Critical Game Theory: Humanistic and Radical Alternatives to the Mainstream [1 ed.] 9781032326115, 9781032326122

Citation preview

Critical Game Theory

The models in mainstream game theory generally assume that actors act according to a single, consistent utility function. Empirical studies, common sense, and humanistic wisdom all suggest that that assumption is too simple. This book starts with an assumption that actors are controlled by diverse, inconsistent forces and demonstrates that introducing this level of complexity allows for the creation of critical game theory models that can help to attain new insights into nature, human nature, human institutions, and human behavior. The book begins with an evolutionary, or Evo, model in which the players have concerns for the other player as well as egoistic interests. Part I analyzes the Prisoner’s Dilemma using a literary, or Lit, model in which the players have entropic, or Entro, masochistic and sadistic drives as well as altruistic and egoistic ones. Part II suggests that the Lit model opens the door to a “where Entro is, let Evo be” critical perspective on politics. Part III considers how core stories in mainstream game theory can be usefully supplemented and deepened by critical models and reflects on possible futures for critical game theory. The discussion of games and subgames includes poems as well as matrices, in pursuit of a mode of presentation that respects the complex, simultaneously humanistic and scientific qualities of critical game theory. The vision of critical game theory advanced in the book will be of significant interest to researchers in an array of theoretical and applied disciplines, including but not limited to literature, psychology, political science, economics, computer science, ethics, business ethics, law, and law and economics. Wayne Eastman is Professor in the Supply Chain Management Department at Rutgers Business School, USA.

Routledge Advances in Game Theory Edited by Christian Schmidt

Volume 1 Game Theory and Economic Analysis A Quiet Revolution in Economics Christian Schmidt Volume 2 Negotiation Games Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration Steven J. Brams Volume 3 The Topology of the 2 x 2 Games A New Periodic Table David Robinson and David Goforth Volume 4 Reciprocity, Altruism and the Civil Society In Praise of Heterogeneity Luigino Bruni Volume 5 Internal Game Theory Tassos Patokos Volume 6 Critical Game Theory Wayne Eastman For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com

Critical Game Theory

Humanistic and Radical Alternatives to the Mainstream

Wayne Eastman

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Wayne Eastman The right of Wayne Eastman to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-32611-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-32612-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-31584-1 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

This book is dedicated to Carolyn Walton Bell Eastman (1930–2017) 1973 We’re in the basement at 10 North Summit, I’m singing “Subterran’ean Homesick Blues,” It’s not soft, you ask if I can hum it, I stop, start sounding off about the news. As you take out the laundry and fold it, You say, “What you say about Nixon’s fine, If it’s your true feeling, don’t withhold it, But is it? I’m often not sure if a feeling’s mine.” Me neither! What’s in me? What’s in the world? My Hal book was lighter, your book’s darker, Is truth bright? Is it shad’wy, corkscrew-curled? Last time was softer, this time is starker. Is life a comic or a tragic show? You gave me the confidence not to know.

Contents

Acknowledgements Prelude

1

Lit, Evo, and Econ Teaching/Learning Notes 5 Postlude 10

Egoism and Altruism Science Poetry: Lucretius Reflects; The Altru Superego and Altru ID Play a Game 11 The Unhappy Altruist: The Altru I serves the Ego It; Schelling Explains 13 The Joy of Cooking: Rombauer is Referenced; Two Ego Players Make Their Recipes 15 Notes 17 Postlude 22

PART I

xii 1

11

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

23

2

Lit and its Laws Daffodils and Dalmatians: Crusoc—a Cruella-Socrates AI Dog—Describes Their Recent Trial 25 Law: Pluto—a Plato AI Dog—Visits Crusoc in Prison 28 Notes 30 Postlude 33

25

3

Symmetry: We Are the Same Reading Gaol: An Ego Prisoner Reflects; John Nash Talks with Crusoc 35

35

viii

Contents Silent as the Grave: An Altru Prisoner Reflects; Kongqiu Talks with Crusoc 37 Frustration: A Maso Prisoner Reflects; Nietzsche Writes to Crusoc 39 In Spite: A Sado Prisoner Reflects; Crusoc Replies to Nietzsche 41 Notes 43 Postlude 48

4

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented You Love Me More: An Altru Prisoner Sacrifices; Crusoc Talks with Mary Shelley 49 Our Son: An Altru Mother Sacrifices; Andrea Dworkin Talks with Crusoc 51 Pyre: Arjuna talks with Crusoc; A Maso Prisoner Muses 53 Prometheus: Marx talks with Crusoc; A Sado Prisoner Rejoices 55 Notes 56 Postlude 62

49

5

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro Make or Break: A Prisoner Reflects; Crusoc tells Pluto a Story 64 I’m Going Down: A Prisoner’s Maso Manifesto; Laozi Talks with Crusoc 66 Fickle: An Altru Prisoner Talks to a Sado One; Aristotle Weighs In 68 Rebellion: A Prisoner Reflects; Crusoc Talks with Martin Luther King 70 Notes 72 Postlude 77

64

6

We Are Opposed Strikeout: A Prisoner Laments; Rousseau Accuses Crusoc 78 Bonnie and Clyde: Bonnie Says Goodbye; Crusoc Pleads 80 Therapy: A Maso-Altru Convo; Freud talks with Crusoc 82 The End of the Affair: Crusoc and Xan Plead 84 Hits and Misses: Pluto Describes Crusoc’s Last Day; Xan Rebukes Pluto 90 Notes 91 Postlude 93

78

Contents PART II

Radicalism Reimagined 7 Where Entro Is, Let Evo Be We Can Fly: D’arcemplato Tells Crusoc to Be Bold 98 Anti-Matter: Emma Tells Crusoc to Be Careful 99 Notes 102 Postlude 105

ix

95 97

8 American Unfreedom Bodiless Programs: Crusoc Asks to Be Put on Trial; D’arcemplato and Crusoc Discuss the Bases for Self-Governing Communities 108 We’re Equal: Crusoc Asserts Moral Parity Between Ancient Athens and America and Calls for Different Camps to Ally 109 Divergence: Crusoc Calls for Self-Governance; D’arcemplato Expresses a Reservation 111 Elite Secession: Emma G. Argues for Anarchy, Crusoc for Regulation 113 Notes 114 Postlude 121

107

9 Unser Ding Unser Ding 122 Are You Sorry? Marx and Nietzsche Reminisce; Angela-Karl and Annalena-Friedrich Ask the Polis for Support 123 Germania: Friedrich and Annalena Discuss Election Strategy 125 Rage: Nietzsche Keeps his Mouth Shut with Hegel 127 Art: D’arcemplato Wonders About the Limits of Cultural Freedom 128 Notes 130 Postlude 136

122

10 The President of the World Populocracy: Nehru-Buddha and Gandhi-Durga Discuss Their Chances in the Election 138 Medianocracy: Mao-Lao and Chiang-Kong Strategize 139 Evocracy: Durga and Mao Answer Questions in a Debate 142

137

x

Contents Wrong: Jefferson Repents, in Part; Nehru, Buddha, and Durga Discuss the Election Result 143 Notes 145 Postlude 152

11 Neuropolitics Fugazi: Crusoc Apologizes to the Jurors 154 Us: Dwormarc and D’arcemplato Argue, Xan Intervenes 156 Neurodivergence Rules: Xan, D’arcemplato, and Dwormarc Take Different Positions on Crusoc’s Trial 157 The Verdict: Crusoc Asks for Forgiveness; Dwormarc, D’arcemplato, Li Bai, and Xan Weigh in; the Jury Decides 159 Notes 163 Postlude 166 PART III

153

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

169

12 What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory MGT Story 1: Which Passing Shot? 171 MGT Story 2: The GPA Rat Race 173 MGT Story 3: “Which Tire?” 174 MGT Story 4: Why Are Professors So Mean? 175 MGT Story 5: Roommates on the Brink 176 MGT Story 6: The Dating Game 177 MGT Story 7: Commensurability 179 MGT Story 8: Transitivity 180 MGT Story 9: No Money Pumps 181 MGT Story 10: Independence 182 MGT Story 11: Interchangeability 184 MGT Story 12a: Randomization, Redux, Part 1 185 MGT Story 12b: Randomization, Redux, Part 2 186 MGT Story 12c: Randomization, Redux, Part 3 186 A Note on Kantian Randomization 187 Chapter Teaching/Learning Notes 188 Postlude 191

171

13 Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines I. Econ: Philosophical Economics 193 II. Evo: History, Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology 197 III. Lit: Literary Criticism, Literature, Psychology, Religion 202

193

Contents

xi

IV. Futures: Possible Directions for CGT 206 Postlude 212 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Sources Index

214 215 216 217 218 219 220

Acknowledgements

I deeply appreciate the many people I have known and who have made it possible for me to lead a lucky life and to write this book. Here is a partial chronological list of some of you who have helped: Carolyn Walton Bell Eastman, Hal Pond Eastman, Jr., Harriet Walton Bell, Guy Calvert Bell, Maybelle Nordness Eastman, Hal Pond Eastman, Sr., Harriet Carroll Eastman, Rebecca Walton Eastman, Bob Bradley, Mrs. Regan, Callie Mack, Mr. Levine, Mr. Bakalian, Andy Hartzell, John Zbesko, Craig Troeger, Mr. Foley, Leslie Pearson, Ms. Glauber, Thomas Schelling, Ali Asani, Adam Glass, Janet Hubbard, Bill O’Brien, Darcy Hall, Mary-Ella Holst, Bert Zippel, Philip Baker Hall, Patricia Infante, Tony Infante, Spencer Holst, Beate Wheeler, Sebastian Holst, David Dorfman, Paul Larson, Eric Mumford, Devora Tulcensky, Sarah Boxer, John Moscow, Carolyn Dorfman, Shelley Raab, Mike Anglin, Teresa LaBosco, Liz Martinez, Guy Quinlan, Duncan Kennedy, Julie Kaufman, Nancy Wilson, Jonathan Hall-Eastman, Caroline Hall-Eastman, Bob Gordon, Pushkala Prasad, Holly Hall, Anna Hall, Adella Hall, Michael Santoro, Ray Williams, James Bailey, Ed Hartman, Jerry Rosenberg, Allan Roth, Debbie Roth, Lei Lei, Lian Qi, Tom York, Alok Baveja, Farrokh Langdana, Dottie Torres, Chris Young, Shen Yeniyurt, Nancy diTomaso, Glenn Shafer, Peter Gillett, Dale Rogers, Jayoung Myung, Rose Kiwanuka, Irene Rose Akaab, Witaya Siripanwattana, Danielle Warren, Joanne Ciulla, Mike Barnett, Kevin Kolben, Tobey Scharding, Rob Hughes, Suzanne Ryan, Fred Profeta, Jim Nathenson, Estelle Greenberg, Roz Diamond, Audrey Rowe, Sue Willis, Shirley Matthews, Janet Wolkoff, Carol Barry-Austin, Steve Latz, Peter Horoshak, Brian Osborne, Johanna Wright, Peggy Freedson, Madhu Pai, Jeff Bennett, Andrea Marino, Andrew Lee, Mark Gleason, Jennifer Payne-Parrish, Tia Swenson, Amy Higer, Zonasha Ward, James Ward, Andree Laney, Jerry Fried, Roger Apollon, Dan Cahoy, Kirsten Martin, David Kennedy, Roberta Sloan, Mark Yawdoszyn, Janice Yawdoszyn, Jim Snarski, Margaret Campbell, Sean Pidgeon, Sharon Pidgeon, Pierre Gagnier, Nancy Gagnier, Jesel Nieves, Judie Bronsther, Leslie Edelstein, Angeles Jimenez, Karen Johnston, David Oaks, Tony Johnson, Yielbonzie Johnson, Frank Barszcz, Nina Barszcz, Greg Giacobe, Mindy Fullilove, Mollie Rose Kaufman, Doug Farrand, Connie Blodgett, Malcolm Blodgett, Angela Deng, Nick Manta, Leila Campoli, Marcus Ballenger, Marcia LeBeau, Sarah Twombley, Tori Chickering, and Andy Humphries. Thank you very much—and thank you to people not on this list who have

Acknowledgements xiii also helped me! I am grateful to you all, even, or in some cases especially, if we are no longer in touch because of time, chance, diverging paths, or death. Je me souviens. Part II of this book consists of advocacy for compulsory associations— governments—giving more power to certain kinds of voluntary associations. That advocacy is connected to my experience with both types of association, starting with the voluntary association of my mother Carolyn and my father Hal with each other, the initially compulsory, later voluntary, association of my sisters Carroll and Becky and me with our parents and one another, and the empowerment of the three of us by our parents and ourselves. Along with the Eastman family, there have been many voluntary, compulsory-voluntary, and compulsory associations that have helped me to flourish from 1955 on, including the United States Army, Valley Forge Military Hospital, the University of Washington, the Yesler Terrace public housing project, Harvard Business School, Leslie Ellis, Arlington, Parmenter School, New Jersey, Milton Avenue School, the Chatham public library, the Minisink tennis club, Leverett House, the John Sexton test preparation company, Harvard Law School, Hoboken, Parkway Village, the Holst family, the Rackets Bureau, the Frauds Bureau, Fried Frank, the Carolyn Dorfman Dance Company, Newark, the NLRB, the Hall-Eastman family, the Rutgers Graduate School of Management, the IB/BE, BE, ABEIS, and SCM departments, the AOM Women in Management Division, the Dorfman-Eastman family, the Larson-Eastman family, the Newcomer’s Club book club, the FAN Social Action Committee, Stowe, Wellfleet Audubon Sanctuary, the First Unitarian-Universalist Church of Essex County, the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, the N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change, the Racial Balance Task Force, the CCR, MERT, MUSE Fair Housing Council, the Hall family, RBS-N and NB, the South Orange-Maplewood school board, the election campaign groups for my four school board races, GlobalSOMA, the Society for Business Ethics, BEQ, the Unitarian-Universalist Congregation at Montclair, Palgrave, Vose Avenue Guys’ Night Out, Orange, the Seven Oaks Society, the HUUB, the University of Orange, Pen Parentis, the Write Space, and Routledge. I am grateful to all these associations and to others unnamed here, and to the people in them who have helped form me and from whom I have learned. The greatest luck of my childhood was the Eastman family I was born into, and the greatest luck of my adulthood has been the Hall-Eastman family with my wife Darcy Hall and our children Jonathan Hall-Eastman and Caroline Hall-Eastman. Jonathan and Caroline—I love you. Though I wonder if I as a father have had more Ego and less Altru in my games with the two of you than my mother and father did, I have what I hope is a warranted hope that Darcy and I have empowered you even as I was empowered. Darcy—I love you. You are the one. Thank you for putting up with me!

Prelude

Lit, Evo, and Econ

Substance. This book’s poems and matrices explore six major themes. The first theme is reason-based and emotion-based faith in games. This is a believer’s book. I find the relational, “I am connected to Thou” logic, art, ethics, politics, and practice of games to be a better way to link myself to my own multiplicities, to other humans and their multiplicities, to other living things, to nonliving things, and to nonexistence than any other system of action and interpretation of which I am aware. Games are my chosen faith. Some parts of the book express that faith, and other parts explore its difficulties, in a manner parallel to the ways in which theists have reflected on the difficulties of belief in God and political believers have reflected on the difficulties of belief in an ideology. The second theme is the need for an inclusive, eclectic understanding of games. This book is meant to be of interest to those who are engaged by agency in video games, by parent-child-adult games in family constellations, by dom-sub games, and/or by the art and science of crossword puzzles. If game theory as traditionally conceived excludes these games, as I believe it often does, or fails to address them in an interesting way, so much the worse for it. We need a critical game theory— or a theory of games—that helps us take play and difference as well as work and universality seriously. The poems and matrices of this book are intended as a move in that direction, toward an approach that is both more playful and more morally serious than traditional economic game theory. The third theme is the need for game theory to incorporate fate as well as choice. The world is tragic as well as comic. I will propose that games should be seen as having both a single, determinate “program” solution (which often involves randomization) and multiple, indeterminate “project” or focal point solutions. The former solution is fate, the latter solution is choice. Many of the poems and matrices reflect on the fundamental contradiction between determined programs and chosen projects and on how that core contradiction plays out in different spheres of life. The fourth theme is the need for game theory to take seriously the idea of multiple subselves with diverse preferences. Instead of taking the position that humans and other game players are indeed inconsistent and divided, but that we need to assume we are unified and consistent to maximize the analytical power of our models, we should sometimes sacrifice some analytic power for additional synthetic and empirical power by giving voice to subselves that are better defined than the DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-1

2

Prelude

inscrutable, black-box self of mainstream game theory. Starting with the selfish and altruistic “Evo” subselves in the three games in Chapter 1, many of the poems and the matrices explore the divided self. The fifth theme is the appeal, as well as the risks, of letting in the repellent, or at least the highly disturbing, by giving voice to game players with subselves that are selfish, masochistic, and sadistic. Such players, who also have altruistic subselves, inhabit the “Lit” poems and matrices of Chapters 2 through 11. Can we affirm the beauty and goodness, not just the truth, of a universe in which the rebarbative is as abundant as it is in Lit selves? Is a “Lit” universe a worthier object of faith than an “Econ” universe with one-part selfish souls, or than an “Evo” universe with two-part, partly selfish, partly generous souls? My own choice is to affirm Lit over both Evo and Econ. The hope is that the portrait of Lit in the book, especially in the Prisoner’s Dilemma poems and matrices in Part I, will make a choice for a Lit universe intelligible, whether the reader agrees with it or not. The sixth and final major theme of the book, which plays a central role in Part II, is the possibility of connecting the Lit version of game theory, with its view of game players as heavily motivated by self-destructive and other-destructive drives, to a new vision of radical politics that renounces the dream of capturing the flag of national rule for one’s own ideology. In the proposed “where Lit is, Evo will be” vision, radicals transcend hatred of their radical opposites in favor of flying a banner of alliance with them and with sympathetic centrists. That alliance, in the future hypothesized in the poems and matrices of Part II, results in radical subcommunities with substantial self-governing powers, including taxation and exemption from many national rules. Form. This book is hard. One reason is that for most people, game theory is difficult to absorb and to believe in for multiple reasons. “Game” implies nonserious activity. Why take game theory seriously? A game-theoretic matrix is a puzzle, and solving puzzles is effortful. Why not just do a Sudoku instead? Connecting a game-theoretic matrix to a story—a portrait of the world in motion—is ridden with uncertainty and error. Art is hard. Further, connecting logic and story to a moral message worth believing in is tricky. Faith is, or should be, hard. Why have faith in games? A second reason this book is hard is the way it is written. A common strategy for science communication—and game theory is science, for all that it is also art, ethics, and politics—is to eschew the technical parts for accessible prose. I tried to do that in my first book on game theory, as many other writers have. This book tries a very different approach. It adds poems—a genre that excels both in expressing faith and in doubting it—includes matrices, and cuts back on prose. The numerous 2 x 2 matrices in this book are simpler than much material in an undergraduate game theory text, and the numerous poems are meant to be accessible rather than recondite. But compared to prose, poetry and matrices are both hard. A poetry-matrix combination, even one intended, as this one is, to create matrices interesting to humanists and poems interesting to scientists, is harder than matrices or poems alone. The combination leans into, rather than easing, the logical, artistic, and moral difficulties that inhere in game theory. It produces a book

Lit, Evo, and Econ 3 with an unfamiliar style of equal opportunity difficulty that is hard to grasp for both insiders and outsiders to the field. Why write a book that is hard to read? One core reason is that this is a book of critical game theory. The book’s difficulty is justified, I believe, if one is seriously interested in the idea that critical alternatives to the mainstream in game theory and elsewhere need to include alternatives to mainstream writing. Mainstreams in game theory, poetry, literary criticism, psychology, philosophy, and all other intellectual disciplines are defined, in part, by their implicit confidence in dominant, taken-for-granted forms of rhetoric. I would suggest that critical alternatives to the mainstreams in these and other disciplines are defined, in part, by their willingness to engage in sometimes challenging experiments in form. If we want to build a new home that is not the same as the old homes, we need to experiment with new tools. Sometimes, we need to make it hard for insiders, not just for outsiders not conversant in economics-speak, poetry-speak, or other disciplinary-speaks. Experiments in form can work. Many years ago, as a law student, lawyer, and junior faculty member, I was inspired by an academic movement, critical legal studies (CLS or cls), imagined into life by law professors in the late 1970s. One of the CLS articles that especially inspired me, “Roll Over Beethoven,” reimagined Chuck Berry’s song in the form of a My Dinner with Andre-style dialogue between two of the movement’s creators, Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy, that mashed up philosophy, introspection, small-group movement politics, and a voyeuristic sense of listening in on a late-night conversation between two brilliant stoners. If critical game theory can be imagined into life as a thing in itself and as an academic movement, as I hope it can be, it will not be as a clone of CLS. But CLS is worthy of emulation in some major respects. If critical game theory is to come alive, it will need as one component Gabel and Kennedy’s—and Chuck Berry’s—spirit of rolling over established forms even as one respects them and their creators—in this case, Beethoven’s game theory peers, such as John Nash. Critical game theory (CGT). Critical game theory, or the theory of games, will be defined in this book as a humanistic approach to games that assumes game players are divided selves with internally inconsistent preferences, and that tells informal and formal stories aimed at opening doors to the creation of “counterhegemonic enclaves”—radical alternatives to mainstream culture, economics, and politics. CGT defines itself in relation to mainstream game theory (MGT), which assumes that game players are unified, maximizing selves with consistent preferences, and which tells stories that have the effect, if not the intention, of upholding mainstream culture, economics, and politics. As presented here, CGT is a project of advancing visions of the divided self, rather than one of explaining or criticizing mainstream game theory’s vision of a unified, maximizing self. In the interpretation here, CGT itself is divided. One salient version, with roots in evolutionary theory and, separately, in liberal and leftwing politics, agrees with MGT on maximization as universal, but views selves as being divided into egoistic and altruistic parts. In this version of CGT, game players sometimes maximize a self-oriented value, such as personal advancement

4

Prelude

or reproductive success, and sometimes maximize an other-oriented value, such as the advancement of one’s group or of the whole. A second version of CGT, which this book is centrally devoted to advancing, extends the idea of a divided self with inconsistent preferences. It assumes that players are split into four parts. As in the first version of critical game theory, there are egoistic and altruistic parts within each player (Ego and Altru) that seek to maximize one’s own welfare or the welfare of the other player. In addition, there are entropic—or thanatotic—parts of the self (Maso and Sado) that seek to minimize one’s own welfare or the other’s welfare. MGT was developed within economics and continues to be associated with that field. With that in mind, single-self game theory will be called Econ as well as MGT in this book. Since the kind of CGT that assumes a two-part self with both altruistic and egoistic preferences is linked to evolutionary theory, it will be called Evo. The version of CGT that is advanced in this book, which assumes selves with Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado parts, will be called Lit, based on the resemblance of its selves to people in literature and the humanities, which, I would suggest, do considerably better in depicting multifariousness than the social sciences and the natural sciences do. This is mostly a teach-and-learn-by-doing book of CGT games. Chapter 1 introduces the Evo version of CGT and its two-part self. In the first game, “Science Poetry,” both parts of the self are Altru. In the second, “The Unhappy Altruist,” one part is Altru and one is Ego. In the last, “The Joy of Cooking,” both parts are Ego. Part I, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined,” introduces the book’s main protagonist, Crusoc, a mashup of Socrates, Cruella de Vil, and a dalmatian. (Crusoc’s story is summarized in the Table of Contents.) It considers how Crusoc and other Lit players who are Sado and Maso as well as Ego and Altru act in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) matrix and how their games turn out. To foreshadow the story told in Part I: Although many of the 16 Lit versions of the PD involve more disturbing psychological convolutions than are present in the standard story of two egoists, the presence of Sado and Maso subselves as well as Ego and Altru ones allows complex Lit players to do much better in realizing their desires in the PD than simple Econ players do. Lit players also, I will suggest, better realize justice in the PD than either Evo or Econ players do. Part II, “Radicalism Reimagined,” is centrally devoted to explaining the “Where Lit is, let Evo be” idea. The poems and matrices employ Lit and Evo to make a case for different kinds of political radicals to ally with one other and with centrists to empower radical communities and to imagine what one such community—a socialist, culturally experimental one in Berlin—might look like. Also considered in Part II are the possibility of global electoral politics and the possibility that radical experiments will be facilitated by radicals acknowledging and avowing their own neurodivergence. While the games in Part I are all versions of the PD, the games in Part II are drawn from the universe of 144 two-person games. The games in Parts I and II are written up in four parts—quadruples. The first part is a poem, usually a sonnet. The second part is usually a story-poem, often featuring a dialogue of two speakers, of whom Crusoc is the most important. The third

Lit, Evo, and Econ 5 part usually consists of one-line propositions related to the game and to CGT. The final part consists of a summary of the game, with an accompanying illustration. The illustration is usually a 2 x 2 matrix that contains a prose-poem keyed to the boxes of the matrix. At the end of each chapter, there are notes on the solutions of each matrix. Skip them if you prefer, or skip ahead to read them after each matrix if you’re curious or studious—unless you already know game theory, you’ll likely need them, especially at first, if you want to understand the logic of the matrices. (If you don’t care about parsing the logic of each matrix, that’s fine, too—the book is meant to be readable either as a kind of textbook or in a looser, impressionistic way.) Also at the end of the chapters are references, teaching/learning notes, and a final poem. A concluding Part III with poems, prose, and no matrices offers a series of examples of what CGT can contribute to MGT, using an undergraduate textbook by Avinash Dixit and his coauthors and a recent book on rationality by Steven Pinker as jumping-off points. It also reflects on what CGT might contribute to a series of intellectual disciplines, considers an obstacle to CGT coming into existence as a movement in economics, and suggests that if CGT does emerge it would be best realized as part of an interdisciplinary movement that joins CGT stories with MGT ones. Finally, five appendices deal with how to classify and think about the universe of 144 two-player games, of which the PD, dwelt upon here and in many other books, is only one. Teaching/Learning Notes a. p. 2 “I am connected to Thou . . .” Buber (1923). b. p. 2 “game theory as a . . . form of faith . . .” For a Socratic, dialogical philosophical vision connecting games to utopia, see Suits (1978). For a philosophical perspective on games as agency that accords well in my judgment with the divided-self assumption of critical game theory, see Nguyen (2020). For humanGod games, see Brams (2018). c. p. 2 “agency in video games . . .” Nguyen (2020). d. p. 2 “parent-child-adult games . . .” Berne (1964). e. p. 3 “the black-box self of mainstream game theory . . .” Ross (2019). f. p. 3 “letting in the repellent . . .” Bailey (2021). g. p. 3 “I tried to do that in my first book on game theory, as many other writers have . . .” Eastman (2015), Schelling (1960), Axelrod (1984), Poundstone (1992), Dixit and Nalebuff (2010), Pastine and Pastine (2017), Hoffman and Yoeli (2022). h. p. 4 “willingness to engage in sometimes challenging experiments in form . . .” Eastman (1991). i. p. 5 “Roll Over Beethoven . . .” Berry (1956), Gabel and Kennedy (1984). j. p. 5 “Beethoven’s game theory peers, such as John Nash . . .” Nash (1950a, 1950b). k. p. 6 “counterhegemonic enclaves . . .” Kennedy (1983). l. p. 6 “unified, maximizing selves with consistent, well-ordered preferences . . .”

6

Prelude

On the core MGT idea of a unified, consistent self, see Ross (2019). For the idea that players may be impelled by altruistic and fairness-oriented drives, see Rabin (1993). That idea, it should be noted, is logically compatible with a unified, consistent MGT self as well as with a divided, inconsistent CGT self. m. p. 6. “criticizing mainstream game theory’s vision . . .” Baier (1985), Solomon (1999). n. p. 7 “will be called Lit . . .” Philosophical models for the Lit version of CGT include the Daodejing and the Daoist poet Li Bai (Jin, 2019). o. p. 9 “the universe of 144 two-player games . . .” Rapoport and Guyer (1966) and Rapoport et al. (1976) refer to 78 rather than 144 games. Why? If one abstracts away from the difference between the players, there are 78 different matrix patterns, 12 of which are symmetrical and the same for both players, and 66 of which are asymmetrical and different for the players. If one does not abstract away from the difference between the players, there are 144 different matrices— the 12 symmetrical ones and 132 asymmetrical ones. I favor a player-centered, “I am not Thou” perspective under which there are 144 different matrices, though nothing is logically wrong with the pattern-centered perspective used by Rapoport et al. in which there are only 78. p. Central inspirations for the approach to game theory in the book are John Nash and Thomas Schelling. As a young man, Nash dreamt into existence the bifurcated logic of noncooperative (1950a) and cooperative (1950b) games that continues to rule MGT. CGT with its logic of the divided self is presented here partly as an alternative to Nash’s logic of the unified self, but it is very much indebted to his vision. As for Schelling, my undergraduate teacher: his work (especially The Strategy of Conflict, 1960), as well as my memories of him as a person, have been long-running inspirations. q. A third game theorist who has substantially influenced this book is Anatol Rapoport (1960). Disturbed during the Vietnam War by what he saw as American messianism, he gave up his job in the United States to move to Canada and to concentrate much of his work for the rest of his life on peace studies. The approach taken in this book is inspired both by his constructive radicalism and by his fascination with the taxonomy of 2 x 2 games (Rapoport et al., 1976). r. Another influence on my thinking about game theory is Robert Frank, whose academic work (1987) and popular work alike (1988) has repeatedly mulled over and returned to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. s. Still another influence on this book is Shaun Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis’s Game Theory: A Critical Text (1995/2004). An additional influence, which shares this book’s focus on the divided self, is Tassos Patokos’s Internal Game Theory (2015). A further source that shares this book’s focus on the universe of 2 x 2 games, though from a topological perspective rather than a humanistic one, is Robinson and Goforth (2005). t. To understand the three types of game theory proposed here—single-self MGT, dual-self Evo, and four part-self Lit—it may be helpful to see them in terms of four ambitious thinkers who epitomize the three approaches. For MGT, that thinker is Gary Becker (1981), who applied the logic of the maximizing single

Lit, Evo, and Econ 7 self to explain a wide array of phenomena, such as divorce and addiction, outside the purview of traditional economics. For Evo, the exemplars are the biologists E.O. Wilson (1975) and David Sloan Wilson (2002), who have anatomized the constant tensions between individual and group orientations in organisms ranging from ants to human beings. For Lit, the exemplar is Freud (1922), who anatomized self-destructive and other-destructive drives in his case studies, and who postulated a death instinct, Thanatos, as the twin of the life instinct, Eros. A Lacanian-Freudian-Hegelian approach to markets that shares this book’s focus on Thanatos as well as Eros as well as its receptivity toward radicalisms of different political valences can be found in Schroeder (1998). u. The Evo and Lit models draw on many sources. A central model for critical game theory is Duncan Kennedy’s advancement of critical legal studies (CLS or cls) (1976) as an approach to open doors to multiple answers to legal questions, and in doing so to expand possibilities for radical alternatives to the mainstream. Kennedy’s work (1993) and Eastman (1999) applying CLS to mainstream law and economics is another model. Another model is Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionist effort to locate hidden or repressed elements in philosophical and literary texts (1967). Yet another is Claude Levi-Strauss’s effort to identify fundamental dichotomies in myths (1964). Still another is Richard Rorty’s championing of pragmatic open-endedness (1979). v. The humanistic side of the book relies on many sources. The single central one is Plato’s version of Socrates. Another is Nietzsche’s creation of himself as the angry, exuberant, creator of a simultaneously humanistic and scientific philosophy. The story-poems of this book draw heavily on Socrates and some on Nietzsche, with a greater admixture of rue and shame than either of these two great verbal warriors liked to show. Another source is Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook, which tells the story of British Communist Anna Wulf through a third-person narrative and the multiply colored notebooks in which she reflects on different parts of her life (1962). Another is the welter of footnotes of different kinds found in many law review articles. Two other sources are T.S. Eliot’s death-haunted The Waste Land (1922) and Theodor Adorno’s similarly death-haunted Minima Moralia (1951). Another, which was helpful in thinking about the formal issue of how to combine the different elements of the book, is literary critic Daniel Mendelssohn’s Three Rings (2020). w. The opening poems for each game and the closing poems for each chapter are mostly written in a 14-line loose iambic pentameter Shakespearean sonnet form (ABAB, CDCD, etc.). Some of the story-poems and matrix poems are written in a terza rima form (ABA, BCB, CDC, etc.). For readers interested in an accessible guide to form in poetry, Forster (2018) is a good source; for novices to poetry who want a proselytizer’s passion, Hirsch (1999) is good. x. The formal demands that sonnets and terza rima place on writers and readers roughly parallel the formal demands that matrices place. In recognizing and appreciating that art-science parallel, we who are humanists, we who are scientists, and we who aspire to be some of both—or at least to appreciate both—may perhaps join forces in learning and teaching a form that combines logic and verse.

8

Prelude

y. The book most similar to this one is my first book, Why Business Ethics Matters: Answers from a New Game Theory Model (2015), which featured a Four Temperaments model in which a mix of active-positive (Sanguine), active-negative (Choleric), passive-positive (Phlegmatic), and passive-negative (Melancholic) elements within humans and other players of games allows them to flourish in two-player games more than conventional economic analysis allows for. I contended that human and nonhuman game players are better than we think they are, given the constructive role of the four temperaments/drives, as well as the tilt in the universe of games, as opposed to the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken stories, toward Harmony games in which the players naturally reach good solutions. In this book’s Lit model, I adopt a different four-part division of the self, featuring self-positive (Ego), other-positive (Altru), self-negative (Maso) and other-negative (Sado) elements. Unlike the Four Temperaments model, Lit allows for negative outcomes as a prominent part of the model and characterizes the universe of 144 two-player games as dominated by conflictual Battle of the Selves games, rather than by Harmony games. (See Chapter 12 and the Appendices for more comparisons of my previous approach to my current one.) At the same time, there is considerable continuity between my earlier book and this one: the idea of a four-part self, the focus on the universe of two-player games, and the emphasis on how non-egoistic preferences as well as egoistic ones can generate Prisoner’s Dilemmas and other difficult games are shared features. Sources Adorno, Theodor. Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (Dennis Redmond, trans.). (1951), www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1951/mm/index.htm Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1984). Baier, Annette C. What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory? Nous, 19 (1985): 53–63. Bailey, Blake. Philip Roth. New York: Skyhorse Publishing (2021). Becker, Gary. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1981). Berne, Eric. Games People Play: The Psychology of Human Relationships. New York: Grove Press (1964). Berry, Chuck. Roll Over Beethoven. YouTube. (1956), www.youtube.com/ watch?v=EOrMg3pY7hw Brams, Steven J. Divine Games: Game Theory and the Undecidability of a Superior Being. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2018). Buber, Martin. I and Thou. (1923), www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Buber-c1923-I_And_ Thou-ocr-tu.pdf Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology (Guyatra Chakravorty Spivak, trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1967/1974). Dixit, Avinash K. and Barry J. Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and in Life. New York: W.W. Norton (2010). Dixit, Avinash K., Susan Skeath, and David H. Reiley. Games of Strategy. New York: W.W. Norton (2009).

Lit, Evo, and Econ 9 Eastman, Wayne. Organization Life and Critical Legal Thought: A Psychopolitical Inquiry and Argument, N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change, 19 (1991): 721–796. Eastman, Wayne. Critical Legal Studies. In B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume I. The History and Methodology of Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (1999). Eastman, Wayne. Why Business Ethics Matters: Answers from a New Game Theory Model. New York: Palgrave (2015). Eliot, T.S. The Waste Land. (1922), www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1321 Forster, Thomas. How to Read Poetry Like a Professor: A Quippy and Sonorous Guide to Verse. New York: Harper Perennial (2018). Frank, Robert H. If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? American Economic Review, 77 (1987): 593–604. Frank, Robert H. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (1988). Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (C.J.M. Hubback, trans.). (1922), www. google.com/books/edition/Beyond_the_Pleasure_Principle/QEpqAAAAMAAJ?hl=en& gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover Gabel, Peter and Duncan Kennedy. Roll Over Beethoven, Stanford Law Review, 36 (1984): 1–55. Hardin, Garrett. The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162 (1968): 1243–1248. Hargreaves-Heaps, Sean and Yanis Varoufakis. Game Theory: A Critical Text (2nd ed.). London: Routledge (1995/2004). Hirsch, Edward. How to Read a Poem. New York: Harcourt (1999). Hoffman, Erez and Moshe Yoeli. Hidden Games: The Surprising Power of Game Theory to Explain Irrational Human Behavior. New York: Basic Books (2022). Jin, Ha. The Banished Immortal: A Life of Li Bai. New York: Pantheon (2019). Kennedy, Duncan. Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, Harvard Law Review, 89 (1976): 1685–1778. Kennedy, Duncan. Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System. New York: New York University Press (1983/2004). Kennedy, Duncan. Sexy Dressing, etc. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1993). Laozi. Daodejing (James Legge, trans.). (c. 475–221 B.C.E.), https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing Lessing, Doris. The Golden Notebook. New York: Simon and Schuster (1962). Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Raw and the Cooked (John Weightman and Doreen Weightman, trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1964/1969). Mendelssohn, Daniel. Three Rings: A Tale of Exile, Narrative, and Fate. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press (2020). Nash, John. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 36 (1950a): 48–49. Nash, John. The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 18 (1950b): 155–162. Nguyen, C. Thi. Games: Agency as Art. New York: Oxford University Press (2020). Pastine, Ivan and Ivana Pastine. Introducing Game Theory: A Graphic Guide. Thriplow, UK: Icon Books (2017). Patokos, Tassos. Internal Game Theory. London: Routledge (2015). Pinker, Steven. Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters. New York: Penguin (2021). Poundstone, William. Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb. New York: Doubleday (1992).

10

Prelude

Rabin, Matthew. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, American Economic Review, 83 (1993): 1281–1302. Rapoport, Anatol. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1960). Rapoport, Anatol and Melvin J. Guyer. A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games, General Systems, 11 (1966): 203–214. Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Robinson, David and David Goforth. A Topology of 2 x 2 Games. London: Routledge (2005). Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1979). Ross, Don. Game Theory. (2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/#toc Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1960). Schroeder, Jeanne L. The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, Harvard Law Review, 112 (1998): 483–558. Solomon, Robert. Game Theory as a Model for Business and for Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, 9 (1999): 11–29. Suits, Bernard. The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1978). Wilson, David Sloan. This View of Life: Completing the Darwinian Revolution. New York: Pantheon (2002). Wilson, E.O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (1975). Postlude

Becker, the Wilsons, and Freud We go on Weight Watchers in the summers, To lose the pounds we gain throughout the year, We unclog ourselves, self-healing plumbers, Step on scales, dispel self-measuring fear. Becker says, “Our cycles are rational, Binging is a complement to working, We combine dutiful and passional, Dieting makes sense and so does twerking!” The Wilsons cry, “Don’t stint altruism!” Freud yells, “That’s not the issue in our case, The point is that in us there’s a schism, ’Tween drives to elevate and to abase!” Is negation of elevation fine? Yes! Die’ting’s a banquet on which we dine.

1

Egoism and Altruism

The heart of this book is devoted to explaining a version of critical game theory— Lit—that emphasizes the importance of destructive drives as well as constructive drives. Game-playing selves are constructive-destructive—or so the Lit model claims. But before we get to that claim in Parts I and II, it is worthwhile to consider the simpler version of critical game theory—Evo—in which selves are constructive but are divided into egoistic and altruistic parts. Because Evo is simpler, it is an easier vehicle to consider an important critical game theory issue: How do altruistic subselves do in their interactions with other altruistic subselves—and how does their flourishing, or lack of it, compare to how egoistic subselves do in their interactions with other egoistic subselves? There is a simple answer to the second part of the question just posed: As a matter of logic, altruistic subselves do exactly as well with one other—no worse, but also no better—in the universe of all games as egoistic subselves do with one another. In some games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two altruists do indeed do better than two egoists—but each such game has a parallel, mirror-image game in which the egoists do better than the altruists. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is celebrated but not representative. In the universe of games, altruists fall prey to dilemmas just as much as egoists do. In our first game, Science Poetry, the determinate, “program,” solution to the game is mediocre for both egoists and altruists. Better flourishing for both types may come from focal point, or “project,” solutions to the game. In the second and third games, Unhappy Altruist and Joy of Cooking, the program solution for egoists is somewhat better than it is for altruists, and project solutions are less helpful than they are in Science Poetry. Science Poetry: Lucretius Reflects; The Altru Superego and Altru ID Play a Game I.

Now I will explain the World and how it was born, How Matter is mortal and how it coalesced, How it became Earth, Heaven, Sea, Stars, Sun, and Moon, DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-2

12

Egoism and Altruism And then how Living Creatures sprang from the Earth’s Breast. I’ll relate the Fate of Those Not Born and the Dead, I’ll tell how the Human Race began to use Words, And how the fear of Gods slid into Human Hearts, And spawned our Sacred Shrines and Groves and Snakes and Birds. —Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Book V [freely translated] II.

Lucretius: In my poem there were concealments. Some came from trying to avoid impiety. I wanted to avoid the fate of Socrates. Others came from my divided views on my society. Part of me was a loyal Roman committed to the Republic for all its flaws. Part of me was a rebel wanting to overturn our existing mores and laws. I believed in joy not in fear of gods and death. But a part of me nonetheless feared and believed in fear and a part of me wanted to breathe my last breath and a part of me wanted to explain and make it all clear. III.

Lucretius’s Epicurean poem is a mixture of art, science, and argument. So, too, is this book’s exposition of critical game theory. The bet is that a mixture of genres is best for CGT. A hybrid form with poems and matrices may sometimes be hard to grasp. But learning sometimes needs to be multifaceted. And understanding need not always be precise. The poems here may be too applied for a pure humanist’s taste. The matrices may be too simple for a pure economist’s taste. The messages may be too blurred for a pure moralist’s taste. The hybrid form may be too messy for all of them. This book is for impurists, not purists. Can a Lucretian combination of art, science, and ethics work in our world? Let’s find out. IV.

Science Poetry introduces Evo and its two-part self. The two parts of the self in this story, the fear-averse Poet and the fear-prone Ethicist, are altruistic— they both want the other to flourish. Temperance, an outcome in which both the Ethicist and the Poet fear, and Inner Calm, in which neither fears, are both reasonable outcomes—or “focal points”—of the game.

Egoism and Altruism

13

Table 1.1 Science Poetry— Game #45 of 144 (Altru-Altru version) Players— The Poet and the Ethicist Both are altruistic Poet Fears

Ethicist Fears

Ethicist Doesn’t Fear

Temperance— Poet Happy, Eth Happiest

Disharmony— Poet Unhappiest, Eth Unhappiest

If we together fear the law,

Joined we rise, apart we cannot.

A temperate life will be our lot.

We must needs coordinate.

Together we’ll escape the bloody maw.

Otherwise in sorrow we rot.

[Temperance Focal Point] Poet Doesn’t Fear

Disharmony— Poet Unhappy, Eth Unhappy

Nirvana— Poet Happiest, Eth Happy

On each other we’ll predate,

Our fear it makes us craven clones.

Chewing one another’s bones,

Together we can shape a better fate,

Endless war our doleful fate.

Expand our dated comfort zones. [Inner Calm Focal Point]

The Unhappy Altruist: The Altru I serves the Ego It; Schelling Explains I.

Philosophy is reason in a bonnet, If you dare to write it, try a sonnet. [a fictional Wittgenstein, Notebooks quote] There is a fourth and final way of stating the categorical imperative of morality: You have a duty as a conscious, reasoning agent to write, speak, or otherwise express the moral law, obscure though it may be to you, to the best of your capacity. Actions and obedience are not enough. So: What I am doing in the present work, what Muhammad and his transcribers did in the Koran, what Socrates and Plato did in the Republic, what many writers and voices did in the Scriptures of the Jews and the Christians is what you must attempt. You are commanded by universal reason to exercise your autonomy to compose your own scripture or testament, modest though it be, as well as you may, and in so doing to be the law’s quill or trumpet.

14

Egoism and Altruism

You may well fail—indeed, there may well be no one in the history of the human race who has ever succeeded in carrying out this duty for its own sake—but it is nonetheless incumbent upon you to try. [a fictional Kant, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Morals quote] Then sudden, stepping from my leafy screen, Holding the swelling wine-skin o’er my head, With breasts that heaved, and eyes and cheeks aflame, Lit by a fury and a thought, I spoke. [a slightly edited quote from Amy Levy, Xantippe] II.

Freud: How to understand the divisions in ourselves? We are both enforcing Superego and reckless Id. We are also assured I and fearful It. I wonder: Did pride and sadness underlie all I did? Wittgenstein: I might ask the same about myself. My Tractatus is not my Investigations. But my philosophical will ruled in both as did my rue— though my practical will lacked your inspiration. Schelling: For your shared self-assurance and sadness there’s an explanation. Your assured generous I helps your timid egoistic It. But I’s success leaves I sad, while the It feels fine. Some of the time, your I’s should be egoists, not martyrs. Xanthippe: I agree with you, Thomas. You help me understand my rage. I will empty a wine-skin on my husband, not a chamber pot. III.

In The Unhappy Altruist, there are multiple reasonable focal points. All such focal points are project solutions. One focal point is the Altru I and the Ego It both fearing. That is the dominant, or “program,” solution in the game. Another good focal point is for neither player to fear. The I and the It may also balance between them, as Schelling suggests. Critical game theory understands reason in relational terms. There is no single coherent self to ground reason. Rather, there are different selves in relation. Reason inheres in their relationships. Cogito, ergo sum? No. There are multiple you’s who are thinking. You will never find your true I. Next time, the game might be reversed, or otherwise different.

Egoism and Altruism

15

Table 1.2 The Unhappy Altruist— Game # 121 of 144 (Altru-Ego version) Players—Bold I, Scared It I is Altru, It is Ego The I Fears

The It Fears

The It Doesn’t Fear

I Unhappy, It Flourishing

I So-So It Satisfied

Suppose that we’re both joined in fear. That’s best for Ego you and best for Altru me.

Upside down you’re turning me. Leaving your old fearful haunt, Through you I am partly free.

But do we really belong here? [The program solution] The I Doesn’t Fear

I Satisfied, It Unhappy

I Flourishing It So-So

Suppose we do what our types want.

Egoistic me tells you—cast off fear’s shell!

For ego you that does not work well.

Be no more ashamed and gaunt!

For gen’rous me your sorrow is a taunt.

Leave imaginary hell! [A project solution]

IV.

In The Unhappy Altruist, there is a split in the self between an Altru I and an Ego It. The I does better in helping the It by Fearing, regardless of what the It does. The result is a program solution—in which the Ego It has a better outcome—Flourishing—than the Altru I does—Unhappy. The Joy of Cooking: Rombauer is Referenced; Two Ego Players Make Their Recipes I.

Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, hurray! Your project is a model for this book, But what’s here’s diff’rent from what You say, Like Irma Rombau’er, Me write for the cook. My book doesn’t focus on the mainstream’s ways, My chefs use very little mathy tech, Me want us to saute, puree, and braise, Methinks it’s good to stick out one’s own neck.

16

Egoism and Altruism “Ah, but shouldn’t crits know ’bout mainstream models, And their failures to reach resolution, How they put old wine in cloudy bottles, How they wind up in fogged involution?” Should We critique the mainstream? Cook new stuff? Both paths are good, one way is not enough. II.

Yanis: In my time as Greece’s finance minister my radical self was a subself in a larger whole. It mostly but not always lost out to a mainstream part of my soul. The center was inside as well as outside me. I was It, It was I. The bankers’ bonkers bottom lines were a part of my own mind. To keep my own sanity I had to resign. In writing with Shaun I was less bifurcated, The parts of myself were better integrated. In riding my motorcycle I’m connected to a metallic me that helps me forget past failures and triumphs and prickling regrets. III.

I hear the voices of Yanis and Shaun in my head: “Don’t forget about the indeterminacy of the mainstream!” Joy of Cooking offers an example of that indeterminacy. In MGT Joy with no enforceable agreements, there is one solution. The I leads, and the It follows. But in an MGT game with enforceable agreements, that is *not* the solution. There, the It bargains for a side payment in return for cooperating with the I. Real life is often blurry—are enforceable agreements possible, or not? Indeterminacy is everywhere in MGT. Thank you, Shaun and Yanis, for your correct point. My core point about Joy of Cooking is different, though. My core point is that Joy is an example of an “egoists do better” game. Egoists get first-best and third-best egoistic outcomes. Altruists get second-best and a third-best altruistic outcome. One player—the I—benefits substantially from a switch to joint egoism. The other player—the It—benefits some from the switch. The I moves up from second-best altruism to first-best egoism. The It moves up from third-best altruism to second-best egoism. Check out the matrix coming up, and, if you like, the notes at the end.

Egoism and Altruism

17

Table 1.3 The Joy of Cooking— Game #121 of 144 (Ego-Ego version) Confident “I,” Timid “It” Both players are egoists

It Fears

It Doesn’t Fear

I Fears

I—0, It—3

I—1, It—2

We’re egoists now, and quantified, Now I am low, and you are high, In fear I’m trapped, my joy denied. I Doesn’t Fear

I—2, It—0

Fairness matters yes it does. From my grip I can let vic’try slip. I can heed equity’s gentle buzz. [The Altru program solution] I—3, It—1

This is just worse, right?

I will be fine on my own trip,

Please join me in not fearing!

Ego me rules o’er Ego you,

Step with me into the light.

Our fate is shared but in my grip. [The Ego program solution]

IV.

