Critical Theory and Public Life 0262060973

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Critical Theory and Public Life

Studie•in Contemporary German Soc·fa] Thought Thorna11M(Cart,hy, (.,,;n,;r,:1I J·1Ji11,r 1ne,,dor W. Ad(Jrno,Agatri;tf4't1ttrr111foJ!,';: A Mt://v:rUvp;,e TI, odor W. Adomn, l'rt1m1 Karl-Otto Apel, Undmtandtngand Exp/awJJ,ft;r,: A Jranv.,,ewJ.;,ntn.1-1-'ragrrv.JJ,v, Pmpeat,,e Ri hard J. Bttmtcin, editor, Jl(J.}}erma.1 and Modtrnity Ernst Bloch,Natural Law and Human DignUJ Haru Blumenberg, TheLegUtmacy of 1M Modtrn Age

Ham B]umenberg,Workon Myth Helmut Dubiel, Theoryand PolUtc1: Studiej in 1MDevelbpment if Crniad Ther.,ry John Forester,editor, CriticalTheMJand PubucLife Ham-Georg Gadamcr, Phtil.Jsophical, ApprenttceshijJ1 Ham-Georg Gadamcr, Rea.wnin theAge of S&na Jurgen Habcrmas, PhU()wphical,-PolUtcaL Projiks Jurgen HabcnnaJ, editor, Observatums cm "The spiritual Situatit.mof the Agen Hans Jo.u, G. H. Mead:A Contemporary Re-examination of Hu Thought Reinhart Kosclleck., FuturesPast:On theSemanticsof Hist.rAiadTmu Claus Offe, Contradictums oftheWelfareState Claus Offe, Df.surgantud Capualism: Contemporary Tra,efmna/,ums efW · could·occur only if a sense of a lea.iner's and teacher •· ", 1 u· \\uh. •ultembcr 191 Sl 6- One wort. th.at does attempt an empiriGllanalysis of political communication froma critia] theoT)· pcrspectiYe is Cl.a.usMudlcr T1sr~ rfC.O~ ~ew _Yod::Oxford Uoivusity Press, 1973). Mueller·s work.~ concams relam-cly little discussioo oft.he media. 7. CBS. December

11 and 16, 1968.

8. See my T1srUncmsaml War. T1ir Malia and Vidna.m (New Yori: Oxford UniversityPros, forthcoming); also Todd Gitlin. T1s, W1-oh World Is w~ Mass Media DI IN M~ "114 Unmaking rf tJu New Left (Bedeley: Unn-e:rsi.ty of California.Press, 1980). 9. Thomas£.

Patterson and Robert D. McClure, TM Un.setingE~: 1M MJtlrr{Telmsitm Por«r 1976).

in Nalitmal Po/ilia (New Yod.: Putnam,

10. Ntw Yod Trmn, October 29, 1980, p. I. l I. CBS. No.,-embcr 12, 1981. 12. One might object: ·-what about the editorial. the ·op-ed' page and the speciamcdpress of political opioioo? Doesn't modem American journalism merely differentiate news and political commentary?" Political conu:nentary ceruinly survives in the modem media. but it survives in a subordinate and restricted status. It is no longer considered the primary wk of jou:malism. It is banished from the front page. It also tends to be restricted to the ~ press. The Ntw Yod Trmn, the Washington Post~and a few other papen with rdati..,'Clyelite readers.hips have fairly substantial "op-ed" pages. most U.S. newspapers do Dot. and ~-ision. which is the major source of information for the mass public. places a panicu)arlylow value on political commentary. The ..op-ed" page itself is DOl unaffected by the growing unporuntt of the tcchnic:al angle in news analysis. 13. Benjamin Fraokli:n. T1srAulobiograplrJ and OtJtn-Wnnng.s(New York: Signet, 1961). p- 213.

14. Tocqueville, Dnn«Taq, p. 518. 15. In discussing the early Ammcan news media, I draw heavily on two fine studies: Mich:id Schudson, Ductnlning tJu Nnm C ~grnatics, CriticalJleSS, Pf

and Everyday Life

of substantive reasoning activities. In its mundane aspect en types · d 1 ' twe .ding constraints on reaso~g are eep y pr~ctical: it is not a the ~ f deciding what, according to an externally unposed principle · theory be done quesuon°te scientific me th o d (or th e like ), could m f adequa d . 0 ther of what it makes sense to o m terms of what can have a but. rawithin the activity · · un d erway. In contrast th eonzmg · · lS · detached pointthe relevances th at are constitutive . . f;or th e part1apant. . . The munfrorn . b b th. . preoce character of consumer reasoning can e seen o m its dantion with getting on with the task at hand (choosing products, cupa . hin . .c. • ) th th makingcomplaints, we_1g g sat1s1act1ons ra_ er ~ pondering abstract questions (what 1s a consumer? what 1s a rationally grounded validityclaim?) and also in the fact that it is carried out in everyday circumstances,in the marketplace rather than under idealized conditions of reflection and deliberation. Somehow consumer reasoning- like otherkinds of mundane reasoning-is able to proceed without benefit of cultivation of a theoretical attitude toward its preoccupations. We might be inclined to view this stance as a function of the ignorance of consumers. We could, for example, view this in the light of the common observation, typical of consumer education literature, that consumersfail to be adequately scientific in dealing with their problems, as in the following: There is a wide gap between the best scientific knowledge relating to consumer commodities and the beliefs held by most of the people. Not ~nly are many consumers prevented by lack of scientific understandingfrom making fully intelligent choices and use of foods, vitamin pro~ucts,~d medicines-to mention only a few products-but even ~e littlesaence they do know can be, and not infrequently is, exploited Y pseudoscientific advertising and sales promotion. 16 :ut ~he attempt to see consumer reasoning in its mundane aspect eq~es a different attitude. It is not a question of viewing consumer prac~ceas a defective version of scientific practice but rather of understandmgits exclusion of all motives (such as ideals of consistency and cornprehe . . al c nsiveness) that do not respect the primacy of its practlc oncerns1, Th . . . tical d · e paramount property of consumer reasorung 1S its pracequacy, its · adequacy-in-use to the practical contingenaes · · 0f the a ... activities f lh . o consumers. 0 beg e ~Jectionthat conswner reasoning in its mundane aspect cannot enlllnely · · fb · critical must be acknowledged. Here two notions o emg

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Peter Grahame

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critical need to be distinguished. On the one hand, the term .. may be applied to the cultivation of modes of resistance and oppo~~al . s1tton indigenous to mundane reasorung-part of the cultural compet .. . ence of consumers, c.1or examp 1e. Consumer cntlasrns o f particular produ and marketing practices seem to belong here, as well as attempts~ "improve consumer decision making" insofar as they merely provide remedies and improved versions of the same kind of reasoning consumers already use. On the other hand, the term critical may be reserved for the adoption of a special attitude that breaks with the apparent naturalness of such a domain of criticism and exposes its unexamined assumptions. Critiques designed to show that consumerist criticisms serve only to reproduce the victimization of the consumer seem to belong here. Such critiques depart from the relevances of mundane reasoning in order to propose alternative-usually philosophically or scientifically clarified-conceptions of adequacy in reasoning. The stance of these two senses of criticism is thus radically different, but Habermas's universal pragmatic approach appears to suggest an underlying link between the two since the orientation to unimpeded discursive testing that could expose the false limits detennining mundane practices has its basis in the acquisition of competence for participating in ordinary language communication. In this respect the move from mundane criticism to critical theorizing would require consumers to appropriate reflectively the communicative competence they already possess. But it would also require them to take up a new relation to the particular cultural competence they have as consumers. We must therefore try to do justice to the distinctive reasoning practices that are constitutive of membership in consumer culture.

The Domain of Consumer Literacy "The consumer" is such a pervasive and familiar figure in contemporary public life that it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves of the div,~;: sources from which this figure has been built up. In fact, we owe coconsumer" to several discourses, which, in one sense~ hav~rning constituted this actor-type but also continue to compete lil wfl authority over its definition. Each of these discourses projects ~ts; de version of the consumer and the world consumers inhabit. They JJl ~et public policymaking, law, public education, the social sciences, rnai

d:ai

~ atics, and Everyday Life . . _1.-.ess,Pr criucau•

gm

. . al research, and cultural criticism in a broad sense ouvauon . al. 1 . , and rn muckraking JOUm ism to e evated discourses on the • g frorn rangtn d anners of the masses. There are also diverse discourses · to w hi ch consumers tast~san call rn directed to consumers an d. m re 1at1on speafi Y. themselves to be the addressees. These include adverrecognize ~~ oduct instroctions and guarantees, demands for or declarations osmg,pr er rights, consciousness-raising campaigns, boycotts and other ofconsur:onsumer alerts and product recalls, and advice and assistance . b ureaus, ffillllstnes · · · o f consumer affairs, Protests, . ed by better busmess . . sh ows th at d ramatlze . consumer d1spens and newspaper columns an d te 1ev1s1on blems. They also include the burgeoning array of consumer guides, ;ging from the lore and scienc~ of ~sing a par~cular kind o~ product (the recent explosion of magazme literature. d1:ected to vtdeo ~d computer enthusiasts, for example) to ~e ub1qwt?us pr~~uct tesung and rating literature. The latter occupies a special pos1tlon among thesediscourses because it both addresses a mass public of consumers and routinely grants consumers an active role in the construction of a relationship between their needs and the satisfaction of them. In this section dose attention will be given to the use of this literature as an example of mundane criticism. In the North American context, the magazine ConsumerReports is onlythe most well-known example of a considerable body of periodical and monograph publications that share typical features related to the provisionof product ratings. 18 Our concern here will be with what it is to use a typical individual report. (The terms consumer report, report, ratings,and so on will not refer specifically to Consumer Reports but rather to any typical report in terms of the particular, situated comp:tence implied, relied on, and elaborated by recurrent features of ~~-r~port design. This will involve setting aside much of what actual, . ividualconsumer-readers might know in addition or otherwise, in vutue of an . Th _acquamtance with critical theory, for example.) • . vent e Working d assumption underlymg the treatment o f report use ure (Iiher e is · th at texts have a design that orders their· poss1·ble reader} asidea: ter~te) uses. The focus on the design of a text implies setting of the · notion of one correct, authoritative reading of a text in favor of des/gnea0 ~ a field of possible, sensible readings. Further, the kind · not one that is decidable . · · · sornepri ilat issue h ere 1s by mterv1ewmg · • v eged , ) is 1t redu .bl group of readers (including the text s producer , nor ci e to th e perceptions of actions of particular empinc · · al

f

d

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Peter Grahame

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readers. Rather what is required is to clarify those featur · o f poss1'bl e rea d ers-users. To b es of the text that project a commuruty . o th er than those e~ea actual uses may turn out to b e qwte · text's · · d · b d · uses the , order projects; its es1gn may e use or ignored or viola d teXts pirical readers. The extreme case of this can be seen in ,~ . by etn. thr oug h w hi ch th e text 1s · use d opportunisticall ncolage" practices ., · 'th · 'd al · · la · Y and tn way w hi ch 1s e1 er mc1 ent to or m vio non of its desi d a use. 19 Although the possibility of bricolage is itself intriguinf,~f~r not our conce1:1 here; indeed the _very possibility of recognizing counteruses pomts back to the honzon of use projected in and throu h the text's design. Our question concerns what it is to use the consum~ report "properly," that is, in accordance with what its typical features require. This will also involve a reconstruction of the reader required to operate the text properly, the reader who is a member to the cultural practices encoded in the text and who is thus its entitled reader. 20

s~;

The Discursive

Production

of ConsUD1er Advice

Let us begin by considering some features of the background to c:~ sumer report readership. A common feature of many mundane 'th · · ncem W1 col)rses that compete for the consumer ,s attention is a co this reexamining the alternatives available for satisfying a need. ofteodnts . . li e d companson . f specific prh 'dea uc takes the form of a direct or nnp .. eedTel within a product genre as means for satisfying a given n . · . eluding of choosing the best means lies behind many forms of ad:1c~,Ulbserved 0 both advertisements and product ratings. It has been wi?e Y tionto .. . . ch01.ces m re1a that advert1smg does not stop at mfluenang ew ones · · d d~~n this too),21 for given needs but both modifies present nee s ~ (of course, it may prove that other forms of advice d0 f nventional 0 example, domestic cleaning tasks mark out a spher~ cdoTypicallr · difecte · t needs to which a great deal of advertising effort is on theta0 11 · k but a d vertisements addressed to this. sphere d o not r ely. so he OYusewor .. ,, · · domg uflow cntena of adequate cleanliness used by persons ded as sp ded rather promote additional criteria that are often regar utinelY a~iag ..J:.. •.-T°Oes are ro deaJ.,.. b y other consumer advisers. For instance, penw..u duct's fr 5bthe pro ,, e to cleansers. The perfumes add nothing to ffi ct that a effectiveness but are used to warrant claims to th ee e

