or on behalf of governments (Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 at 452–3; Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 at 524–7 (CA); Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 at [144]). Sometimes the reasoning is not supported by reference to external material at all, eg Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413 at [52]–[56]. See the examples given in K Burns, “The Australian High Court and Social Facts: A Content Analysis Study” (2012) 40 Fed LR 317 at 334– 335. Sometimes it is derived from evidence tendered in the case itself: Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [103]. 533 Carl Baar, “Criminal Court Delay and the Charter: the Use and Misuse of Social Facts in Judicial Policy Making” (1993) 72 Can Bar Rev 305; J J McGrath, “Reading Legislation and Ivor Richardson” (2002) 33 Vic U Wellington L Rev 597 at 612–18; J D Heydon, “Developing the Common Law” in (eds) JustinT Gleeson and Ruth C A Higgins, Constituting Law: Legal Argument and Social Values, 2011, p 93. 534 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 at [76]. 535 R v Giam (No 2) (1999) 109 A Crim R 348 at [21]. 536 Re Ly; Ex parte Dixon v Ly (1995) 62 FCR 432 at 435. 537 Owens v Repatriation Commission (1995) 59 FCR 559 at 589 (FC). See also Jenkins v
Repatriation Commission (1996) 137 ALR 729 at 737 (Fed C of A). 538 Barker v Gifford (2005) 192 FLR 347 at [27]. 539 X v X [2000] FLC 93–017 (Fam C of A FC). 540 Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 204 ALR 258. 541 JLS v JES (1996) 20 Fam LR 485 at 486–7 (NSWSC). 542 Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 186 FCR 226 at [24]. 543 Kent v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd (2006) 15 Tas R 264 at [12]. 544 LED Technologies Pty Ltd v Elecspess Pty Ltd (2008) 80 IPR 85 at [48]. 545 Victorian Women Lawyers’ Association Inc v FCT (2008) 170 FCR 318 at [116]. 546 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Jutsen (No 3) (2011) 285 ALR 110 at [100]. 547 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v E Direct Pty Ltd (in liq) (2012) 206 FCR 160 at [74] para 8 (relying on Australian Bureau of Statistics publication). 548 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [77] and [82]. 549 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [75]–[82]; ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of NSW (2004) 60 NSWLR 18 at [219]–[232]; Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington (2005) 2 DDCR 271 at [82]. Cf Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 204 ALR 258 at [17]; Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170 at [21] and [73]. 550 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [85]. 551 Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Ltd (2004) 139 FCR 215 at [16]. 552 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67 at [85]. 553 ALRC 26, vol 1, [977]. 554 ALRC 26, vol 1, [977]. 555 Urquhart v Butterfield (1887) 37 Ch D 357 at 369 (CA); Dunn v Brown (1911) 12 SR (NSW) 22 at 41 and 51 (FC). 556 Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738; Ridolfi v Rigato Farms Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 455; Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 327 at [17]–[19]; Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Norlis Pty Ltd (2010) 79 ACSR 668. Cf H Clark (Doncaster) Ltd v Wilkinson [1965] Ch 694 (CA). See also Cropper v Smith (1884) 26 Ch D 700 (CA); Hollis v Burton [1892] 3 Ch 226 (CA); Dunn v Brown (1911) 12 SR (NSW) 22 at 41 and 51 (FC); Ell v Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Board (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 437 at 441–2 (FC); Cumper v Pothecary [1941] 2 KB 58; McFadden v Snow (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 8 at 9; Langdale v Danby [1982] 3 All ER 129 at 140 (HL); JW Shaw (2003) 77 ALJ 731. For withdrawal of admissions by insurers of liability under motor accidents legislation, see Ness v Graffen (2003) 60 NSWLR 549. 557 Doe d Wetherell v Bird (1835) 7 C & P 6 at 7; Langley v Earl of Oxford (1836) 5 LJ Exch (NS) 166 at 167; Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 at [18]. Cf Dawson v Great Central Railway (1919) 12 BWCC 163 (CA). 558 Dunn v Brown (1911) 12 SR (NSW) 22 at 41 and 51 (FC); cf J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1972, vol 4 [1067]. 559 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70. See generally [3040] below. 560 Section 191 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). See ACCC v Bridgestone Corp (2010) 186 FCR 214 at [12]–[16]. 561 ACCC v The Australian Medical Association Western Australia Branch Inc (2001) 114 FCR 91 at [34]. 562 Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 10 at [35]. 563 For example, Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] 2 AC 229 at [18]–[19]. 564 Gramophone Co Ltd v Magazine Holder Co (1911) 28 RPC 221 (HL); Davison v Vickery’s Motors Ltd (in liq) (1925) 37 CLR 1 at 7; Adams v Naylor [1946] AC 543; Royster v Cavey [1947] KB 204
(CA); Termijtelen v Van Arkel [1974] 1 NSWLR 525 at 530 and 534–5 (CA); Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492 at [157]–[163] (foreign law); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 321 at [42]–[51]; Holdway v Arcuri Lawyers [2009] 2 Qd R 18 at [5] and [65]. 565 R v Chiron [1980] 1 NSWLR 218 at 226–7. There is a statutory ban on the reception of the plea as an admission in the Northern Territory: Justices Act s 141 (4). There is a statutory ban on comment to the jury at all there, and on any comment by the prosecution in South Australia: Summary Procedure Act 1921 s 111 (3). 566 R v Hetherington [1972] Crim LR 703 (CA). See also cases cited at [33605] nn 549 and 550 and [33610] n 557. 567 R v Bateman (1845) 1 Cox CC 186; Munday v Gill (1930) 44 CLR 38 at 68 and 70; R v Maes [1975] VR 541 at 550 (FC); R v O’Sullivan (1975) 13 SASR 68 at 74 (FC). Cf R v Thornhill (1838) 8 C & P 575 at 576, where Lord Abinger CB refused to accept an agreement between the attorneys and said that no admission could be made unless it was made at the trial by the defendant or the defendant’s counsel; but in Rattray v Roach (1890) 16 VLR 165 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria denied the proposition that admissions could be made by counsel. In Smart v Pepper (1987) 26 A Crim R 140 at 142 it was said that the trend of recent English authority “gravitates towards requiring a defendant to be bound by admissions made by his advocate in his presence as an application of the general principles of agency”, citing R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr App Rep 67 at 82. But R v Turner concerned admissions made by an advocate, not in the trial of the accused in which they were tendered, but in an earlier trial. Whether there are other ways of narrowing the issues in a criminal trial, particularly so as to avoid the tender of similar fact evidence, is controversial: Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374 at [110], [144]–[150]. 568 R v Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337 at 341. See also Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374 at [88]. 569 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 ss 184 and 191; Qld: Criminal Code 1899 s 644; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 ss 184 and 191; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 184 and 191; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 ss 184 and 191; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 34; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 32; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 ss 184 and 191; NT: Criminal Code 1983 s 379; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 184 and 191. 570 R v Lewis (1971) 55 Cr App R 386; Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374 at [63], [89]–[94] and [106]–[109]. 571 R v Lennard [1973] 2 All ER 831 at 834. 572 L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 304. 573 Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482 at [79]. 574 Yager v R (1977) 139 CLR 28. 575 See Old Chief v United States (1997) 519 US 172 at 187–9. 576 R v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37 (ACT SC); R v O’Sullivan (1975) 13 SASR 68 at 74 (FC); R v Raabe [1985] 1 Qd R 115 at 116 and 124 (FC); Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1 at [73]; cf R v Smith [1981] 1 NSWLR 193 (CCA). 577 R v Mitchell [1971] VR 46 at 65 (FC). 578 In the Northern Territory, as an added incentive, the Criminal Code entitles the judge in sentencing an accused to have regard to his unreasonable refusal to make an admission when so required by the Crown: Criminal Code 1983 s 380. 579 R v Hepworth 1928 AD 265. 580 L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 303. 581 R v Kolton [2000] Crim LR 761 (CA). 582 R v Maes [1975] VR 541 at 551 (FC); R v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 at 9 (CCA). In the Northern Territory this is specifically provided for: Criminal Code 1983 s 379 (2). 583 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 183. Since a failure to make admission as to matters not seriously in issue may be taken as an indication of lack of remorse for the purposes of sentencing,
there is some incentive for an accused not to withhold such an admission: Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5 (2C) and (2D). Furthermore, an unreasonable failure to make an admission may provide cause for an order for costs against the accused or the legal representatives of the accused: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 352 and ss 358. 584 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 182. 585 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 183. See also Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v McEwan (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 421 (relying on the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 137 in refusing leave to the prosecution to cross-examine the accused on the response where it had been drafted by a lawyer rather than by the accused). 586 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 222 (b). 587 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 237 (1) (a). 588 R v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 at [19]. The accused may dispute an admission in the prosecution’s notice of pre-trial admission: s 183 (3). 589 R v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 at [18] and [23]–[24]. 590 S v Christodoulou 1967 (3) SA 269. 591 Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538 at 570 (“common experience”); Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 577–8 (“common experience”). 592 A L Levin and R J Levy, “Persuading the Jury With Facts Not in Evidence: The FictionScience Spectrum” (1956) 105 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139 at 141. In R v Deaboyer (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 198 at 228 L’Heureux-Dube J said: “there are certain areas of inquiry where experience, common sense and logic are informed by stereotype and myth”. See also the difference of opinion about the impact of scarring as between males and females in Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Burbury (1989) 10 MVR 189 (NSWCA). 593 R v Jansen [1970] SASR 531 at 554 [4] (CCA). “Common experience” is also relevant in criminal law. “Common experience is necessary to the man of ordinary prudence, and a man who assumes to act as the defendant did must have it at his peril. When the jury are asked whether a stick of a certain size was a deadly weapon, they are not asked further whether the defendant knew that it was so. It is enough that he used and saw it such as it was”: Commonwealth v Pierce 138 Mass 165 at 180 (1884) per Holmes J. 594 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 214. See also Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 640. 595 Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 87. 596 G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 at 390 per Brennan and McHugh JJ. See also Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Moss (1906) 4 CLR 311 at 317; R v Shaw (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 383 at 388 (FC); Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 173; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375 and 381; Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 222 and 224–5; R v Sutton (1983) 32 SASR 553 at 554 and 568–9; Eastern Express Pty Ltd v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 43 at 72. Further, “the judges do know, as much as juries, what is the usual and normal state of things, and consequently whether any particular article is of such a description as that it may be a necessary under such usual state of things”: Ryder v Wombwell (1868) LR 4 Ex 32 at 40. 597 Rostad v Portland Ry, Light and Power Co 201 P 184 at 187 (SC Or, 1921) per Burnett CJ. 598 Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269 at [47]. 599 Eg, refreshment of memory: [17220]; warnings relating to delayed trials: [17295]; and drawing, and not drawing, inferences from silence: [3280] and [23015]. See generally [3159]. 600 But see J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, pp 265, 270– 1, 275, 279–80 and 314; J H Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof, 2nd ed, 1931 p 5; G F James, “Relevance, Probability in the Law” (1941) 29 California Law Review 689; L J Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, 1977, pp 248–51 and 274–5; R Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983, pp 143–4;W A NWells, Evidence and Advocacy, 1988, pp 47–53;WA NWells, Natural Logic, Judicial Proof and Objective Facts, 1994, pp 2–3, 8, 75 and 82–7; P Roberts and A Zuckerman,
Criminal Evidence, 2004, at pp 111–16; J A Smillie, “The Problem of ‘Official Notice’: Reliance by Administrative Tribunals on the Personal Knowledge of their Members” [1975] Public Law 64 at 68–9. See also Stokes v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 at 48 (FC); Kouris v The Prospector’s Motel Pty Ltd (1976) 14 SASR 407 at 425 (FC). 601 Indeed in Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 at 607, Toohey and McHugh JJ appeared to suggest that there is no distinction. The same may be true of Brennan CJ’s observation in Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [19]: “In finding facts, the jury is restricted to the evidence laid before them supplemented by facts commonly known that need no proof.” See also E M Morgan, “Judicial Notice” (1944) 57 Harv L Rev 269 at 272. However, one essential difference is that judicial notice is taken of indisputable matters, and once they have been noticed it is not possible to contradict them by evidence, whereas in many instances what is inferred from ordinary experience is often disputable, and may be contradicted by evidence: see A Zuckerman Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice, 2nd ed, 2006 [21.84]–[21.90]. 602 See [3035]; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 at [163] per Callinan J. McHugh J appeared to assert the contrary in relation to legislative facts at [67]. 603 See [3010]–[3125]. 604 For example, Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182 at [35]–[37] compared with at [69]–[70]. 605 Maloney v Commissioner for Railways (1978) 18 ALR 147 at 148. 606 R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 at 76–7 (emphasis added). For these distinctions in a different context, see J D Heydon, “Developing the Common Law” in (eds) Justin T Gleeson and Ruth C A Higgins, Constituting Law: Legal Argument and Social Values, The Federation Press, 2011, p 93 at pp 100–16. 607 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 134. 608 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 265. See also Stokes v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 18 at 48 (FC); R v Randall [2004] 1 All ER 467 at [20] (HL). 609 See [1490]. 610 Miller v Sabinske 322 SW 2d 941 (1959) at 947–8. 611 Lillibridge v McCann 75 NW 288 (1898) at 289. 612 R v Alexander [1979] VR 615 at 629 (FC). 613 Carruthers v Macgregor 1927 SC 816 at 819–20. 614 Rostad v Portland Ry, Light and Power Co 201 P 184 at 187 (SC Or, 1921) per Burnett CJ. 615 Australian Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Metcalf (1961) 106 CLR 177 at 184. 616 Burns v Lipman (1975) 132 CLR 157 at 161; R Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983, pp 143–4. 617 Huntress v Boston & Me RR Co 34 A 154 (1890) at 156. 618 R v Alexander [1979] VR 615 at 629 (FC). 619 Doyle v Boston & A Ry Co 14 NE 461 (1888) at 465–6; Lamoureux v New York, NH & H 47 NE 1009 (1897) at 1010. 620 Bridges v North London Railway Co (1874) LR 7 HL 213 at 223. 621 Bridges v North London Railway Co (1874) LR 7 HL 213 at 234. 622 Franklin v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1959) 101 CLR 197 at 207. 623 Bressington v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1947) 75 CLR 339 at 348. 624 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 241. 625 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 at [355]. 626 R v Sharmpal Singh [1962] AC 188 at 198 (PC). 627 Neill v NSW Fresh Food and Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362 at 368–70. See also Australian Oil Refining Pty Ltd v Bourne (1980) 28 ALR 529 at 532–533 (the presence of water on a steel platform makes it more slippery). 628 Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) 112 CLR 316 at 321–2.
629 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 389–90. 630 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 at [360]. 631 McCartney v R (2006) 31 WAR 416 at [150]. 632 Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 at 721 (CA). See [1130]. 633 Speight, In re; Speight v Gaunt (1883) 22 Ch D 727 at 758. 634 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 595–6 per Brennan J. 635 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182 at [35]–[37] and [69]–[70]. 636 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] ATPR 42-447
at [10]. 637 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 at 404. 638 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 at 405. 639 Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 at 607. 640 Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375 at 399; Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 220 FLR 198 at [50]–[54]. See [29050] n 131. 641 Bridges v North London Railway Co (1874) LR 7 HL 213 at 234–5. See also Graham v Badger 41 NE 61 (1895) and Manning v West End St Ry Co 44 NE 135 (1896). 642 See v Hardman [2002] NSWSC 234 at [27] per Bryson J (who also spoke at [28] of “my general understanding of values and behaviour in the community of which I must take notice”). 643 R v Wood [1982] 2 NZLR 233 at 236 (CA). 644 Bridges v North London Railway Co (1874) LR 7 HL 213 at 223. See also Doyle v Boston & A Ry Co 14 NE 461 (1888) at 465–6; Illinois Civil R Co v Nowicki 35 NE 358 (1893) at 360; Hopkinson v Knapp & Spaulding Co 60 NW 653 (1894); Lamoureux v New York, NH & H 47 NE 1009 (1897) at 1010; Chicago & EIR Co v Beaver 65 NE 144 (1902) at 145. 645 Huntress v Boston & Me RR Co 34 A 154 (1890) at 156. 646 Huntress v Boston & Me RR Co 34 A 154 (1890) at 155. 647 Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 176. 648 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 402. 649 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 250 per Menzies J; De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [28]. See [1140]. 650 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 250; De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [28]. 651 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [59]. See also R v Batte (2000) 49 OR (3d) 321 at [120]– [121] (CA). 652 Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 at 213 (PC) (although expert evidence to the same effect was called). 653 Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319 per McLelland CJ in Eq. See also Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] ATPR 42-240 at [41]. 654 Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211 at 224; Royal Warrant Holders’ Association v Edward Deane & Beal Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 10 at 14; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 348 at 390. See [29050]. 655 State v Chambers 280 NW 196 (1938) at 198. 656 Bruce v R (1987) 74 ALR 219. See [1195]. 657 See [15210]–[15225], [33435] and [33470]–[33505]. 658 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 670–1. 659 R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 at 161. 660 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 385. 661 R v Watson (1996) 108 CCC (3d) 310 at 325 (Ont CA). 662 Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 4, quoted in Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 480–1; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5 and 309–10. 663 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 210 (CA). 664 Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119, followed
in DPP v Jordan [1977] AC 699 at 718. 665 Buckley v Wathen [1973] VR 511 at 514–15; cf DPP v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159 (DC of QBD) (an exceptional case concerning very young children). 666 R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441 at 444. 667 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 841–3 (CA). See [29050]. 668 This sentence was criticised in various factual respects in Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 111; see also at 130. 669 R v K; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2002) 132 A Crim R 108 at [14]. Similar reasoning is often employed in relation to the admissibility of similar fact evidence, eg R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [44] (“for a man to sexually interfere with a female houseguest while she is still asleep is fairly unusual”). 670 Brian Gardner Motors Pty Ltd v Bembridge (2000) 120 A Crim R 53 at [60] per Hasluck J. 671 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956 at 987. 672 Davidson v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 316 at 325. 673 Davidson v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 316 at 323. 674 Tasmania v Martin (No 2) (2011) 20 Tas R 445 at [39]. 675 APC v Western Australia (2012) 224 A Crim R 59 at [97]. 676 State v Chambers 280 NW 196 (1938) at 199. 677 Hayes v Wagner 77 NE 211 (1906) at 213. 678 See [11150] n 326. See also R v Keast [1998] Crim LR 748 (CA). 679 R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 at 95. 680 The first and third sentences were approved in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159 at [29]. 681 See [3150] n 316, and the disagreement noted at [3285] n 668 above. 682 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193. 683 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50. 684 H H Glass, M H McHugh and F M Douglas, The Liability of Employers, 2nd ed, 1979, p 35. 685 Hart v Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 at 263. 686 Coombes v Roads and Traffic Authority (2006) 46 MVR 215 at [68]. 687 Learned Hand, “Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony” (1901) 15 Harv L Rev 40 at 51–2. 688 Ohlstein (by her tutor Ohlstein) v Lloyd t/as Otford Farm Trail Rides [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-866 at [155]; Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419 at [58]. 689 Trustees of the Property of Cummins (a bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278 at [3] and [42]–[49]. 690 Richard A Posner, Reflections on Judging, 2013, pp 136–40, illustrating the reasoning by his judgment in Gilles v Blanchard 477 F 3d 466 (7th Cir 2007).
[page 243]
Chapter Three Estoppels
Section 1 — Estoppel by Record A — INTRODUCTION Status of estoppel by record [5001] Character of estoppels When an estoppel binds a party to litigation, that party is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. This justifies the treatment of estoppel as an exclusionary rule of evidence. So regarded, it is less rigorous than the rules governing the exclusion of evidence on the ground of public policy, because estoppels only operate if they are pleaded. But, like the exclusion of evidence on the ground of public policy, and unlike the exclusion of evidence under the rule relating to similar facts discussed in Chapter 11, “Similar Fact Evidence”, estoppels operate without reference to the purpose for which reliance is placed on a particular fact. From the point of view of the party in whose favour it operates, the estoppel could be regarded as something which renders proof of certain facts unnecessary. From the point of view of the party against whom it operates, the estoppel has the same effect as if the subject facts were formally admitted. It will be seen, therefore, that it is possible to argue that estoppel is better regarded as a matter of pleading or substantive law, rather than a rule of evidence. Estoppels are of three kinds — by record, by deed and by conduct. However, this Chapter will deal in detail only with the form of estoppel that is better seen as a rule of evidence than the others — estoppel by record.1
[5005] Underlying principles The principles underlying estoppel by record are interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the common good that there should be an end to litigation), and nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa (no one should be harassed twice for the same cause). The practical consequence is that,
generally speaking, the order of a court of [page 244] competent jurisdiction is conclusive. An application may be made to have it set aside if it was obtained by fraud,2 and fraud or collusion in the obtaining of a judgment may be proved by a stranger to the proceedings.3 These matters belong to the law of procedure, but the conclusive effect of judgments on the whole world as well as on the parties to civil litigation has some bearing on the law of evidence. After they have been considered, reference will be made to the somewhat specialised question of estoppel by record in matrimonial causes and criminal cases. A judicial determination will have the effect of precluding a person from disputing the determination in subsequent proceedings in one of three ways. First, because the cause of action in the subsequent proceeding no longer exists, it has been subsumed in the earlier judgment — it is res judicata: see [5070]. Secondly, a party in the subsequent proceeding will be prevented from relitigating an issue which has previously been finally determined against that party — issue estoppel: see [5075]. Finally, in certain circumstances which do not fall within either of the preceding cases, the court may act to prevent a party from litigating an issue when to do so would amount to an abuse of process: see [5170]. The role of estoppel by record therefore is essentially an exclusionary one. It is different from the problem of the extent to which a judgment can be considered as positive evidence of the facts on which it was based, which is discussed in [5180]–[5235].
B — EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS ON ALL PERSONS Conclusiveness of judgments [5010] Conclusiveness against all persons A judgment when proved is conclusive against all persons of its existence, date and legal effect.4 This is because it is a public official act
and is presumed to be accurately worded. It will be seen in [7265] and [39150] that there are powerful statutory and common law presumptions which operate to this effect. Thus, in an action for malicious prosecution, the record of the Criminal Court would be conclusive of the acquittal of the plaintiff.5 In an action by a creditor against a surety, a judgment obtained by the creditor against the primary debtor would be admissible and conclusive where the guarantee itself provided that the liability of the surety shall be so determined.6
[5015] Judgments in rem The conclusiveness of a judgment for all persons is of great importance if it is a judgment in rem. A judgment in rem is: “a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction determining the status or the disposition of a thing, as distinct from a particular interest in it of a party to the litigation”.7 All other judgments are in personam. [page 245] A simple illustration8 of the effect of a judgment in rem so far as the whole world is concerned arose where the defendant was indebted to P, and, on P’s death, X obtained probate of what purported to be P’s will. The defendant paid X the amount of P’s debt, and, when the grant of representation was set aside in favour of the plaintiff because the will was a forgery, it was held that the defendant was not liable to pay the debt over again to the plaintiff. Everyone was bound to give credit to the probate (a judgment in rem) until it was vacated, which meant that the plaintiff was estopped from denying X’s executorship at the material time. Other examples of judgments in rem are provided by the condemnation of a ship by a Prize Court, which precludes everyone from denying the non-neutral nature of the cargo;9 an order made pursuant to the Fisheries Act 1968 (Vic) forfeiting to the Crown a fishing boat, which prevented a successor in title who purchased without notice of the forfeiture from denying the title of the Crown;10 a determination that a street is a highway;11 and a decree of nullity or divorce.12 A decree of jactitation of marriage, on the other hand, only establishes that the petitioner is not married to the
respondent so far as it appears to the court which enjoins silence on the matter. Accordingly, the judges advised the House of Lords on the prosecution of the Duchess of Kingston in 1776 for bigamously marrying the Duke in the lifetime of her husband, the Earl of Bristol, that the Crown was not estopped from asserting the validity of her marriage to the Earl by a jactitation decree she had obtained in the Ecclesiastical Court before going through the impugned marriage ceremony.13
C — EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS ON PARTIES: CIVIL CASES General effect [5020] Outline Whether a judgment is in rem or in personam its effect on the parties and those claiming through them is much wider than its effect in litigation between strangers. This is because the rule is that the record binds both the parties and their privies. The record binds them in two ways. They are bound by the state of affairs established by the judgment, that A has been adjudged liable to B in the sum of $1000, or that X is divorced. This may be described as estoppel by res judicata.14 [page 246] Secondly they are bound by the court’s findings as to the grounds on which the judgment was based: that A breached a contract with B, or that X committed adultery. This is called issue estoppel. These two doctrines have a number of common features. There must be a final judgment before a competent tribunal between the same parties litigating in the same capacity or their privies. Each of these features will be considered before attention is directed to the two estoppels themselves.
Specific rules [5025] Final judgment
Where res judicata is alleged, “only the actual record is relevant”.15 The record consists of the pleadings and the judgment, but not the reasons for judgment, although the reasons for judgment may be examined to see whether the causes of action in the first case were dealt with “on the merits” or were “litigated”.16 The essential characteristic of a final judgment is that it determines finally the dispute between the parties.17 An order which may be reversed on appeal is nonetheless final,18 though once reversed on appeal it ceases to give rise to an estoppel,19 even if the reversal turns on a point not argued below.20 If the appeal is allowed the estoppel stems from the appellate decision,21 unless the appellate court merely directs a new trial, in which case no estoppel arises,22 though the reasons for granting a new trial may bind later courts as a precedent, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, or unless the appellate court reverses the court below for want of jurisdiction, in which case no estoppel arises since the appellate court decided nothing on the merits.23 A decision refusing to adjudicate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction creates no estoppels,24 except, so long as it stands, in the tribunal holding that it had no jurisdiction.25 An adjudication of an interlocutory character will generally not suffice.26 The test is not whether the proceedings are interlocutory, but whether it is reasonable to regard the earlier decision as a final [page 247] determination of the issue.27 Rulings made and issues decided by a judge during a trial at the end of which the jury disagree are not binding at the retrial.28 A decision on the admissibility of evidence will not suffice to create an estoppel.29 Nor will a determination which is of its very nature non-permanent or potentially so, as, for example, a determination of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.30 Nor will an order that requires some further act before it can become effective or enforceable.31 Nor will an order which has not been made on the merits.32 In this [page 248]
sense, an order made “on the merits” includes an order following trial,33 admission or compromise34 and an order of a procedural character, provided it is “on the merits” in the sense that it rests on a decision which establishes certain facts proved or not in dispute, states the applicable principles of law and expresses a conclusion with regard to the effect of applying those principles to the facts.35 An order “on the merits” for purposes of issue estoppel (but not res judicata) includes dismissal of an appeal by consent.36 The operation of consent orders as res judicata may be affected by the legislative background under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).37 A decision “on the merits” also includes proceedings in which only a declaration was made.38 Non-judicial investigative reports, even if delivered by a court, are not final judgments.39 Withdrawal by the plaintiff, reserving liberty to bring fresh action, is [page 249] not a decision, unless the parties intended to terminate the litigation.40 And issue estoppel can arise from an interlocutory judgment of a foreign court on a procedural issue (eg submission to jurisdiction) where the issue was expressly submitted to the court and a specific issue of fact was raised before and decided by the court.41 The court whose judgment is invoked must have had jurisdiction and must have given judgment directly on the matter in question: but … if the matter came collaterally into question in the first Court, or were only incidentally cognisable by it, or merely to be inferred by argument from the judgment, the judgment is not conclusive.42
It is not necessary to establish that the decision is correct. A tribunal of competent jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly; a mistaken decision remains binding unless reversed on appeal.43 Where an application is made to bankrupt a person by reason of an unpaid judgment debt, the judgment works no estoppel: the debtor is at liberty to seek to demonstrate that there was in truth no antecedent debt.44 Even where no estoppel is worked because the judgment is not final, a second application for relief denied initially may be stayed as an abuse of process.45 An order deciding a separate question, though it may be interlocutory
for the purposes of appeal, is final for res judicata purposes.46 No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail against the Constitution, so that orders made under constitutionally invalid legislation are nullities.47 An arbitration can create an issue estoppel.48 Where a statute prescribes that the decisions of a particular body are “final”, no greater ambit of finality should be attributed to its decisions than the statute itself marks out.49 A judgment relied on in a first set of proceedings to create res judicata [page 250] must have been delivered before the hearing of the second proceedings in which it is said to operate as res judicata, but it is not necessary that the judgment relied on be delivered in proceedings instituted before the second proceedings. It has been said that the risk that a party may seek to obtain a speedy judgment in a foreign forum by commencing proceedings after existing proceedings, or amending an existing proceeding there, is sufficiently met by the law’s disfavour for parties who seek the same relief in more than one forum, and for vexation and oppression.50
[5030] Competent tribunal The determination relied upon as giving rise to the estoppel must not be impeachable for want of jurisdiction51 or fraud52 or (in the case of default judgments or consent orders) mistake.53 A “competent tribunal” need not be a court of record or a superior court.54 It suffices if the tribunal has jurisdiction to resolve a particular dispute, whether that jurisdiction rests on statute55 or the consent of the parties,56 for example, when jurisdiction is conferred on an arbitrator,57 or a domestic tribunal.58 Traditionally, a distinction is drawn between the determinations of a judicial nature in respect of which estoppel may be raised, and mere administrative decisions in respect of which it may not.59 An award of the NSW Workers’ Compensation Commission, being a “completely effective … adjudication upon the rights of the parties”60 is within the former category.
However, a decision of the Commonwealth Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation has been considered not to give rise to issue estoppel because of the administrative character of that body. [page 251] The underlying principle of this form of estoppel is that parties who have had a dispute heard by a competent tribunal should not be able to litigate the same issues in other tribunals. When the decision-making body is an administrative body not affording the opportunity of presenting evidence and argument, it seems to me there is no room for the operation of this principle.61
But a decision upon an application for judicial review of an administrative decision is capable of supporting an estoppel.62 The court should not be distracted by too fine an examination of the status of the tribunal in question, of the extent to which it exercises judicial functions, or of whether its status is judicial or administrative: The doctrine of estoppel extends to the decision of any tribunal which has jurisdiction to decide finally a question arising between parties, even if it is not called a court, and its jurisdiction is derived from statute or from the submission of the parties, and it has only temporary authority to decide a matter ad hoc.63
It is not thought that Gibbs J in this passage intended to say that the manner in which the tribunal arrives at its determination is entirely irrelevant.64 But in that case, the fact that the tribunal was to be “guided by the principles of equity and good conscience and shall not be bound by rules of evidence or legal procedure” did not mean that the tribunal’s determination could not give rise to an estoppel.65 McHugh JA66 raised the question whether a decision of the New South Wales Consumer Claims Tribunal was capable of giving rise to an estoppel or res judicata, since its orders do not determine causes of action or rights. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine disputed claims for money arising out of contracts and to make orders for the payment of money or to direct the performance of work or to relieve of obligations. While it might consider and make findings on causes of action relied on by claimants and on defences raised by respondents, these are determinations ancillary to the exercise of its jurisdiction and therefore are collateral matters not creating an estoppel. It is submitted that, while there may be sound practical reasons67 for denying the orders of such Tribunals the capacity to raise estoppels, the distinction set out above is an unnecessarily fine one and is
contrary to the approach of the cases mentioned above. The controversy is acute in relation to administrative tribunals. There are statements that because of their administrative character they cannot create issue [page 252] estoppels,68 and other discussions indicating doubt and consciousness of the difficulties attending the subject.69 But there is also old70 and new71 authority pointing the other way. Lord Bridge stated this principle:72 “the presumption … must be that where the statute has created a specific jurisdiction for the determination of any issue which establishes the existence of a legal right, the principle of res judicata applies to give finality to that determination unless an intention to exclude that principle can properly be inferred as a matter of construction of the relevant statutory provisions”. Even if the doctrines of issue estoppel and res judicata can apply to the decision of an administrative body, there must be a coincidence of issues or causes of action before the doctrines can have any relevant operation.73 The grant or refusal by a judge of a search or other warrant pursuant to statutory power cannot create estoppels.74
[5035] Foreign judgments The principles of estoppel are applicable to a foreign judgment75 unless it was given perversely.76 For the purposes of res judicata, foreign judgments are as conclusive as domestic judgments.77 To this, Lord Hodson added a caution based on the procedural differences which may exist in foreign tribunals.78 It would seem that, if there were not present in the procedures of foreign courts “those things which are reckoned as the elements, or the cornerstones of the due administration of justice”79 with the consequence of denying to the parties the opportunity to present argument and evidence in a way the domestic court considered acceptable, the court would be reluctant to hold the parties bound.
[page 253] It should be noted that, in Australia at least, where (as will be seen in [5070]) res judicata is firmly bound to the doctrine of merger, the rule that a cause of action does not merge in a foreign judgment80 raises a difficulty of principle. If the doctrine of merger does not apply to foreign judgments, how can the cause of action disappear in a foreign judgment? This difficulty will probably be resolved by reference to Fullagar J’s “broad rule of public policy”81 rather than by the application of the doctrine of merger. A majority of the House of Lords considered that issue estoppel might arise from the determination of issues in a foreign judgment. Lord Guest, the dissentient, based his decision partly on the inapplicability of the doctrine of merger to foreign judgments and partly on the practical difficulty, for one not familiar with foreign procedures, of determining what issues were determined and whether they were collateral or essential to the main decision.82 Lord Reid referred to these practical difficulties as reasons for a cautious application of the doctrine to foreign judgments and added that where the costs involved in conducting international litigation were out of proportion to the matters at stake, this may justify a party not contesting a claim in a foreign court, so that in such a case it may be unjust to hold that party to an adverse judgment.83 Where there are two competing foreign judgments, each of which was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction and each of which was final and not open to impeachment on any ground, in general the earlier in time is given effect to the exclusion of the latter unless there were circumstances connected with the obtaining of the second judgment which made it unfair for the party attempting to rely on the first to seek to enforce it.84 Because of the rule against execution of foreign penal laws, a decision by a foreign tribunal imposing disqualification on or diminishing the status of a subject of a foreign state creates no estoppel.85 The nature and effect of a foreign judgment may raise questions of foreign law, to be determined as matters of fact on evidence.86
[5040] Identity of parties
It is a fundamental requirement of both res judicata and issue estoppel that there be identity of parties.87 Thus it is not an abuse of process for a plaintiff who complains of a finding of fact made in favour of the defendant in a first set of proceedings to contest that finding in a second set of proceedings against a different defendant.88 This will usually be satisfied by an examination of the respective records to determine who actually is a party to each of the proceedings, although as will be seen89 ([5055] below) it will be sometimes necessary to look beyond the title to an action to identify against which person relief is in fact sought. In one case90 [page 254] the plaintiff was injured in a collision with the defendant’s lorry when he was driving his father’s car. The plaintiff’s father sued for damage to the car, when the defendant’s plea that it was caused by the contributory negligence of the plaintiff succeeded. It was held that the plaintiff was not estopped from denying his contributory negligence in an action in which he claimed damages for personal injuries. This was simply because the parties to the two actions were different. The expression “party” includes a submitting party, such as a magistrate in proceedings for a declaration that a warrant issued by the magistrate was issued without statutory authority.91 It is not necessary that all the parties to both proceedings be identical; it suffices if the party raising the estoppel and the party against whom it is raised are common to both sets of proceedings.92 It has been suggested that an issue estoppel can arise where the sole controller of a company seeks in later proceedings to re-agitate issues decided against the company in earlier proceedings: an alternative approach with the same result rests on abuse of process analysis.93
[5045] Identity of capacity Furthermore the parties must be suing or being sued in the same capacity. In one case,94 a defendant council’s bus was involved in a collision with the car of the plaintiff (Mr Marginson) which was being
driven by his wife as his agent. She was killed, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries and some houses were damaged as well as the bus. The owners of the houses recovered damages in an action brought against Mr Marginson and the Borough Council on the footing that each of them was vicariously liable for negligent driving. Both drivers were held to have been equally to blame, and the council failed in a claim against Mr Marginson for damages to the bus because Mrs Marginson and the council’s driver were equally to blame. Mr Marginson subsequently claimed damages for his own injuries and also sued as his wife’s personal representative under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (Eng). The English Court of Appeal held that Mr Marginson’s personal claim failed because he was estopped from denying the contributory negligence of his wife by the finding that she and the council’s driver were equally to blame for the damage to the bus and, under the substantive law as it then stood, contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery.95 On the other hand, it was held that Mr Marginson was not estopped from denying his wife’s contributory negligence in relation to his claims as her personal representative because he made those claims in a different capacity.96 See further [5095].
[5050] Privity: general The requirement of identity of parties may be satisfied, notwithstanding that the parties are different, where there exists privity between the party in the concluded [page 255] action and the action in which the estoppel is raised. Privity may arise from blood, title or interest.97 Difficulties will arise in identifying the ambit of the third of these privities.
[5055] Identity of parties and privity of interest The requirements of identity and privity are narrowly construed by the English courts. The leading case98 concerned two corporations each
calling itself “Carl Zeiss Stiftung”, one operating in the Eastern zone of Germany and the other in the Western zone. Each corporation claimed to be the sole and legitimate successor of a body called Carl Zeiss Stiftung established in Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach in 1896. The plaintiff, the East German Stiftung, brought an action in England in 1955 alleging passing off against various defendants including the West German Stiftung. In 1956 the defendants attempted to stay the plaintiff’s action on the ground that it was brought by the solicitors on the record without the authority of the plaintiff. It was argued that the plaintiff, the East German Stiftung, did not exist under East German law and further that its governing body, the Council of Gera, from whom the London solicitors obtained instructions, had no authority to give instructions on the plaintiff’s behalf. In earlier proceedings brought in 1953 in West Germany by the Council of the District of Gera representing the East German Stiftung, against the West German Stiftung and certain directors, the defendants in that action successfully argued that the East German Stiftung was not properly before the West German Court as the Council of Gera was not its legal representative. This, the defendants in the English action argued, was the same issue as that raised by them and the plaintiff should be bound by it. The House of Lords rejected this argument on the ground that the parties to the English application were the defendants including the West German Stiftung on the one hand, and the London solicitors on the other. Since the Council of Gera was not a party to the English proceedings, the earlier judgment against it could not bind the English solicitors unless it could be said that there was privity between them and the Council of Gera. The majority of the Lords rejected the existence of privity of interest. Representation of a common principal does not of itself lead to privity. Lord Wilberforce, unlike the other members of the House, tended to think that the only ground on which it could be held there was no estoppel was that the West German judgment was not final. From a realistic point of view he thought the parties were the same (the Council of Gera) and the issues raised in the causes of action were the same (passing off). There is American authority in favour of this more flexible approach. In Australia the Full Court of the Federal Court has adopted a similar approach: It seems clear to me that issue estoppel can only be raised by or applied against parties who were in “controversy” at the time when the issue was first determined, either in their favour or adversely to them. If a party was not involved in the litigation of that issue, either because it was not an issue between him and another party to the proceedings, or because he was not a party at
all to the proceedings at the time of resolution, then he is not affected by, nor can he raise, an estoppel. Likewise his presence initially or subsequently can not affect the right of other parties to raise or rely upon issue estoppel as between themselves. If the contrary was the case, the public interest in not having the same matters relitigated could with ease be bypassed.99
[page 256] There was no privity of interest for the purposes of the estoppel rule between a police officer and the government, which owned the vehicle being driven by him at the time of the collision in question, nor could privity of interest exist between joint or concurrent tortfeasors simply because of that relationship. Barwick CJ identified the necessary relationship in these terms: “The basic requirement of a privy in interest is that the privy must claim under or through the person of whom he is said to be a privy”.100 Joint tenants are capable of being privies in interest.101 But the relationship must be such that the supposed privy obtains a benefit or incurs an obligation from the preceding action.102 It is not sufficient that he is merely concerned, even commercially concerned in that action,103 or that he provides financial backing to the party in the earlier action.104 The privity relationship must be such as to operate to bind the supposed privy to the earlier judgment whether it has been in favour of or adverse to that party.105 A compulsory third party insurer can take advantage of issue estoppels available to its insured.106 A disabled and dependent child has been held not to be in privity with her mother.107 There is privity between trustees and beneficiaries,108 and between liquidators of an investment scheme and beneficiaries of the scheme.109 Identity of parties in successive proceedings was not found where the Australian Securities Commission was not named as a party in the first set of proceedings and did not intervene in them: notice of the proceedings had been given to it pursuant to statute, and it exercised a statutory right to make submissions, but that, “if anything, was done by way of making information available to the Court”.110 Identity of parties was not found where the first proceedings were interpleader proceedings and the relevant party was the stakeholder, for the stakeholder could not plead for or against either of the parties claiming the money, or otherwise play an
active role.111 [page 257] Privity may arise by force of statute.112
[5060] Interests in goods Sir Robert Megarry V-C expressed the test thus:113 It seems to me that the substratum of the doctrine is that a man ought not to be allowed to litigate a second time what has already been decided between himself and the other party to the litigation. This is in the interest both of the successful party and of the public. But I cannot see that this provides any basis for a successful defendant to say that the successful defence is a bar to the plaintiff suing some third party, or for that third party to say that the successful defence prevents the plaintiff from suing him, unless there is a sufficient degree of identity between the successful defendant and the third party. I do not say that one must be the alter ego of the other; but it does seem to me that, having due regard to the subject-matter of the dispute, there must be a sufficient degree of identification between the two to make it just to hold that the decision to which one was party should be binding in proceedings to which the other is party. It is in that sense that I would regard the phrase “privity of interest”.
The doctrine applies to interests in goods as well as land.114 It is necessary for the person bound to have acquired the relevant interest after the date of the order in the earlier proceedings.115
[5065] No application to findings in criminal proceedings The courts have consistently refused to accept privity of interest where a civil claim follows criminal proceedings based on the same facts and the claimant has sought to bind the convicted person by an estoppel based on the earlier conviction,116 or where the acquitted person has sought to bind the prosecutor by the findings implicit in the verdict.117
[5070] Res judicata Fullagar J described estoppel by res judicata thus:118 [W]here an action has been brought and judgment has been entered in that action, no other proceedings can thereafter be maintained on the same cause of action. This rule is not, to my mind, correctly classified under the heading of estoppel at all. It is a broad rule of public policy
based on the principles expressed in the maxims “interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium” and “nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa”.
Although its bearing on the substantive law is of great importance, this kind of estoppel does not call for detailed consideration here. Once it appears that the same [page 258] cause of action119 was held to lie or not to lie in a final judgment120 before a competent tribunal between the same parties, or their privies, litigating in the same capacity, there is an end of the matter.121 “If one party brings an action against another for a particular cause and judgment is given upon it, there is a strict rule of law that he cannot bring another action against the same party for the same cause”.122 This is because “the very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit has … passed into judgment, so that it is merged and has no longer an independent existence …”.123 Judgment for the plaintiff for damages for breach of warranty to build a house in a workmanlike manner was held124 to bar a claim for damages subsequently occurring in consequence of the breach of warranty.125 This applies only to litigation arising out of the same facts. If the facts in issue are different, then a judgment arising out of the earlier facts raises no estoppel.126 It follows that what is necessary is an examination of the factual circumstances relied upon to establish the [page 259] right to relief in each case in order to determine that there is a sufficient identity between them.127 A decision as to the ownership of one patent creates no res judicata with reference to the ownership of the second patent applied for after the first was held invalid.128 There is no inconsistency between a judgment based on notices of assessment to pay tax and proceedings on amended notices of assessment.129
[5075] Issue estoppel The second kind of estoppel by record is often called issue estoppel. The principle underlying issue estoppel was stated by Dixon J as follows: A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies.130
The essential distinction between res judicata and issue estoppel131 is that in res judicata the cause of action no longer has an independent existence. It has been disposed of. In issue estoppel the plea is that a relevant issue or matter in the action before the court is to be taken as having been necessarily decided by a prior action. Where the plea is res judicata, only the actual record, that is, the pleadings and the judgment, may be looked at in order to determine the plea.132 But where the plea is one of issue estoppel, any material may be looked at which will show what issues were raised or decided. So, the reasons for judgment and the trial judge’s notes may be looked at to determine whether the issues in respect of which estoppel is asserted were in fact determined and whether they are identical with those raised for determination in the subsequent proceeding.133 Where these aids are absent, as in [page 260] the case of a judgment, order or decision by consent, deciding whether an issue estoppel has been created can be difficult.134 An estoppel can arise from a finding expressed in negative terms as much as it can from a finding expressed in positive terms.135 Some think it has been held to arise from the finding of non-satisfaction of a particular state of affairs.136 An issue estoppel created by a judgment between a plaintiff and a defendant in proceedings to which a cross-defendant was also a party can be relied on by the cross-defendant in later proceedings.137 Issue estoppels may find co-defendants inter se.138 In general an issue estoppel cannot be waived.139
[5080] Issue estoppel: legal indispensability But not every determination of an issue in a trial will bind the parties
and their privies.140 The extent of the operation to be given to issue estoppel is restricted to those matters which form the ingredients of the cause of action. “Nothing but what is legally indispensable to the conclusion is thus finally closed or precluded.”141 Dixon J defined the extent of issue estoppel thus. “Findings, however deliberate and formal, which concern only evidentiary facts and not ultimate facts forming the very title to rights give rise to no preclusion.”142 Only a decision about a matter which it was necessary to decide — a decision which is fundamental or cardinal to the judgment—can create an issue estoppel.143 Hence it is necessary to understand what the author of the decision was required to decide. A practical test for determining whether a decision is fundamental is to ask whether it is possible to appeal against the finding.144 A decision of fact or law against the party in whose favour the proceedings were decided will not found an issue estoppel because it cannot have been necessary for the substantive decision.145 Nor will a finding against which there is no appeal.146 [page 261] A decision in favour of a defendant does not bar proceedings founded on new or altered circumstances such as those flowing from a legislative amendment.147 or an amended tax assessment.148
[5085] Issue estoppel: identity of issues A strict construction of the requirement concerning identity of parties and their capacity can be justified on the ground that no one ought to be wholly precluded from arguing a point by a decision taken in proceedings at which that person was not represented. It is open to question whether the requirement with regard to identity of issues should be applied so strictly, for it is undesirable that there should be conflicting decisions on what is in substance the same issue of fact even though there is a technical ground for treating it as different from that which was the subject of earlier litigation. Some cases favour a narrow and some a broad approach to this
question. The Privy Council held149 that a taxing authority was estopped from making an assessment for the year 1920–1921 by a previous judgment relating to the assessment for the year 1918–1919. On the other hand, the House of Lords held150 that a local valuation officer was not estopped from assessing the society’s premises for rates by the decision on a previous year’s assessment that the society was exempt. The question in these cases was, basically, whether one year’s assessment raises a different issue from another year’s assessment, although the same legal point is involved, and special rules appear to be applicable to tax and rating cases.151 Sometimes it is not possible to say at the start of a later case whether an issue estoppel operates in it arising from an earlier decision. A finding in the Compensation Court that a work incident had caused a worker particular injuries was held to create an estoppel; but whether a finding as to “incapacity” did so depended on the evidence as it emerged at the second trial.152
[5090] Issue estoppels in propositions of law Hutley JA considered153 that no issue estoppel can arise in respect of a “bare proposition of law”. Glass and Mahoney JJA did not share this view.154 Aickin J thought155 that nothing was more clear than that an issue estoppel may arise with respect to a question of law just as it may arise with respect to a question of fact. The many decisions in which statutory construction or declarations of rights have bound the parties in later cases indicate very strongly that the view of Aickin J is to be preferred.156 [page 262]
[5095] Issue estoppels and negligence The requirement of identity of issues to give rise to estoppel leads to nice problems in the law of negligence:157 in particular, whether a finding that the plaintiff in the first action was not guilty of contributory negligence means that the defendant in that action is later estopped from denying negligence in a later action involving that plaintiff and, in some cases, passengers in vehicles involved in the collision in question. This
arises, to a large extent, because it is now well settled158 that contributory negligence can be constituted either by a failure to take reasonable care towards oneself or by a failure to take reasonable care towards the defendant. In the principal Australian authority,159 the first action was between Goldsmith and Jackson who were respectively the driver of a motor vehicle and rider of a motor cycle between which vehicles a collision occurred. Goldsmith successfully alleged that the damage to his car was solely caused by Jackson’s negligence. In the second action White, Jackson’s passenger, sued Jackson who claimed contribution from Goldsmith. It was held by a majority of the High Court that the result of the first action did not estop Jackson from alleging that Goldsmith was guilty of a breach of a duty which he owed to White. The issue decided in the first action concerned different duties, namely, the duty of care owed by Jackson to Goldsmith and the duty by Goldsmith to take reasonable care for his own safety. This decision was followed in a case160 where in a collision Randolph was a passenger in a car driven by Tuck, the first defendant, and that car collided with a car driven by Steale, the third defendant, in the course of his employment with the second defendants. In an earlier action brought by Tuck against Steale, Tuck was held solely to blame for the collision. Randolph was, however, held entitled to judgment against all three defendants and, on the claim for contribution by the second and third defendants, it was held that Tuck was not estopped from denying his sole responsibility for the damages due to the plaintiff. The decision proceeded primarily on the basis that Steale’s breach of duty to Tuck and Tuck’s contributory negligence which were in issue in the first action were, in law, different issues from that of the responsibility of the first and third defendants as between themselves for the damages sustained by the plaintiff. The Australian courts161 have for the most part shown a firm adherence to the principle that a decision in respect of one duty creates no estoppel in respect of a different duty. Thus it has been held that if a passenger injured in a collision sues both drivers, the drivers are not estopped by a finding as to their responsibility in [page 263]
that action if they are later sued by another passenger in the same car, as their respective duties to the passengers are not identical.162 Clarke JA has offered a modern reformulation of the position:163 It is not a necessary condition of an estoppel arising from … a finding that it be made in the determination of an issue which is identical with the issue in the later proceedings. It is sufficient if the finding, of fact or law or mixed fact and law, is made in respect of an identical question notwithstanding that that question may fall to be decided in the course of the determination of issues which are not identical.
A compulsory third party insurer can take advantage of issue estoppels favourable to its insured.164
[5100] Issue estoppel: role of pleadings, evidence and argument As it is permissible to have regard to the pleadings, evidence and arguments in each action for the purpose of identifying the common issues, there is much to be said for the broad approach, which prevents the existence of conflicting judgments on what are substantially identical issues of fact. If the pleadings, evidence or points taken in argument in the second action are different from those of the first, the court hearing the second action would not, it seems, be bound to hold that there is an estoppel. In many cases it does not matter whether the approach adopted is broad or narrow.165
[5105] Issue estoppel: prior criminal proceedings The application of the doctrine of issue estoppel where a party who has been convicted or acquitted of a criminal charge then sues or is sued for damages arising out of the same incident is made more difficult because of the differing parties in each proceeding,166 the unlikelihood that the issues will be identical,167 and by the uncertainty that attends a jury verdict on the general issue.168 Even when the issues are identical, difference in the onus of proof may sometimes prevent an estoppel from arising. For this reason, if for none other, it would probably be held that an acquittal on a criminal charge of assault would not estop the victim from suing in tort on the same facts.169 A plaintiff might be estopped from denying facts relied on by the
defence as justification where that plaintiff sued the Crown for damages for an assault by a police officer, if those facts had been the subject of a criminal conviction for some such offence as drunkenness or using insulting words on the occasion in [page 264] question.170 In such a case the heavier burden borne by the prosecutor on a criminal charge could not possibly operate adversely to the plaintiff. These matters must now be considered in the light of the principles discussed at [5175].
[5110] Issue estoppels: prior finding taken with evidence A decision as to one proposition cannot operate to establish by estoppel a second proposition which follows from the first only when the first proposition is combined with additional evidence, however strong.171
[5115] Issue estoppel: policy limitations The doctrine of issue estoppel operates in a more restricted way in family law disputes (see [5125]) and in criminal cases: see [5130]. This is because of the special considerations in those areas which prevail over those which protect a litigant from double jeopardy and which require that there be an end to litigation. That these special considerations may have a wider application than criminal law and family law is demonstrated where estoppels were overridden by gaming or usury law172 and by rent control legislation.173 The Privy Council advised that a money-lending statute prevailed over an estoppel since the legislation “can be seen to represent a social policy to which the court must give effect in the interests of the public generally or some sections of the public, despite any rules of evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduct or otherwise”.174 Another possible illustration is proceedings brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission for breach of the Trade Practices Act.175 Another is professional disciplinary proceedings.176 There are other defences to the operation of estoppels, for
example a cross-estoppel arising from a representation,177 a contract to ignore a decision,178 consent,179 and lack of notice of foreign proceedings or opportunity to appear in them and present a case.180
[5120] Need for estoppels to be specially pleaded At common law it was held that the party alleging the existence of an estoppel by record must plead the former judgment and, if that party fails to do so, it is merely an item of evidence in that party’s favour which must be considered by the jury.181 [page 265] If, notwithstanding the prior judgment or verdict, they are prepared to decide in favour of the opposite party, there is no reason why they should not do so, although they will no doubt be disposed to act as the tribunal did on the former occasion. The rules of pleading are, of course, less exacting than used to be the case, but it is still generally maintained that all estoppels must be specially pleaded.182 In a plea of res judicata there is a factual component which may be put in issue by the reply or other plea in response. This is more probable where one or other of the extended doctrines of estoppel by record is raised.183 It is therefore important that the pleadings indicate precisely what facts are alleged and what are in dispute so that the estoppel of whatever kind may be disposed of, if possible, before the remaining issues are tried.184 A court may allow a party to rely on an estoppel where the plea is not raised but the facts with respect to the estoppel had been fully explored.185 The rule that when a judgment is not pleaded, it may, nevertheless, be treated as evidence of the facts upon which it was based in later proceedings between the same parties is hard to reconcile on principle with the rule that the judgment is not admissible as evidence of these facts in proceedings between third parties, or between one party to the earlier litigation and a stranger; but as will be seen in [5180], some regard the latter rule as the questionable one.
[5125] Effect of judgments on parties: matrimonial and
children’s cases There are numerous authorities on estoppel by record in matrimonial causes which are not easy to reconcile at first sight. This apparent conflict can be largely, if not entirely, resolved if it is borne in mind that, whereas the ordinary principles of estoppel apply as between the parties, a family court is in a unique position on account of its duty to inquire, so far as it reasonably can, into the facts alleged by the petitioner or by the respondent. The result can be summed up by saying that estoppels bind the parties to a matrimonial cause, but they frequently do not bind the court. It is not proposed to discuss the authorities, because they relate largely to systems of matrimonial law based on matrimonial offences. They thus have little relevance to modern Australian law. They were discussed in the fifth Australian edition of this work at [5125]. There is no strict rule of issue estoppel binding on any of the parties in children’s cases. However, the court has a discretion to decline to allow a full hearing of the evidence in relation to matters decided in previous proceedings. Where one party in a case concerning children wishes to rely on, and another party wishes to challenge, findings made in previous proceedings the court might wish to be made aware of those findings and of the evidence on which they were based before deciding whether to exercise its discretion to allow any issue of fact to be tried afresh. In exercising that discretion, the court will balance the underlying considerations of public policy that there is a public interest in an end to litigation, that delay in determining a case is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the child concerned, that the child’s welfare is unlikely to be served by reliance upon determinations of fact which have turned out to have been erroneous, and that the court’s discretion must be applied so as to work justice. The court will also consider the importance of previous findings in the context of the current proceedings and whether there is [page 266] any reason to think that a re-hearing of the issue would result in any substantially different finding, having regard to whether the previous findings have been the result of a full hearing and, if so, whether there was
any ground on which their accuracy could have been the subject of a challenge on appeal at the time, and whether there was any new evidence or information casting doubt on their accuracy.186
D — EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS ON PARTIES: CRIMINAL CASES Autrefois acquit and autrefois convict [5130] Cause of action estoppel In a criminal case, the equivalent to a plea of cause of action estoppel is a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. The most usual tests for determining the validity of such pleas are whether the accused had been previously acquitted or convicted of the same offence, or of a substantially similar offence, or whether the accused could have been convicted at the first trial of the offence with which the accused is charged at the second. The formulation and application of these tests has produced a great deal of case law which need not be considered here.187 It is necessary that the parties be the same. A doubt was cast on whether they were the same where the criminal proceedings were conducted by the Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of the Crown, and the other proceedings were conducted by the Health Care Complaints Commission, a statutory body representing the Crown.188 Further, the issues must be identical, and this requirement is not satisfied where the standard of proof is different.189 Disciplinary proceedings consequent upon a conviction in criminal proceedings are not barred by autrefois convict or any wider principle of double jeopardy.190 Adverse disciplinary action does not bar later criminal proceedings arising out of the same facts.191 An acquittal in criminal proceedings is not a bar to disciplinary proceedings arising out of the same facts.192 Nor is it a bar to an attempt by the son of a person allegedly [page 267] killed by that person’s spouse to prove that the spouse, even though
acquitted of murder and manslaughter, was disentitled from inheriting on the ground that the spouse unlawfully caused the death.193
[5135] Restriction of issues by previous convictions or acquittals Quite apart from the possibility of their founding pleas of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit, previous convictions and acquittals can restrict issues as between the Crown and the accused in subsequent criminal proceedings. When a previous conviction of the accused is put to the accused in cross-examination or proved against the accused, the accused cannot deny guilt of the offence for which the accused was convicted.194 The operation of previous acquittals as estoppels is illustrated by a case in which the appellant had been charged with two offences, carrying a firearm and being in possession of ammunition. He was acquitted of the second, but a new trial was ordered with regard to the first. At the second trial, the prosecution relied on a statement of the appellant in which he said that he was both carrying a firearm and in possession of ammunition. He was convicted of carrying a firearm, but the Privy Council advised that his conviction should be quashed because the assessors had not been told that the prosecution had to accept that the part of the statement dealing with the ammunition was untrue. Lord Macdermott said: The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim “Res judicata pro veritate accipitur” is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings.195
This principle applies not only to verdicts of acquittal after a fully contested trial, but also to acquittals after the Crown has decided there is insufficient evidence to justify a conviction.196 [page 268]
[5140] Discretion to stay second trial Even where a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict is not available, the court has, in appropriate circumstances, a discretion to stay a second
trial if it considers that it would be unfair to the accused to allow it to proceed.197 This too is a matter which does not call for detailed discussion here.
Issue estoppel [5145] Identifying the “issue” The traditional Australian view was that the doctrine of issue estoppel exists in criminal law.198 But it proved difficult to identify and isolate the issue in respect of which the estoppel was said to arise in any two proceedings.199
[5150] Double jeopardy These difficulties have led a majority of High Court justices200 to join other jurisdictions201 in denying the applicability of the doctrine of issue estoppel in civil law to criminal proceedings. Instead there is a principle against double jeopardy which is wider than the autrefois acquit rule, for it applies where the charge is different in the second trial, but the Crown in the second trial seeks to prove facts which are the essential ingredients of the earlier charge. It rests on a logical (or illogical) slide in favour of the accused: an acquittal is taken not merely to be a sign of the prosecution’s failure to achieve the criminal standard of proof, but as a judgment of innocence.202 It holds that the Crown may not directly or indirectly challenge the ultimate result of a previous trial in which there was an acquittal.203 Thus a perjury prosecution was stayed where the perjury alleged was the accused’s denial of killing a baby at a trial in which he was acquitted of murdering the baby.204 It has been held wrong for the Crown to seek to establish that the accused was guilty of indecent assaults on three occasions other than those in respect of which he was charged: while the Crown was not seeking a verdict in the later trial directly contrary to the earlier acquittals, since it was only seeking to rely on the events leading to the acquittals as similar fact evidence, it was seeking to challenge the findings explicit in the three acquittals.205 Undertakings as to damages may be given by the Crown in order to obtain restraining orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
against the property [page 269] of the accused. In proceedings by acquitted accused persons to enforce the undertakings, it is not open to the Crown to re-litigate the issue of guilt unless the acquittal is set aside as fraudulently obtained.206
[5155] Evidentiary rulings The principle can apply not only to decisions about the primary facts, but also to evidentiary rulings. Where a court of competent jurisdiction had already determined that records of interview between police and the appellant contained admissions obtained involuntarily, it was an abuse of process that the records of interview be tendered again by the Crown in further proceedings against the appellant.207 This was not applied to a ruling in an earlier trial (the accused’s conviction at that trial having been quashed on appeal) which was not a finding of fact (like voluntariness) but a discretionary decision to exclude evidence the prejudicial effect of which outweighed its probative value.208 After a jury has returned a verdict, an evidentiary ruling as between Crown and accused, whether or not it is discretionary, will bind the judge at a second trial unless it is tainted by fraud or there is additional evidence which will change the findings fundamental to the earlier ruling.209 The principle does not require that the evidence given in the earlier proceedings should by reason of that fact be rejected.210 But its permissible relevance should be scrutinised by the trial judge and, where it is admitted, the jury should be carefully warned that the evidence should not be taken to derogate from the conclusion in the earlier trial that the accused is entirely innocent of the offence then charged.211 In short, this emerging doctrine bears many of the hallmarks of one of the extended doctrines of estoppel by record which are considered in the next part of this chapter. In general the only party entitled to require a court to treat as incontrovertibly correct a verdict of acquittal will be the party in whose favour that acquittal was rendered.212 One exception is the rare case where
an accessory can demonstrate that the acquittal of a principal has established that no primary offence has been committed.213 A possible exception is true inconsistency where an accused was allegedly acting in concert with the acquitted person.214
[5160] Acquittal in first proceedings no defence to charge of perjury in second Finally, it should be noted that there is no rule, whether it be issue estoppel or another rule, which entitles a person accused of perjury to set up that person’s acquittal in the earlier proceedings as a defence to that charge.215 [page 270]
E — EXTENDED DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL BY RECORD Policy behind estoppel by record [5165] Introduction The courts have tended to apply narrowly the principles of estoppel by record. This attitude has been expressed in the maxim “estoppels are odious”. There are, however, two circumstances where the policy behind the principles of estoppel by record may be frustrated by the application of the technical rules, and the courts have striven to prevent this. First, where a party has not brought forward an argument which that party ought properly to have raised, can that party be prevented from litigating this argument in subsequent proceedings? Second, where a party has suffered an adverse decision, can that party impugn this decision in different proceedings between different parties?
[5170] Arguments not raised In 1843 Sir James Wigram V-C said:216
… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties217 to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances)218 permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.
[page 271] His Lordship’s principle was expressed as an aspect of res judicata and, indeed, it is referred to by Lord Wilberforce219 as an instance of that principle. But, whether the principle is seen as an extended application of res judicata, or as a manifestation of some principle of wider import,220 it is so closely connected with the policy underlying estoppels that it will be considered in the present section of this work. In the leading case221 a workman was injured when he was struck by a load of girders being handled by a crane operated by Anshun Pty Ltd. The crane was owned by the Port of Melbourne Authority and hired by it to Anshun Pty Ltd under an agreement whereby Anshun Pty Ltd agreed to indemnify the Authority against liability including liability for personal injury however caused. The workman sued both Anshun Pty Ltd and the Authority and obtained judgment against them both. In contribution proceedings brought between the defendants as joint tortfeasors, the Authority was held liable to Anshun Pty Ltd for 90 per cent of the workman’s claim and Anshun Pty Ltd liable to the Authority for 10 per cent. No claim in this action was brought by the Authority based on the indemnity agreement. Such a claim was brought by the Authority in separate proceedings commenced after judgment in the workman’s action. This subsequent claim was stayed on the ground that it was an abuse of the process of the court. The majority of the High Court emphasised that the case was not one of issue estoppel, nor of res judicata based on merger, for in the earlier trial the indemnity point was not raised or argued or determined.222 They accepted the statement of principle of Sir James Wigram set out above and
sought to put it in the context of the modern pleading rules. There is an obligation on a party to bring forward the party’s whole case. If the party does not the party may be prevented from doing so in later proceedings. The question is, how extensive that obligation is. They rejected as too wide the statement of the Privy Council223 which could prevent a party from litigating “matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings”. They favoured a far more flexible test based on reasonableness. The principle will not apply where a party failed to raise a defence in earlier proceedings: unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in this second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it. Generally speaking, it would be unreasonable not to plead a defence if, having regard to the nature of plaintiff’s claim, and its subject matter it would be expected that the defendant would raise the defence and thereby enable the relevant issues to be determined in the one proceeding … The likelihood that the omission to plead a defence will contribute to the existence of conflicting judgments is obviously an important factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the omission to plead can found an estoppel against the assertion of the same matter as a foundation for a cause of action in a second proceeding. By “conflicting”
[page 272] judgments we include judgments which are contradictory, though they may not be pronounced on the same cause of action. It is enough that they appear to declare rights which are inconsistent in respect of the same transaction.224
The principle has been applied with great caution.225 It may not apply to a default judgment.226 It may not prevent a party from litigating a claim which it might, or even should, have brought by counterclaim in an earlier proceeding.227 The principle can apply even if the parties in the second proceedings are different.228 An employer was not debarred from raising an argument before the Supreme Court in an action for indemnity from other employers in respect of its liability to an employee in the Dust Diseases Tribunal which could have been raised before the Tribunal. The issue was “quite different” in that at the time the proceedings were before the Tribunal the statutory background had complications rendering resolution of the issue before the Tribunal more difficult than it turned out to be before the Supreme Court.229 There are examples of reasonable230 and unreasonable231
conduct in the cases. The principle applies not only where the right in issue is derived from the common law but also where it is derived from statute. It applies to decisions about administrative law rights.232 The principle has been said to apply to administrative [page 273] tribunals.233 In England it is applied to control repeated interlocutory applications.234 In Australia different techniques are used.235 The principle was applied in favour of a minister whose breach of statutory duty deprived the opposing party of a chance to respond to the case made.236 At least in England, the principle may be used to debar a litigant whose action has been struck out for delay from commencing a second action within the limitation period.237
[5175] Different parties A requirement of res judicata estoppel and issue estoppel is that the parties be the same: see [5040]. This will normally prevent a party in civil proceedings from relying upon, or even leading in evidence, a previous conviction or acquittal arising out of the same facts: see [5065]. That this may lead to an abuse of the court process or to illegitimate harassment is exemplified in a leading case.238 A number of accused were charged with murder following a bombing incident in Birmingham. In their trial they challenged the voluntariness of statements containing admissions, alleging that they had been assaulted by police. Following a voir dire in which the accused and police gave evidence, the trial judge found that the accused had not been assaulted and the statements were admitted in evidence. Before the jury the accused renewed the allegations of police assault but they were all convicted. The accused then brought civil proceedings against the police seeking damages for the same assaults. The Law Lords rejected an attempt by the Court of Appeal to extend the principles of issue estoppel to the case where it was only the party against whom it is raised that was a party to the earlier proceedings.239 They affirmed the
requirement that for the principles to apply both parties must be common to both proceedings. Nevertheless, they dealt shortly with the civil claim, castigating it as an abuse of process since it was: the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending
[page 274] plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.240
The proper method of challenging the jury’s finding in the criminal proceeding should have been by way of appeal in that proceeding. Two points should be noted about this decision. First, the “final decision” which the plaintiffs were seeking to impugn was the ruling of the trial judge on the admissibility of the confessional statements. This determination could not give rise to an issue estoppel on the question whether the accused were in fact assaulted by the police. If it were suggested that the final decision which barred the civil claim was the jury verdict of guilty, it is equally difficult to see that this necessarily included a finding on the assault allegation. Secondly, the statement of principle enunciated by the Law Lords leans very heavily on the purpose for which the civil proceedings were brought. In a given case it might be difficult to disentangle the purposes for which the second action is brought, especially if the matter arises by way of summons when evidence of purpose may be unavailable. Without this emphasis on purpose, the acceptance of the quoted principle without qualification would permit the jettison of much, if not all, of the traditional learning on estoppels by record and on the use of convictions in civil proceedings: [5180].241 If the parties to later civil proceedings were not parties to or privies of those who were parties to the earlier proceedings, then it will only be an abuse of the process of the court to challenge the earlier factual findings if either it would be manifestly unfair to a party to the later proceedings that the same issues should be re-litigated or to permit re-litigation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.242 In considering whether those conditions are satisfied, in general the court is slower to prevent a party from continuing to deny serious charges
of which another court has found that party guilty than to prevent the party from initiating proceedings for the purpose of relitigating the question whether the party is guilty of those charges.243
F — THE RULE IN HOLLINGTON V HEWTHORN244 Judgments as evidence against strangers [5180] The problem stated In order to appreciate the problem with which this part is mainly concerned, it is necessary to refer to two distinctions already mentioned, the distinction between a [page 275] judgment and the facts upon which it was founded and the distinction between evidence and estoppel. Every judgment is conclusive as to the state of things it actually effects. If the question whether A is a convicted felon should be in issue, A’s conviction for felony is conclusive, even if A is a stranger to the proceedings in which the issue arises. No judgment is conclusive against all the world as to the facts which must have been proved before it could be pronounced. If A has been convicted of larceny of a motor car, A is not precluded from denying guilt in an action for conversion brought against A by the owner of the car, and the insurer of the car would not be precluded from denying it was stolen should this fact be relevant in proceedings brought against the insurer by the insured. Parties and their privies are, however, estopped from denying the facts on which a judgment was founded when the same question is raised in subsequent proceedings between them.245 A convicted thief would be unable to deny guilt if that matter should be raised at a trial of the thief for another offence. The problem with which this section is primarily concerned is whether a judgment can be treated as prima facie evidence of the facts upon which it was founded when the proceedings in which this question is raised are between a party and a stranger, or two strangers.
Does proof of a judgment cast an evidential burden of disproving the facts on which it was founded on the party denying them? If A is convicted of murder or robbery and A sues B for libel in describing A as a murderer or robber, would the conviction be admissible evidence in support of pleas of justification on B’s part? If H obtains a divorce from W, on the ground of C’s adultery with W, would a decree from a previous suit, that H had been guilty of adultery, be admissible against H? Before 1943, there was some authority for an affirmative answer,246 but most of it favoured a negative response, and this was confirmed by a decision of the English Court of Appeal in that year.247 The decision has since attracted much unfavourable comment, both judicial248 and [page 276] non-judicial.249
[5185] Authorities before Hollington v Hewthorn As long ago as 1698 it was said “Conviction at the suit of the King for battery etc cannot be given in evidence in an action for trespass for the same battery or vice versa”.250 It is true that, before the abolition of the incompetency of interested witnesses, parties and their spouses in the middle of the nineteenth century, the principal reason given for the exclusion was that a civil case might be decided on inadmissible evidence if a criminal conviction were received to prove the facts on which it was based; but some of the relevant authorities belong to the second half of the nineteenth century.251 A judgment in an English court is not conclusive as to anything but the point decided, and therefore a judgment of conviction on an indictment for forging a bill of exchange, though conclusive as to the prisoner being a convicted felon, is not only not conclusive, but is not even admissible evidence of the forgery in an action on the bill, though the conviction must have proceeded on the ground that the bill was forged.
There is a suggestion252 that this is only applicable to a case in which the convicted forger is not a party to the proceedings on the bill. This is because the modern tendency is to justify the exclusion of a judgment as evidence of its grounds by reference to the maxim res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. This simply means that it may be unjust to hold a person
bound by a finding of fact in proceedings in which that person had no responsibility for the pleadings, and could neither give evidence nor crossexamine: [1620]. These objections do not apply where a party to the earlier judgment is also a party to the later proceedings. Similarly, if a plaintiff obtains judgment against a defendant because of the latter’s negligence, the judgment is conclusive as to the amount of damages that the defendant had to pay the plaintiff, but it is not evidence that the defendant was negligent.253 A judgment granting a poker machine dealer’s licence is conclusive as to the grant, but not as to whether a person found to be a fit and proper person to be associated with the licensee was in fact fit and proper.254 On a claim by the Crown for money had and received against its former servant who had previously been acquitted of a fraud charge in respect of the same money, [page 277] the High Court disagreed with the trial judge’s ruling that there was a res judicata, pointing out that fraud was not an issue in the civil case. Griffith CJ reviewed the wider question on the reception of prior verdicts thus: There are … serious difficulties as to the question whether a verdict in a criminal case either of guilty or not guilty is admissible under any circumstances as evidence in a civil case, and, if so, for what purpose. According to the older authorities it was never admissible. It may be that for some purposes it is admissible. But, if it is, it can only be admitted as res judicata, and only where it appears that the point determined by the verdict is the same point which is in issue in the civil case.255
[5190] Justifications for the rule The maxim res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet is invoked to justify some aspects of the rule. From the theoretical point of view, the basic objection to the reception of a judgment as evidence of the facts upon which it was founded is that to do so would infringe this rule as well as the general prohibition on the reception of opinion on a matter which does not call for expertise. The rule against hearsay would be infringed because the judgment is an assertion which is not made by a witness, and the situation would not be improved by calling the judge or, where appropriate, the 12
jurors, to testify to the result of the previous trial, or an arbitrator,256 as their conclusion would inevitably be based on the testimony of the witnesses called before them. The assertion is, of course, a mere statement of opinion, because the disputed facts were perceived by the witnesses, not the judge or jury at the previous trial. This approach is, however, sufficiently technical to be unrealistic, and it is hardly surprising that an exception to an analogous combination of the rule against hearsay with the opinion rule has been recognised for a considerable time.257 Indeed, the relevant cases to some extent antedate the final settlement of either of the above rules. Inquisitions, surveys, assessments, reports and returns are admissible, but not generally conclusive, in proof of their contents when made under public authority, and in relation to matters of public interest or concern.258
This common law exception to the two exclusionary rules covers a heterogeneous mass of cases ranging from extracts from Domesday Book to a return by a bishop to a writ from the Exchequer directing him to ascertain the vacancies and advowsons in his diocese.259 It was once thought that the verdict of a coroner’s jury could be received under this head as evidence of the cause of death, but it is now settled that that is not the case; owing partly to the essentially preliminary nature of the inquiry, and partly to the unlikelihood of the coroner’s attention being drawn to some points that might be of interest in the proceedings in which it was sought to adduce his return.260 It is, however, settled that the old inquisitions and former masters’ orders in [page 278] lunacy are admissible, though not conclusive, evidence of the unsoundness of mind of the person to whom they refer.261 The English Court of Appeal adopted this analogy with regard to a finding of the General Medical Council that a dentist had been guilty of professional misconduct. The majority of the court was prepared to treat it as evidence of the misconduct in subsequent proceedings for the dissolution of the dentist’s partnership.262
[5195] Scope of the decision in Hollington v Hewthorn The conviction of one of the defendants for careless driving was held to be inadmissible as evidence of his negligence in proceedings for damages on that ground against him and his employer.263 The main reason for the decision was that the conviction merely proved that another court, acting on evidence which was unknown to the tribunal trying the civil proceedings, was of opinion that the defendant was guilty of careless driving. At first sight this conclusion would appear to be wide enough to warrant the proposition that a judgment or conviction can never be received as evidence of the facts upon which it was founded; but this would be open to question on several grounds. In the first place, there would be no point in allowing convictions to be proved in crossexamination to credit if they were not evidence of the existence of the facts upon which they were based.264 As Sachs J has said: “On questions of credit a conviction is prima facie assumed to be justified”.265 Secondly, there is a long series of cases in which convictions and verdicts have been received as evidence of public rights. Where the defendant alleged in answer to an action for trespass that he was using a public right of way, and he put in evidence a conviction of the plaintiff’s predecessor in title for public nuisance by obstructing the way, the court held that this did not operate as an estoppel, but they had no doubt that the judgment and indictment were admissible evidence on the issue whether the locus in quo was a highway.266 They would tend to establish public user [page 279] at the time of the conviction and this would warrant a decision in favour of the defendant in the absence of evidence of a change of user.267 The precise extent of the principle was considered by Sachs J in a case268 in which a husband petitioned for divorce on the ground that his wife’s conduct constituted cruelty and constructive desertion. He was a serving officer in the army throughout the war, and her association with the enemy cause, coupled with her conviction for espionage, injured his health. The evidentiary effect of the conviction was raised, and, though Sachs J stated that, where the fact in issue in a matrimonial cause is
coextensive with an issue as to which there has previously been a judgment, it must be proved de novo, he concluded that the conviction could not be treated as something from which no inference could be drawn in the case before him. He said that upon proof of a conviction in a matrimonial cause (unless the subject matter of conviction is coextensive with the matrimonial offence charged), the court is entitled, as regards the conduct of the spouse convicted, to draw such inferences as a reasonable man would normally draw upon becoming aware of the conviction against the background disclosed in evidence, having regard to such inferences that the other party to the marriage would normally draw. Where a marriage breaks down upon one spouse incurring a conviction it is open to a jury at least to draw the inference that the overt conduct of the convicted spouse has been such as to lead 12 reasonable jurors to consider that spouse guilty. By a similar process of reasoning it was held269 that a certificate of conviction was admissible to show reasonable suspicion in support of an application by the police for a declaration as to premises where liquor was sold without a licence. These latter cases are not true exceptions to the state of mind of the appropriate person or persons in the subsequent case.270 Likewise the rule has no application where an accused person has in the course of the trial made an admission which may be used against that person in any subsequent proceedings. Such an admission may be made by a plea of guilty or by evidence given from the witness box or the dock. A party may, upon proof of service of prior criminal proceedings upon the defendant, rely in subsequent civil proceedings upon the defendant’s nonappearance to answer the charge and the defendant’s subsequent conviction and also (upon proof that the conviction came to the defendant’s knowledge) the defendant’s failure to apply for a rehearing thereafter as an admission of the facts constituting the charge.271 In professional disciplinary cases heard by a court, it has been said that conviction of the practitioner is “admissible prima facie evidence bearing on the ultimate issue”, that [page 280] is fitness to practise.272
Relaxation of the general rule against the admissibility of a judge’s finding of fact against a non-party may occur where the connection of the non-party with the original proceedings is so close that the non-party will not suffer any injustice,273 eg when considering a summary application for costs against the non-party.274
[5200] The admissibility of the previous convictions and acquittals of the parties in subsequent cases Although the rule under discussion operates to exclude evidence of judicial findings in previous civil cases,275 it is the exclusion of previous convictions and, to a lesser extent, acquittals of the parties in subsequent cases that has drawn the greatest criticism. It is difficult to escape the apparent inconsistency of a judicial system which will deprive an accused person of liberty upon the say-so of a jury but not permit this fact to be placed before a subsequent tribunal charged with the task of determining the same issue upon a lesser standard of proof. The consequence of such a rule may be that a convicted arsonist may establish a claim against an insurer arising out of the same blaze upon which the conviction is founded. The justification of this anomalous rule is that the verdict of the criminal jury is nothing more than its opinion based on facts which it did not witness. It is also said that in the subsequent civil case it is likely that the party relying upon the conviction, and the civil tribunal itself, will tend to place undue weight upon this evidence to the exclusion of other evidence which the convicted person might seek to adduce. It is submitted that, in the case of a previous conviction, these justifications are illusory if one accepts the proposition that a convicted person is guilty of the offence of which that person has been convicted and at the trial had the opportunity and, indeed, the incentive to present to the court every matter which favoured the defence case. Furthermore, as is seen at [29105], the modern tendency is to admit opinion evidence as a matter of convenience, even as to ultimate issues, reserving the right of the court to make up its own mind upon the whole of the evidence. Finally, the common law exception referred to in [5190] above makes it clear that in certain cases the court will act upon the determination of a non-judicial tribunal.
[5205] Previous convictions in civil cases The previous conviction of a party to civil litigation may be proved when it is a fact in issue, as in a libel action, in which the statement that the plaintiff had been convicted is justified. The conviction itself may also be a relevant fact, whether or [page 281] not it was well founded.276 It may be received as evidence of public rights existing at the time when it took place, or as part of an admission, and it is also proof of the facts upon which it was based when a question is raised concerning the credibility of a witness. There is no authority on the position when the Crown is a party to civil litigation. For example, if a Crown servant were injured by the defendant who was convicted of careless driving, would the conviction operate as an estoppel in an action for loss of services? The answer is probably in the negative because of the difference in the subject matter and the capacity of the Crown in the two proceedings, but it is difficult to see how the maxim res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet could prevent the conviction from being received as evidence of negligence. A challenge to the correctness of the conviction is permissible in a later civil proceeding eg to recover a penalty on the same facts,277 or to challenge a tax assessment,278 unless the issue was raised with a view to setting it at nought by collateral attack.279 The rule was “distinguished”, but in truth departed from, when it was held that in proceedings claiming a civil recovery order, a conviction in a French court, containing much more detail about the matters found proved, was admissible to prove what had to be proved.280
[5210] Previous convictions in criminal cases Although there is very little authority on the point, it seems that the principle applies to criminal cases.281 As between the Crown and the accused, the previous conviction estops the accused from denying guilt of the offence, but the conviction of a third party is generally inadmissible as evidence of the facts on which it was based.282 Thus, at the trial of a
handler, the conviction of a thief is inadmissible as evidence that the goods received were stolen.283 The conviction of one co-offender is inadmissible against another.284 On the other hand there is a long established rule that, upon the trial of a person on a charge of having been an accessory to the commission of a felony, proof of the conviction of the alleged principal offender is admissible, and constitutes prima facie evidence that the felony was committed by that offender.285 But the rule does not make admissible against the accessory [page 282] evidence which is otherwise not admissible against the accessory.286 New Zealand Courts have recognised the possibility, based on United States authority, that convictions for crimes of violence committed by a person killed by the accused are admissible where self-defence was an issue.287 It follows that where similar fact evidence is admissible, the relevant facts can be proved by a conviction, evidencing the material facts underpinning the elements of the offence alleged, irrespective of whether the conviction took place after a trial or on a guilty plea.288 But mere proof of a prior conviction will often lack the detail which makes similar fact evidence sufficiently probative to be admissible.289
[5215] Previous acquittals Notwithstanding the anomalous exception relating to the effect of a conviction for the principal offence in the trial of an accessory,290 the rule operates to require the exclusion of evidence where the alleged principal offender was acquitted.291 There are, however, various reasons why the previous acquittal of a party should not be admitted as evidence of innocence in subsequent civil proceedings. Chief amongst these is the fact that the standard of proof is different, so that an acquittal only means that the case against the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus acquittal on one charge does not prevent evidence relevant to that charge being tendered on another charge.292 Observations293 of Avory J in a Divisional Court to the effect that, in affiliation proceedings, the
acquittal of the respondent on a charge of a sexual offence against the complainant was something that could have been taken into account by the justices as showing that the girl’s evidence did not convince the jury, are now of doubtful correctness. There may be other exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of acquittals, but even if they are admitted, their effect is not conclusive for all purposes.294 The previous acquittal of a party may be proved where, as in an action for malicious prosecution, which is peculiar and exceptional in character, it is a fact in issue. The verdict of acquittal establishes the innocence of the plaintiff.295 It has also been suggested that in malicious prosecution cases the conviction of the plaintiff [page 283] was admissible to establish his guilt.296 It is permissible to cross-examine a witness to the effect that the witness had made false allegations against the accused at an earlier trial, but not to seek to establish this by relying on an acquittal.297
[5220] Suggestions for reforming the law Quite apart from its unreality, and the fact that it excludes a valuable item of evidence, the rule is said to add unnecessarily to the cost of litigation. In proceedings between insured and insurer, why should a conviction of larceny not be prima facie evidence of guilt? In a runningdown action, it is perhaps open to question whether much saving of expense would be effected by admitting the driver’s conviction as prima facie evidence of negligence, for “it would be necessary to link up or identify the careless driving with the accident”, and in most, if not all, cases to call the same evidence as that which was called in the criminal proceedings.298 Nevertheless, various suggestions for reform have been made in relation to convictions after a person has been found guilty.299 In cases in which there was a plea of guilty, the plea may, by existing law, be received as an admission under an exception to the rule against hearsay.300
[5225] Legislative reform
In South Australia the Evidence Act 1929 s 34A provides that where a person has been convicted of an offence or found by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction to have committed an offence and the commission of the offence is in issue or relevant to an issue in a civil proceeding, the conviction or finding is evidence of the commission of the offence and admissible in the proceeding against the person or a party claiming through or under the person. Sections 91–93 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provide:301 91 (1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. (2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. 92 (1) Subsection 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of probate, letters of administration or a similar order of a court to prove: (a) the death, or date of death, or a person; or (b) the due execution of a testamentary document.
[page 284] (2) In a civil proceeding, subsection 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, not being a conviction: (a) in respect of which a review or appeal (however described) has been instituted but not finally determined; or (b) that has been quashed or set aside; or (c) in respect of which a pardon has been given. (3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a kind referred to in this section. 93 This Part does not affect the operation of: (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation; or (b) a judgment in rem; or (c) the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.302
The fact of conviction for s 92(2) purposes may be proved by a certificate under s 178.303 Section 178 does not create evidence that the underlying offence was committed.304 Section 92(2) does not specify the weight to be accorded to the conviction. Nor does it create a presumption that the conviction is correct. Witnesses who gave evidence in the proceeding may be recalled, and may be the subject of a request under s
166(g) and s 167(b); if there is no reasonable cause for non-compliance with the request, the court may order that the conviction not be admitted into evidence (s 169(1)(c)), taking into account whether another witness is available: s 169(5)(f). Reasons for judgment in later proceedings which are inadmissible to prove the facts found may be admissible for the purpose of understanding what the issues were and how the evidence addressed them.305 The Queensland Evidence Act 1977 has introduced changes to the common law rule. The operative Queensland section is s 79:306 79 (2) In any civil proceeding the fact that a person has been convicted by a court of an offence is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving, where to do so is relevant to any issue in that proceeding, that he committed that offence. (3) In any civil proceeding in which by virtue of this section a person is proved to have been convicted by a court of an offence that person shall, unless the contrary is proved, be taken to have committed the acts and to have possessed the state of mind (if any) which at law constitute that offence. (4) This section applies — (a) whether or not a person was convicted upon a plea of guilty; and (b) whether or not the person convicted is a party to the civil proceeding.
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 83 creates a different inroad into the common law by providing that in certain civil proceedings under the Act against a person a finding of fact by a court in specified civil or criminal proceedings in which that person is found to have contravened the Act is prima facie evidence of that fact, and the finding may be proved by production of a document made under [page 285] the seal of the court from which the finding appears.307 Where a party relies on s 83 and also tenders evidence of the facts in the conventional way, the court must make its own findings.308 It is otherwise obscure what effect s 83 has. Does it create an evidential burden on the defendant? Is the consequence of the defendant’s not calling evidence that the prima facie evidence becomes conclusive? Or does s 83 create a merely “tactical” burden on the defendant, so that a failure to call evidence in answer to the prima facie evidence will not necessarily result in the plaintiff succeeding on the issue? There is also a controversy about whether s 83 only applies after contested hearings, or whether it can
apply to proceedings in which the defendant has made admissions which led to agreed remedies. There are cases in which, though the permissibility of this course was not argued, the court has made s 83 findings of fact even though it proceeded on the basis of an agreed statement of facts and penalty.309 In other cases it has been held that the words “a finding of fact by any court” mean a finding after a contested hearing.310 An intermediate position is to rely on the discretionary nature of the s 83 power and to decline to exercise it where the parties only “rely on statements of agreed facts which have not been the subject of critical analysis by the Court”.311 This intermediate position is not satisfactory: for a discretion which can only be exercised one way is not in truth a discretion at all. In principle the view that s 83 applies only to facts found after a hearing appears correct. A fact found is not a fact admitted. When a court relies on an agreed fact, it is not making a “finding”, but merely recording an agreement and proceeding to deal with the consequences of the agreement. As Carr J said: “The apparent purpose of the provision is to save inconvenience and expense in requiring a matter to be proved more than once”.312 An agreed fact is not something which has to be proved. It obviates the need for something to be proved or to be found. And Finkelstein J thought that a judge acting on formal admissions was not making a finding of fact, because the purpose of an admission is to dispense with the need to prove the admitted fact and with the judicial task of finding a fact; and the procedure was quite different from the case where the judge hears evidence on a controversial topic and makes findings on that evidence.313 [page 286] If s 83 only applies to facts found in contested hearings, it will have only a limited role in practice — because in practice most Commission victories are by consent. However, the fact that s 83 may only have limited utility is not a bar to that construction: it has some utility.
[5230] English authority The initial English legislation (Civil Evidence Act 1968) lacked a
provision such as s 79(3). Accordingly, in that jurisdiction considerable attention was directed to the weight to be attached to the conviction in the subsequent civil proceedings. Although the same problem arises in the application of the Australian provisions other than Queensland, it does not appear that it has attracted judicial attention here. Differing views on this matter have been expressed. Buckley LJ treated the conviction as raising a presumption — a rebuttable presumption of law — which, “like any other presumption, will give way to evidence establishing the contrary on the balance of probability without itself affording any evidential weight to be taken into account in determining whether that onus has been discharged”.314 For Lord Denning MR, the conviction not only shifts the burden of proof, “it is a weighty piece of evidence itself”.315 It would appear from the wording of the Queensland legislation that the view of Buckley LJ has there been preferred. But it would be unrealistic to suppose that the burden created by the presumption could be lightly discharged.316 In one case317 the plaintiff disputed the authenticity of her late husband’s will. She put in evidence the conviction of one of the executors of forging the document in question. An appeal against the conviction was pending at the date of the trial of the plaintiff’s action. The court adjourned the hearing to enable the appeal to be heard. Notwithstanding important differences between the wording of the Civil Evidence Act (Eng) and the Queensland legislation, it is thought that the course adopted in that case is a convenient method of resolving the evidentiary effect of a conviction under appeal.
[5235] Defamation As the conviction constitutes the basic fact of a presumption, it should be capable of corroborating other evidence where corroboration is required; it is stated by s 79(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) to be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving “… [the accused] committed the offence”. A Divisional Court decision318 treating the respondent’s conviction of unlawful intercourse with the applicant as corroboration of her evidence in affiliation proceedings is inconsistent with the common law, but may well have been resuscitated by the legislation. As long as convictions are not conclusive evidence of the guilt of the
person convicted, it is possible for that person to obtain a retrial of the issues raised in the criminal proceedings in a subsequent civil action by suing for defamation anyone implying that that person was guilty of the offence. Even if the civil action succeeded, the validity of the conviction would of course be unaffected. The English Law Reform Committee took the view that, as a matter of substantive law, no-one ought to be at risk of incurring civil liability for stating that another person was [page 287] guilty of an offence of which that other person had been convicted; and, conversely, no-one ought to be entitled, without incurring civil liability, to state that another person was guilty of an offence of which that other person had been acquitted.319 The Committee therefore recommended that, in defamation actions, where the statement complained of alleges that the plaintiff has been guilty of a criminal offence, proof that the plaintiff has been convicted of that offence should be conclusive evidence of guilt, and proof that the plaintiff was acquitted should be conclusive evidence of innocence. The first, but not the second, of these recommendations was accepted in s 13(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, which has been adopted in some Australian jurisdictions.320
Section 2 — The Place of Estoppels in the Law ESTOPPELS CHARACTERISED Estoppel as a rule of evidence [5240] The controversy The word “estoppel” simply means that the law prevents a party from pursuing a course of conduct. This work is concerned with rules which prevent a party from adducing evidence. These rules are various and depend upon different policies: that which would encourage finality in litigation, that which seeks to free an acquitted person from the recurrence of similar accusations, and that which would hold a party to a position the party has adopted where it would be unfair to others to release that party. It is in this sense that estoppels are properly regarded as rules of evidence. The majority of judges appear to share Lord Maugham’s view321 that this is so, and the classic statement to this effect is that of Bowen LJ who said: Estoppel is only a rule of evidence; you cannot found an action upon estoppel. Estoppel is only important as being one step in the progress towards relief on the hypothesis that the defendant is estopped from denying the truth of something which he has said.322
On the other hand, Lord Wright has said: “Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence as indeed it may be so described. But the whole concept is more accurately viewed as a substantive rule of law”.323 A dictum of the same judge in an earlier case shows that he was of this opinion because estoppel “may have the effect of creating substantive rights as against the person estopped”.324 If a rule of [page 288] substantive law is one which defines rights, something may have the effect of creating them against a particular party without itself being such a rule.
However, the various forms of estoppel other than estoppel by record are best studied in the works of substantive law, pleading and procedure which deal with them.325 1 Detailed accounts of estoppel by deed and estoppel by conduct appeared in the 4th Australian
edition of this work, [5240]–[5325]. The classic account of the subject matter of this chapter is K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009. This chapter can, in comparison with that work, offer only an introductory account, and has employed frequent cross referencing to the detailed analysis of particular topics in it. See also K R Handley, “Res Judicata: General Principles and Recent Developments” (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 214; S Maiden, “Recent steps in the evolution of res judicata, cause of action estoppel and the Anshun doctrine in Australia” (2004) 25 Aust Bar Rev 130. 2 Edgerton v Edgerton [2012] 1 FCR(UK) 421 (CA) at [38]–[39]. 3 Duchess of Kingston’s Case (1776) 20 St Tr 355. 4 Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [44-02]. 5 Purcell v Macnamara (1807) 9 East 157. 6 Ex parte Young; Re Kitchin (1881) 17 Ch D 668. 7 Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th ed, Vol 26, [503], adopted in Lazarus-Barlow v Regent Estates Co Ltd [1949] 2 KB 465 at 475, by Evershed LJ who added: “such a judgment is conclusive evidence for and against all persons whether parties, privies or strangers, of the matters actually decided”. The courts have not developed the statement made in Hill v Clifford [1907] 2 Ch 236 at 244, that there are two kinds of judgment in rem, one of which is conclusive against all the world, and the other of which is not. An instance of the latter was said to be an inquisition in lunacy “which has always been allowed to be read in a subsequent suit between third parties, as evidence of the lunacy, though it is not conclusive, and may be traversed”. See generally K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, ch 9. 8 Allen v Dundas (1789) 3 TR 125. 9 Geyer v Aguilar (1798) 7 TR 681. 10 McGovern v Victoria [1984] VR 570 (FC). 11 Wakefield Corporation v Cooke [1904] AC 31. This decision was applied in Meere v City of Sandringham [1956] VLR 638 to hold that the finding of a magistrate as to a private street construction scheme was a judgment in rem that the street was a previously constructed street and so outside the legislation in question. See PE Bakers Pty Ltd v Yehuda (1988) 15 NSWLR 437 (declaration that certain conditions imposed by a planning authority on the use of land were valid). 12 Salvesen v Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] AC 641; Andrew v Hanson [1992] Fam 1. 13 Duchess of Kingston’s Case (1776) 20 St Tr 355 (HL). 14 Called “cause of action estoppel” by Diplock LJ in Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181 at 197–8. He said: “ ‘cause of action estoppel’ … prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist, ie judgment was given upon it, it is said to be merged in the judgment … If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam”. 15 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 at 467. 16 Willoughby v Clayton Utz (No 2) (2009) 40 WAR 98 at [17]–[29]. 17 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, ch 5. The analysis can involve circularity: D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 at 599–600 (CA). 18 Wilkins v Wilkins [1896] P 108 (CA); Marchioness of Huntly v Gaskel [1905] 2 Ch 656 (CA);
Woodland v Woodland [1928] P 169; K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [5.19]. 19 Roe v R A Naylor Ltd (1918) 87 LJKB 958 at 963 (CA) (findings in second trial ordered by Court of Appeal supersede those in the first); Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220; D M Gordon: “Effect of Reversal of Judgment on Acts done between Pronouncement and Reversal” (1958) 74 LQR 517 at 518–21. 20 Zatorski v South Australian Railways Cmr (1982) 41 ALR 655 (Fed C of A FC). 21 Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470; R v Marks; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1981) 147 CLR 471 at 476. See K R Handley, “Some Overlooked Aspects of the Res Judicata Doctrine” (2011) 127 LQR 83 at 83–4. 22 Gray v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 509 at 520–1; Lyons v Nicholls (No 3) [1958] NZLR 755 (CA); Duhamel v R (No 2) (1981) 131 DLR (3d) 352 at 357 (Alta CA). 23 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.33] n 4 and cases cited therein. 24 Tak Ming Co Ltd vYee Sang Metal Supplies Co [1973] 1 All ER 569 (PC). 25 R v Middlesex Justices; Ex parte Bond [1933] 2 KB 1 (CA). 26 Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285 at 296. 27 Joseph Lynch Land Co Ltd v Lynch [1995] 1 NZLR 37 at 43 (CA); Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 at 583; Re Martin; Ex parte Amtron Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 62 FCR 438; Castillon v P & O Ports Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 219 at [49]–[58]; Webuildem Pty Ltd v Arab Bank Australia Ltd (2013) 300 ALR 99 at [53]. In Mullen v Conoco Ltd [1998] QB 382 at 391, Evans J left open the possibility that there might be a case where the court’s ruling on an application to set aside a default judgment, though a discretionary decision to grant or not grant a procedural remedy, was so clear and so specific as regards a particular defence or potential defence that there were legal or discretionary grounds for barring a further action. 28 The same is true in relation to findings given in granting a divorce decree nisi which is not made absolute: Kemp v Pearce [1972] VR 805; an exception was said to exist where a divorce decree nisi was rescinded on the application of the Queen’s Proctor in Butler v Butler [1894] P 25; (CA), but the decision is wrong for the reasons given by K R Handley (ed) Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [15.15]–[15.16], and deals with what is now so archaic a subject that it is of no general significance. See that work also at [2.10] and [5.13]–[5.14]. 29 R v Rogers (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 179 at 182 (CCA) (rev’d on other grounds: Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251). 30 R v Gough; Ex parte Municipal Officers’ Assn (1975) 133 CLR 59 at 70; Australian Transport Officers Federation v State Public Services Federation (1981) 34 ALR 406 at 413 (Fed C of A); Huysse v Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority [1975] 1 NSWLR 401 (CA). See also Buehler AG v Chronos Richardson Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 960 (Opposition Division of European Patent Office cannot make final decisions on patent validity). A review of workers compensation payments may be subject to res judicata or issue estoppel, but if and only if the circumstances at the time of review are precisely the same as they were at the time of the original decision: Weeks v Harbourworks Clough [1985] WAR 327 (FC); Waddington v Silver Chain Nursing Assn (1998) 20 WAR 269 (FC). See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [5.15] and [5.20]. 31 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506 at 539. See also cases cited in K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.10], nn 1 and 5. However, there are equity orders (eg orders for foreclosure or redemption nisi, specific performance and general administration) which declare the rights of the parties and create estoppels binding on the parties in later proceedings in the suit designed to work out the parties’ rights (eg the taking of accounts: see K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [5.21] ff). The position is similar where separate questions are answered: K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009 [5.28].
32 For example, a judgment entered in default of compliance with a self-executing order: Baines v
State Bank of New South Wales (1985) 2 NSWLR 729 at 738, cited with approval in Rogers v Legal Services Commission of South Australia (1995) 64 SASR 572 at 595 (FC) (a case distinguished in Willoughby v Clayton Utz (No 2) (2009) 40 WAR 98 at [33]). However, other default judgments have been held to be capable of creating estoppels, for example dismissal of proceedings for default of appearance to the initiating process ( New Brunswick Railway Co v British and French Trust Corp Ltd [1939] AC 1), default in pleading, default in appearance at the hearing of the trial or the appeal (K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata,, 4th ed, 2009, [2.22]–[2.23]), or judgments after non-appearance by the non-moving party ( Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508). Because there are many reasons why a party may allow judgment to go by default and therefore there can be hardship in permitting estoppels to arise, there is a tendency to require extreme rigour in locating an identity of issues, and a doubt whether issue estoppels arise: K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.24]– [2.25], discussing New Brunswick Railway Co v British and French Trust Corp Ltd [1939] AC 1, Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 (PC) and Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. An order dismissing proceedings on the ground that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action has been held to work no estoppels, since no finding was made as to any fact or the availability of any cause of action: Rogers v Legal Services Commission of South Australia (1995) 64 SASR 572 (FC). 33 Even an order following a trial where one party leads no evidence: SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri (No 3) [1987] QB 1028 (CA); Barber v Staffordshire County Council [1996] 2 All ER 748 (CA); cf R v Calcedo [1986] VR 499 at 505 (FC); Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 (judgment obtained when party does not appear is a final judgment notwithstanding that it may be set aside). Dismissal of applications not pursued can have more radical consequences than those which fail in part: the former will create estoppels on all questions, but the latter create estoppels only on the matters decided, not on those only assumed to be the case: Vitosh v Brisbane City Council (1955) 93 CLR 622. 34 Re South American and Mexican Co; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37 (CA); Isaacs v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp Ltd (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 69 (FC) (issue estoppel); Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 at 1010 (PC); Spens v IRC [1970] 3 All ER 295 at 301; DSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Owners of The Sennar; The Sennar [1985] 2 All ER 104 at 111; Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483; Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 at 582; Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at [15]–[20] (on difficulty of assessing what a consent judgment necessarily decides); Land Enviro Corp Pty Ltd v HTT Huntley Heritage Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 160 at [63]–[65]; Edgerton v Edgerton [2012] 1 FCR(UK) 421 (CA) at [35]; Western Australia v Fazeldean (No 2) (2013) 211 FCR 150 at [21]–[29]; Webuildem Pty Ltd v Arab Bank Australia Ltd (2013) 300 ALR 99 at [63]. But see SCI Operations Pty Ltd v TPC (1984) 2 FCR 113. The operation of consent orders as working estoppels is an exception to the principle that there must be a decision on the merits. Consent orders absolve the court from the duty to make a decision on the merits and convert an agreement into a judicial decision: K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.16]. Their efficacy depends on the capacity of the parties to consent and the jurisdiction of the court to make a consent order: Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150. Any issue recognised by the parties as the subject of the litigation and fundamental to the judgment or order fairly and reasonably interpreted will be conclusively determined (Re South American and Mexican Co; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37 at 50; Dinch v Dinch [1987] 1 All ER 818 at 827). However, if there are no materials to determine what those issues are, neither party is estopped from disputing anything but the actual judgment or order: K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.17]. A notation that a party agrees to judgment if certain conditions are not complied with is not a consent order founding an estoppel: Litchfield v Ready
(1850) 5 Exch 939 at 947 (Exch). In Pople v Evans [1969] 2 Ch 255, it was held that a judgment for want of prosecution will not give rise to res judicata. See too Hart v Hall & Pickles Ltd [1969] 1 QB 405 at 411 (CA); Birkett v James [1978] AC 297 at 328; Samuels v Linzi Dresses Ltd [1981] QB 115 at 126 (CA); Williams v Zupps Motors Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 493 (FC). It may be, however, that the nature of the plaintiff’s delay has been such that a subsequent similar action would be stayed or struck out as an abuse of the court process: Janov v Morris [1981] 3 All ER 780 (CA). A consent judgment will not work an estoppel in relation to matters specifically reserved or not admitted: Isaacs v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp Ltd (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 69 (FC); cf SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri (No 3) [1987] QB 1028 (CA). 35 DSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Owners of The Sennar; The Sennar [1985] 2 All ER 104 at 111. 36 Khan v Golechha International Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 259 (CA). 37 Western Australia v Fazeldean (No 2) (2013) 211 FCR 150. 38 Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 at 20 (CA). See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [5.12]. 39 For example Fracis Times & Co v Carr (1900) 82 LT 698 (CA); The European Gateway [1987] QB 206. 40 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.11]–[2.12] and [2.14]. 41 Desert Sun Loan Corporation v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847 (CA). 42 Attorney-General (Trinidad and Tobago) v Eriché [1893] AC 518 at 52–3 (PC), applied in Re Norris; Norris v Manteit (1997) 78 FCR 594 at 599. See also SK Foods LP (California Ltd Partnership) v SK Foods Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 at [40]. 43 Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139; Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 at 114–15; R v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128 at 151–2 (PC); Merker v Merker [1963] P 283; Crown Estate Cmrs v Dorset County Council [1990] Ch 297 at 305; Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider (2005) 91 SASR 544 at [77]–[80]; SK Foods LP (California Ltd Partnership) v SK Foods Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 at [53]. 44 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.20]. There is a dispute as to whether a decision by one judge that there is no bona fide dispute as to the existence of a debt in refusing an injunction against advertising a winding up petition can work an estoppel so as to prevent investigation of the existence of the debt in the winding up proceedings themselves: Australian Mid-Eastern Club Ltd v Elbakht (1988) 13 NSWLR 697 (CA), criticised in Yassim v Australian Mid-Eastern Club Ltd (1989) 15 ACLR 449. 45 D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 (CA). 46 Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at 642; quoted with approval in Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 at [57]. 47 ReWakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 at [79], and see at [297]. See also Queensland v Commonwealth (Territory Representation Case (No 2)) (1977) 139 CLR 585 at 597; there may be a contrary assumption in Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575 at 654. 48 Roberts v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 505 at 516 (FC). 49 Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown (2011) 242 CLR 647 at [40] (an issue estoppel case). See also Kocak v Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd (2012) 35 VR 324 at [34]–[37]; Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 303 ALR 64. 50 SK Foods LP (California Ltd Partnership) v SK Foods Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 302 ALR 260 at [26]–[31]. 51 For example R v Hutchings (1881) 6 QBD 300. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, Ch 4. 52 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 917. In McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] QB 283 at 333, Goff LJ makes it clear that it is not
sufficient merely to allege that the earlier judgment was obtained by perjury. There must be fresh evidence to support the allegation. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.02]–[17.10] and [17.12]–[17.13]. 53 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.14]. 54 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.02]. 55 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.03]–[2.04]. 56 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.05]. 57 Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works (1870) LR 5 Ex 221 at 231 (Exch Ch); Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at 643 (CA). On arbitral jurisdiction, see K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [4.12]–[4.16]. 58 Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 at 114. See also R (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [2011] 2 AC 146 at [30]–[32] (SC), in which it was said that the question whether an exception to cause of action estoppel should exist in the case of disciplinary proceedings was a matter for the legislature, not the courts (at 48]–[50]). 59 Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 305 (FC); Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285; Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335 (FC) (issue estoppel); David Jones (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Zapasnik (1982) 42 ACTR 6; Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 (CA); Salmon Street Ltd (in liq) v Jorgensen (1991) 56 SASR 158 (FC); Bruce v Grocon Ltd (1995) 11 NSWCCR 247 (Neilson J); McNair v Press Offshore Ltd (1997) 17 WAR 191 (FC); Waddington v Silver Chain Nursing Assn (1998) 20 WAR 269 (FC); Kuligowski v Metrobus (2002) 26 WAR 137; Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363. See also Milojevic v ROH Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78 (issue estoppel extends to Industrial Court); Accident Compensation Commission v Detar [1989] VR 931 (FC). 60 Somodaj v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285 at 297. 61 Pastras v Commonwealth (1966) 9 FLR 152 at 155 (SC(Vic)). 62 Taylor v Ansett Transport Industries Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 342 (a decision of the Federal Court exercising power under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)); Somanader v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 178 ALR 677 at [65]; Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722 at [71]. Cf R v Secretary of State for Environment; Ex parte Hackney London Borough Council [1983] 3 All ER 358; SCI Operations Pty Ltd v TPC (1984) 2 FCR 113 at 180; R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2004] QB 395 at [79] (CA). See E Campbell, “Relitigation in Government Cases: A Study of the Use of Estoppel Principles in Public Law Litigation” in (1994) 20 Mon L Rev 21. The matter is discussed in ReWakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 at [295]. 63 Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 453. 64 Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 402. 65 Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 402, 455. In so far as Bede v Commonwealth Hostels Ltd (1980) 4 NTR 31 expresses a contrary view it should not be considered good law. 66 Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 (CA). 67 Such as those mentioned by Kirby P in Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 368 (CA). 68 W J & F Barnes Pty Ltd v FCT (1957) 96 CLR 294 at 315; Pastras v Commonwealth (1966) 9 FLR 152 at 155 (SC (Vic)); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649 (Fed C of A FC); Commonwealth v Sciacca (1988) 17 FCR 476 at 480; Midland Metals Overseas Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1991) 30 FCR 87 at 96–8; Comcare Australia v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 at 64; Re Cooper (WH) and Repatriation Commission (1995) 38 ALD 164 at 167; Bramwell v Repatriation Commission (1998) 158 ALR 623. See also Caffoor v Cmr of Income Tax, Colombo [1961] AC 584 (PC).
69 Bogaards v McMahon (1988) 23 FCR 472; Wiest v DPP (1988) 86 ALR 464 (Fed C of AFC);
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 at 219 (FC); Miller v University of New South Wales (2003) 132 FCR 147. 70 Hoystead v Cmr of Taxation [1926] AC 155 (PC); Re Jackson; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 13 at 17. 71 Re Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc (1992) 28 ALD 25 at [15]; Crown Estate Cmrs v Dorset County Council [1990] Ch 297; Lambidis v Police Cmr (1995) 37 NSWLR 320; Lilienthal v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2001) 65 ALD 438 at [20]–[24]; Link Technology 2000 Ltd v A-G [2006] 1 NZLR 1 [47] (CA); Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 413. 72 Thrasyvoulou v Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 2 AC 273 at 289 (the rest of the House of Lords concurring); see also Thrasyvoulou v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] QB 809 at 819–23 (CA); K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [16.03]–[16.10]. 73 House v Dept of Defence (1996) 65 FCR 94 at 101. 74 Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374 at 380; Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348. 75 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. See E Campbell, “Res Judicata and Decisions of Foreign Tribunals” (1994) 16 Syd LR 311; P R Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 2001. See also SK Foods LP (California Ltd Partnership) v SK Foods Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 at [22]–[25]. 76 Simpson v Fogo (1862) 1 H & M 195. This is so equally for a foreign judgment that another judgment had not been obtained by fraud: House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241 (CA). 77 Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139. 78 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 926–7. 79 Houlditch v Donegal (1834) 8 Bli (NS) 301 at 338 per Lord Brougham. 80 Nouvion v Freeman (1889) LR 15 App Cas 1. 81 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 at 466. 82 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 938. 83 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 918. 84 Showlag v Mansour [1995] 1 AC 431 (PC). 85 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.40]–[2.42]. 86 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [2.43]–[2.44]. 87 Tedeschi v Legal Services Cmr (1997) 43 NSWLR 20. 88 Morgan v WorkCover Corp (2013) 118 SASR 297 at [151] (no qualification for “exceptional circumstances”). 89 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. 90 Townsend v Bishop [1939] 1 All ER 805. 91 Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 at 19–20 (CA). 92 Taylor v Ansett Transport Industries Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 342 at 358–9; Dale v Western Australia (2009) 261 ALR 21 at [33]–[38]; Quall v Northern Territory (2009) 180 FCR 528 at [33]–[37]. 93 Thomas v Balanced Securities Ltd [2012] 2 Qd R 482 at [49]. 94 Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] 2 KB 426. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [9.22]–[9.28]. 95 But see Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271. 96 See also Zotovic v Dobell Boat Hire Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ACTR 29; Re Australasian Memory Pty Ltd and Corporations Law; Brien v Australasian Memory Pty Ltd (1997) 149 ALR 393 at 412–13 (NSW SC). 97 Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271 at 279; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 910; Shears v Chisholm [1994] 2 VR 535 at 544–5. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [9.38]–[9.40].
98 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. 99 Taylor v Ansett Transport Industries Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 342 at 358. Hence estoppels can operate
as between defendants with conflicting interests in circumstances where it was necessary to resolve the conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief claimed: Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664 at [105]–[110], discussing North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners [1990] 3 All ER 547. 100 Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271 at 279. See also the example given by Lord Reid in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 911, discussed in Jeans v Cleary (2004) 196 FLR 1. For a case when an employer was able to rely on the plea following a successful defence by his agent in an earlier action, see South British Fire & Marine Insurance Co v Ackhoonzada (1909) 11 WALR 47. 101 Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain (2013) 305 ALR 612 at [111]. 102 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506 at 541. 103 Gleeson v JWippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54; Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 406 at 413–14; upheld on appeal in Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (1993) 43 FCR 510; Ann Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq) v Beck (2009) 175 FCR 532 at [27]–[30]. See also ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) (2001) 119 FCR 1 at [1145]–[1149] (company in violation of statute not in privity of interest with its employee through whom the breach was committed). See K R Handley, “Some Overlooked Aspects of the Res Judicata Doctrine” (2011) 127 LQR 83 at 90–5. 104 Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co v River Plate Trust, Loan and Agency Co [1894] 1 Ch 578. 105 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506 at 541. 106 Craddock’s Transport Ltd v Stuart [1970] NZLR 499 at 524 (CA); Webb v Davey [1982] Qd R 356; Wall v Radford [1991] 2 All ER 741 at 749–50; Talbot v Berkshire County Council [1994] QB 290 (CA). 107 C (a minor) v Hackney London Borough Council [1996] 1 All ER 973 (CA). 108 Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54 at 60. 109 C B Darvall & Darvall v Moloney (2006) 236 ALR 796 at [30]. 110 Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 505. 111 Gribbon v Lutton [2002] QB 902 (CA). 112 Stewart v GIO (NSW) (1996) 39 NSWLR 531 (CA). 113 Gleeson v JWippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 54 at 60. See too Young v Public Service Board [1982] 2 NSWLR 456; Official Custodian of Charities v Mackey (No 2) [1985] 2 All ER 1016 at 1022; House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241 at 252 (CA); Thomas & Agnes Carvel Foundation v Carvel [2008] Ch 395 at [36]–[40]. But see Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 406 at 416. 114 Powell v Wiltshire [2005] 1 QB 117 (CA). 115 Powell v Wiltshire [2005] 1 QB 117 (CA). 116 See Soare v Ashley [1955] VLR 438. See the discussion in this case of the special rule said to apply in malicious prosecution cases. See too Earnshaw v Loy (No 1) [1959] VR 248; R v Tween [1965] VR 687 (FC). See [5180] below. 117 Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321. See [5105] below. 118 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 at 466. 119 In order to identify the coincidence of the causes of action it is not necessary to analyse them in a technical way. Where it is open for the plaintiff on the same set of facts to elect whether to frame the claim in tort or contract this is immaterial: Maganja v Arthur [1984] 3 NSWLR 561 at 563; Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234 at 245 and 254. In a building case a judgment or a claim for breach of a contractual term as to workmanship has been held to merge all allegations of poor workmanship whether or not they were particularised in the first action: Onerati
v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1989) 16 NSWLR 730; Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150. See also Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Levine [1990] VR 205. 120 It is therefore necessary that there exist a formal judgment or some act which, in accordance with the rules of the court, will have the effect of extinguishing the cause of action by merger: Maganja v Arthur [1984] 3 NSWLR 561. As to the question of whether an order of the New South Wales Consumer Claims Tribunal could give rise to res judicata or estoppel, see Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 (CA), discussed in [5030] above. 121 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506 at 538. See too Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [8.29]. The doctrine does not apply where the first tribunal lacked jurisdiction: Houvardas v Zaravinos (2003) 202 ALR 535 at [110]. 122 Per Lord Denning MR in Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at 640 (CA). See, for example, Wells v D’Amico [1961] VR 672; Van Amstel v Country Roads Board [1961] VR 780. 123 Per Dixon J in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532. This passage is analysed by Brennan J in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 611. 124 Conquer v Boot [1928] 2 KB 336 (DC of KBD); Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1989) 16 NSWLR 730; Marlborough Harbour Board v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223 (CA); Marks v National and General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416 (ACTSC); Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd [1993] AC 410; Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150; Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197 at [209]–[211] and [235]. On the other hand, in Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141 (CA) it was held that recovery of damages for injury to property caused in the collision did not bar a separate action to recover damages for personal injury caused in the same collision. It has been said that though the decision has been much attacked (K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [21.11]), it is too late to question it, and even that it represents the better view: Marlborough Harbour Board v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223 at 231 (CA); cf Baltic Shipping Co v Merchant (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1994) 36 NSWLR 361 at 370 (CA). If a particular remedy for a wrong has been sought in one set of proceedings, another set of proceedings may not be instituted for a different remedy: Serrao v Noel (1885) 15 QBD 549 (CA); Dillon v Macdonald (1902) 21 NZLR 375 at 393 (FC); Neylan v Dickens [1987] 1 NZLR 402 (CA); King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 619 at [17]. A cause of action against a primary contravener of Pt IV of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is not the same as one against a secondary participant: ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) (2001) 119 FCR 1 at [1141]–[1144]. 125 This case was distinguished in Purser & Co (Hillingdon) Ltd v Jackson [1977] 1 QB 166 where there was a submission to arbitration and the award was held to apply only to the matters covered by the submission. 126 Thyssen-Bornemisza v Thyssen-Bornemisza [1986] Fam 1 (CA). 127 Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543 at 559. Thus cause of action estoppel was found where one “factual matrix … generated” a controversy characterised as breaches of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in the first case and negligent misrepresentation in the second: Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 406 at 418–22; appeal dismissed on other grounds: Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (1993) 43 FCR 510. See also Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd (2005) 67 NSWLR 457. 128 GS Technology Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (2007) 157 FCR 373. 129 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 8) [2013] FCA 494. 130 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531; Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1990] Ch 573 (CA); Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93. The latter case introduced a qualification to this principle based on Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100. This would deny
an issue estoppel where estoppel would work injustice, eg, where it was clear that the first issue was wrongly decided and appeal was not available or where new facts had come to light which cast doubt on the decision. See also, as to fresh evidence, Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459 at 468–9 (DC of QBD); McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] QB 283 at 320 and 333– 4 (CA); Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 545. It is unclear whether this qualification is available in Australia. It was criticised in Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 VR 427 at 449; the similar views of the trial judge ([1989] Ch 63) were criticised by Brennan J in O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 at 258. 131 For the distinction between issue estoppel and res judicata, see Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464; Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321; Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181 (CA); McNair v Press Offshore Ltd (1997) 17WAR 191 at 197 (FC). The point was left open, though contrary arguments were assembled, in Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363 at [58]–[63]. 132 Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251 at 263. The contrary view was expressed in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch 506; Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 at 516 (CA); Bulurru Australia Pty Ltd v Oliver (2000) 49 IPR 384 at [32] and Angel v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] ATPR 41-832 at [48]–[51]. 133 Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285; Lombardo v Stuart Bros Pty Ltd (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 159 at 162 (CA); Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 (CA). 134 Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Harbord (1997) 69 SASR 75 at 90–1 (FC); ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) (2001) 119 FCR 1 at [1152]–[1155]. 135 Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 (CA). 136 Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 at 607 (CA) (tribunal not satisfied that injury resulted in a disc lesion); Paliflex Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) (2004) 215 ALR 681 at [20]: sed quaere. 137 Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5 (CA). See also Re Jackson; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 13 at 18 (FC). 138 K R Handley, “Some Overlooked Aspects of the Res Judicata Doctrine” (2011) 127 LQR 83 at 84–5. 139 Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (2013) 305 ALR 648 at [94]–[98]. 140 On which see Shears v Chisholm [1994] 2 VR 535 at 544–5. 141 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532; Brewer v Brewer (1953) 88 CLR 1 at 15–16. 142 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532. An example of the distinction between facts which are “ultimate” and those which are evidentiary, subsidiary or collateral is G K Sanford Pty Ltd v Jansen (1992) 36 FCR 83 at 98 (FC). See also Theo v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 70 FCR 317 at 325–6; Waddington v Silver Chain Nursing Assn (1998) 20 WAR 269 (FC); Kuligowski v Metrobus (2002) 26 WAR 137; Re Ebner; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2003) 196 ALR 533 at [29]–[31]. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [8.23]– [8.24]. For issue estoppel in patent cases, see E I Du Pont de Nemours and Co v Imperial Chemical Industries (2007) 163 FCR 381. 143 See Re B (minors) (care proceedings: issue estoppel) [1997] Fam 117 at 122–3 and cases there cited. See also Talyancich v Index Developments Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 28 (CA). 144 Murphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 at 288 (CA); Glen Eira City Council v Kingston City Council (2001) 116 LGERA 292 at [23]. 145 Re State of Norway’s Application (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 723 at 752 (CA). See also James v Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 570 at 584 and 590–1. 146 Arbuthnot v Chief Executive of the Department of Work and Income [2008] 1 NZLR 13 (SC). 147 Ashwin on behalf of the Wutha People v Western Australia (No 2) (2010) 191 FCR 549. 148 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 8) [2013] FCA 494. 149 Hoystead v Cmr of Taxation [1926] AC 155. See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, ch 13; Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363 at [40]–[54].
150 Society of Medical Officers of Health v Hope (Valuation Officer) [1960] AC 551. 151 See Association of Franciscan Order of Friars Minor v City of Kew [1967] VR 732 where a decision
as to whether a property was used for charitable purposes in 1944 was held to create no estoppel in respect of a later period. See also Re Balfour Centre Pty Ltd [1998] 2 Qd R 112. On issue estoppel in patent cases, see E I Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries plc (2007) 163 FCR 381. 152 Feltham v St Vincent’s Hospital (1993) 9 NSWCCR 547 at 571 (CA). 153 Ryde Municipal Council v Lizzio (1982) 46 LGRA 431 at 434. He relied on Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531. 154 Ryde Municipal Council v Lizzio (1982) 46 LGRA 431 at 439 and 446. 155 Queensland v Commonwealth (Territory Representation Case (No 2)) (1977) 139 CLR 585 at 614– 15. 156 Nevertheless, Fitzgerald J considered this to be a live controversy in Sinclair v W R Carpenter Australia Pty Ltd (1983) 76 FLR 120 at 128. 157 See D St L Kelly, “Issue Estoppel and Negligence on the Highway” (1967) 41 ALJ 12, 46; K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, ch 12; Friend v Civil Aviation Authority [2001] 4 All ER 385 (CA). 158 Edwards v Joyce [1954] VLR 216. See Noall v Middleton [1961] VR 285; Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183; Grant v Gorrell (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 142 and Hood v Commonwealth [1968] VR 619 (FC). 159 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446. 160 Randolph v Tuck [1962] 1 QB 175. 161 See Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183; Bollen v Hickson [1980] Qd R 327 (revd Bollen v Hickson [1981] Qd R 249 (FC)); Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455; Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1VR 427; Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664 at [92]–[103] (Fed C of A); Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104. The English cases are generally less strict: Bell v Holmes [1956] 3 All ER 449; Wood v Luscombe [1966] 1 QB 169; North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners [1990] 3 All ER 547; Waugh v Radford [1991] 2 All ER 741. These authorities are more fully analysed in Cross on Evidence, 6th Aust ed at [5095]. 162 Edwards v Joyce [1954] VLR 216. See too Craddock’s Transport Ltd v Stuart [1970] NZLR 499. For a contrary decision in this situation, see Black v Mount [1965] SASR 167, more fully analysed in Cross on Evidence 6th Aust ed, at [5100]. See also Clyne v Yardley [1959] NZLR 617. 163 Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 at 610 (CA) (Mahoney JA concurring). Compare the stricter approach in Marr (Contracting) Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 425 (FC). 164 Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104 at [33]. 165 For example, Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 629 (CA) (fraud). 166 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691. 167 Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321 at 328 (FC). 168 R v Seery (1914) 19 CLR 15. 169 Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321. See too Ryde Municipal Council v Lizzio (1982) 46 LGRA 431 at 435 (NSW CA); El Alam v Northcote City Council [1996] 2 VR 672. 170 Cameron v James [1945] VLR 113 (FC); Stimac v Nicol [1942] VLR 66 (FC), where the defendant in the subsequent civil action was able to estop the plaintiff from denying that she had used insulting words where this charge had been dismissed as trifling. 171 O’Donel v Cmr for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1938) 59 CLR 744, applied in Association of Franciscan Order of Friars Minor v City of Kew [1967] VR 732, and Hood v Commonwealth [1968] VR 619 (FC). 172 Carter v James (1844) 13 M & W 137. 173 Welch v Nagy [1950] 1 KB 455 (CA).
174 Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 at 1016. See K R Handley (ed),
Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.20]–[17.23]. 175 SCI Operations Pty Ltd v TPC (1984) 2 FCR 113 at 180 (Fed C of A FC). 176 Law Society of NSW v Weaver [1977] 1 NSWLR 67 at 73-4 (CA); Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 636. 177 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.15]–[17.16]. 178 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.17]. 179 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.18]. 180 K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [17.27]. 181 Vooght v Winch (1819) 2 B & A 662. See also Persky v McKeller (1942) 36 QJPR 55 (necessity to raise estoppel at the earliest opportunity); Blaikie v Blaikie [1950] SASR 247 (FC). An estoppel may be pleaded in the second action though the writ was issued before judgment in the first: Morrison Rose & Partners v Hillman [1961] 2 QB 266; Noall v Middleton [1961] VR 285. 182 This is normally required by rules of court, for example NSW: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 14.14. 183 See [5170] and [5175]. 184 Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (1993) 43 FCR 510 (FC). 185 Laws Holdings Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563. 186 Re B (minors) (care proceedings: issue estoppel) [1997] Fam 117. 187 Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 (HL). See also R v O’Loughlin; Ex parte Ralphs (1971) 1 SASR 219 (FC); Falkner v Barba [1971] VR 332; State Pollution Control Commission v Tallow Products Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 517; R v Beedie [1998] QB 356 at 360–1 (CA). See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, chs 14 and 23. The common law principles have been cut back by legislation permitting retrials after acquittals in specified circumstances, eg NSW: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 ss 99–106; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 327A–327S; Qld: Criminal Code ss 678–678K; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 331– 339; Tas: Criminal Code Act 1924 ss 390–397AF. 188 Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 634–5 (CA), discussing Re Mulligan; Ex parte Isidoro [1979] WAR 198 (FC). 189 Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 635 (CA). See also Maxwell v Inland Revenue Cmrs [1962] NZLR 683 at 702 (CA). 190 Re Weare [1893] 2 QB 439 (CA); Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 (CA). 191 Lewis v Mogan [1943] KB 376; R v Hogan [1960] 2 QB 513 (CCA); Wigglesworth v R [1987] 2 SCR 541 at 565–7; Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 635 (CA). 192 Bodna v Deller and Public Service Appeals Tribunal [1981] VR 183 at 196; Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953 at 972; Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 636 (CA). 193 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 709; Rivers v Rivers (2002) 84 SASR 426. 194 This view of the effect of convictions as between the Crown and the accused is challenged in D J Lanham, “Issue Estoppel in the English Criminal Law” [1970] Crim LR 428. It contends that the conviction is no more than prima facie evidence of guilt. The view taken in this book is the logical consequence of the civil cases on the effect of judgments inter partes, but it must be admitted that it is no more supported by convincing authority than Professor Lanham’s view although it is the view taken in the 11th Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (Eng) [99]. See also Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419 at [59] and [112]. 195 Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458 at 479. In Garrett v R (1977) 139 CLR 437, the Crown in a rape trial was not permitted to allege against an accused that
he had earlier raped the prosecutrix where he had been acquitted of the earlier rape. As in civil cases, where the earlier verdict was obtained by fraud or perjury it will not bind the parties subsequently: R v Lucas [1977] Tas SR 53; R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 at 423. Sambasivam’s case was given a narrow reading in R v Z [2000] 2 AC 483. It was said to be correctly decided on the ground that an accused should not be prosecuted a second time where the two offences were founded on one and the same incident, and should not be prosecuted for a second offence “which was manifestly inconsistent on the facts with a previous acquittal”: at 504. But it was said that evidence relevant on a subsequent prosecution is not inadmissible because it tends to show that the accused was in fact guilty of an offence of which that accused had earlier been acquitted. This is contrary to Australian authority: [5155]. See P Roberts, “Acquitted Misconduct Evidence and Double Jeopardy Principles, From Sambasivam to Z” [2000] Crim LR 952; C Tapper, “Clouded Acquittal” (2001) 117 LQR 1. See also Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; HP v R (2011) 32 VR 687; Gilham v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 22. 196 R v Young [1998] 1 VR 402 (CA); Tasmania v Finnegan (2011) 21 Tas R 116; cf R v Calcedo [1986] VR 499 (FC). 197 Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254; R v Hutton (1994) 3 Tas R 225; R v Beedie [1998] QB 356 at 361–6 (CA). See K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [14.20]–[14.23]. 198 R v Wilkes (1948) 77 CLR 511 at 518–19; Kemp v R (1951) 83 CLR 341; Mraz v R (No 2) (1956) 96 CLR 62; Garrett v R (1977) 139 CLR 437. 199 Eg Mraz v R (No 2) (1956) 96 CLR 62; O’Mara v Litfin; Ex parte O’Mara [1972] QWN 32 (FC). 200 R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 at 371–4, 379–89 and 400–1; Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251 at 254–5 and 278. See also R v Owen (1993) 68 A Crim R 247 (SC Tas); R v El Zarw [1994] 2 Qd R 67 (CA) and K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [14.04]. 201 Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1; R v Davis [1982] 1 NZLR 584 at 589 (CA). For Canada, see R v Mahalingan [2008] 3 SCR 316. 202 R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 at 387; R v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668 at 683. 203 R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364; Weaver v Law Society of NSW (1979) 142 CLR 201 at 207; R v Groves (1981) 58 FLR 18 (Fed C of A). This principle has much in common with the extended doctrine of estoppel by record discussed at [5175]. However, in R v Z [2000] 2 AC 483 the House of Lords held that the principle of double jeopardy did not render inadmissible similar fact evidence of the accused’s conduct in relation to charges of which the accused had earlier been acquitted. This is inconsistent with Australian law: R v Chekeri (2001) 122 A Crim R 422. 204 R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635. 205 R v Young [1998] 1 VR 402 at 423 (CA). 206 McCleary v DPP (1998) 20 WAR 288 at 312–13 (FC). 207 Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251. 208 R v Edwards [1998] 2 VR 354 (CA). 209 R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [4]–[6], [74] and [82]. 210 R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 at 397. See too R v Calcedo [1986] VR 499 (FC). 211 In some cases the difficulty of giving a proper direction will lead to the rejection of the evidence on the ground that its probative value is exceeded by its prejudicial effect: R v Davis [1982] 1 NZLR 584 (CA). See also R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 (CA). 212 R v Pennant [1998] 2 VR 453 at 459 and at 472. 213 R v Pennant [1998] 2 VR 453 at 459 (CA). 214 R v Pennant [1998] 2 VR 453 at 459 (CA); cf at 476–7. 215 Weaver v Law Society of NSW (1979) 142 CLR 201; Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1; R v El-Zarw [1994] 2 Qd R 67 (FC). 216 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at 115. See K R Handley, “Anshun Today” (1997)
71 ALJ 934; W F Ormiston, “Abuse of Process, Anshun and the Criminal Law — A Commentary” (1997) 71 ALJ 942; B A Beaumont, “Commentary on ‘Anshun Today’” (1997) 71 ALJ 950; K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, ch 26; K R Handley “A Closer Look at Henderson v Henderson” (2002) 118 LQR 397. The doctrine does not apply where the first court lacked jurisdiction: Houvardas v Zaravinos (2003) 202 ALR 535 at [110]. 217 See C (a minor) v Hackney London Borough Council [1996] 1 All ER 973 (CA); Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287 at 297 (FC); Foodco Group Pty Ltd v Northgan Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 356. 218 In Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502, the Deputy Commissioner sought to found an argument on this parenthesis. The appeal was allowed on another point, but Dawson J observed that, where the circumstances attracting the principle are established, these words cannot be used to confer a discretion in the court whether to apply it. But in Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1990] Ch 573 (CA); Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93 the words were used to justify the denial of an issue estoppel where the issue in the earlier case was wrongly decided. It was criticised in Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 VR 427 at 449; the similar views of the trial judge ( [1989] Ch 63) were criticised by Brennan J in O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 at 258. See [5075] above. See also Talbot v Berkshire County Council [1994] QB 290 (CA) (special circumstances not shown); Stuart v Sanderson (2000) 100 FCR 150 at [29]–[36] (special circumstances where an attempt was made to apply the Anshun doctrine to prevent an accused person from establishing innocence via judicial review proceedings). See Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1; Gairy v Attorney-General of Grenada [2002] 1 AC 167 at [26]–[27]; Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197; Australian Education Union v Lawler (2008) 169 FCR 327 at [183]; Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Wholefoods Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 43; Stuart v Goldberg Linde (a firm) [2008] 1 WLR 823 (CA). 219 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 966. 220 In which case it might be more appropriately discussed in a work on procedure rather than in one on evidence. 221 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589. See also Boles v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666 (CA); Chamberlain v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 21; Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76 (FC); Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd (2005) 67 NSWLR 457; O’Farrell v Palicave Pty Ltd (2009) 176 FCR 134; Kadkhudayan v British American Tobacco (Australia) Services Ltd (2009) 263 ALR 568 at [27]. 222 But see Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502 and Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O’Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332. 223 Yat Tung Investment Co v Dao Heng Bank [1975] AC 581 at 590. The test has also been rejected in England: Barrow v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 981 (CA). 224 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 602–4. Brennan J dissented on the ground that the rule in Henderson’s case has no application to prevent a party from litigating in fresh proceedings an issue which has not merged in the earlier judgment. See also Westpoint Corp Pty Ltd v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 584; Gibbs v Kinna [1999] 2 VR 19 (CA); Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664 at [112]–[113]; Angel v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] ATPR 41-832 at [69]–[72]; King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 619; Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245 at [3]–[4], [52] and [89]. On the significance of conflicting judgments, see Egglishaw v ACC (2007) 164 FCR 224 at [32]. 225 Commonwealth v Jennings Construction Ltd [1985] VR 586 at 597 (FC); Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 628 at 632–8, where Young J opined that the rule applies to plaintiffs only where they seek to litigate again on the same cause of action; an appeal was dismissed: Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 629 (CA). See also Gilmour
Holdings Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (1984) 52 LGRA 378 (SC Qld); cf Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76. 226 Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 (PC). 227 Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O’Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332. Cf Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287 (FC); Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180; Re Australasian Memory Pty Ltd and Corporations Law; Brien v Australasian Memory Pty Ltd (1997) 149 ALR 393 at 414 (NSW SC); Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc [2008] 1 WLR 748 (CA); Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court (NSW) (2009) 263 ALR 556; Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245. 228 Yat Tung Investment Co v Dao Heng Bank [1975] AC 581 at 581. In Bradford & Bingley Building Society v Seddon [1999] 4 All ER 217 (CA) it was said to be well established that the rule in Henderson v Henderson was capable of application where the parties were different. See also Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198; Redowood Pty Ltd v ASX-Perpetual Registrars Ltd (2006) 57 ACSR 256; Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245 at [5], [62]–[75] and [117]–[140] (privies). On the question whether the test is different from that which applies where the parties are the same, see Solak v Registrar of Titles (2011) 33 VR 40 at [67]–[71]. 229 Wellcome Australia Ltd v Australia Eagle Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 34 NSWLR 269 at 285–6; Ilvariy Pty Ltd t/as Craftsman Homes Northern Rivers v Moss (2009) 74 NSWLR 710. 230 For example, Davis v Hedges (1871) LR 6 QB 687; Terry v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1995) 6 BPR 14,091 (NSWSC); Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269 at [82]. 231 Paliflex Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) (2004) 215 ALR 681 at [31]. 232 Stuart v Sanderson (2000) 100 FCR 150 at [24]. 233 Lambidis v Police Cmr (1995) 37 NSWLR 320 at 325. See generally E Campbell, “Relitigation in Gevernment Cases: A Study of the Use of Estoppel Principles in Public Law Litigation” (1994) 20 Mon L Rev 21 at 51–5. It was held not to apply to the Refugee Review Tribunal in Badraie v Commonwealth (2005) 195 FLR 119. 234 Woodhouse v Consignia plc [2002] 2 All ER 737 at [55]–[56] (CA). 235 D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 at 599–600; Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139 esp at [109]. 236 Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 146 FCR 10 at [50]–[54], reversing Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722 at [153]. 237 Securum Finance Ltd v Ashton [2001] Ch 291 (CA). 238 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529. See N Zaltzman, “Relitigating the Admissibility of a Confession: Collateral Attack on Acquittal in Subsequent Criminal Proceedings” [1999] Crim LR 886. See also Australian Federal Police Cmr v Hatfield (1992) 34 FCR 190; R v Kite (1992) 60 A Crim R 226. Another type of abuse of process was detected by Laddie J (Pill LJ disagreeing, Robert Walker LJ not deciding) in Gribbon v Lutton [2002] QB 902 (CA): a stakeholder was not a “party” to interpleader proceedings, so an issue estoppel did not operate, but the ruling in those proceedings was advantageous to the stakeholder, and it was an abuse of process for him to challenge it in later proceedings. 239 McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] QB 283 at 322 and at 346. 240 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 541. See also Smith v Linskills (a firm) [1996] 2 All ER 353 (CA). 241 A wide ambit was given to the principle in Hunter’s case in Reid v New Zealand Trotting Conference [1984] 1 NZLR 8 and New Zealand Social Credit Political League Inc v O’Brien [1984] 1 NZLR 84. 242 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1 at [38] (CA); Conlon v Simms [2006] 2 All ER 1024; rev’d on the facts: Conlon v Simms [2007] 3 All ER 802 (CA). 243 Conlon v Simms [2007] 3 All ER 802 at [146] (CA).
244 Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 (CA). This matter is fully discussed in Z
Cowen and P B Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, 1956, Essay 6. See F A Mann, “Note”, (1943) 59 LQR 299 and C A Wright, “Case and Comment: Evidence — Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Civil Actions — Hearsay” (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 653; J A Coutts, “The Effect of a Criminal Judgment on a Civil Action” (1955) 18 MLR 231; J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials of Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1974, [167] (a); and J A Andrews, “The Criminal in the Civil Courts” [1967] Crim LR 441. The common law rule has been abrogated by statute in England, Queensland, and South Australia, as well as by the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT): see [5225] below. 245 Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419 at [60] and [112]. 246 For an affirmative answer in the murder case, see In the Estate of Crippen (dec’d) [1911] P 108 at 115; for an affirmative answer in the divorce case, see Partington v Partington & Atkinson (Barrow Intervening) [1925] P 34. 247 Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd [1943] KB 587. The rule applies to foreign convictions: Union Carbide Corp v Naturin Ltd [1987] FSR 538 (CA). The rule does not apply to tribunals not bound by the rules of evidence, so that before them a conviction can be evidence of the facts on which it was based: Re Weare [1893] 2 QB 439 at 445–6 (CA); General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627; Re a Solicitor [1993] QB 69 at 78–9 (DC of QBD). 248 See for example Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333 at 339 (CA); Barclays Bank Ltd v Cole [1967] 2 QB 738 at 743 (CA); Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1980] QB 268 (CA) and Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 543 (where Lord Diplock said that Hollington’s case was “generally considered to have been wrongly decided” — a remark said by Hoffmann J not to have been necessary for the decision in Land Securities plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 4 All ER 124 at 126, though it was approvingly quoted in Re a Solicitor [1993] QB 69 at 79 (DC of QBD)). Lord Hoffmann said that it was generally thought that the case took “the technicalities of the matter much too far” in Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 at 702. See also R v Hayter [2005] 2 All ER 209 at [21] and [72] (HL). It has not been applied in Western Australia ( Mickelberg v Director of the Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365); New Zealand ( Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961), Tasmania (according to Cox J in Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47 at 72, Green CJ and Underwood J not deciding), and Ontario ( Demeter v British Pacific Life Insurance (1984) 48 OR (2d) 266 (CA)). In New Zealand it was abolished in civil cases: Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 Pt II. Apart from the Land Securities case (arbitrator’s award), there are other instances of its continuing application to the extent to which statute permits eg Savings and Investment Bank Ltd v Gasco Investments (Netherlands) BV [1984] 1 All ER 296 at 303 (company inspector’s report); Hui Chi-Ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34 (PC); R v D [1996] QB 283 (CA); Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at 237 at [5], [31]–[32] and [272]; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1 at [15]–[27] (CA). 249 For extra-judicial criticisms, see argument in Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 at 963; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1 (CA). 250 R v Warden of the Fleet (1698) 12 Mod 337 at 339. See Gibson v MacCarty (1736) Ridg t H 311; Smith v Rummens (1807) 1 Camp 9; Blackmore v Glamorganshire Canal Co (1835) 2 Cr M & R 133; March v March (1858) 2 Sw & Tr 49; Leyman v Latimer (1878) 3 Ex D 352; Yates v KyffinTaylor and Wark [1899] WN 141. The majority of Commonwealth decisions both before and after 1943 seem to be in accord with the English case law, see, eg, Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 710 (admissibility of acquittals); Shaw v Glen Falls Insurance Co [1938] 1 DLR 502; Origliasso v Vitale [1952] St R Qd 211 (FC); Ex parte Mavromatis; Re Windsor (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 420; Re Maritime Asphalt Products (1966) 52 DLR (2d) 8; Public Trustee v Fraser (1987) 9 NSWLR 433 at 435; but there are several contrary rulings, eg Christie v Christie [1922] WLD 109 and cases cited in [5180] n 249. See also Harvey v R [1901] AC 601 (PC) (order in lunacy admissible as prima facie
evidence). 251 Castrique v Imrie (1870) LR 4 HL 414 at 434. Ballantyne v Mackinnon [1896] 2 QB 455 at 462 (CA); Caine v Palace Steam Shipping Co [1907] 1 KB 670 at 677 and 683 (CA). 252 In the Estate of Crippen (dec’d) [1911] P 108 at 113–14. 253 Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 at 597 (CA). 254 Burden v Ainsworth (2004) 59 NSWLR 506 at [22] (the order was an order as to status; the finding was not: [27]). 255 R v Seery (1914) 19 CLR 15 at 16–17. 256 Land Securities plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 4 All ER 124 (in a rent review arbitration, evidence of the award of an arbitrator as to the market rent of another property inadmissible). 257 In Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961, the Court of Appeal would create a further exception to the hearsay rule to meet this objection. 258 Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [32–87]. An example is Brisco v Lomax (1838) 8 Ad & E 198 at 212 and 214–15 (QB) (finding of jury summoned under a commission to determine boundary between estates evidence in rem). 259 Irish Society v Lord Bishop of Derry (1846) 12 Cl & Fin 641. 260 Bird v Keep [1918] 2 KB 692; Calmenson v Merchants’ Warehousing Co (1921) 90 LJPC 134; Barnett v Cohen [1921] 2 KB 461. 261 Harvey v R [1901] AC 601 (PC), and see cases cited in K R Handley (ed), Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed, 2009, [11.08] nn 3 and 6. 262 Hill v Clifford [1907] 2 Ch 236. This could perhaps be distinguished from Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd but, though criticised, the last-mentioned case was treated as good law by the Court of Appeal in Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333. Hill v Clifford could perhaps be distinguished from Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd because, being charged with the duty of inquiry, the General Medical Council fulfilled a different function from that of the judge. Under s 33(2) of the Medical Act 1956 (Eng) the Council had to treat a decree nisi as conclusive evidence of adultery; the decree had previously been spoken of as strong prima facie evidence in General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627 at 635, applied in Re a Solicitor [1993] QB 69 (finding of Barristers’ Board of Western Australia adverse to solicitor admitted by Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in England). In Conlon v Simms [2006] 2 All ER 1024 at [237], Hill v Clifford was said to be difficult to reconcile with Hollington’s case. In Zaidi v Health Care Complaints Commission (1998) 44 NSWLR 82 at 86 (CA) Mason P said, without deciding, that “where guilt is established to the criminal standard, public policy suggests that so long as the conviction stands the facts necessarily established ought to be regarded as proved for the purpose of any civil proceedings.” He cited Lai v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 28 FCR 346: the Federal Court view is that administrative tribunals, in reviewing the decision of a Minister to deport involving issues of character, can make their own assessment of the nature and gravity of the conduct but cannot assess the propriety of the conviction (see also Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649 at 653–4 (Fed C of A FC); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 42 ALR 209 at 230–1. 263 Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 (CA). 264 Roberts v Western Australia (2005) 29 WAR 445 at [145]. 265 Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390 at 406. 266 Petrie v Nuttall (1856) 11 Exch 569. The principle underlying this and similar decisions was most clearly stated by Abinger CB in Pim v Curell (1840) 6 M & W 234 at 266: “The opinion of this court is, that in the cases where reputation is evidence — that is, cases involving a general right, in which all the Queen’s subjects are concerned — a verdict or judgment, upon the matter directly in issue between the parties — although between other parties — is also evidence; not, however, that it is evidence of any specific fact existing at the time, but that it is evidence of the most solemn kind, of an adjudication of a competent tribunal upon the state of facts, and the question of usage
at the time”. 267 The cases were not mentioned in Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd and it is scarcely conceivable that the court intended to overrule them even if it had power to do so. It is doubtful whether Mash v Darley [1914] 1 KB 1 (affirmed, on other grounds, Mash v Darley [1914] 3 KB 1226 (CA)) in which the respondent’s conviction of carnal knowledge of the complainant was treated by the Divisional Court as corroboration in affiliation proceedings, has survived Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd. 268 Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390 (CA). 269 Re 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne [1969] VR 293. 270 See Pim v Curell (1840) 6 M & W 234 at 266. 271 Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR (CN) 1049 (Vic). Presumably, if the defendant had appeared in answer to the charge but maintained his right to remain silent, this would not enable his conviction to be proved against him. 272 Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 288 per Fullagar J, who was one of the majority opposing disbarment, on the ground that the totality of the circumstances deprived the conviction of significance. His view of the status of the conviction appears to have been shared by the dissenters, Dixon CJ at 285; 622 and McTiernan J at 287; 623. The other members of the majority did not state a view on whether the conviction was evidence of the underlying facts, pointing out that Ziems had only been asked to show cause as to whether the conviction disqualified him from practice, as distinct from the conduct underlying it: see Kitto J at 298–9 opining that it was not, and Taylor J at 302–8 opining that what mattered was the conduct, to be examined independently of the conviction. 273 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 at [46]–[52] (FC). 274 Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 193 (CA); Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 525 (CA). 275 Eg, Roberts v Western Australia (2005) 29 WAR 445 at [141]–[150]. 276 Eg, Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390 (CA). The decision in In the Estate of Crippen (dec’d) [1911] P 108 may perhaps still be supported on the ground that the conviction as such justified the passing over of Crippen’s executrix. 277 Australian Federal Police Cmr v Hatfield (1992) 34 FCR 190. 278 Saffron v Cmr of Taxation (1991) 30 FCR 578 (FC). 279 Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Butler (1989) 91 ALR 293 (as limited in Saffron v Cmr of Taxation (1991) 30 FCR 578 (FC)) and Australian Federal Police Cmr v Hatfield (1992) 34 FCR 190. 280 Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v Virtosu [2008] 3 All ER 637. 281 R v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120 at 124. 282 Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419 at [111]. 283 R v Turner (1832) 1 Mood 347 (CCCR); R v Lee 1952 (2) SA 67; R v Moore (1956) 40 Cr App R 50. 284 R v Cowell (1985) 24 A Crim R 47 (NSW CCA); Connell v R (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 (FC); Rompiotis v R (1996) 18 WAR 54 (FC). 285 R v Smith (1783) 1 Leach 288; Prosser’s Case (1784) 1 Leach 290; R v Dawson [1961] VR 773 at 774 (FC); R v Carter; Ex parte A-G [1990] 2 Qd R 371 (CCA) (but there the principal offender pleaded guilty); R v Hutton (1991) 56 A Crim R 211 (Qld CCA) (accessory before the fact). In R v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57, R v Carter was questioned and R v Hutton was overruled. R v Dawson was dissented from in R v Triffett (1992) 1 Tas R 293. And there is a dictum, offered without reference to the authorities, against it in R v Spinks [1982] 1 All ER 587 at 589 (CCA). 286 R v Welsh [1999] 2 VR 62 (CA), citing R v Turner (1832) 1 Mood 347 (CCCR); cf R v Blick (1830) 4 C & P 377.
287 R v Davis [1980] 1 NZLR 257 (CA); R v Wilson [1991] 2 NZLR 707. 288 Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419 at [66] and [130]. 289 Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419 at [121]. 290 See [5210]. 291 Hui Chi-Ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34 (PC); S & Y Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commercial Union
Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1986) 82 FLR 130 (SC (NT)). See also Rizzo v Hanover Insurance Co (1993) 103 DLR (4th) 577 (Ont CA); Majindi v Northern Territory (2012) 31 NTLR 150. There are cases where a prior acquittal has been admitted, but these are exceptional, resting on some special feature making the acquittal relevant: eg R v Hay (1983) 77 Cr App R 70; R v Cooke (1986) 84 Cr App R 286. 292 R v Terry [2005] QB 996 (CA). 293 Parker v Clayton (1932) 97 JP 14. The opposite view was taken in O’Donnell v Hegarty [1941] IR 538. See further Helsham v Blackwood (1851) 11 CB 111; Re Emele [1941] 4 DLR 197; Lingor v Lingor [1955] 1 DLR 719. In Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691, there were dicta that an acquittal of murder was not admissible in that case as evidentiary fact. In the same case Starke J suggested without deciding that though an acquittal ascertained no fact as did a conviction, it might be considered high public policy that a not guilty verdict should, like a conviction, “not be blowed off by a side wind”: Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 703. See also R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364, discussed in [5155]; and Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529, discussed in [5175]. 294 R v Terry [2005] QB 996 (CA). 295 Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275. 296 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527 at 550–1. 297 R v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175. 298 Hollington v F Hewthorn and Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 at 595 (CA). 299 Z Cowen and P B Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, 1956, p 173. Rule 521 of the American Law Institute’s Code of Evidence simply provides that “Evidence of a subsisting judgment adjudging a person guilty of a crime or a misdemeanour is admissible as tending to prove the facts recited therein and every fact essential to sustain the judgment”. See also ALRC 38, Evidence Bill clause 80. 300 R v Fontaine Moreau (1848) 11 QB 1028 (the fuller report in 12 Jur 626 should be consulted; see A H Hudson, “A Plea of Guilty in Later Civil Proceedings” (1959) 22 MLR 543); Rakay v MacFarlane (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 488 at 493; Cohen and Rudelier v Bates and Sanser & Sons Ltd (1962) 32 DLR (2d) 763. 301 For s 91 (2), see ALRC 26 [771]–[783], Bill clause 77; ALRC 38 [170]–[171], Bill clause 80. See National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 at [46]–[51] (FC). For s 92, see ALRC 26 [771]–[782], Bill clause 78; ALRC 38 [170]–[171], Bill clause 8. For s 93, see ALRC 26 [773], Bill clause 79; ALRC 38 [171], Bill clause 82. 302 See ALRC 26 [773], Bill clause 79; ALRC 38 [171], Bill clause 82. 303 See Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett (2004) 145 A Crim R 220. 304 Chevalley v Morrison (2011) 288 ALR 761 at [58]. 305 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavie Sistemi Energia SRL (No 4) (2012) 298 ALR 251 at [178]–[179]. 306 Like any estoppel s 79 (3) is applied with caution. See Kerr v Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1987) 5 MVR 175 (Qld FC), where evidence of a conviction of driving without due care was admitted in a civil claim by an injured passenger to prove that the defendant was the driver and that in some respects he was driving without due care and attention. It did not prove the negligence alleged or that this had caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See also Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 385 (FC). 307 Eg judgments and reasons for judgment: Fenech v Sterling (1983) 51 ALR 205 at 217–18 (Fed
C of A). 308 Parry’s Department Store (WA) Pty Ltd v Simpson Pty Ltd (1983) 76 FLR 60. 309 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd [2001] ATPR 41-809; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Tasmanian Salmonid Growers Association Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-954; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Emerald Ocean Distributors Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42-108; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jurlique International Pty Ltd [2007] ATPR 42-146 at [8]–[9]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mailpost Australia Ltd [2010] ATPR 42-315 at [22]. 310 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Monza Imports Pty Ltd [2002] ASAL 55-076 at [25]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Apollo Optical (Aust) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1456; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (No 3) [2002] ATPR 41-873 at [51]. 311 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301 at [118] per Goldberg J. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 at [107]. 312 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Monza Imports Pty Ltd [2002] ASAL 55-076 at [25] (emphasis added). 313 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 169 at [51]. 314 Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 50 at 76 (CA). 315 Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 50 at 72. If available, the transcript or proof of evidence of the deceased witness in the criminal case would be admissible under the Civil Evidence Act 1968. For the position under the Australian statutes see [35065] below. 316 Taylor v Taylor [1970] 2 All ER 609 (CA); Wauchope v Mordecai [1970] 1 All ER 417 (CA). 317 Re Raphael; Raphael v d’Antin [1973] 3 All ER 19. 318 Mash v Darley [1914] 1 KB 1. 319 15th Report of the Law Reform Committee, [26]–[33]. 320 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 80. See also NSW: Defamation Act 2005 s 42; Vic: Defamation Act 2005 s 42; Qld: Defamation Act 2005 s 42; Tas: Defamation Act 2005 s 42; NT: Defamation Act 2006 s 39; ACT: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 139M (Australian convictions conclusive evidence, and any non-Australian conviction evidence, on a question of truth of imputations). On facts such as those in Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333 (CA), in which one of those convicted of the Great Train Robbery of 1963 claimed damages for a libel stating that he was guilty of the offence, the statement of claim, if it said no more, would be struck out. 321 Maritime Electric Co Ltd v General Dairies Ltd [1937] AC 610 at 620 (PC). 322 Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82 at 105, applied in Hood v Commonwealth [1968] VR 619 (FC). 323 Canada and Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd [1947] AC 46 at 56 (PC). 324 Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Central Bank of India Ltd [1938] AC 287 at 297 (PC). 325 The character of various estoppels as rules of substantive law, rules having the effect of rules of substantive law, rules of evidence and rules of pleading was considered in Cross on Evidence, 4th Aust ed, [5330]–[5335].
[page 289]
Chapter Four The Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 1 — Different Types of Burden of Proof A — INTRODUCTION Preliminary [7001] Structure of chapter Although traditionally dealt with in works on the law of evidence, the rules relating to the burden of proof are largely rules of substantive law,1 especially those allocating the burden of proof.2 This allocation may either be unconditional, or conditional upon the proof of certain facts. In the latter case, and occasionally in the former,3 it is usual to employ the language of presumption. In the whole area the key to clarity lies in the precise definition and discrimination of the issues to be tried, and the facts upon the determination of which they depend. Unfortunately this is hindered by the absence, in general,4 of formal pleadings in criminal cases and the lack of an agreed terminology. There are four occasions upon which it is vitally important to know which of the two parties to litigation has the burden of proof on a given issue. These are when there is a dispute concerning the right to begin calling evidence, a procedural question which is mentioned in Chapter 9, “The Course of Evidence”; when there is a submission of no case to answer; when the tribunal of fact is left in doubt; and when an appellate court is considering the correctness of a judgment or summing up relating to the burden of proof. The different types of burden are discussed in this section, the principles governing the allocation of the burdens in Section 2, the effect of the shifting of burdens in Section 3 and, finally, in Section 4, the nature of presumptions is discussed. There is a distinction between questions about the burden of proving matters of fact and questions about factual matters going to the characterisation of particular
[page 290] laws: the proponent of a particular position in the latter category may assume a persuasive burden of argument, but not a legal burden of proof.5
[7005] The meanings of “burden of proof” Writing at the end of the nineteenth century, the American scholar J B Thayer claimed that the phrase “burden of proof” is used in more than one sense. It is only necessary to discuss two of the three senses he mentioned because the third was said to be “an undiscriminated use of the phrase, perhaps more common than either of the other two, in which it may mean either or both of the others”.6 Thayer’s first sense of the term was: The peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given proposition on which parties are at issue — who will lose the case if he does not make this proposition out, when all has been said and done.7
This nearly corresponds to the legal burden, or burden of proof in the strict sense, which is discussed below. The correspondence is not complete, because no allowance is made in the passage quoted for the fact that the burden in question is confined to particular issues.8 Most cases involve more than one issue, and the burden of proof upon the different issues may be variously distributed between the parties — a fact which can be readily appreciated by considering a claim for damages for negligence in which the defendant raises the issue of contributory negligence; or a criminal charge on which insanity is pleaded. Owing to the possible multiplicity of issues, a party may have “the risk” of a given proposition and yet not lose the case if that party fails to make the proposition out. An example would be a claim in contract in which the defendant pleads both restraint of trade and duress: the defendant bears the burden of proof on each of these issues, but failure on one of them does not entail the loss of the case. Thayer’s second sense of the phrase “burden of proof” was: The duty of going forward in argument or in producing evidence, whether at the beginning of a case, or at any later moment throughout the trial or discussion.9
This corresponds in part to the evidential burden discussed below, but it is a much broader concept because, in addition to embracing argument as
well as the adducing of evidence, it covers not merely the obligation placed on a party by the law to be able to point to the existence of sufficient evidence to raise an issue before the tribunal of fact, but also the tactical obligation to lead counter-evidence placed upon a party against whom evidence has been adduced. To anticipate, Thayer’s second sense of the term “burden of proof” conflates the evidential burden with what is sometimes called a “provisional” or “tactical” burden. Just because Thayer failed to distinguish between the strict senses of the legal and evidential burden as described below, and the burdens which arise as between different issues, or as a matter of tactics in the course of a trial, his successors, both [page 291] in extra-judicial writings,10 and in judicial opinions,11 have had to refine his terminology. These refinements have not been uniform, and have contributed substantially to the confusion over the question of whether burdens can shift. This confusion has been exacerbated by parallel problems over the role and terminology of presumptions. The present section will confine itself to burdens in the strict sense; other senses of the term will be considered in connection with the whole question of the shifting of burdens in Section 3.
B — LEGAL BURDEN Definition — Legal burden [7010] Range of usages The legal burden of proof is the obligation of a party to meet the requirement of a rule of law that a fact in issue be proved (or disproved) either by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt, as the case may be. The definition is based on r 1.04 of the American Uniform Rules. The words in parentheses are intended to cover the case in which a party has to negative a particular fact, as the prosecution has to negative consent on a charge of rape. The words are also apt to cover a
case in which a party has to negative a particular fact if the opposing party adduces sufficient evidence of its existence. An example would be provided by a murder trial at which self-defence is pleaded; if there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of a reasonable jury, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence. [page 292] The phrase “legal burden” is that of Lord Denning and it is justified by the fact that its incidence is determined by the substantive law. Other English writers refer to it as the burden of proof on the pleadings12 or “the fixed burden of proof ”,13 but the pleadings do not always indicate which party bears the burden, and the second principal burden, “the evidential burden”, also has claims to be described as “fixed”. Wigmore spoke of the “risk of non-persuasion” but this, like Professor Glanville Williams’s “persuasive burden”, is open to the objection that both parties may bear such a risk on the same issue; for instance, when self-defence is pleaded on a charge of murder, the accused runs the risk, as a practical matter, of failing to induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury although, provided the accused adduces sufficient evidence of self-defence, it is ultimately incumbent on the prosecution to negative the plea. Some judgments in which the distinction between the principal burdens is mentioned simply refer to this one as the “burden of proof ”14 or the “probative burden”15 and such a course may be justified by the fact that the discharge of the other principal burden, the evidential burden, proves nothing.16 Burdens of persuasion affect the outcomes only of cases in which the trier of fact thinks the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s positions equi probable. Burdens of persuasion are, in other words, tie-breakers. If the trier of fact, having heard all the evidence, comes to a definite conclusion, there is no occasion to invoke a burden of persuasion.17
C — EVIDENTIAL BURDEN Definition — Evidential burden
[7015] Range of usages An evidential burden is not a burden of disproof. Rather the evidential burden is the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue,18 due regard being had to the standard of proof demanded of the party under such obligation. The concluding clause is designed to meet the point that the amount of evidence required to induce a judge to leave an issue to the jury varies, according to whether the case is civil or criminal, and whether the party bearing the burden is plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or accused. The phrase “evidential burden” is employed by Lord Bridge and Professor Glanville Williams (while Phipson has spoken with equal accuracy of the “burden of adducing evidence”19). It is a phrase which is coming to be increasingly used by English judges.20 Wigmore described it as the duty “of passing the judge”, and there [page 293] is no doubt that the difference between the two principal burdens is best approached by considering the position of plaintiffs or prosecutors with regard to issues which are about to be tried with a jury, such as negligence, or the commission of a criminal act by the accused. They have two hurdles to surmount. First, they must produce a sufficient quantity of evidence to prevent the judge from withdrawing the issue from the jury. Secondly, they must convince that body. If they surmount the first, they may yet fail at the second. This may be because the jury do not believe their witnesses, or will not draw the necessary inferences, or else because of the doubt raised by the counter-evidence. To quote Wigmore:21 The important practical distinction between these two senses of “burden of proof” is this: The risk of non-persuasion operates when the case has come into the hands of the jury, while the duty of producing evidence implies a liability to a ruling by the judge disposing of the issue without leaving the issue open to the jury’s deliberations.
Two further points must be stressed in connection with the definition of the evidential burden. In the first place, it caters for the abnormal situation where the party who starts with the legal burden of proof does not also bear the evidential burden, as well as for the normal situation where they
are each borne by the same person in the first instance. To vary an illustration which has already been given with reference to self-defence: on a prosecution for murder, for example, the Crown has the legal burden of negativing provocation, but questions of provocation do not have to be considered by the jury unless there is evidence on the subject. Depending on what follows, it is up to the accused to produce or elicit this evidence,22 although it will be sufficient if the evidence might raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the conduct was provoked or unprovoked.23 Secondly, it must not be supposed that the production of evidence always involves the calling of testimony or the tendering of documents by the party on whom the evidential burden rests in that party’s own case. This will be necessary in the vast majority of cases in which an evidential burden has to be discharged, but it may be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses called by the other party and there are rare instances in which the evidence called on the other side is such that it discloses facts which might give rise to a defence.24 On a prosecution for murder, the Crown witnesses might say enough in chief about provocation to make the judge feel obliged to raise the question in summing up, although the matter will usually be brought before the court in consequence of the cross-examination of the Crown witnesses, reinforced by material brought forward by the accused. Where the evidence is sufficient to raise a defence which the accused does not wish to raise, and the defence is “optional” in the sense that the defence is not to be raised unless the accused chooses to, the defence should not be left with the jury.25 [page 294]
D — ILLUSTRATIONS OF CONFUSION Types of confusion and their sources [7020] Consent in rape Two major sources of confusion in this part of the law are: first, failure to agree upon the discrimination of separate issues to which the rules are
to apply; and, secondly, failure to distinguish explicitly between the legal and evidential burden. In one case,26 the accused were charged with rape. The defence was that the victim consented, or at least that they believed her to have consented. The trial judge directed the jury that it was for the prosecution to show that the act took place and to negative consent, but, in effect, that it was then for the accused to adduce some evidence to show that his belief in the victim’s consent was reasonable. This view was upheld by the Court of Appeal where Bridge J distinguished between two kinds of case: that in which the definition of the offence specified a particular mental state, in which event the prosecution bore both legal and evidential burdens of showing it; and that in which there was no such definition. In this event, the issue of reasonable belief arose as a separate issue, the evidential burden of establishing which was on the accused. The House of Lords accepted Bridge J’s analysis, but allowed the appeal because, by a majority, it took the view that in rape there was only one issue as to the accused’s mental state, and the prosecution bore both burdens in respect of that issue. The whole difficulty arose simply because it was uncertain whether in relation to the accused’s mens rea there was one issue, or two.
[7025] Insanity of testator Where the heir at law claimed to be entitled to an estate as against a devisee, on the ground that the testator was insane, the trial judge told the jury that, once the will was shown to have been duly executed, the burden of proving insanity shifted to the plaintiff, who must accordingly fail if there was any doubt on the matter. This was held to be a misdirection in the Full Court of Common Pleas where Cresswell J said: If, indeed, a will, not irrational on the face of it, is produced before a jury, and the execution of it proved, and no other evidence is offered, the jury would be properly told that they ought to find for the will; and, if the party opposing the will gives some evidence of incompetency, the jury may, nevertheless, if it does not disturb their belief in the competency of the testator, find in favour of the will: and in each case the presumption in favour of competency would prevail. But that is not a mere presumption of law: and, when the whole matter is before the jury on evidence given on both sides, they ought not to affirm that a document is the will of a competent testator, unless they believe that it really is so.27
In other words, the defendant bore the legal burden of proving the testator’s sanity, although the production of a rational will might be said to have shifted the evidential burden to the plaintiff, and the trial judge erred
in suggesting to the jury that the presumption of testamentary capacity shifted the legal burden to the plaintiff in addition to the evidential burden. [page 295]
[7030] “Defences” other than denial of essential element in a criminal charge In a case in which Woolmington, who was charged with murdering his wife, from whom he was separated, gave evidence to the effect that he had shot and killed her accidentally while threatening to shoot himself in an endeavour to induce her to return to live with him, Swift J’s summing up to the jury contained the following passage: If [the Crown satisfy you that this woman died at the prisoner’s hands,] then he has to show that there are circumstances to be found in the evidence which has been given from the witness-box in this case, which alleviate the crime so that it is only manslaughter, or which excuse the homicide altogether by showing that it was a pure accident.28
Woolmington was convicted, but his appeal was allowed when it reached the House of Lords because the jury had been misdirected. The actual decision turned on the point that Swift J’s direction suggested that, the killing having been admitted, the legal burden of disproving malice aforethought shifted to the accused, but Lord Sankey’s speech in the House of Lords also shows that, even in cases in which the defence consists of something other than a denial of an essential element of the prosecution’s case — a plea of provocation or self-defence, for instance — the accused does not, as was formerly believed, bear a legal as well as an evidential burden. The speech can be regarded either as marking a change in the law29 or as an insistence on the distinction, ignored by the old authorities, between the legal and evidential burdens.30 Whichever be the correct view, there is no doubt that a number of appeals have been decided on the point that the judge wrongly instructed the jury that the accused bore the burden of proof on a particular issue, whereas all that was borne by the accused was an evidential burden, a matter with which the jury has no concern.31
[page 296] Where an accused person relies by way of defence upon an honest belief on reasonable grounds in the existence of a state of affairs which, had it existed, would have made the acts innocent, the accused person bears only an evidential burden.32
Section 2 — Incidence of the Burden of Proof A — GENERAL RULES Evidential burden [7035] Structure of the section33 Various tests for determining the incidence of the burden of proof have been suggested, but they are deprived of much of their value because they rarely indicate which burden is contemplated. It is possible only to lay down a few general rules. After they have been stated, something will be said of the operation of presumptions, statutes and agreements to determine the incidence of the burden of proof.
[7040] Taylor’s test According to Taylor,34 the right test for determining the incidence of the burden of proof is to consider, first, which party would succeed if no evidence were given on either side and, secondly, what would be the effect of striking the allegation to be proved out of the record. The onus lies on whichever party would fail as a consequence of one or other of these steps being taken. But these tests are only applicable to the evidential burden; they cannot apply to the legal burden in all cases. Suppose, for example, that want of testamentary capacity is pleaded as a defence to a probate action. The defendant would fail on the issue if no evidence was given on either side; and the plaintiff would succeed if the allegation was struck out of the record. Therefore, Taylor would have had to say that the burden of proof is on the defendant, but the fact remains that the legal burden of establishing [page 297]
testamentary capacity is borne by the plaintiff.35 Taylor’s test is undoubtedly sound so far as the incidence of the evidential burden is concerned, although it has been said to be the statement of the effect of a rule, rather than the formulation of the principle underlying it.36
[7045] General rule In other words, resort must be had to the precedents. This is particularly true of criminal cases where the absence of pleadings makes it unreal to speak of striking allegations out of the record. Even so, general statements are attempted from time to time.37 The general rule is that the party bearing the legal burden on an issue also bears the evidential burden. This means that, in a criminal case, the prosecution must normally adduce evidence, fit to be left to a jury, of the essential ingredients of the offence charged. It is not enough to adduce evidence which would be sufficient on one of two mutually exclusive hypotheses, and leave the jury to choose between them.38 The general rule also means that the defence bears an evidential burden on the issue of insanity (by virtue of the common law) and on sundry other issues (by virtue of statutory provisions) on which the legal burden is placed upon the accused as an exception to the usual rule: [7030]. In these cases the accused has to adduce evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury of the existence of the defence on the balance of probabilities.39 On issues arising out of special pleas the accused bears a persuasive and hence also an evidential burden eg unfitness to plead40 or autrefois convict41 or autrefois acquit.
[7050] Criminal “defences” With regard to a number of general common law defences it is settled that, although the prosecution bears the legal burden of disproving them,42 the accused bears the burden of adducing sufficient evidence to raise the issue of their existence.43 Even when there are no words dealing expressly with the burden of [page 298]
proof, a statute will frequently be construed so as to place an evidential, if not a legal, burden on a particular issue on the accused.44 Although there is little direct authority on the point, it seems that where the accused bears an evidential, but not a legal burden, the accused may discharge it by adducing evidence of a reasonable possibility of the existence of the defence.45 It is hardly surprising that there should be no direct authority, because judicial generosity — or, as the cynics would have it, the possibility of an appeal — leads to a disinclination to withdraw issues on which there is some defence evidence from the jury. This disinclination may also account for the dearth of authority on the question whether the accused bears an evidential burden in respect of all defences which are more than mere denials of an allegation necessary to the prosecution’s case. Sir Francis Adams answered the question in the affirmative,46 but Professor Glanville Williams took the contrary view.47 His contention was that it is logically impossible that both sides should carry an evidential burden on the same issue. This led him to conclude that the accused cannot bear an evidential burden with regard to alibi because the accused’s presence at or absence from the scene of the crime is put in issue by the prosecution. The prosecution also puts the accused’s mens rea in issue at the outset of a criminal trial, with the result, it is said, that the accused cannot bear an evidential burden with regard to the defence of accident. However weak the evidence on these matters may be, it must be left to the jury. The court, Professor Williams maintained, has no power to censor it as it has in the case of such general defences as self-defence and duress. There is much force in these arguments, but there are counter-arguments. It could be said that, when the accused raises the defence of alibi,48 or even accident, a fresh specific issue within the general issue is being raised. The little authority that exists leaves the point fairly open.49 So far as principle is concerned, there is surely something to be said for [page 299] preventing the jury from considering the possibility of defences which lack any reasonable foundation: “[i]t is not every facile mouthing of some easy phrase of excuse that can amount to an explanation. It is for a judge to
decide whether there is evidence fit to be left to a jury which could be the basis of some suggested verdict”.50
[7055] Civil defences In civil cases the nature of the defence will usually be raised on the pleadings from which the allocation of the respective burdens can be deduced. Where this does not occur, the principles which apply are similar to those in criminal cases. The proponent of a proposition may bear the persuasive burden of proving an issue to the satisfaction of the court, but is not necessarily bound to anticipate every possible defeasing defence, especially when it could easily have been pleaded. Thus while the opponents of a claim to patent a wheel had the burden of proving that the wheel had been in prior use, they were not bound to anticipate a contention that such prior use had been secret. It was for the applicant to raise the issue by adducing some evidence, or at least by cross-examining the opponent’s witnesses so as to show that the use had been in secret. Until this had been done proof of prior use without more was sufficient to entitle the opponent to succeed, though if the issue had been so raised the opponent would have had to prove that the use was not secret upon the balance of probabilities.51
Legal burden [7060] Normally burden on moving party So far as the legal burden is concerned, Wigmore has rightly said “There are merely specific rules for specific classes of case, resting for their ultimate basis upon broad reasons of experience and fairness”.52 But this does not often lead to difficulty in ascertaining the party upon whom the burden rests. For a fundamental requirement of any judicial system is that the person who desires the court to take action must prove the case to its satisfaction.53 This means that the legal burden of proving all facts essential to their claims normally rests upon the plaintiff in a civil suit or the prosecutor in criminal proceedings.
[7065] Walsh J’s formulation One of the clearest Australian expositions of the general rule is the
following statement of Walsh JA’s: [T]he burden of proof in the sense of establishing a case, lies on a plaintiff if the fact alleged (whether affirmative or negative in form) is an essential element in his cause of action, eg, if its existence is a condition precedent to his right to maintain the action. The onus is on the defendant, if the allegation is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the cause of action, but is one which, if established, will constitute a good defence, that is, an “avoidance” of the claim which, prima facie, the plaintiff has.54
[page 300]
[7070] Burden of proving a negative The rule is sometimes expressed in terms of such maxims as omnia praesumuntur pro negante, and ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat; but this must not be taken to mean that the onus of proof cannot lie upon a party who makes a negative allegation. If this were so, the application of the rule could be made to depend upon the language in which a case happened to be pleaded. For instance, a claim for damages for breach of covenant to keep a house in repair may be stated by saying, either that the defendant did not repair the house, or else that he allowed it to become dilapidated, but the legal burden is borne by the plaintiff, however the claim is expressed.55 There are numerous instances in which a plaintiff or prosecutor assumes the legal burden of proving a negative.56 Absence of consent must be established by the Crown on a charge of rape or assault,57 and where lack of consent58 or want of due notice of a particular fact59 is alleged in a civil action, these matters must be proved by the plaintiff. As Bowen LJ said in the leading case60 which decided that the legal burden of proving absence of reasonable and probable cause rests on the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution: “If the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the plaintiff’s case, the proof of the assertion still rests upon the plaintiff.” Cases on assessment of damages for personal injury provide frequent illustrations of attempts to have evidential issues alter the onus of proof. Where a plaintiff claimed that her pre-injury training did not fit her for any employment after her accident, the court rejected arguments that the onus then lies on the defendant to show what earning capacity was open to the plaintiff.61 Other examples include proof that a contract has been terminated in an action by the purchaser to recover a deposit,62 and proof
that there is no retainer as a solicitor.63 [page 301] In the case of relief by declaratory order, the party seeking the declaration has the burden of proof of any matter which is a necessary element of the declaration sought “(even if in proceedings by that party for relief of another kind, or in proceedings by the other party, that matter would not arise unless raised (and the burden of proof consequently assumed) by the other party).”64 Where a party seeks a negative declaration (eg a declaration that an acquisition will not contravene s 50 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)), that party bears the onus of proving that negative proposition.65
[7075] Assertion essential to whose case? Difficulty may sometimes arise with regard to the question whether an assertion is essential to a party’s case or that of his adversary. This is strikingly illustrated by a case66 where the charterers of a ship claimed damages from the owners for failure to load. The owners pleaded that the contract had been frustrated by the destruction of the ship owing to an explosion, and the only question of fact was whether this had been caused by their fault. As the evidence was scanty, it became necessary to determine which of the parties bore the legal burden with regard to the matter. If the rule were that charterparties cease to be binding when the vessel, without default of either party, is disabled by an overpowering disaster, the negation of fault would be an essential aspect of the defendant’s case. On the other hand, proof of fault would be an essential of the plaintiff’s case, if the rule were that charterparties cease to be binding when the vessel is disabled by an overpowering disaster, provided that disaster is not brought about by the fault of either party. The House of Lords decided that the latter was the correct formulation, and accordingly held that the plaintiff has the legal burden of proving fault when frustration is pleaded as a defence to an action on a contract. Their Lordships’ speeches referred to principles, such as the difficulty of proving
a negative and the presumption of innocence, but Stone has suggested that general considerations of public policy probably constituted the decisive factor.67 If such considerations are the guide where there is no governing precedent, it is obviously vain to seek for any set formula determining what facts are essential to a party’s case. Hence the incidence of the legal burden of proof can only be ascertained by consulting the precedents concerned with the various branches of the substantive law. In the case of a claim for repayment of money lent, the High Court has held that the burden of proving that an advance of money is by way of loan not gift is on the plaintiff,68 but that there is no burden on the plaintiff of proving that the debt has not been repaid; the [page 302] burden of proving repayment rests on the defendant.69 In the case of bailment, for example, it is settled that the bailee has the onus of proving that the goods were lost without his fault,70 and, at a criminal trial, the accused has the legal burden on a plea of insanity,71 or insane automatism.72 A solicitor seeking payment from a client bears the onus of proving all the terms of the retainer including identification of the performance for which the payment was to be remuneration.73 No a priori tests could have produced these results; it is pointless to collect numerous isolated precedents.
B — PRESUMPTIONS EXPRESSING THE INCIDENCE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF Linguistic shifts [7080] Describing burden of proof in the language of presumption As noted earlier, the burden of proof is sometimes allocated by way of the terminology of presumption. The terminology is mainly applied to a situation in which the proof of one fact affects the burden relating to another, and consideration of this is postponed to the next section of this
chapter. In some cases, however, there is no basic fact at all, and the “presumption” does no more than express the incidence of the relevant burden. Typical examples are provided by the presumption of innocence, and the presumption of sanity in criminal cases.
Presumption of innocence [7085] Meaning and consequences When it is said that an accused person is presumed to be innocent,74 all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and unless and until this is done the accused is taken to be innocent, not merely not guilty.75 This is the fundamental rule of criminal procedure, and it is expressed in terms of a presumption of innocence so frequently as to render criticism somewhat pointless; but this practice can lead to serious confusion of thought, as is shown by a much discussed decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.76 The accused had been convicted of misappropriating the funds of a bank after the jury had been told that they should acquit unless [page 303] satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and a new trial was ordered because the judge did not enumerate the presumption of innocence among the items of evidence favourable to the accused. In other words, the Supreme Court considered that the presumption was something different from the rule concerning the onus of proof on a criminal charge, for they regarded it as an instrument of proof — an item of evidence which had been withheld from the jury. This decision has been universally condemned; it could hardly have been pronounced if the court had not been misled by the verbal dissimilarity between the rule that the prosecution bears the legal burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence. Thus it is not an error for a trial judge who has given a correct direction on the burden and standard of proof to fail to refer to the presumption of innocence.77 It is a misdirection to direct a jury about any presumption of innocence
applying to witnesses, because that presumption is only relevant to the accused, and the above direction may lead the jury only to reject the evidence of police officers if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that they are lying.78 The presumption of innocence can have an impact on the appropriate direction to be given when the accused testifies. In a civil case, it is commonplace to take into account in assessing the credibility of a party/witness what that party/witness stands to gain or lose. The same applies to witnesses who are not parties. In criminal cases the High Court described the position as follows in a case where the jury was directed that if it thought a witness had a large interest in the outcome it could conclude that it should scrutinise the evidence of that witness closely, and that it might well think that the accused had the greatest interest of all the witnesses:79 [T]he fairness of the trial was seriously impaired by the effect of [his Honour’s] directions concerning the interest of a witness in the outcome of the case. The jury could hardly escape the conclusion that the appellant had “the greatest interest of all the witnesses” in the outcome of the case. Indeed, his Honour had suggested to the jury that they might think that the appellant had a greater interest than any other witness in the outcome of the case. If the jury accepted that suggestion, as they almost certainly would have, his Honour’s directions had the effect that the evidence of the appellant had to be scrutinized more carefully than the evidence of any other witness, including the complainant, for no reason other than that he was the accused. The unfairness of such a direction is manifest, particularly when the outcome of the trial inevitably turned upon the jury’s preference for the evidence of the complainant against that of the accused. Moreover, the directions
[page 304] virtually had the effect that the appellant was to be treated as a “suspect witness” in the same way as an accomplice, a complainant in a sexual case and a young child have been treated as “suspect witnesses”, that is, as witnesses whose evidence is to be accepted only after the most careful scrutiny … An express direction which had the effect of his Honour’s directions would have been a clear misdirection … Furthermore, his Honour’s directions on the point do not sit well with the presumption of innocence which is the consequence of a plea of not guilty. If that presumption is to have any real effect in a criminal trial, the jury must act on the basis that the accused is presumed innocent of the acts which are the subject of the indictment until they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he or she is guilty of those acts. To hold that, despite the plea of not guilty, any evidence of the accused denying those acts is to be the subject of close scrutiny because of his or her interest in the outcome of the case is to undermine the benefit which that presumption gives to an accused person. Nothing in the above is intended to suggest that the evidence of an accused person is not subject
to the tests which are generally applicable to witnesses in a criminal trial. Thus, in examining the evidence of a witness in a criminal trial — including the evidence of the accused — the jury is entitled to consider whether some particular interest or purpose of the witness will be served or promoted in giving evidence in the proceedings. But to direct a jury that they should evaluate evidence on the basis of the interest of witnesses in the outcome of the case is to strike at the notion of a fair trial for an accused person. Except in the most exceptional case, such a direction inevitably disadvantages the evidence of the accused when it is in conflict with the evidence for the Crown.
This entails the difficulty, not uncommon in the law of evidence, that though the jury is entitled to take into account a matter, the jury is not to be told in detail how it may do so. For the same reason, it is undesirable and often highly dangerous to intrude into a charge any suggestion that a conviction or acquittal will reflect favourably or unfavourably on the credit of a witness, or bear in some way on the prospects of a witness, or have some other effect of that kind.80 A related issue is the issue of why a person complaining of a crime would lie. In circumstances where there is no direct evidence of a material motive for a witness to lie, or evidence from which a specific motive could reasonably be inferred, it is impermissible for the jury to be asked in address:“Why would the complainant lie?” It is impermissible because the jury may think it open to it to infer that because the complainant had no apparent motive for lying that fact of itself showed that the complainant was telling the truth, and this is illegitimate speculation.81 However, where a motive to lie is asserted in relation to the evidence of the complainant (or there is evidence from which a motive to lie could reasonably be inferred), arguments may be put to the jury by counsel or the judge relating to the validity of [page 305] the possible motive to lie. This is so even though no onus rests on the accused to prove a motive to lie. In many cases where the evidence of the witness is vital, it may be appropriate for the judge to direct the jury that, even if it rejects the motive to lie put forward by the accused, that does not mean that the witness is necessarily telling the truth, and to emphasise that the Crown must still satisfy the jury that the witness is telling the truth.82
By parity of reasoning, it is not permissible to cross-examine an accused person to show that that accused person cannot prove any ground for imputing a motive to lie to the complainant.83 Similarly, grounds for rejection of parts of the record of interview may exist where police officers ask “Why would [the complainant] make this allegation?”84 A jury inquiry as to whether the accused knew of any reason why a witness would falsely implicate him was appropriately answered by the judge in saying that there was no evidence on the point and it was not for the accused to advance such reasons.85 A prosecutor is not prohibited from raising the absence of evidence of a complainant’s motive to lie in address to the jury where the defence has alleged that the complainant was lying.86 Similar care must be taken in dealing with conflicts between a prosecution witness and a defence witness. When a case turns on a conflict between the evidence of a prosecution witness and the evidence of a defence witness, it is commonplace for a judge to invite a jury to consider the question: who is to be believed? But it is essential to ensure, by suitable direction, that the answer to that question (which the jury would doubtless ask themselves in any event) if adverse to the defence, is not taken as concluding the issue whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the issues which it bears the onus of proving. The jury must be told that, even if they prefer the evidence for the prosecution, they should not convict unless they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of that evidence. The jury must be told that, even if they do not positively believe the evidence for the defence, they cannot find an issue against the accused contrary to that evidence if that evidence gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to that issue.87
[page 306] Another formula which has been criticised is “Who else but the accused would have committed these murders?”88 However, it may be permissible to ask an accused person whether another witness has lied if the accused has alleged this.89 And it may be permissible to ask why a complainant would lie if the accused had suggested, in address, in cross-examination of the complainant or in evidence, that the complainant did have a motive to lie.90 There is no rule that a jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a suggested motive for a prosecution witness to lie is unacceptable, or that a failure to reject the suggested motive to lie beyond reasonable doubt must be taken into account in favour of the accused.91 A related flaw arises where the judge asks defence witnesses what their “theories” about the issues are.92
Presumption of sanity [7090] Meaning and consequences In criminal cases, the presumption of sanity is no more than a conclusion which must be drawn until the contrary is proved, for the M’Naghten Rules state: that the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction.
The M’Naghten Rules apply to criminal charges,93 and the presumption of sanity which they entail must be distinguished from the same presumption in some other branches of the law. For example, if a rational will is produced, and shown to have been duly executed, the jury ought to be told to find in favour of the testator’s competence.94 The legal burden rests on the party who propounds the will, but the rule that party does not have to adduce evidence of capacity in the first instance is sometimes said to raise a presumption of sanity in testamentary cases. This presumption is dependent on the proof of a basic fact — the execution of a rational will. Therefore it is an illustration of the second principal meaning of the term. Allowance must be made for a number of presumptions without basic facts, for example Lord Kilmuir and Lord Denning spoke of “the presumption of mental capacity”95 simply as a compendious way of expressing the fact that the accused bears the evidential burden on the issue of non-insane automatism. Likewise, where the testimonial capacity of an apparently rational witness is in issue, the evidential burden of showing that the evidence of the witness is affected by delusion or paranoia lies on the party attacking credit.96 Although it is common enough to speak of a presumption that mechanical [page 307] instruments were in working order as a means of indicating the fact that an evidential burden is borne by the party denying that this was the case,97 it can hardly be said that any basic fact is involved.
C — SOME STATUTES AFFECTING THE INCIDENCE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF Representative examples [7095] Deeming provisions It is not possible to deal with all the many instances in which courts have had to construe particular statutes creating defences either to civil wrongs or crimes.98 It is not uncommon for statutes to provide that certain facts shall be deemed to exist until the contrary is proved. The precise words that are employed vary from statute to statute, and they could have a decisive effect. Examples are furnished by s 35(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) and averment provisions.
[7100] Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) s 35(2) Section 35(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 provides that every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course; but if in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that the acceptance, issue, or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of proof is shifted, unless and until the holder proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith been given for the bill. In the light of cases decided before and after the Act came into force, when the subsection speaks of “proof” it is clear that all that is meant is “evidence upon which a jury would be entitled to base a verdict”.99 The result is that the holder has the legal burden of proving that the holder gave value for the bill in good faith, but the holder does not bear the evidential burden on the point until the defendant has made out a prima facie case that the bill was tainted with fraud, duress or illegality. No doubt this is commercially fair even if, from the point of view of literal interpretation, there is something to be said for a construction less favourable to the defendant.100
[7105] Averment provisions An averment or like provision that creates a statutory presumption does
not have a limited effect necessarily falling short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, nor does the prosecution lose the benefit of the provision if it puts forward any evidence of the matters embraced by the averment.101 An averment may be of law or fact or of [page 308] mixed law and fact.102 But in every case the averment must be drawn with precision and clarity because otherwise it will have no evidentiary effect.103 Thus in a prosecution104 based on a charge of developing land for a prohibited purpose, the prosecutor was unable to overcome the requirement of proof of no non-conforming user by an averment that “such development [was not] made lawful by …” the provisions relating to the existing user. An averment105 provision may relate to an essential and not merely technical or preliminary part of the offence.106 Dixon J said of one section: It is to be noticed that this provision which occurs in a carefully drawn section does not place upon the accused the onus of disproving the facts upon which his guilt depends, but, while leaving the prosecution the onus, initial and final, of establishing the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, provides, in effect, that the allegations of the prosecutor shall be sufficient in law to discharge that onus.107
It is submitted that the above remarks are generally applicable to averment provisions in other Commonwealth legislation, and that such provisions have the effect only of casting an evidential burden on the accused. In such a case the averment and the evidence must be considered by the tribunal in order to determine whether the prosecution case has been made out beyond reasonable doubt. Where, because the evidence casts doubt upon the averments or otherwise, the whole of the material fails to discharge the criminal burden on the prosecutor, the defendant must be acquitted.108
Statutory interpretation in criminal cases109 [7120] Summary trials In addition to the common law rule as to the construction of statutes, there is
[page 309] frequently to be found a general statutory provision applicable to all summary offences to assist in determining the incidence of the burden of proof of exemptions. One model creates an evidential burden on the accused, eg Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 130. Another model creates a legal burden on the accused, eg Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 142A.110 The latter type of provision, in casting a legal burden on the accused,111 goes further in some cases than the common law principle discussed at [7150]. A particular instance arises where a legal burden of disproving possession is created. Many find this unpalatable, particularly because it calls for proof of a negative. But it does facilitate proof of possession much more than a simple placement of the evidential burden on the accused would. It increases the likelihood of the accused entering the witness box more than a reverse evidential burden would. That is because there is a radical difference between the two burdens. A legal burden of proof on the accused requires the accused to disprove possession on a preponderance of probabilities. An evidential burden of proof on the accused requires only a showing that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the nonexistence of possession. The legal burden of proving something which the accused is best placed to prove like non-possession is much more likely to influence the accused to testify than an evidential burden, capable of being met by pointing to some piece of evidence tendered by other means and perhaps by the prosecution.112
[7125] Examples By the operation of such provisions or the common law principle, or both, the legal burden113 of establishing a qualification or exception has been cast on the defendant in a case involving the sale of milk without a licence,114 and in one involving a claim by an employer that an applicant worker injured himself through his own default.115 On the other hand, no such legal burden was cast on the defendant where it was held that on a charge of using a motor car without consent
[page 310] the burden remained on the prosecution to prove the absence of consent.116 So, too, it has been held,117 in relation to a street betting charge (a street being so defined as to apply to enclosed land “not including racecourses”), that, notwithstanding what is now s 130 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), the legal burden was on the prosecution to prove that the enclosure in question was not a racecourse. The matter ultimately is a matter of construction. The question turns on whether the offence is described in terms of a general expression subject to an exception, in which case the prosecutor must prove that the defendant does not fall within the exception, or whether the exculpatory circumstance or exception assumes liability in the first instance and admits the possibility that the defendant will prove additional matters which excuse him.118
[7130] Trials on indictment: exceptions and provisos The common law used to attach importance to the distinction between exceptions and provisos and the effect of the defendant’s peculiar knowledge of material facts. There was an old rule of pleading dating back to the seventeenth century according to which an indictment had to negative exceptions, but not provisos. In the words of Lord Mansfield CJ: [I]t is a known distinction that what comes by way of proviso in a statute must be insisted on by way of defence by the party accused; but where exceptions are in the enacting part of a law, it must appear in the charge that the defendant does not fall within any of them.119
Lord Mansfield’s distinction has only been mentioned in connection with criminal statutes, although there is an analogy in the construction of contracts. It refers to matters of procedure rather than questions of evidence. Thus it has been held to justify the omission of various averments from an indictment, but it does have a bearing on the burden of proof because, if an allegation is left out of an indictment, the prosecution is relieved from calling evidence on the point.
[7140] No Crown burden to negative exceptions and
provisos But it did not follow from the fact that the Crown had to negative exceptions in the indictment that it bore any kind of burden with regard to them at the trial.120 It was decided that an indictment for bigamy need not state that the accused was a British subject although the alleged second marriage took place abroad.121 The defence that would have been available to the accused was the consequence of words used in the proviso to the relevant statute but, although the decisions make [page 311] it plain that the evidential burden was borne by the accused in the first instance, the position with regard to the legal burden is not so clear.122
[7145] Trials on indictment: Dowling v Bowie The common law doctrine was discussed by the High Court in a case in which the defendant was charged with breach of a Northern Territory Ordinance forbidding the sale or supply of liquor to a person who was an Aborigine or a half-caste within the meaning of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918–1947. The ordinance provided that a person who was a half-caste might be declared not to be a half-caste within the ordinance. The court held that the onus lay on the prosecution to show that the person to whom liquor was sold was not the subject of a declaration. The common law doctrine was described thus:123 Where a statute having defined the grounds of some liability it imposes, proceeds to introduce by some distinct provision a matter of exception or excuse it lies upon the party seeking to avail himself of the exception or excuse to prove the facts which bring his case within it. The common law rule distinguishes between such a statutory provision and one where the definition of the grounds of liability contains within itself the statement of the exception or qualification and in the latter case the law places upon the party asserting that the liability has been incurred the burden of negativing the existence of facts bringing the case within the exception or qualification.124
[7150] Trials on indictment: Vines v Djordjevitch The matter was also fully discussed by the High Court a little later:125
… “There is a technical distinction between a proviso and an exception, which is well understood. All the cases say, that if there be an exception in the enacting clause, it must be negatived: but if there be a separate proviso, it need not”— ….126 The distinction has perhaps come to be applied in a less technical manner, and now depends not so much upon form as upon substantial considerations. In the end, of course, it is a matter of the intention that ought, in the case of a particular enactment, to be ascribed to the legislature and therefore the manner in which the legislature has expressed its will must remain of importance. But whether the form is that of a proviso or of an exception, the intrinsic character of the provision that the proviso makes and its real effect cannot be put out of consideration in determining where the burden of proof lies. When an enactment is stating the grounds of some liability that it is imposing or the conditions giving rise to some right that it is creating, it is possible that in defining the elements forming the title to the right or the basis of the liability the provision may rely upon qualifications exceptions or provisos and it may employ negative as well as positive expressions. Yet it may be sufficiently clear that the whole amounts to a statement of the complete factual situation
[page 312] which must be found to exist before anybody obtains a right or incurs a liability under the provision. In other words it may embody the principle which the legislature seeks to apply generally. On the other hand it may be the purpose of the enactment to lay down some principle of liability which it means to apply generally and then to provide for some special grounds of excuse, justification or exculpation depending upon new or additional facts. In the same way where conditions of general application giving rise to a right are laid down, additional facts of a special nature may be made a ground for defeating or excluding the right. For such a purpose the use of a proviso is natural. But in whatever form the enactment is cast, if it expresses an exculpation, justification, excuse, ground of defeasance or exclusion which assumes the existence of the general or primary grounds from which the liability or right arises but denies the right or liability in a particular case by reason of additional or special facts, then it is evident that such an enactment supplies considerations of substance for placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to rely upon the additional or special matter ….127
[7155] Trials on indictment: exculpatory provision in separate statute The question of onus may sometimes arise where the exculpatory provision lies in a quite separate statute. Thus the court rejected the view that, on a statutory charge of loitering, the onus was on the prosecution to negative the application of another statute that protected the right of assembly in a street.128
[7160] Trials on indictment: facts peculiarly within knowledge of accused
Bayley J said that he had always regarded it as a general rule that: [I]f a negative averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the other, the party within whose knowledge it lies, and who asserts the affirmative is to prove it, and not he who avers the negative.129
It is important to grasp the limited extent of Bayley J’s general rule. It is a rule of statutory interpretation confined to cases in which the affirmative of negative averments is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. There is nothing in the nature of a general rule that the burden of establishing any defence based on facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is borne by the accused. Were there such a rule, someone charged with murder would bear the burden of proving many facts connected with provocation or self-defence, or even the burden of disproving an intention to kill, for few things can be more especially within a person’s peculiar knowledge than that person’s state of mind. The existence of such a rule was emphatically repudiated by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in a case in which a mechanical defect was the accused’s answer to a charge of dangerous driving.130 The most that can be said by way of generalisation is that a party’s knowledge of [page 313] essential facts may lessen the amount of evidence required to discharge an evidential burden borne by his adversary.131 To quote Lord Mansfield CJ: It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted.132
In consequence of Bayley J’s rule of statutory interpretation, the prosecution has been relieved of the necessity of showing that an apothecary charged with practising without a certificate did not possess one,133 that a person charged with selling cocaine without a licence did not have a licence,134 that a driver charged with infringing insurance regulations did not have a certificate,135 that a sugar dealer charged with an offence against the Defence Regulations 1939 had not been granted a licence,136 that a motorist did not possess a licence when he was charged with driving without one,137 and that an accused was in the possession of drugs without a prescription.138
[7165] Trials on indictment: criticism of English cases Some of these cases have not gone uncriticised. This is partly due to the construction placed by the courts on the regulations or statute under which the accused were charged,139 and partly because the cases are considered to represent unjustifiable extensions of the principle from statutes containing a number of [page 314] qualifications under which the acts charged would be lawful to issues concerning a single negative which would be as easy to prove by prima facie evidence as the affirmative. Suppose, for example, that a motorist is charged with driving without a licence. It would be as easy for the prosecution to provide prima facie evidence of guilt by calling a witness to swear that the accused was asked to produce his licence and failed to do so,140 as it would be for the defendant to attend court and produce his licence or explain its non-production, but English authority decides that this latter course must be adopted.141 In Australia it has been said142 that that English authority went further than the Australian courts have gone and that it was difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the reasoning of the Australian cases. It is submitted that these show that the legal burden is not affected by the operation of the principle concerning the affirmative of negative averments peculiarly within the knowledge of one of the parties.143 Where one party bears the burden of proving a negative but the other has greater means to produce evidence to contradict the negative proposition, then provided the party bearing the burden of proof has tendered some evidence from which the negative proposition may be inferred, the other party carries a tactical burden to advance in evidence any matters with which (if relevant) the first party would have to deal in the discharge of its legal burden of proof.144 This has been said to follow from the maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to produce, and in the power of the other to have contradicted.145 A more extreme doctrine, known as the “scintilla” doctrine, applies where one party bears the onus of proving a
negative and the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the other; only slight evidence is required for the first to discharge the onus.146 There is, however, a further difficulty about the application of the doctrine of Bayley J. Precisely when can the negative of a positive averment be said to be “peculiarly within the knowledge” of the defendant? This question is particularly pertinent in a case in which there is a single readily accessible register of licensees, and the charge is one of carrying on a certain activity without a licence.
[7170] Trials on indictment: R v Edwards This point was taken by an appellant who had been convicted of selling intoxicating liquor by retail without holding a Justice’s licence authorising him to do so. He had not given evidence; the prosecution had adduced ample evidence from [page 315] which sales might be inferred, but none with regard to the absence of a licence. Lawton LJ recognised the force, on the particular facts, of the point taken with regard to peculiar knowledge and raised some questions by way of general criticism of doctrines such as that enunciated by Bayley J. Who is to decide whether a fact is within the peculiar knowledge of the defendant? Is it a matter on which evidence is receivable? A very learned review of the authorities, culminating in the following statement, ensued:147 In our judgment this line of authority establishes that over the centuries the common law, as a result of experience and the need to ensure that justice is done both to the community and to defendants, has evolved an exception to the fundamental rule of our criminal law that the prosecution must prove every element of the offence charged. This exception, like so much else in the common law, was hammered out on the anvil of pleading. It is limited to offences arising under enactments which prohibit the doing of an act save in specified circumstances or by persons of specified classes or with specified qualifications or with the licence or permission of specified authorities. Whenever the prosecution seeks to rely on this exception, the court must construe the enactment under which the charge is laid. If the true construction is that the enactment prohibits the doing of acts, subject to provisos, exceptions and the like, then the prosecution can rely upon the exception.
This part of the judgment concludes with the clearly expressed opinion
that the burden borne by the accused in cases covered by the statement is persuasive or legal. The standard is the balance of probabilities. Lawton LJ’s reformulation of the common law rules with regard to exceptions has the great merit of avoiding problems with regard to the meaning of “peculiar knowledge”. Moreover, the reference to the court’s duty to construe the statute under which the charge is laid leaves room for a consideration of the object of the legislation as expressed in its language before concluding that it prohibits the doing of acts subject to provisos, exceptions and the like.148 But difficulty may be experienced in reconciling Lawton LJ’s statement of the law with some previous decisions in England.149
[7175] Trials on indictment: impact of Woolmington v DPP The leading House of Lords case150 in 1935 affirmed the rule that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to two exceptions, the defence of insanity and “any statutory exception”. Does every statutory offence governed by the rule propounded by Lawton LJ constitute a “statutory exception” in this context? The answer is “Yes, if the term includes exceptions implied under a rule of statutory construction”. But it is a little surprising that this point was not considered by the Court of Appeal, having regard to the fact that Lord Simon later referred to Lord Sankey’s second exception as covering no more than “offences [page 316] where the onus of proof is specially dealt with by statute”.151 Admittedly, there is an element of pedantry in the point that has just been taken, but in 1935 it was by no means clear that the line of decisions following Bayley J placed a legal burden on the accused. It was said to have this effect in important dicta after 1935.152
[7180] Trials on indictment: impact of human rights
charters Lawton LJ’s reformulation has received little consideration in Australia.153 In assessing whether a statute imposes a legal or merely evidential burden on the accused, it is necessary in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory to take into account the Human Rights Charters in force in those jurisdictions.154
D — THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AFFECTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF Agreement in civil cases [7185] Legal burden generally affected The incidence of the burden of proof may be determined by the agreement of the parties in civil cases,155 and, where there is such an agreement, there can be little doubt that the burden in question would generally be taken to be the legal one. This is also the burden which has been the subject of discussion in cases concerned with the construction of contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, and insurance against various types of loss.
Perils of the sea: The Glendarroch [7190] Legal burden of proving negligence If a plaintiff claims damages from shipowners for breach of contract to carry goods safely, and the defendants rely on a clause exempting them from loss or damage occasioned to the goods by a peril of the sea, they must prove that such [page 317] peril occurred, and alone156 caused the damage in question; but, if the
plaintiff relies upon a proviso to the exemption clause relating to negligence on the part of the defendants, the legal burden of proving negligence rests on him. Lord Esher MR said: The plaintiffs would have to prove the contract and the non-delivery. If they leave that in doubt, of course they fail. The defendants’ answer is, “Yes; but the case was brought within the exception — within its ordinary meaning”. That lies upon them. Then the plaintiffs have a right to say there are exceptional circumstances, viz, that the damage was brought about by the negligence of the defendants’ servants, and it seems to me that it is for the plaintiff to make out that second exception.157
Insurance exceptions [7195] War loss and theft In a case158 concerned with an insurance policy covering the loss of a ship through perils of the sea, subject to an exception in respect of enemy action, Bailhache J held that the defendants bore the legal burden of proving that the ship was lost in consequence of the latter, with the result that the plaintiffs succeeded on their claim, as the ship had not been heard of after she set sail, and there was no evidence of the cause of her disappearance. The law on this point cannot, however, be regarded as completely settled for, in an earlier case,159 Lush J had decided that, where an insurance policy against loss of jewellery contained an exception in respect of theft by the plaintiff’s servants, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to negative loss from this cause. This is not the kind of problem that can be solved by logical argument, for there is no difference between a clause which is construed to read “The insurers shall be liable for loss except that which occurs in specified circumstances” and a rule which says “the insurers shall be liable for loss arising from all causes other than those specified”,160 but it is submitted that practical considerations as well as previous authority161 are in favour of the view of Bailhache J. He said that if he had been asked to advise on evidence in the earlier case, it would not have occurred to him to suggest that the plaintiff should call all his servants, one after the other, to swear that they had not stolen the jewels. “The procession would be a long one if Messrs Whiteley were the plaintiffs.”162 [page 318]
Section 3 — Shifting Burdens of Proof A — GENERAL An illusory conception [7200] Non-shifting burden The definitions of the two principal burdens adopted in this work render it difficult to speak meaningfully of the “shifting” of either of them. The evidential burden has been defined as the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. The legal burden, “burden of proof”, “probative” or “persuasive” burden has been defined as the obligation of a party to meet the requirement of a rule of law that a fact in issue must be proved or disproved. The question whether there is sufficient evidence to raise the issue of the existence of a particular fact can be answered only once in the course of a case and, if there is a jury, the answer must be given by the judge. The question whether a fact in issue has been proved can be answered only after both parties have called their evidence and, when there is a jury, the answer must be given by them after they have been instructed by the judge. Writing with reference to a criminal trial with a jury Professor Glanville Williams has said: [T]he evidential burden governs what the judge does, in leaving the question to the jury or withdrawing it from them; the persuasive burden governs what he says, in directing the jury how to reach their verdict.163
The concept of the evidential burden is the product of trial by jury and the possibility of withdrawing an issue from that body. Unlike the concept of the legal burden it is not a logical necessity of litigation about questions of fact: “If it were to be said of any issue, that it was not covered by an evidential burden, the only effect would be to remove the judge’s filtering power in respect of that issue”.164 It is true that Lord Simon of Glaisdale, in a dissenting speech,165 spoke
of the shifting of the evidential burden “backwards and forwards in the course of a trial”, but he was attempting to justify the view of the Court of Appeal that, as a matter of law, someone charged with rape bears the evidential burden on the issue of his mistaken belief that the woman was consenting to intercourse.166 The decision turned on the substantive law, but, so far as the evidential burden was concerned, the majority of the House of Lords appears to have accepted the argument of counsel for the appellant summarised as follows by Lord Cross of Chelsea: If [the Crown] adduces evidence to show that intercourse took place and that the woman did not consent to it then in the absence of any evidence from the defendant the jury will
[page 319] certainly draw the inference that he was aware that she was not consenting. So as a practical matter he is bound — if he wishes to raise the point — to give evidence to the effect that he believed that she was consenting and as to his reasons for that belief; and the weaker those reasons are the more likely the jury is to conclude that he had no such belief. But the issue as to the accused’s belief in the woman’s consent is before the jury from the beginning,167 and is an issue in respect of which the evidential burden is on the Crown from the first to last. There is never any question of any evidential burden with regard to it being on the accused or of the judge withdrawing it from the jury.168
[7205] Circumstances in which burdens may “shift” The practice of speaking of the shifting of the burden of proof is quite inveterate among both judges and writers, so all that can be done is to endeavour to ascertain the different situations to which the expression is usually applied. It seems that there are three of these, namely, those in which the evidential burden on a particular issue is said to shift, those in which the legal burden on a particular issue may be said to shift, and those in which the burdens on the different issues in a given case are variously distributed between the parties. The kind of problems that may arise are illustrated by High Court cases169 dealing with the burden of proof in a personal injuries claim where the defendant claimed that the plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing condition which negatived her claim for incapacity said to flow from the defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff has the burden of making out a
prima facie case that incapacity resulted from the defendant’s negligence but the onus of adducing evidence that the plaintiff’s incapacity is wholly or partly the result of some pre-existing condition rests upon the defendant. It remains for the plaintiff upon the whole of the evidence to satisfy the trier of fact of the extent of the injury caused by the defendant’s negligence. It is perhaps erroneous to speak of the shifting of the evidential burden because that term has been defined as the obligation to point to the existence of sufficient evidence to raise an issue, and the cases about to be considered are ones in which a burden on an issue already before the jury is said to shift; but the point being expressed is clear enough: a party against whom evidence on a particular issue has been given will often be well advised to adduce evidence on it in order to avoid defeat, or even be obliged to do so in consequence of a presumption of law.170
B — THE SHIFTING OF THE EVIDENTIAL BURDEN Tactical shifting [7210] Provisional burdens Assume that the proponent of an issue discharges the evidential burden which rests on that proponent by adducing evidence that is “prima facie” in the first sense explained at [1600]. If the tribunal of fact believes the proponent’s witnesses, the requisite inference may be drawn in the proponent’s favour, and the chances of this happening will generally be increased by the opponent’s failure to adduce evidence. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the tribunal of fact will not draw the requisite inference, even if the opponent does not adduce any evidence. The opponent merely [page 320] runs a risk of losing on the issue if the opponent remains silent, and, in such a case, when it is said that the burden of proof has shifted from the proponent to the opponent, all that is meant is that the latter should
adduce some evidence as a matter of common prudence.171 The evidential burden of disproving the case made by the proponent on the issue in question is sometimes described as “a provisional burden”. Examples are provided by any criminal case in which the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of mens rea if its witnesses are believed,172 or, in a civil case, where the plaintiff has established that the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the defendant’s negligence, it passes to the defendant to adduce evidence that the plaintiff would have been disabled in any event by some other cause.173 A provisional burden is one which is borne by the opponent on an issue after the proponent has discharged the evidential burden. The opponent must, in the words of Lord Denning, “call evidence or take the consequences which may not necessarily be fatal”.174 An example is provided by any criminal case in which the prosecution relies on the actus reus as evidence of mens rea. By not calling evidence on the subject, the accused runs the risk of an adverse finding with regard to the accused’s mental state if the jury accepts the Crown’s version of the accused’s external conduct. The degree of risk run by an opponent who does not adduce evidence on a particular issue varies from case to case. Lord Denning even speaks of the provisional burden shifting to and fro in the course of a case. No doubt judges often have something of this sort in mind when they refer to a shifting of the burden of proof, but the concept of a provisional burden (sometimes called a “tactical burden”) is devoid of legal significance because there is no means of telling when it has been brought into existence or when it has been discharged. It is evidential in the sense that it entails the calling of evidence but, by definition, it is non-existent at the beginning of a case when a judicial ruling with regard to burdens may be obtained. Such a ruling may likewise be obtained at the end of a proponent’s case if the judge is required to decide whether enough evidence to raise a particular issue has been adduced, but, in the [page 321] first instance at any rate, a provisional burden is borne by the opponent. There can be no further ruling on burdens until the end of the case when the legal burden is the all-important matter.
[7215] Basic facts and presumed facts If a fact in issue may be inferred from the proof of another particular fact in a commonly recurring situation, the language of presumption is often employed. The fact which is proved can be referred to as the basic fact, and the fact inferred as the presumed fact. Thus Lord Denning refers to such a presumption as casting a provisional burden upon the opponent of the presumed fact. In other words, the party proving the basic fact is likely to win on the issue to which the presumed fact relates, in the absence of evidence to the contrary adduced by the other party. According to older classifications, presumptions having this limited effect are described as “presumptions of fact”, and instances which have already been mentioned are the presumption of continuance,175 the presumption of guilty knowledge arising from the possession of recently stolen goods,176 and the presumption of unseaworthiness in the case of a vessel which founders shortly after leaving port.177 These are all inferences which may be drawn by the tribunal of fact. It is not obliged to draw them as a matter of law, even if there is no further evidence, although there may be occasions on which a civil jury should be directed that they ought to draw the inference as reasonable people, and, in civil cases, a verdict, or even the decision of a judge sitting alone, might be set aside if the inference was not drawn.
Legal shifting [7220] Tactical considerations Assume that the proponent of an issue discharges the evidential burden by adducing evidence which is “presumptive” or “prima facie” in the second sense explained at [1605]. Provided the proponent’s witnesses are believed, the tribunal of fact is bound to decide the issue in the proponent’s favour if the opponent calls no evidence. In such a case, when it is said that the burden of proof has shifted from the proponent to the opponent, what is meant is that the latter must adduce evidence on the issue or lose. If the opponent does call evidence, and the jury are unable to come to a definite conclusion one way or the other, a proponent who bears the legal burden will lose. The effect of some presumptions of law is to produce such a situation. To appreciate this, it is only necessary to have recourse to a case to which the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta
applies. As a matter of common sense, the mere erection of traffic signs might not be thought to amount to presumptive evidence of compliance with the relevant statutory provisions, but the legal force of the presumption is such that it casts the evidential burden of disproving compliance on the opponent of this fact.178 The effect of a presumption of law is governed by legal rules and, as a matter of law, it is only when such rules are applicable that the evidential burden can be said to have shifted for legal as opposed to tactical purposes; but the proponent’s evidence in a civil case may be so weighty as a matter of fact that the practical effect is an absolute shifting of the evidential burden. An example is provided by a case in [page 322] which unseaworthiness is alleged and it is proved that the ship foundered soon after she left port. If the opponent adduces no evidence, a verdict for the proponent will be necessitated and a verdict to the contrary would be set aside on appeal.179 In criminal cases tried with a jury the situation is complicated by the rules that there cannot be a directed verdict of guilty and that the Crown has no right of appeal; but, when the accused bears the evidential burden in the first instance, the judges sometimes speak of the shifting of that burden to the Crown in consequence of the weight of the evidence given by the accused.180
C — THE SHIFTING OF THE LEGAL BURDEN Can the legal burden shift? [7225] The nature of the controversy The mere cogency of the evidence adduced by the party who bears the legal burden can never affect its incidence. As long as the matter is governed by the principles of ordinary reasoning, unaffected by rules of law, the party who bears the risk of non-persuasion on a particular issue
continues to do so until the tribunal of fact has to come to a decision. Thus the Crown assumes the legal and evidential burdens of proving malice aforethought at the beginning of a murder trial. The evidential burden will be discharged by proof that the deceased died in consequence of the voluntary act of the accused, but: [I]f, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.181
That was what Viscount Sankey LC called in that case “one golden thread” in the web of the English criminal law. Whatever was novel in that case (see [7030]), the general need for the prosecution to exclude a reasonable doubt was not. It can be traced back to the eighteenth century, and earlier.182 Many writers strenuously contend that it is erroneous to speak of the shifting of the legal burden in the course of a trial in any circumstances; but it is arguable that certain presumptions of law have this effect. In the case of some presumptions of law, the substantive law indicates the quantity of evidence required to rebut the presumption, and this may amount to proof to the contrary on the balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt. Where a child’s legitimacy is in issue, the jury must be told to find in favour of the party who bore the legal burden at the outset if they accept that party’s evidence that the child was born in wedlock, unless the adversary satisfies them to the appropriate standard that the child’s parents did not have intercourse by which it could have been begotten. One way of expressing this result is to say that the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of legitimacy shifts [page 323] when birth in wedlock is established.183 Those who maintain that the legal burden can never shift in the course of a trial argue that three issues are raised when legitimacy is disputed, namely, the validity of the marriage of the child’s parents, the child’s birth in wedlock, and access between its parents at the time of conception. This enables them to say that the legal burden of negativing access rests on the party denying legitimacy at the
outset of the case; but it is not always easy to subdivide an issue in this way. For example, where184 the plaintiffs claimed damages for negligence from the defendants whose ship collided with their vessel which was at anchor in a river while normal daytime weather conditions prevailed, the Court of Appeal held that, once these facts were established, it was incumbent on the defendants to show that the collision was the result of an inevitable accident.185 In other words, the legal burden of disproving negligence was cast on the defendants. It is noteworthy that Lord Denning, who maintained in 1945 that the legal burden on a particular issue never shifts, spoke in 1954 of the shifting of that burden when discussing this case.186 Those who contend that the legal burden on a particular issue never shifts in the course of a case could urge that, on those facts, there are three issues — the collision, the normality of the weather conditions and the question whether the collision was due to the defendant’s negligence. They could say that the legal burden on the first two rests on the plaintiff from the outset, while the defendant bears the legal burden from the beginning so far as the third issue is concerned. Perhaps those who contend that the legal burden on a particular issue never shifts have the better of this battle of words. They can say that, even in cases most favourable to the view that it may shift, such as those which have just been mentioned, the sounder analysis suggests that there is no shifting. The basic facts of the presumptions of legitimacy and negligence are either admitted on the pleadings, or else are in issue. If they are admitted, the legal burden of disproving legitimacy or negligence is fixed at the beginning of the trial by a rule of law, sometimes spoken of as a “rule of presumption”. If the basic facts are not admitted, the party wishing to establish legitimacy or negligence bears the legal burden of establishing those facts. There is no means of knowing whether that party has done so until the whole case is under consideration by the tribunal of fact, but, if that tribunal concludes that that party has, the rule of presumption requires a finding of legitimacy or negligence unless the tribunal of fact is, on the balance of probabilities, convinced to the contrary. The presumption simply discharges the burden of proof with a particular consequence defined by the rule of presumption. Unfortunately there is a tendency to speak of presumptions shifting burdens when what is meant is that they discharge them.
