Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question 9780755619436, 9781784531133

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In writing this book, which has evolved over time, I owe my gratitude to a wide number of colleagues, friends and institutions. While these are too many to name, a few people and institutions deserve special mention. A special thank you goes to the School of Politics at Queen’s University of Belfast, where I initially started my postgraduate studies, and whose commitment to conflict regulation studies has been an important source of inspiration to take on this study. I especially wish to thank Dr Ann Lane, whose guidance until she moved on to King’s College in London was of great importance and inspiration to me. The support and encouragement I received on the way from my PhD supervisor Professor Svein Mønnesland at the University of Oslo, has been invaluable. Great thanks also go to the Faculty of Humanities and to ILOS, the Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages at the University of Oslo. Ivo Banac, Tone Bringa, Sabrina Ramet and Vladimir Petrović also deserve a special mention, as all have given me valuable feedback along the way. Their generosity with time and advice has meant a lot for this work. I also want to direct special thanks to all the people I met on numerous trips to the Balkan region, and who have all left their impression on the book. I would especially like to thank the Institute for Contemporary History, the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, the Archives of Yugoslavia, all in Belgrade, as well as Rudi Rizman and Aleš Gabrič and the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (ARS) in Ljubljana, and the National Library in Zagreb. On a more personal note, I would like to thank my good friend Nataša in Belgrade, and to Saša, Duda and Ivana in Zagreb. I am also greatly indebted to my good friends and colleagues Roisin Kelly, Gro Anna Persheim, Cecilie Endresen, Synne Bjerkaas and colleagues at the University of Oslo and the QUB for invaluable collegial support and endless discussions throughout the process. Last but not least, I would like to thank my editors at I.B.Tauris, and copy editors at Bookcraft.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AVNOJ CC CK KPJ CK SKJ Cominform Comintern CPSU FEC HRSS HSS JNA KPH KPJ KPM NDH NFJ NKOJ NOO NOVJ NOVŠ

Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Antifascist Council for Popular Liberation Central Committee Central Committee of the KPJ Central Committee of the SKJ Communist Information Bureau Communist International Communist Party of the Soviet Union Federal Executive Council Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka The Croatian Republican Peasant Party Hrvatska seljačka stranka The Croatian Peasant Party Jugoslav Peoples’ Army Komunistička partija Hrvatske The Croatian Communist Party Komunistička partija Jugoslavije The Yugoslav Communist Party Komunistička partija Makedonije The Macedonian Communist Party Nezavisna Država Hrvatska Independent Croatian State Narodni front Jugoslavije Popular Front of Yugoslavia Nacionalni komitet oslobođenja Jugoslavije National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia Narodnooslobodilački odbor People’s Liberation Council Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije The People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia National Liberation Army of Albania

List of Abbreviations OOUR PKSH SANU SKH SKJ SSDP SRPJ(k) SDB UDBa VMRO

ZAVNOH ZUR

ix

Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada Basic organisation of associated labour Partia komuniste e Shqipërisë Communist Party of Albania The Serbian Academy of Science and Arts Savez komunista Hrvatske League of Communists of Croatia Savez komunista Jugoslavije League of Communists of Yugoslavia Serbian Social Democratic Party Socijalistička radnička partija Jugoslavije (komunista) The Socialist Workers’ Party of Yugoslavia (Communist) Služba državne bezbednosti Service for State Security Uprava državne bezbednosti Administration of State Security (IMRO) Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација, Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske National Antifascist Council for People’s Liberation of Croatia Zakon o udruženom radu Law on associated labour

INTRODUCTION

Creating a socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, communist leadership and the national question The national question has [in our country] been solved; and at that very well been settled, to the general satisfaction of all our peoples. It has been solved in the manner taught by Lenin … and this solution to the national question reflects on the character of our revolution.1 (Speech given by Tito to the Slovenian Academy of Science and Art in November, 1948) When the Yugoslav communists came to power in 1945, they claimed to have introduced a socialist solution to the Yugoslav national question. This ‘solution’ originally promulgated a federal state framework. Five of the constitutive peoples2 were granted a ‘home’ republic and were constitutionally guaranteed the right to self-determination including secession. The ‘solution’ depended on the principle of national equality where no group was able to dominate within Yugoslavia. Constitutional and institutional aspects of this ‘solution’ were based on the slogan of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, combined with an aspiration to develop a socialist society under the leadership of a fully unified Yugoslav communist party. Brotherhood and Unity were later complemented with an attempt to infuse society with a new concept of socialist Yugoslavism, a concept which sought to give socialist theoretical legitimacy to the SKJ’s (Savez komunista Jugoslavije – League of Communists of Yugoslavia) solution to the national question. This book examines the strategies pursued by the Yugoslav communists from 1935 until 1990 in their quest to find this ‘socialist solution’ to the national question. It looks at how the Yugoslav communist party formulated

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

its thinking about the national question within the specific Yugoslav historical context. The Yugoslav communist movement had been searching to find a common approach to the national question in Yugoslavia since the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, originally under the name Socijalistička radnička partija Jugoslavije (komunista) (SRPJ[k]) came into existence in 1919. The approaches during the inter-war period attached varying degrees of importance to the national question and to the degree in which the communists should concern themselves with this question. From 1935, the KPJ endorsed a strategy of searching for a ‘socialist solution’ to the national question within a multinational Yugoslav context. This approach recognised the existence of multiple national groups; the KPJ was ready to concede the right of these groups to self-determination based on a federal principle. The promise of national self-determination and equality formed a crucial aspect of their ‘solution’ to the national question. So did the advocacy of a common Yugoslav line. The socialist aspect of this solution was predicated on the belief that only the building of a socialist society under the auspices of a unified Bolshevik party could ensure a true solution to this question. The KPJ/SKJ believed that this approach would lessen the importance of national conflict. Although the commitment to national equality based on an all-Yugoslav federal principle remained the paramount aspect of their approach to the national question throughout their time in power, the KPJ remained more evasive about what sort of Yugoslav unity they envisioned. The federal system they introduced underwent many changes, as did their definition of their solution to the national question. The changes in the KPJ/SKJ’s strategies on the national question were influenced by a variety of factors. Some changes were catalysed by external events like the break with Stalin, while others were influenced by internal processes such as intra-party struggles and interrepublican relations, democratisation attempts and reform processes. The differing and often opposing views held by various national groups on the question of the ideal organisation of the Yugoslav state also had an impact on their policies, as did the lack of a common understanding of the purpose of Yugoslavia. The need to maintain unity while at the same time allowing room for diversity within a highly heterogeneous state, represented a dilemma for the communist party. Striking a balance between unity (of party and of state) and diversity remained a challenge throughout the party’s existence. Achieving unity remained one of the main aspirations of the KPJ/SKJ, but the Yugoslav communist movement continued to be a diversified movement both before and after getting

Introduction

3

into power. This diversity was to have a profound impact on the party’s approach to the national question. The Yugoslav communists approached this from a Marxist position, but their diverse backgrounds frequently led them to respond to problems and issues in very different ways. The way the tension between the need to ensure both unity and diversity in Yugoslavia impacted on the attitudes of communist leaders is explored throughout this book, not only in the context of the national question, but also with regard to the organisation of the state, the party and the longterm aims of the KPJ. Ultimately the KPJ/SKJ had to decide whether their most important task was maintaining the leading role of the party or the management of national conflict within the new Yugoslavia. These two tasks closely depended on each other, and both were vital. Approach This study takes a macro-history perspective, focusing on how the communist elites conceptualised and responded to the challenges the management of the national question imposed on their regime. However, the book is not intended to be another ‘history of Yugoslavia’. Nor is it the purpose to address all aspects of the national question and of all expressions of national conflict in Yugoslavia. It is not primarily an attempt to ‘explain Yugoslavia’s demise’, but a study of the Yugoslav communist movement’s approach to a particular issue – that of the national question – within a Yugoslav historical context. My purpose has been to examine how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia conceived and approached the national question in Yugoslavia, and especially to shed light on how management of national conflict within a socialist multinational state differed from that of non-socialist multinational states. Shortly after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the three socialist multinational federal regimes (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) all disintegrated, in different ways. From each emerged new nation-states, and in numerous cases an increase in national tension followed. Many studies have since addressed the rise of national conflict in post-communist regimes. However, the question of how the communist elites approached the national question in a multinational context and attempted to manage national conflict between the different national groups that lived within these federal states merits more attention. Theory on the management and regulation of ethnic and national conflict emanated primarily from the study of elite co-operation and the regulation of ethnic and national conflict in divided societies in Western democracies, but later expanded to comparative

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

studies of national conflict in deeply divided societies in other parts of the world.3 Even though certain aspects of these theories can be useful for the study of national conflict in former state-socialist regimes, most existing theories on ethnic and national conflict regulation do not take into account the ideological aspect of how communist elites conceptualised the nation and the national question, and how this affected the manner in which they managed national conflict. The postwar development of Yugoslav politics and history was subject to a highly complex interaction of political, social, cultural, ideological, institutional and economic processes, influenced by a variety of internal and external pressures. In my view, ideology held a central role in the forming of policies and strategies of postwar Yugoslavia, especially those relating to the national question. The Yugoslav communists were highly pragmatic, nevertheless the shaping of policies and strategies was – to a large extent – ideologically defined; the professed aim and vision of the KPJ/SKJ was to create a socialist society. The Yugoslav state formed the framework, and the SKJ strategies on the national question were set within the boundaries of their socialist Yugoslav project. Ideology is therefore vitally important when addressing the question of how national conflict was managed in a socialist context. In the media and much of the popular literature that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslav territories, the upsurge in national conflict during the 1990s has commonly been explained through a ‘lifting of the lid’ analogy whereby the communists have been seen to have put a lid on a boiling pot of irreconcilable conflict between groups unable to coexist. This analogy suggests that events post-1989 were a kind of history repeating itself, referring back to national tension in the inter-war period and above all the fratricidal war during World War II. These are often the same commentaries that have viewed the Yugoslav conflicts primarily as a result of ethnic hatred. Few serious researchers on Yugoslavia would promote such a view. Such analogies view everything that happened between as of no consequence, and inadvertently accept too readily the communist elite’s own claim to have ‘solved the national question’. They also tend to ignore the presence of national discourses within state-socialist regimes, and suggest that national conflict under the communist regime was prevented by sheer coercion and suppression. These are all presumptions that need to be questioned. Suppression and coercion were certainly available options to manage national relations, but they did not represent the only strategy available to the Yugoslav communists. Instead, their ability to ensure good national relations

Introduction

5

between the different national groups, and to present themselves as the force preventing national conflict, became an important factor in their search for popular support for their regime, and an imperative source in their wider strategies through which they sought legitimacy for their socialist project. I do not believe that national ideology disappeared under the regime of the Yugoslav Communist Party. On the contrary, I argue that national ideologies coexisted in a sometimes symbiotic, sometimes antagonistic relationship with other ideas, often under a different label. Such ideologies also remained in different arenas, most notably within the cultural sphere and within the ruling communist party itself. Nor were the communists immune to the force of national ideology themselves.4 I see national ideology as a phenomenon that the communist elites had to take into account and could not afford to ignore. The national question in Yugoslav communist discourse With regard to the national phenomena, it is not formation and development of individual national discourses but rather the national question in Yugoslav communist discourse that forms the focus of this book. I refer in this work to the national question in Yugoslav communist discourse as the synthesis of their understanding of the nation and their rhetoric and policies on the national question. Such policies tended to be highly pragmatic and grew from the need to find a practical approach to the existence of multiple national groups and potential or real national conflict within a multinational state. Their approach was nevertheless deeply rooted in a particular theoretical perception of the nation that originated within the Marxist-Leninist tradition to which they adhered. The Yugoslav communists nominally perceived ‘the national question’ as a question that could be solved. Such a framing of the national as a question that required an answer and a solution was in itself derived from Marxist theory. In The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, the national question was defined as: The totality of political, economic, territorial, legal, ideological and cultural relations among nations (natsii), national groups and nationalities (narodnosti) in various socioeconomic formations.5 Marxists both defined the national phenomena as a question, and aspired to come up with a response to it. In Yugoslavia, as in the Soviet Union, the communists claimed not only to have found a response, but also a solution to the national question. This formulation had important consequences for the communists’ further discourse on the national question in

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia, and also had implications for the examination of their strategies on the national question. The Yugoslav communists engaged with the nation on a number of levels. Within the framework of Yugoslavia they awarded the right of national self-determination to some previously recognised peoples such as Croats, Serbs and Slovenes; they recognised ones that had not been recognised within the first Yugoslav state, like Montenegrins and Macedonians, and in the Macedonian case, they actively engaged in the construction of a new nation. In addition to this, at certain times they aspired to create a new supranational, socialist Yugoslav culture and identity. An important question is, why was the national question at all important to the communists? Their professed worldview was an internationalist one, in which class was more important than the nation. In his definition of the nation, Benedict Anderson argues that, as ‘imagined community’, ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship’6, Although the nation as a political community is, in the words of Anderson ‘imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.7 Marxism is in principle based on a notion of universality and internationalism. National discourse builds on an underlying notion that individuals have a ‘home country’, even in cases where the person lives in another country.8 The views that characterise the national discourse on how to organise the world thus stood in contrast to the Marxist discourse that was inherently international, agitated for a vertical comradeship based on class loyalty in nature and placed class conflict as the primary form of human conflict rather than national conflict. Theoretically and practically, the greatest ordeal faced by communists regarding the nation, was to find a way in which to come to terms with the competition from national(ist) movements. Marxists aimed for international workers’ solidarity across national borders, but largely avoided providing theoretical clarity on the vital topics of the position of the nation and the existence of national conflict. For this reason, they have not been able to account theoretically for the powerful effect the allegiance to the nation-state has had on the masses during the twentieth century.9 Nevertheless, on a practical level, the communist engagement with the nation had above all to do with how to mobilise support for the communist cause. After the communist party came to power, their interest in the national issue had to do with retaining their leading role in society and to seek legitimacy to this role. Marxists, most prominently Lenin, viewed the national question as having a great revolutionary potential. They understood how concerns about national identity could be harnessed to provide support for the socialist revolutionary movement.

Introduction

7

Lenin foresaw the danger of letting non-socialist movements monopolise the political and social potential of national forces and was willing to form strategic alliances with them and concede certain qualified rights to nations. Indeed, the slogan of the right to self-determination, including that of secession, was to become a principal part of the Marxist-Leninist approach not only to the national question but also to their overall revolutionary strategy. National oppression therefore became perceived as the manifestation of capitalist oppression in ‘the time of imperialism’, and according to Lenin, a socialist revolution would not be conceivable without addressing the question of national oppression. Although the national question was a supposedly bourgeois problem and continued to be viewed as an issue belonging to the capitalist sphere, from the 1920s, the international communist movement increasingly advocated that a revolutionary ‘solution’ to the nationalist question should be found. To overcome the challenge socialist revolutionaries encountered from nationalist forces, Lenin advocated a tactical strategy whereby socialist revolutionaries not only adopt the doctrine of national self-determination, but actually go beyond it. Socialist revolutionaries thus made the promise of national self-determination, including the right to secession, a hallmark of their strategies, even if these promises in many ways stood in direct contradiction to their own internationalist aspirations. The logic behind this strategy was dictated by a belief that even if the fight for national independence was capable of making the masses act in opposition to their economic interests, the offering of self-determination would serve to put to rest the national question and lead the masses to focus on their economic interests. It was this kind of logic that led socialist revolutionaries to believe that one could ‘solve’ a national question. Introducing a socialist solution to the national question The claim to have introduced a ‘socialist solution to the national question’ immediately raises two questions: What does it imply to solve a national question? And, what does introducing a socialist solution to a national question entail? The belief that it was possible to ‘solve’ a national question was rooted in the SKJ’s conceptualisation of the nation from a Marxist-Leninist position. Such a claim further relied on a perception that national conflict could, if not immediately, then at least over time, be overcome. It built on a belief that national conflict could be resolved, rather than regulated. Through the building of socialism, it was believed that the attachment to national values and identities would

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

become less important. While the Yugoslav communists to a large degree recognised that national conflict would not automatically disappear with the introduction of a socialist regime, their claim to have solved the national question went beyond being a rhetorical stratagem. The federal institutions created were not designed in such a way as to deal with national conflict as an ongoing phenomenon, and territorial federalism was countered by a high degree of party centralism. The claim to have introduced a ‘socialist solution’ to such a question furthermore implied that the Yugoslav communists had imposed an ideological ‘solution’ to come to grips with Yugoslavia’s complex national make-up. The rather bold claim made by the KPJ may have been useful when they initially came to power, but it also had serious consequences for their further policies towards this question. The claim to have solved the issue made it almost impossible to discuss problematic aspects relating to the national question in an open and public manner. There were also important implications for the rhetoric employed, and for the legitimising strategies of the KPJ/SKJ. Legitimising and hegemonic strategies This book also examines what role the national question, and the ability of the Yugoslav communist leaders to manage it, played in the legitimising strategies of the SKJ. A crisis of legitimation has often been pointed to as a crucial factor in the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe in the late 1980s.10 Regardless of whether or not the communist regimes enjoyed any degree of legitimacy, it is clear that to a certain extent they attempted to employ legitimising strategies in order to retain their power. The KPJ/SKJ claim to have created a new Yugoslavia founded on national equality and ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, formed an important source in their attempt to legitimise their leading role in Yugoslav society. To what extent was the legitimacy of the new Yugoslav state linked to the legitimacy of the Yugoslav communist regime? To address these issues, I have adopted and adapted the theories of Ian S. Lustick. Lustick’s theory builds on a Gramscian understanding of hegemonic processes, and he is particularly concerned with the presumption that boundaries (including boundaries of the state) are treated as a given. He argues that a discussion of the boundaries of a social order – here the state – has explicitly or implicitly been excluded from the framework of analysis: ‘From the internal perspective of any state,’ Lustick points out, ‘stable borders are reflections of presumptive beliefs which remove

Introduction

9

potentially intractable questions of the composition from the political arena.’11 He further argues that: Different borders have different demographic implications and different political myths associated with them. The territorial shape of a state therefore helps to determine what interests are legitimate, what resources are mobilisable, what questions are open for debate, what ideological formulas will be relevant, what cleavages could become significant and what political allies might be available.12 Lustick defines institutionalisation as ‘a process by which change in the rules of political competition becomes increasingly disruptive and decreasingly likely to be part of the strategic calculus of competitors within the institutional arena.’ In the building of institutions, including the building of the state, ‘the process, by which positively valued and stable expectations are produced or destroyed, includes both continuous and discontinuous elements, and both political and psychological aspects.’13 In Yugoslavia, the framework of the Yugoslav state, and the nature of the social relations among the population living within the territorial boundaries of it, could not be seen as a given. Since the Yugoslav state had come into being in 1918, there had been disagreement on what form South Slav unity should take, and on what the nature of relations among the peoples within the state should be like. Furthermore, the Yugoslav state was destroyed during World War II, and in the ensuing civil war, the relationship between the different groups was far from unanimous. The KPJ reorganised the state into a federation, where both old and new groups were given the status of national groups and therefore granted a national homeland. The KPJ only made their decisions regarding the actual internal organisation, number and status of federal units and their borders at the very end of World War II. Some of the borders and units were new, yet many of them were also shaped along old historical lines. Some were more contentious than others. While Yugoslavia represented the core of unit for the KPJ, the communists were also eager for a while to expand this unit, and until 1948, toyed with the idea of creating a Balkan federation. The existence and the shape of the Yugoslav state and its boundaries were therefore not at all self-evident when the KPJ came to power. After 1935, the KPJ was clearly committed to the continuity of Yugoslav unity. The promise of introducing a ‘socialist solution’ formed an important part of the Yugoslav communists’ strategy to gain support for their wider aspirations to build a socialist society. The Yugoslav state

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

formed the framework of this project, one that could ensure social justice and equality for all the peoples within it. The new state represented at the same time both continuity and discontinuity with the old Yugoslav state. Aims and objectives The emphasis in this book is on how the SKJ itself articulated its strategies and policies on the national question. The focus is not the formation or reproduction of national consciousness or national identity, but the public articulation and representation of such identities in the Yugoslav communist discourse. For this reason, the analysis focuses on the political elites. How was a socialist Yugoslav identity represented in the discourse of the Yugoslav communists? To what extent and in which form was such an identity identified as alternative to other competing national or multinational representations in Yugoslavia? The study retains emphasis on the main figures that articulated the Yugoslav communists’ responses to the complex multinational context in which they lived and worked. While recognising that not everything the communists said was necessarily reflected in their actions, I see it as vital to analyse why these issues were articulated and framed in the manner and language they were. In addition, I focus on what impact these issues and the communists’ articulation again had on the dynamics between the theoretical and the practical aspects of their discourse. The question of how the Yugoslav communists articulated their position in the public sphere is therefore imperative. To examine how the communists’ own constructs, and their policies towards national relations, changed over time, the strategies on this question must be placed in context of the wider ideological and institutional processes in the Yugoslav socialist system. The process through which the KPJ/SKJ’s policies on the national question evolved is viewed in this study as a dynamic one, remoulding the interaction between actors within the new system, and also the nature of the system itself. The framework of Yugoslav communists’ socialist project set clear limitations for how different issues were articulated in public; what was and was not legitimate to express in public debates, and in which forums.14 Although the communists were not in a position to implement their ‘solution’ to the national question until after World War II, they arrived at the decision to introduce a federal state model (initially loosely-defined) within an all-Yugoslav framework at the Plenum of the KPJ’s Central Committee in Split in 1935. For this reason, 1935 forms the starting point for this work. The main aspects of the SKJ’s response to the national question and changes in the SKJ’s management of the national question from

Introduction

11

1935–1990 will be presented. What characterised their understanding of and strategies on the national question, what issues influenced these strategies, and why and how did they change? And eventually, what impact did they have on the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state? Political figures, sources and literature Certain figures in the party played a key role in developing the Yugoslav communist discourse on national relations. Tito had remained the undisputed leader of the Yugoslav communist movement since 1939,15 and was its outward symbol. Kardelj became the leading ideologue of the Yugoslav socialist system, and the main defender of the doctrine of socialist selfmanagement on which the system built. He was also the main architect behind the federal and constitutional framework of the Yugoslav state, and the party’s main spokesman on its theoretical position on the national question. These two men engaged in the production of considerable articles, speeches as well as party resolutions, statutes and programmes. This material was collected by the party itself and despite the occasional cleanout of the archives, much remains available as archival sources and in selections published in multi-volume series. Many of the leaders’ most important statements were also published in the party’s official publication Komunist, or in party newspapers like Borba, Vjesnik, Oslobođenje and Delo. The works of Kardelj and Tito formed the core of the official policy on the national question. These were the works which everybody else had to respond to, and which defined the official position at any given time. On the other hand, the responses generated often had an impact on the direction of the leadership’s policies. An important example of this was the change in Kardelj’s thinking on the role of the republics in the early 1960s. In many cases, the leadership set the cue for discussion, but allowed others (writers, lawyers) to carry out the discussions, albeit within clearly defined limits of the party’s officially sanctioned public discourse.16 In some cases, republican leaderships allowed particular debates to take place in the cultural sphere in order to promote a particular view on what they considered an important issue. The Slovene–Serbian polemics on Socialist Yugoslavism in the 1950s and 1960s are a good example of this. In general, the strictness of censorship gave a good indication of how ‘liberal’ or controlling the party was at particular times. A number of the leading members of the SKJ have written memoirs, biographies and autobiographies. A question can be raised as to the reliability of such sources. To what extent can we use the memoirs of figures like Milovan Đilas who was ousted from the SKJ because of his critique of the Party in

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

1954? Although Đilas became the best-known critic of the Yugoslav system in the West, he had also held a central position as one of the four most highranking leaders in the Party until this point. He had been part of the ultra-left wing of the Party and had held a decisive role in forming many of the policies and aspects of the Yugoslav system that he would later criticise. For this reason I have chosen to treat the articles he wrote and the speeches he held while in power as primary sources (in line with those of other Politburo members) while approaching his later works from a different angle. The same applies for other prominent party leaders who later wrote memoirs recounting their view of events that had taken place earlier. These memoirs have been approached as subjective retrospect accounts of events where such figures held a central or sometimes more peripheral role. While such accounts cannot be taken to be ‘objective’ accounts of events, they nevertheless add valuable insight into the interpersonal relationships between the different figures, many of who have since passed away. A great challenge has also been posed when it comes to Slobodan Milošević. His secretive approach and carefulness not to leave a documentary trail behind, make it exceedingly difficult to extract information about his intentions and strategies from his speeches, media statements and other public statements at the time. Unless these are set in context of Milošević’s actual actions and the events that unfolded in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, they make little sense.17 Not surprisingly, the more prolific producers of memoirs tended to be figures who had been ousted or for other reasons left the party or came to play more marginal roles in the actual development of policies. These works were frequently catering to a Western audience as much as to a Yugoslav one. This particularly was the case with Milovan Đilas and historian Vladimir Dedijer. These two, together with Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, were among the most productive communist memoirist chroniclers. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo kept to writing his own memoirs,18 but Đilas and Dedijer also published biographies on Josip Broz Tito.19 Dedijer had been Tito’s official biographer, and his first work from 1953 naturally portrayed Tito in his full glory.20 His highly controversial and revisionist ‘contributions’ to Tito’s biography in Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita were far less flattering. This work, which formed the start of what should soon become a prolific stream of new works with a more critical view on the legacy of the Titoist years, sparked a furore in Yugoslavia. The greatest anomaly remained the case of Aleksandar Ranković. The high-profile Serbian head of the security police who was ousted in 1966,

Introduction

13

kept silent all the years he remained alive. His alleged diary was nevertheless published by his wife after he died in 1983.21 The most high-ranking Yugoslav and SKJ leaders who remained in power throughout the period of research, most importantly Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić and Josip Broz Tito, engaged less in such autobiographical exercises.22 Nor did they really need to. By virtue of their positions in power, they held control over Yugoslav historiography and over how important historical events, the party and its leaders were presented and their performance interpreted. They set clear boundaries for what others could write about them, especially within Yugoslavia. They held central roles in forming the actual policies on the national question and strategies to manage national conflict. A number of memoirs have also been written by figures from the generation who participated in events in the late 1960s and early 1970s and were ousted from the leadership, such as Latinka Perović, Mika Tripalo, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Stane Kavčič and Vlado Gotovac, to mention a few. These are similarly treated with care. Many have been written in retrospect, as antitheses to the officially presented picture of their actions at earlier junctions; in many cases authors have a clear wish to legitimise their own position or actions. While such sources must be used with qualifications, they are nevertheless valuable to gain a broader picture than the official view served by the party itself. They give insight into how these participants viewed their own role in these events. They particularly add a human dimension and are helpful to understand the interpersonal relations between the men and women who held central roles in the attempt to create a Yugoslav socialist society. In some cases, they add the sort of inside information that is difficult to gain from official documents. Although they sometimes are of limited value as ‘objective’ historical sources, they offer valuable insight into the relations between the different leaders and as narratives of the world they lived in. These kinds of sources will not be interpreted in isolation, but placed in context of an analysis of ideological, political and institutional processes that are important to understand the approach of Yugoslav communists to the national question. Even though the KPJ/SKJ did its best to retain hegemony over the public discourse in socialist Yugoslavia, control over the public sphere varied in different periods of the Party’s rule, as did the strictness with which censorship was imposed over what was published. Debates and polemics which were printed in different journals, weeklies and dailies, offer a good insight not only into the strictness of censorship applied at

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

various times, but also into how some often controversial topics could be discussed under the guise of social and cultural debates. In order to shed some light on more underlying issues and on how the SKJ’s articulations were perceived in the broader public sphere, it has been useful to examine certain polemics and public debates between different members of the intelligentsia and the political elites in for example newspapers and journals, and also to peek into the sphere of cultural politics. However, the fact that discussions often took place in other arenas than the purely political one, which was hegemonised by the communist party, poses a challenge to the researcher. This relates to the need, so to speak, of being able to decode the language which the participants use and to interpret the very particular vocabulary employed both by the party, due to their need to make sure Marxist ideology remained a part of the public discourse. This was valid also for those who were engaged in debates with these elites, who similarly needed to cloak their arguments in a language that did not leave them open to reactions from the regime. While this was less the case in Yugoslavia than in other state-socialist regimes, the debates and polemics that took place were frequently cloaked in a particular party-friendly rhetoric, where much of the terminology had very specific meaning. This of course poses some problems for an outside researcher regarding the question not only of what sources to look for, but also of how to read and employ them. Outline Preceded by a preliminary chapter on the KPJ’s strategies to the national question before 1935, the study delineates five specific phases in the development of Yugoslav federalism and of KPJ/SKJ management on the national question until 1990. The measures introduced from 1972– 1980 marked only the beginning of a fourth phase in Yugoslav federalism under the KPJ/SKJ leadership, and the repercussions of the changes introduced in this period were not seen in full until after the death of Tito in 1980. The death of Tito and the original revolutionary leaders in Yugoslavia brought about a new dynamic in the SKJ’s practical management of national relations, even if the developments in the 1980s cannot really be described as a new phase in the SKJ strategies towards the national question. Rather, this last phase could be described as a somewhat unsuccessful attempt by the new collective leadership to preserve the Titoist approach. The last chapter primarily focuses on discussing the factors that led to the fragmentation and delegitimation of the SKJ itself and of its professed solution to the national question in the 1980s.