°

~Pragmatics, criticalness,

and Everyday Life

ors" (or lemon- or pine-fresh) scent will be obtained er as-outdO d fu h . . , an euect . then adduce as a rt er cntenon of adequate cl anlin that 1s . d .. e ess. 1 :_: hen claims are 1ll111te to more trad1t1onal criteria d r. W Even . , a s 01ten . d A common type of claim used for cleaning products . nus1ea • c . . " thin consists owmg. No g cleans better than X!" A littl riations on the 10 11 0 f va thi 1 . b _re robing shows that s c au~ can e penectly true without affording P useful grounds for ch01ce, for the proposition "Nothing cleans :rter than X" is fully compatible, in the logic of ordinary language use, with the propositions "Everything cleans just as well as X" and "X cleans no better than anything else." The first proposition does notrule out the second two, and all three can coexist as true descriptions of the same world. Yet neither of the latter two claims would be likely to inspireus to dash out and stock up on X. The first invites an uptake, albeitone based on faulty logic, that is clearly ruled out by the other claims.We might say that the first is an apparent superlative. While the first seems to say, "X is best," lying behind the exclamation is a disguised comparative, "X is as good as the others." None of the propositionsis adequate for grounding the conclusion, "Choose X"; at best, they ground the conclusion, "Choose X or any other equivalent to it." The relevance of this conclusion can be seen by considering anotherclaim with which the first is compatible: "Many products (but not necessarily all) clean just as well as X." The issue here is familiar: the advisers that compete for the consumer's attention claim what it is in their interest to claim while suppressing additional information required to furnish adequate grounds for choice. The consumer's interest in grounding choice rationally is thereby frustrated . . Consider,then, that "consumers" are those who must make choices m the context of communication situations with features such as th ose sketched.Evidently what they need is a rational form of advice, advice adequate to the tasks of choosing with which they are faced. The consumer . . • w hich consume rs can find,, . report furrushes a discourse m their probl • · a c1 orma t "adequate t ems o f consuming constituted within . 1 d' . f . lik ther kinds of advice, o the pract1·c the a con 1uons o ch01ce. Yet e o . robrleportform is not neutral for it constitutes consumers and dtberr P ems · · . ' . will inclu e at leastth m its own distinctive way. The typical report bl e foll0 · er's pro em asa wmg features: (1) a formulation of the consum . . all test!brloble_m of rational choice, (2) the provision of suitable, empd~c t~ · O f product performance, an d (3) ra tings' accor mg e cnte • d the c · . na b ing examme . ntena 0 f ' competing products within the genre e

160 Peter Grahame

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A consumer choice is "adequately" grounded when it can be Inad in accordance with this format. e What does one have to know in order to use such a report? S · · d 22 uppose that dishwashing liquids are bemg exarrune . One has to kno h .d d . hin h . C w ow to apply what is provi e wit t e ratmgs 1ormat to a recu task of everyday domestic life (washing the dishes) and how t;ent that information in the context of shopping, itself a distinctive practi: task. The report mediates the consumer's relation to both home and market in a unique way. To begin with, the consumer must set aside the folk knowledge he or she already possesses pertaining to both dishwashing and shopping. The report will probably assist in thisby debunking popular myths related to each. Further the consumer learns to separate moral and technical features of the problem. This will often consist of thematizing technical features of a product's use to the exclusion of other features. In the home "washing the dishes"is practically constituted through moral, technical, and aesthetic relevances. It is a question of who will be required to wash the dishes how and with what effect. For example, is dishwashing regarded as "women's work"? Is rack or towel drying preferred? Is lemon or another scent desired? The particular way in which these and other of considerations are handled will make up the dishwashing customs_ a home, and the handling of other considerations will make up shopp~g customs. One may be inclined to shop according to product loyalues, sales and specials, or the advice of friends or shopkeepers. The hold of these customs over the consumer must be neutralized so that "cleand ing" can be properly operationalized. Then the consumer can atten strictly to the product's performance features. . _ A shift in attitude is involved, bringing with it a new set of req~e rnents. Before, use of the product was situated in a network of rouunde . an d commonsense knowledge. Now, the consumer_IDay~biJlg practice ~ochange everything about his or her relation to the task of tlishwas•fied m o~der to make it more rational, more in conformity with th e ~~ofll version in the report. In effect the consumer is required to s~ ;ed to a g_raspof product use as something familiar and unquesuo. 0·cailY seemg pro duct use as a problem and as an occasion • for cri port reexaminin hi rn the re . g s or her practice. Other requirements gove cesbe · · concern is that performance differen form itself.· Th e ovemdmg .a-, ences establishe d · Th e testing • strategy used may be vane. d un til d1uer · criteria are found· If umerences ..1:ac. • • • _c_ mance 1ailto appear, add1t10nal penor

-~Pragmatics, and Everyday Life criticalness,

adduced in order to locate relevant differen th rnaYbe . d . . ces at make it "ble to organize pro uct ratmgs mto a hierarchy 211 E . n0ss1 b . . · xcepuons to r-. ocedure tum out to e an mvers1on of the basic p • . this pr . d h al . rmcip1e: where reiud1ce hol s t at re differences exist amon d ular P 'J pP g pro ucts of a genr e , the test may be used . to show that in fact th ere are no 1. rmance differences. Yet m the report context this "s . . ,, pen•0 . . ' urpnsmg of the testing and ratmg . findingserves to .remforce .the appropnateness . format by standmg as an mstructtve exception to the expectation th at differences permitting a rating will be located. while the body of the report prefaces ratings that in themselves might be regarded as the decisive feature, the significance of this preface should be un~erestimated. The ~eport body prepares the consumerfor usmg the ratm_gsby deconstruct.Ing the prejudices through which he or she had prevtously known the product. It is here that product use appears in its new guise, as a problem of rational action. Yet using the report is not a matter of repeating the experimental format of the test design but rather-given the rearticulation of one's needs established in the report and coded into the ratings-using the report as a map of possibilities for rational satisfaction afforded by the market. Following the report's reconstruction, one proceeds as if these(cleaning power in its operationalized aspect, convenience of dispensing, and so forth) are the product's rational features, and the local particulars-price fluctuations, location of retail outlets with stocks suitablefor comparisons, acceptability to the user of unrated product characteristics,and so on-are to be fitted to the deliberative procedures supported by the report's reconstruction. However, the point is not to use the report to produce perfectly rational action. Indeed the report could~ot without incongruity be used that way for very long, for even the ratmgs-supported achievement of a "best buy" can be undone by to~orrow's sale, which makes the same product available at ~alf tbe pnce.Nor is it a matter of using the report as if it were an advertisement for some best buy, although that might be tempting since th e report can dra · c as a commatize a certain product's superadequate ieatures lllendable l . Th 0 int is rather an . so ution to some everyday problem. eP b . exercise Of · . . d t mouvated Y th intelligent practical J.udgment, a JU gmen . e need t . . • ali · g forces. Yet 1t is 1 resist manipulative deceitful, rrrauon · zm d d a so a . d ' . f familiarnee s an satif; .JU gment based on the transformauon

?ot

°

sirn~r:ns

°

.

into a technically articulated proble~- The raun~:;

y

e textual culmination

of this transformauve

process.

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Peter Grahame

salience depends on the reconstruction of need and satisfa ti out in the body of the report. c on worked

The Textual Organization

of Validity

With respect to Habermas's universal pragmatic schem 'tl d e, one ,..,~1 observe that the enu e , competent user of the repon (th ""' who complies with what the text requires) has at his or her e~eader a discourse within which validity claims relevant to consumer can be h~dled. Thus the typic~ report ~ include claims to pro~~: useful, reliable, relevant, factual information (truth), to be in confonni with normative conditions of advice giving (rightness), and to be since~ and free from improper influences (truthfulness). Yet it is not just that validity claims are handled that is noteworthy but rather that the handling of claims is organized in a way that permits readers actively to take up a new relation to need interpretations that had hitherto defined their possibilities. The significance of consumerist criticism lies to a great extent in the production of counterdiscourses that depart from the marginalization of consumer judgment promoted through dominant definitions of consumers' needs. The counterdiscourses signify organized attempts at reappropriating the power to interpret needs. In the midst of the contest between producer-oriented discourse (such as advoca~ advertising) and popular consumerist counterdiscourses (such ~s Journalistic exposes of consumer problems), the consumer report disco~e genre has achieved a unique position by virtue of the special cl~ to advise it has won. The use of a consumer report to n:1~hal ~n propositions about a potential purchase signifies its cogruuve_1:15e~y . cogmttve . . aspect the report must d'1stmgws . . h 1tse . lf propos1uonad· its from competing claims to advise, such as producers' advocac~cial . . . t a u·on of supedeJll· verttsmg, as we 11 as the "consumer c hic " onen . an d expose., In thi s d'unens1·on the report consumenst. a d vice e features onstrates the testability of product claims and perfo~anc}-{ence the and the applicability of test results to problems of choice. a daifll to report's accountable basis in a testing procedure gro~ waYthe provide consumers with correct information. In a s ~ercial or reporting publication's professed lack of any ties wi th ~ess, Iri th~ 0 other conflicting interests grounds claim to tru st w?r th interest expressive dimension the report claims to act only 10 e

ch~al

...,~ ~rragmatics, and Everyday Llfe coricalneSS,

er. Thus it distinguishes itself from both co . . the consurn mmeraal mt r......rn pasitions, such as those of governmental age . erests and u v nfli . . f noes, that hav te the co cung mterests o the various P"'..-.: hi e to Ill edia . .... ues to w ch the however, the most distinct1· Y arerespnsible.. In my VIew, d . Ii . . ve aspect of eprt'sdann to a VISe es m the mteractive dim . the r . d . Ii nl . enston. The . htness of Its a VICe es not o y m the provision of inf; . ng ,, d " b. d" b als . ormat:J.on o m the use of a form th that is "correct an ,un Iase . ll ut b at at uires the consumer s active co a oration. The repon furnish req d .. b th " b. . es not a completed eas10n ut ra er ~ o ~ective,, set of grounds for decision.A concrete consumer deas1on cannot be arrived at without thejudgmental work of the reader, who enlists these grounds in weighingup the choices. The competent reader is one who uses this advice to enhance the autonomy of his or her deliberations. Unlike the instillationof prejudices typical of other mass forms, what is required is a deliberation that leads to individuation, not massification. Above allit is this design whereby the user's active collaboration is required that distinguishes the consumer report's special claim to advise. It should be clear from these considerations that the dimensions of validityand language use each have a different status within the repon form.Each kind of validity is not equally open to examination on the occasionof reading a particular report. In the expressive dimension trustwonhiness is stabilized not at the levd of the individual repon but rather through avowals of freedom from bias that appear in a ritualizedform in each issue as part of the magazine's identifying apparatus (often as part of its masthead). In the interactive dimension thespecial legitimacy won through participant critique does not vary in its essentials from report to report; rather it is encoded into the veryform of the report. While the special advisory relation ~f reader andreport furnishes a device for debunking other attempts to influence consumers,the relation itself is treated as stable rather than as some~g to be questioned within each report. Both the e pressiv ~nd mt · · · tionalized eractive characteristics of the report have thus been 111s t1tu . as.recurrent, ongomg . . . parti.n()"medium. features of the maganne as a re t> f It is th · . oded at th l e1 0 e mteracuve features that are actually enc ol the text · th · ed · vite read r lab . m at reports are routinely orgaruz to lll . blished d . . While trustworthiness IS sta . . oration in reachin on th g a eas10n. .thin .art1culru re e level of the reporting medium rather than w1 . p t stin . artdorts,. the reports themselves will include features (debunkirf. d1g: ino· ; rating d . li-1..·n nt o a t e, ev1ces) that support the ace mp ~u

d

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Peter Grahame

the occasion of a particular reading. Yet on the level of . d' . • • d" ' Jn lVId11 ...1 • the cogruuve reports, it is o nly m rmens1on that clear-cut · · of product cl .tests of validity are came· d out: th e c. 1actual exarrunauon characteristics. It is. no~ my purp~se _to suggest that this as=~d in the textual organ1zauon of val1d1ty m consumer reports is inviditry that asymmetry itself is somehow a bad thing. Rather the asymm~us, is a built-in characteristic of the consumer report as a concrete cultur~ form. However, this recognition need not prevent us from addressin some of the limitations of report use, both on its own terms and respect to broader critical concerns about consumerism. '4(U

wiJ

The Limits of Consumer

Literacy

Attempts to use the report's advice involve the consumer in a rediscovery of particularities that resist its rationalizing sphere of influence. Critical consumers will need to recognize when the advice directs them to do something they cannot practically do or do only at the costof producing unacceptable conflicts. Thus they cannot expect to reproduce the ideal situation of comparison depicted in the report, nor can they expect to impose a purely legal definition of the situation on those with whom they deal in the marketplace. They have to realize.that attempts to make provocative use of the report's findings are lik~ly to involve risks. Furthermore, readers, who had shifted their perspectt~e to take into account the ratability of the product, must sh~ftthe~ perspective again when they return to the scene of cons~puon ~ discover what it is to use the product they had known previouslyOcily in terms of its reconstruction in the report. They will have ~or~co\ ; themselves to differences between the potential for satisfacnon undp \ . . 1'ts a vie m the report and the outcome that has resulted from usmg en . . fu~~ m a parucular way. They will have to discover the concrete eed fied an · th e product they have purchased and the need to be sans ' • gly w hose character and intensity may now be felt even more P~-outine than before. A "best buy" can be more disappointing th an.a rather · f. cuon r pure h ase precisely because one now expects real sans a lerated than the looser fit between product and satisfaction one h~dulto 13ack th UC af. . m O er cases. The product I use is not ideal but par tingshas th home, what occupied a certain mathematized place in e r:oduct as at last become something that is mine I now know the P .,,crete . . f. in a co~• something that enters into my life and becomes part O it

