Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII 9780814768877

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE NOMOS

XXVII

NOMOS Lieber-Atherton, Publisher s I Authorit y 1958 , reissued i n 198 2 b y Greenwoo d Pres s II Communit y 195 9 III Responsibilit y 196 0 IV Libert y 196 2 V Th e Publi c Interes t 196 2 VI Justic e 1963 , reissued i n 197 4 VII Rationa l Decisio n 196 4 VIII Revolutio n 196 6 IX Equalit y 196 7 X Representatio n 196 8 XI Voluntar y Association s 196 9 XII Politica l an d Lega l Obligatio n 197 0 XIII Privac y 197 1 XIV Coercio n 197 2 XV Th e Limit s o f La w 197 4 XVI Participatio n i n Politic s 197 5 N e w Yor k Universit y Pres s XVII Huma n Natur e i n Politic s 197 7 XVIII Du e Proces s 197 7 XIX Anarchis m 197 8 XX Constitutionalis m 197 9 XXI Compromis e i n Ethics , Law , an d Politic s 197 9 XXII Propert y 198 0 XXIII Huma n Right s 198 1 XXIV Ethics , Economics , an d th e La w 198 2 XXV Libera l Democrac y 198 3 XXVI Marxis m 198 3 XXVII Crimina l Justic e 198 5 XXVIII Justificatio n i n Ethics , Law , an d Politic s (in preparation ) XXIX Authorit y Revisite d (in preparation )

NOMOS XXVII

Yearbook o f th e America n Societ y fo r Politica l an d Lega l Philosoph y

CRIMINAL JUSTIC E Edited b y

J. Rolan d Pennock , Swarthmore College and

John W . Chapman , University of Pittsburgh

New Yor k an d Londo n • New Yor k Universit y Pres s • 1985

Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII edited b y J. Rolan d Pennoc k an d Joh n W . Chapma n Copyright © 198 5 b y Ne w Yor k Universit y Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a Library o f Congres s Catalogin g i n Publicatio n Dat a Main entr y unde r title : Criminal justice . (Nomos ; 27 ) Bibliography: p . Includes index . 1. Crimina l law—Philosophy—Congresses . 2 . Crimina l law—Congresses. 3 . Punishment—Congresses . I. Pennock , J . Rolan d (Jame s Roland) , 1906 II. Chapman , Joh n Williams , 1 9 2 3 - III . Series . K5018.A3 198 3 345'.00 1 84-1477 6 ISBN 0-8147-6588- 2 (alk . paper ) 342.500 1 Clothbound edition s o f Ne w Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e Smyth-sew n an d printed o n permanen t an d durabl e acid-fre e paper .

CONTENTS

Contributors i

x

Preface x

i

Introduction 1 J. ROLAN D PENNOC K

PART I : T H E MORA L AN D METAPHYSICA L SOURCES O F T H E CRIMINA L LA W 1 The Moral and Metaphysical Sources of the Criminal Law 1

1

MICHAEL S . MOOR E

2 Intentionality

and the Concept of the Person 5

2

LAWRENCE ROSE N

3 The

Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Intent 7

8

MARTIN SHAPIR O

PART II : CONCERNIN G RETRIBUTIV E THEOR Y 4 Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and Ethical Problems 8

9

H U G O ADA M BEDA U

5 How

to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime 11

9

MICHAEL DAVI S

6 Retributivism

and the State's Interest in Punishment 15

6

JEFFRIE G . MURPH Y

7 A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law 16

5

R.B. BRAND T

vn

Vlll C O N T E N T

S

PART III : CRIMINA L RESPONSIBILIT Y I N GOVERNMENT 8 Criminal

Responsibility in Government 20

1

DENNIS F . THOMPSO N

9A

Comment on "Criminal Responsibility in Government" 24

1

CHRISTOPHER D . STON E

10 The

Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations 26

7

SUSAN W O L F

PART IV : T H E ECONOMI C THEOR Y O F CRIMINAL LA W 11 On

the Economic Theory of Crime 28

9

ALVIN K . KLEVORIC K

12 Comment

on "On the Economic Theory of Crime" 31

0

RICHARD A . POSNE R

13 Crime,

Kickers, and Transaction Structures 31

3

JULES L . COLEMA N

14 Is There an Economic Theory of Crime? 32

9

STEPHEN J . SCHULHOFE R

Bibliography 34

5

ANDREW C . BLANA R

Index 36

7

CONTRIBUTORS

HUGO ADA M BEDA U Philosophy, Tufts University ANDREW C . BLANA R Legal Studies, University of Pittsburgh R. B . BRAND T Philosophy, University of Michigan JULES L . COLEMA N Philosophy, University of Arizona MICHAEL DAVI S Philosophy, Illinois State University ALVIN K . KLEVORIC K Law, Yale University MICHAEL S . MOOR E Law, University of Southern California JEFFRIE G . MURPH Y Philosophy, Arizona State University RICHARD A . POSNE R Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit LAWRENCE ROSE N Anthropology, Princeton University STEPHEN J . SCHULHOFE R Law, University of Pennsylvania MARTIN SHAPIR O Law, University of California, Berkeley CHRISTOPHER D . STON E Law, University of Southern California DENNIS F . THOMPSO N Politics, Princeton University SUSAN WOL F Philosophy, University of Maryland ix

PREFACE

In hi s boo k The Political Tradition of the West, Frederic k Wat kins, a forme r presiden t o f th e America n Societ y fo r Politica l and Lega l Philosophy , calle d attentio n t o th e fac t tha t Wester n civilization, a s contraste d wit h th e grea t ethica l civilization s o f the East , i s a n essentiall y lega l civilization . Neithe r Confuciu s no r Gandhi ha d muc h us e fo r th e rul e o f law , and onl y recentl y hav e the Chines e begu n t o establis h a syste m o f crimina l law . Bu t th e standing an d operativ e ideal s o f th e Wes t hav e bee n freedo m under la w an d justic e accordin g t o th e law . Thes e ideal s hav e metaphysical an d religiou s origins . The ancien t Greek s hi t upo n th e ide a tha t w e liv e i n a n or dered universe ; the y conceive d thi s orde r a s bot h natura l an d moral. Thei r conceptio n o f justice carrie d th e meanin g o f th e divinely appointe d orde r o f th e world , an d thi s orde r wa s en forced b y Zeus . A s Hug h Lloyd-Jone s point s out , " A ma n wh o commits a n injustic e agains t anothe r ma n offend s Zeu s i n hi s capacity a s th e protecto r o f justice, s o tha t i f th e victi m o f suc h an ac t appeal s t o Zeus , h e wil l no t g o withou t redress." 1 Crim e is a n offens e agains t th e hono r o f Zeus . Christianity too k ove r fro m th e Greek s thi s crucia l belie f i n a morally ordere d universe , an d th e Christia n Go d became , lik e Zeus, a Go d o f justice . I n hi s monumenta l wor k o n th e lega l significance o f th e "Papa l Revolution " o f Gregor y th e Great , Harold J . Berma n demonstrate s tha t behin d tha t revolutio n wa s "the belie f i n a Go d o f justice wh o operate s a lawfu l universe , punishing an d rewardin g accordin g t o principle s o f propor tion, mercifull y mitigate d i n exceptiona l cases." 2 I n thi s meta physical perspective , "Th e Wester n la w o f crime s emerge d fro m a belie f tha t justice i n an d o f itself , justice an sich, requires tha t a violatio n o f a la w b e pai d fo r b y a penalty , an d tha t th e pen alty shoul d b e appropriat e t o th e violation." 3 A s i n th e cas e o f XI

Xll

PREFACE

Zeus, crim e wa s see n a s a n offens e agains t th e Christia n God' s honor an d a s suc h mus t b e vindicated . Today w e find a n ech o o f fundamenta l Gree k an d Christia n conviction i n Hyma n Gross' s "anti-impunity " justificatio n o f criminal punishment . Gros s says , "th e rule s o f conduc t lai d dow n in th e crimina l la w ar e a powerfu l socia l forc e upo n whic h so ciety i s dependen t fo r it s ver y existence , an d ther e i s punish ment fo r violatio n o f thes e rule s i n orde r t o preven t th e dissi pation o f thei r powe r tha t woul d resul t i f the y wer e violate d wit h impunity." 4 I n th e Wes t crimina l justice derive s fro m an d pre serves th e primordia l belie f i n a n objectiv e mora l order . This volum e i s base d o n paper s presente d a t th e twenty-sev enth Annua l Meetin g o f th e America n Societ y fo r Politica l an d Legal Philosophy . Ou r meetin g wa s organize d b y Owe n Fis s o f the Yal e La w School , an d w e al l ow e hi m ou r gratitude . I t too k place i n conjunctio n wit h th e 198 3 meetin g o f th e Associatio n of America n La w School s hel d i n Cincinnati . A s usual , th e ed itors o f NOMO S solicite d additiona l chapter s wit h a vie w t o making th e volum e mor e comprehensiv e wit h respec t t o point s of vie w an d issue s considered . Breaking wit h ou r standin g policy , th e editor s includ e a pa per tha t ha d bee n previousl y published , "Ho w t o Mak e th e Punishment Fi t th e Crime, " b y Michae l Davis . Withou t it , retributive theor y woul d hav e receive d scan t attention . W e ar e grateful t o th e edito r o f Ethics and t o th e autho r fo r permissio n to reprin t it . We than k ou r contributors , an d onc e agai n ou r specia l thank s go t o ou r peerles s editoria l assistant , Eleano r Greitzer . W e als o express ou r thank s t o th e Managin g Edito r o f Ne w Yor k Uni versity Press , Despin a Papazoglou , fo r he r patienc e an d help fulness. J.W.C. J.R.P.

Preface

Xlll

NOTES 1. Hug h Lloyd-Jones , The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley : Universit y o f Cal ifornia Press , 1971) , p . 55 . 2. Harol d J . Berman , Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Press , 1983) , pp . 529-30. 3. Ibid. , p . 194 . 4. Hyma n Gross , A Theory of Criminal Justice (Ne w York : Oxfor d Uni versity Press , 1979) , p . 401.

INTRODUCTION J. ROLAN D PENNOC K Books o n "justice " usuall y hav e relativel y littl e t o sa y abou t "criminal justice." Indeed , thi s topi c i s completel y absen t fro m John Rawls' s A Theory of Justice. NOMO S VI , Justice, discusse d criminal justice onl y tangentially , i n on e chapter . Justice, i n th e unqualified form , generally , perhap s especiall y today , suggest s distributive justice , o r socia l justice , whil e crimina l justice , al most b y definition , i s th e specia l concer n o f lawyers , althoug h of cours e philosopher s hav e ha d muc h t o sa y abou t th e justifi cation o f crimina l la w a s a whol e an d th e justification o f crimin alizing certai n act s an d o f wha t constitute s appropriat e punish ment fo r them . Ou r Societ y ha s devote d onl y par t o f on e o f it s sessions t o th e subject . (Se e th e si x chapter s o f Par t I I o f NO MOS III , Responsibility). Typically an d ver y roughly , thos e wh o theoriz e abou t crimi nal justice, an d especiall y abou t th e justification o f punishment , may b e classifie d a s utilitarian s (stressin g deterrence , incapaci tation, an d reform , wit h varyin g emphases ) an d deontologist s (whose concern s i n thi s contex t ar e wit h deser t and , mor e spe cifically, retribution) . Thi s issu e havin g bee n discusse d widel y in th e literatur e o f late , however , th e presen t volum e i s largely , but b y n o mean s exclusively , devote d t o othe r matters . (Issue s relating t o th e concep t o f retributio n ar e discusse d i n II. ) Part I opens , a s di d ou r meetings , wit h Michae l Moore' s pa per "Th e Mora l an d Metaphysica l Source s o f th e Crimina l Law, " which become s als o th e titl e o f thi s part . Confinin g himsel f t o the "genera l part " o f th e substantiv e crimina l law , he note s fou r 1

2

J. ROLAN D PENNOC K

principles tha t comprise , o r a t leas t ar e include d among , th e sources o f thi s branc h o f th e law . The y ar e (1 ) th e principl e o f accountability, (2 ) th e principl e tha t th e person s i n questio n mus t have ha d a fai r chanc e t o acquain t themselve s wit h th e norm s of thei r society , (3 ) th e principl e o f answerability , an d (4 ) th e principles o f justification an d excuse . Togethe r thes e principle s constitute a se t i n tha t the y i n tur n ma y b e justifie d b y som e more genera l principles , suc h a s responsibilit y o r liberty . The y themselves neithe r impl y no r depen d upo n an y particula r mo rality. The y ar e i n thi s sens e neutral . After a brie f consideratio n o f thes e mora l principles , Moor e turns t o th e secon d hal f o f hi s topic , whic h i s his mai n concern . It i s entailed b y th e mora l principle s alread y advance d tha t per sons ar e rationa l an d autonomou s agents . Thi s i s reveale d i n the concept s o f action , intention , negligence , causation , com pulsions, accountability , an d s o on . T h e majo r par t o f Moore' s chapter i s devote d t o a carefu l examinatio n o f th e concept s o f rational an d autonomou s agency . H e define s thes e terms , show s why the y ar e properl y terme d "metaphysical, " an d give s the m a partia l defense . Thi s defens e consist s i n th e attack s o f lega l realists, o r hermeneuti c skepticism , an d o f behaviora l skepti cism. I n general , hi s argument s agains t thes e source s o f skep ticism d o no t tak e th e for m o f contendin g tha t n o evidenc e coul d controvert th e metaphysica l belief s i n question . Rather , h e ar gues tha t thos e belief s ar e no t challenge d b y th e apparentl y competing view s derive d fro m psychiatry , behaviorism , socio biology, physiologica l psychology , an d compute r science . The nex t chapter , althoug h i t deal s wit h on e o f Moore' s mora l concepts, employ s a completel y differen t method . Lawrenc e Rosen i s a cultura l anthropologist . Hi s metho d i s comparativ e and, a s migh t b e expected , th e comparison s h e make s ar e o f strikingly differen t cultures—i n thi s cas e Islami c Morocco , me dieval Europe , an d ou r own . "Th e questio n o f th e concep t o f the person, " h e declares , "i s ofte n a t th e hear t o f th e wa y i n which a lega l syste m handle s issue s o f fac t an d fault , procedur e and remedy." l T h e concep t o f intentionalit y mus t b e place d i n the contex t o f cultura l definition s o f personality . H e believe s tha t the stud y o f Islami c la w an d o f th e developmen t o f th e concep t of personalit y i n medieva l Europ e wil l she d ligh t o n ho w idea s about th e individua l contribut e t o a gradua l shif t i n lega l con -

Introduction

3

cepts. H e goe s o n t o speculat e o n ho w competin g view s o f th e self hav e influence d th e formatio n o f th e concep t o f intention ally i n contemporar y America n law . H e conclude s tha t Englis h and America n la w ar e currentl y i n a stat e o f uncertaint y an d lack o f consensus . Mor e specifically , thi s lega l uncertaint y grow s out o f ou r psychologica l uncertaint y abou t ho w t o conceiv e th e self—whether a s a n "inne r self " o r a s a mor e sociall y deter mined one . Commenting o n Rose n an d Moore , Marti n Shapir o place s them i n th e broa d framewor k o f moder n trend s i n philosophy , while a t th e sam e tim e relatin g the m t o mor e specifi c lega l prin ciples. Wit h respec t t o th e latter , h e suggest s tha t th e differen t approaches t o inten t tha t Rose n finds a s betwee n Morocca n an d Western court s d o no t flow fro m a les s autonomou s versio n o f personhood amon g th e Muslims , a s Rose n argues ; rather , h e believes tha t i t i s th e Wester n secula r vie w a s oppose d t o th e religious approac h o f th e Islami c court s tha t accoun t fo r an y differences. Rose n errs , Shapir o believes , i n lookin g a t th e black letter la w o f Wester n countrie s rathe r tha n takin g a mor e real istic vie w o f th e judicia l process . Mor e broadly , h e hold s tha t Rosen's an d Moore' s difference s gro w ou t o f Moore' s construc tivism an d Rosen' s deconstructivism , th e latte r bypassin g th e commonsense approac h i n favo r o f th e dark , th e deep , an d th e peculiar. The nex t fou r chapters , comprisin g Par t I I o f thi s volume , all relate , mor e o r les s directly , t o th e issu e o f retribution . Hug o Bedau discusse s classification-base d sentencin g an d shows , amon g other things , tha t suc h system s indicat e th e directio n i n whic h retributivist theorie s lead . Classification-base d sentencin g scheme s are on e typ e o f determinat e sentencin g an d on e suc h schem e i s represented b y th e 198 0 proposal s o f th e Pennsylvani a Com mission o n Sentencing . Beda u devote s hi s chapter t o a close stud y of thes e proposals . T h e "guidelines " fo r sentencin g se t fort h b y these proposal s are , o n th e whole , base d o n retributiv e theory . They ar e followed , however , b y a lis t o f post-classificatio n fac tors tha t introduc e othe r considerations , th e effec t o f whic h i s to modif y retributivis m bot h b y consideration s o f equalit y an d equity an d als o b y thos e o f utility . Onl y i f suc h a syste m i s pu t into operatio n wil l i t b e possibl e t o se e wha t i t woul d lea d to . I t might wel l tur n ou t t o b e a n improvemen t bot h o n curren t la w

4

J . ROLAN D PENNOC K

and o n wha t a primaril y utilitaria n syste m o f sentencin g woul d provide. The followin g chapter , b y Michae l Davis , "Ho w t o Mak e th e Punishment Fi t th e Crime, " constitute s a departur e fro m stan dard NOMO S practic e i n tha t i t wa s no t writte n fo r NOMO S but ha s bee n previousl y published. 2 Recognizin g tha t a mai n difficulty confrontin g th e retributivis t i s that o f providin g prin ciples fo r determinin g th e natur e an d severit y o f th e punish ment t o b e mete d out , h e addresse s himsel f t o tha t proble m b y proposing an d defendin g a schem e tha t i s i n principl e practi cally identica l t o th e syste m discusse d b y Bedau— a two-stag e system i n whic h th e first stag e make s us e o f retributiv e princi ples, whil e th e secon d stag e introduce s othe r considerations . Hi s chapter comprise s a defens e a s wel l a s a n expositio n o f thi s kin d of system . Jeffrie Murph y raise s a n interestin g an d seldo m dis cussed questio n abou t th e retributiv e theor y o f punishment : not , Do criminal s deserv e certai n punishment ? but , I s i t righ t fo r th e state t o tak e i t upo n itsel f t o met e ou t suc h punishment ? I n Constitutional language , i s i t a "compellin g stat e interest, " an d one tha t coul d no t b e satisfie d b y mean s tha t ar e les s burden some t o fundamenta l rights ? The concludin g chapte r i n thi s par t i s Richar d Brandt' s " A Motivational Theor y o f Excuse s i n th e Crimina l Law. " I t i s no t an appraisa l o f retributiv e theory , bu t i t set s fort h a theor y o f excuses that , h e argues , provide s a philosophica l foundatio n fo r any soun d recommendation s tha t migh t b e derive d fro m retri butive theory—foundation s tha t h e finds lackin g i n tha t theory . His argumen t i s tha t crimina l liabilit y require s a "motivationa l fault" i n th e agent . Absen t suc h fault , th e agen t shoul d b e ex empt fro m punishment . Hi s theor y woul d brin g unit y i n th e la w where pluralit y no w reigns . It s substantiv e result s woul d closel y parallel existin g law , but woul d no t b e identica l wit h i t in al l cases. Divergences woul d generall y correspon d t o area s no w con tested amon g lega l scholar s o r abou t whic h the y sho w som e uneasiness. No t suprisingly , hi s theor y bear s a marke d resem blance t o th e ethica l theor y tha t h e ha s se t fort h elsewhere . H e contends tha t "lega l principle s ar e justified i f tha t moral system, which factuall y informe d an d rationa l person s woul d prefe r t o any othe r i f the y expecte d t o liv e unde r it , woul d cal l o n indi viduals t o obe y an d requir e official s t o enforc e them." 3 Ob -

Introduction

5

viously, whil e th e placemen t o f thi s chapte r i n thi s par t result s from th e bearin g i t ha s o n retributiv e theory , th e mai n thrus t of it s argumen t deal s wit h th e theor y o f excuses . Part II I o f thi s volum e deal s wit h th e specia l proble m (o f grea t importance i n moder n society ) o f crimina l responsibilit y i n gov ernment. Denni s Thompso n provide s th e lead-of f pape r fo r thi s discussion. Dealin g firs t wit h th e proble m o f crimina l responsi bility i n comple x organization s generally , h e argues , contrar y t o the "structuralis t thesis, " tha t w e hav e a stron g basi s fo r imput ing crimina l liabilit y t o official s i n organizations , whil e w e shoul d be war y o f imputin g organizationa l responsibilit y les t w e giv e organizations to o muc h autonom y an d punis h wher e i t i s un warranted. Turnin g t o governmenta l organizations , h e argue s that thei r specia l natur e doe s no t shiel d thei r official s fro m eve n stricter standard s o f liability . Similarl y wit h othe r mean s o f sanctioning conduct , suc h a s impeachment . "I n fact , concep t o f trust i s a bette r guid e fo r th e responsibilit y o f governmen t of ficials tha n i s th e concep t o f immunity." 4 Commenting o n Thompson' s chapter , Christophe r Ston e want s to hol d government s criminall y liabl e i n appropriat e cases , without bein g calle d a "structuralist, " althoug h h e wil l accep t thi s designation i f necessary . H e believe s tha t th e danger s o f th e structuralist thesi s ar e les s seriou s tha n Thompso n does . H e als o thinks Thompson' s argumen t i s deficien t becaus e i t fail s t o de velop a theor y o f government— a theor y tha t woul d tel l us , fo r instance, whethe r a n entit y lik e Amtra k i s "government" o r not . He als o list s severa l possibl e base s fo r disparat e treatmen t o f governmental an d nongovernmenta l agencie s tha t Thompso n does no t consider . Susan Wol f conclude s thi s par t wit h a chapter title d "Th e Le gal an d Mora l Responsibilit y o f Organizations. " Makin g adroi t use o f th e distinction s betwee n causa l an d mora l responsibilit y and betwee n practica l an d mora l responsibility , sh e argue s tha t the distinctio n betwee n th e Atomisti c an d th e Organi c view s o f organizations i s unabl e t o groun d th e lega l an d mora l respon sibility o f organizations . Rather , he r analysi s lead s he r t o hol d that i t i s appropriat e t o subjec t organization s t o th e civi l law , including thos e part s o f i t tha t ar e infuse d wit h mora l judg ment, bu t inappropriat e t o appl y crimina l la w directl y t o them . Part I V o f th e presen t volume , harkin g bac k t o th e subjec t o f

6

J . ROLAN D PENNOC K

NOMOS XXIV , Ethics, Economics, and the Law, deal s wit h th e economic theor y o f crime . Alvi n Klevoric k begin s b y lamentin g that th e economi c theor y o f crim e ha s faile d t o penetrat e main stream lega l theor y i n th e wa y tha t economi c analysi s ha s i n th e case of othe r branche s o f th e law . H e finds tw o reason s fo r this : (1) failure o f th e economi c theor y t o includ e a requisite politica l theory an d (2 ) lac k o f communicatio n betwee n variou s strand s of th e economi c literature . T h e implicatio n i s that bot h o f thes e deficiencies shoul d b e corrected , bu t tha t th e first o f the m fall s outside o f th e real m o f economi c analysis . A politica l theor y o f rights i s a minimu m requirement . In a brie f repl y t o Klevorick , Richar d Posne r contend s tha t the lac k o f a requisit e politica l theor y i n n o wa y distinguishe s the economi c theor y o f crimina l la w fro m th e economi c theor y of torts ; ye t th e latte r ha s entere d mainstrea m lega l theory . Th e real problem , h e contends , i s simpl y tha t theorist s hav e no t don e enough wor k i n thi s area . Judges an d practitioner s can' t b e ex pected t o d o it , argue s Judg e Posner , therefor e th e theorist s should ge t busy . The y shoul d no t awai t th e developmen t o f rel evant politica l theory . Jules Coleman , i n criticizin g Klevorick , goe s i n th e opposit e direction fro m Posner . H e woul d no t hav e th e economi c theo rists wor k mor e o r harde r wit h thei r ba g o f tools . Rather , i t mus t be recognized , whethe r o r no t th e economi c theorist s d o so , tha t what i s lackin g i n th e economi c theor y i s somethin g tha t i s no t properly economi c a t all . Thus fa r h e i s in agreemen t wit h Kle vorick. Bu t th e elemen t lacking , accordin g t o Coleman , i s not a political theory ; i t i s a mora l theory . Mor e specifically , i t i s a theory o f "desert, " which , incidentally , i s wha t distinguishe s criminal la w fro m tor t law . Finally, thi s part , an d th e volume , conclude s wit h Stephe n Schulhofer's reflection s o n Klevorick' s thesis . H e finds tha t Kle vorick ha s confronte d "al l o f us " wit h a dilemma , on e that , i f he i s right , wil l requir e a grea t dea l o f rethinking . Thi s di lemma arise s fro m th e parado x tha t economi c analysi s o f th e law ha s produce d mutuall y contradictor y reaction s i n th e field of crimina l la w fro m thos e tha t i t ha s evoke d i n othe r part s o f the law . Th e natur e o f thi s paradox , alon g wit h th e bul k o f th e substance o f wha t th e othe r author s hav e t o say , i s no w lef t fo r the reade r t o discover .

7

Introduction NOTES

1. Below , p . 5 3 2. Michae l Davis , "How t o Mak e th e Punishmen t Fi t th e Crime, " Ethics 93 (1983 ) pp . 726-52 . 3. Below , p . 16 9 4. Below , p . 22 3

1 THE MORA L AN D METAPHYSICA L SOURCES O F TH E CRIMINA L LA W MICHAEL S . MOOR E

INTRODUCTION

My topi c call s fo r clarification : wha t i s mean t b y "crimina l law " and b y "source? " T he crimina l la w tha t i s the subjec t o f thi s pa per is , firs t o f all , substantive crimina l law , no t crimina l proce dure. Secondly , withi n substantiv e crimina l law , I wil l discus s onl y what fo r decade s no w ha s bee n know n a s th e "genera l part," 1 that se t o f lega l doctrine s an d principle s tha t hav e relevanc e t o all crime s an d whic h d o no t concer n themselve s wit h th e ele ments o f particula r crimes . T h e requirement s o f actus reus, mens rea, and th e principl e o f legalit y ar e example s o f th e doctrine s and principle s o f th e genera l part , a s are mos t o f th e res t o f th e standard far e o f a first-yea r la w cours e i n substantiv e crimina l law. Whether a (truly ) genera l par t o f th e substantiv e crimina l la w exists i s a matte r o f som e controversy . Georg e Fletcher , fo r ex ample, urge s tha t w e operat e wit h thre e differen t "pattern s o f criminality," eac h wit h it s ow n characteristics. 2 Mar k Kelman' s more recen t attemp t a t "deconstruction " i s eve n mor e extrem e in it s denia l tha t a coherent , genera l par t t o th e crimina l la w exists.3 Withou t arguin g th e point , I thin k i t i s demonstrable tha t neither o f thes e kind s o f criticis m ca n sho w tha t th e traditiona l view o f th e matte r i s mistaken . T h e cas e fo r ther e bein g a se t of doctrine s cuttin g acros s al l crime s i s muc h stronge r tha n i s 11

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the correspondin g cas e fo r ther e being , say , a genera l par t t o property la w tha t cut s acros s al l kind s o f property , rea l a s wel l as personal . Assuming , then , th e existenc e o f a genera l par t t o the substantiv e crimina l law , m y interes t i s t o inquir e int o it s sources. By "source, " I d o no t mea n t o designat e th e legitimatin g or igin o f crimina l doctrines—th e sens e i n whic h jurisprudes spea k of th e "source s o f law. " Whethe r crimina l la w i s statutory, com mon law , customary , etc. , i s no t m y question . Neithe r i s thi s a n historical inquiry . B y "source " I mea n t o designat e thos e non legal idea s tha t i n som e sens e ca n b e sai d t o underli e ou r crim inal law . T h e relatio n betwee n thes e idea s an d th e crimina l la w is a logica l one , suc h tha t th e crimina l la w ca n b e sai d t o pre suppose thes e other , mor e genera l ideas. 4 I believ e th e crimina l la w ha s tw o suc h sources , on e mora l an d one metaphysical . Sinc e th e metaphysica l basi s o f th e crimina l law i s th e principa l topi c o f thi s paper , I shal l utiliz e thi s intro duction t o sa y somethin g abou t th e relatio n o f th e crimina l la w to it s underlyin g mora l basis . T h e mora l basi s o f th e crimina l law i s t o b e foun d i n thos e mora l principle s unde r whic h faul t is properl y ascribe d t o person s fo r thei r behavior . Thes e ar e th e moral principle s tha t tel l us : (1 ) whe n a bein g i s sufficientl y ac countable fo r hi s action s tha t h e ma y b e counte d a mora l agent ; (2) o n wha t occasion s mora l o r lega l norm s ma y fairl y obligat e such agents ; (3 ) when a n ac t i s done, a harm i s caused, an d wit h which menta l state s culpabilit y i s t o b e found ; an d (4 ) wha t cir cumstances amoun t eithe r t o a justificatio n o r a n excus e fo r having cause d a harm . Thes e fou r principle s ar e s o closely em bodied i n crimina l la w tha t crimina l lawyer s ar e ap t t o forge t that the y ar e als o mora l principle s definin g culpabilit y an d tell ing u s whe n a perso n ma y fairl y b e blame d fo r hi s actions . These fou r principle s togethe r for m a syste m tha t I shal l her e minimally sketch . First , th e principle s o f accountabilit y defin e the rang e o f being s wh o ar e mora l agent s an d thu s th e prope r addressees o f ou r substantiv e mora l norms . A s usuall y con strued, thes e principle s exclud e animals , corporations , infants , and th e insan e fro m bein g th e kind s o f agen t tha t ar e capabl e of bein g morall y responsible . S o construed , mora l agenc y be comes coextensiv e wit h personhood , s o tha t al l an d onl y per sons ar e mora l agents ; aggregate s o f person s (corporations) , an d

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members o f th e huma n specie s tha t lac k certai n distinctiv e fea tures o f personhoo d (a s th e insan e an d th e ver y youn g lac k ra tionality) ar e no t mora l agents , o n thi s view . Second, th e principle s o f fairl y impose d obligatio n limi t blameworthiness t o thos e mora l agent s wh o hav e ha d a fai r chance t o acquain t themselve s wit h th e norm s o f an y society . The alien s wh o com e amon g us , children , an d (mor e contro versially) wha t use d t o b e calle d psychopaths , wh o hav e no t ha d such chanc e a t mora l education , ar e no t fairl y blameabl e fo r th e harms the y cause . Third, i n ou r faul t ascription s w e appl y wha t migh t b e calle d a principl e o f answerability , whic h require s th e simultaneou s concurrence o f thre e things : (1 ) tha t th e individua l acted ; (2 ) that h e di d s o intentionally , recklessly , o r negligently ; an d (3 ) that h e eithe r cause d som e morall y ba d result , or , i f h e di d no t cause it , suc h resul t wa s th e objec t o f som e furthe r intentio n o f his wit h whic h h e acted . Exclude d b y th e first o f these , th e ac t requirement, ar e involuntar y movements , suc h a s refle x move ments, a s wel l a s another' s us e o f one' s bod y a s a n instrumen tality. T h e menta l stat e requiremen t exclude s peopl e wh o ar e non-negligently ignoran t o r mistake n abou t wha t i t i s the y ar e doing b y thei r actions . T h e causatio n requiremen t exclude s persons wh o neithe r trie d t o caus e som e ba d resul t no r i n fac t did so . If , o n th e othe r hand , someone' s behavio r satisfie s al l three requirement s (an d assumin g h e i s a mora l agen t wit h a fair chanc e t o become morall y educated) , the n h e i s prima faci e answerable fo r tha t behavior . Such a perso n i s onl y prim a faci e answerable , however , an d not actuall y culpable , becaus e o f th e fourt h se t o f principle s rel evant here . Thes e ar e th e principle s o f justification an d excuse . If on e ca n sho w tha t i n th e particula r circumstance s i n whic h one acted , th e har m cause d o r intende d wa s les s tha n th e har m prevented, on e ma y b e justified i n s o acting ; alternatively , w e may b e justified i n actin g i f th e part y wh o suffer s th e har m i s himself a t faul t i n placin g u s i n a positio n o f peril . Th e princi ples o f excuse , b y wa y o f contrast , don' t tel l u s whe n i t i s legit imate t o ac t i n way s otherwis e prohibited ; rather , the y tel l u s when i t wa s sufficientl y difficul t fo r a n agen t t o resis t causin g some har m tha t h e ma y no t fairl y b e blame d fo r bringin g i t about. Peopl e wh o ac t unde r th e coercio n o f others , wh o ar e

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placed b y nonhuma n circumstance s i n position s requirin g ver y hard choices , an d peopl e wh o ac t unde r extrem e emotiona l dis turbance, ar e th e kind s o f peopl e typicall y excuse d unde r thes e principles. These fou r set s o f principle s for m a syste m i n th e sens e tha t they togethe r determin e whe n a bein g i s morall y culpabl e an d thus, morall y blameworthy . The y ma y themselve s b e justified b y yet mor e genera l principles , suc h a s H.L.A . Hart' s principl e o f responsibility o r eve n ye t mor e genera l principle s o f liberty. 5 More pertinentl y here , th e fou r principle s by-and-larg e justif y the doctrine s tha t mak e u p th e genera l par t o f th e substantiv e criminal law. 6 Thes e principle s ar e th e sourc e o f crimina l la w doctrines i n th e sens e tha t the y for m par t o f th e mos t coheren t justification tha t ca n b e give n o f thes e doctrines . I d o no t regar d th e thesi s tha t ou r crimina l la w ha s suc h a moral basi s t o b e ver y problematic . I t ca n onl y b e mad e t o seem problematic i f on e confuse s i t wit h muc h stronge r these s abou t the relationshi p o f crimina l la w t o morality . T h e thesi s I hav e sketched i s not , t o begi n with , a natura l la w theory—o r a t leas t it needn' t be . T h e connectio n betwee n la w an d moral s asserte d here i s only a contingen t one : th e doctrine s o f ou r crimina l la w turn ou t t o b e base d o n particula r mora l theor y abou t whe n a being i s morall y responsible . Suc h a connectio n t o moralit y i s not necessary for ou r crimina l law s t o b e laws , a s a natura l la w theory woul d assert . W e coul d hav e law s tha t assig n liabilitie s i n ways tha t hav e littl e resemblanc e t o thi s o r an y othe r mora l the ory, an d the y woul d stil l b e laws . A s i t happens , however , ou r criminal la w doe s reflec t thi s underlyin g mora l theor y abou t when i t i s fai r t o ascrib e responsibilit y t o a person . Secondly, n o necessar y or contingent connectio n betwee n wha t it i s th e crimina l la w prohibit s an d wha t i t i s tha t moralit y pro hibits nee d b e asserted . T h e genera l par t o f th e crimina l law , a s we hav e seen , i s "topic-neutral " i n th e sens e tha t i t i s no t con cerned wit h wha t i s define d a s criminal ; th e genera l par t deal s with th e condition s unde r whic h liabilit y ca n attach , n o matte r what act s o r harm s ma y b e prohibite d b y th e specia l par t o f th e criminal law . The relevan t morality , accordingly , i s not tha t whic h concerns itsel f wit h wha t ar e goo d o r ba d act s o r state s o f af fairs o r righ t o r wron g actions , bu t rather , "topic-neutral " mo rality, thos e mora l principle s tha t defin e th e condition s unde r

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which i t i s fai r t o attribut e mora l responsibilit y fo r act s o r harms , no matter what the moral status of the latter. 1 I t i s thi s topic-neutra l morality, th e mora l principle s o f faul t ascription , wit h whic h th e general par t o f th e crimina l law s i s to b e linked . On e ca n imag ine a syste m wit h wildl y immora l crimina l la w prohibition s tha t nonetheless parcele d ou t liabilit y onl y unde r thos e mora l con ditions o f fai r faul t ascription ; fo r suc h a syste m m y thesi s abou t the crimina l la w havin g a mora l basi s woul d b e satisfied . The secon d se t o f idea s underlyin g ou r crimina l law—wha t I shall cal l it s metaphysica l basis—consist s o f thos e presupposi tions o f wha t person s mus t b e lik e i f th e mora l syste m tha t I have jus t describe d ca n fairl y b e applie d t o them . T h e mora l principles tha t determin e whe n faul t i s fairl y ascribed , I con tend, themselve s utiliz e concept s tha t lin k moralit y (an d thu s th e criminal law ) t o a particula r metaphysica l vie w abou t persons . This i s the vie w tha t person s ar e rationa l an d autonomou s agents . The concept s tha t revea l suc h a vie w o f ma n ar e th e concept s of action , intention , negligence , causation , compulsion , ac countability, an d th e like—th e ke y concept s i n th e mora l prin ciples o f fai r faul t ascription . Thes e concept s ar e no t onl y con cepts i n term s o f whic h mora l responsibilit y i s ascribe d bu t ar e also th e concept s i n term s o f whic h w e understan d ourselve s a s persons. Suc h concepts , i n othe r words , ar e no t just mora l con cepts; the y ar e mor e generall y th e concept s i n term s o f whic h we describ e an d explai n huma n doing s i n everyda y lif e an d throughout mos t o f th e socia l sciences . Thus , th e moralit y i n which th e crimina l la w i s embedde d i s itsel f buil t upo n a mor e general metaphysica l vie w o f wha t person s ar e like . Since I d o no t regar d th e mora l thesis , a s I hav e describe d it , as ver y problematic , I shal l no t argu e fo r i t her e beyon d wha t has alread y bee n said . No r wil l I see k t o giv e th e metaphysica l thesis th e defens e i t require s i n term s o f a detaile d considera tion o f ho w th e principle s o f faul t ascription s presuppos e tha t persons ar e rationa l an d autonomou s agents , fo r thi s I hav e don e elsewhere. 8 Rather , i n th e bod y o f thi s pape r I see k t o d o thre e things: first, t o sharpe n th e metaphysica l thesi s b y definin g ra tionality an d autonomy ; second , t o sho w wh y an y vie w o f per sons i n term s o f suc h attribute s i s properl y characterize d a s "metaphysical;" an d third , t o giv e a partia l defens e o f th e meta physical thesis , no t b y makin g th e positiv e cas e fo r it , bu t b y re -

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butting severa l commo n skepticism s abou t th e metaphysic s o f minds an d person s prevalen t i n lega l circles . I shal l clos e wit h some remark s abou t wh y w e shoul d car e abou t th e metaphysic s of personhoo d presuppose d b y bot h th e crimina l la w an d th e morality tha t underlie s it . T H E METAPHYSIC S O F PERSON S A S RATIONA L AN D AUTONOMOU S AGENTS

Rationality and Autonomy The attribute s o f rationalit y an d autonom y ar e bes t analyze d in term s o f th e ide a o f a n agen t actin g fo r reasons . Thi s ide a i s actually a conjunctio n o f tw o ideas : tha t o f action , an d tha t o f reasons fo r acting . Thes e tw o idea s correspond , respectively , t o the idea s o f autonom y an d rationality , an d wil l b e considere d separately. Rationality and Reasons. Reason-givin g explanation s o f huma n behavior hav e tw o part s an d serv e tw o explanator y functions. 9 With regar d t o th e tw o parts : a ful l explanatio n i n term s o f rea sons fo r actio n requires , first , a statemen t specifyin g th e agent' s desires (goals , objectives , mora l beliefs , purposes , aims , wants , etc.), an d second , a statemen t specifyin g th e agent' s factua l be liefs abou t th e situatio n h e i s in an d hi s ability t o achieve , throug h some particula r action , th e objec t o f hi s desires . Fo r example , if someon e (X ) opens th e windo w i n orde r t o chil l th e room , w e will hav e explaine d hi s actio n b y citin g explicitl y o r implicitly : 1. Hi s desir e tha t th e roo m b e chilled , an d 2. Hi s belie f tha t openin g th e windo w wil l chil l th e room . Knowing thi s desir e an d belie f se t o f X , w e ca n understan d hi s action i n th e fundamenta l wa y i n whic h w e understan d al l hu man actions , i n term s o f th e agent' s reason s o r motive s fo r act ingThis mod e o f explanatio n serve s tw o quit e distinc t functions : reasons fo r a n actio n bot h rationalize the actio n an d causally explain it . A belief/desir e se t rationalize s a n actio n i n th e sens e tha t it portray s th e actio n a s th e rationa l thin g t o do , give n th e agent' s beliefs an d give n hi s desires . W e understan d th e actio n i n thi s sense becaus e w e can understan d tha t a rationa l agen t woul d s o

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act, an d tha t ha d w e a simila r belief/desir e set , w e to o woul d s o act. W e ca n se e th e actio n a s a mean s t o somethin g th e agen t wants. A s lon g a s th e objec t o f th e agent' s desir e i s intelligibl e to u s a s somethin g a perso n i n ou r cultur e coul d conceivabl y want, an d s o lon g a s th e factua l belief s ar e no t themselve s ir rational, w e ca n empathiz e wit h th e action , eve n i f w e disagre e with i t morall y o r esthetically . W e empathiz e because , knowin g the belief/desir e set , w e perceiv e th e activit y t o b e th e rationa l thing fo r a n agen t wit h suc h belief s an d desire s t o do . This aspec t o f reason s fo r actin g i s sometimes confusingl y ex pressed b y sayin g tha t ther e i s a logical connection betwee n th e sentences describin g th e belief/desir e se t an d th e sentenc e de scribing th e action . Ye t withou t supplementatio n wit h furthe r premises, ther e i s n o logica l connectio n betwee n sentence s de scribing a desir e an d a belie f o f a n agen t an d a sentenc e de scribing hi s action . Still , som e connectio n exist s betwee n th e content of th e belief s an d o f th e desires , o n th e on e hand , an d the actio n the y explai n o n th e other . Th e conten t o f X' s belie f about mean s wil l necessaril y includ e th e sam e descriptio n o f th e action t o b e explaine d (openin g th e window ) a s i s give n i n th e conclusion, an d th e conten t o f thi s belie f wil l also necessaril y in clude th e sam e descriptio n o f th e en d (chillin g th e room ) a s i s given i n th e sentenc e describin g X' s desire . On e ma y se e thi s easily b y schematizin g a reason-givin g explanatio n as : STATEMENT 1 . XD(q). STATEMENT 2 . XB(p'Dq). STATEMENT 3 . p.

Here XD(q) i n th e exampl e mean s " X desire s tha t th e roo m b e chilled;" XB(pDq) mean s " X believe s i f h e open s th e window , then th e roo m wil l b e chilled; " an d p mean s " X open s th e win dow." To specif y wit h an y precisio n wha t kin d o f relatio n mus t ex ist betwee n eac h o f th e occurrence s o f p an d q i n th e abov e schema i s surprisingl y complex . Dee p philosophica l difficultie s beset th e semantic s o f thos e sentenc e fragment s describin g th e content o f menta l state s suc h a s belief s an d desires. 10 Nonethe less, fo r ou r purpose s i t ma y suffic e t o sa y tha t p an d q nam e the sam e propositio n i n eac h o f thei r occurrence s i n th e expla -

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nation schem a above , s o tha t th e relation s require d fo r a be lief/desire se t t o constitut e a reason-givin g for m o f explanatio n are three : tw o o f propositiona l identit y ( p = p i n statement s 2 and 3 , an d q = q i n statement s 1 an d 2) , an d on e o f materia l implication ( p 3 q i n statemen t 2). 11 T o sa y tha t thes e relation s hold fo r belief/desir e set s tha t ar e reason s fo r action s i s bu t t o say tha t w e presuppos e th e rationalit y o f th e agen t wh o wil l se e these relation s i n selectin g a mean s t o hi s desire d end . T o sa y there i s a "logica l relation " i n suc h pattern s o f explanatio n i s really t o sa y tha t a n actio n i s rationalized in th e fashio n jus t out lined. The secon d sens e i n whic h w e understan d a n actio n whe n w e understand it s reaso n i s that w e understan d whic h o f a n agent' s many belief s an d desire s actuall y cause d th e action . Whe n w e say tha t X opene d th e windo w becaus e o f hi s belief s an d de sires, th e "because " i s necessaril y causal . X migh t hav e ha d an y number o f belief/desir e set s tha t woul d equall y wel l rationaliz e his actions . H e migh t hav e desired , fo r example , t o offen d hi s guests an d hav e believe d tha t a n intentiona l openin g o f th e window woul d accomplis h that ; ye t eve n i f h e ha s suc h a desire , and eve n i f h e intentionall y open s th e window , i t nee d no t b e for th e latte r reaso n a t all . H e ma y b e muc h to o polit e fo r that . His reaso n ma y b e simpl y a s state d earlier : t o chil l th e room . Which reaso n i s hi s reaso n fo r openin g th e windo w i s a straightforwardly causa l hypothesis : whicheve r belief/desir e se t caused hi m t o ac t a s h e di d explain s hi s action . Thus , th e ety mology o f "motive" : somethin g tha t move s u s t o action . Having outline d a relativel y standar d accoun t o f reason s fo r action, i t remain s t o relat e tha t accoun t t o th e idea s o f practica l reason an d practica l reasoners . Reason s fo r actin g i s a for m o f explanation i n term s o f state s tha t exis t a t a tim e i n th e world , and whic h ente r int o causa l relation s wit h themselve s an d ac tions. Ofte n confuse d wit h thi s for m o f explanation i s th e kin d of logic, o r pattern s o f vali d inferences , tha t a rationa l agen t employs a s o r befor e h e i s acting. 12 Logi c deal s wit h timeles s propositions (no t state s o r events ) an d wit h th e logica l (no t causal ) relations betwee n them . T h e kin d o f inference-drawin g pat terns tha t dea l wit h actio n have , sinc e Aristotle , bee n calle d "practical syllogisms " an d th e kin d o f reasonin g on e doe s wh o

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employs suc h practica l syllogism s Aristotl e calle d "practica l rea soning." 13 Practical reasonin g involve s th e formulatio n o f end s an d th e selection o f mean s t o th e attainmen t o f thos e ends . Practica l reasoning thu s take s th e content o f one' s desire s o r mora l be liefs, an d th e content o f one' s factua l beliefs , t o b e premise s i n an argument . Th e acto r worryin g abou t chillin g th e roo m migh t reason: 1. Le t th e roo m b e chilled . 2. I f I ope n th e window , the n th e roo m wil l b e chilled . Therefore: 3. I ope n th e window . Such reasonin g i s "practical " i n tha t i t aim s a t tellin g u s wha t to do . I n thi s i t i s to b e distinguishe d fro m wha t Aristotl e calle d theoretical reasoning , whic h aim s a t tellin g u s wha t t o believe . The conclusio n o f a practica l syllogis m i s accordingl y a direc tive t o action , no t th e mor e typica l propositio n abou t ho w th e world is , th e conclusio n o f tru e logica l syllogisms . Moreover , practical syllogism s d o no t fi t an y o f th e pattern s o f vali d infer ence o f standar d deductiv e logic . Th e conclusio n tha t I shoul d open th e windo w doe s no t follo w deductivel y fro m th e tw o premises stated . The relatio n o f practica l reasonin g t o reason-givin g expla nations shoul d b e relativel y apparent : th e premise s o f a vali d practical argumen t leadin g t o som e directiv e t o actio n a s it s conclusion ar e just th e content s o f a belief/desir e se t tha t coul d rationalize th e actio n i n question . Th e exten t t o whic h a n agen t must actuall y reaso n throug h a vali d practica l argumen t befor e we ar e entitle d t o explai n hi s actio n a s havin g bee n don e fo r reasons i s somewha t les s apparent . I t seem s ver y implausibl e t o think tha t on e mus t consciously reason throug h suc h practica l arguments i n orde r fo r reason-givin g explanation s t o be appro priate. Unconscious reasoning ma y suffice , bu t a t leas t thi s muc h is essential. 14 All relevan t sense s o f "rationality " cente r o n th e idea s o f rea son-giving explanation s an d practica l reason . I n th e mos t basi c sense o f "rational, " t o describ e a n act a s rationa l i s t o sa y tha t

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the acto r ha d a se t o f belief s an d desire s th e content s o f which , taken togethe r wit h a n ac t description , for m a vali d practica l syllogism; i n thi s sense , t o sa y o f a n actor that h e i s rational i s t o say tha t h e by-and-larg e act s o n vali d practica l syllogisms . The ide a o f rationalit y i s not exhauste d b y th e basi c sens e de scribed above . Numerou s notion s o f rationalit y havin g t o d o wit h practical reasonin g ar e stronge r tha n th e simpl e requiremen t tha t an agen t ac t o n vali d practica l syllogisms. 15 Eac h o f thes e stronge r senses relate s t o on e o r anothe r o f th e premise s o f a n agent' s practical reasonings . W e may , fo r example , describ e a n agent' s desire a s rationa l an d mea n b y that : tha t i t i s a n intelligibl e de sire fo r on e i n ou r cultur e t o hold ; tha t th e individua l desir e i s consistent (fre e o f forma l contradictio n i n it s object ) wit h th e full se t o f th e agent' s desires ; tha t th e individua l desir e fits withi n a se t o f transitivel y ordere d desires ; o r tha t th e desir e i s (mor ally o r prudentially ) right . Analogously , on e ma y describ e a means/end belie f a s rational , an d mea n b y that : tha t i t i s a n in telligible belie f fo r on e i n ou r cultur e t o hold , give n other , widel y shared beliefs ; tha t th e individua l belie f i s consisten t wit h th e full se t o f th e agent' s belief s abou t th e world ; tha t th e individ ual belie f fit s withi n a coheren t syste m o f beliefs ; o r tha t th e belief i s (factually ) true . Eac h o f thes e stronge r requirement s o f rationality i s in place s presuppose d b y th e crimina l law , bu t th e basic sens e o f rationality—th e actin g o n vali d practica l syllo gisms, n o matte r ho w bizarr e th e premises—i s th e sens e o f ra tionality generall y presuppose d throughou t th e crimina l la w an d its underlyin g morality . Actions and Autonomy. A basi c o r simpl e actio n i s an actio n on e performs b y doin g n o othe r action. 16 On e open s a doo r b y pushing agains t it ; on e pushe s agains t i t b y movin g one' s arm ; but b y wha t furthe r ac t doe s on e mov e one' s arm ? Simpl e mo tions o f th e bod y tha t a perso n bring s abou t ar e basi c act s be cause w e don' t d o anythin g els e in orde r t o do them . On e want s to isolat e suc h simpl e acts , no t becaus e the y figure ofte n i n everyday life , socia l science , law , o r morals , bu t becaus e the y properly focu s th e importan t questio n abou t th e metaphysic s o f action: wha t i s th e differenc e betwee n th e (simple ) action o f raising one' s arm , an d th e mer e movement of th e bod y describe d by sayin g tha t th e ar m wen t up? 1 7 Tha t the y d o diffe r i s show n by th e relationshi p betwee n th e followin g statements :

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. X raised his arm. 2 . X's arm went up.

STATEMENT 1 STATEMENT

Statement 1 implies statemen t 2 , bu t statemen t 2 doe s no t im ply statemen t 1 . X' s ar m ma y g o u p because , fo r example , th e wind blow s it , someon e grab s it , o r a refle x occurs . Henc e state ment 1 an d 2 ar e no t equivalent ; statemen t 1 say s mor e tha n statement 2 . This i s demonstrabl y no t tru e fo r th e "actions " o f inanimat e objects. 18 Suppos e th e followin g i s sai d o f som e wate r tha t wa s partly elevate d i n a U-shape d tube : STATEMENT

3 . The water sought its own level.

Although th e grammaticall y activ e moo d migh t sugges t tha t th e water performe d som e actio n i n th e sam e sens e tha t X per formed som e actio n i n statemen t 1 , thi s i s no t th e case . Com pare statemen t 3 wit h th e following : STATEMENT

4 . The water fell to a constant level.

Not onl y doe s statemen t 3 impl y statemen t 4 , bu t statemen t 4 implies statemen t 3 . T h e statement s ar e equivalent ; th e "ac tions" o f inanimat e objects , suc h a s water , d o no t shar e som e crucial feature s o f human action . Simpl e behavioris m ma y serv e for th e "actions " o f inanimat e objects , bu t wil l no t d o a s a n ac count o f human action . A long-popula r attemp t t o captur e th e uniquenes s o f huma n action relie s o n th e concep t o f reason s t o d o th e job. Thi s the ory assert s tha t a bodil y movemen t wil l be a n actio n i f i t i s cause d by som e menta l stat e o f desire , intention , o r volition . John Stuar t Mill succinctl y state d a n earl y versio n o f thi s theory , an d wa s echoed i n lega l theor y b y J o hn Austin , an d mor e recently , b y J.L. Mackie. 19 The theor y tha t Mill , Austin , an d Macki e articulat e i s i n fac t but a partia l versio n o f th e contemporar y causa l theor y o f ac tion. T h e ful l theor y i s that a movemen t i s an actio n i f an d onl y if i t i s caused b y a belief/desir e se t whos e content s for m a vali d practical syllogism . Althoug h Mackie , fo r example , seem s t o be lieve tha t i t i s th e causatio n b y a desire that make s movemen t a n

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action, a s Alvi n Goldma n ha s shown , both a belie f an d a desir e must caus e th e movement ; further , th e belie f an d desir e mus t be relate d t o on e anothe r an d t o th e actio n the y caus e i n th e manner earlie r describe d fo r reason-givin g explanations. 20 If th e Mill/Austin/Mackie/Goldma n theor y o f actio n wer e correct, the n on e coul d explicat e th e concep t o f a n actio n i n terms o f th e concep t o f reasons : explicabilit y b y reason s woul d be a necessar y an d sufficien t conditio n fo r a movemen t bein g a basic action . However , a n apparentl y insurmountabl e proble m for an y versio n o f th e causa l theor y arise s fro m wha t ar e calle d "deviant causa l chains." 21 Suppos e someon e i s behin d th e whee l of a ca r an d see s he r hate d enem y ste p befor e her . Suppos e further tha t sh e form s th e desir e t o ru n ove r he r enemy , an d believes tha t i f sh e shift s he r foo t fro m th e brak e t o th e accel erator, sh e wil l ru n ove r he r enemy . Suppos e furthe r tha t he r foot move s fro m th e brak e peda l t o th e accelerator , an d tha t this movemen t wa s cause d b y he r desir e an d b y he r belief . I s the causa l rol e o f thi s belief/desir e se t enoug h t o sa y tha t th e person acted in movin g he r foot ? Befor e on e say s ye s to o read ily, conside r th e followin g elaboration : th e driver' s belief s an d desires go t he r s o excite d i n anticipatio n o f finally bein g i n a position t o kil l he r enem y tha t he r foo t slippe d of f th e brak e t o the accelerator . Ou r intuition s ar e plai n i n suc h a cas e tha t th e person's foo t movemen t i s not a n action , despit e th e causa l rol e of he r belief/desir e set . I f thi s i s so , ou r ide a o f a n actio n i s no t captured b y th e causa l theor y eve n i n it s mos t sophisticate d modern form . Consequently, on e canno t avoi d sayin g tha t person s hav e causa l powers ove r thei r ow n bodies . Th e Mill/Austin/Mackie/Goldma n causal theor y attempt s t o eliminat e tal k o f irreducibl e causa l powers o f person s i n favo r o f a mor e Hume-lik e notio n o f even t or stat e causatio n (e.g. , b y belief s an d desires) . Ye t th e causa l theory fail s precisel y becaus e i t leave s ou t th e centra l ide a o f human action , tha t o f a person bringin g abou t (causing ) som e new stat e o f affairs. 22 If a perso n possesse s causa l power s no t themselve s reducibl e to causatio n b y state s o f belie f an d desire , the n th e concep t o f a basi c actio n ha s equa l dignit y wit h th e concep t o f reason s i n terms o f explicatin g ou r concep t o f a person . Th e argumen t fro m deviant causa l chains , i f i t succeeds , establishe s just tha t fact .

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We ar e no w i n a positio n t o defin e autonomy : autonom y re fers t o a person' s causa l powe r ove r th e movement s o f hi s ow n body. On e o f ou r fundamenta l idea s abou t person s i s tha t the y are being s wh o ar e (t o paraphras e Locke ) master s o f them selves an d proprietor s o f thei r ow n bodies , an d thus , o f th e ac tions o r labo r o f it. 23 Tha t person s hav e suc h irreducibl e causa l powers—i.e., tha t the y ca n perfor m basi c actions—i s on e o f th e defining characteristic s o f personhood , par t o f ou r metaphysic s about persons . Nothing i n suc h a concep t o f autonom y commit s on e t o view ing person s a s havin g "fre e will. " Autonom y commit s on e t o persons havin g a will , bu t no t t o a wil l tha t i s "free" (i n th e sens e of exemp t fro m th e law s o f causation) . I t i s true , a s I hav e jus t argued, tha t th e causa l agenc y o f a perso n canno t b e reduce d to even t o r stat e causation . Bu t thi s doe s no t mea n tha t a per son's act s mus t b e uncause d b y thos e state s o r events . Indeed , most commonl y basi c act s ar e cause d b y variou s belief/desir e sets , and the y remai n basi c act s nonetheless . More generally , on e migh t plausibl y urg e tha t basi c action s are cause d b y al l kind s o f factors , no t jus t state s o f belie f an d desire. Menta l state s othe r tha n belief/desir e sets , suc h a s emo tional states , ma y caus e u s t o perfor m basi c acts . Environmenta l conditions o r conditionin g ma y als o operat e a s causes . Un doubtedly man y physiologica l event s i n ou r bod y caus e u s t o ac t as w e do . Non e o f thes e form s o f determinism , mechanisti c o r otherwise, i s incompatibl e wit h person s havin g irreducibl e causa l powers. 24 Rationality and Autonomy as Intentionalistic Metaphysics The concept s o f practica l reaso n an d o f basi c actio n partl y define ou r commonsens e vie w o f persons : person s ar e rationa l and autonomou s agents , agent s wh o exercis e causa l power s fo r reasons. Neithe r o f thes e basi c concept s ca n b e reduce d t o th e other. The y jointly for m th e basi c vocabular y i n term s o f whic h we understan d an d evaluat e ourselve s a s persons . This vie w o f person s i s "metaphysical " i n th e sens e tha t th e concepts i n term s o f whic h person s ar e conceive d ar e no t them selves (i n an y straightforwar d way , a t least ) reducibl e t o con cepts tha t ar e ye t mor e basic . Rather , w e see m t o hav e a famil y of concept s applie d t o person s tha t ar e bot h systematicall y re -

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lated t o on e anothe r an d tha t ar e systematicall y differen t fro m the concept s i n term s o f whic h w e conceiv e o f th e natura l world . Rationality an d autonom y appl y t o person s an d ar e no t i n an y apparent wa y reducibl e t o nonpersona l concepts , suc h a s thos e used i n th e natura l sciences . The "philosophica l psychology " o f th e 1950 s an d '60 s sough t in variou s way s t o captur e thi s strikin g fac t abou t th e meta physics o f personhood , followin g Ryle' s proclamatio n o f a "cat egorical difference " betwee n th e vocabular y o f person s an d th e vocabulary o f natura l science. 25 Th e claim s wer e ofte n bot h ov erstated an d weakl y supported . Nonetheless , som e systemati c difference tha t Ryl e an d other s sough t t o captur e wit h th e doc trine o f categor y difference s doe s see m t o exist . A mor e defen sible statemen t o f thi s distinctivenes s o f "personal " concept s i s in term s o f thei r Intentionality. 26 Whether Intentionalit y i s th e "mar k o f th e mental " i s a mat ter o f som e debat e i n th e contemporar y philosoph y o f mind. 27 In an y case , i t i s a distinguishin g featur e o f man y menta l words , including thos e mos t pertinen t here , "belief, " "desire, " and "ac tion." On e ca n se e tha t thes e concept s ar e Intentiona l b y con sidering th e nonsubstitutibilit y o f th e nomina l referent s o f thei r objects, a s illustrate d i n not e 26 . Suppos e Joh n desires th e larg est roo m i n th e inn , o r tha t h e believes that h e i s approachin g the larges t roo m i n th e inn , o r tha t h e i s acting s o as t o see k th e largest roo m i n th e inn . Suppos e furthe r tha t "th e larges t roo m in th e inn " refer s t o wha t turn s ou t t o b e th e dirties t roo m i n the inn . Despit e th e las t suppose d identity , on e canno t substi tute "th e dirties t roo m i n th e inn " fo r "th e larges t roo m i n th e inn" an d stil l preserv e trut h abou t wha t John desires , believes , or seeks . Thi s inabilit y t o substitut e codesignativ e term s mark s desire, belief , an d actio n a s Intentiona l concepts . The strikin g featur e o f Intentiona l concept s i s their apparen t irreducibility t o th e non-Intentiona l concept s o f natura l sci ence. Ou r logi c an d ou r natura l scienc e depen d upo n th e exis tence o f wha t i s calle d a n extensional language . A n extensiona l language i s on e i n whic h (1 ) th e logica l connective s ar e trut h functional, an d (2 ) codesignativ e term s ma y b e substitute d without changin g th e trut h valu e o f th e overal l expressio n i n which the y occur. 28 Th e firs t i s a basi c requiremen t fo r th e logi c of Frege-Russell-Quin e t o work . Th e secon d i s a requiremen t

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of scientifi c laws , whic h generaliz e abou t things irrespectiv e o f how thos e thing s ar e describe d o r named. 2 9 (Imagine , fo r ex ample, Kepler' s law s o f planetar y motio n bein g tru e o f Venu s only unde r som e descriptions , suc h a s "Venus, " bu t no t unde r others, suc h a s "th e mornin g star"—Kepler' s law s ar e tru e o f the thing , Venus , no t th e thin g unde r a certai n description. ) Rationality an d autonomy , the n ar e basi c i n tw o senses . First , they canno t b e reduce d t o othe r Intentiona l concepts , althoug h those othe r Intentiona l concept s (suc h a s "intention" ) ca n b e explicated i n term s o f them . Second , th e entir e famil y o f Inten tional concept s canno t a t presen t b e reduce d t o ou r mor e typi cal vocabular y o f natura l science. 30 Tha t person s hav e causa l powers ove r thei r bodies , an d tha t the y ac t fo r reasons , i n a n essential par t o f ou r conceptio n o f ourselves . "Metaphysical " i s as goo d a labe l a s an y fo r suc h basi c definin g attribute s o f per sons. Skepticism About the Metaphysics of Personhood in the Contemporary Theory of Criminal Law Metaphysics generall y ha s a ba d reputatio n amon g lawyers . "Metaphysical" i s ofte n a pejorativ e labe l fo r a poin t o r argu ment tha t i s s o ethereal , abstract , an d withou t conten t tha t i t i s thought t o b e a n arbitrar y posi t rathe r tha n a discovere d trut h about th e world . Ye t w e al l hav e a metaphysics , a n implici t o r explicit vie w o f ho w th e worl d i s constructed. I t show s u p whe n we discus s causa l relations , whe n w e ascrib e propertie s t o ob jects, indeed , wheneve r w e speak . Ou r metaphysica l belief s ar e simply thos e mos t genera l belief s abou t wha t exist s an d abou t the qualitie s an d relation s betwee n thos e existen t things . Meta physical beliefs , althoug h mor e abstract , ar e no t differen t i n kin d than scientifi c o r ordinar y factua l beliefs . Metaphysics a s suc h i s thu s no t t o b e writte n of f a s "muc h ado abou t nothing, " a s di d th e logica l positivists . Nonetheless , lawyers an d lega l theorist s ar e ofte n quit e unreceptiv e t o a metaphysical descriptio n o f persons , fo r thre e sort s o f reasons : (1) crimina l theorists , lik e othe r lega l academicians , ar e de scendants o f th e lega l realis t traditio n accordin g t o whic h th e use o f a concep t shoul d b e guide d b y th e socia l consequence s attached t o tha t use , no t b y som e underlyin g metaphysics ; (2 ) some crimina l theorist s hav e imbibe d o f th e antirealism 31 abou t

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minds (an d thu s o f persons ) o f th e hermeneuti c an d Wittgen steinian traditio n i n philosophy ; an d (3 ) some crimina l theorist s have als o imbibe d o f anothe r versio n o f antirealis m abou t minds , namely, tha t skepticis m abou t th e realit y o f menta l state s rep resented b y behavioris m i n philosoph y an d psychology . I shal l discuss eac h suc h purporte d basi s fo r skepticis m i n turn . Legal Realist Skepticism. Perhap s th e easies t rout e t o under standing th e skepticis m abou t metaphysic s bequeathe d t o u s b y the lega l realis t traditio n i s t o as k som e mor e genera l question s about lega l concept s an d wha t i t is to see k thei r meaning . Prim a facie, on e migh t adver t t o tw o quit e distinc t sort s o f thing s i n "giving th e meaning " o f a lega l concep t suc h a s "crimina l in tent" o r "person" : (1 ) on e migh t see k t o describ e th e se t o f facts under whic h th e lega l concep t i s correctl y applied ; o r (2 ) on e might see k t o describ e th e se t o f legal consequences whic h attac h to th e authoritativ e us e o f tha t concep t b y a judge. Consider th e concep t o f ownership . I f aske d t o giv e th e meaning o f th e two-plac e predicate , " X own s y, " on e migh t de scribe th e fact s unde r whic h a perso n X coul d correctl y b e sai d to ow n som e thin g y , fact s suc h a s tha t X receive d y a s a gif t from hi s uncle , tha t X purchase d y , tha t X occupied y for a cer tain period , an d th e like . Alternatively , on e migh t mentio n th e kind o f lega l consequence s tha t ar e suppose d t o flo w fro m i t being authoritativel y pronounce d o f X , tha t h e own s y . Suc h consequences includ e th e fac t tha t X ma y dispos e o f y b y gift , sale, o r devise ; tha t X ca n b e taxe d o n y ; tha t X ma y enjoi n in terference b y other s i n hi s us e an d enjoymen t o f y ; an d s o forth . The reaso n fo r thi s Janus-face d aspec t o f lega l concept s lie s in wha t Hohfel d calle d thei r "dispositive " function. 32 Lega l concepts suc h a s ownership, malice , intention, o r person , ar e use d both t o describ e i n lega l term s th e fact s i n particula r situation s and t o "dispose " o f th e issue s i n case s b y prescribin g wha t re sults a judge shoul d brin g abou t i n hi s applicatio n o f thos e con cepts. Dispositiv e lega l concept s for m th e "conceptua l cement " that connect s a judge's factua l finding s t o hi s lega l remedies . It i s sometime s though t tha t thi s dua l functio n o f lega l con cepts render s the m essentiall y ambiguous . Georg e Fletcher , fo r example, finds crimina l la w theor y seriousl y muddle d becaus e of th e "systemati c ambiguity " h e see s betwee n th e descriptiv e and th e normativ e use s o f concept s suc h a s actio n o r inten -

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tion. 33 Ye t ambiguit y i s a semanti c categor y havin g t o d o wit h two sense s o f a word. 34 "Entertain, " fo r example , i s ambiguou s in tha t i t can mea n thinkin g abou t o r considerin g a questio n o r it ca n mea n hospitabl e an d amusin g behavior . T h e tw o func tions serve d b y lega l concept s i s no t a semanti c distinctio n bu t rather a distinctio n o f use. A judge perform s tw o distinc t speec h acts when h e use s a dispositiv e lega l concep t suc h a s "intention " or "ownership " i n a lega l proceeding . Hi s "assertorial " speec h act i s t o describ e th e fact s befor e him , whil e hi s "prescriptive " speech ac t i s to prescrib e tha t certai n lega l consequence s shoul d attach. These sam e dua l function s appea r i n ou r us e o f languag e t o express mora l judgments . T o us e a mora l term , suc h a s "per son" o r "intention, " i s ofte n bot h t o describe a n entit y o r a stat e of affair s a s bein g o f a certai n kind , an d t o prescribe tha t mora l guilt o r blam e shoul d attac h t o th e entit y o r even t s o described . The differenc e betwee n mora l an d lega l usage s i s tha t th e mora l consequences prescribe d ar e no t fixed b y conventiona l rule s o f such detai l a s ar e th e lega l consequence s attache d t o dispositiv e legal concepts . Skepticism abou t metaphysic s i s generate d fo r man y lawyer s by thei r preoccupatio n wit h th e consequence s o f usin g a con cept suc h a s perso n o r intention . Thi s preoccupatio n lead s the m to thin k tha t suc h concept s hav e n o descriptiv e content , tha t w e do an d shoul d guid e ou r usag e o f the m no t b y metaphysica l truths abou t person s bu t b y pragmati c policie s havin g t o d o wit h what w e wan t t o achiev e b y us e o f thes e concept s i n particula r contexts. Conside r i n thi s regar d th e concep t o f a n action . I f one give s u p o n articulatin g th e metaphysic s o f action , on e wil l adopt somethin g lik e H.L. A Hart' s once-hel d ascriptivis t theor y of action. 35 Accordin g t o it , on e firs t decide s whethe r respon sibility shoul d b e ascribe d t o som e perso n fo r som e harm , an d only the n whethe r th e bodil y motio n causin g th e har m wa s hi s action. I f on e wishe s t o ascrib e responsibility , hi s behavio r wil l be describe d i n th e Intentiona l idiom s o f action ; i f on e wishe s to sa y h e i s no t responsible , th e behavio r wil l no t b e described . Hart's kin d o f argument—becaus e on e i s ascribing responsi bility on e canno t b e describing some factua l stat e o f affair s wit h a concep t suc h a s "action"—ha s bee n mad e fo r menta l state s a s well a s action . Joh n Dewey , fo r example , argue d tha t motive s

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are characterization s o f conduc t tha t ar e merel y " a refinemen t of th e ordinar y reaction s o f prais e an d blame, " s o tha t motiv e words, suc h a s "greed, " "simpl y [mean ] th e qualit y o f [an ] ac t as sociall y observe d an d disapproved." 3 6 Georg e Fletcher , anal ogously, analyze s th e concep t o f intentio n a s havin g a s on e o f its tw o meanings , "a n inten t t o ac t unde r circumstance s (suc h as failin g t o enquir e abou t th e ag e o f a sexual partner ) tha t ren der a n ac t properl y subjec t t o blame." 37 This kin d o f preoccupatio n wit h th e consequence s o f sayin g that someon e ha s performe d a n action , o r don e s o wit h a cer tain intention , motive , o r reason , i s t o b e foun d wit h regar d t o each o f th e concept s i n term s o f whic h responsibilit y i s ascribe d in la w an d morals . Judge Andrews , i n dissen t i n Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 38 speakin g n o doub t a s a n accurat e repre sentation o f th e thought s o f man y contemporar y lawyers , urge d that th e requiremen t o f proximat e caus e "i s al l a questio n o f expediency" an d o f "practica l politics" : "Wha t w e d o mea n b y the wor d 'proximate ' i s tha t becaus e o f convenience , o f publi c policy, o f a roug h sens e o f justice, th e la w arbitraril y decline s t o trace a serie s o f event s beyon d a certai n point." 39 Stanle y Ing ber ha s recentl y analyze d th e excus e o f dures s a s first consistin g of th e mora l judgment tha t on e i s not responsible , an d onl y the n is th e judgment mad e tha t th e behavio r i n questio n wa s "invol untary." 4 0 Thoma s Szas z an d hi s lega l follower s ar e constantl y contending tha t phrase s suc h a s "menta l illness " hav e n o de scriptive meaning ; suc h phrase s ar e merel y label s w e appl y t o persons afte r decidin g fo r on e reaso n o r anothe r t o degrad e them a s persons. 41 The mos t genera l strai n o f thi s kin d o f lega l thinkin g ha s bee n by the America l lega l realists . They hel d tha t i n applyin g a lega l term on e mus t loo k t o th e lega l consequences being prescribe d b y its authoritativ e us e b y a judge, an d further , tha t i t wa s a n il lusion t o thin k tha t suc h lega l term s ha d a meaning tha t deter mined thei r correc t us e apar t fro m suc h consequences . Thi s general vie w cam e t o b e know n a s functionalism. 42 Ethical philosoph y ha s als o ha d it s share o f theorist s wh o urge d that ethica l utterance s wer e use d eithe r t o expres s th e speaker' s emotions o r t o prescrib e wha t on e ough t o r ough t no t t o do. 4 3 These "emotivist " an d "prescriptivist " theorie s i n ethic s urge d that becaus e suc h expressiv e o r prescriptiv e function s wer e

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served b y mora l use s o f language , descriptiv e function s coul d not als o b e served . If on e adopte d suc h a positio n abou t th e lega l o r mora l usage s of th e wor d "person, " on e woul d urg e tha t anything coul d b e called a person—i t woul d simpl y depen d o n whethe r on e wishe d to attac h th e lega l o r mora l consequence s o f bein g s o labelle d to tha t entity . Consider , fo r example , th e debat e abou t whethe r corporations (a s entitie s distinc t fro m thei r shareholders , direc tors, an d officers ) ar e mora l o r lega l persons . On e adoptin g th e functionalist analysi s o f lega l concept s o f America n lega l real ism wil l collapse th e questio n o f whethe r corporation s are mora l persons int o th e questio n o f whethe r the y should be called moral persons i n ligh t o f th e consequence s attache d thereto . Christo pher Stone , fo r example , argue s tha t th e questio n o f whethe r "it i s intelligible t o blam e th e corporatio n draw s o n considera tions tha t i t i s useful t o spea k i n tha t manner." 44 Similarl y i n law , if on e wishe s t o kno w whethe r a corporatio n i s a lega l person , one wil l inquir e int o "th e likel y effec t o f holdin g th e corporat e body legall y accountable . On e want s t o kno w ho w makin g th e corporation th e law' s quarr y wil l affec t thos e bot h 'outside ' th e corporation an d thos e wh o labo r 'within, ' i n term s o f thei r per ceptions (mos t importantl y thei r self-perceptions ) an d thei r be havior." 45 Lik e an y goo d functionalist , Ston e relegate s th e de scriptive questio n o f whethe r corporation s ar e lega l person s an d thus ca n intelligibl y b e hel d legall y accountabl e a s persons , t o the scra p hea p o f intellectua l histor y an d (pejoratively ) aca demic pursuits. 46 My ow n vie w i s that th e lega l an d mora l question s o f whethe r some entit y i s o r i s no t a person , whethe r tha t perso n per formed a n action , whethe r h e di d s o intentionally o r wit h a cer tain motive , whethe r tha t ac t proximatel y cause d harm , whethe r the acto r acte d unde r threat s o f anothe r amountin g t o duress , and whethe r th e acto r i s mentall y ill , ar e al l factua l questions . The concept s employe d i n discussin g al l suc h question s ar e no t empty label s fo r a mora l o r lega l conclusio n reache d o n othe r grounds, o r o n n o ground s a t all ; the y ar e concept s havin g a descriptive an d explanator y function , n o matte r wha t othe r ex pressive, prescriptive , o r ascriptiv e function s the y ma y serv e i n contexts suc h a s thos e o f responsibilit y assessment . I t accord ingly make s sens e t o see k th e meanin g o f "persons " an d it s re -

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lated term s ("action, " "reasons" ) i n term s o f th e fact s tha t mus t be tru e i f thes e concept s ar e t o b e correctl y employed . I hav e elsewher e addresse d thi s kin d o f meaning-theory generated skepticis m abou t ethica l discourse, 47 an d wil l no t re capitulate tha t branc h o f th e argument . Abou t lega l utterances , it should b e a simple r matte r t o se e tha t preoccupatio n wit h th e consequences of saying, e.g. , tha t a corporatio n i s o r i s no t a le gal person , canno t b e exclusiv e o f som e concer n a s t o whethe r corporations are legal persons . I f ou r lega l concept s ha d a s thei r only meaning s tha t certai n consequence s coul d b e achieve d b y their use , the y woul d b e completel y vacuous . The y coul d neve r be use d i n givin g reason s t o justif y lega l results , bu t onl y t o summarize thos e results . A t th e least , therefore , an y concept s actually doin g an y wor k i n lega l reasonin g mus t hav e som e de scriptive content. 48 Thi s i s no t t o sa y tha t suc h conten t mus t al ways b e give n b y a n analysi s into , e.g. , th e metaphysic s o f wha t persons reall y are ; i t coul d com e fro m lega l conventions , lik e those tha t inves t "merger " i n corporation s la w wit h meaning . In th e cas e o f suc h borrowe d concept s a s personhood , how ever, i t i s unlikel y i n th e extrem e t o thin k tha t th e meanin g i s to b e foun d solel y i n lega l conventions . I n an y case : t o rebu t the lega l realis t skepti c i t i s enoug h t o sho w tha t th e meanin g of legal , ordinary , an d mora l concept s canno t b e foun d solel y in th e consequence s o f authoritativ e utterance . Hermeneutic Skepticism. Anothe r for m o f skepticis m abou t th e metaphysics o f th e perso n stem s fro m a dee p skepticis m tha t anything "i n th e world " i s referre d t o whe n on e talk s abou t ac tions an d menta l state s (an d thu s abou t persons) . Thi s doub t i s a kin d o f antirealis m abou t mind s an d abou t anythin g tha t smacks o f "mentalism, " includin g huma n action . Ther e ar e dif ferent kind s o f distrus t o f th e mental . T h e behavioris t skepti cism o f private , nonphysical , inferentiall y validated , interna l bu t nonetheless causall y efficaciou s state s o f mind , i s considered be low. Recently , mor e influentia l skepticis m ha s stemme d fro m th e Intentionality o f menta l concepts . Th e fea r her e ha s bee n tha t the objects o f menta l state s canno t b e specifie d objectively , tha t the onl y wa y suc h object s ar e fixed i s b y a certai n interpretiv e stance adopte d b y th e observer . Give n th e centralit y o f Inten tional object s t o sayin g wha t menta l state s are, the skeptica l con clusion ha s bee n tha t the y ar e no t thing s a t all .

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Two recen t crimina l la w theorist s illustrat e thi s kin d o f skep ticism abou t th e metaphysic s o f mind s an d persons . Hyma n Gros s has oriente d hi s recen t A Theory of Criminal Justice aroun d a n explicit antirealis t positio n abou t mind . I n considerin g specifi c intent, fo r example , Gros s urge s tha t "th e inten t i s par t o f th e act no t som e stat e o f min d tha t ma y hav e accompanie d it." 49 What Gros s apparentl y ha s i n min d her e (t o spea k loosely ) i s G.E.M. Anscombe' s poin t tha t man y o f ou r description s o f ac tion ar e formall y description s o f execute d intentions. 50 On e can , for example , redescrib e a crouchin g a s a hiding , i f th e purpos e with whic h th e crouchin g wa s don e wa s t o hide . "I n doin g wha t he does, " Gros s woul d sa y o f suc h a croucher , "th e acto r ha s a purpose tha t make s th e ac t a n ac t o f tha t kin d rathe r tha n o f another kin d . . . Bu t havin g a purpos e a s on e act s doe s no t mean tha t on e the n ha s a purpos e i n mind." 5 1 Abou t purpose s themselves, Gros s argue s tha t the y "ar e no t account s o f menta l occurrences o r state s a t all , no r i n fac t ar e the y account s o f an y sort o f persona l occurrenc e o r state. " Th e reaso n fo r this , w e are told , "i s tha t a n accoun t o f motive s doe s no t tel l u s wha t caused a n ac t t o b e done , bu t tell s u s rathe r in what cause it wa s done. A n accoun t o f th e motive s fo r a n ac t i s no t a n explana tion tellin g wh y th e ac t occurred , bu t rathe r a n explanatio n o f the rol e o f th e ac t i n a large r stor y o f th e actor' s pursuits. " Fi nally, abou t th e crucia l crimina l la w notio n o f actin g intentionally (whic h Gros s rightl y distinguishe s fro m actin g wit h a fur ther o r "specific " intention) , Gros s similarl y urge s tha t "mentalis m is objectionable becaus e i t purport s t o giv e a n accoun t o f inten tional an d unintentiona l acts—an d thu s o f culpability—i n term s of th e menta l affair s o f th e actor. " Again , w e ar e tol d tha t act ing intentionall y involve s n o referenc e t o "privat e inne r work ings" no r t o "wha t i s goin g o n i n th e mysteriou s regio n wher e acts originate. " Rather , whe n w e sa y tha t a n actio n i s don e intentionally we ar e merel y rebuttin g someon e else' s clai m tha t th e act wa s nonstandar d ("unintentional" ) wit h respec t t o th e ac tor's control . T h e actor' s control , Gros s furthe r urges , i s no t a mental matte r a t all. 52 George Fletcher' s recen t "rethinking " o f crimina l la w ha s als o led hi m t o a n antirealis t positio n abou t mind s (althoug h o f a somewhat les s trenchan t variet y tha n tha t o f Gross) . Fletche r als o explicitly reject s th e "mentalis t bia s i n philosophica l psychol -

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ogy," 53 an d urge s tha t w e "dro p th e notion s o f causatio n [b y mental states ] fro m th e metaphysic s o f actin g an d willing." 54 I n place o f th e metaphysic s defende d earlier—o f belief/desir e set s causing actions—Fletche r woul d emphasiz e th e observer' s rol e in interpretin g behavio r a s a n actio n don e fo r a certai n ai m o r reason. W e mus t stres s "th e perceptio n o f huma n actin g a s a form o f intersubjectiv e understanding" 5 5 i f w e ar e t o hav e a n adequate theor y o f actio n o r intention . Suc h intersubjectiv e un derstanding i s possible onl y i f th e observe r an d th e actor s shar e a "for m o f life. " Al l o f thi s i s t o den y tha t intendin g o r actin g are state s o r event s tha t reall y exis t i n th e worl d i n th e wa y tha t tables an d chair s do ; seein g a n even t a s a n action , o r a stat e a s an intention , o n thi s view , depend s entirel y o n ther e bein g a certain interpretiv e stanc e whic h th e observe r bring s t o thes e events i n orde r t o s o vie w them . These skepticism s abou t min d shoul d b e see n a s par t o f a larger traditio n tha t stem s i n par t fro m th e philosoph y o f th e later Wittgenstein, 56 i n par t fro m certai n wor k i n th e philoso phy o f history, 57 an d i n par t fro m th e influenc e o f th e herme neutic traditio n i n Continenta l philosophy. 58 Al l o f thes e tradi tions hav e i n commo n thei r blurrin g o f an y distinctio n betwee n the menta l state s tha t a n acto r reall y possesses , o n th e on e hand , and th e menta l state s hi s behavio r i s interprete d a s expressin g because o f th e observor' s interpretiv e stance , o n th e other . A s G.H. Vo n Wrigh t put s it , himsel f influence d b y eac h o f thes e traditions: "Behavio r get s it s intentiona l characte r fro m bein g seen by th e agen t himsel f o r b y a n outsid e observe r i n a wide r perspective, fro m bein g set i n a contex t o f aim s an d cogni tions. ° y Various reason s migh t convinc e on e tha t suc h menta l state s as belief s an d desire s d o no t exis t excep t a s som e kin d o f fictional posit s i n th e interpretiv e stanc e o f a n observer . Mos t per tinent t o th e skepticis m considere d her e i s tha t skepticis m abou t mental state s stemmin g fro m on e o f thei r long-notice d fea tures, namely , thei r Intentionality . Becaus e th e object s o f men tal state s ar e essentiall y linguistic , i t migh t see m inevitabl e tha t the necessar y linguisti c characterizatio n o f thos e object s coul d come fro m nowher e els e but th e linguisti c effort s o f th e inter preter. T h e onl y seemin g alternativ e woul d b e t o thin k tha t th e actor explicitly say s t o himsel f th e sentenc e tha t form s th e con -

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tent o f hi s belief s an d hi s desires . Yet suc h silen t soliloquie s surel y can't b e th e sourc e o f suc h contents , becaus e th e observe r ofte n rewords th e actor' s ow n explici t formulatio n o f hi s belief s an d desires int o th e observer' s ow n languag e an d hi s ow n idiom . W e think thi s quit e legitimate . Hence , th e interpretivis t skepti c con cludes, th e only way suc h object s o r content s ca n b e formulate d is b y th e observer' s "empatheti c understanding, " hi s desir e t o fill out a stor y s o tha t i t make s sense , etc . If I a m right , th e basi c motivatio n fo r believin g tha t ascribin g "real" belief s o r desire s t o a n agen t make s n o sens e lie s i n th e difficulties on e ha s i n formulatin g th e object s o f menta l state s without observe r interpretation. 60 Tha t thi s i s a n insufficien t motive fo r bein g a n interpretivis t ca n b e see n b y repairin g t o another "essentiall y linguistic " context, tha t o f reporte d speech . Suppose a n observe r reports : "Joh n sai d tha t Mar y i s a har d worker." Suc h indirec t speech , whic h doe s no t quot e th e origi nal speake r bu t paraphrase s wha t h e meant , i s muc h lik e sen tences o f menta l state s i n tha t bot h tak e propositiona l objects . In addition , i n neithe r contex t i s th e connectio n betwee n th e dependent claus e an d th e overal l sentenc e trut h functional . Th e truth o f th e overal l sentence , "Joh n sai d tha t Mar y i s a har d worker," doe s no t depen d o n th e trut h o f th e enclose d sen tence, "Mar y i s a har d worker. " John coul d hav e sai d i t withou t Mary bein g a har d worker , just a s John coul d hav e believe d tha t Mary i s a har d worke r withou t Mar y i n fac t bein g a har d worker . Moreover, just becaus e John sai d tha t Mar y i s a har d worker , i t is no t tru e tha t John sai d tha t th e lazies t worke r i n th e offic e i s a har d worker—eve n i f "Mary " an d "th e lazies t worke r i n th e office" bot h refe r t o on e an d th e sam e person . Fro m thes e thre e features on e ma y conclud e tha t th e objec t o f th e "sayin g that " is essentiall y linguistic , just a s i t i s fo r belief , desire , an d othe r mental states . The trut h o f th e overal l sentence , "Joh n sai d tha t Mar y i s a hard worker, " i s a functio n o f tw o items : (1 ) tha t ther e wa s som e utterance U b y John; an d (2 ) tha t "Mar y i s a har d worker " i s an accurate interpretation o f U . Thu s a n interpretiv e tas k is boun d up i n verifyin g th e trut h o f th e sentence s o f indirec t speech . Yet tha t som e interpretatio n i s require d fo r th e trut h o f sen tences reportin g indirec t speec h woul d temp t n o one , I shoul d think, t o asser t tha t ther e i s n o fac t o f th e matte r abou t wha t

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the utteranc e reall y was. 61 I t i s true , th e observe r mus t charac terize (interpret ) tha t utterance—itsel f a bi t o f languag e use d by John—bu t surel y th e necessit y o f suc h interpretatio n i s n o argument a t al l tha t utterance s don' t exis t excep t i n th e observ er's "story " o r "interpretiv e stance " o r whatever . Utterance s ar e real-world speec h act s b y real-worl d peopl e wh o unproblemat ically exist . An interpretivis t migh t wel l respon d tha t belief s an d desire s are unlik e utterance s i n a crucia l way . Whil e bot h belief s an d utterances tak e linguisti c object s tha t requir e interpretation , ut terances hav e a n establishe d tex t t o b e interpreted . Fo r belief s or desires , h e migh t ask , wha t i s the authoritativ e formulatio n of thei r object s tha t ca n serv e a s th e tex t agains t whic h al l inter pretations ar e t o b e judged fo r accuracy ? On e migh t urg e tha t "the text " formin g th e object s o f belief s an d desire s i s to be foun d in th e actor' s speec h t o himsel f abou t wha t h e want s an d wha t he believe s o n certai n occasions . Bu t thi s idea—tha t w e have be liefs o r desire s onl y whe n w e hav e engage d i n som e suc h silen t soliloquy—is a ver y inaccurat e vie w o f mind . W e unproblemat ically explai n behavio r b y reason s whe n th e acto r ha s engage d in n o suc h explici t recital s o f th e premise s o f hi s practica l rea soning. The "text " fo r belief s o r desire s i s to b e foun d i n tw o sources : first, i n th e abilitie s o f th e acto r t o avo w th e object s o f hi s be liefs an d desires . Thes e abilitie s d o no t depen d o n an y silen t sayings t o oneself , no r nee d the y b e readil y exercisabl e b y a n agent—they ma y b e "repressed. " Second , th e tex t ma y b e foun d in whateve r physiologica l event s tur n ou t t o b e "th e languag e of thought " i n th e brain. 62 Hence , althoug h finding th e tex t i s a mor e complicate d affai r fo r belief s an d desire s tha n fo r ut terances, i t i s no t th e cas e tha t no tex t exist s sav e tha t whic h a n external observe r bring s wit h hi m whe n h e seek s t o explai n th e behavior. Becaus e a tex t exists , th e nee d fo r interpretin g tha t text—the objec t o f belief s an d desires—n o mor e commit s on e to th e interpretivis t traditio n tha n doe s a simila r nee d commi t one t o interpretivis m abou t utterances . Som e interpretatio n i s involved i n formulatin g th e object s o f beliefs , o f desires , an d o f utterances; i n al l cases , however , wha t wa s really believed, de sired, o r uttere d i s a matte r o f fact . Behaviorist Skepticism. Anothe r antirealis t for m o f skepticis m

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about th e metaphysic s o f person s tha t ha s ha d som e influenc e with crimina l la w theorist s stem s fro m behavioris t psychology . Two kind s o f behavioris m ar e relevan t here , methodologica l behaviorism an d logica l behaviorism. 63 Those philosopher s an d psychologist s wh o ar e calle d "meth odological behaviorists " simpl y pu t mentalisti c explanation s t o the side , urgin g tha t menta l state s ar e to o "private, " "internal, " "inferred," o r i n som e othe r wa y unfi t fo r a (methodologically ) proper scienc e o f huma n behavior . Althoug h no t classifyin g himself a s a methodologica l behaviorist , B.F . Skinne r i s mos t consistently construe d t o b e skeptica l o n methodologica l ground s about th e utilit y o f menta l concepts. 64 Fo r Skinner , concept s lik e belief, desire , o r willin g ar e t o b e shunne d fo r a variet y o f rea sons, th e mos t importan t o f whic h i s tha t suc h explanation s presuppose som e kin d o f "homunculi " wh o reside s "inside " th e brain. Logical (ofte n calle d "philosophical, " o r "analytical" ) behav iorism i s no t skeptica l abou t th e methodologica l adequac y o f mental concepts ; rather , thi s for m o f behavioris m i s reduction ist i n character , fo r i t assert s tha t menta l word s lik e "belief " o r "desire" nam e eithe r behavio r itsel f o r dispositions to behav e i n certain ways—i n an y case , no t inne r state s tha t caus e behavior . On suc h a n account , t o sa y tha t X believe s tha t i t i s rainin g ca n be reduce d t o statement s abou t wha t X i s dispose d to do, e.g. , carry hi s umbrella , no t tak e lon g walks , sa y "i t i s raining, " etc . To explai n a n actio n b y citin g a belie f o r a desire , accordingly , will no t b e t o nam e a se t o f state s causing th e action ; rather , i t will be t o sa y tha t X wa s dispose d t o d o a n ac t o f tha t type , muc h in th e wa y tha t t o explai n th e dissolvin g o f a lum p o f suga r b y citing th e sugar' s solubilit y wil l b e t o sa y tha t i t wa s dispose d t o do tha t unde r certai n conditions . Such a reductio n i s mechanisti c becaus e th e disposition s t o which menta l state s ar e reduce d ar e themselve s mer e theoreti cal stand-in s ("behaviora l constructs" ) fo r th e rea l cause s o f ac tion, environmenta l stimuli . I t i s because o f ou r pas t condition ing tha t w e ar e disposed , e.g. , t o avoi d painfu l things ; s o tha t to explai n tha t X avoide d th e fire becaus e h e di d no t wan t t o get burned , i s ultimatel y t o sa y tha t event s i n hi s pas t cause d him t o engag e i n pain-avoidanc e behavior . Each o f thes e form s o f behavioris m ha s incline d som e judge s

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and theorist s t o a kin d o f skepticis m abou t th e menta l state s o f belief, desire , an d willin g o n whic h th e metaphysic s o f person s is built . On e who , fo r example , i s convince d tha t menta l state s are to o private , internal , o r inferre d t o b e th e (methodologi cally) prope r basi s fo r psychology , wil l also believe tha t thes e sam e characteristics preven t menta l state s fro m bein g th e touchston e of mora l culpabilit y an d lega l liability . Herber t Fingarett e ha s nicely characterize d thi s latte r view : "I n essence , th e viewpoin t in questio n consist s i n supposin g tha t i n sayin g thes e thing s w e are tryin g t o describ e certai n state s a s processe s withi n th e per son's min d o r 'insid e another' s skin. ' Bein g internal , thes e state s or processe s ar e necessaril y unobservabl e b y others . Therefore , we ough t no t t o tr y t o judge wha t i n th e natur e o f th e cas e w e cannot know." 65 Suc h a vie w lead s directl y t o th e well-know n "objective" theor y o f menta l states , accordin g t o whic h on e put s aside an y enquir y int o whethe r a defendan t actuall y believe d hi s conduct woul d caus e a certain result , i n favo r o f a n enquir y abou t whether a reasonabl e perso n woul d hav e foresee n suc h a re sult. Th e objectiv e theor y o f min d i n crimina l la w i s ofte n (bu t not inevitably ) motivate d b y th e sam e distrus t o f private , inter nal menta l state s tha t motivate s som e psychologist s t o becom e behaviorists. 66 Similarly, i f on e i s a logica l behavioris t abou t menta l states , one wil l believ e tha t n o on e (crimina l lawyer s included ) shoul d be concerne d abou t anythin g interna l o r private . Rather , th e criminal la w wil l be concerne d wit h a menta l concep t suc h a s a n intention onl y becaus e i t name s a disposition to engag e i n behav ior o f a certai n sort ; whe n tha t behavio r i s of a prohibite d sort , the la w care s abou t th e intentio n onl y becaus e i t care s abou t dangerous propensities . A s Justice Holme s pu t it , i n discussin g criminal attempts : "Th e importanc e o f th e inten t i s not t o sho w that th e ac t wa s wicked , bu t t o sho w tha t i s was likel y t o b e fol lowed b y hurtfu l consequences." 67 If on e i s eithe r a methodologica l o r a logica l behavioris t on e will b e deepl y skeptica l abou t anythin g tha t coul d b e calle d a metaphysics o f personhood . T h e inne r state s o f persona l causa tion (willing ) an d o f causall y efficaciou s belief s an d desire s eithe r do no t exis t (logica l behaviorism ) or , i f the y d o exist , ar e to o private fo r us e b y la w o r scienc e (methodologica l behaviorism) .

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Yet th e proble m fo r a behavioris t skepti c i s t o mak e plausibl e either o f thes e form s o f behaviorism . Sometimes methodologica l behavioris m i s only a ple a t o pur sue a particula r strateg y i n buildin g a theor y wit h whic h t o ex plain huma n behavior . T h e strateg y migh t b e paraphrase d a s the injunction , "se e i f yo u ca n explai n behavio r usin g onl y en vironmental cause s an d eschewin g menta l state s an d neuro physiology." Suc h a n explanator y strateg y nee d b e skeptica l abou t minds n o mor e tha n i t i s abou t brains , sinc e i t eschew s bot h i n favor o f cause s o f othe r kinds . T h e trul y skeptica l form s o f methodological behavioris m mus t g o furthe r tha n this , an d prefer behavioris t account s becaus e o f suspicion s abou t com peting account s i n term s o f menta l states , o n th e groun d fo r instance tha t menta l state s ar e private , internal , o r inferred , an d thus ca n onl y b e know n b y thei r holder. 68 Ye t w e infe r man y things, suc h a s forces , fields, electrons , kineti c energy ; fro m th e point o f vie w o f phenomenalism , w e als o infe r th e existenc e o f physical object s fro m thei r appearances . Th e inference-lade n nature o f ou r knowledg e abou t an y o f thes e thing s ca n hardl y be a legitimat e groun d o f skepticism . Similarly, th e privac y o f menta l state s i s easil y overstated . I t is tru e tha t w e d o hav e privilege d acces s t o ou r ow n state s o f mind, tha t i s a privilege d (becaus e noninferential ) wa y o f know ing wha t w e desir e o r believe . I t i s no t true , however , tha t only the holde r o f a stat e o f min d ca n kno w it s contents. 69 W e mak e legitimate (warranted ) inference s abou t others ' state s o f min d every day , base d o n behavio r an d wha t w e kno w abou t a cul ture. Suc h explanator y inference s b y others ma y supplemen t o r supplant th e agent' s ow n belief s abou t hi s menta l states . We ar e not guessin g a t somethin g tha t onl y th e agen t ca n kno w fo r cer tain whe n w e mak e thes e inference s abou t others ' menta l states . Freud taugh t u s a s much , i f indee d w e neede d th e lesson . The mai n thrus t o f Skinner' s skepticis m doe s no t ste m fro m these feature s o f menta l states , bu t fro m th e fea r earlie r iden tified: menta l state s lea d t o th e unacceptabl e positin g o f a ho munculus i n th e brain , a littl e ma n i n th e machine , whos e sci entific statu s i s abou t a s hig h a s tha t o f a "possessin g demon " or goblin . Skinner' s targe t her e i s just th e metaphysica l vie w o f persons earlie r described ; wha t mus t b e abolished , Skinne r tell s

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us, i s "th e autonomou s man—th e inne r man , th e homunculus , the possessin g demon , th e ma n defende d b y th e literatur e o f freedom an d dignity." 70 Skinner's fea r i s tha t person s conceive d a s autonomou s agent s presents u s wit h a n unacceptabl e dilemma : eithe r w e conceiv e of the m a s "uncause d causers, " i n whic h even t n o explanatio n is possibl e o f wh y suc h agent s d o wha t the y do ; or , i f w e giv e an explanation , i t wil l b e i n term s o f anothe r autonomou s agent , and the n another , leadin g t o a n infinit e regress : . . . th e littl e ma n . . . wa s recentl y th e her o o f a tele vision progra m calle d "Gateway s t o th e Mind ' . . . Th e viewer learned , fro m animate d cartoons , tha t whe n a man' s finger i s pricked , electrica l impulse s resemblin g flashes o f lightning ru n u p th e afferen t nerve s an d appea r o n a tele vision scree n i n th e brain . Th e littl e ma n wake s up , see s th e flashing screen , reache s out , an d pull s th e leve r . . . Mor e flashes o f lightnin g g o dow n th e nerve s t o the muscles , whic h then contract , a s th e finger i s pulle d awa y fro m th e threat ening stimulus/Th e behavio r o f th e homunculu s was , o f course, no t explained . A n explanatio n woul d presumabl y require anothe r film. An d it , i n turn , another. 71 Skinner's dilemm a i s a fals e one . Ou r metaphysic s o f ratio nality an d autonom y doe s no t presuppos e a n uncause d causer . Autonomy, a s I hav e argued , shoul d b e conceive d i n term s o f causal power , an d ye t th e exercise s o f tha t powe r ma y b e (an d surely are ) themselve s caused . Secondly , th e explanation s pos sible ar e not limited t o th e autonomou s act s o f othe r littl e agents , leading t o Skinner' s feare d infinit e regress . W e currentl y ex plain mos t suc h autonomou s doing s b y th e Intentiona l state s o f belief an d desire , bu t ther e i s n o reaso n wh y thos e Intentiona l states ma y no t themselve s b e explainabl e b y non-Intentiona l states. Tha t remain s t o b e seen . Onl y a n indefensibl y stron g (an d very implausible ) versio n o f th e doctrin e o f categor y differ ences w e earlie r encountere d coul d sustai n Skinne r o n thi s point . Skepticism proceedin g fro m logica l behavioris m fare s n o bet ter tha n doe s tha t proceedin g fro m methodologica l behavior ism. Despit e it s famou s proponents , logica l behavioris m i s vir tually dea d amon g philosophers , psychologists , artificia l

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intelligence specialists , linguists , an d other s currentl y worryin g about th e natur e o f menta l state s suc h a s "belief " an d "desire. " This i s i n par t du e t o a variet y o f philosophica l attack s o n phil osophical behaviorism. 72 T h e deat h knel l fo r logica l behavior ism ha d no t com e fro m an y o f thes e arguments , howeve r (som e of them , indeed , ar e no t persuasive) , bu t fro m othe r considera tions. On e i s th e erosio n o f th e logica l positivis t theor y o f meaning underlyin g philosophica l behaviorism . T h e mai n temptation t o see k t o reduc e "belief " o r "desire " t o behavio r comes fro m a logica l positivis t vie w abou t meaning , accordin g to whic h al l nonanalyti c expression s mus t hav e presentl y veri fiable condition s tha t ca n serv e a s th e criteri a fo r th e correc t us e of thos e expressions . Fo r menta l term s suc h a s "belief, " th e onl y public evidenc e w e hav e i s th e behavio r o f th e perso n whos e belief i t is—whic h lead s directl y t o th e reductionis t analysi s o f logical behaviorism . Fe w person s toda y woul d subscrib e t o suc h a logica l positivis t theor y o f meaning , fo r reason s tha t I hav e detailed elsewhere. 73 Briefly , "belief " ca n hav e meanin g eve n i f we hav e n o criteri a fo r it s application . Beliefs , desires , an d othe r mental state s ma y b e rea l physiologica l state s o f th e brain , o r they ma y b e functiona l state s o f th e brai n tha t canno t b e iden tified wit h an y type s o f brai n states . This scientifi c questio n can not b e foreclose d b y enshrinin g ou r presen t indicator s o f whe n mental state s exis t i n other s (behavio r o f certai n sorts ) a s if suc h indicators wer e analyticall y necessar y o r sufficien t conditions . I t is good evidenc e tha t someon e i s in pain , fo r example , whe n h e engages i n pain-expressin g behavior ; suc h evidenc e however , cannot b e sai d t o b e a n analyticall y necessar y o r sufficien t criterion fo r bein g i n pain . A n individua l coul d lear n th e pai n be havior an d no t b e i n pain , o r h e coul d b e i n pai n bu t no t en gage i n th e behavio r (curare , whic h paralyze s bu t doe s no t eliminate th e painfu l feelings , i s no t a n anesthetic) . Onl y i n ligh t of ou r bes t theor y o f wha t sor t o f stat e pai n i s ca n w e answe r whether someon e i s i n pain . On e canno t foreclos e th e devel opment o f suc h scientifi c theorie s b y positin g fixed connection s (meaning connections ) o f "pain " t o certai n kind s o f behaviors . Aside fro m thi s erosio n o f th e meanin g theor y foundation s of logica l behaviorism , th e positio n ca n b e see n t o b e untenabl e simply b y examinin g carefull y attempte d behavioris t reduction s of menta l term s lik e "belief. " I t i s n o acciden t tha t nowher e i n

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The Concept of Mind74 doe s Gilber t Ryl e giv e mor e tha n a sketc h of wha t a translatio n o f menta l term s int o "multi-track " dispo sitions woul d loo k like . T h e kin d o f translation s Skinne r casu ally throw s of f fro m tim e t o tim e throughou t hi s wor k ar e no t persuasive eve n t o hi s admirers , wh o regar d the m a s loos e par aphrases bu t no t reductions. 75 Jus t a s logica l positivism' s at tempted reductio n o f objec t languag e t o phenomena l languag e failed i n larg e par t becaus e n o adequat e translation s wer e eve r proposed, s o logica l behavioris m ha s foundere d i n larg e par t because o f th e reductionists ' simila r failur e t o delive r th e prom ised translations . Neither for m o f behavioris m ca n sustai n th e rejectio n o f th e subjective menta l state s o f belief , desire , an d willing . I f on e i s going t o argu e eithe r fo r th e objectiv e theor y o f menta l state s or fo r limitin g th e lega l relevanc e o f intention s t o manifestin g dangerous propensities , i t wil l hav e t o b e o n ground s othe r tha n those supplie d b y behaviorists . More generally , non e o f th e form s o f skepticis m w e hav e ex amined shoul d shak e th e realis t intuitio n tha t "th e stat e o f a man's min d i s a s muc h a fac t a s th e stat e o f hi s digestion." 76 Persons reall y posses s th e menta l state s o f belie f an d desire , reall y will (cause ) th e movement s o f thei r bodies , an d nothin g fro m contemporary lega l theory , philosophy , o r psycholog y shoul d convince u s otherwise . CONCLUSION

It i s eas y t o parod y th e vie w o f person s a s autonomou s an d rational agent s b y showin g tha t i t leave s ou t muc h o f wha t w e know t o b e tru e abou t persons . On e suc h parod y i s A.P . Her bert's well-know n portrai t o f tor t law' s reasonabl e man , abou t whom Herber t concludes : "Al l soli d virtue s ar e his , sav e onl y the peculia r qualit y b y whic h th e affectio n o f othe r me n i s won." 77 Suc h parodie s ar e no t challenge s t o th e lega l vie w o f persons becaus e the y sho w onl y tha t i t i s incomplete . Man y o f the mos t value d attribute s o f th e particula r person s eac h o f u s care abou t hav e nothin g t o d o wit h autonom y an d rationality , in eithe r th e fundamenta l o r som e riche r sense s o f thos e words . The ver y abstrac t vie w o f person s i n term s o f autonom y an d rationality i s o f cours e radicall y incomplet e a s a pictur e o f an y

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person w e know . I n particular , lef t ou t i s th e lif e o f th e emo tions where , i f anywhere , th e "affection s o f othe r men " ar e gained. Ye t suc h radica l incompletenes s o f th e law' s vie w o f a person i s n o argumen t tha t i t i s wrong . A s fa r a s i t goes , th e law's vie w o f person s coul d b e quit e correc t eve n i f radicall y in complete. I t take s a vie w o f min d quit e differen t tha n tha t o f commonsense psycholog y t o challeng e th e law' s ow n vie w o f persons, roote d a s i s th e law' s vie w o f min d i n par t o f th e com monsense psychology . There i s n o deart h o f suc h challenges . On e w e hav e alread y touched upo n i s radica l behaviorism' s quit e differen t vie w o f persons, whic h eschew s an y Intentiona l conceptualizatio n o f persons. Mor e generally , a s scienc e progresse s i n it s under standing o f th e relatio n betwee n geneti c background , environ mental influences , th e brai n an d behavior , th e law' s vie w o f persons wil l see m increasingl y threatened . More—an d better — books wil l urge u s t o la y asid e th e Intentiona l idiom s an d t o mov e beyond th e accompanyin g mora l vocabular y o f "freedo m an d dignity." Advance s i n geneti c research , brai n physiology , infor mation theory , an d artificia l intelligenc e wil l increasingl y see m to man y t o b e replacement s fo r a n Intentiona l conceptualiza tion o f persons . I n th e fac e o f suc h apparen t challenge s i t wil l become eve r mor e importan t t o b e clea r abou t wha t i s th e metaphysical vie w o f person s presuppose d b y our mora l an d le gal principle s o f responsibilit y assessment . Onl y wit h suc h un derstanding o f personhoo d ca n on e asses s th e degre e t o whic h this vie w i s actuall y inconsisten t wit h (an d thu s threatene d by ) the competin g image s o f ma n propose d b y th e variou s science s of huma n though t an d behavior . My ow n positio n i s that nothin g tha t scienc e i s likely t o tel l u s can shak e ou r metaphysica l vie w o f ourselves. 78 I hav e recentl y defended suc h a positio n wit h regar d t o on e familia r vie w o f persons lon g though t t o challeng e th e lega l view . I n m y recen t book 79 I examin e thre e seemin g challenge s t o th e lega l vie w o f persons comin g fro m psychiatr y an d psychoanalysis . T h e firs t is a kin d o f conceptua l imperialis m whereb y th e psychiatri c no tions o f healt h an d illnes s ar e urge d a s substitute s fo r th e ethi cal notion s o f goodnes s an d badness . Thes e ar e th e familia r view s that identif y menta l healt h a s huma n flourishing o r whic h iden tify an y for m o f socia l devianc e a s menta l illness . Suc h views , i f

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accepted, woul d mak e meaningles s th e law' s attemp t t o sepa rate th e sic k fro m th e bad . Fo r o n suc h view s n o on e i s reall y bad excep t i n th e sens e tha t on e i s sic k o r ill . On suc h view s th e law's divisio n o f huma n being s int o accountabl e o r nonaccount able agent s make s littl e sense ; give n th e merge r o f badnes s int o sickness, no huma n being s ar e accountabl e fo r th e ba d result s they ma y cause . Thi s vie w i s destructiv e o f th e law' s ide a tha t a person i s a bein g wh o ha s passe d som e threshol d o f rationalit y such tha t h e ca n fairl y b e ascribe d responsibility . Th e secon d challenge stem s fro m th e ide a tha t Freu d mad e almos t defini tive o f twentieth-centur y psychiatry , tha t o f th e unconscious . "Al l of th e categorie s whic h w e emplo y t o describ e consciou s menta l acts, suc h a s ideas , purposes , resolution s an d s o forth, " Freu d wrote, coul d b e applie d t o describ e th e unconscious mental life. 80 "Indeed, o f man y o f thes e laten t state s w e hav e t o asser t tha t the onl y poin t i n whic h the y diffe r fro m state s whic h ar e con scious i s just i n th e lac k o f consciousnes s o f them." 8 1 This idea , of a kin d o f shado w mind , th e existenc e an d content s o f whic h are unknow n t o it s possessor , coul d hav e a radica l impac t o n the lega l vie w o f persons , dependin g upo n ho w th e uncon scious i s conceived . I f th e unconsciou s i s conceived o f i n Inten tional terms , the n i t seems tha t th e menta l lif e o f ma n i s far riche r than th e la w ha s supposed , s o that nomina l accident s ma y reall y be (unconsciously ) intentiona l action s fo r reasons . Alterna tively, i f th e unconsciou s i s conceive d o f i n th e nonlntentiona l vocabulary o f th e Freudia n metapsychologies , i t ma y see m tha t the suppose d rationalit y an d autonom y o f person s i s a n illu sion, tha t reall y n o on e i s responsible becaus e n o on e i s free fro m the gri p o f th e seething , irrationa l current s o f hi s primar y pro cess thinking . The thir d challeng e t o th e lega l vie w o f person s come s fro m the temptatio n no t onl y o f psychiatrist s bu t o f other s a s well , t o fractionate th e perso n int o smalle r selves . A n animisti c concep tion o f th e unconscious—a s a kin d o f secon d autonomou s an d rational self—i s on e stran d o f thi s kin d o f subdividin g o f per sons. Bu t ther e ar e othe r strand s a s well . Wheneve r a theor y attributes causa l agenc y an d practica l reasonin g t o subpersona l entities, b e the y calle d "ego, " "id," "censors, " "th e past, " "ances tors," "roles, " "othe r people, " o r "Syste m Ucs., " on e present s th e same challeng e t o th e lega l vie w o f persons . T h e challeng e i s t o

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the lega l assumptio n tha t one , bu t onl y one , rationa l agen t wit h causal power s (person ) reside s "in " an y huma n being . In m y recen t boo k I see k t o defus e thes e apparen t challenge s to la w an d moralit y comin g fro m psychiatry . Suc h a tas k i s pos sible—for psychiatry , fo r behaviorism , sociobiology , physiolog ical psychology , an d compute r scienc e a s well—only i f on e i s clear about th e metaphysic s o f personhoo d presuppose d b y th e law . This essa y i s intende d t o serv e a s suc h a clarifyin g firs t ste p i n a genera l defens e o f ou r mos t basi c view s abou t ou r nature .