Soviet-style federalism

Integralist federalism

Federalisation of the federation. Yugoslavia described as ‘community’ – Zajednica, described as a new type of socialist multinational system for regulating national conflict Further federalisation of Yugoslav system through 1974 Constitution

Federal arrangement of 1974 under increasing attack, leading towards the disintegration of the State

1935–1948

1948–1963

1964–1972

1980–1990

1972–1980

Federal phases

Period

Rotating Party leadership after Tito’s death Decentralisation – power to the republican leaderships

Party recentralisation, reaffirmation of the SKJ’s leading role in Yugoslav society Ideological restrictions and renewed focus on democratic centralism

Ascendancy of new leadership Search for unity and Soviet-style centralism Comintern influence – Popular Front tactics Self-managing socialism KPJ becomes SKJ; its role described as ‘educational’ rather than ‘leading’ Party Unity (minus Đilas) until 1958 – public pretence of unity until 1966 ‘Decentralisation, democratisation, deétatisation and de-bureaucratisation’ – (4 Ds) Decentralisation of Party organisation; more power to republican party organisations Two wings – ‘Centralists’ and ‘Federalists’

Party

Table 0.1  Phases in KPJ/SKJ strategies on the national question in Yugoslavia

Acknowledgement of existence of national conflict under socialism Regulation of national conflict, rather than finding solution to it Elusive Yugoslav socialist patriotism, but no Yugoslav integration Disintegrating Yugoslav unity Serbian disillusion with AVNOJ Yugoslav arrangement

Promise of national self-determination on federal principle ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ Claim to have solved the national question Socialist Yugoslavism Attempt to create common Yugoslav culture Abandonment of socialist Yugoslavism Part abandonment of claim to have solved the national question at Eighth Congress, 1964

Strategy on national question and Yugoslav unity

1 THE SEARCH FOR REVOLUTIONARY RESPONSES TO THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1918–1935

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia came into existence during the Congress of Unification held in Belgrade in April (20–23) 1919, the year following the formation of the Yugoslav state. Originally under the name Socijalistička radnička partija Jugoslavije (komunista) (SRPJ[k]), the name of the Party was changed to Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije (KPJ) – the Communist Party of Yugoslavia – the following year at the Second Congress in Vukovar, June 1920. The new party was formed from various small groups within the socialist movement which formerly existed within Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The KPJ became an underground organisation in 1920 when the government made the Communist Party illegal through the Obznana (Pronouncement). KPJ activities were outlawed in 1921, in the Law for the Protection of the State, and the KPJ was to remain an illegal party until World War II. Throughout this period, communists in Yugoslavia lived and worked in difficult conditions and were frequently subject to imprisonment. Remaining at the fringe of political life for the large part of the interwar period, communists were not directly engaged in the actual political struggle over what should be the relations between the state and the nations within the new Yugoslav entity. Nevertheless, the complex relations between the various groups inhabiting the new state, and the struggle to define their status, greatly affected the development of the revolutionary

18

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

strategies of the KPJ. The gradually developing tension within the state also played its part. The multifaceted national composition in Yugoslav society was to have a profound impact on the organisation of the Party, on the framework within which they agitated for revolution, on their attempt to gain support for their cause, on the strategies developed by the KPJ to achieve the aim of a socialist revolution, and on the nature of the revolution itself. The communists’ ability to act as an effective political force became hugely inhibited by their inability to decide on a strategy on the national question. From 1919 until 1935 the Yugoslav communist movement moved through a number of stages in their search for a socialist approach to the national question in Yugoslavia. At the beginning of this period the KPJ attributed very little significance to the national question, but by 1935 it was a major issue for them. In the early 1920s they gave wholehearted support to the principle of Yugoslav unitarism, viewing the Slovenes, Serbs and Croats as three tribes of one nation. A decade later, they were advocating that the Yugoslav state should be dismantled and national self-determination granted to these three groups as well as to a number of groups not recognised by the Yugoslav regime. The Party’s confusion and inability to agree a policy on the national issue can be observed in the factional struggles which characterised much of this period. These struggles originated in questions of party organisation and revolutionary strategies, becoming more apparent when the KPJ evolved from a loose federation of small groups within the socialist movement in Serbia and the Habsburg Empire into a centralised, Bolshevised party. This was not an easy process. The members of the Party had worked within different contexts; they had differing degrees of radicalism and divergent attitudes towards socialist agitation, therefore they focused their attention on different issues. The factional alliances changed and their positions did not remain constant. Gradually, however, two identifiable positions emerged, referred to as a ‘leftist’ and a ‘rightist’ wing of the KPJ, these labels identifying their attitude towards revolution. Although the factional struggles were, to a large extent, linked to questions of party organisation and revolutionary strategies, the national question was to emerge as a central issue in the ensuing disputes. Disagreement on issues of national relations and degrees of revolutionary radicalism became interlaced in a complex, almost intangible relationship. The Yugoslav case demonstrated that, for the communist movement, the national issue could be exploited for revolutionary purposes, yet it could also stifle revolutionary activity, and indeed, render socialist revolutionaries utterly ineffective.

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An important factor in the development of KPJ strategies on the national question in Yugoslavia was the influence of the Communist International – the Comintern. The Comintern’s favoured strategies were not always particularly sensitive towards the reality of the Yugoslav socio-political context, nor towards the problems of socialist revolutionaries within it. Although the Comintern’s officially stated main purpose was to promote world revolution, in practice it functioned more like an extended defence system for the Soviet Union in which it was expected that the highest duty of all communist parties was the defence of the Soviet Union, ‘the only real existing socialist society’. The Comintern offered help to organise revolutionary activities and to promote socialist revolution in countries where the ‘objective’ conditions for revolution existed, but the Comintern’s interpretation of when and where such conditions existed were largely defined according to Soviet Union foreign policy interests. In return, communist parties from countries outside the Soviet Union were expected to give their full allegiance to the Comintern, and their full commitment to Comintern policies. Comintern interference has frequently been highlighted as a crucial contributing factor to the KPJ’s inability to get to grips with the national question in Yugoslavia. The Comintern showed a lack of understanding of the nature of the sometimes conflicting relationships between the Yugoslav nations, and its frequent interference in Yugoslav affairs clearly complicated the disputes surrounding the KPJ approach to the national question. The KPJ’s inability to agree on a nationalities policy in the 1920s and 1930s was however also influenced by domestic factors. KPJ leaders were the product of different backgrounds, different experiences, and came from different parts of Yugoslavia. Their opinions on how progressive the formation of a Yugoslav state might be when viewed within the Marxist concept of historical materialism also diverged considerably. While the socio-political context in Yugoslavia differed substantially from that in Russia, and posed a different set of problems for the KPJ, when the national question arose, the KPJ stance was similar to its Bolshevik mentors. The central issue for both was how to channel national discontent into communist support. Despite the differences in approach of KPJ members towards the national question, as well as the inability by the KPJ to decide on a common strategy, all approached it from the perspective of class. It is extremely difficult to present a coherent picture of the KPJ’s perception of the national question, or their policies and strategies on it, since neither remained constant during the inter-war period. The approaches suggested and taken up prior to 1935 attached differing degrees of relevance to the national question

20

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

for Yugoslavia as a state, and for Communists within it. However, despite the extremely complex and often conflicting KPJ strategies towards the national question, it is important to remain aware that the motive behind each approach was always the attempt to find a socialist response to the Yugoslav national question. Advocacy of Yugoslav unitarism, centralism and the ‘three-named people’ To understand the nature of the conflict which developed around the KPJ’s approach to the national question, and the radical change in the importance attached to it, one has to begin by understanding how the Communists conceptualised Yugoslav unity and the Yugoslav state formed in 1918. Although the merging of various parties in the region into a Yugoslav party came about under strong Comintern influence, the creation of the Yugoslav state was not looked upon in a particularly favourable light from the view of the international communist movement.1 The Comintern was generally hostile to the post-Versailles world order. In its view, the states which emerged from the former AustroHungarian Empire had been created to benefit the imperialist interests of the Entente powers. It was more in favour of exploiting the national question in the region for revolutionary purposes and toyed frequently with the idea of forming a Balkan federation, to be closely linked to the Soviet Union.2 Despite this hostility to the state of Yugoslavia, the Comintern did not interfere in the affairs of the KPJ, nor actively oppose the KPJ’s support for Yugoslav unitarism, until 1922. Unlike the Comintern, the Yugoslav communists viewed the creation of the Yugoslav state as a progressive event, at least initially, and tended to support some form of Yugoslav unitarism. The various factions which made up the KPJ came to strikingly similar positions on the national question. During the Unification Conference, and at party conferences over the next two years, the national question was granted little attention. At the Unification Conference, it was referred to in one single sentence, calling for ‘one national state with broad self-governing regions, districts and communes’.3 Members of the KPJ championed the concept of narodno jedinstvo (national oneness), the principle on which the state had been established, a principle declaring that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three tribes (plemena) of one people.4 They considered the differences between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to be negligible, and thought they would in time disappear through shared market, industry, administrative, legal and educational systems.5

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21

A typical example of the communist attitude towards the national question was expressed by the Serbian Social Democratic Party (SSDP), in an editorial in the SSDP party newspaper, Radničke novine on 30 December 1918: ‘Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are one people because they have one language and indistinguishable ethnic characteristics… Serbs, Croats and Slovenes feel themselves to be one people … and that their unification in one national society is of great political, economic and cultural necessity.’6 The Croat Social Democrats expressed a similar view on 1 May 1918, asserting ‘Slovenes, Croats and Serbs are one and the same people, and as a consequence they have all the attributes of one people and especially in this respect … they constitute an independent free state.’7 Although the KPJ were united in their support for narodno jedinstvo and in advocating for South Slav unitarism, the reasons behind their support, and the manner in which they arrived at this position, were quite different. The South Slav Social Democratic parties from the former AustroHungarian Empire had long been preoccupied with the national question, and with the attempt to find some accommodation to this question. Dušan Lukač argues that all the groups within the renewed social democratic movement, regardless of political differences, expected Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to unify in the name of the ‘three-named people’ and become one nation. Their differences related only to the manner in which they expected this unification to be realised.8 Three views among these groups had been dominant prior to the unification. One group, centred on Juraj Demitrović, was originally in favour of South Slav unity within the framework of Austria-Hungary, then radically evaluated its position in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, coming to support self-determination and the creation of a Yugoslav state.9 Another group, centred on Vitomir Korač, a former South Slav socialist leader under the Habsburg Empire, had from the start worked for South Slav unity, advocating that all parties in the country should concentrate their attention on creating a Yugoslav national state.10 Both these groups regarded the creation of a Yugoslav state as the natural result of a successful national revolution, and thus as a progressive step which socialists ought to support. The leftists, although they also supported the concept of the national oneness of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, did not see unification as a ‘successful national revolution’. Rather, these radicals believed that the ‘ideal of a messianic South Slav state was betrayed by the bourgeoisie’.11 They had favoured ‘a solution to the national question of the Balkan people involving a proletariat revolution’ but they did

22

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

not have a problem with the concept of Yugoslav unitarism, nor with the notion that Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs were three tribes of the same nation. August Cecarec, a leading Croat leftist, expressed the view that it was ‘singularly unfortunate … that the national unification was not brought about by the united revolt of the people themselves’.12 The Serbian Social Democratic Party (SSDP) had historically been less concerned with the national question, and did not have the same enthusiasm for the concept of South Slav unity. The SSDP was more theoretically orientated, and consisted mainly of intellectuals and students whose outlook was more doctrinaire.13 Despite the fact that SSDP members had gone over to Bolshevism en masse following the Russian Revolution, their attitude towards the national question seemed closer to the position of Rosa Luxemburg than to that of Lenin. They felt the national question belonged to the sphere of the bourgeoisie, and that socialists ought not to engage with it. Rather, their focus should be on class struggle. The unification of 1918, in the name of narodno jedinstvo, was seen as the bourgeois stage in the classical Marxist theory of revolution. Now the socialists had to concentrate on achieving the next stage – the proletarian revolution. The SSDP’s approach to the national issue, particularly the lack of enthusiasm for the concept of South Slav unity, reflected the organization’s socio-political background and the fact that the Serbs had already acquired their own state. Serbs did not have the same need for a supranational identity as did the South Slavs from the Austro-Hungarian regions. They had originally been in favour of the formation of a Balkan federation, but following the creation of the Yugoslav state they supported the concept of narodno jedinstvo, seeing no compelling reason to object to it. This support did not, however, have the same urgency and ideological overtones as that of the non-Serbian socialists; it was more a question of practicality, as was illustrated by the SSDP’s encounter with a delegation from another branch within the new Yugoslav socialist family: the Pelagićists from Vojvodina (mostly made up of returned war prisoners from Russia). The Pelagićists had been greatly influenced by Bolshevism, and attempted to put forward the idea, in a Marxist-Leninist spirit, that the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs constituted three different nations, and that the Yugoslav Communists ought to struggle for the creation of a socialist federal republic consisting of these peoples. At their meeting with the SSDP in Belgrade on 17 February 1919, the leader of the Party, and subsequently the first leader of the SRPJ(k), Filip Filipović, recognised that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were formative nations, but nevertheless underlined that ‘since the

The Search for R evolutionary R esponses

23

workers’ movement with regard to all the layers of the nation accepted narodno jedinstvo,’14 it followed that the support for that idea be asserted within the Party. Despite these differences within the newly merged Yugoslav Communist Party, the various factions arrived at the same conclusion, giving their support to a unitary, centralised Yugoslav state, based on the principle of narodno jedinstvo. The KPJ’s support for unitarism and centralism was partly rooted in specific local concerns, and partly in their adherence to Marxist ideology. Their unitarism was a response to the specific circumstances of the region in this period, and although ultimately, narodno jedinstvo, as Banac points out, represented a form of nationalism (more specifically ‘the prototype of South Slavic supranationalism’15), their approach was also influenced by Marxist universalism and the Marxist perception of historical development. Their continuing support of unitarism relied more than anything on their belief that Yugoslav unity was progressive in nature. This belief was largely rooted in the Marxist tendency to favour larger, centralised states. Narodno jedinstvo, lacking Marxism’s universalism, did not exactly correspond with international proletarianism, nor with the Comintern’s view that the national question should be exploited as a tactical tool for revolutionary purposes. Yet paradoxically, the Yugoslav communists’ support for South Slav unity, and their view that the concept of narodno jedinstvo was progressive, drew a lot of inspiration from the Marxist universalist perception of historical development. The KPJ’s approach to the national question in this period relied on the conviction that the accomplishment of narodno jedinstvo would settle national contentions, which in their view were relics from the past, and that the more important class struggle would become the main focus. The KPJ’s continuing support of unitarism must also be viewed from the perspective of their tendency to perceive the national question as the historical task of the bourgeoisie.16 There was the additional notion that in the event of the failure of the bourgeoisie to achieve Yugoslav unity, this task would have to fall on the shoulders of the proletariat. The KPJ also held strong expectations of an imminent socialist revolution, which would render the discussions surrounding the national question largely irrelevant. Despite the mounting evidence of national conflict within the new state, indicating that any journey towards national harmony would be far from smooth, the KPJ continued to support centralism and unitarism while at the same time remaining aloof from the national question. The national issue did not start to command a more prominent position on

24

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

the KPJ agenda until 1922, and the topic was not discussed as an explicit issue in its own right until 1923. 1923–1928: Factional strife between the left and the right wings of the KPJ In the early 1920s, the KPJ put little emphasis on the national issue. They did not question the progressive nature of Yugoslav unity; at the very best, saw the national issue as a bourgeois concern; and frequently acted as if Yugoslav unification had solved the national question. Notwithstanding the KPJ’s reluctance to give much time and concern to the national question, events in this period soon forced the KPJ to review its stand on this issue. The existence of national tension became clearly evident to communists and non-communists alike, as did the recognition that national relations within the state were far from harmonious. The struggle to define the national character and political organisation of the state became crucial to the mounting national conflict. Narodno jedinstvo, the principle on which the state had been established – holding the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to be three ‘tribes’ of the same nation – was not greeted with the same enthusiasm by all groups. This partly resulted from the fact that, as Aleksa Đilas argues, ‘by the time Yugoslavia was created in 1918, both Croatian and Serbian national ideologies were fully formed and embedded in the psyche of their respective peoples’.17 The idea of South Slav unity, also dating back to the nineteenth century, had commanded a certain level of support, mostly among intellectuals, and also among young socialists attached to groups like the Revolutionary Youth and Young Bosnia. However, many of those who supported the concept of South Slav unity found that the way in which the new state was implemented in 1918, and the distribution of power within its constituent groups, fell short of their aspirations. In the end, many were left disillusioned with the new Yugoslavia and with narodno jedinstvo. For some the establishment of the new kingdom was viewed as a betrayal of the concept of South Slav unity. The gradual centralisation of power in Belgrade, and increasing domination of Serbian forces on the political scene did not improve the situation. The unitary position gradually lost legitimacy with most non-Serbs, who increasingly considered it nothing more than an expression of Serbian hegemony. The communists’ glowing support for a unitarist strategy was became problematic. The non-communist opposition was disillusioned with the increasing Serbian domination in Yugoslav politics. This opposition, in Slovenia and particularly in Croatia, became expressed primarily in

The Search for R evolutionary R esponses

25

national terms (or language). The KPJ strategy of remaining aloof from the national question had evidently become detrimental to its wider revolutionary aims. After the government had pronounced the KPJ illegal through the Obznana (Pronouncement) in 1920, and outlawed its activities in the Law for the Protection of the State in 1921, support for the KPJ plummeted drastically, leaving the Party decimated and isolated.18 Paradoxically, the regions in Yugoslavia that actually had some industry and workers, such as Slovenia and Croatia, were the areas where the KPJ met the greatest challenges in mustering support for their movement. There was also strong competition from nationalist movements throughout the inter-war period, and well into the war – particularly in Croatia, where the overwhelming majority of the support of the people went to Stjepan Radić’s Croatian Radical Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka – HRSS). Many of the disputes surrounding the KPJ’s stand on the national question became centred on how to deflect support away from national movements like the HRSS towards the communist movement, and on the relationship the KPJ should have towards other movements opposed to the regime. In a slow process, the KPJ started reviewing its position and approach to the national question. After the Party was made illegal in Yugoslavia, two focal points emerged within the KPJ, one an illegal leadership within Yugoslavia, and another made up of Yugoslav Communists in exile in Vienna. These two points soon became identified as the KPJ’s left and right factions respectively. The subsequent factional struggles originated in organisational issues and the question of which revolutionary strategy was best pursued in view of the Party’s illegal status. However, the national question soon surfaced in this struggle. The leftist wing favoured an underground, revolutionary organisation, being confident that the red wave would lead to an imminent socialist revolution in Yugoslavia. They were also in favour of exploiting the rising national tension within the state to further their revolutionary aims. They recognised the popular potential of the national movements such as the HRSS, and were eager to find a way of channelling that support into support for communism. The right faction was less confident that a revolution was imminent. They favoured a legal, more open party organisation, and worked for the re-legalisation of the KPJ. They felt the present circumstances were unsuitable for the exploitation of national tension, arguing it would be against the interest of the Party to split the base of the workers’ movement. Thus, the right faction tended to minimise the importance of the national question. In the factional disputes over the KPJ’s approach to

26

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

the national question, two main issues emerged. Firstly, they were in disagreement over the most suitable state organisation in Yugoslavia, and secondly they could not agree on how to strategically approach Radić’s Peasant Party and other national movements. These two issues remained in contention throughout the inter-war period. But the KPJ could not start to review their revolutionary strategy towards these issues until they had reassessed their position on the national question. In doing so, however, the KPJ was greatly divided on the question of the nature of national conflict within the state. The outline of the discussion between the rightists and leftists on the national question started to emerge at the first Land Conference of the KPJ in July 1922. At this conference, Kosta Novaković and Lovro Klemenčič raised the issues of the KPJ’s perception of the nature of national conflict in Yugoslavia, and also its support for unitarism. A number of leftists were critical of the assertion made by Sima Marković – the major spokesman of the rightist faction – who held that the struggle over the national question in Yugoslavia was one between the different bourgeoisies, and that the character of this struggle was purely one of class. Sima Marković characterised the political situation in Yugoslavia as a struggle between the ruling bloc of the Serbian bourgeoisie and the opposing bloc of the Croatian bourgeoisie.19 The remaining national bourgeoisie, he argued, steered towards the one bloc or the other, depending on concrete needs and interests.20 Concerning the question of the national character of the state, he maintained it was ‘all the same whether the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are three “tribes” of one nation or three nations’.21 Kosta Novaković, a Serbian leftist, countered Marković’s arguments, and attempted to show that the conflict in Yugoslavia could not be seen as purely an issue of class, and that there was a link between national and class oppression in Yugoslavia. Marković also met opposition to his view that the national question was of a purely bourgeois character from within his own camp, notably from the Slovene Lovro Klemenčič, who was also the first to criticise the theory of narodno jedinstvo. Klemenčič viewed the basis of national conflict in Yugoslavia to be ‘the hegemonism of the Great Serbian bourgeoisie, which was increasingly being transformed into open imperialism’. The theory of the national oneness of the state was thus, he argued, only an imperialist mask.22 At this conference the views of Sima Marković prevailed. The conference’s resolution stated, rather ambiguously, that ‘the KPJ had to seek a solution to all the tribal differences by the way of self-determination’.23 In this statement, the KPJ thus continued to support the notion of narodno jedinstvo.

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27

Further discussion of the national question within the KPJ was prompted by the Comintern’s decision at its Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922 that the class and national aims of the proletariat of the oppressed nations supplemented each other. The view that national conflict was a result of Serbian oppression against the other national groups became strengthened by the increasing Comintern interference in this period. The Comintern tended to favour a loosely defined MarxistLeninist imperialist interpretation of the nature of conflict within the Yugoslav state, and saw Yugoslavia primarily as a product of Serbian chauvinism. In view of this interpretation, they supported the right to self-determination for all national groups except the Serbs (who were viewed as the oppressors). Support of national self-determination in Serbia was therefore seen to be regressive. The arguments and viewpoints in the debates on the national question both within each faction and between them were many and diverse. Yet, both factions approached the issue from a class position, and remained constrained by the framework of Marxist historical materialism. Sima Marković’s book The National Question in the Light of Marxism, published in September 1923, became an important influence on further communist discussions of the national question.24 This work by the major spokesman of the right faction acted as a kind of catalyst which forced other communists to respond and articulate their position on the national question, a process which eventually crystallised the arguments into two relative recognisable positions. Being convinced that the national question was one belonging to the bourgeois sphere, Sima Marković had drawn the conclusion that reconciliation over national conflict had to be sought within a capitalist framework.25 Although Marković maintained that it was largely irrelevant to Marxists whether the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three ‘tribes’ of one nation or three nations, he had now come to the conclusion that the theory of one people with three names did not have a scientific justification.26 Instead, it had allowed Serbian bourgeoisie to dominate the Croat and the Slovene bourgeoisie.27 Although in this work he recognised the leftist position (that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes constituted three different nations) he still vehemently opposed the concept of self-determination and the support of national movements. Rather he argued that the national question was a constitutional one, and that the KPJ should fight for revision of the Vidovdan constitution. He also opposed all suggestions of federalism, advocating an autonomist solution instead. He argued that ‘regional autonomy on the basis of the fullest democracy would be the best solution to the constitutional question’.28 A

28

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

number of leftists disagreed with Marković’s analysis, and particularly with his insistence that the national question was a constitutional one and thus belonged to the bourgeois sphere. With varying degrees of criticism, leftists such as Rajko Jovanović, Triža Kaclerović, Đuro Cvijić, August Cecarec and Ante Ciliga responded to Marković’s book in the Party press. In these critiques, and in the responses to them, the various views concerning the desired state organisation started to emerge, as did attitudes towards the national movements. On the leftist side, the various participants in the debates seemed to be in agreement that the national question could not be viewed as a bourgeois one, and thus could not be solved by constitutional reform. They carried the conviction that the national question could only be solved by a proletarian revolution within a socialist framework. They agreed on the desirability of some form of federalist organisation of the state, although not on its features, nor on the degree of autonomy granted within such a framework. They tended to advocate some co-operation with the national movements like the HRSS, although some were more enthusiastic than others about such cooperation. The Croat leftist Ante Ciliga was one of the more critical participants in this debate. He criticised Marković, whose theory of reasons behind the Serbo-Croat conflict, he argued, did not represent a Marxisteconomic explanation of national struggle, but rather a Marxist-economic defence of Serbian hegemony.29 He also criticised the more moderate leftist Đuro Cvijić, who he felt did not go far enough in criticism of Marković. Ciliga also argued that the federal provisions advocated by Cvijić were not far reaching enough, especially since Cvijić was not prepared to endorse Ciliga’s own advocacy of separate federal armies in Croatia and Slovenia.30 Ciliga also showed great enthusiasm for the idea of co-operation with the HRSS, and advocated the immediate rapprochement between the PWPY and Radić, requesting a united front between workers and peasants in the struggle to achieve a republican peasantworker federation.31 Cvijić responded by arguing that Ciliga’s criticism was futile and disloyal criticism of the Party and he was also sceptical to the idea about co-operation with the national movements, warning against the danger of co-optation.32 The rightist faction, led by Marković and Filipović, continued to view the national question as a bourgeois one, and to work for improvement of national relations within a bourgeois framework. This faction was generally in favour of constitutional revisionism, and some form of political autonomy, though short of federalism, for the Croats and Slovenes.33

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29

The third Land Conference of the KPJ in 1924 rejected Marković’s call for revision of the existing constitution and called on the KPJ to fight to adopt a new federalist one. The conference also called for co-operation with national movements.34 From then on, the leftist view began to prevail and the rightist approach was increasingly discredited. This was aided by Comintern pressure on the KPJ to co-operate with the national and peasant movements, and to exploit the potential of the national question to progress revolutionary aims. Until 1922–23, the Comintern had not interfered directly in Yugoslav affairs, despite its open hostility towards the creation of the Yugoslav state, and of the post-Versailles order in the region in general. The continuing KPJ defiance of Comintern directives, and their hesitancy to exploit the national question were, however, increasingly becoming a source of irritation within the Comintern, who were starting to push the various communist movements to actively exploit, even encourage national conflict, in an attempt to unsettle the post-Versailles political order. At the third KPJ Congress in 1926, the Party accepted the resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Comintern’s Executive Committee of 1925, which called for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the creation of a revolutionary Balkan federation.35 The pressure for this grew stronger as the HRSS joined the Krestintern,36 and in its search for allies toyed for a while with the idea of establishing relations with Moscow during the summer of 1924. Although Stjepan Radić made a swift turnabout and joined the royal government a couple of months later instead, the rightist faction was in reality defeated. In November that year, the KPJ Central Committee stated ‘the national question cannot be identified with the constitutional question, since it is tantamount to maintaining the integrity of imperialist states’.37 Although the two factions reached some reconciliation at this time, they soon started to bicker again, and after continual intervention by the Comintern, a fourth conference was called in 1928. This conference represented the victory of the radical leftist line, describing Yugoslavia as an imperialist creation which had to be broken into smaller units. By 1928, the KPJ had firmly abandoned its support for a unitary state and the principle of narodno jedinstvo, and had come to the recognition that the Yugoslav state comprised of a number of national groups with diverse aspirations.38 However, what this recognition entailed for their revolutionary strategy was a different matter. In these discussions of the national question in the mid-1920s in Yugoslavia, both factions were desperately searching for a ‘solution’ to the national question, whether they believed the question belonged to

30

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

a bourgeois sphere or a socialist one. They differed on what the question of which approach would better serve their ultimate revolutionary aspirations. The KPJ’s support for Yugoslav unity was largely based on their understanding that unification of the various groups within the state based on the principle of narodno jedinstvo was both a progressive event, and a historical task of the bourgeoisie. The perception that the national question in Yugoslavia was revolutionary in nature relied firstly on the KPJ’s belief that the bourgeoisie had failed to accomplish its ‘historical mission’, and secondly on the Marxist-Leninist contention that in ‘the age of imperialism’ the questions of national and class oppression were two sides of the same coin, and that national demands could only be satisfied, and the national question settled, through socialist revolutionary means. In practice, settling national demands within this Marxist-Leninist strategy meant supporting the principled right to national self-determination, which would be granted through the revolutionary seizure of power by the communists and the consequent establishment of a socialist society. Settling national demands also relied on the expectation that by offering a unique socialist solution to the national question, the communists would be able to attract support away from the bourgeois national movements to the communist cause. The KPJ’s calculations in relation to both these ideas failed miserably during the 1920s, and continued to do so well into the 1930s. The KPJ strategies to create a revolutionary situation in Yugoslavia turned out to be hopelessly misconceived, as did their confidence that they would be able to attract the support of the national movements to the communist cause. Importantly, the search for a revolutionary approach to the national question did not in itself settle the question of state organisation or of the framework where this revolutionary solution would be found. 1928 –1935: The Third Comintern period – advocacy of the break-up of Yugoslavia The recognition of the Yugoslav state as a multinational entity, and of the national question as a revolutionary one, had led the leftist faction to advocate the principle of national self-determination. For the majority of leftists, this meant some form of federal framework. But as the strategy of the Comintern became more leftist and militant from 1928 until the mid-thirties, so did the KPJ. In 1928, the Comintern sidelined the leftist faction, and installed a new leadership consisting of Comintern-trained activists with few ties to Yugoslavia. Therefore from 1928–35 the KPJ

The Search for R evolutionary R esponses

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advocated the break-up of the Yugoslav state, and supported national self-determination for its constituent national groups, including the possibility of secession. Throughout the 1930s, KPJ tactics and strategies, including those on the national question, were severely influenced by internal political developments in Yugoslavia, and most of all by international political developments in Europe. Among the internal events that hugely impacted on the development of the KPJ’s strategies towards the national question, were the intensification of political conflict within Yugoslavia following the assassination of Stjepan Radić in 1928, and the introduction of royal dictatorship under Aleksandar I in 1929. After Radić’s assassination, parliament headed towards breakdown. In an attempt to overcome the political deadlock that followed the death of Radić, and to ensure the continuing unity of a centralised and Serbian-dominated state, King Aleksandar introduced a temporary arrangement that soon became a permanent dictatorship. The King banned political parties and abolished the constitution and parliament. He also took steps to further centralise the state, renaming it Yugoslavia, and to create national unity. He refused to recognise any national aspirations or the existence of nationalist loyalties, except to the Yugoslav state. As Aleksa Đilas argues, ‘the King hoped to solve the national question by simply abolishing it’.39 Yugoslavia was reorganised into nine banovine (provinces). The new administrative organisation did not take into consideration ethnic divisions or historical borders; instead new internal borders, named after various rivers, were made. The King’s action was an ill-conceived attempt to persuade nonSerbs to support a Yugoslav state. However, rather than abolishing the national question, the King’s strategy of refusing to recognise the existence of multiple national groups multiplied nationalist opposition to the regime, alienating nationalists from the Yugoslav state and identity he attempted to force upon them. The King’s version of Yugoslav identity was not one to which most of its non-Serbian population could grant their loyalty. The Croats who had hoped for a federal constitution were bitterly disappointed by the new developments, and loyalty to the Yugoslav state was at an all-time low. Although the King refused to talk of a separate Serbian identity as much as he did other national identities, and although he met some resistance against the dictatorship in Serbia as well as in other regions, his rule was modelled on unitary centralism and to some extent accommodated Serb national aspirations by keeping all Serbs within one centralised and unified state. During the 1930s, opposition to the regime increasingly became channelled into agitation by non-Serbian

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

national groups. The Yugoslavia envisioned by the King lost its legitimacy among large parts of its non-Serb population and for the remainder of the inter-war period, it became closely linked in the minds of most non-Serbs to ‘Great Serbian hegemony’. The KPJ was not very successful in attracting potential support from national groups disillusioned with the royal dictatorship. Under this dictatorship and the political paralysis that followed, the KPJ followed an active, uncompromising and increasingly militant line against both the regime and the Yugoslav state. They also adopted a more confrontational attitude towards bourgeois forces, preferring to attempt to outflank them, in an attempt to channel support for movements such as the HSS into support for itself.40 They refused to cooperate with social democratic forces, frequently referring to them as ‘social fascists’.41 The Yugoslav communists also flirted with the ultra-right Croatian Ustaša Movement, whose members they frequently encountered while in prison, hoping that they could turn them towards the left. This flirtation came to little, since the clearly fascist tendencies of the Ustaša were stronger than their revolutionary potential, and was soon abandoned.42 The directives from the Comintern in this period did a lot of harm to individual communist parties, including the Yugoslav one, in the changing international atmosphere. In keeping with the interests of the Soviet Union, the Comintern directed its members to exploit national conflict with the aim of splitting up the states in Eastern and Central Europe as a way of spreading revolution westwards. KPJ strategies to exploit the national question turned out to be a disaster. Signs of imminent revolution were conspicuously absent. The KPJ’s confrontational attitude towards other anti-regime political forces meant that few organisations would co-operate with them. The KPJ overestimated its own ability to transform support for groups like the HSS into support for communism. Despite, or because of, Radić’s assassination, the HSS still commanded the overwhelming support of the Croats. The suspicion of the new HSS leader, Vladko Maček, towards the KPJ hardly helped their relationship with his party. Nor did their continual attempts to split and discredit the HSS. Their confrontational line with the Yugoslav government also affected the KPJ command structure, since many of their leaders were imprisoned or killed in clashes with the regime. KPJ strategies to exploit the national question during this period totally failed and did little to progress their revolutionary aims, or to attract the support of nationalist groups to the communist cause. In fact, the KPJ were left even more politically isolated, as well as internally fragmented and weakened.