p►

~PraO'fllatics, and Everyday Life criticalness,

o··-

short, use of the report permits consumers to w k a1•d' . th f or out a way, In . to certain v i iues at are part o the culture of co . relauon . nsumpt.1on theyinhabit. . Thus, while our concern has been with what the achievement of a etent user of a consumer report is, such reports can als b cornp . . . bl . . o e viewedas providmg a quesuona e bas1~for rational action. The sphere nstituted by the report format proJects through its relevances a co f . al . delimitedversion o ration action. Consumers must translate their prejudices(the sp~ere .~f routine practice in which they begin) so as to ensure the applicability of the report. On the one hand, it is consumersqua readers who achieve and carry out this applicability. On the other hand, it is the testing-rating format that articulates the relevantmodel of rational action to be applied. It is commonly admitted that the consumer can expect problems of application (normal, local troubles)beyond the report's power to aid or ameliorate. 24 Application of the report is a real achievement, but it is also a possible source for an exaggerated sense of being in control of factors that still resist adequateanalysis. Whatis provided for in the consumer report format is a deliberation regardinga codified array of products that all claim to satisfy the sameneed in the same way. What is not provided for organizationally, eventhough it creeps into the commentary from time to time, is the questionof whether the need in question is adequately defined in the first place by such a commodity. In other words, what is left largely unquestionedis the commodification of needing, which has already ~ee?worked out in such exquisite detail by the market that we recgruzeour needs largely through the product arrays that claim our attention.In order to address this broader issue of need interpretation, 0 ther kinds of discourses are needed, discourses that permit· moves excludd b · al d' es may d~ Y the report format. For example, ecologic 1scour~ b • ir~ct us to reconsider our choice of a detergent but not on . as1sof it th rn will be t0 s ratable proficiency as a cleanser. Rather . e conce av 'd · ment andthi 01. products that could cause damage to the environ ul ' noti0 s nught lead us to reappraise the wisdom of adhering to _pop ar ns of d d ons1der th relative . a equate cleansing. It may even lea us to. c . ash hecau Wisdomof a life-style in which there are fewer dishes to wal. se cookin d'rr tl We may '- s be dire g and eating are organized 1neren Y· . 1 thequct?d to moral and political discourses in which, for examlp ' estton 0 f · portant t 1"'n who washes the dishes is much more im

166 Peter Grahame

----

the question of how, technically, they are washed (with wh t . a econo and effectiveness). It may be a matter of reappraising the • Illy of dishwashing in the household economy (for example, qu::po~ce · th at d.ish was hin g is · '' women ' s work"), or of questio eSttolllng th e view . whether one should rely on corporate empires to provide the rel Illng th evant . . . . pro d uct array, versus parttcipattng m a co-op at produces or an production of a basic and unmystified product. Consumer repo~ courses do not tend to question the rules of the game in the wa permitted by these other discourses. In the latter, it is no long: sufficient to adhere to the consumer per se as the central figure for collecting an appropriate image of human satisfaction. Thus in a crucial way, the consumer report leaves claims associated with interactive language use unthematized. For while the legitimacy of the report's intervention is asserted, the legitimacy of the marketplace as an instrument of satisfaction remains largely unquestioned. The report encourages a deliberation about propositional claims, about the facts of satisfaction, but not about the correctness of the norms that determine that, in societies like ours, the marketplace functions as the chief arena of satisfaction. Indeed, it is this underlying accord with market culture that grounds the consumer report's production of alternative facts. While this failure to probe implicit normative claims suggests the consumer report's limits with respect to a broader view of satisfaction, there are also indications of limits from within. The aura of criticalness attached to the report is all too easily undone in the course of its application to a concrete task of consumption. The alternative. prod~: turns out to have its own problems; it too is a particular thing limited power to satisfy. The "best buy" may tum out to be t . . ul or chance. better than what was bought previously, by h a b it, imp se, th hope In this way, satisfaction will still elude consumers. For thern e be , · seern to for power to see through the market s deceptions may pular little more than self-delusion. They are also likely ~o e~count: ~:sion, 5 commentaries that remark on their foibles and mevitable . • a1ness holding up a ridiculous image of what all their efforts at the ul mentanes . . h ave amounted to. On this pomt, the pop ar com undone . . . . sumers are e levate d cntiques appear to agree: as cntics, con by their very preoccupation with consumption.

:tle

_cn:d

167~-----::-------:;--;:--:-:--:;---:-:-;:-------------Pragmatics, and Everyday Life

~alness cone

'

conclusion In one sense, the e~plication of a_cultural competence leaves everything as it is. But in showmg what specific power to pose questions is achieved by use of the cons~er rep~rt, we have ait:ea~y ?egun to indicate what is left unquesuoned. Uruversal pragmaucs md1cates the need to review the validity claims that govern not just manifestly distorted communications but also everyday forms of criticism. Following Habermas, we might say that insofar as the demands of consumer criticism remain focused on rationalizing the circulation of goods by improving the conditions of personal choice, such criticism remains committed to the form of life of possessive individualism. The consumer report user's instrumental attitude toward personal satisfaction even takes on an archaic appearance in the face of the increasingly public character of social wealth (represented, for example, in the growth of infrastructure-transportation, leisure, health care, education, and so forth). Although the model of private accumulation of commodities can no longer convincingly represent "the expanded horizon of possible satisfyingalternatives," the consumer report still locates the achievement of satisfactions in terms of the preferences of private individuals. In contrast, the increasingly public character of wealth, represented in collectivecommodities, means that the constant interpretation and reinterpretation of needs has become a matter of collectivewill-formation. In this process, free communication can be replaced only by massive manipulation, that is, by strong, indirect control. The more freedom the preference system has, the m~re_pressingbecome the problems of market policy for the suppli~rs. T~s 1s true, at least, if the appearance that consumers_can dea~e pnvatelyand autonomously-that is, according to monologicallycertain preferences-is to be preserved. Opportunistic adaptatio~ of ~onsumers to market strategies of monopolistic competition is th~ rr~ruc form of the consumer autonomy that is supposed to be mamtamed as the fa+,

0 .... § V,

""I

V, (1)

L

-188 Ray Kemp

. all all potential participants to the discourse must have e al y, h Th" . qu •t to use constative speec acts. 1s reqmrement ens opporturu y . . . . ures the equal opportunity to prov~d~mterpretat1ons a~d explanationsand also to problematize any valid~ty cl~1ms so th~t- ~ the long runno one view is exempt from cons1derat1on and cnt1c1sm. Thus the corresponding underlying validity claim of speech requires that all arguments be truthfully grounded. . . Habermas maintains that these formal properties, denved fromhis formal analysis of the rational foundations of everyday speech, alone guarantee that a rationally grounded consensus can emerge from practical discourse: ''A reasonable consensus can eventually be distinguished from a false one only in respect to an ideal speech situation" (Habermas 1973a, p. 257). Only to the extent that a decision is reached owing to the force of the better argument can it be argued that communication has taken place free from domination. A preliminary reading of the features of the ideal speech situation may lead one to form the opinion that together they merely represent an idealistic, normative conception for political discourse (Therbom 1971, Woodiwiss 1978). However, Habermas himself notes that it is doubtful whether the ideal speech situation can be empirically attained because of external political and internal psychological constraintson the participants. But this is not in fact a problem, since what is being suggested is that it is the supposition of the ideal speech situation:its ~se as a rational standard against which existing discourses can be Judged, which is important. In this sense the model of the ideal speech si~ation should be used counterfactually as a critical measure of the existence of constraints on communication. Fm

The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere _con~truct,but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally :de 10 ~IS~o~se.This supposition can, but need not be counteifac_tual; er e~en _ifit is made coun.terfactually it is a fiction that is operauveakly euect1vem. .the .Process of commU01cat1on. . '. Therefore I prefer to 5pe. 0 f an antic1pati f 'd · · uon alone is th on an_1 eal speech situation. . . . This ant1ap~ d consensus ~:r~t which J:>ermitsus to join to an actually att~sea critical stand d aim .of a rational consensus. At the same urne it a11 be called int:r ag~mst which every actually realized consensus c que stion and checked. (Habermas 1973a, P· 2SB) Before I attempt t0 tili' . atio11 to call int . u ze the model of the ideal speech 5itu 0 f o question and ch eck th e " consensus'' that emerge d 0 ut

°

89 · . of Public Heanngs, an d t h e Po I'ltlcs planning, I ~

o·1scours

recent example of public participation in the development of nuclear :nergy in Britain, I :wan~to .stress the follow~g ~oints. First, the model f the ideal speech situation is the formal descnption of those democrati ;roperties that the p~blic. sph~r~ strove ~o attain in the eighteenth d nineteenth centunes m Bntam. In this sense Habermas's model an al al . is grounded in ~storic ~ ysis. Secon~, th~ British public local inquiry system (of :Whichthe Wmdscale ~nqmry is a prominent but by no means atypical example) arose dunng and as part of that public sphere. Third,the ideal speech situation is further grounded analytically through Habermas's discussion of universal pragmatics: the rational foundations of everyday speech. It is the formal conditions of possible consensus formation, of practical discourse, which provide legitimatory force for politicaldecisions today (Habermas 1979b, p. 184). Fourth, as a consequence, we are at once presented with both a normative model for the conduct of political discourse and an incisive model of social criticism, which, as Habermas revealed in a recent interview, remains faithful to the very foundations of critical theory: "I need the ideal speech situation in order to reconstruct the normative foundations of CriticalTheory" (Horster and Reijen 1979, p. 41). We can now turn to an empirical application of the model, specifically to a consideration of the public local inquiry into the proposal to constructa thermal oxide reprocessing plant (1HORP)for waste nuclear fuel,at Windscale, Cumbria, in 197 7. This inquiry was held to consider several issues of sociopolitical importance, and the communicative process that took place at the inquiry may be interpreted as a form of practical discourse.

Public Local Inquiry at Windscale In June 1976 British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), a state-owned ~ted company, submitted a formal application to the local authorities m Cumbria, England, to build a commercial-scale nuclear waste reprocessingplant at their Windscale works. Several national and international issues of a controversial nature were being raised, and responding to pressures from several sources, the secretary of state for the environment, Peter Shore, called in the application on December 22 19 , 76, so that a public local inquiry could be held. . th e Windscale Inquiry was conducted by Mr. Justice Parker, assiSted by two technical assessors, from June 14, 1977, until November 4,

190 Ray

Kemp

1977

_ 100 days of inquiry in

all. The major objectors to the proposal

included the Friends of the Earth (FOE), the Town and Country Pbnnin Association (TCPA), the Windscale Appeal Group A_G),the Oxfor~ PoliticalEcology Research Group (PERG), and the Soaalist Environm . . 'bl ent and Resources Association (SERA). It 1s 1mposs1 e to summarize th many and varied arguments pr~sent~d a~ the. he~g. Generallyth: inquiry was officially held to consider the unplicatlons of the proposed development for the safety of the public and for other aspects of the national interest" (Parker Report 197 8, para. 1.2). It is important to note that it was not until these terms of reference were announced on April 4, 197 7, that objectors were certain that discussion of issues relating to the national interest was permissible at the hearing. Thus they had a little over two months in whichto prepare their cases. The inquiry took place as scheduled and was followed by the publication of a written report by Mr. Justice Parker on March 6, 1978, which recommended that construction ofTIIORP should begin without delay. By contrast the accompanying ministerial decision was in fact to refuse the application; however, this provedto be merely a procedural device in order to allow the House of Commons to debate the issue in the light of the Parker Report, for it was argued that a parliamentary as opposed to a ministerial decision was necessary for such an important issue. On May 15, 1978, parliamentary approval fo~ 1HORP _w~s obtained. Thus in less than two years BNFL had gamed pe:1111ss1on for its plans through what appeared to be the m~st democratic of available procedures: a public hearing and a parliamentary decision. 1 now wish. to examine some specific issues raised at the hearing and reco rd ed m the Windscale Inquiry transcripts which lend support to . the view that th e commun1cat1on . . ' process that occurre d at the · · was in fact systematically distorte d and that Wmdscale p ubl'ic mqu1ry th e subsequent d . . RPdid not ecis1on to allow the construction of THO l fl re ect a genuin ch d soleY on the issue and was not rea e due to the £ e consensus f th alyze O th d' orce e better argument. To do this we can an ts e iscourse that t00 k 1 . . .rernen of the ·d al Pace m terms of the four maJor reqUI nsus th I e speech situation, all of which must be met if the conse at emerges fro . . m a practical discourse is to be genume.