[page 324]
D — DISTRIBUTION OF ISSUES Different location of legal burden on different issues [7230] “Ultimate burden” The fact that in some cases one party has the legal burden on one issue, while the opposite party has it on another issue, has an important bearing on one of the senses in which the burden of proof is said to shift. If the issues are considered successively, it is possible to say that, if A discharges the legal burden on the first issue, the onus of proof shifts to B because B will lose the case unless B discharges B’s legal burden on the second issue. This is how the matter is occasionally stated by the judges, but it must be borne in mind that the burden which is then said to shift is not the burden of establishing a particular issue, nor the burden of adducing evidence with regard to it, but the burden on the ultimate issue that must arise in any litigation, namely, which party is entitled to judgment, or, as the late Ernest Cockle put it, “the burden of proof on the whole case”.187 The “ultimate burden” as used by Lord Denning is a phrase appropriate only to a case involving more than one issue, but it is often used by other judges as a synonym for the legal or persuasive burden. To quote Lord Denning: Where the ultimate decision of a case depends on the determination of a number of separate issues, the burden on the ultimate issue needs to be distinguished from the burden on the separate issues.188
The ultimate burden is thus the burden borne by the party against whom the legal burden on a particular issue has been discharged. Lord Denning illustrates his meaning by reference to an action brought by the holder against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. The ultimate decision depends on whether the plaintiff is a holder in due course. The plaintiff might begin by proving that the plaintiff was the holder of a bill signed by the defendant as acceptor. The plaintiff will succeed unless the defendant makes good some such defence as fraud in the negotiation of the bill. In
turn, the defendant will succeed unless the plaintiff makes good a reply such as value in good faith subsequent to the fraud: “this shifting to and fro is often described as a shifting of the burden of proof and so it is, but it is a shifting of the ultimate burden”.189 No doubt Lord Denning’s ultimate burden (sometimes spoken of as “the burden of proof on the whole case” or the “general burden of proof”) is what judges sometimes have in mind when they say that burdens have “shifted”, but the concept is subject to the same objections as those which have been advanced against the provisional burden, and to the further objection that, in the context of the law of evidence, the expression “burden of proof” is meaningless unless it is used with reference to a particular issue. [page 325]
Section 4 — Presumptions: General A — INTRODUCTION General problems [7235] Causes of problems “Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness, and has left it with a feeling of despair.”190 This is an unduly pessimistic statement, but it has the merit of drawing attention to the extraordinary perplexity which has attended,191 and still attends,192 the extrajudicial discussion of presumptions. Two factors contributing to the difficulties of the subject are the terminological inexactitude which is a besetting sin of the whole law of evidence, and the tendency of writers to apply rigid scientific distinctions to somewhat unsuitable material. There is no need to enlarge upon the first, but the second should be stressed at the outset. No doubt there is force in laments such as those of Lord Denning over the fact that presumptions “have been grouped into unscientific categories”,193 and all attempts to remedy this state of affairs must be beneficial to some extent; but the new classifications have to be applied to decided cases and they will continue to wear a slightly unreal appearance so long as they are not employed by the judges by whom the cases are decided. Moreover, many of the problems that are rightly treated as fundamental in any thorough academic discussion, such as the correct formulation of the basic facts of some presumptions and the precise effect which others may have upon the incidence of the burden of proof, have not been solved in practice for the simple reason that they have never been raised.
[7240] Main senses of “presumption”
There are two main senses in which the word “presumption”194 is used by lawyers, and the fact that they are closely connected with each other makes it all the more desirable to distinguish carefully between them. In the first place, a presumption sometimes means nothing more than a conclusion which must be drawn until the contrary is proved; secondly, and more frequently, it denotes a conclusion that a fact (conveniently called the “presumed fact”) exists which may or must be drawn if some other fact (conveniently called the “basic fact”) is proved or [page 326] admitted.195 The difference between the two uses of the term thus depends on the presence or absence of a fact which can constitute the basis of the presumption in question. Examples of the first sense are the presumption of innocence196 and the presumption of sanity in criminal cases.197 An example of the second sense is the presumption of sanity in testamentary cases, for that depends on proof of a basic fact — the execution of a rational will. Another example is the presumption of undue influence or that of advancement which depends upon proof of a specific relationship between the parties in question.198 The presumption of regularity whereby, upon proof of a public act, it will be presumed that the pre-conditions to the lawful performance of that act exist, falls somewhere between these two senses. Like the second sense it requires proof of the performance of the act whose validity is in issue; but in truth the presumption is merely a principle of expediency whereby it falls upon the impugning party to assert and justify the grounds of his attack.199 Further examples of the second sense in which the word “presumption” is used are the presumption of legitimacy, under which a child must be held to be legitimate on proof of birth during its mother’s wedlock; the presumption of the formal validity of a marriage which must be drawn on proof of the marriage ceremony; and the presumption of death arising from the fact that someone has not been heard of for seven years or more by those who would be likely to have heard of him. These are all conclusions which must be drawn in the absence of further evidence, but the dependence of each of them on proof of a basic fact distinguishes them from conclusions which are presumptions in the first sense.200
B — THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF PRESUMPTIONS Types of presumption [7245] Sources of difficulty It would be unreasonable to expect anything approaching neat precision in this area of the law. Indeed it has been the subject of an extraordinary catalogue of complaints. There are a number of reasons for this. The precise delimitation and distinction of basic fact and presumed fact is assumed by the approach indicated above, but often not realised in practice.201 This can mean that the same evidence rebuts both basic fact and presumed fact; for example, in the case of the presumption of death, evidence that the subject has been seen alive by a relative may rebut both one of the basic facts of the presumption, that the subject has not been [page 327] seen alive, and the presumed fact, that the subject is dead.202 This could cause serious problems where the legal burden of proving the basic fact of the presumption is on the proponent of death, and the legal burden of rebutting the presumed fact of death upon the opponent. Another example of overlapping between basic fact and presumed fact is provided by the presumption of legitimacy. The basic fact of that presumption is either the birth of a child to a married woman during wedlock, or its conception during wedlock. In one case, however, the child was born slightly more than nine months after the termination of a marriage by divorce.203 In order to establish the basic fact of the presumption of legitimacy it was accordingly necessary to rely upon a different and hitherto unrecognised presumption, the basic fact of which appeared to be the birth of a child within a possible period of gestation after the termination of a marriage, and the presumed fact that conception took place during the marriage.
[7250] Facts presumed from basic facts The ensuing discussion is confined to presumptions in the second main sense of the term used in [7240], for they play a much more important role in the law of evidence. The concern therefore is with conclusions that a presumed fact exists which may, or must, be drawn on proof of a basic fact and the words “may, or must,” give the clue to the orthodox classification of presumptions. This classification is largely the outcome of the deliberations of the civilians and canonists among whom the various types of presumption were much discussed. The division is into presumptions of fact (praesumptiones hominis) and presumptions of law. The latter may be irrebuttable (praesumptiones juris et de jure) or rebuttable (praesumptiones juris sed non de jure).204
Presumptions of fact [7255] Nature and illustrations Presumptions of fact are not true presumptions. They are merely frequently recurring examples of circumstantial evidence.205 Instances which have already been mentioned are the presumption of continuance,206 the presumption of guilty knowledge arising from the possession of recently stolen goods,207 the presumption that an act done by an apparently conscious person was done voluntarily208 and the presumption of unseaworthiness in the case of a vessel which founders shortly after leaving port.209 Further extensive illustration would be pointless, for the number of possible inferences of fact is very great, but one more famous example should be mentioned — the so-called presumption of intention in criminal law. [page 328] The criminal law punishes wicked acts. It regards wickedness as, in general, depending upon the mind of the accused when he did the act charged. What a man does is often the best evidence of the purpose he had in mind. The probability that harm will result from a man’s acts may be so great, and so apparent, that it compels an inference that he actually intended to do that harm. Nevertheless, intention is a state of mind. The circumstances and probable consequences of a man’s act are no more than evidence of his intention. For this reason this Court has often said that it is misleading to speak of a man being presumed always to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.210
Nevertheless this misleading connotation of the term “presumption” used in connection with ordinary processes of inferential reasoning has become so familiar that in most cases the word is hardly likely to be productive of great confusion. An evidentiary presumption means only that, without evidence one way or another, a particular state of affairs is accepted as fact because it is ordinary and universal experience that, save perhaps in extraordinary situations, it is always so. The practical effect of an evidentiary presumption, based as it is on ordinary and universal experience, is that it can only be displaced by credible evidence assigning a cause sufficient to explain what, if it happened at all, must be viewed as an extraordinary event.211
Presumptions of law [7260] Nature and illustrations Presumptions of law, on the other hand, are arbitrary in as much as they are applied to a basic fact situation without regard to the individual case. Thus a boy of 14 years and one day who is accused of rape is unable to shelter behind the presumption which provides an absolute defence for his younger accomplice.212 And neither of them would enjoy any protection in subsequent civil proceedings, in Tasmania at least.213 Likewise, where a person has been unheard of for only six years in circumstances which would otherwise raise a presumption of death after seven years, the plaintiff obtains no assistance from the presumption of death. In each such case the presumption is unavailable. The issue must be determined as an issue of fact and conclusions must be drawn from the facts in accordance with the normal principles of logic. Furthermore, as has been seen,214 where the basic facts before a tribunal entitle it to rely upon a presumption of fact it is not obliged to do so, even if no evidence to the contrary is put forward. The situation is otherwise in the case of presumptions of law. Once the basic fact is established the court must act upon it. The effect of the basic fact will depend upon the presumption in question. It may be that the law will admit no evidence to controvert the presumed fact, as in the case of an irrebuttable presumption. It may be that the establishing of the basic fact casts upon a party against whom it operates the task of bringing forward evidence to rebut the presumption but it does not disturb the ultimate burden or risk of non-persuasion. Finally, in some cases, the effect of the
operation of the presumption is to shift to the other party not only the evidential burden, but also the legal burden. In these last two situations the presumption is said to be a rebuttable presumption of law. [page 329] It is unfortunate that, in many of the cases in this area of law, the distinctions between presumptions of fact and rebuttable presumptions of law, on the one hand, and between the two types of rebuttable presumptions of law, on the other, have not been maintained. But the confusion does highlight the important fact that presumptions of law are convenient methods of proving elusive facts and that they are or ought to be well founded upon every day experience.
Irrebuttable presumptions of law [7265] Nature and illustrations Irrebuttable presumptions of law are rules of substantive law or procedure expressed in presumptive form. For example it is conclusively presumed that no child under a specified age215 can be guilty of an offence. A certificate of incorporation is conclusive evidence that all the requirements in respect of registration and of matters precedent and incidental thereto have been complied with and that the company referred to therein is duly registered.216 Such presumptions are most commonly created by statute but it does happen that parties to a contract bind themselves to accept the giving of a certificate as conclusive evidence of its contents.217 In these and all similar cases, there is a basic fact, and its establishment is legally equivalent to proof of the presumed fact. Another way of putting the same thing is to say that the conclusion that the presumed facts exist must be drawn,218 and all rebutting evidence is inadmissible.
Rebuttable presumptions of law [7270] Nature and illustrations
In the case of a rebuttable presumption of law, once the basic fact is established, the conclusion as to the existence of the presumed fact must be drawn in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Examples are provided by the presumption of sanity in testamentary cases and by innumerable instances of the application of the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. Whenever reliance is placed on a rebuttable presumption of law, two legal rules are involved. First, there is what may be termed the “rule of presumption”, according to which the presumed fact must be found to exist until evidence tending to disprove it is adduced, and, secondly, there is the rule which prescribes the amount of rebutting evidence required.
[7275] Relationship between presumption and probative value of basic fact The rule of presumption sometimes does little more than reflect the probative value of the basic fact. In the absence of further evidence, it would be highly unreasonable not to infer legitimacy from a child’s birth in wedlock. On the other hand, a rule of presumption may have the effect of increasing the probative value of the basic fact where there is no evidence contradicting such inferences as might be [page 330] drawn from it. In the case of the presumption of death, for example, there is no particular magic in seven years’ absence so far as the ordinary tests of probative value are concerned. A person who has been absent and unheard of by those who would be likely to hear from that person for six and a half years is, for all practical purposes, just as likely to be dead as someone who has been absent in similar circumstances for seven years; but seven years’ absence brings into play a rebuttable presumption of law, while absence for a shorter period merely gives rise to a more or less cogent presumption of fact that the person in question is dead. Reflections of this nature have led to the remark that “presumptions of law are nothing else than natural inferences or presumptions of fact which the law invests with an artificial or preternatural weight”.219 While this may often
be the case, it is by no means always the case. Some presumptions are clearly designed merely to resolve an impasse either of proof or of procedure. Thus the statutory presumption contained in s 184(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (Eng) and its Australian equivalents220 provides that where two or more persons have died in circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other, such deaths shall (subject to any order of the court), for all purposes affecting the title to property, be presumed to have occurred in order of seniority, and accordingly the younger shall be deemed to have survived the elder. In such a case the evidential value of the basic fact is non-existent, and the whole effect of the presumption is expended on the allocation of the burden of proof. It is, however, sometimes suggested that presumptions have an evidential effect in excess of the true probative worth of their basic fact and quite independent of their effect in allocating the burden of proof.221 Although it would be unreasonable, in the absence of any further evidence, not to infer legitimacy from a child’s birth in wedlock, the probative force of that fact is not such as of itself to warrant a finding of legitimacy in the face of evidence tending to show that it is more probable than not that the child is illegitimate, but, at least in civil cases, the presumption of legitimacy is only rebuttable by proof to the contrary beyond reasonable doubt. There is usually some justification on the ground of convenience in such artificial enhancement of the probative value of the basic facts of a rebuttable presumption of law. Murphy J propounded the view that the “justification for all presumptions is human experience of the association between the known and the presumed facts or circumstances”222 and said that any federal law creating a presumption without any “rational basis” was unconstitutional.223 He also said that there “is no justification for maintaining a presumption that if one fact is proved, then another exists, if common experience is to the contrary”.224 The former proposition is without other judicial support and the latter is belied by the [page 331] fact that presumptions serve many purposes besides reflecting common experience.225
[7280] Absence of inherent weight in presumptions Apart from that, and apart from the fact that to formulate a presumption is to place a burden of proof, once evidence is called the presumption has no inherent superadded weight: “Presumptions may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts”.226 Hence a presumption can no more be measured against evidence “than two and a half pounds of sugar can be weighed against half-past two in the afternoon”.227 As Morgan has said: To consider a compelled assumption as evidence or to weigh it with evidence seems to involve a mental operation impossible of practical comprehension, to say nothing of understandable exposition or explanation to a jury.228
It is submitted that Lord Reid’s words on the effect of the presumption of legitimacy are of more general application. Once evidence has been led it must be weighed without using the presumption as a make-weight in the scale for legitimacy. So even weak evidence against legitimacy must prevail if there is not other evidence to counter-balance it. The presumption will only come in at that stage in the very rare case of the evidence being so evenly balanced that the court is unable to reach a decision on it.229
If this is correct, and if the artificial force of presumptions is achieved by allocation of burden, it is hardly surprising to find that it is affected by other factors also directed to that end.230 This is most obvious in criminal cases, especially since [page 332] 1935.231 Although there is some older authority to the contrary232 it is hard to believe that since then a court233 would be prepared lightly to apply a common law presumption so as to cast a legal burden upon the accused in a criminal case.234 It is rare for an evidential burden to operate against the accused. An example is provided by a case in which the accused had been convicted of bigamously marrying Miss D during the life of his wife C. He had married A in 1864 and, in 1868, he was convicted of bigamously marrying B in A’s lifetime. The prosecution proved a formally valid marriage ceremony between the accused and C in 1879, together with a further marriage ceremony with D in 1880. The accused was therefore guilty of the offence charged in the indictment if he was validly
married to C. His defence was that this was not the case because A, who was alive in 1868, was still alive when he married C in 1879. The conviction was quashed because the jury had not been properly directed with regard to the burden of proof. To quote from the judgment of Lord Coleridge CJ:235 It is said, and I think rightly, that there is a presumption in favour of the validity of this latter marriage [the marriage to C], but the prisoner shewed that there was a valid marriage in 1864, and that the woman he then married was alive in 1868 … The common serjeant did not leave the question to the jury, but … held, that the burden of proof was on the prisoner, who was bound to adduce other or further evidence of the existence of his wife in 1879; … I am clearly of opinion that in this the learned common serjeant went beyond the rules of law. The prisoner was only bound to set up the life; it was for the prosecution to prove his guilt.
At one stage Lord Coleridge spoke of a conflict between the presumption of the validity of the 1879 ceremony and the presumption of continuance of A’s life, but this is a presumption of fact, a recurrent item of circumstantial evidence. The prosecution bore the legal burden of proving the validity of the 1879 ceremony, but the presumption of the validity of that marriage placed an evidential burden of raising the issue of its invalidity on the accused. He discharged this burden by “setting up” the life of A, and the jury should have been told that they could only decide the issue in favour of the Crown if they were sure that A was dead when Willshire married C.
[7285] Limitations on presumptions in criminal cases An illustration of the stringent modern approach in relation to the presumption of the lawfulness of official action, omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, is afforded by a case in which the accused, a policeman, was charged with negligently permitting the escape of two prisoners who were lawfully within his custody. The prosecution failed to offer formal evidence of the lawfulness of the custody. The accused submitted that there was no case to answer, but both trial judge and appellate court held that the prosecution could rely upon the presumption. The Privy Council rejected this view, holding that the courts will not presume the existence of facts which are [page 333]
central to an offence, and that when the liberty of the subject is involved there is no room for presumptions in favour of the Crown. It also expressed the view that: it would be contrary to fundamental principles of law that the onus should be upon a prisoner to rebut a presumption that he was being lawfully detained, which he could only do by the (notoriously difficult) process of proving a negative.236
It should be noted that when the issue is a central one, the prosecution will bear both an evidential and legal burden in relation to it, and the effect of the ruling is to deny even the provisional force of the presumption in such cases; that is to say, the presumption is insufficient to discharge the burden of adducing evidence to show the custody to have been lawful, and there should be a directed verdict in favour of the accused, in the absence of any other evidence on this issue.
[7290] Quantum of rebutting evidence Judicial statements concerning the amount of rebutting evidence required vary from presumption to presumption, and they sometimes differ with regard to the same presumption. In certain cases it is said that the presumption stands until “some” evidence to the contrary is given. In other cases it is said that the rebutting evidence must be “clear”, “strong”, or even “conclusive”. These variations suggest that it may be desirable to subdivide rebuttable presumptions of law according to the quantity of evidence required to rebut them, but they also suggest that it would be rash to expect anything in the nature of a precise classification.
The new classifications [7295] “Evidential” presumptions Some presumptions of law have the effect of evidence which is prima facie in the second sense mentioned above.237 If the basic fact is found to exist, the presumed fact must likewise be found to exist unless sufficient evidence to the contrary is adduced; if such evidence is adduced, the legal burden comes into play and will be decisive of the issue of the existence or otherwise of the presumed fact in the light of the whole of the evidence.238 An example is provided by the ordinary application of the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. If it becomes necessary to prove that a public
officer was duly appointed, one way of achieving this result, in the absence of a statutory provision limiting the mode of proof, would be to show that the public officer had acted in the requisite capacity. If, however, the party denying due appointment were to adduce evidence fit to be left to a jury tending to negative the appointment, the proponent of the issue would lose unless the tribunal of fact was satisfied to the requisite degree of persuasion that the officer was duly appointed. Further examples of this kind of presumption are afforded by the presumption of sanity in a testamentary case, and by the numerous statutes according to which fact A is stated to be prima facie evidence of fact B. One way of stating the effect of such presumptions is to say that they shift the evidential burden of proof, and Professor Glanville Williams refers to them as “evidential” presumptions.239 [page 334]
[7300] “Persuasive” or “compelling” presumptions In the case of some presumptions of law, the evidence in rebuttal must be sufficiently cogent to persuade the tribunal of fact of the non-existence of the presumed fact on the balance of probability, or even beyond reasonable doubt. Instances are provided by the presumption of legitimacy and possibly the presumption of the formal validity of a marriage. One way of describing the effect of such presumptions is to say that they shift the persuasive or legal burden of proof, and Professor Glanville Williams speaks of them as “persuasive” presumptions. Lord Denning describes the last-mentioned kind of presumption as “compelling”.240 He has no word for the other class of rebuttable presumption of law described by Professor Glanville Williams as “evidential”. Lord Denning speaks of irrebuttable presumptions of law as “conclusive” and of presumptions of fact as “provisional”. A presumption of fact is said by Lord Denning to cast a provisional — or, as it is sometimes termed, a “tactical”— burden of disproving the fact on the opponent of the issue.241 The merit of the new appellations is that they describe the legal effect of presumptions with greater precision than do the old ones.
[7305] Lord Denning’s analysis A criticism that can be made of Lord Denning’s analysis is that it fails to take account of the type of presumption which casts a burden of adducing evidence not provisionally, but absolutely, on the party against whom the presumption operates. If the party fails to discharge it, the court is obliged to find that the presumed fact exists, but, if the party does discharge it, the court may or may not find that the presumed fact exists, and the incidence of the legal burden will be decisive in the event of doubt. An example of this kind of presumption is provided by the presumption in favour of the essential validity of a marriage. It may be illustrated by the following decision of the High Court. In a maintenance action the appellant wife proved that she had gone through a ceremony of marriage with the respondent in January 1932. The respondent denied that the appellant was his lawful wife, alleging (a) that H, her husband by a prior marriage in 1911, was alive in 1923, when he deserted the appellant, and (b) that H should be presumed to have survived to 1932, thus constituting an impediment to the respondent’s marriage in 1932. The justices of the peace considered the evidentiary effect of these conflicting presumptions and held in favour of the wife. In their opinion the husband, to rebut the presumption of marriage, must adduce “strict proof” of the continued existence of the former husband. The High Court agreed that the justices were entitled to make or not to make the inference of continued life urged by the husband, but the court was not satisfied that they had given full weight to this presumption in the circumstances and the matter was sent back for a rehearing. The Chief Justice said: The justices … considered that, the complainant having proved her marriage to the defendant, it was for the defendant to satisfy the court that the former husband was still alive. But it was for the complainant to establish upon a balance of probabilities, after all
[page 335] the evidence had been duly considered, that she was the wife of the defendant. If the justices were left in a state of doubt as to whether or not she was the wife of the defendant, no order should have been made in favour of the complainant.242
The presumption of essential validity of the marriage was successfully
raised by the wife, but this is not what Lord Denning describes as a provisional presumption, because it only obliged the justices to decide in her favour on the issue of essential validity until some evidence was called by the husband in reply, setting up the life of her former spouse. When he had done this, the legal burden of establishing the continuance of the life was not on him, for the justices were entitled to dismiss the complaint even if they had a suspicion that the former husband was dead in 1932, provided they were left in a state of doubt on the matter. Therefore the presumption is not what Lord Denning would describe as a compelling one.
[7310] Other classifications It is submitted that the most satisfactory categories for rebuttable presumptions of law would be “conclusive”, “persuasive”, “evidential” and “provisional” but it is not suggested that there is any sign that these categories will supersede the older ones in practice. There are a number of other classifications which could be employed. Presumptions might, for instance, be divided into those which exist at common law, in equity or by virtue of various statutes, but there is no need for any discussion of these other classifications in a work of this nature. Occasional use is made of Professor Williams’ terminology in the course of this chapter; but it should be borne in mind that the distinction between an evidential and a persuasive presumption is irrelevant in criminal cases and liable to be nebulous in civil proceedings. Proof of the basic facts of a common law presumption can cast no more than an evidential burden onto the accused and nothing less than a legal burden on to the prosecution. If someone charged with incest with his daughter contends that, though conceived and born in wedlock, she is the child of another man, it is difficult to believe that any court would hold it to be incumbent on him to do more than adduce such evidence as would suggest a reasonable possibility of illegitimacy. If, on the other hand, the prosecution were to contend that, though born during the accused’s wife’s marriage to another man, the girl was in reality the accused’s daughter, the judge should withdraw the case from the jury if the prosecution could do no more by way of rebuttal of the presumption of legitimacy than prove
statements by the accused to the effect that the girl was his child.243 The new classifications of presumptions at least have the merit of drawing attention to the existence of more than one kind of rebuttable presumption of law. This is something which is obscured by some codes of evidence. According to r 301 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence: In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by act of Congress or by these Rules, a presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
[page 336] There does not seem to be any good reason for including a provision about presumptions in a code of evidence. They are scattered throughout the law, and endeavours to state their effect on burdens in inflexible terms are foredoomed to failure.
C — CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS Mutually cancelling presumptions [7315] Instances It has already been pointed out that the orthodox classification of presumptions is to some extent the outcome of discussions which took place among the civilians and canonists. These discussions went to minute detail, and they were much concerned with the relative strengths of the various presumptions. To a common lawyer, the conclusions at which the civilians arrived sometimes appear to have amounted to “the substitution of arithmetic for observation and reasoning when estimating the value of evidence”244 and they were wholly unsuited to the atmosphere of a trial at common law. A pale replica of the civilians’ discussions is to be found in an occasional allusion by judges to the subject of conflicting presumptions; but such allusions amount to nothing more than the recognition of the fact that, in certain situations, rebuttable presumptions of law cancel each
other out. Where the court was invited by the parties to draw an inference as to a matter upon which there was no direct evidence, namely that the first spouse was, or was not, alive at the date of the second marriage, since the presumption in favour of the later marriage was cancelled out by the presumption in favour of the survival of the first spouse, the issue became one of fact unaffected by presumptions of law and the legal burden resting upon the claimant was decisive.245 Another case246 was a next of kin inquiry where the widow had married the deceased in 1959. She had been previously married in 1939 to a man whom she believed to have died in 1945, although there was no direct evidence of his death. The claimants were to share in the intestate estate of the deceased included the widow, and it was therefore necessary for her to establish the death of her first spouse prior to 1959. The contest was then the familiar one between the presumption of validity of the 1959 marriage and the presumption of continuance of the life of the first spouse. McInerney J referred, with approval, to an article by Morgan.247 It was argued that the solution to a conflict of presumptions lies in an examination of the social policy behind the presumptions themselves, so that that presumption which rests upon the weightier reasons should prevail. He observed that the facts giving rise to the presumptions and the presumptions themselves are merely part of the evidentiary material before the court and should be assessed like any other evidence. In the result, the presumption of validity of the marriage was held to outweigh the presumption of continuance of life, so that the widow had discharged the legal burden resting upon her. [page 337] It is too early to predict with confidence whether this approach will be favoured in other Australian courts, but it does seem clear from McInerney J’s judgment that, in reaching the conclusion that he did, he took into account such evidence as was before him as to the antenuptial relationship between the widow and the deceased and the mores of the community at the time. In view of this it would not be accurate to conclude that the learned judge was seeking to establish an absolute
hierarchy of presumptions, which would be available as a rule of thumb to resolve all such conflicts.
D — CONCLUSION Specific presumptions and statutory provisions [7320] Specific presumptions In editions of this work up to and including the 4th Australian edition there was discussion of the presumption of legitimacy, the presumption of marriage, the presumption of death and the presumption of negligence in cases to which the maxim res ipsa loquitur is applied.248 The interested reader is referred to that discussion. The collection and analysis of the other innumerable presumptions that are scattered throughout the length and breadth of the substantive law would be utterly beyond the compass of this work, and would in any event constitute what Thayer described as “an unprofitable and monstrous task”.249 These other presumptions are best considered under the particular rubric of the substantive law to which they happen to belong. Another presumption of some generality, that based on the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta250, has already been mentioned in Chapter 1, “Introduction”, where references to some of the more common presumptions which are “presumptions of fact” within the orthodox classification will also be found.251 The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), the 2001(Tas), Evidence 2008 (Vic), Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) do not affect the operation of legal and evidential presumptions that are not inconsistent with each Act.252
[7325] Criminal Code Act The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Ch 2, Pt 2.6, Div 13 makes provision in relation to the burden of proof in criminal cases. By s 2.2, that Division, together with the rest of Ch 2, applies to offences against the laws of the Commonwealth. The provisions relating to burden of proof are as follows: 13.1 (1) The prosecution bears a legal burden of proving every element of an offence relevant to the guilt of the person charged.
Note: See section 3.2 on what elements are relevant to a person’s guilt. (2) The prosecution also bears a legal burden of disproving any matter in relation to which the defendant has discharged an evidential burden of proof imposed on the defendant.
[page 338] (3) In this Code: legal burden, in relation to a matter, means the burden of proving the existence of the matter. 13.3 (1) Subject to section 13.4, a burden of proof that a law imposes on a defendant is an evidential burden only. (2) A defendant who wishes to deny criminal responsibility by relying on a provision of Part 2.3 (other than section 7.3) bears an evidential burden in relation to that matter. (3) A defendant who wishes to rely on any exception, exemption, excuse, qualification or justification provided by the law creating an offence bears an evidential burden in relation to that matter. The exception, exemption, excuse, qualification or justification need not accompany the description of the offence. (4) The defendant no longer bears the evidential burden in relation to a matter if evidence sufficient to discharge the burden is adduced by the prosecution or by the court. (5) The question whether an evidential burden has been discharged is one of law. (6) In this Code: evidential burden, in relation to a matter, means the burden of adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the matter exists or does not exist. 13.4 A burden of proof that a law imposes on the defendant is a legal burden if and only if the law expressly: (a) specifies that the burden of proof in relation to the matter in question is a legal burden; or (b) requires the defendant to prove the matter; or (c) creates a presumption that the matter exists unless the contrary is proved. 13.6 A law that allows the prosecution to make an averment is taken not to allow the prosecution: (a) to aver any fault element of an offence; or (b) to make an averment in prosecuting for an offence that is directly punishable by imprisonment. 1 A K R Kiralfy (ed), The Burden of Proof, 1987. 2 For certain purposes, questions of burden and
standard of proof fall within the expression “practice and procedure”: Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 at [117]–[131]. 3 For example, the presumption of innocence is simply another way of saying the burden of proving the guilt of the accused is unconditionally allocated to the prosecution. 4 Perhaps insufficient attention is paid to what was said in Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467 at 489 and 497–8 about the need for particulars. 5 Maloney v R (2013) 298 ALR 308 at [355]. 6 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 355. 7 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 355.
8
Though surprisingly little attention is bestowed upon the critical matter of the precise discrimination of issues. 9 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 355. 10 In addition to Thayer, Ch 9, reference should be made to J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn Rev, 1981, vol 9 [3485]–[3489]; J Stone, “Burden of Proof and the Judicial Process: A Commentary on Joseph Constantine Steamship Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd” (1944) 60 LQR 262; A T Denning, “Presumptions and Burdens” (1945) 61 LQR 379; N Bridge, “Presumptions and Burdens” (1949) 12 MLR 273 (a reply to Lord Denning); G L Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part, 2nd ed, 1961, Ch 23; Sir Francis Adams, “Onus of Proof and Criminal Cases” in R S Clark (ed), Essays on Criminal Law in New Zealand, 1971; C R Williams, “Placing the Burden of Proof” in L Waller and E Campbell (eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982 and “Burdens and Standards in Civil Litigation” (2003) 25 Syd LR 165; and Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Proceedings (Parliamentary Paper No 319, 1982). 11 See Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164, where it was also pointed out that the distinction between the two principal burdens was recognised in Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 200 at 218, and Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99 at 118. Lord Denning’s views stated in “Presumptions and Burdens” (1945) 61 LQR 379 are repeated in Emmanuel v Emmanuel [1946] P 115 (CA); Dunn v Dunn [1949] P 98 (CA); Tilley v Tilley [1949] P 240 (CA); Smithwick v National Coal Board [1950] 2 KB 335 (CA); Re Shephard; Shephard v Cartwright [1953] Ch 728 (CA) (the decision was reversed by the House of Lords in Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431, but without reference to Lord Denning’s views on presumptions and burdens); Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182 (CA) (the decision was reversed by the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218 without reference to Lord Denning’s views on presumptions and burdens); Huyton-with-Roby UDC v Hunter [1955] 2 All ER 398 (CA); Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd [1960] 1 All ER 577; Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 413; Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corp v Wright [1971] 2 All ER 1028 (CA). Professor Glanville Williams’ distinction between the persuasive and evidential burdens was adopted in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered by Edmund Davies J in R v Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688 and in Henderson v Henry E Jenkins & Sons [1970] AC 282 at 301. Lord Pearson distinguished the “evidential burden of proof” from the “formal, or legal or technical burden of proof”; but he spoke of the evidential burden in terms of Lord Denning’s provisional burden and doubted the propriety of calling it a burden of proof. The terminology of probative and evidential burden, having been used in the Court of Appeal by Bridge J, was repeated without question by the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182. 12 Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [6-06]. 13 N Bridge, “Presumptions and Burdens” (1949) 12 MLR 274. 14 Devlin J in Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277 at 284; Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 414. 15 Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182; R v Bennett (1978) 68 Cr App R 168. 16 Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618. 17 Bristow v Drake Street Inc 41 F 3d 345 at 353 (7th Cir 1994) per Judge Posner. 18 Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1 at [665]. 19 Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [6-02]. 20 The High Court has described it as the burden of proof in the sense of introducing evidence: Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164. However, in Brady v Group Lotus Car Cos plc [1987] 2 All ER 674 at 687, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC said: “In my experience every time the phrase ‘evidential burden’ is used it leads to error”. 21 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn Rev, 1981, vol 9 [2487]. 22 Vasquez v R [1994] 3 All ER 674 (PC).
23 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1. See also R v Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547 (CCA), applying the same
doctrine to self-defence; Bullard v R [1957] AC 635 at 642; Rolle v R [1965] 3 All ER 582 (PC). See also R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 at 459. 24 R v Bonnick (1977) 66 Cr App R 266 (self-defence). See also Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1; R v Hamand (1985) 82 Cr App Rep 65. 25 R v Campbell (1986) 84 Cr App R 255. 26 Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182; R v Brown (1975) 10 SASR 139 (CCA); R v McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926 (CCA). 27 Sutton v Sadler (1857) 3 CB(NS) 87 at 98–9. See also Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164. The word “mere” is equivalent to “pure”. The presumption was treated as a mixed presumption of law and fact (whatever that may mean). If it had been one of law alone, it might have cast the legal burden on the plaintiff. 28 Quoted in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 465–6. See Anthony Hooper, “Fair Trial: ‘One Golden Thread’ ” in (eds) L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry, The Judicial House of Lords 1876–2009, 2009, p 613. 29 Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 at 625; Vasquez v R [1994] 3 All ER 674 (PC). 30 Sir Francis Adams in Clark (ed), Essays on Criminal Law in New Zealand, 1971, pp 70–1. 31 Parker v R (1963) 111 CLR 610 at 632; R v Wheeler [1967] 3 All ER 829 (CA); Lee Chun-Chuen v R [1963] AC 220; R v Acott [1997] 1 All ER 706 (PC) (provocation); Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386; R v Carter [1959] VR 105; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 3–5; Woodbridge v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 503 (non-insane automatism); Chan Kau v R [1955] AC 206 (PC) (self-defence and provocation) following Latour v R [1951] SCR 19 and HM Advocate v Doherty 1954 SC (J) 1; R v Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547 (CCA) (selfdefence); R v Smyth [1963] VR 737; R v Bone [1968] 2 All ER 644 (CA) and Van den Hoek v R (1986) 161 CLR 158 (duress); R v Guerin [1967] 1 NSWR 255 (CCA) (provocation); R v Stones [1956] SR (NSW) 25 (CCA) (drunkenness not amounting to insanity); R v Joyce [1970] SASR 184 (CCA); R v Moon [1969] 3 All ER 803 (CA); R v Hinz [1972] Qd R 272 (CCA); R v Abraham [1973] 3 All ER 694 (CA); Griffiths v R (1994) 125 ALR 545 (accident, though negating this may well always be for the prosecution rather than being a “defence”). For confusion as to where the burden of proof lay when rape was pleaded as a defence to adultery, see Redpath v Redpath [1950] 1 All ER 600 (CA); Orchard v Orchard (1972) 3 SASR 89 at 97 (FC). An example of legislation casting only an evidential burden on one party without affecting the legal burden on the other is discussed in Francis v Stevens [1983] 1 VR 260 (document in statutory form tendered as prima facie evidence of its contents imposes only evidentiary burden). For English statutes, see Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [6-12]. The evidential burden of proving impossibility is on the defence: R v Bennett (1978) 68 Cr App R 168 at 177 (CA). In New South Wales the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused did not act in self-defence: Crimes Act 1900 s 419. 32 See He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 at 534–5 and 593. See also R v Sheehan (1999) 153 FLR 326;CTM v R (2008) 236 CLR 440. Before He KawTeh v R, weighty dicta could be marshalled both in support of and in opposition to this proposition. Contrast, eg in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, Lord Pearce at 158; 357–8 (onus on accused) with Lord Diplock at 164; 362–3 (onus on Crown). Against the proposition: Maher v Musson (1934) 52 CLR 100; Bergin v Stack (1953) 88 CLR 248; R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381 at 389, 396, 410; R v Martin [1963] Tas SR 103 per Crawford J (dissenting) at 134–40; Zarb v Kennedy (1968) 121 CLR 283. For the proposition: R v Martin [1963] Tas SR 103 (CCA); R v Strawbridge [1970] NZLR 909 (CA) (apparently citing Lord Pearce’s speech in Sweet’s case in mistake for that of Lord Diplock); Kidd v Reeves [1972] VR 563 (FC); R v Brown (1975) 10 SASR 139 (CCA); Holt v Cameron (1979) 22 SASR 321 at 323–4, and cases there cited. The position is complicated in some States by provisions of the Criminal Code. See eg Queensland Criminal Code s 24, which places the onus on
the Crown: Loveday v Ayre [1955] St R Qd 264 (FC); see also Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 at 12, 22–3 (FC); Geraldton Fishermen’s Co-op v Munro [1963] WAR 129 at 134–5 (FC). The imposition of the burden upon the Crown in rape cases may be traced to the mingling of this issue with lack of consent. See Snow v R [1962] Tas SR 271 (CCA); R v Bourke (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 793 (CCA); R v Sperotto (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334 (CCA). The position is otherwise in bigamy cases: R v Bonnor [1957] VR 227. See generally C Howard, “Strict Responsibility in the High Court of Australia” (1960) 76 LQR 547 and C R Williams, “Placing the Burden of Proof”, in L Waller and E Campbell (eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982, pp 286–8, where there is full citation of authority. 33 See generally C R Williams, “Placing the Burden of Proof”, in L Waller and E Campbell (eds),Well and Truly Tried, 1982. 34 J P Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence as Administered in England and Ireland, 12th ed, 1931, [365]. 35 Sutton v Sadler (1857) 3 CB(NS) 87. Taylor’s test was applied by Farwell LJ in Talbot v Von Boris [1911] 1 KB 854 at 863 (CA), but the court was there concerned with the evidential burden (see per Kennedy LJ at 866). The test is based on Amos v Hughes (1835) 1 M & Rob 464, and is supported by Bowen LJ in Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 at 457 (CA), where, however, the different burdens are not distinguished. 36 J D Finlaison (ed), Wills on the Law of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 3rd ed, 1938, p 29. 37 See G L Williams, “Evidential Burdens on the Defence” (1977) 127 NLJ 182. 38 Tsang King-Nam v R [1981] 1 WLR 1462 (PC). 39 R v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306, holding that some medical evidence must be adduced before the defence of diminished responsibility can be left with a jury. 40 R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325 (CCA). 41 R v Coughlan (1976) 63 Cr App R 33. 42 Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 657. 43 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1 (provocation); Chan Kau v R [1955] AC 206 (provocation and selfdefence); R v Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547 (CCA) (self-defence); Director of Public Prosecutions v Walker [1974] 1 WLR 1090 (PC) (no need to leave self-defence to the jury where no evidence that it was necessary); R v Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688 (CCA) (duress); R v Bone [1968] 2 All ER 644 (CA) (duress); Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 215–16 (automatism); R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 at 88 (intoxication); Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601 at 607 (provocation); Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88 at 95, 117, 146 and 147–8 (self-defence); R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 (CCA) (duress); Spautz v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506 at 534 (qualified privilege as defence to criminal defamation); He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 at 534–5 and 593 (honest and reasonable mistake); R v Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 (necessity/duress). For a fuller list of English cases, see Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [6-04]; and for a fuller list both of English and Australian cases, see C R Williams, “Placing the Burden of Proof”, in L Waller and E Campbell (eds),Well and Truly Tried, 1982, pp 288–9. The evidential burden of raising provocation is on the accused, and the legal burden of disproving it is on the prosecution, in the Code States (Van den Hoek v R (1986) 161 CLR 158 at 162, approving Sreckovic v R [1973] WAR 85 at 90 (CCA)); compare Johnson v R (1976) 136 CLR 619 (a decision reversed in New South Wales by s 23(4) of the Crimes Act 1900, inserted in 1982). 44 See eg R v John [1974] 2 All ER 561 (CA). 45 See per Lord Devlin in Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 at 624 (PC); see R v Newcastle Justices; Ex parte Hindle [1984] 1 All ER 770 (DC of QBD) (drink imbibed after accident but before breathtest), and also R v Thornton (1967, unreported) (Northern Ireland case), discussed by E Comerton, “Automatism and the Criminal Justice Act 1966” (1968) 19 NILQ 60; R v Zecevic [1986] VR 797 at 802 (FC); and R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 3 (NSW CCA). The preceding two sentences in the text were quoted with approval in Kerrison v Official Trustee (1990) 27 FCR 272 at
277 (FC). 46 F B Adams, Criminal Onus and Exculpations, 1968, [3]. 47 G L Williams, “The Evidential Burden: Some Common Misapprehensions” (1977) 127 NLJ 156 at 157–8. 48 R v Johnson [1961] 3 All ER 969 (CCA), cited by Sir Francis Adams and R N Gooderson in Alibi, 1971, p 23, does not turn on the evidential burden because the judge was held to have misdirected the jury by suggesting that the accused bore the legal burden, but the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal contains the suggestion that alibi should be treated in the same way as self-defence and provocation. See Sir Rupert Cross’s Rede lecture, The Golden Thread of the English Criminal Law, 1976, 12–13. 49 What appears to have been the view of the majority in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182, that the prosecution bears the evidential burden with regard to the accused’s belief and consent, might be cited in support of Professor Williams, but the Court of Appeal had trailed a red herring by referring to the evidential burden when the point at issue was one of substantive law. The incidence of the evidential burden was irrelevant to the decision of the majority of the House of Lords. Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 decides that the accused bears the evidential burden on the issue of non-insane automatism although the plea could be said to be no more than a means of contradicting the prosecution’s allegations, already before the jury, of actus reus and mens rea. Moreover Lord Kilmuir LC said (Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 405) that the accused bears the evidential burden with regard to accident. See also R v Bennett (1978) 68 Cr App R 168, placing an evidential burden on the accused with regard to impossibility in a conspiracy case. 50 Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 417 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. 51 Re Dunlop Holdings Ltd’s Application [1979] RPC 523 (CA). 52 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn Rev, 1981, vol 9 [2486]. 53 Dickinson v Minister of Pensions [1953] 1 QB 228 at 232. 54 Currie v Dempsey (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 116 at 125 (FC); Stewart v Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd [1974] VR 24 at 28 (FC); Murray’s Transport NSW Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd (2013) 118 SASR 11 at [6]–[8]. 55 Soward v Leggatt (1836) 7 C & P 613. 56 On the difficulties of proving a negative, see J R Gulson, Philosophy of Proof, 2nd ed, 1923, pp 72–3. Generally speaking, negative facts are not observed to the same extent as positive ones — it is easier to find a witness to swear there was a clock in the room than to say that no clock was there. “Negative evidence, therefore, is always in some sort circumstantial or indirect, and the difficulty of proving the negative lies in discovering a fact or series of facts inconsistent with the fact which we are seeking to disprove, from which it may be possible to infer its absence with anything like an approach to certainty” (op cit p 153). Though true of some of the instances in which the law requires a negative to be proved, for example, absence of fault, this is not true of all of them, for example, absence of consent; nor is the difficulty so acute in cases where it is possible to use a computer to establish a negative averment. See eg United States v Greenlee 517 F 2d 889 (1975). As to proving a motor vehicle was uninsured, see Nominal Defendant v Dunstan (1963) 109 CLR 143. As to the probative value of “negative” evidence, see R v City of Doncaster & Templestowe; Ex parte Mayor [1971] VR 466. As to the amount of evidence which is required to discharge the burden, see Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corp (1985) 1 NSWLR 561 at 565. See too [9100] ff. 57 R v Horn (1912) 7 Cr App R 200; R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 (CCA). 58 Toleman v Portbury (1870) LR 5 QB 288. 59 Williams v East India Co (1802) 3 East 192. 60 Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 at 457 (CA); aff’d Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1886) 11 App Cas 247. See also Crowley v Glissan (No 2) (1905) 2 CLR 744 at 754.
61 Beck v Cavaiulo (1972) 8 SASR 288; cf Van Velzen v Wagener (1975) 10 SASR 549 (FC). As to
the burden of proof in a claim that the plaintiff has failed to mitigate his loss, see Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 (CA). As to claims of pre-existing disability, see Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164. 62 Smith v Butler [1900] 1 QB 694 at 699 (CA); Fileman v Liddle (1974) 2 BPR 9192 at 9202–3 (NSWSC). 63 Inglis v Moore (No 2) (1979) 25 ALR 453 at 464–5 (Fed C of A); Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (formerly Sacs Group Pty Ltd) (1993) 113 ALR 637 at 639; sub nom Halliday v Sacs Group Pty Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 678 at 679–80; Ernst & Young v Tynski Pty Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 433 at [35]. 64 Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 at 474; Smart v Allen (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 241 at 244–5; Industrial Equity Ltd v G & C Consolidated Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 456 at 458–9; Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 212–13 (CA); Massoud v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1995) 62 NSWLR 657 at 658–60 (NSWSC); Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Beard (1999) 47 NSWLR 735 at [11]; Blanch t/as Hicksons v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 653;Warner v Hung (No 2) (2011) 297 ALR 56 at [46]–[47]. Earlier English authorities are to the contrary: Allen v Bone (1841) 4 Beav 493; Hood v Phillips (1842) 6 Beav 176; Pinner v Knights (1843) 6 Beav 174; Maries v Maries (1853) 23 LJ Ch 154. 65 Australian Gas Light Co v ACCC (2003) 137 FCR 317 at [355]–[356]. 66 Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1942] AC 154. 67 J Stone, “Burden of Proof and the Judicial Process: A Commentary on Joseph Constantine Steamship Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd” (1941) 60 LQR 262 at 278. 68 Heydon v Perpetual Executors Trustees & Agency Co (WA) Ltd (1930) 45 CLR 111 at 113; Joaquin v Hall [1976] VR 788; Jenkins v Wynen [1992] 1 Qd R 40 at 43–4; Motor Auction Pty Ltd v John Joyce Wholesale Cars Pty Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 647 at 660 (NSWSC); Coshott v Sakic (1998) 44 NSWLR 667 at 671; White v Shortall (2006) 60 ACSR 654 at [16]; (to the contrary see Seldon v Davidson [1968] 2 All ER 755 (CA); Re Matthews [1993] 2 NZLR 91 at 94). 69 Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560. 70 Tozer Kemsley & Milbourn (A’Asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384; Fankhauser v Mark Dykes Pty Ltd [1960] VR 376 (FC); Coldman v Hill [1919] 1 KB 443 (CA); Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros [1937] 1 KB 534 (CA) and cases there cited; Hunt & Winterbotham (West of England) Ltd v BRS Parcels Ltd [1962] 1 QB 617 (CA); Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694 (CA). This is so whether the bailment be gratuitous or for reward: Port Swettenham Authority v TWWu and Co (M) Sdn Bhd [1979] AC 580 at 590. 71 Sodeman v R (1936) 55 CLR 192; M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200 (HL); R v Smith (1910) 6 Cr App R 19. For criticism see G L Williams, Criminal Law (The General Part), 2nd ed, 1961, p 516. As to Queensland, see the Criminal Code s 26. 72 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 (CCA). 73 Coshott v Sakic (1998) 44 NSWLR 667 at 672 (CA). 74 C K Allen, Legal duties and other essays in jurisprudence, 1931, p 253. 75 The burden of proving facts relevant to sentence on which the prosecution wishes to rely rests on the prosecution: R v Pemberton [1983] Crim LR 121 (CA) and [9045]. For the possibility of a view different from that stated in the text, see the citations in Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1 at [54] nn 105–110. 76 Coffin v United States 156 US 432 (1895) discussed by J B Thayer in A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, App B. See now Taylor v Kentucky (1978) 436 US 478 at 483. 77 Palmer v R (1992) 64 A Crim R 1 at 6–7; Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 at [13]. 78 Howe v R (1980) 32 ALR 478. Similarly, non-party witnesses are not presumed to be of good character: Cheatley v R [1981] Tas R 123 (CCA).
79 Robinson v R (No 2) (1991) 180 CLR 531 at 535–6. See also R v Wilson [1992] 2 Qd R 174
(CCA); R v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 at 98–9; Stafford v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510; Ramey v R (1994) 68 ALJR 917; R v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 (NSWCCA); R v Brown [1995] 1 Qd R 287 (CA); Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [70] and [102]–[103]; R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636 at 655–6 (CA); R v McKellin [1998] 4 VR 757 at 762 (CA); R v Haggag (1998) 101 A Crim R 593 (Vic CA); Rowbottom v R (2003) 142 A Crim R 513; R v Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616; R v McMahon (2004) 8 VR 101 at [27]–[29]; Etherton v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 65; R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407 at [90]; De Rosa v Western Australia (2006) 162 A Crim R 344; Morris v R (2006) 201 FLR 325; Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257. These cases apply to judicial directions. In Queensland there is division on whether the prosecution is also debarred from comment: R v Ellem (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 549 (CA). In the ACT they have been applied to the prosecution: Seivers v R (2010) 173 ACTR 19. It is permissible and desirable to warn a jury in a case where one co-accused gives evidence inculpating another that, in considering the case against the second coaccused, caution should be exercised in relying on that evidence alone to convict the second coaccused because the first co-accused has interests of his own to serve: R v Webb (1992) 59 SASR 563 at 583–4 (CCA); R v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542 at 554-5 (CCA);Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 65. See Gans J, “Directions on the Accused’s Interest in the Outcome of theTrial” (1997) 21 Crim LJ 273. 80 R v Coulston [1997] 2 VR 446 at 458 (CA). 81 R v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540 (CA); F v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 512 (NSW CCA); R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 at 461–6 (CCA); R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 at 521, 531 and 535 (CCA); R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at 9–10 and 42–3 (disapproving R v Rodriguez [1998] 2 VR 167 (CA)); R v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575 (CCA); Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380 at [20]–[22] and [126]–[137]; CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304 at [126]–[132]. Cf R v T [1998] 2 NZLR 257 (CA); R v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659 (CA); R v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784 at 787–90 (CA); R v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862 (CA); R v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113 at 144–5; R v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 at [47]–[48]; R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 365–7; Doe v R (2008) 187 A Crim R 328 at [58]–[60]; R v Abdulla (2010) 200 A Crim R 365 at [46]–[55]; DS v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 235. These principles apply only to jury directions, not to trial by judge alone: J McPhee & Son (Aust) Pty Ltd Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532 at 559. If a direction is to be impugned in relation to what it said about a motive to lie, the offending passage must have given the issue prominence or legitimacy: see R v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310 at [34]. 82 R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 at 521–2, 531–2 and 535 (CCA); Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at 6–12 and 42–3. But it is not necessary in every case to give a direction whenever there have been questions as to specific motives which the jury are being asked to reject: R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567. However, a direction was held necessary where an invitation by the prosecutor to reject a reason for the complainant to lie advanced by defence counsel might, if accepted, have caused the jury to think that the complainant’s evidence was more credible: R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567. A Palmer direction need not be given where motive is not a central issue: R v Huynh (2006) 165 A Crim R 586. 83 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at 7 and 42-3. See also Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at 116–17 and 145; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71. Cf R v T [1998] 2 NZLR 257 (CA);R v B [2003] 1 WLR 2809 (CA). See [17485] n 807. 84 Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606 at 616; R v O’Neill (2003) 7 VR 408 at [24]–[25]. Police interviewers may ask the question, but if the answer is not an admission the question and answer may be inadmissible at the trial: R v SAP; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] 1 Qd R 367; R v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501. See also R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228 at [62]; Deriz v R (1999) 109 A Crim R 329 at [101]–[108]. 85 R v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 at [84]–[93].
86 R v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568 at [28]. 87 Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 at 515; Selig v Hayes (1989) 52 SASR 169 at 171; R v Laz
[1998] 1 V R 453 at 465 (CA); R v Morley (1999) 107 A Crim R 538 (WA FC); R v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 at [58]–[60]; R v Woods (2008) 102 SASR 422 at [36]–[38]; R v KDY (2008) 185 A Crim R 270 at [25]–[30]; R v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55 at [39]–[43]; R v Tran (2011) 109 SASR 595. See also [9020] n 23; Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at [9]–[16]; R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410 at [219]–[234]; R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526. 88 R v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1. 89 R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71 at [28]. 90 R v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155 at [65]–[66]; R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [45]. 91 R v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55 at [36]–[37]. 92 Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237. 93 See M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200 and Taylor v R (1978) 22 ALR 599 at 613 (Fed C of A FC). The Code States have a similar presumption: Qld: Criminal Code s 26; Tas: Criminal Code s 15; WA: Criminal Code s 26: see R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 (WA Criminal Code). 94 See Sutton v Sadler (1857) 3 CB(NS) 87. 95 Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 407 and 413. 96 This is a manifestation of the task of the tribunal of fact to determine the veracity of a witness. The expression “presumption of sanity” in that context is at best unhelpful and very often misleading: R v Anderson (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 (NSW CCA), discussed by B Fischer, “The Presumption of Sanity in Relation to Witnesses” (1993) 10 Aust Bar Rev 86. 97 See [1180] above. 98 For example Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 606 (where statutory defences are available in respect of acts having a designated connection with the actual or intended course of official duty, the onus of establishing the connection will, in the absence of contrary legislative intention, rest on the defendant). 99 Talbot v Von Boris [1911] 1 KB 854 at 866 (CA); Hall v Featherstone (1858) 3 H & N 284; Douglas v Tiernan (1931) 32 SR (NSW) 149 at 151 (FC); Trimble v Thorne [1914] VLR 41 at 51 (FC). See also Crawford Earthmovers Pty Ltd v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 116 (FC) as to the nature of “proof to the contrary” of deemed ownership of a motor vehicle. 100 For the commercial justification of the law on this subject, see Alderson B in Elkin v Janson (1845) 13 M & W 655 at 664. 101 Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39; Jones v Hayes [1953] VLR 363. As to the difficulties raised by this provision, see Ex parte O’Sullivan; Re Craig (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 291 (FC). See also Brady v Thornton (1947) 75 CLR 140. 102 Brady v Thornton (1947) 75 CLR 140 at 146. 103 Jambajimba v Svikart (1984) 71 FLR 287 (NT); Charlton v Rogers; Ex parte Charlton (1985) 82 FLR 40 (Qld); Gallagher v Lendak [1988] VR 731 at 738–9. 104 Macarone v McKone; Ex parte Macarone [1986] 1 Qd R 284. 105 See W Paul, “The ‘Averment of the Prosecutor’ in Criminal Charges” (1940) 14 ALJ 4, K A Anderson, “Averments” (1945) 19 ALJ 102 and R Else-Mitchell, “Note on Averments” (1945) 19 ALJ 178; Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Proceedings (Parliamentary Paper No 319, 1982) Ch 7. For an example of the operation of an averment provision in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), see R v Governor of the Metropolitan Gaol [1963] VR 61, and as to an averment provision in the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 255, see Simmons v Venning (1971) 1 SASR 403. 106 Baxter v AhWay (1909) 10 CLR 212 at 216 (note that the provision in the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 255 there discussed was subsequently amended). As to such provisions being within constitutional power, see Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307. Federal Parliament cannot create a valid law upon a subject matter of legislative power by creating a statutory fiction, and
hence Parliament cannot conclusively assert that a person has committed an act which is within a head of constitutional power (Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169), sometimes because it bears too remote a connection with the head of power (210–11), sometimes because it contravenes Ch III of the Constitution on the basis that it is inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power that the courts be required to make findings of fact, guilt or liability on proof of facts from which those conclusions do not rationally follow, but only on the basis of a legislative conclusion which is unexaminable judicially (214). 107 R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 at 507. See also Brady v Thornton (1947) 75 CLR 140; Commonwealth v Pilt (1974) 3 ALR 236 (NSW DC) where the facts were insufficiently stated in the claim to enable the averment provision to take effect; Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 at [142]. 108 Charlton v Rogers; Ex parte Charlton (1985) 82 FLR 40 (Qld). 109 The following paragraphs owe much to Sir Francis Adams, Criminal Onus and Exculpations, 1968. 110 Qld: Justices Act 1886 s 76; Criminal Code s 565(e); SA: Summary Procedure Act 1921 s 56(2);WA: Justices Act 1902 s 72; NT: Criminal Code Act ss 43D, 43K and 440. For English authority see Buckman v Button [1943] KB 405 (DC of QBD); Baker v Sweet [1966] Crim LR 51 (DC of QBD); Gatland v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1968] 2 QB 279; Nimmo v Alexander Cowan and Sons Ltd [1968] AC 107. For Australian authority, see Taylor v Ellis [1956] VLR 457; Ex parte R J Winborne Pty Ltd; Re Beale (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 353 (FC); Nominal Defendant v Dunstan (1963) 109 CLR 143; Neptune Oil Co Pty Ltd v Fowler (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 530 (FC); Meyn v Graham (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 16; Coleman v Haywood; Ex parte Coleman [1978] Qd R 411 (FC); Francis v Flood [1978] 1 NSWLR 113; Baronian v Potter Constructions Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 215; Phillips v Cassar [1979] 2 NSWLR 430 (CCA); O’Leary v Matthews (1979) 28 ALR 97; Marshall v Crane 1982 Tas R 17. 111 Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389. 112 Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1 at [467]. 113 Notwithstanding such decisions as Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389 it is still possible that an appeal court may hold that provisions such as s 130 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) impose only an evidential burden on the accused. These decisions did not have the benefit of the stress by the High Court in Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 on the importance of a distinction between the legal and the evidential burden. In Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 the Privy Council rejected an argument that a similar no more stringently worded provision in the Ceylon Evidence Ordinance imposed only an evidential burden of proof on the accused. 114 Kirkpatrick v Bartlett [1936] SASR 10. See Zis v Bland [1962] WAR 137 (FC) (charge of being the owner of a commercial goods vehicle that operated when not licensed; proof of exemption held to be on the defendant); Attorney-General (ACT); Ex rel Olaseat Pty Ltd v ACT Minister for Environment, Land and Planning (1993) 43 FCR 329 (FC). 115 Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Jacobsen (1945) 70 CLR 635. See also Ex parte Ferguson; Re Alexander (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64; Clark v Flanagan (1934) 52 CLR 416. 116 Donoghue v Terry [1939] VLR 165; Hayward v Whitbread [1966] SASR 1. 117 Barritt v Baker [1948] VLR 491. Cf Harris v Macquarie Distributors Pty Ltd [1967] VR 257 (burden of proof as to exemption in by-law on the defendant). 118 Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136 at 139–40. 119 R v Jarvis (1756) 1 East 643n at 646. See also Ex p Ferguson; Re Alexander (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 (FC). 120 R v Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206. It is arguable that Turner’s case decided no more than that, where a statute provides a plurality of excuses, the accused must raise the issue of the existence of those on which reliance is placed. See Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 at 457 (CA); and Graham v Belfast and Northern Counties Railway Co [1901] 2 IR 13 at 26. The
decision did not put an end to the distinction between exceptions and provisos (if only because reliance was occasionally placed on the fact that an exempting clause was a proviso to justify the absence of any reference to it in the indictment, and the imposition of some burden with regard to it on the accused: R v James [1902] 1 KB 540 (CCCR); R v Audley [1907] 1 KB 383 (CCCR)). 121 R v Audley [1907] 1 KB 383 (CCCR). 122 So far as bigamy is concerned, it was held in R v Bonnor [1957] VR 227 (FC) that the legal burden of proving the seven years’ absence referred to in the Victorian enactment was on the accused. See now the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 94, which expressly requires proof by the accused. As to the English position, see R v Jones (1883) 11 QBD 118 (CCCR). 123 Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; Bannister v Bowen (1985) 65 ACTR 3; Macarone v McKone; Ex parte Macarone [1986] 1 Qd R 284 (FC). 124 As to the burden of proof where the defendant relies upon a defence of interstate trade, see Colbert v Tocumwal Trading Co Pty Ltd [1964] VR 820 (FC); D P Drummond, “Section 92 and the Burden of Proof” (1966) 40 ALJ 384. 125 Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 519–20; see also Lynch v Attwood [1983] 3 NSWLR 1; Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 285; Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88 at 119; Stevenson v Yasso [2006] 2 Qd R 150 at [95]–[97]. Section 72 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) creates an evidential burden on the accused in relation to exceptions, exemptions, provisos, excuses or qualifications. 126 Steel v Smith (1817) 1 B & A 94 at 99. 127 Morgan v Babcock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163; Metropolitan Coal Co Ltd v Pye (1934) 50 CLR 614; Metropolitan Coal Co Ltd v Pye (1936) 55 CLR 138; Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Jacobsen (1945) 70 CLR 635; Barritt v Baker [1948] VLR 491 at 495; Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; Daire v O’Malley (1986) 41 SASR 583; Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249; Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465 at [39]–[42]; Overland Corner Station Pty Ltd v Gould (2010) 106 SASR 428. 128 Samuels v Stokes (1973) 130 CLR 490. 129 R v Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206 at 211. For a civil case in which the doctrine was applied, see General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp v Robertson [1909] AC 404 at 418. 130 R v Spurge [1961] 2 QB 205 (the appeal was dismissed because the accused was negligent); R v Mandry; R v Wooster [1973] 3 All ER 996 at 1000; see also R v Hinz [1972] Qd R 272 (CCA). See also the striking decisions on ordinances based on s 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872: “When any fact is essentially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him”: Attygalle v R [1936] AC 388 (PC); Seneviratne v R [1936] 3 All ER 36 (PC); Ng v R [1958] AC 173 (PC). 131 See Re Dunlop Holdings Ltd’s Application [1979] RPC 523 at 544 (CA). Only slight evidence has been necessary on the part of an owner to make out a prima facie case that the hirer was in breach of his obligation to insure the chattel, the fact of insurance being a matter within the peculiar knowledge of the hirer: Moller v Bruce Sanders [1962] QWN 12 (FC). The same rule has been applied in employers’ liability cases: Bellia v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 401 (FC); De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1. This does not mean that the peculiar means of knowledge of one party spares the other the burden of adducing evidence on the issue, although very slight evidence will often suffice: Elkin v Janson (1845) 13 M & W 655 at 662; Over v Harwood [1900] 1 QB 803 (DC). On the justification for reversing the burden in licence cases, see Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Lee Kwong-kut [1993] AC 951 at 969 (PC) (“Common sense dictates that the prosecution should not be required to shoulder the virtually impossible task of establishing that a defendant has not a licence when it is a matter of comparative simplicity for a defendant to establish that he has a licence.”). 132 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65. See also R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 at 140, cited in Joyce v DPP [1946] AC 347 at 380; J F Stephen, Digest of Law of Evidence, 5th ed, 1887, art 104,
applied in Cullen v Welsbach Light Co of Australasia Ltd (1907) 4 CLR 990 at 1013–14; R v Kakelo [1923] 2 KB 793 at 795, and cited in R v Cohen [1951] 1 KB 505 (CCA) (suggesting that the doctrine is only concerned with the evidential burden); O’Sullivan v Stubbs [1952] SASR 61. Lord Mansfield’s observation has been referred to in a variety of contexts, eg Vetter v Lake Macquarie CC (2001) 202 CLR 439 at [36] (impaired memory of party not bearing the onus); Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [134] (defective and suppressed records). 133 Apothecaries Co v Bentlee (1824) 1 C & P 538. 134 R v Scott (1921) 86 JP 69. 135 In Williams v Russell (1933) 149 LT 190 at 191 (DC of KBD). 136 R v Oliver [1944] KB 68 (CCA). 137 John v Humphreys [1955] 1 All ER 793 (DC of QBD), not followed in McGowan v Carville [1960] IR 330 (Eire SC) where the authorities are reviewed. See also Attorney-General (Comer) v Shorten [1961] IR 304, cf R v Brien (1965) 50 DLR (2d) 92. 138 R v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 322 (CCA) applied in R v Sciretta [1977] VR 139 where the court held that the accused had the burden of proof of the existence of a suicide pact whereby under s 6B of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) a charge of murder might be reduced to one of manslaughter. See also Marshall v Rennie (1979) 25 ALR 116 (NT SC). 139 The absence of a licence is sometimes said to be something which makes a prima facie innocent act unlawful rather than a condition by virtue of which a prima facie unlawful act is innocent: R v Putland and Sorrell [1946] 1 All ER 85 (CCA). But this distinction is somewhat unreal. 140 As in Buchanan v Moore [1963] NI 194 (CA). 141 John v Humphreys [1955] 1 All ER 793 (DC of QBD). In Buchanan v Moore [1963] NI 194 at 196 Lord MacDermott CJ would express no opinion about the correctness of John v Humphreys. 142 Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389. 143 Ex parte Ferguson; Re Alexander (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 at 67. 144 Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corp (1985) 1 NSWLR 561, citing Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 at 167–8, 171. In those cases the burden called “tactical” above is termed “evidential” but it is thought “tactical” is meant. The sentence in the text was quoted with approval in Lee v Napier (2013) 216 FCR 562 at [74]. 145 Apollo Shower Screens case, citing Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65, 66; J F Stephen, Digest of Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, art 104; Storey v Eastbourne Rural District Council [1927] 1 Ch 367 at 405 (CA); Morgan v Babcock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 178; Ex parte Ferguson; Re Alexander (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 at 70 (FC); Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 at 371; R v Guiron (1962) 72 WN (NSW) 811 at 813 (CCA). 146 Apollo Shower Screens case, citing Parker v Paton (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 237 at 243 (FC); Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 at 371. 147 R v Edwards [1975] QB 27 at 39–40 (CA). For a criticism of some of the historical statements in the judgment and of the utility of the general principles stated in it, see A Zuckerman, “TheThird Exception to the Woolmington Rule” (1976) 92 LQR 401. In R v Hunt [1987] AC 352, there was some consideration, and no explicit disapproval, of R v Edwards, but it was stressed that in every case the question is one of the proper construction of the particular enactment before the court. See A Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence, 1989, pp 142–9. See also R v Alath Construction Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1255 (CA); R v Colle (1991) 95 Cr App R 67; Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Lee Kwong-kut [1993] AC 951; R v Charles [2010] Crim LR 303 (CA). 148 In accordance with the views of Lords Pearson and Guest in Nimmo v Alexander Cowan and Sons Ltd [1968] AC 107. 149 Eg Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; R v Putland and Sorrell [1946] 1 All ER 85 (CCA); this and the other relevant cases are discussed in the 4th Australian edition of this work at [7175]. 150 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. 151 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1 at 11.
152 For example in R v Evans [1967] 1 QB 322 (CCA) but see Hall v Dunlop [1959] NZLR 1031
at 1036. 153 The Full Family Court said in In the Marriage of Sutcliffe (1988) 12 Fam LR 794 at 798 that the assertion in R v Edwards that the legal or persuasive burden rests on the defendant was inconsistent with May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658; but that case was concerned with the consequences of a defendant’s failure to call evidence once there was a case to answer, not with the “doctrine” of R v Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206. Otherwise the reception has been favourable: Rowbottom v Nicolitsi (1986) 41 SASR 576 at 579; Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594; Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249; AttorneyGeneral’s Reference (No 1 of 1989); R v Brown [1990] Tas R 46 (CCA); Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465 at [39]. The Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Proceedings (Parliamentary Paper No 319, 1982) recommended that all persuasive burdens at present lying on defendants in criminal proceedings be reduced to evidential ones, that provisions imposing an evidential burden on them be kept to a minimum, and that averment provisions be kept to a minimum. 154 R v Momcilovic (2010) 265 ALR 751; Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1. 155 Levy v Assicurazioni Generali [1940] AC 791 (PC); Re Petroleum and Chemical Incorporation (Aust) and Australian Gas Light Co (1947) 76 WN (NSW) 230 (FC); Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643; Brooks v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1969) 121 CLR 432; but see Commonwealth v Vita-Nut Products Pty Ltd [1957] VR 688; Levine v Kelly [1958] Qd R 74 (FC); Re Davstone Estates Ltd’s Leases; Manprop Ltd v O’Dell [1969] 2 Ch 378 (provision as to finality of expert’s certificate as to construction of a covenant in a lease held contrary to public policy and void). 156 Such provisions are sometimes expressly controlled by statute: see Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (UK) Sch 3 art 18. 157 The Glendarroch [1894] P 226 at 231; contrast Slattery v Mance [1962] 1 QB 676 (QBD). In the case of insurance of the ship against fire the insurer must establish scuttling on the balance of probabilities. The Glendarroch was approved in Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd v Shipping Corporation of India Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 12 at 23–4 (CA); Shipping Corp of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142 at 168; Stateliner Pty Ltd v Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 16 (FC); Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad (1996) 39 NSWLR 683 at 694 (CA). See generally S Rares, “The onus of proof in a cargo claim —Arts III and IV of the Hague-Visby rules and the UNCITRAL Draft Convention” (2008) 31 Aust Bar Rev 159. 158 Munro Brice and Co v War Risks Assn Ltd [1918] 2 KB 78. 159 Hurst v Evans [1917] 1 KB 352. 160 Cf J Stone, “Burden of Proof and the Judicial Process: A Commentary on Joseph Constantine Steamship Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd” (1941) 60 LQR 262 at 278ff. 161 Gorman v The Hand in Hand Insurance Co (1877) IR 11 CL 224; his dictum was approved by Donaldson J in Golodetz and Co Inc v Czarnikow-Rionda Co [1979] 2 All ER 726 at 743. 162 Munro Brice and Co v War Risks Assn Ltd [1918] 2 KB 78 at 87–8. 163 G L Williams, “The Evidential Burden: Some Common Misapprehensions” (1977) 127 NLJ 156. See J de Meyrick, “Does the Burden Shift?” (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 61. 164 G L Williams, “The Evidential Burden: Some Common Misapprehensions” (1977) 127 NLJ 156 at 158. 165 Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 317. See also Re Dunlop Holdings Ltd’s Application [1979] RPC 523 (CA), where Buckley and Bridge LJJ took a similar view, though Waller LJ viewed the situation entirely in terms of the distribution of legal and evidential burdens. 166 Even if that were law it would not have justified the trial judge’s action in leaving to the jury the question whether the accused had reasonable grounds for their belief, although it might have
justified the withdrawal of the issue of the belief of the accused persons from the jury on the ground of insufficiency of supporting evidence. 167 The definition of rape being unlawful sexual intercourse with a non-consenting woman knowing that she does not consent or being reckless as to whether she does so. 168 Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 200. 169 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; applied in Pastras v Commonwealth [1967] VR 161 at 168. 170 See J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, pp 369–70 and 378–84. 171 See Barwick CJ’s analysis along these lines in Katsilis v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181 at 197 and Cameron v Holt (1980) 142 CLR 342 at 347 (stressing that the legal burden does not shift however much “an evidentiary burden has shifted to the accused”); and see Brady v Group Lotus Car Cos plc [1987] 3 All ER 1050 at 1059 (CA) and Office of Fair Trading v IBA Healthcare Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 1103 at [57] (CA). In Amoco Oil Co v Parpada Shipping Co Ltd [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 369 at 370 (CA) Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR described the process, using not the expression “provisional burden”, but “evidential burden”. 172 See Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 (CA). Another example is the provisional burden resting on a defendant against whom fraudulent misrepresentation is alleged: even though the legal burden of proof of inducement rests on the plaintiff, the defendant must as a matter of prudence seek to rebut “the inference of the fact of inducement which would ordinarily be drawn from the fraudulent making of a false statement calculated to induce a person to enter into a contract followed by entry into that contract”; the defendant might seek to do so by showing that the plaintiff knew the true facts or disavowed reliance on the representations: Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 238. (It is there misleadingly termed an “evidential” burden: cf [7015] above.) The English Court of Appeal has gone further in relation to reliance on assurances said to give rise to a proprietary estoppel and placed the legal burden of proving non-reliance on the representor: Greasley v Cooke [1980] 3 All ER 710. 173 Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164. 174 A T Denning, “Presumptions and Burdens” (1945) 61 LQR 379 at 380. The usage was adopted by Hope and Glass JJA in Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 at 425–6 (CA) and (in part) by Lord Simon in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 217 (though he also used “evidential burden” in that sense). See also Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182 at [53]. 175 See [1125] above. 176 See [1195] above and Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 243. 177 See [1605] above. 178 Meyn v Graham (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 16. 179 Ajum Goolam Hossen & Co v Union Marine Insurance Co [1901] AC 362 (PC); cf Pickup v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co (1878) 3 QBD 594 (CA) discussed in Skandia Insurance Co Ltd v Skoljarev (1979) 142 CLR 375. 180 R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87 (CCA). 181 Per Viscount Sankey LC in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481. 182 James Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial, 2008, pp 193–200. 183 As to the appropriate standard of proof, see Cocks v Juncken (1947) 74 CLR 277 and Garfath v Garfath [1959] SR (NSW) 362 (FC). 184 The Merchant Prince [1892] P 179. 185 For a comprehensive discussion of the nature of the defence of inevitable accident and the burden of proof in relation to it, see G A Pape, “The Burden of Proof of Inevitable Accident in
Actions for Negligence” (1965) 38 ALJ 395. As the author points out, it is unlikely, having regard to such decisions as Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99, that the High Court would direct the jury as in The Merchant Prince that the burden of proving inevitable accident lies on the defendant. See also Antoniou v Kitson (1972) 2 SASR 525. For a discussion of the burden of proof in trespass cases, see McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; Venning v Chin (1974) 8 SASR 397. 186 Compare Emmanuel v Emmanuel [1946] P 115 at 118 with Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182 at 199–200 (CA). 187 L F Sturge (ed), Cockle’s Cases and Statutes on Evidence, 8th ed, 1952, p 127. Lord Denning speaks of this burden as an “ultimate burden”. That expression is, however, often used as a synonym for the legal burden on a particular issue. 188 A T Denning, “Burdens and Presumptions” (1945) 61 LQR 379 at 380. 189 For a case in which the burden of proof was said to shift in this way, see Medawar v Grand Hotel Co [1891] 2 QB 11; Medawar v Grand Hotel Co [1891–4] All ER Rep 571 (CA). See also Coldman v Hill [1919] 1 KB 443 at 452 (CA); Brady v Group Lotus Car Cos plc [1987] 3 All ER 1050 at 1058 (CA). For a case of this type disposed of without any reference to the shifting of the burden of proof, see Neal v Fior [1968] 3 All ER 865 (DC of QBD). 190 E M Morgan, “Presumptions” (1937) 12 Washington Law Review 255 cited by S J Helman, “Presumptions” (1944) 22 Canadian Bar Review 118 at 119. 191 See the citation from Alciatus (dec 1550) in J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 1898, p 313. 192 The subject provoked an acute difference of opinion among those who drafted the American Law Institute’s Code of Evidence. 193 A T Denning, “Burdens and Presumptions” (1945) 61 LQR 379 at 382. 194 In addition to the citations in [7005] n 5 of this chapter, all of which have some bearing on the subject of presumptions, reference may be made to J F Stephen, “An Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence” in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, pp 132–3 and ss 107–114; J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 1898, Ch 8; J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn Rev, 1981, vol 9 [2490]–[2498]; E M Morgan, “Foreword” in the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Evidence, 1942, pp 60ff; E M Morgan, “Some Observations Concerning Presumptions” (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 906; E M Morgan, “Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and Burdens of Proof” (1933) 47 Harv L Rev 59; S J Helman, “Presumptions (A Review)” (1945) 22 Canadian Bar Review 118. 195 The terms “presumed fact” and “basic fact” are taken from the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Evidence r 701. 196 See [7085] above. 197 See [7090] above. 198 But these are more appropriately dealt with in a treatise on the substantive law of equity, rather than as matters of evidence. See J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P GTurner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 5th ed, 2014, [15–055]–[15–100] and J D Heydon, and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia, 7th ed, 2006, [1212]–[1216]. 199 See eg McLean Bros & Rigg Ltd v Grice (1906) 4 CLR 835; Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154 at 164. See too [1175] above. 200 Another example in English law is the presumption that a child is incapable of forming a criminal intent on proof that his or her age is less than fourteen: C v DPP [1996] 1 AC 1. 201 For a convincing demonstration of this, see G H Treitel, “The Presumption of Death” (1954) 17 MLR 530. See also J Stone, “The Presumption of Death: A Redundant Concept?” (1981) 44 MLR 516 for the view that this presumption no longer has any practical effect. 202 See Prudential Assurance Co v Edmonds (1877) 2 App Cas 487. 203 Knowles v Knowles [1962] P 161. 204 Reference is sometimes made to “mixed” presumptions of law and fact, but it is not clear what
is intended by the expression. 205 This sentence was approved in Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85 at [39]. 206 See [1125] above. 207 Bruce v R (1987) 74 ALR 219; R v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433; R v Illingworth (2000) 127 A Crim R 302. As to the dangers of the expression “presumption” in this context, see Bellamy v R [1981] 2 NSWLR 727, explained in R v Ately (1985) 9 NSWLR 226. See [1195] above. 208 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 61 and 83; Police v Barber (2010) 108 SASR 520 at [31]– [32]; Dover v Doyle (2012) 34 VR 295 at [39]. 209 Pickup v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co (1878) 3 QBD 594 (CA). 210 Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 82. See also Charlie v R (1998) 119 NTR 1 at 6 (CCA) (discussing Criminal Code (NT) s 7(1)(b)). 211 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 83. 212 This presumption does not apply in affiliation proceedings: L v K [1985] Fam 144. 213 Reid v Hesselman [1975] Tas SR 95 (FC). 214 See [7250] above. 215 Qld: Criminal Code s 29; NSW: Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 s 5; Vic: Children and Young Persons Act 1989 s 127; Tas: Criminal Code s 18(1); SA: Young Offenders Act 1993 s 5; WA: Criminal Code s 29; NT: Criminal Code s 38; ACT: Criminal Code s 25. 216 Corporations Act 2001 s 1274(7A). 217 Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 at 654. 218 Thayer’s oft-quoted and cryptic statement that the law has no mandamus to the logical faculty (A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 1898, pp 313–14 n 1) is at best only a half truth. The law may order nobody to draw inferences, but it sometimes prohibits all rational investigation into the existence of a fact. 219 J R Gulson, Philosophy of Proof, 2nd ed, 1923, p 371. 220 Qld: Succession Act 1981 s 65; NSW: Conveyancing Act 1919 s 35; Vic: Property Law Act 1958 s 184; Tas: Presumption of Survivorship Act 1921 s 2; WA: Property Law Act 1969 s 120. There is no such provision in South Australia, where the old law applies. 221 See per Lord Denning MR in Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 50 at 72. It is, however, possible that the difference between Lord Denning and Buckley LJ in that case related only to the probative worth of the basic fact. 222 Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169 at 213. 223 Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169 at 213-15. 224 Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 264. 225 However, there are dicta about the invalidity of certain conclusive presumptions: Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95 at 108 and 117; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 at 185; Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [156]. See also Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 at 704. Reversing the burden of proof does not create invalidity: Commonwealth v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners (1922) 31 CLR 1 at 12; Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95; Orient Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Gleeson (1931) 44 CLR 254 at 259–60, 262–3 and 264; Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307 at 316, 318–19 and 320– 1; Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 at [41]. It is doubtful whether legislation permitting a mere averment of a constitutional fact to establish it is valid: Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95 at 122–3; Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [155]; Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 at [54]; Cheikho v R (2008) 75 NSWLR 323 at [131]–[133]. For discussion of the validity of legislation permitting proof of part of the prosecution case by certificate operating as conclusive evidence, see Cheikho v R (2008) 75 NSWLR 323. A law deeming an element of an offence to be proved may be unconstitutional: Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 at
[156] and [162]. See generally Kizon v Palmer (1997) 72 FCR 409 at 446–7; Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450 at [190]–[191], [229], [257], [283] and [390]; Elbe Shipping SA v Giant Marine Shipping SA (2007) 159 FCR 518 at [27]. 226 Mackowik v Kansas City St F CBR Co 94 SW 256 (1906) at 262 per Lamm J (Mo SC). 227 W L Prosser and W P Keeton, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 5th ed, 1984, [38]. 228 “Some Observations Concerning Presumptions” (1931) 44 Harv LR 906 at 908. See also Speck v Sarrer 20 Cal 2d 585 (1942) at 594 and J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, pp 560–4 and 575–6. 229 S v S [1972] AC 24 at 41. This may be contrasted with the effect, in a civil case, of the evidential presumption of death. The party against whom it operates must produce such evidence as would, if believed and uncontradicted, justify either a finding that the person in question was alive, at the material time, or the inability of the tribunal of fact to come to a conclusion either way. Small wonder that the possibility of subdividing rebuttable presumptions of law has received more extra-judicial than judicial attention. 230 For the suggestion that presumptions should be classified on the basis of the policies they are designed to promote, see L Cohen, “Presumptions According to Purpose: A Functional Approach” (1981) 45 Albany L Rev 1079. See also Re Peatling (dec’d) [1969] VR 214 discussed in [7315] below. 231 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. 232 See R v Curgerwen (1865) LR 1 CCR 1; R v Audley [1907] 1 KB 383 (CCCR). 233 Though it has been done in Australia: see R v Bonnor [1957] VR 227 (FC). In the United States this issue gives rise to constitutional problems, see ReWinship 397 US 358 (1970) at 364; for comment see J C Jeffries and P B Stephan, “Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law” (1979) 88 Yale LJ 1325. 234 See eg R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 at 364, a strong case since the issue was merely collateral. 235 R v Willshire (1881) 6 QBD 366 at 369 (CCCR) 236 Dillon v R [1982] AC 484 at 487 (PC). 237 See [1605]. 238 See R v Williams [1978] 1 NSWLR 674 (CCA). 239 Criminal Law (The General Part), 2nd ed, 1961, p 877ff. 240 A T Denning, “Burdens and Presumptions” (1945) 61 LQR 379 at 380. 241 See [7210] above. 242 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 at 402. 243 R v Hemmings [1939] 1 All ER 417 (CCA). 244 W M Best, cited J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 1898, p 343. 245 Monckton v Tarr (1930) 23 BWCC 504 (CA). 246 Re Peatling (dec’d) [1969] VR 214. 247 “Some Observations Concerning Presumptions” (1931) 44 Harv LR 906. See also [7280] n 230 above. 248 See 4th Australian edition, [7320]–[7490]. 249 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 1898, p 313. 250 See [1175]. 251 See [1125], [1180] and [1195]; see also [7255]. 252 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 9(3)(a); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 9(2)(b); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 9(2)(b);Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 9(2)(b);ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 9(2)(b); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 9(2)(b).
[page 339]
Chapter Five Degrees of Proof
Section 1 — Civil and Criminal Standards — Degrees of Proof1 A — GENERAL Non-circumstantial evidence [9001] Introduction Once the party who bears the evidential burden has discharged it by adducing evidence sufficient to justify consideration of a particular issue, it becomes necessary for the party bearing the legal burden on that issue, the proponent, to persuade the trier of fact that it should be decided in the proponent’s favour. If the proponent’s evidence is less persuasive than that of the opponent the proponent must inevitably fail. If it is more persuasive, the question is whether the proponent must equally inevitably succeed. The answer to that question demands consideration of the requisite standard of proof. It is generally accepted that Australian law applies two main standards, though their precise connotation, formulation and application, the possibility of a third standard, and their relationship to precisely quantifiable evidence, raise debatable issues which will be discussed in this chapter. It is then necessary to consider the standard which must be achieved to discharge an evidential burden or adduce “sufficient” evidence.
[9005] The distinction between the criminal and civil standards The cases show that there is a difference between the standards of proof in criminal and civil proceedings.1 Speaking of the degree of cogency which the evidence on a criminal charge must reach before the accused can be convicted Denning J said: That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect
the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable”, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.2
[page 340] When speaking of the degree of cogency which evidence must reach in order that it may discharge the legal burden in a civil case, he said: That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say:“We think it more probable than not”, the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal, it is not.3
The validity of the distinction has not gone unquestioned. Lord Goddard once confessed that he had some difficulty in understanding how there are or can be two standards,4 and Hilbery J is reported to have said: “I personally have never seen the difference between the onus of proof in a civil and criminal case. If a thing is proved, it is proved, but I am not entitled to that view”.5 Yet it can hardly be doubted that there are degrees of probability. If this much is conceded, the law can intelligibly [page 341] require that a very high degree must be established by the prosecution at a criminal trial. So long as the proportions do not become excessive, it is better that people who are probably guilty should go free than that those whose innocence is reasonably possible should be convicted. The balance of probabilities is not a demanding standard, as the possibility that the less probable state of fact may be the true one is very obvious, and makes civil justice very vulnerable to error.6 The fact that the “criminal standard of proof is a designedly exacting standard” has been illustrated by contrast with the civil standard in “contested issues involving the care and protection of children.”7 It is thought important that criminal justice be less vulnerable to error. The importance of the liberty of the subject also accounts for the applicability of the criminal standard in contempt of court cases whether criminal or civil.8 That standard may also be explicitly
required by statute or statutory instrument for other good reasons or policies.9 On the other hand, there is conflict in the authorities as to whether that standard extends to facts relevant to sentencing in criminal cases: [9045]. Nor does that standard apply to proof of facts essential to establish jurisdiction in the court.10 A special difficulty arises where an accused is charged with alternatives (for example stealing and receiving stolen goods): the jury should be directed that if they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of one or other of the offences but cannot say which they should convict on the “less serious” offence.11
[9010] Degrees of proof within each standard It will be submitted that there are no more than two standards of proof recognised by the law, though allowance must be made for the fact that some occurrences are inherently more probable than others, and the consequences of some decisions are more serious than others. People are less likely to commit murder than to drive recklessly, and less likely to be fraudulent than to be negligent. It is more serious to be in prison for life for murder than to be conditionally discharged by a magistrate for assault, and it is a more serious matter to determine that civil fraud has been committed than to determine whether a civil trespass has occurred. For these reasons prosecutors on the more serious criminal charges, or those carrying graver consequences, and plaintiffs in some civil cases, have higher hurdles to surmount than when they are making less serious allegations or those with more trivial consequences. This led Denning LJ to speak of degrees of proof within the same standard: It is of course true that by our law a higher standard of proof is required in criminal cases [page 342] than in civil cases. But this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that standard … So also in civil cases, the case must be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require for itself a higher degree of probability than that which it would require when
asking if negligence is established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature; but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion.12
The point was put more succinctly by Morris LJ when he said: Though no court and no jury would give less careful attention to issues lacking gravity than to those marked by it, the very elements of gravity become a part of the whole range of circumstances which have to be weighed in the scale when deciding as to the balance of probabilities.13
This view has been endorsed and applied by the House of Lords to the judicial review of the decisions of immigration officers in illegal entry cases: The reviewing court will therefore require to be satisfied that the facts which are required for the justification of the restraint put on liberty do exist. The flexibility of the civil standard of proof suffices to ensure that the court will require the high degree of probability which is appropriate to what is at stake.14
However, there remain two distinct standards. But the standard of proof to be applied in a case and the relationship between the degree of persuasion of the mind according to the balance of probabilities and the gravity or otherwise of the fact of whose existence the mind is to be persuaded are not to be confused. The difference between the criminal standard of proof and the civil standard of proof is no mere matter of words: it is a matter of critical substance. No matter how grave the fact which is to be found in any civil case, the mind has only to be reasonably satisfied and has not with respect to any matter in issue in such a proceeding to attain that degree of certainty which is indispensable to the support of a conviction upon a criminal charge.15
[9015] Failure to meet a standard on an issue does not establish the contrary It is possible that the law governing the different standards of proof is more settled and better understood than the preceding passages might suggest. Some of the difficulty is created by the words in which the standard is formulated. In ordinary civil cases it is usually expressed as involving the “preponderance of probability”, the “balance of probabilities”, or the “preponderance of evidence”. It [page 343] might be argued that the last of these seems to involve no more than the preponderance of the evidence produced by the proponent of an issue over
that produced by its opponent.16 It is more common, however, to regard all of these terms as synonymous, and as connoting not really relative preponderance over the evidence of the opponent but satisfaction of a prescribed level of probability.17 The possibility of a contrary finding does not prevent a finding reached on that standard from being appropriate.18 It is not enough for a plaintiff to fail that his account “may not be correct”.19 It has, however, been proposed that to avoid confusion a new formulation should be adopted which recognises that the amount required to satisfy the standard in different situations varies: [T]he plaintiff (or the party on whom the burden rests) must satisfy the court that it is reasonably safe in all the circumstances of the case to act on the evidence before the court, bearing in mind the consequences which will follow.20
Though courts frequently appear to assume that they must make positive findings in civil cases whatever the state of the evidence, the House of Lords21 stressed that the judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other. The judge can, and in appropriate cases should, decide on the basis that the party bearing the burden of proof has failed to discharge it. A particular finding requires satisfaction on the evidence that the matter found to have occurred is more likely than not to have occurred, and this requirement is not met where a judge bases a finding on the less improbable of two extremely improbable possibilities. Thus in criminal cases where the evidence is equivocal as between two co-accused, each of whom alleges that the crime was committed, in the absence of proved complicity between them each must be acquitted, even though it is clear that one or other must have committed the crime.22
[9020] Difficulties of formulating a “reasonable doubt” Once the judge departs from the firm ground of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”, the problem of formulation is still more acute in criminal cases where a direction has to be given to a jury. It is plainly wrong to tell the jury—even in a civil case, but certainly in a criminal one — that it is for them to decide where the truth lies or who is telling the truth; for the proponent may fail because it may be impossible for the trier of fact to do [page 344]
so23 (reluctant though judges sitting alone are to accept this). There are, of course, three, not two, logically possible outcomes to the application of the appropriate degree of proof to the facts. The first is that the tribunal of fact is satisfied to the appropriate standard that the case of the prosecution or plaintiff has been made out; the second that the tribunal of fact is satisfied that the case of the accused or the defendant has been made out; and the third that the tribunal of fact is in a state of doubt24 as to whether any case has been made out. In each of the last two cases the plaintiff or the prosecution fails.25 It is for this reason that judges in criminal cases traditionally direct the jury that it is only where the Crown has satisfied them beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused that a verdict of guilty may be returned.26 In England the expression “reasonable doubt” has been deprecated.27 Lord Goddard objected to it because of the difficulty of following explanations of what does, and does not, constitute a reasonable doubt. He thought that no real guidance was afforded by saying it must not be a fanciful doubt, and to say it must be such a doubt as would make jurymen hesitate in their own affairs does not suggest any particular standard because one juryman might hesitate where another would not do so.28 In another case Lord Goddard CJ said: Let us leave out of account, if we can, any expression such as “giving the prisoner the benefit of the doubt”. It is not a question of giving the benefit of the doubt, for, if the jury are left with any degree of doubt that the prisoner is guilty, then the case has not been proved.29
[page 345] There have been continuing difficulties in England30 and Eire.31
[9025] Set form of words? The English courts32 and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are against any set form of words:33 If the jury are made to understand that they have to be satisfied and must not return a verdict against the defendant unless they feel sure, and that the onus is all the time on the prosecution and not on the defence, then whether the judge uses one form of language or another is neither here nor there.34
The English Court of Appeal has said that there would be fewer appeals
if judges stop trying to define that which is impossible to define.35 If the evidence against the accused is sufficiently strong it has even been held not necessarily to be fatal that the judge altogether omits to direct the jury as to the standard of proof required.36
[9030] Set formula in Australia In the United States Judge Posner asked the following questions about the reasonable doubt standard. “Can it be that the term should never be defined? Is it a mystical term, a talisman, somehow tarnished by attempts at definition? Is a refusal to define key terms consistent with the search for truth?”37 He continued:38 Undefined and unelaborated, the expression “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” requires, and is (I believe) understood to require, that the jury be certain of the defendants’ guilt, with this proviso: complete certainty — the certainty of such propositions as that cats do not grow on trees and that I have never set foot on Mars—is never attainable with respect to the question whether a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime for which he is being tried, and the jury should set aside doubts that it would be unreasonable to entertain given the practical limitations on attaining certainty in the trial setting.
Elsewhere he said that judicial refusal to elaborate to a jury the meaning of “reasonable doubt” was “a rare example of a wise acknowledgment of the limitations of definition”.39 [page 346] In Australia, in contrast to other places,40 the High Court has consistently emphasised what is described as “the plain rule that what is required to justify a conviction is proof beyond reasonable doubt”.41 In the case from which those words are taken, the trial judge, though he had directed the jury as to the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt, had also used the phrase “a feeling of comfortable satisfaction” in relation to proof of intent. The court treated the case as one involving a critical misdirection and ordered a new trial. In reiterating the plain rule, Kitto J referred to the debate in the English cases: Nothing in recent English cases should be taken as impairing this principle. It has been unequivocally stated by the House of Lords …42 it has been plainly affirmed by the Privy Council …43 and it has been uniformly applied by this Court.44 Whether a doubt is reasonable is for the jury to say; and the danger that invests an attempt to explain what “reasonable” means
is that the attempt not only may prove unhelpful but may obscure the vital point that the accused must be given the benefit of any doubt which the jury considers reasonable.45
The High Court has also pointed to the desirability of retaining the term “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in explaining to juries the standard of proof required in criminal cases. It was put thus by Dixon CJ:46 … [I]n my view it is a mistake to depart from the time-honoured formula. It is, I think, used by ordinary people and is understood well enough by the average man in the community.47 The attempts to substitute other expressions, of which there have been many examples not only here but in England, have never prospered. It is wise as well as proper to avoid such expressions.48
[page 347] In the words of Barwick CJ: A reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertain in the circumstances. Jurymen themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances. It is that ability which is attributed to them which is one of the virtues of our mode of trial: to their task of deciding facts they bring to bear their experience and judgment.49
Directions which, if they stood alone, might be correct and sufficient may nevertheless form part of a summing up which is defective when considered as a whole, because other passages in it might be understood as explaining or qualifying those passages; however, statements by the judge that the jury’s task was to determine whether the accused was guilty or innocent were held not to be misleading, because they related, not to the question of standard of proof, but to the fact that the responsibility for determining issues of fact was the jury’s.50 It is wrong to invite juries to examine doubts which may exist with a view to classifying them into reasonable and fanciful ones.51 It is wrong to suggest that it is for the jury to choose between preferring the Crown version and preferring the accused’s version: proof of the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt requires no comparison between alternatives except persuasion or non-persuasion beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt.52 However, it is not necessarily erroneous to attempt to give guidance on the meaning of “reasonable doubt” so long as the jury is not misled as to the nature of the burden of proof resting on the Crown.53 Where a jury question indicates a misapprehension about the standard of proof some warning may be called for.54 It is open to the judge to give a more detailed direction even if the jury does not request this.55 It is not wrong, and it
may be desirable, but it is not necessary, to give a direction about the “presumption of innocence” in addition to a direction that the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.56 Reasonable doubt is not imputed, as a matter of law, to a process of scientific testing for forensic purposes merely because more perfect procedures might have been adopted or might now be available: the evidence of a reasonable doubt is to be ascertained by reference only to admissible evidence.57 The prosecution is thus obliged to exclude rational hypotheses consistent with innocence, but not hypotheses that are not reasonably capable of being inferred from the evidence; it is not obliged to exclude fanciful suppositions or groundless speculations.58 To direct the jury that the criminal standard of proof is the highest standard of proof known to the law is correct but not obligatory.59 [page 348]
Circumstantial evidence [9035] No higher standard for circumstantial evidence From time to time it has been suggested that further precautionary instructions are required in criminal cases founded on circumstantial evidence, but there is no rule that, in addition to directing the jury that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a judge must, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, direct them to acquit unless the facts are not only consistent with the accused’s guilt, but also inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.60 Great stress has been placed on the destructive effect on the cumulative force of circumstantial evidence pointing to guilt of one rational hypothesis of innocence,61 but the direction to the jury is treated as no more than a formula suitable in some cases for instructing the jury that they must be satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.62 Accordingly, Glass JA has summarised Australian law as follows:63 In charging the jury it will not be a misdirection to instruct that the accused ought not to be convicted unless the circumstances are such as to be incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused64 or unless guilt is the only rational inference
which the circumstances enable them to draw.65 By a grammatical inversion the jury may be instructed that they are bound to acquit if the circumstances in their view are susceptible of a reasonably possible explanation consistent with innocence.66 These formulae are intended to define the ultimate question for the jury by applying the criminal standard of proof to a body of evidence in which the conduct, state of mind and identity of the accused are all inferential. Directions of that kind do not stem from a separate rule brought into play by circumstantial evidence. They derive from the general requirement
[page 349] that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt67 and may without misdirection be omitted.68 But the question for the jury is not fully defined without telling them that they are not obliged to accept as proved all the circumstances to which witnesses have testified. [Approval has been given to] the following passage from the summing up to a jury.69 “In a case in which there is no direct evidence against the prisoner, but only the kind of evidence that is called circumstantial, you have a two-fold task; you must first make up your mind as to what portions of the circumstantial evidence have been established and then when you have got that quite clear, you must ask yourselves, ‘Is this sufficient proof?’.” As with direct evidence, any circumstantial evidence unacceptable to them may be discarded.
There is no requirement to give a circumstantial evidence direction in every case in which the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence.70 There is no obligation to give a circumstantial evidence direction when the inference to be drawn relates to the accused’s state of mind.71 In a circumstantial evidence case where the hypothesis of innocence requires the concurrent existence of a number of different matters, there may come a time when the number of required matters is so great that the hypothesis of innocence becomes so improbable that it is to be dismissed as fanciful — as not a rational hypothesis.72
[9040] Standard does not apply to each item of evidence It has been held by the English Court of Appeal that it is unnecessary for a judge to direct the jury that it must be unanimous with regard to even one item of evidence bearing upon a particular count before convicting on it.73 It seems to be enough that all members of the jury find the accused guilty upon the basis of some of the facts bearing upon that count: it is not necessary that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of each and every evidentiary fact, for different members of the jury may be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused by their acceptance of the existence of different facts.74 But can there be satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused when there is no such satisfaction with regard to any of the evidentiary facts? It is wrong for the jury to consider each item of evidence separately and eliminate it from consideration unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. The items of evidence must be considered together at the end of the trial, and one piece of evidence may resolve the jury’s doubts about another.75 Gibbs CJ and Mason J put it this way.76 [page 350] Similarly in a case depending on circumstantial evidence, the jury should not reject one circumstance because, considered alone, no inference of guilt can be drawn from it. It is well established that the jury must consider “the weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together”77 …. [To an argument] that the motives of the accused could not be considered until it was shown by evidence that in some physical way his actions were responsible for his wife’s death…. Dixon CJ said:78 “All the circumstances of the case must be weighed in judging whether there is evidence upon which a jury may reasonably be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the crime charged. There may be many cases where it is extremely dangerous to rely heavily on the existence of a motive, where an unexplained death or disappearance of a person is not otherwise proved to be attributable to the accused; but all such considerations must be dealt with on the facts of the particular case. I cannot think, however, that in a case where the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence any part of the circumstances can be put on one side as relating to motive only and therefore not to be weighed as part of the proofs of what was done”. It follows from what we have said that the jury should decide whether they accept the evidence of a particular fact, not by considering the evidence directly relating to that fact in isolation, but in the light of the whole evidence, and that they can draw an inference of guilt from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone would support that inference. Nevertheless the jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt. When the evidence is circumstantial, the jury, whether in a civil or in a criminal case, are required to draw an inference from the circumstances of the case; in a civil case the circumstances must raise a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged, and in a criminal case the circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence ….79 “There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish”80 [. This] is obviously as true of criminal as of civil cases. The process of reasoning in a case of circumstantial evidence gives rise to two chances of error: “first from the chances of error in each fact or consideration forming the steps and second from the chance of error in reasoning to the conclusion” ….81 It seems to us an inescapable consequence that in a criminal case the circumstances from which the inference should be drawn must be established beyond reasonable doubt…. In [a murder case], the direct evidence was insufficient without certain scientific evidence to
permit the case to be left to the jury. The scientific evidence was that certain trace materials (fibres, foraminifera, paint chips and hairs) found on or about the deceased girl were similar to other trace materials found on or about the accused. For example, fibres found on the girl’s singlet were said to be similar to those from the accused’s pullover. The Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia had to consider two questions: first whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, and, secondly, whether there had been a misdirection in the summing up. The first question depended on whether it was open to the jury to infer, from the fact that in a number of instances the trace
[page 351] materials on the deceased and on the accused could have originated from the same source, that they did so originate, notwithstanding that the individual identity of any one set of trace material, considered in isolation, was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the inference could be drawn by the jury. The second question was whether it was correct to direct the jury in effect that they could draw an inference of guilt from primary evidence as to whose existence they were in doubt. The court held that it was a misdirection to instruct the jury in that way. The court said:82 “But the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt relates to the final stage in the process; the jury is not, in our view, required to split up the various stages in the process of reasoning leading to the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and to apply some particular standard of proof to each of those steps … and to instruct them to do so would, in our view, be confusing and possibly misleading and would tend to the imposition of an artificial and scholastic strait-jacket on their deliberations. That, of course, does not mean that they ought to be encouraged or permitted to draw inferences of guilt from doubtful facts. As a matter of common sense it is impossible to infer guilt beyond reasonable doubt from facts which are in doubt. There is a clear distinction between drawing an inference of guilt from a combination of several proved facts, none of which by itself would support the inference, and drawing an inference of guilt from several facts whose existence is in doubt. In the first place the combination does what each fact taken in isolation could not do; in the second case the combination counts for nothing.” It is clear that the first part of this statement was not intended to contradict the second. It refers only to the manner in which the jury should be directed. It is quite correct to say that the jury are not required to split up the various stages in the process of their reasoning; they are not required to make findings on questions of primary fact, and jurors who agree in reaching the same ultimate conclusion may nevertheless disagree as to what evidence is to be accepted, or as to what inferences are to be drawn from evidence which they do accept. However that does not mean that the jury may draw an inference of guilt from a fact which has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. [The] court went on to say:83 “We think, as we shall develop later, that the jury should be told that they can draw inferences only from facts which are clearly proved, but further than that it is neither necessary nor desirable to go. There may not be much difference between telling them that and telling them that they can draw inferences only from facts proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there is authority in favour of the first proposition and authority against the necessity for the second proposition. Of course we did not say that it will be a misdirection to tell the jury that they can draw inferences only from facts which are proved beyond reasonable doubt.” Sir Richard Eggleston84 … expresses the view that this statement is erroneous. With all respect we do not agree with the criticism of the learned author, but it must be understood that the
court was intending to say that inferences cannot be drawn from facts that remain doubtful at the end of the jury’s consideration, and did not mean that facts which, viewed in isolation, seem doubtful must be disregarded. However, in our opinion, it must follow from the reasoning in [the South Australian case] that the jury can draw inferences only from facts which are proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Even if the contrary view85 — that only elements of the offence need be proved beyond reasonable doubt (as opposed to primary facts which are ingredients or elements of the offence) — were the law, a primary fact — a fact depending on [page 352] direct evidence and not inference — may itself be an ingredient in the offence.86 Further, a collateral fact which is not an element of the crime would, on any view, have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt if, without it, the whole case would fail.87 There is controversy over whether motive, other than in cases in which it is an indispensable link in a chain of reasoning towards guilt, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.88 The High Court89 held that: (i) the case quoted above is not authority for the proposition that in a circumstantial evidence case the jury may only properly draw an inference of guilt upon “facts” — individual pieces of evidence — proved beyond reasonable doubt; (ii) the case does not require such a direction to the jury; (iii) the case recognises that if it is necessary for the jury to reach a conclusion of fact as an indispensable intermediate step in the reasoning process towards an inference of guilt, that conclusion must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; and (iv) whether there is a need for a trial judge to identify such a conclusion and direct the jury as to that standard of proof will depend on the circumstances of the case. Thus where flight is relied on as evidencing a consciousness of guilt, as part of a circumstantial case, neither it nor its character need be established beyond reasonable doubt.90 The same can be true of motive.91 But where a confession has, “standing alone, the ability to lead the jury to
a conclusion of guilt”, the jury should be directed not to convict unless it finds the confession established beyond [page 353] reasonable doubt.92 The same is true of DNA evidence.93 There is a division in the authorities on the standard of proof in relation to “relationship evidence”.94 It has been said that in summing up the judge should not refer to intermediate facts indispensable to the proof of guilt, but rather identify any fact of that kind and tell the jury that it is critical and that they should not convict unless satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt; and if a fact will become critical if certain evidence is rejected, say that, and give the direction just outlined.95 It has also been said that while it may be necessary, it is not usually essential for a judge specifically to instruct the members of the jury that where they believe particular facts are indispensable links in their chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt, they need to be satisfied of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt: the emphasis always given in summings up on the Crown’s obligation to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt will often be adequate with respect to a matter which the jury may reasonably regard as an indispensable intermediate fact.96 It has been said that if in the absence of evidence of a fact there would nonetheless be a case to go to the jury, the fact is not indispensable; if not, it is indispensable.97
Standard of proof where accused bears legal burden [9045] Balance of probabilities What is the standard on issues on which the accused bears the legal burden? [I]n any case where, either by statute or at common law, some matter is presumed against an accused person “unless the contrary is proved”, the jury should be directed that it is for them to decide whether the contrary is proved, that the burden of proof required is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution in proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the burden may be discharged by evidence satisfying the jury of that which the accused is called upon to establish.98
In this context the word “satisfy” connotes satisfaction on the balance of probabilities.
B — PROOF OF CRIME IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS A dilemma [9050] Civil standard Special considerations apply when the question of whether facts amounting to a [page 354] crime have been proved arises in other proceedings. The difficulty is that the court in those proceedings is placed in a dilemma in which it must abandon either consistency of standard of proof as between two different proceedings relating to the same issue, or abandon it as between two different issues arising in the same proceedings. Such a dilemma can arise in administrative proceedings for the recovery of compensation for criminal injuries. It can also arise in an ordinary civil case. Damages are claimed by A for a libel in which B referred to A as a bigamist; the insurer’s defence to an action on a policy of fire insurance is that the assured was guilty of arson; or the plaintiff simply claims damages for a conspiracy to defraud. Though in England there are some cases supporting the application of the criminal standard,99 in Australia (and in other English cases) the law is that the civil standard applies, though the gravity of the issues must be borne in mind.100 That approach is commonly employed where civil proceedings are brought in relationship to contraventions of those parts of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) which can be the subject of criminal prosecutions,101 and where civil proceedings are brought under that Act for a penalty.102 The approach does not change the civil standard of proof. It merely reflects the
perception that members of the community do not ordinarily engage in serious misconduct.103 The appropriate reasoning processes have been classically stated in the leading High Court case. Rich J said:104 In a serious matter like a charge of adultery the satisfaction of a just and prudent mind cannot be produced by slender and exiguous proofs or circumstances pointing with a wavering finger to an affirmative conclusion. The nature of the allegation requires as a matter of common sense and worldly wisdom the careful weighing of testimony, the close examination of facts proved as a basis of inference and a comfortable satisfaction that the tribunal has reached both a correct and just conclusion.
[page 355] And Dixon J said:105 … [R]easonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of the given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent judgment if the question was whether some act had been done involving grave moral delinquency … It is often said that such an issue as fraud must be proved “clearly”, “unequivocally”, “strictly” or “with certainty” … This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil issue may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probability. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained. When, in a civil proceeding, a question arises whether a crime has been committed, the standard of persuasion is, according to the better opinion, the same as upon other civil issues … But, consistently with this opinion, weight is given to the presumption of innocence and exactness of proof is expected.
But generalisations to the effect of those quoted are in some circumstances unhelpful or misleading.106 When an issue falls for determination on the balance of probabilities and the determination depends on a choice between competing and mutually inconsistent allegations of fraudulent conduct, generalisations about the need for clear and cogent proof are likely to be at best unhelpful and at worst misleading. If such generalisations were to affect the proof required
of the party bearing the onus of proving the issue, the issue would be determined not on the balance of probabilities but by an unbalanced standard. The most that can validly be said in such a case is that the trial judge should be conscious of the gravity of the allegations made on both sides when reaching his or her conclusion. Ultimately, however, it remains incumbent upon the trial judge to determine the issue by reference to the balance of probabilities. The balance of probabilities standard is not to be applied merely mechanically on a serious issue such as whether due skill had been exercised in building work, for this might result in the cancellation of the builder’s licence and determination of his capacity to earn his livelihood in that occupation.107 Similarly, the exercise of executive discretion to interfere with liberty depends on proof on the civil standard at the high end of the scale.108 [page 356] The principle does not apply to suicide109 or paternity.110 It has been applied to sexual abuse by a father of his daughter;111 to a finding of nonAboriginality;112 to forcible removal of children from parents, beating of children, and sexual assault;113 to allegations against non-parties114; and to accusations against a solicitor of camouflaging negligence by procuring the signature of false acknowledgments.115
[9055] Distinction between inference and conjecture Where satisfaction of the civil standard of proof depends on inference, there must be something more than mere conjecture, guesswork or surmise. That is, there must be more than “conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture”.116 If there is, the test is as follows: “The difference between the criminal standard of proof in its application to circumstantial evidence and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged”.117
C — STANDARD OF PROOF IN MATRIMONIAL CAUSES Adultery [9060] Civil standard Section 48 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) rendered irretrievable breakdown of marriage the sole ground for dissolution of marriage. Before that time there was a significant debate as to the standard of proof in matrimonial causes, which is described in the fourth Australian edition.118 In Australia the High Court decided that the standard of proof of adultery in a matrimonial suit was the civil standard, “subject only to the rule of prudence that any tribunal should act with much care [page 357] and caution before finding that a serious allegation such as that of adultery is established”.119 The Full Court of the Family Court has held that that is still the law.120
D — MISCELLANEOUS Contempt of court [9065] Criminal standard All charges of contempt of court, whether civil or criminal, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.121
Sentencing [9070] Differential standards of proof The judge, in sentencing the accused, may not take matters of fact into account in a manner which is adverse to the accused’s interests (in the sense of being likely to result in a more severe sentence) unless those facts
are established beyond reasonable doubt,122 but if there are circumstances which the judge proposes to take into account in favour of the accused, it is sufficient if those circumstances are proved on the balance of probabilities.123 Statute may provide to the contrary.124 Thus in Queensland, the sentencing judge may act on an allegation of fact which is admitted or not challenged, or on any other allegation of fact if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is true (Evidence Act 1977 s 132C(2) and (3)); and the degree of satisfaction required varies, according to the consequences, adverse to the person being sentenced, of finding the allegation to be true (s 132C(4)).
Professional disciplinary and other proceedings [9075] Civil standard The civil, not the criminal, standard of proof applies in disciplinary proceedings, but the degree of satisfaction for which the civil standard calls may vary according [page 358] to the gravity of the fact to be proved.125 The same principle applies in conventional civil proceedings where a finding might put the reputation or earning capacity of a professional at risk.126
Section 2 — The Question of a Third Standard and the Possibility of Anomalies — Degrees of Proof MULTIPLE STANDARDS? A controversy [9085] Two standards, with a qualification Three standards of proof appear to be recognised in the United States, proof by “clear, strong and cogent” evidence lying midway between proof on a preponderance of probability and proof beyond reasonable doubt.127 Sometimes language is used suggesting that the law recognises standards other than those of proof beyond reasonable doubt and on a balance of probabilities. A claim for rectification must, it has been said, be established by “strong, irrefragable evidence”.128 A high standard is called for in cases of alleged professional misconduct, as the Judicial Committee could not envisage professional men condemning each other on a mere balance of probabilities.129 The evidence in rebuttal of the presumption of a formal validity of a marriage must, it has been said, be “clear, distinct and satisfactory”;130 while an intention to change domicile must be “clearly and unequivocally proved”.131 Observations of this sort will no doubt continue to be cited by the courts,132 but they do not support the importation of a third standard, for as Nourse J remarked in connection with the proof of mutual wills: [page 359] [T]hat does not mean that there has to be a departure from the ordinary standard of proof
required in civil proceedings. I have to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the alleged agreement was made, but before I can be satisfied of that I must find clear and satisfactory evidence to that effect.133
In the same vein Lord Tucker was, it is believed, expressing the commonly held opinion when he said: “I am quite unable to accede to the proposition that there is some intermediate onus between that which is required in criminal cases and the balance of probability which is sufficient in civil actions”.134 Read au pied de la lettre, some of the statements in the cases which have just been cited support the view that a criminal standard of proof is called for even though the proceedings are civil. There is therefore a danger that this work makes things look tidier than they really are in two ways; its insistence on the existence of no more than two standards of proof and its contention that the criminal standard is (subject to statute) only applicable in criminal cases and on allegations of contempt of court. It is nonetheless submitted that suggestions that the criminal standard applies in other cases are anomalies. Dixon J correctly said: “there were never more than two standards of persuasion”.135 One qualification to the application of the civil standard of proof arises in relation to past hypothetical events or future events, as distinct from actual past events. Though the plaintiff must meet a standard of proof that loss has been caused by establishing on the balance of probabilities some loss, in evaluating the chance of whether past hypothetical events would have happened or whether future events will happen, it is not necessary to apply a standard based on the balance of probabilities; damages may be assessed by reference to prospects, even though the prospects are less probable than not. This applies in relation to the assessment of damages for personal injuries,136 the assessment of damages for breach of contract;137 and the assessment of damages for breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)).138 The principle has been explained in relation to lost commercial opportunities thus:139 the applicant must prove on the balance of probabilities that he or she has sustained some loss or damage. However, in a case such as the present, the applicant shows some loss or damage was sustained by demonstrating that the contravening conduct caused the loss of a commercial opportunity which had some value (not being a negligible value), the value being ascertained by reference to the degree of probabilities or possibilities. It is no answer to that way of viewing an applicant’s case to say that the commercial opportunity was valueless on the balance of probabilities because to say that is to value the commercial opportunity by reference to a
standard of proof which is inapplicable. … The approach results in fair compensation whereas the all or nothing outcome produced by the civil standard of proof would result in the vast majority of cases in over-compensation or under-compensation to an applicant who has been deprived of a
[page 360] commercial opportunity. Furthermore, it is an approach which conforms to the long-standing practice of taking into account contingencies in the assessment of damages.
A similar principle can apply where statutory language calls for it eg where the issue is whether a fugitive offender might, if returned to a designated country, be prejudiced.140 There is no special standard of proof, either higher or lower than the ordinary civil standard, applying to proprietary claims by indigenous people based on traditional custom or culture.141
Section 3 — Mathematics and the Standard of Proof — Degrees of Proof MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES An emerging field [9090] Marginal significance Since the standard of proof is concerned with the question of the amount of evidence which is required to persuade the trier of fact, there is an understandable tendency to attempt to apply the techniques of mathematics to its assessment. The temptation to count is an old one, and still persists in some corroboration requirements.142 It has appealed most to those of a theoretical disposition. Bentham was attracted to it, influenced by the observation that wagering and insurance both attached numerical values to probabilities.143 With the proliferation of ways in which modern technology can assist judicial inquiry, it has become increasingly necessary for courts to adopt methods of combining evidence of mathematical precision with less exact sources of information. It is also common knowledge that many important decisions in fields such as business, national defence, and the formation of economic policy are increasingly taken upon the basis of the mathematical modelling of probabilities and decision theory. Whatever the reason, there has been a burgeoning of attention on the question of the possibility of applying mathematical techniques to law.144 Much of this debate is, to say the least, remote from the practical concerns of trial lawyers. There has been a judicial reminder of this: [page 361]
The concept of “probability” in the legal sense is certainly different from the mathematical concept; indeed, it is rare to find a situation in which the two usages co-exist although, when they do, the mathematical probability has to be taken into the assessment of probability in the legal sense and given its appropriate weight.145
In that case the English Court of Appeal refused to “transmute a mathematical probability into a forensic certainty” by determining the paternity of a child upon the basis of statistical blood-grouping evidence, at least in the absence of a full investigation of all the surrounding circumstances. One of the problems is that the proper foundation for the application of the mathematical techniques is rarely present. A striking example of this, and one which sparked off much of the modern American interest, is provided by a case146 in which the trial judge admitted statistical evidence in an attempt to identify the accused with the perpetrators of the robbery in question. There was evidence that the guilty couple possessed six characteristics. A statistician was allowed to testify that the likelihood of their all being present in any couple was, upon certain assumptions, 12 million to 1 against. The accused couple possessed the six characteristics and were found guilty. As was pointed out on appeal, this procedure was quite inappropriate. There was no basis for the assumptions of the likelihood of each of the characteristics occurring independently, and there was no ground for supposing that they were independent, indeed there was every ground for supposing that they were not. It will be extremely rare for the information required to make such estimates of probability to be available to report. Nor should the court attempt to manufacture its own statistics where there is no evidence at all. A cautionary example here is provided by the opinion of Murphy J in a case in which the plaintiff sought damages in respect of a road accident in which both drivers had been killed, and there was little evidence as to which driver was to blame. Murphy J took the view that it was too little. He was, however, prepared to uphold the claim on the basis that there were three possibilities: that both drivers were to blame, that the driver who was the plaintiff’s husband was to blame, and that the driver who was the defendant’s employee was to blame. Since two of these favoured the plaintiff’s claim and only one opposed it, the balance of probabilities was satisfied.147 It is not clear why he excluded the possibility of neither driver being to blame. Quite apart from that, the procedure is obviously prone to cause injustice, for example in the case where only one of three injured employees has caused the damage by his negligence in the course of his
employment, but it is unknown which of them it was. In such a case the odds of any one being an innocent victim are also 2 to 1 on, with the startling consequence that all three can succeed although the whole calculation presupposes that one of them is not in fact entitled to do so. In another case148 the question was whether a driver who had returned a blood-alcohol reading of 0.155 per cent a little more than one hour after an accident was at the time of the accident on the balance of probabilities [page 362] so much under the influence of intoxicating liquor as to be incapable of exercising effective control of the vehicle. There was no direct evidence of impaired control of the vehicle. Evidence was admitted from an expert witness to the effect that the majority of drivers with the blood-alcohol level of the defendant would be incapable of exercising effective control of a motor vehicle, but that some would or might be so capable. King CJ observed: The most that can be said is that it is statistically more probable than not that any individual with such a blood alcohol level would be incapable of exercising effective control…. I am clearly of the opinion that the statistical fact that a particular proposition is true of the majority of persons cannot of itself amount to legal proof on the balance of probabilities that the proposition is true of any given individual.149
If part of the difficulty is that there is usually an insufficient evidential basis for the mathematical exegesis, another is that the mathematical techniques are themselves controversial. Thus the statistical appendix to the judgment in the seminal American case which purported to substitute an accurate statistical analysis for the faulty methods proposed by the trial judge has itself been attacked as being mathematically unsound,150 and the whole theme of Cohen’s book is the inapplicability to law of classical Pascalian probability (that is, the theory that when the conclusion of an inference is a conjunction of two independent facts, the strength of the inference is measured by multiplying together the strengths of the inferences considered separately).
[9095] Useful applications and dangers There will, of course, be some statistical evidence which does have a
satisfactory foundation, and some issues to which that evidence is relevant. Such evidence will not automatically be excluded on the basis that it falls short of absolute scientific certainty.151 Blood group evidence may be of that character. If a question arises as to the paternity of a child it may be possible to establish that if the husband of the mother is not the father then it could be one person in any ten of the population. In such a case the court must be wary of the alluring precision of the figures, and must not be seduced from the path of weighing together all of the circumstances, for example the terms of the relationship between husband and wife, the opportunities and inclinations of the wife for extra-marital intercourse, and the motives of the parties in making any allegations. It will be an extremely rare case where mathematical techniques will make a decisive contribution to the resolution of forensic uncertainty,152 and that conclusion appears to be compatible with the following observations of Mahoney JA:153 In this regard, the court is required to test its conclusion, not merely according to the subjective conviction of it, but also by reference to the reasonableness of its basis. Whether this involves a conceptual inconsistency in relation to probability is not of significance: in fact the conclusion is so tested. It may be tested, according to the case, against facts otherwise known or assumed to exist, and the inferences from them. The court may also
[page 363] look to the “probability” of the conclusion being correct according to a different meaning of probability. In this sense, it may test the conclusion by reference to the “chance” of its being so, in the sense of Pascal’s dice or Beanoulli’s “Large Numbers”. It may also test it according to what, if they are available, are the statistics (the human experience reduced to numbers) as to the existence of a particular fact in given circumstances. According to such matters, it may modify a view formed on other grounds…. But the probability of the correctness of the particular proposition of fact, at least of the present kind, cannot depend completely upon such a mechanical meaning of probability. There are, as the plaintiff’s argument in the present case emphasised, many cases in which Pascalian mathematics cannot be done, because there cannot be, or at least is not, information as to what are the number of “chances” or possibilities, and whether each of these is equally weighted. In such cases, and the present is one of them, the probabilities cannot be determined in that way. The existence of the fact is, subject to testing in such ways as may be appropriate, to be determined according to the court’s assessment of the facts, and its confidence that its assessment is correct. Testing aside, it may be that further explanation of this process is a matter for the experimental psychologist rather than for the lawyer or mathematician.
Expert evidence of the Bayes Theorem is probably inadmissible in jury
cases.154 Undue emphasis on statistical probability evidence in address has been deprecated.155 However expert evidence relating to the statistical interpretation of DNA analyses is admissible.156 If the possibilities of one version exceed another, but the tribunal does not “feel an actual persuasion”, to use Mahoney JA’s expression, of either, neither version can be found as a fact. “There are … some questions to which the only answer is: I do not know”.157
Section 4 — Standard of Proof Relating to Sufficiency of Evidence: Discharge of Evidential Burden158 SUFFICIENCY ISSUES Different stages [9100] Test on appeal When the sufficiency of the evidence in law to support a jury verdict is considered on appeal, the test is its capacity to satisfy a jury beyond reasonable doubt (if the [page 364] case is a criminal one)159 or on the balance of probabilities (if the case is civil). The further ground of appeal, that there was evidence upon which the jury might have convicted, but that nevertheless it is “unsafe” to permit the conviction to stand, is outside the subject matter of this present discussion.
[9105] Test at close of evidence The same tests will apply to a determination by the trial judge at the close of evidence as to whether there is sufficient evidence in law for the case to be left to the jury; the trial judge’s determination just before verdict is identical with an appellate court’s soon after verdict.160 Where there is such evidence, the judge may not direct the jury to acquit on the ground that the evidence is exiguous or unsatisfactory. At trial the function of
assessing the weight of evidence is that of the jury, although at appellate court level the bench may, on such a ground, reverse a decision or order a retrial.161
[9110] No-case submission The same test applies also to where a no-case submission is made — that is, where the issue is whether an evidential burden has been discharged by the prosecutor or plaintiff whether or not there is a jury.162 The question at that stage is similar to the previous questions: it is “whether on the evidence as it stands [the defendant] could lawfully be convicted”163 or “whether the evidence is such that a reasonable tribunal might convict”.164 The test to be applied by the judge in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in favour of the proponent of an issue is whether there is evidence which, if uncontradicted, would justify persons of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the proposition which the proponent is bound to maintain, having regard to the degree of proof demanded by the law with regard to the particular issue.165 Hence a trial judge is neither bound nor entitled to direct the jury to acquit if, at the close of the Crown case, the judge thinks that a reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused is capable of being inferred from the evidence, or inferences of fact could properly be drawn which were consistent with innocence and other inferences could equally properly be drawn which were consistent with guilt.166 Those are relevant matters for the jury at the end of the evidence, not the judge at the end of the Crown case. Indeed a decision that there is a case to answer leaves a magistrate (or a jury) perfectly [page 365] entitled to refuse to convict even if no evidence is called in answer or if such evidence as is called does not satisfactorily answer the prosecutor’s or plaintiff’s case.167 This is because the task of the tribunal of fact is to assess the weight of the evidence. An acquittal in these circumstances merely means that evidence which is capable of supporting a conviction did not in fact do so.
[9115] Criminal standard in criminal cases There is a dispute as to whether the criminal or the civil standard of proof applies in determining whether there is a case to answer in criminal cases. On principle, as indicated above, the answer is that while the civil standard applies in civil cases, the criminal standard applies in criminal cases. As Glass JA has said:168 When a no case application is being entertained, the question to be decided is “whether on the evidence as it stands the defendant could lawfully be convicted”169 or “whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury might convict”.170 Ex hypothesi, no person can lawfully be convicted unless his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. These pronouncements imply a conclusion that there is no case to answer unless the evidence adduced by the prosecution is capable of bringing satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt to the minds of a reasonable jury. The legal necessity of applying a criminal standard of proof in determining whether there is a case to answer can be demonstrated … by an argument of the reductio ad absurdum type. Suppose the trial judge rejects a no case submission on the ground that the evidence, though not capable of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, can prove it to a lesser degree.171 Suppose the accused then calls no evidence and asks that the jury be directed to acquit. Since the application must by definition succeed, a judge is placed in the absurd position of having made two inconsistent rulings, namely, that on the same body of evidence the defendant could be and could not be lawfully convicted.172
The main trend in the Australian and English authorities favours the criminal standard.173 [page 366]
[9120] Assumption that evidence favouring proponent is to be accepted What evidence can be taken into account in determining whether there is “sufficient” evidence (that is, a case to answer either at the close of the proponent’s case or at any later time before verdict, or evidence which in law supports the verdict)? The court can consider only that evidence which favours the proponent174 and must assume that it is accepted without reservation by a jury.175 Evidence favouring the defendant (if it is the Crown or the plaintiff who is the proponent) must be disregarded.176 This is because it is not the court’s function to weigh evidence “or assess its acceptability whether in relation to the character of the evidence itself or the credibility of the witnesses who gave it”.177 Similarly, when the question of sufficiency arises on appeal, it:
… is accepted doctrine that the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to support a conviction cannot be reduced to insufficiency by any amount of contrary evidence for the defence no matter how overwhelming or preponderant it may be.178 To this principle one exception only has been recognised. If a prima facie case has been made out only if some evidence remains unexplained and the defendant furnishes an explanation by evidence which cannot be treated as genuinely in dispute and which reasonable men could not reject, what appeared to be a prima facie case no longer exists in point of law …179 Only in such marginal circumstances can the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence be depressed below the sufficiency level.180
The reason for the rule is to be found in the fact that the jury is entitled to disbelieve uncontradicted evidence favouring the accused even if it is given by Crown witnesses.181 Hence a case to answer can be made out even though some of the Crown witnesses support the accused’s alibi.182 The Privy Council stated183 one exception to the principle that the prosecution case must be taken at its highest: if [page 367] the only prosecution evidence is “so inherently incredible that no reasonable person could accept it as being true”, the accused should be acquitted. Similarly, when the defendant in a civil case makes a non-suit application or an application for verdict by direction at the close of the plaintiff’s case or at the close of all the evidence, the test for insufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence is whether there is evidence capable of satisfying the trier of fact on a balance of probabilities that each of the constituents of the plaintiff’s claim has been established. The evidence to be examined is limited to that favouring the plaintiff: hence there may be evidence capable of discharging the burden borne by the plaintiff even though the evidence to the contrary is weightier.184 Those principles apply where trial is by jury, but where trial is by judge alone there is a controversy whether there can be circumstances in which the trial judge decides not merely whether the evidence permits inferences to be drawn, but whether the quality of the evidence is in fact such that those inferences should be drawn.185 Where circumstantial evidence is involved in criminal cases, the test of sufficiency is whether it is open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.186 It is, however, necessary to distinguish between criminal cases in which the evidential, but not the legal, burden on a particular issue such as
provocation or automatism is borne by the accused, and criminal cases in which the evidential burden is borne by the Crown. When the accused bears the evidential burden alone, it is only necessary for there to be such evidence as would, if believed and uncontradicted, induce a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable jury as to whether the accused’s version might not be true, for example as to whether the accused was provoked or in a state of automatism.187 In the words of Lord Devlin, the evidence must be enough to “suggest a reasonable possibility”.188 There must be some evidence, derived either from the prosecution189 or adduced by the defence; it is not enough to rely upon an out-of-court self-serving statement,190 and probably not enough to have equivocal evidence from which the jury is invited to draw a medical inference, itself contradicted by the evidence of a doctor.191 Where the accused bears both the legal and evidential burdens, for example in relation to insanity and related defences such [page 368] as diminished responsibility, or in relation to establishing a plea of pardon or a plea in bar,192 it is necessary for the accused to go further and to adduce evidence such as might satisfy a jury on the balance of probabilities.193 It was held incumbent upon the accused to adduce some medical evidence before the defence of diminished responsibility could be left to the jury.194 For the sake of theoretical completeness it may be added that when, in a civil case, the party with the legal burden on a particular issue also bears the evidential burden, it is discharged, as has been seen, by the adduction of sufficient evidence to satisfy a reasonable trier of fact on the balance of probabilities.195 If the party bearing the evidential burden does not bear the legal burden the former is probably discharged by the adduction of sufficient evidence to leave the mind of a reasonable trier of fact in a state of equilibrium. The degree of proof required in committal proceedings is regulated by statute in most jurisdictions.196
Section 5 — The Process of Fact Finding FACT FINDING Unexplored issues [9125] Evaluation of factual findings The decline of special jury verdicts and of jury trial generally means that the range of cases in which the process of fact finding can be scrutinised by courts of appeal is widening. On the other hand, the scope for attack on errors of fact finding alone is diminished by the superior position of the trial judge where questions of witness demeanour and the like are material: [11150]. There is little discussion in the cases on how facts are to be found and how the findings are to be evaluated. Mahoney JA said that the process of judicial fact finding often has two stages. The first is a “psychological” conclusion that a fact exists. That conclusion might be arrived at formally by logical inference or deduction. Or it might be arrived at more intuitively, particularly where the assessment of the basic credibility of witnesses is concerned. The second is a more formal process of testing and scrutiny to determine whether the conclusion initially reached should be acted on. The testing process may estimate the logic or coherence of the conclusion, or examine or weigh its consistency with other facts, premises or principles. While in fact finding in ordinary life this testing of inferences and conclusions may not be necessary or may not often be performed, in forensic fact finding it more often is. And the [page 369] acceptability of a trial judge’s inferences and conclusions is commonly tested in this way by an appellate court. But the process of trial fact finding is not to be formalised. A judge may, for example, reach a
conclusion as to a witness’s credibility without formally following testing procedures. “If a witness is, for example, plainly incoherent, inconsistent or concedes that she is wrong, her evidence may without error be put aside without more”.197 All the evidence must remain available for such use as is properly to be made of it. But that does not mean that each item of evidence must be reviewed and considered formally and step by step. What is required will depend on the significance each item of evidence has in relation to the issue of fact then being considered.
Section 6 — Statutory Reform EVIDENCE ACTS AND CRIMINAL CODE Degrees of proof [9130] Reflection of common law Sections 140–142 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provide:198 140 (1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and (b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters alleged. 141 (1) In a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. (2) In a criminal proceeding, the court is to find the case of a defendant proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. 142 (1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, in any proceeding the court is to find that the facts necessary for deciding: (a) a question whether evidence should be admitted or not admitted, whether in the exercise of a discretion or not; or (b) any other question arising under this Act; have been proved if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities. (2) In determining whether it is so satisfied, the matters that the court must take into account include: (a) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding; and (b) the gravity of the matters alleged in relation to the question.
Section 140(1) adopts the common law standard of proof in civil cases. Section 140(2) also corresponds with common law principles.199 “Civil proceedings” [page 370]
include proceedings under s 112AD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).200 Hence the common law rule that the criminal standard of proof applies to all charges of contempt, whether classified as civil or criminal, has been reversed.201 Section 141(1) adopts the common law standard of proof resting on the prosecution. Section 141(2) adopts the common law standard of proof resting on the defendant in criminal cases in the exceptional areas where the defendant bears the burden of proof. Common law principles will continue to apply in relation to jury directions ([7085] and [9020]–[9030]) and circumstantial evidence ([9035]–[9040]). Section 142 creates a balance of probabilities standard for proof of facts antecedent to the admissibility of evidence. This is an area where the common law is not wholly settled.202 The opening words contemplate the possibility that different standards for fact finding in relation to admissibility are created by other parts of the Act eg ss 57(1), 87, 88, 125(2), 131(3)–(4) and 146(2). Where the allegation in relation to the question referred to in s 142(2), as distinct from the allegation in the proceedings, is not grave, a principle analogous to s 140(2) does not apply.203 Otherwise s 142(2) corresponds with the equivalent common law rule.204 The Criminal Code Act 1995 makes provision in relation to the standard of proof in criminal cases. The relevant provisions are as follows: 13.2 (1) A legal burden of proof on the prosecution must be discharged beyond reasonable doubt. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the law creating the offence specifies a different standard of proof. … 13.5 A legal burden of proof on the defendant must be discharged on the balance of probabilities. 1 See further Z Cowen and P B Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, 1956, pp 242–9, and G L
Williams, “The Direction to the Jury on the Burden of Proof” [1954] Crim LR 464. For the standard of proof at a trial within a trial, see [11075] below. 2 Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 at 373–4. See also R v Winsor (1865) 4 F & F 363; Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1 at 11. The question of the quantum, as opposed to the burden, of proof was not directly before the House in the last two cases. For an earlier statement see Cooper v Slade (1858) 6 HLC 746 at 772. See also the chapter on this topic in Sir Owen Dixon’s Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses, 1965. The rule that the prisoner must have the benefit of reasonable doubt has been traced back to the end of the eighteenth century: J Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, 2008, pp 193–200. The propriety of summing up in terms of probability and possibility was questioned in R v McKenna
(1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 330 (CCA); but cf R v Coe [1967] VR 712 (FC). See also R v Vassilief (1967) 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 445 (CCA). And see. 3 Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 at 374. In Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207 at 219 Lord Simon of Glaisdale said: “[T]he concept of proof on a balance of probabilities … can be restated as the burden of showing odds of at least 51 to 49 that such-and-such has taken place or will do so”. But it is not enough that mathematically the chances favour a proposition; “the fact that only a minority of men die of cancer [would not] warrant a finding that a particular man did not die of cancer”: Sargent v Massachusetts Accident Co 29 NE (2d) 825 (1940) at 827. See also Smith v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE (2d) 754 (SJC Mass, 1945); Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 642–3. A competing view is that proof of a fact on a balance of probabilities requires the tribunal to “feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality … [A]t common law … it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal”: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361–2. Satisfaction on the balance of probabilities calls for the court to “feel an actual persuasion of [the] occurrence or existence” of the matter in issue: Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712. See D H Hodgson, “The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact Finding” (1995) 69 ALJ 731; H Bennett and G A Broe, “The civil standard of proof and the ‘test’ in Briginshaw: Is there a neurological basis to being ‘comfortably satisfied’?” (2012) 86 ALJ 258; Smith v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE (2d) 754 (SJC Mass, 1945); Andrijich v D’ Ascanio [1971] WAR 140 at 142 (FC); Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319 (discussing the difficulty of satisfying the standard where an allegation of misleading conduct arising from an oral but unconfirmed conversation is made); Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] ATPR 42-240 at [40]–[41]. Among the contentions which Hodgson advances is the proposition that the court must consider whether the material before it is or is not so limited as to be an inappropriate basis on which to reach a reasonable decision, and in that regard the importance of having regard to the ability of the parties, particularly but not only the party bearing the onus of proof, to lead evidence on a particular matter, and the extent to which they have done so: at 732–3, 736 and 740. See also Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [14]–[20]. See further D H Hodgson, “Probability: the Logic of the Law — a Response” (1995) 15 OJLS 51 at 58–60. 4 R v Hepworth [1955] 2 QB 600 at 603 (CCA). 5 In the course of argument in R v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72. Suggestions were made that the onus borne by the plaintiff in civil litigation was the same as that undertaken by the prosecutor on a criminal charge in Flower v Ebb w Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Co Ltd [1936] AC 206 and Munro Brice and Co v War Risks Assn Ltd [1918] 2 KB 78 at 80. It has been said that it is not appropriate to speak of the reasonableness of a suspicion as being established beyond reasonable doubt; that a suspicion is either reasonable or not reasonable; and that it is for the court to decide whether any suspicion, duly proved, should be characterised as reasonable: Tepper v Kelly (1987) 45 SASR 340 at 343 and 345, approved on appeal in Tepper v Kelly (1988) 47 SASR 271 at 273, and in Police v Beck (2001) 79 SASR 98. See also Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman Networks Ltd (2006) 150 FCR 110 at [15] (it is facts in issue which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the domestic law and its proper application to established facts are not matters for proof or disproof). 6 National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 at [34]. 7 Douglass v R (2012) 290 ALR 699 at [48]. 8 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525. See [9065]. The absence of any risk of being sentenced for an offence contributed to the application of the civil standard to prove breach of recognisances entered into in consequence of criminal proceedings: R v Marlowe Justices; Ex parte O’Sullivan [1984] QB 381 (DC). The distinction between civil and criminal contempt of court is important in New South Wales in relation to the existence of rights of appeal against a finding that no contempt
was committed: Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 at [13]–[141]. 9 Judd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1966] 2 QB 580. 10 Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 12–13 and 39 (locality); R v Abdulla (2010) 200 A Crim R 365 (age). 11 Gilson v R (1991) 172 CLR 353. Among the competing views rejected by the majority in that case are that the accused should be convicted of neither; that the accused should be convicted of whichever charge the jury thinks, on the balance of probabilities, is made out; and that the charges should be put separately and successively, since acquittal on the first may entail conviction on the second. 12 Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 at 36–7 (CA). The passage has met with frequent judicial approval eg in Blyth v Blyth [1966] AC 643 at 673; Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 1077 (CA). For applications of the principle to proof of arson in civil cases, see S & M Carpets (London) Ltd v Cornhill Insurance Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 667;Watkins & Davis Ltd v Legal and General Assurance Co Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 674; as to fraud, see Smith Bros v Madden Bros [1945] QWN 33. A different terminology was suggested in Re JS (a minor) [1981] Fam 22 (CA). 13 Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247 at 266 (CA). This answers the observation of Sir Carleton Allen (Legal Duties, 1931, p 288) that it would startle the legal world and the public if, when trying an action for damages, the judge were to say to the jury: “You need not be as careful in arriving at your conclusion as if you were trying a criminal case”. 14 Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [1984] AC 74 at 113–14. 15 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521. 16 Support for this view can be gleaned from Hickman v Peacey [1945] AC 304 at 318 (PC); and from S v S [1972] AC 24 at 41. In G v H (1994) 124 ALR 353 at 356 Brennan and McHugh JJ said that a slight preponderance of evidence showing that one man rather than another was father of a child may be sufficient to establish paternity if the man failed without reasonable excuse to comply with a parentage testing order. 17 See Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] AC 648 at 669 (PC); Larby v Armement L Hermans SA [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 43 at 45. See also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 18 Murray v Kickmaier [1979] 1 NSWLR 414 (CA). 19 Goodwin v Nominal Defendant (1979) 54 ALJR 84. 20 Re JS (a minor) [1981] Fam 22 at 29 (CA). 21 Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712 at 718; Morris v London Iron & Steel Co Ltd [1988] QB 493 at 504 and 506–7 (CA); Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries plc [1998] 3 All ER 462 at 473 (HL) (conflicting medical evidence); Maher-Smith v Gaw [1969] VR 371 at 374 (FC). Just as disbelief in a witness’s evidence does not establish the contrary, so disbelief in the case presented by the moving party does not necessarily permit the court to conclude that the opposing party’s positive case is correct: Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363 at [60]. 22 R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497 at 503 (CCA); R v Aston (1991) 94 Cr App R 180. 23 R v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355 (CCA); Bartho v R (1978) 19 ALR 418 at 423; R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 (no consideration in context); Selig v Hayes (1989) 52 SASR 169 at 171–2 (CCA); Burlinson v Police (1994) 75 A Crim R 258 (SASC); R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 498–500 (NSWCCA); R v Daniel (2010) 207 A Crim R 449. 24 A mental condition described by McInerney J as that of being “in equilibrium on the issue”: Re Peatling (dec’d) [1969] VR 214 at 226. 25 R v Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547 at 551; R v Jackson (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 477. 26 Where such an orthodox direction is given, there is no obligation on the trial judge to direct the jury in terms that if they cannot make up their minds where the truth lies they should acquit the accused person: R v Clough (1992) 64 A Crim R 451 at 465–6 (NSW CCA). To establish a reasonable doubt it is not enough that an inference or hypothesis compatible with innocence is
open as a mere conjecture: the bare possibility of innocence should not prevent the jury from convicting if the inference of guilt is the only reasonable one: Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 661; Hogan v R (2008) 186 A Crim R 52 at [24]–[29]. 27 R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82 at 90 (CCA); R v Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059 (CCA). 28 R v Hepworth [1955] 2 QB 600 at 603 (CCA). For similar criticisms, see Brown v R (1913) 17 CLR 570; R v Harris (1971) 1 SASR 447 (FC). The idea of a doubt which would cause jurymen to hesitate in their own affairs is traceable to the summing-up of Pollock CB in R v Manning (1849) 30 CCC Sess Pap 654: “If the conclusion to which you are conducted be that if there is that degree of certainty in the case which you would act upon in your own grave and important concerns, that is the degree of certainty which the law requires and which will justify you in returning a verdict of guilty”. In Walters v R [1969] 2 AC 26 the Judicial Committee upheld a description of reasonable doubt as “that quality and kind of doubt which when you are dealing with matters of importance in your own affairs, you allow to influence you in one way or another”. The decision is criticised in L J Blom–Cooper, “The Quantum of the Burden of Proof in a Criminal Trial”, (1969) 32 MLR 217 at 218–20. Lord Maugham’s definition of a reasonable doubt was “the doubt which men of good sense may reasonably entertain, not the doubt of a fool or a person of weakness of mind”: “Observations on the Law of Evidence with Special Reference to Documentary Evidence” (1939) 17 Can Bar Rev 469 at 472. 29 R v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388 at 394–5 (CCA). The reference to giving the prisoner the benefit of the doubt has been traced back to the eighteenth century and it appears to have the blessing of the House of Lords: Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481; Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1 at 11. 30 R v Blackburn (1955) 39 Cr App R 84n; R v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72; R v Hepworth [1955] 2 QB 600 (CA); R v Jones [1961] Crim LR 322 (CCA); R v Head (1961) 45 Cr App R 225; R v Johnson [1962] Crim LR 52 (CCA); R v Attfield [1961] 3 All ER 243 (CCA); R v Stafford [1968] 3 All ER 752 (CCA); R v Gray (1973) 58 Cr App R 177. 31 People (Attorney-General) v Byrne [1974] IR 1. 32 R v Allan [1969] 1 All ER 91 (CA). 33 Walters v R [1969] 2 AC 26 (PC); the direction upheld in this case is criticised in L J Blom– Cooper, “The Quantum of the Burden of Proof in a Criminal Trial” (1969) 32 MLR 217 at 218– 20; but it was also upheld, with a preference for the time-honoured formula “beyond reasonable doubt”, in Ferguson v R [1979] 1 All ER 877 (PC). 34 Walters v R [1969] 2 AC 26 at 30 quoting R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82 at 89 (PC). 35 R v Ching (1976) 63 Cr App R 7. 36 R v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 5. The circumstances are most unusual and may be contrasted with those in R v Gibson [1983] 3 All ER 263 (CA) where an appeal was allowed because the direction on burden and standard of proof had been given only once. 37 United States v Hall 854 F 2d 1036; 1988 US App at 1043 (7th Cir 1988). 38 United States v Hall 854 F 2d 1036; 1988 US App at 1044 (7th Cir 1988). 39 Richard A Posner, Reflections on Judging, 2013, p 65. 40 For England, see [9020] nn 27–31 and R v Bentley [2001] 1 Cr App R 307 at [42]. For Canada, see R v Lifchus [1997] 3 SCR 320 at [39] (“sure”); R v Russell (2000) 192 DLR (4th) 585. For New Zealand, see R v Wanhalla [2007] 2 NZLR 573 at [20]–[56] (CA) (“sure”). 41 Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 593 per Fullagar J. 42 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1 at 11. 43 Bullard v R [1957] AC 635 at 642. 44 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654. 45 Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 595. See also Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373 at [69]. 46 See also Sir Owen Dixon, “A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ at 266. See also Pryor v R (1969) 43 ALJR 388; Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28;WvR(2006) 16 Tas R
1 (CCA). For the dangers of the direction that it is for the jury to decide which side to believe without an indication that they must acquit if they do not know whom to believe, see R v Lapuse [1964] VR 43 (FC) and R v Smith [1964] VR 217 (FC). 47 In R v Chatzidimitriou (2000) 1 VR 493 it was not held wrong for the trial judge to have refused to define “doubt”, “reasonable doubt” and “beyond reasonable doubt”, nor was it wrong to have acceded to the jury’s request for access to a dictionary. 48 Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 18. See also Faraj v R (1980) 31 ALR 472 (WA CCA); R v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422 (CCA); R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554 (CCA) (criticising lengthy directions and those which discuss examples of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the topic of mathematical certainty); R v Chedzey (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 (WA CCA) (“beyond any theoretical possibility of doubt”, “beyond any skerrick of doubt”); R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 at 195 (per King CJ: “To direct or even invite a jury to subject a doubt which it entertains …, to a process of analysis or evaluation in order to determine whether it is reasonable, is an error of law”); R v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92 at 94–5 (CCA) (discussing distinction between “absolute certainty or scientific certainty and a state of persuasion beyond reasonable doubt”); R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 at 117 (CCA); R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 (FC); R v Condo (1992) 62 A Crim R 11 (WACCA); R v Krasniqi (1993) 61 SASR 366 (CCA); R v Holman [1997] 1 Qd R 373 (CA); R v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370; R v Anderson (2001) 127 A Crim R 116;R v Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545; R v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595; R v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233 at [59]–[70]; R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 at [54]–[60]. 49 Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28 at 32–3; La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62; Van Leeuwen v R (1981) 36 ALR 591. 50 Bartho v R (1978) 19 ALR 418. 51 R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203 at 430 (CCA). 52 Murray v R (2002) 211 CLR 193 at [57]; R v Molloy (2008) 102 SASR 452 at [54]–[59]. See [9020] n 23. 53 R v Goncalves (1997) 99 A Crim R 193 (WACCA); Boonudnoon v R (2002) 172 FLR 111 at [38]. 54 R v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136. 55 R v Clarke (2005) 159 A Crim R 281 at [53]. In New South Wales a stricter view is taken: the words “beyond reasonable doubt” should not be explained unless counsel’s address necessitates it or the jury requests it: R v RWB (2010) 202 A Crim R 209 at [50]. 56 Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 at 225. 57 R v Butler [2010] 1 Qd R 325 at [107]. 58 R v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219. See also R v Clarke (1995) 78 A Crim R 226. 59 Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593 at [142]–[149]. 60 McGreevy v DPP [1973] 1 All ER 503;R v P [2008] 2 Cr App R 6. Though the direction is often called for in circumstantial evidence cases, it can be appropriate in direct evidence cases, since it is a direction which is only an amplification of the rule that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt: Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 502. Further, it is not correct that the accused must demonstrate that two inferences — one consistent with innocence and one consistent with guilt — are equally open: at 503. See also Holland v United States 348 US 121 (1954); Police v Pereira [1977] 1 NZLR 547; R v Cooper [1978] SCR 860. 61 R v Hodge (1838) 3 Lew CC 227. See also Burrell v R (2007) 190 A Crim R 148 at [163]–[165] and B L Berger, “The Rule in Hodge’s Case: Rumours of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated” (2005) 84 Can Bar Rev 47. And see Brooks v Police (2013) 116 SASR 234 at [28] 62 Grant v R (1975) 11 ALR 503; see also Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234; Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82; R v Poulter (1978) 19 SASR 370; Szekely v R (1978) 19 SASR 431 (CCA); R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 (CCA); Faraj v R (1980) 31 ALR 472 at 479 and 483 (WA CCA); R v Lawrence (1980) 32 ALR 72 at 124 (NSW CCA); Stanton v R [1981] WAR 185 (CCA); R v
Milinkovic (1985) 17 A Crim R 122 (SA CCA); R v Sorby [1986] VR 753 (FC); Shepherd v R (No 5) (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 578; Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 502; Lyons v R (1992) 1 Tas R 193 (CCA); Stevens v R (2005) 222 ALR 40 at [26]; R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 at [20]; R v KDY (2008) 185 A Crim R 270 at [20]–[22]; Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581 at [52]. The direction corresponds with the reasoning process to be employed by the trier of fact on issues to be proved by circumstantial evidence: Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375. 63 H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 852–3. 64 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 634; Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 104; R v Smith (1985) 20 A Crim R 130 (Qld CCA). The rule applies only in criminal cases; in civil cases competing explanations need only be excluded on the probabilities: Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 40 FCR 303 at 321 (FC). 65 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 252. 66 R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 374 (CCA); Berlyn v Brouskos (2002) 134 A Crim R 111 at [32]. 67 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 252. 68 McGreevy v DPP [1973] 1 All ER 503 (HL); Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 105. They may certainly be omitted where the circumstantial evidence is not a major question: R v Ketchup [1982] Qd R 732 (CCA); Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 at 240 (CCA). 69 R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 379 (CCA), quoting from W W Wills, Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 7th ed, 1936, p 324. 70 R v Duong (2011) 110 SASR 296 at [75]. 71 R v Tillott (1991) 53 A Crim R 46 at 50 (NSWCCA). 72 R v Duncan (2011) 109 SASR 479 at [25]. 73 R v Agbim [1979] Crim LR 171 (CA). 74 Thomas v R [1972] NZLR 34 (CA). 75 R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; R v Keenan (2009) 252 ALR 198 at [128]; Cooper v R (2012) 293 ALR 17 at [101]; Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581 at [53]. 76 Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 535–9, 570 and 599. Deane J preferred a slightly less strict and general approach at 626–7; 313. Cf the degree of proof where similar fact evidence is involved (see [21085]). For the same principle in a civil case, see Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 (CA). See also R v Beble [1979] Qd R 278 at 289 (CCA);Weeder v R (1980) 71 Cr App R 228 at 231; cf T C Brennan, “Circumstantial Evidence” (1930) 4 ALJ 106 at 108. 77 Re Belhaven and Stenton Peerage (1875) 1 App Cas 278 at 279 (HL); Thomas v R [1972] NZLR 34 at 37–8 and 40 (CA); R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 373 (CCA). Hence though evidence (eg epidemiological evidence) showing a possibility does not by itself satisfy the requirement of proof on a balance of probabilities, taken with other evidence, it may: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [78]–[98]. See also R v Dickman (Notable British Trials Series) (1910) pp 185–6;Woolley v Dunford (1972) 3 SASR 243 at 281–2. 78 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 242. 79 Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 358; Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 104. See also Gaetani v The Trustees of the Christian Brothers [1988] Aust Torts Rep 80-156 at 67,393–4 (Tas SC). 80 Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 at 169. 81 Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626 at 644. 82 R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 374 (CCA). 83 R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 375 (CCA). 84 Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983, p 122. 85 See H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842
at 850–1. See also eg R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 (FC), which was overruled by R v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 (FC). 86 For example, the identity of the accused and the guilty man (R v Rothery (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451 at 459 (FC)) or size of lobsters in a prosecution for possessing undersized lobsters: Moss v Baines [1974] WAR 7 at 11 (FC). 87 R v Dener [1969] NZLR 763 (CA) (lie about accused’s movements). 88 R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 59–60 (CA and CCA); Penney v R (1998) 155 ALR 605; cf R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123 at [25]–[28], [44]–[47] and [50]–[54]; R v Koeleman (2000) 2 VR 20 at [28]; R v Nguyen (2001) 118 A Crim R 479 at [104]–[105]; R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166 at [73]–[77]; R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 at [31]. 89 Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573. The decision was a response to a debate about Chamberlain’s case: Dominguez v R (1985) 63 ALR 181 at 191–3 (Fed C of AFC); R v Sorby [1986] VR 753 (FC); R v Perera [1986] 1 Qd R 211 (CCA); R v Shepherd (1988) 16 NSWLR 1 (CCA); R v Shepherd (1988) 86 ALR 387 (NSW CCA); R v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 (FC); R v Fyffe [1991] 2 VR 72 (FC). See also R v Cosgrove (1988) 34 A Crim R 299 (NSWCCA); R v Garth (1990) 49 A Crim R 298 (Vic CCA);R v Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 (FC); R v Rogerson (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 at 545 (NSWCCA); R v Jones [1993] 1 Qd R 676 (CA); Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 204; Stratford v Ministry of Transport [1992] 1 NZLR 486; R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim 180 at [29]; Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217 at [664]–[694]; D L Hamer, “The Continuing Saga of the Chamberlain Direction: Untangling the Chains and Cables of Criminal Proof” (1997) 23 Mon L Rev 43; W A N Wells, Natural Logic, Judicial Proof and Objective Facts, 1994, pp 7–81; R v Kotzman [1999] 2 VR 123; R v Koeleman (2000) 2 VR 20; R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 at [39]–[41]; Burrell v R (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; R v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378; Wilson v R (2011) 33 VR 340 at [175]. For earlier authority to the same effect, see R v Grant [1964] SASR 331 at 336–7 (CCA). For a slightly different approach, see R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618 at [64]. 90 Minniti v R (2006) 196 FLR 431. The position is the same for lies: Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [44] (not intermediate indispensable fact) and [15220]. Of course, an item of circumstantial evidence is not to be taken into account unless it has been established: Dalton v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 279 at [73]. 91 R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 at [107]. 92 Walford v McKinney [1997] 2 VR 353 at 357 (CA); R v D (1998) 71 SASR 99 at 99–100 and 104 (CCA); R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123 at [21]; R v Koeleman (2000) 2 VR 20 at [28]. 93 R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 559 (NSWCCA); R v Fletcher [1998] 2 Qd R 437; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 at [154]. 94 See [21050] n 133. For other types of uncharged similar fact evidence, see R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 242 (NSWCCA) (standard of proof of similar facts is beyond reasonable doubt where those facts may become “indispensable intermediate facts”). 95 R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 231 (NSWCCA). 96 R v Davidson (2009) 75 NSWLR 150 at [10], [19], [24] and [27]. 97 R v Davidson (2009) 75 NSWLR 150 at [74]. 98 R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607 at 612 per Humphreys J (CCA); see [7105] above and see also Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj [1970] AC 913 (PC); Murray v Murray (1960) 33 ALJR 521; Mizzi v R (1960) 105 CLR 659; Sodeman v R (1936) 55 CLR 192 (PC) (insanity); R v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1 (CCA) (diminished responsibility); R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325 (CCA) (fitness to plead); R v Bradley (No 2) (1986) 85 FLR 111 (SC(NT)) (fitness to plead); R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429 at 435 (CCA); Corry v Dorron; Ex parte Corry [1985] 1 Qd R 31 (FC). 99 See Thurtell v Beaumont (1823) 1 Bing 339 (CB); Chalmers v Shackell (1834) 6 C & P 475; Willnett v Harmer (1839) 8 CB 695; Elfie A Issaias v Marine Insurance Co Ltd (1923) 15 LI L Rep 186 (CA) and New York v Heirs of Phillips [1939] 3 All ER 952 at 954 (PC).
100 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691. See also Clark v Flanagan (1934) 52 CLR 416; Briginshaw v
Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; Doe d Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PCC 502 (PC); Motchall v Massoud [1926] VLR 273; Lek v Matthews (1927) 29 Lloyd LR 141 at 164 (HL); Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247 (CA); Slattery v Mance [1962] 1 QB 676; Re Dellow’sWillTrusts; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Institute of Cancer Research [1964] 1 All ER 771; Nischina Trading Co Ltd v Chiyoda Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 QB 449 (CA); Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449; Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 174 (FC); Leeks v XY (2008) 21 VR 118 at [9]– [11]. A distinction could be attempted between cases in which the party with the legal burden has to prove the commission of a crime and those in which the party with the legal burden has to negative it, but this has not been done, and it is doubtful whether it would work satisfactorily in practice. See also Exchange Hotel Ltd v Murphy [1947] SASR 112; McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157 (FC); Tracius v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 687 (FC); Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board v Tallow Products Pty Ltd (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 370 (CA); Lemmer v Bertram (1971) 2 SASR 397; Poole v Hunt (1979) 22 SASR 293. It has been suggested that some cases adopt a “flexible standard”, under which the standard of proof varies according to the seriousness of the issues, while others adopt a “prior probability approach”, under which the standard remains fixed but the degree of evidence needed to satisfy it varies because more serious events are said to be less probable: M Redmayne, “Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation” (1999) 62 MLR 167 at 176–7. See also P Mirfield, “How Many Standards of Proof Are There?” (2009) 125 LQR 31. 101 Eg ACCC v Maritime Union of Australia (2001) 114 FCR 472 at [52]–[54]. 102 For examples see J D Heydon, Competition and Consumer Law, [140.430] n 1. 103 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [72]. 104 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 350. 105 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362–3. 106 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449. 107 Barten v Williams (1978) 20 ACTR 10. See also Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 26 ALR 609 (Fed C of A); Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 26 ALR 247 at 255 (AAT). And see Willcox v Sing [1985] 2 Qd R 66 (FC) (civil negligence proceedings potentially affecting reputation and earning capacity of professional man) and Forster v Hunter New England Area Health Service (2010) 77 NSWLR 495 at [23]–[24] (interim damages payments). 108 Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [1984] AC 74 citing Wright v Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191 at 210; R v Schafferius [1987] 1 Qd R 381 (CCA) (unsoundness of mind leading to compulsory detention in hospital). 109 Clark v NZI Life Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 11 at 16. 110 G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387. 111 Re H (Minors) (sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] AC 563, construing s 31(2) of the Children Act 1989, and overruling Re G (Minor) [1987] 1 WLR 1461 (which has been read as calling for a higher standard). See also WK v SR (1997) 22 Fam LR 592 at [26] and [46]–[47]; Taylor v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706 (FC); Tait v Phathaisong [2000] FLC 93-049 (FC); Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee [2009] 1 NZLR 1 (CA); Re B (children) (sexual abuse: standard of proof) [2009] 1 AC 11 (HL); In re D (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland intervening) [2008] 4 All ER 992 (HL). 112 Shaw v Wolf (1998) 83 FCR 113 at 123–4. 113 Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1. 114 Wati v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 71 FCR 103 at 113; Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1 at [351]. 115 Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31 at [61]–[65].
116 Nominal Defendant v Owens (1978) 22 ALR 128 at 132 (Fed C of A FC), quoting from
Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 5; see Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5, 310 and 318–19. At 305 and 370 Kitto J said: “One does not pass from the realm of conjecture into the realm of inference until some fact is found which positively suggests, that is to say provides a reason, special to the particular case under consideration, for thinking it likely that in that actual case a specific event happened or a specific state of affairs existed.” The evidence must give “rise to a reasonable and definite inference, not merely to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability”: Trustees of the Property of Cummins (a bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278 at [34]. 117 Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141, quoting from Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 5. 118 [9060]–[9080]. 119 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 347 per Latham CJ. 120 In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259. 121 Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162; Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Business Reports Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-577 at 44,007 (Fed C of A). Statute may provide to the contrary: In the Marriage of Lindsey (1995) 128 FLR 46 (Fam C of AFC). 122 R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359 (CA), relying inter alia on Anderson v R (1993) 177 CLR 520 at 536; Law v Deed [1970] SASR 374; R v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 640 (CCA); R v Halden (1983) 9 A Crim R 30 (FC); and overruling R v Chamberlain [1983] 2 VR 511 (FC) and, in part, R v Ali [1996] 2 VR 49 (FC); see also Weaver v Samuels [1971] SASR 116; R v Thompson (1975) 11 SASR 217 at 221 (CCA); R v Stehbens (1976) 14 SASR 240 at 245–6 (CCA); Bierkowski v Pearson (1971) 18 FLR 110 (ACTSC); Browne v Smith (1974) 4 ALR 114 (NTSC); R v O’Neill [1979] 2 NSWLR 528 (CCA); R v Taggart (1979) 1 Cr App R 144 at 149; R v Gardiner [1982] 2 SCR 368; Bresnehan v R (1992) 1 Tas R 234 at 244–5 (CCA); Langridge v R (1996) 17 WAR 346 (CCA); R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 (CCA); R v Haydon (2001) 80 SASR 560; R v Lobban (2001) 80 SASR 550. Cf R v Welsh [1983] 1 Qd R 592 (FC) (balance of probabilities); R v Jobson [1989] 2 Qd R 464 (CCA); R v Nardozzi [1995] 2 Qd R 87 (CA) (which three cases were overruled in R v Morrison [1999] 1 Qd R 397 (CA)); Williams v New York 337 US 241 (1949); Anon, “Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony” 81 Harv L Rev 821 (1968). 123 R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359 (CA), approved in R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 at 281; see also R v Capobianco (1978) 20 ACTR 29; R v Tait (1979) 46 FLR 386 at 396 (Fed C of A FC); R v Haydon (2001) 80 SASR 560 (FC); R v Lobban (2001) 80 SASR 550 (FC). Cf R v Aloia [1983] WAR 133 at 136 (FC) (“some evidence”); R v Bukvic (2010) 107 SASR 405 124 Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466. 125 In Re a Solicitor; Ex parte The Prothonotary (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53 (FC); Ex parte A-G (Cth); Re a Barrister and Solicitor (1972) 20 FLR 234 at 246 (ACT FC); Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 227 (so construing Bhandari v Advocates Committee [1956] 3 All ER 742 at 744–5 (PC)); New South Wales Bar Assn v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231 at 238 (CA); R v Hampshire County Council; Ex parte Ellerton [1985] 1 All ER 599 (CA); Versteegh v Nurses Board of South Australia (1992) 60 SASR 128; Kerin v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee (1996) 67 SASR 149; Bannister v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699 at 711–12 (CA); Z v Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] 1 NZLR 65 (CA), aff’d [2009] 1 NZLR 1 (SC). Cf R v Police Complaints Board; Ex parte Madden [1983] 2 All ER 353; T v Medical Board of South Australia (1992) 58 SASR 382 at 391 (FC) (sexual misconduct with patient charges against medical practitioner); Re a Solicitor [1993] QB 69 (DC of QBD); Campbell v Hamlet [2005] 3 All ER 1116 (PC). See also [9050] and Mercer v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [1968] VR 72. 126 Willcox v Sing [1985] 2 Qd R 66 (FC). 127 E M Morgan, Some problems of proof under the Anglo-American system of litigation, 1956, p 82;
Uniform Rules 1.04, see Addington v Texas 441 US 418 (1979). 128 Countess Dowager of Shelburne v Earl of Inchiquin (1784) 1 Bro CC 338 at 341; Roberts & Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555; cf Earl v Hector Whaling Ltd [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 459 (CA). See also Re Snowden (dec’d) [1979] Ch 528. 129 Bhandari v Advocates Committee [1956] 3 All ER 742 (PC); Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 (FC). See [9050]. 130 Piers v Piers (1849) 2 HLC 331 at 370; Mahadervan v Mahadervan [1964] P 233 at 236 (DC). 131 Moorhouse v Lord (1863) 10 HLC 272 at 286 (HL). 132 See eg in Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536 at 563–4. 133 Re Cleaver (dec’d); Cleaver v Insley [1981] 2 All ER 1018 at 1024. See also In the Estate of Fuld (dec’d) (No 3); Hartley v Fuld [1968] P 675 at 685. 134 Dingwall v F Wharton (Shipping) Ltd [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 213 at 216 (HL). 135 Murray v Murray (1960) 33 ALJR 521 at 524. And see generally Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 136 Eg Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638. 137 Eg Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64. 138 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332. 139 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 355–6. 140 Fernandez v Government of Singapore [1971] 2 All ER 691 (HL). 141 Mabo v Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78 at 86. 142 [15005]. 143 Treatise on Judicial Evidence, 1825, Ch 17; P Roberts and A Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence, 2004, pp 116–32. 144 Such techniques are canvassed in L J Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, 1977; R Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983; M O Finkelstein and W B Fairley, “A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence” (1970) 83 Harv L Rev 489; L H Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process” (1971) 84 Harv L Rev 1329, see also pp 1801 and 1810 for continuation of debate; G L Williams, “The Mathematics of Proof” [1979] Crim LR 297 at 340; L J Cohen, “The Logic of Proof” [1980] Crim L Rev 91, and see p 103 for a rejoinder by Glanville Williams; and J D Jackson, “Probability and Mathematics in Court” (1980) 31 NILQ 239. See also A Ligertwood, “The Uncertainty of Proof” (1976) 10 MULR 367; R Eggleston, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” (1977) 4 Mon L Rev 1; R Eggleston, “Probabilities and Proof” (1963) 4 MULR 180; R Eggleston, “Focusing on the Defendant” (1987) 61 ALJ 58; K J Carruthers, “Some Observations on the Standard of Proof in Marine Insurance Cases, with Special Reference to the Popi M Case” (1988) 62 ALJ 199; A L Tyree, “Probability Theory and the Law of Evidence” (1984) 8 Crim LJ 224; D L Hamer, “The Civil Standard of Proof Uncertainty: Probability, Belief and Justice” (1994) 16 Syd L Rev 506; D H Hodgson, “The Scales of Justice; Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-Finding” (1995) 69 ALJ 731; D H Hodgson, “A Lawyer Looks at Bayes’ Theorem” (2002) 76 ALJ 109; A Ligertwood, “Avoiding Bayes in DNA Cases” (2003) 77 ALJ 317. 145 Re JS (a minor) [1981] Fam 22 at 29 (CA). 146 People v Collins 438 P 2d 33 (1968). 147 TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345. The rest of the court decided the case upon the quite different basis that the evidence adduced was just sufficient to prove negligence. See S Simpson and M Orlov, “An Application of Logic to the Law” (1980) 4 UNSWLJ 415;West v GIO (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 70. 148 State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31; Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas SR 360. 149 State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 at 32–3; R v Mitchell (1997) 130 ACTR 48 at 53. For a purported use of probability theory, see Rose v Abbey Orchard Property
Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Rep 80-121 at 68,928–9 (NSW CA). 150 W B Fairley and F Mosteller, “A Conversation about Collins” (1974) 44 U Chic L Rev 242. 151 S v S [1972] AC 24; R v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44. See also R v Gian [2010] Crim LR 409 (CA). 152 But not completely unknown; fingerprint or other forensic matching is often decisive. 153 Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 227–8 (CA). 154 R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 at 374–5; R v Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [22]; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 at [191] (the rejection of Bayes’ Theorem arises because it “involves subjectively attaching numerical values to evidence and usurps the rule of the jury”). R v GK also discusses authorities on the “prosecutor’s fallacy” in relation to statistical DNA evidence: at [47]–[60]. On that subject see also R v Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493; R v Keir (2002) 127 A Crim R 198; Aytugrul v R (2010) 205 A Crim R 157; R v Dlugosz [2013] 1 Cr App R 32. 155 R v Chedzey (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 (WACCA). 156 R v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [55]–[61]. See [29075]. 157 Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 at 262 (CA) per Mahoney JA. 158 See generally J C Wood, “The Submission of No Case to Answer in Criminal Trials — The Quantum of Proof” (1961) 77 LQR 491; W L Morison, “The Quantum of Proof in Relation to Motions for Non Suits and Verdicts by Direction” in H H Glass (Ed) Seminars on Evidence, 1970, Ch 2, H H Glass, “Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842, H H Glass, “Acquittals by Direction” (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 11 and H H Glass, M H McHugh and F M Douglas, The Liability of Employers in Damages for Personal Injury, 2nd ed, 1979, Ch 15. See also [11080]–[11095]. 159 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 242, 247; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 67–9 (CA and CCA). 160 G L Williams, “The Application for a Directed Verdict” [1965] Crim LR 343; H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 846. 161 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410, following R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 and not following R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 (CA). See [11095]–[11105]. 162 See H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 847; Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 151 (PC); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410 (FC); J Thomson, “No Case Submissions” (1997) 71 ALJ 207 at 208–9. 163 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658; Harris v Pandava (1975) 14 Tas R 50; R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321 at 337 (CCA); Torrance v Cornish (1985) 79 FLR 87 (NSW SC). See [11095] 164 Practice Note [1962] 1 All ER 448. 165 Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 436 (CA); see also Bridges v North London Railway Co (1874) LR 7 HL 213 at 233; Shirt v Wyong Shire Council [1978] 1 NSWLR 631 at 648 (CA). 166 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410 (FC); R v Stewart; Ex parte A-G [1989] 1 Qd R 590 (FC). 167 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 659. See also Benney v Dowling [1959] VR 237; Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 at 442; Ex parte Jones; Re Macreadie (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 136; Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39 (FC); Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Gorman [1973] VR 570 at 580. 168 “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 847. See also E J Edwards, “Proof and Suspicion” (1969–70) 9 UWA L Rev 169; R M Eggleston, Evidence: Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983. Glass JA’s views have been criticised by J Thomson, “No Case Submissions” (1997) 71 ALJ 207 at 210–18, who favours the view that a prima facie case must be made out with respect to each element of the charge if the no case submission is to be rejected.
169 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658. 170 Practice Note [1962] 1 All ER 448. 171 For example, the only identification witness says in cross-examination: “It probably was the
accused but I cannot be sure”. 172 G L Williams, “The Application for a Directed Verdict” [1965] Crim LR 343 at 346. 173 Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 at 319; R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 at 1062 (CA); Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 151 (PC);Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 429 and 436 (CA); R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321 (CCA); Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256 (CCA); R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 67–9 (CA and CCA); Gebert v R (1992) 60 SASR 110 (CCA); Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482; R v Illingworth (2000) 127 A Crim R 302. To the contrary are R v Smith (1865) 34 LJMC 153 (CCCR); Wilson v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 (FC); Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VR 505 at 512; and R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 at 104–5 (WA CCA) (overruled in Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482 at 491 (CCA)); Cox v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12. There is language in May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 apparently equating the civil and the criminal position, but this is not what it means, read in context: see H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 848–9 and Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 436 (CA). There are also ambiguous dicta in Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 at 442: see H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 849–50. Those dicta, read in context, support the criminal standard as applying in criminal cases. The same applies in the United States: United States v Taylor 464 F 2d 240 (1972); United States v Prout 526 F 2d 380 (1976); cf United States v Feinberg 140 F 2d 592 (1944). 174 Bressington v Cmr for Railways (NSW) (1947) 75 CLR 339 at 353. 175 Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 429 (CA); Western Australia v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155. 176 Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 at 207; Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 at 624 (“such evidence as, if believed and if left uncontradicted and unexplained, could be accepted by the jury as proof”); R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 at 1062 (“the Crown’s evidence, taken at its highest”); Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 151 (PC); Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 429 (CA); Towers v R (1984) 75 FLR 77 at 80 (NSW CCA); R v JMR (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 (NSW CCA); Case Stated by Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 70 A Crim R 323 at 326–7 (SA CCA); R v Morris (1997) 98 A Crim R 408; R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 at 130 (CCA). There is a dispute in relation to “no case” submissions in civil cases. The view stated in the text is supported by Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 225 at 241 (Fed C of A); Australian Securities Commission v Macleod (1993) 40 FCR 155 at 157. It is opposed by Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 239 (FC); Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 at 8–9 (Fed C of A). 177 Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 429 (CA) per Glass JA. 178 Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 443; Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 at [16]–[17], [42], [117]–[119]. 179 De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 at 4; Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 at [1]–[4]. 180 Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 431 (CA); cf Samuels JA at 438–9, who considered that wider resort to the defendant’s evidence is permissible at least in committal proceedings. 181 R v Rothery (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451 at 461 (FC). 182 R v Brent [1973] Crim LR 295 (CA); R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 552. 183 Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 151 (PC). 184 Dublin Wicklow and Wexford Rail Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155 at 1168, 1187, 1202,
1216 and 1217 (HL); Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 443. See generally, H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 843. 185 The view that there can be is supported by the following civil cases: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 330–1; Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 (FC); Rasomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 216 at 226–9 (FC). The contrary view is supported by the following criminal cases: Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 at 442–3; Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 151 (PC); Torrance v Cornish (1985) 79 FLR 87 (NSW SC); Myers v Claudianos (1990) 95 ACTR 1 (SC); Cox v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12 at 14–15; Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482 (FC); Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (2001) 122 A Crim R 166 at [31]–[50]. 186 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 247. 187 Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 419. See also R v Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App R 318; United States v Shepherd [1977] 2 SCR 1067. Cf R v Cambridge [1994] 2 All ER 760 (CA). 188 Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 at 624 (PC); Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601 at 607; R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 at 88. 189 R v McDonald [1991] Crim LR 122 (CA) (self serving letter by accused but tendered by prosecution). 190 R v Newcastle Justices; Ex parte Hindle [1984] 1 All ER 770 (DC of QBD). 191 R v Bailey [1983] 2 All ER 503 (CCA). 192 R v Milnes (1983) 33 SASR 211 (CCA). 193 R v Ayoub [1984] 2 NSWLR 511 (CCA) (mental illness); indeed this was said to be the relevant standard whether the issue was raised by the accused, the Crown or the court. 194 R v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306. 195 As to the position in a civil case before a jury, see the discussion in Cofield v Waterloo Case Co Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 363, and Fletcher v T C Whittle Pty Ltd (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 419 (CA). 196 NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 62–66; Qld: Justices Act 1886 ss 104(2) and 108(1); Vic: Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 Sch 5 cl 23; SA: Summary Procedure Act 1921 s 107. See Forsyth v Rodda (1988) 37 A Crim R 50 (Fed C of A); Thorp v Abbotto (1992) 34 FCR 366 (FC). See Saffron v DPP (1989) 16 NSWLR 397 (CA); Kolalich v DPP (NSW) (1991) 173 CLR 222. 197 Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 449. 198 See ALRC 26 [474]–[475] and [994]–[1008], Bill clauses 129–133, Appendix C [285]–[297]; ALRC 38 [236]–[237], Bill clauses 136–138. 199 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, see [9050] above and W K v SR (1997) 22 Fam LR 592 at [26] and [46]–[47]; Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 at [64]–[68] (FC); Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39 at 70; Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537 at [110] and [139]; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [401]–[416]; Bale v Mills (2011) 282 ALR 336 at [70]–[72]. As at common law, it has been assumed that the court must experience an “actual persuasion”: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [136]; Communication, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v ACCC (2007) 162 FCR 466 at [31]; R v Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 at [55]; Warner v Hung (No 2) (2011) 297 ALR 56 at [48]. There is authority for that view: Strong v Woolworths Ltd t/as Big W (2012) 246 CLR 182 at [76] (cf the majority at [30] and [34]); Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Hellicar (2012) 286 ALR 501 at [255]. According to ALRC 26 [998], the provision does not require actual belief: but that is not what its language says. In civil circumstantial evidence cases it suffices if circumstances raise a more probable inference: Vines v ASIC (2007) 73 NSWLR 451 at [813] and can establish even a serious allegation (at [811]); Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201 at [82]. 200 In the Marriage of Lindsey (1995) 128 FLR 46 (Fam C of A FC); In the Marriage of Reilly (1995) 19 Fam LR 213 (Halligan JR).
201 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Sigalla (No 4) (2011) 80 NSWLR 113 at [94].
That is, Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 has been reversed and Jendell Australia Pty Ltd v Kesby [1983] 1 NSWLR 127 restored. 202 See [11075]. 203 R v Vincent (2002) 133 A Crim R 206 at [19]. 204 Namely, Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336: see R v Petroulias (No 8) (2007) 175 A Crim R 417 at [17].
[page 371]
Chapter Six The Functions of Judge and Jury
Section 1 — The General Rule — The Functions of Judge and Jury A — INTRODUCTION Significance of distinct roles [11001] General The traditional separateness of the judicial role and the jury role is significant. Historically, the separation of the functions of the judge and jury has left so deep a mark upon English jurisprudence that the rules and habits of juristic thought, which it has engendered, are scarcely touched by the present-day decline of the jury trial in civil matters. If jury trial is ever abolished, many of these rules and conceptions will yet remain as long as the common law system is in being. The judge sitting alone must constantly be aware of the line which divides his two quite distinct functions. And the proper observation of the distinction is by no means a mere academic matter, but of the highest practical importance in its bearing on the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.1
A due appreciation of the respective functions of the judge and jury is therefore essential to a proper understanding of the law of evidence. The general rule is discussed in this section, and some of the more direct methods of judicial control are considered in Section 2.
[11005] Law/fact distinction The general rule is that questions of law must be determined by the judge and questions of fact must be determined by the jury, but there are some special cases as well as exceptions to the general rule. It is clear that, as part of this general rule, questions as to admissibility of evidence are questions for the judge to decide.2 More subject to argument is the rule that it is for the judge to decide whether there [page 372]
is any — and, if so, what — evidence which can legally be considered by a jury as satisfying a legal requirement: for example, whether there is any evidence which can amount to corroboration.3
B — SOME SPECIAL CASES Construction [11010] Contracts and statutes In many cases, the actual words used by the parties may be a vital consideration and, if there is any doubt concerning that which was in fact written or said, it must be determined by the jury in accordance with the general rule. Nettle JA has suggested a three-stage process in relation to jury trials involving the terms of a written contract:4 The first step is to decide whether the words of the contract have been used in the sense which they have in ordinary English or in some legal, technical or other special sense. That is a question of law for the judge.5 Secondly, if the words have been used in the sense which they have in ordinary English, it is necessary to decide the meaning of the words. That is ordinarily described as “interpretation”, and it is a question of fact for the jury.6 If the words have been used in some non-legal technical sense, the ascertainment of their meaning is also a question of fact for the jury.7 But if it is decided that the words have been used in the sense of some legal meaning, the ascertainment of that meaning is a question of law for the judge.8 Thirdly, once the meaning of the terms of the contract has been ascertained, it is necessary to determine the legal effect of the meaning of the terms as so found. That process is ordinarily described as “construction”, and it is also a question of law for the judge.9
Lord Reid has said: “The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law”.10 [page 373] Lord Reid said this on the hearing of an appeal in a criminal case from an English Divisional Court.11 The appeal was concerned with the meaning of the words “insulting behaviour” in s 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 (Eng). Lord Reid continued: [I]f the context shows that a word is used in an unusual sense the court will determine in other
words what that unusual sense is. But here there is in my opinion no question of the word “insulting” being used in an unusual sense… It is for the tribunal which decides the case to consider, not as law but as fact, whether in the whole circumstances the words of the statute do or do not as a matter of ordinary usage of the English language cover or apply to the facts which have been proved.12
Concern has been expressed lest this gives the jury too free a hand, but account must be taken of a number of limiting factors. The proper construction of a statute may require a judge to do more than decide whether words are used in an unusual sense and, if so, what the sense is. The judge may have to choose between a variety of possible meanings, including ordinary meanings of which there are sometimes more than one, and this will result in a direction on the law. Even when the sole question is the ordinary meaning of a word, the fact that it is a matter for the jury does not mean that they have an unfettered choice, for Lord Reid recognised the possibility of an appeal on the ground that “no tribunal acquainted with the ordinary use of the language could reasonably reach that decision”. The judge may therefore direct the jury that it is not open to them to give a particular meaning to ordinary words because that would be unreasonable, and, provided the judge makes it plain that the decision must be theirs, the judge can illustrate the application of a word or phrase to various factual situations including that of the instant case. Even so, there is a danger of uncertainty when a jury is left to pronounce on such general matters as the question whether property was “dishonestly” appropriated or obtained by the accused without anything more than a direction on what “dishonestly” cannot reasonably mean and some illustrations of what it can mean. There could well be contradictory verdicts in different cases concerned with substantially the same facts. If this is undesirable it is the price to be paid for the rule that, although a judge may direct an acquittal on appropriate facts, a judge has no power to direct a verdict of guilty even though satisfied that an acquittal would be perverse.13 The extent to which the words of Lord Reid quoted above can be generalised is an open question. It is tempting to say that the meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is always a matter of fact to be determined by the jury while construction is always a matter of law. There can be no doubt about the second of these propositions, but there is a good deal of authority from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in support of the view that in a civil case tried with a jury the meaning of ordinary words comes within the sphere of
[page 374] construction.14 The jury is not to be told the meaning of “beyond reasonable doubt” but can be given access to a dictionary for that purpose.15 Where all material facts are fully found and the only question is whether the facts are such as to bring the case within the provisions properly construed of some statutory enactment, the question is one of law only.16 Evidence tendered for the purpose of interpreting ordinary English words is inadmissible, for they bear their ordinary meaning,17 but evidence can be admitted to elucidate the meaning of words used in a technical or trade fashion.18 The principles have been summarised as follows. In construing a statute, evidence may be given of the meaning and usage of a word in a trade: (1) where it is clear that a word in the statute is used in a specialised or trade sense and that usage differs from the ordinary English usage of the word the courts will be more ready to conclude that the word is used in a specialised or trade usage where the statute to be construed is a revenue law directed to commerce; (2) where the word is used in a specialised or trade sense in the statute, the word has an accepted trade usage and it is necessary to determine whether that trade usage differs from the ordinary English usage; (3) where the word is used in a specialised or trade sense in the statute and it is necessary to determine whether there is an accepted trade usage as a preliminary to showing that that usage differs from the ordinary English usage; (4) where the word used in the statute is directed to a particular trade and there has not been occasion for a widespread adoption by the general public of the word or a particular denotation of the word; (5) where the trade usage assists in supplying the context or background of surrounding circumstances necessary to the construction of a word used in the statute; (6) where the trade usage may assist the court by way of background to determine whether the word used in the statute is used in a specialised or trade usage or in accordance with ordinary English usage…
While it is now too late to call into question the basis for the common law rule that evidence can not be given as to the meaning of an ordinary English word used in a modern statute, the logic underlying the rule is not compelling. It is unquestionable that the meaning of an ordinary English word is a question of fact and not law. Evidence is ordinarily to be admitted to determine questions of fact. Yet evidence is to be excluded where the fact to be established is the ordinary meaning of words. One
may well ask why. The question is not satisfactorily answered by reference to the principle that the [page 375] construction of a statute, being a matter of law, is a matter for the judge and not a jury … The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is itself far from transparent.19
However, the common law rule that evidence cannot be given as to the meaning of an ordinary English word in a statute or document (though dictionaries and other books may be examined) has been affirmed.20 It has been suggested that the justification for the rule lies in the special responsibility of judges in interpreting the written word, balancing context, surrounding circumstances and admissible extrinsic evidence.21 There is an exception to the rule where the evidence tendered is evidence that the ordinary meaning of a word has changed since the last publication of the dictionary meaning.22 It is also permissible to take into account the meaning of ordinary English words in particular industries in applying statutes relating to those industries and containing those words.23 Evidence has been admitted from experts as to the meaning of legislative phrases having specialised meaning in economics.24 It has been admitted to prove the meaning of technical terms in administrative determinations under challenge.25 Subject to the reception of evidence for the purpose of construing terms of art or technical terms in documents other than statutes,26 their interpretation is a question of law for the court on which the evidence of witnesses is inadmissible.27 It is permissible to consult a standard medical dictionary in order the better to understand medical evidence in which technical terms were employed, provided [page 376] that if some new point arises, the parties must be given a fair opportunity to deal with it.28 There is no one dictionary which has primacy.29
Defamation [11015] A compromise Fox’s Libel Act of 1792 provided that, in criminal prosecutions for libel, the jury shall, after direction by the judge on the law, give a general verdict upon the whole matter. In consequence of this statute it has come to be the practice for the judge to determine whether the document in question is capable of bearing the meaning alleged by the prosecution, while the jury decides whether it does in fact amount to a criminal libel. This has been said to be because the intention of the parties is always a question for the jury, and the meaning of the document is part of that intention;30 but the same procedure is adopted in civil cases where the intention of the parties is, to say the least, not so important as on a criminal charge.31 It is, therefore, best to regard the established practice as a compromise. A literal adherence to the rule that the construction of documents and the ordinary meaning of words is a matter of law for the judge would mean that the jury simply determines whether the alleged libel was published, and whether the circumstances from which any suggested innuendo could be inferred existed. This was the usual practice before Fox’s Libel Act, but it proved to be objectionable on political grounds, and because it contravened the jury’s right to return a general verdict in criminal cases.32
C — EXCEPTIONS Foreign law33 [11020] Foreign law as a question of fact The law of other countries is a matter of fact to be determined on the evidence adduced in a particular case. Thus, if the validity of a ceremony of marriage is among the facts in issue, proof of the ceremony will not be sufficient, for it must usually be shown to have constituted a formally valid marriage according to the law of the place of celebration. It was formerly the practice to submit evidence relating to the foreign law to the jury, but any question as to the effect of evidence as to foreign law is now decided by the judge alone in both civil and criminal cases.34 The difficulty of the points that may be involved is no doubt an ample
justification for this course. In a criminal case the evidence of foreign law is not heard by the jury.35
Reasonableness [11025] Where reasonableness is for the judge The reasonableness of a particular belief or course of conduct is essentially a [page 377] question of fact and, as such, it normally has to be determined by the jury, but, in certain civil cases, it must be decided by the judge, although the judge may leave to the jury subsidiary issues upon which the question of reasonableness ultimately depends. In an action for malicious prosecution the question whether the defendant had reasonable and probable cause for initiating the criminal proceedings must be answered by the judge.36 A similar rule applies in the case of false imprisonment. It is also the duty of the judge to determine whether the terms of a covenant in restraint of trade are reasonably necessary for the protection of the covenantee,37 but the judge may require the jury, on the unlikely assumption that trial is by jury, to find relevant facts concerning the information on which the defendant acted in the first case, and the nature of the covenantee’s business in the second.
Facts affecting the admissibility of evidence38 [11030] Conditions precedent to admissibility Sometimes the admissibility of evidence depends on certain facts. There are conditions precedent which are required to be fulfilled before evidence is admissible for the jury. Thus an oath, or its equivalent, and competency, are conditions precedent to admitting viva voce evidence; and the apprehension of immediate death to admitting evidence of dying declarations;39 a search to secondary evidence of lost writings;40 and stamp to certain written instruments: and so is consanguinity or affinity in the declarant to declarations of deceased relatives.41 The judge alone has to decide whether the condition has been fulfilled. If the proof is by witnesses, he must decide on their credibility. If counter-evidence is offered, he must receive it before he decides; and he has no right to ask the opinion of the jury on the fact as
a condition precedent.42
[page 378] Other examples are afforded where the accused objects to the reception of a confession on the ground that it was not given voluntarily,43 or a witness claims to be privileged from answering a particular question.44 In all such instances, the judge, and not the jury, must determine disputed facts, and the entirely separate nature of these preliminary or incidental issues was emphasised by the old practice under which witnesses who deposed to them were required to take a different oath, known as the “voir dire”, from that sworn by those giving evidence which was to be submitted to the jury. The trial of the incidental issues is often called “a trial within a trial”. Where it becomes apparent to the trial judge that circumstances exist which throw doubt on the admissibility of evidence, a voir dire should be held whether or not counsel requests this,45 unless it is clear that counsel does not object to the evidence. It is also probably true to say that the judge is not bound by all the exclusionary rules in determining what material to receive as proof of facts constituting a condition precedent to the admissibility of certain items of evidence, although the judge is generally as much bound by these rules when sitting alone as when there is a jury. An affidavit has been accepted in support of the contention that a person was too ill to attend court, with the result that a deposition previously made by that person could be read in evidence;46 but it is impossible to speak with any certainty concerning the exact limits of this doctrine. In New South Wales it has been held that an accused person has a statutory right to give evidence on the voir dire and this right cannot be refused for any reason.47 Hearsay statements concerning the circumstances in which a confession was made would hardly be likely to be received in the course of a dispute concerning its admissibility.48 The rule49 that if the admissibility of evidence depends upon a question of fact or on an inference of fact, the fact must be ascertained or the inference must be drawn by the judge rests upon the consideration that it is often impossible to decide the question of admissibility without disclosing the evidence on which the dispute turns. If it is alleged that a
confession was made under pressure, the dispute can often only be settled by considering the terms of the accused’s statement, and the jury could scarcely help being influenced by them even if they were to conclude that the surrounding circumstances rendered the confession inadmissible.50 [page 379] The application of the rule has given rise to four practical difficulties — the question whether the evidence of facts constituting a condition precedent to admissibility should invariably be heard in the absence of the jury, the course which should be adopted when those facts are identical with the facts in issue, the distribution of the functions of judge and jury with regard to the admissibility of confessions, and the burden and standard of proof at a trial within the trial.
[11035] Absence of the jury Two settled rules in criminal cases are, first, that the accused must be present throughout the entire trial of an indictable offence;51 and, secondly, that all the evidence should generally be given in the presence of the jury. Some qualifications are obviously necessary so far as the second of these rules is concerned, otherwise the accused might be prejudiced; and there is no doubt that the judge has power to dismiss the jury while hearing arguments on the admissibility of evidence or while holding a trial within a trial.52 In a jury trial, evidence on a voir dire is normally given in the absence of the jury. In such cases as an inquiry into the competence of a witness, which would normally be conducted before the jury, it is for the judge to decide whether prejudice to the accused is such as to require that the examination be held in their absence.53 If the inquiry is conducted in the presence of the jury, and in every case tried before a judge alone, it would seem that the evidence given, if relevant and not subject to any specific exclusionary rule, is available on any issue.54 There is authority that it need not be tendered afresh.55 However, to require that it should be (without requiring that testimony be given again) would have advantages: it would enhance clarity by fixing the parties’ minds on whether the
evidence was irrelevant or otherwise objectionable and whether conditions should be imposed on its reception. It has been held wrong for judges of their own motion to question witnesses of tender years in private in order to ascertain whether they were competent to testify, since this should have happened in open court.56 It is more controversial whether inquiries into competency should take place in the presence of the jury.57 The answers to questions to the prospective witness may affect the weight of the [page 380] witness’s evidence when it comes to be given, and it is unlikely that the judge would put them to the witness again in the presence of the jury, having decided that the witness was competent. Moreover, there is always the danger that the jury will think they are asked to withdraw because statements prejudicial to the accused are about to be made,58 and it may be better that they should remain in court while evidence concerning facts constituting a condition precedent to admissibility is given, unless it is impossible to take such evidence without disclosing matters which the judge might ultimately hold to be inadmissible. The Australian authorities59 generally hold that the inquiry should be in the absence of the jury, though a different course has been supported by reference to the particular terms of the legislation in question.60 In a civil case,61 it was held that evidence as to the system of, and personnel engaged in, keeping business records should be given in the presence of the jury. Section 189(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that if there is a jury, it is to be absent from the hearing of a preliminary question whether (a) particular evidence is evidence of an admission, or evidence to which s 138 (discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence) applies; or (b) evidence of an admission, or evidence to which s 138 applies, should be admitted. Section 189(4) provides that the jury is to be absent from the hearing of any preliminary question unless the court otherwise so orders; s 189(5)
sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to that discretionary decision. The jury is to be absent from hearings which determine whether members of the family of the accused are compellable: s 18(5). Section 192A authorises the making of a ruling under s 192 on whether and how a discretionary decision under s 135 or a decision under s 137 will be made in relation to evidence before it is tendered.62
[11040] Identity of preliminary fact with fact in issue In a leading case the issue in an action of ejectment was whether Elizabeth Stevens was legitimate. She was dead, and the defendants sought to call evidence of a declaration made by her to a solicitor when she handed him a certificate which apparently related to her parents’ marriage. Statements by deceased persons as to [page 381] pedigree are admissible by way of exception to the rule against hearsay if they were made by legitimate members of the family in question. The plaintiff argued that the judge, in the absence of the jury, ought not to receive on behalf of the defendant evidence tending to show that Elizabeth Stevens was legitimate, offered with a view to inducing him to admit her declaration. The answer given by Lord Denman CJ63 was that “neither the admissibility nor the effect of the evidence is altered by the accident that the fact which is for the judge as a condition precedent is the same fact which is for the jury in the issue”. Accordingly he allowed the declaration to be placed before the jury. The court held that, after deciding that Elizabeth Stevens was legitimate (presumably without relying on her declaration), the judge had rightly allowed this declaration to form part of the evidence to go the jury on the issue of legitimacy. The judge had heard evidence on the voir dire from both sides before deciding the preliminary question of legitimacy. This course has two disadvantages when the preliminary question of fact to be determined by the judge as a condition precedent to the admissibility of an item of evidence is identical with the issue which has ultimately to be decided by
the jury. First, it means that the judge has to sum up to the jury on an issue the judge has already decided. Secondly, it may mean that all the evidence given on the voir dire will have to be given over again, and this will certainly be so when the trial within a trial is held in the absence of the jury. In a later case considerations of this nature led Lord Penzance to reject evidence tendered on the voir dire by those denying legitimacy. He held that he ought to admit the declaration on being satisfied that those alleging legitimacy had adduced sufficient evidence of that fact for it to be left to the jury.64 On practical grounds, the course taken by Lord Penzance may be preferable to that followed by Lord Denman CJ. However that may be, there are certainly cases which involve the reception of documentary evidence and in which all that the judge can require, as a condition precedent to the admissibility of a copy, is prima facie evidence of the existence of a genuine original. Where the plaintiff succeeded in a claim on an insurance policy which the defendant alleged had never been executed, and the judge had allowed the plaintiff to give secondary evidence of the contents of the policy on the basis that the original had been lost and left the jury to decide the validity of the defendant’s contention that the policy had never existed, it was held that the course followed by the judge was the right one, for: where the objection to the reading of a copy concedes that there was primary evidence of some sort in existence… the judge must, before he admits the copy, hear and determine whether the objection is well founded. But where the objection goes to shew that the very substratum and foundation of the cause of action is wanting, the judge must not decide upon the matter, but receive the copy, and leave the main question to the jury.65
A similar situation would arise in a case in which the defendant contends that the document on which the plaintiff is relying as giving him a cause of action is forged. Cases of that type must be carefully distinguished from those in which the preliminary issue is whether a document has been lost, or which of two originals is the proper one to place before the jury.66 In such cases the question of fact to be decided by the judge is not the same as that which has to be decided by the jury. There is then no doubt that the judge must hear evidence on both sides of the voir [page 382]
dire and come to the decision on the preliminary issue instead of being content with prima facie evidence from the party arguing for admissibility. The question whether the maker of a dying declaration was under a settled hopeless expectation of death, a condition precedent to its admissibility at a trial for homicide, should on principle be decided by the judge.67 By way of contrast, on the question whether a tape-recording was the original, being one which must ultimately be determined by the jury, the judge need do no more than decide whether there is sufficient evidence to leave the issue to it.68
[11045] Confessions The question whether a confession attributed to the accused in a criminal case was ever made is of the same type as the question whether a tape-recording is genuine, and it has accordingly been held that it is for the judge to decide whether there is prima facie evidence that the confession was made, leaving the jury to determine whether it was in fact made, and was true.69 An exclusionary discretion operates on that latter question as follows:70 Where an accused by his confession admits facts not then known to his interrogators which are subsequently found to be true, this circumstance affords strong evidence that the confession was in fact made. Where, however, the accused by his confession admits only facts already known to his interrogators the probative value of the truth of what is admitted on the issue whether the confession was in fact made is less cogent and it should, in general, be excluded from the jury’s consideration of that issue in fairness to the accused because its prejudicial effect in the minds of the jury may well outweigh any probative value it has.
The question whether a confession is voluntary is determined by the judge — in the absence of the jury — on the voir dire,71 at which stage the accused may give evidence as well as call witnesses.72 In many cases the accused will seek determination of the admissibility of a confession at a trial on the voir dire. The obligation rests on the trial judge to be satisfied as to the voluntariness of a confession even if the accused does not specifically raise the matter and seek a voir dire.73 The functions of judge and jury [page 383]
in relation to evidence of a confession that may have been the subject of a voir dire were well summarised by Rich J.74 If the admissibility of the evidence depends upon the existence of the fact and the judge is not satisfied by the evidence given on the voir dire that it exists, he rejects the evidence. If he is so satisfied he admits it. But it does not follow from this that the evidence given before him on the voir dire on the question of whether the evidence should be admitted may not, in a proper case, be given again in its entirety as evidence in the trial, not of course for the purpose of inviting the jury to give a ruling on admissibility of evidence, but for the purpose of assisting them to consider whether, in their opinion, the evidence qualifies the weight of the evidence which the judge has admitted.
The truth of the confession is not directly relevant on the voir dire. It is, of course, the crucial question for the jury if the judge decides to admit the confession. The method by which a confession was obtained may have an important bearing on the question of its truth, for a statement made in consequence of violence, or some other powerful inducement, is much less likely to be true than one which is given freely, and the jury are entitled to consider the circumstances of the making of the statement in deciding on its weight and value.75 Accordingly, it has been held that, at the trial before the jury, counsel for the defence has the right to cross-examine again the witnesses who have already given evidence on the voir dire in the absence of the jury.76 No doubt the accused can again testify and presumably call witnesses concerning the method by which the confession was obtained.77 A conviction has been quashed in Ireland because an accused person who was not represented was not told of his right to crossexamine at his trial after he had cross-examined the police on the voir dire and the confession had been held admissible.78 The judge retains control over the evidence ultimately to be submitted to the jury throughout the trial. Accordingly, if, having admitted a confession as voluntary on evidence given in the absence of the jury, the judge concludes, in the light of subsequent evidence, that the confession was not voluntary, the judge may either direct the jury to disregard it, or, where there is no other evidence against the accused, direct an acquittal, or, presumably, direct a new trial.79 The circumstances in which the judge will decide to take any of these courses are likely to be rare.80 Where the truth of a confession is in issue, the jury should be told that they must be satisfied of its truth.81 It is wrong to tell them that they must be satisfied of its voluntariness.82
[11050] Confessions: the problem of the voir dire The admissibility of a confession is a matter for the court, and once it has been admitted the role of the jury is not to consider admissibility, only weight; but the [page 384] jury should be told that what weight they attach to the confession depends upon all the circumstances in which it was taken, and that it is their right to give such weight to it as they think fit.83 A confessional statement may be voluntary and yet to act upon it might be quite unsafe; it may have no probative value. Or such a statement may be involuntary and yet carry with it the greatest assurance of its reliability or truth.84
The court may often be well advised to direct the jury specifically on the credibility of the confession.85 Trials within a trial are time-wasting in cases tried by jury. They are something of an unreality in cases without a jury because the question of admissibility has to be determined by the same tribunal as that which pronounces on the issues. Elimination of the trial within a trial in cases in which the admissibility of a confession is in dispute would be achieved if the following suggestion of Lord Justice General Clyde were adopted: It would seem that there is much to be said for leaving the evidence once and for all before the jury. If the judge takes the view that the Crown has not led evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily given, he can at the end of the day direct the jury to disregard the evidence on the confession or, if the Crown case is otherwise insufficient, he may direct them to return a verdict of not guilty. But if he considers the confession was freely and voluntarily given, he leaves the matter to the jury.86
The adoption of the proposed course would, however, sometimes entail the disclosure to the jury of the terms of an inadmissible confession. As it would be difficult for them to disregard those terms, it might frequently be necessary for the judge to discharge the jury and order a new trial at which the confession would be inadmissible. At such a retrial the judge would have to decide whether the evidence given at the aborted trial should be treated as having been given on the voir dire and, if so, what reliance should be placed upon it. It is thought that this objection alone would render the proposed course unrealistic.
[11055] Confessions: permissibility of question on voir dire as to the truth of the confession Is a question to the accused on the voir dire concerning the truth of a confession permissible? One line of authorities holds it to be permissible if relevant to the credibility of the accused’s statements on the voir dire concerning the way the confession had been obtained.87 Against this it may be argued that the attitude of judge and counsel towards the conduct of the trial could hardly be unaffected by the [page 385] accused’s admission on the voir dire of having committed the crime charged.88 Another holds it impermissible.89 A third holds it permissible subject to the possibility of discretionary rejection.90 The point has been left open in the High Court.91
[11060] Cross-examination at trial about admission on voir dire Where an accused admits guilt on the voir dire, the confession is held inadmissible, and the accused then gives evidence at the trial denying guilt, can the accused be cross-examined about the admission on the voir dire?92 The House of Lords has given a negative answer. If such evidence, being relevant, were admissible at the substantive trial, an accused person would not enjoy the complete freedom that he ought to have at the voir dire to contest the admissibility of his previous statements. It is of the first importance for the administration of justice that an accused person should feel completely free to give evidence at the voir dire of any improper methods by which a confession or admission has been extracted from him, for he can almost never make an effective challenge of its admissibility without giving evidence himself. He is thus virtually compelled to give evidence at the voir dire, and if his evidence were admissible at the substantive trial, the result might be a significant impairment of his so-called “right to silence” at the trial.93
This ban on the use of a statement made on the voir dire applies to both use in chief by the prosecution as an admission, and use in crossexamination as a previous inconsistent statement to impeach the accused’s credit, whether the trial was by judge alone or by judge and jury in the normal way.94 The exclusion by a court of such admissions as a matter of
its discretionary control of a criminal trial was explicitly rejected as a satisfactory solution by the House of Lords.95 Where a confession is admitted after a voir dire, admissions made at it cannot be led against the accused.96 But the accused may be crossexamined as to credit on [page 386] statements made on the voir dire which are inconsistent with the accused’stestimony at the trial.97 Section 189(3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that on a voir dire as to the admissibility in a criminal proceeding of a defendant’s admission (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), the issue of the truth or untruth of the admission is to be disregarded unless the issue is introduced by the defendant.
[11065] Confessions: procedure on voir dire It will have been noted that a distinction has been drawn between cases where the accused denies that any confession was made, and those where the accused says that it was made only as a result of improper pressure. In the latter case alone is there an issue to be tried on the voir dire. In real life the situation will be less clear-cut. The accused may both deny some material parts of the confession, and assert that the whole was obtained by improper pressure, or the accused may admit having signed a statement but complain of having been induced to do so by threats, or misrepresentation of the contents. The Privy Council held98 that if the accused admits making the statement, but raises the issue of its voluntariness, the judge must determine that issue after holding a voir dire. If the accused admits making the statement and does not raise that issue, the judge must determine voluntariness even though the defence does not raise the issue, again after holding a voir dire. This is subject to the rights of defence counsel to indicate positively that no voir dire is desired, as discussed below.99 When the accused alleges that the confession was not made, but does not raise any issue of voluntariness, the
issue of fact whether it was made or not is purely for the jury; no voir dire need be held. Where the accused denies authorship of a written statement but admits signing it and alleges that it was improperly obtained by threats or inducement, the accused puts in issue the voluntary character of the signature and thus of the statement itself: the judge must decide the question of law as to whether the statement is admissible. If the judge admits the statement, all issues of fact as to the circumstances of the making and signing of the statement must be left for the jury to consider. It follows from the above principles that, if the accused chooses to deny making the statement, but there is material suggesting that, if it was made, it was voluntary, the judge must determine the latter question (of voluntariness), leaving the former (whether the accused made the statement) to be determined by the jury.100 The above instances were given as typical, but not exhaustive. Another is where an accused person denies making an alleged oral statement but claims that if it was so made, it was made involuntarily: the court must decide the question of law as to admissibility and, if the court admits the statement, must leave all issues of fact as to the making of the statement for the jury.101 [page 387] Procedurally those principles are to be applied as follows:102 (1) In the normal situation which arises at the vast majority of trials where the admissibility of the confession statement is to be challenged, defending counsel will notify prosecuting counsel that an objection to admissibility is to be raised, prosecuting counsel will not mention the statement in his opening to the jury, and at the appropriate time the judge will conduct a trial on the voir dire to decide on the admissibility of the statement; this will normally be in the absence of the jury, but only at the request or with the consent of the defence….103 (2) Though the case for the defence raises an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement in accordance with the principles indicated earlier in this judgment, defending counsel may for tactical reasons prefer that the evidence bearing on that issue be heard before the jury, with a single cross-examination of the witnesses on both sides, even though this means that the jury hear the impugned statement whether admissible or not.104 If the defence adopts this tactic, it will be open to defending counsel to submit at the close of the evidence that, if the judge doubts the voluntariness of the statement, he should direct the jury to disregard it, or, if the statement is essential to sustain the prosecution case, direct an acquittal. Even in the absence of such a submission, if the judge himself forms the view that the voluntariness of the statement is in doubt, he should take the like action proprio motu. (3) It may sometimes happen that the accused himself will raise for the first time when giving
evidence an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement already put in evidence by the prosecution. Here it will be a matter in the discretion of the trial judge whether to require relevant prosecution witnesses to be recalled for further cross-examination. If he does so, the issue of voluntariness should be dealt with in the same manner as indicated in paragraph (2) above. (4) Particular difficulties may arise in the trial of an unrepresented defendant, when the judge must, of course, be especially vigilant to ensure a fair trial. No rules can be laid down, but it may be prudent, if the judge has any reason to suppose that the voluntary character of a statement proposed to be put in evidence by the prosecution is likely to be in issue, that he should speak to the defendant before the trial begins and explain his rights in the matter.105
[11070] Confessions: role of prosecution counsel in seeking voir dire The procedure set out in paragraph (1) of the previous quotation has been amplified as follows:106 It is primarily the responsibility of defence counsel to inform the prosecution and the judge in advance and in the absence of the jury of an intended objection to the admissibility of statements of a defendant. On the other hand, if the position remains unclear, counsel for the prosecution is under a duty to seek clarification of the position in the absence of the jury. At the appropriate time counsel must ask the judge to request the jury to withdraw so that a matter can be raised on which the ruling of the judge is required. No discussion of an intended objection must take place in front of the jury. The judge should simply tell the jury that a matter has arisen on which his ruling is required and that they must please retire for the time being. When the voire dire has been completed, and the judge has given his ruling, the judge should give no explanation of the outcome of the voire dire to the jury.
[page 388] Gibbs CJ and Wilson J said107 there need not be a voir dire on every occasion when a confession is tendered, and said further that the judge is not bound to accede to an application made for a voir dire when there is nothing to suggest that a real question of voluntariness, unfairness or impropriety arises. For it does not advance the cause of justice to allow a voir dire which is merely used as a fishing expedition or a means of testing in advance the evidence of the Crown witnesses; and the court has a discretion to keep the examination and cross-examination of witnesses on the voir dire within reasonable bounds.108 The rule that, since the question of whether a confession was made is for the jury, the judge had to rule on the voluntariness of a confession the
judge may think was not made, has been attacked109 as an artificiality. The question whether an accused had adopted a statement inculpating him and made in his presence was a question of fact for the jury to determine in all the circumstances and on a voir dire the trial judge has merely to decide that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that he had adopted the statement.110 If the judge rules that the confession is voluntary, the jury should not be informed of the ruling on various grounds, principally that the jury may erroneously infer that the judge is critical of the defendant’s credibility.111 Section 189(8) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that if the jury was not present at a hearing to determine a preliminary question, evidence is not to be adduced in the proceeding of evidence given by a witness at the hearing unless it is inconsistent with other evidence given by the witness in the proceeding, or the witness has died.
[11075] The burden and standard of proof at a trial within a trial It was seen at [7075] that decisions on the question of which party bears the burden of establishing a particular issue are generally decisions on the substantive law. Decisions as to which party bears the burden of establishing a fact constituting a condition precedent to the admissibility of an item of evidence belong to the law of evidence. However, there is very little authority on the subject, no doubt because as a practical matter the conditions of admissibility have to be established by those alleging that they exist. It is settled that the burden of proving the facts constituting a condition precedent to the admissibility of confessions112 and dying declarations113 is borne by the person seeking to tender them in evidence. These items of evidence are admissible as exceptions to the rule against hearsay, and it is reasonable to suppose that the burden of establishing the facts rendering hearsay admissible is always borne by the party tendering the evidence. [page 389]
In the days when interested witnesses were incompetent it was held that the burden of establishing that incompetency rested on the party alleging it.114 The persuasive burden of establishing the competence of its witnesses beyond reasonable doubt is borne by the prosecution, though the evidential burden of raising the issue is naturally upon the accused.115 In the case of a claim to privilege by a witness, the burden of establishing the privilege would presumably be borne by the witness. Where the issue is one which must be decided once and for all by the judge, it would seem proper to hold that, in civil cases, the preliminary fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the judge on the balance of probabilities. So far as the tendering of evidence by the prosecution in criminal cases is concerned, the English authorities suggest that the preliminary fact must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.116 It has, however, been held in Australia with regard both to confessions117 and to dying declarations,118 and in United States Federal Courts119 with regard to confessions, that the prosecution need only establish facts justifying admissibility on the balance of probabilities. Where the judge merely has to be satisfied that there is prima facie evidence — for example, that a confession was made, that a previous consistent statement amounted to a complaint, or that a tape-recording was the original — the judge need only hear evidence from the party tendering the confession, previous consistent statement or taperecording.120 The English Court of Appeal regarded this as equivalent to a requirement that such evidence need reach only the standard of the balance of probabilities for fear of usurping the function of the jury.121 It is [page 390] submitted that the better view is that the requirement is no different from that applying to the satisfaction of an evidential burden: namely, whether the evidence, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to prove the matter asserted to the standard required to satisfy the legal burden. This involves no usurpation of the function of the jury since the jury is free not to believe the evidence, and may well not do so after taking into account its contradiction by the other side. Such a view is in complete harmony with the ordinary rules on the discharge of an evidential burden, the
determination of whether or not there is a case to answer, and the proper distribution of functions between judge and jury.122 The burden of proving facts revealing unfairness or impropriety sufficient to cause the court to exclude a voluntary confession in its discretion is on the accused.123 The standard of proof in relation to issues on which the accused bears the burden is the balance of probabilities.124 It has been held wrong for the jury to be told in the course of the judge’s summing up that the judge has arrived at a conclusion that the statement of a co-conspirator has been admitted against the accused as a hearsay exception on the balance of probabilities, because it is unnecessary and because the jury may mistakenly take that as a statement that the judge thinks the accused is probably guilty.125 These decisions are applicable beyond their precise context. Particular provisions of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) regulate the burden of proof of matters raised in a voir dire. The burden of proving that an admission was not influenced by violent conduct, once an issue on that question has been raised, is on the prosecution: s 84. The burden of proving that an admission of a defendant tendered in a criminal proceeding was not made in circumstances affecting its truth is on the prosecution: s 85. The burden of proving facts material to certain decisions to exclude evidence rests on the party seeking exclusion (ss 135– 137); of others, on the party resisting it: ss 138–139. Competence and compellability is presumed: ss 13, 14 and 18. The standard of proof is generally the balance of probabilities (s 142), but is in particular instances lower eg ss 57(1), 87, 88, 125(2), 131(3) and 131(4).
Section 2 — Judicial Control of the Jury A — WITHDRAWAL OF AN ISSUE FROMTHE JURY Need for sufficiency of evidence [11080] Structure of section The exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact must be determined by the jury are one facet of the judicial control of that body. Another facet is illustrated by presumptions and the doctrine of judicial notice, each of which restricts the jury’s power of finding facts. This section is concerned with more direct methods of [page 391] control by means of withdrawing an issue from the consideration of the jury, by exercising ‘discretion’ to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, by the summing up and by setting aside verdicts on appeal.
[11085] Consequences of insufficiency Before an issue can be submitted to the jury, the judge must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence in support of the proponent’s contention for their consideration, and, if the judge is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient, the judge must decide the issue in favour of the opponent.126 [I]t has always been considered a question of law to be determined by the judge, subject, of course, to review, whether there is evidence which, if it is believed, and the counter-evidence, if any, not believed, would establish the facts in controversy. It is for the jury to say whether and how far the evidence is to be believed. And if the facts, as to which evidence is given, are such that from them a farther inference of fact may legitimately be drawn, it is for the jury to say
whether that inference is to be drawn or not. But it is for the judge to determine, subject to review, as a matter of law whether from those facts that farther inference may legitimately be drawn.