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33

The growth of right-wing nationalist extremism in this period made the KPJ more doubtful of its ability to agitate for national secession, or to channel the resulting nationalist conflict into support for the communist cause. Gradually, it recognised that the attempt to exploit the national question for revolutionary purposes in the political climate of the 1930s could play into the hands of national extremists and fascist forces. In 1932, the Party came under the leadership of Josip Čižinski, better known as Milan Gorkić who was appointed General Secretary of the KPJ. (Many of the communists had pseudonyms like this, because of the Party being illegal.) Gorkić had been in Moscow and worked for the Comintern for the best part of a decade, and had not resided in Yugoslavia since 1923. He was appointed a member of the Central Committee of the KPJ in 1927, and joined the Politburo in 1928. Gorkić had a good reputation among the Russians in the Comintern, but he was never entirely accepted by the Yugoslav communists, who viewed him to be out of touch with the reality of the conditions in Yugoslavia.43 Like many of the other members of the Central Committee, Gorkić was trained by the Comintern in the Soviet Union, and spent little time in Yugoslavia. The main responsibility for organising the KPJ’s fourth Land Conference in 1934 was granted to Josip Broz, later better known as Tito, who had recently been released from prison and co-opted onto the Central Committee of the KPJ. At the fourth Land Conference, the KPJ to a large extent followed the line of the Fourth Congress in 1928, and it still insisted, for the last time, on advocating the break-up of the Yugoslav state. Importantly, this Conference also made the decision to establish separate Croatian and Slovenian Party organisations to make it easier for cadres in these areas to influence the masses and to give some credibility to their policies on the national question. However, these organisations were not actually established until 1937, under considerable pressure from the Comintern. Josip Broz aided the practical implementation of the new party organisations. Josip Broz also raised the need to facilitate communist engagement with the national question during his work on setting up a Regional Committee for Slovenia in October 1934. He argued that one of the primary parola (pledges) of the KPJ must ‘be the liberation of all the peoples of Yugoslavia under Great Serbian hegemony’, with the Communists in the forefront. Josip Broz advised the Regional Committee for Slovenia not to wait for instructions from the Central Committee, but to publish a leaflet about the national question for Slovenia, taking into account the newest developments.44 Four years later, one of the participants at this session, Edvard Kardelj, published not only a leaflet, but a

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

full monograph on the national question in Slovenia. This work, Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja,45 was the first attempt to provide a Marxist analysis of the historical and national development of Slovenia. Kardelj’s analysis built on Stalin’s definition of the national question, adapted to the Yugoslav and Slovenian situation. This was also the first attempt since Sima Marković to tackle the KPJ position on the national question. Kardelj played an instrumental part in the development of the Slovenian party organisation and would also become one of Tito’s closest associates. Although the fourth Land Conference still advocated the break-up of the Yugoslav state, there was a gradual move towards the recognition that the strategies and tactics of preceding years had been detrimental to the KPJ, and a slow change in focus could be witnessed from this point on. Conclusion The Yugoslav communist movement moved through a number of stages in their search for a socialist approach to the national question in Yugoslavia from 1919 to 1935. The approaches taken and suggested during the inter-war period attached different degrees of importance to the national question and the degree to which the Communists ought to concern themselves with it. Underlying the KPJ’s difficulty in defining an approach to the national question prior to 1935 was its inability to agree on the nature of national relations within the state. The nature of these relations within the newly formed Yugoslav state and the definition of the state’s national character were of an extremely complex nature, and soon became a matter of contention. The members of the KPJ often disagreed fundamentally in their perception of the national make-up of the state, on the character of the national conflict developing in Yugoslavia, and on the strategy they should take towards this conflict. Were the three groups recognised in the name of the state – the Slovenes, Serbs and Croats – three separate tribes, as claimed by the regime, or were they separate nations? What about the groups that were not recognised at all? Despite the differences in the suggested approaches as well as the inability of factions within the KPJ to decide on a strategy, all KPJ factions arrived at the issue from a class position. Their discussions of the nature of national relations during the 1920s primarily centred on the question of how the concept of Yugoslav unity and the formation of a Yugoslav state fitted within the Marxist concept of historical materialism. Likewise, the dispute concerning the strategy to be pursued on the national question, and the various positions taken in this dispute grew

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35

from one ultimate concern: to find a socialist response to the national question in Yugoslavia. The communists’ search for a ‘socialist solution’ to the national question within a Marxist framework meant that the national question was given varying degrees of attention according to its relevance to the revolutionary aims of the KPJ. The issue of identifying a socialist response to the national question had the ultimate aim of attracting popular support to the communist cause, as well as neutralising the power exerted by nationalist movements and forces. The national question was therefore approached as a tactical issue which may or may not help the communists to achieve a socialist revolution and put the KPJ in a position of power from which they could attempt to create a new socialist society. Not all the members of the KPJ adhered to the view that the national question was a purely tactical issue. Differences had long existed within the communist movement surrounding the degree to which the communists ought to concern themselves with the national question, and the extent to which it was an issue which could be exploited for revolutionary purposes. As a result of this, differences also emerged around the degree to which communists should co-operate with ‘bourgeois’ national and liberal democratic forces, and about the ideal organisation of the state. Communists in Yugoslavia had, from the start, been very diverse. Although the majority were fully committed to the socialist movement and opposed ‘bourgeois nationalism’, the leaders of the various factions had grown up in radically different circumstances and environments. They differed not only on their attitudes towards the national groups and the importance of the national question but also on the question of state organisation. These differences ultimately influenced the organisation of the Party and the aims of the KPJ. The Yugoslav case demonstrates quite clearly that revolutionaries do not operate in a vacuum, but that the specific socio-political conditions in which they work play a crucial role in determining the strategy they pursue towards their revolutionary aims. The complex nature of national relations within the pre-war Yugoslav state had a great impact on the communist movement in the area. Far from being able to exploit the issue for their own revolutionary purposes, their inability to decide on a strategy towards the national question practically paralysed the Party, and prevented them having any political impact or increasing support for their movement during this entire period. In addition, the shifting political climate in Europe and the strategies advocated by the Comintern also had a definite influence on the strategies and responses of the KPJ.

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

The KPJ’s inability to agree a unified approach on the nature of national relations in Yugoslavia and party policy towards the national question left the KPJ beset by fractional strife, fragmented, ineffective, and utterly isolated during most of the inter-war period. Although the factions and the positions they held were extremely complex and shifted substantially during this period, they all in some way related to the national question. Each of the factions espoused its own standpoint on the nature of the national question in Yugoslavia, the national character of the state, and the policy the KPJ should take on these.

2 TOWARDS YUGOSLAV FEDERAL UNITY UNDER COMINTERN INFLUENCE

In the period 1935–1940 important changes took place which profoundly influenced the KPJ’s search for a solution to the national question in Yugoslavia. From 1935 (the year when the Comintern introduced the Popular Front line to its members), the answer was sought firmly within the context of a Yugoslav state. The introduction of the Popular Front line encouraged the KPJ to modify the expression of its revolutionary ambitions and to return to seeking co-operation with all ‘freedomloving and progressive movements’ including social democrats and the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). With the rise of fascism in Europe and this shift in the Comintern the KPJ stopped its insistence on dismantling the state and gradually started working towards a federal solution to its organisation. Simultaneously, important developments took place within the organisational structure of a KPJ that found itself in serious crisis. By the mid-1930s, the KPJ had become weakened to the point where it was in danger of evaporating. While its continuing existence and new leadership were not secured until 1939, the KPJ party organisation underwent considerable restructuring from 1936 until World War II. Vital to these changes was the rise of Josip Broz to the leadership of the Central Committee of the KPJ. With his appointment as organisational secretary inside Yugoslavia in 1936, work began to move the KPJ leadership back to Yugoslavia. Josip Broz’s arrival at the head

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

of the Party organisation accelerated the process of unifying the KPJ along a Bolshevik line, to rule out different factions and to strengthen the organisational network of the KPJ in different parts of the Yugoslav state. These intra-party processes impacted upon the national question. A key factor in the process of change was the need to strengthen the Party’s organisational presence in the regions. The KPJ recognised that thus far, revolutionaries in different Yugoslav regions had failed to attract the support of the masses to the socialist cause. Therefore, the KPJ now sought to present itself as the best protector of national rights of individual peoples inhabiting different regions of Yugoslavia. One KPJ strategy was co-operation with those non-communist national and liberal parties which had traditionally received the bulk of the popular support, while at the same time annexing their supporters. This presented a huge challenge for the Yugoslav communists. There was internal disagreement in the Party, which was directly linked to the Popular Front and the national question. The Comintern and the Popular Front Comintern and Soviet influence strongly affected all aspects of Yugoslav tactics throughout this period, including the understanding of federalism and the national question. The increasing threat of fascist forces across Europe led the Comintern to modify its confrontational line against social democrats and moderate leftist forces. From the mid1930s, the Soviet Union shifted the emphasis away from exploiting national conflict in the hope of splitting up the states in Eastern and Central Europe and spreading revolution westwards. Instead they prioritised the task of presenting a united front against the danger of fascism. The shift to the Popular Front line greatly affected responses to the national question by the communist movement all over Europe, including Yugoslavia. The Comintern officially introduced the Popular Front line in 1935. Communists were instructed to tone down their revolutionary rhetoric and activities, and encouraged again to co-operate with ‘progressive’ liberal and social-democratic forces. Which groups were considered to be ‘progressive’ was primarily judged by their anti-fascism. While the tactics of the Popular Front line emerged, to a large extent, as a search for a way of dealing with the increasing fascist threat and the new focus in Soviet foreign policy, the shift in Comintern policy was also affected by internal pressures and by frustration within national communist parties at the damaging tactics of the Comintern Third Period from 1928–1935.1 Therefore, the new

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approach also represented a reformulation of the international communist movement’s revolutionary tactics. As a result, the Comintern had to rethink its approach to alliances with other classes and democratic forces, and reconsider its stand on the national question. The uncompromising sectarianism which had characterised communist agitation during the Third Period was exchanged for an increasing focus on attracting popular support. With the shift to the Comintern’s Popular Front policy, the concept of the ‘People’ increasingly emerged as an important term in the communist rhetoric.2 A key advocate of the new Comintern line was the Bulgarian Communist Georgi Dimitrov, who emerged as the new Comintern leader in 1934. The resolution of the Seventh Comintern Congress, held in Moscow in July and August 1935, was an important influence on the KPJ’s future approach to the Yugoslav state and the national question in Yugoslavia. In his address to the Seventh Congress, Dimitrov voiced the opinion that ‘proletarian internationalism must, so to speak, “acclimatise itself” in each country in order to sink deeper roots in its native land.’3 Nevertheless, these variations in national conditions were not seen to be in contradiction to proletarian internationalism. Even though the new line allowed for some tactical variation in a national context, the communist parties remained very much under the control of the Comintern and Soviet influence. Although Stalin eventually converted to this new Popular Front line and expected the communist parties to follow suit, he was initially hesitant about the Popular Front tactics, particularly with regard to co-operation with social democrats.4 While the Popular Front line greatly served the interests of the Soviet Union, Soviet interests were in no way set rigidly in the quickly changing context of late 1930s Europe, and Stalin attempted to keep his options open. The KPJ and the Popular Front The KPJ followed the new Comintern line, seeking co-operation with other leftist and liberal forces, including the social democrats and the HSS. The KPJ increasingly viewed the treatment of the national question as part of a larger, international struggle, the temporary focus of which was the struggle against fascism. The KPJ was therefore prepared to support developments that could achieve some improvements in national relations within the Yugoslav state. Although the KPJ maintained that the solution to the national question should ultimately be a socialist one, it recognised that any attempt to exploit the issue for revolutionary purposes

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

in the political climate of the 1930s could be harmful and play into the hands of national extremists and fascist forces. Therefore, the organisation modified the expression of its revolutionary ambitions and sought to co-operate with liberal and moderate national forces in different parts of Yugoslavia which were considered anti-regime and anti-fascist, with the aim of building a common front against the danger of fascism. The decisive shift within the KPJ’s search for a solution to the national question came in June 1935 at a CK KPJ Plenum in Split. This change in policy was closely connected to the idea of the Popular Front. Although the official Comintern endorsement of the Popular Front line came two months later, at the Seventh Comintern Congress in Moscow, the KPJ policies introduced at the Split Plenum anticipated this shift and supported the new line. In preparation for the Seventh Comintern Congress, the Central Committee of the KPJ (CK KPJ) made a critical assessment of its work over the previous years, an assessment that also included a critique of the activities by the CK KPJ and other party organs with regard to the national question. The KPJ recognised that revolutionaries in different Yugoslav regions had failed to attract popular support to the socialist cause. They argued that while national revolutionaries had maintained minor isolated groups in Slovenia and Croatia, they had imprinted minimal influence and no success whatsoever in Montenegro and Macedonia.5 The rise of fascism in Europe and the Comintern shift to the Popular Front line also had an impact on the KPJ’s position on the Yugoslav state. At the plenum in Split, the KPJ stopped insisting the Yugoslav state should be dismantled. It now concluded that a solution to the national question within a Yugoslav context needed to recognise multinationalism and the right of different groups to self-determination. Its resolution stated that ‘although the KPJ struggles for the right to self-determination of the oppressed parties, it does not insist on the break-up of Yugoslavia at any cost; rather every nation has the right to determine with whom and how it will establish its state unit.’6 The KPJ did not yet officially endorse the kind of federalist framework that was to emerge during the war, and remained vague on the question of which form the state organisation should take, but it recognised that, in the present conditions, insistence on breaking up the state was playing into the hands of rising fascist forces. The decisions taken at the Plenum of the CK KPJ in 1935 formed a crucial point of departure in the Yugoslav communists’ approach to the national question as, from this time onwards, the Yugoslav communists did not depart from this line of supporting a multinational Yugoslav state entity.

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41

Although in previous years the KPJ had agitated for the break-up of the Yugoslav state as directed by the Comintern, the return to a Yugoslav line did not cause too much disruption in the organisation. Not all communists had felt entirely at ease with this policy, which in essence was imposed upon them by the Comintern. Even though the Yugoslav communists had pursued the secessionist and sectarian policy of the Third Comintern with great vigour, even the leftist Yugoslav cadres had in the late 1920s been in favour of some form of federal Yugoslav solution. Despite its otherwise marginal position in Yugoslav politics, the KPJ was the only political force with a network extending throughout the entire Yugoslav state, and not related to one particular national group. Cadres frequently moved around to different regions, and the Party was organised on a Yugoslav principle. The fact that the Party and its activity was structured in this way meant that advocating secession and the break-up of the Yugoslav state would not be advantageous to the KPJ. Therefore, the support for a Yugoslav line resulted from a combination of new orders from Moscow, and a more realistic assessment of the KPJ’s revolutionary tactics and strategies, including its internal position in Yugoslavia, and its ability to attract support in the new political context. On the other hand, although the new strategy emphasised a Yugoslav line, the all-Yugoslav profile also challenged the KPJ’s ability to make alliances with regional political forces whose main focus often coincided with the particular interests of national groups. At the Seventh Comintern Congress, the CK KPJ provided an official explanation for why it had up to this point supported a secessionist line and the break-up of the state, and also why this was no longer a viable approach. According to the CK KPJ, after World War I, and particularly during 1929–1930, the Versailles bloc (which included Yugoslavia, but had France at its head) constituted a direct threat to the USSR. Supporting the Versailles order would mean supporting the forces that prepared counter-revolutionary war against the first country of socialism. For this reason, the KPJ’s pledge supporting the break-up of one link in that system (Versailles Yugoslavia) was entirely correct.7 The new conditions, however, had altered the situation, both internationally and domestically. The Yugoslav communists argued that France and its allies were, at least temporarily, interested in preserving peace. Now the phenomenon of fascism and its demand for an alteration of the borders created by the Versailles order represented the greatest threat to the USSR. In these circumstances, an intact Yugoslavia could play a positive role, though the KPJ should continue to fight for democratisation through a Popular

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

Front.8 The KPJ increasingly came to view the search for a solution to the national question as one important, though integrated, part of a larger project – that of building a unified front of ‘all progressive and democratic forces’ against the danger of fascism and extreme nationalism. Although maintaining the belief that the ultimate solution of the national question had to be a socialist one, Blagoje Parović, in his address to the plenum in Split, argued ‘the communists do not suggest a postponement in finding a solution to the national question until a soviet revolution would take place.’9 Therefore, after 1935, the KPJ were prepared to put their weight behind the demand for some improvement of national relations within the framework of the existing state, and thus advocated free parliamentary elections for all the nations of Yugoslavia. Details of the actual organisation of the state and relations between different national groups were not discussed, but the KPJ did advocate the setting up of national parliaments for Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Vojvodina.10 The creation of a Croatian Sabor, or parliament, was viewed as the most urgent question. For the KPJ, the Popular Front line represented primarily a tactical direction with the aim of strengthening the influence of a party which had become thoroughly marginalised in Yugoslav politics. From 1935 until 1939, the KPJ focused on attracting popular support by presenting itself as the most dedicated defender of national and democratic rights and the protector of progressive values. In an effort to assert greater influence on the masses, the KPJ decided at the plenum in Split to start working through the legal routes available to it, including the legal trade union organisations, cultural societies, sports clubs and similar institutions, and set up the Party of the Working People as a legal front for its activities. In this way, the organisation hoped to convey its interpretation of the national question to the masses.11 There was an increasing focus upon making cadres ‘legal’ so that they could participate in these organisations rather than living an underground existence constantly on the run from the police. The universities, particularly the University of Belgrade, were also important arenas for agitation and recruitment, since organising in these institutions involved less risk. An important purpose behind the KPJ’s participation in these organisations was infiltration and building a base of support for the communist cause. Thus the KPJ pursued a dual strategy: seek co-operation with the leaders of various liberal and national movements opposed to the Yugoslav regime and to fascism, while at the same time trying to infiltrate legal organisations and build a base of support for the communist cause from within.

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The switch to the Comintern’s new Popular Front, though welcomed by many communists, presented its member parties with a delicate balancing act. The KPJ faced a great credibility challenge in its quest for rapprochement with the liberal and social democratic forces which it had treated with considerable hostility for years. Support from other anti-fascist and anti-regime forces in a broad political coalition led by the KPJ was not forthcoming. Communication from the exiled CK KPJ, which maintained main responsibility for transmitting all Comintern instructions and directives to the cadres operating inside Yugoslavia, was sporadic, leaving the Yugoslav cadres to manage as best they could for much of the time. In addition, the uncompromising oppression of communist activists within Yugoslavia made internal communication difficult. According to Tito, ‘instructions were slow in coming, and when they came, they were often contradictory.’12 One example of this was the KPJ’s tactics on participation in the parliamentary elections arranged in Yugoslavia in May 1935, following the assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseille in 1934. Milan Gorkić first issued instructions directing the Yugoslav KPJ to put forward its own candidates for the election through the Working People’s Party, the KPJ’s newly established legal front. Soon after, however, in anticipation of the changing Comintern line, and probably on their instruction, Gorkić issued a contradictory directive, instructing the KPJ to seek participation with the partners in the United Opposition (a coalition of Croatian, Serbian and all other parties opposing the dictatorship) headed by Vladko Maček, the leader of the HSS.13 The continuing reluctance of other parties to co-operate with the Communists constituted a serious challenge towards building a Popular Front as envisioned by the Comintern. The United Opposition was already being set up, and had experienced considerable success in attracting the support of the masses, particularly in Croatia. The leader of the coalition, Vladko Maček, was extremely sceptical about the communist movement. Maček rightly calculated that much of the support of those sympathetic to the communist cause would go to the United Opposition, and saw no need to grant concessions to the KPJ, or give them any significant role in the oppositional front. In the end, these elections changed little, since the Regent Prince ignored the results and installed Milan Stojadinović as the new Yugoslav Prime Minister. With his increasing expression of sympathies towards the Axis powers, Stojadinović gradually steered the vulnerable Yugoslav state closer to international disaster. Nevertheless, many Yugoslav cadres were dissatisfied with the failure of the KPJ to agree on a tactic that would have rendered them more effective and given

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

them a role in the events that were taking place. Their frustration was primarily aimed at Milan Gorkić, as was that of the Central Committee of the KPJ. In April 1936, a plenum was arranged by a group of members of the Central Committee, without the knowledge of the Comintern or Gorkić (who was in Moscow at the time). The participants at this meeting expressed the view that support to the Yugoslav state was still conditional on the overthrow of the present regime. They also continued to grant support to the right to self-determination and secession. Although the Comintern greatly contributed to the chaos by issuing contradicting instructions, they did not approve of the decisions taken at this plenum, and reprimanded the KPJ for continuing to advocate the right to secession. The politburo of the KPJ organised a meeting in Moscow in June 1936 where they rejected the position taken at the March plenum. They also criticised the KPJ’s weak performance and failure to adhere to the new line since the Seventh Comintern Conference.14 At the June plenum in Moscow, the CK KPJ decided to modify their previous call for the creation of national parliaments. Now, they decided to back the United Opposition. The unification of the KPJ and the emergence of a new Party leadership The KPJ’s search for a solution to the national question within a Yugoslav context was not only affected by the switch to the Popular Front, but also conditioned by internal developments in the Yugoslav party organisation. Although the KPJ had an organisational network that spread throughout the Yugoslav state, their party organisation was in serious disarray. From the mid-1930s, the process of creating a more organised, dynamic and unified party organisation began. Although Milan Gorkić remained the Political Secretary of the CK KPJ, and was the person who enjoyed the principal loyalty and support of the Comintern, the task of reviving the KPJ inside Yugoslavia became the responsibility of Josip Broz from 1936.15 According to Josip Broz, the suggestion to reorganise the KPJ and divide the leadership originated with him. I called on Dimitrov … and put forward my view that the basic prerequisite for the successful work of a party is that its leadership be at home, among the people, to share the rough and the smooth with them. A heated discussion developed over my proposal, Gorkić in particular opposing it. One part, headed by me, would go home to work while Gorkić as Political Secretary would stay

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45

abroad. He was also given the right to veto all political decisions adopted in Yugoslavia.16 In this capacity, Josip Broz was granted the main responsibility of trying to revive the communist party within Yugoslavia, and purge it of people who defied the Comintern directives and engaged in factional disputes.17 The rise of Josip Broz to power From 1935–1939, crucial years in the history of the KPJ, the Croatian peasant’s son from Zagorje emerged as the undisputed leader of the communist party in Yugoslavia and would remain so until his death in 1980. Josip Broz had been a member of the KPJ since the 1920s. He had been sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause ever since his capture by the Russians while serving as a podoficir in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War I and witnessing the Russian Revolution. Upon his return to Yugoslavia, he became a prominent union organiser. He was imprisoned as a political agitator in late 1928, and remained in prison until 1934. Upon his release, Josip Broz was more committed than ever to the communist cause18 and became a member of the KPJ Regional Committee for Croatia. He soon rose in the ranks of the Party hierarchy. The regional committee sent Josip Broz to Vienna in 1934 to get acquainted with the work of the Central Committee. He was co-opted onto the Central Committee, and began his career as an underground agitator. He had many aliases, but was primarily known in the Comintern as Walter. Later he became best known under the name Tito. He also travelled to Yugoslavia frequently on different tasks. In September 1934, he was granted the responsibility to organise a provincial party conference in Slovenia, in an attempt to reactivate the Communist Party in Slovenia. It was here he met Edvard Kardelj for the first time.19 Both men were assigned to training in Moscow shortly after. Josip Broz went to Moscow in February 1935. Upon returning to Yugoslavia in 1936, Tito systematically set out to strengthen the Party organisation and tighten the unity of the Party. Josip Broz emphasised the need for the leadership to be in Yugoslavia, and to have greater awareness of the social and political conditions within their country. He liaised with the few communists still active in Yugoslavia who were not in prison, and who had tried their best to perform party work and keep the remnants of the Party together in the difficult domestic and international conditions.