('Y

► 191 · . o 1·o·1sco11rsc __.I public Hcnnngs, imtI t t1c· Po 1· 1t1C11 pl11nn ng,

cornmunicatives what extent wer th " parti ipants at th inquiry equally able to T0 · to raise issues and provide initiate and perpetuate d'1scourse, t hat 1s, appropriate answers? To w~at. ~xt_ nt_ were they ~?le to make their arguments understood? A _rnaJOIlim1tat1onon th~ ability of the objectors to raise and develop their arguments was the1r lack of financial resources.No state finance is made available to objectors at British public localinquiries, and this proved to be a significant feature of the WindscaleInquiry where the main objectors had very limited funds available for undertaking research and hiring legal counsel. In comparison, BNFL,as a state-financed company, had much greater financial reserves. This imbalance affected the chances of an equal presentation of arguments at the inquiry. For example, when the inspector demanded details of alternative energy proposals that might fill the supposed energy gap resulting from a decision not to press ahead with the development of nuclear energy, objectors were unable to undertake the necessary research to provide support for their arguments. This was in part due to the financial constraints and in part a consequence of the fact that the question was being put only on the thirteenth day of the inquiry itsel£ Objectors had neither the time nor the finance to meet the inspector's request, and Mr. Kidwell for FOE stated that to attempt to do so "would greatly lengthen the Inquiry, and it is not something on which we feel able to embark" (WindscaleInquiry Transcripts, Day 17, July 7, 1977, p. 98). . A similar example arose with the question of the economic viability of the 1HORP project. During the inquiry the participants were led to believe that economic arguments were of central interest to the · her:;mg: · All concerned expended a great deal of time an.d effi?rt ~ p entmg their respective cases; however, Parker later deaded m his re~ort,on which the final parliamentary decision was based, that any evidenceof the unsatisfactory economic performance of THORP need notcount against the proposal and thereby lead to a refusal of planning Pernussion. · Conversely Parker argued that a financially profitab Ie PIant Would •• 'dence of n . be a much more acceptable propos1uon. Th us eVI · fie;1dcialadvantage would count in favor of the proposal, wher~as an_y 1 . disadvantage . eft ence . of financ1al would not coun t a gainst 1t. This ectivelyemasculated the arguments of objectors who had questioned I

I...

192

Ray Kemp

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THORP's economic reliability, arguments they had taken a great deal of time and money to research and present. Objectors were often at a disadvantage in presenting their cas because they were unable to afford to hire legal counsel to pres es . . f th ent their cases and undertake cross-exarrunation o o er parties' witnesses. This resulted in several examples of confusion on the behalf of objectors over the correct procedure to be used in cross-examination and consequently in their inability to present their cases unproblematically. On several occasions the inspector was obliged to offer guidance,of which the following is a typical example: The Inspector: Forgive me for interrupting you but this is not the time for making a speech. . . . I must remind you that the object of crossexamination is simply to establish facts. Arguments will follow.I know it is difficult because you are not an expert in the subject and the tendency is to bring in a great deal of argument. You must try and restrict yourself at this stage to seeking facts and then we will have the argument later. (Windscale Inquiry Transcripts, Day 8, June23, 1977, p. 3) This advice was given to Mr. Taylor of PERG, although similarwarnings were given to Dr. Little of Ridgeway Consultants and to Mr. Sedley of SERA. The point to be made here is that the formalized, legal nature of the hearing restricted the ability of all the participantsto make their cases equally understood. Although it may be true that all arguments were later given time for fuller development at the inquiry, clearly participants who were able to afford to hire counsel were at a distinct advantage in being able to present their casesac. th r . 'th less cord~g to e 1ormal rules of the occasion. Those objectors Wl tood· sufficientresources were less able to make their arguments unders Representatives Th · . to the e second reqwrement of the ideal speech situaaon relates d abilitY O f participants · · · erely all to discourse to express themselves smc . •oris

op:

to have _equal~pportunity to represent fully their attitudes ~d aJld on paracular issues. All speakers must be free from both mtern . quit1 exte1:°al constraints on their arguments. With regard to internal constraints it was argued at tbe J!l .•nt th h ' .1-.c..1accol,I'· at t e pro-nuclear lobby failed to present a wholly truUUUJ.

~public

pJaflJllJlg,

Hearings, and the Politics of Discourse

irairs within the industry. One suggested reas c . . of au, • · · • on wr this 1s the . t nee of a massive mst1tut1onal commitment to th b . ex1se . e un ndled de loprnent of nuclear energy, a pomt raised by Andrew D d local branch of FOE at the inquiry: u man of

~:e

I think the building of THORP will make the Fast Breeder Reactor programme more like1y b ecause ~f the momentum efhigh technology. By this, J mean the tendency for high technology to develop •th . . d b b . w1 out benefitof rauona 1JU _gements ut y its own logic. This is due to the vast sums of m~°:ey mvo!v_ed, l~ng lead-_tii_nes,q_uestionsof prestige which ~ake ~oht1cal de~1s1ons_like adrmttmg mistakes or changing one's mind, difficult or 1mposs1ble, and perhaps most of all to the human factor which here has two aspects in particular: a) the technology is so advanced that the only relevant advice that the government can get is from the technologists involved, and b)the technologists so involved are characteristically committing themselves... wholeheartedly and unquestioningly to the solution of a great technical problem. (Windscale Inquiry Transcripts, Day 61, September 8, 197 7, pp. 7-8)

As a result the fundamental characteristic of the nuclear industry that emerges is one of overall consensus, a state of affairs that is highly improbable for no scientific process can develop without some controversy and disagreement (Kemp 19 77). With regard to external constraints on the ability of speakers to represent their arguments fully, the evidence of certain parties was said to be constrained by financial and other interests. Thus, on the one hand, Brian Wynne of the Network for Nuclear Concern argued that the particular interests of BNFL in developing a profitab~e reprocessingplant may well overcome more universal, generalizable mterestsin reliable safety standards. On the other hand, John Tyme, forthe National Centre for Alternative Technology, stated tbat he was havingdifficulty in obtaining witnesses from two separate sources: ~hefirstis Government Departments and Government Agencies.J:Id~re, sir, We fi d h d th 0 0 tunity of prov1 mg y . n t at witnesses are refuse e PP : w are ~~: 1th_evidence. The second source, sir, is pnv~te ~s~on:acts assoc·g, sir, that what amounts to the ever p~oli~e~~ \rms from givinlate~ with the Atomic Energy Autho~ty are inhib~g lose either contrgevidence before you, sir, the Tnbunal, lesfut y (Windscale acts in mm • d or possible contracts wa Y in the ture. In u• q iry Transcripts, Day 61, September 8, 19 77, P· I)

I 94 Ray Kemp

-----

This leads us to consider whether actual witnesses to the . . were prevented from giving their evidence sincerely due to mqUJry ex:terna1 ressures and constraints place d on th em or if such pressures pr P . F II . fr thi s 1t . can bear evented certain witnesses from appeanng. . o owmg om · · · was notgued that the second requirement o f th e 1'de al speec h situation . . th h . . met at the Windscale In~wry m at t_ ~ part1c1pan~s were not equallyable to represent their atatudes and oplillons on the issues fully and sincere! due to the existence of both internal and external constraints 0: communication. Regulatives The third requirement refers to the need for all participants to practical discourse to have the equal chance to command and oppose, pennit and forbid arguments. The fundamental restriction on the implementation of this particular rule within the British public local inquiry context is the existence of the Official Secrets Act and related legislation Members of the nuclear industry can be prevented from giving evidence in public if their testimony is thought to contravene the Act, and indeed the objectors at the Windscale Inquiry were well aware of the possible use of confidentiality as an excuse to disguise issues and prevent certain facts and arguments from being scrutinized: Kidwell: My clients I must say will be readily receptive of a co~idered judgement by the government that some area of infonnauon falls within the Official Secrets Act if such areas exist. We may view with much more scepticism the claim by B~L_to confidentiality of information. It would not be the first time an mquuJ has found itself handicapped by unnecessary and successiv~ s;cr;z on the part of the nuclear agents. (Windscale Inquiry Transcript ' 1, June 14, 1977, pp. 27-28) Clearly BNFL and the government were in a privileged positio~: ' . .. . . . . ossess10 terms O f therr ability to restnct access to informaaon m their P . arid whether covertly or overtly, and appeals to the need for secunty ·srri t 0 th I · · · rnechaJll e egitimacy of the Official Secrets Act were a pnmary . the iJ'l· through which this privilege was maintained. Thus despite jble ' ~p~ spector s statement that "care must be taken to ensure that ui1)' .m fcormation · · d ale !J1q can be produced and considered" (Wm sc ded . ~~ T ranscnpts, Day 25, July 19, 197 7, p. 2), he nevertheless P

195 . . o f Discourse . ----:Public Heanngs, an d t h e Po I'1t1cs pJann1ng,

deliver a carte blanche to BNFL by restricting discussion of the . . safetyof plutonium con~amers as 10 ows: remember always that one there is an item deduct10ns can be made, and something which looks harmless in itself may be very far from harmless" (Windscale Inquiry Transcripts, Day 27,July 21, 1977, p. 49). The significance of this type of argument was not lost on Mr. Aylesbury, who stated for WA: "I would confine myself to a comment on our behalf that what is secret is not necessarily safe, and clearly on behalf of the Appeal I wish to expressour continuing worries about the fuel plutonium transportation, but obviously I cannot take up the particular lines any further" (ibid., p. 50). Clearly there was not an equal chance for all participants at the Windscale Inquiry to employ regulative speech acts since the establishment enjoyed the privilege of being able to forbid arguments through the device of appeals to confidentiality and the need for security, supported by the relevant legislation. to

cu

"

Constatives The final requirement of the ideal speech situation demands that all participants to the discourse should have equal opportunity to put forward or criticize statements, explanations, interpretations, and justificationsso that in the long run no one view is exempt from consideration and criticism. On the one hand, certain arguments were exempt from consideration at the inquiry, and on the other hand, certain arguments actually presented at the inquiry were either omitted from or misreprese~~ed m the inspector's report on which the final parliamentary deasi?n :,va~~ased. Thus not only did concerns for confidentiality ai:1dsecurity inhibitthe consideration of certain issues, but perhaps more important, accordingto established inquiry procedure, government policy itself :,vasexempt from discussion. Indeed some confusion did exiSt at the :quiry as to the exact policy position of the governme~t with respect r both reprocessing and the development of a commer_aal~ast breeder eactor, and it was not until the fifty-fifth day of the mquiry that the ~overnment's position was clarified. Even then this position could n~t · e ?ebated by those who wished to do so. Perhaps the cleareSt, albeit llld1re · ct d.iscussion of the development of government po1· icy 0 n these issuescame from Andrew Dudman of FOE, who argued that the

, I

196 Ray

Kemp

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nuclear establishment was confused about policy and was singlemind in its determination to achieve the fast breeder reactor. ed Finally, several arguments wer~ ~ither omitted from the inspector's report or, worse, misrepr~sented m 1t.For example, :ERG later argued that their evidence on maJor hazards and the safety nsks accompanyin the development of THORP was distorted by the inquiry: g The treatment of PERG's hazard evidence by legal counsel and the Inspector prov~ded us with a salutary ~esson ~onceming the workings of the legal mind. In the, perhaps naive, belief that the proceedings of the Inquiry were meant to illicit truth, our witness Thompson agreed under cross examination with two propositions: (i) It is possible that THORP may be made acceptably safe.... (ii)That the accident analyses carried out by him were not predictions of risk under realistic conditions. . . . It was not altogether surprising to us that legal counsel should seek answers under cross examination which, taken out of context, were convenient to their case. We were saddened that the Inspector should quote the same answers, also out of context and without their imprtant qualifications, in paras 11.16 and 11.17 of his report. (PERG 1978,P·

5) This is just one example of many similar omissions and misrepres:n· tations in the report. It is arguable, therefore, that the truthfulgroun~ of arguments both at the inquiry itself and in the subsequent pai:lia· mentary debate was hindered through misrepresentation and distorti~n. In other words the fourth requirement of the ideal speech situation was also not met by the public local inquiry at Windscale.

Conclusion The communication process that occurred at the Windscale Inq4 0 and in th e subsequent decision to proceed with the developrnent THO~, when analyzed in terms of the ideal speech situation,;: be said to have been subject to systematic distortion. Each of the d • ansgresse requireme t O f d' . ns 1stort1on-free practical discourse was tr anY m some mann er, an d as a consequence, 1t . can be argue d thatfalse assumed consens . fr om the deas1on . . was 1Il · .cact a fact 1' · us emergmg one. This may app ear to b e a surpnsmg . . statement 1Il • vie· w of the h .1d li 't S Olll th at a par amentary decision was taken on the issue. But 1 d ori b e remembered th t th . . was 1Il · c. a e par liamentary dec1S1on ia ct base

-}97~----;::i~U:~~:-;:;:~~~~~fn;===----------

pj;ning, Public Hearings, and the Politics of Discourse

the findings of the Parker Repor~, which contained distortions of events . at the inquiry and was . a. reflect10n of the imbalances and m·equ alities evident at the inqmry 1tsel( T?~ consensus_ that _emerged was an apparent and not a true one; legitimacy for the decision was achieved not through ~orce ~f th~ better argument but through the systematic istortion o £.~~mumcatlon; ~d those interests that prevailed wer~ not generalizab~~in~rests but those of state and capitaf in proceeamg, ~ eve opment of a mode of energy production ·aesigneato ower urncos s and lessen ~h~ possibilities for industrial action oy ffie wor g C ass. ~ UC ear energy is seen on the one hanct as. a poss1 e -ceclmicaflix for the declining profits of capitalism and on the other hand as a means for wresting control over energy production from such disparate but potentially disruptive elements as the mineworkers and the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East.4 It may be argued that the use of the ideal speech situation as a criticalstandard in such cases is an idealistic and impossibly demanding yardstick. I have attempted to demonstrate, however, that the ideal speech situation is not idealistic but is historically grounded in the criteriaof openness, impartiality, and rationality that gained importance during the development of the public sphere with the enclosure movement and formally grounded in Habermas 's analysis of the rational foundations of everyday speech. The requirements of a truly rational consensus are therefore not merely utopian and arbitrary but follow from historical precedent and from the notion that only with the promise of attaining an underlying rational consensus can practical discourse and everyday speech continue to take place success~~Finall this leads us to a consideration of the relevance of a cntical theoreticapproach to the an ys1so E well as other import3:11t sociopo tical issues today, For cntical theo erovides -~e ote??al for e~ lodin the myths surroundin ins~itutionalize .o inc~ deasmn making.Histo and lin istic analysis show that ub~~ heanngs m,!}' -:,~t be as o . en, im artial a.11dration as the are claimed to be'. the legitunacy ·· · · d ifs stemancall of political rocesses ma be uestione ~ commurucation enables the domination of particular intereSts . . . terests· T .ere as ' (of state an o caP,ital)over more ener alizable m Deena recent tendency in British politics.to justify controv~rs1algothvernment dec1s1ons .. . . them to be sub1ect to e in advance by cIaurung J ~utcomeof a public inquiry. Evidence I have presented would su:~e.st, owever,that this is merely another move in the attempt to depo ticIZe

annmiras"