NOTES 1. Se e Glanvill e Williams , Criminal Law: The General Part, 2 d ed . (London: Steven s an d Sons, 1961) . 2. Georg e Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston : Little , Brown , 1978). Fletche r nevertheles s concede s tha t "th e quest fo r a genera l part ha s much t o commen d it " (p. 393) and proceed s i n th e sec ond hal f o f his book t o articulate tha t genera l par t i n terms o f the concepts o f wrongdoing an d attribution . 3. Mar k Kelman , "Interpretiv e Constructio n i n th e Substantiv e Criminal Law, " Stanford Law Review 3 3 (1981) : 591-673 . Mos t o f Kelman's argument s would , i f true, undercu t th e moral thesi s state d below, tha t a coherent mora l theor y govern s th e attribution o f faul t to individuals . 4. Spellin g ou t wit h an y precisio n th e natur e o f thi s logica l relatio n is a notoriousl y difficul t task . T h e literature i n contemporar y jur isprudence tha t speak s o f principle s "underlying " positiv e la w generally content s itsel f wit h a variet y o f differen t relation s pa raded unde r thi s label . W e seek som e relatio n tha t i s stronger tha n mere freedo m fro m contradictio n betwee n rule s an d principles, and yet i s weaker tha n stric t implication . T h e same relatio n i s neede d by coherenc e theorist s i n epistemology . 5. H.L.A . Hart , Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford : Oxfor d Uni versity Press , 1968) . 6. T h e "by-and-large" hedg e i s to take int o accoun t th e obvious fac t that th e identit y betwee n lega l an d mora l condition s o f faul t as cription i s not perfect—the counterexample s o f strict liabilit y stat utes, th e objective standar d o f negligence, th e partial disallowanc e of mistak e o r ignoranc e o f la w as a n excuse , an d th e lac k o f a n excuse versio n o f natura l necessity , ar e wel l know . Fo r a defens e of m y mora l thesi s here , despit e thes e discrepancies , se e Jerome

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Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2 d ed . (Indianapolis : Bobbs Merrill, 1960) , chaps. V an d X. ) Suc h counterexample s canno t de stroy th e genera l thesi s tha t thes e mora l principle s fit th e estab lished doctrine s o f th e crimina l la w bette r tha n an y othe r princi ples, suc h a s utilitarianism . 7. Fo r a n exampl e o f th e broade r mora l thesi s tha t I a m no t defend ing, se e Davi d A J . Richards , "Huma n Right s an d th e Mora l Foundations o f th e Substantiv e Crimina l Law, " Georgia Law Review 13 (1979) : 1395-1446 . Richard s ignore s an y distinctio n betwee n the moralit y o f fai r faul t ascriptio n an d th e moralit y tha t con demns certai n harm s o r acts . I t i s thi s distinctio n tha t Har t als o overlooks whe n h e criticize s th e mora l thesi s state d i n th e text . Th e dependence o f crimina l liabilit y o n mora l culpabilit y i s no t falsi fied b y showin g tha t man y crimina l norm s prohibi t conduc t tha t is no t orall y prohibited . Hart , Punishment and Responsibility, p. 37 . On thi s erro r o f Hart's , se e Ronal d Dworkin , Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvar d University , 1978) , p . 9 . 8. Michae l S . Moore , Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (Cambridge: Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1984) , chap . 2 . 9. Th e accoun t o f reason s fo r actio n state d herei n follow s closel y th e account i n Michae l S . Moore , "Th e Natur e o f Psychoanalyti c Ex planation," Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 3 (1980) : 4 5 9 543; reprinte d i n expande d for m i n L . Laudan , ed. , Mind and Medicine: Explanation and Evaluation in Psychiatry and the Biomedical Sciences, Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy and History of Science vol. 8 (Berkeley : Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1983) . 10. Thes e ar e th e difficultie s havin g t o d o wit h th e Intentionalit y o f mental states . 11. Th e problem s elide d her e are , first, tha t i t i s unclea r whethe r w e have an y coheren t ide a o f propositiona l identit y (se e P.T . Greach , Logic Matters [Berkeley : Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1980] , p . 170), an d second , eve n i f w e do , tha t i t guide s ou r individuatio n of menta l state s suc h a s thos e o f belie f o r desire . I n addition , th e relation o f materia l implicatio n i n premis e 2 i s plainl y to o strong : an acto r nee d no t believ e tha t hi s actio n i s a sufficien t conditio n of bringin g abou t hi s desire d end ; i f h e believe s i t i s possibl e (o r at leas t doe s no t believ e tha t i t i s impossible ) tha t hi s ac t wil l hav e the desire d effect , tha t i s enoug h fo r hi m t o b e sai d t o hav e acte d with tha t en d a s hi s reason . 12. Fo r a goo d explicatio n o f th e distinction , se e Bria n Fay , "Practica l Reasoning, Rationality , an d th e Explanatio n o f Intentiona l Ac tion," Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior 8 (1977) : 77-101 . 13. I t i s no t a t al l clea r wha t Aristotl e mean t b y "practica l reasoning "

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and "practica l syllogisms " in th e scattere d writing s i n whic h h e use d these phrases . Fo r a defens e o f th e vie w tha t h e use d i t i n th e manner suggeste d i n th e text , wher e th e premise s o f a practica l inference ar e jus t th e content s o f a belief/desir e set , se e Marth a Nussbaum, "Practica l Syllogism s an d Practica l Science, " i n he r Aristotle's De Moto Animalum (Princeton : Princeto n Universit y Press , 1977). 14. O n th e ide a o f th e unconsciou s an d it s relation t o explanator y rea sons, se e Moore , Law and Psychiatry, chaps. 7—8 . 15. Thes e stronge r sense s o f rationalit y ar e explore d i n Moore , Law and Pschiatry, chap . 2 . 16. Se e Arthu r Danto , "Basi c Action, " Amer. Philos. Quart. 2 (1965) : 141—148; D.F . Pears , "Th e Appropriat e Causatio n o f Intentiona l Basic Actions, " Critica 7 (1975) : 39-69 . 17. Whic h i s th e questio n bequeathe d t o th e contemporar y philoso phy o f actio n b y Ludwi g Wittgenstein : "Wha t i s lef t ove r i f I sub tract th e fac t tha t m y ar m goe s u p fro m th e fac t tha t I rais e m y arm?" Ludwi g Wittgenstein , Philosophical Investigations (London : Basil Blackwell , 1958) , p . 161 . 18. Fo r furthe r argumen t an d example , se e Richar d Taylor , Action and Purpose (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. : Prentic e Hall , 1965) , p . 59 . 19. Joh n Stuar t Mill , A System of Logic (London: Longma n Group , 1965) , p. 35 ; J o hn Austin , Lectures on Jurisprudence (London : J . Murray , 1869), p . 427 , an d J.L . Mackie , "Th e Ground s o f Responsibility, " in P.M.S . Hacke r an d J . Raz , eds. , Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1977) , pp . 175-188 . Macki e shifte d the Mill-Austi n theor y slightl y t o tak e int o accoun t a n objectio n H.L.A. Har t onc e voice d (Hart , Punishment and Responsibility, 9 0 112). Macki e point s ou t tha t a causa l theoris t ma y rejec t an y no tion tha t a n acto r mus t desir e to move his arm in orde r fo r tha t ar m movement t o hav e bee n a n action . I t i s enoug h tha t suc h move ments, "thoug h no t themselve s desired , . . . wer e suc h a s woul d normally fulfil l th e desir e tha t brough t the m abou t an d tha t the y came abou t becaus e the y wer e s o associate d wit h it s fulfillment " (Mackie, p . 179) . 20. Alvi n Goldman , A Theory of Human Action (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1970) . 21. Se e Roderic k Chisholm , "Th e Descriptiv e Elemen t i n th e Concep t of Action,"/ , of Philos. 6 1 (1964) : 613-624 ; fo r a n attempte d so lution, se e C . Peacocke , "Devian t Causa l Chains, " Midwest Studies in Philosophy I V (1979) : 123-155 . Donal d Davidso n ha s reviewe d Goldman's an d othe r causa l theorists ' attempt s t o provid e a causa l criterion fo r actions , an d conclude s tha t on e mus t "despai r o f

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spelling ou t . . . th e wa y i n whic h attitude s mus t caus e action s i f they ar e t o rationaliz e th e action. " Davidson , Actions and Events (Ne w York: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1980) , p . 79 . 22. On e migh t sho w tha t th e causa l powe r o f a perso n itsel f depend s on th e knowledg e o f th e actin g subjec t tha t h e i s acting . Thi s i s not a causa l theor y o f actio n (ac t = movemen t cause d b y belief ) but rather , a n epistemi c indicato r o f whe n a perso n acts . I articu late thi s epistemi c criterio n i n "Responsibilit y an d th e Uncon scious," Southern California Law Review 5 3 (1980) : 1536—1675 . 23. Joh n Locke , Two Treatises of Government (Ne w York : Hafne r Pub lishing, 1956) , p . 134 . 24. Se e generall y Moore , Law and Psychiatry, chap . 10 , fo r a defens e of thi s "compatibilist " position . 25. Gilber t Ryle , The Concept of Mind (London : Hutchinso n an d Co. , 1949). A considerabl e literatur e followe d Ryl e i n pursuin g th e various distinction s tha t hav e bee n though t t o constitut e thi s cat egory difference . 26. Th e wor d "Intentional " i s capitalized t o distinguis h thi s character istic fro m th e mor e familia r "intention " o r "intentional " o f ordi nary speech . Brentan o hel d tha t "ever y menta l phenomeno n i s characterized b y wha t th e scholastic s o f th e Middl e Age s called th e Intentional Inexistenc e o f a n objec t an d whic h w e woul d cal l . . . the referenc e t o a content , a directio n upo n a n object. " Fran z Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig , 1874) . A selection o f thi s wor k i s translate d in : R . Chisholm , ed. , Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (Glencoe , 111. : Free Press , 1960) . A mor e moder n characterizatio n o f Intentionalit y i s i n term s o f three criteria : (1 ) A sentenc e i s Intentiona l i f i t use s a nam e o r description i n suc h a wa y tha t neithe r th e sentenc e no r it s contra dictory implie s eithe r tha t ther e i s or ther e isn' t anythin g t o whic h the nam e o r expressio n trul y applies . " I hop e fo r a 60-foo t sail boat," fo r example , doe s no t impl y tha t ther e i s a 60-foo t sailboat . (2) A sentenc e i s Intentiona l i f i t contain s a propositiona l claus e whose trut h o r falsit y i s no t implie d b y th e sentenc e a s a whole, o r its contradictory . " I hop e tha t i t wil l rain, " fo r example , doe s no t imply tha t "i t wil l rain " i s tru e o r false . (3 ) A sentenc e i s Inten tional i f codesignativ e name s o r description s canno t b e substitute d and preserv e truth . I may , fo r example , orde r th e larges t roo m i n some inn ; eve n i f th e larges t roo m i s identical wit h th e dirties t roo m in th e inn , on e canno t substitut e th e secon d descriptio n fo r th e first; I di d no t orde r th e dirties t roo m i n th e inn . Se e R . Chisholm , Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1957), pp . 170-171 . 27. Se e Willia m Lycan , "O n Intentionalit y an d th e Psychological, "

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American Philosophical Quarterly (1969) : 305-312 ; Da n Dennett , Content and Consciousness (London : Routledg e an d Kega n Paul , 1969), chap . II . 28. Fo r th e classi c treatmen t o f this , se e Willar d Va n Orma n Quine , "Reference an d Modality, " i n hi s From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvar d Universit y Press , 1961) , pp . 139-159 . T o sa y that a languag e i s Intentiona l i s t o sa y tha t i t i s no t extensional . See Jame s Cornman , "Intentionalit y an d Intensionality, " Philos. Quart. 1 2 (1962) : 4 4 - 5 2 . 29. Se e W.V.O . Quine , "Th e Scop e an d Languag e o f Science, " i n hi s Ways of Paradox (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1966) . 30. Th e "a t present " hedg e i n th e tex t i s t o avoi d takin g th e Rylea n position tha t on e ca n logicall y sho w tha t n o suc h reduction s ar e possible. Se e Ala n Garfinkel , Forms of Explanation (Ne w Haven : Yal e University Press , 1980) , p . 49 , fo r a discussio n o f th e provisiona l independence w e shoul d gran t Intentionalis t descriptions . Se e als o Moore, Law and Psychiatry, chap. 1 . 31. A realis t vie w abou t mind s grant s tha t ther e reall y ar e menta l states , that i n an y takin g o f inventor y o f th e furnitur e o f th e univers e mental state s mus t b e include d jus t a s surel y a s table s an d chairs . Such a philosophica l realis t abou t mind s i s to b e distinguishe d fro m the ill-name d lega l realists , wh o wer e typicall y antirealist s i n thei r metaphysics. 32. W . Hohfeld , Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven : Yal e Uni versity Press , 1923) , pp . 2 7 - 3 1 . Se e als o Al f Ross , "Tu-Tu, " Harvard Law Review 7 0 (1957) : 812-825 . 33. Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law, pp . 396-401 . Fo r a simila r idea , see Danie l Dennett , "Th e Condition s o f Personhood, " i n A . Rorty , ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1976), pp . 175-196 , wherei n Dennet t urge s tha t w e hav e tw o dif ferent concept s o f a person , "th e mora l notio n an d th e metaphys ical notion " (p . 176) . Tha t differen t speec h act s ar e bein g per formed wit h "person " i s n o argumen t tha t th e wor d i s ambiguous . 34. Fo r a discussion o f genuin e case s of ambiguit y i n lega l uses of words , see Michae l Moore , "Th e Semantic s o f Judging, " Southern California Law Review 5 4 (1981) : 151-294 , especiall y pp . 181-188 . 35. H.L.A . Hart , "Th e Ascriptio n o f Responsibilit y an d Rights, " Proc. Arist. Soc'y 49 (1949) : pp . 171-194 . Har t late r cam e t o repudiat e his ascriptivism . 36. Joh n Dewey , Human Nature and Conduct (New York : Holt , Rhinehar t and Winston , 1922 ) pp . 120-121 . 37. Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law, p . 397 . 38. 24 8 N.Y . 339 , 16 2 N.E . 9 9 (1928) . 39. Ide m a t 354 , 16 2 N.E . a t 104 .

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40. Stanle y Ingber , "Boo k Review, " U.C.L.A. Law Review 27 (1980): 8 1 6 848, a t pp . 822-24 . 41. Fo r discussio n o f thi s argument , an d citatio n t o th e Szaszia n lit erature, se e Moore , Law and Psychiatry, chap. 4 . 42. Feli x Cohen , "Transcendenta l Nonsens e an d th e Functiona l Ap proach," Columbia Law Review 3 5 (1935) : 809—849 . Fo r a n expo sition o f th e dependenc e o f America n lega l realis m upo n a func tionalist theor y o f meaning , se e Rober t Summers , Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (Ithaca: Cornel l Universit y Press , 1982) , p. 32 . 43. Fo r example , C.L . Stevenson , Ethics and Language (Ne w Haven : Yal e University Press , 1944) ; R.M . Hare , The Language of Morals (Ox ford: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1952) . Fo r a helpfu l summar y o f the earl y form s o f emotivis m i n ethics , se e J.O. Urmson , The Emotive Theory of Ethics (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1968) . 44. Christophe r Stone , "Corporat e Accountabilit y i n La w an d Mor als," i n J. Houc k an d O . Williams , eds. , The Judaeo-Christian Vision and the Modern Business Corporation (Notre Dame : Universit y o f Notr e Dame Press , 1982) . 45. Ide m a t p . 285 . 46. Idem . 47. Michae l Moore , "Mora l Reality, " Wisconsin Law Review 1982 , pp . 1061-1156. 48. Anothe r wa y o f puttin g th e lega l realist' s poin t abou t meanin g i s to sa y tha t th e meanin g o f lega l concept s i s wholl y "context-de pendent," tha t is , tha t the y depen d o n wha t (purpose ) on e want s to achiev e i n utterin g them . Fo r a n attac k o n thi s Fulleria n ver sion, se e Moore , "Th e Semantic s o f Judging," pp . 274-277 . 49. Hyma n Gross , A Theory of Criminal Justice (Ne w York : Oxfor d Uni versity Press , 1979) , p . 103 . 50. Se e G.E.M . anscombe , Intention, 2 d ed . (Ithaca , N.Y. : Cornel l Uni versity Press , 1963) . 51. Gross , Theory of Criminal Justice, p . 100 . 52. Al l th e quotation s i n thi s paragrap h ar e fro m Gross , Theory of Criminal Justice, a t pp . 109 , 98 , 91 , and 97 . Th e las t tw o sentence s refer t o pp . 8 8 an d 89 . 53. Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law, p . 437 . 54. Fletcher , p . 436 . 55. Fletcher , p . 436 . 56. Wittgenstein , Philosophical Investigations. 57. Se e Michae l Oakshott , Experience and its Modes (Cambridge : Cam bridge Universit y Press , 1933) ; Willia m Dray , Laws and Explanation in History (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1957) ; R.G . Colling wood, The Idea of History (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1946) .

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For a sympatheti c relatin g o f Collingwoo d t o th e issue s of contem porary actio n theory , se e Re x Martin , Historical Explanation: Re-enactment and Practical Inference (Ithaca : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1977). 58. Fo r a brie f discussio n o f th e verstehen tradition i n Germa n histor y and sociology , se e G.H . Vo n Wright , Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1973) , pp . 4 - 7 . 59. Vo n Wright , Explanation and Understanding, p . 115 . 60. Donal d Davidso n (despit e hi s staunc h adherenc e t o a causa l vie w of reasons ) i s led t o what h e call s "th e necessaril y holisti c characte r of interpretation s o f propositiona l attitudes " b y thi s motivation . Se e Davidson, Actions and Events, pp . 238—9 . 61. Davidson , wh o see s thi s analogy , believe s tha t t o sa y wha t th e ut terance meant i s t o infus e one' s ow n (observer ) concept s int o th e interpretation o f th e utterance . Ye t Davidso n woul d no t disput e that a particula r ac t o f speec h existe d a t a particula r time , eve n i f that ac t o f speec h require s interpretatio n t o b e understood . 62. Whethe r ther e i s anythin g tha t coul d b e calle d a "languag e o f th e brain" i s a hotl y conteste d matter . Fo r a n introductory , i f skepti cal, treatmen t o f th e issue s involved , se e Da n Dennett , "Bria n Writing an d Min d Reading, " i n Brainstorms (Putney , Vt : Bradfor d Books, 1978) , pp . 39—50 . Compar e Jerr y Fodor , The Language of Thought (New York : Thoma s Y . Crowell, 1975) . Although on e migh t doubt tha t th e relatio n betwee n languag e an d brai n physiolog y i s as simpl e a s th e "languag e o f thought " schoo l woul d suggest , surel y some relatio n exist s betwee n languag e abilitie s an d suc h physiol ogy63. Fo r th e separatio n o f methodologica l fro m philosophica l behav iorism, se e Michae l Martin , "Interpretin g Skinner , Behaviorism. 6 (1978): 129-138 . 64. Norma n Malcol m (wit h a goo d dea l o f textua l support ) construe s Skinner t o b e a reductionis t abou t menta l terms . Se e Norma n Malcolm, "Behavioris m a s a Philosoph y o f Psychology, " i n T.W . Wann, ed. , Behaviorism and Phenomenology (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicago Press , 1964) , pp . 141-154 . I n he r attemp t t o constru e Skinner i n suc h a wa s a s t o immuniz e hi m fro m th e defect s o f philosophical behaviorism , Brend a Mape l make s th e cas e fo r Skinner a s a nonreductionist . Se e Brend a Munse y Mapel , "Philo sophical Criticis m o f Behaviorism : A n Analysis, " Behaviorism 5 (1977): 17—32 . Dan Dennet t nicel y separate s Skinner' s variou s ar guments agains t mentalis t language , an d rightl y conclude s tha t Skinner neve r eve n sa w tha t h e ha d t o tak e a positio n o n thi s is sue: "I t i s unfathomable ho w Skinne r ca n b e s o sloppy o n thi s score , for reflectio n shoul d revea l t o him , a s i t wil l t o us , tha t thi s vacil -

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lation i s ove r a n absolutel y centra l poin t i n hi s argument. " Den nett, Brainstorms, p . 63 . 65. Herber t Fingarette , The Meaning of Criminal Insanity (Berkele y an d Los Angeles : Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1972) , p . 8 2 66. A s Jerom e Hal l point s out , th e objectiv e theor y o f menta l state s need no t res t o n suc h antirealis t position s abou t minds : "Holme s did no t res t hi s theor y upo n tha t so-calle d 'skeptical ' position . . . . He acknowledge d tha t menta l state s ca n b e discovere d and , i n th e face o f that , h e maintaine d tha t thi s knowledg e i s irrelevan t i n modern pena l law , an d properl y so ! I n sum , hi s theor y challenge s the ethic s o f pena l law , no t it s epistemology." Jerome Hall , General Principles of Criminal Law, p . 156 . 67. Olive r Wendel l Holmes , The Common Law (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard Universit y Press , 1963) , p . 5 6 68. Dennett , "Skinne r Skinned, " i n Brainstorms, nicel y separate s thes e various methodologica l claims . 69. Fo r a separatio n o f th e claim s o f privilege d acces s fro m thos e o f incorrigibility, an d a n attac k o n th e latter , se e Moore , "Natur e o f Psychoanalytic Explanation. " 70. B.F . Skinner , Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Ne w York : Knopf , 1971) , p. 200 . 71. Skinner , "Behavioris m a t Fifty, " i n T.W . Wann , ed , Behaviorism and Phenomenology (Chicago: Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1964) , p . 80 . 72. Thes e include d Norma n Malcolm' s epistemi c arguments , base d o n the oddnes s o f behaviora l translation s o f first-perso n psychologi cal report s (" I a m i n pain " i s a statemen t whos e trut h i s no t in ferred b y th e acto r fro m observin g hi s ow n pain-behavior) . Se e Norman Malcolm , "Behavioris m a s a Philosoph y o f Psychology, " in T.N . Wann , ed. , Behaviorism and Phenomenology. Richard Peter s and other s als o urge d tha t behavioria l reduction s coul d no t bridg e the "logica l gulf " o r "categorica l difference " betwee n intelligent , rule-following, purposiv e actio n o n th e on e hand , an d colorles s movements an d othe r "dumb " phenomena , o n th e other . Se e Pe ters, The Concept of Motivation (London : Routledg e an d Kega n Paul , 1958). Mor e recently , Quin e an d other s hav e urge d tha t certai n logical peculiaritie s o f mentalisti c language—havin g t o d o wit h "belief" an d othe r menta l word s takin g objects or contents—pre clude an y kin d o f reduction , whethe r o f a behaviora l o r a neuro physiological kind . Fo r Quine , a s for Skinner , thi s means on e shoul d avoid "belief, " "desire " an d othe r Intentiona l idiom s i n formulat ing a trul y scientifi c (an d behaviorist ) scienc e o f huma n behavior ; one shoul d avoi d suc h idiom s precisel y becaus e on e coul d not re duce the m t o scientificall y respectabl e (i.e. , non-Intentional ) speech . See W.V.O. Quine , Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press ,

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1960). Quin e admit s tha t "ther e i s n o breakin g ou t o f th e Inten tional vocabular y b y explaining it s members i n othe r terms " (p. 220). 73. Moore , "Th e Semantic s o f Judging," a t pp . 208-210 . 74. Ryle , Concept of Mind. 75. Se e Mapel , "Philosophica l Criticis m o f Behaviorism. " 76. Justic e Bowen , i n Edington v . Fitzmaurice , 2 9 Ch . Div . 459 , 48 3 (1882). 77. A.P . Herbert , Uncommon Law, 7t h ed . (1952) , pp . 2 - 3 . 78. Thi s i s no t becaus e ou r metaphysica l belief s can' t b e controverte d by evidenc e o r changed , bu t rather , becaus e ou r metaphysica l be liefs abou t person s ar e no t i n fac t challenge d b y th e seemingly competing view s o f behavioris t psychology , dynami c psychiatry , an d th e like. 79. Moore , Law and Psychiatry. 80. Sigmun d Freud , "Th e Unconscious, " in Collected Papers, vol. IV (Ne w York: Basi c Books , 1959) , pp . 98-136 , a t p . 101 . 81. Freud , "Th e Unconscious. "

2 INTENTIONALITY AN D TH E CONCEPT O F TH E PERSO N LAWRENCE ROSE N

Social scientist s hav e lon g accepte d a s th e startin g poin t o f thei r task th e analysi s o f th e way s i n whic h th e peopl e o f a give n cul ture interpre t on e another' s action s an d orien t thei r ow n en deavors accordingly . Suc h interpretation s an d thei r assessmen t may b e give n a s a matte r o f commo n sens e i n everyda y affair s or lef t t o th e specia l consideratio n o f professional s t o whom th e task o f makin g sens e o f somethin g o n behal f o f al l ma y b e in corporated int o th e overal l schem e o f a n acceptabl e socia l or der. Bu t whateve r it s particula r components—fro m th e mos t obvious recognitio n o f another' s act s t o th e mos t arcan e ac count rendere d o f them—i t remain s a n axio m o f moder n socia l science tha t th e mode s b y whic h w e perceiv e an d ac t towar d others ar e intimatel y entwine d with—an d hav e systemi c reper cussions for— a hos t o f social , economic , religious , political , an d other aspect s o f tha t culture . T o rais e th e questio n o f ho w an other i s perceived , o r how , i n a give n society , th e ver y ide a o f a perso n i s conceptualized , i s t o ta p int o on e o f th e centra l un derstandings b y whic h a cultur e i s composed an d sustained . The autho r acknowledge s wit h gratitud e th e suppor t provide d b y th e John Si mon Guggenhei m Foundation , th e Rockefelle r Foundatio n Stud y Cente r a t Bellagio, an d th e J o h n D . an d Catherin e T . MacArthu r Foundatio n Award . I also greatl y appreciat e th e discussion s I hav e ha d abou t thi s pape r wit h Pau l Gehl, Penn y Schin e Gold , Anthon y T . Grafton , R . Ken t Greenawalt , Stanle y N . Katz, Ameli e Rorty , an d Abraha m L . Udovitch .

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As i n othe r realms , th e questio n o f th e concep t o f th e perso n is often a t th e hear t o f th e wa y i n whic h a lega l syste m handle s issues o f fac t an d fault , procedur e an d remedy . Fo r eve n i f le gal specialist s hav e develope d method s an d idea s concernin g th e nature o f th e individual , hi s personality , hi s socia l responsibili ties, hi s comman d ove r hi s ow n acts , an d th e natur e o f hi s in ner state , thes e lega l concept s wil l b e deepl y embedde d in , an d draw muc h o f thei r sustenanc e an d meanin g from , th e wa y th e person i s conceptualize d i n th e broade r real m o f society . In deed, i t i s both th e subjec t an d th e thesi s o f thi s chapte r tha t i n order t o understan d th e developmen t an d applicatio n o f th e concept o f intentionalit y i n an y lega l syste m i t i s indespensabl e to plac e thi s concep t i n th e large r contex t o f th e cultura l defi nition o f th e person . Specifically , I conside r th e relationshi p be tween th e wa y i n whic h intentionalit y i s attribute d i n th e Is lamic la w o f contemporar y Morocc o an d th e wa y i n whic h th e individual i s constitute d i n tha t culture . The n b y drawin g a comparison wit h th e developmen t o f th e ide a o f th e individua l as th e possesso r o f a distinc t interio r stat e i n earl y medieva l Eu rope I conside r how , subtl y an d ofte n quit e indirectly , a chang e in idea s abou t th e ver y natur e o f th e individua l migh t contrib ute t o a gradua l shif t i n lega l concepts . Finally , I conside r som e of th e way s socia l scientist s hav e tackle d th e proble m o f othe r minds i n othe r culture s an d t o speculat e o n th e rol e tha t com peting view s o f th e sel f hav e playe d i n th e formatio n o f th e concept o f intentionalit y i n contemporar y America n law . I To th e Wester n ey e th e Morocca n concep t o f th e perso n seem s strikingly familia r fo r it s emphasis o n th e individua l a s th e fun damental socia l uni t an d it s frequen t an d explici t referenc e t o an inne r state , a fram e o f mind , a n intentiona l structur e tha t i s integral t o eac h individual. 1 Ye t element s tha t ma y hav e ana logues i n on e cultur e may , b y thei r arrangemen t an d interpre tation, carr y a quite differen t se t o f meaning s i n another . Thus , in th e Morocca n cas e familia r idea s tak e o n a distinctiv e shap e when viewe d a s a n ordere d system. 2 To Moroccan s eac h individua l i s th e embodimen t o f a con stellation o f situate d trait s an d ties , a cumulatio n o f feature s tha t

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are mad e availabl e throug h th e mediu m o f a se t o f definin g concepts an d subjec t t o a n on-goin g proces s o f negotiation . Specifically, ther e ar e thre e centra l ideas , eac h embrace d i n a set o f critica l terms , throug h whic h th e perso n i s define d an d known, concept s tha t relat e t o th e natur e o f huma n nature , th e sources o f one' s attachment s an d customs , an d th e essentiall y negotiable qualit y o f interpersona l obligations . Human natur e is , i n th e Morocca n view , centere d o n th e re lation, indee d th e struggle , betwee n tw o majo r attributes : nafs, or "passion, " an d c aqel, "reason." Eac h individual , i t i s said, pos sesses bot h o f thes e qualitie s bu t thei r distribution , particularl y as between me n an d women , childre n an d adult s i s seen t o var y considerably. Me n no t onl y posses s a greate r capacit y t o de velop reasonin g power s tha n d o wome n bu t must , fo r tha t ver y reason, b e hel d t o highe r standards . Children , bein g al l nafs an d little c aqel, must b e place d unde r th e guidanc e o f wis e teacher s and made , b y habi t an d repetition , t o develo p thei r reasonin g powers s o the y ma y channe l thei r passion s int o usefu l an d le gitimate pursuits . Passion s ar e not , i n an d o f themselves , evil : "to hav e nafs" i s t o hav e "self-respect, " bu t t o b e "eate n u p b y one's nafs" i s t o b e a n "egotist. " Stud y an d th e acquisitio n o f worldly knowledg e wil l kee p sexua l passio n withi n bounds : at tachment t o other s wh o hav e develope d th e capacit y fo r reaso n will increas e th e sociall y desirabl e aspect s o f acquisitivenes s an d personal ambition . Thu s t o characteriz e other s an d b e charac terized i n tur n i n term s o f th e nafs- caqel paradig m i s t o stres s that me n an d wome n ar e responsibl e fo r th e developmen t o f their ow n knowledg e an d reasonin g powers , tha t th e conse quences o f a n actio n ma y b e attributabl e t o thi s inheren t qualit y of passio n an d reason , an d tha t th e standar d o f behavio r t o whic h different kind s o f person s ma y b e hel d is , in part , itsel f a func tion o f th e interactio n o f one' s natur e an d th e situation s i n whic h it i s develope d an d enacted . The emphasi s o n th e interpla y o f contex t an d natur e i s sim ilarly represente d i n anothe r Arabi c concept , asel. The ter m it self mean s "origin, " "patrimony, " "descent, " "strengt h o f char acter," "authentic, " "proper, " an d "indigenous. " A s an attribut e of persona l identity , asel summarize s th e ide a tha t individual s draw muc h o f thei r characte r fro m th e physica l an d socia l en vironment tha t ha s contribute d t o thei r nurtur e an d suste -

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nance. T o sa y o f a ma n tha t h e "possesse s asel" is t o impl y tha t he ha s root s i n a grou p an d a local e whos e characteristi c mode s of establishin g an d enactin g relationship s ca n giv e anothe r a sense o f th e tie s i t ma y b e possibl e t o for m wit h him . Thu s wher e an America n ma y wish , first , t o plac e anothe r b y askin g wha t he does (i.e., wha t occupatio n h e practices ) becaus e suc h infor mation convey s a hos t o f implication s fo r economic , social , an d political attitudes , i n Morocc o th e centra l questio n i s "where ar e your 'origins ' " sinc e i t i s thi s informatio n which , initially , con veys a degre e o f predictabilit y abou t th e sor t o f tie s tha t ar e possible wit h suc h a man . Summarize d i n persona l name s o r nicknames, an d signale d b y everythin g fro m th e wa y a turba n is tie d t o th e wa y on e sit s i n th e marketplace , th e concep t o f a man's "origins " focuse s attentio n o n hi s relationship s an d th e customs b y whic h the y ar e formed , an d feed s directl y int o th e belief tha t al l relationship s impl y th e nee d fo r reciprocity . Th e key wor d her e i s th e Arabi c ter m haqq. Haqq i s usuall y translate d a s "truth " o r "reality " and , a s such , is both a nam e fo r th e Almight y an d a characterization o f worldl y utterances an d events . Bu t haqq also mean s "right " an d "duty " and thu s convey s th e ide a o f obligation , indee d o f a n attach ment bor n o f a contrac t o r covenant , whethe r explici t o r im plicit. T o Moroccan s thi s i s a vita l concept , fo r t o the m ever y relationship implie s a n obligation : whethe r i t i s a bon d forme d by kinshi p o r residence , politica l affiliatio n o r economi c associ ation i t i s a centra l assumptio n o f Morocca n lif e tha t ever y ac tion towar d anothe r create s a n obligatio n tha t ma y b e calle d u p later i n a simila r o r varie d form . "Truth " an d "reality " ar e therefore th e arrangemen t o f obligationa l bond s amon g me n an d between ma n an d God . An d th e socia l worl d i s on e i n whic h each ma n mus t com e t o kno w an d operat e withi n a real m o f ever-shifting bond s o f indebtedness . Through eac h o f thes e thre e conceptua l domains , a s wel l a s many others , commo n theme s ca n b e see n a t work . Eac h incor porates a sens e o f th e interactio n betwee n qualitie s an d rela tionships availabl e i n th e worl d o f everyda y experienc e an d th e individual a s th e entit y wh o draw s fro m thi s availabl e reper toire i n th e constructio n o f hi s o r he r distinctiv e patternin g o f these features . T h e trick , a s i t were , i s t o arrang e one' s tie s i n such a wa y a s t o secur e onesel f an d one' s dependent s a s bes t a s

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possible i n a worl d conceive d a s constantl y o n th e brin k o f chao s (fitna). Tw o culturall y distinctiv e features—eac h o f whic h ha s a n important bearin g o n th e concep t o f intentionality—thu s be come centra l t o th e arrangemen t o f suc h ties . In th e constructio n o f persona l network s Moroccan s recog nize tha t th e ver y term s the y us e t o characteriz e others—a s a "cousin," a "fello w tribesman, " a "neighbor " an d s o on—con tain, a t thei r ver y heart , a qualit y o f essentia l negotiability . Tha t is t o say , th e referen t o f suc h a ter m i s no t a specifi c ti e tha t i s fixed i n th e worl d an d give n institutiona l suppor t b y th e ar rangement o f individual s i n a serie s o f corporat e group s fo r which th e specifi c act s o f a n individua l woul d b e largel y define d by th e expectation s an d sanction s associate d wit h eac h o f th e terms use d t o characteriz e thei r ties . Rather , eac h individua l i s expected t o negotiat e wit h an d throug h thes e term s i n th e ar rangement o f hi s ow n affiliations . T o cal l anothe r "cousin " o r to sa y tha t "w e ar e fro m th e sam e famil y ( cd'ila)" is not t o depic t a settle d relationshi p bu t t o invok e a basi s o f affiliatio n whos e specific conten t mus t b e bargaine d ou t i n th e proces s o f form ing a n interpersona l bond . Thi s mean s that , just a s me n mus t negotiate a pric e i n th e marketplace , so , too , th e repertoir e o f relational possibilitie s upo n whic h the y pla y an d throug h whic h their obligation s wil l b e forme d mus t b e negotiate d usin g al l th e knowledge, associations , an d shrewdnes s on e ca n marsha l i n th e formation o f a persona l network . An importan t concomitan t o f thi s ques t fo r negotiate d bond s concerns th e Morocca n concep t o f truth . Sinc e th e term s tha t imply som e for m o f obligatio n remai n incompletel y defined , open-textured, until , b y a proces s o f negotiation , a n actua l re lationship come s t o b e define d throug h them , i t i s no t surpris ing tha t Moroccan s distinguis h betwee n th e rol e word s pla y i n assaying th e tie s tha t ar e possible in an y encounte r an d th e rol e such word s pla y i n fixing a relationship , i n linkin g suc h utter ances t o a serie s o f specifi c consequences . Wha t i s a t issue , therefore, i s th e wa y i n whic h mer e utterance s com e t o posses s some attachmen t t o th e qualit y o f truth . Bu t wherea s a West erner wh o make s a statemen t abou t hi s relatio n t o anothe r ma y expect hi s utteranc e t o b e see n a s havin g som e implication s o f truthfulness—even i f i t i s a bald-face d lie—Moroccan s assum e that a statemen t abou t relationship s t o others , standin g alone ,

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has absolutel y n o bearin g whatsoeve r o n th e questio n o f trut h or falseness . I t is , again , lik e a pric e mentione d i n th e market , which i s no t "true " i n an y sens e unti l th e partie s mak e i t appli cable t o thei r circumstance . Similarly , i n Morocca n socia l life , a statement abou t relationship s ha s n o trut h valu e unti l some thing mor e happens , unti l tha t utteranc e receive s som e valida tion. Thi s ma y occu r i n a variet y o f ways , includin g th e us e o f oaths, validatio n b y a reliabl e witness , stylize d mode s o f con ducing th e agreemen t o f others , o r b y convincin g other s tha t one's relian t action s wer e properl y based . B y delaying th e poin t at whic h a statemen t abou t relationship s i s see n t o trigge r ex pectations an d demand s fo r reciprocity , on e put s a t a distanc e entangling obligations . B y characterizin g al l unvalidate d utter ances a s havin g n o trut h valu e leewa y i s grante d fo r th e nego tiation o f one' s persona l attachments . Some o f th e implication s o f thes e cultura l principle s fo r th e Moroccan concep t o f th e perso n ar e immediatel y apparent . T o Moroccans th e concep t o f th e sel f i s no t tha t o f a personall y fashioned individual , on e wh o has , b y whateve r spiritua l o r psychological means , create d a n inne r sel f distinctiv e fro m al l others. No r i s i t a concep t o f th e sel f a s persona, a mas k pre sented t o other s tha t conceal s a n inne r sel f bu t whic h i s itsel f an artifac t create d b y tha t inne r self . Rather , i t i s a concep t o f the individua l a s on e wh o maneuver s withi n th e broa d se t o f relationships, huma n qualities , an d changin g circumstance s t o cumulate fo r himsel f a se t o f publicl y recognize d an d worldl y consequent trait s an d ties . The worl d i s pictured a s a plac e withi n which individual s forg e alliance s an d affiliation s b y drawin g o n relations an d concept s tha t are , a t thei r mos t fundamenta l level , fraught wit h th e ide a o f implici t obligation . It i s a world—an d henc e a self—i n whic h a ma n i s known b y his situated obligation s an d b y th e consequence s tha t hi s action s have o n th e entir e chai n o f obligation s b y whic h h e an d hi s so ciety ar e known . Eac h individua l i s no t onl y fre e t o negotiat e within an d beyon d th e confine s o f kinship , locality , an d linguis tic communit y th e bond s o f obligatio n tha t wil l for m hi s ow n web of indebtedness : th e ver y word s h e uses—fro m kinshi p term s to th e concept s o f haqq and asel themselves—are subjec t t o a grea t deal o f bargaining , th e specifi c meanin g the y wil l carr y i n an y given situatio n bein g th e momentar y resul t o f a proces s o f bar -

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gaining ove r th e applicabilit y an d implication s o f th e ter m em ployed. Thus, fo r Moroccan s th e perso n i s alway s a situate d actor . H e embodies qualitie s o f huma n nature , attachmen t t o th e peopl e and plac e o f hi s nurture , an d associatio n wit h thos e t o who m he owe s an d fro m who m h e receive s negotiate d bond s o f obli gation. Me n d o no t creat e themselves , bu t the y ca n plac e them selves i n contexts—wit h teachers , partners , kinsmen , o r strangers—such tha t th e proces s o f bargained-fo r relationship s that wil l define thei r plac e i n th e worl d o f me n wil l yield a char acterization tha t tell s who , quit e literally , the y are . Men , say s a n Arabic proverb , ar e me n throug h men ; onl y Go d i s God throug h Himself. This emphasi s o n ma n a s a sociall y situate d sel f whos e publi c person i s th e sociall y relevan t perso n i s a t th e hear t o f th e Mo roccan concep t o f intentionality. 3 Th e wor d i n Arabi c fo r inten t is niya, whic h i s usuall y translate d a s "intent, " "purpose, " "plan, " "volition," o r "desire. " Niya als o mean s "naive " o r "sincere, " an d hence t o ac t "wit h niya" i s t o ac t wit h loyalt y an d goo d faith . Niya als o ha s dee p religiou s significance . Befor e eac h o f th e dail y prayers—and i n som e Islami c countries , befor e man y othe r rit ual an d lega l acts—th e believe r declares , softl y o r aloud , th e niya, the statemen t o f inten t b y whic h h e signifie s th e meanin g an d purpose o f hi s act . Bu t intent , i n th e Morocca n view , i s not sim ply a matte r o f one' s inne r state , a secre t domai n int o whic h Go d alone ca n pee r an d tha t lie s eithe r hidde n fro m o r irrelevan t t o the worl d o f huma n affairs . Rather , Moroccan s believ e tha t over t acts ar e directl y connecte d t o interio r states , and tha t i f yo u kno w a man' s trait s an d ties , an d th e context s i n whic h thes e ar e re vealed yo u wil l als o kno w tha t person' s intentiona l structure . Thi s attitude, whic h ca n b e see n a t wor k i n th e explanatio n o f every day behavior , i s central to , an d no t sharpl y differentiate d fro m its applicatio n in , th e real m o f lega l decisions . The questio n o f inten t arise s i n a numbe r o f lega l contexts : in determinin g th e validit y o f a religiou s bequest , i n character izing th e natur e o f certai n partnership s an d contracts , an d i n assessing culpabilit y i n matter s o f crimina l law . Althoug h spe cific aspect s o f a n inquir y int o inten t var y fro m on e lega l issu e to another , a glanc e a t th e exampl e o f homicid e ma y hel p u s t o

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understand th e genera l developmen t o f th e concep t o f inten tionality i n Morocca n lega l culture . In almos t al l part s o f th e Middl e Eas t an d Nort h Africa , i n the year s befor e Wester n influenc e becam e predominant , th e appropriate recompens e fo r killin g anothe r wa s th e paymen t o f blood mone y (diya). Compensatio n wa s als o th e appropriat e remedy fo r injury . Th e Qura n distinguishe s betwee n killin g wit h intent ( camd) and b y mistak e (kata y), an d th e fou r mai n school s of Islami c la w tha t develope d i n th e earl y Islami c perio d mad e further refinement s i n thi s distinction . Fo r Islami c jurists , therefore, th e questio n o f inten t wa s ver y important : th e amoun t of compensatio n du e o r th e permissibilit y o f retaliatio n (qisds) was a functio n o f whethe r th e ac t wa s deeme d intentional . Bu t for scholar s an d jurist s alik e inten t wa s no t a questio n o f th e accused's stat e o f min d a s such . Rather , inne r stat e wa s as sumed fro m over t acts . T h e intentio n o f killin g wa s presume d whenever a n illega l killin g followe d a n ac t generall y regarde d as fata l i n it s result . A grea t dea l o f casuistr y develope d ove r matters o f externa l evidence , especiall y th e natur e o f th e weapon : for example , tha t a deadl y weapo n wa s use d wa s sufficien t t o impute a n inten t t o kill . Eve n whe n a n ac t wa s th e resul t o f a mistake—thinking th e injure d ma n wa s a wil d animal , acciden tally suffocatin g a be d partne r b y rollin g ove r o n hi m i n th e night—blood mone y ha d t o b e pai d b y th e offende r o r hi s kins men. Victorie n Loubigna c report s tha t amon g th e Zae r tribe , for example , eve n i f a har m wa s unintentiona l th e perpetrato r had t o pa y fo r th e upkee p o f th e guest s wh o visite d th e injure d and fo r par t o f th e injure d man' s suppor t i f hi s wound s wer e especially grave. 4 The emphasis , then , i s squarel y o n th e consequence s o f a n act. Externa l evidence , suc h a s th e kin d o f weapo n used , i s take n as a n inde x o f a n interio r state , a n insigh t int o wha t th e perso n must hav e meant . B y categorizin g type s o f situation s jurists wer e saying somethin g abou t a stat e o f mind . T h e connectin g poin t would appea r t o b e th e ide a tha t n o on e wh o i s no t immature , insane, o r spirituall y possesse d woul d engag e i n a particula r kin d of ac t withou t intendin g it s usua l consequences . Whateve r th e other advantage s of , fo r example , bloo d mone y payments—a s a for m o f socia l insurance , a limitatio n o n th e scop e o f violence ,

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or a les s hars h penalt y whe n situatio n an d inten t wer e ambig uous—drawing a direc t correlatio n betwee n ac t an d inten t re affirmed th e lin k betwee n privat e choic e an d publi c conse quence. Intent , i n Islami c law , wa s therefor e neithe r irrelevan t nor th e subjec t o f mor e direc t religiou s o r psychologica l in quiry: i t was assume d t o b e a necessar y an d discernibl e elemen t of a give n act . This emphasi s o n discernin g inten t throug h situate d act s continues t o manifes t itsel f i n Morocca n adjudication , notwith standing th e use , durin g th e Protectorat e an d post-Protectorat e periods, o f Europea n crimina l codes . I n interviews , judges re peatedly insis t tha t the y ca n tel l wha t a man' s inten t i s an d whether h e i s lyin g simpl y b y inquirin g carefull y int o hi s back ground, relationships , an d prio r behavior . Similarly , whe n sto ries ar e tol d i n Morocco—rathe r lik e thos e relate d i n th e Thousand and One Nights—of reall y cleve r judges, the y ofte n involv e the judg e disguisin g himsel f an d entrappin g th e suspec t int o committing th e sam e o r a simila r infractio n a s tha t o f whic h h e is accused . T h e cleve r judg e i s not , o f course , determinin g whether th e ma n di d i n fac t d o wha t h e i s accused of : h e i s seeing if h e i s a perso n wh o wil l eve r d o suc h a thing ; h e i s making a n investigation int o th e accused' s character . "I f a ma n i s bad, " on e judge tol d me , "h e canno t hid e it . I t wil l sho w u p i n th e wa y h e acts. I f yo u as k a lo t o f question s a ma n canno t kee p hi s thought s hidden: hi s intentio n [niya] will b e obvious. " Thus th e belie f tha t a man' s interio r stat e i s directl y accessi ble an d relevan t fo r lega l determination s i s clearl y embedde d in th e broade r perceptio n o f th e perso n i n Morocca n culture . Men ar e forme d an d know n b y th e contexts—th e situation s o f interlocking bond s o f reciprocity—the y hav e forge d wit h on e another throug h th e mediu m o f term s an d concept s tha t tak e on meanin g a s th e relationship s create d throug h the m tak e shape. T o kno w a ma n on e need s t o kno w th e context s o f hi s acts. Tha t i s why , i n th e tellin g o f storie s o r histori c accounts , Moroccans fin d tempora l sequenc e fa r les s revealin g abou t wh y someone acte d a s he di d tha n a n accoun t o f ho w tha t individua l has acte d i n a wid e variet y o f situations . Similarly , i n th e court room, evidenc e i s ofte n adduce d a s t o a wid e rang e o f a n indi vidual's activitie s an d relationship s sinc e i t i s contex t tha t re veals actio n an d actio n tha t reveal s intent . T h e logi c b y whic h

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intent i s attribute d i n th e la w is , notwithstandin g fou r decade s of Frenc h colonia l rul e an d th e subsequen t adoptio n o f som e codes base d o n Europea n examples , on e tha t i s squarely linke d to th e mode s o f reasonin g an d th e perceptio n o f othe r mind s that infor m a wid e rang e o f Morocca n cultura l life . II From roughl y th e middl e o f th e elevent h centur y an d throughout mos t o f th e twelft h Europea n concept s o f th e na ture an d rol e o f th e individua l underwen t a profoun d altera tion, a n alteratio n tha t stemme d fro m an d affecte d suc h divers e realms a s religion , literature , law , an d politica l life . I t was , i n essence, a shif t fro m th e view , curren t i n lat e antiquity , o f th e individual a s deepl y embedde d i n a se t o f loyaltie s an d conven tions tha t allowe d an d encourage d littl e scop e fo r persona l ini tiative an d developmen t t o a concep t o f th e individua l a s th e possessor o f a n inne r sel f tha t i s capabl e o f bein g understoo d and expresse d i n relation s wit h Go d an d one' s fello w men . Fro m an emphasi s o n over t act s a s th e centra l qualit y an d definin g feature o f th e individual , a person' s inne r state—hi s feelings , his motives , hi s reasonin g capacity , an d hi s sens e o f th e moral — came t o tak e precedence . Althoug h th e chang e canno t b e at tributed t o a simpl e se t o f causa l factors , i t i s clear tha t muc h o f the impetu s cam e a s a resul t o f change s i n th e real m o f reli gious thought. 5 The centra l embodiment—th e archetyp e an d metaphor—o f the complet e huma n bein g i n th e earl y Middl e Age s wa s th e monk. No t onl y wa s th e mon k th e exempla r o f other-worldl y asceticism, h e als o lived i n a n orde r i n whic h adherenc e t o stric t rules, obedienc e t o th e dictate s o f hi s society , an d a n unwaver ing stres s o n th e prope r act s o f ritua l lif e define d hi s ver y ex istence. Failur e t o perfor m requisit e acts , rathe r tha n inappro priate motives , wa s central . Eve n i n th e worl d outsid e th e wall s of th e monasteries , wher e citie s wer e fe w an d kinshi p attach ments central , wher e scholarshi p wa s a t it s lo w eb b an d eve n the introspectio n o f a St . Augustin e ha d bee n los t t o commo n view, th e stres s o n ma n a s th e enactmen t o f hi s obligation s an d the lac k o f concer n wit h a n inne r stat e wa s unmistakable . By th e secon d hal f o f th e elevent h centur y a significan t chang e

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was under way . I n plac e o f the unquestioned acceptanc e o f monastic routin e o r a spiritualit y base d o n th e overt, th e attentio n of theologian s an d scholar s turne d mor e towar d th e natur e o f a man' s min d an d hi s active engagemen t i n comprehendin g a n inner stat e separabl e fro m hi s ever y act . "Sti r u p you r torpi d mind/' preache d th e great Benedictine , St . Anselm: "Ente r int o the chambe r o f you r min d an d exclud e al l els e bu t Go d an d those thing s whic h hel p yo u in finding Him." 6 I n a n ag e whe n (with th e exceptio n o f Italy ) citie s wer e just beginnin g t o bur geon, whe n th e rediscover y o f classica l writer s adde d th e rigo r of logi c t o th e earlie r concer n wit h regularize d conduct , an d when ne w classes and concept s o f social ran k wer e beginnin g t o emerge, thi s recastin g o f th e fundamenta l Christia n convictio n that th e sinne r ma y be mad e ove r b y the Hol y Spiri t i f only h e opens himsel f t o Hi m carrie d grea t force . T o th e mos t impor tant figure i n thi s development , Bernar d o f Clarivaux , a man' s inner life—hi s devotion , hi s love , hi s humility , an d hi s inwar d drive fo r knowledge—coul d prope l hi m to the acquisition o f self knowledge an d thencefort h t o knowledg e o f God . Through a n emphasis o n th e stage s o f a man' s menta l growt h St . Bernar d was abl e t o articulate a n educationa l progra m firmly ensconce d in th e monastic settin g ye t give voic e t o the centrality i n this development o f a distinctiv e inne r self . It was , however, i n St . Bernard's grea t riva l Pete r Abelar d tha t the concep t o f a n interio r sel f receive d it s furthest extensio n i n this period . T o Abelar d intentio n wa s all: sinfulness wa s not a function o f overt ac t but of the sinful desir e tha t la y within, and therefore a ma n migh t believ e h e wa s acting rightl y ye t be sin ful, o r vic e versa . Me n migh t punis h actions , bu t Go d look s t o the inne r self ; Go d remains omnipoten t bu t men must struggl e within themselve s t o achiev e a kin d o f inne r conversion . Al though St . Bernard wa s to succeed i n repressing Abelard' s views, 7 there was , in the view the y an d man y other s shared , a commo n orientation towar d self-awarenes s an d th e primacy o f man' s in ner self . These theologica l reconceptualization s wer e no t withou t thei r attachments t o th e dail y routin e o f Christia n religiou s lif e an d secular politics . T h e Eucharist , wit h it s stress o n Christianit y a s a communit y o f believers , becam e les s centra l tha n thos e ele ments o f th e Mas s directe d towar d th e cultivation o f individua l

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devotion. T h e doctrin e o f contritionism , whic h argue d tha t re pentance wa s sufficien t fo r absolution , ultimatel y los t ou t t o th e Church's insistenc e o n th e rol e o f th e pries t i n grantin g for giveness, bu t i t di d spar k a bod y o f confessiona l literatur e i n which me n an d wome n explore d th e natur e o f thei r inne r sel ves. Th e Virgi n Mar y too k o n ne w significance . Sh e appeare d miraculously t o individual s an d he r direc t an d privat e encoun ters encourage d me n i n th e pursui t o f persona l devotion . Eve n Christ, wh o fo r a thousan d year s ha d bee n represente d i n painting an d sculptur e a s dea d o n th e cross , no w becam e a liv ing, sufferin g figure, a n individua l whos e agon y wa s quit e re cognizably privat e an d interio r n o les s tha n redemptiv e an d universal. I n politics , w e ca n detec t a concomitan t shif t fro m consensual decisio n makin g withi n ecclesiastica l bodie s t o a rec ognition tha t legitimat e authorit y migh t resid e i n individua l leaders, a shif t tha t gav e furthe r impetu s t o man' s imag e o f himself a s a rationa l creature . Nowhere i s th e ne w sens e o f self-awarenes s mor e full y rep resented tha n i n th e burs t o f literar y activit y o f th e twelft h cen tury. T h e epi c poem s tha t wer e s o popula r i n precedin g cen turies ha d show n me n fulfillin g thei r obligation s b y adhering t o the cod e o f aristocrati c convention . A s th e epi c for m give s wa y to th e developmen t o f th e romance—whethe r i n tale s o f chiv alrous knights , th e satire s o f a Chretie n d e Troyes , o r th e pop ular Miracles of the Virgin —the affections , experiences , an d in tentions o f th e individua l knight , lover , o r believe r ar e give n central place . A s Rober t Hannin g ha s convincingl y demon strated, th e character s i n a romanc e "us e thei r persona l wi t an d ingenuity t o shap e thei r encounter s wit h th e worl d outsid e themselves t o thei r ow n benefit , self-consciousl y an d i n way s tha t are ofte n morall y problematic." 8 Th e figure i n a romanc e thu s comes t o vie w realit y fro m a persona l perspective , an d b y hi s emphasis o n th e inne r lif e t o shif t th e ver y term s b y whic h me n apprehend thei r world . "Chivalri c romance , a s i t emerge d i n twelfth-century courtl y society , offere d a literar y for m i n whic h to work ou t th e implication s o f individuality , implication s whic h twelfth-century theolog y an d philosoph y wer e beginnin g t o confront, bu t wer e no t ye t abl e fo r lac k o f technica l an d con ceptual vocabulary , full y t o describ e an d categorize." 9 Wit h thi s emphasis o n th e inne r sel f als o come s a ne w meanin g t o time .

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In th e narrativ e styl e o f th e romance , tim e exist s t o allo w ma n to gro w an d experience ; becomin g replace s being . I t i s not the passage o f grea t event s o r age s tha t mark s a man' s biography ; what i s significant i s the way, at critical moments , "th e persona l experience o f tim e shape s response s whic h contribut e t o self definition, an d i n th e lon g run , impe l th e individua l towar d o r away fro m self-fulfillment." 10 On e ca n understan d events , therefore, onl y b y the cumulatio n o f numerou s individual-cen tered views , and on e can know individua l me n only b y compre hending thei r discover y o f trut h throug h th e discover y o f themselves. The discover y o f th e individua l (t o borro w Coli n Morris' s characterization o f thi s development ) was , as scholar s hav e bee n careful t o note , neithe r unifor m no r sudde n no r withou t it s contradictions. It s centra l feature s involve , a s Morri s himsel f argued, " a concer n wit h self-discovery ; a n interes t i n th e rela tions betwee n people , an d i n th e rol e o f th e individua l withi n society; [and ] an assessmen t o f peopl e b y their inne r intention s rather tha n b y their externa l acts." 11 Thes e qualitie s ar e no less central t o th e change s tha t occu r i n thi s perio d i n variou s as pects o f Europea n law . In th e mid-elevent h centur y bot h Englan d an d th e continen tal countrie s were , i n quit e differen t ways , laborin g unde r for mal rule s o f la w tha t wer e onl y graduall y becomin g subjec t t o alterations i n th e concep t o f th e self . I n England , th e Anglo Saxon law s effectivel y hel d swa y fo r a hal f centur y afte r th e Conquest, an d monetar y compensation—wit h it s emphasi s o n impersonality an d delay—bor e stron g resemblanc e t o the earl y payments o f wer and bot. 12 Althoug h element s o f a n accused' s state o f min d appea r i n th e ninth-centur y law s o f Alfred , th e predominant thrus t i s towar d assessin g th e consequence s o f a man's acts , th e questio n o f intent , unsystematicall y evoked , goin g more t o th e question s o f deliberatio n an d mitigatin g penaltie s than t o any subtl e exploratio n o f a man' s inne r direction. 13 In deed, i t i s precisel y th e contending , an d ofte n contradictory , images o f th e perso n an d o f th e role o f th e stat e i n monitorin g his conduct tha t revea l themselve s i n the conflicting element s of these earl y laws . T h e Leges Henrici, compile d i n th e earl y de cades o f th e twelfth century , gav e greate r attentio n t o the issu e of intent , particularl y i n th e famou s propositio n tha t " a perso n

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is no t t o b e considere d guilt y unles s h e ha s a guilt y intentio n (reum non facit nisi mens rea)." 14 Ye t contradictor y proposition s (e.g., "wher e on e i s unwilling, tw o person s d o no t com e t o blows;" "a perso n wh o unwittingl y commit s a wron g shal l wittingl y mak e amends"), 15 couple d wit h th e retentio n o f roya l merc y t o for give unintende d acts , sugges t tha t th e tension , o n th e on e hand , between th e individua l Christian' s mora l choic e an d th e need s for communit y harmony , and , o n th e other , betwee n kin-grou p cohesion an d th e rol e o f th e stat e i n constrainin g violence , ha d not ye t achieve d tha t degre e o f resolutio n whic h th e developin g concept o f th e perso n wa s t o aid . Similarly, o n th e continen t th e year s leadin g u p t o th e elev enth centur y ha d bee n marke d b y a n emphasi s o n customar y laws, bearin g a certai n famil y resemblanc e fro m countr y t o country, tha t wer e fa r mor e readil y comprehende d b y judge an d petitioner alik e tha n wer e th e availabl e Roma n compilations . A stron g emphasi s o n th e impac t o f individua l action s o n com munity lif e adde d suppor t t o th e elaborat e us e o f compensa tory payment s base d o n th e natur e o f th e act . A s i n England , however, neithe r custo m no r procedur e implie d a n absolut e re jection o f th e individualit y o f a n accused . Thus , th e ordeal , th e pre-eminent fact-findin g mechanis m o f th e period , containe d elements o f th e supernatura l an d th e social . Th e ordea l no t onl y called fort h a divin e determinatio n o f absolut e certainty , but , a s Peter Brow n ha s argued , serve d th e need s o f tightl y kni t loca l communities b y bot h slowin g dow n th e joinde r o f difference s until temper s coul d coo l an d providin g a symboli c vehicl e fo r the expressio n o f communit y consensus. 16 Moreover , a s w e kno w from th e stud y o f oath s an d ordeal s i n othe r cultures , th e de cision a s t o wh o shoul d submi t t o thi s supernatura l sanctio n i s often base d o n a prior , culturall y inscribe d assumptio n abou t which person—or , mor e often , whic h category o f person—i s mos t likely t o kno w th e trut h an d henc e b e pu t t o th e test . Ordeal s were thu s consonan t wit h customar y la w an d relativel y wea k monarchies i n thei r emphasi s o n th e individua l a s possessin g a soul, a n obedien t heart , an d a socia l place , bu t no t a sel f tha t could b e explore d fo r it s ow n distinctiv e intent . The gradua l shift o n th e continen t i n theology , literature , an d political though t t o whic h w e referre d earlie r show s mos t clearl y in th e la w throug h th e developmen t o f lega l education . I t was ,

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as Mar c Bloc h noted , "a n ag e whe n ever y ma n o f actio n ha d t o be somethin g o f a lawyer." 17 B y th e earl y elevent h century , particularly i n Bologna , me n wer e rediscoverin g Roma n la w an d applying it s rules , an d mor e generall y it s measure d approac h of reason , t o a hos t o f mundan e affairs . Th e emphasi s o n logi c was no t unrelate d t o th e approac h o f Anselm , Abelard , an d others, fo r i n bot h case s me n sough t th e underlyin g reasons , the logica l structure , o f a tex t presente d them . Wher e thi s led , in th e cas e o f religiou s thinkers , t o a developin g interes t i n th e particularities o f huma n emotion s an d thought , and , i n th e cas e of th e satiri c poets , t o a heightene d sens e o f th e individua l a s set agains t th e decaden t orde r o f churc h an d state , in th e hand s of th e lawyer s i t yielde d a powerfu l ne w mentalit y tha t legiti mized th e rationa l calculatio n o f huma n affairs . Wha t wa s t o develop int o a n inquisitoria l for m o f judicia l fact-findin g re sulted, therefore , no t simpl y fro m th e receptio n o f a bod y o f rediscovered la w o r fro m th e growin g realizatio n tha t ordeal s were subjec t t o huma n manipulation . Rather , th e emphasi s o n man's ow n capacitie s fo r rationa l fact-findin g an d judicia l or ganization wa s inextricabl y linke d t o th e establishmen t o f a cli mate o f though t i n whic h th e ver y ide a tha t me n possesse d a n inner sel f capabl e o f discernment , expression , an d investigatio n had becom e th e receive d assumptio n o f thos e wh o wer e t o giv e such matter s judicial implementation. 18 The stor y i n Englan d is , of course , quit e differen t i n it s lega l forms but , w e ma y conjecture , no t unrelate d t o th e developin g concept o f th e person . I n th e first centur y afte r th e Conques t the stat e wa s concerne d wit h centralizin g it s control , throug h a small numbe r o f administrators , ove r a vas t real m populate d b y a conquere d people . Homicide , whic h unde r Anglo-Saxo n la w had bee n punishabl e whe n committe d i n secret , cam e t o in clude killing s tha t ha d occurre d quit e openl y bu t which , i n th e eyes o f th e state , coul d lea d t o furthe r disorde r an d fo r whic h the penalt y o f deat h could , therefore , b e impose d i f pardo n wa s not grante d b y th e king . I t i s no t clea r whethe r jurie s i n th e twelfth century , lik e thos e o f a late r century , regarde d simpl e homicide a s inappropriatel y characterize d a s murde r an d thu s took int o accoun t som e aspect s o f a man' s mora l an d menta l stat e in fashionin g a definitio n o f hi s crim e tha t fit th e availabl e pun ishments. 19 Wha t doe s appea r possibl e i s tha t a s Churc h doc trine, popula r sermons , an d th e us e o f som e Roma n concept s

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in lega l literatur e converged , a climate o f though t slowl y devel oped i n whic h th e individual , an d no t th e entir e community , came t o be seen a s the irreducible uni t o f mora l an d socia l life , and henc e a climat e establishe d withi n whic h distinctivel y En glish concept s o f crimina l liabilit y an d procedur e coul d de velop. A s Francis Bowe s Sayr e wrote , i n hi s analysis o f the history o f mens rea, by th e earl y thirteent h centur y defense s tha t took accoun t o f a man' s inne r state—defense s tha t include d in sanity, infancy , an d compulsion—bega n t o b e take n int o con sideration: "Th e poin t i s not tha t moralit y firs t bega n t o mak e its appearanc e i n th e law, but tha t a n increasin g an d no w con scious emphasi s upo n moralit y necessitate d a new insistence upo n psychical element s i n determinin g criminality." 20 Thi s moralit y was, I woul d suggest , no t solel y relate d t o interna l alteration s in lega l procedur e a s such bu t to the interaction, i n the Englis h case, of the twelfth-century stres s o n self-awarenes s an d the relative autonom y o f man's psychi c composition , wit h it s evocation by bot h jury an d roya l cour t a s a centra l ingredien t i n th e def inition o f any given situation . I t is perhaps no t simply, a s James Marshall ha s suggested, tha t "whe n th e law of Englan d reache d the poin t a t whic h i t distinguishe d betwee n intende d an d un intended acts , judges an d lawyer s wer e alread y conditione d b y the doctrin e o f fre e will:" 21 i t is also, perhaps , tha t th e concep t of th e perso n a s on e wh o coul d envisio n himsel f a s a distinc t and privat e sou l capabl e o f persona l devotio n an d salvatio n through hi s own acts, coul d serv e a s a basi s fo r regardin g oth ers no t solel y a s component s o f a n interdependen t communit y but a s person s whos e inne r qualitie s mus t b e take n a s an inte gral par t o f thei r overal l identity . T h e twelfth centur y thu s wit nessed a fundamenta l shif t i n th e term s an d concept s b y whic h the perso n wa s comprehended, a shif t that , b y its emphasis o n the inne r self , no t onl y serve d t o establish th e individual a s the central figur e i n the social an d mora l orde r bu t changed th e very terms an d concept s fro m a focu s o n externa l act s t o a vocabu lary o f inne r inten t b y which a hos t o f lega l issue s coul d them selves com e t o be formulated . Ill When Ma x Weber chos e a s the central focu s o f hi s sociolog y the way s i n whic h individual s attac h meanin g t o other's action s

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and orien t thei r ow n activitie s accordingl y h e wa s no t ascribin g to huma n being s eithe r th e characteristic s o f cultura l auto mata—programed t o deciphe r on e another' s move s b y th e dic tates o f inviolabl e custom—o r th e insigh t o f bor n min d read ers—capable o f clairvoyan t apprehensio n o f another' s purpos e and direction . Rather , fo r Weber , th e meaning s w e attribut e t o other's act s ar e socially situated, culturally constructed . Ou r as sessment o f others—includin g an y interio r state—i s a publi c process, on e i n whic h th e term s tha t ar e used , th e symbol s em ployed, an d th e end s sough t posses s culturall y distinctiv e qual ities. Take n fro m thi s angle , motive s an d intention s ar e neithe r wholly privat e no r independentl y causal : the y ar e culturall y characteristic ascription s b y mean s o f whic h th e situation s i n which peopl e find themselve s an d th e kind s o f peopl e the y en counter ar e mad e mor e o r les s comprehensible . To shif t th e ques t fo r motive s an d intention s fro m th e pri vate t o th e public , fro m th e causa l t o th e ascriptive , an d fro m the real m o f th e positiv e t o tha t o f th e interpretiv e i s t o ope n up a whol e worl d o f issue s an d ideas . I t wa s i n thi s vein , fo r example, tha t C . Wrigh t Mills , i n hi s essa y "Situate d Action s an d Vocabularies o f Motive, " argue d tha t "rathe r tha n fixed ele ments 'in ' a n individual , motive s ar e th e term s wit h whic h inter pretation b y socia l actor s proceeds." 2 2 Wheneve r w e attribut e motives t o others , h e argued , w e ar e reall y tryin g t o defin e th e situation i n whic h w e find ourselves . T o spea k o f a situatio n a s one involvin g "love " or "duty, " "kinshi p obligation " o r "malice " is t o anticipat e an d judg e th e consequence s o f a n act , no t sim ply t o asser t a prio r condition . A s Gilber t Ryl e pu t it : "Th e cu rious conclusio n result s tha t thoug h volition s wer e calle d i n t o explain ou r appraisal s o f actions , thi s explanatio n i f just wha t they fail t o provide . I f w e ha d n o othe r anteceden t ground s fo r applying appraisal-concept s t o th e action s o f others , w e shoul d have n o reaso n a t al l fo r inferrin g fro m thos e action s t o th e vo litions allege d t o giv e ris e t o them." 2 3 "Actions, " a s Stanley Cav ell ha s noted , "unlik e envelope s an d goldfinches , d o no t com e named fo r assessment , nor , lik e apples , rip e fo r grading:" 2 4 Through th e publicl y worke d term s b y whic h situation , moral ity, an d socia l consequence s ar e asserted , a cultur e ma y con struct, an d no t simpl y denominate , th e qualities , bot h externa l and interior , o f th e peopl e wh o mak e u p th e society .

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It i s particularl y i n th e concep t o f th e perso n tha t man y o f the strand s b y whic h a societ y articulate s it s visio n o f realit y ar e drawn together. 25 Thu s i n Morocco , wit h al l th e force s o f it s social relation s an d cultura l categorie s marshale d t o for m a vi sion o f th e perso n a s a densel y situate d entity , a n amalga m o f his o r he r consequence s i n a networ k o f obligationa l bond s per sonally forge d an d personall y serviced , th e ide a o f inten t a s di rectly discernibl e throug h over t ac t partake s o f tha t logi c o f covenant an d negotiation , reciprocit y an d maneuverabilit y tha t runs throug h eac h domai n o f Morocca n life . Fo r al l it s forma l qualities, Islami c la w couple s wit h thi s imag e o f th e person , partakes o f it s centra l themes , an d whil e givin g specia l effec t t o its implications , i s itsel f a n integra l par t o f tha t articulate d vi sion. So , too , i n medieva l Europe , wher e th e revolutionar y idea s of th e twelft h centur y abou t man' s inne r existenc e no t onl y spread fro m th e real m o f theolog y int o othe r domain s bu t i n a sense harmonize d man y concept s tha t wer e eve n the n i n flux, the situation s i n whic h me n wer e see n t o exis t wer e redefine d and wit h the m th e way s i n whic h reason s wer e attribute d t o thei r acts. Lega l concept s o f intentionality , whic h ha d bee n th e expression o f a man' s socia l identit y a s see n i n hi s socia l rela tionships, ha d reflecte d th e conflictin g socia l an d politica l claim s made o n a man' s actions . Bu t a s th e ide a o f th e individua l a s comprising a n inner , a s wel l a s a relational , sel f seepe d int o th e logic o f administration , literature , privat e devotion , an d politi cal identit y th e law , too , cam e no t merel y t o reflec t bu t t o artic ulate th e strains , th e prospects , an d th e implication s o f th e ne w reality. It is , o f course , no t onl y i n distan t culture s o r distan t time s that a n approac h t o lega l concept s o f intentionalit y a s par t o f a culture's large r vie w o f th e perso n ma y prov e useful . Consider , for example , th e situatio n i n th e commo n la w countrie s i n ou r own day . W e are , I believe , i n a tim e whe n n o singl e concep t o f the sel f hold s sway . N o unifor m visio n o f ho w th e perso n i s constituted o r ho w individual s ough t t o b e assesse d command s unanimous an d commonsensica l acceptance . Severa l different , though related , view s o f th e perso n ar e a t work . Ther e i s th e romantic visio n o f th e self , whic h see s th e inne r sel f a s the mea sure agains t whic h al l externa l affair s ar e t o b e know n an d val ued. Thi s romanti c sel f ma y b e see n a s give n it s greates t chanc e

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for developmen t i f freed fro m th e oppression o f civilization, inhibitions, o r socia l convention s o r a s capabl e o f it s own discov ery throug h th e possession o f a private, eve n sacred , domai n o f its own , but it invariabl y assert s tha t individualit y i s both a mora l good an d a necessit y o f persona l existence. 26 Excep t i n its mos t deterministic forms , th e psychoanalyti c visio n o f th e self form s a versio n o f th e romanti c conception : i t see s th e perso n a s a n arena i n whic h biolog y an d experience , impuls e an d conven tion carr y o n a constan t struggle . T h e worl d outsid e eac h psy che i s viewe d fro m withi n an d i s see n t o affec t o r servic e thi s most centra l real m accordingly . Assessmen t o f others ' act s make s sense onl y i f viewe d agains t th e dynamic s o f th e inne r self . B y contrast, th e concep t o f th e communitaria n self , whil e no t denying privat e thought s o r persona l meanings , see s each individ ual a s predominantl y a socia l personality , on e whos e involve ment i n society , whos e association s an d impact , constitut e th e central facto r i n hi s identity an d qualities . Fro m suc h a vantag e a man' s inne r stat e i s no t a s crucia l a s hi s effec t o n an d hi s treatment b y society , hi s demonstrate d commitmen t t o th e or derliness o f th e team , th e profession , th e community , o r th e nation. 27 Given thes e contendin g view s o f wha t a perso n is , it i s smal l wonder tha t th e law, in it s specific concern s wit h intentionality , should appea r n o les s uniform . Ther e ha s bee n considerabl e discussion b y courts i n Englan d an d the Unite d State s i n recen t years ove r th e appropriat e standar d t o us e whe n inferrin g in tent fro m a person' s acts . T h e Englis h hig h cour t an d Parlia ment hav e refuse d t o b e boun d b y th e ide a tha t on e can infe r either inten t o r foresigh t simpl y fro m th e natural an d probabl e consequences o f a man' s act s howeve r muc h on e ma y us e th e full rang e o f evidenc e t o dra w a variet y o f inference s abou t a man's stat e o f mind. 28 Similarly , i n th e Unite d States , th e issu e has recentl y bee n addresse d i n the Supreme Court' s decisio n i n Sandstrom v . Montana. 29 I n tha t case , a unanimous Cour t hel d that i t wa s erro r fo r th e judge i n a tria l fo r "deliberat e homi cide" t o instruc t th e jury tha t i f the y foun d tha t th e accused ha d committed th e ac t of killin g th e la w presumes h e intende d th e ordinary consequence s o f hi s act. Such a n instruction , th e Cour t reasoned, ha s the effec t o f shiftin g th e burden o f proo f o n the question o f purpos e o r knowledg e fro m th e stat e t o th e de -

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fendant. Th e jury migh t ver y wel l tak e th e ter m presume to mea n that the y ha d t o find a certai n menta l stat e when , i n fact , i t i s not th e defendant' s tas k t o disprov e suc h a n inference . Leavin g aside tha t thi s opinio n i s clearl y consisten t wit h th e commo n la w use o f burden s o f proo f an d presumption s a s mechanism s fo r establishing th e indeterminabl e a s fact , wha t i s strikin g fo r ou r present purpose s i s that th e Cour t i s clearly face d wit h a societ y in whic h n o commo n vie w o f th e perso n exist s suc h tha t on e could, a s a matte r o f commo n sense , expec t t o mak e inference s about another' s inne r state . A s i n th e Unite d Kingdon , w e ma y all b e heir s t o a languag e o f inten t tha t ha s ha d a significan t impact o n lega l development. 30 Bu t w e ar e no t heir s t o a suffi ciently unifor m vie w o f th e person— a vie w tha t organize s ou r actions an d sustain s a commonsens e visio n o f th e orderlines s o f our experience—suc h tha t w e can , a s a matte r o f law , direc t judges an d juror s t o dra w inference s abou t others ' mind s tha t will reflec t ou r commo n value s an d beliefs. 31 That n o singl e conceptio n o f th e sel f hold s swa y i n Anglo American societ y an d la w i s no t inherentl y goo d o r bad . I t does , however, carr y certai n systemi c implications . Ou r us e o f a lan guage o f inten t serve s no t onl y t o guar d agains t wha t migh t b e regarded a s th e oppressiv e forc e o f societ y bu t agains t assault s on ou r vie w o f individua l autonomy : paradoxically , a n empha sis o n th e inne r perso n help s t o war d of f intrusion s int o tha t interior self . I t als o mean s that , a s Mill s suggested , w e contes t the characterizatio n o f action s becaus e suc h definition s impl y a n evaluation o f motiv e an d intent . T o defin e th e action s o f a John Hinckley a s san e o r insane , is , i n part , t o contes t th e ver y defi nition o f a perso n i n ou r society . I f w e focu s o n th e victi m an d the impac t o f th e ac t w e discoun t th e relevanc e o f th e accused' s inner state . Bu t i f w e gran t heightene d statur e t o th e roman tic/psychotherapeutic imag e o f th e perso n a s interio r sel f w e obtain a n explanation , a mora l view , an d a cours e o f treatmen t of a significantl y differen t nature . T h e "objective " standard s w e may see k i n th e la w ca n sugges t ne w concept s b y whic h t o com prehend ou r vie w o f lega l responsibilit y bu t i t i s unlikel y that , in th e peculia r domai n o f attributin g state s o f min d t o others , we will , i n th e law , achiev e resolution s whe n th e sam e consid erations remai n unsettle d i n th e ordinar y perception s o f thos e who wil l decid e th e actua l cases. 32

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T h e r e a r e , i n s u m , fe w place s i n t h e la w w h e r e o u r view s o f o t h e r s a n d o u r n e e d t o d e c i d e w h a t t o d o a b o u t thei r b e h a v i o r c o m e int o g r e a t e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a n i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a n expla nation fo r o t h e r s ' action s t h a t ca n b e give n lega l effect . I n s o m e c u l t u r e s a n d time s t h e ver y ide a t h a t t h e sel f i n c o r p o r a t e s a n e l e m e n t o f t h e i n t e r i o r i s absent ; i n o t h e r s i t i s s u b s u m e d withi n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e e x t e r n a l ; i n stil l o t h e r s t h e ide a o f a sepa r a t e sel f i s t h e subjec t o f i n t e n s e c o n c e r n . T h e goa l fo r socia l a n d lega l scholar s i s n o t t h e c a t a l o g u i n g o f suc h variation s n o r t h e steril e q u e s t fo r whic h take s g r e a t e r causa l priority , la w o r c u l t u r e . I t is , a t leas t f r o m t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s p o i n t o f view , t o see ho w th e concep t o f th e perso n a n d it s lega l articulatio n mes h with o n e a n o t h e r a n d wit h a hos t o f o t h e r concept s i n a societ y a n d t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e ver y fac t t h a t w e rais e suc h question s is integra l t o t h e proces s b y whic h w e h a v e c o m e t o c o n s t r u c t o u r o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f ourselves .

NOTES 1. O n th e natur e o f th e individua l i n Islami c thought , se e S.D . Goi tein, "Individualis m an d Conformit y i n Classica l Islam, " i n Ami n Banani an d Spero s Vryonis , Jr., eds. , Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam (Wiesbaden : Ott o Harrassowitz , 1977) , pp . 3—18 ; and Fazlu r Rahman , "Th e Statu s o f th e Individua l i n Islam, " i n Charles A . Moore , ed. , The Status of the Individual in East and West (Honolulu: Universit y o f Hawai i Press , 1968) , pp . 217-25 . 2. O n th e Morocca n concep t o f th e perso n an d th e ethnographi c background o f thi s essay , se e Cliffor d Geertz , " 'From th e Native' s Point o f View: ' O n th e Natur e o f Anthropologica l Understand ing," i n Keit h H . Bass o an d Henr y A . Selby , eds. , Meaning in Anthropology (Albuquerque: Universit y o f Ne w Mexic o Press , 1976) , pp. 221—37 ; Cliffor d Geertz , Hildre d Geertz , an d Lawrenc e Ro sen, Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society (New York : Cambridg e University Press , 1979) ; an d Lawrenc e Rosen , Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim Community (Chi cago: Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1984) . Fo r discussion s o f th e relation betwee n cultur e an d lega l proces s i n Morocco , se e Law rence Rosen , "Equit y an d Discretio n i n a Moder n Islami c Lega l System," Law and Society Review 15 , no. 2 (1980-81) : 217-45 ; an d Clifford Geertz , Local Knowledge (Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1983) , pp. 167-234 .

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3. O n inten t i n Islami c law , se e generall y Loui s Milliot , Introduction a VEtude du Droit Musulman (Paris : Recuei l Sirey , 1953) , pp . 225-35 ; and Josep h Schacht , An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford : Ox ford Universit y Press , 1964) , pp . 116-18 . 4. Victorie n Loubignac , Textes Arabes des Zaer (Paris : Librairi e Ori e n t a l e t Americain e Ma x Besson , 1952) , pp . 273-78 . Se e als o Ed ward Westermarck , "Custom s Connecte d wit h Homicid e i n Mo rocco," Transactions of the Westermarck Society 1 (1947) : 7—38 . O n similar blood-mone y practice s i n othe r Islami c countries , se e Aus tin Kennett , Bedouin Justice (London : Fran k Cas s 8c Co. , 196 8 [1925]); an d Herber t J . Liebesny , The Law of the Near and Middle East (Albany : Stat e Universit y o f Ne w Yor k Press , 1975) , pp . 2 3 0 32. Man y o f th e theme s presen t i n th e Islami c concep t o f lega l in tent posses s interestin g analogue s i n Jewish law . See , fo r example , "Homicide" i n th e Encyclopedia Judaica vol . 8 , pp . 944—46 ; and Mi chael Higger , "Intentio n i n Talmudi c Law, " i n Edwar d M . Gersh field, ed. , Studies in Jewish Jurisprudence (Ne w York : Hermo n Press , 1971), pp . 2 3 5 - 9 3 . 5. Th e argumen t presente d her e i s draw n fro m th e followin g mai n sources: Rober t L . Benso n an d Gile s Constable , eds. , Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Press, 1982) ; R . Howar d Bloch , Medieval French Literature and Law (Berkeley: Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1977) ; Pete r Brown , "Society an d th e Supernatural : A Medieva l Change, " Daedalus 104 , no. 2 (Sprin g 1975) : 133—50 ; Carolin e W . Bynum,/m* s as Mother (Berkeley: Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1980) , pp . 82-109 ; Rob ert W . Hanning , The Individual in Twelfth-Century Romance (Ne w Haven: Yal e Universit y Press , 1977) ; Coli n Morris , The Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200 (Ne w York : Harpe r & Row , 1972) ; Alexander Murray , Reason and Society in the Middle Ages (Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press , 1978) ; Charle s M . Radding , "Evolutio n of Medieva l Mentalities : A Cognitive-Structura l Approach, " American Historical Review 8 3 (1978) : 577-97 ; R.W . Southern , The Making of the Middle Ages (Ne w Haven : Yal e Universit y Press , 1953) ; Walter Ullmann , The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (Bal timore: John s Hopkin s Press , 1966) ; an d Kar l J . Weintraub , The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography (Chi cago: Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1978) . I hav e als o foun d help ful th e discussio n o f Gree k concept s o f th e perso n i n Brun o Snell , The Discovery of the Mind (Ne w York : Harpe r 8c Row , 1960) . 6. Quote d fro m severa l o f St . Anselm' s work s i n R.W . Southern , The Making of the Middle Ages, p . 226 . 7. Abelar d thu s wrote : "Seeing , i n a mos t wonderfu l manner , wha t none othe r sees , H e take s n o accoun t o f action s whe n H e punishe s

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sin, bu t th e intentio n only , whil e we , o n th e contrary , tak e n o ac count o f th e intentio n whic h quit e escape s us , bu t punis h th e ac tion whic h w e see. " Quote d i n Etienn e Gilson , The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Ne w York : Scribner's , 1940) , p . 349 . Se e als o th e role o f Abelard' s though t o n th e developin g concep t o f th e indi vidual i n Kar l J. Weintraub , The Value of the Individual, pp . 72-92 . For a n accoun t o f th e conflic t betwee n St . Bernar d an d Abelard , see Fredric h Heer , The Medieval World (Ne w York : Ne w America n Library, 1961) , pp . 101-25 . O n th e relate d concep t o f conscience , see Timoth y C . Potts , Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cam bridge: Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1980) . 8. Hanning , The Individual in Twelfth-Century Romance, p . 12 . 9. Hanning , p . 3 . The emphasi s o n individualit y i s also evident i n th e fact tha t wherea s earlie r author s usuall y remaine d anonymous , th e names o f th e author s o f chivalri c romanc e ar e highlighted . Indi vidual distinctivenes s als o begin s t o appea r i n suc h everyda y prac tices a s th e developmen t o f a persona l styl e o f handwriting . 10. Hanning , p . 140 . 11. Morris , The Discovery of the Individual, p . 158 . 12. Se e th e discussio n i n Theodor e F.T . Plucknett , A Concise History of the Common Law (Boston : Little , Brown , 1956) , pp . 425—26 . 13. F.L . Attenborough , ed. , Laws of the Earliest Kings (Cambridge : Cambridge Universit y Press , 1922) , especiall y th e well-know n in stance o f a ma n carryin g a spea r ove r hi s shoulder , Cap . 36 . Com pare Alber t Levitt , "Th e Origi n o f th e Doctrin e o f Men s Rea, " Illinois Law Review 1 7 (1922) : 117-37 , i n whic h h e argue s that , owin g to th e influenc e o f St . Augustine , inten t wa s a significan t facto r i n early Englis h law , with th e mor e measure d argumen t tha t "prio r to th e twelft h century , a crimina l inten t wa s no t recognize d a s a n indispensable requisit e fo r criminality " mad e b y Franci s Bowe s Sayre, "Men s Rea, " Harvard Law Review 4 5 (1932) : 974-102 6 a t p . 977. T h e argumen t b y Perc y H . Winfield , "Th e Myt h o f Absolut e Liability," The Law Quarterly Review 4 2 (1926) : 37—51 , properl y ac knowledges tha t ther e wer e i n thi s perio d element s o f bot h abso lute liabilit y an d a concer n fo r th e reason s behin d a man' s actions , but h e fail s t o recogniz e tha t rathe r tha n a mas s o f indecipherabl e contradictions w e ca n vie w thes e rule s a s statement s abou t situa tions, a kin d o f calculu s o f consequenc e b y whic h behavio r i s as sessed i n situationa l term s rathe r tha n b y genera l rules . Moreover , different powers—church , king , loca l baron—claime d jurisdictio n over thes e variou s situations , suc h tha t a statemen t o f situatio n wa s both a statemen t abou t motiv e an d politica l obligation . 14. L.J . Downer , ed. , Leges Henrici Primi (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1972), Sectio n 5,28b . I t shoul d b e recalle d tha t thi s provisio n ap -

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plies t o perjury , an d tha t a s Polloc k an d Maitlan d noted : "W e re ceive a shoc k whe n w e mee t wit h a maxi m tha t ha s trouble d ou r modern lawyers , namel y Reum nonfacit nisi mens rea, in th e middl e of th e Leges Henrici amon g rule s whic h hol d a ma n answerabl e fo r all th e har m tha t h e does . . . . But th e borrowe d scra p o f St . Au gustine speak s onl y o f perjury , an d tha t anyon e shoul d eve r hav e thought o f chargin g wit h perjur y on e wh o swor e wha t h e believe d to b e true , thi s wil l giv e u s anothe r glimps e int o ancien t law. " Frederick Polloc k an d Frederi c W . Maitland , The History of English Law, vol . 2 (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1968) , p . 476 . See generally , Bloch , Medieval French Literature and Law, pp . 28 — 29. 15. Leges Henrici Primi, section s 84, 2 an d 90, 1 la respectively . 16. "Wha t w e hav e foun d i n th e ordea l i s no t a bod y o f me n actin g on specifi c belief s abou t th e supernatural ; w e hav e foun d instea d specific belief s hel d i n suc h a wa y a s t o enabl e a bod y o f me n t o act." Pete r Brown , "Societ y an d th e Supernatural, " p . 140 . 17. Mar c Bloch , Feudal Society, vol. 1 (Chicago: Universit y o f Chicag o Press, 1964) , p . 107 . 18. O n th e rol e o f churc h thinker s i n th e abolitio n o f th e ordeal s se e J.W. Baldwin , "Th e Intellectua l Preparatio n fo r th e Cano n o f 121 5 against Ordeals, " Speculum 3 6 (1961) : 613-36 , an d R.C . va n Cae negem, "Th e La w o f Evidenc e i n th e Twelft h Century : Europea n Perspectives an d Intellectua l Background, " i n Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (1965) : 297-310 . However, bot h author s dra w th e boundarie s o f th e intellectua l cli mate affectin g change s i n th e la w o f evidenc e to o narrowly . Thu s Baldwin states : "Th e reviva l o f theologica l studie s a t th e begin ning o f th e twelft h centur y b y suc h writer s a s Abelar d wa s occu pied chiefl y wit h speculativ e issues , an d i t wa s no t unti l th e en d o f the centur y tha t theologian s turne d t o mor e practica l affairs " (p. 626) . H e thu s restrict s th e intellectua l root s o f th e Cano n o f 1215 t o theolog y an d eve n i n tha t contex t fail s t o se e th e impac t that change s i n th e concep t o f th e perso n ha d o n bot h theolog y and law . Similarly, van Caenegem , i n hi s brief discussio n o f "change s in intellectua l attitude " (pp . 306-310 ) limit s himsel f t o th e change s that occurre d i n th e thinkin g abou t judicia l procedure . I t i s pre cisely m y argumen t her e that , importan t a s th e change s i n bu reaucratic approache s t o crimina l procedur e were , th e intellectua l background o f thi s developmen t canno t b e limite d t o th e spher e of judicia l activit y alone— a vie w tha t see s th e la w a s workin g through t o mor e rationa l procedure s solel y a s a functio n o f it s ow n internal history-bu t a s interdependentl y associate d wit h shift s i n the concep t o f th e perso n fo r whic h th e terms , th e concepts , an d

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the initia l application s firs t foun d developmen t i n theology , liter ature, an d socia l relations . Se e also Bloch , Medieval French Literature and Law, p . 3 9 ("I t wa s not unti l late r i n th e twelft h centur y that jurists influence d b y th e theologica l discussion s o f th e inten tionally an d th e menta l element s o f sin , began t o discern divers e degrees o f crimina l guil t accordin g t o individua l cases") . 19. Se e Thomas A . Green, "Societa l Concept s o f Criminal Liabilit y fo r Homicide i n Mediaeva l England, " Speculum 47 (1972) : 669-94 ; an d "The Jur y an d th e Englis h La w of Homicide , 1200-1600, " Michigan Law Review 7 4 (1976 ) 413-99 . 20. Sayre , "Men s Rea, " p. 989. 21. Jame s Marshall , Intention in Law and Society (New York : Minerv a Press, 1968) , p . 21. 22. C . Wrigh t Mills , "Situate d Action s an d th e Vocabular y o f Mo tives," American Sociological Review 5 (1940) : 904-1 3 a t p . 906. 23. Gilber t Ryle , The Concept of Mind (Ne w York: Barne s 8c Noble, 1949) , p. 66. 24. Quote d i n Hann a F . Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley : Uni versity o f Californi a Press , 1972) , p . 166. 25. Fo r an exampl e o f thi s approac h an d a discussion o f its theoretica l implications, se e Cliffor d Geertz , "Person , Time , an d Conduc t i n Bali," in hi s Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basi c Books , 1973) , pp. 3 6 0 - 4 1 1 . 26. O n th e romanti c vie w o f th e self , se e Stephen Greenblatt , Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1980) . On th e transitio n t o th e psychoanalyti c view , se e Lione l Trilling , Sincerity and Authenticity (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1974) . See als o th e argument i n Ralp h H . Turner, "Th e Real Self : Fro m Institution t o Impulse," American Journal of Sociology 81 (1976): 9 8 91016 concernin g th e vie w o f th e perso n i n socia l versu s volitiona l terms. Fo r a fascinatin g exampl e o f ho w on e domai n o f mean ing—the concep t o f th e person—couple s wit h anothe r domain — the natur e o f illness—se e Susa n Sontag , Illness as Metaphor (Ne w York: Vintag e Books , 1974) . 27. Fo r a recen t expressio n o f thi s perspectiv e se e Michae l Novak , "Mediating Institutions : T h e Communitaria n Individua l i n Amer ica," The Public Interest 6 8 (1982) : 3-20 . 28. Se e D.P.P. v . Smith (1961 ) A.C . 290 an d R. v . Hyam (1974 ) 2 All E.R. 41 . For discussions o f thes e Englis h cases , as analyzed i n term s relevant fo r th e presen t discussion , se e Anthon y Kenny , "Inten tion an d Purpos e i n th e Law, " in Rober t S . Summers , ed. , Essays in Legal Philosophy (Berkeley: Universit y o f California Press , 1968) , pp. 146-63 ; and his "Intention an d Mens Rea in Murder, " i n P.M.S.

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Hacker an d J . Raz , eds. , Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Clar endon Press , 1977) , pp . 161-74 . 29. 42 2 U.S . 510 , 6 1 L.Ed . 2 d 3 9 (1979) . 30. I t could , fo r example , b e argue d tha t inchoat e crimes , includin g attempt an d conspiracy , ar e one s tha t hav e com e t o b e couche d i n terms o f inten t because , a s th e resul t o f th e developin g concep t o f the romanti c self , w e hav e com e t o stres s th e perso n a s th e crucia l ingredient i n ou r characterizatio n o f acts , eve n thoug h on e coul d well conceptualiz e thes e issue s wholl y i n term s o f socia l har m an d apply canon s o f stric t liability . T h e standar d o f inten t i s intuitivel y comprehensible t o u s becaus e ou r concep t o f th e perso n ha s be come couche d i n thes e terms , whateve r it s merit s a s a vehicl e fo r earlier interventio n b y th e stat e i n unlawfu l conduct . See , i n thi s regard, Georg e P . Fletcher , "Th e Metamorphosi s o f Larceny, " Harvard Law Review 8 9 (1976) : 520-25 . Se e generall y Rober t L . Misner, "Th e Ne w Attemp t Laws : Unsuspecte d Threa t t o th e Fourth Amendment, " Stanford Law Review 3 3 (1981) : 201-230 , a t pp. 207—13 . Fo r a fascinatin g exploratio n o f how , i n th e absenc e of a languag e o f attemp t an d incitement , th e languag e o f inten t contributed t o th e differentiatio n o f inchoat e offense s i n Judai c law, se e Bernar d S . Jackson, "Liabilit y fo r Mer e Intentio n i n Earl y Jewish Law, " i n hi s Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History (Leiden: E.J . Brill , 1975) , pp . 202-34 . 31. I t is , i n part , th e absenc e o f a commo n vie w o f th e person , there fore, tha t contribute s t o disagreement s ove r wha t woul d constitut e manifestly crimina l activity . See , i n additio n t o Fletcher' s "Th e Metamorphosis o f Larceny, " th e debat e betwee n Lloy d L . Wein reb, "Manifes t Criminality , Crimina l Intent , an d th e 'Metamor phosis o f Larceny, ' " Yale Law Journal 9 0 (1980) : 294-31 8 a t pp . 310-18 an d Georg e P . Fletcher , "Manifes t Criminality , Crimina l Intent, an d th e Metamorphosi s o f Lloy d Weinreb, " Yale Law Journal 9 0 (1980) : 319-48 , a t pp . 340-48 . 32. T h e ide a o f competin g concept s o f th e person , a s discusse d here , also ha s relevanc e t o man y othe r area s o f th e law . See , fo r exam ple, th e discussion s abou t property , evidence , an d privacy , in , re spectively, Margare t Jan e Radin , "Propert y an d Personhood, " Stanford Law Review 3 4 (1982) : 957-1015 ; H . Richar d Uviller , "Evidence o f Characte r t o Prov e Conduct : Illusion , Illogic , an d Injustice i n th e Courtroom, " University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130 (1982) : 8 4 5 - 9 1 ; an d Note , "Towar d a Constitutiona l Theor y of Individuality : T h e Privac y Opinion s o f Justic e Douglas, " Yale Law Journal 87 (1978) : 1579-1600 .

3 THE DECONSTRUCTIO N AN D RECONSTRUCTION O F INTEN T MARTIN SHAPIR O

We ar e presente d i n th e previou s chapter s wit h tw o exposi tions o f th e base s o f crimina l law , on e b y a lawye r anthropolo gist, th e othe r b y a lawyer philosopher . T h e anthropologis t say s that th e crimina l la w mus t operat e fro m som e basi c concep t o f the person , whic h i t draw s fro m th e notion s o f personhoo d prevalent i n a culture , an d tha t Wester n crimina l la w i s base d on a concep t o f th e autonomou s individua l tha t entere d West ern hig h cultur e durin g th e medieva l period . Th e philosophe r agrees tha t Wester n crimina l la w i s based o n conception s o f th e autonomously acting , means-end s calculatin g person . Throug h a surve y o f crimina l la w an d philosophi c material s h e show s tha t these conception s ar e th e commo n sens e o f ou r intellectua l her itage an d presen t a n intellectua l syste m sufficientl y coheren t t o render a t leas t th e broa d outline s o f th e "genera l part " o f th e criminal la w coherent . ANTHROPOLOGY AN D PHILOSOPH Y

This happ y conjunctio n o f anthropolog y an d philosoph y i n the constellatio n o f la w signal s som e interestin g development s in bot h disciplines . Professo r Moore , practicin g a s peripateti c synthesizer an d criti c o f th e professiona l philosoph y o f th e las t fifty years , tell s u s i n effec t tha t ou r old-fashione d folkwa y o f 78

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thinking abou t crime , i n whic h X want s t o hur t Y and doe s hur t Y and s o ought t o b e punished , make s sens e afte r al l i n spit e o f all th e confusin g thing s philosopher s an d socia l scientist s hav e been saying . Yes , Virginia , ther e ar e ba d guy s wh o d o ba d thing s and, yes , Virginia , it' s O K t o punis h them . Well , th e Mora l Ma jority an d mos t o f th e cops , excep t thos e wh o hav e bee n t o graduate school , kne w thi s al l along . What' s new ? Actually quit e a lo t o f wha t Professo r Moor e say s i s new , a t least i n th e sens e o f bein g reconstruction . Th e well-educate d ma y argue tha t Wester n philosoph y ha s bee n disintegratin g jus t a s fast a s i t ha s bee n integratin g sinc e th e Greeks . T o mos t o f us , however, disintegratio n seeme d t o hav e reache d a pea k o f ac celeration i n th e 1930s , '40 s an d '50s , an d certainl y th e move ment t o deconstruc t everythin g continue s apace . Philosopher s of scienc e an d actio n philosopher s an d ordinar y languag e phi losophers an d structuralist s an d ne w critic s an d behaviorist s an d Marxists hav e bee n tellin g u s tha t nothin g tha t w e sa y o r d o makes sens e o r mean s wha t w e thin k i t means ; tha t ou r worl d is absurd, mysterious , indeterminan t an d complexl y problemat ical beyon d th e wildes t dream s o f simpl e folk . Eve n th e youn g lady fro m Natchez' s simpl e rul e o f conduc t wa s calle d int o question b y a philosoph y tha t wa s increasingl y i n tatter s an d patches. In th e fac e o f al l thi s deconstruction , a reconstructio n ha s be gun i n philosophy . It s hallmark s ar e a n appea l t o logica l dis course i n ordinar y languag e aime d a t discoverin g wha t mos t o f us woul d agre e wa s righ t o r tru e o r a t leas t mor e righ t o r mor e true tha n somethin g else , an d the n th e constructio n o f a satis fying demonstratio n o f th e defensibilit y o f thos e agreements . Although on e o f th e basi c technique s o f thi s movemen t i s ap peal t o widel y share d mora l intuitions , w e ar e forbidde n t o cal l this movemen t intuitionis m o r consensualism . It s othe r basi c technique o r clai m i s tha t i t i s perfectin g a mod e o f mora l dis course tha t generate s ethica l truth s tha t ris e abov e th e leve l o f "I lik e vanilla, " o r eve n "w e lik e vanilla, " u p t o th e leve l o f al l thinking people , wh o shoul d b e persuade d tha t vanill a reall y is , if no t tru e an d beautiful , a t leas t bette r tha n chocolate . Per haps, withou t offense , w e coul d labe l thi s movemen t a neo common sens e schoo l o f philosophy .

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DECONSTRUCTION AN D RECONSTRUCTIO N

What Professo r Moor e say s i s that , i n spit e o f al l th e stuf f tha t the learne d hav e churne d out , i t i s al l righ t t o believ e tha t per sons choos e t o d o crime s an d the n d o them ; tha t w e don' t hav e to sa y tha t th e victim s di d th e crime , o r tha t societ y di d th e crime , or tha t nobod y di d th e crim e o r tha t nobod y know s wha t crim e means o r wha t doin g mean s o r tha t al l we mea n i s that a n even t has occurre d tha t a majorit y o f u s o r a clas s o f u s hav e decide d we don' t like . T h e philosopher s o f deconstructio n an d recon struction wil l n o doub t d o battl e fo r man y year s ove r th e aston ishing propositio n tha t som e person s d o crimes—an d n o doub t I hav e state d i t i n a for m unacceptabl e eve n t o Professo r Moore . Nevertheless, i t i s comfortin g t o kno w tha t a t leas t som e learne d people wil l b e abl e t o sa y with som e eas e tha t a fello w wh o pick s up hi s gu n an d goe s dow n t o th e liquo r stor e an d demand s you r money o r you r lif e has—si x chance s i n ten—committe d a crime . Which o f cours e bring s u s t o th e conjunctio n o f philosoph y and anthropology . N o matte r wha t th e ne w philosopher s ma y claim i n term s o f "truth, " th e anthropologis t ca n vie w thei r wor k as th e collectin g an d systematizin g o f th e hig h cultur e o f a give n society—a repor t o f wha t th e cultur e specialist s o f a comple x society conclud e ar e it s belief system s afte r a n extended , critica l examination o f it s stoc k o f ideas . Thi s produc t o f philosophica l discourse ma y b e particularl y welcom e t o th e anthropologis t because o f th e weaknesse s o f othe r methods . I n comple x soci eties wit h larg e volume s o f writte n materials , i t appear s t o b e quite arbitrar y t o rel y o n a scatterin g o f individua l informant s as i s don e b y thos e studyin g simple r societies . T h e alternativ e typically ha s bee n Weberian-styl e historica l sociology , i n whic h the investigato r singlehandedl y attack s th e hug e mas s o f writ ten materials , attemptin g t o dra w fro m the m th e basi c cultura l traits o f th e society . T h e verstand o f eve n th e mos t esteeme d o f these investigator s mus t alway s rais e suspicion s o f individual ized coloration s tha t ar e onl y partiall y correcte d b y successiv e re-interpretations b y subsequen t scholars . For a time , socia l scienc e seeme d t o offe r a n alternativ e i n survey research . A scientificall y draw n sampl e o f th e entir e population, o r o f an y particula r subset , coul d simpl y b e aske d questions designe d t o elici t it s beliefs; a quantifie d statemen t o f

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the basi c belie f syste m o f th e societ y coul d the n b e constructed . It ha s turne d out , however , tha t whil e survey s ca n d o ver y wel l at revealin g transitor y publi c opinio n abou t particula r issue s o r persons, the y d o no t see m t o d o ver y wel l a t revealin g funda mental beliefs . T h e basi c proble m seem s t o b e tha t surve y re spondents canno t b e mad e t o tak e seriousl y fundamenta l ethi cal problems . A t leas t withi n th e limit s o f th e kind s o f question s and interviewin g format s tha t ar e feasibl e economically , surve y respondents appea r t o mak e rathe r sna p judgments highl y con ditioned b y immediat e circumstances . Mor e fundamentally , th e beliefs state d d o no t emerg e fro m a carefu l workin g throug h of th e possibl y contradictor y idea s hel d b y th e respondent . The kin d o f exercis e conducte d b y Professo r Moore , tha t is , the critica l workin g throug h o f th e commo n sens e o f th e soci ety, make s u p fo r precisel y thes e deficiencie s o f surve y re search. Or , t o pu t th e matte r differently , a coupl e o f doze n in formants lik e Moor e migh t plac e th e anthropologica l studen t o f complex culture s o n a pa r wit h thos e wh o stud y simple r cul tures throug h nativ e informants . PERSONALITY AN D CRIMINA L LA W

Assuming fo r th e moment , a t least , tha t thi s propositio n i s true, we migh t tur n t o Professo r Rosen' s hypothesi s tha t th e Mosle m criminal la w o f Morocc o differ s i n som e way s fro m Wester n criminal la w becaus e o f differin g concept s o f th e person , an d more particularl y tha t Wester n crimina l la w presuppose s a n au tonomous perso n wherea s Islami c crimina l la w presuppose s a n individual wh o earn s hi s personalit y b y cementin g hi s familial , social, an d religiou s relation s wit h other s i n hi s society . Both thes e paper s dea l wit h intent , on e o f th e centra l prob lems o f crimina l law . A majo r ambiguit y i n thi s are a i s whethe r particular lega l rule s o n inten t ar e generate d b y fundamenta l philosophic and/o r psychologica l conception s o f inten t o r whethe r they ar e pragmati c adjustment s t o th e practica l proble m o f proving inten t a t trial . Whil e Professo r Rose n doe s no t giv e u s much detail , h e suggest s that , i n establishin g crimina l intent , a Moroccan cour t i s prepare d t o hea r fa r mor e tha n a Wester n court abou t th e defendant' s we b o f socia l relations . Professo r Rosen attribute s thi s differenc e t o th e differin g Islami c an d

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Western concept s o f th e person , rathe r tha n simpl y t o differen t pragmatic response s t o th e proo f problem . Ye t Professo r Moore , fully consciou s o f th e problem s o f fre e will , determinism , an d causation i n Wester n philosophy , reduce s persona l autonom y t o the irreducibl e common-sens e minimu m tha t whe n on e will s a part o f one' s bod y t o mov e an d i t the n move s withou t som e in dependent, externa l forc e bein g applie d t o it , on e ha s acte d in tentionally. Fo r al l th e Islami c stres s o n interrelations , I believ e that Isla m to o accept s thi s minimu m definitio n o f persona l au tonomy. Professor Moor e goe s o n t o sho w tha t crimina l inten t i n th e West i s buil t u p ou t o f thi s definitio n o f autonom y plu s a n as sumption o f means-end s rationalit y i n individual s s o tha t th e prototype actio n runs : becaus e I wan t X an d becaus e movin g my ar m i n manne r Y wil l hel p m e achiev e X , I wil l m y ar m t o move i n manne r Y . T h e movemen t o f th e ar m i s the n hel d t o be intentiona l i n th e absenc e o f a n externa l force . Her e agai n I believe Isla m accept s th e sam e prototyp e o f action . I would , therefore, tentativel y suggest , pendin g fulle r elaboratio n b y Professor Rosen , tha t i f Islami c court s admi t a wide r rang e o f evidence o n inten t tha n d o Wester n ones , i t i s no t becaus e Is lam offer s a les s autonomou s versio n o f personhoo d tha n doe s Western philosophy . Professo r Moor e ha s ha d s o t o reduc e concepts o f persona l autonom y t o ge t the m throug h th e screen s of moder n Wester n philosoph y tha t the y reac h a minimu m leve l that Isla m accept s a s well . T h e Shari a to o assume s tha t person s move thei r bodil y part s b y wil l fo r th e purpos e o f achievin g som e arrangement o f th e physica l worl d tha t the y prefe r t o tha t whic h will occu r i f the y don' t mov e thei r bodil y parts . Judges unde r both Wester n an d Islami c la w ar e instructe d t o discove r thos e instances i n whic h th e defendant' s conduc t doe s no t corre spond t o thi s prototyp e an d reliev e hi m o f crimina l responsi bility i n suc h instances . CULTURE AN D INTEN T

If a Morocca n judg e i s mor e prepare d t o infe r inten t fro m the whol e corpu s o f th e defendant' s previou s conduc t unre lated t o th e event s a t issu e tha n i s hi s Wester n counterpart , i t may b e fa r les s becaus e h e hold s differen t conception s o f per -

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sonhood tha n becaus e o f a numbe r o f othe r factors . Th e Wes t may simpl y b e mor e solicitou s o f individuals , seekin g t o mak e the prosecutor' s job harder . Or , pu t anothe r way , i t ma y b e mor e anxious t o limi t th e powe r o f governmen t t o pu t ba d actor s awa y and s o requir e th e governmen t t o g o furthe r i n provin g a par ticular ba d ac t rathe r tha n allowin g i t t o rel y mor e o n cumula tive ba d behavior . Alternatively , th e judges o f closel y kni t soci eties migh t b e expecte d t o hav e mor e confidenc e i n thei r abilitie s to infe r inten t i n on e particula r inciden t fro m th e whol e pat tern o f pas t behavio r tha n judge s o f anomi c societie s i n whic h behavior i n on e contex t a t on e tim e i s barel y connecte d t o be havior i n othe r sphere s a t othe r times . Or , mor e fundamen tally, th e proces s o f secularizatio n ma y hav e gon e muc h furthe r in Wester n tha n i n Morocca n courts . Where crimina l la w retain s stron g religiou s overtones , an d where lega l an d mora l o r religiou s obligation s ar e no t rigidl y distinguished, court s ma y b e mor e incline d t o judge th e whol e man—to judg e th e stat e o f th e sou l rathe r tha n th e natur e o f the act . Th e court s o f Morocc o ar e no t i n th e stric t sens e khadi' s courts directl y applyin g th e orthodo x religiou s la w o f Islam , th e Sharia. O n th e othe r hand , i t woul d b e foolis h t o se e the m a s simply secula r arm s o f a secula r governmen t administerin g a purely secular , national , statutor y law . The y ar e Islami c court s administering Islami c law . I woul d b e mor e incline d t o trac e differences i n th e "genera l part " o f crimina l la w t o thi s strikin g difference betwee n secula r an d religiou s lega l tradition s tha n I would t o difference s i n concept s o f personhood , particularl y i f the Wester n concep t o f perso n ha s t o b e reduce d a s fa r a s Pro fessor Moor e rathe r persuasivel y argue s i t mus t be . If th e Islami c judge i s prepare d t o receiv e mor e evidenc e tha n his Wester n counterpar t o n th e socia l role s o f th e accused , Pro fessor Rose n tell s u s h e i s prepare d t o receiv e fa r les s bearin g directly o n th e subjectiv e stat e o f min d o f th e accused . Th e Mo roccan cour t impute s subjectiv e inten t fro m th e outcom e o f th e act. Ho w differen t i s thi s approac h fro m th e Wester n assump tion tha t a perso n intend s th e natura l consequence s o f hi s acts ? As fa r a s I ca n see , no t muc h differen t excep t tha t th e Islami c judge begin s no t wit h a generalize d perso n bu t wit h a perso n in his/he r particula r socia l setting . Thus , fro m th e sam e out come h e ma y infe r a different inten t o n th e par t o f a mal e hea d

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of famil y tha n o n th e par t o f a young femal e servant . Bu t I woul d argue tha t i n realit y th e sam e accoun t i s take n o f role s i n West ern imputation s o f intent . My difficulty i n acceptin g th e difference s betwee n Wester n an d Islamic judicial though t tha t Professo r Rose n finds s o obviou s stems fro m tw o secondar y cause s an d on e primar y cause . Le t me addres s th e secondar y cause s first. Professo r Rose n give s u s no actua l case s agains t whic h t o tes t hi s position , an d h e i s ac tually comparin g th e realitie s o f wha t goe s o n insid e th e rea l Moroccan crimina l proces s wit h th e forma l rule s o f evidenc e o f a Wester n crimina l trial . At th e conferenc e a t whic h hi s pape r wa s initiall y given , I of fered hi m th e followin g case , note d b y Lyn n Mathe r durin g he r study o f th e Lo s Angele s Superio r Court. 1 A ma n i s foun d sleeping nex t t o a safe . Ther e i s physica l evidenc e o f a break in. Ther e ar e mark s o n th e saf e o f a n attempte d safecrackin g and th e tool s ar e lyin g nex t t o th e saf e an d th e man . Ther e i s a larg e amoun t o f mone y i n th e safe . Th e ma n i s charged wit h burglary an d attempte d gran d larceny . A t th e ple a bargainin g session, th e assistan t distric t attorne y argue d tha t i t wa s ob viously a n attempte d safecracking , citin g no t onl y th e physica l evidence bu t th e defendant' s lon g crimina l recor d a s a safe cracker an d burglar . T h e publi c defende r argue d tha t th e ma n was no t a safe-cracke r bu t a n ol d drunk . Year s ag o h e wa s a professional burglar , bu t no w h e i s a n alcoholic . H e n o longe r lives the lif e o f a big-time burglar . H e ha s n o mone y an d know s no fences . H e i s a semi-derelict , hangin g aroun d stree t corners . He go t drun k an d fo r ol d times ' sak e wen t throug h th e motion s of a job, bu t th e fe w pitifu l tool s h e collecte d coul d neve r hav e gotten hi m int o tha t moder n safe , an d h e wa s s o drun k tha t h e fell aslee p i n th e middl e o f hi s charade . Th e D.A . accepte d a plea o f guilt y t o a mino r trespassin g offense . I woul d argu e tha t th e sam e treatmen t o f inten t occur s her e as occur s i n Morocco . Basi c imputation s o f inten t ar e mad e fro m the physica l evidence , bu t i n th e ligh t o f th e socia l role s tha t th e defendant ha s create d fo r himself . I f th e defendan t i s indeed a professional burglar— a distinc t socia l rol e i n ou r society—the n one inferenc e o f inten t i s draw n fro m th e physica l evidence . I f he i s a n ol d drunk—als o a distinc t socia l rol e i n ou r society — then a differen t inferenc e i s drawn . An d wha t influence s th e

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assistant D.A . i s no t direc t evidenc e o f th e subjectiv e inten t o f the defendant , bu t evidenc e o f th e defendant' s curren t life . I believe tha t Professo r Rose n misse s thes e similaritie s betwee n Western an d Morocca n justic e becaus e h e deal s wit h th e rea l criminal proces s i n Morocc o an d th e black-lette r la w o f th e West , and becaus e h e doe s no t presen t u s full y develope d Morocca n cases tha t w e coul d compar e wit h Wester n cases. 2 EVIDENCE AN D INFERENC E

Professor Rosen' s respons e t o thi s cas e whe n I presente d i t brings u s t o th e primar y caus e o f ou r disagreement . H e simpl y replied tha t thi s cas e di d no t soun d t o hi m a t al l lik e wha t woul d have happene d i n Morocco . I stil l don' t kno w why i t didn't soun d the sam e t o him . I realiz e tha t professiona l burgla r an d ol d drun k are America n urba n role s quit e differen t fro m suc h Morocca n roles a s youn g mal e cousi n an d employe e o f wealth y hea d o f family. However , the y ar e certainl y socia l role s create d b y th e role playe r an d use d alon g wit h physica l evidenc e t o infe r in tent. Within anthropolog y an d comparativ e studie s mor e gener ally, ther e ar e toda y tw o genera l movement s tha t w e migh t als o call constructiv e an d deconstructive , borrowin g th e categorie s I applied earlie r t o philosophy . Th e ethnographer s insis t tha t eac h culture i s different , opaque , mysterious , pervasive , an d deter minative o f individua l though t an d behavior . Th e outside r can not kno w wha t a perso n i n th e cultur e i s doin g unti l h e ca n "think" i n th e culture . A cultur e i s no t merel y a se t o f con straints bu t a specia l an d peculia r wa y o f thinking . I f i t appear s to m e tha t neithe r th e Morocca n khad i no r th e America n D.A . can loo k int o th e min d o f th e accuse d s o tha t bot h depen d o n inferences fro m wh o h e i s an d wha t h e ha s done , I a m simpl y told t o g o an d liv e i n Morocc o fo r te n year s an d the n se e i f I am stil l dupe d b y th e surfac e similarities . The othe r schoo l o f comparativist s tend s t o find tha t individ uals i n al l culture s ac t primaril y o n th e basi s o f self-interested , means-ends calculation s designe d t o improv e thei r materia l po sitions i n life. 3 Differen t culture s creat e differen t channel s an d constraints o n thi s "rational " behavior . Nevertheless , anyon e ca n make sens e o f wha t someon e i n anothe r cultur e i s thinking an d

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doing onc e h e understand s th e alternative s tha t tha t cultur e of fers, becaus e al l o f u s everywher e ar e seekin g t o b e a littl e bet ter of f tomorro w tha n w e wer e today . Fro m thi s perspectiv e I see tw o peopl e bot h charge d wit h punishin g certai n intentiona l acts, bot h unabl e t o gai n direc t evidenc e o f intent , an d bot h us ing th e sam e proces s o f inferenc e o n th e sam e physica l an d so cial evidence i n orde r t o overcom e th e inten t proble m an d clea r their docket . I f th e rea l Islami c judge i n a rea l courtroo m ap pears mor e brusqu e i n movin g fro m wha t happene d t o wha t was intended tha n th e idea l America n judge o f th e evidenc e text , then I sugges t w e mov e fro m th e tex t t o th e realit y o f wha t goe s on a t th e America n plea-bargainin g session s tha t ar e ou r rea l criminal trials . In th e final analysis , wha t make s th e paper s o f Professor s Moore an d Rose n s o differen t i s no t tha t the y attac k th e prob lem o f crimina l inten t fro m th e differin g prospective s o f phi losophy an d anthropology , bu t tha t on e i s i n th e constructivis t and th e othe r i n th e deconstructivis t camp . Professo r Moor e stresses wha t i s bot h commo n an d commonl y availabl e t o th e instructed intelligence . Professo r Rose n stresse s th e dark , th e deep, th e peculiar , tha t whic h i s not commonl y availabl e bu t mus t be sough t i n th e labyrinth . I forbea r t o mumbl e abou t yi n an d yang. NOTES 1. Se e Lyn n Mather , Plea Bargaining or Trial (Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books , 1979) . 2. Thu s returnin g t o my earlier instanc e o f th e Wester n doctrin e tha t a perso n i s assumed t o inten d th e natura l consequence s o f hi s act , it is true tha t th e doctrine i s not, as a technical matter, applicabl e in criminal proceedings , wher e th e prosecutio n bear s th e burde n o f proving subjectiv e intent , bu t i t is certainly th e maxi m tha t under lies the judge an d jury's thinkin g abou t whethe r th e prosecution ha s met tha t burden . 3. Se e Samue l Popkin , The Rational Peasant (Berkeley : Universit y o f California Press , 1981) .

4 CLASSIFICATION-BASED SENTENCING: SOM E CONCEPTUA L AND ETHICA L PROBLEM S HUGO ADA M BEDA U

For centuries , philosopher s hav e debate d principle s o f pun ishment generate d fro m tw o dominan t considerations , eithe r th e backward-looking concern s o f retributiv e justic e o r th e for ward-looking concern s o f genera l welfare . Meanwhile , official s charged wit h th e day-to-da y developmen t an d administratio n o f criminal justice hav e ha d t o rel y o n actua l scheme s t o met e ou t sentences t o convicte d offenders , typicall y base d o n som e unar ticulated an d eclecti c combinatio n o f retributiv e an d utilitaria n considerations. Legislature s designin g an d revisin g a jurisdic tion's pena l code , prosecutor s recommendin g sentence s fo r convicted offenders , tria l judges handin g dow n sentence s cas e by case , administrativ e official s actin g o n application s fo r pa role, commutation , an d releas e fro m punishment , lawyer s ad vising client s liabl e t o sentencing—al l suc h person s hav e a di This chapte r i s a revisio n o f a pape r originall y prepare d a t th e reques t o f th e Panel o n Sentencin g Research , Committe e o n Researc h o n La w Enforcemen t and th e Administratio n o f Justice , Commissio n o n Behaviora l an d Socia l Sci ences an d Education , o f th e Nationa l Researc h Council , an d presente d a t th e Panel's conferenc e o n Jul y 27—29 , 1981 . I a m gratefu l t o th e Pane l member s and especiall y t o m y commentators , Norva l Morri s an d Andre w vo n Hirsch , fo r stimulating criticism , thoug h o f cours e the y ar e i n n o wa y responsibl e fo r m y views.

