Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China 0816504946, 9780816504947

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w~ lllimi crisis ant> prospErity •

1n

•

sung china John Winthrop HOEgEr editor

lfJ The University of Arizona Press Tucson. Ari zona

The Co111ril)//tors dedicate this 1·0/11111e to S A DAO AOYAMA and

I C HISADA MIYA Z AKI

invaluable contributors to internatio nal Sung studies The Sung 11 Confe re nce was spo nsored a mJ suppo rted by the Commi11ee o n Studies o f C hinese C iv ilization of the A me rican Counci l o f Learne d Societies . T he pu blication of t his volu me has a lso bee n assiste d by the Cou ncil.

011d ack11ow/ed1:e 11·ith than ks HA N -S H ENG C H 'UAN

H E RB ERT FRA NKE

T H E UN IVERS ITY

or

A RI Z O N A PR ESS

Cop yrig ht © 1975 The A rizona Board of Regents All Rights Reserved Manufactured in the U.S .A . 1.S.13.N.-0-8 165 -0494-6 LC. No. 74- 1560 3

PETER

J.

J AM ES

T. C. L i u

GOLA S

GA BRI ELL E S A TTL ER

J IN G -SIi EN T AO Participwlls i11 the S 1111~ II Co1(/£'re11ce 1111d MAu N o A M A RR Cox the edito r's a ssistant

About the Authors ...

JOHN WINTHROP HAEGER was chairman of the I 971 Sung II Conference in Germany which gave rise to the development of this volume. A Princeton gr aduate with a doctorate from the University of California at Berkeley , he was chairman of the Department of Chinese at the Claremont Colleges from I 968 to I 973 , becoming director of th e Luce Scholars Program for the Asia Foundation in 1974. E. A. KRAC KE JR. has served on the board of directors of the Assoc iation for Asian Studies and as president of the American Oriental Society. Professor Emeritus of C hinese Literature and Institutions at the University of Chicago, he served on that faculty from 1946 to I 973, and was honorary chairman of th e Sung 11 Conference. BRIAN E. M c KNIGHT became a member of the history facult y at the University of H awaii following completion of a doctorate at the Universit y of C hicago. Among his publi shed writing s i s V illage and Burea u cr acy in Southern S1111g C hina. C 11 ARLES A. PETERSON was coordinator of the first Sung projec t in 1965-66. 1-1 is writings have focu sed on probl ems of China's foreign relations in the medieval period and the dynamics of central government-provincial relations in middle and late T'ang. Following post-doctoral studies in Paris and Kyoto, he j oined the Chinese history faculty at Cornell University. CON RAD SCHIROKAUER has written widely on the personalities and problems

or nco-Confucianism, especiall y Chu H si . and his articles have appeared in the .lo urnal of" the History of" Ideas and the Encyclopedia Brita1111ica as well as in sc vcra l symposium volumes. H older of a Ph.D. from Stanford, he later joined lh c histor y faculty at the City College of the C ity U niversit y of New York. Yos111 NOBU SHlllA studied C hinese economic histor y at Tokyo University , in I 962 j oining the faculty at Kumamoto U niversit y and later becoming associate professor at Osaka. His S tudies i11 the Commerce and S ociety of Sung China

I vii I

viii

A BO·, UT TH E AUT H ORS

( 1968) was issued in abs trac ted Eng lish t ransla tio n a s Commerce and S ociety in Sun g C hina b y t he Unive rsit y of M ic higan. ROLF T RA UZETTEL·s c hie f interes t ha s been in C hine se polit ical a nd intel le ct ua l his to ry. his pu blica tio n s inc lud ing T s'ai Chin~ als T ypus des illegitimen Mi11isters a nd. with H erber t Franke . Das chi11esisclte Kaiserreich. A fte r re ce ivi ng his doc to rate from Munic h in 1964. he ta ught there until 197 1 w he n he bec a me professo r of F a r Eas te rn S t udies at t he U ni ve rs it y o f Go ttingen. E DM UND H . W ORTHY was fo unding e dit or of the S ung S tudies Ne ws/el/er a nd has c o ntri buted numerous a rtic les o n va rio us aspects of S ung a nd mo dern C hine se histo ry. Fo llowing g rad ua tio n fro m Ya le a nd gradua te studi e s a t Princeto n . he beca me Vis iting Lec turer in the Depa rtme nt of Histo ry at N ew Asia C o llege in the C hine se U nive rs it y of H o ng Kong and al so re presen te d the Ya le -in -C hina A ssoc ia tio n.

Contents

Abbreviations Used in this Book

xiv

1.

Introduction: Cris is and Prosperity in S ung China

2.

Urbanization and the Development of Markets in the Lower Yangtze Valley

John Winthro p H aeger

13

Yoshinobu Shiba Po pulatio n C o nce ntratio n and Urbani za t ion U rban Po pula ti o n Rearra nge m e nt of A dminis trative D ivisio ns T he Ec o no mi c Backgro und of U rba niz a tio n C o mmerc ia l D eve lo pme nt o f H u-cho u C o m merc ia l Deve lopme nt of Hui-cho u Concl us io n

3.