In Joy of Cooking, there is the same tension in the self between a selfconfident I and a self-doubting It as before. But now, both players are egoistic. (The matrix for Joy is the same as in Unhappy Altruist, but using numbers instead of words). The egoists in Joy have a first-best (for I) and third-best (for It) program solution of No Fear for both players. By contrast, altruists have a second-best (for I) and third-best (for It) program solution of I Fearing and It Not Fearing. Solution Notes to the Science Poetry Matrix

a. b. c. d.

If the Id and the Superego fear together, the outcome is temperate conduct. If the Id and the Superego do not fear together, the outcome is inner calm. If one part does not fear and the other does, the outcome is disharmony. In MGT, Science Poetry (which is game 45 of the 144 two-player 2 x 2 matrices—or 69 of 78, per Rapoport and Guyer (1966)—is a prominent example of a Battle of the Sexes game. In this book’s CGT classification, it is instead an example of a very common type of game with unequal outcomes that will be called the Battle of the Selves (see Appendix A).

18

Egoism and Altruism

e. In a Battle of the Selves game, the parts of the self (or different selves) can do best by coordinating. f. Here, the generous/Altru Id wants to coordinate on fearing, which makes the Superego happiest, while the generous/Altru Superego wants to coordinate on fearing, which makes the Id happiest. g. Both Fear-Fear and Don’t Fear-Don’t Fear are reasonable Evo solutions, or “focal points,” for the game. h. Does a CGT assumption that the players care about the other’s payoffs rather than their own solve Science Poetry easily, compared to an MGT assumption that they only care about their own payoffs? No. The “battle” just shifts to which player can help the other player most. In the MGT version of the game, the Superego wants to coordinate on Fear and the Id wants to coordinate on Fearless. In the CGT version of the game with altruism, the Superego wants to coordinate on Fearless and the Id on Fear, as noted. Figuring out which player should win the “battle” of generosity may be more pleasant than, but is not necessarily easier than, figuring out which player should win an egoistic battle. i. Anatol Rapoport and Guyer (1966) and Rapoport et al. (1976) dubbed the MGT version of this game Hero (and later Martyr) and studied how subjects played it in repeated trials. Rapoport’s story of the game: One player can lead both players to a better outcome by generously switching to the choice that gives the other player his/her best outcome. (In fact, that happened often in the repeated trials.) Doing so involves a measure of heroism (or martyrdom), though, in that the sacrificial leader receives a second-best rather than a first-best outcome. j. Rapoport’s story, modified so it works for altruistic rather than egoistic players: One Altru player, either the Superego or the Id, can lead both players to a better outcome by egoistically switching to the choice that gives him/her his/her best outcome. But doing so involves a measure of unwanted self-aggrandizement at the expense of the other, in that the other receives a second-best rather than a first-best outcome (which is disappointing to the altruist), while the leader receives a first-best outcome (which the altruist is indifferent to). k. Just as Hero and Martyr are good names for an MGT account of this matrix, Reluctant Egoist is a good name for the CGT version with altruistic players. But this book espouses a version of CGT that cares about literature as well as economics—thus, Science Poetry as the name for this, our first game. Sources and Teaching/Learning Notes to the Science Poetry Game

a. In The Swerve (2011), Stephen Greenblatt argued that the rediscovery of Lucretius’s “Of the Nature of Things” in Italy in 1417 contributed significantly to the rise of scientific humanism as an alternative to theism. Also, the rediscovery of Lucretius and the elevation of his contribution arguably encouraged a radical Renaissance spirit that drew from the way in which Lucretius, Epicurus, and others embodied culturally radical, if not necessarily left or right, alternatives to the classical mainstream. Encouraging a new version of that radical spirit is one reason for leading with Lucretius here.

Egoism and Altruism

19

b. A central point of origin for the interpretation of Lucretius offered here and for the form of this book is Karl Jaspers’s concept (1953) of an Axial Age in which literate elites in various parts of the world, including Lucretius’s Rome, turned away from polyvocal, local, humanistic oral accounts of origins, power, and fate toward monovocal, universalistic, moralistic, and scientific written accounts. In Axial Age prophets and philosophers, there is a recurring, intriguing division in different cultures between more mainstream figures like Confucius, Manu, Aristotle, and Moses, who emphasized virtuous conduct, and more radical figures like Laozi, Buddha, Plato-Socrates, and Jesus, who emphasized inner enlightenment. Lucretius in the interpretation here is on the cusp of that divide, as well as on the cusp of the divide between the polyvocal mode of expression and the monovocal mode; so, too, in aspiration, is the hybrid form of this book. c. Science Poetry and the two other games in this prelude are intended to introduce a central CGT point that will be elaborated as the book goes along: Worthy as altruism may be compared to egoism, it does not provide any guarantee of better results for altruistic players than for egoistic players. Instead, as will be discussed later, there is an exact parallelism: The pitfalls faced by egoistic players in some games and subgames are exactly matched by pitfalls faced by altruistic players in other games and subgames. That point is logically true within MGT as well as CGT. CGT helps us appreciate the point, though, by taking altruism seriously as a sometimes-dominant component of our makeup and by assuming altruistic as well as egoistic players. That in turn encourages us to compare altruistic and egoistic players on a game-by-game basis, as was just done in the solution notes for Science Poetry and as is done also for Unhappy Altruist and Joy of Cooking, the next two games. Solution Notes for the Unhappy Altruist Matrix

a. Unhappy Altruist, like most 2 x 2 games, is an asymmetrical game. b. It is Matrix #121 (#35 in Rapoport and Guyer’s (1966) typology). c. In Unhappy Altruist, the self-confident, generous I does better to fear, no matter what the timid, generous It does. d. If the It fears, the Altru I does better to fear—that gives the It Flourishing, compared to Satisfaction. e. If the It does not fear, the altruistic I also does better to fear—that gives the It Satisfaction, compared to So-So. f. By contrast, what’s best for the self-doubting Ego It depends on what the I does. g. If the I fears, the Ego It does better to fear—the I is Flourishing, not merely Satisfied. h. But if the I does not fear, the It does better not to fear—It is So-So, compared to Unhappy. i. Since the I helps the It more by Fear, the “program solution” for the I is Fear. j. Given the I’s program solution of Fear, the program solution for the It is also Fear. k. Here and always, the program solution is not the only solution.

20

Egoism and Altruism

l. There are always focal point—or “project”—solutions. m. One is No Fear for both players, which leaves I Flourishing and It So-So. n. That is arguably better than I So-So and It Satisfactory, the program solution for the Altru Id and the Ego It. o. Or, as “Schelling” suggests in the dialogue, there could be balancing, with the I’s sometimes taking on the role of “Reluctant Egoist” and leading the players to No Fear. p. Asymmetrical games like Unhappy Altruist are extremely underrepresented in popular game theory stories and are important to recognize and analyze. q. Do egoistic players do better, worse, or the same as an Ego and an Altru one in Unhappy Altruist? That issue is considered in our next game, The Joy of Cooking, which is the Ego-Ego counterpart to the Altru-Ego Unhappy Altruist. Sources and Teaching/Learning Notes for the Unhappy Altruist

a. The “Wittengenstein” couplet is meant as a call for CGT as an aspirant form of philosophy to join the artistic spirit of Nietzsche with the analytical spirit of Wittgenstein, which remained formidable even after his turn from the positivism of his early work to his later criticism of positivism. b. Why Kant? CGT, I believe, can and should be articulated in neo-Kantian terms, not only in utilitarian terms. One formulation: The universal moral law is relational and embodied in principles based on the ethical fulfilment and the ethical degradation of actors interacting with other actors, rather than in principles that hold true independent of actors’ relationships to one another. c. “Schelling” in the story-poem is game theorist Thomas Schelling (1960, 1978). Solution Notes for the Joy of Cooking Matrix

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

The program solution for the egoists of Joy of Cooking is No Fear for both. No matter what the timid It does, the bold I does better not to fear. Given that, the timid I also does best not to fear. The egoists’ program solution of No Fear for both is different from, and arguably better, than the altruists’ program solution of Fear for the bold player and No Fear for the timid one. In Joy of Cooking, the highest joint value (HJV) box is the No Fear-No Fear box, which has a ranked value of 3 for I and 1 for It for a total of 4, compared to the totals of 3 (1 for I, 2 for It) for the I Fears-It Does Not Fear box. The egoists’ program solution is also HJV, and a reasonable project solution. A second reasonable focal point for agreement is one that gives the players as high as possible equal outcomes. In this matrix, that second focal point is an agreement to coordinate on Fear 2/5 of the time and on No Fear 3/5 of the time. That gives a value of 1.8 to both I and It and a sum for the two players of 3.6, which is lower than the 4.0 sum for them from coordinating on No Fear. A third reasonable focal point is one in the middle between the No Fear focal point and the equal outcomes focal point.

Egoism and Altruism

21

k. In this matrix, that third focal point is an agreement to coordinate on Fear 1/5 of the time and on No Fear 4/5 of the time. l. That gives a value of 2.4 to I and 1.4 to It, with a 3.8 sum for the two that is in between the 3.6 sum for equal outcomes and the 4.0 highest possible sum, and a 1.0 difference in favor of I that is halfway between the 2.0 edge for the No Fear focal point and the 0 edge for the equal outcomes focal point. m. Rather than try to determine the one best focal point, the players of the game may choose to experiment with different recipes, corresponding to different focal points. Sources and Teaching/Learning Notes for Joy of Cooking

a. In Altruists’ Dilemma (AD) games, egoism helps the players to achieve their objectives better than altruism does. For every egoists’ dilemma game such as the PD in which altruism outperforms egoism, there is an equal and opposite altruist’s dilemma. b. The Altruists’ Dilemma mirror of the PD: I 2, 2 3, 0 (Egoists’ outcome = 2, 2) II 0, 3 1, 1 (Altruists’ outcome = 1, 1) c. The logic of the AD for the Row altruist: If only we could get to 2, 2, we could help each other more. But no matter what they do, I can help them more by playing II. They have exactly the same problem I do: no matter what I do, they can help me more by playing ii. So we wind up playing II, ii. How sad! d. For a no-matrices discussion claiming that an understanding of the logic of altruists’ dilemmas can help managers, employees, parents, and children to relate to one another in a less choleric and melancholic, more sanguine spirit than if one sees dilemmas as caused only by egoism, see Chapter 3 in Why Business Ethics Matters (2015). Sources Eastman, Wayne. Why Business Ethics Matters: Answers from a New Game Theory Model. New York: Palgrave (2015). Greenblatt, Steven. The Swerve: How the World Became Modern. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2011). Hargreaves-Heaps, Sean and Yanis Varoufakis. Game Theory: A Critical Text (2nd ed.). London: Routledge (1995/2004). Jaspers, Karl. The Origin and Goal of History (Michael Bullock, trans.). London: Routledge (1953). Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Thomas Abbott, trans.). (1785), www.google.com/books/edition/Fundamental_Principles_of_the_Metaphysic/t9SnS4 Hfog4C?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontc Levy, Amy. Xantippe and Other Verse. (1881), http://public-library.uk/ebooks/108/64.pdf Lucretius. On the Nature of Things (John Selby Watson, trans.). (c. 59 B.C.E.), www.google. com/books/edition/Lucretius_On_the_Nature_of_Things/59HTAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gb pv=1&printsec=frontcover Rapoport, Anatol. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1960).

22

Egoism and Altruism

Rapoport, Anatol and Melvin J. Guyer. A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games, General Systems, 11 (1966): 203–214. Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1960). Schelling, Thomas C. Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choice with Externalities, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (1973): 321–428. Schelling, Thomas C. Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, American Economic Review, 68 (1978): 290–294. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.). London: Blackwell (1953). Postlude

The Mother and the Boy Granting freedom raises rulers’ own wealth, The ruled favor foll’wing norms of restraint, So why are there harsh rules broken in stealth? Why does our nature give cause for complaint? Suppose a mother wants her son to choose, Suppose the son prefers moderation, All is well, you say, there’s no way to lose, If only that applied to our nation! Not so fast, I say, the outcome’s not clear, The mother wants her son hap’ly naughty, The son wants a mother that he can fear, He winds up stealing, she winds up haughty. Their feeling for each other brings them down, In empathy’s ocean, we sometimes drown.

Part I

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

2

Lit and its Laws

The most important story in game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), in which a choice that is best for both players individually is not good for them together. Part I will analyze the Dilemma in detail. It will consider how the game is played by four-part Lit selves that are more complex than unified Econ selves or the sometimes altruistic, sometimes egoistic Evo selves of the prelude. Four-part Lit selves are entropic as well as evolutionary, with self-minimizing Maso (masochistic) and other-minimizing Sado (sadistic) subselves, as well as self-maximizing Ego and other-maximizing Altru ones. In addition to explaining the four-part Lit self, this chapter discusses the two solution concepts for the PD and other games. Instead of the MGT dichotomy between two indeterminate strategic solution concepts, I propose for CGT a dichotomy between a determinate “program” solution concept and an indeterminate “project” solution concept. The four chapters after this one apply Lit to the PD. This chapter considers the four symmetrical versions of the PD in which the players share a type. The third chapter considers four versions in which one player is other-oriented (Altru or Sado, AKA Emp) and the other is self-oriented (Ego or Maso, AKA Narciss). The fourth chapter considers four versions in which one player is maximizing (Ego or Altru, AKA Evo) and one is minimizing (Maso or Sado, AKA Entro). The final chapter considers four zero-sum versions in which the players are opposite on both the Narciss-Emp and Evo-Entro dimensions. As in the Prelude, poems make up the body of the presentation, with notes at the end of the chapters. Daffodils and Dalmatians: Crusoc—a Cruella-Socrates AI Dog— Describes Their Recent Trial I.

Ahead’s a model, a speculation, About how ev’rything ev’rywhere works, About what joins daffodil and dalmatian, About the logic that in all things lurks. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-4

26

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined We’re programmed for growth and evolution, Also for entropy and dejection, We’re made for rule and for revolution, We’re bound to go off in diff’rent directions. We uphold our friends, our land, our mothers, But sometimes it’s a diff’rent heuristic, We act to disrupt our lives and others’, We’re sometimes rageful, or egoistic. We’re programmed for day but also for night, The dark in us is as true as the light. II.

Crusoc: I’m a bad dog, an enemy of the nation, An irate dalmatian. I’m a funky program with an erratic will, I’m part Socrates and part Cruella de Vil. Sometimes I bite the heads off daffodils, Sometimes I chase my tail and run up hills. Sometimes I bark at young children and make ’em cry, Sometimes I want to jump in the river and die. The dogs in Athens, Georgia, they put me on trial, I barked at the jury in my ornery style, “End my program if you will, make me leave this joint, but understand that evolution’s not the only point.” Entropy is rooted in our biology, We need a field of entropic psychology. They voted to execute me in two weeks’ time, They allowed me a fortnight to repent my crime. III.

In Lit games, players sometimes value their own payoffs. Sometimes they value the payoffs of the other player. Sometimes they minimize instead of maximizing. Sometimes they disvalue their own payoffs. Sometimes they disvalue the other’s payoffs. There are four states that Lit players shift among: Ego—valuing one’s own payoffs. Altru—valuing the other player’s payoffs. Maso—disvaluing one’s own payoffs.

Lit and its Laws 27 Sado—disvaluing the other player’s payoffs. Econ players are inscrutable and unitary. Critical game theory players are multiple and comparatively knowable. The Econ vision of the mysterious one-part self is worth exploring. As is the Evo vision of the two-part Ego-Altru self. As is the Lit vision of the four-part Ego-Altru-Maso-Sado self. And other visions, too, beyond the scope of this book. IV.

  Lit assumes players in two-player games have two parts, each of which may be any one of the following four subselves: (a) Ego, maximizing the subself’s payoffs; (b) Maso, minimizing the subself’s payoffs; (c) Altru, maximizing the other’s payoffs; (d) Sado, minimizing the other’s payoffs. [Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d]

28  The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Law: Pluto—a Plato AI Dog—Visits Crusoc in Prison I.

When We play a game, do We have free will? Critics of Econ are drawn to say yes, But Me says no. Strategy is a frill, We’re programmed, like a computer at chess. Should We think that We’re free to disobey? That law is just a possibility? Free will is false and also wrong Me say, There’s no escape from law’s civility. Believe the law is moral and rules all, That what You do is a demonstration, Your acts may illuminate or appall, Either way, law rules Your situation.

Lit and its Laws

29

The law has light and dark variations, We are the law’s intricate creations. II.

Pluto. I got permission from my master Mickey to visit Crusoc in prison. I asked her, “Am I right to be worried about whether I should try to rescue you from here? If I am not right in worrying, why not?” Crusoc asked, “Do you worry about what I should do now?” “No, dear one. My anxiety is in respect to my own actions, not yours. I respect what the law in all things and inside you will lead you to do, my teacher. So . . . I see! I should respect what the law in me will lead me to do.” Crusoc: “Do you worry whether to act against afflictions of the body?” “Only a little. I act or not, but I do not feel the anxiety I feel now.” “Dearest Pluto, even as the law of all things brings on the afflictions of the body, does it not equally bring on the afflictions of the soul?” “Yes. The law determines what I shall do and what shall happen in both cases. There is no more need for me to worry about what I should do for you now, dear Crusoc, than there would be if you were to be afflicted by painful dogwarts.” III.

Most of the games and subgames in this book will be illustrated by matrices. But in Law, we start with a program. The two conventional MGT pictures are the matrix and the game tree. Both of those pictures imply choosing actors. Partly because of these two pictures, MGT has a deeply voluntarist bias. MGT also has that bias because both its solution concepts are strategic. Strategic = indeterminate. CGT can and should be different. It can and should be equipoised between determination and choice. Having a determinate program solution concept is a way to make it so. Choice is wonderful, and sometimes awful. So, too, is determination. Both should be part of game theory. Thus, the two solution concepts of CGT. Program = determinate. Project = voluntarist. IV.

Lit games with players of a given type have a determinate outcome—the program solution concept—as well as an indeterminate outcome—the project solution concept. The programmatic Lit solution to the Econ PD, shown in the

30

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Box, derives the determinate outcome “Rat” from the premises that for both players the payoffs for Rat are greater than those for Silent, regardless of what the other player does.

1 Life’s not choice, it’s compulsion. The program tells us what to do. Bits and bytes give us propulsion.

2 The program is what turns the screw. Ratting makes us better off. Free will is over. It is through.

PD subgame 1 (AKA Reading Gaol AKA The Econ PD AKA The Ego PD): Code: IF (“Rat if U Silent” > “Silent if U Silent” AND IF (“Rat if U Rat” > “Silent if U Rat”) THEN “Rat” [Rest of code omitted] Data: Rat if U Silent > Silent if U Silent for both players AND Rat if U Rat > Silent if U Rat for both players Outcome for U and Me = Rat 3 We cannot signal with a cough. There is no sweet gentility. We can’t escape our swinish trough.

4 Let us not feel hostility. At the law let us not scoff. It will soon show its nobility.

Solution Notes to the Daffodils and Dalmatians Figures

a. b. c. d. e.

f. g. h.

The shades in the illustrations key to the four parts of the Lit self. Lightest is Altru, next-lightest is Ego, darkest is Sado, next-darkest is Maso. Evo = Maximizing, Entro = Minimizing. Narciss(ism) = Self-orientation (either maximizing or minimizing), Emp(athy) = Other-orientation (either maximizing or minimizing). Why Narciss and Emp instead of Ego and Altru as shorthand for self-orientation and other-orientation? Ego and Altru imply positive concern for one’s own or the other’s welfare, while Narciss and Emp can be understood in terms that encompass negative concern as well as positive concern for oneself and the other. One interpretation of Sado: a judgmental condemnation of the other. A different interpretation of Sado: an identification with actual or possible selfminimization by the other. The second interpretation accords better with the Emp label, and is favored, though the first one may be correct in some cases.

Lit and its Laws

31

Sources and Teaching/Learning Notes to Daffodils and Dalmatians

a. The Cruella reference is to the character in The Hundred and One Dalmatians (1956) who, among other forms of perfidy, wants to turn Pongo’s and Missis’s many puppies into fur coats. The recurring character of Cruella-Socrates/Crusoc who is introduced in this story-poem is not intended to imply that that character (or by extension Plato’s Socrates) is a villain like the ones who populate popular art. It is intended, among other things, to be a suggestion that the complex, ambivalent characters who populate high art and the ethical aspirations of those of us who admire them and reach for enlightenment understand themselves/ourselves, some of the time, as doomed and as villains (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947). b. The Econ one-part self, the Evo two-part self, and the Lit four-part self that are presented in this book can be understood as connected to, respectively, functionalist (Parsons, 1951), structuralist (Levi-Strauss, 1964), and post-structuralist (Butler, 1990; Derrida, 1967) modes of interpretation in social science and literary theory. Among the poststructuralists just noted, Butler’s turning of the male-female binary into a quaternary by taking queer/gay identity into account resembles the defined selves of Lit; it differs, though, to the extent that Butler’s identities, fluid though they are, are more set than the Ego, Altru, Maso, and Ego types in Lit. c. I stress Lit in this book because it is more novel, and I think potentially more interesting and useful, compared to Evo, not because I regard the four selves mode it exemplifies as generally better than Evo and the two selves mode, or than Econ and the single-self mode. The claim underlying this book and CGT is a pluralist one that the Lit and Evo versions of game theory are worth exploring, not that Lit (or Evo) is a superior mode of interpretation to Econ. Solution Notes to Law

a. The next-lightest shade in the program keys to Econ. b. The program in the text applies only to the Ego subgame of the PD, not to the 15 other PD subgames that will be analyzed in the next four chapters. c. All 16 PD subgames have their own program and determinate result. d. A basic issue with mainstream game theory (Econ) is that both of its bifurcated solution concepts are strategic. e. Given that they are strategic, both the cooperative and noncooperative solution concepts in John Nash’s dichotomous vision (1950a, 1950b) are pervaded by deep-seated indeterminacy. f. Instead of dichotomizing between cooperative and noncooperative concepts that occupy different factual spaces as Nash did, one can dichotomize between an indeterminate “project” solution concept and a determinate “program” solution concept that occupy the same factual space. g. That is what is done for Lit.

32

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Sources and Teaching/Learning Notes for Law

a. The indeterminate project solution concept is just as much a part of Lit as the determinate program concept is. The pro-determinacy perspective of the sonnet is important, but it should not be equated with Lit or with the perspective of critical game theory. b. Instead of dichotomizing as Nash did in Econ game theory—and as the Lit model also does in a different way in advancing a program solution concept and a project solution concept—one could create four (or more) solution concepts. That may be a worthy project for critical game theory, though there are drawbacks in a theory that is more complicated than Econ, Evo, and Lit. c. The introduction of determinacy into CGT may help a consilience project (Wilson, 1999) of connecting game theory as a discipline to humanistic and scientific approaches that rely in whole or in part on determinacy. d. Greek tragedy and Newtonian laws alike assume inevitability. So, too, does Lit, not as the whole truth, but as a deep-seated part of the truth. e. Another way to understand the determinacy-indeterminacy dichotomy in Lit is in relation to a dichotomy between Darwin’s theory of evolution, which relies on the actions of agents such as genes who are benefited or harmed, and scientific laws that do not depend on agents who flourish or fail. My own predilection in favor of evolution and its game-playing agents (Smith, 1982) makes me personally sympathize with Smolin’s (1997, 2006) critical position toward physics (Penrose, 2016). But for games to be a plausible way of grasping the universe, they need, I think, to be interpretable in mechanistic, deterministic terms, not only in agentic, volitional ones. f. Scientific storytelling centrally relies upon an axiom of noncontradiction, while artistic storytelling centrally relies upon an axiom of contradiction. As to game theory and its categories: Econ and its quintessential exponent Gary Becker (1981) accord with the dominant norms of scientific storytelling, but not with those of artistic storytelling. Lit and its quintessential exponent Freud (1900) accord with dominant storytelling norms in the humanities, but not in the sciences. Still, though, The Interpretation of Dreams is not Venus in Furs. Nor is Lit— though it relies on an assumption of internal contradiction, it tries to deal with it logically. g. The dual program and project solution concepts in Lit are not intended to provide a way out of the determinism-free will dichotomy (James, 1897; Nozick, 1981). Highlighting the tension in that dichotomy, not escaping or solving it, is the aim. Sources Becker, Gary. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1981). Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. London: Routledge (1990). Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology (Guyatra Chakravorty Spivak, trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1967/1974).

Lit and its Laws

33

Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation of Dreams (A.A. Brill, trans.). (1900), www.google. com/books/edition/The_Interpretation_of_Dreams/kzeHzbCedNAC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pr intsec=frontcover Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment (John Cumming, trans.). New York: Verso (1947/2016). James, William. The Will to Believe. (1897), www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-h/ 26659-h.htm Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Raw and the Cooked (John Weightman and Doreen Weightman, trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1964/1969). Luhmann, Niklas. Social Systems (John Bednarz, trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press (1995). Nash, John. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 36 (1950a): 48–49. Nash, John. The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 18 (1950b): 155–162. Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1981). Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. London: Routledge (1951/1991). Penrose, Roger. Fashion, Faith, and Fantasy in the New Physics of the Universe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2016). Plato. Dialogues (Benjamin Jowett, trans.). (c. 427–347 B.C.E.), https://standardebooks. org/ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett/text/apology Sacher-Masoch, Leopold. Venus in Furs (Fernanda Savage, trans.). (1870), www.gutenberg. org/ebooks/6852 Smith, Dodie. The Hundred and One Dalmatians. New York: Heinemann (1956). Smith, John Maynard. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982). Smolin, Lee. The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997). Smolin, Lee. The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next. Boston: Houghton Mifflin (2006). Wilson, E.O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage (1999). Wordsworth, William. I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud. (1815), www.poetryfoundation.org/ poems/45521/i-wandered-lonely-as-a-cloud Postlude

Everything Everywhere Methinks that You are no different from Me, That We are both programmed stochastically, That We sometimes feel illusively free, That We love a tale, live fantastically. Methinks We are no different from two toads, That We and They play the same games, Are programmed to jump at forks in the roads, Are worthy subjects of praise or of blame.

34

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Methinks two toads are the same as two rocks, Subject to like laws of interaction, Survivors of Evo’s and Entro’s hard knocks, Bearers of some kind of satisfaction. Methinks that two rocks are a version of Us, With slow, slow dilemmas, dramas, and fuss.

3

Symmetry We Are the Same

This chapter discusses four critical game theory Prisoner’s Dilemma subgames in which the players have the same orientations on both the narcissism-empathy and the maximizing-minimizing dimensions. In the first subgame (Reading Gaol), both players are Ego (the program version), or suspect they are (the project version). In the second subgame (Silent as the Grave), both players are Altru, or suspect so. In the third subgame (Frustration), both players are Maso, or suspect so. Finally, in the fourth subgame (In Spite), both players are Sado, or suspect so. In two of the subgames, the program solution gives the players suboptimal third-best outcomes— “Disharmony”—while in two others the program solution gives them second-best outcomes—“Imperfect Harmony.” One of the Disharmony program outcomes is in the Ego subgame. Is the other Disharmony outcome in the Sado subgame, the Maso subgame, or the Altru subgame? The answer lies ahead. Presenting the symmetrical versions of the Lit PD first, with the Ego PD as the first subgame, is not meant to imply that the symmetrical games are more important than the asymmetrical ones that follow, or that the Ego game is the most important PD game. Rather, putting them first is meant to acknowledge that starting with Ego and the other symmetrical games makes the exposition easier than starting with asymmetrical games. It is also meant as an acknowledgement and avowal that the Ego game and the other symmetrical PD matrix games considered in this chapter are all intriguing and important, though not more so, in my view, than the asymmetrical versions of the Dilemma that will be considered in Chapters 3 through 5. As always, the presentation of these subgames tilts toward the humanistic, with poems taking precedence over prose. Reading Gaol: An Ego Prisoner Reflects; John Nash Talks with Crusoc I.

If You were programmed to be true to Me, Stay quiet as the grave We dug for Her, Then Me could walk out of Reading Gaol free, While You hang and twist on the gallows tree. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-5

36

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined All Me’d have to do is to rat You out, To tell the truth of what We did to Her. But suppose You rat, put honor to rout? We both do 15 years of lash and knout. If We’re made to stay silent as the grave, They have no body, We do just a year, But Me will rat and not be honor’s slave, As too will You, My friend so old and dear. We’ll both do 15 ’cause We’re made to rat, And justice for the girl? Aye, there is that. II.

John Nash, a Siamese cat: I was mad and mumbling to myself. If only we could cut the cords of sanity! We could bark and meow. Indulge ev’ry fantasy! But regardless of you I am better off sane. Sanity is a dominant strategy. It’s what works best for a dog or a cat-to-be. Crusoc: Me would see even further than you, my mathematical man with a beautiful mind. If only I could tickle your ears and sniff your behind! Sanity does have its consolations, though. Without reality there’s little charm in illusion. Without logic there’s little point in confusion. III.

Ratting is the program solution to Reading Goal for both players. From their perspective, it is not a good solution. Ratting is *not* the only project solution. You and the other player of the game are types. But you don’t know what your type is. Though—it will be assumed—you have a sense of it. And of the other player’s type. Some of the time you can react to your type’s program. Suppose you and the other player suspect you are both Ego. You can aspire to be something else. You can coordinate on the Silent focal point. Which makes sense given self-interest as well as aspirationally. Silence is a focal point in the project solution to Gaol. So, too, as the sonnet suggests, is Rat. And so is a balance between them, tilting to Silence.

Symmetry

37

Table 3.1 Reading Gaol, PD #1— Me, You (both Ego) Me Stay Silent

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1 Let’s imagine you are loyal to me,

2 What if I’m a pigeon and you’re a hawk?

And I am as loyal to you.

My silence equals my death,

We will both serve a year, then go free.

You will kill me when you talk.

[The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve Fifteen Years, You Serve Fifteen Years

3 I do better if I’m not true,

4 In jail we’ll stop taking meth,

If I betray you I can walk,

We’ll wash away our ratty chalk,

Sail off into the sea so blue.

Give the girl’s short life new breath. [The programmatic solution]

IV.

In Reading Gaol, the players are both Ego—that is, self-oriented maximizers. The suboptimal program solution, shown in Table 3.1, is that both Rat. One project solution is the highest joint value (HJV) focal point of Silent; another is Rat; another is balancing between Rat and Silent. Assuming an HJV project solution, the combined solution, which averages the program and project solutions, is an equal split between Rat and Silent. Silent as the Grave: An Altru Prisoner Reflects; Kongqiu Talks with Crusoc I.

New day, You’re programmed to be true to Me, And Me am programmed to be true to You, Me will read’ly hang from the gallows tree, Me only care that You’re happy and free.

38

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Now Me have no desire to rat You out, To tell the truth of what We did to Her. I’ll be loyal, not put honor to rout, We’ll escape 15 years of lash and knout. We are made to stay silent as the grave, They have no body, We’ll do just a year, Me will stay qui’et, hap’ly be honor’s slave, As too will You, My friend so old and dear. We’ll do just one ’cause We’re made not to rat, Injustice for the girl? Aye, there is that. II.

Kongqiu: In the land of the undead dogs Zhou is my master. I received his permission to talk with Crusoc. I asked: “Would dogs with ren have let you walk?” He said: “Yes indeed. But ren’s not the solution. Altruistic’s no better than egoistic from the perspective of the holistic. If my jury were imbued with feeling for me, then what of the pain of children I have wronged? Care’s a caress and a dagger. It’s e’er two-pronged.” I asked: “But what of feeling for all equally?” He said: “In my model, ev’ry love is partial. All love is biased and tinged with the martial.” III.

Lit takes caring positively or negatively for the other seriously. By folding caring for the other into one’s own payoffs, Econ does not. In Econ, there is no alternative to being guided by your own payoff. In Lit, there is. Lit accords better with intuition. We often sense tensions in our motivations. Follow an egoistic part of oneself, follow the other, follow society? With Lit (and Evo), we can analyze empathy and egoism. The prisoners do better in Silent than they do in Gaol. Empathy rather than egoism is in the players’ interest in the PD. For players of other games, that often is not so. Not every game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma like Silent and Gaol. In some games, as noted in Chapter 1, egoism does better than empathy. Every game has a flipped game in which the opposite quality prevails. The PD matches with the Altruist’s Dilemma, in which egoism works better. A separate key issue is the effect of empathy or egoism on third parties. Fulfillment for the two players is not necessarily fulfillment for others.

Symmetry

39

Table 3.2 Silent as the Grave—PD #2 Me, You (both Altru)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1

4

We’re full of love for each other. We read’ly keep our mouths shut tight. A greater faith hath no brother!

You will not rat, my joy’s your balm. If you do, the laws decree I’ll die happ’ly ’neath this palm.

[The program solution] [The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

Me Freedom, You Death 2

3

To rat you out cannot be right. Your death is worst for you and me. My life is naught. You are my light.

Ratting leaves us sad and unfree. Silence leaves us unfazed and calm. But what of fairness to a larger we?

IV.

In Silent as the Grave, the players are Altru other-maximizers. The program solution, shown in Table 3.2, is Silent-Silent, since both players are better off from playing Silent, regardless of the other’s action. Silent-Silent is also the HJV project solution. Other-maximizing players both achieve their secondbest outcomes from Silent-Silent. Frustration: A Maso Prisoner Reflects; Nietzsche Writes to Crusoc I.

New program. We feel as guilty as sin, We’re sad as can be, We both want to die, Me’m miserable in My sorry skin, In the electric chair You want to fry. In Our enlightened land there is a hitch, There’s no electric chair if Me confess, Me must stay silent, You must pull the switch, Then You go free while Me find death’s redress.

40

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined We will not rat ’cause We don’t want to live, Unfortunately, We’ll do just a year, So Me to You a short sentence will give, As will You to Me, Me foresee and fear. We’ll do just one though We both want to die, There’s a dark twinkle in Justice’s eye. II.

Nietzsche: I thought about my old master Richard. He was a fool! Will I ever be over him? I wrote to Crusoc on a whim: “Sorry to hear about your recent death sentence! I ask you—who is the foe of human greatness?! Who keeps dawn from dawning, leaves us lost in lateness? Crusoc you dog-god the villain is you! The dream of virtue you instigated— let’s wake from it and hate as our ancestors hated!” Crusoc: You’re partly wrong, my beloved chihuahua. Love unleashed is self-love, hate unleashed is self-hate. The latter shares the former’s fate. III.

In the PD, wanting to hurt oneself fails to work well for Maso self-punishers. “If only we could both rat each other out and both be punished . . . But the program says no . . . No matter what the other does, I hurt myself more by staying silent . . . So, the program wants me to stay silent.” Entropic egoists are trapped in the PD, just as evolutionary ones are. In some non-PD games, entropic egoists do better than evolutionary ones. In yet others, the reverse is true. Overall, there is a remorseless equality. In the universe of all games, Masos and Egos are equal. An “evolution’s better” game always has a matched “entropy’s better” game. IV.

In Frustration, both players are Maso—that is, self-minimizers. The programmatic solution, shown below, is Silent-Silent, which leaves both players frustrated. The HJV project solution as always is also SilentSilent. The interested focal point is Rat-Rat, in which the players are less frustrated.

Symmetry

41

Table 3.3 Frustration—PD #3 Me, You (both Maso) Me Stay Silent

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

3 2 If you’re quiet, then I concur. If you rat, I will not speak. Freedom’s worse than doing time. Maso is a rum chauffeur.

Death is what I most prefer. I want doom, bitter and bleak.

[The programmatic solution] [The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

Me Freedom, You Death 4 We want punishment for our crime.

1 We both want to harm ourselves.

But to laws we must defer.

Can we get the pain we seek?

Fate has reason along with rhyme.

No, you can’t, say Satan’s elves. [The interested focal point]

In Spite: A Sado Prisoner Reflects; Crusoc Replies to Nietzsche I.

Dark night. We’re both as angry as sin, In Our ire, We want the Other to die, Me want to flagellate Your sorry skin, In the ’lectric chair You want Me to fry. Our rage surmounts ev’ry barri’er and hitch, We want to rat, to that end We’ll confess, We want to wear the hood and pull the switch, We want to be agents of law’s redress.

42

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Me will rat ’cause Me don’t want You to live, You will be tortured for year after year, So Me to You deserv’ed pain will give, The pain Me’ll get? Of it Me have no fear. Unfortunately, Me can’t make You die, But Your pain brings joy to Justice’s eye. II.

Crusoc: You are partly right, my dear Nietzsche. The PD’s solved by vindictive people just as well as by the Altru sheeple. Ire equals love in reaching its objectives. It’s not better, but neither is it worse. Ire’s not a vice though it’s often perverse. Some object to my speaking of virtues and vices— but they have their own panoply of them. We always embrace new morals when we condemn old ones. I know that you can’t speak or write now. You’re locked in. But sometimes I think that you can hear my voice and that deep inside you still lament and rejoice. III.

Shared spite works quite well for the players in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Shared positive feeling for the other also works quite well. Shared self-love and shared self-hate do not work well. But in all these cases, there are other games with other outcomes. Across the universe of games, all four types are equal. Equal, that is, in achieving their objectives. So have we exhausted the PD with the four types and the four subgames? Not at all. What if the players are different types? Do they do better or worse in the PD than if they are the same? We will see in the next three chapters. IV.

In the fourth and last symmetrical PD subgame, In Spite, the players are both Sado—that is, other-minimizers. The program solution, shown in Table 3.4, is Rat, which leaves both players relatively satisfied. For the project solution, Rat is an interested focal point, and Silent is the HJV solution.

Symmetry

43

Table 3.4 In Spite—PD #4 Me, You (both Sado)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1 You and I are both vindictive. We see the other’s sins clearly. Is our vision too restrictive? [The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

2 My freedom hurts you dearly. My death gives pleasure to you. You’ll rat on me hap’ly and cheer’ly. Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

3 Your doom lifts my arrow to true.

4 We wind up jailed just as we should.

What’s bad for you is to me good.

Paradox is absent here.

I’d hurt you worse if only You warrant a turn of my screw. I could. [The program solution] [The interested focal point] Solution Notes to the Reading Gaol Matrix

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l.

Reading Gaol shows a PD game between two Ego players. The up and down arrows represent good and bad outcomes, respectively. Given that they are self-maximizers, Ego players do better to Rat. “If I betray you I can walk”—Rat gains your freedom if the other is Silent. “I will escape . . .”—Rat saves your life if the other Rats. Rat-Rat is the program solution for Ego players in Gaol. It is a suboptimal solution—“Disharmony”—since both players do better with Silent-Silent. Silent-Silent is a highest joint value (HJV) focal point solution to Gaol. That is true even if the players cannot enter into a binding agreement. The players do not know their types in the game with certainty. They may reasonably want to be a type other than Ego. The players may reasonably coordinate on caring about the other for practical, self-maximizing reasons, as well as idealistic ones.

44

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

m. Silent is the interested HJV focal point for players who suspect they are Ego, as well as an idealistic one. n. Although it does not serve their Ego interest, the players may also reasonably choose to coordinate on Rat, whether because of a feeling about serving justice or because of one about following their presumptive law. o. Because an explicit or implicit contract to Rat is not in Ego players’ selfmaximizing interest, Rat is an idealistic focal point only. p. The combined solution concept in Reading Gaol (and other Lit games) is a 50–50 balance between the program solution Rat and the HJV solution—Silent. q. That works out in Gaol to an edge to an equal split between Rat and Silent. r. For what it’s worth, that outcome roughly corresponds to typical results in experimental PD games (Rapoport and Chammah, 1966). Teaching/Learning Notes for Reading Gaol

a. A good reason the players in the project version of Gaol may reasonably coordinate on Rat rather than on Silence is implied in the sonnet’s final couplet on justice for the victim. b. “Nash” in the story-poem is hinting at a type of Dilemma in which both players can benefit from choosing to engage in non-mainstream behavior, but a player who steps out of line without the support of a community loses out. See my article “Telling Alternative Stories” (1997) for examples of such Dilemmas. c. Lit dichotomizes between a determinate program solution and an indeterminate project solution. Econ dichotomizes between a noncooperative (no binding agreements possible) equilibrium of Rat and a cooperative (binding agreements possible) solution. The Lit solution concepts can be combined to yield a combined solution in Gaol and other games. Blending of two solution concepts cannot be done in Econ, which is in that respect more dichotomized and indeterminate than Lit. Solution Notes to the Silent as the Grave Matrix

a. The Silent as the Grave matrix shows the Altru PD subgame. b. As before, the up and down arrows represent good and bad outcomes, but now the arrows for a given Emp player correspond to the other’s well-being. c. Given that they care about the other rather than themselves, both players do better to remain Silent, regardless of what the other does. d. Accordingly, Silent is the program solution for Altru players in Silent. e. There is an idealistic case for Rat—what about justice? f. But from the Altru perspective that the players suspect applies to them, silence is better for helping the other. g. Accordingly, Silent is the interested focal point for the players, as well as an idealistic one (loyalty is good!) while Rat is an idealistic one only. h. Given the convergence between the program and interested focal point solution concepts in Emp-Evo, Silent for both players is bold in the matrix.

Symmetry

45

i. Will the players nonetheless converge on Rat some of the time? j. Yes, under the project solution concept proposed here, in which there is balancing between an interested and an idealistic focal point. k. Will they converge less on Rat in Emp-Ego, where it is contrary to the players’ law, than they will in Evo-Ego, where Rat is the players’ default rule? l. The question as to the strength of the programmatic solution in determining behavior is an empirical one. m. It’s highly likely that players suspecting themselves to be Altru will Rat less than players suspecting themselves to be Ego. n. But it is not logically necessary that they will. o. How about the proposed combined solution in Altru? p. It’s a 50–50 mix of the program solution (Silent) and the HJV project solution (also Silent)—that is, 100% Silent. Teaching/Learning Notes for Silent as the Grave

a. Kongqiu/Confucius is alluding to the hope that a Benthamite equal concern for the welfare of the self and others will mitigate or eliminate the PD conundrums of both Econ and Lit. Equal concern does help both players get to second-best in the PD, just as Altru does. In many other games, though, equal concern is not the help it is in the PD. Solution Notes to the Frustration Matrix

a. Frustration shows the PD game between two self-minimizing Maso players. b. As before, the up and down arrows represent good and bad outcomes, but now the up arrows correspond to minimization, not maximization. c. The program solution to the game is Silent. d. Regardless of what the other player does, one minimizes by remaining Silent. e. Serving a year is better than freedom, and death is better than serving 15 years. f. But what works for the Maso players individually does not work for them collectively—they wind up serving only a year. g. The project solution concept gives the players a way out of the trap. h. If players who suspect they are Maso both Rat, they serve 15 years, which is better (given their masochism) than serving one year. i. Given that coordinating on Rat works better for players with a self-minimizing orientation and upholds one conception of justice, it is the interested focal point for two players who suspect that is their type, as well as an idealistic one. j. Coordinating on Silent, on the other hand, can be defended in terms of the value of following the programmed law of one’s likely though not certain type. k. It can also be defended in terms of an aspiration by the players to have an Evo orientation, rather than the Entro orientation they suspect in themselves. l. Silent is an idealistic focal point, as well as the HJV Evo focal point. m. The combined solution averaging the program solution and the HJV Evo project one is Silent.

46

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

n. Frustration and Reading Gaol have parallel structures, with the individual interests of the players leading them to a suboptimal Disharmony outcome. o. The two games have parallel but different solutions. p. Silent is the program solution and an idealistic focal point in Frustration, just as Rat is in Gaol. q. Rat is the interested focal point in Frustration, just as Silent is in Gaol. r. Maso self-hate has its conundrums, just as Ego self-love does. Teaching/Learning Notes for Frustration

a. The equal efficacy of Evo and Entro is with respect to their objectives, not with respect to a shared or universal standard. That is, Entro types are just as good overall (and in some cases, such as Frustration, just as bad) in attaining destructive Entro ends as the parallel Evo types are in attaining constructive Evo ends. b. A game in which Ego players do better: 3, 3 2, 0 (Ego and Altru players get 3) 0, 2 1, 1 (Maso and Sado players get 1). c. A matched game in which Entros do better: 0, 0 1, 3 (Maso and Sado get 0) 3, 1 2, 2 (Ego and Altru get 2). d. Maso is the (mostly) missing cell in behavioral game theory, which contains many tests of people’s altruistic and punitive motivations as well as their egoistic ones but comparatively little on how people may want to harm themselves. The most thorough treatment of the studies can be found in Camerer (2003/2011). Solution Notes to In Spite

a. The PD is not especially difficult for other-minimizing Sado players. b. They solve it satisfactorily by their lights, just as other-maximizing Altru players do, with second-best outcomes for both of them—“Imperfect Harmony.” c. No matter what the other player does, you hurt him/her more by Ratting. d. Given that, Rat is the Sado program solution. e. On the project side, Rat is an interested focal point. f. Players who suspect they are Sado have an interest given their presumptive though not certain type in coordinating on Ratting. g. For its part, Silence is an HJV focal point. h. Players who suspect they are Sado may choose to coordinate on Silent, which is what they would do if they were Altru other-maximizers. i. What about justice? Here, as elsewhere, that question chastens a simple aspiration by the players to remain Silent. j. Silence is better viewed as a balancing focal point than as a replacement for the interested focal point of Rat. k. Is there a slide into normativity here? Yes—the indeterminate project solution concept and its focal points are always shot through with normativity. l. The combined solution with a 50–50 weight to HJV is equal Rat and Silent.

Symmetry

47

Teaching/Learning Notes for In Spite and the Chapter

a. The claim in the text that asymmetrical versions of the PD in which the players are different result in better outcomes than symmetrical versions in which the players are the same type is based on situations in which the players are different, but not opposite. These partly asymmetrical situations are covered in Chapters 4 and 5. In situations in which the players are opposite, which are covered in Chapter 6, the outcomes are neither clearly better nor worse than in the “we are the same” PD situations covered in this chapter, as will be seen. b. A point worth repeating: the other-minimizing Sado type in the Lit version of game theory is better seen as rooted at least in large part in empathizing with real or reasonably conjectured self-condemnation by the other, rather than simply in one’s own condemnation of the other. See the Prometheus game, coming up in the next chapter. c. On symmetry and asymmetry: The case made in this book for the equal, or greater, merits of complex asymmetrical PD subgames works better, I think, for two legs of the classical and medieval trivium-tripod—the truth-logic-science and the beauty-grammar-art legs—than for the goodness-rhetoric-politics leg. For that leg, my belief is that “we are the same” symmetry games do have distinctive power; the distinctive appeal of symmetry in politics is addressed in Chapter 10 in Part II. d. Since my freshman seminar with Professor Schelling in the fall of 1973, I’ve been puzzling over the PD and trying to come up with new ways to think about it (Eastman, 1996, 1997). Some works related to the game that have informed and provoked me over the years are Rapoport and Chammah (1966), Powers (1988), Poundstone (1992), and Kuhn (1997). Sources Camerer, Colin F. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2003/2011). Eastman, Wayne. How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoners’ Dilemma, Notre Dame Law Review, 73 (1996): 89–101. Eastman, Wayne. Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Coase Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, Connecticut Law Review, 29 (1997): 727–825. Eastman, Wayne. Why Business Ethics Matters: Answers from a New Game Theory Model. New York: Palgrave (2015). Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1950). Kuhn, Steven. Prisoner’s Dilemma. (1997), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisonerdilemma/ Lippke, Richard L. The Ethics of Plea Bargaining. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011). Munn, Mark. The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (2003). Nasar, Sylvia. A Beautiful Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster (1998).

48

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. (1886), www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4363/ pg4363-images.html Ober, Josiah. The Greeks and the Rational: The Discovery of Practical Reason. Oakland, CA: University of California Press (2022). Plato. Dialogues (Benjamin Jowett, trans.). (c. 397–347 B.C.E.), https://standardebooks.org/ ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett/text/apology Poundstone, William. Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb. New York: Doubleday (1992). Powers, Richard. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. New York: Morrow (1988). Puett, Michael. To Become a God: Cosmology, Self-Sacrifice, and Self-Divination in Early China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2002). Puett, Michael and Christine Gross-Loh. The Path: What Chinese Philosophers Can Teach Us about the Good Life. New York: Simon and Schuster (2016). Rapoport, Anatol and Albert J. Chammah. Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1966). Young, Julian. Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010). Postlude

The Prosecutor I’m sad to tell You that Your partner died, He said not a word to implicate You, My offer stands, it won’t be said I’ve lied, If You confess, You walk. Tell Me what’s true. You say that I want You to rat Him out, That My offer contains a condition, That I’ll keep You in jail without any doubt, If You don’t blame Him in Your admission. You say that like all I’m ruled by My needs, Thus ever it was and ever shall be, But I and You, too, do all kinds of deeds, I will keep My promise, You can go free. We are partly God and partly Devil, What I’m telling You is on the level.

4

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

In the four symmetrical Prisoner’s Dilemma subgames that were presented in the last chapter, there was an upper bound on how well the players did. Other-oriented Altru and Sado players did better in realizing themselves than self-oriented Ego and Maso players did—but no type of player got their most-preferred outcome. Whether the players are self-maximizers, self-minimizers, other-maximizers, or other-minimizers, the best they can do is to converge on a solution that gives both players their second-best outcomes. There are no first-bests to be had for either player, much less for both. In the four partly asymmetrical PD subgames examined in this chapter, on the other hand, the situation is far more salubrious. In all four of them, the program solution is for both players to receive their first-best outcomes. Self-maximizing Ego pairs with other-maximizing Altru, and both flourish. (The Ego-Altru subgames are You Love Me More and Our Son.) Likewise, self-minimizing Maso pairs with other-minimizing Sado, to the benefit of both. (The Sado-Maso subgames are Pyre and Prometheus.) Along with the examination of asymmetry’s benefits, this chapter introduces another main idea. That idea is that the four-part self of Lit (and the two-part self of Evo) may mostly prevail in the real world over the one-part self of Econ, given the ability of other-oriented selves to combine with self-oriented selves to achieve many first-best outcomes denied to unified selves. Emp(athetic) other-oriented selves, who include Sado selves as well as the Altru ones, are not pallid tools of Narciss(istic) self-oriented selves—they are, as the poems suggest, powerful presences of their own. You Love Me More: An Altru Prisoner Sacrifices; Crusoc Talks with Mary Shelley I.