89

90

HUGO ADA M BEDA U

rect interes t an d involvemen t i n th e practic e o f punishment . The y must als o be concerne d wit h th e actua l system , whateve r it s mora l rationale, enforce d b y la w i n term s o f whic h legall y authorize d punishments ar e currentl y bein g determined . Conspicuously influencin g th e discussio n an d refor m o f pun ishment i n thi s countr y a t th e presen t tim e i s th e "determinat e sentencing" movement, 1 an d prominen t i n tha t movemen t i s th e development o f "classification " scheme s a s a technique o f deter minate sentencing . T h e purpos e o f thi s essa y i s to evaluate suc h schemes fro m th e mora l poin t o f view , tha t is , fro m a poin t o f view i n whic h ethica l consideration s (a s distinc t fro m economi c costs, politica l feasibility , an d administrativ e efficiency ) ar e par amount. Relate d consideration s tha t pla y a considerabl e rol e i n determining th e actua l punishment s experience d b y convicte d offenders an d tha t aris e fro m preconvictio n constraint s o n th e prosecution (e.g. , ple a bargaining ) an d fro m postsentencin g powers o f th e priso n administratio n tha t lea d t o revisio n o f court awarded sentence s wil l b e lef t aside . Importan t a s thes e issue s are i n an y complet e mora l evaluatio n o f th e syste m o f punish ment i n ou r society , the y d o no t she d an y ligh t directl y o n th e classification an d sentencin g syste m itself . To gras p th e genera l ide a o f th e natur e o f classificatio n an d its rol e i n sentencing , conside r th e simpl e an d familia r distinc tion betwee n felonies an d misdemeanors. Typically, a perso n con victed o f a felon y mus t serv e no t les s tha n a yea r i n prison , whereas a perso n convicte d o f a misdemeano r i s liabl e t o pun ishment o f no t mor e tha n a yea r i n prison . I n orde r t o connec t these tw o categorie s o f offens e an d thei r respectiv e punish ments, a t leas t thre e intervenin g step s mus t b e taken : (1 ) a wid e variety o f offenses , say , fro m murde r t o embezzlement , mus t be classe d togethe r a s felonies , an d anothe r wid e rang e o f of fenses, say , fro m overparkin g t o off-trac k betting , mus t b e classe d together a s misdemeanors ; (2 ) th e offense s classe d togethe r mus t have roughl y th e sam e relativ e gravity , s o tha t an y offens e i n the felon y categor y i s grave r tha n an y i n th e misdemeano r cat egory; (3 ) punishment , o r sentence , o r a t leas t th e presumptiv e sentence upo n conviction , wil l b e proportionatel y mor e sever e for a n offens e i n th e felon y categor y tha n fo r a n offens e i n th e misdemeanor category . Crud e a s th e felony/misdemeano r dis tinction ma y be , i t contain s th e rudiment s o f an y possibl e clas -

Classification-Based Sentencing

91

sification scheme ; fo r th e nonc e i t ca n serv e a s th e backdro p o f our discussion . The poin t o f introducin g a classificatio n schem e a s par t o f a n overall progra m o f punitiv e sentencing , a s viewe d fro m a n eth ical perspective , i s twofold : (1 ) t o guarante e tha t onl y (thoug h perhaps no t all ) th e factor s ethicall y relevan t t o a sentenc e ar e determinative o f tha t sentence , an d (2 ) t o guarante e tha t of fenders convicte d o f th e "same " offense ge t th e "same " punish ment, whil e offender s convicte d o f "different " offense s ge t "different" punishments . T o achiev e thes e results , tw o thing s a t a minimu m wil l b e needed : a n adequat e normativ e theor y t o account fo r th e relevan t empirica l factor s o f whic h th e sentenc e should b e a function ; an d th e exclusio n o f gratuitiou s discre tion fro m th e deliberation s tha t resul t i n sentencin g decision , lest thes e decision s defea t th e result s o f prio r classification. 2 If on e i s aske d t o defen d (1 ) an d (2 ) o n mora l grounds , th e natural lin e t o tak e i s that retributiv e justice i s the sourc e o f (1 ) and equa l justic e i s th e sourc e o f (2) . Surely , i t i s prim a faci e unjust fo r an y convicte d offender' s sentenc e t o b e influence d by factor s theoreticall y irrelevan t t o sentencing . Furthermore , whatever th e relevan t factor s are , the y mus t b e s o identifie d b y reference t o morall y relevan t aspect s o f th e criminal' s act . Henc e the retributiv e basi s o f consideratio n (1 ) above . Likewise , i t i s prima faci e unjus t fo r an y tw o convicte d offender s t o b e sen tenced t o differen t punishment s whe n n o facto r relevan t t o sentencing ca n b e cite d a s th e basi s fo r th e difference . Henc e (2) wit h it s egalitarianism. 3 I n thi s way , fundamenta l claim s o f justice see m t o prope l u s i n th e directio n o f creatin g a classifi cation schem e an d makin g i t th e dominan t facto r i n sentencing . There are , however , a t leas t tw o possibl e line s o f objectio n t o such a strategy , eac h o f whic h ca n b e couche d i n mora l terms . One objectio n woul d b e tha t th e introductio n o f classificatio n has n o appreciabl e effec t o n justic e i n sentencing . Sinc e ther e is n o wa y t o achiev e just sentencin g (s o th e objectio n runs) , th e introduction o f classificatio n i s simpl y spinnin g one' s wheel s i n the sand—o r worse . A classificatio n syste m purportedl y base d on consideration s (1 ) an d (2 ) abov e cast s a fals e illusio n o f jus tice o n th e practic e o f sentencing . I shal l ignor e thi s objectio n as bein g to o cynica l t o deserv e a seriou s reply . Eve n i f i t wer e correct, on e migh t stil l hop e t o reduc e th e grosse r injustice s an d

92

HUGO ADA M BEDA U

adopt a classificatio n schem e a s a useful , eve n necessary , too l t o that end . The secon d objectio n i s tha t ther e i s a bette r wa y tha n clas sification t o ensur e tha t th e claim s o f justice i n sentencin g ar e satisfied. Thi s objectio n i s base d o n th e hypothesi s tha t classifi cation i s unnecessar y o r insufficien t t o achiev e bot h (1 ) an d (2 ) above, wherea s a n identifiabl e alternativ e strateg y wil l succee d in thes e objectives . An y argumen t attackin g classificatio n alon g the latte r line s i s likel y t o deriv e fro m a concer n t o "individu alize" sentence s an d thu s punishments , i.e. , t o enabl e th e sen tencer t o decid e th e punishmen t fo r eac h convicte d offende r on a case-by-cas e basis , fre e o f th e constraint s impose d b y a classification scheme . Individualizatio n o f sentencin g i n tur n i s likely t o b e defende d o n ground s eithe r o f equit y o r o f specia l deterrence; th e clai m her e woul d hav e t o b e tha t al l scheme s o f classification defeat , ignore , o r preven t individualizatio n an d thu s both equit y an d specia l deterrence . If ther e i s a repl y t o thi s objection , i t must b e o n eithe r o f tw o general grounds . On e i s tha t individualizatio n i s unfeasible; a n unbiased compariso n betwee n a n orderl y classificatio n syste m and a n individualize d syste m give s th e pal m t o th e forme r be cause o f th e chaoti c feature s o f th e latte r i n actua l practice . Th e other repl y i s i n fac t a partia l concession , namely , i t i s possibl e to desig n a classificatio n schem e i n whic h th e claim s o f justic e as retributio n an d a s equalit y ar e modifie d wher e appropriat e in favo r o f individualize d treatment , i n orde r t o satisf y th e claim s of justice a s equit y o r o f utility . A s w e shal l se e shortly , th e lat ter repl y ha s muc h t o commen d it . Eve n wher e classificatio n dominates sentencing , i t nee d no t (on e migh t eve n argu e i t mus t not) d o s o a t th e expens e o f rulin g ou t o n a prior i ground s an y opportunity fo r mor e individualize d sentencing , provide d som e relevant mora l principl e i s serve d b y suc h individualize d sent encing—indeed, i n th e idea l case , th e ver y mora l principle s tha t underly th e classificatio n schem e itself .

A MODE L CLASSIFICATIO N AN D SENTENCIN G SYSTE M

For th e purpose s o f th e res t o f thi s discussion , th e relatio n o f classification t o sentencin g wil l be illustrate d throug h a close stud y

Classification-Based Sentencing 9

3

of th e 198 0 proposal s o f th e Pennsylvani a Commissio n o n Sent encing. 4 As ou r previou s accoun t o f th e felony/misdemeano r distinc tion showed , basi c t o th e ver y ide a o f a classificatio n schem e i s the notio n tha t statutor y offense s ca n b e distinguishe d fro m on e another b y referenc e t o thei r mora l seriousnes s o r gravity . Thi s fundamental assumptio n prompt s tw o comments . First , w e mus t assume tha t w e ar e dealin g wit h a n idea l crimina l code , com plete i n th e sens e tha t i t i s neithe r under - no r over-inclusiv e o f true wrong s designate d b y th e cod e a s offenses . I f thi s i s no t true, th e classificatio n schem e wil l reflec t th e erro r an d en d u p either b y recommendin g fo r punishmen t somethin g tha t shoul d not b e punishe d a t all , o r b y failin g t o recommen d fo r punish ment somethin g worth y o f suc h a response . Thes e ar e gros s er rors fro m a mora l poin t o f view , an d n o doub t exis t i n mos t penal codes . Bu t w e shal l simpl y assum e tha t the y d o no t aris e in th e schem e abou t t o b e examined . (Ho w w e are t o tel l whethe r they hav e arise n raise s issue s tha t canno t b e discusse d here.) 5 Second, a n unmistakabl y retributiv e basi s underlie s an y at tempt t o classif y offense s b y referenc e t o thei r gravity . Ho w th e relative gravit y o f offense s i s t o b e determine d is , o f course , crucial t o th e claim s o f justice advance d o n behal f o f th e clas sification schem e an d t o th e sentence s base d upo n it . Althoug h the Pennsylvani a Commissio n o n Sentencin g di d no t discus s thi s matter i n it s repor t t o th e legislature , other s hav e se t fort h else where th e genera l basi s fo r judgments o f th e relativ e gravit y o f criminal offenses. 6 A s th e proble m i s s o centra l t o th e projec t of basin g sentencin g o n classification , I shal l retur n t o i t below . In orde r t o se e th e exac t relatio n betwee n classificatio n an d sentencing, w e nee d t o loo k closel y a t th e detail s o f th e classifi cation schem e itself . Unde r th e Pennsylvani a system , a n of fender's classificatio n afte r convictio n an d prio r t o sentencin g i s a functio n o f tw o variables , "offens e score " an d "offende r score. " Offense scor e i s itsel f a functio n o f "offens e rank " (o n a scal e of 1 to 10 , in orde r o f ascendin g gravity ) an d fou r othe r factor s of lesse r importance . On e o f thes e factor s (namely , inchoat e of fense) subtract s on e poin t fro m offens e score ; th e othe r thre e (possession o f a deadl y weapon , us e o f suc h a weapon , inflictio n of bodil y injury ) eac h ma y ad d on e poin t t o th e final score . Sinc e murder necessaril y involve s bodil y injur y an d i s th e onl y crim e

94

H U G O ADA M BEDA U

ranked a t 10 , n o crim e ca n hav e a final offens e scor e highe r than 12 . A t th e othe r en d o f th e scale , presumably , n o offens e ranked a t 1 can eve r b e reduce d t o 0 i n virtu e o f bein g a n in choate offense . Thus , th e offens e scor e varie s alon g a scal e o f uniform interval s fro m 1 to 1 2 an d constitute s on e dimensio n of th e classificatio n scheme . The othe r dimension , offende r score , i s independen t o f th e offense score . (Actually , th e tw o dimension s ar e no t strictl y in dependent; fo r discussio n se e th e appendi x a t th e en d o f thi s chapter.) Thi s scor e i s constructe d o n a seven-poin t scal e ( 0 t o 6, i n orde r o f ascendin g gravity) , wit h positio n o n th e scal e bein g determined b y th e offender' s prio r crimina l record . Eac h prio r serious felon y convictio n add s 1 point, eac h prio r misdemeano r conviction count s a s roughl y hal f a felony ; an y combinatio n o f felonies an d misdemeanor s tha t sum s t o mor e tha n 6 i s auto matically reduce d t o 6 . The resul t i s a two-dimensiona l tabl e wit h 7 2 cells , eac h cel l containing a sentenc e deeme d appropriat e fo r it s coordinat e offense scor e an d offende r score . T h e penaltie s distribute d through th e cellula r matri x ar e typicall y incarcerative . Thus , where th e offende r scor e i s 6 an d th e offens e scor e i s 4 , th e classification schem e yield s a priso n sentenc e o f 1 5 to 1 8 months . Incarceration i s mandator y i n al l bu t 2 0 o f th e 7 2 cells . I n five of thes e 20 , th e classificatio n schem e dictate s a n alternativ e sen tence t o incarceration ; unde r th e Pennsylvani a system , thi s woul d be a sentenc e o f probation , a fine, restitution , o r som e combi nation thereof . I n th e othe r 15 , incarceration i s optional . I n al l 20, th e offens e scor e mus t b e fairl y low , althoug h th e offende r score ma y b e quit e high . Hence , fo r example , incarceratio n fo r up t o a yea r i s th e mos t sever e sentenc e fo r a n offende r wit h a long recor d o f onl y mino r offenses . Thes e an d othe r detail s o f the classificatio n schem e ar e eviden t i n tabl e 1 . Any sentenc e locate d b y us e o f th e classificatio n scheme , however, i s onl y a guidelin e t o th e actua l sentenc e receive d b y any give n offender . Indeed , thi s i s par t o f th e nomenclature ; the cellula r arra y i s called th e "Guidelin e Sentenc e Chart." 7 Thu s the classificatio n schem e function s a s a presumptiv e sentencin g recommendation; i t set s th e sentenc e th e cour t mus t met e ou t except a s othe r consideration s enter . Th e purel y presumptiv e status o f th e classificatio n schem e i s clearly reveale d b y th e rol e

0

0

0

)

3 (*)

2 1 (*

)1

0-l(*) 1 0-l(*) |

0-l(*) | 0-1 (*) | 0-l(*) |

0-6(*)

0-l(*)

(*l

(*)

0-6(*) |

5-8

8-11 ^2 |

~

0-3(*)

0-6(*)

2-6

8-i iy 2

12-15

17-22

27-37

48-60

60-72

78 9 0

90-102

108-120

4

6

0-6(*)

2-6

5-8

12-15

15-18

22-32

32-42

| 54-6

66-78

90-102

96-108

114-120

5

SOURCE: Pennsylvania Bulletin 11 , no . 4 (Januar y 24 , 1981) : 466. a The recommende d sentenc e expresse d in month s of incarceration, i.e. , no t les s tha n 7 8 month s and no t mor e tha n 9 0 months. b The recommende d sentenc e i s eithe r a priso n ter m of up to 6 month s or an alternativ e of probation, fine, or restitution. c The recommende d sentenc e i s nonincarcerative , i.e. , probation , fine, or restitution.

1 1 (*

c

3-6

12-17 1

22-27 f

17-22 1 8-1 \V2 1 5-8 1 0-8(*) 1

6-9

1

72 8 4 | 54-66 ~] 42-54 |

6 J 4^ 7 5 1 0-6(*) b 4 1 0-3(* )

7 8—11

60 7 2 |

48-60 1

84-96 |

102-114 [

3

36-48 |

30-42

12-17

6

/2

8 | 24-3

42-54

9 1 36-4 8

72-84 |

54 6 6

8 60

66-78

60-7 2

90-102 1

2

Offender Scor e

Table 1 Sentence s unde r th e Classificatio n Schem e

84-96

1

10 | 4

a

11 1

12 1 78-90

Offense Score

0-6(*)

5-8

8-1IV2

15-18

18-24

27-37

37-52

60-78

72-90

90-114

102-120

120

6

96

H U G O ADA M BEDA U

alloted t o a numbe r o f othe r (hereafter , post-classification) factors: 1. The sentenc e specifie d i n eac h cel l is typically onl y a "range, " from a minimu m t o a maximum . Thi s rang e exhibit s consid erable variation , fro m thre e month s t o tw o years . (Ther e i s als o typically a considerabl e overla p i n th e maximu m o f a give n cel l and th e minimu m o f th e nex t mos t sever e sentence , i n th e cel l adjacent t o th e right. ) I n addition , a s alread y noted , roughl y a quarter o f al l guidelin e sentence s permi t choic e betwee n mode s of punishment . Onc e th e guidelin e sentencin g cel l has been fixed, the sentence r mus t decid e whethe r t o impos e th e minimum , th e maximum, o r a sentenc e i n between . T h e guidelin e merel y "recommends tota l confinemen t withi n tha t range." 8 2. An y guidelin e sentenc e o f imprisonmen t ma y hav e a n "ad ditional" sentenc e impose d o f fine o r restitutio n o r both . Fo r such addition s th e classificatio n schem e itsel f offer s n o guid ance; thei r impositio n an d degre e ar e entirel y a t "th e discretio n of th e court." 9 3. T h e guidelin e sentenc e ma y b e revise d b y referenc e t o a n explicit lis t o f circumstance s tha t eithe r "aggravate " o r "miti gate" th e offens e (hencefort h thes e wil l b e calle d aggravators an d mitigators, respectively) . T h e aggravator s numbe r five (e.g. , th e offense ha d multipl e victims) , th e mitigator s seve n (e.g. , th e of fender wa s unde r 21) . Thus, wher e th e guidelin e sentenc e i s 1 5 to 1 8 month s i n prison , an d wher e i n additio n th e sentence r finds certai n aggravators , th e sentenc e "may " b e shifte d on e cel l to th e righ t (i.e. , i n th e directio n o f greate r severity ) t o yiel d a guideline sentenc e o f 1 8 t o 2 4 months . Wer e mitigator s foun d instead, th e guidelin e sentenc e coul d b e reduce d b y a leftwar d shift t o a sentenc e o f 1 2 t o 1 5 months . Al l suc h shift s ar e dis cretionary wit h th e sentencin g court. 10 4. An y sentenc e unde r th e guideline s ma y b e increase d o r decreased, bu t onl y if , th e judgmen t o f th e sentencer , "th e guideline sentenc e i s clearl y unreasonabl e becaus e o f recorde d facts specifi c t o th e case." 11 The pictur e o f sentencin g tha t emerge s i s o f a classificatio n scheme tha t serve s a s n o mor e tha n a first approximatio n t o th e actual sentenc e an y offende r receives . The classificatio n schem e itself i s constructe d i n term s o f fairl y rigi d considerations . Th e guideline sentence , however , i s to be fine-tuned b y referenc e t o a se t o f post-classificatio n modifications . Thes e consideration s

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transform th e sentenc e a s initiall y identifie d b y classificatio n int o an actua l sentenc e b y mean s o f a serie s o f individualizin g con siderations, includin g bu t no t confine d t o th e se t o f aggravator s and mitigators , an d th e catch-al l provisio n tha t authorize s th e sentencer t o modif y an y guidelin e sentenc e wheneve r al l th e fact s show tha t suc h a sentenc e i s "clearl y unreasonable. " Thus , w e have neithe r a pur e classification-base d sentencin g schem e no r a purel y individualize d sentencin g scheme , bu t a hybri d o f th e two. In ligh t o f thes e features , i s i t reall y tru e tha t classificatio n dominates sentencing , i n th e sens e o f bein g th e mos t influentia l single factor ? T h e classificatio n syste m b y itself , i n conjunctio n with th e fact s sufficien t t o classif y convicte d offenders , doe s no t enable a n observe r t o predic t wit h precisio n wha t an y actua l sentence wil l be ; th e post-classificatio n factor s allo w to o muc h freedom fo r that . T h e fragmen t o f th e sentencin g syste m tha t is controlle d b y th e classificatio n schem e i s sufficientl y smal l an d complete b y itsel f that , a priori , on e ha s n o wa y o f knowin g precisely wha t effec t o n sentence s actuall y mete d ou t th e initia l classification o f offender s wil l have . Thi s i s boun d t o loo k lik e a signa l defea t fo r equa l justice, an d eve n fo r retributiv e justic e if th e sentence r use s hi s discretio n t o rel y o n nonretributiv e factors. I t ma y be , of course , tha t thes e apparen t defeat s fo r equa l and retributiv e justice ca n b e vindicate d a s triumph s o f equita ble justice. Presumably , tha t i s th e ai m o f th e overal l system . I n any case , i t seem s likel y tha t sentence s imbue d wit h th e spiri t and th e lette r o f a guidelin e sentencin g schem e suc h a s tha t proposed fo r Pennsylvani a would , ove r time , issu e sentence s dominated b y th e classification s give n t o offenses , rathe r tha n by an y othe r facto r amon g th e man y post-classificatio n consid erations tha t coul d b e brough t int o pla y (se e below) . W e ar e dealing here , o f course , wit h a n empirica l question , bu t i n th e absence o f evidenc e on e wa y o r th e othe r ther e i s n o reaso n t o be undul y pessimisti c ove r th e possibilit y tha t a presumptiv e sentencing syste m derive d fro m a classificatio n schem e actuall y would pla y th e dominan t rol e it s supporter s inten d i t t o have . T H E ETHICA L PROBLEM S O F SENTENCIN G

The ethica l problem s o f sentencin g a s the y aris e unde r a sys tem lik e tha t discusse d her e ca n b e divide d betwee n thos e tha t

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arise fro m th e classificatio n schem e itsel f an d thos e tha t aris e from th e post-classificatio n factors . Le t u s tur n t o th e former . The first concer n ha s t o b e whethe r th e actua l mora l gravit y of differen t offenses , rangin g fro m flag desecratio n t o murder , is capture d b y th e ten-poin t scal e o n whic h th e offende r scor e relies. I s th e sprea d fro m leas t (1 ) t o wors t (10 ) adequatel y large ? Are th e interval s themselve s o f adequat e size , o r to o smal l o r too large ? Ar e th e end-point s o f th e scal e correctl y set ? I n par ticular, i s th e uppe r boun d o f th e sentencin g scal e (te n year s i n prison) neithe r to o sever e no r to o lenien t fo r th e graves t of fense (murder) ? T h e proble m o f sprea d an d rang e reappear s with regar d t o th e offende r scor e a s well . Doe s th e seven-poin t scale develope d fo r thi s concep t adequatel y expres s th e tru e gravity o f th e offender' s deser t insofa r a s tha t i s a functio n o f his crimina l history ? These question s pos e ethica l problem s becaus e th e classifica tion schem e ha s t o answe r t o tw o ethica l consideration s some what independen t o f eac h other . O n th e on e hand , th e schem e is rooted i n taci t bu t unmistakabl y retributiv e considerations , i n which severit y o f punishmen t i s suppose d t o b e coordinate d wit h desert i n th e offender , an d deser t i n th e offende r determine d jointly b y th e harmfulnes s o f th e offens e an d th e faul t i n th e offender (se e below) . T h e othe r consideratio n i s tha t equalit y of treatmen t i n sentencin g require s tha t differen t person s guilt y of offense s o f th e sam e gravit y b e pu t int o th e sam e classifica tion, an d thu s hav e visite d o n the m (a t leas t a s a first approxi mation) th e sam e sentence . Non e o f thes e result s ca n b e achieve d if th e calibration s o f th e classificatio n schem e ar e inaccurat e o r arbitrary. A furthe r proble m i s whethe r consideration s no t introduce d into th e classificatio n schem e shoul d b e introduce d there . Thus , to tak e th e simples t case , instea d o f a two-dimensiona l guide line, a three-dimensiona l gri d migh t b e envisione d t o creat e a logical spac e withi n whic h guidelin e sentence s migh t b e mor e fully an d adequatel y define d tha n a t present . Whethe r an y tru e independent variabl e ca n b e identified , however , i n term s o f which a 3-spac e (muc h les s a 4 - o r 5-space ) coul d b e create d i s not clear . I t ma y b e tha t ever y othe r possibl e dimensio n o r in dependent variabl e fo r sentencin g turn s ou t o n close r inspec tion t o b e a n aspec t o f th e offende r an d offens e variable s al -

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ready identified , o r i s a n irrelevan t factor , o r i s best treate d (lik e the aggravator s an d mitigators ) a s a post-classificatio n factor . Fo r example, certai n variable s ar e easil y identifie d a s affectin g sen tencing outcome s i n th e crimina l justic e syste m a s i t reall y op erates i n society , suc h a s case-processin g o r judge-relate d fac tors, se x an d rac e o f offende r an d victim , o r communit y vari ables. 12 However , eve n i f suc h factor s tur n ou t t o be relevan t t o sentencing, i n th e sens e o f explainin g actua l sentencin g pat terns i n a give n jurisdiction , i t i s difficul t (excep t o n straight forwardly politica l o r cost/benefit , utilitaria n grounds ) t o se e ho w they coul d b e relevan t t o justifying difference s i n sentence s an d punishments. Accordingly , the y ar e no t stron g candidate s fo r additional variable s i n classificatio n o r post-classification ; de spite thei r importanc e t o socia l scientists , the y ca n b e ignore d here. So lon g a s a classificatio n schem e utilize s tw o o r mor e dimen sions, th e questio n wil l aris e ho w t o coordinat e th e scale s alon g each dimensio n an d wha t t o pu t int o th e resultin g cells . I n th e scheme befor e us , thi s reduce s t o th e question s whethe r (1 ) eac h increment i n offende r scor e ( = previous crimina l record ) shoul d carry th e same , less , o r mor e increas e i n punitiv e severit y tha n is carried b y eac h increas e i n offens e rank , an d (2 ) whether thes e increases i n severit y shoul d b e i n increment s o f unifor m size . As inspectio n o f tabl e 1 wil l show , n o on e answe r i s give n t o question (1 ) an d a negativ e answe r i s give n t o questio n (2) . Choose an y cel l (othe r tha n on e o n th e to p o r righ t border , o r in th e lowe r left-han d corne r o f th e table ) a t rando m an d se e how th e sentenc e severit y increase s faste r b y movin g on e cel l t o the righ t tha n b y movin g on e cel l up . Occasionally , th e increas e is identical i n eithe r direction . Bu t a s sentences increas e i n thei r severity (i.e. , mov e towar d th e uppe r right-han d corne r o f th e table), the y typicall y d o s o somewha t mor e rapidl y a s a functio n of offens e ran k tha n o f offende r rank . Thi s seem s t o b e a product o f wantin g left-righ t difference s typicall y t o involv e considerable overlap , wherea s up-dow n difference s ar e rarel y allowed t o overlap . (Instead , th e latte r occasionall y presen t striking gaps , s o tha t th e minimu m sentenc e o f a give n cel l i s sometimes wel l abov e th e maximu m o f th e cel l immediatel y be low it. ) Are thes e asymmetrie s owin g t o defectiv e draftsmanship , o r

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to th e inheren t limitation s o f an y classificatio n schem e con structed alon g thes e genera l lines ? O r d o the y aris e fro m hid den bu t systemati c difference s tha t ar e relevan t t o th e assess ment o f desert , an d thu s o f a guidelin e sentence ? Th e sam e questions an d uncertaintie s aris e fro m reflectio n o n th e varia tions i n th e rang e o f severit y withi n differen t guidelin e sen tences, i.e. , th e variatio n betwee n th e minimu m an d maximu m sentence fro m cel l t o cell . Unquestionably, th e ethica l proble m mos t thoroughl y burie d by th e classificatio n schem e i s th e fundamenta l decisio n i t ex presses concernin g th e availabl e mode s o f punishmen t an d thei r distribution: mandator y incarceratio n i s t o b e widel y used , an d its onl y alternative s (sometime s optional , otherwis e mandatory ) are probation , fines, an d restitution . I t seem s clea r tha t purel y retributive consideration s canno t accoun t fo r th e choic e o f an d among thes e mode s o f punishment . What , then , doe s accoun t for them ? Ar e ther e ethica l principle s tha t categoricall y rul e ou t all othe r mode s o f punishment , i n particular , corpora l an d cap ital punishments ? Wha t ethica l principle s justify o r requir e in carceration an d permi t n o alternative s excep t th e thre e pro posed? Three majo r issue s o f ethica l concer n ar e raise d b y th e post classification feature s o f th e sentencin g system . Th e first i s t o determine precisel y wha t th e mora l basi s is , an d whethe r i t i s sound, fo r introducin g an y o f thes e post-classificatio n factor s a s modifications o f th e guidelin e sentence . Th e secon d i s whethe r the degre e o f modificatio n introduce d i s ethicall y defensible ; thi s is a versio n o f th e interva l proble m i n th e classificatio n schem e discussed above . T h e thir d i s whether ther e ar e othe r post-clas sification factor s tha t ough t t o b e introduce d o r use d t o supple ment o r supplan t thos e alread y proposed , eithe r becaus e the y have a bette r clai m fo r thi s rol e give n th e ethica l consideration s justifying post-classificatio n modification s o f a guidelin e sen tence o r becaus e the y res t o n bette r an d stronge r ethica l ground s than d o th e modifier s alread y proposed . Of thes e thre e questions , th e mos t troublesom e i s th e first. Given th e divisio n o f th e sentencin g syste m int o tw o phases , som e ground mus t b e identifie d fo r th e lexica l orde r (pace Rawls) tha t requires th e sentence r alway s t o coun t offens e scor e an d of fender scor e ahea d o f othe r relevan t factors , whic h ar e as -

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signed t o a secondar y rol e i n th e post-classificatio n phas e o f sentencing. Regardless o f ho w th e foregoin g question s ar e answered , ther e is or ough t t o b e th e naggin g worr y ove r whethe r th e discretio n left i n th e hand s o f th e sentence r t o b e exercise d durin g th e post-classification phas e o f sentencin g wil l in practic e defea t th e retributive an d egalitaria n aim s tha t underli e th e creatio n o f th e classification schem e i n th e first place . Th e ethica l issu e paralle l to thi s empirica l worr y i s whether an y adequat e mora l principl e justifies introducin g suc h extensiv e discretio n an d th e possibil ities o f unpredictabilit y an d abus e o f powe r tha t i t creates . SOLVING TH E PROBLEM S O F CLASSIFICATIO N

Since th e hypothesize d foundatio n i n justice o f th e classifica tion schem e i s retribution , i t i s necessar y tha t th e scal e o f grav ity i n th e rankin g o f offense s propose d b y th e schem e reflec t the gravit y o f th e crime . Thus , fo r example , w e nee d som e as surance tha t corruptio n o f minor s reall y i s no mor e an d n o les s (or i s not justifiably treate d i n th e schem e a s more o r less ) grav e than th e unlawfu l sal e o f explosives , becaus e unde r th e Penn sylvania schem e bot h crime s ar e ranke d a t 3 ; an d tha t eac h o f these offense s i s neithe r mor e no r les s tha n hal f a s grav e a s filming sexua l act s o f a mino r unde r 1 6 (ranke d a t 6) , an d thre e times a s grav e a s falsel y registerin g domesti c animal s (ranke d as l). 1 3 For reason s tha t hav e bee n discusse d elsewhere, 14 i t i s mor e than doubtfu l whethe r ther e i s an y theoreticall y sound , nonar bitrary wa y t o rat e th e gravit y o f offense s i n a classificatio n scheme. T o b e sure , suc h objection s ca n b e obviate d i f w e ig nore a t th e star t an y attemp t t o mak e th e classificatio n schem e reflect th e deser t o f th e offender , i.e. , abandon th e effor t t o mak e the sentencin g syste m int o a genuin e desert-base d scheme . I f we ar e conten t t o mak e sentencing , an d i n particula r classifica tion, int o a purel y harm-base d scheme , the n ther e ma y wel l b e nonarbitrary an d theoreticall y acceptabl e way s to construc t a scal e of th e sor t neede d fo r tha t purpose , a s researc h ove r th e pas t generation ha s shown. 15 Ther e ma y eve n b e a mora l rational e for suc h a scale ; sinc e i t woul d hav e t o b e a rational e base d o n perceived relativ e socia l cost s o f th e variou s crimina l harm s in -

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flicted b y th e classifie d crime s accordingl y ranked , th e rational e would appea r t o b e mainl y i f no t wholl y utilitarian . The classificatio n schem e unde r discussion , however , ha s bee n assumed t o b e fundamentall y retributive , an d s o it s penalt y schedule mus t b e base d o n tw o basi c retributiv e principles : (1 ) the severit y o f th e punishmen t mus t b e proportiona l t o th e gravity o f th e offense , an d (2 ) th e gravit y o f th e offens e mus t be a functio n o f faul t i n th e offende r an d har m cause d th e vic tim. 16 Bot h o f thes e principle s ar e directl y reflecte d i n th e clas sification scheme , an d i n particula r th e latte r principl e (2) . A s we hav e seen , tha t schem e attempt s t o provid e fo r a guidelin e sentence tha t i s a direc t functio n o f onl y tw o variables , on e tha t measures th e relativ e wrongnes s o f th e offens e (roughly , i n term s of th e har m cause d th e victim ) an d anothe r tha t measure s th e relative faul t o f th e offende r (roughly , i n term s o f th e degre e to whic h th e offende r i s a hardene d recidivist) . If w e assum e tha t th e mora l poin t o f vie w require s u s t o ac cept som e for m o f retributiv e theor y o f punishmen t (a n issu e discussed elsewhere), 17 an d tha t n o nonretributiv e theor y ca n incorporate principle s (1 ) an d (2) , the n a classificatio n schem e based o n suc h principle s i s unquestionabl y superio r t o an y sen tencing syste m tha t ignore s them . Bu t i t remain s unclea r ho w one i s t o sho w tha t th e classificatio n schem e unde r discussio n i s the only , o r th e best , interpretatio n o f principle s (1 ) an d (2) , rather tha n merel y on e fro m amon g a n infinit e numbe r o f pos sible interpretation s tha t woul d var y fro m thi s on e i n eithe r o r both o f tw o directions , namely , b y increasin g (decreasing ) th e internal sprea d o f th e guidelin e sentence s o r b y increasin g (de creasing) eithe r o r bot h th e minimu m an d maximu m sentence s of th e entir e scheme . T o pu t thi s poin t anothe r way , ther e seem s to b e n o wa y i n principl e fo r tw o retributivists , wh o agre e com pletely i n thei r ordina l judgments o f offens e rankin g (e.g. , rap e is a grave r crim e tha n robbery) , o f offende r faul t (e.g. , a two time recidivis t deserve s a mor e sever e punishmen t tha n a first offender), an d o f penalt y rankin g (e.g. , te n year s i n priso n i s more sever e tha n five years) , t o resolv e a disput e ove r whic h o f two cardina l judgments o f deserve d punishmen t (th e first-tim e rapist deserve s five year s i n priso n vs . te n year s i n prison ) i s correct. T h e possibilit y tha t eithe r judgment i s correct, becaus e correctness i s determined entirel y b y th e prio r choic e o f a sent -

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encing schem e i n whic h eac h individua l judgment i s generated , falls shor t o f th e implici t rigo r i n th e notio n o f "jus t deserts. " Inability t o resolv e suc h a dispute, whic h i s tantamount t o th e inability t o mak e a nonarbitrar y choic e amon g man y interpre tations o f principle s (1 ) an d (2) , doe s no t sho w tha t th e classifi cation schem e unde r discussio n i s unjustifie d o n retributiv e grounds. Suc h a conclusio n woul d follo w onl y i f th e schem e wer e manifestly inconsisten t wit h principle s (1 ) an d (2) , an d ther e i s no evidenc e tha t i t is . Rather , i t i s t o argu e tha t th e schem e i s not know n t o b e justified solel y o n retributiv e ground s relativ e to an y alternativ e classificatio n schem e draw n u p o n th e sam e first principles . Succinctly , i t show s u s tha t retributive principles of punishment under-determine the classification scheme and therefor e any sentencin g syste m involvin g classification . For thi s reason , i t i s impossibl e t o regar d th e classificatio n scheme her e proposed , or , fo r tha t matter , an y alternativ e scheme tha t migh t b e preferred , a s a reflectio n o f th e offend er's 'jus t deserts"—unles s eac h offender' s 'jus t deserts " ar e va gue an d arbitrar y becaus e the y depen d i n eac h cas e o n whic h among a n infinit e numbe r o f possibl e interpretation s i s given t o principles (1 ) an d (2) . Could w e say , a t least , tha t th e guidelin e sentenc e schem e an d the sentence s i t generate s ar e no t unjustified , i n th e sens e tha t although the y ar e arbitrar y vis-a-vi s alternativ e classificatio n schemes, take n i n themselve s the y ar e no t unjust ? I t migh t b e argued tha t w e coul d sa y thi s i f w e coul d sho w tha t thes e clas sifications ar e case s o f pur e procedura l justic e (a s i n fai r gam bling), wher e althoug h w e hav e n o independen t ide a o f wha t the actua l sentenc e ough t t o loo k like—an y o f a n infinit e rang e of possibilitie s i s a s defensibl e a s an y other—w e d o a t leas t kno w that whateve r sentenc e i s reache d i s just, o r no t unjust , becaus e it i s th e resul t o f a serie s o f step s tha t emplo y a jus t o r fai r procedure 1 8 —in ou r case , principle s (1 ) an d (2) . In th e presen t instance , eve n thi s resul t goe s beyon d wha t ca n be show n becaus e th e assumption s tha t gover n th e classificatio n scheme g o wel l beyon d wha t ca n b e claime d a s n o mor e tha n principles o f fai r procedure . Fo r example , centra l t o th e classi fication schem e i s th e shif t fro m mandator y nonincarcerativ e sentences throug h optionall y incarcerativ e sentence s t o man datory incarcerativ e sentences , a s th e offende r an d offens e score s

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increase i n magnitude . Bu t n o purel y procedura l considera tion, a s define d solel y throug h principle s (1 ) an d (2) , generat e this shift . Thi s i s bu t on e o f man y crucia l feature s o f th e clas sification schem e tha t rest s o n som e substantiv e (nonproce dural) mora l intuitio n o r principle . Thu s w e canno t character ize th e classificatio n schem e a s just, o r no t unjust , becaus e i t i s the produc t o f pur e procedura l justice . The final importan t ethica l issu e raise d b y th e classificatio n scheme concern s th e wa y i n whic h imprisonmen t i s given prior ity ove r probation , fines, an d restitution , whil e n o plac e what ever i s alloted t o corpora l o r capita l punishments . O n wha t mora l grounds i s loss o f libert y t o b e give n prid e o f plac e i n a morall y defensible sentencin g system ? No doub t som e woul d defen d i t a s th e leas t restrictiv e mod e of punishmen t consisten t wit h th e genera l welfar e (fo r whic h read publi c safety , o r genera l deterrence) . Other s migh t de fend i t i n th e sam e wa y bu t shif t th e emphasi s t o incapacitatio n and specia l deterrence. 1 9 O n eithe r o f thes e rationales , preven tion o f har m t o th e innocen t i s th e aim , a n ai m easil y justifie d on an y o f severa l differen t mora l principles . Bu t a differen t ar gument i s also wort h considering , on e tha t shoul d appea l t o th e egalitarian i f no t t o th e retributivist . Los s o f libert y i s a mod e of penalt y tha t everyon e ca n pay ; lik e los s o f lif e o r limb , an d unlike los s of mone y o r reputatio n an d th e provisio n o f service s or good s o f valu e (th e necessar y featur e o f an y restitution) , everyone ha s hi s o r he r ow n libert y t o lose . O n th e Benthamit e (but no t fo r tha t reaso n uniquel y utilitarian ) principl e tha t eac h is to coun t fo r on e an d non e fo r mor e tha n one , w e ca n decid e to trea t on e person' s libert y a s valuabl e a s another' s (despit e som e empirical reason s fo r doubtin g suc h equality) . W e ca n tak e a further ste p i n thi s directio n an d assum e tha t eac h uni t o f on e person's libert y (e.g. , eac h mont h o f a priso n sentence ) i s wort h as muc h t o tha t perso n a s i s ever y othe r suc h uni t o f another' s liberty (n o doub t als o empiricall y false , i n man y cases) . Thes e assumptions ar e fundamenta l t o egalitaria n justice , an d the y dictate priorit y fo r an y mod e o f punishmen t tha t wil l satisf y them. The orchestratio n o f probation , fines, restitution , an d incar ceration raise s furthe r problems . Tha t th e offender s wh o de serve th e leas t punishmen t shoul d ge t i t i n th e for m o f proba -

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tion, a s th e classificatio n schem e provides , seem s hardl y t o nee d discussion; i t i s readil y justified give n th e othe r assumption s al ready a t ou t disposal . Th e case s o f fines an d restitutio n ar e quit e different; the y presen t u s fo r th e first tim e wit h victim-oriented punishments. I n contras t t o incarceration , whic h confer s a ben efit o n th e victi m o r societ y onl y i n specia l case s (namely , wher e the cost s o f th e burde n o f punishmen t ar e outweighe d b y th e losses avoide d throug h incapacitatin g th e offender) , fines di rectly benefi t societ y an d restitutio n directl y benefit s eithe r th e victim o r societ y o r bot h (dependin g o n th e for m th e restitutio n takes). Som e hav e argue d tha t restitutio n ca n b e justified i n term s of retributiv e considerations. 20 Thi s i s distinctl y a minorit y view . Whether simila r o r othe r difficultie s atten d th e defens e o f fines on retributiv e ground s i s no t clear. 21 Wha t i s clea r i s tha t gen eral principle s o f socia l justice warran t imposin g cost s o n guilt y offenders i n a n effor t t o replac e o r compensat e fo r losse s in curred whe n offender s victimiz e th e innocent . Th e entir e prac tice o f punishmen t rest s fundamentall y o n thi s consideration , and i t therefor e seem s especiall y appropriat e that , wher e pos sible, certai n mode s o f punishmen t shoul d b e preferre d ove r other mode s becaus e the y hav e thi s featur e a s well . Whethe r there i s a s wel l a cost/benefi t defens e o f fines an d restitutio n i s not s o obvious . I t wil l depen d entirel y o n whethe r th e cost s o f collection an d administratio n o f suc h penalties , plu s th e cost s o f the crim e itself , ar e outweighe d b y th e benefit s conferre d o n the victi m an d society , give n th e cost s an d benefit s o f alterna tive sanctions . Claim s o n behal f o f restitutio n a s a n alternativ e to priso n an d probatio n rarel y conside r whethe r i t satisfie s cost/benefit considerations, 22 an d s o th e unbiase d observe r mus t doubt whethe r thi s facto r ca n b e counte d i n it s favor . This bring s u s t o th e considerations , i f any , tha t properl y ex clude th e us e o f corpora l o r capita l punishments . Whethe r a purely retributiv e sentencin g syste m coul d consistentl y repu diate suc h mode s o f punishmen t i s doubtful . Traditionally , o f course, whe n retributio n i n punishmen t wa s understoo d t o re quire modelin g th e punishmen t o n th e crime—roughly , lex talionis—corporal an d capita l punishment s wer e th e ver y para digm o f retribution . Recently , however , severa l writer s hav e argued tha t genera l principle s o f retributio n (suc h a s thos e cite d above) d o no t requir e th e us e o f suc h punishments. 23 Som e hav e

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even claime d tha t thes e principle s prohibi t suc h mode s o f pun ishment. 24 I t remain s unclear , therefore , whethe r th e silen t ex clusion b y th e classificatio n schem e o f corpora l an d capita l pun ishments i s evidenc e o f th e taci t presenc e o f principle s o f justic e in punishmen t tha t depar t fro m whateve r i s sufficien t t o yiel d sentences base d o n retributiv e "jus t deserts " t o th e offender . I t is als o clear , a s I hav e argue d elsewhere , tha t purel y utilitaria n considerations canno t suffic e t o exclud e categoricall y al l re course t o capita l punishments; 2 5 i t seem s likel y tha t th e sam e i s true o f corpora l punishments . Exclusion o f corpora l an d capita l punishment s fro m th e pen alty schedul e i s probabl y base d o n on e o r th e othe r o f tw o dif ferent line s o f taci t reasoning . On e relie s upo n som e singl e ba sic moral principl e relevan t t o punishment , suc h a s is to b e foun d in th e Bil l o f Right s (Eight h Amendment ) prohibitio n agains t "cruel an d unusua l punishments " o r i n Articl e 7 o f th e Inter national Covenan t o n Civi l an d Politica l Right s tha t prohibit s "inhuman o r degradin g punishment. " T h e othe r (explaine d i n greater detai l elsewhere) 26 relie s o n severa l differen t mora l principles, n o singl e on e o f whic h i s decisiv e i n itself , i n con junction wit h genera l fact s abou t societ y an d huma n conduct , and yield s a balanc e o f reason s agains t an y us e o f suc h penal ties a s flogging o r death . SOLVING TH E POST-CLASSIFICATIO N PROBLEM S

The post-classificatio n aspect s o f th e sentencin g syste m un der examinatio n her e primaril y involv e th e introductio n o f tw o theoretically independen t type s o f modification s o f th e guide line sentence : (1 ) modification s tha t resul t fro m usin g aggrava tors an d mitigators , an d (2 ) modification s tha t aris e fro m un specified factor s o n whic h th e sentence r relie s whe n th e guidelin e sentence i s rejecte d i n a give n cas e a s "clearl y unreasonable " (henceforth th e reasonableness criterion) . Wha t i s the mora l basi s in term s o f whic h eac h o f thes e type s o f factor s ca n b e justifia bly introduce d t o modif y a guidelin e sentence ? Le t u s examin e each i n turn . Regarding th e aggravator s an d mitigators , a rational e need s to b e provide d t o explai n wh y suc h factor s shoul d b e handle d as variable s t o modif y th e guidelin e sentence , rathe r tha n eithe r

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excluded fro m consideratio n altogethe r o r include d directl y int o the classificatio n schem e itself . Ther e are , perhaps , tw o quit e different answer s t o thi s question . On e concern s th e priorit y o f previous crimina l recor d ove r an y othe r genera l consideratio n in th e constructio n o f a desert-base d classificatio n scheme . Th e argument her e i s tha t previou s crimina l record , bette r tha n anything else , show s th e mora l characte r o f th e offende r rele vant t o hi s o r he r culpabilit y i n a give n crime : th e mor e pre vious conviction s th e wors e th e offender' s character , an d there fore th e mor e deservin g o f severe r punishmen t i s the offender. 27 This argumen t ha s bee n criticize d primaril y o n th e groun d tha t it allegedl y reveal s a departur e fro m desert-base d considera tions i n favo r o f specia l deterrenc e wit h it s underlyin g utilitar ian (an d antiretributivist ) assumptions. 28 Desirabl e thoug h i t i s in principl e t o resolv e thi s dispute , i t i s no t necessar y t o d o s o here. I t i s enough t o not e that , i f ther e i s a coherent retributiv e argument i n favo r o f confinin g th e classificatio n schem e t o a structure dominate d b y th e offender' s prio r crimina l recor d rather tha n t o an y othe r aggravatin g facto r i n th e offens e o r the offender , i t mus t b e som e versio n o f th e argumen t pro posed above . The othe r an d les s importan t argumen t point s t o a n impor tant empirica l differenc e betwee n th e sentencing-relevan t vari ables tha t defin e th e classificatio n schem e i n contras t t o thos e employed a s aggravator s an d mitigators . Th e tw o variable s use d to construc t th e classificatio n schem e ca n b e know n wit h com plete certaint y t o b e presen t i n every case tha t call s fo r sentenc ing; no t s o wit h th e severa l factor s tha t ca n b e use d t o aggra vate o r mitigat e th e severit y o f th e guidelin e sentence . Man y o f these wil l no t b e presen t i n an y case , an d fe w case s wil l involv e several o f thes e factors . Thi s alon e guarantee s thei r secondar y importance. Thei r relativ e infrequenc y o f applicatio n permit s them t o b e treate d separatel y an d independentl y a t a later stag e of th e sentencin g process . T h e genera l ide a her e i s a s ol d an d as fundamenta l a s Aristotle' s contras t betwee n equitabl e an d le gal justice. Equa l justice i s bes t regarde d a s a functio n o f uni versally applicabl e factor s suitabl y expresse d i n a genera l rul e (the classificatio n scheme) ; equitabl e justice ca n b e counte d o n to incorporat e relevan t bu t infrequen t individuatin g considera tions (th e aggravator s an d mitigators). 29

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The argumen t s o fa r provide s a reasonabl y secur e basi s fo r the two-stag e sentencin g system , i n whic h th e secon d stag e i s governed b y a se t o f explici t aggravator s an d mitigator s tha t ar e used t o fine-tune th e offender' s sentenc e beyon d wha t ca n b e provided b y th e classificatio n schem e itself . W e ma y no w tur n to th e problem s o f justifying o n retributiv e ground s th e partic ular se t o f aggravator s an d mitigator s i n questio n (a s well a s th e weight t o b e attache d t o each) , whic h i s t o sa y th e logi c o f thei r combination i n modifyin g a guidelin e sentence . The Pennsylvani a schem e i s unusuall y sensitiv e t o confinin g the aggravator s an d mitigator s t o factor s tha t expres s desert relevant considerations . T o illustrate , th e mor e victim s involve d in a give n crime , ceteri s paribus , th e mor e har m i s done ; ac cordingly, th e guidelin e sentenc e i s aggravate d i f th e offens e involves mor e tha n on e victim. 30 Similarly , th e offender' s faul t is les s tha n otherwise , ceteri s paribus , i f th e victi m provoke d th e offense; accordingly , suc h provocatio n i s a mitigatin g factor. 31 Other factor s ofte n foun d i n scheme s o f aggravatio n an d miti gation (e.g. , th e victi m wa s a polic e officer) , whic h doubtfull y have a retributiv e rational e (bu t whic h ar e nonetheles s popu lar), pla y n o rol e i n th e Pennsylvani a system . As t o th e weigh t o f thes e factor s an d thei r interna l logic , however, th e Pennsylvani a syste m i s anythin g bu t rigi d an d predictable. I n theory , th e simples t schem e woul d b e t o hav e each aggravato r an d mitigato r coun t th e same , s o tha t i n an y given case , e.g. , involvin g thre e aggravator s an d tw o mitigators , simple arithmeti c woul d yiel d a modificatio n o f th e guidelin e sentence, i n thi s example , b y the ne t amoun t o f on e aggravator . This i s not ho w th e Pennsylvani a syste m works . There , th e sen tencer i s tol d onl y t o "conside r thei r respectiv e impact " whe n one o r mor e o f eac h typ e o f facto r i s presen t i n a give n case ; i f such a facto r i s presen t "th e cour t ma y i n it s discretion " modif y the guidelin e sentenc e accordingly. 32 Onl y th e mos t confiden t trust i n th e sentencer' s abilit y t o weig h accuratel y an d judge eq uitably justifies suc h a vagu e instruction . Whethe r suc h trus t i s misplaced o r no t i s a n empirica l questio n no t eas y t o answer . In regar d t o th e reasonablenes s criterion , ther e i s n o doub t some implici t principl e tha t underlie s it s introduction , bu t pre cisely whic h principl e i t i s impossibl e t o say . Ther e ar e severa l candidates, rangin g fro m retributive-base d concern s t o individ -

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ualized punishment s ( a principl e tha t clearl y play s a rol e else where i n th e overal l sentencin g system ) t o politica l expedienc y and th e preservatio n o f arbitrar y judicial power . T h e bes t rea son t o introduc e suc h a criterio n mus t b e tha t n o matte r wha t rule-structured sentencin g schem e migh t b e designed , ther e wil l often (though , o f course , no t i n ever y case ) b e unforeseeabl e circumstances tha t mus t b e take n int o accoun t i f th e actua l sen tence mete d ou t i s to b e just t o th e offender . Th e genera l poin t might b e argue d i n thi s way : conside r tw o sentencin g scheme s exactly alik e excep t tha t on e ha s an d th e othe r lack s th e reason ableness criterion . Assum e tha t eac h schem e i s buil t o n th e sam e rules an d tha t thes e rule s ar e a s just a s the y ca n be . Eve n so , there i s stil l n o wa y t o guarante e tha t a cas e wil l no t aris e i n which th e ver y consideration s tha t gav e ris e t o th e rule s them selves wil l no t als o giv e ris e t o a n exceptio n t o them . Ye t unde r the latte r schem e (th e on e lackin g a reasonablenes s criterion ) there wil l b e n o wa y t o accommodat e suc h a n exception . Thi s entails tha t a justifiable exceptio n t o th e rule s canno t b e made , and tha t th e individua l mus t accep t a sentenc e that , i n justice , ought t o b e modified . Thus , a schem e wit h th e reasonablenes s criterion woul d b e preferre d b y rationa l an d disintereste d per sons becaus e i t introduce s fro m th e star t a devic e b y mean s o f which th e rule s ca n b e lef t intac t (whic h woul d b e desired , sinc e by hypothesi s thes e rule s ar e th e bes t tha t justice i n legislatio n can devise ) withou t havin g t o ignor e th e occasiona l justifiabl e exception. To b e weighe d agains t thes e rathe r abstrac t mora l considera tions, i n term s o f whic h th e mora l basi s fo r th e post-classifica tion feature s o f th e sentencin g syste m hav e bee n defended , ar e the ethica l aspect s o f th e actua l consequence s t o whic h thes e features lead . Fo r example , i t i s obviousl y possibl e tha t th e rea sonableness criterio n ca n b e abuse d i n th e nam e o f an y o f sev eral prejudicia l an d unjus t considerations , thereb y destroyin g whatever i s just i n th e classificatio n schem e itself . Th e convicte d offender's futur e dangerousness—unquestionabl y on e o f th e most popula r aggravatin g factor s i n th e crimina l justice syste m as i t actuall y operate s a t present 33 —looms silentl y a s th e unack nowledged consideratio n tha t migh t ("reasonably?" ) b e take n int o account i n increasin g th e severit y (e.g. , duration ) o f a sentenc e of incarceration . T h e omissio n o f thi s facto r fro m th e explici t

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list o f aggravator s i s bu t on e mor e sig n tha t th e sentencin g sys tem unde r discussio n ha s primaril y a basi s i n retribution . Ye t its omission fro m th e explici t lis t o f aggravator s doe s no t suffic e to eliminat e i t fro m th e sentencer' s consideration . Nothin g ex plicitly prohibit s th e sentence r fro m attemptin g t o tak e i t int o account afte r th e guidelin e sentenc e an d eac h o f th e explici t aggravators ha s bee n considered . Futur e dangerousness , how ever, i s a facto r tha t a purel y retributiv e theor y o f punishmen t cannot accommodat e a t all . Rather , i t i s the mos t obviou s facto r to b e take n int o accoun t onl y wher e specia l deterrenc e play s a prominent role , a s i t wil l i n mos t utilitaria n approache s t o pun ishment. 34 Once th e door s ar e opene d t o sentencin g discretion , a s the y are throug h th e reasonablenes s criterion , ar e th e offender' s fu ture dangerousnes s o r othe r nonretributiv e factor s likel y t o pla y a rol e i n th e actua l sentence s mete d out ? Presumably , thos e wh o defend th e entir e syste m o n ground s o f retributiv e justice wil l hope otherwis e an d b e aler t t o thes e unsettlin g possibilities . I t might b e appropriat e t o introduc e constraint s o n exercis e o f th e reasonableness criterio n wit h a n ai m t o channelin g stil l furthe r any exercis e o f discretion . N o suc h constraint s ar e par t o f th e Pennsylvania syste m a s proposed , however . O n th e othe r hand , eliminating discretio n entirel y ca n b e defende d o n ground s o f justice onl y i f assuranc e ca n b e give n tha t an y abuse s t o whic h its exercis e lead s outweig h th e goo d tha t i t permit s throug h th e operation o f relevan t equitabl e considerations , o r excee d th e good unobtaine d an d th e har m incurre d b y employmen t o f a more rigid , discretionles s sentencin g system . I t i s unlikel y tha t such assurance s ca n b e given. 35 CONCLUSION

The attemp t t o bas e punitiv e sentencin g b y th e crimina l court s on a two-stag e system , th e firs t stag e o f whic h depend s o n a fairl y rigid classificatio n schem e b y mean s o f whic h presumptiv e sen tences ar e th e resul t o f assessment s o f th e offender' s deser t (it self measure d i n term s o f th e har m cause d b y th e offens e an d the offender' s fault) , i s a n importan t ste p i n th e directio n o f constructing a rationa l mora l syste m o f punishment . Suc h a system i s bes t understoo d a s a n attemp t t o res t punishment s o n

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grounds o f retributiv e justice, wit h du e regar d bot h fo r equal ity amon g similarl y situate d offender s an d fo r equitabl e indivi dualization o f sanction s i n eac h case . Accordingly , vagu e sen tences an d opportunitie s fo r unbridle d sentencin g discretio n ar e at a minimum . The y ar e not , however , reduce d t o zero . Th e classification schem e contain s som e roo m fo r maneuve r a s th e sentencer searche s fo r th e bes t sentenc e i n eac h case . Whe n w e turn t o th e secon d stag e o f th e system , however , th e balanc e ma y seem t o begi n t o ti p th e othe r way . Whil e i t woul d b e a n exag geration t o sa y tha t th e post-classificatio n aspect s o f th e syste m unravel wha t th e classificatio n schem e ha s woven , i t i s true tha t discretionary consideration s ar e generall y mor e conspicuou s an d more prominen t i n th e conceptio n o f th e system , eve n i f the y prove i n practic e no t t o be manifes t o r troublesom e i n ever y case . The designe r o f a sentencin g system , imbue d wit h exclusivel y retributivist principles , cannot , o f course , hop e t o produc e a n entire syste m o f punishment . Hi s material s ar e to o meager . Th e decision mad e b y th e Pennsylvani a syste m agains t corpora l an d capital punishments , an d i n favo r o f incarceration , i s on e o f several tha t canno t b e explaine d o n purel y retributiv e grounds . This i s no t t o sa y tha t i t canno t b e justified, however . Ther e i s no reaso n t o believ e tha t justic e i n punishmen t i s confine d t o the se t o f consideration s tha t constitut e a reasonabl e retributiv ism. 36 Mor e t o th e poin t ar e doubt s whethe r consideration s o f utility, cost/benefit , an d efficienc y (no t t o mentio n politica l ex pediency) cree p bac k int o th e overal l sentencin g syste m t o suc h an exten t tha t th e anteceden t retributiv e concern s ar e no t i n th e end s o watere d dow n an d compromise d tha t littl e i s left o f them . No doub t i t i s possibl e t o imagin e retributive-base d sentencin g schemes tha t diffe r fro m th e Pennsylvani a proposa l i n bein g more faithfu l t o th e requirement s o f th e origina l inspiration ; i t is doubtful , however , whethe r an y hav e bee n recentl y enacte d into law. 37 O n a spectru m o f possibl e sentencin g systems , rang ing fro m th e primaril y utilitaria n t o th e primaril y retributive , the syste m w e hav e examine d her e fall s wel l t o th e righ t o f cen ter, bu t b y n o mean s a t th e extremity . Eve n so , thi s sentencin g system constitute s a mode l syste m i n term s o f whic h retributiv ists can se e writte n i n som e detai l wher e thei r first principle s (i n conjunction wit h som e othe r plausibl e principles ) woul d lea d i f given statutor y effect . Wha t woul d b e th e resul t i n actua l prac -

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tice canno t b e foreseen . Fo r that , experimentatio n unde r la w i s indispensible. I t i s not unreasonabl e t o hop e tha t suc h a system , imperfect thoug h i t ma y be , ma y nevertheles s b e a definit e im provement bot h o n tha t w e hav e unde r curren t la w i n mos t ju risdictions an d o n wha t an y purel y o r primaril y utilitarian-base d sentencing schem e woul d provide . APPENDIX

The independenc e o f th e "offender " scor e fro m th e "of fense" scor e i s somewhat mor e doubtfu l tha n firs t appears . On e might argu e tha t althoug h th e tw o variable s appea r t o b e de fined (o r definable ) strictl y independen t o f eac h other , ther e ar e built int o th e concep t o f th e offens e scor e aspect s o f criminalit y that ough t t o b e treate d a s owin g no t t o th e harm done in the offense, a s a n objectiv e featur e o f th e crimina l act , bu t t o th e culpability of the offender. Th e Offens e Ran k Lis t use d b y th e Pennsylvania Commissio n o n Sentencin g include s som e 24 0 criminal offenses , thre e doze n drug-relate d offenses , an d a fur ther doze n moto r vehicl e offenses. 38 T o varyin g degrees , eac h of thes e offense s i s defined b y statute s tha t refe r t o th e mens rea of th e offender . Negligence an d recklessness as minimall y culpabl e mental state s ar e expressl y use d i n th e definitio n o f som e of fenses. Maliciousness an d willfulness (o r purposefulness) a s maxi mally culpabl e menta l states , althoug h no t mentione d explicitl y in th e shor t titl e o f th e offense s a s cite d i n th e Offens e Ran k List, implicitl y figure eithe r i n th e ful l languag e o f th e statut e defining th e offens e o r i n th e evidenc e neede d t o sustai n a con viction unde r th e statute , o r both . Alon g wit h intentionality an d deliberateness, these menta l state s indicat e varyin g degree s o f culpability an d thu s properl y fall o n th e offender' s sid e o f th e offense/offender distinction . Ye t the y ar e no t explicitl y give n suc h a rol e i n th e classificatio n scheme—an d quit e rightly ; a s thing s stand, thi s woul d b e tantamoun t t o counting thes e factor s twice , first i n securin g th e crimina l convictio n an d secon d i n appor tioning th e degre e o f punishment . Thus , th e concep t o f of fense scor e a s use d i n th e classificatio n schem e i s no t trul y con fined t o harmfu l aspect s o f th e crimina l act ; th e concep t o f offender scor e doe s no t includ e degre e o f culpabilit y fo r th e criminal act . (Whethe r i t woul d b e possibl e an d desirabl e t o re -

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define thes e concept s i n th e direction s indicate d goe s beyon d the scop e o f thi s discussion. ) Fo r th e defende r o f "jus t deserts " in sentencing , however , ther e i s a somewha t awkwar d conse quence, becaus e a s thing s stan d faul t seem s t o ente r no t onc e but twic e a s a facto r i n determinin g presumptiv e sentences . First , it enters tacitl y a s par t o f th e concep t o f Offens e Rank , wit h th e result (a s w e hav e see n above ) tha t thi s concep t i s no t purel y a measure o f har m cause d b y th e offense . Ye t faul t enter s als o i n terms o f th e concep t o f Offende r Score . N o doub t a n offend er's deser t i s som e functio n o f hi s faul t an d th e har m hi s crim inal ac t causes . Bu t i s ther e an y reaso n t o believ e tha t wherea s harm ca n b e calculate d alon g on e dimension , faul t need s t o b e counted alon g two ? O r shoul d on e conclude , a s hav e som e crit ics of classificatio n scheme s i n whic h prio r crimina l recor d play s a prominen t role , tha t recidivis m i s reall y no t a prope r wa y t o measure faul t a t all ?

NOTES 1. Se e Davi d B . Griswold,an d Michae l D . Wiatrowski , "Th e Emer gence o f Determinat e Sentencing, " Federal Probation 47: 2 (Jun e 1983): 2 8 - 3 5 ; Andre w vo n Hirsc h an d Kathlee n Hanrahan , "Determinate Penalt y System s i n America : A n Overview, " Crime and Delinquency 27:3 (July 1981) : 289-316 ; Gra y Cavender , "Th e Philosophy o f Justification s o f Determinat e Sentencing, " American Journal of Jurisprudence 2 6 (1981) : 159-177 ; Nationa l Institut e o f Law Enforcemen t an d Criminal Justice, Determinate Sentencing: Reform or Regression? (Washington , D.C. : U.S . Department o f Justice, 1978); Michae l S . Serrill, "Determinat e Sentencing : History , The ory, Debate, " Corrections Magazine 3: 3 (September 1977) : 3—15 . 2. Ther e i s another reaso n underlyin g som e sentencin g classificatio n schemes: to make futur e sentencin g decision s approximat e a s closely as possibl e t o past sentencin g decisions . See , e.g. , Leslie T. Wilkin s et al. , Sentencing Guidelines: Structuring Judicial Discretion (Washington, D.C. : National Institut e o f La w Enforcemen t an d Crimina l Justice, 1978) . This approac h ha s been rightl y criticize d fo r failin g to reflec t an y ethical concern s beyon d wha t amount s t o very wea k conformity t o principl e (1 ) in th e text . Se e Andrew vo n Hirsch , "Constructing Guideline s fo r Sentencing: T h e Critical Choice s fo r the Minnesot a Sentencin g Guideline s Commission, " Hamline Law Review 5: 2 (Jun e 1982) : 164-215 , a t pp. 171-174 .

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3. Thi s versio n o f th e connectio n betwee n equalit y an d justice i s con sistent wit h bu t doe s no t entai l th e ver y relaxe d connectio n pro posed b y Norva l Morris , namel y tha t sentencin g shoul d impos e "equality o f punishmen t unles s ther e ar e substantia l utilitaria n reasons t o th e contrary. " Norva l Morris , "Punishment , Deser t an d Rehabilitation," i n Hyma n Gros s an d Andre w vo n Hirsch , eds. , Sentencing (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1981) , pp . 2 5 7 271, a t p . 267 . I n th e sentencin g syste m t o be discusse d i n th e text , as wil l b e evident , "utilitaria n reasons " ente r onl y a t tw o points . One i s dee p i n th e backgroun d o f th e whol e system : namely , i t i s useful t o threate n punishmen t i n orde r t o increas e th e leve l o t general publi c complianc e wit h just laws . T he othe r appear s i n th e effort t o specif y detail s o f sentencin g o n a case-by-cas e basi s i n ligh t of particula r fact s abou t th e offende r an d th e offense . 4. Th e Pennsylvani a Commissio n o n Sentencing , "Th e Courts : Titl e 204—Judicial Syste m Genera l Provisions : Par t VIII . Crimina l Sentencing," Pennsylvania Bulletin 11:4 , par t II , (Januar y 24 , 1981) : 463-476. Th e propose d sentencin g syste m wa s expecte d t o g o int o effect o n Jul y 24 , 1981 ; however , i n April , th e Pennsylvani a leg islature refuse d t o adop t th e Commission' s recommendations . Fo r discussion, se e Susa n E . Martin , "Th e Politic s o f Sentencin g Re form: Sentencin g Guideline s i n Pennsylvani a an d Minnesota, " i n Alfred Blumstein , Jacquelin e Choen , Susa n E . Martin , an d Michae l H. Tonry , eds. , Reasearch on Sentencing: The Search for Reform (Washington, D.C. : Nationa l Academ y Press , 1983) , vol. 2, pp. 2 6 5 304. 5. Underreac h o f th e crimina l la w i s rarel y th e proble m tha t over reach is . Fo r discussio n o f th e latter , se e Edwi n M . Schu r an d H.A . Bedau, Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J.: Prentice-Hall , 1974) ; and Davi d A.J . Richards , Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law: An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization (To towa, N.J. : Rowma n an d Littlefield , 1982) . 6. Notably , b y Thorste n Selli n an d Marvi n E . Wolfgang , The Measurement of Delinquency (New York : John Wiley , 1964) . Se e als o not e 15 below . Fo r a n attemp t t o rel y o n th e Sellin-Wol f gang analysi s as th e basi s o f a professedl y retributiv e sentencin g system , se e An drew vo n Hirsch , Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (New York : Hill an d Wang , 1976) , pp . 7 7 - 8 3 . Suc h a n analysi s doe s no t work , unfortunately, fo r thi s purpose , a s I hav e explaine d elsewhere ; se e H.A. Bedau , "Retributio n an d th e Theor y o f Punishment, " The Journal of Philosophy 75:1 1 (Novembe r 1978) : 601-620 , a t pp . 6 1 3 615. 7. Pennsylvani a Commission , "Th e Courts : Titl e 204, " p . 46 5 (§303. 3 (h)); cf . pp . 463—46 4 ("sentencin g guidelines") .

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8. Ibid . (§303. 3 (b)) . 9. Ibid . (§303. 3 (£)) ; cf. §303.5(c ) (2) . 10. Ibid . (§303. 4 (a)) . 11. Ibid . (§303. 4 (a)) . 12. Se e Blumstei n e t al. , Research on Sentencing, vol . 1 , pp . 69—125 . 13. Pennsylvani a Commission , "Th e Courts : Tid e 204, " pp . 468-47 6 (§303.9). 14. Se e Bedau , "Retributio n an d th e Theor y o f Punishment, " pp . 6 1 1 615; als o Edmun d Pincoffs , "Ar e Question s o f Deser t Decidable? " in J.B. Cederblo m an d Willia m L . Blizek , eds. , Justice and Punishment (Cambridge , Mass. : Ballinger , 1977) , pp . 75-88 . Fo r a recen t attempt t o ge t aroun d thi s proble m withou t actuall y solvin g it , se e Michael Davis , "How T o Mak e the Punishmen t Fi t the Crime," Ethics 93:4 (Jul y 1983) : 726-752 . 15. Se e Selli n an d Wolfgang , Measurement of Deliquency. This researc h has bee n subjec t t o extensiv e review , summarize d i n Charle s F . Wellford, e t al. , "Symposiu m o n th e Measuremen t o f Delin quency," Journal of Criminal Law & f Criminology 66:2 (Jun e 1975) : 173-221. Th e result s fro m mor e recen t researc h ca n b e gauge d from V . Le e Hamilto n an d Stev e Rytina , "Socia l Consensu s o n Norms o f Justice : Shoul d Punishmen t Fi t th e Crime? " American Journal of Sociology 85:5 (Marc h 1980) : 1117-1144 ; Maynar d L . Erickson an d Jac k P Gibbs , "O n th e Perceive d Severit y o f Lega l Penalities," Journal of Criminal Law fcf Criminology 70: 1 (Sprin g 1979) : 102-116; an d Lesli e Sebba , "Som e Exploration s i n th e Scalin g o f Penalties," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 15: 2 (Jul y 1978): 247-265 . 16. Se e vo n Hirsch , Doing Justice, an d hi s subsequen t discussion , "De sert an d Previou s Conviction s i n Sentencing, " Minnesota Law Review 65: 4 (Apri l 1981) : 591-634 . Principle s (1 ) an d (2 ) i n th e tex t do no t suffic e t o constitute a retributive theor y o f punishment . Wha t would suffic e I hav e discusse d elsewhere ; se e Bedau , "Retributio n and th e Theor y o f Punishment. " 17. Se e H.A . Bedau , "Concession s t o Retributio n i n Punishment, " i n Cederblom an d Blizek , Justice and Punishment, pp . 5 1 - 7 3 . Fo r th e most recen t accoun t o f jus t punishmen t i n term s o f retribution , see Rober t Nozick , Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard Universit y Press , 1981) , pp . 363-397 . 18. Joh n Rawls , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvar d Uni versity Press , 1971) , §14 . 19. Se e e.g. , Norva l Morris , The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago , 111.: University o f Chicag o Press , 1974) , pp . xi-xii , 5 8 - 8 3 . Morri s cite s "defined socia l purposes " (p . 59 ) an d "sociall y justified deterren t purposes" (p . 60 ) o n behal f o f incarceration , bu t i t i s ambiguou s

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whether thi s i s mean t t o b e a defens e o f imprisonmen t a s (1 ) a mode o f punishment , i n preferenc e t o othe r modes , o r a s (2 ) th e best punishmen t i n a particula r case , o r a s bot h (1 ) an d (2) . Se e also not e 3 4 below . 20. J.P . Day , "Retributiv e Punishment, " Mind 87:34 8 (Octobe r 1978) : 498-516. Da y write s " . . . I submi t th e followin g definition : ' a retributive politica l punishment ' mean s ' a restitutio n o r a compen sation [t o th e victi m fro m th e offender ] . . . for a crime ' " (p. 503) . It ha s als o bee n argue d tha t th e biblica l vie w o f lex talionis inextricably weave s togethe r retributiv e an d restitutionar y ideas ; se e Davi d Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press, 1947) , pp . 102-153 . 21. Nevertheless , thi s i s no t th e groun d o n whic h the y ar e currentl y defended. Th e Pennsylvani a Commission , "Th e Courts : Titl e 204, " at p . 46 5 (§303. 3 (f ) (1) ) defend s th e impositio n o f fines ove r an d above incarceratio n wheneve r "th e cour t i s o f th e opinio n tha t a fine i s especially adapte d t o deterrenc e o f th e crim e involve d o r t o the correctio n o f th e defendant . . . . " I n hi s recen t genera l dis cussion o f th e punitiv e us e o f fines, Ernes t va n de n Haag , Punishing Criminals: Concerning a Very Old and Painful Question (Ne w York , N.Y.: Hil l an d Wang , 1975) , merely observe s tha t fines ca n b e mad e as "punitive " a s other mode s o f sever e punishmen t (pp . 229-240) . 22. Cost-effectivenes s i s typically ignored altogethe r b y writers who favo r offender restitution ; se e e.g. , Stephe n Schafer , Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime (Montclair, N.J.: Patterso n Smith , 1970) , pp. 117—135 , Joe Hudso n an d Steve n Chesney , "Researc h o n Res titution: A Revie w an d Assessment, " i n Bur t Galawa y an d Jo e Hudson, eds. , Offender Restitution in Theory and Action (Lexington , Mass.: D.C . Heath , 1978) , pp . 131-148 . Whe n a n occasiona l write r speaks o f restitutio n a s " a low-cos t . . . approach " t o corrections , it i s don e withou t an y seriou s consideratio n o f it s cost-effective ness; se e James H . Bridges , John T . Gandy , an d James D . Jorgensen, "Th e Cas e fo r Creativ e Restitution s i n Corrections, " Federal Probation 4 3 (Septembe r 1979) : 2 8 - 3 5 , a t p . 29 . 23. See , e.g. , Igo r Primorac , "O n Capita l Punishment, " Israel Law Review 17: 2 (Apri l 1982) : 133-150 ; Jeffri e G . Murphy , "Crue l an d Unusual Punishments, " i n hi s Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (Boston, Mass. : D . Riedel , 1979) , pp . 223-249 ; Davi d A.J . Richards , The Moral Criticism of Law (Belmont , Calif. : Dickenson , 1977) , pp . 235-262; H.A . Bedau , " A Socia l Philosophe r Look s a t Capita l Punishment," American Journal of Psychiatry 123:1 1 (Ma y 1967) : 1361-1370, a t pp . 1364-1366 . A numbe r o f othe r writer s hav e defended a generall y retributiv e theor y o f punishmen t withou t an y mention o f o r suppor t fo r th e deat h penalty , e.g. , vo n Hirsch , Doing

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Justice. Fo r a defens e o f th e deat h penalt y o n retributiv e an d de nunciatory grounds , se e Walte r Berns , For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death Penalty (Ne w York , N.Y. : Basi c Books , 1979). 24. Rober t A . Pugsley , " A Retributivis t Argumen t Agains t Capita l Punishment," Hofstra Law Review 9: 5 (Summe r 1981) : 1501-1523 . 25. H.A . Bedau , "Bentham' s Utilitaria n Critiqu e o f th e Deat h Pen alty," Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 74 (Fal l 1983) : 100 1 — 1034. 26. H.A . Bedau , "Capita l Punishment, " i n To m Regan , ed. , Matters of Life and Death (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1980) , pp . 148-182 , especially pp . 179-180 , an d H.A . Bedau , "Th e Deat h Penalty : So cial Policy an d Socia l Justice," Arizona State Law Journal 1977:4 , 7 6 7 795, especiall y pp . 791-795 . 27. Se e vo n Hirsch , "Deser t an d Previou s Conviction s i n Sentencing. " 28. Nige l Walker , Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice (Totowa , N.J. : Barne s & Noble , 1980) , pp . 125-128 ; and Blumstei n e t al. , Research on Sentencing, vol . 1 , pp . 171-172 . 29. Aristotle , Nichomachean Ethics, v . 10 . 30. Pennsylvani a Commission , "Th e Courts : Title 204, " p. 467 (§303.4(c ) (5)). 31. Ibid . (§303.4(d ) (1) . 32. Ibid . (§303.4(b)) . 33. Thi s i s mos t conspicuousl y tru e wher e futur e dangerousnes s i s a factor th e sentence r mus t us e i n choosin g betwee n deat h o r im prisonment afte r a convictio n o f capita l murder , a s unde r curren t Texas law . Se e Georg e E . Dix , "Administratio n o f th e Texa s Deat h Penalty Statues : Constitutiona l Infirmitie s Relate d t o th e Predic tion o f Dangerousness, " Texas Law Review 55: 8 (Novembe r 1977) : 1343-1414. 34. Se e especiall y Andre w vo n Hirsch , "Utilitaria n Sentencin g Resus citated: T h e America n Ba r Association' s Secon d Repor t o n Crim inal Sentencing, " Rutgers Law Review 33: 3 (Sprin g 1981) : 772-789 . Contemporary nonretributivist s divid e o n th e rol e t o b e give n t o predicted futur e dangerousnes s i n th e sentencin g o f convicte d of fenders. Nige l Walker , fo r example , a professe d "eclectic, " re gards suc h prediction s a s a legitimat e basi s fo r differentia l sen tencing an d especiall y fo r delayin g releas e fro m incarceration ; se e Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma, pp . 88—113 . Norva l Mor ris, however , somewha t mor e o f a utilitaria n tha n Walker , regard s it a s "a n unjus t basis " fo r imposin g o r prolongin g punitiv e incar ceration; se e Morris , Future of Imprisonment, pp . xi , 59 , 62—73 , 76 , 91—92. Se e also , however , not e 1 9 above . Ernes t va n de n Haag , after wringin g hi s hand s ove r th e unreliabilit y o f prediction s o f

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future violence , endorse s the m a s a morall y prope r basi s fo r th e decision t o incarcerate ; se e va n de n Haag , Punishing Criminals, pp . 241-250. 35. Som e sceptic s o f retribution-base d sentencin g system s hav e sug gested tha t th e chie f resul t o f suc h systems , i f enacte d int o law , will b e a n overal l increas e i n severit y o f sentences , whic h shoul d be deplore d b y al l sensibl e persons , sinc e ou r societ y alread y ha s "the longes t averag e priso n sentence s i n th e wester n worl d an d a n extraordinarily hig h pe r capit a rat e o f imprisonmen t . . . " in Joh n C. Coffee , Jr. , "Th e Represse d Issue s o f Sentencing : Accountabil ity, Predictability , an d Equalit y i n th e Er a o f th e Sentencin g Com mission," The Georgetown Law Journal 66: 4 (Apri l 1978) : 975-1107 , at p . 1079 . I t i s al l th e mor e wort h notin g tha t th e chie f advocat e of "jus t deserts " i n curren t sentencin g declare s hi s hop e tha t hi s favored approac h wil l achiev e a significan t "moderatio n i n pun ishment levels. " Andrew vo n Hirsch , "Recen t Trend s i n America n Criminal Sentencin g Theory, " Maryland Law Review 42: 1 (1983) : 6-36, a t p . 29 . Who ha s th e bette r o f th e argumen t a t presen t seem s impossible t o say . 36. Thi s vie w i s held b y most , i f no t all , of th e writer s cite d i n th e note s above, i n particular , Morris , Richards , va n de n Haag , vo n Hirsch , and Walker . M y ow n view s ar e spelle d ou t i n a n unpublishe d pa per o n th e justification o f punishment . 37. Se e vo n Hirsch , "Constructin g Guideline s fo r Sentencing, " an d "Recent Trend s i n America n Crimina l Sentencin g Theory, " an d von Hirsc h an d Hanrahan , "Determinat e Penalt y System s i n America." 38. Pennsylvani a Commission , "Th e Courts : Titl e 204, " pp . 468-47 6 (§303.9).

5 HOW T O MAK E TH E PUNISHMEN T FIT TH E CRIM E MICHAEL DAVI S

Though th e retributiv e theor y o f punishmen t ha s recentl y enjoyed a startlin g revival, 1 ther e seem s t o remai n on e decisiv e objection t o it . T h e objectio n ha s bee n stated : "Th e retributiv ist's difficult y i s tha t h e want s th e crim e itsel f t o indicat e th e amount o f punishment , whic h i t canno t d o unles s w e firs t as sume a scal e o f crime s an d penalties . Bu t o n wha t principle s i s the scal e t o b e constructed , an d ho w ar e ne w offence s t o b e fitted int o it ? These difficultie s admi t o f n o solutio n unles s w e agre e to examin e th e consequence s t o b e expecte d fro m penaltie s o f different degree s o f severity : i.e. , unles s w e adop t a utilitaria n approach." 2 T h e objectio n i s t o retributivis m bot h a s a theor y of wha t a judge shoul d d o (act-retributivism ) an d a s a theor y o f what th e legislatur e shoul d d o (rule-retributivism) . Bu t th e ob Republished (slightl y revised ) fro m Ethics 93 , no . 4 (Jul y 1983) : 726-752 , wit h the kin d permissio n o f th e autho r an d Th e Universit y o f Chicag o Press . © 198 3 by T h e Universit y o f Chicago . Al l right s reserved . Part o f a n earlie r versio n o f thi s pape r wa s rea d befor e th e Philosoph y Collo quium o f Illinoi s Stat e University , January 26 , 1979 , and befor e th e Philosoph y Club o f th e Universit y o f Chicago , Apri l 13 , 1979 . I shoul d lik e t o than k thos e present fo r thei r comment s an d criticisms . I shoul d als o lik e t o than k Richar d Epstein fo r hi s helpfu l editoria l advic e o n tw o late r drafts , an d m y ol d crimina l law professor , Yal e Kamisar , fo r lon g ag o askin g al l th e righ t question s (and , fortunately, givin g al l th e wron g answers) .

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jection strike s hardes t a t retributivis m a s a theor y o f legislation . The judg e a t leas t ha s th e statutor y maximu m (an d perhap s minimum) t o limi t hi s discretion , th e legislativ e inten t t o guid e him. Th e legislatur e ha s onl y th e principle s o f punishmen t (an d perhaps certai n constitutiona l restraints) . Th e objectio n doe s no t deny tha t ther e ar e nonutilitaria n principle s b y whic h t o scal e crimes: shock , injur y t o victim , similarit y t o crime s alread y o n the books , an d s o on . T h e objectio n i s tha t eac h o f thes e prin ciples i s incomplete , counterintuititiv e i n importan t applica tions, an d anywa y alway s les s satisfactory tha n a utilitarian prin ciple. Th e objectio n i s that , withou t a utilitaria n scal e o f crime s and penalties , retributivis m i s a t bes t vacuous . I believ e thi s objectio n misunderstand s th e relatio n betwee n retributivism an d consequences , betwee n utilitarianis m an d consequences, an d betwee n theorie s o f punishmen t an d th e world. By "retributivism " I mea n an y theor y o f punishmen t claim ing a t leas t (1 ) tha t th e onl y acceptabl e reaso n fo r punishin g a person i s tha t h e ha s committe d a crime , (2 ) tha t th e onl y ac ceptable reaso n fo r punishin g hi m wit h such-and-suc h severit y is tha t th e punishmen t fit s th e crime , an d (3 ) tha t th e fit be tween punishmen t an d crim e i s independen t o f th e actua l o r probable consequence s o f th e particula r punishmen t o r th e particular statutor y penalty. 3 Whe n contrastin g retributivis m wit h utilitarianism, I mea n b y "utilitarianism " no t th e genera l ethica l theory bu t merel y an y theor y o f punishmen t makin g th e fit be tween punishmen t an d crim e depen d upo n th e actua l o r prob able consequence s o f th e particula r punishmen t o r statutor y penalty. I d o no t inten d anythin g I sa y here t o affec t th e debat e between (ethical ) utilitarianis m an d competin g ethica l theories . Indeed, I hop e t o convinc e eve n th e devoutes t act-utilitaria n tha t there i s goo d reaso n no t t o mak e direc t appea l t o utilit y whe n imposing a punishmen t o r enactin g a penalty . I shal l argu e tha t ther e i s a retributiv e principl e fo r settin g statutory penalties , tha t th e principl e shoul d sometime s yiel d statutory penaltie s differen t fro m thos e a utilitaria n principl e would yield , tha t th e retributivis t penalt y appear s morall y pref erable wher e i t differ s fro m th e utilitarian , an d tha t th e retri butivist penalt y i s th e on e mor e likel y t o b e chose n i n practice . Because th e settin g o f statutor y penaltie s i s suppose d t o b e

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the majo r difficulty fo r retributivism , I shal l sa y littl e abou t wha t judges d o unti l th e final sectio n o f th e paper . I d o no t inten d my silenc e t o sugges t tha t judges shoul d behav e i n a wa y muc h different fro m th e wa y I argu e legislature s should . I just d o no t think th e distinctio n betwee n act-retributivis m an d rule-retri butivism important. 4 Because "punishment, " "justification, " an d certai n othe r cru cial term s hav e bee n use d wit h importantl y differen t meaning s of late , I shal l begi n m y discussio n b y goin g ove r wha t shoul d be familia r ground . I t will , I think , b e wort h ou r while , sinc e even her e w e wil l no w an d the n leav e th e familia r path : I shal l be concerned t o poin t ou t ho w th e proble m o f makin g th e pun ishment fit th e crim e change s onc e w e tak e seriousl y th e plac e of punishmen t withi n th e crimina l law . Th e change , thoug h n o greater tha n tha t fro m "man " t o "person " i s nevertheles s th e hook upo n whic h everythin g els e hangs . I. PUNISHMEN T AN D TH E CRIMINA L LA W

What i s punishment ? I t i s a n evi l satisfyin g thes e si x condi tions: 1. Ther e i s a bod y o f rule s capabl e o f guidin g actio n ("primary rules") ; 2. Ther e ar e being s ("persons" ) capabl e o f followin g thes e rules o r no t a s the y choose , capabl e o f choosin g o n th e ba sis o f reasons , an d capabl e o f treatin g th e prospec t o f suf fering a specifie d evi l a s a reaso n agains t doin g a n ac t (t o be weighe d wit h othe r reason s fo r an d against) ; 3. Ther e i s a procedur e ("authority" ) fo r inflictin g type s of evi l ("penalties" ) upo n a perso n i f h e doe s no t follo w th e rules; 4. Ther e ar e ("secondary" ) rule s connectin g failur e t o follow primar y rule s ("crimes " o r "offences" ) wit h certai n penalties; 5. Bot h th e primar y an d secondar y rule s ar e suppose d to b e know n t o th e person s subjec t t o the m (i n general , a t least); an d 6. Impositio n o f th e penalt y i s (i n general , a t least ) justified b y th e person' s no t havin g followe d th e appropriat e rule whe n h e coul d have. 5

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The crimina l la w provide s th e centra l case s o f punishment . A theory o f punishmen t mus t com e t o term s wit h th e crimina l la w or fail . Wha t goe s o n i n clubs , corporations , universities , an d other association s o f person s i s relevan t onl y insofa r a s clos e t o the crimina l law . Wha t parent s d o wit h thei r children , owner s with thei r pets , o r th e win d wit h th e countryside , i s a t bes t pe ripheral. There ar e man y mean s o f socia l contro l tha t nee d no t tak e into accoun t th e personhoo d o f it s subjects : fo r example , ter ror, incapacitation , o r conditioning . Wha t distinguishe s th e criminal la w fro m thes e i s tha t th e crimina l la w presuppose s people wh o (1) ca n follo w rule s o r no t a s the y choos e an d (2) can b e persuade d t o follo w th e rule s b y th e distan t prospec t o f set penalty . Th e crimina l la w woul d hav e n o us e wher e peopl e were no t mor e o r les s rational , where , tha t is , peopl e di d no t adjust thei r act s t o tak e int o accoun t possibl e consequence s fa r off, uncertain , an d limited . T h e insane , th e feebleminded , th e immature properl y d o no t com e unde r th e crimina l law . The y are brough t int o cour t onl y t o b e sen t elsewhere. 6 Th e crimina l law doe s not , however , requir e a societ y o f craft y deliberator s or practica l Newtons . T h e crimina l la w require s onl y that , somehow o r other , peopl e wil l generall y adjus t thei r act s t o tak e the penaltie s int o accoun t (or , fo r othe r reasons , sta y clea r o f wrongdoing). 7 Punishment (s o understood ) canno t b e conceive d apar t fro m the crimina l la w (o r som e analogue) . T o as k th e justification o f punishment a s a n institutio n i s the n t o as k th e justificatio n o f the crimina l la w a s a whole . T o as k tha t is , however , t o as k fo r one o f tw o justifications. "Th e crimina l law " may refe r eithe r t o the crimina l la w i n genera l (the criminal law ) o r t o thi s o r tha t system o f crimina l la w (th e crimina l la w w e liv e under) . T o as k the justification o f th e first i s t o as k wh y a rationa l perso n shoul d prefer a syste m o f crimina l law , give n a choic e betwee n a fai r representative o f th e crimina l la w an d a fai r representativ e o f any alternativ e metho d o f socia l control . T o as k th e justificatio n of a particula r syste m o f crimina l la w is , in contrast , onl y t o as k why a rationa l perso n shoul d prefe r tha t syste m ove r an y alter native syste m o f crimina l law . (Fo r th e purpos e o f justification , a metho d o f socia l contro l o r syste m o f crimina l la w i s an alter native t o anothe r onl y insofa r a s th e tw o ar e possibl e bu t in -

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compatible method s o f orderin g th e sam e affair s o f th e sam e persons.) Wha t I shal l no w argu e i s that neithe r th e justificatio n of th e crimina l la w i n genera l no r th e justification o f a partic ular syste m o f crimina l la w entail s a utilitaria n principl e fo r set ting penaltie s ( a principle , tha t is , which woul d mak e th e choic e of penalt y depen d upo n th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f having a particula r penalt y o n th e books) . II. JUSTIFYIN G T H E CRIMINA L LA W I N GENERA L

There i s surprisingl y littl e disagreemen t abou t wha t justifie s the crimina l la w i n general . A rationa l perso n woul d (i t is agreed ) prefer th e crimina l la w t o an y alternativ e metho d o f socia l con trol becaus e th e crimina l la w serve s th e interest s o f rationa l persons bette r tha n doe s an y alternative . Onl y th e crimina l la w can orde r certai n importan t socia l relation s s o a s t o allo w ra tional person s t o pla n an d act , withou t orderin g societ y s o com pletely tha t ther e i s little a t onc e wort h plannin g an d fre e fro m the defeatin g interferenc e o f authority. 8 Thoug h i t ma y see m obvious tha t th e crimina l la w thu s strike s th e bes t balanc e be tween protectin g person s an d respectin g them , w e mus t con sider wh y tha t i s s o t o se e tha t th e genera l justificatio n o f th e criminal la w entail s n o utilitaria n principl e fo r settin g penalties . We ma y trea t wha t follow s a s i f i t wer e a n (ethical ) utilitaria n argument. Bu t i t woul d b e wis e t o notic e tha t th e argumen t i s not necessaril y utilitarian . W e shal l no t hav e t o sa y whethe r th e benefits justifyin g th e crimina l la w accru e t o societ y a s a whol e or t o everyon e individually . Thus , w e shal l no t hav e t o decid e between utilitaria n an d "contract " theorists . W e shal l als o no t have t o sa y whethe r th e benefit s justifyin g th e crimina l la w ar e merely contingen t fact s abou t thi s worl d o r conceptua l truth s about rationa l person s (an d al l th e possibl e world s wher e the y may b e found) . Thus , w e shal l als o no t hav e t o decid e betwee n ordinary consequentialist s an d thos e wh o foun d ethic s upo n a priori truths . The crimina l la w maintain s orde r b y layin g dow n rules , threatening punishmen t i f th e rule s ar e no t obeyed , an d car rying ou t th e threa t ofte n enoug h t o kee p th e threa t alive . Th e criminal la w nee d no t establis h socia l tranquility . I t doe s enoug h if i t hold s th e commotio n o f lif e belo w a roar . Th e primar y rule s

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need no t forbi d al l conflic t betwee n person s o r eve n al l unde sirable activity . T h e rule s nee d onl y forbi d th e mor e substantia l harms an d regulat e majo r conflict . Th e threatene d punish ments nee d no t b e s o frightfu l tha t n o rationa l perso n woul d risk them . T h e punishment s nee d onl y b e frightfu l enoug h t o make crim e relativel y rare . I t doe s no t matte r whethe r th e pun ishments accomplis h thi s b y assurin g thos e wh o wis h t o obe y th e rules tha t other s wil l no t tak e advantag e o f tha t obedience , o r by frightenin g of f mos t o f thos e wh o migh t otherwis e commi t crimes, o r b y satisfyin g th e resentmen t o f thos e wh o migh t oth erwise tak e revenge , o r b y instillin g a horro r o f th e forbidde n acts, o r b y keepin g mos t criminal s wher e the y canno t commi t crimes, o r b y som e combinatio n o f thes e o r othe r means . Wha t does matte r i s tha t th e crimina l la w maintain s a t leas t a modi cum o f order . Every la w take s wit h on e han d whil e i t give s wit h th e other . The crimina l la w ca n nevertheles s preserv e fo r person s a spher e of actio n fre e fro m th e interferenc e o f authorit y (a s well a s fro m the interferenc e o f othe r persons ) i n a t leas t fou r distinc t ways . First, s o long a s th e primar y rule s ar e no t to o man y o r to o broad , the crimina l la w justifie s interferenc e wit h person s onl y i n a limited an d predictabl e way , tha t is , onl y fo r disobeyin g a rul e the perso n coul d hav e obeyed . Second , s o lon g a s th e proce dure o f th e crimina l la w i s reasonably designe d fo r it s purpose , the crimina l la w wil l rarel y interfer e wit h a perso n excep t whe n he ha s i n fac t disobeye d a rule . Third , whe n someon e ha s dis obeyed a rule , th e crimina l la w justifies onl y tha t interferenc e to whic h th e act corresponds, th e statutor y penalty . Th e crimi nal cannot b e punishe d fo r wha t h e is , only fo r wha t h e ha s done . The penalt y canno t b e freel y tailore d afte r th e ac t s o that , ha d the crimina l know n i n advanc e wha t th e penalt y woul d be , h e would neve r hav e committe d th e crime . Th e punishmen t i s a foreordained respons e t o th e crime. 9 An d last , becaus e penal ties are foreordaine d (an d s o long a s they ar e no t to o frightful) , the potentia l crimina l ca n trea t eac h penalt y a s th e pric e o f th e corresponding forbidde n act . Th e crimina l la w migh t no t lon g survive i f everyon e treate d penaltie s tha t wa y al l th e time . Bu t there i s muc h t o b e gaine d i f peopl e d o trea t the m tha t wa y sometimes. Al l huma n rule s fai l o f sens e no w an d then . A la w made t o b e disobeye d (occasionally ) serve s ou r interest s bette r

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than on e which , threatenin g penaltie s to o frightfu l t o risk , pre tends t o b e th e wor k o f a god. 10 This i s th e crimina l la w w e ar e t o compar e wit h othe r meth ods o f socia l control . It s superiorit y i s considerable , s o consid erable tha t i t remains preferabl e thoug h penaltie s ar e se t i n an y number o f radicall y differen t ways . Eve n drawin g statutor y penalties fro m a ha t woul d no t und o tha t superiorit y a s w e just described i t (provided , o f course , penaltie s i n th e ha t wer e nei ther trivia l no r to o severe) . But , i f th e justification o f the criminal la w doe s no t exclud e (o n th e basi s o f actua l o r probabl e consequences) suc h a sill y metho d o f settin g penaltie s a s draw ing fro m a hat , i t canno t requir e a principl e linkin g particula r penalties t o particula r consequences . T h e justificatio n i s to o strong t o rel y upo n th e consequence s o f choosin g penaltie s ac cording t o an y particula r principl e (thoug h no t s o stron g a s t o survive choosin g penaltie s b y an y principl e whatever) . Hence , there i s nothing i n th e justification o f crimina l la w i n genera l t o entail a utilitaria n principl e fo r settin g penalties . III. JUSTIFYIN G PARTICULA R SYSTEM S O F CRIMINA L LA W

The justificatio n o f a particula r syste m o f crimina l la w ma y seem t o lea d directl y t o a utilitaria n principl e fo r settin g pen alties, eve n i f th e justification o f th e crimina l la w i n genera l doe s not. T o justify a particula r syste m o f crimina l la w shoul d i n par t mean justifyin g i t agains t system s ver y muc h lik e i t an d s o (i t may seem ) agains t thos e differin g fro m i t onl y b y a singl e pen alty. W e may , fo r example , thro w ope n th e statut e book , notic e that th e penalt y fo r kidnappin g i s on e t o five year s imprison ment, an d as k wh y th e maximu m penalt y i s no t death . T o as k that questio n is , it seems , t o compar e tw o system s differin g onl y in th e penalt y fo r kidnapping , t o suppos e ther e i s goo d reaso n to prefe r on e penalt y ove r th e othe r (a s indee d ther e is) , an d to as k wha t tha t reaso n migh t be . Wha t migh t i t be ? Surel y (i t will be said ) th e onl y reaso n on e coul d offe r woul d b e th e over all advantag e (actua l o r probable ) o f livin g unde r on e syste m rather tha n th e other . I t seem s the n tha t th e justification o f a particular syste m o f crimina l la w entail s appea l t o a principl e o f setting penaltie s an d tha t th e principl e appeale d t o wil l b e util itarian.

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Legislatures d o choos e betwee n penalties ; w e d o argu e abou t whether thi s o r tha t choic e i s justified. Ther e i s n o doub t abou t that. Th e questio n i s whethe r justificatio n mus t b e i n term s o f the actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f slightl y differen t sys tems o f crimina l law . T h e answe r i s tha t i t canno t be . Conside r how strang e a justification i n suc h term s is . We woul d compar e two complet e system s differin g onl y i n a singl e penalty . W e ma y perhaps imagin e the m o n a counter , sid e b y side , tickin g lik e clocks. Bu t wher e ar e w e t o ge t tw o suc h systems ? System s o f criminal la w ar e no t (lik e clock s an d beakers ) availabl e throug h laboratory services . W e canno t eve n com e clos e t o layin g tw o such system s sid e b y side . I f w e compare tw o contemporary sys tems, w e mus t compar e system s differin g a t leas t i n personnel , history, an d surroundin g society , eve n i f w e ca n find tw o sys tems wit h th e sam e procedure s an d statutes . An d w e ar e no t likely t o ge t tw o system s wit h procedure s o r statute s wit h mor e than a famil y resemblance . I f instea d w e compar e tw o succes sive state s o f on e syste m o f crimina l law , w e hav e th e sam e problem. T h e successiv e state s wil l diffe r i n personne l (deat h caring littl e fo r ou r inquiry) , histor y (th e chang e o f penalt y bein g potentially a s importan t a s wha t th e penalt y i s changed fro m o r to), an d surroundin g societ y (fashion , busines s cycles , war , an d so o n carin g a s littl e fo r ou r inquir y a s deat h does) . Eve n th e other statute s an d procedure s canno t b e counte d o n t o remai n fixed durin g th e comparison . Th e lif e o f th e la w i s n o mor e t o be pen t u p tha n lif e i n general . Abov e tha t pictur e o f lega l sys tems tickin g awa y sid e b y sid e tower s a vanit y o f intellec t s o enormous i t deserve s a name . I woul d sugges t "th e fallac y o f omnipotent science " (th e fallac y bein g t o suppos e tha t whateve r experiment w e ca n imagine—howeve r indistinctly—i s withi n th e power o f science) . It migh t see m tha t I a m unfair . Afte r al l (i t wil l b e said ) w e do no t hav e t o la y system s sid e b y side . W e ca n compar e the m less fancifully . W e ca n us e statistica l procedure s t o isolat e th e crucial variables , follo w th e effect s o f thos e variable s i n differ ent systems , an d s o compar e penalties . O r w e coul d construc t a mathematical mode l o f th e particula r syste m o f crimina l law , hypothesize variou s penalties , an d i n eac h cas e deduc e th e con sequences just a s a physicis t woul d d o i f h e wante d t o kno w th e effect o n pressur e tha t heatin g a fixed volum e o f ga s t o such -

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and-such temperatur e woul d have . Or , a t least , w e can perfor m "thought experiments. " Same fallacy . Som e da y w e ma y b e abl e t o d o suc h wonder s (though sectio n I V cast s doub t eve n o n that) . Certainl y w e can not d o the m today . Wh o know s wha t th e consequence s woul d be if , say , Illinoi s adopte d deat h a s th e maximu m penalt y fo r kidnapping? Woul d ther e b e fewe r kidnappings , more , o r th e same numbe r a s now ? Woul d ther e b e an y sentence s o f death ? Would Illinoi s b e bette r off , wors e off , o r muc h th e sam e a s no w overall? W e ca n guess , o f course . Bu t w e canno t d o more . Ther e is n o mathematica l mode l o f societ y fro m whic h t o mak e de ductions abou t th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f suc h a penalty. Ther e wil l b e non e tomorrow , o r th e nex t day . An d without som e model , w e canno t eve n perfor m though t experi ments. No r ca n w e hop e th e statistician s wil l help . The y d o no t have th e dat a the y woul d need . The y d o no t kno w wha t pro cedures t o use . An d perhap s give n th e dat a an d procedure s the y would fac e a proble m o f suc h magnitud e the y woul d stil l no t be abl e t o ge t significan t results . Thei r computers , time , an d other resource s ar e finite. Muc h tha t i s possibl e i s fa r fro m practical. If w e canno t no w find ou t wha t woul d b e th e actua l o r prob able consequence s o f makin g suc h a dramati c chang e i n th e penalties o f a singl e state , wha t ar e w e t o mak e o f th e clai m tha t we ar e t o decid e every penalty b y considering th e consequences ? What ar e w e t o d o whe n th e choic e i s betwee n tw o an d thre e years imprisonment ? T h e troubl e wit h th e utilitaria n principl e of settin g penaltie s i s no t s o muc h tha t i t lead s u s astra y a s tha t it lead s u s no t a t all . Still (someon e migh t respond) , th e utilitaria n theor y provide s an idea l towar d whic h w e ca n striv e guide d b y othe r mean s un til scienc e ca n com e t o ou r aid . W e mus t rejec t tha t response . Under th e circumstance s i n whic h penaltie s ar e i n fac t chosen , we woul d no t kno w whethe r w e approache d o r fel l fro m th e ideal. W e simpl y canno t d o wha t utilitarianis m tell s u s t o do , only nervousl y shif t fro m foo t t o foot . Nor wil l i t d o t o respon d tha t w e must b e abl e t o mak e suc h comparisons becaus e w e mak e the m al l th e time . T h e questio n is what w e d o whe n w e justify on e penalt y agains t another . Wha t I hav e argue d s o fa r i s tha t w e canno t justify on e penalt y agains t

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another b y comparin g tw o system s o f crimina l la w differin g onl y in on e penalt y o r (wha t i s suppose d t o com e t o th e sam e thing ) by comparin g directl y th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f adopting eac h penalty . I admi t w e d o tal k abou t th e "conse quences" o f thi s o r tha t penalt y (especiall y abou t whethe r th e penalty wil l "deter") . I onl y den y tha t suc h tal k ha s anythin g t o do wit h th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f th e penalty . Ho w can tha t be ? IV. INSID E TH E CRIMINA L LA W

Before I answe r tha t question , I shoul d lik e t o dra w a n anal ogy between scientifi c theorie s an d system s o f crimina l law . Th e analogy will , I hope , mak e wha t I sa y abou t decidin g penaltie s less disturbin g an d s o mor e convincing . It i s commonl y hel d tha t a scientifi c theor y consist s bot h o f claims tha t ca n b e teste d (mor e o r less ) directl y ("experimenta l laws") an d o f claim s tha t ca n b e teste d onl y b y testin g th e the ory a s a whol e ("theoretica l laws") . Bot h kind s o f la w are , o f course, "empirical " an d "contingent, " bu t th e proo f o f on e i s quite differen t fro m th e proo f o f th e other . Experimenta l laws , though deducibl e fro m th e theor y a s a whol e an d importan t i n its defense , ca n surviv e th e theory' s overthrow . The y ultimatel y rest upo n experiment , no t deduction . Whil e claim s for th e the ory, the y ar e (mor e o r les s directly) claim s about the world . The oretical law s canno t likewis e surviv e a theory' s overthrow . The y draw thei r conten t fro m th e theor y a s a whole . Ever y chang e i n the theor y change s them , too . A nam e ma y mov e fro m theor y to theor y bu t th e connectio n betwee n entitie s referre d t o i s familial, no t personal . Whil e theoretica l law s ar e claim s within a theory, the y ar e no t quit e claim s abou t anything . The y ar e ve hicles fo r reachin g th e world , no t point s o f interes t i n it , ab stractions, no t tangibl e objects . Consider , fo r example , tha t par t of Bohr' s theor y o f th e ato m statin g tha t electron s hav e a n elec trical charg e o f e (4:.11X 10~10 electrostatic units) . I t contain s bot h an experimenta l an d a theoretica l claim . Th e experimenta l clai m is tha t e is th e minima l electri c charge . Tha t clai m ca n b e con firmed b y an y numbe r o f experiment s withou t an y commit ment t o Bohr' s theor y a s a whole . Tha t clai m i s abou t th e world . The theoretica l clai m i s that ther e ar e electrons . Tha t clai m ha s

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one meanin g withi n Bohr' s theor y ( a particl e wit h such-and-suc h properties) an d othe r meaning s i n succeedin g theorie s ( a par ticle o r wav e packe t wit h somewha t differen t properties) . Bohr' s claim tha t ther e ar e electron s canno t b e confirme d apar t fro m his theor y o f th e ato m becaus e th e clai m draw s it s meanin g fro m that theory . T h e clai m i s onl y a clai m withi n th e theory , stand ing o r fallin g wit h th e theor y a s a whole. 11 A syste m o f crimina l la w i s like a scientifi c theor y i n thi s way : certain claim s abou t a syste m are , lik e experimenta l laws , ca pable o f proo f independen t o f th e syste m a s a whole . Other s are not . Fo r example : th e clai m that , i f a t leas t on e kidnappe r in te n i s pu t t o death , th e rat e o f kidnappin g wil l no t excee d one pe r 10,00 0 person s i n th e jurisdiction, i s a n "experimenta l law." Th e clai m ca n b e understoo d withou t supposin g an y par ticular syste m o f crimina l law , ca n b e confirme d i n an y numbe r of jurisdictions (i f i t ca n b e confirme d i n any) , an d ma y b e tru e even o f a syste m whic h i s hardly a syste m a t all . I n contrast , th e claim tha t th e deat h penalt y i s th e mos t effectiv e deterren t o f kidnapping is , thoug h superficiall y lik e th e othe r claim , a "the oretical law. " T h e clai m doe s no t itsel f sa y anythin g abou t th e rate o f crim e i f deat h i s pu t int o th e kidnappin g statute . "De terrent" doe s no t hav e an y relatio n t o actua l o r probabl e crim e without assumption s abou t th e rationalit y o f criminals , th e ef fiency o f police , the likelihoo d tha t th e penalt y wil l not itsel f mak e the crim e glamorous , an d s o on. Similarly , "deat h penalty " doe s not itsel f mea n tha t anyon e wil l fea r fo r hi s life , b e pu t t o death , or anythin g else . Reachin g a clai m abou t th e actua l o r probabl e consequences o f makin g a certai n crim e capita l require s consid eration o f th e ful l machiner y o f a particula r syste m o f crimina l law. T h e clai m tha t deat h i s the mos t effectiv e deterren t o f kid napping i s a clai m within a particula r system , a deductio n fro m its presuppositions , a vehicl e b y whic h th e syste m reache s th e world. Tha t claim , unlik e th e first, stand s o r fall s wit h th e par ticular syste m o f crimina l law . B y itself, i t can neithe r stan d no r fall. This analog y make s th e inquir y discusse d i n th e las t sectio n seem mor e dubious . Eve n a n omnipoten t socia l scientis t coul d not freel y chang e penaltie s i n a syste m o f crimina l la w whil e holding al l els e constant . T h e presupposition s o f th e crimina l law generat e certai n principle s o f punishment . Thos e princi -

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pies guid e th e operatio n o f th e syste m a s a whole an d decisivel y settle al l sort s o f particula r questions . On e ca n easil y chang e th e words o f a statut e (well , relatively easily , sinc e eve n suc h a chang e would requir e muc h politica l power , acumen , o r luck) . Bu t on e cannot contro l wha t happen s thereafter . A certai n statutor y penalty ma y b e declare d unconstitutiona l whil e on e muc h lik e it would no t be ; i t ma y b e nullifie d b y a jury o r prosecuto r wher e one muc h lik e i t woul d no t be ; an d s o on . Fo r som e penalties , there i s onl y a grav e o f pape r unles s th e whol e syste m i s re made t o suit . A n omnipoten t socia l scientis t canno t stud y pen alties apar t fro m particula r system s o f crimina l law , canno t di rectly compar e th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f pena l provisions o f differen t systems , an d canno t freel y chang e pen alties withi n a particula r syste m withou t makin g on e syste m int o another. So , eve n a n omnipoten t socia l scientis t i s no t likel y t o learn muc h fro m th e stud y o f statutor y penalties . Fo r thos e in terested i n th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f livin g unde r a particula r syste m o f crimina l law , wha t i s important i s the sys tem a s a whole . T h e penaltie s themselve s ar e nothing. 12 Now, bac k t o tha t questio n a t th e en d o f sectio n III : I ca n admit tha t w e tal k abou t th e "consequences " o f thi s o r tha t pen alty whil e denyin g tha t suc h tal k ha s anythin g directl y t o d o wit h the actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f th e penalt y becaus e I believe suc h tal k goe s o n within th e crimina l law . T h e claim s in volved ar e "theoretical " an d therefor e t o b e defende d b y ap peal t o th e presupposition s o f th e particula r syste m o f crimina l law, no t b y direc t appea l t o th e worl d (whic h i s t o say , no t b y direct appea l t o th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f partic ular penalties) . The disput e whic h i s the topi c o f thi s pape r woul d have bee n impossibl e i f bot h utilitarian s an d retributivist s di d not suppos e tha t claim s o f deterrenc e (an d othe r "conse quences") wer e "experimenta l laws. " Th e utilitarian s ar e righ t to clai m tha t th e "consequences " o f a penalt y shoul d b e con sidered i n decidin g wha t penalt y t o adopt . The y ar e wron g onl y in supposin g tha t "consequences " ha s her e th e sam e meanin g as i t ha s i n (ethical ) utilitarianis m generally . Havin g justified th e criminal la w a s a system , the y ar e n o longe r fre e t o argu e a s i f it were no t a system . Similarly , th e retributivist s ar e righ t t o clai m that th e actua l o r probabl e consequence s hav e nothin g t o d o wit h deciding particula r statutor y penalties . The y ar e wron g onl y i n

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supposing tha t thei r clai m rule s ou t consideration s o f deter rence an d othe r theoretica l "consequences. " The y to o hav e no t understood ho w muc h justifyin g th e crimina l la w a s a syste m entails. T h e crimina l la w ha s th e richnes s an d powe r o f a phy sicist's theory . V. SEVE N EAS Y STEP S T O A FITTIN G PENALT Y

The tim e ha s com e t o offe r a n alternativ e t o th e utilitaria n procedure fo r settin g penalties . I n thi s section , I shal l stat e th e alternative, explai n it s relationshi p t o th e presupposition s o f th e criminal law , an d explai n wha t make s i t retributiv e rathe r tha n utilitarian. T h e alternativ e ma y b e state d i n seve n steps : 1. Prepar e a lis t o f penaltie s consistin g o f thos e evil s (a ) which n o rationa l perso n woul d ris k excep t fo r som e sub stantial benefi t an d (b ) whic h ma y b e inflicte d throug h th e procedures o f th e crimina l law . 2. Strik e fro m th e lis t al l inhuman e penalties . 3. Typ e th e remainin g penalties , ran k the m withi n eac h type, an d the n combin e ranking s int o a scale . 4. Lis t al l crimes . 5. Typ e th e crimes , ran k the m withi n eac h type , an d the n combine ranking s int o a scale . 6. Connec t th e greates t penalt y wit h th e greates t crime , the leas t penalt y wit h th e leas t crime , an d th e res t accord ingly. 7. Thereafter : typ e an d grad e ne w penaltie s a s i n ste p 2 and ne w crime s a s i n ste p 4 , an d the n procee d a s above. 15 Step 1 The crimina l law , a s note d i n sectio n I , presuppose s person s who ca n follo w rule s o r no t a s the y choos e an d ca n b e per suaded t o follo w rule s b y th e distan t prospec t o f se t penalties . The lis t of penaltie s shoul d therefor e consis t just o f wha t n o ra tional perso n subjec t t o th e particula r syste m o f crimina l la w i n question woul d ris k excep t fo r som e substantia l benefit . Noth ing les s woul d b e persuasive . T h e lis t ma y var y somewha t fro m society t o society . Fo r example , i n a societ y o f hono r a singl e slap acros s th e fac e publicl y administere d b y th e commo n

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hangman ma y b e a penalt y onl y deat h coul d excee d i n severity ; while, t o us , suc h a penalt y seem s lighte r tha n a five-dollar fine (and so , amount s t o n o penalt y a t all) . The lis t o f penaltie s shoul d no t contai n an y evi l commonl y believed beyon d th e powe r o f th e crimina l la w t o inflict . Eter nity i n hell , fo r example , thoug h onc e th e greates t penalt y i n Christendom, woul d no t b e appropriat e i n th e crimina l cod e o f Illinois. Wh o woul d believ e Illinoi s t o hav e suc h power ? Th e lis t of penaltie s shoul d als o no t contai n anythin g th e procedure s o f the crimina l la w ar e commonl y believe d unwillin g t o inflict . Ex ile to th e moon , fo r example , thoug h toda y a penalt y withi n th e power o f som e governments , i s stil l on e n o governmen t woul d be willin g t o pa y for . Hence , i t to o woul d mak e a n empt y threat . The lis t will , I think , usuall y includ e death , los s o f libert y (e.g. , by imprisonmen t o r supervision) , pai n (e.g. , b y flogging o r har d labor), los s o f propert y (e.g. , b y fine o r forfeiture) , an d muti lation (e.g. , b y brandin g o r amputation) . Step 2 An inhuman e ("crue l an d unusual" ) penalt y i s on e th e crim inal la w woul d sometime s inflic t i f available . T h e penalt y is , nevertheless, t o b e struc k fro m th e lis t becaus e mos t member s of th e societ y objec t t o i t o n principl e (an d independen t o f it s utility withi n th e crimina l law) . ("Most " i s defined b y th e politi cal constitutio n o f th e society. ) W e ma y b e willin g t o us e inhu mane penaltie s o n som e people . W e ma y believ e inhuman e penalties t o b e effectiv e deterrents . Wha t w e objec t t o i s thei r general use . W e find suc h us e morall y shocking . W e prefe r t o take th e ris k o f operatin g ou r lega l syste m withou t suc h penal ties. 14 (Floggin g an d mutilatio n would , e.g. , b e struc k fro m th e list i n thi s societ y a s inhumane. ) Step 3 Penalties nee d t o b e pu t i n a n orde r th e potentia l crimina l can appreciate . Tha t i s th e poin t o f ste p 3 . 1. Dividin g penaltie s b y typ e i s groupin g the m s o tha t eac h group contain s al l thos e penalties , an d onl y thos e penalties , dif fering fro m on e anothe r onl y b y degree . Fo r example : fines (tha t is, takin g mone y o r it s equivalen t i n property ) constitut e a sin gle typ e o f penalty . Fine s diffe r fro m on e anothe r onl y i n th e

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amount taken . A "fine " o f a da y i n priso n o r o f a n ar m is , how ever, a penalt y o f a differen t type . Suc h a "fine " i s no t simpl y a greater taking . I t i s a differen t taking . N o rationa l perso n woul d prefer t o ris k a greate r fine rathe r tha n a lesse r (al l els e equal) ; so, fines diffe r onl y i n degree . Bu t som e rationa l person s (thoug h surely no t all ) ma y prefe r t o ris k a da y i n priso n rathe r tha n a fine o f thi s o r tha t amoun t whil e other s ma y prefe r a fine o f this o r tha t amoun t rathe r tha n a da y i n prison ; so , fines diffe r from imprisonmen t i n type . Wher e a penalt y i s o f mixe d type — thirty lashe s o f th e whi p an d $50 0 fine, on e yea r i n priso n an d two year s supervisio n thereafter , o r th e like—i t shoul d b e treate d as a typ e differen t fro m thos e o f whic h i t i s mixed . 2. Onc e divide d b y type , th e penaltie s o f a typ e shoul d b e ranked fro m leas t t o greatest . T h e leas t penalt y i s th e on e an y rational perso n woul d ris k i f (al l els e equal ) h e ha d t o choos e between riskin g i t an d riskin g an y othe r penalt y o f tha t type ; the nex t leas t i s th e on e an y rationa l perso n woul d ris k i f h e had t o choos e betwee n riskin g i t an d riskin g an y othe r typ e ex cept th e least ; an d s o o n u p t o th e greatest . Wher e a typ e o f penalty ha s a hug e numbe r o f degrees , thes e shoul d b e re duced t o a manageabl e few . Tha t ma y b e don e eithe r b y select ing certai n roun d number s (e.g. , te n dollars , fifty dollars , an d so on) o r b y groupin g th e penaltie s int o range s (e.g. , on e t o te n dollars, eleve n t o fifty dollars , an d s o on) , o r b y som e combi nation o f these . 3. Onc e penaltie s ar e type d an d ranke d i n thi s way , the y ca n be combine d int o a n ordina l scale . T h e scal e ma y branc h lik e a tree (eac h branc h bein g a typ e o f penalty) , b e a n interweav e o f vines (eac h vin e bein g a typ e o f penalty) , o r b e otherwis e mes sily multiplex . Suc h complexities , thoug h ofte n inconvenien t (an d best avoided) , ar e no t importan t here . (So lon g a s w e ar e con cerned wit h mor e tha n on e typ e o f penalty , ther e i s n o inter esting unilinea r syste m o f preferenc e al l rationa l person s mus t share.) Wha t i s importan t i s tha t ther e b e a singl e directio n t o the orderin g (leas t penalt y o f on e typ e neares t leas t penalt y o f other types ) an d genera l (i f rough ) agreemen t abou t wher e t o start an d en d a typ e (e.g. , fines t o begi n befor e priso n tim e an d end a t on e yea r i n prison) . O f course , n o penalt y shoul d eve r be preferabl e t o on e below.