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

Stalinist purges and the struggle for the Yugoslav party leadership Together with his Slovene colleague Kardelj, Josip Broz Tito was one of the few Comintern-trained Yugoslav communists to escape Stalin’s purges. These purges caught up with the Yugoslav branch of the Comintern in Moscow in 1937–1938, where a large part of the existing Yugoslav communist apparatus perished. A great number of exiled Yugoslav communists, including most of their more prominent leaders from the previous decade, vanished in the Stalinist purges. These purges decimated the official KPJ leadership in exile, as well as the large group of Yugoslav communists in Moscow, including Sima Marković, Filip Filipović Kosta Novaković, Stefan and Đuro Cvijić, Kamil Horvatin and Vladimir Čopić.20 The purges also caught up with the KPJ Secretary Milan Gorkić in 1937, and in 1939, Petko Miletić, who became Tito’s main contender in the leadership struggle, also disappeared in the Soviet Union in inexplicable circumstances. Together with the harsh treatment meted out to communist activists by the Yugoslav regime, the Stalinist regime cleansing of the KPJ leadership weakened the Yugoslav party organisation to the point where it was in danger of evaporating. On the other hand, in a most sinister manner, these developments also rooted out the factional strife that had marked the policies of the KPJ since its initiation, and facilitated the construction of a unified and focused Yugoslav party organisation. After Milan Gorkić disappeared in Stalin’s purges in 1937, Josip Broz Tito took over the temporary leadership, but the Party’s existence and his position was consolidated only in 1939. The activities of the KPJ Central Committee were suspended from 1937 until the Comintern confirmed the continuing existence of a unified Yugoslav communist party and Tito’s leadership of this party two years later.21 In this two year interim, a bitter struggle over the Party leadership unfolded. With the lack of direction from the CK KPJ in exile during much of the early 1930s, and the large number of communists in Yugoslav prisons, the prison committee (kaznionički komitet) of Srijemska Mitrovica, popularly referred to as Kakić, emerged as an important centre for the struggle for control of the KPJ organisation.22 A struggle broke out between different factions among the incarcerated communist activists in the Srijemska Mitrovica prison. Although Tito attempted to mediate in this conflict, this same conflict also involved a struggle over the leadership which he had temporarily been granted. He therefore took steps to neutralise his main and most dangerous opponent, Petko Miletić. Following the purge of Gorkić,

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Miletić made a strong bid for the leadership in Srijemska Mitrovica, where he remained until 1938. In the prison, he had built up a group of supporters, and bullied communists in the prison who did not support him, particularly the older generation of revolutionaries, most importantly Andrija Hebrang and Moša Pijade.23 Miletić also tried to make bonds with some members of the KPJ apparatus in Paris in the attempt to build up a new Central Committee.24 The Paris-based members of the exiled Central Committee, Kusovac and Marić, who were also positioning themselves in the leadership struggle following Gorkić’s purge, lent their support to Miletić. Miletić had also been working for the Comintern for some years, and had made friends within the Bulgarian branch, who supported him in the struggle with Tito over the leadership. Tito, who had the backing of the powerful Comintern leader Dimitrov, was successful in neutralising Miletić’s influence in prison, and handed the main responsibility to Moša Pijade. Tito’s position and the continuous existence of the KPJ were both finally approved by the Comintern in 1939. Consolidation of a new KPJ leadership and the Popular Front in Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito had been pursuing his mission to create a more unified party organisation and move the leadership back to Yugoslavia ever since he was appointed organisational secretary for the KPJ inside Yugoslavia in 1936. A new leadership of the KPJ was gradually built, relying primarily on younger cadres, carefully handpicked by Josip Broz who was a good 20 years older than many of them. Although they pursued the tactical shift to the Popular Front line, the new party leadership spent considerable effort in unifying the Party and training its members to be ready for underground struggle if and when a revolutionary situation should occur. The new leadership consisted of members from different parts of Yugoslavia with diverse social backgrounds, and was a compromise between leftist and more moderate members of the Party.25 It represented a tightly knit group of men who guided the Party through World War II and the People’s Liberation Struggle, and after the war set out with vigour on their mission to create a new socialist society in Yugoslavia. The new leadership included many of those who would become Tito’s closest colleagues, such as Milovan Đilas, Aleksandar Ranković, Edvard Kardelj and Ivo Lola Ribar. These were the new generation of socialist revolutionaries in Yugoslavia. The only one of this group who would continue to work with Tito throughout his time in power was the Slovene

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Edvard Kardelj (1910–1979). Kardelj, trained as a schoolteacher in Ljubljana, had been a member of the KPJ since his youth, and spent two years in prison in 1930–1932. He resided in the USSR from 1934 to 1937, where he again met Tito, whom he had encountered in Ljubljana prior to his deployment to the USSR. Kardelj attended classes at the Lenin School and Communist University for the National Minorities of the West (KUNMZ) where he also did some teaching, combining this with work in various committees of the Comintern.26 He became a member of the Central Committee of the KPJ in 1937 and played a central role in the founding of the Slovene Communist Party. He became a trusted colleague assisting Tito in the rebuilding of the Yugoslav Party organisation and remained a central figure in the Party until his death in 1979. He also emerged as the main ideologue of the Yugoslav system after 1948, and became the Party’s principal theorist on the KPJ’s strategy on the national question in Yugoslavia. Milovan Đilas and Aleksandar Ranković both belonged to the most radical leftist wing of the Party, and had both been supporters of the Miletić faction in Srijemska Mitrovica popularly referred to as the ‘Wahabites’.27 Đilas and Ranković first encountered each other in prison in 1934, but were out of p­rison by the time the leadership struggle reached its height in Srijemska Mitrovica. They both became the loyal associates of Tito and were included in the new leadership. Milovan Đilas (1911–1995), an eager young Montenegrin communist, became a member of the KPJ and secretary for the Party organisation at Belgrade University in October 1932. He was in prison from 1933–­1936, mainly in Srijemska Mitrovica. In 1937, he acquired a leading role in revitalising the Party organisation in Serbia, and the same year, he became a member of the Regional Committee for Serbia.28 Đilas’ first encounter with Josip Broz Tito was in Zagreb in 1937. At their second encounter, according to Đilas, Tito asked him for the names of a competent worker and a politically mature youth in the Serbian leadership who could join them at the following meeting. The two names mentioned by Đilas were Aleksandar Ranković and Ivo Lola Ribar.29 Ranković was made secretary of the regional committee for Serbia, and Lola Ribar was made secretary of the communist youth organisation SKOJ. Đilas was elected to the Central Committee of the KPJ and became a member of its Politburo in 1940. Ranković (1909–1983) was a Serbian of peasant origin and a tailor by profession. He joined the KPJ in 1928 and in 1937 became a member of its Central Committee. Ivo Lola Ribar, from Zagreb, was the son of the influential Dr Ivan Ribar, who had been President of the National

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Assembly in 1921 and was sympathetic to the KPJ.30 Ivo Lola Ribar became the dynamic leader of SKOJ, and one of Tito’s trusted associates. SKOJ also held an important role in the recruitment strategies envisioned by Tito, who viewed the youth as the future of the Party. Ivo Lola Ribar was killed at Jajce in 1943. In addition to these four, Tito’s new leadership included Miha Marinko from Slovenia, Rade Končar, a Serb from Croatia, and Ivan Milutinović, from Montenegro.31 By the end of the decade this new and tight leadership group was running the Party’s affairs and activities, especially when Tito was away on his many travels abroad, executing tasks with energy and vigour. The team members would grow even closer to each other through the Partisan struggle and the ensuing effort to create a new Yugoslav society a few years later. Although Tito was a pragmatic man, and the new leadership represented a compromise body, it must nevertheless be described as a thoroughly revolutionary group of men, loyal to Stalin, the Comintern, Bolshevism and Tito’s new party line. However, not everybody in the Party was equally at ease with the increasingly stark effects of Stalinism and its influence on the Party. The disappearance of many colleagues in the Soviet Union in Stalin’s purges had a traumatising effect on some of the older generation. The well-known Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža referred to the men who perished in the Soviet Union – many of whom were his personal friends – as ‘our tombs in Siberia’.32 The attempt to pursue a Popular Front strategy at the same time as making the Party into a revolutionary movement with an emphasis on underground struggle and illegal activity, created new problems and disagreement within the KPJ. Party unity, Popular Front and the national question 1938–1940 The KPJ adjusted its tactics with the Popular Front, following the spirit of Dimitrov, but had no intention of leaving its revolutionary aspirations behind. It regarded the Popular Front line as primarily tactical, a temporary measure when fascism represented the greatest danger to the revolution and the Soviet Union. Tito was equally interested in improving the structure and position of the Party, and making its members capable of underground struggle if and when a revolutionary situation should occur. Considerable attention was directed towards the task of making the KPJ into a unified, tightly knit and more effective revolutionary movement on a Leninist principle. Tito also put a lot of emphasis on building a party organisation capable of attracting support from the masses. In a letter to Dimitrov in 1939, he argued:

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‘our reorganisation must be understood such that we pass from being small isolated cells into becoming a larger party entity, rooted in the masses.’33 The KPJ encountered internal problems in face of this new emphasis on intra-party streamlining, while still trying to attract the support of disillusioned nationalist groups to its cause. The Party faced challenges around the issue of the national question, and co-operation with moderate national movements and anti-fascist forces. In an attempt to shape the KPJ into a party organisation similar to the CPSU, Tito set out to remove all traces of factional tendencies, and ensure the Party organisation conformed to just one version of Marxist ideology: a Bolshevik one. Most Yugoslav communists had welcomed the change to Popular Front tactics. The KPJ nevertheless remained divided on the ideal level of co-operation to pursue with other political forces within a Popular Front line. Some circles within the KPJ hoped that the Party would leave behind its insurrectionary tactics and form a genuine front with moderate democratic forces against fascism. This was particularly so in Croatia, where the KPJ met great competition from the HSS, the Croatian Peasant Party. The Croatian question emerged as the most urgent internal question in Yugoslavia in the mid-1930s. The overriding aim of most popular forces, led on by the HSS, was to achieve some form of self-rule for Croatia. The failure by the authorities to address the Croatian national question, and to recognise Croat national aspirations, which were becoming more loudly articulated in the 1930s, had come to represent one of the major potential dangers to the integrity of the Yugoslav state. This had been acknowledged by Milan Gorkić at the Seventh Comintern Conference, where he stated the ‘HSS constitutes the primary force within the Croatian national movement’.34 For the communists, standing on a Yugoslav platform while at the same time attempting to convince the Croatian masses that the KPJ supported the popular demands for recognition of Croatia’s national aspirations, presented them with a difficult dilemma. Some cadres had reservations about how closely the KPJ should co-operate with the United Opposition under the leadership of the HSS, when Maček continued to refuse to co-operate with the communists. The KPJ pursued the Popular Front line with the aim of acquiring the leading role in such a movement, not to take part as inferior partners without even a legal right to participate in the process. Since many political forces continued to refuse to co-operate with the KPJ, this strategy had only limited success and the KPJ grew impatient.

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The set-up of separate party organisations in Slovenia and Croatia Despite the new focus on party discipline and centralisation, the KPJ set up separate party organisations in Slovenia and in Croatia.35 These reflected the differing conditions in these parts of the Yugoslav state. Their main purpose was to facilitate the implementation of the Party’s wider Popular Front strategies in their respective regions, but their ability to act independently from the central Yugoslav leadership was limited. The founding Congress of the Communist Party of Slovenia (KPS) was organised in April 1937, and the Communist Party of Croatia (KPH) was founded in August of the same year. Tito emphasised the necessity for parties to be organised in such a way that they could work successfully among the masses.36 But although it was Tito himself who enabled the setup of these organisations, he was not entirely happy with the performance of the KPH in particular. In the case of the organisation in Slovenia, Tito argued that it had at least partially understood its purpose, and ‘had adapted their party entity [the KPS] to the new working conditions and thus had not lost their party identity.’37 What Tito was referring to was of course the fact that in his view, the KPS worked according to an understanding that they were an integral part of the KPJ and under its authority. As Kardelj’s work Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja demonstrated, the KPS also explicitly recognised that Slovenia’s solution to the national question would be found within a Yugoslav framework.38 With Kardelj in charge, Tito trusted that the KPS would not go against the main KPJ line. Communication between the KPJ and the KPH, however, was more complicated and between 1938 and 1939 their relationship became strained over a number of important issues. Tito thought the KPH was acting too independently, was too compliant toward the HSS, and was therefore in danger of losing its identity. Most importantly, he was dissatisfied with the fact that the KPH deviated from the main KPJ line on a number of important issues. The KPH, from its point of view, had to take into account the particular circumstances in Croatia, and the strong position of the HSS among the Croatian masses. The Croatian party organisation and the leftist intellectual circles in Zagreb became the main targets for Tito’s attempt to streamline the Party organisation in 1938–1939. The KPJ and the national movement in Croatia In line with the wider KPJ strategy, the KPH remained committed to the aim of establishing some form of Croatian autonomy within a Yugoslav

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context. The KPH endorsed the Popular Front strategy built on the pursuit of formal co-operation with the HSS, which was heading the United Opposition in Croatia. The KPJ pursued this strategy through the Party of the Working People, the legal wing of the KPJ. At the same time as they expressed their support for the aim of creating a broad front with Croat leftist intellectuals, the KPH leadership also expressed its commitment to the aims of infiltrating the HSS and peasant organisations and creating left-wing groups sympathetic to the aims of the Communists. However the KPH soon came into conflict with the central leadership of the KPJ over the issue of how it should accomplish its aims. Responding primarily to local circumstances during a very tumultuous period, the KPH deviated from the KPJ line on a number of issues. Following the assassination of King Aleksandar relations between the KPJ and the KPH were affected by the attempt by the Regent Prince Pavle to accommodate Croatian demands, culminating after the 1938 elections in the establishment of the autonomous Croatian Banovina, secured through the Sporazum (agreement) of 26 August 1939. In an attempt to appease the Croats, Prince Pavle dismissed Milan Stojadinović as Prime Minister in 1939, and replaced him with Dragiša Cvetković. Negotiations between Cvetković and Maček resulted in the establishment of the autonomous Banovina of Croatia, encompassing Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, including Srijem, and some districts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most public and administrative functions, except the areas of foreign affairs, the military and joint finances were handed over to an autonomous Croat administration, which was headed by Ban Ivan Šubašić.39 This agreement largely settled Croatian national demands. It did not, however, address other national problems or demands within the rest of the Yugoslav state. The KPH did not offer separate candidates in the 1938 elections as the KPJ and the KPH had agreed. Instead, the KPH put its weight behind the United Opposition, seeing its victory as an important step in the resistance against fascist forces, and fearing that, by standing separately, it would weaken the opposition as well as discredit the KPH’s claim to champion Croatian interests. Once the Banovina was established, the KPH became reluctant to criticise the HSS which, once in power, did not give the communists much room for manoeuvre in Croatia. The Sporazum was greeted positively at first by the KPJ, but it soon became sceptical, especially as its illegal status continued. The KPJ also disapproved of the Sporazum’s failure to address the demands of the other nationalities. The KPH, in contrast, avoided criticising the HSS, fearing that to do so would alienate potential supporters. The Croatian communists, always aware of

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their disadvantage in relation to the HSS, were anxious that they would become isolated from the Croatian population if they did not appear to respond to their national sentiments. They were far more tolerant of the HSS than the rest of the Party, even though the communists continued to be subject to persecution, and cut off from legal participation. The impact of the Nazi–Soviet Pact of Non-aggression To add to the difficulties, the KPJ were faced with a new challenge from Moscow. Shortly after the consolidation of the new KPJ leadership and the new party line emphasising unity, another shift occurred in Comintern strategy, following the signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact of Non-aggression on August 23, 1939. This new policy – which bore the clear mark of Stalin’s influence – resulted in confusion within the KPJ throughout 1939–1941 over how they should respond. Stalin now characterised the war as a fight between two groups of capitalist states.40 Thus, the distinction drawn at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern between ‘war-like’ fascist states and ‘peaceful’ democratic ones, could no longer be made.41 Through this agreement, the war became defined as ‘the Second Imperialist War’. The Comintern advocated that the various communist parties should refrain from offering support to their respective governments, and should instead adopt a defeatist line. This volteface by Stalin made it hard for the communists to muster support, and many cadres had difficulty making sense of the new Comintern-imposed policy. The signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact of Non-aggression also put a strain on the relationship between the KPJ and the KPH. With the threat of Axis encroachment on Croatian territories, the KPH refused to support the Comintern’s defeatist line, and backed the government instead. Tito and the Zagreb leftist intellectuals A further source of friction between the KPH and the KPJ related to the attempt by the former to establish closer contacts with Croatian intellectual circles. This strategy, was problematic for the KPJ, not least due to Tito’s attempt to root out potential new factions not adhering to the new party line or to the Bolshevik version of Marxism. The purge against the Croatian leftist circle was by far the most important one in this respect. This group, focused around the well-known Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža, who had been a party supporter since 1919, greeted the KPH’s Popular Front strategy with great enthusiasm. Krleža and his circle were known for their critical engagement in debates on various aspects of Marxist theory, philosophy, science, psychoanalysis, art and

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other themes. Though a long-time supporter of the communist movement in Yugoslavia, Krleža’s private dislike for the more shady aspects of Stalinism was well known and barely disguised in his writings.42 The purge of Krleža and the Zagreb circle of leftist intellectuals from the Party in 1940 was linked not only to his refusal to endorse Stalinism, but more importantly to his support of the Popular Front line in Croatia, and his backing the KPH leadership when they had defied the KPJ line. Additionally, in 1935, Krleža had indirectly criticised the Party’s official policy on the national question, referring to their support for self-determination and secession as ‘platonic slogans’, and arguing for a socialist movement founded on an ‘agrarian basis’.43 The Popular Front strategy was seen as a positive step, but Krleža continued to push for a more genuine, broad Popular Front, and for the KPJ to enter genuine co-operation with the nationalist opposition, leave behind its revolutionary pretences, and their engagement in underground, illegal activities. The main conflict surrounding the ‘liberal deviance’ of leftist intellectuals in Zagreb, which according to Ivo Lola Ribar the Party regarded as the greatest danger to a revolution, came to its height with the publishing of Krleža’s journal, Pečat, established in 1939.44 Three of the contributors, Zvonimir Richtmann, Vaso Bogdanov and the Serbian surrealist, Marko Ristić, had been denounced by the KPJ as ‘Trotskyites’ (the pejorative applied to most dissidents at the time) and were banned from the Party. These three, most notably Richtmann, had been involved in debates with radical Party leftists since 1937, their leftism referring to their uncompromising adherence to social realism, the Stalinist version of Marxism and interpretation of dialectical materialism. Milovan Đilas was among these leftists. Krleža continued to support Richtmann and his other ostracised colleagues. An essay entitled Dijalektički antibarbarus (The Dialectical Antibarbarus) in the December issue of Pečat in 1939, was dedicated entirely to a sharply critical attack on the leftists by Krleža. The Party leadership, with Milovan Đilas and Edvard Kardelj in the forefront, soon prepared an attack on this criticism, in a work entitled Književne Sveske (Literary Notebooks) which sought to discredit Krleža and his circle and defend social realism. Tito was in Moscow during the preparation of Notebooks, and not directly involved in this attack on the Zagreb circle (Krleža was a long-standing personal friend). But he did approve of the publication of Notebooks, which appeared in the summer of 1940, and came to represent the de facto removal of the Zagreb leftist circle from the Party. The drive to purge the Party of dissident voices reflects a low tolerance of ‘deviation’ in a period where Stalinism reigned

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supreme. More importantly, the new party leadership worried that an alternative party centre would arise at very the time they were seeking conformity. Tito had decided to abandon the Popular Front line, and bring the KPH back into the Party fold. He replaced the leadership of the KPH, and at the fifth Land Conference, which was held in secrecy in Zagreb on October 19–23, 1940, the Popular Front strategy was declared a failure and abandoned.45 It was replaced by increased focus on securing a separate identity for the KPJ and identifying a specific socialist approach to the Yugoslav national question(s). Consolidation of the new Party line The fifth Land Conference was the final land conference before Yugoslavia was attacked by the Axis powers. It would also prove to be the end of the Popular Front in Yugoslavia. The conference confirmed Tito’s new party line and concluded this round of purges of elements perceived to deviate from this line. With the abandonment of the Popular Front, the KPJ took a step to the left, though this time within a firmly established Yugoslav line. The KPJ remained an illegal organisation. By the time the fifth Land Conference took place, World War II had already started and Tito expected that it was only a matter of time before Yugoslavia would also become involved. Tito was convinced that an anticipated war could also provide an opportunity to struggle for social revolution in Yugoslavia. The Nazi–Soviet pact, however, made it very difficult for the KPJ to present itself as defender of the people, democracy and civil liberties. The years of underground agitation, and time spent in Moscow and in prison, had taught Tito the value of pragmatism. He was prepared to wait for the right circumstances. While participating in anti-fascist agitation, he tried to prepare the KPJ cadres for what he expected was ahead of them. The fifth Land Conference was an important part of this, and had an important bearing on the Party’s approach to the national question. Tito stressed the need to build party organisations in every part of Yugoslavia. A few years earlier, he had tasked the Serbian Regional Committee with establishing party committees in Macedonia and Kosovo, where they did not yet exist.46 Delegates from all parts of what then made up Yugoslavia participated: Croatia and Slovenia already had separate Party organisations: Serbia, Vojvodina, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro all had separate area committees. For the first time, so did Macedonia. Kosovo and Metohija as well as other smaller regions had district committees.47 The event was a significant step in consolidating a KPJ which was truly all-Yugoslav. A Central Committee consisting of 38

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members and candidates was elected. Within it, a new Politburo selected, consisting of Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Đilas, Aleksandar Ranković, Rade Končar, Ivan Milutinović and Franc Leskošek, in addition to Tito as the General Secretary.48 The developments from 1935–1940 would have tremendous impact on the evolution of the KPJ from a marginal, almost distinct political force, into a political force capable of stepping up to the challenges they would meet in the Popular Liberation Struggle during World War II. In this process, the KPJ approach to the national question played a very important role. It maintained that the ultimate solution to the national question had to be a revolutionary one, but it was willing to modify tactics and to accept improvement of national relations within a Yugoslav context, and within the existing social context. The Popular Front line encouraged the KPJ to seek co-operation with other political forces for a while, but was never entirely successful. Although willing to lend nominal support to all ‘progressive’ anti-regime and anti-fascist forces, the KPJ remained an illegal party and was therefore unable to exert much influence on the events in Yugoslavia in the late 1930s. From 1935, the KPJ returned to a policy which supported a search for solution to the Yugoslav national question within the framework of a Yugoslav state, and abandoned earlier Comintern-influenced support for the break-up of the Yugoslav state. The KPJ’s new all-Yugoslav line, with its recognition of the multinational composition of the state, gradually developed in the direction of a federal solution. The communists remained vague on the question of organisation, on the number of federal units, on which groups would be recognised, and what kind of national rights such groups would receive under their proposed solution to the national question. The advocacy of an all-Yugoslav line, combined with such vagueness, and lack of specific promises to any particular groups would prove valuable for the KPJ during the war even though support of a Yugoslav state continued to pose many challenges. The Croatian question had constituted by far the most urgent challenge within the first Yugoslav state. The creation of the Croatian Banovina was an attempt by Prince Pavle to remedy the situation by settling Croatian demands, but was too little too late. The dictatorship of King Aleksandar and the continuing disregard for the parliamentary system under the regency of Prince Pavle (who had appointed his own ministers without democratic processes during the inter-war period) had served to severely weaken the legitimacy of the existing Yugoslav state among most non-Serb groups.

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Although the war would change circumstances radically, the KPJ’s party line and approach to the Yugoslav state and the national question in Yugoslavia came to maturity between 1935 and 1940. The Party’s strategy on the national question in Yugoslavia had been one of the main obstacles to the KPJ’s ability to act in a unified manner but at last it succeeded in moving away from constant factional fighting to finally becoming a unified and Bolshevised communist party in which decisions were made according to the principle of democratic centralism. This new party line, which closely followed that of the Soviet Union and was dependent on the dictates from the Comintern, left less room for intraparty disagreement. The emphasis on party unity remained a hallmark of Tito’s politics, as did his attempt to accommodate the national aspirations of the various national groups within the Yugoslav state. However, the assertion that the KPJ had become a fully unified Bolshevised party, and that all the problems from the entire inter-war period had been resolved, is open to question. To create unity and coherence within the communist movement in a state as diverse as Yugoslavia was no easy task, which is not necessarily to imply that the variations in approaches were rooted in nationalistic attitudes. Despite the Bolshevisation carried out when Tito took over the leadership of the KPJ, divergences over strategies emerged during World War II, and the KPJ’s approach to the national question and national movements continued to have a central role in the disputes.

3 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND BUILDING OF A NEW YUGOSLAVIA, 1941–1945

While the KPJ’s indecision on the national question had isolated them during the entire inter-war period, put severe limitations to their ability to act as a serious political force and made it difficult for them to muster support for their cause, during World War II their approach towards the national question proved crucial for their attainment of power at the end of the war. Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 changed entirely the context in which the KPJ operated. The occupation was accomplished swiftly, taking everybody (including the communists) by surprise, and marked the end of the existence of the first Yugoslavia. A ten-day blitzkrieg was quickly followed by a partition of the state. Yugoslavia was carved up beyond recognition through a number of annexations made by the Germans and Italians. They each took control of respective zones, and in addition granted authority of some areas to the fascist Croatian Ustaša. Other parts were annexed to the Axis-controlled states of Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. Germany retained control in Serbia, and incorporated Vojvodina east of the Tisza river (the Banat) and parts of Slovenia into its jurisdiction. The Italians controlled the southern part of Slovenia, the Dalmatian coastal littoral, from Zadar to Split, most of the Adriatic islands, as well as Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor. Kosovo and Metohija, the Sandžak and the western part of Macedonia were annexed to Italiancontrolled Albania; the rest of Macedonia, a small part of Kosovo and of south-eastern Serbia were occupied by Bulgaria; Prekmurje Međimurje,

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Baranja and Bačka, including Novi Sad, came under Hungarian control.1 The remaining parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were named the Independent State of Croatia (NDH – Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) and put under the control of the Ustaša. The military responsibility for this area was divided between Italy and Germany. As a revolutionary movement, the KPJ was quick to seize upon an opportunity for action, channelling the frustration resulting from this occupation into a communist-led struggle. On the ruins of the old state, the KPJ decided to mount a struggle for popular liberation based on an all-Yugoslav platform that included the building of a new Yugoslavia and a future with the KPJ in power. During the first year and a half of the People’s Liberation Struggle, in 1941–1943, the KPJ concentrated its energies on establishing control within the various parts of Yugoslavia and strengthening its relationship with the population; building up an army capable of engaging with the enemy and strengthening military discipline among the Partisan detachments; mobilising popular support for the Partisan struggle; and creating local political structures through the establishment of local anti-fascist councils in ‘liberated territories’. As the war fortunes of the Axis powers turned and the Allies switched their support from the Četniks to the Partisans, the KPJ largely succeeded in establishing themselves as the leading force within the Peoples’ Liberation Movement by 1943, despite continuous fighting against the occupants and domestic enemies. From 1943–45, they directed their energies towards institutionalising and broadening the groups they had created. They spent much effort on consolidating their position not only as the leading political force within the People’s Liberation Movement, but also as the legitimate defender of Yugoslavia. The manner in which events unfolded during World War II had a fundamental impact on the KPJ’s approach to the national question, which served an important role in securing it a leading role in the new Yugoslav society at the end of the war, and in legitimising both the new state and regime. At the same time, the national question also constituted one of the greatest challenges to attracting support for their struggle for the new state. This chapter focuses on the events and issues during this war which had a bearing on the KPJ’s approach to the national question and the building of a new Yugoslavia. The creation of a People’s Liberation Movement There were four important components in the Partisan struggle launched by the KPJ. Firstly, as with most other Comintern members,

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the KPJ officially launched its struggle as an anti-fascist resistance against the occupying forces. Secondly, closely linked to this, the KPJ mobilised support for its struggle with the aim of national liberation for each of the Yugoslav peoples, appealing to different national groups within a new Yugoslavia with the promise of securing the right to selfdetermination for different national groups.2 Thirdly, at least part of the KPJ leadership saw the war as an opportunity to achieve their socialist revolutionary aspirations. Finally, as a result of all of the above aspects of their struggle, the Partisans became entangled in a bitter civil war against other domestic political factions and forces. The relationship between these four aspects of the Partisan struggle was a complex one, with the aims and strategies of different factions often closely intertwined. While the KPJ appealed to all these motives in order to mobilise support, disagreement within the KPJ emerged over what strategy would best ensure support for the Partisan cause. Should the Party appeal to the different peoples primarily with the promise of the right to national self-determination, or should it agitate primarily for socialist revolution? Was the aim behind the struggle primarily to get rid of the occupation, or was it equally about delegitimising competing domestic forces? KPJ members also disagreed about the approach towards other pro-Allied domestic political groups, and inevitably there was another round of factional struggle over strategy. Although the disputed issues themselves closely resembled those of the inter-war period, the Axis occupation and partition of Yugoslavia had dramatically changed the context in which they operated and tested the unity of the KPJ in an entirely new manner. People’s liberation or socialist revolution? With regard to the KPJ’s resolve to stage a People’s Liberation Struggle, the fact that Yugoslavia had just been partitioned out of existence also begged the urgent question of what exactly it was the Partisans proposed to liberate. From the start, the KPJ’s wartime struggle rested on the restoration of the Yugoslav state. Largely the all-Yugoslav identity of its organisation and party line made the survival of the KPJ dependent on such an approach. In the ‘First Bulletin of the High Command of the People’s Liberation Partisan Units in Yugoslavia’, published on 10 August 1941, Tito emphasises the all-Yugoslav character of the People’s Liberation Partisan Units, and argues that the main effort in the war was put towards liberating the people of Yugoslavia from the occupying forces as well as ‘fighting the domestic agents of the occupation forces

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who aided the oppression and the terrorisation of our people’.3 Although the Yugoslav dimension was always present, the KPJ appealed to the various groups not in the name of Yugoslavia as such, but in the name of the national liberation of each of the respective peoples making up the Yugoslav state. Their justification for supporting Yugoslav unity was largely based on the notion that only a qualitatively different Yugoslav context, as advocated by the KPJ, could guarantee the survival of the various peoples and secure harmonious relations between them. The qualitative difference they referred to was the revolutionary socialist dimension. Nevertheless, Tito was careful to emphasise the popular aspect, and argued that the Partisan struggle represented a popular struggle in Yugoslavia:4 The partisan units are called People’s Liberation units because they are not the struggling formations of any political party or group, not even the KPJ, notwithstanding the fact that the communists are fighting in the first lines … These are fighting units of the peoples of Yugoslavia in which all patriots fit for fight, ought to partake in the armed struggle against the occupying forces, regardless of political opinion.5 They also conveyed the impression that the war would end soon with Soviet victory. This qualitative difference, as well as their wish to take a leading role in this struggle for popular liberation in Yugoslavia, raises the question of the revolutionary aspirations of the KPJ. The KPJ cadres did not always agree internally on what the relationship between their aims of national liberation of each people and that of a socialist revolution should be. The actions of the KPJ, including the creation of the People’s Committees as well as comments made by individual leaders, strongly imply that the war was not only about defeating the foreign enemies, but was also an ideological and tactical struggle over who would be in power once the war was over. The revolutionary aspirations of the communists became more openly expressed as the war went on. They became more confident and determined to retain the role they had acquired during the war, nevertheless, their revolutionary motives were apparent from the very start. The war was thus clearly about more than fighting against the occupation, even if this represented the most urgent immediate goal. The KPJ firmly took a stand against the Axis powers and their domestic allies, and announced their willingness to resist the occupation. However the Hitler–Stalin

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Non-aggression Pact remained in place until after the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the KPJ continued to talk about ‘the Second Imperialist War’. Therefore a broad Partisan struggle was not mounted until after the German attack on the Soviet Union, when the KPJ were given the signal from Moscow to call for a wide struggle against the Axis powers and all ‘fifth columnists’. In the meantime, the KPJ spent the time preparing for insurrection. The KPJ political platform for the wartime struggle was established at the May Consultation in Zagreb in early May 1941.6 At this consultation, the Central Committee of the KPJ decided to build an anti-fascist liberation front, and form military committees which would be responsible for gathering arms and military equipment, training and preparing groups of recruits for armed struggle, and establishing lines of communication.7 The main task of the Party was declared to be the ‘struggle against the occupiers for the national (nacionalno) liberation of all the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia’. In order to achieve this, it was also declared necessary to engage everywhere in the Yugoslav territories with all the groups and supporters of disbanded parties who were willing to fight under the leadership of the communist party.8 The process of improving the unity and capacity of the KPJ organisation during the previous years had served the Party well. As the only all-Yugoslav organisation, with an underground network stretching through most parts of the collapsed state, the KPJ willingly made its organisation available to all those wishing to engage in the fight against the occupiers. This move was facilitated by the lack of action on behalf of other political forces. The Yugoslav army quickly surrendered, and the government and the King fled abroad to spend the remainder of the war period in exile in Great Britain. In Croatia, Maček adopted a wait-and-see attitude, hoping for better conditions, relying on an Allied victory against the Axis powers. In the meantime, the Croatian Peasant Party, the HSS, fell apart, one half gravitating towards the left, to the Partisans, and the other towards the right, and Pavelić’s Ustaša regime.9 The Serbian Četnik Movement had been formed in the initial months of the war under the command of former army colonel Draža Mihailović and was for a long time the main hope of both the government in exile and the British. However, the Četnik Movement was reluctant to fight the Germans directly out of fear that this would worsen the situation for the population. With their increasing focus on fighting the Partisans, the Četniks also eventually became involved in collaboration with the Germans and the Italians. The effect of Ustaša terror, mainly against the Serb population