S ung K'ai-feng : Pragmatic Metropolis and Formalistic Capital

49

E. A . Krac ke , Jr. 4.

Fiscal Privile ges and the Social Order in Sung China

79

Brian E. M c Knight 5.

Regional Control in the Southern S ung Salt Administration

Edmund H. W o rth y Hi s to ric a l a nd Ad minist rative Bac kground Pro duc tio n a nd Cont rols Administ rato rs a nd Ad minis t ratio n Me rc hants a nd Marke ting Co nc lu sio n

I ix I

101

X

6.

CONT E NTS

1126-27: Political Crisis and the Integrity of Culture

CO NTENTS

I LLUSTRA TIO NS 143

John Winthrop H aeger

Map: Sung C hina: C ircuits and M aj or Urban Centers Figure 3. / : K'ai-feng About 102 1

The Crisis of the Monarchy The Decline of the Eunuchs Institutiona l Limitations and Innovations The Transcendence of C ivilism

7.

Neo-Confucians Under Attack: The Condemnation of Wei-hsiieh

2.1.

163

The Po liti cal Status of Neo-Confucianism under Kao-tsung (r. I 127-62) a nd H s iao-ts ung (r. 1162-89) Tao-hsiieh unde r Kuang-tsung ( r. 11 89-94) From Tao-hsiieh to Wei-hsiieh: 11 94-97 The Arguments Against Wei-hsiieh The Composition of the Two Groups T he Ban on Wei-hsiieh Runs It s Course. 11 97-1 202 Conclusio n

Sung Patriotism as a First Step Toward Chinese Nationalism

199

Rolf Trauzettel

9.

First Sung Reactions to the Mongol Invasion of the North, 1211-17 C harles A . Peterson

xvi 58

TABLES

Conrad Schirokauer

8.

xi

215

Glossary

255

Index

263

2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2. 7. 2.8. 2.9. 2. IO. 2.1 1. 2.1 2. 2. 13. 2. 14. 2.15. 4.1. 5. 1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 7. 1. 7.2. 7.3.

Population by H ousehold Prefectures with Popula tion Inc rease Population of Yin Co unt y Population of S he Co unt y Popul a tio n of T an-t'u Cou nty Population of Hang-chou Population of H a ng-cho u Frequency Distribution of Tax S ta tions F req ue ncy Distribution of Tax S tat ions Amount of Autumn T ax Ri ce Population C ha nge in Hu-chou Diked Lands in Hu -chou Population C ha nge in Hui-chou Irri gati on Ponds in Hui-c hou Number of Chi11-shih H o lders Land Tax a nd Labor Service Re quirement s Sung Monopoly and Silk Revenues Annua l Cash Inco me Monopoly Incomes Salt Produc ti on Quotas Dates Whe n Chi11 -shih Received Me mbe rs of "Spurious Learning C lique" Op po nents of "Spurious Learning"

17 18 21 21 21 22 23 25 27 30 34 35

38 39 41 96 111

11 2 11 3 11 6

168 185 185

Abbreviations

HTCTC HWHTK KFFC LS MHL MHLC

PCSMC PMHP

SHY SL SS SYHA

Abbreviations Used in the Text

TCKC APT CKCHL CKFC

cs CSPM CTYL CWTS CYTC HCP

Ch'en Ch'un, Ao-po t'u 1.4liibt~ Li kang, Ching-k'ang ch'uan-hsin lu !ftll'~WJf~f~ Ssu-pu pei-yao ed. Sun Feng-chi, Chih-kuanfen-chi ij~'B'5.Hc. Ssu-k'u chen-pen ed., Shanghai 1934-5. T'o T'o et al, Chin-shih ~~ 0 Po-na pen ed. Feng Chi, comp., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo *~*c.IJl:*;f( KHCPTS ed., Taipei 1956. Li Ching-te, comp., Chu-tzu yu-lei ¼rMHllo Chiu wu-tai shih rtfnfl;:~ Po-na pen ed. Li Hsin-ch'uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi ~~l:J*f!}] !fftUco Reprint of Shih-yuan ts'ung-shu ed., Taipei 1967. Li Tao, Hsu tzu-chih t'ung-chien ch'ang-pian aft~i'sillll{df Chekiang shu-chu ed., 1881. Shen Fu-yi, Hsiang-Ju hsien chih iif¥ff\\%~ 1898 ed. Li Hsin-ch'uan, Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu ~~].:J*~~ ~&ffc KHCPTS ed. Huang Chen, Huang-shih jih-ch'ao fen-lei l Ut B tP:B-ffio 1767 woodblock ed. 0

0

0

0

0

~

HFHC HNYL

0

0

0

HSJC

[xiv]