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Step 4 The lis t o f crime s shoul d contai n an y ac t th e legislatur e for bids o n pai n o f penalty . A crim e ma y b e a n ac t itsel f morall y objectionable, on e objectionabl e fo r som e othe r reason , o r eve n an ac t th e legislatur e just madl y chos e t o objec t to . Th e proce dure fo r settin g penaltie s work s independentl y o f th e wisdo m of th e legislatur e i n establishin g crime s (excep t tha t th e unwis dom o f th e legislatur e ma y reappea r i n ste p 5 a s a lac k o f "se riousness"). Step 5 The crimes , lik e th e penalties , mus t b e i n som e order . 1. Dividin g crime s b y type is groupin g the m b y "intent " (i.e. , by wha t a rationa l perso n woul d ordinaril y ai m a t i f h e di d th e act, whateve r els e h e migh t ai m at) . Th e minima l ai m o f bot h theft an d blackmai l i s gettin g another' s property . Thes e crime s are, then , bot h o f on e type . T h e ai m o f murder , mayhem , o r vandalism i s no t ordinaril y gain . So , non e o f thes e crime s i s o f the sam e typ e a s thef t o r blackmail . W e grou p crime s b y inten t because w e se t penaltie s s o tha t th e potentia l crimina l wil l hav e reason t o choos e th e lesse r crim e rathe r tha n th e greate r whe n he choose s hi s crime . Inten t tell s u s wha t th e crimina l wil l b e choosing between . Whethe r a criminal' s ai m i s revenge o r gain , he wil l not ordinarily choos e betwee n a typ e o f thef t an d a typ e of murder . Ther e are , o f course , exception s (th e gunma n wh o chooses betwee n robbin g a ban k an d contractin g t o kill , th e re venge seeke r wh o wonder s whethe r hi s intende d victi m love s money mor e tha n life , an d s o on) . T h e crimina l la w i s not con cerned wit h suc h exception s ("mer e motive") . But , whe n a n ex ception become s common , ther e i s reaso n t o defin e a ne w crime , the peculia r ai m o f individual s bein g groupe d a s a ne w inten t (e.g., "us e o f a weapo n fo r unlawfu l gain " o r "takin g ven geance"). 2. Onc e divide d b y type , th e crime s o f eac h typ e shoul d b e ranked fro m leas t t o greatest . Th e leas t crim e i s th e on e a ra tional perso n woul d prefe r t o ris k (al l els e equal ) give n a choic e between riskin g i t an d riskin g an y othe r o f tha t type ; th e nex t least i s th e on e a rationa l perso n woul d prefe r t o ris k give n a choice betwee n i t an d an y othe r o f tha t typ e excep t th e least ;

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and s o on. 15 Th e rankin g o f crime s nee d b e n o fine r tha n th e ranking o f penalties , an d th e mor e divers e th e society , th e les s fine i t i s likel y t o be . W e ma y distinguis h between , say , gran d and pett y theft , simpl e an d aggravate d theft , an d s o on , be cause suc h distinction s d o mar k significan t difference s i n wha t we (a s rationa l persons ) fear . But , becaus e w e (a s rationa l per sons) nee d no t agre e o n ever y detai l (e.g. , o n whethe r a thef t of fifty dollar s i s t o b e feare d significantl y mor e tha n a thef t o f five dollars), th e distinction s o f ran k (e.g. , between kind s o f theft ) cannot b e ver y fine. And , i n fact , the y ar e likel y to be quit e crude . Illinois, fo r example , recognize s onl y five "classes " of felon y (plu s capital crimes ) an d thre e "classes " o f misdemeanor . The existenc e o f a particula r rankin g fo r a particula r societ y is, o f course , a contingen t fact . Bu t th e existenc e o f som e rank ing o r othe r share d b y al l rationa l person s i n a societ y i s vir tually guarantee d b y th e nee d o f ever y societ y t o agre e o n a fe w things just t o exis t an d th e possibilit y o f makin g th e rankin g o f crimes crud e enoug h t o mirro r tha t minimu m agreement . I f on e doubts th e existenc e o f suc h agreemen t fo r this society, h e ha s only t o g o t o a statut e boo k an d as k himsel f whethe r th e rank ings generall y mirro r hi s fear s (an d whether—al l els e equal— a person wh o ranke d crime s muc h differentl y woul d b e rational) . For example : doe s h e no t (al l els e equal ) fea r gran d thef t mor e than pett y theft ? Woul d i t (al l else equal ) b e rationa l t o fea r the m equally, muc h les s t o fea r pett y thef t mor e tha n gran d theft ? This metho d ma y pu t severa l seemingl y differen t crimes—fo r example, burglar y an d blackmail—i n th e sam e rank . Tha t doe s not mea n ther e i s n o differenc e betwee n them , onl y tha t ther e is n o genera l reaso n (give n th e societ y i n questio n an d th e ab stractness necessar y fo r legislation ) fo r rationa l person s t o pre fer t o ris k on e rathe r tha n th e other . Whic h i s preferable : t o lose one' s propert y b y burglar y o r blackmail ? Well , i t depends , doesn't it ? 3. Onc e crime s ar e type d an d ranked , the y ca n b e combine d into a n ordina l scale . Wha t I sai d o f th e scal e o f penaltie s ap plies equall y t o th e scal e o f crimes . T h e scal e ma y wel l resembl e a Ne w Yor k subwa y map . Wha t i s importan t i s that , fo r eac h crime (bu t th e mos t serious) , w e prefe r t o hav e i t occu r rathe r than an y ranke d immediatel y above . Thus , i f w e hav e th e tw o lines (i ) first-degree murder , second-degre e murder , man -

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slaughter (wher e ther e i s intent t o kil l bu t suitabl e provocation ) and (ii ) aggravate d kidnapping , simpl e kidnapping , unlawfu l restraint, first-degre e murde r shoul d b e close r t o aggravate d kidnapping tha n t o unlawfu l restrain t an d unlawfu l restrain t nearer t o manslaughte r tha n t o murder . Th e tw o lines nee d cros s only wher e th e kidnappin g i s s o aggravate d tha t i t amount s t o murder (e.g. , wher e th e victi m die s becaus e o f th e ba d treat ment h e receive s fro m th e kidnapper s eve n thoug h the y di d no t intend hi s death) . Step 6 Connecting th e tw o scale s i s more o r les s mechanical . Th e leas t penalty should , o f course , b e assigne d t o th e leas t crime ; th e greatest penalty , t o th e greates t crime . Th e line s connecting scale s should neve r cross . Crossin g line s woul d mea n givin g th e po tential crimina l a reaso n t o choos e th e crim e w e woul d rathe r he no t choos e shoul d h e b e choosin g betwee n tha t on e an d som e we ranke d lower . T h e numbe r o f line s meetin g a t an y singl e crime o r penalt y shoul d b e kep t a s fe w a s possible . To hav e man y lines mee t a t on e crim e i s t o mak e unclea r wha t penalt y th e criminal ma y expec t i f h e choose s t o d o th e crim e an d s o t o tel l him les s abou t ho w w e ran k tha t crim e relativ e t o other s tha n we coul d tel l him . T o hav e to o man y line s mee t a t on e penalt y is t o tel l th e crimina l w e d o no t car e whic h o f thos e crime s h e chooses whe n w e d o care . Where severa l penaltie s ar e ranke d togethe r (say , te n lashes , thirty day s i n jail, an d fin e o f $300) , ther e ma y b e loca l reason s for assignin g onl y on e t o a particula r crim e (e.g. , lashe s t o as sault, jail t o fals e imprisonment , o r fine t o pett y theft) . Ther e may als o b e loca l reason s fo r puttin g al l thre e int o eac h statute , leaving t o th e judg e th e decisio n abou t wh o get s what . Ther e may eve n b e loca l reason s fo r no t usin g certai n penaltie s fo r certain crimes . "Loca l reasons " ma y includ e th e likel y educa tional effec t o f sufferin g wha t on e ha s mad e other s suffer , th e satisfaction o f resentmen t likel y fro m suc h exac t mirrorin g o f the wron g (i.e. , th e penalty' s "expressiveness") , th e unpopular ity of certai n penaltie s wit h certai n socia l classes, and s o on. Whil e such reason s are utilitarian , the y d o no t concer n th e scal e o f penalties o r th e proportio n betwee n penalt y an d crime , onl y th e choice amon g penaltie s ranke d equall y severe. 16

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Neither appearanc e o f ne w penaltie s no r th e commone r ap pearance o f ne w crime s shoul d presen t an y ne w proble m fo r the procedur e outline d here . A ne w penalt y wil l eithe r belon g to a n ol d typ e o r constitut e a ne w type . I f o f a n ol d type , rank ing th e penalt y wil l b e a matte r fo r clerks . I f a ne w penalty , fit ting i t into th e scal e will require onl y th e sam e crud e agreemen t required t o mak e u p th e scal e i n th e firs t place : "Mos t rationa l persons woul d prefe r t o ris k thi s rathe r tha n that. " A ne w crim e will als o eithe r belon g t o a n ol d typ e o r constitut e a ne w one . If o f a n ol d typ e ("Larcen y b y compute r i s just larcen y b y trick") , ranking th e crim e wil l b e eas y enough . If , however , th e crim e is o f a ne w typ e ("No , larcen y b y compute r i s th e onl y crim e where th e minima l ai m i s bot h fu n an d profit") , the n w e mus t compare i t wit h variou s crime s mor e o r les s analogou s an d al ready o n th e books , askin g whic h w e woul d prefe r t o risk , jus t as w e di d t o establis h th e scal e initially . The procedur e outline d her e ma y appea r clums y compare d to Bentham' s mathematic s o r th e equall y nic e proposal s o f twentieth-century utilitarians . I mak e n o apology , believin g th e clumsiness t o recogniz e a certai n indeterminanc y i n wha t i s ra tional. Th e procedur e may , however , als o appea r t o diffe r fro m the utilitaria n i n n o othe r way . I t wil l b e wort h a minut e t o no tice ho w muc h i t doe s differ . T o scal e crimes , th e procedur e outline d her e take s int o ac count th e preference s o f rationa l person s i n th e societ y t o whic h the syste m o f crimina l la w applies . N o doub t thos e preference s promiscuously reflec t th e actua l consequence s o f particula r crimes an d ma y themselve s affec t th e probabilit y o f suc h con sequences. Bu t a utilitaria n principl e woul d tak e suc h conse quences int o accoun t directl y an d systematically . T h e proce dure outline d her e doe s not . I f th e tw o procedure s yielde d identical scales , i t woul d b e fortuitous . Similarly , t o scal e pen alties, th e procedur e outline d her e take s int o accoun t th e pref erences o f th e potentia l criminal . T h e potentia l crimina l (lik e his brothe r abstractio n economi c man ) i s no t someon e yo u wil l meet i n a n alle y o r discove r pryin g ope n you r window . H e i s there, o f course . Bu t h e i s ther e i n eac h o f us , mor e o r less . A utilitarian procedur e woul d tak e int o accoun t th e preference s

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not o f the potentia l crimina l bu t o f al l thos e potentia l crimi nals w e hop e neve r t o mee t i n a n alle y o r a t ou r window . The procedur e outline d her e need s n o sociology , onl y suc h knowledge a s everyon e has , n o statistic s o r experiments , onl y the procedure s o f a politica l constitution . A utilitaria n proce dure woul d nee d a matur e sociolog y t o b e a t al l reliable . T h e procedur e outline d her e work s withou t informatio n abou t the actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f th e particula r penalties . A utilitaria n procedur e woul d no t (howeve r muc h troubl e i t would hav e obtainin g suc h information) . Sinc e th e procedur e outlined her e set s penaltie s withou t directl y takin g int o accoun t the actua l o r probabl e consequence s o f particula r penalties , i t is the retributiv e principl e promise d a t th e beginnin g o f thi s paper. VI. MORA L DESER T

The procedur e outline d her e i s als o retributiv e i n th e mos t orthodox sens e o f apportionin g punishmen t accordin g t o th e criminal's (act-related ) "illici t pleasure, " "wickedness, " an d "mora l desert." 17 Th e procedur e assign s th e severes t penaltie s (i.e. , th e penalties th e potentia l crimina l mos t prefer s no t t o risk ) t o th e most seriou s crime s (i.e. , th e crime s rationa l person s mos t pre fer no t t o risk) ; th e lighte r penalties , t o th e les s seriou s crimes . Such a n assignmen t make s th e punishmen t a functio n o f th e special wron g a crimina l doe s simpl y b y committin g th e crime . What wron g i s that ? Th e criminal' s ac t ma y b e morall y wrong , law o r n o law . But , eve n i f hi s ac t woul d b e morall y indifferen t were ther e n o law , th e obedienc e o f other s make s hi s disobe dience a takin g o f unfai r advantag e (al l els e equal) . Others , though the y to o woul d lik e t o tak e suc h libertie s a s h e has , di d not. 18 H e ha s somethin g the y d o not . Th e unfai r advantag e i s the "illici t pleasure " i n ever y crime , whethe r jaywalking o r mur der, prostitutio n o r stealing . Wha t th e crimina l deserve s (fo r thi s act) i s a punishmen t proportione d t o tha t advantag e (an d t o tha t advantage alone) . Bu t ho w (i t ma y b e asked ) ar e w e t o measur e that advantage ? We ar e no t accustome d t o thin k o f crime s a s object s o f com merce. Th e ide a o f window-shoppin g fo r a crim e seem s wildl y unrealistic whe n i t doe s no t see m just back-slappingl y funny . W e

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would rathe r peopl e concentrat e o n obeyin g th e law . Still , w e can gai n a bette r appreciatio n o f th e specia l wickednes s o f a particular crim e b y thinkin g o f crime s a s thing s t o b e bough t and sold . Imagin e a marke t i n whic h th e governmen t sell s li censes permittin g th e holde r t o brea k a specifie d la w onc e ( a sort o f absolut e pardo n i n advance). 19 Th e numbe r o f suc h li censes woul d hav e t o b e limite d jus t a s w e no w limi t huntin g and fishing licenses . Th e principl e o f limitatio n woul d b e th e same. License d act s (togethe r wit h unavoidabl e poaching ) shoul d not deplet e socia l orde r belo w th e desire d minimum . How woul d price s b e set ? Le t u s suppos e th e license s t o b e sold a t publi c auction . Sinc e th e crimina l la w forbid s onl y thos e acts som e peopl e woul d otherwis e do , ther e shoul d b e n o crim e so great o r s o small tha t someon e woul d no t commi t i t if h e coul d do s o cheapl y enough . Her e woul d b e th e chance . Differen t li censes would , o f course , fetc h differen t prices . Bu t ther e woul d be a pattern . Publi c auctio n (o r an y othe r ope n market ) woul d tend t o mak e th e pric e o f a licens e ris e wit h th e seriousnes s o f the crim e (an d s o approximat e th e procedur e outline d i n sec tion V) . Ther e ar e thre e reason s fo r that : first, th e quantit y o f licenses woul d hav e t o decreas e a s th e seriousnes s o f th e crim e licensed increased . (Th e mor e seriou s th e crime , th e fewe r th e social orde r ca n tolerate , al l els e equal. ) Second , th e deman d fo r licenses i s likel y t o increas e wit h th e seriousnes s o f th e crime . (If tha t seem s unlikel y give n mora l constraint s o n potentia l buyers, as k yoursel f whethe r yo u woul d prefe r t o hav e a licens e to stea l o r a licens e t o jaywalk.) An d las t (an d mos t important) , the seriousnes s o f a crim e woul d itsel f pu t a floo r unde r th e market price . Th e mor e peopl e prefe r no t t o ris k something , the mor e the y woul d pa y a license e no t t o us e hi s license . Th e license woul d alway s b e wort h a t leas t wha t the y woul d pay . We ar e no w read y t o measur e unfai r advantage : th e crimi nal's (act-related ) "wickedness " varie s wit h th e valu e o f th e un fair advantag e h e take s o f thos e wh o obe y th e la w (eve n thoug h they ar e tempte d t o d o otherwise) . The y ar e th e societ y h e wrongs b y hi s crime . Wha t h e "owes " the m i s th e pric e o f hi s advantage. Th e pric e canno t b e th e cos t o f th e propert y taken , bones broken , o r live s lost . Suc h cost s measur e th e privat e in jury h e ha s done , th e damage s h e shoul d pa y o r th e restitutio n he shoul d mak e hi s victims , no t th e valu e o f th e licens e h e ha s

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taken simpl y b y doin g th e crime. 20 Wha t the n doe s h e "owe? " The obviou s answe r i s th e penalt y provide d b y law . Th e pric e of th e crim e i s th e penalt y th e crimina l la w ha s se t fo r th e crime , the crimina l la w operatin g a s a syste m o f administere d prices . Even tha t price , may , however , no t b e wha t h e shoul d "owe " (what h e "owes " morall y speaking , hi s "mora l desert") . Th e ad ministered pric e i s no t necessaril y a fai r price . A penalt y i s a fair pric e onl y i f i t correspond s t o wha t a licens e t o d o tha t crim e would fetc h o n th e ope n marke t (th e outcom e o f a fai r proce dure). Th e correspondenc e i s not equalit y bu t homology , a rel ative correspondence . Ther e is , afte r all , n o decisiv e reaso n tha t the societ y shoul d choos e thi s o r tha t minimu m o f socia l order ; nor i s ther e an y privilege d rul e fo r convertin g dollar s int o year s in prison , lashe s o f th e whip , o r th e like . So, a crimina l ha s caus e t o complai n i f h e i s subjec t t o a pen alty no t correspondin g t o th e fai r pric e o f th e licens e h e ha s taken. Th e caus e o f complain t i s the sam e whethe r th e noncor respondence i s th e wor k o f judg e o r statute . Th e caus e i s un fairness, tha t is , hi s no t bein g treate d lik e (hi s no t bein g charge d the sam e "price " as ) thos e wh o hav e acte d wit h equa l license . What h e deserve s fo r hi s ac t i s a penalt y correspondin g t o th e license h e took . Wha t h e go t wa s somethin g else . T o sa y tha t a criminal "owes " a certai n penalt y fo r hi s ac t i s a metapho r bu t to sa y tha t th e penalt y i s wha t h e deserve s (fo r hi s act ) i s onl y the litera l truth . Now, someon e ma y thin k o f th e followin g objection : whethe r the penalt y doe s correspon d t o th e fai r pric e o f a license o r not , "the crimina l brough t th e punishmen t upo n himself. " H e com mitted th e crim e knowin g th e penalt y (or , a t least , th e crimina l law mus t suppos e suc h knowledge—a s explaine d i n sectio n I) . Surely, h e ha s n o caus e fo r complain t whateve r th e statutor y penalty. T h e objectio n would , I think , hol d i f criminal penaltie s were se t b y ope n market . Provin g knowledg e o f th e penalt y i n an ope n marke t woul d prov e th e punishmen t fai r (fai r becaus e the procedur e i s fair) . Bu t th e crimina l la w i s lik e a syste m o f administered prices , no t lik e a n ope n market . Othe r safeguard s must replac e th e safeguard s o f th e ope n marke t i f w e ar e no t to ris k treatin g th e crimina l wors e tha n h e deserve s (for hi s act) . (We d o no t punis h fo r ba d busines s judgment, foolishness , o r whatever els e migh t hav e le d hi m t o "buy " a n overprice d li -

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cense.) Provin g tha t th e crimina l "contracted " a certai n penalt y cannot, therefore , prov e th e penalt y fair . T o prov e th e penalt y fair is , o n th e contrary , t o prov e th e penalt y t o correspon d t o the open-marke t pric e (t o b e fai r becaus e i t correspond s t o th e outcome o f a fai r procedure) . T o prov e tha t i s t o prov e th e penalty t o correspon d t o th e seriousnes s o f th e crim e (a s th e auction analog y shows) . An d t o prov e tha t i s t o prov e th e pen alty t o correspon d t o th e outcom e o f th e procedur e outline d i n section V . Therefore , wha t i n al l fairnes s th e crimina l deserve s (for hi s act ) i s a punishmen t correspondin g t o th e outcom e o f the procedur e outline d i n sectio n V . Anythin g els e woul d b e ou t of proportio n t o th e crime . Th e procedur e outline d i n sectio n V thu s fulfill s th e traditiona l retributivis t functio n o f appor tioning punishmen t t o (act-related ) mora l desert . This argumen t provide s a secon d justificatio n fo r th e proce dure o f sectio n V . T h e first justificatio n wa s tha t th e procedur e was derive d fro m th e presupposition s o f th e crimina l law . Whatever justified th e crimina l la w justified th e procedur e too . The secon d justificatio n connect s th e procedur e directl y wit h moral desert . T h e procedur e i s justified becaus e th e penaltie s it generate s ar e fai r an d becaus e i t woul d b e unfai r t o adop t a procedure generatin g penaltie s differen t fro m thos e generate d by it . Lik e th e first justification , thi s secon d i s dependen t upo n justification o f th e crimina l law . Wher e w e canno t justify appli cation o f th e crimina l la w (e.g. , t o th e insane) , ther e wil l b e n o justifiable punishmen t an d s o bot h n o prope r punishmen t un der th e procedur e o f sectio n V an d n o on e morall y deservin g of punishment . VII. T H E RETRIBUTIV E PROCEDUR E I N PRACTICE : WEEMS v .

U.S.

The discussio n ha s necessaril y bee n quit e abstrac t s o far. I dar e not leav e i t tha t way . T h e abstractes t theor y mus t stan d u p i n practice o r fall . A theor y tha t canno t guid e actio n i s only a sca recrow o f theory . T h e retributiv e theor y describe d abov e does , I believe , giv e a helpfu l guid e t o actio n eve n wher e utilitarian ism doe s not . This sectio n offer s a n exampl e o f punishmen t disproportion ate t o th e crime , demonstrate s tha t th e retributiv e procedur e

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easily pick s ou t th e disproportion , an d the n consider s wha t a utilitarian theor y woul d hav e t o say . T h e exampl e come s fro m the la w courts . I hav e chose n i t fo r thre e reasons . First , a la w case remind s u s o f th e relatio n a theor y o f punishmen t ha s t o the practic e o f punishmen t (th e decision s actuall y t o b e guided , the informatio n actuall y t o b e ha d a t th e momen t o f decision , and th e consequence s differin g theorie s woul d actuall y have) . The us e o f suc h a cas e forbid s floating philosophicall y fro m thi s world t o tha t idea l worl d wher e everythin g i s mor e convenient . Second, judicia l decision s ar e carefu l judgment s person s o f learning an d experienc e actuall y mad e whe n face d wit h livin g detail an d force d t o decid e wha t justice requires . The y giv e val uable insigh t concernin g wha t ou r ow n considere d judgmen t might be . Third , th e cas e chose n i s itsel f a classic , a clea r ex ample o f punishmen t no t itsel f inhuman e bu t stil l s o ou t o f proportion tha t i t shocks . Ha d I mad e u p suc h a case , i t migh t have bee n dismisse d a s to o contrive d fo r i t t o matte r wha t a theory ha d t o sa y abou t it . But , comin g straigh t fro m practic e (and, indeed , havin g a n importan t positio n t o retur n to) , it can not b e dismissed . T h e theor y tha t canno t sa y somethin g sensi ble abou t i t plainl y ha s no t stoo d u p wher e i t mos t ough t to . Such a case , thoug h b y itsel f no t a refutatio n o f utilitarianism , does a t leas t pos e a proble m an y utilitaria n theor y o f punish ment shoul d resolve . But , combine d wit h a satisfactor y retri butive theor y (a s I believ e i t her e is) , suc h a cas e constitute s something approachin g a crucia l experiment . I f a utilitaria n theory i s n o goo d here , wha t goo d i s it ? The case , Weems v. United States, was decide d b y th e U.S . Su preme Cour t i n 190 9 an d remain s th e leadin g America n cas e on th e questio n o f proportio n betwee n punishmen t an d crime . Weems, a disbursin g office r employe d b y th e U.S . governmen t in th e Philippines , ha d falsifie d a cas h boo k o f th e Captai n o f the Boar d o f Manil a b y enterin g a s pai d ou t th e smal l sum s o f 208 an d 40 8 pesos , a s wage s t o certai n employee s o f th e Ligh t House Service . H e wa s convicte d o f falsifyin g ("perverting" ) tha t public documen t "corruptl y an d wit h i n t e n t . . . t o deceiv e an d defraud th e Unite d State s Government . . . ." 21 Th e statut e under whic h h e wa s charged , thoug h datin g bac k t o Spanis h times, ha d bee n reenacte d unde r authorit y o f Congress . Th e statute se t a maximu m an d a minimu m penalty . Weem s re -

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3

ceived a sentenc e fallin g midwa y between . H e wa s "[t o serve ] . . . fiftee n year s o f Cadena, togethe r wit h th e accessorie s o f section 5 6 o f th e Pena l Code , an d t o pa y a fin e o f fou r thou sand pesetas . . . ." 22 T h e term s "Cadena" an d "accessories " re quire explanation : "[Thos e sentence d t o Cadena] shall labo r fo r the benefi t o f th e state . The y shal l alway s carr y a chai n a t th e ankle, hangin g fro m th e wrists ; the y shal l b e employe d a t har d and painfu l labor , an d shal l receiv e n o assistanc e whatsoeve r from withou t th e institution." 23 T h e "accessories " ar e (1 ) civi l interdiction, (2 ) subjectio n t o surveillanc e durin g life , an d (3 ) perpetual absolut e disqualification . Thes e penaltie s ar e define d as follows : Art. 42 . Civi l interdictio n shal l depriv e th e perso n pun ished a s lon g a s h e suffer s it , o f th e right s o f parenta l au thority, guardianshi p o f perso n o r property , participatio n in th e famil y council , marita l authority , th e administratio n of property , an d th e righ t t o dispos e o f hi s ow n propert y by act s inter vivos. Thos e case s ar e excepte d i n whic h th e law explicitl y limit s it s effects . Art. 43 . Subjectio n t o th e surveillanc e o f th e authoritie s imposes th e followin g obligation s o n th e perso n punished . 1. Tha t o f fixing hi s domicil e an d givin g notic e thereo f to th e authorit y immediatel y i n charg e o f hi s surveillance , not bein g allowe d t o chang e i t withou t th e knowledg e an d permission o f sai d authorit y i n writing . 2. T o observ e th e rule s o f inspectio n prescribed . 3. T o adop t som e trade , art , industry , o r profession , should h e no t hav e know n mean s o f subsistenc e o f hi s own. 24 The penalt y o f perpetua l absolut e disqualificatio n i s "th e dep rivation o f office , eve n thoug h i t b e hel d b y popula r election , the deprivatio n o f th e righ t t o vot e o r t o b e electe d t o publi c office, th e disqualificatio n t o acquir e honors , etc. , an d th e los s of retiremen t pay , etc." 2 5 The punishmen t i s shocking , isn' t it ? Bu t why ? Th e sentenc e is no t "crue l an d unusual " i n th e sens e o f inhumane . Takin g the penaltie s on e b y one , ther e wa s nothin g remarkabl e abou t them i n 1909 ; and , excep t fo r th e chai n (an d th e permanenc e of th e surveillance) , ther e i s stil l nothin g remarkabl e abou t the m

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today. I f th e sentenc e i s "crue l an d unusual, " i t i s only becaus e fifteen year s i n priso n (an d 4,00 0 peseta s fine) i s too much . Bu t the punishmen t i s certainl y no t to o muc h fo r an y crime . W e would hav e n o qualm s abou t imposin g suc h a penalt y for , say , murder. I t would , afte r all , b e les s sever e tha n lif e imprison ment o r death . So , i f th e sentenc e i s "crue l an d unusual " a t all , it i s s o onl y becaus e i t i s to o muc h fo r tryin g t o embezzl e 61 6 pesos b y falsifyin g a publi c record . Bu t wh y shoul d th e penalt y be to o muc h fo r that ? The retributiv e procedur e outline d abov e woul d hav e u s an swer tha t questio n b y comparin g th e falsificatio n o f publi c rec ords wit h crime s o f th e sam e typ e t o se e whethe r th e severit y of th e penalt y correspond s t o th e seriousnes s o f th e crime . That , in fact , i s th e procedur e th e majorit y o f th e Cour t adopted. 26 Here i s par t o f wha t the y uncovered : There ar e degree s o f homicid e tha t ar e no t punishe d s o severely, no r ar e th e followin g crimes : . . . forgery o f bond s and othe r instrument s fo r th e purpos e o f defraudin g th e United States , robbery , larcen y an d othe r crimes . . . . I f we tur n t o th e legislatio n o f th e Philippin e Commissio n w e find . . . tha t forger y o f o r counterfeitin g th e obligation s or securitie s o f th e Unite d State s o r o f th e Philippin e Is lands shal l b e punishe d b y a fine o f no t mor e tha n te n thousand peso s an d b y imprisonmen t o f no t mor e tha n fifteen years . I n othe r words , th e highes t punishmen t possi ble fo r a crim e whic h ma y caus e th e los s o f thousand s o f dollars, an d t o preven t whic h th e dut y o f th e Stat e shoul d be a s eage r a s to preven t th e perversio n o f trut h i n a publi c document, i s no t greate r tha n tha t whic h ma y b e impose d for falsifyin g a singl e ite m o f a publi c account. 27 The cour t ha s n o troubl e drawin g th e obviou s conclusion : " . . . [This] contras t show s mor e tha n differen t exercise s o f legisla tive judgment . I t i s greate r tha n that . I t condemn s th e sen tences i n thi s cas e a s crue l an d unusual . I t exhibit s a differenc e between unrestraine d powe r an d tha t whic h i s exercised unde r the spiri t o f constitutiona l limitation s forme d t o establis h jus tice." 28 Becaus e eve n th e minimu m penalt y fo r falsifyin g offi cial document s wa s twelv e year s o f Cadena, th e Cour t declare d

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the statutor y penalt y unconstitutiona l an d se t Weem s free. 29 "I t is," th e Cour t held , " a precep t o f justic e tha t punishmen t fo r crime shoul d b e graduate d an d proportione d t o offense." 30 Of th e si x justices participatin g i n th e case , two dissented. Thei r dissent (writte n b y Justic e White , Justic e Holme s merel y join ing) i s instructive. T h e dissen t sound s utilitarian , ye t it s concer n is no t proportio n i n punishmen t a s suc h bu t th e propriet y o f letting court s decid e suc h matters . [If] i t b e tha t th e lawmake r i n definin g an d punishin g crim e is imperativel y restraine d b y constitutiona l provision s t o apportion punishmen t b y a consideratio n alon e o f th e ab stract heinousnes s o f th e offense s punished , i t mus t resul t that th e powe r i s s o circumscribe d a s t o b e impossibl e o f execution, o r a t al l event s i s s o restricte d a s t o exclud e th e possibility o f takin g int o accoun t i n definin g an d punishin g crime al l thos e consideration s concernin g th e conditio n o f society, th e tendenc y t o commi t th e particula r crime , th e difficulty o f detectin g th e same , th e necessit y fo r resortin g to ster n measure s o f repression , an d variou s othe r subject s which hav e a t al l time s bee n deeme d essentia l t o b e weighe d in definin g an d punishin g crime. 31 There i s a n ambiguit y i n thi s passage . Wha t might b e though t wrong wit h "abstrac t heinousness " (seriousness ) a s a standar d of proportio n i s tha t i t fail s t o tak e int o accoun t th e rationa l concerns o f a particula r society . Stealin g a hors e i s abstractly n o worse tha n stealin g money . Yet , i n a n unpopulate d countr y where horse s ar e th e onl y mean s o f transport , stealin g a hors e may b e muc h th e sam e a s firing a gu n a t someon e wel l withi n range. Th e dissen t woul d certainl y b e righ t t o counse l agains t abstracting crim e fro m th e condition s o f th e societ y wher e th e crime i s committed . Bu t seriousnes s i s no t abstrac t i n tha t sense . (See ste p 5 i n sectio n V. ) I f al l tha t worrie d th e dissen t wer e such abstractio n fro m th e rationa l concern s o f society , th e con clusion t o dra w i s tha t th e cas e shoul d b e sen t bac k t o th e Phil ippine court s fo r rehearin g o n th e questio n o f specia l condi tions justifying th e specia l penalty . Th e dissen t doe s no t dra w that conclusion . Wha t i t conclude s i s that n o cour t shoul d delv e into question s o f proportion . Why ?

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An unstate d premis e mus t b e lurkin g i n th e shadows . Ordi narily, ther e i s nothing injudicia l supervisio n o f abus e t o mak e the exercis e o f a legislativ e powe r "impossible. " Fo r th e dissent , what i s wron g wit h "heinousness " a s a standar d o f proportio n is not it s abstractness bu t it s indefiniteness. Th e standar d woul d (they fear ) giv e th e court s a fre e han d t o invad e th e legislativ e power. Why ? A goo d utilitaria n shoul d no t believ e that . Utili tarians hav e traditionall y bee n th e one s t o argu e tha t "heinous ness" i s no t a n arbitrar y ter m bu t a shorthan d fo r jus t thos e "considerations concernin g th e conditio n o f society " tha t th e dissent wishe s t o hav e th e legislatur e tak e int o account. 32 I f "heinousness" i s n o harde r t o prov e tha n an y othe r fact , wh y not le t court s delv e int o suc h facts ? Th e la w know s ho w t o gran t presumptions i n favo r o f a decision-maker , distribut e burden s of proof , an d otherwis e protec t th e legislativ e o r executiv e powe r from meddling—withou t closin g of f revie w wher e discretio n ha s clearly bee n abused . T h e majorit y wer e no t willin g t o ac t unti l convinced tha t the y ha d befor e the m mor e tha n mer e "differ ent exercise s o f legislativ e judgment." Wh y ar e th e minorit y no t willing t o d o th e same ? Apparently, th e dissen t doe s no t believ e "heinousness " t o b e just anothe r fact . The y shoul d a s utilitarians , bu t the y d o not . Behind th e concer n abou t wh o shoul d decid e question s o f pro portion is , it seems , th e fea r tha t ther e i s no standar d b y whic h to decide ; th e fea r that , i f judges ca n ente r int o suc h decision s at all , there i s no rationa l limi t t o wha t the y ca n review ; th e fea r that th e questio n befor e th e Cour t i s reall y whos e arbitrar y judgment shoul d defin e crime s an d punishments . Whil e th e majority ha d n o difficult y decidin g wha t seem s a clea r cas e t o us a s well , th e minorit y canno t understan d wh y i t i s clea r an d so trembl e a t th e case s t o come . Thei r utilitarianis m blind s the m to th e differenc e betwee n obviou s injustic e an d ordinar y legis lative discretion . Wh y shoul d tha t be ? Bot h Whit e an d Holme s are practica l me n wh o kno w wha t judges an d legislator s ca n do . They mus t realiz e tha t neithe r judge no r legislato r ca n i n prac tice find ou t wha t necessaril y mus t b e foun d ou t t o defen d an y conclusions abou t "heinousness " a s they understand it . An d so , they conclud e tha t t o giv e th e powe r t o decid e "heinousness " (as the y understan d it ) i s t o giv e powe r b y it s natur e arbitrary . The powe r t o find abus e o f suc h a powe r i s simpl y th e powe r

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to usur p power . Her e i s confirmation o f th e conclusion s draw n in section s II I an d IV . Wha t seem s t o b e wron g wit h utilitarian ism i s no t s o muc h tha t i t lead s u s astra y a s tha t i t lead s u s no t at all . I f i t seem s t o utilitarian s tha t I hav e bee n unfair , le t the m explain ho w thi s cas e (o r on e lik e it ) shoul d hav e bee n decide d given th e informatio n actuall y availabl e t o th e court s an d leg islatures i n 190 9 (o r th e informatio n availabl e today) . The y must , I believe , eithe r adop t th e metho d outline d i n sectio n V or tak e up th e positio n Holme s an d Whit e retreate d to . The y wil l not , I believe , b e abl e t o provid e a utilitaria n decisio n o f thi s case . VIII. JUDGES , RETRIBUTION , AN D CLEMENC Y By no w i t i s eviden t wh y I conside r th e distinctio n betwee n act-retributivism an d rule-retributivis m unimportant . Act-retri butivism i s th e fallbac k positio n fo r theorist s wh o woul d lik e t o claim more . I f wha t I hav e argue d her e i s sound , ther e i s n o need t o fal l back . Wha t ma y no t b e s o eviden t ye t i s that, i f ther e is any weaknes s i n th e defense s o f retributivism , i t i s i n th e ol d stronghold, sentencing . T h e legislatur e work s dee p insid e th e great machin e o f crimina l law ; th e judge , ou t wher e tha t ma chine cut s int o th e world . Th e legislatur e ha s onl y t o follo w th e procedure describe d i n sectio n V t o d o al l i t ca n o r should ; bu t the judge mus t an d doe s d o more . H e look s t o th e perso n a s well a s t o th e act , t o reformatio n a s wel l a s t o punishment , t o mercy a s wel l a s t o justice. I t i s hi s busines s t o kno w whe n t o sentence wit h th e fulles t severit y an d whe n t o suspen d a sen tence entirely , whe n t o pu t a crimina l o n probatio n instea d o f sending hi m t o prison , whe n t o le t th e ne w sentenc e b e serve d concurrently wit h other s instea d o f afterward . Th e judge ofte n seems t o d o les s tha n justice . I d o not , however , conside r suc h judicial gentlenes s eithe r evidenc e agains t m y claim s fo r retri butivism o r mer e "rummagin g abou t i n th e serpent-winding s o f utilitarianism." I d o conside r tha t gentlenes s somethin g deserv ing a t leas t brie f explanation . I shal l no w giv e it . We mus t conceiv e o f sentencin g a s proceedin g i n tw o quit e different stages . T h e first stag e i s retributive . Onc e a perso n i s found guilt y o f a crime , th e judg e type s an d rank s th e crim e according t o th e procedure s o f sectio n V , exercisin g discretio n the legislatur e ha s lef t hi m t o continu e th e wor k o f refinemen t

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they di d no t dar e t o complet e i n advance . Typin g shoul d b e trivial. A singl e statut e ordinaril y deal s wit h onl y a singl e typ e of crime . Rankin g i s not muc h harder . T h e judge imagine s (or , more likely , remembers ) th e leas t someon e coul d d o t o violat e the statute , wha t someon e migh t d o i n additio n t o mak e th e vi olation mor e serious , an d ho w seriou s th e violatio n mus t b e be fore bein g th e wors t possibl e unde r tha t statute . (Th e extreme s should, o f course , b e representativ e rathe r tha n bizarre. ) Th e judge the n place s th e actua l crim e i n th e appropriat e ran k (perhaps on e o f a half-doze n o r so) . Her e i s th e plac e fo r hi m to conside r al l mitigatin g circumstance s (duress , provocation , necessity, an d s o on ) an d aggravatin g circumstance s (exploita tion o f a positio n o f trust , extrem e brutality , helplessnes s o f vic tim, an d s o on). T h e judge nex t take s th e differenc e (t o giv e a n exact nam e t o a roug h process ) betwee n th e maximu m an d minimum sentence s permissibl e unde r th e statute , divide s th e difference int o a s man y rank s a s h e ha s rank s o f crime , an d chooses th e sentenc e correspondin g t o th e ran k o f th e particu lar crime . T h e judge ha s no w don e al l tha t justice requires . H e has foun d th e penalt y t o fi t th e crime . H e canno t justify a sen tence mor e sever e tha n tha t b y an y othe r consideration . Fo r ex ample, fo r hi m t o sentenc e i n th e followin g wa y woul d b e un just: "Th e statutor y maximu m i s ten years . I hav e decide d tha t the crim e deserve s five years . But , becaus e s o man y peopl e ar e committing thi s crim e thes e day s [o r becaus e th e crimina l i s suc h a ba d person] , I a m goin g t o sentenc e hi m t o th e maximum — five year s fo r wha t h e di d an d five year s fo r wha t other s migh t do [o r fo r wha t h e is]. " The secon d stag e i n sentencin g i s no t retributive . I t canno t be becaus e al l retributiv e consideration s ar e take n int o accoun t in th e first stage . T h e ac t ha s tol d u s al l it can. Th e secon d stag e stands t o retributio n a s promise-breakin g stand s t o promising . The secon d stag e concern s exceptions , no t th e genera l case . Her e is th e plac e fo r consideration s o f persona l character , famil y sit uation, hop e o f reform , overcrowdin g o f prisons , an d s o on. Th e theory o f thi s stag e i s properl y a par t o f th e sam e theor y o f clemency coverin g decision s no t t o arres t o r no t t o prosecute ; commutations, pardons , an d amnesties ; an d paroles , furloughs , good-time remissions , an d simila r reduction s i n severit y o f de served punishment . Whil e th e theor y o f clemenc y i s wel l be -

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yond th e scop e o f thi s paper , I mus t mak e thre e observation s to avoi d misunderstandin g o f wha t I hav e alread y said . First, th e principle s o f judicial clemenc y (lik e thos e o f clem ency i n general ) canno t allo w clemenc y t o b e to o common , pre dictable, o r generous . T h e crimina l la w i s possibl e withou t clemency bu t no t withou t deterrence . Wher e clemenc y become s the rule , ther e i s n o deterrence ; th e metho d o f socia l contro l i s no longe r crimina l law ; an d so , that principl e o f clemenc y i s no t the principl e o f exception s familia r t o th e crimina l law . Second, th e principl e o f judicial clemenc y shoul d no t b e di rect appea l t o utility . Judges , thoug h i n n o positio n t o gaug e accurately th e genera l disutilit y o f thi s o r tha t ac t o f clemency , are onl y to o wel l place d t o recogniz e it s utilit y t o th e prisoner . A judge wh o alway s aime d directl y a t th e greates t goo d o f th e greatest numbe r woul d probabl y d o mor e har m tha n good . A judge may , o f course , conside r th e consequence s o f variou s sentences, bu t suc h consideratio n wil l b e quit e selective. 33 Third, judicial clemenc y i s not necessaril y unjus t (thoug h lik e acts d o no t lea d t o lik e sentences) . Th e crimina l wh o receive s clemency ha s nothin g t o complai n o f (excep t wha t anyon e ha s to complai n o f whe n give n bette r tha n h e earned) . Th e crimi nal wh o ha s committe d th e sam e crim e a s anothe r bu t no t re ceived clemenc y ma y als o hav e nothin g t o complai n of . Th e principles o f clemenc y shoul d b e principle s al l rationa l person s in th e societ y woul d prefe r i f the y ha d t o choos e betwee n thos e principles an d non e a t all . A gran t o f clemenc y accordin g t o suc h principles i s nothin g on e ca n rationall y complai n o f o n princi ple (howeve r muc h on e ma y thin k anothe r principl e o f clem ency better o r wis h h e to o ha d receive d clemenc y unde r thi s one) . Punishment i s what a rationa l perso n deserve s fo r hi s act ; clem ency, wha t h e deserve s fo r othe r reason s (perhap s onl y becaus e of som e official' s arbitrar y grace) . Ther e i s n o injustic e s o lon g as eac h crimina l receive s wha t h e deserves. 34

NOTES 1. See , e.g. , Herber t Morris , "Person s an d Punishment, " Monist 52 (1968): 475-501; Jeffrie G . Murphy , "Marxis m an d Retribution, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973) : 217-43 ; Ala n Wertheimer ,

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"Should Punishmen t Fi t th e Crime? " Social Theory and Practice 3 (1975): 4 0 3 - 2 3 . 2. S.I . Ben n an d R.S . Peters , The Principles of Political Thought (Ne w York: Fre e Press , 1965) , p . 21 9 (originall y publishe d i n 195 9 un der th e titl e o f Social Principles and the Democratic State). Th e sam e objection i s mor e full y mad e i n Stanle y I . Benn , "A n Approac h t o the Proble m o f Punishment, " Philosophy 33 (1958) : 334-37 . Hug o Adam Beda u ha s recentl y repeate d th e objectio n i n "Retributio n and th e Theor y o f Punishment, " Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978) : 601-22. 3. Compar e Edmun d L . Pincoffs . The Rationale of Legal Punishment (New York : Humanitie s Press , 1966) , pp . 2-16 . I hav e muc h changed th e wordin g o f Pincoffs ' "clai m iii " t o brin g ou t th e in consistency betwee n wha t Ben n argue s i n th e abov e quotatio n an d what I argue . I nonetheles s believ e tha t th e principl e I defen d be low i s on e o f "desert " i n somethin g lik e th e traditiona l retributiv ist's sense . I explai n wh y I believ e tha t i n sectio n V I below . 4. I d o not , I migh t add , thin k th e distinctio n entirel y pointless . A s I shall explai n i n sectio n VII I below , judges d o ( I believe ) behav e i n ways importantl y differen t fro m th e wa y legislature s behave . Tha t difference i s not , however , s o muc h a functio n o f th e act-rul e dis tinction (thoug h i t i s i n par t a functio n o f that ) a s i t i s a functio n of whic h o f tw o stage s o f sentencin g th e judge i s in. Th e first stag e follows ( I shal l argue ) th e sam e principle s o f punishmen t th e leg islature follows ; whil e th e secon d follow s principle s o f clemenc y ("forgiveness" i n Morris' s sense) , somethin g th e legislatur e canno t possible do . T h e act-rul e distinctio n invite s u s (thoug h i t doe s no t require us ) t o conflat e thos e tw o stages . But , mor e o f tha t later . 5. Compar e Ben n an d Peters , p . 202 ; Morris , pp . 447-80 . Al l dif ferences betwee n thi s definitio n an d th e on e Ben n borrow s fro m Flew are , I believe , simpl y explicatio n o f wha t th e argumen t make s clear i s ther e al l along . Th e definitio n ignore s th e specifi c prob lems pose d b y vicariou s crimina l liability , collectiv e crimina l liabil ity, "crime s o f status, " retroactiv e laws , secre t laws , and suc h othe r troublesome rarities . 6. Se e m y "Guilt y bu t Insane? " Social Theory and Practice 1 0 (1984) : 1-23. 7. Compar e E . Va n de n Haag , "O n Deterrenc e an d th e Deat h Pen alty," Ethics 7 8 (1967-68) : 280-89 : Steve n Goldberg , "O n Capita l Punishment," Ethics 85 (1974-75) : 75-79 . T o sa y tha t th e crimina l law presuppose s knowledg e o f penaltie s i s no t t o sa y eithe r tha t knowledge o f th e penalt y i s an elemen t o f an y crim e o r tha t man y people actuall y kno w th e penaltie s whe n the y contemplat e crimes . Quite th e contrary . T o sa y tha t th e crimina l la w presuppose s

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knowledge o f penaltie s i s t o sa y tha t th e crimina l la w proceed s a s if particula r criminal s hav e suc h knowledg e whatever the facts may be. The "criminal " wh o prove s himsel f incapable of suc h knowledg e will, of course , b e judged incompeten t an d excuse d fro m crimina l justice. T h e crimina l wh o prove s th e penalt y coul d no t hav e bee n known t o anyone (e.g. , becaus e th e statut e wa s neve r published ) should b e excuse d o n a technicality . Bu t th e crimina l wh o prove s only hi s ow n ignoranc e o f th e penalt y wil l be convicte d eve n mor e easily tha n on e wh o prove s himsel f ignoran t o f th e primar y rul e he violated . Indeed , h e wil l b e convicte d a s easil y a s th e crimina l who prove s himsel f a n exper t i n th e law . "Ignoranc e o f th e la w i s no excuse. " Th e discover y tha t mos t criminal s wer e i n fac t igno rant o f th e penalt y whe n the y brok e th e la w woul d b e interestin g as a piec e o f sociolog y bu t strictl y irrelevan t a s a poin t o f law . Ho w can tha t be ? Mus t no t th e crimina l la w hee d th e facts ? No t always . Outside a theory , particula r fact s d o no t hav e muc h t o say . Just a s a scientifi c theor y ma y ignor e anomalies , s o th e crimina l la w ma y ignore som e discoverie s inconsisten t wit h it s presuppositions . And , just a s a theor y wil l stan d s o lon g a s i t handle s th e phenomen a with whic h i t deal s bette r tha n doe s an y alternative , s o the presup positions o f th e crimina l la w nee d no t b e rejecte d s o lon g a s th e criminal la w seem s preferabl e t o an y alternativ e metho d o f socia l control. Eve n th e crimina l himsel f ma y (a s Morri s ha s reminde d us) prefe r t o b e treate d a s a rationa l agen t rathe r tha n a s th e un fortunate foo l h e ma y i n fac t be . 8. See , e.g. , Morris , pp . 477—478 ; H.L.A . Hart , Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Ne w York : Oxfor d Uni versity Press , 1968) , esp . pp . 28—53 ; Rol f E . Sartorius , Individual Conduct and Social Norms (Encino , Calif. : Dickenso n Publishin g Co. , 1975), esp . pp . 106-9 . 9. Thus , thi s analysi s o f crimina l la w identifie s th e us e o f indetermi nate sentence s a s foreig n t o th e crimina l law , a practic e tendin g t o reduce th e benefit s th e crimina l la w provide s rationa l person s b y letting the m kno w th e consequence s o f thei r acts . (B y "indeter minate sentence " I mea n a sentenc e wher e th e maximu m i s eithe r undefined o r s o uniforml y hig h a s t o leav e th e parol e boar d vir tually ful l discretion. ) Refor m theory—wit h it s preferenc e fo r in determinate sentences—is , o n thi s analysis , no t s o muc h a theor y of punishmen t a s a theor y o f alternatives to punishment . 10. I a m no t her e talkin g abou t excusin g conditions . Wha t I hav e i n mind ar e case s wher e w e woul d say , "Yes , I woul d hav e don e jus t what yo u di d ha d I bee n i n you r place ; bu t th e la w canno t recog nize suc h case s a s a n exception. " Civi l disobedienc e i s perhap s th e sort o f cas e tha t come s mos t readil y t o mind , bu t suc h odditie s a s

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Regina v . Dudley and Stephens (Q.B.D . 1884 ) ar e close r t o th e par adigm. Suc h case s ar e fi t subject s fo r clemenc y a s explained i n sec tion VIII . 11. I hav e relie d o n Ernes t Nagel , The Structure of Science (New York : Harcourt, Brace , & World , 1961) , esp . pp . 8 2 - 8 5 , fo r wha t I sa y of scientifi c theory . 12. Compar e Joh n Rawls , "Tw o Concept s o f Rules, " Philosophical Review 6 4 (1955) : 3—32 . Rawls' s distinctio n betwee n th e concep t o f rule a s "summary " an d rul e a s "practice " i s different fro m th e dis tinction betwee n claim s withi n th e syste m an d claim s fo r th e sys tem. Hi s distinctio n i s importan t fo r hi s celebrate d contras t be tween justifyin g a practic e an d justifyin g action s fallin g unde r a practice. M y distinction concern s tw o ways a claim (bu t no t th e sam e claim) ma y b e proved . Suc h a clai m ma y b e use d eithe r i n justify ing a practic e (e.g. , havin g thi s statute ) o r i n justifying a n ac t un der a practic e (e.g. , imposin g thi s sentenc e unde r th e statut e o r enacting thi s statut e unde r a particula r syste m o f crimina l law) . Yet , whatever th e differences , th e tw o distinction s see m t o lea d t o th e same conclusion : "[Where ] ther e i s a practice , i t i s th e practic e it self tha t mus t b e th e subjec t o f th e utilitaria n principle " (Rawls , p . 30). Th e utilitaria n principl e canno t reac h particula r sentence s (or , though Rawl s conclude s th e opposite , particula r statutor y penal ties). 13. Thi s procedur e was suggeste d b y J.D. Mabbot , "Punishment, " Mind 48 (1939) : 152-67 , p . 162 . Benn' s attac k upo n th e possibilit y o f a retributive scal e i s his answe r t o Mabbot' s suggestion . Se e Ben n an d Peters, p . 218 . T h e presen t pape r ma y b e though t o f a s th e re sponse Mabbo t shoul d hav e mad e t o tha t attack . 14. Fo r a somewha t fulle r discussio n o f wha t make s a penalt y inhu mane, se e m y "Death , Deterrence , an d th e Metho d o f Commo n Sense," Social Theory and Practice 7 (1981) : 145-77 . 15. Wha t i s feare d i s no t a stat e o f affair s a s suc h (e.g. , deat h o r los s of property ) bu t a n ac t (e.g. , bein g intentionall y kille d o r bein g in tentionally deprive d o f one' s propert y fo r gain) . Murde r i s not th e same typ e o f crim e as , say , involuntar y manslaughte r (sinc e th e murderer intend s deat h whil e th e perpetrato r o f manslaughte r doe s not). Now , certai n act s (suc h a s blinding ) ar e crime s no t everyon e can suffer . Other s (suc h a s treaso n o r mutilatio n o f a corpse ) ar e crimes n o on e ca n suffer . Suc h crime s should , o f course , stil l b e ranked wit h thos e everyon e ca n suffer . So , w e mus t suppos e eac h person rankin g crime s t o conside r ho w muc h h e fear s eac h crim e being committe d agains t himsel f or someon e (o r something ) fo r whom h e cares . I f someon e care d littl e o r nothin g fo r anyon e o r anything bu t himself , h e woul d ran k man y crime s lowe r tha n th e

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rest o f u s would . Fo r th e sam e reason , change s i n ou r concer n fo r others (e.g. , infants , dogs , th e insane , trees ) ma y hav e a n impor tant effec t upo n wha t w e punis h an d ho w muc h w e punis h it . Fo r a fulle r discussio n o f th e par t fea r play s i n th e rankin g o f crimes , see m y "Stator y Penalties : Wha t Doe s Rap e Deserve?" , Law and Philosophy, 3 (1984) : 61-110 , esp . 8 1 - 8 5 . 16. Compar e th e discussio n o f "characteristicalness " i n Jerem y Ben tham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Ne w York : Hafne r Publishing, 1948) , pp . 192-93 . 17. I d o no t omi t "mora l blameworthiness " b y accident . Blameworthi ness i s not , lik e th e term s o f m y litany , associate d wit h th e "mora l accounting" o f retributio n (excep t a t th e stag e o f clemency) . Com pare Willia m Kneale , The Responsibility of Criminals (Oxford : Ox ford Universit y Press , 1967) , pp . 25—30 . Thi s pamphle t i s re printed i n ful l (excep t fo r th e dedicator y openin g paragraph ) i n James Rachels , Moral Problems (Ne w York : Harpe r & Row, 1971) , pp. 161-87 . 18. Notic e tha t th e clai m her e i s no t tha t everyone—excep t th e crim inal i n question—ha s restraine d himsel f fro m committin g th e crim e in question . T h e r e ar e crime s fe w o f u s find temptin g enoug h t o require restrain t les t we commit them ; an d perhap s n o crime tempt s everyone. Fe w men—an d eve n fewe r women—ar e tempte d t o commit rape . T h e ric h seldo m hav e an y interes t i n arme d rob bery. Th e poo r ar e likel y t o b e equall y unintereste d i n committin g stock fraud . An d s o on . T h e clai m her e i s only tha t som e o f thos e who di d no t brea k th e la w i n questio n woul d hav e don e th e for bidden ac t bu t fo r th e la w (o r penalty ) an d tha t i t i s thes e ove r whom th e crimina l woul d gai n unfai r advantag e i f h e wer e no t punished fo r breakin g th e la w i n question . Ther e wil l ordinaril y be suc h peopl e becaus e a la w failin g t o restrai n anyon e (eithe r be cause everyon e wit h th e urg e t o brea k th e la w doe s o r becaus e n o one—except thi s on e criminal—ha s an y urg e t o brea k it ) i s eithe r ineffective o r pointles s (an d s o no t likel y t o b e a la w a t all) . Bu t what i f ther e wer e a la w one , onl y one , perso n ha d an y urg e t o break? Ho w woul d h e tak e unfai r advantag e o f anyon e b y break ing that law? A har d question . Bu t ther e is , I think , a plausibl e an swer consisten t wit h wha t I hav e alread y said . Th e crimina l stil l benefits fro m th e restrain t o f other s wh o migh t brea k othe r law s from whic h h e benefit s (jus t a s they benefit fro m hi s keepin g law s he woul d rathe r no t keep) . T h e woma n wh o ha s n o urg e t o rap e may ye t hav e a n urg e t o castrate . T h e unfairnes s her e woul d de pend upo n a mor e complicate d practic e tha n befor e (upo n a sys tem o f law s rathe r tha n a singl e law) ; bu t ther e i s n o othe r differ ence. Stil l (i t migh t no w b e asked) , wha t i f th e crimina l i n questio n

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is th e onl y on e wit h an y urg e t o brea k an y la w whatever ? Wha t i f he i s a ma n amon g angels ? Whil e I a m no t sur e thi s las t questio n deserves a n answer , i t certainl y ha s one : Yes , accordin g t o th e re tributive theory , thi s crimina l woul d not deserve punishment ; and , it seem s t o me , th e theor y i s right : "It wa s wron g t o d o this, " sai d th e angel . "You shoul d liv e lik e a flower, Holding malic e lik e a puppy , Waging wa r lik e a lambkin. " "Not so, " quoth th e ma n Who ha d n o fea r o f spirits ; "It i s onl y wron g fo r angel s Who ca n liv e lik e th e flowers, Holding malic e lik e th e puppies . Waging wa r lik e th e lambkins. " Stephen Cran e 19. Strictly , thi s analog y applie s onl y t o complete d crimes . Attempt s would hav e t o b e license d wit h onl y partia l o r conditiona l pardon s and s o a licens e t o attemp t woul d alway s b e wort h les s tha n a license t o d o th e ful l act . Yo u woul d b e pardone d onl y i f yo u di d not succeed . T h e marke t analog y seem s t o explai n wha t retribu tivists an d utilitarian s alik e hav e foun d perplexing , i.e. , wh y w e should punis h failure s les s severel y tha n successes . Compar e Law rence Becker , "Crimina l Attemp t an d th e Theor y o f th e La w o f Crimes," Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 (1974) : 262-94 . 20. Fo r th e opposit e (and , I think , mistaken) , view , se e J.P. Day , "Re tributive Punishment, " Mind 8 7 (1978) : 498-516 . 21. Weems v. United States, 21 7 U.S . (1909) , pp . 357-58 . 22. Ibid. , p . 358 . 23. Ibid. , p . 364 . 24. Ibid . 25. Ibid. , pp . 364-65 . 26. Fo r a differen t interpretatio n o f Weems, se e Herber t Packer , "Making th e Punishmen t Fi t th e Crime, " Harvard Law Review 7 7 (1964): 1071-1082 , esp . 1075 . 27. Weems v. U.S., pp . 3 8 0 - 8 1 . 28. Ibid. , p . 381. 29. Ibid. , p . 382 . 30. Ibid. , p . 367 . 31. Ibid. , pp . 387-88 . 32. Compar e Bentha m o n "mischievou s acts, " pp. 152—77 . 33. Fo r a fulle r discussio n o f wh y principle s o f clemenc y shoul d no t

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be direc t appeal s t o utility , se e Ala n Wertheimer , "Deterrenc e an d Retribution," Ethics 8 6 (1975-76) : 181-99 . Thi s poin t abou t clem ency i s evidentl y no t obvious . Ben n expressl y claim s tha t judge s should sentenc e accordin g t o thei r judgmen t o f th e utilit y o f eac h sentence (Ben n an d Peters , pp . 222-26) . M y remark s shoul d no t be interprete d a s denyin g th e specia l sor t o f act-utilitarianis m Sar torius argue s for . Al l I wan t t o den y i s th e possibilit y o f an y act utilitarianism no t buildin g i n comple x factua l assumptio n equiva lent t o a ba n o n direc t appea l t o utilit y fo r clemency . 34. Fo r a differen t view , se e Michae l Clark , "Th e Mora l Graduatio n of Punishment, " Philosophical Quarterly 2 1 (1971) : 132-40 . Clar k has, I think , confuse d th e tw o stage s I distinguish . Fo r a fuller dis cussion o f th e importanc e o f th e distinctio n t o understandin g jus tice i n sentencing , se e m y "Sentencing : Mus t Justic e B e Even handed?" Law and Philosophy 1 (1982): 77-117 .

6 RETRIBUTIVISM AN D TH E STATE' S INTEREST I N PUNISHMEN T JEFFRIE G . MURPH Y

The purpos e o f thi s brie f discussio n piec e i s no t t o stat e an d defend an y thesi s bu t i s rathe r simpl y t o rais e a puzzl e fo r th e retributive theor y o f punishment— a puzzl e tha t ha s receive d insufficient attentio n i n th e literatur e o n th e philosoph y o f punishment. Most philosophica l discussion s abou t th e retributiv e theor y o f punishment (includin g mos t o f m y own ) hav e focuse d o n th e question o f whethe r th e goal s aime d a t b y retributiv e punish ment (e.g. , a n apportionin g o f sufferin g t o mora l desert ) are — contrary t o som e utilitaria n ba d press—prope r mora l goals , goal s that describ e a morall y acceptabl e o r eve n a morall y desirabl e state o f affairs . Thu s defense s o f retributivis m ofte n tak e th e form o f arguin g tha t muc h o f th e mora l outloo k tha t w e value — i.e., on e tha t contain s respec t fo r person s an d thei r rights—migh t not surviv e i f w e fail t o tak e seriousl y th e concept s o f mora l re sponsibility, desert , an d som e notio n o f th e sufferin g tha t i s proper o r appropriat e t o thos e concepts . Suc h concern s hav e been centra l no t simpl y i n m y ow n wor k bu t i n th e importan t work o f suc h writer s a s Herber t Morri s an d Herber t Fingar ette.1 Becaus e o f th e uphil l fight involve d i n defendin g th e mora l legitimacy o f retributivis t goals , a questio n o f wha t i s a t leas t o f equal importanc e ha s bee n almos t totall y neglected—namely , th e question o f whethe r th e retributivis t goals , howeve r morall y ad 156

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mirable the y ma y be , ar e legitimate state goals, goals tha t i t i s th e state's prope r busines s t o pursue . I t i s surely logicall y consisten t to regar d a goa l a s morall y importan t an d als o argu e tha t th e state ha s n o busines s promotin g tha t goal . Fo r example , i t i s characteristic o f th e libera l traditio n t o maintai n tha t th e pro motion o f persona l virtu e i s a morall y importan t goa l bu t (be cause o f fear s o f stat e indoctrination , etc. ) tha t th e goa l i s bes t pursued b y privat e mean s (e.g. , withi n th e family ) an d no t b y the state . On e thin g tha t mus t b e remembered—bu t i s ofte n forgotten b y philosopher s o f law—i s tha t th e philosoph y o f la w is a par t o f socia l an d politica l philosoph y an d no t merel y o f moral philosophy . Thus , i n additio n t o considering th e intrinsi c moral merit s o r demerit s o f a lega l practic e (e.g. , punishment) , philosophers o f la w mus t als o se e suc h practice s i n term s o f th e general problem s o f socia l an d politica l philosophy , particularl y the proble m o f th e natur e an d justificatio n o f th e stat e an d it s coercive power . Whe n considere d i n thes e terms , I shal l sug gest, th e retributiv e theor y o f punishmen t face s ver y seriou s problems indeed . First, a bi t o f background . Crimina l punishmen t i s th e appli cation o f stat e coerciv e powe r i n it s mos t bruta l form . Th e cor e punishments o f th e crimina l la w (deprivatio n o f libert y o r life ) represent gravel y seriou s assault s o n th e fundamenta l right s o f persons, stigmatiz e an d humiliat e thos e persons , an d typicall y cause the m grea t persona l unhappiness . Eve n whe n punish ments ar e no t actuall y inflicte d o n a particula r individual , th e possibility tha t the y migh t b e inflicte d ma y b e sufficien t t o gen erate enoug h fea r i n tha t individua l t o caus e hi m t o refrai n fro m acting i n way s h e otherwis e woul d hav e foun d desirable— a coercive curtailmen t o f hi s liberty . Becaus e o f thi s radicall y in trusive natur e o f crimina l punishment , i t is natural tha t person s committed t o th e value s o f individua l right s an d a fre e societ y would, o n bot h mora l an d politica l grounds , accep t a syste m o f punishment onl y wit h grea t reluctance . Adaptin g constitutiona l language fro m a somewha t differen t context , on e migh t see k t o discover i f crimina l punishment , a s a mechanis m tha t encum bers th e fundamenta l right s o f persons , i s indee d th e leas t re strictive mean s tha t coul d b e employe d t o accomplis h whateve r compelling goal s o r interest s th e stat e seek s t o accomplis h throug h punishment. 2 (I f on e trul y value s th e right s o f persons , the n

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surely on e wil l want t o deman d tha t th e stat e no t threate n thes e rights i n th e pursui t o f goal s tha t ar e o f trivia l o r eve n contro versial socia l importance. ) A thoroug h examinatio n o f thi s issu e would, o f course , requir e carefu l consideratio n o f wha t i t mean s to sa y o f on e alternativ e tha t i t i s indee d mor e restrictiv e o r in tusive tha n anothe r and , eve n mor e importantly , woul d requir e an articulat e an d defensibl e accoun t o f wha t make s a stat e goa l compelling. Lover s o f libert y should , o f course , b e willin g t o tak e at leas t thi s amoun t o f trouble . One star t towar d a n analysi s o f th e concep t o f a compellin g state interes t migh t b e foun d i n som e o f th e device s o f tradi tional socia l an d politica l philosophy—particularl y th e genera l idea o f a socia l contrac t settin g fo r rationa l socia l an d politica l choice. I f a grou p o f person s livin g i n competitiv e proximit y t o each othe r di d no t hav e a stat e o r government , wha t goo d rea sons migh t the y hav e fo r formin g a stat e o r governmen t an d accepting th e resultin g lac k o f libert y tha t thi s woul d entail — i.e., wha t reason s woul d the y find "compelling " i n reluctantl y making suc h a decision ? T h e obviou s initia l answe r (on e tha t gives comfor t t o deterrenc e theorie s o f punishment ) i s self-protection—protection o f thes e person s fro m outsid e threat s (na tional defense ) an d fro m insid e threat s fro m th e violen t an d abusive person s i n thei r mids t (polic e power) . Usin g Rober t Nozick's metaphor , w e migh t als o conside r th e matte r i n thi s way: i f w e thin k o f th e stat e a s a n agenc y tha t w e migh t hire (a t a cos t i n bot h mone y an d liberty ) t o d o a certai n job fo r us , wha t kind o f job woul d b e wort h th e price ? Again , protection seems t o be th e answer. 3 A t leas t thi s on e goal—definitiv e o f eve n a min imal state—wil l surel y strik e rationa l person s a s compelling , a s clearly sufficien t (i f use d onl y whe n necessary ) t o justify th e re sulting curtailment s o f liberty . Where doe s retributivis m fit int o suc h a story ? Th e retribu tive theor y o f punishment , speakin g ver y generally , i s a theor y of punishmen t tha t seek s t o justify punishment , no t i n term s o f social utility , bu t i n term s o f a particula r cluste r o f mora l con cepts: rights , desert , merit , mora l responsibility , an d justice . (Different version s o f retributivis m diffe r i n whic h o f thes e concepts the y tak e a s primar y an d th e analysi s the y giv e fo r thes e concepts.) Thu s th e retributivis t seeks , no t primaril y fo r th e so cially usefu l punishment , bu t fo r th e just punishment , th e pun -

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ishment tha t th e crimina l (give n hi s wrongdoing ) deserve s o r merits, th e punishmen t tha t th e societ y ha s a righ t t o inflic t an d the crimina l a righ t t o demand . Onl y a theor y o f punishmen t built o n thes e values , s o a commo n argumen t goes , wil l respec t persons a s individual s o f specia l worth— a wort h tha t i s com promised i f w e fee l fre e simpl y t o us e the m (a s utilitaria n de terrence theor y appear s willin g t o us e them ) fo r th e socia l good. 4 But, o f course , onl y a ver y wea k for m o f retributivis m i s re quired t o avoi d th e horrendou s consequence s ofte n feare d fro m utilitarian deterrenc e theory—namely , tha t th e concep t o f desert function, no t a s a goa l o r ai m o f punishment , bu t simpl y a s a side-constraint o n th e permissibl e mean s tha t ma y b e employe d in th e pursui t o f whateve r goal s ar e properl y pursue d b y th e practice o f punishment . Thi s for m o f retributivis m (onc e nicel y labeled b y th e lat e J.L. Macki e a t a conferenc e a s "negativ e re tributivism") simpl y impose s th e requiremen t that , i n th e pur suit o f suc h goal s a s deterrence , th e crimina l neve r b e treate d more severel y tha n h e deserves . Anyone familia r wit h th e writing s o f suc h classica l retributiv ists as Kan t an d Hege l will , o f course , realiz e tha t thei r theorie s involve considerabl y mor e tha n th e negativ e o r sid e constrain t respect fo r deser t outline d above . Thes e retributivist s (an d thei r contemporary followers ) ar e mainl y concerne d t o defen d a muc h stronger claim , a vie w tha t Macki e calle d "positiv e retributiv ism:"5 th e retributivel y just o r deserve d punishmen t i s not merel y a limi t o n th e pursui t o f utilitaria n deterrenc e bu t i s itsel f th e general justifying ai m o f punishment . Th e ver y poin t o f havin g a practic e o f punishmen t i s t o guarante e tha t criminal s wil l ge t their jus t deserts—eve n i n case s wher e thi s woul d b e clearl y disutilitarian. 6 But wha t doe s i t mea n t o sa y tha t a perso n deserves a certai n level o f sufferin g a s punishment ? On e model , draw n fro m ou r theological tradition s o f God' s fina l judgmen t o f al l sinners , i s this: eac h perso n shoul d bea r a leve l o f sufferin g tha t i s i n ex act proportio n t o hi s o r he r ow n leve l o f iniquity . Whateve r on e may thin k o f th e mora l o r theologica l merit s o f thi s principle , it seem s highl y implausibl e a s a justificatio n fo r lega l (a s op posed t o cosmi c o r divine ) punishment . A s argue d above , lega l punishment mus t b e justified i n term s o f a compellin g stat e in terest, an d i t i s har d t o se e an y stat e interes t a t al l i n bringin g

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about thi s (perhap s ultimatel y desirable) 7 stat e o f affairs . Ther e are man y state s o f affair s tha t migh t b e though t desirabl e ye t not wort h formin g a stat e o r governmen t t o achieve . I f w e live d in th e absenc e o f la w an d government , i t i s eas y t o se e wh y w e might thin k tha t i t i s i n ou r rationa l interes t t o for m a govern ment fo r protectio n agains t externa l an d interna l violenc e (th e basis fo r utilitaria n deterrenc e theory) . Bu t i s i t likel y tha t ra tional being s woul d for m a governmen t an d accep t al l th e re sulting limitation s o n freedo m simpl y t o brin g abou t a prope r apportionment (whateve r th e means ) o f evi l an d suffering ? Th e very suggestio n seem s preposterous . I t i s silly (an d perhap s im pious) t o mak e God' s ultimat e justice th e mode l fo r th e state' s legal justice; thu s an y attemp t t o identif y "criminal " wit h "sin ner" shoul d b e avoided. 8 Thus, i f th e genera l justifyin g ai m o f stat e o r lega l punish ment i s t o mak e sur e tha t criminal s ar e give n thei r "jus t de serts," we nee d a mor e plausibl e theor y o f "jus t deserts"— a the ory tha t wil l a t leas t mak e i t clea r wh y th e stat e ha s a compellin g interest i n suc h matters . Kant' s theor y o f just desert s rest s upo n a deb t metapho r an d wha t ha s bee n calle d a principl e o f "rec iprocity" o r "mora l balance. " Thi s lin e o f thought , give n a con temporary defens e b y Herber t Morri s an d others , includin g myself, goe s a s follows. 9 Thin k o f a lega l syste m a s a syste m tha t confers th e substantia l benefit s o f th e "rul e o f law " o n a grou p of citizen s onl y becaus e th e vas t majorit y o f citizen s giv e it s rule s voluntary compliance . Eve n i n case s wher e a loya l citize n de sires th e benefit s tha t woul d flow fro m breakin g th e law , tha t citizen wil l foreg o thos e benefit s an d accep t th e burde n o f self restraint i n orde r t o kee p th e system , th e rul e o f law , function ing i n a health y way . T h e citize n wil l se e tha t th e syste m woul d collapse i f al l citizen s fel t fre e t o shir k self-restrain t an d violat e its rules wheneve r the y fel t lik e it . Th e loya l citize n expect s oth ers t o bea r thi s burde n o f self-restrain t necessar y t o kee p th e system goin g (t o obe y th e law s whe n the y woul d prefe r no t to) . Thus i t i s onl y fair—require d b y th e "principl e o f fai r play" — that th e loya l citize n d o hi s par t whe n hi s tur n come s i n thi s beneficial syste m o f reciproca l restraint . Thi s "fai r play " mode l of lega l allegianc e generate s th e followin g mode l o f criminality : the crimina l i s a parasit e o r freeride r o n a mutuall y beneficia l scheme o f socia l cooperatio n (or , a t least , reciproca l restraint) —

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1

an individua l wh o woul d see k t o enjo y th e benefit s o f livin g un der ou r rul e o f la w withou t bein g willin g t o mak e th e necessar y sacrifice (obedience , self-restraint ) required . H e mus t thu s suf fer punishmen t a s a "debt " h e owe s t o hi s fello w citizens , for , i f he i s no t punished , h e wil l b e allowe d t o profi t fro m hi s ow n wrongdoing (somethin g tha t i s clearl y unjust ) an d wil l thu s b e allowed t o tak e a n unfai r advantag e o f thos e citizen s wh o hav e been loya l an d obedient , an d wh o hav e born e th e necessar y burdens o f self-restraint . (Th e "profit " her e i s simpl y th e free dom fro m th e burde n o f self-restraint. ) T h e stat e interes t i n punishment, then , i s this : t o prevent , i n thi s context , on e citi zen's takin g a n unfai r advantag e o f th e majorit y o f hi s fello w citizens. I t i s i n thi s sens e tha t th e crimina l deserve s t o suffe r punishment. There ar e seriou s (perhap s fatal ) problem s wit h thi s at tempted retributivis t justification fo r punishment, 1 0 bu t i s doe s seem t o b e th e sor t o f justification tha t could work. Unlik e th e model o f retributio n a s a secula r equivalen t o f God' s cosmi c justice, i t i s a t leas t no t unthinkabl e tha t thi s versio n o f retri butivism coul d lin k punishmen t t o a stat e interest : th e preven tion o f on e citizen' s profitin g fro m hi s ow n wrongdoin g an d thereby takin g a n unfai r advantag e o f thos e citizen s wh o ar e law abiding. But eve n thi s ha s problems . Eve n i f thi s versio n o f retributiv ism coul d b e worke d ou t an d defended , i t stil l seem s tha t i t coul d be a t mos t on e stat e ai m i n punishing , bu t surel y no t th e dom inant (o r mos t compelling ) one . I f w e wer e formin g a govern ment an d decidin g t o liv e under a rul e o f law , our primar y con cern woul d surel y no t b e wit h th e questio n o f ho w t o dea l wit h persons wh o hav e alread y violate d ou r right s bu t wit h th e ques tion o f ho w t o preven t person s fro m violatin g ou r right s i n th e first place. 11 Thu s i t woul d see m tha t deterrenc e wil l alway s b e the dominan t genera l justifying ai m o f punishment , wit h retri bution—even o n a sophisticate d theor y o f retribution—bein g a t most a sid e constrain t an d a secondar y aim . It migh t b e helpfu l t o distinguish , no t merel y negativ e an d positive retributivism , bu t als o tw o form s o f positiv e retributiv ism: stron g positiv e retributivis m an d wea k positiv e retributiv ism. Wea k positiv e retributivis m i s th e vie w tha t retributiv e o r desert value s function , no t merel y a s sid e constraints , bu t als o

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as s e c o n d a r y p a r t s o f t h e g e n e r a l justifying ai m o f p u n i s h m e n t . (Desert value s a r e g o o d r e a s o n s i n s u p p o r t o f p u n i s h m e n t . ) S t r o n g positiv e retributivis m i s t h e vie w t h a t retributiv e o r d e sert value s function , no t merel y a s sid e constraint s a n d no t merel y as g o o d s e c o n d a r y r e a s o n s , b u t a s t h e d o m i n a n t a n d p r i m a r y justifying r e a s o n s fo r p u n i s h m e n t . (Deser t value s a r e sufficien t r e a s o n s i n s u p p o r t o f p u n i s h m e n t . ) Kant , Hegel , a n d o t h e r classical retributivist s h a v e s u p p o r t e d s t r o n g positiv e retributiv ism. M y suggestio n i n thi s essa y ha s b e e n t h a t thei r claim s hav e p e r h a p s b e e n to o a m b i t i o u s — t h a t wea k positiv e retributivis m i s t h e mos t t h a t o n e m i g h t reasonabl y eve n h o p e t o d e f e n d . I n constitutional t e r m s , t h e p u r s u i t o f retributiv e value s m i g h t r e p r e s e n t a permissibl e o r eve n rationa l stat e interest . I t m i g h t be difficul t t o d e m o n s t r a t e , however , t h a t t h e p u r s u i t o f suc h values coul d b e a c o m p e l l i n g stat e i n t e r e s t — t h e onl y kin d o f in terest sufficien t t o justif y t h e e n c u m b e r a n c e s o f f u n d a m e n t a l rights involve d i n t h e practic e o f p u n i s h m e n t . 1 2

NOTES 1. Se e Herber t Morris , "Person s an d Punishment, " The Monist 52 , no . 4 (Octobe r 1968) , an d Herber t Fingarette , "Punishmen t an d Suf fering," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1977) . See als o m y Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (Dordrecht : D . Reidel , 1979). T h e closes t I com e t o seein g punishmen t a s a proble m i n political philosoph y i s in th e essa y "Marxis m an d Retribution " con tained i n tha t collection . M y mos t recen t exploratio n o f th e prob lems o f punishmen t (fro m whic h a par t o f thi s essa y i s adapte d and expanded ) occur s i n The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, b y Jeffri e G . Murph y an d Jule s L . Coleman , forth coming i n 198 4 fro m Rowma n an d Allanheld , Totowa , N.J. , 1984 . 2. Standard s o f judicial revie w hav e bee n give n thei r mos t comple x articulation i n th e are a o f equa l protectio n analysis . Th e norma l standard o f revie w i s sometime s calle d th e "rationa l basis " test: stat e action wil l pas s revie w i f i t serve s a purpos e tha t coul d b e re garded a s rational. (Thi s i s clearly a weak standard , sinc e some goo d reason ca n probabl y b e foun d fo r al l bu t th e mos t sill y stat e ac tions.) Whe n fundamenta l right s ar e encumbere d o r whe n specia l burdens ar e place d o n member s o f "suspec t classifications " (e.g. , racial minorities) , "stric t judicia l scrutiny " i s triggered . Thi s in volves th e "compellin g stat e interest/leas t restrictiv e alternative " test :

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state actio n wil l pas s revie w onl y i f th e encumberanc e o f th e righ t is justified b y a compelling (no t merel y rationa l o r legitimate ) stat e interest an d i f th e encumberanc e i s actuall y necessar y t o accom plish tha t interest . Thi s i s clearl y a ver y toug h tes t t o pass . Fo r a good genera l discussio n o f thes e matters , se e Joh n E . Nowak , e t al., Constitutional Law, 2 d ed. , (St . Paul : Wes t Publishing , 1983) , pp. 59 0 ff . 3. I n hi s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1974) , Robert Nozic k explore s th e interestin g suggestio n tha t th e stat e should b e viewe d a s a "dominan t protectiv e agency. " 4. Ther e i s a sense , o f course , i n whic h a t leas t som e criminal s hav e simply use d other s a s mean s t o thei r ends . Doe s thi s the n mea n that the y hav e waive d thei r righ t no t t o b e s o use d themselves ? 5. Fo r Kant' s powerfu l statemen t an d defens e o f hi s versio n o f th e retributive theor y o f punishment , se e hi s Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans . Joh n Lad d (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill , 1965) , pp . 99-108. 6. Kant , i n Metaphysical Elements of Justice, argue s tha t justice require s that al l convicte d murderer s b e pu t t o deat h eve n b y a societ y tha t is i n th e proces s o f disbandin g itself . Thi s coul d hardl y hav e an y utilitarian deterrenc e valu e fo r tha t society . 7. Kant' s "mora l p r o o f fo r th e existenc e o f Go d place s suc h weigh t on th e importanc e o f givin g eac h perso n hi s o r he r jus t desert s that, realizin g tha t thi s i s usuall y no t possibl e i n thi s world , Kan t feels tha t w e migh t postulat e th e existenc e o f Go d an d a n afterlif e in orde r t o satisf y ou r mora l desir e tha t i t ge t don e sometime . Se e Lewis Whit e Beck , A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1960) , pp . 27 1 ff . 8. Imagin e ho w intrusiv e o f privac y an d autonom y a stat e woul d hav e to b e i f i t se t ou t t o identif y al l mora l iniquit y an d punis h accord ingly. 9. T h e followin g argumen t draw s heavil y o n th e so-calle d "principl e of fairnes s o r fai r play " defende d b y John Rawl s an d H.L.A . Har t and criticize d effectivel y b y Rober t Nozick . Se e H.L.A . Hart , "Ar e There An y Natura l Rights? " Philosophical Review 6 4 (1955) : 1 7 5 191, Joh n Rawls , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvar d University Press , 1971) , sectio n 18 , an d Rober t Nozick , Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York : Basi c Books , 1974) , pp . 9 0 ff . 10. Fo r a discussio n o f thes e problems , se e Murph y an d Coleman , Philosophy of Law, chap . 3 , no . 25 . 11. Bu t i s no t al l punishmen t afte r th e fact ? O f course . Bu t th e utili tarian deterrenc e vie w advocate s usin g suc h punishmen t fo r future good. Not e tha t a sophisticate d utilitaria n theor y o f punishmen t does no t hav e t o se e punishmen t a s justified solel y t o secur e fu-

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ture genera l happiness . I t ca n als o advocat e othe r futur e values — e.g., right s maximization . Fo r mor e o n thi s an d it s problems , se e Murphy an d Coleman , Philosophy of Law, chaps . 2 an d 3 . 12. I f th e stat e ha s a legitimat e (bu t no t compelling ) interes t i n at tempting t o ensur e tha t on e citize n doe s no t profi t b y hi s o r he r wrongdoing an d thereb y tak e a n unfai r advantag e o f others , ther e are way s less intrusive o r restrictiv e tha n punishmen t tha t th e stat e might emplo y t o see k thi s end—e.g. , a syste m o f compensation . My purpos e here , o f course , ha s no t bee n t o sho w tha t th e state' s interest i n pursuin g suc h value s i s no t compelling . I hav e rathe r been concerne d t o sho w tha t i t i s no t obviou s tha t thi s interes t i s compelling an d thu s tha t th e burde n o f proo f i s on thos e wh o be lieve tha t i t i s to demonstrat e it s compellin g nature . I f thi s interes t is no t compellin g an d i f th e stat e pursue s i t anywa y i n justifyin g the punishmen t o f someon e i n exces s o f wha t woul d b e demande d to serv e utilitaria n deterrenc e values , the n perhap s a case could b e made tha t suc h punishmen t woul d b e crue l an d unusua l i n on e o f the sense s o f "excessive " use d i n th e Eight h Amendment—namely , a punishmen t tha t doe s no t stan d i n reasonabl e proportio n t o a compelling stat e aim . Fo r a furthe r discussio n o f thi s (on e wit h which I a m no w no t totall y happy) , se e th e chapte r "Crue l an d Unusual Punishments " i n m y Retribution, Justice, and Therapy.

7 A MOTIVATIONA L THEOR Y O F EXCUSES I N TH E CRIMINA L LA W R.B. BRAND T

The centra l contentio n o f th e followin g pape r i s that crimina l liability require s a motivational fault i n th e agent . Mor e fully , persons wh o hav e unjustifiabl y broke n vali d la w shoul d b e ex empt fro m punishmen t unles s thei r behavio r i s a resul t o f som e defect o f standin g motivatio n (on e migh t sa y "character " in stead)—"should be " i n th e sens e tha t th e exemptio n i s require d by an y reasonabl y adequat e genera l theor y o f crimina l justice. I shal l suppos e tha t w e nee d fou r concept s i n th e crimina l law . First, th e la w prohibit s certai n type s o f actio n (cal l a n instanc e of one , "actu s reus" ) suc h a s arson , larceny , rape , assault . Th e traditional vie w i s tha t thes e form s o f behavio r ar e forbidde n because the y ar e though t t o b e normall y harmful , o r threaten ing, o r ba d i n themselves . O f course , som e kind s o f behavio r the la w forbid s o r ha s forbidde n ar e no t harmful , o r threaten ing, o r bad , i n fact ; bu t le t u s pas s this . Cal l thi s forbidde n be havior, thi s violatio n o f "primary " (Hart ) lega l norms , "unlaw ful." Second, i n particula r circumstance s a n instanc e o f on e o f thes e forbidden type s o f actio n ma y no t be , o r a t leas t i s reasonabl y believed b y th e agen t no t t o be , harmful , o r bad , o n th e whole , from th e poin t o f vie w o f society ; o n th e contrary , i t ma y b e o r at leas t i s reasonabl y believe d t o b e preferabl e t o othe r option s open t o th e agent . I n thi s cas e th e la w permit s a n exception . 165

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Thus wherea s arso n i s forbidde n b y th e law , a n agen t wil l no t be punishe d i f h e set s fir e t o a hous e i n orde r t o preven t a gen eral conflagration . Cal l behavio r whic h i s unlawful bu t fall s int o this specia l class , "justifie d unlawfu l action. " Third, a n ac t ma y b e unlawfu l bu t not justified i n thi s sense , but nevertheles s ma y no t manifes t an y defectiv e motivatio n o f the agent . Thus , i f a perso n commit s a rape , w e ca n normall y infer tha t h e ha s n o stron g aversio n t o usin g violenc e fo r ob taining sexua l gratification , o r t o producin g fea r an d shoc k i n his victim, o r t o forcin g a woman t o hav e intimat e relation s whic h she doe s no t want , an d t o infringin g th e prohibition s o f th e law . (We migh t ad d tha t th e perso n doe s no t hav e a stron g aversio n to th e ris k o f incurrin g sever e lega l penalties , bu t I thin k w e should no t includ e lac k o f suc h self-intereste d aversio n amon g the "defects " o f motivation ; i t woul d mak e n o differenc e t o th e argument i f w e did. ) Bu t sometime s suc h a n inferenc e i s blocked . A perso n wh o ha s rape d ma y hav e honestl y believe d tha t h e ha d the woman' s consent . I n thi s cas e a circumstanc e ma y o r doe s block th e norma l inferenc e t o substandar d motivation ; th e ac tion i n thi s situatio n i s compatible wit h th e agen t havin g a n ad equate standar d leve l o f motivatio n i n al l respects . Now , sa y o f such a cas e tha t th e behavio r i s "excused, " an d th e relevan t cir cumstance tha t block s th e inferenc e w e ca n cal l "a n excuse. " S o accidents an d mistake s o f fac t ar e excuses . Fourth, ther e i s behavio r tha t i s unlawful , unjustified , an d no t excused i n thi s sense , bu t nevertheles s though t no t properl y punished. Fo r instance , behavio r o f infant s o r person s suffer ing fro m som e form s o f insanity . (Bu t unlawful , unjustifie d be havior arisin g fro m a delusio n ma y b e excused , a s involvin g mistake o f fact. ) Sa y tha t suc h behavio r i s "not responsible. " Thu s we nee d fou r terms : "unlawful, " "unjustified, " (behavio r whic h is unlawfu l an d unjustifie d ma y b e calle d "legall y wrongful") , "unexcused" an d "responsible. " A n unlawfu l unjustifie d ac t i s done wit h men s re a onl y i f responsibl e an d no t excused ; a t leas t I propos e w e tal k thi s way , givin g a clea r meanin g t o "men s rea. " It shoul d b e notice d tha t th e foregoin g conceptua l frame work deliberatel y diverge s fro m familia r lega l categorie s i n som e ways. First , th e "actu s reus" , o r unlawfu l conduct , i s defined s o as not t o requir e suc h menta l element s a s purposefulness , reck lessness, an d th e like , althoug h i n orde r t o b e conduc t a t all , i t

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must b e different , fo r instance , fro m sleepwalking ; tha t is , it mus t be guide d b y some beliefs an d desires . Thus absenc e o f th e menta l elements i s include d amon g excuses . I n thi s an d als o i n th e matter o f ho w t o explai n "justification " I a m happ y t o hav e th e support o f Glanvill e William s *; h e note s tha t th e inclusio n o f mental element s i n th e definitio n o f a n offens e raise s problem s about th e liabilit y o f accessories . I als o note tha t Herber t Packe r pointed out 2 tha t th e Mode l Pena l Code' s procedur e i s cleare r and simple r i n som e ways , bu t tha t i t i s mor e perspicuou s t o identify th e kind s o f over t behavio r th e la w aim s t o prevent , an d then t o lis t th e variou s menta l element s tha t serv e t o exemp t violators fro m punishment . I n thi s respec t m y ter m "excuse " i s more inclusiv e tha n i t i s fo r suc h writer s a s Georg e Fletcher . But o n th e othe r hand , m y us e o f excus e i s i n othe r respect s narrower tha n i s usual. Wherea s infanc y an d insanit y ar e ofte n viewed a s excuses , I propos e no t t o cal l the m s o becaus e the y differ fro m othe r excuse s i n importan t ways , whic h th e follow ing discussio n wil l mak e clear . I a m not , o f course , suggestin g that infanc y o r insanit y shoul d no t exemp t fro m punishment ; but th e reason s ar e different . I a m callin g sanit y an d nonin fancy condition s o f "responsibility"—an d th e lis t coul d b e ex panded. Whethe r w e defin e men s re a s o a s t o impl y bot h ab sence o f excus e i n m y sense , an d responsibility , o r onl y th e former, i s a semanti c issu e t o whic h littl e importanc e shoul d b e attached. I n earlie r times , excuse wa s not eve n distinguishe d fro m justification; thi s failur e t o distinguis h wa s a manifes t confu sion. T h e mai n contentio n o f thi s chapte r depart s bot h fro m tra dition an d th e Mode l Pena l Code . Th e motivatio n theor y doe s have somethin g i n commo n wit h a n earlie r perio d o f th e la w when, fo r example , Bracto n sai d tha t "desir e an d purpose " dis tinguish "evil-doing," 3 an d "desir e t o injure " wa s a par t o f th e definition o f arson , an d a chil d o f eigh t wa s hange d fo r arso n because o f "malic e an d revenge " i n him. 4 T h e la w a t tha t tim e seems t o hav e overlooke d tha t a person' s motivatio n i n actin g involves no t onl y desire s fo r certai n outcome s bu t als o aversions to bein g motivate d no t t o d o certai n things , an d overlooke d th e central importanc e o f th e latter . Bu t th e la w ha s move d fro m identifying th e menta l elemen t o f a crim e fro m somethin g abou t motivation, t o intent. Ther e ar e differen t intention s comprisin g

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the menta l elemen t fo r th e variou s offenses , s o tha t F.B . Sayre , at th e conclusio n o f hi s historica l study , opine d tha t i t i s futil e at presen t t o see k "an y singl e precis e meaning " fo r men s rea. 5 (Of course , tha t i s exactly wha t I a m proposin g t o do.) Th e Mode l Penal Cod e group s togethe r severa l unrelate d "genera l princi ples o f liability" , namely , tha t th e agen t ha s acte d "purposely , knowingly, recklessly , o r negligently , a s th e la w ma y require" , but then , i n th e sam e Article , list s variou s specifi c defenses , in cluding ignoranc e o r mistak e o f fac t o r law , involuntar y intox ication, duress , entrapment , etc. , an d separate s al l thi s fro m a section o n justificatio n an d a furthe r sectio n o n responsibilit y (insanity an d infancy) . I f an y genera l principl e underlie s th e various excuse s liste d i n th e Code , i t i s not mad e clear ; perhap s the motivatio n theor y i s wrong , bu t a t leas t i t put s forwar d a general principl e t o b e assessed . Incidentally , th e movemen t o f the la w fro m motiv e t o inten t ma y b e mor e verba l tha n real , since a person' s inten t reflect s hi s motivation ; thi s "movement, " unless I a m mistaken , reflect s a n overl y simplifie d psychology . But I agre e tha t th e motivatio n theor y i s a departur e fro m mainstream thinkin g an d therefor e ha s t o b e defended . In th e cours e o f m y argumen t I explai n wh y certai n circum stances (fo r example , duress , accident , mistak e o f fact ) excus e an actio n accordin g t o th e motivatio n theory , an d poin t ou t tha t these circumstance s i n fac t exemp t fro m punishmen t accordin g to curren t law . Bu t I a m no t suggestin g tha t because m y defini tion implie s tha t certai n circumstances , whic h ar e standardl y regarded a s excusin g b y th e courts , d o excus e i s a confirmation of m y proposal . Sociolog y o f th e law , o r explanator y histor y o f the law , aim s t o explai n actua l law s an d cour t decision s ideall y in th e sam e wa y a s astronomy explain s eclipses ; suc h theoretica l frameworks are refute d b y disconformit y wit h th e actua l law s and decisions . No t s o the theor y I shal l provide . I n an y cas e th e conformity i s inexact : th e theor y t o b e propose d doe s no t fol low th e law' s vie w that , roughly , nonculpabl e ignoranc e o f th e law i s n o excuse , o r tha t men s re a consideration s ma y b e ig nored i n connectio n wit h th e offense s o f bigam y o r statutor y rape, o r tha t a stric t felony-murde r rul e i s justified. (Sinc e man y lawyers ar e uncomfortabl e wit h th e la w a t thes e points , perhap s an elemen t o f fiction i s presen t i n tal k o f "th e law." ) I wis h t o say, however , tha t th e roug h conformit y o f actua l la w t o th e

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proposed genera l principl e i s enoug h t o giv e plausibilit y t o th e view tha t th e principl e i s i n som e sens e implici t i n th e law ; I also poin t ou t tha t wher e principl e an d la w i n principl e ar e dis crepant, ther e i s reaso n t o doub t tha t th e la w i s justified. W H A T KIN D O F THEOR Y D O W E WANT ?

I a m urgin g th e genera l positio n tha t legall y wrongfu l act s ought t o b e subjec t t o lega l punishmen t onl y i f the y ar e a t leas t partially cause d b y a defectiv e stat e o f th e agent' s (long-term ) motivation. Bu t ho w i s on e t o suppor t suc h a contention ? A ful l explanatio n an d defens e o f a n answe r t o thi s questio n would b e to o larg e a projec t t o b e undertake n here ; wha t wil l be possibl e i s onl y t o outlin e a view , a paralle l t o whic h fo r th e closely relate d field o f ethic s th e write r ha s defende d i n detai l elsehwere. 6 Wha t w e ma y sa y briefl y i s tha t w e ar e lookin g fo r justified lega l principle s abou t excuses . Bu t wha t i s i t fo r a lega l principle t o b e 'justified, " an d ho w d o w e identif y on e tha t is ? I mak e us e her e o f a proposa l defende d elsewher e fo r ethica l principles: a lega l syste m i s justified i f an d onl y i f al l factuall y informed an d rational 7 adult s woul d choos e o r prefe r i t t o b e obeyed an d enforce d i n th e society , wit h it s institutions , i f the y expected t o liv e in it . Or, wha t ma y b e ver y nearl y th e sam e thing , legal principle s ar e justified i f tha t moral system, which factuall y informed an d rationa l person s woul d prefe r t o an y othe r i f the y expected t o liv e unde r it , woul d cal l o n individual s t o obe y an d require official s t o enforc e them . I hop e an d anticipat e tha t mos t readers wil l b e favorabl y dispose d towar d thi s conceptio n o f justified principle ; I thin k mos t i f no t al l person s wil l b e mor e favorably dispose d towar d a legal principl e o r syste m i f they thin k it i s justified i n thi s sense—o r bette r justified tha n alternatives. 8 Among th e "institutions " o f a societ y lik e our s i s th e politica l system: wit h legislativ e an d excutiv e branche s roughl y demo cratically chosen , wit h a Constitution , a Suprem e Court , an d a division o f power s amon g th e thre e branche s o f governmen t (no t to mentio n al l th e pressur e group s suc h a s unions , th e Mora l Majority, etc.) . I t migh t b e tha t al l rationa l person s woul d wan t any lega l system , adopte d an d supporte d b y thi s politica l orga nization, t o enjo y a defeasible presumptio n o f authority— a pre sumption tha t migh t b e defeate d b y a clea r showin g tha t som e

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feature o f th e syste m mus t b e expecte d t o wor k contrar y t o th e long-range welfar e o f peopl e i n general . Can w e sa y anythin g abou t wha t kin d o f legal/mora l syste m informed rationa l person s woul d prefe r fo r a societ y i n whic h they expecte d t o live ? I believ e th e answe r i s tha t the y woul d prefer a legal/mora l syste m th e currenc y o f whic h i n th e societ y would maximiz e genera l benefit—genera l happiness , i f yo u like . In othe r words , a rule-utilitaria n system . Thi s chapte r i s not th e place fo r an y extensiv e argumen t fo r thi s answer . I t i s admit tedly controversia l today , an d unpopula r i n som e quarters . Among thos e wit h who m i t i s unpopula r ar e neo-retributivist s about th e crimina l law . Thes e writers , however , seldo m o r neve r work ou t a theor y o f thei r allege d mora l knowledge ; no r doe s the retributiv e theor y eve r ge t a precis e statement . Thos e wh o lean towar d th e mor e traditiona l utilitaria n vie w nee d no t worr y for fea r the y ar e ou t o f date. 9 Fo r th e presen t purpose s I fee l free t o suppos e tha t utilitarianis m i s sufficientl y plausibl e to day. 10 t o mak e i t worthwhil e t o develo p th e implication s o f a utilitarian theor y o f th e crimina l law , a s I shal l d o i n th e final section o f thi s chapter . What w e ar e specificall y concerne d wit h her e i s thos e lega l principles tha t rationa l person s woul d wan t a s principle s gov erning exemptio n fro m punishmen t whe n a legall y wrongfu l ac t has bee n committed . T h e motivatio n theor y o f excuse s i s suc h a possibility : tha t a legall y wrongfu l ac t ough t t o b e subjec t t o punishment onl y i f th e ac t manifeste d a defec t o f motivation . (Of course , a perso n wh o ha s acte d wrongfull y shoul d als o b e exempt fro m punishmen t i f h e i s insane , a n infant , etc. ) The motivationa l theory , a s stated , i s a restricte d principle ; i t states onl y wha t i s a necessar y conditio n fo r bein g punishe d a t all. I t coul d b e expanded , i n combinatio n wit h a principl e o f proportionality, int o th e thesi s tha t th e severit y o f punishmen t for a give n crim e shoul d b e proportiona l t o th e gravit y o f th e defect displaye d b y th e crimina l act . Retributivist s migh t ap prove this , unles s the y thin k tha t th e punishmen t inflicte d mus t somehow equa l th e evi l done . Thus , i f a wors e defec t o f moti vation i s show n b y intentiona l homicid e tha n b y reckles s homi cide, on e migh t infe r tha t th e punishmen t fo r murde r shoul d be mor e sever e tha n fo r manslaughter . O f course , th e "gravity " of a defec t i s no t obvious , excep t fo r som e cases : willingnes s t o

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kill i s manifestl y wors e tha n willingnes s t o risk a killing . Mostl y our thought s abou t relativ e defect s o f motivatio n see m t o g o wit h our thought s abou t ho w objectionabl e i s th e typ e o f ac t tha t typically manifest s it . W e d o hav e opinion s o n suc h matters , shown b y ho w relativel y sever e a punishmen t w e thin k accept able, an d als o b y ou r thought s abou t whic h kind s o f benefi t wil l justify; thu s w e thin k an d th e la w hold s tha t us e o f a letha l weapon i s justified t o defen d one' s ow n lif e (o r tha t o f wif e o r children), bu t no t t o preven t a theft , muc h les s t o preven t tres pass o n one' s land . T h e Suprem e Cour t evidentl y think s tha t murder i s mor e heinou s tha n rape . However thi s ma y be , i t i s certain tha t supposition s abou t th e character ( = syste m o f motivations) 11 o f a defendan t pla y a considerable rol e bot h i n actua l sentence s t o imprisonmen t an d in normativ e statement s i n th e Mode l Pena l Cod e abou t th e principles tha t shoul d gover n sentences . We shoul d not e tha t som e writer s thin k tha t th e dangerous ness o f a person , a s reveale d b y hi s crimina l act , doe s an d shoul d play a larg e rol e i n th e crimina l law . Ho w dangerou s a perso n is, o f course , i s closel y relate d t o th e particula r defec t o f moti vation show n b y hi s crimina l behavior ; informatio n abou t a person's standin g motivatio n i s a n importan t guid e t o predic tion o f futur e behavior . W H Y TH E MOTIVATIONA L THEORY ?

Why shoul d w e thin k tha t a n agen t ough t t o b e exemp t fro m punishment fo r a wrongfu l ac t i f a defec t o f motivatio n i s no t among th e causa l condition s o f th e act ? W e shal l g o int o thi s more deepl y i n th e final section , whe n w e surve y th e rational e of lega l punishmen t a s a whole , bu t certai n consideration s meri t attention a t thi s point . W e ca n a t leas t cal l o n th e authorit y o f ancient traditio n i f w e thin k tha t a n ac t i s liabl e t o punishmen t only i f i t spring s fro m a n "evi l heart " o r "viciou s will. " Accord ing t o Sayre , abou t 160 0 th e "malice " require d fo r a charg e o f murder involve d "genera l malevolenc e o r cold-bloode d desir e to injure." 12 A s Sayr e put s it, 13 th e mora l blameworthines s o f a criminal dee d (an d men s re a require d this ) wa s "necessaril y base d upon a fre e min d voluntaril y choosin g evi l rathe r tha n good. " This view , i f w e includ e th e tal k abou t a "free " min d choosin g

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evil, appear s t o b e burdene d wit h a heav y loa d o f questionabl e metaphysics. W e ge t th e pictur e o f a mind , fre e i n th e sens e o f causally undetermined , optin g fo r wha t i s evil rathe r tha n wha t is good . Thi s pictur e mus t b e modifie d t o som e exten t i f th e conception i s to deserv e a seriou s hearin g today . Th e firs t thin g we hav e t o d o i s constru e fre e choic e i n th e ordinar y sense , suc h as when a perso n says , "You marrie d m e o f you r ow n fre e will" , meaning i n th e absenc e o f coercio n (i t wa s no t a shotgu n wed ding) an d perhap s afte r a n opportunit y t o deliberat e o n th e op tions an d thei r probabl e consequences , an d t o tak e th e optio n one mos t wante d t o take , everythin g considered . Thi s i s far fro m free choic e i n th e sens e o f causa l indeterminism , an d i s com patible wit h a scienc e o f motivationa l psycholog y ( a scienc e abou t lawfulness i n action , o r causatio n i n action) . Suppose , then , w e take fre e choic e t o mea n uncoerce d actio n determine d b y th e desires an d aversion s o f th e agen t an d hi s conception o f th e op tions ope n t o hi m an d thei r probabl e consequences . The n w e can constru e a n evi l wil l i n term s o f th e (objectionable ) desire s or aversion s o f th e agent , fro m whic h hi s action s spring , i n part . So w e migh t mea n b y a n evi l wil l th e presenc e o f desire s t o d o harm t o someone , an d th e like , or , mor e importantly , indiffer ence t o th e prospec t o f harmin g other s o r runnin g th e ris k o f so doing . I f w e d o this , w e ca n regar d huma n agent s a s causa l systems, o f whic h desires/aversion s ar e a n importan t part . I f w e make thi s change, an d g o alon g wit h traditio n i n identifyin g men s rea wit h a n evi l will , the n w e ca n clai m th e suppor t o f traditio n in holdin g tha t men s rea , th e menta l elemen t necessar y fo r li ability t o punishment , a t leas t i n larg e par t concern s th e moti vation o f th e agent , a s a consequenc e o f whic h h e chos e t o d o what h e did , i n th e situatio n a s h e sa w it . Indifferenc e t o th e welfare o f others , then , ma y b e a majo r par t o f wha t i t i s to hav e an evi l will . Recent writings , however , emphasiz e tha t th e menta l elemen t of a crim e ha s t o d o wit h intention , whethe r somethin g wa s don e knowingly o r purposefully . I n th e cas e o f Regina v . Cunningham (Court o f Crimina l Appeal , 4 1 Crm . App . 155 , 1957) , th e cour t proposed tha t t o sho w tha t a defendan t acte d "maliciously, " i t suffices t o sho w tha t h e "foresaw " tha t wha t h e di d migh t in jure. Thi s seem s a departur e fro m a motivationa l conceptio n o f mens rea . Bu t i t i s not; th e psycholog y o f motivatio n appear s t o

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have bee n widel y misunderstood . I f w e tur n t o psychologica l theory, w e find tha t wha t a perso n doe s a t a give n momen t i s a function o f a t leas t five variables : (1 ) his beliefs (possibl y partl y unconscious) abou t th e option s ope n t o him ; (2 ) his beliefs abou t the situatio n h e i s in ; (3 ) hi s belief s abou t consequence s tha t might occu r i f h e take s an y one of thes e option s an d ho w stron g they ar e (ho w likel y h e think s th e consequence s woul d be) ; (4) the vividnes s o f hi s representation o f thes e matter s a t the time ; and (5 ) his desires an d aversion s fo r thes e consequence s (takin g each actio n a s being a consequence o f itself , s o that a n aversio n just t o doin g somethin g o f a certai n sor t i s included). T h e the ory assert s tha t a perso n wil l hav e a tendency to perfor m a n action h e think s ope n t o him , accordin g a s i t promise s t o hav e consequences h e wants wit h ho w great a probability; th e perso n will actuall y perfor m tha t ac t whic h h e ha s th e stronges t ten dency t o perform , a s fixed b y th e desires/aversion s associate d with th e anticipate d consequences , thei r influenc e diminishe d by th e anticipate d improbabilit y o f a consequenc e occurrin g i f he perform s th e act . Som e writer s pu t thi s b y sayin g tha t peo ple ac t roughl y s o a s t o maximiz e thei r expecte d utility—"util ity" being define d i n term s o f thei r desires/aversion s a t th e time . A surprisin g fac t the n emerges : th e motivatio n an d belie f ar e entangled i n th e productio n o f a n actio n i n a wa y seemingl y overlooked b y som e writer s o n th e law . Suppose w e say Jane i s guilty o f a crim e becaus e sh e tampere d wit h th e brake s o f he r husband's car , expectin g i t woul d brin g abou t hi s death . Ou r legal schola r say s Jane ha s men s re a becaus e sh e knowingl y acte d so a s t o brin g abou t a death . (Presumabl y Jan e brough t abou t her husband' s deat h no t becaus e sh e wante d thi s fo r itself , bu t because hi s death woul d enabl e he r t o collect hi s insurance an d elope wit h someon e else. ) Now , whe n w e tak e psychologica l theory int o accoun t i t is clear tha t wha t i s responsible fo r Jane' s tampering wit h th e brake s an d thereb y producin g he r hus band's deat h i s no t merel y he r wantin g th e insuranc e mone y along wit h knowin g tha t tamperin g wit h th e brake s i n orde r t o get i t woul d brin g abou t hi s death ; wha t i s responsibl e i s he r relative indifferenc e t o bringin g abou t he r husband' s death . Ou r legal schola r coul d a s well hav e sai d tha t Jane i s guilty o f a crim e because sh e tampere d wit h th e brakes , relativel y indifferen t t o the prospec t tha t s o doing wil l brin g th e death . Bu t for tha t in -

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difference, he r actio n woul d no t hav e occurred . S o i t i s clea r that whil e th e Mode l Pena l Cod e make s th e norma l menta l con dition o f criminalit y tha t th e agen t purposefull y o r knowingl y or recklessl y d o a forbidde n thing , i t coul d a s wel l b e sai d tha t the norma l conditio n o f crimina l actio n i s failure to be motivated to avoid a foresee n forbidde n consequenc e o r t o b e indifferen t to a substantia l ris k tha t i t occur . Thu s tal k abou t intentio n o r foresight i s misleading ; th e intention s w e hav e ar e a functio n of ou r desires/aversions , an d wha t a perso n foresa w i s evidenc e about wha t h e wa s indifferen t to . Wha t i s nove l i n th e motiva tion theory , a s compare d wit h th e ordinar y view , i s simpl y th e looking a t anothe r sid e o f th e picture . If w e spea k o f "defect s o f motivation, " th e questio n arise s which kin d o f defec t w e hav e i n mind . Woul d som e mora l de fect, lik e lac k o f generosit y o r sympathy , o r sadism , b e enough ? (If w e answe r affirmatively , a judge migh t hav e t o dra w o n th e positive moralit y o f hi s da y t o identif y a defect , or , i f h e hap pens t o be a scholar i n th e histor y o f philosophy , h e migh t spec ulate a s t o "true " defects. ) A mor e plausibl e vie w woul d b e t o identify a s defect s thos e state d o r implie d b y th e prohibition s (in statute s o r precedents ) o f a give n lega l system ; so , if th e la w forbids intercours e wit h a gir l les s tha n te n year s o f age , ab sence o f a n adequat e aversio n t o intercours e wit h a child , o r a t least absenc e o f a n adequat e aversio n t o obedienc e t o th e rele vant prohibitio n o f th e law , woul d coun t a s a defect. Sometime s the la w specifie s tha t a crim e o f a certain sor t i s committed onl y if th e agen t intende d something , fo r example , i f h e enter s a building fo r th e purpos e o f committin g som e crime ; th e defec t then i s no t onl y tha t o f bein g unavers e t o enterin g a buildin g not one' s own , bu t als o tha t o f bein g unavers e t o th e prospec t of committin g som e othe r wrongfu l act . S o ou r lis t o f defect s i s essentially take n fro m th e law . O f course , th e la w ma y b e ba d law, i n whic h cas e th e "defects " wil l no t reall y b e defect s fro m any poin t o f vie w othe r tha n tha t o f ba d law . Th e la w i s alway s subject t o improvemen t fro m th e standpoin t o f reflectiv e mo rality. When w e spea k o f a "defect " o f motivation , w e nee d t o spec ify som e degre e o f strength . A perso n migh t hav e som e degre e of aversio n t o killin g another , o r breakin g th e la w generally , bu t go ahea d anywa y becaus e th e prospectiv e victi m stoo d i n hi s way .