These remarks were made in a case127 in which a passenger’s thumb had been crushed by the slamming of the door of a railway carriage. There was evidence that the defendants had been guilty of negligence in allowing the carriage to become overcrowded, but there was no evidence that the overcrowding had caused the plaintiff’s thumb to be where it was when the door was slammed, and the House of Lords held that the judge should have withdrawn the case from the jury for this reason. When a judge comes to the conclusion that evidence in support of the contention of the proponent of an issue is insufficient, the course to be adopted will vary from case to case. Sometimes the jury should be discharged and judgment entered for the opponent of the issue, as in a civil suit in which there is insufficient evidence in support of the plaintiff’s allegation of negligence. But even in this kind of case it may be desirable to have the damages assessed by the jury. On other occasions, the judge will direct the jury to return a verdict in favour of the opponent, as in a criminal case where the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient. There may be other issues to be left to the jury, as on a criminal charge when the judge rules that there is insufficient evidence of insanity (an issue of which the accused is the proponent), and it is nonetheless necessary for the jury to decide whether the prosecution has established the accused’s guilt in other respects. In civil proceedings the judge may defer deciding whether there is insufficient evidence in support of the plaintiff’s allegation until after the jury have given their verdict. In the result the jury may find for the defendant and a ruling by the judge becomes unnecessary. Whichever of these courses is adopted, the judge is obviously exercising considerable control over the jury, for the judge is either totally withdrawing facts from their consideration, or else directing them to come to a certain conclusion, whatever their own views may be. [page 392] The extent of this method of control increased during the nineteenth century:128
It was formerly considered necessary in all cases to leave the question to the jury if there was any evidence, even a scintilla, in support of the case; but it is now settled that the question for the judge … is, … not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is none that ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is established.
The test of sufficiency is considered elsewhere.129 Although the judge may withdraw an issue from the jury unilaterally, questions of the sufficiency of evidence are usually raised on a submission of no case to answer which is made by the opponent on the issue.130 If the judge rules against the submission, the issue must be determined by the jury, but, even when the opponent calls no evidence, their decision will not necessarily be in favour of the proponent. The jury may disbelieve the testimony given on the proponent’s behalf, or, if they do accept it, they may not be prepared to draw the requisite inference. Where the plaintiff gives contradictory answers in the witness box, on one of which the defendant will be entitled to succeed, and where evidence for the defendant is also called, the judge is not entitled to direct a verdict for the defendant, but should leave the case to the jury to decide what the plaintiff really meant by the answers.131 There are certain practical differences in the procedure which ought to be followed by the judge according to the class of case which is being tried.
[11090] Civil cases A party may make a submission that there is no case to answer and that accordingly a verdict should be directed in favour of that party132 but it is controversial whether the judge may decline to rule on the submission unless the party making it elects not to call evidence. Where an application is made for a verdict by direction, it will succeed if there is no evidence on which a properly directed trier of fact would be entitled to find the material facts of the claim proved on the balance of probabilities.133 But there is authority that it may also succeed if [page 393] the “evidence is so weak or so unsatisfactory that it should not be accepted”.134 This points to a difference between civil and criminal proceedings, since in the latter that type of submission cannot in general
be made: [11100]. In England, where the submission is made to a judge sitting alone without a jury, it has been said that the judge must put the party submitting to an election.135 At least two considerations justify this requirement. In the first place, the judge has to determine the facts as well as the law, and the judge ought not to be asked to express an opinion on the evidence until it is complete. No one would ask a jury at the end of a plaintiff’s case to say what verdict they would be prepared to give if the defendant called no evidence.136 Secondly, the parties might be put to extra expense if the judge ruled in favour of the submission before the evidence was complete, for, if the appellate court were to decide against that ruling, a new trial would be necessary so that the party who made the submission could call evidence. Neither of these considerations applies to civil cases tried with a jury. Accordingly, it has been held in England that the judge has a discretion in such cases, and the judge may rule on the submission without putting the party who makes it to an election whether to call evidence.137 If the judge decides in favour of the submission, there would have to be a new trial if that ruling is reversed on appeal, but this would also be the case if the ruling was deferred until the evidence was completed, for the verdict of the jury would have to be obtained in either event. In Victoria, the courts have taken the view that there is a discretion in all civil cases whether tried with or without a jury.138 In the Full Court139 it has been said that it will not often be right to allow the party making the no case submission to do so without electing except where the answer depends principally on a question of law; that the party is less likely to be put to an election if fraud is alleged against that party;140 that the submission may be put and answered before the judge decides whether to put its maker to an election; and that the submission may be based on the argument that there is no evidence against the maker, or the argument that there is only unsatisfactory evidence against him, or a combination of the two arguments. One of three results may ensue if the submission is entertained: (a) that the evidence could sustain a finding against the maker, in which event the case proceeds; (b) that even if the evidence could sustain such a finding the judge is not satisfied that it should be made, in which case, at least in non-jury cases, the case proceeds; (c) that the judge upholds the submission.
[page 394] In New South Wales the defendant cannot go into evidence without leave if the no case submission fails in the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court.141 In Queensland it is possible to put a no case submission without election if it is based on the want of evidence in support of a material element, but the putting of a submission that there be judgment on the ground that, though there is evidence, it is so weak and unsatisfactory as not to be accepted is not possible unless the party putting it elects not to call evidence.142 In South Australia there is a discretion, and no general practice one way or the other,143 as to whether or not the party making a no case submission should be put to an election. The Federal Court of Australia tends to follow the practice of the jurisdiction in which it is sitting.144 However, since the power to entertain a no case submission has been said to have its source in O 35 r 1 of the Federal Court Rules, the risk of excessive variation in practice may be reduced.145 The general rule of practice is that a decision will not be given on a submission of no case unless the moving party elects to call no evidence, but the trial judge has a discretion to depart from the general rule where the particular circumstances require it. In deciding which course to follow the judge will be guided by the nature of the case, the state it has reached, the particular issues involved and the evidence that has been given. The imposition of the requirement that the moving party make an election before the judge entertains the submission or rules on it will depend on the just and convenient disposition of the litigation. There is no general rule which requires that a party seeking to make a no case submission must elect to adduce no further evidence if some evidence has already been led or exhibits have been tendered in cross-examination. In a particular case, the fact that the respondent has taken steps of this kind will be one of the circumstances to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion.146 [page 395]
A judge may even rule that there was no evidence fit to go to the jury after they have returned a verdict in favour of the proponent.147 The practice of taking the jury’s verdict before ruling on the sufficiency of evidence has the merit of obviating the necessity of a new trial in the event of a successful appeal, although it is liable to produce the impression that the verdict of the jury has been overruled by the judge, when all that has happened is that the judge has decided somewhat belatedly that the issue ought not to have been left to them at all. Whether a civil case is tried with a jury or not, it seems that, if the judge rules that there is a case to answer and the defendant gives evidence, the defendant’s liability must be judged on the whole of the evidence and an appeal may be dismissed although the appellate court is of opinion that the judge should have ruled in favour of the submission when it was made.148 In civil cases involving more than one defendant, a verdict by direction for one defendant alone will not normally be granted and the plaintiff may, therefore, succeed in having the defendants implicate each other in the course of their evidence.149 The tests for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the plaintiff’s case, which can differ depending on whether or not the trial is by jury, have been discussed above.150 There is a relatively small class of case where it is open to a defendant to submit that there is no case to answer by applying for the plaintiff to be non-suited. The capacity of the plaintiff so to apply has been impliedly abolished by the development of discontinuance; the survival of non-suits on the application of the defendant appears to depend on express language in Rules of Court.151 Perhaps for this reason, there is little authority on whether the same tests apply in determining whether the defendant’s application should succeed.152
[11095] Criminal cases: “no case” submission Three distinct procedures have been discussed in the cases as a means of prematurely terminating criminal trials: the “no case” submission, the “unsafe” submission, and the “Prasad” invitation.153 The “no case” submission is normally made at the end of the Crown case.154 The basis of it is that there is no evidence [page 396]
upon which the jury could lawfully convict.155 In criminal cases, whether they are tried summarily or with a jury, the accused is never put to an election whether to call evidence or not before a ruling is made on the submission that there is no case to answer.156 If the ruling is in favour of the submission, the charges are dismissed, or the jury are directed157 to acquit. If the submission fails, the accused calls evidence in the ordinary way. At the conclusion of the Crown case, any of several accused persons may submit there is no case to answer even though the other co-accused may not be able to sustain such a submission and may intend to call evidence.158 In Victoria, however, the practice is that an application for a direction to acquit cannot be made until the close of all the evidence whether for the Crown or for the defence.159 It is submitted that the Victorian practice is at variance with the rule that no doctrine of election applies in criminal proceedings in that the co-accused persons may be compelled to elect to call no evidence before being entitled to apply for a direction to acquit. The Victorian practice is tempered somewhat by the fact that an accused wishing to submit that there is no case to answer may secure leave to defer the submission until after the co-accused have given evidence, and before the accused comes to give or call evidence.160 in Western Australia the judge may acquit the accused on the ground that there is no case to answer whether or not the accused has so submitted.161 A no case submission is made in the absence of the jury.162 If it is rejected, the judge should not give detailed reasons.163 The jury should not be informed of the judge’s decision not to withdraw the case from them lest it wrongly influence them.164 In England165 and South Australia166 the court will allow an appeal against an erroneous holding that there was a case to answer even though evidence tendered [page 397] after that stage implicates the accused: the latter evidence is ignored by the appellate court. In Victoria,167 Tasmania168 and Western Australia169 the contrary position exists.
[11100] Criminal cases: “unsafe” submission The “unsafe” submission is the second possible procedure. It has been held in England that a submission may be made at the close of the evidence that the case should be withdrawn from the jury where the evidence, though sufficient,170 provides an unsafe or unsatisfactory basis for a conviction.171 The judge ought not to stop the case merely because some of the witnesses appear to be lying172 but, according to now discredited English authority, may do so if some of the evidence is so conflicting as to be unreliable to the extent that if the jury did rely on it the verdict would be unsafe.173 The English doctrine was said to be connected with the change made by s 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (Eng) in the powers of the English Court of Appeal from being based on the test whether there was evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict to a test whether the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory.174 That is a reason for thinking that the doctrine does not exist in Australia, where the power of appellate courts corresponds with the pre-1968 English position. The High Court held175 that the doctrine does not exist: evidence capable of supporting a guilty verdict, even if tenuous or inherently weak or vague, must be left to the jury. If there is no evidence which will justify a conviction then, as a matter of law, there must be an acquittal. That decision is for the judge and the jury must accept and act on his direction on that question of law. If, however, there is evidence which is capable in law of supporting a conviction, a direction to the jury to acquit would be an attempt to take from them part of their function to adjudicate upon the facts. That… would be contrary to law.176
Further, as Glass JA has said: The usurpation of the jury’s function of weighing evidence is contrary to accepted principle governing jury trials. Although that proposition has been eroded to the extent that three judges on appeal may now say that a conviction though open on the evidence
[page 398] would be unsafe, it would not be warranted to confide that power to a single judge guided only by his own unaided and uncorrected assessment of the testimonial weight.177
The doctrine has now been largely repudiated in England as well.178 Thus an appeal can succeed if the appellate court thinks:179 that the defendant’s evidence was so preponderant in weight that a conviction would be perverse,180 or that upon the whole of the evidence and, particularly having regard to the
unreliability of some of the prosecution evidence, a conviction would be unsafe.181 However, the exercise of such powers is confined to courts of Criminal Appeal. A trial judge sitting with a jury has no power to direct an acquittal because a conviction would be perverse,182 or because it would be unsafe.183
However, an exception appears to exist in relation to identification evidence. There is authority that where “in the judgment of the trial judge, the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, as for example where it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer observation made in difficult conditions … [the] judge should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification”.184 And in England there is another exception: where the prosecution case depends wholly on confessions, the defendant suffers from a significant degree of mental handicap and the confessions are unconvincing to the point where a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon them, then the judge, assuming the confessions have not been excluded earlier, should withdraw the case from the jury.185 Further, the operation of a discretion to exclude some evidence can render the balance insufficient to make out a case to answer: [I]t may sometimes happen (although it should be but rarely) that evidence is withdrawn because it becomes apparent that, although technically admissible, it has no or
[page 399] insignificant probative value in comparison with its prejudicial effect, with the consequence that, if the remaining evidence will not support a guilty verdict, a verdict of not guilty must be directed …186
[11105] Criminal cases: “Prasad invitation” The third procedure is the “Prasad invitation”. Glass JA has described it as follows: [T]he trial judge may put to the jury as strongly as he likes that they may be minded to stop the trial because the evidence seems to them to furnish an unsafe foundation for a conviction.187 He has authority at the close of the Crown case to tell them that they may do so then or at any later stage of the trial.188
There is no obligation on the judge to take that course.189 The accused may be unwise to encourage this technique: it may be dangerous to trigger
the possibility that the jury may form a premature adverse view before hearing all the evidence, the addresses and the charge. The direction is not to be given merely because the judge considers the Crown case is not very strong; that would be to usurp the function of the jury.190 There are circumstances in which a judge is entitled to direct a jury to return a verdict of not guilty where the only defence raised is one the burden of proof of which rests on the defence.191 In England it has been held that the jury should only exercise its right to acquit at any time after the close of the Crown case after having been invited to do so by the judge, and that it was difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a judge to invite the jury to acquit because of the difficulties this had led to in the past.192
[11110] Magistrates A submission of no case may be made in proceedings before magistrates. If the proceedings are criminal, there is no question of the accused being put to an election.193 If the proceedings are civil, the party making the submission may be put to an election. If the magistrate rules against the submission, the party making it should be given further opportunity to address them on the facts.194 This is because a finding that there is a case to answer is not a decision of the whole case against the party making the submission. It is perfectly proper for the magistrate to hold that there is a case to answer and on the same material decide the issue in favour of a party making the submission. The magistrate may come to the conclusion that the evidence of the opposite party is not to be believed.195 [page 400] The alleged insufficiency of prosecution evidence may be raised in a committal proceeding after the evidence for the prosecutor has been taken, or when the evidence for both sides has been taken. An unsuccessful no case submission does not deprive the accused of the right to give evidence in committal proceedings.196
B — DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE Overriding rules of admissibility [11115] Development of common law discretion If the judge is not to dictate the decision on an issue by withdrawing it from the trial or by directing a verdict, the next most powerful way in which the judge can affect the decision is by overriding the rules governing the admission of evidence relevant to that issue. The general question is how far the judge has a discretion to do so. In 1790 Grose J dreaded “that rules of evidence should ever depend upon the discretion of the judges”. He wished to find the rule laid down and to abide by it.197 Channell J also believed it to be “better to apply the rules directly than to allow it to be supposed that a judge has a discretion to relax them if he thinks they will work an injustice”.198 Lord Halsbury expressed himself in similar vein in 1914,199 but he was in the minority200 and since then there have been many statements of the judge’s discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence. It will be necessary to distinguish between criminal and civil cases, but first the very nature of discretionary control must be examined.
[11120] Nature of the discretion Not for the first — or last — time in the law of evidence, it is necessary to beware of the danger inherent in the loose use of terminology, in this case the use of the word “discretion” in a number of different senses.201 It is particularly important to distinguish between the idea that the judge has the responsibility of deciding the application to the facts of an inherently vague term, and the idea that the judge is free to act in any way (within broad or narrow limits) upon the facts found to exist.202 The difference is that in the former case the judge must act in a particular way once the facts have been found, and in the latter the judge is still free to choose which action to take after finding them. In practice, the dichotomy may not be so apparent; the distinction has not always been present in the mind of judges, and the terminology of discretion has been used indiscriminately to apply to both types of situation. Nevertheless there are signs that the distinction is now being drawn.203 The English Court of Appeal said, on the issue of allowing questions to be asked in cross-
examination about the complainant’s sexual history that: [page 401] It is wrong to speak of a judge’s “discretion” in this context. The judge has to make a judgment whether he is satisfied or not in the terms of s 2. But once having reached that judgment on the particular facts, he has no discretion. If he comes to the conclusion that he is satisfied it would be unfair to exclude the evidence, then the evidence has to be admitted and the questions have to be allowed.204
One practical consequence of drawing this distinction is simply that the grounds upon which an appellate court will review a discretion205 are not so extensive as those on which it will review the incorrect application of a rule.206 In general terms, the exercise of a discretion will stand so long as the judge “does not err in law, takes into account all relevant matters and excludes consideration of irrelevant matters”.207 To this should be added error in fact and instances where, though no error can be identified, the result is such that on the facts which were or ought to have been found, the discretion could only have been exercised in a manner different from that in which it was.208 In these respects the principles relating to appeals in relation to evidentiary discretions are similar to those relating to appeals against discretionary judgments in general. A further consequence is that it becomes much more difficult for even consistent factors to mature into a rule.209 In some situations, the nature of the rule of evidence which is in question is defined in such terms that it is difficult to discern any possible role for the application of an exclusionary discretion. Sometimes the rule is drafted in much more rigid terms, and in such cases it is feasible to construct guidelines for the exercise of a discretion designed to avoid injustice.210 If the distinction mentioned above is accepted, it is tolerably clear that the only exercise of a discretion can be to exclude otherwise admissible evidence. It cannot be used to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence.211 It is true that some exclusionary rules are phrased in such vague terms that some judges occasionally appear to suppose that they are exercising an inclusionary discretion, but such cases are best explained as ones in which the vague question is resolved in such a way that the exclusionary rule does not apply.212
A true inclusionary discretion could be conferred by statute. Statute may achieve the same effect without strictly conferring an inclusionary discretion by relaxing the rules of evidence so far as proof of the conditions of admissibility are concerned.213 It is interesting to note in proceedings where the general exclusionary rules of evidence do not apply, for example in some tribunals,214 there is no room for an exclusionary discretion. Where statute has sought to extend the range of material [page 402] available to the tribunal, it is not for the tribunal to cut it down as it chooses by the exercise of any such discretion.215 It has also been held that in Australia, unlike England, in cases where the function of the tribunal is merely to establish the existence of a case to answer, as in the case of committal proceedings, there is room for an exclusionary discretion.216 In England, that discretion comes into play only at the trial.217
[11125] Discretion to exclude relevant evidence in criminal proceedings Though the word “discretion” is not always wholly apt, the categories of what are commonly called “discretions” to exclude relevant218 and otherwise admissible evidence are as follows.219 (a) Evidence may be excluded where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. This is commonly applied in relation to similar fact evidence,220 but can apply more generally.221 Generally the trial judge must, in assessing admissibility, take the evidence at its highest without determining whether the jury should or should not accept it.222 It is wrong to proceed on the basis that “the probative value of … evidence is determined by a consideration, not of what it would prove if accepted, but of the reasons for not accepting it.”223 Evidence is not prejudicial merely because it strengthens the prosecution case. It is prejudicial only when the jury are likely to give the evidence more weight than it deserves or when the nature or
content of the evidence may inflame the jury or divert the jurors from their task.224 (b) There is a discretion to disallow cross-examination on an accused person’s criminal record under the Australian equivalents to s 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng).225 (c) There is a discretion to reject a confession if it would be unfair to use it against the accused.226 [page 403] (d) There is a discretion to reject evidence,227 including a confession,228 on the ground that it has been unlawfully obtained. (e) There is a residual discretion to reject any evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused — that is, it is rejected on the ground that to receive it would be unfair to the accused in the sense that the trial would be unfair.229 It has been said that, confessions apart, it is not easy to think of circumstances in which grounds might exist for the exercise of that residual discretion in relation to any evidence which would not fall within the more specific principle that evidence will not be admitted where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value.230 The unreliability of a witness has been held not to attract the discretion,231 on the ground that this interferes unduly with the division of function between judge and jury, and would amount to an anticipatory ruling which would be erroneous if given at the close of the Crown case.232 A difficult area of potential application concerns accomplices.233 An example of the discretion may exist where the weight and credibility of the evidence cannot be effectively tested.234 Another example may exist in relation to excessively inflammatory evidence such as gruesome photographs.235 Section 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides that nothing in the Act derogates from the power of the court in a criminal proceeding to
exclude evidence if the court is satisfied that it would be unfair to the person charged to admit that evidence. The common law Pfennig test for the admissibility of similar fact [page 404] evidence236 is not incorporated into s 130.237 The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) created an even more extensive range of possibilities than the common law. Sections 135–137 provide: 135 The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b) be misleading or confusing; or (c) cause or result in undue waste of time. 136 The court may limit the use to be made of evidence if there is a danger that a particular use of the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b) be misleading or confusing. 137 In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Sections 135 and 137 do not control questions as such, only the evidence which may be given in answer to questions. If a question is likely to elicit an answer which is prejudicial, it may be objected to. If a question is likely to elicit an answer which is not prejudicial, it is not objectionable merely because a different answer would be prejudicial.238 Generally “probative value” is assessed by taking the evidence at its highest, without assessing its reliability.239 However, the weight of evidence can be taken into account on the question of unfair prejudice.240 And the fact that an identifying witness was a long-serving police officer who had greater training and experience for perceiving and remembering the features of a person under observation than many lay persons was held relevant to the probative value of the evidence in upholding a magistrate’s decision not to exclude the evidence under s 137.241 Where it is the very probative weight of the evidence which gives rise to the prejudice, it is unlikely to be excluded.242 That is because the relevant prejudice does not lie in the simple fact that the evidence may advance one side’s case or weaken the
other’s; prejudice means damage in some unacceptable way, for example by provoking some irrational, emotional or illogical response, or by giving the evidence more weight than it truly deserves,243 in a way logically unconnected with [page 405] the issues in the case.244 The risk must be real, not hypothetical.245 There are also several other provisions like s 137 which, while not permitting the discretionary exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, do depend on a process of weighing competing considerations which is in a looser sense discretionary eg s 18 (evidence by family of accused), s 98 (tendency evidence and coincidence evidence) and s 130 (evidence of matters of State). Thus, since, in performing the task set by s 137, a trial judge’s estimate of how the probative value should be weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice “will be one of opinion based on a variety of circumstances, the evidence, the particulars of the case and the judge’s own trial experience”, the result is analogous to a discretionary judgment.246 However, that fact should not be allowed to lead the courts into error. And there is: a risk of error if a judge proceeds on the basis that he or she is being asked to exercise a discretion about whether or not otherwise admissible evidence should be rejected because of unfair prejudice to the defendant. The correct approach is to perform the weighing exercise mandated. If the probative value of the evidence adduced by the prosecutor is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, there is no residual discretion. The evidence must be rejected.247
In this respect the mandate created by s 137 contrasts with the power created by s 135. Sections 138 and 139 make provision for the reception of evidence which is inadmissible because it was obtained improperly or illegally where the “desirability” of doing so outweighs the “undesirability” of admitting evidence obtained in that way: this, though not a discretion, has some resemblances to that referred to in (d) above. Section 90 provides for a discretion to exclude admissions where it would be “unfair” to the defendant to admit them. Where a risk that the jury will misuse prejudicial evidence by proceeding on an improper basis, it is the duty of the trial judge to give appropriate directions,248 and that duty is to be taken into account in assessing the
danger of unfair prejudice.249 An instance where evidence was unfairly prejudicial and might cause or result in undue waste of time within the meaning of s 135 was postulated where it would require other parties to undertake, at a late stage of the trial, a lengthy exercise of rebutting complex evidence of peripheral relevance.250 Section 135(c) has the effect of permitting the exclusion of evidence which at common law would have been held irrelevant.251 An appeal succeeded on the ground that opinion evidence by witnesses based on tests conducted by persons who were available but not called ought to have been excluded under s 135, particularly since the prosecution had an [page 406] independent duty to call them.252 Exclusion is likely where medical records contain warnings as to their reliability, are of uncertain provenance, and are likely to hamper the opposing party in dealing with them.253 The cases on trap orders in passing off and misleading conduct cases raise considerations relevant to the application of s 135 in that context.254 Section 135 was applied where there was a mixture of admissible and inadmissible material rendering it impracticable to distinguish between them.255 Where the evidence is a hearsay statement of a person not available for cross-examination, the fact that crossexamination is impossible is relevant to exclusion under ss 135 and 137, but not decisive.256 It is irrelevant, in applying s 137, to take into account community concern that persons who commit serious offences are brought to justice.257 The probative weight of relevant DNA statistical evidence tendered through a witness of due expertise cannot itself be a ground for withholding it from the jury under s 137. Its very significant probative weight is a factor in favour of admission, despite the capacity of extremely high odds “to carry a prejudicial overlay”.258 The fact that the legislature has provided an entitlement to a medical examination for arrested persons suspected of driving with excessive alcohol in their blood does not create an unfairness in the trial of those persons who are suspected but not arrested and therefore do not have that entitlement.259 It is inappropriate to employ ss 135 and 136 to make orders excluding evidence irrelevant against one party which is relevant against another: the
irrelevance against the first party prevents prejudice to that party.260 The discretions under s 90 and Pt 3.11 cannot be exercised in New South Wales by magistrates in committal proceedings: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 70. It has been said that apart from ss 135 and 137, the trial judge “probably … retains a general discretion to protect against unfairness, and that may extend to the manner in which evidence is presented”.261 It is notable that s 137 only applies to evidence adduced by the prosecution. It does not apply to evidence adduced by a co-accused which may be injurious to a second co-accused. It is questionable whether, when applying ss 135 and 137, the court should assess the probative value of a particular item of evidence in the light of other evidence that has been or will be admitted in the trial, and treat a particular item of evidence as having minimal probative value because it adds very little to the other evidence.262 [page 407]
[11130] Discretion to exclude relevant evidence in civil proceedings The existence of a common law equivalent to s 135 of the legislation based on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is questionable. A discretion to exclude in civil cases, on the basis that the evidence will be more prejudicial than probative in revealing evidence of extrinsic discreditable acts, has been denied in Australia in intermediate appellate courts.263 In the High Court its existence has been said to be “highly doubtful”.264 The other context in which the question has been raised is in relation to claims of privilege which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 13, “Privilege”, and Chapter 14, “Public Policy”, below. If an established privilege already exists no question of discretion arises because, in the words of Lord Wilberforce, “to substitute for a privilege a dependence on the court’s discretion would substantially be to the defendant’s detriment”.265 A question of discretion only arises when a witness makes an unsuccessful claim to be privileged from answering a question. Does
the judge then have a residual discretion not to allow the question to be put? Lord Simon was quite clear that in such a case “it must be law, not discretion, which is in command”.266 Unfortunately Lord Hailsham took the opposite view, accepting the views expressed in the sixteenth report of the Law Reform Committee on privilege in civil proceedings: Privilege in the main is the creation of the common law whose policy, pragmatic as ever, has been to limit to a minimum the categories of privileges which a person has an absolute right to claim, but to accord to the judge a wide discretion to permit the witness, whether a party to the proceedings or not, to refuse to disclose information where disclosure would be a breach of some ethical or social value and non-disclosure would be unlikely to result in serious injustice in the particular case in which it is claimed.267
[page 408] The position has been reconsidered in subsequent authority, though the issue has, at best, arisen on the periphery of a claim based on a resistance to discovery. Since discovery is an equitable order, or an order resulting from a statutory procedure with an equitable history, it always has a discretionary element.268 It is far from clear that the same principles apply to prevent evidence from being adduced. Thus Dixon J said, in refuting a claim that a rule limiting discovery applied to create an evidentiary privilege: “The answer is that it is not a rule of evidence but a practice of refusing in an action for libel … to compel discovery of the name of … informants”.269 It might be argued that this passage relates only to the question of total immunity as a matter of law, and does not touch the question of discretionary exclusion. When the issue arises during a trial the judge has control over the propriety of the proceedings, and can certainly disallow improper or irrelevant questions. It is possible that the dicta in the authorities cited to justify the Law Reform Committee’s view in its report relied upon that power.270 Sir Robert Megarry V-C urged separate consideration of the position first in interlocutory proceedings, second at the trial, and third in deciding upon a remedy.271 Lord Denning MR rejected this view and asserted that the same principles applied at each stage.272 In the House of Lords it is less clear how far the decision that the court has a discretion extends beyond the precise question of pre-trial disclosure. The better view is that it does extend to evidence at the trial. Lord Wilberforce refers to the duty as one to disclose to a court,273 not as
one to disclose to an opponent. Then in his final summary of his reasons, after asserting that the court undoubtedly has a discretion, he goes on to consider those parts of Sir Robert Megarry V-C’s reasons which explicitly related to a discretion in relation to evidence, and not to the discretion in relation to a remedy which he had carefully segregated.274 It seems that the principle upon which the discretion is to be exercised is that stated by the House of Lords, namely: to consider fairly the strength and value of the interest in preserving confidentiality and the damage which may be caused by breaking it; then to consider whether the objective — to dispose fairly of the case — can be achieved without doing so …275
It is probably too late now to argue that this process relates only to the determination of the initial objection to answer, rather than to that of determining whether the obligation should be overridden in the circumstances of the particular case at the discretion of the judge.276 [page 409] A discretion has been recognised in civil cases to exclude evidence which, though relevant, is only remotely relevant or has small probative value compared to the additional issues which it would raise and the additional time required for their investigation or might tend to confuse the jury as to the real issues.277 Questions of ambiguity in trap orders, and absence of notice that this type of evidence will be used, are relevant under s 135.278
C — THE SUMMING UP Judicial control of jury [11135] Directions and comments [T]he judge in a criminal trial must accept the responsibility of deciding what are the real issues in the case, must tell the jury what those issues are, and must instruct the jury on so much of the law as the jury needs to know to decide those issues. The trial judge may, but need not, comment on the facts of the case. The trial judge may, but need not, suggest how the jury might evaluate the credibility of evidence that has been given. In some circumstances the common law or statute may require the trial judge to give a particular warning to the jury about factual issues. But informing and underpinning all of these requirements is that the judge’s instructions to the
jury, whether by way of legal direction or judicial commentary on the facts, must not deflect the jury’s attention from the need to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt before returning a verdict of guilty.279
It is difficult to estimate the amount of control which a judge exercises over a jury by means of the summing up, for, quite apart from the legal rules that govern the matter, juries expect and receive considerable guidance with regard to the evidence submitted to them, and this guidance may be expressed in emphatic terms.280 The legal rules on the subject have never been precisely formulated, but it seems that a judge must always put defences raised by the evidence to the jury,281 and the judge can never be justified in directing a jury that they must accept the judge’s view of disputed facts,282 although the judge may, and sometimes should, tell them that they ought to do so as reasonable persons.283 If a party tenders no evidence on a contested issue the judge may instruct the jury to draw the most favourable [page 410] inference possible from the evidence tendered by the other.284 It is not enough, in cases other than simple cases, merely to remind the jury of counsel’s addresses; the significant evidence which is controversial should be marshalled issue by issue.285 The respective cases for each party must be accurately and fairly put, though the judge need not put every argument for the accused to the jury.286 Whether the judge should refer to an evidentiary matter or argument depends on whether the reference is necessary to ensure that the jury has a sufficient understanding of the evidence to discharge their duty to determine the case according to the evidence.287 The judge must focus on the critical issues of fact.288 The High Court, on the other hand, said: Often, perhaps much more often than not, the safer course for a trial judge will be to make no comment on the facts beyond reminding the jury, in the course of identifying the issues before them, of the arguments of counsel.289
Lord Salmon referred to the judge’s duty to direct an acquittal in a criminal case if satisfied that there is no evidence before the jury to justify them in convicting and said:290 This rule, which has long been established, is to protect the accused against being wrongly
convicted. But there is no converse rule — although there may be some who think that there should be.291 If the judge is satisfied that, on the evidence, the jury would not be justified in acquitting the accused and indeed that it would be perverse of them to do so, he has no power to pre-empt the jury’s verdict by directing them to convict. The jury alone have the right to decide that the accused is guilty.
Earlier cases in which the facts were undisputed and in which it was held proper to direct a verdict of guilty292 are probably no longer authoritative. The same is true even where the burden of raising a defence rests on defendants and they fail to discharge it. The ultimate independence of the jury in relation to all issues of fact raised by the evidence is not a thing to be trifled with, and Lord Salmon went on to suggest that when a judge has, as a judge is fully entitled to do in an appropriate case, made forceful statements on the facts, the judge should reiterate the point, which no doubt will have been made previously, that all questions of fact are for the [page 411] jury to decide. Even in the case of medical evidence the judge ought not to direct them to accept it although there is no apparent reason for not doing so.293 It is clearly the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on all matters of law, including the effect of any relevant presumption of law and the incidence of the onus of proof. This may oblige the judge to direct the jury that they must find one of the facts in issue to be proved if they are satisfied as to the existence of some other fact, for, when a rebuttable presumption of law applies to the case, proof of one fact is legally equivalent to proof of some other fact in the absence of further evidence. Thus, if the legitimacy of a child is among the facts in issue in civil proceedings, and the proponent adduces evidence to show that the child was born in wedlock, the judge must direct the jury to find in favour of the proponent if they accept this evidence, unless the opponent satisfies them to the appropriate standard that there was no intercourse between the child’s mother and her husband by which it could have been begotten. Similarly, if it becomes necessary to establish that a particular person is dead, the judge may have to tell a civil jury that they must find in favour of the proponent on being satisfied that the person in question had been
absent for more than seven years, without having been heard of by those with whom that person, if alive, would most probably have communicated. When the judge directs the jury on the effect of a presumption of law, the judge is not telling them that they must accept the judge’s view of the facts. As a matter of ordinary reasoning, many people, including the judge, might not be prepared to infer legitimacy from birth in wedlock if there was evidence of prolonged intimacy between the child’s mother and a person other than her husband, any more than they would be prepared to infer death from seven years’ absence if the person in question was young and healthy when last heard of. For a number of different reasons, the law attaches an artificial probative value to certain facts, and the judge’s direction in such a case informs the jury of the legal consequences which follow upon their finding that these facts exist. The trier of fact is not bound to believe any witness and may believe part and disbelieve part,294 however intimately the latter is associated with what is accepted, unless no reasonable person could so conclude.295
D — APPEALS Varieties of process [11140] Criminal cases tried with a jury On the hearing of an appeal against conviction, the appellate court may set aside the verdict of the jury on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.296 Whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant [page 412] conviction by a jury acting reasonably is a question of law.297 The test of sufficiency is discussed elsewhere.298 Under the second limb of the formula, a verdict which is not wrong in law (in the sense that there is sufficient evidence to support it) may be set aside because it is wrong in fact if the appellate court regards it as against the weight of the evidence299
or unsafe or unsatisfactory300 or considers that it would be unsafe or dangerous to let it stand.301 The verdict will be unsafe or unsatisfactory if the appellate court concludes that the jury, acting reasonably, ought to have entertained a sufficient doubt as to the guilt of the accused so as to have entitled the accused to an acquittal.302 It is not a question of whether the appellate court itself experiences such a doubt.303 The evidence is considered together with the summing up, and the appeal may be allowed even though the court suspects that the conviction was right as a matter of conjecture, as opposed to inference from the evidence.304 Conversely, the appeal may be dismissed if there was evidence to support the conviction, notwithstanding the trial judge’s opinion that the verdict was unreasonable, for such an opinion is only one of the factors to be considered.305 If the court does set aside the verdict of the jury, the accused may either be acquitted or retried, but a verdict of guilty of some other offence may be substituted if it was one of which the accused could have been convicted on the indictment, and if the court concludes that the jury must have been satisfied of facts which proved guilt of the other offence.306 The appellate court must undertake an independent examination, and assess the quality, of the [page 413] relevant evidence; a verdict may be unsafe or unsatisfactory even though there is sufficient evidence to entitle a reasonable jury to convict.307 For the sake of completeness, it may be added that the appellate court may allow an appeal on account of a wrong decision on any point of law, or because there was a miscarriage of justice,308 and these provisions are, of course, wide enough to cover any wrongful admission or rejection of evidence by the judge, as well as an irregularity in the summing up. Where evidence is received in a criminal trial without objection and the trial judge makes no ruling on its admission, there is no wrong decision by the judge on a question of law, though the appeal may succeed if there is a miscarriage of justice.309 The court also has power to hear fresh evidence,310 and limited power to hear evidence which is not fresh in the sense of having been available at the trial,311 but its entire jurisdiction is subject to the important proviso312 that an appeal may be dismissed if the
court considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, notwithstanding its opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant. This proviso, like the corresponding rule in civil cases, is of considerable significance in relation to the practical operation of the law of evidence, for it probably deters counsel on either side from taking frivolous technical objections at the original hearing. The mere fact that an objection was overruled when an appellate court thinks that it should have been sustained, or vice versa, does not mean that an appeal must succeed, as it does in some American jurisdictions.313 It is wrong to call a decision whether to apply the proviso “discretionary”.314 The appellate court must review the whole of the record of the trial, make its own independent assessment of the evidence and determine whether, making due allowance for the natural limitations that exist in the case of an appellate court proceeding wholly or substantially on the record, the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty of the offence on which the jury returned its verdict of guilt.315 Even if the accused’s guilt was so proved, the appeal may nevertheless be allowed where there [page 414] has been a “significant denial of procedural fairness”316 or a “serious breach of the presuppositions of the trial”.317 Although in general there is no right to appeal against an acquittal,318 it is possible for the prosecution to state a question of law to an appellate court which will leave the acquittal in place even if the answer would have led to a different result had the trial judge applied it.319
[11145] Civil cases tried with a jury After a civil case has been tried with a jury, the party against whom their verdict has been given may apply to the appellate court for an order for a new trial and, if such an order is made, the verdict of the jury is set aside.320 A new trial may be sought on the ground that there was no evidence which ought properly to have been left to the jury in favour of the proponent of the issue in question, or because the verdict of the jury was
against the weight of the evidence.321 In order that a new trial should be granted on the latter ground, it is not enough that the judge, who tried the case, might have come to a different conclusion on the evidence than the jury, or that the judges, in the court where the new trial is moved for, might have come to a different conclusion, but there must be such a preponderance of evidence, assuming there is evidence on both sides to go to the jury, as to make it unreasonable, and almost perverse, that the jury when instructed and assisted properly by the judge should return such a verdict.322
If the appellate court concludes that the judge ought not to have left an issue to the jury because there was insufficient evidence in support of the proponent’s case, it will enter judgment for the opponent forthwith. It may also adopt this course where the evidence in support of the opponent’s case was very strong, although there was some evidence favourable to the proponent, provided it is clear that no further material would be available at a second trial.323 Serious doubts have been expressed on the question whether the Court of Appeal is entitled to enter judgment [page 415] for the proponent of an issue after setting aside a verdict for the opponent.324
[11150] Civil cases tried by a judge alone The appeal is in effect a rehearing when a civil case has been tried by a judge alone, so the result is usually judgment for one of the parties rather than an order for a new trial. Usually the appeal is dealt with on the basis of a transcript or note of the proceedings in the court below. Appeals on matters of law may involve questions of the wrongful admission or rejection of evidence, and these are disposed of in the same way as appeals involving any other legal issue.325 The appellate court will naturally be loath to disturb the finding of fact by the trial judge who has had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses, “their candour or their partisanship, and all the incidental elements so difficult to describe which make up the atmosphere of an actual trial”.326 This principle applies as much to expert witnesses as to lay witnesses.327 The principle applies particularly where “the interests of individuals are divergent and
conflicting, where personal feeling is acute, and where … so much depends upon the character, personal motives and interests of individual persons”.328 “Trial by transcript can seldom be an adequate representation of an oral trial before a judge or an oral trial before a judge and jury.”329 Reading the transcript alone is not a substitute for seeing and hearing the [page 416] witness, “since the transcript eliminates clues to veracity that are supplied by tone of voice, hesitation, body language, and other nonverbal expression”.330 [A]s the evidence proceeds through examination, cross-examination and re-examination the judge is gradually imbibing almost instinctively, but in fact as a result of close attention and of long experience, an impression of the personality of the witness and of his trustworthiness and of the accuracy of his observation and memory or the reverse. He will not necessarily distrust a witness simply because he finds him inaccurate in some details: he can give such inaccuracy its proper place, particularly if he sees that the witness is tired, or antagonised, or confused, or perhaps impatient, and especially if the matter of the inaccuracy is of minor or collateral importance. But such inaccuracies may appear in a very different light when pointed to as isolated passages in the shorthand notes and abstracted from the human atmosphere of the trial and from the totality of the evidence. The judge will form his impression from the whole personality of the witness: he can allow for the nervous witness, standing up in a crowded Court or worried by the strain of cross-examination. The judge may be deceived by an adroit and plausible knave or by apparent innocence: for no man is infallible; but in the main a careful and conscientious judge with his experience of Courts is as likely to be correct in his impressions as any tribunal …331
But there are other relevant considerations. The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one: requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. As the Court has stated in a different context, the trial on the merits should be “the ‘main event’ … rather than a ‘tryout on the road’.”332
There is another advantage which the trial judge enjoys: the capacity to receive and consider the whole of the evidence (not selected parts of it) in the order presented (not as counsel choose to present it on the appeal),
and the opportunity, normally over a longer interval than that available to an appellate court, to reflect upon it and draw conclusions from it, viewed as a whole.333 On the other hand, appellate courts also enjoy advantages, “for example, the collective knowledge and experience of no fewer than three judges armed with an organised and complete record of the proceedings, and the opportunity to take an independent overview of the proceedings below, in a different atmosphere from, and a less urgent setting than the trial”.334 The validity of a widely-shared belief in the capacity of trial judges to determine the honesty of witnesses from demeanour has been questioned.335 However, the current law rests on that widely-shared belief. [page 417] Only in a clear case will a court disturb a credit finding where a judge, after seeing and hearing the witness, takes into account apparent inconsistencies in the witness’s evidence, particularly where the evidence was given through an interpreter.336 Only in “exceptional circumstances” ought an appellate court to differ from a finding of fact at trial about the state of mind of a witness.337 It does not follow that because the trial judge did not refer expressly to demeanour and credibility that they played no part in the judge’s conclusions.338 A long delay between trial and judgment will weaken the trial judge’s advantages339 and will require the trial judge to give reasons why one witness is to be preferred over another.340 Errors of law or fact by the court below on other matters do not necessarily vitiate its conclusion on credibility.341 Hence it is unusual to set aside, or order a new trial on the ground of, the findings of a trial judge based on the credibility of a witness unless it can be concluded that the trial judge failed to use or palpably misused the advantage he or she had of seeing and hearing the witness, or that the trial judge relied on evidence which was inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence, or that the trial judge acted on evidence which was glaringly improbable, or that the trial judge fell into some error of principle, or that the trial judge mistook or misapprehended the facts, or if the effect of the overall evidence was such that it was not reasonably open to make the
findings.342 However, it is possible to set it aside, or order a new trial on the ground of, credibility-based findings in other circumstances, because “no short exhaustive formula” of the above kinds can meet every case.343 The court occasionally takes the view that the judge was wrong to give credence to a particular witness,344 or to find a witness unreliable,345 in either case because “a whole body of evidence points inescapably [page 418] to a conclusion different from that reached by the judge at first instance, where in a complex pattern of events incontrovertible evidence can only be fitted into the pattern if a different view of the credibility of a witness is taken by the court on appeal.”346 These restrictions on appellate review have little application where the issue is how a patient would have responded to a warning about the risks of medical treatment: demeanour can play little part in accepting the plaintiff’s evidence, though it may be a ground for rejecting it, because human nature being what it is, most plaintiffs will have developed a genuine belief that had an injury-avoiding option been presented, they would have taken it, so that their reliability can only be assessed by reference to objective factors, particularly their attitude and conduct around the time of the breach of duty.347 There is no restriction on appellate review where no significant assistance, as the trial judge acknowledged, was to be obtained from observing and hearing the testimony;348 or where the evidence was obtained by means of leading questions from the judge.349 The appellate court will be far more ready to reverse the decision in a case which depends on inferences from admitted or undisputed facts.350 In Victoria, even where the judgment appealed from has been properly and lawfully made, there is still power to set it aside where it is shown by the appellant that its operation has had the result of depriving him unjustly of a right.351 However, though the appellate court will more readily differ from a trial court in the case of findings which are not credibility-based, even there appellate caution is exercised. [page 419]
It is true that … this House decided that, while the judge’s findings of primary fact, particularly if founded upon an assessment of the credibility of witnesses, were virtually unassailable, an appellate court would be more ready to differ from the judge’s evaluation of those facts by reference to some legal standard such as negligence or obviousness. In drawing this distinction, however, Viscount Simonds went on to observe352 that it was “subject only to the weight which should, as a matter of course, be given to the opinion of the learned judge”. The need for appellate caution in reversing the judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la vérité est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation. It would in my view be wrong to treat [that case] as authorising or requiring an appellate court to undertake a de novo evaluation of the facts in all cases in which no question of the credibility of witnesses is involved. Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no such question of principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge’s evaluation.353
Similar views prevail in the High Court.354 No doubt where the conclusion of the trial judge is not based upon or in any respect influenced by his opinion of witnesses orally examined before him, the appellate court is in an equal position with the trial judge as to what inferences can be drawn from the facts as proved before him. But this does not mean that the appellate court should treat the appeal as a hearing de novo. The trial judge, although not depending in any respect on the credibility of any witness, may have preferred one possible view of the primary facts to another as being in his opinion the more probable. Such a finding may, in my opinion, be disturbed by an appellate court but this should only be done if other probabilities so outweigh that chosen by the primary judge that it can be said that his conclusion was wrong. Again, the trial judge, having found the primary facts, may decide that a particular inference should be drawn from them. Here no doubt the appellate court has more room for setting aside that conclusion. But, even in that case, the fact of the trial judge’s decision must be displaced. It is not enough that the appellate court would itself, if trying the matter initially, have drawn a different inference. It must be shown that the trial judge was wrong. This may be achieved by showing that material facts have been overlooked, or given undue or too little weight in deciding the inference to be drawn: or the available inference in the opposite sense to that chosen by the trial judge is so preponderant in the opinion of the appellate court that the trial judge’s decision is wrong.
[page 420] Where a trial judge has observed an in-court demonstration355 or had an out-of-court view,356 an appellate court should have regard to that advantage. In intellectual property cases it is commonly said that answers given by trial judges on questions of appearance, and other questions, should not be departed from on appeal unless an error of principle is
shown.357 Appeals from decisions of judges in civil non-jury cases tried in the District Court or in the County Court, and appeals in criminal cases tried by magistrates, do not call for separate discussion in a work of this nature. The appellate court has power to receive evidence of matters occurring after the trial or hearing below,358 power to receive evidence that the judgment was obtained by fraud,359 and more limited power to hear evidence which could have been procured for the trial. The last matter is largely regulated by enactments. One technique is found in the constrained discretion granted by the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 75A(7)–(9).360 Those subsections provide that, although the Court of Appeal “may receive further evidence”, save for evidence concerning matters occurring after a trial or hearing, the Court “shall not receive further evidence except on special grounds”. What constitutes a special ground has been treated as resting on the same principles as those the common law courts applied to motions for a new trial on the ground of fresh evidence.361 Dixon CJ summarised those principles thus:362 It must be reasonably clear that if the evidence had been available at the first trial and had been adduced, an opposite result would have been produced or, if it is not reasonably clear that it would have been produced, it must have been so highly likely as to make it unreasonable to suppose the contrary. Again, reasonable diligence must have been exercised to procure the evidence which the defeated party failed to adduce at the first trial.
[page 421] Another technique is the simple discretion given by s 93A(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).363 This discretion was formerly considered to turn on the common law analogy.364 Now the discretion is seen as wider.365 An unusually elaborate discretionary regime is found in the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 48. It provides: (1) On the hearing of any appeal a Full Court shall have power to receive further evidence upon questions of fact, and may take such evidence by oral examination in court or by affidavit, or may direct the same to be taken by a judge or an examiner, or a commissioner, or a judge of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction. (2) Upon appeals in interlocutory applications, or in any case as to
matters which have occurred after the date of the judgment, order, or other determination from which the appeal is brought, such further evidence may be given without special leave. (3) Upon any appeal from a judgment, order or other determination given or made after the trial of any cause or matter on the merits, such further evidence (except as to matters which have occurred after the date of judgment, order, or determination) shall be admitted only by special leave of the Full Court, which shall only be granted in cases in which— (a) the evidence was not in the possession of the party seeking to have it admitted, and could not by proper diligence have been obtained by him, before the termination of the trial; or (b) there is some other special circumstance which, in the opinion of the Full Court, justifies the admission of it. It is no bar to the reception of fresh evidence that it establishes fraud.366 There is no distinction between cases tried with or without a jury.367
[11155] Effect of wrongful rejection or admission of evidence At common law, if evidence is wrongly rejected or admitted, an appellate court may order a new trial: When material evidence has been erroneously rejected at the instance of the party who succeeds, then to deny nevertheless to the unsuccessful party the remedy of a new trial the court must have some sure ground for saying that the reception of the evidence would not have affected the result or that it ought not to have done so.368
Windeyer J said: There is a clear distinction between, on the one hand, applications for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence or because of discovery of fresh
[page 422] evidence or because the judge’s summing-up was, in relation to the facts, insufficient, and, on the other hand, complaints of misdirection of law or wrongful rejection and reception of evidence. In the former cases a new trial is, within limits, a discretionary remedy to be applied
only if the court thinks there has been a miscarriage of justice. But in the latter cases there has been an error in law; and the court must assume that it has, or may have, resulted in a miscarriage of justice, for a party has a right to have his case tried according to law.369
Dixon CJ said that the difference between the two positions “can easily be exaggerated”.370
[11160] Effect of denial of natural justice The High Court has said:371 Where, however, the denial of natural justice affects the entitlement of a party to make submissions on an issue of fact, especially when the issue is whether the evidence of a particular witness should be accepted, it is more difficult for a court of appeal to conclude that compliance with the requirements of natural justice could have made no difference. True it is that an appeal to the Full Court from a judgment or order of a judge is by way of rehearing and that on hearing such an appeal the Full Court has all the powers and duties of the primary judge, including the power to draw inferences of fact: Supreme Court Rules, O 58 rr 6 and 14. However, when the Full Court is invited by a respondent to exercise these powers in order to arrive at a conclusion that a new trial, sought to remedy a denial of natural justice relevant to a finding of fact, could make no difference to the result already reached, it should proceed with caution. It is no easy task for a court of appeal to satisfy itself that what appears on its face to have been a denial of natural justice could have had no bearing on the outcome of the trial of an issue of fact. And this difficulty is magnified when the issue concerns the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of a witness at the trial. This is just such a case. At the trial the critical question on the issue of causation was whether Dr Scanlon’s testimony should have been accepted in preference to theappellant’s expert witnesses, notably Dr Donsworth. It was an issue pre-eminently suitable for determination by the primary judge who had an advantage over the Full Court in seeing and assessing the witnesses. We do not see how the Full Court, denied the important advantage of seeing and assessing the witnesses, could satisfactorily conclude that had the appellant’s counsel been given a reasonable opportunity to present submissions on the issue, it could have made no possible difference to the result. 1 N Bridge, “Presumptions and Burdens” (1949) 12 MLR 273 at 275; Lord Devlin, Trial by Jury
(the Hamlyn Lectures for 1956, revised 1966). See also W R Cornish, The Jury, 1971 and G D Nokes, “The English Jury and Law of Evidence” (1956–7) 31 Tul LR 153. 2 R v Gwaze [2010] 3 NZLR 734 at [51]. 3 Ex parte Thrift (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 450; Standfield v Byrne [1929] SASR 352 (FC); Lonergan v R [1963] Tas SR 158 (CCA). See further [15100] and [15245]–[15250]. 4 Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v R (2011) 203 IR 396 at [33]. See also Neilson v Harford (1841) 8 M & W 806 at 823 (Exch); Larratt v Bankers & Traders Insurance Co Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 215 at 225 (FC); Stephens v R (1977) 18 ALR 245 at 247–8 (Fed C of AFC); Stephens v R (1978) 139 CLR 315 at 322; R v Spens [1991] 4 All ER 421 (CA); Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287 (FC). 5 New South Wales Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 94 CLR 509 at 511–12; Cozens v Brutus [1973] AC 854 at 861; Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 395.
6 Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 79 at 85; Life Insurance Co of
Australia Ltd v Phillips [1925] VLR 311; New South Wales Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 94 CLR 509 at 512. 7 Simpson v Margitson (1847) 11 QB 23; Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 395. 8 Simpson v Margitson (1847) 11 QB 23; Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 395. 9 Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips [1925] VLR 311; Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 395. 10 Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 at 861. See also Church of the New Faith v Pay-Roll Tax Cmr (Vic) [1983] 1 VR 97 at 128–9 (FC); R v H [1993] 1 NZLR 130 (CA); R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 (CA). In Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162 at [24], Lord Hoffmann said: “Lord Reid was here making the well-known distinction between the meaning of a word, which depends upon conventions known to the ordinary speaker of English or ascertainable from a dictionary, and the meaning which the author of an utterance appears to have intended to convey by using that word in a sentence. The latter depends not only upon the conventional meanings of the words used, but also upon syntax, context and background. The meaning of an English word is not a question of law because it does not in itself have any legal significance. It is the meaning to be ascribed to the intention of the notional legislator in using that word which is a statement of law. It is because of the nature of language that, in trying to ascertain the legislator’s meaning, it is seldom helpful to make additions or substitutions in the actual language he has used.” 11 The application of his remarks to a criminal trial by jury in R v Feely [1973] QB 530 (CA) was disapproved as far as the word “dishonestly” is concerned in R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633 (FC). 12 As Lord Hoffmann said in Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162 at [25], there is much authority for saying that the question of whether facts found or admitted fall on one side or the other of a line drawn by the law is a question of fact: eg Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 7. 13 See [11135] below. See G L Williams, “Law and Fact” [1976] Crim LR 472 and 532 and DW Elliott, “Law and Fact in Theft Act cases” [1976] Crim LR 707; R v Salvo [1980] VR 401 (FC); R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633 (FC). 14 See eg Neilson v Harford (1841) 8 M & W 806 at 823. For cases treating the meaning of ordinary words in statutes as matters of construction, see R v Robinson [1978] 1 NZLR 709 at 716 (CA); Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Caldwell [1982] AC 341; R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303; Flack v Baldry [1988] 1 All ER 673 (HL). 15 R v Chatzidimitriou (2000) 1 VR 493. See also Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593 at [217]–[227] (“foster”). 16 Moulang v CSR Chemicals Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 38 (CA). 17 R v Peters (1886) 16 QBD 636 at 641 (CCCR); Tancred, Arrol & Co v Steel Co of Scotland Ltd (1890) 15 App Cas 125 (clear words not to be altered by proof of custom); Unwin v Hanson [1891] 2 QB 115 at 119 (CA); Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379; Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409 at 413; Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 at 415 and 420; Scott v Moses (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 101 (CCA); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 518; aff’d Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1972) 46 ALJR 609; Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General (Qld) [1979] AC 411 at 423 (PC). 18 Federal Cmr of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 at 271–3 (VSC); Re Michael; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25 WAR 511 at [107]; BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council [2007] ATPR 42-141 at [168]–[169]. 19 Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v FCT (1995) 62 FCR 289 at 298–9 per Hill J; he
concluded that the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) made no difference. See also Dowling v Pontypool, Caerleon and Newport Railway Co (1874) LR 18 Eq 714 at 727 (plans); Markell v Wollaston (1906) 4 CLR 131 at 147 and 150; Chandler & Co v Collector of Customs (1907) 4 CLR 1719 at 1726–1727 and 1741; Whitton v Falkiner (1915) 20 CLR 118 at 127; Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v FCT (1932) 47 CLR 222 at 227–8; Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 at 420; London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman [1946] AC 278 at 294; Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 386; Harding v Hayes [1973] Crim LR 714 (QBD); Matter of Envirodyne Industries Inc 29 F 3d 301 at 305 (7th Cir 1994); Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 398–399; Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 263 ALR 155 at [313]. 20 Dyson t/as Pharmacy Plus v Pharmacy Board of New South Wales (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 at [36], applying Australian Gaslight Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126 at 137. 21 Dyson t/as Pharmacy Plus v Pharmacy Board of New South Wales (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 at [36]. 22 Dyson t/as Pharmacy Plus v Pharmacy Board of New South Wales (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 at [38]– [39]. 23 Freight Rail Corporation v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2001) 107 FCR 15. 24 Re Michael; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25 WAR 511 at [107] (Gas Pipeline Access (Western Australia) Act 1998 (WA)); Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300 at [666]. Cf Telstra Corporation v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd (2000) 102 FCR 517 at [124]; Trade Practices Commission v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 20 ALR 31 at 45–8 (Fed C of A) (meaning of “control or dominate” in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 50 as it then stood — expert evidence rejected in the light of economics literature, other provisions in the Act, and a decision of the European Communities Commission on which s 50 was based); Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at [247] and [287] (unclear whether court must rely on expert evidence or whether it can conduct its own unaided examination of economic theory and economic writings). 25 Telstra Corp Ltd v ACCC [2008] ATPR 42-259 at [48]. 26 For examples, see Robertson v Jackson (1845) 2 CB 412 (CP) (practice of port of Algiers); Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85 at 88 (CA); Max Cooper & Sons Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1980) 29 ALR 77. See [29050]. 27 N Guthridge Ltd v Wilfley Ore Concentrator Syndicate Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 583 at 591, 596–7 and 600. 28 Kirkpatrick v Commonwealth (1985) 9 FCR 36 at 41–2 (FC); Goldsborough v O’Neill (1996) 131 FLR 104 at 107 (ACT SC). 29 Kuzmanovski v New South Wales Lotteries Corp (2010) 270 ALR 65 at [37]–[40]. 30 Morrell v Frith (1838) 3 M & W 402 at 404–5 (Ex). 31 Nevill v Fine Art and General Insurance Co [1897] AC 68. 32 W S Holdsworth, History of English Law, 1938, Vol 10, p 688. 33 See [41005]–[41035]. 34 See [41005] n 4. 35 R v Goldstein [1983] 1 All ER 434 (HL). 36 Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305. See also Reynolds v Metropolitan Police Cmr (1984) 80 Cr App R 125 (reasonable or probable cause for procuring search warrant); Blundell v A-G [1968] NZLR 341 (CA) (reasonable and probable grounds in relation to arrest). 37 Dowden and Pook Ltd v Pook [1904] 1 KB 45 (CA); Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd [1913] AC 724 at 732; Attorney-General (Cth) v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 797; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 471; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688 at 707; Lindner v Murdock’s Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628 at 653; Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 288 at 317. 38 See J M Maguire and C S S Epstein, “Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence” (1926) 40 Harv L Rev 392; E M Morgan, “Functions of Judge and Jury
in Determining Preliminary Questions of Fact” (1929) 43 Harv L Rev 165; E M Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation, 1956, Ch 3; R Mahoney, “Proving Preliminary Facts” (1993) 15 NZULR 225; R Pattenden, “The Proof of Rules of Pre-Verdict Judicial Fact-Finding in Criminal Trials by Jury” (2009) 125 LQR 79; R Pattenden, “Pre-Verdict Judicial Fact-Finding in Criminal Trials with Juries” (2009) 29 OJLS 1. 39 Under an exception to the rule against hearsay as to the cause of death in the case of homicide. See [33260]–[33310]. For an early example of the exclusive control of the judge, see R v Hucks (1816) 1 Stark 521. 40 For example, Bartlett v Smith (1843) 11 M & W 483 (Exch). 41 Admissible under an exception to the rule against hearsay on genealogical issues. See [33205]–[33255]. 42 Doe d Jenkins v Davies (1847) 10 QB 314 at 323 per Lord Denman CJ. See also Cleave v Jones (1852) 7 Ex 421 at 428; Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558 at 581–2; Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 248. The above passage was cited and applied in Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559, where the High Court held that the standard of proof to be applied in deciding on facts which are conditions precedent to the admission of evidence not the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard. Wendo v R was followed in R v Hagan [1966] Qd R 219 (CCA). See a criticism of these decisions by T G Matthews in (1965–6) 5 UQLJ 203. In R v Donohoe (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 38 (CCA), a question as to the standard of proof required before a statement is admitted as a dying declaration was discussed but not fully ruled on; for a contrary view, see R v Hope [1909] VLR 149 at 164; R v Rogers [1950] SASR 102 (CCA). 43 R v Chadwick (1934) 24 Cr App R 138. 44 Stace v Griffith (1869) LR 2 PC 420 at 427–8. See also Jonas v Ford (1885) 11 VLR 240 (FC) and Douglas v Tiernan (1931) 32 SR (NSW) 149. Both cases decide that it is for the judge, if necessary by hearing evidence, to decide questions of privilege. See also R v Lynch [1954] Tas SR 47, and Taylor v Taylor [1956] Tas SR 84, both cases upon s 96 of the Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) which gave statutory recognition to claims of privilege by clergymen and doctors. See now Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) ss 127 and 127A. 45 R v Little (1976) 14 SASR 556 at 566 and 571 (CCA). 46 Duke of Beaufort v Crawshay (1866) LR 1 CP 699. 47 Ex parte Hamilton; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732 (Crimes Act 1900 s 407, now repealed, but the right must continue: Evidence Act 1995 ss 12(a) and 189). 48 R v Chadwick (1934) 24 Cr App R 138. See also Attorney-General (NSW) v Jackson (1906) 3 CLR 730, where it was decided that where the admissibility of a deposition is in question, all relevant questions of fact are to be determined by the court and that its decision is conclusive unless it is manifestly not warranted by the evidence. By s 189(7) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), the exclusionary rules of Ch 3 of the Acts apply. For detailed discussion, see K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law, 1997, pp 16–23. 49 Harris v Minister for Public Works (NSW) (1912) 14 CLR 721. 50 R v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 at 608. 51 Lawrence v R [1933] AC 699 at 708. There are exceptions in the case of misdemeanours, and in cases in which the accused renders his continued presence in court impossible by his violence (R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 739 (CCA); Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 43–4 (FC)); also where the public interest requires secrecy. See R v Browne (1906) 70 JP 472; R v Hales [1924] 1 KB 672 (CCA) (prisoner’s presence absolutely essential when sentence passed for felony) and R v Vernell [1953] VLR 590 (FC). See also Criminal Code (Qld) s 617. When it is necessary for argument to take place in the absence of the accused, the period of exclusion should be kept to the minimum: R v Preston [1994] 2 AC 130. 52 See Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619. This power may be exercised whether or not the accused
consents: R v Hendry (1988) 88 Cr App R 187; R v Davis [1990] Crim LR 860 (CA). 53 Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20; Kerr v R [1980] WAR 21 (CCA). 54 Ex parte Whitelock; Re MacKenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534; Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617 at 636; Casley-Smith v F S Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332. These cases are discussed in Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 119 FCR 269 at [93]–[95]; ASIC v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338 at [30]–[49]. That position has not been altered by the Evidence Acts unless a s 135 or 136 order is made: see at [23]–[29] and [49]. 55 See the authorities cited in n 54, together with Banjima People v Western Australia (2011) 200 FCR 138 at [15]–[22]. 56 R v Dunne (1929) 99 LJKB 117 (CCA). Dicta in this case are criticised in H Potter, (1930) 46 LQR 137. 57 R v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 (CCA) (requiring jury to be absent and criticised in P H Winfield, (1950) 66 LQR 157); R v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190; R v N (1992) 95 Cr App R 356. It was distinguished in R v Deakin [1994] 4 All ER 769 (CA) and not applied to expert evidence on the question of the capacity of a mentally handicapped complainant to tell the truth. Its validity is doubtful: R v Hampshire [1996] QB 1 (CA). 58 R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178 at 183. 59 Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20; R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373 (CCA); R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423 at 428 (CCA); R v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 at 272. That result is sometimes achieved by legislation, eg R v Caine (1993) 68 A Crim R 233 (Vic SC). See also s 18(5) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT). 60 Lau v R (1991) 6WAR 30 (CCA) at 35 per Seaman J (s 100A of the Evidence Act 1906 “demands a more complicated inquiry” than s 101), at 41 per Murray J (ratio of Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20 depends on particular provisions of Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 400 (2) (now repealed)) and 59–60 per Owen J (making both points); R v Revesz (1996) 88 A Crim R 253 (WACCA). There is no vice in the trial judge’s reasons for holding the witness competent being given in the presence of the jury provided no specific approbation of the witness’s credibility is conveyed: Cook v R (2000) 22 WAR 67 at 98–9 (CCA). Ordinarily cross-examination on the voir dire by the accused is not permitted: R v Simmons (1997) 93 A Crim R 32 at 38 (CCA). 61 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 especially at 567–8 (CA). See generally K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law 1997, pp 163–4 and 397–402. 62 This reverses TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124. See ALRC 102 [16.97]–[16.109]. 63 Doe d Jenkins v Davies (1847) 10 QB 314 at 323–4 (QB). 64 Hitchins v Eardley (1871) LR 2 P & D 248. 65 Stowe v Querner (1870) LR 5 Ex 155 at 158–9. 66 Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 11 Exch 360. 67 But see R v Christensen [1923] 2 DLR 379; cf R v Donohoe (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 38 (CCA), where the question was decided by the judge in accordance with English authorities. 68 R v Robson and R v Harris [1972] 2 All ER 699. See generally K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law, 1997, pp 15 and 32. 69 R v Roberts [1954] 2 QB 329; Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 (PC); R v Mulligan [1955] OR 240 (CA); R v Gleeson [1975] Qd R 399 (CCA); Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 261; R v Schaeffer (2005) 13 VR 337 at [65]. On what jury directions are appropriate, see R v Lewis (2000) 1VR 290 at [101]. See generally K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law, 1997, ch 5. 70 Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 264. See also R v Kerr (No 2) [1951] VLR 239 at 246 (FC); Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633; R v Lattouf (1980) 2 A Crim R 65 at 74–5 (NSW CCA); Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 588; R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at [42]–[43]; A-G (Tas) v Maynard (2003) 11 Tas R 437 (CCA); R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407 at [19]–[26]; Sumner v R (2010) 29 VR 398 at [42]. 71 R v Francis (1959) 43 Cr App R 174; Director of Public Prosecutions v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574;
MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512. This is so unless the accused prefers to have the issue decided by the jury as part of the main trial: R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178; endorsed in Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 at 223 (PC). The right to a voir dire exists also where there is no jury: Smithers v Andrews; Ex parte Andrews [1978] Qd R 64 (FC); Egan v Bott [1985] VR 787. 72 R v Cowell [1940] 2 KB 49 (CCA); Ex parte Hamilton; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 524. 73 R v Deathe [1962] VR 650 at 652 (FC). See Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 at 222; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512. 74 Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 326. 75 MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 522. 76 R v Murray [1951] 1 KB 391 (CCA); R v Mahoney-Smith [1967] 2 NSWR 154. 77 Jackson v R (1962) 108 CLR 591. 78 Attorney-General v Ainscough [1960] IR 136 (CCA), approvingly discussed in MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 535. 79 Only the first two possibilities were mentioned by Lord MacDermott in R v Murphy [1965] NI 138 at 144 (C-M AC). See also Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235. See [1880]. 80 R v Watson [1980] 2 All ER 293 at 296 (CA). 81 Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 261; R v Perera [1986] 1 Qd R 211 at 217 (CCA); R v D’Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140 at 147 (CA); R v Robertson [1998] 4 VR 30 at 40 (CA); R v Cotic (2000) 118 A Crim R 393 at [9]–[18]; R v Green (2002) 4 VR 471 at [31]. 82 R v Blades; Ex parte AG (2001) 124 A Crim R 415. 83 R v Willie [1960] Qd R 525; R v Burgess [1968] 2 QB 112 at 117–18 (CA); R v Ovenell [1969] 1 QB 17 (CA); ChanWei Keung v R [1967] 2 AC 160 (PC); MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529. Cf R v Zerafa [1935] St R Qd 227 (CCA); R v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680 at 684 (CCA); R v Mushtaq [2005] 3 All ER 885 (HL). 84 Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628 at 640, applied in R v Pratt [1966] 2 NSWR 516; see also R v Czerwinski [1954] VLR 483 (FC); R v McAloom [1959] OR 441 (CA). 85 R v McCarthy (1980) 70 Cr App R 270 as explained in Prasad v R [1981] 1 All ER 319 (PC). 86 Thompson v HM Advocate 1968 JC 61 at 66. See B MacKenna, “The Voirdire Revisited” [1967] Crim LR 336; Jackson v Denno 389 US 368 (1964). See also [1880]. 87 R v Hammond (1941) 28 Cr App R 84 at 87. The decision has been followed by the Supreme Court of Canada (De Clerq v R [1968] SCR 902) after not being followed in some provinces: R v Weighill [1945] 2 DLR 471 (BCCA); R v Hnedish (1958) 26 WWR 685 (Sask). R v Hammond was approved in Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 263. 88 As to the particular problem raised where there is no jury and trial is before judge alone, see Cooper v R (1961) 105 CLR 177 and R v Amo [1963] P & NGLR 22. 89 Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 (PC). This was said to be too broad in R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208 at [12]. 90 Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 263. 91 The point was left open by Gibbs CJ and Wilson J in MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 524. It caused division in Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 (CCA). See also R v Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 13 VR 28 at [11]–[15]. See also R v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444. 92 See Sir Frederick Pritchard, The Common Calendar, pp 88–9; F M Neasey, “Cross-examination of the Accused on the Voir Dire” (1960) 34 ALJ 110. In R v Gray [1965] Qd R 373 a statement made on the voir dire inconsistent with his testimony was proved against the accused on the issue of credibility. See also R v Wright [1969] SASR 256 (CCA); Harris v Samuels (1973) 5 SASR 439 (CCA); R v Banner [1970] VR 240 (FC); and R v Toner [1966] QWN 44 (accused giving evidence on voir dire not bound to answer questions which might incriminate — overruled in R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208 at [12]); cf R v Toomey [1969] Tas SR 99. 93 R v Brophy [1982] AC 476 at 481; although it is not clear that in R v Brophy there was an extra-
judicial confession confirmed on the voir dire, this ought, in principle, to be immaterial. See also R v Silley [1964] QWN 45. 94 R v Brophy [1982] AC 476 at 482. For criticism of this result see R Pattenden, “Informal Judicial Admissions of Criminal Activity” (1983) 32 ICLQ 812. For the view that R v Brophy is a “very weak authority” on this point, see K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law, 1997, p 427. See also R v Treacy [1944] 2 All ER 229 (CCA); Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 at 259 (PC); R v Ram [2007] 3 NZLR 322 (CA). 95 R v Brophy [1982] AC 476 at 483. But see Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 263. 96 Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 at 258 (PC). 97 Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 at 260 (PC), subject only to the legislation equivalent to the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (Eng) s 4: [17535]. The decision was accepted as correct in MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 534. 98 Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 (PC). See also Thongjai v R [1998] AC 54 (PC). 99 See text at nn 103 and 104 and MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 522–3, 533, 543 and 547; R v Deathe [1962] VR 650 at 652 (FC); Foster v R (1982) 38 ALR 599 (Fed C of A FC); Buckland v R (1983) 9 A Crim R 132 (WACCA). Similar principles apply in Queensland under s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894: R v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78 (CA). 100 Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 at 222 (PC). The last proposition is supported also by MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 522. See also R v White (1976) 13 SASR 276 (CCA); R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8 (CCA); cf R v Matheson [1969] SASR 53 at 55–6; R v Gleeson [1975] Qd R 399 (CCA). 101 Thongjai v R [1998] AC 54 at 63 (PC) 102 Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 at 223 (PC); Timothy v State [2000] 1 WLR 485 (PC). 103 R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178. 104 The judge can overrule that preference and exclude the jury: R v Davis [1990] Crim LR 860 (CA). 105 See also MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512. See also Foster v R (1982) 38 ALR 599 (Fed C of A FC); Buckland v R (1983) 9 A Crim R 132 (WA CCA). On the general duty of a trial judge to an unrepresented defendant, see R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168. 106 Mitchell v R [1998] AC 695 at 704 (PC). 107 MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 523. 108 Cf Mason J in MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 533–4: the better view is not that there is a discretion to grant or refuse a voir dire, but that the accused is entitled to it once the issue of voluntariness arises. To the same effect is Erven v R [1979] 1 SCR 926. See also R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 (CCA). 109 Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 13. 110 R v Thomas [1970] VR 674 (FC). 111 Mitchell v R [1998] AC 695 (PC); Thompson v R [1998] AC 811 at 843 (PC). 112 R v Thompson [1893] 2 QB 12 (CCCR). See generally K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law 1997, ch 9. 113 R v Jenkins (1869) LR 1 CCR 187 at 192. 114 Marsden v Stansfield (1828) 7 B & C 815 (KB). 115 R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313. 116 This appears to be the position in England in cases on confessions (R v Sartori [1961] Crim LR 397; R v McLintock [1962] Crim LR 549 (CCA); R v Cave [1963] Crim LR 371 (CCA); R S O’Regan, “Admissibility of Confessions — Standard of Proof” [1964] Crim LR 287) and dying declarations (R v Jenkins (1869) LR 1 CCR 192; cf R v Booker (1924) 88 JP 75 (CCA), where the words used were “if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge”) at least so far as the standard of proof demanded of the prosecution on the voir dire is concerned; and the same is true of the proof of handwriting tendered for comparative purposes: R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039 (CA), overruling R v Angeli [1978] 3 All ER 950 (CA). If the evidence is tendered by the defence, the civil standard
would seem appropriate: R v Mattey [1995] 2 Cr App R 409. 117 R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 (CCA); R v Hagan [1966] Qd R 219 (CCA); R v Hart (1977) 17 SASR 100 at 103; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519; R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442 at 445 (NT SC). See [33675]. This was treated as being of general application to all ancillary questions in Police v Anderson [1972] NZLR 233 at 249–50 (CA); R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 at 22 (CA); R v Gallagher [1991] 3 NZLR 163 (CA); R v Duncan [1992] 1 NZLR 528 (CA); R v Te Kira [1993] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559 is often cited as authority for the balance of probabilities standard, but in fact Taylor and Owen JJ, with whom Dixon CJ agreed, applied a test of whether there was “a prima facie reason” for admitting the evidence, relying on Starke J in Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 239 and Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 328. It was applied to proof of a writing with which a document allegedly in the accused’s handwriting was to be compared in R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 (FC), not following R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039 (CA) and R v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 (CCA). Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559 is often cited as authority for the balance of probabilities standard, but in fact Taylor and Owen JJ, with whom Dixon CJ agreed, applied a test of whether there was “a prima facie reason” for admitting the evidence, relying on Starke J in Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 239 and Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 328. 118 R v Donohoe (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 38; cf R v Hope [1909] VLR 149 at 164; R v Rogers [1950] SASR 102 (CCA). 119 Lego v Twomey 404 US 477 (1972). 120 This passage is discussed in K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law, 1997, p 30 n 55. 121 R v Robson [1972] 2 All ER 699. 122 See Timm v R [1981] 2 SCR 315, applying this principle to the question of whether a complaint was made by the victim of a rape (but distinguishing the questions of whether it was spontaneous or recent). See Section 2. 123 MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512. See [33765]. 124 R v Mattey [1995] Crim LR 308 (CA). 125 R v Bacash (2001) 3 VR 428; R v Atallah (2001) 3 VR 437. 126 The proponent is the party by whom the issue must be raised in the first instance. The proponent is usually the plaintiff in a civil case, and the prosecutor on a criminal charge, but this is not necessarily so. To use the terminology employed in [7005]–[7015], the proponent has the evidential burden of proof in this first instance. The proponent usually bears the legal burden also, but this is not always the case. Wigmore uses the term to describe the party bearing the legal burden of proof. 127 Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 at 207 per Lord Blackburn; Wakelin v London and South Western Railway Co (1886) 12 App Cas 41; Cofield v Waterloo Case Co Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 363. 128 Ryder v Wombwell (1868) LR 4 Ex 32 at 39 (Ex). In Jones v Great Western Rail Co (1930) 144 LT 194 (HL) the trial judge referred to the scintilla rule in determining to leave the case to the jury. In Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 at [39] McHugh J approved Willes J’s test; at [82]–[84] Kirby J and at [120]–[121] Callinan J disapproved its use in Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 240. For cases rejecting the scintilla theory, see Gaudron J at [16] n 17. 129 See [9100]–[9120]. For the application of the test to circumstantial evidence, see Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352; Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470;Watt v S G Waite Pty Ltd (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 137 (FC) (held wrong in Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 at [43]–[45]); R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321 (CCA). See also R Eggleston, “Probabilities and Proof” (1963) 4 MULR 180. 130 See G L Williams, “The Application for a Directed Verdict” [1965] Crim LR 343 and 410; R Pattenden, “The Submission of No Case — Some Recent Developments” [1982] Crim LR 558 and
P Macmillan, “No case submissions: A neglected corner of civil procedure” (2004) 25 Aust Bar Rev 63. For a comprehensive discussion of non-suits in New South Wales law, see De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1; Menzies v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 62 at 64 (FC) and NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules rr 29.9 and 29.10. For the equivalent in Victoria see Humphrey v Collier [1946] VLR 391 (FC); Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Puddy [1949] VLR 242. 131 Nicol v Nicol (1888) 14 VLR 695. 132 For the distinction between “verdicts by direction” and “non-suits” see Windeyer J’s discussion in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 322–31. 133 Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 at 207; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 319–20. 134 Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492 at 495 (FC): Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 239 (FC). 135 Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169 (CA). (Cf William H Muller & Co’s Algemeene v EbbwVale Steel Iron & Coal Co Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 1363 at 1365, where Branson J said Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169 enunciated no more than a principle of convenience.) This rule was described as “general” in Stevenson v Barham (1977) 136 CLR 190 at 202–3. It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that a new trial will be ordered by the Court of Appeal after an election (Portland Manufacturers Ltd v Harte [1977] QB 306 (CA)). The use of the expression “no case to answer” in civil as opposed to criminal cases has been described as unfortunate: Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492 at 494–5 (FC). 136 Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169 at 178 (CA). 137 Young v Rank [1950] 2 KB 510 where the authorities are reviewed by Devlin J. 138 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Puddy [1949] VLR 242. 139 Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 (FC). This approach was followed in Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 at 7–9 (Fed C of A). 140 For example, Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 357 at [21]. 141 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 29.10. 142 Bank of New South Wales v Signorini; Ex parte Signorini [1966] Qd R 322 (FC), applying the former NSW practice in Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492 at 495 (FC). 143 Copper Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 at 294 perWalters J (unless “the basis of the submission were that the evidence was so ‘vague or ambiguous’ or ‘so weak and indefinite that the court should not accept it’”); Antique Pty Ltd v Securities & General Insurance Co Ltd (1984) 112 LSJS 317; Preston v Dowell (1987) 45 SASR 111; Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54. 144 See eg Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1978) 40 FLR 74 at 77 (Fed C of A); Treharne v Geo McEwin & Son Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 543 (Fed C of A). See also James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1986) 9 FCR 448 at 451–2. J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers—Western Australian Branch (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458, followed the Victorian position. In the Northern Territory there is no established practice, and the trial judge has a discretion: Tovehead Pty Ltd v Freeman (2003) 175 FLR 311 at [46]. 145 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344 at [60]. 146 Rasomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 216. See also William H Muller & Co’s Algemeene v EbbwVale Steel Iron & Coal Co Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 1363 at 1365–6; Trade Practices Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55 (Fed C of A); Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 225 (Fed C of A);
Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 (Fed C of A); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum (2004) 141 FCR 183; Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532 at [16]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291 at [535]-[546]; Helal v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 285 ALR 281 at [29]–[35]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Turi Foods Ltd (No 4) [2013] ATPR 42-448 at [62]–[68]. 147 Skeate v Slaters [1914] 2 KB 429 at 434. In Grinstead v Hadrill [1953] 1 All ER 1188, it was held that a judge ought not to enter a verdict for the opponent once he had decided that there was some evidence in favour of the proponent’s contention fit to go to the jury. As to the power of the judge to enter judgment non obstante veredicto, see Phillips v Ellinson Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 221. 148 Payne v Harrison [1961] 2 QB 403 (CA). See also Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 329; Lennard v District Council of Naracoorte [1924] SASR 407 at 410. 149 Menzies v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 62 (FC); Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664. In J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers — Western Australian Branch (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458 at 463–5, the issue was said to be a matter of proper case management having regard to the interests of justice. 150 See [9120]. 151 Eg, NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 29.9. Non-suits do not exist in the Federal Court: James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1986) 9 FCR 448 at 454. 152 Cf A Ligertwood, Australian Evidence, 5th ed, 2010, [6.38], who contends, without citing authority, that it is not open on a non-suit application to argue that the plaintiff should fail on the ground that the evidence is so weak or unsatisfactory that it should not be accepted. 153 So described in Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 672 by Dawson J, after R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 (CCA). 154 R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425 at 439–40 (ACT SC). The Victorian position is discussed below; see text at nn 159 and 160. It is thus wrong, at least without an agreed application by the parties that the judge consider whether on agreed or admitted facts an offence is made out, for a judge to direct a verdict of not guilty before the end of the prosecution case: R v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3. 155 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; Harris v Pandava (1975) 14 Tas R 50; R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 (CCA); R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 (CA); Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 (PC); R v Ling (1981) 6 A Crim R 429 (Tas CCA); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410 (FC); R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321 (CCA); Lowe v Goodluck [1985] ACLD 400 (Tas); Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256 (FC); R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72 (CCA); R v Pyke (1988) 38 A Crim R 322 at 337 (WA CCA); R v Brady (2005) 92 SASR 135. For the test in the case of circumstantial evidence see R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321 (CCA). 156 Evgeniou v R [1965] ALR 209; Fawkes v Shadwell; Ex parte Shadwell [1966] Qd R 20. Cf Nicholson v Superior Home Improvements Pty Ltd; Ex parte Nicholson [1987] 2 Qd R 201 at 210. 157 In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410 at 414 (FC) the court appeared to suggest that the judge’s powers included “advising” the jury to acquit; but this passage is probably not one to which significance should be attached. 158 R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497 (CCA); R v Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 at 182–3 (CCA); Prashar v R (1988) 1 WAR 190 at 198–9 (CCA). 159 R v Jones [1956] VLR 98; R v Anthony [1962] VR 440 (FC); R v Webster [1974] VR 457. 160 R v Faure [1978] VR 246. 161 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s 108(2). 162 Williams v R [1982] WAR 277 (CCA); R v Wati [1985] 1 NZLR 236 (CA); Crosdale v R
[1995] 2 All ER 500 (PC). 163 R v Utans (1982) 29 SASR 592 at 594–5. 164 R v Smith (1986) 85 Cr App R 197 at 200; Crosdale v R [1995] 2 All ER 500 (PC). 165 R v Joiner (1910) 4 Cr App R 64; R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497 (CCA) (which endeavours unsuccessfully to distinguish R v Power [1919] 1 KB 572 (CCA)); R v Cockley (1984) 79 Cr App R 181. See H Calvert, “‘No Case to Answer’ in the Court of Criminal Appeal” [1958] Crim LR 232. 166 R v Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 at 182–3 (CCA). 167 R v Wood [1974] VR 117 (FC); Wright v Bastin (No 2) [1979] VR 329 at 331; R v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 at 375 (Vic FC). 168 Riseley v R [1970] Tas SR 41 at 60–1 (CCA). 169 Low v R (1978) 23 ALR 616 at 623–4 (WA CCA); Prashar v R (1988) 1 WAR 190 at 198–9 (CCA). 170 The distinction is made plain in Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 at 319, though obscured in other cases. 171 R v Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 at 357, stating further that the court should not, instead, invite the jury to stop the case: see also R v Young [1964] 2 All ER 480 (CCA). 172 R v Barker (1975) 65 Cr App R 287. 173 R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 (CA); R v Goring [2011] Crim LR 790 (CA). See now the authority cited in n 178 below. There was Australian authority for the “unsafe” submission as well as English: see Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315; R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579 at 584 (FC). 174 R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 at 140. For the court’s powers under s 2, see below, [11140] n 296. The doctrine appears to be reviving in England: R v Brown [2002] 1 Cr App R 46. 175 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207. 176 R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 at 163 (CCA); R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321. See also Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2VR 410 (FC); Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 at 319; R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72 (CCA); R v Fellowes [1987] 2 Qd R 606 (CCA); R v Stewart; Ex parte A-G [1989] 1 Qd R 590 (CCA); R v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74 (CCA) (a full analysis of the authorities, following R v Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 229 (NSW SC) and discussing Mezzo v R (1986) 27 CCC (3d) 97 (SC Can)); Gebert v R (1992) 60 SASR 110 (CCA); Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 (CCA); R v Prosser (1993) 70 A Crim R 391 (WACCA); R v Morris; Ex parte A-G [1996] 2 Qd R 68 (CA); R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346; R v F [2012] Crim LR 282 (CA). 177 H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 845. 178 R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 (CA); R v F(S) [2011] 2 Cr App R 28 at [36]–[37]. See R Pattenden, “The Submissions of No Case — Some Recent Developments” [1982] Crim LR 558. R v Galbraith at 1062 stated two propositions, identified as (2)(a) and (2)(b): “(2)The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of tenuous character, for example because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other evidence. (a) Where the judge comes to the conclusion that the Crown’s evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict on it, it is his duty, upon a submission being made, to stop the case. (b) Where however the Crown’s evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witness’s reliability, or other matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury.” The latter was approved in Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 214; the former was disapproved so far as it refers to “inconsistent” evidence. The correct approach is to ignore the evidence which tells against the prosecution even though it is “inconsistent” with that telling against the accused: resolution of the inconsistency is not for the judge in mid trial but for the jury at the close of the
trial. 179 Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 at 431–2 per Glass JA (CA). 180 R v Crooks (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 390 at 393 (CCA); Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 250. 181 Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534, 604 and 608. 182 Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430. 183 R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 (CCA); R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 (CA). 184 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 at 229–30 (CA); R v Flemming (1987) 86 Cr App R 32 at 36–7; R v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74 (CCA); R v Akaidere [1990] Crim LR 808; Reid v R [1990] 1 AC 363 (PC); Daley v R [1994] 1 AC 117 (PC); R v Fergus (1994) 98 Cr App R 313; R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (NSW CCA); R v Ley [2007] 1 Cr App R 25 at [27]. 185 R v MacKenzie (1993) 96 Cr App R 98 at 108. 186 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 212 and 214. 187 Benney v Dowling [1959] VR 237 at 242. 188 H H Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842 at 845, citing R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 at 163 (CCA). Cf R v Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 at 357 and R v Young [1964] 2 All ER 480 (CA). Similarly, just as a jury can bring a not guilty verdict at any time after the close of the prosecution case, so may a tribunal which is judge of both law and fact: R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 at 163 (CCA). See R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 at 217–18 (CCA). 189 R v Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1 at [153]. 190 Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 at 239. 191 R v Morgan; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [1987] 2 Qd R 627 (CCA). 192 R v Speechley [2005] Crim LR 811 (CA). 193 Jones v Metcalfe [1967] 3 All ER 205 (DC of QBD). 194 Disher v Disher [1965] P 31 (DC of PDA); Mayes v Mayes [1971] 2 All ER 397 (DC of PDA). 195 De Filippo v De Filippo (1963) 108 Sol Jo 56 (DC of PDA). For the New South Wales position, see above [11090] n 141. See also May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433. 196 R v Horseferry Road Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Adams [1978] 1 All ER 373 (DC of QBD). 197 R v Eriswell (Inhabitants) (1790) 3 TR 707 at 714. Exactly the same sentiments prevented the adoption of the United States Model Code. See J H Wigmore, “The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent” (1942) 28 ABA Jo 23. 198 R v Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271. 199 R v Christie (1914) 10 Cr App R 141 at 149 (HL). 200 R v Christie [1914] AC 545. 201 R Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation, 2nd ed, 1990, pp 1–4 distinguishes six senses. 202 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, pp 31–3 describes these as weak and strong senses of discretion. See also [21235] below. 203 R Cross, “Discretion and the Law of Evidence: when it comes to the ‘Forensic Crunch’” (1979) 30 NILQ 280 at 294. 204 R v Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73 at 77 (CA). See also R v Murnkami [1951] SCR 801 at 803. An Australian example is Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528, discussed at [21230] below. 205 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473; Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627. 206 Charles Osenton & Co v Johnston [1942] AC 130, where it was said that there was a presumption that the discretion had been exercised correctly. In Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556 at 566, Lord Diplock explicitly distinguished between the role of an appellate court in relation to rule and discretion. 207 R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 at 1028 (CCA).
208 R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 552 (CA). 209 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 360–1. See [23330]–[23345] below. 210 R v Britzman [1983] 1 All ER 369 at 373 (CA). 211 Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001 at 1024. But see R v Greasby [1984] Crim LR 488 (CA). 212 For example, R v Dodd (1981) 74 Cr App R 50. 213 See eg ss 170–173 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and
2011 (ACT), and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 214 See [1050]–[1070]. 215 Rosedale Mouldings Ltd v Sibley [1980] ICR 816. 216 Seymour v A-G (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416 at 441. 217 R v Horsham Justices; Ex parte Bukhari (1982) 74 Cr App R 291 (DC of QBD). For criticism, see D J Birch, [1982] Crim LR 179. 218 The decision as to whether evidence is “relevant” is often thought to conceal a discretionary decision: [1490] text at n 822. 219 See R Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation, 2nd ed, 1990; B Selway, “Principle Public Policy and Unfairness — Exclusion of Evidence on Discretionary Grounds” (2002) 23 Adel LR 1; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49 at [14]–[15]. See also F Bennion, “Distinguishing judgment and discretion” [2000] PL 368. 220 See [21220] ff. 221 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 191–2; R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 551–6 (CCA); R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (NSW CCA). This permits the court to edit a written statement of an accused tendered by the prosecution, whether in a trial of that accused alone, or in a joint trial, on the ground that it is unduly prejudicial to the other accused (eg R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88 (CA)); the discretion does not apply to evidence tendered by a co-accused: Lobban v R [1995] 2 All ER 602 (PC). The discretion can operate where an admission is equivocal: AM v Western Australia (2008) 188 A Crim R 457 at [113]–[114]. 222 R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 65–6 (NSW CCA); BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [112]. 223 R v Grimes [2013] 1 Qd R 351 at [24] and [28]. 224 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [51]. See also R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 at [47]; P v Tasmania (2009) 19 Tas R 266 at [29]–[31]. 225 See [23340] ff. 226 See [33680] ff. 227 See [27230] ff. 228 See [33680] and [33760] ff. 229 Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541; R v Sang [1980] AC 402 at 444–5; Stephens v R (1985) 156 CLR 664 at 669; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 594–5; R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 231 at 236–40, 241–2 and 251–2 (FC); R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 at 175 (CCA); Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 at 549 (FC); R v Grimes [2013] 1 Qd R 351 at [31]–[44]. Subparagraph (e) was quoted by Martin J in R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [76] (CCA): the case contains a detailed discussion of various of the discretions referred to in the paragraph. See also Police v Dunstall (2013) 118 SASR 233. 230 R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 231 at 252; Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1VR 533 at 553–4 (FC). 231 R v Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543 at 547–8 (NSW CCA); R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 231 at 260; Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 at 553–4 (FC) (though a verdict based on that witness’s evidence may be set aside on appeal as unsafe or unsatisfactory: R v Ralph (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 at 210 (NSW CCA); approved in Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 at 446); R v Grimes [2013] 1 Qd R 351 at [31]–[44]. The contrary was assumed but not decided in Hardwick v Western Australia (2011) 211 A Crim R 349.
232 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; see [11100]. 233 See [13085]. 234 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 363; Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 (FC) (discussing
inability to cross-examine the deceased maker of an admissible statement and citing R v Moore (1973) 17 CCC (2d) 348); R v Collins [1986] VR 37; R v NRC [1999] 3 VR 537 at [51]; in Scott v R [1989] AC 1242 at 1258 (PC) the discretion to exclude depositions of deceased persons was recognised, though it was said that it “should be exercised with great restraint”). 235 R v Ames [1964–5] NSWR 1489 (CCA); R v Murdoch (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 at 127 (NSW CCA); R v Baker [1989] 3 NZLR 635. See also Green v R (1939) 61 CLR 167 at 172; R v O’Leary [1946] SASR 175 at 185 (CCA); R v Jeffrey [1967] VR 467 at 473; R v Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 at 435 (CCA); R v O’Sullivan (1975) 13 SASR 68 at 74–5 (CCA); R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489 at [156] (where the fact of violent death is patent to all in the trial, a degree of robustness should be applied and the sensitiveness of jurors to photographs should not be overstated); R v Bunting (2004) 92 SASR 146 at [665] (same). 236 See [21035]. 237 Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610. 238 R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [87]. 239 R v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397 at 403 (NSWCCA); Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [60]; R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 at [47]–[68]; Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470 at [174]–[177]; R v Mundine (2008) 182 A Crim R 302 at [33] (wrong to reject evidence which, if accepted, was evidence of positive identification on the claimed grounds of the inherent unreliability of photographic identification, of the non-accordance of the non-identified images with the description of the suspect, and of supposed weaknesses in cross-racial identification); Irani v R (2008) 188 A Crim R 125 at [25]; KM J v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; cf Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [86]; T Smith and S Odgers, “Determining ‘probative value’ for the purposes of section 137 in the Uniform Evidence Law” (2010) 34 Crim LJ 292. 240 R v Mundine (2008) 182 A Crim R 302 at [44]. 241 Young v Lusted (2011) 20 Tas R 98 at [27]. 242 R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 at 195 (ACT SC); R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139; Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]. 243 R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 at [116]; Martin v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77 at [89]–[91]. 244 Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [92]; R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 at [31]. See also R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 at 460 (NSW SC); Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185 at [122]–[130]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49 at [20] (CCA). 245 R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139 (NSW SC); R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [30]; R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 at [117]. 246 R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 at [20]. See also Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33 at [41]–[44] and [68]–[70]. 247 R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 at [20] per Sheller JA. See also R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374 at [24]; R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [68];R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [3], [74] and [76]; R v Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 44 at [47]; R v Rima (2003) 145 A Crim R 27 at [38]–[39]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49 at [14]–[15] (CCA); Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68 at [60]–[61]. 248 BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275. 249 P v Tasmania (2009) 19 Tas R 266 at [31]. 250 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 at 176–7. 251 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90 at [21]. 252 R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31.
253 O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1 at [90]. 254 Nick Scali Ltd v Super A-Mart Pty Ltd (2010) 189 FCR 550 at [19]. 255 De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (2011) 200 FCR 253 at [42]. 256 R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [164]; R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 at [101] and
[126]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320 at [339]–[343]; Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v BB (2010) 29 VR 110 at [21]. 257 R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374 at [18]–[27] (though the evidence was held admissible on appeal on the ground that its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice). 258 R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [39]. 259 Kerney v Lewis (2005) 155 A Crim R 95 at [27]. 260 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v MacDonald (2008) 68 ACSR 126. 261 Aytugrul v R (2010) 205 A Crim R 157 at [176]. 262 Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170 at [40]–[65]. 263 Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 at 118; Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363 at 368–9; David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 at 531; Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 (CA). See also Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364. In England the common law position is the same: R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 564; Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599 at 610 (PC); Helliwell v Piggott-Sims [1980] FSR 356 at 357 (CA); ITC Film Distributors v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431, and the cases cited in Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388 at 402; Bradford City Metropolitan Council v K [1990] Fam 140, regretted in Re M and R (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Expert Evidence) [1996] 4 All ER 239 at 255 (CA). Cf Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137, where Carter J recognised the existence of the discretion in dicta attacked by J R S Forbes, “Extent of the Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases” (1988) 62 ALJ 211. Although the terminology of discretion was employed in this context in Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625, it seems likely that it was used no more than loosely to characterise those elements of the exclusionary rule of an essentially indeterminate nature. See further below [21275]–[21290]; Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 at [86]. 264 CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [142] n 106 per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ. Cf Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388 at 402 per Pincus J. See also Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361 and 381 (FC) and Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364. The reference to unfairness in Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v DeWolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119 at 127 (CA) supports Pincus J’s doubt. 265 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 at 442. 266 D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 239. The House was numerically equally divided on this point. Lord Edmund-Davies delivered a speech to the same effect as Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Diplock did not mention the matter, and Lord Kilbrandon contented himself with agreeing with Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone. In British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1113, Sir Robert Megarry V-C thought the balance favoured Lord Hailsham’s view. 267 Paragraph 1, citing Attorney-General v Clough [1963] 1 QB 773 and Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477 (CA), which, however, do not entirely justify the statement. See also [51]. Mulholland was sentenced to six months and another journalist to three months imprisonment for contempt of court in refusing to reveal their sources to the Radcliffe Tribunal. “They went to prison masquerading as martyrs in the sacred cause of press freedom; but the truth is that they did not want to admit that they were liars who had invented their stories”: Richard Davenport-Hines, An English Affair: Sex, Class and Power in the Age of Profumo, 2013, p 240. 268 In British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1174, Lord Wilberforce said “The remedy (being equitable) is discretionary” (emphasis added). 269 McGuinness v A-G (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 at 104, a passage quoted with approval by Viscount
Dilhorne in Granada’s case. 270 As decided in Re Buchanan (1964) 65 SR (NSW) 9 (FC). 271 British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1111. 272 British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1129. 273 British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1168. 274 British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1175. 275 Science Research Council v Nassé [1980] AC 1028 at 1067. Although in terms limited to questions arising in relation to discovery, it should be noted that this passage is justified by reference to cases like Mulholland’s case and Clough’s case where no question of discovery arose. 276 As argued by Professor Cross in “Discretion and the Law of Evidence: When it Comes to the ‘Forensic Crunch’” (1979) 30 NILQ 289. 277 D F Lyons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 28 FCR 597 at 604 and 607, citing in particular Kitto v Gilbert (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 441 at 447 and R v Westfield Freezing Co Ltd [1951] NZLR 456 at 466. See also Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364. 278 Nick Scali Ltd v Super A-Mart Pty Ltd (2010) 275 ALR 228 at [19]. 279 Hargraves v R; Stoten v R (2011) 245 CLR 257 at [42] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. 280 For general statements see Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; Schulmann v Peters [1961] ALR 209 (HC); Clouston & Co Ltd v Corry [1906] AC 122 at 130 (PC); and R v O’Donnell (1917) 12 Cr App R 219 at 221. See Y B Smith, “The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict” (1924) 24 Col L Rev 111. However, the summing up must be fair and must not usurp the role of the jury as finder of fact: R v Tikos (No 2) [1963] VR 306 at 308–9 (FC); R v Hughes (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 (Vic FC); Courtney–Smith (No 2) v R (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 at 55–8 (NSW CCA). A desire on the part of the trial judge to reduce a perceived imbalance in the quality of representation or of address cannot provide a justification for an unbalanced summing up: R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 (CCA). 281 R v Badjan (1966) 50 Cr App R 141. This means inconsistencies in the evidence must be referred to: R v Amado-Taylor [2000] 2 Cr App R 189. 282 Dublin Wicklow and Wexford Rail Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155 at 1186. An example of this error is telling them that what in truth is a matter of fact is a matter of law: Arulthilakan v R (2003) 203 ALR 259 at [23] and [50]. 283 See eg Pickup v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co (1878) 3 QBD 594 at 600 (CA). 284 Ross v Associated Portland Cement Manufactures Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 452. See generally [1205] ff above, where the rule in Jones v Dunkel is fully discussed. 285 R v Amado-Taylor [2000] 2 Cr App R 189. 286 Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628 at 637; Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561; R v Williams (1999) 104 A Crim R 260 at 269; R v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 at 427. 287 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561; R v Williams (1999) 104 A Crim R 260 at [39]–[40]. See also R v Veverka [1978] 1 NSWLR 478 at 482 (CCA). 288 R v Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335 at 347 (NSWCCA); R v Williams (1999) 104 A Crim R 260 at 269. 289 RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [42]. In Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [52], the majority added: “Unnecessary or extensive comments on the facts carry well-recognised risks of misstatements or other errors and of blurring the respective functions of the judge and the jury”. See also Broadhurst v R [1964] AC 441 at 464 (PC); R v Mong (2002) 5 VR 565 at [27]–[29]; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [15]–[16]. 290 Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 at 80. 291 See Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 at 69 and 72 per Lord Diplock and Lord Dilhorne. They both dissented on this point although they concurred in affirming the conviction.
292 R v Kelly [1970] 2 All ER 198 (CA); R v Morris [1972] 1 All ER 384 (CA); R v Herd (1973) 57
Cr App R 560; but see R v Bates [1973] 2 All ER 509 (CA) and R v Martin (1972) 57 Cr App R 279. The House of Lords so held in relation to the first two cases in R v Wang [2005] 1 All ER 782. See also Lord Devlin’s Trial by Jury, 1966 rev ed, App 2; E Griew, “Directions to Convict” [1972] Crim LR 204, M J McConville, “Directions to Convict—A Reply” [1973] Crim LR 164 and G L Williams, “Law and Fact” [1976] Crim LR 472 and 532; and see R v Healey [1965] 1 All ER 365 at 370 (CCA). 293 R v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77 (CA). 294 Dublin Wicklow and Wexford Rail Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155 at 1201;Ward v RoyW Sandford Ltd (1919) 19 SR (NSW) 172 at 185 (FC); S v M (1984) 36 SASR 316 at 319–20; Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1 at [118]–[125]. 295 Christmas v Nicol Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 317 at 322 (FC). 296 Qld: Criminal Code s 668E; NSW: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 6; Tas: Criminal Code 1924 s 402; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 353; WA: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 ss 8(1) and 30(3). See also R v Wallace (1931) 23 Cr App R 32; R v Hyman Bookbinder (1926) 19 Cr App R 125; R v Barnes (1942) 28 Cr App R 141; R v Dent [1943] 2 All ER 596 (CCA). Under s 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (Eng), the Court of Appeal had to allow an appeal if they thought that the conviction (an expression substituted for “verdict” by the Criminal Law Act 1977 s 44) should be set aside on the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe or unsatisfactory. See Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 151 (PC); R Pattenden, “The Submission of No Case — Some Recent Developments” [1982] Crim LR 558. The English jurisdiction, it has been suggested, is different from and ampler than the Australian: Hayes v R (1973) 47 ALJR 603; Ratten v R (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 515; Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 688–9; cf Stafford v DPP [1974] AC 878. However, the High Court declined in Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534 to decide the point. Though the Australian provisions do not use the words “unsafe or unsatisfactory”, they do permit verdicts of that character to be set aside:M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 492. In Victoria s 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 applies. It is to be construed on its own precise terms, not those of its common form predecessor: Baini v R (2012) 293 ALR 472 at [14]–[35]. 297 Raspor v R (1958) 99 CLR 346 at 350. 298 See [9100] ff. 299 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 250; Saffron v R (1988) 17 NSWLR 395 at 460 (CA and CCA) (verdict may be set aside even if there was, as a matter of law, evidence on which the accused could have been convicted). 300 Raspor v R (1958) 99 CLR 346 at 350–2; Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 244 and 250; see also Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 686; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 531–2 and 601–4. See also R v Hart (1914) 10 Cr App R 176; R v Barnes (1942) 28 Cr App R 141; R v Williams [1954] SASR 216 (CCA); R v Tamblyn [1967] SASR 140 (CCA). 301 Hayes v R (1973) 47 ALJR 603; Ratten v R (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 515; R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 at 183 (CCA). 302 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 687; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534 and 603–4; Saffron v R (1988) 17 NSWLR 395 at 459–60 (CA and CCA); Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495; M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439;MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; Michaelides v R (2013) 296 ALR 1. 303 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 686–7; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534 and 603–4. 304 R v Bennett (1912) 8 Cr App R 10. 305 R v Perfect (1917) 12 Cr App R 273; R v Moor (1920) 15 Cr App R 31; R v Hopkins-Husson (1949) 34 Cr App R 47. See ReVan Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 183 (CCA); R v Jansen [1970] SASR 531 at 543 (CCA).
306
Qld: Criminal Code s 668F(2); NSW: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 7(2);Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 277; Tas: Criminal Code 1924 s 403(2); SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 354(2);WA: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 s 30(5)(c). See Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107; Johnson v R (1976) 136 CLR 619; R v Spratt [1980] 2 All ER 269. 307 Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454. Brennan J disagreed with the latter half of the sentence in the text in Carr v R (1988) 165 CLR 314 at 333. See also Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 (there are passages stressing the great advantage which a jury has in seeing and hearing witnesses);M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487. 308 This requires demonstration that an error caused the accused to lose a real chance of acquittal: TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [65]–[68]. 309 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [11] and [79]; Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291 at [45]; Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524 at [114]; SPW v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 301. 310 See R v Thomas [1959] 3 All ER 522 (CCA); R v Parks [1961] 3 All ER 633 (CCA); Green v R (1939) 61 CLR 167; R v Wakefield [1957] VR 547 (FC); Stafford v DPP [1974] AC 878; Ratten v R (1974) 131 CLR 510; R v Bingapore (1975) 11 SASR 469 (CCA); R v McMahon (1978) 68 Cr App R 18; Lawless v R (1979) 142 CLR 659; Mallard v R (2003) 28 WAR 1. The High Court has no such power in appeals from state courts exercising state jurisdiction: Mickelberg v R (1989) 167 CLR 259. The same applies to appeals from the Supreme Court of the ACT: Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1. 311 The topic is largely regulated by enactments: see, eg, NSW: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 12; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 353A. 312 Qld: Criminal Code s 668E(1) and (1A); NSW: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 6; Tas: Criminal Code s 402(2); SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 353;WA: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 ss 14(2) and 30(4); NT: Criminal Code Act s 411. The Cth: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 28(1)(f) has the same meaning: Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203. See also Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 276. 313 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Tillers rev, 1983, vol 1, [8c]. 314 Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v R (2012) 246 CLR 92. 315 Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300. See also Cooper v R (2012) 293 ALR 17 at [20]–[21]. 316 Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [45]. 317 Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [46]. See Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365 at 373; Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1 at 11–12; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203 at [103]; Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373 at [94]–[96]; AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 at [54]; Gassy v R (2008) 236 CLR 293 at [33]–[34]; CTM v R (2008) 236 CLR 440 at [128]; Cesan v R (2008) 236 CLR 358 at [126]; MNO v Western Australia (2009) 193 A Crim R 466 at [75]; R v BBR (2009) 195 A Crim R 330 at [57] (non-compliance with rule for competence of witnesses). 318 R v Cheng (1999) 48 NSWLR 616. But see Qld: Criminal Code s 669A(1) and (1A);Tas: Criminal Code ss 401(2)(b) and 402(5);WA: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 ss 7(2), 24 and 25. 319 NSW: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 5A; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 308; Qld: Criminal Code s 669A(2) and (2A); SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 350-351A; Tas: Criminal Code s 388AA; WA: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 s 47; ACT: Supreme Court Act 1933 s 37S; NT: Criminal Code s 414. 320 See generally Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430; also Hocking v Bell (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 130 (FC) and Hocking v Bell (1948) 75 CLR 125 (PC). 321 See Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226; McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95; Dairy Farmers Co-op Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458; Freeman v G J Coles & Co Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 297 (CA); Brown v Churchill (2006) 31 WAR 246. A new trial may be ordered on a number of other grounds. 322 Metropolitan Rail Co v Wright (1886) 11 App Cas 152 at 153. The search for the preponderance
of evidence must relate to “the evidence in its totality”: Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33 at 41. 323 Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346. 324 Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346 at 369 and 379, reiterating doubts of Lord Halsbury in Toulmin v Millar (1887) 12 App Cas 746; but see Croker v Croker [1932] P 173 (CA) and Winterbotham Gurney & Co v Sibthorp & Cox [1918] 1 KB 625 at 634 (CA). 325 For discussions of the general principles on which appellate courts should proceed, see Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212; Riebe v Riebe (1957) 98 CLR 212; Jones v Jones (1960) 62 SR (NSW) 377 (FC); Da Costa v Cockburn Salvage and Trading Pty Ltd (1970) 124 CLR 192; Flannery v Cohuna Sewerage Authority (1976) 51 ALJR 135 at 136. Failure to object to evidence in civil cases will normally prevent the point being taken on appeal, it having been waived: [1680]. See generally P Gillies and S Galitsky, “Is the judge sovereign in fact?” (2006) 28 Aust Bar Rev 192. 326 Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484 at 490–91. See also Clarke v Edinburgh and District Tramways Co Ltd 1919 SC (HL) 35 at 36–7; SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporak [1927] AC 37; Thomson v Kvaerner Govan Ltd 2004 SC (HL) 1 at [17]. For matters to be considered other than demeanour see Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 at 431–2 (HL). For the position elsewhere, see Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [90]–[96]. 327 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 635 at 637; Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 at 25; Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074 at 1091; Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248 at 305 (FC); X and Y (by her tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 at 34 and 49 (CA); Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23 NSWLR 288 at 299–300 (CA); Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v A-G (Cth) (1994) 49 FCR 211 at 243–4; Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries Plc [1998] 3 All ER 462 (HL); Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127; cf Joyce v Yeomans [1981] 2 All ER 21 at 24 and 27 (CA), where Waller LJ and Brandon LJ considered that the advantages of the trial judge in relation to experts, though real, were not as great as with lay witnesses. 328 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 at 161 per Latham CJ. 329 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [41], [92]. The theory is that where there is oral evidence, the trial judge can act on material outside the reach of the appellate court, because “[a] look, a gesture, a tone or emphasis, a hesitation or an undue or unusual alacrity in giving evidence, will often lead a judge to find a signification in words actually used by a witness that cannot be attributed to them as they appear in the mere reproduction in type”: Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549 at 561. That and many other similar authorities are discussed in Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [65]–[69]. While for many years Kirby J had doubted this approach, he was in the majority in that case; Callinan J, on the other hand, in that case advanced detailed arguments questioning whether the present law could stand with the language employed in modern statutes conferring rights of appeal: at [127]–[148] and [152]; see also Roads and Traffic Authority v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330 at [268]. Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury, 1956, p 212, n 17 states: “The cases in which a judge’s finding on credibility is rejected are generally those of a complicated character, in which the judge’s rejection of a witness’s story is based upon some fundamental misconception of the evidence as a whole; or those in which a lengthy narrative has twisted and turned as the case has developed, and the judge has failed to check his conclusions on credibility by a review of the probabilities that emerge from the evidence as a whole.” 330 R A Posner, Reflections on Judging, 2013, p 123. 331 Powell v Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 at 267. See also Housen v Nikolaisen [2002] 2 SCR 235 at [14]. 332 Anderson v City of Bessemer 470 US 564 (1985) at 574–5. See also Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] 3 All ER 929 at [53]. 333 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earth Line Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160
ALR 588 at [90]–[92] (and cases there cited); Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [23]. 334 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [142]. 335 McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 284; O G Wellborn III, “Demeanor” (1991) 76 Cornell L Rev 1075; Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 at [16]–[27]. See also R D Giles, “The Assessment of Reliability and Credibility” (1995) 2 TJR 281; T E F Hughes, “The Assessment of Credibility and Reliability of Witnesses” (1995) 2 TJR 295; C Porter and R W R Parker, “The Demeanour of Expert Witnesses” (2001) 33 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 45; D S Bell, “Judgments Revisited: Abalos — a High Court Low” (2001) 33 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 61; P McClellan, “Who is telling the truth? Psychology, common sense and the law” (2006) 80 ALJ 655; D Ipp, “Problems with fact-finding” (2006) 80 ALJ 667. 336 Australian Fisheries Management Authority v Su (2009) 255 ALR 454 at [38]. 337 Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 at 957; Clarke Boyce v Mowat [1994] 1 AC 428 at 436– 7 (PC). 338 Jones v Hyde (1989) 85 ALR 23 at 27; Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 at 561; Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 at 178–9; Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263; Dawson v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 104 ALR 295; Halvorsen Boats Pty Ltd v Robinson (1993) 31 NSWLR 1 at 4–5 (CA); Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [37], [42] and [92]. 339 Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17 at [70]. 340 Hadid v Redpath (2001) 35 MVR 152 at [34] and [53]. On the duty to give reasons in relation to credibility, and the appropriate reasoning process, see Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 at [28]–[31]. 341 Baker v Thorpe (1985) 62 ACTR 1. 342 Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [37]–[42] and [92]; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 (incontrovertible fact of skid marks). 343 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588 at [3], quoting Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 480. A useful analysis of some of the exceptional areas appears in Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [98]–[99]. 344 For example, Coghlan v Cumberland [1898] 1 Ch 704 (CA); Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 (CA) and Re W and W (2001) 164 FLR 18 at [145]–[190] (expert witness believed by trial judge but rejected on appeal because of extreme partisanship). 345 See Voulis v Kozary (1975) 180 CLR 177 (rejected evidence consistent with much unchallenged evidence, including contemporaneous notes); Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 at 349–50 (assessment of credibility based on supposed but non-existent conflict between witnesses; approved by Kirby J in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588); Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474 at 496–7 (FC) (manner of giving evidence outweighed by other material); Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 (adverse impression based on erroneous analysis of contemporaneous documentary evidence and inconsistent with expert testimony); State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588 (adverse impression of oral testimony outweighed by unchallenged affidavit material and business records; Kirby J analysed a great many of the authorities at 609–18). 346 Agbaba v Witter (1977) 14 ALR 187 at 196; approved in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588 at [4]. 347 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at [32] n 64. In NSW evidence of this kind is now prohibited: Civil Liability Act 2002 s 5D(3)(b). The unsatisfactoriness of the evidence is alluded to in Cackett v Keswick [1902] 2 Ch 456 at 463–4; Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR
553 at 581–2; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [155]–[156] and [221] and, in a commercial context, Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd (2010) 80 ACSR 585 at [120]. 348 Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422 at 426. 349 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84 at 92 (“I do not believe a judge may make impregnable findings of fact by expressing a belief in evidence which he has put in a witness’s mouth”; per Meagher JA). 350 The leading cases are now Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53; Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1; Zuvela v Cosmarnan Concrete Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 227 at 229–30. See also Piro v Foster & Co Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 313; Mann v Mann (1957) 97 CLR 433; Jones v Capaldi (1956) 98 CLR 615; Uranerz (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hale (1980) 30 ALR 193 (HC); Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 (FC); Lend Lease Development Pty Ltd v Zemlicka (1985) 3 NSWLR 207 (CA); Moran v McMahon (1985) 3 NSWLR 700 (CA). Cf Powell v Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 with Flower v EbbwVale Steel, Iron and Coal Co Ltd [1936] AC 206, and see Montgomerie & Co Ltd v WallaceJames [1904] AC 73 at 75; Dominion Trust Co v New York Life Insurance Co [1919] AC 254 at 257– 8 (PC); Clarke v Edinburgh and District Railways Co 1919 SC (HL) 35 at 36–7; Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370; Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267 (HL); Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884 at 889 and 892 (PC); A L Goodhart, “Appeals on Questions of Fact” (1955) 71 LQR 402. See also Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484 at 487–8. 351 Freeman v Rabinov [1981] VR 539; Composite Buyers Ltd v J CTaylor Constructions [1983] 2 VR 311. 352 Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370 at 374. 353 Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45 (HL) per Lord Hoffmann. See, for the advantages enjoyed by the trial judge in relation to matters of impression and judgment, Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [29]; Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (2011) 197 FCR 67 at [25]–[34]. 354 Whiteley Muir and Zwanenberg Ltd v Kerr (1966) 39 ALJR 505 at 506; followed in Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 542–3 and Zuvela v Cosmarnan Concrete Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 227 at 229–30. The third last sentence in the quotation from Kerr’s case is questionable. Cf Riekmann v Thierry (1896) 14 RPC 105 at 116–17: “upon appeal from a Judge where both fact and law are open to Appeal, it seems to me that the Appellate tribunal is bound to pronounce such judgment as in their view ought to have been pronounced in the Court from which the Appeal proceeds, and that it is not within their competence to say that they would have given a different judgment if they had been the Judge of first instance, but that because he has pronounced a different judgment they will adhere to his decision.” 355 Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 at 178. 356 Pledge v Roads and Traffic Authority (2004) 205 ALR 56 at [49]. 357 SW Hart & Co Pty Ltd v Edwards HotWater Systems (1985) 159 CLR 466 at 478; TurboTek Enterprises Inc v Sperling Enterprises Pty Ltd (1989) 23 FCR 331 at 350 (design infringement); Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Hogan (1989) 23 FCR 553 at 581 (passing off in character merchandising); Allsop Inc v Bintang Ltd (1989) 15 IPR 686 (patent infringement); S & I Publishing Pty Ltd v Australian Surf Life Saver Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 354 at 359–61 (contraventions of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)); Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 700 at 702 and 707. 358 Murphy v Stone Wallwork (Charlton) Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 949 (HL); Peterhaensel v Woodman [1971] SASR 333 (FC). 359 McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529. 360 See also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 766(1)(c); Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) r 5052(1)(c). 361 See, for example, Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 at 160 (CA). Nowlan
v Marson Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 116 at [13]–[14] and [17]–[19] (the three conditions are not exhaustive and not all need be satisfied);Wood v Balfour (2011) 15 BPR 29,773 at [119]–[121]. The same approach has been taken to the expression “special grounds” in an enactment in England: Skone v Skone [1971] 2 All ER 582 at 586. See also Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745 (CA); House v Haughton Brothers (Worcester) Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 39; Orchard v Orchard (1972) 3 SASR 89 at 99 (FC). It has been taken even where no discretion appears to have been conferred: Clodumar v Nauru Lands Committee (2012) 288 ALR 208. In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [105] McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ noted that the common law power was wider than that conventionally applied to statutes; see also Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134 at 140. 362 Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 at 444. 363 See also the discretion given by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27, regulated by Federal Court Rules 2011 r 36.57; by the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 64.22(3); and by the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 286(3)(a). The former O 63, r 10(1) of the Western Australian Supreme Court Rules gave “full discretionary power to receive further evidence”. 364 Florance v Andrew (1985) 58 ALR 377 at 381 (FC); Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 368 (FC); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134 at 140. See also Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 76 at [30] (FC). 365 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [51]–[54], [89]–[116] and [186]–[189]. It was pointed out that the common law test was wider than was assumed in Wollongong Corporation v Cowan; this may affect the approach adopted in Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 at 160 (CA). See also Sobey v Nicol and Davies (2007) 245 ALR 389 at [68]–[72]; Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225 at [92]. 366 McCann v Parsons (1955) 93 CLR 418. 367 Leeder v Ellis (1952) 86 CLR 64 (PC). 368 Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 232 per Dixon CJ. 369 Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 243–4. 370 Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 232. 371 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145–6. See also Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [62]–[64].
[page 423]
Chapter Seven The Competence and Compellability of Witnesses
Section 1 — Introduction A — STRUCTURE Key distinctions [13001] Competence, compellability and privilege distinguished It is necessary to distinguish between three separate, though closely related, concepts — the competence, compellability and privilege of a witness. A person is competent if that person may lawfully be called to give evidence. Nowadays, most people are competent witnesses, but under the law which applied to civil cases down to the middle of the nineteenth century, and to criminal trials until the end of that century, many of those who could give relevant evidence were not allowed to do so. A person is compellable if that person can lawfully be obliged to give evidence. The general rule is that all competent witnesses are compellable, but there are a few exceptions which will have to be mentioned in due course. The essential difference between competence and compellability on the one hand, and privilege on the other, is that the two former matters must be resolved before the witness begins to testify. Once the witness has entered the witness-box and has been sworn, has affirmed or is permitted by law to give unsworn evidence, the witness must answer all questions put unless excused or unless the refusal to answer is based upon a privilege conferred by law. Competence and compellability therefore attach to the witness and not to the evidence the witness may give. In a very limited class of cases, the competence of a witness to testify may be related to the weight of the witness’s evidence. Where a witness is of greatly defective intellect the judge may treat the witness as incompetent to testify. But where this defect is not so great it may simply call for caution in acting upon the evidence and, possibly, a warning to the jury of the danger of so doing.1 The different privileges of witnesses are discussed in Chapter 13, “Privilege”, while competence and compellability are the subjects of Section 2 of this chapter. Section 3 is principally concerned with the
evidence of unsworn witnesses. Section 1 is purely historical. Incompetence due to youth or mental disability is recognised under the modern law, but there were formerly five further classes of [page 424] persons who were wholly or partially prohibited from testifying, namely, non-Christians, convicts, persons interested in the outcome of the proceedings, parties and their spouses. Generally speaking, the term “witness” must be taken to include parties to the proceedings. The latter expression comprises the parties in a civil action and the accused, but not the prosecutor, on a criminal charge. There are several respects in which the position of a party differs from that of an ordinary witness, and attention is drawn to them where it is necessary to do so. Subject to these points of difference, everything that is said in this work about witnesses applies to parties.
B — HISTORY Non-Christians, convicts, interested persons, parties, spouses of parties [13005] Non-Christians Until the end of the seventeenth century, the law was that evidence had to be given on oath and that oath had to be taken on the Gospel. A proposed witness who did not accept the authority of the Gospel was incompetent to give evidence. Coke included Jews as well as heathens in this class, and although his views were not entirely shared by Hale, it was not until 17442 that the law was modified and it was held that the depositions of Jews should be received as they believed in a governor of the universe in whose name the depositions were sworn. Only since the nineteenth century has the law had its modern basis in statute, although Quakers and Moravians3 had previously been permitted to make a solemn affirmation. The present position is discussed in Section 3 of this chapter.
[13010] Convicts Until the nineteenth century, persons who had once been convicted and sentenced for an infamous crime were incompetent as a witnesses until death. However, in 1828 the Civil Rights of Convicts Act rendered them capable of acting as witnesses after they had served their sentence, unless they had been found guilty of perjury. The Evidence Act 1843 (Eng), and similar legislation in Australia in those colonies where the English Act did not apply, provided that no person should thereafter be excluded by reason of incapacity on account of a conviction from giving evidence in any proceedings.4 Under the present law, therefore, the fact that a witness has been convicted is a matter which concerns the cogency and not the competency of the testimony.
[13015] Interested persons Until the nineteenth century, those who had a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the proceedings were incompetent to act as witnesses in them. In the middle of the nineteenth century the legislature5 abolished incompetence through [page 425] interest except in the case of the parties and their spouses. Interest is now something which only affects the weight of a person’s evidence.6
[13020] Parties in civil cases The parties gave evidence in the Court of Chancery from an early date and they were allowed to do so in the County Court in 1846. The parties to most other civil proceedings were made competent and compellable witnesses by the Evidence Act 1851 (Eng) and equivalent legislation in Australian jurisdictions. It is important to bear in mind that since 1851 in England, and a short time later in various Australian jurisdictions, 7 a party’s right to call an opponent as a witness and compel the opponent to give evidence has been beyond dispute. For obvious reasons, resort is not often made to it, and the opponent cannot generally be treated as a hostile
witness.
[13025] The accused The accused’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings was one reason for the accused’s inability to give evidence at the hearing of a criminal charge against that accused; but there was a further reason based on what was largely an illogical application of the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum — one should not be obliged to give oneself away. This lies at the root of the witness’s privilege against self-incrimination discussed in [25065]–[25185]. In or about the last decade of the nineteenth century, legislation was passed by each colony whereby it was provided that every person charged with an offence would be a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings.8
[13030] Spouses of the parties: the common law disability Subject to comparatively unimportant exceptions which were confined to criminal cases, a party’s spouse was incompetent as a witness for or against the party at common law.9 De facto spouses were not incompetent.10 The incompetence extended to spouses of either sex and to testimony concerning events occurring before, as well as during, the marriage.11 [page 426] From time to time it has been suggested that, in addition to rendering the spouses of the parties incompetent, the common law prohibited the disclosure of marital communications by any witness, whether they passed between witness and spouse or were other people’s marital communications overheard by the witness; but it has been authoritatively decided that the only relevant common law rule is that of incompetency.12 The confidential nature of the marriage relationship is the reason given for that rule in several cases, but the privilege attaching to marital communications is best regarded as exclusively the outcome of the
statutory provisions which are fully considered in [25190].
[13035] Spouses of parties: exceptions to common law disability There was one clear exception to the common law rule, and two further ones concerning which there is a high degree of uncertainty. The one clear exception was constituted by criminal charges involving personal violence by the accused against the spouse.13 The first of the uncertain exceptions is treason. If it exists, it can be justified on the ground that the public interest in the safety of the state outweighs whatever public interests are promoted by preventing one spouse from testifying against the other;14 but there is no decision on the subject. Finally, there are cases in which it has been held that in prosecutions under old statutes for abducting and marrying a girl against her will, she was a competent witness even if the marriage happened to be legally valid.15 These may be accounted for on the ground that something in the nature of personal violence was involved.16 One spouse was a competent witness for the second in all cases in which the second was a competent witness against the first.17 The spouse was not compellable.18
[13040] Statutes affecting spouses The spouses of parties were made competent and compellable witnesses in all civil cases by legislation in the middle of the nineteenth century. The competence of one spouse to give evidence in criminal proceedings involving the other spouse was the subject of later legislative changes to the common law position under which spouses were neither competent nor compellable. [page 427]
Section 2 — Competence and Compellability Under the Modern Law A — PRELIMINARY Structure of this section [13045] Introduction The general rule is that anyone is a competent and compellable witness in any case; but there are exceptions relating to children, persons of defective intellect, the accused and the accused’s spouse. After these exceptional cases have been discussed, something must be said about the competence of one spouse to give evidence against the other in civil proceedings and about the position of a divorced spouse.19 There is old authority that counsel is competent, but not compellable, to give evidence of what was said in court, 20 but it is highly questionable whether the authority is now right as to non-compellability.
B — CHILDREN Sworn evidence [13050] Necessary understanding A child may be sworn if he or she has the requisite understanding, for competency is not a matter of age but of understanding. At common law no testimony can be received except upon oath. An infant may be sworn provided the infant appears, on strict examination by the court, to possess sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of an oath.21 Some courts consider that a child of tender years might be sworn
notwithstanding that he or she lacks an awareness of the divine sanction attending a breach of the oath: It is unrealistic not to recognise that, in the present state of society, amongst the adult population the divine sanction of an oath is probably not generally recognised. The important consideration, we think, when a judge has to decide whether a child should properly be sworn, is whether the child has a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion, and the added responsibility to tell the truth, which is involved in taking an oath, over and above the duty to tell the truth which is an ordinary duty of normal social conduct.22
At common law, if the court comes to the conclusion that the child does not understand the nature and consequences of an oath, the evidence must be rejected [page 428] unless it is considered to be worthwhile to adjourn the case so as to instruct the proposed witness in these matters or unless the relevant statute permits the witness to give unsworn evidence.23 The matter is commonly dealt with by legislation. In Queensland a person is competent to give sworn evidence if that person understands that the giving of evidence is a serious matter and that, in giving evidence, he or she has an obligation to tell the truth over and above the ordinary duty to tell the truth.24 In Western Australia a child under the age of 12 may give evidence on oath or affirmation if the child understands that the giving of evidence is a serious matter and that he or she has an obligation to tell the truth.25 In South Australia there are no special provisions for children: a person is presumed to be capable of giving sworn evidence (which is defined in s 4 as meaning evidence given under the obligation of an oath or affirmation) unless the judge determines that that person does not have sufficient understanding of the obligation to be truthful, and unsworn evidence is permitted on certain conditions.26 If, without compliance with these mandatory requirements, evidence is taken unsworn, an irregularity capable of giving rise to a miscarriage of justice will have occurred.27 At common law, if the court comes to the conclusion that the child does not understand the nature and consequences of an oath, the evidence must be rejected unless it is considered to be worthwhile to adjourn the case so as to instruct the proposed witness in these matters or unless the
relevant statute permits the witness to give unsworn evidence.28 The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) deal with the matter otherwise than by reference to children. Except as provided by the Act every person (including a child)29 is competent to give evidence, and a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is also compellable to give that evidence: s 12. A person — child or not — who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful [page 429] evidence (s 13(3)), but may be competent to give unsworn evidence (s 13(4)): see [13060]. Expert evidence is admissible under s 13(8): see [13065].
[13055] Procedure on inquiry as to understanding Where evidence is to be taken from a prospective witness, the inquiry as to competence to be sworn or to give evidence unsworn is conducted by the judge. In Queensland expert evidence may be received on this issue.30 Counsel has no right to cross-examine the prospective witness in order to test competency to give evidence.31 The question whether the examination should take place in the presence of the jury was discussed at [11035]. The question of competency to give sworn evidence may be raised and determined even after the witness has partially given evidence, 32 but an objection made after the evidence was complete and verdict given has been held to be too late.33 There are older cases holding that a party who does not challenge the competence of a witness to take an oath is disentitled from later raising the objection, but the grounds for incompetence would not now be recognised even if the challenge had been made in time.34 Whether, in a given case, inquiry of a child as to competence is appropriate is a matter for the judge. If the child appears to be giving evidence in a proper manner, there will be no need to investigate the child’s ability to understand the oath which has been taken.35 The
same is, of course, true of any witness. But where a challenge is made to the witness, it would doubtless be advisable to investigate the matter.36 In the Family Court, s 100B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) prohibits a child under the age of 18 years from being called as a witness or providing an affidavit without leave of the court unless the child is either a party to the proceedings or seeking to become a party.
Unsworn evidence [13060] Tests for capacity to give unsworn evidence In jurisdictions bound by legislation similar to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence.37 Section 13(4) provides that a person who is not competent to give sworn evidence about a fact “may” be competent to give unsworn evidence about the fact if (pursuant to s 13(5)) the court has told the person that: [page 430] (a) it is important to tell the truth; and (b) he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs; and (c) he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue.38 The word “may” in s 13(4) does not give the court a discretion to refuse to allow the person to give unsworn evidence: s 13(4) simply confers a particular procedure for giving unsworn evidence.39 A failure to make the statements described in s 13(5) renders the evidence inadmissible.40 The fact that a person does not understand what the judge says does not
preclude that person from giving unsworn evidence.41 It is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a person is not incompetent because of s 13: s 13(6). In South Australia, a person is presumed to be capable of giving sworn evidence unless that person lacks sufficient understanding of the obligation to be truthful entailed in giving sworn evidence.42 A person who lacks it may give unsworn evidence provided that the person understands the difference between the truth and a lie, that the judge tells the person that it is important to tell the truth, and the person indicates that he or she will tell the truth. In determining these questions, the judge is not bound by the rules of evidence.43 In Queensland the judge must be satisfied that the child is able to give an intelligible account of events which the child has observed or experienced.44 In Western Australia a child under 12 years who is not competent to give evidence on oath or affirmation may give evidence not on oath or affirmation if the child is able to give an intelligible account of evidence which that child has observed or [page 431] experienced.45 In the Northern Territory, where a person called as a witness appears to be incapable of understanding the nature of an oath or the meaning of an affirmation, the court may receive that person’s evidence unsworn if the person is either 14 and understands that he or she will be liable to punishment if the evidence is false, or, if less than 14, is capable of giving an intelligible account.46 In Queensland also there is a statutory procedure for receiving in evidence in civil and criminal proceedings a documentary record of a statement made by a child47 or an intellectually impaired person who had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in it. Where either type of statement is admitted, the party tendering it shall, if required to do so by any other party, call as a witness the person whose statement is admitted and the person who recorded it.48 Similar but not identical provisions exist in Western Australia49 and Tasmania.50
In New South Wales, if the witness is in fact competent but by mistake no oath or affirmation is administered, the evidence is inadmissible.51 It has been held wrong to give a direction to the jury as to the weight of informal evidence in the same way as if it were an unsworn statement by an accused person (which is no longer possible): to do so underrates its significance, since the accused, unlike the informal witness, could have given sworn evidence.52 The admissibility of evidence from extremely young children has been controversial.53
C — DISABLED PERSONS Competence to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or unsworn [13065] Tests for competence At common law where it is contended that the witness is too mentally disabled to give evidence, it is for the judge to decide whether the witness understands the nature of an oath. If the judge answers this question in the affirmative, it is for the [page 432] jury to say what degree of credit is to be given to the testimony. The inmate of an asylum whose only delusion was that spirits talked to him was, accordingly, allowed to give evidence at a prosecution for manslaughter.54 If it appears that, though duly sworn, the witness is incapable of testifying or that, for some other reason, such as deafness or dumbness, the evidence cannot be taken, the judge may declare the witness to be incompetent.55 Temporary incapacity, occasioned by illness or intoxication, would presumably lead to an adjournment in an appropriate case. As to the weight which might be given to such evidence, see [17480]. In the appropriate case these persons may be entitled to give unsworn evidence where the local statute permits: see [13060]. Again, a question may arise as to the weight to be given to the evidence of persons
with mental disability, and the court may look for corroboration.56 The Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 106B(2) provides that a person with a mental impairment may give evidence on oath or affirmation provided that person is competent to do so — ie, understands that the giving of evidence is a serious matter and that he or she in giving evidence has an obligation to tell the truth. Section 100A(1) provides that if a person tendered as a witness does not understand the nature of, or the obligation imposed by, an oath or affirmation but does understand that he or she is required to speak the truth and, where the witness is a compellable witness, to tell what he or she knows about the matter to which the testimony relates, and that he or she will be liable to punishment if he or she does not do so, the evidence of that person may be received without an oath and without formality. This does not apply to children, for whom provision is made in s 106C. Sections 13(1)–(2), (6) and (8) and 14 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) create a special regime. Section 13(1) provides that a person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability): (a) the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact; or (b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact; and that incapacity cannot be overcome.57 A child who can speak and understand basic English with strangers is competent.58 Examples of incapacities that may be overcome with assistance, and of the types of assistance, are to be found in s 30 (witnesses needing an interpreter) and s 31 (deaf and mute witnesses).59 But a person is not compellable to give evidence on a particular matter if the court is satisfied that substantial cost or delay would be [page 433] incurred in ensuring that the person would have the capacity to understand a question about the matter or to give an answer that can be
understood to a question about the matter, and “adequate evidence on that matter has been given, or will be able to be given, from one or more other persons or sources”: s 14. Section 13(2) provides that a person who, because of s 13(1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. Section 13(8) provides that for the purpose of determining a question arising under s 13, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, including by obtaining information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience. Thus the court is bound by neither the rules of evidence nor the areas of controversy between the parties. The general principles of natural justice would require that the parties be informed of the approach which the court is contemplating before a conclusion is arrived at.60 Section 13(7) provides that evidence that has been given by a witness does not become inadmissible merely because, before the witness finishes giving evidence, he or she dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence. This corresponds with the better view of the common law.61 The legislation contains no provision about whether inquiries into competence should take place in the presence or absence of the jury, despite the general law controversy on the subject.62
Vulnerable witnesses [13070] Evidence in protected environment Difficulties arise where a witness is of tender years or disabled or, for some good reason, might be reluctant to give evidence in the presence of an accused person or might suffer undue trauma by so doing. Although the receipt of evidence otherwise than in the presence of an accused person runs counter to the fundamental procedures of the common law trial, 63 concern for the welfare of certain witnesses and the availability of modern technology in the courtroom have led to the introduction of legislation whereby evidence from certain classes of witnesses may be given in a protected environment out of sight of the accused or in camera or by video tape taken in another room or in the presence of a “supportive person”. The provisions are generally complex, and vary in points of detail from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, even in jurisdictions which in other
respects have followed the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).What appears below is no more than a summary of some principal provisions.
Commonwealth The Crimes Act 1914 ss 15YE–15YH deal with the cross-examination of [page 434] children (persons under 18). Section 15YE provides that the court may disallow questions put to child witnesses, vulnerable adult complainants and special witnesses which are inappropriate or unnecessarily aggressive, having regard to the personal characteristics of the child witness, including age, culture, mental capacity and gender. Section 15YF provides that an unrepresented defendant may not cross-examine a child complainant (ie a child victim of various sexual offences). Section 15YG provides that an unrepresented defendant may not cross-examine a child witness (other than a child complainant), a vulnerable adult complainant and a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order (“vulnerable persons”) without the court’s leave. The court must not give leave unless satisfied that the vulnerable person’s ability to testify under cross-examination will not be adversely affected if the defendant conducts the cross-examination. If the court refuses leave, a person appointed by the court is to ask the vulnerable person any questions that the defendant requests. Section 15YH provides that a defendant who is represented by counsel is not to cross-examine a child witness, a vulnerable adult complainant or a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order except through counsel. Section 15YI of the Crimes Act makes provision for the evidence of a child witness, a vulnerable adult complainant or a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order to be given by closed-circuit television unless the child is at least 16 and opposes this course, or the court otherwise orders, or the court lacks closed-circuit television facilities (in which case s 15YL provides for alternative arrangements to be made). Section 15YM of the Crimes Act provides that a video recording of an interview of a child witness, a vulnerable adult complainant or a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order may be admitted as evidence in
chief if a constable or prescribed person conducted the interview and the court gives leave. Admissibility is not affected by the fact that the child gave evidence of “previous representations”: s 15YN. Section 15YO of the Crimes Act provides that, subject to contrary order by the court, a child witness, a vulnerable adult complainant or a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order may choose one or more adults to accompany the child while giving evidence, including evidence by closedcircuit television. Section 15YP gives the court power to exclude some or all members of the public from the courtroom in which a child witness, a vulnerable adult complainant or a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order is giving evidence. Section 15YQ provides that if there is a jury in a proceeding in which a child witness, a vulnerable adult complainant or a special witness subject to a s 15YAB(3) order has given or will give evidence, the judge is not to warn the jury, or suggest to the jury in any way: (a) that the law regards persons within those classes as an unreliable class of witness; (b) that the law requires greater or lesser weight to be given to evidence that is given by closed-circuit television or alternative arrangements under ss 15YI–15YL; (c) that the law requires greater or lesser weight to be given to evidence that is given by a video recording under ss 15YM–15YN; or 2(d) that the law requires greater or lesser weight to be given to evidence because an adult accompanies the a person within those classes under s 15YO. Section 15YR makes it an offence to publish certain matter identifying persons who are not defendants as child witnesses or vulnerable adult complainants. [page 435]
New South Wales Section 294B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 gives certain rights to a complainant giving evidence in respect of a prescribed sexual offence who is not a vulnerable person within the meaning of Pt 6 (ie is not a child or an intellectually impaired person). Those rights are to choose (subject
to a contrary court order) to give that evidence from a place other than the courtroom by means of closed-circuit television facilities or other technology that enables communication between that place and the courtroom (s 294B(3)(a)), or to choose to give that evidence by use of alternative arrangements made to restrict contact (including visual contact) between the complainant and the accused person or any other person or persons in the courtroom, including the use of screens and planned seating arrangements (s 294B(3)(b)).Where evidence is given pursuant to s 294B(3) the judge must inform the jury that it is standard procedure for the evidence of complainants in such cases to be given by those means or by use of those arrangements, and warn the jury not to draw any inference adverse to the accused person or give the evidence any greater or lesser weight because it is given by those means or by use of those arrangements (s 294B(7)). Section 294C(1) provides that a complainant is entitled to have a person or persons chosen by the complainant present near the complainant, and within the complainant’s sight, when the complainant is giving evidence in proceedings in respect of a prescribed sexual offence. Section 294C(2) provides that the entitlement applies even if the complainant gives evidence by means of closed-circuit television or under any alternative arrangements, and even if the proceedings are held in camera. Section 294C(3) provides that the person or persons chosen by the complainant to be with the complainant may include a parent, guardian, relative, friend or support person or a person assisting the complainant in a professional capacity. Section 294C(4) provides that an accused person is not entitled to object to the suitability of the person or persons chosen by a complainant to be with the complainant when giving evidence, and the court is not to disallow the choice of its own motion, unless the choice is likely to prejudice the accused person’s right to a fair trial (for example, because the person chosen by the complainant is a witness or potential witness in the proceedings). Section 294D(1) provides that the above provisions apply to a sexual offence witness in the same way as they apply to a complainant in the proceedings. Section 294D(2) defines a “sexual offence witness” as any witness in the proceedings against whom a prescribed sexual offence is alleged to have been committed by the accused person, being a prescribed sexual offence that is not the subject of the proceedings concerned. Section 294D(6) provides
that a witness is to be treated as a sexual offence witness, even if the witness has not yet given evidence in the proceedings, if the court is satisfied that the prosecutor has given notice to the accused person that the prosecutor intends to adduce evidence that the accused person committed a prescribed sexual offence against the witness. Part 6 (ss 306M–306ZP) makes provision for the evidence of vulnerable persons. The key parts are Div 3 and Div 4. Part 6 Div 3 (ss 306R–306Z) applies to the giving of evidence of out-ofcourt representations by a vulnerable person made in the course of an interview during which the person is questioned by an investigating official in connection with the investigation of the commission or possible commission of an offence. Section 306S(1) provides that a vulnerable person may give evidence of a previous representation to which Div 3 applies made by a person in any criminal proceeding wholly or partly: [page 436] (a) in the form of a recording of the previous representation made by an investigating official of the interview in the course of which the previous representation was made and that is viewed or heard, or both, by the court, or (b) orally in the courtroom, or (c) if the evidence is given in any proceedings in which Div 4 applies — in accordance with alternative arrangements made under s 306W.64 Section 306T(1) provides that a person must not call a vulnerable person to give evidence of a previous representation to which Div 3 applies made by the vulnerable person by means other than a recording made by an investigating official of the interview in the course of which the previous representation was made unless the person has taken into account any wishes of the vulnerable person, considered in the light of (in the case of a child) the child’s age and understanding, or (in the case of an intellectually impaired person) the person’s intellectual impairment. Section 306U(1) provides that a vulnerable person is entitled to give, and may give, evidence in chief of a previous representation to which Div 3 applies made by the person wholly or partly in the form of a recording made by an investigating official of the interview in the course of which the
previous representation was made and that is viewed or heard, or both, by the court. The vulnerable person must not, unless the person otherwise chooses, be present in the court, or be visible or audible to the court by closed-circuit television or by means of any similar technology, while it is viewing or hearing the recording. Section 306U(2) provides that, subject to s 306Y, a person is entitled to give, and may give (no matter what age the person is when the evidence is given) evidence as referred to in s 306U(1) in the form of a recording of a previous representation to which Div 3 applies made when the person was less than 16 years of age. Section 306U(3) provides that if a vulnerable person who gives evidence as referred to in s 306U(1) is not the accused person in the proceeding, the vulnerable person was subsequently made available for cross-examination and re-examination orally in the courtroom, or, if the evidence is given in any proceeding to which Div 4 applies, in accordance with alternative arrangements made under s 306W. Section 306V(2) provides that evidence of a previous representation to which Div 3 applies of a vulnerable person who is not the accused person in a proceeding that is given by the vulnerable person in the form of a recording made by an investigating official is not to be admitted unless it is proved that the accused person and his or her lawyer (if any) were given a reasonable opportunity to listen to, and, in the case of a video recording, view the recording. Section 306X provides that if a vulnerable person gives evidence of a previous representation wholly or partly in the form of a recording made by an investigating official in accordance with Div 3 in any proceedings in which there is a jury, the judge must warn the jury not to draw any inference adverse to the accused person or give the evidence any greater or lesser weight because of the evidence being given in that way. Section 306Y(1) provides that a vulnerable person must not give evidence by means of a recording made by an investigating official in accordance with Div 3 if the court orders that such means not be used. Section 306Y(2) provides that the court may only make such an order if it is satisfied that it is not in the interests of justice for the vulnerable person’s evidence to be given by a recording. [page 437]
Part 6 Div 4 (ss 306ZA–306ZI) applies to various proceedings relating to violence, and to proceedings in relation to a child protection prohibition order: s 306ZA. In those proceedings, vulnerable persons (other than defendants) are entitled, subject to a contrary court order, to give evidence by closed-circuit television facilities (s 306ZB); while vulnerable persons who are accused persons or persons against whom a complaint is made may do so if the court so orders, on satisfaction that the child may otherwise suffer mental or emotional harm or that the facts are better ascertained if a child’s evidence is given in accordance with the order (s 306ZC). Identification evidence on a fact in issue is not to be given by those means; but it need not be given until the whole of the witness’s other evidence is completed, and the court must ensure that the witness is not in the presence of the accused for any longer time than is necessary to give the identification evidence (s 306ZE). Section 306ZI provides for jury warnings. There are two further provisions applying to vulnerable witnesses. First, s 306ZK gives vulnerable persons in certain types of proceeding an entitlement to have nearby a person chosen by the vulnerable person. That person may be, for example, “a parent, guardian, relative, friend or support person of the vulnerable person”. And that person “may be with the vulnerable person as an interpreter, for the purpose of assisting the vulnerable person with any difficulty in giving evidence associated with an impairment or disability, or for the purpose of providing the vulnerable person with other support”. Secondly, subject to any contrary court order, in certain types of proceeding where the defendant is unrepresented, a vulnerable person is to be examined in chief, cross-examined or reexamined by a person appointed by the court instead of by the defendant (s 306ZL). Pursuant to s 294A the cross-examination of a complainant in sexual offence proceedings on behalf of an unrepresented accused person is conducted by a person appointed by the court. The legislation has been held constitutionally valid.65
Victoria The Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 42F provides that in certain proceedings relating to a child, the child must physically appear before the court unless the court directs that the child appears by
audiovisual link, which is not to be done unless the direction is in the best interests of the child and consistent with the interests of justice.
Queensland The Evidence Act 1977 s 21A deals with “special witnesses”.66 A “special witness” is a child under 16; or a person who, if required to give evidence in the ordinary way, would, as a result of a mental intellectual or physical impairment or any other relevant matter (which means the person’s age, education, level of understanding, cultural background or relationship to any party, the nature of the subject-matter of the evidence, or another matter the court considers relevant), be likely to be severely disadvantaged as a witness, or to suffer severe emotional trauma, or to be so intimidated as to be disadvantaged as a witness; or a person who is to give evidence about the commission of a serious criminal offence (defined in s 7 of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009) committed by a criminal organisation or a member of a criminal organisation (defined in s 1 of the Criminal Code): [page 438] s 21A(1). Section 21A does not apply to a child to the extent to which ss 21AA–21AO apply to the child: s 21A(1A). However, a party or the accused can be a special witness: s 21A(1A). Section 21A(2) provides that where a special witness is to give or is giving evidence in a proceeding, the court may make or give one or more of the following orders or directions: (a) in the case of a criminal proceeding or other prescribed proceeding — that the person charged be excluded from the room in which the court is sitting or be obscured from the view of the special witness while the special witness is giving evidence or is required to appear in court for any other purpose; (b) that, while the special witness is giving evidence, all persons other than those specified by the court, be excluded from the room in which it is sitting; (c) that the special witness give evidence in a room other than that in which the court is sitting and from which all persons other than
those specified by the court are excluded; (d) that a person approved by the court be present while the special witness is giving evidence or is required to appear in court for any purpose in order to provide emotional support to the special witness; (e) that a videotape recording of the evidence of the special witness or any portion of it be made under such conditions as are specified in the order and that the videotaped evidence be viewed and heard in the proceeding instead of the direct testimony of the special witness; (f) another order or direction the court considers appropriate about the giving of evidence by the special witness, including, for example, a direction about rest breaks, a direction about keeping questions simple, a direction that questions be limited by time and a direction that questions be limited by number. A “prescribed proceeding” is a proceeding for, or an appeal from an order made on, an application under the Criminal Organisation Act 2009. The Evidence Act 1977 Pt 2, Div 4A (ss 21AA–21AO) applies to the evidence of an “affected child”, ie a child who is a witness in a “relevant proceeding” and is not a defendant. The expression “child” receives a complex definition in s 21AD. In criminal proceedings a child is an individual who is under 16 when certain forms of criminal process are initiated, or is a special witness who is 16 or 17 years of age when the proceedings start; in civil proceedings a child is an individual who is under 16 years when the proceedings start; or is a special witness who is 16 or 17 when the proceedings start. The expression “relevant proceeding” is defined to mean a criminal proceeding for an offence of a sexual nature, or an offence involving violence if there is a prescribed relationship between a child who is a witness and the defendant; or a civil proceeding arising from the commission of a relevant offence. The purposes of Div 4A, according to s 21AA, are to preserve, to the greatest extent practicable, the integrity of an affected child’s evidence, and to require, wherever practicable, that an affected child’s evidence be taken in an environment that limits, to the greatest extent practicable, the distress and trauma that might otherwise be experienced by the child when giving evidence. Section 21AB provides that Div 4A prescribes the following measures for the achievement of those purposes. In criminal proceedings, apart from committal
proceedings where the child’s evidence in chief is to be given only as a statement and the child is not to be called as a witness for crossexamination (s 21AB(a)(iii)), the child’s evidence is to be pre-recorded in the presence of a judicial officer, but in advance of the proceeding [page 439] (s 21AB(a)(i)). If that cannot be done, the child’s evidence is to be given at the proceeding, but with the use of an audiovisual link or with the benefit of a screen (s 21AB(a)(ii)). In civil proceedings the child’s evidence is to be given at the proceeding with the use of an audiovisual link or with the benefit of a screen (s 21AB(b)). The detailed provisions for committal proceedings are in ss 21AE– 21AH; in particular, ss 21AG–21AH restrict cross-examination. The detailed provisions for pre-recording evidence are in ss 21AI– 21AO. In particular, s 21AL gives the judicial officer presiding at the preliminary hearing power to make orders about whether the child is to be in a courtroom or a separate room, and who is to be present. And s 21AM provides that a videotaped recording of the affected child’s evidence is admissible as if it were given orally in the normal way, and, subject to contrary order, admissible in other proceedings. It may be sensible to mark the recording for identification, but it should not be admitted as an exhibit; a request by the jury for access to it should ordinarily be dealt with in the same way as any request by a jury to be reminded of evidence; the jury should not generally be allowed unrestrained access to the recording so that it can be played and replayed; rather it should be played in court in the presence of judge, counsel and accused.67 This has been explained on the ground that the recording is not a piece of real evidence, properly to be received in evidence as an exhibit, but part of the record of the trial.68 The detailed provisions for the use of an audiovisual link or screen are in ss 21AP–21AR. There are general provisions in ss 21AS–21AX. In particular, s 21AU provides for the exclusion of persons from the courtroom while an affected child gives evidence. Section 21AB provides that an affected child, while giving evidence, is entitled to have nearby a “support person”. And s 21AW(2), like similar provisions in the legislation of some other jurisdictions, provides that the judge must tell the jury that
measures taken under ss 21AI–21AO and ss 21AP–21AR are routine practices of the court and that they should not draw any inferences as to the defendant’s guilt from them, 69 that the probative value of the evidence is not increased or decreased because of the measures, and the evidence is not to be given any greater or lesser weight because of the measures. Pursuant to ss 21N–21O the examination of a complainant in sexual offence proceedings on behalf of an unrepresented accused person is conducted by a person appointed by the court.
South Australia Section 13 of the Evidence Act 1929 provides that if it is practicable and desirable to make special arrangements for taking evidence from a witness in order to protect the witness from embarrassment or distress, to protect the witness from being intimidated by the atmosphere of a courtroom or for any other proper reason, the court should, on its own initiative, order that special arrangements be made if those arrangements can be made without prejudice to any other party to the proceedings. The expression “special arrangements” includes the use of closed-circuit television, the playing of audio visual recordings of evidence taken outside the place of trial, [page 440] the use of screens, partitions or one-way glass, the exclusion of the defendant from the place where evidence is taken, the prevention of the defendant from directly seeing and hearing the witness while giving evidence, the employment of a relative or friend to accompany the witness and provide emotional support, and measures to assist witnesses with physical or mental disabilities.70 Section 13A makes similar provision for the making of special arrangements for protecting vulnerable witnesses when giving evidence in criminal proceedings. Section 13C makes provision for the making of audio visual records of the evidence of vulnerable witnesses. Section 13D(1) provides that if, on application by a party to civil or criminal proceedings before a court, the court is satisfied that evidence given by a
witness in earlier criminal proceedings is relevant to the proceedings before the court, and the witness has died, or has become too ill or infirm to give evidence, or has not, after diligent search, been found, or is a vulnerable witness, the court in the later proceedings has a discretion to admit an official record of the evidence. Section 13D(2) provides that an official record of evidence is a record made at the direction or with the approval of the court before which the evidence was taken and, if an audio or audio visual record of the evidence was taken at the direction or with the approval of the court, in addition to a written transcript, the official record of evidence includes the audio or audio visual record. Section 13D(3) provides that before the court admits an official record into evidence in proceedings under s 13D, the record must be edited as agreed between the parties to those proceedings so as to exclude material that is not relevant to those proceedings, and so as to exclude evidence that is inadmissible in those proceedings for any other reason. Section 13D(4) provides that if the court admits an official record into evidence under s 13D, it may relieve the witness, wholly or in part, from an obligation to give evidence in the later proceedings. Section 13B(1)(a) prevents cross-examination of a witness who is an alleged victim of various offences in criminal cases unless the crossexamination is by counsel. Section 13B(1)(b) prevents cross-examination of the witness in civil cases relating to the offence save by counsel or (in the case of unrepresented defendants) a delegate of the judge.
Western Australia Section 106E of the Evidence Act 1906 provides that a child (ie a person under 18) is entitled while giving evidence to have nearby a person (not being a witness or party) who may provide the child with support. Section 106F provides that where a child is to give evidence, the court may appoint a suitable and competent “communicator”, whose function is to communicate and explain to the child questions put to the child and to communicate and explain to the court the evidence given by the child. Section 106G provides that an unrepresented person may not directly cross-examine a child or (without consent) a person complaining of a serious sexual offence, but provides that the unrepresented person’s questions be put by the judge or a person approved by the court. Sections 106HA–106HD provide that a visually recorded interview
conducted with a child by a person of a prescribed class who has reason to believe that that child or another child has or may have suffered physical or sexual abuse may be [page 441] admitted as to the whole or part of the evidence in chief of the interviewed child, irrespective of the child’s age or maturity, and even if the child is capable of giving evidence in the proceeding. Sections 106I, 106K and 106M provide that in a proceeding for certain offences involving sex or violence, the judge may order that the whole of the evidence of an affected child (see definition in s 106A) be taken at a special hearing and recorded on a visual recording, and that the affected child not be present at the proceeding. Directions may be given about who is to be present while the child’s evidence is taken, but the accused is not to be in the same room. Sections 106N–106Q provide that in a proceeding for certain offences involving sex or violence, the court shall, unless the affected child desires otherwise, give evidence via video link, or if no video link is available, using a screen, one-way glass or other device which prevents the affected child from seeing the accused, but permits the affected child to be seen by judge, jury, accused and accused’s counsel. Section 106R provides that the court may make orders declaring a person (other than an affected child) to be a special witness, and directing arrangements for the taking of the special witness’s evidence where the grounds stated in s 106R(3) apply —the witness would otherwise not be able by reason of physical disability or mental impairment to give evidence, or give it satisfactorily, or be likely to suffer severe emotional trauma, or be so intimidated or distressed as to be unable to give evidence, or give it satisfactorily. However, in proceedings for a serious sexual offence an order must be made in respect of the victim unless the court is satisfied that s 106R(3) does not apply and the victim does not wish to be declared a special witness. The arrangements which may be directed are that the special witness have nearby a person approved by the court to provide support, and that facilities of the type described in s 106N(2) (videotape) or s 106N(4) (screen, one-way glass or light device) can be
supplied. Where evidence is given by an affected child or a special witness in one of the ways described in s 106N(2) or s 106N(4) and the identification of the accused is an issue, the affected child or special witness is not required to be in the presence of the accused for that purpose: (a) for any longer than is necessary for that purpose; and (b) before the whole of the evidence of the affected child or special witness (including cross-examination and re-examination) is completed. Section 106RA provides that where a prosecution for an offence has commenced in a court, a judge may order that the evidence of a person (other than an affected child) whose evidence is or may be relevant in the prosecution be taken at a special hearing and recorded on a visual recording. The grounds on which an order can be made are that the witness has been declared to be a special witness under s 106RA(4)(a) or that it is likely that the witness will be out of the State at the time of the proceeding for the offence and will not be able to give evidence at the proceeding by means of a video link or an audio link.
Tasmania The Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 s 4(1) provides that in giving evidence in any proceeding, a child is entitled to have nearby a person approved by the judge who may provide the child with support. Section 4(2) provides that a judge may only approve a person for that purpose if that person is not, or is not likely to be, a witness in or a party to the proceeding. Section 6(1) provides that except where an order under s 7 is in force, the evidence of an affected child in a prescribed proceeding is to be given by audiovisual [page 442] link. Section 6(2) provides that while an affected child is giving evidence by audiovisual link, only the following persons may be present in the room with the child — a person approved under s 4, and one person employed at the court in which the proceedings are being conducted. An “affected
child” is defined essentially as a child who is a victim of various crimes of sex and violence, and a “prescribed proceeding” is a proceeding involving various crimes of those kinds. Section 7(2) provides that a judge may make an order declaring that s 6 does not apply in the proceeding if satisfied that the affected child is able and wishes to give evidence in the presence of the defendant in the courtroom. Section 8(1) provides that a court may make an order declaring that a person (other than an affected child) who is giving, or is to give, evidence in a proceeding is a special witness if satisfied that: (a) by reason of intellectual, mental or physical disability, the person is, or is likely to be, unable to give evidence satisfactorily in the ordinary manner; or (b) by reason of age, cultural background, relationship to any party to the proceeding, the nature of the subject-matter of the evidence or any other factor the court considers relevant, the person is likely to suffer emotional trauma or to be so intimidated or distressed as to be unable to give evidence or to give evidence satisfactorily. Section 8(2)(b) provides that the order may include an order that the special witness have nearby a person who is not a party or witness who is approved by the judge in order to provide support, an order that the evidence of the special witness be given by audiovisual link, and an order that, while the special witness is giving evidence, all persons other than those specified in the order be excluded from the courtroom.
Northern Territory Section 21A(2) of the Evidence Act deals with vulnerable witnesses. That class comprises children (ie persons under 18), witnesses who suffer from an intellectual disability, witnesses who are the alleged victims of a sexual offence to which the proceedings relate, and witnesses under a special disability because of the circumstances of the case or the circumstances of the witness. Section 21A(2) provides that a vulnerable witness is entitled to give evidence using one or more of the following arrangements as chosen by the witness: (a) that the evidence of the vulnerable witness be given at a place outside the courtroom and transmitted to the courtroom by means of a closed-circuit television where that facility is available; (b) that a screen, partition or one-way glass be placed to obscure the
witness’s view of a party to whom the evidence relates but not so as to obstruct the view of the witness by the judge or the jury (if any); (c) that the vulnerable witness be accompanied by a relative, a friend or any other person whom the vulnerable witness requests to accompany him or her and whom the court considers is in the circumstances appropriate to accompany the vulnerable witness, in each case for the purpose of providing the vulnerable witness with emotional support; (d) that the court be closed while evidence is being given by the vulnerable witness in the proceeding and that no persons remain in or enter the courtroom or remain within the hearing of the court without its permission. However, s 21A(2A) provides that the court may make an order that the vulnerable witness is not to give evidence using an arrangement under s 21A(2) if satisfied that [page 443] it is not in the interests of justice for this to be done or that the urgency of the proceeding makes the use of the arrangement inappropriate. Section 21B provides that in proceedings for the trial of a sexual offence or a serious violent offence in which a vulnerable witness is to give evidence, the court may exercise one or both of the following powers. The first is to admit a recorded statement in chief as the witness’s evidence in chief or as part of the witness’s evidence in chief. The second is to hold a special audio-visually recorded sitting for conducting the examination of a witness and replaying it to the jury as the witness’s evidence.71 Section 21D(2) provides that if a witness is a child, the court must have regard to the following principles: (a) the court must take measures to limit, to the greatest extent practicable, the distress or trauma suffered (or likely to be suffered) by the child when giving evidence; (b) the child must be treated with dignity, respect and compassion; (c) the child must not be intimidated when giving evidence; (d) proceedings in which a child is a witness should be resolved as quickly as possible.
However, s 21D(3) provides that if the court is satisfied that a child is able, and wants, to give evidence in the presence of the defendant, special measures are not to be taken, contrary to the wishes of the child, to protect the child from the apprehended distress or trauma of giving evidence in the presence of the defendant. Section 21E(1) provides that if the vulnerable witness is to give evidence in criminal proceedings, and facilities are available for making an audiovisual record of the evidence, the court may direct that an audiovisual record be made of the witness’s evidence. Section 21E(4) provides that if in later civil or criminal proceedings a court is satisfied that evidence of which an audiovisual record has been made under s 21E is relevant to the later proceedings, the court may admit it in evidence. Section 21F provides that in a case involving a charge of a sexual offence or a serious violent offence, the court is to be closed while the evidence of the vulnerable witness is being taken. In the Northern Territory the Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act 1983 s 5(1) provides that the cross-examination of a complainant in sexual offence proceedings on behalf of an unrepresented accused person is to be conducted as follows: the accused states questions to the judge or a person appointed by the judge, who repeats them to the witness. Section 5(2) provides that the judge is to warn the jury under s 21A(3) of the Evidence Act 1910 that the procedure is routine, that no adverse inference is to be drawn against the accused, and that no greater or lesser weight is to be given to the witness’s evidence as a result of the procedure.
Australian Capital Territory Section 9(1) of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 provides that if a child other than the accused is to give evidence in a courtroom equipped with an audiovisual link between the courtroom and another place, the evidence of the witness must be given from the other place using the audiovisual link unless the court otherwise orders. Section 9(4) provides that the court is not to make an order [page 444]
unless it is satisfied that the child prefers to give evidence in the courtroom, or the proceeding will be unreasonably delayed if an order is not made, or there is a substantial risk of the court being unable to ensure that the proceeding is conducted fairly if an order is not made. Section 38C provides that evidence by certain types of witness in certain types of proceeding may be given without the witness being able to see the accused or others. Section 38D prevents self-represented accused persons from crossexamining certain witnesses in certain types of proceeding. Section 38E gives power to the court to order that a support person be in the court while certain witnesses in certain types of proceeding are giving evidence, and that the support person be close to the witness and within the witness’s sight. Section 39(2) provides that the court may order that the courtroom be closed to the public while all or part of the evidence of a witness complaining of a sexual offence is given. Section 39(3) provides that the complainant is entitled to nominate a person to be present despite a s 39(2) order. Part 4 Div 4.2A deals with the reception of audiovisual recordings of police interviews of “witnesses” — persons complaining of a sexual offence or a violence offence who are children or are intellectually impaired. The recording may be played as the witness’s evidence in chief: s 40F(1). The witness is not to be in the courtroom, or visible to anyone in it by audiovisual link, while the audiovisual recording is being played: s 40F(3). It is a precondition of admissibility that notice of the intention to tender the audiovisual recording be given to the defence, together with a transcript: ss 40G and 40J.72 Part 4 Div 4.2B deals with the giving of audiovisual link evidence at a pre-trial hearing by a prosecution witness complaining of a sexual offence who is a child, or is intellectually impaired, or must give evidence as soon as possible because it is likely that the witness will suffer severe emotional trauma or be intimidated or distressed. Part 4 Div 4.3 deals with the giving of evidence from places other than courtrooms by witnesses who are complainants in sexual or violent offence proceedings.
D — THE ACCUSED
As a witness for the prosecution [13075] Substantial preservation of common law rule of non-competence The common law rule was that the accused was not a competent, and a fortiori not a compellable, witness for the prosecution in any criminal case.73 This rule has not been affected by the various statutes which have enabled an accused to give evidence in the defence case. There have been, however, in many States and Territories, limited statutory modifications of the common law rule. The consequence of these modifications is as follows. The accused is a competent witness for the prosecution in the Northern Territory unless charged with an indictable offence.74 The common law rule of incompetence and [page 445] non-compellability is preserved by s 17(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT).75 The accused is not a competent witness for the prosecution in Western Australia, 76 South Australia77 and Queensland.78 In general this result flows from the common law and its non-abolition by statute.
[13080] Non-competence of co-accused The effect of the common law rule is that one co-accused cannot be called by the prosecution to give evidence against another. Co-accused persons are persons who are being jointly tried when the question of competency has to be decided.79 Committals have been quashed because one co-accused had been called on behalf of the prosecution at the preliminary examination.80
[13085] Rendering a participant competent and compellable There are various devices by which the prosecution may render a co-
accused competent and compellable on its behalf. Each of them has the effect of making the witness cease to be a co-accused within the above definition. A nolle prosequi may be filed with reference to the case, it may be stated that no evidence will be offered against the co-accused so that the co-accused is acquitted, an order for separate trials may be obtained or the co-accused may plead guilty. In this last event it is desirable that the witness should be sentenced before being called on behalf of the prosecution:81 [15075]–[15115]. A witness, although an accomplice, who has not been charged with the accused, nor dealt with for the offence, nor given an indemnity against prosecution is nonetheless a competent Crown witness. Such a person, however, has a very powerful motive to give evidence to oblige the prosecution. Accordingly, although there is no rule of law or practice preventing the Crown calling such a witness, 82 the judge in the interests of a fair trial for the accused has a discretion to exclude the evidence.83 A warning against the danger of acting on the uncorroborated testimony [page 446] of a former co-accused who was an accomplice will have to be given to the jury (save in proceedings to which the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) apply: s 164(3)). In England the practice is that when an accomplice gives evidence for the Crown, counsel for the Crown should in opening the case tell the jury about the accomplice’s convictions unless defence counsel opposes this course.84
As a witness for the defence [13090] Accused competent for the defence The effect of s 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 in England and equivalent Australian provisions85 is that the accused is a competent witness for the defence in a criminal trial.86 The provisions contain important provisos.87
Evidence given by an accused may be used against a co-accused whether it is given in chief or under cross-examination.88
[13095] Evidence in chief Humphreys J said:89 while a statement made in the absence of the accused person by one of his co-defendants cannot be evidence against him, 90 if a co-defendant goes into the witness box and gives evidence in the course of a joint trial, then what he says becomes evidence for all the purposes of the case including the purpose of being evidence against his co-defendant.91
But, even in modern times, language is sometimes used which suggests that nothing said by one co-accused in the witness box is evidence against the other.92 There was some early authority in support of this view, when doubts were expressed whether the evidence of a prisoner who had been acquitted and testified for one of the two remaining co-accused was admissible against the other.93 It is submitted that this sort of hesitancy springs from a failure to distinguish between one co-accused’s out-of-court assertions which are certainly not evidence against the other, and the sworn evidence of a co-accused in court which is analogous to that of any other witness. [page 447]
[13100] Evidence elicited in cross-examination On principle, there can be no doubt that when an accused person volunteers to give evidence the accused person may be cross-examined by the prosecution and by a co-accused on any matter relevant to the issues in the trial. And what the accused says in cross-examination may be relied on by the party responsible for the cross-examination in that party’s favour. This would mean that anything that one co-accused says under cross-examination by the prosecution may be treated as evidence against the other.94
As a witness for a co-accused [13105] Accused competent for, but not compellable
against, co-accused The general rule is that the accused is a competent but not a compellable witness for anyone being tried jointly with that accused. This is the effect of s 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) and equivalent Australian provisions. It means that, if A and B are being tried together, B may call upon A to testify for B provided A is willing to do so. An accused who has pleaded guilty is not a “person charged” nor, it would seem, “an accused person”, within the meaning of the legislation because that accused is not concerned in any issue before the jury; that accused is therefore both competent and compellable for a co-accused.95 That accused has ceased to be a co-accused within the definition of that term in the common law rule mentioned above. For the same reason, someone who was originally jointly indicted with the accused, but is subsequently being tried separately, is both competent and compellable for the accused.96 An accused who gives evidence is liable to be cross-examined by a coaccused, even though the former did not give evidence against the latter.97 The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) deal with this topic by recourse to the notion of an “associated defendant”. That expression is defined thus: associated defendant, in relation to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, means a person against whom a prosecution has been instituted, but not yet completed or terminated, for: (a) an offence that arose in relation to the same events as those in relation to which the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted arose; or (b) an offence that relates to or is connected with the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted.
Section 17(3) provides that an associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant in a criminal proceeding, unless the associated defendant is being tried separately from the defendant. Section 17(4) provides that if a witness is an associated defendant who is being tried jointly with the defendant in the proceedings, the court is to satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the absence of the jury) that the witness is aware of the effect of s 17(3). [page 448]
E — THE ACCUSED’S SPOUSE Rule of incompetence [13110] Modification of common law of non-competence The common law rule that the spouse of an accused person was not a competent witness for or against the accused or for any co-accused98 was discussed at [13030]. It has been eroded by many statutory modifications, but continues where no statutory exception applies.99 It applies to matters occurring after a judicial separation.100
[13115] The accused’s spouse as a witness for the prosecution So far as the common law exceptions are concerned nothing more need be said about the cases of treason and forcible marriage: see [13035]. The only clear exception to the general rule of incompetence at common law is an accusation of personal violence by one spouse against another. There is some uncertainty with regard to the extent of this exception. It certainly applies to assaults of all kinds, and it has been held to extend to the commission of an unnatural offence by a husband against his wife.101 An attempt to murder by poison is an act of personal violence.102 So, probably, is a letter threatening murder.103 The applicability of the exceptions is sometimes said to depend on the nature of the charge rather than the supporting evidence.104
[13120] Preservation of common law exceptions The common law exceptions by which the accused’s spouse could be called as a witness without the consent of the accused were expressly preserved by the Act of 1898.
[13125] Compellability of competent spouse There has been division in the House of Lords on whether at common law a spouse who is competent to give evidence is compellable. The majority denied this; Lord Edmund-Davies disagreed because of the
public interest in prosecuting crimes of violence.105 Subsequent statutory changes to the common law, discussed in [13145] ff, indicate that the policy evinced in the dissenting speech has had a greater appeal to the Australian legislatures. The erosion of the rule that, for spouses, competence implies compellability, leaves open the question of the compellability of spouses in the doubtful case of treason. [page 449]
[13130] Dangers in joinder of counts There are dangers in a joinder of counts on which the accused’s spouse is a competent (or even compellable) witness for the defence and incompetent for the prosecution. Deacon was charged with murdering his brother-in-law in the presence of Mrs Deacon, the accused’s wife, by shooting him, and with the attempted murder of Mrs Deacon by subsequently shooting at her. She gave evidence that she saw the shooting of the accused’s brother-in-law, and Deacon was convicted of his murder. No verdict was taken on the charge of attempted murder. The conviction of murder was quashed by the Court of Appeal because Mrs Deacon was not a competent witness for the prosecution on that count.106 Presumably the right course would have been for the prosecution to have applied for separate trials of the two counts, calling Mrs Deacon at the trial for attempted murder.
[13135] Statutory competence in England does not imply compellability Where the spouse was competent by reason of the common law exceptions, at least that relating to violence on the spouse, he or she was not compellable. By the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 the legislature in England created further exceptions to spousal incompetence. Where the accused has been charged with one of the scheduled offences the spouse may be called as a witness for the prosecution or for the defence without the consent of the person charged. As competence usually implies compellability, many people thought that
this legislation made the accused’s spouse compellable for the prosecution in the specified cases. The House of Lords decided that this was not so. Leach was charged with incest with his daughter. His wife was called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution. She objected to giving evidence but was compelled to do so. Leach was convicted, and, after an unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, he successfully appealed to the House of Lords. Lord Atkinson summarised their Lordships’ answer to the argument that competence implies compellability when he said: The principle that a wife is not to be compelled to give evidence against her husband is deep seated in the common law of this country, and I think if it is to be overturned it must be overturned by a clear, definite, and positive enactment, not by an ambiguous one such as the section relied upon in this case.107
In England it has been held that police officers interviewing a spouse who is not compellable are not generally obliged to inform the spouse of that fact.108
[13140] Australian statutory equivalents to English Act of 1898 In Australia the legislative equivalents of the English Act of 1898, in so far as it concerns the matters under consideration, are various.
[13145] Queensland The spouse of an accused person is competent and compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, and without the consent of the accused.109 [page 450]
[13150] New South Wales Section 18 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) is to the same effect as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 18: [13180]. Section 19 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) provides that s 18 does not apply where the accused is charged with offences under certain provisions of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) or where the offence
charged is a domestic violence offence or a child assault offence referred to in s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.110 For the purposes of the second circumstance of compellability, spouse includes a “de facto partner”. A de facto partner is a person in a registered relationship or registered interstate relationship within the meaning of the Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW), or a person in a de facto relationship (as defined in s 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)), namely a relationship between persons who live together as a couple and who are not married to one another or related by family. The same position applies in relation to comment as under s 20 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): [13225].
[13155] Victoria The position is the same as under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): [13180].
[13160] Tasmania A spouse is a competent prosecution witness, but is not compellable except in proceedings for incest, certain offences against persons under the age of sixteen years, or violence against the spouse, de facto spouse, parent or child of the defendant, or in proceedings constituted as a result of a complaint by the spouse or de facto spouse for an offence alleged to have been committed by the defendant against or in relation to the property of his or her spouse or de facto spouse.111 “Spouse” is defined in s 3(1), in relation to a person, as including the person who is in a significant relationship, within the meaning of the Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), with that person. Section 4(1) of that Act defines a “significant relationship” as a relationship between two adult persons who have a relationship as a couple and are not married to one another or related by family: it is not necessary for the couple to live together, although this is a relevant factor (s 4(3)(b)). By reason of s 18 of the Evidence Act, a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child who is not compellable has a right equivalent to that in s 18 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), discussed in [13180] below. Section 3(13) provides that reference to a child of a person includes a reference to an adopted child, surrogate child, or ex-nuptial child of the person, or a child living with a person as if the child were a member of the
person’s family. Section 3(14) makes similar provision in relation to parents. And s 3(1) defines “surrogate child” and “surrogate parent”.
[13165] South Australia112 A close relative of the accused is competent and compellable for the prosecution unless an exemption, upon application by the witness, 113 is granted. The expression “close relative” is used to include not only the accused’s spouse but also the [page 451] accused’s parents, children and any putative spouse within the meaning of the Family Relationships Act 1975. The application for exemption 114 is made in the absence of the jury and no mention of it may be made to the jury. The discretion to grant exemption requires the judge to weigh the importance of the evidence and the gravity of the offence against the likelihood that the giving of the evidence would harm the witness or the witness’s relationship with the accused. Notwithstanding that the court fails to satisfy itself that the proposed witness is aware of the right to claim exemption, the witness is competent and the witness’s evidence is lawful evidence on which the accused could be convicted.115 The failure is nonetheless an irregularity which might, in the appropriate case, entitle an appellate court to set aside the conviction.116 The expression “child” does not include “stepchild”.117
[13170] Western Australia The spouse is a competent prosecution witness in all cases and is compellable without the consent of the accused when the accused is charged with an offence listed in the Second Schedule to the Evidence Act or a repealed Code section or with attempting or conspiring to commit or inciting the commission of such an offence or with an offence committed with respect to the property of the spouse or is compellable under some other enactment.118 A former spouse is competent and compellable in all cases.119
[13175] Northern Territory Section 18 of the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 is to the same effect as s 18 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): [13180]. There are provisions equivalent to those in the Dictionary Pt 1 cl 11 to the Interpretation Act (NT) s 19A(3). Section 19 is different from but has similarities with s 19 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 19.
[13180] Territory
Commonwealth
and
Australian
Capital
The result of s 18 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is to create the following regime in federal courts. The regime created by s 18 applies only in criminal proceedings: s 18(1). It gives a right to a certain class of person to object to being required to give evidence at all, or to being required to give evidence of the communication between the person and the defendant, as a witness for the prosecution: s 18(2). The class in question consists of the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of the defendant. The Dictionary Pt 1 cl 11(1) provides that a reference in the Act to a de facto partner of a person is a reference to a person who is in a de facto relationship with the person. Clause 11(2) provides that a person is in a de facto relationship with another person if the two persons have a relationship as a couple and are not legally married. Clause 11(3) provides that in determining whether two persons are in a de facto relationship, all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including such of the following matters as are relevant in the circumstances of the particular case: (a) the duration of the relationship; (b) the nature and extent of their common residence; [page 452] (c) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them; (d) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property; (e) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; (f) the care and support of children;
(g) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. Clause 11(5) provides that the following matters are irrelevant: (a) whether the persons are of different sexes or the same sex; (b) whether either of the persons is legally married to someone else or in another de facto relationship.120 Section 18(3) provides that the objection is to be made before the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of the right to object, whichever is the latest. Section 18(4) provides that if it appears to the court that a person may have a right to make an objection under s 18, the court is to satisfy itself that the person is aware of the effect of s 18 as it may apply to the person. Section 18(5) provides that if there is a jury, the court is to hear and determine any objection under s 18 in the absence of the jury. Section 18(6) provides that a person who makes an objection under s 18 to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that: (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given. Section 18(7) provides that without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for the purposes of s 18(6), it must take into account the following: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) whether any other evidence concerning the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person; (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant. Section 18(8) provides that if an objection under s 18 has been
determined, the prosecutor may not comment on the objection, the decision of the court in relation to the objection, or the failure of the person to give evidence. As to comment by others, see [13225]. Similar provisions exist in the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 18. Section 19 provides that s 18 does not apply in a proceeding for an offence against the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Pts 2–5, that is an offence against a person under 16; an offence against ss 423, 789, 791, 803 and 804 of the Children and Young People Act 2008 (ACT); and an offence that is a domestic violence offence within the meaning of the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT). Section 19 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is to similar effect. The position in relation to warnings is discussed at [13225]. [page 453]
[13185] The accused’s spouse as a witness for the accused or a co-accused The general rule is that the accused’s spouse is competent to testify on behalf of the accused. This follows from the equivalents of s 4(1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng). A summary of the statutory provisions in each State and Territory is set out below. It is submitted that an accused’s spouse would be compellable for the defence, at the very least, in all cases where such spouse would be a compellable witness for the prosecution.121 But if A and B were being tried together, not only was the spouse of A incompetent as a witness for A, but that spouse could not be called by B without A’s consent.122 This was presumably subject to the exception that if A and B were jointly charged with violence against the spouse of A, that spouse would have been a competent and compellable witness for B as well as for the Crown. But this position has been substantially modified by statute in each of the Australian jurisdictions.
[13190] Queensland The spouse of an accused person is competent and compellable either for the prosecution or the defence, and without the consent of the accused.123
[13195] New South Wales The spouse is a competent witness for the accused spouse and for the co-accused. Comment is governed by the same rules as apply under s 20(3)–(5) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): see [13225].
[13200] Victoria The spouse is a competent witness for the accused spouse and for the co-accused. Comment is governed by the same rules as apply under s 20(3)–(5) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): see [13225].
[13205] Tasmania The spouse is a competent and compellable witness for the accused spouse and for the co-accused. Comment is governed by the same rules as apply under s 20(3)–(5) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): see [13225].
[13210] South Australia124 A spouse or putative spouse is competent and compellable125 in all cases to give evidence for the spouse accused and any co-accused. The prosecutor may comment upon the failure of the spouse to give evidence.126
[13215] Western Australia A spouse is competent and compellable as a witness for the spouse accused and any co-accused in all cases.127 [page 454]
[13220] Northern Territory The spouse is a competent witness for the accused spouse and for the co-accused. Comment is governed by the same rules as apply under s 20(3)–(5) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): see [13225].
[13225] Territory
Commonwealth
and
Australian
Capital
The result of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is to create the following regime in federal courts. Section 20, which applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence (s 20(1)), permits comment by the judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) on a failure to give evidence by a person who, at the time of the failure, was the defendant’s spouse or de facto partner or a parent or child of the defendant: s 20(3). “De facto partner”, “parent” and “child” are expressions defined in the Dictionary Pt 1 and Pt 2 cl 10: see [13180]. The result of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is to create the following regime in federal courts. Section 20, which applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence (s 20(1)), permits comment by the judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) on a failure to give evidence by a person who, at the time of the failure, was the defendant’s spouse or de facto partner or a parent or child of the defendant: s 20(3). “De facto partner”, “parent” and “child” are expressions defined in the Dictionary Pt 1 and Pt 2 cl 10: see [13180]. However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, a comment on a failure by a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child to give evidence must not suggest that the failure was because the defendant was guilty or the person failing to give evidence believed the defendant was guilty: s 20(4).128 Section 20(5) provides that if two or more persons are being tried together for an indictable offence, and comment is made by any of those persons on the failure of any of those persons or of the spouse or de facto partner, or a parent or child, of any of those persons to give evidence, the judge may, in addition to commenting on the failure to give evidence, comment on any comment of the kind made by one of the co-accused. Similar provisions exist in the ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 20.
[13230] Spouses and civil proceedings The spouses of parties to litigation are now competent and compellable witnesses in all civil cases. In addition to the general statutory provisions, 129 specific provisions in respect of matrimonial proceedings are now to be found in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Section 100(1) makes provision
for competence and compellability of all parties to proceedings under the Act. There is a provision removing the protection given to a party to a marriage from being compelled to disclose a matrimonial communication between the party and the party’s spouse: s 100(2).
Former spouse testifying to matters occurring during the marriage130 [13235] Statutory change in relation to divorced spouses The effect of statutory change on the common law rule of spousal incompetency as it applied to a divorced spouse testifying to matters occurring during the marriage must now be considered. [page 455]
[13240] Criminal cases It seems that, in criminal cases, the law governing the competence and compellability of the accused’s divorced spouse to testify to matters occurring during the marriage131 is identical with the law governing the competence and compellability of his or her present spouse.132 The construction of the relevant statutory provisions in the case of a divorced spouse presents a problem. In the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) and its Australian equivalents, the “wife” or “husband” of the accused is made a competent witness. These expressions have been held to include a divorced husband and wife testifying to matters occurring during the marriage.133 A possible argument to the contrary is that, in s 1(d) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 and the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 18, the words “husband” and “wife” may have to be construed so as to exclude a divorced spouse. Under proviso (d): no husband shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during the marriage.
A civil case134 turning on the identically worded provision of the Evidence Amendment Act 1853, decided that the words “husband” and “wife” do not include a widow or divorced person even when they are
being questioned concerning matters occurring during the marriage.135 It is difficult to see why s 1(d) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 should be construed differently, but this cannot be regarded as an insuperable bar to holding that in the earlier parts of the Act of 1898 “husband” and “wife” include a divorced spouse testifying to matters occurring during the marriage. Section 18(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) makes it plain that the right of a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child to refuse to give evidence as a prosecution witness is limited to a person answering that description at the time “when [that person is] required to give evidence”.
[13245] Civil cases It is certainly difficult to believe that a modern court would hold the divorced wife of a party incompetent to testify concerning a contract made by her former husband during his marriage to her.136 The best view is that the common law was changed by the Evidence Amendment Act 1853 s 1. This rendered the “husbands” [page 456] and “wives” of parties competent and compellable, and “husband” and “wife” have been held in a criminal case to apply to former spouses testifying to matters occurring during the marriage.137 Section 3 of the Act of 1853 and its present Australian equivalents (see [13240]) confers a privilege against the disclosure of marital communications in terms identical with those of proviso (d) to s 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. In a civil case138 it was held that a widow could be obliged to disclose a communication made to her by her husband during their marriage, and it was said that the disclosure of such a communication could also be compelled in the case of a divorced person. In civil no less than in criminal cases, it seems to be necessary to construe the words “husband” and “wife” in different senses in different parts of the same statute.
F — SOVEREIGNS, DIPLOMATS, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT Competence and non-compellability [13255] Statutory regimes The sovereign is not a compellable witness. Foreign sovereigns, their ambassadors and diplomatic suites are also competent, but not compellable, as witnesses. There are some modern statutory provisions under which High Commissioners and their staff are immune from compulsory process.139 It is sometimes said that judges, jurors and arbitrators are not compellable to testify as to the reasons which led them to certain conclusions. Since this attaches to the evidence rather than to the person, it is proposed to consider these matters in [27200]–[27220] below. The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 15, provides that none of the following is compellable to give evidence: the Sovereign; the Governor-General;140 the Governor of a State;141 the Administrator of a Territory; a foreign sovereign or the Head of State of a foreign country: s 15(1). It provides further that a member of a House of an Australian Parliament (defined as the Parliament of the Commonwealth (Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 17(e)), or Parliament of a State, or a Legislative Assembly of a Territory (including the ACT House of Assembly) is not compellable to give evidence if the member would, if compelled to give evidence, be prevented from attending the sitting of that House or a joint sitting of that Parliament, or a meeting of a Committee of that House or that Parliament, being a committee of which he or she is a member: s 15(2). However, by virtue of s 10, which provides that the Act, and s 15(2) in particular, does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament, the compellability of members of the Commonwealth Parliament to give evidence is governed by s 14(1) [page 457] of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth). A member of a House of
the Commonwealth Parliament is not required to attend a court on any day on which the House or a Parliamentary committee of which the relevant member is a member meets, or on a day within five days before or after that day. Similar provisions appear in the Evidence Acts 1995 (NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and in the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT).
G — BANKERS Competence and non-compellability [13260] Statutory regimes There is a limited immunity enjoyed by bankers under the statutory provisions of some States relating to the production and proof of entries in bankers’ books.142 These include a provision that a banker or officer of a bank shall not, in any legal proceeding to which the bank is not a party, be compellable to produce any bankers’ book the contents of which can be proved under the Act in question, or to appear as a witness to prove the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded, unless by order of a judge made for special cause. The object of these statutes is to save the time of bankers and protect them and their customers from the inconvenience of producing the originals of their books. It will be seen at [39070]–[39075] that, though it is sufficient to produce a copy of a public document to the court, the original of a private document has to be produced as a general rule. Bankers’ books rank as private documents, but the legislation provides for their proof by means of a copy. There are various safeguards which it is not necessary to mention, beyond saying that the authenticity of the copy can usually be established by affidavit, thus sparing any bank official the necessity of attending court.
H — EXPERTS Competence, compellability and discretion [13265] Rule of practice There is a rule of practice in England143 which has been applied in
Australia144 that, as a general rule, the court will not in its discretion compel an unwilling expert to give evidence where the expert has had no connection with the facts or the history of the matter in issue. In United States litigation against the manufacturer of drugs taken by women during pregnancy, the plaintiff sought to have Dr McBride, an expert on the effects of the drugs, give evidence before a commissioner in New South Wales for use in the Superior Court of California. Clarke J acceded to Dr McBride’s application to set aside ex parte orders for the taking of the evidence, relying upon this rule of practice which is available to witnesses of opinion but not to witnesses of fact. In exercising his discretion, his Honour relied on the fact that if Dr McBride were required to give evidence he would have to spend time and study collating material to prepare himself to take part in a trial in which he had no professional interest. The position would be otherwise where the expert had been involved in the case by examination of evidence or by reporting upon it. The rule applies to domestic proceedings as well as foreign tribunals. [page 458] However, the strict position is that the expert is compellable, even if the expert has already advised the party opposed to the party seeking to call the expert (though the communications between the expert and the solicitors for the opposing party are privileged).145 A contract between a witness and one side not to give evidence has been said to be unenforceable as contrary to public policy.146 It is probably the case that a court would not ordinarily compel an expert to give evidence where no satisfactory arrangements as to fees had been arrived at, or where giving evidence could disrupt other important work, or where the evidence could be obtained from other sources of equal authority.147
I — ABSENT WITNESSES Video-link evidence [13270] Statutory regimes and questions of principle
Is an absent witness thereby incompetent to give oral evidence? Central to the conduct of litigation in common law systems is the requirement that evidence be given orally and in public by witnesses who may be crossexamined. This is particularly a feature of criminal trials which have traditionally conferred on the accused the right to confront the accuser.148 This requirement can, however, work an injustice where the witness is unable to come to court, or unwilling to do so and not amenable to subpoena, or where the expense of bringing the witness to court is very great. The traditional solution has been by the taking of evidence before trial which evidence is then presented to the tribunal of fact by reading the deposition or by showing a video record of the witness giving evidence: [17005]–[17050]. Modern technology now permits a witness to give evidence live to the court by videolink. This is now possible in those jurisdictions which permit a protected or vulnerable witness ([13065]) or other absent witness149 to give evidence in certain criminal cases, and it is frequently done by consent in civil cases. Where such consent is not given, orders for the giving of video-link evidence have been made pursuant to the powers conferred on the court to order that “evidence of any particular fact be given at the trial in such manner as may be specified by the order”150 or even under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.151 The exercise of this extraordinary power is discretionary and may be refused where no good reason is [page 459] shown for its exercise, 152 where the credibility of the witness is an issue153 or where, for some other reason, it would not advance the cause of justice.154 The objection that the giving of evidence in this way lessens the impact of the evidence or prejudices the cross-examiner has lost much of its force since legislation now permits a protected witness to give evidence outside the courtroom. The order, in any event, will be tailored to suit the requirements of the case.155 The procedural aspects of the exercise of this power are beyond the scope of this work, but it does raise difficult questions of principle which remain to be worked out. The question where the evidence is being given, at the place where the witness speaks156 or at the place where the court is
sitting, 157 may be relevant to the question whether the court is purporting to sit outside its territorial jurisdiction, 158 to the question where an allegedly perjurious witness should be tried and for breach of what law, 159 and to the question whether the evidence should be regarded as hearsay, 160 or at least not truly oral evidence161 in open court as is required by ordinary procedure.162 Nor is it altogether clear whether the witness is to be sworn in accordance with the procedures of the court163 or those of the place where the witness speaks.164 Similar problems may arise where the procedures of the court or those of the place where the witness speaks permit the giving of informal evidence. Doubtless, questions of admissibility would be for the court, but there may be no effective method of compelling the absent witness to answer a question or produce a document, or of reinforcing the sanction of the oath with the prospect of prosecution for perjury.165
Section 3 — Oath, Affirmation and Unsworn Evidence A — OATH AND AFFIRMATION Facilities and procedures [13275] Statutory regimes Normally there is legislative provision for the form of oath, but an oath may be [page 460] taken in such form and with such ceremonies as the person taking it may declare to be binding.166 The legality of the administration of an oath does not depend on the intricacies of the witness’s religion. It suffices if the oath appears to the court to be binding on the conscience of the witness, and if the oath is considered by the witness to be binding on the conscience of the witness.167 It is not necessary that the witness believe in God or in a system of future awards and punishments.168 In Queensland any person who objects to being sworn by reason of an absence of religious beliefs, or conscientious grounds, or other reasonable grounds, may make an affirmation.169 Under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, the ACT and the Northern Territory, however, there is a general right to make an affirmation in lieu of an oath.170 If a written statement is tendered, it must be sworn or affirmed, 171 unless there is sworn or affirmed evidence that what is said in the written statement is true.172 If the proposed witness has a religious belief which is not opposed to the taking of an oath but declines to take the usual form of oath or declines or is unable to say what form of oath binds the proposed witness or if the proposed witness is unable to take a binding oath, 173 the proposed witness would appear not to be
competent, except in those jurisdictions where there is a general right to affirm and the proposed witness elects to affirm.174 No doubt the proposed witness would be guilty of contempt of court if the uncooperative attitude were prompted by a desire to avoid giving evidence, and, in an appropriate case, there might be an adjournment so that the witness could receive instruction with regard to the binding force of oaths. If a witness claims to be an agnostic and expresses a desire to affirm, the judge should not refuse to allow the witness to do so on the grounds that the witness expresses a belief in certain parts of the Gospel. A witness who affirms with wilful falsity is liable to be proceeded against and [page 461] punished as if the witness had committed perjury. Once an oath has been duly administered its validity is not affected by the fact that the person taking it had no religious belief.175 Section 23(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth), and 2001 (Tas) provides that the court is to inform the witness that the witness may choose to take an oath or make an affirmation. Section 23(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) provides that the court is to inform the witness that the witness may choose to take an oath or make an affirmation, unless the court is satisfied that the person has already been informed or knows that he or she has the choice. Section 23(3) of the five Acts provides that the court may direct the witness to make an affirmation if the witness refuses to choose or if it is not reasonably practicable for the witness to take an appropriate oath. Testimony not given on a validly administered oath or affirmation or other sanction recognised by law is inadmissible176 unless it falls within a specific exception permitting unsworn evidence. In England, while there is no entitlement to cross-examine a witness who has affirmed as to why the witness affirmed and as to whether affirmation is as binding on the witness’s conscience as the taking of an oath on a holy book, there may be cases where there is an expectation that the witness would normally swear on a holy book, in which it is permissible, in the discretion of the court, for the reason why the witness
did not take the oath to be explored. Unless counsel consent, the matter should be raised initially with the judge in the absence of the jury.177 It is permissible to cross-examine a witness who has affirmed as to why that witness did not take an oath.178 It is also permissible to cross-examine witnesses who have taken an oath as to whether they think that the oath is binding on their conscience.179
B — UNSWORN EVIDENCE The accused’s unsworn statement at a criminal trial [13285] General abolition The traditional right of an accused person to make an unsworn statement in defence of a criminal charge has now disappeared in Australia (apart from Norfolk Island).180 [page 462]
Unsworn evidence of children181 [13290] Comparison with sworn evidence The unsworn evidence which children of tender years are allowed to give in criminal cases and, in some states, in civil cases, is, in most respects, procedurally the equivalent of sworn evidence. The witness is liable to be prosecuted for giving wilfully false testimony, and to be crossexamined. Furthermore there can be no doubt that the child’s testimony does constitute evidence in the case in which it is given. Finally, a trial judge should give careful consideration to the question whether the requirements of the case demand that the jury be warned of the dangers of acting upon this evidence where it is thought to be unreliable.182 The law depends on the solemnity attaching to the taking of the oath or affirmation to impress upon the minds of witnesses the crucial importance of telling the truth in the witness box by comparison with other, everyday occasions on which the sanction and solemnity of the oath are not invoked. It has
been said that experience indicates that a great many witnesses are impressed by the solemnity of the taking of the oath or affirmation, and they are influenced to comply with its obligations by a variety of considerations — religious, civic or instinctive; and witnesses are thus more prone to be careful about telling the truth in their evidence in court than they might be on other everyday occasions. On these grounds the trial judge should refrain from making any observations to a jury which diminish their appreciation of the solemnity and importance of the taking of the oath by witnesses.183
Informal evidence of adults and children184 [13295] Comparison with sworn evidence The statutory procedures in force in some jurisdictions185 permitting unsworn evidence to be given where the witness is unable to understand the obligation imposed by the oath or affirmation do not in terms provide that the evidence is different from sworn evidence. In at least one instance, the witness may be prosecuted for perjury where the evidence is false186 and may be cross-examined. Nevertheless, in the nature of things, the witness may be unable to give conventional evidence because of some mental disability. In such a case, a trial judge should give careful consideration to the question whether the requirements of the case demand that the jury be warned of the dangers of acting upon this evidence where it is thought to be unreliable.187
Miscellaneous [13300] Counsel and others The other cases in which a witness need not be sworn depend on the common law. Someone who simply produces adocument pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum [page 463] does not have to be sworn if there is another witness who can identify the
document.188 This means that the person producing it cannot be crossexamined.189 Another person who may not have to be sworn, according to old and questionable authority, 190 is the advocate giving evidence of the terms of a compromise reached between the parties to litigation in which the advocate acted for one of them. Sometimes the advocate’s statement was made from the well of the court.191 There is authority for its being from the well of the court, although on oath.192 In a Queensland case, 193 the judge directed that a counsel who was called to prove an agreement, in which he had been concerned, had to be sworn, and had to give his evidence from the witness box. There is little doubt that all modern Australian courts would insist on this procedure. Section 21(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) provides:194 A witness in a proceeding must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before giving evidence.
This would appear conclusively to preclude any “right” in an advocate not to make an oath or affirmation.195 The same follows from the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) s 21(1). 1 See [17480] below. 2 Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21. See J HW igmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law,
Chadbourn rev, 1979, vol 2, [516]. 3 See the historical analysis by Dixon J (dissenting) in Cheers v Porter (1931) 46 CLR 521 at 528ff; C JW Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 50–94. 4 C JW Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 95–122. See now, eg, Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 6(b). 5 See now Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 12; Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 6(a); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 12; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 12; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 12; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 15; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 6; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 12; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 12. For the history see C JW Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 95–122. Section 12 of the Commonwealth, NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian and ACT Evidence Acts has been held not to be limited to the actual trial: Re Z (1996) 134 FLR 40 at 68 (Fam C of A FC) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 6 A police officer giving evidence for the prosecution is not regarded as an “interested” person in this sense, but this does not mean that the evidence is to be given undue weight: Bierkowski v Pearson (1971) 18 FLR 110 at 112; Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 at 921 (CA). The fact that a witness has a motive for falsifying evidence may provide a reason for a judge, as a matter of prudence, seeking corroboration or warning the jury to scrutinise the evidence with care. See [15160] below. 7 See now Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 12; Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 7; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 12; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 12;Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 12; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 16; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 7; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 12; NT: Evidence Act 1939 s 7; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 12. For the history see C JW Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England,
1997, pp 95–122. 8 C JW Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 123–80. 9 Bentley v Cooke (1784) 3 Doug KB 422 (KB). See also R v L [2009] 1 WLR 626 at [27]–[29] (CA); R v BA [2013] 1 All ER 280 at [16]–[17] (CA). 10 Batthews v Galindo (1828) 4 Bing 610 (CP); R v Cobby (1883) 4 LR (NSW) L 355 (FC); R v Fuzil Deen [1895] QCR 307 (void marriage); R v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279 at 287 (CCA); R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 (bigamous marriage); R v Khan (1986) 84 Cr App R 44 (second polygamous marriage); R v Byast [1999] 2 Qd R 384 (CA). 11 Monroe v Twisleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; Doker v Hasler (1824) Ry & Mood 198; O’Connor v Marjoribanks (1842) 4 Man & G 435 (CP); cf Beveridge v Minter (1824) 1 C & P 364. See generally W Harris, “Spousal Competence and Compellability in Criminal Trials in the 21st Century” (2003) 3 QUTLJJ 274. 12 Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814; see also Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 (CA), criticised on historical grounds by W S Holdsworth, (1940) 56 LQR 137. 13 R v Lapworth [1931] 1 KB 117 at 121 (CCA). See too Riddle v R (1911) 12 CLR 622; Lord Audley’s Case (1631) 3 S Tr 401; R v Kenny (1886) 12 VLR 816 (FC); R v Jacono [1911] VLR 326 (FC); R v Bishop (1913) 15 WALR 70 (FC); R v Phillips [1922] SASR 276. 14 Director of Public Prosecutions v Blady [1912] 2 KB 89 at 92. The other dicta for or against the competency of the accused’s spouse in treason are collected in H Cohen, Spouse–Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 1913, p 23. 15 R v Wakefield (1827) 2 Lew CC 279. 16 Reeve v Wood (1864) 5 B & S 364 at 369 (KB). 17 R v Serjeant (1826) Ry & Mood 352 at 355. 18 Riddle v R (1911) 12 CLR 622; Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1979] AC 474; cf R v Lapworth [1931] 1 KB 117; Sharp v Rodwell [1947] VLR 82; Harris v Markham [1975] WAR 93 (FC). 19 On voir dire issues see K D Stephens, Voir Dire Law 1997, Ch 4. 20 Curry v Walter (1796) 1 Esp 456 (Erskine declined to testify). See [13300]. 21 R v Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199 (KB). 22 R v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288 at 291; R v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190; followed in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1993) (1994) 4Tas R 26 (FC); R v Bellamy (1985) 82 Cr App R 222 (adult with child’s mental age);R v X (1989) 91 Cr App R 36 at 41.R v Hayes was doubted in R v Cooper (2007) 175 A Crim R 94 at [44]. 23 Hence the importance of the court properly informing itself as to the capacity of the witness to be sworn. When the local legislation permits the witness to give unsworn evidence there is often a requirement for corroboration, so that the court’s direction to the jury will vary depending upon whether the evidence is sworn or unsworn: [15030]. See eg Domonic v R (1985) 14 A Crim R 418 (WASC). 24 Evidence Act 1977 s 9B(2). See R v Chalmers [2013] 2 Qd R 175. Expert evidence is admissible: s 9C. Special principles are stated for dealing with child witnesses, sworn or unsworn (s 9E) and child witnesses who are not defendants (ss 21AA–21A). 25 Evidence Act 1906 s 106B(1). See R v Revesz (1996) 88 A Crim R 253 (WA CCA) (inquiry to be in presence of jury). See R v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546. 26 Evidence Act 1929 s 9. It has been said that the modern approach is not to be overcautious about the evidence of children: Nichols v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232 at [35]. The judge may question the child or take into account evidence given, or statements or depositions prepared, by the child elsewhere; counsel for the prosecution may ask questions: R v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81 (CCA). 27 R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 (CCA); R v J, AP (2012) 113 SASR 529. See also R v French (2012) 114 SASR 287.
28 Hence the importance of the court properly informing itself as to the capacity of the witness to
be sworn. When the local legislation permits the witness to give unsworn evidence there is often a requirement for corroboration, so that the court’s direction to the jury will vary depending upon whether the evidence is sworn or unsworn: [15030]. See eg Domonic v R (1985) 14 A Crim R 419 (WA SC). 29 R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 at 124 (CCA); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (2002) 217 ALR 716. 30 Evidence Act 1977 s 9C. In England expert evidence has been held inadmissible: G v DPP [1998] QB 919. In South Australia it has been admitted: R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489. 31 R v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15 (FC); R v Garvey [1987] 2 Qd R 623; R v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81 (CCA). 32 R v Whitehead (1866) LR 1 CCR 33 (17-year-old deaf mute); De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 at 8 (FC). See also Stone v Blackburn (1793) 1 Esp 37; Jacobs v Layborn (1843) 11 M & W 685 (Exch) (incompetence through interest); R v Hampshire [1996] QB 1 at 4–5 and 7 (CA). 33 R v Keightley (1893) 14 LR NSW (L) 45 (FC); Turner v Pearte (1787) 1 TR 717 (KB) (incompetence through interest); Gray v Macallum (1892) 2 BCR 104 at 109;R v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 at 283 (CCA); cf at 272. 34 Sells v Hoare (1822) 3 Br & B 232 (CP) (Jew swearing on Gospels — see [13275]); Dewdney v Palmer (1839) 4 M & W 664 (Exch) (incompetence through interest). 35 Brunsgard v Jennings [1974] WAR 36. 36 See also Cheers v Porter (1931) 46 CLR 521. 37 Section 13(3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). See ALRC 102 at [4.29]–[4.89]. 38 Section 13(5) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). See RA v R (2007) 175 A Crim R 221 (leaving open the question of whether the competence of a child whose evidence in chief is given by a recording tendered under s 9(1) of the Evidence (Children) Act 1997 (NSW) (see now Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306S(1)) is to be determined by reference to the date of the recording or the date of the tender). See also SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258. 39 SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258 at [6] and [8]. 40 SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258 at [35]. 41 R v Muller (2013) 178 ACTR 1 at [2]–[3], [41], [44] and [49]. 42 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 9(1). See R v J, AP (2012) 113 SASR 529. According to R v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 (CCA) the sole determinant of capacity is whether the witness has sufficient understanding of the obligation to be truthful; that if the presumption as to capacity is not rebutted, witnesses can either take an oath or make an affirmation as they choose; that determination of whether the witness has sufficient understanding of the obligation to be truthful is to be considered without regard to whether the evidence is given on oath or affirmation; that the witness is not required to choose between oath and affirmation before the s 9(1) determination is made; and that s 9(1) contemplates an understanding that in giving sworn evidence the person is thereby accepting the solemnity of the taking of an oath or the making of an affirmation and the sanctions which would follow, morally and legally, if that person failed to comply with the obligation to tell the truth. See also R v Pascoe (2004) 90 SASR 505. 43 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 9(3). 44 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 9A(2). 45 Evidence Act s 106C. See also s 100A (a person may give evidence not on oath or affirmation where the person does not understand the nature of, or the obligation imposed by, an oath or affirmation, but does understand the requirement to speak the truth and the liability to punishment if that requirement is not complied with).
46 Oaths Act s 25A. 47 At the time of the trial: R v GR [2006] 1 Qd R 185. 48 Evidence Act 1977 s 93A. See [35410]. It follows that the maker must be competent to give
evidence; it is not enough that the maker be alive and well and in the jurisdiction: R v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546 at [40]. Under the section in an earlier form, the cases have held as follows. The court has a discretion to regulate proceedings so that attempts are made to obtain the child’s evidence orally: R v T [1993] 1 Qd R 454 at 456–7 (CCA). See also R v Cowie; Ex parte A-G [1994] 1 Qd R 326 (FC); Horan v Ferguson [1995] 2 Qd R 490; R v Morris; Ex parte A-G [1996] 2 Qd R 68 (CA); R v Griffin [1998] 1 Qd R 659 (CA). The question whether the discretion under s 98 or s 130 to exclude a statement otherwise satisfying the requirements of s 93A should be exercised will almost always turn on reliability: R v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49 (CA); R v D (2003) 141 A Crim R 471. 49 Evidence Act 1906 s 106H. 50 Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 s 5. 51 R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 (CCA); RJ v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 174. 52 R v Meier (1982) 30 SASR 126 (CCA). 53 Compare R v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 at 160 and R v Wright (1987) 90 Cr App R 91 at 94–5 with R v Z [1990] 2 QB 355 at 360–1 (CA). 54 R v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254 (CCCR). In R v Bellamy (1985) 82 Cr App R 222 it was held appropriate to test the competence of an adult complainant with a child’s mental age as if she were a child. 55 R v Whitehead (1866) LR 1 CCR 33. Cf Jacobs v Layborn (1843) 11 M & W 685 (Exch). It was held in People (Attorney-General) v Keating [1953] IR 200 (CCA) that the judge must examine the witness although he or she has previously examined the same witness in a previous case: Ranieri v Ranieri (1973) 7 SASR 418. Cf as to children R v Surgenor [1940] 2 All ER 249 (CCA). In R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 it was held that a child victim’s memory may have become irretrievably contaminated by what was said to her during hypnosis, and her evidence was excluded as a matter of discretion, since admission would have imperilled the fairness of the trial. 56 R v Spencer [1985] QB 771 (CA). Cf R v Bagshaw [1984] 1 All ER 971 (CA). 57 See ALRC 38 cl 19(3), Appendix A, [31]; see also ALRC 26 [521]. See also ALRC 102 [4.29]– [4.89]. 58 R v Mac Pherson [2006] 1 Cr App R 30 at [27]. 59 See also Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) s 55 (prosecutor must provide competent interpreter if witness does not seek, or fails, to do so). 60 See, on a related topic, [3140]. 61 See [13055]. 62 See [17480]. 63 That the accused be present and that evidence be given orally. See [17170]. As to the right of an accused person to have the prosecution witnesses attend the trial and give oral testimony in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 14.3(D)(e) see Astill v R (1992) 63 A Crim R 148 at 157 (NSW CCA); R v West [1992] 1 Qd R 227 (FC). Even at common law there is power to order that the accused sit out of the sight of the complainant while the latter testifies (R v Smellie (1919) 14 Cr App R 128) or that there be a screen between witnesses and accused (R v DJX (1990) 91 Cr App R 36; BUSB v R (2011) 80 NSWLR 170 (ASIO witnesses)). In relation to cross-examination, see R v E [2012] Crim LR 563 (CA); R v Wills [2012] Crim LR 565 (CA); A Keane, “Towards a Principled Approach to the Cross-examination of Vulnerable Witnesses” [2012] Crim LR 407. On intermediaries, see R (AS) v Great Yarmouth Youth Court [2012] Crim LR 478. 64 For discussion of an earlier version of this provision in relation to a jury request to play the videotape, see R v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628. 65 R v MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204. See generally Clark v R (2008) 185 A Crim R 1 at [23]–[86].
66 See R v Samson (2011) 221 A Crim R 295. 67 Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208 at [93]–[96]. Depending on the circumstances, it may be
necessary to give the jury a warning about giving the evidence excessive weight: at [96] and [115]. See also R v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462; R v Sardar (Aamir) [2012] Crim LR 618 (CA). 68 R v Ryan (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384 at [32] (dealing in contrast with a taped prior inconsistent statement). 69 R v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; R v MBE (2008) 191 A Crim R 264. 70 See R v Griffis (1996) 67 SASR 170 at 176–8 (FC); Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1997) (1998) 98 A Crim R 544 (FC); R v WS (2000) 78 SASR 33 (CCA). 71 An earlier version of s 21B was considered in R v Manager (2006) 18 NTLR 206. See now R v SG (2011) 250 FLR 337. 72 Part 4 Div 4.2A is not inconsistent with the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): R v Zuber (2010) 175 ACTR 1. 73 Where the accused is a corporation it would seem that this rule does not render an officer of the corporation incompetent: R v Wright [1980] VR 593 (FC). 74 Evidence Act 1939 s 9(1) and (2)(a). 75 An example of the rule being contravened by consent (impermissibly, since s 190(1)(a) precludes dispensation with it) is Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (2010) 239 CLR 531. 76 Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(a). 77 Evidence Act 1929 s 18. 78 Evidence Act 1977 s 8. 79 R v Payne (1872) LR 1 CCR 349. See also R v Richardson (1967) 51 Cr App R 381 and R M Gooderson, “The Evidence of Co-prisoners” (1953) 11 CLJ 209. 80 R v Grant [1944] 2 All ER 311; R v Sharrock [1948] 1 All ER 145. 81 R v Payne [1950] 1 All ER 102 (CCA). Cf Chan Wai-Keung v R [1995] 2 All ER 438 (PC); R v Palmer (1994) 99 Cr App R 83. 82 R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 at 171–6 (CCA) following R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 at 78–9 in disapproving R v Pipe (1967) 51 Cr App R 17. As to the co-accused called by the prosecution who is reluctant to give evidence, see R v Lawless (1993) 98 Cr App R 342. The significance of the rule of practice that accomplices should be sentenced before being called to give evidence for the Crown has been qualified by the capacity of the Crown to obtain a review of an accomplice’s sentence which has been reduced because of assistance to the authorities in the event that the accomplice fails to fulfil an undertaking to give evidence: R v Ambrosi (2004) 144 A Crim R 67 at [15]–[17]. 83 R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 at 79; R v Weightman [1978] 1 NZLR 79 at 81–2; R v Condren [2003] 3 NZLR 702 (CA). However, any discretionary exclusion on grounds of unreliability, if it exists at all, would normally depend on the prejudicial effect of the evidence exceeding its probative value, and would only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, according to Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 at 549 and 559, discussing R v Falzon [1990] 2 Qd R 436; R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 231 (FC); Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 at 460; R v Peirce [1992] 1 VR 273; R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 (CCA). See also R v Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543 at 547–8. Similar principles apply to financial inducements relating to testimony: R v Kennedy [2004] 3 NZLR 189 (CA). 84 R v Taylor [1999] 2 Cr App R 163 at 171. 85 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 8(1); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8; NT: Evidence Act 1939 s 9. See also s 12 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 86 Even after a plea of guilty the accused may give evidence in mitigation of sentence: R v Wheeler [1917] 1 KB 283 (CCA). The accused may also give evidence on the voir dire: R v Cowell [1940] 2 KB 49; Ex parte Hamilton; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732.
87 See [23015]–[23040] (comment), [23150]–[23415] (cross-examination) and [25190]–[25200]
(marital communications). 88 See eg Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 (PC), discussed at [19155] below. 89 R v Rudd (1948) 32 Cr App R 138. To the same effect are R v Hunting (1908) 1 Cr App R 177; R v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 (CCA); R v Garland (1941) 29 Cr App R 46 and Young v HM Advocate 1932 SC (J) 63. It was assumed that one co-accused’s testimony was evidence against the other in Rigby v Woodward [1957] 1 All ER 391. 90 This is on account of the rule against hearsay, but see Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454 (PC). 91 R v Rudd (1948) 32 Cr App R 138 at 140. 92 For a ruling that comes near to telling the jury to disregard the evidence of one co-accused when considering the case against the other see R v Meredith (1943) 29 Cr App R 40. 93 R v Burdett (1855) Dears 431 (CCCR). 94 R v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 (CCA), criticised in Young v HM Advocate 1932 SC (J) 63. 95 R v Boal [1965] 1 QB 402 at 415 (CCA). 96 R v Richardson (1967) 51 Cr App R 381. 97 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421 (CA). See I G Carvell, “The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(f)(iii)” [1965] Crim LR 419; [23370] ff. 98 R v Thompson (1872) LR 1 CCR 377. 99 R v Mount (1934) 24 Cr App R 135; R v Boucher (1952) 36 Cr App R 152. 100 Moss v Moss [1963] 2 QB 799 (DC of QBD). 101 R v Blanchard [1952] 1 All ER 114. 102 R v Verolla [1963] 1 QB 285. For further authorities on the common law exception see Lord Audley’s Case (1631) 3 S Tr 401 (husband accessory to rape of wife, wife competent); R v Jagger (1796) 1 East PC 455; R v Pearce (1840) 9 Car & P 667; Reeve v Wood (1864) 5 B & S 364 (QB) (wilful neglect to maintain); Director of Public Prosecutions v Blady [1912] 2 KB 89 (DC of QBD) (husband living on wife’s immoral earnings incompetent). 103 Cf R v Yeo [1951] 1 All ER 864. See O Stone, “When a Wife May Testify” (1951) 14 MLR 341. 104 On the test of the nature of the charge as distinct from the supporting evidence, a wife would be an incompetent witness for the prosecution at her husband’s trial for dangerous driving, even if she had sustained personal injuries: cf Parson v Tomlin (1956) 120 JP 129; Sharp v Rodwell [1947] VLR 82. 105 Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1979] AC 474. 106 R v Deacon [1973] 2 All ER 1145 (CA). 107 Leach v R [1912] AC 305 at 311. 108 R v L [2009] 1 WLR 626 (CA). 109 Evidence Act 1977 s 8(2). 110 On the obscurity of s 19, see LS v DPP (NSW) (2011) 81 NSWLR 551. 111 Evidence Act 2001 ss 18–19. 112 Evidence Act 1929 s 21. This provision extends to every proceeding before any court: Evidence Act 1929 s 5, including a proceeding under the Community Welfare Act 1972: Priestwood v Shuttleworth (1985) 39 SASR 125. See generally R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442. 113 Probably the witness is not entitled to legal representation; the judge should explain to the witnesses the right to such exemption; it is not sufficient that counsel for one or other of the parties has done so: Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43. 114 Where the prospective witness is a young child or mentally impaired, the court must consider whether an order should be made, notwithstanding that no application has been made: s 21(3A). 115 R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 at 476 (CCA); R v T, T (2004) 90 SASR 567 at [94]–[95]. 116 Riddle v R (1911) 12 CLR 622 at 630–1; R v Pitt [1983] QB 25 (CA). 117 Nadler v Police (SA) (2008) 187 A Crim R 347.