TFSL THY TLT TML TPHY ITSL WHTK

YFCY YH

xv

Pi Yuan, comp., Hsu tzu-chih t'ung-chien fl~i'Elil!Hfi Kuchi ch'u-pan-she ed., Peking 1957. Wang Ch'i, Hsii wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao ij't:3'.l::!ll!,ljfil~ KHCPTS ed. Kuan Chieh-chung, K'ai-feng Ju chih OOtJfff~ 1863 ed. T'o T'o et al, Liao-shih ~~ 0 Po-na pen ed. Meng Yuan-lao, Twzg-ching meng-hua lu * }5f)!f.l1H:!fe Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu ed. Tung-ching meng-hua Ju chu *~W,:l)!$ffcial develop men t we can pe rhaps appreciate tha t some seeds o f c ri s is we re co ntai ned w ithin Su ng p rosperit y. T he re is some evide nce tha t

or

8

JOHN W. H AEGE R

Sung K 'ai-feng may have prospered too much and begun to suffer from a twelfth-century strain of urban blight. Calcu lation s of population density are diffic ult to make with precision. but the crowdin g in some quarters of the old city must have been excru ciating, expeciall y if we envision (as we must) that traditional north C hinese one-story houses had not given very much way to the two- and three-story dwelling places of later H ang-chou. Mr. Krac ke finds some inter esting evidence that the oldest and wealthie st official families of the North ern Sung may have moved their primary places of re sidence from the traditional residential quarters to the hilly suburbs of K 'ai-feng before the end of the eleventh century l eaving the "center city" to the increasing profusion of merchants. craftsmen and nouveaux ri ches. There were repeated effo rt s to clean and beautify the bustling bu t esthetically unedifying capital, and Emperor Hui-tsung even encouraged a mild mania for rock gardens which imitated in miniature the majestic drama of wilderness landscape. While th e great cities of th e south apparently escaped the worst aspects of K 'ai-feng's distress, at least for the duration of Southern Sung. the countryside suffered in another way from excess growth. Mr. Shiba points o ut that the widening differentiation between urban and rural areas not onl y co ntributed to the gradual creation of an identifiable "urban" class. possessed of di stinctive interests and a distinctive mode of life, but al so worked to the disadvantage of th e countryside. which tended to bear more and more of the total tax burden levied by the government. Partiall y because C hinese government never really adjusted to the idea that weal th was separable from the land. partially because the complexity of commercial organization defied the full comprehension of nonspec ialist offic ials. and partiall y because the nouveaux riches and their families became rapidl y influential in government circles. the state was never able to derive proporti onate revenue fro m the cities and fro m commerce. relying instead on th e land, which th ey had taxed fro m the beginning of time. By the encl of Southern Sung much of the countryside had been impoveri shed by the selfsame forces which had s parked the agric ultural and co mme rc i al r evo lution s in the first place. The sour fruit of prosperit y itself was by no means the o nl y source of problems for the Sung. Fro m the very beginning of the dynasty . C hao K'u ang-yin's decision to limit the court's military strength. set against the increasing restlessness of t he Ji_irchen and Khitan. made fora season of traumatic encou nters between the Sung and it s northern neighbors. My own essay and Mr. Peterson ·s are devoted to th e formulation of Sung policy in the fac e o f major threats to their nation al security: mine in respect to the C hin attack o n K 'ai-feng in the winter of I 125-26, Mr.

/ 111rod11ctio11

9

Peterson's in respect to the Mongol attack on the C hin in 12 1 I and their sL1bsequent conquest of no rth C hina. In both cases the external cri sis precipitated a majo r policy debate be t ween high officials of moderate persuasion and a group of hard-line irredentists. who favored the adoption of a more aggressive posture and held o ut the promise that part s of north Chi na could and should be recovered from barbarian rule. In I 126 the moderates showed an unmistakable reluctance to admit that a crisi s had actually occ urred and a preference for believing that a ri ght-ordered world was still intact. They comforted them selves at ever y indication of no rmalcy and steadfastly refu sed to commit themse lves to any major military action. which might have catapulted generals into significant positions of leadership. The apparent determination to frame policy according t o co nditions rather than principles which characterized the moderate positio n in both crises ma y be deceptive. ho wever: while the irredenti st voice is shriller. the comparat i ve silence or the moderates is more C hinese. and probabl y denotes an almos t unutterable faith in th e verit y of Confucian principles even under fire. Mr. Trauzettel's essay provides another perspective o n the world views which lay behind the moderate and irredentist positions. In the context or a general dec line of emphasis o n th e concentric. radiant world order or Han and Tang desc ribed in the concept of r 'i en-hsia, and the conc urrent development of a more circumscribed , less grandiose vision of C hin a's place in the world th e moderat es (o r pacifi st s. in Mr. Trauzettel's phrase) were the dying universalists. while the irredentists renounced universalism. and considered the barbarian s as enemies of th e fatherland. the fatherl and qua kuo, not as potential members of the cultural oik11111e11e. The tran sformatio n of empire into co untry was probably rooted too firml y in th e Sung approach to history and value to have been a w holly partisan issue, however . and the moderate s apparcntl y abandoned their share of universalism too. On the one hand they maint ained that t he encl of t he Confucian state was the whole end, on the other the y wer e prepared to recognize th at the Ii mits of their effective power no longer coinc ided with the farthest edges o f C hinese cultural inlluence. and they took occasional perverse pleasure at the mimicr y of C hinese social and political institutions by the Jiirchen and Khitan. Ideas were more than a backdrop for political debate. however. and at the end of the twel fth century. intell ectual and political cri ses het:ame interwove n. Mr. Schirokauer's essay desc ribe s the bitter dcha tc ove r "spurious learning." wh ich had its ori gins in the genuine Nco-Confucian effort to sort throu gh the parentage of ideas. was fueled by factional politics and personal grudges. and finall y led to a temporary ban on th e most influential thinkers of th e day. Whil e th e direction of