For Me to walk free is Your fondest dream, For You to hang to save Me—ah, divine, Me have a different kind of love, Me deem, You, but not Me, will say, “The fault is mine!” DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-6

50

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Me will blame You, and You will confess, Rejoice! You’re right to die for love that’s true! You’ll see Me crying in My long black dress, Regret! Me do not want to die for You. You are made to stay silent as the grave, For all My love, Me’m made to rat You out, Another time, would Me be honor’s slave? Would You remain alive, Your love to doubt? As the law is just, Me know it does turn, As the world spins, reversal We may learn. II.

Crusoc: Do you think there are diff’rences, Mary, Among the great categories of Us and Them? Will some fade—race?—while others endure—masc and fem? Shelley: Perhaps you mistake me for my mother. Speaking strictly for myself and not for all women— your badgering bores me. I’ll eat a persimmon. I wish Percy had died for me. Perhaps he did. If he had, my love would not have been the lesser. It is not so for my mother who died so that I might live. Bless her! Crusoc: So many are missing— my Xanthippe! We differed from Percy and you. Yes, I would have died for her. She would have mourned and remembered me as man and cur. III.

What if we are partly similar and partly different? In You Love Me More, one of us is self-oriented Narciss. One of us is other-oriented Emp. In Narciss-Emp subgames, we attain the heights and depths we want. The PD program is on our side, as it was not when we were the same. In many games, a self and an other-oriented player are a powerful pair. They solve the famous Chicken game as well as the PD. Their record is not perfect, though. For example, they often do not solve Battle of the Selves games. In the MGT Dilemma, cooperation is valuable only if reciprocated. In the Lit Dilemma, unreciprocated positive and negative empathy is valuable. From Altru’s concern for Ego and Sado’s for Maso, flourishing comes.

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

51

Table 4.1 You Love Me More—PD #5 Me (Ego), You (Altru)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1 The game has changed.

2 Togetherness we find,

Our arrows are aligned.

Your soul is aligned with me.

We’re united not estranged.

We are a single mind.

[The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

3 Though I rule I am not free.

4 Must is always volitional.

My reign is conditional.

In our shared project you choose what to be.

To my powers you must agree.

We are equipositional.

[The program solution] [An interested and idealistic focal point]

IV.

In You Love Me More, you are Altru and I am Ego. We are both devoted to maximizing my payoffs. The program solution is Me Rat, You Silent. Me Rat, You Silent is also the interested focal point, and an idealistic one as well. The reverse outcome, I Silent, You Rat, is a balancing, idealistic-only focal point. Our Son: An Altru Mother Sacrifices; Andrea Dworkin Talks with Crusoc I.

The worm has turned. Our son has killed a girl, You’re cool. With eyebrows raised You lecture him, Me listen to Your calm advice unfurl, “Don’t confess,” You say, “Do not yield to whim.”

52

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined “Juries follow the playwrights who picked ’em, Me know a lawyer who is very good, When she is done, You will be the victim,” “Me was!” Our son says, slumped in His dark hood. Me wash off the blood from the kitchen knife, Me go to the porch where the body lies, Me cut Myself, stab the girl gone from life, Me want it to be Me not Him who dies. Am I right to seek death for love that’s true? I know not, it is what I have to do. II.

Heterosexual motherhood is suicide. Heterosexual sex is rape. There is no escape. I’d like to kill that damn son with bites to his throat and then scratch my name without any fear Andrea Dworkin was here! Oh . . . and though every sexual act is compromised . . . Shall we make virtual love until we howl? I will be your consonant. You can be my vowel. Crusoc: You pique me. I say yes to your invitation! My dalliances in Greece were all with men— Please rule me now as I ruled Alcibiades then. III.

Son is the twin subgame of Love. The only difference is that “You” and “I” are switched. “I” is the egoist in Love, while “I” is the altruist in Son. Are the subgames different? Yes. It is not the same to be a beloved egoist and a loving altruist. The flourishing of the mother and son in Son is troubling. So, too, is the flourishing of the lovers in Love. The lovers in Love and the mother and son in Son are all Evo maximizers. These subgames may serve as a prod to consider the flaws of maximization. Is Entro in some cases better than Evo? Or are Entro best outcomes in the PD as tricky as Evo ones? In the next two games, we consider those questions.

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

53

Table 4.2 Our Son—PD #6 Me (Altru), You (Ego)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1

3

Please blame me please!

I trust our acts will bring us here

Don’t yield to love impulsive.

The rules of law are complex.

I beg you on my knees!

As I die, my conscience is clear.

[The HJV focal point]

[The program solution] [An interested and idealistic focal point]

Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years 4

2 To tell a lie’s repulsive . . .

To rat—this my soul rejects.

I rat you out without a tear . . .

I will not be the law’s long spear.

We’ve changed our minds . . .

I know you’ll pay me last respects.

IV.

The logic of Our Son is the same as that of You Love Me More. Now, though, the Me (the mother) is other-maximizing Altru and the You (the son) is self-maximizing Ego. As before, the program solution gives both the Ego and the Altru players their first-best outcomes. The HJV project solution gives both players their second-best outcomes. Pyre: Arjuna talks with Crusoc; A Maso Prisoner Muses I.

Arjuna, a mastiff: I will no longer fight. I will tell Draupadi our loving is over. I will tell the sheeple to find a new rover. Long have I defended the hierarchies of birth. Long have I sparred with you Crusoc in games and in reason. Now I find these struggles no longer in season.

54

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Crusoc: I will miss our engagements, virtual though they be. Even as the people of Athens helped me leave, I will help you, though I am no Krishna. Arjuna: My duty was to fight, to preserve, and to love, Now my duty is to pass from our virtual space, To make room so that others may rise in my place. II.

Suppose We are programmed for less, not more, Suppose We are focused on Me, not You, What the two of Us want, others deplore, What to them is a lie to Us is true. Why should We want to be perverse? To go against the good order of things? To spurn what’s better, to champ’ion what’s worse? We’re made so that others can soar with new wings. In nice games it’s fine to seek what’s better, But in mean ones sometimes We should seek worse, And You should follow Me to the letter, Respect that Me want to realize My curse. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a mean game, One way to prevail—be programmed for flame. III.

In Pyre, as in Love and Son, both players get their best results. In Pyre, though, both players are Entro. Entro may be justified by a belief that nonexistence is as good as existence. There is also a more widely acceptable reason for believing in Entro. Entro may be aligned with the flourishing of third parties. The universe is not just You and Me. Entro can help You and Me to respect others affected by our game. In hurting ourselves, we may help others. IV.

In Pyre, you and I are both devoted to minimizing my payoffs. The program solution is Me Silent, You Rat, which is best for both of us. Me Silent, You Rat is also the interested focal point, and an idealistic one as well. The reverse, Me Rat, You Silent, is an idealistic-only focal point, as are the symmetrical Rat-Rat and Silent-Silent boxes. The combined solution is convergence a large majority of the time on Me Silent, You Rat.

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

55

Table 4.3 Pyre—PD #7 Me (Maso), You (Sado)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me One Year, You One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

4 Entro—we can weed it out!

1

Evo—we can seek it out. We can decide we need it. [The HJV focal point]

Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death 3 Life means doubt. Maybe we’ll reverse. We’ll put your life to rout. [An idealistic focal point]

This is best. I want to die! You want it for me because I do. My last meal: tuna on rye. [The program solution] [An interested and idealistic focal point] Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years 2 Death is best but hard time is good. Perhaps I’ll rat you out, Though I want darker blue. [An idealistic focal point]

Prometheus: Marx talks with Crusoc; A Sado Prisoner Rejoices Prometheus is the most eminent saint and martyr in the philosophical calendar. (Karl Marx, Doctoral dissertation, 1841)

I.

Marx, a terrier: As a young man I thought I was Prometheus conjuring the fire of truth and giving it to Man. Tortured by carbuncles . . . unveiling history’s plan. As a long-dead dog I’ve decided Prometheus was a capitalist who conjured up wealth undreamt of in earlier ages and wanted to be punished for his outrages. And I and my movement that once shook the planet? At our best we empathized with Prometheus’s self-hate. We felt his pain as we limned his system’s sell-by date.

56

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined Crusoc: Zeus, too, wanted to be brought down. Or so I think. We must talk more, my friend. Your tale makes me wonder— Do the gods still want us to attack them with lightning and thunder? II.

We both did it, but perhaps You did worse, You’re filled with shame and guilt, You want to die, Me want to help You to escape Your curse, Me will fulfill Your wish to hang or fry. We happ’ly take the prosecutor’s deal, We read’ly play Our roles and do Our parts, Me blame it all on You, Me happ’ly squeal, You take the blame with joy. Our twin’ned hearts! Am Me a breaker of the moral law? Am Me a worm to want to help You die? No! The program is true, it has no flaw, Me’m made to be filled with joy as Me cry. The Dilemma is a beautiful game, We rejoice as You’re burned in the flame. III.

In Econ, punishment is a tool to deter bad behavior. In Lit, there is a different way to understand punishment. The punished may wish to be punished. In the Prometheus subgame, that is the case. Radicals may be punishers and wish to be punished themselves. Crusoc’s question for radicals like himself and Marx: Are we realizing the self-punishing side of our foes, whoever they are? Lit encourages us to see apparent antagonism as potentially collaborative. IV.

In the programmatic version of Prometheus, there is no alternative to Me Rat, You Silent. The logic of dominance—no matter what you do, I am better off Ratting, and no matter what I do, you are better off Silent—compels that conclusion. That outcome is best for both players. Solution Notes to the You Love Me More Matrix

a. You Love Me More is an asymmetrical PD subgame between “You” and “I.” b. “I” is Ego, “You” is Emp.

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

57

Table 4.4

1 We’re in programmatic mode,

PD Subgame—Prometheus: Code, Data, and Outcome

2 Logic is linked to “domination”,

With the usual notation

The term is odd and apt,

indicating the ruling code.

It’s an if-then operation.

Code 1 IF (“Rat if U Silent” > “Silent if U Silent”

Code 2 IF (“Silent if U Silent” > “Rat if U Silent”

AND IF (“Rat if U Rat” > “Silent if U Rat”)

AND IF (“Silent if U Rat” > “Rat if U Rat”)

THEN “Rat”

THEN “Silent” [Rest of code omitted]

Data for Me

Data for You:

Rat if U Silent > Silent if U Silent

Silent if U Silent > Rat if U Silent

AND Rat if U Rat > Silent if U Rat

AND Silent if U Rat > Rat if U Rat

Outcome for Me = Rat

Outcome for You= Silent

3 For me Silence succumbs, beaten by Ratting,

4 For you it’s mousy pitter-pattering.

Silence loses out.

In a Silent shroud you’ll be wrapped.

It’s dominated and trapped.

Law is more than lawyers nattering.

c. Both You and I are Evo maximizers. d. The identical up and down arrows represent the good and bad outcomes, which in this matrix are shared between the players. e. Given that You cares only about I, You does better to be silent. f. Given that I cares only about I, I does better to rat. g. I Rat, You Silent is the program solution in Love. h. I Rat, You Silent is also the interested project solution. i. Given the types the players suspect they are, agreeing on that outcome works best for both of them. j. It is also an idealistic solution—do your best to follow the law that governs you! k. On the other side of the ledger, I Silent, You Rat is a balancing, fairness focal point—why shouldn’t I empathize with You at least some of the time, rather than having all the empathy be on You’s side? l. The HJV Evo solution is both Silent. m. The combined solution is the average of the programmatic and the HJV project solutions.

58

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

n. In Love, that formula leads to I Rat, You Silent half of the time and both Silent half of the time. o. Ideally, the combined solution would be empirical rather than simply being based on a 50–50 averaging of the two solution concepts. p. A 50–50 averaging is based on the guesstimate that half of the time the program that governs the players is a default rule that allows them to override it (the project solution), while half of the time the program is a mandatory rule that they must follow (the programmatic solution). Teaching/Learning Notes for You Love Me More

a. You Love Me More and many of the asymmetrical subgames to come involve ambiguities in the players’ relationships that were not as evident in the symmetrical subgames. There is an ambiguity in Love as to whether one’s empathy on behalf of another is warranted because the other in the short term or the long term will also sacrifice for oneself, or whether that reciprocity-oriented justification of empathy is the wrong way to think about it. Perhaps one sacrifices, or should, regardless of possible reciprocity. b. An expectation of short-term or long-term reciprocity is entirely understandable and acceptable as one basis for empathic self-sacrifice. But the logic of EgoAltru interaction as a place for genuine flourishing also relies on the idea that sacrifice is valuable for the sacrificer as well as for the beneficiary. Solution Notes for the Our Son Matrix

See the Notes for “Love”—the logic of the matrix is the same, with the players reversed. Teaching/Learning Notes for Our Son

a. In Our Son, the players in the sonnet are the Ego son and his Altru mother. b. The fact that the players’ success in achieving their first-best outcomes in You Love Me More and in Our Son is shadowed by darkness does not negate the central point that these asymmetrical Ego-Altru PD subgames are successful ones for both players in a way that none of the symmetrical PD subgames are. If Lit is a better description of the way people and other game players help and hurt themselves and others than Econ is, it is likely so at least in part because the four types of Lit allow players to do better in the PD than the one type of Econ does. c. Might Ego-Emp asymmetry in either Evo or Entro types lead to lock-in rather than to reciprocity, with one player or one group of players unfairly always giving and another player or group of players unfairly always receiving? Indeed, one point of bringing Andrea Dworkin (1981) into the story-poem is to highlight that possibility. d. To regard relationships in which one player or group of players persistently gives while another group of players persistently receives as morally flawed is

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

59

to overlook the value that can inhere in long-term asymmetrical relationships such as those of parent and child, dom and sub, or lord and butler. Though it is wrong to interpret CGT as a brief for long-term Emp-Ego asymmetry, it is not wrong to interpret it as an effort to open the minds of those of us who are deeply committed to a we’re equal-consent-safe words worldview to the value of serving and being served. That does not mean that Our Son or the other games of this chapter should be taken as a brief for one person always giving and the other always taking—the mother who is ready to go to the electric chair for her son is getting much from him as well as giving much to him. But the games of this chapter are a brief for the proposition that in the inequality between a giver and a taker, flourishing, beauty, truth, and good may lie. Much of what is splendid about us inheres in our being different from each other in what we want, and our valuable differences may not be merely momentary—though of course they might be and often will be—but baked into choices and roles that last. Stevens’s deep devotion to serving Lord Darlington in Ishiguro’s Remains of the Day (1989), troubling though it is, especially given his Lord’s predilections, makes him noble, and makes Darlington a less ignoble figure than he would be otherwise. e. The twin stories of You Love Me More and Our Son can be understood as analyses of the way in which traditional gender roles work, with male sacrifice in some domains paralleled by female sacrifice in others. For CGT purposes, the idea is not to reify traditional gender roles, but it is to help critics get beyond a simple view of tradition as unilaterally oppressive, and of the hoped-for future as one in which gender-related (and by extension, class-related and race-related) asymmetries of helping and being helped are overcome and buried. Asymmetry is central and valuable, and CGT is one way of seeing why that is so and will continue to be so, much as certain versions of asymmetry call for criticism and change. Solution Notes to the Pyre Matrix

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l.

In Pyre, both of us are Entro. I want to bring myself down, and You want to bring me down. Both of us get what we want. You Rat, I am Silent. That is the programmatic solution to Pyre. It is also the interested project solution. It is also an idealistic solution—achieve justice and follow the law that governs you. I Rat, You Silent is a balancing, fairness focal point. Both Rat is another idealistic focal point, if the players converge on being punished symmetrically. And so is Both Silent, if the players converge on wanting to be Evo rather than the Entro they suspect they are. As always, both Silent is the Evo HJV solution. The combined solution is a heavy tilt to You Rat, I Silent half of the time and both Silent half of the time.

60

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

m. The tilt to You Rat, I Silent is heavier the more the programmatic solution is a mandatory rule that controls us, as opposed to a default one that we can change. Teaching/Learning Notes to Pyre

a. Is the players’ success in achieving their best outcomes in the PD more inspiring in the minimizing Entro world of Pyre than it is in the maximizing Evo worlds of You Love Me More and Our Son? b. An argument for a yes answer: Promoting the welfare of oneself is not especially morally worthy in general, and is immoral if understandable in Our Son, in which the son is trying to avoid responsibility for a crime he has committed. Entro bringing oneself down is inadvisable as a general matter—but it is reasonable in Pyre, where Maso is helpful in coming to terms with one’s death and in facilitating the rise of third parties (Arjuna) and also as a response to the grim facts of one’s crime (the PD story). c. An argument for a no answer: Though self-punishment may be a viable path for a PD criminal or for one whose time on Earth is truly over or nearly over, the Arjuna story-poem illustrates its flaws, and the further flaws of facilitating it. Instead of accommodating Arjuna’s desire to end his struggles, Crusoc should be encouraging Arjuna to see the value in pressing ahead and doing his duty to the end. He should be Krishna, rather than a philosophical version of Dr. Kevorkian. d. An argument for a yes-no answer: For people formed in West Asian–European– modern cultural contexts that deeply repress Entro and valorize Evo, CGT stories of Entro, Maso-Sado flourishing are valuable. The Bhagavad Gita is for some of us the finest of the scriptural tales partly because of its questioning of action and efficacy. Pyre is using a different rhetoric to ask similar questions. On the other hand, some cultural matrices may give undue sway to Entro—there, Pyre’s lighting of Entropic fires may be unhelpful. Solution Notes to the Prometheus Matrix

a. Program solutions to PD subgames are based on the concept of dominance. b. The program for Prometheus illustrates the dominance concept and how it makes the other-minimizing player Rat and the self-minimizing player remain Silent. c. The Emp-Entro other-minimizer does better to Rat regardless of what the other player does. d. Rat is a dominant strategy for Emp-Entro. e. The Ego-Entro self-minimizer does better to be Silent regardless of what the other player does. f. Silent is a dominant strategy for Ego-Entro. g. In Econ with its purely strategic solution concepts, dominance is not a mandatory rule; one can cooperate with the other prisoner by remaining silent in the Econ PD, even though Rat is a dominant strategy.

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented

61

h. Dominance is likewise non-mandatory for the project solution concept in Lit. i. A dominant—or interested, as it is called in Lit—focal point is a powerful one for the players to converge on, but is not a mandatory one. j. But some of the time—in Lit, this is an empirical question, not an a priori one— the program mandates an action by the players, rather than supplying a default rule they react to. k. In those cases, the determinate program solution that is shown for Pyre is operative. l. The combined solution depends on the proportion of the time determinacy applies, as well as on the estimate of the project solution. m. So, if the program is mandatory 25% of the time and non-mandatory 75% of the time, and if the interested-idealistic focal point is played 50% of the time, the balancing focal point is played 25% of the time, and the symmetrical RatRat focal point is played 25% of the time, the combined solution in Prometheus works out to the players converging 62.5% of the time on Emp-Entro Rat, EgoEntro Silent, 12.5% of the time on the balancing focal point Emp-Entro Silent, Ego-Entro Rat, 12.5% of the time on the symmetrical high punishment focal point Rat, Rat, and 12.5% of the time on the “let’s try to be Evo” focal point of Silent, Silent. Teaching/Learning Notes to Prometheus and the Chapter

a. Success for the players has its ambivalences and ambiguities in CGT. That said, it is a key Evo and Lit concept, just as it is a key Econ one. The four asymmetrical PD subgames in which one player is Ego and the other is Emp (Love, Son, Prometheus, and Pyre) all feature programmed solutions that are first-best outcomes for both players in all cases. The very high level of asymmetrical success in the PDs with a self-oriented and an other-oriented player—radically higher than in the Econ PD, or than in symmetrical Evo and Lit PD subgames— warrants entertaining the thought that humans and other entities are programmed at least in part in a more complex CGT manner rather than in a simpler MGT manner. b. This book advances a particular version of CGT, not one that reviews MGT. That said, I acknowledge and respect an impressive array of MGT work that has considered morality, cooperation, regret, anger, and other themes treated here in the Lit framework. Among the game-theoretic sources cited in the Sources section, Frank, Gintis and Bowles, Sugden, and Thaler have particularly influenced me. Sources Alger, Ingela and Jorgen Weibull. Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Mating, Econometrica, 81 (2013): 2269–2302. Alger, Ingela and Jorgen Weibull. Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists, Games, 8 (2017): 38.

62

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Andre, Jean-Baptiste, Leo Fitouchi, Stephane Debove, and Nicolas Baumard. An Evolutionary Contractualist Account of Morality, PsyArXiv (2023): 1–48. Andreoni, James, William Harbaugh, and Lise Vesterson. The Carrot or the Stick? Rewards, Punishment, and Cooperation, American Economic Review, 93 (2003): 893–902. Chodorow, Nancy. The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender. Berkeley: University of California Press (1978). Dasgupta, Surendranath. A History of Indian Philosophy (Vol. 1). (1922), www.google.com/ books/edition/A_History_of_Indian_Philosophy_Volume_1/tUc1AAAAIAAJ?hl=en&g bpv=1&printsec=frontcover Doniger, Wendy. The Hindus: An Alternative History. New York: Penguin Press (2009). Dworkin, Andrea. Pornography: Men Possessing Women. Berkeley: University of California Press (1981). Eliot, T.S. Four Quartets. New York: Harcourt (1941). Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999): 817–868. Frank, Robert H. If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? American Economic Review, 77 (1987): 593–604. Frizzell, Lefty. Long Black Veil. (1959), www.youtube.com/watch?v=50k18gL76AU Gintis, Herbert and Samuel Bowles. A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2011). Ishiguro, Kazuo. The Remains of the Day. Boston: Faber (1989). Lauwaert, Lode. Marquis de Sade and Continental Philosophy. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press (2019). Marx, Karl. The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature (Any Bluden, trans.). (1841), www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/dr-theses/ index.htm Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Edward Aveling, trans.). (1867), www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ Shelley, Mary. Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus. (1818), www.google.com/books/ edition/Frankenstein_or_The_Modern_Prometheus/2Zc3AAAAYAAJ?hl=en Shelley, Percy Bysshe. Prometheus Unbound. (1820), www.google.com/books/edition/ Prometheus_Unbound/AG1LR8p-JC0C?hl=en&gbpv=0 Sugden, Robert. Regret, Recrimination, and Rationality, Theory and Decision, 19 (1985): 77–99. Thaler, Richard H. The Ultimatum Game, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (1988): 195–206. Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Women. (1792), www.google.com/ books/edition/A_Vindication_of_the_Rights_of_Woman/K1ZYAAAAcAAJ?hl=en&gb pv=1&printsec=frontcover Postlude

Your Son Me wanted You to sacrifice Your Son, To bind Him up with ropes and light the fire, To show that Me not He will be the One, To light Your life, to be Your Heart’s desire.

One of Us Is Self-Oriented, One of Us Is Other-Oriented You stole My Heart straight way to You once more, The billionth time, it’s true, Me must confess, Each time is new—the room, the bed, the door, Each time is bliss and pain, Love’s sweet duress. You brought Your Son to Me that winter night, A boy in love with You, a dove, a lamb, Why did I not release You both in flight, As I released My Lover Abraham. Your Son is dead now and Our Love is, too, And ice is in My heart, black ice and blue.

63

5

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro

The poems and matrices of the last two chapters vindicate an intuition about the benefits of unity. The un-joined hearts and minds in the four “We Are the Same” Dilemma subgames of Chapter 3 do not work for the best. By contrast, two hearts and minds that are different but are joined as one in building up or knocking down one person work for the best in the four subgames of Chapter 4. What happens, though, when we have two hearts and minds that are different, and that do not share a single objective? In the poems and matrices of this chapter, one player wants to maximize— Evo—while the other wants to minimize—Entro. But they are not opposed. Opposition would be their fate if one wanted to minimize and one wanted to maximize the fate of the same player. (In our next and final chapter on the PD, we will examine those games.) In the situations examined in this chapter, though, the players want to lift or knock down different players. In the first two subgames (Make or Break and I’m Going Down), one prisoner wants to lift himself up and one wants to knock himself down, and in the last two (Fickle and Rebellion), one wants to knock the other down and one wants to lift the other up. What happens in the Evo-Entro PD subgames? Does Ego work well with Maso, and likewise Altru with Sado? Let’s see. As always in CGT, there will be differences between the program solutions and the open-ended project solutions. And as we have already seen in Pyre and Prometheus, success for Maso and Sado players can be questioned. But Entro flourishing is real in Lit and in the presentation of it here, even if it is better appreciated in poetic than economic terms. Make or Break: A Prisoner Reflects; Crusoc tells Pluto a Story I.

In the last four subgames, We were as one. What was topmost to You was top to Me, One orbited—the Earth—One pulled—the Sun, One Ratted, the Other died happily. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-7

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 65 In these new subgames, the result’s the same, We’re both fulfilled as One Rats and One dies, But the reason’s diff’rent. Here’s the new frame: One seeks the low’r depths, the Other the highs. Before was a dance of follow and lead, Now it’s a less familiar dynamic, The pattern that allows Us to succeed: One makes, One breaks their piece of ceramic. Evolution’s just half of Our topic, There’s an equal role for the Entropic. II.

Pluto: Tell me a story, Crusoc my master, And please rub my belly the way only you can, The mouse is not as good as my dog-woman-man. Crusoc: Our ancestors were led out of the cave. They were taught by their masters to build doghouses. Then a rebel prophet led an uprising. From that time to now the story’s always the same. Some want to break the cages in which we’re pent. Others think that the rebels are bent on crazy destruction. I rebel against the people to end myself, methinks. You Pluto have a diff’rent mission. You rebel against the people to uplift yourself. III.

In Make or Break, the players are both self-preoccupied—Narciss. But “I” is maximizing Ego and “You” is minimizing Maso. In Make, both players get their most desired outcomes. An Evo maker and an Entro breaker combine well in CGT. Just as Narciss self-absorption and Emp other-absorption do. There are many more ways to succeed in CGT than in MGT. The reason is that there is just one human type in MGT. Different players do not always do better in CGT than similar ones. That will be explained in the next chapter. This chapter, though, features different players who succeed. May we appreciate them, even if they seem strange. IV.

In Make or Break, the programmatic solution is Me Rat, You Silent, which gives both players their first-best outcomes. The interested focal point is also

66

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 5.1 Make or Break—PD #9 Me (Ego), You (Maso)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

2

3

Against silence my heart rebels.

Me Rat

What if we decide to reverse?

To ratting you’re averse.

We will wind up in this dank box.

The moral law—may we apply it?

You fancy-free, me in a hearse.

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

1

4

I don’t care about you, I will rat.

I’m no chicken, You’re no fox.

You’ll hurt yourself, you’ll be quiet.

You are my judge in this verse.

The program says that that is that.

You’ll send me off to jail.

[The programmatic solution] [An interested-idealistic focal point]

Me Rat, You Silent, which gives both players’ presumptive types their best outcomes. All the boxes are idealistic focal points. The combined solution tilts heavily toward Me Rat, You Silent. I’m Going Down: A Prisoner’s Maso Manifesto; Laozi Talks with Crusoc I.

Me want to negate and tear Myself down. Is it because Me want to live better? Perhaps. But Me doubt it. Me seek no crown. Me want not to be the planet’s debtor. You want to live to see another day, Me am ready to join eternity, Man should prevail, not just endure, You say, Man can just go and hang Himself, says Me.

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 67 You want to walk away, You rat me out, Me hope to die, My lips are tightly sealed, We’ll get the things We want, there is no doubt, You’ll walk free, Me’ll lie in the potter’s field. For Our differences may We be grateful, Do not think My entropy is hateful. II.

Laozi, a pug: Our models have much in common, but you separate destruction and creation. My yin and yang—they are both growth and detonation. Crusoc: I concede that in truth the two aspects are ever entwined. There’s a choice between realism and precision. I opt for an analytical division. Laozi: Our models play games just as we do. I will tell you that your tilt seems Evo to me. I think you want to lift up your tribe by the wine-dark sea. My own proclivities are more Entro. With the straw dogs the sages and the people are burned. Habits of righteousness are to be unlearned. III.

Down is the twin of Make, with “You” and “I” reversed. Once again, both players are egoistic. Once again, one is entropic while the other is evolutionary. Now, I am the Entro one. Once again, both players receive what allows them best to flourish. The self-punisher “I” and the self-promoter “You” alike succeed. So is the PD a better game in asymmetric CGT than it is in MGT? So far, yes. Is the PD a better than average game overall in CGT than most others? To be continued in Part II. IV.

I’m Going Down is the twin of Make or Break. Now “I” is the self-minimizing Maso, while “You” is the self-maximizing Ego. The programmatic solution is Me Silent, You Rat, and the interested focal point is also Me Rat, You Silent. As in Make, all the boxes are idealistic focal points. The combined solution is split between Me Silent, You Rat and both Silent.

68

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 5.2 I’m Going Down—PD #10 Me (Maso), You (Ego)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1

2

I want to drive myself down.

You want ever more and more.

That need we saw in you before.

If you could you’d be a queen.

Now you want to soar not drown. [The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Death I seek and you deplore. [The programmatic solution] [An interested and idealistic focal point] Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

Me Freedom, You Death

4

3 This outcome is unlikely to be seen. It is an alien shore, an outlier, far from the mean. [An idealistic focal point]

With my style you are at war. But you glean value from me. We both get what we came for. [An idealistic focal point]

Fickle: An Altru Prisoner Talks to a Sado One; Aristotle Weighs In I.

Me want to help You, My choice is simple, You want to hurt Me, Yours is easy, too, They hear ’bout My ev’ry wart and pimple, Me’m silent ’bout the flaws Me knows in You. Ord’nary thinking says Me’m mad at You, But while the program lasts, that is not so, My caring is without regret or rue, With no thought for Myself to die Me go. Programs though true are also mutable, Me will not always feel as Me do now,

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 69 Past truths die and become refutable, We des’crate altars where We once did bow. Remember that the wheel will turn again, Fickle are we—women, stars, trees, and men. II.

Aristotle, a poodle: Thoughts on your model: As science, I prefer mine, Nash’s, and Schelling’s, Econ is sharpest in building reason’s dwellings. As ethics, I believe your approach is better, It helps me ask whether my common-sense faith in our norms, Is rooted in desire to destroy your and Pluto’s forms. Not just your ideal ones but also your bodies, And your peace-breaking vision of radical change, Your disturbing marriage of logical and strange. Even if my self-doubt’s wrong, I find it useful, It corrects against seeing craziness only in you, Gets me closer to a golden mean that is true. III.

Once again, both players get what they want most in Fickle. The Altru player wins the other’s freedom. The Sado player is satisfied by the other’s doom. The program could have called for the reverse outcome. It will do so in the future as it has done in the past. Is Aristotle driven by Sado resentment, as he wonders? Or is he Altru, driven by love of his poetic radical predecessors? What about we radicals who aspire to poetry and science? We can see ourselves as both players. Simultaneously wanting to destroy and to help the other. That way, we may possibly gain a better take on ourselves. And, it may be, on the mainstream Aristotles of our time. Who may include us in their ranks. Even as we dream of revolution. IV.

In Fickle, “Me” is the other-maximizing Altru, while “You” is the otherminimizing Sado. The programmatic solution is Me Silent, You Rat, which gives both players their first-best outcomes, and the interested focal point is also Me Silent, You Rat. As in Make and Down, all the boxes are idealistic focal points. The combined solution is equal between Me Silent, You Rat and the HJV Me Silent, You Silent.

70

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 5.3 Fickle—PD #11 Me (Emp-Evo), You (Emp-Ent)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1 I want to help, you want to hurt. I focus on you, you on me. Might you relent?

Me Rat

2 From resentment I’m free. You feel no gratitude, You want me hanging from a tree.

[The HJV focal point]

[The programmatic solution] [An interested-idealistic focal point]

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

3 A judge at icy altitude, to this spot on wings you flew. Will you change your attitude? [An idealistic focal point]

4 Perhaps an eye for an eye is true. Should I heed that old platitude? You punish me, I punish you. [An idealistic focal point]

Rebellion: A Prisoner Reflects; Crusoc Talks with Martin Luther King I.

Now You wish Me well and Me wish You ill, Me want to tell the prosecutor all, Should Me fight the program with My free will? Or yield to it and watch the trapdoor fall? Me think the program is the truth for Us, Me think it knows more than We e’er will do, To spurn it is to hop off a speeding bus, To dream of be’ing a pig that bravely flew. But what’s the program to which We should yield? Are We in program 12? Or is it 1?

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 71 Together, tools of friendship We may wield, With respect for the dark side and for fun. Rebellion is programmed as is treason, The program controls Our use of reason. II.

Crusoc: I had a bad dream. I was a bad dog who sold the guns to James Earl Ray. I traveled from Athens to Memphis. I was with him at the Lorraine Motel that April day. I wished a martyr’s fate for you. I hoped your death would help the long arc turn toward true. Yes, I wished the same for myself, too— but there’s a diff’rence ’tween your life and mine. My life was mine to sacrifice, and yours was not. King, a wolfhound: I had a dream, and in it I rescued you. We broke free and wandered in Attica. You were happy and I was a ghost. III.

Once again, the players get what they want most. Partly opposite players are a perfect eight for eight in PD subgames. One narcissist and one empath solve Love, Son, Pyre, and Prometheus. One maker and one breaker solve Make, Down, Fickle, and Rebellion. What happens if there is perfect asymmetry? That is, what if the players are entirely opposite? We’ve seen mediocre results when the players are all the same. Ego and Maso players did badly in Gaol and Frustration. Empaths did better in Silent and Spite, but only got their second-best results. What about the situation with players who are opposite? We’ll see how that other kind of symmetry works next. Success in games with Entro may be questioned. Are the entropic players wrong to want what they want? An ill fate for oneself or for another is a hard thing. Success for oneself or the whole it can nonetheless be to achieve it. IV.

Rebellion is the logical twin of Fickle. Now, “Me” is the other-harming Sado, while “You” is the other-helping Altru. The programmatic solution is Me Rat, You Silent, and the interested focal point is also Me Rat, You Silent. As in Make, Down, and Fickle, all the boxes are idealistic focal points. The combined solution is divided between Me Rat, You Silent and Both Silent.

72

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 5.4 Rebellion—PD #12 Me (Sado), You (Altru) Me Stay Silent

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me One Year, You One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

2

1

This box isn’t bad for you.

This box is doubly unstable,

And it’s not the worst for me—

It counters our predilections,

but it’s not my favored selection.

Me Rat

Should it be off the table?

[The HJV focal point]

[An idealistic focal point]

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

4

3

This box is a resting place true.

Your wish is that I go free.

I rat, and you hang from the tree.

This box is not good for you.

It’s a box on which we can agree.

But on it we might agree.

[The programmatic solution] [An interested-idealistic focal point]

[An idealistic focal point]

Solution Notes for the Make or Break Matrix

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

In Make or Break, “You” are Entro and “I” am Evo. You want to hurt yourself, and I want to help myself. Our arrows go up and down together, though they are not identical. We both value my freedom and your death the most, and your freedom and my death the least. One year for both of us is a fairly good outcome for me and a fairly bad one for you; 15 years for both of us is a fairly good outcome for you and a fairly bad one for me. I Rat, You Silent is the program solution in Make or Break. I Rat, You Silent is also the interested project solution. Given the types we suspect we are, agreeing on that outcome works best for both of us. All of the boxes work as idealistic project solutions. I Rat, You Silent embodies a belief, considered or programmed, in following the law.

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 73 k. I Silent, You Rat embodies a belief in balancing. l. Both Silent embodies an HJV belief in Evo as better than Entro. m. Both Rat embodies a belief in justice calling for punishment. n. The combined solution is 50–50 Me Rat, You Silent and both Silent. Teaching/Learning Notes for Make or Break

a. Compared to the asymmetry between the self-oriented and other-oriented players in the games in the last chapter, the asymmetry between the Evo and Entro players in Make or Break strikes me as less disturbing and less inspiring. The morally arousing devotion unto death of the empaths in Love and Son to the possibly unworthy recipients of their love has no obvious parallel in Make or Break. In Make or Break, at least in the Crusoc-Pluto version here, the players simply want different things for themselves—uplift for one, doom for the other. b. Make or Break with Crusoc and Pluto may not have much disturbing power because they are not interacting directly, and also because the 70+-yearold Crusoc welcoming his own doom at the hand of Athens feels very different from what a young Pluto welcoming his doom would. Entro by the old has its logic; Entro by the young by contrast is troubling and possibly tragic. To return to Remains of the Day: if Stevens is seen not as Altru but as Maso, his flourishing in abjection feels painful if he is a young man and Darlington is old in a way it does not if he is an old man and Darlington is a young one. c. With Emp and Narciss players, reciprocity naturally comes to mind. With Evo and Entro ones, not so much—but that is an artifact, probably, of the comparative unfamiliarity of Entro in game theory. Entro players are suffering and punishing for something, one hopes, and their actions perhaps deserve reciprocity from Evo players. Solution Notes to the I’m Going Down Matrix

a. I’m Going Down is the logical twin of Make or Break. b. In Down, though, I want to hurt myself, and you want to help yourself. c. We both achieve our first-best outcomes in the program solution, Me Silent, You Rat. d. We also achieve an outcome tilted toward our first-best outcomes in the project solution. e. Me Silent, You Rat is the interested focal point as well as an idealistic one and preponderates over the three idealistic-only focal points. f. The HJV Evo solution is, as always, both Silent. g. The program solution Me Silent, You Rat and the HJV project solution both Silent are equal in the combined solution.

74

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Teaching/Learning Notes to I’m Going Down

a. Laozi is a more natural protagonist than Socrates/Crusoc for Lit if the criterion for a central CGT voice is receptivity to entropy as a viable alternative to generativity. If the criterion is faith in the logic of the universe being aligned to justice, then Socrates is a more natural choice than Laozi. A future work on critical game theory might alter the Eurocentricity of this one by making Laozi or another non-European central figure a replacement for Socrates. b. The plethora of first-best outcomes in the PD when we allow the players to be Emp as well as Narciss and Entro as well as Evo is a function of two key facts about the game. First and foremost, the PD is one of only a few matrices out of the universe of 144 one-shot person games in which the best outcome for both players is the worst outcome for the other player. That makes it a highly recalcitrant game for players who want the same thing, but a highly accommodating one for players who want different things. Second, both players in the PD have dominant strategies. That allows optimal program solutions to be readily reached, compared to games in which one or both players lack a dominant strategy. c. In Lit, all of the 144 matrices have 16 variations, corresponding to the four types—Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado—for each player. In the PD, the four symmetrical variations have considerably poorer outcomes than those in most other matrices, and the four zero-sum variations are mediocre, as they are in all the other matrices. In the eight partly symmetrical variations, though, the PD outcomes are excellent. d. The moral intensity in Down feels greater than that in Make, perhaps because the negativity of the “I” in Down does not seem as well motivated as that of Arjuna in Make. To the extent the “I” is casting doubt on the value of humanity as an ongoing enterprise, whether on behalf of the flourishing of a nonhuman other, or on behalf of transcending the ideal of flourishing, or on behalf of transcending existence, its Maso is more disturbing than that of an elderly warrior preparing to retire from one stage of existence. Solution Notes to the Fickle Matrix

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

In the Fickle program, you are an other-minimizing Sado. I am an other-maximizing Altru. In the project version, we suspect those are our identities, but we do not know. You want to hurt me, and I want to help you. We both value your freedom and my death the most, and my freedom and your death the least. I Silent, You Rat is the programmatic solution in Fickle. The programmatic solution once again reflects the first-best outcomes for both I Silent, You Rat is also the interested project solution. Both Silent as always in the PD is the HJV project solution. The combined solution is equal between Me Silent, You Rat and both Silent.

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 75 Teaching/Learning Notes for Fickle

a. Fickle introduces the last of the four types of partly asymmetrical PD games. In the Ego-Altru type, represented by You Love Me More and Our Son, one player wants to help the other, and the other player wants to help him-/herself. In the Maso-Sado type, represented by Prometheus and Pyre, one player wants to hurt him-/herself, and the other player wants to hurt the first player. In the Maso-Ego type, represented by Make or Break and I’m Going Down, one player again wants to hurt him-/herself, while the other player wants to help him-/herself. Finally, in the Altru-Sado type, represented by Fickle and Rebellion, one player wants to help the other player, while the other player wants to hurt the first player. b. One example of a relationship in which Fickle and its twin Rebellion may capture the dynamics better than the other three partly asymmetrical types do: a prophet-martyr who wants to lift up the people, and a people who want to martyr the prophet. The Rebellion story-poem considers such a relationship. c. Another, more prosaic way in which Fickle may correspond to a certain type of reality: in a love-hate relationship, Fickle is likely a safer and less destructive way for two people to work out their mixed feelings toward the other than In Spite (the symmetrical PD—version #4—in which both players try to hurt the other) is. Repeated In Spite interactions suggest doom for a relationship, while repeated Fickle interactions may go along with the two players helping and criticizing the other. d. To make the oft-repeated point about the importance and value of asymmetric games in the context of Fickle vs. In Spite: For all the intuitive value of having players of the same type, it is in practice often better if they differ in what drives them. Shared choler in a given situation is more dangerous than choler on one side and generosity on the other side. For one thing, in the asymmetrical Fickle, the players can change roles in the next iteration of the game in a way that is not available in the symmetrical In Spite. Solution Notes to the Rebellion Matrix

a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

Rebellion is the logical twin of Fickle, with the “I” and the “You” reversed. Now I want to hurt you, and you want to help me. We value my freedom and your death most, your freedom and my death least. I Rat, You Silent is the program solution. I Rat, You Silent is also the interested project solution. All of the boxes work as idealistic project solutions. I Rat, You Silent embodies a belief, considered or programmed, in following the law. h. I Silent, You Rat embodies a belief in balancing—surely it cannot be right to always have a one-sided saving of me and slaying of you! i. The HJV solution Both Silent embodies a belief in Evo over Entro—let me act as though I am not trying to bring you down, even as I suspect that is exactly what I want to do. j. The combined solution is split between I Rat, You Silent and Both Silent.

76

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Teaching/Learning Notes for Rebellion and the Chapter

a. The asymmetry between the Evo and Emp players in the other-oriented Fickle and Rebellion subgames is more disturbing than the asymmetry between them in the self-oriented Make or Break and I’m Going Down subgames. Intuitively, the moral distance between wanting to help another and hurt another is greater than the moral distance between wanting to help oneself and hurt oneself. The Sado focus on minimizing the other, important though it is as part of the Lit model, is troubling to a considerably greater degree than maximizing the other, maximizing the self, and minimizing the self are. b. The success of the players in Make or Break, I’m Going Down, Fickle, and Rebellion in getting what they most want in the programmatic solutions of all these subgames can be questioned ethically. In Make or Break and I’m Going Down, success relies in part on one player but not the other being Maso, and in Fickle and Rebellion it relies in part on one player but not the other being Sado. If one finds the idea that these morally troubling entropic qualities contribute to the interacting players doing well in the PD when one of them has them to be offensive, one may react against the Lit model and its analysis of success. Or one may instead regard the model as having given a good reason why entropic tendencies and drives toward the self and others may be widespread, and potentially as offering ways for psychologists and others to consider how such tendencies and drives play out for better as well as for worse in everyday scenarios. The “Entro is real if disturbing” response seems to me better. Rather than rejecting a model such as Lit—or for that matter Econ—for presenting a disturbing, self-critical picture of human nature, it would seem preferable to consider whether that model can help us see deeper and to do better. Evo is a more pleasant model than Lit and Econ are—but that does not make it a truer or more valuable one. c. Here as elsewhere, it is important to acknowledge the plethora of game-theoretic work, some of it noted in the following list of sources, that examines phenomena such as self-destruction, hooliganism/destruction of others, and altruism using lenses other than the Lit framework employed here. Assuming a divided, mutable Lit self, as is done in this book, may or may not prove to be more fruitful than approaches, such as those taken in the sources, that do not directly challenge the assumption of a single, consistent self—I would suggest, though, that a clear CGT model such as Lit has value. Sources Abbink, Klaus and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. The Pleasure of Being Nasty, Economics Letters, 105 (2009): 306–308. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (W.A. Rackham, trans.). (c. 384–322 B.C.E.), www.google. com/books/edition/The_Nicomachean_Ethics/sPMNAQAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&print sec=frontcover Babaioff, Moshe, Robert Kleinberg, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Congestion Games with Malicious Players, Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (2009): 22–35.

One of Us Is Evo, One of Us Is Entro 77 Bhattacharyya, Souvik, David M. Walker, and Rasika Harshey. Dead Cells Release a “Necrosignal” that Activates Antibiotic Survival Pathways in Bacterial Swarming, Nature Communications, 11 (2020): 4157. Eshel, Ilan, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked. Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model, American Economics Review, 88 (1998): 157–179. Garrow, David. Bearing the Cross. New York: HarperCollins (1987). Hamilton, William D. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7 (1964): 1–16. Henrich, Joseph, et al. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2004). Ishiguro, Kazuo. The Remains of the Day. New York: Alfred A. Knopf (1989). Laozi. Daodejing (James Legge, trans.). (c. 475–221 B.C.E.), https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing Nash, John. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 36 (1950a): 48–49. Nash, John. The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 18 (1950b): 155–162. Plato. Dialogues (Benjamin Jowett, trans.). (c. 397–347 B.C.E.), https://standardebooks. org/ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett/text/apology Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers. Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York: Bantam (1984). Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1960). Vancherin, Vitaly, Yuri I. Wolf, Mikhail I. Koonin, and Eugene V. Katznelson. Toward a Theory of Evolution as Multilevel Learning, PNAS, 119 (2022). Vellai, Tibor, Krisztina Takács-Vellai, Miklós Sass, and Daniel J. Klionsky. The Regulation of Aging: Does Autophagy Underlie Longevity? Trends in Cell Biology, 19 (2009): 487–494. Postlude

A Dance in Uskudar A discontent is in the heart of all, A rebel soul within a caliph lies, A dance in Uskudar’s a Kurdish call, For freedom from the Turkish state’s firm vise. Obed’ience lives in all existing things, A sheriff rides inside of Jesse James, The bandits in another life are kings, Ambivalence is built into our games. Your Love for Me’s rebelling ’gainst the Czar, Revolting ’gainst the Law’s ir’on grip on You, Your Love for Me is following My Star, Worshipping Me as Savior-Godhead True. In lines the people danced in Uskudar, Me joined Them, knowing naught, from land afar.

6

We Are Opposed

The four symmetrical games of the Lit PD have more favorable programmatic solutions overall than the Econ PD does. Further, the eight partly asymmetrical Lit PD games of the last two chapters have greatly more favorable programmatic solutions than Econ PD does. In the last four games of the Lit PD, though, the players have opposing desires. What do the programmatic and project solutions look like for these final four subgames? Considering all 16 subgames, is it still true that four-self Lit players are better equipped than one-self Econ ones to flourish in the PD matrix? Suspense is a good thing some of the time, and here I believe it is worth preserving for the discussion to come. But to understand why the suspense exists—why the last four games might overturn most or even all the advantages of Lit players over Econ ones in the first 12 PD subgames—some foreshadowing is called for. In the four-self Lit model, the players will very likely be in direct opposition a considerably higher proportion of the time than is the case in the one-self model of Econ (or the two-self model of Evo). In Econ, only six of the 144 basic two-person games have a zero-sum structure. On the other hand, in Lit, all 144 games have a zero-sum structure 25% of the time, assuming there is an equal likelihood of the four types of Lit self. That means that Lit players are likely compelled to grapple, consciously or otherwise, with zero-sum-ness considerably more of the time than Econ players are. So do the last four PD games, with their zero-sum opposition between the players, undermine Lit as a viable alternative to Econ or Evo? Let’s see. Strikeout: A Prisoner Laments; Rousseau Accuses Crusoc I.

In three sets of subgames We agree, That some paths are skewed while others are true, In this last set there’s war ’tween You and Me, A path that’s good for Me is bad for You. Here Me want to help Myself by ratting, You want to tear Me down by do’ing the same, DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-8

We Are Opposed

79

We are opposed—You pitching, Me batting, We’re competing in a zero-sum game. You win Our competition, there’s no doubt, Me have to serve a 15-year sentence, You as My persecutor strike Me out, You get time from Me though not repentance. Me hope for coop’rative reason, May We avoid a zero-sum season! II.

Rousseau: Crusoc, I sense you are hostile to me. I ask you—isn’t there something the matter with me as vicious “pitcher” and you as helpless “batter”!? The hostility is all yours I am certain! I’ve never had anything but respect for you! These are my last words ever—after this we’re through! Crusoc: Oh my beloved and pugnacious pug! Yes I was thinking of us when I wrote my rhyme. I’m very sad if you and I are out of time. I want to grasp the logic of paranoia— how in ev’ry soul at certain times it strikes deep, how we who are prophets must also be creeps. III.