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How muc h motivatio n i s adequate ? I t nee d no t b e o f infinit e strength, enoug h t o overcom e ever y possibl e contrar y motiva tion; t o us e terminolog y som e favor , i t mus t onl y b e enoug h t o resist contrar y motivation s tha t a perso n o f ordinar y firmness would resist . S o th e aversio n t o cooperatin g i n a n arme d rob bery shoul d b e greate r tha n an y desir e t o d o wha t migh t wi n the affection s o f a lady , bu t i t nee d no t b e enoug h t o overcom e an aversio n t o havin g a bulle t i n one' s head , instantly , i f on e refuses t o g o alon g (excus e o f duress) . On e finds som e o f thes e comparisons spelle d ou t i n case s i n whic h i t i s debated whethe r an offens e i s "justified. " On e wil l als o ge t a roug h orderin g o f the expecte d strengt h o f aversion s fo r variou s offenses , b y looking a t th e severit y wit h whic h th e correspondin g offens e i s punished. (Thi s correspondenc e is , however , certainl y rough : in Rummel v . Estelle th e Suprem e Cour t uphel d Texa s statute s that inflicte d lif e imprisonmen t o f a perso n whos e thre e non violent felonies , fo r example , a forge d check , involve d a tota l of $240. ) If th e motivationa l theor y o f men s re a i s correct , i n holdin g that a n unlawfu l an d unjustifie d ac t i s subjec t t o punishmen t only i f i t manifest s a defec t o f motivation , the n a n excus e mus t be som e showing , i n th e fac e o f knowledg e tha t th e accuse d acte d illegally an d withou t justification , tha t th e actio n wa s compati ble wit h ther e bein g n o defec t o f motivation—th e norma l infer ence fro m ac t t o motivatio n i s blocked. I f w e hol d tha t thi s the ory o f excuse s i s essentiall y embodie d i n th e law , w e expec t t o find tha t th e recognize d excuse s (and , mutati s mutandis , a t leas t some mitigations ) ar e o f thi s kind . It ma y b e though t tha t obviousl y a lega l excus e i s n o suc h thing, for , i f i t were , judge s woul d b e require d t o dabbl e i n speculations abou t motivatio n i n orde r t o appl y th e law . (O f course, accordin g t o th e motivationa l theory , a judge i s no t re quired t o su m u p th e virtue s an d vice s o f a perso n an d decid e whether o n th e whol e h e i s a virtuou s man , o r a t leas t u p t o average. Also , h e i s no t require d t o decid e whethe r a give n ac tion woul d b e morall y blameworthy—manifes t a mora l defect — if i t wer e no t contrar y t o law. ) Bu t judges i n fac t necessaril y d o make som e judgment s abou t motivation . (An d judgment s abou t the inten t o r belief s o f th e accuse d nee d b e n o les s speculative. ) If w e follo w th e Mode l Pena l Code , a judge, i n orde r t o decid e

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that a voluntar y ac t wa s performe d a t all , mus t conclud e tha t the bodil y movemen t wa s no t a resul t o f a convulsion , mad e during slee p o r unconsciousnes s o r a s a resul t o f hypnoti c sug gestion, bu t rathe r tha t i t wa s " a produc t o f th e effor t o r deter mination o f th e actor , eithe r consciou s o r habitual " (Art . 2.01). 14 The conclusio n clearl y require s inferenc e beyon d observabl e bodily behavior . Moreover , accordin g t o th e Code , i n orde r t o decide tha t a n ac t meet s th e genera l condition s o f crimina l culpability, i t mus t b e show n tha t eithe r (1 ) th e "consciou s ob ject" o f th e agen t wa s t o behav e i n a certai n wa y o r produc e a certain effect , o r (2 ) tha t th e agen t wa s "awar e o f o r "practi cally certain " o f al l materia l element s o f th e offense , o r (3 ) tha t the agen t consciousl y disregarde d a substantia l an d unjustifia ble ris k "suc h tha t it s disregar d involve s a gros s deviatio n fro m the standar d o f conduc t tha t a law-abidin g perso n woul d ob serve i n th e actor' s situation, " o r (4 ) h e act s a s i f h e wer e dis regarding a risk , bu t i s unawar e o f th e ris k althoug h hi s failur e to b e awar e o f i t i s itsel f a "gros s deviatio n fro m th e standar d of car e tha t a reasonabl e perso n woul d observ e i n th e actor' s situation" (Art . 2.0 2 (2)) . Wit h th e possibl e exceptio n o f (2) , i f this i s no t speculatio n abou t motivation , wha t woul d be ? The motivationa l theor y o f excuse s require s onl y tha t some one decid e whethe r a certai n featur e o f th e cas e rule s ou t a n inference t o a defec t o f motivation , give n th e othe r fact s sur rounding wha t th e defenden t did . It ma y b e objecte d tha t th e theor y implie s that , whe n illega l behavior i s unexcused, ther e ca n b e inferenc e fro m behavio r t o defect o f motivation , wherea s n o suc h inferenc e i s eve r possi ble. Bu t thi s i s absurd. Onc e w e assume , a s w e must , tha t actio n is a functio n roughl y o f th e belief s an d desires/aversion s o f th e agent, w e ar e i n a goo d positio n t o reconstruc t th e motivation , and w e d o s o al l th e time . I f a perso n doe s no t interrup t a friendly gam e o f tenni s t o mak e inquirie s whe n a chil d fall s of f a bicycl e i n th e nex t cour t an d i s screamin g an d covere d wit h blood, an d n o on e els e is around t o rende r succor , w e infer tha t he i s defective i n sympath y o r empathy . O f cours e a furthe r stor y might provid e a justification o r excuse . An d th e inferenc e doe s require commonsens e familiarit y wit h ho w peopl e ordinaril y behave i n certai n circumstances , an d wh y the y d o th e thing s the y do. Bu t w e d o kno w thes e things. 15

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T H E MOTIVATIO N THEOR Y AN D RECOGNIZE D EXCUSE S

The motivatio n theor y wil l appear mor e plausibl e i f i t is clea r that th e standar d excuse s recognize d ar e excuse s i n m y sense . I hav e suggeste d earlie r tha t thi s fac t doe s no t strictl y confir m the theory ; bu t i t does sho w th e theor y i s in touc h wit h th e real ities o f th e law . Le t u s therefor e surve y th e majo r excuses , an d see ho w wel l the y fit th e motivatio n theory . Accidents. A n acciden t occur s whe n som e untowar d even t oc curs becaus e a causa l proces s ha s unforeseeabl y gon e awry : a bullet richochet s an d kill s a bystander ; a chil d dart s ou t fro m between parke d car s i n fron t o f a motorist; a cable breaks. (Th e event i s no t accidenta l i f negligenc e i s involved, fo r example , i f the drive r coul d hav e stoppe d ha d h e no t bee n talkin g wit h a passenger o r wavin g t o a friend. ) I n suc h cases , whe n a n even t occurs tha t th e la w prohibits , th e agen t i s legall y excused . Th e motivation theor y implie s thi s conclusion , fo r i n suc h case s (negligence aside ) n o inferenc e t o a defec t o f motivatio n i s pos sible. I n som e specia l circumstances , however , th e agen t i s no t legally excused . Fo r instance , i f a perso n i s committin g a fe lony, an d accidentall y discharge s a weapon, killin g someone , h e is no t excused , sinc e th e contex t o f th e attempte d felon y pro vides "presumption " tha t th e deat h wa s cause d "recklessl y un der circumstance s manifestin g extrem e indifferenc e t o th e valu e of huma n life " (Mode l Pena l Cod e 210. 2 (l)(b)) . Th e "pre sumption," o f course , nee d no t correspon d wit h th e facts , bu t the explanatio n offere d b y th e Cod e fits th e motivatio n theory , in tha t th e tota l even t i s sai d t o "manifes t extrem e indifferenc e to th e valu e o f huma n life"—certainl y a defec t o f motivatio n o f high degree. 1 6 Mistake of fact. T h e motivationa l theor y affirm s tha t a n agen t is no t liabl e t o punishmen t fo r a wrongfu l ac t (unjustifie d breac h of th e law ) i f th e breac h wa s no t a t leas t partl y cause d b y a standing defec t o f hi s motivation . So , is a woma n guilt y o f a crim e if sh e kill s he r husband , shootin g throug h a close d door , i n th e honest belie f tha t sh e i s firing a t someon e attemptin g t o brea k into he r bedroo m t o rap e her ? Wha t woul d b e th e defec t o f motivation? T h e la w doe s no t condem n willingnes s t o us e a le thal weapo n t o protec t one' s sel f fro m bein g raped . So , i n th e circumstances, ther e i s n o reaso n t o suppos e he r actio n wa s

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caused b y defectiv e motivation , and , accordin g t o th e theory , she mus t b e excused . Tha t i s als o th e conclusio n o f th e law . (Se e the Mode l Pena l Code , 2.04 , 233.1(1 ) an d 212.4(l)(a). ) I t ca n be, however , agai n a s th e la w affirms , that , give n a person' s mistaken belief , hi s actio n show s som e othe r defec t o f motiva tion differen t fro m tha t whic h woul d hav e bee n show n ha d h e not entertaine d a mistake n belief , an d the n h e ca n b e guilt y o f a lesse r crime. 17 It ma y b e objecte d tha t th e motivationa l theor y doe s no t re flect the la w since , according t o th e motivationa l theory , a n hones t mistake o f fac t coul d bloc k inferenc e t o a defec t o f motivation , whereas a t leas t th e commo n la w traditio n require s tha t th e mistake b e reasonable , an d i n som e case s (bigamy , statutor y rape , abduction, attackin g a n office r o f th e law) , a mistak e o f fac t i s no defense , reasonabl e o r not . (Th e motivationa l theor y wil l concede tha t th e reasonablenes s o f a belie f i s importan t evi dence fo r whethe r th e belie f wa s actuall y held. ) A view , close r to th e motivationa l theor y (Texa s statute , se e Green v . State) 18 requires tha t th e belie f aris e fro m wan t o f prope r care , whic h of cours e implie s a defec t o f motivation , bu t possibl y a mino r defect. Contemporar y lega l opinion , however , appear s t o hav e moved int o substantia l agreemen t wit h th e motivationa l theory , requiring onl y actua l belie f rathe r tha n reasonabl e belief , fo r serious crimes . Mistake of law. T he motivatio n theor y appear s t o be i n conflic t with th e practic e o f court s o n th e questio n whethe r mistak e o f law i s a n excuse . O n th e whole , a t leas t i n theory , court s hav e held tha t mistake s a s t o crimina l la w (a s distinct , fo r instance , from propert y law ) ar e n o excuse . Fo r example , a nativ e o f Baghdad committe d a n unlawfu l "unnatura l offence " o n boar d an Eas t India n shi p anchore d i n a n Englis h harbor . Th e ac t wa s no crim e i n hi s nativ e country ; h e di d no t kno w tha t i t wa s i n England; an d h e presumabl y di d no t thin k th e actio n immoral . But hi s convictio n wa s upheld . Ho w coul d thi s be , i f liabilit y t o punishment require s a defect o f motivation ? I t woul d b e unrea sonable t o suppos e tha t h e shoul d hav e inquire d a s t o th e le gality o f th e ac t i n England ; thu s ther e wa s n o evidenc e o f de fect o f diligenc e i n inquirin g int o th e law , s o n o lac k o f respec t for th e la w o f England . I t ma y b e tha t i n th e Englan d o f th e time (1836) , i t wa s though t manifes t tha t "unnatura l offences "

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were immora l an d tha t th e ma n shoul d hav e bee n pu t o n notic e thereby tha t th e la w migh t wel l prohibi t them; 1 9 o r i t ma y hav e been though t tha t absenc e o f a n aversio n t o sodom y wa s itsel f a defec t o f motivation . Publi c opinio n today , however , i s prob ably bette r summarize d i n a n opinio n o f th e Iow a Suprem e Court, i n par t a s follows : "Respec t fo r law , whic h i s th e mos t cogent forc e i n promptin g orderl y conduc t i n a civilize d com munity, i s weakened , i f me n ar e punishe d fo r act s whic h ac cording t o th e genera l consensu s o f opinio n the y wer e justifie d in believin g t o b e morall y righ t an d i n accordanc e wit h law." 20 Nevertheless, a lin e o f distinguishe d jurist s ha s offere d argu ments t o th e effec t tha t allowin g ignoranc e o f th e la w a s a n ex cuse woul d b e impracticabl e an d undermin e th e efficac y o f th e law. Eve n a n opinio n o f th e U.S . Suprem e Court, 21 delivere d by Justice Douglas , whil e overturnin g a conviction o f infringin g a Californi a la w tha t th e defenden t coul d no t hav e know n about , stated tha t "W e d o no t g o wit h Blackston e i n sayin g tha t ' a vi cious will ' i s necessar y t o constitut e a crime , fo r conduc t with out regar d t o th e inten t o f th e doe r i s often sufficient . Ther e i s wide latitud e i n th e lawmaker s t o declar e a n offens e an d t o ex clude element s o f knowledg e an d diligenc e fro m it s definition. " The Cour t manage d t o distinguis h th e cas e a t han d o n th e ground tha t i t wa s "conduc t tha t i s wholl y passive—mer e fail ure t o register . I t i s unlik e th e commissio n o f acts , o r th e fail ure t o ac t unde r circumstance s tha t shoul d aler t th e doe r t o th e consequences o f hi s deed. " T h e Cour t foun d tha t i n thi s typ e of situatio n a convictio n violate d th e constitutiona l requiremen t of du e process . Olive r Wendel l Holme s argue d a t lengt h tha t the test s o f criminalit y ar e externa l behavior , excep t fo r case s of infanc y an d insanity. 22 I believ e w e mus t conced e tha t som e decision s o f th e court s in denyin g ignoranc e o f th e crimina l la w a s a n excus e ten d t o show tha t th e motivatio n theor y i s no t entirel y i n accor d wit h judicial practice . O n th e othe r hand , th e justificatio n o f thi s practice i s open t o seriou s question . Th e dictu m eve n o f th e Su preme Cour t doe s no t justify it . Th e argument s offere d b y le gal writers , i n defens e o f th e practic e (fo r example , tha t allow ing th e excus e woul d b e unacceptabl y burdensom e fo r th e courts , that i t woul d encourag e ignoranc e o f th e la w an d stan d i n th e way o f efficac y o f th e la w i n preventin g objectionabl e form s o f

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conduct, o r i n effec t tha t i t woul d mak e th e la w identica l wit h whatever th e defendan t think s i t is ) see m withou t merit . I f wha t the court s ha d t o decide , i n th e term s o f th e Iow a decision , wer e whether th e defendan t wa s "justifie d i n believin g hi s conduc t t o be morall y righ t an d i n accordanc e wit h th e law, " th e burde n on th e cour t woul d no t b e to o heavy . Nobod y woul d convinc e a jur y tha t h e think s unjustifie d murde r i s morall y righ t an d also i n accordanc e wit h th e law . An d a perso n wil l hardl y b e justified i n thinkin g hi s conduc t i n accordanc e wit h th e law , un less h e ha s diligentl y mad e inquiries , whe n h e i s awar e a t leas t that ther e ar e o r ma y wel l b e difference s o f mora l opinio n abou t an action , s o tha t h e i s pu t o n notic e tha t th e la w ma y contai n a relevan t provision . I t i s tru e tha t i f th e Iow a principl e wer e followed, a defendan t mus t b e excuse d whe n h e infringe s som e unadvertised regulatio n abou t whic h mora l consideration s giv e no warning . Bu t suc h a practic e woul d no t undermin e th e law , especially i f i t wer e understoo d t o appl y onl y i n th e cas e o f se rious charge s involvin g possibl e imprisonment . Her e w e shoul d go a t leas t par t wa y wit h Professo r Har t whe n h e write s tha t ". . . we shoul d restric t eve n punishmen t designe d a s 'preven tive' t o thos e wh o a t th e tim e o f thei r offenc e ha d th e capacit y and a fai r opportunit y o r chanc e t o obe y th e law : an d w e shoul d do thi s ou t o f consideration s o f fairnes s o r justice t o thos e who m we punish." 2 3 W e nee d g o onl y par t wa y wit h Har t i n tha t w e should, I think , replac e hi s phras e abou t "capacit y an d a fai r opportunity t o obey " wit h a n expressio n abou t defec t o f moti vation, an d replac e hi s referenc e t o reason s o f "fairnes s o r justice" by on e t o long-rang e utilitaria n considerations , a s w e shal l see below . It shoul d b e notice d tha t th e motivatio n theor y doe s no t im ply tha t al l ignoranc e o f la w shoul d constitut e a n excuse , bu t only tha t kin d o f ignorance , o r ignoranc e i n suc h circum stances, a s t o mak e clea r tha t th e defendant' s conduc t di d no t spring fro m a defec t o f motivation . Voluntary intoxication. T h e la w understand s "intoxication " t o refer t o a stat e brough t o n b y drug s a s wel l a s alcohol ; i t will d o no har m t o confin e ourselve s t o th e cas e o f alcohol . Le t u s sup pose, then , tha t a perso n ha s becom e drun k an d commit s a n offense, an d tha t th e offens e an d circumstance s ar e suc h that , had h e bee n sober , hi s conduc t woul d undoubtedl y hav e man -

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ifested a defec t o f motivation . No w th e la w says , i n effect , tha t even if , i n hi s stat e o f intoxication , on e canno t assum e a defec t of motivation , h e i s nevertheles s liabl e t o punishmen t (barrin g crimes th e definitio n o f whic h include s "specifi c intent") , unles s he too k th e alcoho l fo r medica l reasons , o r doe s no t kno w (an d need no t know , morall y o r legally ) tha t th e amoun t ingeste d would caus e intoxicatio n (se e Mode l Pena l Code , 2.08) . I s thi s what th e motivatio n theor y implies ? Evidently w e mus t distinguis h tw o acts , wha t th e agen t di d after h e wa s alread y drunk , an d hi s act s (on e o r more ) o f drinking a quantit y o f alcohol . Drinkin g i s not a crime, an d un less on e think s i t morall y wron g th e takin g o f a drin k doe s no t permit inference , b y itself , o f a defec t o f motivation . However , on th e basi s o f pas t experienc e o f hi s ow n reactio n t o alcohol , or b y inductiv e generalizatio n fro m th e reaction s o f others , th e agent migh t wel l hav e reaso n t o believ e tha t i n drinkin g wha t he did , h e wa s runnin g a risk—whic h a n ordinar y law-abidin g person woul d no t run—o f becomin g drun k an d committin g a n offense i n tha t conditio n (fo r example , drivin g hi s car) . I n tha t case, hi s initia l ac t showe d som e defec t o f motivation : indiffer ence t o takin g thi s risk . H e migh t eve n kno w h e i s runnin g a substantial ris k o f actin g violently . I n tha t cas e w e ca n sa y tha t his subsequen t offens e aros e ou t o f thi s initia l defec t o f moti vation, bu t onl y indirectly . T h e offens e fo r whic h h e i s culpabl e is running th e risk . I f a perso n run s th e ris k o f actin g violentl y and kill s someone , h e migh t wel l b e charge d wit h manslaugh ter—his behavio r coul d b e classifie d a s reckless . Howeve r thi s may be , a perso n wh o ha s demonstrabl y ru n a seriou s ris k wil l have don e somethin g that , i f on e adopt s th e modifie d Wootton like vie w o f punishmen t defende d b y H.L.A . Har t an d Joe l Feinberg, justifies hi s bein g place d a t th e disposa l o f th e syste m for dealin g wit h crimina l offenders . Ne w Yor k Stat e ha s a stat ute forbiddin g reckles s endangerment . The motivatio n theory , then , i s out o f lin e wit h th e la w whe n the la w refuse s t o coun t voluntar y drunkennes s a s an y kin d o f excuse (excep t fo r th e cas e o f specifi c intentions) . Bu t then , i n this th e la w i s inconsistent : o n th e on e han d i t declare s tha t a n act mus t b e voluntar y (controlle d b y belief s an d desires) , i n or der t o b e criminal , an d the n i n effec t affirm s tha t act s no t s o controlled ( a drunke n act ) ma y b e full y liable . Th e motivatio n

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theory ha s implication s identica l wit h thos e th e la w ought t o have . There i s anothe r wa y o f viewin g th e tota l situatio n tha t migh t reconcile th e la w an d th e motivatio n theory . Suppos e i t i s agree d that wha t th e la w shoul d punis h i s reckles s endangermen t (b y taking a drin k i n circumstance s suc h tha t th e agen t shoul d kno w he i s takin g a risk) . T h e la w migh t wis h t o dete r suc h reckless ness b y suitabl e punishment , bu t th e problem s o f detectio n mak e this impracticable . However , th e la w migh t sa y that , i n thi s sit uation, th e sensibl e thin g t o d o i s to punis h quit e severel y thos e who caus e rea l damage ; thi s i s a kin d o f selectiv e punishmen t (like punishin g ever y tent h person) , an d i t would serv e th e pur pose o f deterrin g fro m reckles s endangerment , i f th e la w i s known. I f lawmaker s d o vie w matter s i n thi s light , i t woul d b e helpful i f th e fac t wer e wel l publicized . I a m no t familia r wit h an y ful l phenomenolog y o f drunken ness; i t coul d wel l b e tha t behavio r whe n drun k (dependin g somewhat o n ho w drun k th e perso n is ) could reveal , or b e cause d by, standin g defectiv e motivations. 24 Th e motivatio n theor y nee d not objec t t o punishmen t i n som e suc h circumstances . Duress. My theor y give s a clea r account , superio r i n simplicit y and plausibility , o f wh y an d whe n dures s i s an excuse . T h e the ory, w e recall , hold s tha t wrongfu l behavio r i s liabl e t o punish ment onl y i f i t manifest s a defectiv e leve l o f motivation . Bu t ho w strong mus t b e th e motivatio n t o avoi d a certai n offense , o r t o act i n a law-abidin g fashion ? I t depend s o n th e offense . Fo r in stance, aversio n t o killin g one' s wif e i s expecte d t o b e stron g enough t o outweig h a desir e t o b e fre e t o elop e wit h one' s sec retary. Bu t aversio n t o breakin g som e law s i s no t expecte d t o be abl e t o compet e wit h certai n othe r motives , suc h a s a pre sent, immediat e threa t o f deat h o r seriou s bodil y injur y eithe r to one' s sel f o r other s clos e t o one . S o th e Mode l Pena l Cod e (2.09) state s tha t i f a perso n i s threatene d wit h unlawfu l forc e "which a perso n o f reasonabl e firmnes s i n hi s situation " woul d be unabl e t o resist , ther e i s a vali d defense . Th e standar d o f motivation expecte d b y th e la w fall s shor t o f th e requiremen t of provin g one' s sel f a hero , mor e dedicate d t o avoidin g illega l acts tha n person s o f reasonabl e firmness . Wha t a perso n ma y do, then , depend s bot h o n th e unlawfu l ac t h e i s coerce d t o perform, an d als o o n th e natur e o f th e threat . Matters ar e mor e comple x i f th e defendan t wa s responsibl e

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for bein g i n hi s dilemma : if , fo r instance , h e voluntaril y joine d a grou p tha t h e kne w migh t late r threate n hi m i f h e refuse d t o perform violen t acts . I n tha t cas e th e situatio n mus t b e viewe d from a longe r time-span , a s i n th e cas e o f unlawfu l behavio r when drunk , an d th e whol e situatio n ma y lea d t o a n inferenc e of defectiv e motivatio n a t th e tim e o f joining, s o that inference s comparable t o thos e i n th e cas e o f drunkennes s ar e authorized . Provocation. Provocatio n i s no t a n exculpatin g excus e i n th e law, bu t onl y a mitigatin g one , reducin g a charg e o f murde r t o one o f manslaughter . Bu t it s lega l statu s i s sufficientl y simila r to tha t o f intoxicate d behavio r t o meri t dicussion . A rathe r plausibl e (perhap s unrepresentativel y progressive ) principle, state d i n Maher v . People (10 Mich . 1962) , is that ther e is legal provocatio n i f "reaso n should , a t th e tim e o f th e act , b e disturbed o r obscure d b y passio n t o a n exten t whic h migh t ren der ordinar y men , o f fai r averag e disposition , liabl e t o ac t rashly , without du e deliberatio n o r reflection , an d fro m passion , rathe r than judgement." Thi s i s somewha t simila r t o th e Mode l Pena l Code rul e (210. 3 (l)(b) ) tha t a homicid e i s onl y manslaughte r when " a homicid e whic h woul d otherwis e b e murde r i s com mitted unde r th e influenc e o f extrem e menta l o r emotiona l dis turbance fo r whic h ther e i s reasonabl e explanatio n o r excuse . The reasonablenes s o f suc h explanatio n o r excus e shal l b e de termined fro m th e viewpoin t o f a perso n i n th e actor' s situatio n under th e circumstance s a s h e believe s the m t o be. " Strong emotiona l disturbanc e i s know n t o primitiviz e think ing (muc h a s doe s alcohol) . A stat e o f ange r notoriousl y en hances one' s aggressiv e tendencies , an d reduce s one' s empa thetic o r sympatheti c concer n abou t injurin g it s target . S o th e law ha s traditionall y looke d sympatheticall y a t homicid e brough t on b y discoverin g one' s spous e i n th e ac t o f adultery , o r b y a violent blow . Why ? Herber t Wechsle r an d Jerom e Michae l opined 2 5 tha t th e reaso n i s tha t th e fac t o f ange r block s infer ence t o a deficienc y i n th e agent' s characte r (standin g leve l o f motivation, i n m y terms) ; th e mor e a n ordinar y man , o f "fai r average disposition, " woul d inclin e t o d o th e same , th e les s rea son ther e i s t o thin k tha t th e agen t fall s short , i n hi s norma l standing motivation , o f a satisfactor y leve l o f moral/lega l moti vation. No t just an y stron g emotio n wil l d o thi s job: a s th e Mode l Penal Cod e put s it , ther e mus t b e a "reasonabl e explanatio n o r

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excuse," traditionall y th e objectionabl e conduc t o f th e victim , presumably becaus e ange r no t understandabl e t o th e averag e person woul d b e a manifestatio n o f irascibility , whic h i s itsel f a defect o f motivatio n o f a sort . The la w o n thi s topi c ha s puzzlin g features . Wh y doe s prov ocation no t exculpate , an d merel y mitigate , i f th e provocatio n shows tha t th e motivatio n o f th e accuse d i s no t demonstrabl y less acceptabl e tha n tha t o f th e reasonabl e man ? Perhap s th e law i s bes t rea d a s suggestin g tha t th e standin g motivatio n o f the provoke d ma n i s no t s o ver y fa r fro m tha t o f th e ordinar y man (bu t surel y h e i s a difficul t perso n wit h a ho t temper!) , an d hence, combine d wit h a theor y o f proportionality , tha t hi s pun ishment shoul d b e less . In general , th e legall y mitigatin g effec t o f provocatio n fits i n reasonably wel l wit h a motivationa l theor y o f excuse s (mitiga tions). 26 We shoul d notic e tha t th e la w governin g th e punishmen t o f attempts fits nicel y wit h wha t th e motivationa l theor y implies . If a ma n announce s t o a woma n tha t h e i s goin g t o rap e her , and i s i n a positio n t o d o so , an d the n abandon s hi s venture , the la w take s a ver y differen t vie w o f hi s behavio r i f hi s aban doning i t i s brough t abou t b y th e unexpecte d appearanc e o f a policeman, a s compare d wit h hi s sayin g t o her , "No , I simpl y cannot d o a thin g o f thi s sort . Pleas e forgiv e me. " Manifestl y the latte r behavio r show s a leve l o f motivatio n muc h neare r t o what th e la w expect s tha n doe s th e former . Somewhat th e sam e migh t b e sai d o f th e la w i n jurisdiction s where a crim e i s punishe d les s severel y i f th e defendan t ha s a low leve l o f intelligence . T h e intellectua l defec t leave s ope n th e possibility tha t th e character—motivation—o f th e agen t i s no t below, o r no t fa r below , wha t th e la w expects . Insanity. I shal l conside r tw o question s abou t th e insanit y de fense: first, whethe r i t add s anythin g t o th e excuse s alread y considered, fo r example , mistak e o f fac t o r law ; an d second , i f it does , whethe r thi s defens e ma y b e viewe d a s a n excus e i n th e sense explaine d above , a s a consideration blockin g inferenc e fro m a person' s unlawfu l behavio r t o a defec t o f motivation . W e ma y follow th e Mode l Lega l Cod e (4.01(1) ) definitio n o f th e de fense: tha t a perso n i s exemp t fro m punishmen t fo r legall y wrongful (unlawful , unjustified ) conduc t "i f a t th e tim e o f suc h

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conduct a s a resul t o f menta l diseas e o r defec t h e lack s substan tial capacit y eithe r t o appreciat e th e criminalit y [wrongfulness ] of hi s conduc t o r t o confor m hi s conduc t t o th e requirement s of law. " I t i s added tha t "menta l diseas e o r defect " doe s no t in clude abnormalit y manifeste d onl y b y repeate d antisocia l con duct. We ma y assum e tha t w e ar e considerin g onl y "voluntary " act s within th e meanin g o f th e Mode l Pena l Cod e (2.01) , limite d t o bodily movemen t tha t i s " a produc t o f th e effor t o r determi nation o f th e actor , eithe r consciou s o r habitual, " an d thu s ex cluding convulsions , automatisms , movement s durin g slee p o r unconsciousness, o r resultin g fro m hypnosis . Ou r question s ar e not eas y t o answe r becaus e "menta l diseas e o r defect " ca n tak e many forms , o r b e manifes t i n man y ways . One widesprea d for m o f insanit y i s th e occurrenc e o f delu sions o r distortion s o f judgment, s o a s (t o us e term s o f th e olde r M'Naghten rule ) "no t t o kno w th e natur e an d quality " o f one' s act. Suppose , t o tak e a n exampl e tha t appear s t o b e a favorit e of la w professors , a ma n strangle s hi s wif e i n th e hones t belie f that h e i s squeezin g a lemon . I n thi s cas e th e agen t i s actin g o n the basi s o f a mistak e o f fact ; i f th e fact s wer e a s h e believe s them t o be , hi s conduc t i s perfectl y lawful . S o thi s kin d o f "in sane" behavio r i s alread y covere d unde r "mistak e o f fact, " an d no additiona l insanit y defens e i s needed . Th e sam e goe s fo r al l behavior tha t woul d b e lawfu l o r justifie d i f th e agent' s delu sional belief s wer e true. 2 7 The olde r M'Naghte n rul e distinguishe s somethin g els e fro m such factua l mistake , namely , "i f h e di d no t kno w h e wa s doin g what wa s wrong, " echoe d b y th e Mode l Pena l Cod e a s "i f h e lacked substantia l capacit y . . . t o appreciat e th e criminalit y [wrongfulness (moral?) ] o f hi s conduct. " I n bot h case s i t i s stip ulated tha t th e ignoranc e mus t b e th e produc t o f menta l dis ease o r defect . Thi s conceptio n i s puzzling . Perhap s th e agen t is deficien t i n capacit y t o visualiz e th e impac t o f wha t h e doe s on others . Presumably , i f thi s wer e intended , th e defens e woul d seem t o recogniz e a showin g tha t th e inabilit y i s a resul t o f som e other defect , lik e brai n damage , sinc e som e studie s hav e show n prison population s t o b e relativel y deficien t i n a capacit y fo r visualization. Som e interpreter s o f th e la w constru e th e mora l knowledge o r appreciatio n t o includ e emotiona l appreciation .

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But the n suc h interpretatio n migh t classif y mos t crimina l con duct a s insane , i f w e construe , a s apparentl y w e must , thinkin g that a n ac t i s wrong o r appreciatin g it s wrongness, a s essentiall y not cognitiv e bu t a matte r o f attitudes—essentiall y aversio n t o an act , dispositio n t o fee l guilt y abou t performin g it , an d dis approving o f other s wh o do . Bu t i f tha t i s wha t i s true , the n that kin d o f insanit y consist s precisel y i n failur e t o hav e ade quate moral/lega l motivation . An d i t i s puzzlin g ho w tha t coul d serve a s a n excuse ; adequat e moral/lega l motivatio n (or , i n othe r words, character ) i s exactl y wha t th e la w expect s o f people ; be havior tha t mus t b e explaine d b y absenc e o f adequat e motiva tion i s precisel y unexcused . Anothe r possibl e interpretatio n o f these passage s i s tha t i t i s suggeste d tha t a person' s conceptua l scheme i s s o primitiv e tha t hi s concept s o f th e criminal/morall y wrong ar e to o undevelope d t o serv e a s th e basi s fo r motivatio n to avoi d crimina l form s o f behavior . Bu t thi s i s speculation: th e meaning o f th e lega l conception s doe s no t see m clea r enoug h for a n answe r t o ou r tw o questions . The Mode l Pena l Cod e also , a s noted , exempt s fro m punish ment if , a s a resul t o f menta l disease , a n agen t "lack s substantia l capacity . . . t o confor m hi s conduc t t o th e requirement s o f law. " This coul d b e a cognitiv e defec t bu t no t a mistak e o f fac t o r law, i f w e follo w Si r Jame s Stephe n i n hi s account : "Th e ma n who doe s no t contro l himsel f i s guide d b y th e motive s whic h immediately pres s upo n hi s attention . I f thi s i s so, th e powe r o f self-control mus t mea n a powe r t o atten d t o distan t motive s an d general principle s o f conduct , an d t o connec t the m rationall y with th e particula r ac t unde r consideration , an d a diseas e o f th e brain whic h s o weaken s th e sufferer' s power s a s t o preven t hi m from attendin g o r referrin g t o suc h consideration s . . . de prives hi m o f th e powe r o f self-control." 28 I f on e attempt s t o apply thi s interpretation , on e face s th e difficult y o f discriminat ing betwee n incapacit y derivin g fro m a "diseas e o f th e brain " and tha t incapacit y common , mor e o r less , t o u s all , o r a t leas t to man y criminals . More frequently , however , th e incapacit y o f a n agen t t o con form hi s conduc t t o th e la w i s explaine d i n a differen t way . Courts hav e recognize d a n "irresistibl e impulse " t o d o some thing, fo r example , steal , a s relievin g fro m responsibility . Wha t seems t o b e mean t i s tha t th e desir e t o stea l wa s s o stron g tha t

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it woul d overcom e eve n a satisfactor y leve l o f moral/lega l mo tivation. I f so , ther e coul d b e n o inferenc e fro m th e crimina l act t o defectiv e motivation , an d thi s insanit y defens e coul d b e incorporated a s a n instanc e o f th e motivationa l theor y o f ex cuses, rathe r lik e duress . Bu t perhap s thi s i s no t wha t i s mean t by a n irresistibl e impulse , fo r i n case s o f kleptomani a i t i s know n that th e desir e i s no t a norma l desire : i t i s fo r thing s tha t ap parently d o th e agen t n o good , an d ca n hardl y b e a sourc e o f satisfaction. 29 Bu t th e psychologica l literatur e o n kleptomani a i s minute, an d i t ma y b e tha t an y sensibl e theor y o f i t woul d re quire a differen t account . Other type s o f cas e apparentl y fal l withi n thi s "inabilit y t o conform" conceptio n o f lega l insanity . Fo r instance , a ma n wh o suffered brai n damag e an d wh o mutilate d himsel f an d kille d others i n sudde n fits o f rage. 30 O r a woman , i n wha t wa s diag nosed a s a psychosi s brough t o n partl y b y repeate d ingestio n o f drugs, wh o repeatedl y stabbe d he r mothe r wit h n o apparen t motive.31 On e migh t sa y tha t th e psychiatrist' s accoun t doe s bloc k an inferenc e t o defectiv e moral/lega l motivation . Bu t on e i s lef t puzzled abou t th e possibl e stat e o f th e defendants ' moral/lega l motivation. On e ca n hardl y sa y tha t th e evidenc e raise s n o doub t that th e motivatio n syste m i s normal/adequate , i n th e wa y n o doubt i s raise d whe n w e lear n tha t crimina l behavio r aros e fro m a nonculpabl e mistak e o f fact . I sugges t tha t thi s kin d o f insan ity defens e no t b e viewe d a s a n excuse . T H E BASI S O F TH E MOTIVATIO N THEORY : T H E GENERA L THEORY O F PUNISHMEN T

What sor t o f justificatio n ca n b e give n fo r th e motivationa l theory, tha t person s wh o hav e unjustifiabl y broke n vali d la w should b e exemp t fro m punishmen t unles s thei r behavio r i s a result o f som e defec t o f standin g motivatio n (on e migh t sa y "character" instead) ? One wa y t o answe r thi s questio n woul d b e t o affir m a certai n form o f th e retributiv e theor y o f punishment , an d poin t ou t tha t the motivatio n theor y follow s fro m it . Tha t is , on e migh t sub scribe t o tha t for m o f retributivis m whic h hold s tha t a perso n should suffe r punishmen t fo r lawbreakin g t o a degre e corre sponding wit h hi s mora l blameworthiness , o r a t leas t tha t h e

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forfeit hi s righ t no t t o b e use d fo r purpose s o f deterrence , an d to th e exten t o f hi s blameworthiness . Thi s theor y entail s th e motivation theor y if , a s I thin k " X i s morall y blameworth y fo r doing A " should b e explaine d roughl y a s "X did A , and h e woul d not hav e don e A bu t fo r a defec t o f standin g motivatio n (char acter), an d a s a resul t i t i s fittin g fo r person s t o disapprov e o f X o n accoun t o f hi s doin g A. " Thus , thi s retributiv e theor y im plies that a perso n shoul d b e punishe d fo r a n ac t only i f it showe d a defec t o f motivation . T h e retributiv e theor y o f cours e goe s beyond th e motivatio n theor y i n implyin g a principl e o f pro portionality: o f quantit y o f punishmen t an d degre e o f blame worthiness. It seem s likel y tha t fe w philosopher s (bu t perhap s relativel y more lega l theorists ) tak e th e retributiv e theor y ver y seriousl y at th e presen t time , despit e th e popularit y o f som e kin d o f in tuitionism i n som e circles . Som e writers , wh o woul d dra w bac k from assertin g th e retributiv e principl e a s jus t a basi c mora l principle know n intuitively , hav e trie d t o deriv e som e form s o f it fro m differen t principle s o f justice whic h the y find congenial , but thei r view s ar e ope n t o seriou s criticism. 32 I n an y case , th e retributive theor y a t bes t give s onl y a n ordina l theory : i t tells u s that X shoul d b e punishe d mor e fo r A tha n Y shoul d b e fo r doing B , bu t give s n o clu e exactl y ho w muc h eithe r on e shoul d be punished . T h e utilitaria n theor y ha s th e virtu e o f yielding , in principle , som e quantitativ e guide . It seem s worthwhile , then , fo r thi s an d mor e genera l reason s suggested earlier , t o examin e wha t a utilitaria n theor y woul d imply wit h respec t t o th e motivationa l theor y o f exemptio n fro m punishment. We ma y recal l tha t utilitarianis m i s a theor y roughl y tha t th e whole syste m o f socia l institution s shoul d b e appraise d fo r it s impact o n well-bein g o r happiness . T h e syste m o f crimina l justice i s one o f thes e institutions . On e importan t caus e o f unhap piness, o f course , i s harmful behavior , an d henc e on e o f th e aim s of a n optima l syste m o f institutions , accordin g t o th e utilitarian , will b e t o minimiz e harmfu l behavior , t o th e exten t tha t s o doin g does no t impai r realizatio n o f mor e importan t goals . Amon g th e other feature s o f a societ y tha t affec t happines s ar e suc h thing s as freedo m t o pla n one' s ow n lif e an d implemen t th e relevan t decisions, th e preservatio n o f persona l privacy , a considerabl e

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degree o f socia l an d economi c equality , knowledg e an d it s uti lization i n persona l planning , an d s o on . T h e syte m o f crimina l justice i s a n institutio n especiall y aime d t o reduc e harmfu l o r antisocial behavior , but , accordin g t o th e utilitarian , i t i s ope n to criticis m i f i t accomplishe s thi s specia l ai m a t to o grea t a cost , for example , los s o f freedo m an d privacy ; som e los s i n pre venting harmfu l behavio r mus t b e accepte d i f avoidin g i t woul d cost mor e i n los s o f othe r benefits . O f course , certai n othe r in stitutions shoul d aim , amon g othe r things , a t preventin g anti social behavior : th e economi c syste m b y removin g incentive s t o crime an d th e crime-fosterin g condition s o f th e ghetto ; th e ed ucational system ; th e church ; th e syste m o f medica l car e fo r th e mentally defectiv e o r ill ; an d positiv e moralit y i f w e wan t t o cal l that a n "institution. " I n vie w o f thes e points , i t i s clea r tha t th e system o f crimina l justice mus t operat e unde r som e constraints . In orde r t o avoi d intolerabl e intrusion , o r undu e interferenc e with freedo m o f planning , th e syste m canno t giv e everyon e psychological test s t o determin e whether , t o maximiz e th e gen eral safety , h e o r sh e shoul d b e i n custody ; a perso n mus t b e left alon e unles s h e o r sh e actuall y doe s somethin g contrar y t o law—rather lik e allowin g a do g on e bit e befor e it s dangerous ness i s scrutinized . S o a perso n canno t b e hel d criminall y liabl e unless ther e i s a n actu s reus— a prove d unlawfu l act . What ca n th e syste m o f crimina l justice do , withi n thes e con straints, t o achiev e it s primar y functio n o f reducin g harmfu l o r antisocial behavior ? I mentio n thre e things . 1. Partl y i t ca n b e educational ; i t i n effec t announces , i n a forceful wa y becaus e th e announcemen t i s accompanie d b y a threat, whic h form s o f behavio r th e societ y (o r it s representa tives) consider s harmfu l t o th e exten t o f bein g sociall y intoler able. 2. I t ca n operat e a s a deterren t t o harmfu l behavior . W e should b e clea r just wha t ca n b e expecte d o f th e syste m i n thi s respect. Mos t peopl e hav e well-interiorize d mora l standards , an d hence, t o a larg e extent , wil l confor m thei r conduc t t o th e la w in an y case . Bu t i f ther e wer e n o parkin g meters , eve n ver y de cent peopl e woul d b e incline d t o tak e mor e tha n thei r shar e o f that scarc e commodit y o f parkin g space ; an d i f th e Interna l Revenue Servic e neve r prosecuted , i t i s doubtfu l whethe r s o many eve n generall y decen t peopl e woul d pa y thei r shar e o f

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taxes. S o while, fo r mos t people , th e deterren t threa t o f th e la w is unnecessar y fo r mos t kind s o f harmfu l behavio r (mos t peo ple woul d no t conside r murder , quit e apar t fro m th e law) , a threat o f punishmen t i s beneficial, fo r som e type s o f case , t o hel p the averag e perso n behav e properly . Thi s i s no t t o sa y tha t se vere penaltie s (lon g priso n terms ) ar e neede d fo r th e averag e person; th e reade r nee d onl y as k himsel f fo r wha t conceivabl e gain h e woul d ris k bein g arrested , tried , havin g hi s shortcom ings sprea d i n th e newspaper , bein g fined o r imprisone d fo r si x months, o r eve n jus t bein g pu t o n probation . Th e write r ca n think o f fe w gain s wort h suc h a risk ; an d on e nee d no t escalat e the ris k t o tha t o f twent y year s i n priso n i n orde r alread y t o have maximize d deterrence . O n th e othe r hand , man y peopl e are no t deterre d b y th e law , eve n wit h th e relativ e severit y o f its threat s i n th e Unite d States . Why? Fo r on e thing , peopl e wit h littl e o r n o incom e hav e lit tle incentiv e t o sta y ou t o f jail, wher e the y receiv e thre e squar e meals a day ; the y ma y thin k the y ar e bette r of f i n tha n out . Again, som e d o no t rea d a newspape r an d kno w littl e abou t th e threats o f law , o r perhap s the y hav e neve r learne d t o evaluat e prospective behavior s i n term s o f consequence s an d costs . Th e law als o need s hel p fro m morality : i f a n agent' s grou p doe s no t proscribe violenc e o r crime s o f passion , o r eve n idealize s powe r in a syste m o f organize d crime , th e targete d deterrenc e i s in fo r problems. 3. T h e syste m o f crimina l justic e ca n operat e t o preven t re peaters. O f course , i f a perso n i s imprisone d an d kep t ou t o f circulation, ther e i s n o dange r o f furthe r crimina l behavio r (a t least, outsid e th e prison) . Moreover , n o on e wil l doub t tha t a substantial fine fo r runnin g a traffi c ligh t will , a t leas t fo r som e weeks, rende r th e convicte d motoris t mor e cautiou s abou t obeying traffi c signals . I s length y imprisonmen t effectiv e a s fa r as futur e behavio r o f th e crimina l i s concerned ? No t unles s i t gets a t th e cause s o f th e origina l misbehavior . I t woul d see m that th e priso n syste m shoul d ai m t o retur n inmate s t o norma l life a s soo n a s i s compatible wit h publi c safety—an d tha t mean s such thing s a s treatmen t fo r dru g addiction , j ub training , assis tance i n finding a job o n leavin g a prison , an d s o on . With thes e genera l backgroun d consideration s i n mind , w e ca n now understan d th e justificatio n o f exemptin g person s fro m

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punishment whe n the y hav e committe d a n unjustifie d offens e by a n actio n no t caused , eve n i n part , b y a defectiv e syste m o f legal/moral motivation . T h e utilitarian' s genera l answer , o f course , an d I sugges t i t i s the righ t answer , i s tha t th e motivatio n theor y o f exemption s will maximiz e benefits . Le t m e summariz e th e reasoning . 1. I f a perso n ha s broke n th e la w bu t wit h n o defec t o f mo tivation, n o benefi t i s gaine d fro m punishin g him , a s fa r a s hi s own futur e behavio r i s concerned . T o allo w hi m t o circulat e i n society i s n o mor e dangerou s tha n i n th e cas e o f thos e wh o hav e not broke n th e law . I t ma y b e tha t punishmen t wil l attac h a n additional negativ e affec t t o th e ide a o f doin g tha t o n accoun t of whic h h e wa s convicted , bu t i f hi s leve l o f motivatio n i s al ready satisfactory , s o far a s is known, t o buil d u p mor e negativ e affect i s pointless . S o th e perso n (an d presumabl y hi s family ) i s penalized withou t an y benefit , a t leas t a s fa r a s hi s futur e im pact o n societ y i s concerned. O f course , a syste m o f excuse s dif ferent fro m th e motivatio n theor y (lik e th e presen t on e whic h emphasizes lac k o f intention , knowledge , recklessness , o r neg ligence a s a n excuse ) ma y hav e muc h th e sam e effect , bu t th e point o f identifyin g excuse d behavio r fo r thes e reason s mus t b e that th e indirec t effec t i s tha t peopl e alread y adequatel y moti vated ar e excused . Bu t th e motivatio n theor y get s t o th e centra l point directly , an d point s th e wa y t o a desirabl e refor m o f law , by wa y o f abolishin g stric t liabilit y conjoine d wit h seriou s pen alties, a s wel l a s variou s irrationa l anomalie s i n th e la w suc h as , possibly, th e felony-murde r rule . 2. Wha t i s th e alternativ e t o th e motivatio n theory , o r some thing essentiall y identica l wit h it ? On e possibilit y i s a syste m o f strict liability : a perso n convicte d o f unjustifiabl y breakin g th e law (o r perhap s just breakin g th e law , justified o r not ) woul d b e given a specifie d sentence , dependin g o n th e offens e (o r a t leas t turned ove r t o th e detentio n syste m fo r treatment , a s Lad y Wootton woul d hav e it) . Suc h a syste m coul d wel l b e a night mare, intolerabl e fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e averag e law abiding citizen . Wha t woul d lif e b e lik e i f on e mus t anticipat e a year i n priso n fo r accidentall y runnin g dow n a child , wit h n o fault whatsoeve r o n one' s ow n part ? T h e nightmar e woul d b e less ba d i f Lad y Wootton' s versio n wer e adopted , bu t eve n s o the lif e o f anyon e unluck y enoug h t o brea k th e la w b y accident ,

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or becaus e o f nonculpabl e mistak e o f fact , woul d b e grossl y damaged. 3. Tha t punishmen t fo r excuse d crime s i s pointles s becaus e not needed , an d tha t th e impac t o f a pur e strict-liabilit y syste m would b e disastrous , migh t no t b e totall y convincing , i f i t wer e not tha t exemptin g adequatel y motivate d person s fro m punish ment doe s no t diminis h th e deterren t impac t o f th e syste m o f criminal justice. T h e issu e i s important , sinc e th e reaso n fo r le gal punishment , accordin g t o mos t writers , i s th e deterren t ef fect o f threa t o f punishmen t o n potentia l wrongdoers . Man y writers thin k tha t i n fac t th e incorporatio n o f excuse s i n a sys tem o f crimina l la w doe s diminis h th e deterren t effec t o f th e system, an d therefor e hol d tha t th e consisten t utilitaria n woul d be oppose d t o a lega l syste m wit h excuses . If i t wer e tru e tha t a stric t liabilit y syste m woul d b e a mor e effective deterrent , tha t woul d b e a utilitaria n poin t i n it s fa vor—but onl y one , t o b e weighe d agains t th e precedin g one s just mentioned . Bu t wh y shoul d i t b e though t tha t allowin g ex cuses diminishe s deterrence ? A s fa r a s I know , n o comparativ e studies sho w tha t excuse s increas e th e crim e rate . S o w e mus t simply thin k th e matte r throug h i n a commonsens e way . Le t u s ask: wha t clas s o f crime s woul d b e deterre d b y a stric t liabilit y system bu t no t b y a syste m wit h excuse s (roughl y a s th e moti vation theor y advocates) ? No t thos e committe d b y person s wh o do no t kno w th e law , s o w e mus t limi t th e effect s t o person s relatively informe d o n th e syste m o f crimina l justice . Suppos e we thin k o f a n informe d rationa l person , wh o fo r som e reaso n wants hi s wife ou t o f th e wa y an d i s deliberating whethe r t o mak e an attemp t o n he r life . Ho w wil l th e fac t o f th e syste m o f ex cuses affec t hi s thinking ? Perhap s h e ca n manag e t o hav e a bul let ricochet ? Perhap s h e ca n convinc e a jury tha t h e mistoo k hi s wife fo r a burglar , o r tha t h e wa s actin g unde r hypnoti c sug gestion, o r tha t someon e threatene d t o kil l hi m i f h e didn't , o r that th e episod e wa s th e resul t o f a delusion , o f schizophrenia ? I thin k th e rationa l prospectiv e murdere r wil l d o bette r t o spen d his tim e thinkin g ho w t o commi t th e crim e s o tha t th e jury wil l not b e convince d tha t h e actuall y di d it . S o ho w muc h deter rence wil l b e lost , fo r rationa l informe d persons , fro m knowl edge o f th e syste m o f excuses ? Th e rationa l perso n wil l see tha t it i s goin g t o b e ver y difficul t fo r hi m t o escap e punishmen t b y

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the excus e route . I thin k w e ma y agre e tha t peopl e ma y b e en couraged t o commi t crime s b y knowledg e tha t person s wh o commit crime s ar e mostl y no t punished . Perhap s the y kno w tha t most murderer s ar e neve r brough t t o justice. Ho w man y o f thes e escape vi a th e excus e route ? Perhap s tw o percent ? Wil l thi s tw o percent hav e a detectibl e effec t o n deterrence , give n th e gen eral situation ? Suppos e w e think , a s ma y b e true , tha t th e de terrent effec t o f th e crimina l la w come s throug h vicariousl y at taching negativ e affect , b y conditioning , t o th e though t o f a give n offense. I s ther e an y reaso n t o thin k thi s conditionin g proces s will b e significantl y affecte d b y th e knowledg e tha t a ver y smal l proportion o f person s escap e punishmen t b y th e excus e route ? Nevertheless, variou s writer s a t present , a s fa r a s I ca n se e without suppor t fro m eithe r observatio n o r psychologica l the ory, airil y assum e tha t w e kno w tha t allowin g excuse s mus t re duce deterrence . No t tha t thes e writer s advocat e tha t excuse s be abolishe d i n vie w o f th e allege d impac t o n th e deterren t forc e of th e system . Quit e th e contrary . Wha t the y wan t t o d o i s pi n on utilitarian s a commitmen t t o stric t liabilit y i n th e law , be cause the y do , o f course , i n principl e favo r a syste m tha t o n th e whole wil l maximiz e utility . I n fact , thes e critic s fai l t o sho w tha t a stric t liabilit y syste m woul d actuall y increas e th e deterren t ef fect o f th e law . Eve n i f i t did , th e foregoin g tw o reasons , espe cially th e second , ar e weighty ; i n vie w o f them , on e coul d hardl y advocate a stric t liabilit y syste m o n utilitaria n ground s eve n i f such a syste m wer e somewha t superio r i n efficac y o f deter rence. Thu s a utilitaria n syste m o f punishmen t wil l necessaril y exempt fro m punishmen t thos e wh o hav e acte d wrongl y bu t i n so doin g manifes t n o defec t o f motivatio n o r character . My conclusio n i s tha t a rationa l an d informe d person , i f h e were t o b e give n a choic e amon g possibl e system s o f crimina l justice fo r th e societ y i n whic h h e expecte d t o live , woul d op t for a syste m exemptin g fro m punishmen t thos e person s wh o have committe d a n unjustifie d unlawfu l act , bu t di d no t thereb y manifest an y defec t o f standin g motivation , o r character . Bu t I do no t sugges t tha t a perso n woul d fee l happ y abou t th e tota l situation, eve n i f th e syste m o f crimina l justic e wer e mad e a s humane a s possible , compatibl y wit h a reasonabl e degre e o f protection o f societ y fro m harmfu l actions . Thi s i s becaus e o f the grea t inequalitie s i n ou r society , no t onl y economically , bu t

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in intelligence , health , energy , an d th e typ e o f famil y i n whic h a perso n i s reared . Man y person s wit h a hig h leve l o f intelli gence an d th e goo d fortun e o f upbringin g i n a goo d famil y an d a goo d educatio n ar e neve r pu t i n a positio n wher e the y ar e strongly motivate d t o disobe y th e law . Wit h other s th e opposit e is th e case . Eve n a human e syste m o f excuses , on e tha t pun ishes a perso n fo r a crim e onl y whe n i t i s "hi s fault, " doe s no t remove th e unjustifie d inequalit y i n th e lotter y tha t bestow s goo d things o n som e an d ba d thing s o n others . I t i s true tha t w e shoul d say t o ourselves , "Ther e bu t fo r th e grac e o f Go d g o I. " I sug gest w e al l hav e a n obligatio n t o wor k towar d th e amelioratio n or remova l o f thes e inequalities , bu t tha t i s no t th e job o f th e criminal law . Wha t justifies th e crimina l la w i s tha t i t i s the bes t compromise amon g unhapp y alternatives , fo r th e worl d a s i t no w is. On th e on e hand , lif e woul d b e intolerabl e i f n o crimina l la w existed an d n o on e wa s deterre d fro m doin g a s h e please d b y the threa t o f punishment ; o n th e othe r hand , wit h th e system , many hav e t o suffe r wh o woul d no t hav e ha d t o suffe r ha d th e lottery o f lif e no t pu t the m wher e the y are . S o th e crimina l la w has t o remai n a n uneas y compromise , attemptin g t o accommo date bot h th e nee d t o protec t societ y fro m harm , an d th e obli gation t o avoi d imposin g sufferin g o n thos e wh o hav e broke n the law . A syste m tha t exempt s fro m punishmen t offender s wh o are no t "a t fault"—defectiv e i n moral/lega l motivation—i s a n advance towar d humanit y withou t significan t los s i n protectio n of society. 33

NOTES 1. Glanvill e Williams , "The Theor y o f Excuses, " Criminal Law Review (1982): 73 4 ff . A s will be clear i n wha t follows , however , I do no t accept hi s definition o f "excuse, " p. 735. 2. Herber t Packer , The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Palo Alto: Stanford Universit y Press , 1968) , chap. 6. Packer point s out rightl y tha t mens rea is also relevant t o mitigation. Se e the discussio n o f prov ocation below . 3. DeLegibus, 136b. 4. Franci s Sayre , "Men s Rea, " Harvard Law Review 45 (1932) : 974 1026, at p . 1010 . 5. Ibid. , p . 1023.

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6. A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1979) ; and "Th e Explanatio n o f Mora l Language, " forthcoming . 7. Se e th e writer' s "Th e Concep t o f Rationa l Action, " an d te n othe r essays b y variou s authors , o n th e genera l topi c o f rationa l deci sion, i n th e Septembe r 198 3 issu e o f Social Theory and Practice. 8. I t i s logicall y possibl e tha t no t al l rationa l person s woul d prefe r one an d th e sam e se t o f lega l principle s fo r a societ y i n whic h the y expected t o live , an d i n tha t cas e w e shoul d hav e t o adop t a mor e person-relative conceptio n o f "justified " suc h as , "I f I wer e full y rational, / woul d choos e o r prefe r thi s se t o f lega l principle s t o b e obeyed an d enforce d i n tha t society , wit h it s institutions , i f I ex pected t o liv e i n it. " Fo r ou r purpose s w e ca n ignor e thi s compli cation, whic h wil l hardl y aris e fo r th e proble m wit h whic h w e ar e concerned. Anothe r possibl e complicatio n i s that th e mora l syste m that al l rationa l adult s woul d prefe r fo r a societ y i n whic h the y ex pected t o liv e migh t condem n th e ver y law s tha t the y woul d wan t obeyed an d enforce d i n tha t society . I ignor e thi s logicall y possibl e complication. 9. Fo r a criticis m o f som e recen t retributiv e theories , se e R.W . Burgh , "Do the Guilt y Deserv e Punishment? " Journal of Philosophy 7 9 (1982): 193—210; an d D.F . Thompson , "Retributio n an d th e Distributio n of Punishment, " Philosophical Quarterly 1 6 (1966) : 59—63 . Fo r Kant , see D.E . Scheid , "Kant' s Retributivism, " Ethics 9 3 (1983) : 262-82 . 10. Fo r suppor t o f this * view se e Joh n Harsayni , "Moralit y an d th e Theory o f Rationa l Behavior, " Social Research (1977): 623-56 , an d his Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation (Dor drecht: Reidel , 1976) . Se e als o Brandt , Theory of the Good and the Right, chaps . 11 , 14 , an d 15 . 11. Se e R.B . Brandt , "Trait s o f Character : a Conceptua l Analysis, " American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970) , especiall y p . 34 . Contras t Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton , N.J. : Princeto n Univer sity Press , 1970) . pp . 126-7 , 1 9 0 - 1 . 12. Sayre , "Men s Rea, " p . 997 . T h e presen t write r ha s argue d tha t t o say a n ac t i s morall y blameworth y i s t o affir m tha t th e ac t woul d not hav e occurre d bu t fo r a defec t o f characte r (motivation) . Se e "Blameworthiness an d Obligation " i n A.I . Melden , ed. , Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle , Wash. : Universit y o f Washingto n Press , 1958); an d Ethical Theory (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall , 1959), chap . 18 . Fo r th e connectio n bewtee n characte r an d moti vation, se e not e 1 1 above . Professor Fletche r appear s t o b e mistake n whe n h e say s "Th e only wa y t o wor k ou t a theor y o f excuse s i s to insis t tha t th e excus e represents a limited , tempora l distortio n o f th e actor' s character. " See Georg e Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston : Littl e Brown ,

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1978), p . 802 . Assumin g w e identif y characte r wit h standin g mo tivation, ther e i s n o suc h thin g a s a "limited , tempora l distortion " of it . Ange r migh t see m a n example , bu t i f a perso n act s fro m ex treme reasonabl e ange r (provocation) , w e thin k hi s characte r i s all right—that is , his standin g aversions—i t i s only tha t th e temporar y angry desir e t o hur t wa s stronger . I n th e cas e o f mistak e o f fact , or duress , ther e i s n o defec t o f characte r (motivation ) a t all . (Se e Brandt, "Trait s o f Character." ) Fletche r remarks , however , tha t "a n inference fro m th e wrongfu l ac t t o th e agent' s characte r i s essen tial t o a retributiv e theor y o f punishment " (p . 800) . Furthe r " . . . if someon e violate s a lega l prohibitio n unde r a n unavoidabl e mis take abou t th e legalit y o f hi s conduct , w e canno t infe r anythin g about hi s respec t fo r la w an d th e right s o f others . Th e sam e breakdown i n th e reasonin g fro m conduc t t o characte r occur s i n cases o f insanity . . . . " It shoul d b e note d tha t mora l blameworthiness , a s a common sense term , i s n o bette r of f tha n men s rea . I hav e argue d (se e "Blameworthiness an d Obligation" ) tha t i t i s usefu l t o defin e i t i n a certai n way , bu t i n fac t th e ter m i s hardl y i n activ e us e a t al l b y ordinary speaker s (non-lawyers , o r mor e likely , non-law-profes sors), an d th e mos t obviou s candidate , "deserve s t o b e blamed, " raises mor e question s tha n i t answers. Wha t i s it to blame someon e for something ? T o reproac h hi m fac e t o face ? T o criticiz e hi m be hind hi s back ? T o affir m tha t som e defec t i n hi m i s a caus e o f hi s act? ("Th e engine' s performanc e mus t b e blame d o n th e plugs." ) Evidently th e meanin g o f thi s ter m doe s no t li e o n th e surface . 13. Sayre , "Men s Rea, " p . 1004 . 14. Actually , a judgment i s require d abou t a causa l relatio n t o belief s and desires . Se e A.I . Goldman , A Theory of Human Action (Engle wood Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall , 1970) , p . 72 . Scholar s o f th e criminal la w shoul d b e familia r wit h thi s book . 15. Fo r a vie w simila r i n man y way s t o th e motivatio n theor y o f ex cuses, se e Michae l D . Bayles , "Character , Purpose , an d Crimina l Responsibility," Law and Philosophy (1982) : 5—20 , especiall y pp . 9 ff . Bayle s attribute s a for m o f th e theor y t o Hume . On e migh t object tha t a ma n ma y b e guilt y o f manslaughte r i f h e kill s hi s brother wh o ha s a termina l cancer , i s i n pain , wishe s t o die , bu t cannot find a physicia n wit h th e courag e t o giv e a letha l dose . Ho w is thi s possible , i f criminalit y require s som e defec t o f motivation ? In fact , mos t peopl e d o no t thin k th e ma n a criminal , an d ar e no t surprised o r shocke d i f h e receive s probatio n o r a nomina l sen tence, perhap s jus t a fine. T h e judg e i s i n a dilemma : h e canno t himself regar d th e ma n a s a crimina l who m th e la w ough t t o pun ish, bu t h e doe s no t wis h t o encourag e othe r peopl e t o mak e de -

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cisions abou t th e live s o f others , possibl y i n a les s discriminatin g way. Muc h th e sam e ma y b e sai d abou t conscientiou s objector s t o many laws . 16. Fo r a usefu l discussio n o f th e histor y an d logi c o f th e statu s o f ac cidents, se e Georg e Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law, pp . 27 6 ff . and 48 7 ff . 17. Thi s remar k suppose s tha t th e defec t o f motivatio n i s t o functio n not merel y a s a conditio n fo r nonexemptio n fro m punishmen t al together, bu t a s a clu e t o th e permissibl e degre e o f punishment , as i t doe s i n thos e theorie s tha t hol d tha t th e severit y o f punish ment shoul d b e proportiona l t o th e blameworthines s o f th e agent . If thi s vie w i s rejected , a s i t woul d b e b y th e writer , fo r a largel y treatment vie w o f crimina l justice, onc e guil t (som e offens e + men s rea) i s established , the n degree s o f defec t woul d b e o f littl e func tional importance . T h e rol e o f consideration s o f deterrenc e wil l b e discussed i n th e followin g section . 18. 15 3 Tex . Crim . 442 , 22 1 S.W . 2n d 612 , 1949 . Se e citatio n i n P.W . Low, J.C. Jeffries , Jr. , an d R.J . Bonnie , Criminal Law (Ne w York : Foundation Press , 1982) , p . 264 . 19. Th e cas e wa s Rex v . Esop, 17 3 Eng . Rep . 20 3 (Cent . Crim . Ct . 1836) . 20. State v . O'Neil, 14 7 Iow a 513 , 12 6 N.W . 45 4 (1910) . 21. Lambert v . California, 1957 , 33 5 U.S . 225 . 22. Se e The Common Law, chap . 2 . 23. Revie w i n Yale Law Journal 7 4 (1965) : 132 5 ff . 24. Se e th e learne d an d helpfu l discussio n i n Herber t Fingarett e an d Ann F . Haas , Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility (Berke ley, Calif : Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1979) , chaps. 6 , 9 , 11 , and 12. 25. Herber t Wechsle r an d Jerom e Michael , " A Rational e o f th e La w of Homicid e II, " Columbia Law Review 3 7 (1937) . 26. I omi t discussio n o f entrapment . I t seem s impossibl e t o giv e a co herent accoun t o f i t a s a n excuse , sinc e th e ver y seduction s t o crim e that ar e a defens e whe n the y ar e provide d b y th e police , d o no t serve a s a defens e whe n provide d b y privat e parties . (Th e la w doe s suggest th e motivatio n theory , however , whe n i t speak s o f entrap ment a s providin g inducement s t o crim e "b y person s othe r tha n those wh o ar e read y t o commi t it. " Doe s "read y to " refer t o a sub standard leve l o f aversio n t o th e offens e o r t o lawbreakin g i n gen eral?) Mayb e wha t i s behin d i t i s th e ide a tha t w e ar e al l likel y t o commit a crime if we are tempte d ofte n enough , o r severel y enough , and i t ma y b e th e victim' s ba d luck , no t hi s less-than-adequat e character, i f h e i s seduce d b y th e police . O r perhap s i t i s tha t w e do no t thin k th e law-enforcemen t agencie s ough t t o b e i n th e business o f temptin g peopl e t o brea k th e law . J. Feinberg , i n Doing

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and Deserving, pp . 19 1 an d 21 3 ff . give s helpfu l suggestions . I a m indebted t o L.M . Seidman' s paper , "Th e Suprem e Court , Entrap ment, an d Ou r Crimina l Justic e Dilemma, " Supreme Court Review (1981): 111-55 . 27. Se e Heathcot e W . Wales , "A n Analysi s o f th e Proposa l t o 'Abolish ' the Insanit y Defens e i n S.l : Squeezin g a Lemon, " Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Rev. (1976) : 687—712 . 28. A History of the Criminal Law of England I I (1883) , p . 170 . 29. State v. McCullough, 11 4 Iow a Suprem e Court , 53 2 (1901) . Se e th e interesting discussio n i n Joel Feinberg , Doing and Deserving, pp . 2 8 188. 30. People v. Robles, 1970 , 2 Cal . 3 d 205 . 31. People v. Kelly, Suprem e Cour t o f Calif. , 1973 , 1 0 Cal. 3d . 575 , 11 1 Cal. Rptr . 171 , 516 P . 2 d 875 . 32. Fo r a critica l revie w se e R.W . Burgh , "D o th e Guilt y Deserv e Pun ishment?", Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982 ) 193-210 . 33. I hav e learne d a grea t dea l fro m th e comment s o f variou s individ uals wh o kindl y rea d an d responde d t o a n earlie r draf t o f th e pre sent paper : Willia m K . Frankena , Bruc e Frier , J. Rolan d Pennock , Adrian M.S . Piper , Loui s Michae l Seidman , Heathcot e Wales , an d Peter Westen . Needles s t o say , the y ar e no t responsibl e fo r th e er rors tha t ma y remain . I a m als o indebte d t o Pete r Tague , whos e course o n substantiv e crimina l la w I audite d whil e a visitin g pro fessor a t th e Georgetow n Universit y La w Center , an d t o conver sations abou t th e topi c o f th e presen t pape r wit h Patrici a D . Whit e and Sila s Wasserstrom .

8 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILIT Y I N GOVERNMENT DENNIS F . THOMPSO N

The crimina l la w serve s bette r t o punis h th e crime s o f citi zens tha n th e crime s o f governmen t agains t citizens . On e rea son n o doub t i s practical : government s manag e th e mean s o f punishment. Bu t a mor e fundamenta l reaso n i s theoretical : governmental crim e doe s no t appea r t o satisf y th e condition s that justify th e us e o f th e crimina l sanction . I n origi n an d ratio nale, th e crimina l la w i s directed agains t offense s committe d b y individuals actin g a s ordinar y citizens . Governmenta l crim e ofte n lacks either a n individua l crimina l o r a citizen criminal , o r both . Such crim e ma y i n thi s wa y b e structura l an d official . I t i s structural whe n i t i s more th e produc t o f organizationa l practice s tha n of deliberat e decisio n b y individuals . I t i s official whe n i t can b e imputed onl y t o individual s o r organization s actin g withi n th e scope o f offic e o r othe r legitimat e authority . These tw o difference s betwee n governmenta l crim e an d or dinary crim e giv e ris e t o th e theoretica l problem s tha t I exam ine here . T h e first differenc e create s a proble m o f mora l re sponsibility: ho w ca n w e justif y punishin g individual s o r organizations fo r structura l crim e i n th e apparen t absenc e o f the "guilt y mind " th e crimina l la w morall y requires ? Thi s prob lem plague s th e us e o f th e crimina l la w t o contro l an y kin d o f For advic e i n writin g thi s paper , I a m gratefu l t o Joe Carens , Mik e Comiskey, Jameson Doig , Amy Gutmann , an d Walte r Murphy . 201

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complex organization , corporation s a s wel l a s governments . Th e second differenc e point s t o a proble m o f politica l responsibil ity: ho w ca n w e justify punishin g individual s o r organization s acting i n thei r officia l capacit y a s agent s o f a democrati c gov ernment? Thi s proble m especiall y affect s th e us e o f th e crimi nal la w agains t government s becaus e the y ar e permitte d t o adop t methods (suc h a s violence ) tha t woul d b e illega l i f use d b y pri vate parties , an d becaus e the y ar e authorize d t o act , wit h dis cretion, o n behal f o f al l citizens . I shal l argu e tha t neithe r th e problem o f mora l responsibilit y no r th e proble m o f politica l re sponsibility stand s i n th e wa y o f usin g th e crimina l sanctio n against publi c officials , bu t tha t bot h revea l a nee d fo r broade r notions o f persona l responsibilit y an d publi c office , an d bot h undermine th e ide a o f organizationa l responsibilit y fo r crime s of government . My argumen t i s compatibl e wit h a wid e rang e o f theorie s o f punishment. I t make s onl y tw o assumption s abou t th e natur e of justifiabl e punishment. 1 First , I assum e tha t a legitimat e practice o f punishmen t mus t gran t certai n right s t o person s wh o are subjec t t o it s sanctions ; i t woul d not , fo r example , punis h anyone wh o ha d no t voluntaril y committe d a n offense . Second , I assum e tha t punishmen t characteristicall y ha s a n expressiv e function, signifyin g socia l attitude s o f resentmen t an d judg ments o f reprobation . N o doub t a pur e deterrenc e theor y o f punishment coul d no t accep t thes e assumptions , bu t mor e so phisticated theories , includin g othe r utilitaria n ones , see k t o ac commodate them . T H E PROBLE M O F MORA L RESPONSIBILIT Y

Since th e proble m o f mora l responsibilit y i n governmen t de rives fro m characteristic s tha t government s shar e wit h othe r complex organizations , w e shoul d conside r th e proble m i n th e context o f organization s i n general . I n th e la w i t i s the corpora tion tha t ha s provoke d th e mos t seriou s examinatio n o f th e problem. Severa l writer s i n recen t year s hav e pointe d ou t th e existence o f structura l crim e i n corporations , an d note d tha t th e criminal la w i n it s standar d for m doe s no t cop e wel l wit h thi s kind o f crime. 2 Thes e observation s themselve s ar e consisten t wit h many differen t theorie s o f responsibility , includin g th e vie w t o

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be defende d here . Certainl y an y searc h t o discove r th e cause s of suc h crime , an d an y reform s t o preven t it s recurrence , can not focu s exclusivel y o n individuals . Bu t th e existenc e o f struc tural crim e i s ofte n allege d t o hav e mor e far-reachin g implica tions. I t i s take n t o dictat e a particula r solution—wha t I shal l call th e structuralis t thesis—t o th e genera l proble m o f respon sibility i n comple x organizations. 3 Proponents o f th e structuralis t thesi s mak e tw o distinc t claims . First, the y den y tha t individual s ca n b e hel d criminall y respon sible fo r man y crime s o f organizations . Second , the y affir m tha t organizations ca n b e hel d criminall y responsible . Thes e tw o claims mus t b e distinguishe d because , thoug h th e first ofte n lead s to th e second , th e secon d ma y b e maintaine d alone . W e ma y assert, fo r example , tha t bot h individual s an d corporation s ar e liable fo r differen t type s o f crime s o r eve n fo r th e sam e crime. 4 (Less plausibly , w e migh t hol d onl y th e first claim , i n effec t im plying tha t n o agen t ca n b e hel d responsibl e a t al l fo r man y or ganizational crimes. ) Personal Responsibility in Organizations Consider, then , th e clai m tha t w e canno t legitimatel y ascrib e personal responsibilit y fo r crime s o f organizations . Crimina l li ability, lik e mora l responsibility , require s tha t a n individua l charged wit h a n offens e ha d th e abilit y an d knowledg e t o ac t otherwise tha n h e did . T h e requiremen t o f a guilt y min d fo r many crime s consist s o f eithe r th e "intentio n t o d o th e imme diate ac t o r brin g abou t th e consequence s o r (i n som e crimes ) recklessness a s t o suc h ac t o r consequence." 5 Th e structuralist s who rejec t persona l responsibilit y fo r organizationa l crim e pre sumably d o no t mea n tha t w e ca n neve r legitimatel y charg e in dividuals wit h crim e i n a n organization . Illega l conduc t tha t i s plainly outsid e o f th e scop e o f a n offic e o r positio n i n th e or ganization pose s n o seriou s theoretica l problem . A n officia l wh o takes a brib e o r extort s mone y fro m a client , i n th e absenc e o f any authorizatio n o r encouragemen t b y th e organization , i s surely guilty o f a crim e a s a n individual . The differenc e betwee n persona l an d officia l crim e i s no t al ways clear , bu t i t i s perhap s bes t capture d b y th e distinctio n i n French administrativ e la w betwee n 3. fante personnelle, for whic h an individua l alon e i s blamed , an d a faute de service, for whic h

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the organizatio n i s also culpable . Th e forme r reveal s " a ma n wit h his [personal ] weakness , hi s passions , hi s imprudence, " wherea s the latte r manifest s a n "impersonal " officia l who , like anyon e i n the position , i s "mor e o r les s subjec t t o error." 6 Th e distinctio n is no t primaril y on e o f motive s (actin g fo r one' s ow n end s o r for th e organization' s purposes) , sinc e mos t illega l conduc t i n organizations probabl y embodie s man y differen t motive s a t th e same time. 7 Officia l crim e i s bette r conceive d a s conduc t au thorized o r supporte d b y th e organization , eithe r formall y through instruction s an d procedure s o r informall y throug h th e norms an d practice s o f th e organization . But no t al l officia l crim e i n thi s sens e create s a proble m o f responsibility. Tha t a n officia l wa s merel y followin g order s wil l not usuall y protec t hi m fro m crimina l liability , eve n whe n h e had reaso n t o believ e tha t th e orde r cam e fro m th e highes t of ficials in th e organization. 8 I n defens e agains t a conspiracy charg e involving th e break-i n a t th e offic e o f Danie l Ellsberg' s psychi atrist, John Ehrlichma n pleade d tha t h e reasonabl y believe d tha t the Presiden t ha d authorize d th e entry . Th e federa l distric t cour t held tha t eve n i f th e Presiden t ha d don e so , Ehrlichma n woul d still b e liabl e fo r failin g t o recogniz e tha t th e break-i n violate d the law. 9 No r doe s th e proble m o f responsibilit y aris e simpl y because man y individual s tak e par t i n a crime . Th e way s th e criminal la w distinguishe s amon g degree s o f participation , in cluding variou s role s i n conspiracie s an d othe r inchoat e crimes , may b e interprete d a s mor e o r les s conformin g t o th e princi ples o f mora l responsibility. 10 Eve n i n case s o f collectiv e omis sions—as whe n al l th e officer s i n a n organizatio n fai l i n a dut y to preven t a har m tha t an y on e o f the m alon e coul d hav e pre vented—the commo n la w generall y agree s wit h moralit y i n holding eac h o f the m responsible. 11 I f th e structuralis t thesi s i s to hav e an y plausibility , it s concern s abou t responsibilit y mus t be state d mor e specifically . The proble m tha t seem s t o worr y th e structuralist s spring s from tw o characteristic s o f organizations—specializatio n an d routinization. Becaus e o f th e first, individual s wh o hav e knowl edge o f a crim e (usuall y lower-leve l officials ) ma y no t hav e th e ability t o d o anythin g abou t it , an d th e individual s wh o hav e th e ability (higher-leve l officials ) d o no t hav e knowledg e o f it . T h e division o f organizationa l labo r thu s become s a divisio n o f mora l

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agency: an y particula r rol e allow s a n individua l t o satisf y onl y one o f th e condition s necessar y fo r mora l an d lega l responsi bility. Polic e officers , fo r example , ma y observ e thei r colleague s taking bribe s bu t fail t o repor t the m ou t o f fea r o f retaliation , or i n th e belie f tha t thei r supervisor s wil l d o nothin g abou t th e corruption. 12 Subordinate s believe , ofte n correctly , tha t thei r superiors d o no t wan t t o kno w abou t illega l behavio r i n th e or ganization. 13 I n suc h cases , prosecutin g onl y thos e official s wh o most obviousl y satisf y th e condition s o f responsibilit y wil l serv e neither t o preven t th e corruptio n no r t o provid e fai r punish ment. A s lon g a s w e insis t o n persona l responsibility , i t seem s that w e ca n brin g n o mor e tha n wea k charge s agains t thos e wh o fail t o repor t crime , an d n o charge s a t al l agains t th e superior s who kno w nothin g abou t it . Routinization als o pose s a n obstacl e t o ascribin g persona l re sponsibility fo r organizationa l crime . Contrar y t o anyone' s in tentions, practice s an d norm s o f a n organizatio n ma y contrib ute t o crimina l activity . A practic e originall y intende d t o serv e respectable purpose s ma y com e t o promot e crimina l projects . The cit y o f "Rainfal l West " adopte d stringen t healt h an d safet y standards fo r restaurant s an d cabarets , presumabl y bette r t o protect th e healt h an d safet y o f citizens . Bu t th e standard s wer e so stringen t tha t almos t n o busines s coul d satisf y them ; a s a re sult, cit y inspectors , police , an d prosecutor s enjoye d enormou s discretion i n decidin g whic h businesse s t o charg e wit h viola tions. Thes e circumstance s invite d th e selectiv e prosecution , ex tortion, an d briber y tha t occurred. 14 I n othe r instances , n o on e consciously establishe s th e practices ; routine s simpl y develo p piecemeal ove r th e years , ofte n a s par t o f th e informa l cultur e of a n organization. 15 Organizationa l routine s appea r t o tak e o n a lif e o f thei r ow n an d t o pla y a greate r rol e i n creatin g crim e than d o decision s o f an y individuals . I t woul d no t mak e sense , according t o th e structuralis t view , t o imput e responsibilit y t o any individua l i n thes e circumstances , certainl y no t crimina l re sponsibility. Even i n thes e kind s o f cases , however , th e structuralis t clai m does no t see m warranted . Th e mistak e th e structuralist s mak e is t o tak e a n overl y stati c vie w o f organizationa l behavior , look ing a t onl y on e crim e a t a time . I f w e adop t a mor e historica l perspective, routinizatio n an d specializatio n ca n actuall y ai d th e

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ascription o f persona l responsibility . Becaus e organization s de velop routines , thei r mistake s recu r i n predictabl e ways ; thei r designs ma y no t b e dar k bu t thei r crime s ar e reiterated . Th e patterns o f patholog y know n t o theorist s o f organization s ca n be, an d ofte n are , a s wel l know n t o thos e wh o wor k i n organi zations. Highe r official s ma y no t b e awar e o f specifi c crime s i n their organization , bu t the y know , o r shoul d know , tha t certai n structural condition s (suc h a s discretio n i n enforcin g overl y stric t standards) giv e ris e t o organizationa l corruption . Individual s wh o could b e expecte d t o kno w abou t thes e condition s an d tak e step s to correc t the m coul d b e morall y blameworth y an d i n som e case s properly subjec t t o crimina l sanctions . A t th e least , w e could re quire official s t o infor m legislator s tha t th e condition s ma y b e contributing t o corruption . Where th e condition s canno t b e diagnose d i n advanc e an d where higher-leve l offical s mus t rel y heavil y o n lower-leve l of ficials t o repor t an d chec k corruption , w e stil l nee d no t despai r of assignin g responsibilit y t o individuals . Her e specializatio n ca n be a n all y o f persona l responsibility . T h e la w ca n requir e tha t organizations establis h office s specificall y charge d wit h discov ering an d preventin g crim e i n th e organizatio n an d protectin g officials wh o repor t crimina l activit y i n th e organization . In spectors general , meri t system s protectio n boards , ombudsmen , parliamentary commissioners , an d vulnerabilit y assessmen t tas k forces alread y g o som e wa y towar d establishin g institution s tha t could hol d specifi c individual s responsibl e fo r failur e t o pre vent organizationa l crime , an d virtuall y al l individual s i n th e organization responsibl e fo r a t leas t reportin g suc h crime. 16 Failure t o maintai n an d protec t institution s tha t hel p expos e crime coul d itsel f b e a crime . I n thes e variou s ways , th e ver y characteristics o f organization s tha t mak e i t difficul t t o hol d in dividuals criminall y responsibl e fo r isolate d crim e mak e i t pos sible t o hol d the m responsibl e fo r reiterate d crime . But a proble m remains . Th e persona l responsibilit y tha t w e can accommodat e i n thi s wa y fall s shor t o f th e standar d o f men s rea tha t th e crimina l la w usuall y requires . I f w e mak e official s liable fo r crim e the y shoul d hav e know n about , regardles s o f whether the y actuall y kne w abou t it , w e i n effec t establis h neg ligence a s a principa l basi s fo r crimina l culpabilit y i n organiza tional crime . Althoug h virtuall y ever y Wester n lega l syste m

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punishes negligence , mos t confin e th e practic e t o offense s in volving seriou s an d direc t physica l harm , an d eve n s o i t ha s bee n the objec t o f persisten t criticis m b y jurists an d scholars. 17 Whe n we punis h negligence , i t is said, w e violat e a fundamenta l mora l principle o f th e crimina l law—tha t person s shoul d no t b e pun ished unles s the y hav e "mad e a consciou s choic e t o d o some thing [they ] kne w t o b e wrong." 1 8 O n thi s view , th e boundar y of crimina l liabilit y migh t exten d t o recklessnes s ( a consciou s disregard o f risk ) bu t woul d sto p shor t o f negligenc e (a n un reasonable failur e t o b e awar e o f a risk). 19 T h e objectio n i n thi s for m i s to o broad , however . T h e mora l principle tha t underlie s crimina l liabilit y doe s no t impl y tha t persons mus t hav e ha d i n thei r min d a t th e tim e o f th e ac t th e desire for , o r awarenes s of , th e har m prohibite d b y th e law . Rather, a s H.L.A . Har t ha s shown , th e principl e require s tha t the ac t mus t hav e bee n voluntar y i n th e sens e tha t th e perso n could hav e don e otherwise. 20 "Wha t i s crucial i s tha t thos e who m we punis h shoul d hav e had , whe n the y acted , th e norma l ca pacities, physica l an d mental , fo r doin g wha t th e la w require s and abstainin g fro m wha t i t forbids , an d a fai r opportunit y t o exercise thes e capacities." 21 W e ma y punis h negligenc e i f w e ca n show tha t a reasonabl e perso n woul d hav e take n th e precau tions tha t th e accuse d faile d t o take , an d tha t th e accuse d ha d the capacitie s t o tak e thos e precautions . Followin g thi s ap proach, w e woul d dra w th e boundar y o f crimina l responsibilit y between negligenc e (whic h stil l respect s mora l responsibility ) an d strict liabilit y (whic h disregard s it , punishin g a prohibite d ac t regardless o f effort s th e accuse d mad e o r coul d hav e mad e t o avoid committin g it) . That negligenc e ma y b e justifiable ground s fo r punishin g som e crimes doe s no t sho w tha t i t is an acceptabl e basi s fo r punishin g organizational crime . T h e revise d version s o f th e U. S Crimina l Code, eve n thoug h proposin g liabilit y fo r a failur e i n supervi sion tha t contribute s t o th e occurrenc e o f a n offense , adop t a standard o f recklessnes s ("willfu l default" ) rathe r tha n negli gence. 22 Mos t commentator s wh o endors e th e ide a o f crimina l negligence limi t it s applicatio n t o "gross " rathe r tha n "ordi nary" deviation s fro m a reasonabl e standar d o f care , an d or ganizational crim e frequentl y result s fro m negligenc e tha t seem s quite ordinary. 23 T h e sectio n chie f i n th e Burea u o f Mine s wh o

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fails t o assig n inspector s t o a compan y wit h a n uneve n recor d of compliance , o r th e FD A officia l wh o ignore s a n interna l memorandum tha t warn s o f danger s i n a dru g abou t t o b e ap proved, hardl y seem s guilt y o f " a failur e t o exercis e eve n tha t care whic h a careles s perso n woul d use." 2 4 There ar e nevertheles s severa l reason s fo r adoptin g th e stricte r standard o f negligenc e i n judging organizationa l crime . First , a view tha t justifie s punishin g negligenc e direct s ou r attentio n beyond th e curren t stat e o f min d o f a n allege d crimina l an d th e immediate occasio n o f a n allege d crim e t o th e prio r circum stances tha t le d t o th e negligence . I n thi s way , th e vie w ex presses a concep t o f responsibilit y tha t mor e satisfactoril y rep resents huma n relationship s i n a mora l community . W e woul d not conceiv e o f official s confrontin g citizen s a s isolate d individ uals comin g togethe r a t discret e moments , sharin g onl y a n awareness tha t the y shoul d no t intentionall y har m on e another . Instead, w e regar d the m a s person s havin g character s shape d over tim e i n associatio n wit h eac h other , sharin g a n under standing tha t official s ow e citizen s a mor e stringen t an d con stant concern . I n suc h a community , citizen s woul d judg e offi cials accordin g t o standard s o f car e tha t th e communit y ha s evolved, an d i n ligh t o f th e pas t effort s tha t eac h ha s mad e t o satisfy thos e standards . Organization s provid e th e orde r an d continuity necessar y t o sustai n suc h standards . Fo r practica l reasons, th e crimina l la w ma y confin e it s attentio n t o th e im mediate contex t o f a crime , bu t it s underlyin g conceptio n o f moral responsibility , a t leas t whe n applie d t o organizationa l life , would b e understoo d a s havin g greate r tempora l extension . A secon d reaso n tha t negligenc e i n organization s ma y de serve th e crimina l sanctio n derive s fro m th e natur e o f th e har m that thi s negligenc e ca n cause . T h e degre e o f car e demande d by a standar d o f conduc t traditionall y ha s bee n se t i n propor tion t o th e apparen t risk ; arguably , tha t ris k ma y b e highe r i n organizations. 25 T h e magnitud e an d persistenc e o f th e har m from eve n a singl e ac t o f negligenc e i n a larg e organizatio n i s usually greate r tha n fro m th e act s o f individual s o n thei r own . The greate r ris k come s fro m no t onl y th e effect s o f siz e bu t als o from thos e o f function . I n th e commo n la w o f officia l nonfeas ance, fo r example , publi c official s whos e dutie s includ e th e "public peace , healt h o r safety " ma y b e criminall y liabl e fo r

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negligence fo r whic h othe r official s woul d no t b e indictabl e a t all. 26 Becaus e o f th e tendenc y o f organizationa l negligenc e t o produce greate r harm , w e ma y b e justified i n attachin g mor e serious penaltie s t o les s seriou s departure s fro m standards . Al though th e departur e ma y b e ordinary , th e potentia l har m ma y be gross . A relate d reaso n fo r imposin g stricte r standard s i n organi zations i s tha t official s ar e mor e likel y t o underestimat e th e har m that thei r negligenc e ma y cause . Th e divisio n o f labo r an d th e remoteness o f result s combin e t o creat e a psychologica l (an d perhaps moral ) distanc e tha t ma y mak e effort s t o tak e precau tions see m les s importan t tha n the y are. 27 T o compensat e fo r this discountin g effect , th e la w ma y hav e t o attac h mor e sever e sanctions t o som e kind s o f negligenc e tha n woul d b e warrante d either solel y b y th e har m produce d i n an y particula r instanc e or b y th e har m produce d b y thi s typ e o f negligenc e i n general . It i s sometimes claime d tha t intentiona l harm s ar e mor e seriou s than negligen t harm s becaus e w e ca n usuall y expec t th e forme r to b e repeate d unles s w e tr y t o preven t them. 28 Whateve r th e merits o f thi s distinctio n i n individua l conduct , i t doe s no t hol d in organize d activit y wher e persisten t har m i s a t leas t a s likel y to b e cause d negligentl y a s intentionally . T h e careles s bureau crat i s mor e commo n tha n th e maliciou s one . Finally, th e ide a o f consen t justifie s imposin g th e stricte r standards o f negligenc e o n official s wh o violat e the m i n an y particular instance . I n organization s w e hav e a stronge r basi s for claimin g tha t negligen t conduc t i s voluntary. First , th e stan dards tha t a n individua l i s suppose d t o observ e ca n b e mad e more explici t an d bette r know n i n organize d tha n i n unorga nized activity . Second , th e decisio n tha t a n individua l make s t o hold offic e i n a n organizatio n ca n b e mor e plausibl y take n t o signify acceptanc e o f thos e standards . Ho w fa r thes e considera tions warran t ou r regardin g a n ac t o f negligenc e a s voluntar y depends o n ho w strongl y th e organizatio n an d th e la w suppor t the standards . I t als o depend s o n ho w readil y official s ca n tak e steps i n advanc e t o preven t organizationa l crim e o r t o avoi d participating i n it . When w e canno t reasonabl y expec t an y officia l t o tak e suc h steps, w e ma y wis h t o condem n onl y continuin g participatio n i n crime. Bu t eve n here , th e la w ma y requir e som e positiv e actio n

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on th e par t o f th e participant s a t th e poin t whe n the y shoul d recognize tha t the y hav e becom e implicate d i n a patter n o f criminal activity . I n som e cases , the y ma y b e require d t o repor t the activit y t o appropriat e official s o r eve n t o person s outsid e the organization , an d i n othe r case s t o resig n fro m offic e an d publicly denounc e th e activity . Whil e w e woul d hardl y wan t t o demand tha t official s resig n wheneve r the y shoul d forese e an y risk o f involvemen t i n crime , w e ca n surel y expec t tha t the y re sign whe n the y se e a patter n o f crim e i n whic h the y ar e likel y to pla y a par t an d whic h the y canno t otherwis e avoid . Eve n Talleyrand, on e o f th e mos t braze n apologist s fo r holdin g o n to power , recognize d a s much . Whil e rationalizin g hi s ow n de cision t o remai n i n offic e whe n ordere d t o commi t a crime , h e nevertheless concede d tha t a n officia l woul d hav e t o resig n i f the crim e wer e no t isolated. 29 T h e mora l responsibilit y o f of fice, moreover , doe s no t wholl y terminat e upo n resignation . W e may wis h t o insis t tha t forme r official s mak e som e effor t a t leas t to brin g th e negligenc e o f thei r forme r colleague s t o publi c at tention. Ther e i s a mora l life—an d perhap s ther e shoul d b e le gal liability—afte r resignation . Despite th e complication s t o whic h an y standar d o f negli gence woul d hav e t o attend , w e ma y conclud e tha t w e hav e stronger reason s fo r attachin g crimina l penaltie s t o th e viola tion o f standard s i n organizationa l tha n i n ordinar y life . I f thes e reasons wer e bette r appreciated , citizen s an d official s migh t com e to vie w negligenc e i n offic e mor e harshl y tha n the y d o now , an d prosecution an d convictio n o f suc h negligenc e migh t becom e more practicable . I n an y case , thes e reason s provid e theoretica l grounds fo r imputin g crimina l liabilit y t o official s i n organiza tions, an d t o thi s exten t undermin e th e structuralis t clai m tha t individuals canno t b e hel d personall y responsibl e fo r organiza tional crime . Organizational R esponsibility The secon d structuralis t clai m make s organization s them selves th e targe t o f th e crimina l sanction. 30 Whil e organization s cannot b e imprisoned , the y ca n b e fined an d sentence d t o pro bation, an d the y ca n suffe r th e stigm a o f a crimina l conviction . Some version s o f th e clai m woul d hol d a n organizatio n respon sible eve n whe n non e o f it s member s ar e a t fault , bu t mos t woul d

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charge th e organization , unde r th e doctrin e o f respondea t su perior, onl y whe n a n individua l actin g o n it s behalf commit s a n offense. 31 T h e latte r vie w thu s stil l ha s t o rel y o n a notio n o f individual responsibilit y i n orde r t o establis h organizationa l guilt . A principa l argumen t fo r organizationa l responsibilit y allege s that i t provide s a mor e efficien t deterren t tha n individua l re sponsibility. A n organizatio n i s i n th e bes t positio n t o discove r and disciplin e th e misconduc t o f it s own officials , an d wil l do s o efficiently i f th e la w threaten s th e organizatio n wit h sufficientl y stiff penalties . Critic s hav e pointe d ou t tha t a fine larg e enoug h to dete r corporation s woul d usuall y excee d thei r abilit y t o pay , and woul d therefor e serv e a s n o deterren t a t al l whe n th e ris k of discover y i s lo w an d th e expecte d gai n i s high. 32 Also , th e higher th e penalt y is , th e greate r th e interna l pressure s ar e t o conceal th e illega l conduc t fro m official s wh o migh t b e abl e t o do somethin g abou t it . Thes e criticism s cas t doub t o n th e effi cacy o f thi s strateg y o f organizationa l responsibility , bu t the y ar e not decisive . W e lac k th e empirica l evidenc e tha t woul d sho w the effect s o f differen t schedule s o f penaltie s o n th e frequenc y and kin d o f organizationa l crime . Th e questio n o f th e mora l status o f organizationa l responsibilit y therefor e become s criti cal. Thre e objection s t o holdin g organization s morall y respon sible deserv e t o b e considered . First, i t i s argued tha t a n organizatio n b y it s natur e canno t b e a mora l agen t i n th e sens e require d b y th e crimina l la w becaus e organizations lac k minds . Th e notio n o f a "menta l stat e ha s n o meaning whe n applie d t o a corporat e defendan t sinc e a n or ganization possesse s n o menta l state." 33 Partl y fo r thi s reason , in virtuall y al l civi l la w countrie s th e genera l rul e i s tha t cor porations ar e no t criminall y liable. 34 Organization s certainl y d o not hav e mind s i n th e sam e sens e tha t person s do , an d th e ef forts t o sho w tha t corporation s hav e characteristic s tha t resem ble aspect s o f th e menta l state s o f individual s (suc h a s a deci sion-making structur e an d a capacit y fo r long-rang e planning ) do no t dispos e o f th e objection. 35 Thes e effort s produc e a t bes t only partia l analogies . T h e intentio n o f a n organizationa l min d exists onl y b y virtu e o f convention s stipulatin g tha t th e state ments an d action s o f individual s i n certai n position s wil l coun t as expressin g th e purpose s o f th e organization . But tha t organization s d o no t literall y hav e mind s o f thei r ow n

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does no t entai l tha t the y ma y no t b e morall y blameworthy . Th e law require s men s re a fo r person s becaus e the y hav e minds , bu t from thi s requiremen t i t doe s no t follo w tha t men s re a i s nec essary fo r punishin g entitie s tha t d o no t hav e minds . Sinc e th e "minds" of organization s diffe r s o fundamentall y fro m th e mind s of persons , w e shoul d expec t th e criteri a fo r ascribin g organi zational responsibilit y als o t o differ . Th e criteri a ar e likel y t o refer partl y t o th e state s o f min d o f individual s (fo r example , the principa l officer s o f a corporatio n an d th e policie s the y avow) . But ther e i s n o reaso n t o suppos e tha t th e criteri a ca n b e re duced t o statement s referrin g onl y t o individuals , an d there fore n o reaso n t o den y tha t a n organizatio n ca n b e hel d liabl e as a collectivity , independentl y o f an y responsibilit y tha t w e ma y also wis h t o imput e t o it s members. 3 6 Whe n w e blam e Hooke r Chemical fo r dumpin g hazardou s chemica l wast e a t Lov e Cana l or th e Niagar a Fall s Boar d o f Educatio n fo r permittin g a schoo l to b e buil t o n th e site , w e ar e partl y condemnin g pas t an d pre sent official s o f th e corporatio n an d th e board. 37 Bu t w e ar e doing mor e tha n that . W e ar e als o criticizin g th e practice s o f the organizations—th e interna l an d externa l pattern s o f rela tionships—that persis t eve n a s th e identitie s o f th e individual s who participat e i n the m change . That w e ma y morall y criticiz e organizations , however , doe s not impl y tha t w e shoul d criminall y punis h them . A secon d ob jection t o organizationa l responsibilit y maintain s tha t th e ef fects o f punishin g organization s ar e unfair. 38 Th e unfairnes s results no t fro m th e direc t punishmen t o f a n organizatio n tha t may no t b e a mora l agent , bu t fro m th e indirec t punishmen t o f individuals associate d wit h th e organizatio n wh o ma y no t b e morally responsible . Whe n th e la w fines a corporation , man y persons suffe r wh o coul d hav e don e nothin g t o preven t th e crime—among them , shareholders , employees , an d consumers . To b e sure , som e o f thes e person s ma y hav e benefite d fro m th e crime. Bu t i t i s importan t t o preserv e i n th e la w th e mora l dif ference betwee n benefitin g fro m a wron g an d contributin g t o it by a n ac t o r omission . I t i s one thin g t o mak e th e beneficiarie s of misconduc t pa y th e cost s o f damage s whe n th e cost s mus t fall somewhere , bu t i t i s quite anothe r t o impos e punitiv e dam ages an d th e stigm a o f punishmen t o n person s wh o ha d neithe r

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the knowledg e o f th e crim e no r th e capacit y t o do anythin g abou t it. The validit y o f th e objectio n fro m unfairnes s plainl y depend s on th e kin d o f punishmen t th e la w prescribes . T h e objectio n i s most cogen t whe n th e la w impose s a fine o r penalt y tha t im pairs th e performanc e o f a organizatio n an d spread s th e cost s of th e impairmen t indiscriminatel y amon g al l connecte d wit h th e organization. T h e objectio n i s les s persuasiv e i f th e la w direct s the sanctio n mor e specificall y towar d th e sourc e o f th e crimina l activity, a s i n th e proposal s fo r corporat e probatio n o r th e eq uity fine. 39 Bu t n o matte r ho w precisel y targete d th e sanction , the stigm a o f convictio n fall s i n som e measur e o n everyon e as sociated wit h th e organization . I f th e sanctio n doe s no t i n som e sense conve y th e ide a tha t th e organizatio n wa s a ba d on e o f which t o b e a member , th e sanctio n seem s n o mor e tha n a civi l penalty. Bu t i f th e sanctio n carrie s th e mora l forc e o f punish ment, i t shoul d respec t th e mora l constraint s o f justifiable pun ishment. Punishin g th e organizatio n i s likel y t o sprea d th e blam e beyond th e responsibilit y an d i s t o tha t exten t withou t mora l justification. A thir d objectio n t o organizationa l responsibilit y concern s it s implications fo r organizationa l autonomy . W e ca n begi n t o se e the danger s i n punishin g organization s whe n w e notic e th e pre rogatives som e writer s ar e read y t o confe r o n corporation s the y regard a s fit t o assum e ful l mora l responsibilit y fo r violatin g th e law. I f i n thi s respec t corporation s "ar e lik e persons, " on e phi losopher suggests , "then , the y shoul d als o hav e th e right s tha t people have " an d therefore , h e implies , the y d o no t hav e t o b e so closel y "watche d an d regulated." 4 0 W e nee d no t accep t th e implication tha t woul d gran t t o corporations ful l personhoo d wit h all it s attendan t rights . Bu t w e shoul d recogniz e tha t a practic e of holdin g organization s responsibl e ha s implication s fo r orga nizations tha t coul d b e punishe d a s wel l a s fo r thos e tha t ac tually are . T h e practic e implie s tha t al l organization s (a t leas t those wit h th e statu s o f mora l agents ) deserv e t o hav e thei r au tonomy respecte d o n term s simila r t o thos e enjoye d b y citizens . Seeking a warran t t o punis h delinquen t corporations , th e ad vocates o f corporat e responsibilit y ma y en d u p grantin g al l cor porations a mora l licens e t o resis t othe r form s o f socia l control .