10

JO H N W . H AEGE R

N eo-Confuc ia n tho ug ht after th e e nd of N o rthern Sung was certainl y toward the esta blishme nt of inte llectu al lines of descent fro m c lass ical masters, free fro m the e laboratio ns of Ha n and T'a ng scho la rs, and while this was probably related to the socio-inte llectua l effect of the loss of no rth C hina and the recognitio n of S ung's unique c harac ter , the spurio us learning cris is is remarka ble fo r its ra the r poo r re flection of socia l, econo mic or regio nal d ivis io ns in society. In purely inte llectua l terms too, it was filled with sound a nd fury s ig nify ing little , except a ma nifest de s ire fo r ideological no rma lc y to e nd a lo ng period of rap id c ha nge w hic h had invo lved mo re people in the world of ideas tha n a ny age before o r s ince. One of the unifying themes in Sung response to c risis is forma lism . In descri bing the evolutio n of K'ai-fe ng, Mr. Krac ke ide ntifies fo rmalis m as the o bverse of pragmatis m. T o counter the rela ti ve permissiveness and spontane it y of the te nth century a nd the conseque nt disorder of the city's growth , effo rts were made in the second half of the eleventh century to broaden some of the major ave nues, to relocate gates symmetrically in the walls a nd a bove a ll to cha nge the na mes of s treets, gates and landma rks to eradicate localisms a nd evide nces of s po nta neity and to replace these with class ical a llusions symbo lizing the proper configuratio n of a n im perial capita l. Mr. Kracke also notes the ana logy be tween this stru ctural fo rmalism in the re novatio n of K' ai-feng and the te nde ncy of major reform progra ms in Northern Sung to grow mo re sweeping, mo re utopia n and mo re decorated with c lass ical precede nts, and less res po ns ive to s pecific proble ms o r abuses. Altho ugh reform began as a genuine re spo nse to the problems and possibilities of social change in the post-T'a ng period, it e nded as a me thod of governa nce in its own right. At court, legislatio n began to overpowe r adju d ication as the centra l posture of gove rnment, and even c rises we re met no t with ind ividua l decis io ns toward a single s pecified co urse of actio n, but with ba rrages of plan ning a nd new law. C rises we re also me t by a se cond variatio n o n fo rma lis m: re newed e mphasis o n symbo lic o rder. N o thing was mo re im porta nt in the wake of the C hin attac k in 1 126 tha n pro pe r a r ra nge me nt s fo r Hui -t s un g' s o rd e rl y abd icati o n and C h'in-ts ung's accessio n to the th ro ne. Contemporaries perceived tha t when the real wo rl d was d isarra yed , artific ia l o rder in matte rs of cere mo ny parti all y compensated. T he world of titles, rank a nd symbols was no t an illusio n, but the mirror of realit y, a nd the refo re a lso an instrument fo r the adjustme nt of reality. F ina ll y, M r. Schi roka uer's pa per s uggests that a third vari atio n on forma lis m is orthodoxy. The te nde ncy to claim e xclus ive access to the truth a nd to cast disagreeme nts in the vocab ul ary of error and perversio n was very stro ng in tao-hsueh fro m

I II trod11ct ion

II

its beginning in the firs t yea rs of Southern Sung. D ecades of bitter debate, inc luding some unseeml y c ha racter assass inati o n. did nothing to ins till a sense of inte llectual humilit y o r relativit y a mo ng S ung thinkers: o n the contrary it seemed to intens ify the desire for o ne , depe nda ble, o rthodox truth. But in this respect , it was le ft to the Y iian to comple te S ung wo rk - the re was no certified o rthodoxy until C hu H si's comme ntaries o n the class ics we re made sta ndard fo r the purpose of state e xaminatio n in 13 13. While the effo rt to ac hie ve clear. dec is ive his to rical pe rio dizati o n is obvio us ly moc ked by the cert aint y tha t each mo ment ho lds within its e lf some vestige of the pas t and some seed of the future, it may still be useful to distinguish broad ly betwee n N o rthe rn a nd Southe rn Sung. Mr. Mc Knight's essay calls atte ntio n to the transitio nal c ha racte r of Northe rn Sung. With its roo ts in Ho-na n. it was in a sense the la s t successo r state o f the T'ang and t he natu ra l he ir to man y as pects o f T'a ng c ulture a nd ins titutio ns. Much of this it resented . howeve r , and found burde nsome to the development of its own pe rso na lit y. By cont ras t, lhe geograph y of Southe rn Sung d id no t even inc lude the o ld heartl and of C hinese c ulture, a nd its his to ry ris ked compariso n o nl y with N o rthern S ung, never w ith the T'a ng. U nli ke Northe rn S ung, whic h had to sort o ut a complicated heritage full o f a lien influe nce and exotic overl ay a nd had to build unit y fro m the piecemeal conquest of a doze n splinter sta tes , the so uthern d ynasty sta rted fro m a re lati vely clean slate. T he ninth so n of Hui-ts ung, w ho ha d never been G rand He ir o r pre pa red in an y way to rule, was a rrested fleeing in th e co untrys ide a nd enth ro ned; a new capita l was virtua ll y built fro m scratc h beginning in 11 29 ; a nd the political and econo mic cente rs of gra vity we re fina ll y made to coinc ide. T he Southe rn S ung was a " fi nanc ia l" sta te in a way the no rthern d y nasty co uld never have been : wealth y c it y-dwellers came powerfull y c lose to establis hing a d istincti ve urban class, and socia l leaders hi p in the countrys ide was lo dged firml y in the hands of men whose o nl y common c harac te ristic was the ir wealth. In the e nd , the loss of the north was less a li beratio n tha n a new constraint. The practi cal proble ms of provid ing ror a cons iderable influ x of nort hern refugees, most of the m unreconc i lc d to se pa ra ti o n fro m th e ir a nces tra l ho m es , was a d ded to th e immense psycho logical burden of being cut off fro m the roots of C hinese civilizatio n. T he materia l comfo rts of li fe in the southeast never e ntire ly ulrset an atmosphere of impe rmane nce. The e legant a nd c harming new ca pital at H a ng-cho u , the largest city in th e medieval world, they called hsi11g-1.rni, the " ha lting place." T heir ho uses a nd even the ir public buil dings we re built of wood, w hich in spite of a d va nced urban services, l"rcq ue ntl y we re consumed in fla me. The ir poetry is pervaded with int ro-