~-J,.;i,,i,------

198

Ray Kemp

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the public sphere by appealing to the democratic natur . JUStI . "ficatory r:1orce when the I e. of hearings in order to gam . puh1: llC egituna such an appeal may well be suspect. C~early continued research~ of the communicative processes of pracucal decision makin . lllto planning and other sociopolitical areas will help to throw ~Ill ~th on the true nature of politics in advanced capitalism. Thus to ;1" light . . al th . . 1 h Ii · al rnploy cnuc eoretic tenruno ogy, sue groups as po Uc activists . ronmentalists, and political scientists should beware of the scientiza ~Vlof politics and attempts to. d~politiciz~ the public sphere through means as the use of mystifying tenrunology, bureaucratic rules, and the distortion of communication. The theoretical work of JiirgenHahennas provides a form of social criticism that guards against these possibilities and reaffirms the need for rational, truly democratic political decision making by enabling the demystification of the interested, ideological constraints and conditions that surround public hearings.

!:

Notes Many thanks to the Town and Country Planning Association for allowing me to have ace~ their transcripts of the Windscale Inquiry and to the University of Wales for financial support. Thanks also to Karin Schubert for her assistance with translations and to John Forester for some useful comments and criticisms. to

1. See, for example, Guardian, December 19, 1979; Western Mail, June 27, 1979. On PWR development in Britain see Kemp et al. (1984) and Purdue et al. (1984).

Pl~!

2. Evidence was given to the Galloway Hills People's Inquiry by the Town and Co~try. Association: Town and Country Planning {June 1980), pp. 49, 200-203. The m3:111 ob~ecnofthe the fo?°al public local inquiry was that the terms of reference excluded ~y d15cussio;cation dumpmg of nuclear waste and its ramifications. The inquiry was to consider an app for test drilling and nothing more. . ~~ 3· Amstein O971) has developed a ladder of citizen participation, of which tokeniSrn15 a element. . carnpbeU 4· This has become clear from the revealing lealc. of cabinet minutes, quote;;ter: "(fhe 0 9 80). The following statement is attributed to David Howell, the energy (' 1wouldhave nu clear ) programme would not reduce the long term requirement r: it the dangers ,or coal. · But frorn ~ th e ~dvan_tageo~ remo~g a substantial proportion of electricity pr~?ucuon bell l 980, P· 468 of d 15rupt1on by mdustnal action by coal miners or transport workers (Carnp

References floyt1I

l ofthe

AmStein, S., 19 71. "A Ladder of Citizen Paticipation in the United States." Jou.ma Town Planning Institute 57:176-182.

--~c plaJ1I1J.I1g, P

Hearings, and the Politics of Discourse

•A 1977. "Energy and Form: The Windscale File." Town and Country Planning (Nove m b er.)· /\5h,in-, 469-477, 9_ Arguments far Socialism. London: Jonathan Cape. Benn, T., 197

_ Windscale Fallout: A Primer far the Age efNuclear Contruversy. Hannondsworth: Breach, I ·• 1978 penguin77_ "Nuclear Civil War." New Statesman, November 4, pp. 603-604. Bug!er, J•• 19 BugIer, J••

1978a. "The Windscale Verdict." New Statesman, March 10, pp. 309-310.

Bugler, J, 1978b. "Windscale:

A Case Study in Public Scrutiny." New Society, July 27, pp.

183-186. Campbell, c., 1980. "The Nuclear Cage." New Statesman, March 28, pp. 464-469. Cooke, P. N., and R. V. Kemp, 1980. "Normative Structures: Their Role in the Analysis of Communicative Content in Public Policy-Making." Department of Town Planning Working Paper No. 3. Cardiff: University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology. Curtler, W. H. R., 1920. The Enclosure and Redistribution Dreitzel, H. P., ed., 1970. Recent Sociology, Number

efOur

Land. Oxford: Clarendon.

2. New York: Macmillan.

Elliot,D., P. Coyne, M. George, and R. Lewis, 1978. The Politics Ona two-prang ed analysis. To show t at t e po .Uc -economic structure understood as a communications structure, 1s systematically butun~ necessarily distorted, first he must develop an answer to the question "distor.teq from what?" His the~ry of "universal pragmatics," discuss~ --b~low, addresses this problem. Secondly, the critjcal communications theory must suggest how existing social and political-economicrelations actually operate as distorted communications, obscuring issues,manipulating trust c~nseni:. t'Yi~_!ing_factand possibility. Habennas nasdevoted less·attention to this second problem (the empiricalresearch into these systematic distortions of communication) than he hasto preparing the groundwork for such research. Tables I and 2, though (presented and discussed later in this article), identify basic typesof distorted communication which subvert understanding and knowledge at face-to-face, organizaffi5hal,and political-economic or structuralleveb of analysis."Ihe-power of Habermas's work is to cany fmwarJ!.the classicalMarxian "critique of ideology" into a subtle ind refinedanalys~ of the structurally, systematically distorted communication and language-use which constitute, mediate, and take expression in the concrete, historical social relations of production, politics, and cul~e. Although these paragraphs have provided only a simplified ovefVleW of Habermas's communications theory, some of the finer pointscan now be elaborated and applied to planning practice.

ancl

P~g Action

Practice as Attention-Shaping: Communicative

. ~ p~acuce any action works not only as a tool but also as a pro ut shapmg expectations. Planners may be effective not because thedy words on pa per, b ut b ecause they may alter expectauon · s by 0the so. Th~ planner's formality may tell a city resident more th~,(lts; actual m£ · · · cov>· . _onnation provided. The ualit. of the ,.,.....-nrnunican~on oO• without it t hni 1 . . d and c . ' ec ca mformation would never be tru ste ' rkj(I erat1on woul . . rr rivewo e. With no one listening, euec __,,,trnrnlG';;'~~:::-:~e:_;un~p~o~s~s1~ e P anrungo ce woul · d hal )of Consid l gnn to a t. d gro\.lP a prop edrah oc~ planner's description (to a neighborhooth prolt ose s oppm , 'bes e . g in d . g center project. If he or she descn eth111 pre .ommantly . will e soril , se d agail1' diffe th economic terms the audience rent an if it . d . . , .. J\!l is escnbed m mostly political tertnS· fu

kg

~Th ry and Planning Practice critical eo

uld see something different if he or she describes th . . . e project 1fdomg a Sunday supplement bout the proposed shoppmg center. But each of these des • ,.; storya . . cnpuons d be about the same proJect. Which account should be • ;> woul uld b b 1· d;>7 h · given. which account s~o . e e 1eve . , C o~ces must inevitably be made. The probl~m 1s this:_the _planners_ ordma~ descri tion of a project (orof a rneetmg, of ~hat_ someone said, etc.) 1sa c~~~~~~ative action in itself.Like all action, 1t depends upon intentions and interests, and ~~dience. Without an audience, the description would be like a playon opening night when no one came, an·d it would be absolutely uninteresting and worthless, almost by definition, without intentions and interests setting it up. But with interests making something worth describing,intentions ma.king the describing worth doing, and an audience to listen, the planner's description of a project may actually help get ordinary work done. Planners do much more than describe, of course. They warn others ofproblems; they present information to other staff (and neighborhood residents,developers, and others); they suggest new ideas; they agree to perform certain tasks or meet at certain times; they argue for particularefforts; they report relevant events; they offer opinions; and they comment upon ideas and proposals for action. These are only a fewof the minute, essentially pragmatic, communicative acts which planners perform all the time. These acts are the "atoms" out of whichany bureaucratic, social, or political action is constructed. When they are verbal, we can call these acts "speech acts. " 8 If these social acts were not possible, we couldn't even ask one another "what did the project sponsor say?" Precisely because such communicative acts are effective, the phrase "watch out-he doesn't like planners" has meaning.The pragmatic meaning is: you watch out. 9 Without th ese elementallycommunicative acts, the intelligibility and common sense of~urordinary social world could not exist. Planning problems would be mexp .bl . 1.ble. i o ressi e; practical action would be 1mposs . . actions . These are a t the heart . of the . . . elementary commurucatlve 0 P ss1bility0 f any ordinary, cooperative wor kin g re 1a tionships m . everyda lir . d. c1ety gen· e all Y ie, m planning in political movements, an m so . c:rny.fiCommunicative a~ts are fundamental to practical life; tbey .,,e rst w· h din common sense, no h · It out them there is no understan g, no h d s ared b . fl. i I Without s are ' asis even for disagreement or con ict.

theywO . . in thernost sunple ordmary lan~age-as

~20~8---------------~

John forester

tructured communicative abilities (i.e., "communi . commonly s bl "H 11 ,, d cauve ") we would not be a e to say e o an be understOOd competence " . , . And the planner would not be able to say, The ~eetmg s Wednesday at ?:SO-come prepared" and b~ understood either. These commu. •cative acts are ordinary, often JUSt taken for granted, but theyar ru , h e politically potent as well. 12 The planners speec acts perfonn both technical and political work.

From Enabling Rules to Organizing Practices Enabling Rules These essential communicative acts of ordinary planning practicedon't just happen. They do not grow automatically from natural conditions. They are not biological. They are social actions, workin throuh languages we can _3>~ak~ Words an n01ses don't just come from our mouths; we speak. We tell, or ask, or promise, or greet,or argue. We act. And when we speak, we don't just make noises,we participate in a structured form of social action, which is already normative and rule-structured. 13 And it's not up to us to decidewhether or not we want to follow the rules of ordinary language use-if we want someone else to understand what we say, what we promise,or warn of, or call attention to, or ask. If we want to tell someonetb~t ~ project review meeting is likely to be especially important, wecant Just make up a special word to get the point across-we must try hard to say what we mean, using the language, and whatever fraille of re~erence we share. If we want to be understood when we s~~1ak practically r h) th rwe5 . ' we must 1ollow (or put into use or work throug e 't ' structunng O d · -won b h r mary1anguage-or what we really mean to say ot e w at anyone listenin thinks rul here aren restrictions; the g we mean. The es 14 rheY h 1 Y enable us to know what one another means,_ to 1y e p me know th t " 1 ,, . 't like mean " , all a P ease check out the proposal 1sn . ally' we re done w'th. "Hi • grnauc 1 though th it. We can commurucate pra . •pate, ere are ex . d anuo d when speakin ceptions-:- because we presuppose ~ fi Uowe 0 th in real life.16 g, at a set of implicit rules will ordinarily be We ordinarily (bu 1, t not always!) try and expect others:

209 ~Th

. Pr · ry and Planmng acttce cnncal eo

speakcomprehensibly; if we didn't ordinarily presuppose this norm :~ ~e in effect, we'd expect babble and never listen; _ to speaksincerely;if we di~ not presuppose this norm, generally, 2 we'd never trust a_nrone we listened to-or even trust that we could checkwith someone else to see what was really meant; 18 in c?nte~t; we don't expect building developers 3. to speaklegitimately, to give biblical interpretations ~ front of the Planning Commission or clergy to propose planned urut developments before their congregations;and 4. to speakthetruth;if we didn't generally presuppose this norm, we'd never believe anything we heard, even if we had no doubt of the speaker's sincerity, if we knew the best of intentions were involved. We'd never be able to check or test the truth of a story or hypothesis if we generally expected falsehood to pervade communication. Only by presupposing and mutually fostering this norm of "truth" do we make it possible for each other to tell the difference between reality and ideology, between fact and sheer fantasy. Those skeptical about this norm of truth might consider if they presume less when they speakof the realities of poverty, sexism, or cruelty. (Of course exceptions to the generally presupposed norm exist. We can lie, but even the lie onlyworks because the listener is ordinarily bound by the norm to .expect truthfulness in ordinary communication.) These norms of pragmatic communication are usually taken for granted. They are part of the subtle foundations of common sense. If we violate them, or when we do, we face puzzlement, mistrust, anger, and disbelief.19 As these pragmatic norms are broken, our shared experience and our social and political world disintegrate.20 ~ese problems have special importance in planning for two reasons. Frrst' _smce · · the planners often have little formal power or authonty, effectivenessof their communicative acts becomes all the more im~rtant. Second, planners serving the public face particular special, :vate, or class interests (e.g., corporate development inte:ests) which Y.Work systematically to violate these norms of ordinary com· group snowed Inllnicatio b n. Planners then face the results; a commuruty ] a developer'sconsultant, an inquisitivecitizenconfused by apparently necessary" b . . ganiz . pu lie works cutbacks, a working-class commuruty oration led to accept delays as wealthier neighborhoods receive