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in Croatia and in Bosnia, was strongly felt, as was the repression by the Germans, Italians, Četniks and other occupation forces. These circumstances made it possible for the communists to seize on an opportunity missed by other forces, to take command of what they referred to as the People’s Liberation Struggle of Yugoslavia. According to Milovan Đilas, the Party position till 1941, following the decisions of the Comintern, was that in order to succeed, the revolution needed to go through two distinct stages: bourgeois-democratic and proletarian. Đilas states that Tito established a new thesis at the Zagreb consultation in May 1941: the possibility of a direct communist take-over of power. Tito thus postulated ‘a communist take-over after the defeat of Germany, to prevent any other party or organisation from doing so’.10 This meant, Đilas claimed, that the communists had abandoned earlier schemes for democratic and national revolution, as well as the idea of collaboration with allies in a transitional period.11 Although the revolutionary aspirations were clearly apparent within the communist movement as a whole, there were differences in their degree of radicalism, and certain members of the Politburo clearly espoused more ‘leftist tendencies’ than others, in the sense that they viewed the war as an opportunity to stage a socialist revolution as well as a struggle for people’s liberation. Milovan Đilas was the best-known exponent of the leftist line within the Party, and Boris Kidrič from Slovenia was also among the more leftist figures within the KPJ. Tito and Kardelj, though also to the left of the Party, were slightly more moderate. As the war continued, and the communists’ position became more secure, Tito gradually became more pragmatic, shifting towards a more moderate position.12 In Croatia, Andrija Hebrang took quite a different approach. Following a line more similar to the pre-war Popular Front strategy, he attempted to build a broad front in which the separate nature of the various partners would be preserved, stressing the separate structure of the Croatian Liberation Council, ZAVNOH. Again, intra-party disagreement surfaced over the kind of co-operation the Communist leaders should aspire to have with other anti-fascist forces. Initially, however, it was the revolutionary radicalism of the more leftist forces within the Party which landed the KPJ in the greatest trouble. Even if the Comintern did not view this period as a good time to stage revolutionary insurrection and provoke a reaction from the Axis powers, the KPJ clearly had no intention of supporting the fallen regime. The fall of the government, flight of the King and collapse of the Yugoslav army, gave the KPJ the perfect opportunity to organise a struggle not

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only for liberation from the Axis powers but also for a communist takeover after the war. This enthusiasm was spurred on by the KPJ’s initial confidence that the Soviet Union would not be drawn into the war, and that the war would soon be over. This changed with Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union on June 22 1941, after which the KPJ accelerated their activities to stage a resistance struggle. On 27 June, Tito summoned a new meeting of the Central Committee in Belgrade (where the Politburo had moved shortly after the May Consultation in Zagreb). The existing military committees were replaced with a General Headquarters of the People’s Partisan Detachment, and Tito was appointed chairman.13 While the KPJ had hardly anything that could qualify as an army at the time, this decision nevertheless indicated its ambition to build one. On 4 July, at a session of the Politburo of the CK KPJ, a decision was made to send twelve senior members of the Central Committee to different regions of the country, to supervise activities and set up Partisan detachments. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo was made responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milovan Đilas for Montenegro, and Edvard Kardelj, already in Slovenia, was made responsible for this, his native region. Tito and Ranković stayed in Belgrade and were responsible for staging an uprising in Serbia. The Partisan uprisings experienced considerable initial success. From April until the start of the summer, the Party ranks swelled from 4,000 to 12,000 members.14 The largest uprising was in Montenegro, in July. More soon followed in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Slovenia, the Liberation Front for the Slovenian People – Osvobodilna fronta slovenačkog naroda – had been created as early as 27 April. This front was a joint collaboration between the Communist Party of Slovenia (KPS), the Sokols – a Slavic youth movement and gymnastics organisation – and the Christian Socialists. Armed struggle thus also commenced in Slovenia in July, and likewise, Partisan action developed in Croatia. Partisan detachments were also created in Vojvodina in July.15 Gradually the KPJ started creating People’s Liberation Committees throughout the partitioned state. The creation of People’s Committees In the early part of the war, the KPJ concentrated its attention on building up a broader base of support within each of the regions of the old Yugoslavia, through the establishment of local People’s Committees in each region. The People’s Committees, described by Leon Geršković as the ‘political foundation of our new society’, were to form the main

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vehicle for the KPJ’s attempt to achieve support for their struggle.16 The People’s Committees carried multiple functions. They were ‘the organs for mobilisation, for renewal of life in liberated territories and the carriers of brotherhood between the peoples and the protectors of security’.17 While it was initially announced that these were to be temporary, the KPJ also started to introduce institutionalisation measures in the attempt to secure its position after the war and to support the creation of a socialist Yugoslavia. The People’s Committees were described as temporary organs of power until 1942, when they were channelled into the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), founded at Bihać in December 1942. Although the KPJ clearly assumed a leading role in the People’s Liberation Movement (Narodnooslobodilački pokret – NOP), which co-ordinated the activities of all forces in Yugoslavia fighting against the occupying powers and domestic collaborators, for tactical reasons the Party was careful not to stress this openly during the actual struggle. Instead, it attempted to maintain the illusion that the People’s councils were not the organs of any particular group or party. The KPJ was the only party organisation to retain a separate identity within the movement, later channelled into the People’s Front of Yugoslavia (NFJ). Until 1945, the KPJ was careful not to highlight its leading role – instead stressing to other groups the necessity of placing the needs and the joint interests of the People’s Liberation Movement ahead of those of individual parties. Only in areas where the KPJ encountered stronger political opposition, such as in Croatia and Serbia, did they tolerate the separate identity and organisation of some political parties, at least temporarily. But even in these cases, the KPJ tried, as in the case of the HSS, to connect the People’s Liberation Movement with those they termed the ‘progressive’ elements of the Party, thus provoking a split between those elements who supported the Partisan struggle, and those who chose to stand outside. The KPJ was also aware of the need to avoid being ‘contaminated’ by such co-operation, and therefore spent considerable effort during the war, and in the immediate postwar period, to ensure its leadership within the People’s Liberation Movement, and to safeguard a privileged position for the communist party after the war. Even if the struggle for popular liberation achieved mythical status within the postwar Yugoslav historical discourse, and became one of the fundamental legitimising sources for the Communist regime, the KPJ victory at the end of the war was not so much a military victory, as

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a victory of its strategy for gaining support from the masses and international support from the allies. The KPJ’s struggle to attain international approval and support had resulted in considerable conflict with other domestic forces, and KPJ leaders did not always appear to be entirely clear on what to do with the support they had attained. Internal divergence within the KPJ to a large extent originated in more fundamental disagreements over the revolutionary nature of the struggle, as well as what the main purpose of the struggle actually was, and how to draw support to the Partisan struggle under widely differentiating conditions. Again, the national question was at the centre of attention. The national question constituted a double-edged sword for the communists. One the one hand, the KPJ gradually came to understand that the promise of securing national rights to individual groups was a far more effective strategy for mobilising support in many regions than the promise of socialist revolution. Concurrently, they had to compete with other national or regional forces, as well as the occupation powers, who deliberately attempted to play on previous national animosities. The partition of the state constituted a great challenge to the organisation of a resistance struggle. In regional conditions that now diverged more than ever, this tested the newly created unity within the KPJ. The variation in conditions made it necessary for cadres to pursue various strategies to attract support for the Partisan struggle, and also made communication difficult. An additional challenge was presented by the fact that Germany directed its hostility specifically against the Serbs, and actively attempted to exploit pre-existing animosity towards the Serbs among other national groups.18 Therefore, the KPJ’s resolve to fight for the restoration of a Yugoslav state – which for many minorities was viewed as a representation of Serbian hegemony – made it difficult for the Partisans to muster support from many non-Serb groups. Croatia, Macedonia, and Kosovo presented particular challenges in this respect. The KPJ also made some strategic mistakes in the initial years, which were very costly. Through their implementation of radical revolutionary policies in certain regions, they soon lost control over areas they had ‘liberated’. The revolutionary radicalism espoused by some members of the leadership in the initial stages of the partisan struggle brought the KPJ into considerable trouble, and later had to be reversed. The creation of the NDH and the policies they embarked upon also had enormous impact upon the wartime strategy of the KPJ, and will be explored later in the chapter.

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‘Period of Leftist Errors’ The revolutionary radicalism introduced in certain parts of the country was neither apt for the actual war situation, nor followed the stages identified in communists’ own revolutionary model. In July 1941, the Politburo adopted a strategy advocating that the Partisans should aim to create operational bases known as ‘liberated territories’, which would be cleared of enemies. These liberated territories were to be ruled like a small state, within which a framework of local government would gradually be built up. Such areas would also provide the communists with the opportunity to start putting their political ideas into practice and to expose the local population to socialist ideals and practices. As part of this strategy, the KPJ established what they referred to as the Užice Republic in western Serbia in the autumn of 1941. Many leftist policies were adopted in these areas. The socialist radicalism espoused by some communists at the time, with frequent sequestration of land, was not always popular among the peasants. This led many peasants in Serbia, Montenegro and Herzegovina to defect into the ranks of Mihailović’s Četnik Movement. As the Partisans increasingly came into conflict with the Četniks, their treatment of suspected enemy villages became more ruthless and indiscriminate. Villages that had been associated with the Partisans were often subjected to equally ruthless treatment by the Četniks and the Germans, not serving to enhance the Partisans’ reputation. This leftist strategy, referred to by the communists themselves as the ‘Period of Leftist Errors’, and by others as the ‘Red Terror’, was to have catastrophic consequences for the Partisan struggle, particularly in Montenegro and Herzegovina.19 This period lasted until the spring of 1942.20 The ‘Period of Leftist Errors’ was instrumental in the defeat suffered by the Partisans at the hands of a joint German–Četnik offensive at the end of 1941.21 This offensive led to the collapse of the Užice Republic, and forced the decimated Partisan forces into eastern Bosnia and the Sandžak (their base for much of the remainder of the occupation period). This experience demonstrated that the mobilisation of support for a purely revolutionary strategy was not ideal and instead drove many potential supporters to the enemies. The case of Montenegro was illustrative of the the damage done by the leftist strategy. The first and probably the largest of the Partisan uprisings developed in Montenegro, starting on July 13 1941. Milovan Đilas (who had been sent back the week before to his native region to channel discontent into a communist-led revolt) proved unable to take control of the events taking place here. Despite instructions to play down the

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revolutionary aspects of their policies, the two leading Montenegrin members of the Politburo, Đilas and Milutinović (both among the most radical leftists in the Party leadership) introduced what was referred to as ‘soviet elements’ during the uprising in Montenegro in the summer of 1941. They saw this uprising as the first and necessary stage in what would eventually lead to a proletarian revolution.22 Tito’s instructions to limit action to guerrilla warfare rather than a full-scale insurrection were impossible to abide by in the rebellious atmosphere which reigned, and Đilas soon found himself countermanding his own orders.23 The result was confusion and loss of momentum. This approach did considerable damage to the Partisan cause in Montenegro, but although it was repudiated by the KPJ and Tito, Đilas and Milutinović retained their positions. Comintern and the KPJ during World War II The struggle over strategy also had an international dimension. The attack on the Soviet Union officially encouraged the Yugoslavs to stage an anti-fascist battle against the occupiers and Tito largely followed the new instructions from the Comintern to ‘without wasting a moment, organise Partisan detachments and start a Partisan war behind the enemy lines’.24 However, the response from Moscow to the communiqués from Tito about the decisions taken during the early months of the war and developments in Montenegro and Serbia was not particularly favourable. The Comintern, in the person of Dimitrov, responded by reminding the Yugoslav Communists that they were facing a People’s Liberation Struggle, and not a proletarian revolution.25 Although Tito went some way towards addressing this by stressing that the Partisan detachments were to be called People’s Liberation Detachments, the communists ignored Comintern instructions not to implement radical socialist policies. In addition, they made heavy use of symbolism from the international communist movement. This included putting the red five-point star on the caps of the Partisans’ uniforms, forming the proletarian brigade on Stalin’s birthday, deciding to make the Yugoslav flag, with an added red star, the official flag of the People’s Liberation Movement and the use of the clenched-fisted salute.26 The emerging disagreement between the Yugoslavs and Moscow revolved around far more serious issues than the employment of communist symbols, being linked to Stalin’s strategic alliances with the Western Allies, particularly Britain. Comintern tactics shifted again after the attack on the Soviet Union, to a strategy which closely resembled the Popular Front line pursued until 1939, though in entirely new circumstances.

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Following this, Stalin redefined his position on the nature of the war. In the search for a common base with the Allies, he toned down the communist aspect of the struggle, emphasising instead the joint struggle of the Western Powers and the USSR for ‘the restoration of democracy and democratic liberties against the anti-democratic forces of fascism’. Stalin argued:27 We have not, and cannot have, any such aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic and other enslaved nations in Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle for liberation they are waging against Hitler’s tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to arrange their lives and their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations! Although Stalin evidently changed his mind entirely about the latter matter, at this stage he expected communist parties in other states, including Yugoslavia, to put up a struggle for the national liberation of their country. He also expected them, at least initially, to take literally the call to work in defence of the political order which had been in place in the country prior to Axis occupation. Stalin applied patriotic terminology in his struggle against the Germans, referring to it as ‘a patriotic struggle for people’s liberation of the motherland against the evils of fascism’. Although the Yugoslav Communist Party adopted much of the Stalinist People’s Liberation jargon, it would for a number of reasons have been difficult for them to launch their struggle on the same basis as the Soviets. The Soviet struggle was very much based on Russian patriotism, invoking traditional Russian symbolism, portraying the war as the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and as a struggle for ‘Mother Russia’. Although the Serbs were the largest and most dominant group in the first Yugoslavia, they did not have anything like as dominant a role as the Russians did in the Soviet Union. The aversion of other groups to Serbian hegemonism, together with the all-Yugoslav base of the KPJ and their reliance on a Yugoslav dimension, would in any case have made it difficult for the KPJ to play on traditional symbolism, particularly with a Serbian flavour to it. Nor would the fight for the restoration of the old monarchy lend them much support from non-Serb groups. In any case, the civil war which developed in Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the partition of the state, made it much more difficult to stage a struggle purely on a patriotic basis, since the very definition of the nature of this patriotism was an integral

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part of the struggle. An important difference was, of course, the fact that the USSR had already had its revolution, while the KPJ saw the war as an opportunity for a revolutionary struggle, and for the party to finally gain the leading role which it had pursued but failed to achieve in the preceding decades. The KPJ also had to gain international support for their struggle. However, the Soviets did not want to upset the British, who initially supported Draža Mihailović, leader of the Serbian Četnik Movement. Mihailović became recognised as defence minister of the Yugoslav government in exile, and received material and military support from the British until 1943.28 The Russians’ lack of support left Tito and the KPJ increasingly frustrated and confused with the Soviet Union. Although they continued to be among the most devoted supporters of the Soviet Union, in the chaotic situation created by the war, and being some distance from Moscow’s watchful eye, they started taking more individual decisions on internal affairs in Yugoslavia. For example, the KPJ had enough confidence to organise the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of Peoples of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), at Jajce in November 1943, without seeking Moscow’s approval beforehand. According to Milovan Đilas, Tito remarked to Kardelj, Ranković and himself that they ‘should not keep the Russians informed of all new decisions, because they would be opposed and would undermine the entire session’.29 Despite this manoeuvre, the KPJ remained utterly loyal to the Soviet Union. AVNOJ – Consolidation of the KPJ leading role Independent KPJ decision-making and efforts to ensure a continuing leading role for the Party had already started at the first (constitutive) session of AVNOJ at Bihać in November 1942. The People’s Committees – until now described as temporary organs of power – were channelled into AVNOJ, thus signalling the institutionalisation of these Committees as permanent features of the peoples liberation struggle. The set up of AVNOJ also signalled increasing centralisation in the decision-making within the organs of the People’s Liberation Movement (NOP). AVNOJ was proclaimed as the only legitimate representative of NOP in Yugoslavia. Regional Anti-Fascist Councils were set up in various parts of the country, claiming the right to represent the NOP and AVNOJ in their respective areas. At the second session of AVNOJ, held in Jajce on November 1943, AVNOJ was declared to be the highest legislative and executive representative body of the Yugoslav peoples. This decision would form the foundation

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of the federal system introduced by the KPJ in 1945, and of the entire postwar Yugoslav state. A fundamental, but practical part of the communists’ promise to the different Yugoslav peoples of a socialist ‘solution’ to the national question during the war was their promise of a federal organisation to the state and of a new constitution guaranteeing the national equality of all the constituent nations and nationalities recognised by the party. The KPJ advocated a federalist structure which became embodied in the resolution of the second AVNOJ council at Jajce, and its provisions – though not definite – were put into immediate effect. In an article published in December 1942, shortly after the first AVNOJ session, Tito reintroduced the principle of self-determination and secession, which had not been present in their documents since 1937. He argued that the KPJ ‘had not abandoned, nor were to abandon, the principle introduced by our great teachers Marx, Engels and Lenin, the principle that every nation has the right to self-determination, including the right to secession’.30 The KPJ made sure not to commit itself to any specific solution to the national question until the very end of the war. The questions surrounding particular provisions of autonomy for specific national groups, and about the borders of various federal units were also left open until the end of the war. These questions were then to be solved ‘according to the wishes of the people’.31 This territorial federalisation did not entail political devolution or decentralisation within the party, on the contrary, the KPJ became gradually more centralised following the second session of AVNOJ. Tito’s reference to the Soviet federal model was in fact an attempt to justify the increasing centralisation within the party. For Tito, as for Lenin, the introduction of a federal organisation to the state was done primarily to overcome the challenge of the national question, as a way to attract the support of the ‘masses’, and it did not indicate an intention to federalise the Communist Party or its powers in any way. As Tito himself argued in 1945, ‘we made the [federal] divisions to solve the national question.’32 In this respect, the KPJ’s arrangement followed the Stalinist dictum that a state could be ‘national in form, socialist in content’. A process to create Land Assemblies for different regions of Yugoslavia had been started following the first (constitutive) session of AVNOJ at Bihac in 1942. Most of the Land Assemblies were not formed until late 1943, or later in the Macedonian case. The Slovenian People’s Liberation Committee was established in October 1943; the Land Assemblies for Croatia (ZAVNOH), Bosnia-Herzegovina (ZAVNOBiH), the Sandžak (ZAVNOS), Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor (ZAVNOCGiB), and the Main People’s Liberation Committee for Vojvodina (GNOO Vojvodine) were all established in November 1943;

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and the Land Assembly for Macedonia (ASNOM) came into being in August 1944. The Main National Liberation Committee for Serbia had been established in November 1941, but remained inactive after the fall of the Užice Republic until the liberation of Serbia in October 1944.33 Following the second session of AVNOJ, the Land Assemblies were gradually transformed into what the KPJ considered the representative, legislative and executive organs in their respective areas. In Slovenia a further transformation resulted from the establishment of the Slovenian People’s Liberation Assembly (SNOS) at Črnomelj in February 1944. In Croatia the transformation took place at the third session of ZAVNOH at Topusko in May 1944; in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the second session of ZAVNOBiH at Sanski Most in June and July 1944; in Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor by the introduction of the Montenegrin Anti-fascist Assembly of People’s Liberation (CASNO) at Kolašin in July 1944; in Macedonia at the First ASNOM at Prohor Pčinjski in August 1944; and finally in Serbia by the establishment of the Great Anti-fascist Assembly of People’s Liberation (VASNOS) in Belgrade in November 1944.34 The decision to transform the representative political organs as represented by the Land Assemblies into members of the federation, had a constitutional basis, and formed the foundation of the federal state of Yugoslavia. The increasing centralisation within NOP and institutionalisation of the state structures were influenced by the attempt to secure the leading role of the KPJ in postwar Yugoslav society and politics. Embodied in the resolution of the second session of AVNOJ were a number of important decisions taken by the Politburo shortly before the session took place. These included the decision to create a provisional government, the decision to prohibit the return of King Petar and the Royal Government, and a decision on the federal organisation of Yugoslavia. The decision to form a provisional government signalled a desire by the KPJ to break with the old order, and a determination to introduce a new political and social order. Milovan Đilas argued that the decision to introduce a provisional and not a regular government, and to prohibit the return of the King rather than overthrow him at once resulted from the decision by Tito and the central leadership to take a more moderate transitional course. This decision, he further argued, would help maintain the KPJ’s relations with the Allies, and thus ‘make it easier for the British to break with the King and the government-in-exile’ without complicating ‘the Soviet government’s relationship with Britain’.35 The KPJ’s newly found confidence was partly inspired by the success of the Partisans in battles against difficult odds, against both the Četniks and the occupation forces. It was also boosted by the capitulation of Italy,

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from which the party profited considerably. Confidence was boosted further by the recognition the Partisans now received from the British, who eventually shifted their support away from Draža Mihailović and towards them. The party strategy towards the Allies was thus inspired by an attempt to gain international recognition by following a more moderate line, while giving as few concessions as possible. When making their decisions to prevent the King and the government in exile from returning, without informing the Soviets about it before issuing a formal declaration, the Yugoslavs were confident that the British would not object too strongly. In a dispatch sent to the Soviet government in connection with the Teheran conference, which was held at the same time, Tito declared, ‘The English general has informed us that the English government would not insist very much on the king and the Government-in-Exile.’36 Stalin was furious at the Yugoslavs’ decision, and the dispatch was not publicised. Only after the Western powers reacted more favourably than Stalin had expected did the USSR accept the decisions made at Jajce. Challenges with regard to the national question Through the Partisan struggle, the Communists became involved in a delicate balancing act between retaining the leading role in the People’s Liberation Movement, and soliciting co-operation from representatives of the various nationalist groups with the aim of building a broad movement. The building of People’s Committees happened at different paces determined by local conditions in different areas of partitioned Yugoslavia. Not all lent themselves to the radical approach taken in Serbia and Montenegro. Attracting support for the Partisan struggle when it was based on an all-Yugoslav identity and the restoration of the Yugoslav state proved more difficult in certain regions. In both Croatia and Slovenia, the KPJ tried to keep the appearance of a genuine coalition between the groups within the People’s Liberation Movement. They tried to stress the aim of popular struggle and the emphasis on class struggle was minimised. At the same time, the communists maintained their usual mistrust towards other ‘bourgeois’ groups, and were determined not to jeopardise their leading role. In Slovenia, the three other groups, which together with the communists made up the Osvobodilna Fronta (the name of the liberation front in Slovenia), were put under pressure by the communists. In 1943 they signed the Dolomite agreement, which revoked the separate identity of the non-communist organisations, and in which they recognised the leading role of the KPJ within the Osvobodilna Fronta. The leadership of the Communist Party of

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Macedonia (KPM) provided the KPJ with a serious difficulty with its defection to the Bulgarian Communist Party, and expressed no great desire to stay within a Yugoslav entity. The fact that the KPJ based its struggle on the restoration of Yugoslavia created particular problems for the communists in terms of attracting support from the non-Slav groups, such as Albanians and Hungarians, who could hardly be expected to support such an aim. Most of them were hostile to the idea of staying within a Yugoslav entity, and not particularly keen on becoming engaged on the side of the Partisans whose propaganda to attract support focused substantially on the South Slav factor. The Kosovar Albanians presented a particular problem for the KPJ in this regard. Many Albanians perceived the occupation and collapse of the Yugoslav state as an opportunity to gain more control over their own affairs, and regain territory they had lost in the inter-war period. They also saw it as an opportunity to reverse the slavicising policies to which they had been subjected in the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, some Albanians became involved in collaboration with the Italians and Germans. The Albanians in Kosovo did not trust the KPJ promises of self-determination within Yugoslavia after the war, fearing they would again come under Serbian domination. They were not interested, therefore, in the KPJ’s project or the restoration of the Yugoslav state. Virtually all the non-Slav national groups residing within the pre-war Yugoslavia became involved in collaboration with the occupational forces. This collaboration was most often not rooted in particular sympathy with fascism or Nazism, but in the desire to free themselves from what they considered Serbian hegemony. Developments in Croatia The best case to exemplify the divergence in party strategy over the national question and the KPJ relationship with other forces within the People’s Liberation Movement was Croatia. The communist leadership in Croatia diverged from the central Yugoslav leadership on a number of issues, and again ran into conflict with them over strategic issues. In Croatia, the communists had to take into account the collapse of a Yugoslav state, which had been viewed by many Croats as a vehicle for Great Serbian hegemony. Besides, they had to take into account the establishment of the Ustaša’s NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) the Independent State of Croatia. For all the shortcomings of this political configuration, its establishment posed a challenge to the Partisan struggle. The Partisans also had to take into account the influence commanded by the Croatian Peasant Party, the HSS, despite its fragmentation during the war. They

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faced the double task of detracting support away from the HSS, who opposed the strategy of military resistance espoused by the Communists, and persuading the Croats that the Communists could fulfil their national aspirations (no easy task). The Croatian question continued to remain the most important question with regard to creating a viable Yugoslav state. One of the first aims set out by the KPH was to try to undermine the legitimacy of the new regime. In the first proclamation of the KPH after Ustaša’s declaration of the Independent State of Croatia in April 1941, the KPH set out to discredit Ustaša’s claim to have liberated the Croats from the Serbian yoke, and fulfilled centuries-old national aspirations of the Croatian people. In this declaration, the KPH estimated that the Ustaša’s act of proclaiming the NDH ‘under the pretext of a struggle against Great Serbian hegemony would only clear the path for a new oppression of the Croatian people: German, Italian and Hungarian imperialism’.37 The necessity for Croats and Serbs in Croatia to fight together for the national liberation of Croatia was also seen as an important element in the foundation of the KPH’s policy. This was built on the notion that the equality of Serbs and Croats and a peaceful coexistence between the two groups could only be achieved within a free Croatia. This again could only be within a liberated and reconstituted Yugoslavia, achieved under the leadership of the communist party. The Partisans’ initial support base in Croatia came partly from the Italian-occupied Croats in Dalmatia, and mostly from the Serbs in different parts of Croatia who suffered the persecution at the hands of the Ustaša. In the first two years of the war, the Partisans experienced great difficulties in attracting Croatian support. The large number of Serbs within the Partisan Movement led many Croats to see it as basically Serbian. To create a broader base on which to stage a general uprising, the KPH also needed the kind of support enjoyed by the HSS, the Croatian Peasant Party. The KPH therefore increasingly focused on gaining a foothold within the patriotic ground that had long been occupied by the HSS, and emphasised the struggle for the establishment of a free Croatia within a reconstituted Yugoslavia. ‘The struggle against the influence of the HSS’ constituted, according to Vladimir Bakarić, ‘the central question for the further development of the [Partisan] uprising [during] … the second half of 1942 and in 1943’.38 Therefore, the HSS in many ways constituted a much greater challenge to the KPH and the KPJ than the Ustaša, who only had limited support among the Croats, and winning over the supporters of the HSS was crucial to the Partisan cause. This was recognised by Andrija Hebrang, who became leader of the KPH and a member of the KPJ Politburo after Ustaša released him from

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imprisonment in exchange for two captured Ustaša members in August 1942. Hebrang followed a strategy similar to that of the Popular Front in Zagreb during 1939–40. By playing down the more radical socialist elements in the communists’ policies, Hebrang attempted to bring the moderate elements within the Croatian Peasant Movement under the Partisan umbrella. He also emphasised the Croatian element in seeking support, setting the fulfilment of Croatian national aspirations as a primary task of the liberation struggle. The organisational vehicle of the People’s Liberation Front in Croatia was ZAVNOH, whose founding conference was held in Otočac on 13th June 1943. This was the Croatian regional equivalent to AVNOJ, the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia. The intention was that it would eventually develop into the ‘first national democratic Croatian Sabor’, or parliament, which would ‘lay the firm foundation of a federal Croatian state’.39 Although all the groups and organisations within ZAVNOH and the United Front for People’s Liberation (Jedinstveni narodnooslobodilački front – JNOF) maintained their separate identities and no strict ideological restrictions were imposed on the members, all the adherents were in reality subject to the communist dictum with few possibilities for independent decision-making. Ivan Supek argues that, in comparison to developments in Slovenia where the KPJ gradually had taken over the leading role in Osvobdilna fronta, the HSS were still too strong a force in Croatia to be entirely subordinated.40 However, a good deal of controversy surrounds the question of how strong or weak the HSS actually was as a political force, and even more about how strong it was perceived to be by Hebrang and the KPH. Although the KPJ Politburo was willing to make concessions to the HSS to attract the support of its followers and the Croatian masses, a clear difference of opinion developed between Hebrang and the rest of the KPJ Politburo over which strategy to pursue. The KPH had applied a dual policy towards gaining the support of the HSS, unsuccessfully attempting to elicit the co-operation of the HSS leadership on a few occasions.41 Vladko Maček attempted to keep the HSS’s organisational structure intact while waiting for what he believed would eventually be an Allied victory. His hands were to a large extent tied, and he continued a passive policy towards the Ustaša and the occupying forces, being convinced that the outcome of the war would be decided first and foremost by the Great Powers. Gradually, however, the HSS fell apart, and some members gravitated towards the Ustaša, and others towards the Partisans. Maček did not veto the participation of a number of HSS members in the government created by the Ustaša, but nor did he condemn the actions of the new regime.