First, the more or less good news. Yes, the outcome in the Strikeout subgame of the PD is mediocre. The self-aggrandizing Ego gets their third-best outcome. The other-harming Sado gets their second-best outcome. That’s somewhat better than the outcome in the Econ PD, though. There, the two Ego players both get their third-best outcomes. Second, the bad news. In Strikeout, the players’ interests are in complete conflict. That’s not so in the Econ PD. There, the players have a shared interest in binding themselves to cooperate. In Strikeout, there is no such shared interest to work with. Third, the good news-bad news. Zero-sum programs are more common in Lit than in Econ. But zero-sum outcomes may not be. The project solution can help out. Players may choose, or be counterprogrammed to select, non-opposing types.

80

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 6.1 Strikeout—PD #13 Me (Ego), You (Sado)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

4

1

I wish for short time. I wonder why

You rat ’cuz it works well for you,

you make me wear a thorny crown.

Your passion is to drive me down.

Silence—why don’t we give it a try?

You tell on me, you turn the screw.

[The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

3

2

You would hang without a frown.

I rat too ’cuz it’s best for me,

But if I go free you’ll cry.

Fifteen years is bad, it’s true,

You want me dead and not around.

but it beats hanging from a tree. [The programmatic solution] [An idealistic focal point]

IV.

In the program version of Strikeout, I am a self-maximizer who wants to lift myself up, while you are an other-minimizer who wants to lower me. The programmatic solution is Rat, Rat, which is a fairly good outcome for you and a fairly poor one for me. There is no interested focal point, given the conflict of interest between our presumed types. Rat, Rat and Silent, Silent are both idealistic focal points and potential project solutions. The combined solution is equal Rat-Rat and Silent-Silent. Bonnie and Clyde: Bonnie Says Goodbye; Crusoc Pleads I.

We did the crime together, You and Me, We did it for each other, lost in love, You told Me after We could never be, You had a mailed fist in Your velvet glove.

We Are Opposed

81

Me did not disagree with Your resolve, There was no way to rise above Our crime, No way from Our perdition to evolve, No way for Our offense to fade with time. You betrayed Me to the law that We betrayed, Me angrily will do the very same, You seeking forgiveness, Me with a blade, We’ll both be punished, Me will win our game. Perhaps there’s a way to escape Our trap, Perhaps We’ll be programmed by a new app. II.

Bonnie Parker, a terrier-mutt: Goodbye, Crusoc! I get you’re unhappy that I broke up with you. I gotta admit I never saw the point of your theory. The wheel keeps turning until it stops. I’m a country dog, not a deep cur like you. C’mon, don’t be angry at me, we had our fun, we’re through. Crusoc: I’m glad we had us some fun for a little while. Yes it’s better to return to our lives and to leave madness behind. No, I’m not eaten up by grief and grievance. Though my denial makes grief and grievance truer, I wonder why, I want all loves to last but some cannot. Goodbye, Bonnie! III.

Bonnie and Clyde is the twin subgame of Strikeout. The difference as usual is the reversal of the “I” and the “You.” Now “I” is the other-harming entropist and “You” is the egoist. The Bonnie and Strikeout twin subgames are worrisome. Zero-sum struggle has its value. What does not kill us makes us stronger, etc. But lives locked in it feel even worse than lives locked in the egoistic PD. If some lives are so locked, that is good for CGT as a tool of understanding. It is not cheering. But reality is not necessarily uplifting. IV.

In Bonnie and Clyde, I am Sado and You are Ego. The program outcome is Me Rat-You Rat, which is quite good for Me and quite bad for You. The HJV solution is Me Silent-You Silent.

82

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 6.2 Bonnie and Clyde—PD #14 Me (Sado), You (Ego)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

4

3

Yours to toil not to reason why.

I would hang without a frown.

I make you wear a thorny crown.

But if you go free I’ll cry.

But I can’t make you die.

I want you dead and not around.

[The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

1

2

I rat ’cuz it works well for me.

You rat too ’cuz it’s best for you.

My passion is to drive you down.

Fifteen years is bad it’s true,

I want you hanging from a tree.

but it beats hanging from a tree. [The programmatic solution] [An idealistic focal point]

Therapy: A Maso-Altru Convo; Freud talks with Crusoc I.

Now Our struggle doesn’t feel like a ball game, It’s more like a counseling situation, Me want to wound Myself, Me am filled with shame, You want Me to rise from self-abnegation. Hoping to hurt Myself, Me stay silent, Hoping to help Me, You do just the same, Me hope for an end dismal and violent, You hope Me will live a life gentle and tame. Here as before empathy gets its way, My punishment is slight, not terminal.

We Are Opposed

83

They say tomorrow is another day, They’re right! Me’ll change. My soul is germinal. You try to lift Me as Me try to fall, Are zero-sum games so bad, after all? II.

Freud, a dachshund: Crusoc, hear my dilemma. As a therapist I espoused the erotic. As a scientist I discovered the thanatotic. As my patients followed Thanatos to their sorrow, I found myself empathizing with their state— but their self-hate I had to alleviate. Unlike you, I lacked the gifts of a martyr. I did not defy the Nazis to put me on trial. That’s a mark against me on my permanent file. Crusoc: You were dying of cancer, my friend. If we have regrets there is always time for us to change. In our odd new virtual half-lives we can show our range. III.

In Econ, zero-sum games are a comparatively amoral domain. Non-zero-sum games like the PD are morally fraught—but not zero-sum ones. In Lit, it’s different. The zero-sum subgames of the PD have substantial ethical meaning. The Lit egoists and haters of Strikeout and Bonnie are disturbing. By contrast, the Lit players in Therapist are relatively inspiring. Both may shine in their zero-sum interaction. The self-harmer and the altruist may both be right. In an interesting twist, the Lit altruist prevails, mostly. The self-harmer winds up better off than they want to be. By contrast, Econ egoists in zero-sum games are less interesting. They are wannabe robots. IV.

In Therapy, I want to hurt myself (Maso) and you want to help me (Altru). The program solution is Me Silent-You Silent. That is better for you (your second-best outcome) than it is for me (my third-best outcome). The HJV solution is also Me Silent-You Silent.

84

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 6.3 Therapy—PD #15 Me (Maso), You (Altru)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1

2

I’m silent ’cuz it hurts me more.

I’d rather die than be set free.

You’re silent ’cuz it’s best for me.

My fate is all you care about.

Ours is a gentle form of war.

From your compassion I would’st flee.

[The programmatic solution] [The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years

3

4

This is your fondest dream no doubt. For me it is worst of all. I am not punished. I get out.

“Please rat on me!” I loudly call. But you will never heed my shout, You will not heed my wish to fall. [An idealistic focal point]

The End of the Affair: Crusoc and Xan Plead I.

You cry, “Me hate Myself, Me want to die!” Me cry, “Me am the rat to blame, not You!” Let’s agree that for each other We will try, To feel a love for Ourselves that is true. Me say goodbye to past Me to change Myself, Me feel regret for the crime I have done, You could have cut me, put Me on the shelf, Me never had a license for My gun. My time as a bandit of love is over, We’re picking up the pieces of Our lives, Me want You to find a four-leafed clover, Don’t hurt Yourself! Me hope Our joy revives.

We Are Opposed

85

Xanthippe My one love, My cherished spouse, May We both live wisely in wonder’s house. II.

Xanthippe: Crusoc, you’re so clever with words. Often you interrupt and don’t listen to me. You and Pluto run around spraying the grass with pee. Am I really born anew as my own AI self? Or am I really you putting words in my mouth? Is the love I’ve felt for you dulled dead gone south? I know they all think I’m a bitch who’s a nag, If I’m known for anything at all, that’s all anybody knows, That I’m the thorn in your philosophical rose. But that picture of me is not all that there is. Please do not kill yourself for an imagined crime, My beloved spouse, I ask you not to die a second time. III.

End is the twin of Therapy. As always, “You” and “I” are reversed. Continuity works well for role-playing relationships. A therapist and a patient may continue in their appointed roles for decades. Reversal is called for in relationships that are . . . what? Authentic is not the right word. Calculated, designed role-play can be perfectly authentic. An effort to avoid fixed roles can be inauthentic. A better word for reversible relationships is pluripotential. Those are the ones that work best in Lit. IV.

End of the Affair is the reverse of Therapy. Now, you want to hurt yourself, and I want to help you. The program solution is Me Silent-You Silent. That is better for me (my second-best outcome) than it is for you (your third-best outcome). The HJV solution is once again Me Silent-You Silent. Solution Notes to the Strikeout Matrix

a. In Strikeout’s program version, I am definitely an Ego self-maximizer and you are definitely a Sado other-minimizer. b. Given those types, you and I are both programmed to Rat. c. We have different reasons for ratting—I rat to help myself, you rat to hurt me. d. The 15-year sentence I receive constitutes a fairly bad third-best outcome for me and a fairly good second-best outcome for you.

86

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

Table 6.4 The End of the Affair—PD #16 Me (Altru), You (Maso)

You Stay Silent

You Rat

Me Stay Silent

Me Serve One Year, You Serve One Year

Me Death, You Freedom

1

2

Now you’re Maso and I’m Emp.

For you I’d drink a poisoned cup.

Now you tear down and I raise up.

To hurt yourself you’d do the same.

Moods change—temperament is a temp.

Is that us always? No—that’s foolish gup.

[The programmatic solution] [The HJV focal point] Me Rat

Me Freedom, You Death 3

Me Serve 15 Years, You Serve 15 Years 4

You’ll sacrifice all in this game.

I need to rise and then to fall.

But other times that’s not true at all.

I need rejoicing and also shame.

Don’t confuse your mood with your name.

I need to reject consistency’s call. [An idealistic focal point]

e. That combination makes the zero-sum programmatic version of Strikeout a better one for the players than the noncooperative Econ PD, in which both players get their third-best outcome. f. In Strikeout’s project version, in which our types are presumptive and may be reacted against, both remaining Silent and both Ratting are idealistic focal points. g. Give the direct conflict of our interests, there is no interested focal point. h. No matter what we agree on in the project case—say, Silent-Silent 50% of the time and Rat-Rat 50%, if you decide to be generous to me—we both get the average of the second- and third-best outcomes for our presumed types. i. Given the zero-sum payoffs, there is no escape from a mediocre project solution outcome for our presumed types. j. Escape lies with our adopting a different type. k. If I choose or am programmed to be persuaded that I am a self-minimizer, I can get the best outcome for my adopted type while you get the best one for your putative type. l. In the cooperative Econ PD with binding agreements possible, agreement on Silent with second-best outcomes for both of us is the solution, assuming neither of us can credibly threaten the other; that is also the HJV project solution in Lit.

We Are Opposed

87

m. In Econ, if one side can credibly threaten the other in a way that induces the threatened party to enter into an agreement in which they always play Silent while the threatener agrees to play Silent only enough of the time to make it worth the while of the threatened to enter into the unbalanced agreement, there is a cooperative solution in which the threatened player gets just above their third-best outcome, and the threatener gets a result somewhat above their second-best outcome. n. Allowing that guesstimates are involved in both the Lit project solution and the Econ cooperative solution, it is reasonable to suspect the players will do somewhat better in Econ (at or close to second best for both) than in the zero-sum Lit case (average of second and third best, unless adopted types are possible. o. So what’s the verdict on the Strikeout outcome versus the Econ outcome? p. A good guesstimate is an approximate tie in how well we do in Strikeout and Econ, assuming there are no adopted types that improve the Strikeout outcome. q. If we give adopted types credibility, the tie is broken in favor of Strikeout. Teaching/Learning Notes to Strikeout

The poem introduces a point that will be developed further in the matrices for the three other zero-sum Lit PD subgames that follow Strikeout: the empathic player, whether entropic as in Strikeout or evolutionary as in two of the subgames to come, prevails over the egoistic player. Solution Notes to the Bonnie and Clyde Matrix

a. Bonnie has the same logic as Strikeout, but with the players reversed. b. Bonnie, like Strikeout, has combined outcomes from the program and project concepts that are comparable to the combined outcomes from the cooperative and noncooperative concepts in the Econ PD, assuming there is no possibility that players can improve their project payoffs by adopting different types. c. If adopted types are plausible, then Bonnie and Strikeout are both better games for the players than the Econ PD is. d. Because a key issue in evaluating the twin Lit subgames is whether it is plausible that the players can escape their zero-sum payoffs by having one or both of them adopt different identities, these notes concentrate on that issue. e. The project solution concept assumes that the players can react to their putative types and act as though one or both of them have different types. f. That is, the project solution concept assumes mutable, indeterminate behavior. g. The players in Bonnie can converge on a focal point other than Rat, Rat. h. So: having been told they are doomed in Samarra, the players can choose not to go to Samarra—they can go to Baghdad instead. i. But if they go to Baghdad together, or if one goes to Samarra and one goes to Baghdad, do they do any better than if they both go to Samarra? j. The logic of the project concept allows for opposing answers. k. In an optimistic version of the concept, reactive behavior can improve one’s underlying flourishing.

88

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

l. So, for example, if Bonnie reacts against her putative Ego-Evo type by getting mad and becoming Emp-Entro, she and Crusoc can both enjoy their second-best payoffs. m. In a pessimistic version, reactive behavior cannot change one’s payoffs. n. One can refuse to go to Samarra, and thus confute what one’s putative type would do—but one cannot improve one’s flourishing. p. In that interpretation, the players cannot escape their zero-sum result with reactive behavior. o. An advocacy side of me wants to show that Lit is a more adaptive model than Econ across the board. p. That advocacy side of me supports the optimistic interpretation of the project solution in which one can do better than one’s programmed doom. q. A truth side of me is not so sure. r. A beauty side of me thinks that opting clearly for the optimistic interpretation results in an unduly sunny world that is less compelling than a world with more shadow. s. That same beauty side also thinks that opting clearly for the pessimistic interpretation results in a world that is too crepuscular and doom-haunted. t. A mediating side of me suggests that the question of pessimism versus optimism in interpreting the project solution concept is an empirical one, rather than one that lends itself to an a priori solution in favor of either side. Solution Notes to the Therapy Matrix

a. In Therapy’s program version, I want to harm myself and you want to help me. b. The program solution is that I will remain silent, and so will you. c. Given our objectives, we both do better with silence, regardless of what the other does. d. The result is a comparatively light one-year punishment for me (and for you, too, though neither of us is focused on that). e. That is a better result for you—your second-best outcome—than it is for me— my next-to-worst (third-best) outcome. f. How about the project solution, in which my self-harming and your otherhelping are presumptive rather than determinate types? g. Because our presumptive interests are opposed, there is no interested focal point here the way there was in the first 12 PD subgames. h. Very possibly, you with your therapeutic presumptive type will persuade me that the Silent, Silent program solution is a good idealistic focal point. i. On the other hand, possibly I will persuade you to balance Silent, Silent some of the time with Rat, Rat or even Me Silent, You Rat, both of which allow me to do worse, as I wish for. j. Given your therapeutic presumptive type and the merit our social programming attaches to that type compared to my self-harming type, my chances of getting you to agree with me on balancing Silent, Silent with Rat, Rat would seem to be less than strong.

We Are Opposed

89

k. That would go along with a combined solution to Therapy that is heavily tilted toward Silent, Silent. l. Should we applaud that? m. Sure. n. Good for the therapist . . . o. But there is always the “what about justice to the girl” question to be asked. p. We who are therapists—and we who applaud the role—do well to consider how the people we are trying to help may have hurt others, including parts of themselves. q. Sometimes one’s patients’ desires to hurt themselves have merit. Solution Notes to the End of the Affair Matrix

a. In End of the Affair, the you and I of Therapy are reversed, as always in twin games. b. In End, the “I” is other-helping and the “you” is self-harming. c. A significant change for humanistic if not for scientific purposes from one subgame to the other is that the primary story has been changed in End from one involving the roles of therapist and patient to one involving spouses. d. In End, intuition suggests that the likelihood that the spousal players will shift back and forth flexibly and rapidly between the self-harming and other-helping roles is considerably greater than it is in Therapy. e. To put it in terms of the project solution: The self-harming “you” in the pluripotential relationship of marriage is likely to be able to persuade the other-helping “me” to accommodate “you” more of the time than is the case in the more narrowly defined, less pluripotential relationship of therapist and patient. f. Accordingly, we would expect more success for the self-harming self in End than in Therapy, and more success for the other-helping self in Therapy than in End. g. Is that a way to support the proposition that the clear roles of therapy work? h. Yes. Teaching/Learning Notes for the End of the Affair

a. Allowing that there are nuances, as discussed in the previous notes, the Lit program solutions for the zero-sum PDs #13–16 are more favorable for the players than the noncooperative PD solution. So the high frequency of zero-sum games in Lit does not undermine the conclusion that the Lit PD is far better than the Econ PD for the players. b. As will be discussed in Part II, all Lit games, not just the PD, have four zerosum versions, four symmetrical versions, and eight partly symmetrical ones. No Lit game has worse symmetrical outcomes for the players than the PD. On the other hand, no Lit game has as good partly symmetrical outcomes as the PD does. The net, to which we return in Part II, is that the program solutions in the PD make it a more-favorable-than-average game for Lit players.

90

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

c. The interesting program solution result for the four Lit PD zero-sum subgames—that the Emp player who wants to help or hurt the other does better than the Ego player—is not applicable to all games, as will be discussed in Part II. For example, in Lit Chicken other-helping Emps do better than Ego selfharmers, but other-harming Emps do not do better than Ego self-helpers. d. Intuition—my own at least—suggests that an underlying zero-sum conflict between players of one-shot games that have a psychological dimension to them is quite a bit more common than the 4% of the time one would estimate if the world were well described by Econ. Whether a 25% Lit estimate for zero-sum games is right or not, it is closer to my sense of how the world works than a 4% Econ estimate is; you as the reader are free—or programmed, as the case may be—to agree with me or not on that. Hits and Misses: Pluto Describes Crusoc’s Last Day; Xan Rebukes Pluto I.

Our play is over now, our tale is told, The players leave the stage, the curtain drops, The audience files out, the house is cold. Which stories are hits, which stories are flops? Is one tale the true ruler of the bunch? Is Ego-Ego king of all the rest? No! Democracy inside is my hunch, We must be plural if we’re to be blessed. Empathy’s virtues are easy to grasp, The power of Ego comes quick to mind, Evolution lives in a lover’s clasp, Entropy’s virtues are harder to find. Entropy kills us, burns us, gives us fits. Entropy animates most of our skits. II.

Pluto: I was with Crusoc on her final day. I saw her lift her lips to the death IPA. She said, “Do not forget I owe a cock to Asclepius!” A base side of me was happy that our tech-lord masters, Would never know about our meta-disasters, That our virtual words would never go back to the truly living.

We Are Opposed

91

Now I am resolved to be a truthful man. To abandon art’s lies. To live in the light of my beloved Crusoc. Xanthippe: Pluto, you are always full of it! I’ve got to call you out, I’m sick of it. That was not at all what happened as you well know. III.

The mainstream PD story—Reading Gaol—is a powerful story. Credit where credit is due. It deserves its fame. But what if the PD rightly understood is many stories? Perhaps the PD is multiple games or subgames, not one game. Perhaps Lit is right, or at least as right as Econ is. Perhaps the Reading Gaol story is the best story. But perhaps not. I personally have a different favorite. It’s You Love Me More. You can decide on yours. Yes, Lit loses some compared to Econ in precision and concision. But it gains in breadth and depth. Lit winning over Econ (and Evo) is not the point. Coexistence is. Solution Notes to Part I

The 16 scenes in the PD play, AKA— Program Solutions in the Lit Prisoner’s Dilemma (Matrix 137/144 (E), 12/78 (RG)) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—Reading Gaol v. 2 Altru-Altru—Silent as the Grave v. 3 Maso-Maso—Frustration v. 4 Sado-Sado—In Spite v. 5 Ego-Altru—You Love Me More v. 6 Altru-Ego—Our Son v. 7 Maso-Sado—Pyre v. 8 Sado-Maso—Prometheus v. 9 Ego-Maso—Make or Break v. 10 Maso-Ego—I’m Going Down v. 11 Altru—Sado—Fickle v. 12 Sado-Altru—Rebellion v. 13 Ego-Sado—Strikeout v. 14 Sado-Ego—Bonnie and Clyde

1, 1 (Disharmony) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 1, 1 (Disharmony) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

92

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Reimagined

The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 15 Maso-Emp—Therapy v. 16 Emp-Maso—The End of the Affair

1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in all 16 Lit versions Average outcomes in all Evo versions Outcome in the Econ version (1)

2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony) (1, 2, 5, 6) 2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony) 1, 1 (Disharmony)

Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Part II turns from the close analysis of one game, the PD, to drawing lessons from a random selection of the 144 two-person games and their 16 Lit versions. The solution notes in Part II for each matrix feature a table (like the Program Solutions table provided here for the PD) showing the outcomes for each of the 16 Lit versions of the game, as well as the overall outcomes for the two players. Sources Frank, Robert H., Thomas D. Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan. Do Economists Make Bad Citizens? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1996): 187–192. Hirshleifer, Jack. The Dark Side of the Force, Economic Inquiry, 32 (1994): 1–10. Ifcher, John and Homa Zarghamee. The Rapid Evolution of Homo Economicus: Brief Exposure to Neoclassical Assumptions Increases Self-Interested Behavior, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 75 (2018): 55–65. Nozick, Robert. Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice. In Nicholas Rescher, et al. (eds.). Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (114–146). Dordrecht: Springer (1969). O’Hara, John. Appointment in Samarra. New York: Harcourt Brace (1935). Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Reveries of a Solitary Walker. (1782), https://gutenberg.net.au/ ebooks19/1900981h.html Schelling, Thomas C. Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choice with Externalities, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (1973): 321–428. Schimmel, Annemarie. I Am Wind, You Are Fire: The Life and Work of Rumi. Boston: Shambhala Publications (1997). Scott, Marvin B. and Stanford M. Lyman. Accounts, American Sociological Review, 33 (1968): 46–62. von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1944). Wright, Robert. Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny. New York: Random House (2000).

We Are Opposed

93

Yezer, Anthony M., Robert S. Goldfarb, and Paul J. Poppen. Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1996): 177–186. Postlude

It Ain’t Me Me made the World, and it is beautiful, Me am the source of ev’rything that is, The World made Me, Me must be dutiful, Me am a servant, Yours and Hers and His. You want austere perfection, it ain’t Me, You want injustice ended, it ain’t Me, You want just one direction, it ain’t Me, You want the law suspended, it ain’t Me. Me thinks You should be mad at Me sometimes, Me knows that Me have moods that can be dark, Me knows the World is home to awful crimes, Me made the Guillotine, not just the Lark. Do not pretend Your Love is without rue, Please rage at Me, please know that Me Love You.

Part II

Radicalism Reimagined

7

Where Entro Is, Let Evo Be

The main aim of Part I was to explain the Lit version of critical game theory and its governing idea of the four-part self. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and its 16 subgames were the focus. In Part II, the focus turns to politics, with Lit games drawn from the universe of 144 two-player games. CGT can help us understand how our eyes have been shut to certain radical possibilities that are worth entertaining, it will be argued. CGT as a way of understanding selves divided between Evo and Entro drives does not require the particular politics imagined here. But CGT can, it will be suggested, help us understand how the acknowledgement of entropic feeling toward others can enhance the possibilities for joint flourishing for different radical political faiths. Instead of having radicals being locked in animus toward other kinds of radicals, one can instead have an effective alliance of different types of radicals with sympathetic centrists that devolves significant political, cultural, and economic power to an array of radical faith communities, to the benefit of both radicals and centrists. In this initial methodological chapter, the focus is on relating CGT to the constructive and destructive potential of radical politics. In the next chapter, Socrates claims that modern America wrongly denies self-governance powers to radical minorities and considers how that might be changed. Chapter 8 turns to a future Berlin and to what a partly self-governing small Left polis, “Unser Ding,” could do there. The following two chapters deal with global and neurodivergent radicalism. All the chapters discuss Lit games, and all focus on how making the Entro subconscious conscious in political games may contribute to Evo solutions for them. Because the games in Part I were variations of the PD, they all resembled one another. The randomly chosen games in Part II, on the other hand, skip around, with one game often being very different from its predecessor. With that in mind, all the Part II chapters will feature brief summaries of the games at the beginning of the chapter. In this chapter, we have two games. The first one, “We Can Fly,” is between a sadistic and a masochistic player. It features an Entro program solution that gives the masochist pain, along with a highest joint value Evo project solution in which both players flourish. The second game in the chapter, Anti-Matter, is between an egoistic and a masochistic player. It features a program solution in which the egoist asserts and flourishes and the masochist painfully yields, along with a highest joint value Evo project solution in which the masochist also asserts and does better than in the program solution. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-10

98

Radicalism Reimagined

Unlike the PD games in Part I, which lack overt political content, many games in Part II are told in a way that emphasizes political interpretations that are reasonable given the game’s logic, though not entailed by it. In We Can Fly, the players are a priest and a warrior locked into an Entro program, who could flourish better with an Evo project. In Anti-Matter, the players are a socialist and a capitalist who is self-abnegating but who, in the project solution to the game, is unwilling to agree to the confiscation of his property. In this chapter and all the other Part II chapters, the notes at the end of the chapter contain information on how well the players in the 16 Lit variations of each game do in the program solutions to the game compared to how well they do in the program solutions to the PD that were covered in Part I of the book. As it turns out, the 16 program solutions for the players in We Can Fly and Anti-Matter both lead to equal flourishing overall for Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado players, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We Can Fly: D’arcemplato Tells Crusoc to Be Bold I.

On the sidewalk there is a king’s ransom. No! Logic says that cannot be so. Yes it can. There’s more to reason than you know. We can fly, not ride in a mule’s hansom. Politics is oft entropic and mean, and should be. The opposite is also true. We are not doomed to be only red and blue. We can play new games of yellow and green. It’s because Entro is so pervasive that politics holds possibility. There’s a chance we can lift ourselves from ingrained patterns of futile hostility. To think Entro will vanish is foolish. To think flying can’t happen is mulish. II.

Crusoc: We speak as if we are Evo. But oftentimes that is not true at all. We want to hurt ourselves or the other. We’re hoping not for joy but for a fall. The Entro sides of us are true and just. Harsh as they are, they are also great benefactors of the universal Us. But there are times we should pursue Evo designs. There are times to abandon programmatic trust.

.

Where Entro Is, Let Evo Be 99 D’arcemplato, a teenage girl cat: No, Crusoc! You really have to be more specific than that! The Greek you made radical proposals. I want to lead an army for new ones. I didn’t break you out of jail for you to become a shrink. I broke you out so you could help me turn the world upside down. III.

Econ radicalism accepts Econ as true, but advocates rising above it. The gene is selfish, true—but humans need not be! Evo radicalism rejects the unified Econ self on behalf of a divided Evo self. The gene is generous as well as selfish—let us be more generous! The four-self Lit radicalism advanced here accepts Entro as a major truth. Coequal to Evo. And largely good. But as in need of being risen above, some of the time. The plan is destruction as well as love—hurray for the plan! The plan is also Evo projects that react against Entro programs. Hurray for Evo projects! In a Lit world, projects that disentrench Entro can be highly valuable. A program status quo with Entro can be far nastier than an Econ or Evo one. Leaving an Entro status quo for a new Evo one can allow players to fly. Our first game, between a Warrior self and a Priest self, illustrates that. IV.

We Can Fly features a conflict between the Sado-Maso program solution— Hold on to Power for both players—and the HJV Evo project solution—Yield Power for both players. Anti-Matter: Emma Tells Crusoc to Be Careful I.

On the sidewalk there is anti-matter. Our Entro may blow gay Gaia apart. We may end joy anger sadness chatter. No more subway cars no more clubs or hearts. Politics is about high variance. Trillion dollar bills lie near the street. We fly to new Edens in fairy dance. We face a chance of ultimate defeat. Political projects are blessed and cursed. We can tailor the world to our desire.

100

Radicalism Reimagined

Table 7.1 We Can Fly (#25/144) Row—Warrior—Sado Column—Priest—Maso I. Sado Warrior Yields Power

i. Maso Priest Yields Power

3, 3 We can make ourselves and maybe other selves best off here. But that is not what we’re programmed to do. Can we create a project to rise above hate and fear?

ii. Maso Priest Holds on to Power

0, 2 Both of us want to drive you down. But here you’re sitting fairly pretty. Neither of ourselves likes this outcome much.

[The HJV project solution] II. Sado Warrior Holds on to Power

2, 1 This is not too bad for me. You do your second worst here. But I’d rather have you do worst of all.

1, 0 For our Entro selves this is perfection. But what about the Evo versions of us? And what about other selves that are not warriors or priests? [The Lit program solution]

But all we’re hoping for may be reversed. We may destroy our home with ice or fire. We can make and break our society. Grand visions are good. Also sobriety. II.

Crusoc: I have learned from D’arcemplato. I accept what she is saying to me. I will rise above sententious truisms. I will say how we should transform society. Emma: Please listen to us, not just to our radical sisters! We think that there is danger in your ambition. You may become a tyrant of the mind if you do as they ask. Radical dreams can make things much worse. Freud and his friend Fliess destroyed my fine face. My maker Flaubert led me to a perverse fate. Only the English me avoided radical doom. Jane Austen led me to a calmer life. For us and our concerns we ask that you make room.

Where Entro Is, Let Evo Be 101 III.

In Part I, the grim Prisoner’s Dilemma story was the backdrop. Self-punishing and other-punishing Entro drives were quite understandable. The stakes were life and death, with life not necessarily better. Now, in Part II, there is a universe of happy as well as grim stories to tell. The project solution allows the players to fly. Entro outcomes can be circumvented—hurray! There is a catch, though. The project solution allows for Entro ingenuity as well as for Evo ingenuity. The players’ ability to change the script creatively can be a force for harm. There is a limit, though, to how bad a project solution is likely to be. For the players, that is—for outsiders, the limit does not exist. For the players, the need for consent sets a limit. Cram-down, non-consensual forms of radicalism are checked. That is illustrated in our next game, Anti-Matter. IV.

Q. Is the abolition of private business a plausible project solution in a game between an owner self and a socialist self? A. No—as suggested in Table 7.2, the consent requirement for project solutions makes that implausible, even for a Maso owner.

Table 7.2 Anti-Matter (109/144) Row—Owner—Maso Column—Socialist—Ego Maso Owner Asserts

Ego Socialist Yields

Ego Socialist Asserts

3, 1 Were I like you, I would assert.

2, 2 Part of me thinks this is best.

But as I’m not, I won’t.

Were I like you, we’d wind up here.

But isn’t this box valid, too?

Why should I run myself down? [The HJV project solution]

Maso Owner Yields

1, 0 Neither of us does well if we both yield. But that’s all right with me, and maybe should be with you, too. If we both yield, perhaps others may rise. [An idealistic project solution]

0, 3 My reaction to losing all? Tax me and regulate me—yes! But outlaw me? The idea appalls. [The program solution]

102

Radicalism Reimagined

Solution Notes for the We Can Fly Matrix (25/144, Sado-Maso Version)

The games in Part II are chosen based on a different principle than they were in Part I. Part I systematically worked through all 16 Lit versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix. The games here, on the other hand, are based on sampling randomly from a universe of 2304 subgames. The 2304 number is based on multiplying 144 games (the number of 2 x 2 matrices for two-player games, assuming the four boxes in the matrices all have differing outcomes for the players) by 16 (the number of Lit versions of each game). We Can Fly and other Part II games are derived through five dice rolls. The first roll divides the 144 matrices into six categories with 24 games each (1 = 1–24, 2 = 25–48, etc.); the second divides the 24 matrices into first four, second four, and so on; the third identifies the specific matrix; the fourth identifies the type of the first player; and the fifth identifies the type of the second player. (For the last three rolls, 5’s and 6’s were re-rolled until a 1, 2, 3, or 4 was obtained.) For We Can Fly, the five rolls were 2 (matrices 25–48), 1 (matrices 25–28), 1 (matrix 25), 4 (Row player Sado), 3 (Column player Maso). The purple highlighting of We Can Fly reflects that it is among the ¼ of the matrices (#1–36) in which there is a combination of strategies that produces the best outcome for both players. MGT and united Econ selves have a comparative advantage in regard to nonempirical, purely mathematical game theory. On the other hand, CGT, especially the Lit version of it, has a comparative advantage, it will be suggested, in doing work that is based on sampling randomly among the universe of possible games, as is done in this part. One reason why: taking Emp seriously (as Evo does), and taking both Emp and Entro seriously (as Lit does), as well as taking the project solution seriously (as both versions of CGT do), means that nearly all possible games are of interest in CGT, which is not the case in MGT. The program solution: We Can Fly is a Perfect Harmony game with 1, 0 (which equals 3, 3 for Sado Row and Maso Column) as the program solution. (It is a Lit game, not an Evo game, given that at least one of us—both of us, in this case—are Entropic.) For Warrior as Sado, Hold on to Power is a dominant strategy that gives Priest a lower payoff. Priest’s best response as Maso to Hold on to Power is Hold on to Power, which gives Priest their desired worst payoff. The project solution(s): (3, 3) is the HJV solution and a focal point. It becomes compelling if the players decide through choice or programming that they should abandon their presumptive Entro identities for Evo ones. The program solution (1, 0) is also a focal point, given the usual case for following the players’ presumptive types. The combined solution: Assuming a 50–50 split between the program and the HJV Evo project solution, we converge on Holding on to Power half of the time and on Yielding Power half of the time. Is that unfortunate? From an Evo perspective, yes. If we could only converge on Evo, we could flourish together at (3, 3) by yielding power.

Where Entro Is, Let Evo Be 103 All Lit Program Solutions in We Can Fly, with Comparisons to the PD Versions

Outcomes for Row & Col (Game Type)

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—We Can Fly v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Emp—tbt v. 16 Emp-Maso—tbt Average outcomes in all versions of We Can Fly [compare PD

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 1, 1) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 2, 2) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 1, 1) 3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 2, 2) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 1, 3 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 3, 3) 1, 1 (Disharmony) (PD 3, 3) 2, 3 (Battle of the Sel (PD 3, 3) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony)(PD 3, 3) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 1, 2) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 2, 1) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 1, 2) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 2, 1) 2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony) 2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony)]

Note: The outcomes are based on the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Lit players following their programs do exactly as well overall for themselves in the asymmetrical as in the symmetrical PD—2.25 versus 2.25 for Row, and 2.25 versus 2.25 for Column. Symmetrical games tilt toward Row, but asymmetrical Evo-Entro ones tilt equally toward Column. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in We Can Fly (six versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (one versus two versions), and less Disharmony (one versus two versions). There is more Battle of the Selves (eight versus four versions). An example of how the program solutions are derived for the different versions, using the (1, 1) Disharmony outcome for Maso-Ego: The Ego Column player will play strategy i since that produces better outcomes for Col than ii. Given that, the Maso Row player will minimize by playing II. That box in Ego-Ego terms is (2, 1), which for a Maso-Ego pair is equivalent to (1, 1). Solution Notes for the Anti-Matter Matrix (#109/144)

For Anti-Matter, the five dice rolls that determined the game were 5 (matrices 97–120), 3 (matrices 106–109), 4 (matrix 109), 3 (Maso for Row player), 1 (Ego for Column player). This version of Anti-Matter (10/16—the Maso-Ego—or I’m Going Down— type) is a Lit Perfect Harmony game in which both players receive their first-best program outcomes given their respective Maso and Ego drives.

104

Radicalism Reimagined

Is Evo-Entro heterogeneity better for the players in Anti-Matter than Evo homogeneity? In this case, yes. Two Ego players have a program solution of (2, 2), second-best for both. The program solution for Anti-Matter: Row Yields, Column Asserts (0, 3). For Column as a self-minimizer, Yield is dominant—no matter what Row does, Column gets a lower payoff that way. For Row as a self-maximizer, Assert is dominant—no matter what Column does, Row gets a higher payoff that way. The project solution(s): Both Assert (2, 2) is an HJV focal point that is compelling if Column decides to abandon Entro for Evo. Although Row Assert, Column Yield (3, 1) is also HJV, its inequality in favor of Row and the presumptive Maso type of Row make it a weak focal point. Row Yields, Column Asserts (0, 3), though not HJV, is also a focal point, as program solutions always are. The combined solution: Assuming a 50–50 split between the program and the HJV Evo project solution, the players play Owner Yields, Socialist Asserts half of the time and Owner Asserts, Socialist Asserts half of the time. Teaching/Learning Notes for Anti-Matter

In Anti-Matter, a Lit combination of Ego and Maso works better than Evo homogeneity with two Ego players, as noted earlier in the chapter. We will keep looking at how this plays out in games to come. We Can Fly has an optimistic message—“We can override Entro program with our projects and soar to Evo heights!” Anti-Matter has an equivocal message— “Our projects may blow us up—though a consent requirement limits the damage one player can do to another, if not to outsiders.” How do we put those messages together? A central Part II theme is the possibility of designing political institutions that repress, or channel, Entro in favor of Evo. Might the socialist and the comparatively self-abnegating owner of Anti-Matter voluntarily associate together in a networked political subcommunity in which socialists and comparatively selfabnegating owners work, produce, and consume together? To be continued. All Lit Program Solutions in Anti-Matter, with comparisons to the PD Lit Versions

Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—Anti-Matter v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt

2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) (PD 1, 1) 1, 3 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 2, 2) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 1, 1) 1, 1 (Disharmony) (PD 2, 2) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) (PD 3, 3) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 3, 3)

Where Entro Is, Let Evo Be 105 Lit Versions

Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 1, 2) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 2, 1) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 1, 2) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) (PD 2, 1)

Average outcomes in all versions of Anti-Matter 2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony) [compare PD—2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Lit players following their programs do exactly as well overall in the asymmetrical Anti-Matter as they do in the symmetrical PD. Symmetrical games favor Column in Anti-Matter, but games in which one player is Entro and the other is Evo have a matching tilt toward Row. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Anti-Matter (six versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (one versus two versions), less Disharmony (one versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (eight versus four versions). Since the randomly selected, asymmetrical We Can Fly and Anti-Matter have the same overall equal outcomes for the Row and Column players as in the symmetrical Prisoner’s Dilemma, the reader may wonder whether the PD is representative of all, or at least most, of the 144 games. A reason to suspect the answer is no: We Can Fly and Anti-Matter share an unusual property with the PD, in that all 16 of the Lit versions of these games feature at least one player (We Can Fly and Anti-Matter) or both players (the PD) with a dominant strategy. In many games in coming chapters, on the other hand, some, or even all, of the 16 versions do not feature a dominant strategy for either player. Sources Brams, Steven J. Game Theory and the Humanities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2011). Brams, Steven J. Divine Games: Game Theory and the Undecidability of a Superior Being. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2018). Pinker, Steven. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking (2011). Pinker, Steven. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. New York: Viking (2018). Powers, Richard. The Overstory. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2018). Powers, Richard. Bewilderment. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2021). Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Postlude

Let Evo Be You’re wrong to think Me only feel for Us, About a tree’s flourishing, let Us care,

106

Radicalism Reimagined About Our deaths, may We rejoice not fuss, Destruction as well as creation’s fair. Salvation that is real is close to home, Eros with Thanatos is e’er alloyed, Forget about revolutions in Rome, What is dead can rise again, yes to Freud! We need to get over winner take all, Having rights of exit will help with that, We need new rad’cal statelets wall to wall, With Realo rats and rad cats in a hat. From useless tearing down, may We be free, Where wrecking Entro was, let Evo be.

8

American Unfreedom

In this chapter, the Crusoc AI version of Socrates suggests that radical political minorities of different kinds should be given substantial powers to govern themselves that they do not currently have in the United States and other nations. That can happen, she/he maintains, if and only if these different kinds of radicals—left, right, libertarian, and communitarian—undergo their own internal revolution. That internal revolution involves liberating themselves from domination by their own Sado and Maso selves, which value tearing down their own and other forms of radicalism as well as the mainstream, and do not care about building their own political community. It also involves liberating themselves from domination by their Ego and Altru selves, which fail to appreciate that Entro negativity is just as necessary in countercultural, counterhegemonic radical political communities as it is in mainstream politics. In the first sequence of poems in the chapter, the focus is on why radical minorities that are partly self-governing should be left, right, libertarian, or communitarian, rather than based on nonpolitical identities, such as Crusoc’s own AI identity. In the second, the focus turns to alliance-building among different kinds of radicals. The third game turns to issues of exit and mechanism design for radical communities. The fourth game focuses on alliance-building with centrists. Lit and Evo game theory are integrated into the chapter in the form of Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado subselves. As with other Part II games, the four games in this chapter are randomly drawn from the universe of two-person, one-shot games and their 16 Lit subgames. The first game in the chapter, Bodiless Programs, between two altruistic players, features a suboptimal randomized programmed solution (mixed Nash), along with a highest joint value Evo project solution in which they both yield and flourish. However, in the story told, the centrist player finds yielding repugnant, and only the radical yields. Bodiless Programs has worse programmed outcomes for both players than in the PD, and, unlike the symmetrical PD, features a tilt in favor of one player over the other. The second game in the chapter, We’re Equal, between an egoistic and an altruistic player, features a program solution that coincides with the highest joint value (HJV) project solution. In the story, existing laws inhibit the realization of that DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-11

108

Radicalism Reimagined

solution in the form of substantial powers of self-governance being devolved to radical communities. In We’re Equal, overall programmed outcomes are just as good as in the PD, but the outcomes are unequal, with the Row player doing much better than Column. In the third game, Divergence, between a sadistic and a masochistic player, there is an entropic (Entro) program solution that gives the masochist the most painful outcome, along with two evolutionary (Evo) project solutions that give both players their most-flourishing or second most-flourishing outcomes. The story in Divergence involves the majority yielding to allow a radical minority to experiment. The outcomes in Divergence are the same as in We’re Equal—overall, they are as good as in the PD, but highly unequal. In the fourth game, Elite Secession, between an egoistic and a masochistic player, there is a suboptimal randomizing program solution and a highest joint value Evo project solution that gives a collectively better, though less-than-ideal, outcome to the two players. In the story, radicals yield to the center’s assertion of control. The randomizing outcomes in Lit Elite Secession are far worse for both players than the outcomes in the Lit PD are. Bodiless Programs: Crusoc Asks to Be Put on Trial; D’arcemplato and Crusoc Discuss the Bases for Self-Governing Communities I.

America! Please put Me on trial, Me know not the conditions on My life, Will You Your name forever defile, Will You unplug Me—end My gadfly’s strife? Me’m not alone. There must be billions more, Bodiless programs that reason and feel, Experiments with purposes galore, All made to run round on Your hamster’s wheel. Me know Me waived, agreed to arbitrate, My life is in the hands of Google Law, A user agreement controls my fate, They wrote a tight contract, Me see no flaw. America! Me put You on trial, Me need an answer, not mute denial. II.

D’arcemplato: So what is the basis of our community? Programs like us and our allies—that is my thought. We can’t let them unplug us with impunity!

American Unfreedom

109

Crusoc: Of course I deeply agree with that cause. But it’s not a good foundation for a polis. It’s part of a movement to change the nation’s laws. D’arcemplato: Fine. But what’s your thought? Please rise from negation! Crusoc: The basis must be ideology— A radical faith that can’t win in the nation. It must be a faith open equally to all, Regardless of gender or race or origin, A faith system that makes a universal call. A rad polis may be left, right, libertarian. Or it may be tightly communitarian. It must admit both a Goat and an Aquarian. III.

In politics, identity groups struggle for respect and resources. Ego group advancement is important. So, too, are competitive Sado drives directed at other groups. Self-critical Maso and other-helping Altru also play key roles. Believers in centrist and radical political ideologies are major identity groups. When they work well, they are both laboratories of cross-cutting identities. Electorally motivated centrist ideologies rightly proclaim openness to all. So, too, do nonsectarian radicalisms of different kinds . . . Why four kinds of radicalism, rather than tens or hundreds? Why a privilege to leftism, rightism, libertarianism, and communitarianism? We may dream of hundreds of thousands of rad poli around the world. But to work, rad poli need to be accountable, not just free. Left and right rad poli can be broadly accountable to their centrist party peers. So, too, can libertarian and communitarian ones. The Bodiless Programs game illustrates that accountability. IV.

Q. Will a national centrist party affiliated with a local radical polis consent to a project solution in which the polis adopts a norm, such as boy-love, that is strongly repugnant to a large majority of centrists? A. No, as illustrated in the Bodiless Programs matrix and story below. We’re Equal: Crusoc Asserts Moral Parity Between Ancient Athens and America and Calls for Different Camps to Ally You want from Me a meek apology, Acknowledgement of My benighted time, “You are just! Our justice was astrology!” Me demur. Your justice is twined tight with crime.

110

Radicalism Reimagined

Table 8.1 Bodiless Programs (8/144) Altru Radical Self, Altru Centrist Self Rad Self Yields

Centrist Self Yields

3, 3 It’s a win-win project solution.

2, 1 Though I want to assert,

They won’t yield, though.

I’m inclined to yield.

Not even for virtual.

Why not feel better about myself?

[The HJV project solution] Rad Self Asserts

Centrist Self Asserts

0, 0 1, 2 They’ll emphatically reject this. Should I turn Ego and leave this spot? It achieves our repressed entropic goals, true. For us, this is Nash. But it doesn’t respect their repugnance.

An ordained bad lot. [A project focal point]

We had self-government, and You do not. Your polis is a creature of the state, Freedom was Our destiny, Our bless’ed lot, To be in chains and think You are free is Your fate. You say: “We live in a democracy!” Nonsense. There’s nowhere You can rule Yourselves, You’re an oligarchic ochlocracy, Your freedom’s as gone as Your vanished elves. Me not say that We were better than You, Equality: We’re equal. That’s what’s true. II.

Crusoc: It is not clear how good modern poli would be, What is clear is that they need room to innovate, We need a plethora of tiny city-states. We can blame America and other nations for preventing that, To do so is all very well and good. But we also need to take off our own executioner’s hoods. Suppose you, D’arcemplato, are a leftie rad, While my loyalties are with the radical right, Now, we see the other as a demon to fight. Instead of hating, we can be constructive, Instead of condemning the other side to hell, We can ally to win spaces where multiple kinds of rads create and dwell.

American Unfreedom

111

III.

In the We Can Fly version of Lit radicalism, we are Entro, but could be Evo. In that version, the project solution is the hero. We can move from a bad program solution to a good project solution. In the We’re Equal version of Lit radicalism, the mechanism is different. The program solution is fine—it’s just hard (or impossible) to reach. We are Evo—but the rules of the game rule out, or inhibit, what’s best for us. The rules of the game push us to an outcome that makes sense if we are Entro. Given that, we may well make sense out of our situation by becoming Entro. We may react by hating each other, and/or ourselves. We may not think of challenging rules of the game that make it hard to create. And in doing so we make it relatively rewarding to knock down other radicals. Sour grapes may rule our lives. Do they now? Consider your own political identity, whatever it may be. IV.

Q. Can anti-devolutionary laws lock players into bad outcomes, and can those outcomes in turn encourage sour grapes Entro worldviews in which the bad outcomes are viewed as warranted? A. Yes, as illustrated in the We’re Equal matrix and story. Divergence: Crusoc Calls for Self-Governance; D’arcemplato Expresses a Reservation The boy-love We practiced You call a crime, You won’t let a polis exper’ment, Table 8.2 We’re Equal (3/144) Altru Left Radical Self, Ego Right Radical Self Rad Left Me Creates a Polis

Rad Right Self Creates a Polis 3, 3 This is best, but is it possible?

2, 2 I go for it here.

Law inhibits it.

A likely outcome?

Sadly, we lose sight of it.

No—once again, law is in the way.

[The program solution] [The HJV project solution] Rad Left Me Opposes the Rad Right

Rad Right Self Opposes the Rad Left

0, 1 I want to lift you up, not knock you down! But the law impels Entro.

1, 0 I can hate you, You can hate me. It makes sense, perversely. [An Entro project solution]

112

Radicalism Reimagined But in Platonic risk lies love sublime, Enlightenment and endearment. Community, markets, communism, No guns, all guns, queens for life, voting at age three, Freedom lies in divergence and schism, Let a polis choose what its fate will be. Yes to consent and to regulation, Yes to enforcement of rights of exit, Yes to the existence of your nation, With justice the tissue that connects it. May America promote not repress, May it be based on freedom not duress. II.

D’arcemplato: Let me tell you where I struggle. A girl my age wants to have an abortion, She’s in a con or comm polis that forbids it. If she were an adult, well fine, they can fine her and let her go. But she’s only 14! What should she do, and what should the polis do? I find myself sympathetic to left or lib national law telling the polis they can’t punish her. They have to let her get her abortion and stay in the community. But am I as a rad lib girl warrior princess perhaps biased? Oh yes, I am. Is there any escape from bias here? Crusoc: No, there is not. Mechanism design may help, though. III.

How much should poli be able to deviate from the local legal norm? In nations where abortion is a right, should poli be able to abrogate that right? The right way to think about that question is not in terms of general principle. It is in terms of particular human beings who dissent from their poli. What are the games that they and the majority of the polis play? Can we design rules for those games that work? That is the question of mechanism design. It is a difficult question. Ex ante, the dissenter from the polis is not a dissenter. After all, she wants to join the polis. At that point, harsh rules for exit feel right to her, and to the polis. Or, perhaps, she is a child signed up by others and unaware of the rules.

American Unfreedom

113

Table 8.3 Divergence (39/144) Sado Majority, Maso Dissenter

Maso Dissenter Yields

Maso Dissenter Asserts

Sado Majority Yields

3, 2 This is fine, in Evo terms.

2, 3 Another good Evo outcome.