118 Evidence Act 1906 s 9(1). The expression “repealed Code section” is defined in s 9(6). 119 Evidence Act 1906 s 9(2). 120 See ALRC 102 [4.90]–[4.117]. 121 There is no direct authority on several points. Darling J evidently considered that there were
cases in which the accused’s spouse is not a compellable defence witness and he must have had in mind cases coming within s 1 of the Act of 1898. See R v Acaster (1912) 7 Cr App R 187, where Darling J said that he would warn a wife that she could not be obliged to give evidence when called by her husband in any case in which she is not a compellable witness. An argument in favour of compellability for the defence on charges of personal violence against a spouse could be based on the principle of reciprocity mentioned in R v Serjeant (1826) Ry & Mood 352. 122 R v Thompson (1872) LR 1 CCR 377. 123 Evidence Act 1977 s 8(2). 124 Evidence Act 1929 ss 18 and 21. 125 The spouse, as a close relative of the accused, has a right to seek exemption: see [13165]. 126 Cf s 18(1)(b) (prohibition on prosecution commenting on failure of accused to give evidence). 127 Evidence Act 1906 s 9(1). 128 See DJF v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 412. 129 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 12; Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 7; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 12; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 12; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 12;Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 12; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 16;WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 7; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 12; NT: Evidence Act 1939 s 7; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 12. 130 Monroe v Twisleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219 may be thought to imply that, so far as all matters preceding the divorce are concerned, a divorced spouse was in the same position at common law with regard to competence as a party’s present spouse who was incompetent to testify to matters occurring after the marriage. See [13030] and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 (CA). 131 The rule of incompetence does not apply to matters occurring before the marriage: R v Ash (1981) 81 Cr App R 294. 132 R v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279 (CCA). See R v Cooper (No 2) (1974) 51 DLR (3d) 315 (HC Ont). See also the dicta in Moss v Moss [1963] 2 QB 799 (DC of QBD). The statement may also have less force in those jurisdictions where the spouse is competent for the prosecution in all criminal cases, since R v Algar would not be directly in point. For criticism, see Anon [1959] Crim LR 685 and Cross on Evidence, 6th Aust ed, 2000, at [13240]. 133 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 (CA); Meagher JA dissented. 134 Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 (CA). 135 This aspect of the decision was neither approved nor disapproved by the House of Lords in Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814. 136 The case was mentioned, although its present status was not considered, in Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814. 137 See [13240] n 133. To obviate the effect of O’Connor v Marjoribanks (1842) 4 Man & G 435 (CP) the words must also be taken to include a widow or widower testifying to matters occurring during the marriage when proceedings are brought against his or her deceased spouse’s estate. The problems were discussed in more detail in Cross on Evidence, 6th Aust ed, 2000, at [13245]. 138 Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 (CA). 139 For example: Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth) ss 11 and 12, article 38 in the Schedule to the Act; Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1972 (Cth) ss 10 and 11. 140 Which includes a reference to the person for the time being administering the Government of the Commonwealth: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 16A(a). 141 Which includes any person who is, for the time being, the chief executive officer or
administrator of the Government of the State: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 16B. 142 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 ss 83–91 (books of account of any business); SA: Evidence Act 1929 ss 46–51;WA: Evidence Act 1906 ss 89–96. See [35335]–[35340]. 143 Seyfang v G D Searle & Co [1973] QB 148; Lively Ltd v City of Munich [1976] 3 All ER 851 at 857. 144 Re Application of Forsyth; Cordova v Philips Roxane Laboratories Inc [1984] 2 NSWLR 327. 145 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 3 All ER 177 (CA); Connolly v Dale [1996] QB 120 at 126 (CA); Re L (a minor) (police investigation: privilege) [1997] AC 16 at 25 and 34 (“there is no property in a witness”). See also [25235]. 146 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 3 All ER 177 at 182 (CA). 147 A A S Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice, 2nd ed, 2006, [20.23]. 148 See Astill v R (1992) 63 A Crim R 148 at 157 (NSW CCA). Hence there is at common law no power in the court to permit evidence to be given over the telephone in a criminal case: R v Diane [2010] 2 Cr App R 1; R v Hampson [2014] 1 Cr App R 4. 149 See eg Cth: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 35A, applied in Federal Cmr of Taxation v Grbich (1993) 31 ALD 97 (Fed C of A); Cth: Crimes Act 1914 ss 50EA–50EG; SA: Evidence Act 1929 ss 59IA–59IP. 150 Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisors Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 655 at 657. See too Cth: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 ss 27, 47A(1); Vic: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 9H; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 59E(4);WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 110; and B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95. 151 R v Accused [1992] 1 NZLR 257 at 262–3 (CA). 152 Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 at 224–5. 153 Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 at 225. But see B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 at 108. 154 B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95; Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 (power to make an order doubted, but order would have been refused in any event). 155 B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 at 109–10. 156 Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisors Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 655. 157 Bayer AG v Minister for Health (Cth) (1988) 96 FLR 50 at 116. 158 In Henderson v SBS Realisations Ltd (CA(UK), Lord Donaldson MR, 13 April 1992, unreported, but noted by M Dockray, “Evidence by Television” (1992) 108 LQR 561 at 563) Lord Donaldson MR said that a “videolink is, for all practical purposes, very much the same as hearing evidence in court”. 159 Bayer AG v Minister for Health (Cth) (1988) 96 FLR 50 at 116. 160 M Dockray, “Evidence by Television” (1992) 108 LQR 561 at 563 asserts that, for this reason, as well as for the fact that it provides an inferior opportunity to cross-examine and to observe the demeanour of the witness, evidence of this nature should be regarded as hearsay. It is submitted that this analysis cannot be correct. See Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 186; B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 at 109. 161 See Ventouris v Mountain (No 2) (The Italia Express) [1992] 3 All ER 414 (CCA). 162 See M Dockray, “Evidence by Television” (1992) 108 LQR 561 at 563. 163 As in B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95. 164 As in Bayer AG v Minister for Health (Cth) (1988) 96 FLR 50 at 116. 165 These may be relevant to the exercise of discretion to order the giving of evidence in this way. 166 Qld: Oaths Act 1867 s 32; NSW:Oaths Act 1900 s 11A; Vic: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 100; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 6(1) (s 6(1)(a) permits a Jewish oath: R v Climas (Question of Law Reserved) (1999) 74 SASR 411); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 97; NT: Oaths Act 1939 s 24. See M Weinberg, “The Law of Testimonial Oaths and Affirmations” (1977) 3 Mon LR 25; B Chen, “Diminution and Secularisation of Oaths in Australian Courts” (2013) 37 Aust
Bar Rev 291. 167 R v Chapman [1980] Crim LR 42 (CA); R v Kemble [1990] 3 All ER 116 (CA); R v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 (CCA) (citing R v McIlree (1866) 3WW & A’B (L) 32; R v Ah Foo (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 343 (FC)). 168 R v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81 (CCA). 169 Oaths Act 1867 s 17. See also s 18 (Quakers and Moravians), s 19 (separatists) and s 37 (objection to oath or incapacity to understand its nature). 170 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 ss 21 and 23–24;Vic: Evidence Act 2008 ss 21 and 23–24; ACT: Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984 ss 7, 14 and 17; NSW: Oaths Act 1900 ss 12 and 13; Evidence Act 1995 ss 21 and 23-24; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 ss 21 and 23–24; Oaths Act 2001 s 16; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 6(3);WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 99; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 ss 21 and 23–24; NT: Oaths, Affidavits and Declarations Act 2010 ss 5 and 11. In relation to SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 6(3), R v Climas (Question of Law Reserved) (1999) 74 SASR 411 (CCA) establishes that it is for the witness to choose between an oath and an affirmation, that there is no room for intervention by the court apart from providing the information necessary to assist the witness in making the choice, and that the court need not determine whether the person has sufficient understanding of an oath or affirmation before making the choice. 171 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82 at [26]. 172 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31 at [6]. 173 R v Pritam Singh [1958] 1 All ER 199. 174 New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. In Queensland, a witness who claims a religious belief cannot be allowed to affirm: see Oaths Act 1867 ss 17–18. See also R v Moore (1892) 61 LJMC 80, for the court’s duty of investigation before a person is permitted to affirm. 175 Thus s 24(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) provides that an oath is effective even if the person who took it did not have a religious belief or a religious belief of a particular kind, or did not understand the nature and consequences of the oath. See also NT: Oaths Act 1939 s 24(c);WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 100. Section 24A(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) provides that a person may take an oath even if the person’s religious or spiritual beliefs do not include a belief in the existence of a god, and s 24A(2) provides that despite anything to the contrary in the Act, the form of oath taken by a person need not include a reference to a god, and may instead refer to the basis of the person’s beliefs in accordance with a form prescribed by the regulations. 176 Lord Shaftsbury v Lord Digby (1676) Freem KB 422 (KB); R v Marsham; Ex parte Pethick Lawrence [1912] 2 KB 362 (DC of KBD); R v Brown [1977] Qd R 220 (CCA); R v Sossi [1986] WAR 163 at 167 (CCA); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1987) (1987) 46 SASR 275 (CCA); R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 (CCA). The default was cured by acquiescence in Andrews v Armitt (1971) 1 SASR 178 (FC). 177 R v Mehrbah (Razia) [2002] 1 Cr App R 561. 178 R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113 at [105]–[107]. 179 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284. 180 See [23055]. 181 The various statutes authorising the procedure are listed and discussed in [13060] above. As to the requirements for corroboration of this evidence, see [15030] ff below. 182 See [15160]. This warning will have to avoid the prohibitions contained in legislation of the type mentioned in [15140]. 183 R v Whittingham (1988) 49 SASR 67 at 69 (CCA). 184 See [13060]. 185 See [13060]. 186 Evidence Act 1906 s 100A(5) (WA). Section 13 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW),
2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) makes no provision on this topic. 187 See [15160]. See also ss 164–165 of the Evidence Acts (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 188 Perry v Gibson (1834) 1 Ad & E 48 (KB). See also Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 21(3); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 21(3);Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 21(3); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 21(3); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 21(3); Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) s 21(3). 189 Questions may be asked of the witness to determine whether the order of the court has been complied with: Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306 at 312. 190 See the cases discussed in R E Megarry, A Second Miscellany-at-law, 1973, pp 92–3. 191 Hickman v Berens [1895] 2 Ch 638 (CA). 192 Wilding v Sanderson [1897] 2 Ch 534 at 539 n 6. 193 Pioneer Concrete (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd v Cassidy (No 2) [1969] Qd R 290. 194 For the NT, see Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 21. 195 There are obvious ethical objections to an advocate acting as a witness in a case in which the advocate is professionally engaged (R v Secretary of State for India; Ex parte Ezekiel [1941] 2 KB 169 (DC of KBD)), at least on any seriously disputed question, but it would probably be going too far to say that the advocate is never a competent witness in such circumstances (Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) [1974] Ch 269 at 283–4); though it was held in Stones v Byron (1846) 4 Dowl & L 393 at 395 that the evidence ought not to have been received, the case was regarded as a very special one in Cobbett v Hudson (1852) 1 El & Bl 11 (QB). If it can be foreseen that the advocate will be called, the advocate should not act (Chapman v Rogers; Ex parte Chapman [1984] 1 Qd R 542 at 544–5); if the advocate has to be called in unforeseeable circumstances, whether the advocate continues to act would depend on an appreciation of the effect of this on the client’s interests. A stricter view was taken in R v Jaquith [1989] Crim LR 508 and 563 (CA): it was said that if the advocate gives evidence, that advocate could take no further part in the trial. See also R v Brice (1819) 2 B & Ald 606 (KB); Hutchinson v Davis [1940] NZLR 490 at 506 (CA). In a case in which he ordered a solicitor to cease acting, Brereton J said: “It is generally undesirable for a practitioner who is aware that he is likely to be called as a witness, other than in relation to formal or non-contentious issues, to continue to act. If a practitioner’s credibility is at stake as a witness, his personal integrity may be put in issue and that may constitute a personal interest inconsistent with the practitioner’s duty to the court or to the client.”: Kallinicos v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 561 at [87]; Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) (2011) 195 FCR 43 at [97]–[98]. See also Sheahan v Northern Australia Land & Agency Co Pty Ltd (1994) 176 LSJS 257.
[page 465]
Chapter Eight Corroboration
Section 1 — When Corroboration is Required A — INTRODUCTION Background [15001] Preliminary The general rule of the law of evidence is that the court may act upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, and such requirements as there are concerning a plurality of witnesses, or some other confirmation of individual testimony, are exceptional. This does not mean that the court must act upon the evidence of one witness, even if it is unshaken in crossexamination, and in no way discredited by the witness’s demeanour.1 To quote Sir James Fitzjames Stephen:2 The circumstances may be such that there is no check on the witness, and no power to obtain any further evidence on the subject. Under these circumstances juries may, and often do, acquit. They may very reasonably say, We do not attach such credit to the oath of a single person, of whom we know nothing, as to be willing to destroy another person on the strength of it. This case arises where the fact deposed to is a passing occurrence — such as a verbal confession or a sexual crime — leaving no trace behind it, except in the memory of an eye or ear-witness … The justification of this is, that the power of lying is unlimited, the causes of lying and delusion are numerous, and many of them are unknown, and the means of detection are limited.
It was to meet situations such as those which have just been mentioned that the judges developed rules of practice under which juries must be warned of the dangers of convicting on uncorroborated evidence. These rules are discussed in this section, together with the statutory provisions under which corroboration in some form or other is required as a matter of law. Section 2 is concerned with the nature of corroboration and what does and does not constitute corroboration in the legal sense of the term. Section 3 deals with the radical changes in the law effected by the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT).
[page 466]
[15005] Contrast with canon and civil law One of the great differences between the modern law of evidence and that prescribed by the canon or civil law, which usually applied the maxim testis unus testis nullus, consists in the absence of any general requirement of a plurality of witnesses. More than one oath helper was required when compurgation was among the standard methods of trial. English law started with something like the requirements of a number of witnesses such as were demanded by the canon law under the influence of Roman law, although the compurgators were of course quite unlike the modern witness. The two systems diverged more or less completely when the English jury trial began to assume its present form in the seventeenth century. Before that period, the jurors were themselves witnesses, rather than triers, of fact, so there was a sense in which it could be said that more than one witness was always necessary at a common law trial. And it is of some significance that Coke maintained that more than one witness was necessary in proceedings without a jury, as where the validity of challenges fell to be determined. Moreover, it is worth noting that, as the jurors ceased to resemble the modern witness, some efforts to impose rules requiring two or more witnesses were made by statute; but provisions of this nature were never generalised, and they are now of no importance.3 In all the situations which are about to be discussed except the first, the required corroboration will not necessarily consist in the testimony of a second witness. It will often take this form, but an admission or real evidence or admissible documentary hearsay, for example, will also suffice.
B — STATUTORY PROVISIONS Range of enactments [15010] Preliminary As a general rule, where corroboration is essential as a matter of law, rather than being merely desirable as a matter of practice, this arises because of a statutory provision. Only in the case of perjury is the requirement for corroboration applied as part of the common law. That
requirement is not affected by the abolition of corroboration requirements by the legislation modelled on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).4 Some jurisdictions have express statutory provisions requiring corroboration.5 Others have abolished it.6 There is no common law requirement that DNA evidence be corroborated.7 [page 467]
[15015] Statutes requiring two or more witnesses A few English criminal statutes that are still in force in Australian States provide that the accused can only be convicted on the oath of two or more credible witnesses. These include the Blasphemy Act 1697 and the Places of Religious Worship Act 1812, dealing with the disturbance of religious meetings. These provisions are of no practical importance from the point of view of the general law of evidence.
[15020] Perjury At common law a person was not liable to be convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury solely upon the evidence of one witness as to the falsity of any statement alleged to be false.8 Queensland, Tasmania and the Northern Territory have embodied the common law rule in statute.9 The rule is strictly confined to proof of the falsity of the statement.10 And corroboration is not needed if the crime is proved otherwise than by the evidence of a witness.11 A second witness to the falsity of the impugned statement is, however, not essential. A letter, the authenticity of which is duly proved or admitted, and which might be construed as a subornation to someone else to commit perjury in relation to the same matter, will suffice.12 A clear admission of the falsity of the impugned statement by the accused would, of course, also suffice,13 but if all that is proved is that the accused contradicted the impugned statement, there is not enough evidence to support a conviction. Nothing more is established than that one of two allegations made by the accused is untrue. Additional evidence, such as the repetition of the contradiction of the impugned statement on a number of occasions to different people, will, however, be sufficient.14 A business record will be sufficient, provided it was prepared independently
of the witness to be corroborated.15 The court is obliged to warn of the need for corroboration and of the need to assess the quality of the evidence relied on as corroboration.16
[15025] Procuration Those statutory provisions17 which punish such offences as procuration for the purpose of prostitution sometimes provide that no person shall be convicted of any offence under them upon the evidence of one witness, unless the witness be [page 468] corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused. The requirement that the corroborating evidence must implicate the accused “in a material particular” is characteristic of several statutory provisions as well as the common law rules of practice on the subject. As will be explained more fully in the discussion of the evidence of accomplices, it is not enough that that which is relied on should confirm any part of the testimony of the witness to be corroborated, it must do so in relation to that part of the testimony which implicates the accused.18
[15030] Unsworn evidence of children: reliability? As was seen at [13060] children are allowed to give unsworn evidence in certain criminal and civil cases provided they are of sufficient intelligence and understand the duty of speaking the truth. In some jurisdictions, where a child of tender years or a person with impaired mental functioning gives unsworn evidence the court is prohibited from warning or suggesting to the jury that such persons are an unreliable class of witness.19 In South Australia where unsworn evidence in a jury trial is given the judge must explain to the jury the reason why the evidence is unsworn and may, and if a party so requests, must, warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it.20 In other jurisdictions, in a jury trial, the judge may be obliged to direct the jury that the reliability of the evidence may be affected by
youth.21
[15035] Unsworn evidence of children: corroboration In former times there was a legislative requirement that the unsworn evidence of children had to be corroborated. On a very literal construction of the legislation, it might have meant that, if a child gave unsworn uncorroborated evidence, there could not be a conviction whatever the other evidence in the case may have been. If this were the right view, a conviction of burglary based on the sworn evidence of two adults that they saw the accused enter a house empty-handed and emerge from it carrying a bag full of silver, together with the uncorroborated evidence of an unsworn child that the accused gave the child a silver spoon proved to belong to the householder, would had to have been quashed. “So preposterous an intention cannot reasonably be ascribed to Parliament.”22 On a broad construction, the legislation meant that all that was required was corroboration of the evidence of the unsworn child by other material evidence from any source, including another unsworn child. The House of Lords held that “other material evidence” meant evidence admitted otherwise than by virtue of the section.23 In the words of [page 469] Viscount Dilhorne, “the effect … is to secure that no person is liable to be convicted solely on unsworn testimony”.24 The House thus confirmed a dictum,25 which had not gone unchallenged, to the effect that, as a matter of law, the unsworn evidence of one child might corroborate the sworn evidence of another, or vice versa.
[15040] Unsworn evidence of children: ban on mutual corroboration? The decision of the House of Lords is of some theoretical interest in relation to corroboration in general because it gets rid of a supposed ban on what had come to be called “mutual corroboration”.26 Opposition to “mutual corroboration” was questionable. Suppose you
believe what A says, but think at the same time that it would be dangerous to act on it without confirmation, because A is young, and you think that young persons tend to be inaccurate and over-imaginative. Suppose you hear similar evidence from B who is also a young person. Suppose you believe what B says also, but you treat this evidence with similar caution. It is neither illogical nor nonsensical to treat the evidence of B as a matter which would entitle you to act on A’s evidence with more confidence than might be the case if it stood alone. Of course there can be no question of looking for corroboration of evidence which you do not believe or of finding corroboration in such evidence. To quote Lord Morris of Borth-yGest, “The essence of corroborative evidence is that one creditworthy witness confirms what another creditworthy witness has said”.27
[15045] Affiliation: general Under certain statutes relating to affiliation,28 the court may make an affiliation order against the putative father if the evidence of the mother is corroborated in some material particular to its satisfaction. In Victoria and South Australia corroboration is not necessary where the alleged father fails to deny on oath that he is the father of the child or that the woman is pregnant by him. The requirement applies only to evidence of the mother. An order can, therefore, be made on uncorroborated evidence, in the unlikely event of paternity being proved without evidence from the mother. It is difficult to say more by way of generalisation with regard to the nature of the corroboration required in affiliation proceedings, than that it must implicate the alleged putative father in a material particular.29 His admitted intercourse30 or acts of familiarity with the child’s mother31 have been held to amount to corroboration although they took place some time before conception.32 The fact that he and the woman were intimately associated during the period in which conception must have occurred, being seen together in public, has likewise been held sufficient in the absence of any evidence of the mother’s [page 470] association with other men.33 Attempts to suborn witnesses can amount to
corroboration,34 as may the making of false charges against the respondent of intercourse with other men.35 False denials of significant incidents deposed to by the mother may amount to corroboration of her testimony; a false denial of the opportunity of intercourse could, for instance, justify an inference that advantage was in fact taken of that opportunity.36 The mere fact of opportunity, as where the man and mother were seen together in a barn to which they had to resort in the course of their employment as farm-hands, will not suffice,37 any more than the fact that the man allowed the mother, who was his housekeeper, to remain in his house for five weeks after the birth of the child,38 or the fact that the man had falsely denied that he had had an interview with the mother some three months after the conception of the child. But the payment by the respondent of sums in support of the child is corroborative.39 Neither the respondent’s failure to give evidence nor the fact that his brother gave false evidence of intercourse with the mother corroborates her testimony,40 nor do the mother’s complaints to others about the conduct of the alleged putative father.41 Corroboration has been found in an entry in a hotel register coinciding with the date on which the mother alleged she and the putative father stayed together at the hotel.42 In each case, attention must be directed to the whole circumstances, including the alleged corroborative acts, to determine whether these acts produce a reasonable belief in the mind of the court that the mother is telling the truth.43
[15050] Affiliation: alleged father’s letters At one time, difficulty was experienced with regard to letters from the alleged putative father to the mother. If they can fairly be treated as an admission of paternity, or even of intercourse, they are the best possible corroboration provided their authenticity is duly proved. This can be effected by evidence of handwriting and there is no difficulty when the writing is admitted by the respondent, or proved by some witness other than the applicant; but what if hers is the only testimony as [page 471]
to the respondent’s handwriting? The authorities differ.44 Those favouring the view that she can prove the handwriting are open to the criticism that this is self-corroboration.45
[15055] Breach of promise of marriage In Queensland there must be corroboration in actions for breach of promise of marriage,46 so far as that cause of action may still exist.47 The defendant’s conduct towards the plaintiff may, of course, constitute corroboration, and it has been held that a man’s constant references to the plaintiff as his fiancée some time before the alleged engagement is sufficient.48 A letter from the defendant to the plaintiff may be construed as an admission of a promise to marry.49 The defendant’s failure to answer letters from the plaintiff or third parties referring to such a promise will generally not have this effect. The effect of a failure to reply to a letter depends on the answer to the question whether it would be reasonable to infer an admission of truth of its contents from this fact. In the words of Lord Esher MR: [M]ust it be taken, according to the ordinary practice of mankind, that if a man does not answer he admits the truth of the charge made against him? If it were so, life would be unbearable.50
In relation to oral dealings, Cave J said:51 Undoubtedly, when persons are speaking on even terms, and a charge is made, and the person charged says nothing, and expresses no indignation, and does nothing to repel the charge, that is some evidence to show that he admits the charge to be true.
The question whether silence is to be held to have this effect must depend for its answer on the facts of the particular case.52
[15060] Bigamy Section 94(7) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) provides as follows: In a prosecution for an offence against this section, the fact that, at the time of the alleged offence, a person was married shall not be taken to have been proved if the only evidence of the fact is the evidence of the other party to the alleged marriage.
[15065] Miscellaneous statutory provisions There are additional instances of statutory corroboration requirements. These include treason and like offences,53 as well as certain sexual offences and hearsay exceptions (see [35410]).
[page 472]
C — RULES OF PRACTICE Duties to warn [15070] General In the cases mentioned below, the dangers of coming to a conclusion on uncorroborated evidence have been stressed by the judges. At common law, which has been radically affected by statute in many jurisdictions, in some jurisdictions it is now settled or likely that, where there is a jury, the law requires the judge to give due warning of these dangers and an appeal will be allowed (subject to the proviso that the appellate tribunal may decide that no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred) if no warning is given. But judge and jury are alike entitled to act on uncorroborated evidence in each of the situations which are about to be mentioned. There are numerous other instances in which judges, in fact, commonly emphasise the dangers of accepting uncorroborated evidence,54 but this is done as a matter of discretion in the circumstances of particular cases. The English cases insisted that the trial judge was obliged to warn the jury even where there was corroborative testimony. They held that if the warning were not given in those circumstances the verdict would be quashed unless the proviso referred to above could be invoked to preserve it. In Australia the rule was more flexible, at least with respect to sexual cases. It was not the law that the jury was obliged to be given a specific warning that if they disbelieved the corroborating testimony they were obliged to be careful of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of the victim.55 Where the corroborating testimony was substantial and there was therefore no likelihood that the jury would reject it and therefore have to deal with the case on the basis of uncorroborated evidence, the raison d’être for the warning disappeared. It was clear, however, that in such cases it was desirable as a matter of prudence for the warning to be given for it was always possible that the jury, or an appellate court, might differ from the judge in assessment of the corroborative testimony.56
Accomplices57 [15075] Peremptory warning For reasons given at [15115], the common law rules about to be discussed concerning accomplice evidence have only limited direct application. The desirability of some form of corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice of the accused has been stressed at criminal trials from the first half of the nineteenth century, but, down to 1954, the English cases showed that two schools of thought existed on the subject. According to one school, it lay in the judge’s discretion whether the jury were warned of the desirability of corroboration. The other school insisted that the warning must be given. In 1954 the House of Lords in three propositions settled this point in favour of what may be described as the “peremptory” school. [page 473] First proposition: In a criminal trial where a person who is an accomplice gives evidence on behalf of the prosecution, it is the duty of the judge to warn the jury that, although they may convict upon his evidence, it is dangerous to do so unless it is corroborated. Second proposition: This rule, although a rule of practice, now has the force of a rule of law. Third proposition: Where the judge fails to warn the jury in accordance with this rule, the conviction will be quashed, even if in fact there be ample corroboration of the evidence of the accomplice, unless the appellate court can apply the proviso to s 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907.58
The proviso referred to is that whereby the appellate tribunal may dismiss an appeal on the ground that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. That passage appears to define the position at common law in Australia, with the clear exception of Victoria, where the rule was laid down as follows: [T]he practice of the court is to quash a conviction where part of the evidence against the accused has been that of an accomplice and where no proper warning as to the use of that evidence has been given, unless there was, apart from the evidence of the accomplice, substantial evidence implicating the applicant and upon which the jury could properly have convicted the applicant even if they had disregarded the evidence of the accomplice.59
On the question whether the warning must be given where it is against the accused’s interests, see [15100].
[15080] Evidence of co-accused The passage quoted above refers to an accomplice giving evidence on behalf of the prosecution. One of two co-prisoners may incriminate the other when giving evidence for the defence. The High Court has resolved a substantial conflict in the authorities by holding that in those circumstances an accomplice warning is not mandatory. The question whether a warning should be given and, if so, in what terms cannot be resolved without reference to the unique circumstances of each case.60
[15085] Who is an accomplice? The House of Lords held that an accomplice warning must be given with regard to the evidence of the following classes of witness when called by the Crown: (a) participes criminis in the actual crime charged, whether as principals and accessories before or after the fact61 in the case of felonies, or as persons committing, procuring, aiding or abetting a misdemeanour; [page 474] (b) receivers giving evidence at the trial of those alleged to have stolen the goods received by them; the relationship between thieves and receivers being that of “one-sided dependence” — there could not be a receiver unless the goods had first been stolen;62 (c) the parties to other crimes alleged to have been committed by the accused, when evidence of such crimes is received on the ground that it tends to prove something more than mere criminal propensity.63
[15090] Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions The leading case was one in which there was no evidence that the witness was an accomplice, so an appeal which was primarily based on the absence of a warning against the danger of acting on his testimony without
corroboration was dismissed. Davies was charged with murder by knifing the deceased. He and the witness were members of a gang who had assaulted the deceased. Assault was the offence for which the witness had been convicted, but the witness had desisted from the attack by the time the knife was used, and there was no evidence that he had previously been aware of Davies’ possession of such a weapon. Although the judgment embodies the previous case law on the question of who is an accomplice, it is arguable that the principle which underlies the rule that the warning must be given should cover all parties to the transaction in the course of which the crime is committed. The first class of accomplices above has been criticised as being too rigid having regard to the purpose of the warning. It has been held that the requirement that the witness be a participant “in respect of the actual crime charged” should be understood as including a participant in any other crime of which the accused might lawfully be convicted on the indictment.64 Moreover, Sholl J said: The temptation to exaggerate or make false accusations would appear to be much more related to the nature and possible punishment of the offence of the witness than to its technical identity with that alleged against the accused.
If he had been free to do so, Sholl J would have held the true principle to be: that person is an accomplice within the common law rule who is chargeable, in relation to the same events as those founding the charge against the accused, with an offence (whether the same offence or not) of such a character, and who would be if convicted thereof liable to such punishment, as might possibly tempt the person to exaggerate or fabricate evidence as to the guilt of the accused.65
[page 475] Nevertheless, in Australia the cases support an application of the House of Lords formulation,66 tempered somewhat by a readiness to recommend that in other analogous cases the trial judge should warn the jury of the dangers in too readily accepting the testimony in question. The mere fact that the witness has already been acquitted or convicted or has been granted immunity67 ought not to relieve the judge from the necessity of giving the warning, because the witness’s evidence at the earlier trial of the witness may have been affected by the considerations mentioned by Sholl J and it is likely that the witness would adhere to it on
a subsequent occasion.68 The House of Lords at least lends no countenance to the view that the fact that the witness has already been acquitted or convicted of the offence for which the prisoner is being tried can have any bearing on the question whether the warning should be given.
[15095] Non-accomplices An agent provocateur or spy is not an accomplice.69 The youthful victim of a sexual offence is not an accomplice, nor is a woman on whose immoral earnings the accused is charged with having lived.70 To be an accomplice it must be shown that the witness intentionally gave assistance and encouragement to the criminal activity of the accused. It is not sufficient to be a mere bystander, because a mere bystander is not at risk and therefore lacks the incentive falsely to implicate the accused which is the basis for the rule in question.71 Where the Crown case is that either the accused or the witness was the offender, the witness cannot be characterised as a “participant” in the accused’s crime, and hence no mandatory accomplice warning applies: but a warning may nonetheless be appropriate because of the witness’s self-exculpating motive and other circumstances.72 The House of Lords did not favour an extension of the meaning of “accomplice”. They did not suggest that thieves are to be regarded as the accomplices of receivers to whom stolen goods are passed on, and there are undoubtedly cases in which it would be wrong to treat the thief as an accomplice. For example, if A and B steal something and C is charged with receiving it from B, there may be good reason for treating B as C’s accomplice at C’s trial, but there would be no reason for treating A as C’s accomplice.73 Yet there seems to be every reason for treating the thief from [page 476] whom the accused receives goods as an accomplice in all cases,74 and some judgments support this approach.75
[15100] Functions of judge and jury The question whether a witness is an accomplice is often answered by the witness’s own confession or plea of guilty, or by the fact of conviction of the crime under consideration. Otherwise it is for the judge to rule whether there is evidence that the witness is an accomplice. The jury must decide whether this is so in fact, the judge having warned them against the danger of convicting on the witness’s uncorroborated evidence if they come to the conclusion that the witness was an accomplice.76 It seems that the trial judge might be faced with three possible situations. In the first place there may be no sufficient evidence that the witness was an accomplice, in which case the judge is not required to say anything to the jury with regard to corroboration. In the second place, the question whether the witness was an accomplice may have to be left to the jury with a warning that, if they think the witness was an accomplice, they should be cautious before convicting in the absence of corroboration. Finally, it may occasionally be the duty of the judge to direct the jury that a particular witness is an accomplice and, according to an Irish decision, this may be so in cases other than those mentioned above in which the question whether the witness is an accomplice has been answered by the witness.77 An example78 arose where the corroborating witness was a person who, on the evidence, was quite possibly also an accomplice. This witness’s evidence had been left to the jury as that of an independent witness; defence counsel had not submitted that he was an accomplice. A new trial was ordered on the grounds that, though there was ample other corroborating evidence, the judge, in the circumstances, ought to have warned the jury that there was evidence upon which they might find the second witness was also an accomplice.79 Once the witness is identified as an accomplice the judge should point out to the jury the relevance of this matter to the value of the testimony. This will involve explaining to the jury, where the evidence permits, that the witness has been charged, convicted or dealt with, that the witness has obtained any immunity in exchange for an agreement to testify, and any other matters, and relating these [page 477]
matters to the creditworthiness of the witness.80 In England at least the jury must be informed that it is really dangerous to convict on the evidence of the impugned witness alone, the danger (of which the jury need not necessarily be told) being the serious risk that the jury will err by convicting an innocent person.81 The need to give an accomplice warning is not removed where the accomplice’s evidence discloses no attempt to shift the blame, because the need for the warning is not related to the evidence which is actually given, but to the fact that accomplices as a class are perceived to be frequently unreliable.82 A possible difficulty with regard to joint trials is that anything in the nature of a direction that a co-accused is an accomplice may be taken by the jury to be an indication of the judge’s views concerning the guilt of the co-accused.83 If there is evidence on which a reasonable jury could on the balance of probabilities hold that a witness was an accomplice, there is a dispute whether an accomplice warning is mandatory. Some cases hold that it is, whether or not the warning had been sought or disavowed.84 Others hold that it is not, on the ground that the warning is directed to serving the accused’s interests, and it would be curious if it were compulsory even where it might be prejudicial to those interests.85 Hence, on the latter view, when the evidence of an accomplice partly supports the prosecution and partly supports the accused, the warning need only relate to the former.86 Since the purpose of the warning is to alert the jury to the dangers of accomplice evidence, it must be related to evidence upon which the jury may convict the accused — that is, evidence which is adverse to the accused87 — and which is in dispute — that is, it is tendered on an issue which the jury may have to resolve to reach a verdict of guilty.88 It is not necessary where the accomplice evidence is not controverted — for example, where the accomplice is called to prove a fact which is not formally admitted, but which, once proved, is not challenged by the defence,89 or where the prosecution, pursuant to its duty of fairness, calls an accomplice whose evidence is wholly favourable to, and accepted by, the accused,90 or where the accomplice’s evidence in chief is substantially undisputed and the cross-examination carried out by the defence is directed to eliciting evidence of facts favourable to the defence case,91 or where all the witnesses were at one in their
[page 478] evidence.92 Whether the accomplice’s evidence is in issue depends on how the case was conducted, may not be known until closing address, but will usually be apparent from how the examination and cross-examination are conducted as well as from what is said in closing address.93
[15105] Corroboration of an accomplice’s evidence Corroboration does not mean that there should be independent evidence of that which the accomplice relates, otherwise the accomplice’s testimony would be unnecessary.94 It would merely be confirmatory of other independent testimony. There is a judgment of Viscount Reading CJ which is of the greatest importance because it settles a conflict between two views concerning the nature and extent of corroboration. According to the first view, independent evidence tending to verify any part of the testimony of the accomplice would suffice, while the second required that the evidence should not only show that part of the accomplice’s testimony is true, but it should also implicate the accused. Viscount Reading CJ favoured the latter: evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime … The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common law or within that class of offences for which corroboration is required by statute. The language of the statute, “implicates the accused”, compendiously incorporates the test applicable at common law in the rule of practice.95
It is submitted that the decision in favour of the second view is sound on principle because “false evidence given by an accomplice is commonly regarded as more likely to take the form of incriminating the wrong person than of imagining the crime charged”.96
[15110] Mutual corroboration of accomplices Viscount Reading’s statements of the rule stressed that the corroboration be “independent testimony”.97 The question that now arises is whether the evidence of an accomplice may provide independent corroborating testimony of the evidence of another accomplice. In 1934 a negative answer was given.98 The answer today is far less clear.
The “rule” against mutual corroboration has been rejected after due consideration in South Africa99 and it is certainly difficult to justify on principle. If A’s evidence, standing alone, is, subject to a warning against the danger of acting on it in the absence of corroboration, sufficient to support a conviction, why should it not be sufficient to corroborate the evidence of A’s accomplice B? Assuming that the evidence of each witness implicates the accused in a material particular, and assuming that there is no question of a conspiracy between the witnesses, A’s evidence adds considerably to the probability of the truth of B’s and vice versa. The House of Lords has held that there is no rule against mutual corroboration [page 479] where the accomplice is in the third of the three classes.100 Clearly there is far less danger of collaboration between accomplices called by the prosecution when they belong to different classes (one being a party to the crime charged and the other a party to a different crime) than when they are both alleged to be parties to the crime charged. It is open to question, however, whether this is something which ought to justify a rule of law that accomplices who are parties to the crime charged cannot corroborate each other. It has already been seen that such a rule cannot be based upon the requirement of logic, and the danger of collaboration between witnesses is something which naturally goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of their evidence.101 However, the High Court held102 that if there was a possibility of joint fabrication of evidence by the accomplices, the jury should be directed they could not corroborate each other; if not, not. It has, however, been held that the wife of an accomplice who is not called can corroborate one who does give evidence.103 The evidence of the wife of an accomplice may afford corroboration of the evidence of the accomplice,104 although her evidence, naturally, must be treated with caution.105 Finally, where an accomplice gives evidence against two prisoners, the fact that there is corroboration so far as one of them is concerned does not corroborate the testimony against the other.106
[15115] Statutory relaxation of peremptory rule There is no universal requirement for a corroboration warning in Western Australia in trials on indictment (Evidence Act 1906 s 50),107 nor in Queensland (Criminal Code s 632(2)). Nor is there under s 164(3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). However, under those Acts, in appropriate cases there is a power and a duty to give the warning: s 165(5).108 [page 480]
Adultery [15120] Caution to be exercised It has been held that caution should be exercised in finding that adultery has been committed when the only evidence to that effect is the uncorroborated testimony of one of the alleged adulterers.109
Sexual offences [15125] Common law duty to give direction Under a common law principle now radically changed by legislation, the courts directed juries in all cases involving sexual offences that it was not safe to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant but that they might do so if satisfied of its truth.110 The basis for the rule was the fear that complainants sometimes tell “an entirely false story which is very easy to fabricate, but extremely difficult to refute.”111 The warning did not have to be given where the reasons underlying it did not exist (eg where there was no dispute that the complainant was raped by several members of a gang to which the accused belonged and that he was present in her flat at the time),112 or where there was indisputable, substantial or ample corroboration.113 This rule, in those jurisdictions where it obtained, was probably best regarded as a peremptory requirement, as appeals were allowed because no such direction was given114 but allowance had to be made for special facts, as
when the age of the victim rendered it improbable that the charge was promoted by hysteria or spite,115 and an admission of indecency might dispense with the need for corroboration on a charge of indecent assault.116 This, if anything, is all that could be meant by the suggestion, made as long ago as 1922, that it is safer to act on uncorroborated evidence in a sexual case than in a case involving an accomplice.117 It was held118 that if evidence of an earlier indecent assault is admitted against the accused in order to negative his or her defence of accident in relation to the indecent [page 481] assault with which he or she is charged, there did not need to be any warning against accepting the earlier evidence if it is uncorroborated. It was said in Queensland that there is no requirement that the summing up always identify the reasons why corroboration of a complainant’s evidence is desirable.119
[15130] Implication in material particular The alleged corroborative evidence had to implicate the accused in a material particular. Accordingly, in a charge of rape, confirmation of the complainant’s evidence that someone had intercourse with him or her at the relevant time did not corroborate the case against the accused, for it neither negatives consent nor identifies the accused as the culprit.120 In such a case, evidence corroborating the complainant’s testimony that the intercourse was non-consensual could not amount to corroboration without more. In addition to coming under the present head, the evidence might be that of an accomplice, or it might be given by a person of tender years. In such a case each ground for the warning had to be mentioned.121
[15135] Abolition of duty to warn In New South Wales,122 Victoria,123 South Australia,124 Western Australia,125 Tasmania,126 the Northern Territory,127 Queensland,128 the
Australian Capital Territory,129 and in federal courts,130 the legislature has intervened to abrogate the rule of practice that a warning should be given against reliance on the uncorroborated evidence of victims in sexual cases. Two broad models have been adopted. The first operates in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and in federal courts. It provides that the court is not required by any rule of law or practice at trials of persons for sexual offences to give a warning to the jury to the effect that it is unsafe to convict the accused on uncorroborated evidence. The second model, operating in Queensland and Western Australia, does not merely provide that the judge is not required to give a warning, but forbids a warning to be given merely on the basis that complainants in sexual cases are an unreliable class of witness. The practical differences between the two models may not be great. If, contrary to the prohibition in the second model, and notwithstanding that the first model renders it non-obligatory, a warning is given, it is not a matter adverse to the interests of the accused, and hence is unlikely to ground a successful appeal against [page 482] conviction. Further, neither model prevents the court giving other types of warning131 and the Victorian and Northern Territory provisions explicitly permit comments on the evidence that are “appropriate to make in the interests of justice”. The legislature is concerned with the rule of practice presently under discussion which is applicable simply because the charge is a sexual one and because the witness is the victim. The judge in a criminal trial is also charged with the responsibility of giving to the jury an appropriate warning whenever, for any reason, justice requires it. Moreover in the course of summing up, the judge has a wide discretion in making comment upon the reliability of particular witnesses. The legislation is not directed to these last two functions of the trial judge. The High Court said, speaking of the second model: No longer may the judge tell the jury that it is dangerous to convict in the circumstances described in para (a) because the experience of the courts has shown it to be so, but the judge may invite the jury in sexual cases (as is done in other criminal cases) to make their own
evaluation of the alleged victim’s evidence in the light of common human experience. By force of para (a), alleged victims of sexual offences no longer form a class of suspect witnesses, but neither do they form a class of especially trustworthy witnesses. Their evidence is subject to comment on credibility in the same way as the evidence of alleged victims in other criminal cases, but to comment only. Perhaps it should be added that the judge’s discretion to comment should not be exercised so as to convey to the jury, whether by phrase, gesture or intonation, a caution about the general reliability of the evidence of alleged victims of sexual offences which is tantamount to the warning the requirement for which para (a) eliminates.132
This means that a conviction will not be quashed in a sexual case where no warning is given unless something more is shown than that testimony of the victim was not corroborated.133 It has been said that a judicial warning that it is unsafe to convict to a large extent arrogates to the judge the responsibility which the criminal trial assigns to the jury, and that something more than the mere absence of corroboration is required to render a judge’s refusal to warn the jury in a trial of a sexual offence that it is unsafe to convict on the complainant’s uncorroborated evidence an appellable error.134 It is necessary for the appellant to demonstrate some special circumstance concerning the evidence of the victim which called for a warning.135 In the leading case, where the conviction was quashed, 20 years had elapsed between the date of the offences and the date of trial. This, and the youth of the victim at the time of the offence and the nonviolent nature of the offences, [page 483] were matters which called for comment. The warning, if otherwise called for, is not made unnecessary by the evidence of corroboration.136 Finally, there is a controversy which has agitated the Supreme Court of South Australia as to whether the legislation has in sexual offence cases swept away the other rules of law and practice which would require a traditional corroboration direction. Consider the case where the accused is charged with sexual misconduct with a child and an adult. Each of them gives evidence on oath as does another eye-witness child. It is clear enough that the evidence of the adult witness need not be corroborated and no special direction need be given in respect of it. The child victim’s evidence if uncorroborated would require a traditional corroboration direction on two separate grounds — the offence is a sexual one and the evidence is of
a child. Is it intended that the caution with which courts have approached the evidence of children in any case is now to be abandoned by the statute? If so, the consequence would be that the only evidence for which the corroboration direction is required is that of the bystander. The majority of the Full Court held137 that a corroboration warning was still required where the victim was a child.138 The interpretation of the statute adopted in the High Court judgment quoted above indicates that it is not to be taken to have abolished in sexual offence cases the other rules of law or practice requiring a corroboration direction.
Sworn evidence of children [15140] Common law requirement and its statutory abrogation The sworn evidence of a child did not have to be corroborated as a matter of law at common law. But it was obligatory to warn a jury that there was a risk in acting on the uncorroborated evidence of young children, though they might do so if convinced that the witness was telling the truth. This warning had also to be given whether the witness of tender years was called to give sworn evidence in corroboration of the evidence (sworn or unsworn) of another child or of the testimony of any adult.139 It appears that the requirement of warning the jury of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of a young child was peremptory, and not a matter for the discretion of the particular judge.140 [page 484] In federal courts141 the common law requirement for a warning has been abrogated by statute; the matter remains one for the judge’s discretion. In Tasmania the judge is not to warn, or suggest to, the jury that it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a child on the ground that children are classified by law as unreliable witnesses.142 The same is true in Queensland,143 and the Australian Capital Territory.144 Section 165(6) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas),
2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that s 165(2) does not permit a judge to warn or inform a jury in proceedings before it in which a child gives evidence that the reliability of the child’s evidence may be affected by the age of the child: any warning or information of that kind is to be given only in accordance with s 165A(2) and (3). Section 165A(1) provides that a judge in any proceeding in which evidence is given by a child before a jury must not do any of the following: (a) warn the jury, or suggest to the jury, that children as a class are unreliable witnesses; (b) warn the jury, or suggest to the jury, that the evidence of children as a class is inherently less credible or reliable, or requires more careful scrutiny, than the evidence of adults; (c) give a warning, or suggestion to the jury, about the unreliability of the particular child’s evidence solely on account of the age of the child; (d) in the case of a criminal proceeding — give a general warning to the jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a witness who is a child. Section 165A(2) provides that s 165A(1) does not prevent the judge, at the request of a party, from: (a) informing the jury that the evidence of the particular child may be unreliable and the reasons why it may be unreliable; and (b) warning or informing the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence of the particular child and the weight to be given to it, if the party has satisfied the court that there are circumstances (other than solely the age of the child) particular to the child that affect the reliability of the child’s evidence and that warrant the giving of a warning or the information. Section 165A(3) provides that s 165A does not affect any other power of a judge to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury.145 In Western Australia146 the judge is not to suggest that it is unsafe to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child on the ground that children are classified by the law as unreliable witnesses. As has been seen, all the authorities on warning the jury in the terms indicated above are decisions in criminal cases, but the principle might
well be applied in a civil suit, for the justification of the rule is the tender years of the witness,147 rather than the nature of the subject matter of the evidence. [page 485] In South Australia, s 12A of the Evidence Act 1929 provides: (1) In a criminal trial, a judge must not warn the jury that it is unsafe to convict on a child’s uncorroborated evidence unless— (a) the warning is warranted because there are, in the circumstances of the particular case, cogent reasons, apart from the fact that the witness is a child, to doubt the reliability of the child’s evidence; and (b) a party asks that the warning be given. (2) In giving any such warning, the judge is not to make any suggestion that the evidence of children is inherently less credible or reliable, or requires more careful scrutiny, than the evidence of adults.
This applies to a child witness, whether sworn or unsworn. A child is a person under 18: s 4.148 It has been questioned whether s 12A applies in a trial by judge alone.149 However, despite these provisions and the expert opinions on which they are based to the effect that young children are capable of giving reliable evidence, the particular characteristics of a young child’s uncorroborated evidence may make it unreliable.150
[15145] Mutual corroboration As has been seen, the sworn evidence of a child may corroborate the sworn evidence of another child,151 and the sworn evidence of a child may be corroborated by the unsworn evidence of another child and vice versa.152 In Queensland it seems that the unsworn evidence of different witnesses received pursuant to Evidence Act 1977 s 9A may be mutually corroborative. Why then, when it is unsafe to act on the evidence of either in the absence of corroboration, should the evidence of one child not corroborate the evidence of the other? All that can be said is that the factors rendering it dangerous to act on the evidence of children and accomplices differ. In each case there is a danger of invention, but the tendency of all accomplices is to tell the same kind of lie, that is, one implicating the accused, while there is no reason why the supposed over-
imaginativeness of children should lead to a coincidence in their untruthfulness. The point has never been fully considered by an English or Australian court.153
Claims against the estates of deceased persons [15150] Corroboration desirable but not essential A claim against the estate of a deceased person will not generally be allowed on the uncorroborated evidence of the claimant, because the absence through death of one of the parties to the transaction calls for caution,154 but there is no rule of law against allowing it.155 The same principle applies to any evidence from a living [page 486] witness of a conversation with a deceased person.156 There can often, however, be considerable suspicion attached to the failure to call available witnesses who could have corroborated the claim.157
Matrimonial causes [15155] No corroboration requirement The abolition of matrimonial offences as a ground for dissolution of marriage by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) has swept away the learning which required corroborative evidence in support of the proof of those offences. By s 48(2) of the Act, the Family Court may grant a decree of dissolution of marriage where it is “satisfied that the parties have separated and thereafter lived separately and apart for a continuous period of not less than 12 months immediately preceding the date of the application”. The decree shall not be made if the court is “satisfied” that there is a reasonable likelihood of cohabitation being resumed. The standard of proof is the civil standard.158 The special problem in matrimonial cases is that the issues raised — involving, as they do, matters of status and the welfare of children —
require careful examination by the tribunal before the appropriate degree of satisfaction can be attained. On the other hand, the evidence available is often, perforce, unsatisfactory and essentially self-serving. The Family Law Act imposes no requirement that such evidence should be corroborated. To do so would in many cases cause unnecessary hardship, for the nature of many matters alleged is such that corroboration may not be available. This problem, and the judges’ practical solution to it, is found especially in the case of separation under one roof. In such cases, without a full explanation of the circumstances, there is an inherent unlikelihood that the marriage has broken down, for the common residence suggests continuing cohabitation. Such cases, therefore, require evidence that goes beyond inexact proofs, indefinite testimony and indirect inferences. The party or parties alleging separation must satisfy the court about this by explaining why the parties continued to live under the one roof, and by showing that there has been a change in their relationship, gradual or sudden, constituting a separation. For this reason many of the judges of the Family Court of Australia have adopted the practice of requiring corroboration of the applicant’s evidence in cases where the parties reside in the same residence. We do not wish to lay down an inflexible rule that evidence from a witness other than the parties to a marriage must be given, but an applicant should always be ready to call such evidence. Whether the judge will require such evidence will depend on the circumstances of each case.159
[page 487]
Disputed confessions and other possible cases [15160] Confessions, witnesses with purposes of their own, identification, potentially unreliable evidence There is no requirement for corroboration or a corroboration warning, or any rule of practice about corroboration warnings, in relation to confessions made to persons other than police officers.160 However, a particularly troublesome problem confronting accused persons and their representatives is that caused by disputed oral admissions or confessions allegedly made to police officers. The ordinary difficulty of successfully impugning the credit of an experienced police witness often supported by corroborating witnesses with no apparent motive to mislead the court is compounded by the fact that the contradicting evidence of the accused normally lacks any confirmation. Furthermore, the jury, despite a strong warning from the judge as to the burden of proof, may approach the case from the position that the police witnesses are probably unbiased and
prima facie ought to be believed. Finally, counsel for the accused, if the client gives sworn evidence, must face the prospect that an attack on the character of the Crown witness may expose the character and prior convictions of the accused.161 In an effort to remove these difficulties and to protect police witnesses from unwarranted attack, the practice has arisen where practicable for interviews in serious crimes to be recorded on audio or video tape. There is a growing legislative trend requiring this.162 Despite initial hesitancy,163 the High Court164 established a rule of practice that a warning be given of the dangers of convicting on the evidence of confessions to police officers. The rule is that where a disputed confessional statement by the accused is made to police officers whilst in police custody, the making of the statement is not reliably corroborated,165 and that confession is the only (or substantially the only) basis166 for finding that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt, the warning must be given. A warning is required whether the confessional statement is oral or contained in a document procured by the police and signed by the accused as a true statement. The form of the warning must be tailored to suit the circumstances. But the judge should warn the jury of the danger of convicting the accused when the only or the only substantial basis for a finding of guilt is a confessional statement allegedly made to police officers. They should be told to scrutinise the confession with care, giving proper consideration in the appropriate case to the fact that police witnesses [page 488] are often practised witnesses whose veracity is often difficult to assess and to the fact that available means of recording the statements were not used. The jury must weigh these and any other relevant matters against the fact that persons who make confessions sometimes repudiate them.167 The corroboration which must be looked for is corroboration of the making of the confession as distinct from its truth.168 It is not necessary to tell the jury that police evidence of oral admissions has often been fabricated in the past.169 It is proper to warn the jury
against proceeding on the basis that police evidence is inherently unreliable in that police officers as a category are suspect or unreliable.170 Are there other possible categories where corroboration should be looked for? It has been said171 that whenever it appeared that a witness, whether a Crown witness or a co-accused, may have some purpose to serve in giving evidence adversely to the accused it was a desirable practice for the trial judge to give a warning similar to that required for accomplices. This statement has been subsequently treated as prudent advice rather than as a statement of any rule of law, and the failure to give such a warning does not of itself lead to the conclusion that there has been a miscarriage of justice.172 If the judge is to be invited to warn the jury along these lines, it is at least inappropriate to fail to put to the witness what purpose he or she had to serve and how (for example) an indemnity against prosecution affected his or her reliability.173 The Supreme Court of Ireland has said:174 The category of circumstances and special types of case which call for special directions and warnings from the trial judge cannot be considered as closed. Increased judicial experience, and indeed further psychological research, may extend it.
The case before the court concerned the reliability of evidence of visual identification and it was said that, in all such cases, whether or not there was a plurality of witnesses, the jury’s attention should be drawn to the necessity of caution because there have been cases in the past in which responsible witnesses to identification have been subsequently proved to have been mistaken.175 Nevertheless, any expectation that the categories of evidence requiring corroboration warnings may be treated as not closed in Australia has been qualified by a murder case where the Crown case depended largely on the evidence of an eyewitness, Carter. Carter was a schizophrenic who on the night in question, but [page 489] after the alleged murder, suffered an episode of that illness and was admitted to a mental hospital. The accused unsuccessfully urged the trial judge to direct the jury that it would be dangerous to convict on the
uncorroborated evidence of such an unreliable witness. In refusing special leave the High Court declined to extend the cases for which there is a requirement for a corroboration warning. It is sufficient that the trial judge explain to the jury in terms appropriate to the case that there is a danger in basing a conviction on the testimony unless it is confirmed by other evidence.176 In that case, too, it was said that where the mental infirmity of the witness had been brought to the attention of the jury it is likely that, as a matter of common experience, his evidence would have been treated by them with caution. There is a responsibility on the trial judge to give to the jury a warning, which is tailored to suit the case, of the dangers of convicting on evidence which is potentially unreliable.177 A class of evidence which will in most cases call for such a warning is that of a gaol-yard confession proved by a police informer,178 but not that of a police informer who is not a prisoner or that of an agent provocateur.179 What is required is not a corroboration warning,180 for the nature of this evidence is such that there is a risk that it is fabricated with knowledge of some circumstances of the crime. Assuming the evidence to be false, there is a high probability that corroboration will for that reason be found. In these circumstances a conventional warning of the danger of relying upon such evidence without corroboration may tend to give the evidence a reliability which it does not warrant. Moreover, the jury should be warned that the real issue for its determination is whether the admission was in fact made to the witness by the accused.181 In all cases of serious crime it is customary for judges to stress that where there is only one witness asserting the commission of the crime, the evidence of that witness must be scrutinised with great care before a conclusion is arrived at that a verdict of guilty should be brought in; but a direction of that kind does not of itself imply that the witness’s evidence is unreliable.182 The inflexibility of the old rules and the change in attitude demonstrated by the judges and legislatures of the last decades have caused the courts to approach the [page 490]
question of unreliability of witnesses on an individual basis and by requiring a warning to the jury which is tailored to the particular evidence in question and directed to the care with which it must be approached by the jury. This tendency has the merit that it draws attention to the fact that the list of cases in which a cautionary warning is necessary may not be closed, and that it avoids all reference to the technicalities of corroboration. But it suffers from the drawback that the Crown and the defence at trial are unable to predict with confidence whether a warning will be given, and further it makes the task of the appellant very difficult because, as the judge’s decision approaches a true discretion, so too it is difficult for an appellate court to be persuaded of error. It has been suggested that, leaving aside instances where authority requires a warning, it will not be possible to demonstrate error in a trial judge’s failure to warn unless logic or repeated experience or scientific works demonstrate a real risk of unreliability and a jury would have been incapable of appreciating the risk or would have been likely to have overlooked it.183 An appeal succeeded where a judge failed to direct a jury to treat a witness’s evidence with care, since she was “closely connected” with the accused.184
Section 2 — The Nature of Corroboration185 A — INTRODUCTION Definitional issues [15165] Definition “Corroboration” is not a technical term. It simply means “confirmation”.186 But, in all cases in which it is required in law or practice, it must take the form of a separate item of admissible187 evidence implicating188 the person against whom the testimony is given in relation to the matter concerning which corroboration is necessary.189 It need not replicate the evidence to be corroborated, but it must tend to connect the person against whom it is given with the alleged act.190 As was seen in [15105], Viscount Reading CJ said:191 [page 491] [E]vidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it.192
The requirement that the corroborative evidence implicate the accused or connect the accused with the crime creates its own difficulties. Isaacs J said this of the passage quoted above:193 … corroboration of whatever statement requires corroboration must be by independent testimony, and … if it be required to implicate a person in a given act, the independent testimony must be such as of its own force to connect or tend to connect him with the act.
And later: In other words, the independent evidence must support the story both as regards the alleged crime and the alleged criminal.
This means that many things that show, or might be thought to show, that a witness is speaking the truth do not corroborate in law. Evidence of mere opportunity, without more, cannot amount to corroboration.194 It sometimes happens that the allegedly corroborative evidence does not necessarily indicate an involvement of the accused in the crime charged. An example195 is where Kerim was charged with indecent dealings with and rape of his 12-year-old step-daughter. The evidence of the complainant was said to have been corroborated by medical evidence that her hymen was not intact. This evidence was, of course, consistent with her account that Kerim had raped her, but since the rupture was not established to have occurred at a time or a place which involved the accused, this evidence was incapable of affording corroboration. In reaching this conclusion the majority of the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal had regard to the probative value of the alleged corroborative evidence in the light of the circumstances of the case. Where sexual acts between persons living together in the one household are alleged, no corroboration can be obtained from evidence of propinquity. The situation may be altogether different where the parties are strangers. The point of departure between the majority and the minority was whether the alleged corroborative evidence must both support the complainant’s account and involve the accused or whether, as McPherson J dissenting argued, it is sufficient that it perform one only of these functions. The case in which Viscount Reading CJ spoke itself is instructive on this matter.196 The accused, Baskerville, was charged with acts of gross indecency with two boys. It was common ground that the boys were invited to his flat where they alleged the acts occurred. He maintained that the visit was innocent. The Crown offered as corroboration of the boys’ evidence a letter from [page 492] Baskerville to one of them enclosing £10 and arranging a rendezvous. The letter was treated as amounting to corroboration on the basis that it admittedly involved the accused and that it was consistent with the evidence of the complainants. It is clear therefore that evidence to be corroborative must satisfy both these requirements — that it involves the accused and that it is consistent with the evidence requiring corroboration,
although it is not necessary that it inevitably demonstrate guilt.197 Nor need it concern the specific actual account of the witness to be corroborated, as distinct from the conclusion to which that account points.198 Where the issue was whether admitted sexual intercourse was consensual, the evidence that the accused had struck the complainant was corroborated by evidence that she had a recent black eye soon after the relevant date.199 Corroboration need only support part of the evidence in relation to which corroboration is looked for. Hence it is possible that corroboration may be treated as being without weight if the witness needing to be corroborated is sufficiently weakened by cross-examination or evidence that the witness is lying.200 Where a witness raising the need for corroboration questions to be considered on the ground that she was an accomplice gave evidence of an offence against a complainant of which the complainant gave no evidence, the evidence of the complainant proving the corroborating fact, based on other episodes of sexual passion, was held to be capable of being corroborative.201 Finally, consistent with its role of confirming other evidence rather than amounting itself to evidence which necessarily leads to conviction, the corroborative evidence does not need to prove any proposition beyond reasonable doubt.202
[15170] Significance of issues In determining whether a given piece of evidence is capable of amounting to corroboration regard must be had to the issues at the trial. While it is true that the corroborative evidence need not relate to the particular incident or incidents described by the witness requiring corroboration,203 and need not by itself be wholly probative of guilt, as for example where a person admits matters not then known to his or her interrogators which are subsequently found to be true, thereby making it more likely that the admission was made,204 it must bear upon matters in issue, for otherwise it would not tend to implicate the accused.205 It is on this basis [page 493] that courts have rejected (as corroborative evidence) evidence which is as
consistent with innocence as with guilt,206 for example opportunity,207 or which merely tends to confirm a matter which is common to the case of the Crown and that of the accused,208 unless this matter seen in the light of the Crown case is capable of implicating the accused, or unless the matter alone or with other evidence gives rise to an inference implicating the accused.209
[15175] Circumstantial evidence as corroboration Finally, corroborative evidence may be circumstantial as well as direct. Where there is before the court evidence of a chain of circumstances which in combination implicate the accused, this may amount to corroboration notwithstanding that any one link in the chain would not.210
[15180] “Intrinsically credible” evidence There is authority that the question of corroboration does not arise unless the evidence of the witness requiring corroboration is “credible”. The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence to evidence which is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that which as evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible: and corroborative evidence will only fill its role if it itself is completely credible evidence.211
This cannot mean that where evidence is merely insubstantial and weak the judge is relieved of the burden of charging the jury about the need for independent supporting evidence. Lord Hailsham explained212 that “unless a witness was intrinsically credible he could neither afford corroboration nor be thought to [page 494] require it”. Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case where a witness of a class requiring corroboration whose evidence is placed before the jury as part of the evidence against an accused, would fail to be a “credible” witness within his Lordship’s meaning of that expression.213 It is, however, important to have regard to the functions of the judge and jury in this context. In the exceptional case where the evidence is not credible, ie not reasonably capable of being believed, it cannot be put to the jury as
potential corroboration and, if there be no other corroboration, the Crown case will fail where the principal evidence is of a class requiring corroboration. If the corroborative evidence does pass the credibility test, the jury is then instructed that it may use it, if accepted, to confirm the evidence of the witness in question. It is not necessary for the judge in every case to direct the jury that it must first be satisfied that the corroborative evidence is credible before it may use it. As with the testimony of any witness, if the jury does not accept the corroborative evidence it cannot perform any function in its deliberations.214 Likewise, where a principal witness has given evidence which the jury considers credible, ie capable of belief, the corroborative evidence may confirm this evidence and dispel any doubts about acting on it.215
B — CONDUCT OR CONDITION OF THE PERSON WHOSE TESTIMONY REQUIRES CORROBORATION Self-corroboration compared with physical condition [15185] Common law rule against self-corroboration “In order that evidence may amount to corroboration it must be extraneous to the witness who is to be corroborated.” This remark was made by Lord Hewart CJ216 where the accused was charged with unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 16. It was suggested that her testimony might have been corroborated by the fact that she spoke to her mother about her condition some time after the alleged intercourse, whereupon her mother laid an information against the accused. Lord Hewart demonstrated the absurdity of this contention when he said: “A girl cannot corroborate herself, otherwise it is only necessary for her to repeat her story some 25 times in order to get 25 corroborations of it”.217 Another leading case which turned in part on the impossibility of self-corroboration arose218 where the accused was charged with indecently assaulting a little boy who gave unsworn evidence. The boy’s mother and a policeman testified to the terms in which the boy had described the assault shortly
after it occurred when he also identified the accused; but the [page 495] House of Lords held that these witnesses did not corroborate the boy’s testimony and the conviction was quashed because the trial judge had suggested that it did have this effect.
[15190] Statutory rule against self-corroboration It is common for statutes making written statements admissible to provide that the statement does not corroborate the maker: [35135] and [35285]. Even if the statement is rendered admissible by virtue of a common law rule of evidence such as that relating to cross-examination on a diary or address book used to refresh memory discussed in the next chapter, it does not corroborate the evidence of the maker.219
[15195] Physical condition and distress The physical condition of the victim is a matter which stands in a different position. It is often suggested that the distressed condition of the victim of a sexual assault is evidence capable of being corroborative. The difficulty with such a suggestion is that distress can be feigned, and this has led the courts to caution against any emphasis upon this as supporting the complainant’s evidence. The reported decisions emphasise that each case must be judged on its own facts; the basic question being whether the distressed condition in the light of ordinary experience is likely to have been causally related to the alleged incident. The Victorian Full Court said:220 … regard must be had to such factors as the age of the prosecutrix, the time interval between the alleged assault and when she was observed in distress, her conduct and appearance in the interim, and the circumstances existing when she is observed in the distressed condition. Without attempting to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such evidence may amount to corroboration, we are of opinion that if, regard being had to factors of the kind we have mentioned, the reasonable inference from the evidence is that there was a causal connexion between the alleged assault and the distressed condition, evidence of the latter is capable of constituting corroboration. If such inference is not open, the evidence is not, in our opinion,
capable of amounting to corroboration. We should add that except in special circumstances221 … evidence of distressed condition will carry little weight and juries should be so warned by the trial judge in the course of his charge.222
King CJ was even more cautious:223 In order to treat such manifestations as capable in law of amounting to corroboration, it is necessary to be able to exclude, on any reasonable view of the evidence, the possibility that they are concomitants of the relation of a fabricated story or of an account which has its only basis in a disordered imagination.
Where the observation is made some time after the incident,224 or where the victim’s condition might have been the result of assaults or other incidents which do [page 496] not form part of the charge,225 or where for some other reason the victim’s condition is equivocal, or even where it is a borderline case, the trial judge ought not to direct the jury that the victim’s condition is capable of being corroborative testimony.226 The question of the weight, if any, which the jury may give to this testimony is, of course, a matter for them.227 The question whether the existence of physical injuries can amount to corroboration of the complainant’s testimony concerning them, implicating the person against whom the evidence is given, is a question of fact varying from case to case.228 In England evidence as to the demeanour of an allegedly abused child during the period of abuse and after complaints of it were made has been treated suspiciously, except to rebut recent invention.229
C — CONDUCT OF THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM CORROBORATION IS REQUIRED Range of conduct [15200] Admissions The conduct of the defendant or accused may constitute corroboration, for example, an admission.230
[15205] Evidence of defendant or accused An example is the accused’s admission in evidence that he had platonically touched a child whose testimony was that he had indecently assaulted her.231 As Atkin LJ said: “The question of corroboration often assumes an entirely different aspect after the accused person has gone into the witness-box and has been cross-examined”. The mere demeanour in the witness box of the person against whom corroboration is required will not normally be sufficient to constitute corroboration. Whether anything that emerges in the course of the evidence of the [page 497] defendant or accused does corroborate the opponent’s witnesses is, of course, a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of the particular case. A discrepancy between a party’s testimony and what may be inferred from that party’s counsel’s questions in cross-examination as being the party’s instructions can be taken into account in evaluating the evidence: [17460]. However, the content of the questions has been held incapable of constituting corroboration.232 Where there is a trial of several accused, the statement of one accused made to the police cannot be used to corroborate the evidence against the other accused.233 However, evidence in the form of an admission by one accused which, while not corroborating a witness, nonetheless tends to show that that witness is speaking the truth, may be used in considering the case against other accused persons.234 The unsworn statement of one co-accused could not amount to corroboration against another coaccused.235
[15210] Falsity of evidence Lord MacDermott236 said that a prisoner does not corroborate an accomplice merely by giving evidence which is not accepted and which must therefore be regarded as false. Corroboration may well be found in the evidence of an accused person; but that is a different matter, for there confirmation comes, if at all, from what is said, and not from the falsity of what
is said.
So far as this is valid, it is generally true of all cases in which corroboration must be sought.237 There is, however, room for some debate as to whether it is universally valid. Demonstrable lies out of court may amount to corroboration of the case against the person who tells them, and there is no logical reason, as the Full Court of Victoria has pointed out,238 why lies of a certain type told in the evidence of the defendant or accused should not have similar effect.239 The contrivance of falsehood can sometimes only be explained on the footing that the contriver is anxious to conceal guilt, but this is not always so. In addition something more than a mere denial simpliciter in the witness box would seem to be necessary,240 because in order to be satisfied that the testimony was false the jury must first be satisfied that the Crown evidence is true, a conclusion which cannot be reached without rejecting the testimony in question.241 As Lowe J pointed out in a case dealing with proof of adultery in a divorce petition: [page 498] … by no torturing of the statement “I did not do the act” can you extract the evidence “I did do the act”. The truth is that there must be evidence aliunde to support the petitioner’s case, before you can use an untrue denial of the parties charged as affording corroboration of that case.242
There are examples of that error.243 But it is not right to espouse the contrary view, that an accused’s lies in court can never provide corroborative evidence.244 There is an impressive quantity of authority against such a proposition. If the accused’s lies take the form of denials of specific allegations or the concoction of a particular story which can reasonably be construed as indicative of a guilty mind and as amounting to an implied admission there seems no reason why they should not constitute corroboration provided always that they are admitted by the accused or proved by independent evidence. In an affiliation case245 the appellant’s denial in evidence in chief that he had taken the respondent home after a dance, admitted by him in crossexamination to have been false, could be treated as corroborative of the mother’s evidence. The suggestion that the false denial of an opportunity to commit a crime may constitute evidence that advantage was taken of
the opportunity has been acted on by the Divisional Court in a case concerned with lies to the police.246 It is difficult to see why an Australian court should not follow a South African case on seduction247 and hold that the man’s denial that he was alone with the girl in an empty house late at night, made in the course of his evidence, could corroborate the girl’s evidence if the testimony of other witnesses that the couple were together in the house were accepted. No doubt it is impossible to make a completely satisfactory generalisation concerning the kind of lie which is capable of providing corroboration, and it is a matter which calls for the most careful direction to a jury. If the question is whether A’s evidence or B’s evidence is true, the rejection of B’s evidence does not mean that A’s evidence must be accepted as true, for B might have other reasons for lying. As a matter of logic, the rejection of B’s evidence does mean that A’s evidence must be accepted if B’s evidence is its contradictory. On a charge of rape, the rejection of the accused’s assertion that the complainant consented entails acceptance of the assertion of non-consent; the false assertion of consent could not, without more, be corroborative of the complainant’s evidence. The conclusion that it did have this effect would amount to holding that mere disbelief in what the accused said amounts to corroboration of the evidence.248 On the other hand, the accused’s assertion of some such specific incident as an invitation by the complainant to take the complainant home and make love there, alleged to be false by another witness, ought, on principle, to be corroborative of the complainant’s testimony denying consent if the other witness is believed. The conclusion that the accused invented a particular falsity to support the allegation of consent is more than a mere utilisation [page 499] of disbelief in that allegation as corroboration, although, as a matter of logic, the rejection of this particular item of the accused’s evidence does not entail acceptance of the complainant’s statement that the intercourse was nonconsensual. In the context of corroboration there is no reason to treat an accused’s lies in court any differently from the accused’s lies out of court.249 These
are discussed below at [15220]. Depending on the circumstances, there can be a need for care in directing juries as to the use which they may make of the fact that they have rejected an alibi.250
[15215] Failure to give evidence Lord Goddard CJ said:251 One cannot say, because a man has not gone into the witness box to give evidence, that that of itself is corroboration of the evidence of accomplices. It is a matter which the jury could very properly take into account and very probably would, but it is not a right direction to give a jury, and it should be clearly understood that it [the direction that failure to testify can amount to corroboration] is wrong in law.
The distinction between a matter which the jury can take into account and one which can amount to corroboration is perhaps, in this context, not as clear as it might be. The rule that a party’s failure to testify does not constitute corroboration of the evidence against the party applies to affiliation proceedings. Thus, the applicant admitted to intercourse with the respondent’s brother as well as with the respondent on various occasions, but alleged that she had only had intercourse with the respondent during the month in which her child was conceived. The applicant’s mother gave evidence of meetings between her daughter and the respondent, but the Divisional Court held that mere evidence of opportunity could not amount to corroboration. The court came to a similar conclusion with regard to the fact that the respondent’s brother gave what the magistrates considered to be false evidence concerning the periods at which he had had intercourse with the applicant, there being no evidence that he had been incited to do so by the respondent. The latter did not give evidence and, when allowing his appeal on the ground that this too did not corroborate the applicant’s evidence, Lord Parker CJ said: If there is evidence against him, and some corroborative evidence, it may be that the justices are entitled to take into consideration the fact that he gave no evidence in considering the weight to be attached to the corroboration.252
The distinction between corroboration and a fact which, though not itself corroboration, adds weight to corroborative evidence is another one which is not altogether easy to grasp. In affiliation proceedings the respondent is a compellable witness for the applicant, but there would
normally be no point in her calling him because a party cannot crossexamine a witness called by that party. If the law were to be changed so as to allow the respondent’s failure to give evidence to be capable [page 500] of amounting to corroboration, it would be consistent with that of some Australian jurisdictions in which corroboration is only required in affiliation proceedings if the respondent gives evidence: see [15045]. Failure to cross-examine is never in itself corroboration of the witness’s evidence.253
[15220] False statements out of court A false statement out of court will not necessarily constitute corroboration, but it may have this effect. A false statement must relate to254 “incriminatory features of the crime”.255 Thus it was said in a Scottish case that the existence of an opportunity to do the act complained of, which would not amount to corroboration by itself, may have a complexion put upon it by a statement made by the defendant which is proved to be false.256 It was on the strength of these remarks that the Divisional Court decided257 that the fact that the accused had falsely, as he subsequently admitted, told the police that he had not left his house on a particular evening corroborated the unsworn evidence of two children that he had been guilty of an indecent assault a short distance away from his home.258 Similarly it has been held that false statements to the police and to the court concerning the manner in which the accused came by certain goods can sometimes be construed as an admission that the goods were stolen,259 and this might be enough to corroborate an accomplice’s evidence.260 A feigned lack of memory can be a lie told in consciousness of guilt, in that to admit a recollection of what was done could be inconsistent with a lack of intention to do it.261 Where an accused is charged with sexual offences against a complainant, the failure of the accused to have reported an assault on him by the complainant at a time postdating the alleged sexual offences can be an implied admission of the
sexual offences.262 On the whole, this appears to be yet another matter where it is dangerous to generalise. Lies may be due to panic, or other reasons than a sense of guilt.263 On principle, [page 501] out-of-court lies of a certain type can corroborate evidence against the liar just as much as lies in court, and there is no authority to the contrary (as there is in the latter case),264 but in order to do so, such lies must be seen as the concoctions of a guilty person.265 The High Court had before it a case involving a charge of an indecent assault upon a young girl. There was evidence proving opportunity on the part of the accused, but it did not establish the commission of the crime by the accused, who denied all knowledge of the girl. Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ said: Now, if a jury be of opinion that the prisoner’s statements are false, then they may properly come to the conclusion that his falsehood indicates that the child’s story is true, and that he is telling lies in order to discredit the evidence of the other witnesses because he is unable to account for what they say they saw, in any way consistent with his own innocence.266 Corroboration may be found in independent evidence or in admissions of the prisoner, or in inferences properly drawn from his conduct and statements. And it is, in our opinion, for the jury in the present case to say what complexion the conduct and statements of the prisoner bear.267
The English Court of Appeal laid down four conditions which must be satisfied to enable an out-of-court lie to be capable of corroborating other testimony. It must: … first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.268
Because of the requirement that the lies in effect amount to an implied admission proceeding from a consciousness of guilt, it will not be appropriate in many cases that they go to the jury as corroboration.269 “The use of lies as corroboration is fraught with the risk of miscarriage.”270 Where the evidence of lies is found by the judge to be capable of amounting to corroboration, it is not necessary that the lie be
[page 502] established beyond reasonable doubt before it may perform that function271 unless the lie is the only evidence against the accused or is an indispensable link in a chain of evidence necessary to prove guilt.272 The High Court has laid down the following modification of the English direction.273 The judge in directing the jury must identify the lie relied on274 and the circumstances and events which are said to indicate that it constitutes an admission against interest. The charge should include a direction that the jury may use it as corroboration only “if they are satisfied, having regard to those circumstances and events, that it reveals a knowledge of the offence or some aspect of it and that it was told because the accused knew that the truth of the matter about which he lied would implicate him in [the commission of] the offence”.275 Finally, the judge must in appropriate cases instruct the jury that there may be reasons for the telling of a lie apart from the realisation of guilt276 and that it is for the Crown [page 503] to eliminate any reasonable possibility that the lie was told for such a reason.277 It can be dangerous to give examples of common motives for lying: it “exposes the accused to the risk that the judge may not cover the whole field of possible hypotheses and might advance too few or, albeit unconsciously, put up skittles too readily bowled over”.278 An imperfect direction will not inexorably lead to the quashing of the conviction.279 It is not necessary to give these directions in every case in which the defendant testifies or in which the defendant may have told a lie out of court, but only where the jury are invited to regard, or there is a danger that they may regard, lies as probative of guilt, whether as corroboration or as admissions.280 The direction is not called for where the lie is relied on merely as identifying a point at which the evidence of competing witnesses diverge and one has to be preferred to another,281 or where the lie is relied on so as to discredit other parts of the alleged liar’s evidence.282 It has been said that the direction is not called for where the jury would not
engage in the impermissible process of reasoning against which the direction warns.283 Thus the direction was not required where the prosecution had not relied on the accused’s conduct in cleaning up blood stains and washing blood-stained clothing to evidence a consciousness of guilt, but only to explain the absence of incriminating clothing, footwear or blood in the accused’s cells.284 If there is a risk of confusion or doubt as to the way in which the prosecution puts its case, the trial judge should inquire of the prosecution whether it contends that lies may constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt and, if so, should require identification of the lies in issue and the basis on which they are said to be capable of implicating the accused in the commission of the offence charged.285 The jury should then be directed accordingly.286 However, where although the Crown does not rely on the lies as implied admissions or corroboration, there is a danger that the jury may so regard them, the judge should direct the jury that the lies go only to [page 504] credit and are not to be used as evidence of, or implied admissions of, guilt.287 If either the Crown’s disavowal of that type of reliance, or the direction just described, is liable to be misunderstood, a full direction should be given.288 However, it has been said that no direction is needed where the alleged lie is no more than a denial of the charge and is to be proved to be a lie by the same evidence as is led to prove guilt.289 Assessment of the significance of a lie must take place in the context of all the evidence.290 A statement can be proved to be a lie on a particular point without direct evidence of the truth on that point. The inference that it is a lie may be drawn from its inherent improbability;291 and from the fact that the maker of the statement said to be a lie contradicted it. At least in the case of in court statements, an inference that a statement is a lie could be drawn from the demeanour of the witness;292 this is much less likely in the case of out of court statements because of the difficulties facing the witness recounting the out of court statement in communicating admissibly, clearly and reliably what the demeanour of the maker of the out of court
statement was. If it is only possible to conclude that an accused lied by finding that he or she committed the offence charged, the alleged lie cannot be used as evidence of guilt.293 The problems are less in the case of a video recorded interview, but it has been said that proof of guilt by demeanour displayed during the interview would be rare.294 The admissibility of lies rests on their pointing to a consciousness of guilt. Other manifestations of a consciousness of guilt such as flight are also capable of being corroborative, and similar principles apply.295 However, they need not be applied in their entirety in every case outside the area of lies.296 But where an attempt to prevent disclosure of an incriminating conversation is relied on, it is almost always necessary to identify the terms or precise substance of the conversation alleged, and to direct the jury that before they could infer consciousness of guilt from the accused’s efforts to suppress the conversation, they had to be satisfied that the terms [page 505] or precise substance were as alleged before concluding that the accused’s efforts to suppress the conversation were motivated by fear that the disclosure of those terms or that precise substance would implicate him or her in the commission of the offence charged.297 Ordinarily, if postoffence conduct is relied upon as part of a circumstantial case to establish consciousness of guilt, it is not necessary for the jury to be satisfied of the occurrence of the post-offence conduct or its character beyond reasonable doubt. But where the post-offence conduct constitutes an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning to guilt, the jury must be instructed that they cannot act on that evidence unless satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt. There are also some cases where, although consciousness of guilt is not necessarily an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning to guilt, it appears to be of such significance to proof of the prosecution case that the jury should be warned as a matter of prudence that they ought not to act on it unless satisfied of the occurrence of the conduct and its significance beyond reasonable doubt.298 Lies and other post-offence conduct are ordinarily but a species of circumstantial evidence such that an inference
of guilt may usually be drawn from a concatenation of circumstances including the lies or other post-offence conduct. It follows that, as with other forms of circumstantial evidence of guilt, a jury may accept evidence of lies and other post-offence conduct and act upon it without necessarily being satisfied that there is no other explanation of the lies or post-offence conduct reasonably open on the facts.299 There has been criticism of the above body of law as having obscured “what is a very old, very simple, very sound and very important notion”.300 It is wrong to direct a jury that if they conclude that the accused told a lie by reason of consciousness of guilt, they have in effect found the accused guilty.301 It is wrong because a lie of the relevant kind is no more than an implied admission, to be weighed with all the other evidence in determining whether the prosecution case has been made out beyond reasonable doubt.302 If the prosecution intends to rely on a lie to establish a consciousness of guilt it should give the defence notice of that intention303 and, it has been said, should raise the matter with the judge before the submission is put to the jury.304 While mere disbelief of a denial by the accused is not corroborative evidence of a complainant’s evidence that an offence was committed, disbelief of a denial by the accused of something the complainant claimed he had said later can be: there is no circularity.305 [page 506]
[15225] Silence when charged There can be an inference of guilt when a person to whom a serious charge is put expresses no repudiation of that charge.306 This principle was acted on when307 the accused’s failure to answer the observation of the girl’s father about some pills was held to be capable of corroborating her evidence that the accused had attempted to procure her miscarriage.308 Silence was taken to be corroboration in “a family affair in which the honour of accuser and accused were equally at stake”.309 But what if the persons in question are not speaking on even terms? Though on occasion the failure of an accused person to reply to
allegations of police officers or to offer an explanation when charged has been treated as corroboration,310 in most cases it has not.311 Refusal by an accused person to supply hair samples for scientific examination has been held capable of constituting corroboration.312
[15230] Conduct on previous occasions Chapter 11, “Similar Fact Evidence”, discusses the general rule that facts tending to show that someone committed a crime or civil wrong, or behaved improperly, on other occasions, may not be proved in order to establish that that person committed the crime into which the court is inquiring, if they are only substantially relevant as showing a disposition to commit crimes generally, or the kind of crime with which the court is concerned. This will often exclude the previous conduct of the party against whom corroboration is required, but such conduct may be substantially relevant to the issue for some reason other than its tendency to show that the defendant or accused was disposed to commit crimes generally, or the kind of crime into which the court is inquiring. It operates as circumstantial evidence showing an aspect of the relationship between accused and victim.313 In two further instances it may be admissible to corroborate other evidence against an accused. In the first place it may show a propensity which is more specific than that of committing a certain crime because it involves doing so in a particular way or with a particular person,314 and secondly it may corroborate a witness’s story about statements made by the defendant or accused. But evidence of similar conduct forming the subject matter of counts on which the accused was acquitted cannot constitute corroboration.315 [page 507]
[15235] Previous conduct to show specific propensity An example of the first kind of corroboration by previous conduct is provided by a case316 in which the accused was convicted of buggery with H on a particular day. H gave evidence of the commission of the offence on the day in question, and he also deposed to the fact that the accused had done the same thing to him on a previous occasion. There was no
corroboration of H’s evidence so far as the offence mentioned in the indictment was concerned, but his evidence with regard to the previous occasion was corroborated by another witness who saw the accused take H to his office, lock the door and draw the blinds. It was held that H’s evidence with regard to the previous occasion was admissible because a person who alleges that an offence such as that with which the court was concerned has been committed is entitled to show that the offence was indulged in habitually. It was also held that the corroboration of H’s testimony concerning the former crime constituted corroboration of his evidence with regard to the crime charged.317 In this respect the case may be compared with those in which the defendant’s conduct before the intercourse or promise alleged has been held to corroborate the testimony of the claimant in proceedings for affiliation and breach of promise respectively.318
[15240] Previous conduct to corroborate accused’s statement to witness Evidence which tends to show that the accused incited a course of conduct resulting in the commission of the crime charged certainly implicates the accused in a material particular. Accordingly, anything which confirms a witness’s story with regard to such incitement will be held to constitute corroboration when this is required. Numerous telephone calls and visits by a middle-aged man to a young girl alone in her house within a limited period have been held capable of corroborating her evidence of subsequent sexual molestation.319 Sometimes the alleged incitement takes the form of a reference to previous misconduct on the part of the accused. In one case,320 for instance, a man was charged with indecently assaulting a girl named Sheila, who gave sworn evidence against him. In addition to deposing to the assault upon her, Sheila said that the accused told her about his behaviour with a girl named Judy, and it was held that this girl’s testimony with regard to the accused’s conduct corroborated the evidence of Sheila, who could hardly have heard of Judy from anyone other than the accused as the two girls lived in different parts of the country.
D — FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY
Range of problems [15245] Is evidence capable of corroborating, and does it do so? It is a question of law to be decided by the judge whether there is evidence [page 508] capable of amounting to corroboration; it is a question for the jury whether the evidence is in fact corroborative and has any weight.321
[15250] Where there is no corroboration In a case in which there is no corroboration, the judge should direct an acquittal if corroboration is required as a matter of law. If the case is one in which a corroboration warning is required as a matter of practice, and there is no corroboration, the judge should warn the jury of this fact, in addition to warning them of the danger of acting on uncorroborated evidence. This is specially so where there is an item of evidence such as a complaint, which the jury might mistakenly think to be corroborative.322 Where there is in fact no corroborative evidence, the judge need not give the jury any direction as to what constitutes corroboration.323 Nor, it seems, is there any need for the judge to say expressly that there is no corroborative evidence324 or to tell them what evidence could amount to corroboration.325 Smith J offered the following guidance to the trial judge in such a case:326 … the warning to be given to the jury need not, of course, follow any precise form. There is wisdom, however, in keeping close to the broad lines of the formulation of the warning which has now long been customary. The broad lines of that formulation are that the jury is told of the danger of convicting in the absence of corroborative evidence, and the reason for that danger is indicated, and the jury is then instructed that although it is open to it in law to convict on uncorroborated evidence, it will not be proper for it to do so unless, after a careful scrutiny of the uncorroborated evidence, it is clearly convinced that the evidence is true. The virtue of such a formulation is, to my mind, that it draws the jury’s attention not merely to the fact that there is in general a danger in cases of the particular class that they are dealing with, but to the fact that they, the jury, are themselves in danger and need to follow a particular course in order to cope with that danger. The essence of the matter, I consider, is that the jurors need to have their minds drawn to the difficulties of their own task in the particular case which they are deciding.
The warning that they are given must, therefore, be a real warning and not a mere recital of some formula.327
[15255] Summing up There is no model summing up appropriate to all cases. The summing up “should not contain a general disquisition on the law of corroboration couched in lawyer’s language but should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case.”328 The judge must tell the jury what corroboration is — independent evidence of some material fact which implicates the accused person and tends to confirm that person’s guilt of the offence charged.329 The jury’s attention must be directed to the [page 509] evidence which is capable of amounting to corroboration.330 The degree of particularity to which the judge ought to descend will depend upon the facts of the case.331 Where it is a simple case it is sufficient to draw the attention of the jury to the specific items of evidence which are capable of providing corroboration.332 The directions should be given without disclosing the judge’s necessary antecedent ruling that the matters mentioned are capable of amounting to corroboration.333 Where the case is complex the judge’s charge should include an indication of broad categories of the evidence where corroboration may be found and an instruction on the qualities of corroboration so as to leave it beyond doubt what conditions the material must satisfy before it can be regarded as corroboration. To require the charge in such a case to set out each item of evidence that the jury should consider as possible corroboration would place an unnecessary burden on both the trial judge and the jury.334 It is wrong for the trial judge to leave it to the jury to take into account any evidence which they may consider as amounting to corroboration.335 When one accused gives evidence implicating another, the question whether an accomplice warning should be given, and, if so, in what terms, cannot be answered without reference to the unique circumstances of the case.336 “It is essential in the interest of the accused who gives the evidence that the warning should be restricted in terms to those parts of the evidence which inculpate any co-accused … it must not be left open to
[the jury] to believe that the warning might attach to the accused’s evidence in his own case”.337 A conviction may be quashed if the judge refers to items of evidence as corroborative when they do not possess this quality.338 Where there is corroboration so far as some counts are concerned, but not with regard to others, this fact should be made plain to the jury.339 The cases commonly assert that the warning should make it clear to the jury that, in the appropriate case, it is dangerous to convict without corroboration. This is doubtless true. But appellate courts have consistently warned judges that they are to [page 510] direct the jury in everyday terms appropriate to the particular case; for, in the words of Salmon LJ in a case concerned with corroboration evidence of sexual offences: … the rule that the jury must be warned does not mean that there has to be some legalistic ritual to be automatically recited by the judge, that some particular form of words or incantation must be used and, if not used, the summing-up is faulty and the conviction must be quashed.340
The fact that the word “corroboration” is not used is certainly not fatal for, as Salmon LJ went on to point out, that is not a word which the jury would understand without explanation. Nevertheless, it will generally not be enough to emphasise the need for care to be taken by the jury without inviting them to consider whether there is independent evidence implicating the accused in a material particular.341 In England it has been said that in almost all cases where a direction on corroboration is required, the judge should at the conclusion of the evidence hear submissions from counsel as to what the ingredients are in the offences in respect of which the jury should be told to look for corroboration, and what evidence there is capable of amounting to corroboration.342 Where a warning has been given against the dangers of particular evidence, there is no rule that the evidence must be disregarded; those parts of it which the trier of fact accepts may be relied on.343 A comment to the effect that the warning no longer applies if corroboration is present can give the impression that special care is no
longer needed in assessing the witness’s evidence.344 Where a complaint has been admitted, the jury should be told that it is incapable of constituting corroboration.345 [page 511]
Section 3 — Cth: Evidence Act 1995, NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008 and ACT: Evidence Act 2011, and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 GENERAL Contrast between s 164 and s 165 [15260] Sections 164 and 165 Sections 164 and 165, though they have statutory and common law precursors, constitute an attempt at a fresh start.346 Section 164 provides: (1) It is not necessary that evidence on which a party relies be corroborated. (2) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of a rule of law that requires corroboration with respect to the offence of perjury or a similar or related offence. (3) Despite any rule, whether of law or practice, to the contrary, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, if there is a jury, it is not necessary that the judge: (a) warn the jury that it is dangerous to act on uncorroborated evidence or give a warning to the same or similar effect; or (b) give a direction relating to the absence of corroboration.
However, s 164 does not dispense with the need for a direction, where that direction is appropriate, that the evidence of a single witness asserting the commission of a crime should be scrutinised with great care.347 And while it abolishes the necessity for corroboration and the necessity for warnings about acting on uncorroborated evidence, it does not prohibit warning a jury that it would be dangerous to convict on uncorroborated evidence.348
But s 164(3) has an illusory character in view of s 165.349 It provides: (1) This section applies to evidence of a kind that may be unreliable, including the following kinds of evidence: (a) evidence in relation to which Part 3.2 (hearsay evidence) or 3.4 (admissions) applies; (b) identification evidence;350 (c) evidence the reliability of which may be affected by age, ill health (whether physical or mental), injury or the like;
[page 512] (d) evidence given in a criminal proceeding by a witness, being a witness who might reasonably be supposed to have been criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceeding; (e) evidence given in a criminal proceeding by a witness who is a prison informer; (f) oral evidence of official questioning of a defendant that is questioning recorded in writing that has not been signed, or otherwise acknowledged in writing,351 by the defendant; (g) in a proceeding against the estate of a deceased person — evidence adduced by or on behalf of a person seeking relief in the proceeding that is evidence about a matter about which the deceased person could have given evidence if he or she were alive. (2) If there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to: (a) warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable; and (b) inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be unreliable; and (c) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it. (3) The judge need not comply with subsection (2) if there are good reasons for not doing so. (4) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in giving the warning or information. (5) This section does not affect any other power of the judge to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury.
Section 165(2) thus creates a duty to warn on request if the evidence is of a kind that may be unreliable (unless, under s 165(3), there are good reasons not to or, in NSW, unless the evidence is that of a child in which case ss 165(6), 165A and 165B apply: see [15140]). Section 165(5) preserves a general law power to warn when the evidence, though not of a kind that may be unreliable, nonetheless may be unreliable in the particular circumstances.352 It is noteworthy that though many of the items listed in s 165(1) correspond with areas where the common law developed either a duty to warn or a practice of giving a warning, there is no reference in s 165(1) to sexual offences. The list is only inclusionary, but it would be a brave court which adds sexual offences to the list in view of the legislative trends
discussed at [15135].353 In most cases a trial judge should state what are considered to be the good reasons for not complying with s 165(2).354 The question whether a witness to whom the accused confessed but who concealed the confession for some time was “criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceeding” within the meaning of s 165(1)(d) has been considered but not decided.355 It has been said that where a matter which might adversely affect the reliability of evidence would readily be understood and appreciated by a jury because it falls within their general [page 513] knowledge and understanding, and where the court has no special knowledge about the matter or no reason to doubt that the jury will appropriately assess its weight, that the evidence is not “of a kind that may be unreliable”.356 The language of this test, however, appears to be directed more towards whether the jury can grapple with potential unreliability without judicial assistance than it is towards whether there is in fact potential unreliability. Neither evidence of persons of significant bad character, nor evidence of persons with a personal interest to give evidence in a particular way, is evidence “of a kind that may be unreliable”.357 In Tasmania s 164(4) provides that a judge is not to warn, or suggest to, the jury that it is unsafe to convict a person on the uncorroborated evidence of a child on the ground that children are classified by law as unreliable witnesses. One consequence of s 165(5) is that even if an item of evidence falls outside s 165(1), there is a residual power to warn or inform the jury of whatever matters are necessary in the interests of justice.358 Where a warning is given because a witness has given evidence against the accused, attention should be drawn to the fact that the sentence imposed on the witness could be increased, by reason of an undertaking given, if he did not give evidence in accordance with the undertaking.359 If the mental state of the witness is relevant both at the time of the commission of the crime and the time of the trial, attention should be drawn to that fact.360
It has been assumed that the common law rule that one accomplice could not corroborate another where there was a possibility of joint fabrication applies under ss 164–165, but it has been said that one witness can give “independence support” — a wider conception than corroboration — even if there is a possibility of joint fabrication, provided the jury receives adequate warnings as to the care needed in assessing the witnesses’ evidence.361 1 But, where uncontradicted evidence, which is inherently reasonable, probable and conclusive of
the matter has been given, the court is bound to accept it: Hardy v Gillette [1976] VR 392 at 396. See also [1610] and [17460]. And in the context of opinion evidence see [29075] below. 2 A General View of the Criminal Law of England, 1863, pp 249–50. 3 The foregoing historical account is based on J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1978, vol 7, [2032]. J H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 2003, pp 203–17, argues that the rule dates from the 1740s, and as a rule of exclusion, not a rule of caution. See also R v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945 at 960–6 (FC). Scots law requires corroboration in criminal cases: P Duff, “The Requirement for Corroboration in Scottish Criminal Cases: One Argument Against Retention” [2012] Crim LR 513. 4 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 164(2); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 164(2); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 164(2); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 164(2); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 164(2); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 164(2). 5 Qld: Criminal Code ss 125 and 193–195; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 8(2) and 76; Tas: Criminal Code s 96; NT: Criminal Code ss 98 and 120. 6 Qld: Criminal Code s 632; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 242(4); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 35. There is no statutory corroboration requirement in the ACT (Crimes Act 1900 ss 167–179) or NSW (Crimes Act 1900 ss 327–339) but in each case see s 164(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and 1995 (NSW). There is no statutory corroboration requirement in Victoria (Crimes Act 1958 ss 314–315). 7 Forbes v R (2009) 232 FLR 229. 8 R v Muscot (1713) 10 Mod 192. The common law imposed no corroboration requirements in relation to conspiracy to commit perjury: R v Barker [1986] 1 NZLR 252 (CA). 9 [15010] n 5 above. See also Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 52(2). 10 R v Linehan [1921] VLR 582 (FC). Special leave was refused: (1921) 29 CLR 604; R v Allsop (1899) 24 VLR 812 (FC); R v Mondon [2003] 1 Qd R 200. 11 R v Mondon [2003] 1 Qd R 200. 12 R v Threlfall (1914) 10 Cr App R 112. 13 For example, an admission on oath recorded on transcript (R v Willmot; Ex parte A-G [1987] 1 Qd R 53 (FC)), and an admission on a single occasion proved by two witnesses (R v Peach [1990] 2 All ER 966 (CA); see also R v Rider (1986) 83 Cr App R 207). 14 R v Hook (1858) Dears & B 606 (CCCR). See also R v Harris (1822) 5 B & Ald 926 (KB); R v Knill (1822) 5 B & Ald 929n (KB); R v Yates (1841) Car & M 132; R v Parker (1842) Car & M 639; R v Wheatland (1838) 8 C & P 238; R v Mayhew (1834) 6 C & P 315; R v Cleland (1901) 20 NZLR 509 (FC); R v Atkinson (1934) 24 Cr App R 123; R v Pearce (1862) 1 W & W (L) 248 (FC); R v Sumner [1935] VLR 197. 15 R v Cooper [2010] 2 Cr App R 13. 16 R v Hamid (1979) 69 Cr App R 324; R v Carroll (1993) 99 Cr App R 381. 17 For example: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 76.
18 R v Goldstein (1914) 11 Cr App R 27. See also R v Staub (1909) 2 Cr App R 6, and R v Cohen
(1909) 3 Cr App R 234. 19 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 165A; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 165A; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 165A; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 165A; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 106D; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 165A; NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 165A. 20 That provision has abolished the rule that a jury should be warned against acting on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, but has left on foot the duty to warn wherever there is a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice arising from the circumstances of the case: R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 at [40]–[41] (CCA). 21 Section 165(1)(c) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 22 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 323 per Lord Diplock. 23 See too Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154; R v Rima (1892) 14 ALT 138 (CCA); R v Skafte (1940) 58 WN (NSW) 9 (CCA); Scruby v R (1952) 55 WALR 1 (CCA); Croft v R (1917) 19 WALR 49 (CCA); see also R v Parker [1968] NZLR 325 (CA); R v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 at 392 (FC). 24 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 318. 25 R v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432 at 438 (CCA). 26 R v Manser (1934) 25 Cr App R 18 at 20–1. The decision is overruled by Hester’s case. 27 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 315. 28 Vic: Maintenance Act 1965 s 27; SA: Family and Community Services Act 1972 s 140; NT: Maintenance Act s 31(1). 29 See Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413; Thomas v Jones [1921] 1 KB 22 at 44–5 (CA); Kurth v Paff; Ex parte Paff [1968] QWN 21 (FC). 30 Simpson v Collinson [1964] 2 QB 80 (CA). 31 Cole v Manning (1877) 2 QBD 611 (DC of QBD). 32 See also Hayter v Howie [1937] SASR 59 (FC), where the corroboration lay in the unsuccessful attempt by the respondent to have intercourse with the mother the night before the conception date alleged in the complaint. 33 Moore v Hewitt [1947] KB 831 (DC of KBD). See also Doran v Gray (1917) 13 Tas LR 36 (FC). Cf Nichols v Digney [1921] VLR 513; King v Deel; Ex parte Deel [1932] QWN 4 (FC). 34 Mahoney v Wright [1943] SASR 61. 35 Mash v Darley [1914] 3 KB 1226 (CA); described in Cracknell v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 569 (DC of QBD) as illustrating the high watermark of what can amount to corroboration. See also Jensen v Ilka [1960] Qd R 274 (FC). 36 Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413; Jones v Thomas [1934] 1 KB 323 (DC of KBD); Ridley v Whipp (1916) 22 CLR 381; Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207 (FC); Burton v Laycock; Ex parte Laycock [1930] St R Qd 312 (FC); Hampson v Asher [1960] Qd R 383 (FC); Corfield v Hodgson [1966] 2 All ER 205 (DC of QBD). 37 Ridley v Whipp (1916) 22 CLR 381 (it might have been different if they had been seen together in a wood or some other dark place); Cracknell v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 569 (DC of QBD) (visits to girl’s house and walks with her alone insufficient); Ex parte Brown; Re Morris (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 165 (FC) (couple left a party and after a considerable time were found seated in the back of a car: held insufficient to constitute corroboration). See also Harris v Dellaca (1933) 36 WALR 17. See [15165] below. 38 Thomas v Jones [1921] 1 KB 22 (CA). 39 Hacker v Vereschagin [1973] Qd R 112 (FC). 40 Cracknell v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 569 (DC of QBD). In Hacker v Vereschagin [1973] Qd R 112 (FC), the failure of the respondent to give evidence was seen as entitling the court more readily to infer paternity, but there was corroborative evidence. 41 Luther v Ryan (1956) 3 DLR (2d) 693.
42 Kenny v Hornberg (No 2) (1963) 37 ALJR 162. 43 Hacker v Vereschagin [1973] Qd R 112 (FC). 44 Those favouring the view that she can prove the handwriting include Jeffery v Johnson [1952] 2
QB 8 (CA) and X v Y [1975] 2 NZLR 524 (CA). Those against include King v Deel; Ex parte Deel [1932] QWN 4 (FC); Crutchfield v Lee [1934] VLR 146; Moore v Hewitt [1947] KB 831 (DC of KBD); and Senat v Senat [1965] P 172. 45 For the case where the evidence as to the letter was itself corroborated, see Flaherty v Piva; Ex parte Piva [1960] Qd R 53 (FC); see also Flohr v McMahon; Ex parte McMahon [1956] St R Qd 253 (FC). 46 Evidence Act 1977 s 132; see Sawdon v Dale (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 573 (FC). 47 This cause of action has been severely truncated by the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. 48 Wilcox v Gotfrey (1872) 26 LT 481 (Exch). 49 Hansen v Dixon (1906) 23 TLR 56. 50 Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 at 538 (CA). 51 R v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 at 508. See also Bessela v Stern (1877) 2 CPD 265 (CA) and [15225] and [33485] below. 52 Ex parte Freeman (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 73 and generally Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57. 53 For example: Cth: Crimes Act 1914 ss 24C–24D (sedition); NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 Sch 3 Pt 2 cl 3(2) (treason); Tas: Criminal Code s 60(1) (treason); SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 8(2) (treason); NT: Criminal Code s 47(2) (sedition). 54 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 740. See R v Bagshaw [1984] 1 All ER 971 (CA), where a warning was required where the case against the accused was the uncorroborated oath of a mental patient. But R v Bagshaw was disapproved in R v Spencer [1985] QB 771 (CA). 55 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534. See also Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619; Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13; Hicks v R (1920) 28 CLR 36. 56 R v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19 where the Court of Criminal Appeal expressed the view that the trial judge should never decline to give the warning when counsel asks for it. 57 See J L Edwards, “Accomplices in Crime” [1954] Crim LR 324; G L Williams, “Corroboration — Accomplices” [1962] Crim LR 588; C J W Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 43–7. 58 Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378 at 399. For an example of insufficient warning, see R v Price [1969] 1 QB 541 (CA). 59 R v Teitler [1959] VR 312 at 330 (FC). See also R v Fuhrer [1961] VR 500 (FC); R v Anthony [1962] VR 440 (FC) and R v He (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 at [30] (in that case at n 8 it was noted that at the time of Davies v DPP, and in contrast to the position in Victoria, it was not possible for the appellate court to order a retrial). For cases illustrating the practice in other States, though both before Davies’ case, see R v Moeller (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 613 (FC) and Coulter v R (1926) 29 WALR 40 (CCA). In R v Young [1923] SASR 35 (FC) the rule as to corroboration of accomplice evidence was described as having become virtually equivalent to a rule of law. See R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 (CCA). The view that Davies’ case was not law in New South Wales was argued but not decided in R v Hayler (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 at 379 (NSW CCA). 60 Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41. See also R v Cheema [1994] 1 All ER 639 (CA). 61 In several States it has been held that an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice for the purpose of the rule: R v Lewis (1906) 8 WALR 83; R v Ready and Manning [1942] VLR 85 (FC); Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 (CCA); R v Ling [1981] Tas R 250 at 276; R v Carranceja (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 (Vic FC); R v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388 at [54]; R v Parsons (2004) 145 A Crim R 519. Cf R v Perry [1970] 2 NSWR 501 (CCA). See also R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at 560. The reasons why some courts do not include accessories after the fact within the category of
accomplices are summarised in R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [51]–[52]. That case also discusses the definition of “accessory after the fact”: at [53]. 62 R v Jennings (1912) 7 Cr App R 242; R v Dixon (1925) 19 Cr App R 36; R v O’Keefe [1959] QWN 9. 63 R v Farid (1945) 30 Cr App R 168. 64 Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 (CCA). 65 McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520 at 530. See also R v Sneesby [1951] St R Qd 26; R v Ling [1981] Tas R 250 (CCA); R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 at 37 (CCA). The latter case illustrates the rigidity of the first class of accomplices described in Davies’ case. There the effect of a statutory amendment in 1972 reduced the crime in question from a felony to a misdemeanour. See 12 SASR 30 at 53. Accordingly, an accessory after the fact would cease to be an accomplice. It is to be deplored that the operation of the rule under discussion should depend on such technicalities. See also R v Thomas (1988) 40 A Crim R 89 at 92–3 (Vic FC); Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 599 (one who conspired to commit murder properly treated as accomplice of murderer); R v Ware (1994) 73 A Crim R 17 at 27–33 (incest victim not accomplice); R v Asghar (1995) 1 Cr App R 223 (participants in affray accomplices of murderer). 66 R v Turnbull (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 (Qld CCA); R v James (1983) 36 SASR 215 (CCA). 67 R v Weightman [1978] 1 NZLR 79. 68 R v Checconi (1988) 34 A Crim R 160 (NSW CCA). 69 Moss v Baines [1974] WAR 7 at 10 (CCA); R v Mullins (1848) 3 Cox CC 526; Dunn v Littlejohn (1900) 2 WALR 138 (FC); R v Herman (1904) 6 WALR 89; R v Bickley (1909) 2 Cr App R 53; R v Phillips [1963] NZLR 855 (CCA); Davissen v Dias; Ex parte Dias [1944] QWN 20 (FC); R v Nation [1954] SASR 189 (CCA); Sneddon v Stevenson [1967] 2 All ER 1277 (DC of QBD); R v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 (CCA); R v Williams (1978) 19 SASR 423 (CCA); R v Turnbull (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 (Qld CCA); Martin v R (1990) 48 A Crim R 208 at 214 (NSW CCA); R v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675 (CCA). Cf R v D’Arrigo [1994] 1 Qd R 603 at 607–8 (CCA). 70 R v Pitts (1912) 8 Cr App R 126 and R v Tatham (1921) 15 Cr App R 132 (child victims of sexual offences); R v Cratchley (1913) 9 Cr App R 232 (child not accomplice in stealing); R v King (1914) 10 Cr App R 117 (woman not accomplice of man living on her immoral earnings. “On the other hand, the judge is justified in warning the jury against accepting the evidence of a girl who is leading such a life against a man, without corroboration. This is a matter for the discretion of the judge”: per Viscount Reading LCJ — but see [15135]). See also R v Bramhill (1933) 24 Cr App R 79. 71 R v Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344 (CA); R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 (CCA); R v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 (CCA). 72 R v Macaskill (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155 at [18]–[26]. See [15160]. 73 J W C Turner (ed), Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th ed, 1966, p 522, n 3. The position might be different if A knew that the goods would probably be passed on to C by B. 74 In Medcraft v R [1982] WAR 33 at 37 (CCA) Burt CJ disagreed with the generality of the statement in the text. In every case whether a thief is an accomplice for the purposes of the rule will depend on the circumstances. 75 R v Vernon [1962] Crim LR 35 (CCA); R v Hodgett [1957] NI 1; R v McDonald [1955] NZLR 699 (CA). See also Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206. 76 R v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37 at [69]; The onus of proving that the witness is an accomplice has been said to be on the accused on the balance of probabilities: Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 at 53 (CCA); R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 (CCA); R v Turnbull [1988] 2 Qd R 266 at 272 and 287 (CCA); R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 (CCA); R v Schioparlan (1991) 54 A Crim R 294 at 299–300 (Vic FC); R v He (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 at [28]; R v Parsons (2004) 145 A Crim R 519 at [23]. See also R v Kay [1950] OR 235; R v Ling [1981] Tas R 250 at 276 (CCA). 77 People v Carney [1955] IR 324 (CCA), discussed by J A Coutts, “Accomplices: Functions of
Judge and Jury” (1958) 22 Journal of Criminal Law 61. In R v Chrimes (1959) 43 Cr App R 149, the trial judge directed the jury that a witness who had not confessed or been convicted was an accomplice although the Court of Criminal Appeal said that he need not have done so. 78 R v Malouf (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 142 (FC). 79 See also R v Reeve (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 81 (FC); R v Hutton (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282; R v Webbe [1926] SASR 108 (CCA). See also R v Glover (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 482 (FC); Scruby v R (1952) 55 WALR 1 (CCA); Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1. 80 R v Booth [1982] 2 NSWLR 847 (CCA); R v Checconi (1988) 34 A Crim R 160 (NSW CCA) at 170–2; R v Button [1992] 1 Qd R 552 (CCA). 81 R v Stewart (1986) 83 Cr App R 327 at 335, as explained in Carr v R (2002) 11 Tas R 362 at [34] (CCA). 82 R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at 562. 83 A related problem is discussed at [15255], text at nn 335–336. 84 R v Edwards [1975] 1 NZLR 402 at 404; R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 at 66 (CCA); R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at [32]–[34]; R v He (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 at [27]. In R v Jenkins (2002) 6 VR 81 at [178], the question whether there was a discretion not to give an accomplice warning if to do so would be likely to damage the defence case was left open, as it was in R v Fountain (2001) 124 A Crim R 100 at [24]. 85 R v Anthony [1962] VR 440 at 446 (FC); R v Royce-Bentley [1974] 2 All ER 347 (CA); R v Peach [1974] Crim LR 245 (CA); R v Gallagher [1986] VR 219 at 238 (FC); R v Long (2002) 137 A Crim R 263 at [83]. 86 R v Jamieson (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 at 76 (NSW CCA); Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116 at [31]; R v Macfie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215 at [72]. 87 R v Royce-Bentley [1974] 2 All ER 347 (CA). 88 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116 at [33]. 89 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116 at [31]. 90 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116 at [31]. 91 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116 at [34]. 92 R v Willett (2005) 156 A Crim R 214. 93 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116 at [30], [32] and [33]. 94 R v Mullins (1848) 3 Cox CC 526 at 531. 95 R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 at 667 (CCA). See [15165] ff below. 96 Per Lord MacDermott in Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 at 265 (PC). 97 R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 at 667 (CCA). 98 R v Manser (1934) 25 Cr App R 18. 99 State v Avon Bottle Store Pty Ltd 1963 (2) SA 389 (AD); Nkambule v R [1950] AC 379 (PC) (construing the Swaziland Criminal Procedure Proclamation s 231). 100 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729. See also Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 326 and 330; R v Thompson (1992) 57 SASR 397 (CCA). On the principles applying to the admissibility of potentially “contaminated” similar fact evidence, see R v H [1995] 2 AC 596. 101 See [15040] above. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 751, Lord Reid doubted there should be a universal rule for accomplices in the first class. Bray CJ in R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 at 37 (CCA) regarded it as a universal rule as did R v Lamb [1975] Qd R 296 (CCA) and R v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37 at [92], but cf R v Rance (1975) 62 Cr App R 118 (no duty to warn that accomplices cannot corroborate each other). In R v Parker (1983) 8 A Crim R 324 (Vic FC) at 336, Gobbo J raised the question whether there exists a binding rule against mutual corroboration and the precise nature of its operation. 102 Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 600. This has been applied also to similar fact evidence tendered as corroboration: Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296; J v R 1989 Tas R 116 (CCA); cf
R v Kehagias [1985] VR 107 (FC); R v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945; R v Williams [1988] VR 261 (FC). 103 R v Willis [1916] 1 KB 933 (CCA). 104 Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1. 105 R v Evans [1965] 2 QB 295 (CCA). 106 R v Jenkins (1845) 1 Cox CC 177, approved in R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 at 669 (CCA); R v Donat (1985) 82 Cr App R 173 at 178. 107 Chew v R (1991) 4 WAR 21 (CCA); Wong v R (2001) 159 FLR 328; Foo v R (2001) 126 A Crim R 486. Hence in trials not on indictment the common law warning requirement continues: Betts v Hardcastle (2001) 23 WAR 559 at [53]. 108 R v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300 at [58]; R v Livingstone (2004) 150 A Crim R 117 at [72]– [75]. 109 McConville v Bayley (1914) 17 CLR 509; Fairman v Fairman [1949] P 341 (DC of PDA); Galler v Galler [1954] P 252 (CA). Cf Kossenberg v Kossenberg (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 358 (FC). 110 R v Graham (1914) 4 Cr App R 218; Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13 at 24; R v Weston [1924] VLR 166 (FC); R v Grasso [1950] VLR 21 (FC); R v McGinnis [1946] SASR 24 (CCA); R v Jones (1925) 19 Cr App R 40; R v Freebody (1935) 25 Cr App R 69; R v Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164 (CCA); R v Burgess (1956) 40 Cr App R 144; R v Trigg [1963] 1 All ER 490 (CCA) (R v Trigg was distinguished in R v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722 (CCA); R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 (CCA); R v Turnsek [1967] VR 610 (FC); R v Walczuk [1965] QWN 50 (CCA)). In civil cases, too, there is authority that it is “very dangerous to accept the uncorroborated story of” young women in charging men with sexual intercourse: Mattouk v Massad [1943] AC 588 at 591 (PC) (seduction). For developments in England and the Privy Council, see R v Chance [1988] QB 932 (CA); R v Makanjuola [1995] 3 All ER 730 (CA); R v Gilbert [2002] 2 AC 531 (PC). 111 R v Manning (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 at 153. 112 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534. 113 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 541, 546 and 560. 114 In Victoria the same consequence as the failure to give the proper warning in respect of accomplice evidence appears to apply. See as to this [15075] above. 115 R v Zielinksi [1950] 2 All ER 1114 (CA). In R v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722 (CA), a conviction of attempted rape was upheld although the trial judge had not used the word “corroboration” in a very careful direction about the weakness of the oral evidence of identification in which the jury were told to concentrate on the scientific evidence concerning the hair on the accused’s clothes. 116 R v Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr App R 4. 117 R v Crocker [1922] All ER Rep 775 (CCA). 118 R v Sanders (1961) 46 Cr App R 60. 119 R v Stewart [1993] 2 Qd R 322 (CA). 120 James v R (1971) 55 Cr App R 299. But the generality of this statement has been questioned: R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 at 11 (FC) and see [15170] below. 121 R v Gammon (1959) 43 Cr App R 155. 122 Evidence Act 1995 s 164. See [15260]. 123 Crimes Act 1958 s 61; Evidence Act 2008 s 164. 124 Evidence Act 1929 s 34L(5). 125 Evidence Act 1906 s 50 (in trials on indictment). In trials not on indictment, the common law prevails: Betts v Hardcastle (2001) 23 WAR 559 at [53]. 126 Criminal Code s 136; Evidence Act 2001 s 164. See [15260]. 127 Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act 1983 s 4(5)(a). 128 Criminal Code s 632. 129 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 s 69; Evidence Act 2011 s 164. 130 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 164. See [15260].
131 Eg R v Rhodes (1999) 104 A Crim R 572 (Qld CA). 132 Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 87–8 (discussing WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 36BE(1),
which was limited to sexual offences; s 36BE(1) has been repealed and s 50 now applies to all corroboration warnings in trials on indictment). See also Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214 (CCA); R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 (CCA); Fleming v R (1998) 197 CLR 250; Robinson v R (1995) 13 WAR 451 (CCA); R v MacDonald (1995) 65 SASR 322 at 332 (CCA); R v Glencourse (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 (NSW CCA); Young v R [1998] 1 VR 402 (CA); R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 (CA); R v Jolly [1998] 4 VR 495 (CA); R v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862 (CA); Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162; R v M (2000) 109 A Crim R 530; Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161 at [44]–[45], [128]–[132] and [140]–[143]; Christophers v R (2000) 23 WAR 106; R v Green (2001) 78 SASR 463 (CCA); Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343; R v Roberts (2001) 53 NSWLR 138; R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; R v ERJ (2010) 200 A Crim R 270 at [49]–[51]; Svajcer v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 587 at [12]–[24]. 133 R v B [1987] VR 276 (FC). 134 R v MAS (2013) 118 SASR 160 at [32]. 135 R v G (1987) 45 SASR 102 (CCA); R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 (CCA); R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 (CCA); Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162. 136 Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343. 137 R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 (CCA). The case was decided before the enactment of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 12A: see [15140]. See too R v Atkins (1985) 50 SASR 272 (CCA). 138 But note the dissent of King CJ and the doubts of Cox J in R v Corkin (No 2) (1988) 50 SASR 285. In R v Do (1990) 54 SASR 543 (CCA) the court refused to reconsider the majority decision in R v Pahuja, and it was followed in Hickman v R (1993) 60 SASR 415 (CCA). 139 R v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432 (CCA). 140 Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13; R v Cleal [1942] 1 All ER 203, where Hilbery J, delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, referred to it as a rule to be applied and observed in all cases. See further R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 at 212 (CCA); R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 at 200, 215–17 and 222–3 (CCA). It is doubtful whether the distinction suggested in R v Mitchell (1952) 36 Cr App R 79, between cases in which the child is and is not an accuser, can be maintained either on principle or on authority. The warning must be given though the only issue is that of the identity of the perpetrator of a sexual crime against a child: R v Sawyer (1959) 43 Cr App R 187. In Hicks v R (1920) 28 CLR 36 the conviction was not quashed though the appropriate warning was not given; there was in fact ample corroboration of the child’s sworn evidence. To the extent that the very brief report in R v Paine [1974] Tas SR (NC) N1 (CCA) indicates the contrary view, it must not be taken to be the common law, despite its apparent approval in K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227 at 233 (FC). See generally R v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158 at 161. For discussion of the related question whether, if no warning is given, an appeal will only be dismissed if the proviso can be applied, see A Ligertwood, “Failure to Warn in Criminal Cases Where Corroboration May Be Required” (1976) 50 ALJ 158. 141 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 164. 142 Evidence Act 2001 s 164(4). 143 Criminal Code s 632(2). 144 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 s 70; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 164. 145 See also Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YQ(a), and ALRC 102 [18.55]–[18.69]. 146 Evidence Act 1906 s 106D; Reference of a Question of Law (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 106 A Crim R 408. 147 But whether in a given case the witness is sufficiently young to warrant the application of this principle is a matter for the good sense of the judge: R v Morgan [1978] 3 All ER 13 (CA). 148 For the relationship between a s 12A warning and a warning pursuant to Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 (see [15160]), see R v Warsap (2010) 106 SASR 264 at [64].
149 R v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225 at [2], [77] and [81]. 150 Douglass v R (2012) 290 ALR 699 at [44]–[48]. 151 R v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432 (CCA). See [15035] above. 152 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296. 153 R v Gregg (1932) 24 Cr App R 13. 154 The preceding 15 words were quoted with approval in Tam v Tang [2013] NSWSC 708 at
[18]. 155 Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544; Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666 at 674 and 681– 2; Morrissy v Clements (1885) 11 VLR 13 (FC); Tone v Brolly (1891) 17 VLR 467; Re Hodgson; Beckett v Ramsdale (1885) 31 Ch D 177 (CA); Re Garnett; Gandy v Macaulay (1885) 31 Ch D 1 at 9 and 16 (CA); Rawlinson v Scholes (1898) 15 TLR 8 (DC of QBD); Vavasseur v Vavasseur (1909) 25 TLR 250; Copland v Bourke [1963] P & NGLR 45 (claim for workers compensation benefit by widow involving evidence as to statements by husbands); Re Mallows (1926) 29 WALR 62; R v Cummins (dec’d) [1972] Ch 62 (CA); Grundel v Registrar General (1990) 5 BPR 11,217 at 11,219 (SC NSW); Re Newey (dec’d) [1994] 2 NZLR 590 at 595; Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785 at 789 (SC NSW); Nolan v Nolan (2003) 10 VR 626 at [146]–[156]. See Anon, “Note” (1921) 37 LQR 268. 156 Clune v Collins Angus & Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 246 at 253 (Fed C of A). 157 For example, Lachmi Parshad v Maharajah Narendro Kishore Singh Bahadur (1891) 19 LR Ind App 9 (highly suspicious claim coupled with Jones v Dunkel inferences). 158 In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259. See also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361; Watts v Watts (1953) 89 CLR 200; Mann v Mann (1957) 97 CLR 433. 159 In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259 at 265 (Fam C of A FC). See also In the Marriage of G (1978) 24 ALR 258, where no corroboration was required, disapproving In the Marriage of Wiggins (1976) 9 ALR 8. 160 Ross v R (1922) 30 CLR 246. 161 See [23295] ff. 162 See [33775]–[33780]. Before the enactment in 1992 of the WA: Criminal Code s 570D (now repealed), it was said that as a matter of practice, when video recording facilities are available they should be used, and selective use may raise issues of fairness: Kelly v R (1994) 12 WAR 405 at 413–16 (CCA); Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240 (CCA). 163 Carr v R (1988) 165 CLR 314; Duke v R (1989) 180 CLR 508. 164 McKinney v R (1991) 171 CLR 468; Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 (FC); R v Wakeley [1994] 2 Qd R 196 (FC); R v Kypri (2002) 5 VR 610; Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291. Even before the new rule of practice, particular circumstances might require a judge to warn about the dangers of acting upon an uncorroborated disputed confession: Black v R (1993) 179 CLR 44 at 54. 165 See R v Butler (No 2) (1991) 1 NTLR 166 (NT SC). 166 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 599–604 (CCA); R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 (NSW CCA); R v Lawson [1996] 2 Qd R 587 at 589 (CA). 167 McKinney v R (1991) 171 CLR 468 at 474–5; R v Tarantino (1993) 67 A Crim R 31 (NSW CCA); Lau v R (1991) 6 WAR 30 at 65; Druett v R (1994) 123 FLR 249 at 266 (NT CCA). 168 R v Asfour (1992) 60 A Crim R 409 (NSW CCA). 169 R v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 at 333–5 (NSW CCA). 170 R v Tarantino (1993) 67 A Crim R 31 (NSW CCA). 171 R v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464 (CCA). 172 R v Stannard [1965] 2 QB 1 (CCA); R v Russell (1968) 52 Cr App R 147; R v Roberts [1967] Crim LR 477 (CA); R v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807 (CA); R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 at 167 (FC); R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 (CCA); R v K [1984] 1 NZLR 264 at 268 (CA); Asciak v R [1990] WAR 120 (CCA); R v Collie (1991) 56 SASR 302 (CCA); R v Cheema [1994] 1 All ER 639 (CA);
R v Asghar (1995) 1 Cr App R 223; R v Carabott (2002) 83 SASR 293; R v Johnson (2004) 89 SASR 294; R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511 at [57]; Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344 at [109]. 173 R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [64]. 174 Attorney-General (Ireland) v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33 at 38. 175 See Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 (CA). This requirement is discussed more fully in the context of identification evidence in [1335] ff above. 176 Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 319 and 325, approving R v Spencer [1987] 1 AC 128. See also R v Harawira [1989] 2 NZLR 714 (CA); Director of Public Prosecution v Faure [1993] 2 VR 497 (FC); R v Glencourse (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 (NSW CCA); R v Macaskill (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155 (CCA); R v Carabott (2002) 83 SASR 293 (CCA); R v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258 at [71]– [73]; R v Wanganeen (2006) 95 SASR 226; R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407 at [8]; Sumner v R (2010) 205 A Crim R 325 at [17]–[22]. 177 Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315; Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 86. See also R v Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543 at 548 (NSW CCA); DPP v Faure [1993] 2 VR 497 (FC); FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313 at [44]–[46]; R v Strawhorn (2008) 185 A Crim R 326 at [159]–[176]; R v Tran (2009) 198 A Crim R 23. 178 R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 at 406 (CCA). Contrary to what is there said, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the jury should be told that it is “dangerous to convict” because of the tendency of that phrase to be understood as a direction to acquit: Robinson v R (2006) 162 A Crim 88 at [19]. 179 Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558; R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 (CCA); R v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 at [66] (Tas CCA); Benedetto v R [2003] 1 WLR 1545 (PC). No warning is needed where one prisoner gives evidence of being attacked by others in gaol: R v Ton (2002) 123 A Crim R 340 at [34]. 180 R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 at 147 (CCA). An agent provocateur is not an accomplice: [15095]. 181 See also R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 (CCA). 182 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 at 19 (CCA); Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162 at [21]; Tully v R (2006) 230 CLR 294; DTS v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 204. 183 FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313 at [7] (holding that there was no duty to warn about internal inconsistencies in a complainant’s evidence, inconsistencies between her evidence and that of other witnesses, depression, self-harm or similar mental states, the fact that the complainant was asleep prior to the commission of the offences, and delay in complaint). 184 R v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37 at [93]. 185 See generally R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 114 (CCA); C J W Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 47–9. 186 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 325. In earlier editions of this work the word “support” was included in this context. Its use has been deplored in R v Apostilides (1983) 11 A Crim R 381 at 401 (FC); R v Kehagias [1985] VR 107 at 112 (FC). Cf McGookin v R (1986) 20 A Crim R 438 (Vic FC). 187 Buck v R [1983] WAR 372 at 376 (CCA). 188 “Implicate” does not necessarily mean “incriminate” or “inculpate”; it may mean only “involve”: R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 at 432 and 453 (CCA); R v Doney (1988) 37 A Crim R 288. And it may mean “confirm or tend to confirm the accused’s involvement in the events related by the accomplice”: Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 211. See also R v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 (CA); R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531. 189 R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 at 516 (CCA). 190 R v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 at 851 (CA); R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213 at [12]; GBT v Western Australia (2009) 192 A Crim R 483 at [34]–[35].
191 R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 at 665 and 667 (CCA). 192 This oft-quoted statement was made in the context of corroboration of accomplice evidence,
but it has been applied to sexual cases and there is no reason to doubt its general applicability wherever corroboration is required (quoted with approval inWLC v R (2007) 19 NTLR 136 at [28]). In Thomas v Jones [1921] 1 KB 22 at 44–5 (CA), the decision in R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 (FC) was said to be of general application on the meaning of corroborative evidence. See also Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619. But see judgment of Denning LJ in Fromhold v Fromhold [1952] 1 TLR 1522 (CA) to the effect that any confirmatory evidence will suffice in divorce for cruelty. See also R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 (CCA). 193 Ridley v Whipp (1916) 22 CLR 381 at 392. 194 Ridley v Whipp (1916) 22 CLR 381; Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154. Cf R v King [1967] 2 QB 338 (CA). 195 R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 (CCA). 196 See the analysis of these facts by McPherson J in R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 at 454–5 (CCA); and R v Doney (1988) 37 A Crim R 288 at 298 (NSW CCA). 197 Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 at 158; R v Doney (1988) 37 A Crim R 288 (NSW CCA). There is no rule in rape cases that there must be corroboration both of intercourse and of non-consent: RvM [1995] 1 Qd R 213 (CA). It has been said that corroboration must be capable of being regarded as more consistent with the accused’s guilt than that of any other person: R v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 (CA). 198 R v Galluzzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 (NSW CCA). 199 R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 (CCA). 200 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at [49]. 201 WLC v R (2007) 19 NTLR 136 at [25]. 202 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 211; R v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 at 151–3 and 166–7 (SA CCA). 203 R v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807 at 815 (CA). See R v Galluzzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 at 215 (NSW CCA). 204 R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407 at [14]; Sumner v R (2010) 29 VR 398 at [42]–[51]. See also Bui v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 93 at [71]–[74]. 205 Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 638–9; R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 (CCA); BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275. But see R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 at 11 (FC); and Forgie v Police [1969] NZLR 101, a case which also shows that the accused’s acquaintance with the layout of the complainant’s flat is no corroboration when the accused admits that he was in the flat at the material time. See also Holman v R [1970] WAR 2 (CCA). But note the warning of Zelling J in R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 122 (CCA) that “an accused person cannot, by a timely admission of facts which could otherwise amount to corroboration, deprive them of that quality by making an admission”; concurred in by R v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 at [29]; R v Danine (2004) 145 A Crim R 278 at [14]. See too the discussion of McPherson J (dissenting) in R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 at 453–8 (CCA); R v Goonan (1993) 69 A Crim R 338 at 346 (NSWCCA); R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228 at [42] and R v Gill (2003) 142 A Crim R 22 at [11]–[13]. 206 R v Young [1923] SASR 35 at 74 (CCA); R v McConnon [1951] SASR 22 at 27 (CCA); Thomas v Jones [1921] 1 KB 22 at 33 (CA); R v Stephenson (1978) 18 SASR 381 (CCA); R v Nanette [1982] VR 81 at 86 (FC); R v Ralph (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 at 204 (NSW CCA). In BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 297 Gaudron J said evidence was not corroborative if it was “intractably neutral”, thereby sanctioning a phrase used in several earlier cases. The South Australian cases were contrasted unfavourably with R v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 at 480–1 in R v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 at 433 (NSW CCA). The approach was also rejected in R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213 at [13]–[16], approving R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 at 526–7 (CCA). See
also R v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 (CA); R v Pisano [1997] 2 VR 342 (CA); R v Le Blowitz [1998] 1 Qd R 303 (CA). 207 R v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225 at [82]–[88]. 208 R v Yates [1970] SASR 302 at 306 (CCA), as qualified in R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 122 (CCA). Cf R v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 at 480 (CCA). 209 R v Massey [1997] 1 Qd R 404 at 406 (CA) (accused charged with rape admitted paternity of victim’s child: though not probative of lack of consent, this was corroborative as “increasing the probability that” the victim’s entire testimony was truthful). R v Massey was approved by McHugh J in Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343 at [68]. 210 R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 at 190–1 (FC); R v Fuhrer [1961] VR 500 at 509 (FC); R v Davy (1964) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 42 at 47; R v Colless (1964) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 55 at 57; R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 117–120 (CCA); R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 at 52 (CCA); Medcraft v R [1982] WAR 33 (CCA); R v Nanette [1982] VR 81 at 84 (FC); R v Galluzzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 (NSW CCA); R v Hills (1987) 86 Cr App R 26; R v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 at [28]; Sumner v R (2010) 29 VR 398 at [31]; R v Hill (2011) 212 A Crim R 359 at [227]. Cf Thomas v Jones [1921] 1 KB 22 at 48 (CA); doubted R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 153–4 (FC). 211 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 315 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. 212 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 455 and in Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 746. 213 See R v Howlett (1981) 5 A Crim R 45 (WA CCA). For a criticism in this context of the expression “credible witness”, see R v Sorby [1986] VR 753 at 781 (FC). And see generally Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Wong [1987] AC 501 (PC). 214 R v Sorby [1986] VR 753 at 780 (FC). 215 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 750; R v Spencer [1987] AC 128 at 134: Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Wong [1987] AC 501. See too Turner v Blunden [1986] Fam 120 at 127 (DC); R v Doney (1988) 37 A Crim R 288 at 299–300 (NSW CCA); R v Panagiotidis (1990) 55 SASR 172 (CCA). 216 R v Whitehead [1929] 1 KB 99 at 102 (CCA). In R v Elsworthy (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 at 460 (CCA) Sperling J said: “for a jury to think that evidence of complaint could be treated as corroboration may be an easy mistake in circumstances where corroboration is in the air, but it is a monumental mistake”. 217 R v Whitehead [1929] 1 KB 99 at 102 (CCA). See Ridley v Whipp (1916) 22 CLR 381 at 389 and Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 at 157. 218 R v Christie [1914] AC 545. 219 Senat v Senat [1965] P 172. For the converse case, where the document is that of the person against whom the corroboration is required, see [15050] above. 220 R v Flannery [1969] VR 586 at 591; R v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558 at [151]. 221 R v Redpath (1962) 46 Cr App R 319; R v Knight [1966] 1 All ER 647 (CCA). 222 This passage has been approved in R v Yates [1970] SASR 302 (CCA); R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 (CCA); R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 (CCA); R v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 at [42]; Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at [43]–[50]. 223 R v Waye (1984) 14 A Crim R 391 at 393 (SA CCA). See also Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524 at [70]. 224 R v Moana [1979] 1 NZLR 181 (CA) (nearly one hour); R v Poa [1979] 2 NZLR 378 (CA); R v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342. 225 R v Richards [1965] Qd R 354 (CCA). 226 Other Australian cases on this subject are R v Yates [1970] SASR 302; Fox v R (1982) 7 A Crim R 28 (Tas CCA); R v Donald (1982) 7 A Crim R 474 (SA CCA); R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC); R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 at 527 (CCA); Peterson v R (1979) 27 ALR 641 (Fed C of A); R v Kooyman (1979) 22 SASR 376 (distressed condition confirmed by natural and spontaneous
cries); R v Major [1998] 1 Qd R 317 (CA); R v Williams [2010] 1 Qd R 276. And for a case where an emotional condition was unsuccessfully offered as corroborative of accomplice evidence, see R v Thompson [1983] 1 Qd R 224 at 229 (CCA). However, the view that a distressed condition can only corroborate if it is reasonably explicable only on the basis of the alleged actus reus having occurred, though it has been propounded in South Australia (R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 at 216–17 (CCA); R v Pitman (1985) 38 SASR 566 (CCA)) is too extreme: R v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 at 481 (CCA). 227 It is not necessary that the jury be told that generally evidence of a distressed condition is of little weight: R v McDougall [1983] 1 Qd R 89 at 91 (CCA); R v Romeo [2004] 1 Cr App R 30. But see R v Luisi [1964] Crim LR 605 (CCA). 228 R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 at 527 (CCA); R v Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73 (CCA); R v Danine (2004) 145 A Crim R 278 at [14]. 229 R v Keast [1998] Crim LR 748 (CA). 230 Hobbs v Davies; Ex parte Davies [1943] St R Qd 131 (CCA); R v McKeon (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 at 359 (Qld CCA). 231 R v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158. See also Goguen v Bourgeois (1957) 6 DLR (2d) 19. In R v McConnon [1951] SASR 22, a teacher’s admission that he sat in the desks with his pupils to assist them in their lessons and that he may have on occasions momentarily touched them was not corroborative evidence on a charge of indecent assault on one of his pupils as the evidence was as consistent with an innocent practice as with the alleged offence. 232 R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 (CCA). 233 R v Smith [1964] NSWR 537 (CCA). 234 R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511. 235 Montgomery v Counsell [1956] St R Qd 120 (CCA). 236 Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 at 270. 237 R v Chapman [1973] QB 774 (CCA). 238 R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 at 193 (FC). 239 R v Perera [1982] VR 901 (FC). But note R v King [1967] 2 QB 338 (CA). No question of corroboration was involved in that case. In any event this case is inconsistent with Trainer v R (1906) 4 CLR 126. 240 Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207; R v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 (NSW CCA). 241 The argument is circular: Gionfriddo v R (1989) 50 A Crim R 327 at 333 (NSW CCA); R v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 (NSW CCA). The mere fact that the jury prefers the evidence of the Crown witness to that of the accused is not something which can be treated as corroboration of the Crown witness: Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 at 270; R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 (CA). 242 Edmunds v Edmunds [1935] VLR 177 at 186. But note the comments in R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 at 193 (FC). 243 R v Chapman [1973] QB 774 (CA). 244 R v Lucas [1981] QB 720; R v Perera [1982] VR 901 (FC); R v ST (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 (NSW CCA). 245 Corfield v Hodgson [1966] 2 All ER 205. 246 Credland v Knowler (1951) 35 Cr App R 48. 247 Poggenpoel v Morris 1938 CPD 90. 248 This conclusion is rejected in Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207 at 211 (FC). 249 R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 (CA); R v Collings [1976] 2 NZLR 104 (CA); R v Perera [1982] VR 901 (FC). 250 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 at 230 (CA); King v R (1986) 15 FCR 427 at 438; R v Pemberton (1993) 99 Cr App R 228 at 232; R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 at 629-30 (CA); R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411 at [39]–[41]. 251 R v Jackson [1953] 1 All ER 872 at 873.
252 Cracknell v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 569 at 571 (DC of QBD). 253 Dingwall v F Wharton (Shipping) Ltd [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 213 at 219 (HL). In R v Bassett
[1952] VLR 535 (FC), the appellate court decided that the trial judge ought not to have criticised counsel for one of the accused in his charge to the jury for not cross-examining a co-accused who gave evidence contradicting the first accused. Cf R v Tooma [1971] Qd R 212 (CCA) where adverse comment was made about counsel’s failure to examine police officers in detail. 254 Lord Lane CJ’s exposition in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 at 724 (CA) (set out below) has been criticised as requiring an insufficiently close nexus between the lies and the matter in issue in the trial: R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 at 245–6 (CCA). 255 R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 at 193 (FC); Lonergan v R [1963] Tas SR 158 (CCA). 256 Dawson v M’Kenzie (1908) 45 Sc LR 473. 257 Credland v Knowler (1951) 35 Cr App R 48. 258 See too R v Vallance [1955] NZLR 811 (CA); White v R [1956] SCR 709. 259 R v Young [1953] 1 All ER 21 (CCA). 260 No question of corroboration was involved in R v Young which in any event is inconsistent with Trainer v R (1906) 4 CLR 126. 261 R v Calway (2005) 157 A Crim R 322 at [11]. 262 Papazoglou v R (2010) 28 VR 644. 263 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 211; R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 at 724 (CA); R v Clynes (1961) 44 Cr App R 158. See R v May [1962] Qd R 456 (CCA) where the court stressed the necessity of warning the jury in relation to a false denial that it had very slight weight as corroborative evidence. See too R v Toia [1982] 1 NZLR 555 (CA), discussing the evidentiary effect of out-of-court lies, and stressing that most lies are not capable of adding to the Crown case whether as corroboration or simply as strengthening evidence. For lies as corroboration in affiliation cases see Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413. 264 R v Chapman [1973] QB 774 (CA). 265 See McClintock v R (1946) 47 WALR 95 (CCA). 266 See too R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 at 243 (CCA); Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413 at 422. 267 Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 at 158. See also R v Kaye (1960) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 39 (CCA), R v Colless [1964–5] NSWR 1243 (CCA) and R v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225 at [90]. 268 R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 at 724 (CA), approved with respect to lies in court in Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193. On the importance of materiality, see R v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 at 701 (CCA); Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 209; R v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 at 390–1 (CA); R v Ugochukwu (2003) 138 A Crim R 544. On the fourth point, see Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 211; R v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 (NSW CCA); Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; R v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 (CCA); R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 (NSW CCA); Burr v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 220 (Vic FC); R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344 (FC); Buck v R [1983] WAR 372 (FC); R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 at 150–1 (CCA); R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 595 (CCA); Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; RR v R (2011) 216 A Crim R 489. 269 R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 (CCA); Harris v R (1990) 55 SASR 321 (CCA); R v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584 (CCA); R v De Lam (1999) 108 A Crim R 440 (FC); R v GGT (2007) 97 SASR 315 at [12]. 270 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 595 (CCA); R v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 at 701 (CCA). 271 R v Jeffrey 1991 Tas R 336 (CCA); Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 210; R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 at 150 (CCA) (not following R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344 (CCA); R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 (CCA) on this point in the light of Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573); R v Khoosal (1994) 71 A Crim R 127 (Vic FC); R v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 (NSW
CCA); R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510 at [54]–[61]; R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 at [37]–[38]; Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [43]; R v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189 at [24]–[26] and [98]–[107]. The merits of this position were questioned in R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 at 468–9 (CA). 272 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 210; R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406 at 422–3 (CA); R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 92 (CA). Hence it is not correct to say, as was said in R v Strudwick (1993) 99 Cr App R 326 at 331, that lies “on their own do not make a positive case”. See [17600]. 273 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193. 274 R v Khoosal (1994) 71 A Crim R 127 (Vic FC); R v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491 at 503 (CA); R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 at 465–6 (CA); R v Martin (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 at [17]–[18]. Hence the jury should be told that a lie shows consciousness of guilt only out of a combination of knowledge and fear — knowledge of some aspect of the offence and fear that the truth would implicate the accused: R v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 at 389–90 (CA). The trial judge can identify the lies by adopting an identification made by the prosecutor without repeating the lies seriatim, for the latter course may give the lies undue prominence to the potential prejudice of the accused: R v Wehlow (2001) 122 A Crim R 63 at [4] and [32]. See also R v Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616. 275 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 211. It was said in Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234 at [16] that the words in square brackets should be included in the statement of principle for the sake of clarity. Must the lies show a specific consciousness of guilt of the very offence of which the accused is convicted, as distinct from other offences charged, or available as an alternative finding? In Victoria the answer is “No”: R v Woolley (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 at 423–4 (Vic FC) (“when the conduct occurs the accused is presumably not thinking of guilt of a specific offence, much less of a series of alternatives. Rather the question is whether he is betraying a consciousness of being implicated in the actus reus”); R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406 at 415–16 (CA); R v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401 (evidence admissible on whether accused was implicated in particular conduct, but not, in general, on question of which of two alternative crimes was committed); R v TY (2006) 12 VR 557 at [21]; R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [33]–[87] (disapproving R v Heyes); R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240 at [41]–[46]; R v Panozzo (2007) 178 A Crim R 323; R v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395; R v Lam (2008) 185 A Crim R 453 at [66]–[85]; Bui v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 93 at [75]–[84]. In Queensland the position was stated thus in R v Mitchell [2008] 2 Qd R 142 at [50]: “where the false statement is capable of amounting to an acknowledgment of guilt of one or more of several offences with which the accused stands charged, it is necessary for the trial judge to point out to the jury the possibility that the consciousness of guilt revealed by the lie relates to the lesser offence”. In Western Australia it has been held unwise to attempt to lay down general rules: Meko v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 131 at [50]–[51]. In Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389 at [287]; R v Ciantar at [78] was quoted without dissent. 276 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 (applied in R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 (CA)); cf Horrell v R (1997) 6 NTLR 125 at 134. There is no requirement that a judge directing a jury in accordance with the principles stated in that case must cover each point in it; the charge should be tailored to the circumstances: R v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 (CA). 277 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 595 (CCA), citing R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 at 724 (CA); R v Ali (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257. 278 Jeffrey v R 1991 Tas R 336 at 361 and 363 (CCA). 279 R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 92 (CA); R v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 (CA). 280 R v Goodway [1993] 4 All ER 894 at 902 (CA); R v Richens [1993] 4 All ER 877 at 886–7 (CA); R v Burge [1996] 1 Cr App R 163; R v Erdei [1998] 2 VR 606 at 622 (CA) (explaining R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 91–2 (proposition 12)); R v Gallagher [1998] 2 VR 671 at 685 (CA); R v DPM [1998] 3 VR 705 (CA); R v Williams [2001] 1 Qd R 212 at [14] (CA); R v Nguyen (2001) 118 A Crim R 479; Nestorov v R (2002) 137 A Crim R 310; R v Shiers (2003) 7 VR 174; R v
Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207. 281 R v House [1994] Crim LR 683 (CA). 282 R v Tucker [1994] Crim LR 683 (CA); R v Landon [1995] Crim LR 338 (CA); R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 91 (CA); R v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491 at 501 (CCA); R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636 at 660–4 (CA). See also R v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118 at [20]; Johnstone v R (2011) 31 VR 320 at [53]. 283 Howson v R (2007) 210 FLR 288 at [94]. 284 R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153 at [94]–[105]. 285 Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234 at [17], citing Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316 at [42]–[44]; Cesan v DPP (Cth) (2007) 174 A Crim R 385 at [133]–[136]; see also Johnstone v R (2011) 31 VR 320 at [69]–[84]. In Victoria, it is ordinarily necessary for the trial judge, before final addresses commence, to identify a lie relied on as evidencing consciousness of guilt, to identify the evidence capable of demonstrating that it is a lie, to identify the issue in respect of which the prosecution relies on the lie as evidencing consciousness of guilt, and to identify the acts, facts and circumstances said to show that the lie bespeaks consciousness of guilt for the purposes of that issue: Ellis v R (2010) 30 VR 428 at [3], citing R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [81]–[85]. 286 R v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233 at [40]; R v Jovanovic (2007) 172 A Crim R 518 (CCA). 287 Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316 at [44], [109]–[112], [155], [248]–[252]; R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 92 (CA). A suggested jury direction for this type of case is given in Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234 at [23]. See also R v Burns (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 at [169] (FC). See also Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1; R v Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616; R v Ibrahim (2003) 7 VR 141; R v Baring (2005) 92 SASR 117; R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113 at [50]–[56]; R v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118 at [14]–[18] and [31]–[35]; R v Hirst (2013) 116 SASR 300 at [48]. 288 R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236. See also R v SBB (2007) 175 A Crim R 449. 289 R v B, FG (2013) 115 SASR 499 at [166]–[170]. 290 R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [48]; Brooks v R (2012) 36 VR 84 at [50]–[70]. 291 R v Wurch (1932) 58 CCC 204 (Man CA); MacDonald v R (1946) 87 CCC 257 at 267 and 269 (Can SC). The previous sentence and a half were approved in R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27 at [115]–[116]. See also at [17600]. 292 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 213. 293 R v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 at 577 (NSWCCA); R v Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309 at [14]. 294 R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240 at [31]. 295 R v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572 (FC) (consciousness of guilt as an isolated question need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt); R v El Adl [1993] 2 Qd R 195 (CA); R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 (SA FC); R v Nguyen (2001) 118 A Crim R 479; R v Ibrahim (2003) 7 VR 141; R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527 at [126] (altering crime vehicle, altering appearance and fleeing); R v Dupas (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380 at [23]–[24]; DJF v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 412 at [43]–[53]. See [33435]; R v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251 at [55] (accused’s statements that he could not get involved or play with children and that he was seeing a psychiatrist and a psychologist); Bui v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 93 at [75]–[84] (participation in burning victim’s body). 296 R v Liddy (2002) 81 SASR 22 at [247] (CCA). 297 R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410 at [175]–[186]. 298 R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410 at [201]. 299 R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 at [70] per Vincent and Nettle JJA and Vickery AJA, citing R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [44]–[69]. 300 R v Mazur (2000) 113 A Crim R 67 at [20]; R v Franklin (2001) 3 VR 9 at [67]. Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 has generated a prodigious quantity of appellate litigation, particularly in Victoria: R v Camilleri (2001) 119 A Crim R 106 at [109]. In Queensland, too, there have been
complaints about the overuse of Edwards directions: R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 at 530 (CA); R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [25]. 301 R v Camilleri (2001) 119 A Crim R 106; R v Franklin (2001) 3 VR 9. 302 R v Camilleri (2001) 119 A Crim R 106 at [107]; R v Franklin (2001) 3 VR 9 at [114]. Ormiston JA’s judgments in these two cases contain a penetrating analysis of the difficulties surrounding the use of lies, from which the majority (Phillips CJ and Brooking JA) to some degree disassociated themselves. 303 R v Howard (2005) 156 A Crim R 343. See now Practice Note (No 1 of 2004) (2004) 8 VR 475. 304 R v GGT (2007) 97 SASR 315 at [12]. 305 Aubertin v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 87 at [68] and [103]. 306 See the dictum of Cave J in R v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 at 508 cited [15055] above. 307 R v Cramp (1880) 14 Cox CC 390. 308 See also Bessela v Stern (1877) 2 CPD 265 (CA), and contrast the position where the charge is made by letter when it would often, though not invariably, be wrong to draw an adverse inference from failure to reply: Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 (CA). See [15055] above. 309 Ex parte Freeman (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 73. 310 R v Feigenbaum [1919] 1 KB 431 (CCA). See also R v McKelvey [1914] St R Qd 42 (FC). 311 R v Whitehead [1929] 1 KB 99 (CCA); R v Charavanmuttu (1930) 22 Cr App R 1; R v Naylor [1933] 1 KB 685 (CCA); R v Littleboy [1934] 2 KB 408 (CCA); R v Keeling [1942] 1 All ER 507 (CCA); People (Attorney-General) v Quinn [1955] IR 57 (CCA); Hall v R [1971] 1 All ER 322 (PC). 312 R v Smith (1985) 81 Cr App R 286; cf R v Martin [1992] 1 NZLR 313. 313 R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 (CA). 314 R v McCann [1972] Tas SR (NC 3) 269 where evidence of subsequent acts of intercourse were received as corroborative of the girl’s evidence for they indicated a guilty passion. See also R v Massey [1997] 1 Qd R 404 (CA) and [15170] n 209. And see generally [21165] below. On potentially “uncontaminated” similar fact evidence as corroboration, see R v H [1995] 2 AC 596. 315 R v S (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 at [27]. 316 R v Hartley [1941] 1 KB 5 (CCA). 317 See also R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 (CCA); Howson v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 401 at [94]; R v McKeon (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 at 361 (Qld CCA); K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227 (FC); B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599; WLC v R (2007) 19 NTLR 136 at [24]. 318 Cole v Manning (1877) 2 QBD 611 (DC of QBD); Wilcox v Gotfrey (1872) 26 LT 481 (Exch). An example of corroboration supplied by the accused’s modus operandi is provided by Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729. See too R v Viljoen 1947 (2) SA 56. 319 R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213. 320 R v Mitchell (1952) 36 Cr App R 79. 321 Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 at 159. See also Standfield v Byrne [1929] SASR 352; Ex parte Thrift (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 450 (FC). See also [15100] above. 322 R v Goddard [1962] 3 All ER 582 (CCA); R v Anslow [1962] Crim LR 101; R v O’Reilly (1967) 51 Cr App R 345; R v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 at 25 (Vic FC), or where the corroborative evidence is weak and the judge feels that the jury might properly reject it: Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534. 323 R v Jansen [1970] SASR 531 (CCA). 324 R v Evans [1965] 2 QB 295 at 302 (CCA). 325 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 328. 326 R v Turnsek [1967] VR 610 at 615–16 (FC). 327 See too R v Matthews [1972] VR 3 at 19 (FC). 328 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 328. The goal is to give such directions as are necessary in the particular circumstances to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of
justice: R v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 at 388 (CA); R v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 (CA). 329 R v Clynes (1961) 44 Cr App R 158. See also R v Maffei [1960] SASR 284 (CCA). Cf R v Adams [1965] Qd R 255 (CCA). In R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 at 51 (CCA), where the trial judge failed to define corroboration in express terms, the Full Court regretted this but considered that his charge implicitly made clear what it was. See also R v Sorby [1986] VR 753 at 781–3 (FC). See [15165] above. 330 R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at 556 (CA). 331 Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 (a general statement that it would be dangerous to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices together with a sturdy criticism of those witnesses was sufficient indication to the jury that it should look for corroboration). 332 R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 at 255–6 (CCA); R v Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300; R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 593 (CCA), citing R v Walczuk [1965] QWN 50 at 64 (CCA). 333 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 593 (CCA); R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 103 (CCA). 334 R v Matthews [1972] VR 3 at 20–2 (CCA); R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 at 255–6 (CCA); R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 593 (CCA); R v Bellino [1993] 1 Qd R 521 (CA); R v Goddard [1962] 3 All ER 582, disapproving R v Zielinski (1950) 34 Cr App R 193; R v Donald (1982) 7 A Crim R 474 at 477 (SA CCA); R v Baynon [1960] NZLR 1012 (CA). See also R v Haddad (1988) 33 A Crim R 400 at 409–11 (NSW CCA); Carr v R (2002) 11 Tas R 362 at [51]– [52] (CCA); R v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93 at [89]–[90]. 335 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 593 (CCA), citing R v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 at 98 (NSW CCA). 336 Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41. See also R v Knowlden (1981) 77 Cr App R 94 at 100; R v Cheema [1994] 1 All ER 639 (CA); R v Jones [2004] 1 Cr App R 5; R v Petkar [2004] 1 Cr App R 22. 337 Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 65, quoting R v Henning (NSW CCA), Gleeson CJ, Campbell and Mathews JJ, 11 May 1990, unreported, BC9002977). 338 R v Thomas [1959] 3 All ER 522; R v Kendrick [1997] 2 VR 699 (CA). 339 People (A-G) v Shaw [1960] IR 168 (CCA). 340 R v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722 at 727 (CA). 341 R v Price [1969] 1 QB 541 (CA); R v Perry [1970] 2 NSWR 501 (CCA). 342 R v Ensor [1989] 2 All ER 586 (CA); R v Nagy [1990] Crim LR 187 (CA); R v Royle [1993] Crim LR 57 (CA). 343 Trade Practices Commission v Vales Wine Co Pty Ltd (1996) 145 ALR 241 at 266–7 (Fed C of A). 344 R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 at 238 (Vic FC); R v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542 at 555 (CCA); R v Baker (2000) 78 SASR 103 (CCA). 345 Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439; R v FP (2007) 169 A Crim R 318 at [14]. 346 For the background see ALRC 26 [488]–[490] and [1009]–[1023], Bill clauses 133–134, Appendix C [298]–[308]; ALRC 38 [238]–[239], Bill clauses 139–140. See Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [220]. 347 R v Vawdrey (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 496–7 (NSW CCA). See also Morgan v Kazandzis (2010) 206 A Crim R 235 at [50]. 348 Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203 at [53] and [55]. 349 For example Aitchison v DPP (1996) 135 FLR 217 at 221 (ACT SC). For a discussion of the differences between the common law accomplice warning and a s 165(2)(b) warning, see Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [188]–[209]. On s 165 see generally R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166. A s 165 warning in relation to admissions differs from the common law warning about disputed confessions ([15160]): the former relates to unreliability, the latter to the vulnerability of accused persons in police custody, and the former is to be given whether or not the admissions form the only (or substantially the only) evidence of guilt: R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at
311 (NSW CCA). 350 This is not subject to the definition in s 114: R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701. The same case points out that the warning used for identification evidence adverse to the accused would not necessarily be given where the evidence favours the accused; there would be no basis for warning the jury that mistaken identification has led to erroneous convictions, and it would not be necessary, generally, to give a s 165(2)(c) warning. 351 These last two words are not in the Tasmanian Act. 352 See R v Makanjuola [1995] 3 All ER 730 at 732–3 (CA). When the reliability of a single witness is the kernel of the Crown case, it has been said that the issue of reliability is best handled by detailed directions rather than by using the s 165(2) formula, and this can constitute “good reasons” within the meaning of s 165(3): R v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 at [29]. 353 Lane v R (1996) 66 FCR 144 at 148 (Fed C of A FC). 354 R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 160 (CCA). 355 R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [57] and [70]. 356 R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 (a case where the impugned witness had received a discounted sentence in return for an undertaking to give evidence) at [98] per Howie J. Hulme J agreed at [34]. Spigelman CJ reserved his opinion at [17], and said at [16] that the word “kind” might appropriately be read down. See also R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [70]–[73] (where the impugned witness in a murder case had received immunity in relation to crimes other than murder). 357 R v Chan (2002) 131 A Crim R 66. 358 R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701. 359 R v Yammine (2002) 132 A Crim R 44 at [23]. 360 R v Yammine (2002) 132 A Crim R 44 at [22]. 361 Aouad v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 411 at [191] and [204]–[214].
[page 515]
Chapter Nine The Course of Evidence
Section 1 — Miscellaneous Procedural Matters A — INTRODUCTION Structure of the chapter [17001] The role of counsel In this chapter an account is given of the principal rules governing the examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses.1 The methods by which witnesses are brought before the court are best studied in books on practice. This is also true of the ways in which evidence may be taken before trial, the right to begin and the order of the advocates’ speeches; but they are discussed in the barest outline in this section. Section 2 is concerned with the main rules governing examination in chief, while those that control cross-examination and re-examination are mentioned in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the calling of evidence in rebuttal. The role of counsel in the course of a trial is important. In a criminal case tried by jury, the Privy Council, speaking through Lord Bingham of Cornhill, said:2 The jury’s attention must not be distracted from its central task of deciding whether, on all the evidence adduced before it, and on all the submissions made, and on the judge’s legal direction and summing up of the evidence, the guilt of the defendant is or is not established to the required standard. From this imperative several subsidiary but important rules derive. (i) Evidence should ordinarily be given without interruption by counsel. If either counsel has cause to object to any evidence adduced or about to be adduced such objection should be made promptly and shortly and the judge should rule. If such an objection prompts any extended argument or seems likely to do so, and particularly if the argument bears on the substantial merits of the case, it should take place in the absence of the jury. (ii) The procedure of the criminal courts provides opportunities for prosecuting and defence counsel to address the jury, usually before and after the calling of evidence. Counsel are not (save where the rules allow defence counsel to open the defence) permitted to address the jury at any other time, nor is it permissible under the guise of an interjection for counsel to make observations intended to influence the mind of the jury. (iii) While the duty of counsel may require a strong and direct challenge
[page 516] to the evidence of a witness, and strong criticism may properly be made of a witness or a defendant so long as that criticism is based on evidence or the absence of evidence before the court, there can never be any justification for bullying, intimidation, personal vilification or insult or for the exchange of insults between counsel. Any disparaging comment on a witness or a defendant should be reserved for a closing speech. (iv) Reference should never be made to matters which may be prejudicial to a defendant but which are not before the jury. (v) Unless the judge seeks the assistance of counsel on a point of factual detail, or makes a factual misstatement which can be quickly and uncontroversially corrected, his summing up should proceed without any interruption by counsel. If, as not infrequently happens, prosecuting or defence counsel wish to bring some suggested misdirection or omission or inaccuracy to the attention of the judge, this should be done, preferably at the close of the summing up or at some convenient interlude in the proceedings, and in the absence of the jury unless the point is one which can safely be discussed in their presence without risk of prejudice. It can never be proper for counsel to make any interjection prejudicial to the defendant when the judge is in the course of summing up to the jury.
Mutatis mutandis, and subject to particular provisions or practices in particular jurisdictions, these principles are salutary in civil jury trials as well. Though in the modern Australian civil trial without jury counsel tend to make numerous speeches, often helpful, Lord Bingham’s observations (omitting those only applicable to jury trial) have considerable force. It is convenient also to note warnings issued about the use of books or bundles of documents which are in part irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible. “Discrimination and economy should be exercised by those who prepare cases in which documentary evidence is likely to be extensive and important. Those who conduct such cases should ensure that what is actually in evidence, and its relevance and significance, are clearly identified.”3 These warnings were made in the context of unsatisfactory practices in commercial cases, but similar practices exist in personal injury actions, where the reports of medical and other experts are often tendered indiscriminately and not closely analysed by the legal representatives of the parties until an appeal takes place.
B — EVIDENCE BEFORE TRIAL Civil cases [17005] Summary
In civil cases, all the evidence is often given viva voce at the hearing; but it may be taken before trial and read at the trial when it is given by affidavit (or written statement), on commission, under letters of request, in answer to interrogatories or by way of perpetuation of testimony.
[17010] Affidavits In a number of cases, specially provided for by Rules of Court or practice directions, evidence may be by affidavit or written statement. In appropriate cases, the deponent or maker can be obliged to attend for cross-examination, and failure to attend may render the affidavit or statement incapable of being read.4 [page 517]
[17015] Commissions The court or a judge may, in any cause or matter where it shall appear necessary for the purpose of justice, make any order for the examination upon oath before the court or judge or any officer of the court, or any other person, and at any place, of any witness or person, and may empower any party to any such cause or matter to give such deposition in evidence therein, on such terms, if any, as the court or a judge may direct.5
[17020] Letters of request Letters of request may be issued to a foreign, dominion or colonial court asking one of their judges to take the evidence of a specific person within the jurisdiction of the court. They will not be issued so as to facilitate fishing expeditions.6 The depositions are remitted to the court, and may be read at the trial.
[17025] Interrogatories Interrogatories are written questions drafted by one party which the court directs that party’s adversary to answer on oath. If interrogatories are delivered, they are answered on affidavit, and appropriate parts of the
affidavit may be read at the trial as informal admissions by the responding party.7 The procedure is designed to facilitate proof of the adversary’s case and to save expense; but the court will not allow interrogatories of an oppressive nature.
[17030] Perpetuation of testimony Any person who would, under the circumstances alleged by that person to exist, become entitled, upon the happening of any future event, to any honour, title, dignity, or office, or to any estate or interest in any property, real or personal, the right or claim to which cannot be brought to trial by that person before the happening of such event, may commence an action to perpetuate any testimony which may be material for establishing such right or claim. This procedure is rarely used, but it might have to be employed by someone who is contingently entitled to property if certain facts can be proved in the future when there is a danger that the [page 518] evidence of these facts will not be available, and the court is unlikely to make a present declaration concerning future rights.8
Criminal cases [17035] Summary Depositions are taken at the preliminary examination of a person charged with an indictable offence. When the deponents attend the trial, their testimony, and not the statements in the depositions, constitutes the evidence in the case; but a limited provision is made for the use of the depositions as evidence of the facts stated therein in the absence of the deponents.
[17040] The preliminary examination Some of the witnesses at the preliminary examination may be bound over to attend the trial, and their depositions may be read as evidence if
they do not attend. This is so if the deposition was taken in the presence of the accused and the accused or the accused’s representative had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness. If these conditions are fulfilled, the deposition may also be read if the maker is proved to be dead or insane, or so ill as not to be able to travel.9 The judge must be satisfied on these matters by direct evidence and not upon evidence of belief based only on hearsay.10 Where the deposition is read the judge must warn the jury that they have not had the benefit of seeing the witness and hearing the evidence tested in cross-examination. In the appropriate case, too, their attention should be drawn to conflicts between the deposition and other evidence which it has not been possible to explore in cross-examination.11
[17045] Coronial and other depositions When depositions are taken by a coroner, there does not appear to be any similar statutory provision for their being read at any trial that takes place on the coroner’s inquisition. It has been held that the deposition of a dead deponent might be read if it was signed by him and the coroner, and the accused had an opportunity of cross-examination.12 A deposition may be taken out of court by a magistrate from anyone who can give information with regard to an indictable offence if that person is dangerously ill and it is impracticable to take the deposition in the ordinary way. The deposition may be read as evidence at the preliminary examination. In addition, a justice may take a [page 519] deposition from someone who is dangerously ill, for use at the trial. The person against whom the deposition is to be read in evidence must have been given reasonable notice and must have had an opportunity of crossexamining the deponent.13 The procedure for the taking of such depositions is a matter of statutory provision in each jurisdiction.14
[17050] Victorian pre-trial criminal procedures
In response to concern expressed at the length of certain criminal trials, the Victorian legislature has enacted a scheme of pre-trial procedures which involve a substantial departure from those of the traditional common law criminal trials. The apparent intent of the procedures is to identify before trial the real issues between the Crown and the accused in much the same way as interlocutory procedures in civil trials do. See [3190] and [17130].
C — ORDERING WITNESSES OUT OF COURT Right to stay in court until contrary order [17055] Orders and consequences of breach In practice, a person who is to testify often remains outside the court until called to give evidence so as not to be able to tailor the evidence to what has gone before. But there is no rule of law requiring this15 if the judge has not exercised the discretion to make an order, on the application of either party, that witnesses remain outside and beyond the hearing of the court until required to give evidence.16 Whether or not witnesses are to remain in court being solely a matter for the discretion of the trial judge, judges vary on that as on many other matters. If I may be purely personal for one moment, my own preference (particularly in cases which, if not actually arising under the criminal jurisdiction, yet, like contempt proceedings, are certainly on the fringe or savour of a criminal prosecution) is for the witnesses to be out of court. But I know other judges who take exactly the opposite view; they prefer the witnesses to remain in court so that they may observe their reaction when they hear the evidence of other witnesses.17
The judge may also order a witness who is being examined to leave the court while legal argument takes place about that witness’s evidence.18 However, there is doubt about whether the parties may be ordered from the court if they behave properly; in practice they often remain, since they have a right to remain to instruct [page 520] counsel or conduct their own case.19 And a solicitor for a party may
remain, “his assistance being in most cases absolutely necessary to the proper conduct of a cause”.20 Experts are generally permitted to remain in court, particularly in criminal proceedings, or where there is or may be a conflict of expert evidence.21 A witness familiar with complicated exhibits may well be allowed to remain.22 So too may corroborating police witnesses. Where a witness disobeys the order, the court has no discretion to exclude the evidence in either civil23 or criminal24 cases. The opponent of the party calling the witness is at liberty to comment on the weight of the evidence. Where a party is a company, the practice is for the court to exempt a representative of the company from the order. The above discussion assumes that oral evidence is always given by witnesses present before the judge and the parties. In modern conditions that need not be so. In most jurisdictions there are detailed provisions for the giving of evidence by audiovisual or audio links.25 Unless foreign law forbids this, there are no questions of sovereignty or comity between nations to be considered.26 There is no common law right for evidence to be given by telephone.27 [page 521]
D — THE RIGHT TO BEGIN Opening addresses [17060] The function of an opening The plaintiff, the prosecutor or their respective advocates often open the case in the sense that they explain the issues to the court. It is a significant facility, but sometimes an overrated one. There is no doubt about the importance of opening statements in providing the jury with a road-map to the often confusing presentation of evidence that is characteristic of the common law trial — some witnesses testify only to links in an elaborate chain the end of which is not visible from their testimony, witnesses are often called out of order to accommodate their schedules, and the smooth development of each side’s case is interrupted by cross-examination. But
acknowledgment of the utility of opening statements is a far cry from supposing the jury mesmerised by their rhetoric, especially since the judge will have reminded the jury repeatedly that what lawyers say in a trial is not evidence.28 Questions sometimes arise concerning this right. The defendant would be entitled to open in any case in which the defendant has the right to begin calling evidence. In criminal cases where there is a plea of not guilty,29 the Crown always has the right to begin calling witnesses because there must invariably be some issue upon which the evidential burden of proof is borne by the prosecution, unless appropriate formal admissions have been made by the accused.30 In civil cases, the plaintiff has the right to begin if the plaintiff bears the evidential burden on any issue raised by the pleadings,31 including the quantum of damages.32
[17065] Order of speeches The incidence of the right to begin may affect the order in which the advocates’ speeches are made to the court. In civil cases, assuming that the plaintiff has this right, the plaintiff opens the case to the court,33 calls witnesses and delivers a final [page 522] address if the defendant does not call witnesses. The defendant then replies and thus secures the last word. If the defendant calls witnesses, the plaintiff does not address at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, but the defendant opens, calls witnesses and addresses, leaving the plaintiff with the right of reply.34 The foregoing procedure is reversed if the defendant has the right to begin calling evidence. That describes a traditional common law approach: other approaches are employed in other jurisdictions and in different places. In Australia it is common now, even where the defendant calls evidence, for the plaintiff to make a final address, then the defendant, and then the plaintiff to deliver a speech in reply. In criminal cases, the prosecutor opens35 and calls evidence. Sometimes this is by statutory right (eg Qld: Criminal Code s 619(1); Tas: Criminal Code s 371(a)); sometimes it rests on the common law. The order of
speeches thereafter varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions an accused is entitled36 or obliged37 to make a statement immediately after the prosecutor’s opening and before the prosecutor calls evidence. In New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania, after the prosecution case has closed, if the accused intends to give or call evidence, the accused may open the case for the defence.38 In New South Wales and Tasmania this is so even if an address was made after the prosecutor’s opening.39 In New South Wales the accused may address the jury after the close of the evidence for the defence and any evidence in reply by the prosecution and after the prosecutor has made, or declined to make, a closing address to the jury.40 In Queensland if the accused calls evidence, the prosecution closing address comes after the accused’s.41 In South Australia, the prosecution’s final address always precedes the accused’s.42 In Tasmania, if no defence witness other than the accused is called, the defence addresses after the prosecutor;43 if a defence witness other than the accused is called, the accused addresses before the prosecution.44 In [page 523] Victoria, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, the accused addresses last unless in that address a fact is asserted that is not supported by evidence, in which event the court may permit the prosecution to give an address in reply to that assertion.45 In the Northern Territory, where the accused is unrepresented, the prosecution addresses last; where the accused has counsel, that counsel addresses last if the defence calls no witnesses to the facts except the accused, otherwise the prosecution addresses last.46 In some jurisdictions47 other than Victoria48 there is a rule of practice, but not a rule of law,49 that where the accused is unrepresented the prosecution does not make a final address, unless the case is complex50 or the accused has addressed for a long time.51 While counsel for the prosecution are entitled to urge the prosecution case with vigour, they must “do so temperately and with restraint, bearing constantly in mind that [their] primary function is to aid in the attainment of justice, not convictions.”52 The following are examples of behaviour which the courts censure in prosecution addresses, which may lead to
special judicial directions, and which may lead to the discharge of the jury or the allowing of an appeal: references to material which is not in evidence; intemperate or inflammatory comments tending to arouse prejudice or emotion in the jury; comments belittling or ridiculing part of the accused’s case; impugning the credit of a prosecution witness who was not given an opportunity to deal with the matter in evidence; and conveying counsel’s personal opinions.53 Another example is asking the jury to consider whether the accused has answered various questions, whether rhetorical or not.54 Prosecution counsel should not address the jury about the warnings the judge will give or seek to minimise or undercut them;55 nor about recent changes in the law.56 Prosecution counsel should not interrupt the defence address, but rather raise difficulties with the court in the absence of the jury during a scheduled adjournment with a view to the court inviting defence counsel to correct any error, or making an appropriate [page 524] comment at the time or during the summing up, or permitting the prosecution to exercise any statutory right to give an address in reply.57 The prosecutor must not invite the jury to accept any argument that does not carry conviction in his or her own mind, or that is misleading, unfair or otherwise unsustainable, such as an unfair application of the rule in Browne v Dunn.58 Similar principles apply to defence counsel as well.59 In civil cases counsel have a freer hand, but counsel are obliged not to abuse their privileges by making “damaging irrelevant” statements, or statements not capable of being substantiated by evidence, and it is not enough that counsel hope to be able to substantiate these statements “out of the mouth of a witness for the other side”.60 Vices which have led to an order for a new trial (apart from vices in cross-examination [17435]–[17460], [17485] and [17505], and apart from those just mentioned in relation to counsel for the prosecution) include: introducing prejudicial extraneous material, failing to fulfil promises to the judge to correct errors made in address to the jury, recounting irrelevant personalised anecdotes, failing to limit arguments advanced to the evidence adduced, giving evidence from the bar table and delivering
personal attacks on opposing counsel.61 In both civil and criminal cases, the above procedure may be modified to include a submission that there is no case to answer, arguments about the admissibility of evidence,62 or arguments on points of law.63
E — THE CALLING OF WITNESSES AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE Essential feature of adversary system [17070] Outline The essential feature of the adversary or accusatorial system of justice is the questioning of witnesses by the parties or their representatives, summoned for the most part by them, and called mainly in the order of their choice before a judge acting as umpire rather than as inquisitor.
[17075] Order of calling witnesses In civil cases the duty of deciding what witnesses should be called and in what order they should be called is solely a matter for counsel.64 Where the evidence is [page 525] given by affidavit, it is in counsel’s decision as to what order counsel presents the deponents for cross-examination in.65 However, on the application of cross-examining counsel the judge may for some good reason defer a particular cross-examination.66 In criminal cases the common law rule is that the accused should give evidence first67 unless a formal or non-controversial witness is interposed by counsel;68 or it is convenient for some background matter to be established before the accused testifies, in the interests of easier comprehension of the accused’s testimony;69 or it is convenient for a defendant named second on the indictment to give evidence before the one named first, for example, because the second-named defendant had a better knowledge of the
documents.70 However, though it is undesirable for the defendant’s evidence to be given after other witnesses, that evidence could not be excluded as a matter of law,71 though it is open to a strong comment that the defendant’s evidence may have been tailored to fit in with that of preceding witnesses. The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 231(4) makes it plain that the accused has a right to give evidence at any stage during the defence case in jury trials where the defence calls witnesses in addition to the accused. On the other hand, the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 144(4) provides that if the accused intends to give evidence, he or she must do so before any other witness called by the accused, “unless the court permits otherwise for a good reason”. The order in which prosecution witnesses are called is a matter for the Crown prosecutor, and can only be reviewed on appeal as part of an allegation that the trial miscarried through unfairness.72 If a particular order of witnesses creates problems for the cross-examiner, witnesses may be recalled for further cross-examination.73 The recall of a witness whose evidence is concluded is a matter requiring the leave of the trial judge. The overriding principle applying to that discretionary decision is whether the interests of justice require leave to be granted or refused. The party seeking leave need not show that that party has been taken by surprise. Ordinarily the interests of justice favour the grant of leave where the evidence sought to be adduced had been overlooked and the other party would not be prejudiced by the fact that the additional evidence is to be given after cross-examination and reexamination of the witness has been completed. On the other hand, sound reasons for rejecting the application might be found in the circumstance that counsel had deliberately refrained from leading the evidence when the witness was being examined in chief in the hope of gaining some tactical advantage, or it [page 526] appeared that the opposing party would suffer prejudice if leave were granted.74 A judge will permit an accused person to be recalled only to deal with matters which have arisen since that accused person gave evidence if that person could not reasonably have anticipated them and it
is in the interests of justice that the person be recalled. It is only rarely that a judge should permit an accused person to be recalled so that that person may resile from evidence already given and advance a version of events which, though new, was available to that person when that person was first in the witness box.75 Section 11(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that the power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by the legislation, except so far as it provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. There is no provision on the order of witnesses or the calling of witnesses by the court. Section 46 deals with a limited aspect of the recall of witnesses (ie persons who have given oral evidence either in court or by some means such as video link, not persons whose evidence has only been in the form of written statements):76 [17460].
[17080] Power of judge to call witnesses in civil cases There is authority that in civil cases a judge (or umpire) may not call a witness without the consent of both parties, though the position in Australia is controversial.77 The prohibition, if it exists, does not apply to the special case of motions to commit for contempt.78 Nor does it apply where the witness is recalled by the judge.79 There is authority that it does not apply in relation to expert evidence in infant custody cases.80 Other exceptions have been suggested: where a party has no, or incompetent, legal representation.81 It has been said that the judge may direct a party to call additional evidence (though this is to be doubted, or limited to the particular instance of an official assignee in bankruptcy), but that the preferable course is to suggest to the appropriate party that the party apply for leave [page 527] to reopen that party’s case.82 Under some rules of court judges are given power to call witnesses of their own motion.83 That power is not conferred by s 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and its counterparts.84
It has been said that even where the judge has power, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which there would be a duty to exercise it.85
[17085] Power of judge to call witnesses in criminal cases The position in criminal cases is somewhat obscure, but appears to be as follows.86
[17090] Exceptional nature of power (1) A judge presiding at a criminal trial has power to call a witness of the judge’s own motion and without the consent of the parties.87 The power is exercisable only “in the most exceptional circumstances”88 where the judge considers the interests of justice make it necessary. It is a power to be exercised carefully, and with full regard to the ordinary rule that the parties and their advisers, who will be more familiar with the background circumstances, should not ordinarily suffer judicial intrusion into their conduct of the adversarial contest.89
[page 528] The judge’s power to call a witness should not be elevated into a duty to be carried out over the objection of defence counsel.90 It would not be proper for the prosecution to decline to call a Crown witness for tactical reasons in the expectation that the witness would eventually be called by the trial judge and become available for cross-examination.91 More is required to establish “most exceptional circumstances” than the prosecutor’s failure to call a witness.92
[17095] Time of calling witness (2) (a) It has been said that in Australia,93 unlike England,94 the witness can be called even after the jury has retired, though particular care is needed in deciding whether to do so. (b) In Australia,95 and according to some English cases,96 but unlike others,97 there are no fetters on the judge calling a witness after the defence case analogous to those which bind the Crown.
[17100] Evidence in chief and cross-examination (3) When the judge calls a witness, the judge may either elicit the evidence in chief, or invite (but not require) one of the parties to assist by eliciting it. Whichever course is taken, both the Crown and the accused should be afforded an unrestricted right of cross-examination, unless the judge, as a matter of discretion (for example, if the witness has supported the Crown case), thinks it just to confine to some extent the Crown’s cross-examination.98
[17105] Power to elucidate evidence (4) It is permissible within fairly broad limits99 to ask questions to elucidate a witness’s answers, and to recall witnesses for the same purpose (a power normally but not necessarily exercised in response to a request from the jury).100 The judge’s power to direct the recall of witnesses may be exercised so that either the judge101 [page 529] or the parties102 may question them. There is little point in recalling a witness merely to repeat that witness’s evidence, at least where a shorthand note exists; where there is none, it is within power for a judge to recall a witness for that purpose.103 Recall may occur after the completion of addresses.104
[17110] Jury questions (5) Apart from questions which a judge might personally wish to ask a witness, it is permissible for a judge, at the request of the jury, to ask questions of a witness where they are relevant and admissible and where the judge thinks it appropriate? While there is no rule of law prohibiting the asking of questions directly of a witness,105 the practice of permitting a juror to ask questions directly of a witness with the leave of the court106 is out of favour in New South Wales: the proper course is for the questions to be suggested to the judge who will put them if the judge thinks it right to do so.107 The practice is permitted in a limited and qualified way in
Victoria.108
[17115] Crown prosecutor’s responsibility for calling witnesses (6) The Crown prosecutor alone bears the responsibility of deciding whether a person will be called as a witness for the Crown.109 The decision is often called discretionary, but that only means that the judgment is a personal one. Hence it is not open to appeal like a judicial discretion or review like an administrative discretion.110 It flows from the nature of the criminal trial—an accusatorial process in which the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.111 Failure to call a witness who should have been called will only lead to a successful appeal if it occasioned a miscarriage of justice.112 And discussion of the prosecutor’s role as a “duty” is to be understood as advice about the prosecutor’s task, not as stating a rule of law formulating a duty owed by the prosecutor to the accused.113 [page 530]
[17120] Content of prosecutor’s duty The High Court said of the prosecutor’s responsibility for deciding whom to call as a witness:114 It is not only a lonely responsibility but also a heavy one. A decision whether or not to call a person whose name appears on the indictment and from whom the defence wish to lead evidence must be made with due sensitivity to the dictates of fairness towards an accused person. A refusal to call a witness will be justified only by reference to the overriding interests of justice. Such occasions are likely to be rare. The unreliability of the evidence will only suffice where there are identifiable circumstances which clearly establish it; it would not be enough that the prosecutor merely has a suspicion about the unreliability of the evidence. In most cases where a prosecutor does not wish to lead evidence from a person named on the indictment, but the defence wishes that person to be called, it will be sufficient for the prosecutor simply to call the person so that he may be cross-examined by the defence and then, if necessary, be reexamined.115
In general, the prosecution should call “[a]ll available witnesses … whose evidence is necessary to unfold the narrative and give a complete account of the events upon which the prosecution is based”.116 It is erroneous to suppose that “a prosecutor must call witnesses irrespective of
considerations of number and of reliability, or that a prosecutor ought to discharge the functions of both prosecution and defence”.117 It may be in the interests of justice that a witness should not be called by the Crown so that that witness can be cross-examined by the Crown.118 A prosecutor need not proffer a witness merely to give the defence material with which to attack the credit of other witnesses on which the Crown relies.119 However, witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be called by the prosecution, whether in the result the effect of their testimony is for or against the prosecution case.120 Where a witness’s evidence is capable of belief it is the prosecution’s duty to call that witness even though it is inconsistent with the case which the prosecution is attempting to [page 531] prove.121 It is the prosecution’s duty in general to call “all witnesses whose testimony is necessary to put before the court the complete story of the events on which the prosecution is based”, subject to there not being some good contrary reason, for example, “that the witness is clearly untruthful … or the numbers to be called would be unreasonably great”,122 or that the witness is in the accused’s camp,123 or that the witnesses whom the accused wishes to call would confuse the jury by supporting a version of events contrary to two already advanced by the accused,124 or that the witness is a co-conspirator with the accused “and where at least some accused having like interests to an accused calling the witness will be able to cross-examine the witness”.125 The prosecutor must adopt some technique, such as a conference with the witness, to enable an appropriate view of the witness to be formed.126 The interests of justice do not require in every case that the prosecution should call all experts who are known to have expressed opinions on a matter in issue, but the circumstances of particular cases may cause a miscarriage of justice if it does not.127 The prosecution may call a witness if it is open to the prosecutor to form a view that part of the witness’s evidence is capable of belief even though another part is not relied on.128 The prosecutor should have in court all available witnesses129 on the back of the indictment, so that they may be called by the defence if desired; if so called, they are defence witnesses.130
Where the Crown calls a witness whose evidence, whether given in chief in answer to Crown questions or in cross-examination in answer to defence questions, it does not accept, care must be taken in the extent to which the Crown criticises the witness in address in view of the difficulties in the way of putting those criticisms to the witness.131
[17125] Court control of prosecutor The court can interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion if it has been “influenced by some oblique motive”132 —“a consideration not relevant to his proper task”.133 The relevant interference does not include directing the prosecutor to call the witness. It can take the following forms. [page 532] (2) The trial judge may but is not obliged to question the prosecutor in order to discover the reasons which lead the prosecutor to decline to call a particular person. He is not called upon to adjudicate the sufficiency of those reasons.134 (3) Whilst at the close of the Crown case the trial judge may properly invite the prosecutor to reconsider such a decision and have regard to the implications as then appear to the judge at that stage of the proceedings, he cannot direct the prosecutor to call a particular witness.135 (4) When charging the jury, the trial judge may make such comment as he then thinks to be appropriate with respect to the effect which the failure of the prosecutor to call a particular person as a witness would appear to have had on the course of the trial. No doubt that comment, if any, will be affected by such information as to the prosecutor’s reasons for his decision as the prosecutor thinks it proper to divulge. (5) … (6) A decision of the prosecutor not to call a particular person as a witness will only constitute a ground for setting aside a conviction if, when viewed against the conduct of the trial taken as a whole, it is seen to give rise to a miscarriage of justice.136
[17130] Additional principles The judicial directions as to the consequences of a witness not having been called may include a direction as to the possibility of an inference that the witness would not have assisted the Crown case,137 and may include a direction as to the unfairness of the position in which the accused has been placed.138 The following additional courses appear to be open if the prosecution
will not call a witness: (a) The judge may call the witness, subject to the constraints indicated above. (b) The judge may adjourn the trial to enable the attendance of the witness to be procured139 if requested.140 (c) The judge may discharge the jury and remand the accused for retrial.141 (d) The judge may dismiss the case as an abuse of process: a power to be exercised sparingly, and only if there is no alternative course such as the judge calling the witness.142 Some additional principles may be noted. First, where the Crown calls a witness who did not give evidence at the committal proceedings, the accused should be given reasonable notice of the Crown’s intention to call the witness and should be furnished with a proof of the witness’s [page 533] proposed evidence.143 In Victoria, evidence not disclosed prior to the trial in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 may be introduced by a party with the leave of the court even though it represents a departure from the case disclosed prior to the trial: s 233(1) of that Act. The presiding judge or, with the leave of the court, a party, may comment on the departure: s 237. Leave is only to be granted if the comment is relevant and not likely to produce a miscarriage of justice: s 237(2).144 Secondly, where the Crown has in its possession the statement of a person who can give material (that is, relevant and admissible) evidence, but decides not to call that person, it must make that person available so that the defence can call that person if it wishes. In England it must also supply the defence with a copy of the statement taken.145 In Australia it has not yet been held necessary to supply the statement,146 but if a miscarriage of justice results from a failure to give the accused the witness’s statement an appeal will succeed.147 Thirdly, where the Crown has in its possession a statement of a credible witness who can speak of material facts which tend to show the accused’s innocence, it must either call that witness or make the witness’s statement
available to the defence.148 [page 534] Fourthly, in summary proceedings the prosecution is obliged to notify the defendant of additional witnesses who are known to the prosecution but whom the prosecution did not intend to call.149 Fifthly, where a prosecution witness gives evidence materially inconsistent with an oral or written statement made by that witness the prosecution should inform the defence — and, if there is more than one defendant, all of them, whether or not the prior statement favours a particular defendant150 — and provide copies of the statements to the defence.151 Sixthly, where a prosecution witness is of known bad character, it is the duty of the prosecution to inform the defence of that fact and of the material on which it is based (for example, convictions), but there is no duty to examine every record to see if anything exists which might affect the witness’s character.152 Yet though the prosecution may in its own interests tell the jury the witness is of bad character, there is no duty on the prosecution or the court to do so: it is a matter carrying advantages and risks properly to be determined only by the defence.153 Seventhly, in England the defence is entitled to be informed of any convictions and disciplinary findings against any police officers or other persons involved in the case, together with transcripts of any Court of Appeal decisions in which convictions had been quashed, or trials stopped or discontinued, by reason of misconduct or lack of veracity on the part of identified police officers or other persons.154 The prosecution duty is less at the stage of committal than at the stage of trial. Committal proceedings are a safeguard, to ensure that the citizen does not have to stand trial without a prima facie case being shown; they are not a dress rehearsal in which the defence can cross-examine prosecution witnesses with a view to using the results with advantage at the trial. Hence the prosecution has a discretion not to call witnesses, even important witnesses, in committal proceedings.155 In some jurisdictions the problems just discussed are regulated by statute.156
[page 535]
[17135] Powers of and restraints on the judge The following remarks of a Scottish judge are equally true for trials under the Anglo-Australian system.157 Judges sometimes flatter themselves by thinking that their function is the ascertainment of truth. This is so only in a very limited sense. Our system of administering justice in civil affairs proceeds on the footing that each side, working at arm’s length, selects its own evidence. Each side’s selection of its own evidence may, for various reasons, be partial in every sense of the term. Much may depend on the diligence of the original investigators, or on the luck of finding witnesses or on the skill and judgment of those preparing the case. At the [trial] itself whom to call, what to ask, when to stop and so forth are matters of judgment. A witness of great value on one point may have to be left out because he is dangerous on another. Even during the progress of the proof values change, treasured material is scrapped and fresh avenues feverishly explored. It is on the basis of two carefully selected versions that the Judge is finally called upon to adjudicate…. He is at the mercy of contending sides whose whole object is not to discover truth but to get his judgment. That judgment must be based only on what he is allowed to hear. He may suspect that witnesses who know the “truth” have never left the witness-room for the witness-box because neither side dares risk them, but the most that he can do is to comment on their absence.
However, although it is true that there must be no descent into the dust of the arena, the power to call and recall a witness in criminal cases serves as a reminder that the Anglo-Australian judge is more than an umpire in the strict sense of the word.158 It is, of course, always proper for a judge — and it is his duty — to put questions with a view to elucidating an obscure answer or when he thinks that the witness has misunderstood a question put to him by counsel. If there are matters which the judge considers have not been sufficiently cleared up or questions which he himself thinks ought to have been put, he can, of course, take steps to see that the deficiency is made good. It is, I think, generally more convenient to do this when counsel has finished his questions or is passing to a new subject. It must always be borne in mind that the judge does not know what is in counsel’s brief and has not the same facilities as counsel for an effective examination in chief or cross-examination. In cross-examination, for instance, experienced counsel will see just as clearly as the judge that, for example, a particular question will be a crucial one. But it is for counsel to decide at what stage he will put the question, and the whole strength of the cross-examination may be destroyed if the judge, in his desire to get to what seems to him to be the crucial point, himself intervenes and prematurely puts the question himself.159
Further, the judge may exercise a very considerable influence over the jury,160 the judge has a discretion to exclude certain types of evidence161 and the judge ought
[page 536] to intervene to prevent improper addresses to the jury.162 In the system of trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society at large, as happens, we believe, in some foreign countries. Even in England, however, a judge is not a mere umpire to answer the question “How’s that?” His object, above all, is to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law … The judge’s part … is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of witnesses where it is necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves seemly [sic] and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of a judge and assumes the robe of an advocate; and the change does not become him well.163
In particular, the judge should not cross-examine a witness while the witness is being examined in chief by counsel,164 particularly where the witness is the accused.165 That is because: there are cases in which it is of the utmost importance to the defence that the examination-inchief of the accused in the witness box shall be conducted by counsel who has decided, having considered his instructions, how, by asking questions, to bring out before the jury the testimony of the accused in its most persuasive and effective way. That often calls for very great judgment. It has been correctly stated that the judgment and skills with which the evidence-in-chief of a witness is conducted may be of crucial significance for the purpose of giving the jury a clear appreciation of the case for the accused put at its strongest.166
The judge is entitled to intervene to clarify the evidence. This does not necessarily require the judge to question the witness. The judge may point out, in the absence of the jury, evidential ambiguities or obscurities to counsel. Judicial questioning involves the risk of the judge becoming identified with one side or the other.167 However, it is proper for the judge to clarify the evidence, and even go beyond clarification by putting questions arising out of the evidence.168 The judge should not interrupt the cross-examination of a witness for this may [page 537] make the cross-examiner’s task too hard169 particularly if the interruptions are very numerous.170 The judge may ask a question to clarify an
ambiguity,171 or a confused answer;172 to establish a point of detail;173 to ensure the accuracy of the judge’s notes;174 to correct mistakes made by counsel or witness;175 to ensure that in its proper chronological context each topic is fully developed in evidence;176 to ensure that the witness’s answers can be followed in their immediate context and in relation to earlier relevant evidence;177 and to ensure that the jury is following the evidence.178 If the judge wishes to ask a question to clear up an ambiguity, it is more likely to be helpful if asked at, or close to, the time when the ambiguity first became apparent.179 Subject to those considerations, it is best for judicial questioning not to begin until that of counsel has finished.180 The judge should be wary of employing leading questions to elicit evidence favourable to the party calling the witness, since the witness is even likelier to agree with the judge than with counsel for the party calling the witness: “[m]any witnesses have a subconscious urge to give the judge the answer which they think he wants.”181 The judge should not put questions which suggest that the judge is satisfied of the accused’s guilt,182 or has taken sides,183 as by asking the accused hostile questions after reexamination repetitive of those asked in cross-examination.184 The judge should not endeavour to fill gaps in the prosecution case, or ask questions to raise an issue which the prosecution and the defence have left alone, or ask leading questions to throw doubt on the witness’s credit, particularly if the witness is the accused.185 The judge may also ask “questions, and searching questions at that, directed to the merits of the case”, but the conduct of questioning is not to be taken out of the hands of counsel and the proper conduct and presentation of their cases is not to be prevented.186 In [page 538] particular, hostile cross-examination is to be avoided by the judge.187 However, there is more legitimate scope for curial questioning when a party is unrepresented188 (although questioning the accused trenchantly is to be avoided where the prosecution has been doing so)189 or the prosecution is represented by a police prosecutor without formal legal training.190 While mere discourtesy of the judge to counsel will not ground a successful appeal, discourtesy amounting to an invitation to the jury to
disregard what is said and amounting to active and public interference with counsel will: there is a distinction between discourtesy to counsel and discourtesy to the case of that counsel’s client.191 The task of restoring the credit of a Crown witness or of destroying the credit of the accused or one of the accused’s witnesses should always be left by the judge to the Crown prosecutor.192 On the other hand, a judge: is not a bump on a log, nor even a referee at a prizefight. He has not only the right, but he has the duty to participate in the examination of witnesses when necessary to bring out matters that have been insufficiently developed by counsel. He is in charge of the trial and may exercise his control to assure that the jury is not [misled] by unfair phrasing of questions by counsel.193
Further, judicial interventions can be meritorious by assisting a party or a witness criticised in that an opportunity is afforded for a correction of a preliminary judicial view which is adverse.194 Greater latitude in questioning is permitted to a judge sitting alone than to a judge sitting with a jury.195 The judge has a responsibility to ensure that the trial is not prolonged by irrelevant cross-examination. Hence the judge may properly interrupt counsel to inquire as to the relevance of a particular question or line of questions. The judge has power to reject a question without objection, but it is only to be exercised with circumspection and in limited circumstances. These include but are not limited to instances where the question is offensive or obviously calculated to do no more than unfairly prejudice the witness (or the party who has called that witness);196 where the form of the question involves unfairness to the witness (which other counsel may not have detected);197 where the question is likely, because of latent or patent [page 539] ambiguity or for any other reason, to elicit an answer which could be misleading;198 and where the asking of the question represents a flouting of some earlier ruling on admissibility.199 The point is that excessive rejection of questions without objection may lengthen the hearing (because all counsel are content to have the evidence elicited in that way), may give the appearance of the judge having descended into the arena and become an ally of one of the combatants, and may undesirably interrupt
the flow of cross-examination200 or evidence in chief.201 The same impression may flow from abuse of the judge’s power to suggest the calling of further evidence.202 The remarks of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in a Privy Council appeal from a criminal trial by jury have force, mutatis mutandis, for all trials:203 It is the responsibility of the judge to ensure that the proceedings are conducted in an orderly and proper manner which is fair to both prosecution and defence. He must neither be nor appear to be partisan. If counsel begin to misbehave he must at once exert his authority to require the observance of accepted standards of conduct. He should not disparage the defendant in the course of the evidence. Nor should he disparage defence counsel, since jurors inevitably tend to identify clients with their counsel. Sometimes a trial judge may have briefly to check or rebuke counsel. If however he has occasion, in any serious or sustained manner, to criticise the conduct of the defence case or to criticise or rebuke defending counsel, it will usually be prudent for the judge to do so in the absence of the jury and he should ensure that his disapproval of or irritation with counsel does not affect the jury’s judgment. If he chooses to express personal opinions in the course of the summing up, he should do so in a restrained, moderate and balanced way.
The judicial duty to conduct a fair trial includes a duty to behave courteously.204 Aggressive behaviour by judges which may unsettle accused persons just before they enter the witness box can lead to successful appeals.205
Section 2 — Examination in Chief A — INTRODUCTION Character testimony [17140] General The object of examination in chief is to obtain testimony in support of the version of the facts in issue or relevant to the issue for which the party calling the witness contends. The testimony must be based on personal knowledge — on what the witness saw, heard, felt, touched or tasted. It must be testimony as to facts, not inferences. Testimony as to opinions or inferences or beliefs may, exceptionally, be permitted if the rules as to opinion evidence are satisfied, or if a contrary course [page 540] would be over-pedantic.206 The facts in issue and the concept of relevancy have already been discussed, while the various exclusionary rules which prohibit the proof of certain facts are considered elsewhere in this work. At present the primary concern is with the manner in which witnesses must be treated who can, ex hypothesi, give relevant and admissible evidence. Generally speaking they may not be asked leading questions, and, although a witness may refresh memory by referring to documents previously prepared by that witness, a witness cannot usually be asked about former statements of that witness with a view to their becoming evidence in the case or in order to demonstrate the consistency of that witness. A party may call a second witness to contradict a first witness called by that party who has given unfavourable evidence with regard to a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, but a party may only discredit a witness called by that party if the judge considers the witness to be hostile.
There follows a discussion of leading questions, refreshing memory, previous statements of witnesses consistent with their present testimony and unfavourable or hostile witnesses.
[17145] Question-and-answer system The evidence of witnesses in chief is elicited by means of questions and answers, not by the delivery of a speech. This is a characteristic feature of the English trial, which is made essential by the exclusionary rules of evidence. If a witness were allowed to say what he wished, as in the Continental practice,207 a rule such as the exclusion of hearsay would be impossible to operate. The question-and-answer method gives counsel control of what the witness says, which makes for order and relevance but places upon counsel a considerable responsibility to present the evidence in a fair and complete manner.208
The question-and-answer system can have the drawback of upsetting witnesses by preventing them from telling their stories in their own way: it may tend to undermine their composure, their powers of memory and of convincing and clear narration. On the other hand “a witness given free rein to his tongue may waste a lot of time in irrelevancies. And proper questioning may give a proper lift to the timid or forgetful, or a proper check to the biased”.209 However, s 29(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that a court may, on its own motion or on the application of the party that called the witness, direct that the witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. Section 29(3) provides that the direction may include directions about the way in which the evidence is to be given in that form.210 The limits of one restriction on the form of testimony should be noted. Witnesses are commonly interrupted as they endeavour to recount conversations in indirect speech, and urged to give the actual words used. This is a counsel of virtue, but it is questionable whether it is a rule of law. A witness may give the witness’s best recollection of the substance, effect or purport of what was said, even though the [page 541]
exact words cannot be recollected, and the witness may also recount the impression made on the witness by whatever words were used.211 If so, it is hard to see why witnesses must be compelled into uttering untruths on oath by giving a form of words in direct speech with which they are not happy and which they cannot actually recollect in preference to their own words in indirect speech, so long as mere conclusions are avoided. “The rule that evidence of conversations shall be given in direct speech is, in Australia a rule of practice rather than of law; a practice that is probably now disregarded as often as it is followed”.212 This is particularly so where the conversations took place a long time ago.213 Similarly, there is no provision in the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) or 2011 (ACT) or Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) which makes inadmissible evidence of a conversation given in indirect speech, though the possibility of discretionary rejection under s 135 is available.214 Despite s 29, in civil cases evidence may be given by affidavit, or by statement the truth of which is sworn to or affirmed if the witness enters the witness box. In contrast, in criminal trials evidence is “ordinarily” given orally.215 Section 26 of those Acts provides that the court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to: (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses. The court might permit the evidence of witnesses to be given as a group, and permit them to sit or stand as a group while testifying.216 It might permit them all to swear an oath or make an affirmation at the outset, and then might permit counsel for the party calling them to switch questioning from one to another, rather than extracting the whole of the evidence in chief of one witness before moving to another.217 But it is unlikely that the cross-examiner will be allowed to do likewise.218 The court may allow witnesses to consult with other persons without those other persons themselves becoming witnesses.219 Section 26(a) is subject to s 192.220
B — LEADING QUESTIONS
The ban and its exceptions [17150] Definition and illustration A leading question is one which either suggests the answer desired, or assumes [page 542] the existence of disputed facts.221 An example of the first type would be the following question put to one of the plaintiff’s witnesses in a runningdown case: “Did you see another car coming very fast from the opposite direction?”222 It should be split up into something like the following: “Did you notice any other traffic? Which direction was it coming from? At what pace was it going?” Typical examples of the second type of leading question would be “What did you do after Smith hit you?”, or asking why a person did something before having established that he did it, or asking how much was paid before proving that payment had been made, or asking when a man stopped beating his wife without establishing that he had started doing so. Lord Ellenborough once said that if questions are asked to which the answer “yes” or “no” would be conclusive, they would certainly be objectionable.223 But this is untenable as a test for determining whether a question is leading. The answer “yes” or “no” would be conclusive to such a question as “Did you notice any traffic?”, but the question would not necessarily be a leading one. Again, such a question as “Did you hear what A said?” would be a leading question of the second type if the presence of A in the witness’s company, or the fact that A said anything, were in dispute, and as yet unproved by the witness; otherwise it would fall outside the definition of a leading question. And a question capable of being answered in some way other than “yes” or “no” would still be objectionable if “it rehearses lengthy details which the witness might not otherwise have mentioned, and this supplies him with full suggestions …”.224 As Best said, “It should never be forgotten that ‘leading’ is a relative, not an absolute term”.225 [A] question can … be formulated so as to call for a Yes or No answer which makes no assumption of fact and without the slightest implication that Yes rather than No is the hoped for
answer.226
The ban on obtaining evidence by leading a witness applies outside oral questioning. “To give [a] patent to a prospective witness [on obviousness] is tantamount to leading the witness.”227 The answers to leading questions in examination-in-chief or reexamination are not inadmissible in evidence228 although the method by which they are obtained may rob them of all or most of their significance.229 Leading questions are objectionable because of the danger of collusion between the person asking them and the witness, or because of the impropriety of suggesting the existence of facts which are not in evidence. Account must also be taken of human laziness — it is [page 543] easy to say “yes” or “no” on demand, and most leading questions can be answered in this way, even if the same is true of some questions that are not leading. Questions assuming the existence of disputed facts “are often put unintentionally by a cross-examiner so certain of his facts that he has not noticed that the witness has not admitted them … An affirmative and a negative answer may be almost equally damaging, and a perfectly honest witness may give a bad impression because he cannot answer directly, but has to enter on an explanation”.230 There is, however, no doubt that leading questions save time, they are often an indispensable prelude to further interrogation, and a travesty could be made of any examination in chief by an over-emphatic insistence on the prohibition. There are, therefore, numerous recurring instances in which it does not apply.
[17155] Primary exceptions to the prohibition A witness may always be led on the formal introductory part of his testimony. The following is the beginning of almost any examination in chief. “Is your name John Smith?”,231 “Are you a baker?”,232 “Do you live at 1 Any Street, Anywhere?” Undisputed matters belong in the same category. In a divorce case in which the marriage was not denied by the respondent, the examination might well continue: “Were you married at St John’s Church, Tooting?”, “Did you live happily with the respondent
until last June?” It is common for this mode of examination to be used either by prior arrangement between counsel, or until the opponent of the counsel asking the questions indicates that leading should cease because controversial ground is being approached. It would often be impossible to persuade a witness to identify a person or thing in court without the aid of leading questions. Accordingly, such questions as “Was he the man you saw?” or “Was that the book he lent you?” have to be allowed every day.233 Questions with regard to the identification of persons or things are, in fact, an example of a broader class of question rendered necessary in order to focus the witness’s mind on a particular point. These are questions on the borderline between the legitimate area of suggesting a subject to the witness, and the illegitimate one of suggesting the answer to the witness.234 Someone is called to prove a partnership; in order to stimulate the witness’s memory, the witness may be asked whether named persons did, or did not, participate in the business.235 It is desired to cause a witness to deny or otherwise state the witness’s position in relation to some accusation against the witness or some matter on which another witness contradicts the witness: the accusation may be put in leading form, for “satisfaction is not likely [page 544] to be obtained unless the disputed incident or words are put to him directly”.236 Commonly, some attempt is made to exhaust the witness’s recollection before putting the leading question. Lists are sometimes drawn up as to the matters with regard to which leading questions are permissible. Introductory or undisputed matters, questions of identity, questions putting assumptions to expert witnesses preparatory to seeking their opinion and questions designed to bring the witness’s mind to the point are among the items that commonly appear on such lists, but the subject does not lend itself to exhaustive treatment of this nature. There are bound to be cases which do not fall within any lists. A witness is in court while a previous witness is giving evidence about the contents of a letter; when the time comes for the second witness to give evidence in chief, the second witness says, “I read the letter”; a question
can be asked whether it contained the particular passage.237 A magistrate dies in the course of a case in which many witnesses have given evidence; provided there is an opportunity of cross-examination, each witness can be recalled before a new magistrate, and after the deposition of that witness has been considered by that witness, the witness can be asked: “Does the document represent your evidence?”, because long leading questions may be allowed, even in chief, at the discretion of the judge.238 No one would have dreamed of including these cases in any list before they were decided. Leading questions may be proper because of the nature of the proceedings — for example, in investigations into the operations of a trade union, affecting its many members who were not parties and in respect of whom there was a paramount duty to discover the truth.239 Leading questions may be employed where it is desired to direct the witness’s mind to particular points which are vague in the testimony of that witness given in response to non-leading questions.240 Probably witnesses who are frightened, ignorant, very young, mentally feeble, or not fluent in English may more readily be led than others. Wigmore stated a wider exception: Where the witness is unable without extraneous aid to revive his memory on the desired point — ie, where he understands what he is desired to speak about, but cannot recollect what he knows — here his recollection, being exhausted, may be aided by a question suggesting the answer. The trial judge’s discretion must be relied upon to prevent imposition.241
There seems to be no leading case suggesting that the law goes so far, though Best agreed;242 the technique is often employed in practice, and this illustrates the width of the judge’s general discretion to control the form of questions. [page 545]
[17160] Further exceptions to the prohibition A further exception seems to have been recognised by Dixon J.243 During the course of the prosecution case, a witness for the prosecution gave evasive answers and professed himself to be unable to recollect certain events — Dixon J, without determining whether the witness was “hostile”, gave leave to counsel for the prosecution to cross-examine the witness by leading questions in conformity with the terms of the written statement made by the witness in the course of the preparation for the trial. That leave was limited to cross-examination as to the facts recorded in the statement in writing. There was no leave to cross-examine the witness generally, Dixon J reserving to counsel the right to make application at a later stage for leave to cross-examine generally if it should then appear that the witness was “hostile” … The
cross-examination was, accordingly, in the first instance, confined to establishing the facts stated in the previous written statement: it was not directed to establishing that the witness had made the previous written statement. Counsel was permitted to place the previous written statement in the hands of the witness and to put to the witness direct or leading questions as to what were the facts, such questions being based on and conforming to the statement of those facts contained in the writing. Counsel was not permitted to read aloud to the witness any passages in that written statement, nor was the witness permitted, in answering these questions, to read aloud to the jury any passage in the written statement … [This] should not be taken as authorising the crossexamination of a party’s own witness simply because the witness has strayed from his proof. The procedure adopted by Dixon J will generally be appropriate only where a witness is in effect adverse or hostile but the judge decides to allow limited cross-examination without the necessity of declaring the witness is hostile.244
A more general rule was stated thus: … in his discretion, which must be exercised upon judicial grounds, the judge, if he thinks the interests of justice require it, may permit questions which suggest the desired answers to be put in examination in chief …245
There are statutory exceptions in some jurisdictions to the rule against leading questions. Section 33 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that in any criminal proceeding, a police officer may give evidence in chief for the prosecution by “reading, or being led through” a signed written statement previously made by the police officer which was made by the police officer at the time of or soon after the occurrence of the events to which it refers, and of which a copy has been given to the person charged or that person’s Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution.246 Section 37(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that a leading question must not be put to a witness in examination in chief or in re-examination unless the court gives leave, or the question relates to a matter introductory to the witness’s evidence, or no objection is made to the question where parties other than the questioning party are represented by an Australian legal practitioner, legal [page 546] counsel or prosecutor,247 or the question relates to a matter that is not in
dispute, or, if the witness has specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience, the question is asked for the purpose of obtaining the witness’s opinion about a hypothetical statement of facts, being facts in respect of which evidence has been, or is intended to be, given. Section 37(2) provides that unless the court otherwise directs, s 37(1) does not apply in civil proceedings to a question that relates to an investigation, inspection or report that the witness made in the course of carrying out public or official duties. Section 37(2) is similar to the New South Wales Supreme Court and Federal Court Rules just referred to.248 Section 37(3) provides that s 37(1) does not prevent a court from exercising power under Rules of Court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence in chief of its maker.249
[17165] Leading questions in cross-examination It is often said that leading questions may always be put in crossexamination.250 No doubt this is true so far as questions suggesting the desired answer are concerned; but those which suggest the existence of unproved facts may well be disallowed, even in cross-examination. Both types of leading question may be unfair to the questioning party’s opponent and useless to the court; the second type of leading question is unfair to the witness as well. It has been said251 that questions put to a prisoner in cross-examination ought to be put in an interrogative form; they should commence “Did you?” and not “You did”. There was also in former times— and perhaps still is — a custom of an ethical character, that direct suggestions should only be employed in cross-examination where the cross-examiner has evidence or some other material to back up the suggestion; if not, the cross-examiner should use the “Did you?” form.252 The judge has a wide discretion in these matters, particularly where the interests of justice and expedition are concerned,253 and it is difficult to say more than that leading questions will generally be permitted in cross-examination. Thus in a case where there are multiple parties, the effective role of witnesses may vary according to the function their evidence is serving as between the parties, and the right to ask leading [page 547]
questions will vary accordingly.254 Barry J held255 that there is no absolute right to put leading questions in cross-examination and that a trial judge has a discretion to forbid leading questions in cross-examination, in particular, where the witness shows any partisanship towards the party against whom that witness is called. The reasons why leading questions are more commonly allowed in cross-examination are plain. The crossexaminer will normally have had no contact with the witness before the trial, and no instructions about the story to be told will have been supplied. Many witnesses tend to be partisan for the party calling them, and will be disinclined to accept the cross-examiner’s suggestions unless the truth, expressed to them in the form of explicit leading questions, compels them to do so. Section 42 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that a leading question may be put in cross-examination unless the court forbids it. The court must reject the question if it “is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used”: s 42(3). The court also has an apparent discretion to reject a leading question; in exercising that discretion, the court must take into account, inter alia, the extent to which: the evidence in chief was unfavourable to the party calling the witness, the witness has an interest consistent with an interest of the cross-examiner, the witness is sympathetic to the cross-examiner, and the witness’s age or any disability may affect the witness’s answers. The section “does not limit the court’s power to control leading questions”: s 42(4).256
C — REFRESHING MEMORY257 The principle of orality [17170] Orality and refreshing memory Perhaps the most important feature of an Australian trial, civil or criminal, is its “orality”.258 Much greater weight is attached to the answers given by witnesses in court on oath or affirmation than to written statements previously made by them, and contrary to what is commonly supposed by persons without experience of litigation, the way in which a
witness responds to examination in chief is often more informative about that witness’s reliability than that witness’s reaction to cross-examination. This accounts for the dislike by some judges of affidavit evidence on contested questions. It stems from the fact that a witness’s answers to nonleading questions reflect credibility well in that they are that witness’s answers, not the answers of a legal adviser. Orality is also particularly important in jury trials: it is thought to encourage an exchange of views producing a more legitimate [page 548] merging of opinions than would the separate consideration by each juror of written evidence. In all cases orality ensures the public character of justice.259 Yet, for all its apparent orality, an examination in chief is rarely conducted “out of the blue”. The witness has usually given a statement (commonly called a “proof of evidence”) to the solicitor for the party calling that witness. Alternatively, if the witness is a prosecution witness in a criminal case, the witness will have made a statement to the police. It is on the basis of these statements that the questions put to the witness in chief will be framed. The statement will frequently have been made a considerable time before the trial, and the witness may or may not have retained a copy of it. In these circumstances, it is inevitable as it is desirable that the witness should read the statement shortly before the hearing or even be taken through it by the person to whom it was made. If it were to transpire that there had been anything in the nature of “coaching” by such a person, or some kind of pre-trial conference between witnesses, the trier of fact would no doubt treat the evidence with the contempt it deserved. It was, however, once suggested that it is objectionable for prosecution witnesses to be provided with copies of their statements to the police to be read or gone through shortly before the trial.260 But it would have been difficult to justify or enforce a special rule for this particular case, and, if the statement were an elaborate one, as even statements to the police sometimes are, the law would have been absurd. The practice has since been held to be perfectly proper.261 Without it the ordinary trial process would be unworkable. However, it is
wrong for witnesses to be handed copies of each other’s statements or proofs of evidence in circumstances enabling them to compare what each had said;262 for statements or proofs of evidence to be read to witnesses in each other’s presence;263 for witnesses to discuss what evidence they will give;264 and for witnesses to be trained or coached in their evidence, whether one-to-one or in groups.265 This does not prevent familiarisation of the witness with the layout of the court, the likely sequence of evidence while the witness is giving evidence, and a balanced appraisal of the different responsibilities of the various participants.266 When a witness refreshes memory from a document outside the court, a party calling the witness need not produce the document when genuine recollection is revived, but must do so, if objection is taken, when recollection is not revived, because in that case the witness is in effect giving “oral secondary evidence of an available and unproduced document”.267 There is authority, too, for the view that an opponent of the party calling a witness who refreshes memory out of court may [page 549] call for and inspect the document “without penalty”, that is, without having to tender it;268 it is hard to see how this rule can be applied when the opponent is unaware of the refreshment. Where refreshment of memory out of court has occurred, it is desirable that the opponent of the party calling the witness be informed, but there is no rule of law to this effect.269 If a privileged document is used to refresh memory outside the court, the privilege is waived when the witness testifies.270 The witness has no right to see the statement, and need not be shown it if there is reason to suppose he or she has some sinister purpose for wanting to see it.271 If the witness is cross-examined on the document, it does not become evidence unless there is cross-examination on material in it which was not used to refresh memory; in this respect the rule is identical with the rule for documents used to refresh memory in court.272 No other conditions concerning documents which may be used to refresh memory out of court have been laid down.273 Section 34 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) regulates
the practices by which witnesses seek to revive their memories in court by referring to documents and things outside the court before giving evidence. It gives the court, at the request of a party, power to give directions to ensure that specified documents or things are produced to that party: s 34(1). It gives power to exclude the evidence if the directions are not complied with: s 34(2).274 The reference to “specified” things is intended to ensure that the power can be used in relation to some only of the documents and things which a witness may use.275 The reference to “things” in s 34, coupled with the lack of reference to “things” in s 32, appears to indicate that a “thing” can be used to revive memory out of court, subject to the controls of s 34, but that the thing can be used in court independently of the controls established by s 32. An alternative view, which sits badly with the language of s 32, apparently creating only a limited prohibition, is that revival of memory in court by the use of a thing is wholly prohibited; if that were so, it would create another irrational contrast with s 34. Section 33 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) permits a police officer in [page 550] criminal proceedings to give evidence in chief for the prosecution by reading, or being led through, a written statement previously made by the officer. The conditions of admissibility are that the statement must have been made at the time of or soon after the occurrence of the events to which it refers; it must have been signed by the police officer at the time it was made; and a copy must have been given to the person charged or his or her Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution. The former time requirement has been made to involve a concept of immediacy and contemplate days rather than weeks as being the permissible time that may elapse; considerations of convenience and practicality are irrelevant in determining whether a statement complies.276 Other exceptions to the principle of orality are created by s 232(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) which provides that the trial judge
may permit a person to give evidence (a) with the consent of the parties, by the witness reading a statement of the witness prepared in advance; (b) in the case of expert witnesses, by presenting audio or audio visual material; (c) by playing an audio or audio visual recording; or (d) in any other manner that the trial judge considers may be appropriate. Section 232(3) provides that nothing in s 232 affects the operation of s 41G and Pt IIA of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) and ss 29 and 50 of the Evidence Act 2008. Section 29(4) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that evidence may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid its comprehension of other evidence that has been given or is likely to be given. On the common law position, see [1320]. A further example of legislation permitting evidence to be given by written statement only is NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 78–94.277 In NSW, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 31.19 permits the reports of experts served in conformity with the rules to be admissible in non-jury trials without further oral evidence, subject to a right in the parties served to require the attendance of the expert for cross-examination, in which case the hearsay exceptions in ss 63, 64 and 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 do not apply.