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The KPH increasingly tried to discredit the prewar HSS leadership with Maček at its head, and to encourage the rank and file within the Party to take up arms, and to co-operate with the Partisans. KPH also gave support to the pro-Partisan wing of the HSS, under the leadership of Božidar Magovac, and claimed those members of the HSS to have joined the JNOF to be its only real representatives.42 In June 1943, Magovac presented the KPH leadership with a number of requests, most of which were accepted by the KPH. The most important was the request for the revival of the pre-war HSS publication, Slobodni Dom, which had been edited by Magovac himself. This would now be published as a Partisan publication, but ‘entirely freely and independently in the spirit of the Croatian Peasant Movement’s programme’.43 He also suggested the establishment of an executive committee of the Croatian Peasant Movement. These demands were all accepted by the KPH CK. Magovac resumed the publication of Slobodni Dom the following month, and in October 1943 an executive committee of the HSS was constituted within the People’s Liberation Movement, under ZAVNOH, as the ‘new and sole leadership of the HSS’. Hebrang presented these two measures as important weapons in their struggle against the influence of Maček and the pre-war HSS leadership. Through attacking only Maček and his circle, the Croatian communist leaders hoped to isolate Maček and his ‘clique’ from ‘the peasant and nationally oppressed masses’.44 Although the HSS members within ZAVNOH were allowed to form this new executive committee of the HSS, they were not allowed to recruit new members nor to establish independent Peasant Party units, and they had to agree to restrict their work to activities within the Partisan ‘Committees for People’s Liberation’ (Narodnooslobodilački odbori – NOO), which were under the control of the KPH. Tito and the KPJ leadership had no objections to granting some concessions to the HSS leaders, and did not fear Magovac and his group. Following a visit to the KPH headquarters, Kardelj assured Tito that the activities of the HSS were within the framework of ZAVNOH and under the control of the KPJ. Tito was not interested in what he suspected to be an attempt by Hebrang to reconstitute the HSS as an independent political grouping within the Partisan Movement, and he feared the possibility of the HSS being revived as an independent political factor at grassroots level. Controversy still exists over Hebrang’s intentions concerning the role of the HSS within the Partisan Movement. Vladimir Bakarić, who took over the KPH leadership following Hebrang’s dismissal from this position, argued that ‘Hebrang behaved very strangely towards [the HSS]; he

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saw it as necessary to build a national front in a way in which they [the HSS] could organise their party, so that they could be our partners…’45 Hebrang always preached caution towards the HSS. But although he retained awareness about the strength of legendary status achieved by the original HSS leader Stjepan Radić in Croatia, and indeed used it to draw support to the Partisan Movement in Croatia, he was also careful to stress that the HSS was subject to the dominance of the Communist Party within this movement. Even Bakarić admitted that, although Hebrang recognised the HSS as partners, he did not intend to work out a joint programme with them, making it clear that the Central Committee [of the KPH] was in charge. This, Bakarić argues, frequently brought Hebrang into conflict with Magovac.46 Magovac and the HSS’s own illusions surrounding a possible reconstitution of the organisation appear to be a matter of equal contention. According to Ivan Jelić, Magovac viewed the People’s Liberation Front as a coalition.47 There have been suggestions that Magovac was reassured about the role of the HSS within the Partisan Movement after he had personally spoken with Tito during the second session of AVNOJ at Jajce.48 Although Magovac certainly tried to negotiate the widest possible sphere of influence for the HSS within the Partisan Movement, he nevertheless seems to have been well aware that any role played by the HSS would be an inferior one to the KPJ. Even in the frequent run-ins with Hebrang alluded to by Bakarić, Magovac appears to have backed down, ‘because he feared imprisonment’.49 By the time Magovac put forward his demands in June 1943, the Partisan Movement was already too strong for any realistic attempts to restore the HSS to a fully fledged party. If Magovac continued to have reservations about criticising Maček in public, the rest of the HSS Executive Committee made clear their commitment to the KPH leadership in a letter to Hebrang of February 26, 1944. In this letter Filip Lakuš confirms that ‘we, [the pro-partisan HSS leadership] the truthful followers of the Radićist idea who joined the People’s Liberation Struggle, could now see even more clearly the true leadership in the Communist Party and the organisers of the struggle… If Magovac is still not willing to write against Maček in [Slobodni] Dom, it would be better to stop its publication. Let [Slobodni] Dom continue to publish, but it must comply to what we wish to write about, and not with the wishes of Magovac, since it is not his private publication, but one which belongs to the People’s Liberation Movement, as does Vjesnik’.50 However, the question of Hebrang’s relationship with the HSS was not the only, nor perhaps the most important reason why he ran into

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increasing conflict with the Partisan Supreme Staff. The conflict had been brewing since the second part of 1943, and came to a head in the autumn of 1944. As Milovan Đilas points out in his memoirs, Tito and the Central Committee were embittered by ZAVNOH’s declaration ‘annexing Istria and the Dalmatian islands – hitherto Italian – to Croatia, thereby assuming a sovereignty which belonged to Yugoslavia alone. Tito also objected to the fact that the proclamation was signed only by ZAVNOH, and not by AVNOJ’.51 One of the main charges made against Hebrang was that of nationalism. In addition, Tito and other members of the Partisan Supreme Staff like Kardelj, Ranković and Đilas expressed concern about what was referred to as ‘Croatcentrism’ on the part of Hebrang. When Milovan Đilas inspected the activities of the Croatian Agit-prop during a visit in August 1943, he found them unsatisfactory, arguing that there was too much emphasis on Croatia, and too little on Yugoslavia.52 Equally, Tito’s dissatisfaction with Hebrang revolved around an increasing suspicion that the Croats were acting too independently, becoming an independent political factor. Due to the pressure put on the Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation Movement in various German–Četnik operations against the Partisans, the KPH was in many ways left to fend for itself.53 Well away from the sight of the Supreme Command, it was perhaps not unexpected that the KPH under Hebrang would follow its own directives. The fall of the Užice Republic would not have inspired Hebrang to pursue a line similar to that followed by the KPJ leadership. Within the People’s Liberation Front in Croatia, ideological restrictions were not imposed on its members, and the various forces within the Movement were allowed to retain their separate identity. In 1943, ZAVNOH declared that the ‘people’s liberation movement is introducing no radical changes in regard to social life’ and that it ‘recognises the inviolability of private ownership as well as the broadest possibilities for the expression of initiative in industry and in other economic activities’.54 In May 1944, during his speech to the third session of ZAVNOH at Topusko, Hebrang even went as far as declaring that the ‘people’s liberation movement has been and is leading the struggle not for communism but … for common popular aims – for national liberation and democracy’.55 Building on this type of Popular Front policy, which was actually much closer to Stalin’s directives than the policy pursued by the Supreme Staff, Hebrang also expressed a strong sentiment against what he referred to as sectarianism within the Partisan Movement. He cautioned against the danger of adopting a sectarian stand towards other political groups, particularly the HSS. Hebrang was

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a popular figure in Croatia, and his moderate line helped attract Croatian support for the Partisan Movement, but it increasingly collided with that of Tito and the rest of the Politburo. A number of incidents led Tito to react. In April 1944 Tito sent Hebrang a telegram in which he told him to ‘immediately correct these words in your publication Žena u Borbi: “Long live free and united Croatia in a fraternal federal community with free Serbia and free Slovenia.”’ ‘It is simply unbelievable’, Tito goes on, ‘that you could let this pass by, disregarding the other peoples, and omitting the word Yugoslavia’.56 In the same telegram, Tito called on Hebrang and two other members of the KPH leadership, M. Belinić and P. Gregorić, to come to Drvar to see him. He reprimanded them over this issue, and sharply criticised Hebrang and the KPH’s conduct. Matters came to a head again when ZAVNOH made a decision to make teaching the Catechism compulsory in primary schools in liberated territories in Croatia.57 Tito again sent a telegram on September 25, stating, ‘It strikes me as unusual the way in which you in ZAVNOH have taken the decision to make religious instruction a compulsory subject in Croatia. This is a very crude mistake’.58 ZAVNOH’s decision to recognise only church weddings was equally criticised in a report made by Kardelj after he had been ordered by Tito to go at the end of September and investigate the ‘separatist tendencies’ espoused by Hebrang. Two days after sending the radiogram, on 27 September, Tito directed sharp criticism towards Hebrang’s decision to set up a Croatian telegraphic agency, TAH (Telegrafska Agencija Hrvatske) which had already started broadcasting its first news. An angry Tito ordered Hebrang to ‘immediately cease the work of your so-called telegraphic agency TAH’. ‘What is the meaning of this?’ he further inquired. ‘You are slipping into full-scale separatism. Do you not see that federal states too have only one official telegraphic agency? Let the Soviet Union be an example to you, if no one else will be’.59 Some days later, Kardelj was ordered to go to Croatia to investigate Hebrang’s separatist tendencies and ‘the mistakes that were being made there’. Together with Milovan Đilas, Aleksandar Ranković and Ivan Milutinović, he prepared the report that was to form the basis for the dismissal of Hebrang from his position as leader of the KPH. In this report, Kardelj argues that the improvement of the situation in Croatia would depend on the removal of Andrija Hebrang. ‘His entire mentality and character represents a continuous tendency to weaken the linking of Croatia to Yugoslavia’, Kardelj reports, arguing that ‘at every step, every day, Hebrang commits some Croatian nationalist uklon’ (the Russian expression for deviation).60 In addition to the accusation of nationalist

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deviation, Kardelj accused Hebrang of ‘underestimating the authority of the Central Committee [of the KPJ]’ and charged him with being an autocrat ‘who the cadres fear more than they love’.61 Hebrang was eventually removed from his position as leader of the KPH, and made Minister of Finance at the central administration in Belgrade. The removal of Hebrang and the reasons given for it must be considered in light of the discussion of previous factional struggles within the KPJ over the Party line. The wartime dispute in Croatia in many respects constituted a continuation of the inter-war factional struggles over the political line of the KPJ, the KPJ’s strategy on the national question and their approach towards bourgeois national and democratic forces and their revolutionary aims. In this new round of intra-party dissent, Hebrang’s line did not conform to that of Tito and the KPJ leadership in the new circumstances. Due to Hebrang’s removal in 1944, it is difficult to say exactly what kind and what level of co-operation he envisioned between the HSS and other political forces within ZAVNOH.62 Within his Popular Front strategy, however, there were expectations that some level of power would be invested in the political and social institutions built up by the communists through the war, which became the vehicles of the People’s Liberation Movement. It is suggested by Milovan Đilas that one of the principal reasons for removing Hebrang was linked to the suspicion that the Croatian party leadership were ‘setting up shop on their own’.63 It is likely that increasing independence within the decision-making process of ZAVNOH and the KPH figured prominently when the charges of nationalism and separatism were made against Hebrang. The Croatian case demonstrated the difficulties inherent in the KPJ wartime strategies, particularly the problem of maintaining a unified party line, based on an all-Yugoslav platform, while at the same time taking into consideration conditions in the highly multinational, socially and economically diversified Yugoslav state. This dilemma did not only concern Croatia, but also many of the other regions. The actual shape of the new state, including the question of the number of republics, autonomy and status for various national groups, remained to be decided at the end of the war – all of which will be discussed in the next chapter. Consolidation of the Bolshevik line in the People’s Liberation Movement From late 1943 onwards, the main preoccupation of Tito and the KPJ was to consolidate the gains they had achieved so far in the war, as well as their leading position. By this time, there was an increasing

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centralisation of power within the Party leadership, on a Leninist principle, and therefore, there was no room for autonomous action on behalf of regional leaders. The power was to rest with the Party, rather than with the state institutions. To hold the monopoly of power was, according to Leninist doctrine, an important requirement for transforming society in a revolutionary manner. Political pluralism was seen as a threat to the new socialist order the KPJ aimed to establish. Therefore, at the end of the war, the KPJ set out to suppress all other political forces within and outside the People’s Liberation Movement and do away with political pluralism in favour of a Bolshevik model. This happened faster in Yugoslavia than in any other of the new emerging state-socialist regimes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In line with the KPJ leadership’s partial attempt to tread lightly in their communication with the Allies, Tito agreed to meet with Ivan Šubašić, the pre-war Yugoslav Premier in exile in London. In their meeting at Vis, an island off the Adriatic Coast, in May 1944, Tito reluctantly had to accept a monarchist state, under strong pressure from Stalin. Šubašić, on his side, had to agree to accept a mixed government consisting of both communists and members of the Government-in-exile. But the KPJ already had the upper hand at this time. In a second meeting between Tito and Šubašić on 1 November 1944, it was agreed that King Petar would not be allowed to return to Yugoslavia, pending a referendum on the future of the monarchy. Šubašić also had to recognise AVNOJ as the provisional government. Although a meeting on 9 October 1944 between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow resulted in the notorious agreement to share the sphere of influence fifty/ fifty between the USSR and Western powers, the KPJ was not interested in granting more influence to the Government-in-exile who had remained in London during the entire war and largely ignored Stalin’s instructions about this. Instead, the KPJ continued to consolidate its leading position within the state, neutralising other political forces in the country. Nevertheless, the Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia received Allied recognition in March 1945, two months before the war had officially ended. In the meantime, the KPJ paid lip service to the Tito–Šubašić agreement by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, by agreeing to include in the new government some of the pre-war deputies who had been elected to the national assembly in 1938. Elections were held in September 1945. In August the same year, the KPJ had organised the founding Congress of the People’s Front. The Popular Front of Yugoslavia (Narodni Front Jugoslavije – NFJ) was a continuation of the United People’s Liberation Front (JNOF) formed in

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1944, and functioned as an umbrella organisation open to all political organisations. The creation of the NFJ was part of the KPJ’s attempt to maintain the illusion that it was not aiming to install communism. The KPJ faced this accusation from members of the opposition along with strong suspicions from Stalin. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav Popular Front was firmly and obviously under the full control of the communist party. The Axis attack on Yugoslavia in 1941 effectively signalled the destruction of the first Yugoslav state, which was partitioned out of existence by the occupational forces. The legitimacy of the first Yugoslav state had already been considerably weakened by the inter-war Yugoslav experience, and few of the non-Serb groups were initially ready to fight for the restoration of the old order once it collapsed in the early days of the war. At that time, apart from the KPJ, there existed no political force with an all-Yugoslav profile which had the capacity to appeal to all the different groups in all the different territories which made up the first Yugoslav state. The passivity of other political forces, combined with the collapse of the Yugoslav army and the complete destruction of the first Yugoslav state, facilitated the ascendancy of the Communist Party to the role it seized during World War II. During the course of the war, the KPJ changed from being a marginal, illegal political party to the leading political force in a struggle against the occupation and domestic competitors, and for the creation of a new Yugoslavia based upon the promise of national and social equality to all peoples in Yugoslavia. The KPJ came to power through a war that was a simultaneous struggle against external aggression and internal civil strife. The Party had already spent years preparing for an eventual conflict when the tumult of war and the collapse of the state provided an opportunity to stage a struggle against foreign and domestic enemies and to achieve revolutionary aspirations. Ultimately the KPJ’s aim was to gain the leading role in a new Yugoslav state, which would form the framework for the creation of a socialist society. The promise of national equality and national determination to the different peoples within a new, federal Yugoslavia was an important factor in securing support for this struggle. The Yugoslav communists, following the Soviet experience, and adhering to the Bolshevik tradition, had recognised the rarity of ‘pure revolution’. Therefore, their quest to find a solution to the national question formed an integral part of the wartime struggle in the same way as it had formed an integral part of their pre-war revolutionary strategies. It was the popular liberation struggle, not the struggle for socialist revolution, which became the main vehicle

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leading the KPJ to power and fulfilling its revolutionary aims. The promise to solve the national question and to ensure peaceful national relations was the most important and effective strategy in the mobilisation of support for the Partisan movement. After some initial, rather misguided attempts to introduce revolutionary elements, for strategic reasons, the KPJ played down its revolutionary aims, both internationally and at home, and agitated for support primarily on a platform of national liberation for the different Yugoslav peoples. The promise of People’s Liberation – liberation from Axis occupation combined with national self-determination for individual groups within a Yugoslav framework – came to constitute a powerful legitimising force for the new regime and state. As the only Yugoslav force which promised national brotherhood and unity, the Partisans held a significant appeal in ethnically mixed areas where inter-ethnic strife and occupation had claimed considerable casualties during the war. The Partisan myth and the People’s Liberation Struggle thus became vital elements in the postwar communist discourse and in the Party’s legitimising strategies after 1945. After the war, the legacy of the People’s Liberation Struggle was to hold a central role in legitimising the KPJ’s claimed solution to the national question. The new Yugoslav state, the promise of national equality and a federal state model formed not only the framework of this solution, but also arose as an integral part of the solution, intrinsically linked to the KPJ postwar project.

4 ‘WHITE LINES ON MARBLE PILLARS’: REPUBLICS, AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES AND BORDERS

The KPJ came to power claiming to have solved the national question ‘in the manner taught by Lenin’, and to have found a socialist solution to the national question. A fundamental, but practical, part of this ‘solution’ was the introduction of a federal state organisation and a new constitution guaranteeing equality for all the constituent nations and nationalities recognised by the Party. However, the claim to have introduced a socialist solution implied that the Yugoslav communists had imposed an ideological solution to address the complex national make-up of Yugoslavia. The constitutional and institutional aspects of this ‘solution’ were thus combined with the aspirations to develop a socialist society under the leadership of a fully unified Yugoslav Communist Party, based on the slogan of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’. The KPJ claim to have a solution to the national question can only be understood within the wider framework of its postwar socialist project. Decisions on the practical details of the constitutional set-up of the state were a question most of the KPJ leaders thought better left to the end of the war, once their power was consolidated. Yet the few documents dealing with questions on borders, territories and status of the national groups reveal that significant changes took place at the end of the war. Not all the Land Assemblies were transformed into representative organisations in their regions, and not all expectations of being granted republican or autonomous status were fulfilled. How

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the KPJ made practical decisions with regard to the number and status of different peoples and republics in the new Yugoslav state at the end of World War II is significant, and the federal and territorial aspects of the KPJ ‘solution’ to the national question will be the focus of this chapter. 1946: Institutional and constitutional ‘solution’ to the national question The formal constitutional organisation of the new federal state was introduced mostly to provide reassurance to the Yugoslav national groups and non-communists that there would be national equality and that this equality would be constitutionally guaranteed. The 1946 Yugoslav Constitution was closely modelled on the 1936 Soviet Constitution and the federal system introduced by the Yugoslav communists was intended to uphold an administrative function. The federal institutions were meant to respect, and at the same time transcend, national differences. As in the Soviet Union, the power remained tightly controlled centrally by the KPJ itself. The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed by the KPJ in November 1945. Six federal units were incorporated into the new federal state organisation; Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Vojvodina was given the status of Autonomous Province (Pokrajina) and Kosovo and Metohija (later just Kosovo) was given the lesser status of Autonomous District (Oblast); both were incorporated into the Federal Republic of Serbia. As a multinational federation, socialist Yugoslavia was based on a three-tier system of national rights. In addition to the three original groups identified when the first Yugoslavia was set up, the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, two more groups, the Macedonians and the Montenegrins, were given the status of constituent state-forming nations of Yugoslavia. Each was allocated a republic as a ‘national home’. Bosnia-Herzegovina was established as the only multinational republic, in which the Serbs, Croats and Muslims inhabiting the republic were all considered its constituent nations. Ten other groups, the main ones being the Albanians and the Hungarians, were recognised as national minorities, granted cultural rights and given the right to use their own languages, now legally recognised. In official Yugoslav terminology, these were referred to as ‘nationalities’ (narodnosti), because the word ‘minorities’ was perceived to carry a negative connotation according to Leninist ideology.1 Importantly, however, their state-forming nations were considered to be outside the borders of Yugoslavia. Article 19 talked of the rights of nationalities in Yugoslavia, stating that ‘nationalities in the Federative People’s Republic

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of Yugoslavia enjoy the right to and protection of their own culture … and the free use of their own language’.2 At the bottom of the communists’ national hierarchy were groups that were officially defined as ‘ethnic minorities’, including Roma, Jews, Germans, Ukrainians, Vlahs and other small groups, which did not have constitutionally guaranteed minority rights. The Yugoslav Federation was constructed on a dual concept of sovereignty, the sovereignty of the republics and the sovereignty of the peoples.3 Article 1 of the 1946 constitution stated: ‘The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is a Federal Peoples’ State, republican in form, a Community of Peoples equal in rights, who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right to secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state.’4 This article in principle granted the right of a republic to sovereignty, to the point of secession. In reality, there was no room for the federal units to secede from Yugoslavia. Reference to the rights of the nations and nationalities to secession had been absent in the Draft of the Constitution submitted to the Assembly in December 1945,5 and the question of sovereignty posed a point of disagreement among those who drafted the Constitution, primarily Edvard Kardelj and Moša Pijade. While Kardelj viewed the federal units as sovereign, except in matters which were constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the highest organs of the state, Pijade’s interpretation was that the nations’ right to self-determination had been exercised when they entered into the Yugoslav federation.6 In the end, a compromise was made in the wording of the text. Although the nominal right to self-determination was included, the KPJ avoided going into any detail about the nature of this sovereignty, and pointed simply to the fact that the introduction of federalism had solved the national question, and therefore, the question was no longer particularly important. Although Article 1 emphasised the sovereign nature of the republics, it also stated that the peoples were equal in rights. Article 47 of the constitution stated, ‘a single citizenship is established for the citizens of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Each citizen of a People’s Republic is at the same time a citizen of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia’.7 The same article further states ‘every citizen of a republic enjoys in every republic the same rights as the citizen of that Republic’.8 Members of other national groups thus had the right to partake in all decisions affecting the sovereignty of the predominant national group and its republic. At the same time a member of a national group living outside the borders of their own ‘homeland’ republic were still defined

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as part of their own national group. In this way, a Serb living in Croatia held equal rights to a Croat in that republic, but was still defined also as a member of the Serbian national community. In a similar way a Croat from Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered a member of the Croatian national community, yet also a constitutive member of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, enjoying the same rights and duties as the Muslims and the Serbs in that republic. The Yugoslav federation was based on the principle of national equality, not ethnic proportionality. This equality formed an important role in the new regime’s attempt at regulating ethnic and national relations. The most important aspect of this national equality, from the regime’s perspective, lay in the principle that no one nation would be allowed to dominate the federation, or hold a position of dominance like that held by Russia within the Soviet Union. The position of the national groups within the new federation Discussions on the nature of the new federal system had been taking place within the KPJ, as well as within the various branches of the People’s Liberation Movement, since the second session at AVNOJ in Jajce. Although the Land Assemblies were regarded as the foundation for the future federal units in socialist Yugoslavia, not all Land assemblies were transformed into representative organisations in their regions. Neither the December 1945 Draft Constitution nor the 1946 Constitution there mentioned Sandžak, which had previously had its own Land Assembly. Montenegro and Bay of Kotor was reduced to just Montenegro, although the Bay of Kotor remained within the Montenegrin federal republic. The issue of autonomy was not mentioned at Jajce, and the KPJ avoided defining the exact status of the various federal units and the demarcations between them. However, there were considerable expectations among many of the peoples that autonomy or federal status would be granted, depending of course on the progress of the People’s Liberation Struggle. However, the Party leadership had put off making any definite decisions about the exact nature of the federation and status of the various national groups until the end of the war. The KPJ kept insisting that it would be up to ‘the people’ themselves to make the actual decisions about the nature of the federal system. However, as a consequence of the increasing centralisation within the KPJ and the People’s Liberation Movement during the final stages of the war, the KPJ leadership (specifically Tito) tried to lower expectations around the decisions made at AVNOJ. All decisions regarding the status of the national groups, numbers of units, and the borders between them, were ultimately taken by the inner circle

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of the KPJ, with little debate outside the highest party ranks. There were certainly no plans to have a referendum or any other form of public debate on the organisation of the new federal system. The decisions made were to large extent pragmatic ones, subject to the shift of emphasis which took place within the KPJ as the war came to a close. These included, most importantly, the long-term strategies pursued by the KPJ in order to gain international recognition for the new state, as well as to consolidate the Party’s position within it. Eventually, there would be significant differences between the borders of Yugoslavia as they were described in a document made by the president of AVNOJ in February 1945, and the final internal borders of Yugoslavia.9 Few documents exist which explain how decisions were taken on the status of national groups and the borders between the republics. Moša Pijade, president of AVNOJ was one of the few high-ranking KPJ figures concerned at that time with defining borders and what rights and responsibilities the different groups should be given. Pijade argued fiercely that the legal activities of AVNOJ should be revived, having suggested as early as December 1943 that the People’s Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia – NKOJ (Narodni Komitet Oslobođenje Jugoslavije) – release some form of declaration on the future shape of Yugoslavia.10 Tito and a number of other top-ranking communists considered Pijade’s suggestion somewhat premature. Tito felt it was necessary to wait until a more favourable moment ‘with regard to their work tasks and the political situation’.11 During the spring of 1944, as president of the legislative commission of NKOJ, Pijade spent some months in Rog in Slovenia, where he worked in close collaboration with Boris Kidrič, Dr Ivan Ribar and Marko Vujačić, on forming draft declarations on legal matters and on the definition of the status of the various national groups in the new state.12 Pijade’s writings from 1944 offers a rare insight into the thinking of the Party inner circle (and to some of the differences among them) around the national question and the constitutional position of the different national groups at the time. Although Pijade went further than most other communist leaders in arguing that the Yugoslav peoples had exhausted their right to selfdetermination, he also attatched much more importance to defining formal and legal institutions and structures than Tito and most members of the Politburo. Pijade viewed his draft declaration as a forerunner to the constitution, acting as a legislative document until a constitution was made after the war.13 To him, the adoption of new laws was a way of de-legitimising opponents and to make a break between the old and

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the new regime. He emphasised that the continuity the Yugoslav state was based on the ‘wish of the people’ and excluded any possibility of returning to the ‘old, reactionary and suppressive Yugoslavia’.14 All in all, Pijade was much more concerned than many of his colleagues to underpin the rapidly-introduced changes with some legal justification. Pijade’s close attention to detail on defining the nature and status of the national units, and drawing of maps to show where republican borders should go, was ridiculed to a certain extent by some members of the inner circle of the KPJ. His efforts were ironically referred to as ‘Moša’s legislative offensive’.15 In the end, however, not all aspects of Pijade’s attempt to deal with these questions from a legal perspective appealed to Tito. For Tito it was important to keep a balance between giving national groups enough concessions to make the KPJ appealing to them, and for them to see the KPJ as the guardian of their national aspirations. At the same time, however, Tito was concerned for the KPJ not to cause contention by getting entangled in decisions over territories and borders at a time when the KPJ was still securing its role in Yugoslavia. In addition, NKOJ – with Tito as leader – was still engaged in a delicate balancing act to win international approval, and the KPJ was waiting for what Tito referred to as a more appropriate time to discuss these matters (i.e. when the KPJ had consolidated its position). The status of the various nations and nationalities in their official form, as well as their rights and responsibilities, were set down in the new Yugoslav constitution, prepared by Edvard Kardelj in 1945, and presented in January 1946. Although not all of Pijade’s suggestions materialised, his legal outlines from 1944 provided the KPJ a ready blueprint and had considerable impact on shaping the new Yugoslav constitution which took place in the course of 1945. However, some important differences emerged between Pijade’s draft declarations and the final constitutional draft. The main changes which occurred related to the status of regions that had been considered for autonomous status. The question of autonomy: the position of Sandžak, Vojvodina and Kosovo Though the decision of the second session of AVNOJ guaranteed all national rights to the nationalities, the AVNOJ declaration did not mention autonomy. Tito and the KPJ leadership also made clear to regional leaderships in Vojvodina and Sandžak that the question of autonomy was to be left for a future date, even though those leaders

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were pressing for clarification on the status of their respective areas at the late stages of the war. In Declaracija o nardnoj vlasti (‘declaration on the people’s power’) from April 1944, Pijade defined Democratic Federative Yugoslavia (DFJ) as a democratic federative state, guaranteeing full equality for Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins; that is, the peoples of Serbia, Vojvodina, Sandžak, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.16 The main People’s Liberation Committee for Vojvodina (GNOOV) was to remain a provincial Antifascist Liberation Council (pokrajinski AVNO) and be acting provincial national government until such time that its status was resolved.17 The same would go for Sandžak, where a similar temporary set-up would exist. According to Pijade’s declaration, the people of Vojvodina and Sandžak were to be given substantial liberty to make decisions about their position within the federation.18 Pijade also stressed equality between the five national groups he lists,19 and refuted the possibility that any one group or republic would be more privileged than others.20 The status of Kosovo was not mentioned in Pijade’s draft declaration, nor was it included in the AVNOJ declaration from Jajce, and Kosovo’s position was not clarified until the very end of the war. Although Pijade’s Dclaracija o narodnoj vlasti suggests that autonomous status was still considered for Vojvodina and Sandžak as late as 1944 the aspirations to autonomy and independent development, which had grown in Vojvodina and Kosovo during earlier phases of the war, were curbed towards its end. Both were included in the Republic of Serbia as autonomous provinces, but with some differences in status. Sandžak was simply divided up between Serbia and Montenegro. Vojvodina Vojvodina was not mentioned in the decision to build Yugoslavia as a federation. This is noteworthy, as Vojvodina had been one of the regions mentioned when the KPJ discussed the national question back in 1935, and for which they had proposed the creation of national parliaments.21 Vojvodina had also had its own area committee and in 1940 was represented at the fifth Land Conference in Zagreb. But at Jajce, AVNOJ failed to even mention Vojvodina, and made no decision about its future status within the Federation. The KPJ was reluctant to upset Serbo-Croatian relations over the sensitive question of Vojvodina at such a critical point of the war.22 Being involved in a recruiting process to attract more support for the Partisan struggle from Croatia, the KPJ was keen to avoid

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possible obstacles. The status of Vojvodina remained unresolved until late in the war. Vojvodina was inhabited by a mixed population of Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, and a substantial German minority of which many were expelled from Yugoslavia at the end of the war. The region had been subject to numerous demographic changes since the creation of the Yugoslav state. Vojvodina’s territorial demarcation vis-à-vis Croatia and Serbia was contentious, particularly with regard to the Srijem/ Srem region.23 Srijem had historical ties to Croatia, and had been part of Croatia-Slavonia in the Habsburg Empire before WWI. It had also been included in the 1939 Croatian Banovina. Accordingly, Croats tended to view Srijem as part of Croatia, whereas Serbs considered it part of Vojvodina. Since the region had a high proportion of Serbs, Serbs tended to be of the opinion that Vojvodina would gravitate towards Serbia even though it had not previously formed part of Serbia. Despite confusion over the exact composition of Vojvodina, a Regional Committee for People’s Liberation in Vojvodina had been formed at the initiative of Svetozar Marković and Branko Bajić in October 1942.24 After the Partisan Movement in Vojvodina was almost completely destroyed in heavy fighting, particularly in Bačka and Baranja, the KPJ Politburo chose to attach the Area Committee for Srijem to the KPH Commission for Slavonia, thus linking it to Croatia. On the military front, Srijem was also attached to Croatia, as they entered into the third military zone for Croatia. Renewed fighting by Partisan detachments in Bačka and Baranja nevertheless led to the reformation of the People’s Liberation Movement in Vojvodina, on the initiative of the Srijem communists. As a consequence, a unified regional party leadership in Vojvodina was revived in October 1943.25 The KPJ emphasised its wish to retain Vojvodina as a unified entity, and the division of work between the Party leaders in Vojvodina and Croatia in Srijem built upon the restoration of the whole of Vojvodina. Branko Petranović refers to a letter sent by Rade Končar, from the CK KPJ on 2 August 1942 to the Organising Secretary for the Party Committee of the KPJ for Vojvodina and the District Committee for Srijem, in which Končar had written of the revival of the KPJ Regional Committee for all of Vojvodina. Končar describes the revival of the KPJ Regional Committee for Vojvodina as acceptance of the independence of Vojvodina and the unified character of the People’s Liberation Struggle within it.26 After the revival of the Regional Party Committee for Vojvodina,27 the CK KPJ transferred some territory from Srijem which had been under the jurisdiction of the KPH, to the Party organisation in Vojvodina. This included the areas of Vukovar, Vinkovci