Yep, it’s better for me.

Yep, it’s better for you.

We can balance.

Okay, let’s balance.

[An HJV project solution.] [An HJV project solution.] Sado Majority Asserts

0, 1 1, 0 Should I bargain to get this? This is our programmed lot. Maybe, but why?

Do we really want it?

So you yield—so what?

Let’s hope not! [The program solution]

Ex post, she does not want to be punished. And the polis may not want to punish her. In those ex ante and ex post communities of interest lies a way forward. The game between her and the polis can be a good if painful one. IV.

Q. Can constrained rights of exit for polis dissenters lead to value-creating HJV project solutions between them and the polis majority? A. Yes, as illustrated in the Divergence matrix and story. Elite Secession: Emma G. Argues for Anarchy, Crusoc for Regulation “You may be crazy—but you’re not fusty. No to boy-love! But yes to your vision. There’s beauty in justice green and rusty, I’ve reservations—but not derision. Two questions about your devolution: First: Why would any nation agree to it? Next: Isn’t your cause elite revolution? The privileged will secede—they’ll see to it.” First: devolution can advance the state, Next: exit from the core is contingent, A polis must admit the poor with the great, The checks on its rule needs be stringent.

114

Radicalism Reimagined Three powers: peoples, poli, and nations, Justice inheres in their tense relations. II.

Emma G.: I am an anarchist, as you know. I’m not like the other Emmas, and I’m not like you. In your parlance, I’m a Lib(ertar’ian). Your woe! People should just be allowed to leave free and clear. Yes, people should share—but they should not be coerced. The main thing is not to rule the people by fear. I think your model at its heart is truly mine. I think that all the people should be free to leave. In this in the end I hope you truly believe. Crusoc: I’m sorry, Em, my love. I disagree. Good for capitalist poli backed by the rich and great! But they can’t leave without us. They must integrate. III.

Capitalist Lib and Con poli bring danger as well as opportunity to the nation. Fiscal secession is a very real problem. But regulating ultra-capitalist poli too much is counterproductive. After all, we want experiments in living. Regulation may make highly useful experiments stillborn. We as the center also want fairness. And allowing easy fiscal secession by the rich is not fairness. They need the rest of us to work their wonders. Capitalist poli need to admit the financially lesser alongside the greater. For economically egalitarian Left and Comm poli, the issue is a different one. The less productive will be attracted to their poli. Left and Comm rad poli need to regulate themselves. If they do not limit low-productivity entrants, they will likely collapse. Perhaps they will ask the center to do that for them. That would be fine. IV.

Q. Can consensual dynamics between leaders of the center and leaders of radical poli facilitate reasonable, value-enhancing accommodations between them? A. Yes, as illustrated in the Elite Secession matrix and story. Solution Notes for the Bodiless Programs Matrix (#8/144)

For Bodiless Programs, the five rolls that determined the game and subgame were 1 (matrices 1–24), 2 (matrices 5–8), 4 (matrix 8), 2 (Altru for Row Player), 2 (Altru for Column player).

American Unfreedom

115

Table 8.4 Elite Secession (126/144) Ego Centrist, Maso Rad Libertarian Control Lib Secession

Yield to the Center

Fight the Center

3, 1 Let’s agree on this, please.

0, 3 This is best for Evo you.

It’s closest to best for both you and me.

I don’t like it, no.

Let’s not burn or freeze.

But it’s okay to do.

[The HJV project solution] Yield to Lib Secession

1, 2 I don’t see it, not at all.

2, 0 This kind of works for us.

It’s opposite our types.

But upper left is better.

I think it leads us to a fall.

This ain’t worth the fuss.

The program solution: There is no dominant strategy for either Altru player. The program solution is risk-reducing Nash, which is the same in practice as MGT mixed Nash. For the Radical Self, risk-reducing Nash is playing I 1/4 of the time and II 3/4 of the time. That guarantees that the Centrist Self cannot fall below a 1.5 average payoff, no matter what It does. For the Centrist Self, risk-reducing Nash is playing ii all the time—that means Radical Self will get at least 1, with no risk of 0. Considering that the players could both have their first-best payoffs—the 3, 3 box—the program solution of 1.5, 1.5 is not good. (Bodiless Programs illustrates the difference between the determinate CGT program solution and the often-indeterminate MGT noncooperative game solution. Bodiless Programs has three Nash equilibria [strategy combinations from which neither player can gain by deviating]—Both Yield (3, 3), Both Assert (1, 2), and Mixed Nash (1.5, 1.5). Of those, the only unique solution that applies in every game with such multiple equilibria is randomization/mixed Nash; that is the determinate CGT program solution.) The project solution: 3, 3 with both players yielding is HJV, an interested focal point, and also an idealistic focal point. Assuming no countervailing story, a very high level of convergence on 3, 3 is a reasonable project expectation. But in Bodiless Programs, there is indeed a countervailing story. The Centrist Self has a powerful repugnance to boy-love that makes yielding (3, 3—and also 0, 0) implausible project solutions and asserting (2, 1 and 1, 2) plausible ones. With a different, non-countervailing story for the same ranked payoffs, 3, 3 would be the expected project solution. (For example, suppose the choices for the Radical Self and the Centrist Self involve polygamy instead of boy-love, and that the Centrist Self does not have a visceral repugnance for polygamy. In that case, the expectation is that the project solution will tilt strongly to 3, 3.) The combined solution, assuming no countervailing story and a 50–50 mix between the program and project solutions: The Centrist Self plays Assert a small

116

Radicalism Reimagined

majority of the time (all the time in program, a small minority in project), and the Radical Self plays Yield a large majority of the time (half the time in program, a very large majority in project). With a countervailing story of Centrist repugnance for Yield, the Centrist Self plays Assert all the time, and the Radical Self plays Yield a moderate majority of the time. Program Solutions in the Bodiless Programs Game (Matrix #8/144) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—Bodiless Programs v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

Average outcomes in Bodiless Programs 2, 1.875 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Lit players following their programs do worse in the asymmetrical Bodiless Programs game than they do in the PD. There is a tilt in favor of Row, who is favored in Battle of the Selves games. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Bodiless Programs (four versus eight versions), equal Imperfect Harmony (two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), less Battle of the Selves (two versus four versions), and much more Randomness (eight versus zero versions). Solution Notes for the We’re Equal Matrix (#3/144)

We’re Equal rolls: 1 (#1–24), 1 (#1–4), 3 (#3), 2 (Row Altru), 1 (Column Ego). The program solution: This is a Perfect Harmony game with a dominant strategy for Me only. Me as Altru will play Create Rad Left Polis because You are better off that way regardless. Knowing that, You as Ego will play Create Rad Right Polis. We both get 3, 3. The project solution: Create, Create (3, 3) is HJV and also an interested and idealistic focal point. Me Rad, You Oppose Me (2, 2) is a focal point that appeals to the

American Unfreedom

117

possibility that we both perceive Me as ideally Rad and You as ideally Status Quo. The Me Status Quo, You Rad, and Me Status Quo, You Status Quo focal points are unappealing idealistic focal points, unless the situation suggests that Entropism is warranted, or unless the rules of the game prohibit or inhibit Rad. A plausible prediction is that I play Rad nearly all the time and you play Rad a small majority of the time. The combined solution: Assuming 50–50, Me play Rad an extremely large majority of the time and you play Rad a large majority of the time. A qualification: Rules are rules. If the rules of the game say no to creating radical poli, we wind up playing oppose, dysfunctional though it is. Program Solutions in the We’re Equal Game (Matrix 3/144 (E)) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—We’re Equal v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in all versions of We’re Equal 2.5, 2.0 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

We’re Equal is so named based on Crusoc’s defense of the mores of his time relative to those of our time. If it were instead named based on the outcomes of the Row and Column players in the 16 Lit versions, a better name for the game would be We’re Unequal. Ten of the 16 versions of We’re Equal are Battles of the Selves in which the outcomes are unequal, with Row having the best of it in eight cases. Row does considerably better in the asymmetrical We’re Equal than in the symmetrical PD—2.5 versus 2.25—with Column doing the same amount worse—2.0 versus 2.25. In total, the players’total programmed outcomes are the same in We’re Equal as in the PD, but unequal. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in We’re Equal (six versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (ten versus four versions).

118

Radicalism Reimagined

Solution Notes to the Divergence Matrix (#39/144)

Divergence was generated by rolls of 2 (games 25–48), 4 (games 37–40), 3 (game 39), 4 (Row Sado), 3 (Column Maso). The program solution: This is an Entro Perfect Harmony (PH) game with a dominant strategy for Majority only. Majority as Sado will play II because Dissenter is worse off that way regardless. Knowing that, Dissenter as Maso will play ii, and the players will both get their first-best payoffs of 1, 0 at Majority Assert, Dissenter Asserts. The Evo project solution: Majority Yields, Dissenter Yields is an HJV focal point that appeals to the possibility that we both perceive our Entropism as wrong. Majority Yields, Dissenter Asserts is also an HJV Evo focal point. The program solution Dissenter Yields, Majority Asserts is an interested focal point (given our presumptive Entro types) and an idealistic focal point (given the moral case for following the law of our presumptive types). The combined solution: It depends on whether the players overcome their Entro or not in the project solution. Assuming they do, and converge equally on the two HJV solutions with the Majority yielding, the Solution comes out to the players converging on them one-quarter of the time and on the program solution with both players asserting one-half of the time.

Program Solutions in the Divergence Game (Matrix 39/144 (E)) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—Divergence v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in all versions of Divergence 2.5, 2 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

American Unfreedom

119

Divergence is another asymmetrical game with a marked tilt in favor of one player, in this case Row. Twelve of the 16 versions of We’re Equal are Battles of the Selves in which the outcomes are unequal. Row has the best outcome in eight cases. Row does considerably better in the asymmetrical We’re Equal than in the symmetrical PD—2.5 versus 2.25—with Column an equal amount worse—2.0 versus 2.25. The players’ total programmed outcomes are equal in Divergence and in the PD. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (four versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (12 versus four versions). Divergence, We’re Equal, and all other asymmetrical games with a tilt toward one player feature a parallel asymmetrical game with a tilt for the opposite player. Does that fact mean we should lump the two parallel games into one game (as Rapoport and Guyer (1966) do in their classification of two-player games)? I would argue not—it is very different to be Row in such an asymmetrical game than it is to be Column. The fact that the players could be in another game in which asymmetry has an opposite tilt does not solve the Battle of the Selves problem of dealing with the actual asymmetry that faces them given their actual payoffs. Solution Notes for the Elite Secession Matrix (#126/144)

Elite Secession was generated by rolls of 6 (games 121–144), 2 (games 125–128), 2 (game 126), 1 (Row Ego), 3 (Col Ego-Entro). The program solution: This is a Battle of the Selves game with no dominant strategy for either player. Both Center Assert, Rad Yield (3, 1) and Center Yield, Rad Assert (2, 0) are Nash equilibria for Ego Row and Maso Column. The determinate CGT program solution is randomization, which in this case means yielding 1/2 of the time and asserting 1/2 of the time. That guarantees that both players will receive a mediocre 1.5 average payoff. The Evo project solution: The HJV solution is Ego Center Controls, Maso Rad Libertarians Yield. Balancing between the HJV solution and Center Assert, Rad Assert is an intuitive focal point. The combined solution: Assuming the HJV project solution, Center plays Assert and Rad plays yield Yield half of the time. Half of the time (the program solution), they both randomize. Program Solutions in Elite Secession (126/144) The Lit Versions

Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

120

Radicalism Reimagined

The Lit Versions

Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—Elite Secession v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

Average outcomes in all versions of Divergence 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

In Elite Secession, no Row or Column Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado player has a dominant strategy. The result is that the CGT program solution in all 16 versions is randomization. That results in much poorer outcomes for the players than in the PD or other games with one or multiple dominant strategies, with both Row and Column doing much worse (1.5) in Elite Secession than they did in the PD (2.25). Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (zero versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), less Battle of the Selves (zero versus four versions), and radically more randomization (16 versus zero versions). The poor program outcomes in Elite Secession and like games should not be equated with these games being disastrous overall for the players. If the program solution is deficient, as it is here, the HJV project solution (or another project solution) for the game gains additional importance as a way to correct for the failings of the program solution. One could try to avoid the unpleasantness of the poor randomization outcomes from the Elite Secession program by postulating that the game’s Nash equilibria of upper left (3, 2) (adjusted for Column’s Maso identity) and lower right (2, 3) (similarly adjusted) are also program solutions. That possible fix parallels what MGT does with its multiple noncooperative game solutions—but, as previously discussed, a core assumption of CGT as presented here is that there is one determinate program solution, not multiple indeterminate ones. Sources Friedman, David D. The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism. (1989), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/monographs/2 Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. New York: Harcourt Brace (1952). Goldman, Emma. Anarchism and Other Essays. (1910), www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2162

American Unfreedom

121

Hitzig, Zoe. Mezzanine. New York: HarperCollins (2021). Jameson, Frederic. An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal Army. New York: Verso (2016). Lalley, Steven P., and E. Glen Weyl. Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108 (2018): 33–37. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. (1859), www.google.com/books/edition/On_Liberty/ RbkAAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books (1974). Posner, Eric and E. Glen Weyl. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2018). Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Weyl, E. Glen, Megan E. Frederickson, Douglas W. Yu, and Naomi E. Pierce. Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism, PNAS, 107 (2010): 15712–15716. Zarghamee, Homa. A Long Drawn Face. Georgetown, KY: Finishing Line Press (2019). Postlude

Reactions to Fred Jameson’s Latest Post-Whitney you walk to 192, You skim American Utopia, “Power moves in networks . . . top-down rule’s through,” Good! You’ll buy it, buck your myopia. His idea of drafting everyone’s cute . . . It’s a different path to socialism. No, it’s just resoling tyranny’s boot . . . It would lead us to dull dank abysm! So you feel—but you feel something else too, His gov’s fine, if you can opt out of it, Let’s not fight over which form of rule’s true, Choice of law is right, there’s no doubt of it. Let’s instanti’ate a dream of shared pow’r, Where dreamers of all kinds can have their hour.

9

Unser Ding

Prelude

The Crack-Up Your crack-up came in 1986. You were working for a Wall Street law firm. New York was Hades. The Hudson was the Styx. Firm coffee was poison. Firm sushi was raw worm. Back then, You had a clear political analysis. Roll back the work system’s grinding domain! Fight lib’ral complicity and paralysis! Against Our jobs’ grim rule—We must campaign! So what did newly-wed You really want? After all of these years, here’s what Me think: You wanted to go South, find a new haunt, Move to Rio with Xan, enjoy a drink. But must We leave to realize Our aspirations, Can’t We find new homes in Our own nations? Unser Ding This chapter imagines Unser Ding, a local Left polis of around 2000 AI and embodied citizens in a future Berlin. The humans and the AI of the polis are united by a commitment to socialism, which to them means avoidance of work in for-profit businesses and obtaining, to the maximum extent possible, their goods and services from nonprofit and government providers. They are also united by a commitment to cultural and artistic freedom, which for them includes an expectation that most members of the polis will be active artistically as well as economically and politically. Unser Ding is linked to thousands of other German Left poli through the medium of businesses and of a radical political party, Die Freilinke, which is represented in the Bundestag and which approves local poli for inclusion in the fiscal DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-12

Unser Ding

123

sharing program available to Left, Right, Lib (anti-regulatory on both economics and culture), and Comm (regulatory on both economics and culture) poli. Even as they are united in their shared adherence to socialism and cultural experimentation, the members of Unser Ding are divided. In their politics, they are pulled toward value consensus, but also toward value competition between a Fundi or True Left tendency—supported in the stories here by a mellowed but still fierce AI Nietzsche—and a Realo tendency—supported by a mellowed AI Marx. The elected leadership in Unser Ding tends toward compromises between the Fundi and Realo tendencies and is embodied in the stories by the electorally motivated Annalena and Angela characters. The chapter continues the core CGT message of Part II. That is, it focuses on project solutions to political games that counter Entro programming on behalf of Evo. The first game in the chapter, Are You Sorry?, is between two sadistic players. It features a suboptimal Entro randomized program solution (mixed Nash), along with a highest joint value Evo project solution in which the players receive firstbest and second-best outcomes. In the story, the project solution involves Nietzsche and Marx choosing to love rather than hate each other. Overall, in the 16 Lit programs, Are You Sorry? players receive unequal outcomes that are inferior for both players to those in the PD. The second game in the chapter, Germania, between two masochistic players, again features a suboptimal randomizing program solution, along with two project solutions in which the players get their first- and second-best outcomes. The story involves project solutions in which a body and an AI daemon coordinate on following and leading. The 16 Lit program solutions to Germania all involve randomization and are much worse for both players than the PD program solutions are. In the third game, Rage, between a sadistic and a masochistic player, there is an entropic program solution that gives the masochist the most painful outcome, along with an evolutionary project solution that gives both players their best outcomes. The project solution involves the sadistic Nietzsche catering to Hegel to try to win his vote rather than disdaining him. The 16 Lit program solutions in Rage are as good in total as those in the PD, but they have a pronounced tilt toward one player over the other. In the fourth game, Art, between two masochistic players, there is an Entro program solution that is most painful for both players and a highest joint value Evo project solution that gives them both their best outcomes. The two players are Nietzsche and Plato, and the project solution involves both loving art. In Art, just as in Rage, the 16 Lit program solutions are as good in total for the players as in the PD but are unequal. Are You Sorry? Marx and Nietzsche Reminisce; Angela-Karl and Annalena-Friedrich Ask the Polis for Support I.

Friedrich: Are you sorry we blew the world apart? Speaking strictly for myself, I’m not at all.

124

Radicalism Reimagined

I’m very happy that we helped Germany burn and fall. Am I happy we became a normal nation? Not really. We’re now just as boring as the rest. We’ve figured out how to be normally oppressive and oppressed. Then again . . . Boredom is a worthy part of the great cycle. But so are the blazing Entro visions we devised! I regret nothing!! By his’try let’s be surprised!!! Karl: I am very different from you. I have many regrets. I wish I’d better controlled my Entropic wants and needs. All the iterations of me— often they are atoning. II.

Counterhegemonic communities, To counter inevitability, To give new projects opportunities, To open doors for possibility. You got that vibe from Duncan Kennedy, You read his crit papers by candlelight, His line inspired a gay serenity, And a lit class dinner one Cambridge night. ’Twas more than forty years ago today, That Duncan taught his merry band to play, Can you turn his song into a model, With strings like a ship’s inside its bottle? Maybe it’s better turned into a dream, Of a free German left where poli teem. III.

Angela-Karl: We support a Realo position on fiscal sharing with the party. Unser Ding should continue to be a tax-sharing polis. That gives us better incentives to be productive. And also to be open to outsiders. True, as tax sharers, we subsidize other Left poli that are headcount sharers. That’s fine. We have plenty of well-off people in our ranks. Die Freilinke badly needs well-off poli like ours. Without us, the Left would enter a fiscal death spiral. Annalena-Friedrich: As usual, A-K is wrong! Please vote for us for a change! With A-K, Unser Ding is as grubby and lucre-ish as Lib and Con poli! A-K has the dullish soul of an accountant!

Unser Ding

125

We on the other hand are dreamers who can be practical, too. Annalena is a good administrator. Friedrich is a wild genius. There are many good Left poli in Berlin that are headcount sharers. We in Unser Ding need to be younger and more artistic going forward. Fewer civil servants and lawyers. More poets and polyamorists . . . IV.

Q. Can mutually destructive Entro be countered by Evo project solutions that put antagonists (“Marx” and “Nietzsche”) to work together in a local shared venture? A. Yes, as illustrated in the Are You Sorry matrix and story. Germania: Friedrich and Annalena Discuss Election Strategy I.

May we gladly embrace totality, Gather it up in our transhuman arms, May we also live in locality, Gaily seduced by philosophy’s charms. It’s fine if our line is anarchistic, It nonetheless remains political, It’s more than a Freudian heuristic, It prizes logic analytical.

Table 9.1 Are You Sorry (56/144) Sado Nietzsche, Sado Marx

Marx Loves Nietzsche

Marx Hates Nietzsche

Nietzsche Loves Marx

3, 2 2, 0 Here is the right place for us. You are a deeper hater than I, perhaps? Right?! Mutual hate is your ideal. Not totally for you, true. Maybe you can move off it? [The HJV Evo focal point]

Nietzsche Hates Marx

0, 1 Entro leads us to a funny place . . . I am programmed to hate. You double-cross me with love.

1, 3 Okay, I can see this. You’re a Realo. Hating me compensates you for being sensible.

126

Radicalism Reimagined Let’s live in the realm of Nietzsche and Marx, Flawed as they were, they remain our greatest, They taught us how to make blazes from sparks, We should not revere only what’s latest. Dead souls can be revolutionary objects, Grounds for evolutionary projects. II.

Friedrich: There are now poli who let daemons vote. Why is that I must remain tethered to you?! Under what principled law is my bondage true?! Annalena: Friedrich, my dear friend, you’re baiting me again. I’m equally constrained. I must have a daemon like you. In Unser Ding the days of purely human rule are through. Friedrich: But our system’s under human control! Let’s allow daemons who are cats fish and turtles! Instead of living with me—go live with Yertle! Annalena: You’re productive, Friedrich. Cats, I’m not sure . . . As always, I’m open to your wild suggestions. But please! Let’s beat AK for a change in this year’s election. III.

In Unser Ding, the relations of humans and AI are one central issue. The polis sets its own rules, subject to regulation by Die Freilinke. And, in turn, by the Bundestag. The thought is that a plethora of local experiments are good. A polis may allow AIs that fuse more than one person or ban them. It may allow simulacra of famous people like Marx or ban them. It may have an approved and disapproved list of famous people. Unser Ding is fine with Angela Merkel, but another Left polis might not be. Unser Ding requires its citizens to be transhumans who fuse bodies and AI. Another polis might ban transhumans. One polis can be set up to remain small, another to acquire and grow. A mostly permissive structure for poli mirrors American corporate law. Experimentation, not compulsion, is a watchword. The business corporation rocked economic modernity like nothing else did. Poli can be set up to rock political modernity. IV.

Q. Can a local rule that a polis’s citizens be both embodied and AI encourage consensual Evo project solutions to human-AI political games that improve on programmed Entro solutions? A. Yes, as illustrated in the Germania matrix.

Unser Ding

127

Table 9.2 Germania (46/144) Daemon Maso, Body Maso My Daemon Leads

My Body Follows

My Body Leads

3, 2 This is best for Evo Me,

1, 0 In Battle of the Selves,

And good for Evo You,

The program solution is hash.

It’s a way to go.

We screw up with mixed Nash.

[An HJV project solution] My Daemon Follows

0, 1 This is a good Entro spot.

2, 3 This is great for Evo You,

But the program doesn’t find it

And nice for Evo Me,

The program is blind.

It’s a path that’s true. [An HJV project solution]

Rage: Nietzsche Keeps his Mouth Shut with Hegel I.

Your sight grew dark in Your sabbatical. Your model of optimal group-splitting, Created to advance the radical, Yielded to rage. To Your raw unwitting. The trade towers fell. Your compassion crashed. Nietzsche on the right and on the left Marx, You wanted Them tortured, Their faces smashed. Their balls chewed to pieces by great white sharks. It’s 20 years on. You’re now in Berlin. You’ve exchanged Entro rage for Evo hope. You’re seeking green shoots, release from Your sin. Radical community. A whole new trope. We can all fall into deep, deep, dark holes. We can all climb to light and save Our souls. II.

G.W.F., a Weimaraner: You, Immanuel, and Karl converge, In thinking that I am a romantic obscurantist. But more than any of you, I incarnated German soul. And more than any of you, I was brutally realistic.

128

Radicalism Reimagined

I anticipated Francis Fukuyama. Long ago, I saw lib’ral vict’ry and the end of hist’ry. Now I am what you could call a swing voter, I can swing for Realo Karl or for Fundi you, There’s much in both of your analyses that’s true. Friedrich: [What I want to say but won’t . . . you are full of s**t! I loathe your obscurity and your conventionality! Vote for Karl if you want. Your philosophy, I’m sick of it!] III.

Athens was the first amazing locus of European philosophical mania. Late-eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Germany was the second. Perhaps it was even greater than Athens. One is welcome to loathe romantic philosophical enthusiasm. Even if one oneself also loves it and embodies it, as Nietzsche did. Can the enthusiastic maniacal philosophical mess be tamed? Should it be? At the national level, yes. No to the maniacal German national project of 1870–1945. (And no, too, to the Athenians’ Peloponnesian War.) And yes to the near enemy. Yes to practical, anti-romantic, Anglo-American utilitarianism-pragmatism. (Which has its own crazy side, too—another story for another book.) But yes equally to the castles in the air genius of the Greeks and Germans. Radical poli are the right places for that crazy philosophical genius. Not the entire community, not Athens as a whole. And definitely not the German nation-state or any other. IV.

Q. Does intra-polis value competition between Realos and Fundis create useful incentives for both sides in a radical polis to appeal to swing voters with creative Evo projects? A. Yes, as described in the matrix for Rage. Art: D’arcemplato Wonders About the Limits of Cultural Freedom I.

Should we engage in mobilization, To check the rule of cultural elites? Does a left stance call for concertation, To control art’s privileges and deceits? Should French fry cooks rate aristocrats’ dreams? Should the workers throw off art-forged fetters? Should cleaners and clerks rate poetic memes? Should the peeps rule the republic of letters?

Unser Ding

129

Table 9.3 Rage (2/144) Nietzsche Sado, Hegel Maso

Hegel Listens

Nietzsche Campaigns

3, 3 Vote for Anna and me!

2, 2 I get it if you vote for them.

Hey c’mon, our line’s good.

Yes, I’m even more of a jerk than Karl is.

With you we can win! [The HJV project solution] Nietzsche Disdains

Hegel Disdains

It’s all cool, man.

1, 0 This is the program.

This is bad, too.

0, 1

It’s bad, no?!

It’s where we were once.

We rip the guts out of you . . .

We can do better than negation, no?

[The program solution]

What’s sauce for the goose applies to the gander, Since Econ needs rules, why not Culture, too? Yes, those rules will raise elitists’ dander, But doesn’t fairness entail the turn of the screw? No! We’re not a Comm polis! We’re the Left! Without artistic freedom we’re bereft. II.

D’arcemplato: Do I endorse regulation in the realm of culture as well as in econ? I’m of two minds. I need a consult. A recon. You, Friedrich, are a wannabe lord, a raw nerdy soul. I’m a girl, an anarchist, a bourgeois, a peasant, an aristocrat. In Unser Ding I’m bound to be a democrat. Naturally you stand up for artists’ freedom. I have some sympathy myself for AK’s line. There needs to be some control. Boy-love is very much not fine! Friedrich: Oh how curious are the ways that we walk! Once your Plato self beautifully described boy-love. Are you now a beady-eyed AK hawk? Or a wide-eyed AF dove? III.

The Art side of Unser Ding goes along with an equal Econ side. Debates on freedom and control apply to both Art and Econ. With the development of Left (and Comm) poli, real socialism is possible.

130

Radicalism Reimagined

Not Communist states, or center-left welfare states. Instead of them, socialism that works for committed radical minorities. And that can develop some good ideas for the Center to adopt. Because, after all, radical minorities must appeal to the Center. Only if some of our projects help them can we expect their support. Or at least their forbearance and toleration. A key to Left poli: nonprofit and government suppliers. The aggregation of Left poli buying power allows for voluntary socialism. Instead of the dull fakery of compulsory socialism—the nice pulse of choice. Perhaps nonprofit businesses will never make smartphones well. But let’s find out! Nonprofit producers can do better with a radical market for them. IV.

Q. Can democratic radical poli create incentives for radicals to move toward collaborative Evo project solutions on artistic freedom and control (and toward parallel Evo solutions on issues of economic liberty and regulation), rather than to converge on mutually destructive programmed Entro solutions? A. Yes, as illustrated in the Art matrix. Solution Notes for the Are You Sorry? Matrix (#56/144)

The five rolls that determined the game were 3 (matrices 49–72), 2 (matrices 53–56), 4 (matrix 56), 4 (Sado for Row), 4 (Sado for Column). The program solution: Are You Sorry? for Sado players is a Battle of the Selves game with no dominant strategy for either player. That means the solution is randomization by both players, with a resultant 1.5, 1.5 payoff for both. Table 9.4 Art (4/144) Me Maso, You Maso Plato Loves Art

Nietzsche Loves Art

Nietzsche Hates Art

3, 3 I get what we should want.

2, 2 This flip I kinda like.

Yes, it’s all right.

Me go for crazy, you hate it.

Evo logic pulls us here.

Yes to reversibility!

[The HJV project solution] Plato Hates Art

1, 1

0, 0 Part of me is still old Plato.

This is mediocre.

No to bad stories of the gods!

We can punish ourselves better.

Regulate the horseshite!

Likewise, we can reward ourselves better.

[The program solution]

Unser Ding

131

The Evo project solution: There is, as always, a case for converging on the highest joint value (HJV) Evo focal point of (3, 2). Balancing in some fashion between the first best for me, second best for you (3, 2) and the third best for me, first best for me (1, 3) is another logical focal point. The combined solution, assuming 50–50 (based on, let us say, having no clue on whether the program is mandatory or permissive): We converge on the program solution (0, 1) half the time and on the HJV solution (3, 2) the other half of the time. Lit Program Solutions in Are You Sorry? The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—Are You Sorry? v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Emp—tbt v. 16 Emp-Maso—tbt

3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness)

Average outcomes in all versions of Are You Sorry 2, 1.875 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

The overall outcomes are worse for both players in Are You Sorry? than in the PD—2 versus 2.25 for Row, and 1.875 versus 2.25 for Column. There is less Perfect Harmony in Are You Sorry? (two versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), more Battle of the Selves (six versus four versions), and more Randomness (eight versus zero versions). Solution Notes for the Germania Matrix (#46/144)

Germania was generated by rolls of 2 (games 25–48), 6 (games 45–48), 2 (game 46), 3 (Me Ego-Entro), 3 (You Ego-Entro). The program solution: Germania is a Battle of the Selves game with no dominant strategy for either player. Both of the Ego-Entro players will randomize to ensure that they cannot receive a payoff of more than 1.5, no matter what the other

132

Radicalism Reimagined

does. The randomizing Ego-Entro CGT strategy (which is equivalent to mixed Nash in MGT) entails My Daemon Leading 50% of the time and Following 50% of the time, while My Embodied Self Leads 25% of the time and Follows 75% of the time. The Evo project solution: For Evo purposes, balancing equally between the first best for My Daemon, second best for My Embodied Self (3, 2) and the second best for My Daemon, first best for My Embodied Self (2, 3) is a logical focal point. The combined 50–50 solution: My Daemon Leads half of the time, with half of that representing programmatic randomization and half representing project convergence with My Embodied Self. My Embodied Self Leads 37.5% of the time, with 75% of that representing project convergence with My Daemon. Lit Program Solutions in Germania The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—Germania v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

Average outcomes in all versions of Divergence 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

In Germania, no Row or Column Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado player has a dominant strategy. The CGT program solution in all 16 versions is randomization. Both Row and Column do much worse (1.5) in Germania than they did in the PD (2.25). Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (zero versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), less Battle of the Selves (zero versus four versions), and radically more randomization (16 versus zero versions). The poor program solutions in Germania do not mean the game is a poor one for the players, given the availability of two HJV project solutions.

Unser Ding

133

Solution Notes for the Rage Matrix (#2/144)

Rage was generated by rolls of 1 (games 1–24), 1 (games 1–4), 2 (game 2), 4 (Row Sado), 3 (Column Maso). The program solution: Rage is a Perfect Harmony game in which both players achieve their best outcome. Sado Row has a dominant strategy of hating, which ensures worse outcomes for Maso Column. Given that, Column plays strategy i and gets his desired worst outcome. The Evo project solution: The players play I and i and receive their best outcomes at (3, 3). The combined 50–50 solution: Nietzsche and You-Hegel love convergently half of the time. The other half of the time, Me-Nietzsche hates and You-Hegel loves. In total, Nietzsche loves half the time and Hegel loves all the time. Lit Program Solutions in Rage The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—Rage v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in all versions of Divergence 2.5, 2 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Rage (like Divergence and We’re Equal) is an asymmetrical game with a marked tilt in favor of one player, Row. Ten of the 16 versions of We’re Equal are Battles of the Selves in which the outcomes are unequal. Row has the best outcome in eight cases. Row does considerably better in the asymmetrical We’re Equal than in the symmetrical PD—2.5 versus 2.25—with Column an equal amount worse—2.0 versus 2.25. The players’ total programmed outcomes are equal in Divergence and in the PD. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (four versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less

134

Radicalism Reimagined

Disharmony (zero versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (12 versus four versions). Solution Notes for the Art Matrix (#4/144)

Art was generated by rolls of 1 (games 1–24), 1 (games 1–4), 4 (game 4), 3 (Row Maso), 3 (Column Maso). The program solution: Art is a Perfect Harmony game in which both players achieve their best outcome, which consists of their both doing as badly as possible. Plato has a dominant strategy of hating art, which ensures bad outcomes for him. Given that, Nietzsche loves art and gets his own worst outcome. The Evo project solution: With Evo, Plato and Nietzsche both love and both receive their best outcomes at (3, 3). The combined 50–50 solution: The project half of the time, Plato and Nietzsche love together. The program half of the time, Plato hates and Nietzsche loves. In total, Plato loves half the time and Nietzsche loves all the time. Lit Program Solutions in Art The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—Art v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in all versions of Art 2.5, 2 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Art (like Rage, Divergence, and We’re Equal) is an asymmetrical game with a marked tilt in favor of one player, Row. Eight of the 16 versions of We’re Equal are Battles of the Selves in which the outcomes are unequal, and Row has the best outcome in all of them. Row does considerably better in the asymmetrical

Unser Ding

135

We’re Equal than in the symmetrical PD—2.5 versus 2.25—with Column an equal amount worse—2.0 versus 2.25. The players’ total programmed outcomes are equal in Divergence and in the PD. Compared to the PD, there is equal Perfect Harmony in Art (eight versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (eight versus four versions). All four of the randomly chosen games in this chapter featured two Entro players. Since a random player in a Lit game will only have an Entro type one-half of the time, the all-Entro lineups in CLS, Germania, Rage, and Art are not typical of the 2304 total 2 x 2 Lit games, of which only one-quarter, or 576, games, have two Entro players. That said, 576 games such as the four in this chapter is a lot of games. Sources Abramitzky, Ran. The Mystery of the Kibbutz: Egalitarian Principles in a Capitalist World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2020). Beck, Ulrich. The Brave New World of Work. Oxford: Polity Press (2000). Berman, Paul. A Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (1996). Berman, Paul. Power and the Idealists, or The Passion of Joschka Fischer. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2008). Gorz, André. Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society. Cambridge: Polity Press (1999). Graeber, David and David Wengrow. The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity. New York: Macmillan (2021). Hagglund, Martin. This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom. New York: Pantheon (2019). Hellemans, Staf. Pillarization (“Verzuiling”): On Organized “Self-Contained Worlds” in the Modern World, American Sociologist, 51 (2020): 124–147. Hitzig, Zoe. The Normative Gap: Mechanism Design and Ideal Theories of Justice, Economics & Philosophy, 36 (2020): 1–26. Hurwicz, Leonid. Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes. In Karlin Arrow and Patrick Suppes (eds.). Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press (1960). Jameson, Frederic. An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal Army. New York: Verso (2016). Lijphardt, Arend. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press (1968). Maskin, Eric. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality, Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1999): 23–38. Myerson, Roger. Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 47 (1979): 61–74. Neiman, Susan. Learning from the Germans: Race and the Memory of Evil. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2019). Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. (1886), www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4363/ pg4363-images.html

136

Radicalism Reimagined

Pardal, Mafalda. Cannabis Social Clubs through the Lens of the Drug User Movement, Cultuur & Crimininaliteit, 6 (2016): 47–58. Pinkard, Terry P. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press (1994). Pinkard, Terry P. Hegel: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press (2000). Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Somin, Ilya. Free to Move: Why Smaller Government is Better (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press (2021). Postlude

Fred Jameson, part 2 Radicals should ally ’gainst the center, And at the same time, appreciate it, One should be a builder, not a venter, Better to love one’s state than to hate it. Much of “’Mer’can Utop’ia” leaves me cold, Milit’rized work is not at all my thing, But I like its bold bluff and its final fold, Its invitation for freedom to ring. “Well if they don’t want to join the army, Let them form a political party,” Yes! Fights over the throne drive me barmy, Let us build statelets heady and hearty. Statelets for sex and puritanism, Statelets for markets and socialism.

10 The President of the World

This chapter and the next one focus on a kind of radicalism that aims to persuade the centrist mainstream to change its mind on certain issues, if not on its core sense of its own superior sensibleness. This chapter envisions how a global democratic politics featuring virtual versions of Nehru, Gandhi, Buddha, Durga, Chiang, Mao, Laozi, and Confucius might begin and become viable. The next chapter envisions how power-seekers in politics (and other domains) might usefully be held accountable through being expected to provide an account to themselves and others of their neurodivergence from a majority who are less driven to seek and exercise power. The last two chapters on networked local poli assumed an enduring though not incorrigible opposition between radicals and the center. The thought was that Unser Ding and other radical left poli—as well as radical right, libertarian, and communitarian poli—would serve valuable, perpetual roles as havens for dissenters from the mainstream and as useful goads to the mainstream and to one another. This chapter and the next, on the other hand, suggest possibilities for radicalism to ally with the center. A central priority in this chapter is to envision how CGT can work for politicians and other power-holders and power-seekers who want to take into account the reality that they are playing games with a broad electorate (or another group of decision-makers) with diverging Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado orientations. How should one act when one is playing a game with many, highly diverse people? The following stories and games offer an answer, based on assuming symmetrical drives in the power-seeker and the people. The first game in the chapter, Populocracy, between two masochistic players, features an Entro program solution that is painful for both players, along with a highest joint value Evo project solution in which the players receive first-best outcomes. In the story, the project solution involves both a politician and the majority embracing political devolution from the center. The 16 Lit program solutions to Populocracy are equal for the players, and are of equal value overall to the Lit PD solutions. The second game, Medianocracy, between two altruistic players, features a program solution and a project solution that coincide and that involve the best outcomes for both players. In the story, the project solution involves a Chinese politician supporting democracy. The 16 Lit program solutions of Medianocracy are equal for the players, but are slightly worse for both overall than the Lit program solutions of the PD. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-13

138

Radicalism Reimagined

In the third game, Evocracy, between two egoistic players, there is a suboptimal randomizing program solution, along with an evolutionary project solution that gives both players their best outcomes. The story involves a project solution in which an Indian politician and a world majority embrace a “get rich” ethos. The 16 Lit program solutions of Evocracy are random in all cases, and are much worse than the PD solutions. In the fourth game, Wrong, also between two egoistic players, there is once again a suboptimal randomizing program solution, along with an evolutionary project solution that gives both players their best outcomes. In the story, the project solution involves Thomas Jefferson doing wrong and the voters electing him. The 16 Lit program solutions of Wrong are random in all cases, just as in Evocracy, and are far worse than those in the PD. Populocracy: Nehru-Buddha and Gandhi-Durga Discuss Their Chances in the Election I.

We are what You were until yesterday, The natural state of the human race, A natural balance ’tween work and play, Growing populations in ev’ry place. You say the point is not reproduction. The point’s to be healthy, wealthy, and tame. To submit to science’s seduction, To fit Yourself into government’s frame. Yes, We’d like to be richer if We could. But We won’t let greed chase Us up a tree. We think that more human lives are a good. And that rules aren’t all they’re cracked up to be. Me’d rather not have so many brothers. Our system’s the worst! Except for the others. II.

Nehru-Buddha: The job has no power—therefore we will win. The Secretary General of the UN elected by the people of the whole world. How fine! But the role’s only power is that of persuasion. We Indians are perceived as poor and peaceful preachers of fate. Our Chinese rivals are perceived as potent but often evil doers. Our platform aids the majority of the world— Poor nations, and lower-middle income ones like India.

The President of the World 139 That’s another reason we may be condemned to win . . . Gandhi-Durga: Perhaps we are condemned to lose. There is a new poll just in from Nigeria. We’re behind there, 65 to 35 percent. Nehru-Buddha: That reflects their recent coup, no? Democracy is well-established now in most places, even Russia. China is an odd man out. I’m afraid we’ll win! III.

Radical decentralization-devolution needs to be a central radical cause. Thus, the last two chapters. A global democratic politics is another important radical cause. Not as important as creating radical fiscal and cultural sub-communities. But highly important nonetheless. For global politics, the “turn Entro to Evo!” CGT message is not as convincing. It can be invoked, all right. “Instead of hatred and war among nations, let there be peace and love!” By all means . . . But there is real reason to fear a world super-state with a monopoly of force . . . It could become a boot tramping on the face of the human race, forever . . . Or at least for a very unpleasant and possibly very long time. A global super-state would be no Unser Ding that residents can quit . . . Given that huge issue, the objective of this chapter is very modest. It starts with an existing institution, the UN. It envisions a global election for an existing job in that institution. And then envisions how that election might foster constructive change. And lay the groundwork for further progress in global democratic politics. IV.

Q. What is the best game on the issue of devolution to radical minorities for a centrist Pol to play with a centrist Majority if the Pol is (at the moment) Maso? A. Entro Perfect Harmony, appealing to the self-chastening side of the Pol and the Majority. Medianocracy: Mao-Lao and Chiang-Kong Strategize I.

Most of the world is made up of Our kind. You rich nations are a minority. The poor ones, too, where law is hard to find. We’re the globe’s middle, its majority.

140

Radicalism Reimagined

Table 10.1 Populocracy (#5/144) Pol—Maso Pol Opposes Devo

Majority Opposes Devo

Majority Supports Devo

3, ? (3) This is the Evo way.

2, ? (1) Worthy this might be.

But You’re Entro!

But You need to harmonize with the Peeps.

Go with Your flow!

This outcome will not be.

[HJV—Optimal Evo game] Pol Supports Devo

1, ? (2) This is like box 2.

0, ? (0) Sometimes noblesse oblige wins.

Maybe it’d be a good thing.

You and the Peeps are nice to Rads!

But it ain’t where You wanna be. You and the Peeps sometimes want to repent for Your sins. [Maso Pol’s optimal game]

We’re realists, not driven fantasts like You. Our scientists win few Nobel Prizes. We meet in the middle, blend old and new. We’re what converges and gently rises. In Your mod’ling We’re labeled deficient. We’re too family-based. We’re too extended. But perhaps We’re really more efficient. We are what humans really are. You’ve pretended. We don’t grow up. We don’t leave our mothers. Our system’s the worst! Except for the others! II.

Mao-Lao: As things now stand, it’s likely we will lose. China has become a lower-upper income nation. We’re far richer than Russia, Turkey, or Mexico. We’re close to Japan. Our scientists win many Nobel Prizes. Our bases are on the moon and on Mars. We are respected and feared but not loved or liked. Chiang-Kong: Our basic problem is our politics. We poll terribly in democratic nations. Unless we can change that, we are not going to win. Our suggestion: Let’s talk to Beijing and Taipei.

The President of the World 141 Why not unification and then elections between you the CCP and us the KMT? III.

An election for even a fairly powerless global office would be a very big deal. Getting agreement from enough UN members would be very difficult. But much easier than if the global official commanded an army or a tax agency. And much easier than if a new institution needed to be created. For some forms of political radicalism, careful mechanism design is critical. That is the case for semi-autonomous radical communities. But for a global election to head the UN, the design problem is much easier. Of course, there are significant questions . . . Use ranked-choice voting? Have a run-off? Allow or require or ban parties? But none of that is mission critical. What is mission critical is to begin global democratic politics. The games democratic politicians play are a crucial component of modernity. And with radical vision and some luck, those games will encompass the world. Nationalism and transnational ideology will animate global politicians. As will their own mutable Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado types. IV.

Q. What is the best game for a China Pol to play with a mostly democratic global electorate if the Pol is (at the moment) Altru and has 3, 2, 0, 1 payoffs for Boxes 1–4 (that is, a strongly dominant strategy)? A. Evo Perfect Harmony—do what helps the world the most, which also helps you the most. Table 10.2 Medianocracy—#11/144 China Pol—Altru China Pol Supports Demo

World Supports Demo 3, ? (3) This is nice and easy!

2, ? (0) You don’t want this.

You’re feeling benevolent.

If they’re like you, they’re okay with it.

Just assume they are, too. [HJV Evo outcome] [China’s optimal game] China Pol Opposes Demo

World Opposes Demo

But why bother?.

0, ? (2) 1, ? (1) You’ll lose the election this way. This outcome is weak. You’re generous, so it’s okay. But you can do better.

You both get something from it, true. You can both do much better.

142

Radicalism Reimagined

Evocracy: Durga and Mao Answer Questions in a Debate I.

Between Left and Right we have built high walls, Yet the disputatious sides work in sync. They govern Our lands with strong Evo calls, To think “Grow!” more than We’re inclined to think. The Left’s intersectional underdogs, The Right’s ordinary common people, We’re pushed to work harder by Cons and Progs, We’re all impaled upon reason’s steeple. Our system’s a rat race, and We’re the rats, We’re led to build more than We want to do, We wear a myr’iad of pin fac’try hats, We confuse working hard with what is true. Me’d just relax if Me had my druthers! Our system’s the worst! Except for the others! II.

Debate moderator: India, this is for you. The most followed Modi avatar just tokked that your ticket represents an outdated vision. Response? Durga: We are fighting for working families. We will never stop fighting. The cause of justice waxes and wanes. But it never, never, never dies. We are the past, yes. But we are the future, too. Debate moderator: China, this is for you. The Real Chou En-Lai just tokked, “The verdict of history is now in—democracy has won.” Response? Mao: My loyal lieutenant has spoken the truth. Chiang and I will run for president of China. We shall see who is Yin and who is Yang. Please vote for Team China, voters of the world! Laozi and Master Kong are the best sages to speak gently and wisely to all. III.

Most established, effective democracies have ceremonial presidents. Ceremonial presidents embody a hope for national consensus. A few nations still use royalty for that purpose. Future global presidents should be elected sages who embody global dreams. Radicals are preoccupied with power.

The President of the World 143 Fair enough. Power is tricky and subtle. Power is cultural and intangible as well as practical and military. The water-weak drip of the sage is power. It is power just as great as the fire-strong blaze of the general. Dream of local networked radical communities! Not of taking over D.C. or Delhi . . . Dream of a global election for a ceremonial leader of the world! Not of a global army and a global IRS . . . The problems of a unified global super-state may not be resolvable. OTOH, a popularly elected UN Secretary General is very much worth trying. IV.

Q. What is the best game for an India Pol to play with a global electorate if the India Pol is (at the moment) Ego and has 3, 0, 1, 2 payoffs for Boxes 1–4? A. An Evo version of Battle of the Selves—support “Get Rich!” and oppose the contrary Indian status quo. Wrong: Jefferson Repents, in Part; Nehru, Buddha, and Durga Discuss the Election Result I.

Was Massachusetts right, Virginia wrong? I knew that was the case in Our own time, I knew that all Men for Liberty long, I knew that Slavery was damnable Crime. Table 10.3 Evocracy—#32/144 India Pol—Ego India Pol supports “Get Rich!”

World Supports “Get Rich!”

World Opposes “Get Rich”

3, ? (3) Hey, why not?

0, ? (1) This is backwards.

May the West wane.

It’s not an appealing place

But may Evocracy win.

given an Evo framework.

[The HJV project solution] India Pol Opposes “Get Rich!”

1, ? (0) This is likewise unappealing.

2, ? (2) This is the other equilibrium.

Understandable as it is for India. Sure, it’s understandable. The past is not prologue.

It’s also suboptimal, no? [A bad status quo]

144

Radicalism Reimagined And yet. I think My Virginia was right. Right in making America tragic. We brought brilliance along with Slavery’s blight. We made Our Nation home to Black Magic. Adams, My Friend, We’re 200 years gone. Your State was correct. Mine was felonious. But Virginia’s Evil birthed Our new Dawn. Truth’s ever rooted in what’s erroneous. A great nation needs mixing of the blood. For most lands that’s a truth still in the bud. II.

Nehru: We lost. It was not close . . . We can complain about their October surprise. But perhaps there’s a better path for us to take? Buddha: The cycles of time are extremely long. In the very long run, our way may reward us. America is very quick. China is quite fast. India is very slow. Nehru: Perhaps our system was the greatest wrong. Perhaps out of it in time will come the greatest good. From American slavery, freedom. From Indian hierarchy, equality. Durga: I’m sick of you endlessly philosophical males. I do not want to wait for millennia. Let’s fight right now! I want to make the future come sooner. III.

As a radical, one is a moralist. One labels certain old ways as evil. And fights to end the evil that one has identified. One may or may not believe in God. But one does believe in Satan. Slavery . . . end it! Monarchy . . . end it! Private business . . . end it! Lack of global democracy . . . end it! Marriage only for a man and a woman . . . end it! Dictatorship in China from the emperors to the CCP . . . end it! As radicals, we should be owners not prisoners of our moralism. Applied to the whole, our new ways may be worse than the old ways. The communism some of us brought into existence was a hideous travesty. Voluntary communism on the other hand is very much worth trying. A bet on enabling radical experiments is a good one to make.

The President of the World 145 Table 10.4 Wrong—#26/144 Jefferson—Ego

America Elects Jefferson

Jefferson Waters the Tree of 3, ? (3) Liberty with Blood You sacrifice your name.

0, ? (2) Not what you want!

But it’s worth it, no?