---cl=~~

210

John Forester

more attention from city government. Planning staff to anticipate the practicaJ effects not only of the need municative actions of others, but of their own communicativ~ ~mas well. Practices Meaning More (in Practice) Than Intended

Whe~ pl~er~ tell a n~ighborhood group about a proposed project, thel._!IleVltabl ~ommurucate more than they intend." They may lapse mto bureaucr~uc lan~age and so confuse ancl mystifypeople.ttThey may present mformauon but have no way of knowing what it will really mean to the audience. They may be trying to please, but their professional or formal manner may lead residents to doubt their sincerity. Pragmatically effective communication is never guaranteed.~ The four norms of "universal pragmaticsn are just that: they are pragmatic guides and standards for practice. 1H As they are violated,,}. mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation wilrsiilfer. We can take ese four norms o or ary commurucauon, our universallypresupposed pragmatic abilities, and pose them, then, as practical questions for planning practice. I. Is the planner's communication comprthtnsiblt,so others can under-stand what in fact is happening around them or to them.?

t.r::

2. Is the planner's communication offered sinctrtlyan~ uttered faith, or are the listeners being manipulated, tmsled, foo

misguided? , , role 3. Is the planner's communication legitimat,.gi~en the.~h.ui-ne\~ter and the participation of other interested J>t:u·tt s, or 18 theef tells~ taking advantage of professional status unflurly (If 1 plrutn to live . . • b . "vou 11have l d~ve lo~er o~ community o~garuzation 1n .1,,_ .' - '((}fe~atllPe, with tlus design, there's nothmg you an do, tlus tn._t be, a personal judgment in prof essionnl cloth~s.) . b t onit< b r ~ tt ,e , 4. Is the planner's comm uni ation tr t? Con t' e ie_ f the sitU3uo» 0 Is th re evidence supporting· it? What do th r ~unt , h theY'C3.1' 11 say? Are the listeners b ing oJ=reredinfonn,iti n up n a11v? . . . f' . .1 •u.,. 1• unintrnuon J a t, Or are they b-elflg• tl11Sll1 rtnt.'u& 1\ \\IC:'v"--

-'!~

V:'

~Th criucal

ory and Planning Pra.cricc

c

. al Distortions of Communication: Political Costs d . m corrective Strategies ~~~

aining or other adversarial situations, for example 1 In barg " ll h h , p anners won'tbe expected to te t e w ole truth, and nothing but the truth.,, Whenplanners must present arguments as advocates for a particular roposal,or when they must argue for budgetary needs, others ma p . · d'1scussedabove to bey expect the or d'mary norms o f comm~mcatton violatedby the planners, but they will also expect (in order to compensate)to be able to check what the planners say with others, e.g., friendsor contacts in other agencies whom they expect not to violate thesebasic norms. 25 This latter expectation makes any checking possible.26 Thus, in those conventional situations when bargaining or adversarialbehavior is expected to result in exaggeration, mistruth, or misrepresentation, the ordinary pragmatic norms nevertheless make possiblecompensating checking strategies which protect us from being misled,from "being snowed." In these situations, the four questions come more, of om rehensibilit , sincerit 1 ~ tima , and t we are generally to trust and rely upon ra er an ess, important. plannersas responsible public servants, it will be crucial to know not onlywhen and why insincerity and falsehood may at times be justified, but also to know what results such practices have.27 These questions are particularly important because of the bureaucratic and political pressuresoperating upon planners: 28 planners will often feel com elled to be less frank or o en than thex.,rru t w1s~,but then the should ot e surprised when they find members o~ the p~lic at times . · - susp1c1ous re , or an ese four· questions ask how the four norms of ordinary comm~cation are met or violated in planning practice, but this is only ~ slightbeginning. The planners' distortions are certainly no more ~por~t or influential than the systematic structural dist0rtio~s 0 ~ :mm~cation which planners and their clients both face. ConSid~r~ t -~politicallyselective channeling of information; the unequ~~ dis ll Utedability to . Ii . al d lanning processes (ofcitizens with engage m po tic an p al (or sti or for whom the planning staff work); the profession status d gma)of th 1 . . . t tions of cases an sign·fi e P anner's deeds; confl1ctmgmterpre a . d l cance· . -----.'d k of contacts, an1 da rn ' scarce mformation and flm networ s azeof b . ate We are e to a8k ureaucratic rules for the uninitiated to nav1g . d blic of the organizational structure of private intereSts an pu

212 John Forester

----

agencies how they foster or retard open, unmanipulated comm . . c':1cation (and so participation) by affected persons. When ordin~ ic3:tion _i~structurally but unnecessarily or?"eu6~ely diston::\U.t.... 29 sponsible political action will be crippled. • -L.re~ The socially and politically structured distortions of communicati we face every day-as citizens and as planners-can now begin to~: recognized and assessed (table 1). For each entry in table 1 we can ask a practical question: "How can planners work with others to prevent such distortions of communication?" Table 2 suggests strategies of response, "exposing" or correcting the distortions of table 1. These strategies of response are varied, but they can be summarized in one word-"organizing." This is the planner's pragmatic response to a political reality of effectively disabling distortions of ordinary communication: the careful, political organization of attention and action which corrects or seeks to eliminate these distortions. 30 Not only do these strategies address the basic obstacles to open democratic political processes, they are also pragmatic as well. They seek concretely to marshal information, to cultivate support, to work through informal channels, to use expertise discriminately, and so forth. 31 Thus, the analysis of the distortion or violation of the norms of ordinary communication leads logically to questions of response.

On Practice: Enabling (Organizing) and Disabling Practice

. practice? . Now what of local planrung W h ere ' s th e pracuc. al payoff.for 's acuon planners? As we broaden our understanding of the p 1anner . al (from technical to communicative), we come to understand the pracucto organizational problems planners face a little differently. We by understand that roblems will be solved not b one ex ert, ut by pooling expertise and non-professional contributions as welll; n:erit; 7 ormal procedure alone, u ·w~~ ful se ormal cons tatton an 1Il 11 · tl b · b t bv car~ d not pre omman y y stnct re ance on ata ases, u ~rrnauY 0 of _trusted "resources," "contacts," 'friends"; not ~ou~d the qerauonal management procedures, but b internal _,P~2--;ngill~g velo ment of a working consensus; not y so vmg an .th 0 }iucal equation, u oycomplem'.enting°technical performance wt ~tuitiofl sophistication, support-building, liaison work, and, finail~ futu!eand luck. Only in the most isolated or most routine cases 32 oriented planning proceed "one, two, three. "

cc;;te

r

Table

How

C"'l\t-:> ";l. '.;,

1

we experience

distortions

o. r.

of communication

~'

Norms Practical level Face

to face

Organizational (e.g., hospital proposing expansion)

p'olitical-economic structure

of pragmatic

communication

Sincerity

Legitimacy

Truth

Lack of sense ambiguity confusion

Deceit, insincerity

Meaning out of context

Misinformation

"What?"

"Can I trust him?"

"Is this right?"

"Is this true?"

Public exclusion by jargon

Rhetorical reassurances; expression of false concern; hiding of motives

Unresponsiveness; assertion of rationalizations; professional dominance

Information withheld; responsibility obscured; need misrepresented

"Can we trust?"

"Is this justified?"

"Is this true?"

Mystification complexity

Misrepresentation of the public good

Lack of accountability; legitimation by line, not by active participation

Policy possibilities obscured, withheld, or misrepresented; ideology as: public ownership is always inefficient

"Who are they to

"What they never tell us about is ... "

..

"That's their line."

Say.:>"

('1)

~ ~

0..

"What's this mean?

"Do you think they understand what that means?"

~

;t

Comprehensibility

t crq

~ ~

c:. (j

(1)

,

Table .2 Responses correcting distortions of communication:

c..-1"° 5 ~ 0

organizing practices of planners

6'

Distortion type (pragmatic norm violated)

"'

Comprehensibility

Sincerity

Legitimacy

Truth

Face to face

Revealing meaning

Checking intentions

Determining roles and contextsb

Checking evidence

"What does that mean?"

"Does she mean that?"

"I don't need to accept that ... "

"I'll check to see if this is really true."

Minimizin~ jargon; ereating 1:mblic review conuruttees

Organizing counter-advacates; c eek.in{ with contacts, networ s

Making decisions particiatory; checking with a ected persons

Utilizing independent/ critical third party expertise

"Clean up the Ianguage so people can understand it."

"Check with Stu to see if we can trust them on this."

"What's the neighborhood association had to say about this?"

"Check the data and calculations to see if these fir,-ires are really correct. '

Demystification; counter-skills

Exposing unexpressed interests

Democratizin$' the state; _politicizing planrung'"

Institutionalizing debate, political criticism

"All this really means is ... "

"Of course the& say that! The)''re t e big winners if no one speaks up."

"Without political pressure, the bureaucracy will continue to serve itsel£ ... "

Democratizing inquiry; r,oliticizing plannm(: 'we have to show what can be done here."

Political-economic structurec1

a. For an analysis of the problems of distorted communication "listen.mg: 'The Social "Po\icy of Everyday Life (Critical Theory

~

~

Practical level

Organizational'

-

and political response at the level of face to face interaction and Hermeneutics in Practice)" (Forester 1980b).

&

see

j

,

,~

b. R. R. McGuire writes, " ... inso£ar as systems of mies and norms contribute they exist as systematic barriers to discursive will formation, they are irrational ate a fiction 0£ reciprocal accountability, concomitantly creating ideologies hr, they are irrational . .. and hence illegitimate-involving no moral obligation '

to systematically distorted communication, insofar as .... And insofar as lcommunication structures\ cresustaining the 'legitimacy' of these very structures (197 7).

c. Several sources provide insight and suggestions for those seeking to correct distortions of communication at the organizational level: Harold Wilensky (I 967), Needleman (1974), Saul Alinsky (1971); also helpful may be Guy Benveniste (197 7) and Paulo Freire (1974, 1970).

\"°

C"':I ';l. ~

~~

~

~

;

0..

d. The political economic ethic or vision of "opening communications" is the ethic of the critique of ideology. Embodied in actions seeking to correct distorted communication, the distortion of attention to actual possibilities, this is a call for political organizing, for democratizing public policy. e. To politicize planning does not mean to grind planning to a halt. This is the poisonous misreading of politics that perpetuates a narrow, technically-focused, politically inept planning practice. To politicize planning along the lines called for by critical theory means to broaden the basis of consideration of alternatives, to foster participation and spread responsibility to non-professional citizens; to balance the reliance upon technique with the attention to regular political debate and criticism. See Pitkin (19 72). f. "The ultimate objective of repoliticization ... should be to resurrect the notion of democracy, which is far too important an ideal to be sacrificed to capitalism. ... The problem is not that capitalist societies accumulate, but the way in which they do it. In order for the beneficiaries of accumulation to remain a narrow group, a boundary is established beyond which democracy is not allowed to intrude .... [T]he time has come to think, not about demolishing accumulation, but about democratizing it. The way to eliminate the contradictio~ between accumulatio~ and l~~timation is to apply the prin~ples of de_mocracyt?. both-_tgi~~people the same voice in making mvestment and allocation deas1ons as they theoretically nave m more directly political deas1ons (Wolfe 1977,

p. 346).

t: crq

~C::?. (') (b

216

John Forester

The planner's technical acts may be instru~entally ~killed, but rtheless politically inept. A formal econorruc calculation may be neve , li " impeccably performed, but the ~lanner s c ~nt may ~ot really trust the numbers." Any technical act10n (calculatmg a solution, making a demographic prediction, revie:in_g archi~ectural plans for flaws)communicates to those it serves, this solution (etc.) serves your needs" or "now, this much done, you may still wish to ... (change this parameter, devise another scenario, look and see for yourself)." In planning contexts, this meta-communicative character of technical action has often been overlooked.!l!l Its practical implications, particularly its costs, have often been neglected. The most well-meaning professional activities of planning staffs have at times communicated, if unintentionally, "leave the analysis to me; I'll give you all the results when I'm through; you can depend on me." At times this has reflected an agreed-upon division oflabor. At other times the political and practical consequences of such (often implicit) communication has been to separate planners and planned-for, to reduce the accessibility to information of those affected by plans, to minimize the planner's capability to learn from design review criticism, to engender public mistrust for planning staff, and to reinforce the planner's apprehension of what seems to be necessarily disruptive public participation. As long as this practical communicative dimension of (even the most technical)planning is ignored, planners will pay such costs.s4 This practical communicative dimension of planning practice involves much more than how clearly the planner writes or speaks. ss Whatthe planner ch?oses to say-and not to say-is pragmatically, and p~~tICally,crucial. If the planner, for example, takes the role of the mformed technocrat" and chooses to emphasize the technical aspects of a proble~ while ~gnoringits political dimensions, the planner's ?wn ~der standmg of his or her appropriate role may lead to a senous misrepresen~ti~n that problem. Ideologies, of course, are distortions of commurucation m precisely this sense. They are distortions not beca~se tbey are unclear, but because they are indeed dear; but tbey so misr~present social and political reality that they may obscure alternatives . . an d .c. d . . ' cover up respons1'bili'ty, encourage pass1v1ty iatalisrll,