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and Županja. This development led to some disagreement between the KPH Commission for Slavonia and the Regional Party Committee for Vojvodina over Srijem. Although large parts of Srijem fell within the jurisdiction of the KPJ Party Committee of Vojvodina, they were nevertheless asked by the CK KPJ to stop bickering over whom Srijem would belong to, and were told that this question would be resolved after the war.28 In the wake of these developments, questions also arose around Vojvodina’s status in the proposed new Yugoslavia. Although the KPJ insisted that the peoples in Vojvodina would be allowed to decide on its status at the end of the war, the KPJ Regional Committee for Vojvodina’s suggestion of a land assembly for Vojvodina was turned down. Vojvodina remained under the military command of the Main Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Struggle in Vojvodina until 1945. The political leadership was provided by the Main People’s Liberation Council for Vojvodina (GNOO Vojvodine), provisionally constituted on 10 March 1944. GNOO Vojvodine held expectations that Vojvodina would receive some form of autonomous status after the war, but Tito was not ready to concede any promises of autonomy for Vojvodina at that time. In an article, printed in the first issue of Nova Jugoslavija published on 1 March 1944, Tito wrote Today, we can only say this: without doubt, Vojvodina will, like the other districts which aspire to this, receive the widest autonomy. But the questions of autonomy and of which federal unit this province will belong to, depend on the people themselves, or rather on their representatives, when the definite state organisation is determined after the war.29 This statement suggests that Vojvodina would probably not be constituted as a federal unit in its own right, but as a province within another federal unit, although Tito does not make clear which federal unit. He suggests that some autonomy was likely to be granted, but is less clear about the extent of this autonomy. He also makes it clear that the decisions on Vojvodina’s future autonomy would not by made by popular vote or referendum, but by the people’s representatives – that is, the KPJ’s representatives – at the end of the war. Despite the absence of representatives from Vojvodina at Jajce, it has been suggested that even at that time, ‘because of its national composition, an opinion prevailed that Vojvodina should be included in Serbia’.30 Still, the final decision to do this was not taken until 1945. The suggestion to include Vojvodina within Serbia had

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been discussed at a meeting of the Main People’s Liberation Council for Vojvodina on 6 April 1945, when the delegates agreed in principle on the inclusion of Vojvodina in Serbia. The following day the issue was raised by the political secretary for PC KPJ for Vojvodina, Jovan Veselinov, at the first meeting of VASNOS – the Great Anti-fascist Assembly of People’s Liberation in Serbia. The decision to include Vojvodina in Serbia was officially finalised on the first meeting of the delegates the Assembly of Vojvodina in Novi Sad on 30–31 July 1945.31 Kosovo Like Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija was included in the federal unit of Serbia. While Vojvodina was given the status of Autonomous Region (pokrajina), Kosovo was classified as an Autonomous District (oblast). Although the communists never made the practical difference in status between the two clear, it was implied by the names that the status of Vojvodina was slightly higher than that of Kosovo. The question surrounding the position and status of Kosovo within the new Yugoslav Federation appeared even more complicated than that of Vojvodina. Kosovo had a large Albanian population, a population whose homeland, the KPJ felt, was outside the borders of Yugoslavia. It was eventually recognised as one of the nationalities in Yugoslavia. The KPJ’s decision on the status of Kosovo was influenced by the problems it had gaining party support in this region, as it tended to be perceived as a Slav-based organisation. The question of Kosovo’s status also had an international dimension, as it was linked to the KPJ’s relationship with the Albanian Communist Party, as well as the broader international picture in the Balkans in this period. The relationship between the Yugoslav and Albanian Communist Parties was an intimate one, if not always heartfelt, and the Yugoslavs were intensely involved in the establishment of the Albanian Communist Party (ACP). The KPJ also continued to interfere in the affairs of the PKSH, (Partia komuniste e Shqipërisë Communist Party of Albania) whose leadership were mostly puppets of the Yugoslavs. The KPJ had two emissaries to Albania, Miladin Popović and Dušan Mugoša, and was heavily involved in the unification of various Marxist groups into one cohesive Albanian Party. Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs were trying to control the development of the PKSH’s policies. The KPJ kept an eager eye on the Allies’ involvement in Albania and their plans for its future. In 1945, Tito and the KPJ were still toying with the idea of creating a Balkan Federation. The Yugoslavs aspired to take the leading role in such a federation, in which they saw Albania as constituting a republic

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closely attached to the Yugoslav federation. It was envisioned, under a Balkan federative arrangement that Kosovo could be joined with Albania. However, since the realisation of such a project still remained uncertain in 1945, the KPJ did not want to jeopardise its relationship with the PKSH by raising the contentious issues of Kosovo’s position and borders, particularly when the Yugoslavs were also intent on making sure Kosovo remained within the borders of the Yugoslav state. Miladin Popović told the Albanian communists ‘this question does not concern us, but only concerns the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’.32 In the end, however, the PKSH did not appreciate the overtures from the KPJ, resenting what it perceived as the Yugoslavs’ arrogance. The 1948 Yugoslav break with Stalin meant that the Yugoslav communists no longer received Stalin’s support for plans to incorporate Albania in a proposed Balkan Federation. As in the case of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija was not mentioned in the decisions made during the second session of AVNOJ at Jajce. For the Kosovar Albanian communist leaders, it was difficult to understand why the position of Kosovo and Metohija had not been settled. The Party Committee of Kosovo and Dukagjin – as they had renamed Metohija with its Albanian name33 – asked for the CK KPJ to ‘sometimes remember the Albanian people’, and argued that many ‘asked the question why Kosovo and Metohija had not been mentioned’ [in the AVNOJ decision at Jajce].34 Two district committees – one for Kosovo and one for Metohija had been established in November 1943. Under the auspices of Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, one Regional Committee for Kosovo and Metohija was formed shortly afterwards. As in the case of Vojvodina, the CK KPJ was keen for the Party leadership in Kosovo and Metohija not to build a Land Assembly, but rather to remain within the existing District Committees for People’s Liberation. In a letter, the CK KPJ argued ‘it had not been necessary to build a Regional Committee for Kosovo and Metohija, since [Kosovo and Metohija] did not constitute a “specific compact district’. They were asked to go back to the old name ‘District Committee”’.35 However, the KPJ also argued that the role of the District Committee was unclear, and advised that it could be only a steering committee, for the purpose of political unification of the masses, and that it could not be constituted as an organ of power, since the communists in Kosovo did not have a liberated territory.36 The CK KPJ advised its communist colleagues in Kosovo to be careful to avoid disagreement with their comrades from Albania over various border demarcations, and to concentrate on the struggle against the Germans

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and the effort to increase the support of the masses in that struggle.37 However, this proved to be a difficult challenge. The lack of mention of Kosovo in the dialogue between the KPJ and the PKSH frustrated even Miladin Popović, the KPJ’s man in Albania. In a letter dispatched to Ivan Milutinović in July 1943, he expressed his concern: Our Central Committee raises the question of [the status of] Slovenia, Macedonia, the German minority etc, but Kosovo is not mentioned. This would not have been so difficult if it had not been for the fact that parts of the Albanian ‘liberal’ bourgeoisie and parts of the Albanian patriots, who are already taking part in the People’s Liberation Struggle, are interested in and have raised this question… How to take a decisive position so as not to provoke hatred in one of the most important nations is truly a difficult problem. With this in mind, we are challenged to take a decisive position, rather than always use the parola of self-determination tomorrow. In this manner, it is not possible to mobilise the Albanian masses in the war against the occupier’s ‘liberators’. And various chauvinistic elements have with different pledges succeeded in leading the Albanian masses into a struggle against the ‘Slav’ Serbs… I only wish to express my opinion that in relation to Kosovo and Metohija, it is necessary to change the present attitude both of the Albanian party and ours.38 Popović’s concern over the KPJ policy on Kosovo, as expressed in his letter, to some extent related to the emergence in Albania of groups like the Second League of Prizren (the main aim of which was to ensure the ethnic unity of the Albanian population and make sure that Kosovo continued to remain united with Albania after the war) and the more Western-orientated National Front (Balli Kombëtar) which raised the question of a Greater Albania inclusive of Kosovo.39 Popović increasingly became convinced that the KPJ could only counter this threat by giving the Albanian communists more influence in Kosovo, and by raising the issue of self-determination for the Albanians in Kosovo. The KPJ leadership and Tito did not like this approach, nor what they seem to have interpreted as a rather too close relationship with the Albanian Communist Party. Popović was withdrawn from the Albanian mission, killed in Priština in 1945 under ‘mysterious circumstances’,40 and replaced by Velimir Stojnić, a military colonel. Nijaz Didarević, who was an assistant to Colonel Stojnić, argues in an interview in 1989 that

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‘[Popović] showed unsatisfactory firmness on some strategic questions, especially Kosovo… Miladin was very close to Enhver Hoxha, much closer than some individual members of the Albanian Politburo… He suddenly began to speak about the Albanian Party being independent.’41 Tito had no interest in an independent Albanian Party, and did his utmost to ensure that the Albanian Party stayed under the auspices of the KPJ. Nevertheless, Popović did provoke the KPJ into making this statement on Kosovo in this letter sent to the Albanian Communist Party, on 2 December 1943: When it concerns the national question, one must keep in mind two issues: Firstly, every nation has the right to self-determination, up to, and including separation. Secondly, we do not support all national movements – only those who really fight against imperialism, and who support real democratic national development. This means that Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija have the right to organise how they want and how they wish.42 The CK KPJ thus qualified a people’s right to self-determination, linking it to the extent to which they (i.e. the Albanian population in Kosovo) participated in the armed People’s Liberation Struggle together with the Yugoslavs. The KPJ, however, could not get past the dilemma that even those Albanian communists in Kosovo who did fight against the occupation tended to gravitate towards the ACP, wishing for some form of unification with Albania. The desire of the Albanian communists in Kosovo to strengthen their ties with the ACP and Albania was expressed in the resolution of a conference held by the Regional Committee for Kosovo in the village of Bujan in Albania between 31 December 1943 and 2 January 1944. Forty-one out of 49 delegates from the two district committees present at the meeting were Albanian, including 10 from the ACP. In this resolution, which has since caused a lot of controversy, they stated: Kosovo and Metohija is inhabited mainly by Albanians, who today, like always, wish to join with Albania. In that respect, we feel the duty to point out the correct way in which the Albanian people ought to follow to realise their aspirations. The only manner in which the Albanian people in Kosovo and Metohija can join Albania is through a joint struggle with the other Yugoslav people against the occupying forces and their servants. This is the only

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way in which to secure liberty, and by which all the peoples, including the Albanians, will be able to work out its fate, with the right to self-determination, including secession. The guarantee of this is NOVJ, as is NOVŠ, to which it is closely linked. In addition to this are the guarantees of our great allies, the USSR, Great Britain and America.43 Through this resolution, the Albanian communists in Kosovo refer to the statements made by the KPJ the previous year, but use the right to self-determination, including the right to separation, as formulated by the KPJ, as a justification of their wish to join another state. The CK KPJ was not happy about the decision, and sent a letter to the Regional Committee expressing their displeasure with this part of the resolution. The meeting at Bujan has since created a lot of controversy in more recent debates over Kosovo’s position in Yugoslavia, and the resolution has been used against the KPJ. Accusations, mostly from Serbian historians in the 1980s, have particularly focused on the fact that the conference was held on Albanian soil, and not in Kosovo, and that this makes its legitimacy questionable. The Bujan Resolution has also been accused of being separatist in nature.44 Although the KPJ itself later criticised the Bujan Resolution for separatist tendencies, it is nevertheless important to note that Vukmanović-Tempo and the leadership of the Regional Committee for Kosovo approved the decision, and more importantly, that the CK KPJ, despite its displeasure, did not revoke the resolution. The statements made by the KPJ to the Albanian Communist Party prior to the Bujan Conference, make it clear that the KPJ had itself raised the question of self-determination although under certain qualifications. The fact that the KPJ did not demand this statement be revoked suggests that its problem with the Bujan declaration related less to the questions it raised, and more to its timing. Insufficient support for the People’s Liberation Struggle meant in any case that the KPJ was unlikely to be persuaded to support national self-determination for Albanians in Kosovo. The declaration must be understood within the historical context of the period, a wartime context in which the relationship between Albania and Yugoslavia was still undetermined. The KPJ’s main preoccupation was to attempt to increase its support in Kosovo, while at the same time making sure Kosovo stayed within the sphere of the Yugoslav Party. The decision to join Kosovo with Serbia, was also influenced by developments in Serbia in the last stages of the war. In relation to the KPJ’s

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revised plans for the liberation of Serbia, the Second Kosovo People’s Liberation Brigade was incorporated into the newly created Second Serbian Division in May 1944. Keeping Kosovo within the sphere of the Serbian Partisan unit helped to ensure the region would remain within Yugoslavia. It should be kept in mind that the decision to attach Kosovo to Serbia was made in 1945, while the idea of a Balkan Federation was not laid to rest until 1948. However, both the Macedonians and the Montenegrins argued (unsuccessfully) for Kosovo to be joined with them. In the final stages of the war, the KPJ had to tread carefully around the Serbs, who as the war neared its end may have needed the most convincing that the Yugoslavia envisioned by the KPJ had anything to offer them. The KPJ feared that granting Kosovo to Albania, or Macedonia or Montenegro for that matter, would have severely provoked the Serbs, who saw Kosovo as part of Serbia and a place that held an important symbolic role in their national heritage. Although the KPJ had no plans to let Kosovo go from Yugoslavia, they tried instead to entice the Albanians with their idea of a Balkan Federation. However, as the end of the war drew closer, the Albanians in Kosovo were unconvinced by the promises of the KPJ. The military campaign launched by the Partisans in late 1944, to consolidate their victory as the Germans retreated from Kosovo, did not improve the Kosovar Albanians’ perception of the Yugoslav communists in the region. Even though their stated aim was to deal with collaborators, their treatment of Albanians in general was harsh, and in some circumstances degenerated into persecution. The fact that many of the Partisans in Kosovo were of Serb or Montenegrin origin did not help. Soon, a revolt developed in Kosovo, and unrest continued well into 1945. Even after this settled, the Kosovar Albanian population was considered a threat to the stability of the Yugoslav state, and like other minorities, remained under close watch by the Yugoslav security services. The Kosovar Albanian population’s Yugoslav experience thus did not get off to a very good start. Sandžak The most noticeable change of status within the new federal framework was that of Sandžak. Sandžak had a substantial minority of Bosnian Muslims (43.09%) and a majority of Orthodox Serbs (56.48%). In addition, there were smaller minorities of Albanians and Catholics.45 The status of Sandžak had been equal to that of the other federal units in 1943. In contrast to Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija, Sandžak had its own Land Assembly, and had been present at Jajce. Sandžak had

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also been mentioned by Pijade in his declaration on people’s power.46 There had also been suggestions that Sandžak should be included as an autonomous province in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the end, however, Sandžak was divided up and incorporated into the Serbian and Montenegrin federal units. ZAVNO Sandžaka had been formed on November 20, 1943. Questions around its status started to emerge in 1944, originating in a disagreement between the District Committee for Sandžak and the Land Assembly of Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor. At the start of January 1944, the secretary of the Land Assembly of Montenegro and Bay of Kotor sought clarification from the CK KPJ on the relationship between the Montenegrin party organisation and the organisation in Sandžak. In their letter, the leadership of Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor strongly suggested that the Party organisation in the Sandžak should be joined to that of Montenegro. In a declaration in this letter, they cited Montenegro and the Sandžak as one ‘federal unit’.47 This provoked a strong reaction from the CK KPJ, which responded: ‘the central party emphasises that the decision made by AVNOJ does not state that the Sandžak should become part of Montenegro, nor does it mention its position at all’. The CK KPJ further emphasised that AVNOJ’s decisions were given only in principle, and Sandžak would be given the status that its freely elected representative selected. In this respect, what Marshal Tito wrote concerning Vojvodina in ‘Nova Jugoslavija’ also held true for the Sandžak.48 The reference by the CK KPJ to this article by Tito does suggest it was likely that some autonomy was to be granted to Sandžak, but is less clear about the extent. However, Tito’s statement on Vojvodina had hardly served to make the KPJ’s policy on autonomy for Sandžak or any other regions clearer. Rather, it suggested that the decision would be made by the KPJ – that is ‘the people’s representatives’ – and not by the people themselves. In the case of Sandžak, the Presidency of AVNOJ took a definite decision regarding its status in February 1945. In the end, no autonomy was awarded to Sandžak. The KPJ argued that ‘since Sandžak was liberated, it is viewed that there is no reason for ZAVNO Sandžaka to continue its existence’.49 According to the Presidency of AVNOJ, Sandžak ‘did not have a national basis for obtaining the status of autonomous unit, and it could easily become a formula for a redundant and irrational crumbling of the Serbian and Montenegrin totalities, and of Yugoslavia in general’.50 On 29 March 1945, in Novi Pazar, ZAVNO Sandžaka, bound by the statements of the Presidency of AVNOJ, took the decision to divide Sandžak between Serbia and Montenegro, and to dissolve itself.

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Two other regions, which in contrast to the ones above received status as federal units, also figured in the discussions over autonomy. Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina both demonstrate important issues relating to the KPJ’s decision-making in relation to the status of the different national groups in the new Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina The KPJ’s decision to recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal unit constituted a departure from the rule. It was the only republic that did not serve the role of a homeland for one specific national group. It was defined instead by its historical social and political peculiarities and multinational composition. Milovan Đilas points out in his memoirs, Wartime, that the KPJ had not initially intended to give Bosnia and Herzegovina republican status. Rather, they had intended to give Bosnia and Herzegovina the status of autonomous province.51 This had also been the recommendation given at the first session of AVNOJ at Bihać. However, just prior to the second session of AVNOJ, in November 1943, the Regional Committee of the KPJ for Bosnia and Herzegovina had discussed which federal unit an autonomous Bosnia and Herzegovina would join, and whether it would be constituted within Serbia or Croatia. In order to avoid the delicate question of where it should belong and both Croatia’s and Serbia’s claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian leadership suggested the creation of a Bosnian Federal Republic with equal status to the other republics. R. Čolaković argued that Bosnia was ‘an already historically formed geographic-economic totality with specific political problems’.52 The decision to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina republican status was taken in January 1944, according to Đilas ‘at a meeting during a march after the retreat from Jajce’. Đilas further argues that ‘Ranković reported that the Bosnian leadership proposed a Republic, Tito agreed, and so did the rest of us as if this were something acceptable on the face of it’.53 This statement is perhaps the clearest example of the pragmatism involved in the decision-making process within the KPJ when it came to decisions about borders and federal units. Yet, it also shows the communists’ willingness to make concessions when it was deemed necessary, and to take the peculiarities and complexities of Yugoslav national relations into consideration when it was possible and did not otherwise collide with their greater strategies. Čolaković pointed to the specific peculiarities in the composition of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the Croats and Serbs, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a large Muslim community. Although

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the communists recognised that this group had a specific character which distinguished them from the other two groups, at this time they were reluctant to recognise them as a separate national group. Instead, they were seen as a specific religious group. For a long time, the KPJ did not have a clear policy on how to define the Bosnian Muslims, and discussions about whether they constituted a separate national group only emerged in the 1960s. In the immediate postwar years, Bosnian Muslims were encouraged to declare themselves as either Croats or Serbs; by the 1950s, they could also declare themselves as ‘Yugoslavs undeclared’. In the 1961 census, the category ‘ethnic Muslim’ was introduced. Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a specific national group in 1968. In 1971, for the first time, they could declare their nationality as ‘Muslim’.54 Macedonia The Macedonian case raised the question of how much autonomy the KPJ was willing to grant individual national groups, and what form any such autonomy should take. In Macedonia, the KPJ not only accepted a national group, but actually actively encouraged the further development of a specific national identity. This was mostly due to Macedonia’s relationship with Bulgaria, and Bulgaria’s rival claim to be the protectors of Macedonian interests. The Macedonian question was further complicated by the wider international context and rival claims by Yugoslavia’s neighbours Bulgaria and Greece. As in the case of Kosovo, the proposal to create a Balkan Federation increased the complications. The task of organising a popular liberation struggle in Macedonia, as the KPJ had done in other parts of Yugoslavia, was particularly difficult in these circumstances. The nature of Macedonian national consciousness was fluid, to say the least (and the existence of a separate Macedonian identity was not recognised by all the neighbouring peoples). The KPJ task was also made difficult by the general resentment of most Macedonians towards the inter-war Yugoslav state, and by the KPJ’s conflicts with the Bulgarian Communist Party over the leadership of the resistance movement in Macedonia.55 Macedonia was not specifically mentioned at the first AVNOJ at Bihać, but it was defined as one of the five nations that would be constituted with their own homelands within the new Yugoslavia at the second session of AVNOJ at Jajce. Yet, as with other groups, the exact status and the shape of Macedonian autonomy was not finalised at that time. At the beginning of the war, the Yugoslav communists found little support among the Macedonians who had lived within the inter-war

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Yugoslav state. There was a considerable degree of anti-Serbian sentiment in Vardar Macedonia (the part of Macedonia within Yugoslavia) and the Macedonians had been hostile towards the inter-war Yugoslav state. Except for its Albanian-populated western and north-western part, Vardar Macedonia came under Bulgarian occupation. At first, many Macedonians greeted the Bulgarians with enthusiasm. Over 800 Bulgarian schools were set up, and many new teachers were recruited to make the Macedonians more conscious of their ‘Bulgarian’ identity. A new citizens’ law passed in July 1942 stated that all inhabitants were perceived to have acquired Bulgarian nationality unless they had specifically opted for Serbian or Greek nationality.56 However, as the Bulgarian occupiers became increasingly repressive, support for them began to wane. As Palmer and King point out, however, the majority of Macedonians did not actively oppose the Bulgarian regime, instead they ‘continued to grumble quietly about their wartime privations and rulers who seemed increasingly foreign’.57 The KPJ initially received little support from the Macedonian communists, and between 1941 and 1943 had limited influence over them. Communication between the KPJ and the Macedonian party branch was extremely difficult due to the occupation. More important, however, was the Bulgarian communists’ attempt to influence the Macedonian communists and to take over the small Macedonian party organisation in Vardar Macedonia. The defection of the Macedonian party branch and its leader Metodi Šatarov to Bulgaria in 1941 presented the KPJ with a serious problem, even before it had been able to organise a resistance movement in Macedonia. There was considerable conflict between the KPJ and the Bulgarian Communist Party over who would be in charge of operations in Macedonia. In view of the Bulgarian occupation, the Bulgarian communists felt it was natural that they would operate in this area. For their part, the Yugoslavs emphasised their legal jurisdiction over Vardar Macedonia on the basis of territorial integrity of pre-war Yugoslavia. The KPJ took the issue to the Comintern, who eventually ruled in favour of the Yugoslavs in August 1941. This did not, however, deter the Bulgarians from continuing to attempt to influence the Macedonian communists. Tito’s view on Macedonian autonomy reflected his general policy on national relations in the rest of Yugoslavia; the Macedonians, at least those within the Vardar region, were viewed as a specific Yugoslav people, and any debates on autonomy were framed within a Yugoslav context. In a letter sent to Dobrivoje Radosavljević, KPJ instructor for the Macedonian communists, Tito stresses: ‘It must be clear that

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the People’s Liberation Struggle is the significant form through which will be decided the question of the existence, freedom, and independence of all the peoples, and equally that of the Macedonian people’.58 Tito indicated that some, still vaguely defined, autonomy for the Macedonians within a Yugoslav framework would rely on the active participation of the Macedonians in the People’s Liberation Struggle. Another great challenge for the KPJ was to counter the influence of VMRO – the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, whose main aim was to achieve Macedonian independence. Although VMRO was generally anti-Yugoslav and had operated from Bulgaria in the pre-war period, many members were increasingly sceptical of Bulgarian rule. The KPJ therefore recognised the need to organise the struggle broadly enough – through a Popular Front policy – to accommodate those VMRO members who would be willing to fight with the Partisans. With its usual pragmatism, KPJ took into consideration the lack of support for the popular liberation struggle in Macedonia. Hence, the KPJ also had to convince the Macedonians that it was serious about recognising them as a distinct people, and make some gestures to convince them that they would indeed be granted some selfdetermination within a new Yugoslavia. Tito and the KPJ were aware that they needed not only to counsel against Bulgarian hegemony, but also to disassociate themselves from any Great Serbian connotations, and emphasise that the Yugoslavia they were aiming to create would be different from the inter-war Yugoslav state. In recognition of this the KPJ consented to the forming of a Macedonian Party organisation, but remained reluctant to make specific promises of autonomy until the end of the war. After experiencing little initial success in creating Partisan units in Macedonia, Tito sent the dynamic Montenegrin Svetozar Vukmanović (known as ‘Tempo’) to sort out the problems in the spring of 1943. Although this task proved difficult at first, Tempo eventually succeeded in generating support for the Partisan Movement in Macedonia, and in diminishing the influence of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Tempo had been given instructions to set up a Macedonian party similar to those set up in Croatia and Slovenia. Although he was initially sceptical about the creation of a separate Macedonian Party organisation, Tempo soon set up the Macedonian Communist Party (KPM – Komunistička Partija Makedonije) and a Macedonian Central Committee. Combined with the KPJ’s tactic of appealing to Macedonian nationalist sentiment, this played an important part in building Macedonian support for the Partisan

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Movement. However, Tempo continued to encounter challenges in the attempt to get the KPM to support the KPJ party line on the Macedonian question. The Macedonian Communist Party had been in the habit of referring to Macedonian autonomy for propaganda purposes, but without mentioning that this autonomy would be set within a Yugoslav context. Such references worried Tempo deeply. He was not happy about the KPM’s failure to give prevalence to the Yugoslav communists in their statements. A KPM statement made in June 1943, stated: With the doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, develop still further the struggle of our people for the realisation of their centuries-old ideals… Long live the Macedonian People’s Liberation Front!… Long live the brotherly People’s Liberation armies of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece! … Long live our mighty allies, Soviet Russia, England and America! Long live the Fatherland Front and the insurrectional detachment of the brotherly Bulgarian people! Long live the brotherhood of all Balkan peoples!59 This statement not only muddles up the Yugoslav Partisans with the Partisans of Greece and Albania, it also gives preponderance to the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. and does not mention Tito at all. In addition, the KPM remained reluctant to print Tito’s new views on the question of Macedonian autonomy, and was evasive on the issue. Concurrently, the KPM demanded clarification from the Politburo on the ‘national’ aims of the partisan struggle. Tempo did eventually bring the KPM into line with the rest of the KPJ, and it was given a welcome boost by the Italian capitulation. In August 1944, the first session of ASNOM (the Macedonian Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation) was finally convened. This brought some clarification to the status of Macedonia and the aims of the Partisan struggle in the region. ASNOM supported the idea of a united Macedonia, recognised the existence of a Macedonian nationality and declared Macedonian the official language in the area.60 With increasing confidence, the KPJ continued to work for the creation of a Macedonian unit which would incorporate not only Vardar Macedonia, but also the Macedonians from the Pirin district in Bulgaria, as well as the Aegean Macedonians from northern Greece. Despite considerable pressure mounted by the Yugoslav communists in both cases, in the end the KPJ did not succeed in incorporating these territories into a common Macedonian Republic, presumably to be constituted within Yugoslavia and within a larger Balkan Federation.