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Just becaus e w e punis h corporations , w e d o no t o f cours e hav e to gran t the m al l th e right s w e accor d persons . Th e proble m i s that a s subject s o f punishment , rathe r tha n o f onl y civi l penalty , corporations hav e a stronge r mora l basi s tha n the y shoul d hav e on whic h t o pres s claim s fo r autonomy . T h e lega l right s o f a corporation (a s distinc t fro m th e right s o f it s members ) shoul d rest mainl y o n socia l utility , an d therefor e ma y b e overridde n when the y conflic t wit h th e legitimat e claim s o f a majorit y o f citizens.41 Th e right s o f person s hav e a n independen t mora l basi s and canno t b e s o directl y se t aside. 42 Thi s an d othe r importan t differences betwee n corporation s an d individual s ar e obscure d by th e assumptio n tha t bot h similarl y deserv e t o b e hel d mor ally an d criminall y responsible . Suc h a n assumptio n lead s court s and commentator s automaticall y t o exten d t o corporation s a wid e range o f persona l right s (especiall y i n crimina l procedure) — without insistin g tha t thes e right s b e justified o n a basi s differ ent fro m th e right s o f individuals. 43 Because organizationa l responsibilit y ma y distribut e punish ment beyon d mora l responsibilit y an d becaus e i t ma y entai l ex cessive organizationa l autonomy , w e shoul d b e war y o f it . W e should rel y instea d o n persona l responsibilit y t o provid e th e foundation fo r th e punishmen t o f crime s i n organizations . T H E PROBLE M O F POLITICA L RESPONSIBILIT Y

Although government s ar e organizations , the y ar e a specia l kind o f organization : the y an d thei r agent s clai m variou s form s of immunit y fro m th e law . I wis h t o argu e tha t thei r specia l sta tus doe s no t shiel d governmenta l official s fro m th e persona l li ability tha t individual s i n othe r kind s o f organization s incur . O n the contrary , governmenta l official s ma y hav e t o mee t eve n stricter standard s o f responsibility . Similarly , th e objection s t o imposing crimina l sanction s o n organization s appl y eve n mor e strongly t o imposin g the m o n governmenta l organizations—no t because government s enjo y an y specia l immunities , bu t becaus e they mus t accep t specia l duties . Insofa r a s official s an d organi zations outsid e governmen t shar e th e characteristic s o f thos e i n government, thes e conclusion s appl y t o the m a s well. Where w e draw th e boundar y betwee n governmen t an d nongovernmen t (or betwee n publi c an d privat e institutions ) doe s no t criticall y

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affect th e argument . Wha t matter s i s that w e do no t permi t claim s of immunit y t o stan d i n th e wa y o f ou r ascribin g crimina l re sponsibility t o governmenta l officials , o r t o provid e th e basi s fo r our no t ascribin g i t t o governmenta l organizations . The rational e fo r th e immunit y o f governmenta l organiza tions differ s somewha t fro m tha t fo r th e immunit y o f officials , but bot h appea l t o th e sam e characteristi c o f government—it s sovereignty i n th e makin g an d enforcin g o f law . Justice Holme s set fort h th e classi c judicial statemen t o f th e rationale : "Ther e can b e n o lega l righ t a s agains t th e authorit y tha t make s th e la w on whic h th e righ t depends." 4 4 A s hi s chie f authorit y fo r thi s principle, Holme s cite d chapte r 2 6 o f Leviathan, wher e Hobbe s maintains tha t "th e sovereig n . . . i s no t subjec t t o th e civi l laws." 45 Sinc e i n Hobbes' s preferre d commonwealt h th e sover eign i s a monarc h agains t who m citizen s hav e n o effectiv e rights , democrats coul d hardl y embrac e th e doctrin e o f sovereig n im munity o n thes e terms . But ther e i s a mor e nearl y democrati c versio n o f th e doc trine, i n whic h th e sovereig n consist s o f a majorit y o f citizens. 46 Public minister s actin g o n behal f o f thi s majorit y enjo y th e priv ileges o f sovereig n office , whic h includ e immunit y fro m certai n laws. T h e sovereig n majorit y ma y prescrib e standard s fo r th e proper exercis e o f ministeria l authority , an d establis h penaltie s for it s abuse. Bu t th e scop e an d enforcemen t o f thes e standard s are inherentl y limited . Som e action s tha t woul d obviousl y b e crimes i f committe d b y citizen s ar e no t alway s s o whe n per formed b y officials . Becaus e th e circumstance s tha t woul d jus tify suc h action s b y official s canno t b e specifie d i n detai l i n ad vance, official s mus t hav e considerabl e discretio n t o ac t o n behal f of th e sovereign . Furthermore, t o permi t an y independen t authorit y t o punis h what i t regard s a s a n abus e o f thi s discretio n woul d b e t o allo w it t o substitut e it s judgment fo r tha t o f th e official s directl y act ing fo r th e democrati c sovereign . T h e sovereig n itsel f coul d au thorize suc h punishment , bu t a sensibl e sovereig n wil l no t d o so because o f th e dange r o f "overdeterrence." 4 7 T h e mer e gen eral threa t o f th e punishmen t an d th e conflict s i t ca n produc e among th e sovereign' s representative s ma y discourag e eve n conscientious official s fro m vigorousl y carryin g ou t th e dutie s of thei r office , an d ma y dissuad e worth y person s fro m accept -

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ing appointmen t t o publi c office . Therefore , th e democrati c version o f th e immunit y doctrin e woul d subjec t governmenta l agencies an d thei r official s t o crimina l sanction s onl y i n th e mos t flagrant case s o f persona l crime , wher e wrongdoin g take s plac e completely beyon d th e scop e o f office . Fo r al l othe r miscon duct, onl y th e sanction s o f th e politica l process—elections , ad ministrative discipline , legislativ e oversight , impeachment—woul d be applied . The notio n o f sovereig n immunit y ha s lef t it s mark , some times i n subtl e ways , on man y differen t practice s i n moder n de mocracy. Althoug h explici t discussio n o f a doctrin e o f sover eign immunit y toda y usuall y appear s i n th e civi l rather tha n th e criminal law , judges ofte n stat e th e doctrin e s o broadl y tha t i t would, i f take n seriously , protec t official s fro m crimina l a s wel l as civi l liability . I n Nixon v . Fitzgerald, th e opinio n o f th e Court , according t o th e dissenters , place s th e Presiden t abov e th e law , reviving th e doctrin e tha t th e kin g ca n d o n o wrong : "Take n a t face value , th e Court' s positio n tha t . . . the presiden t i s abso lutely immun e shoul d mea n tha t h e i s immun e no t onl y fro m damages action s bu t als o fro m suit s fo r injunctiv e relief , crimi nal prosecution s and , indeed , fro m an y kin d o f judicia l pro cess."48 Member s o f Congres s enjo y immunit y unde r th e "Speec h and Debate " claus e tha t o n recen t interpretation s shield s the m from prosecutio n eve n fo r som e crime s (suc h a s bribery ) tha t are clearl y beyon d th e scop e o f thei r office. 49 Whil e executiv e and administrativ e official s canno t s o easil y escap e prosecutio n for suc h gros s persona l crimes , the y rarel y fac e charge s fo r of ficial crimes. 50 Even treatin g official s exactl y a s citizen s ca n hav e th e effec t of conferrin g immunit y i n thos e activitie s i n whic h onl y official s engage. T h e mos t pervasiv e manifestatio n o f thi s kin d o f im munity i s th e absenc e o f an y provision s i n th e la w t o prohibi t many o f th e harm s tha t official s an d agencie s cause—thos e tha t result, fo r example , fro m supervisor y negligenc e i n th e contro l of corruption , th e inspectio n o f mines , o r th e certificatio n o f dangerous drugs . T h e commo n la w o f officia l misconduc t i s in frequently invoked , an d th e crimina l la w hardl y take s notic e o f the specia l dutie s o f publi c office . T h e section s o f th e U.S . Criminal Cod e dealin g wit h publi c official s refe r almos t exclu sively t o bribery , conflic t o f interest , an d fraud. 51

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Although w e ma y wis h t o preserv e som e o f th e practice s o f immunity o n othe r grounds , w e shoul d no t rel y o n th e ratio nale o f sovereig n immunit y eve n i n it s mos t nearl y democrati c form. Tha t rational e i s seriousl y flawed i n severa l respects . I t may b e true , a s Hobbe s an d Holme s imply , tha t th e ide a o f th e criminal responsibilit y o f a governmen t a s a whol e i s unintelli gible excep t i n a n internationa l system . W e woul d hav e t o imagine th e governmen t holdin g itsel f responsible , simultane ously punishin g an d bein g punished . W e can , however , vie w th e government no t a s a n indivisibl e entity , bu t a s compose d o f various part s (executiv e an d judicial branches , o r loca l an d stat e jurisdictions). Fro m thi s perspectiv e th e crimina l responsibilit y of governmen t simpl y mean s tha t on e par t o f th e governmen t pronounces judgmen t an d impose s sanction s o n anothe r par t (agencies a s wel l a s officials) . I f a democrati c constitutio n as signs thes e dutie s t o prosecutor s an d courts , the y ac t i n th e nam e of th e democrati c sovereig n n o les s tha n th e official s whos e conduct the y judge. A s lon g a s th e crimina l law s an d th e con stitutional arrangement s remai n ope n t o revie w throug h th e democratic process , w e canno t plausibl y argu e tha t th e ide a o f democratic governmen t itsel f call s fo r an y kin d o f crimina l im munity fo r anyone . The argumen t tha t th e possibilit y o f prosecutio n fo r miscon duct wil l "overdeter " official s an d agencie s depend s largel y o n empirical assumption s tha t hav e no t bee n supporte d wit h an y substantial evidence . Official s an d thei r judicial defender s hav e repeatedly invoke d th e sam e argumen t i n favo r o f civi l immu nity, bu t the y neve r demonstrat e th e actua l effect s tha t suc h li ability migh t hav e o n th e legitimat e activitie s o f official s (fo r ex ample, b y comparin g jurisdictions tha t gran t greate r an d lesse r degrees o f immunity). 52 Wha t littl e evidenc e exist s tell s agains t civil immunity , a t leas t i n it s unqualifie d forms , an d on e woul d suppose tha t th e inhibitin g effect s o f civi l action s woul d b e a t least a s extensive a s thos e o f crimina l charge s sinc e s o man y mor e people ca n brin g civi l suits. 53 Toug h penaltie s fo r misconduc t may discourag e som e peopl e fro m acceptin g publi c office , bu t they ma y als o encourag e mor e worth y peopl e t o accep t offic e by making publi c servic e a mor e honorabl e calling . Evidenc e doe s not support , fo r example , th e commo n belie f tha t th e stringen t disclosure an d conflict-of-interes t provision s o f th e Ethic s i n

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Government Ac t hav e impede d th e recruitmen t o f politica l ex ecutives. T h e Ac t ma y i n fac t serv e t o protec t hones t official s from fals e charges , an d hel p kee p the m i n publi c office. 54 Finally, politica l sanction s ar e no t adequat e t o th e tas k tha t advocates o f immunit y assig n them . Th e basi c proble m i s tha t a politica l judgmen t ma y faste n o n almos t an y featur e o f th e whole performanc e o r characte r o f a n officia l o r a n organiza tion. T h e cleve r officia l ca n usuall y poin t t o othe r achievement s which, i f the y d o no t outweig h hi s crime , wil l a t leas t diver t th e attention o f hi s judges. Whe n th e assembl y o f th e Roma n peo ple aske d Scipi o t o "rende r hi s accounts, " h e talke d instea d o f his grea t militar y victor y an d le d th e peopl e t o th e Capito l t o thank th e gods . Bentha m remark s tha t "ha d I live d a t tha t time , most probabl y I shoul d hav e gon e u p wit h th e res t t o th e Cap itol, bu t I shoul d alway s hav e attaine d a littl e curiosit y wit h re spect t o th e accounts." 55 Present-da y politician s d o no t nee d t o distract voter s wit h militar y victories . Eve n withou t immunit y an d even afte r conviction , official s ca n evad e politica l punishment . Convicted o f acceptin g a brib e whil e mayo r o f Unio n City , Ne w Jersey, Willia m Must o pleade d tha t hi s crim e wa s "victimless, " that hi s wrongdoin g wa s trivia l compare d t o th e corruptio n i n other cities , an d tha t h e ha d alread y suffere d enoug h fro m th e publicity. T h e judge wa s no t persuaded , bu t enoug h voter s ev idently were ; the y re-electe d hi m decisively. 56 Howeve r permis sively we ma y interpre t th e righ t o f citizen s t o elec t anyon e the y choose, w e shoul d no t suppos e tha t th e crimina l sanctio n an d the politica l sanctio n serv e precisel y th e sam e purposes . Neither ar e quasi-judicia l procedure s suc h a s impeachmen t a n adequate substitut e fo r crimina l prosecution . Eve n whe n suc cessful, the y onl y remov e th e officia l fro m offic e an d (some times) ba r hi m fro m holdin g offic e i n th e future ; the y d o no t impose an y furthe r punishment . Impeachabl e offenses , fur thermore, ar e no t identica l t o crimes. 57 Also , disciplinar y pro ceedings agains t permanen t official s ar e notoriousl y ineffectiv e in punishin g misconduct , partl y becaus e accuse d official s hav e so man y procedura l protections . Indeed , th e possibilit y o f a criminal charg e ma y ofte n b e require d t o se t i n motio n a n ad verse actio n agains t a n official. 58

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Personal Responsibility in Government Instead o f lookin g t o Hobbe s fo r th e foundatio n o f officia l responsibility, w e shoul d atten d t o Locke . Neithe r Hobbe s no r Locke conceive s o f th e relatio n betwee n citizen s an d th e gov ernment a s a contract , whic h woul d impl y a reciproca l recog nition o f rights . Hobbe s doe s not , becaus e h e want s t o den y tha t citizens hav e an y effectiv e right s agains t th e sovereign . Lock e does not , becaus e h e wishe s t o deny tha t ruler s hav e right s agains t citizens. Fo r Locke , th e relationshi p betwee n citizen s an d th e executive, an d betwee n citizen s an d th e legislature , resemble s a fiduciary trust. 59 Lock e i n effec t transfer s th e concep t o f trus t from privat e la w t o publi c law , mergin g th e trusto r an d th e beneficiary int o on e part y (th e citize n body) . T h e governmen t as truste e incur s a unilatera l obligatio n t o citizen s t o ac t fo r thei r good. Th e concep t implie s tha t citizen s ca n a t an y tim e chang e the term s o f th e trus t o r revok e th e powe r tha t confer s th e trust. 60 I f w e adop t th e concep t o f trus t a s th e basi s fo r th e re sponsibility o f publi c officials , w e ar e no t likel y t o b e tempte d by th e claim s o f governmenta l immunity . Althoug h fo r practi cal reason s w e ma y decid e (democratically ) t o gran t som e pro tection t o certai n office s o r certai n functions , w e woul d no t ac cept a theoretica l principl e tha t confer s o n publi c offic e an y independent right s o r privileges . T h e ide a o f trus t als o ha s a mor e far-reachin g implication : i t calls fo r a mor e exactin g conceptio n o f publi c office . A s Justic e Cardozo wrote : "Man y form s o f conduc t permissibl e i n a work aday worl d fo r thos e actin g a t arm' s lengt h ar e forbidde n t o thos e bound b y fiduciary ties . A truste e i s hel d t o somethin g stricte r than th e moral s o f th e marke t place . No t honest y alone , bu t th e punctilio o f a n hono r th e mos t sensitive , i s then th e standar d o f behavior." 61 Publi c office , conceive d a s a trust , thu s impose s higher standard s o f conduc t tha n doe s citizenship . Action s tha t may b e permissibl e o r civill y wron g whe n performe d b y privat e citizens coul d b e criminall y wron g whe n don e b y publi c offi cials. This conceptio n woul d i n par t rejuvenat e th e commo n la w offense o f officia l misconduct . I n th e semina l Englis h case , a n official accountant , charge d wit h neglectin g an d refusin g t o dis close a n ite m tha t shoul d hav e bee n i n governmen t accounts ,

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pleaded tha t hi s conduc t rendere d hi m liabl e onl y fo r a "civi l injury, no t fo r a publi c offense." 62 Lor d Mansfiel d conclude d to th e contrary : "i f a ma n accept s a n offic e o f trus t an d confi dence, concernin g th e publi c . . . he i s answerable t o th e Kin g for hi s executio n o f tha t office ; an d h e ca n onl y answe r t o th e King i n crimina l prosecution , fo r th e Kin g canno t otherwis e punish hi s misbehavior , i n actin g contrar y t o th e dut y o f of fice."63 The notio n o f offic e a s a trus t ha s reappeare d i n America n law i n recen t year s unde r th e unlikel y aegi s o f th e federa l mai l fraud statute. 64 Thre e stat e governors , charge d wit h scheme s t o defraud th e public , hav e bee n convicte d o n principle s relatin g to a breac h o f fiduciary trust. 65 Thes e case s sugges t tha t suc h a breach ca n occu r eve n i f th e schem e defraud s n o on e o f an y money o r propert y an d eve n i f i t enriche s n o on e an d wa s no t intended t o do so . It i s sufficient i f in specificabl e way s the schem e defrauds citizen s o f thei r "righ t t o . . . disinterested an d hon est government." 6 6 I n th e cas e o f Governo r Mande l o f Mary land, "concealmen t o f materia l information " abou t politica l fa vors h e di d fo r hi s friend s seeme d t o b e enoug h fo r conviction. 67 Commentators hav e objecte d t o thi s us e o f th e concep t o f trust. 68 The y argu e that , b y turnin g aspirationa l standard s int o criminal prohibitions , thi s applicatio n o f th e concep t threaten s to discourag e "robust " politica l activity . I t coul d d o so , first, be cause incumbent s ca n exploi t it s vague standard s t o haras s chal lengers an d othe r politica l opponents . Second , th e standar d ma y have a chillin g effec t o n politica l participatio n an d "interfer e wit h the delicat e proces s o f coalitio n formation, " whic h require s th e "striking o f deals." 69 These concern s abou t overcriminalizin g th e politica l proces s cannot b e lightl y dismissed . Bu t whethe r th e expansio n o f th e legal liabilit y o f official s woul d inhibi t legitimat e politica l activ ity surel y depend s o n wha t standard s o f trus t w e establis h fo r various publi c offices , an d ho w precisel y w e formulat e them . I t may wel l be tha t w e shoul d carr y ou t an y expansio n onl y throug h explicit legislatio n rathe r tha n judicial interpretation , currentl y the mos t commo n method . An d w e certainl y shoul d no t see k t o support all , o r eve n most , o f ou r mora l judgments abou t poli tics with th e forc e o f th e crimina l sanction . Bu t fro m punishin g the conduc t exemplifie d i n th e case s o f th e corrup t gover -

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nors—which involve d secretl y givin g favor s o f offic e t o friends — it i s a lon g wa y t o prohibitin g al l politica l deal s an d al l politica l patronage. Eve n i f th e implicatio n o f thi s lin e o f decision s i s t o turn th e mai l frau d statut e int o a "truth-in-government " act , a s one criti c fears, 70 tha t resul t coul d hel p citizen s kno w bette r wha t kind o f "robust " politic s i s goin g o n s o tha t the y ca n decid e wha t kind o f deal s an d favor s the y wan t t o tolerate . If w e move towar d stricte r standard s o f responsibilit y fo r publi c officials, w e shoul d conside r a t leas t tw o genera l kind s o f mis conduct. First , i n accor d wit h m y previou s comment s abou t negligence, w e woul d penaliz e th e failur e t o tak e reasonabl e step s to discove r an d preven t conduc t tha t i s alread y designate d criminal. Official s woul d b e liabl e fo r supervisor y negligenc e i f they hol d office s tha t explicitl y requir e oversigh t o f th e specifi c activity i n whic h th e crim e occurs . Suc h oversigh t nee d no t b e the exclusiv e concer n o f on e office , bu t coul d als o b e par t o f the dutie s o f genera l supervision . Thi s approac h woul d exten d to governmenta l official s a modifie d for m o f a doctrin e som e courts hav e alread y applie d t o corporat e officials . Official s wh o stand i n a "responsibl e relationship " t o a crim e ar e liabl e eve n if the y di d no t participat e i n it. 71 Wha t thi s relationshi p actuall y requires remain s unclear , an d presumabl y woul d diffe r fo r cor porations an d governments . Bu t determinatio n o f responsibl e relationships i n governmenta l organization s i s precisel y th e kin d of tas k tha t democrati c theor y assign s t o legislatures , an d the y are wel l situated , i f an y institutio n is , t o fix thes e relationship s in way s tha t allo w fo r th e prope r measur e o f administrativ e dis cretion an d subsequen t judicia l review . Legislature s ar e als o i n the bes t positio n t o ensur e tha t greate r supervisor y liabilit y woul d not encourag e overl y cautious , rule-boun d administration . The y could fashio n a packag e o f sanction s tha t woul d balanc e pen alties fo r negligenc e an d reward s fo r excellenc e i n administra tion. A secon d kin d o f misconduc t ma y b e conceive d a s official ob struction o f th e democrati c process . Her e th e concer n woul d b e not primaril y th e protectio n o f procedure s i n th e lega l o r elec toral processes , whic h ar e alread y covere d b y numerou s crimi nal laws , bu t th e promotio n o f broade r feature s o f th e politica l process suc h a s opennes s an d access . A prim e instanc e o f suc h obstruction woul d b e a n official' s failur e t o disclos e importan t

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information t o th e publi c o r t o designate d authorities . Conceal ing th e tru e stat e o f a city' s financial condition , fo r example , might ver y wel l b e mad e a crim e eve n i n th e absenc e o f an y ac t of perjury . I t i s perhap s no t surprisin g i n ou r societ y tha t fail ing t o disclos e certai n informatio n t o investor s i n th e financial marketplace ha s lon g bee n illegal , bu t refusin g t o revea l infor mation t o citizen s i n th e politica l aren a ha s rarel y bee n penal ized. 72 Ther e is , o f course , a nee d t o protec t classifie d infor mation tha t official s kee p secre t fo r legitimat e reasons , bu t ther e is equall y a nee d t o publiciz e informatio n tha t official s concea l mainly fo r persona l o r partisa n motives . T h e la w pay s mor e at tention t o th e forme r tha n t o th e latter . Th e U.S . Crimina l Cod e contains man y section s tha t meticulousl y proscrib e unauthor ized disclosur e o f informatio n bu t virtuall y non e tha t require s disclosure. 73 A relate d kin d o f obstructio n o f democrac y occur s whe n of ficials preven t citizen s fro m reportin g informatio n o r express ing thei r view s t o governmen t agencies . Suc h intimidatio n ma y take mor e subtl e form s tha n th e la w no w normall y proscribes . After Cor a Walke r reporte d tha t Ne w Yor k Cit y housin g in spectors solicite d a brib e a s a conditio n o f grantin g he r a certif icate o f occupanc y fo r he r ne w roomin g house , th e Superinten dent o f Housin g immediatel y filed crimina l charge s agains t he r for rentin g room s withou t th e prope r permit . Althoug h sh e eventually wo n o n appeal , nothin g happene d t o th e superin tendent o r othe r official s wh o initiate d th e crimina l proceed ings agains t her. 74 Further , official s ma y improperl y discourag e not onl y citizen s bu t als o othe r official s fro m comin g forwar d with importan t information . Becaus e th e Fitzgerald case s pose d the issu e o f th e civi l liabilit y o f officials , th e cour t an d th e liti gants focuse d o n th e har m tha t Fitzgeral d suffere d i n losin g hi s government jo b an d havin g hi s constitutiona l right s violated. 75 They gav e les s attentio n t o th e mos t disturbin g consequenc e o f the episode—th e inhibitin g effec t o n futur e official s who , lik e Fitzgerald, woul d expos e th e mistake s an d misconduc t o f othe r officials. T o dete r an d punis h suc h intimidation , th e crimina l sanction i s i n principl e (thoug h no t alway s i n practice ) bette r suited tha n th e civi l suit . Another for m tha t obstructio n o f th e democrati c proces s ca n take i s th e encouragemen t o f violation s o f properl y enacte d

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government regulations . Whe n th e Administrato r o f th e Envi ronmental Protectio n Agenc y i n 198 2 promise d a smal l oi l re finery i t woul d no t b e penalize d i f i t violate d federa l lea d stan dards, sh e evidentl y violate d n o la w herself. 76 Whil e th e democratic proces s shoul d gran t administrator s considerabl e discretion, i t surel y doe s no t authoriz e the m selectivel y t o en courage citizen s t o ignore legitimat e regulation s (eve n i f admin istrators pla n t o chang e th e regulation s i n th e future) . Thes e and othe r instance s o f officia l misconduc t constitut e candidate s for offense s unde r a n expansiv e approac h t o th e crimina l re sponsibility o f publi c officials . Tha t approach , a s w e hav e seen , is bette r guide d b y a concep t o f trus t tha n b y a concep t o f im munity. Organizational Responsibility in Government That official s shoul d b e hel d criminall y liabl e fo r som e gov ernmental crim e doe s no t necessaril y impl y tha t governmenta l organizations shoul d be . Althoug h I hav e rejecte d th e genera l arguments fo r immunit y tha t woul d shiel d bot h th e official s an d the organization s o f government , I hav e no t ye t considere d som e claims tha t woul d specificall y protec t governmenta l organiza tions. Both th e Mode l Pena l Cod e an d th e Nationa l Commission' s Study Draf t o f a ne w Federa l Crimina l Cod e explicitl y exemp t governmental entitie s fro m crimina l liability , bu t thei r rational e for th e exemptio n i s obscure . T h e Code' s commentato r say s merely tha t "corporat e liabilit y i s generall y pointles s i n suc h cases." 77 T h e onl y reaso n th e Commission' s staf f offer s i s tha t public agencie s receiv e close r scrutin y tha n d o privat e corpora tions—a doubtfu l distinction , whic h ma y i n an y cas e b e over whelmed, a s th e staf f implies , b y th e similaritie s betwee n th e conditions o f crimina l activit y i n publi c an d privat e organiza tions. 78 There hav e bee n fe w domesti c case s i n whic h a governmenta l organization ha s bee n a crimina l defendant , an d apparentl y onl y one i n whic h a cour t ha s seriousl y examine d th e theoretica l is sues tha t suc h statu s raises . I n Cain v . Doyle, the Australia n Hig h Court overturne d th e convictio n o f a governmen t factor y man ager charge d wit h bein g a n accessor y i n a crim e allegedl y com mitted b y th e government. 7 9 Althoug h othe r consideration s

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played a part , thre e o f th e five justices suggeste d tha t the y woul d not convic t th e Crow n o f a crimina l offens e (a t leas t i n th e ab sence o f explici t statutor y permissio n t o d o so) . Apart fro m som e technical point s o f Australia n law , th e chie f argument s ap pealed t o th e "absurdit y o f supposin g tha t th e Executiv e Gov ernment . . . i s t o b e brough t befor e magistrate s t o receiv e punishment, a punishmen t whic h th e Executiv e ma y enforc e o r remit." 80 Thi s clai m i n par t relie s o n th e Hobbesia n poin t I hav e already rejected , bu t i t als o invoke s th e practica l parado x o f punishing th e authorit y tha t control s th e mean s o f punishmen t and th e powe r o f pardon . Thi s "absurdity " ma y see m mor e dif ficult t o avoi d i n th e absenc e o f a syste m o f separatio n o f pow ers, bu t eve n i n it s absence , onl y on e justic e considere d th e problem t o b e insurmountable . A s on e o f th e dissenter s pointe d out, th e legislatur e coul d authoriz e th e fund s t o pa y th e fine, and th e court s coul d direc t tha t a t leas t a portio n o f th e fine b e paid t o th e aggrieve d parties. 81 The mos t substantia l objection s t o organizationa l responsibil ity i n governmen t ar e variation s o n tw o o f th e objection s I pre viously raise d agains t organizationa l responsibilit y i n general . First, th e proble m o f th e dispersio n o f punishmen t i s eve n mor e serious i n governmen t tha n i n othe r organizations . No t onl y doe s the punishmen t fal l o n citizen s who , lik e shareholder s o r em ployees o f corporations , ha d nothin g t o d o wit h th e crim e an d may no t b e abl e t o d o anythin g abou t simila r crime s i n th e fu ture, bu t i t als o ofte n fall s mos t heavil y o n thos e citizen s wh o have th e leas t opportunit y t o d o anythin g abou t suc h crimes . To asses s a fine o r punitiv e damage s agains t th e budge t o f a derelict governmen t agency , a s som e reformer s hav e pro posed, 82 woul d b e almos t t o guarante e tha t th e agency' s client s with th e leas t politica l clou t woul d find thei r governmenta l ben efits reduce d th e most . Som e woul d perhap s no t regre t thi s consequence i n th e cas e o f certai n agencie s (e.g. , th e Depart ment o f Defense) , bu t w e shoul d disapprov e o f i t i n th e cas e o f others (e.g. , Healt h an d Huma n Services) . T h e sanctio n o f probatio n tha t som e lega l reformer s woul d impose o n corporation s seem s inappropriat e fo r governmenta l organizations. 83 Her e w e migh t reasonabl y objec t tha t th e ju diciary woul d b e usurpin g function s tha t th e legislatur e o r citi zens mor e generall y shoul d exercise . Judicial oversight , eve n th e

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increasingly commo n us e o f "specia l masters, " ma y b e war ranted i n som e instances . Bu t i f th e structure s an d procedure s of a whol e agenc y ar e th e sourc e o f persisten t crime , th e agenc y is likely t o requir e massiv e reorganizatio n an d continua l review . Such extensiv e interventio n shoul d fal l withi n th e provinc e o f a legislature, whic h ca n conside r wha t change s ar e appropriat e i n light o f th e need s o f othe r governmenta l agencie s an d policies . Furthermore, i f th e legislatur e take s temporar y contro l o f a n agency i n thi s way , th e stigm a o f a crimina l convictio n woul d probably los e mos t o f it s significanc e (sinc e th e agenc y woul d have becom e a differen t organizatio n i n critica l respects). 84 T o the exten t tha t th e stigm a ha s an y force , i t coul d unfairl y dis credit official s i n th e agenc y wh o ar e workin g t o improv e it , an d discourage other s wh o ar e considerin g whethe r t o join it . Th e social har m coul d b e greate r fro m thes e effect s o n govern ment tha n o n a corporatio n sinc e a discredite d governmenta l agency ma y b e th e onl y provide r o f certai n essentia l service s fo r citizens. If th e practic e o f punishmen t implie s a respec t fo r th e right s of al l agent s potentiall y subjec t t o it s sanctions , the n w e shoul d be eve n mor e hesitan t abou t acceptin g th e practic e fo r govern mental tha n fo r othe r kind s o f organizations . A s w e notice d earlier, ther e ar e danger s i n grantin g an y organizatio n th e kin d of autonom y w e recogniz e i n persons . Bu t nongovernmenta l organizations ca n sometime s clai m independen t right s agains t government insofa r a s th e organization s expres s th e right s o f particular individual s o r group s i n society . Democrati c theory , at leas t i n it s liberal versions , assume s tha t individual s an d group s do no t hav e t o justify thei r autonom y b y showin g tha t ever y ac tivity the y pursu e positivel y contribute s t o th e goo d o f th e whol e society. An y autonom y tha t governmenta l organization s enjoy , however, mus t b e justified o n precisel y thos e grounds . A n agenc y may legitimatel y clai m right s agains t th e res t o f th e governmen t only whe n citizens , throug h th e democrati c process , determin e that thes e right s woul d ultimatel y serv e collectiv e purposes . A s long a s w e wis h t o trea t governmenta l organization s a s solel y means t o ou r commo n ends , w e shoul d den y the m th e statu s o f moral agency , an d therefor e exclud e the m fro m th e practic e o f punishment. Thi s exclusio n doe s no t impl y tha t w e shoul d no t impose sanction s o n th e organization s o f government . Indeed ,

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in grav e case s o f reiterate d crime , w e ma y nee d t o hav e re course t o th e analogu e o f capita l punishment—th e eliminatio n of th e agency . Bu t thi s an d simila r sanction s ar e not , o r shoul d not b e understoo d as , punishment : the y ar e politica l policies , and nee d neithe r respec t th e sam e mora l constraint s no r ex press th e sam e mora l forc e a s th e practic e o f punishment . T o suppose otherwis e woul d b e t o misapprehen d th e mora l an d political foundation s o f crimina l responsibility . T H E LIMIT S O F CRIMINA L RESPONSIBILIT Y

We hav e see n tha t th e practic e o f punishin g publi c official s (though no t publi c organizations ) ca n hel p sustai n mora l re sponsibility an d democrati c accountability . Bu t w e shoul d als o recognize tha t th e practic e ha s som e significan t limitations . Th e most obviou s one s aris e fro m th e practica l problem s o f enforce ment an d deterrence. 8 5 Governmenta l crime s ofte n leav e fe w traces sinc e th e victim s (sometime s al l citizens ) d o no t realiz e the y have bee n harmed . Prosecutio n ma y b e unde r th e contro l o f officials wh o d o no t wis h th e crime s t o com e t o light . High-leve l officials ca n trac k th e progres s o f investigatio n an d secretl y sub vert it . Jurie s ar e ofte n hesitan t t o convict , an d judge s reluc tant t o impos e stif f sentence s on , respectable-lookin g defen dants wh o plea d tha t the y wer e onl y doin g thei r duty . T o som e extent, thes e problem s ca n b e overcom e b y institutiona l re forms (e.g. , authorizin g specia l prosecutors ) an d b y change s i n public attitude s (e.g. , recognizin g th e seriousnes s o f negligenc e in publi c office) . Bu t al l thes e problem s concer n th e capacit y o f the crimina l proces s t o achiev e it s aim s o n it s ow n terms . Mor e fundamental ar e it s limitation s i n servin g othe r purpose s o f morality an d democracy . First o f all, man y o f th e wrong s tha t government s inflic t upo n the worl d ar e b y thei r natur e usuall y beyon d th e reac h o f th e criminal sanction . Som e o f thes e wrong s ar e no t appropriatel y deemed crimina l eithe r becaus e non e o f th e decision s tha t pro duce the m i s i n itsel f wrong , o r becaus e n o decision s produc e them a t all . I hav e argue d tha t o n a prope r understandin g o f responsibility i n publi c office , fewe r wrong s fit thes e descrip tions tha n i s usuall y assumed , bu t n o doub t som e stil l do . Th e most obviou s ar e thos e tha t li e beyon d th e capacit y o f an y gov -

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ernment t o correct . Government s hel p perpetuat e th e socia l an d economic structure s tha t contribut e t o diseas e an d famine , bu t though government s an d thei r official s ca n sometime s amelio rate thi s sufferin g an d sometime s exacerbat e it , the y rarel y ca n change th e underlyin g structure s i n an y perio d o f tim e tha t coul d even i n principl e fall withi n th e scop e o f an y crimina l judg ment, howeve r broadl y conceived . Othe r wrong s ar e th e prod uct o f identifiabl e decision s bu t canno t b e crime s becaus e soci ety disagree s deepl y abou t ho w seriou s the y are , o r abou t whether the y ar e wron g a t all . A n ac t perhap s doe s no t hav e t o be "universall y disapprove d of " b y al l member s o f society , a s Durkheim maintained, 86 bu t i t cannot b e widel y approve d o f b y a substantia l portio n o f th e society . Man y practice s tha t w e ma y wish t o regar d a s crimina l mus t remai n th e object s o f onl y mora l and politica l condemnation . T h e injustic e o f th e distributio n o f wealth i n moder n societie s ma y b e partl y attributabl e t o policie s of government s an d decision s o f officials , bu t it s perpetrator s are no t ye t criminals . Finally , som e wrong s tha t ar e almos t uni versally considere d crime s ma y no t b e punishable . I n th e ab sence o f a n internationa l syste m o f crimina l justice , hig h offi cials wh o commi t wa r crime s ar e likel y t o b e abl e t o escap e criminal sanctions . A secon d se t o f limitation s concern s compensator y justice. Th e criminal convictio n o f official s doe s no t hel p th e immediat e vic tims o f governmenta l crime ; a civi l sui t fo r damage s i s sup posed t o serv e thi s aim. 87 Citizen s ma y initiat e civi l action s themselves, an d ma y d o s o without havin g t o sho w tha t th e harm s are intentiona l an d withou t havin g t o g o throug h th e cumber some procedure s o f a crimina l trial . T h e aggrieve d citize n wil l still encounte r a (mor e explicit ) doctrin e o f sovereig n an d offi cial immunity. 88 Bu t th e doctrin e doe s not , o r a t leas t shoul d not, hav e th e sam e implication s i n th e civi l a s i n crimina l pro cess. I n fact , i n a n optima l system , th e immunitie s conferre d i n one proces s woul d b e just th e revers e o f thos e grante d i n th e other: official s (thoug h criminall y liable ) woul d b e civill y im mune, an d governmen t (thoug h criminall y immune ) woul d b e civilly liable . T h e interrelationship s amon g thes e form s o f im munity an d thei r effect s o n deterranc e an d justice ar e to o com plex t o conside r here , bu t th e basi c reason s tha t th e civi l an d criminal proces s shoul d trea t government s an d official s differ -

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ently ca n b e mentioned . Civi l sanction s fal l mor e effectivel y an d justly o n governmen t (al l taxpayers ) tha n d o crimina l sanctions , but ar e mor e likel y t o "overdeter " individua l official s tha n ar e properly designe d crimina l sanctions . A n adequat e schem e o f civil liabilit y fo r governmen t almos t certainl y wil l hav e t o rel y on a n expande d syste m o f crimina l sanctions , bu t fo r th e pur pose o f deterrin g official s rathe r tha n satisfyin g victims . Perhaps w e shoul d no t expec t th e crimina l proces s t o ensur e that justice i s don e fo r innocen t citizens , bu t w e shoul d expec t it to se e tha t justice i s done t o guilt y officials . A n importan t rea son fo r bringin g publi c official s t o tria l ha s traditionall y bee n t o demonstrate tha t al l persons—citizen s an d official s alike—ar e equal befor e th e law . I n th e debate s precedin g th e executio n o f Louis XVI , th e Girondi n leader s argue d forcefull y agains t proscription an d fo r prosecutio n unde r th e law : "becaus e ever y man i s a citizen , ever y ma n ca n als o b e a criminal ; becaus e n o man i s without peers , n o ma n i s exempt fro m judgment." 89 On e could stil l argu e toda y that , despit e grea t inequalitie s i n re sources, official s ar e mor e likely , i n th e courtroo m tha n i n othe r arenas, t o receiv e th e sam e treatmen t tha t citizen s receive . Pub lic officials , t o b e sure , ar e mor e visibl e an d perhap s mor e vul nerable t o politicall y motivate d charges . T h e "politica l trial " ha s a lon g (an d no t wholl y unworthy ) histor y i n moder n govern ment. 90 Bu t mos t democracie s hav e give n judicia l institution s sufficient independenc e t o protec t agains t th e mos t blatantl y political prosecution s o f official s (i f no t o f citizens) . Whateve r we ma y thin k o f th e FBI' s technique s i n th e ABSCA M investi gation o f member s o f Congress , w e canno t den y tha t th e con victed legislator s receive d a t leas t a s muc h impartia l judicial re view o f thei r claim s o f unfai r treatmen t a s citizen s woul d hav e enjoyed i n simila r circumstances. 91 Former officials , however , seldo m suffe r a s muc h a s ordinar y citizens fro m th e subsequen t effect s o f a criminal conviction . Mos t of th e Watergat e criminals , especiall y thos e wh o serve d i n th e higher offices , hav e foun d respectabl e position s i n th e privat e sector.92 Som e hav e realize d substantia l profit s fro m lecture s an d books abou t thei r experiences , an d som e hav e gaine d nomina tion t o publi c offic e again. 93 Fran k Wills , th e aler t nigh t watch man wh o starte d th e chai n o f event s tha t le d t o th e Watergat e convictions, ha s no t sinc e foun d a stead y job. 9 4

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It i s often sai d tha t th e disgrac e o f convictio n i s greate r fo r a public official . Bu t i f thi s i s so , i t shoul d b e though t o f a s merel y compensating fo r th e undeserve d prestig e th e officia l enjoye d while hi s crimina l activit y remaine d undiscovered . Man y offi cials, moreover , elud e th e disgrac e a t leas t i n th e circle s tha t matter t o them . Charge d wit h failin g t o testif y "fully , com pletely an d accurately " befor e a Senat e Committee , CI A Direc tor Richar d Helm s pleade d nol o contender e (itsel f a device cor porate an d governmen t official s commonl y us e t o avoi d th e stigma o f conviction). 95 Helm s implie d tha t h e woul d wea r thi s conviction a s a "badg e o f honor. " " I don' t fee l disgrace d a t all, " he said , " I thin k i f I ha d don e anythin g else , I woul d hav e bee n disgraced." 96 Helm s believe d tha t h e ha d acte d ou t o f loyalt y t o the CI A an d th e agent s h e led . I t i s har d enoug h t o caus e th e full forc e o f punishmen t t o fall o n official s wh o commi t per sonal crime s i n government ; i t i s stil l mor e difficul t t o mak e i t felt b y official s wh o commi t crime s o f stat e wit h th e approva l o f professional colleagues . Neither doe s th e practic e o f punishmen t contribut e t o th e democratic proces s a s muc h a s on e migh t hope . Th e tria l o f a public officia l ca n dramaticall y focu s publi c attentio n o n crime s of government . I t can , upo n occasion , stimulat e broade r re forms tha t ma y hel p citizen s hol d official s mor e accountabl e i n the future . Watergat e an d othe r investigation s o f th e earl y 1970 s spurred effort s t o strengthe n contro l ove r th e FB I an d CI A an d to toughe n th e standard s governin g th e financial dealing s o f federal executive s an d legislator s i n offic e a s wel l a s i n cam paigns. 97 Bu t crimina l investigation s an d prosecution s rarel y giv e rise t o suc h vigorou s movement s o f reform . Th e exposur e t o which politica l authorit y i n th e Unite d State s wa s subjecte d i n this period , accordin g t o on e account , wa s "uniqu e i n moder n history, asid e fro m investigation s b y revolutionar y regime s o f their predecessors." 98 I n an y case , th e crimina l tria l itsel f mus t fix it s attentio n o n particula r individual s eve n whe n the y ar e charged wit h structura l crimes . Althoug h prosecutor s an d wit nesses ma y incidentall y expos e pattern s o f misconduct , the y mus t confine themselve s primaril y t o th e offense s o f individuals , an d to fact s tha t ca n surviv e th e stringen t standard s o f crimina l pro cedure. In thei r effort s t o hol d official s accountabl e citizen s shoul d

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care a s muc h abou t honorin g faithfu l official s a s condemnin g felonious ones . Althoug h lega l reformer s a t leas t sinc e Beccari a have criticize d society' s obsessio n wit h punishmen t an d it s ne glect o f reward , ou r forma l institution s remai n bette r suite d t o denunciation tha n commendation . Ye t th e sanctio n o f rewar d offers severa l benefit s tha t punishmen t doe s not . Bentha m no ticed tha t rewar d serve s bette r t o produc e "act s o f th e positiv e stamp" an d i s mor e likel y t o b e self-enforcin g (becaus e candi dates hav e a n incentiv e t o brin g forwar d th e necessar y evi dence). 99 Mos t significantly , a syste m o f reward , a s Roussea u suggested, ca n giv e "mor e consideratio n t o person s tha n t o iso lated deeds " an d ca n therefor e hono r "sustaine d an d regula r conduct . . . th e faithfu l discharg e o f th e dutie s o f one' s sta tion, . . . i n su m deed s tha t flow fro m a man' s characte r an d principles." 100 Perhap s robus t institution s o f reward , suc h a s th e Rosiere d e Salenc y tha t Roussea u an d Bentha m ha d i n mind , are possibl e onl y i n small , homogenou s communities. 101 Bu t something lik e th e broade r assessmen t o f characte r an d caree r that suc h institution s provid e i s essential i n th e democrati c pro cess. Th e institution s o f punishmen t no t onl y fai l t o serv e thi s function, bu t becaus e o f thei r pre-eminen t positio n i n th e pro cesses o f publi c judgment, the y ma y als o preven t othe r institu tions fro m servin g it . T h e crimina l proces s i s no t s o inhospitabl e t o democrati c participation a s i s sometimes supposed . I t is , after all , th e hom e of th e quintessentia l democrati c institution—th e jury. Ther e als o may b e way s o f encouragin g citizen s t o tak e par t i n th e earlie r stages o f a crimina l proceeding . Som e politica l scientist s hav e suggested tha t recipient s o f governmenta l benefit s (suc h a s medical car e an d welfare ) coul d organiz e s o that the y coul d dis cover an d repor t corruptio n i n th e administratio n o f thes e pro grams. 102 Crimina l proceedings , nevertheless , remai n a proces s in whic h th e governmen t usuall y mus t initiat e th e forma l charges , few citizen s ca n activel y participate , an d n o on e ma y officiall y discuss man y o f th e significan t implication s o f th e crim e i n question. None o f thes e limitation s o f th e us e o f th e crimina l sanctio n in governmen t show s tha t i t i s i n itsel f unjustified , onl y tha t i t is insufficient a s a metho d o f realizin g mora l responsibilit y an d democratic accountabilit y o f publi c officials. 103 Ho w significan t

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a plac e w e shoul d assig n i t i n th e pursui t o f thes e goal s depend s in larg e measur e o n ho w w e evaluate it s merits compare d t o thos e of civil , administrative , an d politica l sanctions . On e o f it s mos t valuable role s ma y tur n ou t t o b e a s a sanctio n o f las t resor t fo r standards tha t ar e no t onl y establishe d bu t als o usuall y en forced throug h othe r institution s an d b y citizen s mor e gener ally. Th e Offic e o f Governmen t Ethics , fo r example , review s an d clears th e financial disclosur e report s tha t high-leve l official s i n the executiv e branc h file t o compl y wit h conflict-of-interes t rule s set b y Congress . Accordin g t o a forme r Directo r o f th e Office , this proces s "amount s t o prospectiv e enforcemen t o f crimina l laws b y requirin g nominee s [fo r publi c office ] t o tak e precau tionary step s t o sta y ou t o f harm' s way." 104 Here , a s i n man y other circumstances , th e practic e o f punishin g publi c official s functions bes t i f n o officia l need s t o b e punished . Furthermore , we ca n hardl y expec t individua l officials , eve n unde r th e threa t of punishment , t o comba t crim e o n thei r own . The y mus t b e able t o coun t o n th e suppor t o f colleague s an d citizen s wh o shar e their concer n fo r th e integrit y o f publi c office , an d the y mus t be abl e t o rel y o n institution s tha t protec t an d promot e coop erative activit y towar d thi s end . Despite thes e limitations , crimina l responsibilit y remain s a n important resourc e fo r judgin g an d controllin g democrati c governments. Throug h th e practic e o f punishin g publi c offi cials, a democrati c communit y seek s no t onl y t o dete r officia l misconduct, bu t als o t o defin e it s collectiv e sens e o f th e stan dards o f publi c office . T h e denunciatio n tha t punishmen t ex presses i s the mos t solem n statemen t o f wha t a betrayal o f thos e standards mean s t o th e community . W e ma y no t alway s b e abl e to discove r th e official s wh o deserv e suc h denunciation , bu t w e should no t suppos e tha t th e principle s o f mora l responsibilit y or politica l democrac y stan d i n th e wa y o f bringin g the m t o justice. Neithe r th e organizationa l complexit y no r th e sovereig n status o f democrati c government s preclude s ou r holdin g offi cials personall y responsibl e fo r crime s o f government . NOTES 1. Th e assumptions, respectively, follo w H.L.A . Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1968) , pp . 1-27 ;

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and Joe l Feinberg , Doing and Deserving (Princeton : Princeto n Uni versity Press , 1970) , pp . 95-118 . 2. Th e bes t discussio n i s Christophe r D . Stone , Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (Ne w York : Harpe r 8c Row, 1975). 3. E.g. , "Development s i n th e Law—Corporat e Crime, " Harv. L. Rev. 92 (1979) : 1227-137 5 a t pp . 1241-43 ; note , "Structura l Crim e an d Institutional Rehabilitation, " Yale L.J. 8 9 (1979) : 353-7 5 a t pp . 3 5 7 60; Pete r French , "Th e Corporatio n a s Mora l Person, " American Philosophical Quarterly (1979) : 207-15 ; Davi d T . Ozar , "Th e Mora l Responsibility o f Corporations, " i n Thoma s Donaldso n an d Patri cia H . Werhane , eds. , Ethical Issues in Business (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J.: Prentic e Hall , 1979) , pp . 294-300 ; an d Thoma s Donaldson , Corporations and Morality (Englewoo d Cliffs : Prentice-Hall , 1982) , pp. 18-34 . I n "Th e Plac e o f Enterpris e Liabilit y i n th e Contro l o f Corporate Conduct, " Yale L.J. 9 0 (1980) : 1-77 , Christophe r Ston e defends aspect s o f th e structuralis t thesi s (a t pp . 28—55 ) bu t als o emphasizes a n approac h tha t woul d punis h violation s o f "stan dards" (pp . 36-45) . Thi s latte r approac h seem s consisten t wit h th e notion o f persona l responsibilit y a s I develo p i t here . Fo r philo sophical defense s o f mor e genera l form s o f th e structuralis t thesis , see John Ladd , "Moralit y an d th e Idea l o f Rationalit y i n Forma l Organizations," Monist 54 (1970): 488-516; an d W.H . Walsh, "Pride , Shame an d Responsibility, " Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1970) : 1-13 . An exampl e o f a sociologica l approac h i s Alber t J. Reiss , Jr., "Or ganizational Deviance, " i n M . Davi d Erman n an d Richar d J . Lundmann, eds. , Corporate and Governmental Deviance (Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press , 1978) , esp . pp . 3 3 - 3 5 . 4. See , e.g. , Joh n C . Coffee , Jr. , " 'No Sou l t o Damn : N o Bod y t o Kick': A n Unscandalize d Inquir y int o th e Proble m o f Corporat e Punishment," Mich. L. R. 7 9 (1981) : 386-459 . 5. Glanvill e Williams , Criminal Law (London : Steven s 8c Sons, 1961) , p. 31 . Also, cf. Hart , Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 19—22 , 1 4 3 46, 193-95 ; Georg e P . Fletcher , Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston : Little, Brown , 1978) , pp . 4 3 9 - 4 9 ; an d Hyma n Gross , A Theory of Criminal Justice (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1979) , pp . 22— 23, 155-56 , 167-69 . 6. Edouar d L.J . Laferriere , Traite de la jurisdiction administrative . . . (Paris: Berge r Levrault , 1887 ) p . 648 . A surve y o f interpretation s of th e distinctio n i s in H . Street , Governmental Liability (Cambridge : Cambridge Universit y Press , 1953) , pp . 58—62 . 7. Cf . Edwar d C . Banfield , "Corruptio n a s a Featur e o f Governmen tal Organization, " Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975) : 587—60 5 at pp . 587-88 .

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8. "Development s i n th e Law, " a t p . 1259 , n . 80 . 9. U.S. v . Ehrlichman, 37 6 F . Supp . 2 9 (1974 ) a t 35 . Fo r a critica l dis cussion o f th e rational e o f th e cour t decision s reversin g th e con viction o f th e individual s wh o carrie d ou t Ehrlichman' s orders , se e Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, pp . 756-58 . 10. Williams , Criminal Law, pp . 346-427 ; an d Gross , Theory of Criminal Justice, pp . 160-61 , 423-36 . 11. Pau l Finn , "Officia l Misconduct, " Crim. L.J. 2 (1978) : 307-2 5 a t p. 315 . 12. Testimon y t o th e Knap p Commissio n investigatin g polic e corrup tion i n Ne w Yor k Cit y showe d tha t official s a t eac h leve l o f th e hierarchy u p t o th e Mayor' s assistan t ignore d o r minimize d re ports o f corruptio n fo r a lon g tim e befor e actin g o n them . Ne w York Cit y Commissio n t o Investigat e Allegation s o f Polic e Cor ruption, Commission Report, Decembe r 26 , 197 2 (Ne w York : Georg e Braziller, 1973) , pp . 5 - 7 , 2 1 0 - 1 3 . 13. A surve y o f som e 8,00 0 federa l employee s indicate d tha t 5 3 per cent o f thos e wh o observe d corruptio n di d no t repor t i t becaus e they believe d nothin g woul d b e done . Se e U.S . Meri t System s Pro tection Board , Whistleblowing and the Federal Employee (Washington: G.P.O., 1981) , pp . 2 7 - 3 1 . 14. Willia m J . Chambliss , "Vice , Corruption , Bureaucrac y an d Power, " in Jack Dougla s and John Johnson, eds. , Official Deviance (New York : Lippincott, 1977) , pp . 306-2 9 a t pp . 316-25 . 15. Fo r a n example , se e Pete r M . Blau , The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, rev. ed . (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1963) , pp . 187—93 . 16. Inspector s Genera l Ac t (1978) , 9 2 Stat. 110 1 (Publi c La w 95-452) ; Civil Servic e Refor m Ac t (1978 ) 9 2 Stat. 111 1 (Publi c La w 95-454) ; Bernard Schwart z an d H.W.R . Wade , Legal Control of Government (Oxford: Clarendo n Press , 1972) , pp . 6 4 - 7 5 ; U.S . Departmen t o f Labor, Offic e o f th e Inspecto r General , Semiannual Report of the Inspector-General (March 31 , 1981) , pp . 28-29 , 35-36 , 72 , 94 ; an d Jameson W . Doi g e t al. , "Deterrin g Illega l Behavio r i n Comple x Organizations," Criminal Justice Ethics 1 (1984): 27—5 6 at p . 33 . O n the difficultie s o f th e us e o f th e commo n la w offens e o f misprison , see Williams , Criminal Law, pp . 422—27 . 17. Georg e P . Fletcher , "Th e Theor y o f Crimina l Negligence : A Comparative Analysis, " U. Penn. L. R. 11 9 (1971) : 401-3 8 a t pp . 401-2. 18. Note , "Negligenc e an d th e Genera l Proble m o f Crimina l Respon sibility," Yale L.J. 8 1 (1972) : 949-7 9 a t p . 979 . 19. Se e Model Penal Code, sec. 2.0 2 i n Uniform Laws Annotated (St . Paul , Minn.: Wes t Publishing , 1974) , pp . 464-67 . 20. Hart , Punishment and Responsibility, pp . 136—57 .

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21. Hart , Punishment and Responsibility, p . 152 . Als o se e Gross , Theory of Criminal Justice, pp . 419—23 . Fo r criticis m o f Hart' s view , se e Richard A . Wasserstrom , "H.L.A . Har t an d th e Doctrine s o f Mens Rea an d Crimina l Responsibility, " U. Chi. L. R. 3 5 (1967) : 92-12 6 at pp . 102-4 . 22. U.S . Nationa l Commissio n o n Refor m o f Federa l Crimina l Laws , Working Papers, July 197 0 (Washington : G.P.O. , 1970) , vol . I , pp . 166, 186-7 . Bu t cf . U.S. v . Park 42 1 U.S . 65 8 (1975) . 23. Hart , Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 148-49 ; note , "Negligenc e . . . " p . 979 ; an d Mode l Pena l Code , sec . 2.02 . 24. Th e definitio n o f "gross " negligenc e i s fro m Willia m Prosser , Handbook of the Law of Torts, 4t h ed . (St . Paul , Minn. : West , 1971) , p. 183 . T he example s ar e discusse d i n Jethro K . Lieberman , How the Government Breaks the Law (Ne w York : Stei n & Day, 1972) , pp . 194-95. 25. Prosser , Handbook of the Law of Torts, p . 180 . 26. Finn , "Officia l Misconduct, " a t p . 317 . 27. O n "mora l distance, " se e Joh n Harris , Violence and Responsibility (London: Routledg e 8c Kegan Paul , 1980) , pp . 94-98 . 28. Anthon y Kenny , "Intentio n an d Purpos e i n th e Law, " i n R.S . Summers, ed. , Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell , 1970) , p. 158 . 29. Memoires of the Prince de Talleyrand (Ne w York : Putnam , 1891) , vol . I l l , pp . 216-17 . 30. French , "Corporatio n a s Mora l Person, " a t p . 207 ; Donaldson , Corporations and Morality, a t pp . 30 , 124-6 ; Stone , "Plac e o f Enter prise Liability, " a t p . 31 , but cf . 21—28 ; "Developments i n th e Law, " at pp . 1247—48 . T h e so-calle d "Chicag o School " favor s corporat e sanctions o n efficienc y grounds : se e Gar y Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment," Journal of Political Economy 7 6 (1968) : 169 ; an d Richard Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, 2 d ed . (Boston : Little , Brown, 1977) , pp . 165-67 . 31. U.S . federa l court s hav e hel d tha t an y employe e ma y mak e a cor poration liable , bu t mos t stat e law , th e Mode l Pena l Code , an d British la w usuall y requir e th e involvemen t o f a high-leve l official . See U.S . Senate , Judiciary Committee , Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, 95t h Cong. , 1s t Sess. (Washington : G.P.O. , 1977) , pp . 7 4 - 8 ; Commission o n Reform , Working Papers, pp . 176—8 1 an d W . Friedman, Law in a Changing Society, 2d ed . (Ne w York : Columbi a University Press , 1972) , pp . 207-10 . 32. Coffee , " 'No Sou l t o Damn, ' " a t pp . 390 , 4 0 7 - 8 ; an d Coffee , "Corporate Crim e an d Punishment, " Am. C. L. Rev. 1 7 (1980): 4 1 9 76. 33. "Development s i n th e Law, " a t p . 1241 ; Commissio n o n Reform ,

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Working Papers, pp . 184-5 ; Williams , Criminal Law, a t pp . 8 5 6 57; an d Kathlee n F . Brickey , "Corporat e Crimina l Accountabil ity," Wash. U. L. Q . 6 0 (1982) : 393-42 3 a t pp . 393-94 . 34. Gerhar d O.W . Mueller , "Men s Re a an d th e Corporation, " U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 9 (1957) : 2 1 - 5 0 a t pp . 2 8 - 3 5 . 35. Cf . Donaldson , Corporations and Morality, a t pp . 125-26 . 36. Cf . French , "Corporatio n a s Mora l Person; " Feinberg , Doing and Deserving, a t pp . 222—51 ; an d D.E . Cooper , "Collectiv e Responsi bility," Philosophy 43 (1968) : 258-68 . 37. U.S . House , Committe e o n Interstat e an d Foreig n Commerce , Subcommittee o n Oversigh t an d Investigations , Hazardous Waste Disposal, September , 1979 , 96t h Cong. , 1s t sess . (Washington : G.P.O., 1979) , pp . 1 8 ff . 38. Stone , "Plac e o f Enterpris e Liability, " pp . 26-27 ; an d Coffee , " 'No Soul t o Damn, ' " pp . 4 0 1 - 2 . 39. Note , "Structura l Crime, " a t p . 364 ; an d Coffee , " 'No Sou l t o Damn,' " a t pp . 413-24 , 4 4 8 - 5 7 . 40. Donaldson , Corporations and Morality, a t pp . 18 , 26 , 209 . 41. Cf . Rober t Dahl , Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Have n & London: Yal e Universit y Press , 1982) , pp . 194-202 . 42. Fo r recen t view s o f th e distinctio n betwee n utilit y an d rights , se e Ronald Dworkin , Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge , Mass. : Har vard Universit y Press , 1978) , pp . 184-205 ; T.M . Scanlon , "Rights , Goals, an d Fairness, " i n Stuar t Hampshir e e t al. , Private and Public Morality (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1978) , pp . 9 3 111; an d J . Rolan d Pennoc k an d Joh n W . Chapman , eds. , Ethics, Economics, and The Law: Nomos XXIV (Ne w York : Ne w Yor k Uni versity Press , 1982) , par t II , pp . 107-215 . 43. Howar d M . Friedman , "Som e Reflection s o n th e Corporatio n a s Criminal Defendant, " Notre Dame Lawyer 55 (1979) : 173-20 2 a t pp . 188-201. Mor e generally , se e Arthu r S . Miller , The Modern Corporate State (Westport , Conn. : Greenwoo d Press , 1976) . Th e bes t recent judicia l discussio n o f th e firs t amendmen t right s o f cor porations is : First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 5 5 L Ed 2d 70 7 (1978). 44. Kawananakoa v . Polybank, 20 5 U.S . 83 4 a t 83 6 (1907) . Thi s wa s a civil cas e involvin g a controvers y ove r a foreclosur e o f a mortgag e on a property , par t o f whic h ha d bee n conveye d t o th e territor y of Hawaii , whic h claime d immunit y fro m suit . 45. Leviathan, M . Oakshott , ed . (Oxford : Blackwell , 1946) , p . 173 , an d generally chap . XXVI , pp . 172-89 . Holme s als o cite d Jea n Bod in's defens e o f absolut e sovereignty , foun d i n Six Books of the Commonwealth, M.J . Tooley , trans . (Ne w York : Barne s & Noble, 1967) , chap. 8 : "On e ma y b e subjec t t o law s mad e b y another , bu t i t i s

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impossible t o bin d onesel f . . . " (p. 28) . Fo r goo d measure , Holme s throws i n tw o mor e absolutists—Si r Joh n Elio t (1592-1632 ) an d Baldus [presumabl y Bald o degl i Ubaldi ] (1327P-1400) . 46. Leviathan a t p . 121 , and generall y chap . XIX , pp . 121-29 . 47. O n th e proble m o f overdeterrenc e fro m civil liability , se e Ronal d Cass, "Damag e Suit s Agains t Publi c Officers, " U. Perm. L. Rev. 12 9 (1981): 1110-118 8 a t pp . 1153-60 . 48. Nixon v . Fitzgerald, 5 0 LW 479 7 a t 4806 , 481 0 (1982) . 49. Congressiona l Quarterly , Congressional Ethics, 2n d ed . (Washing ton: Congressiona l Quarterly , 1980) , pp . 169—75 . 50. Associatio n o f th e Ba r o f th e Cit y o f Ne w York , Committe e o n Federal Legislation , Remedies for Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by Federal Officers and Employees (New York : Associatio n o f th e Bar , 1979), p . 28 ; an d Cass , "Damag e Suit s Agains t Publi c Officers, " a t p. 1167 . 51. Cf . U.S. Code, Title 18 , chaps. 11 , 29, 93 . 52. Virtuall y al l o f th e recen t literatur e o n civi l liabilit y warnin g o f th e danger o f overdeterrenc e relie s o n analyti c argument s (suc h a s economic models ) tha t ar e no t subjecte d t o empirica l tes t (see , e.g. , Cass. "Damag e Suits; " als o cf . not e 8 8 below) . 53. Joann e Witts , "Federa l Executiv e Immunit y Fro m Civi l Liabilit y i n Damages," Col. L. Rev. 7 7 (1974) : 625-4 8 a t p . 643 . 54. J . Jackson Walter , "Th e Ethic s i n Governmen t Act , Conflic t o f In terest Law s an d Presidentia l Recruiting, " Public Administration Review 41 (1981) : 659-6 5 a t pp . 663-65 . 55. Jerem y Bentham , The Rationale of Reward (London : Rober t He ward, 1830) , p . 59n . 56. U.S. v . Musto, U.S . Distric t Cour t fo r Ne w Jersey, No . 81-144 , Ma y 10, 1982 , 707-4 2 [cour t transcript] . Must o eventuall y los t bot h hi s Senate sea t an d th e mayorshi p unde r a stat e statut e tha t require s officials convicte d o f a crime t o forfei t thei r office , thoug h hi s wif e was electe d t o serv e o n th e cit y commissio n i n hi s place , an d hi s former legislativ e ai d wo n hi s Senat e seat . 57. Raou l Berger , Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvar d Universit y Press , 1973) , pp . 5 9 - 6 1 , 63 . 58. Institut e fo r Socia l Research , Organizational Assessments of the Effects of Civil Service Reform, Secon d Yea r Repor t fo r U.S . Offic e o f Per sonnel Managemen t (An n Arbor : Universit y o f Michigan , Insti tute fo r Socia l Research , 1981) , pp . 2 2 - 2 3 . 59. Joh n Locke , Two Treatises of Government, Pete r Laslett , ed . (Ne w York: Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1960) , sees . 135—6 , 139 , 142 , 153, 156 , 16 0 ff . Althoug h recen t scholar s hav e neglecte d th e ide a of trusteeshi p i n thei r interpretation s o f Locke , earlie r commen tators recognize d it s significance . Se e C.E . Vaughan , Studies in the

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History of Political Philosophy . . . (Manchester : Universit y o f Manchester Press , 1939) , pp . 143-57 ; an d J.W . Gough , John Locke's Political Philosophy (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1950) , pp . 136-71 . The concep t o f trus t di d no t necessaril y entai l a truste e theor y o f representation. I n fact , thos e eighteenth-centur y writer s wh o re garded M.P. s a s delegate s wer e mor e likel y t o us e th e ide a o f a n "equitable trust " tha n wer e thos e wh o viewe d the m a s trustee s (Gough a t p . 166) . 60. Lock e himsel f reject s th e latte r implication , holdin g tha t th e ex ecutive's trus t ca n b e revoke d onl y i f th e truste e violate s term s o f the trust . Ibid , a t sees . 100 , 149 , 156 , 164 ; bu t se e sec . 153 . 61. Meinhard v . Salmon, 249 N.Y . 458 a t 464, 16 4 N.E. 545 at 54 6 (1928) . 62. R. v . Bembridge, 2 2 Stat e Tr . 1 (1783). Se e Finn , "Officia l Miscon duct," pp . 3 0 8 - 9 . 63. Finn , "Officia l Misconduct, " pp . 155-56 . 64. Joh n C . Coffee , "Fro m Tor t t o Crime : Som e Reflection s o n th e Criminalization o f Fiduciar y Breeche s an d Th e Problemati c Lin e between La w an d Ethics, " Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 9 (1981) : 117-72 ; D.V. Morano , "Th e Mai l Frau d Statute, " John Marshall L. Rev. 1 4 (1980): 4 5 - 8 7 ; an d W . Rober t Gray , "Th e Intangibl e Right s Doc trine an d Political-Corruptio n Prosecution s Unde r th e Federa l Mai l Fraud Statute, " U. Chi. L. Rev. 4 7 (1980) : 562-87 . 65. U.S. v . Isaacs, 49 3 F . 2 d 112 4 (7t h Cir.) , cert, denied, 417 U.S . 97 6 (1974) [Ott o Kerner , Illinois] ; an d U.S. v . Mandel, 59 1 F . 2 d 134 7 (4th Cir.) , cert, denied 10 0 S.C + 164 7 (1980 ) [Marvi n Mandel , Maryland]. Governo r Blanto n o f Tennesse e wa s convicted o f mai l fraud an d othe r charge s i n J u ne o f 198 1 (se e th e New York Times, J u n e 10 , 1981) . Federa l briber y statute s coul d no t b e applie d t o the stat e official s i n thes e cases . 66. U.S. v . Mandel a t 1359-60 . 67. Ibid . 68. Coffee , "Fro m Tor t t o Crime," pp. 132 , 141 , 142-48; Morano, "Mai l Fraud Statute, " p . 4 5 - 8 7 ; an d Gray , "Intangibl e Right s Doctrine, " pp. 566 , 587 . 69. Coffee , "Fro m Tor t t o Crime, " p . 144 . 70. Coffee , "Fro m Tor t t o Crime, " p . 143 . 71. Se e U.S. v . Dotterweich, 320 U.S . 27 7 (1943) ; an d U.S. v . Park, 42 1 U.S. 65 8 (1975) . Se e th e analysi s b y Doi g e t al. , "Deterrin g Illega l Behavior," pp . 4 1 - 4 2 . 72. Cf . rul e o n "manipulativ e an d deceptiv e devices " issued b y th e Se curities an d Exchang e Commissio n i n accor d wit h th e Securitie s and Exchang e Ac t o f 193 4 (1 7 C.F.R. 240.10b-5) . Th e Freedo m of Informatio n Ac t doe s no t penaliz e official s wh o fai l t o releas e requested information : see J. U.S.C., sec. 552 .

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73. See , e.g. , U.S . Code , sees . 1902-8 . 74. Note , "Constitutiona l Law—Equa l Protection—Defendan t Permit ted t o Prov e Discriminator y Enforcemen t . . . " Harv. L. Rev. 7 8 (1965): 884-87 . 75. Nixon v . Fitzgerald a t 4798-99 ; an d Harlow and Butterfield v . Fitzgerald, 50 L W 481 5 a t 481 9 (1982) . 76. U.S . Environmenta l Protectio n Agency , Offic e o f Inspecto r Gen eral, Offic e o f Investigations , Repor t o f Investigation , Thriftway Company (Fil e #1-82-045 , Apri l 5 , 1982) . M y request , unde r th e Freedom o f Informatio n Act , fo r a cop y o f thi s repor t wa s denie d on th e ground s tha t "th e productio n o f suc h record s woul d inter fere wit h enforcemen t proceedings " (lette r t o autho r fro m Rich ard M . Campbell , Assistan t Inspecto r General , E.P.A. , Jul y 19 , 1982). I obtaine d a cop y fro m anothe r source . 77. America n La w Institute , Model Penal Code, Proposed officia l Draft , July 30 , 196 2 (Philadelphia , America n La w Institute , 1962) , sec . 2.07, Comment , p . 38 . 78. Commissio n o n Reform , Working Papers, p . 165 . 79. Cain v . Doyle, 7 2 Commonwealt h La w Report s 40 9 (1946) . W . Friedman i n Law in a Changing Society, pp. 210-12 , give s th e cas e a somewha t differen t interpretatio n b y emphasizin g tha t onl y on e justice dismisse d i n principl e th e ide a tha t th e Crow n ca n b e liabl e for a crimina l offense . 80. Cain v . Doyle at 424 . 81. Ibid , a t 433-34 . 82. U.S . Senate , Committe e o n Judiciary , Subcommitte e o n Citizen' s and Shareholder' s Right s an d Remedie s an d Subcommitte e o n Administrative Practic e an d Procedure , Joint Hearing on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 95t h Cong. , 2n d sess. , 1978 , p . 358 . 83. Coffee , " 'No Sou l t o Damn, ' " pp . 448-57 ; an d note , "Structura l Crime an d Institutiona l Rehabilitation, " pp . 364-74 . 84. O n th e importanc e o f th e stigm a o f convictio n i n organizationa l crime, se e Associatio n o f th e Bar , Remedies for Deprivation, pp . 20— 21; an d Friedman , Law in a Changing Society, p. 211. 85. See , e.g. , Watergat e Specia l Prosecutio n Force , "Polic y an d Pro cedure i n Investigatio n an d Prosecutio n o f Governmen t Officials, " 12 Crim. L. Bulletin 1 2 (1976):26-57 ; an d U.S . House , Committe e on th e Judiciary, New Directions for Federal Involvement in Crime Control (Washington: G.P.O , 1977) , pp . 6 2 - 6 7 . 86. Emil e Durkheim , The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe , 111. : Fre e Press, 1964) , pp . 68-132 . 87. A principle d distinctio n betwee n crim e an d tort , difficul t enoug h to dra w fo r ordinar y offenses , become s eve n mor e problemati c fo r governmental crime . Mos t seriou s wrong s b y official s coul d ver y

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well b e see n a s offense s agains t th e whol e society , an d offense s tha t should b e prosecute d b y th e governmen t an d deterre d b y penal ties—traditionally som e o f th e distinguishin g characteristic s o f crimes. Fo r a thoughtfu l recen t analysi s o f th e distinction , se e Richard A . Epstein , "Crim e an d Tort : Ol d Win e i n Ne w Bottles, " in Rand y Barnet t an d Joh n Hage l III , eds. , Assessing the Criminal (Cambridge, Mass. : Ballinger , 1977) , pp . 231-57 . 88. Se e Jerry L . Mashaw , "Civi l Liabilit y o f Governmen t Officers, " Law and Contemporary Problems 4 2 (1978) : 8-34 ; Jerem y McBride , "Damages a s a Remed y fo r Unlawfu l Administrativ e Action, " Cambridge L. J. 3 8 (1979) : 323-45 ; Cass , "Damag e Suit s Agains t Public Officiers, " pp . 1110-1188 ; an d Pete r H . Schuck , "Suin g Ou r Servants," Sup. Ct. Rev. 198 0 (1981) : 281-368 . 89. Michae l Walzer , Regicide and Revolution (Cambridge , England : Cambridge Universit y Press , 1974) , p . 77 . 90. Ott o Kirchheimer , Political Justice (Princeton : Princeto n Universit y Press, 1961) , pp . 3-118 , 4 1 9 - 3 1 . 91. See , e.g. , U.S . Senate , Selec t Committe e o n Ethics , Investigation of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Septembe r 3 , 198 1 (Washington : G.P.O., 1981) . Mor e generally , se e Congressional Ethics, pp . 5 - 1 3 . 92. Pau l L . Montgomery , "1 0 Year s Later , Watergat e Figure s Recal l Turning Poin t i n Thei r Lives, " New York Times (Jun e 17 , 1982) . 93. E.g. , Presiden t Reaga n nominate d Mauric e Stan s t o a positio n o n the boar d o f th e Oversea s Privat e Investmen t Corporation . Al though acquitte d o f obstructin g justice, Stan s pleade d guilt y t o fiv e misdemeanor charge s o f campaig n contributio n violation s i n th e 1972 Nixo n campaign . Se e New York Times (Decembe r 10 , 1981) . 94. Montgomery , "1 0 Year s Later. " 95. Thoma s Powers , The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (Ne w York : Simo n 8c Shuster, 1979) , pp . 382-95 . O n th e use o f nol o contendere , se e Marshal l Clinar d e t al. , Illegal Corporate Behavior (Washington : Dept . o f Justice , Nationa l Institut e o f Law Enforcemen t an d Crimina l Justice) , pp . 207—8 . 96. Powers , Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 391. 97. Samue l P . Huntington , American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvar d Universit y Press , 1981) , pp . 141—42 , 188—89; Sherma n Lewis , Reform and the Citizen (Nort h Scituate , Mass.: Duxbur y Press , 1980) , pp . 274-75 ; Bruc e Jennings , "Th e Institutionalization o f Ethic s i n th e U.S . Senate, " specia l supple ment, Hastings Center Report 1 1 (1981) : 5—9 ; an d Joh n T . Elliff , The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations (Princeton: Princeto n Uni versity Press , 1979) , pp . 3 - 1 3 . 98. Huntington , American Politics, p . 189 . 99. Bentham , The Rationale of Reward, pp . 21 , 43.

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100. Jea n Jacque s Rousseau , Gouvernement de Pologne, chap . XIII , i n Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, C.E . Vaughan , ed. , vol . II (Oxford : Blackwell , 1962) , p . 498 n (m y translation) . 101. Se e Danie l Mornet , Les origines intellectuelles de la Revolution Francaise, 1715-1787 (Paris : Collins , 1933) , p . 263 . Mor e generally , see Willia m J. Goode , The Celebration of Heroes (Berkeley: Univer sity o f Californi a Press , 1978) , pp . 151-80 , 313 , 394 . 102. Doi g e t al. , "Deterrin g Illega l Behavior, " p . 35 . 103. Crimina l sanction s ar e onl y on e kin d o f sanctio n tha t coul d en force ou r judgment s o f th e mora l responsibilit y o f officials ; o n the genera l proble m o f makin g suc h judgments , se e Denni s F . Thompson, "Mora l Responsibilit y o f Publi c Officials, " American Political Science Review 7 4 (1980) : 905-16 . 104. Walter , "Th e Ethic s i n Governmen t Act, " p . 662 .

9 A COMMEN T O N "CRIMINA L RESPONSIBILITY I N GOVERNMENT " CHRISTOPHER D . STON E

Some amoun t o f misconduc t i n governmen t i s inevitable. T o deal wit h it , w e hav e device s rangin g fro m politica l houseclean ing—abetted b y th e "disinfectan t glar e o f publicity"—t o civi l damage suits , impeachment , an d action s i n quo warranto. Th e issue Denni s Thompso n raise s is , what i s the place , i n thi s pan oply o f contro l techniques , fo r th e la w o f crimes ? Unde r wha t circumstances, i f any , i s i t appropriat e t o tur n crimina l investi gations an d sanction s inwar d agains t th e government' s ow n of ficers? An d unde r wha t circumstances , i f any , i s i t appropriat e to prosecut e a governmenta l entity ? Thompso n suggest s tha t these question s hav e bee n generall y slighte d i n th e literature , and tha t w e ma y b e undercriminalizin g governmen t wrongdo ing les s fro m thought-throug h principl e tha n fro m habit . Thompson's approac h i s t o identif y tw o genera l ground s o n which ou r apparen t reluctanc e t o invok e crimina l responsibilit y in governmen t migh t lie , whic h I wil l cal l th e Genera l Bureau cratic Consideration s an d th e Specia l Governmenta l Considera tions. Th e firs t involv e reservation s tha t migh t b e derive d fro m the fac t tha t muc h o f governmenta l wrongdoin g occur s i n a bu reaucratic setting . W e ar e no t dealing , typically , wit h th e para digm o f th e common-la w crime , th e lonel y cutpurs e stalkin g th e I am gratefu l fo r th e comment s o f Bren t Fisse , Michae l Moore , Stephe n Morse , Judi Resni k an d Jef f Strand .

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streets, bu t rathe r wit h a n Organizatio n Man , livin g withi n th e bylaws an d furnishing s o f office . Yet , a s Thompso n correctl y observes, whateve r complication s thes e consideration s intro duce fo r invocatio n o f th e crimina l la w ar e no t complication s peculiar t o th e criminalizatio n o f governmen t conduct ; the y hav e to b e accounte d fo r i n controllin g th e conduc t o f bureaucrati c organizations generally , b e the y automobil e manufacturers , la bor unions , o r armies . On th e othe r hand , governmen t organization s ar e obviousl y not just lik e an y othe r bureaucracies . The y ar e instrument s an d symbols o f politics , operatin g withi n thei r ow n specia l aims , tra ditions, an d constraints . A s a consequence , th e decisio n ho w t o control the m introduce s certai n special , eve n speciall y delicate , considerations: th e Specia l Governmenta l Consideration s tha t make u p th e secon d hal f o f Thompson' s analysis . I thin k w e ca n fairly follo w th e gis t o f hi s pape r b y analyzin g hi s positio n o n these tw o consideration s i n turn , eve n i f i t i s impossibl e t o d o justice t o eac h an d ever y threa d o f hi s generall y well-develope d arguments. T H E GENERA L BUREAUCRATI C CONSIDERATION S

Thompson opine s tha t som e o f th e reluctanc e t o criminaliz e governmental misconduc t stem s fro m organizationa l attribute s of th e settin g i n whic h i t typicall y take s place . Often , i f no t or dinarily, th e wrongdoin g wil l be th e joint produc t o f man y hand s and minds , enjo y th e suppor t o f institutiona l resources , occu r in furtheranc e o f institutiona l goals , an d b e motivate d b y th e informal, i f no t th e forma l rules , practices , an d custom s o f th e institution. But , a s h e suggests , thes e consideration s troubl e th e criminalization o f conduc t i n an y large-scal e organization . Thompson begin s therefor e wit h a genera l examinatio n o f th e sanctioning i n a bureaucrati c setting , wit h particula r attentio n to wha t h e call s th e "structuralis t thesis. " Thi s i s a positio n tha t he associate s wit h tw o claims : first, tha t i n a bureaucrati c set ting, crimina l conduc t ma y tak e plac e fo r whic h i t i s inappropriate l t o hol d an y o f th e organization' s agent s crimi nally responsible ; and , second , tha t conduc t ma y occu r fo r whic h it i s appropriat e t o hol d th e organizatio n itsel f criminall y re sponsible.

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Thompson's decisio n t o giv e a centra l plac e t o structuralism , rather tha n t o "reductionism," 2 th e mor e familia r ter m i n th e literature, deserve s som e comment . I t seem s t o m e tha t on e could reach Thompson' s tw o "structuralist " claim s throug h bein g a nonreductionist, tha t is , b y takin g th e positio n (a s I do ) tha t statements abou t th e behavio r o f organization s canno t b e trans lated int o a se t o f statement s abou t th e behavio r o f identifiabl e persons withou t remainder ; tha t i f w e eliminat e al l referenc e t o the organizatio n an d it s attributes , w e los e somethin g o f signif icance i n th e translation—o f significanc e bot h fo r lega l guil t an d moral blame . Bu t t o b e a structuralis t i n th e sens e o f holdin g Thompson's tw o claims , i t ma y no t b e necessar y t o reac h an y position o n reductionis m a t all . A structuralis t coul d favo r sanc tioning th e organizatio n o n perfectl y plausibl e practica l grounds , unconnected t o an y metaphysica l notio n tha t corporation s ar e independent mora l agents . Fo r example , conside r a cas e i n whic h a prosecuto r believe s tha t whoeve r i s responsibl e i s burie d s o deeply i n th e bureaucrati c structure , woul d b e s o costl y t o find and prosecute , an d wa s s o tenuousl y culpabl e tha t th e likel y sanction woul d no t meri t th e effor t o f prosecutin g him . Afte r all, th e prosecuto r ha s th e optio n o f prosecutin g th e organiza tion—a les s costl y undertaking—an d leavin g i t t o th e organiza tion t o identif y an d disciplin e th e culpri t accordin g t o it s ow n devices. Whethe r suc h a n allocatio n o f prosecutio n resource s is , in an y give n circumstance , prudent , i s on e question . Bu t whe n it i s selected , a s i t commonl y is , i t implie s n o specia l mora l on tology, n o commitmen t t o "quee r entities. " Thus , le t m e stres s at th e star t tha t on e ca n safel y b e a structuralis t withou t gettin g entangled i n som e o f th e stumblin g block s tha t a nonreduction ist i s often suppose d t o face . One migh t sa y a t th e start , too , tha t mos t o f u s wh o ar e con cerned wit h wha t I wil l follo w Thompso n i n callin g structural ism wan t t o spea k no t onl y t o th e liabilit y rules , bu t als o t o re lated question s tha t commonl y an d importantl y aris e i n considering whethe r organizationa l circumstance s ma y warran t a specia l justification , excuse , mitigatio n o f sentence , o r per haps eve n th e downgradin g o f a n offense. 3 Assuming , how ever, tha t w e d o wel l t o restric t ou r focu s t o liabilit y o r nonlia bility a s th e tw o alternatives , th e genera l question , I tak e it , i s this: Respectin g misconduc t tha t ha s occurre d i n a n organiza -

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tional setting , i n wha t circumstances , i f any , i s i t appropriat e t o prosecute: 1. th e entit y bu t n o agen t ( E bu t no t A) ; 2. bot h a n agen t an d th e entit y ( A + E) ; 3. a n agen t bu t no t th e entit y ( A bu t no t E) ; an d 4. neithe r a n agen t no r th e entit y (no t A an d no t E) . I wil l examin e thes e fou r possibilitie s i n turn . The Criminal Liability of the Entity but not of any Agent I presum e tha t n o one , n o structuralis t o f an y stripe , claim s that unde r n o circumstance s ough t a n agen t t o b e hel d person ally answerabl e fo r hi s conduc t i n offic e (particularl y i f w e de fer, unti l th e nex t section , whethe r immunitie s migh t attac h t o some hig h governmenta l offices) . I f someon e adulterate s food , his convictio n ough t no t t o tur n o n whethe r h e di d i t o n hi s own behal f o r tha t o f hi s corporat e employer . Bu t th e rea l question come s fro m th e othe r side : ar e ther e circumstance s under whic h i t migh t b e appropriat e t o introduc e th e la w o f crimes, bu t unde r whic h i t i s no t appropriat e t o hol d an y agen t personally responsible ? I thin k th e answe r i s yes. Consider th e followin g stat e o f affairs . I t i s a federa l offens e wilfully t o discharg e prohibite d effluent s int o a navigabl e waterway. Eac h month , corporatio n Z , whic h ha s a plan t abut ting a river , purchase s a certai n amoun t o f hydrochlori c acid . Some portio n o f th e aci d i s consume d i n th e production ; som e portion no t consume d i n productio n i s chemicall y recovere d an d packaged fo r recyclin g t o othe r companies . On e agen t em ployed a t th e plant , th e purchasin g agent , A , know s th e first datum, tha t is , ho w man y pound s ar e enterin g th e plan t eac h month. Anothe r employee , th e productio n manager , B , know s the secon d figure, tha t is , ho w man y pound s th e plan t i s usin g in production . I t i s th e job o f stil l anothe r employee , th e sale s agent, C , t o sel l th e recapture d acid . Hence , C know s ho w man y pounds ar e bein g recovered . In fact , th e amoun t consumed , whe n adde d t o th e amoun t recaptured fo r resale , doe s no t equa l th e amoun t purchased . Th e difference, a certai n amoun t o f th e acid , unknow n t o A , B , an d C, i s bein g discharge d int o th e river . Neithe r thi s fact , no r th e

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clues fro m whic h h e migh t deduc e it , ar e brough t t o th e atten tion o f D , th e plan t manager . D migh t kno w o f th e excess , in dependently, i f on e o f th e discharg e meter s wer e workin g cor rectly, bu t i t i s not, havin g bee n allowe d t o fal l int o disrepai r b y E, th e inadequatel y trained , understaffe d plan t manager . A s a result, unlawfu l discharge s ar e spillin g ou t o f th e plan t int o a navigable waterway . Now, m y assumptio n i s that, o n thes e facts , non e o f th e agents , not A , B , C , D o r E , i s wilfully committin g th e offendin g dis charge. I f wilfulnes s i s deeme d a n elemen t o f th e crime , an d i f we canno t sa y tha t th e bit s an d piece s o f knowledg e th e variou s agents had , whe n aggregated , mad e th e corporation's actions wil full, the n w e fac e th e prospec t that , whil e unlawfu l discharge s (in on e sense ) ar e occurrin g ther e i s n o crimina l t o prosecute : not a victimles s crime , bu t a criminalles s one . Thompson, wh o i s disinclined t o dra g th e corporatio n int o i t (for reason s I wil l tur n to) , see s a t leas t tw o way s t o mak e th e criminalization o f th e agent s appea r mor e morall y palatable . On e approach, o f whic h I mysel f hav e bee n a stron g advocate , woul d have th e governmen t tak e a mor e activ e han d i n th e establish ment o f certai n corporat e office s an d i n th e definitio n o f thei r powers an d obligations. 4 I n term s o f ou r illustration , eac h plan t handling potentiall y toxi c material s coul d b e require d t o des ignate on e o f it s employee s responsibl e fo r monitorin g dis charges, an d fo r notifyin g th e EP A o f an y excesses . Failur e o f this designate d employee , F , t o carr y ou t hi s functio n woul d no t be merely , a s a t present , a disciplinar y matte r fo r th e compan y to handl e i n accordanc e wit h it s own interna l rules , bu t a crime , a breac h o f well-define d dut y fo r whic h F , clearl y forewarned , would b e answerabl e t o th e outsid e world . Thi s approac h re spects th e traditiona l constraint s o n criminalization , bu t force s the lawmakin g agenc y t o anticipat e exactl y wha t migh t g o wron g and exactl y wha t corporat e performanc e migh t aver t it . I t also , unfortunately, risk s trammellin g industr y wit h cost s i n exces s o f the socia l benefit s t o b e realized , i f dutie s ar e no t tailore d pru dently. An d o f cours e i t leave s ope n th e question , wha t ar e w e to d o i n th e grea t numbe r o f circumstance s fo r whic h n o suc h task-defining rul e ha s bee n anticipated ? The alternativ e Thompso n favor s shift s th e burde n o f fore sight fro m th e lawmakin g bodie s t o corporat e agents , a t thei r

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peril. Rathe r tha n limi t a n agent' s persona l liabilit y t o his breache s of clearl y define d duties , Thompso n propose s restin g culpabil ity on , essentially , omissions , vi a a n expansio n i n th e criminali zation o f negligenc e an d ( I gathe r also , bu t no t s o clearly ) o f vicarious conduc t o r stric t crimina l liability . Thompso n mar shalls severa l argument s i n defens e o f thi s technique : th e crim inalization o f negligenc e i s no t a s radica l a departur e fro m tra dition a s man y imagine; 5 th e seriousnes s o f th e har m tha t ca n be don e throug h large-scal e organization s warrant s som e de parture i n orde r t o "ge t through " t o th e agents; 6 we might vie w people enterin g th e emplo y o f a bureaucracy a s "consenting " t o strict liabilit y ( a particularl y nic e an d I thin k origina l point); 7 and a t leas t som e o f th e carelessnes s tha t occur s i n a bureau cratic settin g i s s o predictable 8 tha t t o criminaliz e i t (o r t o hol d supervisors responsible ) doe s no t a s sharpl y conflic t wit h no tions o f fairnes s a s whe n w e criminaliz e negligenc e i n th e or dinary nonorganizationa l contexts . Much ca n b e sai d fo r Thompson' s argument . W e coul d ex tend th e reac h o f crimina l la w by broadenin g th e swat h o f stric t and vicariou s liability , an d increasin g th e us e o f relativel y vagu e negligence-type elements . Doin g s o i n organizationa l setting s might b e les s offensiv e tha n elsewhere . Nonetheless , w e canno t blink th e fac t tha t t o mov e th e la w i n thi s directio n is , a t leas t by degrees , t o loose n th e crimina l law' s mora l tethers . Negli gence i s shadowy . Vicariousnes s i s plasti c (who , afte r all , wil l appear, afte r th e fact , t o hav e bee n i n " a responsibl e position?" ) Neither square s wel l wit h fai r notice , intent , o r rea l blamewor thiness. I n fact , I a m persuade d tha t eve n i f th e la w doe s g o i n this direction , th e ne t effec t o n th e agents—o n thei r jeopard y and behavior—wil l no t b e considerable . W e kno w tha t eve n fo r deliberate an d knowin g nonvicariou s crimes , court s ar e loat h t o come dow n har d o n white-colla r offender s excep t i n th e mos t flagrant cases . Wher e th e basi s o f th e crim e i s nothing bu t neg ligent omissio n o r failur e t o supervise , an d wher e mora l re sponsibility i s diluted , nothin g mor e tha n a ligh t fine i s (no r morally ough t t o be ) i n store . Everyon e wil l kno w i t an d prob ably ac t accordingly . Som e o f th e risk s o f thes e ligh t fines wil l be absorbe d ex ante—that is , the enterpris e wil l be th e tru e beare r of th e burde n anyway , becaus e i t wil l hav e t o increas e th e com pensation tha t th e agent s wil l demand i n retur n fo r th e hazard s

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of fine s the y hav e limite d abilit y t o avoid . An d wha t burde n th e company doe s no t pa y u p ex ante, i t ma y settl e ex post, throug h indemnification. Unde r th e stat e corporation s codes , a n office r who i s fined, particularl y i n consequenc e o f unintentiona l crim inal conduct , ma y hav e a stron g cas e fo r turnin g righ t aroun d and requirin g th e compan y t o reimburs e hi m o r her. 9 I n effect , the compan y wil l be i n muc h th e sam e positio n a s i f i t ha d bee n the targe t o f th e fine originally . T h e la w coul d be , an d shoul d be, amende d t o restric t thes e way s o f bluntin g th e criminalizin g of agents ' conduct . Bu t a s I hav e suggeste d elsewhere , som e de gree o f bluntin g i s uneliminable , particularl y wher e th e mora l basis o f th e particula r penalt y i s shaky. 10 At wha t poin t d o al l thes e machination s aime d a t nailin g som e officer becom e pointless—an d worse ? Ther e i s anothe r alter native, t o hol d tha t eve n i f n o agen t i s criminall y culpable , th e corporation migh t rightl y b e sanctione d notwithstanding . I f Thompson reject s thi s option , on e woul d expec t hi m t o mak e his cas e b y referrin g to , an d defending , som e theor y o f sanc tions, demonstratin g ho w criminalizatio n o f th e entit y (eve n i f not o f a n agen t coincidentally ) doe s no t fit. Thompso n how ever, treat s th e theoretica l basi s o f justifiable punishmen t fairl y summarily (o n th e view , apparently , tha t hi s argumen t "i s com patible wit h a wid e rang e o f theories"). 11 M y ow n sens e i s tha t one canno t hop e t o carr y throug h a n inquir y suc h a s hi s with out som e deepe r an d mor e consisten t concer n fo r th e under lying rational e o f th e crimina l law—th e subject , afte r all , of thi s volume. Start wit h deterrence . I s sanctionin g th e corporatio n likel y t o reduce th e incidenc e o f th e unwante d conduc t (i n ou r illustra tion, o f wate r pollution) ? Th e answe r i s clearl y yes . Othe r thing s being equal , a legal regim e i n whic h corporation s ar e criminall y liable fo r wate r pollutio n wil l hav e les s pollutio n tha n regime s that hol d th e corporation s immune. 1 2 Observ e tha t th e reduc tionist's analysi s doe s no t undercu t th e structuralist' s position . It ma y b e tru e tha t fining th e corporatio n works , becaus e i t i s the behavio r o f rea l flesh an d bloo d peopl e who , on e hopes , wil l be influence d b y th e threa t o f th e fine. Bu t al l th e structuralis t needs t o sho w i s tha t fining th e entit y i s a n efficien t an d no t unfair wa y t o modif y th e agents ' behavio r i n th e righ t direc tion, superior , accordin g t o som e theor y o f crimes , t o pursuin g

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them directly . Rathe r tha n beatin g th e bureaucrati c under brush t o find a marginall y culpabl e agent , a prosecuto r migh t be warrante d in some cases (dependin g upo n hi s resources , amon g other things ) t o fine th e corporation , turnin g ove r t o th e com pany's officer s th e optio n t o identif y an d disciplin e anyon e the y felt require d i t fo r thei r an d th e company' s welfare . The structuralist' s cas e i s certainl y n o les s stron g i f w e con sider rehabilitation . T h e crimina l sanctio n i s commonl y justi fied a s a mean s t o makin g th e wrongdoe r men d it s ways . Bu t what ar e th e way s i n nee d o f mending ? On e perfectl y plausibl e answer i s the corporation's, particularl y i n thos e circumstance s where th e misconduc t ca n b e trace d t o omission s t o establis h procedure an d personne l adequat e fo r compliance . I t wa s a failure o f corporat e rule s an d practice s tha t n o corporat e em ployee wa s charge d wit h puttin g togethe r th e clue s fro m whic h the violatio n migh t hav e bee n deduced : wha t A knew , wha t B knew, wha t C knew , an d s o on . I t i s no t onl y th e corporation' s authority an d informatio n networ k tha t appea r implicated . I t might als o b e th e hirin g an d trainin g practice s tha t pu t D i n a position o f monitorin g an d repairin g th e discharg e meters , a job for whic h h e ma y no t hav e bee n prepare d o r capable . O r th e flaw ma y hav e lai n wit h th e allocatio n o f corporat e resources : the maintenanc e cre w havin g bee n inadequatel y staffe d t o per form th e periodi c checkup s required . I a m no t assertin g tha t i t lay outsid e th e powe r o f som e combinatio n o f person s t o hav e altered thes e things : o f stockholders , directors , lin e managers , supervisors, an d s o on . Bu t powe r i s simpl y no t coextensiv e wit h culpability. I t i s on e thin g t o clai m tha t someon e migh t hav e foreseen an d averte d th e wrong ; i t i s a fa r cr y t o mak e fro m that omissio n moral , muc h les s criminal , responsibility . I n suc h circumstances, sanctionin g th e organizatio n ma y precipitat e th e necessary changes , "rehabilitating " th e company , withou t dilut ing th e mora l forc e o f th e law . I f th e fine b y itsel f seem s un likely t o induc e th e appropriat e interna l reform , the n th e crim inal judgment ca n serv e a s th e basi s o f a probatio n orde r tha t mandates institutiona l improvemen t directly. 13 Suppose w e conceive , a s a n independen t basi s o f th e crimina l law's educativ e function , th e denunciatio n o f wrongfu l conduc t in ceremonie s o f state . I n term s o f ou r illustration , assumin g that th e effluen t discharge s wer e wrongful , an d that , withou t

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scapegoating, ther e i s n o agen t t o denounce , i t hardl y seem s pointless t o underscor e th e gravit y o f th e conduc t b y denounc ing th e corporation . Indeed , t o denounc e th e corporation , whos e name i s more likel y t o b e recognize d tha n tha t o f an y o f it s em ployees, i s a messag e calculate d t o travel . Granted, retributio n agains t a n entit y i s a mor e problematica l notion. 14 Le t u s imput e t o Thompso n th e positio n (becaus e i t would b e th e mos t intelligibl e on e fo r hi m t o wor k from ) tha t retribution, someho w conceived , i s a limi t o n th e impositio n o f criminal sanction , an d further , tha t retributio n i s applicabl e onl y to metaphysica l persons. 15 Thi s woul d b e a goo d start . Bu t wh y should retributio n b e regarde d a s a necessar y condition ? An d why canno t corporation s b e conceive d a s th e sor t o f "persons " capable o f receivin g it ? Bot h questions , a s wel l a s th e natur e o f retribution, ar e fa r to o comple x t o permi t u s t o rejec t ou t o f hand th e possibilit y tha t retributio n ca n intelligibl y an d defen sibly appl y t o corporations. 16 I d o no t mea n jus t i n th e loos e sense, tha t prosecutin g a corporation ma y provid e a satisfactio n of emotions , a blind strikin g ou t b y th e ver y primitiv e stuf f tha t vengeance i s mad e of. 17 I mea n tha t i f on e doe s carr y ou t a n examination o f wha t i t mean s t o b e a metaphysica l person—a s Professor Moor e doe s i n hi s contributio n t o thi s volume—th e basis fo r excludin g corporation s (whic h arguabl y exhibi t thei r own plan s an d engag e i n means-end s analysi s ove r time ) i s no t at al l obvious. 18 The poin t i s that th e prim a faci e cas e fo r sanctionin g th e cor poration finds enoug h suppor t i n th e traditiona l base s o f th e criminal law , tha t th e burde n i s quite reasonabl y pu t o n th e othe r side: wh y not criminaliz e th e corporation? 1 9 Thompson invoke s th e traditiona l appea l t o th e innocen t shareholders, employees , an d s o on , o n who m th e brun t o f th e punishment indirectl y falls . Wha t h e i s sayin g i s tha t stric t o r vicarious liabilit y shoul d b e viewe d wit h prejudice . Indeed . Bu t the mora l an d practica l differenc e betwee n extendin g agen t li ability (whic h h e advocates ) an d extendin g shareholder , etc. , li ability (whic h h e opposes ) i s a difference , a t best , o f degree . Eve n granting tha t (most ) shareholder s hav e les s contro l ove r th e sit uation tha n (most ) supervisor y officers , th e unfairnes s t o th e shareholders seem s problematical . First , i t is not a t al l clear tha t the shareholder s ar e entirel y innocent ; the y ar e th e beneficiar -

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ies, throug h elevate d shar e values , o f th e cost-cuttin g tha t re sults fro m th e substandar d pollutio n monitoring ; tha t is , ove r the years , the y reaped , pr o rata , th e benefit s o f th e corpora tion's misconduct . Wha t i s unfai r abou t thei r suffering , pr o rata , a diminutio n o f shar e value s whe n th e corporation' s miscon duct i s discovered ? Indeed , th e notio n o f "consent, " whic h Thompson invoke s o n behal f o f expande d agen t liability , ap plies wit h equa l i f no t greate r forc e t o th e positio n o f th e share holders: havin g purchase d thei r share s i n a regim e tha t allow s corporate fines, the y i n effec t consen t t o thei r ris k tha t th e pric e that the y pa y fo r thei r share s wil l b e discounte d fo r th e hazar d that the y ma y suffe r consequence s o f misconduc t beyon d thei r control. (I t happen s whe n th e corporatio n suffer s larg e award s in tort s an d contract s cases. ) Second, I find i t har d t o believ e tha t an y stigmatizatio n i s in volved—that shareholder s (wh o ar e increasingl y pensio n fund s and othe r institutions , anyway ) han g thei r (institutional ) head s in sham e whe n thei r investmen t i s haule d int o court . Bu t eve n if ther e wer e stigma , woul d i t be a mor e unfai r stigm a tha n tha t which Thompso n i s prepare d t o plac e o n corporat e agent s through th e criminalizatio n o f thei r negligence ? In th e las t analysis , Thompso n doe s no t res t hi s reluctanc e t o criminalize th e organizatio n o n thes e grounds . H e fear s tha t i f we countenanc e sanctionin g organizations , a s such , th e practic e may impl y that , a t worst , al l organizations , an d a t best , thos e that w e punish , shoul d hav e thei r autonom y respecte d jus t a s ordinary citizen s do. 2 0 I n othe r words , i f the y ar e deeme d fit t o be hel d responsible , b y implicatio n "the y shoul d als o hav e th e rights tha t peopl e have." 2 1 Where doe s suc h a n implicatio n com e from ? I canno t find i t in th e cours e o f histor y o r th e crannie s o f logic. 22 Loo k a t th e record. True , centurie s ago , qualm s abou t haulin g th e corpora tion int o court , no t unlik e thos e Thompso n invokes , wer e com mon. 23 Bu t sinc e the n w e hav e com e t o accep t a s a matte r o f course a lega l syste m i n whic h corporation s ar e expecte d t o pa y up o n thei r contracts , mak e goo d fo r thei r torts—eve n inten tional torts—and , mor e recently , no t t o discriminat e i n hiring . Criminalizing thei r conduc t migh t b e regarde d a s a mor e mor ally significan t move , an d i n fac t wa s s o viewed . Bu t w e hashe d that ou t nearl y a centur y ago , an d graduall y decide d tha t cor -

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porations ar e th e sor t o f "persons " whos e conduc t ca n b e criminalized. Wha t hav e bee n th e dir e implication s fo r corpo rate rights ? Obviously, th e impositio n o f som e liabilitie s raise s som e ques tions o f right s tha t woul d otherwis e no t hav e com e up . Onc e w e decided tha t a corporatio n coul d b e tried , the n w e ha d t o de cide whethe r i t ha d a righ t t o jury trial . (I t wa s decide d tha t i t did.) Bu t whil e w e hav e conferre d som e right s o n corporations , we hav e no t conferre d all ; no r hav e w e conferre d o n the m th e full mora l statu s o f persons , no r i s ther e muc h clamo r tha t w e relent an d d o so . (Somewha t th e sam e history , I think , coul d b e written o f fetuses , animals , species , an d even , i n som e circum stances, th e dead. ) Corporation s d o no t enjo y th e benefi t o f th e privileges an d immunitie s clause . No r d o the y hav e Fift h Amendment rights , nor , a s I rea d th e cases , do the y hav e right s equally wit h a perso n unde r th e Firs t o r Fourt h Amendments . They canno t vote . Thei r participatio n i n politica l campaign s i s restricted. Moreover, eve n i f w e pu t thes e difference s aside , eve n i f w e suppose tha t ther e i s som e slipper y slope , that , onc e w e punis h corporations a s thoug h the y wer e persons , ther e wil l b e pres sure t o increas e thei r rights , the n th e normativ e basi s o f Thompson's argumen t woul d stil l nee d developing : wh y woul d a movemen t i n tha t directio n b e a ba d thing ? Som e writers — Peter French 2 4 an d I, 25 fo r example—hav e suggeste d bot h tha t it i s intelligible , an d quit e defensible , t o trea t corporation s a s moral agent s i n som e circumstances . Liability of the Agent and the Entity (A + E) Thus fa r I hav e proceede d unde r th e assumptio n tha t w e ar e faced wit h tw o alternatives , t o hol d eithe r th e agen t o r th e en tity liable . Thi s nee d no t b e so . I n fact , th e mos t commo n re sponse i s t o pas s a statut e tha t provide s th e optio n t o coindict . Prosecutors inclin e t o exercis e thi s option , an d t o indic t th e en tity eve n i n thos e situation s wher e (a s distinc t fro m ou r illustra tion) ther e i s a clearl y culpabl e individua l the y ca n readil y iden tify. Th e prosecutor s ma y b e persuade d that , whil e A deserve s his sanction , i t i s equall y tru e tha t th e wrongdoin g reflecte d a pattern o f behavio r ingraine d i n th e corporation' s way s o f doin g things: it s institutiona l practice s i n hiring , supervising , monitor -

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ing an d disciplinin g employees , gatherin g an d disseminatin g information, allocatin g authorit y an d responsibility , an d s o on . Merely t o convic t A wil l no t assur e refor m i n thes e practices . I n fact, i f thes e practice s ar e deepl y enoug h entrenched , eve n th e imprisonment—the removal—o f A i s n o assuranc e tha t th e or ganization's behavio r wil l b e modified ; a ne w A ma y b e place d in th e sam e ol d wor k environmen t an d ris k th e sam e ol d crim inal tasks . On e ca n pu t th e argumen t eve n mor e strongly . I f w e adopt th e practic e tha t onl y agent s ar e indictable , th e prosecu tors, i n orde r t o assur e th e agent' s convictio n an d provid e th e basis fo r stif f sentences , wil l emphasiz e th e individual' s respon sibility a t th e cos t o f distractin g attentio n whe n i t migh t bes t b e put—on th e underlyin g organizationa l pathology. 26 Liability of the Agent but not the Entity (A but not E) A dyed-in-the-woo l structuralis t migh t g o eve n further , an d argue tha t ther e wa s n o cas e i n which , th e agen t havin g com mitted a crim e mad e possibl e b y din t o f corporat e office , th e entity ough t no t b e liabl e also—tha t is , there i s n o cas e fo r whic h the strateg y A bu t no t E i s appropriate. Thi s i s a toug h positio n to spea k for , a s illustrate d b y ban k embezzlement , a crim e i n which th e agen t acts , no t onl y fo r hi s ow n advantage , bu t agains t the interest s an d order s o f E , hi s employer . Surely , th e non structuralist wil l sa y tha t her e i s a cas e fo r th e prosecutio n o f A but no t o f E . But i s E' s nonresponsibilit y s o clear ? Unlik e th e statutor y rap e that a bank employe e migh t commi t afte r hour s i n hi s own home , this crim e too k plac e i n th e bank , an d th e opportunit y wa s pro vided b y hi s positio n a s a ban k officer . I t i s tru e tha t A her e acted agains t th e bank' s clearl y implie d i f no t expres s orders . But th e la w ha s take n th e position—quit e wisely , I think—tha t an employe r ma y b e criminall y liabl e fo r act s o f it s agents , not withstanding thei r apparen t insubordination , a s long a s the em ployer ha d opportunit y t o contro l th e situation 27 (muc h o n th e basis, incidentally , tha t woul d suppor t Thompson' s criminali zation o f a supervisin g agent' s omissions) . T h e distinctio n ha s got t o b e tha t th e embezzle r i s no t onl y actin g contrar y t o th e employer's orders , bu t contrar y t o it s interests , a s well . Thi s evaporates ou r suspicion s tha t th e employe r (o r supervisin g agent) reall y di d no t hav e it s hear t in , wa s perhap s eve n wink -

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ing a t violation s of , it s forma l enunciations . Afte r all , th e non structuralist wil l say , tha t th e employe r migh t itsel f b e a victi m already provide d i t wit h incentive s t o preven t th e crime . But w e mus t remembe r tha t th e crim e o f embezzlemen t vic timizes mor e tha n th e ban k an d it s shareholders—whic h i s wh y it i s no t merel y a tor t bu t a crim e agains t th e people , th e elim ination o f whic h i s a publi c goo d th e publi c i s prepare d t o pa y for. Th e ris k o f embezzlemen t add s t o th e cost s o f ban k insur ance, burdenin g th e entir e industr y an d throug h it , society . If , as a consequenc e o f th e embezzlement , th e compan y shoul d fail , it is not onl y th e shareholder s wh o suffer , bu t th e creditors , de positors, an d societ y a s a whole . Therefore , i t i s no t enoug h t o point ou t that , eve n absen t th e specte r o f crimina l liability , th e bank's investor s an d manager s hav e independen t incentive s t o hire an d monito r thei r agent s i n suc h a wa y a s t o preven t em bezzlement. T h e questio n remains , migh t societ y no t hav e rea sons t o preven t embezzlemen t tha t warran t eve n mor e strin gent measure s tha n ar e warrante d b y th e bank' s ow n incentives ? Suppose w e d o no t wan t t o bea r th e expens e o f figuring ou t which officers , i n whic h banks , ar e bes t pu t i n jeopardy i f some one embezzles . Organizationa l systems , lik e biologica l ones , var y in way s tha t mak e interna l tamperin g jeopardou s t o thei r sur vival. W e migh t simpl y threate n t o fine th e bank , lettin g th e bank's officer s wor k ou t ho w bes t t o monitor , t o g o suret y for , its employees ' lawfu l conduct . I t is , s o fa r a s need s concer n us , the entit y tha t hires , compensate s (ar e teller s underpaid?) , su pervises, an d create s th e physica l an d ethica l environmen t i n which it s agent s work . On e wa y t o induc e th e sociall y optima l level o f supervision , etc. , i s to introduc e som e furthe r disincen tives t o animat e th e corporatio n t o preven t it s employee s fro m becoming criminals , knowin g tha t th e detail s o f th e appropriat e response wil l likel y var y fro m corporatio n t o corporation . In fact , ther e see m t o b e case s goin g bot h way s o n whethe r a corporation ca n b e coindicte d i n comparabl e circumstances. 28 The court s tha t hav e dismisse d indictment s agains t corpora tions hav e bee n moved , n o doubt , b y a n intuitio n tha t i t de taches th e la w fro m it s mora l foundatio n t o penaliz e th e cor poration, an d throug h it , it s shareholders an d others , fo r actio n that the y no t onl y di d no t authorize , bu t wa s agains t thei r in terests. T o carr y thi s positio n beyon d th e intuitiv e leve l involve s

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us i n ver y comple x questions , non e o f whic h ha s a compellin g answer. I f th e la w shoul d firml y establis h coindictabilit y i n suc h cases, the n th e prospec t o f th e corporatio n bein g fine d fo r dis loyal agen t misconduc t wil l b e discounte d i n shar e values ; everyone bein g o n notic e o f th e rule , an d payin g th e righ t pric e for th e risk , th e unfairnes s argumen t lose s som e o f it s appeal . In thos e circumstances , th e questio n o f indictin g E alon g wit h A i n al l case s i n whic h A i s indicte d would , i n th e las t analysis , be dominate d b y consideration s o f efficienc y i n la w enforce ment, th e forc e o f mora l constraint s bein g minimal . Neither the Agent nor the Entity (not A and not E) Finally, w e shoul d a t leas t allud e t o th e rang e o f wrongdoin g in which , perhaps , neithe r th e entit y no r th e agen t shoul d b e dealt wit h a s criminals . Peopl e draw n int o institution s ge t in volved i n morall y knott y situations . A s Thompso n himsel f ob serves (i n th e governmen t context) , man y practice s tha t w e ma y wish t o regar d a s criminal mus t remai n th e objec t o f onl y mora l and politica l condemnation . Or , w e migh t add , civi l suits . W e must remembe r that , excep t fo r wrong s s o highl y culpabl e tha t a priso n ter m i s in order , th e differenc e betwee n a criminal sui t and, say , a governmen t civi l suit , o r civi l penalt y suit , i s a thi n line, particularl y wher e th e defendan t i s b y it s natur e unimpri sonable. I a m concerne d tha t man y o f th e consideration s Thompson raise s a s objection s t o criminalizin g conduc t coul d be turne d wit h equa l forc e agains t ordinar y o r punitiv e civi l damage suits. 29 Wha t i s the differenc e whethe r th e chec k a cor porate treasure r i s force d t o writ e i s i n satisfactio n o f a civi l judgment o r a fine? Thus, on e wonder s whe n th e variou s noncrimina l alterna tives shoul d supplemen t th e la w o f crimes , an d whe n supplan t it. 30 I t i s impossibl e t o determin e Thompson' s respons e fo r th e same reaso n i t i s hard t o asses s hi s stan d o n th e othe r thre e po sitions. T o decid e wha t sort s o f misconduct , i f any , suit s whic h of th e fou r alternatives , w e nee d a mor e develope d theor y o f criminal sanctio n tha n Thompso n ha s bee n able—i n th e shor t space allowe d him—t o provide . Specifically , i n th e decisio n t o criminalize, wha t rol e doe s h e assig n t o eac h o f th e traditiona l justifications: specia l an d genera l deterrence , rehabilitation , re tribution, denunciation , an d s o on ? I infe r tha t Thompso n as -

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signs a ke y rol e eithe r t o fairness , someho w conceived , o r t o re tribution. Bu t i s h e regardin g on e o r th e othe r o r bot h a s a constraint o n th e sanctionin g power , th e prim a faci e cas e fo r which i s base d o n som e combinatio n o f th e traditiona l justifi catory bases ? O r d o fairnes s an d retributio n play , somehow , a more fundamenta l role , wit h som e o f th e others—deterrence , for example—servin g a s boundar y conditions ? T H E SPECIA L GOVERNMENTA L CONSIDERATION S

In an y case , Thompso n emerge s fro m th e genera l bureau cratic analysi s with , t o hi s satisfaction , a stron g presumptio n i n favor o f penalizin g agents , bu t no t entities . H e the n focuse s o n the are a o f governmen t t o conside r whethe r consideration s ar e thereby introduce d tha t requir e u s t o alte r th e genera l analysis . This strike s m e a s a perfectl y sensibl e wa y t o proceed . Ide ally, on e migh t revie w eac h o f th e alternative s above , an d as k whether anythin g ca n b e derive d fro m aspect s o f governmen t that alter s ho w w e evaluat e tha t alternative . Fo r example , th e possibility tha t agent s migh t hav e blanke t office-connecte d (an d not merel y transactional ) immunit y seem s harde r t o rejec t ou t of han d whe n i t is to a high publi c offic e tha t th e immunit y woul d attach. Thompson , I gather , seem s unwillin g t o accep t a broa d interpretation o f Nixon v . Fitzgerald, 31 which, althoug h a civi l suit , could b e rea d t o sugges t tha t th e Unite d State s Presiden t i s als o immune fro m crimina l suits , a t leas t durin g hi s ter m o f office . (I presum e th e Presiden t woul d b e liabl e t o impeachment , or — the statut e o f limitation s tollin g durin g hi s term—t o prosecu tion afte r office. ) On e suppose s tha t ther e i s much t o b e sai d o n both side s o f th e question . Moreover, i t i s no t jus t question s o f liabilit y tha t meri t ex amination, bu t thos e o f excus e an d justification a s well . Fo r ex ample, i n th e Barker case, 32 a burglar y prosecutio n tha t aros e out o f th e Watergat e scandal , th e majorit y o f th e D.C . Cour t o f Appeals too k th e vie w tha t whil e mistak e o f la w i s ordinarily n o excuse fo r a crime , a mistak e o f la w b y person s employe d b y high governmen t officials , wh o ha d n o reaso n t o doub t th e au thority o f thos e officials , o r t o kno w tha t thei r action s wer e wrongful, migh t enjo y a n exception , a specia l ignorance-of-la w excuse fo r governmen t employees . Again , t o understan d ho w

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Thompson woul d dea l wit h Barker woul d tak e u s a lon g wa y to ward mappin g thi s conceptuall y rugge d terrain . Unfortunately, I find i t har d t o construc t o r follo w Thomp son's positio n o n thes e o r th e variou s othe r prescription s tha t the structuralis t analysi s migh t b e designe d t o inform . Fo r on e thing, th e defec t o f th e first par t continue s t o do g u s here : th e failure t o wor k ou t an y specifi c an d buttressin g theor y o f crim inal responsibility . An d here , i n th e secon d part , tha t failur e i s compounded b y anothe r omission . Thompso n need s t o giv e u s a fulle r theor y o f governmen t agains t whic h t o judge why , o r which, governmen t wrong s warran t specia l treatment . Tha t i s to say : b y virtu e o f wha t specia l organizational , financial, polit ical accountability , o r manageria l characteristic s ar e th e specia l considerations derived ? Indeed , on e misse s a theory thic k enoug h even t o enabl e u s t o decid e what , exactly , h e identifie s a s "gov ernment" fo r purpose s o f hi s analysis . Just fo r a start , Thompso n woul d d o wel l t o distinguis h be tween government s a t differen t levels . Som e conceivabl e pros ecutions woul d b e m^ragovernmental—fo r example , i f th e U.S . Department o f Justice wer e t o prosecut e th e CI A o r th e Publi c Health Service . I n suc h a case , i f th e prosecutio n wins , on e coul d depict th e outcom e a s a mer e shufflin g o f federa l funds , a n ex ercise i n bookkeeping . T o satisf y th e fine, th e federa l govern ment woul d writ e itsel f a check . Similarly , i f a federa l court , a t the instigatio n o f a federa l prosecutor , wer e t o decre e a pro bation tha t reshape d a federa l agency , the n th e separatio n o f powers principle , a s Thompson recognizes , woul d b e bruised. 33 But ther e i s a differen t theoretica l tinctur e i n mtergovernmen tal suits , a s wher e th e federa l governmen t fines a municipality , or arrange s fo r a stat e agency—say , th e priso n system , o r th e state menta l healt h hospitals—t o b e pu t unde r a sor t o f trust eeship. Thes e intergovernmenta l conflict s rais e problems , too , bu t they ar e differen t problems : no t thos e o f filmflam bookkeep ing, bu t thos e o f federalism. 34 Moreover, eve n i f we restric t ourselve s t o analysi s o f intragovernmental prosecutions , th e compounde d lac k o f theories—o f punishment an d o f governments—leave s u s listless . We ar e a t a loss eve n t o sa y where , fo r ou r purposes , publi c governmen t leaves of f an d privat e begins . Th e Departmen t o f Stat e i s clearl y government. Bu t wha t abou t Comsa t o r Amtra k o r a n investor -

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owned bu t highl y regulate d publi c utility ? T h e proble m i s per vasive, inasmuc h a s th e lin e betwee n publi c an d private , neve r distinct, i s becomin g increasingl y blurry . A s government s ge t involved i n man y traditionall y privat e line s o f business , suc h a s land development , railroading , insurance , an d fuel s produc tion, ar e the y stil l t o b e regarded , fo r Thompson' s analysis , a s government? Conversely , service s tha t wer e traditionall y pro vided b y governmen t servant s ar e increasingl y bein g mad e available fro m th e privat e sector , sometime s a s competitor s (private mails , privat e rent-a-judge ) an d sometime s unde r gov ernment contract . I n suc h cases , ar e th e th e servic e provider s still t o b e regarde d a s private ? The answe r migh t depen d upo n whethe r w e dra w th e gov ernment-private lin e wit h referenc e t o th e predominan t direc tion o f accountabilit y (t o investor s o r t o th e electorate ) o r b y reference t o function s performed . But , again , I doub t tha t a satisfactory solutio n ca n b e achieve d withou t referenc e t o some theory o f punishment . That , I think , i s th e lesso n o f th e othe r areas i n whic h a blurrin g o f public-privat e line s ha s bee n th e source o f majo r uncertaintie s i n th e law . Consider , fo r exam ple, th e questio n a s i t arise s i n th e are a o f sovereig n immunit y for tor t (i s a privat e compan y unde r contrac t t o provid e gov ernmental service s entitle d t o clai m th e benefit s o f sovereig n immunity?) an d unde r stat e actio n (i s a privatel y owne d restau rant tha t lease s spac e i n a publi c parkin g structur e obligate d t o abide b y th e restraint s th e Constitutio n place s upo n govern ments no t t o discriminate?). 35 I n thos e cases , we approach a sat isfactory solutio n b y identifyin g th e underlyin g principles—i n the tort s cases , o f torts , an d i n th e constitutiona l la w cases , o f the Constitution . So , too , here , wher e punishmen t i s th e ques tion, w e nee d rever t t o th e principle s o f punishment . Let m e giv e som e specifi c illustration s o f ho w adrif t I thin k we are , fo r lac k o f an y theoretica l rudder . Imagin e a "private " for-profit corporation , chartere d unde r th e law s o f California , whose entir e revenu e i s derived fro m governmen t contract s fo r the manufactur e o f vita l components , o n whic h i t owns th e pat ent, fo r a missil e system . T h e compan y ha s fraudulentl y over billed th e Defens e Department . T h e federa l governmen t i s considering a crimina l suit . W e wan t t o kno w whether , i n Thompson's view , th e compan y an d it s officer s ar e a par t o f

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"government." I f th e dominan t consideratio n i s whether a pro secutorial victor y woul d resul t i n mer e bookkeeping , a shuf fling o f ta x dollars , ther e ar e stron g ground s t o characterize th e defense contracto r wit h th e monopol y ove r th e componen t a s a part o f government . O n th e othe r hand , i f investo r o r electora l control ove r managemen t i s th e key , th e cas e i s stronge r (al though stil l uncertain ) tha t th e contracto r i s private . Whic h consideration i s t o control , an d why ? Consider, too , th e statu s o f publi c authoritie s an d govern ment corporations . Authoritie s ar e establishe d b y specia l ac t o f government. The y deriv e thei r operatin g fund s no t fro m gov ernment, however , bu t fro m th e bon d marke t i n competitio n with privat e firms . Thei r officer s ar e governmen t appointees , but the y ofte n ar e appointe d fo r term s tha t exten d beyon d tha t of th e chie f executive , an d thei r deliberation s ar e commonl y buffered fro m politica l winds. 36 Indeed , i t ma y b e easie r t o re move th e Presiden t o f th e Unite d States—h e ca n b e vote d ou t every fou r years , o r eve n impeached—tha n th e presiden t o f th e Synfuels Corporatio n o r o f th e Ne w Yor k Por t Authority. 37 Ar e we t o conside r thes e mixe d entitie s a par t o f government ? I f the dominan t consideratio n fo r distinctiv e treatmen t o f govern ment derive s fro m th e existenc e o f electora l contro l a s a n alter native, the n th e attenuatio n o f electora l contro l ove r publi c au thorities an d publi c corporation s raise s a goo d argumen t tha t they ar e private—bu t I d o no t find thi s convincing , withou t mor e said. It seem s t o m e tha t whethe r w e shoul d alte r ou r misconduc t strategies whe n w e shif t attentio n t o governmen t fro m nongov ernment bureaucracie s (fro m th e for-profi t corporations , i n particular), require s u s t o examin e severa l possibl e base s fo r disparate treatment . Thes e woul d includ e th e following: 38 1. T h e independen t (nonliability ) rule s tha t prevai l i n eac h area. Eac h sor t o f corporation , governmental , for-profit , chari table, an d so , operates subjec t t o a set o f independen t rule s tha t exercises stron g influenc e o n ou r choic e o f liabilit y rule . Con sider th e implication s o f limite d liability , whic h prevail s amon g the for-profit s bu t i s not availabl e t o governments ; civi l servant s often enjo y persona l immunity , whil e thei r counterpart s a t for profit corporation s ca n generall y secur e indemnificatio n mor e readily.

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2. Sinc e th e institutio n i s not imprisonable , threat s t o th e en tity ar e essentiall y mone y threats , thereb y raisin g th e question , do differen t sort s o f entitie s (for-profit , governmenta l entitie s of variou s sorts , not-for-profits , an d s o on ) manifes t differen t sensitivities t o th e prospec t o f a fine? 3. Wha t sort s o f disciplinaria n restriction s prevai l a s w e mov e from are a t o area ? Fo r example , wher e civi l servic e rule s ob tain, i t i s mor e difficul t tha n i t i s i n th e privat e secto r fo r th e entity, howeve r intimidate d i t ma y b e b y th e prospec t o f a fine, to discipline , reprimand , o r discharg e erran t agents , a facto r tha t militates fo r proceedin g directl y agains t civi l servan t agent s mor e readily tha n agains t corporat e officers . 4. Ho w ar e th e incentive s o f th e to p manager s tie d t o th e financial statu s o f th e entitie s the y direct ? On e migh t suppos e that , to th e exten t manager s o f for-profi t corporation s ar e compen sated throug h stoc k o r stoc k options , thei r ow n welfar e i s a di rect functio n o f th e wort h o f th e company , eve n afte r the y leav e the company , assumin g tha t the y tak e a stoc k interes t wit h them . For thi s reason , an d others , congruenc e i s probabl y les s i n th e government secto r tha n i n th e for-profi t corporat e sector , whic h would suppor t direc t action s agains t erran t agent s i n th e gov ernment sector , eve n wher e w e migh t substitut e anti-entit y strategies i n th e privat e sector . I thin k th e reaso n Thompso n feel s excuse d no t t o carr y ou t any suc h systemati c compariso n o f organizationa l features , or , perhaps, wh y th e nee d doe s no t occu r t o him , i s because , fo r Thompson, thes e ar e detail s tha t woul d no t mak e a difference . He carrie s forwar d hi s predilectio n agains t entit y liabilit y o n th e same mora l autonom y ground s a s dominate d hi s analysi s o f th e general questio n o f bureaucrati c sanction , reviewe d earlier . B y and large , hi s concer n i s stil l largel y tha t i f w e giv e thes e Fran kenstein childre n th e rod , nex t thin g yo u kno w som e writer s will wan t t o spoi l the m wit h mora l autonomy , an d the n . . . whatever. I don' t find th e argumen t an y mor e persuasiv e th e second tim e through . Thompso n himsel f wind s u p (o r down ) by suggestin g th e issu e ma y b e on e o f nomenclature : h e allow s that w e migh t hav e t o impos e sanction s o n governmen t orga nizations, bu t say s i t woul d b e t o "misapprehen d th e mora l an d political foundation s o f crimina l responsibility " t o giv e it the nam e "punishment." 3 9 Bu t thi s i s exactl y wha t w e wante d t o know .

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What ar e th e mora l an d politica l foundation s o f crimina l re sponsibility, an d wha t intelligibl e distinctio n i s ther e betwee n a criminal sanctio n an d punishment ? Whatever on e make s o f Thompson' s handlin g o f entit y lia bility i n government , I regar d th e mai n thrus t o f hi s secon d par t to b e th e treatmen t o f agen t liabilit y i n government . Thi s I find quite imaginative , a t leas t generall y right , an d certainl y deserv ing of furthe r attention . Hi s ide a i s essentially this . First, h e point s out tha t governmen t official s ca n d o enormou s har m no t merel y through suc h crime s a s bribery , th e prosecutio n o f whic h pre sents n o rea l theoretica l problems , bu t fro m wha t h e call s "su pervisory negligence " a s well, 40 particularly , I presume , i n thos e activities where th e governmen t enjoy s a speciall y significant , eve n monopoly position , suc h a s i n th e inspectio n an d certificatio n of mine s an d potentiall y dangerou s drug s an d foodstuffs . Muc h of th e literatur e concerne d wit h thes e problem s (i n particular , Jerry Mashaw' s work) 4 1 ha s wrestle d wit h th e optio n o f civi l li ability fo r governmen t employee s fo r harm s arisin g fro m thi s sort o f officia l misconduct—from , o n th e on e hand , imprope r certification, or , o n th e other , fro m delay s an d denial s o f certi fication tha t see m unwarranted , onerous , an d unjustified . Thompson want s t o g o th e advocate s o f extendin g civi l liabilit y one ste p further : wh y no t criminaliz e it ? The stoc k respons e i s tha t criminalizatio n i s to o harsh . Bu t Thompson ha s a comeback , tha t w e ough t no t t o assum e tha t criminal liabilit y i s mor e onerous . Civi l liabilit y ca n expos e of ficials t o judgments o f enormous , almos t unlimite d magnitude , while fines ca n b e tailore d t o a manageabl e and , i t i s hoped, idea l level. Further , h e point s ou t tha t on e o f th e defect s o f civi l ac tions i s tha t th e clas s o f peopl e wh o coul d institut e the m (per haps fo r harassment ) i s almost openended : an y citize n wh o ca n claim injur y withi n th e constraint s o f standin g rules . Bu t i f th e wrongs ar e criminalized , onl y authorize d prosecutor s woul d b e so empowered . T h e angl e fro m whic h governmen t employee s might hav e t o fen d of f attac k become s mor e acute. 42 A commonl y raise d argumen t agains t civi l servan t liabilit y o f any sor t i s tha t i t ma y resul t i n overl y cautiou s behavior—th e overdeterrence argument . Bu t Thompso n remind s u s tha t w e have littl e empirica l evidenc e t o suppor t thi s worry. 43 I woul d add i n furthe r suppor t o f Thompso n a comparativ e point . I f

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overdeterrence o f a manager' s discretio n o r authorit y i s a con cern fo r th e law , i t i s a concer n whe n dealin g wit h a private sector corporat e manage r n o les s tha n wit h a publi c official . Tha t is, if w e assum e tha t th e societ y i s well-ordered i n term s o f ho w it ha s allocate d variou s functions , on e migh t presum e tha t th e marginal socia l produc t o f a n hou r o f th e presiden t o f Genera l Motors' tim e i s equivalent t o a n hou r o f th e Secretar y o f State's , and tha t therefore , somethin g need s b e sai d wh y overdeter rence operates , a s a constraint , mor e objectionabl y i n on e sec tor tha n i n th e other . My gues s i s tha t somethin g muc h mor e tha n overdeter rence—something i n nee d o f a fairl y fine-tuned politica l the ory—underlies ou r readie r acceptanc e o f th e argumen t i n th e public secto r (someho w defined) . I n th e for-profi t sector , ther e at leas t exist s a se t o f clear , positiv e reward s fo r th e manage r who ca n sho w a n abilit y fo r reasonable , competen t perfor mance o f hi s duties . T h e prospec t o f positiv e reward s counter balances th e disincentive s fo r negligenc e an d delay . Fo r exam ple, th e office r o f a pharmaceutica l house , face d wit h th e decisio n whether t o subjec t a ne w produc t t o additiona l testing , o r t o pu t it o n th e marke t a t once , weigh s th e disincentive s o f lawsuits , should th e dru g caus e harm , agains t th e reward s o f profit s (an d the presumptio n o f socia l benefi t tha t the y carry) , shoul d i t cur e and save . Thi s set s u p a crud e balancin g tha t may , i f doctore d appropriately b y th e law , ten d t o assur e tha t th e pharmaceuti cal executives' incentive s an d disincentive s pla y i n tun e wit h th e social ideal . Wit h highl y visibl e electe d officials , th e positiv e re wards ar e clea r enough : reelection , wit h prestige , power , an d so on , exercis e thei r influence . Bu t a s w e g o t o lowe r levels , th e civil servan t i n th e Foo d an d Dru g Amdinistratio n i s no t i n ex actly th e sam e positio n a s hi s pharmaceutica l compan y counter part. On e o f th e problem s wit h achievin g goo d governmen t i s that w e lac k a syste m o f positiv e incentive s tha t ar e quit e s o nicel y discriminating. T h e incentive s o f th e FD A officia l ma y alread y be skewe d towar d a n exercis e o f exces s cautio n fro m a socia l point o f view . Tha t is , on e ma y wel l worr y tha t face d wit h tw o alternatives: (1 ) expeditin g th e processin g o f th e dru g applica tion, wit h a 0. 5 probabilit y o f savin g a thousan d lives , an d (2 ) delaying fo r furthe r testing , wit h a 0. 5 probabilit y o f savin g onl y a hundre d lives , th e officia l wil l inclin e t o delay , eve n i f th e ex -

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pected socia l benefi t i s less . H e know s tha t i f h e expedite s th e license an d th e dru g cause s measurabl e injuries—create s an other thalidomid e scandal—h e o r hi s agenc y wil l b e dragge d before Congressiona l hearings , denounce d i n th e press , an d s o on. I f w e ad d t o th e official' s environmen t anothe r downsid e risk—the prospec t o f a crimina l prosecution—w e coul d til t th e balance eve n furthe r i n th e directio n o f exces s caution . Perhap s excess cautio n i s on e o f th e ver y thing s Thompso n want s crim inalized. Bu t i s bein g overcautiou s reall y th e sor t o f thin g fo r which a judge ca n b e expecte d t o fine someone ? Ca n suc h a crim e be define d i n an y wa y tha t woul d no t resul t i n official s divert ing resource s int o self-protectiv e activity—coverin g themselves , making a goo d record—whe n the y shoul d b e processin g appli cations? Anyone advocatin g increase d criminalizatio n o f governmen t servant activit y mus t accoun t fo r man y othe r factors . Fo r on e thing, i t i s har d fo r th e la w t o ente r thi s field an d no t pu t it s appearances o f evenhandednes s o n th e line . Peopl e i n govern ment—at least , i n hig h governmen t positions—ar e associate d wit h political parties ; typically , on e o f th e majo r partie s appoint s an d appears t o hav e contro l ove r th e prosecutors , a t least i n th e publi c eye. Th e prosecuto r prosecutin g hi s ow n part y woul d b e con sidered to o desultory ; prosecutin g a membe r o f th e othe r party , he ma y b e though t engage d i n a politica l vendetta . Ou r expe rience wit h specia l prosecutor s suggest s tha t i t i s a n unwield y vehicle, feasible , a t best , onl y i n ver y specia l situations . ( A per manent specia l prosecuto r present s som e desig n anomalies. ) Second, a s Thompso n says , criminalizing th e conduc t o f gov ernment employee s woul d no t necessaril y discourag e goo d people fro m serving . The y migh t quit e reasonabl y deman d ad ditional compensatio n t o tak e thei r pos t unde r th e hazar d o f being marke d criminals , no t merel y fo r thei r deliberat e act s bu t for act s ove r whic h the y ha d minima l persona l control . I t doe s not see m unreasonabl e fo r citizens , i n designin g th e rule s fo r their agent s (a s w e migh t conceiv e ou r governmen t servant s t o be), t o accep t som e risk s o f laxit y i n exchang e fo r a slightl y lowe r compensation. Ordinar y investor s d o s o in establishin g thei r re lations wit h thei r corporat e agents : conside r al l th e defense s shareholders allo w director s t o erec t t o charge s o f thei r negli gence i n office . Ho w suc h a bargain i s struck depend s upo n man y

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factors, i n c l u d i n g , o f c o u r s e , t h e relativ e ris k aversit y o f t h e parties. I s h o u l d t h i n k t h a t i n g e n e r a l , t o p e r s u a d e a p r o s p e c tive publi c officia l t o s h o u l d e r t h e p r o s p e c t o f a crimina l fine for negligenc e woul d requir e highe r compensatio n tha n i t woul d be w o r t h t o t h e e m p l o y i n g society , whic h is , afte r all , a s p r e a d e r of it s risks , viz. , t h a t t h e officia l m i g h t b e derelict. 4 4 N o n e o f thes e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r m i n e s w h a t I c o n s t r u e t o be T h o m p s o n ' s basi c claim : t h a t w e n e e d t o giv e m o r e t h o u g h t to a g e n t crimina l responsibility , particularl y i n g o v e r n m e n t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f I f o u n d mysel f t o b e a structuralis t o n pick ing u p Professo r T h o m p s o n ' s p a p e r , I m i g h t b e d u b b e d a n u n r e c o n s t r u c t e d structuralis t o n p u t t i n g i t d o w n . I lik e t o think , t h o u g h , t h a t I a m — w e a r e all—considerabl y b e t t e r p r e p a r e d t o u n d e r s t a n d th e issues , th e strength s a n d weaknesse s o f bot h sides , t h a n k s t o Professo r T h o m p s o n ' s impressiv e c o n t r i b u t i o n .