°~

an JUs~ifythe perpetuation of inequity and suffering. ' Echom~ the _workof Karl Mannheim and John Dewey, Haberrn~ss ~fgumlent implies th at such distortions are increasingly likely in plaJ1lllf1g 1 P anners become m . rocess ore removed from a democratic planmng P

~al Th;ory and Planning Practice cooc

. h encourages political debate, the criticism of al . whic'tions, and th e collectlve . construction of ne dtemauve . pro blem defin1 th .. . w es1gn and Ii als s6 Thus, e sens1t1v1tyto distorted com . . po cy S ropo · . murucauon b I P leads not only to attention to matters of cla 't " ~Panners . "b al h n y, cleanmg 111unicat1ons, ut so to t e appropriate, inevitabl Ii . up corn aff: d th fc th . y po tical roles Janningst : o ey aster or wart informed publi .. . bl. c paruc1pat1on· of p bl and argu ment,. do they' do they pre-empt . or ena e. pu IC debate . • design and policy review and en't•1c1sm? enCourage or discourage . . all their best m·tent10ns• Planning orgaruzatlons . .may- . against . or disable public poh~1cal participation and action. By igirruJ1obilize noring the effects of bureaucratic language, planning organizations mayperpetuate the exclusion of all but those who already "know the langu~ge:"If ~ey are n?t perceive~ .to speak truthfully, planning orgaruzationswill breed distrust, susp1c1on, and a growing hostility to professionalpublic servants-to say little of the possible cooperation thatwill be poisoned. More subtly, if planning organizations pre-empt communityinvolvement by defining problems as overly technical or as too complex for non-professionals to understand, they may, again againsttheir best intentions, engender political passivity, dependency, and ignorance.37 And if they do not systematically search for design alternativesand possible political solutions through regular processes of community consultation, expertise pooling, and project reviews runningfrom "brainstorming" to "collective criticism," planning organizationsare likely to "satisfice" too quickly or inefficiently, and missreal program or design opportunities. . Ironically,then, technically oriented planning may effectlvely but unintentionallycommunicate to the public, "you can dep~nd ~~ m~; you needn't get involved; I'll consult you when appropnate. This m~ssagemay simplify practice in the short run, but it. may also !:a~ to mefficiencyand waste in general. It counterproducavely may . P arate PIanners from ' the political constituency • th ey serve ' weakerung . fc themb0 th b f rful economic orces . efore the designs and agendas o powe bili.ty Ill th · . b t the accounta 38 err neighborhoods and cities. It may su ver th th ofpla Ii . formed ra er an . nners and serve to keep affected pub cs~£r un·g their Pollticall d l l d 1s1onsau ec 1: Y e ucated about events and oca ec . fc may also uves.Pl . . . . hnical m ocus ne 1 ~g which 1s predorrunantly tee ot to mention st thgect Its political friends. When action is at ake-n tly we may e plann , . hi 5 n be cos · find ers Jobs themselves, of course-t ca .. t and efficiency, opportunities to improve planning producuv1 y .

218

John Forester

----

then, not simply by appealing to community involvement, but h callingattention to the minute, practical communications whichfunctiy ·1 y encourage cooperanve, . construcon either to discourage or altemat:lve tive, trusting, supportive organizational and community bases forthe actions of planners. Technical work should not be seen in a vacuwn, then. To avoid the counterproductive "leave it to us" messagesthat these acts may meta-communicate, planners have several options,as indicated in table 3. The statement "planning is political" need not be the end of discussion; it may be a fruitful beginning. By anticipating the interests and commitments of affected groups, planners may build political support in addition to producing technically sound documents. To be effective, rigorous analysis must be used (if not always appreciated) by politically influential groups or the staff of other agencies; technical analysis in planning cannot stand alone. Numerous studies show that the "technician" role of planning analysis is often frustratingand ineffectual if divorced from the pragmatic considerations of political communication: lobbying, maintaining trust and "an ear," addressing the specific concerns of the decision-making audiences as well as those inherent in the projects themselves, and so on. 39 Paying attention to the practical communications that structure the planning process can save wasted time and effort; otherwise, technical reports may be destined to end up on the shelf. Nevertheless, the strategies indicated above are not without their problems. How much information should be given to which groups, and when? What can planners do to prevent such information ~oill being ignored, misinterpreted, or manipulated? What organizau~nal and political forms of community planning, widespread participation, and design review might be both democratic and efficient? Thes~are n?t new questio~ f~r plann~rs- but the analysis of systematl~;, distorted commurucatton provided by critical theory allows these q · b ways t:lonsto e asked and answered in new ways. In particular these . . include: (1) clarifying the ordinary norms of practical communicauo~'. (2) identifying the essential types of disabling distortions to be correcte' (3) l rifyin" th • correet ca g e planner's role in perpetuating or seeking to e such distortions; and (4) locating within a political-economic strllctufd d 'd distorte 0f power~ _1 eology-treated as a structure of systematically. -the commurucatton of assurance, threat, promise, and legitimation ·cepragmaf ic an d po litl·ca1communicative character of planning · practl

~ and Planning Practice criticalTheory

fable S . u·ve strategies complementing planners' technical work corninuru_:c:::a=-------::-:------:--:--:------------------ting their technical work, planners can: compJernen

.

community networks of liaisons and contacts, rather than depend· b th 'd d . . mg wer of documents, o to prov1 e an disseminate information-