[17175] Hypnotically induced evidence Hunt CJ at CL held that there was no inflexible rule against the admissibility of hypnotically induced evidence. After pointing out that the onus of establishing the admissibility of the evidence rested on the tendering party, he drew attention to certain “guidelines” stated by the New Zealand Court of Appeal,278 to the need for the evidence to be “safe” before it was received, and to the “requirements” of the California Evidence Code, and said they should be followed:279 [page 551] The California Evidence Code imposes the following requirements upon the admissibility of hypnotically induced evidence (I have added my comments in relation to them):
(1) The hypnotically induced evidence must be limited to matters which the witness had recalled and related prior to the hypnosis. (I shall refer to that as “the original recollection”.) In other words, evidence will not be allowed where its subject matter was recalled for the first time under hypnosis or thereafter. The effect of that restriction is that only detail recalled for the first time under hypnosis or thereafter will be allowed to be given in evidence. (2) The substance of that original recollection must have been preserved in written, audio or video-recorded form. (3) The hypnosis must have been conducted in accordance with the following procedures: (a) the witness gave informed consent to the hypnosis; (b) the hypnosis was performed by a person who is experienced in its use and who is independent of the police, the prosecution and the accused; (c) the witness’s original recollection and other information supplied to the hypnotist concerning the subject matter of the hypnosis was recorded in writing in advance of the hypnosis; and (d) the hypnosis was performed in the absence of the police, the prosecution and the accused, but was video-recorded. In my view, these procedures are designed: (1) to avoid the generally accepted dangers of hypnosis that, in the heightened level of susceptibility to suggestion which is characteristic of a person in an hypnotic state, the witness may subconsciously be influenced by suggestions or cues planted intentionally or otherwise during the hypnosis, and (2) to assist the trial judge in determining whether there is any likelihood that: (i) the witness has merely confabulated (that is, has subconsciously filled in the gaps in his or her memory by guessing or by fantasising); or (ii) the witness has acquired a stronger and artificial confidence in his or her original recollection; or (iii) the ability of the accused to cross-examine the witness concerning that original recollection has been impaired. (Confabulation is apparently also known by the somewhat more emotive term “pseudomemory”.)These matters must be established to the satisfaction of the trial judge in a voir dire hearing, at which expert testimony is admissible as to the reliability of the witness’s evidence. The guidelines put forward by the New Zealand Court of Appeal do not insist upon compliance with every one of those safeguards, but leave it to the discretion of the trial judge as to whether any non-compliance renders the evidence unreliable. The Californian safeguards are, however, to be complied with as far as reasonably possible. It was said that, obviously enough, the greater the compliance with the safeguards the greater the likelihood that the evidence would be admitted. Regard should be had to the strength of the other evidence available to confirm or to support the evidence hypnotically induced, and in practice it is likely to be more difficult to show that the evidence can safely be admitted if the recollection of the witness emerged for the first time during or after hypnosis. The Court of Appeal also stated that the fact that a witness was hypnotised should be disclosed to the accused, and all relevant transcripts and information provided to the
[page 552]
accused on request. In my view, such information (including video recordings) should be made so available well in advance of the trial, to enable the accused to have the assistance of his own expert witnesses in relation to that material. Finally, the Court of Appeal held that, if the hypnotically induced evidence is admitted into evidence, the trial judge should warn the jury of the special need for caution before placing reliance upon it. The warning need not be in any particular terms, but it should adequately alert the jury to the dangers inherent in the use of hypnotism.
He left open the question whether the burdens facing an accused who wished to tender hypnotically induced evidence were less than those imposed on the Crown. The same “guidelines” have been held applicable in relation to witnesses who have undergone eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing therapy.280 Since there is no requirement under the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) for the evidence to be “safe” before it is admitted, even if that requirement exists, the authorities for it are not applicable to those Acts.281
Conditions on which memory may be refreshed by reference to a document [17180] Summary Although a witness may not normally give evidence to the court by reciting a prepared statement, such as a proof of evidence, the witness is allowed to refer to a document in order to refresh memory, provided certain conditions are fulfilled and the court’s leave is sought. The document must have been made substantially at the same time as the occurrence of the events to which the witness is required to depose. It must have been made, or read over and accepted as accurate, by the witness while the facts were still fresh in the witness’s memory. It must be produced to the court or opposite party on demand, and, in one class of case, the document must be the original. It is not necessary that a witness who seeks to refer to notes should have to exhaust memory as to the whole of the witness’s narrative; the witness may refer to notes each time the witness reaches a point where there is a gap in the witness’s memory,282 and may look at the whole of the notes without being confined to the particular parts which bear on matters forgotten. However, witnesses such as police or customs officers are often allowed to read from their notes
from the outset.283 The existence of the conditions must be established before [page 553] leave to refresh is granted, and the truth of assertions that they exist can be tested on the voir dire.284
[17185] Contemporaneity: general This is, as always, a question of fact. Much may depend on the subject matter of the document. The rule provides “a measure of elasticity and should not be taken to confine witnesses to an over-short period”.285 Although the requirement is usually treated as an independent condition, it can hardly amount to more than strong evidence of compliance with the further requirement that the writing must have been brought into existence while the facts were still fresh in the witness’s memory.286 Detailed comparison of the precedents is not helpful.287
[17190] Contemporaneity: depositions There are cases suggesting that a witness may refresh memory from depositions; but in one of them, a civil case, the deposition was said to have been signed at the time of the events to which it related,288 in another the deposition was used in cross-examination,289 and in the third, the deposition may have been put to a hostile witness as a prelude to the use of leading questions.290
[17195] Qualifications to contemporaneity rule However, the Court of Appeal has greatly modified the law in England.291 It held that the judge had a discretion to permit a witness who has begun to give evidence to refresh memory from a statement made near the time of the events in issue, even if it was not contemporaneous, provided the judge is satisfied: (1) that the witness indicates that he cannot now recall the details of events because of the lapse of time since they took place; (2) that he made a statement much nearer the time of the events
and that the contents of the statement represented his recollection at the time he made it; (3) that he had not read the statement before coming into the witness-box; and (4) that he wished to have an opportunity to read the statement before he continued to give evidence. We do not think that it matters whether the witness withdraws from the witness box and reads his statement, as he would do if he had had the opportunity before entering the witness box, or whether he reads it in the witness box. What is important is that, if the former course is adopted, no communication must be had with the witness, other than to see that he can read the statement in peace. Moreover, if either course is adopted, the statement must be removed from him when he comes to give his evidence and he should
[page 554] not be permitted to refer to it again, unlike a contemporaneous statement which may be used to refresh memory while giving evidence.
[17200] Documents read over or accepted as accurate by witness A witness may refresh memory from his or her own notes, or from notes made by another which the witness has read and found to be in accord with his or herrecollection,292 or from a record the preparation of which was supervised by the witness.293 A witness may refresh memory from a copy of a document provided the accuracy of the transcription is properly verified.294 The courts are not over-insistent on the exactitude of the copy provided they are satisfied that the document by which memory is to be refreshed substantially reproduces what was said in the original. It has been held proper for a surveyor to refresh his memory from a printed report based on his original notes295 and for a police officer to do likewise from the statement prepared by him for use in committal proceedings from his notebook which was not available at the trial.296 It was held297 that a police officer might refresh his memory by referring to a note which he had checked from tape recordings of conversations between accused persons. The officer had heard the conversations but confirmed and improved his note from the recording, which was not put in evidence. There is no objection to police officers refreshing their memory from notebooks or statements prepared by them in collaboration.298 Two police officers were permitted to refresh their memory from the police brief made
by them two days after the event from notes made by the third officer.299 A can verify a note he dictates to B either by reading it himself, or hearing it read back by B to A at the time for confirmation.300 [T]here is no magic in verifying by seeing as opposed to verifying by hearing … If A makes a “contemporaneous” note himself, or if A reads and adopts at the time a
[page 555] “contemporaneous” note made by B, A may refresh his memory from it without the need of another witness. In such a case as the present a second witness will be required. Hill dictated the number, heard it read back and confirmed its accuracy. But although he saw the note being made, he did not read it, so it was necessary for the officer also to be called to prove that the note he produced was the one Hill saw him making and heard him read back. Once that was done, we are of the opinion Hill could refresh his memory from it.
Thus the blind301 or the illiterate302 may refresh their memories. It has been held303 proper for a police witness to refresh memory from documents containing typed questions and handwritten records of the answers; it did not matter that the questions had been designed and typed before the interrogation by a person other than the witness.
[17205] Production of the document If the opposite party or that party’s advocate, asks to see the document, it must be handed over to enable inspection of the document and, if desired, cross-examination of the witness with regard to its contents.304 The jury may also see the document if it assists them in estimating the witness’s credibility.305 The cross-examiner may himself or herself tender the document in evidence for this purpose.306 [I]n many cases it would be impossible properly to assess the value of a witness’s evidence, or to test it in cross-examination, without reference to the original record from which the witness says that he speaks. For example, the record itself could have been dishonestly fabricated, or in his oral evidence the witness could have accidentally or deliberately misstated its contents, and an opposite party ought to have full opportunity of investigating these possibilities, if that party so desires; further, any alleged copy of the original record could prove not to be an accurate copy. But on the other hand there is, we think, no reason why the record upon which the witness has relied should be formally produced in open court by the witness or the party calling him, in a case where nobody has asked for its production. If nobody wants to see the record, why should it be produced, and why would the witness’s evidence not be admissible without its production? Furthermore, any gratuitous or unsought production of the record in court could give selfserving support to the witness’s evidence, and it could embarrass counsel for the opposite party,
if he would prefer to challenge or utilise the witness’s evidence otherwise than by reference to the record from which he has purported to speak.307
[17210] The original If the witness, after refreshing memory from the document, can testify to the fact from personal recollection, it is not necessary for the original document to be [page 556] produced.308 But if the witness can only testify to the fact because of what is in the document, the original must be produced unless it is lost or destroyed.309
Distinction between those cases in which memory is refreshed and those in which it is not refreshed [17215] Present recollection revived/past recollection recorded Wigmore termed the distinction just described a distinction between “present recollection revived” and “past recollection recorded”. His main contentions were that there should be no conditions concerning the document by which the former might be achieved, while in the latter case the document should be received in evidence under what is probably best regarded as an exception to the rule against hearsay.310 Although these contentions do not represent Australian law, they highlight certain features of it.
[17220] Present recollection revived As long ago as 1835 Lewin made the suggestion that a witness should be allowed to refresh memory by any means because: “[c]ommon experience tells every man that a very slight circumstance, and one not in point to the existing inquiry, will sometimes revive the history of the
transaction made up of many circumstances”.311 In America it has been argued that if present recollection is genuinely revived, there is no need for restrictive rules about what can revive it. Thus Judge Frank said:312 Common experience, the work of Proust and other keenly observant literary men, and recondite psychological research, all teach us that memory of things long past can be accurately restored in all sorts of ways. The creaking of a hinge, the whistling of a tune, the smell of seaweed, the sight of an old photograph, the taste of nutmeg, the touch of a piece of canvas, may bring vividly to the foreground [of] consciousness the recollection of events that happened years ago and which would otherwise have been forgotten. If a recollection thus reawakened be then set down on paper, why should not that paper properly serve in the courtroom, as it does in everyday life, to prod the memory at still a later date? The memory-prodder may itself lack meaning to other persons as a symbol of the past event, as everyone knows who has ever used a knot in his handkerchief as a reminder. Since the workings of the human memory still remain a major mystery after centuries of study, courts should hesitate before they glibly contrive dogmatic rules concerning the reliability of the ways of provoking it.
The desirability of carrying out the suggestion has been enhanced by the acceptance of the practice, recognised by Lewin, of allowing a witness to refresh memory out of court. If that is not subject to restrictions concerning the type of document which may be used, it is difficult to justify the retention of such restrictions when it is sought to refresh memory in court.313 However, they [page 557] remain.314 The document which “triggered off” the train of memory is available for inspection should any question of credibility arise, but the witness’s oral testimony is the evidence on which the tribunal of fact is invited to act.
[17225]
Past recollection recorded
This is also the case when present recollection is not in the least revived by the sight of the document, although there are theoretical difficulties which do not appear to have been considered by the courts. The ineptitude of the term “refreshing memory” in such circumstances has been the subject of judicial comment. That is a very inaccurate expression because in nine cases out of ten the witness’s memory is not at all refreshed: he looks at it [the document] again and again; and he recollects nothing of the
transaction; but, seeing that it is in his own handwriting, he gives credit to the truth and accuracy of his habits; and, though his memory is a perfect blank, he nevertheless undertakes to swear to the accuracy of his entry.315
The number of cases in which the witness’s memory remains a “perfect blank” may not be as high as that suggested, but allowance must be made for the numerous situations in which memory is only partly revived. When police officers are allowed to read their notes of interviews in the course of their testimony, it is unlikely that their minds are in a state of complete oblivion with regard to the subject matter, though it is even more unlikely that they could give a coherent account of what was said by any means other than that of reciting their notes. Whether the case be one of total or partial oblivion, legal theory maintains that the matters mentioned in the document are not proved by the statements contained in it under an exception to the hearsay rule but by the witness’s oral testimony.316 In many of the cases the document, to the accuracy of which the witness deposes, though remembering nothing about the matters to which it refers, would have been inadmissible in evidence and the courts have been at pains to emphasise the fact that the evidence is oral, not documentary. Thus a witness was called to prove the receipt of money. Being unable to remember that the payment was made to him, he was shown an unstamped acknowledgment signed by himself whereupon he said that he had no doubt that he had received the sum specified in it, although he did not recall having done so. It was held that this was sufficient evidence of the payment in spite of the prohibition on the use of unstamped receipts in litigation: The paper itself was not used as evidence of the receipt of the money, but only to enable the witness to refresh his memory: and when he said that he had no doubt that he had received the money there was sufficient parole evidence to prove the payment.317
[page 558] Exactly the same reasoning applies in cases of the refreshment of the memory of the number of a motor car by reference to a contemporaneous note. If a person has dictated the number to a third party who has not seen it, the note is inadmissible as evidence of the number since it is hearsay,318 but it can be used by the person, who cannot remember the number, to “refresh” memory.319 It is not surprising that this result has been judicially
castigated as being absurd.320
[17230] Hearsay rule Are these instances of the unwitting reception of evidence infringing the rule against hearsay? According to that rule as formulated at [31025]–[31030], a statement other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact stated. The question can best be approached by distinguishing between the different circumstances in which someone who does not recollect an event might yet have no doubt that it occurred. A man who regularly shaves every morning might well have no doubt that he did so on a named day a little while back, and accordingly be prepared to testify to that effect, although he does not remember shaving on the day in question. He vouches for the regularity of his habits and the absence of anything to lead him to suppose that they might have been broken on the day in question. The further back in time the question goes the less likely is he to be prepared to swear to having shaved on account of the greater chance of some forgotten reason for not having done so. The case may be described as one of “reconstruction” and it is of a kind which counts as personal knowledge for the purpose of the rule that witnesses must have personal knowledge of the facts to which they testify. Now suppose that someone who recollects having dined in a college hall on a particular day is asked what was offered for dinner. The witness’s mind may well be a complete blank on the subject and the witness’s memory may be in no way refreshed by the sight of the menu prepared by the chef and used on the occasion in question; yet the witness might well be prepared to swear the items of food mentioned on the menu were offered. The reasoning might be: “I have never known a college menu to err; therefore I have no doubt that I was offered the dishes mentioned on the menu for that day”. The witness is thus prepared to vouch for the accuracy of the chef. This too is a case of reconstruction, but the witness lacks personal knowledge of the matters testified to, for the knowledge is derived from the menu, not from the regularity of the witness’s habits. As long as the rule against hearsay is formulated in such a way as to embrace previous statements of the witness who is testifying, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it was infringed in such cases. A hearsay
statement is nonetheless a hearsay statement even if someone who has no recollection of the matters to which it refers swears that it is accurate. While such anomalies remain there may be something to be said for preserving the requirement that certain conditions should be fulfilled before a witness is permitted to refresh memory by referring to a note.321 [page 559]
[17235] Consequences of document being in evidence There are several reasons why it is important to know whether a document duly authenticated by its author and before the court is evidence. In the first place, it may affect the order of counsel’s speeches. Hence, if the defendant does no more than ask one of the plaintiff’s witnesses whether a letter is in the witness’s handwriting and proceeds to rely on various passages in it the defendant may forfeit the common law right to have the last word.322 Secondly, it is not until a letter is in evidence that it can lawfully be treated as having any probative value by the judge or jury. The practical effect of the present law is that a judge must never treat, or allow the jury to treat, a document used to refresh memory as evidence merely because it has been so used.
[17240] Calling for and inspecting document There is an old general rule323 that, if a party calls for and inspects a document held by the other party, the first party is bound to put it in evidence if required to do so.324 In this way a previously inadmissible document may become evidence.325 But “where a document is used to refresh a witness’s memory, cross-examining counsel may inspect that document in order to check it326 without making it evidence; and, further, may cross-examine upon it without making it evidence, provided that the cross-examination does not go further than the parts which are used for refreshing the memory of the witness”.327 If, therefore, a witness refreshes memory concerning a date or an address by referring to a diary, the witness may be cross-examined about the form or terms of the entries used to refresh memory without there being any question of the right of the party calling the witness to insist that the diary should become evidence in
the case.328 (However, the document may be tendered, not as evidence of the truth of its contents, where it is difficult for the [page 560] trier of fact to follow the cross-examination of the witness who refreshed memory, or where it is a useful aide memoire to the witness’s evidence if it is long and involved.329) On the other hand, if the witness is crossexamined about other parts of the diary, the party calling the witness may, in the absence of an exercise of the discretion not to compel tender,330 have the whole document treated as evidence in the case. This right has been held in Victoria to be only available during cross-examination, though it is not clear that that is the law elsewhere,331 and in Queensland,332 Western Australia333 and Victoria334 there is authority against its correctness. There may be circumstances where the crossexaminer in fact wishes to have the notes tendered in evidence, eg to assist an attack on the witness’s credit.335
[17245] Statutory changes The major difficulty about the formulation of the general rule and the exception to it concerns the implication of such expressions as “making a document evidence”. It might be thought that the contents become admissible as evidence of their truth by way of exception to the rule against hearsay, but there is authority that, in a criminal case, they are only admissible by way of exception to the rule, about to be discussed, that a witness’s previous statements are inadmissible to bolster credibility by proving consistency.336 There is authority337 the other way; that authority relied on a suggested analogy with the reception of a document compulsorily tendered on the ground that it has been called for and inspected, which is admissible to prove the facts stated.338 Documents which were formerly used for the sole purpose of refreshing a witness’s memory can now often be made evidence in the case under the provisions of the Australian equivalents to the Evidence Act 1938 (Eng). The old law on the subject is becoming increasingly less important, but it is still sometimes applicable in criminal cases. Even in civil cases, the
equivalents to the 1938 Act may not apply to the document, for the party producing it, as well as the opponent, may be unwilling to put it in evidence. Statements used to refresh memory may often be admitted under other statutory hearsay exceptions.339 If a document is the subject of legal professional privilege, the privilege is waived if the document is used to refresh memory.340 [page 561] The English Court of Appeal has said that cases must be rare in which an accomplice, the testing of whose evidence was particularly important, should be allowed to refresh memory.341 A document may be used to refresh memory even though it is not itself admissible in evidence.342 Refreshment of memory normally takes place where the witness has omitted a detail. But it can also take place where the witness seeks to use the document to depart from the detail of the earlier evidence.343 And refreshment of memory can take place in re-examination as well as in evidence-in-chief.344 Section 32 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) alters the common law rules on refreshing memory from documents in court into a discretionary regime, for revival of memory about a fact or opinion.345 The court must take into account whether the witness can recall the fact or opinion adequately without the document, and whether the relevant part of the document is, or is a copy of, a document that was written or made by the witness when the events recorded in it were fresh in the witness’s memory or were, at such time, found by the witness to be accurate: s 32(2). The court also has a discretion to permit a witness who must revive memory about a fact or opinion from a document to read aloud, as part of the witness’s testimony, so much of the document as relates to the fact or opinion: s 32(3). The contents of the document thus apparently come into evidence — not directly since the document is not marked as an exhibit and is not part of the evidence in its own right, but as part of the witness’s oral evidence. The relevant part of the document can be produced to other parties: s 32(4). But s 32 is not limited to refreshing
memory from notes made while the events recorded were fresh in the witness’s memory. It has been applied to an unrepresented litigant having recourse to notes. Unrepresented litigants do not have counsel to lead the evidence from them by appropriately worded questions. They may forget to give evidence of a material fact if unaided by notes. On the other hand, it is important that the witness not simply read the evidence from a prepared document as distinct from looking at subject headings or questions which are not in a leading form.346
D — PREVIOUS CONSISTENT STATEMENTS347 The rule against previous consistent statements [17250] Statement and justification for the rule A party may not in general call evidence supporting the credibility of a witness called by that party. Hence the party may not call evidence supporting the [page 562] disposition of the witness to tell the truth. The potential breadth of these principles is illustrated by the following remarks:348 A habit has developed in both criminal and civil jurisdictions whereunder the caller of a witness has the witness state a fact and thereupon asks him to state his reasons for doing the act or to say why he remembers the fact, or say something about his own state of mind at that moment. This is asked in the expectation that the witness will give a convincing reason and make it easier for the jury or judge to accept the stated fact. Such practices lengthen trials by spawning false issues. In most instances the evidence is quite inadmissible. Sometimes it leads to a miscarriage of justice. It is only when that witness’s state of mind or purpose is relevant to the issues in a case that it may be led in chief, and then at best, except in rare instances, it is only the state of mind of a party that may be relevant in this way.349 Only facts in issue should be led in chief. A witness may not lift himself by his own bootstraps to enhance his credit. If the fact which he states is challenged by the adverse party then that will be made apparent during cross-examination. The witness’s reasons for doing the act or his purpose in doing so may then quite properly be asked, because it may help to show whether he should be believed in relation to that particular fact (ie on the question of credit). But it is for the crossexaminer, not the party calling the witness, to raise matters that go to credit. When this happens
it may be permissible in re-examination to adduce evidence of the witness’s state of mind when he did the act or made the observation or statement.350 Unfortunately the practice of anticipation of such a challenge and the premature attempted rebuttal of the challenge has become widespread. The present case affords a good example why it should cease.
It would be strange, in fairness both to the parties and to the witness, if a witness could not testify to the strength or weakness of a recollection or of an opportunity for observation; and if that can be done, it is not a large step to admit evidence about why that is so. On the other hand, the importance of reducing collateral issues in litigation is great. More particularly, there is an old general rule under which a witness may not be asked in chief whether the witness has formerly made a statement consistent with the witness’s present testimony. It is sometimes called “the rule against narrative” or “the rule against self-corroboration”. The witness cannot narrate such a statement if it was oral or refer to it if it was in writing (save for the purpose of refreshing memory), and other witnesses may not be called to prove it.351 If the statement were tendered to establish the truth of its contents, even if the statement were proved by the witness who made it, the rule against hearsay, as formulated in this work, would be infringed because that rule extends to statements by persons other than the witness who is testifying. The rule against hearsay would not be infringed if the purpose of placing the statement before the court were not directly to establish the truth of its contents, but to demonstrate the reliability of the witness’s present testimony by proving its consistency with the witness’s past utterances. But the rule exists independently of the hearsay rule.352 [page 563] The ease with which evidence of this nature can be manufactured is a reason commonly given for the rule.353 But, generally speaking, this can only be apposite when the witness is a party. In any event, the ease with which evidence can be fabricated is a matter which should affect its weight rather than its admissibility. A more convincing reason was given by Sir W D Evans in his notes to Pothier on Obligations.354 He said that in an ordinary case the evidence would be at least superfluous, for the assertions of a witness are to be regarded in general as true, until there is some
particular reason for impeaching them as false. The necessity of saving time by avoiding superfluous testimony and sparing the court a protracted inquiry into a multitude of collateral issues which might be raised about such matters as the precise terms of the previous statement is undoubtedly a sound basis for the general rule: Generally speaking, as is well known, such confirmatory evidence is not admissible, the reason presumably being that all trials, civil and criminal, must be conducted with an effort to concentrate evidence on what is capable of being cogent …355
Another illustration of the rule relates to the rebuttal of the presumptions of advancement and of resulting trusts. The acts and declarations of the parties before or at the time of the transaction, or so immediately after it as to constitute part of it, are admissible either for or against the party who did the act or made the declaration; subsequent acts and declarations are only admissible against the party who did or made them, and not in favour of that party.356 These principles combine the admissions and res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule.357 The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) might render admissible subsequent conduct, subject to the application of s 135 or s 136.358
[17255] Difficulties with the rule There is much to be said for a broad formulation of the rule under which proof of prior consistent statements would be permissible whenever the fact that the statement was made is substantially relevant for some reason other than its tendency to confirm the consistency of the witness; but the approach of the courts appears to favour a fixed rule with a strictly limited number of exceptions. This is strikingly illustrated by a case359 in which a husband petitioned for divorce on the ground of adultery. The wife had been in the co-respondent’s bedroom, and, when they had been challenged shortly afterwards, they denied adultery. Later they phoned a doctor with a request that he should examine them in order to certify that recent intercourse had not taken place, but the doctor did not come because, in his view, the examination would have been useless. It was held that neither he, the wife nor the co-respondent should have been allowed to testify to the phone conversation. This was largely on the ground that the wife and co-respondent might
[page 564] have prepared themselves for the examination, or been aware of its inutility, with the result, in either case, that they would simply have been manufacturing evidence. Yet it had probative value independent of its tendency to confirm the denials of adultery made from the witness box by the respondent and co-respondent. On the assumption that they believed in the efficacy of the suggested examination, it showed that they were prepared to run what would have been a grave risk had they been guilty. It is interesting to speculate how far the majority view would go. If a husband were to phone a doctor saying “my wife is saying I am drunk and have covered her with bruises, come and examine us”, would this conversation be inadmissible in subsequent proceedings for battery? The fact that the parties might have prepared themselves for the examination or have been aware of its inutility could hardly be said in the hypothetical case which has just been put, but it is by no means clear that the law warrants the drawing of a distinction on these lines. In the case of the common law exceptions to the ban on the reception of previous statements as evidence of consistency there is some reason, other than the mere fact that it preceded the testimony, why the statement should have enhanced the witness’s credibility. When a witness’s previous statement is admissible as evidence of the facts stated by way of exception to the hearsay rule, it is also received as evidence of consistency, on the principle that the greater includes the lesser. A sketch or “photofit” by a police officer made under the instructions of a witness has been held not to be within the rule against prior consistent statements on the ground that it is not a statement, but is analogous to a photograph;360 yet in truth it appears to be a compendious summary of numerous statements by the witness to the police officer. Under the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), if a prior consistent statement is tendered, and its only relevance is to credibility, it is inadmissible in chief (s 102),361 though it may be admitted pursuant to ss 103–104 (evidence adduced in cross-examination), s 106 (evidence to rebut denials), s 108 (evidence to re-establish credibility), s 108C (evidence of persons with specialised knowledge — not in Tasmania) and
s 110 (character of accused persons). By reason of s 60, it is then admissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted. If a prior consistent statement of a witness is tendered to prove the truth of its contents, it is admissible in civil proceedings where the statement is proved by that witness or a person who heard, saw or otherwise perceived the statement being made (s 64(3)), and in criminal proceedings, where, in addition, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person asserting it (s 66(2)). In each case, if the statement is in a document, the document cannot be tendered before the end of the examination in chief of the maker without the court’s leave: s 64(4) and s 66(4). It follows that under the Acts evidence of complaint is, contrary to the common law position, not generally admissible on the issue of consistency in the victim’s conduct (and hence his or her credit): it is only admissible on credit under s 108(3) or as [page 565] evidence of the truth of the facts asserted under s 66 (or s 64).362 But if it is admitted under s 108(3), it is also evidence of the truth of the facts asserted by reason of s 60 (subject to any contrary limiting order under s 136). There are four well-recognised exceptions to the rule prohibiting proof of prior consistent statements — complaints in sexual cases, consistent statements made contemporaneously with the events to which they refer, admitted as part of the res gestae, previous statements admitted to rebut the suggestion that a witness’s testimony was an afterthought and statements received under the Australian equivalents to the former Evidence Act 1938 (Eng). A fifth less well-recognised exception may be mentioned briefly — introductory questions going to the address, marital status, occupation,363 and perhaps educational background and lack of prior contact with the party calling the witness:364 the answers tend to accredit witnesses by locating them in a certain favourable social and forensic milieu.
Complaints in sexual cases
[17260] Development of the law When criminal proceedings began to assume their modern form, the practice grew up of limiting the evidence of a complaint to the bare fact that it was made. Anything in the nature of a narrative of the words used by the prosecutrix was prohibited. As Hawkins J said in a leading case,365 the disadvantage of the above practice was that it left the prosecutrix, or the witness to whom the statement was made, to determine and report to the jury whether her words amounted to a real complaint. He therefore allowed the full terms of a complaint to be proved on a charge of attempted carnal knowledge of a girl between the ages of 13 and 16. Hawkins J insisted that the judge must always impress upon the jury that they are not entitled to make use of the complaint as evidence of the facts of which complaint was made. This point can be seen most clearly by imagining a case in which the complaint contained some detail to which no reference had been made in the prosecutrix’s testimony; if the jury were to consider that the detail had been proved by the narration of the complaint, they would be accepting hearsay as evidence of the truth of that which was heard. Hawkins J concluded that the complaint could only be used as “evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness box, as being inconsistent with her consent to that of which she complains”.366 Consent was not relevant to the issue in that case, but it was denied by the prosecutrix, and the view has been expressed that the terms of a [page 566] complaint can only be proved when the question of consent is raised,367 but this is untenable. Thus where the charge was one of indecent assault upon a girl of 12, the terms of her complaint to another child were held to have been rightly received although consent was neither legally nor factually in issue throughout the entire proceedings.368
[17265] Admissible in criminal prosecutions for sexual offences; voluntariness
The present law can be summarised as follows. (a) Complaints may only be proved as evidence in chief in criminal prosecutions for a sexual offence.369 They may not be proved in relation to allegations of sodomy in divorce proceedings.370 The authorities on cases of personal violence conflict.371 As a matter of practice, a party or prosecutor may no doubt be asked whether he or she made a complaint in order to link his or her evidence up with that which is about to be given by another witness such as a doctor consulted by him or her. This might be allowed in any proceedings.372 Moreover, evidence of a complaint may no doubt be given by the complainant on re-examination, if the crossexamination has suggested that his or her story is a recent concoction. (b) The complaint must have been made voluntarily. That is, it should not have been elicited by questions of an “inducing or intimidating character”, to use Ridley J’s much-cited words in a case373 where the court held that the complaint under consideration was not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it had been made in response to the question, “Why are you going home? Why did you not wait until we came back?” put to the prosecutrix by her friend who had left her with the accused for a short time. Ridley J said that such questions as “What is the matter?” or “Why are you crying?” would not render the ensuing complaint inadmissible, whereas such questions as “Did so-and-so (naming the prisoner) assault you?”, “Did he do this and that to you?” would have that effect. He concluded that: [page 567] [I]n each case the decision on the character of the question put, as well as other circumstances, such as the relationship of the questioner and the complainant, must be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. If the circumstances indicate that but for the questioning there probably would have been no voluntary complaint, the answer is inadmissible. If the question merely anticipates a statement which the complainant was about to make, it is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the questioner happens to speak first.374
Ridley J’s assertion that the answer is inadmissible if it would not have been given but for the questioning has been disapproved.375 It is not enough if there is “a mere recounting of what has happened at the request or insistence of another”.376 Ridley J also required that statements must not be in response to suggestive or leading questions,377 but this has
survived only as one factor in the determination of admissibility.378 A complaint can take the form of an affirmative answer to a question whether the contents of a diary entry are true.379 Clearly this is not a matter upon which a consideration of the reported cases is likely to be of much assistance.380
[17270] Speed (c) The complaint must have been made as speedily as could reasonably be expected.381 In consequence the complaint must have some particularity as to time.382 Here again there are limits to the utility of perusing the cases.383 The mere fact that the complaint might have been made to others before it was made to the witness who narrates it in court does not prevent it from being received in evidence.384 Two or more complaints may be proved, and the fact that the prosecutrix only deposed to one does not prevent proof of the others by the persons to whom they [page 568] were made,385 so long as each of the complaints can fairly be regarded as having been made at the first reasonable opportunity after the offence.386 Reasonableness is to be judged by reference to the sensitivities of the particular complainant and the circumstances in which the particular complainant was placed at the time.387 This may mean that allowance will be made for the fact that a child sexually assaulted by a person in whom the child had trust and confidence will be reluctant to complain.388 In Queensland the complaint must be “recent”.389 The favoured test is whether, having regard to the circumstances, including the time which has elapsed since the alleged commission of the offence, the complaint is capable of supporting the credibility of the complainant as a witness.390 It has been said that where a child complains of a series of sexual assaults over a relatively short period, the complaint may be received not only in relation to the most recent assault but also earlier ones which were part of the same course of conduct.391
[17275] Proof of particulars of complaint (d) The principle is not limited to offences against females, but extends to offences against males.392 (e) The principle is not limited to cases where consent is in issue.393 (f) The particulars of the complaint may be proved.394 But they are not evidence of the facts of which complaint was made. They go only to the credibility of the complainant.395 Hence they are not admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.396 Hence evidence not based on the victim’s personal recollection, but on what others told her, is inadmissible.397 They are not strictly speaking corroborative of the complainant, since they do not come from a source independent of the [page 569] complainant.398 There is a need for a specific direction as to the use which may be made of evidence of complaint.399 It follows that, when consent is not in issue, the terms of a complaint are inadmissible if the victim does not give evidence. The mere fact of complaint, without its terms, is only likely to be admissible in very unusual circumstances.400 Further, it is wrong to adopt “an objectionable mode of introducing evidence indirectly, which if tendered directly would be inadmissible.”401 An example of that mode appears in the now discredited dicta of Lord Goddard CJ in a case in which the accused was charged with incest with his daughter of five. Though called as a witness, she was too frightened to give evidence. Her grandmother was allowed to narrate the terms of a complaint made to her by the child. This was rightly condemned on appeal; but Lord Goddard CJ went on to say that there would have been no objection to the grandmother saying “the little girl made a complaint to me”, and she could have been asked, “In consequence of that complaint what did you do?”, and the answer would have been, “I took her to the doctor and later to the police”. One realises that, although the terms of the child’s statement must not be given, any jury could see that as a consequence of the complaint the grandmother took the child to the doctor and the police and that the terms of the complaint would mention her father.402
While failure to complain tends to undermine the credibility of the victim as a witness, failure to complain is not evidence of consent.403
There might be many reasons for non-complaint other than consent. If consent is in issue, the proof by someone other than the prosecutrix of either the fact or terms of a complaint of a sexual assault would infringe the rule against hearsay if the evidence were tendered in order to establish positively the absence of consent. The express or implied assertion of someone other than the witness who is testifying would be received as evidence of the truth of that which was asserted. The question whether complaints can ever be received under an exception to the rule against hearsay as affirmative evidence of the absence of consent to that of which complaint is made would best be tested by a case in which the victim of an alleged sexual assault was dead. If the only evidence of want of consent were her complaint, would there be a case to go to the jury? On this the English authorities are silent, as the only reported English cases of this nature antedate the development of the [page 570] modern law concerning complaints.404 The Privy Council has suggested an affirmative answer.405 The Australian cases406 suggest not. The purpose of admitting the complaint is to show consistency — or, exceptionally, inconsistency407 — with testimony. It relates only to credibility.408 The significance of non-complaint will vary with the circumstances. It may have little or none in cases of sexual assault on a child by a person having that child’s trust and confidence.409 It may also be explained away by reason of a history of prior sexual abuse.410 [E]vidence explaining why a complainant delayed making a complaint or what motivated a complainant to make a complaint many years after the material events, particularly in a case where no earlier complaint was ever made, will generally be relevant only to the credit of the complainant…
and hence inadmissible in chief.411
[17280] Complaint must relate to sexual character of offence (g) The complaint must relate to the sexual character of the offence and
not to some other offence alleged to be committed at the same time.412 A fortiori, complaints about other incidents not the subject of any charge proved by a person other than the complainant are inadmissible.413 However, there need not be identity between the complainant’s complaint and the complainant’s evidence, so long as the complaint is capable of supporting the credibility of the testimony.414 (h) A complaint is conduct consistent with the sexual offending of which the complainant gives evidence. A mere narrative of events may not be a complaint, but while it might be expected that an adult complainant would express a sense of grievance or make an accusation, this is not necessarily to be expected of a child.415 Hence it is not necessary for the conduct to be the expression of a grievance or accusation or for it to convey anger, despair or any particular emotion.416 [page 571]
[17285] Complaint not provable by complainant alone (i) It is for the judge to determine whether the statement is capable of being a complaint and meets the conditions for admissibility; it is for the jury to determine whether it is in fact a complaint.417 (j) It is not essential to the admissibility of the complaint that its terms be proved by the complainant; they can be proved solely by a person to whom complaint was made.418 (k) A complaint cannot be proved by the evidence of the complainant alone.419 The immediate question is — “How is one to know if she is a truthful girl telling of her complaint?”. The answer—that her own assertion that she did complain will help the jury to assess her truthfulness — needs only to be stated to be recognised for its logical absurdity. Without independent confirmation of what she said, the girl’s own evidence-in-chief that she complained takes the jury nowhere in deciding whether she is worthy of belief. The doctrine of “recent complaint” in sexual cases allowing the prosecutor to adduce evidence of a prior complaint is not to be confused with the rule allowing the recourse to such a statement in order to rebut a specific charge of recent [invention].
Three further observations are necessary. First, although the complaint is received as evidence of credibility it is not treated as evidence as to credit for the purpose of the rule which prohibits evidence in rebuttal.420 Evidence may be led to challenge its genuineness.421 Secondly, words
which amount to a complaint may sometimes be proved under different rules of evidence than that which renders them admissible to enhance the credibility of testimony on a sexual charge. In appropriate circumstances they may, for instance, be proved to rebut a charge of recent invention422 or as statements made in the presence of a party whatever the nature of the proceedings may be; similarly, they may be proved as dying [page 572] declarations on charges of murder or manslaughter, or they may be held to constitute part of the res gestae. In the first and second of these examples, the words are not received as evidence of their truth in the absence of something in the nature of an admission on the part of the person to whom they were spoken. On the other hand, dying declarations constitute an exception to the rule against hearsay, and, provided the requisite conditions are fulfilled, they are admissible as evidence of the truth of that which the deceased said with regard to the cause of his or her death. When an utterance is received as part of the res gestae it may be used to enhance the credibility of testimony or, as will be seen in Chapter 19, “The Doctrine of Res Gestae”, it may constitute an exception to the rule against hearsay. Statements which are in the nature of a complaint are unlikely to be part of the res gestae, since they tend to be made otherwise than in spontaneous reaction to a near contemporaneous event.423 Thirdly, even though a statement is neither admissible as a complaint nor admissible under other rules of the type just mentioned, it may remain admissible, subject to the need for “a careful direction about the limited value which could be attached to it”.424 The need for direction was explained by reference to the following background:425 Their Lordships accept that when the complainant herself is giving evidence, it may be difficult for her to give a fair and coherent account of her behaviour after the incident without allowing her to mention that she spoke to other people who may not be available to give evidence (within the sexual complaints exception) of what she actually said. Their Lordships would not suggest that the mere mention that the witness spoke to someone after the incident was inadmissible. In most cases it will be very difficult to draw any rational distinction between consistent conduct, which is plainly admissible (eg that the witness wept) and the fact that she spoke to someone such as a parent. On the other hand, it is important to avoid infringement of the spirit of the rule against previous self-consistent statements by conveying indirectly to the jury that she had given a previous account of the incident in similar terms with a view to inviting the jury to infer, not
merely that her subsequent conduct was not inconsistent with her complaint but that her credibility was actually supported by the fact that she had told the same story soon after the incident. In the present case their Lordships think that the prosecution probably went further than could be justified by the need to allow the complainant to give a fair account of her conduct after the incident. In the absence of a ruling by the judge that the questions could be asked because of an imputation of recent invitation, she should not have been allowed to say that she had told five people “what had happened.” The inference which the jury were bound to draw was that she had made statements in terms substantially the same as her evidence to the court.
This rule has origins deep in the common law, and was said by Holmes J to be “a perverted survival of the ancient requirement that a woman should make hue and cry as a preliminary to an appeal of rape”.426 In its conditions of contemporaneity and spontaneity it is reminiscent of, but does not fit within, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that a witness’s [page 573] credit should not be bolstered by the party calling the witness, at least in advance of any attack. It is potentially prejudicial in putting before the jury a sometimes lurid account of the facts which the judge must then solemnly instruct the jury to be no evidence of them. It is illogical in supporting the witness’s testimony without itself being evidence of the facts it asserts. It is anomalous in applying only to a small and bizarre assortment of offences in some of which sexual relationship is disputed, in others of which violence is disputed, in some of which absence of consent is a necessary ingredient, and to some of which it is irrelevant. It creates resentment in applying to admit previous consistent statements made by one party to the proceedings when no such concession is made to the other.427 In consequence, there has been some statutory modification of it.
[17290] Statutory changes Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)428 provides: (1) This section applies if, on the trial of a person for a prescribed sexual offence, evidence is given or a question is asked of a witness that tends to suggest: (a) an absence of complaint in respect of the commission of the alleged offence by a person on whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, or (b) delay by that person in making any such complaint.
(2) In circumstances to which this section applies, the Judge: (a) must warn the jury that absence of complaint or delay in complaining does not necessarily indicate that the allegation that the offence was committed is false, and (b) must inform the jury that there may be good reasons why a victim of a sexual assault may hesitate in making, or may refrain from making, a complaint about the assault, and (c) must not warn the jury that delay in complaining is relevant to the victim’s credibility unless there is sufficient evidence to justify such a warning.
Section 294AA provides: (1) A judge in any proceedings to which this Division applies must not warn a jury, or make any suggestion to a jury, that complainants as a class are unreliable witnesses. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), that subsection prohibits a warning to a jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of any complainant. (3) Sections 164 and 165 of the Evidence Act 1995 are subject to this section.
Section 294 is not a code on complaints; in addition to the directions required by s 294, the judge can continue to direct the jury that the absence of a complaint or delay in making it can be taken into account in evaluating the complainant’s evidence.429 However, the warning should not be expressed in terms which undermine the purpose of the legislation by suggesting a stereotyped view that [page 574] complainants in sexual assault cases are unreliable or that delay in making a complaint is invariably a sign that the complainant’s evidence is false.430 The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 4A deals with “preliminary complaints”— complaints about an alleged commission of an offence made before the complainant’s first formal witness statement to a police officer given in, or in anticipation of, a criminal proceeding in relation to the alleged offence: s 4A(6). A complaint about an unrelated and uncharged act of sexual abuse is not a complaint about the alleged commission of an offence.431 Evidence of how and when any preliminary complaint was made is admissible, regardless of when it was made (subject to the court’s general power to exclude evidence operating unfairly to the defendant): s 4A(2)–(3). If the trial is by jury, the judge must not suggest that the law regards the complainant’s evidence to be more or less reliable because of the length of time before the preliminary complaint was made: s 4A(4). That is, the trial judge must not suggest that delay in making a
complaint is of itself a reason for regarding a complainant’s evidence as unreliable.432 The Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34CA replaces, but goes well beyond, an earlier provision relating to complaints by young children. It deals with a “protected witness” — a young child, or a person who suffers from a mental disability that adversely affects the person’s capacity to give a coherent account of the person’s experiences or to respond rationally to questions: s 34CA(5). Section 34CA(1) provides: (1) A court may admit evidence of the nature and contents of a statement made outside the court by a protected witness from the person to whom the statement was made if— (a) the court, having regard to the circumstances in which the statement was made and any other relevant factors, is satisfied that the statement has sufficient probative value to justify its admission; and (b) — (i) the protected witness has been called, or is available to be called, as a witness in the proceedings; and (ii) the court gives permission for the protected witness to be cross-examined on matters arising from the evidence.
Section 34CA(2) provides: (2) A court may only give permission to allow a protected witness to be cross-examined on such matters if satisfied that the cross-examination is likely to elicit material of substantial probative value or material that would substantially reduce the credibility of the evidence.
Section 34CA(3) provides: (3) Evidence that is admitted in a trial under s 34CA of the nature and contents of a statement made outside the court by a protected witness may be used to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement.
Section 34CA(4) provides (4) In a criminal trial, the judge must, if evidence of the nature and contents of a statement made outside the court by a protected witness has been admitted but the protected person has not, for some reason, been cross-examined on matters arising
[page 575] from the evidence, warn the jury that the evidence should be scrutinised with particular care because it has not been tested in the usual way.
Section 34D applies: see [35005].433 Section 34CA(1)(b)(i) is to be construed as meaning “the protected witness has been called and has given evidence or is available to be called
and will give evidence.”434 Section 34CA(1)(b)(ii) must be applied and satisfied before the evidence of the out-of-court statement is admitted. It contemplates permission being granted before the protected witness gives evidence of the out-of-court statement, and before another person gives evidence of the making of the out-of-court statement by the protected witness. Section 34CA(1)(b)(ii) is to be read as referring to “in principle” permission to cross-examine, based on the availability of the protected witness; on assessment of the capacity of the protected witness to give evidence; on the assessment of the ability of the protected witness to cope with crossexamination, and on the nature of the proposed cross-examination.435 This includes an evaluation under s 9 of the capacity of the witness to give either sworn or unsworn evidence.436 Section 34CA provides for permission to cross-examine at a single stage only. The “permission” in s 34CA(1)(b)(ii) corresponds with the “permission” in s 34CA(2). Section 34CA(2) does not confine the criterion for permission to cross-examine to the capacity of the witness to cope with cross-examination. An opponent who wishes to cross-examine the protected witness may do so if the witness has the capacity to give sworn or unsworn evidence and there is a sufficient prospect that the cross-examination will make a difference.437 Where the protected witness is not called to give evidence in chief and is not required by the opponent for cross-examination, the out-of-court statement of the protected witness is admissible under s 34CA if the trial judge is satisfied that the statement has sufficient probative value to justify its admission; no question of competence under s 9 then arises.438 A statement made in an interview and tendered under s 34CA may be proved by a videotape of the interview tendered as an exhibit, since it is not part of the maker of the statement’s evidence in chief.439 It may be appropriate to refuse the jury permission to view the videotape or read transcripts of it in the juryroom.440 Whether the maker is to be crossexamined on the evidence pursuant to s 34CA(1)(b)(ii) depends on the capacity of that person to give evidence; what particular questions may be asked is regulated by s 34CA(2).441 The maker may give oral evidence on the same subject as the statement.442 [page 576]
By reason of s 34CA(4) a decision under s 34CA(2) that some or all of the proposed cross-examination should not be permitted will not require the court to exclude the evidence of the out-of-court statement.443 Section 34CA permits the reception of more than one out-of-court statement relating to the same facts, so long as the conditions of admissibility are satisfied for each statement.444 Reliability difficulties can arise in relation to the particular evidence of a very young child admitted under s 34CA, even though s 12A requires that as a class, children are not to be regarded as unreliable.445 It has been said that until the relationship between ss 12A and 34CA is decided, trial judges ought to treat a statement admitted pursuant to s 34CA as if it were the evidence of the child for the purposes of s 12A.446 Section 34M makes special provision about complaints. It abolishes the requirement of recency and prevents comment on delay, while preserving the judicial discretion to exclude evidence.447 Section 34M(1) provides that s 34M abolishes the common law relating to recent complaint in sexual cases. Section 34M(2) provides: (2) In a trial of a charge of a sexual offence, no suggestion or statement may be made to the jury that a failure to make, or a delay in making, a complaint of a sexual offence is of itself of probative value in relation to the alleged victim’s credibility or consistency of conduct.
Section 34M(3) provides that despite any other rule of law or practice, evidence related to the making of an initial complaint of an alleged sexual offence is admissible in a trial of a charge of a sexual offence. Section 34M(4) provides: (4) If evidence referred to in s 34M(3) is admitted in a trial, the judge must direct the jury that — (a) it is admitted— (i) to inform the jury as to how the allegation first came to light; and (ii) as evidence of the consistency of conduct of the alleged victim; and (b) it is not admitted as evidence of the truth of what was alleged; and (c) there may be varied reasons why the alleged victim of a sexual offence has made a complaint of the offence at a particular time or to a particular person, but that, otherwise, it is a matter for the jury to determine the significance (if any) of the evidence in the circumstances of the particular case.
Section 34M(5) provides that it is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in giving the direction under s 34M(4). The reference in s 34M(4)(a)(ii) to consistency of conduct includes both consistency in making the complaint when it would be expected to be made and
[page 577] consistency between the wording of the complaint and the conduct alleged.448 Section 34M does not apply in relation to non-sexual assaults.449 The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) contain no provisions specifically about complaints beyond the general provisions discussed above.450 Evidence of complaint may often be admissible under s 66 under a hearsay exception; it will thus be evidence of the truth of the facts asserted, unlike the position at common law, which limited it to credit.451 It has been said that it may be appropriate to limit its use to credit pursuant to s 136.452 Evidence of complaint may also be admitted by leave under s 108(3)(b) (s 108(2)(b) in Tas and ACT). Hunt CJ at CL has said that such is the importance of evidence of complaint (because of the powerful support it gives the complainant’s credit) that leave should usually be granted unless the accused’s legal representative states expressly that no suggestion is to be made that the complainant’s evidence has been the result of fabrication, reconstruction (deliberate or otherwise) or suggestion.453 If the evidence is admitted under s 108(3)(b), s 60 makes it evidence of the truth of what was said unless its use is limited under s 136.454 If the evidence is relevant only to credit and is not within any exception to s 102, it is inadmissible.455 The Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 26E(1) provides that in a proceeding in relation to a sexual offence, as an exception to the rule against hearsay, the court may admit evidence of a child’s statement to another person as evidence of the facts in issue if the court considers the evidence is of sufficient probative value to justify its admission; but s 26E(3) provides that an accused person cannot be convicted solely on the basis of hearsay evidence admitted under s 26E(1).456
[17295] The effect of delay in complaint on fairness of trial The law relating to complaints has traditionally focused on the reliability of the complainant. Another aspect of the problem concerns the difficulties which delay in complaint creates for the accused and for the
fairness of the trial. The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal457 has summarised the law as follows. In any criminal trial a feature of which is substantial delay in complaint of alleged sexual offences charged against the accused, a “Longman” direction in the form of a warning, not a comment or caution, must be given. The warning must say that because of the passage of time the evidence of the complainant cannot be [page 578] adequately tested; that it would be dangerous to convict on that evidence alone; that the jury is entitled, nevertheless, to act upon that evidence alone if satisfied of its truth and accuracy; that the jury cannot be so satisfied without having first scrutinised the evidence with great care; that the carrying out of that scrutiny must take into careful account any circumstances which are peculiar to the particular case and which have a logical bearing upon the truth and accuracy of the complainant’s evidence; and that every stage of the carrying out of that scrutiny of the complainant’s evidence must take serious account of the warning as to the dangers of conviction. The warning must bear the imprint of the court’s own authority based on the court’s accumulated experience in dealing with cases involving substantial delays in the making of complaints about alleged sexual offences, and should not be framed so as to suggest that what is being said conveys no more than what the commonsense of the jury would indicate.458 The warning must be tailored to the circumstances, and need not use the precise words set out above as long as their substance is conveyed.459 Where it is not necessary for the warning to be given, there is no separate requirement for a trial judge to direct a jury that lack of a contemporaneous complaint prejudices the conduct of the defence and deprives the accused of the benefits of a proper police investigation launched contemporaneously with an early complaint.460 If a defence counsel asks that no warning be given, that may, but need not, make it unnecessary for the trial judge to give one.461 The warning, if otherwise called for, is not made unnecessary by the existence of corroboration.462 Where the complainant’s evidence is supported by some other corroborative evidence the trial judge must analyse whether despite the corroboration there remain sufficient forensic
disadvantages for the accused as to call for the giving of a Longman direction.463 There is a difference between the majority in the leading case464 and the minority. The majority appear to confine the duty to warn to difficulties of testing and disproving allegations by reason of the passage of time. Deane J located the duty to warn in the risk of child fantasy about sexual matters while half-asleep.465 McHugh [page 579] J located it in the risk that childhood events could be recollected erroneously.466 Later cases have not often found it necessary to explore the significance of the differences,467 but attention has been drawn to the lack of binding support for what Deane and McHugh JJ said, and to the possible lack of a factual basis for it.468 Section 165B of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) makes specific provision in relation to the problem under discussion. It applies in a criminal proceeding in which there is a jury. Section 165B(2) provides that if the court, on application by a party, is satisfied that the defendant has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of delay, the court must inform the jury of the nature of that disadvantage and the need to take that disadvantage into account when considering the evidence. Section 165B(3) provides that the judge need not comply with s 165B(2) if there are good reasons for not doing so. Section 165B(4) provides that it is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in informing the jury of the nature of the significant forensic disadvantage suffered and the need to take that disadvantage into account, but the judge must not in any way suggest to the jury that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict the defendant solely because of the delay or the forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences of the delay. Section 165B(5) provides that the judge must not warn or inform the jury about any forensic disadvantage the defendant may have suffered because of delay except in accordance with s 165B, but s 165B does not affect any other power of the judge to give any warning to, or to inform, the jury. Section 165B(6) provides that for the purposes of s 165B:
(a) delay includes delay between the alleged offence and its being reported; and (b) significant forensic disadvantage is not to be regarded as being established by the mere existence of a delay. In New South Wales alone, s 165B(7) provides that for the purposes of s 165B, the factors that may be regarded as establishing a “significant forensic disadvantage” include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) the fact that any potential witnesses have died or are not able to be located; (b) the fact that any potential evidence has been lost or is otherwise unavailable.469 Section 34CB(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides: (1) A rule of law or practice obliging a judge in a trial of a charge of an offence to give a warning of the kind known as a Longman warning is abolished.
This abolishes the duty to warn a jury by reference to the adverse impact attributable to the passage of time on the accused’s ability to defend a charge; it may still be appropriate for the trial judge to comment on particular circumstances, including delay, that create a forensic disadvantage for the accused, or to give a warning to a jury which might result from circumstances, other than a passage of time, that create such a disadvantage.470 Section 34CB(2) provides: [page 580] (2) If, in a trial of a charge of an offence, the court is of the opinion that the period of time that has elapsed between the alleged offending and the trial has resulted in a significant forensic disadvantage to the defendant, the judge must— (a) explain to the jury the nature of the forensic disadvantage, and (b) direct that the jury must take the forensic disadvantage into account when scrutinising the evidence.
The “significant forensic disadvantage” must be actual and specific, not theoretical, hypothetical or assumed.471 It has been said that the terms of s 34CB(2) do not suggest that s 34CB applies to a judge sitting without a jury, though the same factors may be relevant to the judge’s assessment of weight.472 Section 34CB(3) provides: (3) An explanation or direction under [s 34CB(2)] may not take the form of a warning and
(a) must be specific to the circumstances of a particular case, and (b) must not include the phrase “dangerous or unsafe to convict” or similar words or phrases.
It is convenient to note Wood CJ at CL’s reminder473 of the difficulties which face counsel, judges and juries in sexual assault cases in that not only may a Longman warning and statutory warnings be necessary, but one or more of the following warnings may also be called for: (a) a Murray474 direction that where there is only one witness asserting the commission of a crime, the evidence of that witness must be scrutinised with great care before a decision to convict is reached; (b) a Crofts475 direction: if a jury is to be informed, in accordance with s 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and its equivalents, that a delay in complaint does not necessarily indicate that the allegation is false, and that there may be good reasons why a victim of sexual assault may hesitate in complaining about it, then it should also be informed that the absence of a complaint or a delay in the making of a complaint may be taken into account in evaluating the evidence of the complainant, and in determining whether to believe the complainant; (c) a KRM476 direction that, except where the evidence relating to one count charging sexual assault is admissible in relation to another count or counts alleging a separate occasion of such an assault, the jury must consider each count separately, and only by reference to the evidence which applies to it; balancing that direction, where appropriate, by a reminder that if the jury has a reasonable doubt concerning the credibility of the complainant’s evidence on one or more counts, they can take that into account when assessing his or her reliability on the other counts;477 (d) any warning which may be required by reason of a ruling that limits the use of evidence concerning a complaint, or delay in complaint, to the question of credibility (eg under s 108(3) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and its equivalents as an exception to the credibility rule), or alternatively that [page 581]
allows it to be taken into account (under s 66 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and its equivalents as an exception to the hearsay rule) as evidence of the facts asserted; (e) the Gipp warning478 concerning the way in which evidence of uncharged sexual conduct between an accused and a complainant can be taken into account as showing the nature of the relationship between them, but not so as to substitute satisfaction of the occurrence of that conduct for proof of the act charged; (f) any warning that may be necessary in relation to the use of coincidence evidence (under s 98 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and its equivalents) where the accused is charged in the one indictment with sexual assault against two or more complainants, requiring the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt first of the offences alleged in respect of one complainant, and then of the existence of such a substantial and relevant similarity between the two sets of acts as to exclude any acceptable explanation other than that the accused committed the offences against both complainants; (g) a BRS479 direction that where evidence revealing criminal or reprehensible propensity is admitted, but its use is limited to nonpropensity or tendency purposes, then it is to be used only for those purposes and not as proof of the accused’s guilt.
Previous consistent statements admitted as part of the res gestae [17300] Meaning of “res gestae” The term “res gestae” is a blanket phrase when applied to the admissibility of statements, and may roughly be said to denote relevance through contemporaneity — part of the story.480 The different types of statement that may be admitted under this head are considered in Chapter 19, “The Doctrine of Res Gestae”, where it will be shown that they are received as original evidence in some cases, and under exceptions to the rule against hearsay in others. At this stage it is only necessary to say that the credibility of a witness’s testimony may be confirmed by the narration by the witness or someone else of a statement to the same effect as the witness’s evidence made during the continuance of the events to which it
relates.481 Thus where482 a man commonly known as “the butcher” was charged with murder, the deceased’s son gave evidence that he and a police officer were sitting in a room with his father when a face appeared at the window through which the fatal shot was then fired. At the trial he said that he thought the face was that of “the butcher”. He was allowed to swear how he had shouted “There’s Butcher” when the face appeared, and the police officer, who had not seen the face, was allowed to depose to the shouting of the name Butcher. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen commented on this case as follows: It is … obvious that the fact that he said at the time “There’s Butcher” was far more likely
[page 582] to impress the jury than the fact that he was at the trial uncertain whether the person he saw was the butcher, though he was disposed to think so.
This meagrely reported decision is unaffected by any intervening legislation. Although there is really no authority on the point, it is certainly arguable that previous statements of witnesses constituting part of the res gestae are admissible as hearsay statements, and not merely as evidence of consistency.483 Section 66A of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides for a hearsay exception for contemporaneous representations about the representor’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind.484
Previous consistent statements admitted to rebut afterthought [17305] Rebutting suggestion of afterthought At common law a previous consistent statement by a witness is admissible to rehabilitate credit by rebutting the suggestion that the testimony is a construction subsequent to the events in question. It is not necessary that this should have happened recently,485 nor that it be the
result of deliberate fabrication rather than response to another’s suggestion.486 In the words of Dixon CJ: If the credit of a witness is impugned as to some material fact to which he deposes upon the ground that his account is a late invention or has been lately devised or reconstructed, even though not with conscious dishonesty, that makes admissible a statement to the same effect as the account he gave as a witness if it was made by the witness contemporaneously with the event or at a time sufficiently early to be inconsistent with the suggestion that his account is a late invention or reconstruction.487
Holmes J said:488 It is, I think, clear that the evidence of a witness cannot be corroborated by proving statements to the same effect previously made by him; nor will the fact that his testimony is impeached in cross-examination render such evidence admissible. Even if the impeachment takes the form of showing a contradiction or inconsistency between the evidence given at the trial and something said by the witness on a former occasion, it does not follow that the way is open for proof of other statements made by him for the purpose of sustaining his credit.489 There must be something either in the nature of the inconsistent statement, or in the use made of it by the cross-examiner, to enable such evidence to be given.
[page 583] The fact that the whole of the witness’s testimony is attacked will not bring the exception into play.490 It has been said that the nature of the cross-examination must be such that it can be interpreted as containing the direct question “When did you first invent this story?”. It is for the judge to decide the effect or attempted effect of the cross-examination; the test is not whether the cross-examination may reasonably have been taken by a jury to suggest invention.491 Lord Radcliffe said that the doctrine: cannot be formulated with any great precision, since its application will depend on the nature of the challenge offered by the course of cross-examination and the relative cogency of the evidence tendered to repel it. Its application must be, within limits, a matter of discretion …492
The witness gave evidence denying adultery with his patient; the whole of this was challenged, but evidence of a conversation between the witness and an old friend in which he denied adultery was held to be inadmissible because it could not have: made any contribution to [a] judgment on the veracity of his whole account for them to know that, in such a situation, he had told the old friend substantially the same story as to his innocence of the matters charged as he was now telling at the hearing … [T]he challenge to the appellant’s evidence that was raised by the cross-examination was not of the order that could be
affected by proof of statements made by him of that kind at that date.493 No tribunal that was not otherwise prepared to accept the appellant’s general story could have been led to do so by hearing what he had told [the old friend].494
Windeyer J spoke to the same effect:495 It is not enough that a witness has been cross-examined as to credit, however much his credibility may appear to have been shaken … There must be an imputation, clearly made and not unequivocally disclaimed, that the witness is not speaking from his own recollection of events, but is recounting a story subsequently made up by him or for him. Furthermore, the statement which it is sought to use to dispel this imputation must be made in such circumstances that it logically does so. For if evidence be attacked as a recent fabrication, the attack is not repulsed by proving another statement, itself the product of pressure or of a motive to falsify.496
[page 584] Lord Radcliffe497 illustrated the law by referring to a case498 where: a witness who had testified to the forging of a will was cross-examined to the effect that he had invented his story because of enmity between him and the accused, the beneficiaries under the propounded will. He was allowed to call confirmatory evidence to show that, before the cause of this enmity had arisen, he had told a third party the story he was now telling. In that situation, the issue raised by the cross-examination was clearly defined; a recent invention due to a specified cause, and, if the witness could show that his account had been the same before the cause existed, he was certainly adding a relevant fact in support of his credibility.
Even though an imputation against the witness is only implicit rather than explicit, it may permit rebuttal if it is clear.499
[17310] Examples If it is alleged that a prisoner’s story is an invention, a previous statement concerning the nature of his or her defence becomes admissible.500 A statement made by the accused’s wife to a solicitor before she had seen her husband after his arrest is admissible if it is suggested in cross-examination that her evidence is the result of collusion with him.501 An allegation that a policeman is fabricating his testimony allows his notebook to be put in evidence.502 Generally speaking, the previous statement will be put to the witness in re-examination, but circumstances are conceivable in which he or she would be asked about it in chief. This might be done when the cross-examination of a previous witness had contained a suggestion of fabrication by himself or herself and the succeeding witness, or at a criminal trial when something of the sort had
been suggested in committal proceedings. The previous consistent statement to rebut invention by the witness may be led from other persons even though the witness did not recall making the statement.503 [I]n some of the early statements of the rule regarding the rebuttal of imputations of recent invention it is said that the confirmatory statements must have been made before there was a motive to invent. Recent authoritative statements of the rule, however, do not limit it in this way … [T]he only cases in which it is essential that the confirmatory statements should have preceded the arising of a motive to invent are those in which the imputation made is that the invention was due to, and therefore subsequent to, the arising of a particular motive.504
An allegation of fabrication for the purpose of the rule is not to be found in proof of a prior inconsistent statement. Simply because a witness is shown to have made a statement inconsistent with his testimony, evidence that he had also made consistent statements does not become admissible. And it does not become any more admissible if the inconsistent statement is not an actual utterance or writing, but is the eloquence of silence or of conduct.505
[page 585]
[17315] Statutory position Dixon J has stressed the character of the rule as an exception to the principle excluding prior out-of-court statements, and hence the care called for in assessing whether the witness has been attacked for invention or reconstruction, whether the contents of the statement are to the like effect as the testimony, and whether “having regard to the time and circumstances in which it was made it rationally tends to answer the attack”.506 Where the statement is admitted under this rule, it is admitted not as evidence of the truth of its contents, but as tending to disprove a concoction.507 Is an alleged prior consistent statement admissible when the only evidence of it is the uncorroborated evidence of a person whose credit it was intended to re-establish by the tender? McLelland J gave a negative answer on the ground that the witness’s testimony as to the prior consistent statement has no greater credibility than the testimony said to be recently invented.508 Though the opinion was given ex tempore, briefly, and without citation of authority, it has some force. However, the bulk of authority is to the contrary: there are instances or statements permitting
proof of a prior oral statement by the witness’s own testimony, usually in re-examination,509 or proof of the witness’s notebook,510 or written statement,511 or letter,512 or case notes,513 or diary,514 without any independent corroboration. The New Zealand Court of Appeal515 and the Privy Council516 have specifically contrasted previous consistent statements to rebut recent invention and previous consistent statements tendered as evidence of complaint517 from this point of view. The reason for the contrast is not explained. In the one case the complainant’s [page 586] testimony stands without any specific allegation of recent invention, in the other it is subject to that charge. In the latter case it is assumed that the witness whose credit needs bolstering can bolster himself or herself, in the former it is not. Where an available witness is not called by the accused in rebuttal of an allegation of recent fabrication of evidence by the accused, it may be proper to comment on the failure to call the witness if there is a very strong case for the view that there was recent fabrication.518 The exception does not permit re-examination to show consistency merely because the cross-examination has been directed to showing inconsistencies.519 Section 108(3)(b) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), and s 108(2)(b) of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) and the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) provide that the credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if it is or will be suggested (expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or reconstructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. So far as this calls for leave, it is narrower than the general law; the references to nondeliberate re-construction and suggestion widen it,520 as does the omission of any requirement that the statement be made sufficiently early to be inconsistent with the suggestion that the evidence given at the trial is a recent invention or reconstruction, and thus rationally tends to answer that suggestion (though the last element remains relevant to whether leave
should be granted).521 A denial without more does not necessarily suggest reconstruction, fabrication or suggestion.522 But fabrication need not be explicitly raised or strongly implied.523 Section 108(3) is not limited to the re-examination of a witness.524 The statement is admissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted by reason of s 60.
Statements admissible under statute [17320] Australian equivalents to Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) The Australian equivalents to the former Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) (see Chapter 18, “The Rule against Hearsay: Statutory Exceptions”) altered the law with regard to the admissibility of written authenticated statements of witnesses by providing that in any civil proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document and tending to establish that fact, shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact. For the purpose of any rule of law or practice requiring evidence to be [page 587] corroborated or regulating the manner in which uncorroborated evidence is to be treated, a statement rendered admissible by one of the Acts is not to be treated as corroboration of evidence given by the maker of the statement. This is consistent with the requirement that corroboration must come from a source independent of the witness to be corroborated, but in the light of that requirement the provision is superfluous and may be regarded as having been inserted ex abundanti cautela. If the maker of the statement is not called as a witness, it is received under an exception to the rule against hearsay, but, when the maker is called, the statutes must be treated as having constituted an exception also to the general prohibition on proof of a witness’s previous consistent statements. They are admissible as evidence of the facts stated.525 Hence this exception is different from the others from the theoretical point of view, because statements admitted under them merely demonstrate the
consistency of the witness’s testimony with his former utterances. Although judicial opinion has varied on the probative value of statements received under the Act in cases in which the maker is called as a witness,526 there is no doubt that they may serve a useful purpose in certain circumstances. This is particularly true in cases in which the previous statement was made when the witness had no motive to misrepresent the facts.
[17325] Limited effect of statutes The statutes have not entirely superseded the exceptions to the rule prohibiting the proof of the previous consistent statements of witnesses. They are confined to written statements and civil cases, but these further distinctions are to be borne in mind. The statement of an interested party made at a time when proceedings were contemplated might possibly be received as part of the res gestae whereas it would have to be rejected under the provision in the legislation that excludes statements made by an interested person when proceedings were pending or anticipated. There is possibly no equivalent to the discretion to reject the statement conferred by some of the statutes upon the judge in proceedings with a jury when a statement is admissible as part of the res gestae. A statement might be received under the latter head, even if the original document in which it was contained were lost. The statutes may, of course, apply to many situations in which there could be no question of resorting to the doctrine of res gestae, as where the statement is not made contemporaneously with the events to which it refers. However, the legislation expressly provides that contemporaneity is a factor affecting the weight to be attached to statements received. However undesirable such a course may be in practice, some Australian equivalents to the former Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) appeared to permit the calling of a witness and the putting of the witness’s proof in evidence at the outset of examination in chief.527 These Acts, therefore, could have become the basis of a procedural revolution in civil cases, and many would consider the revolution to be an undesirable one because proofs are often taken by means of leading questions and with an excessive regard to that which the proof-taker hopes that the witness will be able to prove. In the case of a non-expert witness the interests of truth are best served by
examination in chief, without reference being made to the proof either by the witness or the court. [page 588] The Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 101 provides that where a witness’s previous statement is proved for the purpose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication, the statement is admissible as evidence of the truth of the facts stated.528 It may be desirable to tell the jury that s 101 does not make the statement conclusive, and perhaps that it may have less significance than other evidence on the issue.529 Section 101 renders admissible an admission made by a party to another person who repeats it to the witness.530
Other possible exceptions [17330] Three further examples Three further exceptions are statements by the accused on being taxed with incriminating facts, statements by the accused when incriminating articles are recovered from his or her possession, and statements by witnesses when identifying the accused out of court. An additional exception, which has already been discussed, is a previous statement contained in a writing used to refresh memory which is tendered as a result of cross-examination on other parts of the document531 or which has been called for from the possession of an adversary.532
[17335] Statements on being taxed with incriminating facts Where an accused makes a statement which is tendered as an admission which is “mixed” in the sense that it contains statements favourable to the interests of the accused as well as adverse, the whole statement is admissible, and the trier of fact is entitled to rely on the whole or parts of it, depending on what is convincing.533 The accused is not entitled to tender the accused’s prior self-serving statements.534 In England, however, there has grown up a practice — presumably based on a spirit of fairness
— by which the prosecution, with defence approval but sometimes in the face of judicial hostility, successfully seek to tender the accused’s prior statements, not as admissions, but as showing his or her reaction on being taxed (not necessarily for the first time)535 with incriminating facts.536 The statements are then, not being admissions, evidence of the facts stated.537 If an exculpatory statement has no such relevance, perhaps because made after careful consideration and on legal advice, it need not be admitted,538 and the judge need neither take it into account in deciding whether or not there is a case to answer,539 nor draw it to the jury’s attention, if the [page 589] accused fails to testify at his or her trial.540 This creates difficulties for the jury: if the statement “I am innocent” is not admissible as an admission, or as evidence that the accused is innocent, of what utility is it?541 When the accused gives evidence, it may show consistency, but why should this special exception to the rule against narrative exist? The practice may encourage defence counsel erroneously to take the course, which in any event has been in this context warned against as dangerous, of not calling their clients.542 It is not clear that the slight relevance of such a statement, either on grounds of consistency of story, or as showing reaction, is worth the risk of attempting to explain so illogical and anomalous a rule to the jury.543 Such a statement is not admissible at all (otherwise than as an admission) if the accused does not give evidence and accordingly the jury need not be reminded of it.544 There is authority for it in New South Wales,545 and dicta for it in Victoria,546 but the Full Federal Court appeared to doubt it,547 it has been attacked in South Australia,548 and in truth the doctrine is unlikely to survive detailed appellate review in Australia. Spontaneity, relevance and weight in the statement are not passports to admissibility.549
[17340] Statements made on recovery of incriminating articles It was seen in [1195] that, if someone is found in possession of recently stolen goods, there is a presumption of fact that that person was either the
thief or a guilty handler of them. What that person says by way of explanation is therefore admissible on principles similar to those discussed in the last paragraph and, if that person is subsequently charged, it may be some proof of consistency if that person tells the same story in court.550
[17345]
Previous identification of the accused
“[E]vidence has been admitted in criminal trials from time immemorial of the identification of the accused [by witnesses] out of court”.551 There can be no doubt that identification at the time of or soon after the offence will often strengthen the value of the witness’s identification of the accused in court, and nothing more need be said in order to justify the reception of statements forming part of the act of [page 590] identification. The intricacies of the present law are discussed below.552
Statements validated by scientific means553 [17350] Lie detectors and truth drugs Three possibilities which have been considered involve the use of lie detectors, truth drugs and hypnosis. The last was discussed earlier.554 The others have not been received with any enthusiasm. Evidence of the use of a lie detector has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, in part because of its distortion of the normal process of trial. In the same case the accused had been given a truth drug, and the evidence of the psychiatrist who administered it was admitted at the trial. The admissibility of that evidence was not in issue before the Supreme Court, and in any event did not consist of statements of fact relevant to the issues made under the influence of the drug.555 That situation did arise when the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had rightly rejected the evidence of a psychiatrist of statements made to him by the accused while under the influence of a truth drug.556 The evidence was rejected because it infringed the rules excluding previous consistent statements and hearsay, because it would distort the process of trial, and because it was unreliable.
The psychiatrist was of the opinion that the accused’s statements were true, but to admit them as evidence of the facts stated would not only have been to admit hearsay evidence where no previous exception to the rule against hearsay existed; it would also have moved towards substituting trial by psychiatrist for trial by jury. On the other hand, there is the argument, to which reference has already been made,557 that the accused should be allowed the benefit of all the latest medical discoveries. In Scotland facilities for taking such a statement have been refused, once again because it would involve distortion of the trial process.558 Despite arguments in favour of the admission of such statements,559 it is submitted that the unproven reliability of these techniques, together with the danger of the jury’s attributing more weight to such unfamiliar scientific evidence than it deserves, would justify the courts in following the example of their counterparts in the rest of the common law world in showing extreme caution towards the tender of such statements.
Conclusions [17355] Consideration of rule against prior consistent statements The rule against proof of prior consistent statements no doubt serves a useful purpose in keeping witnesses to the point and in excluding evidence of little, if any, [page 591] probative value. But it has tended to become a confusing fetish in practice, under which, to the bewilderment of witnesses, they are frequently prevented from telling their story in their own way by not being allowed to state what they said to their spouses, for example, on a certain occasion.
E — UNFAVOURABLE AND HOSTILE WITNESSES
Common law [17360] Introduction A party calling a witness to prove certain facts may be disappointed by the failure of the witness to do so. The difficulties of the party may be increased by the witness’s manifest antipathy to the party’s cause. This lies at the root of the distinction between unfavourable and hostile witnesses. An unfavourable witness is one called by a party to prove a particular fact in issue or relevant to the issue who fails to prove such fact, or proves an opposite fact. A hostile witness is one who is not desirous of telling the truth at the instance of the party calling the witness,560 ie one “unwilling, if called by a party who cannot ask him leading questions, to tell the truth and the whole truth561 in answer to non-leading questions”. It will be convenient to state the common law with regard to unfavourable and hostile witnesses separately and then to mention the relevant statutory provisions, but something must first be said of the prohibition against a party impeaching the party’s own witness.
[17365] The prohibition on impeaching a party’s own witness562 A party against whom a witness is called may impeach that witness in various ways. The witness may be cross-examined by means of leading questions, and asked about previous inconsistent statements. Those statements may be proved if they are denied — a matter which is now covered by statute. The witness may be cross-examined with regard to discreditable conduct in the past with a view to showing bad character. The witness may be asked about previous convictions or the existence of bias, and these two matters may be proved by other evidence if they are denied. Finally, a party may call evidence to show that the opponent’s witness is not to be believed on oath. The prohibition against a party impeaching that party’s own witness means that there is a general rule preventing a litigant from taking any of the above steps with regard to witnesses called by that litigant.563 Various reasons have been given for the rule. It is said that a party ought not to have the means of discrediting a witness called by that party, or that the party guarantees the trustworthiness of the evidence the party adduces or that it would be
unfair to subject the witness to two cross-examinations. Whatever its basis may be, the rule seems to work well enough in ordinary circumstances as applied to unfavourable witnesses, but it would be ludicrous to apply it to a hostile witness in its full rigour.564 [page 592]
[17370] Unfavourable witnesses At common law a party was allowed to contradict a witness called by that party by calling other evidence if the witness was unfavourable, but this did not amount to a modification of the prohibition against discrediting the witness because it did not involve resort to any of the methods mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph. Calling witnesses who contradict each other, and inviting the court to believe one rather than the other, is not “discrediting” one or the other, except collaterally.565 Thus Cockburn CJ said:566 … the party calling the witness … may do so not only without the intention of abiding by all the witness may say, but with the deliberate intention of calling on the … jury to disbelieve so much of the evidence as makes against him.
Holroyd J said:567 [I]f a witness proves a case against the party calling him, the latter may shew the truth by other witnesses. But it is undoubtedly true, that if a party calls a witness to prove a fact, he cannot, when he finds the witness proves the contrary, give general evidence to shew that the witness is not to be believed on his oath,568 but he may shew by other evidence that he is mistaken as to the fact which he is called to prove.
This last kind of evidence would necessarily concern the issue more directly than evidence with regard to the witness’s credibility, and, in order to appreciate the enormity of the injustice which might be occasioned by rejecting it, a case may be supposed in which a party has four witnesses to support that party’s version of the facts. If the party happened to begin by calling a witness who disproved the party’s case, the party would be deprived of the testimony of the other three. If the party called these before the one who disproved the case, it would have been a question for the jury upon the evidence whether they gave credit to the three or the one. The order in which the witnesses happen to be called ought not to
make any difference.569 Of course, there is a sense in which a witness is being discredited if someone asks the court to believe what another witness says in preference to the [page 593] testimony of the first concerning a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, but, although the question is one of degree, the discrediting is a great deal more obvious if one of the methods mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph is adopted. When this is done, the whole of the witness’s testimony is impugned, but this is not necessarily the case when the witness is contradicted with regard to a particular fact. If a party contradicts part of the testimony of an unfavourable witness, the party is not precluded from relying on the rest of that testimony. Indeed it is open to the court to reject part of one witness’s evidence and accept part of another witness’s evidence so as to form a view of the case which neither witness would support.570 However, where rules of court permit a party on whom a witness statement has been served to tender it if the serving party does not call the witness or tender the statement, it is not open to the tendering party to tender it and contend that it is false.571
[17375] Hostile witnesses572 The judge may allow the examination in chief of a hostile witness to be conducted in the manner of a cross-examination to the extent to which the judge considers necessary for the purpose of doing justice.573 If the witness is not compellable the possibility of being cross-examined as a hostile witness should be explained before the witness is sworn.574 The witness may be asked leading questions, challenged with regard to the witness’s means of knowledge of the facts to which the witness is deposing or tested on such matters as the accuracy of the witness’s memory and perception;575 but the party by whom the witness is called cannot ask about previous bad conduct and convictions, nor can the party adduce evidence of the witness’s doubtful veracity. This is the result of the common law, but it used not to be clear whether a statement inconsistent with present testimony could be proved against a hostile witness — a
matter that became increasingly important with the [page 594] growth of the practice among attorneys of taking a proof of the evidence which a person was prepared to give.576 As Erle J observed: There are treacherous witnesses who will hold out that they can prove facts on one side in a cause, and then, for a bribe or for some other motive, make statements in support of the opposite interest. In such cases, the law undoubtedly ought to permit the party calling the witness to question him as to the former statement, and ascertain, if possible, what induces him to change it.577
The discretion of the judge in determining whether or not a witness is hostile has been said to be absolute and unreviewable on appeal.578 The reason given was this: a judge has to exercise his discretion in many instances with respect to what may be termed preliminary or interlocutory questions arising during a trial. If it might be made ground for a new trial that the new matter upon which he so exercised his discretion had not been strictly proved before him …, he would be greatly hampered in the exercise of his discretion, and the result would be greatly to increase applications for new trials.579
But the better view is that the trial judge’s discretion can be interfered with, though not lightly.580 Thus it has been held that there must be exceptional circumstances to justify an appeal on the ground that a witness had been wrongly held to be hostile.581 The exercise of discretion will be open to appeal if the judge takes into account matters which he should not have considered.582 Williams J said “the judge’s discretion must be principally, if not wholly, guided by the witness’s behaviour and language in the witness box (for the judge can know nothing judicially of his earlier conduct)”.583 Demeanour alone may be relied on.584 But Martin CJ has said that “does not exclude the judge from taking other means to inform himself whether the witness is hostile …”.585 Windeyer J agreed: If the judge could only determine whether a witness was hostile by his demeanour, it appears to me that the remedial object of the statute would be defeated by a witness of cool demeanour, such as would deceive the presiding judge. The best evidence of a witness being hostile is that he deceives the attorney of the side which calls him as to the evidence which he is about to give.586
[page 595]
Hence a witness can, but need not,587 be declared hostile on the basis of prior inconsistent statements which the witness denies,588 including oral statements.589 If it is desired to have a witness declared hostile by reason of a prior inconsistent statement, the witness’s attention should be called to it and the circumstances of its making, and the question whether the witness made it should be asked.590 If its making is admitted, the proof of its making is unnecessary. If its making is not admitted, it is customary for the witness under challenge to be stood down and for another witness to be called to prove the inconsistent statement.591 A witness is not hostile merely because the witness’s testimony is against the party calling the witness; for a party in a civil case may call the opposing party, and such a witness is not necessarily hostile.592 Sholl J593 approved statements that a hostile witness is one who “shows that he is not desirous of telling the court the truth”594 and that a hostile witness “bears a hostile animus to the party calling him and so does not give his evidence fairly and with a desire to tell the truth to the court”.595 The latter proposition is too narrow: the correct test does not depend on hostility or any other particular motive, but on the incapacity of the party calling the witness to elicit the truth by non-leading questions since the witness is deliberately withholding material evidence by reason of an unwillingness to tell the whole truth.596 Counsel for a party may not have that party declared hostile even though that party is only a nominal party in the sense that an insurer has the real interest in the outcome and the nominal party’s interest is in the opponent succeeding (for [page 596] example, where a wife is suing her husband).597 A party who has called a witness and obtained leave to treat the witness as hostile may re-examine.598 Where a witness displays hostility during committal proceedings, the prosecution is not obliged to seek to have the witness declared hostile then and there. The matter may be left to the trial to see how the witness’s evidence there comes out.599 Though a witness may be declared hostile as late as the re-examination,600 in some circumstances it may be desirable to
have the witness declared hostile during examination in chief, not reexamination.601 In general no determination that a witness is hostile should be made before the witness has been sworn and given a chance to come up to proof in the presence of the jury.602 The judge has a discretion whether to conduct a voir dire.603 The calling of a witness known to be hostile for the sole purpose of getting before the jury a prior inconsistent statement which is inadmissible as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted is improper and may well give rise to a miscarriage of justice;604 the position is different in jurisdictions where the statement is evidence of the matters asserted605 or where the witness acknowledges the truth of the prior inconsistent statement in the witness box.606 Where a voir dire is held to determine whether a witness is hostile — a course which is not by any means always necessary — though there is no absolute rule that a witness called in the absence of the jury must be subject to cross-examination, the proper course is to allow crossexamination.607
Statutory provisions [17380] Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (Eng) s 3 Section 22 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (Eng) was passed in order to settle the law with regard to proof of inconsistent statements by a party’s own witness. The terms of the section were confusing so far as unfavourable witnesses were concerned,608 but they were re-enacted in s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act [page 597] 1865. This section, which has equivalents in several Australian jurisdictions,609 governs civil and criminal cases alike at the present day. Thus s 17 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides: (1) A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach the credit of the witness by general evidence of bad character but may contradict the witness by other evidence, or (in case the witness in the opinion of the court proves adverse) may by leave610 of the court prove that the witness has made at other times a statement inconsistent with the present testimony of the
witness. (2) However, before such last mentioned proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness and the witness must be asked whether or not the witness has made such statement.
The latter procedure applies to proof of prior inconsistent statements on the basis of which the witness is declared hostile as it does to proof of such statements after the witness is declared hostile.611 The prohibition on general evidence of bad character applies to hostile and unfavourable witnesses alike. This part of the section in the English Act has been said to be declaratory of the common law and to mean that the witness cannot be asked about his or her bad conduct on former occasions or his or her previous convictions, in order that he or she may be discredited, while the party calling him or her cannot adduce evidence of his or her mendacious disposition.612 The Victorian Full Court appeared to doubt the view that, so far as hostile witnesses are concerned, the right to cross-examine is not otherwise as wide as in normal cross-examination of an opposing witness; hence they doubted a suggested limitation by which the witness cannot be asked questions going merely to credit, for example bias, interest, bad character, memory, or opportunity for observation.613 It is permissible, but not obligatory, to determine hostility by means of a voir dire.614 “Adverse” means hostile,615 so the concluding portion of the section is unambiguous so far as the proof of such a witness’s previous statements is concerned. The section gives rise to two remaining questions — its effect on the old law concerning unfavourable witnesses and the evidential value of inconsistent statements that are proved or admitted under it.
[17385] Unfavourable witnesses The words as they appear in the English Act, “he may, in case the witness shall, in the opinion of the judge, prove adverse, contradict him by other evidence”, and [page 598] their equivalents elsewhere, suggest that a party cannot do this when the
witness is merely unfavourable and not, in the opinion of the judge, hostile. If this is so, the section has altered the common law.616 It appears to be universally agreed that this is not the effect of the section, and, as long ago as 1859, Cockburn CJ said of the identical provision in the Common Law Procedure Act 1854: [T]here has been a great blunder in the drawing of it, and on the part of those who adopted it … [P]erhaps the better course is, to consider the second part of the section as altogether superfluous and useless.617
The alternative, and probably the sounder, method of ignoring the implications of the section is that adopted by Williams and Willes JJ: [W]e think the preferable construction is, that in case the witness shall, in the opinion of the judge, prove “hostile”, the party producing him may not only contradict him by other witnesses, as he might heretofore have done, and may still do, if the witness is unfavourable, but may also, by leave of the judge, prove that he has made inconsistent statements.618
Whatever means may be adopted in order to reach it, the conclusion is that an unfavourable witness can merely be contradicted with regard to facts in issue or relevant to the issue, but cannot be cross-examined or discredited in any other way. However, a witness who is considered by the judge to be hostile may be contradicted on the issue by other witnesses and, in addition, cross-examined, asked leading questions, or even discredited, to the extent that previous statements of the witness inconsistent with the present testimony may be put in evidence by the party by whom the witness is called. Indeed, on the face of the statutory language, there is no prohibition on the witness being cross-examined in all ways save “by general evidence of bad character”. Thus s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 and its Australian equivalents have not affected the common law rule according to which the judge has a discretion to allow a hostile witness to be examined by leading questions and with reference to previous inconsistent statements, for this does not amount to impeachment of credit “by giving evidence of bad character”.619 This has happened where620 the accused was convicted of incest with his daughter who was called as a witness by the prosecution. After answering some formal questions she said that she did not wish to give evidence. The judge allowed her to be treated as hostile with the result that she was examined on a statement she had made to the police and by means of leading questions. The English Court of Appeal held that the judge had acted properly and affirmed the conviction. The witness did not deny making the statement to the police but, if she had done so, an
issue arises as to whether s 3 would have applied to the case for the girl’s statement may not have been “inconsistent with her present testimony”.621 If the section does not apply in such circumstances, it is questionable whether the statement can be proved.622 [page 599]
[17390] Evidential value of previous inconsistent statements A question naturally arises concerning the use that may be made of these statements when they are admitted by, or proved against, the witness. Are they evidence of the facts stated, or do they merely constitute a ground for disbelieving the witness’s testimony? Judicial expression of the former view has not been wanting.623 But the present law is that a statement put in evidence under the Australian equivalents of s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (and the same is true of those proved or admitted under the Australian equivalents of ss 4 and 5, set out in [17535]–[17560] below), cannot be treated as proof of the facts stated,624 unless the maker of the statement happens to be a party to the proceedings, in which case it may be received as an admission,625 or unless it is receivable under a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, such as that relating to business records.626 The effect of the prior inconsistent statement, however, is not necessarily to render the sworn evidence of negligible value: its effect depends on all the circumstances.627 An illustration arose where several witnesses called by the prosecution had previously made statements to the police indicating that the accused had participated in a riot. At the trial these witnesses gave evidence in which they said that the accused did not participate in the riot. The previous statements were admitted, and the judge told the jury that they could choose between the witnesses’ evidence at the trial and their statements to the police. The jury must have acted on the latter for they returned a verdict of guilty, but the conviction was quashed because: [q]uite obviously it is one thing to say that, in view of an earlier statement, the witness is not to be trusted: it is another thing to say that his present testimony is to be disbelieved and his earlier statement, which he now repudiates, is to be substituted for it.628
The deposition taken at the preliminary examination of a witness who subsequently gives evidence at a criminal trial may be used to discredit his testimony if the judge allows the witness to be treated as hostile, but the depositions cannot be substituted for the witness’s evidence at the trial.629 [page 600]
[17395] Jury direction The English Court of Criminal Appeal has said: when a witness is shown to have made previous statements inconsistent with the evidence given by that witness at the trial, the jury should not merely be directed that the evidence given at the trial should be regarded as unreliable; they should also be directed that the previous statements, whether sworn or unsworn, do not constitute evidence on which they can act630.
If the first part of this statement was intended to be an inflexible rule, it is questionable because allowance must at least be made for the case in which the witness gives a prima facie satisfactory explanation of the inconsistency.631 The same comment may be made on approval632 given to a judicial direction to the jury to treat the evidence of a prosecution witness who had previously made a contradictory statement as negligible and to consider whether the case against the accused was proved by other witnesses.633 It is, however, open to question whether these statements were intended to lay down inflexible rules. Whether it is appropriate for a judge to warn the jury about the unreliability of the evidence of a hostile witness, and, if so, in what terms, will depend on all the circumstances.634 Long before they were made, the Court of Criminal Appeal had upheld a conviction in which there was a contradiction of a witness’s testimony at the trial in his deposition concerning a crucially important date.635
[17400] Common law approach: merits It is sometimes said that the approach of the common law under which the previous inconsistent statement merely neutralises the maker’s testimony is the logical one, because rejection of the testimony does not entail acceptance of the statement; but this is simply another instance of the pseudo-logic occasionally indulged in by lawyers. Everything depends upon the contents of the statement and testimony respectively. Of course
the rejection of W’s evidence that he was in Rome on 1 May because he had previously said that he was in Carthage throughout that day does not entail acceptance of this latter fact; but acceptance of W’s previous statement that he was not in Rome on 1 May does entail rejection of his testimony that he was there during that day. Statement and testimony usually cancel each other out because there is no particular reason why one should be preferred to the other. The testimony is on oath, but, in the absence of a convincing explanation of the inconsistency, it is the testimony of someone who has, or may have, lied on the same point on a previous occasion. [page 601] The common law approach may, however, be justified by practical considerations. The earlier statement may have been put into the mouth of its maker by an over-enthusiastic police officer or solicitor, it will generally not have been made on oath, and the maker will generally not have been subject to cross-examination when it was made.636 The solemnity of the occasion may lend support to the truth of the testimony and it will only be in rare cases that acceptable evidence tending to show that the statement rather than the testimony was true will be available.
[17405] Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) Section 38, according to the marginal note, deals with “unfavourable witnesses”. In fact it is potentially wider. Section 38(1) permits a party to cross-examine that party’s own witness with the leave of the court. But it gives little direct guidance as to the basis on which the court’s discretion is to be exercised, save that s 38(1) refers to the witness giving unfavourable evidence (an expression which is not defined), the witness not genuinely attempting to give evidence, and a prior inconsistent statement by the witness, and save that s 38(6) lists two relevant factors (antecedent notice of the intention to seek leave,637 and the nature of questioning by other parties). The methods that may be employed after leave is granted apparently include leading questions (since the references to “cross-
examining” and “cross-examination” in s 38(1)–(2) take the questioning outside the s 37(1) ban on leading questions) and (with leave) questions relevant only to credibility under Pt 3.7 (s 38(3)). Questioning by the party of the party’s own witness under s 38 is to take place before the other parties cross-examine unless the court otherwise directs (s 38(4)) and the order of questioning is subject to the directions of the court (s 38(5)); both these provisions appear superfluous in the light of s 26(c), though the latter is said to have been inserted to make it clear that parties adverse in interest to the party calling the witness may cross-examine after the party calling the witness.638 The terms of s 38(6)(b) reflect the possibility that the court may direct that the witness be cross-examined by adverse parties before being cross-examined by the party calling the witness. Section 38(7) applies s 38 to a party witness where a proceeding is being conducted in the name of the party by or on behalf of an insurer or other person.639 Plainly s 38 goes well beyond the general law on “hostile” witnesses.640 It does not depend on demonstration of “hostility” and general cross-examination on credit is permissible. “Unfavourable” has been held not to mean “hostile” but “not favourable”; the evidence of a witness who had failed in significant respects to come up to a statement he had made to police was held “not favourable”.641 A witness is not necessarily “unfavourable” because the [page 602] witness’s potential testimony “does not accord with some prosecutor’s view of the appropriate ‘camp’ or some case theory which does not accord with all the otherwise reliable evidence”.642 But evidence contradicting a version of events consistent with the accused’s guilt for which there is a reasonable basis is unfavourable.643 An illustration of giving “unfavourable” evidence is giving evidence unhelpful to the party calling the witness and without making a genuine attempt to give evidence.644 The limbs of s 38(1) can thus overlap in practice. The unfavourable “evidence” which triggers the operation of the section may be evidence given in cross-examination.645 Section 38 has no requirement that there be evidence of a motive or reason for the witness to give untruthful evidence.646
Section 38 is not limited to cases where the party calling the witness is confronted unexpectedly by evidence that is unfavourable to that party.647 The common law principle that it is improper to call a witness known to be hostile for the sole purpose of getting before a jury a prior inconsistent statement which is inadmissible to prove the facts asserted no longer applies, because s 60 makes a statement admissible to prove the facts asserted.648 The word “about” in s 38(1) denotes an extensive connection between a question and each of the three s 38(1) subjects. Hence leave may be granted to conduct questioning not only if the questioning is specifically directed to one of the three s 38(1) subjects, but also if it is directed to establishing the probability of a factual state of affairs in relation to those subjects contended for by the party conducting the questioning or the improbability of the witness’s evidence on those subjects. In establishing the probability or improbability of one or other state of affairs, the questioner is entitled to ask questions about matters going only to credibility with a view to shaking the witness’s credibility on the s 38(1) subjects.649 It will often not be right to grant leave to ask s 38 questions on the widest possible basis at the outset. But it will also often not be right for the court to grant small quantities of leave in response to a series of smallscale applications. The latter course creates difficulties for the questioner and is likely to distract the jury, lengthen the trial, and make it more complex.650
[17410] Evidence Act 1938 (Eng) It will be recollected that s 1(1) of this legislation which has equivalents in Australia provided that: In any civil proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document and tending to establish that fact, shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact.
The effect on the law concerning hostile witnesses may be considered before the position with regard to unfavourable witnesses is examined. [page 603]
[17415] Effect on hostile witnesses There is no authority dealing directly with the question whether a previous written statement proved or admitted to have been made by a hostile witness is admissible as evidence of the facts stated under the Evidence Act 1938 or its equivalents when it contradicts the testimony; but that witness’s position is analogous to that of a witness who is being cross-examined by the opponent of the party calling the witness, and some light is thrown on this problem by a case where the defendant’s counsel cross-examined one of the plaintiff’s witnesses from a signed statement which the witness gave to a representative of the commission before the trial. It was held that the plaintiff’s counsel was entitled to a copy of the document which could be read in full to the court because any privilege that had attached to it had been waived. Denning LJ added651 that, once the document was legitimately before the court, it would be admissible under the Evidence Act 1938, in which case there can be no doubt that it would be received as evidence of the facts stated in it. Accordingly the statute appears to have altered the law with regard to the use that can be made of the previous authenticated statements of witnesses under crossexamination, and hence also of hostile witnesses, that contradict the evidence given by them in court; but the change will be purely theoretical in the vast majority of cases, for, in estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to a statement rendered admissible by the Act, regard must be had to all circumstances from which an inference can reasonably be drawn as to its accuracy (s 2(1)) and, generally speaking, a judge will not attach great weight to a statement that the witness swears to have been untrue when it is tendered as evidence of the facts stated.
[17420]
Effect on unfavourable witnesses
There is a conflict of decisions of judges of first instance on the question whether the previous inconsistent statement of an unfavourable witness may be received as evidence of the facts stated under the Australian equivalents to the Evidence Acts 1938.652 The view that it may is the preferable construction. The Act provides that a statement which complies with the prescribed conditions of admissibility is admissible to prove any fact of which direct oral evidence is admissible. Direct oral evidence of a fact that contradicts the testimony of
a witness653 concerning the issues in a case may be adduced by the party calling that witness; therefore the witness’s statement should be received under the Act. Another matter that arises is where the statement of a deceased person is admitted in civil proceedings under the Act and it is sought to contradict the statement by proof of a subsequent oral inconsistent statement. In such a case the legislative requirements that such further statement be put to the deceased before it is proved cannot be met. The oral statement is still admissible.654
[17425] Leading questions to witness not formally declared hostile Dixon J once permitted a party to direct leading questions to his own witness [page 604] about facts stated in a written statement made by the witness earlier.655 The matter has since been analysed by the Victorian Full Court, as discussed above.656
Section 3 — Cross-examination and Re-examination A — INTRODUCTION Purposes, limitations and examples [17430] Purposes, limitations and examples The first object of cross-examination is to elicit information concerning facts in issue or relevant to the issue that is favourable to the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is conducted. The second is to cast doubt upon the accuracy of the evidence in chief given against such a party. In litigation the parties cause to be presented accounts of the past which are “partial in every sense”,657 and cross-examination frequently seeks to demonstrate the extent of those characteristics. The distinction between cross-examination to the issue and cross-examination as to credit is frequently a difficult one to draw.658 So far as cross-examination to the issue is concerned, the ordinary rules with regard to the admissibility of evidence apply. Thus an inadmissible document cannot be made admissible simply because its contents are put to a person in crossexamination, so that the prosecution cannot cross-examine the accused on the contents of an inadmissible confession,659 or the confession of a coaccused inadmissible against the accused,660 or a statement made by a person not called as a witness,661 or any other statement not admissible against the witness being cross-examined.662 However, one co-accused can cross-examine another on the inconsistent statements of the latter in an inadmissible confession.663 The rule against hearsay applies with as much force to the answers given by a witness in cross-examination as it does to those given by the witness in chief. It is, however, permissible to put the substance of a statement made by a person other than the witness without reference to the source.664 Thus, a doctor charged with aborting a woman since deceased was rightly refused permission to ask a prosecution witness in cross-
examination whether the deceased had not told her that she intended to operate on herself and later that she had in fact [page 605] done so. If the accused had called a witness to prove these statements, they would have been inadmissible hearsay and they would not have lost that character by being elicited in cross-examination.665 In another case666 a widow claimed workman’s compensation on the footing that her deceased husband’s last illness arose out of his employment. In crossexamination she said that her deceased husband told her that he had been out and got wet through on Tooting Common when he should have gone straight from one hospital to another, and it was held that her statement was not evidence of the facts stated. The employers could not rely on the deceased’s statement as evidence of the fact that he went on to Tooting Common because, if they had been allowed to do so, hearsay would have been received as evidence of the truth of that which was asserted in a case in which no recognised exception to the hearsay rule was applicable.667 In the hands of some counsel, cross-examination has a third purpose: to advocate a particular view of the case. Questions which are otherwise permissible are not rendered impermissible by their possession of this trait.
B — THE RULE IN BROWNE V DUNN Definition and operation [17435] Definition There is an important rule of practice known as the rule in Browne v Dunn.668 It has been formulated as follows by Hunt J.669 It has in my experience always been a rule of professional practice670 that, unless notice has already clearly been given of the cross-examiner’s intention to rely upon such matters, it is necessary to put to an opponent’s witness in cross-examination the nature of the case upon which it is proposed to rely in contradiction of his evidence, particularly where that case relies upon inferences to be drawn from other evidence in the proceedings. Such a rule of practice is necessary both to give the witness the opportunity to deal with that other evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from it, and to allow the other party the opportunity to call evidence either to corroborate that explanation or to contradict the inference sought to be drawn.
And if a court is to be invited to disbelieve a witness, the grounds upon which the evidence is to be disbelieved should be put to the witness in cross-examination so [page 606] that the witness may have an opportunity to offer an explanation.671 It is a rule of fairness which applies not only to party-witnesses but to other witnesses — particularly since witnesses who are not parties have no capacity to object to attacks on them by a party.672 And it applies not only to legal representatives, but also to trial judges.673 The rule applies in criminal proceedings as well as civil in England,674 New Zealand,675 New South Wales,676 Victoria,677 South Australia678 and Queensland,679 though not in Scotland.680 It has been said that the rule cannot be applied, or applied without serious qualification to an accused in a criminal trial, but the authorities cited in the preceding footnotes were not referred to.681 An argument that the rule did not apply against accused persons has been said, but not decided, to have “much to commend it”.682 Its practical application, however, may differ in criminal cases, not least where the accused is unrepresented.683 The rule does not compel the defence to clear up inconsistencies in the prosecution case.684 “In a trial, the duty arises most clearly where what is being suggested is fraud and false testimony on the part of a witness … [Such] contentions must be clearly identified and not raised accidentally, peripherally and nonchalantly in the course of litigation”.685 Whatever the limitations on the application of the rule in criminal proceedings, they do not affect its general application in civil penalty proceedings, though particular aspects of a given case may moderate its application.686 The rule applies in magistrates’ courts.687 The rule applies in some administrative tribunals.688 But the rule does not apply in the Refugee Review Tribunal because of its inquisitorial character.689 [page 607]
It may be that the more easy it is in a particular jurisdiction to call a witness in rebuttal, the less important the need to comply with the rule.690 A modern English court has, like Hunt J, stressed the importance of indicating to a witness the respects in which the witness’s evidence is not to be accepted.691 The rule applies equally to counsel for one defendant who proposes to suggest that another defendant is not telling the truth as it does to counsel for parties on the opposite side of the record to the party calling the witness.692 The underlying principles are that, in view of the rule against case splitting, which prohibits a party from calling fresh evidence after that party’s case has closed, it is unfair to a witness to deny the opportunity of making any explanation open to the witness if a later invitation to disbelieve or criticise the witness is to be made; that it is unfair to the party calling the witness if the opportunity for the witness to proffer an available explanation is denied. Further, non-compliance with the rule makes the trial unworkable from the court’s point of view, as Wells J has pointed out: … a judge (or a jury) is entitled to have presented to him (or them) issues of facts that are well and truly joined on the evidence; there is nothing more frustrating to a tribunal of fact than to be presented with two important bodies of evidence which are inherently opposed in substance but which, because Browne v Dunn has not been observed, have not been brought into direct opposition, and serenely pass one another by like two trains in the night.693
The same judge has pointed to a slightly different practical problem.694 … I observed questions that half hinted at some imputation, and yet that imputation was never followed up, was never carried through, and was never put fairly and squarely to a witness so as to enable him to cope with it. Then what was sought to be done was that such answers as the witness was able to give with respect to the hinted imputation were used as the basis for an address to the jury and inviting them to draw an inference that carried the imputation. I regard such a course of cross-examination and address as unfair. It represents the sort of conduct described by Alexander Pope in the well-known passage in which he condemned those who were willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike. I do not for one moment suggest that counsel should abandon the arts and fair devices of cross-examination. I am well aware that there are more ways of taking a fort than by frontal attack, but I also hold it to be a fundamental principle that, when all arts and devices of cross-examination have been exhausted for the purpose of testing whether a particular witness merits adverse criticism, then, at some stage, and in some fair manner, he should be given the opportunity of meeting the implication and answering it. A trial judge is placed in a difficult position if such a principle is not adhered to. If he intervenes prematurely, he may destroy a carefully planned cross-examination and cause a miscarriage of justice. If he intervenes at all, at some stage he may be met by the statement from counsel that the imputation was never intended.
[page 608]
So far as unfairness to the party calling the witness is concerned, Hunt J has observed:695 A challenge made to the evidence of a witness in the course of a final address may take place in various ways. The opposing party may ask the tribunal of fact simply to disbelieve that evidence; if he has led evidence in direct contradiction of the evidence of that witness, he may then ask the tribunal of fact to accept the evidence of his own witnesses in preference to that of the witness in question; or he may point to other evidence in the case, led by either party, which tends either to contradict the evidence of that witness or to destroy his credit. There are many reasons why it should be made clear, prior to final addresses and by way of cross-examination or otherwise, not only that the evidence of the witness is to be challenged but also how it is to be challenged. Firstly, it gives the witness the opportunity to deny the challenge on oath, to show his mettle under attack (so to speak), although this may often be of little value. Secondly, and far more significantly, it gives the party calling the witness the opportunity to call corroborative evidence which in the absence of such a challenge is unlikely to have been called. Thirdly, it gives the witness the opportunity both to explain or to qualify his own evidence in the light of the contradiction of which warning has been given and also, if he can, to explain or to qualify the other evidence upon which the challenge is to be based… In many cases, of course, counsel for the party calling the witness in question will be alert to the relevance of the other material in the case to be relied upon for the challenge to the truth of the evidence given by his witness or to the credit of that witness, and in those circumstances counsel will be able to give his witness the opportunity to deal with that other material in his own evidence in chief. But sometimes quite properly he may not be aware either of the other material or of its relevance; or for quite legitimate tactical reasons he may prefer his opponent to be the first to raise the matter, and then deal with it in re-examination or (if allowed) in his case in reply. But at some stage during the course of the evidence, the witness must be given a proper opportunity to deal with the material to be relied upon for the challenge.
The rule was applied where a judge failed to raise with a party and a supporting witness observations made on a view which were supposedly inconsistent with their evidence.696 The rule tends to be applied in only a modified form where the crossexamination of very young children and other vulnerable witnesses is concerned.697
[17440] Operation The practical operation of the rule was illustrated as follows by Hunt J:698 The situation in which most problems arise, and that which arose in the present case, is where the witness is not given the opportunity to deal with the other material upon which the challenge is based and where the relevance of that evidence to the challenge is not immediately apparent. Usually, but not always, such a challenge will be based upon some inference which arises from that other evidence in the case. During the course of the argument in the present case, an example was postulated in which, I believe, the question in issue is pointed up clearly. That example was as follows.
An issue between X and Y is whether X was in Melbourne upon a specific date and at a specific time. X bears the onus of proving that he was not in Melbourne. He gives evidence in his case in chief that he spent the whole day in Sydney with A and B. There are then a number of different situations which may arise:
[page 609] (1) Y does not cross-examine X or give any other warning to suggest that his evidence is challenged; X therefore does not call A or B to corroborate his evidence; and Y leads no evidence to contradict the evidence X gave. Clearly, Y cannot in those circumstances ask the tribunal of fact to disbelieve the evidence of X.699 (2) Y does not cross-examine or give prior warning that the evidence is challenged; X therefore does not call A or B to corroborate his evidence; but Y calls C and D to say that they saw X in Melbourne on the relevant date and at about the relevant time. In those circumstances, the situation could usually be remedied by allowing X to call A and B in reply (at least, in civil cases …700) and, if he wishes, to give further evidence himself. Provided that the situation has been remedied, Y may ask the tribunal of fact to disbelieve the evidence of X. (3) Y does give fair warning that the evidence of X is challenged; but, apart from putting to X that he was in Melbourne at the time and place where C and D saw him, Y does not specifically put to X any other detail of the evidence he proposes to call from C and D or disclose either their identity or the general nature of the evidence which they are to give. In those circumstances, there is, in my view, no obligation upon Y in fairness to put anything further to X in cross-examination; it is obvious that the evidence of X that he was not in Melbourne is under challenge, and it is for X to call A and B in his case in chief to corroborate him; I see nothing unfair in Y subsequently calling C and D to contradict the evidence of X, and asking the tribunal of fact to disbelieve that evidence. (4) If, in the circumstances outlined in (3), evidence also fell from another witness called by X (upon some other issue), whether in chief or in cross-examination, that he had seen X in Melbourne at the relevant time, there is, in my view, no obligation upon Y to put anything further to X in cross-examination. It is for X to deal with the situation as best he can. (5) Y does give fair warning that the evidence of X is challenged, by putting to him simply that he was in Melbourne at the time and place where C and D saw him; there is in evidence (upon some other issue), whether tendered by X or by Y, a diary kept by X in which there is an entry that X had an appointment to see Z in Melbourne on the relevant date and at about the relevant time; Y does not draw any attention to this entry during the course of the evidence, but asks the tribunal by reason of the existence of this entry in the diary to disbelieve the evidence of X. It is the situation postulated in (5) which is applicable in the present case. … [P]rovided that such use of the diary had not in any way been foreshadowed, it would in my view be wholly unfair for Y to rely upon the diary in seeking to have the tribunal of fact disbelieve the evidence of X that he was not in Melbourne.701 If the diary had been put to X, or its significance had in some other way been made apparent, X could have explained, for example, that the entry had been made in error, or that the appointment had been cancelled, and he could have called Z to corroborate his explanation for the existence of the entry. In the absence of forewarning, X would have no chance to do any of these things.
The rule is, of course, applicable to cross-examination of an expert witness.702 The extent to which detailed cross-examination is called for depends on the circumstances. The witness must be given an opportunity to respond to the allegation and to its essential features, which may include the time, place and circumstances of an event, for detail may assist the witness to remember it and qualify the testimony or reject the allegation convincingly.703 [page 610]
Exceptions and consequences of noncompliance [17445] Exceptions: notice in other ways The rule does not apply where the witness is on notice that the witness’s version is in contest. The notice may come from the pleadings,704 or a pretrial document indicating issues,705 or the other side’s evidence,706 or the other side’s opening;707 it may come from the general manner in which the case is conducted;708 it may come from the way an earlier trial between the parties on the same issues was conducted.709 In general, however, this exception to the rule should only operate where the issue is a fairly clear and obvious one. Even where there has been an exchange of affidavits or statements, a cross-examiner must put to the witness any nonobvious implications which the cross-examiner proposes to submit can be drawn from the evidence.710 The mere fact that the witness is on notice of a challenge does not shift any burden of proof resting on the party who gave notice.711 The crossexaminer who because of notice refrains from ‘putting’ the allegations to the witness embarks upon a potentially dangerous forensic course. The tribunal may not be persuaded of the fact in issue if there is no crossexamination on the issue. That risk increases where the party who makes the allegation can adduce no direct evidence as to it and the other party, having adduced no evidence in chief as to the issue, is not crossexamined.712
It may not be necessary to comply with the rule where counsel abstains from cross-examination for reasons of convenience, for example to save time, or where several witnesses are called on the same point; it is prudent to indicate to the court what course is being taken and why in case the court’s view of what the rule requires does not correspond with counsel’s. [page 611] The rule does not apply in respect of matters not put in crossexamination during committal proceedings.713 It requires counsel to put the implications which counsel submits can be drawn from the evidence if those implications are not obvious from pre-trial procedures or the course of the case, but it does not require notice to be given by cross-examination of the legal consequence to be drawn from facts.714 It does not apply in relation to the question of law raised on a submission of no case to answer, ie whether the evidence available and the inferences that might be drawn from it are capable of proving the charges laid.715 It may not apply where the witness’s evidence is internally contradictory, for the question arises as to which version of the witness’s evidence is to be employed to decide whether the cross-examiner breached the rule.716 The view of the trial judge on whether the rule has been complied with can be of particular importance.717 The rule was held not to apply where the accused made a confession in the course of which he referred to a circumstance which he had reason to believe the prosecution would rely upon to say that the confession was true, and where the accused later gave evidence to the general effect that the confession was false but said nothing about the particular matter.718
[17450] Exceptions: a lack of necessity and delicacy The rule does not apply where the witness’s story is of “so incredible and romancing a character that the most effective cross-examination would be to ask him to leave the box”.719 Hence detailed probing of “apparent improbabilities, inconsistencies and incredibilities” may not be necessary. Sometimes it may be “better advocacy to leave the matter with an uplifted eyebrow”.720 There may be some other adequate reason for
the absence of cross-examination, for example, delicacy.721
[17455] Exceptions: challenges to general credit The rule cannot:722 be applied without qualification to a challenge to the witness’s credit generally, particularly the credit of a plaintiff in an action for damages for personal injuries in relation to his evidence about his symptoms and incapacities. Damages are always in issue. Such a plaintiff knows that the defendant will contend that his injuries do not deserve the sum which he himself has placed on them. And in many other cases the witness must know that the other side will contend that he is not telling the truth, and even in some cases that he is deliberately not telling the truth. I cannot assent to the proposition that counsel cannot argue or the court find that a witness is deliberately giving false evidence unless the witness is asked some such question as, “I put it to you that your evidence is
[page 612] false”, or “I suggest that that is a deliberate lie” or the like. Indeed a successful objection might be taken to such questions as needlessly offensive (Evidence Act 1929, as amended, s 25(b)). The rule in Browne v Dunn has much more force when applied to evidence relating to a particular fact or topic than when sought to be applied to the general credit of the witness, though even in the latter case the failure to cross-examine at all may, in appropriate circumstances, be taken as an acceptance of the general credit of the witness as well as the truth of his evidence on particular matters unless that evidence is patently absurd or incredible.
[17460] Consequences of non-compliance Where a party fails to cross-examine a witness at all or on a particular matter, it may be prudent for the trial judge to draw counsel’s attention to the effect this may have on the later conduct of the trial.723 But assuming the matter is not then remedied, what are the sanctions for a breach of the rule in Browne v Dunn? Leaving aside ethical sanctions, they fall into the following groups, though the process of grouping the discretionary decisions which may be made must not be allowed to restrict the flexibility of the court’s response to the particular problem before it.724 First, if the witness is not cross-examined on a point, cross-examining counsel may be taken to accept it and may not be permitted to address in a fashion which asks the court not to accept it.725 This is so even where it is counsel for a co-accused who is in breach.726 A different rule has been said to apply in magistrates’ courts, where a party might not be
represented by a highly qualified professional advocate.727 (Whether the court in fact does accept unchallenged evidence is, of course, a matter for it.)728 Secondly, if the witness has not been cross-examined on a particular matter, that may be a very good reason for accepting that witness’s evidence, particularly if it is uncontradicted by other evidence.729 It can affect the weight of the evidence called [page 613] against the witness.730 In particular, when determining whether to accept a serious allegation, the court may take into account the lack of crossexamination on the point and any explanation the witness might have been able to proffer if there had been cross-examination.731 It is acceptable to tell the jury that the failure by counsel to put certain matters goes to the weight of the evidence, but it is inappropriate to tell the jury that the breach of the rule, of itself, would entitle them more readily to accept or reject the evidence.732 Thus there is no requirement that the court must accept the evidence not the subject of cross-examination; this is particularly so if the evidence is contradicted by other evidence.733 Thus Newton J said:734 [I]f a witness’s evidence upon a particular matter appeared in his evidence-in-chief to be incredible or unconvincing, or if it was contradicted by other evidence which appeared worthy of credence, the fact that the witness had not been cross-examined would, or might, be of little importance in deciding whether to accept his evidence.735
It will usually be unfair to reject evidence on which there has been no cross-examination where the rule in Browne v Dunn has not been complied with and where the witness has not otherwise been given the opportunity to deal with the suggestion now made for the first time in final address.736 Thirdly, the trial judge may, on application by counsel for the party who called the witness in respect of whom the rule was broken to call evidence in rebuttal, accede to the application so that matters not put to the witness earlier may be put now.737 Alternatively, the trial judge may require the relevant witness to be recalled
[page 614] for further cross-examination738 or grant an application for the recall of the witness.739 Fourthly, while in general the court has no, or very limited, discretionary power to reject the tender of relevant and admissible evidence in civil proceedings, if a defendant fails to cross-examine a witness called by the other side on a point, evidence called by the defendant to support it may be rejected.740 Fifthly, if a jury has been addressed without warning to the effect that a witness should be disbelieved or findings adverse to the witness made, the jury may be discharged or an appropriately strong curative direction given.741 If this is not done a judgment or conviction based on a rejection of the evidence of the witness who was not cross-examined may in appropriate circumstances be set aside as the product of an unfair trial.742 Caution should be exercised in deciding whether to give a direction where the party who called the witness who was not cross-examined does not complain.743 However, the direction must not have the effect of obscuring the burden of proof which rests on the prosecution.744 It is necessary to guard against overstatement of the consequences of any breach of the rule, and to take into account the position of the accused in a criminal trial and the particular circumstances relating to the conduct of the case.745 Sixthly, on appeal the court will be inclined to disregard a submission which was [page 615] not tested by putting it to the party best able to deal with it.746 The judge should simply point out to the jury that the particular matter was not put to the relevant witness; that it should have been put so that the witness could have the opportunity of dealing with the suggestion; and that the witness has been deprived of the opportunity to give that evidence and that the court has similarly been deprived of receiving it.747 Finally, where the party whose counsel has breached the rule in Browne v Dunn subsequently calls evidence inconsistent with that of the earlier
witness, the party may be exposed to comment that the inconsistent evidence is not in accordance with instructions to counsel and should be disbelieved as a recent invention.748 Comment of that kind may overlook two explanations for the inconsistency which do not reflect on the credibility of the party or the party’s witness: error on the part of counsel749 or a conscious tactical decision on the part of counsel (ascription of the latter is of course sometimes a mendacious euphemism cloaking the former). Another explanation may be that the non-party witnesses were less than fully co-operative in providing statements.750 Where the possibility of drawing an adverse inference is left to the jury, in general it should be assisted by referring to the possible operation of these factors (though problems would arise in relation to conscious tactical decisions), because jurors are not familiar with the modes of preparation for trials, the course of trials,751 or the wide discretion available to counsel in the conduct of trials.752 An advocate who intends to comment on the calling of evidence inconsistent with a party’s instructions is obliged by the rule to put the inferences which are to be drawn from the inconsistency so that the party may give whatever explanation can be given.753 If that advocate gives notice of an intention to comment in that fashion, the judge may prohibit the making of a comment.754 [page 616] The jury should not be left with the impression that the rule is an inflexible principle breach of which necessarily connotes unfairness in view of the fact that there can be good reason for the rule not being observed.755 It is impermissible for the prosecution to make a submission inviting an unfair application of the rule.756 The judge decides whether there has been an omission attracting the rule if the sanction invoked requires some order or direction from the judge. The jury decides that question if the sanction sought is their disbelief. If the judge thinks that no reasonable jury could take the view that there was a discrepancy between the case put in cross-examination and the evidence called by the cross-examining party, then there is no discrepancy for the jury to consider, and if counsel invited them to act on one they should be told there is nothing on which they may act. If there
was undoubtedly a discrepancy, the judge may give directions about the possible inferences to be drawn. If there may be a discrepancy, the jury can be told that the matter is for them to decide.757 A claim of non-compliance with the rule should be raised at the hearing.758 Failure to make the claim is not waiver, may be relevant to whether there has been unfairness, but is unlikely to have significance where unfairness arises in relation to a non-party witness and is of a serious kind.759
C — GENERAL ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH CROSS-EXAMINATION Rights to conduct and exposure to crossexamination [17465] Leading questions and advocacy Leading questions may be used in cross-examination,760 though the judge has a discretion to disallow them.761 This is commonly employed to deal with those leading questions which assume a disputed fact. It has been seen why they are improper in examination in chief.762 They are improper when put in cross-examination because they “may by implication put into the mouth of an unwilling witness, a statement which he never intended to make, and thus incorrectly attribute to him testimony which is not his”.763 Further, the use of leading questions by crossexaminers to favourable witnesses may be imprudent. It suggests collusion, and may cause the trier of fact to discount the evidence’s weight.764 While it is legitimate to use cross-examination as a form of advocacy, the [page 617] excessive use of leading questions causes cross-examination impermissibly to become “a speech thrown into the form of questions”.765
The position under s 42 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) was discussed above: [17165].
[17470] Who may be cross-examined In the last resort the court, rather than the parties, is the master of the court’s procedure, so that it has power to prevent or restrict crossexamination if this is in the interests of justice secured by a fair trial.766 Generally767 all witnesses are liable to be cross-examined except (a) one who is called for the sole purpose of producing a document who is not examined in chief768 and (b) one who is not examined in chief because of being called by mistake. The reasons for rule (a) were explained thus by Sergeant Ludlow:769 Any other regulation would be productive of the greatest mischief, as it would continually impose on the party the necessity of calling an adverse witness; and a document may even be given by one party… to a most hostile individual, for the very purpose of compelling the opposite party to call him as their witness.
Another reason is that such a person is in a sense not a “witness”. That is so of a person who has been served with a subpoena duces tecum who has not been sworn. The same rule applies if the person has been unnecessarily sworn.770 Rule (b) was stated thus by Coleridge J:771 If there really be a mistake [as to the calling of a witness], whether on the part of counsel or officer, and that mistake be discovered before the examination in chief has begun, the adverse party ought not to have the right to take advantage of this mistake by cross-examining the witness.
Coleridge J went on to draw a distinction for the purposes of this rule between two kinds of mistake.772 Here the learned counsel explains that there has been a mistake, which consists in this,
[page 618] that the witness is found not to be able to speak at all as to the transaction which was supposed to be within his knowledge. This is, I think, such a mistake as entitles the party calling the witness to withdraw him without his being subject to cross-examination. If, indeed, the witness had been able to give evidence of the transaction which he was called to prove, but the counsel had discovered that the witness, besides that transaction knew other matters inconvenient to be
disclosed, and therefore attempted to withdraw him, that would be a different case.
However, a witness not called by mistake can be cross-examined even though the witness did not give evidence, for example, because the answers to all the questions asked of the witness in chief were not received because inadmissible.773
[17475] Who may cross-examine A witness who does not come within these excepted categories is probably liable to be cross-examined, not merely by the opponent of the party calling the witness, but also by all other parties, whether or not the witness is a party, whether or not the witness has given evidence against the party seeking to cross-examine, and even though the witness is a coaccused. Certainly there is authority for the view that any party against whom a witness has testified may cross-examine: “no evidence given by one party affecting another party in the same litigation can be made admissible against the other party, unless there is a right to cross-examine”.774 There is also authority for the view that any party to the proceedings may crossexamine a witness not called by that party whether or not that witness testified against that party: “[i]t would… be intolerable… to have to decide as to each witness and each particular piece of evidence whether it was in favour of or against the other defendant”.775 Of course it might be wrong to allow a party to endeavour to discredit a witness who had not given evidence against that party, but, so far as crossexamination to the issue is concerned, it is difficult to disagree with the following statement of a South African judge: [A]n accused ought, if a fair trial is what is aimed at, to be at liberty to cross-examine a coaccused or any witness (not called by him) who may not have inculpated him in any way in order to establish facts which might tend to support an alibi.776
The absence of a right to discredit in such a situation led the other member of the court to prefer to speak of the accused having a right to put questions to, rather than cross-examine, the co-accused.777 In accordance with the overriding discretion of the judge in this matter a judge may prohibit cross-examination by way of leading questions by counsel for a party in a testamentary capacity action, for example, where that party has the same interest as that of the party for whom the witness is
[page 619] called. Similarly, counsel for one defendant was in one case held not entitled as of right to cross-examine his own client who had been called by the plaintiff to establish the plaintiff’s case against the other defendant.778 Where two or more parties are in the same interest, it is likely that the court’s discretion will be exercised to permit not more than one counsel to cross-examine, at least on the same subject matter.779 There are special statutory provisions protecting accused persons from certain types of cross-examination: they are discussed in Chapter 12, “Evidence by Accused Persons”. A party may cross-examine a witness called by another party780 even though the first party had earlier in the trial called that witness. At common law there is a rule that an attesting witness to a will must be called by the executor, who may cross-examine whether the witness is hostile or not, because the witness is in effect the court’s witness.781 The English Court of Appeal held782 that where a person had made and filed an affidavit for the purpose of use in a legal proceeding, the party procuring the affidavit could not protect the deponent from being crossexamined by withdrawing the affidavit.783 In some jurisdictions, however — for example New South Wales — filing does not expose the deponent to cross-examination until the affidavit is read; and if one party files an affidavit and another reads it, the first may cross-examine the deponent.784 Where a party has called a witness and, without asking the witness any questions in chief, made the witness available for cross-examination785 in order to preclude the drawing of any adverse inference from failure to call a party who may be presumed to know something relevant, it has been held that no cross-examination as to credit is permitted because, as the witness has given no evidence, credibility is not in issue;786 but this is questionable at least from the time when the witness begins to give evidence. There are instances of a judge who has called a witness permitting cross-examination of the witness by one or more parties,787 and it has been held obligatory.788 Section 27 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) permits a party to question any witness, except as provided by the Act; nothing in
the Act prevents a party cross-examining a witness not called by the party, though the permissible mode of doing so may be controlled by the court: eg s 42(2). [page 620]
[17480] Loss of right to cross-examine What effect does the loss of the right to cross-examine a witness in consequence of the unfitness of the witness to continue testifying have on the admissibility of testimony? On one view, the evidence should be disregarded.789 On another, the evidence should continue to be admissible,790 though its weight may be diminished.791 The latter view appears to have strength. The evidence has been given in open court, almost always without any prevision that it would be impossible to crossexamine the witness. Hence to the extent that the fear of crossexamination provides some guarantee of a willingness to tell the truth it is present in this case. It may be assumed that the judge would intervene to prevent any seriously improper questioning. The task of attempting to wipe the evidence from the minds of those who heard it is probably more difficult than the task of giving it whatever weight it deserves. The latter approach is the one adopted by the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). Slightly different issues arise in respect of affidavits sworn by a witness who has since died or become very ill. The evidence is admissible.792 But less weight may be attached to it since it has not been tested in crossexamination.793 Indeed, since it was not given in response to questions under the control of the judge, it is likely to be even less satisfactory than oral testimony. There is a discretion to terminate794 or adjourn795 the trial if a principal prosecution witness becomes so ill as to preclude further crossexamination. Where a child fails to answer many questions asked in crossexamination, it is in the trial judge’s discretion whether the trial should proceed or whether the evidence in chief should be received; if the trial
proceeds and the evidence is admitted, the circumstances may call for a strong warning of the dangers of convicting the accused.796 [page 621] There is authority that a party cannot be asked in cross-examination to admit a conclusion depending upon a legal standard.797
Nature and consequences of questions [17485] Imputations must have a basis, but not necessarily an evidentiary basis It has been held to be improper for defence counsel to attack the honesty of a police officer when cross-examining as to the voluntariness of the confession unless at the time counsel expects that the accused will give evidence to support that line of cross-examination.798 However, this is controversial, is not the law in New South Wales,799 and is not in line with the relevant ethical rules.800 Indeed, there is high authority for the view that counsel may ask questions suggesting matters which are impossible for the questioner to prove other than by admission. An advocate is entitled to use a discretion as to whether to put questions in the course of cross-examination which are based on material which the advocate is not in a position to prove directly. The penalty is that, if a denial or some unsuitable answer is given, the answer stands against the advocate for what it is worth.801 In Canada the law on this form of questioning has been stated thus: … I would think that in appropriate situations any trial judge would at least protect the witness who was asked a demeaning question where the judge has reason to believe it is without foundation or for some ulterior motive. All the judge need say to counsel is: “Are you prepared to call evidence in support of your question?” and if the answer is “No”, to direct the witness not to reply. In my opinion, fairness demands nothing less.802
But that is probably not Australian law, at least so far as relevant questions on which the questioner is unable to call evidence are concerned, as opposed to questions asked for an ulterior motive. What is much more plainly established is that whether or not the cross-examiner can call evidence on the point, he or she must not, “in cross-examination
as to credit, ask a witness if he has not been guilty of some evil conduct unless he has reliable information to warrant the suggestion which the question conveys”.803 A witness is often cross-examined as to credit on the basis of material which is not intrinsically admissible. This practice has not been eroded by English decisions preventing a judge804 or counsel805 cross-examining a witness about dishonest statements on a legal aid application form: these cases must [page 622] be regarded as being based on general principles limiting judicial intervention or the protective statutory regime that restricts the use to be made of legal aid applications. A witness ought not to be invited to criticise other witnesses. [A] witness ought not to be asked whether another witness is telling lies or has invented something. Any witness, of course, can be asked if what another witness said is true.806 … But if he says that what the other witness has said is not true, he should not be asked to enter into that witness’s mind and say whether he thinks the inaccuracy is due to invention, malice, mistake or any other cause … No attempt should be made by the cross-examiner to drive any witness, least of all the accused, into saying that any other witness, least of all a detective, is a liar.807
The objections to questions about whether others are lying are as follows:808 The literal object of such a question is to obtain an opinion whether someone else is a liar, and that … is not an issue in the case or a matter for any other witness to express an opinion [on], it is a matter for the judge or jury. It is also unfair, because it forces the honest witness into a recrimination and seeks to rely upon the natural reluctance of a person to defame another. It is also a form of bullying, using unfair means to persuade a person to retract his or her evidence.
Similarly, it is incorrect to refer a witness to specified testimony from another witness who is identified, and to invite the former to comment on the evidence, unless both are experts.809
[17490] Cross-examination can widen admissibility In many ways the course of cross-examination may let in matter which would have been inadmissible in chief. Cross-examination on the portions of a document not used to refresh memory may let the whole document in.810 Questions as to the contents of a document put to a witness called
merely to prove handwriting let in the whole document against the crossexaminer.811 An allegation of recent invention will let in the witness’s prior consistent statement.812 It is impermissible to mislead a witness by making assumptions contrary to fact, or to mislead the witness by other mis-statements. For the position under the uniform legislation, see [17505]. [page 623]
[17495] Control of lengthy cross-examination There is a modern tendency, particularly in criminal cases, for crossexamination to assume an unduly lengthy and repetitive character. The court probably has inherent power to control this as part of its overall power to regulate the proceedings,813 but it is rare for a court to give directions limiting cross-examination, as opposed to hints. However, the court in appropriate circumstances both can and should intervene.814 The limits of cross-examination are not susceptible of precise definition, for a connection between a fact elicited by cross-examination and a fact in issue may appear, if at all, only after other pieces of evidence are forthcoming. Nor is there any general test of relevance which a trial judge is able to apply in deciding, at the start of a cross-examination, whether a particular question should be allowed. Some of the most effective cross-examinations have begun by securing a witness’ assent to a proposition of seeming irrelevance. Although it is important in the interests of the administration of justice that cross-examination be contained within reasonable limits, a judge should allow counsel some leeway in cross-examination in order that counsel may perform the duty, where counsel’s instructions warrant it, of testing the evidence given by an opposing witness….: “Cross-examination is a powerful and valuable weapon for the purpose of testing the veracity of a witness and the accuracy and completeness of his story. It is entrusted to the hands of counsel in the confidence that it will be used with discretion; and with due regard to the assistance to be rendered by it to the court, not forgetting at the same time the burden that is imposed upon the witness.”815 [While counsel have a duty816] not to extend cross-examination unduly nor to pursue irrelevant lines of inquiry, … counsel must always be at liberty to do their duty in the proper interests of the client. It is the duty of counsel to ensure that the discretion to cross-examine is not misused. That duty is the more onerous because counsel’s discretion cannot be fully supervised by the presiding judge. Of course, there may come a stage when it is clear that the discretion is not being properly exercised. It is at that stage that the judge should intervene to prevent both an undue strain being imposed on the witness and an undue prolongation of the expensive procedure of hearing and determining a case. But until that stage is reached — and it is for the judge to ensure that the stage is not passed — the court is, to an extent, in the hands of crossexamining counsel.
[page 624] While administrative tribunals may under their respective statutes be able to limit the length of cross-examination, limits should be placed only in respect of individual witnesses and having regard to the nature of the issues and the evidence.817 It has been said that where for some good reason the judge wishes to limit the duration of cross-examination, it is usually not proper to indicate at the outset that cross-examination will be limited to a certain period subject to a right to apply for an extension (though this might be justified if time were limited); but the judge can say at any time during cross-examination that unless convinced that the crossexamination produced more assistance, it would be curtailed after a nominated period, though this power should be used sparingly.818 Group cross-examination, either by all counsel cross-examining the witness at one time, or a group of witnesses being cross-examined by one counsel at the same time,819 results in procedures that should not be permitted,820 unless by consent.821 A question in cross-examination may be rejected where this will involve the breach of a confidence imposed by the witness’s religion, profession or conscience,822 but only rarely on the ground that the question is distressing.823 It is permissible to test the evidence of witnesses by reminding them that they are on oath or affirmation.824 The court may limit the methods by which the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses is conducted; the limitations should be clearly defined, and the limits and reasons for them should be stated to the jury.825 It is wrong to make assertions and comments in the guise of asking questions.826
[17500] Width of questions and finality of answers The cross-examiner may ask any question of the witness which is relevant to the issue.827 Subject to that, a cross-examiner has no obligation to give advance notice of the lines of questioning to be employed. Nor is the cross-examiner obliged to give advance notice of the documents to which the witness will be taken828 (although difficulties will arise for the cross-examiner if they were discoverable and have not been discovered).
The cross-examiner may ask questions to discredit the witness; [page 625] but the answers are final at common law, except where the witness denies a previous inconsistent statement, where the witness denies a previous conviction, where the witness denies matters tending to show bias, and where the witness denies that the witness’s moral and physical qualities militate against the witness telling the truth. Under ss 102, 103 and 106 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) the answers are final except where the evidence tends to prove that a witness is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; or has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; or has made a prior inconsistent statement; or is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates; or has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth, in all cases if the evidence is adduced otherwise than from the witness and the witness has denied the substance of the evidence. There is a qualification to the general rule that cross-examination is not restricted to matters raised during the examination-in-chief, but may relate to anything relevant to the issues in the case. If the prosecution ought to have adduced the evidence as part of its case in chief and the evidence is not admissible by way of rebuttal, the cross-examination is impermissible. Hence evidence the relevance of which arose unexpectedly during the course of the trial may be adduced in cross-examination.829
[17505] Form of questions The Evidence Acts in all jurisdictions regulate the asking of what may be called “offensive” questions. One model is that adopted by some jurisdictions similar to the Cth and NSW legislation.830 It creates a duty on the court. Section 41(1) provides that the court must disallow a question put to a witness in crossexamination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered, if the
court is of the opinion that the question (a “disallowable question”): (a) is misleading or confusing; or (b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive;831 or (c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; or (d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability). Section 41(2) provides that without limiting the matters the court may take into account for the purposes of s 41(1), it is to take into account: (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made, aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality; and [page 626] (b) any mental, intellectual or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject;832 and (c) the context in which the question is put, including: (i) the nature of the proceeding; and (ii) in a criminal proceeding — the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates; and (iii) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding. Section 41(3) provides that a question is not a disallowable question merely because: (a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness; or (b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness. Section 41(4) provides that a party may object to a question put to a
witness on the ground that it is a disallowable question. Section 41(5) provides that the duty imposed on the court by s 41 applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question. Section 41(6) provides that failure by the court to disallow a question under s 41, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question. A second model gives the court a discretion, expressed in various forms, to disallow offensive questions. Thus in Queensland s 21(1) of the Evidence Act 1977 provides that the court may disallow a question put to a witness in cross-examination or inform a witness a question need not be answered, if the court considers the question is an improper question. Section 21(2) provides that in deciding whether a question is an improper question, the court must take into account: (a) any mental, intellectual or physical impairment the witness has or appears to have; and (b) any other matter about the witness the court considers relevant, including, for example, age, education, level of understanding, cultural background or relationship to any party to the proceeding. Section 21(3) provides that s 21(2) does not limit the matters the court may take into account in deciding whether a question is an improper question. Section 21(4) defines “improper question” as “a question that uses inappropriate language or is misleading, confusing, annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or repetitive”.833 The Evidence Acts also commonly deal with questions as to credit. Thus in Queensland the Evidence Act, s 20(1), provides that the court may disallow a question as to credit put to a witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness the [page 627] question need not be answered, if the court considers “an admission of the question’s truth” would not materially impair confidence in the reliability of the witness’s evidence. Section 20(2) defines a “question as to credit”, for a witness, as meaning a question that is not relevant to the proceeding except that an admission of the question’s truth may affect the witness’s
credit by injuring the witness’s character.834 These provisions are based on common law rules.835 Though the court must be careful not to interfere with cross-examination merely because it seems irrelevant to matters in issue or to credit, particularly where it is being conducted on behalf of an accused person,836 at common law the judge has a discretion to disallow improper or oppressive questions.837 Indeed, the rule may be put more widely: “The judge has a right on all occasions to exercise the power of stopping examinations which are not necessary for any legitimate purpose”.838 This applies not only to questions considered singly, but also to the effect of the cross-examination as a whole. Viscount Sankey LC once said: … a protracted and irrelevant cross-examination not only adds to the cost of litigation, but is a waste of public time. Such a cross-examination becomes indefensible when it is conducted … without restraint and without the courtesy and consideration which a witness is entitled to expect in a court of law.839
Questioning motivated by a desire to punish is improper.840 Another example of an improper question is one which is hectoring, insulting, abusive, browbeating, badgering, intimidating or bullying, or which causes needless embarrassment, shame, anger, harassment, or confusion to the witness.841 A prosecutor, in particular, must “conduct himself with restraint and with due regard to the rights and dignity of accused persons. A cross-examination must naturally be as full and effective as possible, but it is unbecoming in a legal representative — [page 628] especially in a prosecutor—to subject a witness, and particularly an accused person who is a witness, to a harassing and badgering crossexamination”.842 One reason for the rule is:843 An intimidating manner in putting questions may so coerce or disconcert the witness that his answers do not represent his actual knowledge on the subject. So also questions which in form or subject cause embarrassment, shame or anger and the witness may unfairly lead him to such demeanour and utterance that the impression produced by his statements does not do justice to his real testimonial value. [Emphasis in original.]
Another reason rests on “the confusion occasioned by cross-examination, as it is too often conducted”, for it tended to “give rise to important errors and omissions”.844 Yet another is that: “A mind rudely assailed …
naturally shuts itself against its assailant, and reluctantly communicates the truths that it possesses.”845 Repeating questions is sometimes proper, as when a witness prevaricates; but it may be merely oppressive. The duty of a cross-examiner is to ask questions, not to inject “personal views and editorial comments into the questions”.846 One vice of comments made in the course of questioning is that although they may be potentially damaging in the jury’s eyes, they are not questions, and thus the witness has no opportunity of dealing with the sting in the comments. Another vice is that the jury may regard counsel as a person of special knowledge and status and therefore pay particular regard to the comments, particularly where it is counsel for the prosecution who chooses “to throw the weight of his office” into the case.847 The time for comments, at least legitimate ones — for disparaging comments based on evidence or the lack of it can be legitimate — is the time of final address.848 “Statements of counsel’s personal opinion have no place in a cross-examinaton.”849 The role of prosecution counsel in the administration of justice should not be “personalised”.850 Their own beliefs should not be “injected” into the case.851 Comments are particularly objectionable when they are sarcastic or insulting. They are even more objectionable when they are statements indicating the personal belief of prosecution counsel in the credibility or guilt of the accused: that is not something to be said in address, and a fortiori is not something to be said during questioning. The cross-examiner’s duty is to ask single questions, not compound questions: A compound question simultaneously poses more than one inquiry and calls for more than one answer. Such a question presents two problems. First, the question may be
[page 629] ambiguous because of its multiple facets and complexity. Second, any answer may be confusing because of uncertainty as to which part of the compound question the witness intended to address.852
But compound questions have additional vices. It is unfair to force a witness into the position of having to choose which questions in a
compound question to answer and in which order. Cross-examiners are entitled, if they can, to frame questions as to seek a particular answer — either “Yes” or “No”. Even though the answers desired by the crossexaminer to a compound question may be all affirmative or all negative, the witness may wish to answer some affirmatively and some negatively. To place witnesses in the position of having to reformulate a compound question and answer its component parts bit by bit is unfair to them in the sense that it prevents them from doing justice to themselves: “Evidence should ordinarily be given without interruption by counsel”.853 The cutting off of an answer to a question, though always to be avoided as far as possible, can happen innocently when a questioner is pursuing a witness vigorously and the witness pauses in such a fashion as to suggest that the answer is complete; it can happen legitimately if a witness’s answer is non-responsive. The rule against the cutting off of a witness’s answer follows from the encouragement which the law gives to short, precise and single questions. It is not fair to ask a question which is disparaging of or otherwise damaging to a witness and to cut off an answer which the cross-examiner does not like. The right of a cross-examiner to control a witness does not entail a power to prevent the witness from giving any evidence other than that which favours the cross-examiner’s client. A question put in chief which assumes a fact in controversy is leading and objectionable, “because it affords the willing witness a suggestion of a fact which he might otherwise not have stated to the same effect.”854 While leading questions in the cross-examination of non-favourable witnesses are not intrinsically objectionable, “[w]itnesses should not be cross-examined on the assumption that they have testified to facts regarding which they have given no testimony. Such questions have a tendency to irritate, confuse and mislead the witness, the parties and their counsel, the jury and the presiding judge, and they embarrass the administration of justice”.855 This is because a leading question put in cross-examination which assumes a fact in controversy, or assumes that the witness has in chief or earlier in cross-examination given particular evidence which has not been given, “may by implication put into the mouth of an unwilling witness, a statement which he never intended to make, and thus incorrectly attribute to him testimony which is not his.”856 A further vice in this type of questioning is: “An
[page 630] affirmative and a negative answer may be almost equally damaging, and a perfectly honest witness may give a bad impression because he cannot answer directly, but has to enter on an explanation.”857 Questions of this character are misleading and confusing, within the meaning of both the statutory and the common law rules. It is not permissible to cross-examine on the assumption that a without prejudice conversation had taken place the contents of which are inadmissible.858 It is wrong to pose questions which fail to elicit factual information, but rather provide merely an invitation to argument.859 The vice in a particular type of argumentative cross-examination was described thus by the English Court of Appeal:860 One so often hears questions put to witnesses by counsel which are really of the nature of an invitation to an argument. You have, for instance, such questions as this: “I suggest to you that …” or “Is your evidence to be taken as suggesting that …?” If the witness were a prudent person he would say, with the highest degree of politeness: “What you suggest is no business of mine. I am not here to make any suggestions at all. I am here only to answer relevant questions. What the conclusions to be drawn from my answers are is not for me, and as for suggestions, I venture to leave those to others.” An answer of that kind, no doubt, requires a good deal of sense and self-restraint and experience, and the mischief of it is, if made, it might very well prejudice the witness with the jury, because the jury, not being aware of the consequences to which such questions might lead, might easily come to the conclusion (and it might be true) that the witness had something to conceal. It is right to remember in all such cases that the witness in the box is an amateur and that counsel who is asking questions is, as a rule, a professional conductor of argument, and it is not right that the wits of the one should be pitted against the wits of the other in the field of suggestion and controversy. What is wanted from the witness is answers to questions of fact.
Like several other of the rules discussed above, the rule against argumentative questioning rests on the need not to mislead or confuse witnesses. It can be impermissible to ask questions in cross-examination which call for mere conclusions about or summaries of documents or conversations. It is wrong to defy the judge’s rulings on the propriety of questions, particularly if this is coupled with discourtesy.861 The permissibility of questioning which offends the above rules does not depend solely on whether there are objections from counsel representing the party calling the witness. “The failure of counsel to object does not …
give Crown counsel carte blanche …”.862 Trial judges have a responsibility independently of objections to [page 631] prevent this type of questioning being employed.863 “If counsel begin to misbehave [trial judges] must at once exert [their] authority to require the observance of accepted standards of conduct.”864 In some jurisdictions there is legislation dealing with the special problem of an unrepresented defendant cross-examining particular types of witness. See [13070].
[17510] Cross-examination as to credit Cross-examination purporting to go to credit is impermissible unless an acceptance of the truth of the matter suggested would in truth affect credibility.865 The conduct of a witness cannot be used to attack the witness’s credit unless it is of such a nature as to tend rationally and logically to weaken confidence in the witness’s veracity or trustworthiness as a witness of truth.866 This is necessarily not a topic on which citation of decided cases affords much general guidance.867 It has been held that questions should have been allowed which suggested that a witness had not been a virgin before the conduct charged against the accused had occurred where it was part of her evidence in chief that the conduct charged against the accused caused the loss of her virginity;868 while this issue was not a necessary ingredient in the crime charged, it was a fact in issue rather than a matter merely going to credibility. Third parties should not be implicated needlessly, for the court must attempt to ensure fairness to them as well as to the parties.869 Questions asking the witness to assert discreditable inferences about conduct are impermissible.870 So are questions as to religious belief.871 The same applies to questions concerning critical comments made about a witness’s evidence in an earlier trial.872 Examination of a single witness by more than one counsel (whether the counsel appearing for the same party, or for different parties so far as their interests are the
[page 632] same873) may be oppressive,874 and will not be allowed in the absence of a special reason875 such as illness,876 or where the case is of some complexity and the cross-examination may conveniently be split between counsel,877 or where cross-examining counsel departs from the case leaving a junior behind with the cross-examination incomplete.878 The principles underlying the law here are that truth will out more readily from the lips of a calm witness, or one who has been calmly induced to assert inconsistent propositions, than from one in a state of justifiable terror or rage, or fatigue. And obstacles which prevent witnesses willingly coming forward ought as far as possible to be removed. Stephen refused to believe that: … a person who is called to prove a minor fact, not readily disputed, in a case of little importance, thereby exposes himself to having every transaction of his past life, however private, inquired into by persons who may wish to serve the basest purposes of fraud or revenge by doing so. Suppose, for instance, a medical man were called to prove the fact that a slight wound had been inflicted, and been attended to by him, would it be lawful, under pretences of testing his credit, to compel him to answer upon oath a series of questions as to his private affairs, extending over many years, and tending to expose transactions of the most delicate and secret kind, in which the fortune and character of other persons might be involved?879
The court has a discretion to permit witnesses to be recalled for further cross-examination.880 In defamation cases, cross-examination of the plaintiff as to credit is permissible on matters which might have been, but were not, particularised under the defence of justification, but since it is not relevant to justification, only to credit, the answers are final.881 The same882 is true of cross-examination on matters which cannot go to mitigation of damages.883 The effect of ss 102–103 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) is that credibility evidence about [page 633] a witness is not admissible unless it could substantially affect the
assessment of the credibility of the witness, and the effect of ss 102–103 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) is that cross-examination going solely to credit is impermissible unless the evidence has substantial probative value; the court is to have regard to whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when under an obligation to tell the truth, and to the period which has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred.
[17515] Cross-examination of co-accused The effect of the relevant legislation884 is that an accused person is a competent but not a compellable person for any co-accused person.885 In accordance with general principle, whatever the first accused says may be evidence for or against the first accused or the co-accused person calling the first accused. The first accused may be cross-examined by the prosecution with a view to obtaining incriminating evidence even though the first accused gave no evidence in the first accused’s own defence,886 and whether or not the first accused’s evidence is adverse to the coaccused person calling the first accused or any other co-accused person.887 However, the court has a common law discretion, which it will sometimes be proper to exercise, to disallow cross-examination. A prosecutor is not entitled, under the cloak of cross-examination, to examine an accused upon matters irrelevant to the question of the first accused’s own guilt, and extraneous to any evidence the first accused has given, in order to make the first accused an additional witness against the co-accused.888 The basis for disallowance is that given that there is a rule preventing the prosecution calling a co-accused person, the prosecution should not automatically be placed in the same position as if it had called the coaccused person, with the added advantages of being able to cross-examine, simply because of the fortuitous circumstance that the co-accused person decided to testify.889 Take these four cases: (a) co-accused person A testifies but in chief gives evidence inculpating only A; (b) A testifies and gives evidence in chief exculpating A, but makes no reference to co-accused person B; (c) A testifies and gives evidence in chief exculpating both A and B;
(d) A testifies and gives evidence in chief exculpating B. In the light of the need to avoid the prosecution being able to rely on the accident that A testified to circumvent the ban on being able to call A, in (a) and (b) leave to cross-examine may well be refused, because A has said nothing about B, while in (c) and (d) it may well be given, because the prosecution should be entitled to destroy the effect of A’s evidence in favour of B. It could normally do this if the reason A testified was that A was called by B; for A is a competent witness at B’s instance. The problem for the court may often be in practice to distinguish between crossexamination of A as to what A has said about himself or herself and crossexamination of A so as to extract something which damages B. [page 634] The prosecutor may not cross-examine a defendant on a statement which is inadmissible in the case against that defendant.890
[17520] Cross-examination after judicial questioning Subject to the discretion of the court, “it is … the usual practice to allow some further cross-examination when at the end of the witness’s evidence the judge elicits some further matter tending against the party’s case or contention”.891 The rule applies also when a judge recalls a witness and asks a further question.892 Though this is a matter on which practice varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from judge to judge, in interlocutory proceedings, particularly proceedings for an interlocutory injunction, the court may refuse or limit cross-examination, either by reason of exigencies of time (and indeed this ground could be relied on in any proceedings) or because the narrowness of the issues and the general immateriality of credit questions in such proceedings entail the consequence that much conventional cross-examination is likely only to have a collateral purpose.893
[17525]
Divergence between instructions and
evidence The conduct of cross-examination has to be carried out with particular care so far as it purports to reflect a client’s instructions as to events in issue, because, allowing for the possibilities of human error, a divergence between what a party says or does not say in evidence and the question asked by that party’s counsel of the opposing witnesses may be taken into account in evaluating that party’s testimony894 or in evaluating that party’s case.895 The problem may arise in the following ways. First, the counsel for a defendant may fail to cross-examine the opposing party’s witnesses on a point on which the defendant calls evidence; this raises a problem concerning breach of the rule in Browne v Dunn, discussed at [17460]. Secondly, counsel for the defendant may cross-examine witnesses called by the opposing party to suggest a certain state of facts, but the defendant’s testimony fails to support, or denies, the propositions for which the cross-examination contended. Thirdly, counsel for the defendant may cross-examine witnesses called by the opposing party to suggest a certain state of facts, but the defendant fails to call any witness on the point; this may raise a Jones v Dunkel inference, depending on the considerations discussed at [1210]–[1220].
D — PREVIOUS INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS General [17530] Introduction The law with regard to the previous statements of a witness under crossexamination that are inconsistent with the evidence in chief is contained in [page 635] statutes of most jurisdictions896 based on ss 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (Eng) which apply to both civil and criminal law. For
simplicity, reference is made only to the Queensland provision which is virtually identical with its equivalents in other States and in the English statute. The tender of previous inconsistent statements has been held not to be prohibited by legislation regulating the use of material obtained in consequence of an abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination.897
[17535] Proof of previous statements Section 18 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides: (1) If a witness upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by the witness relative to the subject matter of the proceeding and inconsistent with the present testimony of the witness does not distinctly admit that the witness had made such statement, proof may be given that the witness did in fact make it. (2) However, before such proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness and the witness must be asked whether or not the witness had made such statement.
This is almost, if not entirely, declaratory of the common law.898 The section only applies in respect of divergences between a witness’s evidence and statements by the witness after the events in issue about them, not to divergences between a witness’s evidence about the events in issue and what another witness says as to them.899 It is not permissible simply to ask the witness whether the witness said a particular thing in a previous outof-court statement, and whether it is true; it is necessary first to ask the witness about the facts, and only if there is inconsistency between the testimony and the previous statement can the latter be put.900 An “inconsistency” has been said not to exist where the witness makes two statements from which different inferences can be drawn: they must be contradictory on their face.901 But [page 636] statements may be in substance inconsistent even where one is a statement of fact and one is a statement of opinion.902 A statement remains “inconsistent” with sworn evidence even though the witness cannot remember whether or not the witness made it.903 It has been suggested that the test for inconsistency is whether the trier of fact could reasonably find that a witness who believed the facts testified to would have been
unlikely to have made the prior statement.904 The section is permissive and not intended to abrogate common law principles; accordingly, it did not preclude independent proof of statements tending to prove bias or partiality in the witness.905 If a statement is admitted or proved under the section, it merely impugns the testimony of the witness under crossexamination (unless the witness is a party, in which case the statement may amount to an admission or unless the witness adopts it906); it does not constitute evidence of the facts stated.907 The modern authorities on this point all turn on the previous inconsistent statements of hostile witnesses and they have already been discussed. There is no doubt about their applicability to the statements of a witness under cross-examination by the opponent of the party calling the witness,908 or the co-defendant of that opponent.909 “Relative” means “relevant”.910 A distinction911 has been suggested between “relative” and “relevant”; but this appears to depend on a special meaning being given to “relevant”, namely, “admissible”. While s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 applied to hostile witnesses, s 4 did not, so that evidence could not be called as of right to show that a hostile witness had made a previous inconsistent statement, and the judge has a discretion to refuse leave for this to be done.912 If a witness says the witness has made a statement to the police but denies believing its [page 637] truth, the witness has failed to “distinctly admit” it for the purpose of s 18 of the Queensland Act.913 Where a contradictory statement is proved, a witness may be called to disprove it.914 It is not possible to prove a prior inconsistent statement merely by tendering evidence of it: the procedure set out in the section must be followed.915 And it cannot be proved where the witness admits it: if the witness admits it the purpose of discrediting the witness has been achieved.916 The admission may be tardy, but the section does not render an inconsistent statement admissible merely because the witness does not admit making the statement when first asked to admit making it.917 “It does not matter that the distinct admission was made reluctantly or as the result of a persistent cross-examination.”918 Nothing in s 18 prevents the previous statement of a witness inconsistent
with the witness’s testimony being put to the witness to challenge the witness’s credibility, even where the section does not allow the evidence of the making of the inconsistent statement to be given.919 It follows from the requirement that the circumstances of the statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion be mentioned to the witness that the document must be identified.920 An available and in some respects a desirable procedure is for the witness to be stood down during cross-examination to allow proof of the prior inconsistent statement to be led then, rather than tendered in rebuttal; the tender at the latter stage may be prevented if this is unfair.921 The proof of previous statements under this legislation must not contravene the rules restricting the tender of evidence by a party after that party’s case has closed.922 Where a prior inconsistent statement was put to an intellectually impaired witness who had also made a prior consistent statement, it was held that both statements should have been put to her before she was asked whether her evidence was untruthful.923
[17540] Previous statements in writing: The Queen’s Case Section 19 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) (set out at [17545]) and its equivalents in other jurisdictions924 apply to cases in which the previous statement is in writing; its terminology, apart from this distinction in scope, is similar to that in s 18. [page 638] Such cases had formerly been complicated by the rule laid down by the judges when advising the House of Lords in relation to the divorce proceedings brought against Queen Caroline.925 Wigmore referred to it as a rule which, “for unsoundness of principle, impropriety of policy, and practical inconvenience in trials, committed the most notable mistake that can be found among the rulings upon the present subject”.926 It required that, if a witness was to be cross-examined with regard to a previous statement made by the witness in writing, the witness must be shown the
document before any questions were asked with regard to it. If the witness admitted that it was the witness’s statement, it could be read as the evidence of the cross-examining party, who was not obliged to inquire whether there was any explanation of the inconsistency. If the witness did not admit that the statement was the witness’s, it could be proved by another witness and read as part of the case of the cross-examining party. The ruling in The Queen’s Case was attended by at least four disadvantages. First, it was unfair to the cross-examiner because it deprived the crossexaminer of the invaluable weapon of surprise. In certain situations, the most effective procedure is to ask the witness whether the witness has ever said the contrary of what the witness now says on oath and only to show the witness the previous statement if the witness answers the question in the negative. Secondly, the procedure under consideration was unfair to the crossexaminer by obliging the cross-examiner to read the statement as part of his or her evidence. This might affect the order of counsel’s speeches, because even if the cross-examiner called no other witnesses, the crossexaminer had adduced evidence within the meaning of the common law rules concerning the order of speeches.927 Moreover, there are certain situations in which the cross-examiner will not desire to put the witness’s statement in evidence at all. In one case,928 for instance, counsel for the defence wanted to show a police officer called by the Crown his deposition in order to induce him to vary his answer to a question concerning a statement made by the prisoner. It was held that the correct course was to read the deposition to the witness. This would have had the disadvantage of showing the jury that the witness had, on many matters, told the same story as he told in court, and the reading of the deposition might have been more favourable to the Crown in some respects than the casting of doubt on one point of the witness’s evidence would have been helpful to the accused. What counsel for the defence wants to do in such a case is to be able to ask the witness to read the deposition to himself or herself, and then to inquire whether he or she adheres to the statement made in his or her evidence in chief. If the witness says “no”, counsel for the defence has achieved his or her object; if the witness says “yes”, then only should it be necessary for counsel for the defence to decide whether to use the deposition to contradict the witness; if he or she does so, the deposition
then becomes evidence in the case. Thirdly, the fact that the prosecution was forced to tender the entire document might enhance rather than discredit the witness’s evidence if parts of the document confirmed the witness’s evidence. [page 639] Finally, the ruling could operate harshly from the point of view of the witness, because the cross-examiner was not obliged to give the witness an opportunity of explaining the inconsistency between the witness’s former statement and present testimony. However, the witness would probably have that opportunity in re-examination.
[17545] Previous statements in writing: the current legislation Section 19 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides as follows: (1) A witness may be cross-examined as to a previous statement made by the witness in writing or reduced into writing relative to the subject matter of the proceeding without such writing being shown to the witness. (1A) However, if it is intended to contradict the witness by the writing the attention of the witness must, before such contradictory proof can be given, be called to those parts of the writing which are to be used for the purpose of so contradicting the witness. (2) The court may at any time during the hearing of a proceeding direct that the writing containing a statement referred to in subsection (1) be produced to the court and the court may make such use in the proceeding of the writing as the court thinks fit.
This appears to overcome all the disadvantages of the former law. The witness can be asked whether the witness made a statement and crossexamined on the general nature of its contents without being shown the document.929 The opponent of the cross-examiner cannot tender it.930 The cross-examiner is not obliged to put it in evidence,931 even if the cross-examiner shows it to the witness,932 but the cross-examiner must do so if the cross-examiner wishes to use the document as a contradictory statement made by the witness.933 A document is not “reduced into writing” and hence cannot be tendered if it was not written, signed, orally assented to or otherwise adopted by the witness.934 There is no necessity for the witness to be given an opportunity of explaining the contradiction over and above the identification of the contradictory passages as required
by the section.935 That can be done by the witness’s own counsel in reexamination.936 The document is never evidence of the facts stated in it by virtue of the section because the proviso with regard to the court making such use of it as it may think fit does not extend to the [page 640] court’s directing the jury to choose between it and the testimony of the witness.937 Depending on the circumstances, it may be that only parts of the document containing the statements should be admitted.938 The prior inconsistent statement entitles but does not compel the trier of fact to reject the sworn testimony.939 The prior statement, once admitted, may be used to confirm the witness’s credit if it is both consistent and inconsistent.940 The procedure applies in committal proceedings.941 The procedure applies equally to the prior inconsistent statements of hostile witnesses and to witnesses under ordinary cross-examination.942 The power of the court to make use of the document in the trial presumably extends to compelling its tender, though this is a most unusual course.943 It is unclear whether the section gives the court power to direct the tender of the document as opposed to putting it in of its own motion.944 The court also has a discretion as to how much of the statement will be tendered.945 It has been held by a Queensland court that a prior inconsistent statement made by the accused during the voir dire that preceded the trial could be admitted in the main trial.946 The section concerns statements of the witness “made by him in writing or reduced to writing”. Where the written statement is not made by the witness, but is a statement of the witness reduced to writing by another person, the section has application only where the witness has in some way verified or adopted the document.947 The tender of an inconsistent statement under the statute does not authorise the tender of other out-of-court statements of the witness which are consistent with his or her testimony in order to sustain his or her credit.948 However, this is permitted by s 108(3)(a) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) and s 108(2)(a) of the Evidence Acts 2001 (Tas) and 2011 (ACT).
Section 108(3)(a) is not limited to the tender of consistent statements by the prosecution in response to inconsistent statements tendered by the defence; it extends to consistent statements tendered in relation to evidence led by the prosecution which is damaging to the prosecution case.949 The inconsistent statement which triggers s 108(3)(a) and 108(2) (a) can be one which is inferred from conduct.950 [page 641]
Particular problems [17550] Documents which are not those of the witness The statute did not affect cross-examination based on documents written or signed by persons other than the witness being cross-examined. The former law continues to apply to these cases and consequently the witness is not compelled to answer any questions on the document until the document is shown to the witness and tendered. This means the document must be capable of being properly admitted into evidence.951 Where the document is inadmissible, the only proper course for the crossexaminer is to put the document in the witness’s hands and to ask the witness if, having read it, the witness still adheres to the witness’s previous testimony.952 When that is done, there is no obligation on the crossexaminer to tender the document.953 In a prosecution for larceny and false accounting,954 documents prepared by sales girls who were not called as witnesses were put to the accused in cross-examination and their contents were not admitted, but the accused were none the less called upon to read them out. This procedure was held improper; the sales girls not having been called as witnesses their statements were inadmissible hearsay. It was said that if a document is put to a witness in cross-examination and the witness accepts it as true it becomes evidence against him; if it does not it is, as the Court of Appeal put it, “non-evidence”.955 The terms of this statement are such that it can only be true of party-witnesses.
[17555]
Depositions
So far as depositions are concerned, there is authority that supports the practice of some courts that where counsel causes the witness to look at the deposition, counsel must put it in evidence, even though counsel ostensibly makes use of it only for the purpose of refreshing the witness’s memory.956 But there is also authority for a differing practice, whereby the matter is treated as one for the judge’s discretion [page 642] and no distinction is drawn for this purpose between depositions and other writings.957
[17560] Tape recordings A particular problem is posed where the previous inconsistent statement is contained in a tape recording. In these circumstances, counsel was permitted in a case before a judge alone to reproduce it in the presence of the witness and then to seek the witness’s assent to or dissent from it.958 The decision would almost certainly have been otherwise in a hearing before a jury.959 A party-witness may be asked to make admissions as to the contents of a document if its contents are within the party-witness’s own personal knowledge,960 whether the party-witness is the author or not, but a witness who is not a party may not.961 There is a dispute about whether the party-witness can be compelled to answer: the better view is that the party-witness can.962 If a cross-examiner shows a document to the tribunal of fact or indirectly, by means of cross-examination, gets any of its contents before the tribunal of fact, the cross-examiner can be required to tender the document, or at least the parts relevant to the crossexamination, if this is necessary in order to make the transcript understandable.963
[17565] Previous inconsistent statements as evidence of facts stated In civil proceedings the previous written statement of a witness who is being cross-examined is admissible as evidence of the facts stated under
the Australian equivalents to the former Evidence Act 1938 (Eng), provided the requirements of the relevant Act are satisfied. In the first instance, it is for the cross-examiner to decide whether to ask for the statement to be admitted under the Act, but, once the [page 643] cross-examiner makes it evidence in the case by, for example, crossexamining on it passage by passage, the document may be read under the Act at the instance of the court or the party calling the witness.964 The Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 101 provides that where a previous inconsistent statement is proved, or a witness’s previous statement is proved for the purpose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication, the statement is admissible as evidence of the truth of the facts stated.965 The receipt into evidence of a prior inconsistent statement as evidence of the facts therein contained poses particular problems in a criminal trial, especially where the prior inconsistent statement is more damaging to an accused person than is the testimony of the witness. Where the prosecution seeks to adduce such evidence from a prosecution witness, an issue may well arise as to whether the prejudicial nature of the statement does not outweigh its probative value, such that as a matter of judicial discretion it should be excluded …. If however, such a statement is admitted, it will usually be necessary for the trial judge to give very careful and very precise instructions to a jury as to the weight the evidence should be given. The nature of the instructions will necessarily depend on the particular case. It is difficult to conceive that in a case where the prior inconsistent statement is more damaging to the accused person than the evidence given by the witness, a mere invitation to the jury to consider the matters referred to in s 102 of the Evidence Act [see [35130]] would be a sufficient instruction. In many cases such an invitation may be to the disadvantage of the defence case.966
Where a witness refused to say whether what was said in a prior statement was true or even to acknowledge that it had been made, his testimony was held inconsistent with the statement. “It is not necessary for the testimony to be inconsistent with the statement that it contradict it. It is sufficient that it is not consistent with it for the terms ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ are mutually exclusive.”967 There is no inflexible rule of law or practice that a jury should be directed that the sworn evidence of a witness who had made a prior inconsistent statement was unreliable.968 It has been said that in criminal cases the jury should be directed that they should only act on an out-ofcourt statement admitted as evidence of the truth of its contents which is
inconsistent with a witness’s testimony if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were made and were true.969 It has been said that it will almost inevitably be the case that a conviction cannot safely be entered when the only evidence to support it was a prior statement of a prosecution witness contradicted on oath by that witness at the trial.970 Where the prosecution has a statement from one of its own witnesses conflicting with that witness’s evidence, the prosecution should inform the defence.971 Where previous inconsistent statements are admitted under ss 43 and 45 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW, 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and [page 644] Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), or previous consistent statements in answer under s 108(3)(b) (Tas and ACT: s 108(2)(b)), they may be admissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted: s 60.972
E — CROSS-EXAMINATION ON DOCUMENTS GENERALLY973 Calling for documents [17570] Calling party to tender document if required to A document may become evidence of the facts stated in it by virtue of the common law rules concerning cross-examination on documents. If, at the trial, a party calls for and inspects a document held by the party’s adversary, the party is bound to put it in evidence if required to do so, provided the document was not being used to refresh the memory of one of the adversary’s witnesses. If the document was being used for this purpose, neither the inspection, nor cross-examination on such parts of the document as were used to refresh memory, makes it eligible to be made evidence in the case, though cross-examination on other parts will have this effect.974
In a divorce case in which a doctor was giving evidence on behalf of the wife, the husband’s counsel called for and inspected medical reports from other doctors which were in the hands of the doctor who was testifying although he was not referring to them for any purpose. Wrangham J held that the reports were thus made evidence in the case at the option of the wife.975 Unfortunately Wrangham J did not say, any more than do any of the older authorities on cross-examination on documents, whether or not they are used to refresh memory,976 for what purpose the reports were made evidence in the case. They might have contained matter consistent with the doctor’s testimony or inconsistent with the evidence of one of the husband’s witnesses or their contents might have been received as hearsay statements in support of the wife’s case. If a cross-examiner puts a document in a witness’s hand, the opponent of the cross-examiner is not entitled to see it merely by reason of the fact that questions are asked about its general nature and identity as opposed to the handwriting on it.977 The opponent may, however, call for it.
[17575] Rule in Walker v Walker and its abolition In Australia it has been held that a document called for may become evidence of the facts stated in it at the option of the party thus obliged to produce it, although the rule against hearsay would have prevented him or her from relying on [page 645] the document for this purpose in the first instance.978 This can only be justified on the ground that there is an exception to the rule against hearsay covering documents which a party is obliged to produce at the instance of opposing counsel. The justification of such an exception, especially in a civil case where the rules of evidence may be waived, would be the implied waiver by the opponent of any objection to the favourable portions of the document. The leading case was distinguished in holding979 that an accused might call for and inspect the depositions without having to tender them in evidence: a deposition is not a document of a party even though it may be in the prosecutor’s custody. The principle
appears to apply whether the document is produced in examination in chief or in cross-examination. The principle may work hardship on the cross-examiner when the crossexaminer has not seen the document so that the cross-examiner calls for it at the cross-examiner’s peril. The risk of hardship, however, is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the document, if in the hands of the opposing party, will have been discovered, and if it has not been, it may be inspected upon production under subpoena duces tecum or pursuant to a statutory right to the documents in court.980 The rule has been abolished by s 35 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT).981
F — FINALITY OF ANSWERS TO COLLATERAL QUESTIONS The general rule [17580] The rule: statement and illustrations There is a sound general rule, based on the desirability of avoiding a multiplicity of issues,982 to the effect that the answers given by a witness (including a party-witness)983 to questions put to him or her in crossexamination concerning collateral facts must be treated as final. They may or may not be accepted by the [page 646] jury, but the cross-examiner must take them for better or worse and cannot contradict them by other evidence.984 Collateral facts are “facts not constituting the matters directly in dispute between the parties”985 or those which are not “facts in issue or facts relevant to a fact in issue”.986 “Whether a fact is a fact in issue depends upon the pleadings and particulars of each party’s case. The facts in issue reflect the material facts that constitute the claimant’s cause of action — which may be defined as the set of facts to which the law attaches the legal consequences that the
claimant asserts. The facts in issue also include those material facts that provide any justification or excuse for, or a defence to, the cause of action.”987 “The facts in issue in a civil action case emerge from the pleadings, which, in turn, are framed in the light of the legal principles governing the case. Facts relevant to facts in issue emerge from the particulars and the evidence. The function of particulars is not to expand the issues defined by the pleadings, but ‘to fill in the picture of the plaintiff’s cause of action with information sufficiently detailed to put the defendant on his guard as to the case he has to meet and to enable him to prepare for trial’. The function of evidence is to advance, or cut down, the case of the party in accordance with the rules of statute or common law that determine the nature of the information a court will receive.”988 An example of a collateral fact is one affecting the credibility of a witness.989 Another illustration is a circumstantial detail as to the place at which an alleged admission was made going only to a witness’s reliability.990 Another is the calling of a handwriting expert to contradict a witness’s denial of his signature on an affidavit which was inconsistent with his evidence in matters affecting his credit.991 As relevance is a matter of degree,992 it is impossible to devise an exhaustive means of determining when a question is collateral for the purpose of the rule under consideration; but a useful guide was provided by Pollock CB in the leading case. He said: [T]he test, whether a matter is collateral or not, is this: if the answer of a witness is a matter which you would be allowed on your own part to prove in evidence — if it have such a connection with the issue, that you would be allowed to give it in evidence — then it is a matter on which you may contradict him.993
The defendant was charged with using a cistern for making malt without complying with various statutory requirements. One Spooner gave evidence of the [page 647] use of the cistern and was asked in cross-examination on behalf of the defendant whether he had not told Cook that the excise officers had offered him twenty pounds to say that the cistern had been used. Spooner denied that he had ever made such a statement, and it was held that the
defendant could not ask Cook to narrate the alleged conversation. If Cook had been able to prove that Spooner had actually received a bribe from the excise officers, his testimony would have been admissible because it would have tended to show bias under an exception to the rule prohibiting contradictory evidence on collateral issues.994 An example of a collateral issue is whether the police officers who testify that the accused assaulted them assaulted him after his assault on them.995 The effect of the judgments is aptly stated in the following passage: Independent evidence may be given to prove a self-contradictory statement by a primary witness only if (a) the statement contradicts testimony by the primary witness about a matter directly in issue in the litigation,996 or (b) the statement contradicts testimony by the primary witness as to “those matters which affect the motives, temper and character of the witness,… with reference to his feelings toward one party or the other”.997
But the rule concerning the finality of the witness’s answers on collateral issues is not confined to self-contradictory statements.998 A fortiori a cross-examiner may not question a witness on facts which are not merely collateral, but are wholly irrelevant to the matter in issue, if answered affirmatively, for the purpose of discrediting the witness if the witness answered negatively by calling other witnesses to disprove the answer.999
[17585] The rule: justifications What are the reasons for the rule? Alderson B said: The reason why a party is obliged to take the answer of a witness is, that if he were permitted to go into it, it is only justice to allow the witness to call other evidence in support of the testimony he has given, and as these witnesses might be cross-examined as to their conduct, such a course would be productive of endless collateral issues. Suppose, for instance, witness A is accused of having committed some offence; witness B is called to prove it, when, on witness B’s crossexamination, he is asked whether he has not made
[page 648] some statement, to prove which witness C is called, so that it would be necessary to try all those issues, before one step could be obtained towards the adjudication of the particular case before the Court.1000
Similarly, Rolfe B said:1001 If we lived for a thousand years instead of about sixty or seventy, and every case were of sufficient importance, it might be possible, and perhaps proper, to throw a light on matters in which every possible question might be suggested, for the purpose of seeing by such means
whether the whole was unfounded, or what portion of it was not, and to raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of the statements made. But I do not see how that could be; in fact, mankind find it to be impossible.
Furthermore, false statements on collateral matters may be insignificant, for “[n]o witness can be prepared to support his character as to particular facts”.1002 And Alderson B referred to “the inconvenience that would arise from the witness being called upon to answer to particular acts of his life, which he might have been able to explain, if he had had reasonable notice to do so, and to have shewn that all the acts of his life had been perfectly correct and pure, although other witnesses were called to prove the contrary”.1003 If witnesses could give personal explanations of this kind, they could call other evidence in support of them, and the cross-examination of these other witnesses “would be productive of endless collateral issues”. These controversies, though they “might … obliquely throw some light on the issues must in practice be discarded because there is not an infinity of time, money and mental comprehension available to make use of them.”1004
[17590] The rule: evaluation A leading High Court case1005 prompts speculation on the question whether Pollock CB’s test can always be applied with satisfactory results. One of the plaintiff’s witnesses in a running-down action was asked in cross-examination how he accounted for his presence at the scene of the accident, and he said that he had been to the bank on behalf of a named person. A new trial was ordered on the ground that the judge had wrongly allowed the bank manager to give evidence to the effect that no business was done on behalf of the man named by the witness on the day of the accident. No doubt a witness’s evidence as to how the witness came to be at the place where the events of which the witness deposes occurred is collateral, and Pollock CB’s test applies to the facts with which the court was concerned; but a question naturally arises with regard to the proper decision in such [page 649]
a case if the rebutting evidence goes to show that the witness was not present at the accident at all. It would be a perversion of language to describe such evidence as collateral to the issue, but, by its very nature, it could not be given in chief.1006 Speculations are also prompted by an Irish case1007 in which a witness was giving evidence through an interpreter. He was cross-examined about his knowledge of English, and it was held that evidence could not be given to contradict his statement that he was ignorant of the language. Once again it is difficult to deny the collateral nature of the question in the situation before the court, but it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a witness’s linguistic ability would be directly relevant to the issue, as when it is crucial to know whether the witness understood what was said on the occasion about which the witness is deposing, or whether, with a view to challenging the honesty of the whole of the witness’s testimony, it is desired to establish that an interpreter was not really necessary. The indubitable value of the finality rule should not blind one to the undesirability of a closed list of exceptions to it. In such cases the test of Pollock CB would prohibit the reception of evidence in rebuttal of the witness’s denials. In another case,1008 evidence tending to show that police officers had fabricated a statement by the accused was held to go to the issue, in revealing that they were prepared to go to improper lengths in securing the conviction of the accused, rather than merely to their credit. McHugh J said of that case:1009 it seems impossible to justify this decision if the distinction between collateral facts and facts in issue is to be maintained. Whether the officers had threatened the witness threw no direct light on whether the accused had made the admissions. The evidence simply showed that they were of bad character and willing to break the law. Moreover, the decision is irreconcilable with [a case1010 holding] that evidence could not be called to contradict the denial of a witness that he had tried to dissuade a witness for the other side from giving evidence …
A House of Lords decision1011 suggests that evidence may always be given of a witness’s lack of opportunity or capacity to perceive the events about which the witness testifies. Indeed, the Full Federal Court said that the exclusionary law in question is not absolute and the categories of exceptions to it are not closed. It is a rule of practice related to the proper management of litigation: While judges will be astute to confine or prevent exploration of secondary issues affecting credibility, the exercise of the judicial function in that regard should not be encumbered by overnice distinctions between “collateral” and other matters and the application of enumerated exceptions with a flavour of statutory proviso about them … A trial judge should not be precluded from determining in an appropriate case that the matter on which a witness’ credit is
tested is sufficiently relevant to that credit as it bears upon issues in the case that such evidence may be admitted.1012
Accordingly the court held that evidence contradicting the denial of a witness to a car accident that she had been prepared on other occasions to propose the pursuit [page 650] of a fictitious claim for damages arising out of a staged accident was admissible: it would not embroil the court in a multiplicity of peripheral issues, and it demonstrated, if true, an approach to the litigation and claim process that called into serious question the extent to which she could be believed in what she told the court and her doctors in important areas concerning the extent and location of her pain, which to a significant degree could not be independently verified. The subject of the excluded evidence was an important one which the trial judge was entitled to inquire into in the interests of justice, whether or not it came within any of the traditional exceptions to the rule against evidence on collateral issues. Similarly, McHugh J has treated the rule that answers in crossexamination on collateral questions are final as “a rule of convenience, and not of principle”,1013 and has said that to elevate it and the rule against bolstering the credibility of witnesses ([19005]) to fixed rules of law rather than rules of convenience would be a mistake, particularly in view of the criticism to which the finality rule has been subjected.1014 It depends on matters of degree.1015 But though McHugh J has accepted an invitation to characterise the rule as merely a guide to discretionary case management, the other six members of the High Court did not.1016 Section 102 of the legislation based on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is a statutory version of the common law rule.1017
Exceptions to the general rule [17595] Convictions, bias, inconsistent statements and tendency to untruth The nature of the cross-examination will sometimes entitle the party
calling the witness to call another one to testify to matters which could not have been deposed to in the absence of the cross-examination. For example, if the plaintiff in a running-down case is cross-examined in such a way as to suggest that he or she has suppressed information about a later accident in which he or she sustained injuries, his or her solicitor may be called to prove the prompt disclosure of those injuries. The point is directly relevant to the amount of damages claimed;1018 but cases of this sort do not constitute a real exception to the rule that a witness’s answers to collateral questions or questions concerning credit only are final. There are, however, four well-recognised exceptions — the fact that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the fact that a witness is biased in favour of the party calling him or her, the fact that a witness has previously made a statement inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony1019 and the fact that the moral [page 651] character or physical condition of the witness is such as to militate against the witness telling the truth. Nothing more need be said about the third exception and the others are mentioned later.1020 The possibility of adding to the exceptions has been left open.1021 One quasi-exception is the tender of evidence in rebuttal casting doubt on the contemporaneity of certain evidence tendered as part of the res gestae; the evidence was viewed as going to an issue raised by the defence, and hence rightly admitted in rebuttal.1022 Section 106 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that the credibility rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that a witness (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement;1023 (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth, in each case if the evidence is adduced otherwise than from the witness and the witness has denied the substance of the
evidence. Section 106(2)(d) has significance, because it represents an attempt, probably successful, to reverse decisions to the effect that evidence rebutting a denial of absence by a witness is inadmissible. The omission from s 106(2)(d), after “aware of”, of the words which appear in s 104(3)(b), “or recall”, is significant: evidence of which the witness was once aware but cannot now recall is outside s 106(2)(d).1024 It must be remembered that it is not every piece of bias, every conviction, every false representation, for example, that can be tendered in rebuttal of the witness’s denials. The rebuttal evidence is inadmissible unless the witness gave a denial; and the question to which the denial was given would not have been admissible unless it could elicit evidence substantially affecting the assessment of the credibility of the witness: s 103(1). Has the common law exception to the finality of answers to collateral questions relating to a mental or physical disability of the witness militating against the witness telling the truth been preserved?1025 The exception was certainly intended to be preserved.1026 The language of ALRC 26 Bill clause 85(b) was “is or was unable, by reason of a physical or mental condition or otherwise to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates”. But ALRC 38 Bill clause 99(2)(a) omitted the emphasised words, and they do not appear in s 106(2)(d). On the whole it would seem that the exception has been preserved, and if anything expanded, by reason of the generality of s 106(2)(d). [page 652]
G — THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CROSSEXAMINATION AS TO THE ISSUE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION AS TO CREDIT General [17600] Effect of distinction The distinction between cross-examination to the issue and crossexamination to credit is important not only because in the latter case the
cross-examiner is bound by the witness’s answers, but also because the only inference that can be drawn from the latter is whether the witness is to be believed on oath. Unless the lie of a party-witness is found to operate as an admission by conduct,1027 “disbelief does not amount to positive evidence of the opposite of what is disbelieved”.1028 Hence no inference may be drawn with regard to a fact in issue: If by cross-examination to credit you prove that a man’s oath cannot be relied on, and he has sworn he did not go to Rome on May 1, you do not, therefore, prove that he did go to Rome on May 1; there is simply no evidence on the subject.1029
It is, however, equally important not to over emphasise the significance of the distinction when the witness is a party to the proceedings. In cases in which the accused may be cross-examined on his or her previous convictions, attempts are sometimes made to distinguish between utilising the convictions as evidence of guilt, and utilising them as something affecting the credibility of the accused. The argument is that no direct inference must be made from the fact that the accused has a criminal record to the fact that he or she committed the crime charged, and inferences of this sort are generally prohibited. But this does not render it possible to say that the convictions are being used for a wholly different purpose when the credibility of the accused is under consideration. The line of argument in the latter case is that the accused, A, is not to be believed when A swears that A is innocent because A has a criminal record. Therefore A is guilty. For practical purposes there is no distinction between the two cases. The correct conclusion appears to be that, although the difference between the effects of cross-examination to credit and cross-examination to the issue is crucial when questions concerning the finality of the witness’s denials, or the existence of any evidence of a fact in issue, are under consideration, it is not one that can be usefully applied to the answers given by an accused person, A, who is being crossexamined on testimony in which A has asserted his or her innocence; attempts to utilise it in this connection are in the nature of an unduly subtle refinement. [page 653] Thus the factual circumstances which lead to disbelief in a witness’s
evidence may themselves be evidence of the truth of the contrary. Or the evidence disbelieved may be given in circumstances in which its falsehood points to the truth of contrary evidence.1030 The inherent probability of a story may enable an inference to be drawn that it is untrue, and deliberately untrue. For example, corroboration was found in a lie by a man accused of shop-breaking with intent in giving an explanation of how the police found four sticks of dynamite and five detonators in his bedroom. The reasoning of the majority was:1031 As to the dynamite and detonators, his explanation is as follows: When visiting his brother at Lydia a few days before the 17th, as he was going out on the Saturday to see a neighbour who used dynamite in drilling wells, his brother asked him to procure for him a couple of sticks of the explosive, which he did. He put the dynamite in his pocket, but so completely forgot about it that he did not give it to his brother on his return to the latter’s home, went to church on Sunday still carrying it in his pocket and, still forgetting, brought it to his room in Winnipeg where he put it in his trunk. That four sticks, and not a couple, were found in his trunk of course makes his story still more absurd and unbelievable.
The telling of two inconsistent stories may enable the trier of fact to prefer one and treat the other as a lie, particularly if it is the less inherently probable of the two. In theory a trier of fact could conclude that a statement by a witness was a lie merely on the basis of the demeanour of a witness. (Equivalent reasoning would only rarely be possible in relation to out of court statements in view of the difficulty of the witness who heard the out of court statement in communicating clearly to the trier of fact what the demeanour of the maker of the out of court statement was.)
H — RE-EXAMINATION Object and limits [17605] Object The subject of re-examination can be disposed of briefly. The purpose of re-examination is not merely to remove ambiguities and uncertainties, but is allowed wherever an answer in cross-examination would, unless supplemented or explained, leave the court with an impression of the facts, whether facts in issue or facts relating to credibility, which is capable of being construed unfavourably to the party calling the witness and which represents a distortion or incomplete account of the truth as the witness is able to present it.1032 Leading questions may not be put, any more than
they may be put in chief;1033 previous consistent statements can only [page 654] be put to the witness if rendered admissible by the terms of the crossexamination, or as statements in documents made admissible in civil proceedings by statute, or to refresh memory.1034
[17610] Limits The most important rule is that the re-examination must be confined to matters arising out of the cross-examination, and new matter may only be introduced with the leave of the judge. Thus in an action for malicious arrest arising out of the non-payment of a loan alleged by the plaintiff to be a gift, the plaintiff had given evidence at the trial of one of the defendant’s witnesses for perjury. The plaintiff’s attorney was present at that trial, and he was called as a witness on behalf of his client in the present proceeding. The attorney could not be asked in chief about statements made by the plaintiff at the earlier trial on account of the rule against hearsay, and the prohibition on evidence of a witness’s prior consistent statements; but he was asked in cross-examination whether the plaintiff had not said, in the course of his evidence in the previous proceedings, that he had repeatedly been insolvent. It was held that he could not be asked in re-examination about other portions of the plaintiff’s earlier evidence which had no connection with the statement concerning his insolvency.1035 The rule is sound in principle because it prevents the admission of inadmissible evidence in re-examination, under the guise of dealing with points emerging from the cross-examination, and any hardship that the rule may occasion can be mitigated by the judge.
Admission of further evidence [17615] Illustrations The terms of the cross-examination may, however, let significant and prejudicial evidence in through the re-examination, although such evidence would not be admissible in chief, if it is needed to explain away
or qualify matters emerging in cross-examination.1036 Thus in reexamination a witness may be asked about and used as the means of tendering the whole of the document containing a prior inconsistent statement to show that the wording generally is not inconsistent.1037 The new evidence may include evidence of the witness’s state of mind when the witness made the statement.1038 The reasons for a failure to take a step, in itself adverse to a witness’s position, may be elicited.1039 Further, a report, made by a witness shortly after an interview he had with the plaintiff, was admitted in re-examination to rebut allegations as to credit made during cross-examination.1040 Perhaps the most striking examples are provided by cases in which adverse insinuations are made in the crossexamination of a police witness to the effect that the witness is an agent provocateur. The witness may then be asked in [page 655] re-examination about the witness’s reasons for approaching the accused, and the jury may thus be provided with information about suspicions entertained by the police concerning the accused.1041 Where a witness admitted on cross-examination that he used violent language towards his father, this being assumed to discredit him, he was permissibly asked on re-examination how his father behaved, so as to show that violent language was justified.1042 The conduct of the crossexamination may permit re-examination which discloses offences other than those charged.1043 A cross-examination which elicits convictions on minor charges will justify a re-examination to prove an acquittal on a major charge.1044 It should be noted that at common law the rule that questions must be confined to matters arising from the cross-examination does not forbid questions on parts of a statement which are necessary to explain the parts elicited in cross-examination and the witness’s motives for making it.1045 There is a common law rule1046 that where a witness has been cross-examined about admissions made by the party calling him, that party may re-examine as to the entire statement made by the party: not only so much as may explain or qualify the matter introduced by the previous examination, but, even matter not properly connected with the part introduced upon the previous examination, provided only, that it relate to the subject matter of the suit; because it would not
be just to take part of a conversation as evidence against a party, without giving to the party, at the same time, the benefit of the entire residue of what he said on the same occasion.
If a witness is cross-examined about statements made which have been recorded in a deposition, counsel calling the witness is entitled to elicit the circumstances in which the statement is made, but is not entitled to put the deposition in re-examination where the document was not placed in the witness’s hands and the witness was not asked whether it was a true copy.1047 Where matters are opened up in cross-examination which are not relevant to any matter in issue nor go to credit, may they be re-examined on? The authorities support an affirmative answer.1048 If the matter which came in in cross-examination came in through a non-responsive answer which is not relevant to any matter in issue or to credit, the cross-examiner can have it struck out, or seek a direction that the jury disregard it; if it is not, it remains as part of the evidence, and re-examination on it can take place.1049 The reason is perhaps that it is undesirable for evidence which could (though, ex hypothesi, if it is irrelevant, it ought not to) bear on the result to be left unexplained; perhaps that the right to re-examine should not depend on the taking of an unsuccessful objection, for this may lend [page 656] emphasis to the irrelevant material; perhaps that in the case of a responsive answer, the cross-examiner should not be heard to complain of reexamination that is directed to explaining or clarifying material which he or she has elicited; and perhaps that in the case of a non-responsive answer the cross-examiner is the best person to decide whether the answer is to be expunged or left as part of the evidentiary material before the trier of fact. Where the judge questions the witness at the conclusion of the witness’s evidence and elicits some further matter tending against the party’s case, it is usual for the judge to allow some further cross-examination.1050 Care is called for when the re-examiner proposes to introduce a prior consistent statement in re-examination.1051 Questioning in re-examination of a witness with a view not to removing ambiguities or uncertainties, nor explaining answers in cross-examination, but to destroying the effect of the answers in cross-examination, may be
rejected.1052 Section 39 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that on re-examination, a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination, and other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave.
Section 4 — Evidence in Rebuttal A — INTRODUCTION The rule [17620] General No party is normally permitted to adduce fresh evidence after its case is closed; it may not “split its case”. It is sometimes suggested that there is a distinction between “calling evidence in rebuttal” and “reopening a case”. If evidence is legitimately capable of being called in rebuttal, either as of right or because the circumstances are such that the court can and should properly exercise its discretion to do so, the party calling the evidence is not reopening its own case, but answering its opponent’s. In these circumstances there is a distinction of principle between a party calling rebutting evidence and reopening that party’s case in the sense that the party seeking to call the evidence is attempting to avoid the consequences of a mistake in failing to call it earlier, and asks the court in its discretion to permit it to call additional evidence. But in practice it seems to matter little whether what a party is doing is calling rebuttal evidence or reopening its case. This is because the rules about to be considered appear to apply indifferently to both processes at least to the extent that they are discretionary. Indeed, the principles appear to apply indifferently to evidence rebutting other evidence or contentions, to entirely new evidence in the sense of a case being reopened,1053 and to applications to recall a defendant for further cross-examination.1054 The principles apply to evidence [page 657] proceeding from new witnesses and evidence obtained by recalling witnesses.1055 Certainly authorities on each topic are cited on the others without any precise distinction being drawn.1056
B — CRIMINAL CASES Introduction [17625] The rule It is convenient to deal with criminal1057 cases before civil. There is a general principle of practice, although no rule of law, requiring that all evidential matter that the Crown intends to rely upon as probative of the guilt of the defendant… should be adduced before the close of the prosecution’s case if it be then available.1058
It follows that the power to allow further evidence to be called by the Crown after it has closed its case is exercised very sparingly.1059 The principles in question are of “fundamental importance”.1060 Evidence in rebuttal of that which a witness for a defendant says in cross-examination to credit is occasionally allowed as a matter of right, but, in most cases, the reception of evidence in rebuttal is a matter of discretion.1061
[17630] Effect of High Court cases The older cases must now be viewed in the light of several High Court reviews of the problem. Gibbs CJ and Wilson J said:1062 The general principle is that the prosecution must present its case completely before the accused is called upon for his defence. Although the trial judge has a discretion to allow the prosecution to call further evidence after evidence has been given for the defence, he should permit the prosecution to call evidence at that stage only if the circumstances are very special or exceptional and, generally speaking, not if the occasion for calling the further evidence ought reasonably to have been foreseen. The principle applies where the prosecution seeks to call evidence to rebut matters raised for the first time by the defence; if the rebutting evidence was itself relevant to prove the prosecution case (unless, perhaps,
[page 658] it was no more than marginally, minimally or doubtfully relevant …1063) and the need to give it could have been foreseen it will, generally speaking, be rejected. The principle would not prevent the prosecution from giving in reply evidence directed to an issue the proof of which did not lie on the prosecution, such as insanity, or from rebutting evidence of the accused’s good character, provided that the prosecution had not anticipated the raising of an issue of this kind and led evidence with regard to it, for the prosecution must not split its case on any issue. Also, it has been held that evidence may be given in reply to prove some purely formal matter the proof of which was overlooked in chief.
… [T]here are cases in England that suggest that a trial judge has a discretion to allow evidence relevant to the prosecution’s case to be given in rebuttal if, for some reason, it was not available to the prosecution until after it had closed its case.1064 It would seem unduly technical to exclude altogether evidence that was not in the possession of the Crown until after it had closed its case, and the judge may by the exercise of his discretionary powers prevent any unfairness to the accused from arising.
Particular elements [17635] Discretion Several points arise for discussion. (1) Modern formulations of the rules make it clear that the principle is discretionary.1065
[17640] Exceptional circumstances (2) The exceptional circumstances in which the discretion will be exercised in favour of the prosecution do not include instances which “would have been covered if the prosecution case had been fully and strictly proved”.1066
[17645] Special cases (3) The view1067 that the prosecution must call evidence in chief even on issues on which the burden of proof does not lie on it,1068 such as insanity or the rebutting of the accused’s good character, must be understood in a special sense. It is impermissible, for example, for the prosecution to attack the accused’s character unless the accused has put it in issue, and that will often not occur until after the close of the Crown case. And it would be potentially unjust to the accused if the Crown began calling evidence as to the accused’s sanity before the defence made that an issue. The view that evidence should be given by the Crown on these issues in its case in chief cannot rest on the principle that “the prosecution must not split its case on any issue”, for the Crown has no “case” on the issues of insanity or good character until the defence has raised the matter.1069 Dawson J, while recognising [page 659]
this,1070 nonetheless agreed with Gibbs CJ and Wilson J in saying it might be proper to refuse leave to the prosecution to reopen its case: the example he chose, alibi, however, is not an instance where the Crown bears no burden. While, on a cynical view, an alibi defence ought always to be foreseen,1071 its nature cannot always be foreseen.1072 But no onus of proving alibi rests on the accused; the onus of negativing it is on the Crown. Hence, it was held1073 wrong to permit evidence rebutting an alibi where the Crown ought reasonably to have foreseen that that defence would be raised at the trial because it had been put forward in previous proceedings.1074 And evidence to rebut an alibi which is merely confirmatory of the Crown case is impermissible in reply, as where the Crown attempts to rebut an alibi by evidence that the accused was near the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.1075 The Crown can protect its position by inquiring of counsel for the accused whether the accused is raising alibi; if the latter says no or declines to answer, the circumstances will justify the Crown in calling the evidence in rebuttal.1076
[17650]
Reasonable foreseeability
(4) The test which depends on reasonable foreseeability has replaced the older view that the matter must be one which arose “ex improviso” and which no human ingenuity could foresee.1077 Thus the majority of the High Court said: The formula … has little to commend it. The words “which no human ingenuity can foresee” hardly express a legal principle. They are rhetorical, but if literally understood they lay down a test which could almost never be satisfied … It seems to us unsafe to adopt a rigid formula in view of the almost infinite variety of difficulties that may arise at a criminal trial. It is probably enough to say that the occasion must be very special or exceptional to warrant a departure from the principle that the prosecution must offer all its proofs during the progress of the Crown case and before the prisoner is called upon for his defence … [G]enerally speaking an occasion will not suffice for allowing an exceptional course if it ought reasonably to have been foreseen. Again, it may be pointed
[page 660] out that even an unexpected occasion may be of such a nature that it would have been covered, had the Crown case been fully and strictly proved.1078
Hence, unforeseeable last-minute alibis may be rebutted.1079 So may
unforeseeable “explanations” of incriminating evidence.1080 On the other hand, though the test depends on reasonable foreseeability rather than events which no human ingenuity could foresee, the circumstances permitting evidence in rebuttal must be “very special or exceptional”.1081 The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 232(2), does not in terms state this test, however. That Act makes provision for a “defence response” to “the summary of the prosecution opening” and “the notice of pre-trial admissions”: s 183. Section 233(2) provides that the court may allow the prosecution, after it has closed its case, to call evidence in reply to evidence given by the defence “which could not reasonably have been foreseen” by the prosecution having regard to both defence responses as served. Section 233(3) provides that nothing in the section limits any other power in the judge to allow the prosecution to call evidence after the prosecution case has closed.
[17655]
Credit issues
(5) The rule permits the tendering of evidence admitted as an exception to the rule prohibiting the rebuttal of answers to questions on collateral matters, for example, prior inconsistent statements.1082 But the tender of a previous inconsistent statement in cross-examination will be rejected if it could have been tendered in the Crown case.1083 Thus in practice it is easier to call evidence after the close of the prosecution case on credit than it is on the issues.1084 However, the tender in rebuttal of a previous inconsistent statement may be inadmissible where it is of insufficient probative force to justify this course.1085 To avoid this problem, the witness may be stood down in cross-examination to allow proof of the prior [page 661] inconsistent statement to be led.1086 Where the prosecution tenders a prior consistent statement in its own case which is rejected on discretionary grounds, it is admissible in rebuttal if the statutory conditions for the reception of statements which a witness does not admit making are
satisfied, subject to any discretion to exclude it.1087 The prosecution is also entitled to a case-in-reply where it alleges bias on the part of a defence witness, or alleges that the witness has a general reputation for untruthfulness or alleges that the witness has refused to admit a prior conviction.1088
[17660] Formal, technical or non-contentious matter (6) The rule permits the calling of evidence relating to a purely formal, technical or non-contentious matter after a party’s case is closed.1089 For example, the rule permits evidence to be called relating to the fact that a particular official whose consent is necessary to a prosecution has given it,1090 as it permits the production of a Stationery Office copy of regulations,1091 or a proclamation in a Government Gazette1092 or evidence relating to the fact that goods were of a certain material,1093 or evidence to clear up an ambiguity.1094 But all such matters as proof of identity1095 or causation of injury1096 are not merely formal. Where a deliberate decision has been taken not to tender material on a matter which the defence has notified as being in dispute, it is unlikely that leave to reopen will be granted.1097
[17665]
Unavailable evidence
(7) The rule permits evidence to be called which is fresh in the sense of being unavailable to be adduced at the usual time.1098 Even there Jordan CJ thought the correct practice was to stop the trial and direct a new trial de novo. Admittedly this [page 662] was said in a dissenting judgment applying the now-outmoded ex improvisu standard.1099 But at common law a witness may not be recalled simply because the witness now thinks the witness’s evidence was wrong and wants to change it.1100
[17670] Relevance in chief
(8) A matter relevant to the discretion to allow evidence in rebuttal is the extent to which evidence which is now clearly relevant to credibility would have been marginally or clearly relevant in chief.1101
[17675] Evidence after summing up (9) There is no general rule against the evidence being called after the summing up.1102 But the circumstances in which a properly exercised discretion would lead to this result are likely to be rare.1103
[17680] Evidence before commencement of defence case (10) Where the prosecution wishes to reopen its case, after it has closed but before the commencement of the defence case, for the purpose of tendering additional evidence not tendered by accident, mistake or want of foresight, the court should permit it to do so unless there is a very good reason to the contrary.1104
[17685] Jury request (11) It may be a factor of at least some weight in persuading the court to permit a case to be reopened that the jury requests more evidence, particularly where the accused consents.1105 Where the discretion is exercised in favour of admission over objection by the accused, it is the judge’s duty to ensure by appropriate directions that the new evidence carries no more weight than it properly should, particularly if the jury are attributing undue significance to the point raised.1106
[17690] Accused’s good character (12) Where the accused is put forward as a person of good character in the accused’s own case, the Crown is entitled to call rebutting evidence.1107 Rebutting evidence may be allowed in order to deny the defendants’ accusations of a conspiracy and concocted charges on the part of the prosecution witnesses.1108 [page 663]
Subject to that, rebuttal evidence of little relevance to the issues, the only effect of which is to attack the accused, will ordinarily not be admissible.1109 Another relevant matter is the prejudice to the opposing party, who may no longer have available witnesses who could have rebutted the new evidence.1110 It has been said that it is only rarely that the prosecution will be permitted to call evidence in rebuttal where it has not arisen ex improvisu, or where it is not a mere formality,1111 especially where the evidence is tendered after the case for the defendant has begun.1112 An illustration is proof of the incontrovertible fact that a particular telephone was capable of receiving incoming calls.1113
[17695] Reasons for rule What are the reasons for the rule? The English Criminal Law Revision Committee1114 wrote of the rule against calling fresh evidence after a party’s case had closed: The reasons for the rule, so far as evidence for the prosecution is concerned, are (i) that, since it is thought that fairness to the defence demands that they should be allowed to tell their story after the prosecution have told theirs, it would weaken this principle to allow the prosecution to give further evidence after that for the defence, and (ii) that it is untidy and inconvenient to sandwich defence evidence on some issues between parts of the prosecution evidence. In some cases to allow the prosecution to call a particular piece of evidence at a late stage might cause injustice to the defence because, coming as it did in isolation after the evidence for the defence, and probably after argument as to whether it was so important that it should be admitted even at that stage, it might make a disproportionate impression on the jury.1115
[17700] Rule of fairness The rule is not a technical one. It is a rule based on fairness.1116 If rebuttal evidence were extensively admitted, trials would meander on, with the new evidence in turn being rebutted after adjournments had been granted, and this would be unfair to the accused.1117 Dawson J said:1118 The relevant principle is essentially one of fairness. The accused is entitled to know the case which he has to meet so that he may have adequate opportunity to determine what questions he may wish to ask in cross-examination, what evidence, if any, he may wish to call and what objections, if any, he may wish to raise in the case against him. Ordinarily the depositions upon which he is committed for trial will provide him with this information in advance and if the prosecution intends to call additional evidence it is required to give notice of its intention to do so. The whole procedure would be undermined if the prosecution were permitted, save in
exceptional circumstances, to call evidence in support of its case after the close of the case for the defence.