NOTES 1. Thompso n put s it , whethe r "individual s can be held criminall y re sponsible" (italic s added) . I prefe r t o emphasiz e th e normativ e as pect. 2. Thompso n acknowledge s tha t th e nonreductionis t positio n i n mora l discouse ma y b e correct , bu t rightl y observe s tha t eve n i f so , tha t does no t conclud e it s statu s i n law . 3. A s Thompso n nee d no t b e reminded . Se e Denni s F . Thompson , "Moral Responsibilit y o f Publi c Officials : Th e Proble m o f Man y Hands," Amer. Pol. Science Rev. 7 4 (1980) : 905-916 . 4. Thompson' s illustration s ar e o f th e "inspecto r general " sort , whic h I interpre t t o b e token s o f a broa d clas s o f measure s I hav e ana lyzed unde r th e headin g o f "interventionist " techniques . Se e Christopher D . Stone , "Th e Plac e o f Enterpris e Liabilit y i n th e Control o f Corporat e Conduct, " Yale Law Journal 9 0 (1980) : 1-77 . 5. I thin k ther e i s i n fac t considerabl e concer n amon g crimina l la w theorists a s t o th e propriet y o f th e sort s o f extension s tha t Thompson urges , man y o f which , a s h e indicates , hav e bee n pro posed fo r adoptio n unde r th e propose d Federa l Crimina l Code . See Note , "Individua l Liabilit y o f Agent s fo r Corporat e Crime s under th e Propose d Federa l Crimina l Code, " Vanderbilt L. Rev. 3 1 (1978): 965-1016 . 6. Thompso n unde r "Th e Proble m o f Mora l Responsibility. " 7. Bren t Fiss e ha s reminde d me , however , tha t forewarnin g a perso n

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that w e wil l attac h certai n consequence s t o hi s action s i s no t a justification o f ou r doin g so . See Ala n H . Goldman , "Toward s a The ory o f Punishment, " Law and Philosophy 1 (1982): 57—76 . 8. Observe , however , tha t Thompso n als o says , i n th e sam e breath , that th e possibilitie s fo r carelessnes s ar e "s o numerous"—whic h might mak e on e sympatheti c towar d reducing th e agents ' liability . 9. Se e Stone , "Plac e o f Enterpris e Liability, " pp . 4 7 - 5 6 . 10. Ibid . 11. Thompso n i n introductor y section . 12. I t i s wort h observing , too , tha t i n th e no t uncommo n circum stances o f th e pollutio n illustration , i f w e assum e n o privat e part y to hav e bee n recognizabl y damage d b y th e pollution , ther e wil l b e no ordinar y civi l plaintif f t o dete r th e polluter . A s a consequence , the finin g mechanis m woul d hav e t o carr y th e entir e burden , un abetted b y civi l damages , o f whateve r modificatio n i n th e corpora tion's behavio r ca n b e achieve d throug h threat s t o th e corpora tion's treasury . 13. Bu t civi l injunctiv e relie f coul d equall y wel l for m th e basi s fo r a structural decree . Thi s connect s wit h th e questio n fo r whic h I ca n find n o adequat e answe r i n th e paper : wh y criminaliz e a t all ? 14. On e migh t conside r i n thi s regar d th e proceeding s o f th e Inter national Militar y Tribuna l (Nuremberg ) i n whic h certai n Naz i or ganizations, includin g th e SS , wer e declare d criminal . Se e Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol . 1 (1947), pp. 255—275 . There, however , th e principal purpos e seem s to hav e bee n t o allo w th e convictio n o f individua l member s o f th e organization withou t th e defendant' s righ t t o questio n th e crimi nal natur e o f th e grou p o r organizatio n (se e p . 255) . 15. Se e Michae l S . Moore , "Th e Mora l an d Metaphysica l Source s o f the Crimina l Law, " i n thi s volume . 16. Bu t se e Bren t Fisse , "Th e Socia l Polic y o f Corporat e Crimina l Re sponsibility," Adelaide L. Rev. 6 (1978) : 361 , 405-408, arguin g fo r corporate punishmen t o n a retributio n basis . 17. Loos e becaus e thi s wa y o f regardin g retributio n ca n b e brough t back unde r utilitarianism . 18. Se e Moore , "Mora l an d Metaphysica l Source s o f th e Crimina l Law. " 19. Ther e ar e eve n statute s tha t hav e bee n hel d t o appl y onl y t o cor porations an d no t t o agents . Se e Sherman v . United States 282 U.S . 25 (1930) , wher e th e Safet y Applianc e Ac t wa s hel d t o impos e penalties onl y o n commo n carriers , no t officers . 20. Thompso n unde r "Organizationa l Responsibility. " 21. Ibid . 22. Th e logi c tha t underlie s Thompson' s cas e i s eve n mor e comple x and perplexin g tha n I indicat e i n th e text . I s i t th e cas e tha t mora l

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rights pertai n i f an d onl y i f mora l responsibilitie s d o likewise ? Som e people woul d tak e th e positio n tha t animal s an d fetuse s hav e mora l rights, eve n i f the y d o no t hav e mora l responsibilities . Further , i s Thompson implyin g tha t mora l right s an d responsibilitie s pertai n (with respec t t o something ) i f an d onl y i f lega l right s an d respon sibilities d o likewise ? I doub t tha t connectio n coul d b e defended , descriptively o r prescriptively . 23. Se e Frederic k Hallis , "Introduction " t o Corporate Personality (Lon don: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1930) . 24. Pete r French , "Th e Corporatio n a s a Mora l Person, " American Philosophical Quarterly 1 6 (1979) : 207-15 . 25. Se e Christophe r D . Stone , "Corporat e Accountabilit y i n La w an d Morals," i n O . William s an d J . Houck , eds. , The Judeo-Christian Vision and the Modern Corporation (Sout h Bend , Ind. : Universit y o f Notre Dam e Press , 1982) , pp . 264-291 . 26. Thompson , i n fact , make s a poin t somewha t lik e this . Th e mor e common poin t raise d agains t th e coindictmen t optio n i s a mor e conscious abuse : tha t prosecutor s ma y clea r thei r docke t b y drop ping th e charge s agains t th e officer s i n exchang e fo r thei r agree ment t o plea d thei r corporatio n guilty . 27. Se e Comment , "Th e Crimina l Responsibilit y o f Corporat e Offi cials fo r Pollutio n o f th e Environment, " Albany L. Rev. 3 7 (1972) : 61, 79-80 , citing , amon g othe r cases , The President Collidge, 101 F.2 d 638 (9t h Cir . 1939 ) i n whic h th e defendan t wa s convicte d fo r em ployees havin g throw n garbag e overboar d (ont o a habo r patro l boatman whos e jo b i t wa s t o apprehen d refus e dumpers) , eve n though th e cre w ha d bee n specificall y ordere d no t t o thro w refus e overboard. 28. Compar e Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 14 7 F.2 d 90 5 (4t h Cir . 1945), findin g a corporatio n criminall y responsibl e fo r it s agents ' acts, eve n i n th e fac e o f evidenc e tha t th e act s wer e t o th e cor poration's detriment , i f "withi n scop e o f agent s authorit y o r cours e of thei r employment, " wit h Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2 d 12 0 (5t h Cir . 1962) , finding th e corporatio n no t liabl e for a n employee' s violatio n o f a statut e requirin g "knowingly " a s the basi s o f th e offense , wher e th e agent s wer e actin g i n cooper ation wit h a thir d perso n fo r th e thir d person' s benefi t i n a man ner tha t ma y hav e involve d som e sor t o f "theft " o f th e employers ' property. 29. Fo r example , i n th e governmen t discussion , below , muc h o f wha t worries Thompso n abou t crimina l suit s tha t deriv e fro m thei r bein g under governmen t managemen t applie s equall y t o civil suits brough t by th e government . 30. Conside r tha t statute s ofte n provid e fo r th e alternativ e o f civi l o r

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criminal proceedings — th e Sherma n Antitrus t Act , fo r example . What consideration s militat e fo r on e rout e ove r th e other ? 31. Nixon v . Fitzgerald, 10 2 S.Ct . 269 0 (1982) , discussed b y Thompson . 32. United States v. Barker, 54 6 F . 2 d 94 0 (D. C Cir . 1976) ; compar e th e accompanying case , United States v. Ehrlichman, 54 6 F.2 9 91 0 (D.C . Cir. 1976) , whic h reject s th e U.S . President' s assistant' s clai m t o a national securit y exemptio n t o Fourt h Amendmen t requirements , at leas t i n th e absenc e o f actua l authorizatio n b y th e President . 33. Thompso n unde r "Organizationa l Responsiblit y i n Government. " 34. M y ow n effort s t o examin e thi s issu e appea r i n Christophe r D . Stone, "Corporat e Vice s an d Corporat e Virtues : D o Public-Privat e Distinctions Matter? " U. Penn. L. Rev. 13 0 (1982) : 1441-1509 . 35. Se e Burton v . Wilmington Parking Association, 36 5 U.S . 72 0 (1961 ) which hold s th e restaurant' s discriminatio n t o b e a "stat e action " for purpose s o f th e Fourteent h Amendment ; se e m y discussio n i n Stone, "Corporat e Vice s an d Corporat e Virtues, " pp . 1499—1500 . 36. Se e Annmarie Walsh , The Public's Business (Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T . Press, 1978) . 37. Fo r example , th e chairma n o f th e government' s Synfuel s Cor poration serve s fo r seve n years , an d i s removable b y th e Presiden t only fo r neglec t o f dut y o r malfeasance , 4 2 U.S.C . §87l2(b) . 38. I hav e provide d a mor e elaborat e treatmen t o f th e issue s I sketc h out i n th e tex t i n Christophe r D . Stone , "Larg e Organization s an d the La w a t th e Pass : Toward s a Genera l Theor y o f Complianc e Strategy," Wisconsin L. Rev. 1981 : 861-890 . 39. Thompso n unde r "Organizationa l Responsibilit y i n Government. " 40. Thompso n unde r "Th e Proble m o f Politica l Responsibility. " 41. Se e Jerry Mashaw , "Civi l Liabilit y o f Governmen t Officers : Prop erty Right s an d Officia l Accountability, " Law & ? Contemp. Probs. 42 (Winter 1978) : 8—34 ; Jerr y Mashaw , Bureaucratic Justice (Ne w Haven: Yal e Universit y Press , 1983) . 42. Othe r considerations , however , suc h a s th e nee d t o disciplin e gov ernment misconduc t an d th e distrus t o f government-drive n pros ecutors, migh t lea d on e t o prefe r th e angl e t o b e mor e obtuse . 43. Thompso n unde r "Th e Proble m o f Politica l Responsibility. " 44. Opportunit y costs , th e los t productio n valu e a s official s diver t re sources int o self-protection , mus t b e considere d a s well .

10 THE LEGA L AN D MORA L RESPONSIBILITY O F ORGANIZATION S SUSAN WOL F

Organizations i n ou r societ y d o man y thing s tha t we , a s mem bers o f th e society , hav e bot h th e reaso n an d th e righ t t o tr y t o stop. Thi s i s tru e o f bot h publi c an d privat e organizations , an d not onl y o f organization s a s whole s bu t o f individual s actin g a s bearers o f specifi c organizationa l roles . Th e questio n thu s arises , How ough t w e pu t a sto p t o thes e things , and , mor e particu larly, ho w ough t w e us e th e lega l syste m t o pu t a sto p t o them ? The question , thoug h primaril y pragmatic , ha s mora l dimen sions a s well . Tha t is , we wan t first t o kno w wha t lega l method s would b e effectiv e i n deterrin g thes e activitie s withou t under mining significan t socia l goals . Bu t i t i s possibl e tha t a n other wise effectiv e metho d woul d b e morall y impermissible , an d i t i s possible tha t a method , thoug h no t particularl y effective , woul d nonetheless b e morall y desirabl e simpl y a s a publi c expressio n of sever e disapproval . I restric t m y attentio n her e t o th e mora l dimension s o f thi s issue, an d particularl y t o thos e involve d i n determinin g whethe r This essa y i s base d upo n a commen t o n Denni s Thompson' s paper , "Crimina l Responsibility i n Government, " presente d a t th e twenty-sevent h annua l meet ing o f th e America n Societ y fo r Politica l an d Lega l Philosoph y i n Cincinnat i i n January, 1983 . I profite d greatl y fro m th e comment s o f th e participant s o f tha t conference, an d fro m conversation s wit h Davi d Blumenfeld , Jea n Blumenfeld , David Luban , Dougla s MacLean , an d Larr y Thomas .

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and ho w t o us e th e crimina l la w i n additio n t o o r instea d o f th e civil la w i n dealin g wit h organizationa l act s tha t w e hav e reaso n to deter . Tha t mora l dimension s ar e involve d result s fro m th e fact tha t th e crimina l la w ma y b e understoo d t o be differen t fro m the civi l la w i n certai n principle d ways . T h e crimina l la w ma y be understoo d t o hav e a closer , or , a t an y rate , a differen t re lation t o moralit y tha n th e civi l law . I n particular , th e crimina l law ma y b e associate d wit h mora l blameworthines s i n a way tha t the civi l la w ma y not . How seriousl y t o tak e thi s principle d distinctio n i s a matte r of som e controversy . Indeed , som e woul d den y th e distinctio n altogether, thoug h I shal l hav e nothin g t o sa y o f thei r positio n here. Holder s o f a mor e moderat e positio n woul d poin t ou t tha t the distinctio n i s only usefu l a t a statistica l level . Som e element s of th e crimina l la w canno t reasonabl y b e associate d wit h judg ments o f mora l blameworthiness , and , muc h mor e commonly , elements o f th e civi l law mus t b e understoo d i n mora l terms . I n this connection , i t i s ofte n mentione d tha t mos t tort s ar e suc h that on e wil l no t hav e committe d the m unles s on e i s someho w at faul t an d tha t court s no t uncommonl y awar d punitiv e a s wel l as compensator y damage s i n civi l suits . Although I d o no t wis h t o wa x ove r th e complication s thes e remarks introduce—indeed , I shal l focu s explicitl y o n the m late r on—their forc e i s no t t o eras e th e tendenc y t o associat e crimi nal liabilit y wit h ascription s o f mora l blame . Thus , a mora l di mension remain s i n th e choic e o f whethe r t o us e crimina l o r civil la w t o dete r act s involvin g organization s i n certai n impor tant ways . T he mos t obviou s an d mos t centra l questio n w e nee d to answe r is , Ar e organization s eve r morall y blameworth y themselves o r i s the apparen t blameworthines s o f organization s always mor e properl y regarde d a s a functio n o f th e blamewor thiness o f som e o r al l th e individual s i n it ? Th e questio n coul d be rephrase d as , Are organization s full-fledged , irreducibl e mora l agents? A negativ e answe r t o thi s questio n ma y aris e fro m consider ing tha t organization s are , afte r all , compose d o f individuals . There woul d b e n o Senat e i f ther e wer e n o senators ; ther e woul d be n o tea m i f ther e wer e n o teammates . Moreover , i t seems tha t as organization s ar e compose d o f individuals , organizationa l act s

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are compose d o f th e act s o f individuals . T h e Senat e canno t ap prove a bil l unles s a majorit y o f th e senator s approv e it ; th e tea m cannot pla y wel l unles s a t leas t som e o f it s member s pla y well . Since a n individua l senato r migh t vot e agains t a bil l tha t th e Senate a s a bod y approve s an d a n individua l playe r ma y exce l even thoug h th e tea m a s a whol e play s miserably , i t woul d no t do t o hol d eac h membe r o f a n organizatio n responsibl e fo r ever y organizational act . Thi s take s nothin g awa y fro m th e vie w tha t whenever a n organizatio n i s responsibl e fo r a n action , on e ca n always trac e bac k th e responsibilit y t o some of th e person s withi n it. Let u s cal l thi s vie w th e Atomi c Vie w o f Organizationa l Re sponsibility. Accordin g t o thi s view , just a s th e action s o f a n or ganization ar e a functio n o f th e action s o f th e individua l mem bers, th e responsibilit y o f th e organizatio n i s a functio n o f th e responsibility o f th e members . I f a n organizatio n ha s don e something fo r whic h i t deserve s blame , the n som e o f it s mem bers hav e don e thing s fo r whic h the y deserv e blame . I f a n or ganization ha s don e somethin g fo r whic h i t deserve s praise , the n some o f it s member s hav e don e somethin g fo r whic h the y de serve praise . On e may , o n thi s view , spea k o f th e organizatio n as being , i n som e sense , a morall y responsibl e agent , bu t on e must bea r i n min d tha t th e responsibilit y ascribe d t o th e orga nization i s wholly derivative . One nee d not , however , b e convince d b y th e consideration s put forwar d i n favo r o f th e Atomi c View . On e ma y b e struc k by th e fac t tha t thoug h a n organizatio n i s compose d o f it s members, a n organizatio n i s no t th e sam e a s th e collectio n o f its members . Senator s an d teammate s ma y com e an d go , bu t th e Senate an d th e Baltimor e Oriole s continue . Moreover , al though a n organizationa l ac t i s composed o f th e act s o f individ ual members , th e organizationa l ac t ma y no t b e th e sam e a s th e collection o f individua l acts . Though individua l senator s ma y vot e for a law , onl y th e Senat e a s a whol e ca n pas s one . Thoug h in dividual player s ca n pla y wel l o n a give n day , onl y th e tea m ca n win th e game . On e migh t dra w a n analog y betwee n th e relatio n an organizatio n ha s t o it s member s an d th e relatio n a huma n being ha s t o he r muscle s an d neurons . Tha t m y action s ar e al ways compose d o f th e action s o f m y muscle s an d neuron s i n n o way implie s tha t th e responsibilit y fo r m y action s doe s no t li e

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fundamentally an d irreducibl y wit h me . Wh y shoul d th e fac t tha t an organization' s action s ar e alway s compose d o f th e action s o f its member s persuad e u s tha t th e responsibilit y fo r it s action s does no t res t fundamentall y an d irreducibl y wit h it ? Let u s cal l th e vie w tha t organization s ca n b e full-fledge d ir reducible mora l agent s th e Organi c Vie w o f Organizationa l Re sponsibility. Accordin g t o thi s view , th e mora l responsibilit y o f an organizatio n i s no t reducibl e t o th e mora l responsibilit y o f each o f it s members . Organizations , lik e individuals , ca n b e wholly o r partl y responsibl e fo r committin g objectionabl e o r commendable acts ; an d organizations , lik e individuals , ca n b e wholly o r partly—but , i n an y case , irreducibly—t o blam e o r t o praise fo r suc h acts . O n thi s view , i t i s at leas t theoreticall y pos sible tha t a n organizatio n d o somethin g morall y praiseworth y even thoug h non e o f it s member s d o anythin g praiseworthy ; an d it i s at leas t theoreticall y possibl e tha t a n organizatio n d o some thing morall y blameworth y eve n thoug h non e o f it s member s do anythin g blameworthy . The suppor t tha t ha s bee n give n fo r th e Organi c Vie w s o fa r is wea k a t best . Tha t a n organizationa l ac t canno t b e identifie d with th e collectio n o f act s tha t it s member s perfor m doe s no t imply tha t th e responsibilit y fo r tha t ac t canno t b e identifie d wit h the responsibilit y o f it s members . Thoug h i t take s th e Senat e a s a whol e t o enac t a law , on e o r tw o senator s ma y ye t b e respon sible fo r it s enactment . Thoug h i t take s th e tea m a s a whol e t o win th e game , on e o r tw o player s ma y ye t deserv e th e credi t fo r the win . Fo r tha t matter , eve n i f i t i s not on e o r tw o player s bu t the whol e tea m tha t deserve s praise , wha t reaso n i s ther e fo r thinking tha t praisin g th e tea m a s a whol e i s differen t fro m praising eac h an d ever y playe r t o a n equa l degree ? If th e case s mentione d s o fa r d o no t spea k particularl y i n fa vor o f th e Organi c View , however , ther e see m t o be othe r case s that do . I n som e case s i t seem s clea r tha t a n organizatio n ha s done somethin g wron g eve n thoug h i t i s no t apparen t tha t an y of th e member s o f th e organizatio n hav e don e anythin g wrong . In othe r case s i t seem s clea r tha t a n organizatio n ha s don e something ver y wron g eve n thoug h th e member s o f th e orga nization eac h see m t o hav e don e somethin g onl y slightl y wron g at worst . On e i s tempte d t o sa y i n thes e case s tha t th e wrong ness o f th e organizationa l ac t i s greate r tha n th e su m o f th e

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wrongness o f eac h o f it s individuall y execute d parts . I t i s best , I think , t o suppres s thi s temptation , wit h it s intimation s tha t moral wrongnes s ca n b e quantified . Bu t on e ca n say , somewha t more intelligibly , tha t organization s a s whole s ma y b e respon sible fo r thei r wrongfu l act s i n way s tha t ar e neithe r reducibl e nor wholl y dependen t o n th e responsibilitie s thei r member s ma y have fo r thei r contribution s t o thes e acts . If th e Organi c Vie w i s correct , the n w e hav e reaso n t o appl y the crimina l la w directl y t o organization s a s wel l a s t o individ uals. Accordin g t o th e Organi c View , organization s ca n b e a s guilty o f crime s a s individuals . Onl y i f w e appl y th e crimina l la w to organizations , then , d o w e hav e a chanc e o f punishin g th e right parties . If , o n th e othe r hand , th e Atomi c Vie w i s correct , then ther e i s reaso n no t t o us e th e crimina l la w agains t organi zations a s wholes . O n thi s view , i f an y guilt y partie s ar e in volved i n a n organizationa l act , the y wil l be individua l member s or agent s o f th e organization . The y ar e th e one s t o b e crimi nally prosecuted , no t th e organization s themselves . In choosin g betwee n th e Organi c an d th e Atomi c Views , eve n more i s a t stak e tha n a n answe r t o th e questio n o f whethe r t o hold organization s criminall y responsible . I f w e accep t th e Or ganic View , accordin g organization s th e statu s o f full-fledge d moral agents , w e ma y b e committe d t o grantin g organization s a kin d o f autonom y an d a se t o f correspondin g right s tha t woul d give organization s a frightenin g amoun t o f power. 1 If , o n th e other hand , w e accep t th e Atomi c View , denyin g organization s moral status , the n i t woul d see m tha t w e mus t exclud e organi zations no t onl y fro m th e scop e o f th e crimina l la w bu t als o fro m those portion s o f th e civi l la w tha t ar e generall y acknowledge d to involv e mora l judgments. Thi s woul d see m t o impl y tha t or ganizations no t onl y coul d no t commi t crimes , bu t tha t the y als o could no t commi t man y recognize d torts , tha t the y coul d no t b e legitimately ordere d t o pa y punitiv e damages , an d s o forth . I f organizations ar e exempte d no t onl y fro m th e crimina l la w bu t from larg e section s o f th e civi l la w a s well , the n ou r hop e o f finding a metho d o f stoppin g organizationa l crime s o r ba d act s seems ver y di m indeed . Before addressin g th e problemati c consequence s o f accept ing on e o r th e othe r o f thes e views , however , w e shoul d tr y t o

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choose betwee n them . Perhap s th e bes t wa y t o d o thi s i s by ex amining a cas e o f wha t seems , o n th e fac e o f it , t o be a n obviou s instance o f organizationa l crime . A bab y foo d manufacture r market s a ne w lin e o f puree d ba nanas tha t contain s a preservativ e outlawe d b y th e Foo d an d Drug Administration . A s a result , hundred s o f babie s becom e violently ill . At first , i t ma y see m a n eas y matte r t o trac e th e re sponsibility an d blam e fo r thi s bac k t o individua l member s o f the compan y whos e behavio r contribute d t o th e result . Some one ha d t o bu y th e illega l preservative , afte r all , an d someon e had t o decid e t o includ e i t in th e recipe , s o presumably the y ar e responsible an d blameworth y fo r th e epidemic . Bu t suppos e tha t at th e tim e th e preservativ e wa s purchase d i t was not illega l an d that sinc e th e preservativ e wa s legal a t th e tim e o f purchase , th e label carrie d n o warnin g t o discourag e th e recip e designe r fro m using it . Well, on e migh t think , ther e shoul d hav e bee n a warning , o r at an y rate , th e perso n wh o concocte d th e recip e shoul d hav e known tha t th e ingredien t ha d bee n foun d t o b e dangerou s sinc e the tim e o f it s purchase . Surely , i n a bab y foo d compan y i t i s someone's job t o se e t o i t tha t al l th e ingredient s ar e saf e befor e a ne w produc t i s released . Or , i f not , surel y i t i s someone' s re sponsibility t o assur e tha t someon e ha s tha t job, an d s o on . I n any case , i t seem s tha t inquir y int o th e detail s o f th e company' s structure wil l locat e a t leas t on e an d possibl y severa l person s wh o deserve th e ultimat e blame . But mayb e not . Fo r maybe , thoug h ther e i s someon e whos e job i s t o se e tha t eac h o f th e ingredient s i n eac h o f th e recipe s is safe , tha t perso n ha d checke d th e banan a recip e befor e th e damaging evidenc e abou t th e preservativ e ha d bee n released . Or mayb e th e recipe-checke r ha d learne d o f th e ne w evidenc e and ha d sen t a memorandu m urgin g th e compan y t o sto p pro duction o n th e puree , bu t a failur e o f th e informatio n flow pre vented it s timel y receip t b y th e relevan t people . Perhap s ther e were peopl e occupyin g variou s position s i n th e compan y abou t whom i t ca n b e sai d tha t ha d the y devote d specia l attentio n t o one o r anothe r aspec t o f thi s matter , th e mistak e coul d hav e bee n detected an d th e unfortunat e resul t avoided . Bu t th e peopl e i n these position s migh t themselve s hav e bee n subjec t t o pres sures, whic h themselve s canno t b e trace d t o individual s whos e

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intentions wer e t o produc e thos e pressures , tha t le d the m t o fo cus thei r attentio n elsewhere , o n th e vegetabl e line , fo r exam ple, o r th e vitami n A content , o r th e nee d t o provid e bette r lighting i n th e labellin g an d bottlin g room . Still, one migh t fee l tha t th e releas e o f a n unsaf e typ e o f bab y food ough t t o hav e bee n prevented . T h e questio n o f whethe r baby foo d meet s existin g healt h standard s is , afte r all , s o im portant tha t th e compan y shoul d hav e ha d double , eve n tripl e checks t o ensur e tha t n o produc t i s unsafe. Th e proble m seem s to b e tha t thoug h th e compan y ough t t o hav e bee n prevente d from puttin g thi s produc t o n th e market , ther e i s n o on e i n particular wh o ough t t o hav e prevente d it . As th e blameworthines s o f th e individual s directl y involve d begins t o b e qualifie d o r obscured , th e attractio n o f th e Organi c View ma y see m t o increase . The blam e tha t on e originall y wante d wanted t o assig n t o individua l member s o f th e corporat e struc ture cannot , i t seems , fairl y b e allocate d t o th e individual s whos e actions wer e involved . Shoul d th e "leftover " blam e the n b e at tributed t o th e organizatio n directly , o r shoul d th e blam e b e withdrawn an d th e cas e reassesse d a s a n instanc e o f non-mora l forces just happenin g t o produc e regrettabl e results ? It speak s strongl y i n favo r o f th e latte r positio n that , unlik e the former , i t i s a t leas t clearl y intelligible ; th e meanin g o f th e former vie w i s no t a t al l obvious . T h e forme r alternativ e urge s that i f a n organizatio n doe s somethin g wron g fo r whic h w e cannot blam e th e individua l member s w e shoul d assig n blam e instead t o th e organizatio n itself . Bu t ho w ca n on e blam e a n or ganization onc e on e ha s excuse d al l it s pas t an d presen t mem bers? Tha t ther e is , a s th e Lor d Chancello r says , "n o sou l t o damn, n o bod y t o kick" 2 woul d see m t o indicat e no t just a prac tical difficult y bu t a conceptua l one . Whe n yo u hav e pu t al l th e members o f a n organizatio n t o on e side , al l yo u hav e lef t i s a set o f abstrac t relations , a structura l scheme , a conceptua l flow chart. Ho w ca n a flow char t b e guilty ? I t seem s tha t eithe r evi l lurks i n th e heart s o f me n an d women , o r i t lurk s nowher e a t all. On th e othe r hand , th e suggestio n tha t w e simpl y conclud e that n o responsibilit y ca n b e assigne d fo r thos e ba d organiza tional act s tha t canno t b e attribute d t o th e wrongdoing s o f mor ally responsible , an d s o blameworthy , individual s seem s t o im -

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pugn to o quickl y th e sens e o f mora l indignatio n w e naturall y feel. Whe n a corporatio n put s a defectiv e an d dangerou s prod uct o n th e marke t o r a governmen t agenc y mislead s us , ther e is a sens e o f mora l indignatio n tha t need s t o b e accounte d fo r even afte r w e hav e convince d ourselve s o f th e relativ e inno cence o f th e individua l agent s involved . O f course , i t doe s hap pen sometime s tha t thing s tur n ou t badl y eve n thoug h i t i s no t any responsibl e being' s fault . Th e rai n ca n spoi l a picnic. A pupp y can rui n a carpet . A n earthquak e o r a her d o f stampedin g cat tle ca n brin g abou t disaster . Bu t whe n a n organizatio n doe s something tha t lead s t o ba d results , th e suggestio n tha t i t i s just one o f thos e unfortunat e thing s seem s t o rin g false . Upon reflection , I suspec t tha t a par t o f th e mora l indigna tion w e fee l i n thes e case s wil l fad e an d b e replace d b y a kin d of mora l sadness , directe d no t towar d th e organizatio n bu t to ward th e individual s i n i t o r societ y o r eve n humanit y a t large . Part o f wha t i s morall y disturbin g abou t th e case s I hav e i n min d is that , eve n i f non e o f th e individual s directl y involve d di d anything terribl y wrong , neithe r di d an y o f the m d o anythin g that wa s mor e tha n minimall y right . Thoug h i t wa s n o partic ular individual' s responsibilit y t o hav e take n thi s precautio n o r to hav e spoke n ou t agains t that , tha t n o on e i n th e grou p too k it upo n himsel f t o exten d hi s effort s beyon d th e minima l limit s of wha t wa s morall y require d bespeak s a generall y lo w mora l tone, a kin d o f mora l stingines s o n th e par t o f th e individual s in th e grou p tha t w e ar e ap t t o gree t les s wit h blam e tha n wit h a kin d o f mora l despair . But no t al l ou r mora l feeling s nee d t o b e broke n dow n o r transformed int o sentiment s th e appropriat e object s o f whic h must b e individua l huma n agents . Just a s i t i s tru e o f som e o f the individua l member s o f th e organizatio n tha t the y coul d hav e taken step s t o preven t i t fro m actin g badly , i t i s tru e o f th e or ganization a s a whol e tha t i t coul d hav e take n steps , an d i n thi s case succeede d i n preventin g th e ba d action . O f course , tha t th e organization coul d hav e don e otherwis e depend s o n th e indi viduals withi n i t bein g abl e t o d o otherwise . Nonetheless , i t i s true tha t th e organizatio n coul d hav e prevented , o r mor e sim ply, refraine d fro m performin g th e ba d actio n tha t i t di d per form. Moreover , i t coul d hav e refraine d fro m th e ba d actio n precisely o n th e ground s tha t i t was a ba d action . I n othe r words ,

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the organizatio n coul d hav e subjecte d itsel f t o recognizabl y mora l constraints; i t coul d hav e incorporate d mora l consideration s an d constraints int o it s decision-makin g procedure . Since th e organizatio n could have chosen , o n mora l grounds , to d o othe r tha n wha t i t actuall y did , i t i s har d t o den y th e in telligibility o f th e clai m tha t th e organizatio n ought to have s o chosen. An d since , ex hypothesi, what th e organizatio n actuall y did wa s morall y bad , thi s clai m seem s no t onl y intelligibl e bu t true. The puzzlin g natur e o f thi s cas e arise s because , o n th e on e hand, th e organization' s ability to d o othe r tha n wha t i t di d de pends o n th e abilitie s o f th e individual s withi n i t t o d o othe r than wha t the y actuall y did . Bu t th e organization' s responsibility to d o othe r tha n wha t i t di d doe s no t depen d o n th e individu als' responsibilitie s t o d o anythin g a t all . T he situatio n facin g u s is on e i n whic h certai n individual s coul d hav e take n step s t o prevent th e organizatio n fro m doin g a ba d thing , bu t wer e un der n o obligatio n t o tak e thos e steps . Ye t th e organizatio n a s a whole no t onl y wa s abl e t o preven t th e ba d thing , bu t als o ha d an obligatio n t o preven t it . Are w e t o conclud e the n tha t organization s qu a organization s are full y responsibl e mora l agent s afte r all ? A momen t ag o thi s suggestion seeme d incoherent . Ultimatel y I shal l sugges t a neg ative answe r t o thi s question , bu t I thin k tha t th e implication s of thi s answe r ar e somewha t narrowe r tha n the y ar e likel y a t first t o seem . I thin k tha t althoug h organization s ar e no t irred ucible mora l agents , the y ar e agent s o f anothe r sort , wit h dis tinctive feature s sufficien t t o mak e the m appropriat e bearer s o f important kind s o f legal responsibility . To she d ligh t o n thi s matter , i t wil l b e bes t t o tur n attentio n away fro m organization s fo r a momen t an d loo k instea d a t th e concept o f responsibility , or , rather , a t th e wor d "responsibil ity" an d a t th e differen t concept s t o whic h i t ma y variousl y re fer. A t leas t tw o sense s o f responsibilit y hav e ofte n bee n noted , a causa l sens e an d a mora l sense . W e us e th e causa l sens e whe n we remar k tha t th e ca t i s responsibl e fo r th e spil t mil k o r tha t the wea k girde r i s responsible fo r th e collaps e o f th e bridge . I n these cases , w e simpl y nam e a primar y caus e o f a n even t o r stat e of affairs . W e us e th e mora l sense , o n th e othe r hand , whe n th e

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connection w e mak e betwee n agen t an d even t i s no t merel y causal. Rather , whe n w e clai m tha t a n agen t i s morall y respon sible fo r a n even t o r stat e o f affairs , w e clai m tha t h e o r sh e deserves credi t o r discredi t fo r wha t ha s take n place . Thoug h there i s a sens e i n whic h w e ca n "blame " th e spil l o n th e ca t o r the bridge' s collaps e o n th e girder , ther e i s a recognizabl e dif ference betwee n thi s kin d o f blam e an d th e kin d w e migh t b e justified i n feelin g towar d a rowd y teenage r o r a careles s archi tect i f th e unfortunat e event s i n questio n ha d bee n attributabl e to the m instead . W e ma y cal l th e first kin d o f blam e superficial , and th e second , b y contrast , deep . T o clai m tha t a n agen t i s morally responsibl e i s t o clai m tha t h e o r sh e i s liabl e t o dee p blame o r praise , tha t h e o r sh e i s capable o f bein g guilt y o r he roic, tha t h e o r sh e i s capabl e o f deservin g credi t o r discredi t for wha t h e o r sh e does . Still a thir d sens e o f "responsibility " i s o f specia l interes t fo r us. Fo r lac k o f a bette r word , w e ma y cal l i t th e practica l sens e of responsibility . W e us e th e practica l sens e whe n ou r clai m tha t an agen t i s responsibl e fo r a n actio n i s intende d t o announc e that th e agen t assume s th e risk s associate d wit h tha t action . I n other words , th e agen t i s considere d th e appropriat e beare r o f damages, shoul d the y resul t fro m th e action , a s wel l a s th e ap propriate reape r o f th e action' s possibl e benefits . The practica l sens e o f responsibilit y i s easily confuse d wit h th e moral sense , sinc e i t i s eas y t o confus e damage s wit h punish ment an d benefit s wit h morall y deserve d rewards . Bu t w e ca n keep hol d o f th e forme r distinctio n i f w e atten d t o th e latte r ones. Fo r example , i f whil e playin g softbal l o n a publi c playin g field, I hi t a bal l tha t break s th e pictur e windo w o f th e hous e across th e street , I ma y b e regarde d a s responsibl e fo r breakin g the windo w i n th e practica l sense , th e sens e tha t implie s tha t I should pa y fo r th e window . Still , i t woul d b e misleadin g t o sa y that I a m morall y responsibl e fo r breakin g th e window , fo r though I di d th e damage , I di d nothin g wron g i n playin g soft ball o n a publi c lo t designe d expressl y fo r tha t purpose . I de serve n o blam e whatsoeve r fo r m y action . Similarly , i f I com e across a smal l chil d wh o go t los t i n a crowd an d retur n th e chil d to th e parents , i t ma y b e appropriat e fo r th e parent s t o rewar d me o n th e ground s tha t I wa s practicall y responsibl e fo r th e child's saf e return . Bu t I hardl y deserv e mora l credi t fo r find-

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ing a chil d tha t I di d no t activel y see k o r fo r subsequentl y re turning th e chil d who , afte r all , i s o f n o us e t o me . Mor e dra matic cases i n whic h practica l an d mora l responsibilit y com e apar t are t o be foun d b y looking at situation s i n which w e regard agent s as practicall y responsibl e fo r action s tha t ar e no t thei r own . I f one's chil d break s a neighbor' s dish , on e feel s responsibl e i n th e practical sens e eve n i f on e know s tha t on e canno t reasonabl y b e charged wit h negligenc e o r th e like . I f a produce r want s t o us e one's pe t i n a televisio n commercial , i t seem s natura l t o expec t the produce r t o offe r t o pa y eve n thoug h n o performanc e o f one's ow n take s place . Even i f on e recognize s th e differenc e betwee n practica l an d moral responsibility , though , on e migh t regar d i t a s a relativel y superficial distinction . A t an y rate , on e ma y thin k tha t eve n though on e canno t equat e a n agent' s bein g practicall y respon sible fo r a particula r even t wit h tha t agent' s bein g morall y re sponsible fo r tha t event , on e ca n equat e th e agent' s capacit y fo r practical responsibilit y wit h hi s o r he r capacit y fo r mora l re sponsibility. On e migh t think , i n othe r words , tha t th e condi tions fo r responsibl e agenc y ar e th e sam e whethe r on e i s usin g "responsibility" i n th e practica l o r i n th e mora l sense . I f thi s wer e so, th e conceptua l ga p betwee n th e mora l an d practica l sense s of responsibilit y woul d b e muc h smalle r tha n th e ga p betwee n either o f thes e tw o sense s an d th e causa l sense . Clearly , earth quakes an d viruse s ar e capabl e o f bein g causall y responsibl e agents bu t no t capabl e o f bein g eithe r morall y o r practicall y re sponsible. Indeed, th e assumptio n tha t mora l an d practica l responsibil ity requir e th e sam e typ e o f agenc y i s quit e natura l whe n on e takes one' s usua l surve y o f causa l agents , rangin g fro m inani mate object s t o dum b animal s t o babie s t o norma l adul t huma n beings, i n searc h o f th e contras t betwee n merel y causa l agent s and agent s o f a mor e responsibl e sort . Wha t th e norma l adul t group ha s tha t al l th e othe r group s lac k i s th e intellectua l o r cognitive capacit y t o b e sensitiv e an d responsiv e t o comple x reasons fo r an d agains t variou s actions . Thi s capacit y i s clearl y a necessar y conditio n o f bein g eithe r a morall y o r a practicall y responsible agent . On e canno t hol d a n agen t morall y responsi ble fo r a n actio n i f th e agen t i s incapable o f recognizin g wha t i s morally wron g o r righ t abou t it , an d on e canno t hol d a n agen t

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practically responsibl e fo r somethin g i f th e agen t i s incapabl e of seein g wha t consequence s ma y com e o f i t o r o f incorporat ing thes e expectation s an d possibilitie s int o th e decisio n proce dure tha t give s ris e t o it . Since th e cognitiv e capacit y t o b e sensitiv e an d responsiv e t o complex reason s fo r an d agains t variou s action s i s a necessar y condition o f bot h practica l an d mora l responsibility , an d sinc e this capacit y i s sufficien t t o mar k of f on e typ e o f agen t tha t i s both practicall y an d morall y responsibl e fro m mos t othe r type s of agen t wit h whic h i t i s usuall y compared , on e migh t lea p t o the conclusio n tha t thi s necessar y conditio n fo r mora l an d prac tical responsibilit y i s a sufficien t conditio n fo r thes e type s o f re sponsibility a s well . I f so , th e condition s o f agenc y require d o f a morall y responsibl e bein g woul d b e identica l t o th e condition s required o f a practicall y responsibl e one . A consideratio n o f sociopaths , however , migh t giv e on e pause . Sociopaths, a s I understan d them , ar e full y capabl e o f th e sam e forms o f practica l reasonin g a s th e res t o f us . The y ar e capabl e of recognizin g tha t i f the y d o thing s o f whic h societ y disap proves, the y ar e likel y t o suffe r i n variou s way s rangin g fro m social exclusio n o r antagonis m t o fines o r imprisonment . Wha t they lac k i s a sens e o f inne r disapprova l tha t echoe s th e socia l disapproval o f mora l wrongs . Tha t a n actio n wil l hur t someon e else give s the m n o direc t reaso n no t t o perfor m it ; tha t a state ment i s false give s the m n o direc t reaso n no t t o convinc e other s of it s truth . Sociopaths , i n othe r words , see m t o lac k ordinar y human sympath y an d respect . Mor e generally , the y lac k what ever motivation s mos t o f u s hav e t o kee p ou r action s within mora l bounds. It i s har d t o se e ho w t o describ e thes e case s accurately . On e might describ e the m b y sayin g tha t althoug h sociopath s ca n achieve a n intellectua l understandin g tha t cheating , stealing , murdering, etc. , ar e considered to b e immoral , the y canno t un derstand wh y the y ough t no t t o ac t i n thes e ways . The y canno t achieve a n emotiona l understanding , s o t o speak , tha t evoke s direct, interna l disapproval . The y lac k consciences . If thi s analysi s i s correct , the n i t seem s inappropriat e t o re gard sociopath s a s wholl y morall y responsibl e agents . I t seem s wrong, i n particular , t o blam e them , i n th e dee p sense , fo r fail ing t o constrai n thei r behavio r accordin g t o rule s the y ar e in -

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capable o f bein g motivate d t o obey . I t doe s no t see m similarl y inappropriate, however , t o regar d thes e agent s a s practicall y responsible—to expec t the m t o pa y th e consequence s o r bea r the cost s o f thei r action s insofa r a s the y can . That sociopath s hav e th e sam e intellectua l capacitie s a s othe r human beings , tha t the y ca n forese e possibl e consequence s o f their action s an d incorporat e thei r foresigh t int o thei r practica l deliberations, tha t the y therefor e ar e abl e t o assum e th e risk s of thei r actions , seem s sufficien t fo r holdin g the m practicall y responsible. Th e consideration s above , however , sugges t tha t thi s is no t sufficien t fo r mora l responsibility . Mora l responsibilit y seems t o requir e no t just intellectua l capacitie s bu t certai n emo tional capacitie s a s well . We ma y no w retur n t o th e questio n o f whethe r organization s as whole s ca n b e considere d full y responsibl e mora l agents . Drawing o n th e conclusion s o f th e previou s section , th e answe r appears t o b e No . Fo r ther e i t wa s conclude d tha t a necessar y condition o f morall y responsibl e agenc y i s the possessio n o f th e emotional capacit y t o b e move d b y mora l concerns . W e di d no t delve int o th e fascinatin g questio n o f wha t thi s emotiona l ca pacity amount s to , whether i t can b e identifie d wit h th e capacit y for sympathy , o r th e capacit y fo r respect , whethe r th e object s of th e relevan t feelin g ma y b e person s o r th e law , an d s o on . Whatever th e relevan t emotiona l capacit y should , o n analysis , turn ou t t o be , w e ca n b e sur e i n advanc e tha t organization s d o not hav e it . Organization s d o no t hav e any emotional capacities . They lac k th e unifie d consciousnesse s necessar y fo r feeling . T o put i t differently , organization s lac k souls . This ma y see m t o fly i n th e fac e o f th e man y case s i n whic h it seem s quit e natura l t o describ e organization s i n psychologica l and mora l terms . T h e variou s attitude s w e hav e towar d th e K u Klux Klan , Amnest y International , an d Celestia l Seasoning s o n the basi s o f thei r respectiv e "personalities " canno t b e simpl y dismissed a s radicall y inappropriat e reaction s resultin g fro m a n irrational dispositio n t o anthropomorphize . T h e policie s an d actions o f thes e organization s t o d o merel y see m t o expres s val ues an d goals , a s a tre e trun k o r a n inkblo t migh t see m t o rep resent a huma n face . Organizationa l policie s an d action s typi -

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cally d o expres s value s an d goal s tha t ar e a resul t o f consciou s thought an d intentiona l decision . Here , however , on e mus t consider whos e though t an d decisio n ar e involved . If organization s lac k souls , thei r members , employees , stock holders, an d s o on , evidentl y d o not . Althoug h organization s a s nonreducible whole s ar e no t themselve s morall y responsibl e agents, th e action s an d effect s o f organization s resul t fro m th e actions o f agent s wh o are . Whe n w e blam e th e K u Klu x Kla n for it s activities , w e blam e th e member s fo r choosin g t o ban d together t o perfor m them . Whe n w e prais e Amnest y Interna tional, w e prais e th e founders , managers , an d donor s fo r thei r well-meaning contribution s towar d a fin e goal . Or , t o b e mor e accurate, whe n w e prais e o r blam e a n organization , w e an nounce tha t some individuals connecte d wit h i t deserve prais e o r blame. W e ofte n d o no t kno w anythin g abou t th e interna l structure o f a n organizatio n th e externa l effect s o f whic h evok e moral attitude s an d sentiment s i n us . No t knowin g wh o i n th e organization ha s contribute d t o th e ac t tha t please s o r dismay s us, w e direc t ou r prais e o r blame , gratitude , o r resentmen t les s precisely towar d th e organizatio n a s a whole . The poin t i s tha t i f blame , resentment , contempt , o r thei r happier analogues , praise , gratitude , an d respect , ar e t o prov e ultimately justified, i t mus t b e th e cas e tha t some individuals de serve them . I f i t should tur n out , a s it did i n th e bab y foo d case , that n o individual s deserv e th e attitude s tha t th e organizationa l act o r polic y calle d forth , the n w e shoul d withdra w thes e atti tudes fro m th e organizatio n a s well . So far m y positio n amount s t o on e mor e voic e supportin g th e Atomic Vie w o f Organizationa l Responsibility . Organizations , a s wholes, ar e no t full-fledge d morall y responsibl e agents . Insofa r as mora l responsibilit y i s legitimatel y attribute d t o organiza tions, th e attributio n i s derivativ e an d reducibl e t o attribution s of responsibilit y t o individual s withi n it . Th e denia l o f morall y responsible statu s t o organizations , however , nee d no t forc e u s to th e conclusio n tha t organization s ca n b e responsibl e onl y i n a causa l sense . Fo r man y purposes , w e hav e les s reaso n t o car e about whethe r organization s ca n b e morall y responsible , an d s o be appropriat e bearer s o f dee p prais e an d blame , tha n w e hav e to car e abou t whethe r the y ca n b e practicall y responsible , an d

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therefore whethe r the y ca n b e hel d t o assum e th e risk s o f pos sible costs . Can organization s b e practicall y responsible ? Th e cas e o f so ciopaths suggest s tha t som e agent s tha t ar e no t morall y respon sible ca n ye t b e practicall y responsible . Bu t organization s ar e no t sociopaths, an d i t migh t see m tha t th e sam e consideration s tha t favored denyin g mora l responsibilit y t o organization s woul d als o favor denyin g practica l responsibilit y t o them . Organization s lac k unified consciousnesses , an d i t i s becaus e o f thi s tha t the y lac k the emotiona l capacit y necessar y fo r morall y responsibl e agency . One migh t thin k that , fo r th e sam e reason , w e mus t conclud e that organization s als o lac k th e intellectua l capacit y necessar y fo r practically responsibl e agency . Surely , ther e i s a sens e i n whic h just a s organization s canno t feel , neithe r ca n the y think . But i t i s no t clea r tha t th e capacit y t o thin k is , strictl y speak ing, a necessar y conditio n o f practica l responsibility . Wha t i s necessary i s th e capacit y t o b e sensitiv e an d responsiv e t o com plex reason s fo r an d agains t variou s action s an d th e capacit y t o foresee th e possibl e consequence s o f one' s actions . Althoug h organizations ar e incapabl e o f thought , the y d o hav e th e capac ity t o b e sensitiv e an d responsiv e t o al l sort s o f comple x infor mation by way of th e thought s an d deliberation s o f th e individ uals involve d i n them . Organizations ca n hav e goals , whethe r establishe d b y charte r or vot e o r b y som e perso n i n authority . Organization s ar e de signed an d person s withi n the m traine d i n way s tha t ar e in tended t o lea d t o organizationa l decision s tha t realiz e thes e goal s as efficientl y an d a s fa r a s possible . Importantly , organizationa l goals ca n b e reexamined , rejected , revised , o r retained . Suc h reevaluations ca n b e buil t int o th e ver y structur e o f a n organi zation, the y ca n b e establishe d a s a matte r o f policy , o r the y ca n be instigate d b y collection s o f individual s eithe r withi n o r with out th e organization . Moreover , ther e i s n o mor e reaso n wh y an organization' s goal s shoul d b e exclusivel y self-intereste d tha n there i s fo r a person' s goal s t o be . A n organization' s goal s nee d not b e restricte d t o profi t o r th e goo d o f it s member s o r th e organization's ow n self-preservation . A n organizatio n ca n b e concerned abou t th e goo d o f th e publi c o r th e qualit y o f it s product o r th e welfar e o f it s employees . Mor e generally , thoug h

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also mor e vaguely , a n organizatio n ca n hav e a s a goa l tha t it s actions remai n withi n mora l bounds . It mus t b e remembere d tha t whe n a n organizatio n adopt s a goal i t i s no t becaus e i t i s moved t o adop t it , an d tha t whe n a n organizational decisio n i s base d o n th e expectatio n tha t a cer tain goa l wil l be achieved , th e organizatio n canno t b e sai d t o hav e been motivate d b y a desir e t o achiev e tha t goal . Organizationa l goals ar e no t expression s o f th e fel t concern s o f th e organiza tion. Organizations , unlik e persons , d o no t hav e fel t concerns . They ar e no t subjec t t o motive s o r desires . Presumably , orga nizational goal s an d decision s usuall y reflec t motive s an d con cerns o f person s wh o hav e occupie d o r d o occup y organiza tional roles . Bu t tha t i s no t t o th e point . The poin t i s tha t althoug h organization s lac k th e capacit y t o be motivate d t o adop t mora l goal s an d constraints , the y hav e the capacit y t o b e guide d b y them . Sinc e the y hav e thi s capac ity, ther e seem s n o reaso n no t t o insis t tha t the y exercis e it . Tha t is, i t i s no t unreasonabl e t o hol d organization s practicall y re sponsible, t o insis t tha t the y ac t withi n mora l constraint s i n th e sense tha t the y b e liabl e fo r coverin g th e cost s an d payin g th e consequences fo r th e harmfu l an d immora l action s the y per form. I f i t shoul d cros s one' s min d tha t i t migh t b e unfai r t o hold organization s practicall y responsibl e fo r harm s fo r whic h they ar e no t morall y responsible , on e shoul d recal l tha t a n or ganization's lac k o f blameworthines s i s no t a sig n o f it s mora l innocence bu t rathe r o f it s exclusio n fro m th e dimensio n alon g which mora l guil t o r innocenc e i s marked . It seem s tha t organization s a s wholes ar e no t capabl e o f bein g morally responsibl e agents , bu t the y ar e capabl e o f bein g prac tically responsibl e ones. 3 I t make s n o sens e t o credi t o r blam e an organizatio n nonreducibl y fo r goo d o r ba d behavior . De pending o n th e interna l constitutio n o f th e organization , an d its operations , ther e ma y b e person s deservin g o f credi t o r blam e or ther e ma y not . Ofte n th e interna l structur e an d th e alloca tion o f credi t an d blam e ar e o f les s importanc e tha n th e exter nal effect s o f th e behavio r i n question . Th e mor e pressin g con cern i s tha t th e damag e b e pai d fo r o r th e benefi t secured , o r that th e activit y ceas e o r b e repeated . Thoug h th e absenc e o f emotional capacitie s exclude s organization s fro m susceptibilit y to a kin d o f mora l judgment, th e presenc e o f cognitiv e capaci -

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ties (th e capacitie s t o b e sensitiv e an d responsiv e t o comple x reasons fo r an d agains t variou s actions ) make s the m susceptibl e to externall y impose d mora l force . The mos t obviou s an d probabl y th e mos t effectiv e wa y t o ex ert mora l forc e o n organization s i s to mak e an d enforc e appro priate laws . T h e fina l questio n t o whic h w e tur n i s whether th e curious metaphysica l statu s o f organization s give s us an y reaso n to regar d certai n type s o f la w a s mor e appropriat e tha n others . Since w e bega n wit h th e acknowledgmen t tha t th e crimina l law differs , b y an d large , fro m th e civi l la w i n it s specia l an d closer connectio n t o th e attributio n o f mora l blame , th e answe r must surel y b e yes . Sinc e organization s canno t b e morall y re sponsible agents , mora l blam e canno t b e appropriatel y at tributed t o them , an d i f negativ e judgments i n th e crimina l la w carry a presumptio n o f mora l blame , the n ther e i s a t leas t a symbolic reaso n no t t o appl y th e crimina l la w t o organizations . We d o no t wan t ou r lega l judgments t o expres s o r sugges t fals e moral judgments, an d althoug h thi s i s onl y on e reaso n agains t which othe r mor e pragmati c reason s ma y b e balanced , i t i s a significant consideratio n agains t applyin g th e crimina l la w t o organizations a s wholes . Early on , however , i t was also note d tha t larg e portion s o f th e civil la w ar e ofte n sai d t o presuppos e th e morall y responsibl e status o f thei r subjects . I f w e ar e t o b e barre d o n philosophi c grounds fro m applyin g no t onl y th e crimina l la w bu t als o thes e portions o f th e civi l la w agains t organization s a s such , the n ou r efforts t o kee p organizationa l activit y withi n morall y acceptabl e bounds hav e almos t n o chanc e o f success . When w e loo k agai n a t thos e portion s o f th e civi l la w t o whic h we earlie r referred , though , i t i s no t obviou s tha t w e ough t t o be barre d o n philosophi c ground s agains t applyin g the m t o or ganizations. I t seem s quit e appropriat e t o regar d organization s as capabl e o f bein g a t faul t i n th e sens e require d fo r tort s o f negligence an d i t seem s quit e appropriat e fo r organization s t o be aske d t o pa y no t just compensator y bu t punitiv e damage s i n certain kind s o f civi l suit . Of course , tha t the y seem appropriat e ma y reflec t a mis guided tendenc y o n ou r par t t o anthropomorphiz e organiza tions. Bu t a differen t interpretatio n i s available tha t reflect s les s

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poorly o n ourselves—namely , tha t th e allege d mora l element s in th e civi l la w ar e no t o f a piec e wit h th e mora l element s i n th e criminal law . Bein g a t faul t i n tor t la w nee d no t b e indicativ e o f having don e somethin g morall y blameworthy , bu t onl y o f hav ing engage d i n a n activit y fo r whic h on e ha s assume d th e ris k of certai n harms . Havin g t o pa y punitiv e damage s i n a civi l sui t need no t b e interprete d a s an expressio n o f society' s mora l con demnation; rather , i t ma y b e regarde d a s a predictabl e conse quence o f havin g committe d a n ac t tha t societ y ha s reaso n t o prevent an d whic h canno t b e adequatel y deterre d b y compen satory damage s alone . T o b e a fi t subjec t o f th e judgmen t o f fault al l i t take s i s th e abilit y t o assum e th e risk ; t o b e a fit sub ject o f punitiv e damage s al l i t take s i s th e abilit y t o respon d t o the expectatio n o f havin g t o pa y a ver y larg e fine. T o hav e thes e abilities involve s th e exercis e o f th e cognitiv e capacitie s o f mora l agents. Bu t a s long a s thes e judgments ar e no t essentiall y o r ex plicitly associate d wit h pronouncement s o f mora l blameworthi ness, bein g a fit subjec t o f thes e judgments doe s no t requir e an y emotional capacitie s a t all . That i t shoul d hav e seeme d fo r s o lon g tha t th e aspect s o f civil la w discusse d her e wer e essentiall y associate d wit h pro nouncements o f mora l blameworthiness—that , a t an y rate , thes e aspects o f civi l law shoul d hav e seeme d a s infused wit h moralit y as mos t crimina l law , i s not , however , wholl y surprising . Whe n an agen t wh o possesse s th e cognitiv e capacit y require d t o b e a fit subjec t o f thes e law s possesse s i n additio n th e emotiona l ca pacity tha t i s a conditio n o f liabilit y t o mora l blame , i t ma y wel l be tha t i n a larg e majorit y o f case s th e agen t wh o i s civilly liabl e is also morall y liable . Tha t is , it ma y b e tha t i f a n agen t possess ing bot h th e relevan t cognitiv e an d emotiona l capacitie s i s justly held t o b e a t faul t i n th e sens e require d fo r committin g a tort , or i f th e agen t i s justly require d t o pa y punitiv e damage s i n a civil suit , then , i n th e larg e majorit y o f cases , i t i s likely tha t th e agent ha s don e somethin g deservin g o f mora l blame . Though ther e canno t hav e bee n a logical connectio n betwee n these civi l la w judgments an d mora l blame , then , ther e ma y wel l have bee n (an d continu e t o be ) a n empirica l connection . An d empirical connection s ar e ofte n har d t o distinguis h fro m logica l ones unti l empirica l exception s ar e brough t t o ligh t tha t serv e as counterexample s t o th e logica l claim . Wha t wa s neede d i n thi s

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case wa s a n exceptio n t o th e la w tha t wha t ha s th e cognitiv e ca pacity necessar y t o b e a practicall y responsibl e agen t mus t als o have th e emotiona l capacit y necessar y t o b e a morall y respon sible agent . Excludin g th e difficul t an d controversia l cas e o f so ciopaths, an d leavin g computer s asid e (whic h i n an y cas e ar e no t yet s o advance d a s t o b e abl e i n a n irreducibl e an d nonderiva tive sens e t o commi t torts) , organization s ar e th e onl y typ e o f agent tha t I kno w o f tha t ca n serv e a s suc h exceptions . I t i s no t surprising, then , tha t th e logica l distinctio n betwee n bein g a fi t subject fo r th e crimina l la w an d bein g a fi t subjec t fo r thos e part s of th e civi l la w tha t appea r particularl y morall y tinge d shoul d not becom e eviden t unti l th e degre e t o which organizationa l ac tivity shape s ou r live s an d th e dange r o f organizationa l crim e should hav e increase d t o th e poin t o f demandin g ou r urgen t attention. Indeed, th e empirica l connectio n betwee n th e capacit y t o b e practically responsibl e an d th e capacit y t o b e morall y responsi ble ma y als o accoun t fo r th e combinatio n o f ou r recognitio n tha t organizations ar e no t morall y responsibl e i n a nonreducibl e sense , on th e on e hand , wit h th e persisten t tendenc y t o fee l indigna tion towar d organization s a s such , o n th e other . Whe n w e lear n that a n organizatio n ha s don e somethin g dreadful , som e coher ent an d justifiable thought s appl y t o th e organizatio n directly — e.g., tha t th e organizatio n ough t no t t o hav e bee n allowe d t o have don e tha t o r tha t i t woul d b e legitimat e t o appl y forc e t o prevent tha t sor t o f behavior . Ordinarily , th e legitimac y o f ap plying externa l mora l forc e t o a cognitivel y competen t agen t goe s hand i n han d wit h th e appropriatenes s o f blamin g th e agen t fo r failing t o gover n he r actio n appropriatel y eve n i n th e absenc e of suc h force . Ordinarily , thos e feature s o f th e unwonte d be havior tha t justify us , from th e outside , i n constrainin g th e agent' s activities ar e feature s tha t shoul d als o provid e reason s t o th e agent, o n th e inside , fo r constrainin g he r behavio r o n he r own . Organizations ar e peculia r i n bein g agent s wit h th e cognitiv e capacity t o recogniz e suc h feature s but , becaus e the y lac k th e relevant kin d o f "inside, " the y canno t b e blame d fo r failin g t o be move d t o respon d t o thes e feature s o n thei r own . If m y analysi s i s sound , the n i t wil l b e wholl y appropriat e t o subject organization s t o th e requirement s o f civi l law , includin g at leas t som e portion s o f civi l la w tha t generall y appea r t o b e

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infused wit h mora l judgment. I t wil l als o be appropriat e t o sub ject person s actin g withi n an d o n behal f o f organization s t o th e requirements o f th e crimina l law , insofa r a s the y knowingl y an d significantly contribut e t o act s tha t violat e mora l an d lega l bounds. Bu t i t wil l b e inappropriat e t o appl y th e crimina l la w to organization s directly . A s lon g a s th e crimina l la w continue s to includ e amon g it s function s th e expressio n o f mora l blame , the applicatio n o f crimina l la w shoul d b e restricte d t o person s and othe r being s tha t have , no t just cognitiv e capacities, but souls . NOTES 1. Fo r a good discussio n o f this, see Dennis Thompson, "Crimina l Responsibility i n Government, " i n thi s volume. 2. Edward , firs t Baro n Thurlo w (1731-1806) , quoted i n John C . Coffee, Jr., " 'No Sou l t o Damn; N o Bod y t o Kick' : A n Unscandalize d Inquiry int o th e Proble m o f Corporat e Punishment, " Michigan Law Review 7 9 (1981): 386-433. 3. Fo r an excellent discussion o f a view that is in many respects similar to mine , se e John Ladd , "Moralit y an d th e Idea l o f Rationalit y i n Formal Organizations, " The Monist 54 (1970).

11 ON TH E ECONOMI C THEOR Y O F CRIME ALVIN K . KLEVORIC K

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At th e en d o f hi s interestin g an d importan t article , "Crim e an d Punishment: A n Economi c Approach, " publishe d i n 1968 , Gar y Becker characterize d hi s effort s a t developin g a n "economic " framework fo r analyzin g illega l behavio r "a s a resurrection , modernization, an d thereb y I hop e improvement " o n th e pi oneering effort s o f Cesar e Beccari a an d Jerem y Bentha m dur ing th e eighteent h an d nineteent h centuries. 1 Becke r hoped , a t least implicitly , t o giv e ne w lif e an d directio n t o cost-benefi t analysis o f publi c polic y towar d crime . I n thi s effor t h e surel y succeeded, a s th e fiftee n year s sinc e hi s semina l articl e ap This chapte r i s a revise d versio n o f a pape r prepare d fo r presentatio n a t th e January 198 3 meetin g o f th e America n Societ y fo r Politica l an d Lega l Philoso phy i n Cincinnati . I woul d lik e t o than k Bruc e Ackerman , Guid o Calabresi , Owe n Fiss, Joseph Goldstein , Geoffre y Hazard , Reinie r Kraakman , Ric k Levin , Georg e Loewenstein, Jerr y Mashaw , A . Mitchel l Polinsky , Ro b Prichard , Pete r Schuck , Stan Wheeler , Kennet h Wolpin , an d th e Lega l Studie s Semina r a t th e Univer sity o f Pennsylvani a La w Schoo l fo r helpfu l discussion s an d fo r thei r comment s on a n earlie r draf t o f thi s chapter . I a m als o gratefu l fo r th e helpfu l researc h assistance o f Jon Pedersen . I n revisin g th e paper , I benefite d greatl y fro m th e discussion a t th e meetin g an d especiall y fro m th e extremel y thoughtfu l com ments o f th e commentator s Jule s Colema n an d Stephe n Schulhofer . Thes e people, o f course , bea r n o responsibilit y fo r an y fault s tha t remain .

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peared hav e see n th e developmen t o f a substantial literatur e o n the economic s o f crim e an d punishment . Nevertheless, ther e i s a perception , amon g peopl e i n la w an d economics, tha t excep t fo r th e highl y controversia l empirica l work o n th e deterren t effec t o f th e deat h penalty , th e econo mists' literatur e o n crim e ha s no t entere d th e mainstrea m o f le gal scholarship. 2 Thi s wor k seem s t o hav e remaine d a literatur e that i s principall y o f interes t t o economist s rathe r tha n t o lega l scholars, lawyers , an d criminologists . I n thi s respect , wor k o n the economic s o f crim e stand s i n contras t to , fo r example , th e work economist s hav e don e o n tor t law , whic h ha s genuinel y engaged th e interes t o f tort s scholar s an d teachers. 3 In thi s chapter , I wis h t o sugges t tha t th e economists ' litera ture o n crim e manifest s a n incompletenes s an d als o a lac k o f connection amon g it s variou s strands . Bot h o f thes e feature s o f the bod y o f wor k identifie d a s "th e economi c theor y o f crime " have restricte d th e impac t tha t economists ' contribution s hav e had i n thi s area . Moreover , thes e problem s reflec t a n inheren t limitation o f an y economi c theor y o f crime : an y suc h theor y mus t depend on , an d simultaneousl y b e confine d by , a se t o f politica l and lega l presuppositions . Furthermore , I believ e tha t a n un derstanding o f thi s intrinsi c constrain t o n th e economists ' ap proach t o crim e wil l mak e possibl e a bette r appreciatio n o f th e kinds o f contribution s an d th e scop e o f th e contribution s econ omists ca n mak e i n thi s area . Strength s sometime s appea r mor e clearly whe n inheren t limitation s ar e recognized . 2. T H E STRUCTUR E O F TH E LITERATUR E

I shal l fram e th e discussio n i n a genera l descriptio n o f th e work tha t ha s bee n don e o n th e economi c theor y o f crime. 4 M y intent i s to describ e th e contour s o f th e landscap e o r th e topog raphy o f thi s vas t literatur e rathe r tha n t o provid e a thoroug h survey o r critica l revie w o f it . This literatur e i s comprised o f thre e distinguishable strands . I shal l discus s eac h o f thes e strand s i n turn an d dra w ou t th e relation s amon g the m a s I proceed . A. The Individual's Decision About Criminal Activity T h e first branc h o f thi s literatur e applie s th e microeconomi c theory o f choic e unde r uncertaint y t o th e decisio n proces s o f

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the individua l criminal . Fo r th e mos t part , thi s se t o f paper s view s the potentia l crimina l a s a rationa l acto r wh o balance s th e cost s and benefits , uncertai n a s the y are , o f hi s possibl e action s an d allocates hi s tim e t o lega l an d illega l activities accordingly. 5 Thes e models analyz e th e choic e o f whethe r o r no t t o commi t a crim inal ac t wit h it s potentia l gai n an d it s potentia l cos t i n th e for m of punishment , wher e th e probabilit y o f winnin g o r losin g th e gamble i s determine d b y law-enforcemen t agencies ' succes s i n catching, convicting , an d punishin g crimina l actors . Th e litera ture als o model s th e potentia l criminal' s "labo r allocation " be tween legitimat e an d illegitimat e activities . T h e kind s o f result s that emerg e tak e th e standar d for m o f th e economist' s compar ative stati c conclusion s abou t ho w change s i n on e o r mor e pa rameters—for example , th e probabilit y an d severit y o f punish ment—affect th e actor' s choice . Th e perspectiv e emphasize d b y the model s i s that th e potentia l crimina l responds , a s other s do , in a rationa l wa y t o th e incentive s provide d b y th e environmen t in whic h h e operates . In som e analytica l studie s o f individua l crimina l behavio r th e authors ar e attentiv e t o th e (perhaps ) problemati c natur e o f th e assumptions abou t rationalit y an d informatio n concernin g th e risks presente d b y th e crimina l justice system . Fo r example , Phili p Cook suggest s bringin g t o bea r th e literatur e o n bounde d rationality 6 an d rule s o f thum b o r "standin g decisions " i n anal yses o f crimina l behavior . Coo k als o treat s i n greate r detai l ho w the threat s tha t th e crimina l justice syste m pose s fo r th e crimi nal ar e communicate d t o th e acto r throug h th e media , th e vis ible presenc e o f enforcer s (fo r example , police) , an d persona l experience an d observation. 7 Othe r analyse s o f th e criminal' s choice process 8 emphasiz e th e importanc e o f nonpecuniar y as pects o f th e criminal' s decision . The y show , fo r example , th e problems wit h postulatin g tha t monetar y equivalent s o f som e forms o f punishmen t exis t an d th e assumption s tha t on e mus t make i n derivin g suc h equivalents . The y als o not e tha t becaus e illegal activit y i s time-consuming , th e criminal' s decisio n mus t take int o accoun t effect s o n thing s othe r tha n wealth . Thes e considerations lea d thes e author s t o focu s o n labo r allocatio n models tha t tak e accoun t o f bot h pecuniar y an d nonpecuniar y characteristics o f th e potentia l outcome s tha t th e crimina l faces . Finally, som e student s o f individua l participatio n i n crimina l

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activity ar e attentiv e t o th e organizationa l o r marke t environ ment withi n whic h individua l decision s ar e made . Particula r ex amples includ e Susa n Rose-Ackerman' s wor k o n corruption 9 an d Peter Reuter' s wor k o n organize d crime. 10 B. Criminal Justice Policy While som e o f th e literatur e o n th e economi c theor y o f crim e focuses o n cost-benefi t calculation s o f individuals—th e poten tial criminals— a secon d stran d i s concerne d wit h cost-benefi t analysis a t th e socia l level . Researc h o n th e latter , wit h Becker' s 1968 articl e bein g th e first forma l treatmen t an d stil l th e mos t prominent example , view s "optima l policie s t o comba t illega l behavior [as ] par t o f a n optima l allocatio n o f resources." 11 Her e the tool s o f economi c analysi s ar e applie d t o deriv e result s abou t the sociall y optima l way s t o enforc e th e crimina l law . T h e prin cipal focu s o f suc h polic y analysi s ha s bee n o n th e choic e o f th e optimal probabilit y o f punishmen t an d th e optima l typ e an d se verity o f punishment. 1 2 I t i s assumed, i n thes e models , tha t th e type an d severit y o f punishmen t ca n b e se t directl y whil e th e probability o f punishmen t i s determine d indirectl y b y society' s expenditures o n police , courts , an d othe r la w enforcemen t re sources. 13 Of course , characterizatio n o f a n optima l se t o f policie s pre supposes a functio n t o b e optimized . I n hi s 196 8 article, Becke r introduced a s th e miniman d a genera l socia l los s functio n whos e arguments wer e th e damage s fro m offenses , th e cost s o f appre hending an d convictin g offenders , an d th e socia l cos t o f pun ishments. Fo r th e mos t part , however , hi s analysi s proceede d with a les s genera l formulatio n o f society' s objectiv e function . Specifically, Becke r too k th e socia l goa l t o b e minimizatio n o f the tota l socia l los s i n rea l incom e fro m offenses , convictions , and punishments . A t som e point s i n th e analysis , though , h e di d introduce generalizations—fo r example , a n additiona l ter m i n the los s functio n t o recogniz e th e socia l los s du e t o "ex post 'price discrimination' betwee n offense s tha t ar e no t an d thos e tha t ar e cleared b y punishment." 1 4 Tha t is , he recognize d explicitl y tha t society ma y incu r a n additiona l los s i f tw o individual s wh o com mit th e sam e crim e are , i n th e end , treate d differently , wit h on e being punishe d whil e th e othe r i s not .

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Other writer s hav e generalize d th e socia l los s functio n i n a variety o f ways . John Harris 1 5 introduce d a ter m fo r th e socia l loss fro m wrongfu l punishment . The n i n thei r 197 7 contribu tion, Ro y Carr-Hil l an d Nichola s Stern 1 6 suggeste d incorporat ing retributiv e considerations—specifically , departure s fro m th e "retributionist target " punishment—i n th e ter m measurin g th e net socia l cos t o f punishmen t i n Becker' s socia l los s function . But i n hi s 197 8 paper , "O n th e Economi c Theor y o f Polic y To wards Crime, " Ster n withdre w th e suggestion . H e continue d t o argue fo r th e importanc e o f retributio n a s a determinan t o f punishment level s bu t indicate d tha t i t woul d no t b e "particu larly helpful " t o "amalgamat e differen t criteri a o n mode s o f conduct int o a gran d socia l los s function." 17 Mitchel l Polinsk y and Steve n Shavel l i n specifyin g th e socia l los s functio n i n thei r 1979 articl e too k explici t accoun t o f th e attitude s towar d ris k o f those wh o engage d i n activitie s fo r whic h the y migh t b e appre hended an d fined. 18 Finally , Isaa c Ehrlich 19 examine d th e im plications o f introducin g thre e alternativ e element s int o Beck er's socia l los s function . The y wer e term s representin g equalit y under th e law , avoidanc e o f lega l error , an d retribution . Thes e features correspon d t o suggestion s tha t other s ha d previousl y made—including Becke r himself , Harris , an d Carr-Hil l an d Stern—but Ehrlich' s analysi s o f th e consequence s o f introduc ing the m i s mor e thoroug h an d complete . All o f thes e variant s o f th e socia l los s functio n shar e on e striking feature . T h e ter m representin g th e ne t cos t o r damag e to societ y is , i n eac h case , take n t o b e th e differenc e betwee n the har m t o societ y and th e socia l valu e o f th e gai n t o of fenders. Tha t is , th e utilit y o f th e offende r i s counte d i n th e social welfar e function . Indeed , i n tw o o f th e mor e elegan t an d sophisticated analyse s i n thi s literature , b y Polinsk y an d Shav ell, 20 th e socia l welfar e functio n t o b e maximize d i s th e su m o f the expecte d utilitie s o f th e individua l member s o f th e society . This seem s plausibl e i n thei r 197 9 articl e wher e th e analysi s fo cuses o n fines—both civi l an d criminal—an d th e heuristi c ex ample i s doubl e parking . T h e aggregatio n seem s mor e ques tionable i n thei r lates t contribution , "Th e Optima l Us e o f Fine s and Imprisonment, " wher e th e harm s involve d ar e obviousl y severe enoug h fo r imprisonmen t t o b e contemplate d a s a pun ishment.

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To b e sure , thi s apparen t anomal y i n th e socia l los s functio n has bee n note d before . Georg e Stigler , i n a pape r stimulate d b y Becker's "Crim e an d Punishment : A n Economi c Approach, " an d following closel y i n tim e upo n th e publicatio n o f tha t work , mad e the sam e observation . H e wrot e that : Becker introduce s . . . th e "socia l valu e o f th e gai n t o of fenders" fro m th e offense . Th e determinatio n o f thi s socia l value i s no t explained , an d on e i s entitle d t o doub t it s use fulness a s a n explanator y concept : wha t evidenc e i s ther e that societ y set s a positiv e valu e upo n th e utilit y derive d fro m a murder , rape , o r arson ? I n fac t th e societ y ha s brande d the utilit y derive d fro m suc h activitie s a s illicit. 21 The subsequen t literatur e ha s neve r take n seriou s accoun t o f this point . I t i s an issu e t o whic h I shal l retur n below , thoug h I will no t resolv e th e questio n o f exactl y whos e gain s an d losse s or whos e preference s shoul d b e counte d i n th e socia l welfar e function tha t i s optimized . The nexu s betwee n th e first tw o strand s o f th e economi c analysis o f crim e i s a clos e one . Th e model s o f individua l be havior yiel d prediction s abou t th e suppl y o f offense s b y indi viduals. Thes e individua l suppl y function s ar e aggregate d t o derive a marke t suppl y function—als o know n a s a deterrenc e function—that relate s th e tota l numbe r o f offense s t o th e prob ability an d severit y o f punishment . Thi s deterrenc e functio n i s at th e hear t o f th e polic y mode l tha t i s use d t o obtai n conclu sions abou t optima l strategie s t o comba t illega l behavior . Moreover, Becker' s mode l an d th e theoretica l wor k tha t fol lowed i t hav e emphasize d th e two-wa y interactio n betwee n criminal activit y an d th e policie s adopte d b y la w enforcemen t authorities. Th e latte r affec t th e numbe r o f offense s a t th e sam e time a s the leve l an d effect s o f crimina l activit y affec t th e choic e of value s fo r th e polic y instruments—th e probabilit y an d sever ity o f punishment . I n technica l terms , crimina l activit y an d criminal justic e syste m activit y ar e simultaneousl y determined . This ha s clea r implication s fo r empirica l effort s t o estimat e th e deterrence function , tha t is , th e responsivenes s o f offense s t o policy variables . Becaus e o f th e interdependenc e betwee n crim e

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and punishment , simultaneous-equation s estimatin g technique s ought t o b e use d i f on e hope s t o unrave l th e deterrenc e effects . C. The Existence of the Criminal Category The clos e tie s an d mutua l enrichmen t tha t exis t betwee n th e work o n economi c theorie s o f individua l crimina l behavio r an d the researc h o n economi c theorie s o f th e crimina l justice syste m stand i n shar p contras t t o th e lac k o f communicatio n betwee n the socia l cost-benefi t analysi s an d th e thir d stran d i n th e eco nomics literatur e o n crime . Thi s las t enterprise , t o whic h littl e effort ha s bee n devoted , draw s upo n economi c analysi s t o ex plain th e existenc e o f th e crimina l category . I t maintain s tha t economic analysi s ca n hel p t o explai n wh y w e distinguis h a se t of act s tha t w e cal l crimes—wh y w e hav e th e crimina l la w a t all . The tw o principa l (perhap s only ) contribution s t o thi s par t o f the literatur e o n th e economi c theor y o f crim e ar e b y Guid o Calabresi an d Dougla s Melame d i n "Propert y Rules , Liabilit y Rules, an d Inalienability : On e Vie w o f th e Cathedral" 2 2 an d b y Richard Posne r i n Economic Analysis of Law. 23 Calabresi an d Melame d us e th e framewor k develope d i n thei r article t o conside r th e us e o f crimina l sanction s i n case s o f thef t and violation s o f bodil y integrity . The y d o no t believ e tha t problems o f detectio n an d apprehension , whic h rende r th e probability o f apprehensio n les s tha n one , explai n full y wh y w e "charge" 2 4 peopl e wh o commi t thes e act s mor e tha n th e valu e of wha t the y take . The y argu e instea d tha t eve n i f ever y suc h offender wer e caught , "th e penalt y w e woul d wis h t o impos e would b e greate r tha n th e objectiv e damages." 2 5 Th e explana tion, Calabres i an d Melame d suggest , "lie s i n a consideration o f the differenc e betwee n propert y entitlement s an d liabilit y enti tlements. Fo r u s t o charg e th e thie f wit h a penalt y equa l t o a n objectively determine d valu e o f th e propert y stole n woul d b e t o convert al l propert y rul e entitlement s int o liabilit y rul e entitle ments." 2 6 Bu t the y demonstrate d earlie r i n thei r pape r tha t economic efficienc y considerations , distributiona l goals , an d "other justic e reasons " woul d lea d a collectivit y no t t o emplo y only liabilit y rule s t o protec t entitlements . Instead , a s Calabres i and Melame d persuasivel y argue , th e stat e wil l emplo y a mix ture o f propert y rules , liabilit y rules , an d inalienabilit y rules. 27 Consequently, fro m th e perspectiv e o f thei r analysis ,

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The thie f no t onl y harm s th e victim , h e undermine s rule s and distinction s o f significanc e beyon d th e specifi c case . . . . Since i n th e majorit y o f case s w e canno t b e sur e o f th e eco nomic efficienc y o f th e transfe r b y theft , w e mus t ad d t o each cas e a n undefinabl e kicke r whic h represent s society' s need t o kee p al l propert y rule s fro m bein g change d a t wil l into liabilit y rules. 28 Of course , th e nee d fo r th e "undefinabl e kicker " applie s a s wel l to eac h violatio n o f bodil y integrity . The basi c distinctio n tha t Calabres i an d Melame d dra w be tween th e crimina l wh o rob s o r violate s anothe r person' s bodil y integrity and th e injure r i n a n automobil e acciden t o r a pollute r in a nuisanc e cas e i s tha t th e crimina l resort s t o nonmarke t transactions whe n th e cost s o f marke t transaction s ar e low , whil e the drive r an d th e pollute r find themselve s engage d i n non market rathe r tha n marke t transaction s whe n th e latte r ar e to o costly. Posner' s analysi s i s simila r excep t fo r th e singularl y im portant fac t that , withi n hi s scheme , th e sol e reaso n fo r prefer ring on e for m o f transactio n t o another—i n Calabresi-Melame d terms, on e mod e o f entitlemen t protectio n t o another—i s eco nomic efficiency , a s Posne r define s it . Fo r Posner , th e onl y de sideratum i n socia l polic y i s valu e maximization : th e distribu tional goal s tha t for m a n integra l par t o f th e Calabresi-Melame d framework, an d th e "othe r justice" reason s the y discuss , receiv e no weigh t i n hi s analysis . For Posner , " A 'crime ' i s simpl y a n ac t tha t subject s th e per petrator t o a distinctiv e for m o f punishmen t tha t i s mete d ou t in a distinctiv e kin d o f proceeding, " wher e th e unlawfulnes s o f the ac t derive s fro m "th e polic y o f som e othe r bod y o f law—th e tort law , i n th e cas e o f 'th e commo n la w crimes ' . . . an d var ious law s regulatin g busines s an d persona l behavior , i n th e cas e of . . . statutory crimes." 29 Unde r thi s approach , "th e crimina l sanction i s simpl y a metho d o f pricin g conduct" 30 an d "Th e function o f th e crimina l law—i s t o impos e additiona l cost s o n unlawful conduc t wher e th e conventiona l damage s remed y alon e would b e insufficient t o limit tha t conduc t t o the efficien t level." 31 Posner, lik e Calabres i an d Melamed , show s ho w a probabilit y of punishmen t tha t i s les s tha n on e shoul d lea d t o a punish ment tha t exceed s th e damage s cause d b y th e criminal . Bu t h e

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also make s th e stronge r poin t tha t althoug h a sanctio n i n whic h the expecte d punishmen t cos t i s equal t o th e damag e t o th e vic tim i s "adequat e wher e th e crim e i n questio n i s simpl y th e vio lation o f a regulator y statute," 32 a heavie r penalt y i s require d in othe r situations . Specifically , "i f th e law' s purpos e i n prohib iting th e ac t i n questio n wa s t o channe l activit y int o th e market , i.e. th e aren a o f voluntar y transacting," 33 the n a n expecte d punishment i n exces s o f th e damag e inflicte d i s neede d t o in duce th e perpetrato r t o substitut e a voluntar y transactio n fo r a coercive one . Whe n marke t alternative s ar e available , th e ex pected punishmen t fo r a violatio n woul d b e se t equa l t o "th e sum o f (1 ) th e socia l cost s o f th e violatio n an d (2 ) the additiona l costs t o th e lega l syste m o f substitutin g coerciv e transaction s fo r market transactions." 34 Although Posne r i s no t explici t o n thi s point , i t i s consisten t with hi s argumen t tha t th e "additiona l costs " under ite m 2 woul d include th e Calabresi-Melame d "kicker. " O f course , wher e ther e is n o marke t alternative—Posne r offer s th e exampl e o f " a drive r who violate s th e spee d limi t becaus e th e opportunit y cost s o f hi s time ar e ver y high" 3 5 —the penalt y shoul d b e larg e enoug h t o reflect th e hazard s th e crimina l creates , subsume d i n hi s item 1 , but ther e woul d b e n o add-o n designe d t o induc e substitutio n of a marke t fo r a lega l transaction . 3. IMPLICATION S O F ECONOMI C EXPLANATION S O F TH E CRIMINAL CATEGOR Y FO R TH E ECONOMI C THEOR Y O F CRIMINA L JUSTICE POLIC Y

This third , relativel y undeveloped , stran d o f wor k o n th e economic theor y o f crim e ha s severa l importan t implication s fo r research o n th e economi c theor y o f polic y towar d crime . First , it suggest s tha t economists ' theoretica l wor k o n cost-benefi t analysis o f publi c polic y towar d crimina l activit y i s bes t viewe d as a partia l equilibriu m approach . Th e insight s offere d b y eco nomic theorie s o f th e crimina l justice syste m ar e conditional , fo r those theorie s tak e a s give n th e se t o f act s o r activitie s tha t ar e designated a s crimes . T h e result s i n wha t I hav e labelle d th e second stran d o f th e literatur e o n th e economi c theor y o f crim e tell u s ho w t o allocat e resource s t o apprehensio n an d convic tion, o n th e on e hand , an d t o punishment , o n th e other , once

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the crime s hav e bee n identified . A full , unconditiona l theor y o f the crimina l justice system— a genera l equilibriu m approach , i f you will—woul d tak e a mor e globa l perspective . I t migh t hav e Posner's wealt h measure , o r a n appropriat e amalga m o f th e Calabresi-Melamed desiderata , o r ye t anothe r measur e a s th e criterion t o b e optimized . T h e ful l "solution " woul d the n yiel d the se t o f action s tha t ar e optimall y t o b e designate d a s crime s as well as the optima l probabilit y an d severit y o f punishmen t fo r each crime . For example , suppos e on e accepte d Becker' s measur e o f th e total socia l los s i n rea l incom e a s th e relevan t quantit y o f con cern (an d th e economi c theor y o f th e crimina l categor y speak s to thi s issu e a s well). Then on e ca n imagin e solvin g th e proble m that Becke r pose d fo r eac h o f th e possibl e configuration s o f th e criminal/noncriminal divisio n o f activities . Wha t I hav e re ferred t o a s th e ful l o r genera l equilibriu m solutio n woul d the n be th e categorizatio n o f activitie s an d th e associate d se t o f prob ability o f punishment/severit y o f punishmen t value s tha t yielde d the minimu m minimoru m o f th e Beckeria n socia l los s function . Of course , t o observ e tha t Becke r an d thos e wh o followe d hi m in developin g economi c model s o f polic y towar d crim e delim ited th e scop e o f th e proble m the y analyze d i s no t t o diminis h their contribution . No r i s i t t o sa y tha t the y claime d mor e fo r their analyse s tha n the y ough t t o have . I n particular , Becke r himself wa s quit e clea r abou t th e confine s o f hi s model . Bu t th e partial characte r o f thes e model s doe s sugges t difficultie s fo r on e who woul d see k t o develo p a complet e economi c theor y o f crime . Suppose tha t th e objectiv e functio n o f th e broade r problem , i n which on e determine s th e optima l partitio n o f act s int o crimi nal an d noncrimina l categorie s a s wel l a s th e optima l severit y and probabilit y o f punishmen t fo r eac h o f th e crimina l acts , i s not confine d t o economi c values—as , fo r instance , Posne r woul d seemingly restric t it , but Calabres i an d Melame d woul d not . The n the explanatio n of , o r th e derivatio n o f result s about , th e crim inal justice syste m coul d no t b e full y economi c i n character . A secon d importan t poin t o f contac t betwee n th e Calabresi Melamed an d Posne r contributions , whic h explai n th e us e o f th e criminal sanction , an d th e resourc e allocatio n proble m tha t Becker an d other s hav e addressed , concern s th e functio n tha t relates th e ne t cos t o r damag e t o societ y t o th e numbe r o f of -

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fenses. Thi s function , whic h i s centra l t o th e overal l objectiv e function i n Becker' s an d others ' analyse s o f publi c polic y to ward crime , i s intended t o measur e th e damag e o r ne t cos t tha t society sustain s a s th e resul t o f th e offense s tha t occur . Bu t i t i s difficult t o se e ho w on e ca n asses s th e socia l damage s fro m of fenses unles s on e ha s a theor y o f th e crimina l category . Th e thrust o f th e Calabresi-Melame d an d Posne r analyse s i s tha t a n act i s classified a s crimina l precisel y becaus e th e har m i t doe s t o society exceed s th e conventiona l measur e o f damages . T o spec ify th e socia l los s functio n i n a Beckeria n analysis , on e mus t as sess th e cost s o f thes e additiona l harm s an d b e sur e tha t the y are appropriatel y reckone d i n th e analysis . In particular , th e sociall y disapprove d natur e o f th e crimi nal's act , a s Calabresi-Melame d an d Posne r explai n it s disfa vored status , raise s seriou s question s abou t th e appropriatenes s of subtractin g th e criminal' s gai n fro m th e har m tha t hi s ac t doe s to th e res t o f society . A theor y o r a n explanatio n o f wh y certai n acts ar e labelle d crimina l tha t provide s reason s fo r objectin g t o the particula r actio n ma y als o provid e reason s fo r discountin g the criminal' s gain . Alternatively , sinc e Becke r wa s careful , though other s hav e no t been , t o sa y tha t wha t ough t t o b e sub tracted i s th e "socia l valu e o f th e gai n t o offenders, " th e expla nation o f th e crimina l categor y provide s a mean s to—indee d th e explanation i s require d to—asses s tha t "socia l value. " Once again , I d o no t wis h t o sugges t tha t Becke r wa s no t clea r about th e scop e o f hi s analysis ; o n th e contrary , h e wa s precis e in drawin g th e line s aroun d wha t h e did . A s h e wrote , Reasonable me n wil l ofte n diffe r o n th e amoun t o f dam ages o r benefit s cause d b y differen t activities . . . . Thes e differences ar e basi c t o th e developmen t an d implementa tion o f publi c polic y bu t hav e bee n exclude d fro m m y in quiry. I assum e consensu s o n damage s an d benefit s an d simply tr y t o wor k ou t rule s fo r a n optima l implementatio n of thi s consensus. 36 His analysi s i s fine, then , a s fa r a s i t goes . The difficulty , however , i s tha t b y settin g asid e issue s o f ho w social losse s ar e assesse d an d b y no t havin g a theor y o f th e criminal categor y t o infor m tha t reckoning , Becker' s analysi s i s

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subject t o characterization s tha t mak e i t unattractiv e an d seem ingly unhelpfu l t o lega l scholar s concerne d wit h crimina l law . And th e characterizatio n i s on e tha t Becke r himsel f uses , no t one tha t i s provide d a s a caricatur e b y a critic . Specifically , h e writes, "crimina l activitie s ar e a n importan t subse t o f th e clas s of activitie s tha t caus e diseconomies , wit h th e leve l o f crimina l activities measure d b y th e numbe r o f offenses." 37 I n furthe r characterizing hi s analysis , h e say s Our analysi s o f crim e i s a generalizatio n o f th e economist' s analysis o f externa l har m o r diseconomies . Analytically , th e generalization consist s i n introducin g cost s o f apprehen sion an d conviction , whic h mak e th e probabilit y o f appre hension an d convictio n a n importan t decisio n variable , an d in treatin g punishmen t b y imprisonmen t an d othe r meth ods a s well a s by monetar y payments . A crime i s apparentl y not s o differen t analyticall y fro m an y othe r activit y tha t produces externa l har m an d whe n crime s ar e punishabl e by fines , th e analytica l difference s virtuall y vanish. 38 The criminal' s action s surel y hav e "externa l effects. " Bu t i t i s difficult t o se e a studen t o f crimina l la w vigorousl y pursuin g a n approach t o crim e an d punishmen t tha t self-consciousl y char acterizes itsel f a s a branc h o f th e theor y o f externa l disecon omies, albei t on e tha t extend s tha t theor y b y introducin g cost s of apprehensio n an d convictio n an d b y takin g accoun t o f non monetary penalties . Lega l scholar s wil l find suc h a n approac h even les s invitin g i f the y recal l th e fundamenta l contributio n o f Ronald Coas e i n clarifyin g th e reciprocal nature o f externalitie s and hi s criticis m o f th e vie w tha t on e part y causes the har m i n an externalit y situation. 39 The absenc e o f explici t concer n fo r th e origi n o f th e crimina l category affect s othe r analyse s o f publi c polic y towar d crim e a s well. Fo r example , i n Polinsk y an d Shavell' s 198 2 article , impli cations fo r th e us e o f fines an d imprisonmen t ar e draw n fro m a trul y classica l mode l o f externa l diseconomies . Th e basi c ac tivity tha t "causes " externa l har m i s sociall y beneficia l an d th e social welfar e function , whic h i s a t th e hear t o f th e analysis , i s the su m o f th e expecte d utilitie s o f al l the member s o f th e com munity. 40 T h e result s tha t Polinsk y an d Shavel l deriv e ar e in -

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teresting an d importan t fo r polic y setting s wher e bot h mone tary an d nonmonetar y penaltie s ca n b e use d t o contro l a n activit y that yield s socia l benefits bu t als o result s i n har m t o others. On e can thin k o f man y suc h examples—analyse s o f publi c polic y to ward automobil e accident s o r pollutio n ar e tw o instances—bu t the economi c literatur e o n th e existenc e o f th e crimina l cate gory suggest s tha t polic y abou t crimina l activit y i s no t amon g them. 4. T H E INHEREN T LIMITATIO N O F AN Y ECONOMI C THEORY O F CRIM E

The effort s t o us e economi c analysi s t o explai n wh y som e act s are distinguishe d a s crime s hav e ye t anothe r an d mor e funda mental implicatio n abou t th e kind s o f insight s economists , o r th e use o f economi c analysis , ca n provid e abou t crimina l law . Th e implication migh t b e viewe d b y som e a s negativ e becaus e i t point s to a n inheren t limitatio n o f th e economist' s approach . Bu t i t seems, t o m e a t least , tha t recognizin g thi s boundar y i s no t i n any wa y depreciatory . Rather , i t i s t o recogniz e tha t althoug h economics can indeed contribut e t o ou r understandin g o f crim inal behavio r an d optima l enforcemen t policy , i t canno t pro vide a ful l o r complet e economi c theor y o f crime . T h e wor k o f economists i n thi s are a mus t b e informe d b y wor k i n othe r dis ciplines. What, then , i s thi s implication ? I t i s tha t althoug h a n expla nation o f th e crimina l categor y ca n b e stated in economi c terms , that vocabular y an d mod e o f analysi s doe s not , i n fact , provid e the substantiv e understandin g w e seek . T o se e this , it i s helpfu l to fram e mor e generall y th e answer s offere d b y Calabres i an d Melamed an d b y Posner . Society (o r th e collectivit y o r th e state ) establishe s a "transac tion structure " tha t stipulate s th e term s o n whic h particula r transactions o r exchange s ar e t o tak e plac e unde r differen t cir cumstances. Fo r example , societ y migh t determin e tha t i f yo u and I ar e walkin g dow n th e street , havin g n o contac t wit h on e another, an d yo u desir e m y watch , the n yo u ar e permitte d t o have i t if , bu t onl y if , w e agre e t o a voluntar y exchang e o f m y watch fo r somethin g yo u hav e (o r promis e t o deliver , etc.) . So ciety migh t als o sa y tha t i f th e circumstance s ar e different—fo r

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example, a s yo u peda l you r motorize d bicycl e dow n th e side walk yo u knoc k m e ove r an d m y watc h i s destroyed—yo u ar e permitted t o "have " m y watc h bu t yo u mus t pa y a collectivel y set valu e fo r it . I n Calabresi-Melame d terminology , th e firs t sit uation correspond s t o protectin g m y entitlemen t t o m y watc h by a propert y rule , whil e i n th e secon d settin g i t i s protecte d only b y a liabilit y rule . I n Posner' s terms , th e forme r exchange , if consummated , woul d b e a marke t transactio n whil e th e latte r would b e a nonmarke t transaction . As t o som e possibl e exchanges , societ y migh t impos e a n ab solute bar . I n man y societie s (i t i s a t leas t state d that ) yo u can not bu y m y vot e i n th e sens e tha t yo u canno t pa y m e a certai n amount o f mone y i n exchang e fo r th e capacit y t o cas t m y ballo t in m y place . I n man y societies , a n individua l canno t sel l himsel f into bondage . Thi s las t for m o f regulatin g transaction s corre sponds t o wha t Calabres i an d Melame d refe r t o a s protectin g my entitlemen t t o m y vot e an d m y freedo m fro m bondag e wit h an inalienabilit y rule . The reaso n I introduc e ye t anothe r laye r o f economic s vo cabulary, wit h th e ter m "transactio n structure, " i s t o hel p u s t o move beyon d th e Calabresi-Melame d an d Posne r characteriza tions o f crime . Fo r Calabres i an d Melamed , th e impositio n o f the crimina l sanctio n an d th e characterizatio n o f particula r act s as crime s derive s fro m a nee d t o kee p propert y rule s an d ina lienability rule s fro m bein g "change d a t will " into liabilit y rules ; for Posner , i t derive s fro m a desir e t o induc e individual s t o substitute voluntar y transaction s wit h on e anothe r fo r coerciv e ones whe n th e forme r ar e possibl e a t lo w enoug h cost . Note, however , tha t a societ y tha t impose s th e crimina l sanc tion o n individual s wh o engag e i n th e sellin g an d buyin g o f vote s makes i t a crime t o chang e a n inalienabilit y rul e int o a propert y rule o r i n Posner' s terms , t o substitut e a marke t fo r a nonmar ket transaction . On e ca n als o imagin e a societ y i n whic h i t i s determined tha t al l decision s abou t pollutio n shoul d b e mad e i n a collective setting , tha t is , in whic h al l entitlement s t o b e fre e fro m pollution ar e protecte d b y liabilit y rules . Suc h a societ y migh t well appl y th e crimina l sanctio n t o partie s wh o engag e i n a market transactio n i n whic h th e pollute r "buy s of f " t he pollu tees. Similarly , a crimina l sanctio n migh t b e applie d t o a n em ployer wh o hire s worker s a t a (mutually , agreeable) wag e belo w

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the legislativel y mandate d minimu m o r t o a selle r wh o sell s good s (to willin g consumers ) fo r mor e tha n o r les s tha n a legislativel y set price . A societ y tha t woul d mak e eac h o f thes e las t tw o ac tions a crim e woul d d o s o because a liability-rule protectio n ha d been converte d int o a property-rul e protection . In eac h instance , th e ac t tha t i s characterize d a s a crim e in volves th e actor(s ) forcin g societ y t o dea l wit h a transactio n i n a way i n whic h societ y di d no t wan t t o trea t it . Wha t make s th e act a crim e i s tha t th e individua l assault s th e transactio n struc ture tha t ha s bee n establishe d b y society. 41 On e coul d say , alter natively, tha t th e individua l coerce s society int o considerin g an d coping wit h a n exchang e o r transactio n i n a way tha t differ s fro m the mod e societ y ha d chosen . Finally , on e migh t characteriz e th e criminal a s arrogatin g t o himsel f th e powe r o r th e authorit y t o determine a t leas t a par t o f th e societa l transactio n structure , that is , appropriatin g t o himsel f a powe r o r righ t tha t societ y had reserve d t o itself . T h e crimina l sanctio n i s the n a sanctio n to enforc e th e transactio n structur e tha t societ y ha s chose n a s well a s t o compensat e fo r th e harm s t o individual s withi n th e society.42 But, then , a n explanatio n o f th e crimina l category—eve n a n explanation state d i n economi c terms—require s answer s t o questions an d elaboratio n o f concept s tha t economi c analysi s i s not particularl y well-suite d t o provide. 43 T h e poin t i s no t tha t the languag e describin g th e ground s fo r invokin g th e crimina l sanction—for callin g a n ac t a crime—i s no t draw n fro m eco nomics. On e can , afte r all , describ e th e reason s i n term s tha t are muc h les s evocativ e an d les s clearl y locate d i n anothe r dis cipline tha n ar e th e term s "assault, " "coercion, " an d "arroga tion o f power. " Fo r example , on e coul d simpl y sa y tha t th e criminal act s contrar y t o th e transactio n structur e societ y ha s established. 44 Bu t th e critica l observatio n i s tha t th e explicatio n of wh y som e act s ar e crime s whil e othe r ar e no t require s a n in quiry int o th e legitimatio n o f th e transactio n structure . I t force s one t o confron t question s like : Wh y doe s th e collectivit y hav e the righ t t o decid e th e term s o n whic h particula r transaction s will tak e plac e unde r differen t circumstances ? Wh y d o som e rights resid e i n th e individua l whil e other s res t wit h th e state ? To b e sure , on e ca n propos e a unified , an d unitary , eco nomic basi s fo r determinin g wha t act s ar e categorize d a s crime s

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and wha t probabilit y an d severit y o f punishmen t i s associate d with eac h crimina l act . I f on e posit s tha t wealt h maximization 45 is the sol e criterio n b y which socia l arrangement s ar e t o be eval uated, th e objectiv e functio n i n Becker' s partia l equilibriu m ap proach t o crimina l justice policy , whic h set s onl y th e probabili ties o f punishmen t an d th e penalties , wil l b e consisten t wit h th e global proble m i n whic h th e categorizatio n o f act s i s deter mined a s well. Indeed , determinatio n o f th e optima l probabilit y and severit y o f punishmen t wil l b e a subordinate d par t o f th e larger problem . I n th e solutio n t o th e globa l problem , i t wil l emerge tha t inefficien t substitution s o f nonmarke t transaction s for marke t exchange s ar e subjecte d t o th e crimina l sanction , an d that probabilitie s an d severitie s o f punishmen t ar e chose n t o minimize th e reductio n i n society' s wealth . Bu t eve n suc h a the ory necessaril y invoke s certai n politica l presuppositions—t o wit , that societ y ha s a righ t t o choos e a structur e tha t strive s t o max imize wealt h an d tha t individual s d o no t hav e th e righ t t o resis t that choice . Suc h a theor y doe s no t answe r th e question : Wh y is th e chose n transactio n structur e legitimate ? An d a n answe r to tha t questio n i s a necessar y componen t o f a n explanatio n o f why som e act s ar e treate d a s crimes . In sum , t o giv e a coheren t explanatio n o f th e crimina l cate gory, a s I hav e couche d i t i n economi c terms , on e need s a t leas t a politica l theor y o f rights . Undertakin g a microeconomi c analysi s of crim e require s a s a preconditio n a certai n minimu m o f po litical an d lega l structure . NOTES 1. Gar y S . Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment : A n Economi c Ap proach,"/. Pol. Econ. 7 6 (1968) : 169 , 209 . 2. See , fo r example , th e surve y b y Henr y Hansmann , "Th e Curren t State o f Law-and-Economic s Scholarship, " J.L.E. 3 3 (1983) : 217 . 3. Thi s i s no t t o sa y tha t economists ' writing s o n crim e hav e ha d n o influence o n th e wa y crimina l la w scholar s thin k abou t thei r sub ject. I t woul d hav e bee n difficult , afte r all , fo r th e outpourin g o f economists' wor k o n th e subjec t t o hav e bee n ignored . Bu t th e in sights abou t crim e tha t lawyer s hav e draw n fro m th e wor k o f economists hav e bee n specialize d an d fragmented . Th e economi c theory o f crim e ha s no t take n o n anythin g lik e th e salienc e o f th e economic approac h t o torts , whic h ha s bee n accepte d a s one o f th e

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competing paradigm s tha t tort s scholar s us e i n analyzin g thei r subject. I n torts , a schola r ma y rejec t th e economi c approac h bu t must recko n wit h it . Thi s i s no t th e cas e wit h th e economi c theor y of crime . 4. I n keepin g wit h th e focu s o f thi s volum e o n theorie s o f crimina l justice, I restric t m y discussio n t o economists ' theoretica l wor k o n crime. T h e vas t bod y o f empirica l wor k tha t ha s bee n informe d by tha t theor y an d tha t has , i n turn , influence d theoretica l devel opments lie s outsid e th e purvie w o f thi s chapter . A n interestin g set o f empirica l paper s o n th e economic s o f crim e i s collecte d i n J.M. Heineke , ed. , Economic Models of Criminal Behavior (Amster dam: North-Holland , 1978) , an d a usefu l assessmen t o f empirica l work o n th e subjec t i s provide d b y Phili p J . Cook , "Researc h i n Criminal Deterrence : Layin g th e Groundwor k fo r th e Secon d De cade," i n Norva l Morri s an d Michae l Tonry , eds. , Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, vol . 2 (Chicago : Th e Universit y of Chicag o Press , 1980 ) p . 211. 5. Se e Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment, " Michae l K . Bloc k an d Joh n M. Heineke , " A Labo r Theoreti c Analysi s o f th e Crimina l Choice, " Am. Econ. Rev. 6 5 (1975) : 314 ; Isaa c Ehrlich , "Participatio n i n Il legitimate Activities : A Theoretica l an d Empirica l Investigation, " J. Pol. Econ. 8 1 (1973) : 68 ; John M . Heineke , "Economi c Model s of Crimina l Behavior : A n Overview, " i n Economic Models of Criminal Behavior, volum e 1 . 6. Se e Cook , "Researc h i n Crimina l Deterrence, " p . 220. Fo r th e classi c discussion o f bounde d rationality , se e Herber t A . Simon , Models of Man (Ne w York : John Wiley , 1957) . 7. Phili p J . Cook , " A Unifie d Treatmen t o f Deterrence , Incapacita tion, an d Rehabilitation : A Simulatio n Study " (Durham , N.C. : In stitute o f Polic y Science s an d Publi c Affairs , Duk e University , 1979) . 8. Se e Bloc k an d Heineke , "Labo r Theoreti c Analysi s o f th e Crimi nal Choice; " Michae l K . Bloc k an d Rober t C . Lind , "Crim e an d Punishment Reconsidered,"/ . L. Stud. 4 (1975) : 241 ; Michae l K . Block an d Rober t C . Lind , "A n Economi c Analysi s o f Crime s Pun ishable b y Imprisonment, " J. L. Stud. 4 (1975) : 479 ; Heineke , "Economic Model s o f Crimina l Behavior. " 9. Susa n Rose-Ackerman , Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academi c Press , 1978) . 10. Pete r Reuter , Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: M I T Press , 1983) . 11. Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment, " p . 209 . 12. A relate d interestin g literature , whic h ca n b e viewe d a s a n out growth o f th e earl y socia l cost-benefi t analysi s o f publi c polic y to ward crime , concern s th e comparativ e advantage s o f privat e ver -

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sus publi c enforcemen t o f th e law . T h e principa l work s ar e Gar y S. Becke r an d Georg e J . Stigler , "La w Enforcement , Malfeasance , and Compensatio n o f Enforcers, " J. L. Stud. 3 (1974) : 1 ; Willia m M. Lande s an d Richar d A . Posner , "Th e Privat e Enforcemen t o f L a w , " / . L. Stud. 4 (1975) : 1 ; an d A . Mitchel l Polinsky , "Privat e versus Publi c Enforcemen t o f Fines,"/ . L. Stud. 9 (1980) : 105 . Thei r analyses rel y heavil y o n Becker' s semina l articl e an d it s progeny , in particular , o n th e result s concernin g th e optima l probabilit y an d optimal severit y o f punishment . Thes e analyse s o f th e relativ e ef ficacy o f privat e an d publi c enforcemen t appl y t o lega l command s generally an d no t t o crimina l la w alone . 13. I n reality , th e typ e an d severit y o f punishmen t ar e als o se t onl y indirectly. Ther e ma y b e legislativ e directive s abou t sentence s o r fines, fo r example , bu t ther e i s usuall y a t leas t a residua l elemen t of judicial discretio n i n settin g punishments . 14. Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment, " p . 184 . 15. Joh n R . Harris , "O n th e Economic s o f La w an d Order,"/ . PolEcon. 78 (1970) : 165 . 16. Ro y A . Carr-Hil l an d Nichola s H . Stern , "Theor y an d Estimatio n in Model s o f Crim e an d It s Socia l Contro l an d Thei r Relation s t o Concepts o f Socia l Output, " i n Marti n S . Feldstei n an d Rober t P . Inman, eds. , The Economics of Public Services 11 6 (London : Mac millan, 1977) . 17. Nichola s H . Stern , "O n th e Economi c Theor y o f Polic y Toward s Crime," in Heineke , ed. , Economic Models of Criminal Behavior 123 , p. 148 . 18. A . Mitchel l Polinsk y an d Steve n Shavell , "Th e Optima l Tradeof f Between th e Probabilit y an d Magnitud e o f Fines, " Am. Econ. Rev. 69 (1979) : 880 . 19. Isaa c Ehrlich , "Th e Optimu m Enforcemen t o f La w an d th e Con cept o f Justice: A Positiv e Analysis, " Int. R. L. & Econ. 2 (1982) : 3 . 20. Polinsk y an d Shavell , "Th e Optima l Tradeoff, " an d A . Mitchel l Polinsky an d Steve n Shavell , "Th e Optima l Us e o f Fine s an d Im prisonment,"/. Pub. Econ. (forthcoming) . 21. Georg e J . Stigler , "Th e Optimu m Enforcemen t o f Laws,"/ . Pol. Econ. 7 8 (1970) : 526 , 527 . 22. Guid o Calabres i an d A . Dougla s Melamed , "Propert y Rules , Lia bility Rules , an d Inalienability : On e Vie w o f th e Cathedral, " Harv. L. Rev. 8 8 (1972) : 1089 , 1124-1127 . 23. Richar d A . Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, 2 d ed . (Boston : Little , Brown, 1977) , pp . 163-172 . 24. Th e "charge " t o whic h Calabres i an d Melame d refe r include s whatever monetar y an d nonmonetar y penaltie s ar e impose d o n th e

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criminal. Ther e i s n o assumptio n tha t th e payment , i f i t i s a fine , is use d t o mak e restitutio n t o th e victim . 25. Calabres i an d Melamed , "Propert y Rules , Liabilit y Rules , an d In alienability," p . 1125 . 26. Ibid . 27. I wil l discus s th e substanc e o f eac h o f thes e rule s i n greate r detai l below. 28. Calabres i an d Melamed , "Propert y Rules , Liabilit y Rules , an d In alienability," p . 1126 . 29. Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, p . 163 . 30. Ibid. , p . 172 . 31. Ibid. , pp . 163-4 . 32. Ibid. , p . 165 . 33. Ibid . 34. Ibid. , p . 166 . 35. Ibid . 36. Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment, " p . 209 . 37. Ibid. , p . 173 . 38. Ibid. , p . 201. 39. I n hi s classi c articl e abou t externalities , "Th e Proble m o f Socia l Cost,"/. L. & Econ. 3 (1960) : 1 , Ronald Coas e considers , i n partic ular, "thos e action s o f busines s firm s whic h hav e harmfu l effect s on other s . . . [as ] a factor y th e smok e fro m whic h ha s harmfu l effects o n thos e occupyin g neighbourin g properties " (p . 1) . H e begins th e bod y o f hi s argumen t a s follows : T H E RECIPROCA L NATUR E O F TH E PROBLE M

The traditiona l approac h ha s tende d t o obscur e th e natur e o f the choic e tha t ha s t o b e made . T h e questio n i s commonl y thought o f a s on e i n whic h A inflict s har m o n B and wha t ha s to b e decide d is : how shoul d w e restrai n A ? Bu t thi s i s wrong . We ar e dealin g wit h a proble m o f a reciproca l nature . T o avoi d the har m t o B would inflic t har m o n A . The rea l questio n tha t has t o b e decide d is : should A b e allowe d t o har m B or shoul d B b e allowe d t o har m A ? Th e proble m i s t o avoi d th e mor e serious har m . . . (p . 2) . 40. Polinsk y an d Shavell , "Th e Optima l Tradeoff, " p . 21 . In addition , "it i s assumed tha t eac h individua l i s equally likel y t o b e th e victi m of someon e else' s harm " (ibid.) . Thi s latte r assumption , whic h i s made fo r reason s o f analytica l tractability , i s common i n othe r area s of la w an d economics , too , fo r example , th e analysi s o f alternativ e

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liability rule s i n torts . Whethe r O r not th e assumptio n i s plausibl e in th e accident context , i t calls fo r carefu l scrutin y i n a model ana lyzing la w enforcemen t policy . I t i s clear tha t al l the result s i n th e Polinsky an d Shavel l contributio n ar e robus t t o some relaxatio n o f the assumptio n as , fo r example , i f differen t individual s ca n hav e different exogenousl y give n probabilitie s o f sufferin g harm . Ho w the result s woul d b e altered i f one went furthe r an d ha d th e prob ability o f sufferin g har m depen d o n whethe r o r no t on e engage d in th e harm-engenderin g activit y i s anothe r matter . Th e conclu sions abou t (1 ) the optima l punishment—b e i t a fine o r imprison ment—when onl y on e typ e o f punishmen t i s used an d whe n ther e is only on e wealth clas s and (2 ) the desirability o f using fines t o the maximum feasibl e exten t befor e imposin g nonmonetar y penalties , do no t depen d o n th e exogeneit y o f th e probabilit y o f bein g harmed. Bu t whe n th e likelihoo d o f bein g harme d i s endoge nously determined , som e o f Polinsk y an d Shavell' s statement s abou t underdeterrence an d overdeterrenc e an d som e o f thei r result s fo r the two-clas s mode l ma y require modification . 41. I n th e cas e o f theft , th e crimina l no t onl y challenge s th e wa y i n which societ y ha s chose n t o protec t a n entitlemen t bu t als o over turns th e placemen t o f th e entitlemen t itself . 42. Thos e harm s includ e th e damage s du e t o violatio n o f wha t Cala bresi an d Melame d cal l moralisms . Se e Calabres i an d Melamed , "Property Rules , Liabilit y Rules , an d Inalienability, " pp . 1111-2 . The compensatio n i s "paid " t o society . A s note d befor e (se e not e 24), ther e i s n o assumptio n tha t monetar y payments , i f ther e ar e any, ar e use d t o mak e restitutio n t o victims . 43. Economist s have , fo r example , neve r she d muc h ligh t o n th e con cept o f coercion , despit e th e fac t tha t th e ter m i s ofte n invoked . Some spea k o f the coercion involve d i n governmenta l interventio n in th e marke t whil e other s spea k o f th e coercio n o f th e marke t itself. 44. A n interestin g issue , bu t on e tha t I d o no t address here , i s whethe r all crimes ca n be usefull y describe d a s acts tha t ar e contrary t o the chosen transactio n structure . Fo r example , ca n one , withou t straining language , describ e th e ac t o f perjur y b y sayin g tha t th e perjuror force s societ y t o dea l wit h a transactio n i n a wa y that so ciety di d no t wan t t o trea t it ? I f al l act s tha t w e characteriz e a s criminal canno t b e describe d i n thi s language—or , mor e gener ally, usin g th e vocabular y o f economics—the n i t i s clea r tha t th e scope o f a n economi c theor y o f crim e i s necessaril y limited . M y discussion applie s onl y t o thos e crime s tha t th e economi c theor y of th e crimina l categor y purport s t o explain . 45. Fo r th e purpos e o f thi s discussion , I assum e arguendo tha t wealt h

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maximization ca n b e give n a clear , substantive , an d commonl y agreed upo n definition . Tha t providin g suc h a definitio n i s no t a straightforward tas k i s attested t o b y th e page s o f controvers y abou t it i n th e law-and-economic s literature . Th e poin t tha t follow s ap plies if , fo r example , on e take s a s th e criterio n th e maximizatio n of th e tota l valu e o f al l good s an d service s th e societ y produce s where quantitie s ar e value d a t th e equilibriu m prices , o r i f on e substitutes utilitarianis m fo r wealt h maximization .