I cu1uvate

·

~~~

'

Ii carefully to gauge the concerns and interests of all participants in the 2j;g process to anticipate likely political obstacles, struggles, and p .. opparn.uuues;

S.notify less-organized interests e~ly ~ 3:°Yplanning pr?cess aff~cting them (the more organized groups whose busmess 1t 1s to have such information won't need the sarne attention); 4. educate citizens and community organizations about the planning process and

the "rules of the game"; 5. supply technical and political information to citizens to enable informed, effec-

tivepoliticalparticipation; 6. work to see that community and neighborhood, nonprofessional organizations haveready access to public planning information, local codes, plans, and notices of relevant meetings, and consultations with agency contacts, "specialists" supplementingtheir own "in-house" expertise;

7. encouragecommunity-based groups to press for open, full information about proposedprojects and design possibilities;

~-developskills to work with groups and conflict situations, rather than expectmgprogress to stem mainly from isolated technical work;

?·emphasizeto community

interests the importance of effective participation in info~ processes of project review, and take steps to make such design-change negotiationmeetings equitable to professionally unsophisticated groups; IO.encourage m · d ependent, community-based

· · st1ga · u·ons·' project reviews an d mve

1

l. anticipate external political-economic pressures shaping design · d eosions · · eom an d

anti-p:~:te_for them-soliciting "pressure we can use" (e.g., countering veSted p c mterests) rather than minimizing external pressure altogetber. ITheseacti . bT . concernedons are all elements of "organizing" practices, pracucally mo 1mng solutions.)and affected persons, in addition to technically calculaung problem

I

'

-----

220 John Forester

!,

Each o~ the e~tri_es in tables 2, an~ : ought to be regarded as illustration pomtmg to practical, political research questio an .c ns. Such . th questions are empirical as th ey question e 1orms and effects of dis hlin or en~bling communication; they are interpre_tive as they questi:U meanmgs and myths generated by alternative organizational fo and professional practices; and they are normative as they questionr;::s political and moral responsibilities of professionals, bureaucrats, an~ citizens alike. If the organizing strategies listed in table 3 are considered as isolated ideas, they are nothing new. Only if they are understood and carried out in the context of the structural analysis of systematically distorted communication illustrated in tables I and 2 can they be seen in a new light, focused upon new goals and objectives, and put into practice in increasingly sensitive and effective ways.

th!

Conclusion

Practical organizing strategies (suggested in table 3) may provide options for planners seeking to improve local planning practice and avoid the disruptive, frustration-producing problems of organizationally distorted communications (suggested in table 1). Planning actions are not only technical, they are also communicative: they shape attention and expectations. These communicative effects are often unintentional, ~ut they are pragmatic nevertheless; they make a difference. Presentmg technical information to a community organization, a planner's manner may communicate as much as his or her words. These practical communicative effects can be counterpro~~ f~ planners if they are ignored. Alternatively, if they are rec~gnue ~ planners can complement their technical activities with strategiesth(sug . . to ose gested in table 2) designed to open effective c~mmurucation These 5 persons and groups affected by proposed proJects and pla.Il;• ·cal practical communication strategies may be organizationally e.conoIIllas process, th ey reduce the up.necessary flisruP-tion of th~ Pl~g . -@uce ,_1t.-!__ the they cultivate support for planners' actions, and as they re larger th lik~l~ood that ~lann~rs' efforts will be washed awa~ by focus political process m which any planning is embedded. Fmally, . s cart f . . .......... 1T"\gacuon . _ on th e ·pragmatic aspects o such commumcauve p 1au.AJ.»-A .all as de~ be rooted in the recent literature of critical theory, especi Y ritlcal veloped in the writings of Jiirgen Habermas. Significantly, att:ritlofl theory of planning practice, barely indicated here, calls our a

;e

~d •• _1

fbeory an

p}anningPractice

crioau

irlcallyto concrete communicative actions and organizational (a)emPli . al-economic structures, (b) interpretivelyto the meanings d dpo oc ....r • .c. • an

s of persons penormmg or 1acmg those cornrnunicaa· enence ve ex~ and (c) normativelyto the respect or violation of fundamental acuons, · ·a1nonns of language use, norm~ m aking possible the very intel~oer,Jeffry, 1975. Ti .. . 'hePoliticsofSocial Services. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prennce-Hall.

2~26~--------------------

John Forester

. DialecticofIdeologyand Technology.New York: Seabury Press. Gouldner, Alvin, 1976. .. Communicationand the Evolution ofSociety.Boston;BcaeonPr Haberrnas, Jurgen, 1979. ess.

Letri.timation Crisis.Boston: Beacon Press. .. Haberrnas, Jurgen, 1975. o· .. Theoryand PracticeBoston: Beacon Press. Haberrnas, Jurgen, 1973· .. 1971 Knowledgeand Human Interests. Boston; Beacon Press. Haberrnas, Jurgen, · .. 1970· Towarda Rational Society.Boston: Beacon Press. Haberrnas, J urgen, Hummel, Ralph, 1977. The BureaucraticExperience.New York.: St. Martin's Press. Illich, Ivan, 1977. MedicalNemeJis.New York: Bantam Books. Krumholz, Norman, et al., 1975. ''The Cleveland Policy Planning Report." JournalojtMAmtrican InstituteofPlanners41, 5: 298-304. Lukes, Steven, 1974. Power:A Radical View. London: Macmillan. Mannheim, Karl, 1950. Freecwm, Planningand DemocraticPlanning. New York: Oxford University Press. Mannheim, Karl, 1949. Man and Societyin an Age ofReconstruction.New York: Harcourt. Marris, Pater, 1975. LOSJand Change.New York: Anchor Press. McCarthy, Thomas, 1978. The CriticalTheoryofJurgen Habermas. Cambridge: MIT Press. McGuire,R. R., 1977• "Speech Acts, Communicative Competence and the Paradox of Authority." Philosophy and Rhetoric10(1):30-45. , Meltsner, Arnold, 1976. PolicyAnalysts in the Bureaucrnru. Berkeley: University of California Press. -✓ Mueller, Claus 1973 The p,0lit· '

•

.reommunicatum. New

ic.s D.J

Needleman Carolyn d M . Wiley. ' ' an artm Needleman,

.

York: Oxford University Press.

York: 1974. Gutrrillas in the Bureaucracy. New

Pitkin, Hanna 1972 Wt • ' · ttgen.stemand Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press, Schroyer, Trent, 1973 The Cri · ttque of Domination. Boston: Beacon Press. Schu~, Alfred, 1970. Phen . . ·versitJ of Chicago Press. omenologyand SocialRelations,ed. Helmut Wagner. Chicago.Uru Searle, John 1969 . . SpeechActs Lo d ' Sh · n on: Cambndge University Press. afiro, Jeremy, 1976. "Re . ' .. "Tel0521 (Spnng) 170-I 76. ply to Millers Review of Habennas's Legitimationcnsu,

llllt~ ~h ry and Planning Practice criticalT eo 'ck paul, 1976. How Real /$ Real.1 New York: Vintage Press. watzlaWl • ·ck paul et al., 1967. PragmatiCJofHu.man Communication.New York- N watzlaWl • ' · Orton Press. ld 1967. Organizational Intelligence. New York: Basic Books wilenskY•Haro ' • c Alan 1977. Limits ofLegitimacy. New York: Free Press. wo1e, J '

V ~ of Policy Analysis

,.,

.....

----:-:;iEvaluation of Public Crt~• . A Methodological Case policy.

study FrankFischer

Criticaltheory has always stressed the need for a link between theory and practice. It is generally agreed, however, that its own connection to practice has remained quite abstract. The practical concerns of publicpolicy evaluation are a case in point. The connection between the epistemological categories of critical theory and the practical objectivesof policy evaluation have largely gone unexplored. For this reasonpolicy analysts have mainly dismissed critical theory as a philosophicalproject of little relevance to their immediate concerns. The purpose of this chapter is to address this misconception through a me~odological case study of Project Head Start, a compensatory educational program for disadvantaged children. The task is to show that the epistemological components of a critical theory have direct me~odological bearing on the politics of policy evaluation. 1 The disdemonstrates the import of these connections for a "posteuss1??:118° empmcist" reconstruction of the social and policy sciences.

Social Relevance as a Methodological

Issue

th e search f; li scie or an alternative methodology for the social and po cy nces began d . resp unng the latter half of the 1960s, essentI'allY as a . . 0f onse to th· e po litical turmoil generated by the pu bli c po licies the G Socie tY· T h e fact that an increasing reliance on soc1'al an d Politireat al cornpc _research to plan and leuitirnate policies was sometimes acanied b . l oaf both Yvia ent challenges to political authority became a source constern auon ..: and embarrassment to many soc1'al sc1ent1s . . t s.2

232 Frank Fischer

----

In sharp contrast to the self-confidence exhibited in the earl 1 .al . . th 1 y 960s by empirically oriented soc1 sc1ent1sts, e atter half of the d . . . d ul . b ecade brought polemical d1scuss1onan spec at10n a out the relevanc their research to actual political problems. Complaints emanated ; of 0 both ends of the political spectrum. On the right, those oriented tow md ~ . the priorities of the establishe d power structure mcreasingly lamented the failure of the social sciences to provide usable knowledge for Social guidance and control, while on the left, those oriented toward the causes of the poor and of minorities accused the social sciencesof ideological distortion and manipulation. During periods of normative malaise, as Karl Mannheim pointed out, the academic community is often compelled to confront the epistemological issues that underlie competing political perspectives.3 In the late 1960s and early 197Os, in disciplines such as political science and sociology, political disagreements gave rise to vitriolic epistemological debates about the role of relevance in science. In particular, these debates focused attention on the relation of knowledge to power. Who controlled the production of knowledge? And for what purpose was it employed? One result of this debate was an increasing recognition of the emergence of technocracy and the forms of social and political control associated with it. The power of technocracy is based on a positivistically orien~ed empirical conception of knowledge, which is reflected in a growing inventory of operational techniques such as cost-benefit analysis,operations research, systems analysis, strategic plannning, and computer simulations. 4 Emphasizing the tenets of value-neutral objectivity,ern· pirical operationalism, and professional expertise, modem technocracy stands or falls with the ideology of scientism. Thus, as Haberrnas ciences exp lains, know1edge under technocracy "is defined by what the 5 . f do and can • • . be explicated through the methodological analysisako · 'fic procedures. " 5 In this way, methodological researc h cant e scienti the form of politics at the level of theory. ·cal The fact that empiricists frequently violate their own methodolobgiaok . . 1es should not blind us to the strateoic value of their· te"t ·al prmcip . . o. aJTl5oo · ,_,, precismn. More than any other factor their gn'p on mam stre · · ' thod ~ ~cience is the result of their ability to say what their me 'tted mlicittextual exegesis. As a suggcsti,.-cbcgumin 1.1'1 rrelated contributions by Habermas, Stephen Toulmin, and Paul T I g,

_.-epment,Study by the Wesunghouse Learrung Corporauon (Athens: Ohio Universi July l 2, l 969). ty, 15. Harrell Rodgers, "Head Start-Where

Are the Headlines Now?" Dwent (Spring 1979): 234_

16. Ibid., p. 235. 17. Walter Williams and John W. Evans, "The Politics of Evaluation: The Case of Head Start," in Evaluating Social Programs, ed. Peter Rossi and Walter Williams (New York: Seminar Press, 1972), pp. 249-264; see also M. S. Smith and J. S. Bissell, "Report Analysis: The Impact of Head Start," Harvard Educational Review 40 (Winter 1970): 51-105. 18. Williams and Evans, "The Politics of Evaluation." 19. See Edmund W. Gordon, "Guidance in the Urban Setting," in opening opportunitieJ f()T Disadvantaged Learners, ed. Harry Passow (New York: Teachers College Press, 1972), p. 213. 20. The best guide to the general outline of this argument is Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976). For a guide to the political argwnents in support of the initiation of the Head Start program, see "Head Start, A Retrospective View: The Founders," in Project Head _Start, ed. Edward Zigler and Jeanette Valentine (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-134. As president, LyndonJohnson announced plans to extend the project with these words: "We have reached a landmark not just in education, but in the maturity of our democracy. The success of this year's Head Start program-and our plans for the years to come-are symbols of this nation's commitment to the goal that no American child shall be condemned to failure by the accident of his birth." 2 I. New York TimeJ, cited by Williams and Evans, "Politics of Evaluation," p. 263; and Walter Williams, Social Policy ReJearch and AnalyJis (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 103-130. 22. Rodgers, "Head Start," p. 235. 23. Jurgen Habennas, Knowledge and Human lntemt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), PP· 30l- 31 ~; also see Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory ofjurgen HabermaJ (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978 • for the best methodological explication and interpretation of Habennas's project. c 24. In re,erence to su b stanti al arguments, Beacon Press, 1975), p. 107.

see Jurgen

Habennas,

Legitimation Cns. is (Boston:

25. Ibid. . 26. Stephen Toulmm, The Um of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge

. . p s 1958). Umvers1ty res '

27. Ibid. 28. Paul W. Taylor, Normative Discouru (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 29. Ibid.

196 l).

► ~n

. . E,valuauo couca1

of Public Policy

. 'de to these phases of evaluation, see Fischer, Politics. a detailed gut so.for . . . "Long-Term Gains from Early Intervenuon: An Overvtew of Current eernardBrown, ntcd at the 197 7 annual meeting of the American Association for the 1· ~.,"(Panerprcse 31teseaiv• r~f Science, Denver, Co lora d o, Fe b ruary 2°-1, 1977) • Ad,,anccrnent Fischer, Politics, 32. SeC illi n Goodson and Robert D. Hess, "The Effects of Parent Training Programs ss.B~a;:!r:ance and Parent Behavior" (Paper presented at the 197 7 annual meeting of Association for the Advancement of Science, Denver, Colorado, February 23, on child . the Atnencan !977~ 34. Rodgers, "Head Start," P· 235. Qscar Lewis, Ftue Familie.s: Mexican Ca.seStudies in the Culture ofPoverty (New York: Basic 35· ks 59), The debate over this hypothesis triggered the publication of a nwnber of con19 Boa ~ studies, including the Moynihan Report and Banfield's Unheauenly City. U.S. Department ~Labor, office of Policy Planning and Rese~~• The Negro Family, prepared by Daniel Patrick Moynihan(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965); and Edward C. Banfield, The unlttavenlyCity: The Nature and Future ofOur Urban Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970). 36. Banfield, Unheavenly City. 37.Timothy M. Hennessey and Richard H. Feen, "Social Science as Social Philosophy: Edward c. Banfield and the 'New Realism' in Urban Politics," in Varieties ofPolitical Conservatism, ed. MatthewHoldcn,Jr. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), p. 29.

38.John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge,

Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971).

39. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 310.

40._Sce,_forcxamplc,James Fishkin,Justice, Equal opportunity and the Family (New Haven: Yale Uruvers1tyPress, 1983). On compensatory education and Head Start, see pp. 68-74. 41. Bowlesand Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America.

The Policy Analysis-Critical Theory Affair: Wildavsky and Habermas as Bedfellows?

john Forester

Introduction Policy analysis and critical theory might seem to be unlikely marriage partners, but that may simply be because they haven't met yet. This paper will introduce the two to one another, but it takes no responsibility for the outcome of the relationship. Whether or not there's a match here depends upon far more than any introduction can do. The combination of critical theory and policy analysis might raise eyebrows for yet other reasons. Considering the work of Aaron Wildavsky (1979) as paradigmatic here, policy analysis seems quite earthy, pragmatic if not celebrating realpolitik, proud of realism, boasting of relevance, utility, access to power, and political savvy.' Critical theory, in contrast, seems rarified~ systematic and philosophical but not practical, doubting realism as naivete, warning that our commonplace sentiments may be mere liberal ideology; here we may consider th~ work of Jiirgen Habermas (1970, 1973, 1975, 1979), for exarnple. The policy analyst speaks of feasibility, costing out alternatives, irnpact analysis, and market solutions; the critical theorist speaks of syst~rnatically distorted communications, speech acts, practical cla.uns-rnakin~ and someone named "Hermene-U-Tics." Is it possible that these tw animals live in the same world and care about the same things?. . nVIous Th e po Iicy analyst and the critical theorist are also each a bit e be of the other; fOI'each, the other's strength is their own weakneS~·Tb t · strong on organizational and budgetary an alYSIS' bU po Iicy an alyst IS rather blind to many of the systematic philosophical and ethical pro

~Ii AnalysisCritical Theory Affair rhe Po cy .

ested in the impressi e-soundin. g.claimsof their products· rv-J; , lerJlSn · (r. ...l: _____ • f · Fu anal esand evaluanons 1or a ~~ion o these problems see MacRae ysFischer 1980, Churchman 197 9). The aitical theorist is str 1976, . ong hilosophy and ethics, strong on the dangers of a tempting prag-

:im and so-call~~rofessio~ e~cs.' but rather weak in the analysi5 of concrete orgaruzaoons and mstitutions that carry out policies in practice.3 In the abstract, each needs the other, in the concrete, each has little patience with the other's style. Yet the analyst hung~rs ~or more powerful ~ ays of understanding Politicalaction and the significance of alternative government actions; "costs and benefits" are only poorly measured, and the difficulties of interpreting the significance of the various possible outcomes of differing palicyproPosals present reaming, unavoidable problems (see, e.g. Rein 1976, Dunn 1981). If the critical theorist can help the policy analyst watch out for important problems, for obstacles to implementation, for likely sources of poor information, the analyst may listen (see Forester 1980, 1982a). The critical theorist is far from selfsufficient either. critical theory works supposedly to inform the~sibilities of emancipatory, freedom-seeking political action· yet the analysis of institutional conditions that enhance or thwart such action such "praxis," again presents recurring, unavoidable problems to be faced(see, e.g., Cohen 1979, Honneth 1979). If the policy analyst can help the critical theorist understand questions of the organizational dynamicsof Power and the strategic side of interorganizational conflict the theorist may listen (see, e.g., Lukes 1974).

The Personalities There are still other reasons for these two to be interested in one another. Both the policy analyst and the critical theorist say nobly 1?at they are interested in the conditions of social and political learnmg ~:e Lindblom and Cohen 1979, ch. 2, Wildavsky 1979, ch. 10 ~a~ 1979, ch. 3). Both say that they seek to improve the quali of a~IZens'interactions that are shaped, regulated, and tructuredh p~hlicpolicymaking and state action. The policy analyst is concerned ~ th efficiency and redistribution- the aitical theorist is concetned withthe same tension . . ' the dialectic . · between technologi·ca1 altered a bit: ·· th ~;ogress and social l~aming, between the development of e forces production and that of the relations of production (see Habetmas

h,

60

John

Forester

1979, ch. 4). The optimism of each is the pessi 111isro of the other. The

analyst hopes that productiYity , ..ill enable ever more cmtribution through the workings of markets; the critical theorist dCSJWIS ihat ever greater pm-ate capital accumulation may only tighten the control of corporate capital upon labor and then export dependency as imperialistic aid {see O'Connor 1979). The analyst periodic:ailyfears that "politics" will replace "markets," thus enormously increasing the~ mands for governance in the polity (see Lindblom 1977 part o. The critical theorist, in contrast, hopes that social and labor movements will coalesce to democratize investment decision-making in the society (see Wolfe 1977). Then the effective governing of the polity by capital may be wrestled away and transformed into legitimate ~ of political participation and membership. The analyst wants the :mad.et to solve as many problems of decision-making as possible.; the critical theorist, however, wants democratic politics to govern in,~estment decisions. The analyst has the mark.et, however, imperfect, as it now exists to work with; the critical theorist has democratic traditiom to appeal to, some socialist experience to evaluate critically and a better day to look forward to and work toward Yet these days. though the policy analyst has several lovers in Washington, the critical theorist is more likely to be enjoying other pleasures. Friends of both know the secrets being kept here of course. The policy analyst worries about market imperfections and the nagging problems of being "second-best," which in the market may be far far from best (see, e.g., Lancaster and Lipsey 1956-57). The critical theorist worries about the assessment of legitimacy, and th problems of distinguishing a true from false consensus or manipulated agreements from truly consensual ones (this is the problem forcefull raised, if hardly finally resolved, by Habermas 197 5, part Ill). a.tw-all ach projects their worries as skepticism toward the other. To the analyst who argues that market interactions should distribute services, the critical theorist cries that the market is often rigged, imperfect, subject to horrendous information imperfections and pi blems of monopoly, to say nothing of the exploitation of labor and th appropriation of surplus. To the critical theorist who argues that trul democratic politics would solve the analyst's problem , or that the correction of ideological distortions of communication could sol Poli problems, the analyst asks simply, "How? How will you 'den-iocratiz the state's agencies and all of the economy as , ell? he1 · the j

d

►

. c thal sh WH this nm be done? Do you even have, . , . , , d . . , . 'J cxpcricn • an art1cu1at . 1a mm1strat 1on1 A notion of 'lc dcmoc:racy. F.nonnously brgc. rich in l"C5IDUlttS, lhe big mrpmatioos. --~ ha~ seen, CDIDJIPOO more resources than do most govemmmt uon Tiw!y can also. ~abroad range. insist that govccmncnt meet dim- demands. C"VCD.if these dr:mands ruP