12

JOHN W. HAEGER

spective mela nc holia expressed in the juxtaposition of southe rn pleas ure a nd beauty with e motiona l co mmitment to the north. Perhaps the men o f Southern Sung sensed so me la rger his torical imperma nence in their expe rie nce. The final approach to the significance of Sung is to see w ha t did not happen, to estimate what in the e nd was n o t ac hi eved. The T'a ng-S un g transition is rea l enoug h , b ut th e Sung-Ytian (or eve n S ung- Ming) transitio n seems ro ugher by compariso n. The roads which led to Southe rn S ung, in both a lite ral a nd figurative sense, led nowhe re, a nd th e process of historical evolutio n was in o ne se nse interru pted. The agric ultural revolution o n whic h markets. commerce a nd c ities had been based was eve ntua ll y reversed, a nd the countrys ide s lowly red uced, first to subsistence a nd then to povert y. As Mr. M cKnig ht points o ut , the Yti an re infused so uth C hina with Tang values, essentia lly northern ideas abo ut th e organizatio n of socie t y a nd the management of economy , w hic h had passed from T'ang to Y i.ian through Liao a nd C hin. The leveling of socia l distinctions based o n ascribed c haracte ristics and the beginnings o f capitalist e nte rprise were essentia ll y e nded. Introspection a nd s ubtlety gave way to e remitism o n the o ne ha nd a nd to a bruta l cosmopolita nis m on the ot he r. With the drowning of Ping-ti in 1279 and the fall of H a ng-c ho u to a Mo ngol army, the great Sung experiment was over. The effort to co nfro nt the pressure of socia l a nd economic quickening a nd the aggression of settling no ma ds with modesty. rationalism and fo rma lism had produced a ge nero us a nd b rillia nt age, bu t no mo re permanence than the crudes t forms of power.

Urbanization and the Development of Markets in the Lower Yangtze Valley YOSHINOBU SHIBA

DU RING T H E PER IOD from the eighth to the thirtee nth ce nturies C hinese society unde rwent a great transforma ti o n. Among the most st riking l'c atures of this c ha nge were the rapid growth and di vers ification of trade. the deve lo pme nt towa rd a mo ney econo m y w ith adequa te fac ilities for the transfer of fund s and th e provision of c redit. the progressive urba niza ti o n of socie ty. a nd the growth to prosperity o f an urban c lass with its own distinctive c ulture. Kato S higes hi, a pioneer in C hinese economic his tory, pointed o ut the enormo us progress in urbanization during the Tang-S ung trans itio n. H e e mphas ized the fo llowing developme nts: ( I ) the rapid decline of the o ld "ward sys tem" a nd "official ma rke t system" a lo ng with the co llapse o f rest ric tio ns whic h theoreti call y co nfi ned ac tivities of merc hants a nd a rtisans to specific "wards" of c ities se rving as adm inist rati v e ce nters and (2) th e pro lifera ti on of inte r co nn ected s m a ll a nd me dium-s ized marketplaces th ro ug ho ut the country. indicative o f the rrogressive commerciali zatio n of the peasa nt eco nomy. 1 Kato a lso s uggested that through the a na lysis of s tatistical data on the commercia"i tax whic h has s urvived in the S 1111g hui-yao, 2 the nationwide pattern o f t he distribution of urban centers could be estima ted. T his line of inquiry has been developed in st udies by E ti e nne Balazs3 a nd Lau rence J . C. Ma. 4 O the r economic his to ri ans have cont ri buted mu c h toward eluc idati o n of the eco no mi c background of urbanization and toward st ud y o f lh~ re la tio nship between urba ni zatio n a nd the overall c haracte r of the so cia l d ivis io n of labor. C h\ian H a n-she ng did much to explai n the exlc ns io n o f interlocal trade centered a t state ca pitals, large regional c ities. and temple fa irs. a nd the functio n of these markets as collection und d istribution ce nte rs fo r vario us kinds o f staple goods. 5 Miyazaki