12 COMMENT O N "O N TH E ECONOMI C THEORY O F CRIME " RICHARD A . POSNE R

The questio n Professo r Klevoric k pose s a t th e outse t o f hi s paper i s wh y th e economi c analysi s o f crime, 1 unlik e th e eco nomic analysi s o f torts , ha s no t entere d int o th e mainstrea m o f lawyers' thinking . Th e questio n i s a somewha t surprisin g on e for a n economis t t o put , a s i t i s a questio n abou t th e sociolog y of lega l educatio n an d practic e rathe r tha n abou t economi c analysis. Bu t Professo r Klevorick' s answe r i s more surprising . I t is tha t th e economi c analysi s o f crim e i s incomplete ; i t presup poses a politica l theor y tha t (b y implication ) i s no t ye t i n place . This i s a surprisin g answer , becaus e mos t peopl e thin k th e eco nomic analysi s o f tor t la w i s als o incomplet e an d i n just th e sam e sense—that i t presuppose s a politica l theor y tha t ha s no t ye t bee n developed. I f tor t la w decide s tha t th e farme r shal l hav e t o bea r the cost s o f damag e fro m locomotiv e sparks—tha t h e ha s n o "right" t o preven t th e railroa d fro m causin g suc h damage—i t i s making th e sam e kin d o f judgment tha t i t make s whe n i t say s that a woma n doe s hav e a propert y righ t i n he r body , i.e. , tha t rape i s a crime . While i t woul d b e ver y nic e t o hav e a complete economi c the ory o f an y field o f law , i t i s hardl y a prerequisit e fo r enterin g the mainstrea m o f lega l theory . Ther e i s a muc h simple r an swer t o Professo r Klevorick' s question . I t i s that ther e ha s bee n very littl e applie d wor k o n th e economic s o f crimina l law—ver y 310

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little attempt , tha t i s t o say , t o appl y th e theor y t o th e specifi c legal doctrine s taugh t i n a crimina l la w clas s o r deploye d i n a judicial opinio n i n a criminal appeal . Yo u ar e no t entitle d t o ex pect economi c originalit y fro m judge s o r practicin g lawyers . Th e lead mus t b e take n b y Professo r Klevoric k an d hi s la w schoo l colleagues. I shoul d ad d tha t I thin k th e incompletenes s tha t Professo r Klevorick observe s i n th e economi c analysi s o f crimina l la w i s of a rathe r periphera l character . Th e crim e o f buyin g vote s o r slaves i s no t likel y t o b e i n th e forefron t o f attentio n eithe r i n a course o n crimina l la w o r i n th e practic e o f crimina l law . Whil e the prohibition s agains t payin g worker s les s tha n th e minimu m wage ar e important , I believ e the y ar e rarel y enforce d b y crim inal sanctions . Som e victimles s crime s tha t Professo r Klevoric k does no t mention , notabl y traffickin g i n narcotics , ar e ver y im portant, an d rais e question s fo r a n economis t becaus e wha t i s being punishe d ar e voluntary , an d henc e presumptivel y wel fare-enhancing, transactions . Bu t mos t suc h crime s ar e mad e s o by legislatio n rathe r tha n b y th e commo n law ; fe w economist s believe an y mor e tha t th e characteristi c produc t o f legislatio n i s welfare-enhancing i n a n economi c sense . Mos t o f th e commo n law crime s are , a s th e economi c analyst s claim , attempt s t o by pass th e marke t i n setting s o f lo w transactio n costs—thef t i n it s myriad form s bein g th e bes t example . Thoug h i n principle , a s Professor Klevoric k point s out , th e victi m rathe r tha n th e ag gressor migh t b e th e "cheape r cos t avoider, " i n Calabresi' s ter minology, i t appear s tha t th e market-bypassin g act s tha t hav e been mad e crimina l ar e primaril y thos e wher e th e victi m i s neve r (or ver y rarely ) th e cheapes t cos t avoider . Othe r harmfu l act s are mor e likel y t o b e governe d b y tor t law , wit h it s concept s o f assumption o f ris k an d contributor y negligenc e tha t facilitat e comparing th e cost s t o potentia l injure r an d t o potentia l victi m of avoidin g injury. 2 The proble m wit h th e economi c analysi s o f crimina l la w i s no t that i t i s incomplet e o r lack s rigorou s philosophica l founda tions, thoug h i t is and does , bu t tha t th e economi c analyst s hav e yet t o tackl e th e principa l concept s tha t troubl e lega l analyst s o f the field—such concept s a s attempt , conspiracy , diminishe d re sponsibility, provocation , insanity , stric t crimina l liability , reck lessness, compulsio n o r necessity , an d premeditation . More -

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over, althoug h I d o no t kno w whethe r Professo r Klevoric k woul d regard crimina l procedur e a s a separat e field (hi s citation o f th e Harris articl e an d Isaa c Ehrlich' s wor k o n capita l punishmen t suggests h e woul d not) , th e procedura l aspect s o f crimina l la w are muc h mor e importan t i n th e practic e o f la w tha n th e sub stantive aspects . Ye t apar t fro m th e debat e ove r th e deterren t effect o f capita l punishment , ther e ha s bee n ver y littl e eco nomic analysi s o f crimina l procedure , thoug h a recen t articl e by Professo r Fran k Easterbroo k suggest s tha t ther e ar e man y promising application s o f economic s t o crimina l procedure. 3 The economi c analysi s o f crimina l la w i s indeed ful l o f prom ise. I t offer s excitin g researc h opportunitie s fo r academi c econ omists intereste d i n la w an d academi c lawyer s intereste d i n eco nomics. I t woul d b e a sham e t o defe r thi s researc h pendin g th e development o f a politica l theor y o f right s tha t command s wid e agreement. NOTES 1. Fo r a brie f an d alread y rathe r outdate d summary , se e Richar d A . Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 2 d ed. , (Boston : Little , Brown, 1977) , chap. 7 . Fo r a n up-to-dat e bibliograph y se e C.G . Veljanovski , The New Law-and-Economics: A Research Review (1982) , pp . 83-87 . Vel janovski mingle s substantiv e crimina l la w an d crimina l procedure ; I shal l hol d the m separat e til l th e en d o f thi s comment . 2. Professo r Willia m Lande s an d I hav e discusse d thi s distinctio n i n the contex t o f intentiona l tort s (man y o f whic h ar e als o crimes) . Se e William M . Lande s an d Richar d A . Posner , "A n Economi c Theor y of Intentiona l Torts, " Int 7 . Rev. L. fcf Econ., (1981) : 127 . 3. Fran k H . Easterbrook , "Crimina l Procedur e a s a Marke t System, " J. Legal Stud. 1 2 (1983) : 289 . Se e als o P.osner , Economi c Analysi s o f Law, chap . 21 .

13 CRIME, KICKERS , AND TRANSACTIO N STRUCTURES JULES L . COLEMA N

These remark s ar e occasione d b y Alvi n Klevorick' s ver y thoughtful chapte r "O n th e Economi c Theor y o f Crime " i n thi s volume. 1 T h e economi c approac h t o law , Klevoric k notes , ha s had a fa r wide r an d deepe r impac t o n area s o f th e privat e law — especially torts , contracts , an d property—tha n i t ha s o n th e criminal law . T h e reason : economi c analysi s simpl y fail s (o r ha s failed s o far ) t o elucidat e centra l feature s o f th e crimina l law . In som e ways , Klevorick' s chapte r attempt s t o identif y th e wea k link i n th e chai n o f economi c reasonin g abou t crime . Klevoric k does no t sto p a t identifyin g wha t h e take s t o b e th e problem ; he offer s a tentativ e solutio n t o it . I n th e end , however , h e finds even aspect s o f hi s solutio n wantin g an d give s a n al l to o brief , but provocative , explanatio n o f wh y all economi c theorie s o f th e criminal la w ar e likel y t o prov e unsatisfying . Just wher e i s th e weaknes s i n th e economi c theor y o f crime ? We ca n begi n b y considerin g wher e th e economi c analysi s o f crime ha s prove n mos t fruitful . I n general , economist s hav e don e well a t settin g optima l penaltie s fo r crimina l conduc t an d a t de termining ho w muc h o f a community' s resource s ough t t o b e spent o n enforcin g crimina l prohibitions . I n bot h endeavors , th e economist take s a s give n tha t a certai n aspec t o r categor y o f conduct ha s bee n designate d criminal . I n th e first instanc e h e 313

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wants t o determin e jus t ho w muc h punishmen t i s necessar y t o reduce t o a n efficien t leve l conduc t tha t ha s bee n indepen dently identifie d a s criminal . I n doin g so , th e economis t relie s on basi c model s o f individua l rationa l choice , usuall y unde r conditions o f uncertainty . T h e crimina l i s a rational utilit y max imizer deciding , amon g othe r things , whethe r o r no t t o engag e in crimina l activity . T h e economist' s concern : give n tha t th e probability o f apprehensio n i s les s tha n one , just wha t penalt y is necessar y t o induc e th e rationa l crimina l t o a lif e beyon d re proach—or a t leas t t o on e mor e o r les s i n confromit y wit h th e dictates o f th e crimina l law . It woul d b e nic e i f w e coul d impos e sanction s o n crimina l mischief suc h tha t th e actor' s expecte d margina l cos t o f engag ing i n criminalit y wa s se t equa l t o hi s expecte d margina l gai n s o that eac h crimina l woul d hav e n o goo d reaso n fo r preferrin g criminal activit y t o a noncrimina l alternative . Th e proble m i s tha t most communitie s canno t affor d th e expenditure s necessar y t o eliminate crim e entirely . S o a communit y mus t determin e jus t how muc h o f it s resource s t o devot e t o th e crimina l justice sys tem. T o th e economist , thi s concer n translate s int o th e ques tion: wha t i s th e optima l us e o f resource s i n controllin g crime ? The answe r depend s o n a numbe r o f variables . Fo r example , suppose a communit y wante d t o pu t a virtual en d t o jaywalking but di d no t wan t overl y t o ta x it s resourc e bas e t o d o so . In stead o f employin g resource s t o increas e th e rat e o f detection , it migh t simpl y impos e a ver y heav y sanctio n o n jaywalking. I f we assum e tha t potentia l jaywalkers ar e risk-neutral , the n the y have jus t a s muc h reaso n t o avoi d a $1,00 0 fine the y ar e un likely t o incu r a s the y hav e t o avoi d a $1 0 fine the y ar e 10 0 time s more likel y t o get. 2 T h e likelihoo d o f bein g apprehende d an d sentenced i s a partia l functio n o f th e amoun t o f mone y th e community i s prepare d t o spen d o n detectin g an d convictin g jaywalkers. S o a reductio n i n expenditure s ma y cal l fo r a n in crease i n th e weigh t o f th e sanction . Bu t the n sanction s fo r thos e apprehended an d sentence d ar e unlikel y t o "fit " th e offence , an d thereby t o depar t fro m th e requiremen t tha t th e penalt y fit th e crime. Thi s departur e fro m th e idea l i s fo r th e economis t a "cost"—the cos t o f injustice—which , however , i s not t o sa y tha t it ough t no t b e reckone d with . Moreover , a s th e "price " o f a n offence increases , th e socia l cos t o f a mistak e i n judgmen t in -

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creases. I t i s on e thin g t o impos e a $ 5 fine mistakenly , anothe r to impos e a lif e sentence . An d a s th e leve l o f expenditur e drops , the likelihoo d o f mistake s increases , thu s furthe r increasin g th e expected socia l cost s o f punishment . Economist s concerne d abou t the allocatio n o f resource s t o th e crimina l justic e syste m ar e concerned primaril y wit h determinin g th e cost s an d benefit s o f various allocatio n decision s i n th e ligh t o f th e kind s o f factor s I have just mentioned . Again , however , par t o f th e fruitfulnes s of thes e effort s i s du e t o th e fac t tha t th e allocatio n decision — the decisio n abou t ho w muc h crim e i s permissible—presup poses a n independentl y define d categor y o f crimina l conduct . According t o Klevorick—an d h e i s surel y right—economi c analysis ha s prove n leas t fruitfu l i n explainin g th e ver y exis tence o f a crimina l category . Wha t economi c reasons , i f any , d o we hav e fo r makin g certai n conduc t criminal ? Pu t anothe r way : there i s a n economi c theor y o f undesirabl e actions—act s whos e costs (howeve r conceived ) outweig h thei r benefit s (howeve r conceived). Thes e ar e action s economist s thin k ough t t o b e cur tailed, limited , or , i n som e cases , i f th e cost s o f doin g s o are no t too high , eliminate d entirely . An y numbe r o f mechanism s fo r reducing th e incidenc e o f sociall y undesirabl e activit y ar e wort h exploring. W e migh t counse l agains t mischief ; o r w e migh t im plore, cajole , persuade , plea d with , eve n be g doer s o f dastardl y deeds t o forebear . W e ca n ostraciz e an d morall y brandish . O r we ca n tax , impos e tor t liability , o r criminalize . Wh y d o w e eve r criminalize? Wh y d o w e se t ou t a categor y o f conduct , desig nate i t a s criminal , an d thereb y subjec t violator s t o a particula r kind o f sanction ? I s ther e a particularl y economi c argumen t fo r our doin g so ? Here i s on e wa y i n whic h economist s hav e though t abou t th e need fo r a crimina l prohibitio n agains t certai n activities . Sup pose A harm s B . Now what ? Shoul d w e preven t futur e A s fro m harming futur e Bs , b y givin g B th e righ t no t t o b e harmed ; o r should w e pu t futur e B s on notic e tha t th e losse s shal l li e wher e they hav e falle n b y givin g A th e righ t t o har m B . T o th e econ omist thi s i s a perfectl y seriou s questio n tha t i s no t easil y an swered. Suppos e i n harmin g B , A cause s B $1 0 wort h o f dam age, bu t b y doin g s o h e secure s $1,00 0 gain . Wer e w e t o prohibi t A fro m harmin g B , B would gai n $1 0 an d A would los e $1,000 .

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This seem s hardl y th e rationa l thin g t o do , fo r fe w o f u s woul d forego a $1,00 0 gai n t o avoi d a $1 0 loss . This suggest s w e shoul d not preven t A fro m harmin g B . Bu t i t seem s equall y wron g t o give A licens e t o har m B wheneve r i t i s t o his , A's , advantag e to d o so . A t thi s poin t perhap s yo u ar e incline d t o sa y th e dif ference betwee n th e origina l exampl e an d th e rationalit y o f a n individual's decisio n no t t o foreg o a larg e gai n t o avoi d a smal l loss i s tha t i n th e forme r cas e w e ar e dealin g wit h tw o persons , not one , eac h o f whom' s autonom y mus t b e respected . I n tha t case, th e economis t ha s a suggestio n tha t shoul d satisf y you . Wh y not giv e B th e righ t no t t o b e harme d b y A , bu t permi t A t o buy fro m B th e righ t t o har m him . The n A wil l har m B , bu t will d o s o a t a mutuall y agree d upo n price . I n effect , wha t w e have don e i s decid e bot h tha t B ha s a righ t no t t o b e harme d by A , an d tha t A ha s a righ t t o har m B a s lon g a s h e secure s B's consent . I n terminolog y tha t ha s bee n widel y accepte d b y economists sinc e th e publicatio n o f th e famou s Calabresi Melamed paper, 3 we have assigned the right to B not to be harmed and protecte d i t b y a property rule. We coul d hav e assigne d B th e righ t no t t o b e harme d b y A and secure d i t i n a differen t way , tha t is , b y a liability rule. I n that case , B woul d hav e a righ t tha t A no t har m him , bu t A would nevertheles s b e fre e t o har m B anyway , provide d h e pai d B compensatio n ex post fo r whateve r damag e hi s harmfu l con duct occasioned . Unde r th e propert y rul e scheme , A an d B mus t reach a n agreemen t ex ante befor e A ca n har m B (ac t contrar y to B' s right) . Unde r th e liabilit y rul e scheme , A nee d secur e n o agreement wit h B . H e ma y ac t a s h e deem s fi t provide d h e i s prepared t o rende r B compensatio n ex post.4 In th e traditiona l economi c analysis , th e poin t o f assignin g and protectin g right s accordin g t o variou s option s i s to encour age individual s t o engag e i n activities a t thei r efficien t levels . Fo r example, suppos e B ha s a righ t protecte d b y a propert y rul e that A no t har m him . I n ou r example , i t woul d b e inefficien t for A no t t o har m B , sinc e b y no t harmin g B ther e i s a ne t los s of $99 0 ( a foregon e opportunit y cos t o f $1,00 0 minu s a saving s of $10) . T h e efficien t resul t o f A harmin g B is secured throug h a marke t transactio n require d b y th e propert y rul e a t B' s dis posal. Sometime s efficien t outcome s canno t b e secure d i f right s are protecte d b y propert y rules . Ther e ar e tw o straightforwar d

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cases t o consider . I n one , th e cost s o f negotiation s ar e high . I f the cost s o f negotiation s exceed s th e differenc e i n th e valu e o f the righ t t o A an d B , the n n o transfe r wil l occur . S o i f i t cost s A an d B $99 1 t o reac h agreemen t ex ante, A woul d hav e t o in cur $100 1 i n cos t fo r somethin g h e value s a t $1000 . Wher e ne gotiations ar e costly , i t i s sometime s necessar y t o substitut e lia bility rule s fo r propert y rules , sinc e th e forme r d o no t requir e ex ante agreements . T h e standar d exampl e i s automobil e acci dent law . Thin k ho w difficul t i t woul d b e t o trac k dow n al l th e individuals yo u migh t pu t a t ris k b y you r driving , le t alon e t o negotiate wit h them . The secon d sor t o f inefficienc y i n propert y rule s arise s fro m strategic behavior . I f B know s tha t th e valu e t o A o f harmin g him i s $1,000 , the n h e i s unlikel y t o settl e fo r $10 . I f A know s that th e valu e o f B' s damage s i s $10 , h e i s likely t o pres s fo r a n agreement tha t give s B no t muc h mor e tha n that . W e hav e i n these negotiation s a bargainin g game : a mixe d game—mixe d because i t involve s a redistributiv e an d a productiv e element . A possible $99 0 o f surplu s exist s t o distribut e provide d agree ment ca n b e reached . Agreemen t t o distribute the surplu s (th e redistributive element ) i s necessar y an d sufficien t t o produce i t (the productiv e element) . I f A o r B hold s ou t fo r a shar e o f th e gains fro m trad e tha t i s unacceptabl e t o th e other , n o transfe r will occu r an d th e outcom e wil l b e inefficient . Onc e again , t o avoid th e pitfall s o f negotiations , liabilit y rule s ma y b e substi tuted fo r propert y rules . We ca n follo w a slightl y different , bu t n o les s standar d lin e of economi c argumen t t o reac h th e sam e poin t i n th e overal l argument. Mos t behavio r ha s externa l effects , calle d "external ities." Th e cos t o f externalitie s ca n eithe r li e wher e the y hav e fallen—on victims—o r b e shifte d t o thos e whos e conduc t occa sions them—injurers . Economist s believ e tha t shiftin g o f losse s provides a powerfu l mechanis m fo r inducin g efficien t behav ior. Fo r example , on e wa y o f inducin g efficienc y b y shiftin g losse s is t o impos e liabilit y o n th e part y whos e conduc t cause s th e ex ternality. Thi s proces s i s calle d "internalizin g externalities; " it s effect i s t o forc e th e injure r t o tak e th e socia l cost s o f hi s con duct int o account . Ronal d Coase' s importan t article , "Th e Prob lem o f Socia l Cost," 5 ma y b e rea d a s demonstratin g tha t certai n conditions suppor t a marke t solutio n t o th e proble m o f exter -

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nalities. I n othe r words , externalitie s ma y b e internalize d b y private negotiation s a s wel l a s b y th e impositio n o f liability . Roughly, th e Coasia n approac h correspond s t o th e Calabresi Melamed propert y rul e approach . I n bot h case s inefficiencie s are eliminate d i n standar d marke t ways . Whe n th e marke t ap proach i s unavailabl e becaus e transactio n cost s ar e hig h o r th e threat o f strategi c behavio r i s substantial , th e liabilit y rul e ap proach i s appropriately substituted . Th e purpos e o f th e liabilit y rule i s t o "mimic " th e marke t solution , tha t is , produc e th e ef ficient resul t th e costles s marke t woul d have . Now wha t doe s al l thi s hav e t o d o wit h crime ? Wh y crimin alize whe n a perfectl y goo d propert y rule/liabilit y rul e structur e for respondin g t o righ t violation s o r t o othe r wrongfu l conduc t is available? I n th e classica l economi c theory , th e crimina l la w i s seen a s a wa y t o induc e individual s t o compl y wit h th e relevan t rules o f transfer , tha t is , to adher e t o th e propert y rule/liabilit y rule distinction , o r t o pursu e marke t solution s t o externalit y problems wher e the y ar e availabl e an d feasible . In orde r t o explor e on e wa y i n whic h economi c analysi s trie s to ti e th e crimina l la w t o th e propert y rule/liabilit y rul e distinc tion, conside r th e situatio n wher e n o marke t solutio n t o a n ex ternality exists . The n th e liabilit y rul e metho d seem s i n order . It differ s fro m th e propert y rul e approac h no t onl y i n term s o f ex ante vs. ex post perspectives, bu t als o becaus e liabilit y rule s rais e the proble m o f detection . I f someon e ha s t o bu y B' s righ t fro m him, h e reveal s hi s identit y t o u s throug h negotiations . Bu t i t anyone, includin g A , ca n simpl y injur e B at will , then h e ha s a n incentive t o avoi d detection , sinc e whethe r o r no t h e ha s t o ren der B compensatio n depend s o n hi s bein g "caught. " Th e prob ability o f detectio n i s les s tha n 1.0 . Therefore , i n orde r t o in duce efficiency , th e penalt y impose d upo n th e injure r mus t ex ceed th e actua l damage s h e causes . Th e actua l damage s h e pay s represents th e tor t o r liabilit y rul e remedy . Th e additiona l pen alty necessar y t o induc e complianc e (becaus e detectio n i s im perfect) i s wha t w e thin k o f a s th e crimina l sanction . In thi s view , th e crimina l la w i s parasiti c upo n tor t law : crime s are define d i n term s primaril y o f torts . Crimina l sanction s ar e "kickers" impose d i n additio n t o tor t liabilit y t o foste r compli ance. Bu t i f thi s i s th e basi s o f th e crimina l law , notic e tha t i t

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would becom e otios e i f detectio n rate s approache d 1.0 . Thi s seems a n implausibl e basi s fo r th e crimina l law—eve n t o econ omists. Let u s tr y somethin g mor e sophisticated . Eithe r ther e i s a market (propert y rule ) solutio n t o suc h a proble m o r ther e i s not. I f ther e i s a marke t solutio n t o a n externalit y problem , the n one reaso n fo r imposin g a crimina l sanctio n i s t o induc e indi viduals t o op t fo r th e marke t solutio n whe n i t is available t o them . So w e criminaliz e theft , fo r example , becaus e thef t involve s a coercive transfe r o f resource s whe n a noncoerciv e one—ex change—is available . Thi s i s basicall y Richar d Posner' s expla nation o f th e crimina l category . T h e crimina l i s someon e wh o chooses a nonmarke t solutio n t o a proble m whe n th e marke t solution i s available , an d th e pena l sanctio n i s intende d t o en courage hi m t o op t fo r th e marke t solution . The Calabresi-Melame d analysi s differ s onl y slightl y fro m Posner's. T h e differenc e i s tha t i n Posner' s vie w liabilit y rule s and propert y rule s ar e use d t o promot e efficienc y only . O n th e Calabresi-Melamed theory , th e rule s promot e a mi x o f socia l goals, includin g efficienc y an d justice . Wit h thi s differenc e i n mind, th e tw o view s procee d i n almos t exactl y th e sam e way . For Calabres i an d Melame d th e crimina l sanctio n i s necessar y because tor t liabilit y b y itsel f woul d i n effec t allo w pertetrator s to chang e propert y rule s int o liabilit y rule s a t will . S o w e pe nalize thef t no t just becaus e ther e i s a marke t alternative—ex change—but becaus e i f w e require d onl y tha t th e thie f pa y damages, we , i n effect , giv e thieve s th e optio n o f no t takin g property rule s seriously . I f a societ y wishe s individual s t o pur sue marke t solution s t o problems , the n i t canno t allo w individ uals th e optio n o f ignorin g th e propert y rule/liabilit y rul e dis tinction. T h e crimina l sanctio n i s th e "kicker " adde d t o kee p individuals fro m changin g propert y rule s int o liabilit y rule s a t will, no t a "kicker " adde d t o th e tor t remed y t o compensat e fo r imperfect detectio n rates . As Klevoric k point s out , however , neithe r Posner' s no r th e Calabresi-Melamed analyse s handl e th e cases . A rul e agains t selling onesel f int o slavery , i n effect , prevent s individual s fro m turning inalienabilit y rule s int o propert y rules . Similarly , a rul e against blackmail , b y preventin g a n individua l wh o own s infor mation fro m exchangin g it , migh t b e aime d a t preventin g tha t

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individual fro m turnin g a n inalienabilit y rul e int o a propert y rule. A societ y migh t impos e tor t liabilit y fo r pollutio n an d no t permit privat e agreement s betwee n th e partie s t o circumven t th e liability decision . I n effect , criminalizin g "buy-offs " woul d pre vent th e relevan t partie s fro m turnin g liabilitie s rule s int o property rules . Wha t thes e example s sho w i s that bot h th e Pos ner an d Calabresi-Melame d suggestion s ar e to o narrow . Pos ner's i s too narro w becaus e h e see s th e crimina l la w a s directin g actors t o marke t solution s whe n thei r cost s ar e acceptabl y low , whereas som e crimina l statute s ma y b e aime d a t prohibitin g market transactions . Calabres i an d Melame d g o astra y b y over emphasizing th e rol e o f th e crimina l la w i n inducin g individu als no t t o tur n propert y rule s int o liabilit y rules , wherea s a t leas t sometimes th e crimina l la w i s aimed a t inducin g individual s no t to tur n liabilit y rule s int o propert y rules . T h e mora l Klevoric k draw s fro m al l thi s i s tha t th e prope r economic analysi s woul d emphasiz e th e crimina l law' s rol e i n enforcing a genera l transactio n structur e rathe r tha n particula r elements o f it . A s Klevoric k put s it : In eac h instance , th e ac t tha t i s characterized a s a crim e in volves th e actor(s ) forcin g societ y t o dea l wit h a transactio n in a way in whic h societ y di d no t wan t t o treat it . What make s the ac t a crim e i s tha t th e individua l assault s th e transac tion structur e tha t ha s bee n establishe d b y society . On e coul d say, alternatively , tha t th e individua l coerce s societ y int o considering an d copin g wit h a n exchang e o r transactio n i n a wa y tha t differ s fro m th e mod e societ y ha d chosen . Fi nally, on e migh t characteriz e th e crimina l a s arrogatin g t o himself th e powe r o r th e authorit y t o determin e a t leas t a part o f th e societa l transactio n structure , tha t is , appro priating t o himsel f a powe r o r righ t tha t societ y ha d re served t o itself . T h e crimina l sanctio n i s the n a sanctio n t o enforce th e transactio n structur e tha t societ y ha s chose n a s well a s t o compensat e fo r th e harm s t o individual s withi n the society. 6 These ar e ver y suggestiv e remark s indeed . Notice , however , that Klevoric k take s th e basi c insigh t o f Posne r an d Calabres i and Melame d t o b e correct : namely , tha t th e crimina l la w i s de-

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fined i n term s o f offence s independentl y characterize d else where i n th e law , tha t i t serve s t o redirec t conduc t t o compl y with requirement s se t fort h elsewher e i n th e la w (the propert y rule/liability rul e distinction) , an d tha t th e crimina l la w is con cerned largel y wit h th e transfer o f resource s amon g individual s in a society . Klevorick' s contributio n i s to generaliz e fro m par ticular inducement s withi n a give n transactio n structur e t o th e transaction structur e itself . Next , wha t Klevoric k add s t o th e traditional account s i s a "moral " vocabular y o f "assault, " "coer cion," an d "arrogatio n o f power " tha t h e claim s i s essentia l t o the characterizatio n o f crimina l conduct , bu t whic h i s i n fac t nowhere implie d o r eve n suggeste d b y th e discussio n t o tha t point. I n m y ora l commentary , I suggeste d tha t w e migh t de scribe wha t th e crimina l doe s a s actin g "contrar y t o th e trans action structure, " thu s removin g th e essentiall y mora l feature s of th e characterizatio n o f criminality . Klevoric k appear s t o accept m y point , bu t underestimate s it , fo r ther e i s all the differ ence i n th e worl d betwee n characterizin g crimina l behavio r a s action contrar y t o a prevailin g transactio n structur e an d a s a n assault agains t i t o r a s involving a n arrogatio n o f powers . Klevorick's clai m i s tha t th e economi c analysi s o f crim e i s essentially unsatisfyin g t o th e exten t i t doe s no t adequatel y ex plain th e crimina l categor y itself . Hi s particula r objection s t o th e Posner an d Calabresi-Melame d account s ar e o f tw o sorts . T h e first i s tha t th e previou s wor k emphasize s th e rol e o f th e crim inal la w i n providin g particula r inducements—usuall y t o mar ket behavio r o r t o respecting propert y rules—wherea s th e prope r account woul d se e th e crimina l la w a s a mechanis m fo r secur ing a n entir e transactio n structure . T o th e exten t tha t thi s i s Klevorick's view , i t is an essentiall y economi c one . Klevorick's othe r objection , th e on e I believ e h e take s t o b e the mor e important , i s that a n accoun t o f th e criminal categor y involves a n essentiall y noneconomi c normativ e vocabulary : tha t of assault , coercion , arrogatio n o f power ; tha t whil e i t ma y b e possible t o giv e a n economi c analysi s o f thes e concepts , suc h a n account i s likel y t o b e artifical , uninformative , an d ultimatel y unconvincing. Klevorick' s argumen t rest s o n describin g th e criminal's behavio r i n thes e morall y charge d terms , an d ther e is nothin g i n th e argumen t tha t support s suc h a characteriza tion. Ca n anyon e seriousl y believ e tha t a jaywalker, aut o thief ,

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rapist, o r embezzle r i s essentiall y involve d i n a struggl e ove r fundamental politica l powe r an d authority—takin g upo n him self a powe r tha t i s legitimatel y th e state's—o r tha t i t i s neces sary t o ou r characterizin g hi s conduc t a s a crim e tha t w e de scribe i t a s such ? Fo r on e reaso n o r another—usuall y persona l gain—individuals sometime s ac t contrar y t o th e rule s o f th e game. It' s a s simpl e a s that . Klevorick tacitl y recognize s tha t h e build s to o muc h int o hi s characterization o f crimina l conduct , becaus e h e shift s hi s ob jection t o th e economi c analysi s fro m th e moralit y o f th e actor' s assault agains t th e transactio n structur e t o question s o f th e le gitimacy o f th e transactio n structur e itself : . . . one coul d simpl y sa y tha t th e crimina l act s contrar y t o the transactio n structur e societ y ha d established . Bu t th e critical observatio n i s tha t th e explicatio n o f wh y som e act s are crime s whil e other s ar e no t require s a n inquir y int o th e legitimation o f th e transactio n structure . I f force s on e t o confront question s like : wh y doe s th e collectivit y hav e th e right t o decid e th e term s o n whic h particula r transaction s will tak e plac e unde r differen t circumstances ? Wh y d o som e rights resid e i n th e individua l whil e other s res t wit h th e state? 7 No doub t thes e ar e goo d questions , bu t the y d o no t bea r o n the explanatio n o f th e existenc e o f a crimina l category . Rather , they ar e question s abou t th e legitimac y o f th e rule s societ y lay s down t o gover n transactions . The y ar e essentiall y normative , no t analytic. Presumabl y a societ y coul d decid e t o criminaliz e con duct eve n i f th e rule s i t set s fort h t o gover n transaction s wer e not ultimatel y defensible . I n suc h a cas e w e woul d b e incline d to sa y tha t th e crimina l la w wa s being unjustl y o r wrongl y used , and tha t punishmen t fo r violation s o f it s prohibitions woul d no t be justified. Bu t w e migh t nevertheles s hav e n o difficult y i n ex plaining i n purel y economi c term s (o f th e transaction-structur e sort) wh y tha t societ y foun d i t necessar y t o hav e a crimina l law . In short , Klevorick' s argument , thoug h thoughtfu l an d provoc ative, doe s no t mov e th e economi c analysi s muc h beyon d it s previous frontier . As a n economist , Klevoric k i s take n b y th e transactio n struc -

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ture analysis . Hi s effort s t o explai n th e missin g ingredien t i n the economi c accoun t tak e th e transactio n structur e mode l a s basically correc t an d see k t o augment i t either b y explaining th e criminal categor y i n term s o f th e mora l o r politica l natur e o f the criminal' s conduc t ("assault, " "coercion, " o r "arrogatio n o f power"), o r i n term s o f th e legitimac y o f th e transactio n struc ture itself . Effort s o f th e first sor t involv e a lea p no t warrante d by th e evidence . Thos e o f th e secon d sor t confus e th e proble m of explainin g th e crimina l categor y wit h th e proble m o f justi fying particula r instance s o f it . For al l that , I agre e wit h Klevoric k tha t th e economi c analysi s of crim e give s a les s tha n convincin g accoun t o f th e crimina l category. T h e rea l problem , however , i s tha t i t i s simpl y a mis take t o thin k o f th e crimina l la w a s a n enforce r o f resourc e transfers. Moreover , th e ke y mora l notion s o f crimina l respon sibility—of guil t an d fault—ar e simpl y absen t fro m th e eco nomic infrastructure . Le t m e clos e b y sayin g somethin g brie f an d sketchy o n behal f o f bot h o f thes e points . First, th e economi c theor y goe s wron g b y seein g th e crimina l law primaril y a s a mechanis m fo r securin g a transactio n struc ture. A goo d dea l o f th e crimina l la w ha s nothin g t o d o wit h transactions o r th e transfe r o f resources . What , fo r example , d o murder, rape , an d treaso n hav e t o d o wit h th e exchang e o r th e transfer o f resources ? Conside r tw o cases . I n on e case , B an d A reac h a n agreemen t ex ante whereby A wil l kil l B in exchang e for whic h A wil l pa y a substantia l su m t o B' s family . I t i s "plau sible" in thi s cas e t o describ e th e prohibitio n agains t suc h agree ments a s a refusa l t o permi t individual s t o tur n inalienabilit y rule s into propert y rules . One' s righ t no t t o b e murdere d canno t b e bargained away ; i t i s inalienable . I n th e othe r case , A simpl y murders B . Presumably , wha t A di d constitute s a crime . No w i t cannot possibl y b e th e explanatio n o f th e crim e o f murde r tha t were murde r no t a crim e w e woul d b e allowin g individual s t o turn propert y rule s int o liabilit y rules , sinc e th e previou s cas e demonstrates tha t th e righ t no t t o b e murdere d i s no t pro tected b y a propert y rule , bu t b y a n inalienabilit y rul e instead . Nor ca n w e describ e i t a s a n effor t t o preven t offender s fro m turning inalienabilit y rule s int o liabilit y rule s a t thei r discretion , since th e poin t o f inalienabilit y rule s i s tha t the y limi t th e free -

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dom o f thos e wh o posses s right s fro m bargainin g the m awa y either ex ante o r ex post, i.e. , whethe r b y contrac t o r b y compen sation ex post. 9. Consider rape . Ca n anyon e seriousl y argu e tha t rap e i s crim inal becaus e otherwis e individual s hav e th e optio n o f changin g property rule s int o liabilit y rules ? Wha t coul d possibl y b e th e market (o r propert y rule ) equivalen t o f rape ? Sex ? Se x plu s dominance? I f i t i s either , the n ho w d o w e mak e sens e o f th e prohibition agains t prostitution , tha t is , a prohibitio n agains t placing certai n exchange s i n th e marketplace ? I s i t plausible , therefore, t o thin k o f i t a s a n effor t t o induc e peopl e no t t o tur n inalienability rule s int o propert y rules ? Wha t i s the righ t tha t i s said t o b e protecte d b y a n inalienabilit y rule : th e righ t t o one' s sexual organs ? Presumabl y tha t righ t entail s contro l ove r one' s organs an d thei r use . I t ma y b e tha t on e canno t relinquis h ul timate contro l o f one' s se x organs—thoug h eve n tha t ma y b e false—but on e ca n surel y negotiat e thei r us e i n al l sort s o f con texts. T h e crimina l la w i s a se t o f prohibitions—mandator y le gal requirements . An d i t is a very impoverishe d vie w o f th e rang e of huma n interactio n tha t analyze s al l suc h constraint s o n be havior i n term s o f directive s base d exclusivel y o n exchang e re lations. Second, th e crimina l la w state s lega l requirement s an d pro hibitions, no t prices . T h e economis t misse s importan t feature s of th e crimina l la w b y conceivin g o f i t a s a pricin g mechanism . The crimina l la w set s ou t prohibition s tha t ar e themselve s per fectly intelligible , an d mean t t o serv e a s guide s t o behavio r quit e apart fro m sanction s fo r noncomplianc e bein g attache d t o them . The sanctio n i s o f secondar y importanc e an d come s int o effec t only whe n th e crimina l la w fail s sufficientl y t o dete r behavior . It i s wrong t o murder , t o rape , o r t o assault , an d societ y i s righ t to prohibi t suc h conduct , whethe r o r no t th e prohibitio n i s backed b y a threa t o f sanction . S o i t i s fundamentall y mistake n to tr y t o understan d th e crimina l categor y b y tryin g t o explai n the use s t o whic h on e ca n pu t th e crimina l sanction . Klevorick i s i n fac t neithe r alon e no r firs t amon g economist s in tryin g t o explai n th e crimina l categor y b y a mixtur e o f eco nomic an d mora l terms . Eve n Posner' s analysi s ha s a n essentia l moral dimension . Hi s vie w i s that th e mai n reaso n w e punis h i s to induc e criminal s t o substitute , wher e the y ar e available , vol -

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untary marke t transaction s fo r coerciv e transfers . Sinc e i t i s a n empirical questio n whethe r voluntar y transfer s ar e mor e effi cient tha n involuntar y ones , th e ground s fo r preferrin g marke t to nonmarke t transfer s i s th e mora l one—th e valu e o f volun tary ove r coerciv e transfer . Posner i s close r t o th e wa y w e ordinaril y thin k abou t crim e when h e put s th e argumen t i n term s o f crimina l conduc t (usu ally) bein g coercive : on e part y imposin g hi s o r he r wil l o n an other. O f course , no t al l crim e involve s a perso n actin g con trary t o th e wil l o f another . I n som e case s ther e ar e n o victim s in thi s sense ; i n others , a n activit y ma y b e crimina l eve n i f th e "victim" consents . Wher e crimina l la w i s concerne d wit h coer cion, i t i s concerne d wit h a n individual' s coercio n agains t oth ers, no t th e sor t o f coercio n agains t a n institutiona l arrange ment o f th e sor t Klevoric k ha s i n mind . Striking i n bot h Posne r an d Klevorick' s analyse s i s th e ab sence o f a discussio n o f th e condition s o f responsibilit y a s a re quirement o f crimina l liability . I f th e crimina l la w i s simpl y a mechanism fo r inducin g complianc e wit h a transactio n struc ture, wh y th e enormou s emphasi s o n guil t a s a conditio n fo r imposing th e sanction ? Indeed , wh y th e crimina l sanctio n a s w e know it ? Why , i n othe r words , d o incarceratio n an d th e depri vation o f libert y see m appropriat e response s t o crimina l mis conduct, i f th e purpos e o f th e crimina l la w i s t o encourag e re spect fo r a transactio n structure ? Perhap s a cours e i n economic s would b e a mor e suitabl e "punishment. " The crimina l sanctio n i s no t impose d unles s fairl y rigi d stan dards o f persona l responsibilit y o r culpabilit y ar e met . Wit h fe w exceptions involvin g stric t liability , thes e standard s ar e mor e rigi d than thos e require d t o impos e tor t liability . Thi s emphasi s o n individual culpabilit y canno t b e explaine d i n term s o f th e "in ducement" functio n o f th e crimina l law . I f a body o f la w canno t serve it s inducemen t o r deterren t functio n unles s individual s have availabl e t o the m a wid e rang e o f possibl e excusin g con ditions, the n tor t law , a s wel l a s th e la w o f crimes , shoul d b e replete wit h discussion s o f excusin g conditions . A s w e know , tor t law doe s no t recogniz e a wid e rang e o f excuses , bu t th e la w o f crimes does . Moreover , stric t liabilit y i s rar e i n crimina l law , an d a genera l theor y o f stric t crimina l liabilit y ha s neve r bee n seri ously advanced . I n contrast , i n tort s stric t liabilit y i s o n th e in -

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crease, an d eve n th e rul e o f faul t liabilit y ha s severa l dimen sions o f stric t liabilit y embedde d i n it . Fo r example , i n negligenc e law, a n individua l ma y b e a t faul t fo r th e har m hi s conduc t oc casions eve n i f hi s failur e t o compl y wit h standar d o f du e car e is no t hi s fault : eve n i f h e di d th e bes t h e could . Negligenc e (i n torts), a s th e jurisprude Terr y pointe d ou t sevent y year s ago , i s "conduct, no t a stat e o f mind. " Indeed , i t i s the essentiall y non moral characte r o f negligenc e i n tort s tha t ha s le d economist s like Posne r t o develo p a plausibl e economi c analysi s of tort s base d on Learne d Hand' s famou s characterizatio n o f negligenc e i n U.S. v. Carrol Towing. I t i s precisel y th e essentiall y mora l aspec t o f the condition s o f responsibilit y i n th e crimina l la w tha t make s an economi c analysi s o f i t s o fundamentall y implausible . Put anothe r way : i n crime s th e questio n i s whethe r th e stat e has th e righ t t o depriv e a particula r perso n o f hi s libert y b y in carcerating him . I n torts , i t i s whethe r th e stat e ha s sufficien t grounds fo r shiftin g a los s fro m th e part y upo n who m i t ha s initially falle n t o anothe r individual , whe n th e los s mus t fal l o n one o r th e othe r o f them . I n th e firs t case , th e stat e mus t b e satisfied tha t th e individua l deserves to b e punished . I n th e sec ond, i t mus t fee l tha t ther e ar e goo d reason s a s betwee n tw o parties (on e o f who m i s boun d t o b e mad e wors e off ) t o hav e one rathe r tha n th e othe r shoulde r th e costs . N o equivalen t sit uation exist s i n th e crimina l law . There i s no individua l wh o mus t be punished—whos e libert y mus t b e constrained ; ther e i s n o los s or cos t tha t mus t b e bor n b y somebody . So , i n orde r fo r th e state t o tak e th e extraordinar y ste p o f imposin g thi s burde n o n someone, i t mus t sho w tha t i n som e sens e h e deserve s it . Tha t argument require s a n inquir y no t onl y int o wha t a perso n does , but hi s responsibilit y an d guil t i n havin g don e it . Thes e ar e es sential feature s o f th e crimina l la w an d i t i s no t surprisin g tha t an economi c analysi s o f crime s tha t focuse s o n th e inducemen t aspect o f th e crimina l la w i n term s o f securin g complianc e wit h transfer mechanis m shoul d mis s i t entirely . Suc h a theor y ha s no plac e fo r th e mora l sentiment s an d virtue s appropriat e t o matters o f crim e an d punishment : guilt , shame , remorse , for giveness, an d mercy , t o nam e a few . A purel y economi c theor y of crim e ca n onl y impoveris h rathe r tha n enric h ou r under standing o f th e natur e o f crime. 9

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NOTES 1. Se e chapte r 1 1 i n thi s volume . 2. Ris k neutra l actor s ar e concerne d onl y wit h expecte d outcome s an d are indifferen t amon g outcome s wit h th e sam e expecte d value , re gardless o f th e likelihoo d o f th e outcomes' s occurence . 3. Guid o Calabres i an d Dougla s Melamed , "Propert y Rules , Liabilit y Rules an d Inalienability : On e Vie w o f th e Cathedral " Harv. L. Rev. 85 (1972) . 4. On e reaso n I hav e alway s bee n trouble d b y th e Calabresi-Melame d approach i s tha t i f a righ t i s secure d b y a propert y rule , the n whe n one negotiate s successfull y wit h th e righ t beare r fo r i t ther e i s n o sense i n whic h th e bargaine r act s contrary to th e righ t bearer' s en titlement; wherea s unde r a liability rul e th e actio n i s contrary t o th e right bearer' s entitlemen t period, an d i t make s n o matte r tha t th e intruder render s compensatio n ex post. It strike s m e a s simpl y confuse d t o se e liabilit y rule s a s entitlin g injurers t o purchas e a t thei r wil l "parts " o f (anothe r ver y peculia r notion) th e right s o f others . I t i s har d t o conceiv e o f a n individua l as havin g a freedo m tha t consist s o f nothin g othe r tha n hi s actin g contrary t o th e right s o f others . Normall y w e woul d thin k o f suc h action a s prim a faci e wron g an d i n nee d o f justification. Th e roo t of th e proble m i s tha t advocate s o f th e Calabresi-Melame d dichot omy as k th e notio n o f a liabilit y rul e t o d o to o muc h work , muc h of i t internall y inconsistent : ho w ca n w e conceiv e o f a liabilit y rul e as a protecto r o f one' s right s t o th e securit y o f one' s holdin g an d a t the sam e tim e a s a vehicl e tha t enable s other s t o ac t contrar y t o th e duties thos e right s ar e presume d t o entail ? 5. Ronal d Coase , "Th e Proble m o f Socia l Cost,"/ . Law and Economics, 3 (1960) . 6. Klevorick , unde r "Th e Inheren t Limitatio n o f An y Economi c The ory o f Crime. " 7. Ibid . 8. I n othe r words , th e ver y ide a o f turnin g a n inalienabilit y rul e int o a liabilit y rul e ma y b e incoherent . Inalienabilit y rule s ar e aime d a t restricting th e freedo m o f thos e wh o hav e rights , no t thos e whos e conduct interfere s wit h rights . S o ther e i s a sens e i n whic h i t i s im possible fo r a n offende r t o ac t contrar y t o a n inalienabilit y rule ; onl y one whos e right s ar e protecte d b y a n inalienabilit y rul e ca n d o tha t by, fo r example , tradin g one' s rights—tha t is , b y tryin g t o tur n a n inalienability rul e int o a propert y rule . 9. Le t m e summariz e wha t I tak e t o b e th e difference s amon g Posner , Calabresi-Melamed, an d Klevorick . Posne r see s th e crimina l sanc tion a s a devic e t o induc e marke t behavio r whe n i t i s available. Th e

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Calabresi-Melamed approac h woul d see m t o b e th e sam e i n s o fa r as th e crimina l sanctio n i s see n a s appropriat e t o preven t peopl e from turnin g propert y rule s int o liabilit y rules : i.e. , crimina l sanc tions induc e complianc e wit h marke t alternatives . However , Posne r and Calabresi-Melame d d o differ . Th e latte r emphasiz e no t onl y th e inducement t o marke t alternatives , bu t th e nee d fo r individual s t o respect th e importanc e o f th e distinctio n betwee n liabilit y rule s an d property rules . I t i s no t s o muc h a commitmen t t o th e market—a s it i s i n Posner—tha t warrant s a crimina l category , a s muc h a s i t i s commitment t o th e importanc e o f a distinctio n draw n b y th e publi c power amon g th e rule s o f transfer . Klevoric k build s o n bot h ele ments o f th e Calabresi-Melame d approach : th e framewor k o f transaction an d th e importanc e o f publi c power . Fo r th e Calabresi Melamed distinctio n betwee n liabilit y an d propert y rule s Klevoric k substitutes a "transactio n structure; " fo r th e argumen t tha t th e criminal sanctio n i s warrante d t o suppor t tha t structure , Klevoric k substitutes th e clai m tha t i t i s warrante d becaus e otherwis e individ ual perpetrator s arrogate authority tha t i s no t their' s t o exercise .

14 IS THERE A N ECONOMI C THEOR Y O F CRIME? STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFE R

Professor Klevorick' s interestin g an d instructiv e chapte r direct s our attentio n t o tw o importan t questions . First , i s th e vas t eco nomic literatur e o n crimina l justic e matter s grounde d i n a co herent economi c theor y o f crime ? Second , doe s it s valu e de pend o n it s bein g s o grounded ? Klevoric k conclude s tha t a n economic theor y o f crim e i s inherentl y incomplete . Suc h a the ory mus t dra w upo n politica l concept s tha t i n th e natur e o f thing s cannot b e derive d fro m a n economi c source. 1 Klevoric k goe s o n to sugges t tha t economist s shoul d enlarg e thei r model s t o allo w for a noneconomi c concep t o f th e socia l los s fro m crime . Klevorick's suggestio n ma y sav e th e economist s fro m wha t is , by thei r ow n criteria , a mistake , bu t wil l i t suffic e t o rende r thei r work mor e interestin g o r mor e helpfu l t o crimina l justice schol ars wh o ar e no t economists ? Hi s analysi s seem s t o impl y tha t although a n economi c analysi s o f crim e ca n b e helpfu l i n cer tain ways , that kin d o f analysi s canno t i n th e ver y natur e o f thing s speak t o th e mos t fundamenta l concern s o f student s o f crimina l This pape r wa s presente d a t th e January 198 3 meeting o f th e America n Societ y for Politica l an d Lega l Philosoph y a s commentar y o n Alvi n Klevorick' s paper . I a m gratefu l fo r th e comment s o f participant s a t th e meeting , especiall y Jule s Coleman an d Alvi n Klevorick , fo r th e researc h assistanc e an d substantiv e com ments o f John Summers , an d fo r suppor t i n revisin g th e pape r fro m th e Insti tute fo r La w an d Economic s a t th e Universit y o f Pennsylvania .

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justice. Ca n thi s reall y b e so ? O r ca n economi c analysi s b e o f genuine interes t t o crimina l justice scholars ? The first poin t t o b e mad e i s tha t i n wonderin g abou t th e failure o f economist s t o engag e th e mai n interest s o f crimina l law scholars, Klevoric k ha s devote d nearl y al l of hi s attentio n t o only on e sid e o f th e potentia l intellectua l exchange . A s perhap s befits a n economis t wh o i s bot h rigorou s an d tactful , Klevoric k has carefull y probe d th e wor k o f hi s ow n colleague s i n econom ics, but ha s abstaine d fro m questionin g whethe r th e fundamen tal concerns o f crimina l justice scholar s ough t t o be define d an d confined i n th e wa y tha t the y are . Crimina l la w scholarshi p is , of course , ver y muc h preoccupie d wit h workin g ou t notion s o f culpability an d fairnes s ( I wil l hav e mor e t o sa y abou t thi s later) , but thi s bod y o f scholarshi p i s b y an d larg e no t particularl y concerned wit h question s o f optima l resourc e allocation . Ver y few la w teachers , I a m sure , spen d an y tim e i n thei r crimina l law cours e talkin g abou t th e relativ e effectivenes s o f automo bile patro l versu s foo t patro l o r o f on e office r i n th e ca r versu s two. Precisel y becaus e thi s i s perceive d a s "only " a questio n o f resource allocation, 2 i t is not o n thei r agenda . Fo r th e sam e rea son, th e relativ e effectivenes s o f increasin g th e certaint y o r in creasing th e severit y o f punishmen t woul d no t normall y b e considered a n "interesting " question; 3 i t woul d becom e inter esting t o th e mainstrea m crimina l justic e schola r onl y whe n i t involved question s o f proportionality , distributiv e justice, an d th e like. But i s th e crimina l la w schola r reall y justifie d i n hi s o r he r disinterest i n matter s o f resourc e allocatio n a s such ? I canno t help bu t thin k tha t th e myopi a o f man y crimina l la w teacher s is at leas t partiall y responsibl e fo r th e failur e o f communicatio n that Klevoric k describes . Withou t ignorin g th e gran d issue s o f moral culpability , lega l scholar s mus t als o accep t tha t th e prob lem o f protectin g societ y fro m crim e whil e protectin g offender s from unnecessaril y stringen t sanctions , tha t is , th e proble m o f optimal resourc e allocation , i s centra l t o th e wor k the y shoul d be doing . Thus , th e wor k an d interest s o f man y crimina l justice scholars i s seriousl y incomplete . Thoug h I wil l no t tr y t o pur sue thi s poin t an y furthe r here , thi s incompletenes s need s t o b e borne i n min d i f Klevorick' s criticism s o f th e economist s ar e t o be kep t i n perspective .

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For no w I wil l return t o th e incompletenes s tha t Klevoric k finds on th e economists ' sid e an d attemp t t o asses s t o wha t exten t i t impairs th e valu e o f th e economi c approach . Thi s questio n wil l lead m e t o other s becaus e o f it s implication tha t crimina l justice may diffe r fro m othe r area s o f law , wher e economi c analysi s ha s engaged th e interest s o f man y lega l scholars . I n concludin g tha t there cannot b e a purel y economi c theor y o f crime , Klevoric k has lef t u s wit h a dilemm a tha t I wil l formulat e a s I proceed . T H E EXISTENC E O F TH E CRIMINA L CATEGOR Y

Where, i f anywhere , ca n economi c analysi s b e illuminatin g o r useful? Klevoric k identifie s thre e theme s i n th e literature . T h e one tha t h e see s a s mos t fundamenta l (an d mos t fundamentall y flawed) draw s upo n economi c analysi s t o explai n th e existenc e of th e crimina l category . Richar d Posne r pursue s thi s theme . I t is no t clear , however , tha t Posne r i s attemptin g a comprehen sive accoun t o f th e existenc e o f th e crimina l category . H e i s un characteristically vagu e o n thi s point. 4 Bu t Posne r doe s impl y that th e categor y o f unlawfu l behavio r ordinaril y wil l includ e the resor t t o nonmarke t transaction s wher e efficien t marke t transactions ar e feasible , an d h e als o attempt s t o sho w tha t ef ficient "pricing " o f suc h behavio r ordinaril y wil l require a pena l sanction i n additio n t o othe r remedies . Klevoric k offer s severa l examples t o sho w tha t thi s wil l no t do—societ y migh t an d sometimes doe s choos e t o prohibi t th e resor t t o marke t trans actions (e.g. , th e sellin g o f vote s an d huma n slavery) . Posne r might hav e a n economi c explanatio n fo r som e o f thes e prohi bitions, bu t Klevoric k i s surel y righ t i n sayin g tha t man y crime s are no t readil y explaine d i n Posner' s terms , o r i n thos e o f Cal ebresi-Melamed (cite d an d discusse d below) . I find i t a t leas t equall y instructiv e t o tes t th e Posne r an d Cal abresi-Melamed explanation s o f th e crimina l categor y fro m th e other direction—tha t is , b y askin g whethe r the y cal l fo r crimi nal punishmen t o f behavio r tha t societ y i n fac t choose s t o trea t as noncriminal . A righ t t o contractua l performanc e ordinaril y is protecte d onl y b y a liabilit y rul e (tha t is , a righ t t o collec t damages). Ye t i n thi s situatio n a marke t transactio n fo r modi fication o r recissio n i s quit e feasible, 5 an d thu s th e Posne r an d Calabresi-Melamed criteri a see m t o requir e grantin g th e prom -

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isee th e protectio n o f a propert y rul e (tha t is , a righ t t o specifi c performance). 6 Thos e criteri a als o appea r t o requir e backin g u p that propert y rul e wit h th e adde d "kicker " o f pena l sanctions . In othe r words , thi s kin d o f economi c analysi s lead s t o th e con clusion tha t deliberat e breac h o f contrac t i s (or shoul d be ) treate d as a crime . O f course , societ y doe s no t an d shoul d no t d o an y such thing. 7 Klevorick trie s t o avoid thes e problem s b y modifyin g th e Pos ner an d Calabresi-Melame d explanation s o f crime . Crimina l sanctions, Klevoric k suggests , ar e no t designe d t o channe l transactions int o th e marke t wher e feasibl e (o r efficient) , bu t rather serv e t o enforc e whateve r transaction s structur e societ y has chosen—marke t o r nonmarket . O f course , thi s mov e i s un attractive t o Posner , becaus e th e determinin g factor s becom e noneconomic. Bu t th e terminolog y a t leas t remain s economic , and thi s approac h coul d therefor e preserv e fo r th e economis t a useful , thoug h mor e humbl e role . I hav e tw o set s o f concern s abou t economi c explanation s o f the crimina l category , an d m y concern s ma y exten d eve n t o Klevorick's intriguin g reformulation . T h e firs t concer n i s tha t too often , th e la w fail s t o stipulat e a single , well-define d trans actions structur e fo r particula r exchang e situations . Th e sec ond concer n i s tha t eve n wher e th e transaction s structur e i s wellspecified, on e to o ofte n fail s t o observ e th e predicte d relianc e on pena l la w t o enforc e tha t structure . Let m e elaborat e o n thes e tw o concerns , startin g wit h th e first. Klevorick's approac h require s tha t analysi s begi n b y identifyin g the particula r sociall y approve d transaction s structur e "tha t stipulates th e term s o n whic h particula r transaction s o r ex changes ar e t o tak e plac e unde r differen t circumstances." 8 So cial an d lega l rule s sometime s d o generat e a single , well-speci fied transactio n structur e fo r sufficientl y particularize d exchang e situations, bu t ver y often , i n th e case s tha t interes t us , n o singl e "transactions structure " i s uniquel y specified . Whil e I a m driv ing o n th e highway , i s m y entitlemen t t o bodil y integrit y pro tected b y a n inalienabilit y rule , a propert y rule , o r a liabilit y rule ? One migh t wan t t o sa y tha t th e answe r depend s o n th e natur e of th e interference . I f anothe r motoris t deliberatel y collide s wit h my car , thi s i s an intentiona l interference , an d i n thi s cas e I a m protected b y a n inalienabilit y rule : intentional interferenc e i s ab-

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solutely prohibited , a crim e eve n i f don e wit h m y consent . Reckless interferenc e arguabl y coul d b e place d i n th e sam e cat egory. Bu t merel y negligen t interference , on e want s t o say , i s protected onl y b y a liabilit y rule— I ca n recove r onl y a sociall y determined valu e a s damages . T h e difficult y her e i s that i n fac t even th e negligen t interferenc e i s absolutely prohibited ; societ y still treat s i t a s a crime. 9 Indeed , sinc e th e ac t remain s a crim e even i f don e wit h m y consen t o r voluntar y assumptio n o f th e risk, 10 w e woul d hav e t o sa y tha t th e transactio n i s structure d by a n inalienabilit y rule , eve n thoug h th e civi l courts woul d gran t only a damage s remed y a t most . If w e introduc e furthe r change s int o th e "terms " o f th e ex change situation , w e ca n find circumstance s i n whic h th e civi l courts woul d no t gran t eve n a righ t t o damages . Suppos e tha t the interferenc e occur s despit e th e exercis e o f du e care , o r tha t there i s a negligen t interferenc e t o whic h I contribut e b y m y own negligence . I n bot h case s I canno t recove r damages ; i n a sense I d o no t hav e a protecte d entitlemen t a t all . Nonetheless , in bot h case s th e interferenc e coul d b e a crime. 11 Thus , fro m the perspectiv e o f pena l la w a n exchang e transactio n ca n b e structured b y a n inalienabilit y rul e (o r a t leas t a propert y rule) , while th e sam e highl y particularize d transactio n can , fro m th e perspective o f civi l law , b e structure d b y a liabilit y rul e o r in deed b y a rul e o f n o entitlemen t a t all . To o often , ther e ap pears t o b e n o uniquel y specifie d transaction s structure . My secon d concer n relate s t o th e Posne r an d Calabresi-Me lamed notio n tha t wher e w e d o hav e a coheren t transaction s structure, th e pena l la w ca n b e see n a s a devic e fo r efficientl y enforcing complianc e wit h tha t structure . T o tes t thi s notio n w e must conside r case s i n whic h societ y doe s protec t th e entitle ment b y a n unambiguou s righ t t o specifi c performance . A rea l estate sale s contrac t provide s on e commo n example ; m y righ t to withhol d m y watc h fro m a would-b e thie f i s another . Th e Posner an d Calabresi-Melame d criteri a see m t o requir e backin g up thes e propert y rule s wit h a criminal sanction . Otherwise , th e argument runs , th e propert y rul e coul d b e "change d a t wil l int o [a] liabilit y rule." 1 2 T h e argumen t seem s plausible , bu t it s logi c is no t tight . Ho w doe s th e defaultin g promiso r (o r thief ) con vert a propert y rul e int o a liabilit y rule ? T h e court s i n a civi f action wil l no t simpl y awar d damage s bu t wil l gran t specifi c

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performance (o r replevin , i n th e cas e o f stole n goods) . Thus , whatever th e pena l la w ma y provide , th e propert y rul e remain s a propert y rule , an d th e civi l court s ar e no t limite d t o mer e li ability-rule protection . According fo r uncertaintie s o f apprehensio n doe s no t alte r this criticis m o f th e economi c approach . T h e Posne r an d Cala bresi-Melamed critieri a cal l fo r th e adde d "kicker " o f pena l sanctions eve n whe n th e probabilit y o f apprehensio n ap proaches on e (a s it ordinaril y doe s i n th e rea l estat e case). 13 Bu t in fact , th e crimina l sanctio n i s muc h mor e sparingl y used ; i n such case s societ y usuall y choose s t o preserv e th e integrit y o f it s property rule s simpl y b y permittin g the m t o b e enforce d i n civi l actions. Conversely , wher e probabilitie s o f apprehensio n ar e low , the dange r i s no t tha t propert y rule s wil l b e converte d int o lia bility rule s bu t rathe r tha t th e uncaugh t thie f wil l elud e bot h the replevi n remed y and a damag e judgment. 1 4 Thus , pena l sanctions ar e use d t o punis h som e violation s o f th e transaction s structure, bu t the y ar e no t use d consistentl y enough , i n th e way s that th e Posne r an d Calabresi-Melame d analysi s woul d predict . One ha s t o wonder , o f course , whethe r th e tw o kind s o f anomalies I hav e mentione d sugges t incoherenc e i n th e trans actions structur e approac h o r whethe r instea d the y sugges t in coherence i n th e la w itself . A n economis t certainl y migh t re gard muc h o f th e la w o f remedie s a s inconsistent , inefficient , and eve n irrational . T h e seemin g incoherenc e o f th e remedia l structure may , nonetheless , reflec t nothin g mor e tha n rationa l adaptations t o th e complexitie s o f administratio n i n differen t contexts, togethe r wit h th e divergenc e betwee n th e dominan t goals o f civi l an d crimina l justice . Give n thes e possibilities , I prefer no t t o dismis s Klevorick' s wa y o f conceptualizin g th e transactions structur e problem . Hi s approac h shoul d instea d challenge th e economist s t o se e whethe r th e combine d struc ture o f civi l an d crimina l remedie s wil l yiel d t o a n analysi s i n economic terms . Bu t w e surel y d o no t ye t hav e a satisfactor y explanatory model . I t i s to o soo n t o sa y tha t th e transaction s structure approac h ca n provid e eve n a vocabular y fo r talkin g about wha t behavio r i s o r shoul d b e criminal . Does al l thi s leav e an y rol e fo r economics , i n connectio n wit h efforts t o stud y th e scop e o f th e crimina l category ? A t most , w e seem t o hav e onl y th e possibilit y o f usin g economi c tool s an d

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economic way s o f thinking , man y layer s belo w th e leve l o f gran d theory, t o provid e a comparativ e cost-effectivenes s analysis , wit h the crucia l judgments abou t mora l an d politica l right s take n a s given. Ironically , lega l scholar s concerne d wit h th e criminaliza tion decisio n hav e tende d t o trea t thi s seemingl y limite d kin d of analysi s a s thei r centra l preoccupatio n an d hav e argue d fo r relegating th e ostensibl y fundamenta l politica l an d mora l issue s to th e background . Thes e scholars , suc h a s Sanfor d Kadis h an d Louis Schwartz, 15 hav e neve r bee n mistake n fo r Posnerians , bu t they sho w u s ho w economist s ca n b e helpfu l i n a modest , in strumental way . T h e mor e comprehensiv e claim—fo r a genera l descriptive model—ha s a lon g wa y t o go . CRIMINAL JUSTIC E POLIC Y

The secon d them e i n th e literatur e attempt s a cost-benefi t analysis o f th e optima l allocatio n o f resource s t o sanctionin g an d law enforcement. Professo r Gar y Becker' s pathbreakin g analysis 16 seems usefu l i n it s treatmen t o f certainty-severit y trade-off s an d the cost-effectivenes s o f alternativ e allocation s o f resources . Bu t the attemp t t o establis h a genera l mode l t o guid e th e punish ment decisio n i n particular , concret e case s strike s th e crimina l justice schola r a s hopelessl y myopi c o r naive . Posner's wor k trie s t o avoi d thi s proble m b y applyin g eco nomic analysi s t o sanctionin g issue s a s the y actuall y aris e i n th e context o f particula r lega l doctrines . H e elaborate s a concept o f criminal punishmen t a s a "price " o f engagin g i n prohibite d be havior an d argue s tha t th e lega l syste m attempt s t o se t thi s pric e at a leve l appropriat e t o dete r inefficien t transfers . As a n example , Posne r mention s th e provocatio n defense , which mitigate s th e punishmen t fo r homicide . Posne r explain s the lowe r penalt y a s a consequenc e o f th e highe r probabilit y o f apprehension i n heat-of-passio n killings ; th e kille r wh o pre meditates wil l likel y b e mor e successfu l i n coverin g hi s traces , the probabilit y o f apprehensio n i s lower , an d therefor e th e se verity o f punishmen t mus t b e increased. 17 Ver y fe w crimina l lawyers wil l find thi s explanatio n plausible , eve n o n it s face . A n economist coul d just a s wel l argu e tha t becaus e ther e i s greate r temptation i n a provocatio n situatio n (an d futur e penaltie s woul d be discounte d a t a highe r rate) , a higher penalt y shoul d b e im -

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posed. I n an y case , whe n th e lawye r think s abou t th e rule s o n legally adequat e provocation , coolin g time , an d th e rejectio n o f subjective standards , h e o r sh e know s tha t probabilitie s o f ap prehension ar e simpl y no t involve d i n thes e doctrine s regulat ing th e severit y o f punishmen t fo r homicide . Th e lawye r ma y have bee n confuse d o r perplexe d abou t thes e doctrine s before , but h e i s not likel y t o thin k tha t a Posneria n deterrenc e analysi s helps hi m understan d them . Obviousl y somethin g relevan t ha s been lef t out—th e concep t o f fault , whic h explain s thes e lega l doctrines i n a more-or-les s straightforwar d way , eve n thoug h it s implications i n thi s contex t ru n directl y contrar y t o notion s o f efficiency, socia l los s minimization , an d th e like . The othe r majo r them e fo r Becke r an d Posne r i s that societ y wants som e crime s t o occur , an d tha t i t adjust s th e punishmen t price s o tha t potentia l offender s wil l b e willin g t o commi t crime s and pa y tha t pric e whe n thei r behavio r i s value-maximizing. T o illustrate this , Posne r give s th e exampl e o f a los t hike r wh o chooses t o stea l foo d t o avoi d starvation . T h e pric e o f theft , Posner says , mus t b e se t lo w enoug h s o tha t thi s efficien t trans fer wil l tak e place. 18 Th e difficult y i s that i n th e cas e Posne r puts , the behavior , precisel y becaus e i t is value maximizing , woul d no t be a crim e a t all , an d th e acto r woul d no t b e charge d an y price . The lawyer' s notio n o f th e necessit y defens e involve s a straight forward cost-benefi t analysis. 19 A n economis t wit h limite d am bitions migh t b e happ y t o hel p elucidat e th e lega l standard . Bu t Posner an d Becke r wan t t o mak e mor e sweepin g claims—tha t crime a s suc h i s neithe r goo d no r ba d an d tha t crimina l sanc tions ar e simpl y price s use d t o preven t inefficien t transaction s while encouragin g efficien t ones . O n thei r terms , i t shoul d b e deemed inefficien t t o displac e marke t incentive s an d t o rel y o n a cour t t o conduc t a particularize d cost-benefi t calculatio n cas e by case. 20 Bu t tha t particularit y i s b y an d larg e wha t th e crimi nal la w metho d i s all about . Sociall y value-maximizin g behavio r is no t punishe d a t all . A n analysi s restricte d t o efficienc y sup presses somethin g to o importan t t o b e lef t out—onc e again , th e notion o f fault . Finally, a s t o th e secon d theme , le t m e tur n t o th e literatur e on sanctionin g methods . Th e capita l punishmen t studie s ar e wel l known an d th e issu e deservedl y command s attention , bu t over -

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all th e deat h penalt y account s onl y fo r a ver y smal l par t o f th e sanctioning machinery—i t i s impose d i n onl y a tin y fractio n o f all cases . Next, ther e ar e th e man y studie s o n th e us e o f fines. Thes e studies recogniz e tha t fines ar e rarel y use d an d mos t o f the m seek t o chang e that , bu t i t i s importan t t o se e wher e w e ar e starting from . Fine s withou t imprisonmen t ar e impose d i n onl y 13 percen t o f al l federa l convictions. 21 I n stat e cases , fines ar e very unusual ; i n on e larg e urba n jurisdictio n fines withou t im prisonment wer e impose d i n onl y 2 0 percen t o f th e misde meanor conviction s an d onl y 0. 4 percen t o f seriou s felon y con victions. 22 That leave s imprisonment , whic h th e economi c literatur e ha s treated o n it s ow n term s an d a s a proble m o f th e trade-of f be tween thi s sanctio n an d fines. Case s involvin g imprisonmen t o r imprisonment plu s fine ar e estimate d t o represen t onl y abou t 23 percen t o f al l convictions. 23 I hav e s o fa r accounte d fo r onl y 2 0 t o 5 0 percen t o f al l con victions. Again , somethin g ha s bee n lef t out . Accordin g t o bes t estimates, mor e tha n 5 0 percen t an d i n on e carefu l sampl e 7 7 percent o f al l convicte d defendant s receive d onl y a sentenc e o f probation. 24 There appea r t o b e ver y fe w economi c studie s o n th e us e o f probation. I n one, 2 5 Professo r Kennet h Wolpi n use d regressio n analysis t o estimat e th e impac t o f thre e differen t sanctions—im prisonment, probation , an d fine—upon th e rate of crime in Eng land. 26 H e foun d th e expecte d negativ e relatio n betwee n change s in th e sanctionin g rat e an d change s i n th e crim e rate , an d foun d this negativ e relatio n no t onl y fo r th e rat e o f fine an d impris onment bu t als o fo r th e probatio n rate . Wolpi n foun d tha t th e impact o n th e crim e rat e wa s stronges t fo r imprisonmen t (a s expected) and , interestingly , h e als o foun d tha t th e impac t o n the crim e rat e wa s stronge r fo r probatio n tha n fo r fines. 27 Wol pin's pape r doe s no t offer , however , an y accoun t o f th e mechanism b y whic h probationar y sanction s generat e a deterren t ef fect, an d withi n th e time-allocatio n mode l tha t h e take s a s hi s framework, th e natur e o f tha t mechanis m i s no t obvious. 28 In deed, withi n th e traditiona l economi c framewor k o f utilit y maximization, i t seem s particularl y perplexin g tha t probatio n

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should hav e a stronge r deterren t effec t tha n fine s do. 2 9 Wha t seems t o b e missing , then , i s a theory of probation , an d proba tion is , afte r all , th e mos t commo n crimina l sanction . Of course , i t i s eas y t o gues s wh y th e economist s hav e no t leaped a t th e opportunit y t o analyz e a sanctio n tha t take s nei ther tim e no r mone y fro m th e offender . Bu t wha t doe s Beck er's analysi s impl y abou t a societ y tha t invest s s o muc h i n a pro cess tha t mor e ofte n tha n no t impose s onl y a probationar y sentence? I d o no t mea n thi s questio n t o suggest , rhetorically , that Becker' s analysi s i s wholl y empty . O n th e contrary , wha t Becker's ow n analysi s implie s i s tha t societ y itsel f attribute s grea t importance t o th e impositio n o f a sanctio n th e consequence s o f which ar e difficul t t o understan d i n economi c terms . What i s missin g fro m th e economists ' accoun t is , onc e again , the concep t o f fault . I hav e sai d tha t thi s notio n i s central t o th e criminal la w metho d i n makin g decision s abou t criminalization , excuses, an d th e gradin g o f offenses . T o understan d th e sanc tioning structure , on e mus t se e tha t havin g identifie d fault , th e criminal la w respond s first an d foremos t simpl y b y condemn ing. I n th e majorit y o f case s thi s i s th e onl y response . Even i n wha t I previousl y calle d th e fine cases , th e fine i s generally muc h lowe r tha n efficienc y consideration s warrant , a s the economist s themselve s hav e show n us . Thei r polic y recom mendations ar e interestin g here , bu t the y ma y b e overlookin g the implication s o f thei r wor k fo r a satisfactor y descriptiv e model . What societ y i s actuall y doin g i n thes e low-fin e case s i s not , i n any significan t sense , takin g money , bu t i n mos t case s con demning. 3 0 T h e importanc e o f tha t ac t ca n b e measure d i n eco nomic terms—b y th e resource s societ y devote s t o achievin g i t and, a t leas t i n som e cases , th e resource s tha t defendant s de vote t o resistin g it. 31 Bu t th e concep t o f condemnation , an d th e mechanism b y whic h i t yield s it s deterrent , retributive , an d ed ucative effects , probabl y wil l no t yiel d t o a comprehensiv e an d satisfying economi c analysis . Becke r himsel f ma y hav e bee n tryin g to tel l u s thi s whe n h e mad e th e otherwis e incomprehensibl e statement tha t "whe n crime s ar e punishabl e b y fines, th e ana lytical difference s [fro m tor t law ] virtuall y vanish." 32 Becaus e th e analytical differences , i n strictl y economi c terms , d o virtuall y vanish, w e kno w no t tha t tort s an d crime s ar e th e sam e bu t in stead tha t th e economi c analysi s i s fundamentall y incomplete .

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I wis h t o repea t tha t polic y studie s ca n b e usefu l fo r man y purposes. The y ca n hel p u s t o estimate , fo r example , th e rela tive effectivenes s o f devotin g mor e resource s t o police , t o pros ecutors, o r t o prisons . T h e point , however , i s tha t thes e eco nomic studie s probabl y cannot , i n th e natur e o f things , illuminat e much o f wha t ha s t o be importan t t o optimu m la w enforcemen t policy. T H E INDIVIDUAL' S DECISIO N ABOU T CRIMINA L ACTIVIT Y

The firs t them e tha t Klevoric k identifie s i n th e literatur e ana lyzes i n economi c term s a n individual' s decisio n whethe r o r no t to commi t a crime . Wha t i s ne w an d strikin g abou t thi s litera rure i s no t it s clai m tha t individual s ar e influence d b y th e cer tainty an d severit y o f punishment , bu t rathe r it s mor e compre hensive clai m tha t th e entir e decisio n calculu s ca n b e usefull y modeled i n economi c terms . O f course , th e mode l abstract s fro m reality an d thu s deliberatel y leave s ou t som e thing s tha t influ ence som e people . Th e limited , bu t stil l momentous , clai m i s tha t one ca n usefull y describ e a significan t segmen t o f reality , tha t one ca n bette r understan d it , b y postulatin g tha t th e decision maker i s a rationa l utilit y maximizer , allocatin g hi s tim e an d la bor amon g variou s activities . Becker , fo r example , write s tha t his approac h "assume s tha t a perso n commit s a n offens e i f th e expected utilit y t o hi m exceed s th e utilit y h e coul d ge t b y usin g his tim e an d othe r resource s a t othe r activities . . . . [CJrimina l behavior become s par t o f a muc h mor e genera l theor y an d doe s not requir e a d ho c concept s o f differentia l association , anomi e and th e like . . . ," 33 The lawye r o r criminologis t i s no t likel y t o fin d thi s explan atory mode l ver y satisfactory , eve n whe n buttresse d b y regres sion analysi s an d ver y impressiv e R 2 figures . Th e proble m i s no t that th e economi c explanatio n i s totall y implausible , becaus e th e criminal justice schola r woul d no t wan t t o den y th e existenc e o f rational, utility-maximizin g behavior . Th e problem , rather , i s tha t in postulatin g suc h behavio r th e economis t assume s awa y th e very questio n i n whic h th e noneconomis t i s mos t interested . Justice Thurgoo d Marshal l reflecte d th e lawyer' s fram e o f min d very wel l i n thi s regar d whe n h e responde d t o claim s advance d on behal f o f th e medica l mode l i n Powell v . Texas: "Th e doc -

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trines o f actu s reus , men s rea , insanity , mistake , justification an d duress hav e historicall y provide d th e tool s fo r a constantl y shifting adjustmen t o f th e tensio n betwee n th e evolvin g aim s o f the crimina l la w an d changin g religious , moral , philosophical , and medica l view s o f th e natur e o f man." 3 4 In thi s are a th e crimina l justice schola r see s himsel f a s strug gling wit h a n eterna l problem : wha t i s man ? Th e Posner-Becke r answer—man i s a rationa l maximize r o f utility—i s simpl y be side th e point , eve n t o th e exten t tha t i t ma y b e true . Th e law yer o r philosophe r want s t o lear n abou t economi c rationalit y an d its implications , muc h a s h e want s t o lear n abou t th e diseas e concept o f alcoholism , bu t th e intellectua l proble m i s to sor t ou t the appropriat e contribution s o f thes e divers e perspectives , an d thus t o locate , fo r ou r ow n time , th e domai n o f huma n auton omy an d th e accountabilit y o f a n individua l fo r hi s acts . I a m aware , o f course , tha t a scienc e lik e economic s ca n us e its result s t o tur n bac k o n itsel f an d measur e th e validit y o f it s assumptions. T h e kin d o f hypothesis-testin g require d here , however, lie s fa r beyon d th e capabilit y o f th e econometri c model s with whic h I a m familiar. 35 So m y conclusio n i s tha t th e firs t strand , lik e th e others , ca n be pu t t o a limite d us e b y crimina l justice scholars . I t shed s ligh t on on e piec e o f thei r puzzle . Bu t i t cannot , i n th e natur e o f things, illuminat e thei r mos t fundamenta l concerns .

T H E LIMITATION S O F ECONOMI C THEOR Y

With respec t t o al l thre e strand s o f th e economi c literature , I have suggeste d that , perhap s surprisingly , th e policy-oriente d dimensions o f thi s literatur e ca n b e pu t t o goo d us e b y crimina l justice scholar s an d ar e no t likel y t o strik e the m a s problemati cal. Th e polic y rol e i s no t reall y controversial . I t i s th e descrip tive claim s tha t ar e ambitious , unconventional , an d likel y t o b e highly controversial , excep t tha t thos e descriptiv e claim s ar e ofte n so implausibl e tha t n o on e wil l bothe r t o conside r the m a t all . So w e hav e somethin g o f a paradox , i n tha t i n mos t field s o f law, th e normativ e claim s o f economi c analysi s hav e evoke d in tense controversy , whil e th e descriptiv e analysi s ha s bee n widel y conceded t o hav e a goo d measur e o f validit y an d considerabl e

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p o w e r a s a n e x p l a n a t o r y tool . T h e applicatio n o f e c o n o m i c analysis t o crimina l j u s t i c e a p p e a r s t o hav e p r o d u c e d t h e o p posite situation , wit h t h e polic y analysi s usefu l a n d t h e descrip tive claim s ver y wid e o f t h e m a r k . T h i s p a r a d o x h a s s o m e t r o u b l i n g implications . I sai d earlie r t h a t Klevorick' s c o n c l u s i o n — t o t h e effec t t h a t t h e r e cannot, i n the ver y n a t u r e o f things , b e a purel y economi c theor y o f crime — has lef t u s wit h a d i l e m m a . Doe s t h e b o d y o f la w a n d h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e r e l a t i n g t o c r i m e diffe r s o radicall y f r o m al l o t h e r areas o f la w a n d e x p e r i e n c e ? O r d o t h e p r o f o u n d limitation s that Klevoric k d e m o n s t r a t e s i n t h e e c o n o m i c t h e o r y o f c r i m e p o i n t t o laten t b u t f u n d a m e n t a l s h o r t c o m i n g s i n t h e g e n e r a l economic analysi s o f law ? I f Klevoric k i s right , the n i t seem s likel y t h a t a t leas t o n e o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n s wil l hav e t o b e a n s w e r e d af firmatively. I n t h a t e v e n t w e wil l t h e n , al l o f us , hav e t o star t quite a bi t o f r e t h i n k i n g .

NOTES 1. Alvi n K . Klevorick , "O n th e Economi c Theor y o f Crime, " i n thi s volume. 2. Muc h more , o f course , i s involved, includin g th e prope r definitio n of th e polic e rol e an d th e effec t o f tha t rol e o n communit y atti tudes, communit y coherence , an d lik e matter s tha t ma y hav e a n importance independen t o f thei r relatio n t o crim e rates . 3. Bu t se e Stephe n Schulhofer , "Har m an d Punishment : A Critiqu e of Emphasi s o n th e Result s o f Conduc t i n th e Crimina l Law, " U. Pa. L. Rev. 12 2 (1974) : 1497 , 1544-57 . 4. Se e Richar d Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, 2 d ed . (Boston : Lit tle Brown , 1977) , p . 163 . Posne r seem s t o sugges t tha t conduc t i s a crim e whe n i t i s unlawfu l (e.g. , tortious) , a notio n tha t i s eithe r inaccurate o r deliberatel y incomplete . 5. Se e Ia n Macneil , "Efficien t Breac h o f Contract : Circle s i n th e Sky, " Va. L. Rev. 6 8 (1982) : 947 . 6. Se e Anthon y Kronman , "Specifi c Performance, " U. Chi. L. Rev. 4 5 (1978): 351 ; Alan Schwartz , "Th e Cas e fo r Specifi c Performance, " Yale L.J. 89(1979) : 271 . 7. Fro m th e strictl y economi c perspective , i t become s difficul t t o se e any distinctio n betwee n deliberat e breac h o f contrac t an d ordi nary theft . Fo r som e o f th e problem s face d b y lawyer s i n sortin g out th e distinctio n i n clos e cases , se e generall y S . Kadish , S . Schul -

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hofer, an d M . Paulsen , eds. , Criminal Law and Its Processes, 2 d e d (Boston: Little , Brown , 1983 ) pp . 935-42 . 8. Klevorick , unde r "Th e Inheren t Limitatio n o f An y Economi c Theory o f Crime. " 9. I n a vehicl e homicid e prosecution , som e state s impos e pena l lia bility onl y whe n th e defendant' s negligenc e ca n b e characterize d as "wanton " o r "gross, " bu t i n othe r state s responsibilit y fo r hom icide ca n b e base d o n ordinar y negligence . Se e generall y Kadish , Criminal Law and Its Processes, pp . 411 , 441-47 . 10. E.g. , Commonwealth v. Atencio, 345 Mass . 627, 18 9 N.E.2d 22 3 (1963) ; Jacobs v . State, 18 4 So.2 d 71 1 (Fla . 1966) . Bu t cf . Commonwealth v. Root, 40 3 Pa . 571 , 17 0 A.2 d 31 0 (1961) . Eve n i n th e Roo t case , where th e cour t se t asid e a n involuntar y manslaughte r conviction , finding a n absenc e o f proximat e cause , th e cour t stil l emphasize d that th e defendan t wa s guilt y o f crimina l conduct : "Thi s evidenc e would o f cours e ampl y suppor t a convictio n o f th e defendan t fo r speeding, reckles s drivin g and , perhaps , othe r violation s o f Th e Vehicle Code " (ibid.) . 11. Se e generall y Kadish , Criminal Law and Its Processes, pp. 443—44 , 470-74. 12. Calabres i an d Melamed , "Propert y Rules , Liabilit y Rules , an d In alienability: On e Vie w o f th e Cathedral, " Harv. L. Rev. 8 5 (1972) : 1089, 1126 . 13. Ibid. , p . 1125 . 14. Cf . Klevorick , unde r "Th e Existenc e o f th e Crimina l Category, " a t n.26. 15. See , e.g. , Sanfor d Kadish , "Th e Crisi s o f Overcriminalization, " Annals 37 4 (1967) : 157 ; Loui s Schwartz , "Th e Propose d Federa l Criminal Code, " i n Kadish , Criminal Law and Its Processes, p . 231. 16. Gar y Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment : A n Economi c Approach, " J.Pol Econ. 76(1968) : 169 . 17. Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, p . 174 ; cf . Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment," pp . 189-90 . 18. Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, pp . 166 , 175 . 19. Se e Mode l Pena l Cod e §3.02(1 ) (a ) (Propose d Officia l Draft , 1962) . 20. Se e Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, p . 175 : [S]uppose th e thie f woul d b e excuse d fro m crimina l liabilit y for stealin g th e foo d i n th e cabi n i f h e coul d sho w . . . tha t the benefi t t o hi m fro m stealin g th e foo d exceede d th e cos t t o the owner . . . . Thi s woul d requir e th e cour t t o balanc e th e gains t o th e thie f agains t th e cost s t o th e owne r o f th e cabin . But i t i s preferabl e t o mak e th e thie f strik e th e balanc e him self, b y forcin g hi m t o pa y whateve r cost s hi s ac t impose d o n

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the cabi n owner . T h e analog y t o th e requiremen t o f payin g compensation i n eminen t domai n case s shoul d b e evident . It i s not clea r ho w Posner' s analysi s her e i s to b e reconcile d wit h his rejectio n o f stric t liabilit y i n tort ; i n tha t contex t h e endorse s judicial balancin g o f cost s an d benefit s (unde r a negligenc e stan dard) a s th e efficien t solution . Fo r a fulle r discussion , se e Steve n Shavell, "Stric t Liabilit y versu s Negligence, " / . Legal Studies 1 1 (1980): 1 . 21. M . Hindelang , M . Gottfredson , an d T . Flanagan , eds. , Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Washington , D.C. : U.S . Governmen t Printing Office , 1981) , pp . 428-29 . 22. Offic e o f Cour t Administrator , Statistical Report of the Common Pleas and Municipal Courts of Philadelphia, Decembe r Ter m 1981 , pp. 18 , 38. Th e misdemeano r case s referre d t o i n th e tex t includ e thos e cases fallin g withi n th e jurisdiction o f th e Municipa l Cour t (thos e involving authorize d imprisonmen t o f five year s o r less) . Th e "se rious felony " case s ar e thos e withi n th e jurisdictio n o f th e Com mon Plea s Cour t (authorize d punishmen t i n exces s o f five years) . 23. Se e Kadish , Criminal Law and Its Processes, pp . 6 , 219 . I n Philadel phia, imprisonmen t wa s impose d i n 5 0 percen t o f th e Commo n Pleas (seriou s felony ) conviction s bu t onl y i n 1 9 percen t o f th e Municipal Cour t (les s serious ) convictions . Se e Offic e o f Cour t Administrator, Statistical Report, pp . 18 , 38 . Becke r appear s t o as sume a sharpl y differen t distributio n o f penalties . Se e Becker , "Crime an d Punishment, " pp . 169 , 179 . 24. Se e Kadish , Criminal Law and Its Processes, p . 219 . 25. Calle d t o m y attentio n a t th e Society' s meetin g b y Georg e Priest . 26. Kennet h Wolpin , "A n Economi c Analysi s o f Crim e an d Punish ment i n Englan d an d Wales , 1894-1967, " / . Pol Econ. 8 6 (1978):815. 27. Thi s relatio n wa s observe d acros s al l th e crim e categorie s studied , with th e exceptio n o f aut o theft , fo r whic h (curiously ) th e crim e rate appeare d t o b e mor e strongl y affecte d b y th e probatio n rat e than b y th e imprisonmen t rate . Ibid. , p . 826 . 28. Isaa c Ehrlic h ha s argued tha t probationar y sanction s involv e enoug h stigma t o interfer e wit h employmen t prospect s an d thu s t o reduc e the offender' s expecte d strea m o f futur e earnings . Ehrlich , "Th e Deterrent Effec t o f Crimina l La w Enforcement,"/ . Legal Studies 1 (1972): 259 , 262 . A s a n empirica l claim , thi s hypothesi s is , for man y reasons, quit e problematic , an d i n an y even t i t fail s t o explai n wh y probation shoul d prov e a mor e effectiv e deterren t tha n fines, whic h ceteris paribus involv e th e sam e stigm a o f criminalit y upo n convic tion. Withi n a strictl y economi c framework , on e coul d argu e tha t

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probation take s mor e o f th e offender' s tim e tha n a fine does , be cause o f reportin g requirements . Thi s differenc e seem s to o sligh t to b e consequential , bu t furthe r researc h fro m thi s perspectiv e might b e worthwhile . 29. Par t o f th e difficult y her e ma y ste m fro m th e wa y i n whic h Wolpi n was force d t o defin e hi s variables . Du e t o dat a limitations , h e wa s able t o measur e onl y th e frequenc y wit h whic h fines an d proba tion wer e impose d an d coul d no t contro l fo r lengt h o f probatio n or amoun t o f fine. Wit h respec t t o imprisonment , Wolpi n use d dat a on th e averag e court-impose d term , bu t recognize d tha t thi s figure i s only imperfectl y correlate d wit h averag e tim e actuall y served . Wolpin, "Economi c Analysi s o f Crim e an d Punishment, " p . 824 . 30. Fo r recognitio n o f thi s poin t i n a n economi c analysis , se e R.A . Carr Hill an d N.H . Stern , "Theor y an d Estimatio n i n Model s o f Crim e and it s Socia l Contro l an d thei r Relation s t o Concept s o f Socia l Output," i n M . Feldstei n an d R . Inman , eds. , The Economics of Public Services (London: Macmillan , 1977) , pp . 116 , 127-131 . 31. Tw o strikin g example s ar e United States v. Park, 42 1 U.S . 658 (1975) , in whic h th e defendan t too k appeal s al l th e wa y t o th e U.S . Su preme Cour t i n a n unsuccessfu l effor t t o resis t a $25 0 fine; an d the For d Pint o prosecution , i n whic h $ 1 millio n wa s spen t resist ing a maximu m possibl e sentenc e o f a $10,00 0 fine. Se e Kadish , Criminal Law and Its Processes, pp. 995—96 . Som e o f thes e expen ditures ma y hav e bee n motivate d b y concer n abou t th e civi l liabil ity consequence s o f a crimina l conviction . Bu t eve n tha t motiva tion ma y hav e bee n a n insignifican t facto r i n Park, wher e n o majo r injuries ha d occurre d an d wher e th e conviction , o n a strict liabilit y theory, woul d hav e ha d n o clea r implication s fo r civi l liability . 32. Becker , "Crim e an d Punishment, " p . 201. 33. Ibid. , p . 176 . 34. 39 2 U.S . 514 , 53 6 (1968 ) (opinio n o f Marshall , J.). 35. Compar e Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, pp . 164—65 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY ANDREW C . BLANA R The followin g lis t o f book s an d article s doe s no t attemp t t o be comprehensiv e an d exhaustive . Th e liste d bibliographie s ca n be supplemente d b y th e bibliographie s i n man y mor e recen t volumes, includin g Bedau , Hug o A . ed . The Death Penalty in America, 3r d ed . Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 198 2 an d Gross, Hymn . A Theory of Criminal Justice. Ne w York : Oxfor d University Press , 1979 . BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Index to Legal Periodicals Oxbridge Communications . Legal and Law Enforcement Periodicals. New York : Fact s o n File , 1981 . Radzinowicz, Si r Leo n an d Hood , Roger , eds . Criminology and the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Bibliography. Westport , Conn.: Greenwoo d Press , 1976 . Wright, Martin , ed . Use of Criminology Literature. Hamden, Conn. : Shoe Strin g Press , 1974 . CRIMINAL JUSTIC E AN D CRIMINOLOG Y JOURNAL S

American Journal of Corrections British Journal of Criminology. Crime and Delinquency. Criminal Law Journal. Criminology. 345

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Journal of Criminal Justice. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Beside s man y othe r specialized journal s i n th e fields o f crimina l justic e an d cri minology, article s i n thes e area s ca n b e foun d i n mos t la w re views an d i n sociological , psychological , an d publi c polic e journals. O f specia l interes t i s a yearl y journal edite d b y Nor val Morri s an d Michae l Terry , Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, (fou r volume s t o date) , an d Criminal Justice History (1980-83 , fou r volume s t o date ) fro m Meckle r Pub lishing. CRIMINAL LA W AN D TH E ADMINISTRATIO N O F CRIMINA L JUSTIC E

Auerbach, Gerald . Unequal Justice. Ne w York : Oxfor d Univer sity Press , 1976 . Baker, Keith , an d Rober t J. Rubel , eds . Violence and Crime in the Schools. Lexington: Lexingto n Books , 1981 . Balbus, Isaa c D . The Dialectics of Legal Repression: Black Rebels Before the American Criminal Courts. New Brunswick , N.J. : Trans action Books , 1977 . Baldwin, John , an d Michae l McConville . Jury Trials. Oxfor d University, Press , 1979 . Baldwin, John, an d Michae l McConville , Negotiated Justice Pressures on Defendants to Plead Guilty. Oxford : Marti n Robertson , 1979. Becker, Gar y an d Stigler , George . "La w Enforcement , Malfeas ance, an d Compensatio n o f Enforcers, " Journal of Legal Studies 3 (Januar y 1974) : 1-19 . Becker, H.K . an d E.O . Hjellemo . Justice in Modern Sweden: A Description of the Components of the Swedish Criminal Justice System. Ne w York : Thomas , 1979 . Bennett, W . Lance , an d Marth a S . Feldman . Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom. London: Tavistock , 1981 . Blumberg, Abraham . Criminal Justice. 2 d ed . Ne w York : Ne w Viewpoints, 1979 . Burger, Warren . "Th e Perspectiv e o f th e Chie f Justic e o f th e U.S. Surprem e Court. " Crime and Social Justice (Summe r 1981) : 43. Center fo r Researc h o n Crimina l Justice . The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove. Berkeley : Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1975 .

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INDEX Abelard, Peter , 62 , 6 6 Accountability, 12-1 3 Andrews, Judge, 2 8 Anscombe, G.E.M. , 3 1 Answerability, 1 3 Ascriptivist theor y o f action , 2 7 Austin, John, 2 1 - 2 2 Autonomous agency , 2 , 16—2 3 actions and , 2 0 - 2 3 criminal inten t and , 8 2 definition of , 2 3 metaphysics of , 24 , 25-26 , 4 0 - 4 2 personhood and , 2 3 - 2 5 Beccaria, Cesare , 230 , 28 9 Becker, Gary , 289 , 335-336 , 338 , 33 9 cost-benefit analysi s o f publi c polic y toward crim e of , 289-290 , 2 9 2 295 Bedau, Hugo , 3 - 4 Behaviorism, 3 5 - 4 0 , 4 1 logical, 3 5 - 3 6 , 3 8 - 4 0 methodological, 3 5 - 3 8 , 4 0 Bentham, Jeremy , 218 , 230 , 28 9 Bernard o f Clairvaux , 6 2 Blameworthiness, 273-274 , 284-28 5 Bloch, Marc , 6 6 Bracton, Henr y de , 16 7 Brandt, Richard , 4 - 5 Brown, Peter , 6 5 Cain v . Doyle, 223-22 4 Calabresi, Guido , 31 1 economic theor y o f crim e of , 2 9 5 302, 316-32 1 explanation o f th e crimina l cate gory of , 331-33 5

Capital punishment , 336-33 7 Cardozo, Justice Benjamin , 21 9 Carr-Hill, Roy , 29 3 Causal theor y o f action , 21-2 2 Cavell, Stanley , 6 8 Civil liabilit y o f government , 227-228 , 260-263 Classification-based sentencing , 3 - 4 aggravators an d mitigator s under , 96-97,106-108 classification schem e for , 93—9 7 concept of , 9 0 - 9 1 discretion under , 11 0 ethical problem s of , 97—10 1 goals of , 9 0 - 9 2 guideline sentence s for , 96-97 , 102 103, 111-11 2 model syste m of , 9 2 - 9 7 objections to , 9 1 - 9 2 offense rankin g problem s with , 98 , 101 Offense Ran k Lis t for , 112-11 3 penalties under , 104—10 6 post-classification factor s and , 97 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 , 106-110 , 11 1 procedural justic e and , 103-10 4 reasonableness criterio n of , 108-11 0 Coase, Ronald , 300 , 317-31 8 Coindictment, 251-25 4 Coleman, Jules, 6 Compensatory justice , 227-22 8 Compensatory payments , 59—60 , 64— 66 Concept of Mind, The (Ryle) , 4 0 Contritionism, 6 3 "Crime an d Punishment : A n Eco nomic Approach " (Becker) , 289 , 294

367

368 Criminal behavio r economic analysi s of , 290-292 , 3 3 9 340 Criminal categor y existence of , 295-297 , 321-325 , 331-335 individuals' choice s in , 339-34 0 theory of , 299-30 1 Criminal justice system , 188-189 , 230 , 291, 298 , 304 , 31 5 deterrent effec t of , 189-190 , 193 , 294 enforcement of , 292-29 5 purpose of , 189-19 1 Criminal la w basis of , 318-319 , 32 1 excuses and , 16 6 justified unlawfu l actio n and , 16 6 not responsibl e behavio r and , 16 6 unlawful behavio r and , 16 5 Criminal liability , 4 - 5 , 20 3 motivational fault s and , 16 5 of a n agen t an d no t th e entity , 252— 254 of a n agen t an d th e entity , 251—25 2 of entit y bu t no t an y agent , 244-25 1 of neithe r th e agen t no r th e entity , 254-255 strict syste m of , 191-193 , 325-32 6 Criminal responsibilit y i n govern ment, 5 - 6 , 201-202 , 217 , 231 , 256 limits of , 2 2 6 - 2 3 1 , 241-24 2 general bureaucrati c consideration s for, 241 , 242-25 5 special governmenta l considera tions for , 241 , 255-25 8 Criminal sanctions , 298-299 , 334-32 6 economic analysi s of , 295-297 , 3 3 2 339 imposition of , 325-32 6 "kickers," 296-297 , 318-319 , 3 3 2 335 reasons for , 315-31 9 Davis, Michael , 4 Desert-based punishment , 138-141 , 159-161

INDEX Determinate sentencin g movement , 9 0 Dewey, John, 2 7 - 2 8 Douglas, Justice Willia m O. , 17 9 Durkheim, Emile , 22 7 Easterbrook, Frank , 31 2 Economic Analysis of Law (Posner) , 29 5 Economic theor y o f crime , 6 , 29 0 cost-benefit analysi s of , 292-295 , 297 criminal categor y and , 321—32 5 criminalization and , 315-31 9 critique of , 310-31 2 limitations of , 290 , 301-304 , 321 , 326, 329 , 340-34 1 literature of , 290-29 7 resource allocatio n and , 297-298 , 315,330,339 social los s functio n of , 292-295 , 297-300 value of , 313-31 5 Ehrlich, Isaac , 293 , 31 2 Ehrlichman, John , 20 4 Embezzlement, 252-25 3 Ethical philosophy , 2 8 - 2 9 Ethics i n Governmen t Act , 217-21 8 Excuse theory , 5 , 13-1 4 Excuses, 32 5 accidents, 17 7 duress, 182-18 3 insanity, 184-18 7 mistake o f fact , 177-17 8 mistake o f law , 178-18 0 necessity, 33 6 provocation, 183-184 , 335-33 6 voluntary intoxication , 180-18 2 Fault ascriptio n principles , 15—1 6 Faute de service, 203—204 Faute personelle, 203-20 4 Feinberg, Joel, 18 1 Fines, 337-33 9 Fingarette, Herbert , 36 , 15 6 Fletcher, George , 11 , 26 , 28 , 3 1 - 3 2 , 167 Free choice , 17 2 French, Peter , 25 1 Functionalism, 2 8

Index General par t o f th e crimina l law , 1-2 , 11 compared t o scientifi c theories , 128 — 131 justification for , 123-12 5 justification fo r particula r system s of , 125-128 moral basi s of , 12—1 5 sources of , 2 , 1 1 — 14 utilitarian principle s and , 125 , 126 — 127 Goldman, Alvin , 2 2 Governmental crime , 5 - 6 , 201-20 2 immunity and , 214-21 7 Gross, Hyman , 3 1 Hand, Justic e Learned , 32 6 Hanning, Robert , 6 3 Harris, John, 293 , 31 2 Hart, H.L.A. , 14 , 27 , 165 , 180 , 181 , 207 Hegel, Wilhel m Friedrich , 159 , 16 2 Helms, Richard , 22 9 Herbert, A.P. , 4 0 Hobbes, Thomas , 215 , 217 , 21 9 Hohfeld, W. , 2 6 Holmes, Justic e Olive r Wendell , 36 , 145-147, 179 , 215 , 21 7 Homicide, 66 , 183 , 335-33 6 Impeachment, 216 , 218 , 241 , 25 5 Imprisonment, 326 , 33 6 Inalienability rules , 295-296 , 302 , 323, 324, 332-33 3 Indemnification, 247 , 25 8 Individuality changes i n concep t of , 61—6 7 Christianity and , 62—6 3 development o f lega l recognitio n of , 64-67 modern vie w of , 68—7 0 Individualized sentencing , 9 2 Ingber, Stanley , 2 8 Intentional concepts , 2 4 - 2 5 Intentionality, 2— 3 of menta l concepts , 30 , 32-34 , 38 , 41 medieval concept s of , 67 , 6 9

369 Moroccan concep t of , 5 8 - 6 1 , 81-8 2 standards fo r determining , 70-7 2 Iowa Suprem e Court , 179 , 18 0 Islamic law , 5 8 - 6 0 , 69 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 3 - 8 5 Judicial clemency , 148-14 9 Judicial oversight , 224-22 5 Judges, 175-17 6 Kadish, Sanford , 33 5 Kant, Immanuel , 159 , 160 , 16 2 Kelman, Mark , 1 1 "Kickers," 296-297 , 318-319 , 3 3 2 335 Klevorick, Alvin , 6 economic theor y o f crim e and , 3 1 3 315, 319-326 , 329-34 1 comment on , 310-31 2 Legal Realism , 2 6 - 3 0 Legal syste m justification of , 169-170 , 193-19 4 rule-utilitarian, 17 0 Legal vie w o f person s challenges to , 4 1 - 4 3 standards of , 70-7 2 Liability, 325-32 6 Liability rules , 243-244 , 295-296 , 302 , 316-318, 323 , 331-33 4 Locke, John, 23 , 21 9 Loubignac, Victorien , 5 9 Mackie,J.L., 21-22 , 15 9 Maker v . People, 18 3 Mail frau d statute , 22 0 Mandel, Governo r Marvin , 22 0 Mansfield, Lord , 22 0 Marshall, James, 6 7 Marshall, Justice Thurgood , 339-34 0 Mashaw, Jerry, 26 0 Mather, Lynn , 8 4 Melamed, Dougla s economic theor y o f crim e of , 2 9 5 302, 316-32 3 explanation o f th e crimina l cate gory of , 331-33 5 Mens rea, 171 , 172 , 173 , 206, 21 2 definition of , 166 , 167 , 16 8

370 Mens tea (Continued) history of , 6 7 motivation theor y o f excuse s and , 175 Metaphysics o f personhoo d behaviorist skepticis m about , 34—4 0 hermeneutic skepticis m about , 3 0 34 legal realis t skepticis m about , 26-3 0 legal vie w o f person s and , 4 1 - 4 3 skepticism about , 25—4 0 Michael, Jerome, 18 3 Mill, John Stuart , 2 1 - 2 2 Mills, C . Wright , 68 , 7 1 M'Naghten rule , 18 5 Model Pena l Code , 167 duress and , 182-18 3 excuses and , 16 8 governmental liabilit y under , 22 3 homicide under , 18 3 insanity and , 184-18 6 motivational theor y and , 174 , 1 7 5 176 sentencing under , 17 1 Moral indignation , 274-275 , 28 5 Moral responsibility , 276-27 9 in corporations , 202-203 , 244-24 5 in crimina l law , 32 6 in organizations , 210-214 , 268-27 5 objections t o organizational , 21 1 — 214 personal, 203-21 0 Moore, Michael , 1-2 , 3 , 24 9 critique of , 7 8 - 8 6 Moroccan societ y concept o f intentionalit y in , 5 8 - 6 1 , 83-85 concept o f th e perso n in , 53—58 , 69 concept o f trut h in , 56—5 7 personal network s in , 56—5 7 Morris, Colin , 6 4 Morris, Herbert , 156 , 16 0 Motivation theor y o f excuses , 167—168 , 170-171 benefits of , 191-19 3 general theor y o f punishmen t and , 187-194 mens rea and, 17 5

INDEX motivation defect s and , 174—17 5 recognized excuse s and , 177-18 7 reasons for , 17 1 — 176 Murder, 323-32 4 Murphy, Jeffrie , 4 - 5 Musto, William , 21 8 National Commissio n Stud y Draf t o f Federal Crimina l Code , 22 3 Negligence, 206-210 , 246 , 32 6 Nixon v . Fitzgerald, 216, 222 , 25 5 NOMOS III , Responsibility, 1 NOMOS VI , Justice, 1 NOMOS XXIV , Ethics, Economics, and the Law, 6 Nonfeasance, 208-209 , 216 , 219-22 0 Nozick, Robert , 15 8 Obstruction o f democracy , 221-22 3 Office o f Governmen t Ethics , 23 1 Official misconduc t common la w of , 216 , 219-22 0 kinds of , 221-22 3 nongovernment bureaucracie s and , 258-259 punishment of , 228-23 0 Organizational responsibility , 273—27 5 Atomic Vie w of , 269-271 , 280-28 1 civil la w and , 283-28 6 criminal la w and , 28 3 existence of , 279-28 3 goals and , 281-28 3 Organic Vie w of , 2 6 9 - 2 7 1 , 27 3 Organizational responsibilit y i n gov ernment, 223-22 6 objections to , 224-22 6 Organizations characteristics of , 204-20 7 moral responsibilit y of , 268-27 5 negligence and , 208-21 0 responsibility of , 5 , 210-214 , 2 2 3 226 Overdeterrence, 215-216 , 261-26 2 evidence for , 21 7 Overcriminalizing o f politica l process , 220-221

371

Index Packer, Herbert , 16 7 Pennsylvania Commissio n o n Sen tencing, 3 , 108 , 111 , 11 2 Offense Ran k Lis t of , 112-11 3 proposals of , 9 3 - 9 7 Personal responsibilit y in government , 219-22 3 in organizations , 203-21 0 Philosophy, deconstructio n an d re construction of , 79—8 1 Plea bargaining , 9 0 Polinsky, Mitchell , 29 3 Posner, Richard , 6 economic theor y o f crim e of , 295 — 302 explanation o f th e crimina l cate gory by , 319-321 , 331-33 5 Practical reasoning , 19-2 0 Probation, 224-225 , 337-33 8 "Problem o f Socia l Cost , The " (Coase) , 317-318 Property rules , 295-296 , 316-318 , 323, 324 , 332-33 4 "Property Rules , Liabilit y Rules , an d Inalienability: On e Vie w o f th e Cathedral" (Calabres i an d Me lamed), 295 , 31 6 Psychological theory , 172-17 4 Punishment. See also Retributiv e the ory o f punishmen t definition of , 121-12 3 desert-based, 138-14 1 determining, 131-13 8 deterrence theor y of , 158 , 15 9 justifiable, 20 2 of governmenta l organizations , 224— 226 ranking, 132-133 , 134-13 6 rationale for , 171-17 6 state's interes t in , 157-16 2 types of , 13 2 utilitarianism and , 126-127 , 131 , 137-138 Punishment principles , 8 9 - 9 0 classification-based sentencin g and , 104-106, 11 1 criminal la w and , 122-12 4 general theor y of , 187-19 4

Quine, W.V.O. , 2 4 Rape, 323 , 32 4 Rational agency , 2 , 16—2 0 Rawls, John, 1 , 10 0 Recklessness, 207-20 8 Regina v . Cunningham, 172—17 3 Replevin, 33 4 Respondeat superior , 21 1 Responsibility, 1 4 causal, 275-27 6 moral, 275-279 , 282-28 3 practical, 276-279 , 282-28 3 sociopaths and , 278-279 , 28 1 Retribution, 3 - 5 Retributive theor y o f punishment , 4 5 definition of , 158-16 2 general theor y of , 187-19 4 goals of , 156—15 7 objections to , 119-12 0 sentencing and , 147-14 8 state's interes t in , 157-16 2 statutory penaltie s and , 120-121 , 144 Retributivism strong positive , 161-16 2 weak positive , 161-16 2 Reuter, Peter , 29 2 Romance literature , 6 3 - 6 4 Rose-Ackerman, Susan , 29 2 Rosen, Lawrence , 2— 3 critique of , 7 8 - 8 6 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques , 23 0 Rummel v . Estelle, 17 5 Ryle, Gilbert , 24 , 40 , 6 8 Sanctions agains t corporations , 2 4 7 251 Sayre, Franci s Bowes , 67 , 168 , 17 1 — 172 Schulhofer, Stephen , 6 Schwartz, Louis , 33 5 Sentencing, 17 1 classification guideline s for , 95—9 7 clemency and , 148-14 9

372 Sentencing (Continued) ethical problem s of , 97-10 1 retribution and , 147-14 8 Separation o f power s principle , 25 6 Shapiro, Martin , 3 Shavell, Steven , 29 3 Skinner, B.F. , 35 , 3 7 - 3 8 , 4 0 Social los s function , 292-295 , 297-30 0 Sociopaths, 278-279 , 281 , 28 5 Sovereign immunity , 214—215 , 219 , 257 effects of , 21 6 rationale for , 215-21 7 St. Anselm , 62 , 6 6 Stephen, Si r James, 18 6 Stern, Nicholas , 29 3 Stigler, George , 29 4 Stone, Christopher , 5 , 2 9 Structural crime , 20 3 Structuralism, 203-206 , 210 , 242-24 4 Szasz, Thomas , 2 8 Tallyrand, Princ e de , 21 0 Theory of Criminal Justice, A (Gross) , 3 1 Theory of Justice,A (Rawls) , 1 Thompson, Dennis , 5 critique of , 241-26 3

INDEX

Transaction structure , 301-304 , 3 2 2 323, 332-33 5 Trust, publi c offic e and , 219-22 0 United State s Crimina l Code , 207 , 216, 222 United States v. Barker, 255—25 6 Utilitarianism, 1 penalty-setting and , 126-127 , 131 , 137-138 retributivism and , 119—12 1 theory o f punishment , 188-18 9 Von Wright , G.H. , 3 2 War crimes , 22 7 Watergate, 228-22 9 Weber, Max , 6 7 - 6 8 Wechsler, Herbert , 18 3 Weemsv. U.S., 141-14 5 dissent to , 145-14 7 White, Justice Edwar d D. , 145-14 7 Williams, Glanville , 16 7 Wills, Frank , 22 8 Wolpin, Kenneth , 23 6 Wolf, Susan , 5