[page 664]
[17705] Questions in cross-examination permissible The rule applies with equal force to evidence which the Crown seeks to introduce during the course of the case for the defence or after its close. In Australia the rule against case splitting does not apply to questions asked by the Crown in cross-examination of the defence witnesses;1119 however, questions may be rejected in the court’s discretion if they relate to some entirely new matter which has not been the subject of evidence in committal proceedings or the subject of evidence in chief, or of which notice had not otherwise been given.1120 Where the trial judge rejected certain evidence tendered by the Crown in its own case, the material was held inadmissible during the crossexamination of the accused.1121
[17710] Immediate tender of documents If, in the course of cross-examining defence witnesses, the Crown establishes the admissibility of a document which it subsequently wishes to tender, the tender should be made then and not delayed until the opening or re-opening of the cross-examining party’s case.1122
[17715] Particular points Unsworn statements have been abolished in most jurisdictions: [23055]. But if the circumstances were such that the Crown would have been entitled to rebut the defence evidence had it been given on oath, it was entitled to rebut it if it is proffered in the form of an unsworn statement.1123 A Crown request for leave to adduce rebuttal evidence should be made in the jury’s absence, and it is undesirable that the judge should invite such a request.1124 There is no objection to the recalling of a Crown witness to retract evidence which the witness has given which is damaging to the
accused.1125 An appeal1126 on the ground that Crown counsel successfully recalled for cross-examination a defendant whose counsel had strongly attacked the credibility of a Crown witness where Crown counsel had forgotten to cross-examine the defendant on his prior convictions failed. It is plain that the course could only permissibly be a rare one. A more standard exercise of a similar discretion would arise where a defendant is needed for a crossexamination on the defendant’s record after the defendant’s counsel made imputations on the character of the prosecution witnesses in his or her address.1127 The defence is less likely than the Crown in practice to be able to call rebutting evidence, for knowing the Crown’s evidence from the committal proceedings, and [page 665] having heard it in its own case, the defence can give all relevant evidence in its own case. However, where there was no conscious decision of the defence not to call the evidence and no practical obstacle to a reopening of the defence case, it has been said that “a court would often incline towards allowing the defence a re-opening to call sufficiently important evidence, even after addresses, in a criminal case”.1128 Once a party has been allowed to call a witness in rebuttal, that witness may be cross-examined generally and not merely on the rebutting evidence given.1129
C — CIVIL CASES Introduction [17720] The rule In civil cases the law is somewhat different. The general rule is similar, namely, that evidence in reply must normally be confined to rebutting the defendant’s case rather than merely confirming that of the plaintiff:1130 such evidence must be “strictly in reply”.1131 A similar principle applies
where it is the defendant who bears the onus on an issue and seeks to reply to the evidence called by the plaintiff in answer to the defendant’s case on that issue.1132 Hence, where the issues on a claim and on a counter-claim are identical, the plaintiff cannot call evidence on the counter-claim which could have been called in support of the plaintiff on the claim.1133 But the rules are likely to be applied less strictly in civil cases.1134 As in criminal cases, the court in civil cases has a discretion, but one which will be more liberally exercised. “When a party has closed its case, he often asks, and is allowed, to supply a deficiency.”1135 The unforeseeability of the issue on which the plaintiff seeks to call evidence in reply — the extent to which the plaintiff is surprised — is relevant, as where the plaintiff was permitted to call a witness in reply to defence witnesses on an issue first raised by them and not put to the plaintiff’s case.1136 The rule against case splitting is thus reinforced by the rule in Browne v Dunn1137 in the sense of “the rule of practice that counsel should fairly put his own case to the relevant witnesses called by his opponent”.1138
[17725] Exceptions The following exceptions to the general rule exist. First, evidence from a particular witness in reply may be permitted where the plaintiff was led by the [page 666] defendant to believe the defendant would call the witness, and the witness was not so called; the mere expectation that the witness would be so called is not enough.1139 Secondly, evidence by the plaintiff is permissible in reply “almost as of right”1140 in respect of an issue on which the burden of proof lies on the defendant.1141 There is old authority, for which there is some modern support, for the view that if the plaintiff elects to go into evidence in the plaintiff’s own case on matters on which the defendant bears the burden of proof, the plaintiff must do so completely, and cannot preserve a right to call further evidence later.1142 Thirdly, the plaintiff may call evidence in reply to evidence called by the
defendant where, although the plaintiff “had reason to suspect that such evidence must be given”, the plaintiff ought not to be “bound to waste time by answering by anticipation that which might never be set up”.1143 Fourthly, in general it may be said that the court has a discretion, the exercise of which is difficult to overturn on appeal, to admit further evidence either for its own satisfaction or where the interests of justice require it.1144 Thus a possible mistake arising from ambiguous evidence may be cleared up.1145 Evidence which is fresh may be admitted.1146 Evidence not led by inadvertence may be permitted to be called late, for the laxity of counsel should not, generally, redound to the detriment of the client, but not evidence which was deliberately not led at the correct time.1147 Where, for instance, a decision was based on tactical grounds it may be difficult to resist the conclusion that the interests of justice were better served by the rejection of the application. But even in that circumstance there may be cases in which it is felt that the client whose application it is should not have to suffer for his or her counsel’s deliberate decision. Where the decision is not made for tactical reasons and is based on a mistaken apprehension of the law or the facts the case is more appropriately to be considered as one in which the application has resulted from an error by counsel.1148
Evidence may be let in late if no prejudice is caused to the party against whom it [page 667] is tendered.1149 It may be led late where the interests of justice require it, it is material, and it could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before.1150 Evidence may be led late even if it could have been led with due diligence earlier where justice requires it.1151 Evidence may be admitted even after judgment.1152 But application at so late a stage is a factor weighing heavily against success.1153 While the court’s discretion in civil cases may extend as far as giving directions as to the course of the evidence,1154 it does not go so far as to permit directions which call on a party who does not carry the burden of proof to enter upon the proof of an issue which is quite distinct from the issues raised by the party’s own case.1155 Leave to reopen one party’s case was refused where the proposed evidence went only to a collateral issue, namely the reliability of a witness as to the location at which an admission
was made.1156
A special problem [17730] Differential allocation of burden of proof A special problem arises where, though the plaintiff bears a burden of proof on some issues and the defendant on others, the evidence to be called by the plaintiff in his or her own case bears on the issues on which the defendant has the onus. An example is an action for negligence in which the defendant pleads contributory negligence. It will rarely be possible for the plaintiff to reserve his evidence on the issue of contributory negligence without to some extent splitting his case. It is ordinarily the same set of circumstances, depending on how the facts are found, from which both conclusions fall to be drawn… [Should] the plaintiff seek to reserve his evidence on the issue of contributory negligence his counsel may be expected to indicate as much in opening and the judge would ordinarily go no further by way of directions than to intimate whether a case in rebuttal is or is not likely to be favourably received.1157
As Sheppard J has noted, there is a curious discrepancy between the freedom with which modern courts will grant amendments to pleadings, even during the trial, and the restrictiveness with which they administer their discretion to admit evidence after a party’s case is closed.1158 1 J B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1898, p 526, said: “the rules
regulating the examination of witnesses … are full of sense, and are few, simple and easily understood; although like all rules for strenuous competitive struggles, nothing but practice and the observation of practice can bring them to a man’s fingers’ ends or keep them there.” 2 Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10] (2). 3 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1 at [171] per Kirby and Callinan JJ; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [133]. 4 See J P Bryson, “How to Draft an Affidavit” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 250; J P Bryson, “Affidavits” (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 166 and A R Emmett, “Practical Litigation in the Federal Court of Australia — Affidavits” (2000) 20 Aust Bar Rev 28. A valuable account of the unsatisfactoriness of affidavits as a means of presenting to the court the evidence of “illiterate and ignorant” witnesses is given in Johnston v Todd (1843) 5 Beav 597 at 601. 5 NSW: Witnesses Examination Act 1900 s 11, Evidence on Commission Act 1995 and Uniform Civil Procedure Rules Pt 24; Woolf v Masius Wynne-Williams & D’Arcy Macmanus (Aust) Pty Ltd [1975] ACLD DT 98 (NSW SC); Vic: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 Pt 1, Divs 1–1C; Qld: Evidence Act 1977 ss 22–39; Evidence on Commission Act 1988; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules rr 396 ff; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 ss 194C–194I; Tas: Evidence on Commission Act 2001; WA: Evidence Act 1906 ss 115–118C. The Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) Pt 2 regulates the examination of witnesses abroad. 6 See Hardie Rubber Co Pty Ltd v General Tyre & Rubber Co (1972) 46 ALJR 326; Smith v Smith [1975] 1 NSWLR 725; Charman v Charman [2006] 1 WLR 1053 (CA). For discussion of the
obverse problem of letters of request issued by a foreign court to a local court seeking testimony from a local resident, see Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547; Re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases [1985] 1 All ER 716 (HL); R v Rathbone; Ex parte Dikko [1985] QB 630. See also [25155] and Re Application of Forsyth; Cordova v Philips Roxane Laboratories Inc [1984] 2 NSWLR 327; Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137; British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks for the United States of America (2004) 60 NSWLR 483. The Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) Pt 3 regulates the use of material obtained abroad by request in criminal proceedings for offences against Commonwealth law and related civil proceedings and in criminal proceedings for offences against State or Territory laws, and related civil proceedings, as specified in the regulations. See R v Milne (No 1) (2010) 260 FLR 166. The Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) Pt 4 regulates the use of such material in other civil proceedings under the Corporations Act 2001 or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 in which the ASIC is a party. 7 See [3165] above. 8 See Ranken v Pearce (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 410, where the procedure was used to perpetuate testimony as to the testamentary capacity of the testator during his lifetime as to a will made by him. In Victoria see RSC r 41.12; in NSW see Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 24.18; in Qld see Uniform Civil Procedure Rules rr 410–413. 9 As to the New South Wales position, see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 285–286; R v Attard (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 824 (CCA); R v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 at 101 (CCA) (“What is required is simply a physical incapacity to give any evidence by reason of one or other of the matters stated in the section”—not an incapacity to give credible evidence—note the doubts expressed about this strict view of the statutory preconditions in R v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382 at 387 (NSW CCA)); R v Adamiczka (1993) 33 NSWLR 68 (CCA) (statement must have been properly admitted in committal proceedings). See also [35417]. 10 Coates v R (1957) 96 CLR 353. 11 R v Horan [1951] VLR 249 at 251 (FC); R v Henriques (1991) 93 Cr App R 237 at 242 (PC); R v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382 at 388 (NSW CCA); R v Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 at [33]; Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v BB (2010) 29 VR 110 at [19]–[20]. 12 R v Cowle (1907) 71 JP Jo 152, contra R v Butcher (1900) 64 JP 808; see also R v Black (1909) 74 JP 71, and R v Marriott (1911) 75 JP 288. 13 R v Thrower [1934] VLR 292. 14 See [35417]. 15 Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 All ER 782 (CA); Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593 at 596 (DC of Fam Div); Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375. Section 26(d) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that the court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses. Section 29A of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides that a court in a criminal proceeding may only order a victim of the offence who is a witness in the proceeding to leave the courtroom until required to give evidence if the court considers it appropriate to do so, whether to ensure a fair trial or for any other reason. Section 29A(2) provides that nothing in s 29A prevents a court from ordering a victim who is a witness in the proceeding to leave the courtroom at any time after giving evidence if the court considers it appropriate to do so. The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 336A is to the same effect. 16 Southey v Nash (1837) 7 Car & P 632; R v Bassett [1952] VLR 535 (FC); Holland v Evans [1959] VR 54; R v Tait [1963] VR 520 (FC). 17 Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 All ER 782 at 783–4 (CA). 18 R v Murphy (1837) 8 Car & P 297. 19 Charnock v Dewings (1853) 3 Car & K 378; Selfe v Isaacson (1859) 1 F & F 194. J P Taylor, A
Treatise on the Law of Evidence as Administered in England and Ireland, 12th ed, 1931, [1400], n (h), doubts that parties can be excluded; and R v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 at 114 denies that they can. See also R v Newman (1852) 3 Car & K 252 at 260 (prosecutor); London Chartered Bank v Lavers (1855) Legge 884 (FC); Outram v Outram [1877] WN 75; Holland v Evans [1959] VR 54; R v Tait [1963] VR 520 (FC). 20 Pomeroy v Baddeley (1826) Ry & Mood 430 at 431; Everett v Lowdham (1831) 5 Car & P 91. However, exclusion of the accused’s solicitor from the court was upheld in Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 294 at 298 (CA). 21 For example R v Tait [1963] VR 520 (FC); Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593 at 595 (DC of Fam Div). 22 R v Tait [1963] VR 520 (FC); R v Bicanin (1976) 15 SASR 20 at 26 (FC). 23 Doe d Good v Cox (1790) 6 Car & P 743n; Cook v Nethercote (1835) 6 Car & P 741; Cobbett v Hudson (1852) 1 El & Bl 11 (QB); Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 All ER 782 at 783–4 (CA). Some older cases to the contrary treated the evidence as automatically inadmissible: Attorney-General v Bulpit (1821) 9 Price 4 (revenue side of Exchequer). Some contrary cases treat it as a matter of discretion: Parker v McWilliam (1830) 6 Bing 683 (CP); Thomas v David (1836) 7 Car & P 350 and Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593 (DC of Fam Div). If no order has been made, the evidence is admissible a fortiori: R v Briggs (1930) 22 Cr App R 68; R v Thompson [1967] Crim LR 62 (CA). 24 Chandler v Horne (1842) 2 M & Rob 423; R v Guthridge; Ex parte Campbell (1878) 4 VLR (L) 77 (FC). The older cases treated the matter as discretionary: R v Colley (1829) Mood & M 329; R v Brown (1831) 4 Car & P 588n; see also Beamon v Ellice (1831) 4 Car & P 585. 25 Cth: Crimes Act 1914 ss 15YU–15YZF; Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 47A; NSW: Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998; Vic: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 ss 42C–42Y; Qld: Evidence Act 1977 ss 39A–39Z; SA: Evidence Act 1929 ss 59IA– 59IR;WA: Evidence Act 1906 ss 120–132; NT: Evidence Act 1939 ss 49–49ZC; ACT: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 ss 16–36. The majority school of thought is that the onus of persuading the court to use the technology rests on the party advocating that course: Australian Medical Imaging Pty Ltd v Marconi Medical Systems Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 1; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 303; Odhiambo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 122 FCR 29 at [97]; Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 181 FCR 152 at [65]–[78]; Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (2012) 288 ALR 601. Giving evidence by interpreter through a videolink is “a most unsatisfactory method of resolving contentious and critical issues of fact”: Mastipour v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 140 FCR 137 at [37] per Mansfield J; Stuke v ROST Capital Group Pty Ltd (2012) 207 FCR 86 at [33]. See also Corrigan v Commvault Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (2011) 192 FCR 71. The key question is whether the credibility of the evidence is in issue. See also [13270]. 26 Joyce v Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd (2011) 195 FCR 213 at [60]–[62]. 27 R v Diane [2010] 2 Cr App R 1. 28 Hydrite Chemical Co v Calumet Lubricants Co 47 F 3d 887 at 891–2 (7th Cir 1995) per Judge Posner. 29 Where a special plea is raised, such as autrefois convict, and there is a dispute of fact, the accused would begin. A plea of guilty does not admit everything on the depositions: R v Riley [1896] 1 QB 309 at 318 (FC); R v Maitland [1963] SASR 332 (CCA), according to which an accused pleading guilty should call evidence as to disputed facts. See also R v Henry [1917] VLR 525 (a plea of guilty upon arraignment amounts to an admission of all facts material to the charge and dispenses with any proof), and R v Inglis [1917] VLR 672 (FC). The rule is otherwise in summary proceedings: Coysh v Elliott [1963] VR 114. 30 See R v Power [1940] St R Qd 111 (CCA) where the accused was held bound by an agreement
with the Crown under which inadmissible evidence was adduced. See R v Wilson (1970) 64 QJPR 88. See generally [3165]–[3195]. 31 Ponifex v Jolly (1839) 9 C & P 202, showing that an amendment will not be allowed for the sole purpose of altering the right to begin. See W Lusty & Sons Ltd v Morris Wilkinson & Co (Nottingham) Ltd [1954] 2 All ER 347, showing that, where a claim is admitted in court, the defendant may begin calling evidence on his counter-claim. When the defendant admitted negligence but alleged there was contributory negligence, the plaintiff still retained the right to begin: Portelli v Port Waratah Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [1959] VR 195. See also Price v Seaward (1841) Car & M 23; Seldon v Davidson [1968] 2 All ER 755 (CA); Grunther Industrial Developments Ltd v Federation Employers’ Insurance Assn [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 394 (CA); Re Estate of Parry (dec’d); Parry v Fraser [1977] 1 All ER 309. 32 Mercer v Whall (1845) 5 QB 447 (QB). See also Brown v Lethbridge (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 315 (FC). For the right to begin in matrimonial causes, see Hewitt v Hewitt [1948] P 150 (CA); Arding v Arding [1954] 2 All ER 671; Thomas v Thomas [1970] SASR 36 at 38. For other special cases, see Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [11–16]. 33 The plaintiff must not allude to facts with regard to which the plaintiff cannot call evidence: Faith v M’Intyre (1835) 7 C & P 44; R v O’Neill (1950) 34 Cr App R 108. Nor may the plaintiff allude to the fact of payments into court, nor to the fact that the defendant is insured in personal injuries cases. For these and other prohibitions, see Phipson on Evidence, 14th ed, 1990, [11–34]. Similarly, counsel, particularly counsel for the Crown, should not tell criminal juries things which are not supported by evidence: R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300; R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480 at [30]. 34 Even if the defendant merely puts documents to the plaintiff’s witnesses in cross-examination so that the documents become exhibits the defendant loses his right to the last word (Weller v O’Brien [1962] 3 All ER 65) unless the judge exercises a discretion not to compel tender: Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 (FC). 35 The prosecutor must not allude to previous convictions if these are not an ingredient of the defence. For that and other prohibitions or cautionary rules, see Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed, 2013, [11–69]. 36 Eg NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 159(1)–(2) (on matters disclosed in prosecutor’s opening and matters to be raised by accused): R v MM(2004) 145 A Crim R 148 at [139]; Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 418(c)(ii)(A); SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 288A (to outline the issues in contention: R v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320); WA: Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s 143(2)–(3); Tas: Criminal Code s 371(ab) (on matters of fact not in dispute or issues which accused contends are important to defence case). 37 Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 225. 38 NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 159(3); Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 231; Qld: Criminal Code s 619(3); Tas: Criminal Code s 371(d)(i). 39 NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 159(3); Tas: Criminal Code s 371(d)(i). 40 NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 160. The prosecutor may make a supplementary address in reply to the accused’s if the accused’s asserts relevant facts not supported by any evidence: s 160(2) and Pham v R (2008) 187 A Crim R 21 at [39]. 41 Criminal Code s 619(3)–(4). For the position where one co-accused adduces evidence but another does not, see s 169(5).A Crown Law Officer has a right of reply in all cases, whether the accused adduces evidence or not. 42 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 288B. 43 Criminal Code s 371(c). 44 Criminal Code s 371(d). 45 Vic: Crimes Act 1958 ss 417 and 418(c)(ii)(B) (even if the Attorney-General or SolicitorGeneral is appearing); Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 234–236;WA: Criminal Procedure Act
2004 s 145; ACT: Crimes Act 1900 s 294. 46 Criminal Code Act s 363 and Sch 4. 47 Eg R v Meehan [1919] St R Qd 119 (CCA). 48 R v E J Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 608 at 615–16 (CCA); cf R v Turner (1977) 16 SASR 444 (CCA). 49 R v Marijancevic [1982] VR 936 (FC), relying on Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 417(1) and overruling R v Ginies [1972] VR 394 at 401 (FC); R v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 (Vic FC). In England this is “something more” than a convention: R v Paul [2012] 2 Cr App R 26 at [13], discussing R v Mondon (1968) 52 Cr App R 695. 50 Varley v R (1977) 12 ALR 347. 51 R v E J Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 608 at 615–16 (CCA). 52 McCullough v R [1982] Tas R 43 at 57; see also R v Hay [1968] Qd R 459 (CCA); R v Roulston [1976] 2 NZLR 644 at 654–6 (CA); KNP v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 at [32]; R v Stewart (Eric) [2009] 3 NZLR 425 at [19]–[22] (SC); Robert S Shiels, “The Duties of a Prosecutor” [2012] Crim LR 687. 53 R v DDR [1998] 3 VR 580 at 592–595 (CA); R v Rugari (2001) 122 A Crim R 1; R v Livermore (2006) 67 NSWLR 659 at [24]–[53]; R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [255]; Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232 at [80]–[107]; Causevic v R (2008) 190 A Crim R 416; R v Anderson (2010) 202 A Crim R 68 at [31]–[34]. Where prosecution counsel has made public comments creating an apprehension in the mind of a reasonable person that that prosecution counsel may fail to maintain the requisite detachment for the accused to have a fair trial, proceedings may be stayed until a new prosecution counsel has been appointed: R v MG (2007) 69 NSWLR 20. 54 Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581 at [605]. 55 R v MM (2004) 145 A Crim R 148 at [144]–[147]; Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [260]; KNP v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 at [34]–[41]. 56 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [266]. 57 Ahmadi v R (2011) 254 FLR 174 at [62] and [74]. 58 Bugeja v R (2010) 30 VR 493 at [55]–[72]. For the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, see [17435]–[17460]. 59 R v Farooqi [2014] 1 Cr App R 8 at [102]–[115]. 60 Clyne v The New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 200–1. 61 Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [99]–[114]. 62 If, as will usually be the case, counsel knows that objection will be taken to an item of evidence, counsel should not refer to it in opening, and the objection should be raised when the evidence is about to be given: R v Cole (1941) 28 Cr App R 43; R v Zielinksi [1950] 2 All ER 1114 (CCA). This procedure can be applied to civil cases tried with a jury. The point is not so important when there is no jury. 63 See R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 (CA). 64 Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501 (DC); Barnes v PBC (Business Forms) Ltd [1976] 1 All ER 237 (QBD); Bond v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) (1988) 19 FCR 494 at 514; Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157 at [79]–[83]. There is of course the sanction of liability for costs in respect of superfluous witnesses being called. In civil cases there is the sanction of comment where the calling of the party remaining in court is deferred. 65 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 24. 66 Michelson v Nicoll (1851) 18 LT OS 198; Maclean v Nicholson (1878) 4 NZ Jur (NS) 98; GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 19. 67 R v Morrison (1911) 6 Cr App R 159 at 165; R v Smith [1968] 2 All ER 115 (CA). Cf R v Olsen (1898) 62 JP 777. See E Griew, “The Order of Defence Witnesses” [1969] Crim LR 347. 68 R v Smith [1968] 2 All ER 115 (CA).
69 Criminal Law Revision Committee, 11th Report, 1972, [107]. 70 R v Haslam [1983] Crim LR 566. 71 R v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 (CCA), following R v Richards [1918] SALR 315. See also R v
Hughes (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 288 at 289–90; R v Tait [1963] VR 520 (FC) (“usual” for the accused to go first); Connell v R (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 at 243 (CCA) (if the rule of practice of the defendant going first after an order that other witnesses leave the court is departed from, the departure should be a matter of comment). 72 Saffron v R (1988) 17 NSWLR 395 at 457 (CA and CCA). 73 Saffron v R (1988) 17 NSWLR 395 at 458 (CA and CCA). 74 Brown v Petranker (1991) 22 NSWLR 717 at 728 (CA). See also Nye v State of New South Wales (2003) 58 NSWLR 152; Harrington-Smith v WA (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483 at [121]–[131]. 75 R v Ikram [2009] 1 WLR 1419 at [52]–[55] (CA). See also R v Hakala [2002] Crim LR 578 (CA). 76 Nye v State of New South Wales (2003) 58 NSWLR 152. 77 Re Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock & Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327 (CA), cited approvingly in Titheradge v R (1917) 24 CLR 107; Re Williams (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 383; Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 567–8; cf Coulson v Disborough [1894] 2 QB 316 at 318 (CA); Peters v Owners of SS Argol (1912) 5 BWCC 414 at 415 (CA). In R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 755–6 (CCA) Street CJ questioned Enoch’s case. He said that in principle a judge should have power to call a witness in civil cases, and that (contrary to Coulson v Disborough [1894] 2 QB 316 (CA)) the parties should be able to cross-examine as of right. There are dicta in Bassett v Host [1982] 1 NSWLR 206 (CA), on the practical inconveniences that flow from the parties not calling available witnesses. Hope JA appears to accept the position stated in Enoch’s case while deploring it (at 207). Mahoney JA (at 213) appears to go beyond it. See also R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277. In Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 Wilcox J said that in a civil case a court had power to call a witness, even over the opposition of a party, though this power should not be exercised so as to call a witness whom neither party wished to give evidence, for this would be for the court to assume the conduct of the case. He also said that counsel for a party affected by any material evidence given by the witness called by the judge could cross-examine as of right, and not merely by leave. The Court of Appeal gave directions for the calling by it of an expert in foreign law in Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft v Banque des Marchands de Moscou (1932) 107 LJKB 386 at 389–391. 78 Yianni v Yianni [1966] 1 All ER 231n. 79 Fallon v Calvert [1960] 2 QB 201 (CA); Burns v Joseph [1969] Qd R 130 (CCA). 80 Re S (Infants) [1967] 1 All ER 202; B (M) v B (R) [1968] 3 All ER 170 (CA). See also Huang v University of New South Wales (No 3) (2006) 154 FCR 16 at [26]. 81 Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225 at [66]–[68]. 82 Re Williams (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 383 at 389. 83 Family Court: Family Law Rules r 15.71(1); Federal Magistrates Court: Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 r 15.04 (briefly discussed in Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225 at [50]–[51]); Qld: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 391. 84 Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225 at [48]. 85 Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225 at [75]. 86 See generally M Newark and A Samuels, “Let the Judge call the Witness” [1969] Crim LR 399; E J Edwards, “The Power of the Judge to call Witnesses” (1959) 33 ALJ 269; D Brown, “Failure to Call Vital Witnesses in Criminal Trials” (1974) 11 UWA L Rev 374; I F Sheppard, “Court Witnesses—A Desirable or Undesirable Encroachment on the Adversary System?” (1982) 56 ALJ 234; D A Ipp, “Judicial Intervention in the Trial Process” (1995) 69 ALJ 365 at 373–5; Diehm v DPP (Nauru) (2013) 88 ALJR 34 at [74]–[79]. 87 See R v James (1884) 10 VLR (L) 193 (FC); R v Williams (1897) 3 ALR (CN) 24; R v Collins
[1907] VLR 292 (approved in Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 383 but said in R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [29] to be a conclusion which “may well be thought to be at odds with” R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575); R v Thonemann (1915) 9 QJP 31; R v Justices of the Peace at Melbourne and Rowe; Ex parte Herald and Weekly Times Ltd [1935] VLR 377 at 385; Dawson v Zammit; Ex parte Zammit [1936] St R Qd 322 (FC); R v Cushway (1968) 62 QJPR 90; Skubevski v R [1977] WAR 129 at 140 (CCA); Lo Tin v R [1964] Crim LR 115 (HK SC); R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 706 (FC). To the contrary are R v Trimarchi (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451 (CCA); Skubevski v R [1977] WAR 129 (CCA). For the English position, which is more liberal than the Australian, see R v Oldroyd (1805) Russ & Ry 88 (CCCR); R v Chapman (1838) 8 Car & P 558; R v Holden (1838) 8 C & P 606; R v Edwards (1848) 3 Cox CC 82 at 83; R v Harris [1927] 2 KB 587 (CCA); R v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3; R v McMahon (1933) 24 Cr App R 95; R v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 at 159; R v Oliva [1965] 3 All ER 116 (CCA); R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584 (CA); R v Tregear [1967] 2 QB 574 (CA); R v Haringey Justices; Ex parte DPP [1996] QB 351 (DC of QBD) (recognising the power in magistrates) and the Canadian and New Zealand (see R v Sinclair (1905) 25 NZLR 266 and Long v Reid (1916) 35 NZLR 1186 (FC)) practices are similar: see R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 570–1. The United States practice is similar to that enunciated in R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 570–1. 88 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 571; see also R v Roberts (1984) 80 Cr App R 89; R v Grafton [1993] QB 101 (CA); R v Griffis (1996) 67 SASR 170 (CCA); R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599 at 658–9 (CA). The reluctance of the High Court to recognise the power in R v Apostilides can be seen from the opposition of Isaacs and Rich JJ in Titheradge v R (1917) 24 CLR 107 at 118, from Barton J’s view at 116–17 and 79–80 that the power depended on the accused’s consent, from the doubts of Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Mason JJ in Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 122, and from Dawson J’s view that the power depended on the consent of all parties: Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 673–4. 89 R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 762–3 (CCA); see also R v Evans [1964] VR 717 at 719 (FC); R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584 at 587–8 (CCA). 90 Titheradge v R (1917) 24 CLR 107 at 117; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 765 (CCA). Cf Lo Tin v R [1964] Crim LR 115 (HK SC). 91 R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 765 (CCA). 92 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 576. 93 R v Collins [1907] VLR 292 at 294, approved in Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 383; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 762–3 (CCA). See also People (A-G) v O’Brien [1963] IR 65 (SC). 94 R v Wilson (1957) 41 Cr App R 226; R v Owen [1952] 2 QB 362 (CCA); R v Gearing (1965) 50 Cr App R 18, which enunciates a general rule that there should be no further evidence after the evidence is closed even at the request of the jury, a rule which applies to magistrates also: Webb v Leadbetter [1966] 2 All ER 114 (DC of QBD); R v Lawrence [1968] 1 All ER 579 (CA) (view); R v Nixon [1968] 2 All ER 33 (CA) (view). Cf R v Sanderson [1953] 1 All ER 485 (CCA); R v Bodi [1969] VR 36 (FC); R v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 (FC). The latter line of cases was discussed and preferred to R v Gearing in R v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 at 56–7 (CCA). 95 R v Collins [1907] VLR 292; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 762–3 (CCA). 96 R v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 at 159. 97 R v Haynes (1859) 1 F & F 666; R v Harris [1927] 2 KB 587 (CCA); R v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3; R v McMahon (1933) 24 Cr App R 95; R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584 (CA); R v Tregear [1967] 2 QB 574 (CA); R v Godstone Justices; Ex parte Dickson [1971] Crim LR 602 (DC of QBD). 98 R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 762–3 (CCA). 99 See [17135]. 100 Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 380; R v Hodgkinson [1954] VLR 140 (FC); R v Cartledge [1959] VR 221 (FC); R v Harrison [1966] VR 72 (FC). See [17135] below. 101 R v Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 74 (CCA); Burns v Joseph [1969] Qd R 130 (FC).
102 R v Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 at 107; Fallon v Calvert [1960] 2 QB 201 at 205 (CA); Trade
Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 3) (1989) 21 FCR 316. 103 Phelan v Back [1972] 1 All ER 901 (DC of QBD). 104 Phelan v Back [1972] 1 All ER 901 (DC of QBD). 105 Lo Presti v R (1994) 68 ALJR 477. 106 R v James (1884) 10 VLR (L) 193 (FC); R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 at 177 (CCCR); Sams v R (1990) 46 A Crim R 468 at 473 (NSW CCA). 107 R v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 (CCA). 108 R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 (CCA). 109 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575. Where the State is involved in civil proceedings, it does not have duties equivalent to the prosecution’s duty to call material witnesses in criminal cases: Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 at [678]–[679]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320 at [344]–[368] (and hence the matter was not relevant to the exercise of the discretion to exclude evidence under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1 at [552]–[557]; Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC (2007) 161 FCR 122 at [112]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [140] and [154]. 110 Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 119. 111 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [153]. 112 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [153]. 113 Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 118–19. See also R v Woodhead (1847) 2 Car & K 520; R v Cassidy (1858) 1 F & F 79; Ziems v Prothonotary, Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 307–8; Archbold 2004, [4-274]–[4-277]. 114 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575–6. See also Diehm v DPP (Nauru) (2013) 88 ALJR 34. 115 Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v A-G (Palestine) [1944] AC 156 at 169 (PC). In Barry v Police (SA) (2009) 197 A Crim R 445 at [67]–[69], it was held that the prosecution was not obliged to tender a single admissible out-of-court statement containing both inculpatory and exculpatory statements. Cf R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299. 116 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 674 per Dawson J. Hayne J has said (Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397 at [39]–[41]) that (a) if an accused has made admissible inculpatory statements, the prosecution should ordinarily tender all of them; (b) if an accused has made admissible out-of-court statements containing both inculpatory and exculpatory statements, the prosecution should ordinarily tender all of them. These propositions do not follow from Dawson J’s statement, which is dealing with competent and compellable witnesses, and the accused is not, apart from statutory exceptions, a competent or compellable prosecution witness. Proposition (b) is inconsistent with Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179 at 182 and 188 (FC); Willis v R (2001) 25 WAR 217 at [134]; Sampson v R (2002) 132 A Crim R 326 at [26]; but as Hayne J pointed out, so far as these cases rely on R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300 at 304 for the conclusion that proposition (b) is wrong, they do not support it — a criticism equally applicable to R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240 at [102] n 41. 117 Seneviratne v R [1936] 3 All ER 36 at 48–9 (PC); R v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 (FC). In R v Armstrong [1998] 4 VR 533 at 537 (CA) it was said that a suspicion of unreliability could not justify a point blank refusal to interview the witness or consider notes indicating the substance of the evidence which it was anticipated the witness could give. 118 Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 119. 119 R v Russell-Jones [1995] 3 All ER 239 at 245 (CA). 120 Seneviratne v R [1936] 3 All ER 36 at 49 (PC); Ziems v Prothonotary, Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 292–4; R v Macfie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215 at [36]; Svajcer v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 587 at [32].
121 R v Oliva [1965] 3 All ER 116 at 122 (CCA). 122 R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 697–8 and 706 (FC); Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4
VR 294 at 297 (CA); Lewis v R (1998) 20 WAR 1 (CCA). “Unreliability” is not to be found merely in the fact that the witness’s account does not accord with the theory of the case to which the prosecutor is attracted: R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 at [50]. See also R v Jensen (2009) 23 VR 591 at [61]. 123 R v Williams [1970] 2 NSWR 41 at 44 (CCA); R v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 at 397–8 (CCA). 124 R v Nugent [1977] 3 All ER 662; R v Richardson (1994) 98 Cr App R 174; R v Kizon (1985) 18 A Crim R 59 (WA CCA). 125 R v Su [1997] 1 VR 1 at 37 (CA); R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 (CA). 126 R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 at [51]–]52], citing R v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 at 398–9 (CCA); Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 294 (CA). 127 Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [46]–[47], [116]–[121] and [171]–[176]. 128 R v Cairns [2003] 1 WLR 796 (CA). 129 R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 706 (FC). 130 R v Woodhead (1847) 2 Car & Kir 520; R v Edwards (1848) 3 Cox CC 82 at 83; R v Cassidy (1858) 1 F & F 79; R v Oliva [1965] 3 All ER 116 (CCA); ReVan Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 248 (FC). 131 See R v MRW (1999) 113 A Crim R 308 at [42]–[50]; R v Kennedy (2000) 118 A Crim R 34 at [35]–[40]; R v Teasdale (2004) 145 A Crim R 345 at [23]–[29]; cf R v Macfie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215 at [37]–[65]. See also R v Andrews (2010) 107 SASR 471. 132 Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v A-G (Palestine) [1944] AC 156 at 168 (PC). 133 R v Russell-Jones [1995] 3 All ER 239 at 245 (CA). 134 If the failure to call the witness is because of reasons beyond the prosecution’s control, the trial may continue: R v Cavanagh [1972] 2 All ER 704 (CA). 135 See also R v Trimarchi (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451 (FC); R v Eastwood [1973] VR 709; Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 122; Skubevski v R [1977] WAR 129 at 138–40 (CCA); R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 762–3 (CCA); cf R v Sterk [1972] Crim LR 391 (CA). To the contrary are R v Holden (1838) 8 C & P 606; R v Stroner (1845) 1 Car & Kir 650. 136 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575. 137 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 690, on the principle of Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. This is preserved by Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [6] and [127]–[130]. 138 R v Lawson [1960] VR 37; R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 698 and 706 (FC).An example of a case where the trial judge was held correct in not so commenting is R v Evans [1964] VR 717 (FC). 139 R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 698 and 706. 140 R v McIntyre [1965] VR 593 (FC). The court has no duty to ensure the attendance of a witness whose presence is sought neither by the Crown nor the defence: R v Chernoff (1973) 4 SASR 422 (CCA). 141 R v Cavanagh [1972] 2 All ER 704 (CA); R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 698 (FC) 142 R v Haringey Justices; Ex parte DPP [1996] QB 351 (DC of QBD). 143 R v Ward (1848) 2 Car & Kir 759; R v Greenslade (1870) 11 Cox CC 412; R v Wright (1934) 25 Cr App R 35 at 39–40; R v Devenish [1969] VR 737 (FC); ReVan Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 248 (FC); R v Kane (1977) 65 Cr App R 270; R v Utans (1982) 29 SASR 592 at 595. This requirement is included in statutory pre-trial disclosure requirements, eg NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 142(1)(c) and (h). 144 That legislation alters the position of the accused in criminal cases. Particular statutory provisions apart, there is no general duty on the accused to make a prior disclosure of any defence. For NSW legislation to the same broad effect as the Victorian, see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 134–151. The sections dealing with the subject discussed in the text are ss 146 and 148. See also
[35645]. 145 R v Mills [1998] AC 382, overruling R v Bryant (1946) 31 Cr App R 146 (criticised in Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [10-46]) and Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 at 376 (CA), noting the criticisms of those cases in R v Lawson (1989) 90 Cr App R 107, and following R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326. For New Zealand, see R v Mason [1976] 2 NZLR 122 (CA) (permitting statement to be ordered to be available in exceptional cases). 146 ReVan Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 249 (FC); Lawless v R (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 667 and 678; R v Reci (1997) 70 SASR 78 at 100–2 (CCA). In R v Foley (1984) 13 A Crim R 29 (VicFC), the court did not view with favour the course of the Crown calling a witness but not examining the witness in chief and leaving the witness to be cross-examined by the accused. Starke J said the preferable courses were either to call the witness, having the witness declared hostile and lead from the witness the evidence in chief, or not to call the witness but make the witness available to the defence. See also R v Komornick [1986] VR 845 (FC). See generally R v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 (CCA). 147 Lawless v R (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 673 and 678. 148 Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 at 369 (CA); ReVan Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 249 (FC). Similar principles apply to material other than witness statements which may favour the defence: R v Phillipson (1989) 91 Cr App R 226; R v Sansom [1991] 2 QB 130 (CA); R v Maguire [1992] QB 936 (CA) (duty applies not only to members of prosecuting authority, but to those advising it, eg forensic scientists); R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577 (CA); R v Preston [1994] 2 AC 130; R v Lewis-Hamilton [1998] 1 VR 630 (CA); Grey v R (2001) 184 ALR 593 at [23]; R v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627; R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331 at [116]; Mallard v R (2003) 28 WAR 1; Easterday v R (2003) 143 A Crim R 154 at [194]–[203]; R v Reardon (No 2) (2004) 60 NSWLR 454 at [46]–[54]; R v Livingstone (2004) 150 A Crim R 117; R v Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369 at [17]–[24]; Mallard v R (2005) 224 CLR 125 at [17] and [59]–[88]; De La Espriella-Velasco v R (2006) 31 WAR 291 at [297]–[308]; R v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; D v Western Australia (2007) 179 A Crim R 377; Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300 at [69] and [71]; R v Andrews (2010) 107 SASR 471 at [19]–[20]; R v Lipton (2011) 82 NSWLR 123 at [83]–[111]. Claims for Crown privilege in relation to the material must be determined by the court, in general after notice to the defence: R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577 (CA), qualified by R v Davis [1993] 2 All ER 643 (CA); R v Keane [1994] 2 All ER 478 (CA); R v Turner [1995] 3 All ER 432 (CA); R v H [2004] 2 AC 134. Convictions of prosecution witnesses tending to shake confidence in their reliability should be disclosed: Wilson v Police [1992] 2 NZLR 533 at 537 (CA); R v Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 (CA). There is no duty to disclose material relevant only to the credibility of defence witnesses: R v Brown [1996] 1 WLR 1599 (CA) affirmed R v Brown [1998] AC 367. (Cf NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 142(1)(k) (duty to disclose matter going to credit or credibility of accused).)These principles have been applied in England to proceedings before magistrates: R v Bromley Magistrates; Ex parte Smith [1995] 4 All ER 146 (DC of QBD). On the duty to disclose before committal proceedings, see R v DPP; Ex parte Lee [1999] 2 All ER 737 (DC of QBD). Breach of the prosecutor’s duty is not actionable in tort: Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317. 149 R v Leyland Justices; Ex parte Hawthorn [1979] QB 283 (DC). 150 Baksh v R [1958] AC 167 (PC). 151 Phipson on Evidence, 17th ed, 2010, [10-44]–[10-45]; R v Clarke (1930) 22 Cr App R 58; R v Xinaris (1955) 43 Cr App R 30n; R v Hall (1958) 43 Cr App R 29; Gouldham v R [1970] WAR 119 (CCA); Berry v R [1992] 2 AC 364 (PC). See also NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 142(1)(k). See further AJ v R (2011) 32 VR 614 at [21]–[31] (duty to inform defence counsel of prosecution witness’s lies in an earlier trial). 152 R v Collister and Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr App R 100; R v Paraskeva (1982) 76 Cr App R 162; Cooley v Western Australia (2005) 155 A Crim R 528. The duty was held to extend to the possibility
of charges in R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410 at [206]–[218]. 153 R v Carey (1968) 52 Cr App R 305. Statute may establish a different position, eg NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 138(f). 154 R v Guney (1998) 2 Cr App R 242 (CA). 155 R v Epping and Harlow Justices; Ex parte Massaro [1973] QB 433 (DC); R v Grays Justices; Ex parte Tetley (1979) 70 Cr App R 11 (DC of QBD). 156 Eg NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 134–151; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 179– 206, 233 and 237; Qld: Criminal Code ss 590AB ff. See R v Rollason and Jenkins, ex p A-G (Qld) [2008] 1 Qd R 85. 157 Thomson v Corporation of Glasgow 1962 SC (HL) 36 at 52 per Lord Thomson LJ-C. 158 Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 (CA); R v Clewer (1953) 37 Cr App R 37. See also R v Mawson [1967] VR 205 (FC); R v Martin (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 286 (CCA); Tousek v Bernat (1959) 61 SR (NSW) 203 (CCA); R v Power [1940] St R Qd 111 (CCA); Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 (CA); R v Perks [1973] Crim LR 388 (CA); R v Boykovski (1991) 58 A Crim R 436 (Vic FC); R v EO (2004) 8 VR 154; Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237; R v T, WA (2013) 118 SASR 382. See Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-43]; U Gautier, “Judicial Discretion to Intervene in the Course of the Trial” (1980) 23 Crim LQ 88; D A Ipp, “Judicial Intervention in the Trial Process” (1995) 69 ALJ 365 at 371–3. For the position in the Federal Magistrates Court, see Clement v Clement (No 3) (2012) 262 FLR 47 at [116]–[139]. 159 Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 at 20 (CA). 160 See Chapter 6. 161 [11115] ff. 162 Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 (CA). But this should be done only exceptionally. “The speaker’s train of thought may be disrupted and the jury’s attention may be inappropriately diverted with consequences prejudicial to the case which is being made. Ideally, therefore, interventions for the purposes of correcting or clarifying something said, either by judge or counsel, should be made, in the first instance, in the absence of the jury and at a break in the proceedings, so that, thereafter, if necessary, the point can be dealt with before the jury in an orderly fashion”: R v Tuegel [2000] 2 All ER 872 at 888 (CA). 163 Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 63–4 (CA). See also R v Power [1940] St R Qd 111 at 119–21 (CCA); Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 at 20 (CA); R v Clewer (1953) 37 Cr App R 37; R v Butler (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 328 (CCA); Tousek v Bernat (1959) 61 SR (NSW) 203 (FC); R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 (CCA); R v Davies [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 (CCA); R v Morley [1988] QB 601 (CA). 164 R v Martin (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 286 (CCA); R v Mawson [1967] VR 205 (FC); cf R v Campbell [1970] VR 120 (FC). See also R v Cain (1936) 25 Cr App R 204 at 205; R v Bateman (1946) 31 Cr App R 106 at 111; R v Gilson (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 at 181; the cases cited in Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-43]; R v Frixou [1998] Crim LR 352 (CA). 165 R v Davies [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 at 575 (CCA). 166 R v Gunning (1980) 98 Cr App R 303 at 305. Thus the judge must not deprive the defendant of the opportunity of developing the defence in the manner counsel sees fit. See also R v Barker [1967] Crim LR 310 (CA); R v Malcolm [2012] Crim LR 238 (CA). 167 R v Thompson (2002) 130 A Crim R 24 at [42]. 168 R v Hopper [1915] 2 KB 431 at 435 (CCA). 169 Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 65 (CA). 170 R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23; R v Sharp [1994] QB 261 (CA); R v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388 at [52]. 171 R v Jawitz [1962] Crim LR 567 (CA); R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 261 (CCA); R v Wei Tang (2007) 16 VR 454 at [173]–[189]. 172 Yuill v Yuill [1945] 1 All ER 183 at 195 (CA).
173 R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 at 34. 174 Ex parte Bellanto; Re Prior [1963] NSWR 1556 at 1561 (FC); R v Hamilton [1969] Crim LR
486 (CA); R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 at 34. 175 R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 at 34. 176 R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 at 34. 177 R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 at 34. 178 Brown v R [1971] Tas SR 57 at 61 (CCA). 179 R v Tuegel [2000] 2 All ER 872 at 888–9 (CA). 180 R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 at 34. 181 P Devlin, Easing the Passing, 1985, p 74. 182 R v Rabbitt (1931) 23 Cr App R 112; R v Davies [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 (CCA); R v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 (NSW CCA). English authority appears to permit copious questioning indicative of non-belief in defence evidence: R v Gibson (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 at 181. This is so at least provided the effect can be cured by directing the jury that the facts are for them: R v Hamilton [1969] Crim LR 486 (CA). See also Michel v R [2010] 1 WLR 879 (PC). 183 R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 at 472, 477 and 478 (CCA); Jahree v State of Mauritius [2005] 1 WLR 1952 at [21] (PC); Michel v R [2010] 1 WLR 880 (PC). 184 R v Wooding (1979) 70 Cr App R 256 at 261. 185 R v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 at [25]. 186 R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 261 (CCA). See also Stokes v R (1960) 105 CLR 279 at 283; R v Gardiner (1979) 27 ALR 140 at 152 and 160 (Qld CCA). “He can, and often does, ask the question which neither side dares ask; or the question which one side is not allowed to ask and the other side does not want answered”: P Devlin, Easing the Passing, 1985, p 74. But if one side is not allowed to ask it, can the judge? 187 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 129 (NSW CCA). See also R v Frixou [1998] Crim LR 352 (CA). 188 Rowland v Police (2001) 79 SASR 569 at [65]. 189 R v Hickman [1969] Crim LR 502 (CA). 190 Rowland v Police (2001) 79 SASR 569 at [66] (particularly questioning of prosecution witnesses rather than those called by the defendant: at [67]). 191 R v Clewer (1953) 37 Cr App R 37; R v Dowell [1960] Crim LR 436 (CCA); R v Ptohopoulos (1967) 52 Cr App R 47 at 50 (CA); R v Hircock [1970] 1 QB 67 (CA); R v Hulusi (1973) 58 Cr App R 378; R v Zarezadeh [2011] Crim LR 588 (CA); R v E [2012] Crim LR 383 (CA). 192 R v E (1995) 89 A Crim R 325 at 331 (NSW CCA). 193 United States v Ostendorff 371 F 2d 729 (1966) at 732. See also E H Cochrane Ltd v Ministry of Transport [1987] 1 NZLR 146 at 150. 194 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 282–3 (CA); Burwood Municipal Council v Harvey (1995) 86 LGERA 389 at 397 (NSW CA). 195 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 281–2 (CA). 196 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 126 (NSW CCA). 197 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 126 (NSW CCA). 198 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 126 (NSW CCA). 199 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 126 (NSW CCA). 200 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 125–6 (NSW CCA). 201 R v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 at 423 (Vic CCA). 202 R v Malcolm [2012] Crim LR 238 (CA). 203 Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10] (3). 204 R v Cordingley [2008] Crim LR 299 (CA). 205 R v Tedjame-Mortty [2011] Crim LR 676 (CA). 206 See Chapter 15, “Opinion”.
207 See G L Williams, The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed, 1963, pp 75–6. “The French think that for a
witness the principal quality is spontaneity. Whether they get spontaneity is another matter; it is said that what actually happens, too often, is that the witness makes a prepared speech.” 208 L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 311. 209 J A Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law, 1947, p 34. 210 ALRC 26 [607]–[609], Bill clause 26; ALRC 38 [111](c), Bill clause 33. See also ALRC 102 [5.6]–[5.36]. 211 R v Wright (1985) 19 A Crim R 17 at 18–19 (Qld CCA). See J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1978, vol 7, [2097]. 212 Commonwealth of Australia v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8 at 34 (FC). 213 R v Noble [2002] 1 Qd R 432. The last seven sentences were quoted with approval by Besanko J in Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 at [81]. 214 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31 at [9]. 215 Clark v R (2008) 185 A Crim R 1 at [116]. 216 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82 at [27] (a native title case). 217 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82 at [27]. 218 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82 at [27]. 219 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82 at [27]. 220 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 201 FLR 207 at [9]. 221 This is in effect the definition of J F Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, art 140. The alternative is to describe questions of type (b) as improper rather than leading. Questions of that type are inherently objectionable quite apart from their tendency to lead. See generally A R Emmett, “Examination-in-Chief and Re-examination” (1987) 3 Aust Bar Rev 93 at 95–9; Keane A and Fortson R, “Leading Questions: A Critical Analysis” [2011] Crim LR 280. 222 J H Munkman, Technique of Advocacy, 1951, pp 42–3. 223 Nicholls v Dowding (1815) 1 Stark 81. 224 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [772]. 225 Principles of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1922, p 562. 226 Saunders v R (1985) 15 A Crim R 115 at 118 and 122 (WA CCA). 227 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd (2002) 56 IPR 248 at [45]. 228 Cf R v Wilson (1913) 9 Cr App R 124. 229 Ireland v Taylor [1949] 1 KB 300 at 313 (CA); Moor v Moor [1954] 2 All ER 458 (CA); Charara v Commissioner of Police (2008) 182 A Crim R 64 at [60]. The same applies to “set form” affidavits, statements or statutory declarations: Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd v Farbenfabriken Bayer AG (1965) 120 CLR 285 at 295. 230 A G Walker and N M L Walker, The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 1964, p 361. 231 In the absence of any permissive statutory provisions, the admission of incriminating evidence against an accused person by anonymous witnesses is highly exceptional: R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128; R v Mayers [2009] 1 Cr App 30 (CA); BUSB v R (2011) 248 FLR 368. See also R v Stipendiary Magistrate [1993] 2 Qd R 687 (CCA); Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] 1 VR 84 (FC); D Lusty, “Anonymous Accusers: An Historical and Comparative Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials” (2002) 24 Syd LR 361. 232 It is normal to ask what the witness’s occupation is, and this does not contravene the rule against bolstering the credibility of a witness in chief: R v DS [1999] Crim LR 911 (CA) (senior Church of England clergyman). 233 R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116 at 128 (KB). 234 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 25. 235 Acerro v Petroni (1815) 1 Stark 100; Nicholls v Dowding (1815) 1 Stark 81. 236 L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 313; Edmonds v Walter (1820) 3 Stark 7; cf Hallett v Cousens (1839) 2 M & Rob 238. See also R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R
641 (CA) (“Did you consent to the act of sexual intercourse?”). 237 Courteen v Touse (1807) 1 Camp 43. 238 Ex parte Bottomley [1909] 2 KB 14 at 21 (DC). See R v Scott (1909) 2 Cr App R 214, which goes further, and probably too far, in admitting a question whether a written statement was true where it was not shown that the statement was the result of conventional examination. 239 Gordon v Carroll (1975) 6 ALR 579 (AIC). 240 R v Hodgson (1924) 18 Cr App R 7; R v Duell [1964] Qd R 451 (CCA). 241 J HWigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [777]. 242 W W Best (Ed Phipson), Principles of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1922, para 641 n(f) (“was anything said about the Gazette?”). But see Maves v Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Co (1913) 6 Alta LR 396 (Alb SC); Rivers v Hague (1837, unreported). 243 R v Neal [1947] ALR (CN) 616, more fully discussed in R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 at 101–3 (FC). 244 R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 at 101–3 (FC); R v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 (Vic FC); R v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 at [44]; R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407 at [36]–[42]. 245 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28 per Barry J. 246 See [17170] n 259. 247 A failure to object did not justify leading questions in re-examination by the prosecution in pursuing a “patently impermissible course” (described in [19145] n 239), “by taking advantage of the element of surprise and the likelihood that defence counsel may not object to an unexpected and most unusual line of cross-examination”: Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217 at [226]. 248 ALRC 26 [606] and [618]–[619], Bill clause 33, Appendix C [113](a); ALRC 38 [113](a), Bill clause 40. 249 See eg Federal Court Rules 2011 r 5.04(3) item 21 (cf Alfred v Lanscar (2007) 162 FCR 169, holding that even if there were no rule, it was permissible for an affidavit annexing witness statements prepared for use in other proceedings to be read); NSW: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 31.4. 250 Parkin v Moon (1835) 7 C & P 408; Dickinson v Shee (1801) 4 Esp 67. 251 R v McDonell (1909) 2 Cr App R 322. 252 In R v S [1995] 1 Qd R 558 (CA), it was held that there is no rule that where counsel for the accused uses the word “put” in cross-examination to present facts which counsel has been instructed are true, an expectation is thereby raised that the accused will give evidence. For disapproval of questions in the form “I suggest to you that …” and “do you ask the jury then to believe …”, see R v Baldwin [1925] All ER Rep 402. 253 L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 313; Clarke v Saffery (1824) Ry & M 126 at 127; R v Murphy (1837) 8 C & P 297 at 306; Lawder v Lawder (1855) 5 ICLR 27; Tedeschi v Singh [1948] Ch 319; Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28; R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at 415 (FC); Gordon v Carroll (1975) 6 ALR 579 at 585 (AIC); cf McLure v Mitchell (1974) 24 FLR 115 at 483–4 (AIC). 254 See eg Peabody Donation Fund (Governors) v Sir Lindsay Parkinson [1983] CLY 1660 (unaffected on this point by subsequent proceedings). 255 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22. See also R v Hardy (1794) 24 St Tr 199 at 660 and 755; R v Chubb (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 282 (FC); R v O’Brien (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 146 (FC); Alcoa of Australia Ltd v McKenna (2003) 8 VR 452 at [26]; Stack v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 526 at [26]–[28], [124]–[125] and [140] (majority disapproved trial judge’s decision to refuse to allow any further leading questions). 256 ALRC 26 [632], Bill clause 38, Appendix C [43]–[44]; ALRC 38 [115](c) and [116](b), Bill clause 45. 257 See M Newark and A Samuels, “Refreshing Memory” [1978] Crim LR 408.
258 And evidence, classically, is given face to face. Hence, statute apart, there is no power in the
court to permit evidence to be given over the telephone in a criminal case: R v Diane [2010] 2 Cr App R 1; R v Hampson [2014] 1 Cr App R 4. 259 Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 189–90, who also discuss various legitimate exceptions to orality in criminal cases. On the superiority of oral to written evidence see Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd v Farbenfabriken Bayer AG (1965) 120 CLR 285 at 295. 260 R v Yellow (1932) 96 JP 826. 261 R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 (CA); followed in R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86; Worley v Bentley [1976] 2 All ER 449 (DC of QBD); see also R v Mullins (1848) 3 Cox CC 526; Gleed v Stroud [1962] J Crim LR 161; Lau Pak Ngam v R [1966] Crim LR 443 (HK SC); R v Kerenko (1964) 51 WWR 53 (Man CA); Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 at 92 per Debelle J; cf R v Musterer (1967) 61 WWR 63. The practice is criticised by M N Howard, “Refreshment of Memory out of Court” [1972] Crim LR 351. 262 R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 at 490 (CA). 263 R v Skinner (1993) 99 Cr App R 212 at 216. 264 R v Skinner (1993) 99 Cr App R 212 at 216. 265 R v Momodou [2005] 2 All ER 571 at [61] (CA); Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 731 at [30]. See also Re Equiticorp Finance Ltd; Ex parte Brock (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 391 at 395. 266 R v Momodou [2005] 2 All ER 571 at [62] (CA). 267 King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 at 578 (FC) per Stanley J. 268 Collaton v Correll [1926] SASR 87; Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 (CCA); Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 191 (DC of QBD); R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86; Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 at 88–9; Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 5 FCR 447 at 454–5; Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436. See also Ames v Nicholson [1921] SASR 224; Hill v Arnold (1976) 9 ALR 350 at 353 (SC NT). 269 R v Webb [1975] Crim LR 159; Worley v Bentley [1976] 2 All ER 449 (DC of QBD); R v Westwell [1976] 2 All ER 812 (CA). 270 Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 at 94–5 (discretion not to order production); Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd (2009) 166 ACTR 14 at [31]–[63]; cf Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436. Material wholly unrelated to the evidence which the witness may give may be excised: see Spalding’s case at [64]–[69]. 271 R v Westwell [1976] 2 All ER 812 (CA). 272 Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 191 (DC of QBD). 273 See O’Sullivan v Waterman [1965] SASR 150 at 156. Indeed in Rooke v Auckland City Council [1980] 1 NZLR 680 at 684 Holland J appeared to be of the view that none needed to be, because “there must be a fundamental difference between the investigations and researches a witness may make prior to giving evidence and his right to refer to documentary material when actually giving evidence in the witness box”. 274 Bill clause 37. “Reviving” means the same as “refreshing” at common law: MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236 at 238; Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd (2009) 166 ACTR 14 at [28]–[29]. 275 ALRC 38 [112](b). 276 Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 at 119. As to evidence in a protected environment, see [13065]. 277 Previous provisions were discussed in Director of Public Prosecutions v Losurdo (1998) 44 NSWLR 618 at 622–3 (CA). 278 R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750. 279 R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712 at 714–15. Cf Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 319–
20. See also R v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41 (Tas SC); R v Browning [1995] Crim LR 227 (CA); Christophers v R (2000) 23 WAR 106 (CCA). R v Jenkyns was not followed in Roughley v R (1995) 5 Tas R 8 (CCA); R v Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178 and Sparkes v R (1998) 8 Tas R 21 (CCA). Evidence given after the witness was hypnotised in court was admitted in R v Pitt (1967) 68 DLR (2d) 513; cf R v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99, where the accused claimed his memory had been fortuitously refreshed out of court. Statements made during and after an inadvertently induced hypnotic trance were rejected in Horvath v R [1979] 2 SCR 376. Evidence as to the recollection of a witness under hypnosis was rejected in R v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111; R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489; cf VanVliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195. See L Haward and A Ashworth, “Some Problems of Evidence Obtained by Hypnosis” [1980] Crim LR 469; G F Wagstaff, “Hypnosis and the Law: A Critical Review of Some Recent Proposals” [1983] Crim LR 152; S J Odgers, “Trial by Trance: Hypnosis, Witnesses and the Development of New Rules of Evidence” (1988) 4 Aust Bar Rev 18. 280 R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 (CCA); R v Cooper (1995) 14 WAR 416; R v KG(2001) 54 NSWLR 198 (trial judge had discretion, but was not bound, to reject evidence of therapy which was not video recorded); R v WB (2009) 23 VR 319. See also R v JG(2009) 199 A Crim R 299 (discussing R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239); cf Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (NSW) v JG [2010] NSWCCA 222. 281 DPP (NSW) v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19 at [64]. 282 R v Baffigo [1957] VR 303 (FC); Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1983) 56 ALR 647 at 683–6 (Fed C of A). See also Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321; Bierkowski v Pearson (1971) 18 FLR 110 at 114 (ACT SC); Prestage v R [1976] Tas SR 16 (CCA); Moore v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152 (ACT SC). 283 R v Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685 (CA); in R v Curtis [1957] VR 306 at 308 (FC), the contrary was assumed but not decided; in Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 at 325 it was said that the document should only be read from the outset where its contents were either non-controversial or non-recent: particular refreshment from time to time was a desirable course where matters were controversial. See also s 33 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). And see [17170] n 259. 284 R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n; cf Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 at 323. 285 R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 at 490 (CA). However, it is not just a matter of practice: cf R v Governor of Gloucester Prison; Ex parte Miller [1979] 2 All ER 1103 at 1105 (DC of QBD). 286 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411 at 414, approved in R v Kelsey (1981) 74 Cr App R 213 at 217. See also R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n; R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591; R v Da Silva [1990] 1 All ER 29 at 32 (CA). The “freshness” test is also stated in R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n. 287 Periods which have been held too great are three months (R v Woodcock [1963] Crim LR 273 (CCA)) and one month (R v Graham [1973] Crim LR 628 (CA)). Periods which have been held not too great include twenty-two days (R v Fotheringham [1975] Crim LR 710 (CA)) and the first convenient opportunity after customs officers returned to their office from lengthy interviews (R v Simmonds (1967) 51 Cr App R 316 at 329; see also R v Bryant (1946) 31 Cr App R 146 (CCA)). 288 Wood v Cooper (1845) 1 Car & Kir 645. 289 R v Edwards (1837) 8 C & P 26 (KB). 290 R v Williams (1853) 6 Cox CC 343. See also R v Laurin (1902) 6 CCC 138; R v Marshall (1965) 51 WWR 185. 291 R v Da Silva [1990] 1 All ER 29 at 33 (CA); R v South Ribble Magistrates; Ex parte Cochrane [1996] 2 Cr App R 544. 292 R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591, citing Crnisanin v Logan (1972) 4 SASR 340; R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n; Evans v Sparrow (1973) 6 SASR 519; Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200. A striking example is a contemporary newspaper report of the fact testified to: Dyer v Best (1866) 4 H
& C 189 (Exch). 293 Burrough v Martin (1809) 2 Camp 112; Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541; R v Eleftheriou [1993] Crim LR 947 (CA). See also Groves v Redbart [1975] Crim LR 158 (DC of QBD); Taylor v Armand [1975] Crim LR 227 (DC of QBD). Cf R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n at 536. 294 Burton v Plummer (1834) 2 Ad & El 341 (KB); Topham v McGregor (1844) 1 Car & Kir 320. In Jones v Stroud (1825) 2 C & P 196, a witness was not allowed to refresh his memory from a copy made six months after the date of the original, but the original was covered in figures when the copy was made and the judge’s suspicions appear to have been justifiably aroused concerning the accuracy of the copy. The authorities conflict on whether refreshment of memory by a copy is permissible only if the witness testifies to the accuracy of the copy (Burman v Woolf [1939] VLR 402 at 409 (FC)), or whether it suffices if another witness does this (R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534n at 538; Crnisanin v Logan (1972) 4 SASR 340). 295 Horne v Mackenzie (1839) 6 Cl & Fin 628 (HL); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411. 296 R v Cheng (1976) 63 Cr App R 20; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411. 297 R v Mills [1962] 3 All ER 298 (CCA). See R v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 at 63. 298 R v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680 (CCA); O’Sullivan v Waterman [1965] SASR 150. See G M Stephenson, “Should Collaborative Testimony be Permitted in Courts of Law?” [1990] Crim LR 302. 299 Gorman v Newton; Ex parte Newton [1958] Qd R 169 (FC). 300 R v Kelsey (1981) 74 Cr App R 213 at 217. A contrary dictum in R v Mills [1962] 3 All ER 298 at 301 was disapproved. It is doubtful if R v O’Linn 1960(1) SA 545 (NPD) allowing refreshment of memory from a document dictated by, but not checked by, a witness, is good law in Australia. 301 Catt v Howard (1820) 3 Stark 3. 302 R v Kelsey (1981) 74 Cr App R 213 at 217; R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 (SA CCA). 303 Wodcock v Nichol (1976) 13 ALR 411 (SC NT); Evans v Sparrow (1973) 6 SASR 519 (CCA). 304 Lloyd v Freshfield (1826) 2 C & P 325; Beech v Jones (1848) 5 CB 696 (CP); Crisfield v Frost [1919] VLR 149; R v Harrison [1966] VR 72 at 76 (FC); Wodcock v Nichol (1976) 13 ALR 411 at 414–15 (NTSC). 305 R v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680 (CCA); R v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 at 63 (tapes); R v Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App R 307 at 312; R v Naidanovici [1962] NZLR 334 (CA); R v Callum [1976] Crim LR 257 (CA). 306 Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458. See generally [17240] ff. 307 R v Alexander [1975] VR 741 at 749–50 (FC), disapproving Holm v Smith [1956] QWN 8. Cf R v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591. 308 Doe d Church and Phillips v Perkins (1790) 3 TR 749 (KB). See also Howard v Canfield (1836) 1 Jur 71; R v Harvey (1869) 11 Cox CC 546; Ames v Nicholson [1921] SASR 224; Collaton v Correll [1926] SASR 87; King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 (FC). 309 Topham v McGregor (1844) 1 Car & Kir 320; R v Alward (1976) 15 NBR (2d) 551 (App Div). 310 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [754] and [754A]. 311 Note on Lawes v Reed (1835) 2 Lewin 152 at 153. See Smith v British Aerospace [1982] ICR 98 (CA), where memory was refreshed from a photograph. 312 Fanelli v United States Gypsum Co 141 F 2d 216 (1944) at 217; see also Jewett v United States 15 F 2d 955 (1926) at 956; United States v Rappy 157 F 2d 964 (1946) at 967. 313 R v Cheng (1976) 63 Cr App R 20 at 23–4. 314 But see R v Naidanovici [1962] NZLR 334 (CA); Normandale v Rankine (1972) 4 SASR 205; Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200.
315 Lord Talbot de Malahide v Cusack (1864) 17 ICLR 213 at 220. See also R v Bryant (1946) 31
Cr App R 146. 316 Jacob v Lindsay (1801) 1 East 460 (KB); Kensington v Inglis (1807) 8 East 273 (KB); Maugham v Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14 (KB); R v St Martin’s, Leicester (1834) 2 Ad & E 210 (DC of QBD); Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 (DC of QBD). The rule against hearsay was not mentioned in any of these cases. See also Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 523. R v Naidanovici [1962] NZLR 334 (CA) enunciates an exception to this where the document does not revive recollection; see also to the same effect Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 at 325–6 (citing Naidanovici’s case favourably); Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200 at 203; the point was reserved in R v Alexander [1975] VR 741 (FC). 317 Maugham v Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14 at 16 (KB). Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 (DC of QBD) is to the same effect, and even stronger because the statute with which it was concerned provided that an unstamped receipt should not be given in evidence or available for any purpose whatever. The decision can only be justified as a bold application of the ejusdem generis principle. See also R v St Martin’s, Leicester (1834) 2 Ad & E 210 (KB). 318 Jones v Metcalfe [1967] 3 All ER 205 (DC of QBD). See [31175] below. 319 R v Kelsey [1982] Crim LR 435 (CA). 320 Jones v Metcalfe [1967] 3 All ER 205 at 208 (DC of QBD); Markovina v R (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119 at 130–1 (CCA). 321 Wigmore’s views were accepted in R v Naidanovici [1962] NZLR 334 (CA). See Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 675 and 684 (Fed C of A). 322 Weller v O’Brien [1962] 3 All ER 65. This common law right is often amended by statute: see, eg, R v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 at [9]. There appears to be a discretion not to compel tender: Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 (FC). See also Young v Denton (1927) 21 Sask LR 319 (CA). 323 It has been held to apply just as much to documents used to refresh memory out of court: Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 191 (DC). 324 Wharam v Routledge (1805) 5 Esp 235; Calvert v Flower (1836) 7 C & P 386; Palmer v Maclear and M’Grath (1858) 1 Sw & Tr 149; Stroud v Stroud [1963] 3 All ER 539. 325 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; see [17575] below. 326 Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-63] n 80, suggests that only those parts which are relevant may be inspected. 327 Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 at 177, applied in R v Harrison [1966] VR 72 (CCA). This case probably does not, as the headnote suggests, conflict with Stroud v Stroud [1963] 3 All ER 539, where the documents called for and inspected were not used to refresh memory. See also R v Ramsden (1826) 2 C & P 603; Gregory v Tavernor (1833) 6 C & P 280; Payne v Ibbotson (1858) 27 LJ Ex 341 (Ex Ch); Morrison-Knudsen Co Inc v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1973) 31 DLR (3d) 633; R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 (CCA) (discussing the difficulties of determining what the relevant “part” of a document is for the purposes of the rule, and collecting the authorities); R v Vella (2006) 14VR 592 at [25]–[27]. 328 This passage was approved in R v Britton [1987] 2 All ER 512 (CA). See also Lloyd v Freshfield (1826) 2 C & P 325 (cross-examination on other half of entry used to refresh memory did not make entry evidence); R v Ramsden (1826) 2 C & P 603 (witness could be asked whether entry written on a particular day without making it evidence); R v Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App R 307 at 312 (prosecution could not insist on notes used by policemen to refresh memory of interview, upon which they had been cross-examined, being put before the jury). However, a document used to refresh memory on which there has been cross-examination may be tendered in re-examination if inspection of it would assist the trier of fact to determine whether it is bogus or not: R v Dillon (1983) 85 Cr App R 29; R v Sekhon (1986) 85 Cr App R 19. See also R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 (CCA) (where two people wrote different things on the same piece of paper and only one was cross-examined about his entry, only that part could strictly become evidence).
329 R v Sekhon (1986) 85 Cr App R 19. 330 Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 (FC). 331 Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181; R v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8
at 19 (Vic FC); Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 680 (Fed C of A); cf Holland v Reeves (1835) 7 C & P 36 at 39; R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 (CCA). 332 R v Foggo; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [1989] 2 Qd R 49 at 51 (CCA). 333 Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194. 334 R v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 at [11]–[23]. 335 Dairy Farmers Co-op Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458. See also R v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680 (CCA); R v Sekhon (1986) 85 Cr App R 19 at 23. 336 R v Virgo (1978) 67 Cr App R 323. See also R v Sekhon (1986) 85 Cr App R 19 at 23. 337 R v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 at [33]–[40]. 338 See [17575]. 339 For example R v Cupit [1978] Tas SR 95. 340 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 687–9 (Fed C of A); Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 at 90–1. Section 122(6) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 is to the same effect. 341 R v Graham [1973] Crim LR 628 (CA). 342 Eg, Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 (DC of QBD) (unstamped document). 343 R v Sutton (1991) 94 Cr App R 70 at 73. 344 R v Sutton (1991) 94 Cr App R 70 at 73. 345 ALRC 26 [286]–[289] and [614]–[615], Bill clause 29, Appendix C, [25]–[26] and [28]; ALRC 38 [111](e). Section 32 does not apply to the use of documents to refresh memory while an affidavit is being prepared: Whittaker v Child Support Registrar (2010) 264 ALR 473 at [328]–[343]. 346 Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375 at [81]. 347 See also R H Gooderson, “Previous Consistent Statements” [1968] CLJ 64; M T MacCrimmon, “Consistent Statements of a Witness” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall LJ 285; P W Murphy, “Previous Consistent and Inconsistent Statements:A Proposal to Make Life Easier for Juries” [1985] Crim LR 270. 348 R v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171 at 173–4 (CCA). 349 Eg R v Masters [1987] 2 Qd R 272 at 274. 350 R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 513 and 569 (CCA); R v Nation [1954] SASR 189. 351 R v Parker (1783) 3 Doug KB 242 (KB); R v Coll (1889) 24 LR Ir 522. The older law was to the contrary: Lutterell v Reynell (1670) 1 Mod 282. 352 An example is Gillie v Posho Ltd [1939] 2 All ER 196 (PC), distinguished in Meates v A-G [1983] NZLR 308 at 327. See also R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 (CCA). 353 Jones v South Eastern and Chatham Rail Co’s Managing Committee (1918) 87 LJKB 775 at 778 (DC of KBD). See also in R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191 (CCA). 354 1806, Vol 2, 289. 355 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 230 (PC). 356 Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431 at 445; Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353 at 365; Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 262. These passages do not deal in terms with subsequent acts, but the context in each case supports the proposition stated. Read in context, Trustees of the Property of Cummins v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278 at [65] is to the same effect. 357 Davies v The National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1912] VLR 397 at 402. 358 Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492 at [91].
359 Corke v Corke [1958] P 93 (CA). 360 R v Cook [1987] QB 417 (CA). 361 Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [31]–[38] offers an example of evidence not relevant only to
credibility: it concerned a statement before the trial that the witness made personal observations of the deceased’s behaviour in relation to a murder victim (contrasted to his evidence in chief that all he had told police was what others had told him). The High Court rejected an argument that s 102 should be read as applying to evidence which is not admissible on any basis other than the availability of a witness. It did so because it said the section should be given effect according to its terms, and they compelled the inquiry: is the evidence relevant only to credibility? Section 102 was amended in consequence. 362 R v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 at 170–1 (NSW CCA); Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297. For the differences between evidence of complaint admitted under s 66(2) and under s 108(3), see R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 at [57]. 363 HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 344 at [298]. 364 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v Zell 367 A 2d 14 at 17 (Md CA, 1977). 365 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 (CCCR). The former practice was an excellent example of the ridiculous results of the application of some such mechanical rule as that remarks made in the absence of a party are generally inadmissible, though acts done in his absence may be admitted. The practice was by no means uniform when R v Lillyman was decided. On complaints see generally T H Smith and O P Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence: Admission of Evidence of Recent Complaint in Sexual Offence Prosecutions — Part 1” (2001) 75 ALJ 623; G P McGinley, “Relevance of Recent Complaints in Rape Cases” (2001) 75 ALJ 772. 366 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 at 170 (CCCR). 367 R v Rowland (1898) 62 JP 459; R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 553. The admissibility of the boy’s statements as complaints was not fully argued in Christie’s case. It was not then clear that the doctrine applied to offences against males, and the report does not indicate how the boy was questioned by his mother or the policeman. 368 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 (CCCR); Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460. 369 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 (CCCR); R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 (CCCR); Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 492–493; Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 471–2; R v Jarvis [1991] Crim LR 374 (CA); R v Greenwood [1993] Crim LR 770 (CA); In Queensland the complaint is admissible whenever it was made: see Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 s 4A(2) and [17290]. Perhaps complaints may be proved in relation to crimes in which, though the crimes are not in themselves sexual offences, the prosecution case depends on establishing sexual offences, eg slavery: R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51 at [65]. 370 De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 (FC) followed in Anderson v Anderson (No 3) [1965] QWN 15. Cf In the Marriage of E (1978) 31 FLR 171 (Fam Ct (SA)). 371 R v Wink (1834) 6 C & P 397 (robbery); R v Ridsdale (1837) Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 13th ed, 1908, p 24; Starkie on Evidence, 4th ed, 1853, 469n (shooting); R v Folley (1896) 60 JP 569; Berry v Berry (1898) 78 LT 688 (cruelty); Jones v South Eastern and Chatham Rail Co’s Managing Committee (1918) 87 LJKB 775 at 778 (DC of KBD) (violence); Fromhold v Fromhold [1952] 1 TLR 1522 (CA) (violence); cf on this point Gillie v Posho Ltd [1939] 2 All ER 196 at 200 (PC); De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 (FC) (sodomy); Anderson v Anderson (No 3) [1965] QWN 15 (sodomy); R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 (CCA) (assault). See R N Gooderson, “Previous Consistent Statements” [1968] CLJ 64. No objection ever seems to be taken to the use of complaints of ill-treatment made by accused persons in attempting to exclude confessions from evidence, or to diminish their credibility, see eg McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] QB 283 at 313 (CA). 372 O’H v O’H (1916) 33 TLR 51. 373 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 561 (CCCR) per Ridley J.
374 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 556 (CCCR). 375 R v McNeill [1907] VLR 265 at 268–9 (FC); R v Norcott [1917] 1 KB 347 at 351 (CCA); R v
Freeman [1980] VR 1 at 4 (FC). 376 R v Fetch [1976] 1 ACLD 019 per Lee J; see R v Muise (No 2) (1975) 23 CCC (2d) 422 (Nova Scotia SC App Div). 377 See also R v Stewart (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 33 at 35–6 (FC). 378 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (CCA); R v Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73 at 77 (CCA); R v Wojtowicz (2005) 148 NTR 24 at [16]–[17]; Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at [27]–[28]; R v Ahmet (2009) 22 VR 203 at [48]–[49]. 379 R v Wojtowicz (2005) 148 NTR 24 at [13]–[14]. 380 See, however, R v Merry (1900) 19 Cox CC 442; R v Manning (1910) 13 WALR 6 (CCA); R v Norcott [1917] 1 KB 347 (CCA); S v T 1963 (1) SA 484 (App Div); R v Adams [1965] Qd R 255 (CCA); R v Walesby [1919] NZLR 289 at 299 (CA); R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC); R v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 (CCA); R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [78]–[83]; R v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463 at [37]–[54]. 381 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 561 (CCCR). The telling of a lie by the complainant as to the complainant’s whereabouts does not render the complaint inadmissible: R v Kennelly [1967] Qd R 345 (CCA). It is often called the doctrine of “recent” complaint, but this terminology has been criticised — it is the actus reus which must be recent, not the complaint: R v Munday (2003) 7 VR 423 at [11] n 2 and [42] n 44. 382 R v HG (2007) 171 A Crim R 55 at [22]–[25]. 383 R v Hedges (1909) 3 Cr App R 262; R v Cummings [1948] 1 All ER 551 (CA); Bodechon v R (1964) 50 MPR 184 (Prince Ed Is FC); R v Dubois [1966] QWN 25 (CCA); R v Giffin [1971] Qd R 12 (CCA); R v Ives [1973] Qd R 128 (CCA); R v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 (CCA); R v W[1996] 1 Qd R 573 (CA); R v GG (2004) 151 A Crim R 92; R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [71]–[77]. 384 R v Wilbourne (1917) 12 Cr App R 280. The common law rule has been held not to have been modified by legislation requiring judges to tell juries that there may be good reason why a victim of a sexual assault might delay or hesitate in complaining about it: R v Knigge (2003) 6 VR 181 at [19]. 385 Breen v R (1976) 180 CLR 233. 386 Breen v R (1976) 180 CLR 233; R v Giffin [1971] Qd R 12 (CCA); R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 at 8 (FC); R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 (CCA); Daniels v R (1989) 1 WAR 435 (not agreeing with R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203 at 206 (CCA) and R v Tanda (1986) 43 SASR 161); R v WB (2009) 23 VR 319. 387 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 at 8 (FC); R v Lazos (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 at 395–6 (Vic CA); R v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342 (CA); R v N [1994] 3 NZLR 641 (CA); Miller v R (1995) 13 WAR 504 (CCA); R v Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 (CA); Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401; Young v R [1998] 1 VR 402 at 424–5 (CA); R v Birks [2003] 2 Cr App R 7 at [10] and [24] (it is not enough that the complaint is made within a reasonable time: it must be recent); R v Humble (2009) 193 A Crim R 324 at [58]–[67]). 388 M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 514–15; Suresh v R (1998) 153 ALR 145 at [4] and [47]; R v M (2000) 109 A Crim R 530. 389 R v S (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 at [16]. 390 R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 at 61 (Qld CA). 391 R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [7]–[9]. 392 R v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122 (CCA). See also R v Walesby [1919] NZLR 289 (CA); R v Wannell (1922) 17 Cr App R 53; R v Greenwood [1962] Tas SR 319; R v Hurst (1966) 55 WWR 358 (BCCA). 393 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 (CCCR); R v Robertson; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 262 at 263
and 274–6 (FC); R v Islam [1999] 1 Cr App R 22 at 26. 394 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 (CCCR). 395 Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 472; Ugle v R (1989) 167 CLR 647 at 649; Suresh v R (1998) 153 ALR 145 at [4]. Hence they are not received under an exception to the hearsay rule: cf R v Baltensperger (2004) 90 SASR 129 at [52]. The proposition in the text is a matter of commonsense for the jury to consider, not a matter of legal theory: R v Matthews [1999] 1 VR 534 at [12]–[13]. 396 Cf Suresh v R (1998) 153 ALR 145 at [4]; SPW v R (2012) 220 A Crim R 301 at [49]. 397 Lapthorne v R [1990] WAR 207 (WA CCA). 398 R v Lovell (1923) 17 Cr App R 163 (CCA); Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154; Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460; R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC). See also R v Evans (1924) 18 Cr App R 123; Thomas v R [1952] 2 SCR 344; R v Yates [1970] SASR 302 at 307 (CCA); and [15185] above. 399 Jones v R (1997) 143 ALR 52 at 53, citing R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC) and R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 (CCA); R v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 602 (CA). 400 R v S [2004] 3 All ER 689 at [23] (CA). 401 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 at 178–9 (CCCR). 402 R v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 at 162; R v Lambert [1919] VLR 205 (FC). The dicta in Wallwork’s case are more fully criticised by R Cross, “Complaints of Sexual Offences” (1958) 74 LQR 352 and, according to White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 218 (PC), “convincingly”. See also R v Burke (1912) 47 ILT 111 (complainant an imbecile). 403 Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460, followed in R v Zorad [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 (CCA), and criticising Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 552 at 556 (CCA); R v Hinton [1961] Qd R 17 at 24 (CCA); R v Mayberry [1973] Qd R 211 (CCA). Credibility may not necessarily be undermined where the accused is the grandfather of young girls who allege sexual interference, and they explain their failure to complain: R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265 at [104]. 404 R v Megson (1840) 9 C & P 420; R v Gutteridges (1840) 9 C & P 471; R v Osborne (1842) Car & M 622. 405 White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 215–16. 406 Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460. See also R v Lambert [1919] VLR 205 (FC); R v Hinton [1961] Qd R 17 at 24 (CCA); R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (CCA); R v Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73 at 76–7 (CCA); Suresh v R (1998) 153 ALR 145 at [4]. 407 R v Askew [1981] Crim LR 398 (CA). 408 Sparks v R [1964] AC 964 (PC). 409 M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 515. 410 Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at 113 and 131. 411 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [19] (speaking of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) ss 102–104 and 108, but the same is true at common law): Blow J at [179], however, saw the evidence as admissible to negative the possibility of concoction or contamination as between different complainants. 412 R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 (CCA); R v Braye-Jones [1966] Qd R 295 at 297 (CCA); R v Shonias (1974) 21 CCC (2d) 301 at 304–5 (Ont CA); R v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 at [51]; cf Chesney v Newsholme [1908] P 301; however, even though the crime charged is rape, the complaint need not be of rape: R v Giffin [1971] Qd R 12 (CCA); R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187 (FC); R v Lazos (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 at 394–5 (Vic FC). 413 R v S (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 at [21]. 414 R v Braye-Jones [1966] Qd R 295 (CCA); R v Nazif [1987] 2 NZLR 122 at 126 (CA); R v S [2004] 3 All ER 689 at [28]–[33] (CA). 415 R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [60]–[69]. 416 R v Robertson; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 262 at 263 and 276 (CCA) (disagreeing with De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 at 246 (FC); to the same effect is R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187 at 198
(FC)). See also R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 at 321 (CCA). An example of the difficulties of assessing whether something is truly a complaint is R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 (CCA). 417 R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 at 321 (CCA); see also R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 at 5 (FC); R v Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73 at 77 (CCA); R v Robertson; Ex parte A-G [1991] 1 Qd R 262 at 274 (CCA), and R v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 at 461 (CCA), citing R v Cummings [1948] 1 All ER 551 (CCA). See also R v Nazif [1987] 2 NZLR 122 (CA); R v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1 (CA); R v Mustafa (2005) 91 SASR 62 at [1] and [59]–[60]; R v Abela (2007) 17 VR 1 at [52]. 418 Breen v R (1976) 180 CLR 233; R v Nazif [1987] 2 NZLR 122; cf White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 215 (PC) (“it is necessary not only that the complainant should testify to the making of the complaint but also that its terms should be proved by the person to whom it was made”). In R v Bertrand (2008) 20 VR 222 at [105] it was said: “Ordinarily, it would be neither necessary nor desirable to call multiple witnesses as to recent complaint. It is another matter if the evidence of the making of the complaint or its content is a matter of serious dispute”. A critic might say that the prosecution must assume that everything is in dispute unless a formal admission has been made. 419 R v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1 at 9 (CA), approved in White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 216. In R v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1, R v Lee (1911) 7 Cr App R 31 was said to offer “only very tenuous support” for R v Duell [1964] Qd R 451 (CCA), which was not followed, as it was in R v WB (2009) 23 VR 319 at [9] n 1. However, in R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 (CA), R v Kincaid was not followed, and R v Duell and Kribs v R [1960] SCR 400 were. In R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198 at [93]–[96], R v J (No 2) was followed. The SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 34CA provides that complaints by young children must be proved by a witness to whom the child complained. 420 See [19015]. 421 R v Gibson [1993] Crim LR 453; R v Evans (1924) 18 Cr App R 123, and see [15185] above; Thomas v R [1952] 4 DLR 306 (SC Can); Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460; R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC). 422 R v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1 at 9 (CA); White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 216–17 (PC); R v Tyndale [1999] Crim LR 320 (but complaints cannot be used for this purpose in chief before any suggestion of recent invention has been made). 423 R v Kooyman (1979) 22 SASR 376 at 380–1. 424 White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 218. 425 White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 217. 426 Commonwealth v Cleary 172 Mass 175 (1898) at 176 cited in R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 (CCCR). See also O W Holmes Jnr, “Law in Science and Science in Law” (1899) 12 Harv L Rev 443 at 453; Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, I, Ch 41, s 9. The rule has been widely criticised in North America, see J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1972, vol 4, [1134]–[1144], well summarised in Schiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process, 2nd ed, 1983, p 587. 427 See R v Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325, where the accused argued for an extension of the exception in favour of prior consistent statements made to the police upon this ground. 428 See also Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 61(1)(b) and (1A)–(1F); Tas: Criminal Code s 371A; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 36BD; ACT: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 s 71; NT: Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act. On the need to direct the jury why the complainant might have delayed, see R v ERJ (2010) 200 A Crim R 270 at [51]. 429 R v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276. See also R v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 (CCA); R v MacDonald (1985) 17 A Crim R 297 (NSW CCA); R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 (CCA); R v Ugle (1989) 43 A Crim R 423 (WA CCA); Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79; R v Omarjee (1995) 79 A Crim R 355; Crofts v R (1996) 186 CLR 427; R v Miletic [1997] 1 VR 593 (CA); R v K (1997) 68 SASR 405 (CCA); Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 at 445–6 and 454–5; R v Robertson [1998] 4 VR 30 (CA); R v Hyatt [1998] 4 VR 182 (CA); Cook v R (2000) 22 WAR 67 at [105]– [110]; R v NRC [1999] 3 VR 537; R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82 at [175]–[177], [245] and
[274]–[275]. See also Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 61(2); NT: Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act s 4(6). 430 Crofts v R (1996) 186 CLR 427 at 451. 431 R v NM [2013] 1 Qd R 374. 432 R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129 at [64]; R v DBA (2012) 219 A Crim R 408. 433 Jury directions along the lines of s 34D, and in other respects, may be necessary: R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [77]–[85]. 434 R v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517 at [37]. 435 R v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517 at [25]. 436 R v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517 at [35]–[36]. 437 H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547 at [153]–[155]. 438 H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547 at [156]–[158]. 439 R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [19] and [26]. 440 R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [29]–[31]. 441 R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [44]; R v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517 at [27], [29] and [40]. 442 R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [64]. 443 R v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517 at [28]. 444 R v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225. 445 Douglass v R (2012) 290 ALR 699. 446 R v J, AP (2013) SASR 150 at [4]. 447 R v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86 at [31] and [42]; R v S, DD (2010) 109 SASR 46; R v Heading (2011) 111 SASR 32 at [37]; R v A, GP (2012) 113 SASR 146; R v England (2013) 116 SASR 589; R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1 at [27]–[28]. 448 R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [95]. See also R v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86 at [46]–[50] and [105] for a discussion of various meanings of “consistency”. 449 R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563 at [99]–[102]. 450 See [17255]. 451 Eg Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 (rejecting an argument based on a false analogy with the common law that complaint evidence was not capable of being relevant to an issue, only to credit, and approving R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 (NSW CCA)). See also R v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629. 452 Differing opinions are expressed in R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 142 (NSW CCA) as to the circumstances in which a s 136 order should be made. In Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 the High Court said that the complaint in that case was not appropriately the subject of a s 136 order and there was no general rule that complaints should be subject to s 136 orders. McHugh J said at 326 that s 136 should only be invoked for hearsay evidence where a s 165 warning of its dangers would not cure them: see Hunt CJ at CL to the same effect in R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139–40 (NSW CCA). 453 R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 142 (NSW CCA). 454 R v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 at 368 (NSW CCA). 455 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [45] and [115]–[117]. 456 See R v Joyce (2005) 15 NTLR 134. The legislation is more fully discussed at [35410]. 457 R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241. 458 See also R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 375, citing R v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276; Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 91; Crofts v R (1996) 186 CLR 427 at 447–8; R v Miletic [1997] 1VR 593 at 601–6 (CA); R v K (1997) 68 SASR 405 at 409–10 (CCA); Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 at 454–5. See further Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162; R v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113; R v NRC [1999] 3 VR 537; R v T (1999) 74 SASR 486; Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161 at [44]–[45], [128]–[132] and [140]–[143]; R v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272; R v Green (2001)
78 SASR 463 at [114]–[124]; R v GJH (2001) 122 A Crim R 361; R v Roberts (2001) 53 NSWLR 138; LMD v R (2001) 137 A Crim R 1; R v Glennon (No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [54]–[58] and [127]–[130]; R v GPP (2001) 129 A Crim R 1; R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; R v SJB (2002) 129 A Crim R 572; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; R v GEA (2002) 131 A Crim R 54; R v MWL (2002) 137 A Crim R 282; R v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150; R v WEB (2003) 7 VR 200; R v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278; R v EO(2004) 8 VR 154; R v MM(2004) 145 A Crim R 148; R v KJ (2005) 154 A Crim R 139; Tully v R (2006) 230 CLR 234; Sheehan v R (2006) 163 A Crim R 397; R v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462; R v RW (2008) 184 A Crim R 388; TJ v R (2009) 97 A Crim R 508. 459 Crisafio v R (2003) 27 WAR 169. 460 Liddington v Western Australia (2005) 152 A Crim R 502 at [77]. 461 R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228. 462 Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343; R v Aristidis [1999] 2 Qd R 629 at [11]–[16] (CA). 463 R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at [95]. 464 Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 91. 465 Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 100–1. 466 Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 107–8. 467 Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161 at [42]. 468 JJB v R (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 at [2]–[8]; A Cossins, “Time Out for Longman: Myths, Science and the Common Law” (2010) 34 MULR 69. See also FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313 at [50]–[69]. 469 The issues are discussed in ALRC 102 [18.70]–[18.190]. See generally Hamer D, “Trying Delays: Forensic Disadvantage in Child Sexual Assault Trials” [2010] Crim LR 671. 470 R v Cassebohm (2011) 109 SASR 465; R v N, RC (2012) 222 A Crim R 521. 471 R v Cassebohm (2011) 109 SASR 465. 472 R v Bakhuis (2012) 112 SASR 536 at [57]. 473 R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at [32]. 474 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 at 19 (CCA): see [15160]. 475 Crofts v R (1996) 186 CLR 427 at 451: see [17290]. 476 KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221. 477 R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82 at [259]–[263]. 478 Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106. 479 BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275. 480 See note by Sir Frederick Pollock in Homes v Newman [1931] 2 Ch 112 at 120. 481 Milne v Leisler (1862) 7 H & N 786 (Ex). See also Spittle v Spittle [1965] 3 All ER 451; Stanfield v Rosin [1966] Qd R 10; O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159 at 197; R v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 at 436–7 (CCA). 482 R v Fowkes (1856) The Times, 8 March; J F Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, p 8. 483 See R N Gooderson, “Res Gestae in Criminal Cases” [1957] CLJ 55 at 78. 484 See [35532]. 485 Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 401 (CA). See also R v Sekhon (1986) 85 Cr App R 19; R v DD (2007) 19 VR 143 at [96]. In Wentworth v Rogers the Court of Appeal stated that the doctrine is concerned with any fabrication “anterior to the trial”; in Fraser v R (1995) 65 SASR 260 at 274 Olsson J considered that statements made even after the start of the trial could be admissible. Even if “recent” is to be used, it has been called an elastic description: R v Athwal [2009] 1 WLR 2430 at [58] (CA). 486 Frankcombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139 at 141. See R v Felise [1985] 1 NZLR 186 at 191 (CA) (allegation, not of deliberate fabrication, but of diluted recall due to mental illness). There are divisions in South Australia on the width of the exception: compare Fraser v R (1995) 65 SASR
260 (CCA) with R v Martin (1996) 65 SASR 590 (CCA). 487 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479. See R N Gooderson, “Previous Consistent Statements” [1968] CLJ 64 at 86–9. See also R v Heinze (2005) 153 A Crim R 380 at [58]; Leeks v XY (2008) 21 VR 118 at [24]–[28]. 488 R v Coll (1889) 24 LR Ir 522 at 541. 489 Cf Ahmed v Brumfitt (1967) 112 Sol Jo 32 (CA). 490 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 (PC); R v Okai [1987] Crim LR 259 (CA); R v Burrows (1988) 36 A Crim R 408 (Qld CCA). 491 Transport & General Insurance v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23, criticising on this point, but otherwise approving, Woodward v Shea [1952] VLR 313. 492 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 230 (PC). It was described as a “discretion” in White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 217 (PC). Perhaps for this reason, perhaps because the issue turns on the overall conduct of trial and the tone of the questioning, “great weight should be given” to the trial judge’s opinion by an appellate court: Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479–80 and 495; R v Shum (1968) 62 QJPR 35 (Qld CCA); R v Boland [1974] VR 849 at 875 (FC); R v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784 at 793 (CA). 493 Cf a defence to a charge of crime first put forward on the very day of the crime: R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191 (CCA). 494 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 231. For other examples, see R v Davy [1964–5] NSWR 40 (CCA); Mapp v Stephens [1965] NSWR 1661 (FC); Damon v Snyder [1970] VR 81; R v NRC (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 580; Campbell v Burrows Engineering (2002) 82 SASR 75 (FC). 495 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 495. 496 See also R v Coll (1889) 24 LR Ir 522; R v Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146; Flanagan v Fahy [1918] 2 IR 361; Britton v Cmr for Road Transport (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 249 (CCA); Woodward v Shea [1952] VLR 313; Lavelle v R [1957] Tas SR 162 (CCA); Krycki v Nominal Defendant (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 552 (CCA); Higgins v Dorries [1965] Qd R 389 (CCA); R v Shum [1968] QWN 7 (CCA); R v Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240. 497 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 230. 498 Flanagan v Fahy [1918] 2 IR 361. 499 R v Martin (1996) 65 SASR 590 (CCA); R v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320. 500 R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191 (CCA). 501 R v Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240. See also R v Gregson [2003] 2 Cr App R 521. 502 R v Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146. 503 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 (FC). 504 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 at 268 (FC). 505 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 495. See also G J Coles & Co Ltd v McDonald [1998] 2 VR 218 (CA). 506 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479–80, applied in Damon v Snyder [1970] VR 81. Other authorities are Frankcombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139; Lavelle v R [1957] Tas SR 162 (CCA); Krycki v Nominal Defendant (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 552 (FC); Mapp v Stephens [1965] NSWR 1661 (FC); R v Davy [1964–5] NSWR 40 (CCA); Drakos v Smith [1958] VR 536; Higgins v Dorries [1965] Qd R 389 (CCA); R v Shum [1968] QWN 7 (CCA); Nathan v Vos [1970] SASR 455 at 458 (FC); R v Boland [1974] VR 849 (FC). See also Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 (FC), leaving open, at 282, the question whether, if a party’s testimony is contradicted in cross-examination by an admission, it is permissible to prove an earlier statement under the recent invention rule (this point was not mentioned on appeal in [1969] VR 323 (FC)). In Damon v Snyder [1970] VR 81, cross-examination on answers to interrogatories inconsistent with testimony was held not to be within the recent invention rule. An illustration of the prior consistent statement not rationally answering the attack is R v Martin (No 2) (1997) 68 SASR 419
(CCA). There is also discussion in that case on whether the prior consistent statement should be proved in the prosecution’s case in chief or in rebuttal: at 451. 507 Transport & General Insurance v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23; Leeks v XY (2008) 21 VR 118 at [29]–[36]. That is so at common law: in some jurisdictions the law is different as a result of statute: see [17565]. 508 Pearse v Sommers (1992) 28 NSWLR 492 at 493. 509 R v Coll (1889) 24 LR Ir 522; Flanagan v Fahy [1918] 2 IR 361; Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 490; Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 230 (PC); Mapp v Stephens [1965] NSWR 1661 at 1667; Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 at 274; R v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784 (CA). 510 R v Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146 at 148; R v Shum (1968) 62 QJPR 35 (CCA). 511 Woodward v Shea [1952] VLR 313 at 315–17; R v Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240; Fraser v R (1995) 65 SASR 260. 512 Frankcombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139 at 140 (letter from witness). 513 Waller v Shayler (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 169 at 171. 514 Fraser v R (1995) 65 SASR 260 (CCA). 515 R v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1 at 9. 516 White v R [1999] 1 AC 210 at 216–17. 517 See [17285]. 518 R v Wilmot (1988) 89 Cr App R 341 (accused’s solicitor: no duty to warn that accused had legal professional privilege in relation to solicitor’s advice). The case is further discussed in R v Seaton [2011] 1 All ER 932. 519 R v Ali (H) [2004] 1 Cr App R 39. 520 ALRC 26 [685], Bill clause 88; ALRC 38 [144](a), Bill clause 101. See also Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179 (CCA); R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 at [51] and [56]–[61]; R v Ambrosi (2004) 144 A Crim R 67 at [40]–[41]; R v Pavitt (2007) 169 A Crim R 452 at [105]. 521 R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 140–1 (NSW CCA); Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606 at [9] (majority doubted whether making of a complaint six years after the event would assist in deciding whether the complainant had fabricated her evidence); Abdul-Kader v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 281 at [44] and [50] (similar test where the allegation is not fabrication but reconstruction or suggestion). 522 R v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim 51 at [39]. 523 Pavitt v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 452 at [105]; Oakton Services Pty Ltd v Tessari (2009) 224 FLR 332. 524 R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 141 (NSW CCA). 525 Shepherd v Shepherd [1954] VLR 514; In the Estate of Powe; Powe v Barclays Bank Ltd [1956] P 110. 526 Contrast Robinson v Stern [1939] 2 KB 260 at 269 (CA) with Jarman v Lambert and Cooke (Contractors) Ltd [1951] 2 KB 937 at 947 (CA). 527 Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 769. But see [35010] and [35150]. 528 R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 (CCA); R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 (CCA); R v Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 574 at 585 (CCA). 529 R v Perera [1986] 2 Qd R 431 at 437–8 (CCA). 530 Simon-Beecroft v Proprietors “Top of the Mark” Building Units Plan No 3410 [1997] 2 Qd R 635 (CA). 531 Senat v Senat [1965] P 172. See [17240] ff above. 532 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630. See [17570] ff below. 533 See [33455] below. 534 R v Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325 at 330; R v Malcherek [1981] 2 All ER 422. 535 R v Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 365 at 369; cf R v Storey (1968) 52 Cr App R 334.
536 R N Gooderson, “Previous Consistent Statements” [1968] CLJ 64 at 66–74. See R v Abraham
(1848) 3 Cox CC 430; R v Manzano (1860) 2 F & F 64; R v Mulle (1865) 4 F & F 923n; R v Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922; R v Coats [1932] NZLR 401 at 407 (CA); R v Graham [1974] SCR 206; R v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 at 160. 537 R v Sparrow [1973] 2 All ER 129; R v Thompson [1975] Crim LR 34 (CA); R v Donaldson (1976) 64 Cr App R 59; cf R v McCarthy (1980) 71 Cr App R 142. 538 R v Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325, explaining R v Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 365; see also R v Malcherek [1981] 2 All ER 422, where the statement was made not to the police but to the accused’s solicitor; R v Tooke (1989) 90 Cr App R 417. 539 R v Storey (1968) 52 Cr App R 334. 540 R v Barbery (1975) 62 Cr App R 248. 541 R v Sparrow [1973] 2 All ER 129. 542 R v McCarthy (1980) 71 Cr App R 142 at 146. 543 See D W Elliott and J N Wakefield, “Exculpatory Statements by Accused Persons” [1979] Crim LR 428 and Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [35-33] and [35-35]. 544 R v Barbery (1975) 62 Cr App R 248. 545 R v Rymer (2005) 156 A Crim R 84. The court said that the doctrine applied under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 60, on the basis that the self-serving statement was relevant for a purpose other than proof of the asserted fact (innocence), namely to support the credibility of a plea of not guilty. There are grave difficulties in this confessedly “very liberal” (at [62]) construction. It is convincingly attacked in Barry v Police (SA) (2009) 197 A Crim R 445 at [52]– [54]. See also R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 at 114–15, discussed at [33770]. 546 R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444 at [55]. 547 Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 at 701. 548 Barry v Police (SA) (2009) 197 A Crim R 445 at [54]. 549 R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300 (CA). See also Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179 (CCA). 550 Among the English authorities are R v Abraham (1848) 3 Cox CC 430; R v Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922; R v Mulle (1865) 4 F & F 923n; R v Manzano (1860) 2 F & F 64. See also R v Graham (1972) 7 CCC (2d) 93 (SC Can). 551 R v Fannon (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 427 at 430. 552 [31175]–[31195]. 553 See [19005] below. 554 [17175]. 555 Phillion v R [1978] 1 SCR 18, not accepting the contrary decision in R v Wong [1977] 1 WWR 1, but following the majority view in the United States, stemming from Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (1923). Phillion’s case was applied in R v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 and Mallard v R (2003) 28 WAR 1. See J Edelman, “Admissibility of polygraph (lie detector) examinations” (2005) 29 Crim LJ 21. 556 R v McKay [1967] NZLR 139 (CA), citing R v Barker [1954] Crim LR 423, and a report in (1954) 98 Sol Jo 794. See R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 at 12–13 and 17 (CCA). See [17250] ff above and D L Mathieson, “The Truth Drug: Trial by Psychiatrist” [1967] Crim LR 645. 557 [17175]. 558 Meehan v H M Advocate 1970 JC 11. 559 See eg E Harnon, “Evidence Obtained by Polygraph: An Israeli Perspective” [1982] Crim LR 340. For an excellent exposition of the problems see D W Elliott, “Lie Detector Evidence: Lessons from the American Experience” in E Campbell and LWaller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982. See also [17175] n 279 above. 560 J F Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, art 147. 561 Hence a witness who deliberately withholds material evidence may be declared hostile: McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 104; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398
at 407. 562 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [896] ff; S Simpson, “The Characterisation of One’s Witness for the Purpose of their Impeachment” (1976) 50 ALJ 410. See [19010] below. 563 Holdsworth v Mayor of Dartmouth (1838) 2 Mood & R 153. 564 The rule is probably contravened when an anticipatory watering down of cross-examination is attempted along the lines described by McHugh J in Suresh v R (1998) 153 ALR 145 at [18]: “it is not uncommon for counsel to attempt to blunt the predicted effect of a cross-examination of a witness by leading, and seeking to explain, in evidence-in-chief a discreditable incident concerning the witness”. He said (n 11): “A well known example is Sir John Simon’s question to his witness in ‘The “Mr A” Case’ in the Old Bailey Trial Series published by Jarrolds (at 261): ‘I am sorry to have to ask you, Mr Newton, but I had better ask it here. Have you been convicted of forgery?’” 565 See R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at 209–10 (CCA); Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380 at [109]–[113]; Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd (2010) 275 ALR 293 at [63]–[67]. A fortiori, a party is at liberty to give testimony even though earlier a contradictory answer to an interrogatory was given: Gannon v Gannon (1971) 125 CLR 629 at 640; Kabadanis v Panagiotou (1980) 30 ALR 374 at 381–2 (FCA FC); Stateliner Pty Ltd v Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 16 at 46 (Fed C of A); Mundy v Bridge Motors Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 125 at 131–2; Endeavour Wines Ltd v Martin & Martin [1948] WN 338. 566 Richards v Morgan (1863) 4 B & S 641 at 663; Ward v Roy W Sandford Ltd (1919) 19 SR (NSW) 172 at 185 (FC); R v Cairns [2003] 1 WLR 796 (CA). 567 Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746 at 750 (KB); Anonima Petroli Italiana SpA v Marlucidez Armadora SA (The “Filiatra Legacy”) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 337 at 361 (CA). 568 R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at 210 (CCA). 569 Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746 (KB). See also Bradley v Ricardo (1831) 8 Bing 57 (CA); Freedlander v London Assurance Co (1832) 4 B & Ad 193 (KB). The much-quoted statement of Hamilton J in Sumner and Leivesley v John Brown & Co (1909) 25 TLR 745, must be read with caution. He said: “If a party calls two equally credible witnesses who give evidence the tenor of which he might reasonably have expected, upon a major fact in issue, and such witnesses directly contradict each other, the party calling them is not entitled to accredit the one and discredit the other, and the testimony of both must be disregarded.”The last eight words are inconsistent with the judgment of Littledale J in Ewer v Ambrose. Neither witness can be discredited so long as they both are considered to be merely unfavourable, and it is not clear what is meant by “evidence the tenor of which might reasonably have been expected”. It is unusual for a party to call witnesses whom the party expects to contradict each other. Hamilton J’s statement has been held to be inapplicable to criminal proceedings (R v Brent [1973] Crim LR 295 (CA)) on account of the Crown’s duty either to call all relevant evidence or to give the statements of uncalled witnesses to the defence and it was disapproved in the light of the judgment in Bradley v Ricardo and various Canadian authorities in the civil case of Cariboo Observer Ltd v Carson Lines and Tyrell (1962) 32 DLR (2d) 36 (BC CA), and also in Wells v South Australian Railways Cmr (1973) 5 SASR 74. Bray CJ said the court could be asked to accept one witness’s testimony and reject the other’s. This was followed in R v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 at 435 and 442–3 (CCA): at the latter place Zelling J suggests Hamilton J’s statement may be justified on special facts not appearing in the brief report. See also Leotta v Public Transport Commission (NSW) (1976) 9 ALR 437 at 443 and 449 (HC of A); R v Goncalves (1997) 99 A Crim R 193 at 216 (WACCA); Graham v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152 at [32]–[44]. 570 Leotta v Public Transport Commission (NSW) (1976) 9 ALR 437 at 443 and 449 (HC of A); Barker v Charley (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 296 at 303–4 (FC). 571 McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 861 (CA). 572 See generally M Ladd, “Impeachment of One’s Own Witness — New Developments” (1936) 4
U of Chi Law Rev 69; M Newark, “The Hostile Witness and the Adversary System” [1986] Crim LR 441; R Munday, “Calling a Hostile Witness” [1989] Crim LR 866; R Pattenden, “The Hostile Witness” (1992) 56 Journal of Criminal Law 414; T H Smith and O P Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence: The Unhelpful Witness” (1998) 72 ALJ 720. 573 Bastin v Carew (1824) Ry & M 127. The court has the discretion to control the extent of the cross-examination: R v Dat [1998] Crim LR 488 (CA). 574 R v Pitt [1983] QB 25 (CA). 575 Cf R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 37 (FC). 576 See eg the difference of opinion in Wright v Beckett (1834) 1 Mood & R 414 (CP). 577 Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878 at 890 (QB). 578 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 at 806 (CP); Rice v Howard (1886) 16 QBD 681 (DC of QBD); Harris v Minister for Public Works (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 149 (FC). 579 Rice v Howard (1886) 16 QBD 681 at 685 (DC of QBD). 580 R v See Lun (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 363 (CCA). See generally McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95; R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 450 (CCA). A trial judge’s conclusion of non-hostility was overturned in Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 407. 581 R v Williams (1913) 8 Cr App R 133 at 139. 582 R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 32 (FC). 583 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 at 804 (CP). See also R v Smith (1909) 2 Cr App R 86 at 87; Bassett v Ferguson [1952] VLR 481. 584 R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 37 (FC); Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co v Hanes (1961) 28 DLR (2d) 386 at 425–6 (Ont CA); R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 443 and 449 (CCA). 585 Russell v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) (L) 261 at 263 (FC). 586 Russell v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) (L) 261 at 266 (FC). 587 McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 103; Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 97 (CCA); R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 443–4 (CCA); R v Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750. Cf R v Fraser (1956) 40 Cr App R 160. 588 Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878 (QB); Buckley v Cooke (1854) 1 K & J 29; Faulkner v Brine (1858) 1 F & F 254; Dear v Knight (1859) 1 F & F 433; Pound v Wilson (1865) 4 F & F 301; Amstell v Alexander (1867) 16 LT 830; R v Little (1883) 15 Cox CC 319; R v Dibble (1908) 1 Cr App R 155; R v Smith (1909) 2 Cr App R 86; R v Williams (1913) 8 Cr App R 133; R v Birch (1924) 93 LJKB 385 (CCA); R v Harris (1927) 20 Cr App R 144; People (Attorney-General) v Harrigan [1941] IR 252; R v James [1954] Crim LR 55; R v Fraser (1956) 40 Cr App R 160; R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 (FC); R v Caracella [1958] VR 382; R v Hayden [1959] VR 102; McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95; Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co v Hanes (1961) 28 DLR (2d) 386 (Ont CA); R v Matthews [1972] VR 3; Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 95 (CCA); R v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 at 554 (CCA). 589 R v Prefas (1988) 86 Cr App R 111. 590 Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 87, 90 and 95 (FC); R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 442– 3 (CCA) (at 449 Cooper J said a voir dire in the jury’s absence should be conducted for that purpose: to the same effect is Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 88–9 and 96 (FC), suggesting at 97 that the witness can be cross-examined in relation to the hostility issue, with which R v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82 at 87 agreed). 591 Russell v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) (L) 261; R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 (FC); Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 (FC); Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 125. 592 Price v Manning (1889) 42 Ch D 372 (CA). 593 Bassett v Ferguson [1952] VLR 481 at 482. 594 Coles v Coles (1866) LR 1 P & D 70 at 71. 595 Phipson on Evidence, 8th ed, p 464; see 16th ed, 2005, [11-56]. 596 R v Hutchison (1990) 53 SASR 587 at 591–2, citing R v Hayden [1959] VR 102 and McLellan v
Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95. See also R v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 at 514; Hunter v Police (2011) 111 SASR 411. The sentence in the text was quoted approvingly in Suleski v Sons of Gwalia Ltd [2005] WASCA 220 at [38]. 597 Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267; cf Rostek v Keegan (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 555; Jacobson v Suncorp Insurance and Finance [1991] 2 Qd R 46 (insurer a party). Vocisano v Vocisano has been reversed by s 38(7) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 598 R v Wong [1986] Crim LR 683; R v Pohutuhutu [1987] 2 CRNZ 538. 599 R v Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750. 600 R v Powell [1985] Crim LR 592 (CA); R v Norton [1987] Crim LR 687 (CA); Willis v Magistrate’s Court of Victoria (1996) 89 A Crim R 273 at 279 (VSC). 601 R v White [1970] QWN 46. 602 R v Darby [1989] Crim LR 817; R v Birkby [1994] 2 NZLR 38 (CA) (discretionary matter for trial judge). 603 R v Honeyghon [1999] Crim LR 221 (CA). See also R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 34 (FC); R v Harding [1956] QWN 32. 604 Blewitt v R (1988) 80 ALR 353 at 355; R v Schriek [1997] 2 NZLR 139 (CA); R v O’Brien [2008] 2 NZLR 516 at [21] (CA); see also R v Thompson [1964] QWN 25 (CCA). See the commentary on R v Dat [1998] Crim LR 488 at 489–90 (CA). 605 R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 (CCA) (cf R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 (CCA)); R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 at [100]–[102] (CCA); R v Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442 at [12]; Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [19]. 606 Morgan v Kazandzis (2010) 206 A Crim R 235 at [45]–[48]. 607 R v Ashton (1999) 108 A Crim R 200 at 202 (Qld CA). 608 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 (CP). 609 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 17; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 27; WA: Evidence Act 1906 ss 20, 21. For an example of the procedure adopted under the section in a jury case, see R v Neal [1947] ALR (CN) 616, discussed in R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 (FC). 610 R v Booth (1981) 74 Cr App R 123. 611 Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 (CCA); R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 (CCA). 612 Cross on Evidence, 6th Eng ed, p 273. 613 R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 37 (FC). In South Australia cross-examination of hostile witnesses is full cross-examination: Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 (FC); R v Smith (No 2) (1994) 64 SASR 1 at 17–18 (CCA). 614 R v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 at 553–4 (CCA); R v Andrews [1987] 1 Qd R 21 at 31 (CCA); R v Coventry (1997) 7 Tas R 199 at 200–4 (permitting the use during the voir dire of leading questions and cross-examination by the party seeking to establish hostility, as well as the eliciting of evidence of hostility by independent evidence, so long as the questioning and the eliciting are confined to “the existence and nexus of inconsistency with an attitude referable to the case”). 615 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 (CP). 616 Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746 (KB). See [17370] above. 617 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 at 806–7 (CP). 618 (1859) 28 LJCP 160 at 163 (CP). 619 Clarke v Saffery (1824) Ry & M 126; Bastin v Carew (1824) Ry & M 127; cf R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 (FC). 620 R v Thompson (1976) 64 Cr App R 96. 621 Cf [17565] n 968. 622 The submission that it could not be proved is made in Archbold, 40th ed, para 521, and see R v Booth (1981) 74 Cr App R 123. A different view is taken in Canada: see McInroy v R [1979] 1 SCR
588. 623 Pollock CB, in Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 16 LJ Ex 259 (Ex), spoke of the jury being at liberty to believe either the one account or the other. The same view was taken in McInroy v R [1979] 1 SCR 588. 624 R v Dibble (1908) 1 Cr App R 155; Taylor v R (1918) 25 CLR 573; R v White (1922) 17 Cr App R 60; R v Birch (1924) 93 LJKB 385 (CCA); R v Harris (1927) 20 Cr App R 144; R v Moore (1957) 25 CR 159 (Ont CA); R v Oliva [1965] 3 All ER 116 (FC); Vocisano v Vocisano (No 2) (1973) 1 ACTR 142 (ACT SC); R v Sergi [1974] VR 1 (FC); R v Rose [1977] Qd R 280 (CCA). The jury should be so warned: R v Nelson [1992] Crim LR 653 (CA). 625 A non-party witness may of course render his previous statement evidence of the facts stated by conceding its truth in cross-examination: Birkett v AF Little Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 492 (FC). See also Sainsbury v Allsop (1899) 24 VLR 725; R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 (FC); R v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 at 554–5 (CCA); Stateliner Pty Ltd v Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 16 at 51 (FC); Morgan v Kazandzis (2010) 206 A Crim R 235. The witness is not likely to be a party in the case of statements admitted under s 3, but might be in the case of those admitted under ss 4 and 5. 626 See below Ch 18, “Rule Against Hearsay: Statutory Exceptions”. 627 R v Zorad [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 at 770 (CCA). 628 R v White (1922) 17 Cr App R 60 at 64. 629 R v Birch (1924) 93 LJKB 385 (CCA). 630 R v Golder [1960] 3 All ER 457 at 459 (CCA); the universality of the first part of this statement was questioned in R v Jackson [1964] Qd R 26 (CCA). See also R v Oliva [1965] 3 All ER 116; R v Pearson [1964] Qd R 471 (CCA); R v Schmahl [1965] VR 745 (FC). 631 See remarks on the passage in R v Jackson [1964] Qd R 26 at 29 and 40 (CCA) approved in the High Court of Australia in Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 535; see also R v Morgan [1981] 2 NZLR 164 (CA); R v Pestano [1981] Crim LR 397 (CA); R v Urbano (1983) 9 A Crim R 170 (WA CCA); Alves v DPP [1993] AC 284. 632 R v Harris (1927) 20 Cr App R 144 at 148–9. 633 See Deacon v R [1947] SCR 531, approving the following strong statement in an earlier case: “the fact that a witness has, wittingly or unwittingly, wilfully or mistakenly, voluntarily or under pressure, made a statement under oath or otherwise, differing from that made in the witness box at the trial, does not prevent the jury from considering his testimony and giving it the effect they consider right—they are not to be instructed that they must disregard his testimony and decide the case on other evidence only”: R v Kadeshevitz [1934] OR 213 at 219. 634 KC v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 241 at [65]. 635 R v Williams (1913) 8 Cr App R 133. 636 These objections do not apply to a deposition. 637 See Randall v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 197 at [27]. 638 ALRC 38 [114](c). 639 Cf Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267. 640 ALRC 26 [294]–[297] and [621]–[627], Bill clause 34, Appendix C [34]–[40]; ALRC 38 [113] (b) and [114], Bill clause 41. 641 R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 at 715; R v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420 (NSW SC); Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Donnelly (1998) 82 FCR 418 at 429–30 (FC); R v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465 at [59]–[62]; R v Ashton (2003) 143 A Crim R 354 (upheld on appeal: Randall v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 197) (CCA); R v SH(2011) 6 ACTLR 1. Cf Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2006) 152 FCR 560 (evidence is not unfavourable unless it detracts from the case of the party calling the witness). See also J A Westaway & Son Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1996) 7 BPR 14,773 at 14,796 (NSW SC); DPP v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15.
642 R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 at [54]. 643 Randall v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 197 at [24]. 644 Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [27]; cf at [44]. 645 R v Nguyen (2002) 127 A Crim R 102; R v Cakovski (2002) 133 A Crim R 18 at [14]; R v
Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450 at [71]–[85]; Burrell v R (2007) 190 A Crim R 148 at [232]– [246]; Burrell v R (2009) 196 A Crim R 199. 646 DPP v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15. 647 R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 at [100]–[102]. 648 R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 at [102]; Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [19]. 649 R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [67]; R v White (2003) 140 A Crim R 63. 650 R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [73]. 651 Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 at 190 (CA). 652 Against: Cartwright v W Richardson & Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 742. For: Harvey v Smith-Wood [1964] 2 QB 171. See [35005]. 653 Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746 (KB). 654 Patmoy v Paltie [1960] NSWR 334. 655 R v Neal [1947] ALR (CN) 616. 656 R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 at 101–3 (FC), discussed above at [17155] ff. 657 Thomson v Corporation of Glasgow 1962 SC (HL) 36 at 52 per Lord Thomson, LJ-C. 658 Wren v Emmett Contractors Pty Ltd (1969) 43 ALJR 213 at 221. 659 R v Treacy [1944] 2 All ER 229 (CCA); R v Kane (1977) 65 Cr App R 270; Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 at 259 (PC); cf R v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 (CCA). 660 R v Gray [1998] Crim LR 570 (CA); R v McKenzie [2004] 1 NZLR 181 (CA). 661 R v Cross (1990) 91 Cr App R 115. 662 R v Windass (1988) 89 Cr App R 258 (witness cannot be asked to explain the meaning of inadmissible statements in the document which are damaging to the witness). 663 R v Rowson [1986] QB 174 (CA); Lui Mei-lin v R [1989] AC 288 (PC) (the jury should be warned not to use a statement made by a person other than the witness in support of the prosecution’s case); R v Corelli [2001] Crim LR 913 (CA). See [33595], n 536. 664 R v Windass (1988) 89 Cr App R 258; R v McKenzie [2004] 1 NZLR 181 (CA). 665 R v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 (CCA). 666 Beare v Garrod (1915) 85 LJKB 717 (CA); Sharp v Loddington Ironstone Co Ltd (1924) 132 LT 229 (CA). 667 The statement was presumably not received as a declaration against interest because the declarant was unaware of the fact that it was against his interest. 668 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). 669 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 16. See also R v Farooqi [2014] 1 Cr App R 8 at [112]. 670 It was so described in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 at 70–1 itself, though it is wider than this, because it applies against unrepresented accused persons: McInnis v R (1979) 143 CLR 575 at 590; R v Schneidas (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 at 110–11 (NSW CCA); R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 102 (CCA); Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 102 (Fed C of A FC); Carruthers v Griffis (2000) 111 A Crim R 477 at [28]; cf R v Allen [1989] VR 736. The rule in practice may operate differently where the accused is unrepresented: R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 688, and see MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 532. 671 Village Cay Marina Ltd v Acland [1998] 2 BCLC 327 at 338 (PC). These grounds include demeanour said to support a conclusion that a witness is withholding evidence: Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [70]–[75]. 672 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [66]. 673 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [64].
674 R v Hart (1932) 23 Cr App Rep 202 (Crown bound); R v Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App Rep 307 at
313 (counsel for one co-accused obliged to put that co-accused’s version to another co-accused); R v Lovelock [1997] Crim LR 821 (Crown bound). 675 Gutierrez v R [1997] 1 NZLR 192. 676 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 688–9; Khamis v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 121 at [35]. 677 R v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 (CA); R v MG (2006) 175 A Crim R 342; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71 (with the extraordinary result that the failure of counsel for the accused to comply with the rule led to the accused’s appeal being allowed); R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531 at [273]–[280]. 678 R v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17. 679 R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290 and R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27 at [16] and [181]. 680 McPherson v Coupland 1961 SC (J) 74 at 78 (HC). 681 MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436 at [41]. 682 R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547 at [79]. 683 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 689–90. 684 MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436 at [37] and [41]. 685 Ghazal v GIO (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 at 345 (CA). 686 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1. 687 Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226. 688 Hoskins v Repatriation Commission (1991) 32 FCR 443 at 446–7; Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp (1993) 42 FCR 206; Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437; Secretary, Department of Defence v Gorton (2000) 98 FCR 497 at [79]. 689 Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187]; Re Ruddock; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 347 at [55]–[58]; Lawrance v Centrelink (2005) 88 ALD 664 at [31]. 690 Karidis v General Motors-Holdens Pty Ltd [1971] SASR 422 (FC). 691 R v Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App R 307 at 313. The later view that it is enough to indicate that the evidence was not accepted prevailed in Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 (FC); R v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 (CCA); and Brown v R 1980 Tas R 61 (CCA). Contradictions in the history given by a party to doctors should be put to the party if they are to be used as a basis of challenging the truth of the party’s evidence: Boston Clothing Co Pty Ltd v Margaronis (1992) 27 NSWLR 580 at 590 (CA). 692 R v Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App R 307 at 313, cited without disapproval in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 689. 693 Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 373–4. 694 Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 374. 695 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 22–3. 696 Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 at 500 (FC). 697 R v E [2012] Crim LR 563 (CA); R v Wills [2012] Crim LR 565 (CA). 698 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 23–4. 699 Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362. 700 Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565. 701 Cullen v Ampol Petroleum Ltd (CA(NSW), 20 October 1970, unreported). 702 Bush v R (1993) 43 FCR 549. 703 R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526 at [46]–[55]. 704 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 224–5; Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168 at 181; Jagelman v FCT (1995) 31 ATR 467 at 472–3; Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 101; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J McPhee & Son (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [1998] ATPR (Digest) 46–183 at 50,323 (Fed C of A); Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 192 at 203 (Fed C of A FC).
705 Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437 at 444; White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a
firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 220 (Fed C of A); Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries Qld Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 at [42] (FC); Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185 at [56]. 706 In the Marriage of LC and TC (1998) 23 Fam LR 75 (FC); Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v HSH Hotels (Australia) Ltd (2003) 20 BCL 321 at [56]; West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431 at [95]–[99] (pointing out that more extensive cross-examination may be needed where all the evidence is given orally than it is where the evidence is notified in advance by affidavit or statement); Porter v Oamps Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 635 at [12]; Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382 at [105]. 707 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 at 70 (HL); Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168 at 181; Dolan v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp (1993) 42 FCR 206 at 210 (video of party’s activities given to that party before hearing); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J McPhee & Son (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [1998] ATPR (Digest) 46–183 at 50,323 (Fed C of A); Johnson Matthey (Aust) Ltd v Dascorp Pty Ltd (2003) 9 VR 171 at [101]; State Rail Authority of NSW v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540 at [60]–[66]. 708 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 236; Gutierrez v R [1997] 1 NZLR 192 (CA) (witness not cross-examined had been adamant in chief); Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [242] (CCA); Vo v R (2013) 275 FLR 159. 709 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 8) (2008) 75 IPR 557 at [44]; R v Arnott (2009) 26 VR 490 at [105]. 710 West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431 at [99]. The extent to which “notice” may relieve a party from any duty to comply with the rule was left open in Curwen v Vanbreck (2009) 26 VR 335 at [23]. 711 Curwen v Vanbreck (2009) 26 VR 335 at [27]. 712 Curwen v Vanbreck (2009) 26 VR 335 at [27]. 713 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 689–90 and 703; Petty v R (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 110. 714 West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431 at [89]. 715 Myers v Claudianos (1990) 95 ACTR 1 at 11. 716 R v Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164 at [128]. 717 R v Costi (1987) 48 SASR 269 at 271; Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 at [367]. 718 R v Arnott (2009) 26 VR 490 at [105]–[109]. 719 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL); Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, Department of Corrective Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546 at 560. That may be the explanation of Re Brace; Ex parte Debtor v Gabriel [1966] 2 All ER 38 (CA), which is otherwise outside the general stream of authority. 720 R v Byczko (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 at 466 (CCA). A witness who professes no recollection of a conversation need not be taken through it by counsel: Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168. 721 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 236. 722 Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 at 207 (FC) per Bray CJ. 723 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 236. 724 Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 at 556; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 690. See also Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 225 and 237. It may be that none of the available techniques will serve to prevent a miscarriage of justice in a criminal case, in which event an appeal by the accused must succeed, even though it was the accused’s failure to comply with the rule which caused the problem, as in R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71. 725 Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12–35]; Peters v Perras (1909) 42 SCR 244; Flanagan v Fahy [1918] 2 IR 361 at 388–9; Horner v Canadian Northern Railway Co (1920) 55 DLR 340 (Alb
SC App Div); Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 375, citing R v Hart (1932) 23 Cr App R 202; Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 236; McMinn v Daire (1981) 5 A Crim R 307 (SA SC); Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt (2005) 140 LGERA 333 at [46]; Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [46]; Cooper v R (2012) 293 ALR 17 at [85]; cf Gillan v Police (SA) (2004) 149 A Crim R 354 at [36]. See also Small v Smith 1954 (3) SA 434 at 438 (“the party calling [the] witness is normally entitled to assume in the absence of notice to the contrary that the witness’s testimony is accepted as correct”). However, the proposition in the text must be read as subject to the qualification that it is not open to the court in criminal cases to take an issue of fact from the jury’s consideration: R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 at [53] n 44; Cooper v R (2012) 293 ALR 17 at [85]. 726 R v Bircham [1972] Crim LR 430 (CA). 727 O’Connell v Adams [1973] Crim LR 113 (DC of QBD). 728 O’Connell v Adams [1973] Crim LR 113 (DC of QBD); Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 18; Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 at 507 (CA). 729 R v Jawke 1957 (2) SA 187 (ED); Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 848–9; Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 375; Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362 at 371; Zeccola v Barr (1978) 19 ACTR 1 at 7–8 (ACT SC); Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302 at 305–7; Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 at 426 (CA); Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 at 507 (CA); MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436 at [19] (cf at [41]); Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 65 at [48] and [51]; R v MG (2006) 175 A Crim R 342 at [7]–[10]; Cooper v R (2012) 293 ALR 17 at [85]. Some cases appear to hold that it must be accepted, eg Stewart v Royal Bank (1930) 1 MPR 302, but this is not Australian law: Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (CA) (see particularly at 586–8 per Samuels JA, approving that view and questioning one construction of a statement by McHugh JA in Levinge v Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546 at 560); Elkington v Shell Australia Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 11 at 17 (CA); Sullman v Sullman [2002] DFC 95-248 at [306]; Caldwell v JA Neilson Investments Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 120 at [96]; Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382 at [105]. 730 R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526 at [61]. 731 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [85]. 732 KC v R (2011) 32 VR 61 at [61]. 733 R v Jawke 1957 (2) SA 187 (ED); Re Brace; Ex parte Debtor v Gabriel [1966] 2 All ER 38 (CA); Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 849. 734 Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 848. 735 See Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL); Peters v Perras (1909) 42 SCR 244; Horner v Canadian Northern Railway Co (1920) 55 DLR 340 at 342, 358, 359 and 364 (Alb SC App Div); United Cigar Stores Ltd v Buller [1931] 2 DLR 144 at 147, 148 (Ont App Div); and Small v Smith 1954 (3) SA 434 at 438, 439 (SWA). The last two paragraphs were quoted with approval in Sullman v Sullman [2002] DFC 95-248 at [304]. 736 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 26. 737 Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 375; see also Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 847; R v Killick (1980) 24 SASR 137 at 153 (CCA); R v Popescu (1989) 39 A Crim R 137 (NSW CCA). Cf Brown v R 1980 Tas R 61 (CCA); R v Cannan [1998] Crim LR 284 (CA) (recall witness to show photographs). This is the only area in which the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001(Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) touch on Browne v Dunn. What else does s 46 leave of the rule? ALRC 38 [115](h) observed that non-compliance “should not result in the exclusion of evidence”; what other consequences have been abolished? It may be that so far as the sanctions for breach took the form of jury directions, the power is preserved by s 11(1), but this highlights the questions provoked after replacing reasonably detailed rules by language that is much
more general. Further, as noted above, the rule in Browne v Dunn did not apply where all parties were on notice of the evidentiary issues, eg by reason of affidavits having been exchanged: the language of s 46 gives the court power to grant leave even in these circumstances. Another curious aspect of s 46 is that it places the burden of rectifying a breach of the Browne v Dunn duty on the innocent party, not the party in breach. It does this no matter how hard it may be to secure the recall of the witness, and no matter how much the willingness of the witness (assuming that witness is not the party calling the witness but under the control of the party calling the witness) to cooperate had already been dissipated by one trip to the witness box. And it ignores the difficulty of assessing credibility in circumstances where evidence is elicited otherwise than in the ordinary course, and where the witness being recalled is alerted to the one point on which a certain line of evidence is expected. Section 192 makes provision relating to the factors to be considered in granting leave: a significant one in the present context is the importance of the evidence: s 192(2) (c). The rule in Browne v Dunn survives the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431 at [94]; Ewin v Vergara (No 3) (2013) 307 ALR 576 at [84]. When leave is sought under s 46, the court must consider s 192. 738 Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 at 556; R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 (Qld CA). 739 White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 220 (Fed C of A); Khamis v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 121 at [50]–[52]. A factor favouring grant of the application is the importance of the evidence to a central issue: Talbot v Police (2001) 80 SASR 279 at [25]. See also M W J v R (2005) 222 ALR 436 at [40]. 740 R v Schneidas (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 at 110–11 (NSW CCA) discussed in Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 22 without dissent. R v Schneidas was a strong case, since the person in breach was an unrepresented accused person; note Mason J’s observations on the lower standards to be applied to cross-examination by laymen in MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 532. See also Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 at 556; Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 225; Khamis v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 121 at [36]–[40]. In R v Allen [1989] VR 736 McGarvie J strongly disagreed with R v Schneidas. R v Allen was followed in Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100 at [25]. In Crosthwaite v Elizabeth City Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 105, Olsson J said exclusion would occur in exceptional cases. See also Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 850. 741 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 225; Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 23; R v Nicholas (2000) 1 VR 356 at [128]–[146]; Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [41] and [43]. 742 R v Hart (1932) 23 Cr App R 202; Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320; R v Ngema 1960 (2) SA 263 (TPD); State v Xoswa 1965 (1) SA 267 (TPD); Transport Minister v Garry [1973] 1 NZLR 120; Baulch v Lyndoch Warrnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1 at [12]–[24]. 743 R v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 (CA). 744 R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 at [50]–[53]. 745 KC v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 241 at [57]. 746 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 225 and 237 citing Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362 at 370–1. 747 R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290. 748 R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 387 (CCA); Myers v Claudianos (1990) 95 ACTR 1 at 11; Pearmine v R [1988] WAR 315 at 320 (CCA) (approving the text); R v Sargent (2001) 80 SASR 184 (CCA); R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [62]; Pinkstone v R (2003) 140 A Crim R 83 at [38]–[55]; R v Baring (2005) 92 SASR 117 at [70]; R v Curran (2008) 100 SASR 71 at [65]–[91]; R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27 at [181]. Similarly, it is open to a party to comment on the fact that the positive propositions underlying questions asked of that party’s witnesses in cross-examination differ from what the cross-examining party’s witnesses say in their evidence: Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190
ALR 370 at [107]. The content of questions asked was held not capable of constituting corroboration in R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 (FC); or admissions in Police v Eiffe (2007) 98 SASR 79 at [18]–[20]. The sentence in the text was quoted with approval in 3.meg.com Pty Ltd v TM & SM Pike Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 350 at [85]. 749 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 (CCA). Error includes simple forgetfulness, a misunderstanding of instructions, or the inability to overcome forensic pressures causing looseness or inexactitude in the framing of questions: R v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17, approved in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 691–2; see also R v Von Rijssen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 at 573–4 (NSWCCA); R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 at 464 (CA); R v GED (2003) 141 A Crim R 135 at [15]– [18]; Oldfield v R (2006) 163 A Crim R 242; R v RWB (2010) 202 A Crim R 209 at [101]. 750 R v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17, approved in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 692; see also R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 at 464 (CA). 751 R v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17, approved in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 692. See also R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290 at 291–2; R v Abdallah (2001) 127 A Crim R 46 at 53; R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547 at [84]–[89]; R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135 at [122]–[125]. 752 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 692. 753 R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135 at [115]–[116] and [154]. 754 R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135 at [119]. 755 R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at [50] (CA). 756 Bugeja v R (2010) 30 VR 493 at [55]–[72]. 757 Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1 (CA). 758 Gordon Martin Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2009) 53 MVR 474 at [69]; Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [65]. See also Archer v Richard Crookes Construction Pty Ltd (1997) 15 NSWCCR 297 at 302; BC9705329 (CA). 759 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498 at [63]–[67]. 760 Parkin v Moon (1835) 7 C & P 408. See generally P M Brauti, “Improper Cross-Examination” (1997) 40 Criminal Law Quarterly 69. 761 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22. 762 For a discussion of the difficulties these questions cause when employed in examination in chief, see [17150] above. 763 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [780]; Lever & Co v Goodwin Bros [1887] WN 107 (CA); Kizlyk v Canadian Pacific Railway (1943) 41 Man R 33 (Man CA). 764 Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [117]. 765 J F Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol 1, 1883, p 431; J H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 2003, pp 299–300. 766 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 18 and 22–3. In South Australia it has been said that there is no absolute right to cross-examine whenever evidence is given in the jury’s absence, but justice requires that an opportunity be afforded to the party to be affected by the evidence tendered on an issue at a voir dire to enable the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence to cross-examine and to elicit evidence on the point: R v Anderson (1984) 14 A Crim R 274 at 279–80 (CCA). 767 There are statutes restricting the right of unrepresented accused persons to cross-examine the alleged victims of crime and others: eg Qld: Evidence Act 1977 ss 21L–21S. For cross-examination of the deponent of an affidavit of discovery in relation to claims for privilege, see [25240] n 536. 768 The law was assumed to be so in Wood v Mackinson (1840) 2 M & Rob 273 at 274; see also Reed v James (1815) 1 Stark 132; Summers v Moseley (1834) 2 Cr & M 477 (Ex); Perry v Gibson (1834) 1 Ad & E 48 (KB); Griffith v Ricketts (1849) 7 Hare 299; cf R v Brooke (1819) 2 Stark 472. See generally J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1976, vol 6, [1894]. 769 Summers v Moseley (1834) 2 Cr & M 477 at 480 (Ex).
770 Rush v Smith (1834) 1 CM & R 94 (Ex). 771 Wood v Mackinson (1840) 2 M & Rob 273 at 275. See also Clifford v Hunter (1827) 3 Car & P
16; Rush v Smith (1834) 3 LJ Ex 355 (Ex); cf Creevy v Carr (1835) 7 Car & P 64. See J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1976, vol 6, [1893]. This rule exists also in s 40 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 772 Wood v Mackinson (1840) 2 M & Rob 273 at 275–6. 773 Phillips v Eamer (1795) 1 Esp 355. 774 Allen v Allen [1894] P 248 at 254 (CA); see also Lord v Colvin (1855) 3 Drew 222; R v Hadwen [1902] 1 KB 882 (CCCR); Lonnkvist v Lonnkvist [1952] WN 88; Rigby v Woodward [1957] 1 All ER 391 (DC of QBD); Blaise v Blaise [1969] P 54 (CA). 775 Dryden v Surrey County Council [1936] 2 All ER 535 at 538; see also R v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 (CCA); Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 at 584; Re Baden’s Deed Trusts; Baden v Smith [1967] 3 All ER 159 at 163; R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421 (CA); McLure v Mitchell (1974) 6 ALR 471 (AICFC); unless his having been called by a formal opponent has merely pre-empted his being called by the party seeking to cross-examine: Governor of Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co [1983] CLY 1660; see also Nyense v R [1962] R & N 271; S v Langa 1963 (3) SA 941 (NPI); cf Gemmel v MacNiven 1928 SC (J) 5. See also Berwick-upon-Tweed Corp v Murray (1850) 14 Jur 659; Prentice v Cummins (2003) 134 FCR 449 at [25]. 776 S v Langa 1963 (3) SA 941 at 945 (NPD) per Harcourt J. 777 See generally I G Carvell, “The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(f)(iii)” [1965] Crim LR 419. 778 Tedeschi v Singh [1948] Ch 319. 779 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15. In NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 8) (1999) 161 ALR 581 at 585 counsel for a party was permitted to cross-examine a witness called by another party in the same interest. 780 Lord v Colvin (1855) 3 Drew 222. 781 Coles v Coles (1866) LR 1 P & D 70; Jones v Jones (1908) 24 TLR 839; Oakes v Uzzell [1932] P 19; In the Estate of Fuld (dec’d); Hartley v Fuld (A-G intervening) [1965] P 405. 782 Re Quartz Hill & Co; Ex parte Young (1882) 21 Ch D 642 (CA); see also Clarke v Law (1855) 2 K & J 28. 783 The position is different at common law in bankruptcy proceedings: Ex parte Child; Re Ottaway (1882) 20 Ch D 126 (CA); Re Cohen [1924] 2 Ch 515 (CA). 784 See NSW: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 35.2. 785 For example, Phillips v Eamer (1795) 1 Esp 355 at 357; R v Brooke (1819) 2 Stark 472; Bracegirdle v Bailey (1859) 1 F & F 536. See also HM Advocate v Milne (1866) 5 Irv 22 9 (witness called by defence to show how unlike the accused he was). 786 Bracegirdle v Bailey (1859) 1 F & F 536; Hobbs v C T Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 at 12 (CA). 787 For example, R v Tregear [1967] 2 QB 574 at 583 (CA). See also [17080] n 77 above. 788 R v Bingham [1999] 1 WLR 598 (HLNI). 789 See Anon (1901) 45 Sol Jo 569; see also Meyer v Hall (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 309 (Alb App Div). 790 O’Callaghan v Murphy (1804) 2 Sch & Lef 158; Jones v Fort (1828) 1 M & M 196 (but perhaps admissions involved); R v Doolin (1832) 1 Jebb CC 123, cited in J F Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, p 164, n 1; R v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503; Randall v Atkinson (1899) 30 OR 242 at 255. 791 R v Solomon (1958) 25 WWR 307 at 316 (Man CA). However, if the cause of the witness being unavailable is absence from the country or temporary illness, the proper course may be to adjourn the trial or issue a commission: eg Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq 524 at 529. On problems of jury direction, see R v Lawless (1993) 98 Cr App R 342 at 350–1. 792 Abadom v Abadom (1857) 24 Beav 243; Morley v Morley (1855) 5 De GM & G 610; Ridley v
Ridley (1865) 34 Beav 329; Braithwaite v Kearns (1865) 34 Beav 202; Davies v Otty (No 2) (1865) 35 Beav 208; Tanswell v Scurrah (1865) 11 LT 761; Elias v Griffith (1877) 47 LJ Ch 806. Absence from the jurisdiction or temporary illness have been held insufficient factors to bring this rule into play: Bingley v Marshall (1862) 1 LT 682; Nason v Clamp (1864) 12 WR 973; Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq 524. In these circumstances the trial should be adjourned or evidence should be taken on commission. 793 Abadom v Abadom (1857) 24 Beav 243 at 244 per Sir John Romilly MR (“… I shall, to say the least of it, certainly pay less attention to it than to the other evidence”); Morley v Morley (1855) 5 De GM & G 610 at 615; Braithwaite v Kearns (1865) 34 Beav 202. 794 R v Stretton (1986) 86 Cr App R 7. 795 R v Wyatt [1990] Crim LR 343 (CA). 796 R v NRC [1999] 3 VR 537 at [35]–[37] applying R v Hart (1999) 135 CCC (3d) 377 at 400–1 (Nova Scotia CA). 797 Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 at 675–6 (cf at 686 (CA)); R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 702–3 (similarly questions as to legal professional ethics). 798 R v O’Neill (1950) 34 Cr App R 108; R v Callaghan (1979) 69 Cr App R 88. 799 R v Mahoney-Smith (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249 at 258–9. See also Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 230 (PC); R v Lyttle (2004) 180 CCC (3d) 476 (SC Can); Ebanks v R [2006] 1 WLR 1827 at [26]–[31] (PC). 800 See Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12.30], and the rules of Australian Bar Associations. 801 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 1023 (PC). 802 R v Hawke (1974) 3 OR (2d) 210 at 229. The contrary view was taken in R v Lyttle (2004) 180 CCC (3d) 476 (SC Can). 803 Clyne v New South Wales Bar Assn (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 200. See Strange v Hybinett [1988] VR 418 at 424 (FC), and the rules of Australian Bar Associations. His duties in opening a case are higher; he must not make damaging statements “unless he definitely knows that he has, and definitely intends to adduce, evidence to support them”: at 201; 583–4. See also Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [20]–[43]. 804 R v Winter (1980) 74 Cr App R 16. 805 R v Stubbs [1982] 1 All ER 424 (CA). 806 The footnoted proposition was denied in R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290 at 297; Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 145 at [14] and R v Grimes [2013] 1 Qd R 351 at [71]. However, in Victoria “counsel is entitled to ask the witness whether he would agree with other evidence if it were given”: Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [57]. But the question whether the witness “contradicts” another should not be asked: North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort and Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 385 (CA). 807 R v Leak [1969] SASR 172 at 173–4 (CCA). McHugh J approved this passage in Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [61]; however, a sentence which is supportive of his dissenting view but inconsistent with the majority view in that case has been omitted. It asserted that a witness can be asked “if he knows of any reason why the other witness should be hostile to him or should tell a false story about him”. See [1140]. See also R v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 (NSW CCA); R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at 339; R v Murray (1999) 108 A Crim R 430; R v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 at [9]–[11]; R v Buckley (2004) 10 VR 215 at [9]–[20]; R v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232 at [134]–[152]; R v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55 at [27]–[28]; Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [57]. Cf Vella v R (1990) 2 WAR 537 at 544 (FC). See [7085]. 808 R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290 at 297. 809 W A N Wells, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence, 3rd ed, 1979, [16.95]. 810 [17240] ff above.
811 Phipson on Evidence, 14th ed, 1990, [12]–[14]. 812 [17305] ff above. 813 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28: “in the exercise of his power to control and regulate the
proceedings the judge may properly require counsel to abandon a worthless method of examination”; R v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271 (FC) (“wide discretionary power … to contain cross-examination within proper limits and to disallow repetitious prolix or unnecessary questions”). See also R v Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685 at 693 (CA); Ashmore v Corp of Lloyd’s [1992] 2 All ER 486 at 493 (HL); R v Higgins (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 at 442–3 (Vic FC); Vernon v Bosley [1995] 2 FCR 78; R v B [2006] Crim LR 54 (CA); Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 194 at [28] (“Lengthy cross-examination, particularly cross-examination going only to credit, is responsible for much of the delay and unwarranted cost typically associated with modern litigation. Cross-examination as to credit should be kept, so far as possible, within proper bounds”). On controlling cross-examination conducted by litigants in person, see R v Brown [1998] 2 Cr App R 364 at 369–72. For the position under the uniform legislation, see [17505]. For interlocutory proceedings see [17520]. There is power to subpoena documents for the sole purpose of attacking a witness’s credit: Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 194 at [24]. But the subpoena may be set aside if it is of a fishing character or seeks documents wholly unconnected with the issues: Comcare v Maganga (2008) 101 ALD 68 at [31]–[32]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Whitlam (2002) 42 ACSR 143 at [4]–[6]. 814 Wakeley v R (1990) 93 ALR 79 at 86; R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 at 204 (NSW CCA); R v Sparrow (2009) 104 SASR 320 at [29]–[34]. See also United States v Herrera-Medina 853 F 2d 564 at 566 (7th Cir 1988). 815 Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346 at 359. 816 R v Kalia (1974) 60 Cr App R 200; R v McFadden (1975) 62 Cr App R 187 at 193–4 (Bar Council); R v Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309. 817 R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 34–5. For a similar view in relation to committal proceedings, see R v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271 (FC); In the Marriage of Collins (1991) 14 Fam LR 162 at 174–5 (Fam C of A FC). 818 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 23. 819 R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 35; Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Giles J, 30 November 1988, unreported, BC8801276). 820 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 23. 821 Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance (Aust) Ltd (1985) 3 ANZ Ins Cases 60–663. 822 Vernon v Bosley [1994] PNLR 337 at 340 (CA). 823 Vernon v Bosley [1994] PNLR 337 at 341 (CA). 824 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [231] and [236] (CCA). 825 R v Wills [2012] 1 Cr App R 2 at [36]–[39] (raising the question whether comment on inconsistencies in the cross-examination should be drawn to the jury’s attention at the time when the evidence is given). 826 R v Farooqi [2014] 1 Cr App R 8 at [113]. 827 Haigh v Belcher (1836) 7 C & P 389; Tennant v Hamilton (1839) 7 Cl & Fin 122 (HL); Lever & Co v Goodwin Bros [1887] WN 107 (CA). The questions need not be confined to the matters dealt with in the evidence already given by the witness in chief: Morgan v Brydges (1818) 2 Stark 314; Berwick-upon-Tweed Corporation v Murray (1850) 19 LJ Ch 281; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 686; cf Dean and Chapter of Ely v Stewart (1740) 2 Atk 44; Re Woodfine (1878) 47 LJ Ch 832. There may be circumstances in which the interests of justice require some limit to be imposed on the extent to which a party can cross-examine a witness on issues not addressed by that witness in chief: Prentice v Cummins (2003) 134 FCR 449 at [27]. 828 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [183]–[194].
829 R v Grocott [2012] Crim L Rev 210. 830 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 41; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 41; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s
41. See ALRC 102 [5.70]–[5.132]. See also Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 25. And see R Boyd and A Hopkins, “Cross-examination of child assault complaints: concerns about the application of s 41 of the Evidence Act” (2010) 34 Crim LJ 149. 831 See R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444. 832 In National Auto Glass Supplies (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2007] FCA 569 this was held to justify excusing a witness from being asked any further questions after he appeared to have fallen ill. 833 See also Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YE (children); Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 101; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 41 (which does not follow the Commonwealth and New South Wales for reasons discussed in ALRC 102 [5.119]–[5.132]); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 26; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) s 41; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 41. For the ethical position in England, see Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-30]. The ethical position in Australia is similar. For the New South Wales position see Bar Rules rr 35–35B and 38, although the Attorney-General has been pressing for stricter standards in certain sexual cases. 834 See also Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 22–24; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 25; Evidence Act (NT) ss 13–15. A question about the witness’s heroin addiction went beyond affecting credit by injuring character, since heroin addiction influenced her capacity to perceive and recall events: R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69 at [30] (on the repealed s 37 of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic)). 835 See, for example, R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316; Bickel v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 at 495. In R v Trickett (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 110 at 111, the New South Wales Supreme Court in banco said that it is “right to disallow questions put for the purpose of disparaging or torturing a witness when they could not possibly affect his credibility”. The history of the corresponding common law rules is narrated in R v Noud; Ex parte MacNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86 at 94–6 (FC). See also Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 at 260 (duty of trial judge to prevent Crown cross-examining “in a manner unfair or oppressive to the defendant”); R v Thompson [2006] 2 NZLR 577 at [68] (CA) (“Aggressive cross-examination will become improper when it is calculated to humiliate, belittle and break the witness”). 836 See R v Smallman (1914) 10 Cr App R 1 at 3; Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 (FC). 837 See Cross, Evidence, 4th English ed, 1974, p 227; L H Hoffmann, The South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, p 323. An example of division at the highest level on impropriety is Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404; Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 469. 838 J F Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 1883, vol 1, p 436, applied in R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314 at [37]. On that basis questions containing totally baseless or implausible suggestions may be rejected: R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69 at [34]. 839 Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346 at 360. See also Re Mundell; Fenton v Cumberlage (1883) 48 LT 776. 840 Re Mundell; Fenton v Cumberlage (1883) 48 LT 776. 841 Rubin v State 211 NW 926 (1927) at 929; R v R (AJ) (1994) 94 CCC (3d) 168 at 177; R v Robinson (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 398 at [40]; Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10]; R v Bouhsass (2002) 169 CCC (3d) 444 at [11]; R v Thompson [2006] 2 NZLR 577 at [68]. 842 S v Booi 1964(1) SA 224 at 227–8. See also S v Makaula 1964(2) SA 575 at 577–8. Much of the remainder of the paragraph derives closely from Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559 at [122]–[133]. 843 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [781]. 844 Johnston v Todd (1843) 5 Beav 597 at 601–2. 845 Elliott v Boyles 31 Pa 65 at 66 (1857). 846 R v Bouhsass (2002) 169 CCC (3d) 444 at [12]. See also R v Hardy (1794) 24 Howell State Trials 199 at 753–4 and R v Ings (1820) 33 Howell State Trials 957 at 999; Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [80].
847 R v Robinson (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 398 at [45]. 848 Randall v R [2002] 2 Cr App R 17 at [10]. 849 R v R (AJ) (1994) 94 CCC (3d) 168 at 178. 850 R v S (F) (2000) 144 CCC (3d) 466 at [13]. 851 R v S (F) (2000) 144 CCC (3d) 466 at [18]. 852 C A Wright and V Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, 1993, [6164] at 354, approved
in State of Hawai’i v Sanchez 923 P 2d 934 (1996) at [25]. 853 Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 [10]; Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [81]. 854 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [780]. According to Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 4th ed, 1853, at 197, n (s), as early as 1818 Abbott J ruled in Hill v Coombes and Handley v Ward against questions which assumed facts to have been proved which had not been proved, or particular answers to have been given which had not been given. See also Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [59]. See also [17165]. 855 State v Labuzan 37 La Ann 489 (1885) at 491. See also Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [82]. 856 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [780]. The rule is not to forbid questions being put to experts on assumed facts, controversial though the assumption may be: there is here no question of trapping or misleading the witness, because the witness is not invited to accept the truth of the assumption. Nor does the rule forbid counsel putting suggestions to witnesses that propositions are true which counsel is not in a position to support by calling evidence, so long as counsel believes in good faith and on a reasonable basis that the proposition is correct: Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 3 All ER 225 at 230; R v Lyttle (2004) 180 CCC (3d) 476 at [47]–[66]; Ebanks v R [2006] 1 WLR 1827 at [26]–[31]. 857 A G Walker and N M L Walker, The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 1964, p 361. 858 Croll v McRae (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 137 at 139; Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [49]–[51]. 859 R v R (AJ) (1994) 94 CCC (3d) 168 at 178. See also Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [84]. 860 R v Baldwin (1925) 19 Cr App R 175 at 178–9. See also R v Ruptash (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 182 at 188–9. 861 Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [94]. 862 R v R (AJ) (1994) 94 CCC (3d) 168 at 180. See also R v F (A) (1996) 1 CR (5th) 382. 863 See, for example, Elliott v Boyles 31 Pa 65 (1857) at 66; Rubin v State 211 NW 926 (1927) at 929–30. 864 Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at [10]. See also Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 478 at [86]–[91]. 865 Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 (FC); Hooper v Gorman [1976] 2 NSWLR 431 at 435 and 440–1 (CA). As a matter of law, a question concerning adultery has been held relevant to credibility: Clifford v Clifford [1961] 3 All ER 231 (divorce on ground of cruelty to which respondent’s adultery was irrelevant); cf Lewis v Lewis [1958] P 193 (CA). See generally [19015]–[19055]. 866 Bickel v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 at 494–5; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 408. These two sentences were approved in R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314 at [34]. 867 See R v Cooke (1986) 84 Cr App R 286 and R v Edwards [1991] 2 All ER 266 at 276 (CA) (described as “not … satisfactory” in O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534 at [41] by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers) on the question of when it is permissible to crossexamine a police officer as to credit where it is alleged the officer has fabricated admissions both in
the instant case and in other proceedings. See also R v Guney (1998) 2 Cr App R 242 (CA). Crossexamination on prior findings of discreditable conduct may be rejected on discretionary grounds where the subject matter of the adverse finding overlaps directly with the facts in issue in the later proceedings: Roberts v Western Australia (2005) 29 WAR 445 at [151]–[152]. 868 R v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482 (CA) (in some jurisdictions legislation of the kind discussed in [19080]–[19090] would prevent this questioning, though it fell outside the prohibitions of the English legislation). 869 R v Flynn [1967] Crim LR 489 (CA). 870 R v Bernard (1858) 1 F & F 240 (did a plainclothes policeman attend a meeting “as a spy”?). 871 Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1 (Ex); a fortiori before Roman Catholic emancipation: R v Gordon (1781) 2 Doug KB 590 at 593. 872 Seaman v Netherclift (1876) 2 CPD 53 at 59 (CA). 873 Graydon v Graydon (1921) 51 OLR 301 (Ont SC). 874 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3, [783]; Chippendale v Masson (1815) 4 Camp 174 (CP). Cf Doe v Roe (1809) 2 Camp 280 (KB). 875 Searle v Keayes (1994) 126 ALR 728. In Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140 at [47] the test was said to turn on “the interests of justice and the need to ensure a fair trial”. At [48]–[50] it was suggested but not decided that the test might be different under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). 876 Phillips v Phillips [1966] 1 NSWR 49. 877 See Eva Pty Ltd v Charles Davis Ltd [1982] VR 515, where Beach J permitted the crossexamination to be divided subject to conditions. In GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 23–4 Young J permitted each of two counsel appearing for separate parties in substantially the same interest to cross-examine provided there was no material overlapping; his view appeared to be that such a proposed course should be outlined before crossexamination began. See also Omnia Pelts Inc v Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd (1986) 57 OR (2d) 568. 878 Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140 at [42]–[47]. 879 J F Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, p 222. 880 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 3) (1989) 21 FCR 316; Searle v Keayes (1994) 126 ALR 728. 881 Horne v Milne (1881) 7 VLR (L) 296 (FC); Peatling v Watson [1909] VLR 198 (FC); Mutch v Sleeman (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 125 (FC); Lang v Beardsmore [1968] 2 NSWR 673 at 686–7 (CA); TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Antoniadis (1998) 44 NSWLR 682 at 702 (CA). 882 Mutch v Sleeman (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 125 (FC); Maling v S Bennett Ltd (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 280 (FC); Hobbs v CT Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 (CA); Judd v Sun Newspapers (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 294 (FC); Lang v Beardsmore [1968] 2 NSWR 673 at 686–7 (CA). 883 Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 (QBD): [19165]. 884 See [13075]–[13080]. 885 R v McDonell (1909) 2 Cr App R 322; R v Field (1919) 15 Cr App R 129. 886 R v Rowland [1910] 1 KB 458 (CCA). 887 R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421 at 423 (CA); R v Schuller [1972] QWN 41 (CCA). 888 Young v HM Advocate 1932 SC (J) 63 at 74; cf R v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 (CCA). 889 Indeed, if the co-accused persons are spouses, each of whom testify, they can be crossexamined, even though they are not normally compellable: R v Armstrong [1957] Crim LR 198 (CCA). 890 Lobban v R [1995] 2 All ER 602 at 614 (HL). 891 Stokes v R (1960) 105 CLR 279 at 283–4. 892 R v Howarth (1918) 13 Cr App R 99. 893 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 21–3; Re C & C (1995) 20 Fam LR 24 at 32 (Fam C of A FC); J AWestaway & Son Pty Ltd v Registrar-
General (1996) 7 BPR 14,773 at 14,797 (NSWSC). 894 R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 387 (CCA); Petty v R (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 123; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [62]; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [107]. 895 R v Sargent (2001) 80 SASR 184 at [23]–[25] (CCA); R v Ali (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257 at [21]. 896 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 18; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 28; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 21. Section 43 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) is similar. See ALRC 26 [136], Bill clause 39, Appendix C paras 45–49 and 87; ALRC 38 [115](d) and [116](c), Bill clause 46. Under this legislation, the hearsay character of the statement will not necessarily prevent it from constituting, once admitted, evidence of the truth of the facts asserted: s 60. According to Lee v R (1998) 195 CLR 594, the application of s 60 will depend on what the maker of the previous inconsistent statement intended to assert by it, but in 2008 s 60 was amended to deal with that case: see [35435]. See also R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 at 278–9; Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [21]–[22]. A useful history is given in R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [66]–[76]. See generally M Ladd, “Some Observations on Credibility Impeachment of Witnesses” (1967) 52 Cornell LQ 239; A W Bryant, “The Adversary’s Witness: Cross-Examination and Proof of Prior Inconsistent Statements” (1984) 62 Can Bar Rev 43. 897 Kent County Council v K [1994] 3 All ER 230. 898 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 313; Angus v Smith (1829) M & M 473 at 474; Crowley v Page (1837) 7 C & P 789; Carpenter v Wall (1840) 11 Ad & El 803. The only doubtful point seems to have concerned the position when the witness did not clearly deny or admit the statement. R v Hart (1957) 42 Cr App R 47 at 50 confirms that the section is in no way confined to previous statements on oath. The section applies in criminal proceedings as well as civil: R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 (CCA). It applies to witnesses called in reply as well as to those called earlier: Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692. And it applies to oral statements as well as written: Carpenter v Wall (1840) 11 Ad & El 803; McGahan v Driver [1936] QWN 45; R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 (CCA); Hudd v R (1987) 75 ALR 143 (Fed C of A FC); R v Harrington [1998] 3 VR 531 at 539 (CA). 899 Johnstone, O’Shannessy & Co Ltd v Smith (1893) 19 VLR 18 (FC). 900 CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304 at [43]. 901 Carbury v Measures (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 569 (FC); see also Furlong v Staniforth (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 364 (FC); R v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 (Vic FC); J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [1040]–[1041]. 902 Cotton v Cmr for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66 (FC). See also R v Trotter [1977] Tas SR 133 (NC7). 903 CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304 at [47]. 904 R v Thompson [1995] 3 NZLR 423 at 426. 905 R v Umanski [1961] VR 242 (FC); R v Harrington [1998] 3 VR 531 (CA); cf Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 at [38] (FC). 906 CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304 at [53]. 907 Hammer v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 280 (FC); R v Askew [1981] Crim LR 398 (CA). Where evidence of prior inconsistent statements are admitted on credit only, the jury should be directed to that effect: R v Klein (2007) 172 A Crim R 290. 908 See the cases cited in [17390] n 624 above. When speaking of a witness under crossexamination, Lord Esher MR said “When a witness is asked as to what he said on a previous occasion, he is bound to answer the question; he cannot insist on seeing what he previously said before he answers it; he must answer. If his answer does not contradict what he said before, it is no use pursuing the topic further; he adopts his previous answer and it becomes part of his evidence; if he does contradict it, he can be contradicted in turn by shewing him what he said before. That goes
to his credit only; it proves nothing, it is only a contradiction”: North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort and Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 386 (CA). The actual decision in relation to which these remarks were made was to the effect that the party calling the witness could not see a copy of the particular statement from which he was cross-examined, but it was a deposition under the Companies Act (Eng), and the ruling, which depended on the terms of the statute, has no general application: see Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 (CA). 909 R v O’Neill [1969] Crim LR 261 (CA) (one co-accused denied another’s guilt; the prosecution was permitted to tender a prior statement by the witness to the contrary). 910 R v Hart (1957) 42 Cr App R 47; R v Trotter [1977] Tas SR 133. See also R v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482 (CA); Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 (a case the meaning of which excited disagreement in MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9). Hence the provision does not apply to matters merely going to credit. 911 Cotton v Cmr for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66 at 75 (FC). 912 R v Booth (1981) 74 Cr App R 123. 913 R v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482 (CCA). 914 R v Whelan (1881) 14 Cox CC 595. 915 Hemming v Maddick (1872) LR 7 Ch App 395 (CA in Ch). 916 North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort and Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 386 (CA); Alchin v Cmr for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (FC); Cotton v Cmr for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66 (FC); R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 (FC); R v Soma (2003) 196 ALR 421 at [56]. 917 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [56], criticising R v Soma (2001) 122 A Crim R 537 at [32]. 918 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [57]. 919 R v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482 (CA). 920 J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26. 921 Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 122–6. See [17375], text at n 591 and [17655] n 1085. 922 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299. As the joint judgment said, and as McHugh J emphasised, while some prior inconsistent statements are admissible in the case of the party relying on them (eg those containing admissions by the opposing party), others are not: the rule against case-splitting cannot apply to the latter. 923 I v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 420. 924 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 19; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 29; WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 22. See also Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 45; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 45; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 45; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 45, ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 45 and NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 45. See ALRC 26 [636], Bill clause 41, Appendix C 49; ALRC 38 [115](g) and [116](d), Bill clause 48. Under that legislation the hearsay character of the statement will not necessarily prevent admission of the document as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted: s 60. See [17530] n 896. See also Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [21]–[22]. 925 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284. 926 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1972, vol 4, [1259]. 927 See the judge’s directions in (1820) 7 Car & P 676. 928 R v Ford (1851) 5 Cox CC 184 (CCA). 929 F J Wrottesley, The Examination of Witnesses, 2nd ed, 1931, p 61 ff. Cross-examining counsel must have the document with him even if counsel does not intend to contradict the witness with it: R v Yousry (1914) 11 Cr App R 13; R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178. See generally Alchin v Cmr for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (FC). As in s 19, “relative” means “relevant”: R v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 at [110]. 930 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1983) 56 ALR 647 at 681 (Fed C of A). 931 For example, Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 (FC).
932 Sladden v Sergeant (1858) 1 F & F 322. See s 45(5) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW),
2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT). The rule appears to be otherwise where the crossexaminer appears to be in effect contradicting the witness with a document, though this whole area is one where the judge has a discretion. See Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 (FC). 933 R v Riley (1866) 4 F & F 964; R v Wright (1866) 4 F & F 967; Alchin v Cmr for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 507 (FC). This is so even if it means recalling a witness before the Court of Appeal where the statement was made after the trial: R v Conway (1979) 70 Cr App R 4. The trial judge was said to have an exclusionary discretion in R v Thompson [1995] 3 NZLR 423 at 428. 934 Walker v R (1993) 61 SASR 260 (CCA) (transcript of witness’s evidence in another proceeding not verified or adopted by complainant; no person present during the evidence was called). 935 Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 at 229; cf R v Conway (1979) 70 Cr App R 4 at 6 (“and in what circumstances”). 936 R v Newall (1984) 5 DLR (4th) 352. 937 Birch v R (1924) 18 Cr App R 26. 938 R v Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302. 939 R v Urbano (1983) 9 A Crim R 170 (WA CCA); R v Sorgenfrie (1981) 51 FLR 147 (Fed C of A FC). 940 R v Titijewski [1970] VR 371 (FC); Krycki v Nominal Defendant (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 552 (FC). 941 Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 (CA). 942 R v Cox [1972] Qd R 366 (CCA). 943 Hrysikos v Mansfield (2002) 5 VR 485 at [80]; M H McHugh, “Cross-examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51 at 53. Section 45(3)(c) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) make it plain that the court can admit the document even though it has not been tendered by a party. 944 H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence 1970, p 130. 945 Walker v R (1993) 61 SASR 260 at 267–8, citing R v Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302. 946 R v Gray [1965] Qd R 373. 947 Walker v R (1993) 61 SASR 260 at 263 and 266 (CCA). 948 R v Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240 at 244–5; R v Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302. 949 R v KNP (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 at [29]. 950 R v KNP (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 at [28]. 951 R v Banks [1916–17] All ER Rep 356 (CCA). See too, Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212. 952 R v Orton [1922] VLR 469; R v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 (CCA); Rees v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (2008) 21VR 478 at [54]–[56]. The principle was reaffirmed in Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 442–3, citing in addition Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1; Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 at 326 (DC of QBD); R v Yousry (1914) 11 Cr App R 13. See also R v Langer [1972] VR 973 at 982 (FC); R v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 at 22 (Vic FC). The fairness of even that course to the witness, and its correctness in law, is questioned by R V Gyles and M H McHugh in “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51 at 69–71 and 72–3 respectively, in R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 302–3 (CCA), in Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 at 268 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 201 FLR 207. The rule was doubted in R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 302–3 and not followed in Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 145 in relation to a document which was the statement of another witness because it subverted the rule that witnesses should not be asked to comment on the truthfulness of other witnesses: [17485] nn 9–12. The position is preserved by s 44 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 Tas, 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT): see ALRC 26 [636], Bill clause 40; ALRC 38 [115](e), Bill clause 47; R v T, WA (2013) 118 SASR 382 at [73]. 953 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 682 (Fed C of
A). 954 R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172. 955 See R v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 at 63. 956 R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) (L) 196 (FC), doubted in Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 at 660 (CA) and cf R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 (ACT SC) (counsel has the right to call for and inspect the witness’s deposition without having to tender it). 957 Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 (FC); and see Walton v Deaton (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 393 (FC), followed in Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 (FC) and discussed in Alchin v Cmr for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (FC). 958 Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1165. 959 R v Bragg (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 436. (This was a cross-examination as to credit.) Cf R v Mills [1962] 3 All ER 298 (CCA), where a police witness was permitted to refresh his memory of an interview from a tape recording; also R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688, where the Court of Criminal Appeal admitted translations of a tape recording of a police interview. The court also held that there was no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph: R v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 at 63. 960 R v Cooper (1985) 82 Cr App R 74. 961 Alchin v Cmr for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 508 (FC); Farrow v Blomfield (1859) 1 F & F 653; cf Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1 (Ex). That the practice is a common one in New South Wales is asserted by M H McHugh, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51 at 56. 962 A negative response is supported by R v Banks [1916–17] All ER Rep 356, but that may be in truth an authority against the view that the question cannot even be asked; the same is true of Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1 (Ex). It is also supported by Henman v Lester (1862) 12 CB NS 776 at 787–8 (CP), by Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-33] and by A F Rath QC in H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, p 90. The affirmative view is supported by the language though not necessarily the decision in Farrow v Blomfield (1859) 1 F & F 653, by what appears to be implicit in Alchin’s case at 508–9, by H H Glass QC, Seminars on Evidence, 1970, pp 110–11, and by the reflection that if the witness can be asked but can refuse to answer, a hitherto unrecognised privilege exists. 963 Thiess v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd (No 4) [1992] 2 Qd R 549 at 550. The proposition is asserted by M H McHugh, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51 at 60 and 73 on the authority of Walsh J in Oakes v Gaudron (SC(NSW), 23 May 1963, unreported): see the passages from that case set out in Glass, op cit, pp 134–5. McHugh said: “The rule of thumb test I have always used is: if the transcript is understandable without the tender of the document, then you are not required to tender it, but if the transcript is incomprehensible without the plan or the document or whatever it was, then you are obliged to tender it if your opponent requires you to do so”. This affords a further example of how the conduct of the case by one party can render admissible evidence which would otherwise have been inadmissible. 964 Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 (CA). 965 See R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 (CCA); R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 (CCA); [17325]. 966 Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 at 468–9. 967 R v Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442 at [16]. 968 R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 (CCA). 969 R v Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 72 at 74. 970 R v Parkinson [1990] 1 Qd R 382 (CCA). 971 Gouldham v R [1970] WAR 119 (CCA). 972 See [17530] n 896. 973 See H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, p 136; M H McHugh, “Cross-examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51; D K Malcolm, “Cross-examination on Documents”
(1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 267; P MacNamara, “Cross-examination of a Party on Pleadings” (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 176; J H Phillips, “Cross Examination and Documents” (1990) 64 ALJ 591. 974 See [17240] ff above. 975 Stroud v Stroud [1963] 3 All ER 539. The headnote to Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 suggests that that case conflicts with Stroud v Stroud, but this is doubtful because the diaries with which Senat’s case was concerned were used to refresh memory. 976 Wharam v Routledge (1805) 5 Esp 235; Wilson v Bowie (1823) 1 Car & P 8; Calvert v Flower (1836) 7 C & P 386; Palmer v Maclear and M’Grath (1858) 1 Sw & Tr 149. See also MorrisonKnudsen Co Inc v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1973) 31 DLR (3d) 633; R v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 at 23 (Vic FC). 977 Collier v Nokes (1849) 2 Car & Kir 1012. 978 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630. See also Stunzi Sons Ltd v House of Youth Pty Ltd (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 220 (FC). Both decisions were distinguished in McLennan v Taylor [1966] 2 NSWR 685 (CA). This last case was concerned with the effect of inadmissible evidence tendered without objection rather than with the principle that a cross-examiner may make a document evidence against his party. See too O’Brien v Clegg; Ex parte Clegg [1951] St R Qd 1 (FC); R v Harrison [1966] VR 72 at 75 (FC); McGregor-Lowndes v Collector of Customs (Qld) (1968) 11 FLR 349 (Qld SC); Tausz v Elton [1974] 2 NSWLR 163; R v Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 (Vic FC); and W N Harrison, “Hearsay Admitted without Objection” (1955) 7 Res Judicatae 58. In South Australia Palmer v Maclear and M’Grath has been held to authorise the admission of an extra-judicial statement by the wife as evidence of the facts stated against the co-respondent because his counsel cross-examined the wife on the statement: Whiting v Whiting [1947] SASR 363. For a consideration of the limits of the decision inWalker v Walker see O’Brien v Clegg; Ex parte Clegg [1951] St R Qd 1 (FC) and for politely critical comment on the uses to which it is put see Target Petroleum NL v Petroz NL (1987) 16 FCR 1 at 10–11 (Fed C of A FC). See too Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 (ACT SC) (cross-examination on part of a document does not let in the whole, but only material connected with that referred to so as to explain or qualify the matter already before the court). To the same effect is Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 (FC); Alchin v Cmr for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (FC); cf R v Riley (1866) 4 F & F 964; R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) (L) 196 (FC), and Whiting v Whiting [1947] SASR 363. 979 R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 (ACT SC). 980 [39045] n 41; R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 at 126 (CCA). In Moore v R (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 at 583 (NSW CCA) this was described as the preferable course. 981 ALR 26 [290]–[291] and [617], Bill clause 32; ALRC 38 [119](g), Bill clause 38. 982 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3]. 983 Kurgiel v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 at 130. 984 The rule does not prevent further cross-examination of the witness in an endeavour to challenge or shake the answer: State of Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248 at 288–9 (FC). 985 Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 at 546; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3]. 986 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [32]. 987 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [31]. 988 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [2]; the quotation is from Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712–13 (CA). 989 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3]. 990 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3], [42] and [81]. 991 R v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37. 992 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3] and [103]. 993 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 99 (Ex). Pollock CB was really saying no more
than that a witness may be contradicted on matters relevant to the issue: see S v Sinkankanka 1963 (2) SA 531 at 539 (App Div). See also Palmer v Trower (1852) 8 Exch 247 (Ex); R v Cox [1972] Qd R 366 (FC). J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [1020] put the test thus (emphasis in original): “Could the fact, as to which the prior self-contradiction is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the self-contradiction?”. 994 Similarly, the denials by witnesses of the proposition that they saw or heard anyone in the courtroom attempting to coach them are final: Australian Automotive Repairers’ Association (Political Action Committee) Inc v NRMA Insurance Ltd (No 4) (2004) 207 ALR 389 at [12] (although denials of the proposition that they in fact adjusted their answers in response to coaching “might” not be). 995 R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 (CCA). 996 For example, R v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482 (CA), it was held that prior statements of a complainant (who alleged that in the course of the accused’s conduct towards her she lost her virginity) which proved she had lost it earlier were admissible; the question of virginity was not merely collateral in view of the form taken by the evidence in chief. Cf R v Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271, which was distinguished in R v Funderburk. The distinction between questions going to the issue and questions going to credit is difficult where the disputed issue relates to sexual activity in private: R v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482 at 491 (CA); Smith v R (1993) 9 WAR 99 at 104 (CCA); R v Bannister (1993) 10 WAR 484 at 487–8 and 493–4 (CCA). 997 J M Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law, 1947, p 67. The subquotation is from the judgment of Pollock CB. 998 Some illustrations arise in the context of evidence given by complainants in sexual cases: see [19070]–[19075]. For examples of collateral issues, see Elton v Larkins (1832) 5 C & P 385 at 390; Re Haggenmacher’s Patents [1898] 2 Ch 280; Ready v Brown (1968) 118 CLR 165 (below sub nom Brown v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592 (FC)); R v Slobodian (1982) 30 SASR 161 (CCA). The rule seems sometimes to be misapplied: Palmer v Trower (1852) 8 Exch 247 (Ex) (exclusion of statement attributed to the collateral matter rule rather than the hearsay rule). 999 Spenceley v De Willott (1806) 7 East 108 (KB). 1000 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 103–4 (Ex). See also Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595 at 607; Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 at 296 and 298 (FC); Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [52]. 1001 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 105 (Ex). 1002 Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637 at 638. 1003 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 103 (Ex). 1004 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595 at 607; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [38]. 1005 Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; Orec v Negdet (1996) 23 MVR 425 (NSWCA). Cf East Tennessee, V & GR Co v Daniel 18 SE 22 (1893). In Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3] Gleeson CJ called the case “a strong (and perhaps controversial) illustration of the rule”, McHugh J said it illustrated the “difficulty” of applying the rule, Kirby J at [67] said that Callinan J’s analysis showed the rule was “full of inconsistencies, uncertainties and other defects”, Hayne J at [82] said that the case shows that the relevant distinction “may not always be clear cut”, and Callinan J analysed the case so as to demonstrate that “even among the majority there was not a universal approach” at [97]). 1006 It has been held to go to the issue in Nova Scotia (Tzagarakis v Stevens (1968) 69 DLR (2d) 466 (NS App Div)), a decision which seems to follow from Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595. 1007 R v Burke (1858) 8 Cox CC 44. 1008 R v Busby (1982) 75 Cr App R 79. See also Collaton v Correll [1926] SASR 87 at 94. 1009 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [41]. 1010 Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637. That case, however, is itself questionable: [19035] n 69.
1011 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595. 1012 Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 at 298 and 300; approved in Urban Transport Authority of
NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471 at 478. 1013 Quoting Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 at 551. 1014 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [53]; R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400 at [14]; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [37]–[41]. See also A A S Zuckerman, “Evidence” [1982] All ER Ann Rev 1982 at 128–9; P Roberts and A A S Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2004, pp 258– 69. 1015 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3] and [103]. See also R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288 at [91]. 1016 Nicholls v R (2005) 219 CLR 196. See R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288; Papazoglou v R (2010) 28 VR 644 at [46]. This has not stopped lower courts adopting McHugh J’s approach: R v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685. 1017 See [19005] and Peacock v R (2008) 190 A Crim R 454. 1018 Drakos v Smith [1958] VR 536; the solicitor’s evidence was also admissible on the ground that it rebutted the cross-examiner’s allegation of recent invention. Had the defendant been in a position to rebut the plaintiff’s denials of his failure to disclose the later accident, no doubt he would have been allowed to call a witness to do so. 1019 Crowley v Page (1837) 7 C & P 789; see [17530]–[17565]. 1020 See [19015] and [19035]–[19055]. In Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [36] McHugh J said that another exception to the finality rule arises where a party is able to tender the prior consistent statement of its own witness to rebut recent invention: [17305]–[17315]. However, that relates, not to the finality of answers in cross-examination in the sense that they cannot be contradicted, but to the capacity of the party eliciting from the witness who has been crossexamined, or otherwise, proof of a prior statement consistent with the witness’s answers in crossexamination. 1021 R v Funderburk [1990] 2 All ER 482 (CA). 1022 R v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 at 438–9 (CCA). 1023 R v Ryan (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384. 1024 R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 at [77]–[91]; R v Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220. 1025 See [19050]. 1026 ALRC 39 [179](b), presumably referring to ALRC 26 [822] n 128 and Bill clause 85(b). 1027 Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 564. 1028 Gauci v Cmr of Taxation (Cth) (1975) 135 CLR 81 at 87. See also Scott Fell v Lloyd (1911) 13 CLR 230 at 241; Naylor v Stephen (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 231 at 246; McCalman v Higgins (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 603 at 607 (FC); Eather v Jones [1974] 2 NSWLR 19 at 29 (CA); Steinberg v FCT (1975) 134 CLR 640 at 684 and 694, and the cases cited at the latter place; Calvin v Carr [1977] 2 NSWLR 308 at 328; Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Waugh (1988) 14 NSWLR 360 at 366 (CA). 1029 Hobbs v CT Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 at 21 (CA). See also Edmunds v Edmunds [1935] VLR 177 at 186 (FC). For an example of an unsuccessful attempt to convert a question as to credibility into one as to the issue, see Ready v Brown (1968) 118 CLR 165. There, in a false imprisonment claim, the appeal court held that the defendant was not entitled to lead evidence rebutting the plaintiff’s explanations in cross-examination as to why he had not made an early complaint; the defendants were not entitled to create an additional issue not raised by the plaintiff and then defeat the plaintiff on that issue. See also Freeman v G J Coles & Co Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 297 (CA). See also the discussion as to distinction between cross-examination as to the issue and as to credit in Wren v Emmett Contractors Pty Ltd (1969) 43 ALJR 213. It has been held in Nova Scotia that the question whether a witness saw an accident went to the issue: Tzagarakis v Stevens (1968) 69 DLR (2d) 466 (NS App Div). 1030 Calvin v Carr [1977] 2 NSWLR 308 at 328; Tweed Shire Council v Hancomatic Music Pty Ltd
(2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-922 at [166]. 1031 R v Wurch (1932) 40 Man R 328 at 206-7. See also MacDonald v R (1946) 87 CCC 257 at 267 and 269 (“adverse inference from disbelief in the improbable testimony of the accused” which “could have been accepted only by very credulous persons”). 1032 R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 at 435 and 451 (CCA); see also R v Chambers (1848) 3 Cox CC 92; R v Pullman [1942] SASR 262 (CCA); R v Nation [1954] SASR 189 (CCA); R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 (CCA); Connell v R (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 at 210 (CCA); Mackrell v Western Australia (2008) 190 A Crim R 43 at [107]–[111]; R v Clune (1999) 72 SASR 420 at [118]–[121]. 1033 However, they may be allowed after a cross-examination employing leading questions to a friendly witness: Rawcliffe v R (2000) 22 WAR 490. 1034 R v Harman [1985] Crim LR 326 (CA). 1035 Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & El 627 (QB). 1036 R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 at 734 (FC). 1037 R v Newall (1984) 5 DLR (4th) 352. See also Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 at 112; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 409. 1038 R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 513 and 569 (CCA); see also The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 297; R v St George (1840) 9 Car & P 483 at 488; R v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 535 (CCA) (reasons and motives for false statement; if as a result prejudicial or inadmissible matter is introduced, an appropriate jury direction may be given); R v Meynell [2004] 1 NZLR 507 (CA). 1039 R v Kelly (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 518 (FC). 1040 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 (FC). See also R v Lawless [1974] VR 398; R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 (FC); R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 at 137; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 409. 1041 R v Nation [1954] SASR 189 (CCA). 1042 R v St George (1840) 9 C & P 483. See also Dicas v Lord Brougham (1833) 6 C & P 249; R v Chambers (1848) 3 Cox CC 92; R v Nation [1954] SASR 189 (CCA); Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 (FC). 1043 R v Pullman [1942] SASR 262 at 266 (CCA). 1044 R v Doosti (1985) 82 Cr App R 181. 1045 R v Woods (1840) 1 Craw & D 439; The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 297–8. 1046 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 297–8; R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240 at [103]. 1047 Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 (FC). 1048 Blewitt v Tregonning (1835) 3 Ad & E 554 at 582–5; Turner v McMann (1882) 22 NBR 391 (CA). In Ireland v Chapman (1877) 3 VLR (L) 242 at 251 Fellows J said that no explanation of the evidence could be given in re-examination if it was “wholly immaterial, in any shape or form” but that otherwise re-examination was permissible. 1049 Blewitt v Tregonning (1835) 3 Ad & E 554 at 582–5; R v Noel (1903) 6 OLR 385 at 386–7. 1050 Stokes v R (1960) 105 CLR 279. 1051 R v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563 at [48]. 1052 Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217 at [219]. 1053 See Middleton v Rowlett [1954] 2 All ER 277 (DC of QBD); R v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 at 867– 8 (CCA); Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 (FC). 1054 R v Langer [1972] VR 973 (FC). 1055 Adams v Bankart (1835) 1 Cr M & R 681 (Ex); Roe d Trimlestown v Kemmis (1843) 9 Cl & Fin 749 at 781 (HL); Cattlin v Barker (1847) 5 CB 201 (CP); Green v Sevin (1879) 13 Ch D 589; R v Morrison (1911) 75 JP 272 (CCA); Bristol Corp v Great Western Railway Co [1916] WN 47; R v Day [1940] 1 All ER 402 (CCA); Practice Note [1952] WN 532; Burgess v Burgess [1958] 2 All ER 63. 1056 The distinction between reopening a case in chief and a case-in-reply in relation to prior
inconsistent statements is discussed in R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [63]–[64]. 1057 J A Andrews, “Re-opening the Case for the Prosecution” (1991) 107 LQR 577. 1058 R v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 at 860 (CCA). One exception to this may arise where a witness attends and gives demonstrations at a view held after the close of the prosecution case: R v Lee [1976] 2 NZLR 171 (CA). 1059 In England the practice is less strict because of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005: Malcolm v DPP [2007] 3 All ER 578. 1060 Parker v R (1982) 41 ALR 576 (HC). 1061 This is sometimes specifically provided for in legislation. See eg s 371(i) of the Criminal Code (Tas) and the discussion of such discretion and the proof of previous inconsistent statements in the High Court decision of Niven v R (1968) 118 CLR 513. 1062 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 676–7; Dawson J, with whom Mason J agreed, spoke to similar effect at 684–6 and 12–14. See also R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 (Qld CA); R v Soma (2001) 122 A Crim R 537; Bevan v Western Australia (2012) 43 WAR 233. 1063 R v Levy (1966) 50 Cr App R 198 at 202. A related qualification is where the evidence is of “low prominence” and the accused rejects an offer by the Crown to avoid prejudice by allowing the case for the defence to be re-opened: R v O’Driscoll (2003) 57 NSWLR 416 at [97]. 1064 R v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 at 867–8 (CCA); R v Levy (1966) 50 Cr App R 198 at 202; R v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429. 1065 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 684. 1066 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 684–5, echoing Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379–80. 1067 Taylor v R (1978) 22 ALR 599 at 614 (Fed C of A FC) (defence of automatism). 1068 The contrary view was suggested in Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379–80 and asserted in Thomas v R (No 2) [1960] WAR 129 (CCA); Taylor v Armour & Co Pty Ltd [1962] VR 346 (FC); R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 at 437 (CCA); R v Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153 (CCA); R v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312 (a strong case, since the Crown was aware that the accused intended to rely on the defence of diminished responsibility). 1069 R v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312 at 321: “The Crown might set out in the prosecution case to establish insanity contrary to the wish of the accused who may have, or believe he has, a perfectly good prospect of acquittal on the facts quite apart from insanity. That prospect might be seriously prejudiced by evidence in the Crown case that he was insane. Such prejudice might arise in a number of ways. It would certainly make the evidence of the accused, if he elects to testify, appear to the jury to be less credible …” 1070 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685. 1071 R v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3 at 6. 1072 These propositions have to be qualified in jurisdictions requiring the accused to give prior notice of an alibi defence: [1155] n 4. 1073 Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565. 1074 See also R v Flynn (1957) 42 Cr App R 15 at 18; Barnett v McGregor; Ex parte McGregor [1959] Qd R 296 at 302 (FC); R v Milliken (1969) 53 Cr App R 330 at 333; R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 at 436 (CCA); cf R v Froggatt (1910) 4 Cr App R 115 at 118. 1075 R v Hilditch (1832) 5 C & P 299; Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 at 569 and 576. 1076 Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 at 571. 1077 R v Frost (1839) 4 St Tr NS 85 at 386 per Tindal CJ; see also R v Stimpson (1826) 2 Car & P 415; R v Day [1940] 1 All ER 402 (CCA) (a handwriting expert in a forgery case not permitted to be called); the same rule has been applied when a judge is contemplating calling a witness: see R v Harris [1927] 2 KB 587 (CCA); see also R v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3; R v McMahon (1933) 24 Cr App R 95; R v Browne (1943) 29 Cr App R 106; R v Smith (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268 (CCA); R v Tregear [1967] 2 QB 574 (CA); R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584 (CA); R v Pilcher (1974) 60 Cr App R 1. The modern view appears in R v Crippen [1911] 1 KB 149 (CCA); R v
Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 74 (CCA); R v Owen [1952] 2 QB 362 (CCA); R v McKenna (1956) 40 Cr App R 65; R v Milliken (1969) 53 Cr App R 330 at 333–4; R v Scott (1984) 79 Cr App R 49. 1078 Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379–80. See also R v Smith (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268 (CCA); R v Picknell [1970] 1 NSWR 604 (CCA); R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423; R v Natasien [1972] 2 NSWLR 227 (CCA). 1079 R v Flynn (1957) 42 Cr App R 15; R v Levy (1966) 50 Cr App R 198; R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 (CCA); R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [64]. 1080 Manyam v Western Australia (2010) 201 A Crim R 156 at [30]. 1081 Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 at 3 (HC). See also R v Bodi [1969] VR 36 (FC); R v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 (FC); R v Ghion [1982] Qd R 781 (CCA). In R v Day [1940] 1 All ER 402 (CCA), for instance, the trial judge allowed the prosecution in a case of forgery to call a handwriting expert after the case for the prosecution had been closed. The accused was convicted, but his conviction was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal because the evidence was of a kind the necessity of which should have been foreseen from the outset. See also R v McCarthy (1984) 14 A Crim R 73 (NSW CCA). Evidence in rebuttal was allowed in R v Milliken (1969) 53 Cr App R 330, where the evidence was only rendered relevant by the accused’s attack on the prosecution witnesses in the course of his own evidence. It was also allowed in R v Joseph (1971) 56 Cr App R 60, to rebut a suggestion in the opening speech of counsel for the defence not made in cross-examination. See also R v Natasien [1972] 2 NSWLR 227 (CCA); Fruet v R [1974] WAR 78; R v Hutchinson (1985) 82 Cr App R 51. 1082 R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 (CCA). 1083 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299, discussing Niven v R (1968) 118 CLR 513. 1084 For example, R v Halford (1978) 67 Cr App R 318. There is certainly no rule against this: R v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 (FC); R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 at 16 (SA CCA). 1085 Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 121–2 (FC), applying Niven v R (1968) 118 CLR 513 at 516–17 and R v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209 at 211–12. 1086 Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 90; Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 125 (FCA FC). Section 43(3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW); 2001 (Tas); 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) provides that for the purpose of adducing evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, a party may re-open that party’s case. 1087 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [78]. 1088 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [64]. 1089 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685. See R v Brown [1985] 2 Qd R 126 (CCA); McDonald v Camerotto (1986) 36 SASR 66; Zanet v Hentschke (1988) 33 A Crim R 51 (SA SC). 1090 Price v Humphries [1958] 2 QB 353 (DC); Turner v Tsaousis (1974) 7 SASR 488; cf Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302. 1091 Duffin v Markham (1918) 88 LJKB 581 (DC); Palastanga v Solman [1962] Crim LR 334 (DC of QBD); Royal v Prescott-Clarke [1966] 2 All ER 366 (DC of QBD); R v Ashley [1968] Crim LR 51 (CA). See also Shaw v Beck (1853) 8 Exch 392 at 397; Cole v Dick 1979 Tas R 14; Brady v Mazurak [1983] WAR 291; Higgins v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229. 1092 Maddison v Coombe (1981) 26 SASR 523 at 528–9. 1093 R v McKenna (1956) 40 Cr App R 65. 1094 Williams v Berini [1960] WAR 21; R v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Kaminski [1983] Crim LR 40 (DC of QBD). See generally, Hansford v McMillan [1976] VR 743 and the Victorian cases there cited; Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254 at 258–9; Whitford v Barbarich [1976] WAR 209; Youngberry v Heatherington [1977] Qd R 15 (FC). 1095 Saunders v Johns [1965] Crim LR 49 (DC of QBD); Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 395; R v Gainsborough Justices; Ex parte Green [1983] Crim LR 627 (DC of QBD). See generally Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [11-61]. See also Middleton v Rowlett [1954] 2 All ER 277 (DC of QBD).
1096 Weatherall v Whalan (1989) 50 SASR 319. 1097 Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302; Reynolds v Bogan Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 36 SASR
193 at 200–3; Piszcyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330. 1098 R v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429; R v Harrington [1984] Crim LR 487 (CA); James v South Glamorgan County Council (1991) 99 Cr App R 321; R v Patel [1992] Crim LR 739 (CA). 1099 R v Smith (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268 at 272 (CCA). 1100 R v Haines [1965] QWN 44 (CCA). 1101 R v Levy (1966) 50 Cr App R 198. See also R v Korwin-Drozynki [1963] Qd R 362 (CCA); R v Milliken (1969) 53 Cr App R 330; R v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 at 437 (CCA); Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 at 572; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685. 1102 R v Bodi [1969] VR 36 (FC); R v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 (FC); R v Langer [1972] VR 973 (FC). To the same effect is People (A-G) v O’Brien [1963] IR 65 (SC). The matter was considered but not decided by the High Court in Dryburgh v R (1961) 105 CLR 532. See above [17085] ff (judge calling witness). 1103 Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 408. 1104 Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254, citing Kench v Bailey (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 268 (FC); approved in Brown v Petranker (1991) 22 NSWLR 717 at 728–9 and Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471 at 479. 1105 People (A-G) v O’Brien [1963] IR 65 at 80 (SC); R v Picknell (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 731 (CCA); R v Bodi [1969] VR 36 (FC); R v Natasien [1972] 2 NSWLR 227 (CCA). Cf R v Reilly (1979) 1 A Crim R 376 (NSW CCA) (reopening after judge’s question on a matter dealt with in Crown case in chief). 1106 R v Bodi [1969] VR 36 (FC). 1107 R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 at 437 (CCA); R v Campbell (1978) 69 Cr App R 221 at 226; R v DeVere [1982] QB 75 (CA), citing R v Macacek [1960] Qd R 247 (CCA). 1108 R v Milliken (1969) 53 Cr App R 330. 1109 Brown v R 1980 Tas R 61. 1110 Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 at 333. 1111 R v Francis [1991] 1 All ER 225 at 228; R v CDR (No 2) [1996] 1 Qd R 183 (CA). 1112 R v Munnery (1990) 94 Cr App R 164 at 172. 1113 R v Bowles [1992] Crim LR 726 (CA). 1114 11th Report, 1972, [211]. 1115 The suggested effect would at least be substantially reduced by the fact that the argument would occur in the jury’s absence. However, the point was also made in Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 at 569. 1116 Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 at 569; Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 at 3 and 23 (HC of A); R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685. 1117 R v Day [1940] 1 All ER 402 (CCA); R v Smith (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268 at 272 (CCA). 1118 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685–6. 1119 R v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103 at [97]. 1120 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 678–9 and 686–7, discussing R v Beckett [1966] Qd R 170 at 171 (CCA); R v Kane (1977) 65 Cr App R 270; and Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 at 3. See also R v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627. 1121 R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 at 629 (CA). 1122 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 689–91, discussing The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 289–90, Stephens v Foster (1833) 6 Car & P 289 and J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1976, vol 6, [1884]. 1123 R v Campbell (1978) 69 Cr App R 221 at 226; R v DeVere [1982] QB 75 (CA), citing R v Macacek [1960] Qd R 247 (CCA). See also the authorities cited in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 39th ed, 1976, [583A].
1124 R v Walsh [1981] Qd R 589 (CCA). 1125 R v Smith (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 268 at 272 and 274 (CCA). 1126 Cattermole v Millar [1977] Crim LR 553 (CA). 1127 Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-35]. 1128 Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 at 5 (CA). See also Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232
CLR 397 at [15]. 1129 R v Beckett [1966] Qd R 170 (CCA). 1130 Roe d Trimlestown v Kemmis (1843) 9 Cl & Fin 749 at 781 (HL); Jacobs v Tarleton (1848) 11 QB 421 at 424 (QB). 1131 Gilbert v Comedy Opera Co (1880) 16 Ch D 594. 1132 Penn v Jack (1866) LR 2 Eq 314 at 318. 1133 Green v Sevin (1879) 13 Ch D 589 at 597. 1134 Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 383. For civil cases in which a penalty is sought, see Malcolm v DPP [2007] 3 All ER 578 (DC). For civil cases in which a penalty is sought, see Malcolm v DPP [2007] 3 All ER 578 (DC); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 235 ALR 587. 1135 Wright v Wilcox (1850) 9 CB 650 at 657 (CP). 1136 Wright v Wilcox (1850) 9 CB 650 at 658 (CP); Bigsby v Dickinson (1876) 4 Ch D 24 (CA); Rogers v Manley (1880) 42 LT 584; Obradovich v Lake View and Star Ltd [1968] WAR 170 (CCA). 1137 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). 1138 Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 at 138 (FC). 1139 Barker v Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172 at 184. 1140 Shaw v Beck (1853) 8 Exch 392 at 398 (Ex); Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 (and cases there cited). 1141 Williams v Davies (1833) 1 Cr & M 464 at 465 (Ex); Doe d Lumsdaine v Bollard (1847) 1 Legge 404 (FC); Penn v Jack (1866) LR 2 Eq 314 at 318; Hicks v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd (1879) 5 VLR (E) 228 (FC); Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 (FC); Gaggin v Moss [1983] 2 Qd R 486 at 493. The opposite point of view formerly prevailed (Rees v Smith (1817) 2 Stark 31) where the plaintiff knew by the pleadings or otherwise what the defence would be, but that has been overruled, first in Browne v Murray (1825) Ry & M 254. But modern adherents to the old view are not unknown: Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 at 141 (FC). 1142 Doe d Lumsdaine v Bollard (1847) 1 Legge 404 at 406 (FC); Protean (Holdings) Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187. In this respect Victorian and New South Wales practices (see [17730]) appear to differ. 1143 Wright v Wilcox (1850) 9 CB 650 at 657 (CP). 1144 Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed, 2005, [12-45]; Williams v Davies (1833) 1 Cr & M 464 (Ex); Doe d Nicoll v Bower (1851) 16 QB 805 (QB); Budd v Davison (1880) 29 WR 192; Nikoloski v Ridge Consolidated Pty Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 192 at 195 (ACTSC). 1145 Bigsby v Dickinson (1876) 4 Ch D 24 at 28 (CA). 1146 Baker v Palm Bay Island Resort Pty Ltd (No 1) [1970] QWN 25; Margiotta v Michielan (1981) 26 SASR 356. 1147 Hughes v Hill [1937] SASR 285; Murray v Figge (1974) 4 ALR 612 (NT SC); Joyce v GIO (NSW) (unreported, SC of NSW 21 July 1976) Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2005 to date, “Practice Decisions” [190,200]; Footersville Pty Ltd v Miles (1986) 41 SASR 211. 1148 Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471 at 478. 1149 Murray v Figge (1974) 4 ALR 612 (NT SC); Joyce v GIO (NSW) (unreported, SC of NSW, 21 July 1976) Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2005 to date, “Practice
Decisions” [190,200]. 1150 Watson v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust [1965] WAR 88 at 89; Re Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (WA Branch); Ex parte Ferguson (1986) 67 ALR 491 at 493–4 (Fed C of A). 1151 Betts v Whittingslowe (No 1) [1944] SASR 163. 1152 Jingellic Minerals NL v Beach Petroleum NL (1991) 55 SASR 424 (and cases cited at 425–6); Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 266–7. 1153 Manwelland Pty Ltd v Dames & Moore Pty Ltd [2001] ATPR 41–845 at [34]. 1154 Beevis v Dawson [1957] 1 QB 195 (CA). 1155 Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 at 137 (FC). 1156 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370. 1157 Downs Irrigation Co-op Assn Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 at 138 (FC). 1158 Joyce v GIO (NSW) (unreported, SC of NSW, 21 July 1976) Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2005 to date, “Practice Decisions” [190,200].
[page 669]
Chapter Ten Character and Credibility
Section 1 — Credibility of Party’s Own Witness A — “DISPOSITION” DISTRIBUTED Key distinctions [19001] Character of witness, similar fact evidence, cross-examination of accused This chapter and the two which follow deal with the important and complicated topic of how far evidence may be adduced bearing upon the record and disposition of a person when this is either directly or indirectly relevant to matters before the court. The topic is at its most important when it is concerned with the character of the accused person in a criminal case. Special rules have been developed at common law to deal with the extent to which the prosecution can lead in chief evidence showing the accused in a discreditable light — generally described as “similar fact” evidence; and cross-examination of the accused about such matters is governed by statute. These topics will be dealt with in the next two chapters. The present chapter will deal with the rules which govern the use of evidence relating to the credibility and character of witnesses, and other areas where character is, for one reason or another, relevant. In relation to non-party witnesses, such questions go to the credibility of the witness; in the other cases they may go more directly to the issues before the court. It is convenient to divide the chapter into three principal sections, dealing with the character of a party’s own witness, the character of an opponent’s witness, and other instances where the character of a party is in issue. Section 4 deals briefly with the question whether, and to what extent, it is permissible to rehabilitate the character of a witness who has been the subject of attack. It is always necessary to consider the distinctions between evidence of good character and of bad;1 between evidence of disposition,2 of reputation, of record, and of discreditable conduct;
between [page 670] evidence going to the issue and evidence going only to credit; and it is necessary to consider whether the evidence is to be led in chief, to be the subject of cross-examination, or to be adduced in rebuttal.
B — SUPPORTING OWN WITNESS Good character evidence — party’s own witness [19005] The bolster rule Evidence explicitly commending the good character of the party’s own witness is rarely led, even though as going to the credibility of the witness (a matter which is automatically in issue) it might logically be thought material and relevant. Thus, Lawton LJ said: “in general evidence can be called to impugn the credibility of witnesses but not led in chief to bolster it up”.3 McHugh J has said that4 the “bolster rule” … stipulates that evidence is not admissible if it merely bolsters the credibility of a party or witness, whether the evidence is sought to be led in evidence-in-chief or crossexamination of another witness or in re-examination of the party or witness attacked.
It is nevertheless common for a party to present witnesses called with as respectable an appearance as possible, and introductory questions are commonly asked about the employment and marital status of the witness so as to enhance such an impression.5 Evidence which explains a characteristic of the witness which, if unexplained, might prevent the tribunal of fact from properly assessing the testimony may be admitted notwithstanding that it goes to a matter affecting credibility,6 but not where its purpose is to give reasons why the witness should be regarded as reliable, unless and until the defence puts this in issue on the basis of some mental disability or abnormality.7 If the impression conveyed in this way is totally false, it may be sufficiently serious to provide grounds for a successful appeal.8 Counsel sometimes seek to bolster the credit of witnesses they have
called in indirect ways. One technique is to expose the existence of an earlier consistent statement by using it to refresh the witness’s memory.9 Another is actually to tender an earlier consistent statement. The making of such a prior consistent statement may, depending upon the time and circumstances of its making, have a powerful [page 671] impact on the tribunal’s assessment of the witness’s credit. But reception depends on applying an exception to a general rule against prior consistent statements10 or applying an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus where it is sought to support the veracity of the witness by calling evidence of a prior consistent statement made under the influence of a truth drug or while connected to a lie detector, in each case the earlier statement is rejected, as is the opinion evidence of the doctor or operator that the statement was made and is likely to be true.11 The court accepts that, in general, a party tenders a witness as capable of being believed.12 If a party — especially the prosecution in a criminal case — tenders a witness whose character may be impugned, for example by proof of previous convictions, the court expects the prosecution to be candid and to reveal such convictions to the accused’s advisers13 and to the court.14 In such cases, if evidence of bad character is given before the jury, the party asks the jury to accept the testimony of the witness despite the bad character. Section 102 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible: and s 102 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) provides that evidence that is relevant only to a witness’s credibility is not admissible: s 102. Section 101A defines “credibility evidence”, in relation to a witness or other person, as evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that: (a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; or (b) is relevant: (i) because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; and
(ii) for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Pts 3.2–3.6.15 There are exceptions for cross-examination (ss 103–104), for rebuttal of certain denials by a witness (s 106), for evidence re-establishing credibility (s 108), and for [page 672] evidence of the credibility of persons who are not witnesses (ss 108– 108B), but there are no exceptions in relation to evidence in chief, save that s 108C permits, with leave, persons with specialised knowledge to give evidence of an opinion that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge and could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of a witness, and s 110(1) permits an accused person to adduce evidence of good character.16 Hence though indemnified witnesses may give evidence in chief that they were charged, later approached the authorities and later still were indemnified, their motives for doing so, their prior inconsistent or incomplete statements, and their reasons for the discrepancies in their statements cannot be led in chief, but only in reexamination if an attack of the kind described in s 108(3) is made.17 However, the prosecution is entitled to refer to the evidence which it is anticipated will be given in re-examination in its opening to the jury.18
C — IMPEACHING OWN WITNESS Rule against impeachment [19010] Hostile witnesses In general a party is neither inclined nor permitted to impeach the credibility of a witness called by that party.19 By statute a party cannot impeach such a witness “by general evidence of bad character”.20 The rule clearly cannot be applied in its full rigour to a hostile witness. Apart from the statutory provision for inconsistent statements,21 the rules relating to the impeachment of hostile witnesses are still governed by the common law in other respects. It seems clear that the hostile witness cannot be
impeached by evidence of convictions or discreditable acts unconnected with the testimony, so far as those matters are not governed by the statutory prohibition against general evidence of bad character, which must be understood in its common law sense of reputation.22 Nor may there be cross-examination about the witness’s general veracity. It is, however, equally clear that there can be cross-examination about the witness’s means of knowledge and [page 673] general capacity. It is slightly less certain whether there can be crossexamination about the witness’s possible bias against the party calling the witness, but the preferred view is that there may be.23
Section 2 — Credibility of Opponent’s Witness A — DISCREDITING TECHNIQUES — SUMMARY Avoiding irrelevance and vexation [19015] General considerations An opponent’s witness may be discredited in a wider variety of ways than may one’s own. In addition to demonstrating lack of knowledge or capacity,24 and inconsistent statements, it is possible to raise previous convictions, discreditable conduct, bias, corruption or lack of veracity. There are, however, two general restrictions. The first is that the matter must be relevant, at least to the witness’s credibility, though this sometimes seems rather notional. If it is relevant only to credit, the general rule is that evidence may not be adduced to rebut the witness’s denial. Thus where the accused was charged with a sexual offence against a child, he was not permitted to adduce evidence to rebut her denial of being a prostitute, despite the fact that she had, in error, been allowed to assert in chief that she was a virgin. Since she was a child, consent was not in issue, and her prostitution, even if it could be proved, was relevant only to credit.25 A consequence of this restriction is that it is not proper for the cross-examiner to put to a witness expressly or by implication the substance of evidence which is not permitted to be led because of this rule. Questions as to what other courts have said of a witness have been held impermissible.26 The second general restriction is that the judge has the duty to [page 674]
prevent questioning of an unduly offensive, vexatious or embarrassing character,27 and to prevent the process of the court from being abused to torture witnesses by oppressive cross-examination.28 There are several different ways of attacking the character of an opponent’s witness. Convictions, which are the subject of an explicit statutory rule, will be considered first. They can be regarded as affecting credit only on the basis that they show the witness in a generally unfavourable light. Since the same light is shed by equally discreditable conduct which does not happen to have become the subject of a conviction it is necessary to consider also evidence of that character. Traditionally, bias in the sense of underlying and undue sympathy or hostility felt by the witness towards a party has been regarded as relevant to credit, and has been distinguished from the self-interest of the witness in the cause, and from corruption (in the sense of more specific interference with testimony, typically by way of bribery). Finally, there is a special technique of the common law permitting an attack upon the general veracity of a witness. For convenience of exposition these approaches to character attack will be considered separately, but similar principles underpin them all.
B — CONVICTIONS29 Development of the modern law [19020] History It was relatively rare for witnesses who had convictions to be regarded as competent to give evidence at common law. The question therefore became important only after the passage of the Evidence Act 1843 (Eng). It was considered by the Common Law Commissioners, who recommended in 1853 that cross-examination be confined to “offences which imply turpitude and want of probity, and more especially absence of veracity” — as, for instance, perjury, forgery, obtaining money or goods under false pretences and the like.30 For some reason this limitation was not included in the ensuing statutory provision which provided: A Witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any … misdemeanor, and upon being so questioned, if he either denies or does not admit the Fact, or refuses to answer, it shall be lawful for the cross-examining Party to prove such Conviction.31
[page 675] Whatever the reason for enacting the statute in this form it was generally taken to authorise cross-examination about any previous conviction.32 The statute in each case provides for establishing proof of the conviction if the witness should deny it,33 and thus constitutes an explicit statutory exception to the general rule that denial of a collateral matter cannot be rebutted.34
[19025] Relevance and spent convictions In each of the Australian jurisdictions there is a statutory requirement that cross-examination be directed to matters in issue, and a power conferred on the judge to disallow a question “if, in [his or her] opinion, the subject matter is so remote in time, or is of such a nature that an admission of its truth would not materially affect the credibility of the witness”.35 When these provisions are applied to questioning about convictions, what matters is the convictions themselves, rather than the nature of offences committed; where credit is very much in issue, it is unwise to exclude matters which are relevant to credit unless clearly they are of no material weight.36 It is not usual for a judge to protect a witness under cross-examination from admitting convictions, even those which are far removed from matters of honesty or credit.37 In Queensland under the Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986, a convicted person is not treated as having a criminal record where the sentence imposed was non-custodial or for a term of less than 30 months and a 10 year38 rehabilitation period has expired. In such a case, unless the conviction is relevant to an issue,39 the person is entitled to deny the conviction and no evidence to contradict this denial may be given.40 Where, however, the rehabilitation period is running but not expired, a question tending to show such a conviction may be asked only by leave.41 The conviction may be disclosed if the convicted person wishes to disclose it.42 If a convicted person refers [page 676]
to the conviction in a statement of claim making relevant the extent of the plaintiff’s criminal record, the full extent of it may be revealed by the defendant and considered by the court.43
C — DISCREDITABLE ACTS Questions going only to credit [19030] Limits on cross-examination and finality of answers An authoritative statement of the rule with respect to cross-examination as to credit based on discreditable acts is that of Latham CJ.44 Any witness may be cross-examined for the purpose of discrediting him. But if questions affect only the credit of a witness and are not relevant to the matters actually in issue in the case, the witness’s answers cannot be contradicted by other evidence except in certain exceptional cases. Exceptions to the rule at common law are that after cross-examination of his opponent’s witnesses a party may give evidence to show that they are notorious liars, or have given their testimony from a corrupt or other wrong motive, or that they have previously made statements inconsistent with their evidence. A statutory exemption allows proof of convictions where such convictions have been denied by a witness.
If the question imputes a crime with which the witness has not been charged the witness may claim the benefit of the privilege against selfincrimination so as to refuse to answer.45 Subject to that, and to the judge’s discretion to disallow improper questions, cross-examination about discreditable acts is widely permitted. Principles governing the discretion to disallow cross-examination to credit were propounded by Stephen, incorporated into the Indian Evidence Act 1872, and endorsed by Sankey LJ46 to the effect that (1) questions are proper only when answers would seriously impair the credibility of the witness; (2) questions are improper if they relate to matters so remote in time or of such a character that if established they could not seriously impair the credibility of the witness; and (3) questions are improper if there is a substantial disproportion between the importance of the imputation against the witness’s character and the importance of the witness’s evidence to the issue to be decided.47 In one case48 the English Court of Appeal considered how far it was proper to cross-examine a police witness about previous improprieties to the effect that there was a systematic perversion of justice, that some officers had been the subject of criminal or disciplinary processes in
relation to the falsification of evidence, and that acquittals had been secured in cases where the witnesses had testified. The Court rejected the first line of attack as too remote,49 accepted the second only to the extent that the proceedings had culminated in adverse findings, and accepted the [page 677] third only where there was no other reasonable explanation for the acquittal than a determination that the witness must have been lying.50 It is dubious how far a witness may be asked about criticisms of his or her testimony made by a judge in earlier proceedings, whether or not an acquittal resulted.51 If a question is allowed, then, as stated above, the rule used to be that the witness’s denial could not be rebutted on a purely collateral matter,52 but here as elsewhere there are now signs of a more liberal approach to rebuttal.53 A questionable example54 arose where it was suggested that a police witness for the prosecution had fabricated an oral confession and threatened a potential witness for the defence so as to prevent him from testifying. Both allegations were denied by the police officer, and the defence proposed to call the man who had been threatened, to rebut the denial of a threat. The judge refused to permit rebuttal, applying the traditional collateral matter rule, but the English Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the basis that the defence should have been allowed to rebut the denial because it went to a fact in issue. This seems quite contrary to most tests for the distinction between credit and issue;55 in effect, substituting substantial relevance as a test for allowing rebuttal, and coming close to assimilating it with the third part of the test quoted above for deciding whether to allow the original question to be put. It should be noted that in this case the argument seems simply to have been that someone who would tamper with potential witnesses in the way alleged was a person whose testimony was likely to be unreliable, and one who ought not to be believed when there was a conflict with the testimony of the accused who alleged that the witness’s evidence of an oral confession was a fabrication. It was not suggested that there was any special animus against the accused, or that the witness’s testimony had been secured by corruption.
D — BIAS, INTEREST AND CORRUPTION The categories defined [19035] Distinctions and illustrations Wigmore’s analysis proceeded by reference to three overlapping categories:56 “bias”, in the sense of “all the varieties of hostility or prejudice against the opponent [page 678] personally or of favor to the proponent personally”; “interest” in the sense of “the specific inclination which is apt to be produced by the relation between the witness and the cause at issue in the litigation”; and “corruption”, in the sense of “the conscious false intent which is inferrible [sic] from giving or taking a bribe or from expressions of a general unscrupulousness for the case in hand”. Pollock CB said a witness’s denials of standing in such a “relation” to a party as was likely to prevent that witness having an unprejudiced mind could be contradicted, for example if the witness denies using “expressions that he would be revenged on some one, or that he would give such evidence as might dispose of the cause in one way or the other”.57 “Relation” includes particular, continuing relationships, as where the witness was not only the servant but also the “kept mistress” of the party calling her.58 It is in practice commonly clear that many witnesses, such as parties and their close relatives, are likely to be biased or interested, and there is no special need to bring this out. But where it is not clear, the witness can be questioned about the relevant “relation”, and if it is denied, the answer can be contradicted. “Relation” also includes looser relationships of hostility, for example based on revenge,59 or goodwill.60 Bias extends beyond “relations” to all “matters which affect the motives, temper, and character of a witness … with reference to his feelings towards one party or the other”:61 a wife’s willingness falsely to accuse her husband of incest unless he gave her property;62 a child complainant’s motive to level a false charge against an accused, who was concerned
about the influence of the complainant on his daughter;63 a reluctance to give evidence against an accused due to a fear of reprisals (“a statement to the effect that a person if required to give evidence will give false evidence out of a desire not to offend certain of the parties is a statement indicating partiality in relation to the parties or the cause, whether that partiality stems from friendship or fear”);64 the attempt by a person claiming to be a victim of an abduction to procure a witness to give false evidence, because the brother of the supposed victim wanted to ensure that the accused was falsely convicted;65 the coaching of a witness by a person who is hostile to the party against whom the witness’s evidence has been tendered.66 “Corruption” means corruption in relation to the parties or the cause, not [page 679] corruption unconnected with the proceedings.67 Instances of corruption are found where a witness is offered a bribe by another witness,68 or solicits a bribe;69 where a witness accepts a bribe;70 perhaps where a witness is willing to withdraw allegations against persons being prosecuted if disciplinary proceedings against him are dropped;71 where a witness threatens to make a false complaint against a person disliked by the witness;72 and where a prosecution witness offers to give testimony favourable to the defendant if the defendant’s friends arrange for the dropping of a charge.73 Where a defendant was sued for slanderously saying that a plaintiff had knowingly received stolen cattle from a witness for the defendant, who was convicted of stealing the cattle, an offer by the witness to swear that the plaintiff “was in with him in stealing the cattle” in order to obtain a pardon was admitted.74 Corruption was also exemplified where a witness revealed that another witness, implicated in a murder for which certain other accused persons were charged, had indicated to the first a preparedness to lie on oath in order to ingratiate himself with the police, in the hope that he might influence a reduction in his sentence.75
[19040] Special rules
The “corruption” exception to the collateral evidence rule does not arise where corruption is attempted by a party to the proceedings: that can be proved in any event as an admission by conduct.76 An admission of bias for one reason does not let in evidence of bias for another reason.77 It is a condition of the admissibility of the rebutting evidence of bias, interest or corruption that its details be put to the witness first.78 The reception of the rebutting evidence can raise questions about the hearsay rule: see [33800]. It can be permissible to cross-examine a witness about charges not yet dealt with, or about acquittals, where this goes to bias.79 [page 680]
E — LACK OF VERACITY General character as a ground for disbelief [19045] History and survival of anomalous rule Since 1664 a witness can be called to swear that the opponent’s witness cannot be believed upon oath.80 It was established that the impugning witness must speak from personal knowledge,81 but could not refer to particular events to justify the belief.82 The general form of the question went from the general to the more particular, by asking first “Have you the means of knowing what the general character of the witness is?” and then “From such knowledge of his general character would you believe him on oath?”83 It was not necessary that the witness need have personal knowledge of false testimony by the witness,84 and even if it existed, the witness would not be allowed to refer to it due to the collateral evidence rule.85 It became very rare, in practice, for this cumbersome, anomalous and unconvincing exercise to be conducted.86 Its continued availability was, however, endorsed by a unanimous House of Lords.87 In another case88 strenuous efforts were made to impugn the credibility of a key witness for the prosecution. The defence called a witness in the hope that he would
testify that the key witness could not be believed on her oath if she were frightened, and her own evidence was that she was frightened of the accused. The trial judge allowed the witness to be asked if he were aware of the key witness’s reputation for veracity, and whether he would believe her on oath. After a caution from the trial judge, the witness replied that in certain particulars she could be believed, whereupon the judge intervened to prevent any qualification of that statement, though the witness had gone so far as to indicate that he wished to make some qualification. Nor, despite counsel’s persistence, would the trial judge allow the witness to be asked to give an opinion of her credibility on oath on the basis of his personal knowledge of her. It was held by the English Court of Appeal that the further question should have been permitted, and that a witness is allowed to express an opinion of the veracity of another on the basis both of the other’s general reputation for veracity, and of personal knowledge of the impugned witness. No final view was expressed about the intervention to prevent qualification, though the Court seemed to incline to the view that [page 681] qualification is impermissible if it is adduced only as a means of introducing in chief particular reasons for the qualification, though crossexamination about those reasons is permissible. The common law’s resistance to questions which open up the veracity of a witness as a relevant, as opposed to a collateral, issue has in general meant also that a party cannot lead opinion evidence as to the reliability of a witness except where a specific attack is mounted on one of the established bases presently under discussion. However, in one case,89 best regarded as a special case,90 at trial the judge permitted King, one of two accused persons, each of whom accused the other of the murder, to lead psychiatric evidence to the effect that Lowery, the co-accused, was of such a character that King’s version of the killing was more probable. For the present purpose it is important to note that the trial judge specifically prohibited the expert witness from expressing any opinion as to the tendencies of Lowery to lying, fraud or deceit or the like, so that the case is not authority for any general proposition that psychiatric or
psychological evidence may be led as to the veracity of a witness.
F — MEDICAL OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY Lack of reliability on medical grounds [19050] Testimony and confessions This long-standing rule is to be distinguished from the situation in which the witness’s lack of veracity is imputed to some specific medical or mental condition. Medical evidence is admissible to show that a witness suffers from some disease or defect or abnormality of mind that affects the reliability of his evidence. Such evidence is not confined to a general opinion of the unreliability of the witness but may give all the matters necessary to show, not only the foundation of and reasons for the diagnosis, but also the extent to which the credibility of the witness is affected.91
There is some danger of attempts being made to influence the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a witness by calling medical evidence to prove matters within the jury’s normal competence, such as the propensity of some witnesses, who could perfectly well tell the truth, to tell lies.92 Such cases are best dealt with on the basis of the relevance of the evidence, and the proper function of expert witnesses.93 The rule applies just as much to evidence adduced by the prosecution as by the defence, and to evidence adduced in chief as much as in rebuttal.94 Although not strictly relevant to the issue of impugning the testimony of an opponent’s witness by medical evidence, it is convenient to consider here the question of how far a statement tendered by the prosecution can be discredited by medical evidence of the condition of the maker at the time that the statement was [page 682] made. It is of course incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the confession was voluntary, and the mental condition of the accused may bear upon that issue. It is argued at [33660] below that the court has, at least, a discretion to reject a confession made by an accused person suffering at that time from mental instability. A confession may be
excluded if it were obtained in consequence of anything done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render a confession unreliable. It might well be argued that to question a mentally disturbed person was likely so to do. In such cases it would seem right that the defence should be able to adduce medical evidence of the accused’s condition at such a time.95 In these cases the accused often testifies inconsistently with the confession, and it might be said that the expert evidence could be regarded as simply bolstering the testimony of the accused.96 But where there is a question of a confession by an accused person, the relevant matter is the accused person’s mental condition — to what extent are the words to be relied on as indicating guilt? Any evidence which bears upon that matter goes not to credit, for the accused may not give evidence on it, and is receivable as bearing out a matter in issue.97
G — CTH: EVIDENCE ACT 1995, NSW: EVIDENCE ACT 1995, VIC: EVIDENCE ACT 2008, TAS: EVIDENCE ACT 2001, ACT: EVIDENCE ACT 2011 AND NT: EVIDENCE (NUL) ACT 2011 SS 103, 106 AND 108C Exceptions to statutory “credibility” rule [19055] Limits of the exceptions Sections 103, 104 and 106 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), create exceptions to the “credibility rule” created by s 102, which renders credibility evidence about a witness inadmissible.98 Section 104, dealing with cross-examination of the accused, is discussed at [23180], [23265], [23300] and [23365]. Section 103 provides: (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness99 if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to: (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth; and
(b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred.
[page 683] An example is questioning of a police officer as to whether he had on other occasions as a police officer in the company of other police officers illicitly seized sums of money.100 Section 106 provides: (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if: (a) in cross-examination of the witness: (i) the substance of the evidence was put to the witness; and (ii) the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence; and (b) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) Leave under paragraph (1)(b) is not required if the evidence tends to prove that the witness: (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; or (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement; or (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth.
Since the admissibility of the evidence depends on a prior denial by the witness, the question that produced that denial must have complied with s 103 and have been capable of eliciting evidence which could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. Hence that requirement applies indirectly to s 106. The manner in which s 43 permits and regulates cross-examination on the witness’s prior inconsistent statements was discussed at [17530]. Section 106(2)(d) reverses the common law.101 It probably also preserves the common law permitting evidence of the unreliability of a witness stemming from medical or physical disability. A further exception to the credibility rule dealt with elsewhere is found in s 108 (re-examination and prior consistent statements: see [17315], [17545], [17565] and [19175]). The position under the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) as it stood in 2009 is discussed elsewhere.102 Section 108C(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008
(Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides: (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a person concerning the credibility of another witness if: (a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that: (i) is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge; and (ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness103; and (c) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence.
Section 108C(2) provides: (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1):
[page 684] (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of that kind, a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.104
Section 3 — Character of Party A — MISCELLANEOUS EXCEPTIONS The exceptions outlined [19060] Summary There are a number of rather miscellaneous areas to be considered in this section. The first part of this section deals with the admissibility of evidence of character in cases loosely categorised as concerning the character of prosecution witnesses. The second part is concerned with the rules of common law governing evidence as to the character of the accused in those cases where it is not adduced in chief by the prosecution, for example, where the character of the accused is put in issue by a character witness called by the accused. The third part deals with the admissibility of character evidence in civil cases (excluding those where it is led in chief under the so-called similar fact rule).
B — PROSECUTION WITNESSES Persons other than complainants in sex cases [19065] General Where it is relevant to an issue, the credit of the prosecution witness may be impugned for any of the reasons discussed in Section 2 by crossexamination or by direct evidence. Where the character of a prosecution witness is impugned merely in order to attack credit, then, in general, this may not go beyond cross-examination. The provision is otherwise where the evidence is relevant to a factual issue.105 But in every case regard must be had to the possibility that this course will expose the accused to crossexamination as to antecedents if sworn evidence is given. Evidence of the disposition of a Crown witness may be admissible if there is a logical nexus between it and an issue in the case.106 A marginal
case concerned the circumstances attending the arrest of the defendant near a hotel on 6 May 1978. The police evidence was that he was drunk and driving his car. The defendant denied these allegations, maintaining that his arrest was unjustified and unlawful. [page 685] Evidence that the same police officer had unlawfully and without cause arrested other persons on 26 December 1977 and 2 September 1978 was held to have been wrongfully excluded since it cast a doubt on the lawfulness of the defendant’s arrest in May.107 The difficulty with this case is to establish a logical nexus between the events of 6 May 1978 and those concerning different persons four months before and after respectively — a nexus which goes beyond the creditworthiness of the police witness, whose character was under attack. The majority of the Full Court acknowledged that the evidence would not show a system or scheme.108 Ultimately the justification was that the evidence showed a propensity or disposition on the part of the police officer to arrest persons unlawfully.
Complainants in sex cases [19070] The nature of the problem By far the greatest accumulation of authority has gathered around the issue of the admissibility of evidence and of questioning as to the character of the complainant on an allegation of rape or allied crimes. There are a number of reasons for this. One is that rape is rare in being a crime where the state of mind of the complainant is important; in evidential terms, her disposition may be relevant to the question of whether or not she consented. It is also a defence to rape that the accused believed the complainant to be consenting, so her reputation for unchastity may become relevant. It has also been remarked that sexual intercourse, whether or not consensual, most often takes place in private, and leaves few visible traces of having occurred. Evidence is often effectively limited to that of the parties, and much is likely to depend upon the balance of credibility between them.
The difficulties caused by these factors are also present in relation to much of the evidence used to resolve them. If it is sought to prove consent by evidence that the complainant is sexually promiscuous, it is likely to be just as difficult for the defence to rebut her denials of such promiscuity as it is for the prosecution to prove that she did not consent on the occasion in issue. If it is alleged that she has made a previous false allegation of rape, it is unclear how the falsity of that allegation could be satisfactorily established. In other words, the collateral issues in such cases are likely to prove particularly time-consuming, difficult to resolve and confusing to the jury. It is also likely to be more than usually unfair to confront the complainant with isolated examples of her extrinsic sexual behaviour at the trial without warning, since sexual activity can occur frequently, and it really would be tantamount to forcing her to defend her whole life in a way which is clearly less fair than in the case of, say, allegations of crime.
[19075] The common law rules The position broadly established at common law at the beginning of the nineteenth century was that the complainant could be cross-examined about her promiscuity in general,109 but not about particular acts of intercourse with named men.110 This position crystallised into rules prohibiting rebuttal of her denials by [page 686] adducing evidence of particular acts of sexual intercourse,111 subject to three exceptions. According to these, her denials could be rebutted by evidence of her prostitution,112 of other acts of intercourse with the accused,113 or of other sexual acts constituting part of the surrounding circumstances.114 It seems that such rebuttal was usually justified on the basis that it went to consent, though on occasion it was regarded as going to credibility.115 The concept of prostitution was itself somewhat vague, and became interpreted in such a wide manner that it defeated one of the professed objects of the general ban on rebuttal of denials, namely, that it exposed the complainant to cross-examination upon the whole of her
sexual life without notice.116 It was also possible to adduce extrinsic evidence of, cross-examine on and rebut denials in relation to all the surrounding circumstances of the incident in question, including the sexual behaviour of the complainant.