1131

14

YOSHINOBU SH IB A

Ichisada has discussed the ge neral tendency for rural populations to co ncentrate in urban centers. the relative wealth of the new urban populatio ns and the sharp disparity in the dis tribution of wealth between a few rich in vestors o n the one hand and the majority of petty entrepreneurs on the o ther. According to Miyazaki. the State Trade System (3rd/ I 072) was a measure which extended gove rnme nt loan facilities to s mall merc ha nts whose businesses would otherwise have s uffe red from the s tringe ncy of capital. 6 Studies of the development of Sung c ities in terms of the state's financial control have only recently begun. These have already demonstrated , however, the considerable growth of c itizens' private rights , the inc reased impo rtance of urba n owne rs hip as a lucrati ve source of income, and the concomitant introducti o n of taxes on city houses and lands.7 Sudo Yos hi yuki a nd others have collected a great deal of data regarding small market towns and rural market-gatherings in Sung times, and have pursued various lines of inquiry co ncerning their o rigin, etymology and function. 8 Fujii Hiros hi , in a stud y concerning the relations hip between the development of rural markets a nd long-distance trade under the Sung, maintained that a qualitative change in the nat ure of internal trade took place during the T'ang-Sung trans itio n. H e proposed three esse ntia l elements o f this c hange: ( I) commodities collected and dis tributed by itinera nt merchants were, from Sung times on, no longer limited to luxury goods for the ri ch, but grew to inc lude dail y necessities for a broader base o f the population, including petty rural landow ne rs and the poor: (2) farmers in various regions of C hina were no longer economically self-s uffic ie nt. b ut were in vo lved in a ne two rk of inte rna l trade ; a nd (3) internal trade was no longer confined to urban and quasi-urban areas, but extended to inc lude border villages located far from majo r cities. 9 This qualitative c hange in agrarian economy and in rural society has a lso been emphasized by many o ther scho lars. 10 D enis Twitchett, whose studies have stressed the overall patte rn of rura l development during the T'ang-Sung trans itio n. has postulated that the hierarc hy o f se ttleme nts in the provinces see ms to have c hanged from t he comparatively s imple pattern of village--admini strative town (hsie11) in the earl y T'ang, when the intermed iate category of s mall country town without adm inis trative status was still rare, to a more co mplex mode l village - - subordinate (marke t) town - - adm inistrative town by Sung times. This hierarchy of settlements was essentia lly an econom ic a nd social one, a nd was both forma ll y and functionally completely indepe nde nt of the purely fiscal-administrati ve hierarc hy of Ii-- hsiang-- hsien whic h provided the loca l government with its c hai n of command in the countryside. O nly at the level o f the county town did the two systems co me together. 11

Urbanizarion and Develop111e111 of Markets

15

Twi tchett a lso argued tha t in T'ang times every co unty capita l was ipso facto an administrative center, a nd was norma lly a ma rk et ce nte r as well. 12 In spite of the acc umul atio n of s uch research, the full dimensions of the process of urba nization and the operation of markets in Sung times are not yet clear. For example, in previous studies villages and cities have not been considered together as parts of a s ingle syste m. Further, relative ly little research has been done on small urban centers, in contrast with the detailed informa tion available regarding large urban centers. Nor have the demographic and socia l aspec ts of Sung urbanization bee n adequa tely studied. To go a s tep further in researching the c ities a nd markets of Sung times, we need to concentrate o ur efforts on a few particular regio ns. The lower Yangtze valley, * which was the mos t developed region economically a nd which had the la rges t concentratio n of major cities in the co untry, will be the focus of atten tio n in this paper. What follows is therefore an inquiry which first explores the general features of urbanization in the lower Yangtze, and the n proceeds to focus o n particular prefectures (Hu-cho u and Hui-c hou) to demonstrate the difference be tween leve l a nd hilly dis tricts in commercia l development. Fina ll y, lhe impact of urbani za tion o n Sung culture a nd the response of the s ta te to this socia l change will be discussed. The general features of urbanization in the lower Yangtze valley inc lude population concentrat ion a nd its re lations hip to the process of urbanizatio n, density of urban compared with rural population, the rearrange ment of administrative divisions in prefectures and counties, and lhe economic background of urbanization.

Population Concentration and Urbanization Prior to considering the rapid rise of urban centers, towns, and ma rket-assemblies throughout the lower Yangtze valley during the peri od from late T'ang to Sung, it should be kept in mind that this change was paralleled by another important development: the tremendous mo vement in the mass of C hina's population from the northe rn plains lo the mountainous south and to the southeast coast. To be s ure, this southward migration had a lo ng history eve n before the T'ang, but its magnitude in spatial extent, in number of mig rants, and in degree of res ulta nt sinification of the south exceeded previous population moveme nts by a great deal. Even later counterpa rts, such as the moveme nt 10 Manchuria and Mongki ang under the Manchu conquest, could not " "The lower Yangtze valley" refers to the area includ ing the south of the Yangtze River in present-day Kiangsu and A nhwei. together with the whole territory of C hekiang.