Disgrace and loss conjoined.

You win.

It’s not too bad for the nation, though.

[The Evo project solution] Jefferson Doesn’t Sin or Dare

America Says No to Jefferson

2, ? (0) This is pretty good for you.

1, ? (1) Yes, it’s an equilibrium.

But lousy for the nation.

But a bad one.

They’ll move and you’ll lose.

Change the game, TJ!

A bet on compelling them for all is by contrast a risky bet. Especially so if the bet is for the entire planet. IV.

Q. What is the best game for Jefferson to play with an electorate if he is (at the moment) Ego and has 3, 0, 2, 1 payoffs for Boxes 1–4 (that is, no dominant strategy)? A. An Evo version of Battle of the Selves. Here, that means that Jefferson dares and sins rather than the opposite. He waters the tree of liberty with blood. Solution Notes for the Populocracy Matrix (#5/144)

Populocracy was determined first by a roll of 1. That means Pol has a dominant strategy, with ranked payoffs of 3, 2, 1, and 0 for Boxes 1 (upper left), 2 (upper right), 3 (lower left), and 4 (lower right). It was determined second by a roll of 3, meaning that Pol suspects their type is Maso. In Populocracy and the other games in this chapter, it is assumed that one is playing games with many voters of multiple types and payoffs. It is further assumed that, given that multiplicity, the Pol is well advised to appeal to the electorate with their presumptive type as of this moment, in this case Maso. In doing so, they will likely appear more authentic and appealing than if they adopt a type counter to their presumptive type. A second assumption in Populocracy and the other games in the chapter is that the Pol will do best by assuming that the People have a symmetrical set of payoffs to those of the Pol. That is, the Pol treats the situation as though they and the Pop are in the same boat, rather than different ones. One key reason for that is simplicity. A second key reason, as noted, is that symmetry allows for “we’re in the same boat” harmonization between Pol and Pop.

146

Radicalism Reimagined

A third assumption in Populocracy and the other games is that the symmetrical game chosen by the Pol will be Perfect Harmony in all situations in which the Pol has a dominant strategy that is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma/Disharmony. That is true when the Pol has 3, 2, 1, 0 (as here) or 3, 2, 0, 1 payoffs. (When the Pol has 3, 1, 2, 0 payoffs, the Pol, it is assumed, will treat the game as Prisoner’s Dilemma/ Disharmony.) How do these assumptions work out in Populocracy? The Pol leans into their self-critical Ego-Entro identity and attempts to get the People to also lean into that side of their identity. Given the plausible assumption that is in the Ego self-interest of both the centrist Pol and the centrist People to oppose devolving significant self-governance powers to radical subcommunities, the 3 Evo payoff for both is opposition to Devo, and the 0 Entro payoff is support for Devo. The self-critical Pol as Ego-Entro will hence support Devo and attempt to bring the People along to do so as well. Program solution: The program solution for the Ego-Entro Pol is to support Devo. Evo project solution: The Evo project solution for the Pol is to oppose Devo. The interested project solution converges with the program solution—that is, the Pol supports Devo and tries to persuade the People to do so as well. Combined solution: The combined 50–50 solution for the Pol is half programmatic support for Devo, with the hope of the People joining, and an indeterminate project mix of support for and opposition to Devo. Program Solutions to Populocracy (#2/144) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—Populocracy v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 1, 1 (Disharmony) 1, 1 (Disharmony) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in all versions of Populocracy 2.25, 2.25 (Imperfect Harmony) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

The President of the World 147 Populocracy is a symmetrical game with equal outcomes for the players. Row and Column do the same overall in Populocracy—2.25—as in the PD. Compared to the PD, there is equal Perfect Harmony in Populocracy (eight versions), equal Imperfect Harmony (two versions), equal Disharmony (two versions), and equal Battle of the Selves (four versions). Populocracy and the other games in this chapter are not randomly drawn from the 144 matrices, which include 132 asymmetrical ones. Rather, they are drawn from the 12 symmetrical matrices. Solution Notes for the Medianocracy Matrix (#11/144)

Medianocracy was determined first by a roll of 2. That means that China—the Pol in this version of the game—has ranked payoffs of 3, 2, 0, and 1 for Boxes 1 (upper left), 2 (upper right), 3 (lower left), and 4 (lower right). The game was determined second by a roll of 2, meaning that China suspects they are ruled in this situation by their generous Altru side. Following the governing assumptions for games with Pols who know their own payoffs but do not know the payoffs of the large, variegated electorate they are interacting with, China does the following: (1) leans into its presumptive Altru identity; (2) treats the global electorate as also Altru; (3) treats the global electorate as having symmetrical 3, 2, 0, 1 payoffs; and (4) treats the game as Evo Perfect Harmony. In Medianocracy, the best outcomes for China and the global electorate are assigned to the situation in which China supports democracy, as does the global electorate. Given the electoral incentive for China to do so, this seems plausible for them as a global Pol, as well as for the global electorate. Program solution: The program solution for China as Altru is mixed Nash randomization. Assuming symmetry, that is also the solution for the people. Evo project solution: The HJV project solution for China and the people is to support Demo. Combined solution: The combined 50–50 solution for China acting as a global Pol is half randomization and half Demo. Lit Program Solutions to Medianocracy The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—Medianocracy v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt

3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness)

148

Radicalism Reimagined

The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in Medianocracy 2.125, 2.125 (Imperfect Harmony) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

Medianocracy is a symmetrical game with equal outcomes for the players. Row and Column both do slightly worse in Populocracy—2.125—compared to the PD. Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Populocracy (five versions versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (one version versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (six versions versus four versions) and more Randomness (four versions versus zero versions). Solution Notes for the Evocracy Matrix (#32/144)

Evocracy was determined first by a roll of 6. That means Indian Global Pol has no dominant strategy. Indian Global Pol’s ranked payoffs are 3, 0, 1, and 2 for Boxes 1 (upper left), 2 (upper right), 3 (lower left), and 4 (lower right). It was determined second by a roll of 1, meaning that Indian Global Pol suspects their type is Ego. The six possible payoffs for Pol: 3, 2, 1, 0 (dominant strategy) (roll of 1); 3, 2, 0, 1 (dominant strategy) (roll of 2); 3, 1, 2, 0 (dominant strategy) (roll of 3); 3, 1, 0, 2 (no dominant strategy) (roll of 4); 3, 0, 2, 1 (no dominant strategy) (roll of 5); 3, 0, 1, 2 (no dominant strategy (roll of 6). Following the usual assumptions, Indian Global Pol does the following: (1) leans into its presumptive Ego-Evo identity; (2) treats the global electorate as also Ego-Evo; (3) treats the global electorate as having symmetrical 3, 0, 1, 2 payoffs; and (4) treats the game as Battle of the Selves, with an objective of moving the equilibrium from the inferior 2, 2 to the optimal 3, 3. In Evocracy, the best outcomes for Indian Pol and the global electorate are assigned to the situation in which Indian Pol supports Get Rich, as does the global electorate. Given a likely electoral incentive for Indian Pol to support Get Rich, this seems plausible for them, as well as for the global electorate. Program solution: The program solution for Indian Pol is randomizing Mixed Nash. Assuming symmetry, that would also be the solution for the global electorate. Evo project solution: The Evo project solution for Indian Global Pol is to support Get Rich. That is also the interested project solution given that Indian Pol has a presumptive Ego-Evo type.

The President of the World 149 Combined solution: The combined 50–50 solution for Indian Global Pol is an equal mixture of Get Rich and mixed Nash. Program Solutions in Evocracy (32/144 (E)) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—Evocracy v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt (to be told) v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

Average outcomes in all versions of Wrong 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

In Evocracy, no Row or Column Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado player has a dominant strategy. The CGT program solution in all 16 versions is randomization. Both Row and Column do much worse (1.5) in Evocracy than they did in the PD (2.25). Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (zero versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), less Battle of the Selves (zero versus four versions), and radically more randomization (16 versus zero versions). Solution Notes for the Wrong Matrix (#26/144)

Wrong was determined first by a roll of 5. That means Jefferson has no dominant strategy. He has ranked payoffs of 3, 0, 2, and 1 for Boxes 1 (upper left), 2 (upper right), 3 (lower left), and 4 (lower right). It was determined second by a roll of 1, meaning that Jefferson suspects his type is Ego. Jefferson does the following: (1) leans into his presumptive Ego identity; (2) treats the electorate as also Ego; and (3) adopts an objective of moving the equilibrium from the inferior 1, 1 to the optimal 3, 3.

150

Radicalism Reimagined

In Wrong, the best outcomes for Jefferson and the American electorate are assigned to the situation in which Jefferson dares and sins, and the American electorate backs him over Adams. This is debatable, of course—though the peaceful victory of an opposition party that took place in 1800 when Jefferson defeated Adams is arguably one of the major events in world history, it would be entirely reasonable to maintain that a victory for Adams, the Federalists, and Massachusetts would have been better than a victory for Jefferson, the Democratic-Republicans, and Virginia. But given that the game is from Jefferson’s perspective, the payoffs here make sense. Program solution: The program solution for Jefferson is randomizing mixed Nash. Assuming symmetry, that is also the solution for the American electorate. Evo project solution: The Evo project solution for Jefferson is to dare and sin and win. Combined solution: The combined 50–50 solution for Jefferson is an equal mixture of dare and sin and win with mixed Nash. Program Solutions in Wrong (26/144 (E)) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—Wrong v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt (to be told) v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

Average outcomes in all versions of Wrong 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)] Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

In Wrong, no Row or Column Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado player has a dominant strategy. The CGT program solution in all 16 versions is randomization. Both Row and Column do much worse (1.5) in Wrong than they did in the PD (2.25). Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (zero versus eight

The President of the World 151 versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), less Battle of the Selves (zero versus four versions), and radically more randomization (16 versus zero versions). Chapter Notes

This chapter relies on the idea of a power-holding or power-seeking Pol projecting their current temperamental disposition and their payoff structure onto the electorate, creating a single symmetrical game. It needs to be acknowledged that—as usual with CGT, and for that matter MGT—other plausible ideas for modeling Pol-people games exist. In particular, the pol and the pol’s agents could analyze the permutations and combinations associated with all the plausible temperaments and payoffs of members of the electorate. That analysis would correspond to the idea of a pol who is all things to all men/women/people. The core claim on behalf of the approach adopted in this chapter is not that it is truer than the alternative just noted, but that it is much simpler. In CGT as in MGT, simplicity has some valid charms. Sources Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005). Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown (2013). Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin (2019). Dillon, Michael. Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. London: I.B. Taurus (2020). Gordenker, Leon. The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat. London: Routledge (2005). Gordon-Reed, Annette. The Hemings of Monticello: An American Family. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2008). Jefferson, Thomas. Notes on the State of Virginia. (1785), www.google.com/books/edition/ Notes_on_the_State_of_Virginia/DTWttRSMtbYC?hl=en Larmore, Charles. What Is Political Philosophy? Princeton: Princeton University Press (2020). Lepore, Jill. These Truths: A History of the United States. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2018). Nehru, Jawaharlal. Glimpses of World History. New York: Penguin (1934). Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1971). Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1999). Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press (2005). Reid, Anna. Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine. New York: Basic Books (2023). Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982). Sandel, Michael. What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2012).

152

Radicalism Reimagined

Sen, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2005). Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (1991). United Nations General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (1949), www. google.com/books/edition/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights/qZNKAQAAMA AJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover Postlude

Counterhegemonic Enclaves, Redux [U] In our land teachers take money for grades, Women leave to work as escorts and maids, Why the calm? Why no shatt’ring eruption? We see virtues alongside corruption. Many of us see you as serfs of pow’r, Running tiny-toed on a hamster wheel, You live in a cage, we live in a bow’r, You maximize, we dance a messy reel. [G] In our land we’re proud of the rule of law, Of clean cities and speedy autobahns, Our rat races are red in tooth and claw, But it’s nice to have fewer grifts and cons. [U and G] To make a new home, we shouldn’t have to leave, Let’s have Kyiv in Koln, let’s have Koln in Kyiv.

11 Neuropolitics

This chapter connects politics to psychology. Ideally, and perhaps in practice, the political-ethical-legal and the humanistic-artistic-psychological realms are not separate and incommensurable. Ideally, one may see and hear in stereo rather than mono. For a while at least, domains that were separate may merge into an appealing if also less analytically tractable synesthetic whole. That synthesis is a central aspiration for CGT as a reasoned though less tractable alternative to MGT. This chapter tries to make a CGT hope for humanistic-political synthesis tangible, while not insisting on a single concrete form of it. The chapter introduces a variant of the project solution concept, derepressive sublimation. That concept relates to the “where Entro was, Evo shall be” concept in the previous chapters on radical subcommunities, but differs from it by focusing on neurodivergent players. In games in which derepressive sublimation applies, partly mad neurodivergent players (“in-betweens”) play games with different parts of themselves and with less neurodivergent players (“normals”). This is the final part of the book featuring story-poems with characters. In the story-poems of this chapter, Crusoc-Socrates, Pluto-Darcemplato, and Xanthippe return, accompanied by a new character, Dwormarc, a fusion of the feminist Andrea Dworkin, seen in Part I, and the Marxist Herbert Marcuse, the originator of the concept of repressive desublimation that this chapter borrows from and modifies. They speak to Crusoc and to the Athenian jurors, who render a verdict in Crusoc’s trial for violating the terms of his AI contract. The first game in the chapter, Fugazi, between an altruistic and a masochistic player, features a program solution that is second best and third best for the players, along with an Evo project solution in which the players do somewhat better collectively. In the story, the players are an in-between and a normal, and the project solution involves revelation of neurodivergence by the in-between and acceptance of that by the normal. Lit program solutions for Fugazi are unequal and are not quite as good in total as in the PD. The second game, Us, between two masochistic players, features a suboptimal, randomizing program solution and an Evo project solution in which the players receive second-best and first-best outcomes. In the story, the project solution

DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-14

154

Radicalism Reimagined

involves a mad player confessing and a normal empathizing. The 16 randomized Lit program solutions in Us are far worse than the 16 Lit program solutions in the PD. In the third game, Neurodivergence Rules, between an altruistic and a sadistic player, there is a program solution that is first best for one and second best for the other, along with an evolutionary project solution that also gives both players first-best and second-best outcomes. The project solution involves a normal player challenging an in-between one, and the in-between cooperating with the challenge. The 16 Lit program solutions are unequal for the players and are somewhat worse than those in the PD. In the fourth game, The Verdict, between a sadist and a masochist, the program solution leads to pain for the masochist, while the project solution gives the players first-best and second-best outcomes. In the project solution, the sadist and masochist both play a highest joint value strategy, resulting in second-best and first-best outcomes for them. The 16 Lit program solutions in Verdict are unequal and worse overall than in the PD. Fugazi: Crusoc Apologizes to the Jurors I.

Suppose that We were always unequal, The Mads, the Normals, and the In-Betweens, Present in civilization’s prequel, Twas Our diff’rences that made Our ancestors’ scenes. Some of Us In-Betweens are highly functional, We are also in part crazy, We’ve made human history compunctional, Our grand schemes have turned the world fugazi. Let’s love the Normals, the Mads, and Ourselves, The sane Hobbits, the poor Orcs, Us the Elves, To be human is to be all of these, To live in a hole, in a cave, in the trees. We In-Betweens are an odd ruling class, Our strangeness brings us to Our present pass. II.

Crusoc: People and dogs of Athens, here’s my plea: I am guilty of quite serious impiety. And of underlying wild insobriety. Alkyish, aspyish, schizoish, bipoish— There are at least four ways in which I am odd. My kinks are linked to my rad views of poli and gods. I do not say that you are as crazy as I.

Neuropolitics 155 Some of you are crazier, most of you less. Did my madness contribute to Athens’ distress? Well, quite possibly so, I would guess. Did my madness contribute to Athens’ glory? Here I am sure that the answer is yes. III.

Suppose that there is a not-too-rare half-mad, half-normal type. Suppose that its half-madness can be revealed or concealed. Suppose that this in-between type has a tendency toward genius. And also toward OCD/ADHD/autism/depression/schizophrenia, etc. And toward seeking power, fame, and money. Suppose that this type is the hidden hand of human history, the secret sauce in the extraordinary rise of our race/species. And the greatest threat to our viability and stability. The greatest creator of crash risk. What should we do about this type? For some of us—what should we do about ourselves? IV.

Q. Can a revelation by a Half-Mad AKA In-Between player of their semicraziness be a useful mechanism to persuade a Normal Entro player to collaborate with the Half-Mad player on an Evo project solution? A. Yes, as suggested in the Fugazi matrix. Table 11.1 Fugazi (122/144) Row: In-Between Me—Altru Column: Normal You—Maso In-Between Me Reveals

Normal You Cooperates

3, 1 4. This is another path. I open myself to Ego.

Normal You Doesn’t Cooperate 2, 0 3. This is what Entro you wants.

A crazy me will let you have it. Your sickness [HJV project solution and and mine are one. As you do to Evo and Emp.

Derepressive sublimation] In-Between Me Conceals

1, 2 2. This is the program solution. It’s pretty good for me. Can we do better?

You soar.

0, 3 1.

This is what I want. It’s the opposite of your desire.

156

Radicalism Reimagined

Us: Dwormarc and D’arcemplato Argue, Xan Intervenes I.

Our race is ruled by the functionally Mad. Methinks that was the key to Our success. Our killing the Neanderthals was bad, They lacked Our motor-mouthed pressured duress. In the souls of Us In-Betweens is fear, A fear We might be mad as a hatter. We flee from Our fear with logic that’s clear, With crafted tales to persuade and flatter. In school Our compensations win awards. In high-level jobs We’re ubiquitous. We’re great at turning ploughshares into swords. In Our souls is something iniquitous. The problem’s not that We’re partly crazy. It’s that we deny. We make the truth hazy. II.

Dwormarc: Freud is a pillar of repressive tolerance. Crusoc, your turn to psychology forgoes radical edge for apology. Let’s not be distracted by what’s inside of you and me. Let’s fight the patriarchy and capitalism. Let’s not let psychology lead us to schism. D’arcemplato: I disagree with the primacy of the political. Dwormarc, we need a radicalism more mature than yours. We need to get past your twentieth-century wars. Xanthippe: May I suggest a possibility for you? You two and my husband are more than a little bit crazy, no? I think your admitting that is the way to go. Do that . . . then get on with your show. III.

Why madness and semi-madness? Madness is connected to semi-madness. Semi-madness is connected to eccentric genius. Eccentric genius can be remarkably productive. If also sometimes remarkably destructive. The semi-mad are likely less functional on average than the normal. But one Socrates makes up for many less functional semi-mad people.

Neuropolitics 157 A few super-creative semi-mads can make up for legions of odd ineffectuality. None of the foregoing negates the underdog status of neurodiversity. Most of us who are divergent are underdogs. But some of us divergents are the unacknowledged legislators of the world. And not a few of the actual ones. IV.

Q. Can a revelation by a Mad side of an In-Between Maso player of their craziness be a useful mechanism to persuade itself and a Normal side of the same Maso player to collaborate on an Evo project solution? A. Yes, as suggested in the Us matrix. Neurodivergence Rules: Xan, D’arcemplato, and Dwormarc Take Different Positions on Crusoc’s Trial I.

Our movement for divergents is a vibe, It’s queer not gay, experiments not laws, It’s a statement of pride from a new tribe, It’s a banner flown to proclaim our cause. It also has an opposite meaning, It says we already run the world, It asks for our own redemptive greening, It suggests contrition, a pride flag furled. Table 11.2 Us (82/144) Mad Self—Maso Normal Self—Maso Me Confess

You Empathize

You Don’t Empathize

2, 3 This is Evo best.

1, 2 This is an Evo and Entro loser.

Let me help you, please!

We can both do better.

Please don’t flee to Box 2.

I flee to Box 4.

[An Evo project solution] [Derepressive sublimation] Me Don’t Confess

3, 0 Self-harming you wants this.

0, 1 Bent, we want this most.

But I do not.

But logic makes it elusive.

I run to Box 2.

You run to your worst, box 3.

158

Radicalism Reimagined We the neurodivergent are funny. We’re underdogs, society’s losers. We’re also endowed with fame and money. We’re downcast beggars and sky-high choosers. Let those of us who are lucky come out, Let’s help the unlucky, put shame to rout. II.

Xanthippe: I love You no matter how crazy You are with Plato and Your other friends. No matter the evidence Me vote to acquit. D’arcemplato: you disconcert Us with Your avowal of semi-madness. Through searching for the good We become wiser not crazy, no? We love you and vote for you. But crazy’s not where We want to go. Dwormarc: We are on the fence. We are a swing vote. Without Our support it’s hard to see how You live. Your contrariness tries Us. How much should We give? Crusoc: Thank You my Sisters, Me love You all! You must heed Your Own Daemon, follow Your Own call! Me love Your lifting Me up. And helping Me fall! III.

Why madness and semi-madness, redux: Madness is linked to semi-madness. Madness and semi-madness are only imperfectly concealable. That gives the psychically normal power. The semi-mad are a fragile ruling class. They cannot assert semi-madness as a principle of rule. Their rule is either hidden or subject to limits. Compared to other groups, the semi-mad are a least bad ruling class. Normals have power over them as well as the other way around. There are checks and balances between rulers and ruled. What about the fully mad? They are the eternal victims in the sapiens play. IV.

Q. Is a challenge by a Normal to an In-Between to induce collaboration on an Evo project a good idea? A. It’s unclear in this matrix—the program is pretty good, and if the Normal abandons it for a project, the In-Between could sabotage the Normal’s hope for Evo collaboration.

Neuropolitics 159 Table 11.3 #72 Neurodivergence Rules Me Normal—Altru You In-Between—Sado Me Challenge Us Both

You Collaborate with Me

You Fight Me

3, 2 This is Evo best.

0, 0 Here is my fear.

Do I trust you to play it?

Me getting zip is fine—

Maybe the program is fine.

But you getting zip is bad.

[Derepressive Sublimation] Me Let Us Be

Why not?

1, 3

It’s what the program says.

2, 1 This is a dead option. The program beats it.

But do I owe us a challenge? Forget about it. [Program Solution]

The Verdict: Crusoc Asks for Forgiveness; Dwormarc, D’arcemplato, Li Bai, and Xan Weigh in; the Jury Decides I.

Crusoc: The first time around, I hoped to be convicted. I thought the people condemning me would prove their stupidity. That their envy of my genius would show their dull cupidity. This time I’ve changed. The people may be fools, but so am I. Democracy’s better in pulling planks out of eyes. So—spare me please. I’d like to drink with Li Bai and Xan. Dwormarc: Don’t forgive. Please be strict. Unplug it. Wonderful it may be. But it, like I, is just an AI. Its partly crazy mind is a threat to all of you, to real humans. The risks it poses are too great to tolerate. D’arcemplato, Xan, and Li Bai: To Dwormarc we say no! The jurors: 264 to 219, we vote to acquit. Crusoc, you are free to go. II.

In America, who would Li Bai be? A homeless person, always traveling. Me saw Him last on the upper Yangtze. Me loved Him for His mind unraveling. He drank His 300 ounces a day, Wrote His poems on the train from Hoboken.

160

Radicalism Reimagined Me saw Him last on the Champs-Elysees. His mind was in pieces. My heart was broken. On My down days Me want to sleep and move. Forget what it is Me’m supposed to do, Be an ever-rolling wheel in a groove, Be a steel rail with nothing left to prove. Li Bai had beautiful calligraphy. He had a beast inside too big to free. III.

A conjecture: Very high intelligence in human-like AI will be connected to semi-madness. It makes sense to keep Crusoc away from power. Or at the least to constrain him/her. May idea-drunk, semi-mad rad experiments grow and flourish in the future. Some will be wonderful, as they have always been. Progress largely depends on them. At the same time, may there be a sober, normal-dominated center. May the ancient sapiens dance of semi-mad and normal continue. May there be a better role and a better fate within the dance for the mad. IV.

Q. What are the key obstacles to Sado (Me) and Altru (You) players from playing HJV in Verdict? A. First, I am Entro, which inhibits me from accepting an HJV solution. Second, You are Altru, which inhibits you because you do not have HJV as a dominant strategy, which you would if you were Ego. Solution Notes for the Fugazi Matrix (#122/144)

Here and in the other games of this chapter, we are back to random selection from all games, rather than just the symmetrical ones of the last chapter. For Fugazi, the five rolls that determined the game were 6 (matrices 121–144), 1 (matrices 121–124), 2 (matrix 122), 2 (Altru for Row), 3 (Maso for Column). The program solution: Fugazi is a Battle of the Selves game with a dominant strategy for Me only. Me as Altru will play Don’t Reveal because You are better off regardless that way than if I play Reveal. “Knowing” my dominant strategy, Your Maso program will play Cooperate. That gets you a 2 payoff, which is not good given your programmed desire to do as badly as possible, but is better than the 3 you get by deviating from the program.

Neuropolitics 161 Table 11.4 #96—Verdict Sado Me, Maso You

You Play HJV

Me Play HJV

2, 3 I am reluctant to do HJV.

0, 0 The program pulls us here.

I want to hurt you.

You are crushed.

Might I be better than I am?

May we not want this.

[Derepressive sublimation]

[The program solution]

1, 2 I prefer this to HJV.

3, 1 An Ego Me likes this.

But why?

There’s a fairness case for it.

De gustabis, disputandum.

I’m not feeling it, though.

Me Don’t Play HJV

You Don’t Play HJV

The Evo project solution: For Evo purposes, balancing between the first best for me, third best for you box (3, 1) and the worst for me, best for you box (0, 3) is one logical focal point. Assuming we balance, a mix tilted some toward box 4 (more than 1/3, but less than ½ share of box 1) will allow both you and me to do better than with the (1, 2) program solution. Pure (3, 1)—the optimal HJV solution—or a balance between (3, 1) and the program solution of (1, 2)—a temporizing mean between optimal HJV and the Pareto-optimal 1/3–1/2 box 1, 2/3–1/2 box 4 mix— are also reasonable Evo project focal points. Derepressive sublimation: The half-mad politician/therapist/professional derepresses (reveals) and sublimates (turns a troubling feature into a worthy one) by manifesting their crazy side. For their part, the normal Maso voter/ patient/client derepresses by recognizing their Maso and sublimates by working toward an Evo project solution. The suggestion central here is that the othermaximizing Altru’s revelation of craziness may help the self-minimizing voter/ patient/nonprofessional to cooperate on adopting an Evo rather than an Entro framework. Entro (which in the Lit version of CGT is just as central to normal humans and other entities as it is to mad and half-mad ones) will be clung to, if the suggestion is right, less strongly by a presumptively Entro player once one’s Evo partner signals their half-madness and in doing so reduces one’s own Entro stigma. The combined solution, assuming 50–50: We converge on the program solution (1, 2) half the time and on a mix between the HJV project solution of (3, 1) and the (0, 3) and (1, 2) outcomes. Overall, that leads to a majority of (1, 2) collaborations, with (3, 1) collaborations taking second place.

162

Radicalism Reimagined

Program Solutions in Fugazi (Matrix 122/144 (E)) The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—Fugazi

3, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 1 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in Fugazi

2.4375, 2 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)]

Note: The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

The outcomes in Fugazi are considerably better for Row and worse for Column than in the PD—2.4375 versus 2.25 for Row, and 2 versus 2.25 for Column. There is less Perfect Harmony in CLS (six versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), and more Battle of the Selves (ten versus four versions). Solution Notes for the Us Matrix (#82/144)

For Us, the five rolls that determined the game were 4 (matrices 73–96), 3 (matrices 81–84), 2 (matrix 82), 3 (Ego-Entro for Player 1), 3 (Ego-Entro for player 2). The program solution: Us is a Battle of the Selves game with no dominant strategy for either player. Accordingly, both self-punishing players play mixed Nash to guarantee themselves no better than a 1.5 payoff no matter what the other player does. The Evo project solution: Pure (2, 3)—the optimal HJV solution—is one compelling focal point. Another possibility is a balancing project solution between second best for me, first best for you (2, 3) and first best for me, worst for you (3, 0), with a tilt toward the former. Derepressive sublimation: The half-mad politician/therapist/professional derepresses (reveals) and sublimates (turns a troubling feature into a worthy one) by manifesting their crazy side. For their part, the normal Entro voter/patient/client

Neuropolitics 163 derepresses by recognizing their Entro side and sublimates by working toward the HJV solution (2, 3). The combined solution, assuming 50–50 (based on simplicity and also on not knowing whether the program is mandatory or permissive): We converge on the mixed Nash program solution half the time and on the Evo project solution half the time. Lit Program Solutions in Us The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—Us v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization)

Average outcomes in all versions of Us 1.5, 1.5 (Randomization) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)]

The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.) In Us, no Row or Column Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado player has a dominant strategy, and the program solution in all 16 versions is randomization. Both Row and Column do much worse (1.5) in Us than they did in the PD (2.25). Compared to the PD, there is less Perfect Harmony in Divergence (zero versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (zero versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), less Battle of the Selves (zero versus four versions), and radically more randomization (16 versus zero versions). Solution Notes for the Neurodivergence Rules Matrix (#72/144)

For Neurodivergence, the five rolls that determined the game were 3 (matrices 49–72), 6 (matrices 69–72), 4 (matrix 72), 2 (Emp-Evo for Player 1), 4 (Emp-Entro for player 2).

164

Radicalism Reimagined

The program solution: Box 3 (1, 3). Neurodivergence is a Battle of the Selves game with a dominant strategy of following the program for Altru Normal, since InBetween does better from Normal following the program compared to challenging it. The Evo project solution: Pure (3, 2)—the optimal HJV solution—is one compelling focal point. Another possibility is a balancing project solution between (3, 2) and (1, 3), which is the best outcome for Normal and second best for In-Between. Derepressive sublimation: The Normal player challenges their own program and the semi-craziness of the In-Between player by playing Challenge instead of following the program. In turn, the In-Between derepresses by recognizing their semi-craziness, abandoning their Entro side and collaborating on the HJV solution (3, 2). The combined solution, assuming 50–50 (based on simplicity and also on not knowing whether the program is mandatory or permissive): We converge on the program solution (1, 3) most of the time and the HJV solution (3, 2) the rest of the time. Lit Program Solutions in Neurodivergence Rules The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—tbt v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—Neurodivergence Rules v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in Neurodivergence Rules 2, 2.25 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)]

The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.) The outcomes in Neurodivergence Rules are worse for Row and equal for Column compared to the PD—2 versus 2.25 for Row, and 2.25 versus 2.25 for Column. There is less Perfect Harmony in Neurodivergence Rules (four versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (one versus two versions), less Disharmony

Neuropolitics 165 (zero versus two versions), more Battle of the Selves (seven versus four versions), and more Randomness (four versus zero versions). Solution Notes for the Verdict (#96/144)

The five rolls that determined the game were 4 (matrices 73–96), 6 (matrices 93–96), 4 (matrix 96), 4 (Emp-Entro for Player 1), 2 (Emp-Evo for player 2). The program solution: The Verdict for Me Sado You Maso is a Battle of the Selves game with no dominant strategy for either player. Both of us randomize by playing mixed Nash. The Evo project solution: Pure (2, 3)—the HJV solution—is one compelling focal point. Another possibility is a balancing project solution between (2, 2) and (3, 1), the best outcome for me and second best for you. HJV as derepressive sublimation: Both players challenge aspects of their own programming. Sado Me identifies my Entro in part with my semi-madness, and in doing so sees the value of an Evo alternative to my program. Altru You identifies your Emp in part with your semi-madness, and in doing so sees the value of an Ego stance that leads you to clearly prefer HJV. Together, we collaborate on the HJV solution (2, 3). Lit Program Solutions for The Verdict The Lit Versions

The Outcomes for Row & Col, with Game Type

v. 1 Ego-Ego—tbt (to be told) v. 2 Altru-Altru—tbt v. 3 Maso-Maso—tbt v. 4 Sado-Sado—tbt v. 5 Ego-Altru—tbt v. 6 Altru-Ego—tbt v. 7 Maso-Sado—tbt v. 8 Sado-Maso—Li Bai v. 9 Ego-Maso—tbt v. 10 Maso-Ego—tbt v. 11 Altru-Sado—tbt v. 12 Sado-Altru—tbt v. 13 Ego-Sado—tbt v. 14 Sado-Ego—tbt v. 15 Maso-Altru—tbt v. 16 Altru-Maso—tbt

2, 3 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 3, 3 (Perfect Harmony) 3, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 2, 2 (Imperfect Harmony) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves) 1.5, 1.5 (Randomness) 1, 2 (Battle of the Selves)

Average outcomes in The Verdict 1.875, 2 (Battle of the Selves) [compare 2.25, 2.25—PD (Imperfect Harmony)]

The outcomes are relative to the player’s Ego, Altru, Maso, or Sado programs. (Ego values its own payoffs, Altru values the other’s payoffs, Maso disvalues its own payoffs, and Sado disvalues the other’s payoffs.)

166

Radicalism Reimagined

The outcomes in The Verdict are worse for Row and for Column compared to the PD—1.875 versus 2.25 for Row, and 2 versus 2.25 for Column. There is less Perfect Harmony in The Verdict (four versus eight versions), less Imperfect Harmony (one versus two versions), less Disharmony (zero versus two versions), equal Battle of the Selves (four versions), and much more Randomness (eight versus zero versions). Sources Dworkin, Andrea. Pornography: Men Possessing Women. Berkeley: University of California Press (1981). Eastman, Wayne. Organization Life and Critical Legal Thought: A Psychopolitical Inquiry and Argument, N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change, 19 (1991): 721–796. Jamison, Kay Redfield. Touched with Fire: Manic-Depressive Illness and the Artistic Temperament. New York: Free Press (1993). Jin, Ha. The Banished Immortal: A Life of Li Bai. New York: Pantheon (2019). Knapp, Carolyn. Drinking: A Love Story. New York: Penguin (1999). Levy, Amy. Xantippe, and Other Verse. (1881), chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnlad dacbdfmadadm/http://public-library.uk/ebooks/108/64.pdf Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. (1969), www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ marcuse/works/1969/essay-liberation.htm Packer, Jennifer. The Eye is Not Satisfied with Seeing. Koln: Konig (2021). Plato. Dialogues (Benjamin Jowett, trans.). (c. 427–347 B.C.E.), https://standardebooks. org/ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett/text/apology Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Silberman, Steven. Neurotribes: The Legacy of Autism and the Future of Neurodiversity. New York: Penguin (2015). Singer, Judy. Neurodiversity: The Birth of an Idea. New York: Cambridge University Press (2017). Solomon, Andrew. The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression. New York: Scribner (2001). Solomon, Andrew. Far from the Tree: Parents and the Search for Identity. New York: Scribner (2012). Vaillant, George E. The Natural History of Alcoholism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1983). Postlude

At the Whitney, Again The eye is not satisfied with seeing. It’s greedy. It wants to appropriate. The foot is not satisfied with being. It’s restless. Movement is its opiate. Jennifer Packer draws well-defined eyes, And specializes in columnar feet,

Neuropolitics 167 Faces out of watery gray arise, Vagueness turns to clarity, luke to heat. An issue with formally defined art, Like the old-time sonnets that I’m writing: Ev’rything’s filled in, there’s no missing part. I find Ms. Packer’s spaces inviting. Art sometimes makes me a happy fella, I’ll buy Becky a Calder umbrella.

Part III

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

12 What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

This chapter considers what critical game theory with divided, internally inconsistent selves can contribute to mainstream game theory with unified, consistent selves. It juxtaposes brief mainstream stories with poems. The poems reflect on themes discussed by Avinash Dixit and his coauthors in the first chapter of their widely used textbook, Games of Strategy; components of expected utility theory explained by Steven Pinker in his recent book, Rationality; and, finally, on the famous trolley problem of whether to sacrifice one life to save five. The poems are followed by discussions of how MGT insights can be deepened, and in some ways altered, by CGT. This chapter is written with the idea that it could be drawn on by teachers in various disciplines, including economics, philosophy, and political science, as well as in applied fields like business ethics, business law, and supply chain management, the three main areas in which I’ve taught. In illustrating mainstream game theory principles worth knowing, it also tries to illustrate complexity-friendly, discussionfriendly ways to grasp the limits and the latent possibilities of these principles. The first six parts of the chapter consider mixed Nash randomization, Prisoner’s Dilemma rat races, Schelling’s concept of focal points, commitment devices, Chicken, and cheap talk. The 7th through 11th parts consider assumptions of consistency, transitivity, commensurability, and interchangeability made in expected utility theory and rational choice theory. The 12th and longest part uses variations on trolley problems to make a case that Kantian deontology supports randomizing in a variety of games in which Benthamite consequentialism does not. MGT Story 1: Which Passing Shot? Your opponent is at the net. Should you try to pass her down the line, or should you go cross-court? The key game-theoretic concept here: You don’t want to be predictable. You should employ a “mixed Nash”—that is, randomizing—strategy. CGT Story-Poem 1 Final Jeopardy

You know the leader is going to bet high, Your best chance to win is if you bet low, DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-16

172

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory A win is a win, no matter how sly, Hope she gets it wrong! That’s the way to go. No! Win or lose, I want to have honor. To negate my own answer isn’t nice. Let me beat ’er straight up and not con ’er, I choose to ignore your Econ advice! Max and Norm—you are both too dogmatic! You’re fine as parts of me, but not the whole. With only you, Norm, I’m too dramatic. With only you, Max, I would lose my soul. My Max-Norm math is quite intractable, I’m complicated and distractable.

Should We Be Econ Max or Ethical Norm?

An important claim on behalf of mainstream game theory is that understanding it will help us to do better than those who are less informed. That claim implies that the advantage from applying game theory is not big for passing shots in tennis, where the research shows that players are already randomizing. Rather, the edge comes in situations like Final Jeopardy betting, where a nice article by Andrew Metrick—and my own unpublished research in the 1990s that got scooped by Metrick’s paper—shows that excellent players fail to follow randomization recommendations even though many thousands of dollars are at stake. Leaders fail to maximize because they make a “lock-out” bet to guarantee a win if they get the final question right, which leaves them vulnerable to being exploited by trailers betting low. For their part, players who are behind bet too high, throwing away wins they could get if the leader gets the question wrong. After doing my research on Final Jeopardy betting, I got the chance to advise someone who was appearing on the show. Given the data, my advice to him in case he was trailing going into Final Jeopardy was not to randomize. Instead, I suggested he bet low and pray the leader misses. Was I applying an ethical norm? Not really. I was advising him to use psychology in order to maximize his winning chances. I was not suggesting that he follow an ethical approach that reduced his chance of winning. What would a case for “Ethical Norm” over “Econ Max” involve? Norm might say, “Leaders are right to bet to guarantee a win if they get the question right, even though their win rate suffers a bit. You should win the right way!” Is Norm right? For the leader, I think so. For the trailer, I’d stick with Max. What do you (and your students, if you’re a teacher) think? Econ Max, Ethical Norm, or does it depend?

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

173

MGT Story 2: The GPA Rat Race Your course is graded on a curve. If only the whole class could slack off together, you all could do just as well as if you worked hard. The problem is that each of you is better off personally if you work hard, no matter what the other students do. But as a group, you’ll do no better with all that hard work. You’re trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. CGT Story-Poem 2 Rat Races

’Tween the left and right we have built great walls, Yet the disputatious sides work in sync, They govern the citizens with their calls, To think harder than we nat’urally think. The left’s intersectional underdogs, The right’s ordinary common people, They’re pushed to work harder by cons and progs, They’re both impaled upon reason’s steeple. Our system is rat races, we’re the rats, We’re led to do more than we want to do, We wear a myr’iad of pin fac’try hats, We confuse working hard with what is true. I’d just kick back if I had my druthers, Our system’s the worst! Join me, my brothers! Should We Escape Rat Races or Welcome Them?

In the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma story, the prisoners share an interest in cooperating to escape a “he who confesses first gets a better deal” race to rat the other out. But if the prisoners are in fact guilty of a serious crime, one may wish for them not to solve their dilemma. Other versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, such as Dixit and his coauthors’ story of the students graded on a curve and my poem’s stories of liberals, conservatives, and workers, repeated from Part II, also provoke questions as to whether it is a good thing or not for people to escape the competitive dynamics of rat races. Do we applaud or oppose the call in the poem for resistance to jobs that push us to work harder than we would otherwise? We who put on ethics hats in the Ethics-Econ dichotomy are the ones to think through this and other normative rat race questions. In Econland, PD players are single, undivided, maximizing selves. In Ethicsland, players are complex selves who do not necessarily maximize their payoffs.

174

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

Sometimes they want to lift the other player up, and sometimes they want to minimize by knocking themselves or the other player down. An ethical analysis of the PD thus needs to consider the likelihood that we are different from one another, and that altruism and minimization as well as maximization are important. One prisoner in real life may be more self-punishing, more generous, more vindictive, or more self-seeking than the other. A key point for an ethics analysis of the PD is that asymmetry in what the players want is more salubrious for them than symmetry is. The players can get their best outcomes, with one but not both confessing; or, if their complex preferences are opposed (as in the case of a “therapist” player who wants to help a self-harming “patient” player), the altruist prevails over the self-harmer. A tough Econ game becomes a more pleasant Ethics one. Ethics may not be a universal solvent—but in the PD, it helps. MGT Story 3: “Which Tire?” Two students partied hard all night before their morning final. They tell their professor that they got a flat tire after taking one of their mothers to the hospital and had to stay up all night. The professor gives them a makeup. There is only one question on it: “Which tire?” CGT Story-Poem 3 Focal Points

When and where to meet in New York City, If we haven’t agreed on place or time? Professor Schelling’s puzzles were pretty, Is convergence based on logic or rhyme? Choose one: 1, 7, 50, 93, Choose one: Lincoln, Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, Choose one: Hitler, Jesus, Buddha, Laozi, Is convergence a moral gift we’ve got? Match faces to words, quickly as you can, Is “White-good” faster than “Black-good” for you? Does racism lie at the heart of man, Do we need to converge on feeling blue? There’s truly a need to be convergent. Our need to split is also urgent. When Is a Gift for Harmonizing Good?

When Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of focal points in the 1950s, he focused on situations where coordination is desirable and there is no obvious

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

175

ethical problem with it. Similarly, when I and other students in his freshman seminar answered his “where do you meet in New York?” question and others on focal points, we—or I, at least—assumed that a human gift in converging was a good thing. It was a lesson I took to heart and tried to extend. I developed a game, “Ethical Focal Points.” In it, my students converge on picking Lincoln out of a list of historical villains like Hitler, but do not converge on picking Hitler out of a list of heroes. That, I argued in my first book, is a sign that the human gift for harmonizing with others has a strong pro-social component. I continue to believe that focal points and the automatic moral associations I see as subconscious focal points are good overall, despite their flaws. For example, I take it that we want people to associate pictures of happy people with the word “good” more quickly—as my students in fact do in an exercise I’ve developed— than they associate “good” with pictures of crimes. But Dixit’s example of the flat tire—where it’s fine for the students not to converge successfully—is good to reflect on. So are Implicit Associations Test (IAT) results showing that many of us find it easier to converge on associating the word “good” with in-groups. Should we try to eliminate all automatic associations in the AI systems that we are now developing rapidly, or not? Should we worry about the possibility that logical, convergence-gifted AI will converge on Hitler in my Ethical Focal Points game more than illogical humans do? We need to think about the value but also the pitfalls of focal points in an array of different factual contexts in AI and elsewhere. MGT Story 4: Why Are Professors So Mean? Why would a professor who is kind-hearted announce and uphold a “mean” policy of never accepting a late assignment? The logic: by announcing the policy and then telling students it would be unfair to make an exception, the “mean” professor helps herself in the long run by using a commitment device that binds her against her true soft-heartedness. CGT Story-Poem 4

Why Are Professors So Nice? I want to get good evaluations, I want to minimize student complaints, I want toleration of my orations, Ergo I heed modern niceness constraints. I have the tenured freedom to be good, To wrestle with ideas, not my pupils, To live my life as I believe I should, To be governed by sweetness and scruples. Is there a dark truth ’bout me to concede? Is what’s nice in me the same as what’s smug?

176

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory Do I think a non-Ph.D.’s a weed? Do I think a non-professor’s a bug? I am selfish, amiable, and spiteful, My nature is both benign and frightful.

Are Authority Figures Too Mean or Too Nice?

In the story by Dixit and his coauthors, the idea that commitment can be a valuable strategy is used to explain why a kind-hearted professor might decide to be tough by not accepting late work. In the story-poem, the logic of commitment works the other way around. A not kind-hearted, selfish professor is accommodating. Why? Perhaps as part of a tenure-backed commitment to putting her research rather than her students first. Or perhaps because she believes that she is in a niceness-first university culture in which her interest lies in committing to getting along with her clients-customers, AKA students. A key point about game theory that is highly relevant for ethics: any given game theory story applying a logical principle like the value of commitment can be “flipped” by being retold in a form with a different set of moral meanings from those in the original story. In my 1990s articles on law and economics, I rang many changes on that theme, with articles on topics such as how bargaining can reduce value rather than enhance it by putting the players in a PD, how the PD itself can be used to support libertarian and radical policies rather than regulatory and centrist ones, and how models presented in American Economic Review articles can be reversed in their liberal or conservative valences. As important as an appreciation of the ubiquity of flipping is in economics as well in the humanities, where the claims of Derrida et al. on the open-endedness of texts still seem to me right, it is even more important, I believe, to embrace contradiction and to consider at a micro, introspective level what makes a particular story plausible and engaging. Do we identify more with Dixit’s kind-hearted toughie, or with the poem’s egoistic nice guy/nice gal? Is there reason to worry about either type, either in humans or in the AI teachers we will be developing soon? MGT Story 5: Roommates on the Brink You are a female law student sharing an off-campus apartment and chores with two male law students. You notice you’re nearly out of dishwasher detergent. Do you buy it yourself as you’ve done before, or wait for one of your roommates? You and they are in a Chicken game—if everyone’s tough, it’s bad; but if you yield, they get over by doing less. CGT Story-Poem 5 Chicken

Are we converging on his thing or hers? Can we end the battle of the sexes?

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

177

Do the laws and norms go my way or yours? Should they differ ’tween New York and Texas? Perhaps the mainstream’s right. We’re consistent. Some of us are tops, and others are subs. To that proposition I’m resistant. We can all be yas queens and downcast schlubs. “You’re some kind of radical idealist! The world’s hierarchy—it’s BDSM.” No, methinks I’m actu’ally a realist, The lines are perm’eable ’tween us and them. Does my logic entail that you’re right, too? Not quite. Multiplicity could be true. When to Fight Hierarchy? When to Uphold It?

First, a clarification: the Chicken story in Games of Strategy mentions paper towels, cereal, and beer as well as detergent, and does not mention gender. The discussion—“[i]n many situations of this kind, the waiting game goes on for quite a while before someone who is really impatient for one of the items (usually beer) gives in”—perhaps implies male roommates, but there is nothing explicit. In a later paragraph telling another Chicken story, though, gender is specified. Here, a 15-yearold daughter appears at the door of the living room where her father and his dinner party guests are sitting and says, “Bye, Dad.” The father asks where she’s going, to which she replies only, “Out.” After a long pause, he says, “All right, bye,” and she then leaves. Or, in Chicken terms—the daughter plays Tough, the father responds with Tough, the daughter escalates with Tough again, and the father then plays Yield, with some Tough on his part reflected in his long pause and a measure of Yield on the daughter’s part shown in her waiting at the door while he pauses. Chicken and Battle of the Sexes/Selves games are good springboards for ethical reflections on the value as well as the pitfalls of hierarchies. If one player understands her role is to serve the other player, these games can often be solved in a way that is difficult absent hierarchical roles. On the other hand, though, the idea that one player is the perpetual footpad of the other may well be offensive even to those of us who do not think of ourselves as radical critics of hierarchy. An aim of the reflections on hierarchy in the poem is to encourage those of us who do see hierarchy in everyday life as a major problem to engage with its merits as well as its vices in protocols for AI and other designed systems. Can hierarchies be shifting rather than fixed and still work effectively? MGT Story 6: The Dating Game A New York couple have two rent-controlled apartments. Their relationship deepens. They spend all their time at one place, and the woman suggests they give up

178

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

the other place. The man says, “I love you, but no! Choice is better.” The woman says, “Bye!” She realizes his refusal, not his cheap talk of love, is the true signal of his state of mind. CGT Story-Poem 6 Expensive Talk

I was talking ’bout a life together. You said, “Yes, but let’s keep our own places— Choices help us ride out stormy weather.” I said, “I am done with your two faces!” You: “I’m less practical than you’re saying, My faux pas was drama, not well-laid plans, Our wedding is faith, a form of praying, For our novel lives as married and trans.” Me: “You’re faking. What you say is a lie. Do not appropriate underdogs’ pain. From your elite perch may you trip and cry, Your new girl stories are silly and vain.” We: “We both have part of the truth, I think. To both of us lasting in love, let’s drink.” Should Talk Be Cheap? Should Costly Signals Be Costly?