[19080] Statutory change: outline This state of the law117 became the subject of investigation and reform in many parts of the common law world. However, legislatures, in Australia at least, were not prepared to ban all cross-examination or evidence in rebuttal as to the complainant’s sexual history. The statutes in force in most jurisdictions118 vary greatly. In each case the legislation operates to exclude evidence which would otherwise be admissible, so that it is necessary for the cross-examiner to satisfy the common law and any statutory requirements of the questioning before the legislation can operate.119 This means that when the trial judge is called upon to grant leave under the legislation, the question is already ruled to be relevant to an issue or to credit. All jurisdictions prohibit evidence relating to the sexual reputation [page 687] of a complainant120 save that the Northern Territory allows it to be adduced with the leave of the court if the court is satisfied that the evidence has substantial relevance.
[19085] Prohibition on evidence of complainant’s sexual activity or experience: introduction The statutes further prohibit evidence of the complainant’s “sexual activities” (Qld, Vic, SA, ACT, NT), “sexual activity” (NSW), “sexual experience” (NSW, Tas) or “sexual experiences” (WA). While it is clear that acts of intercourse fall within these expressions, conversations about such acts have also been held to constitute “sexual experience” even in the absence of any suggestion that the conversations had any basis in fact.121 How much further it might go, or how specifically it should be related to
particular incidents with particular men, is a matter for speculation. It would presumably not include having undergone sexual education at school,122 or having associated with prostitutes.123 A question as to whether the complainant was a virgin is one with respect to “sexual experiences” even though the affirmative answer given indicates a lack of sexual experiences.124 It is less clear that evidence of solicitation as a prostitute does not amount to being “about sexual experience”. The expressions “sexual experience” and “sexual activity” can include nonconsensual behaviour, eg the fact that the complainant has earlier been the victim of a sexual assault;125 or has been watched by the accused while naked or observed the accused’s penis.126 The word “experience” is not limited to sexual “activity” by the complainant.127 The activities or experiences on which questioning is prohibited do not include those which are part of the “res gestae” (WA),128 or form “part of the events or circumstances out of which the charge arises” (Tas), or those which are “before or after the events of and surrounding the alleged offence” (SA), or those which are substantially contemporaneous with the offence or that a [page 688] part of a sequence of acts or events that explains the circumstances in which the offence was committed (Qld129 and NT). In Tasmania “direct and substantial relevance” means that the evidence of sexual experience must tend to prove or disapprove a fact or matter in issue, rather than tending to prove or disprove something that may be relevant to a fact or matter in issue.130
[19090] Prohibition on evidence of complainant’s sexual activity or experience: local variations The evidence described in [19085] is not admissible at all if tendered to prove only disposition (in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, the Northern Territory and Western Australia.)131 It has been held that s 36BA of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) prohibited the tender of any evidence which tended to prove the disposition of the
complainant in sexual matters, except where the evidence was evidence of the sexual experience of the complainant and was admissible under s 36BC.132 It has also been held that “disposition” pointed to a “contrast … between statements and conduct which reveal the intrinsic character of the complainant and those which, although relevant to the particular occasion, do not”.133 A telephone conversation which caused the complainant to come to the house in which she was allegedly assaulted and which arguably tended to prove that she came there for the purpose of having sexual intercourse did not relate to the disposition of the complainant in sexual matters.134 In New South Wales the evidence described in [19085] may be admitted if one of seven circumstances exists and its probative value outweighs any distress, humiliation or embarrassment which the complainant might suffer as a result of its admission.135 In South Australia leave is not to be granted unless the court, after giving effect to the principle that alleged victims of sexual offences should not be subjected to unnecessary distress, humiliation or embarrassment, is satisfied that the evidence is of substantial probative value or would, in the circumstances, be [page 689] likely materially to impair confidence in the reliability of the complainant’s evidence. In Tasmania leave is not to be granted unless the court is satisfied that the evidence has direct and substantial relevance to a fact or matter in issue, and the probative value of the evidence outweighs any distress, humiliation or embarrassment which the complainant might suffer as a result of the admission of the evidence, taking into account the age of the complainant and the number and nature of the questions likely to be put. In Victoria and Queensland the court is not to give leave unless it is satisfied that the evidence has substantial relevance to the facts in issue or it is proper matter for cross-examination as to credit (the latter is not the case in the absence of any special circumstances by reason of which the evidence would be likely and materially to impair confidence in the reliability of the complainant’s evidence).136 In Western Australia the court is not to grant leave unless satisfied that the evidence has substantial
relevance to the facts in issue, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any distress, humiliation or embarrassment to the complainant. In the Northern Territory leave is not to be granted unless the court is satisfied that the evidence has substantial relevance to the facts in issue. The evident policy behind the statutes is the balancing of the harm to the complainant which the evidence may cause with the harm to the accused if deprived of a defence which is available to those charged with non-sexual offences.137 The harm to an accused person can be gauged by an assessment of the relevance and cogency of the evidence of which he may be deprived. The consequence to a complainant of being subjected to cross-examination upon personal matters may be devastating or it may not.138 In a series of cases139 decided on the legislation as it stood before the 1984 amendment, the Supreme Court of South Australia has attempted to work out the principles upon which a trial judge in that State should exercise the discretion conferred to admit the evidence where it is directly relevant and its reception is “in all the circumstances of the case justified”. The basic consideration is the relevance of the proposed evidence to the real issues raised in the trial.140 The judge will reject questions which are of a fishing nature. In determining this the judge must rely upon the integrity of the counsel’s assurances that the questions are based on apparently reliable instructions. In a case where the accused’s defence was that he believed the complainant to be consenting, it will be rare that his knowledge of her prior sexual activities will be admissible under the Act, because his belief as to her state of mind at the time of the act must in almost all cases be based on what she says and does at the time.141 Finally, although once [page 690] a line of questioning is permitted it may be difficult to restrain it, the judge will normally delimit the permitted ambit of the evidence.142
Miscellaneous instances where character of prosecutor/victim is relevant
[19095] Common law and statutory position There are a number of other situations in which the character of the prosecutor or victim of a crime may be regarded as relevant.143 Thus where144 the defence hinged completely on the personality of the alleged victim, namely, that he was subject to hysteria and quite capable of misunderstanding, exaggerating and over-reacting to the most solicitous of treatment, the House of Lords had no doubt that such evidence was admissible, irrespective of whether the victim testified or not. Similarly, if self-defence is pleaded in defence of a charge of murder, the accused may show that the deceased was of a violent disposition;145 or where there are special features of the defences dependent upon facets of the victim’s character — for example, that the killing occurred in the course of resisting a violent homosexual advance — then those relevant aspects may be proved also.146 In all such cases it is, however, essential that the evidence shall be relevant, and relevant at the stage of the proceedings at which it is raised.147 A further possible situation is one in which the accused asserts that a third party committed the crime charged, and wishes to adduce evidence of that person’s character in support of such assertion. Most of the English case law is concerned with allegations made with respect to a co-accused, and will be considered in [19155] below. It is sufficient to note here that the rules are no less generous when the alleged criminal is a third party, and that in civil cases they are most generous of all.148 These common law possibilities for non-witnesses who are not accused or co-accused persons appear to have been preserved by s 94(3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), which provides: [page 691] This Part does not apply to evidence of: (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person; or (b) a tendency that a person has or had; if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue.
C — ACCUSED
Accused’s adduction of good character [19100] General The most common situations involving evidence of the character of the accused are those in which it is adduced in chief by the prosecution, and in which the accused is cross-examined about it. These are dealt with in the two following chapters. This section is concerned with those cases where the accused adduces evidence of good character, and the extent to which that opens the way to cross-examination of the character witness, or rebutting evidence, and cases where the accused seeks to adduce evidence, or to cross-examine, as to the bad character of a co-accused.
Evidence of good character [19105] The issues distributed The accused has, from very early times, been permitted to adduce evidence of good character.149 Questions arise as to the type of evidence permitted and as to the purpose for admitting the evidence and the interconnected issue as to the effect of such evidence when admitted. Finally, there is the question of how the trial judge should deal with this evidence.
[19110] Common law The good character of an accused person may mean many things. It is common to hear an accused tell the court that he is a good and loving father, or son, and to deny having been convicted. The evidence is led with a view to persuading the jury that such an upright and respectable citizen would be unlikely to commit the offence charged. This evidence will normally put the accused’s character in issue and will permit crossexamination as to bad character under the various statutory provisions which are to be dealt with in Chapter 12, “The Accused as Witness”. But at common law such evidence would be excluded150 for it has been accepted since 1865 that evidence of character of the accused may be given only by statements of general reputation.151 In the leading case,152 a schoolmaster was charged with indecent assault on a boy, and called witnesses to his character. The
[page 692] Crown called a witness to give evidence in rebuttal, and this witness was asked about the accused’s character for decency and morality of conduct. The reply was in these terms: I know nothing of the neighbourhood’s opinion, because I was only a boy at school when I knew him, but my own opinion, and the opinion of my brothers who were also pupils of his, is that his character is that of a man capable of the grossest indecency and the most flagrant immorality.
It was held that this answer was not admissible in evidence because the witness ought only to speak of the accused’s reputation — a matter about which he plainly knew nothing. The court confirmed that rebutting evidence was admissible, but their decision on the form which evidence of character should take was criticised by Stephen because: A witness may with perfect truth swear that a man who, to his knowledge, has been a receiver of stolen goods for years, has an excellent character for honesty if he has the good luck to conceal his crimes from his neighbours.153
There is much to be said for abandoning a rule which is difficult to apply and widely ignored.154 The proper procedure, then, for leading evidence of the character of an accused in a criminal trial is for the witness to assert familiarity with the opinion of the accused’s character held generally in the neighbourhood or among some other relevant group of people, and to say that the reputation of the accused among such people is that of an honest man, or as the case may be.155 In addition to this, it may be that evidence of the good character of the accused may be elicited by cross-examination of witnesses, even though this defies the old rule to likely guilt. Further, in New Zealand evidence of opinions by witnesses as to the accused’s good character, reliability, trustworthiness, integrity, care and attention to ethical standards in dealing with them or their families of which they had personal knowledge was held admissible in the prosecution of a medical practitioner for impropriety in examining a female patient.156 The mere absence of convictions was held not to be evidence of good character in New Zealand attracting a direction of a type discussed in [19135],157 though it was in England.158 It is open to the accused to suggest good character in other ways than calling evidence of it, eg wearing a regimental blazer in the witness box.159 Evidence that a doctor accused of sexual offences against patients while
purportedly conducting pelvic examinations had conducted other pelvic examinations in exemplary fashion has been held inadmissible, as showing no more than professional competence.160 [page 693]
[19115] Statute Section 110(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) (which applies only in criminal proceedings) provides: The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character.
The defendant is not to be cross-examined on the evidence without leave: s 112. Factors relevant to the grant of leave are set out in s 192 and must be taken into account.161
The purpose and effect of good character evidence [19120] Purpose Evidence of the good character of the accused could be admitted because it goes to the issue of guilt or innocence, because it supports the credibility of the accused, or simply so as to predispose the jury in the accused’s favour. Since such evidence was admissible long before the accused became competent, it is clear that, in origin at least, it was not admitted to support credibility as a witness. Only Martin B was at all inclined to accept that it was admitted simply so as to predispose the jury in favour of the accused.162 So far as relevance to an issue is concerned the process of reasoning was explained thus: [T]he object of laying it before the jury is to induce them to believe, from the improbability that a person of good character should have conducted himself as alleged, that there is some mistake or misrepresentation in the evidence of the prosecution, and it is strictly evidence in the case.163
Attempts are sometimes made to distinguish between relevance to innocence simpliciter, and relevance via disbelief of the prosecution’s
witness.164 This seems both confusing and pointless though the judgments show some difference of emphasis. Thus Cockburn CJ said: It is said that evidence of good character raises only a collateral issue; but I think that, if the prisoner thinks proper to raise that issue as one of the elements for the consideration of the jury, nothing could be more unjust than that he should have the advantage of a character which, in point of fact, may be the very reverse of that which he really deserves.165
Willes J said: … It is a mistake to suppose that, because the prisoner only can raise the question of character, it is therefore a collateral issue. It is not. Such evidence is admissible, because it renders it less probable that what the prosecution has averred is true. It is strictly relevant to the issue …166
Both of these purposes, excluding only simple prejudice in favour of the accused, reappear more recently. The accused may now testify, and Lord Widgery CJ said [page 694] that “possession of a good character is primarily a matter which goes to credibility”.167 In cases where the accused does not exercise the option to testify, the accused is still entitled to have evidence of good character considered as relevant to the issue.168 If the option is exercised, the accused is entitled to have it considered on both grounds.169 When the only possible purpose was relevance to the issue, it made good sense to restrict the evidence of character to those aspects relevant to the nature of the charge. Thus when the accused was charged with treason it was held that evidence of good character should not be general, but limited to character for loyalty and as being peaceable.170 The rule seems, however, to have been disregarded both before the accused became competent171 and after.172
[19125] Effect It was long considered that the effect of evidence of good character was for the jury to take it into account only when otherwise left in doubt; where the scales were evenly balanced. It was then claimed173 that this reduced its effect to nil, since if the jury was in doubt the accused was in any event entitled to be acquitted. This is unconvincing because there must be a point at which the jury requires only the slightest extra evidence
to feel the reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit the accused, and that surely must have been the situation contemplated.174 The law in Australia was stated thus by the High Court:175 The expression “good character” has of course a known significance in relation to evidence upon criminal trials; for it denotes a description of evidence in disproof of guilt which an accused person may adduce. He may adduce evidence of the favourable character he bears as a fact or matter making it unlikely that he committed the crime charged…. [E]vidence of good character is regarded as really bearing on the probability or improbability of guilt. As Cockburn CJ said: “The fact that a man has an unblemished reputation leads to the presumption that he is incapable of committing the crime for which he is being tried”.176
At common law therefore, evidence of good character must be taken into account in all cases in determining whether the Crown had discharged its onus of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt, and, in cases where the credibility of the [page 695] accused is relevant, in assessing that credibility.177 In some cases it can be important in leading to an acquittal.178
[19130] Application of character evidence The logical process whereby the jury will apply the good character evidence to the ultimate question before them must vary, depending upon the issues in the case and the nature of the character evidence offered.179 Where a person accused of theft of a horse raised the defence of honest claim of right, the evidence of good character bore directly on the inference which the prosecution invited the jury to draw that the accused had an intention to steal:180 Gibbs J in an often quoted judgment stated that the evidence of the appellant’s good character was “a yardstick by which the credibility of the testimony against him should be measured”.181 In a case where different issues are involved, the evidence might bear upon the ultimate issue on the basis that a person of good character is less likely to commit the offence than a person of bad character.182 In other cases, testimony of good character may serve to counterbalance adverse evidence.183 But the bearing which character evidence may be established to have on an issue should be seen merely as leading to the ultimate logical
destination, providing the answer to the question, Has the accused been shown to be guilty of the offence charged?
The judge’s direction [19135] Common law and statutory possibilities If no evidence of the accused’s good character is led, the judge has no duty to inquire in the absence of the jury whether the accused is of good character, and if the accused is of good character, direct the jury to take it into account both on credibility and guilt: the issue of good character is for the accused to raise, not the judge.184 If the accused desires to raise good character, it must be done distinctly, by direct evidence from the accused or on the accused’s behalf, or by eliciting it in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.185 Whenever evidence of good character is led, it is desirable that the judge direct the jury as to how they might use [page 696] it.186 That this is not a universal rule is apparent from the observations of Sholl J187 that a jury left without guidance would ordinarily be inclined to use good character evidence both as to credibility and as to guilt. There is, however, authority that a direction should be given whenever it is asked for.188 The jury should be directed to have regard to the accused’s good character not only in assessing the credibility of the accused as a witness,189 but also where the accused, though not testifying, is relying on exculpatory statements made before trial.190 No direction as to the relevance of good character to credibility should be given if there is no credibility to assess, ie where the accused did not testify and made no pretrial statements.191 It is undesirable for the direction as to character, where it is given, to be dismissive.192 Though in Australia the giving of character directions is for the judge’s discretion the position differs in England and New Zealand. Whether or not the accused has given evidence, a direction that good character be taken into account in determining guilt or innocence should,
according to the English Court of Appeal, always be given.193 Where that is done, an appellate court is likely to be slow to criticise any qualifying remarks made in tailoring the direction to the particular circumstances.194 The judge may wish to indicate that good character is not a defence. The significance of good character will vary greatly, from an employee with years of faithful and honest service in the handling of large sums of money now charged with stealing from the till, to a defendant charged with murder who, having pleaded guilty to manslaughter, draws attention to good character as a non-murderer; in the latter case the judge may wish “to stress the very limited help the jury may feel they can get from the absence of any propensity to [page 697] violence in the defendant’s history”.195 The above principles are not to be modified where there are two accused and one has established good character and the other not:196 a defendant A of good character is entitled to have the judge direct the jury [as to its relevance in his case] even if he is jointly tried with a defendant B of bad character. This leaves the question as to what, if anything, the judge should say about the latter. In some cases the judge may think it best to grasp the nettle in his summing up and tell the jury that they must try the case on the evidence, that there has been no evidence about B’s character, that they must not speculate and must not take the absence of information as to B’s character as any evidence against B. In other cases the judge may, however, think it best to say nothing about the absence of evidence as to B’s character. What course he takes must depend upon the circumstances of the individual case, for example how great an issue has been made of character during the evidence and speeches.
That passage deals with the case where there is no evidence of B’s character. Where there is evidence of B’s bad character, the risk of a jury assumption that B’s bad character is relevant to propensity is to be avoided by “directions about the limited relevance of the evidence about previous convictions and the way in which it should be approached”, the precise terms of which depend upon the particular case.197 Where the accused is not of absolutely good character, the judge has a discretion whether or not to give a “good character” direction, and in what terms; the judge cannot properly decide not to do so if the character blemishes are irrelevant or of no significance in relation to the offence charged.198 The assessment of whether the accused is of good character is for the
jury; a direction that evidence of good character is destroyed by proof of convictions unless the convictions are trivial, or of little or no consequence, or so far removed in time as to be of no consequence, would be wrong in law.199 Section 110(1) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) is not explicit as to how evidence of the accused’s good character tendered by the defence may be used. But since the evidence is admissible notwithstanding the credibility rule, it must go to the issue of credibility if the accused testifies. And since s 110(1) is not expressed to apply notwithstanding s 56, the evidence of good character must be relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence. The content of the direction will depend upon the facts of each case. There is no ritual formula; the words, however, must make clear to the jury that they should have regard to the evidence of good character in assessing the accused’s credibility and in deciding whether they should be satisfied as to the accused’s guilt.200 From time to time judges have used expressions such as the following: The only comment I make with regard to evidence of good reputation or good character would be to say to you gentlemen that I suppose, in the case of every criminal, there was
[page 698] a time when he was a person of good repute. There has always got to be a first time, but it is for you to consider.
These words were considered by Gibbs J201 to denigrate the value of the good character evidence in that case so that, in the context of the judge’s charge generally, there was a misdirection.202 His Honour also regretted that the trial judge had not told the jury that in the event that they were in some doubt as to the honesty of the accused’s claim of right, his good character might tip the scales in his favour. This scales metaphor has been criticised in many cases on two grounds. First, it invokes the idea that good character is a matter to be used by the jury separately from the other evidence and only at a specific point in time in their deliberations.203 Secondly, the image of the scales — unless very carefully qualified — will lead the jury to believe that the accused bears some burden of proof.204
The wrongful admission of evidence that an accused charged with child sex abuse had been arrested on a similar charge earlier has been held to undermine the good character direction, and to cause prejudice probably incapable of being cured by jury direction.205
Rebuttal [19140] Common law: putting character in issue The bad character of the accused can be brought out at common law only when the accused has put character in issue. An attack on the character of the witnesses for the prosecution is not enough. … I do not see on what principle it could be said, that if a man does not go into the box and put his own character in issue, he can have evidence given against him of previous bad character when all that he has done is to attack the witnesses for the prosecution. The reason is that by attacking the witnesses for the prosecution and suggesting they are unreliable, he is not putting his character in issue; he is putting their character in issue.206
When does the accused put character into issue at common law? The most obvious way is to call witnesses to testify as to good character; indeed if character means reputation, it is not clear that the accused could testify to his or her own good character. More commonly evidence of particular acts or matters which show the accused in a good light207 may be given by the accused. In an unusual case208 counsel for the accused in crossexamination read to a witness a letter which spoke highly of his client’s good character. Notwithstanding that the letter was not put in evidence or even identified, the prosecutor was permitted to adduce evidence of prior convictions. It seems that if a witness testifies to the accused’s good character without premeditation — for example, in response to a question in [page 699] cross-examination — character will not normally be put in issue. In one case209 the question was asked by the accused’s counsel, but was not intended to elicit evidence of good character even though the answer to the matter in issue could incidentally be construed as showing the accused’s good character, while in another210 a witness who had been
called by an unrepresented defendant to do no more than prove a document blurted out his encomium of the accused without external stimulation. On the other hand it has been held that rebuttal cannot be shut out or restricted by confining the evidence of the accused’s good character to a particular period211 or trait.212 The character of the accused may exceptionally be put in issue by operation of law, as in the case of a child presumed to be doli incapax.213
[19145] Common law: modes of rebuttal It is possible to rebut evidence of the accused’s good character either by eliciting evidence of bad character in cross-examination of the accused or character witnesses called by the accused,214 or by leading extrinsic evidence of it. Despite some uncertainty215 and confusion216 in the earlier law, it now seems settled that a witness may be asked about the accused’s previous convictions.217 It is equally possible to ask about the accused’s previous bad acts, notwithstanding the rule as to the inadmissibility of evidence of good acts for the accused in chief.218 This seems to have been put beyond doubt by a case219 where such cross-examination was justified by the accused’s having put good character in issue, when it would not be countenanced on the basis of simple relevance to facts in issue.220 The evidence of bad character is not necessarily limited to the type of good character claimed by the accused.221 There have been suggestions that the witness can be cross-examined as to rumours about the accused,222 but this seems to have been an unfortunate attempt to restrict cross-examination to reputation, and to be inconsistent with subsequent [page 700] authority.223 No final decision was reached224 as to whether the witness could be cross-examined about a previous acquittal. The court seemed prepared to accept that the same principles apply at common law as apply under the statute relating to cross-examination of an accused. The House of Lords had held225 that an acquittal could not be used in crossexamination to the extent that it was relied upon to suggest that the
accused had really been guilty despite acquittal. It could, however, be put if relevant as a genuine acquittal, as for example by providing a reason for the accused to act carefully so as to avoid the danger of a further false accusation. It has already been noted that extrinsic evidence may be led to rebut a denial on a material issue. Thus, since the accused’s good character is relevant to the issue as well as to credibility, it would seem that a denial by a character witness of the accused’s previous convictions or bad acts could be rebutted by leading evidence. Adduction of the accused’s previous convictions has been upheld.226 The court has been prepared to allow evidence of specific bad acts.227 The prosecution may also adduce evidence to rebut evidence of the accused’s good character given by a witness called by the accused. In a leading case228 only Martin B had any doubt that in such a case the prosecution had such a right; the problem which caused most difficulty related to the nature of that evidence. The accused, who was charged with an offence of indecency, called witnesses to testify that he was a moral and well-conducted man, and the prosecution called a witness in rebuttal to swear that while he knew nothing of the opinion of the neighbourhood, the opinion of the witness and of his brothers who had attended the accused’s school, was that he was a man “capable of the grossest indecency and the most flagrant immorality”. It was not suggested that these three brothers constituted a community within which the accused’s reputation was bad. The dispute centred on the question of whether it was permissible for the witness to express his personal opinion of the accused’s disposition, or whether he was limited to reporting the reputation of the accused. The minority argued that the whole purpose of the evidence was to determine whether or not the accused had a disposition to acts of indecency upon which he had acted. It was more direct to derive it from the witness’s personal knowledge of that disposition than to try to infer it from the general consensus of opinion in the neighbourhood which constituted the accused’s reputation. The majority argued rather narrowly that precedent supported the view that as neither particular acts nor personal opinions could be given in support of the accused’s good character, it would be wrong to allow its refutation by different means.229 This defence is somewhat ironic, since the authorities were by no means so opposed to evidence either of particular acts230 or of personal
opinion231 as the court supposed, but arguments of general principle were available. If the evidence is [page 701] restricted to that of reputation, the trial can be insulated from the confusion, surprise and prejudice likely to be engendered by collateral attack in the form of counter-examples of particular discreditable acts. The fatal flaw in such an argument, however, is in the nature of the evidence being defended. Evidence of reputation, general or specific, is thoroughly unconvincing. It necessarily rests upon hearsay, gossip and rumour, and permits a witness to state something without perjury which the witness believes to be unjustified, and knows will be used as the foundation for an inference believed by the witness to be false. It is uncomfortable to have to rely upon a rule defended by the Supreme Court of the United States only on the ground that “to pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice”.232 It is hardly surprising to find that the rule was roundly condemned by commentators,233 ignored in practice,234 and rejected as a model for the construction of the much more important provisions introduced when the accused was made competent by legislation exemplified by the Criminal Evidence Act 1898.235 If defence counsel indicates to the trial judge a particular proposal to raise good character, the judge can require the Crown to indicate what evidence it might adduce in rebuttal.236 A further indication of the generally unsatisfactory state of this much neglected area of law is the uncertainty which attends the effect of this rebutting evidence. Evidence of good character is relevant to the question of guilt as well as to the credibility of the accused if the accused be a witness. Evidence of bad character will normally be relevant only to showing the accused’s true character.237 It will be seen in the two following chapters that the use that may lawfully be made of this true character is not to establish guilt via propensity; it may be used to destroy the accused’s assertion of good character and, where the accused testifies, to destroy credibility, or both. Where the accused is a witness, regard must be had also to the statutory restrictions on cross-examination of this nature
discussed in Chapter 12, “Evidence by Accused Persons”. Where evidence which incidentally reflects adversely on the accused’s character is admissible for some other reason, the jury may use the evidence for that reason only.238 Where a witness expresses an opinion of the accused’s character which suggests that in the witness’s opinion the accused would not have acted as alleged, it is impermissible to ask the witness to assume that the accused acted as alleged and then seek an opinion on the accused’s character.239 [page 702]
[19150] Statute Section 110(2)–(3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), which applies only in criminal proceedings (s 109), provides: (2) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not generally a person of a good character. (3) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not a person of good character in that respect.
It follows from s 110(3) that the accused’s character is divisible: a claim of good character in one respect is not to be rebutted by proof of bad character in another respect. The defendant is not to be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence tendered under s 110(2)–(3) without leave: s 112.240 The expression “evidence adduced” first appearing in s 110(2) refers to evidence given by the accused in chief or adduced in chief from witnesses called by the accused, adduced by cross-examination on behalf of the accused of other witnesses, and given by the accused nonresponsively in cross-examination.241 “Good character” means disposition and general good character.242
Co-accused [19155] Common law
Another area largely governed by common law rules is that dealing with evidence of the bad character of a co-accused. It is not wholly governed by the common law since cross-examination of a co-accused is subject to the provisions of the various statutes modelled on the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng), and will be dealt with in Chapter 12, “Evidence by Accused Persons”. This part is concerned with the question of how far other witnesses can be cross-examined about the co-accused’s character, and how far evidence of the bad character of a co-accused can be led either to rebut any denial, or simply to inculpate the co-accused. A convenient starting point is provided by a case243 in which the coaccused were charged with offences in connection with the evasion of customs duties. The defence of one of them was that he had not been concerned, and that the offences were all committed by another of the coaccused. In pursuance of that defence he asked a witness for the prosecution whether or not it was true that the offences stopped when that co-accused was sent to prison, and restarted only after he was released. Devlin J held that such a question was perfectly proper, and that if necessary it could be justified by calling evidence in support. In his judgment a [page 703] co-accused was bound only by considerations of relevance, though such relevance would require careful consideration, and the decision: does not open the field to any question of this kind by counsel for an accused person against the character of another accused…. In the ordinary way the character of the accused is no more relevant at the hands of the defence than it is at the hands of the prosecution.244
The authority of that decision has been accepted by the Privy Council245 and by the English Court of Appeal.246 In both, the question arose out of a similarly “cut-throat” defence. In the Privy Council case only the two co-accused were present when a young girl was viciously murdered. The crime must have been committed by one or the other, or by both acting in concert. Each accused adduced evidence of the unlikelihood of his having committed the murder. In the case of Lowery the evidence took the form of evidence of his reputation, his aversion to the sadism involved in the murder, and his generally favourable prospects
and happy family circumstances motivating him towards good behaviour. King, Lowery’s co-accused, sought to adduce expert psychiatric testimony indicating that of the two, Lowery had the personality more disposed towards the commission of acts of the type in question. Each supplemented this evidence with direct testimony of the other’s dominant role at the time of the incident. The expert evidence called by King was admitted at the trial over Lowery’s protests, and the decision was upheld both by the Victorian Full Court, and in the Privy Council. The Privy Council took pains to deny that the psychiatric evidence was related either to crime or to criminal tendencies,247 or even amounted to evidence of the character of the two men.248 It is hard to square this approach to the nature of character evidence with the Privy Council’s earlier statement that an accused person puts character in issue when the jury is asked to take the view that the accused person is not one who would be disposed to have committed or would be likely to have committed the crime in question.249 It is also instructive to note that the Privy Council endorsed the view of the court below that the evidence could not have been led by the prosecution. It may be best to regard it as a case very much influenced by its special facts,250 and the way in which the case was run. The psychiatric evidence might well have been regarded as inappropriate for use by the prosecution, either because its prejudicial effect which may have been vast would then have exceeded its true probative value which may have been small, or because it was simply irrelevant to the contention of the prosecution that the two men were acting in concert. [page 704] In the English Court of Appeal case,251 just as in the Privy Council case, two men were charged with a brutal murder, this time that of a very old man in the course of a burglary. Each claimed that the killing was done by the other when alone with the victim. Bracewell wished to cross-examine his co-accused’s mistress, his own sister, who was a witness for the prosecution, about violent and uncontrolled attacks which his co-accused had made upon her. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s refusal to permit such cross-examination at that stage, on the basis that it was
insufficiently relevant, and because it was, unlike the evidence in the first two cases discussed, controversial and thus capable of raising a confusing collateral issue. However, Lockwood, the co-accused, had himself tried to cast the blame upon Bracewell by contrasting his own professional coolness as an experienced burglar with Bracewell’s panicky inexperience. The Court of Appeal took the view that this put his character in issue, and that Bracewell could, for that reason alone, cross-examine him about his uncontrollable episodes of violence towards his mistress, and — if they were denied — adduce evidence of them. It is immaterial that the co-accused are acting not as part of a joint enterprise, but individually, if their acts so overlap as to engender a defence drawing a comparison between them.252 In a later case253 the co-accused were charged with an assault. Each advanced a defence of alibi, but neither testified. Knutton sought to crossexamine a police witness about the motivation and involvement of his coaccused. The trial judge then permitted cross-examination of the witness as to Knutton’s lengthy criminal record. It was sought to justify such cross-examination upon analogy with s 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) either on the basis that Knutton, by making the implicit comparison, had put his own character in issue, or that he was attacking his co-accused’s character, and that his own character should be exposed on a tit-for-tat basis. Neither contention was accepted by the Court of Appeal. It was held that Knutton’s character was irrelevant in the light of his defence of alibi and of the fact that the offence easily could have been, and was alleged to have been, committed by both in concert rather than by one or the other, and that the cross-examination did nothing to diminish Knutton’s bad character, merely suggesting that his co-accused was no better. On the second point the analogy to attacks under s 1(f)(ii) was rejected on the basis that this part of the statute will not sustain such an analogy, and that on analysis the cross-examination did not amount to an attack on the character of the co-accused since it consisted merely of imputations which were denied. This part of the reasoning seems unconvincing since that is very often the case when cross-examination under the statutory provision is permitted on this ground. The importance of the nature of the defence in determining the relevance of the evidence was further stressed in a case254 in which Neale’s defence to charges of arson and manslaughter arising out of a fire in an
institution was that he was not present at the relevant time. He wished to adduce evidence that his co-accused, Burr, had on two previous and two subsequent occasions set fires while acting alone. It was held that the only question to be considered was whether or not the evidence was relevant to his defence. It was decided that it was not, because even if [page 705] accepted it could not logically found an inference that on this occasion Burr was not acting alone, but in concert with Neale. The logic of that argument would seem to be equally applicable whether Neale’s argument were that he was not present at all, or that, although present, he did not participate. It is possible to derive from these cases a reasonably coherent pattern of admissibility. At one end of the scale there will be cases, though none of these are among them, where the evidence of the accused’s evil disposition will be so strong, and so relevant to the case of both prosecution and co-accused, that it will be admissible at the instance of either. The next position on the spectrum of relevance is occupied by the situation255 where the bad character of one co-accused is necessarily brought out by evidence which is clearly relevant to the defence of the other co-accused, though not at all to the case for the prosecution. There too the co-accused is entitled to cross-examine a witness,256 and to lead evidence, without waiting for character to be put in issue and without the need to balance probative effect against possible prejudice (both of which are required in the case where such evidence is led by the prosecution), and without any danger of the exercise of judicial discretion to prevent the co-accused employing these tactics.257 The next gradation258 is that in which the evidence is not sufficiently relevant to the issues either for the prosecution, or for the co-accused. It seems to be the case that the accused may, however, introduce general evidence of good character, even though it would not meet the standard required for either prosecution or co-accused. It seems reasonable that when good character has been claimed by such evidence that a co-accused should be permitted to attempt to rebut it by evidence coming up to the
same standard of relevance. If one co-accused attacks the character of the other without making any comparison with his or her own character, then cross-examination of the co-accused on the analogy of the tit-for-tat principle of the Australian equivalents to s 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng).259 The final position on the spectrum arises where260 the evidence is insufficiently relevant either at the instance of prosecution or of coaccused, good character is not claimed by the co-accused and no attack is made by one co-accused upon the character of the other. Here is no ground for its admission. A type of instance which is not on the scale at all exists where the evidence, while demonstrative of bad character on the part of one coaccused, is admissible at the instance of the other because it renders the latter’s version of events more probable [page 706] than the former’s.261
[19160] Statute Section 111 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides: (1) The hearsay rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence of a defendant’s character if: (a) the evidence is evidence of an opinion about the defendant adduced by another defendant; and (b) the person whose opinion it is has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (c) the opinion is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) If such evidence has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove that that evidence should not be accepted.
A defendant is not to be cross-examined on matters arising out of the evidence without leave: s 112.262 Factors relevant to the grant of leave are set out in s 192 and must be taken into account.263 This operates more narrowly than the general law described in [19155]. “Good character” means disposition and general good reputation.264
D — PARTIES TO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS Relevance of character [19165] Varieties of relevance Evidence of character may be relevant in civil proceedings in a number of different ways. Quite apart from its possible relevance as similar fact evidence265 it may itself be in issue, as in defamation cases, or it may be used to impugn the credibility of a party witness. It seems that the general good character of a party may not be adduced, unlike that of the accused in criminal proceedings.266 In criminal cases evidence of the good character of the accused is most properly and with good reason admissible in evidence, because there is a fair and just presumption that a person of good character would not commit a crime; but in civil cases such evidence is with equal good reason not admitted, because no presumption would fairly arise, in the very great proportion of such cases, from the good character of the defendant, that he did not commit the breach of contract or of civil duty alleged against him.267
[page 707] As one would expect, exactly the same rule applies to evidence of good character of the plaintiff.268 A plaintiff’s character may be directly in issue on the question of liability in an action for defamation when justification is pleaded, and the question whether specific acts, rumours or reputation can be received will depend upon the pleadings in the particular case.269 The plaintiff’s character is also relevant to the amount of damages recoverable in proceedings for defamation. The plaintiff may lead evidence of good general reputation in the relevant sector, but not evidence of particular facts in support of the claim to have such a reputation.270 The evidence which might be adduced in mitigation of damages for defamation must be confined to the plaintiff’s reputation, and might not consist of rumours or testimony concerning specific acts.271 The evidence of reputation must relate to the segment of the plaintiff’s life to which the defamation relates. It can be difficult to draw a sharp distinction between evidence of specific acts and evidence of reputation. Although evidence of specific acts is not admissible to show
that they were performed, it may be admissible to show that the plaintiff has the reputation of being a person who is in the habit of performing such acts.272 Such matters as rumours and specific acts may be put to the plaintiff in cross-examination as to credit, the answers are final in accordance with the general rule, and the court must endeavour to separate the issue of credibility from that concerning the quantum of damages when it sums up to the jury.273 In an action for defamation, the plaintiff’s previous convictions for offences relevant to the alleged defamation may be proved in mitigation of damages as well as in cross-examination to credit: They are the raw material upon which bad reputation is built up. They have taken place in open court. They are matters of public knowledge. They are accepted by people generally as the best guide to his reputation and standing.274
The exclusionary rules of the law of evidence play a very limited role in modern civil law, and it is certain that there are very many more examples of evidence of the character of a party being adduced without the slightest advertence to this branch of the law.
Section 4 — Rehabilitation of a Witness A — MODES OF SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY Common law and statute [19170] Common law As noted above ([19005]) it is generally impermissible to support the credibility [page 708] of a witness in advance of an attack, even when one is reasonably anticipated.275 The witness may, of course, deny any allegation made in cross-examination and, if necessary, the witness will be given wide scope in re-examination to explain any answers damaging to credit276 or to proffer reasons for the answers.277 These matters are dealt with in Chapter 9, “The Course of the Trial”. If the allegation is made in crossexamination not of that witness but of a subsequent witness, the impugned witness may even be recalled for re-examination in order to have an opportunity to make such a denial.278 If a witness were impeached by calling evidence as to lack of veracity, it was always open to a party to call a witness in rebuttal to affirm it.279 There seems to have been some confusion as to the permissibility of adducing evidence to rebut a specific allegation of misconduct falling short of the commission of a crime, when such an allegation was permitted.280 It can certainly be argued that the same need to conduct a trial expeditiously which dictates the general rule that denials should not be rebutted by extrinsic evidence should be applied to evidence in support of them. On the other hand, some have felt that a
simple denial in response to cross-examination may be too unconvincing a response, at least when the allegation can be answered conclusively.281 It is even less clear whether, when a witness has been cross-examined about particular facts, testimony of general character can be led to rehabilitate the witness. In one case,282 not only was evidence of good general conduct after serving a term of imprisonment permitted to rehabilitate the witness against the effect of the conviction, but evidence of particular good acts was also allowed. Rehabilitation can take the form of proving an absence of criminal convictions, that being some evidence of general good character.283 Where a witness’s credit is attacked on the ground of conduct apparently inconsistent with the testimony, it may be rehabilitated by reexamination designed to explain the apparent inconsistency.284 Not only may the rehabilitating evidence come from the impeached witness, it may also come from another witness.285 That witness may be an expert where the requirements for opinion evidence are satisfied.286 The significance of this for present purposes lies in the acceptance by the court of the principle that psychological evidence may be received to rehabilitate credit where the attack is based on apparently inconsistent conduct. Such evidence, [page 709] of course, cannot be permitted merely to bolster the oath of the witness under attack or to place before the jury an opinion that the witness is telling the truth. Even within permissible bounds, however, this evidence will not be readily admitted since the court will be cautious lest the accused be subjected to a trial by experts rather than a trial by jury.287
[19175] Statute Section 108(1) and (3) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides:288 (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in re-examination of a witness. (3) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness
if: (a) evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted; or (b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or re-constructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of suggestion; and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence of the prior consistent statement.
These provisions appear to correspond with the general law: [17305]–[17315]. 1 “Good character” was said in Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359 to be the opposite of bad
character. In a sense this is true. But good character is often the absence of bad character rather than any positive attribute, as is the case where the prosecutor, when asked about a convicted person, announces “Nothing known”. Moreover, it will be seen in [23280] that the expression “character” whether used in statute or in ordinary speech contains ambiguity. It may mean repute, it may mean disposition or it may refer to the inferences to be drawn from proved instances of conduct. 2 “Disposition” is used to mean a continuing propensity to behave in some way or with some state of mind. “Reputation” means the general opinion held of a person by members of that person’s circle. In this sense, it refers to the known manifestations of the person’s character and is best considered as a means of proving character rather than as a personal attribute of the person. 3 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 842 (CA); see also Bamfield v Massey (1808) 1 Camp 460 at 461. 4 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 at [49]. 5 Such introductory questioning of the accused in a criminal case should be very carefully confined so as to avoid any suggestion that it amounts to giving evidence of good character under the Australian equivalents to the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (Eng) s 1(f)(ii) and s 110 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT); see R v Coulman (1927) 20 Cr App R 106 (regular employment); R v Baldwin [1925] All ER Rep 402 (marital status). See [23275]. 6 Coombe v Bessell (1994) 4 Tas R 149. 7 R v Robinson [1994] 3 All ER 346 (CA); R v Nelson [1982] Qd R 636 (CCA); R v Tobin [2003] Crim LR 408 (CA) is of questionable correctness. 8 Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366 (CA) where the court was deliberately left with the impression that a police witness, sued for assault, had retained the rank of chief inspector, when he had in fact been demoted to sergeant for being concerned with the presentation of false evidence to a court. If the circumstances came to light after appeal processes are no longer available, a conviction may be quashed as having been obtained by fraud: R v Knightsbridge Crown Court; Ex parte Goonatilleke [1986] QB 1. 9 See [17170] ff. 10 See [17250] ff. 11 R v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 (NSW SC) (lie detector); R v McKay [1967] NZLR 139 (CA) (truth drug), where even the offer to submit to the drug was rejected; Corke v Corke [1958] P 93 (CA); Phillion v R [1978] 1 SCR 18; Mallard v R (2003) 28 WAR 1 (lie detector). The tenderers of the evidence in these cases were faced with the further difficulty that the opinion evidence which was offered was in effect an opinion as to guilt or innocence — a matter reserved for the jurors, not for a scientist. See [29105]. This is different from the case where hypnosis or some drug is used as part of treatment of an amnesiac and restores recollection of the events in issue: Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195; R v Barker [1954] Crim LR 423. In Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 (PC) one accused was permitted to lead psychiatric evidence that his version of the
incident was more likely to be true than that given by his co-accused. But see the reservations in R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 842 (CA). 12 It is for this reason that evidence supporting the credit of a witness whose credit has not been impugned is said to be irrelevant. A consequence of this view is that if, by error or inadvertence, evidence of good character is led in these circumstances, the party adversely affected cannot complain of injustice, for the illicit evidence has merely supported a conclusion which the court would draw in any event: R v Moore 1948 (2) SA 227. 13 Practice Direction [1966] 2 All ER 929, though the prosecution is under no obligation to go beyond the revelation of previous convictions in disclosing matter which might impugn the credibility of one of its witnesses: R v Collister and Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr App R 100. See also R v Crown Court at Harrow; Ex parte Dave [1994] 1 All ER 315 (DC of QBD). 14 But not necessarily to the jury, as this remains a matter ultimately within the discretion of prosecuting counsel: R v Carey (1968) 52 Cr App R 305. 15 See ALRC 102 [12.1]–[12.19]. The definition is said to be a response to Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96. 16 See ALRC 26 [784]–[823], Bill clauses 82-88; ALRC 38 [172]–[181], Bill clauses 94–101 and R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 at [23]. 17 R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 at [26]. It is permissible to tender in chief the Crown undertaking not to prosecute: R v Booth [1982] 2 NSWLR 847 (NSW CCA); R v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300 at [27]–[28] (position unaffected by s 102 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). The evidence is not tendered as being relevant only to the credibility of a witness, because it is tendered pursuant to the Crown’s duty of fairness to the accused to lay out before the jury the status of that witness without that status being dragged out in cross-examination in a manner which might not be favourable to the interests of the accused. Other instances of evidence not going to an issue but falling outside s 102 are the name and address of a witness and the qualifications of an expert. 18 R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 at [27]–[29]. 19 As noted above at [17295]. See also J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [896]. This is not to say that the party may not call witnesses whose evidence differs inter se: Kabadanis v Panagiotou (1980) 30 ALR 374 (Fed C of A FC); Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd (2010) 275 ALR 293 at [63]–[67]. See [17370] above. 20 [17380] n 609. 21 See [17380]–[17400]. In particular, s 102 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible, and s 102 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) provides that evidence that is relevant only to a witness’s credibility is not admissible. There are no exceptions permitting a party to impeach the credibility of a witness called by that party, save that s 38 permits certain crossexamination of unfavourable witnesses, and s 38(3) permits that cross-examination on matters relevant only to credibility with the leave of the court. 22 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR), discussed further below at [19105] ff. 23 Though there are dicta to the contrary in Fenton v Hughes (1802) 7 Ves 287 at 290, and in R v Ball (1839) 8 C & P 745 at 746, the point seems settled by R v Chapman (1838) 8 C & P 558 at 559; Dunn v Aslett (1838) 2 Mood & R 122 at 123; and Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878 at 890 (QB). 24 In Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [34] McHugh J said: “the finality rule concerning collateral matters does not prevent a witness being contradicted as to facts that are immediately connected with the facts in issue or facts relevant to the facts in issue. Thus, whether the opportunity to observe a relevant fact is or is not a collateral matter, the practice of the common law courts has been to admit evidence that shows that a witness did not have the opportunity to make the observation. Common law judges have taken the view that the opportunity
to observe an event is so closely connected with the observation that it should not be regarded as a collateral matter falling within the finality rule. So ordinarily a party may contradict an opposing witness’s evidence concerning the time, place and lighting of, and distance from, the scene of an event, if the event is itself relevant.” In Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595 at 608 Lord Pearce said: “If a witness purported to give evidence of something which he believed that he had seen at a distance of fifty yards, it must surely be possible to call the evidence of an oculist to the effect that the witness could not possibly see anything at a greater distance than twenty yards, or the evidence of a surgeon who had removed a cataract from which the witness was suffering at the material time and which would have prevented him from seeing what he thought he saw.” That was extended to mental states in that case: see [19050]. 25 R v Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271. 26 Humphries v R (1987) 17 FCR 182 at 186 (Fed C of A FC); cf S v Damalis 1984 (2) SA 105; Roberts v Western Australia (2005) 29 WAR 445 at [54]–[83], [150] and [187]. 27 Vassiliades v Vassiliades (1941) 18 Cyprus LR 10 at 22 (PC); Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247 at 260 (PC). See too the statutes listed in [17505] nn 830 and 833. 28 Re Mundell; Fenton v Cumberlage (1883) 48 LT 776 at 778. 29 In Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 467, Dixon J took the view that at common law questions had to be restricted to convictions for offences involving the veracity of the witness. Holmes J was of the same view in Gertz v Fitchburg Railroad Co 137 Mass 77 (1884) at 78. See also Altobello v Borden Confectionary Products Inc 872 F 2d 215; 1989 US App at 216 (7th Cir 1989) per Judge Posner. 30 Second Report of Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiry into the Process, Practice and Pleading in the Superior Courts of Law (1853) at 21. Cf J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [980]; Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 465. 31 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 s 6. For historical background see M Ladd, “Impeachment of One’s Own Witness—New Developments” 4 U of Chi LR 69 (1936). The statute is now found in all Australian jurisdictions: in the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) it is necessary that the conviction substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness under s 103(1)); and see Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 106(b); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 16; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 26; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 23(1) (convictions for indictable offences only). The cross-examiner may therefore be bound by a denial or non-responsive answer as to a previous conviction which goes only to credit: Pennell v Carruthers Bros Pty Ltd (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 896 at 900 (FC), following Williams J in Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 475. But see the criticism of this proposition by L Katz, “Extrinsic Proof of Prior Conviction to Impeach Credibility in New South Wales” (1990) 6 Aust Bar Rev 176, pointing out that Dixon J at 465, Wigmore and various old authorities are to the contrary, and that the approval given to Williams J in Pennell’s case was an obiter dictum. 32 Ward v Sinfield (1880) 49 LJKB (NS) 696 (CPD); Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 458, 471 and 475; Clifford v Clifford [1961] 3 All ER 231 at 232; Bickel v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 at 494; R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 741. But see R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 at 320; R v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437 (CA). 33 The marginal note to the section suggests that it was principally designed to facilitate such proof. 34 As to whether a false denial could always provide the basis for a charge of perjury, see R v Baker [1895] 1 QB 797 (CCCR); R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316. 35 The terms of the provisions vary: see [17505] nn 830 and 833. Furthermore, at common law the judge has power to disallow a question which is not relevant to any issue nor to the credibility of the witness: Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 (FC); R v Noud; Ex parte MacNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86 at 94–6 (FC). 36 R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 742 (CCA).
37 R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 (CCA). 38 Five years for children. 39 Section 5(3)(b). 40 Section 8. 41 Evidence Act 1977 s 15A. For other legislative attempts to deal with the problem of spent
convictions, see UK: Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, considered in Thomas v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1997] QB 813 (CA); Cth: Crimes Act 1914 s 85ZZH; NSW: Criminal Records Act 1991; WA: Spent Convictions Act 1988. 42 Section 6(a). 43 Robinson v Laws [2003] 1 Qd R 81. 44 Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 at 545. 45 In the early nineteenth century there was an analogous privilege in respect of questions the answers to which would disgrace the witness. 46 Hobbs v C T Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 at 51 (CA). 47 These principles still allow considerable latitude to a cross-examiner: see R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299 (CA), where it was put to a witness not only that she was generally unreliable but that she suffered from hallucinations, was a prostitute and a deliberate perjurer. 48 R v Edwards [1991] 2 All ER 266. See also R v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35 (Vic FC); R Pattenden, “Evidence of Previous Malpractice by Police Witnesses and R v Edwards” [1992] Crim LR 549; R v Guney (1998) 2 Cr App R 242; R v Twitchell [2000] 1 Cr App R 373; R v Malik [2000] 2 Cr App R 8. 49 See also R v Irish [1995] Crim LR 145 (CA). 50 See R v Thorne (1977) 66 Cr App R 6; R v Hay (1983) 77 Cr App R 70; R v Doosti (1985) 82 Cr App R 181; R v Cooke (1986) 84 Cr App R 286; R v Lucas [1993] Crim LR 599, and R v Gale [1994] Crim LR 208 (CA). Cf R v Dick 1982 Tas R 252. 51 See Humphries v R (1987) 17 FCR 182 (Fed C of A FC); [19015] n 26. 52 Ready v Brown (1968) 118 CLR 165. 53 Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 (Fed C of A FC) (rule described as a rule of practice related to the management of litigation); Bannister v R (1993) 10 WAR 484 (CCA); R v Somers [1999] Crim LR 744 (CA). 54 R v Busby (1982) 75 Cr App R 79. See also R v Knightsbridge Crown Court; Ex parte Goonatilleke [1986] QB 1 at 11 (DC of QBD) (“a matter going to the credit of a witness in a criminal case cannot be said to be collateral to the vital issue; … especially where … the witness in question provides the only evidence upon that issue”); R v Marsh (1985) 83 Cr App R 165; R v Barton (1986) 85 Cr App R 5; R v S [1992] Crim LR 307 (CA) (rebutting evidence more likely to be admitted on confined than on wide and complex issues). In Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [41] McHugh J said that Goonatilleke’s case, R v Chandu Nagrecha [1997] 2 Cr App R 401 (CA) and R v Marsh “blurred the distinction between collateral facts and facts in issue”. 55 See [17580]–[17590]. 56 J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [845] (emphasis in original). See generally J H Phillips, “Impeachment for Bias of Evidence of Witness to Collateral Matters” (1988) 62 ALJ 288; W G Hale, “Bias as Afflicting Credibility” (1949) 1 Hastings LJ 1. 57 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 100 (Ex). 58 Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350 at 351; R v Finnessey (1906) 11 Ont LR 338 (CA). See also R v Mendy (1976) 64 Cr App R 4. 59 Yewin’s Case, unreported, noted in Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637 at 638–9 (apprentice, having been charged with robbing his master, threatened revenge by having the master jailed); R v Shaw (1888) 16 Cox CC 503 (witness desiring revenge due to quarrel); Hall v Marchant (witness wished to “get even” with employer who dismissed him without providing a reference); Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden’s Ltd [1972] VR 732; aff’d Bakopoulos v General Motors Holdens Pty Ltd
[1973] VR 190 (FC) (witness’s desire to punish a party for having frustrated a marriage arranged for the witness’s sister); Smith v R (1993) 9 WAR 99 (CCA) (ward’s motive to make false complaint against foster father because he expelled her from his house for taking drugs); MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 at [88]–[92] (bias not established). 60 Nicholls v R (2005) 219 CLR 196 at [265]. 61 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 100 (Ex). 62 R v Umanski [1961] VR 242 at 244 (FC). 63 R v Harrington [1998] 3 VR 531 at 539 (CA). 64 R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 295 (CCA). 65 Hudd v R (1987) 75 ALR 143 at 146 and 149–50 (Fed C of A FC). 66 R v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 at [30]. 67 R v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295 at [91]. 68 Trial of William Viscount Stafford (1680) 7 How St Tr 1293 at 1342 and 1400–2; Trial of Sir Miles Stapleton (1681) 8 How St Tr 501 at 518–19; Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar (1775) 20 How St Tr 923 at 1035–6; Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 101; Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878 at 881; People v Alcalde 148 P 2d 627 at 630 (SC Cal in banc, 1944); cf Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637 (according to J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [1005], n 4, this case “has been universally treated as erroneous”). 69 Jackson v Thomason (1861) 8 Jur NS 134; Alward v Oaks 65 NW 270 (SC Minn in banc, 1895). 70 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 106 (Ex). In that case a bribe was only offered to, not accepted by, the witness, and the exception did not apply: see [17580]. 71 R v Denley [1970] Crim LR 583. 72 R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400 at [22]–[39]. 73 Roberts v Commonwealth 20 SW 267 at 268 (CA Ky, 1892). 74 Barkly v Copeland 15 P 307 at 309 (SC Cal in banc, 1887). 75 Nicholls v R (2005) 219 CLR 196. 76 Moriarty v London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1870) LR 5 QB 314. 77 Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden’s Ltd [1972] VR 732; aff’d Bakopoulos v General Motors Holdens Pty Ltd [1973] VR 190 (FC). 78 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Br & B 284 at 311–13 (KB); Nicholls v R (2005) 219 CLR 196. 79 R v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105 (Fed C of A FC). 80 Wigmore traces the rule back to 1664. 81 R v O’Coigly (1798) 26 St Tr 1191 at 32. 82 R v Rudge (1805) Peake Add Cas 232. 83 See Mawson v Hartsink (1802) 4 Esp 102; Carlos v Brook (1804) 10 Ves Jun 49 at 50; R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116 at 152; R v Brown and Hedley (1867) 10 Cox CC 453 (CCCR); R v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 (CCA). 84 R v Bispham (1830) 4 C & P 392. 85 R v Hemp (1835) 5 C & P 468. 86 None of the Lords of Appeal, nor any of the counsel, in Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595 could recall its ever having happened, and leading counsel for the prosecution was Mr J H Buzzard, first Treasury Counsel, editor of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice and Phipson on Evidence (11th, 12th and 13th eds), a lawyer of quite unrivalled experience of criminal trials. 87 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595. See also R v Moloney (1888) 14 VLR 934; R v Hanrahan (1964) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 459 at 460 (CCA); Bell v R (1985) 7 FCR 555 at 563 (FC); R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288 at [10]–[48]; PDW v R (2009) 197 A Crim R 1 at [49]–[61]; R v J, SM(2013) 117 SASR 535 (like the court in R v BDX, the court saw the matter as only capable of change by the High Court or the legislature). 88 R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299 (CA).
89 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 (PC). The facts are set out in [19155] below. 90 It was so considered in R v Turner [1975] QB 834. In Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR
370 at [35] McHugh J introduced his statement of the holding with the words “went so far as to hold”. 91 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595 at 609 overruling R v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 (CCA). See also Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 95 (Exch); R v Hill (1851) 20 LJMC 222 at 225 (CCCR); R v Dunning [1965] Crim LR 372 (CCA); Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 322; R v Edwards (1986) 20 A Crim R 463 (WAFC). 92 See R v Ashcroft [1965] Qd R 81 at 85 (CCA); R v McKenney (1981) 72 Cr App R 78 (CCC). 93 See [29050]. The attempt in R v MacKenney to limit the decision in Toohey’s case to total incapacity to tell the truth appears to be inconsistent with the last sentence of Lord Pearce’s speech quoted above. 94 R v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99. 95 Jackson v R (1962) 108 CLR 591. Expert medical evidence of the accused’s condition at the time of confession, adduced to impugn its reliability, was admitted in R v Kilner [1976] Crim LR 740; R v Davis [1979] Crim LR 167; and R v Powell [1980] Crim LR 39. See too R S O’Regan, “Impugning the Credit of the Accused by Psychiatric Evidence” [1975] Crim LR 563. 96 R v McKay [1967] NZLR 139 at 153 (CA); R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 842 (CA). See also R v Moore [1982] 1 NZLR 242 (CA). But see Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 where a conviction was quashed for the rejection of this evidence. See [29050] below. 97 Jackson v R (1962) 108 CLR 591 at 596. 98 See ALRC 26 [784]–[823], Bill clauses 82–88; ALRC 38 [172]–[181], Bill clauses 94–101; ALRC 102 [12.1]–[12.137]. 99 This is probably a higher test than relevance: cf Jovanovski v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 372 at [22] (“substantial probative value” is a higher test than relevance). 100 R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 163 (CCA). See State Rail Authority NSW v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540. See generally Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 185 ALR 463 at [40]–[41] (Fed C of A); R v Burns (2003) 137 A Crim R 557 (convictions for dishonesty). 101 Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; see [17580]–[17595]. 102 J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 7th Aust ed, 2004, [19055]. 103 In the Cth Act, the words are “a witness”. 104 See ALRC 102 [12.108]–[12.133]. The goal is to enact the opinion of Lord Pearce in Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 at 512. 105 See [19015] above. 106 R v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35 (Vic FC); Duff v R (1979) 28 ALR 663 at 689 (Fed C of A FC). See too [21210]. 107 Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98, followed in R v Katipa [1986] 2 NZLR 121 (CA). The criticisms of the case in the text are referred to in R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400 at [9]. 108 As in R v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35 (Vic FC). See too S v Letsoko 1964 (4) SA 768 (AD) and Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 476. 109 R v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; R v Tissington (1843) 1 Cox CC 48. 110 R v Hodgson (1812) Russ & Ry 211 (KB). 111 R v Cockroft (1870) 11 Cox CC 410; R v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334. 112 R v Barker (1829) 3 C & P 589; R v Hay (1851) 5 Cox CC 146; R v Greatbanks [1959] Crim LR 450; R v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692. 113 R v Martin (1834) 6 C & P 562; R v Fitzgibbon (1885) 11 VLR 232 (FC); R v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481 (CCCR). 114 R v Turner [1944] KB 463 (CCA); Gregory v R (1983) 151 CLR 566 at 571, where it was said that such evidence went not to credit but to a matter in issue.
115 R v Barker (1829) 3 C & P 589. It should be noted that in Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350;
R v Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271, and R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299 (CA), it was accepted that an allegation of prostitution impugned the credit of a witness. 116 See R v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 at 474: “Evidence which proves that a woman is in the habit of submitting her body to different men without discrimination whether for pay or not, would seem to be admissible.” 117 Including the reluctance of trial judges to use their statutory and common law powers to prevent the excesses of cross-examiners who were permitted to play upon the prejudices and assumptions of jurors as to the behaviour of rape victims: R v Gun (1977) 17 SASR 165. 118 Qld: Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (see R v RH [2005] 1 Qd R 180); NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 293; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 Pt 8.2 (see C v R (1991) 59 A Crim R 46 (Vic FC); R v Parsons [1998] 1 VR 471 (CA); R v O’Neill (2003) 7 VR 408); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 194M; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 34L; WA: Evidence Act 1906 ss 36A–36BC; ACT: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 ss 48–53; NT: Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act 1983 s 4. The South Australian legislation was substantially amended in 1984. For an examination of those provisions before the amendment and of the legislation in the other States, see P McNamara, “Cross-examination of the Complainant in a Trial for Rape” (1981) 5 Crim LJ 25. The Cth: Evidence Act 1995, the NSW: Evidence Act 1995, Tas: Evidence Act 2001, Vic: Evidence Act 2008 and ACT: Evidence Act 2011 have no corresponding provisions beyond the general sections relating to credibility of witnesses (ss 102, 103 and 106). On the application of s 102 in the context of expert evidence that a child alleging an assault by the accused may have been sexually assaulted by another, seeHG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [72]–[74] and [125]. See also Cth: Crimes Act 1914 ss 15YB–15YD. 119 R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 at 520 (CCA). See also R v Miller (2007) 177 A Crim R 528 at [38]. 120 A cross-examination as to a conviction of loitering for the purposes of prostitution was said to fall within this prohibition in R v Lear [1998] 1 VR 285 at 296. 121 R v Hinds [1979] Crim LR 111. See also R v White (1989) 18 NSWLR 332 at 341 (CCA) (distinguished R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 519 (CCA)); R v Ugolini (1989) 51 SASR 303 (CCA). In R v Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73 (CA), no regard was paid to these words at all and the court appears to have accepted that evidence of the complainant’s having made unaccepted, and less than explicit, sexual advances to particular men, and having a naked man in her flat, amounted to evidence of her sexual experience. Compare Beck v R [1984] WAR 127 (CCA) (evidence that woman had previously cut man’s pubic hair not within statute unless followed by sexual intercourse). 122 See R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 (CCA). 123 One of the allegations in R v Barker (1829) 3 C & P 589. 124 R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 (CCA); R v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120 at [20]; cf R v Allingham [1991] 1 Qd R 429 (FC). In New South Wales and Tasmania the statute expressly deals with this situation. In Tasmania the expression “sexual experience” is defined very widely to include any sexual activity or sexual behaviour of the complainant or the disposition of the complainant in sexual matters or the lack of sexual experience of the complainant: Evidence Act 2001 s 194M(6). See also, for NSW, which uses the words “sexual experience or lack of sexual experience”, R v White (1989) 18 NSWLR 332 (CCA) (distinguished R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 519 (CCA)); M v R (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 at 554–5 (NSWCCA). 125 R v G (1997) 42 NSWLR 451 at 457–8 and 460–1 (CCA); HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [29]–[31], [69]–[70], [91]–[92], [124]–[147]. The court also briefly discussed the application of NSW: Crimes Act 1900 s 409B(3)(b) and (c) (now Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 293(4)). See also R v Bauer [2006] 1 Qd R 420. 126 BG v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 34 at [79].
127 BG v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 34 at [78]. 128 “Res gestae” here means things so close in space or time to the matter being proved as to be
inseparable from it: Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [110]. 129 Beck v R [1984] WAR 127 (a case on repealed WA legislation in similar form to the Qld legislation). 130 Tasmania v Martin (No 2) (2011) 20 Tas R 445 at [105]–[110]. 131 See [19080] n 118. In Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [56] the majority said: “Western Australia is alone in having a provision forbidding evidence relating to the ‘disposition of the complainant in sexual matters’”. However, the same result is achieved in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory by reason of limitations on the court’s power to grant leave. 132 Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [115]. The dissenters preferred the approach of Kennedy J in Bannister v R (1993) 10 WAR 484 at 488 (CCA). 133 Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [59]. 134 Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [22], [41] and [141]. See also Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; VOT v Western Australia (2008) 37 WAR 129. 135 NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 293(4) (formerly Crimes Act 1900 s 409B(3)). The seven circumstances set out in paras (a), (b), (c), (d)(i), (d)(ii), (e) and (f) include the case where the sexual experience took place at or about the time of the commission of the offence (s 293(4)(a) (i)), as to which see R v Morgan (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 (CCA); and where it is evidence relating to a relationship at the relevant time between the accused and the complainant (s 293(4)(b)), as to which see R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 519 (CCA) (distinguishing R v White (1989) 18 NSWLR 332 (CCA)) and R v G (1997) 42 NSWLR 451 at 459. The section is to be construed broadly: Dimian v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 (NSW CCA). Section 293(4)(b) renders admissible evidence relating to a relationship existing or recent at the time of the alleged commission of the offence between complainant and accused, which has been held to include a relationship after that time: Taylor v R (2009) 78 NSWLR 198 at [37]–[43]. While generally counsel may ask any questions they like and wait for objection, s 293(5) positively forbids the asking of questions, and hence it is necessary for counsel to be equipped with a detailed written statement of the proposed evidence, so that an assessment can be made of whether s 293(4) can be complied with: R v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632 at 634–5 (CCA); Taylor v R at [44]. 136 In R v Holt [1983] 2 Qd R 462, where the prosecutrix in a rape trial gave evidence in crossexamination of her limited experience with men, leave was granted to question her on the matter of her previous employment in a massage parlour during a specified period. See also R v Richardson [1989] 1 Qd R 583 (CCA); R v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671 (CCA). The fact that a woman who complained of rape worked as a prostitute was said to have substantial relevance to the facts in issue because it might have explained her injuries: R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69 at [37]. 137 In this regard it will be noted that the types of offence to which the legislation applies varies from State to State. Thus in Queensland alone does it apply to proceedings for incest: R v Sievers [1983] 2 Qd R 170. 138 R v Gray (1978) 17 SASR 534 at 544. 139 R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 (CCA); R v Gun (1977) 17 SASR 165 (CCA); R v Robertson (1978) 17 SASR 479; R v Gray (1978) 17 SASR 534; R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 (CCA). 140 See also R v Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73. 141 R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 293 (CCA); Beck v R [1984] WAR 127 (CCA); R v Cox (1986) 84 Cr App R 132; R v Barton (1986) 85 Cr App R 5; R v Starkey [1988] 2 Qd R 294 (CCA); R v Brown (1988) 89 Cr App R 97 (CA); R v Ellis [1990] Crim LR 717 (CA); R v Riley [1991] Crim LR 460 (CA); R v SMS [1992] Crim LR 310 (CA); R v Barnes [1994] Crim LR 691 (CA).
142 R v Holt [1983] 2 Qd R 462. 143 R Pattenden, “The Character of Victims and Third Parties in Criminal Proceedings Other than
Rape Trials” [1986] Crim LR 367. 144 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1965] AC 595. 145 R v Howe [1958] SASR 95 (CCA). If the accused knew of it, the evidence goes to the accused’s state of mind in apprehending danger, which might reasonably justify resort to more prompt measures of self-preservation; even if the accused did not know of it, the evidence goes to show who was the likelier aggressor: R v Ellem (No 1) [1995] 2 Qd R 542. That case held that a general reputation for violence — a series of items of conduct — was admissible, but that such a reputation was not established by an isolated conviction 19 years earlier. Convictions and unproved charges falling short of establishing a general reputation for violence were held inadmissible in R v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417. See R v Hector [1953] VLR 543 at 547 (FC); R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 at 170–1 (FC); Re Knowles [1984] VR 751 (FC); R v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35 at 41 (Vic FC); R v Masters [1987] 2 Qd R 272; R v Polley (1997) 68 SASR 227 at 235 (CCA); RvMogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 at [78] and [79]; R v PP (2002) 135 A Crim R 575; R v Hajistassi (2010) 107 SASR 67 at [15]–[16] (CCA). 146 As in R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213 (CCA). Evidence contradictory of the accused’s allegations against the victim is also admissible: R v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207 (CCA). 147 In R v Wells Street Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Deakin [1980] AC 477 it was held that the reputation of the prosecution for criminal libel was not relevant at the stage of committal proceedings, but could be raised at the trial. 148 Hurst v Evans [1917] 1 KB 352 at 355. 149 See R v Turner (1664) 6 St Tr 565 at 613; R v Harris (1680) 7 St Tr 926 at 929. 150 In R v Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr App R 10 at 15 such evidence was treated as an indulgence — a relaxation of the law in favour of accused persons. See also Stewart v R (1921) 29 CLR 234 at 243. 151 The principle, of course, has no application where the matter to be proved is not the general character of the accused, but some specific trait which is admissible in accordance with the similar facts rule discussed in Ch 11. See eg Lowery v R [1974] AC 85; R v MacBride (1983) 34 SASR 433 at 443. 152 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR); R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 at 6 (CCA). In practice the rule in R v Rowton is often not observed: Donaldson v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 488 at [73]. 153 Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, 1936, p 201. 154 See R v Hanrahan (1964) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 458 at 460 (CCA). 155 Re T and Director of Youth and Community Services [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 at 399; R v Johnson & Edwards (No 2) [1982] Qd R 555 at 560 (FC). 156 R v Ravindra [1997] 3 NZLR 242. 157 R v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664 at 667 (CA). 158 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 (CA); R v Gray [2004] 2 Cr App R 30 (convictions for drunken driving, and driving unlicensed and uninsured, disregarded); R v D(P) [2012] 1 Cr App R 33. 159 R v Hamilton [1969] Crim LR 486 (CA). 160 R v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 at 205 (NSW CCA). 161 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41]–[46], [55] and [67]. 162 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 at 538 (CCCR). 163 R v Stannard (1837) 7 C & P 673 at 674–5. 164 See R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 (FC); R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47 (CCA). 165 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 at 529 (CCCR). 166 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 at 540 (CCCR). 167 R v Bellis [1966] 1 All ER 552n at 552 (CCA); see also R v Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348; R v Callum [1975] RTR 415 (CA).
168 R v Bryant [1979] QB 108; R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 586 (CCA); R v Calabria
(1982) 31 SASR 423 at 450 (CCA), reversed on other grounds Calabria v R (1983) 151 CLR 670. 169 For example, R v M (CP) [2010] Crim LR 232. 170 R v Turner (1817) 32 St Tr 957 at 1007. 171 See R v Burt (1851) 5 Cox CC 284 (evidence of general good character on a charge of receiving); for judicial recognition of widespread abuse in the older law, see R v Jones (1809) 31 St Tr 251 at 310. 172 See R v Savory (1942) 29 Cr App R 1 (good character as railway porter on a charge of indecent assault); for judicial recognition of widespread abuse in the newer law, see R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 at 6 (CCA). 173 R v Bliss Hill (1918) 13 Cr App R 125 (CCA); R v Brittle (1965) 109 Sol Jo 1028 (CA); R v Andrews [1982] 2 NSWLR 116 (CCA). 174 This may account for the persistence of the older form of direction; see R v Islam (1969) 113 Sol Jo 185 (CA). The “scales” image is criticised below at [19135]. 175 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359, quoted with approval in Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319 at 333, but with a caveat that it did not purport to be a full statement of the law on the subject. Note also the criticisms of the word “improbability” in the quoted passage in R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 17 (CCA). 176 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 at 530 (CCCR). 177 R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 578 (CCA); Cheatley v R [1981] Tas R 123 (CCA); R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 53–5 (CA and CCA); R v Zecevic [1986] VR 797 at 810 (FC); R v Jackson & Hakim (1988) 33 A Crim R 413 at 418 (NSW CCA); R v Warasta (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 (Vic FC); Crowley v Willis (1992) 110 FLR 194 at 200–1 (ACT SC); Durbin v R [1995] 2 Cr App R 84; Courtney–Smith (No 2) v R (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 at 68–70 (NSW CCA); R v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132. 178 R v D (1996) 86 A Crim R 41 (NSW CCA); TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [94]. 179 See R v Mandica (1980) 24 SASR 394 at 406 (CCA). In R v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99 at 111 (CCA) Cox J deprecated a distinction between “good character” and “positive good character” (eg arising from an active involvement in community affairs). 180 R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47 (CCA). See also R v Williams (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 (Qld CCA). 181 This expression was adapted from the 2nd English edition of this work, p 333. 182 R v Bellis [1966] 1 All ER 552n at 552, described in R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 587 (CCA) as a perfectly adequate direction in Australia and in R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 17 (CCA) as “a classically correct direction”. See also R v Bryant [1979] QB 108 at 119 (CA). 183 But it is not permissible to place the accused’s good character in the balance against the supposed good character of the prosecution witnesses, for this has the effect of shifting the burden of proof: Cheatley v R 1981 Tas R 123 (CCA). 184 Thompson v R [1998] AC 811 at 844–5 (PC). 185 Thompson v R [1998] AC 811 at 844 (PC); Barrow v State [1998] AC 846 at 852 (PC); Teeluck v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 WLR 2421 at [33] (PC); Gilbert v R [2006] 1 WLR 2108 (PC). 186 R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 578 (CCA). See R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 244 (CA); R v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664 at 667 (CA) (“an appropriate direction … should now become the general practice”). 187 R v Schmahl [1965] VR 745 at 750 (FC) approved in Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319 at 333; R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 (CCA); R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47 (CCA); Simic v R was followed in Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1 (discretion to direct, not a rule of practice), discussed in R v Cumberbatch (No 5) (2002) 130 A Crim R 599; R v TSR (2002) 133 A Crim R 54. See also R v Bednikov (1997) 95 A Crim R 200 at 208–9 (SA CCA); R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228 at [58];
R v DD (2007) 19 VR 143 at [150]; Sindoni v R (2011) 211 A Crim R 187 at [78]–[82]; R v TZ (2011) 214 A Crim R 316. Nor is the judge bound to direct the jury to disregard the accused’s good character simply because the accused has been shown in cross-examination to have previous convictions: R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 (CCA). 188 R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47 (CCA); R v Williams (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 (Qld CCA); R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 (CA and CCA); Cf Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1. 189 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 244 (CA). 190 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 245 (CA). 191 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 245 (CA). 192 R v M (1998) 104 A Crim R 154 at 157 (WA CCA); R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 at [24] (CCA) (“may be of limited assistance to you”). 193 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 246 (CA); Teeluck v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 WLR 2421 at [33] (PC); Gilbert v R [2006] 1 WLR 2108 (PC); R v D(P) [2012] 1 Cr App R 33. But there is a residual discretion to decline to give a character direction in the case of a defendant without previous convictions if the judge “considers it an insult to common sense”: R v Aziz [1996] 1 AC 41 at 53. The examples given concerned a defendant without convictions who was shown beyond reasonable doubt to have been guilty of serious criminal behaviour similar to the offence charged on other occasions. The cases are closely analysed in R Munday, “What Constitutes a Good Character?” [1997] Crim LR 247. R v Aziz also permits the giving of a good character direction, subject to a qualification about proved or possible criminal conduct of the defendant which emerged during the trial. An example is receipt by the defendant of a police caution after admitting a criminal offence: R v Martin [2000] 2 Cr App R 42. 194 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 247 (CA). 195 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 247 (CA). 196 R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241 at 248 (CA). 197 R v Cain [1994] 2 All ER 398 at 402 (CA). 198 Durbin v R [1995] 2 Cr App R 84; R v Gray [2004] 2 Cr App R 30 (violence, but in course of conduct leading to murder charge); R v Mentor [2005] Crim LR 472 (CA); R v Payton [2006] Crim LR 997 (CA); Brown (Nigel) v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2012] 1 WLR 1577 (PC). 199 R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 at 86 (CCA). Cf R v M(CP) [2009] 2 Cr App R 3 at [14]–[15]. 200 R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 578 (CCA); R v Nilon (1981) 5 A Crim R 385 at 388 (Qld CCA); R v M (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 (SA CCA). 201 R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47 (CCA). 202 In R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 (CCA), King CJ said that the judge is at liberty to make such a comment, but in that case the whole of the charge was held to be inadequate as encouraging the jury to attach little importance to the good character of the accused. It would seem therefore that a judge ought to be very circumspect in exercising the liberty. See also RJ v R (2010) 208 A Crim R 174 at [55]. 203 R v Andrews [1982] 2 NSWLR 116 (CCA). 204 R v Nilon (1981) 5 A Crim R 385 at 389 (Qld CCA). See also Berry v R [1992] 2 AC 364 at 381 (PC); Barrow v State [1998] AC 846 at 850 (PC). 205 Arthurton v R [2004] 2 Cr App R 33 (PC). 206 R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 at 7 (CCA). See also R v Thomas (1957) SR (NSW) 292 (CCA). 207 Such evidence will not expose the accused to rebutting evidence unless it is given in the same trial rather than in an earlier trial: Stewart v R (1921) 29 CLR 234. 208 R v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 (FC). 209 R v Gadbury (1838) 8 C & P 676. 210 R v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 (CCA). See also R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 at 237 (CCA).
211 R v Shrimpton (1851) 2 Den 319 (CCCR). 212 R v Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164 (CCA). 213 R v B [1979] 3 All ER 460 (CA), though this seems a very harsh rule when the accused
disclaims any reliance upon the presumption. 214 Cross-examination of the accused about these matters is governed by statue. It is dealt with in Ch 12, “Evidence by Accused Persons”, below. 215 It was doubted in R v Wood (1841) 5 Jur NS 225. 216 Although accepted as a general rule in R v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 (CCA), the authorities which were relied upon, R v Gadbury (1838) 8 C & P 676 and R v Shrimpton (1851) 2 Den 319 (CCCR), both depended upon particular statutory provisions. 217 R v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204, a strong case because the undoubted admissibility of a previous conviction was held to outweigh the dubious admissibility of a previous acquittal; R v Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164 (CCA); R v B [1979] 3 All ER 460 (CA). 218 R v Hodgkiss (1836) 7 C & P 298; R v Rogan and Elliot (1846) 1 Cox CC 291; R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 19–20 (CCA); R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299 (NSW CCA). 219 R v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44. 220 In Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 where the accused, Lowery, called psychiatric evidence with a view to showing that his disposition was such that it was unlikely that he would have committed the murder. He also gave evidence that he had never been charged with an offence and that he had satisfactory domestic arrangements. The psychiatrist was permitted to give not only his opinion but also its basis. 221 R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299 (NSW CCA). 222 R v Wood (1841) 5 Jur NS 225. 223 R v Savory (1942) 29 Cr App R 1 where the prosecution was not permitted to cross-examine the character witness about complaints made of the accused in the relevant respect which had not become the subject of formal proceedings against him. 224 R v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204. 225 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309. See also R v S (2000) 113 A Crim R 429. 226 R v B [1979] 3 All ER 460 (CA). 227 R v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44. 228 R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR). 229 See too Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 where the same argument appears to have prevailed. 230 See eg R v Williamson (1807) 3 C & P 635. 231 See eg R v Turner (1817) 32 St Tr 957 (Sp Com). 232 Michelson v United States 335 US 469 (1948) at 486. 233 See J F Stephen, History of Criminal Law, Vol 1, 1883, p 450, “The decision [in R v Rowton] settled the law, but in practice it is impossible to act upon it, and it may be doubted whether it is desirable to try to do so”. 234 See eg R v West (1890) 112 CC Ct Cas 725, where the rebuttal consisted in part of evidence of the accused’s known association with criminals. 235 See R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 at 329 (CCA). 236 R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 301 (NSWCCA); R v Robinson (2000) 111 A Crim R 388 at [40]. See also [23290] n 169. 237 At least in so far as it is elicited by cross-examination of the accused: Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114. For authority that this proposition is true generally, see R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 (CCA); BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275. Cf R v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8. This distinction will normally require the most careful explanation from the trial judge. 238 See also [21255]. 239 Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151 at [222]. 240 See ALRC [802]–[803]; ALRC 38 [177] and [178](c), Bill clauses 91 and 95. The question
whether, if evidence adduced under s 110(1) is admissible on the issue of guilt, evidence adduced under s 110(2) or (3) is also admissible on the issue of guilt and not merely to rebut the existence of good character, was raised but not decided in Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 58 (Fed C of A FC). 241 Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 297 (Fed C of A); R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1. 242 Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 53 (Fed C of A FC). See Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359. 243 R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667. See also R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 (FC). 244 R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 at 669. 245 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85, approved in R v Randall [2004] 1 All ER 467 at [29] (HL). The issues discussed in these cases were left open in Jones v R (2009) 254 ALR 626. There has been a dispute about whether, where a co-accused tenders evidence of another’s previous misconduct, it is admissible not only in relation to the Crown case against the first, but also in relation to the Crown case against the second: R v Price [2005] Crim LR 304 (CA) and R v Robinson [2006] 1 Cr App R 480 (CA) favour the view that it is, R v Mertens [2005] Crim LR 301 (CA) and R v Murrell [2005] Crim LR 869 (CA) that it is not. See also R v Roughan (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; R v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259. 246 R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304, where Miller’s case is referred to as “famous”. 247 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 at 101 (PC), a proposition questioned in R v Randall [2004] 1 All ER 467 at [29] (HL). 248 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 at 102 (PC). 249 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 at 102 (PC). 250 It was so treated in R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 842 (CA) and Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 120–1 per Brennan J (dissenting). 251 R v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44. 252 R v Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264. 253 R v Knutton (1992) 97 Cr App R 115. 254 R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304 described as a “borderline decision” in R v Randall [2004] 1 All ER 467 at [31] (HL) and distinguished in R v Kracher [1995] Crim LR 819 (CA). 255 R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667. 256 The local equivalents of the English Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(f) might sometimes prevent cross-examination of the co-accused. See, for example R v Knutton (1992) 97 Cr App R 115. 257 An example of this would be the case where an accused defends by alleging duress by the coaccused. The accused may cross-examine Crown witnesses and lead evidence of the reputation and antecedents of the co-accused in support of his defence: R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 (FC). Unless the co-accused gave evidence this attack would not permit evidence to be led of the co-accused’s bad character unless it was otherwise relevant: R v Knutton (1992) 97 Cr App R 115. 258 R v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44. 259 R v Knutton (1992) 97 Cr App R 115. 260 R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304; R v Priestley (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 (Qld CCA); R v B (C) [2004] 2 Cr App R 34. 261 R v Thompson [1995] 2 Cr App R 589 (CA) (two co-accused said the third started a fire in the course of a burglary; the third said that the first had told him in the presence of the second that the first and second always set fire to premises they burgled, and had done so while burgling a housing office the week before; the trial judge’s decision to permit the third co-accused to cross-examine two prosecution witnesses who said they had seen the first two co-accused near the scene of the housing office burglary and fire with a view to establishing that what the first had said was true, namely that the first and second co-accused had burgled and set fire to the housing office (and hence that the first co-accused had said it) upheld).
262 See ALRC 26 [805], Bill clause 95(2); ALRC 38 [177] and [178](a)–(b), Bill clause 92. 263 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41]–[46], [55] and [67]. 264 Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 53 (Fed C of A). See Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at
359. 265 As to which see [21275] below. 266 A-G v Bowman (1792) 2 Bos & P 532n. 267 Attorney-General v Radloff (1854) 10 Exch 84 at 97. So it is not permissible for the defendant to a breach of contract claim to lead evidence of reputation for fair dealing and trustworthiness. 268 Cornwall v Richardson (1825) 1 Ry & M 305 (KB). See also Deep v Wood (1983) 33 CPC 256 (Ont CA). 269 Maisel v Financial Times Ltd (No 1) (1915) 84 LJKB 2145 (CA). 270 Bickel v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 at 482–3; Anderson v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1986) 5 NSWLR 735 at 737–8. 271 Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 (QBD); Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090; Singleton v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (No 1) [1983] 2 NSWLR 722. 272 Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspaper Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 758 (CA). 273 Hobbs v CT Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 (CA). See also cases cited at [17510] nn 882 and 883. 274 Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333 at 340–1 (CA). 275 Bamfield v Massey (1808) 1 Camp 460. 276 R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 at 734 (FC); R v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 535 (CCA). 277 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 (FC); R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 (CCA). 278 R v Noel (1834) 6 C & P 336. 279 R v Murphy (1753) 19 St Tr 693 at 723 and 724 (Sess). 280 Compare Bamfield v Massey above; Dodd v Norris (1814) 3 Camp 519 (NP); Bate v Hill (1823) 1 Car & P 100; Provis v Reed (1829) 5 Bing 435 (CP); and Doe d Reed v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 330. 281 See eg J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1970, vol 3A, [1174]. 282 R v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241 (NP); Attorney-General v O’Sullivan [1930] IR 52 (CCA). Cf Bamfield v Massey (1808) 1 Camp 460; R v Wood [1951] 2 All ER 112n. In R v Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr App R 10, the accused was not allowed to prove particular heterosexual acts to rehabilitate his character as a man of normal sexual inclinations. 283 R v Saleam (1989) 41 A Crim R 108 (NSW CCA). 284 Eg Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 (FC); R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 (CCA); cf Hickman v R (1993) 60 SASR 415 at 418–19 and 426–7 (CCA). 285 R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 534 (Vic FC); F v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 509 (NSW CCA). 286 See [29040], [29050] and [29060]. See also R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; C v R (1993) 60 SASR 467 (CCA); R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 534–5 (Vic FC); F v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 509 (NSW CCA). 287 See [17350]. 288 See ALRC 26 [685], Bill clause 88(1) and (3); ALRC 38 [144](a), Bill clause 101(1) and (3). In Tasmania the provision numbered s 108(3) elsewhere is s 108(2).
[page 711]
Chapter Eleven Similar Fact Evidence
Section 1 — Exclusion at Common Law in Criminal Proceedings A — INTRODUCTION The nature of the problem [21001] An exclusionary rule This chapter complements the discussion of character and credibility in Chapter 10 and, together with it, lays the foundations for the discussion of cross-examination of the accused in Chapter 12. The subject matter of this chapter is the exclusionary rule which in Commonwealth jurisdictions is commonly, but inaccurately,1 known as the “similar fact” rule.2 That terminology is doubly misleading because it describes the exclusionary rule in a phrase more apt to describe one of the principal exceptions to it,3 and because it suggests a unifying factor between the situations in this area which they do not necessarily possess.4 It has been said5 that there is no one satisfactory term for evidence admitted despite its disclosure of offences other than those charged. “It is always propensity evidence, but it may be propensity evidence which falls within the category of similar fact evidence, relationship evidence or identity evidence. These categories are not exhaustive and are not necessarily exclusive.” The terminology is nevertheless deeply ingrained. It is used here to connote that part of the law of evidence concerned with the rule which prevents a party, usually the prosecutor,6 from leading in chief evidence showing the discreditable disposition7 of the other, usually the accused, as derived from the discreditable acts, record, possessions, or [page 712]
reputation of the latter. Thus the rule may not apply where the issue is not disposition, but the possession of reasonable skill.8 This subject is at its most important in criminal proceedings because such evidence is believed to be very influential in its effect upon a jury.9 It is likely both to help prove the guilt of the accused, and to prejudice the jury. The prosecution justifiably seeks its inclusion for the former purpose, and the defence equally justifiably seeks its exclusion for the latter reason. The dilemma created by these competing aims creates the problems discussed in the first section of this chapter, which deals with the general rules excluding “similar fact” evidence when tendered in chief by the prosecution in a criminal case.10 The remaining sections deal with a few statutory rules which affect the position in criminal cases and, finally, the position in civil proceedings.
[21005] Structure This aspect of the law of evidence is one of the most keenly litigated, and has been described by Lord Hailsham as a “pitted battlefield”.11 Its history, scope, constituent elements and application will be examined in turn. The invocation of judicial discretion will then be considered and the final part will examine some statutory changes.12
B — STATEMENT AND HISTORY OF THE RULE Statement of the rule [21010] Definitional issues The prosecution may not adduce evidence of the character or of the misconduct of the accused on other occasions (including the possession of discreditable material) if that evidence shows that the accused had a propensity to commit crime, or crime of a particular kind, or was the sort of person likely to have committed the crime charged, unless the evidence is sufficiently highly probative of a fact in issue to outweigh the prejudice it may cause. There is one definitional issue to which the cases have paid little
attention. Does the rule apply only where the evidence in fact shows the propensity in question? Or does it apply only where the purpose of the tender is to show the propensity in question?13 In most instances the answer does not matter, since admissibility would not be affected whatever the test. Evidence in fact showing the propensity will usually be tendered by the prosecution for that purpose. Evidence tendered for the [page 713] purpose of showing a propensity will usually in fact show it. The issue will not be debated further, because the cases have not squarely analysed it, and because even if the language of a particular judge can be construed as supporting one or another approach in terms, it is far from clear that that judge was using that language with this question in mind. The analysis employed below is not intended to rest on any particular answer to the question.
History of the rule [21015] Makin’s case and its significance An exclusionary rule seems to have been established by the beginning of the nineteenth century,14 but its application was uncertain throughout that century.15 It was first considered by a final appellate court in a case16 in which Makin and his wife were tried for the murder of a baby, which, it was alleged, they had taken in for informal adoption upon the payment of a small sum by the infant’s mother. As asserted by the Supreme Court of New South Wales Full Court,17 and accepted by the Privy Council,18 there was ample evidence that the accused were guilty as charged. The mother was able to give evidence of the transaction of handing the child over, of deceit and evasion by the accused when she tried to see it again, including an attempt to pass off a different child as hers, and of the identity of clothing found on the child’s dead body. There were admissions. The payment was plainly inadequate to support the child for very long. There was evidence that the accused persons received the baby
in good health one day at one premises, that they moved surreptitiously to another two days later without the baby, and that a corpse, that of an infant wearing the baby’s clothes, was found secretly buried at the first premises. Such circumstantial evidence would surely have been sufficient for a verdict of guilty, even on so serious a charge. But the prosecution wished to adduce evidence from a number of other mothers who had placed babies with the accused on the payment of similarly inadequate premiums. The accused had flatly denied having received any of these children. The prosecution also tendered evidence that the bodies of 13 babies had been found on three different sets of premises occupied at different times by the accused. It was argued that this evidence tended to rebut any possible defence of accidental death, and showed a systematic course of conduct by the accused, known as “baby farming”. The defence attempted to counter this argument by asserting that the evidence of the other bodies was admissible only to show the mens rea of the accused once it had been proved that they had brought about the death of the baby, the subject of the murder charge. The defence argued that there was no clear evidence of this fact. The similar fact evidence was in fact admitted by the trial judge to rebut the accused’s presumed19 defence that they had not engaged in a systematic practice of “baby farming”. The [page 714] direct evidence of the five mothers who testified that they had handed over their babies, and of the finding of so many dead bodies of babies in so many different premises occupied by the accused, rendered quite incredible any suggestion that there was no connection between the bodies found on the premises, and the acts of the accused while they lived there. The majority of the Full Court denied that it was necessary to show even a prima facie connection between the acts of the accused and the death of the babies before the similar fact evidence became admissible, though this denial was obiter since there was abundant evidence showing such a connection. In more analytic and less descriptive terms, the evidence of other discreditable acts, which through them tended to show the disposition of the accused to commit the discreditable act in issue, was admissible circumstantial evidence both of the commission of the actus
reus of the crime and the mens rea required for it. It should be noted that at no stage did the accused raise a defence of accidental death. They simply disclaimed all connection with either mother or baby, and all knowledge of any of the bodies. It was against this background that the Privy Council through Lord Herschell LC delivered the statement later adopted by the House of Lords:20 It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused.21
This passage was both preceded and succeeded by a warning that its application might prove extremely difficult. While the rule depends heavily on the questions of weight and degree which are best left to a jury, the application of the rule properly falls to be decided in advance,22 by the judge, because it combines considerations of relevance and prejudice. There was for a long time a tendency to construe Lord Herschell LC’s words as if they were part of a criminal statute, and in particular to treat the examples given in the second sentence as if they constituted a closed list of rigid categories. But the words of the second sentence are more naturally read as stressing the importance of, and illustrating by examples, the relevance of the evidence to the issues in the case.23 [page 715]
C — SCOPE OF THE RULE An exclusionary rule [21020] Rule excluding relevant evidence, subject to exceptions Since 1982 at least, the High Court has been at pains to emphasise that the rule under consideration is an exclusionary rule of law, subject to
certain exceptions.24 Evidence that an accused person has a propensity to commit crimes of the sort charged, or is the sort of person who is likely to commit such crimes, which would ordinarily be treated as relevant, is generally excluded because it is likely to operate unfairly to the accused.25 The exclusion therefore operates as a rule of policy which undermines the ordinary rule of relevance, whereby relevant evidence is normally admissible. It is therefore necessary to take as a starting point this basic concept of relevance.
Relevance [21025] Probative force and prejudicial effect The rule excludes only evidence that is otherwise relevant. If the evidence is not relevant, it cannot be admitted.26 If it is relevant, then the exclusionary rule under consideration may provide an exception to the general and fundamental principle that all relevant evidence is prima facie admissible. The operation of this limitation upon the scope of the rule is not always easy to recognise. In the first place the baneful tendency to use “relevant” and “admissible” interchangeably clouds the issue. Relevance involves an examination of the logical relationship between the evidence in question and the fact to be proved; admissibility under the present rule is concerned with considerations which are based not on logic but on legal policy. A second problem is that the similar fact rule demands exclusion unless the probative force of the evidence is very strong. Relevance, as will be seen, is merely one element constituting probative force, and if the court determines that the evidence is to be excluded in any event, there is no point in agonising over the distinction between excluding the evidence because it fails the test of relevance and excluding it because its probative force is not sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect. This difficulty is illustrated by two cases of high authority. In the first27 the accused was charged with the murder of Ayesha, a woman with whom he had been living as husband. She had undoubtedly died as a result of cyanide poisoning, and the accused, who was a goldsmith and who was on bad terms with her, had access to cyanide. There was, however, no evidence that the accused had administered poison to her. The prosecution wished to adduce evidence of the death of the accused’s former wife, Gooriah, with whom he had also been on bad
terms. She too had died as a result of cyanide poisoning. The accused had never been charged with causing Gooriah’s death, but there was some evidence that he might have tricked her into taking the cyanide and the prosecution [page 716] suggested that the similar fact evidence was relevant to rebut a supposed defence of accidental poisoning. The Privy Council reasoned that, even assuming it to be established that he had tricked Gooriah, it still did not follow that he had tricked Ayesha. There was no evidence that he had tricked her, or even that he had administered poison to either of them. This sounds like the language of irrelevance, but the court was so adamant in rejecting dicta28 that similar fact evidence was prima facie admissible so long only as it was logically probative, that it may be that the Privy Council thought the evidence was of too much prejudice rather than of too little relevance.29 Much the same analysis may be made of a case decided soon afterwards in the House of Lords. The accused, a policeman, was charged on eight counts of breaking into shops in a market he was patrolling, and of stealing part of the cash on the premises. The evidence on the first seven counts was scanty, amounting to little more than that all the thefts were committed by means of a similar technique, that all had occurred when the accused was on duty and could have been in the area, and that none had occurred when he was not on duty. The evidence on the eighth count implicated the accused more directly. A trap had been set. The accused had been identified in the area and he had been seen to disappear briefly before going to the assistance of the policemen whom he knew and who had set the trap. Furthermore, marked money was found in a place which he could have reached in the time he was absent. He was acquitted by the jury on the first seven counts, but found guilty on the eighth. The House of Lords quashed his conviction on the ground that the jury should have been warned that the evidence called in support of the earlier counts did not in itself prove confirmation of the last charge.30 Once again this suggests that it was irrelevant, but it is probably more accurate to characterise the similar fact evidence as lacking cogency rather
than as irrelevant.31 In a more straightforward case,32 the accused was charged with house-breaking with intent to commit rape. His conviction was quashed because of the admission of evidence of his subsequently entering a nearby house by climbing down the chimney and having consensual intercourse with the occupant. However bizarre, such evidence was simply irrelevant, and excluded as such without any need to rely upon the rule excluding evidence of similar facts.33 It may be said that, in cases where the similar fact evidence relied on involves conduct in respect of which the [page 717] accused has been acquitted, there are also examples of lack of relevance.34 But such evidence is excluded not for irrelevance, but on the ground that the accused is entitled to the full benefit of the acquittal: [5155].
Relevance via disposition [21030] Impermissible chain of reasoning The rule excluding evidence of similar facts is based on the protection of an accused person from the risk that the jury will infer that a person who has been guilty of misconduct of a particular kind on one occasion is likely to be responsible where this misconduct occurs on another occasion. It is in the eye of the law not generally permissible to seek to prove an accused guilty by showing the accused to have a propensity or disposition to commit crime or crime of a particular kind or that the accused was the sort of person likely to have committed the crime charged. This highlights a fundamental matter — it is concerned not so much with the evidence that the accused has been guilty of the misconduct, but rather with the way in which this evidence may be used.35 This distinction was drawn by Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone: [W]hat is not to be admitted is a chain of reasoning and not necessarily a state of facts. If the inadmissible chain of reasoning is the only purpose for which the evidence is adduced as a matter of law, the evidence itself is not admissible. If there is some other relevant, probative purpose than for the forbidden type of reasoning, the evidence is admitted, but should be made subject to a warning from the judge that the jury must eschew the forbidden reasoning.36
His Lordship’s requirement that the trial judge be satisfied that the evidence in question have a relevant probative function other than via disposition is a necessary consequence of his fundamental proposition that evidence of other misconduct is not admissible where it is relevant solely via disposition. That fundamental proposition does not correspond with the common law in Australia in unqualified terms.
[21035] The common law rule in Pfennig’s case In Australia, the common law, which applies only in Queensland, and then only in a modified form, is as follows.37 “Mere propensity” evidence is inadmissible, but in some cases propensity evidence may be admitted where it is used only to demonstrate a disposition to behave in a certain way38 as well as where it establishes [page 718] guilt for some other reason.39 It will not be admitted unless it has sufficient probative force to outweigh or transcend its prejudicial effect, and it will not do this unless there is no rational view of the evidence consistent with the innocence of the accused in the context of the prosecution case.40 The attitude of the legislatures to the common law test in Australia is hostile to the interests of the accused. But the common law test has merits which deserve at least some consideration, and it must be borne in mind as important background. Underlying that test is a recognition of the character of similar fact evidence as circumstantial evidence. A trier of fact “cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on circumstantial evidence unless no other explanation than guilt is reasonably compatible with the circumstances”.41 Juries, of course, are always directed that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and from that direction another has been derived42 which is often given in the terms employed by Alderson B — that they must be satisfied “not only that those circumstances were consistent with [the accused] having committed the act, but they must also be satisfied that the facts were such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the prisoner was the guilty person”.
In the first leading High Court case on similar fact evidence, Dixon J approached43 and Evatt J reached44 the point of saying that the test for admissibility of similar fact evidence was whether it made an inference of guilt “so highly probable as to be almost certain”. In 1984 Dawson J, after referring to Alderson B’s form of direction, to the case in which Dixon J and Evatt J so spoke and to the character of similar fact evidence as circumstantial evidence, stated that the test for admissibility of similar fact evidence should turn on the same standard as that which the jury must apply in dealing with circumstantial evidence.45 If in considering the admissibility of similar fact evidence the trial judge concludes that there is a rational view of that evidence which is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused,
[page 719] then he ought not admit it because in those circumstances the evidence cannot be said to have a sufficiently strong probative force.
In 1988, Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ first46 referred to Dixon J’s and Evatt J’s discussions, and then47 approved the test for admissibility stated by Dawson J. In 1989 Dawson J repeated the test he had stated in 1984. He again justified the greater onerousness of this test for admissibility compared to the test for circumstantial evidence generally on the ground that although similar fact evidence was circumstantial evidence, it was “circumstantial evidence of a dangerous kind because of the prejudice which it engenders”.48 In 1995 Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ referred to what Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ had said in 1988. In a series of passages they then stated what is now known as the Pfennig test,49 which was summarised at the start of this paragraph: [B]ecause [similar fact evidence] has a prejudicial capacity of a high order, the trial judge must apply the same test as a jury must apply in dealing with circumstantial evidence and ask whether there is a rational view of the evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused.50 Here “rational” must be taken to mean “reasonable”51 and the trial judge must ask himself or herself the question in the context of the prosecution case; that is to say, he or she must regard the evidence as a step in the proof of that case. Only if there is no such view can one safely conclude that the probative force of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. And, unless the tension between probative force and prejudicial effect is governed by such a principle, striking the balance will continue to resemble the exercise of a discretion rather than the application of a principle.
A little later they said:52 [T]he evidence sought to be admitted is circumstantial and as such raises the objective improbability of some event having occurred other than that asserted by the prosecution; in other words, that there is no reasonable view of the evidence consistent with the innocence of the accused. In stating the question in that way, we point out, as Lord Cross … suggested …,53 that the purpose of the propensity evidence is to establish a step in the proof of the prosecution case, namely, that it is to be inferred, according to the criminal standard of proof, that the accused is guilty of the offence charged. Accordingly, the admissibility of the evidence depends upon the improbability of its having some innocent explanation in the sense discussed.
They concluded:54 [T]he trial judge … must recognise that propensity evidence is circumstantial evidence
[page 720] and that, as such, it should not be used to draw an inference adverse to the accused unless it is the only reasonable inference in the circumstances. More than that, the evidence ought not to be admitted if the trial judge concludes that, viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is a reasonable view of it which is consistent with innocence.
The Queensland Court of Appeal has criticised these passages, and contended that the evidence is not admissible unless each of the following questions is answered affirmatively:55 (a) Is the propensity evidence of such calibre that there is no reasonable view of it other than as supporting an inference that the accused is guilty of the offence charged? (b) If the propensity evidence is admitted, is the evidence as a whole reasonably capable of excluding all innocent hypotheses? The Queensland Court of Appeal said that the tests it stated were the “only sensible resolution”56 of the key passages stating the Pfennig test. To adopt the High Court’s summary of its criticisms,57 it said that those passages were not as “workable” as the views expressed by minority judges,58 revealed “fundamental difficulty”59 and “artificiality”,60 were “rather perplexing”,61 had led to “the expression and application of different tests” in State courts62 and had a “dubious pedigree”.63 Each of these criticisms is open to doubt. The difficulties which the Pfennig test is said to create are more acute if some particular passages from that case64 are taken in isolation. They diminish if those passages are read together and in the light of the history given above and of the conceptual and procedural background. Most of
the leading common law rules of evidence do not require any particular probative quality as a condition of admissibility. Similar fact evidence is very unusual in this respect. Ordinarily its admissibility is determined at some point before the trial, or at least before all the other evidence has been received; and it is usually determined before the relevant witnesses have given oral evidence. It is usually determined on the basis of what is [page 721] recorded in the committal proceedings or in depositions or in statements to the police or in proofs of evidence or in accounts by the tendering party of what the witnesses, it is hoped, will say. The trial judge will only rarely have heard it being given orally before a ruling on admissibility is made, but even if it has been given orally, the trial judge, in deciding whether or not to admit it, makes no actual finding as to its accuracy. Now determining admissibility is a task for the judge and not the jury, and determining whether the prosecution has excluded a reasonable doubt is a task for the jury and not the judge. In these circumstances the judicial task of assessing whether similar fact evidence has that high probative quality which is essential to admissibility65 is a process which cannot take place in the way a jury would carry it out. It can only take place on the basis of assumptions. One assumption is in favour of the tendering party (usually the prosecution). That assumption is that the similar fact evidence will be accepted. Thus Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ said:66 The basis for the admission of similar fact evidence lies in its possessing a particular probative value or cogency by reason that it reveals a pattern of activity such that, if accepted, it bears no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused person in the offence charged.
The second assumption is in favour of the accused. It is that the evidence in the case other than the similar fact evidence is insufficient to exclude a reasonable doubt. That is, the trial judge “must accept at least the possibility of the truth of the accused’s account”.67 That assumption is necessary because if the contrary assumption were made—that the other evidence excluded any reasonable doubt—it would be impossible to carry out the task, required by many authorities,68 of examining the admissibility of the similar fact evidence in the light of the other evidence,
and in view of that examination assessing whether the evidence as a whole would remove a reasonable doubt. Hence Hodgson JA has rightly said that the Pfennig test is as follows:69 [I]f it first be assumed that all the other evidence in the case left the jury with a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, the propensity evidence must be such that, when it is considered along with the other evidence, there will then be no reasonable view that is consistent with the innocence of the accused. That is, the propensity evidence must be such that, when it is added to the other evidence, it would eliminate any reasonable doubt which might be left by the other evidence.
Hodgson JA also said that the Pfennig test:70 certainly does not require the judge to reach the view that the jury acting reasonably must convict: the judge must form his or her own view as to whether there is no rational view
[page 722] of the evidence, as it then appears to the judge, which is consistent with innocence, and the judge does not need to speculate as to how precisely that evidence may be affected by the way it is presented at the trial or by cross-examination, or how other minds might view it.
He added that the test:71 does not mean that the judge must look at the propensity evidence in isolation, and not admit it unless there is no reasonable view of the evidence so considered that is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the offence with which the accused stands charged. That approach would be quite inconsistent with the correct approach for considering circumstantial evidence72 … and the … [test is sourced in] the character of propensity evidence as circumstantial evidence.
This analysis has been frequently approved in the High Court.73 If it were necessary to do so, difficulties could be demonstrated in the tests proposed by the Queensland Court of Appeal. It is not necessary to do so, since the High Court has held that they should not be adopted or applied, and that the Pfennig test should be applied.74 The Pfennig test applies to the evidence which is tendered independently of any explanation of it which may later emerge in crossexamination.75 Traditionally the authorities in which no risk of exclusion arose because no appeal was made to disposition reasoning may be grouped thus: where the discreditable conduct was part of the background ([21040]–[21045]), where it was part of the res gestae or showed the relationship between the parties ([21050]), and perhaps in other instances ([21055]–[21060]). If one of these areas applies, there is no need to consider whether probative
value exceeds prejudicial effect (save as part of a residual discretion to exclude) or (except perhaps for relationship evidence) to consider, as a matter of admissibility as distinct from jury reasoning, whether there is a rational view of the evidence consistent with innocence.
[21040] Crimes inherent in the background In some cases the revelation that the accused has committed a crime is inherent in the background to the facts of the case, and no one even considers making an objection. Thus, where the accused were inmates of a prison when they stabbed another prisoner, it could be inferred that they had at some time in the past committed crime.76 In another case77 the accused’s presence in the area at the relevant time could be fixed only by reference to the time at which he had escaped from Broadmoor.78 So too where the accused was charged with stirring up racial [page 723] hatred by reference to his experience in prison, it was inevitable that the jury should become aware that he had been convicted of other crimes.79 Sometimes the commission of an extrinsic crime is part and parcel of the crime with which the accused is charged. A good example of this arose where the accused was a letter carrier, and the substance of the crime charged against him was the taking of notes from one letter to replace notes taken by him from another. Clearly evidence of both takings had to be given.80 In another case81 the accused was charged with embezzling six marked coins from a till in the shop where he was employed. It was not possible to monitor the exact extent of his depredations from the till without alerting him, and the prosecution was allowed to prove the total deficiency from the till, which corresponded to the total in the accused’s possession at the end of the day, although he was charged only in respect of the marked coins. Another authority82 was a stage further removed as three men were charged with breaking into a railway booking office and stealing property from it. None of that property was found in the possession of the third of the three accused, but it was held permissible to prove similar breakings in other booking offices on the same night, since
he might have received his share of the night’s takings exclusively from those. Bramwell B said that “The events of that night relating to these burglaries are so intermixed that it is impossible to separate them”. Sometimes the other crime relates to the means for committing the principal crime with which the accused is charged, for example the theft of a car.83 Thus the accused charged with murder was alleged to have stolen articles in three robberies. One article from each robbery was found at the scene of the crime. Others of the articles stolen were found in the accused’s possession. This evidence was admitted to identify the accused as the murderer.84
[21045] Irrelevance of disposition to guilt In none of these cases was the discreditable conduct of the accused involved in the impermissible line of reasoning; in none of them did the prosecution seek to prove from that conduct that the accused had a criminal disposition or propensity so that he was the more likely to be guilty of the crime charged. Whether this impermissible line of reasoning is involved in any given case can be tested by supposing the similar fact to be in no way discreditable to the accused and so not indicative of an evil disposition. If, in such a case, the evidence still tends to prove the guilt of the accused then the inference as to disposition is irrelevant to the line of reasoning. It can easily be seen that it would make no difference to the reasoning in the penal institution cases had the relevant institution been, say, a boarding school. Similarly, in the stealing cases it would be immaterial that the accused had interchanged or mixed something to which he was perfectly entitled with the stolen property, nor would it have made the slightest difference in car cases that the car in question had been innocently lent to the accused. It follows that the impermissible line of reasoning has no necessary place in such cases, and that the evidence is, in [page 724] principle, admissible. This is not to say, however, that the judge should not be alert to warn the jury against the forbidden line of reasoning or against incidental prejudice, as suggested by Lord Hailsham,85 or to
prevent attention being drawn to associated, but logically unconnected, criminality, by severing the indictment.86 Another case best considered in this connection is one87 in which the accused was convicted of the manslaughter of a child. The prosecution tendered evidence of previous assaults upon the child by the accused in order to explain the child’s fear of the accused, which was relevant to explain the circumstances of his death. It was held that the evidence was admissible to show the disposition of the child, not that of the accused. It is arguable that it was immaterial how the child came to have that disposition, and that it could just as easily have been caused by previous assaults by another. It is submitted that it was because the case was not strictly covered by the similar fact rule that the evidence was held to be admissible, even though its prejudicial effect was conceded to exceed by far its probative force.
[21050] Res gestae and relationship evidence Another type of case is that where the discreditable conduct forms part of the res gestae.88 Here the expression “res gestae” refers to evidence which, although it reveals other criminal or prejudicial conduct, is admitted because it tends to prove how or why the conduct the subject of the charge came to take place or because it makes it more likely that the conduct occurred at the time, at the place or in the way alleged.89 In the leading case90 the accused was charged with murder which occurred during a drunken orgy in which the prisoner and other timber workers including the deceased were involved. The deceased died as a result of being struck a number of times with a beer bottle, after which kerosene was poured on him and his clothes were lit. At the trial evidence was admitted that the accused had at various times during the celebrations violently, and sometimes without provocation, assaulted other workers, on each occasion by brutal blows to the head. The evidence of similar acts was admitted by a majority of the High Court of Australia: on the ground that it forms part of the circumstances of the crime, including the drunken condition of the prisoner, how he reached that condition, how long it continued and how, while in that condition, he was behaving. His violence, the fact that he exhibited this violence on slight or no provocation, and all the circumstances, form inseparable features of a transaction consisting of connected events.91
[page 725] This evidence may also be relevant, not to show bad character,92 but to show the relationship between the accused and victim. But it is not enough for the evidence to show a relationship. It must be evidence from which a relevant inference can be drawn.93 Thus a hostile relationship is not to be inferred from “transient ebullitions of annoyance and anger … which immediately passed away and led to nothing.”94 The relationship may be one of hostility95 or of affection96 or marital breakdown97 or indifference to children.98 It may be relevant to show the true relationship between an informant and the accused as a trusted assistant in drug dealing.99 One justification for the admission of relationship evidence is that where there is only one charge, “a truthful complainant is likely to be disbelieved if relationship evidence is excluded and in consequence the jury derive the impression that the complainant is saying that the accused molested him or her out of the blue”.100 The evidence may be admitted as relevant to the accused’s state of mind. Thus it may go [page 726] to intention, motive — hatred or sexual attraction, for example101 — selfdefence or provocation.102 It may go to the identity of the offender.103 It may go to whether an act causing death was an accident or misadventure.104 It may go to whether the actus reus took place.105 It may help explain why a complainant was unclear about the precise dates and details of the offences charged, why there was acquiescence in them, and why the complainant trusted the accused.106 It may reveal “an ongoing business enterprise, the existence of which then gives to things occurring in the course of that enterprise a significance that they would not otherwise have”.107 It may explain the submission and silence of a victim.108 A history of sexual or physical violence may be relevant as a potential explanation of “why a non-consenting complainant behaved as if she were consenting to a sexual act, and/or why an alleged offender could not have believed that any apparent consent was real”.109 It may assist a complainant to give evidence intelligibly.110 But it may be admitted,
without reference to any more specific issue, simply in order to render the evidence complete and comprehensible111 and avoid the jury having to decide the case in a vacuum.112 This latter use has been both questioned113 and said to be [page 727] the only permissible use.114 Evidence of a hostile relationship called by the Crown may be admissible to rebut a defence contention that the relationship was amicable.115 Evidence may be called even if it postdates the crimes charged, as where it revealed why a complainant did not complain earlier, and it revealed a continuing sexual attraction experienced by the accused for the complainant.116 However, the merits of dividing the uses to which evidence of other discreditable acts of an accused can be put — particularly a division between “propensity”, “disposition” and “tendency” on one hand and “context”, “explanation” or “intelligibility” on the other, has been doubted.117 A tendency in an accused person to become violent towards inanimate objects is irrelevant where that person had no tendency to be violent towards human beings.118 It must not be too remote in time.119 The keeping by parents of their children in abject living conditions was held relevant to show why the children failed to complain of sexual misconduct and to show that the parents did not experience the fundamental human instinct of protecting and nurturing their children.120 If the relationship is relevant, it can be proved by admissions from the accused;121 testimony from third parties of their direct observations of quarrels or blows;122 circumstantial evidence;123 real evidence in the accused’s possession;124 testimony by the party to the relationship other than the accused;125 or, since, in cases of violent relationships, that party has usually not survived, statements by that party proved by other witnesses as original evidence126 or by way of exception to the [page 728]
hearsay rule.127 In a case where conventionally admissible relationship evidence suggested that the relationship was not cordial and that its tensions were likely to make the deceased scared, direct evidence of the intensity of the fear and the basis for it expressed by the deceased and reported to the court by a witness was held relevant.128 In some cases129 it has been held or suggested that relationship evidence must satisfy the stricter test for admissibility of similar fact evidence.130 Evidence was excluded where it had limited value as relationship (or “context”) evidence, where it was highly prejudicial, and where, since it came from a video interview of a complainant who died before the trial, there was no opportunity to cross-examine.131 A different illustration of the relationship evidence principle arises where a person is found in possession of drugs and also of items commonly associated with drug dealing: the finding of the items will usually be relevant as part of the circumstantial material to establish the purpose for which the drug was in the person’s possession.132 Some consider it is erroneous to direct the jury that evidence of “background” to demonstrate “relationship” need only be proved on the balance of probabilities.133 [page 729] Some do not.134 The jury should be told, briefly but with particularity, and with reference to the detail of the case before them, how the evidence may be used.135 Three kinds of warning are common. The first is given where the evidence is admitted for some purpose other than proof of disposition. A useful illustration is an incest case136 in which it was said that the jury should be warned, where uncharged extraneous sexual conduct is relied on to show relationship, that it is admitted solely to establish the relationship as part of the context and setting in which the offences charged were alleged to have occurred; that even if the jury accepted the evidence, or part of it, the commission of the offences charged could be proved only by the evidence relating to them, not the evidence relating to the extraneous conduct; and that the jury must not
reason that because the applicant engaged in sexual conduct with his daughter on one or more earlier occasions, he was the kind of person who was likely to do so on the occasions charged. The warning may be given in the summing up; it need not be given at the time when the evidence is admitted.137 Probably a similar warning should be given in all cases where the evidence tendered is such as to suggest that the accused “is of a violent or otherwise immoral character”.138 The second common warning is given where the evidence is admitted to establish disposition. A distinction is drawn between “general” and “specific” propensity. The evidence is admissible, not to prove guilt of the offences charged by a general disposition to commit crime, but to show the nature of the relationship in a manner which bears directly upon the question of guilt. In short what the jury are asked to do is to infer from evidence of uncharged acts that the accused has a disposition to commit the particular crime charged.139
[page 730] The third common warning is a warning against substituting the evidence of uncharged acts which tend to prove the relationship for the evidence of the acts charged.140 Evidence may be admissible by reason of a combination of the res gestae and relationship principles.141 Where relationship evidence is tendered only to enable the jury better to understand the evidence on the acts charged, questions have been raised as to the extent of the tender permissible, particularly in sexual cases.142
[21055] Corroboration There are two other possible instances which have been mooted as falling outside the range of cases where the similar fact evidence must be excluded as it is relevant only because it shows the accused’s bad disposition. There are those where it is relied upon to corroborate a witness,143 and those where it is used to rebut a suggestion of coincidence. It is submitted that both are better regarded as falling within the scope of the rule. The argument in the case of corroboration depends upon a line of reasoning illustrated by the following facts.144 The accused was charged
with having had unlawful carnal knowledge of a servant girl under the age of fifteen living in his household. She testified145 that he had told her of having done the same thing to a girl in another part of the country of whom she could have known in no other way. It was held that he could be cross-examined about his relationship with that other girl, and letters he had written to her were put to him. The relevance of this evidence was to corroborate the complainant’s testimony: Although the latter questions did no doubt tend to prove that he was of bad character, still they also in our opinion tended to shew that he was guilty of the offence with which he was charged, for if he had made that statement to the prosecutrix at the time alleged by her, that fact would strongly corroborate her evidence that the prisoner was the person who had had connection with her.146
This reasoning was criticised by the majority of the House of Lords147 on the ground that cross-examination of the accused about such matters was not properly justified under the provisions of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1.148 The decision was, however, vindicated on the basis that the questioning showed nothing which had not been revealed by the evidence in chief. That vindication reveals a flaw in this line of reasoning. For the evidence to be admissible in chief it must have been regarded as probative of the accused’s guilt. Similarly for the evidence to be corroborative of the witness’s testimony it must not merely support it but also [page 731] implicate the accused in a material particular. It can do those things only if it shows the accused’s bad disposition, and if it is tendered to do that, it comes within the scope of the rule excluding similar fact evidence as formulated earlier. Nevertheless it is accepted that the use of similar fact evidence to corroborate testimony constitutes a very significant, and sometimes overlooked, differentiating factor in determining exactly how the rule is to be applied.149
[21060] Rebutting suggestion of coincidence The other instance sometimes asserted as one in which the similar fact evidence does not operate by way of showing the accused’s bad disposition
is when it is tendered to rebut a suggestion of coincidence. This argument is elegantly deployed by Lord Hoffmann150 in relation to the leading Privy Council case.151 He asserts that the evidence of finding all the bodies operated on a statistical basis. It was inherently improbable that all 13 of the children should have died by accident; the only plausible explanation was that Makin had killed them. Makin’s disposition plays no part in this argument. It is only after the argument has been made, and because it succeeds, that Makin’s bad disposition is established. It should perhaps be noted that in fact the prosecution case was that Makin was engaged in a system of taking in children at inadequate premiums and killing them. It was integral to this case that Makin took in a large number of children, that his disposition was murderous, and that this supported the case that he murdered the child with whose death he was charged. It may also be noted that the defence never raised any question of accident. Nevertheless the case could have been run differently, and the argument should be considered on its merits. While the statistical argument does not rely upon Makin’s disposition, the most that it can establish is that Makin must have murdered most of the children. If there had been only one death the possibility of accident was not rebutted. It was only when there were so many that it became incredible all could be accidental.
Misconduct of the accused [21065] No limitation to criminality In the famous passage quoted at [21015] Lord Herschell refers only to “criminal acts” and “criminal conduct or character”. It is quite clear that discredit extends further than evidence of the commission of crimes. In some cases the evidence in question suggests no more than immorality, in others it consists in some aspect — in itself non-criminal — of a criminal act.152 One of the clearest examples of the [page 732] first sort is provided by a case153 in which a brother and sister were charged with incest contrary to the Punishment of Incest Act 1908. In
order to show that sexual intercourse had occurred between them at a time after the passage of the Act when they were sharing a bed the prosecution wished to prove that the brother had fathered his sister’s child, conception having occurred at some time before incest became a crime under the Act. In that case the act, while not criminal when committed, subsequently became criminal. In another case154 the act, although criminal at the time of commission, had ceased to be subject to criminal proceedings at the time it was adduced in evidence owing to lapse of time. In both the evidence was nevertheless held admissible. The question was also mooted where the prosecution sought to bolster the evidence of three young complainants of various acts of indecency committed by the accused with evidence from three other girls. The evidence of those other girls indicated that the accused had gone through much the same preliminary technique of recruiting them, ostensibly for baby-sitting, by the same false pretences, and had attempted to induce them into a compliant attitude and compromising situation by the use of similar inducements, including the provision of pornographic magazines and photographs. It was not, ever, alleged that any acts of indecency or criminal conduct had occurred. The court nonetheless admitted the evidence.155 The court was wrongly informed that there were no reported cases in which similar fact evidence had been admitted even though no crime had occurred. Instead, the court relied upon cases where the noncriminal circumstances of other crimes had been stressed. It should also be noted that, in a number of cases, the accused’s propensity has been proved by the possession of articles of an indecent character, even though such possession was in itself no offence and there was no suggestion that they had ever been used in connection with the commission of an offence.156 In the case of other articles it has been held that evidence of possession of implements only of the sort actually used for the housebreaking in question is admissible.157 In these cases the possession of certain articles may not be unequivocally discreditable in itself, though the articles may be capable of being used for discreditable purposes. It seems that if there is a suggestion that otherwise innocent articles, such as walkie-talkie radios and imitation police uniforms, may be used for criminal purposes it is not necessary that any such occasion on which they have been so used need be identified, provided
[page 733] that there is some issue to which their possession is sufficiently relevant.158 The possession of money may be admissible.159 So may the possession of items capable of use for dealing in or taking drugs.160
[21070] The role of similarity The exclusionary rule is not directed to evidence of discreditable conduct per se; it is concerned with the impermissible use which may be made of it. Discreditable conduct will therefore not attract the rule unless it has features which may cause the jury to infer that a person who has been responsible for or involved in those acts is likely by reason of that fact to have committed the offence charged. This will normally require, in order to attract the operation of the exclusionary rule, that the discreditable conduct in question has some common features with or shows an offence of the same general character as the offence charged.161 If the evidence of discreditable conduct lacks this feature the exclusionary rule has no application and the evidence will be admitted subject to the exercise of the general exclusionary discretion. On the other hand, where these features are numerous or striking, or in some other way cause the discreditable conduct to have strong probative force, the exception to this exclusionary rule may be invoked so that the evidence may be admitted on that basis.162
Conclusion [21075] The test summarised In summary, where the prosecution wishes to lead evidence of the accused’s bad character or possession of discreditable materials it must meet the following requirements: (1) The evidence must be relevant to an issue. If it is not relevant it will be excluded for that reason. (2) The evil or criminal disposition or propensity of the accused is not itself an issue at the trial — notwithstanding its possible relevance as a matter of logic or common experience.
Therefore proof of that disposition or propensity without more will be excluded. (3) If the evidence is relevant to an issue either because the disposition or propensity is in the circumstances relevant or because the evidence is otherwise relevant but incidentally reveals the evil or criminal disposition or propensity of the accused it will be excluded unless it has a high degree of probative force. Under the Australian common law, the evidence will be inadmissible if there is a rational view of the evidence consistent with the innocence of the accused. Where this evidence is admitted it will be necessary for the judge to instruct the jury carefully as to the proper use which may be made of it. [page 734] (4) Further, it is possible that the evidence may be excluded by the trial judge in the exercise of the general discretion to reject admissible evidence the probative value of which is insufficient having regard to its prejudicial effect. See [21080] and [21220]–[21240].
[21080] The role of the exclusionary discretion It has been suggested that the third and fourth of these requirements are merely one — the general discretion of the criminal trial judge to exclude evidence which satisfies the technical requirements of admissibility, but the reception of which into evidence would operate unfairly against an accused.163 But even if it is not the case, the assessment by the trial court of the probative value of the evidence involves it in a mental process which is very similar to that which it exercises in dealing with an application to exclude evidence under its general discretion. In each case it must examine the evidence in question in the light of the rest of the evidence to determine what it proves and what is its probative value. Against this it must weigh the inevitable prejudice which will flow from the nature of the evidence. So similar are these two processes that it is difficult to imagine a
case where the similar fact evidence is ruled admissible as a matter of law but is rejected in the exercise of the general discretion.164 But there is one very important distinction between them, and possibly two. First, the Crown, as the party seeking to tender the similar fact evidence, has to satisfy the trial judge that it meets the legal requirements for admissibility. The exercise of discretion, on the other hand, is a procedure implemented at the behest of the accused. The second distinction may be asserted as being of greater practical relevance. The role of the appellate court will differ depending upon whether the admission of the evidence is challenged as an error of law or as a miscarriage of discretion. The task of the appellant in the second instance is much more formidable because the grounds for attacking discretionary decisions are narrow. It is now necessary to examine in some detail the third requirement for admissibility of evidence of conduct discreditable to the accused, that it be of strong probative value of a fact in issue. This is the area which has caused, and increasingly will cause, the greatest difficulty.
D — THE DEGREE OF PROBATIVE FORCE165 Probative force [21085] Strong probative force Evidence of the bad character or misconduct of an accused will be admitted exceptionally, where it is strongly probative of a matter in issue.166 The importance of this observation has been emphasised by the High Court in a [page 735] series of cases167 since 1974.168 The court has emphasised that, like any evidence, similar fact evidence must be logically probative of a fact in issue or as part of a chain of facts leading to a fact in issue. But, because of the inevitable disadvantages for an accused person attending the reception of
this evidence, the trial court ought not to admit it unless it is satisfied that it has a high degree of probative force. Various expressions appear throughout the judgments to indicate this special nexus between the evidence and the fact which it is tendered to prove. Its admission “is exceptional and requires a strong degree of probative force”.169 It must have “a really material bearing on the issues to be decided”.170 It is only admissible where its probative force “clearly transcends its prejudicial effect”.171 It must be “really material”; it must have “strong probative force”.172 Brennan J has taken up the expression that the evidence in question will be rejected unless it is of such probative force “that it would be an affront to common sense not to use it”.173 Other statements would place an arguably heavier burden on the prosecution: “to be admissible the similar fact evidence must give rise to a clear inference tending to establish an element of the offence charged and must not be reasonably explicable upon some other basis”.174 As was seen above, this led to the test for admissibility now favoured in the High Court as a statement of the common law of Australia — whether there is no rational view of the evidence inconsistent with the innocence of the accused.175 The courts often analyse the admissibility of similar fact evidence through its particular probative force by reference to expressions such as striking similarities, [page 736] unusual features, underlying unity, system or pattern. These characteristics are not, however, essential pre-requisites to admissibility in every case.176 The judge will assess the admissibility of the evidence on the assumption that it is accepted,177 unless it is capable of rational explanation on the ground of concoction.178
[21090] effect
Balancing probative force and prejudicial
McHugh J has divided the function of similar fact evidence into two: that evidence which is of facts forming part of the transaction under
inquiry (ie part of the res gestae), and that evidence which is circumstantial evidence leading to an inference in favour of the fact in question. His Honour argued that the rule of exclusion under consideration had no place in cases where the discreditable conduct was part of the res gestae, for “such evidence which directly relates to a fact in issue is so fundamental to the proceedings that its admissibility as a matter of law cannot depend upon a condition that its probative force transcends its prejudicial effect”.179 The proper role of the rule was in determining the admissibility of similar fact evidence which is offered as circumstantial evidence. This was deplored by Brennan J who acknowledged that events which are part of the res gestae will normally be admitted, not on the basis that they are evidence of a particular type, but as an application of the rule under consideration which prohibits the admission of similar facts evidence unless “its probative force clearly transcends its merely prejudicial effect”.180 In the circumstances of a given case the cogency of the evidence in question will vary as will the degree of prejudice. It will only be where the probative weight of the evidence of discreditable conduct clearly transcends its merely prejudicial effect,181 or outweighs the inevitable prejudice,182 that the trial judge should rule it admissible.183 Whether in the field of sexual conduct or otherwise, there is no general or automatic answer to be given to the question whether evidence of facts similar to those the subject
[page 737] of a particular charge ought to be admitted. In each case it is necessary to estimate (i) whether, and if so how strongly, the evidence as to other facts tends to support, ie to make more credible, the evidence given as to the fact in question, and (ii) whether such evidence, if given, is likely to be prejudicial to the accused. Both these statements involve questions of degree.184
The two elements to which reference is made have been called above “probative force” and “prejudicial effect”. Each of these composite notions will be considered in turn. Where the evidence is of conduct185 or propensity186 so commonplace as to deprive it of any real probative value in any circumstances it is likely to be inadmissible.
[21095]
Factors relevant to probative force
The probative force of similar fact evidence depends upon three principal factors: (1) the cogency of the evidence showing the accused’s bad disposition; (2) the extent to which such evidence supports the inference allegedly to be drawn from it; and (3) the degree of relevance of that inference to some fact in issue in the proceedings. These factors interact and to some extent strength in one can compensate for weakness in another. A skeleton of this analysis is sketched out here; many of the examples are discussed in more detail in the next part of this section.
[21100] Cogency of evidence showing bad disposition Similar fact evidence can take a wide range of possible forms, from the accused’s confession of extrinsic discreditable conduct187 or disposition,188 or the accused’s conviction for the conduct after a trial,189 to such weak possibilities as charges for which the evidence is scanty,190 or even charges on which the accused has been acquitted.191 In some cases the probative force consists solely of an inference sought to be drawn from equivocal conduct,192 from statements made by the accused,193 from the possession of articles,194 or even of letters written by a third party.195 It is immaterial that the supporting evidence is derived from conduct after the [page 738] commission of the alleged offence196 or even after having been charged with it.197 In some of these cases the evidence was too weak to be accepted. It is interesting that in some cases less cogently established evidence is tendered when stronger is available. This tends to occur where the accused has previously been convicted of similar offences, so the evidence is clearly cogent, but is charged with a large number of incidents of the same character in different counts in the current indictment, all of which are denied.198 It appears to reflect a sentiment not very different from that inspiring the plea of autrefois convict, namely, a desire not to make the accused suffer twice for the same act. A further dimension of cogency relates to the danger of collaboration
between the witnesses to the evidence extrinsic to the charge and those to the conduct in respect of which the accused is being tried. This sometimes seems to be regarded as a matter of weight, and thus as having little bearing on admissibility,199 but another view is to the contrary.200 Lord Wilberforce emphasised that this: may be a real possibility: something much more than mere similarity and absence of proved conspiracy is needed if this evidence is to be allowed. This is well illustrated201 where the judge excluded “intra group” evidence because of the possibility, as it appeared to him, of collaboration between boys who knew each other well. This is … the right course rather than to admit the evidence unless a case of collaboration or concoction is made out.202
Although Lord Cross agreed on this point, the other members of the House were more equivocal, and the English Court of Appeal203 was content to leave the matter to the discretion of the judge. The court was prepared to accede to the trial judge’s view that the question could be ventilated in summing up, and decided by the jury. While it is highly unusual for questions of admissibility to depend upon the likelihood of concoction, the procedure suggested by Lord Wilberforce has been adopted for Australian courts by Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ,204 who noted that it is the possibility of concoction, not the probability or real chance of concoction, which will render the evidence inadmissible. This is because the evidence is admissible only in exceptional circumstances, where it bears no reasonable explanation other than the happening of the events in issue. The trial judge should conduct this inquiry in much the same way as the admissibility of a disputed confession is determined. The admissibility of similar fact evidence of this type is likely to be just as damaging to the accused as that of a disputed confession, and it [page 739] would be appropriate to pursue an analogous course. So if the defence alleges some such concoction and adduces some credible evidence of it, it may be that the prosecution should be required to satisfy the judge on a voir dire that no such concoction has occurred. If it succeeded in doing so the evidence should then be admitted, but the defence remains free to attack its cogency, in much the same way as it remains free to attack the cogency of a confession admitted after a contested voir dire. This risk of
concoction assumes particular importance where the principal justification for the admission of the evidence of bad disposition lies in the corroboration it affords a primary witness.205 A procedural difficulty is that the court can scarcely determine the question of whether there is a concoction without hearing much of the evidence, and this, it would seem, would have to be on a voir dire. On the other hand, the spectacle of trials being disrupted by voir dire diversions even more than they at present are is a disturbing one.206 In principle there may be a tension between the Pfennig test (see [21035]) and the possibility of concoction qualification. But since the latter qualification has been removed by statute in Queensland, the only jurisdiction which the Pfennig test survives, any tension is unlikely to arise for resolution.207
[21105] Strength of the inference from evidence of bad disposition that criminal conduct took place It is obvious that the cogency of the evidence counts for nothing unless it tends to prove what it is tendered to prove, and unless that matter is itself relevant to a fact in issue. The former of these two questions has to be resolved in the light of the other evidence in the case and the form of reasoning to be adopted. The greatest difficulty is experienced in cases where it is necessary to show by the evidence, because of the absence of direct oral testimony, both that a criminal act occurred, and that, if it did, it was the accused who committed it.208 In some cases identity may be conceded, indeed be undeniable, but the commission of a criminal act hotly disputed.209 But it is not possible to draw an inference adverse or, indeed, favourable to an accused person not in some way implicated in the evidence relied on. This can be seen in an unusual poisoning case. It was unusual not only because the victim survived, but also because he supported the accused, his wife, in her protestations of innocence. It was clear that Mr Perry became ill in 1978 and 1979 as a result of poisoning by lead and arsenic. The accused had the opportunity to administer the poison and she stood to gain financially by his death.210 Furthermore, she had the opportunity to administer poison to each of three other deceased persons. In the case of Haag and Duncan she stood to obtain insurance payments following their deaths. The High Court unanimously held that the
[page 740] evidence relating to the death of Duncan was inadmissible. There was no direct evidence that he suffered from arsenic poisoning, and it was clear that he did not die from that cause, and this meant that there was no real nexus between the evidence and the fact to be proved. In the case of the evidence of Montgomerie’s death, the Court was evenly divided, but Gibbs CJ and Murphy J were for rejecting it, since the accused did not stand to benefit by his death and she was not sufficiently implicated in the administration of the arsenic that killed him. The majority were for admitting the evidence of Haag’s death. Poisoning cases, generally, illustrate the difficulty of admitting evidence of similar acts where the involvement of the accused in the other incidents is merely that of an opportunity to administer the poison. This requirement of involvement is stressed in the classic statement of Evatt J: It is not permissible to show that the accused or party is the kind of person who might be expected to do the kind of thing which is imputed to him. On the other hand, poisonings and fires, though often the result of accident, do not, in ordinary human experience, recur in the same family circle or in the case of the same occupier. Accordingly, evidence is allowed to prove the recurrence of such poisonings or such fires respectively without proof that the party concerned was more than “involved”, in order to show the high degree of improbability attending the hypothesis that the poisoning or fire under particular scrutiny is an accident. As human experience negatives the likelihood of any repetition of disastrous accidents of a peculiar kind involving the same person, proof of such repetition is allowed to destroy or reduce the probability of the hypothesis of accident in the given case.211
[21110] Strength of the inference from evidence of bad disposition that accused was criminal The converse case is where the commission of the crime by someone was undeniable, but dispute centred upon the identity of the accused as the criminal in the absence of direct testimony of identification.212 It is in such cases that the courts require the very strongest evidence of similarity, indeed peculiarity, of technique. In other cases where there is direct evidence of the commission of the crime, and it is merely sought to corroborate such evidence,213 a lower standard of peculiarity may be tolerated, and in cases where there is still more compelling further evidence, such as keeping an appointment to meet at a pre-arranged place at a pre-arranged time, even less similarity is required,214 where evidence
of no more than homosexual disposition sufficed. Similarly, if the issue is solely as to the intent, motive or knowledge of the accused — the commission of the act and the identity of the actor being conceded215 — this requirement sinks lower still. The degree of similarity required will depend upon the issues in the particular case, the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced and the other evidence … That test [striking similarity] has been applied when the Crown seeks to prove identity, but the
[page 741] test is less stringent where the evidence is adduced to show knowledge, intent or state of mind or … to refute the defence of accident …216
These matters are considered further below.
[21115] Relevance of similar fact evidence to fact in issue This is the second of the two questions mentioned at the beginning of [21105] above. Even if, say, the act of the accused might lawfully be established by reference to evidence of bad disposition, that evidence is no more than prejudicial if the act of the accused is not in dispute.217 In a sense a plea of not guilty puts every element of the crime into issue: The accused should not be able, by confining himself at the trial to one issue, to exclude evidence that would be admissible and fatal if he ran two defences; for that would make the astuteness of the accused or his advisers prevail over the interests of justice.218
However, the stringency of such a view has now been recognised, and in the light of adverse comments,219 Lord Goddard CJ himself expressed the more traditional and generous view later: [i]n criminal cases … the prisoner does not plead in writing; he pleads orally and a plea of not guilty is a plea of the general issue, and when the general issue is pleaded all defences are open to a prisoner, but it would not, on that account, be right at once in all cases to assume that a prisoner is going to set up a defence which is theoretically open to him.220
The question is clearly complicated by the paucity of interlocutory procedures in criminal cases, apart from committal proceedings, and by the frequent reluctance of the defence to show its hand at an early stage. It is nevertheless clear that the line221 of defence taken by the accused may either contract or expand the ambit of relevance of evidence of bad disposition. Thus a charge of rape might be defended on grounds of alibi,
drunkenness, automatism, insanity, impotence or consent of the victim. If the alibi line is chosen, the prosecution could adduce evidence of any relevant conduct of the accused, including criminal conduct, which took place in circumstances inconsistent with the alibi. If the impotence line is taken, the prosecution could adduce evidence of any acts of sexual intercourse, including criminal acts, to rebut the defence.222 But other acts of criminality which might be proved on the first hypothesis would not now be relevant because of the different line taken by the accused. If the defence were consent of the victim, then neither evidence of general criminality, nor evidence of intercourse with others would be [page 742] admissible.223 Sometimes when the nature of the defence lets in a new range of extrinsic material it becomes relevant in a much wider way than would otherwise have been the case. Thus where the accused denied not only the commission of the acts in question, but also the conversation leading up to them, the prosecution was able to corroborate the evidence of its principal witness with evidence of further discreditable conduct of the accused which could have come to the knowledge of the victim only by way of such a conversation.224 It then became a matter of little consequence how different the details of the two incidents were.
[21120]
The role of similarity
One danger of the description of the exclusionary rule under consideration as the similar facts rule, is that it fastens attention upon the similarity between the fact to be proved and the other discreditable conduct which is sought to be adduced. This has led to the Crown presenting the court with a list of similarities in support of a submission that some, individually or collectively, will strike it as sufficiently bizarre or unique as to reveal striking similarity.225 Such an approach is to ignore the real basis upon which admission of this evidence is permitted; that it must be strongly probative of a fact in issue. This is illustrated by a case226 in which the accused was charged with murdering two sisters on 30 December 1981. The Crown case was that he shot one and killed the
other by a gunshot or other injury to the head. He then sought to disguise this by contriving a motor accident with the bodies inside the car which then burst into flames. His defence was that the motor accident in which the bodies were incinerated was genuine and that the sisters died in the accident and not as a result of his assault. In support of its case the Crown sought to present evidence that in 1984 Thompson had committed four murders by shooting the victims through the head with a similar calibre rifle and had thereafter sought to destroy the evidence by fire. In fact he had been convicted and sentenced for these subsequent murders. In each case Thompson had been the last person with the victims. The appeal against the trial judge’s admission of the similar fact evidence was dismissed unanimously by the majority on the familiar ground that there was a striking similarity between the two incidents. Gaudron J, with whom Deane J agreed, preferred to see the logical force of the later murders in the conclusion that they were “inextricably connected” or shared “an underlying unity” with the facts in issue. In many cases this underlying unity will be demonstrated by similarities, but the importance of this case lies in its recognition that the task of the judge is not just to list similarities which appear striking, but to seek out and assess the logical nexus between the evidence in question and the facts in issue to determine whether as a matter of common sense and experience the evidence raises the objective improbability of some event occurring otherwise than as alleged by the Crown.227
[21125]
Effect of narrow defence on admissibility
It is sometimes possible by unwavering concentration upon the matters actually put in issue by the nature of the defence to protect the accused by insisting upon a similarly restricted scope of the evidence admitted to rebut them. Thus where the [page 743] accused argued that he would not have committed the instant offence because he would not have wanted to run the risk of violating his parole, it was held to be prejudicial to give the highly unpleasant details of another
breach of parole, for the purpose simply of showing that this consideration did not count for very much with him.228 It should have been enough simply to restrict the evidence to an unspecific allegation of a deliberate breach of parole.
[21130] Cumulative testimony This raises the closely related question of cumulative testimony. In the United States the same Federal Rule, r 403, which bestows a discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence also bestows one to exclude needlessly cumulative evidence. Suppose the accused raises alibi as a defence, and that the prosecution has plenty of convincing evidence to rebut it, quite apart from evidence of the accused’s commission of a crime which also tends to rebut it. Should the prosecution be allowed to adduce evidence of the crime in addition to its other evidence to rebut the alibi? The answer is not straightforward. On the one hand, if there is plenty of other evidence the issue might plausibly be regarded as being as little in real contention as, for example, one in respect of which the accused has made an explicit concession, and thus the evidence of the extrinsic crime might seem simply prejudicial. On the other hand the issue is still open, and there is no predicting what view the jury might take of any particular piece or pieces of evidence. Nor is it manifestly just that the weaker the case for the prosecution, the worse off the accused should become so far as the admission of evidence of discreditable extrinsic matters is concerned. It is submitted that the least unsatisfactory procedure depends upon the delicate art of balancing proof and prejudice.229
Prejudicial effect [21135] Examples of non-prejudicial evidence Evidence of discreditable extrinsic conduct or disposition can be relevant in a large number of different ways, for example by showing a system of discreditable conduct and so tending to prove criminal intent; by showing a particular modus operandi and so tending to identify the accused as the criminal; by showing something discreditable about the accused which only the accused could have communicated to the witness and which was communicated as part of the technique of committing the
crime and so tending to corroborate the witness; or by showing some unusual and discreditable attribute of the accused and so tending to corroborate identification of the accused by a witness. There is nothing inherently prejudicial in these processes of reasoning. Suppose the accused’s system were not particularly discreditable—say, a particular and highly unusual system of arranging a client’s affairs so as to reduce tax before a change in the law made it illegal. If, after the change, such an arrangement were found to have been made, there could be no objection to proving that system as tending to show the unlikelihood of a coincidence, and thus that the accused was involved in the (now illegal) arrangement. If the accused could be shown to be in the habit of wearing outlandish clothes, such as an Indian head-dress, in perfectly innocent pursuits, there could be no objection to proving such an unusual habit as tending to show that the accused was the criminal who was also so attired. If the accused could be shown to be in the [page 744] relevant location at the relevant time, an alibi would equally be disproved whether the accused’s activities there and then were innocent or discreditable. If the accused told the victim something perfectly innocent, say the number of a bank account, as part of the technique of committing a fraud, the witness’s knowledge of that number would corroborate the witness’s testimony just as much as if that knowledge related to some discreditable act of the accused. If the accused has some innocent attribute — say, being a bird-watcher — and the criminal also has this attribute, then the fact that the person identified as the criminal by the witness also happens to be a bird-watcher strengthens the inference that the identification is accurate, just as much as if it related to some discreditable characteristic.
[21140] Institutional perils in prejudicial evidence It is thus apparent that it is not the line of reasoning as such which prejudices the accused, nor even the fact that as a result of its application the accused is more likely to be convicted. The tendency is, rather, for the
evidence indicating a bad disposition to persuade the jury to convict the accused for reasons other than the logical force which constitutes the justification for excluding such evidence.230 Its admission is undesirable at two levels. The first relates to the trial process itself, and constitutes what is usually understood by prejudice in this context. Beyond it there lie further ranges of institutional perils which will accrue whenever prejudice of the former type occurs.
[21145] Trial level It is not possible to do more than speculate upon the lines of argument which may occur in the jury room. There are several possibilities. The first, and the most obvious, is that the jury might simply take the view that the evidence shows the accused to be bad, that crimes are more often committed by the bad than by the good, and hence the evidence tends to show the accused likely to be guilty. In short, the principal danger is that the jury may concentrate too much upon the moral infirmities of the accused, and too little upon other factors in the case which may raise a reasonable doubt. It may be swayed more by revulsion for the accused than persuasion by the rest of the evidence. It is for very similar reasons that the court is required to be sparing in the admission of gruesome photographs or particularly revolting details of the crime committed so as not to permit the accused to be made a scapegoat for the jury’s abhorrence of the crime which has been committed, and for its determination that the wrong not go unpunished. A different danger is that the jury, after hearing the evidence of the accused’s discreditable extrinsic conduct or disposition, may not try sufficiently conscientiously to determine whether or not the accused really is guilty of the crime charged. In the former case the danger is that the jury may too readily infer from the evidence that the accused is guilty; here the danger is that the jury may simply infer from the evidence that the accused is the sort of person who ought to be punished whether proved guilty of the crime charged, or not. They may feel that once it has been proved that the accused has committed crimes in the past, or the accused has a disposition which makes it likely that the accused will commit crimes in the future, then the accused ought to be punished for what the accused has already
[page 745] done, or should be prevented from doing what the accused might go on to do, and that for these reasons the accused should be convicted and sentenced. If the evidence consists of crimes for which the accused has already been convicted the accused may suffer from a tendency for the jury not to give the same benefit of any doubt which might have been given to one with no previous convictions. A jury may well wish to be much more sure before inflicting upon a person for the first time all of the opprobrium which attaches to those found guilty of crimes. If that opprobrium already attaches, the jury may not regard the risk of a mistake as quite so serious a matter. A slight variant on this line of reasoning is that the jury may feel that the accused has probably committed many other crimes beyond those for which the accused has previously been convicted, but in some cases has gone undetected, in others has not been charged because of insufficient evidence, and in others has been acquitted upon a technicality of some sort. It might then seem eminently fair to convict on the current charge, guilty or innocent. A similar line of reasoning may be applied in the class of case where the evidence in dispute relates to a large number of incidents in respect of which the accused has not so far been convicted, including some where the incidents are charged in other counts in the indictment,231 and others where the evidence does not constitute a separate count in the indictment, but is merely used to support it.232 The risk, the danger, the logical fallacy is indeed quite manifest to those who are in the habit of thinking about such matters. It is so easy to derive from a series of unsatisfactory accusations, if there are enough of them, an accusation which at least appears satisfactory. It is so easy to collect from a mass of ingredients, not one of which is sufficient, a totality which will appear to contain what is missing. That of course is only another way of saying that when a person is dealing with a considerable mass of facts, in particular if those facts are of such a nature as to invite reprobation, nothing is easier than confusion of mind; and, therefore, if such charges are to be brought in a mass, it becomes essential that the method upon which guilt is to be ascertained should be stated with a punctilious exactness.233
Another different danger operating at this level is that the jury may become genuinely confused, and concentrate so much upon resolving the question of whether the accused really did commit the extrinsic discreditable acts urged against him, that, once having done so, the verdict upon them is simply substituted for that upon the issue which the jury is
really trying. Even where there is no danger of simple substitution of one bad act for another, the intrusion of an issue of extrinsic discreditable conduct may deflect attention from the real issue of intrinsic discreditable conduct. The jury might have considered that the evidence admitted was evidence of excessive chastisement on the part of the appellant which made it unnecessary for them to consider whether the conduct of the appellant on April 4 was itself so excessive or unreasonable as to be unlawful, and they might have been misled into thinking that they need not trouble whether it was lawful or unlawful in the light of what has been proved about the appellant’s earlier conduct: in either case he was morally responsible for the boy’s death.234
[page 746]
[21150] Secondary prejudice If prejudice of this sort is tolerated at the trial, and if evidence of bad disposition is admitted whenever it is barely relevant to the issues of the accused’s guilt, an undesirable ripple effect is likely to occur. It may be expected that prosecutors will rely upon such evidence more and more, and in the absence of any explicit restriction will sometimes seek to use it even to establish a prima facie case. At an earlier stage the police may be inclined to base their inquiries still more strongly upon the personalities and propensities of criminals known to be living in their areas. This danger is likely to be at its most acute in relation to identification evidence, since eye witnesses are very likely to be shown photographs of those with criminal records in an attempt to detect the criminal. It is well known how unreliable such identification can be,235 and how much danger for an accused person it creates. If criminal records are themselves to be more readily adduced in evidence, these dangers will be seriously enlarged. Not only will the police be more likely to rely upon such matters to find people to charge, they will also be in a much stronger position to exert pressure to plead guilty or to confess by persuading the accused that a man with such a record stands little chance of acquittal in a contested case. Some people will have records so damning, and will be so vulnerable to successful prosecution, as to become easily manipulated by the police. No doubt most prosecutors and most police officers are both honourable and energetic and are unlikely to change their current practices, but it is not unduly cynical to suppose that there could be some who might be tempted
into an easier and more certain path to secure convictions and to clear up crimes, especially when convinced of the accused’s guilt. Greater admissibility of evidence of extrinsic discreditable conduct or disposition would also lead to the complication and prolongation of the process of trial. Some such conduct might have occurred long before the trial, and the means of proving it might be most unsatisfactory. Numerous collateral issues are likely to be raised. The party against whom the evidence is tendered can sometimes legitimately claim to have been surprised by the adduction of evidence which could have been countered had that party known it was going to be given.236 Since the accused can be expected to deny the truth of such allegations as vigorously as possible, the chances of a scrupulous jury remaining unconvinced beyond reasonable doubt might be unduly high, and the administration of justice easily be brought into disrepute by the spectacle of continual re-litigation of past events, perhaps with differing results in relation to conduct for which the perpetrator was never charged at the time. The proliferation of such issues will inevitably slow litigation down still more. It will complicate trials by requiring very careful direction of juries on the weight and point of previous judicial findings, and will lead to special difficulty where indictments contain multiple counts and involve several co-accused. All this will then generate more and more appeals. The matter can also be viewed from the perspective of rehabilitation. The modern tendency is to encourage rehabilitation of offenders by making it possible to live down a criminal past and not have it brought up against one over and over again. If having a criminal record becomes a passport to police scrutiny, harassment and unjustified reconviction, all of these aims will be frustrated. Indeed, to the extent that such a system did lead to unjustified conviction, it would rapidly poison the atmosphere in prisons still further, and generate still greater contempt for the forces [page 747] of law. It should also be noted that the effects would be cumulative. More convictions would mean longer records, and so increase the chances of reconviction still further.237
E — APPLICATION OF THE RULE A variety of contexts [21155] Occasions for application of rule Lord Herschell LC introduced his celebrated passage by saying, “the principles which must govern the decision of the case are clear, though the application of them is by no means free from difficulty”.238 He concluded it by saying, “The statement of these general principles is easy, but it is obvious that it may often be very difficult to draw the line and to decide whether a particular piece of evidence is on the one side or the other”.239 One of the problems relates to the nature of the rule, which depends upon questions of degree and weight, questions which in the present context have to be decided by the judge rather than by the jury. The various stages at which the rule may have to be considered were summarised by Scarman LJ.240 He distinguished the pre-arraignment stage from the trial stage. At the former he took the view that the court could exercise its discretion to sever the indictment if it felt that the evidence relevant to one count would not, because of this rule, be admissible on the others.241 At the trial stage the question of admissibility ought to be decided in the absence of the jury at the outset of the trial.242 The court is not however rendered functus officio by the rulings it makes at so early a stage without having had the opportunity to take into account the way the trial develops. It may still permit evidence which would have been relevant to a severed count to be tendered if it becomes convinced, contrary to its provisional view, of its admissibility. It may also instruct the jury to disregard evidence which it now believes itself wrongly to have allowed,243 or — in a really serious case, where such a course is likely to be ineffective to prevent prejudice — it may discharge the jury and order a fresh trial. These considerations make the application of the rule a difficult task for the judge to perform.244 It was perhaps for this reason that a tendency grew up to consider the application of the rule in terms of rigid categories which dictated either admission or exclusion. [page 748]
This practice has been roundly condemned because “where what is important is the application of principle, the use of labels or definitive descriptions cannot be either comprehensive or restrictive”.245 Some of the labels so applied in the past such as “innocent association”, and “system”, were explicitly condemned.246 Such a view opens rather than closes the door to exemplification of, and to the provision of guidelines for, the application of the rules, so long as such examples and guides are not regarded as automatic shackles or escape hatches.247
[21160] Preliminary considerations The application of the rule depends upon the precise balance between probative force and prejudicial effect. Probative force itself depends upon relevance and cogency. Relevance is heavily influenced by the line of defence adopted by the accused, and cogency by the other evidence in the case. These two practical considerations, rather than time-worn cliches of presentation, govern the form of exemplification here. Issues are considered simply in terms of the elements which arise in any criminal case, such as the occurrence of an actus reus, its commission by the accused, and the accused’s intention, motive and state of knowledge in so committing it. They are affected, not only by the formal definition of the crime, but also by the defences actually advanced by the accused, or reasonably open. These constitute the primary vehicle for the exemplification which follows, but within them there operate considerations of cogency and predominantly the question of whether or not there is direct testimony of the commission of the crime. If there is, the similar fact evidence operates to corroborate it; if there is not, the similar fact evidence operates simply as circumstantial evidence of guilt.
To prove commission of crime [21165] Proof of actus reus In many cases the commission of a crime cannot be denied, and the only question to be decided is the identity of the criminal.248 In others, although it would be possible to deny that any crime were committed, the line of defence operates to convert the case into one of identity or participation.249 This leaves cases where the evidence is sufficiently
equivocal for the commission of any crime at all to remain open to doubt. The most common cases are those of “victimless” offences, the commission of which may leave no physical trace, and of murder where there may either remain insufficient evidence of the cause of death to exclude the possibility of a natural cause,250 or where it may be possible for the accused to allege accident,251 or suicide.252 In the case of many sexual offences there is direct testimony from the victim for the similar fact evidence to corroborate. In murder and in the case of “victimless” offences it is less likely that there will be such direct testimony. It is useful to consider the two situations separately. [page 749] At one time it was thought that evidence of the accused’s bad disposition could not be relied upon to establish the existence of an actus reus. This view has been firmly rejected. The evidence of finding the other bodies was admitted solely to show that the Makins had developed a system of taking babies in at low sums, insufficient to support them, and then murdering them, thus helping to prove it more likely that the child in respect of which they were charged had been murdered by them than that it had died from natural causes.253 The evidence that other brides of Smith had died in their baths tended to rebut a possible defence of accident.254 It was inherently implausible that so many accidents would happen. The main authority on the “victimless” crime situation is a case255 in which a brother and sister were accused of incest. There was evidence that they had been living in the same household, sleeping in the same bed, and passing themselves off as man and wife. In addition there was evidence that the sister had borne her brother’s child, conceived before incest became a criminal offence. The House of Lords received the evidence of the conception of the child to show the disposition of the accused to have sexual relations with each other, and hence that such relations took place when they were sharing a bed. The case is particularly significant in this context as the Court of Criminal Appeal had refused to uphold the trial judge’s admission of the similar fact evidence just because it was being used to show the commission of the actus reus which, it held, was an impermissible purpose.
[21170]
Need for increased strength in evidence
In all of these cases, where the evidence is used to show the commission of a criminal act in the absence of direct testimony to that effect, the evidence of disposition needs to be particularly strong. In the traditional terminology these often tend to be the cases where “system” is alleged. The baby-farming case and the brides in the bath case might well have been decided differently if there had been no more than one other example. The disposition was however made out in the one case because there were so many other examples, plus a good deal of circumstantial evidence; and in the other because the situations were so remarkably similar to each other in all of their details.256 Where there is direct testimony of the commission of the crime, usually from the victim in sexual cases, the evidence need not be so strong. These are the cases sometimes categorised as ones of “innocent association”. The accused admits an opportunity for the commission of the crime, but denies that advantage was taken of it. The more compromising and contrived the opportunity the more readily the evidence will be admitted. Thus where the accused not only made the acquaintance of the victims, who were total strangers to him, in a public lavatory frequented by homosexuals, but then invited the boys back to his flat where he shared a bed with one of them, the supporting evidence was so strong that evidence of a general [page 750] disposition to homosexuality was of sufficient probative force to be admitted.257 Where the supporting evidence is not so strong, as where the initial meeting was less questionable, and where no such close contact as sharing a bed was admitted, evidence of the accused’s homosexuality was excluded.258 There have been several English cases259 since 1974 in which the commission of a criminal act has been in issue, but in all of them there has been some direct testimony of the commission of the act in question. They provide no clear guidance to the amount of probative force required. In some the evidence relied upon as being strikingly similar has been
regarded as relating to no more than the stock-in-trade of the perpetrator of the crime in question. In some there has been stress upon the corroborative factor. Where a number of different witnesses, without any suggestion of collaboration, all testify that the same thing has happened, it is significant, particularly where the detail is either unusual,260 or tallies in some very minute particulars over a large number of cases.261 The essence of the argument is the unlikelihood of a coincidence of testimony, and that unlikelihood increases the more peculiar the circumstances and the greater the number of instances. It does, however, then become absolutely vital that the testimony should be truly independent, and free from any danger of collaboration, or any other cause common to the witnesses. It will be seen that the authorities all deal with the conduct or mental state of the accused. An attempt to use similar fact evidence on the issue of whether different complainants did or did not consent to sexual intercourse has failed, on the basis that the evidence proved nothing about, and was irrelevant to, the disposition of the accused; it went only to the mental state of each complainant on a particular occasion.262 [page 751]
To prove commission by the accused [21175] Lack of direct testimony Quite often the commission of an act constituting the crime cannot be denied. This applies to many cases of murder, rape, robbery, burglary and theft. In this situation the accused must usually say that the criminal is another. Here too the cases may be divided according to whether there is, or is not, direct testimony of the accused’s commission of the crime. A very straightforward example of a situation in which there was no such direct testimony is provided by a case263 where the accused had been immured in Broadmoor after being found unfit to plead to two charges of having killed two small girls without having molested them sexually, and then having left their bodies unconcealed where they could readily be discovered. He escaped, and soon afterwards, while he was still in the vicinity of the hospital, a small girl was killed without having been molested sexually, and her body was left unconcealed in a place where it
could readily be discovered. Straffen admitted having seen the girl, but denied that he had killed her. The evidence was held to have been rightly admitted for the purpose of showing that Straffen was the murderer. It should be noted that it was agreed on all sides that the similarities between all of the crimes were very strong, and that the accused’s involvement in the earlier crimes was established as a virtual certainty. The court argued that the evidence was admitted because it showed the identity of the murderer. This is somewhat specious. In all criminal cases it is necessary to show that the person charged is the criminal, and the case264 which the court relied upon differed in that there was there, as argued below at [21180], evidence of identification to be corroborated. It is the existence of such cases which demonstrates that evidence of bad disposition alone may, exceptionally, be admitted. It is, however, vital if this is done to be sure that the evidence is strong enough. The strength of the evidence could have been no more than barely sufficient where the accused was charged with offences arising out of three fires which occurred on his employer’s premises.265 There was evidence that he was present at the seat of the fire on all three occasions, there was some weak evidence of suspicious behaviour by him, and there was similarly weak evidence that all of the fires had been started by the use of a similar, though in itself by no means peculiar, technique. It should be noted that here the accused’s involvement in the other fires was denied, and the technique was not particularly unusual. The factors which must have tilted the balance were that the fires occurred in three different locations, that an employee had started all three, it became clear that only two employees had been in all three locations, and there was no suggestion whatever that the other had been involved.266 This is a good [page 752] illustration of the need to consider the similar fact evidence in the context of all of the other evidence in the case, which there strengthened its probative force considerably.267
[21180] Direct testimony
It is more common for the other evidence of the accused’s involvement to be the direct testimony of a victim. That was the situation where the accused was charged with offences of gross indecency involving two boys on 16 March 1917. According to their account he committed the offences with them in a public lavatory, and made an appointment to meet them there again on 19 March. A trap was set. Thompson arrived at the arranged time and place. He spoke to the boys, he gave them money, and then the trap was sprung. He was found to be carrying powder puffs,268 and to have indecent photographs of boys in his lodgings. His defence was that he was not the man who had committed the offences, and that the boys had misidentified him. The evidence of his disposition to homosexuality as shown by his possessions was admitted to corroborate the evidence of identification: “That the boys should pick out as the guilty person someone who, unknown to them, possessed these objects, confirms their accuracy …”269 In this sort of case, just because the similar fact evidence is not the sole means of identifying the accused, it need not be quite so uniquely denominative of him. The importance of this element of corroboration was stressed in a number of other cases. In one of the more influential the accused was charged in respect of two separate robberies. He was identified practising for one, and committing the other. The importance of these acts of identification was stressed by the trial judge in his charge to the jury: [I]f Robinson is not a guilty man, he is a singularly unfortunate man. He is identified by different people, or said to be identified by entirely two different people, in respect of two entirely different raids.270
The strength of the inference depends, as in all such cases, upon the cogency of the evidence. Two important factors here are the certainty of the implication of the accused in both events, and the independence of the witnesses who testify to it.271 Thus in one case,272 although two of the acts were sufficiently similar and peculiar, the direct testimony of the accused’s involvement in them was unsatisfactory. An example of a case in this category, where the evidence was probably sufficiently strong only because it confirmed direct identification of the accused, is provided by a case in which the accused was charged with four offences involving the use of a stolen credit card to buy large quantities of frozen meat from specialist freezer stores. Apart from the identification testimony, there was evidence
of finding a stolen credit card, of a different brand, and a paper containing attempts to forge a signature in the accused’s dwelling. Despite the fact that it was a different card, the [page 753] fact that it was a different signature, and the fact that the attempted forgeries were not of consistently high quality, the evidence was admitted because: [I]n the particular circumstances … the Access card evidence does bear a similarity to the Barclaycard frauds sufficiently striking to make it admissible in corroboration of identification.273
That the emphasised words are crucial to the admissibility of the evidence is made clear by a case274 in which the accused were charged with breaking, entering and stealing. The only real issue was whether it was the accused who committed the offences. In support of the prosecution case on this issue, evidence was led of the possession by the accused of safebreaking tools. These implements were not used in the crime. The High Court quashed the conviction on the ground that the possession by the accused of these tools showed merely that they had a burglarious disposition.275 The position would have been otherwise if the Crown had made it appear that the tools had been used in the alleged offence, or that they might have been so used;276 and it would be otherwise if it were, in some cases, made to appear that such possession would negative mistaken identity.277 The difficulties posed by the use of similar fact evidence where there is an issue as to the identity of the accused have led the English Court of Appeal to make the following general statement:278 [If] a defendant is charged with two offences and the circumstances and features of the offences are said to be so similar that evidence of one offence is admissible in support of the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the second offence, the jury should be directed to consider first whether, disregarding the similarity of the facts, the other evidence is sufficient to make them sure that the defendant committed offence number one. Only if they are so sure is evidence of similarity admissible to prove that the defendant committed offence number two. An identification about which the jury are not sure cannot support another identification of which they are also not sure however similar the facts of the two offences may be. The similar facts go to show that the same man committed both offences not that the defendant was that man. There must be some evidence to make the jury sure that on at least one offence the defendant was that man.
This passage, which is redolent of the much-criticised “rules” against mutual corroboration, appears, if sound, to create a special regime for identification evidence. The passage has since been said to be relevant to the question whether “in deciding that the defendant committed offence A the jury can have regard to evidence that he also committed offence B. This involves proof not only of similarity, but that the defendant did in fact commit offence B”.279 A different question is “whether identifications of the appellant by several victims can be used cumulatively once the jury is satisfied that other evidence shows all the offences to have been committed by one man”, and it is capable of being answered “Yes”, even though, taken alone, the evidence of each identification falls short of proving that [page 754] the person identified was the defendant in each instance.280 The English Court of Appeal has since denied that there is any special rule in this field for identification evidence.281 In South Australia it has been held, accepting a concession by the prosecution, that although evidence descriptive of the offender is relevant in determining whether similar fact evidence is cross-admissible, identification evidence implicating an accused person is not.282 The latter proposition is questionable.
[21185] “Hallmark” principle The so-called “hallmark” principle which explicitly or implicitly runs through these identification cases may be exemplified thus. The person who committed the crime in question had a wooden leg. The accused has been shown on another occasion to have had a wooden leg.283 Therefore, the fact of possessing a wooden leg tends to show that the two persons are in fact one and the same. The logic of this argument cannot be questioned but, returning to the facts of the gross indecency case discussed in [21180], two dangers must be observed. First, the strength of the argument depends on the rarity of the identifying characteristic. Where the characteristic is unique or rare, the
argument is strong. In a community which numbers a large number of wooden-legged people, or homosexuals, the argument would be worthless.284 Yet the court does not receive evidence on the incidence of homosexuality and on whether the accused’s possession of the impugned articles points to the deviant behaviour charged.285 The court in determining admissibility, like the jury in weighing the evidence, is expected to bring to bear its knowledge of the world to decide whether the factors collectively so defy coincidence as to have sufficient probative value.286 Secondly, an “abnormal propensity” is unlike a wooden leg, in that the latter is permanent whereas the former may influence conduct at one moment and not the next. In the gross indecency case the culprit had the propensity on 16 March and the accused was influenced by it presumably at some time prior to 19 March when he was apprehended. That the culprit and the accused were influenced by the same propensity at the time of the commission of the offence is difficult to say with any confidence. The suggestion in the cases to the effect that the characteristics of homosexuals are such as to put them in a special class, and identifiable by reason of those characteristics, has now been authoritatively rejected by the House of Lords.287 It is not the law that propensity evidence is not to be received in proof of [page 755] identity unless it reveals a signature or some other special feature pointing to the accused as the offender.288
To prove voluntary act of the accused [21190] Inference of voluntariness put in issue The prosecution must always establish that the commission of the actus reus was voluntary. In the absence of some special line of defence this can usually be inferred from the nature of the act in question. Occasionally the accused does not deny the commission of the relevant act, but denies all recollection of having done it. In some such cases similar fact evidence has
been admitted to rebut this defence. This was the last line of defence of an accused charged with the murder of a female cyclist by driving a car at her. The court admitted evidence of his having driven at three other women cyclists at around the same time.289 This case seems to have been overlooked where the accused, who had been found in a house at night after taking keys from a car outside, and who first gave a false explanation for being there and then attempted to run away, raised as a defence that he had no recollection of having entered the house. The trial judge took the initiative in having his long record of previous convictions for housebreaking and burglary put in. In the Court of Criminal Appeal290 Lord Goddard CJ took the view that this was to confuse accident and intent, apparently confining accident to a situation in which any actus reus was denied, and held that the evidence should have been excluded.291 In the nature of things there can be no direct testimony from any other witness of the accused’s mental processes, so no possibility of corroboration arises here. Sometimes physical contact, capable of amounting to an indecent assault, is said to have occurred involuntarily: similar fact evidence can be adduced to show other cases of contact.292
To prove intention of the accused [21195] Purpose Sometimes the criminality of an act depends upon the purpose for doing it. In a leading case the accused, a doctor, was charged in respect of the abortion of a girl whom he had impregnated. His defence was that the girl had spontaneously miscarried when he was engaged in a routine procedure not designed to accomplish such a result. The prosecution was permitted to call another girl whom he had also impregnated, to testify to an unsuccessful attempt to abort her, to which she had been induced to submit by his claim that he had “put dozens of other girls right”. Although there was some division of opinion among the judges, the reasoning was succinctly expressed by Lawrence J: [page 756] That the same accident should repeatedly occur to the same person is unusual, especially so
when it confers a benefit on him. The degree of improbability will depend upon the number of times it is shewn to have occurred and the similarity of the circumstances on each occasion.293
Later cases have approved the admissibility of similar fact evidence for this purpose.294
[21200] Automatism Similar facts may also be used to rebut the defence that the acts of the accused were involuntary and that he lacked intent for that reason. In the second case discussed in [21190], the accused was charged with burglary and pleaded that, although he broke into a house and removed some property, he did so in a state of automatism. The trial judge permitted counsel for the prosecution to put a number of previous convictions for housebreaking and larceny to the accused stating that this course was appropriate “… in view of this defence that has been raised — that there was no intention in the act from start to finish, and that his presence in the house was purely accidental …”295 The accused was convicted, but his conviction was quashed because the evidence relating to his past misconduct had been wrongly admitted. The ground of the decision was that the trial judge confused accident and intent, but this is a statement that needs to be enlarged. The previous convictions merely proved that the accused had been guilty of the offences with which he had been charged in the past; they said nothing, of course, of the circumstances in which the accused had committed the previous crimes.296 They only went to show that the accused was a man of dishonest disposition and could have no further relevance. But, if the earlier convictions had all followed upon a defence similar to that raised by the accused, the facts upon which they were based, coupled with a succession of pleas of this nature, would have been extremely relevant as suggesting a strange coincidence — whenever the accused was found inside someone else’s house, he said he went there in a state of automatism. On the whole, although the decision may be justified on account of the fact that the evidence showed no more than a propensity to commit housebreaking without reference to the circumstances, it [page 757]
would be unwise to treat the case as a decision to the effect that similar fact evidence is never admissible to rebut an allegation that the conduct of the accused was involuntary.297
[21205] Accused’s state of knowledge It is sometimes appropriate to show the accused’s state of knowledge as a step on the way to showing the accused’s intent. This line of reasoning is well illustrated by a case298 involving a charge of attempting to obtain money from a pawnbroker by the false pretence that a diamond ring was genuine. Other attempts to pass false articles as genuine, including the same ring, were admissible since they showed that the accused was not mistaken about the falsity of the ring. In these cases it may not be necessary to show quite the same high degree of similarity as is required in cases where the establishment of an actus reus is in question. It has been held299 it was immaterial that the accused had been acquitted in respect of the conduct which was relied upon to establish knowledge of the state of his bank account. Such a consideration may have motivated a rephrasing of the test so as to require “positive probative value”. The accused director of a building company was charged with making a corrupt payment to a local councillor in respect of securing a contract from the local authority. His defence was that he signed both the false authorisation and the cheque without knowing the true state of affairs. The prosecution was allowed to adduce evidence of two other transactions in which the accused had signed false papers for a similar purpose, though in one of them he had handed the money over in a parcel.300 It should perhaps be noted that there was direct testimony that he really did know the true state of affairs, and the similar fact evidence simply corroborated that testimony. Because it was immaterial to establishing such knowledge that the situations exhibiting it should be identical, the use of the new form of words is unexceptionable. It is, however, important that it should not be allowed to weaken the rigour of the exclusionary rule when the evidence is relied upon for a different purpose, and where the probative force of the evidence is quite different. Similar fact evidence may be admissible to prove motive.301
Similar fact evidence by the accused
[21210] Misconduct of person not accused The statement of the rule at [21010] above is expressed in terms of a qualified prohibition upon the leading of evidence of misconduct by the Crown. This is based on a concern for the interests of the accused whose conduct is in question. This rationale is lacking where the evidence is directed to misconduct of a person other than the accused.302 [page 758] In the days before the accused was allowed to testify or, in the case of a charge of felony, to be represented by counsel, the court occasionally prevented the accused from tendering self-incriminating documents.303 It may have been such a misguided desire to protect the accused from the revelation of past misdeeds which led to the objection to a line of questioning of the prosecution witnesses which would almost certainly have established the innocence of Adolf Beck. Beck was prosecuted for a series of swindles which occurred in 1894. The Crown case was that he was the same person who had perpetrated similar frauds in 1877 and who had been convicted and sentenced for them under the name John Smith. Counsel for the prosecution successfully objected to Beck’s counsel questioning Crown witnesses with a view to demonstrating that the perpetrator of the 1894 swindle was identical with the John Smith of 1877. Had he been permitted to establish this fact it would have been possible for him to prove that Beck was abroad in 1877 when the real John Smith was on trial. And if Beck was not the John Smith of 1877 he was not the John Smith of 1894. The prosecutor’s objection and the judge’s ruling was based on the premise that evidence of the previous conviction of the accused Beck of similar offences ought not to be led by any party.304 Whatever may have been the cause of this unfortunate occurrence at the first trial of Beck, there can be little doubt that the accused may, at any rate when it is clear that the accused is fully cognisant of the danger being run, give evidence of the accused’s own misconduct on other occasions or ask questions with regard to it.305 Assuming the objection of the prosecutor in Adolf Beck’s trial had not been upheld, the evidence which counsel for the accused sought to lead
would be admissible only where there was a sufficient degree of similarity between the swindles of 1877 and those of 1894 to lead to the inference that the same person was responsible. The degree of similarity required for admission of similar fact evidence when led by the accused is not as stringent as that where it is the Crown that leads the evidence. Thus where the issue is one of identity, there must be sufficient similarity between the circumstances of the crime charged and the circumstances of another event for which the accused was not responsible to give rise to the real possibility that the person who committed the crime charged was the person responsible for the other event, so as to raise a reasonable doubt in favour of the accused.306 Furthermore, the question of balancing probative value and prejudice does not arise. Where similar fact evidence is led by an accused, the test is essentially one of relevance: given human experience, is there a sufficient similarity between the two acts as to allow the jury to conclude that there is a real possibility that the same person was involved? 307
[page 759]
[21215] Tender by accused against co-accused In a case308 where the defence of one accused was duress by his coaccused, evidence by the former of the disposition of the latter was admissible. Where bad character is relevant to an issue it is admissible and the restraints imposed by the law upon the use of this evidence by the prosecution have no place. It would seem, therefore, that the exclusionary principle under consideration plays no part in determining the admissibility of this evidence.309 In the appropriate case, the interests of the accused against whom this evidence is to be led can only be protected by separate trials. In a leading case evidence was led by one accused with a view to attaching the responsibility for the murder to the co-accused. Upon appeal it was argued that the exclusionary rule under discussion should operate to exclude it. The trial judge and the Full Court were of the view that this evidence would not have been admissible if led by the Crown. It is, however, a very different thing to say that he is to be restricted in defending himself by excluding such evidence when it tends to rebut his guilt or to prove his innocence. The
considerations applicable when such evidence is sought to be led by the Crown against an accused person are by no means the same as when it is led by an accused person to support his defence, notwithstanding that it may have a prejudicial effect on the co-accused …310 In the latter class of case one important differentiating consideration is the need for an accused person to be left unfettered in defending himself by any legitimate means against the charge made against him.311
There is a conflict in the authorities as to whether there is a discretion to exclude evidence tendered by one accused against another.312
F — ROLE OF DISCRETION313 Does the discretion have any role? [21220] Origins of discretion As noted above at [21015] the rule excluding evidence of the accused’s bad disposition extends back at least to the early years of the nineteenth century. There appears to be no English case in which any judicial discretion to exclude such evidence was mentioned before the beginning of the twentieth century.314 Its appearance seems to derive from the judge’s general control over the proceedings and was for many years expressed in terms of judicial persuasion upon counsel not [page 760] to press for the admission of similar fact evidence even though strictly admissible.315 The discretion changed from being one of persuasion to being one of exclusion.316
[21225] Trifling probative value/disproportion between probative force and prejudicial effect In the same way as there existed two different versions of the function of any such discretion there also existed different formulations of the circumstances in which it could be exercised. In the first really authoritative statement of its exclusionary function, Lord Du Parcq considered that it should be applied only to cases “in which it would be unjust to admit evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the accused
even though there may be some tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible”.317 This approach stresses the trifling probative value of the evidence to be excluded. The alternative formulation stresses the disproportion between probative force and prejudicial effect.318
[21230] Limited role of discretion There are two distinct steps in the process of receiving similar fact evidence. The first step is that of determining whether the evidence is admissible. The second step is the exercise of the discretion to exclude evidence “which is admissible as a matter of law but whose prejudicial effect may be so great as to outweigh its probative value”.319 Many think that the two steps are co-extensive to such an extent that where evidence is properly admissible there is little if any scope for the exercise of the discretion.320 Thus it has been said that only if the Pfennig test under the common law of Australia is satisfied can “one safely conclude that the probative force of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect”.321 In that way the functional role of the discretionary exclusion test is subsumed into the Pfennig test.322
[21235] Meaning of discretion It has nowadays become increasingly realised that the notion of “discretion” may be used in a number of different senses.323 [page 761] It may be used either in a “strong” sense to recognise that its possessor has a choice of alternatives free of binding criteria, or in a weak sense to recognise that its possessor is bound by criteria, but criteria formulated in such a way that personal judgment must be exercised in determining whether or not they have been satisfied. In another context within the law of evidence it has been decided that the judge’s task is of the latter type, and that the terminology of discretion is best eschewed to avoid possible confusion.324 In this context the difference is between taking the view that
a judge can properly decide that the prejudicial effect of evidence outweighs its probative value, and still admit it; and taking the view that once the judge has decided that the prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value it is obligatory to exclude it. It is submitted that the latter is clearly the better view.325
[21240] Discretion or rule The practical difference between treating the power to exclude evidence the probative value of which is slight compared with its prejudicial effect can be illustrated by a case in which the English Court of Appeal said: “We agree that the prejudicial effect of the evidence admitted was enormous and far outweighed its value in proving that the child was frightened of the appellant” but then went on to decide that: “the judge was entitled to exercise his discretion as he did and to admit this evidence”.326 It is much easier to avoid such injustice elsewhere if exclusion is recognised to be by application of a rule, subject to the ordinary processes of appellate review.
G — JURY DIRECTION Invariable requirement [21243] Varieties of direction There is authority that wherever there is before the jury evidence capable of being used as propensity evidence (as distinct from being used, for example, to rebut the accused’s good character, to attack credibility or to corroborate the witness) a warning should “invariably”327 be given as to the legitimate use of the evidence, or in “all but the most exceptional cases”.328 Thus where charges of sexual offences against several victims are tried and the evidence of one victim is not admissible in relation to others, it has been held preferable that the jury be told not only to give each charge separate consideration, but also not to reason, if the jury finds a particular offence committed, that the accused is the kind of person who has committed the others.329 While a jury may be told that it is permissible for the prosecution to
identify points of similarity or a pattern of conduct or system in the allegations made by different complainants and to argue that it was improbable that all complainants [page 762] would make those allegations unless they were true, the jury should be warned that they are not to conclude from acceptance of one or more complainants that the accused was the kind of person who was likely to have assaulted the others.330
Section 2 — Statutory Provisions — Similar Fact Evidence A — THE CTH: EVIDENCE ACT 1995, NSW: EVIDENCE ACT 1995, TAS: EVIDENCE ACT 2001, VIC: EVIDENCE ACT 2008, ACT: EVIDENCE ACT 2011 AND NT: EVIDENCE (NUL) ACT 2011 The “uniform” model [21252] The terms of the provisions The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) have attempted a fresh start.331 There are two exclusionary rules: the “tendency rule”, defined in s 97, and the “coincidence rule”, defined in s 98. “Tendency” reasoning rests on the relevance of a person’s propensity or tendency to act in a particular way or have a particular state of mind. “Coincidence” reasoning rests on the improbability of events occurring by coincidence. Section 97 provides: (1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind, unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. (2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party.
The test of “significant probative value” carries a requirement that the evidence “could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere statutory relevance [under [page 763] s 55]”.332 The probative value of evidence is the degree of its relevance to the fact in issue; significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a “substantial” degree of relevance; it is a probative value which is “important” or “of consequence”;333 the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence (whether led by the Crown or by the accused) must depend on the nature of the fact in issue to which it is relevant and the significance (or importance) which that evidence may have in establishing the fact.334 It is not necessary for the tendency to be a tendency to commit acts closely,335 or substantially and relevantly,336 similar to those which constitute the crime charged. Tendency evidence may be of significant probative value even though it is proved by only a single complainant.337 Features of the alleged offending outside the accused’s control should not be treated as relevant similarities.338 On one point there is division between NSW courts and Victorian courts. In NSW the position is as follows. The court does not usurp any of the jury’s functions, but makes a decision of law about the reasoning processes that are open to a jury.339 The question is whether the evidence is capable, to a significant degree, of rationally affecting the assessment by the trier of fact of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.340 When determining “probative value” in s 97 (and ss 98, 101, 135 and 137) the court should generally not take into account issues of credibility and reliability, but take the evidence at its highest.341 However, in assessing whether there is significant probative value the real possibility of concoction, contamination or innocent infection should be considered.342 Here, too, the court does not usurp any of the jury’s functions, but makes a decision of law about the reasoning processes that would be open to the jury.343 The admissibility question is whether there is evidence capable of establishing the matters described in the first part of
[page 764] s 98(1); the jury question is whether it actually does.344 Deciding whether there is a “real chance” that concoction has occurred will ordinarily not involve any assessment of the credibility or reliability of individual witnesses. Rather, it entails a fact finding exercise, in which the judge will consider what the objective record shows about matters such as relationship, opportunity and motive. These are matters which can properly be assessed by a judge, without usurping the function of the jury.345 In New South Wales, however, there is some division on whether in assessing the probative value of evidence the court can take into account the fact of competing inferences which might be available on the evidence (as distinct from determining which inferences should be or are most likely to be preferred).346 On the other hand, in Victoria it has been said that a trial judge applying s 137 “is only obliged to assume that the jury will accept the evidence to be truthful but is not required to make an assumption that its reliability will be accepted.”347 And in Victoria it was said that the judge had to make some assessment of the weight that the jury could, acting reasonably, give to the evidence.348 New South Wales has maintained its original position.349 An example of evidence not tendered to establish a tendency is evidence that at the time of the events in issue at a hotel the accused was a serving prisoner at liberty under a work release program subjecting him to strict conditions which were breached by his presence at the hotel. The evidence was tendered to refute an innocent explanation for his presence at the hotel (to transport a friend of a friend to the airport, not to prove that the accused had a tendency to act in a criminal way): persons in the accused’s position would be unlikely to put their privileged status at risk by breaking the conditions of work release except for some more important reason than that offered.350 Another example is evidence going to credit but not adduced to prove bad character.351 Another is evidence of various defects in a boat tendered to establish failure to implement an adequate system of work.352 It has been said353 that the s 97(1) exercise is predictive and evaluative and is not a scientific exercise with a clear or rigid answer (which may be accepted) and that it does not have only one correct answer, for reasonable minds may differ, and the decision is only
examinable on appeal on the principles stated in House v R354 (which has been questioned: leaving aside common law rules or statutory provisions [page 765] conferring a discretion, decisions about the admissibility of evidence are questions of law).355 The section is not limited to parties but extends to any relevant “person”.356 Section 98(1) provides: (1) Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the evidence and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value.
The legislation then contains a note: “One of the events referred to in subsection (1) may be an event the occurrence of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.” It then continues: (2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party.357
Section 99 provides: Notices given under section 97 or 98 are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section.
The Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth) reg 6, the Evidence Regulation 2010 (NSW) regs 5 and 6, the Evidence Regulations 2009 (Vic) regs 7 and 8, the Evidence Regulation 2012 (Tas) reg 6, the Evidence Regulations 2012 (ACT) regs 8 and 9 and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Regulations (NT) regs 6 and 7, specify the contents of the notices.358 Rule 31.5 of the NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules specifies their timing and other details. Section 100 of the Acts provides: (1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the tendency rule is not to apply to particular tendency evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 97.
(2) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the coincidence rule is not to apply to particular coincidence evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 98. (3) The application may be made either before or after the time by which the party would, apart from this section, be required to give, or to have given, the notice. (4) In a civil proceeding, the party’s application may be made without notice of it having been given to one or more of the other parties. (5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and
[page 766] (b) may be given either at or before the hearing. (6) Without limiting the court’s power to impose conditions under this section, those conditions may include one or more of the following: (a) a condition that the party give notice of its intention to adduce the evidence to a specified party, or to each other party other than a specified party; (b) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified tendency evidence, or all tendency evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified tendency evidence; (c) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified coincidence evidence, or all coincidence evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified coincidence evidence.
Section 101 provides: (1) This section only applies in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to sections 97 and 98. (2) Tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant. (3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the defendant. (4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by the defendant.
Section 94(1) provides that the Part does not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness. Credibility is dealt with in ss 101A–108C: [19055]. Section 94(2) provides that the Part does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing. Section 94(3) provides that the Part does not apply to evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue. Section 95 provides: (1) Evidence that under this Part is not admissible to prove a particular matter must not be
used to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. (2) Evidence that under this Part cannot be used against a party to prove a particular matter must not be used against the party to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose.
In addition, the discretions to exclude or limit the use of evidence under ss 135–136, and the duty359 to exclude evidence in criminal proceedings adduced by the prosecutor where its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant under s 137, must be remembered. However, it has been said that if the evidence satisfies s 101, it will not be liable to discretionary rejection under s 135 (and will necessarily satisfy s 137).360 It is unclear whether the intractable difficulties of the problem under consideration will be overcome by these provisions.361 Plainly the notice requirements, in respect of which the common law is less fully developed, reduce [page 767] the risk of unfairness and impose greater duties of careful preparation. Sections 97 and 98 adopt the broad approach of the common law in making admissibility in both civil and criminal proceedings depend on the test of “significant probative value”. Section 101(2) also follows the common law in creating a further exclusionary rule, but only in criminal cases, where the probative value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant. That language calls for a “balancing judgment”, not a discretion, and it departs from the common law requirement that there be no reasonable view of the evidence available which is consistent with the innocence of the accused.362 It has been said that in applying s 101(2), the reasonable possibility of concoction or contamination may deprive the evidence of its significant probative value or may result in its significant probative value being substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, when considered in the light of other evidence adduced, or to be adduced.363 The discretion in civil cases to exclude evidence which is only remotely relevant or of small probative value ([11130]) is matched by s 135. An instance where evidence was unfairly prejudicial and might cause or result in undue waste of time within the meaning of s 135 was postulated where it would require
other parties to undertake, at a late stage of the trial, a lengthy exercise of rebutting complex evidence of peripheral relevance.364 Another was where some evidence of relationship was admissible under s 97 but some was not, and difficulties could arise as to the different uses each was capable of being put to and as to differing standards of proof.365 In s 101 “adduced” means “tendered”.366 The warnings which are appropriate about similar fact evidence at common law are also appropriate under the Acts.367 It remains to be seen whether the condition of the authorities on these sections will come to resemble the condition of those applying the common law. The following distinctions have been drawn. First, evidence tendered as relationship evidence in the sense of placing the relevant events in their true context as part of the essential background is not caught by s 97 and s 101.368 This arises where the evidence is relevant because it removes implausibility that might [page 768] otherwise be attributed to the complainant’s account because the incidents charged are presented as isolated. Secondly, evidence is also relationship evidence where it is tendered to show the sexual desire of accused for complainant.369 Thirdly, evidence is not tendered as relationship evidence, but as tendency evidence, when it supports an inference that the accused not only had the motivation of sexual attraction, but was prepared to act on it to the extent of committing sexual assaults. The distinction between the second and third categories is that the mere fact that the accused is sexually attracted to a particular person does not reveal a tendency to gratify the attraction. However, finally, where the evidence shows that the accused is sexually attracted towards a small child, it falls within the third category, not the second: “sexual feelings of adult males towards young children are considered abnormal, and the ordinary motivational force of sexual feelings referred to in [the second category] cannot easily be kept distinct from a perception that a person having such feelings towards a young child is a particular kind of person who is likely to act on these feelings”.370 Once admitted on one of the first two bases, the evidence
cannot be used as tendency evidence unless s 97 is complied with, and the jury should be directed not to use the evidence as tendency evidence unless s 97 is complied with.371 Further, so far as evidence of the relationship between the accused and the complainant is admitted to establish the complainant’s state of mind in relation to consent,372 it is admissible independently of s 97. Where evidence capable of disclosing a tendency on the part of the accused: (a) is tendered for that purpose, and hence is “tendency evidence” within the meaning of s 97(1), and the Crown fails to exclude the reasonable possibility of concoction on the part of the proposed witness or witnesses, the evidence should be excluded pursuant to s 101(2) because its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect; (b) is not tendered for that purpose, so that s 97 and s 101(2) do not apply, it must be excluded pursuant to s 135 and s 137.373 The potentiality for prejudice in relationship evidence not tendered under s 97 may be minimised, and hence the operation of s 135 and s 137 may be affected, by limiting the use which is to be made of the evidence under s 136 and by appropriate jury directions as to the relevance of the evidence, the manner in which it is to be used, and the manner in which it is not to be used374 — that is, it cannot be used to establish a tendency, or to support reasoning that because the accused may have done something wrong to the complainant on an occasion other than that charged, he must have done so on the occasion charged.375 An example of evidence admissible under s 98 is evidence of documents, being cheques, receipts and allegedly false receipts, which were very similar to those directly relevant to the offences charged.376 Evidence about persons charged with [page 769] the offence of intentionally being a member of a terrorist organisation being in possession of videos showing executions is outside s 97: the evidence is not tendered to show tendency but as a mark of membership.377
B — OTHER STATE STATUTES Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and others [21257] The Queensland, Western Australian and South Australian provisions In Queensland the Evidence Act 1977 s 132A provides: In a criminal proceeding, similar fact evidence, the probative value of which outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect, must not be ruled inadmissible on the ground that it may be the result of collusion or suggestion, and the weight of that evidence is a question for the jury, if any.
“Similar fact evidence” is not defined. The section abolishes the doctrine that a “possibility of concoction” of complaints by the victims of allegedly similar events suffices to render the evidence inadmissible,378 but not the doctrine that evidence of disposition is to be excluded if there is a rational explanation consistent with innocence. The section does not refer to “propensity evidence”, which is sometimes used in a sense wider than “similar fact evidence”,379 leaving open the possibility of only relatively narrow application. Section 132B provides: (1) This section applies to a criminal proceeding against a person for an offence defined in the Criminal Code, chapters 28 to 30. (2) Relevant evidence of the history of the domestic relationship between the defendant and the person against whom the offence was committed is admissible in evidence in the proceeding.
It has been said that this does not appear to go beyond the common law, discussed at [21050]380: but that depends on how the common law works in particular applications of it, which is controversial. The offences defined in the Criminal Code, Chs 28 to 30, are homicide, offences endangering life or health, and assaults.381 Section 132B abolishes pro tanto the common law Pfennig test.382 “Relevant evidence” is not limited to evidence relevant by way of propensity.383 Where evidence is admitted under s 132B to show propensity, it is necessary that trial judges give clear and comprehensible warnings about the misuse of the evidence to show propensity and explain the purpose for which it is tendered. Trial judges should identify the inferences which may be open from it or the questions which may have occurred to the jury without the evidence. Those
inferences and those questions should be identified by the prosecution at an early stage in the trial. And [page 770] it should be explained to juries that the evidence is to allow the complainant to tell her, or his, story but that they will need to consider whether it is true.384 In Western Australia s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 provides: (1) In this section— propensity evidence means— (a) similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or (b) evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had; relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. (2) Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers— (a) that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and (b) that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. (3) In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion.
Admissibility under s 31A is a question of law, not discretion.385 There is no statutory discretion to exclude evidence which meets the criteria for admissibility set out in s 31A. Nor is there any room for the existence of a common law exclusionary discretion.386 In applying s 31A(2)(b), it may be necessary to consider whether a direction by the trial judge could adequately guard against potential unfairness.387 When evidence of uncharged sexual acts is admitted under s 31A to prove sexual offences charged in an indictment, the trial judge is not obliged by law to give a direction to the jury about the evidence of the uncharged sexual acts.388 It is only necessary to do so if, in the
circumstances of a particular case, this is necessary to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice.389 Satisfaction of s 31A may be affected by the extent to which the accused does not challenge the prosecution case.390 In South Australia s 34O of the Evidence Act 1929 provides that Pt III Div 3 applies to the trial of a charge of an offence and prevails over the common law. It [page 771] does not apply to evidence adduced pursuant to s 18 (which concerns cross-examination of accused persons on their records): s 34O(2)(a). And it does not apply to evidence of the character, reputation, conduct or disposition of a person as a fact in issue. Section 34P provides: (1) In the trial of a charge of an offence, evidence tending to suggest that a defendant has engaged in discreditable conduct, whether or not constituting an offence, other than conduct constituting the offence (discreditable conduct evidence)— (a) cannot be used to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence because he or she has engaged in discreditable conduct; and (b) is inadmissible for that purpose (impermissible use); and (c) subject to subsection (2), is inadmissible for any other purpose. (2) Discreditable conduct evidence may be admitted for a use (the permissible use) other than the impermissible use if, and only if— (a) the judge is satisfied that the probative value of the evidence admitted for a permissible use substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant; and (b) in the case of evidence admitted for a permissible use that relies on a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue — the evidence has strong probative value having regard to the particular issue or issues arising at trial. (3) In the determination of the question in subsection (2)(a), the judge must have regard to whether the permissible use is, and can be kept, sufficiently separate and distinct from the impermissible use so as to remove any appreciable risk of the evidence being used for that purpose. (4) Subject to subsection (5), a party seeking to adduce evidence that relies on a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue under this section must give reasonable notice in writing to each other party in the proceedings in accordance with the rules of court. (5) The court may, if it thinks fit, dispense with the requirement in subsection (4).
Section 34P(1) applies to evidence suggesting that a defendant has — in the past — engaged in discreditable conduct, not evidence suggesting that
the defendant might intend to do so in future.391 Section 34Q provides: Evidence that under this Division is not admissible for one use must not be used in that way even if it is relevant and admissible for another use.
Section 34R provides: (1) If evidence is admitted under section 34P, the judge must (whether or not sitting with a jury) identify and explain the purpose for which the evidence may, and may not, be used. (2) If evidence is admitted under section 34P and that evidence is essential to the process of reasoning leading to a finding of guilt, the evidence cannot be used unless on the whole of the evidence, the facts in proof of which the evidence was admitted are established beyond reasonable doubt, and the judge must (whether or not sitting with a jury) give a direction accordingly.392 If no objection is taken to evidence, the judge is not obliged to consider whether it should be admitted under s 34P.393
[page 772] Section 34S provides: Evidence may not be excluded under this Division if the only grounds for excluding the evidence would be either (or both) of the following: (a) there is a reasonable explanation in relation to the evidence consistent with the innocence of the defendant; (b) the evidence may be the result of collusion or concoction.
Section 34T provides: Where— (a) two or more defendants are charged in the same information; and (b) a party proposes to adduce discreditable conduct evidence; and (c) a defendant (the applicant) applies prior to or during a trial for a separate trial or for a charge to be severed from the information, the court, when considering the application, must give strong weight to a real possibility that the applicant may be prejudiced by— (d) evidence proposed to be adduced by the prosecutor against another defendant which is not admissible against the applicant; or (e) evidence proposed to be adduced by another defendant which is not admissible against the applicant; or (f) the applicant’s inability to adduce with respect to another defendant relevant evidence that would be admissible but for the operation of section 34P.
Section 34S(a) appears to abolish the Pfennig test.394 Section 34S(b) abolishes the possibility of concoction as a bar to admissibility.395
[21260]
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
It is often very difficult for the prosecution to prove intent in certain crimes, so provisions are sometimes inserted in statutes enabling the proof of character to show the required intent or purpose. One example is the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 24AB. It was discussed in the fifth Australian edition of this work at [21260].
[21265]
Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas)
Another example is vagrancy legislation modelled on the English Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 s 15 — the Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 7 (discussed in the fifth Australian edition of this work at [21265]).
[21270]
Proof of knowledge
In some cases the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had certain knowledge, such as, on a charge of receiving or handling, a knowledge that goods in his possession were stolen. Pursuant to the now repealed Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 200, it was permissible for the prosecution to give, in proof of knowledge, evidence of certain prior convictions within a given period preceding the date of the alleged offence. The legislation was discussed in the fifth Australian edition of this work at [21270]. [page 773]
Section 3 — Civil Cases — Similar Fact Evidence A — PRINCIPLE Similar fact rule or rule of relevance [21275] History Although some early civil cases396 reject similar fact evidence on the basis of being res inter alios acta, it was soon accepted that the rule of exclusion was certainly no stricter than that in criminal cases.397 The real question was whether there was a special rule of exclusion at all, or whether it was not rather a question of simple relevance in each case. In some cases the nature of the issue determined the question in favour of admissibility, as Stephen J remarked: when the question is whether a particular act is a public nuisance, it is difficult to see how it can be proved to be so except by showing cases in which it has interfered with a public right.398
Similarly evidence of previous complaints about accidents was admitted to show that the proprietors of a dock knew of its dangerous condition,399 and previous outbreaks of skin complaints among the defendant barber’s customers to show his negligent practice.400 Evidence of departures from reasonable professional standards is admissible on the question whether an accused lacked reasonable skill in performing particular operations.401
[21280]
Survival of similar fact rule
Similar fact evidence is merely evidence from which the tribunal of fact is asked to infer the existence of the fact in issue. But it is evidence of a particular kind because of the prejudice it carries.402 The law excludes it in criminal cases because of its concern for the interests of an accused person. When there is no question of prejudice to an accused person, as in the case of a civil proceeding, it may be said that the rule has no place.403 As with any evidence, the court will admit it where it is logically probative of a fact in issue.404
[page 774] Nevertheless the courts have in Australia often demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to abandon the criminal rule of exclusion in civil cases. An insurer defended a claim by an insured, Mrs Sheldon, under a fire policy on the basis that the fire was deliberately and fraudulently lit by the insured or persons on her behalf.405 In support of this contention the insurer sought to lead evidence of seven fires in premises owned by members of her family over some 20 years before the claim. Von Doussa J concluded that the similar fact rule in criminal cases depends in part only on the law’s concern to protect the accused from prejudice; it is also to avoid the trial of collateral issues.406 The general prohibition upon calling evidence to dispute a witness’s answer when cross-examined as to credit407 is, of course, based on this practical desire to contain trials within manageable limits, and to avoid the trial of collateral issues, ie issues which are not facts in issue or relevant to facts in issue. But “collateral” in the present rule is used in a different sense. In the case of similar facts evidence, the question of the exclusionary rule does not arise unless the evidence in question is relevant to a fact in issue. The evidence of the earlier fires was not to be used primarily to attack Mrs Sheldon’s credit, although it might incidentally be useful for that purpose. It was directed to the very matters in issue. Indeed, it may be supposed that the insurer would have sought to offer this evidence even if the plaintiff or her husband had not ventured into the witness box. In the event, von Doussa J concluded that he should apply the rule of exclusion in the manner set out in the criminal cases408 saying that the application of these principles “in a civil trial will provide a sound measure of protection against the risk inherent in propensity evidence that it may too readily lead to a conclusion which is erroneous”.409 It is submitted that there are very sound practical considerations in civil trials, at least those not tried by jury, which demand that a firm hand should be imposed upon inquiry into similar facts, but the reason offered by his Honour is not one of them.410 In a civil case control can be exercised by containing the parties to the matters in issue raised in the pleadings411 and by a sensible application of the rules of relevance.412 This is particularly the case since the decisions of the High Court discussed above413 dealing with similar fact evidence in criminal
cases show an increasing tendency to concentrate on relevance. The Full Court dismissed an appeal, but Bollen J in particular414 regarded von Doussa J’s reliance on principles developed in criminal proceedings as misplaced. [page 775] So, where there is an issue whether a party to a contract made a representation which is relied on as being misleading or deceptive within the meaning of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Sch 2, Australian Consumer Law, s 18), evidence has been received that that party made similar representations to other persons on other occasions.415 The sole justification for the admission of this evidence is that it bears upon the probability or increased probability judged rationally on common experience that the fact in issue existed.416
Oppression and unfairness [21285] Formulations of test In one case417 an argument418 was presented that in civil cases evidence of similar acts is receivable, provided it is not unfair to the other side, and also that the other side has notice of it and is able to deal with it. Northrop J firmly stated that such evidence is not rendered inadmissible by reason of oppression and unfairness,419 leaving to one side the question of notice. Ultimately, the question turns on relevance, a concept which is capable of different meanings.420 In an old case421 Willes J put the argument against admissibility this way: I am of the opinion that the evidence was properly disallowed as not being relevant to the issue. It is not easy in all cases to draw the line, and to define with accuracy where probability ceases and speculation begins: but we are bound to lay down the rule to the best of our ability … Now, it appears to me that the evidence proposed to be given in this case, if admitted, would not have shown that it was more probable that the contract was subject to the condition insisted upon by the defendant. The question may be put thus,— Does the fact of a person having once or many times in his life done a particular act in a particular way make it more probable that he has done the same thing in the same way upon another and different occasion? To admit such speculative evidence would I think be fraught with great danger … If such evidence were held admissible it would be difficult to say that the defendant might not in any case where the question was whether or not there had been a sale of goods on credit, call witnesses to prove that the plaintiff
had dealt with other persons upon a certain credit; or, in an action for an assault, that the plaintiff might not give evidence of former assaults committed by the defendant upon other
[page 776] persons, or upon other persons of a particular class, for the purpose of showing that he was a quarrelsome individual, and therefore that it was highly probable that the particular charge of assault was well founded. The extent to which this sort of thing might be carried is inconceivable.
But such evidence would be admissible if the contracting party admitted that he always entered into a contract in identical terms422 or where the question was whether the defendant was contracting on his own behalf or as agent.423 Where evidence of similar acts has been admitted in this context it may best be seen as tending to prove a system rather than a general disposition to enter into a particular kind of transaction. Whether in a given case it is possible to postulate a system will depend upon matters such as the nature of the transaction, its frequency and its proximity in time to the transaction in question.424 The main trends in the modern cases support the view that the criminal tests do not apply; that the essential criterion for admissibility is relevance; that there is no discretion to exclude the evidence on the ground that its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value ([11130]); but that there is a discretion to exclude evidence which is only remotely relevant or has small probative value compared to the additional issues which it would raise and the additional time required for their investigation, or which might tend to confuse the jury as to the real issues: [11130]. In England the House of Lords425 has held that in civil cases the only test for similar fact evidence is relevance: there is no requirement for enhanced relevance or weight. However, relevant similar fact evidence may be excluded in the court’s discretion. Factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion include a weighing — which may vary depending on whether the trial is by jury or by judge alone—of the potential probative value of the evidence against its capacity to cause unfair prejudice, to increase disproportionately the length, expense and complexity of the trial, to prejudice witnesses seeking to recall ancient matters, bearing in mind the loss of documents and the fading of recollection, and, where collateral matters were concerned, to distract attention from the central issues.
B — PRACTICAL QUESTIONS AND STATUTE Practical problems [21290] Irrelevance of surprise May similar fact evidence be excluded where the other party has no notice of it and is therefore unable to present evidence about the similar incidents or to prepare himself for cross-examination about them? Is the plaintiff, notwithstanding the general prohibition against pleading evidence, to be required to include in the pleading a reference to the similar fact upon which reliance is proposed to be placed? Is the plaintiff required to give discovery of documents relevant only to the similar fact? These are very practical problems for plaintiffs, especially in jurisdictions which are reluctant to permit case-splitting or evidence in rebuttal. Generally, the element of surprise can be a very damaging weapon, and the position [page 777] of a cross-examinee who is able to provide a satisfactory answer only after reflection and reference to documents may not be impressive. But if the similar fact evidence is relevant to a matter in issue, ordinary rules of disclosure should apply, and these require an affirmative answer to the last two questions both for plaintiffs and defendants. As to the first question, notwithstanding a dictum of Lord Denning,426 there is no clear authority warranting the exclusion of such evidence in civil cases on the ground of surprise or on the basis of any general discretion to exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect exceeds its probative force.427 The interests of the disadvantaged party, therefore, fall to be protected by the statutory or other powers of the trial judge to protect a witness from unfair or oppressive cross-examination or by the power of the court to grant an adjournment with costs where it feels that justice demands it.428
Statutes [21295] Statutes Sections 94–100 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT), and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) apply in civil cases as well as criminal. 1 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590. 2 See D K Piragoff, Similar Fact Evidence, 1981; J R S Forbes, Similar Facts, 1987. 3 This seems to be the best explanation of R v Lewis (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 at 35. 4 See D W Elliott, “The Young Person’s Guide to Similar Fact Evidence — I” [1983] Crim LR 284
at 288. 5 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 464. 6 In the first trial of Beck (see [1345]) the prosecution questionably but successfully objected to evidence capable of being similar fact evidence, even though the accused did not tender it for that purpose but in order to assist his own case. 7 Throughout this chapter the term “disposition” is used to denote a propensity to act, think or feel in a particular way. 8 R v Patel (2009) 205 A Crim R 302 at [97]. 9 This belief is largely confirmed by the results of empirical investigation: see “Juries and the Rules of Evidence” [1973] Crim LR 208; S McCabe and R Purves, The Jury at Work, 1972, Table 4, p 39; S Lloyd-Bostock, “The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study” [2000] Crim LR 734. The goals of the law are explained by McHugh J in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 512–13; see also [21150]. 10 The same principles apply in disciplinary proceedings against professional persons in some jurisdictions (Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 513 at 547 (CA); Lanford v General Medical Council [1990] 1 AC 13; Reza v General Medical Council [1991] 2 AC 182 (PC)) but not New South Wales: Zaidi v Health Care Complaints Commission (1998) 44 NSWLR 82 at 90–1 (CA). 11 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 445. 12 The reasons for the rule are discussed in Michelson v United States 335 US 469 at 475–6 (1948); Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 512–513. 13 The distinction is drawn by A Palmer, “The Scope of the Similar Fact Rule” (1994) 16 Adel LR 161 at 173. 14 R v Cole (1810, unreported): S M Phillipps, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 1817, 3rd ed, p 143. The original judge’s note of the objectionable evidence is appended to R v Sims [1946] KB 531 at 544. See J Stone, “The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England” (1933) 46 Harv LR 954. For the earlier history, see J H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 2003, pp 190–203. 15 Compare R v Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215, R v Winslow (1860) 8 Cox CC 397 and R v Hall (1887) 5 NZLR 93 (CA), for example. In the case of Neill Cream the evidence of other poisonings was admitted by Hawkins J “as corroboration”: W T Shore, Trial of Thomas Neill Cream, 1923, p 154. 16 Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC). 17 R v Makin (1893) 14 LR (NSW) (L) 1 at 19 (FC). 18 Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 at 64 (PC). 19 Derived from statements made to the police during interrogation, and at an inquest into the
deaths of the children. At the trial the accused seem merely to have put the prosecution to proof. 20 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 438, 453 and 461. 21 Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 at 65 (PC). 22 The various stages at which such questions arise were helpfully dissected in R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 (CA). See [21155] below and R Mahoney, “Similar Fact Evidence and the Standard of Proof” [1993] Crim LR 185. 23 Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116. That this represented the view of the profession in England even before the decision in Makin v A-G is shown by the terms of a letter, appended to the relevant volume of the Law Reports (R v Makin (1893) 14 LR (NSW) (L) 1), written to Windeyer J by Hawkins J, an English judge with very extensive experience of presiding over criminal trials, and who, when asked to comment on the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, wrote, “Relevancy to the issue is, in my opinion, all that is required to make evidence (not otherwise objectionable) admissible”. 24 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580. See too Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528. This rejected R v Chee [1980] VR 303 at 308–9, criticised in R v Vaitos (1981) 4 A Crim R 238 at 297 (Vic FC). See too [21230] below. 25 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 585; Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 15–16. 26 Some cases can be explained on this basis, eg Cooper v R (1961) 105 CLR 177 (exclusion on charge of publishing seditious words of earlier observations in private and of evidence that the accused was a communist atheist who disliked missionaries). 27 Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 (PC), one of very few reported cases of murder in which the similar fact evidence has been excluded. 28 R v Sims [1946] KB 531 (CCA). 29 In R v Fletcher (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 70 at 77–9 (CCA) Owen J analysed the facts of the case and concluded that the proper basis for rejecting the evidence of the earlier death was that there was no evidence that the accused caused her to take poison. 30 Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 711. But since the jury had acquitted Harris on the earlier counts it is difficult to suppose that they considered that these thefts implicated him on the eighth. See the criticism of this case by R Eggleston, “The Relationship between Relevance and Admissibility in the Law of Evidence” in H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, p 68. 31 In R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667, it was regarded as relevant that the commission of crimes did not occur when one of the accused was in prison, though the cases are not exactly comparable. See also R v Holloway [1980] 1 NZLR 315. 32 R v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 (CCA). 33 This also seems to be the best explanation of R v Tricoglus (1976) 65 Cr App R 16 (accused charged with rape committed after victim picked up by “kerb crawler” in city centre, evidence of “kerb crawling” by accused in city centre on other occasions held inadmissible). R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304, discussed at [19155], is another example. See also R v Horry [1949] NZLR 791 (CA) (accused charged with indecent assault of woman tricked into meeting him, evidence of similar tricks upon other women not accompanied by any indecency held to be irrelevant). 34 This is the basis on which cases such as G (an infant) v Coltart [1967] 1 QB 432 (CCA) and R v Holloway [1980] 1 NZLR 315 are discussed in the 7th English edition of this work at pp 344–5. G (an infant) v Coltart was overruled in R v Z [2000] 2 AC 483 (adopted in R v Degnan [2001] 1 NZLR 280 (CA)), but it probably remains good law in Australia: [5150]. 35 See Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 592. 36 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 453 (emphasis in original). See R Cross, “Fourth Time Lucky — Similar Fact Evidence in the House of Lords” [1975] Crim LR 62; A A S Zuckerman, “Similar Fact Evidence — The Unobservable Rule” (1987) 103 LQR 187. 37 The modification is the abolition of Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296–7, so far as it holds that evidence may be excluded if it appears to be the possible result of concoction: see Evidence Act
1977 (Qld) s 132A, discussed at [21257]. 38 Two examples of a case admitting evidence relevant only because it demonstrated a relevant propensity are R v Ball [1911] AC 47 and Thompson v R [1918] AC 221. Another, which relied on Thompson v R, is R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA) (see [21175]), as analysed by Lord Cross of Chelsea in Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 456–8. R v Ball and R v Straffen and Lord Cross’s analysis, together with Lord Hoffmann’s powerful demonstration of its utilisation of propensity reasoning in “Similar Facts after Boardman” (1975) 91 LQR 193 at 199, were approved in Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 600–1 per Dawson J. The general approach of Lord Cross and Dawson J was in turn approved in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 484 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. See also Re K; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2002) 132 A Crim R 108; R v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119 at [22]. See P B Carter, “Similar Fact Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence A Decade After Boardman” (1985) 48 Mod LR 29 at 35–43; P Mirfield, “Similar Facts — Makin Out?” [1987] CLJ 83; C R Williams, “Approaches to similar fact evidence: England and Australia” in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds) Essays for Colin Tapper p 21. The proposition in the text is opposed by F M Neasey, “Similar Fact Evidence and Propensity Reasoning” (1985) 9 Crim LJ 232. 39 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 481, 484–5 and 528. See also Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 593; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 599–601 and 613 per Dawson J and Gaudron J. Adherents to the contrary view included Gibbs CJ (Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116; Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 585; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 532–3) and Brennan J (Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 609–10; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 546–8 and Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590). 40 For a review of the history of, and of doubts about the extent of, the Pfennig test, seeKRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 at [25]–[31]. See also J Clough, “Pfennig v The Queen: A Rational View of Propensity Evidence?” (1998) 20 Adel LR 287; A Palmer, “Propensity, Coincidence and Context: the Use and Admissibility of Extraneous Misconduct Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases” (1999) 4 Newc LR 46. 41 Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 243. 42 R v Hodge (1838) 2 Lewin 227 at 228. 43 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375–6 (Latham CJ concurring). 44 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 380–2 and 392. 45 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564. He said this because of the “inevitable prejudice” of similar fact evidence: 563 and 463. At 539 and 443 Murphy J took a similar approach, which he had foreshadowed in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 594–5. 46 Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 294. 47 Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296. 48 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 602. 49 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 483. The Pfennig test had also been foreshadowed in R v Tetlow (1986) 27 A Crim R 198 at 201 (WA CCA); Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 18. 50 Citing Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564 and Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 602. 51 Referring to Peacock v R (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 634 and Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 252 (each discussing Alderson B’s direction). 52 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 483–4. 53 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 457. The key passage, quoted in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 478, is: “The question must always be whether the similar fact evidence taken together with the other evidence would do no more than raise or strengthen a suspicion that the accused committed the offence with which he is charged or would point so strongly to his guilt that only an ultra-cautious jury, if they accepted it as true, would acquit in the face of it.” 54 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 485, citing Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564; Hoch v
R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296 and Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 602. 55 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 573–4. See also R v Hooper (1999) 108 A Crim R 108; R v BAR (2005) 152 A Crim R 428 at [93]. In Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 481, the High Court said that propensity evidence was only admissible if there is “no reasonable view of it other than as supporting an inference that the accused is guilty”. In R v Wackerow [1998] 1 Qd R 197 at 204 (CA) and R v Kemp (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 510 at 512–13 (CA) Pincus JA regarded this as a laxer test. However, it is unlikely that the High Court intended to differ from the “no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged” test, because the High Court decided that the test to be applied by the judge to the admissibility of similar fact evidence is the same as the test to be applied by the jury in dealing with circumstantial evidence generally: Pfennig v R at 483; 114. Fitzgerald P disagreed with Pincus JA in R v Carne (1997) 94 A Crim R 249 at 252 n 3. See P Franco, “Pfennig Re-visited: Propensity Evidence in Queensland” (1997) 18 Queensland Lawyer 169 at 171. 56 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 573. 57 Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [59]. 58 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 59. 59 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 570. 60 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 571. 61 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 573. 62 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 569. As the High Court said in Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [59] n 32, it may be questioned whether the Court of Appeal made this proposition good for any jurisdiction other than Queensland. 63 R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 565. 64 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 481–2, 482–3, 483–4 and 485, set out in R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 568–9: the last three of them are those quoted in the text above, and the first is quoted in part in note 19. 65 See [21085]. 66 Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 294 (emphasis added). 67 R v Cahill (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 387 at [24]. 68 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 457; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 633; Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 482–3 and 485; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 at [27] and [29]. 69 R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 at [29]; R v Joiner (2002) 133 A Crim R 90 at [37]. In New South Wales disposition evidence is dealt with by the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Hodgson JA was of opinion that the common law tests stated in Pfennig v R also applied under the legislation. That view has since been rejected in R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700, and the High Court has expressed agreement with that case: [2004] HCA Trans 488. But that does not detract from the accuracy of Hodgson JA’s perception of the common law as expounded in Pfennig v R, and nor does the fact that his remarks were dicta so far as the common law is concerned. 70 R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 at [28] (Sully and Buddin JJ concurring); R v Mason (2003) 140 A Crim R 274 at [36]. 71 R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 at [27] (see also [59]). See also Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [63]–[64]. 72 Shepherd v R (No 5) (1990) 170 CLR 573. 73 Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [63]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [27] and [285]; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [107], [155] [157] and [197]. 74 Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [64]. See also HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 344 at [27], [41], [59], [118] and [283]–[288] (discussed by D Hamer, “Admissibility and use of relationship evidence in HML v R, One step forward, two steps back” (2008) 32 Crim LJ 351). 75 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [109]. 76 R v Evans (No 2) [1976] VR 523 (FC). See also R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304.