16

YOS HI NO BU SHI BA

17

Urba 11iz.a tio11 a11d De1·elop1111'11/ of Ma rkets TABLE 2.1.

matc h th e enormous scope of the T'ang-Sung migration. T he increase in southern population did not, o f cour se, occur solel y as a result of immigration from the north. H igher populati on figures can also be accounted for by the natural incr ease in indigenous population as well as by intensified effort s on the part of the government t o r egister previousl y uncounted popu lation. Nonetheless. migration was the primary reason for sudden populati on growth. In thi s regard. a brief review of the demographic change bet ween the Sui and the Sung w ill be instructi ve. According to the census of 606. only 23 percent of registered households li ved in the south, and 77 percent li ved in the north. By 742. however, the southern population had grown to 43 percent of the whole empire. T able 2. 1 show s prefectura l population by households in the years 606 and 742, du ring w hich time the population mor e than doubled in each prefecture. The following proposi tions could be advanced on the basis of this table: ( I ) in regions where both the ratio and the amount of incr ease were high (northern C hekiang, southern K iangsu, and Fukien), the population had increased at a normal rate befor e the Sui , but began t o incr ease at a swi fter pace thereafter because a great deal of land was still open for settlement. (2) In regions where the ratio of incr ease was relati vel y low but the amount o f increase was high (the C hengtu basin. the lower reaches of the Y angtze valley, and the mouth of the Pearl Ri ver valley). the same pace of increase was maintained from th e earliest periods until mid-T'ang times. (3) I n hitherto underdeveloped areas where the rat io of increase was high w hile th e amount was low(Lu-chou on the upper course of the Yangtze. and northern Ki angsi), the ra pid incr ease following the Sui was due to migration. (4) T he population in the southernmost provinces of K wang-nan. northern Hunan, so uthwes tern Szechwan. and southern Kiangsi remained almost unchanged. (5) T he relati ve balance of populat ion between the north and the sout h was completely alter ed. 13 D uring the mid-T'ang and Su ng the sou th ward migration was accelerated by soc ial disorder in th e north and by the transfer of the Sung capital to H ang-chou. T he predominance of the sou thern populati on over the north ern was decisi ve: 65 percent in the south . 35 per cent in the north. M oreover. the pattern o f population distribution was somew hat diffe rent from th at of the T'ang, as shown in T able 2.2. Gener all y. the front line of migrati on moved from middle and southern Cheki ang. southern A nhwei. northern Kiangsi , and middle and southern Hunan to the hitherto sparsel y settled areas of Fukien. centra l Anhwei. eastern Hupei, southern K iangsi, eastern Kwangtung, and the upper reaches of the Pearl Ri ver valley in K wangsi. A lth ough

Po pulation by Household in 606 and 742. Modern Prnvince

Pref cc tu re in T'a ng

Chckiang

C h"ii . Wu . Wen. Tai . Ch'u Lu Mu Fu, C h'ii an, Chien. Ting. ('hang Ssu. Hu. Hang

Szcchwan C hekiang Fukien Kiangsu and C hekian Chekiang A nhwei Szechwan K iangsu H unan and K wanglll ng Kiangsi Szcc hwan Szcchwan Anhwci Hunan Kwangsi S1.cchwan

Szeehwan

S1.cchwan Si.c1· the empress. e mpress dowager. o r grand empress dowagers . kindred of consorts o f lhc first rank and above. kindred of all c ivil and military serving oflicial s of the third rank 11ml above. the kindred of those of great me rit li ving in common. and the kin living in common with dukes of states (k110-k 1111i:). shall be exempt from tax and labour service." i\ cons iderable part of N iida ·s reconstruction is acceptable. and in my own recon, trnction of the Tang rul es. I have la rgdy fol lowed his version. The changes I have