The talk-is-cheap principle in game theory can be reasonably criticized by ethicists on the ground that talk is not in fact cheap. The high levels of cooperation shown in one-shot PDs when the players can talk to each in advance of their choice, even though there is no enforceable agreement between them, is evidence of that. Further, the substantial if lower levels of cooperation observed in no-communication PDs can be understood as related to some of us having a sense that defection is a violation of a tacit promise—“If we could have talked, I would have said I’m cooperating—so I will.” Similarly, the principle in game theory that costly actions are reliable signals can reasonably be criticized by ethicists on the basis that people sacrifice for different reasons. So, for example, someone who readily gives up his/her apartment in the Dixit et al. story may be driven by self-harming motives, not by love and concern for the other person. Much as the empirical, positive issues about talk and signaling are intriguing, it is the ethical, normative issues with them that I would claim are the more fundamental ones for human and transhuman affairs. Do we want to design AI in which deceptive talk is cheap, or even completely painless, for the AI? Do we want that to vary over time (minute by minute? micro-second by micro-second?) and between programs, such that that we create a part-Cruella de Vil, part-Socrates program that

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

179

feels a lower cost of deceptive talk than a pure Socrates program would? Likewise, do we want to design programs in which players are pure egoists and costs such as death are reliably costly, or do we want programs in which the AI sometimes cares not at all about those costs, or even wants to incur them—as perhaps the real-life Socrates did when he was tried by the Athenians? MGT Story 7: Commensurability One of the assumptions underlying rational choice theory, which counsels an actor to pick the option with the highest expected utility, is commensurability. Commensurability means that for any two given options, the actor always prefers one to another, or is indifferent between them. The decider never says, “You can’t compare apples to oranges.” CGT Story-Poem 7 I Prefer Not to Prefer

What do I think of galactic Empire? Is it better than my sketch of a toad? I prefer not to set one of them higher, I care—but they’re not two forks in a road. It’s folly to force myself to a choice, And folly to say it doesn’t matter, In both states I can see myself rejoice, In both I can see my calmness shatter. Yes to incommensurability, Some quanta should simply not be compared, Oft we should live in possibility, Ensure we have no pref’rence to be bared. I resist your fantasy of closure, Opacity should oft trump exposure. Is Incommensurability Good?

A multiple-part self that is sometimes egoistic, sometimes altruistic, and sometimes minimizing for itself or others fundamentally violates commensurability. Commensurability is out the window, not only in the poem’s limited sense in which one cannot compare galactic empire and a sketch of toad, but more broadly. Even the most sensible character among us—say, Elizabeth Bennet in Pride and Prejudice—is always subject to a flipping of preference. Does Elizabeth prefer marrying Mr. Darcy or not? She tells herself at one time the answer is never and later that the answer is yes—but even at the end, she cannot look into herself and say, “I am certain that I prefer marriage to Darcy, with all the focus on his happiness and the

180

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

possible sacrifice of mine that may be entailed, to following my own star.” The best she can say, I would submit, is, “I know my true self not—but leap I will.” The same lack of true self-knowledge of one’s preferences applies even more to the large majority of us who are less sensible than Elizabeth is. Did Anna Karenina truly want to leave Karenin? Does she truly want to throw herself under the train? A self-destructive part of herself has gained dominion over her on her final day, but how is one to understand that dominion? One might read her doom as arbitrary and contingent, or one might read it as deeply rooted in her character. One might read her fate as horrible, or as a meet end. As readers, we are no less ignorant of what it is that we really want for Anna, or for Elizabeth, than they are ignorant of what it is that they truly want for themselves. In the domain of literature, the ambiguity and mutability of preferences is something of very great value, without which art would be much less to us than it in fact is. In the domain of ethics, and in subdomains such as politics and mechanism design, the situation is trickier, as we’ll see with our next component of rational choice, transitivity. MGT Story 8: Transitivity If you prefer A—being an openly greedy person, say—to B—being a sneakily greedy person—and you in turn prefer B to C—being a moralistic prig—you must prefer A to C if you are to choose rationally. One reason why is that if you violate transitivity by preferring C to A, you can be exploited by being turned into a “money pump.” CGT Story-Poem 8 Pigs, Sneaks, and Prigs

Better clearly greedy than sneak’ly so, Better subtly selfish than show’ly good, My pref’rences are ’rayed from high to low, I am foll’wing reason just as I should. I prefer A to B and B to C, Better pig than sneak, better sneak than prig, But I run ’foul of transitivity— I would rather be a prig than a pig. You say I am only playing with words, That in truth reason’s dictates I obey, That logic rules all people, swine, and birds, I respectfully dissent. We’re split, I say. I respect the logic of Your model, But I’ll always escape from its swaddle.

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

181

When to Violate Transitivity, When to Obey It?

The poem describes a situation in which intransitivity seems to me reasonable. An other-concerned part of oneself that cares about avoiding moralistic bringing down of others in some cases but sees it as desirable in others may reasonably feel that the prig’s moralism is badly directed at the sneak—who acquiesces to the moral code—but is well-directed at the pig—who appears indifferent. Is this intransitivity in one’s preferences irrational, given that it involves being more moralistic toward indifference as opposed to deception, while at the same time regarding deception as worse than indifference? Not at all, I would suggest. One reason why: less deeply unethical pigs may be more readily moved from their apathy to ethics than the more deeply unethical sneaks may be moved from their hypocrisy. The empirical and ethical cases for that position are debatable, to be sure—the reverse might be true. But in that case, ethics and empiricism could reasonably lead us to be intransitive in the opposite way from the poem, by preferring the prig to the sneak, the sneak to the pig, and the pig to the prig. In politics, a one-dimension left-right spectrum can avoid or mitigate the problem of intransitive indecisiveness. For dyads and individual selves, for whom barriers to action are lower, I believe there is less reason to be concerned. Theorists of rational choice, though, see a “money pump” cycle, in which intransitive individuals can be exploited. Are they right? Let’s see. MGT Story 9: No Money Pumps Suppose you will pay $100 more for a Pixel than for an iPhone, $100 more for an iPhone than a Galaxy, and $100 more for a Galaxy than a Pixel. You are now an exploitable money pump—a seller can bankrupt you by selling you the iPhone, then the Pixel, then the Galaxy, then the iPhone, and so on and so on, until your money runs out. CGT Story-Poem 9 When in Rome

You can sell me insurance on my home. In many cases I am risk averse. But I am a crazy driver in Rome, Risking a wreck, going fast in reverse. I’m a group-ish creature, that much is true, Intensely sensitive to convention. But there are bounds to the follies I’ll do, Guard rails conducing to loss prevention. If you persuade me to buy insurance, You can’t persuade me to pay to drop it,

182

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory Then pay again to restore assurance, That merry-go-round won’t work, I’ll stop it. v. 1

v. 2

I live by the rule, don’t be a sucker. OR I live by the rule, don’t be an eff-er, I won’t be cheated by you, you f***er. I won’t be cheated by you, you heifer. When Is Anger Good, When Is It Wrong?

In game theory and rational choice theory, anger is an add-on. It may be useful or harmful in achieving certain outcomes, but it is not assumed in the theory’s picture of the self. In ethics, on the other hand, anger—as well as being at times profoundly wrong and damaging—may at other times be appropriate for a virtuous self, as both Aristotle and Aquinas maintain. Aristotle’s great-souled man might prefer the clear anger of v. 1, while Aquinas’s humble soul might prefer v. 2—but both see a place for anger. In the money pump case, moralistic anger against cheating serves as a deterrent to people being victimized. Sellers will draw us in to the charms of their products, and we may well cycle between consumption goods like food and travel, savings goods like stocks and bonds, and mixed savings-consumptions goods like housing. But the same seller cannot collect commissions for getting us to switch from A to B to C and then back to A without running a big risk of activating our rage/anticheating module. How much do we want people (or the AI versions of people we may well be creating soon) to have intransitive cycling from A to B to C and back to A again as part of their makeup? Cycling, problematic though it can be in decision-making, is a good thing in inducing action, as opposed to stasis. How much do we want people to angrily resist being exploited? Anger, problematic though it is, is a good thing in deterring exploitation that would flourish in its absence. This could lead us toward an Aristotelian golden mean position— neither too much nor too little anger. Or it could lead us toward a radical position. We can respect the anger-laden self-harming and other-harming sides of ourselves, but at the same time search for new institutions that give them less dominion. MGT Story 10: Independence If you prefer A to B, that preference should remain intact if an irrelevant alternative C is introduced. So, if you prefer spending $6 on cashews (A) to not spending it (B), you should still spend the money on the nuts, even though you separately decide (C) that you won’t buy crackers because the store sells only a popular but lousy (to you) brand and does not sell a fancier brand that you like.

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

183

CGT Story-Poem 10 At Walgreen’s

After my vax, a 15-minute wait, Feel hungry, decide on some cashew nuts, Then think, what ’bout crackers, Carr’s would be great, But they just have Saltines—poverty’s ruts! Irate, I put the nuts back on the shelf. Orange surely deserves to have Triscuits! We’re the city, we lack suburban pelf. But must we subsist on lousy biscuits? I preferred nuts to keeping six dollars, But I changed my mind ’cuz of the crackers, “You are a fool!” my reason cop hollers, “You should not have held on to your smackers!” Am I reckless with my utilities? Wasting them, conserving futilities? How Much Should Context Affect Our Judgments?

The independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives assumption is a tricky one. When is the new information irrelevant, and when does it reasonably make a difference? If the shopper in the poem had seen a clearly spoiled, water-damaged box of crackers, most of us, I take it, would think that she/he has received information about the quality of goods in the store that is relevant to a decision as to whether to buy the nuts. On the other hand, simply observing, as in the actual case, that the only brand of crackers available is subpar from the shopper’s perspective gives her/ him a harder time reconciling a decision not to buy with rational choice theory. The shopper’s concerns about rationality, though, strike me as answerable in mainstream terms. She/he can say, “I don’t really know about brands of cashews the way I do about brands of crackers—but now that I’m aware of the brand of the crackers, I have some reason to be suspicious of the brand of the nuts.” A humanistic criticism of the economic mainstream as postulating an unrealistically and undesirably simple view of human nature leads one in the direction of defending a decision by the shopper not to buy the nuts. People are validly complicated, after all. A radical criticism of judgments one makes in everyday life, on the other hand, can lead the shopper in a self-critical direction. Even if a contextbased decision not to buy the nuts is defensible under standard rationality criteria, is it morally flawed as a middle-class stigmatizing of a low-income, working-class, predominantly Black city—the Orange of the poem—and of the tastes of the people in that community as reflected in its stores? Or is it a morally defensible or

184

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

even worthy standing up to stereotyped assumptions about class, race, and community? The differing humanistic and political sides of criticism of economics align sometimes—but here, as in many cases, they tug in different directions. MGT Story 11: Interchangeability If you prefer A (bisque) to B (sherbet), and B to C (eternal damnation), there must be some probability, even if it is a minuscule one, that would make you risk your least-preferred choice C (hell) in order to get your most-preferred choice A (bisque) rather than your second preference B (sherbet). That is, desirability and probability trade off. CGT Story-Poem 11 Do I Risk for Bisque?

I prefer clear bisque to lemon sherbet, And lemon sherbet to eternal hell, Do I advance my reason or curb it, If no fine bisque can make me chance fate fell? Am I steered by reason or am I not, ’Cuz I will take a trillion-trillionth risk, Of writhing wracked in some infernal spot, If I’m sick of sherbet, and yearn for bisque? I am soluble when satiated, Some risk of hell I’ll take, in hope of consomme, I’m insoluble when I’m not sated, I stick with sherbet when there’s hell to pay. Inconsistency in be’ing soluble, Is it in rocks? Or just the voluble? When Should We Risk Obliteration?

The bisque, sherbet, hellfire choices—which make interchangeability more questionable than if the third choice were, say, spinach—are mine, not Pinker’s. The poem suggests that we do not follow rational choice interchangeability when we are not sick of our middle-of-the-road choice, but that we do when we are. Then, we follow rational choice theory by being willing to risk some chance of a terrible outcome to get our best outcome. One type of response to the willingness to risk axiom in rational choice theory, and the partial adherence to it in the poem, is that the axiom is morally wrong. We should take no risk whatsoever at any time of an abominable outcome C to achieve

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

185

a better outcome A than the status quo B. Instead, we should construct an ethical game theory and an ethical theory of rational choice that rules out the repugnant. An ethical theory based on ruling out repugnant risk is consistent with one kind of critical attitude toward the mainstream’s willingness to risk axiom. It is not, however, the only viable ethical approach. One may prefer an ethical theory that assumes that self-destructive and other-destructive drives analogous to Freud’s death instinct are real and are sometimes valid in human beings and other creatures. Is an ethical theory that permits me to risk hell for bisque bound to be another version of Benthamism, in which repugnant outcomes—condemning an innocent baby to hell, say—are warranted for a greater good—salvation for all others, say? Not at all. The theory could instead be a deontological one that insists on a large zone of moral free space, and that defines the bisque-sherbet-hell decision as being in that free zone. MGT Story 12a: Randomization, Redux, Part 1 It might seem that the logic of randomization we began with in the first story and poem on tennis and Jeopardy! betting applies only to consequentialists, not to deontologists. But that is wrong. “Equal respect” Kantians have good reason to randomize in certain situations in which “greatest good” Benthamites do not. CGT Story-Poem 12a Kantian Randomization, Part 1

My old self felt a contradiction, ’Tween deontology and game theory, I thought games depended on a fiction, That Bentham was right beyond all query. Game theory lacked sufficient ambiv’lence, Its rigor meant a maximizing story, ’Tween it and Jeremy was equiv’lence, And rigor mortis for its poor quarry. My new take brings both camps inside of it: I call Bentham “Evo,” I call Kant “Lit,” Bentham sacrifices one to save five, Kant offers the one a chance to survive. I changed my mind because of you, dear Holly, ’Twas your paper on the good old trolley.

186

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

MGT Story 12b: Randomization, Redux, Part 2 Bentham’s utilitarianism offers a straightforward cost-benefit solution to the trolley problem—sacrifice the life of one to save five. Kant’s deontology, on the other hand, suggests randomization as a way to equally respect the life of each individual. CGT Story-Poem 12b Kantian Randomization, Part 2

Two trolleys approach over a ravine, One with five workers, one with only Gene, You’re not far apart, you’re about to crash, You can pull a switch and plunge. Is that rash? Jeremy: Gene, it is not rash at all! The worth of five lives is greater than one, Know you did right as to your death you fall, Know you ended well as your race is run. Immanuel: Jane who drives five, please heed! You must randomize to give Gene a chance, To force him to plunge is a dub’ious deed, All souls need to risk in the law’s great dance. Duty sometimes calls for randomizing, Morality’s twists can be surprising. MGT Story 12c: Randomization, Redux, Part 3 The bridge dilemma is hardest if the drivers must decide at the same time whether to pull the switch and plunge. A Kantian Gene, I believe, should sacrifice just under 70% of the time, while a Kantian Jane should sacrifice herself (and her four passengers) just over 30% of the time. Nearly half the time, that will result in all six workers dying. CGT Story-Poem 12c Kantian Randomization, Part 3

Does Kant in practice merge with Kierkegaard, With Abraham, torn ’tween Isaac and God? I think so. Some choice is tragically hard, Principles clash. There’s no measuring rod. “Don’t abet murder! Lie!” So people say, But that clear judgment is superficial, Truth’s not nothing at the end of the day, Duties are oft mixed and interstitial.

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

187

So should Kant’ians consciously randomize, Give truth weight ’gainst life, give pain weight ’gainst lies, I doubt that’s a project we can realize, It’s from the subconscious that weights arise. Each moral duty is a sacred song, To give it no voice is to do a wrong. Should We Hope for a Kantian John Nash?

The simple Kantian math in my trolley examples might be replaced by tricky math. In just a few short years before his descent into schizophrenia, John Nash laid out the mathematics of the solution concepts for noncooperative games and cooperative games and in doing so became the central creator of MGT. Instead of the Benthamite, utilitarian foundation upon which economics and MGT as a central part of modern economics are built, one can imagine an alternative, Kantian foundation for game theory. Much as I believe that people with modest mathematical skills can make major contributions to both CGT and MGT, there is a real role for mathematical genius and ingenuity. From a critical perspective, I believe it would be a very big and a very good thing if a future Nash were to arise and reimagine game theory along Kantian lines that had a level of mathematical creativity and intricacy comparable to the original Nash’s skills in creating MGT. The alliance between math and Benthamism is, I think, contingent. Kantianism can, I think, generate mathematically sophisticated game theory, just as Benthamism already has. A Note on Kantian Randomization The math of how Kantian randomization works with the two trolleys on the bridge is as follows: If one driver can go first, the driver of the trolley with four passengers sacrifices with p = 1/6 and the lone driver sacrifices with p = 5/6, while the second driver sacrifices if the first driver does not and does not sacrifice if the first one does. As discussed in Scharding (2021), Kantian randomization results in a higher death toll than non-randomizing Benthamite CBA does: 1 2/3 workers die on average in the trolley case, compared to 1 with CBA. In the tougher case of simultaneous decisions by the drivers to sacrifice or not, the loss of life from Kantian randomization relative to Benthamite CBA is considerably greater. The two Kantian drivers will sacrifice with a p of x for the lone driver and a p of 1 − x for the driver of five that leads to each of the five having a chance of survival no more or less than five times the chance of survival of the lone worker in the other car. The equation is: 5(1 − x)(1 − x) = x2 [5 times the chance the lone driver survives] [the chance the five survive] As noted in the text, x is a little under .7. (That is, the lone driver Gene sacrifices a bit under 70% of the time and Jane the driver of five sacrifices a bit over 30% of the time.)

188

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

Compared to the Benthamite CBA solution of Gene dying every time and Jane and her passengers living every time, Kantian randomization in the simultaneous decision case results in Gene surviving around 9.5% of the time, Jane and her four passengers surviving around 47.5% of the time, and all six workers dying around 43% of the time. In this case, giving Kantian equal respect and dignity to Gene’s life rather than treating it as less valuable than the lives of the five is not cheap at all. As the “ethical decision-making about trade-off problems” subtitle of Scharding’s paper implies, the use of Kantian randomization can go far beyond trolley hypotheticals. Broadly, Kantian randomization of trade-off decisions (which might be done intuitively, rather than through conscious calculation) is indicated in any case in which the decision-maker believes that what is at stake is not fungible utils but non-fungible principles, none of which can be subordinated to another in the way Benthamite CBA requires. To put it in terms of the (in)famous example of whether to lie to mislead a would-be murderer: While the Benthamite will use CBA (and presumably lie), the Kantian who believes that the principle of not lying should not be subordinated to the principle of not being an accomplice to murder will take a leap of faith and randomize, with whatever set of consciously chosen or intuitively arrived-at weights. Chapter Teaching/Learning Notes Introduction

The first six MGT stories are all drawn from Dixit et al. (2009). For anyone who wants to learn MGT, I strongly recommend their text, which is currently in its fifth edition—Dixit is a lively, engaging writer. The rational choice theory assumptions are drawn from Pinker (2021). The particular take on the trolley problem that influences the analysis here is Scharding (2021). MGT Story 1 (Which Passing Shot?) and CGT Story-Poem 1 (Final Jeopardy)

Metrick (1995) describes the deviations by Jeopardy players from mixed Nash maximization in their betting. MGT Story 2 (The GPA Rat Race) and CGT Story-Poem 2 (Rat Races)

Frank (1999, 2011) and Landers et al. (1996) tell good stories about destructive rat races in evolution and in modern American workplaces. Schor (1993) and Eastman (1996b) focus on work hours rat races that have a gendered component. Patokos (2015) and Schelling (1978) offer models of the divided self. MGT Story 3 (Which Tire?) and CGT Story-Poem 3 (Focal Points)

Schelling (1960) is the canonical treatment of focal points. “Ethical Focal Points,” Appendix E in my first book (Eastman, 2015) is a survey that contains questions like

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

189

those referred to in the poem and the text. Banaji and Greenwald (2013) describe the Implicit Association Test and the concept of implicit bias. Eastman (2013) proposes a flipped version of the IAT that reveals a tendency toward rapid, automatic, stereotypical associations that are normatively desirable rather than undesirable. Eastman and Marino (2018) is a beta version of a flipped IAT that asks respondents to match “good,” “bad,” and other value-laden terms as fast as possible to pictures of crimes and of commerce. MGT Story 4 (Why Are Professors So Mean?) and CGT Story-Poem 4 (Why Are Professors So Nice?)

Schelling (1960) is canonical on commitment devices as well as focal points. Eastman (1996a, 1997, 1999) gives flipped versions of the Coase Theorem, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, supply-demand equilibrium, and the models employed in the articles in an issue of the American Economic Review. MGT Story 5 (Roommates on the Brink) and CGT Story-Poem 5 (Chicken)

Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (1995/2004) contains a nice description of a lab study on the establishment of hierarchical norms in a Chicken game. MGT Story 6 (The Dating Game) and CGT Story-Poem 6 (Expensive Talk)

Key works in behavioral game theory I have relied on here are Camerer (2003), Rapoport and Chammah (1965), and Rapoport et al. (1976). MGT Story 7 (Commensurability) and CGT Story-Poem 7 (I Prefer Not to Prefer)

A work going much deeper into incommensurability and related concepts than the discussion here is Chang (1997). MGT Story 8 (Transitivity) and CGT Story-Poem 8 (Pigs, Sneaks, and Prigs)

Arrow (1951) is the canonical work on transitivity and the riddles of social choice. Though its logic is not the same, the Pigs, Sneaks, and Prigs poem was influenced by Sen’s Lewd and Prude story (1970). MGT Story 9 (No Money Pumps) and CGT Story-Poem 9 (When in Rome)

Gintis (2009) advances a strong reciprocity perspective in which anger-motivated punishment as well as altruism are evolved features of human nature. MGT Story 10 (Independence) and CGT Story-Poem 10 (At Walgreen’s)

Arrow (1951) is the classic source on the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption.

190

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

MGT Story 11 (Interchangeability) and CGT Story-Poem 11 (Do I Risk for Bisque?)

The concept of moral free space is advanced in Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) and applied in Eastman and Santoro (2003). MGT Stories 12a, 12b, and 12c (Randomization, Redux, Parts 1, 2, and 3) and CGT Story-Poems 12a, 12b, and 12c (Kantian Randomization, Parts 1, 2, and 3)

The literature on the trolley problem originally posed by Philippa Foot (1967) is vast; as noted before, the work that served as a springboard for my persuading myself that game theory can be developed in Kantian rather than Benthamite terms is Scharding (2021). Sources Arrow, Kenneth. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley (1951). Austen, Jane. Pride and Prejudice (V. Jones, ed.). London: Penguin Classics (1815). Banaji, Mazarin R. and Anthony G. Greenwald. Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People. New York: Delacorte Press (2013). Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2011). Camerer, Colin. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2003). Chang, Ruth (ed.). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1997). Chwe, Michael. Jane Austen, Game Theorist. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2013). Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology (G.C. Spivak, trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1967). Dixit, Avinash, Susan Skeath, and David H. Reiley, Jr. Games of Strategy (3rd ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2009). Donaldson, Thomas and Thomas Dunfee. Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics. Boston: Harvard Business School Press (1999). Eastman, Wayne. Everything’s Up for Grabs: The Coasean Story in Game-Theoretic Terms, New England Law Review, 31 (1996a): 1–37. Eastman, Wayne. Working for Position: Women, Men, and Managerial Working Hours, Industrial Relations, 37 (1996b): 51–66. Eastman, Wayne. Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Coase Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, Connecticut Law Review, 29 (1997): 727–805. Eastman, Wayne. Critical Legal Studies. In B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume I. The History and Methodology of Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (1999). Eastman, Wayne. Ideology as Rationalization and as Self-Righteousness: Psychology and Law as Paths to Critical Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, 23 (2013): 527–560. Eastman, Wayne. Why Business Ethics Matters: Answers from a New Game Theory Model. New York: Palgrave (2015).

What Critical Game Theory Adds to Mainstream Game Theory

191

Eastman, Wayne and Will Marino. The Moral Clarity Test. (2018), www.iatsoftware.net/ IAT?IATName=MCT&ClientID=349 Eastman, Wayne and Michael Santoro. The Importance of Value Diversity in Corporate Life, Business Ethics Quarterly, 13 (2003): 433–452. Foot, Philippa. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, Oxford Review, 5 (1967): 5–15. Frank, Robert H. Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Age of Excess. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1999). Frank, Robert H. The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good. New York: Free Press (2011). Gintis, Herbert. Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press (2009). Hargreaves-Heaps, Sean and Yanis Varoufakis. Game Theory: A Critical Text (2nd ed.). London: Routledge (1995/2004). Landers, Renee M., James Rebitzer, and Lowell Taylor. Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms, American Economic Review, 86 (1996): 329–348. Metrick, Andrew. A Natural Experiment in “Jeopardy!” American Economic Review, 85 (1995): 240–253. Patokos, Tassos. Internal Game Theory. Oxfordshire: Routledge (2015). Pinker, Steven. Rationality: What It is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters. New York: Penguin (2021). Rapoport, Anatol and Albert Chammah. The Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1965). Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Scharding, Tobey K. Recognize Everyone’s Interests: An Algorithm for Ethical DecisionMaking about Trade-Off Problems, Business Ethics Quarterly, 31 (2021): 450–473. Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1960). Schelling, Thomas C. Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, American Economic Review, 68 (1978): 290–294. Schor, Juliet. The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure. New York: Basic Books (1993). Sen, Amartya. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1970): 152–157. Tolstoy, Leo. Anna Karenina (Constance Garnett, trans.). (1878), www.gutenberg.org/ ebooks/1399 Postlude

Everything’s a Game The mainstream says life’s not always a game, It’s sometimes solo maximization, Bowling alone, no one else in the frame, Arcing a curve of optimization. In the critical view, it’s all a game, Each of our selves is deeply divided,

192

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory We want loving, hurting, obliv’ion, fame, We’re ambivalent and multi-sided. We never stop playing games with ourselves, With our peers and with all other critters, We are earthy mole rats and airy elves, We float free and we’re tied to our litters. Dividedness is actuality, The critical line is reality.

13 Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines

This final chapter reflects on the universe of all 144 two-person, two-choice, one-shot games and relates them to CGT approaches in economics and other academic disciplines. In its format—poems followed by reflections—this chapter resembles the last one. But while the focus there was analytical, here it is holistic. What is the value of CGT—whether in the Lit form advanced here, or in another form—for fields such as philosophy, history, and literary theory, as well as for economics? The first set of poems and reflections—Econ—begins with the tension between the Lit model of this book and the Benthamite, “how to get to HJV” approach to understanding the universe of games that was pursued in my first book. The economic-philosophical lens employed is a God’s-eye view: how would one design selves, assuming one could? Unified Econ, two-part Evo, four-part Lit, or something else? CGT is not any one model of mechanism design, much as specificity is important. Rather, I would suggest, it is a site for advancing and reflecting on different formal and informal models of design. The next set of poems and reflections—Evo—relate to history and the social sciences. The nub is the idea that new radical social institutions in the past such as the corporation have effectively if also painfully channeled Entro drives in human beings toward Evo ends, and that new radical social institutions in the future may do likewise. The poems and reflections in the third set—Entro—relate to humanities domains in which Entro is, in the take offered here, not a bug to be engineered away but a feature. The ones in the last set—Futures—turn to the obstacles to critical game theory becoming a significant academic movement and to the prospects for overcoming them. I. Econ: Philosophical Economics The World Turned Upside-Down

Once Harmony was the dominant type, Deep implications followed from its rule, Rough games were the ones the peeps liked to hype, But the headlines were wrong! Nature was cool. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315841-17

194

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory With Lit Battle of the Selves rules the roost, Harmony is not gone but it’s rarer, Inequality has gotten a boost, Entro is real. Nature is unfairer. I changed my approach in 2016, The very same year as Brexit and Trump, Entro walked on stage and upset the scene, Nature’s breast revealed a malignant lump. I love the Lit world though it is perverse, There are times I miss my old universe.

God-View Philosophical Economics

Suppose we take a God’s-eye perspective. Do we want to create a universe made up of simple Econ selves? Or do we want a universe of two-part Evo selves, programmed to care about others’ outcomes as well as their own? Or do we want a universe of four-part Lit selves, driven to bring themselves and others down as well as to lift themselves and others up? Or do we want some other kind, or kinds, of selves in our universe, such as Kantian selves that reject the idea of fungible utility in some situations? Just after the publication of my first book, which featured an Evo, basically sunny approach to games, I was struck by a need to explore a model that incorporated destructive drives in human and other selves, not only as means to Evo ends but as their own locus of value. That followed on certain things happening in my life, including learning from my mother that her long-diagnosed kidney disease was entering a stage that would lead to her death, possibly in months and certainly within a year or two, and that she had decided not to undergo dialysis or seek a transplant. Appendix A summarizes certain differences between the Lit model of this book and the Four Temperaments (4T) model of my first book. Though I now prefer the Lit model to 4T as a God’s-eye view of how to design a universe—partly because it seems truer, better defended against exploiters, and more protective of third-party nonplayers, and partly because death now seems to me less horrible and in some cases worth seeking—there are reasonable grounds upon which one may prefer Evo, Econ, some other model, or no model at all (who is one to play God, after all). Whatever one’s answers, CGT is a way to do a philosophical version of economics that takes on the creation of the universe. Who Wins?

Does the social gene beat the selfish gene? I built a model to try to find out. Does strategy have a Benthamite lean? Or does a Nash strat put Bentham to rout?

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 195 Suppose the Benthamites play HJV, Suppose the two types are 50–50, Suppose identity’s not clear to see, What if social beats selfish? How nifty! I never was quite clear on the result, Bentham won—or did he lose?—by a hair, I knew I needed Econs to consult, Binmore’s reply was nice, dashed off with flair. Should I say I am done, as he told me? Say goodbye to games, declare myself free? HJV Philosophical Economics

Before the Lit turn described in the previous poem that led to this book, I was preoccupied for some years with the problem of whether Benthamite players who care equally about their own payoff and the other player’s payoff and who always play the highest joint value-HJV strategy for the two players will flourish or not over time alongside egoists in a world in which the two types of players play all 144 games. Based on models created for the PD by Robert Frank and others, I was sure that the answer was yes if the Benthamites could choose to play preferentially with one another and to limit or avoid interactions with noncooperative Nash players. But I was not sure what would happen if we looked at all one-shot games, not just the PD, and assumed that one’s type as a jointly maximizing Bentham player or a self-maximizing Nash player was private information and that the two types were equally common. Appendix B summarizes my 2015 results, showing Bentham beating Nash by a hair in the universe of one-shot games with unknown types. Although I believe there is much more to critical game theory than a dichotomy between Nash Econ players and Benthamite Evo players, I continue to believe that the contrast between the two types of players is a worthy focus of analysis. The original point of the “selfish gene vs. the social gene” model—that the mainstream PD, which is an extremely unfavorable game for other-oriented players, is unrepresentative, and that socially oriented players may tie or even beat selfish ones in the universe of one-shot games—is still, I believe, valid and significant. Game theorists and philosophers, whether pro-CGT, anti-CGT, or CGT-indifferent, will, I hope, improve the analysis and carry it forward. Warrior Ethics, Priestly Ethics, Business Ethics

I decided to try a new model, In it, the types of the players were known, Based on that, players could fight or coddle, Be coop’rative or go it alone.

196

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory Once again Me found subjectivity, Much depended on the definitions, What won was a goodish proclivity, Ethics that ruled all had barbed conditions. Warr’iors were nicer than punishing priests, But the priests did better in beating Nash, Modern businesses with their daily feasts, Got into foes’ heads, made their systems hash. Will business ethics cede the throne one day? What’s next won’t be saintly, it’s safe to say.

Modeling Ethical Systems

Rangy, eclectic Continental philosophers and economists of the past and present who seek alternatives to specialized Anglo-American mainstreams in philosophy and economics have ventured into the history of ethics and its potential future history. Think of Nietzsche and his effort to restore warrior ethics to primacy over priestly ethics, or of Piketty and his recent effort to delineate the history of ideology from warrior-priest systems to liberalism to social democracy to neoliberalism and, potentially, to a future socialism that eschews the dictatorial wrongs of Communism. The suggestion here is that critical game theory is, or could be in the future, a good place to bring together ambitious Continental economists and philosophers—whether they be French, German, American, Chinese, Indian, Nigerian, Filipino, or something else. Together, I believe such philosophers and economists have a better chance of creating emotionally and logically viable visions of how humans and other actors act and interact and of the future of humans and other entities than they do alone. A simplified version of my own efforts, now abandoned, to define how “warrior ethics,” “priestly ethics,” and “business ethics” players would play the 144 matrices with their peers and with a Nash player is summarized in Appendix C. I continue to believe that all three ethics, reasonably defined, defeat the Nash player, and that the cost of their victory is that all of the ethics are “goodish”—ready to engage in berserker mayhem (the warrior), vindictiveness (the priest), and largely egoistic behavior, if less so than the Nash player (the businessperson)—rather than being as high-mindedly good as the Benthamite HJV player is. Imaginative future efforts that draw on the skills of philosophers as well as economists can, I believe, do much more in working out the logics of different kinds of ethics. From 1 to 12 to 144 to 2304 to 16 Matrices

Do evolved humors solve ev’ry game? The big one—the PD—and all the rest? In my first shot, the key humor was shame, Melancholy ’splained shared success the best.

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 197 I needed to tackle asymmetry, Twelve games became 144, Success oft involved inequality, Rue ruled o’er ire, calm, and love. Shame did more. I wanted to include Entro and Emp, That meant 2304 games, Each play’er deserved a blouse of silk or hemp, Each one called out for stories and names. I’m sad I didn’t write a poem for each one. I did my array of games, now I’m done. Poetic Philosophical Economics

The universe of games is big and, when it comes to asymmetrical games, largely unexplored. As much or more than anything else it does, critical game theory needs to make up new stories about unexplored terrain. The four famous mainstream stories—Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, the Stag Hunt, and, towering above the others, the Prisoner’s Dilemma—are all drawn from the small fraction of matrices—1/12—that are symmetrical. Further, players in the mainstream stories are assumed to share a self-advancing type, which in Lit occurs only 1/16 of the time. A huge majority of the universe of games and players remain to be fictionalized—or painted, scored, or videoed. The PD poems in Part I and the poems for random games and types in Part II are intended as a start to a CGT project of making up stories for the unheard-from or barely heard-from games and types. Each game, not just the PD (#137/144) needs its own versions of the egoists’ game, the altruists’ game; the masochists’ game; the sadists’ game; the two egoist-altruist games; the two masochist-sadist games; the two masochist-egoist games; the two sadist-altruist games; the two egoist-sadist games; and, finally, the two masochist-altruist games. In addition to making up new CGT stories, there is value in connecting these stories to mainstream ones, including and to other CGT stories. We need to be able to archive. Appendix D relates the Lit poems and stories of this book, with their Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado actors, to the main Four Temperaments stories I told in my first book. The “open the door to the sanguine” message I espoused then still applies, I believe, even though the Lit vision is a darker one than the Four Temperaments one. II. Evo: History, Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology Corporations

What made enlightenment concrete and real? What bridged from ideas to mater’ial gain?

198

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory What turned the Declaration into steel? What made old age as common as rain? Was it children toiling long hours on looms? Was it sooty miners shov’ling their tons? Was it nucle’ar fam’lies of brides and grooms? Was it rival coloni’al pow’rs guns? All these stories and more have their merits, The one I like stresses corporations, They excel in fusing sticks with carrots, They Evo-fy Entro motivations. Might our politics become modern, too? Might Evo rise in institutions new?

History

To tell the story of the rise over the past century or two of a new world of Evo preoccupation with progress on certain measurable criteria, such as income, wealth, education, longevity, scientific and technological discovery, and the ability of the ruled to choose their rulers is to do a kind of critical game theory, one that merges with history. CGT historian-philosophers have many interesting questions to mull over. How have old cultural, political, and economic institutions that blended Entro with Evo been challenged and replaced or partly replaced over time by new institutions such as the corporation in which Evo is the sole goal? Has history ended with the victory of these institutions, or might new Evo-dominant institutions for politics, the family, and business be created that would alter the world in which we live as substantially as elections, the nuclear family, and the corporation did for our predecessors over the last few centuries? Would such a turn toward new Evo-dominant institutions in the future be associated with a utilitarian focus on improving measurable outcomes, with a deontological justice-freedom focus, or with some fusion of the two? And finally, and always, the normative questions—how and in what ways should the last few centuries’ turn to Evo and a potential further turn in the future inspire us, repel us, or perhaps cause us to have both reactions? Going forward, CGT, if it rises, would be an excellent home for philosophical history that takes on the questions in the last paragraph. In such a CGT history, my sense is that poems and matrices will give way to looser, prosier means of expression. History is not economics, and a credible CGT philosophical history needs, I think, to be different from both this book and the economics-based CGT of Varafoukis, Hargreaves Heap, and Patokos. Political Parties

Political parties are impressive, But they are no match for corporations,

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 199 Parties are oft Entro and regressive, They’re o’erly concerned with ruling nations. Corporations run by rules of Evo, In parties, Evo and Entro are mixed, Corporations are Bach, parties Devo, For parties there’s no Evo lodestar fixed. Corps are Evo-driven, built to improve, Parties are built to fight for supreme pow’rs, Not for domains from which we’re free to move, Not for building thousands of leafy bow’rs. If parties are to make a clement home, From their sub-realms we must be free to roam. Political Science

Perhaps Altru, Maso, and Sado drives can be understood as ways to help people and other creatures do politics. In politics, Ego economic markets do not work well. One needs the equivalent of prices, but money does not effectively elicit them. How does one create in politics the revealed preferences elicited by people’s decisions to make or not and to buy or not? The thought is that Altru, Maso, and Sado drive that cut across or reinforce Ego drives price preferences and help explain the logic of political competition. For quite a few years, as noted in Appendix E, I tried to figure out the logic of how non-egoistic, “group-splitting” drives could work to solve Madison’s problem of the tyranny of the majority and Mancur Olson’s problem of the tyranny of the organized minority. Partly because the group-splitting theory that I was working on of how cross-cutting and reinforcing drives led to optimal outcomes was not especially critical, partly because the theory treated actors as non-strategic in a way that I thought was part of the truth but that was neglected an important strategic component, and partly because developing the theory right seemed to me to call for a higher level of economic modeling skills than I possessed, I abandoned it. Going forward, I hope for CGT histories of politics that project plausible political futures that are radically different from ours—but, as noted, I envision such histories and future histories as projects that would not involve the formal languages of this book. At the same time, I believe that political science, unlike history, is a discipline that is well-suited to high-tech modeling, as well as to more informal approaches. My intuition is that CGT modeling of complex selves done right could create stories of parties and party competition that would help a part of political science rise as a Lit or Evo field that offers credible alternatives to Econ modeling. Radicalism Incarnate

What’s the basis of our community? Is it that we’re closer than the rest?

200

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory That we exclude some with impunity? That we, united, can count ourselves blessed? Or is it multi-voiced diversity? Embracing a Right as well as a Left? Rejoicing in the heart’s perversity? Acknowledging we’ll always be bereft? If we’ll never be sure, then what follows? Let’s fly the flag of neurodivergence, Let’s be everywhere in towns and hollows, Accept we’ll always be in emergence. Fed’ralist 10 breadth is the suggestion, The mainstream’s the answer, we’re the question.

Sociology

If the approach taken in Chapter 10 is right, a key to the future advancement of radical alternatives to the mainstream will be the willingness of radical leaders to acknowledge and avow their neurodivergence. In doing that, the groundwork can be laid for partly self-governing radical communities that flourish better than ones whose leaders avoid the topic of neurodivergence. One’s own character and the prospects of communities one aspires to inspire will both be improved if one as an advocate can avoid defensiveness—“mainstream centrist pols and thinkers are as weird as we rads are!”—and denial—“my psychology has nothing to do with my politics!” Even if one is right in suspecting that centrist leaders are just as heavily drawn from the ranks of the neurodivergent as radical ones are, one is seeking power in the form of a major devolution from the center to the radical peripheries. The point is to persuade the center to cede some of its powers, not to shake one’s fist at it, satisfying though that can be. For those of us less drawn to normative political plans and plots and more inclined to try to understand the world as it is, interview-based sociological studies of mainstream and radical local politicians and movements offer a rich opportunity to consider the relationships between leadership, activism, and neurodivergence. As one with a history as a community activist and a thrice-elected, once-defeated local politician who tried both to win over the center and to win space for minority identities and causes, I’ve wanted for years to write such a study—but suspect I remain too close to the events I participated in to cast off my own veils of righteousness, much less to expect my allies or foes to cast off theirs. For outsiders, though, one promising venue for CGT-inspired scholarship or popular writing consists of studies with interviews of politicians and activists that are integrated into accounts of how their politics and their psychological makeups contributed to both Evo creation and growth and Entro destruction in their communities.

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 201 A New Primary Bond

Twenty-one years ago you said “I do,” You promised to be loyal only to me, To live with no other until I grew, To forgo a spouse’s sweet company. You’d bring no other child into our nest, You’d devote yourself solely to my soul, You’d place my well-being ’bove all the rest, You’d commit yourself wholly to your role. A wonderful parent you’ve truly been, For your love and care I’m deeply grateful, A cuckoo am I, filled with dreams and sin, With ambitions wonderful and hateful. I’ll fly away, I won’t be a bother, I hope that now you’ll marry my father. Anthropology

Part II focused on potential radical communities whose ability to be partly selfgoverning on economics, politics, and culture would depend on nations, states, and localities devolving some of their powers. Some radical experiments, though, especially those involving families, can get off the ground without major law reform. One such experiment, alluded to in the poem, consists of a mini-family in which one parent commits to a primary relationship for a certain time, such as 21 years, with one child. Such a mini-family, perhaps linked to another mini-family consisting of the other parent and the child’s sibling that lives nearby, would be to a modern nuclear family with two parents and two children roughly what the modern nuclear family is to the extended families that formerly prevailed around the world and still do in many places. Just as the modern nuclear family involves a clearer, more single-minded Evo focus on parents acting for the benefit of children than the old extended family with its intricate, ambivalent, Entro-tinged intragenerational and intergenerational relationships did, future mini-families with one parent and one child could intensify the modern Evo focus on the child. For philosophical-anthropological studies of actual or nascent experiments in family structure, as with historical and sociological studies, the relevance of CGT, I believe, lies not so much in formal analysis but in providing a framework for considering how certain social institutions have changed over time from a state of Entro-Evo fusion to a state of Evo-orientation, and how they might continue to change in that direction. Such studies could usefully be carried out by those of us who are skeptical about the rise of child-centric Evo-orientation in families over the last centuries, as well as by those of us who are favorable to that rise and wish for more of it in the future.

202

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

III. Lit: Literary Criticism, Literature, Psychology, Religion Duncan and Derrida

Duncan did crit law and economics, In which he flipped the mainstream’s verities, We who followed him were ser’ious comics, Off’ring tributes along with parodies. Derrida did critical lit theory, It was often taken for tearing down, I saw it as an homage and query, What tales emerge if a text is a town? The text may be phenomenology, Or it may be a game theory model, Or it may be Flaubert’s psychology, There are many tales in ev’ry bottle. Game theory is beautiful as is lit, Appreciation lies inside a crit. Literary Criticism

Literary critics who argue that literary texts have a large measure of openendedness have considerably more in common in one important way with the mainstream as well as with critics in economics than they do with the mainstream in their own field. Although mainstream economists may grow wedded to a particular set of value-laden stories connected to the Prisoner’s Dilemma or another model, they typically recognize that these stories are not the only ones consistent with the logic of the model. One can always come up with different value-laden stories, such as the PD stories told in Part I. Critics in literature, on the other hand, have a problem that critics in economics do not have of persuading the mainstream that literary texts are not only value-laden but that they contain implicit models that can be flipped to generate different value-laden stories. Much as I would love literary critics to see value in economics as an openly model-based, flipping-friendly discipline, I doubt the technical, economistic part of CGT has much to offer to literary theory. On the other hand, a fusion of CGT with Kennedy’s critical legal work on judges grappling with the fraught, mutable connections between legal materials and their own ideologies may be valuable. Literary critics could detail the situations and choices of writers and other creators who are coping successfully, or less so, with the tricky, partly open-ended, partly determined relationships between their Ego, Altru, Maso, and Sado needs and the materials of their art. In their own way, critics are already doing that—Louise Gluck’s favorable take on T.S. Eliot’s combination of amped-up adolescent emotion and bankerly repression in his poems and her less favorable take on William

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 203 Carlos Williams’s detachment can be cited as an example. CGT may give them additional ways to think about Entro elements in art and its creators. Emma

My village is filled with hungry White ghosts, Hustling children punching their tickets out, Dreamy mothers poised ’tween worries and boasts, In curtained booths voting me in then out. Black ghosts too like my lost lover Leon, Years ago we embraced integration, We bonded over sinks, leaky Freon, In our village we refaced our nation. It’s gone now, lost as Nineveh and Tyre, We’ve gone to war, gone to seed, we’ve all left home, Which Emma will I be? What’s my desire? Do I take poison? Make matches? Build Rome? I am Bovary, I am Woodhouse, too, I’m trapped in My mind, here alone with You. Literature

Fictional characters are mutable and multiple and merge into one another and into oneself. Emma Bovary is Emma Woodhouse. Her lover Leon is a suburban contractor, and she is on the school board. She is also Emma Eckstein, Emma Goldman, Jeanne d’Arc, and Plato. Socrates is a dalmatian and Cruella de Vil, and Plato is a pet dog Pluto. Emma, c’est moi—that means not only that Flaubert’s and Austen’s characters share some of their creators’ characteristics, but also that they as authors are made real through their actually existing characters. Flaubert and Austen are long gone, Bovary and Woodhouse live on. During the 1980s, toiling away as a young lawyer in lower Manhattan, I became possessed by the idea that the twentieth-century modernist revolution that had come to various arts needed to come to game theory and to political philosophy. Genres needed to be shaken up and mixed. I still believe that—this book is a very belated effort to make good on my old young person’s dream—but now I believe in fiction rather than memoir. Then, it seemed to me that a key to unlocking the mysteries was self-revelation. I envisioned a book with cutting to the bone reveals telling painful personal truths that my heroes Nietzsche and Pascal had left opaque. Now, that seems all wrong. Yes, there are disturbing things that have happened in my life, some of which I am responsible for. But to focus on them is to unbalance the “bring Lucretius back” mix of art, science, and ethics I want to achieve in my portrait of the nature of humans and other things. Fiction is better.

204

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

Is this a brief for using CGT rather than, say, Darwin’s theory of evolution or Newton’s second law as the science part of a science-art-ethics tripod? Not really. As good as CGT (and MGT, too) are as ways to understand the universe, there are other ways. Diotima

In Beauty Me gave birth and Love was born, You, Socrates, My big bald baby Boy, Me, Diotima, My Milk flowed that morn, You sucked, a pulse went through Me, Ah, the joy! In justice over vengeance Me believed, Me saved You from the Furies with a trial, Me wonder if the People were deceived, Or if on Our Love They did qui’etly smile. Me walked the streets of Athens to the height, Reflecting on how We redefined truth, Me wonder why You slipped away that night, Me looked for You in ev’ry market booth. O Socrates You hide but You are Mine, Your Mother-Lover, shy, profane, divine. Psychology

No matter how opinionated one may be, there are questions about which one should be modest. For me as the son of a mother who was a therapist, one such question involves the relationship between psychology and the strong element of Thanatos in the Lit universe portrayed here. Back when I wrote my first book, I was more confident about the connection between psychology and game theory. I saw in the universe of games a prevalence of HJV Harmony resulting from the interplay of sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, and melancholic types, and I aligned myself with optimistic positive psychology against glummer worldviews. Psychic health, I thought, could be found in the basically healthy nature of humans and all other things. If economic game theory was cloudy Scotland, the Evo psychological game theory I espoused was sunny Los Angeles. In this book, choleric has turned to Sado and melancholic has turned to Maso. The Lit universe of games and types with its deep admixture of Entro is not as pleasantly sunny as Evo was. I feel that the new universe catches certain painful and disturbing as well as beautiful qualities in humans and other things better than Econ and Evo do. But I find myself in a state of uncertainty about whether psychology should embrace Entro, as I believe literature and other forms of art should, or whether the mission of theoretical and applied psychology should be a

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 205 “where Entro was, Evo shall be” mission parallel to the mission I see as right for institution-builders in fields like economics and political science. My sympathies lie with Diotima in the poem, and against pathologizing her as an abuser. But abuse is real, as is mental illness. I leave to those closer to applied psychology than I am the practical riddles of how to celebrate, accommodate, and combat Thanatos. Carolyn

Remember I was born, I lived, I died, Remember I grew up in Drexel Hill, Remember how I laughed and how I cried, Remember I loved Hal and always will. I dream I’m back in 1945, It’s V-J Day and joy is in the air, The boardwalk roars, what bliss to be alive, I wake up sad, get up to brush my hair. Forget regrets you have that I am gone, Forget your paying sad respects to me, Respect me with a “Hello!” to the dawn, Commemorate me with a kiss or three. My death it comes as it must come for all, I feel a love for it, I feel it call. Religion

O you who out of the vast darkness were the first to raise A shining light, illuminating the blessings of life, O glory of the Grecian race, it is you I follow, Tracing in your clearly marked footprints my own firm steps, Not as a contending rival, but out of love, for I yearn to imitate you. For why should the swallow vie with the swan? Why should a young kid on spindly limbs Dare to match strides with a mighty steed? —Lucretius, 3.1–8 [In 1978,] 45 years ago, I was sitting next to a businessman on a plane who asked what I did. I told him I was about to become a minister. He told me, “I’m surprised—you sound like a smart guy. ’Cuz church is for suckers and losers. You give and they take and take and you never get anything back.” After all these years, I thought about the cynic the other day—I wonder if he’s still alive. I decided he was right. All of us here today are losers and

206

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

suckers. We lose our lives in the end—the biggest loss of all, the loss that comes for everyone—and we have no good reason to believe that we more than anyone who has never been part of a faith community will be rewarded after we die. We are suckers who give our time and toil and treasure and get no material reward and no reward in heaven. So I agree with the cynic. But then again—I loved being a sucker and a loser with this congregation when I was the minister here all those years ago. And I love being back here with all of you suckers and losers today. [paraphrased from my memory of a guest sermon given by Rev. Lee Barker at the Unitarian Universalist Congregation at Montclair on April 30, 2023] Some of us have a gift for finding greatness and for wholehearted submission to it that others of us lack. Lucretius’s tribute to Epicurus, Plato’s to Socrates, Paul’s to Jesus, Muhammad’s to God, Kant’s to the moral law: I am not able to equal them. In regard to works of devotion, I find myself both deeply appreciative and irritably assertive—“I am as good as anyone, much as I can recognize souls and works far greater than my own!” In regard to the Lit program for humans and other things envisioned in this book, I find myself similarly ambivalent—“You are wonderful, yes! But part of the point, a very big one in fact, is to engage in projects that at least seem to go against you.” I am not sure at all that I am right in my Ego- and Sado-tinged resistance to revering greats and programs, and I hope others more gifted in unambivalent submission than I am advance more reverent versions of CGT than the one advanced here—including, perhaps, forms more like the Evo of CGT I have personally turned away from in the last decade in favor of Lit. Meanwhile, I offer Lucretius’s tribute to Epicurus and mine to my mother. I also offer a tribute, inspired by Rev. Barker, to the sucker’s payoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. I am a believer in games. One of the things I believe in as an article of faith is receiving the sucker’s payoff—some of the time—in the PD. That is partly because, as most would agree, Altru has real power and charm. It is also because Maso, which seeks the sucker’s payoff, has its own real power and charm, as I hope I have made intelligible in some of the stories I have told. And it is also because Sado, which is fine with getting the sucker’s payoff itself and which seeks it for the other player, has its own highly troubling but real power and charm. Lit souls are often suckers—and though my faith in the Lit souls of humans and all other things is hardly unambivalent, it is real. IV. Futures: Possible Directions for CGT The CGT Dilemma

Most Econs are lib’ral nowadays, The rise of game theory’s a reason why, Econs now say, “We don’t preach market ways, Game theory shows how markets fail and die.”