77 R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA). 78 See also R v Ryan and Walker [1966] VR 553 (FC) where the charge was murder of a prison
warden in the furtherance of an escape; and R v Sims [1967] Qd R 432 (CCA), where the accused, who had escaped from prison, were charged with breaking into a nearby house and stealing clothes: evidence that their discarded prison clothing had been found on the premises was admitted. 79 R v Malik [1968] 1 All ER 582 (CCA). 80 R v Salisbury (1831) 5 C & P 155. See also a case referred to in R v Whiley (1804) 2 Leach 983 at 985 (shirt stolen from one house found in another burgled on the same night). 81 R v Ellis (1826) 6 B & C 145. 82 R v Cobden (1862) 3 F & F 833. 83 As in R v Mortimer (1936) 25 Cr App R 150 (theft of cars used to run down female cyclists). In R v Thomas (1948) 33 Cr App R 74, Lord Goddard CJ deplored the joinder of charges for such ancillary offences (there offences under the Road Traffic Act in relation to the taking and reckless driving of a car in which a rape, which constituted the principal charge, was alleged to have been committed). 84 R v O’Meally (No 2) [1953] VLR 30 (FC). 85 See [21030]. See also R v Ducsharm [1955] OR 824 (Ont CA). 86 See also Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 459. The problem becomes more and more acute as the evidence nears the point of admissibility because of its high probative force. See generally M SWeinberg, “Multiple Counts and Similar Fact Evidence” in E Campbell and L Waller, (Eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982. 87 R v Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453. Another example is R v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 (FC). 88 In Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 628–9 McHugh J treated res gestae cases as falling outside the rule altogether. See [21090] below. His Honour (at 633–4; 193) treated O’Leary’s case as an example, not of res gestae, but of circumstantial evidence to which he would apply the similar facts rule. 89 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 630; R v Hartwick, Hartwick and Clayton (2005) 14 VR 125 at [67]. 90 O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566. 91 O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 576. See also R v Garner (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 120 (CCA); R v Ciesielski [1972] 1 NSWLR 504 (CCA); R v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 at 235 (CCA); Bell v R (1985) 7 FCR 555 (FC); Lyons v R (1992) 1 Tas R 192 (CCA); R v McGhee (1993) 61 SASR 208; R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 (CCA); R v Byrnes (1996) 20 ACSR 260 at 287-8; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515 (CA); R v McKnoulty (1995) 80 A Crim R 28 (NSW SC); Mason v R (1995) 15 WAR 165 (CCA); R v Correia (1996) 15 WAR 95; R v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 at 74–7 (CA); R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; R v Sotheren (2001) 122 A Crim R 301; R v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418; Smith v R (2003) 138 A Crim R 403; R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; FDP v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 87 at [36]–[37]; Samadi v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; TWL v R (2012) 222 A Crim R 445 at [43]. 92 R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 at 288 (CCA); R v Collie (2005) 91 SASR 339 at [104]. 93 Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 339 and 343–4. 94 R v Barbour [1939] 1 DLR 65 at 66 (SC), quoted in Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 338 and Ellis v R (2010) 30 VR 428 at [53]. 95 R v Ball [1911] AC 47 at 68; Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 377–8; Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 251; Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334; R v Iuliano [1971] VR 412 (FC); R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 263–4 (CCA); R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 (CCA); R v Matthews (1984) 36 SASR 503 (CCA); R v Williams (1986) 84 Cr App R 299; R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77 (CCA); R v Andrews [1987] 1 Qd R 21 at 35 (CCA); R v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392 (CCA); R v Luczkowski (1990) 54 SASR 169 at 172; R v Heath [1991] 2 Qd R 182 at 194–6 and 199–209 (CCA); R v Sidhu (1992) 98 Cr App R 59 (association with terrorist group); R v Andrews (1992)
60 A Crim R 137 (SA CCA); R v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 (NSW CCA); R v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 at 258; R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 at 300 (CCA); R v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 at 132 (FC); Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 25–6 (FC); R v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584 (CCA); R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at 341 and 345–6 (Qld CA); R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1 at [29]–[38] (CCA); R v Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 at 234; R v TM [2000] 2 Cr App R 266; R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [37]; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [134]–[146]; R v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468 at [59]–[77]. 96 R v Reardon (1864) 4 F & F 76; R v Ball [1911] AC 47; R v Gellin (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 271 at 277–9 (FC); R v Parkin (1922) 37 CCC 35 (Man CA); R v Hewitt (1925) 19 Cr App R 64; R v Allen [1937] St R Qd 32 (CCA); R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 (CCA); R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77 (CCA); R v Williams [1987] 2 Qd R 777 at 788 (CCA); S v R (1989) 168 CLR 266; R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 at 503 (CCA); K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227 (FC); B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599; R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 (CA); R v W [1998] 2 Qd R 531; R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 (CA); R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567; R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 (CCA); RvM [2000] 1 All ER 148 (CA); R v DBY (2006) 94 SASR 489 at [7]–[18] (CCA); R v IK(2004) 89 SASR 406 (CCA); R v Leonard (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [49]; R v VN(2006) 15 VR 113 at [17]–[22] and [34]; R v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685. A single incident was held incapable of establishing guilty passion in R v Young [1998] 1 VR 402 at 410 (CA). The use to juries of the expression “guilty passion” has been criticised: R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407 at [28] and [69]. See generally T H Smith and O P Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence: Admission of Evidence of Relationship in Sexual Offence Prosecutions” (1999) 73 ALJ 432 and 494; D Ross, “Evidence of Uncharged Criminal Acts” (2006) 80 ALJ 188. 97 R v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222 at [201]. 98 R v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222 at [203]. 99 R v Chan (2002) 131 A Crim R 66. 100 R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198 at [22] (CA). See also R v Wickham (NSWCCA, 17 December 1991, unreported, BC9101334) (the key passage is quoted in R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138 at [17]); R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515; R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 at [41] (CCA); Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 at [22]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [6] and [431]; cf at [316]–[322] and [500]; R v PAB [2008] 1 Qd R 184. See generally JDK v R (2009) 194 A Crim R 333. 101 R v Leonard (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [65]; R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 at [19]–[20]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [7]; Rodden v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 227; WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406 at [38]. 102 R v Heath [1991] 2 Qd R 182 at 204 (CA); R v Stevens [1995] Crim LR 649 (CA); R v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 at 132 (CA); R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1 at [30]; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [28]; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [136]–[138]; R v Phillips [2003] 2 Cr App R 35; R v Hillier (2004) 154 ACTR 46; R v Collie (2005) 91 SASR 339 at [59]. 103 R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 at 288–9 (CCA); R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 at [21]– [23]; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [69]. 104 Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [69]. 105 R v Garner (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 120 at 128–9 (CCA). 106 R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 at [41] (CCA). 107 R v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258 at [45]. 108 R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 at [43]; Tully v R (2006) 230 CLR 234 at [147]. On the other hand, it has been suggested that it may be impermissible to receive the evidence in a sexual assault case to explain an absence of earlier complaint, as this is an impermissible means of bolstering the complainant’s credit in chief unless the defence has made the matter an issue by giving notice, prior to the end of the complainant’s examination-in-chief, that the complainant’s credit will be challenged by reason of delay in or absence of complaint: HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [292]–
[313], citing Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [12]; Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [45]. CfHML v R at [9], [25] and [501]; Gipp v R at [73]. 109 P v Tasmania (2009) 19 Tas R 206 at [20] per Blow J, Slicer and Tennant JJ concurring. 110 R v Chamilos (NSWCCA, 24 October 1985, unreported) pp 14–15. 111 R v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 at 258; R v Leonard (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [49] (“removing implausibility”). 112 R v Sowoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 at 234; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [135]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [433]; WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406 at [86]; Neubecker v R (2012) 34 VR 369. 113 In Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [181] Callinan J did not accept that “non-specific highly prejudicial evidence” could be tendered merely as part of the background. See Tully v R (2006) 230 CLR 234 at [135]–[149]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [498]–[500]. For a similar doubt about admitting evidence tendered as “relationship” evidence on the ground that it is really propensity evidence which satisfies similar fact tests, see Petty v R (1994) 13 WAR 372 at 375 (CCA). The entire subject of “background” or “relationship” evidence is causing increasing difficulties: eg R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425; R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567; R v Pearce [1999] 3 VR 287; Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100; Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [158]–[187]; R v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546; Emery v R (1999) 9 Tas R 120; R v Loguancio [2000] 1 VR 235; R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; R v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278 (CCA). It would seem, however, that Gipp v R did not change the law that relationship evidence was admissible to set the offences alleged in their context and enable the jury properly to evaluate the evidence concerning them, because three justices (McHugh and Hayne JJ, and Kirby J) accepted this, even though two of them were dissenting in the result. See also R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519. In KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 at [31] McHugh J said that until the High Court decided to the contrary, evidence of uncharged sexual conduct should continue to be treated as admissible to explain the nature of the relationship between the complainant and the accused, though sometimes trial judges would have to warn of the limited use that could be made of the evidence and would have to give a propensity warning concerning it: see also Hayne J at [134] and R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [36]. 114 R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 at [22]; R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 at [27] (“if the evidence was not regarded as part of the res gestae”); R v Pearce [1999] 3 VR 287 at [26]. But this is inconsistent with, or to be read down in the light of, other Victorian authorities: see R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603 at 614; R v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235 at [12]; R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407 at [25]–[26]. 115 R v Garner [1964] NSWR 1131 at 1134; Plomp v R (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 251; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [139]–[140]; R v Phillips [2003] 2 Cr App R 35. 116 R v GGT (2007) 97 SASR 315 at [35]; R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113 at [35]–[41]. 117 HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [114]–[117]: the most fundamental reason is that the evidence is inadmissible unless it meets the test for similar fact evidence, which is a controversial view: see n 39. 118 R v Dolan [2003] 1 Cr App R 18 at [23]. 119 R v Iuliano [1971] VR 412 at 416 (FC); R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 at [31]. 120 R v MJJ (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [24]–[34], [154], [158] and [253]. 121 R v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 at 217 (NSW CCA); R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [143]. 122 Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334; R v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 at 217 (NSW CCA); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [85]; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [143]. 123 Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 377; R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 at 289 (CCA); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [85]; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [143]. 124 R v ADJ (2005) 153 A Crim R 324 at [40] (videotape of complainant showering kept with other sexual material).
125 R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [30]. 126 R v Matthews (1990) 58 SASR 19 at 32 (CCA). 127 R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 at [25] and [29] (Evidence Act 1995 s 65(2)(b) and (c)
and s 72 (now s 66A)); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [83]–[98]; R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 (Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 93B: see [35660]). See also R v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468. 128 R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [143]–[146]. See also R v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468. 129 Petty v R (1994) 13 WAR 372 at 375 (FC); R v Wackerow [1998] 1 Qd R 197. The matter is left open in R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 at 613–14 and Kemp v R [1997] 1 Qd R 383 at 398. A contrary view is taken in R v W[1998] 2 Qd R 531 at 533–4; R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 (CCA); R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 at 307–8 (FC); Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [95] (FC); R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1 at [28]–[39]; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [25]; R v M [2000] 1 All ER 148 at 152–3 (CA) (similar fact rule does not apply to background evidence); R v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 (CCA); R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [36]; R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 at [42]–[47] (CCA); R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 at [18]. See P Franco, “Pfennig Re-visited: Propensity Evidence in Queensland” (1997) 18 Queensland Lawyer 169 at 171 for a discussion of unreported New South Wales authority also to the contrary. See also R v Parsons (2000) 1 VR 161; R v Gojanovic (No 2) (2002) 130 A Crim R 179. InHML v R three judges favoured the view that the similar fact test must be satisfied: (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [41], [59] and [102]–[118]. Three did not: at [18]–[26], [455]–[467] and [510]– [511]. 130 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461. 131 R v Galvin (2006) 161 A Crim R 449. 132 R v McGhee (1993) 61 SASR 208 at 210; R v Gordon [1995] 2 Cr App R 61; R v Blackwell (1996) 87 A Crim R 289 at 290–1 (SA CCA); R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 491–3 (Vic CA). See also R v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19; R v Burns (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 at [40] (FC) (evidence of completed and planned drug importations other than that charged). 133 In Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [21] Gaudron J opposed the balance of probabilities. Kirby J at [139], on the assumption that the evidence was admissible similar fact evidence, concluded that the direction on standard of proof was defective because the evidence constituted “indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt”: at [139] and [142]. Callinan J at [183] saw the evidence as admissible propensity evidence but regarded the direction as generally unsatisfactory. McHugh and Hayne JJ at [76]–[77] thought a direction that a finding be made beyond reasonable doubt was only required where the finding was indispensable to a conclusion of guilt. That view was also taken in R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 at [41] (uncharged acts “inextricably intertwined” with charged acts); R v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235 at [9]; R v Cook (2000) 22 WAR 67 at [75]; R v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406 at [78]–[86], [126]–[132] and [143]–[152] (CCA). In R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 at [83] (CCA) and R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 at [51] (CCA) it was said that uncharged acts would have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt if they were to be used as proof of a sexual attraction or pattern of conduct from which the commission of the charged crimes could be inferred since these were indispensable links. Gaudron J’s view was supported in R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 at 300–2 and 309–10 (CCA); R v MM(2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [49]. Some deny that relationship evidence need ever be proved beyond reasonable doubt: R v MM(2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [56]; R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at [19]; R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 at [28]–[30]. See also Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 at [43]; R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89 at [38]–[41]; R v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; R v O, AE (2007) 172 A Crim R 100. In HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [41], [63], [132], [247] and [506] Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ held (allowing an appeal on this point), and Kiefel J said, that juries should be directed not to find that an accused has a sexual
interest in a complainant unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt. That was said to be the ratio of the case in R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69 at [59] and [62], adding (at [65]) that a judge should ordinarily assume that there is a real risk of the jury using evidence of uncharged sexual acts as a step in their process of reasoning sufficiently important to warrant a direction that they should not conclude from the evidence of uncharged acts that the accused had a sexual interest in the complainant unless satisfied of them beyond reasonable doubt. See also R v DWB (2008) 20 VR 112; R v Halliday (2009) 23 VR 419 at [88]; PPP v R (2010) 200 A Crim R 533 at [19]–[25]; Wilson v R (2011) 33 VR 340 at [174]. 134 Some deny that relationship evidence need ever be proved beyond reasonable doubt: R v MM(2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [56]; R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at [19]; R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 at [28]–[30]. See also Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 at [43]; R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89 at [38]–[41]; R v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; R v O, AE (2007) 172 A Crim R 100. 135 R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 at [52]–[57] (FC); R v Long (2002) 137 A Crim R 263 (FC); R v Ngo (2002) 135 A Crim R 550; R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407. 136 R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 at 614 (CA); Bullen v R [1998] 4 VR 621 at 633 (CA). See also R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 516 (CCA); Charlie v R (1998) 119 NTR 1 at 9–12 (CCA); R v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129; R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152 at [18]; R v UB (2007) 178 A Crim R 450 at [24]. This warning should only be given if necessary: R v DWB (2006) 163 A Crim R 71. 137 R v S [2000] 1 Qd R 445, disagreeing with Kirby J in Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at 157; R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 at 625 (CA); R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1 at [40]; Cook v R (2000) 22 WAR 67 at [63]–[94]. 138 R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at [79]. 139 R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407 at [37]. 140 R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603 at 615 (CA); R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407 at [31]. 141 Cook v R (2000) 22 WAR 67 at [44]. 142 R v Bradley (1989) 41 A Crim R 297 at 302 (Qld CCA); R v Kemp [1997] 1 Qd R 383 at 398 (CA). Where there are many counts in the presentment, see also R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198 at [1] and [20]–[22]; R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89 at [37]. 143 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 632, citing R v Lovegrove [1920] 3 KB 643 (CCA), and followed in R v Gordon (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 at 415 (NSW CCA). 144 R v Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 (CCA). 145 Since she alleged that he told her this after the commission of the crime, its initial relevance to the issues is obscure. But in the Times Law Reports and the Law Journal the accused’s statement was said to have been made at the time the offence was committed. 146 R v Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 at 947 (CCA). 147 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 665. 148 See further Chapter 12, “Evidence by Accused Persons”, below. 149 See Part D, [21155] ff below. 150 L H Hoffmann, “Similar Facts after Boardman” (1975) 91 LQR 193 at 198. McHugh J agreed with the argument in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 531; cf Dawson J in Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 600. See also P B Carter, “Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence A Decade After Boardman” (1985) 48 Mod LR 29 at 31–2; T R S Allan, “Similar Fact Evidence and Disposition: Law, Discretion and Admissibility” (1985) 48 Mod LR 253 at 258. 151 Makin v AG (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC). 152 In R v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207 (CCA) evidence was permitted that the accused was homosexual in a State where homosexual acts were not illegal. In R v Turney (1990) 52 SASR 438 at 441 (CCA), dealing with the accused’s lawful sexual practices with his wife, King CJ said that he was unaware of a case in which evidence of conduct, which did not amount to a criminal offence or did not disclose a disposition to commit a criminal offence, had been excluded; cf Duggan J at 443.
In Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 528–30 McHugh J spoke of evidence of “other criminal or wrongful conduct” disclosing “the criminal or discreditable propensity of the accused”. See HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [12], [44], [59] and [161]; R v S, PC (2008) 102 SASR 199 (possession of nude photographs of complainant taken with the consent of the complainant and his father). 153 R v Ball [1911] AC 47; McConville v Bayley (1914) 17 CLR 509; R v Butler (1986) 84 Cr App R 12 (consensual heterosexual acts). 154 R v Shellaker [1914] 1 KB 414 (CCA). 155 R v Barrington [1981] 1 All ER 1132 (CA). See also Griffith v R (1937) 58 CLR 185 at 189 (bogus communications about domestic employment); R v Seaman (1978) 67 Cr App R 234, where the evidence was also of acts probably preliminary to commission of a crime, though not there of an inherently discreditable character. See further R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 at 413 (Qld CCA); R v Fernando (1996) 133 FLR 477 (SA CCA) (gambling habit proved to establish motive for stealing). But see Thompson v R (1968) 117 CLR 313, discussed in [21180] below. 156 See R v Twiss [1918] 2 KB 853; Thompson v R [1918] AC 221 (photographs); Thompson v R (1968) 117 CLR 313 (safe-breaking implements) where the court would require at least possible use in a crime of the sort in question. Cf R v S, PC (2008) 102 SASR 199 (nude photographs of complainant not admissible to show general disposition). Cases where the objects are alleged to have been used in the alleged offence are in a different category (R v Gordon (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 (rebuttal of a suggestion of coaching)). See [21050]. 157 Manning v R (1923) 17 Cr App R 85; Taylor v R (1923) 17 Cr App R 109. See also Guay v R [1979] 1 SCR 18 (indecent book used in commission of crime); R v Hofer (1991) 55 A Crim R 225 (Vic FC) (book admissible because it described a method of cultivating marijuana similar to that allegedly used by accused). 158 R v Reading [1966] 1 All ER 521 (CCA). 159 Compare R v Lewis (1989) 46 A Crim R 365 (NT FC); Wright v R [1994] Crim LR 55 (CA); R v Batt [1994] Crim LR 592; R v Morris (1995) 2 Cr App R 69; R v Gordon [1995] 2 Cr App R 61; R v Grant [1996] 1 Cr App R 73; R v Guney (1998) 2 Cr App R 242 (relevant both to the intent to supply drugs and possession of drugs); R v Edwards [1998] Crim LR 207 (CA). 160 R v Peters [1995] 2 Cr App R 77; R v Yalman [1998] 2 Cr App R 269 (CA); R v Edwards [1998] Crim LR 207 (CA). The decision in Jeppe v R [1987] WAR 124 (Burt CJ dissenting) upholding the admissibility of the accused’s ownership of a book about the use of cocaine to prove knowing possession of the drug is controversial. 161 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593–4. 162 This passage was approved in R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 493; R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603 at 608 (CA). 163 R v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553 (CCA). See [21230] below. And see R v Perry (1982) 150 CLR 580; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 594-5 and 608-9; R v Craig (1982) 1 CCC (3d) 416 at 421. 164 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 534 and 565. See also [21230] ff below. 165 C R Williams, “The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence” (1979) 5 Dalhousie LJ 281. 166 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 392 and 404, discussed by R Eggleston in H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, p 69. 167 Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108; Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292; Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590; S v R (1989) 168 CLR 266. 168 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421. 169 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 444, approved in Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 117; Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 586; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 533; Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 481. 170 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 439, approved in Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 117.
171 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 609; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 548–9, 560 and 565;
Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 633; Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 481. 172 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 586 and Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 523. 173 Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 32; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593, citing Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 456. The expression harks back to Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 759. A collection of other expressions used may be found in Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [54]. 174 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564–5, adopting the same standard as a jury must ultimately apply when considering circumstantial evidence. It is likely that Murphy J was of the same opinion: Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 594–5 and Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 539. This should be contrasted with the role of the judge who is deciding whether a normal circumstantial case should go to the jury. In such a case the judge is to determine merely whether there is evidence upon which a jury might properly draw the inference. 175 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 482–3. R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603 at 608 (CA) points out that the test for admissibility of similar fact evidence is thus a stricter test than the balance of probabilities test for voluntariness of confessions in Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559. Australian law diverges from English on this point: the test there is that the evidence is inadmissible unless its probative value is sufficiently great to make it just to admit the evidence despite its prejudicial effect: Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447; R v H [1995] 2 AC 596. See R Nair, “Weighing Similar Fact and Avoiding Prejudice” (1996) 112 LQR 262. The Australian test has been said to apply to elements in the offence charged or intermediate facts indispensable in the process of reasoning towards guilt, as distinct from facts which are merely circumstances from which the prosecution seeks to draw the inference of guilt: R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 239 (NSW CCA). However, it is hard to imagine instances where similar fact evidence would be admissible to prove the latter type of fact. 176 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 478–9, 481 and 483–4; Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447 at 460–1; R v John W [1998] 2 Cr App R 289 (CA); R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603 at 608 (CA). 177 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 457; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564; Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 294; Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 487; R v Noyes [2005] 1 Qd R 169. Cf P Franco, “Pfennig Re-visited: Propensity Evidence in Queensland” (1997) 18 Queensland Lawyer 169 at 171. This may be an answer to McHugh J’s attack on the Pfennig test, namely that it “requires the judge to come to a view as to the guilt of the accused before the evidence in question is admitted”, even if the trial is without a jury: Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1 at [40]. Evidence admitted because there is no rational view of it consistent with innocence may well not result in a conviction, because the witnesses giving it may be rejected, or may give it in such a fashion that a reasonable doubt arises. 178 Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296 and 300; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 614: see [21100]. 179 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 633. He said that various cases (R v Cobden (1862) 3 F & F 833; R v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 77 (CCCR); O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566; R v Garner (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 120 (CCA); R v O’Malley [1964] Qd R 226 (CCA); R v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 (CCA)) commonly classified as res gestae cases were in truth circumstantial evidence cases. 180 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 594. 181 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 609; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 547–8; Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 300–1; Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 16; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593 and 632–3. 182 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 609; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 547–8; Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 300–1.
183 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 585. See also Sweitzer v R [1982] 1 SCR 949. 184 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 442. 185 R v Wilson (1973) 58 Cr App 438 (CA). 186 R v Turney (1990) 52 SASR 438 (CCA). 187 For example, R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA). 188 For example, R v King [1967] 2 QB 338. 189 For example, R v Harrison-Owen [1951] 2 All ER 726 (CCA). But see R v Shepherd (1980) 71
Cr App R 120, suggesting that the fact of conviction will rarely be relevant. 190 For example, Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694, where the evidence was so scanty that the accused was acquitted on the relevant counts. 191 For example, R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 (CCCR), discussed in Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 at 1326 and 1343. The danger of such evidence is that it may have the effect of calling into question the earlier acquittal. In such a case the evidence is inadmissible for that reason (Garrett v R (1977) 139 CLR 437) or will be excluded in the exercise of the trial judge’s general discretion where there is a real risk of confusion. For the jury must be told that they must accept that the accused was entirely innocent of the earlier charge and yet that they may find a factual element of that charge proved: R v Davis [1982] 1 NZLR 584 (CA). See [5150] above. 192 R v Hall [1952] 1 KB 302 (CCA), the first two counts. 193 For example, R v Horwood [1970] 1 QB 133 (CA). 194 For example, R v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26; R v Jolly [1998] 4 VR 495 (CA). There is a reluctance to admit these where the accused offers a bare denial that the conduct alleged ever happened: R v Wright (1990) 90 Cr App R 325; R v B (RA) [1997] 2 Cr App R 88. 195 R v Cole (1941) 28 Cr App R 43. 196 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461. 197 R v Simpson (1993) 99 Cr App R 48 at 52. 198 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 and Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 both fall into this category. 199 For example, R v Johannsen (1977) 65 Cr App R 101 at 105. 200 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 459; R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 at 1028 (CA); Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292. See further below [21170]. The possibility of concoction in question is a reasonable possibility based on some factual foundation, not a merely fanciful possibility: R v Bridger (2003) 141 A Crim R 287 at [39] (CCA); R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265 at [91]–[95] (CCA). 201 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729. 202 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 444, emphasis in original. See also R v Anderson [1978] 2 NZLR 363 at 371 (CA). 203 R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 at 1028 (CA). 204 Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296 and 300; R v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 (Qld CA); R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [48] and [69]–[75] (CCA); R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 at [38]–[51]; Hickey v R (2002) 136 A Crim R 150; R v Ellis (2010) 107 SASR 94 (CCA). For statutory rejection of this step in Queensland and Western Australia, see [21250]. 205 As in Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421. 206 A range of practical solutions depending on events as the trial proceeds are considered below: see [21155]. For the English position, see R v H [1995] 2 AC 596. Admissibility should first be considered without reference to the issue of collusion; it is only if it becomes apparent in the course of the trial that no reasonable jury would accept the evidence as free from collusion that the court should direct that it not be relied upon for corroboration or any other purpose adverse to the defence; only exceptionally should a voir dire be held. 207 See below at [21257]. 208 Though, usually as a matter of tactical necessity, only one of these issues will be fought
seriously. Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC); R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229, and Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 (PC) all fall into this category in theory, but in none of them was it seriously argued that if the victim was deliberately killed, it was done by someone other than the accused. 209 As in R v Ball [1911] AC 47. 210 Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580. 211 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 384–5. See also R v Floyd [1972] 1 NSWLR 373 at 389 (CCA) where it is suggested that greater involvement of the accused is required to prove that the accused was responsible for the misfortune. Cf Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 586–7. See also R v Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215; R v Grills (1954) 73 WN (NSW) 303 (FC). See also R v Armstrong [1922] 2 KB 555, criticised by Gibbs CJ in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 588. 212 R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA). See also R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 (Qld CCA). 213 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421. 214 Thompson v R [1918] AC 221. 215 As in R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 (CCR), the first two counts in R v Hall [1952] 1 KB 302 (CCA), or R v Rance (1975) 62 Cr App R 118. 216 R v Carpenter (No 2) (1982) 142 DLR (3d) 237 at 243 and 244 (Ont CA) respectively, a case where in an arson trial the Crown sought to lead evidence of two other fires on properties where the accused had been present shortly before they started. The Court of Appeal held the evidence to be admissible and referred to R v Gray (1866) 4 F & F 1102. See R v Johnson [1995] 2 Cr App R 41 (CA). 217 See eg the analysis of R v Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215 in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 587. 218 R v Sims [1946] KB 531 at 539 (CCA). 219 Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 194–5 (PC). 220 R v Hall [1952] 1 KB 302 at 307 (CCA). See too Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 601–2 and 608; Thompson v R [1918] AC 221 at 232–3; R v Armstrong [1922] 2 KB 555 at 565–6; Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374 at [144]–[149]. 221 Evidence admitted at a time when the accused’s line of defence appeared to make the evidence admissible was held not to ground an appeal even though the accused’s line of defence later changed: R v Wright (1985) 19 A Crim R 17 (Qld CCA). 222 See eg R v Solomons 1959 (2) SA 352 (AD), where the accused’s denial of possession of a knife let in evidence of other stabbings, and R v Ward [1963] Qd R 56 at 58 (CCA), where the accused’s denial of knowing how to drive let in evidence of driving offences. 223 See R v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 (CCA). 224 R v Mitchell (1952) 36 Cr App R 79. 225 See eg Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528. 226 Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1. 227 Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 294–5. This sentence was approved in Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 at [50]. 228 United States v Cook 538 F 2d 1000 (1976). 229 In the analogous context of cross-examination on the accused’s record discussed at [23340] ff below, it will be seen that cumulation is one of the considerations recommended to be taken into account: R v Britzman [1983] 1 All ER 369 at 374 (CA). 230 As Street CJ said in R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 20 (CCA), “It is not mere prejudice, no matter how inevitable or grave that may be, which is the touchstone: it is undue or disproportionate prejudice having regard to the probative significance of the evidence upon an issue falling for determination by the jury” (emphasis in original). 231 As in R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 (CA). 232 As in Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC).
233 R v Bailey [1924] 2 KB 300 at 305 (CCA). It should be noted that in this case the prejudice
appears to have been so profound as to have induced the jury to convict as to one count as to which prosecuting counsel conceded that there was not even a case to answer: at 303. 234 R v Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453 at 464. 235 See [1335] ff above. 236 R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155 at 171 (FC). 237 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 513. For moral arguments against receiving similar fact evidence, see M Redmayne, “The Ethics of Character Evidence” (2008) 61 CLP 371. 238 Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 at 65 (PC). 239 Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 at 65 (PC), approved in Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 438 and 446. 240 R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 (CA). 241 Ludlow v Metropolitan Police Cmr [1971] AC 29. See also De Jesus v R (1986) 68 ALR 1; R v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207 (CCA). Dicta of Lords Cross and Wilberforce in Boardman v DPP which apparently suggest a more generally liberal approach are to be construed as applying only where there is serious danger of prejudice on account of the unpleasant nature of the evidence; see R v McGlinchey [1983] Crim LR 808 (CA). See also Vaitos v R (1981) 4 A Crim R 238 (Vic FC); R v Miller (1980) 25 SASR 170; Packett v R (1937) 58 CLR 190. See generally M Weinberg, “Multiple Counts and Similar Fact Evidence” in E Campbell and L Waller, (Eds), Well and Truly Tried, 1982. 242 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 459. 243 As occurred in R v Flack [1969] 2 All ER 784 (CA). 244 It should be noted that the rule applies to criminal proceedings at all levels including summary proceedings; see eg R v Rochford Justices; Ex parte Buck (1978) 68 Cr App R 114. 245 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 439. 246 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 443. 247 See Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 598–9. In Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 it is clear that Gibbs CJ and Wilson J considered the categorisation of exceptions to the rule as helpful. 248 Many cases of murder and robbery fall into this category; R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA) and R v Robinson (1953) 37 Cr App R 95 are typical examples. 249 Thompson v R [1918] AC 221; and R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304 are clear examples. 250 As in Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC). 251 As in R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229; Re K; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2002) 132 A Crim R 108. 252 As in Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 (PC). 253 Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC). 254 R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229. See too [21190] below. 255 R v Ball [1911] AC 47. See also Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 (evidence of regular trips to establish operation of unlicensed bus service). 256 It is interesting to note that suspicion was cast upon Smith by a letter written to the police by the husband of the landlady of the premises in which the second victim had been murdered in which he commented upon the “striking similarity” between that death and that of the third victim, a report of the inquest upon which he had read in his newspaper: see E R Watson, The Trial of George Joseph Smith, 1922, (Notable British Trials Series), p 28. 257 R v King [1967] 2 QB 338. The case was treated as if the evidence had been led in chief rather than elicited in cross-examination, with the result that the Criminal Evidence Act 1988 s 1(f) (UK), which should have governed it, was ignored. 258 R v Horwood [1970] 1 QB 133 (CA). 259 They include R v Novac (1976) 65 Cr App R 107; R v Johannsen (1977) 65 Cr App R 101; R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 (CA); R v Inder (1977) 67 Cr App R 143; R v Clarke (1977) 67 Cr App R
398; R v Downes [1981] Crim LR 174 (CA); R v Barrington [1981] 1 All ER 1132 (CA); R v Lewis (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 (as to one incident); R v Lunt (1986) 85 Cr App R 241; R v Shore (1988) 89 Cr App R 32. So far as R v Inder and R v Clarke require “some feature of similarity beyond what has been described as the pederast’s or the incestuous father’s stock-in-trade before one victim’s evidence can be properly admitted upon the trial of another”, they were overruled in Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447 at 461. 260 This was an important factor in Boardman’s case (two separate suggestions that the middle-aged party played the passive role in homosexual conduct with youths), and in R v Barrington (two separate reports of the impersonation of the same minor celebrity). 261 R v Sims [1946] KB 531 (CCA) is a very good example where four victims all alleged that they had been induced to sit with the accused in order to play cards, and the court stressed that “whereas the jury might think one man might be telling an untruth, three or four are hardly likely to tell the same untruth unless they were conspiring together”. 262 Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [46]–[50]. The same reasoning was employed in R v Holloway [1980] 1 NZLR 315 at 320–1; R v Clermont [1986] 2 SCR 130 at 135; R v Movis (1994) 75 A Crim R 416 at 424–5 (Vic FC); R v Rajakaruna (2004) 8 VR 340 at [120]–[127] and [176] (cf at [10]); R v Handy [2002] 2 SCR 908 at [117]; R v Hakeem (2006) 163 A Crim R 549 at [99]. A different approach was indicated in R v Wilmot (1988) 89 Cr App R 341 at 345–9; R v Brooks (1989) 7 WCB (2d) 170 (BCCA); R v Ryder (1993) 98 Cr App R 242; R v Z [2000] 2 AC 483 at 488 and 510 (common ground); R v McDonald (2000) 148 CCC (3d) 273 (Ont CA). See also People v Oliphant 250 NW 2d 443 (Mich SC, 1976); Williams v State 621 So 2d 413 (Fla SC, 1993). These two lines of authority are not necessarily inconsistent, the issue being fact-specific. 263 R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA). See R Pattenden, “Similar Fact Evidence and Proof of Identity” (1996) 112 LQR 446. 264 Thompson v R [1918] AC 221. 265 R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 (CCA). 266 In O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 582 Williams J said that the fact that the number of possible culprits is limited makes the disposition evidence acceptable. This argument has a logical appeal, but it is submitted that it cannot be supported by the cases, even those to which his Honour indirectly referred. It is also a matter on which different views on different facts can easily be taken by different judges. Had Straffen’s earlier victims been boys, or girls with whom he had interfered sexually, would these facts have rendered the evidence of his other crimes inadmissible? Many may think that, in the circumstances, the fact that Straffen had escaped from Broadmoor would have been admissible whatever the cause of his detention might have been. If only five or six people could have committed a homicide, and one of them had just escaped from Broadmoor, the relevance of that fact can scarcely be exaggerated. But, even so, its admissibility would be doubtful. 267 See also R v Mullen [1992] Crim LR 735 (CA); R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77 (CCA); R v Ruiz [1995] Crim LR 151 (CA). 268 Assumed to indicate a disposition to homosexual practices. 269 Thompson v R [1918] AC 221 at 233. See also at 226; 523 (“to show the probability of the truth of the boys’ story as to identity”) and at 229; 525 (“to prove … that the boys were not making any mistake whatever in their identification of him”). 270 R v Robinson (1953) 37 Cr App R 95 at 106. 271 This makes it very difficult to understand the reasoning in Perkins v Jeffery [1915] 2 KB 702 (DC of KBD), where, on a charge of indecent exposure, the court was more ready to accept evidence by the complainant of previous exposure to her, than evidence by other female witnesses of exposure to them. 272 R v Tricoglus (1976) 65 Cr App R 16. 273 R v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26 at 31 (emphasis added). 274 Thompson v R (1968) 117 CLR 313; Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517; R v Connolly [1991] 2
Qd R 171 (CCA); R v Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60; Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [1], [86]– [103], [181]–[192], [220] and [257]–[261]. 275 See too Manning v R (1923) 17 Cr App R 85; Taylor v R (1923) 17 Cr App R 109. 276 Thompson v R (1968) 117 CLR 313 at 316; R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 (Vic CA); R v Debs (2008) 191 A Crim R 231. 277 R v Reading [1966] 1 All ER 521 (CA), expressly followed in R v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26. 278 R v McGranaghan [1995] 1 Cr App R 559 at 573 (CA). 279 R v Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 at 552 (CA). 280 R v Barnswell [1995] 2 Cr App R 491 at 497 (CA), applying R v Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 at 552 (CA). R v Downey was preferred to R v McGranaghan in R v Grant (1996) 2 Cr App R 272 (CA) and R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 at [26]–[27]. See also R v Barnes [1995] 2 Cr App R 491. 281 R v John W [1998] 2 Cr App R 289; R v Wharton [1998] Crim LR 668. The last two paragraphs were approved in Al-Hashimi v R (2004) 181 FLR 383 at [61]: there is no special regime in Western Australia. 282 Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260 at [59]–[63]. 283 In fact the technique of prosecuting counsel is to list the great number of distinguishing characteristics, some physical, some behavioural. Usually no one characteristic would qualify as distinctive, but the argument depends upon their totality. See eg, R v Salerno [1973] VR 59 (FC); R v Blackledge [1965] VR 397 (FC); R v Aiken [1925] VLR 265 (FC); R v Chee [1980] VR 303 (FC); R v Vaitos (1981) 4 A Crim R 238 at 252 (Vic FC); R v Julian [1918] 1 NZLR 743 at 746 (CA). 284 R v Aiken [1925] VLR 265 at 268 (FC): see [21035] above; Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 460. 285 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 at 460. 286 See [3150]. It is to be wondered how the court can inform itself as to how widespread in the community are some of the distinguishing features relied upon, especially in those sections of the community with which it may not be familiar. 287 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421. 288 R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 at [19]; R v Pretorius [2010] 1 Qd R 67. 289 R v Mortimer (1936) 25 Cr App R 150, although the court said that the evidence showed his intent, his defence was simply that his mind went blank and he did not know what he had done. 290 R v Harrison-Owen [1951] 2 All ER 726 (CCA). 291 See [21200]. It is interesting that both in this case, and in R v Coombes (1960) 45 Cr App R 36, where a similar point arose, the similar fact evidence comprised previous convictions, the facts of which were not elaborated. 292 R v Huijser [1988] 1 NZLR 577 (CA). 293 R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 420–1 (CCCR). 294 For example, Hardgrave v R (1906) 4 CLR 232 (to rebut possible defence that unauthorised appropriation was by mistake); R v Finlayson (1912) 14 CLR 675 (to establish the fraudulent character of the accused’s intention); Perkins v Jeffery [1915] 2 KB 702 (DC of KBD) (to show that exposure was with indecent intent); R v Hall [1952] 1 KB 302 (CCA) (on first two counts to show that handling of victim was with indecent intent); R v Seaman (1978) 67 Cr App R 234 (to show that removal of goods from self-service shop without paying was deliberate); R v Lewis (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 (on three counts to show that handling of victims was with indecent intent); R v Williams (1986) 84 Cr App R 299; R v Sultana (1994) 74 A Crim R 27 at 29 (NSW CCA) (possession of guns and other implements of a drug dealer’s trade relevant to whether accused had possession of drugs with intent to supply); R v Atholwood (2000) 110 A Crim R 417 at [9] (WA CCA) (finding at accused’s house of drugs, scales, cutting agents and plastic bags to show accused
is a drug dealer, and hence to show that he possessed a drug for sale or supply). In R v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 (CCA) there was no suggestion that it was inappropriate to show the intent with which the breaking had been accomplished by similar fact evidence, the evidence was simply insufficiently probative of that intent. 295 R v Harrison-Owen [1951] 2 All ER 726 at 727 (CCA). 296 The accused was estopped from denying that he committed larceny, etc, but the convictions as such were no evidence of the circumstances in which the crimes were committed although some help might possibly have been obtained from the indictment. In R v Porter (1935) 25 Cr App R 59, the accused had been convicted in respect of the matters proved at the trial, but they were established again by witnesses and no allusion was made to the former conviction. See too R v Emmett [1905] VLR 718 (FC). 297 The decision in R v Harrison-Owen was doubted in Bratty v A-G (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 410. 298 R v Francis (1874) 43 LJMC 97 (CCCR); R v Peters [1995] 2 Cr App R 77. This case was apparently overlooked when it was asserted in Makin v A-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57 (PC) that only one case had previously been decided in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. 299 R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 (CCCR); R v Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198 (FC); R v CaceresMoreira [1995] Crim LR 489 (CA). On the facts it is extremely difficult to disagree with the dissenting opinions of Bruce J and Ridley J. 300 R v Rance (1975) 62 Cr App R 118. 301 R v Benson [1985] 2 Qd R 117 (CCA). 302 Re Knowles [1984] VR 751 at 768 (FC). As to this evidence see [19065] and [19155] above. 303 R v Tooke (1794) 25 St Tr 344. 304 G Abrahams, According to the Evidence, 1958, p 136 ff. See above [1345]. 305 K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227; B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 (evidence of prior sexual acts with the prosecutrix adduced by the accused may be probative of guilt or corroborative of prosecution evidence: see [15235]). See also R v Donnini [1973] VR 67 (FC); R v Kenny [1992] Crim LR 800 (CA). And evidence adduced by the prosecution which assists the defence may be used for that purpose: R v Winner (1995) 79 A Crim R 528 at 537 (NSW CCA). 306 Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98; Button v R (2002) 25 WAR 382 at [242]–[244], [261], [285] and [351]. 307 Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 111–12 (FC). See [19065]. See also B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 (the trial judge must carefully instruct the jury as to the permissible use of this evidence). 308 R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 (FC); R v Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 (Vic FC); R v Carranceja (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 (Vic FC); R v Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264. 309 See too R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 (FC). Cf R v Roughan (2007) 179 A Crim R 389 at [71]–[72] (requiring striking similarity: McMurdo J disagreed at [102]). 310 See R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 at 669, and Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 at 586 and 593. 311 R v Lowery and King (No 3) [1972] VR 939 at 947 (FC); approved in Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 at 102 (PC); Unsworth v R [1986] Tas R 173 (CCA). 312 Affirmative: R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 (FC); R v Carranceja (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 (Vic FC); R v Su [1997] 1 VR 1 at 65–66 (CA). Negative: Lobban v R [1995] 2 All ER 602 at 612; R v Hartley [2007] 3 NZLR 299 at [60] and [62]. On the capacity of one co-accused to cross-examine another on the latter’s character, see [23370]–[23395]. See generally D W Elliott, “Cut Throat Tactics: the freedom of an accused to prejudice a co-accused” [1991] Crim LR 5. 313 See [11115]–[11130]; R Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation, 2nd ed, 1990. 314 Such a discretion was referred to, but not exercised, by Darling J in R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 at 780 (CCCR). The earliest reported case in which the discretion seems to have been exercised is R v Miller (1901) 65 JP 313.
315 It was put in this way by R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 559–64. Although R v Christie was not
itself a similar fact case, this view seems to have been anticipated in R v Shellaker [1914] 1 KB 414 at 418 (CCA). It was repeated in the House of Lords in this form in Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 707. 316 See R v Cole (1941) 28 Cr App R 43 at 51; Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 192 (PC). 317 Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 192 (PC). 318 R v Sang [1980] AC 402 at 446–7. 319 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 534 and 565. See [21080]. Cf Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 594–5 (Brennan J refused to “exclude the possibility of a case where, despite the substantial probative force of the evidence, fairness dictates its exclusion”). 320 For example, Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 534–5 and 565; Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 605; Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 515. Among commentators, see for example, Z Cowen and P B Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, 1956, p 155; L H Hoffmann, “Similar Facts after Boardman “ (1975) 91 LQR 193 at 204; R Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, 1983, p 97; R Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation, 2nd ed, 1990. See [21080]. Cf Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 594–5 (Brennan J refused to “exclude the possibility of a case where, despite the substantial probative force of the evidence, fairness dictates its exclusion”). 321 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 483. 322 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [111]. 323 For a theoretical examination of the use of the concept see R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, p 31. See also [11120] ff above. One distinction is between “discretion” and “judgment”. See F Bennion, “Distinguishing judgment and discretion” [2000] Public Law 368. The distinction was applied in R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700 at [95] to s 101(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 324 R v Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73 at 77 (CA), in the not wholly dissimilar context of making a judgment about the fairness of cross-examination of a complainant in a case of rape about her sexual experience. 325 See [21080] and [21230] above. 326 R v Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453 at 464, 465. 327 R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 516 (CCA), approved in BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 329. See also Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [10]; R v Marlow (2000) 113 A Crim R 118 at [17]–[24] (CCA) and [23290] text at n 167. 328 R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 at 503 (CCA); R v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375 at [37]. 329 Eg R v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129 at [14]. See also BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 295, 302–3 and 310; R v T (1996) 86 A Crim R 293 at 299 (Vic CA); R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 (CA); R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 (CA). 330 R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603 at 616 (CA — a case on the now repealed s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), but apparently speaking also of the common law). See also R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 at 430. 331 The language of ss 97 and 98 is at present a little different in Tasmania. The provisions cover the field to the exclusion of the common law: R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700. But they do not apply to circumstantial evidence of the type admitted in O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566: see R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510 at [25]; R v Player (2000) 217 ALR 578 at [16]; TWL v R (2012) 222 A Crim R 445 at [43]. Otherwise it remains obscure whether ss 97 and 98 cover precisely the same evidence as the common law similar fact rule. For the authorities on the former Victorian provision, s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958, see the 7th Australian edition, [21250]. 332 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 at 175–6 (deriving guidance from common law similar fact cases). See generally T H Smith and O P Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence: Admission of Evidence of Relationship in Sexual Offence Prosecutions — Part II” (1999) 73 ALJ 494; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty
Ltd (No 8) (1999) 92 FCR 375; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [72]–[76] (FC); Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) (2012) 301 ALR 494 at [39]–[41] 333 Cited in Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 at [61]. 334 R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 at 459 (NSW CCA); R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 360–1 (NSW CCA); R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 709 (CCA); R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 370 (NSW CCA); FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v McSweeney (1998) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61–400 at 74,406 (Fed C of A); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Ltd (No 8) (1999) 92 FCR 375 at 399–400 (Fed C of A); R v Hinton (2000) 155 FLR 139; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [77]–[82] (FC); Tasmania v Martin (No 2) (2011) 20 Tas R 445 at [34]. Bangaru v R (2012) 297 ALR 108 at [272], [274] and [279]–[281]. The sentence in the text was approved in Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413. See also Buiks v Western Australia (2008) 188 A Crim R 362 at [45]. 335 R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [38]–[43]; R v PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; DSJ v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 758 at [8]–[9] and [55]–[97]. 336 Middendorp v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 286 at [20]. 337 JLS v R (2010) 28 VR 328. 338 PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146 at [19]–[20]. 339 R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [52]. 340 DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568. 341 R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 at [51]–[65]; Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470 at [174]–[177]; DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; KRI v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 552 at [53]–[55]. 342 PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146 at [24]–[28]. See also BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475 at [17]–[22]. 343 R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [49]. 344 R v Gale (2012) 217 A Crim R 487. 345 BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475 at [21], citing Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 302–3; R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [70] and [112]. 346 R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363 at [88] and [207]; cf at [66] and [166]. See also DSJ v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 758 at [10] and [78] (a case which proceeded on a concession — at [78]). 347 Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507. See also MA v R [2013] VSCA 20. 348 Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507 at [63]. 349 R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363. 350 R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374. An example of evidence tendered to establish a tendency (to make representations of a particular kind) is Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [54]–[67] (FC). See also Bangaru v R (2012) 297 ALR 108 at [272], [274] and [279]–[281]. 351 Leung v R (2003) 144 A Crim R 441. 352 R v Cittadini (2008) 189 A Crim R 492 at [26]–[33]. 353 R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 at [35]–[36]. See also Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [75]; R v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504 at [139]–[141]; cf at [45]–[47]; DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; KJM v R (2011) 211 A Crim R 546; KJM v R (No 2) (2011) 33 VR 11. 354 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499. 355 See R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [101]–[107]. 356 Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1 at [956]. 357 On the interrelation of ss 97, 98 and 101, see R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 at [36]; Tasmania v Y (2007) 178 A Crim R 481. For the changes made in 2008, see ALRC 102 [11.24]– [11.25]. On s 98, see Samadi v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 251. For a suggested path through s 98, see R v Gale (2012) 217 A Crim R 487. 358 For an example of, and the difficulty of remedying, non-compliance, see R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176 at [59]–[62]. The Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 30.31–30.32 prescribe forms for the
notices. 359 R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [68] (CCA). 360 R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 at [34]. R v WRC was overruled, but not on this point, in R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700. See also R v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329 at [71]; R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [59]. 361 The ALRC proposals differ somewhat from the legislation, but see ALRC 26 [394]–[413] and [784]–[823], Bill clauses 89–95, Appendix C [162]–[187]; ALRC 38 [172]–[181], Bill clauses 83– 93. For this reason care must be exercised in relying on the Final Report: Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [51]–[53] (FC). The legislation was discussed by a divided court in W v R (2001) 115 FCR 41 (FC). See also ALRC 102 [11.1]–[11.93]. 362 R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700, resolving a conflict in the authorities. The High Court rescinded a grant of special leave and agreed with Spigelman CJ’s construction: [2004] HCA Trans 488. See further W v R (2001) 115 FCR 41; R v Mason (2003) 140 A Crim R 274 at [33]; R v Gibbs (2004) 154 ACTR 1; R v Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381. It has been questioned whether s 101(2) is in truth a rule of admissibility, and suggested that it applies to the jury’s assessment of the evidence (R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 at [45]– [47]): the argument rests on construing “is adduced by the prosecution” as meaning “has been tendered by the prosecution and received by the court”, which is questionable. That case also said at [48] that appeals turn on House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499. See also R v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504 at [38]–[39]. Cf L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381; PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146 at [16]. In Victoria it has been said that the same approach to assuming probative value should be adopted as was adopted under s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (now repealed) in R v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375: see CGL v DPP (2010) 24 VR 486. Section 101(2) was treated as an exclusionary rule in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 and R v Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286 at [54]. 363 L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381 at [40]. 364 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 at 176–7. 365 R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [74]–[76]. 366 R v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504 at [38] and [125]. 367 R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376. 368 R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 708–9 (CCA); R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 (CCA); R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 367 (NSW CCA); Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [97] (FC); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [24]–[26]. This reasoning was questioned in R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 at 428–9 (CA). 369 R v Leonard (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [49]–[52]; cf R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 708–9 (CCA). 370 R v Leonard (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [49] and [68]. 371 R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 708–9 (CCA). 372 R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 368 (NSW CCA). 373 R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [77] (CCA), applying R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [107]. The creation of an obligation to exclude rather than a possibility of exclusion was questioned but accepted in the later case. 374 R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 365; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [27]. 375 See the direction approved in R v Qualtieri (2006) 171 A Crim R 463 at [81], set out in R v Leonard (2006) 164 A Crim R 374 at [63]. See also DJV v R (2008) 200 A Crim R 206. 376 R v Teys (2001) 161 FLR 44 at [58]–[72]. 377 Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593 at [285] (on the repealed s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)). 378 See [21100] and [21170]; Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296–7. See W Harris, “Evidence in Queensland — recent legislative changes” (1998) 18 Queensland Lawyer 196 at 197–8. 379 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 464–5.
380 R v PAB [2008] 1 Qd R 184 at [28]. 381 See R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [37]; R v Raye (2003) 138 A Crim R 355. 382 Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610. 383 Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610. 384 Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610 at [47]. 385 Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165
A Crim R 482 at [60]. On s 31A generally, see Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122 at [102]–[130]; VIM v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 1 at [167]–[168]; Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457 at [26]; Horsman v Western Australia (2008) 187 A Crim R 565 at [19]–[35]. Preston v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347; APC v Western Australia (2012) 224 A Crim R 59; Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419; Western Australia v Lovett (2012) 225 A Crim R 363; AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242. 386 Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482 at [60]. 387 Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413 at [78]–[79]. 388 PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489. 389 Western Australia v Atherton (2009) 197 A Crim R 119 at [82]. 390 Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374 (even though no formal admission was made: see [3180]). 391 R v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119 at [14]. 392 R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; R v MJJ (2013) 117 SASR 81. 393 R v C, G (2013) 117 SASR 162 at [45] and [53], disagreeing with R v C, CN (2013) 117 SASR 64 at [18]–[19] and [33]. 394 See [21035]. See also R v M, BJ (2011) 110 SASR 1 at [29]. 395 See [21085] and [21100]. See also R v M, BJ (2011) 110 SASR 1 at [30]–[31] (discussing Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 278(2)(a)(c)(ii)(B)); R v MJJ (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [13]. 396 Spenceley v De Willott (1806) 7 East 108 (KB) (usurious contracts); Holcombe v Hewson (1810) 2 Camp 391 (bad beer); Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 2 All ER 827 (CA). See B Robertson and A Wheatley, “Similar Fact Evidence in Civil Proceedings: Proof or Policy” (2007) 26 UQLJ 99. 397 Blake v Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 CPD 94 (DC of CPD) (fraudulent trading). In Atkinson v Newmarch [1918] VLR 265, an examination of a judgment debtor under the Imprisonment of Fraudulent Debtors Act 1915, Irvine CJ applied the exclusionary rule applicable in criminal cases because of the punitive or quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. 398 Brown v Eastern and Midlands Rail Co (1889) 22 QBD 391 at 393 (CA). 399 Moore v Ransome’s Dock Committee (1898) 14 TLR 539 (CA). See also McKenna v Greco (1981) 33 OR (2d) 595 (CA) (previous violence in defendant’s hotel to show knowledge of likelihood of violence). 400 Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 (DC of KBD). 401 R v Patel (2009) 205 A Crim R 302 at [105]. 402 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 563. 403 See eg McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 623 at 630–1 (HL). 404 This paragraph was quoted with approval in Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532 at 547 (FC). 405 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236. 406 Duff v R (1979) 28 ALR 663 at 689 quoting with approval Kitto v Gilbert (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 441 at 447–8. 407 See [17500] and [19015] above. 408 The exposition adopted was that in Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116–17. See too P Gillies, “Propensity Evidence” (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 55. 409 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 at 246.
410 Nor is that offered by Rowland J in Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164, although the
results arrived at in each of these cases would probably have been achieved by the application of the principle of relevance. 411 Fairness requires that matters which are to be offered as facts in support of matters in issue should be identified and particularised in the pleadings. 412 See [1530] above. This sentence was approved in Jaldiver Pty Ltd v Nelumbo Pty Ltd [1993] ATPR (Digest) 46–097 at 53,400. 413 At [21085]. 414 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 at 144–5 (FC) followed in Jaldiver Pty Ltd v Nelumbo Pty Ltd [1993] ATPR (Digest) 46–097 at 53,400. 415 Mister Figgins v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 at 30–1; Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1982] 43 ALR 313 at 327. See too Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 119 (CA); Turner v Jenolan Investments Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 40–571 (FCA); Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164; Aroutsidis v Illawarra Nominees Pty Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 500. Cf H W Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667; Boyce v Cafred Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 367. For a full analysis for the principles and the authorities in this area, see D F Lyons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 28 FCR 597 at 603–7. 416 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375. This paragraph was quoted with approval in Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532 at 547 (FC). 417 Mister Figgins v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23. 418 Based on a dictum in Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 119 at 127 (CA), said in Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 2 All ER 827 at 831 (CA) to be limited to trial by judge alone. 419 It is submitted that this view is to be preferred to that in H W Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 at 675. 420 See R Eggleston, “The Relationship between Relevance and Admissibility in the Law of Evidence” in H H Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence, 1970, p 56, where a distinction is drawn between the concept of relevance of Stephen and that of Willes J. This flexibility of such an important concept in this area of law is the source of much uncertainty for litigants and can be a technique for overcoming the theoretical rigidity of the rule which contains no discretionary element. As to relevance in the context of circumstantial evidence, see [1490] above. 421 Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CBNS 388 at 391–2 (CP). 422 Spenceley v De Willott (1806) 7 East 108 (KB). 423 Woodward v Buchanan (1870) LR 5 QB 285. 424 McCormick on Evidence, 3rd ed, 1984, suggests (para 196) that it is generally easier to elicit similar fact evidence in cross-examination than it is in evidence in chief. See too Reddecliffe v North Canterbury Hospital Board (No 2) [1946] NZLR 368, but this may be the result of the general latitude given to the cross-examiner rather than the result of any rule of law. 425 O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534. 426 Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 119 at 127 (CA). 427 Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115. See [11130] above. 428 Similar facts were pleaded in Perrin v Drennan [1991] FSR 81. On problems of discovery relating to similar facts in civil cases, see West Midlands Passenger Executives v Singh [1988] 2 All ER 873 (CA); Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 2 All ER 827 (CA).
[page 779]
Chapter Twelve Evidence by Accused Persons
Section 1 — The Silent Accused A — INTRODUCTION The accused’s position [23001] Two options At the conclusion of the Crown case, there are two options so far as the accused’s personal involvement in the presentation of the defence is concerned. In all cases, in addition to these personal options, witnesses may be called to testify to facts in issue and as to character. The two personal options are to remain silent or to give sworn evidence like any witness. In this last case the witness is liable to be cross-examined by the prosecutor or on behalf of any co-accused, but the ambit of this crossexamination is delimited by special statutory provisions which in Australia are in some jurisdictions modelled on the provisions of the English Criminal Evidence Act 1898. That Act is no longer in force, but the many cases on it retain relevance to those Australian statutes which remain modelled on it.
History [23005] From Tudor times to 1836 In Tudor times1 the criminal trial was conducted as a verbal exchange between the accused and the prosecutor. The interrogation of the accused on arraignment and the answers of the accused in the presence of the jury to evidence tendered against the accused constituted the most important part of the proceedings. The accused was not permitted counsel in most felony cases, and was not competent to give sworn evidence because of the accused’s interest, but the accused participated throughout the proceedings. In the Star Chamber the accused was interrogated under oath. Following the Revolution of 1688 the practice of questioning the prisoner died out. The oath was proscribed as being contrary to the maxim nemo tenetur accusare seipsum, which maxim is now taken to confer upon an
accused privilege against self-incrimination. The accused was considered incompetent as a witness. But in trials for felony where the accused was, in general, not permitted legal representation the accused was still permitted and encouraged to participate in the trial, to answer damaging evidence and generally to conduct the case. In this [page 780] way the trial proceeding operated in an indirect way as an interrogation before the jury. In the eighteenth century the courts permitted counsel for the accused, even in felony cases, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, but not to address the jury. In 1836 the right of full defence, including address, was extended to all trials. Thereafter the practice of the accused making an unsworn statement continued, though defence counsel’s right to participate fully in the trial was limited by an inability to call the accused as a witness.
[23010] The 1898 compromise The rule that an accused (and his wife) were incompetent to testify was described by Sir Edward Clarke as “the worst example of judge-made law which I have ever known”.2 It was said to operate cruelly against an innocent person3 but generally to be of advantage of the guilty. But the rule persisted because, it is said, of the feeling that its abolition would operate unfairly against accused persons.4 Once given the right to give evidence, the accused would be faced with the cruel dilemma of remaining silent and facing the adverse inferences which would be drawn from this decision, or of facing the ordeal of cross-examination where even an innocent person might be placed in a bad light. The solution adopted in the legislation of 1898 was a compromise. The incompetence of the accused as a witness was removed but protection against prejudicial crossexamination was granted. The right of the accused to participate from the dock was preserved in the form of the unsworn statement. The practical reality of the choices which now became available was preserved by the prohibition upon certain comments by the judge or the prosecutor. This legislation was soon enacted throughout the other common law countries.5
In Australia it is presently in force in several jurisdictions, but the terminology varies: [23140] ff.
B — PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SILENT ACCUSED Possible courses [23015] The background Having regard to the importance accorded by the law to the right to remain silent in the face of interrogation and to the long history of testimonial incompetence of the accused, it is not surprising that the Act of 1898 made the accused competent to give evidence but preserved the right not to do so. This right still exists throughout Australia. The concern that then existed, and still exists, was and is to preserve the accused from prejudice in the form of any adverse supposition which may arise where that right is exercised. The difficulty is that such supposition is a normal mental process, especially in a time such as the present when jurors know of the options available to an accused and are sophisticated enough to speculate upon the motives for reluctance to testify. [page 781] It could be sound to draw inferences from the accused’s failure to testify in certain circumstances. One obvious example would be a murder case in which the accused was proved to have been in the deceased’s company shortly before the death; another would be a case of theft or handling in which the accused was found in possession of the stolen goods, and there are many others. But there are cases in which to permit this might lead to an unjust result. The accused might refrain from testifying, not because of a consciousness of guilt, but because of a fear of cross-examination on the accused’s record, because of a wish to protect a friend or because of a fear of being obliged to disclose some compromising information. An associated fear is that the accused may not perform satisfactorily in the
witness box. This was an important reason for the delay in the abolition of the testimonial incompetence of the accused in England in the last century. The concern was that, in an era of a more robust forensic technique than obtains today, the accused, who was very often illeducated, young and overborne by the standing of the prosecutor, might give evidence in such a way as to damage the defence unfairly. The accused who declined to give sworn evidence in such circumstances should be protected from the possibility that adverse inferences be drawn against the accused.
[23020] Four courses In the case of trial by jury four courses were open: (1) Prohibition upon comment by the judge or the prosecution upon the accused’s failure to testify.6 This was the solution ultimately adopted in the Northern Territory under now repealed legislation.7 A provision permitting comment either by the judge or the prosecution was held to be an infringement of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution by rendering it costly for an accused to exercise this privilege not to be a witness against himself.8 But is comment disadvantageous to the accused? In the words of the dissenting judgment: How can it be said that the inferences drawn by a jury will be more detrimental to a defendant under the limiting and carefully controlling language of the instruction here involved than would result if the jury were left to roam at large with only its untutored instinct to guide it, to draw from the defendant’s silence broad inferences of guilt?9
The answer of the majority was: What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.10 What it may infer when the court solemnises the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.11
[page 782] (2) Prohibition upon comment by the prosecution only. This course has been adopted in South Australia,12 and Western Australia13 and in federal courts, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria and the Northern Territory.14 (3) A general prohibition on comment except that the judge might properly draw the jury’s attention to such inferences as might properly be drawn
from the accused’s failure to testify. (4) Make no provision, in which case comment would be available to the judge and the prosecutor. This is the case in Queensland.15
Comment [23025] No prosecution comment Seven of the Australian Acts provide that the failure of any person charged with an offence to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution.16 The courts have decided, on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that there was no ban on comment by the judge17 or by a co-accused.18 For some time it appears to have been thought that the decision when, and how, to comment was within the unfettered discretion of the judge19 but it is now clear that the discretion is subject to appellate control.20 The reported decisions most certainly do not suggest any tendency on the part of the judges to “solemnise the silence of the accused into evidence against him”.21
[23030] The content of judicial comment The English Court of Appeal concluded22 that, in almost every case, the judge’s comment should take the form described by Lord Parker CJ, namely that the jury should be told, if the judge were minded to make any comment at all,23 that: [page 783] he [the accused] is not bound to give evidence, that he can sit back and see if the prosecution have proved their case, and that while the jury have been deprived of the opportunity of hearing his story tested in cross-examination, the one thing they must not do is to assume that he is guilty because he has not gone into the witness box.24
In that case diminished responsibility was pleaded in answer to a murder charge and the conviction was quashed because the judge had gone too far in commenting on the accused’s failure to testify. It was recognised that the number of diminished responsibility cases in which any comment should be made must be small but it was also pointed out that
when comment is proper, it must take a different form in a case in which the burden of proof is borne by the accused.25 The English Court of Appeal recognised that the interests of justice called for a strong comment in a case in which someone charged as a joint principal in a murder case raised the plea that he was only guilty of manslaughter because he had agreed with his co-accused that the latter’s gun should only be used to frighten, not to shoot at, anyone attempting to apprehend them, but did not go into the witness box to support it. Even so, the court had no doubt that the trial judge had erred in suggesting that it was essential for the accused to go into the witness box in order that such a plea should succeed.26 Comments on the accused’s failure to give evidence must not go so far as to have the practical effect of negating in the jury’s minds the warning not to infer guilt from the failure to give evidence.27 These comments must include a reminder that the accused is not bound to give evidence and that the onus lies on the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.28 At one time the judge was at liberty to tell the jury that, in a case where the prosecution case is such that an inference adverse to the accused may be drawn in the absence of some answer or explanation, the failure of the accused to make such an answer or explanation when this might ordinarily be expected of an innocent person may permit the jury to draw that inference more readily.29 That is not now permissible under the general law. Comment under the general law is permissible in only very limited circumstances,30 namely where there are “additional facts which would explain or contradict the inference which the prosecution seeks to have the jury draw”, being facts “which (if they exist) would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused”. In federal jurisdictions, NSW, Victoria, the ACT and Tasmania, it is not permissible for the additional reason that s 20(2) (s 20(3) in Tas, ACT and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) of the relevant Evidence Acts prohibits comments suggesting that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he was, guilty. The High Court has said that s 20(2) is to be given “no narrow construction”.31 This prohibition has been held to have been contravened by a direction that the evidence which the [page 784]
accused might have given “would not have assisted him”,32 by a direction that the accused’s failure to testify enables the Crown evidence to be more readily accepted,33 and by a reference to “the failure of an accused to give evidence, rather than his or her failure to offer an explanation”.34 The prohibition has been construed so broadly as to make any observations which a judge may make about the accused’s silence save those favourable to the accused’s interests at risk of being held on appeal to amount to a suggestion that the accused failed to give evidence because the accused was, or believed that he or she was, guilty. It must not be suggested that the failure of the accused to give evidence is itself evidence of guilt,35 or that it can fill any gap in the prosecution case,36 or amount to corroboration,37 or justify a conclusion that the accused’s evidence would not have assisted the defence case.38 It is ordinarily necessary to warn the jury that there may be reasons, unknown to them, why an accused person, even if otherwise in a position to contradict or explain evidence, remains silent.39
[23035] The importance of the particular circumstances The questions whether the judge should make any comment on the accused’s failure to give evidence, and how far the judge should go in commenting, depend on the particular facts. It is essential for the judge to make two things plain to the jury – first, that the accused has a right not to testify;40 secondly, that they must not assume guilt because the accused does not do so. The mere fact that the judicial comment on this failure occurs several times in the course of the summing-up does not render it improper.41 But excessive references to the accused’s silence are sometimes corrected by appellate intervention.42
No comment [23040] Prohibition on direct and indirect references Where43 no judicial comment is permitted upon the accused’s failure to give [page 785]
sworn evidence:44 If … reference, direct or indirect, and either by express words or the most subtle allusion, and however much wrapped up, is made to the fact that the prisoner had the power or right to give evidence on oath, and yet failed to give, or in other words, “refrained from giving”, evidence on oath, there would be a contravention of the sub-section now under consideration.
This means that the prohibited comment contains two elements, a reference to the fact that the accused could have given evidence on oath, and a reference to the fact that this has not happened. A reference to the first fact will almost always imply the second, but a reference to the second alone does not imply the first.45 The difficulties the trial judge faced with this double prohibition are exemplified by a case46 in which a juror specifically questioned the judge upon the accused’s position in a case where the accused made an unsworn statement. The judge then had to choose whether to tell the jury frankly what courses were open to the accused and that he had, as he was entitled, elected not to give sworn evidence. Alternatively the judge might have given an evasive, inaccurate or incomplete answer. He adopted the former course and the Court of Criminal Appeal felt obliged to quash the guilty verdict and to direct an acquittal. The prosecutor must be careful not to stray close to the line between a general observation that the only version of the facts is that proved by the Crown and, where appropriate, that there is no evidence to support hypotheses suggested by the accused, which is permissible; and a more specific observation such as that the accused has failed to contradict a prosecution witness or provided an alternative version of events or that the accused has not given evidence, which is not.47 The judge’s inability to comment on the silence of one co-accused can cause injustice where the other co-accused testifies.48 It has also been criticised as permitting jurors erroneously to draw an adverse inference.49 Where the evidence given by an accused person at his or her first trial is read to the jury at a second trial at which the accused does not testify, the prohibition on commenting on the silence at the second trial is not contravened by a comment that the jury were at a disadvantage by reason of not having seen the accused give the evidence read out.50
[23050] Duties of counsel According to the English Court of Appeal, it should be the invariable practice of counsel to make a record of the defendant’s decision not to go
into the witness box and to cause the accused to sign that record, giving a clear indication that it was the accused’s decision not to give evidence and that the decision was made bearing in [page 786] mind the advice, if any, given by counsel.51 The Privy Council has said that in addition the record should contain a brief summary of the reasons for the decision.52
Section 2 — The Unsworn Statement of the Accused [23055] Abolition of the right The right of an accused person to give, in answer to the charge, evidence which is unsworn and not subject to cross-examination was conferred by statute dating from the legislation which originally rendered the accused competent to give evidence at all. The right has now been abolished by statute in all jurisdictions in Australia53 except Norfolk Island.54
Section 3 — The Accused as a Witness A — INTRODUCTION A compromise [23140] The statutory shield When Parliament effected a change in the general law and made the prisoner in every case a competent witness, it was in an evident difficulty, and it pursued a compromise.55 If the ordinary rules governing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses were to be applied to the accused without restriction or modification, the accused would have been unduly favoured in one respect and unduly prejudiced in another respect. The accused would have been unduly favoured by being able to give the accused’s version of the circumstances of the offence charged without the risk of being subject to cross-examination as to those matters by claiming the privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that an answer to a question might show that the accused had committed the crime under investigation. In addition, the accused might engage in self-protection by relying on the same privilege if asked about other misconduct in an attempt to destroy the accused’s credit. This danger was met by the insertion of a provision under which the accused may be asked any question in cross-examination notwithstanding that [page 787] it would tend to incriminate the accused as to the offence charged.56 The proviso applied when one prisoner’s evidence was confined to statements exculpating the other co-accused.57 It has been held that an accused person who has elected to give evidence on oath may be compelled to produce documents in the accused’s possession and control
notwithstanding possible incrimination.58 It was thought that the accused who had a criminal record would have been unduly prejudiced because of being exposed to cross-examination on it as a matter affecting credibility. This danger was met by the insertion of a provision which was itself a compromise, because cross-examination as to credit was neither wholly prohibited nor invariably permitted. Its principal effect was to provide the accused with a shield which was only thrown away if the defence tendered evidence of the accused’s good character or cast imputations on the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. When the shield was thrown away the prosecution might cross-examine on the accused’s criminal record and past misdeeds. It is this statutory shield and the various circumstances which might lead to its loss that this section is concerned with. The shield only applies where accused persons testify at their own trial; it does not apply to a person who is a co-offender, but is tried separately, in relation to the evidence that that co-offender gives at the accused’s trial.59
Similarities with and differences from other witnesses [23145] The peculiar position of the accused It has been held that the jury should be told to treat the accused who gives evidence like any other witness: the point of the direction is to prevent the accused’s testimony from being discounted or disregarded or in some other way given less weight than it deserved.60 Although the accused who gives evidence is technically in the same position as any other witness, subject to the important exceptions made by the two provisions referred to, it must be unrealistic to regard their positions as substantially similar from the practical point of view. Moreover it is often difficult, in practice, to discriminate between the use to be made of the answers given by the accused in cross-examination to credit and cross-examination to the issue.61 If, in the case of a witness who is not the accused (or, in a civil case, the defendant), cross-examination of the former type induces the jury to conclude that the witness cannot be believed on oath, it does not follow that the contrary of that which the
[page 788] witness asserts is true. There may well be no evidence on the point.62 On the other hand if a similar kind of cross-examination induces a similar conclusion with regard to a testimonial assertion of innocence by the accused, the result in the mind of the jury will almost inevitably be a finding of guilty. The sanctions of the law of perjury may operate quite differently in the case of the accused from the way in which they apply to an ordinary witness. The latter is confronted with the choice of telling the truth or of taking the risk of a prosecution for perjury. This risk is bound to appear in a somewhat different light if the choice is to take it, or run the risk of conviction for the more serious offence charged. Considerations of this nature have led the judges to be a great deal more solicitous about the propriety of the cross-examination of the accused than that of any other witness. No doubt they have a discretion to disallow questions in each case, but it is most often stressed in relation to the questioning of the prisoner.63 Counsel for the prosecution is repeatedly admonished not to drive the accused into throwing the shield away.64 Even if this was not, in any sense, the purpose of the cross-examination, the questioning may still be held to have been improper because the crucial matter is its effect upon the minds of the jury, not the purpose for which it was put.65 A further safeguard is provided by the requirement that Crown counsel should obtain the approval of the judge66 before embarking on cross-examination upon matters bearing upon the accused’s character or previous misconduct.67
B — THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS68 The terms of the section [23150] Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)–?(4) Although an accused person was permitted to give evidence in Australia before the enactment in England of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 several statutes in force in Australian jurisdictions are modelled on s 1 of that Act. Typical are sub-sections 15(2)–(4) of the Evidence Act 1977
(Qld):69 (2) Where in a criminal proceeding a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending
[page 789] to show that the person has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that with which the person is there charged, or is of bad character, unless— (a) the question is directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that the person is guilty of the offence with which the person is there charged; (b) the question is directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that any other person charged in that criminal proceeding is not guilty of the offence with which that other person is there charged; (c) the person has personally or by counsel asked questions of any witness with a view to establishing the person’s own good character, or has given evidence of the person’s good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or of any witness for the prosecution or of any other person charged in that criminal proceeding; (d) the person has given evidence against any other person charged in that criminal proceeding. (3) A question of a kind mentioned in subsection (2)(a), (b) or (c) may be asked only with the court’s permission. (4) If the proceeding is a trial by jury, an application for the court’s permission under subsection (3) must be made in the absence of the jury.70
For the purposes of this discussion, references will be to the Queensland legislation unless otherwise indicated. Departures of the counterparts will be noted as the details are analysed. The sections have been said to apply to the voir dire and to pre-trial proceedings.71
The structure of the section [23155] The section analysed The section begins with a prohibition on four types of question — those tending to show previous charges, those tending to show previous offences, those tending to show previous convictions and those tending to show bad character.72 Reference is then made to the situations in which such questions are permitted. So far as paras (c) and (d) are concerned, the situations must be brought into existence by the defence itself;73 it must either put the accused’s character in issue or cast imputations on the witnesses for the prosecution or call evidence from the accused against
someone charged with the same offence. No action on the part of the accused is necessary to render questions admissible under paras (a) and (b), but the omission from this part of the proviso of any reference to the fact that the accused has been charged with another offence or is of bad character renders it difficult to reconcile some of the decisions with the strict words of the statute. [page 790]
[23160] Plan of exposition It will be convenient to begin by considering the construction of the prohibition and then to discuss the exceptions — situations in which crossexamination of accused persons on prohibited matters is permitted.
C — THE PROHIBITION Section 15(2) [23165] The provision Where in a criminal proceeding a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that the person has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that with which the person is there charged, or is of bad character …74.
[23180] The “uniform” provision In the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) the prohibition is somewhat differently structured. It is a prohibition on cross-examination without leave about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility.75 However, leave is not required for crossexamination by the prosecutor about whether the defendant is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; is or was unable to be aware of or to recall matters to which his or her evidence relates; or has made a prior inconsistent statement.76
[23185] Evidence in chief permissible Although the prohibition is absolute in its terms, it does not prevent questions concerning the accused’s record in examination in chief on the rare occasions when the accused wishes to testify on that subject. Such words as “shall not be asked” and “shall not be required to answer” are considered to be inapplicable to evidence which is tendered voluntarily in chief.77 And the prohibition does not prevent the accused revealing a record in answer to questions in cross-examination for self-exculpatory purposes, although a direction as to the limited use to be made of the evidence may be given.78
[23190] Identifying the prohibited subjects In relation to the local provisions directly modelled on the English legislation of 1898, little difficulty is to be found in identifying the first three kinds of prohibited subject matter — previous offences, previous convictions79 or previous charges. [page 791] Questions tending to show bad character may be more difficult. It has been said80 that bad character means more than a lack of refinement or sensibility in the context of an accused’s demeanour towards the victim of his alleged rape. It will be seen in [23280] that in this section “character” means both disposition as well as repute, so that unless one or other of the exceptions operates to remove the shield, the accused is protected from cross-examination as to credit except in the sense that matters raised in the accused’s testimony may be challenged.81
[23195] High Court approach to “bad character” The High Court82 considered the expression “or is of bad character” in a murder case where the prosecutor had been permitted to question the accused about aspects of his conduct which showed him to have attacked the deceased on prior occasions and to have been a shiftless person. None of the exceptions to the statutory protection was applicable, so that the
appeal fell to be determined on the narrow question whether this crossexamination contravened the words of the statutory prohibition. In a joint judgment the court observed that a cross-examiner may seek to attack a witness in any of a number of ways with a view to showing that the testimony is not to be relied upon. These may include physical or intellectual infirmities, none of which involve allegations of bad character. In addition, ordinary witnesses are liable to have their testimony impugned because their past bad behaviour or reputation renders them untrustworthy. This line of questioning is not available for use against a witness accused for policy reasons and it is this policy which lies behind the statutory protection. Therefore the statute does not protect the witness accused from questioning about bad character where this goes to a relevant fact and not solely to credit. In such a case the question does not offend the prohibition notwithstanding that, incidentally, it may tell against the accused’s credit.83 Problems have been raised with regard to the relation between the statutory removal of the right of the witness accused to rely upon the privilege against incrimination in respect of the offence charged, and the prohibition presently under consideration. Problems have also been raised with regard to the meaning of the words “tend to show”, the meaning of the word “charged” and the relation of the prohibition to the exceptions conferred by the rest of s 15(2).
[23200] The “literal” and “broad” views In each of the Australian jurisdictions, the right of the accused witness to refuse to answer questions relevant to the charge on the ground of selfincrimination has been abrogated. The terminology varies.84 In Queensland, for example, the provision is as follows: 15 (1) Where in a criminal proceeding a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be entitled to refuse to answer a question or produce a document or thing on
[page 792] the ground that to do so would tend to prove the commission by the person of the offence with which the person is there charged.
There are two main views on the relevance of s 15(2) to s 15(1) — the “literal” and “broad” views. According to the literal view the removal of the privilege permits questions tending directly to incriminate the accused as to the offence charged, while the statutory protection prohibits, subject to exceptions which must be construed literally, questions tending to incriminate the accused indirectly as well as those which simply go to the accused’s credit as a witness. This view is supported by a case85 where cross-examination about a previous charge was held to have infringed the statute although it related to an issue concerning liability, as distinct from credibility. At Cokar’s trial for breaking and entering with intent to steal, his defence was that he had entered the house in question for the sake of warmth and in order to have a sleep. In the course of his crossexamination, Cokar denied that he knew it was no offence to enter a house in order to go to sleep, and the trial judge allowed counsel for the prosecution to put questions concerning a previous charge of breaking and entering which had resulted in an acquittal. It was probable that he had learned, in connection with that charge, that it was not an offence to enter a house in order to go to sleep. Cokar was convicted, and his conviction was quashed on the ground that the question concerning the previous charge had been wrongly admitted. The exceptions to the statutory protection did not apply to the case because Cokar had not put his character in issue, nor cast imputations against a Crown witness, nor given evidence against a co-prisoner. Questions concerning charges resulting in anything other than a conviction were held to be outside the purview of the first exception from which the word “charged” is omitted. According to the broad view, s 15(1) permits questions which tend to incriminate the accused, directly or indirectly, as to the offence charged; and in cases to which none of the exceptions apply, the prohibition in s 15(2) relates solely to cross-examination to credit. This view is consistent with High Court authority86 and is supported by two English cases. In the first,87 Chitson was charged with carnal knowledge of a girl aged 14. In the course of her evidence in chief, the prosecutrix stated that he had told her that he had done the same thing to another girl. There was no evidence whether this other girl was under or over the age of 16 at the material time, but it was held that the prisoner had been properly examined with regard to his relations with her. Although the questions did, no doubt, tend to show that he was of bad character, they also tended
to incriminate him as to the offence charged; if he had had intercourse with the other girl, that fact would confirm the prosecutrix’s statement with regard to what he told her. If the other girl had been under 16 at the material time, the case would have come within the first exception because evidence that Chitson had committed another offence would have been admissible in chief;88 but, if the other girl was over 16 at the material time, no offence would have been committed against her. Nevertheless, despite the omission from the equivalent to s 15(2)(a) of the words “bad character”, the cross-examination was held to be permissible because it was relevant to an issue in [page 793] the case. In the second English case89 the appellant was charged with a conspiracy to defraud by means of a mock auction. His defence was that he was merely the servant of the proprietress of the auction room, and a question suggesting that she was his mistress was held to have been properly put to him in cross-examination simply because it was relevant to the issue. The accused had done nothing to throw his shield away under the equivalent to s 15(2)(c) or (d), and as the question merely tended to show immorality as opposed to the commission or conviction of another offence, the case fell outside the literal words of s 15(2)(a).
[23205] The meaning of “tending to show”: Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions A majority of the House of Lords90 sanctioned a construction of the equivalent to s 15(2) which does much to reduce the practical effect of the difference between the two views concerning the relationship of s 15(1) and s 15(2). Jones was charged with the murder of a Girl Guide. His defence was an uncorroborated alibi that he had been with a prostitute. He deposed to the details of a conversation he had had with his wife on his return home. It was necessary for him to explain why, before setting up this alibi, he had endeavoured to establish another one which would have been corroborated. He did so by stating, in the course of his evidence in chief, that he had previously been in trouble, with the result that he was
afraid that the police would not pay much attention to an uncorroborated alibi. The alibi which Jones ultimately set up bore a striking resemblance to the alibi which he had set up at an earlier trial leading to his conviction for the rape of another Girl Guide. He was cross-examined with regard to the resemblances between the two alibis and the conversations with his wife to which he deposed at each trial. Although the terms of the crossexamination did not actually show that he had committed another offence, it was common ground among the members of the House of Lords who heard the appeal that the questions suggested that he was a person of bad character who had previously been suspected of, if not charged with, a serious crime. Jones was convicted, and the propriety of the crossexamination was challenged in the Court of Criminal Appeal. That court held that s 15(2) had not been infringed because the words “tending to show” mean “make known to the jury”, and the jury had already been made aware of the fact that the accused had been in trouble by means of his evidence in chief.91 Jones appealed to the House of Lords and the House was unanimously in favour of dismissing the appeal. Lords Simonds, Reid and Morris agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeal, but Lords Denning and Devlin expressly disagreed. They were in favour of dismissing the appeal on the broader ground that the cross-examination was relevant to the issue of the prisoner’s guilt because it tended to disprove his alibi; a considerable strain was put on the credulity of the jury when they were asked to believe that identical alibis were true, and that identical conversations took place between Jones and his wife. Lords Simonds, Reid and Morris were, of course, also of opinion that the crossexamination was relevant for this reason, but, in their view, that did not of itself suffice to render the questions admissible under the statute.92 Had Jones not alluded in chief to his previous trouble the majority would have disapproved the questioning. The view that “tending to show” means “make known”, or “reveal” to the jury for [page 794] the first time, goes a long way towards reducing the practical effect of the difference between the literal and broad views concerning the relation
between s 15(1) and s 15(2). This view renders the statutory protection inapplicable to cases in which the evidence tending to show bad character has already been given by the prosecution. On facts such as those of the first English case discussed in [23200], for example, the cross-examination was proper according to the majority, but not for the reason given by the Court of Criminal Appeal in that case. The majority of the House of Lords would have decided it as it was decided, because the prosecutrix had given evidence of the accused’s statement with regard to the other girl, and thus made known to the jury before the cross-examination of the accused, that he was alleged to be a man of bad character.93 Lords Devlin and Denning would have decided it as it was decided for the reason given by the Court of Criminal Appeal, namely, that the cross-examination was relevant to an issue in the case and did not merely go to credit.94 There are, however, many situations in which cross-examination must be rejected according to the House of Lords majority although it would be admissible according to the broad view. For example, the questions concerning the accused’s relations with the proprietress of the auction room upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second English case discussed in [23200] would be condemned on the reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords because there had been no previous suggestion to the jury that the proprietress was the accused’s mistress. On this view, the question would have been prohibited by the equivalent to s 15(2) and not permitted by s 15(1), but the question was perfectly proper according to the opinions of Lord Denning and Lord Devlin.95 The majority view must be taken to represent the present law. There is, therefore, no point in a detailed discussion of the merits of the two opinions. The minority view is difficult to reconcile with the wording of the Act of 1898. But the majority view may operate harshly. “It is one thing to confess to having been in trouble before. It is quite another to have it emphasised against you with devastating detail”.96 There may also be cases in which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to expose a false alibi by reference to the fact that the accused was in prison or with his mistress at the material time because the alibi was raised for the first time after the case for the prosecution had been closed.97
[23210] “Charged in court”
The word “charged” as used in s 15(2) means “charged in court”.98 Accordingly, when a prisoner accused of forgery said that he had never been charged before, it [page 795] was reasonable to suppose that he was using the word in this sense, and the trial judge should have disallowed questions concerning the suspicions that had been entertained against the accused by one of his employers. Lord Simon LC concluded his speech with six propositions, to some of which it will be necessary to refer later. The first summarises the effect of s 15(2). According to the second, the accused may be cross-examined as to any of the evidence given in chief, including statements concerning a good record, with a view to testing veracity or accuracy or to showing that the accused is not to be believed on oath.99 The accused had been questioned before leaving his previous employment, and was presumably well aware of the suspicions. Accordingly, he could presumably have been crossexamined on the subject if he had said in chief that he had never previously been suspected of an offence. Lord Simon’s fifth proposition was that it is no disproof of good character that a person has been suspected or accused of a previous crime. Such questions as “were you suspected” or “were you accused” are inadmissible because they are irrelevant to the issue of character and can only be asked if the accused has sworn expressly to the contrary. When the accused does this the accused may be said to have adopted a particular method of putting character in issue. According to the sixth proposition, the fact that a question put to the accused is irrelevant is one reason for quashing the conviction, though it should have been disallowed by the judge.100 If the question is not only irrelevant, but is unfair to the accused as being likely to distract the jury from considering the real issues and so lead to a miscarriage of justice, it should be disallowed and if not disallowed, it is a ground on which an appeal against conviction may be based.
[23215] The need for relevance When the accused has lost the statutory protection provided by s 15(2),
it would be wrong to suppose that the accused can always be asked questions tending to show that the accused has committed, has been convicted of or has been charged with other offences or is of bad character. Such questions must first be relevant either to the issue or else to the credibility of the accused. Accordingly, it was decided101 that, although a doctor charged with manslaughter by means of an illegal operation gave evidence of his good character, he ought not to have been asked whether a similar charge of which he was acquitted had been made against him in the past. In the instant case, it was impossible to say that the fact that the prisoner had been acquitted on a previous charge was relevant, or that it tended to destroy his credibility as a witness, and the appeal was allowed.102 Viscount Sankey LC recognised the possibility of circumstances in which the fact of a charge resulting in an acquittal might be elicited from the prisoner. Among the instances he mentioned was that of a man charged with an offence against the person who might be asked whether he had uttered threats against his victim because he was angry with him for having brought an unfounded charge. A further instance is suggested by a later [page 796] case103 in which the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld a conviction for receiving stolen goods, although the accused who had put his character in issue had been asked about a previous acquittal on an earlier charge of receiving. The court appears to have considered that Viscount Sankey LC’s reasoning could be distinguished because the question was addressed to a character witness as well as to the accused, and because the question was linked with one concerning a previous conviction for receiving. The court also recognised the possibility that a previous acquittal of receiving might be relevant to the accused’s guilty knowledge on a subsequent occasion. The previous investigation ought to have stimulated the most careful inquiries in the later transaction and thus militated against the credibility of his statements to the effect that he acquired goods cheaply without asking questions concerning their origin. Both cases were concerned with situations in which the statutory protection had been lost. When this is not the case, it is extremely
doubtful whether the accused could be asked about a previous charge resulting in an acquittal owing to the restricted phraseology of s 15(2) and its equivalents. If the exceptions apply, they permit tender of the accused’s record not only before the time of events which are the subject of the charge, but after as well.104 The “bad character” evidence which is admissible after the accused’s shield has been lost is not limited to general reputation.105
D — FIRST EXCEPTION: THE MATTER IS RELEVANT Section 15(2) [23220] The text expounded Section 15106 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides: (2) Where … a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be asked … unless— (a) the question is directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that the person is guilty of the offence with which the person is there charged …
The wording of the protection and that of the first exception do not coincide. Strictly construed, the protection which prohibits the prosecutor from asking the accused a question tending to show one of four matters is lost where proof of one of two only of these matters is relevant to the prosecution case. The protection is wider than the matters mentioned in the first exception not only because it includes charges and bad character, but also because the evidentiary material covered by the prohibited questions and answers tending to show the commission of or the conviction for the other offences will in most cases be more extensive than the bald fact of the commission or conviction. The Queensland and South Australian provisions address this matter in a similar way. [page 797]
[23230] South Australia The South Australian provision107 contains a significant departure from
thestandard provision by adding after “guilty” the words “or not guilty”. The accused is not entitled to the protection where the cross-examination is directed to showing that he is not guilty of the offence charged.
[23235] Federal Courts, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory Here the provisions are very different. The tender of evidence in the nature of “similar fact” evidence is outside the prohibition in these jurisdictions of asking questions about a matter relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility, since the evidence is otherwise relevant.108 Instead it is necessary that the evidence comply with the tendency and coincidence rules.109
[23240] Some problems in s 15(2)(a) Section 15(2)(a) allows the accused to be questioned concerning other offences when proof that the accused has committed or been convicted of them is admissible to show guilt of the offence charged. Although there is not much authority on the point, there can be little doubt that this exception permits cross-examination about previous convictions when they have been proved in chief on the rare occasions on which such a course is permissible: see [21070]. There can also be little doubt that, when similar fact evidence has been given in chief because it does more than show bad disposition, the accused may be cross-examined about the other offences mentioned in such evidence.110 The principle under which evidence of misconduct on other occasions is generally inadmissible if its only relevance is to support an argument that the accused is the kind of person who would commit the crime charged, applies just as much to evidence elicited in cross-examination as to evidence in chief.111 Therefore, questions suggesting that the accused has been convicted of or has committed other offences which have not been proved in chief would normally be inadmissible, but, if they are relevant for some further reason than their tendency to show bad disposition, they may be permissible under s 15(2)(a) although they do not relate to matters proved in chief.112 In general they will, however, be inadmissible, because a proper foundation should have been laid for the cross-examination by means of
the evidence in chief.113 When the accused in evidence in chief stated that he had falsely admitted to the police that he was to blame for an alleged offence and took the blame for another because, as he said, “I have never had much trouble”, the Crown secured leave to put a number of [page 798] previous convictions to the accused under s 15(2)(a) on the ground that these were relevant on the question of the truth or falsity of the accused’s explanation.114 The English Court of Criminal Appeal was clearly of opinion that no question concerning a previous charge, other than one which was merely a preliminary to an admissible question concerning a conviction, could be put under the equivalent to s 15(2)(a),115 and a majority of the House of Lords116 would clearly not have allowed a question tending to show bad character, if the bad character had not previously been revealed to the jury. Hence s 15(2)(a) must be construed literally, and no words justifying questions about mere charges or bad character can be read into it.
[23245] Character relevant to credit only The High Court interpreted the prohibition as affecting proof of conviction for other offences on the one hand, and, on the other, proof of bad character in so far as this was relevant to credit only. Crossexamination as to matters relevant to an issue were not affected by the prohibition at all.117 This construction immediately raises the question why it was thought necessary to enact an exception permitting the accused to be questioned on matters relevant to an issue. If it be said that this was done out of an abundance of caution, why then is there no reference in the exception to evidence of bad character in so far as it is relevant to an issue? The response of the High Court has been that: When he expressly prohibited proof of the commission of an offence or of a conviction of an offence the draftsman saw that he was expressly prohibiting proof of a fact he definitely identified independently of its operation or of the ground of introducing it in evidence. On the other hand, in the case of “questions tending to show that he (the accused) is of bad character” the draftsman was dealing with a description of cross-examination going to credit which he thought of as, ex hypothesi, outside the field of relevancy altogether. In other words, in the case of
strictly relevant facts he was regarding them as open to proof as part of the Crown case and as necessarily, or at least as naturally, the subject of evidence by the accused if he were called as a witness on his trial and he regarded them as not matter going to the bad character of the accused but as matter going to proof of his guilt. The words describe questions as to that kind of evidence excluded at common law upon the trial of criminal issues as a matter of policy but allowable in the cross-examination to credit of an ordinary witness.118
[page 799]
[23250] Offences and convictions/bad character This distinction between cross-examination about the commission of other offences and other convictions on the one hand, and bad character on the other, can lead to difficulties. Bad character may not be the subject of cross-examination of an accused unless it is relevant to a matter in issue under the qualification to the similar facts rule. If it is relevant as such it is not affected by the statutory protection or any of the exceptions. If it is not relevant as such it is excluded by the similar facts rule. King CJ said that cross-examination as to convictions or the commission of an offence stands in an altogether different light. Questions on these matters may not be asked notwithstanding that they are relevant to an issue unless they fall within one or other of the exceptions. The case before him was one where each of the accused persons was charged with possession of Indian hemp for the purpose of trading. The accused Palmer was cross-examined by counsel for a co-accused with a view to establishing the defence of duress. This cross-examination tended to show Palmer to have been guilty of criminal offences and therefore was in breach of the statutory protection unless one or other of the exceptions applied. It was held that the fourth exception (see [23370]) applied since Palmer had given evidence against a co-accused, but the Chief Justice raised the question of the applicability of the protection where to do so would prevent an accused from presenting his defence of duress where it was necessary for him to cross-examine his co-accused by alleging that he was known to be violent and was in fact a violent person.119 In such a case it is open for an accused to lead or elicit this evidence notwithstanding the similar fact rule.120 The same indulgence towards an accused ought also to permit the accused to put these matters to the allegedly violent co-accused if the latter elected to give evidence. If the distinction suggested by King CJ were valid, it would
mean that such an accused could cross-examine the co-accused as to bad character for that was relevant to the defence, but not to put to the coaccused the latter’s long history of convictions for violent crime. This remarkable and unlikely result may be avoided by adopting the approach of Mitchell J in the same case. For her Honour, it was sufficient that the questions were substantially relevant to the defence of duress raised by the cross-examining accused, for in a joint trial an accused is entitled to ask relevant questions of the other accused in order to establish the first accused’s defence.121 But it is submitted that however satisfactory and consistent with basic principle this solution may appear, it ignores the very difficult construction problem which exists. If one reads into the statutory protection an implied exception where the questions are relevant to the issue,122 one is left with the awkward presence of the first of the express statutory exceptions.
[23255] The purpose of the cross-examination allowed under the first exception The basis of the admission of the questions under this exception is their relevance to a matter in issue, the guilt of the accused. Unlike the evidence which may be admitted under other exceptions, the purpose of the evidence is that the jury should have regard to it in determining this issue.123 [page 800]
E — SECOND EXCEPTION: THE ACCUSED’S GOOD CHARACTER Section 15(2) [23260] The text Section 15(2) provides: [A] person charged … shall not be asked … unless: …
(c)
the person has personally or by counsel asked questions of any witness with a view to establishing the person’s own good character, or has given evidence of the person’s good character …124
[23265] The “uniform” position Section 104(4) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT) provides that leave must not be given for cross-examination by the prosecution about any matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility unless, inter alia, evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful, and is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility.125 The same applies in Tasmania, but there the shield may also be lost where the defendant or the person representing the defendant has questioned the witnesses for the prosecution to prove that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character.126
[23270] Examples of what is not “good character” Giving evidence of good character is apt to cover a case in which the accused calls a witness to character but does not cross-examine on the subject or allude to it in the accused’s own evidence in chief.127 It apparently does not cover reference to good character during an unrepresented accused person’s jury address.128 The exception is not brought into play when a defence witness volunteers a statement concerning the character of the accused129 nor when the accused refers to one of many previous convictions as a ground for fearing the police because it would be wrong to infer that the accused meant that the occasion of the conviction was the only occasion on which the accused had previously been in trouble.130 However, [page 801] evidence that the accused has no convictions raises good character.131 It has been held that a general examination into the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime, with a view to establishing innocence, does
not expose the accused to cross-examination under s 15(2). Thus where a dealer, charged with obtaining cheques from a customer by false pretences concerning the cost price of antiques, cross-examined the Crown witnesses about his conduct towards the alleged victim with a view to negativing any intent to defraud, the English Court of Criminal Appeal held that he ought not to have been asked questions under the equivalent to s 15(2)(c), as the cross-examination had not been conducted with a view to establishing good character.132 An accusation as to the dishonesty of persons other than the accused with a view to showing that they were the offenders, not the accused, was not raising the accused’s good character: “it is not implicit in an accusation of dishonesty that the accuser himself is an honest man”.133 An accused does not give evidence of good character in answering questions in cross-examination responsively.134
[23275] Examples of what is “good character” Generally speaking, the accused’s own evidence of character takes the form of allusions to an innocent or praiseworthy past, and the decisions certainly do not indicate any great reluctance on the part of the courts to hold that character has been put in issue by such a reference. The question must be considered in the context of the conduct of the defence generally including the issues raised. So, in a case where intent was in issue, a statement that he did not consider himself “capable of doing such a thing” was sufficient to invoke the exception in the context of his evidence as a whole.135 A man’s allegations concerning his regular attendance at Mass,136 his voluntary charity work,137 his assertion that he had been earning an honest living for a considerable time,138 his good standing in the Public Service139 and his affirmative answer to the question whether he is a married man with a family in regular work140 have been treated as instances in which the protection provided by s 15(2) would be thrown away. In a Victorian Health Act prosecution the statement of the defendant “I always take every precaution” was held to amount to evidence of good character as applied to the trade in question.141 There seems to be some doubt whether a reference to honourable discharge from the army would [page 802]
have this effect142 and similar uncertainty prevails with regard to the statement by a man charged with traffic offences that he disapproved of speeding.143 An accused charged with larceny by finding put his character in issue when he gave evidence with regard to previous occasions on which he had returned lost property to its owner.144 Character has been put in issue by evidence of the peaceful disposition of an accused charged with murder by use of a speargun.145 Evidence directed to a specific aspect of the Crown case may nevertheless be evidence that raises the good character of the accused.146 A claim by a person accused of drug offences that he had never dealt in drugs was giving evidence of good character. But cross-examination was held impermissible because the evidence had been elicited by a series of impermissible questions.147 An accused who claimed, as part of his defence to charges arising out of a violent burglary which led to the death of the victim, that he was an experienced burglar of a non-violent type with a cool head in emergencies while the co-accused was inexperienced, nervous, excitable and possibly drunk, threw away his shield.148
The meaning of “character” [23280] Reputation or disposition “Character” may mean either the reputation or the disposition of the person about whom the inquiry is being made. At common law, a character witness might only be asked about the reputation of the accused: [19110]. The word is used no less than four times in s 15(2). In a case149 concerned with imputations against a witness for the prosecution, Lord Hewart CJ said: it is not difficult to suppose that a formidable argument might have been raised on the phrasing of this statute, that the character which is spoken of is the character which is so well known in the vocabulary of the criminal law — namely, the general reputation of the person referred to; in other words that “character” in the context and in every part of it, in the last part no less than in the first, in the third part no less than in the second, bears [that] meaning …
Lord Hewart CJ concluded, nevertheless, that it was much too late in the day to consider such an argument, because it could not prevail without the revision and, to a great extent, the overthrow of a very long series of decisions. When speaking of the second exception to s 15(2)150 Viscount Simon LC said:
There is perhaps some vagueness in the use of the term “good character” in this connection. Does it refer to the good reputation which a man may bear in his own circle, or does it refer to the man’s real disposition as distinct from what his friends and neighbours may think of him?
[page 803] Viscount Simon was inclined to think both conceptions were combined in s 15(2). This view has since been adopted both in the Privy Council,151 and the House of Lords.152 Lord Denning153 adopted Lord Hewart CJ’s view that it was too late to argue that “character” as used in the Act of 1898 means “reputation” and nothing else. But Lord Devlin expressed the opinion that this was the meaning intended by the draftsman of the statute.154 The point that “character” in the equivalent to s 15(2) means solely “general reputation” has since been again rejected.155 The point never appears to have received judicial support in Australia. The effect of such a construction would certainly be revolutionary and difficult to apply. When the accused testifies to good character, the testimony must almost inevitably speak of good past acts,156 and it would certainly upset past decisions if it were to be held that a man who swore that he had led a good clean life and gone to Mass every Sunday has not “given evidence of his own good character”. If, throughout the entirety of s 15(2), “character” were to mean “reputation”, it would be difficult to construe that part of s 15(2)(c) under which the accused loses the shield if the nature or conduct of the defence involves imputations on the “character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution” (the third exception: [23295]–[23365]). It would then become possible to argue that someone who swore that a police officer had extracted a confession by violence was not casting imputations on the character of the police officer as a witness for the prosecution. The root of the trouble appears to lie in the assumption that the distinction between disposition and reputation necessarily means that the word “character” is being used in one or other or both senses. What the court is seeking, in every case, is evidence of the accused’s disposition — is the accused the kind of person who would do the kind of act charged, or is the accused the kind of person who should be believed on oath? The difference is not so much over the meaning of “character”, as over the
means by which disposition may be proved. An accused is liable to be cross-examined under the proviso, if the accused calls a witness to speak to the accused’s good reputation or crossexamines the Crown witnesses with a view to establishing it, or adopts either of these courses with regard to the accused’s conduct as showing good disposition, or gives evidence on the subject. It is possible that the character witness could be cross-examined about rumours and suspicions affecting the accused ([19145]), although the accused cannot be asked whether the accused was suspected of crime unless the accused’s method of giving evidence of character takes the form of a specific denial of this fact: [23210].
The divisibility of the character of the accused [23285] Putting half a character in issue When the prisoner says: “I ought to be believed when I swear that I am innocent [page 804] of a sexual crime because I have a good character for sexual morality”, it certainly does tend to refute the contention to show that the prisoner was convicted of an indecent assault; but it is open to question whether a conviction for larceny has the same effect.157 It is now necessary to consider the correctness of the dictum: “there is no such thing known to our procedure as putting half a prisoner’s character in issue and leaving out the other half”.158 The present issue arises on the assumption that the accused, in the case in which this was pronounced, Winfield, was cross-examined about his character. Winfield was convicted of indecent assault upon a woman and called a witness to speak of his good behaviour with women. He had previously been convicted of larceny and it is not clear whether this conviction was put to his character witness, in which case the manner fell to be determined by the common law principles that have already been discussed,159 or whether the cross-examination concerning the conviction was of Winfield
himself under the English equivalent to s 15(2)(c). In either event, the English Court of Criminal Appeal appears to have approved of the crossexamination, although their observations on the subject were obiter dicta, because the conviction was quashed on account of the inadequacy of the direction to the jury on the subject of corroboration. So far as the crossexamination of the prisoner was concerned, it ought not to have been used by the jury as a direct means of establishing his guilt, because it was only relevant on the very doubtful footing that a thief is more likely to commit an indecent assault than an honest man. Its relevance to the credibility of the prisoner’s testimony is not much greater, although there is a little more force in the argument that a convicted thief is more likely to lie than others. Viewed as a matter affecting credibility, however, Winfield’s crossexamination can be justified on the footing that, having put his character in issue, he forfeited his right to be treated, as regards cross-examination, otherwise than as an ordinary witness, and an ordinary witness may be cross-examined about a conviction for any offence (at least if it relates to credit) with a view to shaking credibility. The law on the subject may not be beyond reproach, but it is the outcome of the view that crossexamination about a conviction for any offence is permissible (see [19020])160 and has nothing to do with the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 or its Australian equivalents. Viscount Simon said:161 An accused who “puts his character in issue” must be regarded as putting the whole of his past record in issue. He cannot assert his good conduct in certain respects without exposing himself to inquiry about the rest of his record so far as this tends to disprove a claim for good character.
The case in which the dictum was uttered was cited in argument, and it remains to be seen whether Viscount Simon’s statement will be held tantamount to House of Lords approval of the dictum. It should be remembered that the rigour of this [page 805] principle will be mitigated in the appropriate case by the judicious use of the discretion to disallow questions whose relevance is outweighed by the prejudice they may engender in the minds of the jurors.162 In contrast to the position just discussed, s 110 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) does enable accused
persons to put half their characters in issue and leave out the other half: see [23415].
The purpose of cross-examination under the second exception [23290] Credit or issue Viscount Sankey LC said: If the prisoner by himself or his witnesses seeks to give evidence of his own good character, for the purpose of showing that it is unlikely that he committed the offence charged, he raises by way of defence an issue as to his good character, so that he may fairly be cross-examined on that issue, just as any witness called by him to prove his good character may be cross-examined to show the contrary.163
In so far as it is possible to distinguish cross-examination of the accused designed to establish the probability of guilt from that which is concerned with the credibility of testimony, cross-examination under the English equivalent to the first part of s 15(2)(c) may be directed to the first of these purposes.164 From the practical point of view, there is no doubt that crossexamination is permissible under this part of s 15(2)(c) when its main object is to induce the jury to believe that the accused’s oath is not to be trusted. Thus, a man charged with indecent assault upon a girl who put his character in issue was held by the English Court of Criminal Appeal to have been properly cross-examined concerning a conviction for an indecent assault upon another girl, which assault took place after that for which he was being tried.165 It was said that the chronological order of events did not render the conviction any less admissible as evidence tending to show that the accused was not of good character “at the time of the second trial”166 and clearly this could mean that the conviction was regarded by the court as relevant to the credibility of the accused’s testimony only. Barwick CJ was clearly of this view:167 … where the sole purpose of the admission of a prior conviction is to deny a suggestion of good character and to impugn the credit of the accused, the jury should be specifically instructed that they may only use the evidence for those purposes.
Nevertheless the judgments given in that case illustrate that differing views may be taken on this question of relevance.168 If defence counsel indicates
to the trial judge a particular proposal to raise good character, the judge can require the Crown to [page 806] indicate what evidence it might adduce in rebuttal.169
F — THIRD EXCEPTION: IMPUTATIONS ON THE CHARACTER OF CROWN WITNESSES170 Section 15(2) [23295] The provision Section 15(2) provides: [A] person charged … shall not be asked … unless — (c) … the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or of any witness for the prosecution or of any other person charged in that criminal proceeding …171
[23300] The “uniform” provision The Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) provide that leave is not to be given for cross-examination by the prosecutor under s 104(2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful, and is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. However, the shield is not lost in that way merely by the admission of evidence of conduct in relation to the events in relation to which the defendant is being presented, or the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted.172
[23305] South Australia The South Australian legislation provides:173 (2) A defendant forfeits the protection of subsection (1)(d) if —
(a) the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or a witness for the prosecution; and (b) the imputations are not such as would necessarily arise from a proper presentation of the defence. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2), a defendant does not forfeit the protection of subsection (1)(d) by reason of imputations on the character of the prosecutor or a witness for the prosecution arising from evidence of the conduct of the prosecutor or witness —
[page 807] (a) in the events or circumstances on which the charge is based or; (b) in the investigation of those events or circumstances, or in assembling evidence in support of the charge; or (c) in the course of the trial, or proceedings preliminary to the trial.174
Imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses of the prosecutor [23310] A constructional problem In general responsive, as distinct from non-responsive, answers by the accused to questions put in cross-examination do not cause the shield to be thrown away because they are not part of the nature or conduct of the defence.175 Among the cases which consider whether “the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution” are several decisions in which the statutory words have been given their natural meaning. Thus, an attack upon the conduct of a magistrate or police officer not called as witness for the Crown,176 an attack upon counsel for the Crown appearing to prosecute177 and a suggestion by someone accused of murder that the deceased had made indecent approaches to him178 have been held to fall outside the proviso so that they did not warrant cross-examination under it.179 In England it has been held, with some robustness, that the word “witness” extends beyond a person giving oral testimony to include a person who is not before the court but whose evidence is contained in a deposition or statement admitted pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule. [Any] other construction would be a charter for interference with witnesses. Once a witness
could be discouraged from attending trial, he could then be attacked with impunity by or on behalf of a defendant with a record.180
But a strictly literal construction of this part of s 15(2)(c) would mean that, in many cases, a plea of not guilty coupled with an assertion of innocence in the witness box would render the accused liable to crossexamination on a criminal record on account of the tacit suggestion that the prosecutor or a prosecution witness had been guilty of perjury. The avoidance of such a conclusion has led to an uneasy conflict of authority, palliated by an extensive exercise of the court’s discretion.
[23315] Examples The accused’s statement from the witness-box that the prosecutor was a liar has been held not to be sufficient to deprive him of his statutory protection.181 [E]ither the answer amounted to no more than a plea of not guilty put in forcible language such as would not be unnatural in a person in the defendant’s rank in life, or it had nothing to do with the conduct of the defence.182
[page 808] On the other hand, it was lost when the accused asserted that the prosecutor was such a horrible liar that his brother would not speak to him.183 When the veracity of the prosecutor or a prosecution witness is not challenged, the statute has often been construed favourably to the accused. The accused has, for example, been allowed to allege with impunity that the prosecutor refused to deliver a bill184 and that a witness for the prosecution failed to hand over the proceeds of a cheque which he had been asked to cash.185 It would, however, be too much to expect complete consistency: one charged with receiving threw away the shield by casting aspersions on the morality of the prosecutrix,186 but an allegation that the prosecutor was an habitual drunkard by someone charged with robbery did not have that effect.187 It has, however, been held that the statement that the prosecutor, in a case of causing grievous bodily harm following a road accident, was quite drunk, was driving disgracefully, shouting abuse at other drivers and deliberately stopped in the middle of the road to prevent other drivers from passing, amounted to an imputation
on the character of the prosecutor.188 It has also been held that the final address of counsel for the accused is part of the conduct of the defence, and that a trial judge was entitled to apply the statute to permit the recall of the accused where in a final address imputations had been cast of the kind mentioned in the section.189 It is improper for defence counsel to oppose a grant of leave to cross-examine on the client’s record after a muted attack on the prosecution or the prosecution witnesses, and then in final address make a much less muted attack.190 Where the supposed imputation rests in questions, it is necessary to consider not only their precise words but also the manner in which they are asked.191 A suggestion that someone found in possession of stolen property acquired it under instructions from the police was held not to amount to conduct of the defence involving imputations because it was made to develop the defence.192 On the other hand, where an accused charged with larceny as a servant alleged that his receipt of the money in question was made with the concurrence of the managing partner of the employer and as part of a “tax dodge”, it was held that the effect of crossexamination of the managing partner to this effect was to throw away the statutory protection.193 The suggestion that an identification parade had been unfairly conducted was held not to deprive the accused of his shield, because the defence was not conducted on the footing that the police inspector was a witness of such a character that he ought not to be believed.194 It is, however, settled that a [page 809] suggestion that a confession was obtained by threats or bribes,195 that successive remands were obtained by the police to enable them to fabricate evidence,196 and that a confession was dictated by one police officer to another,197 does mean that the conduct of the defence involves imputations on the character of the prosecutor or his witness.198 The same is true of questioning by counsel for the accused alleging that a principal prosecution witness’s testimony was invented.199 Lord Hewart CJ once said that a clear line is drawn between words which are an emphatic denial of the Crown’s evidence, and words which attack the character or conduct of the witness; but the imprecise nature of this distinction was immediately
emphasised when he added: It was one thing for [the] appellant to deny that he had made the confession; but it is another thing to say that the whole thing was a deliberate and elaborate concoction on the part of the inspector …200
It is respectfully submitted that the same judge approached more nearly the truth when he said “It is not possible to lay down, even if it were desirable, as the authorities stand, a series of formulas or regulations upon this matter”.201
[23320] “Unnecessary” or “unjustifiable” imputations? These words were spoken many years ago, but they are still true — a fact which is amply demonstrated by a consideration of the authorities on the subject of adding a gloss to the last part of s 15(2)(c). Can it be said that the accused is only exposed to cross-examination concerning a record when the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve “unnecessary” or “unjustifiable” imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution? If the answer is in the negative, the prisoner who alleges that it was a Crown witness who committed the crime charged, that the prosecutrix who alleges rape was a consenting party to acts of immorality, or that the victim of an alleged assault was the aggressor will be unable to develop the defence without throwing the shield away. An emphatic negative was however the reply of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in a prosecution for larceny to which the defence was that the crime had been perpetrated by a Crown witness.202 Lord Alverstone CJ said: [page 810] We think that the words of the section, “unless the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations” etc, must receive their ordinary and natural interpretation, and that it is not legitimate to qualify them by adding or inserting the words “unnecessarily”, or “unjustifiably”, or “for purposes other than that of developing the defence”, or other similar words.
In spite of this clear statement in favour of the contrary view, the English Court of Criminal Appeal decided that allegations by someone accused of rape to the effect that the prosecutrix had not merely consented to intercourse but had also been guilty of gross indecency did not deprive
him of his shield. Humphreys J expressed the opinion that the case was one in which: … the court is justified in holding that some limitation must be put on the words of the section, since to decide otherwise would be to do grave injustice never intended by Parliament.203
This was mentioned with approval by Viscount Simon LC in the case in which he said: An accused is not to be regarded as depriving himself of the protection of the section, because the proper conduct of his defence necessitates the making of injurious reflections on the prosecutor or his witnesses.204
Some further illustrations of attempts to place some limitation on the words of the section appear in the Australian cases.
[23325] Curwood v R The approach of the Australian courts has been to grapple with the difficulties of construction of the section, rather than fall back on the exercise of discretion to meet the problems raised by the operation of the section. In the leading case, it was held that a defence that a confession was extorted by threats and physical violence on the part of police officers who gave evidence rendered the accused liable to be cross-examined as to his previous character. It was pointed out by Dixon J, however, that: There is much authority to show that a denial by the prisoner of incriminating facts, notwithstanding the clear implication must be that the witnesses for the Crown are lying, does not “involve” an imputation. Further, it makes no difference that the denial is vigorous and even disparaging in its expression or that the imputation of deliberate untruthfulness is explicit.205
Dixon J drew a distinction between, on the one hand, the denial of facts evidentiary or ultimate, and on the other hand, the setting up of a defence the basis of which is misconduct imputed to witnesses.206 In a later case he held that the trial judge had erred, both in ruling that the equivalent to s 15(2)(c) applied, and in his exercise of discretion. The accused was charged with having been an accessory after the fact to burglary. He denied any knowledge of the crime, denied admissions alleged by police officers and claimed that a record of interview produced contained [page 811]
much more than the few questions he had in fact been asked. Dixon CJ reaffirmed his view of the phrase in the proviso as follows: … when you stop to consider the significance of the hypothesis demanded by the words “when the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the witnesses for the prosecution” it becomes plain at once that what is referred to is not a denial of the case for the Crown, not a denial of evidence by which it is supported, but the use of matter which will have a particular or specific tendency to destroy, impair or reflect upon the character of the prosecutor or witnesses called for the prosecution, quite independently of the possibility that such matter, were it true, would in itself provide a defence. The phrase assumes that a denial of the case for the prosecution, although the evidence of the prosecution is necessarily contradicted, does not carry with it an imputation of the kind to which the provision refers. Further the word “involves” refers to what is a part of the defence or, at all events, an element or ingredient in the defence or what arises from the manner in which the defence is conducted. It is not meant to cover inferences, logical implications or consequential deductions which may spell imputations against the character of witnesses.207
However, the majority of the court, Taylor and Owen JJ, were not prepared to disagree with the trial judge’s ruling that the section applied, although they found that there had not been a proper exercise of discretion. It is likely that some judges will prefer not to take up an inquiry into what were described as “the difficult distinctions”208 suggested by Dixon CJ and will, whilst affirming that an emphatic denial of the Crown evidence will not attract the section, decline to add qualifying words into the section,209 but exercise the statutory discretion to protect the prisoner from an over-severe application of the section.
[23330] Selvey v Director of Public Prosecutions The House of Lords has rejected the view that cases applying a strict construction of the equivalent to s 15(2)(c) were wrong. The case is important both because of the attempts made in it to provide a cogent rationale for the difficult and sometimes conflicting decisions on the topic, and because it affirmed the existence and nature of the discretion accompanying the operation of the section. Viscount Dilhorne210 stated that the cases established the following propositions: (1) The words of the statute must be given their ordinary natural meaning. (2) The section permits cross-examination of the accused as to character both when imputations on the character of the prosecutor and his witness are cast to show their unreliability as witnesses independently of the evidence given by them and also when the casting of such imputations is necessary to enable the accused to establish his defence. (3) In rape cases the accused can allege consent without placing himself in peril of such cross-examination. This may be because such cases are sui generis or on the ground that the issue is one raised by the prosecution.
(4) If what is said amounts in reality to no more than a denial of the charge, expressed, it may be, in emphatic language, it should not be regarded as coming within the section.211
[page 812]
[23335] Phillips v R The High Court has endorsed the view that the words of the section are to be given their plain meaning.212 The Crown alleged that the accused broke into and entered the dwelling of the prosecutrix in suburban Brisbane and there raped her. The sole issue was identity. The only evidence identifying the accused with the assailant was the presence of his fingerprints on the aluminium frame of a fly wire screen which had been removed at the time of the unlawful entry. The accused denied that he had visited the flat of the prosecutrix. In evidence he explained the fingerprints in the manner following. The woman had previously visited his home and smoked marijuana there with him. A short time prior to the date of the crime she had asked him to buy some marijuana for some friends “from down south” who were staying with her. He agreed but was unable to obtain the drug. He called at her flat one afternoon to tell her of his inability to meet her request, but she did not respond to his knock on the door. He went to the back of her flat and looked in the kitchen window. In so doing he leant on the wire screen, leaving his fingerprints. It was conceded before the High Court that the allegation that the prosecutrix had smoked marijuana and had attempted to traffic in that substance fell within the terms of the third exception, so that the only question for determination was that as to the trial judge’s discretion. Nevertheless, the High Court took the opportunity to reaffirm its earlier approach213 and to reject the argument that any qualification such as “unjustifiably” or “unnecessarily” should be read into the statute.214 Whenever the case of the accused passes beyond a simple denial, albeit emphatic, then the accused is exposed to cross-examination as to antecedents, subject to the discretion of the trial judge.
The discretion of the court [23340] Specific discretion
The three decisions previously discussed have firmly established the existence of a discretion in the trial judge to mollify the operation of the statutes in England, and in Australia in those jurisdictions where the terms of the statute do not expressly confer it (see [23405]). This discretion is distinct from the overriding discretion to reject evidence whose prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value,215 although the relevant factors in each discretion have much in common. It is now necessary to consider what has been said in the cases as to the nature of this discretion. The House of Lords216 has laid down that there was no rule that the discretion should be exercised by excluding cross-examination if the accused’s defence necessarily involved the imputations that had been made. The Australian cases before this contain a number of formulations of the principles upon which the discretion of the court should be exercised. The most comprehensive of these was the following made by Smith J:217 (a) That the legislation is not intended to make the introduction of a prisoner’s previous convictions other than exceptional. (b) That the prejudicial effect on the defence of questions relating to the accused’s long criminal record needed to be weighed against such
[page 813] damage as his Honour might think had been done to the Crown case by the imputations. (c) That, on the issue of credibility, it might be unfair to the Crown to leave the Crown witnesses under an imputation while preventing the Crown from bringing out the accused’s record. (d) That the actual prejudicial effect of the cross-examination, if allowed, might far exceed its legitimate evidentiary effect upon credit. (e) That great efforts had been made by the defence to make it clear that memory only and not honesty was the subject of attack. (f) That counsel for the defence had not been warned, but had been refused advice when he sought it from his Honour.
Smith J concluded his judgment with the sentence: I may observe that218 … it is essential, if accused persons are not to be unfairly restricted in the putting of their defences, that the courts should be most cautious and sparing in the exercise of the discretion to grant leave.
[23345] No bias in favour of accused His Honour’s first proposition as to the exceptional nature of the accused’s prior history has, despite the House of Lords’ approach, been widely taken to mean that the discretion should be exercised adversely to
the accused only in exceptional cases.219 The High Court has rejected this interpretation.220 The majority found that the trial judge had not improperly exercised his discretion to permit the prosecutor to expose to the jury the antecedents of the accused. These were that he had been twice convicted of offences involving drugs and that he had other convictions including possession of stolen property, and breaking and entry. The decision authoritatively rejects for Australian courts the idea that the trial judge should approach the matter of the exercise of discretion with a bias in favour of the accused. No such bias should be applied, even where the imputation against the Crown witness is a necessary part of the defence. The sole criterion governing the exercise of discretion is what fairness requires in the circumstances of the case. In the application of this overriding principle it is submitted that the following considerations are relevant:221 (1) What are the issues at the trial? If the jury will be required to choose between the evidence of the accused and that of the impugned witness, the judge may be more inclined to permit the jury to know of the dishonest character of each of the witnesses.222 If no such issue arises, the exercise of discretion against the accused smacks more of judicial retaliation. (2) What is the nature of the attack on the Crown witness? What is its likely effect? Where the imputations are gratuitous, that is, not fairly involved in the presentation of the defence, the judge may be more ready to allow [page 814] cross-examination.223 Where on the other hand, the attack, as in the High Court case, was incidental to the defence it might have been expected that the trial judge would act otherwise.224 In such a case the jury would not be likely to use the material in assessing the credibility of the Crown witness concerned. (3) What is the nature of the character evidence which will be exposed to the jury if leave to cross-examine is granted? What is its likely effect? The trial judge will have regard to the proper relevance of the prior convictions which are to be disclosed.
Since the only legitimate use of such material is to impugn the credit of the accused as a witness,225 leave should be granted only where and to the extent that the evidence will further that purpose. The trial judge will also in this regard be sensitive to any prejudicial effect on the accused which the crossexamination may have.226 Thus the cross-examination of the accused on a conviction for raping one of his daughters should have been prohibited at his trial for committing incest with another since it had a marginal bearing on credibility but a devastating effect on the defence; this was particularly so since the conviction was subject to appeal (later upheld).227 However, the mere fact that the character evidence has an incidental effect of suggesting a tendency or disposition to commit the offence charged does not by itself make the questioning impermissible.228 (4) When weighed against the likely prejudicial effect of the material to be elicited in cross-examination, does the damage caused by the imputation against the Crown witness require in fairness that the cross-examination be permitted? In considering this matter, the trial judge would doubtless be alert to the risk that the jury, however directed, would misuse the evidence of antecedents. The judge would be aware that the discretion to grant the application by the Crown should be exercised sparingly and cautiously, for the law, as a matter of fairness to an accused, is reluctant to permit evidence of bad character to be adduced without good cause.229 The fact that the existence of this discretion was not recognised in the early days of the 1898 Act is a matter to be borne in mind when the early decisions are under [page 815] consideration; it is possible that some of them should now be treated as cases in which there was an imputation, although the judge would have been justified in prohibiting cross-examination in the exercise of the discretion, had the judge known that he possessed such a thing. Even now,
in cases in which the trial court does not apply its mind to the question of discretion, the appellate court may exercise its own discretion.230 It may also uphold the trial court’s decision to allow cross-examination on a different ground from that upon which it relied.231 Once the court exercises its discretion to permit cross-examination on character, its role is not exhausted. The following principles have been stated by the English Court of Appeal as being relevant to the extent of cross-examination.232 … (2) It is undesirable that there should be prolonged or extensive cross-examination in relation to previous offences. This is because it will divert the jury from the [principal] issues in the case, which is the guilt of the accused on the instant offence, and not the details of earlier ones. Unless the earlier ones are admissible as similar fact evidence, prosecuting counsel should not seek to probe or emphasise similarities between the underlying facts of previous offences and the instant offence. (3) Similarities of defences which have been rejected by juries on previous occasions, for example false alibis or the defence that the incriminating substance has been planted and whether or not the accused pleaded guilty or was disbelieved having given evidence on oath, may be a legitimate matter for questions. These matters do not show a disposition to commit the offence in question; but they are clearly relevant to credibility. (4) Underlying facts that show particularly bad character over and above the bare facts of the case are not necessarily to be excluded. But the judge should be careful to balance the gravity of the attack on the prosecution with the degree of prejudice to the defendant which will result from the disclosure of the facts in question. Details of sexual offences against children are likely to be regarded by the jury as particularly prejudicial to an accused … (5) If objection is to be taken to a particular line of cross-examination about the underlying facts of a previous offence, it should be taken as soon as it is apparent to defence counsel that it is in danger of going too far. There is little point in taking it subsequently, since it will not normally be a ground for discharging the jury. (6) While it is the duty of the judge to keep cross-examination within proper bounds, if no objection is taken at the time it will be difficult thereafter to contend that the judge has wrongly exercised his discretion …
[23350] Discretion to admit or exclude Burt J observed233 that in Victoria and Queensland the wording of the section as it then stood was such that the discretion was to admit the crossexamination. In the other jurisdictions the discretion was to exclude the evidence.234 In most cases this difference would not be important. It would be unfortunate if, in borderline cases, the admission of important and prejudicial evidence should depend upon the difference.
[page 816] An imputation can be made by an answer of the accused under crossexamination by the prosecution.235 Finally, s 18(2)–(3) of the South Australian Act ([23305]) has gone a long way to erode the exception under consideration so that it will apply only where gratuitous attacks are made on the prosecutor or the prosecution witnesses.236
Judicial warning [23355] Practice of Crown counsel The English Court of Criminal Appeal237 has stressed the importance of giving some sort of warning to the defence that it was going too far. It was said that it has always been the practice of Crown counsel to indicate in advance that the Crown is going to claim its rights, or for the judge to give the defence a caution.238 This is especially needful when the prisoner is unrepresented.239 It is a discretionary matter for the trial judge.240
Purpose of cross-examination under the third exception [23360] Tit for tat Channell J said:241 [I]f the defence is so conducted, or the nature of the defence is such, as to involve the proposition that the jury ought not to believe the prosecutor or one of the witnesses for the prosecution upon the ground that his conduct — not his evidence in the case, but his conduct outside the evidence given by him — makes him an unreliable witness, then the jury ought also to know the character of the prisoner who either gives that evidence or makes that charge, and it then becomes admissible to cross-examine the prisoner as to his antecedents and character with the view of shewing that he has such a bad character that the jury ought not to rely upon his evidence.
In other words it is a case of tit for tat. From this it follows that the purpose of the cross-examination permitted is to discredit the accused. Thus where the accused was charged with murder, his counsel cross-examined a prosecution witness about whether she kept a brothel, and the accused was cross-examined about his previous
larceny and burglary convictions, Darling J told the jury that:242 [page 817] …The only use to be made of these previous convictions is to show that when you have to rely upon his (the prisoner’s) word as contradicting something stated by somebody else, or something which is not corroborated, you have not the word of a person who has done nothing wrong … you have only the word of a man whose past career has been what you know it to have been.243
The South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal stressed the need for the direction to make clear to the jury both the positive and negative aspects of this evidence.244 They should be told positively for what purpose they may use the evidence — to deny the accused’s assertions of good character and to impugn his credit. They should also be directed negatively, that is that they might not use the evidence to infer guilt.
G — FOURTH EXCEPTION: WITNESS AGAINST A CO-ACCUSED Section 15(2) [23365] A difficulty and its palliative It is, however, very doubtful whether warnings of this nature prevent the prejudicial character of the accused’s record from exercising a disproportionately strong influence on the jury. This part of s 15(2)(c) is liable to place counsel for the defence in a somewhat embarrassing position. Assuming that the prosecution has, as it should have done,245 informed counsel of the defendant’s record and of the known records of witnesses for the prosecution,246 counsel cannot cross-examine the witness without exposing the accused to retaliation in kind. On the other hand, [page 818] failure to attack the witness’s credibility may lead the jury to treat
unreliable evidence as though it were trustworthy. This difficulty could be countered by a practice under which counsel for the Crown informs the court of such matters as the previous convictions of the prosecution witness, but there does not appear to be any general rule to that effect. The problem is substantially palliated by s 104(5) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT): [23300].
[23370] The provision Section 15(2) provides: [A] person charged … shall not be asked … unless: (d) the person had given evidence against any other person charged in that criminal proceeding.247
[23375] The rationale for s 15(2)(d) The rationale underlying s 15(2)(d) is presumably that the accused is in the same position as a witness for the prosecution so far as the co-accused is concerned, and nothing must be done to impair the right of persons charged to discredit their accusers. Accordingly, it has been held that the court has no discretion to refuse leave to a co-accused to cross-examine under the exception if it considers that the paragraph applies to the case.248 In the rare case where the prosecution might seek to avail itself of the right to cross-examine under this provision it seems likely that the court has a discretion to grant leave.249
“Evidence against” [23380] Six propositions Kilner Brown J summarised the principles as to what is meant by the expression “has given evidence against” in six propositions:250 (1) If it is established that a person jointly charged has given evidence against the codefendant that defendant has a right to cross-examine the other as to previous convictions and the trial judge has no discretion to refuse an application. (2) Such evidence may be given either in chief or during cross-examination.251
[page 819]
(3) It has to be objectively decided whether the evidence either supports the prosecution case in a material respect or undermines the defence of the co-accused. A hostile intent is irrelevant.252 (4) If consideration has to be given to the undermining of the other’s defence care must be taken to see that the evidence clearly undermines the defence. Inconvenience to or inconsistency with the other’s defence is not of itself sufficient.253 (5) Mere denial of participation in a joint venture is not of itself sufficient to rank as evidence against the co-defendant. For the proviso to apply, such denial must254 lead to the conclusion that if the witness did not participate then it must have been the other who did. (6) Where the one defendant asserts or in due course would assert one view of the joint venture which is directly contradicted by the other such contradiction may be evidence against the co-defendant.
It has been said255 that evidence cannot be given against a person charged if its effect, if believed, is to result not in the conviction but in the acquittal of the person charged; hence the undermining of the defence of the person charged by supplying another did not constitute evidence against the person charged. Where the witness supports the prosecution case in a respect on which there is no issue between the prosecution and the co-accused, the witness’s evidence is not against the co-accused.256
Who is a co-accused? [23385] “Same offence” The interpretation of the expression “another person charged with the same offence”, which appears in three of the Australian equivalents to s 15(2)(d), was settled in a case257 in which the two accused were the drivers of two cars which collided at an intersection causing the death of a pedestrian bystander. They were each charged upon a separate count of causing death by dangerous driving. Not surprisingly, each driver blamed the other. Counsel for one driver sought to cross-examine the other driver upon matters which were covered by the statutory prohibition. He relied upon the fourth exception and was permitted to do so. Lord Dilhorne delivered a speech, with which the other Law Lords agreed, deploring the unsatisfactory wording of this part of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. The “same offence”, his Lordship said, means just that. In the case before the House, the offences with which the two drivers were charged were not the same. Notwithstanding that the prosecution alleged against each a breach of the same statute arising out of the same collision, the breach in each case was a different one. In order to satisfy the requirements of the
fourth exception it is necessary that the accused persons be jointly charged with one offence and that charge be not bad for duplicity or, if they are charged separately, that they could lawfully have been charged jointly. The House deplored the consequence that the right of the accused should depend not upon the forensic predicament in which the accused was found, but upon the choice by the Crown of the form of the indictment. They recommended a change in the law and this was done in 1979. [page 820] In a case258 in which Lovett was charged with stealing a television set and Gregory, his co-accused, was charged with handling it, Lovett cast serious imputations on a witness for the prosecution and gave evidence against Gregory. Gregory’s counsel immediately cross-examined Lovett on his previous convictions; he was convicted and Gregory acquitted. On Lovett’s appeal against conviction the English Court of Appeal held that cross-examination under the equivalent of s 15(2)(d) was improper because the two accused were not charged with the same offence. The court expressed the view that the prosecution may, subject to the discretion of the judge to prohibit such a course, cross-examine under s 15(2)(d) where the conditions for its operations exist.259 The court also took the view that, subject again to the judge’s discretion, crossexamination of an accused by a co-accused was permitted by the equivalent of s 15(2)(c). It is only in very exceptional circumstances that an application by the prosecution for leave to cross-examine under s 15(2)(d) would be likely to succeed. A possible instance would be a case in which two persons jointly charged with the same offence each gave evidence against the other, but because they both had criminal records, neither cross-examined the other under s 15(2)(d). The English Court of Appeal could have exercised its discretion under s 15(2)(c) in favour of Gregory,260 but did not consider it right to do so. An example of a case in which such a course might be proper would be one in which A, charged with stealing, swears that he was acting under the duress of his co-accused B, charged with handling, and of C, a witness for the prosecution. A judge could well take the view that while there was every reason why the discretion under s 15(2)(c) should be
exercised against the prosecution, it should be exercised in favour of B.
[23390] Co-accused’s rights of cross-examination Even when a witness accused has not given evidence against the coaccused, the latter has a right to cross-examine the former,261 but unless the former gives evidence against someone jointly charged with the same offence, the former would not normally be liable to cross-examination by the latter on the former’s criminal record and bad character. One of two accused persons who cross-examines a witness for the prosecution with a view to establishing that the other was the culprit by, for example, asking whether the alleged frauds did not stop while that other was in prison, does not, merely by doing so, become exposed to cross-examination under the equivalent to s 15(2).262 When such a course is likely to be adopted it is a matter for judicial discretion whether separate trials should be ordered.
Purpose of cross-examination under the fourth exception [23395] Co-accused and prosecution in same position The rationale of this exception is that an accused should be permitted self defence against an attack by a co-accused as well as by the prosecution. Where a prosecution witness gives evidence against the accused the accused will normally be able to cross-examine the witness as to the issues and as to credit without restriction. When the attacking witness is a co-accused the evident policy of the [page 821] fourth exception is that, as far as possible, the accused should have similar rights. Unlike the exceptions which have been already considered, the cross-examination permitted by s 15(2)(d) may be used for any purpose for which cross-examination is ever available; the trial judge should therefore warn the jury of the permissible purposes for which they may use the evidence, and also warn them that they should not use it to decide
guilt via propensity.263
H — FIFTH EXCEPTION: RELEVANT TO THE DEFENCE OF A CO-ACCUSED Difficulties in cross-examining to show innocence [23400] Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(b) There are difficulties in construing the typical statutory provision in such a way as to enable an accused to cross-examine a co-accused upon prohibited subjects for the purpose of showing the cross-examining accused’s innocence: see [23240]. In the normal case the co-accused will have given evidence against the accused so that the fourth exception will apply. But where it does not, the accused must rely upon a broad interpretation which would permit questions upon any matter in issue. It will be recalled that cross-examination of an accused under the first exception is permitted only where it shows that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, not that the accused is innocent,264 nor indeed that any other accused is innocent.265 In one State the legislation deals specifically with this problem. In Queensland s 15(2)(b) of the Evidence Act 1977 provides that the crossexaminer is forbidden to trespass upon the prohibited area unless: the question is directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that any other person charged in that criminal proceeding is not guilty of the offence with which that other person is there charged.
Under the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic), 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT), the crossexamination is permissible without leave since it is not relevant only to credibility.
I — THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE Statutory provisions
[23405] Statutory provisions In Queensland the relevant statute makes specific provision for application to be made to the trial judge for permission to cross-examine in the prohibited area in the absence of the jury (if any). Since these statutory provisions vary it may be convenient to deal with them as they affect the five exceptions in turn. First exception — relevant matters. In Queensland only is there express statutory requirement for permission to ask questions under this exception.266 [page 822] Second exception — accused’s good character. Permission is required by the statute in Queensland.267 Third exception — imputations on Crown witnesses. Permission is required by statute in Queensland.268 Fourth exception — hostile co-accused. No statute expressly requires permission. Fifth exception — innocent co-accused. It is only in Queensland that permission is required.269 In the somewhat differently structured legislation applying in federal jurisdictions, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, where cross-examination goes solely to credibility and is outside areas where leave is not required,270 leave must be obtained for the third and fourth exceptions.271 Irrespective of statutory requirement. There are very practical reasons for an advocate to seek the approval, if not the permission, of the trial judge before embarking upon a cross-examination directed towards an accused person’s bad character. These reasons have led the High Court to suggest that permission of the trial judge should be sought whenever the crossexaminer seeks to rely on the second, third or fourth exceptions, whether or not there is a statutory requirement.272 Moreover, the terms of the various exceptions are often vague and, especially in the case of the third exception, they will admit varying applications to any given set of facts. In these circumstances it is not uncommon for a trial judge to warn counsel
for the accused when the cross-examination of Crown witnesses is approaching matters covered by s 15(2)(c): [23355]. But there is not a requirement that this be done and an inexperienced advocate may unwittingly make imputations against Crown witnesses that cause loss for the client of the statutory protection. What procedure should be adopted where the trial judge rules that the accused, who has elected to testify and is under oath, may be crossexamined on the record, but the accused refuses to re-enter the witness box? In England it has been said that the accused may be questioned while standing in the dock. If the accused remains silent, that is treated as a denial of previous bad character, and the convictions may be proved.273
[23410] Role of counsel Counsel for the accused must assess the position at the conclusion of the prosecution case, for it is then that counsel must announce whether the accused will give sworn evidence. Counsel must decide whether the conduct of the defence to that time has put the client’s character in issue or whether imputations have been [page 823] made upon the prosecution or its witnesses. In one case274 Sangster J made for the benefit of an accused in this situation a preliminary ruling as to whether the statutory shield had been thrown away. There is no duty to do so.275 But useful as such a ruling may be, the question whether the accused witness may be cross-examined as to character must be decided when the cross-examiner seeks to embark upon the line of questioning covered by the protection. The position then may be very different from that which obtains at the close of the Crown case. The cases make it clear that an appellate court will be very slow to infer that no injustice has been done to an accused whose character has wrongly been exposed in cross-examination. It will be reluctant to find that the discretion of the trial judge, if it had been sought, must necessarily be exercised in favour of the cross-examiner.276 But where the trial judge’s permission has been sought and granted an appellant has a difficult task in
persuading a court of appeal that the trial judge should not have exercised the discretion in the way that it was. Where leave is given to cross-examine on an accused person’s record, it is impermissible to cross-examine on bad character beyond the record.277
J — CTH: EVIDENCE ACT 1995, NSW: EVIDENCE ACT 1995, VIC: EVIDENCE ACT 2008, TAS: EVIDENCE ACT 2001, ACT: EVIDENCE ACT 2011 SS 110–112 AND NT: EVIDENCE (NUL) ACT 2011 SS 110–112 “Uniform” provisions [23415] Special features The operation of s 104 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) has been noted where relevant above. One aspect there dealt with is that leave is not to be given to one defendant to cross-examine another about a matter relevant only to credibility unless the evidence that the latter has given includes evidence adverse to the former and that evidence has been admitted.278 Further, s 110(1)–(3) permits the tender of evidence by an accused person to show that the tendering party is of good character either generally or in a particular respect, and permits the tender of rebutting evidence — if evidence of general good character has been admitted, generally, and if evidence of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, in that respect. And s 111 permits the tender by one defendant of evidence about another’s character, and the rebuttal of that evidence. See [19150] and [19160]. Section 112 provides that a defendant must not be crossexamined about matters arising out of evidence of a [page 824] kind referred to in ss 110 and 111 unless the court gives leave. Factors relevant to the grant of leave are set out in s 192 and must be taken into
account.279 1 The history of the accused’s right to participate in the criminal trial is set out in J F Stephen, A
History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol 1, 1883, Ch 12. See also [25070] n 223 below; D J A Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865, 1998; J H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 2003, pp 51–3. 2 The Story of My Life, 1919, p 144, quoted in J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Chadbourn rev, 1979, vol 2, [579]. 3 See the example given in J F Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol 1, 1883, p 144. 4 From 1875 there were a number of statutory exceptions to this rule of incompetence in the case of specific offences. These are set out in J F Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 5th ed, 1899, art 108. 5 In fact legislation in certain jurisdictions antedated the English statute. See eg SA: Accused Persons Evidence Act 1882; NSW: Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 1891 s 6; Vic: Crimes Act 1891 s 34; Canada: Evidence Act 1893. For the history in England, see C J W Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 1997, pp 123–80. 6 In R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 (NSW CCA), a trial judge’s decision not to discharge the jury when a Crown witness inadvertently mentioned the right of the accused to given sworn evidence was upheld. 7 Evidence Act 1939 s 9(3). See Massie v R (1993) 3 NTLR 105. 8 Griffin v California 380 US 609 (1965). 9 Griffin v California 380 US 609 (1965) at 621. See also R v Johnson (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 at [107]. 10 It may be expected that a modern jury, familiar with the options open to an accused person and applying the ordinary processes which underpin the rule in Jones v Dunkel, as to which see [1215], would be more ready to draw an inference against the silent accused: R v Hallocoglu (1992) 29 NSWLR 67 at 78 (CCA). See also Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 224–5 and 233. The majority in Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 seek to remedy this problem by directions which “will almost always be desirable” (at [51]) and by prohibiting a comment except in “rare and exceptional” circumstances (at [68]): see [1220]. The dissenters in that case question the effectiveness of this: see at [26]–[27] and [88]. 11 Griffin v California 380 US 609 (1965) at 614. 12 Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(b). 13 Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(c). See Boxer v R (1995) 14 WAR 505 at 534–7 (CCA). 14 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 20; NSW: Evidence Act 1995; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 20; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 20; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 20; NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 20. 15 See for example Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 and generally as to comment [23025]–[23035]. 16 NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, the ACT and federal courts. See H A Snelling, “Commentary upon Comment” (1962) 35 ALJ 395; C R Williams, “Silence in Australia: Probative Force and Rights in the Law of Evidence” (1994) 110 LQR 629; G L Davies, “The Prohibition Against Adverse Inferences From Silence: A Rule Without Reason?” (2000) 74 ALJ 26 and 99. 17 R v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 77 (CCCR). 18 R v Wickham (1971) 55 Cr App R 199; Shevlin v HM Advocate 2002 SLT 239; R v Tran (2006) 96 SASR 8 (CCA). In the last case it was said that counsel for the co-accused should not suggest that the jury could infer guilt from silence alone, and that the trial judge should give a direction of the kind approved in Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217.
19 R v Voisin [1918] 1 KB 531 at 536 (CCA). 20 Waugh v R [1950] AC 203 (PC). 21 Stuart v R (1959) 101 CLR 1. 22 R v Mutch [1973] 1 All ER 178 (CA). See also R v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 (CCA); R v
Fellowes [1987] 2 Qd R 606 (CCA), but the jury should not, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, be told that they may infer intention from the failure of the accused to give evidence: R v Hocking [1988] 1 Qd R 582 (CCA). In R v Martinez-Tobon [1994] 2 All ER 90 (CA) it was said that the judge might think it appropriate to make a stronger comment where the defence case involved alleged facts which (a) were at variance with prosecution evidence or additional to it and exculpatory, and (b) must, if true, be within the knowledge of the defendant. 23 In R v Martinez-Tobon [1994] 2 All ER 90 (CA) it was said that Lord Parker CJ’s direction should always be given. 24 R v Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 99 at 107–8 (CCA). 25 “He [the accused] is not bound to go into the witness box, nobody can force him to go into the witness box, but the burden is upon him, and if he does not, he runs the risk of not being able to prove his case”: R v Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 99 at 108. 26 R v Sparrow [1973] 2 All ER 129 (CA). 27 R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 (CCA). 28 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217. 29 R v Kops (1893) 14 NSWLR 150; Kops v R; Ex parte Kops [1894] AC 650; Morgan v Babcock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 178; Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 227–8 and 235; R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 at 751 (CCA). 30 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [64]. 31 RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [20]; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [56]. 32 RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [19]–[20]. 33 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [74]–[75]. 34 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [66]. 35 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 227–8 and 235 (but see at 244–5 and 565–6); R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424; Boxer v R (1995) 14 WAR 505 at 537–40 (CCA); R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 at 750–1 (CCA). The second sentence of s 20(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and s 20(3) of the 2001 Act (Tas) is to the same effect: R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 at 751–2 (CCA). Compare the evidentiary effect of the silence of an accused when charged: [33770]. In RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [108] Callinan J said that the principles in Weissensteiner v R which permit some types of comment on silence can have no application in jurisdictions in which an equivalent to s 20(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) has been enacted. 36 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 228 and 235. 37 See [15215]. 38 RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620. 39 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 228; R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 at 751 (CCA). The second sentence of s 20(2) of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW) and 2008 (Vic) reinforces this: R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 at 752 (CCA); R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374 at [41]–[44] (NSWCCA). 40 R v Davison [1972] 3 All ER 1121 (CA). 41 R v Sparrow [1973] 2 All ER 129 (CA). See too G L Williams, The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed, 1963, p 57ff et seq; Z Cowen, “Judicial Comment on the Failure of Accused Persons to Testify” (1950) 13 MLR 378. 42 Waugh v R [1950] AC 203 (PC); R v Berry [1993] Crim LR 973 (CA). 43 Evidence Act (NT) s 9(3). 44 Bataillard v R (1907) 4 CLR 1282 at 1291; R v Cormack (1979) 1 A Crim R 471 at 473 (NSW CCA); Siebel v R (1992) 57 SASR 558 (CCA); R v Allen (1994) 77 A Crim R 99 (Vic FC).
45 R v Barron [1975] VR 496 at 502 (FC); R v Humphries [1972] 2 NSWLR 783 (CCA); George v
R (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 at 14 (NSW CCA); R v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 at 471 (CCA); R v Anastasiou (1991) 21 NSWLR 394 (CCA). A prosecution statement that the prosecution evidence was uncontradicted by the defence was held not to contravene the ban on prosecution comment in R v Brown [1983] Crim LR 38 (CA). 46 R v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 (CCA). 47 Siebel v R (1992) 57 SASR 558 (CCA); R v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491. 48 R v Phillips [1997] 1 VR 558 (CA). 49 R v Johnson (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 at [107] (Vic CA). 50 R v Kostaras (No 2) (2003) 143 A Crim R 254 at [105]–[108] (relying on R v Machin (No 2) (1997) 69 SASR 403 at 405 and 411 (CCA)). See also R v Aoukar (2011) 110 SASR 453. See also R v Aoukar (2011) 110 SASR 453. 51 R v Bevan (1993) 98 Cr App R 354. 52 Ebanks v R [2006] 1 WLR 1827 (PC). 53 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 21; Qld: Criminal Code s 618; (see R v DAH (2004) 150 A Crim R 14 at [74]) NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 21, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 31; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 21; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 30A; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18A (though the accused may give unsworn evidence under s 9 which is subject to cross-examination); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 97(2); NT: Criminal Code 1983 s 360; Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 21; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 21A. 54 Section 25 of the Norfolk Island Evidence Act 2004 abolishes any “rule of law or procedure or any practice” permitting the making of an unsworn statement, but in view of s 8 (providing that the Act “does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act”), this language has been held insufficiently clear impliedly to repeal the right to make an unsworn statement expressly conferred by s 405 of the Criminal Law Act 1960: R v McNeill (Ruling No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124 at [37]. 55 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 317. 56 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 128(10) (this and its equivalents does not apply to a hearing to determine a “preliminary question”, ie a question of admissibility: s 189(1) and (6); Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 15(1); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 128(10); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 128(10); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 128(10); SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(c); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1) (d); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 128(11); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 128(10)). The abolition of the privilege applied to the voir dire: R v Wright [1969] SASR 256 (CCA); R v Toomey [1969] Tas SR 99; R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208. The history is discussed in Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260 at [32]–[85]. 57 R v Rowland [1910] 1 KB 458. 58 R v Adams [1965] VR 563 (FC), but the correctness of this decision may be doubted. The circumstances attending the requirement that the accused Adams produce the documents were unusual. Furthermore, the statute which permitted the accused to be questioned as to the matters with which he was charged did not remove any other privilege to which he was entitled. See also [39045] below. 59 R v Nichols [1965] QWN 10 (CCA). 60 R v Ong (2001) 80 SASR 537 at [9]–[10] (CCA). 61 R v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 at 12. 62 Hobbs v C T Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 at 21 (CA); quoted at [17600]. 63 See especially R v Baldwin [1925] All ER Rep 402. 64 R v Eidinow (1932) 23 Cr App R 145; Cushing v R [1977] WAR 7 (CCA). 65 R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 (CCA); R v Sugarman (1935) 25 Cr App R 109. 66 Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 51-2. In some jurisdictions the cross-examiner must seek the permission of the trial judge before embarking upon cross-examination of the accused concerning subjects protected by the statutory shield: [23405].
67 R v McLean (1926) 19 Cr App R 104. Appeals have been allowed on account of improper
questioning by the judge (R v Ratcliffe (1919) 14 Cr App R 95) and counsel for a co-prisoner (R v Roberts [1936] 1 All ER 23 (CCA)) as well as counsel for the prosecution. See also R v Weaver [1968] 1 QB 353 (CA) and R v Duvivier (1982) 29 SASR 217 at 242 (CCA) as to the judge’s discretion to discharge the jury when prejudicial matter is disclosed. 68 See J Stone, “Cross-examination by the Prosecution at Common Law and under the Criminal Evidence Act 1989: A Commentary on Maxwell v Director of Public Prosecutions” (1935) 51 LQR 443 and “Further Problems in the Interpretation of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1, Proviso (f)” (1942) 58 LQR 369. See also R Pattenden, “The Purpose of Cross-Examination Under Section 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898” [1982] Crim LR 707. 69 Its counterparts are SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(c), (d); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1). A somewhat different regime prevails under ss 103 and 104 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) and Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 (NT). 70 There is no provision equivalent to s 15(4) elsewhere. 71 R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 at 527. See also cases cited in [23140] n 56. Cf R v Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559. 72 Which includes conduct which is not necessarily criminal: R v Carter [1997] Crim LR 505 (CA). 73 It is doubtless for this reason that the loss of the statutory protection is very commonly referred to as “throwing away the shield”. But, since the loss of the statutory protection by the operation of s 15(2)(a) does not involve an act of the accused at the trial, this work prefers to speak of the statutory prohibition and its various exceptions. Cross examination impermissible at the time it is conducted is not rendered permissible by the fact that the accused intended to, and later did, conduct the defence in such a fashion as to satisfy the requirements of the legislation later: R v Hayler (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 (NSW CCA). 74 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 15(2). Cf SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(d); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(e). See, for example, Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 (CA). 75 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(2); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(2); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 104(2); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(2); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(2); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 104(2). 76 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(3); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(3); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 104(3); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(3); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(3); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 104(3). See generally ALRC 26 [411]–[413] and [820]–[822], Bill clause 84; ALRC 38 [179](b) and [180](b), Bill clause 97. 77 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 633. For similar fact evidence adduced by the accused see [21210] above. 78 R v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436 at 439–40 (CCA). 79 See R v McGregor (1992) 95 Cr App R 240 (nolo contendere plea to Florida charge not a conviction). 80 R v Yates [1970] SASR 302 at 305. 81 Character may mean disposition, that is, a continuing propensity to behave in some way or with some state of mind. Or it may refer to a reputation which is merely the known manifestation of disposition: see [19001] above. See R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR); R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 (CCA); Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635. 82 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353. 83 This reading down of the protection obtains in South Africa: S v Mokoena 1967(1) SA 440 (AD), although possibly for historical reasons. See L H Hoffmann, South African Law of Evidence, 2nd ed, 1970, pp 60-2. Compare the more literal view of the House of Lords two years after Attwood’s case in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 and Malindi v R [1967] 1 AC 439 (PC). 84 For the statutes, see [23140] n 56. 85 R v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207 (CCA); R v Pommell [1999] Crim LR 576 (CA). The literal view is
also supported by Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309. 86 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353. 87 R v Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 (CCA), discussed in [21055] above. See also R v Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25. 88 Even then a sufficient foundation for the cross-examination should have been laid by the evidence in chief; compare with the treatment of R v Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25 by the majority of the House of Lords in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635. 89 R v Kurasch [1915] 2 KB 749. 90 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635; R v Anderson [1988] QB 678 (CA). 91 See also R v Sarek [1982] VR 971 at 979 (FC); cf R v Couper (1985) 18 A Crim R 1 (NSW CCA). 92 R v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 at 263 (CCA). 93 This case and R v Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25 were expressly stated to have rightly decided for the wrong reasons by Lord Reid in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 665; cf per Lord Morris, another member of the majority: Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 685. 94 See also Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 130 where Menzies J disposed of the appeal in a similar manner. 95 R v Kurasch [1915] 2 KB 749 was not cited in argument in Jones’s case but it was mentioned in the speech of Lord Devlin. Another case which may require reconsideration is R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 where one accused was allowed to ask another, whom he alleged to have been impersonating him in the perpetration of frauds, whether the frauds stopped while the witness was in prison. The question was allowed by Devlin J as relevant to the issue. Quaere whether it would be permissible under s15(2). 96 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 667 per Lord Denning. 97 See the examples given by Lord Devlin in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 694–5. But this is unlikely in those jurisdictions where notice of alibi is required. 98 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315. See also R v Wadey (1935) 25 Cr App R 104, and R v Nicoloudis (1954) 38 Cr App R 118. “Charge” includes pending charges: R v Smith [1989] Crim LR 900 (CA). 99 There was a difference of opinion between Lords Morris and Devlin in Jones’s case as to whether this proposition was solely addressed to cases in which the accused’s shield had been thrown away: see Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 638 and 707. 100 See eg Burrows v R (1937) 58 CLR 249. 101 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309. 102 Having regard to the emphasis placed by the High Court in R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364, upon the accused’s entitlement to full benefit of his acquittal, the legitimate use which the prosecution may make of an acquittal is very limited. See [5150]–[5155] above. 103 R v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204. 104 R v Wood [1920] 2 KB 179 (CCA); R v Coltress (1978) 68 Cr App R 193. 105 Connell v R (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 at 247–9 (CCA). 106 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 15(2)(a). See also WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(e)(i). See C F H Tapper, “The Meaning of Section 1(f)(i) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898” in C F H Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross, 1981, p 296. 107 SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(d)(i); R v Mustafa (2005) 91 SASR 62. 108 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(2); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(2); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 104(2): Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(2); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(2); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 104(2); [23180]. 109 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 ss 97, 98, 101 and 108; NSW: Evidence Act 1995 ss 97, 98, 101 and 108; Tas: Evidence Act 2001 ss 97, 98, 101 and 108; Vic: Evidence Act 2008 ss 97, 98, 101 and 108; ACT: Evidence Act 2011 ss 97, 98, 101 and 108; NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 ss 97, 98,
101 and 108: [21245]. See generally ALRC 26 [411]–[413] and [820]–[822], Bill clause 84; ALRC 38 [179](b) and [180](b), Bill clause 97; ALRC 102 [11.1]–[11.93]. Cf W v R (2006) 16 Tas R 1 (CCA). 110 R v Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 (CCA); R v Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25 (these cases must now be read subject to the majority views in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635: [23205]). See also R v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207 at 210 (CCA). 111 See per Lord Devlin in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 701. 112 The test in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 must be satisfied: R v Fox [2000] 2 Qd R 334. 113 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 685. 114 R v May [1959] VR 683 (FC). It was also held, however, that the accused had not put his character in issue within s 15(2). 115 R v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207 (CCA). 116 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 (CCA). 117 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 360–1. In such a case the prosecution might, subject to the judge’s general discretion, have led the evidence as part of the Crown case if the issue had been exposed: R v Anderson [1988] QB 678 at 688–9 (CA). 118 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 361–2. See also R v Baxter [1927] SASR 321 (CCA); R v Lambert [1957] SASR 341 (CCA); R v May [1959] VR 683 (FC). The view that s 15(2)(a) and its equivalents do not prohibit questions tending to show bad character and (presumably) questions tending to show charges not leading to conviction, where these are directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that the person is guilty of the offence with which the person is there charged, can be reached in three ways: (a) that of Lord Denning in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635, according to which there may always be cross-examination on matters relevant to the issue; (b) that of Lord Devlin in Jones’s case according to which “character” in s 15(2) means “reputation” so that questions about specific acts falling short of an offence are outside the prohibition; and (c) the way adopted by the High Court in Attwood’s case according to which the questions are casus omissus and words may be read into s 15(2) and its equivalents. 119 R v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 412–13 (CCA). 120 R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 (FC), discussed in [21215] above. 121 R v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 424 (CCA). See too R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 at 526–7. 122 As is done in South Africa and denied in England. See [23195] n 2 above. 123 R v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 at 422. 124 Qld: Evidence Act 1977 s 15(2)(c). See also SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(d)(ii); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(e)(ii). 125 See generally ALRC 26 [411]–[413] and [820]–[822], Bill clause 84; ALRC 38 [179](b) and [180](b), Bill clause 97. 126 Evidence Act 2001 s 104(4)(b). 127 R v Barnowski [1969] SASR 386 at 391 (CCA) where it is said that in such a case the accused may be recalled to be questioned about character. Where counsel for the accused read aloud a letter containing statements as to the good character of the accused but did not identify or tender the letter, it has been held that this put the character of the accused in issue: R v Perrier (No 2) [1991] 1 VR 717 (CCA). 128 Carroll v R [1964] Tas SR 76 (CCA); R v Lockard [1968] Tas SR 195. 129 R v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 (CCA), approved in Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595. The exception does not apply where the prosecution elicits evidence of the accused’s good character in cross-examining defence witnesses: R v Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48 (CA). 130 R v Thompson [1966] 1 All ER 505 (CCA), following dicta of Oliver J in R v Wattam (1952) 36 Cr App R 72 at 78. 131 Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 54 (Fed C of A FC).
132 R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 (CCA); R v Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48 (CA). Questions, as
opposed to evidence, will expose the character of the accused only where the purpose of the question is to raise good character. 133 R v Lee [1976] 1 All ER 570 at 572 (CA). 134 Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 294–6 (Fed C of A FC), citing R v White [1969] VR 203 at 205 (FC); R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1. 135 Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1 (Fed C of A FC). 136 R v Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250; but not gesticulating with a Bible while giving evidence: R v Robinson [2001] Crim LR 478. 137 Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 55 (Fed C of A FC). 138 R v Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 217. Cf P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 at 77–8 (CCA) (accused described his occupation as including fund raising activities for the Animal Welfare League: shield not lost). 139 Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 54 (Fed C of A FC). 140 R v Coulman (1927) 20 Cr App R 106. But see R v Barnowski [1969] SASR 386 at 391 where the Full Court observed that “we do not think a man puts his character in issue by saying that he loves his children or even, whether truthfully or untruthfully, that he loved his wife”. 141 Gunner v Payne [1910] VLR 45. 142 R v Parker (1924) 18 Cr App R 14. 143 R v Beecham [1921] 3 KB 464 (CCA). 144 R v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8. 145 Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595. See also R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 (CCA). 146 Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 53–4 (Fed C of A FC) citing R v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333 at 340–1 (CCA); R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 21 (CCA); Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1 (Fed C of A FC); R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 (CCA). 147 R v Norfolk (2002) 129 A Crim R 288. 148 R v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44 at 52. 149 R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 at 329 (CCA). 150 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 324. 151 Malindi v R [1967] 1 AC 439 at 451. 152 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304. 153 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 671. 154 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 699. 155 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304. 156 See per Lord Denning in Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 at 1143. “The plaintiff cannot speak as to his own character and reputation because he does not know what other people think of him, or, at any rate, he cannot give evidence as to what they think of him”. Lord Devlin considered that the word “character” means “reputation” throughout the law of evidence: see Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1961] 2 QB 162 at 195 and 198 (CA); Fridman (1962) 1 The Solicitor’s Quarterly 211. 157 See [19020] above. 158 R v Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164. 159 Winfield’s case is discussed from the point of view of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 by R N Gooderson, “Is the Prisoner’s Character Indivisible?” (1953) 11 CLJ 377 at 386 ff. The case is mentioned at [19140] above from the point of view of the cross-examination of a character witness at common law. 160 See also R v Morris (1959) 43 Cr App R 206 (cross-examination on conviction for dishonesty permitted by imputation of immorality against prosecution witnesses on charge of incest) and R v Gilday [1924] VLR 42 (prior convictions once properly put under s 15(2) are admissible for all purposes).
161 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 326–7; followed in R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 at 240
(CCA). 162 R v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101 (CA). Cf R v Powell [1986] 1 All ER 193 (CA). 163 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 319. Cf R v Micolucco (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 434 (CCA), where rebuttal evidence following a good character claim by the accused was held to be inadmissible on the grounds that it was no more than evidence of complaints about the accused. 164 R v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8. 165 R v Wood [1920] 2 KB 179 (CCA). See also R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299 at 311 (CA); R v Chinmaya [1995] 1 Qd R 542 (CA). 166 R v Wood [1920] 2 KB 179 at 182 (CCA). See also R v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333 (CCA) where evidence of frauds perpetrated after the offence charged was admitted to rebut evidence of good character from the accused. 167 Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 127; Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 659; R v Maiden (1988) 35 A Crim R 346 at 348 (SC NSW). See also [21255]. 168 See the judgments of McTiernan and Menzies JJ. 169 R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 301 (NSW CCA); R v Oliverio (1993) 61 SASR 354 (CCA); R v Robinson (2000) 111 A Crim R 388 at 393; R v Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114. 170 See E Griew, “Imputations on the Character of the Prosecutor or the Witnesses for the Prosecution — A Restatement” [1961] Crim LR 142; F O’Donoghue, “Imputations on the Character of Prosecution Witnesses” (1966) 29 MLR 492; D Lanham, “Cross-Examination under Section 5(2)(d) of the Evidence Act 1908 — Imputations and Necessity” (1972) 5 NZULR 21; S Seabrooke, “Closing the Credibility Gap: A New Approach to section 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898” [1987] Crim LR 231; P Mirfield, “The Argument from Consistency for Overruling Selvey” [1991] CLJ 490. 171 See also Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 104(4)(c); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(e)(ii); NT: Evidence Act 1939 s 9(7)(b). This is one of the respects in which Tasmania departs from the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT). In Tas, WA and NT, the words “or of any other person charged in that criminal proceeding” do not appear. In WA, the following words are added: “or a person who died as the result of the offence wherewith he is then charged”. 172 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(4)–(5); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(4)–(5); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(4)–(5); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(4)–(5). See generally ALRC 26 [411]– [413] and [820]–[822]; ALRC 38 [179](b)–[180](b); ALRC 102 [12.1]–[12.19]. Western Australia is in the peculiar position of having both the “uniform” provision (Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 104(4)–(5)) and the former provision (Evidence Act 1939 s 9(7)(b)). 173 Evidence Act 1929 s 18(2) and (3). 174 The giving of evidence as to the sexual activities of the prosecution witness without leave under s 34L was held to be outside the proper presentation of the defence in P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 (CCA). 175 R v Jones (1909) 3 Cr App R 67 at 69; R v Everitt [1921] VLR 245 at 249 (FC). 176 R v Westfall (1912) 7 Cr App R 176. 177 R v Billings [1961] VR 127 (FC). 178 R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213 (CCA); R v Gillis [1957] VR 91. 179 Cases are conceivable in which the prosecutor would not be called as a witness and imputations on his character would none the less expose the accused to cross-examination under the legislation. 180 R v Miller [1997] 2 Cr App R 178 at 188. 181 R v Rouse [1904] 1 KB 184 (CCCR); R v Grout (1909) 3 Cr App R 64; R v Stratton (1909) 3 Cr App R 255; R v Parker (1924) 18 Cr App R 14; R v Manley (1962) 46 Cr App R 235. 182 R v Rouse [1904] 1 KB 184 at 189 (CCCR). For similar statements see R v Jones (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 at 119; R v Clark [1955] 2 QB 469 at 478 (CCA); R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 345 (CCA); R v St Louis (1984) 79 Cr App R 53; R v Martinelli (1908) 10 WALR 33 (FC); Hewitt v
Lenthall [1931] SASR 314 (FC); Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 10. 183 R v Rappolt (1911) 6 Cr App R 156. 184 R v Morgan (1910) 5 Cr App R 157. 185 R v Eidinow (1932) 23 Cr App R 145. 186 R v Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr App R 1. See also R v Jones (1909) 3 Cr App R 67; R v Cunningham [1959] 1 QB 288 (CCA) (suggestion of provocation by homosexual advances); R v Morris (1959) 43 Cr App R 206 and R v Bishop [1975] QB 274 (CA). 187 R v Westfall (1912) 7 Cr App R 176. 188 R v Brown (1960) 44 Cr App R 181. 189 R v Billings [1961] VR 127 (FC). 190 R v Cummings [1978] Qd R 49 at 51 (CCA). 191 R v Cummings [1978] Qd R 49 at 50 (CCA). 192 R v Bridgewater [1905] 1 KB 131 (CCCR). 193 Matthews v R [1973] WAR 110 (CCA). 194 R v Preston [1909] 1 KB 568 (CCA). 195 R v Wright (1910) 5 Cr App R 131. 196 R v Jones (1923) 17 Cr App R 117. 197 R v Clark [1955] 2 QB 469 (CCA). See also Carroll v R [1956] Tas SR 91 (CCA). 198 See also the cases in which allegations that a Crown witness was acting out of malice in revenge or to shield himself have been held to warrant cross-examination under the exception: R v Roberts (1920) 15 Cr App R 65; R v McLean (1926) 19 Cr App R 104; R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 (CCA). 199 Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595. See also R v Dunn (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 423 (CCA). 200 R v Jones (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 at 120. See also R v Levy (1966) 50 Cr App R 198; R v St Louis (1984) 79 Cr App R 53. 201 R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 at 330. See also R v Wignall [1993] Crim LR 62 (CA); R v Stanton [1994] Crim LR 834 (CA); R v Wainwright [1998] Crim LR 665 (CA); R v Desmond [1999] Crim LR 313 (CA). In R v Britzman [1983] 1 All ER 369 (CA) it was said the shield would not be lost if there was only a denial, however emphatic or offensive, of an act or a short series of acts amounting to one incident, but it would if there was a denial of evidence of a long period of detailed observation or long conversations; further, allowance should be made for witnesses suffering the strain of cross-examination and in consequence making wild allegations (preferring R v Tanner (1977) 66 Cr App R 56 and R v McGee (1979) 70 Cr App R 247 to R v Nelson (1978) 68 Cr App R 12). 202 R v Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464 at 470–1 (CCA). Decisions to the same effect are R v Watson (1913) 8 Cr App R 249; R v Cohen (1914) 10 Cr App R 91; R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 (CCA); R v Pollinger (1930) 22 Cr App R 75 and R v Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr App R 1. See also Curwood v R (1944) 69 CLR 561 and Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1; R v Sargvon (1967) 51 Cr App R 394. 203 R v Turner [1944] KB 463 at 469 (CCA). 204 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 327. For interpretations of Viscount Simon’s fourth proposition, see Curwood v R (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 588. In Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 the proposition was treated by Lord Guest as being obiter and by Lord Pearce as relating only to rape. 205 Curwood v R (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 587; R v Brown [1960] VR 382 (FC); Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1; R v Clark [1962] VR 657 (FC); R v Crawford [1965] VR 586 (FC). 206 Curwood v R (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 588. 207 Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 9–10, endorsed in Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 56–7. 208 R v Billings [1961] VR 127 at 139 (FC); R v Warren [1971] SASR 316 at 319. 209 R v Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464 (CCA). See [23320]. 210 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 339; R v Jessop [1974] Tas SR 64 (CCA); Cushing v R [1977]
WAR 7 (CCA). 211 R v Lasseur [1991] Crim LR 53. 212 Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45. 213 Curwood v R (1944) 69 CLR 561. 214 This decision may be interpreted as marking a shift adverse to the accused in this difficult area. See R v Devine (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 (Qld CCA). 215 See R v Mandzij (1983) 11 A Crim R 209 (WA CCA). See generally [11125] above. 216 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304. 217 R v Brown [1960] VR 382 at 398 (FC). 218 R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 (CCA). 219 Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 17; R v Clark [1962] VR 657 at 664 (FC); R v Crawford [1965] VR 586 (FC); R v White [1969] VR 203 (FC); R v McCaul [1983] 2 VR 419 (FC); R v Warren [1971] SASR 316 at 319; R v Domican (No 3) (1990) 46 A Crim R 428 (NSW CCA). But see Matthews v R [1973] WAR 110 (CCA); R v Jessop [1974] Tas SR 64 (CCA); R v Langford [1974] Qd R 67 (CCA); R v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 (CCA). In R v Bransden (1981) 27 SASR 474 (CCA) the Full Court declined to resolve the conflict between R v Warren and R v Beech. 220 Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 56–7 and 65; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 352. See [23330]. 221 Compare the analysis of Ackner LJ in R v Burke (1985) 82 Cr App R 156 which is approved by the Court of Appeal in R v Powell [1986] 1 All ER 193 at 197 and in R v McLeod [1994] 3 All ER 254 at 266 with that of Smith J in R v Brown [1960] VR 382 at 398 quoted at [23340] above. See also R v Owen (1985) 83 Cr App R 100. 222 R v Brown [1960] VR 382 at 398 (item c) (FC); R v Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr App R 1; R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 348. 223 R v Gramanatz [1962] QWN 41; Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 56–7 and 65; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 352 and 360–1; Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 17; R v Lear [1998] 1 VR 285 (CA); R v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70. 224 It was in the application of the discretion on the facts of Phillips’ case, rather than its definition, that Deane J dissented. Indeed it is difficult to see how in that case counsel for Phillips could have conducted the defence without first putting his instructions to the prosecutrix and then calling evidence in support of them. 225 R v McLeod [1994] 3 All ER 254 at 266 and 267 (CA). 226 But see R v Powell [1986] 1 All ER 193 (CA); R v Chinmaya [1995] 1 Qd R 542 (CA). 227 P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 at 79–80 (CCA). See also Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595. Cross-examination on a conviction which, being spent, would have little impact on credibility but would have a substantial risk of prejudice was held impermissible in R v Barratt [2000] Crim LR 847. 228 R v McLeod [1994] 3 All ER 254 at 266 and 267 (CA). 229 The definition of the discretion in terms of balancing prejudice to the accused against its evidentiary value to the Crown is reminiscent of the balancing exercise which is involved in deciding to admit evidence of similar facts. Indeed, in R v Powell, Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 192 (PC) is cited in this context. But it will be recalled that in Australia this balancing exercise is not seen as the exercise of discretion, but as the application of a rule of law: Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528, discussed at [21080] above. In R v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70 the Court of Appeal said that the discretion should be exercised sparingly and cautiously where the charge against the accused was an old sexual complaint by a member of the accused’s family. 230 R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 (CCA); Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114. 231 R v Clark [1955] 2 QB 469 at 473 (CCA). 232 R v McLeod [1994] 3 All ER 254 at 267 (CA) (discussed by P N Mirfield (1995) 111 LQR 186); R v Taylor [1999] 2 Cr App R 163 at 172.
233 Matthews v R [1973] WAR 110 at 117 (CCA). 234 But see R v Harris (1988) 37 A Crim R 29 at 32 (Tas CCA). 235 See R v Courtney [1995] Crim LR 63 (CA). 236 See P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 (CCA). 237 R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340. 238 It might also be possible, in a doubtful case, for counsel for the accused to apply to the trial
judge, in the absence of the jury, for a ruling as to the likely consequences of a proposed line of cross-examination. The practical difficulty of this course in most cases is that the prosecutor’s application will be made at a later stage when the accused is in the witness box, and must be ruled upon in the light of the situation as it then exists. See [23410] and Carroll v R [1964] Tas SR 76 (CCA). 239 As to how the warning should be given see R v Weston-Super-Mare-Justices; Ex parte Townsend [1968] 3 All ER 225n (DC of QBD). 240 R v Stanton [1994] Crim LR 834 (CA). 241 R v Preston [1909] 1 KB 568 at 575 (CCA). See also per Singleton J in R v Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr App R 1 at 15: “it is only fair that the jury should have before them material on which they can form their judgment whether the accused person is any more worthy to be believed than those he has attacked”. It follows that the question is not the intent with which the accused made the imputations but the likely effect on the mind of the jury: Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114. See D W Elliott, “Cut Throat Tactics: the freedom of an accused to prejudice a co–accused” [1991] Crim LR 5. 242 R v Morrison (1911) 6 Cr App R 159. 243 Cited from “Notable British Trials” in R N Gooderson, “Is the Prisoner’s Character Indivisible?” (1953) 11 CLJ 377 at 388. The direction appears to have been approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal: R v Morrison (1911) 6 Cr App R 159 at 169. A direction of this nature is given more frequently than is sometimes supposed. In R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340, the trial judge told the jury he was sure they would not be prejudiced by the fact that the accused admitted to having been convicted of criminal offences. Later he said this: “When allegations are made against police officers, or indeed any other witnesses for the prosecution, you should consider who is the person who is making them and for that purpose you are entitled to take into consideration that he admits he is a convicted criminal. If you understand what I mean by that, it does not make it any more likely that he committed this crime, but it may mean that it is less likely that the allegations made against the police officers are true than if they were made by a person of good character”. In the Court of Criminal Appeal this was said to have been a proper direction on the limited effect of the appellant’s bad character. But note R v Longman [1969] 1 QB 299 at 311, where the court upheld the argument that evidence of the accused’s bad character has only the limited effect of neutralising an attack on prosecution witnesses. In R v Brown (1960) 44 Cr App R 181 the trial judge said to the jury: “You will not allow your knowledge of his past to weigh your judgment of the evidence given in this case. It is relevant only in your consideration of the suggestion that it was Wright who was the aggressor on this occasion.” This was the only live issue for the jury, and the case illustrates how it is often impossible to draw a distinction between utilising the results of cross-examination under the Act of 1898 to discredit the accused and utilising them to demonstrate the probability of the accused’s guilt. Professor Cross was indebted to the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal for having allowed him to see the papers in R v Cook and R v Brown. The above extracts do not appear in the reports of these cases. In R v May [1959] VR 683 (FC) it was decided that it was a matter of discretion, not duty, for the trial judge to warn the jury not to use his convictions to show the accused was a person with a propensity to commit crimes: but see Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 659–60. 244 R v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 at 420–2 (CCA). See also R v McLeod [1994] 3 All ER 254 at 266 and 267 (CA).
245 Practice Direction [1966] 2 All ER 929. 246 Cf R v Collister and Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr App R 100. See also R v Carey (1968) 52 Cr App R
305, deciding that, where the bad character of a Crown witness is made known to the accused’s counsel who does not cross-examine, there is no obligation on counsel for the prosecution to inform the jury of the witness’s character; it is a matter within counsel’s discretion. See [17130]. 247 See also SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1)(d)(iv); WA: Evidence Act 1906 s 8(1)(e)(iii). In these jurisdictions instead of the words “in that criminal proceeding” the words are “with the same offence”. It does not necessarily follow that co-accused persons jointly tried are persons charged with the same offence: R v Roberts [1936] 1 All ER 23 (CCA). 248 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 654; R v Ellis [1961] 2 All ER 928 (CCA); R v Ransom (1979) 22 SASR 283 (CCA); R v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 413 (CCA); R v Reid [1989] Crim LR 719; R v Maurangi (2001) 80 SASR 308. 249 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574. See Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 where the nature of this discretion is discussed. See I G Carvell, “The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(f)(iii)” [1965] Crim LR 419; earlier authorities on the same point are R v Ellis [1961] 2 All ER 928 (CCA); R v Stannard [1965] 2 QB 1 (CCA); R v McGuirk (1964) 48 Cr App R 75; R v Riebold [1965] 1 All ER 653. It was held on the former Tasmanian legislation that there may be a discretion: Hill v R [1953] Tas SR 54 (CCA). In R v Hoggins [1967] 3 All ER 334 (CA) it was held that Murdoch’s case does not constitute a new element affecting the judge’s decision whether to allow a separate trial; cf R v Ditroia [1981] VR 247 at 252 (FC). 250 R v Varley [1982] 2 All ER 519 at 522 (CCA). 251 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; R v Davis [1975] 1 All ER 233 (CA). Evidence is “against” a co-accused if it makes acquittal of the co-accused less likely: R v Hatton (1976) 64 Cr App R 88. 252 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; Davis v R (1974) 60 Cr App R 157. 253 R v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 (FC). 254 “May”, not “must”, was held to be the test in R v Crawford [1997] 1 WLR 1329 at 1335 (CA). 255 R v Bruce [1975] 3 All ER 277 at 281 (CA). 256 R v Crawford [1997] 1 WLR 1329 at 1334 (CA). 257 Metropolitan Police Cmr v Hills [1980] AC 26. See P Mirfield, “The Meaning of ‘the same offence’ under Section 1(f)(iii)” [1978] Crim LR 725. 258 R v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744. 259 R v Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106. See too Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633. 260 This assumes that no procedural point can be taken with regard to the exercise of the discretion in favour of someone who is not a party to the appeal. 261 R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421. See [17475]. 262 R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667. Presumably the co-accused could be cross-examined on this point under s 15(2)(a). 263 R v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 (CCA). 264 Except in South Australia. See [23230] above. 265 This latter circumstance forced the drivers in Metropolitan Police Cmr v Hills [1980] AC 26 to rely upon the fourth exception to justify the cross-examination. 266 Evidence Act 1977 s 15(3). 267 Evidence Act 1977 s 15(3). 268 Evidence Act 1977 s 15(3). 269 Evidence Act 1977 s 15(3). 270 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(3); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(3); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(3); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(3). 271 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(2) and (4)–(6); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(2) and (4)–(6); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(2) and (4)–(6); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(2) and (4)–(6). For Tasmania, see Evidence Act 2001 s 104(2) and (4)–(5).
272 Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 640; Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 51. See also R v
Howard (1983) 8 A Crim R 109 (WA CCA); R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 at [72]–[73]; R v Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114 at [37]–[44]. 273 R v Forbes [1999] 2 Cr App R 501 at 510. 274 R v Karan (1980) 26 SASR 408. In R v Hembury (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 at 9–13, the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal disapproved the course of requesting a ruling while the prosecution witness was being cross-examined on whether, if a certain line of cross-examination were undertaken, the court would regard that as making imputations on the witness’s character and would grant leave to cross-examine the accused on the accused’s record. 275 R v Dempster [2001] Crim LR 567 (CA); R v Fortunato (2003) 137 A Crim R 453 (CCA). 276 See eg R v Sarek [1982] VR 971 at 980 (FC). 277 R v Day (2000) 115 A Crim R 80. 278 Cth: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(6); NSW: Evidence Act 1995 s 104(6); Tas: Evidence Act 2001 s 104(5); Vic: Evidence Act 2008 s 104(6); ACT: Evidence Act 2011 s 104(6); NT: Evidence (NUL) Act 2011 s 104(6). See ALRC 26 [411]–[412] and [820]–[822], Bill clause 84; ALRC 39 [179](b) and [180](b), Bill clause 97. 279 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41]–[46], [55] and [67].
[page 825]
Chapter Thirteen Privilege
Section 1 — General — Privilege A — INTRODUCTION A non-discretionary exemption [25001] No discretion The court does not have a discretion to permit a witness to refuse to disclose relevant and admissible facts not covered by any recognised privilege.1 A witness may claim to be privileged from answering questions because the answers would expose the witness to the risk of suffering punishment or forfeiture. A married witness may refuse to disclose communications made to him or her by his or her spouse during the marriage. Communications between a client and that client’s legal adviser are privileged from disclosure at the instance of the former. A witness who is not a party cannot be obliged to produce deeds or other documents relating to the witness’s title to any property, and neither party can disclose statements made without prejudice without the consent of the other. These are the privileges are discussed in the six sections of this chapter.2
[25005] Exemption from answering, not from attending Doctrines of privilege in the context of the law of evidence are to be understood as an exemption which is conferred by the law upon a party to litigation or upon a witness in litigation. This exemption is one from the normal obligation of a citizen to provide the judicial arm of the state with the information and documents which are required for the determination of the litigation. The exemption is associated with but should be distinguished from the exemption accorded by the law to particular persons from the obligation to give any evidence at all in certain proceedings. This immunity from compellability or incompetence, discussed in Chapter 7, “Competence and Compellability of Witnesses”, attaches to a person by reason of that person’s status, for example as a
spouse of an accused person. The immunity to be considered in this chapter concerns the right of a party to refuse to disclose certain confidential communications to a tribunal or other person; not the right to refuse to attend before that tribunal and to give any evidence whatsoever.3 [page 826]
B — WAIVER Waiver defined [25010] Waiver illustrated It follows from the fact that privilege attaches to a particular person that the right to confidence4 conferred upon that person by the privilege can, generally speaking, be waived by that person.5 Waiver occurs where the party entitled to privilege performs an act which is inconsistent with the confidence preserved by it.6 A statement made to the police regarding criminal activities does not amount to a waiver, in respect to its contents, of privilege, when other criminal charges could arise from the statement.7 Waiver may be the failure to assert the privilege in circumstances where the failure is inconsistent with its continuance,8 or the [page 827] disclosure of the communication to a stranger to it.9 However the mere reference to a privileged document in a non-privileged document which has been provided for inspection does not necessarily amount to waiver.10 The consequence of waiver where it occurs is that the person becomes subject to the normal requirements of disclosure of the communication. It does not render the privileged communication unprivileged.11 Waiver in this sense may be express or implied; it may be deliberate or inadvertent.12 Disputes as to implied waiver usually arise from the need to decide whether particular conduct is inconsistent with the maintenance of the
confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect. When that question is answered affirmatively, it is sometimes said that the waiver is imputed by operation of law. That is a reference to the fact that the outcome may not reflect the subjective intention of the party who has lost the privilege. What brings about the waiver is the inconsistency which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality, not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large.13 An example of inconsistency may arise where one party deploys a partial disclosure for forensic advantage, while seeking unfairly to deny the other party an opportunity to seek the full text from which the disclosure was made.14 When waiver is express there is no difficulty except in so far as it may expose [page 828] associated matters. In the leading case15 Aboriginal applicants filed with the Land Claims Commissioner a claim book in accordance with his practice direction. This book set out particulars of the claim and a good deal of detail, historical, anthropological and ethnological, in support of the claim. The claim book was distributed to all parties. When the inquiry commenced before Kearney J, the Commissioner, the claim book was tendered but never formally accepted or rejected as evidence. The hearing was later recommenced before Maurice J but the claim book was not then tendered or relied on, although it was referred to in the examination of witnesses. The Attorney-General (NT) sought production of certain material which, although not quoted or referred to in the claim book, was the source of some of the matters set out in it. The Commissioner held that this material was immune from production as it was the subject of legal professional privilege and that this privilege had not been waived by the production of the claim book. In land claims inquiries the claim book plays a part similar to a pleading, although unlike a pleading, it contains more than the allegation of relevant facts. In the case of a pleading which is prepared by a lawyer upon instructions from the client, its mere delivery cannot operate to waive the privilege attaching to this source material. The
position is otherwise when the pleading or affidavit contains reference to a privileged communication, but this does not operate as a waiver unless the reference is to its content.16 In less formal proceedings such as those before a Lands Commissioner, waiver does not operate differently. The question to what extent the use by a party of privileged material acts as an implied waiver of associated material was approached by the High Court in terms of fairness to the other party. It is only where the party entitled to the privilege uses the communication in a way which would make it unfair to the other to withhold it, that waiver operates. Non-inadvertent discovery of a document for which “without prejudice” privilege could have been claimed has been held to waive the right to object to tender of the document in evidence.17 And use of a document for which “without prejudice” privilege could have been claimed in an interlocutory application caused the privilege to be lost at the trial.18 But waiver has not been found in disclosure to an [page 829] expert witness19 for the purposes of proceedings, or to an accounting adviser in connection with proceedings,20 or to the broker of an insured person,21 or by an insurer to an insured.22 Nor, questionably, was it found in disclosure in an application for an ex parte injunction.23 Where a witness uses a privileged document, including a proof of evidence, for the purpose of refreshing memory,24 this document thereby loses its immunity from production. Factors relevant in determining whether legal professional privilege has been waived include the disclosure of documents to a confined class of recipients on terms of confidentiality, and the endeavour to retain confidentiality (even where its assurance cannot properly be given by those recipients).25 Waiver is not established merely by a voluntary disclosure to a third party, for example for a limited and specific purpose.26 Thus disclosure by the Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory of legal advice obtained by the Territory to a member of the Legislative Assembly who wished to consider the reasonableness of the conduct of the Territory in relation to certain litigation did not amount to waiver, since this conduct was not inconsistent with the confidentiality which the
privilege serves to protect.27 Privilege may also be waived where the content of the confidential communication is put in issue in the proceeding by the party entitled to the privilege. In one case28 the plaintiff was entitled under s 2D of the Limitation Act 1939 (UK) to seek relief from a statutory limitation period “if it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed”. Section 2D(3) of that Act required the court to have regard to a number of circumstances, including “the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any advice he may have received”. The Court of Appeal was of opinion that because of the specific wording of that subsection a plaintiff who sought the benefit of s 2D was obliged, where relevant, to disclose generally the nature of the legal advice received and could not refuse to answer an interrogatory as to this. [page 830] The cases, however, show a marked reluctance to treat the party entitled to the privilege as having waived it in this way. It is, of course, not sufficient that the evidence in question be relevant to an issue between the parties; if this were the sole requirement the privilege would be worthless. The mere fact that a medical practitioner is sued by a former patient for negligent treatment does not amount to a waiver by the plaintiff of the statutory confidence which exists between them.29 Nevertheless, as was pointed out by Higgins J,30 this leads to some curious results and given the nature of the plaintiff’s case, the patient, if alive and suing, would be practically forced to consent to waive privilege and allow the doctor to give evidence of the diagnosis. Other decisions should be understood in the light of the practical considerations of running a case. An example31 is a claim by the widow of an employee of the municipality for compensation for loss due to the death of her husband allegedly as a result of the negligence of the employer. The employer alleged that the widow had elected to accept workers’ compensation and that the claim was thereby barred. The form of election executed by the plaintiff recited that she had been advised as to her rights by her solicitor before signing. Counsel for the employer was
permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff as to the advice she had received and to call her solicitor to give evidence as to this matter. It is important to note that it was the employer, not the plaintiff, who raised the issue of election and the burden lay upon the employer to prove that the election was made by the plaintiff with knowledge of her legal rights. Jordan CJ, speaking for the Full Court, had no difficulty in concluding that the evidence was properly admitted on two grounds: first, that she had disclosed the relevant part of her communication with her solicitor in the written application to the Workers’ Compensation Commission, so waiving her privilege, and, secondly, that the fact and nature of the advice was made an issue in the case when she joined issue on the employer’s plea of election. The decision is an unusual one since, from a forensic point of view, the mere tender of the written election reciting that legal advice had been received, would, without more, normally be fatal to her claim. Her evidence denying the legal advice could hardly be very weighty, especially if the claim for legal privilege were asserted. [page 831] This course, however, was apparently not pursued at trial, although the written election was in evidence. In these circumstances, although it is not possible to quarrel with the result, the process of reasoning which led to the conclusion that the employer defendant’s raising of the issue of election (as to which it bore the burden of proof) meant that privilege could not be raised to prevent proof of the advice is hard to reconcile with the decisions referred to above.32 The cases relied upon by Jordan CJ for this conclusion were proceedings in equity to set aside a transaction on the ground of undue influence where it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the person who had parted with property had done so after having received independent legal advice.33 This is because a plaintiff who advances an undue influence case puts in issue the quality of the plaintiff’s consent or assent.34 That quality, it was said in 1998, controversially, will ordinarily be affected by any legal advice received.35 The Chief Justice observed, “I have never known it to be suggested that such evidence is inadmissible on the ground of the plaintiff’s privilege”.36 The case is best
seen as one in which there could only be reliance on the cause of action in negligence if the plaintiff’s state of knowledge about her legal rights when she began her claim for statutory compensation was of a particular character, and in which she was thus acting inconsistently with the maintenance of the confidentiality of advice which was in all likelihood the only source of her knowledge on these matters.37 The principle has been reformulated thus: if a party, by pleadings or evidence, expressly or impliedly makes an assertion about the content of confidential communications between that party and a legal adviser, fairness to the other party may mean this assertion is a waiver of privilege.38 Another formulation is that waiver takes place where parties, whether in a pleading, an opening or evidence, [page 832] have exposed to scrutiny their states of mind, “being states of mind to which their legal advice is likely to have contributed”.39 Another is that “the law implies a consent to the use of the privileged material, or, what is in reality the same thing, a waiver of privilege, if by reason of some conduct of the party otherwise entitled to the privilege it would be unfair to the other party, in a way which goes to the integrity of the legal process, for the privilege to be maintained”.40 These latter two formulations have been criticised as too broad, having preceded the High Court’s stress on the need for inconsistency between the client’s conduct and the confidentiality of the communication, triggering scrutiny of the communication rather than the state of mind.41 The subordination of “unfairness” to possible relevance in the assessment of the inconsistency between the act and the confidentiality of the communication has been seen as producing an important change in the law; and it has been said that whether such an inconsistency exists should be judged in the light of the fundamental entitlement of the holder of the privilege to preserve the immunity of the communication from disclosure.42 Hence cases holding that mere denials of particular states of mind cause waiver are now questionable:43 [A]n argumentative submission that is responsive to an integer of the applicant’s case and defensive of the respondent’s position would not normally give rise to the [relevant]
inconsistency.44
Revelation of legal advice to support the reasonableness of a settlement waives legal professional privilege.45 But attempts to support the reasonableness of a settlement without proving legal advice does not.46 Waiver may be effected by the supply of otherwise privileged material to an expert [page 833] who gives testimony based on it.47 It may arise where an expert makes privileged notes but uses part of them in preparing an affidavit: it was held that waiver of privilege in all the notes had taken place, on the principle that privilege relating to a document dealing with one subject matter cannot be waived as to part and asserted as to the remainder.48 A statement of a potential witness is protected by legal professional privilege.49 It is controversial whether the delivery of a copy of the statement to other parties pursuant to rules of court where the delivery is a pre-condition to the right to call that witness waives the privilege, at least for the purpose of that proceeding. One view is that the privilege is waived because the disclosure is considered voluntary (it is for the party to choose whether to rely upon the evidence) and because it “is not possible to assert a right to refuse to disclose in respect of a document which has already been disclosed”.50 That view has been applied to finalised proofs of evidence and affidavits which have been served.51 There is a substantial line of contrary authority.52 The disclosed material, however, remains subject to an implied undertaking not to use it for a collateral purpose.53 The cases contending that the privilege has not been waived do not clearly distinguish between the question of the implied undertaking not to use material (whether privileged or not) for a collateral purpose and the existence of the privilege. When material is exposed by the party entitled to assert privilege for it, difficult questions arise as to the extent of the waiver. In one case54 the court required the disclosure only of the substance of the advice and not its detail. Clearly a party who refers in interlocutory proceedings to the fact that legal advice has been obtained
[page 834] and who states the effect of that advice does not thereby waive privilege.55 If privilege is waived in relation to part of a document or part of a conversation the court must consider whether fairness requires that the other party should be entitled to adduce the whole of the document or evidence of the whole of the conversation to ensure that the court is not misled by seeing part of it out of context.56 Furthermore, it has been suggested57 that, in a case where legal professional privilege might attach to a communication in two ways, the waiver may affect one only of those privileges, leaving the other intact. An allegation that prior litigation was compromised by lawyers acting contrary to instructions opens up the authority of the lawyers and hence waives privilege.58 It is open to a liquidator both to assert and to waive legal professional privilege on behalf of the company, provided the liquidator forms the view, in good faith, that to do so is or may be in the best interests of the creditors or the company.59 If in the course of pre-trial questioning by the police, a suspect goes beyond saying that he declines to answer on legal advice and explains, personally or through his solicitor as authorised agent, the basis of the advice, there is a waiver of legal professional privilege.60 Waiver does not take place where a document is handed over to be used for specific purposes on terms that privilege is not waived.61 Implied waiver has not been found in the provision of a legal opinion to a court in proceedings under s 63 of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) in accordance with rules of court.62 A legal practitioner may act as agent on behalf of a company in relation to a transaction in such a way that the knowledge, belief and opinion of that lawyer may give rise to a waiver of privilege.63 The disclosure of information in an affidavit filed in support of a claim for public interest immunity does not waive legal professional privilege, even though the public interest immunity claim fails.64
Width of waiver
[25015] Extent of waiver A further difficulty is raised by the extent of the waiver. Where a privileged communication is recorded in a diary note, this note will enjoy privilege. Where this privilege is waived, does the waiver operate to make disclosable only the note, or all privileged documents and other evidence relating to the communication? The [page 835] answer depends on fairness.65 A waiver may take place at trial as when a privileged document is put into evidence by the party entitled to the privilege, or in pre-trial procedures as, for example, where no claim for privilege is made on discovery or a communication is exposed in an affidavit read in an interlocutory proceeding. Hobhouse J66 drew a distinction between waiver in the pre-trial process and waiver by the use of evidence at trial. Waiver before tender at trial affects only the document itself. On the other hand, waiver by tender at trial of a privileged communication entitles the other party to disclosure of all material bearing on that communication for the party must have the opportunity of satisfying himself that the disclosure has not been selective.67 In the case before Hobhouse J cross-examining counsel for the defendant put to a witness a memorandum prepared by another of a conversation to which the witness was a party. The conversation was not privileged, but the memorandum had been brought into existence in circumstances attracting legal professional privilege. The witness did not agree with the account of the conversation recorded in the memorandum so the document could not be part of the evidence unless and until it was tendered as part of the defendant’s case. The plaintiff sought an order that the defendant make discovery of all documents relating to this conversation whether privileged or not, including proofs of evidence, instructions to counsel and any relevant document brought into existence for whatever purpose. Hobhouse J rejected this application first on the basis that it was premature since the document was not yet in evidence. All that had been waived was the privilege attaching to the memorandum as a document.68 The second reason was that, if the evidence was in due course led, then
the waiver attached to the communication with the solicitor recorded in the memorandum and not to the subject matter of the memorandum. It is submitted that this is an unduly technical method of approaching the problem under consideration. The practical difficulties raised by such an application whether at trial or beforehand are best dealt with by a careful and rigorous examination of precisely what is waived rather than by the application of technical rules relating to [page 836] tender.69 It should also be noted that waiver applies only for the purposes of the proceedings, or part of the proceedings,70 in which the privilege is waived. Thus documents handed over to the police by the plaintiff in a civil suit, for the purpose of prosecuting the defendant in criminal proceeding, remained privileged in the civil suit.71 Waiver of privilege in some without prejudice communications does not necessarily result in waiver in relation to later communications.72 Where “joint privilege” exists in relation to advice given to joint clients,73 each must waive the privilege.74 Where “common interest privilege”75 exists, normally76 all persons sharing the common interest must join in the waiver, so that while waiver by one does not automatically bring waiver by others, fairness may require this result in particular circumstances. It has been said that this “follows from the nature of the common interest privilege, with the identity of interest meaning that each holder of the privilege is exposed to the consequences of the acts of the other. If, in prosecuting the interest for the benefit of both, one holder waives legal professional privilege, fairness may well require that the act impact upon the other”.77 Sheller JA said:78 If in principle legal professional privilege vested in a party is not lost by dissemination of the contents of confidential documents to others with a common interest, I think that fairness, in many cases, will require that the privilege not be lost because one of those parties, be it the provider or the recipient, is minded to waive it. Once parties with a common interest have exchanged or provided one to another the contents of communications with legal advisers about the subject of their common interest, the question of whether the privilege is lost with its waiver by one must be determined by asking whether the waiver has made it unfair for the other parties with a common interest to maintain the privilege.79 This requires account to be taken of such matters as the circumstances in which the privileged communication took place and came to be
exchanged and provided to others.
The consequences of the principle that normally if the common interest privilege is to be waived all holders must consent have not been fully explored. Does a duty [page 837] to make inquiry as to the existence of all possible members of this extended category exist, and if so on whom does it rest? The court has no power to inspect privileged material for the purpose of deciding whether privilege had been waived.80
[25020]
Inadvertent disclosure
Waiver of a right requires an intentional act with knowledge, and the assessment of facts said to constitute waiver must be made by an examination of the conduct and position of the person possessing the right.81 Where a privileged document is stolen or otherwise comes into the possession of another party without the knowledge of the party possessing the privilege there can be no question of waiver.82 A further example where there is a want of the necessary voluntariness is furnished by the case where the document or communication is disclosed under compulsion of law.83 It will be seen that where a document is required to be disclosed as part of the court process there arises a duty in the recipient not to use the document or its contents or the information obtained for any purpose other than for the litigation.84 The essential feature of this principle is that the disclosure was made under a public duty,85 and not voluntarily.86 In general failure to claim a privilege is not waiver.87 But the case of inadvertent disclosure raises special problems. In one case,88 counsel for the plaintiff deliberately read out in court two paragraphs of a document which he wrongly but excusably considered must be disclosed. This mistake was not induced by the defendants and the privilege attaching to the document was lost. In other cases, as for example where a document for which privilege was claimed in discovery was inadvertently produced for inspection,89 or even where it was produced without a
[page 838] claim for privilege,90 injunctive relief was granted restraining the other party from using it.91 In England the test (leaving aside inspection procured by fraud) is whether the production was the result of a mistake obvious to the hypothetical reasonable solicitor, taking into account the extent of the claim to privilege in the list of documents, the nature of the disclosure documents, the complexity of the discovery, the pressure under which and the degree of care with which discovery had been carried out, and the surrounding circumstances; the onus is on the party claiming the injunction.92 In Australia it has been held that there may be express waiver where there is knowledge of the right to claim privilege even though there was inadvertence either to the correct principle or the relevant facts, and that express waiver may be made by a solicitor with ostensible authority to do so.93 In Australia it has been said that whether unintended disclosure works an implied waiver would usually turn on issues of fairness.94 Once documents have been disclosed to an opposing party as part of the formal process of discovery and inspection, in circumstances involving no criticism of that party, fairness has been said to require that that party not be disadvantaged in the use it can make of those documents thereafter in the proceedings.95 In some circumstances extrinsic duties may compel disclosure to the parties seeking to use the information, and in such cases neither privilege nor the equity to restrain use can be invoked.96 The more complete the knowledge gained of the inadvertently disclosed documents by the opposing party, the less likely it is that their confidentiality, so far as it continues, will be protected.97 The High Court has suggested that the advent of procedural rules and directions hearings seeking to ensure that litigation is managed justly at a proportionate cost calls for a new approach. The court said that where a privileged document is inadvertently disclosed, the court should ordinarily permit the correction of the mistake and order the return of the document, if the party receiving it refuses to do so.98 It also said that the courts will normally only permit an error to be corrected if the mistaken party acts promptly, that the relief might be refused if the party to whom the document had been disclosed had been placed in a position where it
[page 839] would be unfair to order return, and that no narrow view would be taken of the ability of the latter party and the latter party’s lawyers, to put any knowledge gained to one side.99 Section 122 of the Evidence Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW), 2001 (Tas), 2008 (Vic) and 2011 (ACT) deals with waiver of “client legal privilege”.100 Without prejudice privilege may be waived in various ways: see s 131(2)(a)–(c). There is no provision for waiver of the privilege against selfincrimination, but it must be capable of waiver, and hence the common law will apply. Under the Cth, NSW and ACT Acts, the privilege relating to protected confidences may be waived: s 126C. In Tasmania, the privilege relating to medical communications (s 127A) and counselling communications (s 127B) may be waived.
C — PROOF BY OTHER EVIDENCE Other witnesses [25025] Means of obtaining evidence As the privilege is that of a particular person or class of persons, matters covered by it may always be proved by the evidence of other witnesses. Where an attorney entrusted confidentially with a document communicates the contents of it or suffers another to take a copy, surely the secondary evidence so obtained may be produced. Suppose the instrument were even stolen, and a correct copy taken, would it not be reasonable to admit it?101
It was on the authority of this remark that the English Court of Appeal allowed copies of proofs of witnesses with notes on the evidence in a former action brought by the plaintiff’s predecessor in title to be used by the defendant.102 A confidential letter written by a husband to his wife but which has fallen into the hands of a third party, may be proved against the husband, although had it been received by her, the [page 840]
wife could not have been compelled to disclose it.103 This is because the communication, once in the hands of a third party, cannot be subject to privilege. Any restraint on its use, in court or elsewhere, is a matter for equity.104 Notwithstanding the generality of the quotation it is not correct to say that the courts will not inquire for the purposes of admissibility how the evidence was obtained. As has been seen, the privilege may be lost by waiver by the party entitled to its benefit. The case where the document, or a copy of it, is stolen or obtained by trickery, surreptitious means or mere inadvertence exposes a familiar tension between the principle which would admit all relevant material, and that which causes the court to recoil from underhand or sharp practice. The severity of this tension is apparent from the unsatisfactory solution adopted by the law to these cases. Equity will act to prevent the unauthorised use of confidential material, as when privileged documents were brought to court by a clerk of Lord Ashburton who, feeling unwell, handed them to the solicitor for Pape who took copies of them and proposed to use the copies as evidence.105 On the other hand, the defendant who had obtained copies of privileged documents was not precluded by privilege from tendering these as secondary evidence.106 It is clear enough that the issue as to the provenance of the documents arose in very different ways in the two cases: in the former it was central to the issue of breach of confidentiality; in the latter it was collateral since the document was merely evidence in support of the issues before the court.107 This distinction leads to the unsatisfactory conclusion that the decision whether the copy document may be used in evidence depends upon the form of proceeding in which the question is raised.108 Put another way, if the party entitled to the privilege discovers that the copy is in the hands of the opponent before the copy is produced for tender, and in sufficient time to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court, the party may be able to prevent the tender, but not if the opponent does not take the initiative until it is too late. This surprising result is not consistent with the modern approach of judges to assume greater responsibility in ensuring that the parties before them adhere to acceptable standards of behaviour.109 The principles relating to injunctive relief have been summarised thus.110 First, … the jurisdiction to restrain the use of privileged documents is based on the equitable jurisdiction to restrain breach of confidence … in order to prevent disclosure of documents
which would otherwise have been privileged, and were and remained
[page 841] confidential. Second, after a privileged document has been seen by the opposing party, the court may intervene by way of injunction in exercise of the equitable jurisdiction if the circumstances warrant such intervention on equitable grounds. Third, if the party in whose hands the document has come (or his solicitor) either (a) has procured inspection of the document by fraud or (b) on inspection, realises that he has been permitted to see the document only by reason of an obvious mistake, the court has the power to intervene by the grant of an injunction in exercise of the equitable jurisdiction. Fourth, in such cases the court should ordinarily intervene, unless the case is one where the injunction can properly be refused on the general principles affecting the grant of a discretionary remedy, eg on the ground of delay.111
The normal rules as to the grant of equitable remedies apply. Delay112 or unclean hands113 may prevent relief. The role of the court is not, however, to conduct a balancing exercise by weighing the materiality of the document and the justice of admitting it.114 The injunction may be refused where it is just that confidence be broken, eg that disclosure would reveal “iniquity”.115
Impropriety, equity and inadvertence [25030] Discretion The admissibility regime116 may be made to accord with modern thinking by applying the rule conferring a discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence117 where the document to be tendered has been obtained in circumstances warranting judicial intervention, but where for good reason it has not been possible to invoke the court’s equitable jurisdiction.118 This jurisdiction may be invoked where the privileged document119 has been obtained or copied by fraud, breach of duty of confidentiality,120 a trick121 or in circumstances which amount to an [page 842] unlawful intrusion.122 Furthermore the equitable principle will be
available where there is a breach of confidentiality in circumstances not involving impropriety, as, for example when the document is given up inadvertently. The admissibility of secondary evidence of matters in respect of which privilege might be claimed is in fact a further feature which distinguishes the subjects discussed in this chapter from most of those that are considered in [27025]–[27195].123
D — PERSONAL NATURE OF PRIVILEGE Appeal rights [25035] Limited to parties The personal nature of the privilege means that a party will not necessarily be entitled to succeed on an appeal when the claim to privilege by a witness has been wrongly rejected or accepted in the court below.124 Practically all the decisions of appellate courts in which the judge’s ruling on a question of privilege has been varied or reversed relate to issues in which the person claiming the privilege was a party to and not merely a witness in the proceedings. Many of them are concerned with the discovery of documents, or the propriety of interrogatories, for, as often as not, the issue of privilege is raised in interlocutory proceedings before the actual trial of a civil action.
E — NO ADVERSE INFERENCE AVAILABLE Adverse inferences and failures of proof [25040] No adverse inference No adverse inference should be drawn from the fact that the privilege is claimed.125 This is so whether the privilege be that against incrimination126 or legal [page 843]
professional privilege.127 And it is also true in relation to public interest immunity,128 where the position is even clearer than for the privilege against self-incrimination and legal professional privilege because of the role of the public interest. The practical consequences of a successful claim for privilege cannot, however, be ignored. It may be that the party who needs the evidence to discharge the burden of proof will fail;129 it may leave contrary evidence uncontradicted.130 More difficult is the case where the evidence, had it been given, would have been put against an inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence. In such a case, it is clear enough that the tribunal of fact might draw the inference on the basis that there is no countervailing material,131 but it would seem that it cannot be more bold in drawing the inference by reason of the circumstances in which the evidence was withheld.132 Nor can those circumstances ground a positive inference adverse to the witness or to the party calling that witness.133 If there is evidence other than the mere claim of privilege from which the content of the communication can be inferred, the court may be able to draw the inference in the absence of contrary evidence from the party claiming the privilege.134
F — EFFECT OF UPHOLDING THE CLAIM The need for justification [25045] Damaging effect of successful claim The effect of upholding a claim to privilege involves withholding important information from the court at the expense of what may be justice to one of the parties. It follows that there should be good cause, plainly shown, for the existence of any privilege.135 The crucial question is whether there is some interest protected by the privilege which is at least as significant as the proper administration of justice.136 It is, of course, important not to exclude the possibility that the law is [page 844] defective on account of its failure to recognise certain legitimate claims to
privilege, and not merely because of its protection of interests which do not merit such solicitude.
G — PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF DISCLOSED MATERIAL A middle way [25050] Two accommodations It should not be supposed that the choice of the court is that between the absolute protection and the unqualified exposure of communications for which privilege has been claimed. There are two ways in which the confidential nature of a communication may be accommodated with the policy which requires its disclosure.
[25055] The Harman principle Where one party to litigation is compelled, either by reason of a rule of court, or by reason of a specific order of the court, or otherwise137 to disclose documents or information, the party obtaining the disclosure cannot, without the leave of the court, use it for any purpose other than that for which it was given unless it is received into evidence.138 The principle applies not only to discovered documents139, but to documents produced on subpoena,140 answers to interrogatories,141 witness statements,142 affidavits,143 documents disclosed for the purpose of taxation,144 documents coming to light pursuant to an Anton Piller order,145 material obtained by a liquidator pursuant to directions made by the court146 and information derived from the documents.147 The principle also applies [page 845] to a witness statement which a party is required by the rules to deliver to other parties as a precondition to the right to call that witness.148 It is common to speak of the relevant obligation as flowing from an “implied
undertaking”.149 The implied undertaking is subject to the qualification that once the material is adduced in evidence it enters the public domain, unless the court restrains publication of it.150 However, the protection is not lost merely by reason of the document being read in open court.151 The duty of confidentiality gives way to other duties, for example the duty to give discovery and inspection, or respond to subpoenas, in other proceedings.152 It is common for a party, without leave, to use an affidavit or answers to interrogatories sworn by a witness in an earlier proceeding when crossexamining the witness in later proceedings, but this practice does not appear to have been examined in the light of the “implied undertaking”. Another question is whether an affidavit or documents filed in one proceeding can be used in another proceeding to impugn the sufficiency of the affidavit or documents sworn by the same party in the later proceeding. There is authority153 for a negative answer. To call the obligation of a litigant who has received material generated by litigious processes one which arises from an “implied undertaking” is misleading unless it is understood that in truth it is an obligation of law arising from circumstances in which the material was generated and received.154 Originally the restriction on the use of documents generated by litigious processes depended on an express undertaking.155 Then in 1857 Sir John Romilly MR, while requiring an express undertaking, put the matter in terms of legal rights: “It is not the right of a Plaintiff, who has obtained access to the defendants’ papers, to make them public.”156 The following year the protection was said not to rest on an express undertaking, but on a “rule” that “where documents have been produced in obedience to an order of this court, the court has a right to say to the person who has obtained their production: ‘Those documents shall never be used by you except under the authority of the court’”.157 Although in 1948 Jenkins J referred to a concession by counsel that his client had obtained discovery on an “implied undertaking”, in the operative part of his reasoning he did not analyse the matter in terms of “undertaking”, either express or implied, but in terms of an “implied obligation not [page 846]
to make an improper use of the documents”.158 And other judges have preferred to the language of “implied undertaking” the words “implied obligation”159 or “obligation”160 or “duty”161. Another formula is that the party obtaining discovery is “taken to undertake to the court that the documents obtained on discovery will not be used for any purpose other than the action in which they are produced”.162 Lords Simon of Glaisdale and Scarman said: “Imposed by law the obligation is formulated as arising from an undertaking exacted by the court from the party and his solicitor to whom the documents are disclosed. It is the condition upon which discovery is ordered.”163 And Lord Denning said: “A party who seeks discovery of documents gets it on condition that he will make use of them only for the purpose of that action, and no other purpose.”164 The expression “implied undertaking” is thus merely a formula through which the law ensures that there is not placed upon litigants, who in giving discovery are suffering “a very serious invasion of the privacy and confidentiality of [their] affairs”, any burden which is “harsher or more oppressive … than is strictly required for the purpose of securing that justice is done.”165 The importance with which the courts have viewed the obligation is indicated by the fact that although it can be released or modified by the court, that dispensing power is not freely exercised, and will only be exercised where special circumstances appear.166 The primary person bound by the relevant obligation is the litigant who receives documents or information from the other side pursuant to litigious processes. The obligation also binds others to whom documents and information are given. For example, expert witnesses, who are not parties, commonly receive such documents and information and are bound by the obligation. Documents and information provided to persons funding litigation will likewise be bound by the obligation. Those bound by the obligation have been held to include the party’s solicitor,167 an industrial advocate,168 a Scottish solicitor who though not qualified in the forum, England, engaged in the day-to-day conduct of the litigation,169 and a shorthand writer or court usher.170 These instances have been broadened into a general rule that any person who has knowledge that the relevant document was obtained [page 847]
pursuant to court process is as much subject to the obligation as the party who initially obtained it.171 Governments and their agencies are bound as much as other persons.172 The question of whether forms of notice other than actual knowledge will attract liability for breach of the obligation has not yet been expressly explored. The principle applies to criminal proceedings as well as civil,173 and also arbitrations174 and tribunal proceedings.175 Where the accused supplies information to the police (for example in the course of an interview after being cautioned) it remains confidential until tendered in open court,176 but the party affected by the undertaking remains bound as to the use of the document itself.177 The principle applies to material of a secondary character derived from the documents.178 The undertaking prohibits use of documents and information for a collateral or ulterior purpose not reasonably necessary for the proper conduct of the action.179 A collateral or ulterior purpose is a purpose different from the conduct of the proceedings in or in relation to which the document was disclosed.180 Examples of uses for a collateral or ulterior purpose are: use of documents disclosed in one action for the purposes of another,181 even where the parties182 and the causes of action183 are identical; leaking documents to the press in order to expose wrongdoing;184 using documents to initiate prosecutions.185 Examples of [page 848] permissible purposes are: adding new causes of action186 or parties187 or claims for interlocutory relief188 to the action in which the documents had been disclosed; applying for leave to cross-claim against existing or additional parties;189 using the names of wrongdoers discovered in actions commenced for that purpose to start proceedings against them.190 A party bound by the duty of confidentiality can only be released from it by the agreement of the party having the corresponding right or by the court. Hence it is not permissible to disclose the documents in order to advance some public purpose: a party wishing to be relieved of the undertaking in order to do that must apply to the court for release from it.191 But though the duty is owed to the court as well as to the adversary party, a clear and informed consent by the adversary to what is done will
cause the court to treat the obligation arising out of the undertaking as having been waived, and the court will not enforce the undertaking.192 The court will not grant a release or make a modification except in special circumstances, where the release will serve a purpose193 and where the release or modification will not cause injustice to the other party.194 There is conflict on whether, where the release or modification is for the purpose of prosecuting criminal proceedings, those proceedings must be brought under laws having a connection with the cause of action in the proceedings out of which the implied undertaking arises.195 The release or modification may be in favour of a third party (ie a party other than the [page 849] party giving the implied undertaking).196 The principles just described are not inconsistent with any constitutional freedom of speech.197 The remedies available in relation to breach of the above rules include sanctions against contempt of court;198 the striking out as abuses of process of actions commenced, without leave, in reliance on material to which the implied undertaking applies;199 and injunctions against use of the documents in breach of the undertaking.200 Even if retrospective leave can be granted, it will only be granted rarely.201 The coming into existence of the imp