T,,ry,,

BRlAN E. Mc KNIGHT

84

Unfortunately for the Tang the systems on which these privileges rested were far from stable. When the dynasty was founded, social practice already diverged from the ass umptio n which underlay the land redistribution system: tha t land was not alienable by its holders. Land was being bought, sold, and mortgaged in an economy fast recovering from the depression of post-Han times. The growing gulf between the reality of private landowne r ship and the theory of government-controlled land tenure was particularly critical in a n agrarian state where the military and fiscal systems were so closely tied to the land system. By the early eighth century the disparity had become obvious, and some piecemeal attempts were made to reform parts of the total a rrangement, but it was not until the rebellion of An Lu-shan that the state leaders at las t began to grope towards a thorough and fundamental reorganization. One of the changes which followed the rebellion is central to our concerns - the reform of land taxatio n and corvee finally embodied in the Twice-a-Year tax system of Yang Yen. Prior to the eighth century there had been taxes which fe ll on mos t Tang la ndholders, irrespective of their land-tax privileges. Now, under the financial burdens of the war, the state moved to extend a nd broaden s uch levies. In 7 69 cermade are s hown in italics. "All members of the impe ria l clan registered with the Department of Imperial Genealogy. and a ll kindred of the fifth degree or c loser of the empress. empress dowage r. or grand e mpress dowagers . fi rst degree kindred of co_nsorts _of the first degree or above. ww1dj,11hers. }t11hers. or brothers of co11c11b111e.~ oj the Jijth degree or above, relatives of civil and military servi ng officia ls _of the t_htrd rank and above. first mourning degree relatives of princes of commandcnes lTw1tc hett dele ~es this phrase in his translatio n] . relatives of the ta-kung ,h-gree of '."'!'"'!'"g 11·/to are l,v111g in tile same household 11·iril princes of co111111. 83 7 - 38). That P'eng Yen's proposals were w ithout issue despite the conc urre nce nf the _e!11peror 1s !11ade c lear 111 the memorial of Yang Yen in 780 whic h c learl y reveals lh~ pnvtleged pos111on _o f l_he clergy. and b y the documents from the period of t he Huic it ang s upp~ess_ion w hic h md,cate that the desire to inc rease the number o f ho useholds l111blc to the r w1cc-a- Year tax was o ne consideratio n in the minds of policymakers. TH y ~7 _'TC. 14.6b (p._ 424). T h is is calculated in the following way. One saltern has ten furnaces each of_ w h1~h pro_duces 1,800 chin or 36 1w! _per day: t hus eac h saltern prod uces 1_8.000 th111 daily. W rth ten clays o f nun. a n aclch11onal 20 a re fa lsely reported as having inclement weather. Therefore 20 x 18.000 = 360.000. ·

120

E DM UN D H . WORTHY

of control over production. Huai-nan's quota was 2.683 ,7 11 tan per year, but its 411 furnaces were only a small fraction of the numb~r in Liang-che. 4 5 Operating at the pre-techno logical advance rate of thirtysix tt111 per day, each furnace woul d o n the average require I_14 day~ to meet its quota . Obviously Huai-na n salters had little e xtra time dunng a season to manufacture no n- quota salt. This comparison s uggests that Liang-che furnaces were simply too numerous to be s ubject to effec ti ve control. It would have been far better for Liang-c he admi nistrato rs to have reduced dras tically the number of furnaces a nd demand a greater production from each o ne, yet there is only o ne recorded instance of s uch a measure be ing taken in Liang-c he. In 11 74 the eight ch'ang of T ai and Wen-c hou eliminated al most 170 furnaces , but even so, 302 remained.46 Given so many furnaces it was impe rative that production controls be strictly enforced. A hasty recapitulati on of the steps in the production process as presented in th e Ao-po 1'11 s upple me nted with information fro m other sources will show how and to what extent controls were practiced. Evidently they were not imposed until the boiling s tage. Prior to th is, salte rs had to undertake extensive preliminar y work in the preparation of the brine to be boiled. First a nd foremos t. this involved s ubstantial hydraulic works, fo r the sea water had to be drawn up to the drying beds (t'a11-ch'ang) through a series of pumps and ditc hes. Moreover , as the drying beds were-necessaril y near the sea , and on high ground if possible, the construction of loc ks a nd dikes was ma ndato ry if high tides and s torms were no t to flood the beds. A flooded bed would be as long as a week in dry ing out. 4 7 The labor req uired for these hydraulic works and the ir upkeep meant th at a ll members of salters' fam ilies in additio n to hired laborers had to pool the ir effo rts. T he dryi ng beds were surrounded by ditches from which the brackish water was methodicall y dipped o nto each bed. In the s ummer months it took one day before the bed woul d dry and form salty particles (also called /,11i) but in the w inter. two o r th ree days. 48 These partic les would be swept up and placed in the nearby percolating vat to which was connected a n underground s torage well via a ba mboo pipe. Sea water pou red into the vat wou ld filter through the layers of crystallized particles a nd ashes, a nd finally pass as brine into the s torage well . The brine was then transported, by boat or in buckets toted by porters, to the furnaces, two or three of which were gro uped into a t'uan , at least in Yi.ian ti mes.4 9 These t'uan had walls b uilt a round the m to protect th e bri ne stored there and any salt boiled within the confines. It is at this point that controls were ins titutional-

Regional Control in Salt Administration

121

ized. There were regulations concerning the use of the brine, the s tarting a nd stopping of the fi res, a nd the size of the boiling caldrons. In the mid-eleventh century Lu Ping, in a n effort to restrict illicit sales of salt, fi xed the number of boilings a nd caldrons. 50 However, by 1138 an official complained th at for a nu mber of years the ru les regard ing the s tarting a nd stopping of boiling fires had been abolished so that there was no way to know how much salt salters ma nufac tured' nor any way to control the amount produced. 51 A long sealed memorial of I 163 s uggesting specific reforms in the sal t ad ministration had muc h to say abo ut the control offires a nd caldro ns: l~a_lt pr~ductio nj her etofore has had establi shed regu lations. Caldrons were d1v1ded_ !nto thr~e classes, each having a n order [of useJ .... F or example at ~ne bollmg session [one] could boil so muc h salt. The starting and stopping times of the fires were set. Eac h time [o ne] came to start a fire the product ionsupervisory ch'an? a ppli~d fo r the brine solut ion. As soon as [one! stopped the fi re, (the official) immediately co llec ted !the salt! and store