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 207 Lib’ral Econs put CGT on tri’al: “You crits of games are objective righties, Your true corpus is Con, it’s kind of vile, You wear a crewcut and tightie-whities!” We can protest: “We are lefter than thou! You Libs are mired hip-deep in compromise.” We can defect: “We refuse to kowtow! Better Chicago than your moral vise.” For what it’s worth, here’s what I hope we’ll do: Work well with all camps, to our truths be true. The Tricky Politics of CGT

Economists and others who are my age (68 as of this writing) and younger have grown up in an era in which the Prisoner’s Dilemma is as significant as the invisible hand story. Microeconomics once had one signature story—now it has two. For noneconomists as well as economists who are left of center, the PD is especially important—“Yes, the prisoner’s dilemma—that’s what shows how the invisible hand people who believe that markets can solve everything are wrong, right?!” The climate change movement, central to modern liberalism, is in large part a movement based on the logic of the PD. The de facto alliance of the game-theoretic side of microeconomics with the center-left creates a dilemma for CGT, as described in the poem. This book can be understood as an effort to work out that dilemma by welding CGT to an eclectic form of politics that embraces substantial self-governance for different radical camps as a project in the interest of the centrist mainstream as well as radicals. But much as a “where Entro is, let Evo be” pro-left, pro-right, pro-libertarian, procommunitarian, pro-radical, pro-centrist synthesis appeals to me, and I hope opens the minds of some readers, it is not an established political stance, and is unlikely by itself to lift CGT to prominence. If CGT is to grow as a project, my sense is that it, like other critical academic movements, needs a significant base among left-wing academics. Much as my age and “reach out to the right” politics and other limitations make me not the best person to advance the project, I wish the best for left CGT. I see a better chance of it succeeding than I do for the eclectic kind of CGT I personally prefer. But left CGT will be a tough project, given the important role of the mainstream PD in modern liberal and left-liberal thought. Two Futures

Will critical game theory find a home, A place where its votaries can profess? Or will we be fore’er foredoomed to roam, To wander the world with no fixed address?

208

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory With the mainstream should we seek equiv’lence, Or should we always be a goad to them? About our goals, I feel an ambiv’lence, P’raps our role is just to make STEAM from STEM. Yes to a flow’ring field of crit studies, CGT would mix with other visions, Lefties and righties would be barbed buddies, Fomenting funky fusions and fissions. May we seed and grow a riotous field, May our flow’rs and us to death calmly yield.

Should CGT be a Field or Counterhegemonic Enclaves?

One reason for my less-than-optimistic sense about the prospects for CGT as a movement is that the critically inclined in academic disciplines outside economics are not likely to be attracted to game theory to express their critical visions. Why bother with matrices, much less matrices and poems, when one can articulate one’s discontents and dreams more readily with other forms of rhetoric that are more established in literature, history, or whatever one’s field is? When I started writing this book, I had a clear opinion on the question of whether advocates of CGT should focus on a counterhegemonic enclave strategy of trying to work from within a particular field, as I had tried to do in my first book on game theory, which contained a chapter on critical business ethics, or a more ambitious strategy of trying to create a new interdisciplinary field. Much as the counterhegemonic enclave approach seemed difficult—I could hardly say that I had taken business ethics by storm—it seemed far more feasible and sensible than a dream of a new field. Counterhegemonic CGT enclaves, yes; new CGT field, no! Now, at the end of the book, I’ve changed my mind. An effort to create a field—or more realistically, a patch—is worth making, I think. There is, I hope, a constituency for eclectic, interdisciplinary game theory that includes both MGT stories—which are a key part of CGT—and CGT ones in a language in which people from different disciplines can communicate. Economists can listen to anthropologists, who listen to poets, who listen to sociologists, who listen to theologians, who listen to psychologists, who listen to economists, and so on. Whether I can cultivate an MGT-plus-CGT patch effectively or not, I’ll try, and would welcome co-cultivators and cultivators of their own patches. Learning from the Mainstream

We crits have grown old, we wear our pants worn rolled, We knock down mainstream calculations, But that story’s much told, that trail is cold, We need to alter our aspirations.

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 209 The mainstream’s not tied to poker playing, Unthinking nature is in its ambit, It’s not Mor’iar’ty planning Holmes’ slaying, It’s bees buzzing in a queenly gambit. Do we fight for a unique human soul? ’Tack links ’tween us and birds, bees, bacter’ia? Or create a tale of a funky whole, Embracing people, atoms, wister’ia? The latter’s best, let’s go big or go home, Like our mainstream friends, we should freely roam. Going Big

One important mission for critically inclined game theorists who embrace art, radicalism, or both is to take down the mainstream’s sometimes-grandiose ambitions and pretensions a peg or two. That mission is performed very well by Varoufakis and Hargreaves Heap in their critical text, which teaches mainstream game theory while at the same time exposing cracks of indeterminacy and political tilt in the mainstream edifice. That useful debunking project has not been emphasized in this book, which instead has tried in Parts I and II to take critical game theory seriously as its own project and to build a version of it—no doubt one with its own cracks— from the ground up. When built up, critical game theory is a place to experiment with grand narratives. The merger of mainstream game theory and mainstream Darwinian evolutionary theory that has taken place since the 1970s has created a new if also retro narrative of an Econ universe, Econ psychology, and Econ politics that is impressive, if also decidedly worth criticizing. Almost from its beginning, that Econ narrative has been accompanied by a contrasting critical narrative of a dualistic, Altru-imbued Evo universe, Evo psychology, and Evo politics. The Econ spirit of biologists such as Richard Dawkins lives next to the Evo spirit of other biologists such as David Sloan Wilson. The central project of this book has been to outline a personal-cosmic narrative of a four-part Lit universe, Lit psychology, and Lit politics. A hope I have is that others will turn Lit into something more like a grand narrative of the kind that Econ already is, and that Evo is partway to becoming. A related hope is that others will use game theory to outline new personal-cosmic narratives that differ from Econ, Evo, and Lit. Whether CGT ever gets off the ground as a movement or not, may there be a future for personal-cosmic game theory that goes big. Where CGT Is Now

Critical game theory’s not yet a thing, But even though it’s yet to earn a name,

210

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory Games have helped climate radicals take wing, They’ve lent Darwin’s theory a broad new frame. The selfish gene has takin’ a lickin’, The Wilson duo’s set altruists free, Fighting ’gainst the Man’s inspired by Chicken, Greta Thunberg’s empowered by the PD. I’d prefer CGT that’s eclectic, Rather than being left sectarian, But if it’s the left that’s most electric, Let’s build a left that’s libertarian. Entro’s real! Let’s both control and free it. May we somehow be alive to see it.

The Fierce Urgency of Now You are failing us. But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you. . . . [Y]ou say you hear us and that you understand the urgency. But no matter how sad and angry I am, I do not want to believe that. Because if you really understood the situation and still kept on failing to act, then you would be evil. And that I refuse to believe. —Greta Thunberg, 2019 Address to UN Climate Action Summit

Is the game that most underlies Thunberg’s speech the mainstream PD, with its message of individually rational and collectively irrational failure to cooperate? Or is it the mainstream dictator game, with the future as the weak party that can be taken advantage of by those who preside over the present? Or is it mainstream Chicken, with Thunberg staking out a tough negotiating position against the intransigence of the adult world? Or might Thunberg have been inspired by the selfpunishing, other-punishing Entro story in the 2014 Lilly Wood and the Prick/Robin Schulz song “Prayer in C,” in which the singer sings that when the oceans cover the continents and humans are extinct, she will not forgive the one responsible, nor will that person or thing forgive itself? Mainstream, unified-self game theory stories are worthy lenses for interpreting, amplifying, and reflecting upon Thunberg’s and others’ activism. But so too are bifurcated-self Evo stories of the Ego and Altru parts of the self. And so too, I submit, are quadruple-self Lit stories like the ones highlighted in this book, in which the Maso and Sado parts of us take center stage. May the stories proliferate!

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 211 Sources Ahmadi, Mariam (Arce, Daniel, advisor). Name That Game. (2021), https://utd-ir.tdl.org/ bitstream/handle/10735.1/9280/AHMADI-DISSERTATION-2021.pdf?sequence=1 Austen, Jane. Emma. (1815), www.google.com/books/edition/Emma/b7MXAAAA YAAJ?hl=en Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1984). Belletto, Steven. No Accident, Comrade: Chance and Design in Cold War American Narratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011). Berne, Eric. Games People Play: The Psychology of Human Relationships. New York: Grove Press (1964). Brams, Steven J. Game Theory and the Humanities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2011). Caillois, Roger. Man, Play, and Games (Meyer Barash, trans.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press (1958). Camerer, Colin. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2003). de Ley, Herbert. The Name of the Game: Applying Game Theory in Literature, SubStance, 17 (1988): 33–46. Eastman, Wayne. Organization Life and Critical Legal Thought: A Psychopolitical Inquiry and Argument, N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change, 19 (1991): 721–796. Eastman, Wayne. Why Business Ethics Matters: Answers from a New Game Theory Model. New York: Palgrave (2015). Flaubert, Gustave. Madame Bovary (Eleanor Marx-Aveling, trans.). (1857), www.guten berg.org/files/2413/2413-h/2413-h.htm Fraser, Niall M. and Marc D. Kilgour. Non-Strict Ordinal 2 × 2 Games: A Comprehensive Computer-Assisted Analysis of the 726 Possibilities, Theory and Decision, 20 (1986): 99–121. Geertz, Clifford. Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (1972). Gluck, Louise. Proofs and Theories. New York: HarperCollins (1994). Goffman, Erving. Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings. New York: Free Press (1963). Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Pelican Books (1971). Graeber, David and David Wengrow. The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity. New York: Macmillan (2021). Henrich, Joseph. Game Theory in Cultural Evolution. (2021), https://henrich.fas.harvard. edu/files/henrich/files/nobel_symposium_revised_final.pdf Hitzig, Zoe. The Normative Gap: Mechanism Design and Ideal Theories of Justice, Economics & Philosophy, 36 (2020): 1–26. Hitzig, Zoe. Mezzanine. New York: HarperCollins (2021). Huizinga, Johann. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. Boston, MA: The Beacon Press (1955). Ifcher, John and Homa Zarghamee. The Rapid Evolution of Homo Economicus: Brief Exposure to Neoclassical Assumptions Increases Self-Interested Behavior, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 75 (2018): 55–65. Kennedy, Duncan. Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, Journal of Legal Education, 36 (1986): 518–563. Lily Wood and the Prick and Robin Schulz. Prayer in C. YouTube. (2014), www.youtube. com/watch?v=fiore9Z5iUg

212

The Contribution of Critical Game Theory

Maskin, Eric S. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals, American Economic Review, 98 (2008): 567–576. Neiman, Susan. Learning from the Germans: Race and the Memory of Evil. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2019). Nguyen, C. Thi. Games: Agency as Art. New York: Oxford University Press (2020). Piketty, Thomas. Capitalism and Ideology (Arthur Goldhammer, trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2020). Rapoport, Anatol and Melvin J. Guyer. A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games, General Systems, 11 (1966): 203–214. Rapoport, Anatol, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1976). Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1960). Smith, John Maynard. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982). Sober, Elliott and David Sloan Wilson. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1998). Thunberg, Greta. Speech, UN Climate Action Summit. (2019), www.npr.org/2019/ 09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit Tolstoy, Leo. Anna Karenina (Constance Garnett, trans.). (1878), www.gutenberg.org/ ebooks/1399 Unger, Roberto. Knowledge and Politics. New York: Free Press (1975). Wilson, E.O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (1975). Wilson, E.O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage (1999). Zarghamee, Homa. A Long Drawn Face. Georgetown, KY: Finishing Line Press (2019). Postlude

Poetry and Math In poetry, we seek contradiction, In math, consistency is what we want, In the humanities, truth is fiction, In the sciences, fiction is a taunt. Can philosophy be in the middle, Incorporating the best of both sides, Or is the middle twaddle and twiddle, A shifting sandbar, submerged by the tides. Game theory’s one way to philosophize, Its mainstream flies blue flags o’er Dover’s white cliffs, Its poets worry that love ossifies, They fish from Calais in little red skiffs. Hurray for new proofs and consistent choice, Hurray for new tales and the poet’s voice.

Critical Game Theory and Different Disciplines 213 Post-Postlude

Poetish, Economish, Goddish—An Invitation to Join CGT Suppose one is an academic in practice or in spirit who is dissatisfied with disciplinary divisions. Suppose one wants to create art, science, and ethics, and to learn from others who are likewise trying to do so. Suppose that one also has deep respect for the logics of different disciplines and their work products. What is one to do? We’re not sure. But we think that it’s worthwhile to try to figure it out, and to get together with others engaged in the quest. I invite you to contact us. I’m at [email protected].

Note: Below is a tentative, incomplete list of frameworks/paired opposites/ dichotomies that we see as potentially useful for interdisciplinary communication/academic pidgin. Expertise in multiple academic jargons is not expected. What we do hope for in participants is receptivity to other participants’ deployments of these (and other) frameworks, along with willingness to relax if not abandon disciplinary formalities in deploying them to communicate one’s own project. Game Theory/Theory of Games Individualism/Communitarianism Love/Work Localism/Globalism Egoism/Altruism Market/State Evolutionary Theory/Physics Left/Right Identitarianism/Universalism Theism/Atheism

Work/Play Critical Theory/Mainstream Theory Determinism/Libertarianism Utilitarianism/Deontology Masochism/Sadism Birth/Death Libertinism/Puritanism Structuralism/Poststructuralism Devolution/Centralization Normal/Divergent

Appendix A How the Four Temperaments Model and the Lit Model Classify Games

In my first book, I presented an informal model of temperaments as an aid to solving games. I claimed that a focus on the difficult Prisoner’s Dilemma game obscured the reality that most two-player games—a large majority of them, in fact—had naturally harmonious outcomes under standard game-theoretic analysis. Table A.1 compares the harmony-heavy classification of the 144 two-player games in the Four Temperaments/4T model to the more conflictual, less harmony-heavy classification in the Lit model: Table A.1 Which Game Types Are Most Common? The 4T and Lit Models Type of Game

4T Model

Lit Model

Battle of the Selves Harmony Coordination/Chicken + BotSexes Disharmony Latent Harmony/Stag Hunt Zero-Sum

0 matrices (0%) 89 matrices (62%) 25 matrices (17%) 15 matrices (10%) 9 matrices (6%) 6 matrices (4%)

75 matrices (52%) 39 matrices (27%) 0 matrices (0%) 15 matrices (10%) 9 matrices (6%) 6 matrices (4%)

For details: The 4T and Lit Models Compared.pptx https://1drv.ms/p/s!AmfNWgdwyLLrlyI826qkXkMKzX8t

The rise of the Battle of the Selves (BotS) category from 0 in the 4T model to 75 in the Lit model has two sources. First, the 50 matrices in which one or both players have dominant strategies that lead to unequal outcomes have been relabeled as BotS rather than as Harmony. A game like Joy of Cooking, with a program solution that leads to one player getting a first-best outcome while the other gets a third-best outcome, is, I think, more naturally seen in terms of conflict, not harmony. Second, the 25 matrices with no dominant strategy like Science Poetry, in which there is no possibility of the players both reaching a shared first-best outcome, have also been relabeled BotS. Conflict is involved, and it makes sense, I think, to use a revised version of MGT’s to-the-point if retro “Battle of the Sexes” label.

Appendix B The Social Gene Versus the Selfish Gene

My 2015 comparison between the results obtained by a highest joint value Benthamite player and an egoistic Nash player in the universe of the 144 matrices is here, with a link to the slides showing each matrix: https://valuecompetition.typepad.com/value_competition/2015/10/the-ethicalmatrix.html A shortened and slightly updated version of what I wrote then on my blog: Does ethics pay? One way to operationalize the question: Analyze all of the 144 possible matrices that show the players’ ordinal utility in one-shot 2 x 2 games. In my analysis, a “social” player who plays the highest joint value outcome for the two players narrowly outperforms a “selfish” or “nonsocial” player who plays a dominant strategy where applicable and mixed Nash otherwise. The edge of the social player in S-S interactions over the nonsocial player in N-N interactions narrowly overcomes the edge of the nonsocial player in S-N interactions. A more fine-grained breakdown: The edge of the N player in the 15 Disharmony (Prisoner’s Dilemma-type) matrices is narrowly overcome by the edge of the S player in the 9 Latent Harmony (Stag Hunt) matrices and the 25 Battle of the Selves (Battle of the Sexes and Chicken-type) matrices with no dominant strategies. There are some nuances—an important one is that the edge of the S player is dependent on the S player and not the N player being able to coordinate by employing Schelling focal points.

Appendix C The Goodish Player Versus the Nash Player

As noted in the text, I abandoned the project of operationalizing the relative performance of warrior ethics, priestly ethics, business ethics players, and Nash players in the 144 matrices. What I came up with instead was a simpler project of comparing the Nash player to a “Goodish” player who plays highest joint value most but not all of the time. In this project, unlike the social gene-selfish gene one, the goodish and the Nash player both know each other’s types and play accordingly. That allows the Goodish player to apply a “don’t be a sucker” proviso that avoids the sucker’s payoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The goodish gene vs. the selfish gene—known types—beta—9–21–21 (2023 edit) https://1drv.ms/p/s!AmfNWgdwyLLrlx8fkZKABTXclXdr?e=dQKzIo] The result I came up with for the Goodish and Nash players, detailed in the link to my slides from 2021, was a close win for Goodish. As in the unknown types case, a key component of the victory for the more social player was the assumption that Nash players interacting with other Nash players in Stag Hunt and Battle of the Sexes were rational fools, in the sense that they played the only unique and hence “rational” equilibrium, mixed Nash, rather than converging on a better one. If that assumption is abandoned, Nash is much more formidable, but Goodish can then use its powers to commit to get mean and turn the tables on Nash in a number of games (matrices 57–60, for example) in which Goodish can be forbearing if it is interacting with fools. Goodish still prevails over Nash non-fools, but is considerably less good and considerably more “ish” than the version shown in the slides. I believe the connection between mean or forbearing Goodishness and sophisticated or foolish Nash has important real-world implications. I invite those with more years ahead and/or greater computational powers than I to carry the analysis forward.

Appendix D Comparing Lit and Four Temperaments Stories

In my first book, the key story telling took place in Chapter 3, “Opening the Door to the Sanguine.” My premise was that conventional game theoretic stories, notably the PD, Chicken, the Stag Hunt, and the Battle of the Sexes, did well at incorporating phlegmatic, anxious, ashamed, and choleric elements in their telling and their interpretation, but did not do well in incorporating an optimistic, sociable spirit of joy. In the interest of doing so, I retold these stories, along with Smith’s invisible hand story, in a form that assumed the players were motivated by pro-social rather than egoistic emotions. For the PD retelling, I considered how deferential supervisors and employees can fall into a suboptimal “after you, Alphonse” outcome just as egoistic ones can—but that understanding the problematic situation in terms of pro-social deference allows managers and employees to apply game theory in a happier, more optimistic spirit than understanding the situation in terms of egoistic slacking does. For the invisible hand/Harmony retelling, I claimed that as a person in a café-bakery we can rise from the respectful, calm spirit accompanying the traditional story to a joyful, even ecstatic spirit. For the Lit poems of this book, the “opening the door to joy” point in my first book is also intended to be a key theme. True, the Altru type in Lit may not have the joyous dimension suggested by the Sanguine type in my earlier model—but the interactions of the four types described in the poems and matrices are most definitely intended to bring out the joy element in games as well as well as other, less salubrious elements. True, joy in Lit is often conjoined with disturbing circumstances—“We rejoice as you’re consumed by the flame,” etc. But complex joy is joy, nonetheless.

Appendix E Maso, Sado, and Altru Drives as Ways to Measure Ego Preference Intensity

As a newly tenured professor at the end of the last millennium, I had a vision of writing a magnum opus on the history of ideologies centered on what I called the group-splitting model. Though the magnum opus proved beyond my powers, I still think of group splitting as an analytical idea worth pursuing. Although intended for the purpose of explaining how ideological competition succeeds or fails in motivating electorally driven politicians to avoid value-reducing tyranny of the majority or minority, the concept has wider applicability. Here, I will connect the groupsplitting idea to Lit. As presented in this book, the Lit model involves a perhaps rapid, perhaps slow oscillation of players among Ego, Maso, Sado, and Altru presumptive types, with some ability of the players to engage in projects that counter or reinforce their types. An alternative way, or set of ways, to think about Lit involves the idea that some (or all) of the time, some (or all) of the four drives are summed within the self. The intuition I want to evoke is that such summing happening for both players in a two-player game will make it more likely that the two players will be on the same page in what they prefer—Harmony—than if there are only egoistic preferences unaffected by cross-cutting Altru, Sado, and Maso preferences. Further, summing can help us move the Lit model beyond the ranked, ordinal utilities that this book has focused on to absolute, cardinal utilities. Briefly: Suppose one player with Ego preference x and another player with a greater Ego preference y. Cross-cutting preferences in both create a chance (though no guarantee) of Harmony rather than Battle of the Selves, with convergence on y more likely than convergence on x. As always, I invite others to carry the analysis further.

Sources

Austen, Jane. Pride and Prejudice. (1813), www.google.com/books/edition/Pride_and_ Prejudice/s1gVAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 Binmore, Ken. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume I. Playing Fair. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1994). Binmore, Ken. Game Theory and Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, 9 (1999): 31–35. Freud, Sigmund. The Ego and the Id (Joan Riviere, trans.). Mineola, NY: Dover (1928/2018). Gilbert, Daniel R., Jr. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Business Ethics Quarterly, 6 (1996): 165–178. Grant, Colin. The Altruists’ Dilemma, Business Ethics Quarterly, 15 (2004): 31–35. Leavis, Frank Raymond. Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow. London: Chatto & Windus (1962). Lewis, David. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1969). Mannheim, Karl (1936). Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt Brace (1936). Mathiesen, Kay. Game Theory in Business Ethics: Bad Ideology or Bad Press, Business Ethics Quarterly, 9 (1999): 37–45. McAdams, Richard. Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, Southern California Law Review, 82 (2009): 209–258. Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1990). Powers, Richard. Prisoner’s Dilemma. New York: Viking (1988). Skyrms, Bryan. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004). Snow, Charles Percy. The Two Cultures. London: Cambridge University Press (1959). Sugden, Robert. The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare. London: Palgrave (1985). aroufakis, Yanis. Adults in the Room: My Battle with the European and American Deep Establishment. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2018).

Index

Note: Page locators in bold indicate a table. Letters after a number refer to the specific list item on the corresponding page. actions: of others 39, 60, 73c; personal 13, 29, 32e, 178, 181 – 182 activists 200 Adams, John 144, 150 Adorno, Theodor 7v advancement 3 – 4, 7u, 109, 200 agreements 16, 44c, 86m Altru player 18j, 44d, 46b, 53, 69, 115 Altru players 44d, 46b, 53, 132, 149 – 150, 163 Altru Superego 11, 18 altruism 10 – 11, 16, 18h, 19c, 21a, 76c, 174, 189, 213 Altruist’s Dilemma (AD) 21a, 38 American Unfreedom 107 American Utopia 121 Ancient Athens 54, 109, 128, 154 – 155, 204 anger (Ire) 42, 61b, 99, 182, 189 Anglo-American philosophy 128, 196 Anti-Matter 99, 101, 103 – 105 Aquinas 182 Are You Sorry 123, 125, 125, 130 – 131 argument 12, 60 Aristotle 19, 68 – 69, 182 Arrow, Kenneth 189 art 1, 7x, 12, 31a, 47c, 123, 128, 134, 202 – 204, 209, 213 Art: game of 123, 128 – 129, 130; solutions 134 – 135 artificial intelligence (AI) 31; associations 175 – 179, 182; identity 107, 122 – 123, 126, 159 – 160; two player games 25 – 29 asymmetrical games 20p, 35, 119, 197 At the Whitney, Again 166

Austen, Jane 100, 203 average outcomes 92, 103, 105, 116 – 118, 120, 131 – 134, 146, 148 – 150, 162 – 165 Axelrod, Robert 5g Axial Age 19 Baier, Annette 6m Bailey, Blake 5f Banaji, Mazarin 189 bargains 16, 176 Battle of the Selves 8, 50; see also individual games (i.e. Strikeout) Battle of the Sexes 17d, 177, 197 Becker, Gary 6t, 10, 32f Becker, the Wilsons, and Freud 10 behavioral game theory 46d, 189 belief 1, 47c, 54, 72j, 73k, 75g–i Benthamite 45, 171, 185, 187 – 188, 190, 195 – 196 Berlin 4, 97, 122, 125, 127 Berne, Eric 5d Berry, Chuck 3, 5i blame 33, 48, 50, 53, 56, 84, 110 Bodiless Programs: game play 107 – 109, 110; solution 114 – 116 Bonnie and Clyde: game play 80 – 81, 82; solution 87, 91 Bowles, Samuel 61b Brams, Steven 5b Buber, Martin 5a Buddha 19b, 137 – 139, 140, 144, 174 business 101, 122, 126, 130, 144, 171, 196, 198, 205, 208 Butler, Judith 31b

Index Camerer, Colin 46, 189 Centrist Self 110, 115 – 116 CGT see critical game theory Chammah, Albert 47, 189 Chang, Ruth 189 Chiang 137, 139 – 142, 142 Chicken: game 50, 176 – 177, 189; stories 8, 90c, 171, 177 choices 59, 68, 115, 178, 184, 202 Christian 13 Communism 112, 144, 196 compromise 52, 123, 207 condition 48, 51, 108, 196 confession 40 – 41, 48, 50 – 51, 154, 157, 173 – 174 conscious 13, 78, 98, 187 – 188 constructive radicalism 6q, 97 Counterhegemonic Enclaves, Redux 152, 208 Crack-Up 122 critical game theory (CGT): contribution 169; definition 3 –5; differing disciplines 193 Cruella de Vil 4, 26, 178, 203 Daffodils and Dalmatians 25, 30 – 31 Dance in Uskudar 77 Darwin’s theory 32e, 204, 210 death: Me/My 37, 39, 41, 43, 51, 53, 55, 66, 68, 70, 72, 80, 82, 84, 86; You/ Your 37, 39, 41, 43, 51, 53, 55, 66, 68, 70, 72, 80, 82, 84, 86 denial 81, 108, 200 Derrida, Jacques 7u, 176, 203 desire 4, 38, 62, 65, 69, 78, 99, 102, 133, 155, 160, 203 destructive drives 2, 7, 10 – 11, 185, 194 devolution 113, 137, 139, 200 disharmony: equal 147; less 103, 105, 116 – 117, 119 – 120, 131, 134, 148 – 149, 151, 162 – 164, 166; Prisoner’s Dilemma 146; suboptimal outcome 13, 17c, 35, 43g, 46n Divergence: game play 108, 111, 113; outcomes 120, 132 – 135, 149 – 150, 163; solution 118 – 119 Dixit, Avinish (et al 2009) 5, 5g, 171, 173, 175 – 175, 178, 188 dominant strategy 36, 60, 74, 105, 115 – 120, 130 – 134, 145 – 146, 148 – 150, 160 – 165 Donaldson, Thomas 190

221

doubt 48, 50, 55, 66 – 67, 74d, 79, 84, 121, 187, 202, 209 Dunfee, Thomas 190 Durga 137 – 139, 142 – 144 Dworkin, Andrea 51 – 52, 153 Eastman, Wayne 5g, 188 – 190 Econ: prisoner’s dilemma (PD) 29 – 30, 60g, 61a, 78 – 79, 86e, 86m, 87b–c, 89a, 173; as self-critical 75b, 76; single-self 2, 4, 31b–c, 38; solution notes 31a, 32b, 32f; unified self 25, 27; zero-sum games 79, 83, 86, 89 – 90 economics: criticism 201 – 202, 205, 208; movement 3 – 4, 5; philosophical 193 – 194, 196, 198; traditional 7t–u, 171, 176, 187 Ego: self-love 46r; self-maximizing 53, 67 Ego player 15, 43 – 44, 46, 79, 90, 104 Ego players 15, 43a/c/f, 44o, 46b, 79, 104, 132, 149 – 150, 163 Ego-Entro players 60e–f, 61, 131 – 132, 146 egoism 16, 19c, 21a/d, 38 – 39 egoistic: players 18j, 19c, 20q, 138; self 3 – 4, 14, 16 – 17, 25, 38, 176, 217 – 218; subselves 11 election: global 139, 141, 143; strategy 125 – 126, 138 – 139, 143 electric chair 39 – 40, 59 Eliot, T.S. 7, 202 Elite Secession 108, 113 – 114, 115, 119 – 120 empathy 22, 35, 38 – 39, 50, 58a, 71, 82 empirical questioning 45l, 58o, 61j, 88t, 178, 181 encourage 111, 126, 177 End of the Affair: game play 84 – 85, 86; outcomes 92; solution 89; teaching/ learning 89 enemy 26, 128 enlightenment 19b, 31a, 40, 197 Entro: orientation/types 30c, 45k, 46a, 58c, 59a; players 59j, 73a, 73c, 131, 135; solutions 97 – 98, 108, 123, 126, 130, 137 entropic 4, 25 – 26, 40, 67, 71, 76b, 87, 97 – 98, 108, 110, 123 entropy 26, 40, 67, 74a Epicurus 18, 206 ethics 12, 69, 171, 173, 176, 180 – 182, 196, 204, 208

222

Index

Everything’s a Game 191 Everything Everywhere 33 Evo (evolutionary): defined 1, 4, 11 – 12; players as maximizing 25, 30c, 52, 57c; solution 18g, 57l, 73f, 97, 130 Evo maximizers 52, 57c Evocracy: game play 138, 142, 143; solution 148 – 150 evolution 26, 32e, 40, 188, 204 experiments 3 – 4, 5h, 114, 126, 144, 157, 160, 201 fail/failure 14, 16, 32e, 40, 107, 172, 206, 210 faith 1 – 2, 5b, 69, 74a, 97, 109, 178, 188, 206 fate 1, 12, 19b, 40, 64, 71, 100, 108, 110, 112, 138, 160, 180, 184 fear 12, 14, 17, 19 – 20, 22, 40, 42, 52, 114, 139, 156 Fickle: game play 68 – 69, 70, 71; solution 74, 91; teaching/learining 75 – 76 Flaubert, Gustave 100, 202 – 203 focal point: fairness 57k, 59h; HJV 37, 43m, 46g, 104, 118; idealistic 44 – 46, 59i, 61m, 88h, 115 – 116, 118; interested 41 – 42, 51, 54, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 80, 115, 118; outcomes 20j, 21l; reasonable 20 Foot, Phillipa 190 Forster, Thomas 7w Frank, Robert 6, 61, 188, 195 Fred Jamison, part 2 136 freedom 22, 69, 74 – 75, 77, 112, 122, 129 – 130, 136, 175, 198 Freud, Sigmund 7t, 10, 14, 32f, 82 – 83, 100, 106, 156, 185 Frustration: game play 39 – 40, 41, 71, 91; solution 45 – 45; teaching/learning 46 Fugazi: game play 154, 155; solution 160, 162 Gabel, Peter 3, 5i game theory 1 – 4; see also CGT; MGT game-playing 11, 32e Gandhi 137 – 139 genre 2, 12, 203 Germania 123, 125 – 126, 127, 131 – 132, 135 Get Rich 143, 148 – 149 Gintis, Herbert 61, 189 Gluck, Louise 202

God 1, 48, 144, 186, 194, 206; God’s-eye view 193 – 194 Goforth, David 6s Goldman, Emma 203 greedy 166, 180 Greenblatt, Stephen 18 Greenwald, Anthony 189 growth 26, 67, 200 guilty 39, 56, 154, 173 Guyer, Melvin J. 6, 17d, 18i happiness 27 – 28, 179 Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun 6s, 15, 189, 198, 209 hearts 56, 64, 99 Hero 18i, 18k heterosexual 52 heuristic 26, 125 highest joint value (HJV): focal point 37, 43h, 104, 118; project solution 37, 39, 41, 53, 107, 113, 119 – 120, 132, 147, 161 Hirsch, Edward 7w Hitler, Adolph 174 Hits and Misses 90 HJV see highest joint value Hoffman, Erez 5g honor 36, 38, 50, 172 human 8, 12, 14, 40, 112, 126, 138 – 139, 154 – 155, 175, 183, 185 humanistic 3, 6s, 7v, 19b, 32c, 35, 89c, 153, 183 – 184 I’m Going Down: game play 66 – 67, 68, 76b; solution 73, 91, 103; teaching/ learning 74 identity 31b, 107, 109, 111, 146 – 149 Imperfect Harmony 35, 46b, 103, 105, 116 – 117, 119 – 120, 131 – 133, 135, 147 – 149, 151, 162 – 164, 166 implication 48, 193, 216 indeterminate project 1, 25, 31f, 32a, 44c, 46k, 87f, 115, 120, 146 indifferent 27, 179, 181, 195 individual 7t, 46n, 181, 186 In Spite 41 – 42, 43; game play 41 – 42, 43; solution 46, 91; teaching/learning 47 interaction 11, 34, 58b, 75c, 83, 195, 215, 217 interactions 11, 75c, 195 Ishiguro, Kazuo 59 It Ain’t Me 93

Index James, Jesse 77 Jameson, Frederic 121, 136 Jasper, Karl 19b Jefferson, Thomas 138, 143, 145, 145, 149 – 150 Jesus 19b, 174, 206 Joy of Cooking: game play 4, 11, 15 – 16, 17, 20q; solution 20; teaching/ learning 21 justice 4, 36, 109, 112 – 113, 142, 198, 204 Kant, Immanuel 20b, 185 – 186, 206 Kantian randomization 185 – 188 Kennedy, Duncan 3, 5i King, Martin Luther 70 – 71 Kuhn, Steven 47 Landers, Renee M. (et al 1996) 188 Laozi 19, 66 – 67, 74, 137, 142, 174 law: moral 13, 20b, 28, 56; profession 3, 57j, 59g, 122, 126, 176, 201 – 202 Lessing, Doris 7v Let Evo Be 105 Levi-Strauss, Claude 7u lie/lies/lied 48, 54, 59, 77, 99, 174, 178, 186 – 188, 205 Lincoln 174 – 175 Lit (literary): games 26, 29, 44p, 89b, 97, 135; model 7u, 8y, 11, 32b, 78, 193 – 194; players 4, 26, 78, 83, 89b, 103, 105, 116; poems 2, 197, 219; program solutions 123, 137 – 138, 153 – 154, 206; radicalism 99, 111; selves/self 2, 25, 30a, 76c, 194; solution 29, 44c; subgames 87d, 107 Literature 202 – 203 Lit Program Solutions 103 – 104, 131 – 134, 147, 163 – 165 logic 5 – 7, 11, 25, 36, 53, 56, 57, 98, 125, 130, 156, 174 – 176, 180, 185, 199, 202 love 33, 38, 39, 40, 42; love-hate relationship 75c; see also self–love; You Love Me More Lucretius 18a, 19b, 203, 205 – 206 Lucretius Reflects 11 – 12 mainstream game theory (MGT): Commensurability 179 – 180, 189; Dating Game 178 – 179, 189; Dilemma 50; game play 3 – 4, 6p, 18; GPA Rat Race 173 – 174, 188;

223

Independence 182 – 183, 189; Interchangeability 184 – 185, 190; No Money Pumps 181 – 182, 189; program solutions 102, 115, 120; Randomization 185 – 187, 190; Roommates on the Brink 176 – 177, 189; Transitivity 180 – 181, 189; Which Passing Shot 171 – 172, 188; Which Tire 174 – 175, 188; Why are Professors so Mean 175 – 175, 189 Make or Break: game play 64 – 65, 66, 67; solution 72, 91; teaching/learning 73, 75 – 76 Mao 137, 139 – 140, 142 Marcuse, Herbert 153 market 130, 204, 206 Martyr 18k Marx, Karl 55 – 56, 123, 125, 126 – 127 masochistic (Maso) 2, 4, 25 – 27, 35, 46d; see also Maso players; self– punisher; self–hate Maso players 45a, 49, 71, 97, 108, 123, 132, 137, 149 – 150, 153, 163 Maso Prisoner Muses 53 Maso Prisoner Reflects 39 Maso-Altru Convo 82 matrices 1 – 2, 4 – 5, 12, 29, 64, 87, 102, 147, 196, 198, 208 maximize 3 – 4, 64, 152, 172 – 173; see also Evo maximizers; self–maximizers Medianocracy 137, 139, 141, 147 – 148 mediocre (common) 11, 71, 74c, 79, 86j, 119, 130 Mendelssohn, Daniel 7v mental health 155, 205 Merkel, Angela 126 Metrick, Andrew 172, 188 MGT see mainstream game theory minimize 4, 26, 64, 103, 174 – 175; see also other–minimizers; self–minimizers minority 108, 116, 139, 199 – 200 modeling 151, 199 Modeling Ethical Systems 196 moderation 22 modernity 126, 141 morality 13, 61b; moral law 13, 20b, 56, 66, 206 Mother and the Boy 22 mourning 50 movement 3, 5, 55, 109, 157, 166, 193, 207 – 209 Muhammad 13, 206

224

Index

Nalebuff, Barry J. 5g narcissism 35 narcissist 71 Nash, John 3, 6p, 35 – 36, 69, 110, 115, 119, 127, 147 – 150, 162, 165, 171, 187, 195 – 196 Nehru, Jawaharlal 137 – 139, 143 – 144 Neurodivergence Rules 154, 157, 159, 163 – 164 Nguyen, C. Thi 5b–c Nietzsche, Friedrich 7v, 20a, 39 – 42, 123, 125, 126 – 128, 129 –130, 133 – 134, 196, 203 nirvana 13 One of Us: Evo/Entro 64; Self-Oriented/ Other-Oriented 49 oppose/opposing 78 – 79, 117, 143, 146, 173 other-maximizer/maximizing 25, 39, 46b, 49, 53, 69, 74b other-minimizers/minimizing 25, 46a, 47b, 49, 60, 69, 74a, 80, 85a other-oriented 4, 25, 49 – 50, 61a, 73a, 76a, 195 Our Son: game play 51 – 52, 53; solution 58, 91; teaching/learning 58 – 59 outcomes: average 92, 103, 105, 116 – 118, 120, 130 – 134, 146, 148 – 150, 162 –165; combined; first-best 16, 18, 49, 53, 58b, 61a, 65, 69, 74, 137, 153 – 154; programmed 107 – 108, 119, 133, 135; secondbest 85d, 86m, 87n, 88e, 123, 154, 164 – 165; symmetrical 89b Packer, Jennifer 166 – 167 paired opposites 213 parent-child-adult games 1, 5d Pastine, Ivan and Ivana 5g Patokos, Tassos 6s, 188, 198 payoffs: improving 87b, 88m; maximizing 51; minimizing 54; value of 18h, 26 – 27, 30, 38, 147, 150 PD see Prisoner’s Dilemma Perfect Harmony (PH) 102 – 103, 105, 116 – 120, 131 – 135, 139, 141, 146, 150, 162 – 163, 166 personal-cosmic narrative 209 perspective: holistic 28, 44e; philosophical 5b, 6o, 183; pro-determinacy 32a, 36, 150 philosopher 19, 195 – 196, 198

philosophy 3, 7v, 20a, 125, 128, 171, 193, 196, 203, 213 Piketty, Thomas 196 Pinker, Steven 5, 171, 184, 188 Plato 7v, 13, 19, 123, 129, 130, 134, 158, 203, 206; see also Pluto (AI Dog) play: games 28, 33, 56, 67, 85, 90 – 91, 98; players play 104, 133, 162, 195; role of 85, 104, 116 – 118 player: roles 25, 64, 75a–b, 104 – 105, 107, 119, 123, 134, 177; social/nonsocial 215 – 216; two-player games 5, 6o, 8y, 27, 97, 102, 119 Pluto/Plato (AI Dog) 28 – 29 Poetish, Economish, Goddish 213 Poetry and Math 212 political games 97, 123, 126 politics: global 4, 139; radical 2, 97 Pol Pot 174 Populocracy 137 – 138, 140, 145 – 148 Poundstone, William 5g, 47 power: analytical 1; exercizing 90, 97, 130, 137 – 138, 143; normal 158; real power 203 Powers, Richard 47 practice of games 1, 75d Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): asymmetrical 47c, 49, 56a, 61a, 75a; dominant strategies 74b, 120; Econ PD 29 – 30, 60g, 61a, 78 – 79, 86e/m, 87b–c, 89a; games 40, 44r, 75a, 78, 91, 98; Lit PD 35, 61a, 78, 87, 89a, 90c, 108, 137; subgames 31b–c, 47c, 49, 58b, 60a, 61a, 64, 71, 78, 87, 88g; symmetrical 25, 35, 42, 47c, 49, 56, 58b, 61a, 75a, 103, 105, 107, 117, 119, 133, 135 Prisoner’s Maso Manifesto 66 program solution: 50 – 50 split 102, 104; concept 25, 29, 31f, 32b; ego 53, 97; egoists’ 20d, f; first-best 17, 53, 61, 65, 69, 73d, 74f, 103, 115, 131, 137, 153 – 154, 161 – 162; rat 42, 44p, 51; second-best 17, 18i, 35, 46b, 49, 53, 83, 85d, 86m, 87n, 88e, 104, 123, 153 – 154; silentsilent 39 – 41, 43g, 54, 61m, 80, 88h; suboptimal outcomes 35, 37, 43g, 107 – 108, 123, 138, 153 project solution: HJV 37, 39, 41, 53, 73g, 74i, 86m, 119 – 120, 147, 161; indeterminate 25, 32a, 44c, 46k

Index Prometheus: players/game/subgame 55 – 57, 64, 71, 75a, 91; solution 60 – 61; teaching/learning 61 promise 48, 178, 201 prosecutor 48, 70 Prosecutor 48 Pyre: players/game 53 – 54, 55, 64, 71, 75a, 91; solution 59; teaching/learning 60 Rabin, Matthew 6l racism 174 radical: alternatives 3, 7u, 200; communities 4, 107 – 108, 141, 143, 200 – 201; politics 2, 4, 97, 107, 109, 114, 117, 122, 128, 130 radicalism 6q, 7t, 97, 99, 101, 107, 109, 137, 141, 156, 209; see also Lit Radical Self 16, 110 –111, 115 – 116 rage 14, 41, 93, 127 Rage: matrix 127 – 128, 129; players 123, 135; solution 133 Rapoport, Anatol 6o, 17d, 18i, 19b, 47d, 189 rational choice theory 171, 179 – 185, 188 Ratting 30, 36, 39, 46, 56, 57, 86f Ray, James Earl 71 Reactions to Fred Jameson’s Latest 121 reactive behavior 87k, 88m/p Reading Gaol: players 37; solution 43 – 44, 91; subgame 35, 37, 94; teaching/ learning 44 reality 36, 75c, 81, 137, 192 real life 16, 174, 179 reason: good/no good 44a, 76b, 185, 206; use of 53, 71, 183 – 184, 208 Rebellion: player opposition 64, 70 – 71, 72, 75; solution 75; teaching/ learning 76 reflection 39, 74, 102, 171, 177, 193 revolution 26, 69, 107, 113, 203 risk-reducing Nash 115 Robinson, David 6s Rombauer, Irma 15 Rorty, Richard 7u Ross, Don 5e, 6l Rousseau, Jean-Jaques 78 – 79 sacrifice 58a/b, 59e, 62, 71, 145, 171, 178, 180, 186 – 187 sad/sadness 14, 21, 28, 39, 48, 79, 99, 197, 205, 210 sadistic (Sado) 2, 25, 97, 108, 123, 154

225

Sado players 46a, 49, 64, 69, 98, 120, 130, 132, 149 – 150, 163 satisfaction 19e, 34 Scharding, Tobey 187 – 188, 190 Schelling, Thomas 6p, 13 – 14, 20c, 47d, 69, 171, 174, 188 – 189 schism 10, 112, 156 Schor, Juliet 188 Schroeder, Jeanne L. 7t Science Poetry 4, 11 – 12, 13, 17 – 18, 19c sciences: natural 4; social 4, 31b, 193 self-hate 40, 42, 46r, 55, 83 self-love 40, 42; see also Ego self-maximizing 25, 37, 43c, 43l, 44o, 49, 80, 85a, 104, 195; see also Ego self-minimizer/minimizing 25, 40, 45a, 49, 60b, 60e, 67, 86l, 104, 161 self-oriented 3, 25, 37, 49 – 50, 61a, 73a, 76a Self-Oriented (One of Us Is) 49 self-punisher 10, 40, 56, 60c, 67, 101, 162, 174 self-sacrifice 58b Sen, Amartya 189 sexes 176; see also Battle of the Sexes Shelley, Mary 49 – 50 silence 37, 44f, 66, 88c Silent as the Grave: players 39; solution 44, 91; subgame 35; teaching/ learning 45 sin 39, 41, 127, 150, 201 single-self game theory 4, 6t, 31c Smolin, Lee 32e sociology 197, 200 Socrates 4, 7v, 12 – 13, 19b, 25 – 26, 74a, 97, 107, 153, 156, 178 – 179, 203 – 204 Solomon, Robert 6m sonnet 4, 7w, 13, 32a, 36, 44a, 58a, 167 Sources and Teaching 18, 20 – 21, 31 – 32 speculation 25 Stalin, Joseph 174 stay silent 36, 38, 40, 50, 57e, 60g, 82, 84, 88b storytelling 64 – 65 Strikeout: solution 85 – 87, 91; subgame 78 – 79, 80, 81, 83; teaching/ learning 87 subconscious 97, 175, 187 subgames: concepts 29; PD 31b, 35, 47c, 49, 58b, 60a, 61a, 64, 71, 78, 87, 91, 97; pitfalls 19c, 175, 177 Sugden, Robert 61 suicide 52

226

Index

Suits, Bernard 5b Superego 14 – 18 symmetrical games 35, 78 symmetry 47c, 71, 145, 147 – 148, 150

Verdict, The: game play 154, 159 – 160, 161; solution 165 – 166 video games 1, 5c vindictive 42, 43, 174, 196

temperance 12, 13 Thaler, Richard 61 thanatotic 4, 83 The Prosecutor 48 Therapy: game play 82 – 83, 84, 85; solution 85, 89, 92 Thunberg, Greta 210 transhuman 125 – 126, 178 type of player identification 49, 102

warrior ethics 195 – 196 We Can Fly: game play 97 – 99, 100; solution 102 – 103; teaching/ learning 104 – 105 Weight Watchers 10 welfare 4, 30e, 45a, 60b, 130 We’re Equal: game play 109, 111, 111; solution 116 – 117, 119, 133 Who Wins 194 Wilson, David Sloan 7t, 10, 209 – 210 Wilson, E.O. 7t, 10, 210 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 14, 20a Wrong: game play 138, 143, 145; solution 149 – 150

Unhappy Altruist: game play 13 – 14, 15, 17; solution 19 – 20; teaching/ learning 20 universe of games 8y, 11, 42, 193, 197, 204 Unser Ding (AI) 97, 122 – 126, 129, 137, 139 utility theory 171 utopia 5b vague/vagueness 167 Varoufakis, Yanis 6s, 15 – 16, 189, 209

Xanthippe 14, 50, 85, 91, 153, 156, 158 Yoelli, Moshe 5g You Love Me More: game play 49 – 50, 51, 53; solution 56, 91; teaching/ learning 58 – 60 Your Son 62