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During the war, the Bulgarian Communist Party had agreed to recognise the Macedonians as a national group, and even in principle to the unification of Pirin Macedonia to the Macedonian unit in Yugoslavia. While Bulgaria later reversed its promises of autonomy for the Macedonians in the Pirin District, the KPJ continued to encourage the development of a Macedonian national identity even after the idea of a Balkan Federation had been laid to rest. The KPJ encouraged the creation of Macedonian cultural institutions, the development of distinct Macedonian literature, art and the creation of a standardised Macedonian language. In creating the latter, it was important to make sure it was different from Bulgarian, but yet at the same time distinguishable from Serbian. The KPJ’s active encouragement of the development of a Macedonian national identity was influenced by larger strategic considerations, mostly by the relationship between the Yugoslav communists and their colleagues in the neighbouring countries within a very complex international context in the Balkans at the end of the war. The development of a Macedonian national identity also played an important part in the internal policy towards national relations within Yugoslavia. The encouragement of a separate identity can be viewed as a measure to neutralise the Serb–Croat fissure which had dominated politics so much in the first Yugoslavia. Serbia and the autonomous regions Though there was no doubt that Serbia would constitute one of the Republics, the question of status for the autonomous regions was in each case in some way related to their position regarding a Serbian sphere of influence. The fact that autonomous provinces were established only in Serbia was a theme that would surface frequently in future debates about the federal arrangement.61 Moša Pijade’s writings on autonomy suggest that he was particularly concerned with the question of status of the Serbs who lived outside inner Serbia, the so-called prečani. In an explanatory letter to Edvard Kardelj, Pijade specifically points out that the ‘Declaracija o nardnoj vlasti’ mentions not only the national equality between the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, etc.62 (as specified in the 1943 AVNOJ declaration from Jajce) but between ‘the peoples of Serbia, Vojvodina and Sandžak, Croatia, etc’. In this manner, he remarks, the close community between the Serbs from Serbia, Vojvodina and Sandžak becomes evident, but without going into the question of the very form of that community, which remains to be decided after the war.63 Pijade added:

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This decision does not commit to the determination of boundaries, so this formulation allows the possibility that some part of Vojvodina and Sandžak, according to popular will, could become part of some other federal unit. This supplement has not prejudiced the right of the people in those provinces to decide their own fate, but on the other hand affirms the rights of the Serbian people in Serbia, Vojvodina and Sandžak to unification in one national entity, one Serbian entity which could be created on the terms of the territorial dispersed and disconnected sections of the Serbian people.64 Similar concern about the position of the Serbs outside Serbia can be seen in Pijade’s suggestions for autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia.65 The territorial diaspora of the Serbian population pointed out by Pijade made the Serbian question particularly complex, and the heterogeneous nature of the areas that were considered for autonomous status further added to the delicacy of this issue. While there were differences between the KPJ leaders concerning the granting of autonomy, and its timing, decisions on this issue were largely pragmatic and subject to larger political considerations. The KPJ’s advertised Yugoslav solution entailed a principle of national equality, which required that other national groups should receive recognition and concessions. The communists’ call for support for the wartime struggle was based on the assurance that new Yugoslavia would be different from inter-war Yugoslavia, Their rhetoric emphasised that this would exclude ‘Great Serb Hegemony’, and preclude any notions of Serbian predominance in the federal arrangement. On the other hand, considerable trauma had been caused by the Ustaša persecution of Serbs during World War II, and the KPJ had to take into consideration the fact that Serbs from outside inner Serbia constituted a large part of the Partisan membership. For this reason, concessions also had to be made to Serbs at the end of the war. While Pijade’s hope for an autonomous unit made up of the dispersed Serbian populations outside inner Serbia came to nothing, viewed in the context of the situation at the end of the war, the Serbs nevertheless received considerable concessions. The two regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina – including parts of Srijem – fell within the Serbian republic, even if, as the above discussions have demonstrated, this was not a foregone conclusion. In addition, half of Sandžak fell to Serbia. Furthermore, the centralised Bolshevik model initially introduced by the KPJ was well suited to Serbian interests and political tradition, and the promise

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of Yugoslav unity was appealing to the many Serbs who joined the Partisan struggle. The dual principle of sovereignty, while later causing considerable controversy, granted the Serbs considerable influence in other republics where they lived, for example in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most importantly, the new federal arrangement secured the most important principle within the Serbian national discourse, namely that all Serbs live within one state. Borders There was a strong territorial dimension attached to the federal organisation of the new Yugoslav state. This emerged to a large extent from the fact that the republics evolved from the Land Assemblies developed by the KPJ during the war. In addition, the federal model was introduced first and foremost as an organisational tool to deal with the difficult national relations and the complex multicultural composition in the Yugoslav territories, without compromising the leading position the KPJ had acquired in the course of the war. In his first speech in Zagreb following Liberation, Tito described his vision of the federal organisation of Yugoslavia in the following manner: Many still do not understand what Federal Yugoslavia, Federal Croatia, Federal Serbia and so on, means. It does not mean to draw borders between the different federal units. These federal borders, if I am to describe them as such, must be something like the white lines on a marble pillar. The borders between the federal units in Federal Yugoslavia are not borders that divide, but borders that join together. Answering his own rhetorical question; ‘What is a federal unit in today’s new Yugoslavia?’ Tito argued, ‘it is not a braid of small states; the federation is more of an administrative character, character of free cultural and economic development’. However, he warned: This does not mean that you in Croatia should not be interested in what happens in Serbia. It does not mean that if you are in a better financial situation, you should not help your brothers in Serbia or other federal units and vice versa. This means to behave nicely and help your brothers, because now the brothers are divided, yet still under the one roof.66

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Tito’s view relied on an understanding that the Yugoslav Federation would follow the Soviet model, where a centralised communist party would rule the country. Like Lenin, the KPJ believed that by organising the state according to the principle of territorial federalism, and granting constitutional rights to regional autonomy to each of the nations, they could manage to maintain a privileged position for the communist party while at the same time countering any opposition to their regime from nationalist sources. The borders between the republics were drawn according to a mixture of ethnic and historical criteria. Croatia included the areas of Banija, Slavonija, Dalmatia, Baranja, Lika and Kordun. Substantial Serbian minorities inhabited many of these areas. Moša Pijade tried to propose an autonomous Serbian Province in Croatia, but Tito was not enthusiastic about this suggestion. Vladimir Dedijer described how Pijade saddled up his horse to take his map and statute to Tito, but ‘returned faster than he went’.67 The eastern border between Croatia and Serbia in the Srijem region was one of the most troublesome. A Border Demarcation Committee consisting of five members, and headed by Milovan Đilas was set up at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPJ in June 1945, with the task of realigning the border between Vojvodina and Croatia. On the recommendations of this commission, the counties of Vukovar, Šid, Ilok, Vinkovci and Županja remained within Croatia, while Sremska Mitrovica, Zemun, Ruma and Stara Pazova went to Vojvodina and Serbia. The commission tried its best to make the demarcations according to ethnic composition. A substantial Serbian minority nevertheless remained in the Croatian part of Srijem, and a substantial Croatian minority in Vojvodina. Statements by the Border Commission suggest that some decisions were also of a more political character. According to Milovan Đilas: the commission held to the principle of ethnicity: that there would be as little ‘foreign’ population as possible in either Serbia or Croatia, that we disturb the national fabric as little as possible. Only the towns of Ilok and Bunjevci remained in dispute. At my [Đilas’s] suggestion, Ilok, with its Croatian majority went to Croatia, even if it protruded like a useless appendix into the Serbian expanse of Vojvodina. Bunjevci with its substantial Croat population, remained part of Vojvodina by decision of the Politburo, as the commission had proposed, because its conclusion would have affected a still more substantial group of Serbs and disturbed the

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ethnic composition of Vojvodina to the advantage of the Hungarian minority. Our realignment of the borders was approved.68 The borders between Vojvodina and Serbia proper largely followed the historical border of the Serbian Kingdom from before World War I. The border between Kosovo and Serbia mostly followed the 1878 division, but Kosovo was widened to include the entire Kosovo-Metohija district. With the exception of the Sandžak area that was divided up between Montenegro and Serbia, the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina mainly followed the historical borders between the pre-1878 Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The border between Croatia and Slovenia owed much to historical criteria, and followed the line between the Austrian and the Hungarian parts of the Habsburg Empire. The exception was the decision (based primarily on ethnic criteria) to include Istria in the Republic of Croatia, for the first time. The border between Macedonia and Serbia was constituted according to a mixture of ethnic and historical criteria. Serbia lost what had been referred to as Southern Serbia, to pave the way for the creation of a Macedonian federal unit. Large parts of the borders between Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro followed historical lines. The suggestion of granting some form of autonomy to Dalmatia was put to rest, and Dalmatia was incorporated into the Croatian federal unit. The border between Serbia and Montenegro followed the 1913 dividing line, which cut right through Sandžak. Montenegro gained the important coastline with the Bay of Kotor. The KPJ has since been criticised for not applying unified criteria when designating the borders, and for making these decisions in a rash and arbitrary manner. A lot of contention emerged later over the borders and the status of a number of regions, including Vojvodina, Sandžak, Kosovo, and the Serb-dominated areas of Croatia. However, the KPJ decisions largely followed previous historical lines, except in certain areas were it appeared necessary to apply criteria that were more ethnic. Existing sources on the KPJ’s decisions suggest that many decisions were subject to wider strategic considerations, and some of the strategies used demonstrate an element of pragmatism. But the sources also suggest that the decisions taken by the KPJ were subject to a number of complex political processes and external considerations, and were not as arbitrary as later accusations suggested. This can be seen particularly in the case of Kosovo and Macedonia, but also in Istria and in the debate over Trieste. The KPJ’s pragmatism must be read in the context of the ideological underpinnings of the system they were about to introduce, and of the communist perception of nationhood within a Marxist paradigm.

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When coming to power, the KPJ did not debate publicly what shape the new federation should take, how many republics it should have, where the borders should go, or the status of different groups. The manner in which the decisions were made was far from transparent, which has contributed to much speculation as well as questions about their legitimacy. For example, the status and form of autonomy in both Kosovo and Macedonia were closely related to the Balkan Federation plans, albeit for different reasons. Other decisions were subject to more domestic and internal considerations. All decisions on borders and republics reflected attempts by the communists to create a balance between the different national groups, both to avoid the dominance of one national group, and to at least partly keep their promise of national equality made to the different groups in seeking their support during the war. Ultimately, it is important to keep in mind the KPJ’s continuing insistence that the right to national self-determination could only be achieved through active participation in the armed struggle for People’s Liberation. Although there were some ‘winners and losers’ in the postwar period, the contribution of different groups to the People’s Liberation Struggle became off limits for discussion, to be replaced by the ideal of brotherhood between the different groups united in a joint struggle. Nevertheless, decisions taken in the final stages of the war show that the KPJ found it necessary to grant some concessions to certain groups and regions, such as Montenegro. Such considerations were also evident in the case of Serbia, even if Serbia itself had to make some concessions.. These concessions were subject to the KPJ’s more long-term dilemma of discrediting other political forces while attracting their followers to the KPJ cause. The federal and constitutional measures were first and foremost formal constructions introduced as practical measures to ensure national equality, and in this way, settle national contentions. It was never the aim of the KPJ to create separate nation-states. The introduction of a new socialist and federal system, and granting formal self-determination to different groups was seen as sufficient to ‘solve the national question’. All the constitutional provisions to secure national equality, the number of units established within the federation, the borders drawn between the units, and the ethnic composition within each of them, must be understood in light of the KPJ’s larger strategic and tactical considerations. In the end, Tito’s primary concern was not so much with formal structures and constitutional matters and borders. He was never as interested in these issues as Pijade, or Kardelj for that matter. His main focus was on the political process, securing the leading position of the KPJ within

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Yugoslavia, as well as building a new Yugoslavia created in the vision of the KPJ. Nevertheless, the formal constructs and the manner in which they were introduced were to gain a far greater importance in the political process than Tito or the KPJ had envisioned. To understand the full implications of the KPJ-proclaimed ‘solution’ to the national question and the role of the formal federal decisions in this, they must be placed in context of the wider ideological and political project of the KPJ.

5 INTRODUCING A SOCIALIST SOLUTION TO THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1945–1948

To understand the KPJ’s claim to have found a solution to the national question in Yugoslavia, it is not enough to look at the formal constructs and institutions that the KPJ introduced. These can only be understood in context of the KPJ’s wider goals after coming to power, and the Party’s efforts to reinforce its leading role and create a new socialist society within the borders of Yugoslavia. Despite its pragmatic outlook, the KPJ’s ideological perception of the world was an important influence on its politics, which were formed within the framework of MarxismLeninism. The Yugoslavs’ approach to the national question continued to be influenced by party ideology and worldview, as well as by historical circumstances. Furthermore, their approach to the national question remained subject to the KPJ’s strategies to remain in power. KPJ’s solution to the national question in Yugoslavia, including the introduction of federalism, was thus intrinsically linked to its strategy of legitimising the new Communist regime, the socialist project, and the Yugoslav state that formed its framework. While is not within the scope of this discussion to cover all the complex economic, political, and social aspects of the KPJ attempt to introduce a new social order, it will address some aspects that were particularly important for the Party’s approach to the national question.

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Building a socialist society and establishing a leading role for the KPJ, 1945–1948 When the KPJ came into power in 1945, it had two primary aims: to create a new socialist society within a Yugoslav framework, and to consolidate the leading role it had achieved during the war. The aspiration of creating a socialist society represented a long-term project, but the need to secure the leading role of the Party and create some form of postwar stability was more pressing. However, there was a complex relationship between these tasks. With its broad and disciplined organisation built up during the harsh conditions of the war, the KPJ was in a unique situation in 1945, holding exceptional and undivided power. The Party held control over the armed forces, the militia, security forces, all legislative executive organs as well as all other higher state institutions. There were KPJ members on all levels and in all key functions and mechanisms of power. It was important, however, to continue consolidation of this position. The KPJ succeeded in doing this faster than any other communist party in Eastern Europe. After the elections in November 1945, the KPJ rooted out all political opposition to its position as the leading force in Yugoslavia. The Party transformed from a small illegal organisation into one which enjoyed mass support, with a membership of 141,066 at the end of the war. The composition of membership changed drastically as 9000 out of 12000 original members had perished during the war.1 The vast majority of the members who had joined in wartime were young and enthusiastic, but lacked political experience. Half of the new leaders were under the age of 26, and were not professionally trained revolutionaries like their predecessors. Even though the KPJ Party organisation swelled with new members through the wartime struggle, the Politburo – the close and small leadership group that had taken the KPJ and the People’s Liberation Movement through the war – continued to make decisions. Members of this small group took upon themselves the task of building a new socialist society, the rebuilding of a country devastated by war and the reinvention of a new concept of Yugoslavia. Shared wartime experience had made Tito’s leadership a very tightly knit group, in many ways resembling a family. This close relationship continued into the early 1950s. The allegation levelled at the KPJ by Stalin in 1948, accusing the members of acting as if they were still an underground, conspiratorial organisation was not entirely without merit. The identity of the members in the postwar Politburo was not made public until the KPJ arranged its Fifth Congress, after Stalin’s

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first allegations appeared in 1948. Indeed, some leading communists were not even sure themselves whether they were full members or consulting members of the Politburo.2 The KPJ planned to continue to draw on the mass basis they had acquired during the war to engage Yugoslav citizens in the rebuilding of the country and the creation of a new socialist society. Among the most important vehicles for transmitting the KPJ policies to the people at large were the mass organisations. The largest and most important of these was the Popular Front of Yugoslavia – the NFJ (narodnog fronta Jugoslavije). This was a continuation of the wartime JNOF, an organisation that incorporated all the parties and organisations who fought for the Partisan cause during the war. KPJ put considerable effort into ensuring continued mass participation in the NFJ. Tito pointed to the importance of the unified Popular Front for a faster and easier rebuilding of the devastated country.3 As was the case during the war, the KPJ continued to be careful about expressing revolutionary motives and, until 1947–48, rather than stressing the communist elements in its new strategies, it concentrated on emphasising the elements of popular liberation, Popular Front and the struggle for People’s Liberation. The NFJ which had a membership of over 7 million by 1947, appealed to the masses, not to the working classes specifically. Until the break with Stalin in 1948, the KPJ did not officially describe its wartime struggle in terms of socialist revolution, and tended to play down the revolutionary motive. Milovan Đilas argued that, even as late as the beginning of 1948, the term revolution was not official, even if he and Kardelj felt that their struggle against the occupation had been just that – a revolution.4 As part of the project to create a new socialist society, the KPJ needed to define exactly what they meant by this and maintain a leading role in all spheres of political and social life. Although the KPJ chose the Yugoslav state as the territorial unit for their socialist project, their main interest was not in it as a continuation of old Yugoslavia but rather as a framework for the building of a socialist society. The Yugoslav socialist project could not be a classic state-building or nation-building project since Marxist ideology dictated that both wither away. This did not mean that they did not engage in state-building, but rather that defining it as such posed a challenge. The Yugoslav communists claimed that they had created a new type of Yugoslav state, one that had come about through a joint popular and revolutionary struggle for the People’s Liberation. Tito described the creation of a new Yugoslavia in the following way in an article in Komunist in 1946:

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A lot of persistence was needed to convince all the nationalities that it was only through the People’s liberation war, only through the struggle against the occupiers and domestic traitorous reaction, that they could achieve all national rights, and in this manner build a new Yugoslavia, without the old leaders and on an entirely new basis. The truth is that then, when all the Peoples in Yugoslavia were convinced about the correctness of the line presented to the masses by the KPJ – the national question formed one of the strongest levers in the People’s Liberation War. In this Liberation War, a new type of state was born and finally built. A state with an entirely different social organisation from old Yugoslavia organised much better and more just for the larger popular masses. Built was the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. A Republic instead of a Monarchy. A society with a correctly solved national question [built] on a democratic principle, with a new social and economic structure. Yugoslavia was built in the process of the People’s Liberation War, on the ruins of the old Yugoslavia, whose state apparatus fell apart when the country was occupied.5 Here, as elsewhere, Tito was careful to point out the contrast between the old Yugoslavia (which many had associated with lack of democracy and national inequality) and the new Yugoslavia that had come into being through a common liberation struggle. While the communists eagerly continued pointing out all that was bad about the old Yugoslavia, they also had to conceptualise and define the new Yugoslavia in both a territorial sense and a symbolic one. In other words, the communists needed to create a new hegemonic concept of Yugoslavia, closely linked to the leading position which the KPJ had achieved during the war, and which they sought to consolidate in the immediate postwar years. Tito referred to the national question as ‘one of the strongest levers in the People’s Liberation war’, thus pointing to the importance of the KPJ’s solution to the national question, and particularly to the federal organisation of the state, as a legitimising factor to their new regime and the new Yugoslavia. Although the KPJ attempted to play on the energy from the Partisan struggle to engage the masses in the postwar rebuild of society, and to appeal to the sense of working together for the collective good, they also needed to defuse some of the tension that had been created during the war. Securing some calm and stability between different national groups that had just been through a bloody fratricidal war was an important reason for introducing federal institutions. While the KPJ expected

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the (bourgeois) national consciousness perceived to be the root of this national and ethnic conflict to be overcome through the building of new social relations, it also needed political stability in order to develop the ‘true’ class consciousness necessary for building a socialist society. This need for stability therefore made their ability to ensure national equality and peaceful national relations vital for the KPJ. Although the federal provisions mostly remained formal in the period when party centralism otherwise dominated, they were an important step for securing stability in a country with very complex and fragile national relations. In this manner, the KPJ’s claim to have solved the national solution, and the territorial and ideological aspects of this solution, became closely linked to the legitimation of the communist party’s leading role, and the legitimacy of the new Yugoslav state. The KPJ had started the process of building a new Yugoslavia long before the war was over, and had been implementing institutionalising measures since AVNOJ. However, KPJ doctrine also predicted that the state and the federal institutions would in theory wither away through the advancement on the road to socialism. This concept raised an important but difficult question: how were the KPJ to create a hegemonic concept of new Yugoslavia, so that its nature and existence would not remain permanently in question, while at the same time expecting ‘bourgeois’ institutions, including the state, to wither away? In all of the Yugoslav communists’ actions, the relation between presenting a model for regulating national conflict and ensuring national emancipation, while at the same time securing the leading role of the communist party within the state, remained intrinsically linked in the theory and practice of the Party leadership. The KPJ had not only to ensure that its leading role was not questioned, but also that Yugoslavia, as the framework of their socialist project, did not come into question. This was to constitute one of the Party’s greatest and enduring challenges. The ideological aspect of the KPJ claim to have found a solution to the national question The KPJ claim to have solved the national question in Yugoslavia was based on a fusion between the communists’ re-conceptualisation of Yugoslavism – the idea of Yugoslav unity – and the introduction of a socialist discourse which envisioned the creation of a socialist society.6 The KPJ’s project to build a new, socialist society was a political project, ideologically rooted in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Hence, Vesna Pesić argues that the KPJ ‘promised an ideological resolution to the

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national question through a socialist revolution that subsumed class and national distinction within a socialist framework’.7 The KPJ approach to the national question was an integrated part of this wider aim of creating a socialist society. The belief that it was possible to ‘solve’ a national question was rooted in the KPJ’s conceptualisation of the nation from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. The epistemological position from which communists approached the national question set clear limits to their practical and theoretical understanding of the national phenomena and national conflict. It prevented them from abstracting national relations, or any other political aspect from the ideological base of the system they developed. This very specific ideological position not only played a vital role in shaping the communists’ conception of the national question, but also determined how they formulated their responses to expressions of national conflict in Yugoslavia. The Marxist-Leninist approach to the national question assumed that it was a purely political issue, in the last instance economically determined and linked to the bourgeois stage of development, and that it would be rendered obsolete once society progressed to the higher stage of socialism. This approach presumed that, by granting self-determination and settling specific national demands, it would be possible to ‘solve the national question’. The expectation that national conflict could be solved was to a large extent built on the communists’ stern belief that socialism was a progressive step in human development, which would qualitatively change both society, and human consciousness. However, the KPJ was not always so clear about how they thought the withering away of the nation and the lessening of attachment to national values and individual national identities would take place in practice. Their tendency to perceive national ideology mainly in political terms contributed to their lack of perception towards individual groups when it came to the preservation and development of languages and culture within the new state. At times, this also prevented the communists from grasping the continuing attachment of the people to what they considered traditional and feudal values. The KPJ had pledged to uphold the rights of the various groups to use particular national languages and cultural practices, but the Yugoslav communists showed little sensitivity in this area in the immediate postwar period. For example, as Aleš Gabrič points out, the right to use one’s mother tongue was only established in very general terms, and the constitutions of both Yugoslavia and the republics did not specify the official language (the language of the state).8 Although Serbian and Croatian were initially recognised tentatively as separate languages, the KPJ soon encouraged greater linguistic unity,

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and the two languages were increasingly treated as variants of the same language. The attempts at purification of the Croatian language made within the NDH under the Ustaša regime, purging it of what were considered Serbian and Yugoslav influences, made it easier for the KPJ to justify an attempt at rapprochement within the linguistic arena. Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian) clearly established itself as the lingua franca in communication within the Yugoslav state administration and other areas of common cross-republican communication. Andrew Wachtel points out that in the first postwar educational programmes for use in schools, the existence of a single Serbo-Croatian language was simply assumed.9 The claim to have solved the national question had wider-reaching political repercussions. In the early years, this claim most importantly prevented discussion of the practical dimension of having solved the national question in any depth. This included issues around sovereignty of the different peoples and republics; practical efforts to ensure interaction between the different peoples; and the creation of co-operation between republics while concurrently allowing for linguistic and cultural diversity. In a speech in Zagreb, Tito made it explicitly clear that following the implementation of the communists’ ‘socialist solution’ to the national question, expressions of nationalist discontent would not be tolerated: I will warn you that in the new Federal Yugoslavia, there can be no place for chauvinism, or negative local patriotism, since this would be interfering and damaging not only to the federal unit in question, but to all of Yugoslavia. The question of chauvinism and local patriotism must be removed from the agenda; it can no longer remain. Today, Croats no longer hold the right to cite the oppression from 1918 to 1941 as a reason for aspirations against a common Yugoslavia. … we can and we must be clear that what was then, that which washed away the blood of the best sons of all the Yugoslav peoples, it has to be removed from the agenda. Those who still dare to oppose this are the enemy not only of the new Federal Croatia, but is also the enemy of the Croats.10 In this manner, Tito made clear that the decisions taken by the KPJ on national relations were not up for discussion, effectively warning off any forces who might consider using national discontent as a way to challenge the party’s leading role. He indicated, with a stroke of a pen, that there would be no process of reconciliation to deal with the sensitive issue of the role that different national groups had played in war

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atrocities. Instead, all the groups were expected to put the previous atrocities behind them, and focus on their joint future, through the building of Brotherhood and Unity. So, although Tito claimed that the national question had been solved, the KPJ never really confronted the national conflict that had led to such atrocities. Rather than actually deal with any issues, never mind solving them, the Party declared such national conflict no longer existed. The KPJ expected the attachment to national cultures to lessen, but questions remained as to how they imagined this would happen. What would replace the attachment to national cultures of the different peoples within a new Yugoslavia? Being an all-Yugoslav organisation, the KPJ clearly favoured the principle of Yugoslav Unity. Inherent in the principle of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ was the expectation of the development of a true Yugoslav patriotism replacing any attachment to what the communists labelled chauvinistic nationalism. The socialist ideology that the KPJ sought to infuse into Yugoslav society was professedly internationalist and universalist, but their project also carried a strong Yugoslav dimension. In an article entitled ‘O nacionalnoj istoriji kao vaspitnom predmetu’ (‘On national history as an educational subject’) Milovan Đilas points out that: brotherhood and unity between the peoples of Yugoslavia is an example not only of the persistent implementation of the principle of internationalism within the framework of one state, but also of the accomplishment of all the key conditions for the continuous full rapprochement between the peoples of Yugoslavia, and all the peoples who fight against imperialism.11 Having fought the war on the principle of recognising national diversity and the fact that Yugoslavia was a multinational state, the KPJ did not seek to create such unity through force or denial of the existence of individual national cultures. Rather, it sought to create Yugoslav unity, as Tito argued, through the recognition of diversity. This unity was based on the recognition of the individuality of the different national cultures. On the other hand, the Communists did not expect these individual cultures to play an important role in the new Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslav culture they intended to create was thus conceived in principle as an overarching supranational culture, which would respect and incorporate parts of the existing national cultures. The KPJ was not yet entirely clear about the Yugoslav aspect of the new culture they were hoping to create,

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nor on how it would be defined. Did ‘Yugoslav patriotism’ or socialism constitute the most important aspect of the KPJ’s postwar project? Since the KPJ did not expect attachment to particular national cultures would remain important, would the rapprochment towards a unified culture lead towards a new type of ‘national’ Yugoslav culture? In the period before the break with Stalin, when the KPJ appealed to the masses primarily on the basis of their common struggle for popular liberation, the patriotic motive remained strong, even if the socialist aspect was also present. Referring primarily to its pragmatic concept of Brotherhood and Unity the KPJ remained decisively vague on the nature of Yugoslav unity, at least until its attempt to introduce socialist Yugoslavism raised debates in the mid-1950s/early 1960s, and even beyond this. A part of its revolutionary strategy, the KPJ aspired to create a new Yugoslav culture in the long run, while seeking to incorporate the acceptable parts of previous national cultures and adapt them into the postwar discourse. The attempt to reinterpret existing cultural works to make them ideologically suitable constituted an important part of the exercise of the new regime to create a new Yugoslav culture. The KPJ sought to influence the development of a socialist consciousness through education (Vaspitanje). Such education included formal education through a new school curriculum, but was also much more broadly defined. An important agent in the education and socialisation of the new citizens of Yugoslavia into acquiring what the KPJ viewed as the true class-consciousness and the necessary moral fibre to become good socialists, and to make sure party ideology was transfused into Yugoslav society, was the Department for Agitation and Propaganda, popularly referred to as Agitprop. This department was under the leadership of Milovan Đilas. Among the tasks of the Agitprop was to present the ‘positive’ aspects of different national cultures in a manner which was cohesive with the building of socialism. Agitprop also strove to demonstrate how these aspects contributed in the creation of a wider Yugoslav culture. Agitprop proved to be a particularly efficient watchdog, keeping a keen eye on cultural activities throughout Yugoslavia, and maintaining strict censorship over what were deemed non-acceptable cultural activities. It held regular meetings with publishers, theatre directors, and other cultural institutions.12 The KPJ also sought to encourage the participation of well-known cultural figures such as the writers Miroslav Krleža and Ivo Andrić to the creation of a postwar Yugoslav culture. One individual who worked for Agitprop was Dobrica Ćosić, later to become Serbia’s bestknown writer. In 1945, he and a diverse group of Serbian intellectuals

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and artists would form an informal circle referred to as Simina 9a. The name referred to the address where they met – a flat in central Belgrade belonging to another writer, Borislav Mihajilovic-Mihiz. This became the long-time nest for a group of intellectuals of various persuasions, who, in Ćosić’s words, all carried certain ideological doubts.13 Some, like Ćosić, initially held great faith in the socialist project, had joined the Partisans and become devoted cultural footsoldiers for the new regime. Others, like Mihajilović-Mihiz (who described himself as a ‘fallen soul’) harboured considerable scepticism towards communism. Ćosić depicted the Siminiovci as ‘not communists and not reactionaries’, but ‘halfcommunists and partisans without discpline’.14 Yet, Ćosić was allowed to visit Goli Otok, a concession that would have been unlikely to be bestowed upon somebody not devoted to the regime and socialist cause. Most of the Siminiovci were of a similar generation, born around 1920, coming of age during World War II and sharing a sense of a common destiny. In addition to Ćosić and Mihajilović-Mihiz, this circle included many figures who would become well-known cultural figures in Serbia: Mića Popović, Vojislav Đurić, Mihajlo Đurić, Pavle Ivić, Živorad Stojković, Dejan Medaković. There are unanswered questions about why Agitprop neither banned the activity of this circle, nor reprimanded Ćosić for associating with the Siminiovci. One likely reason for this might be that all of the protagonists – despite doubts, and despite adhering to rather traditional Serbian values – had come down on the side of the Partisans during the war. Until the late 1960s, they embraced the new Yugoslavia, believing that the SKJ professed solution to the national question would provide unity for a Serbian nation that had recently been involved in a fratricidal war. Furthermore they all accepted that the SKJ socialist project would form the framework for their life and professional activity. Another reason why the regime turned a blind eye to Simina 9a may have been their fear of alienating these intellectuals. The regime strived to co-opt the cultural workers as ambassadors for the new Yugoslavia, so having the Serbian intellectuals on board was very important. On the subject of teaching history, Đilas argued that ‘each national history as a teaching subject needed at the same time also to be the history of all the Yugoslav peoples’, and ‘every history of the peoples of Yugoslavia had to truthfully reflect the past of all its peoples’.15 The responsibility for education was tentatively granted to the republics. Although there was no Yugoslav Ministry of Education after 1948, education was subject to strict party centralism, under the watchful eye

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of Agitprop. There were, however, regional differences with regard to the instructions given to each republic on how to teach history, especially on the inter-war period. According to Andrew Wachtel, teachers in Croatia were given much more detailed instructions than teachers in Serbia or Bosnia, who were granted greater autonomy in this matter.16 In the late 1940s, the KPJ addressed little attention to the specifics and practical details attached to their professed solution to the national question. Their main concern at the time rested on consolidating their position within the Yugoslav state, but also within a regional context. Furthermore, they strove to find their place within the postwar international socialist order. In the latter matter, their relations with Stalin became increasingly strained. The Soviet–Yugoslav split The Soviet–Yugoslav split in 1948 and the emergence of the concept of building socialism in one country would bring to attention the role of the state in this development. Although the split did not touch the national question directly, the changes it brought about in Yugoslav theory and practice would seriously impact on the KPJ’s internal policies. Understanding these changes is helpful, therefore, for an understanding of later developments in the KPJ’s policies on the national question. The emerging conflict related closely to the relationship between the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe, particularly the attempt by Stalin to gain tighter control over the new satellite states in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after 1945. Primarily, the split revolved around a power struggle over who would dictate affairs in Yugoslavia and the Balkans: Stalin or Tito. From the Soviet perspective, there was a growing perception that Tito and the Yugoslav communists were acting too independently, while the Yugoslavs resented the interference of the Soviets in what they felt were their internal affairs.17 In Edvard Kardelj’s words, ‘two views developed between us and the Russians concerning the question of socialist development: namely, should socialism develop through cooperation between equal peoples, or through the expansion of the USSR, as the Russians would like’.18 After the war, Stalin was anxious to ensure Soviet control over the newly imposed communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Increasingly with the emergence of the Cold War, Stalin and the USSR came to place greater emphasis on the role the USSR and the Red Army had played in bringing most of the new regimes of the People’s Democracies to power. Although he had previously argued that ‘there must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other

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nations’, by 1947 Stalin had clearly changed his mind. He portrayed the new People’s Democracies as still at a transitional stage, in need of USSR leadership and experience in building socialism. In 1947, the Cominform was also set up (with its headquarters in Belgrade) as a body that would symbolise the fraternity between the USSR and the new People’s Democracies. Like its predecessor Comintern, it was entirely controlled by the USSR, and its function was really as the USSR’s ‘long arm’ for meddling in the affairs of the new ‘People’s Democracies’. The Yugoslavs, being among the most loyal Stalinists at the time, were one of the few states to express any enthusiasm over its formation, but they were soon disappointed. Despite receiving some help from the Red Army, who liberated Belgrade at the end of the war, the Yugoslav communist leaders were fond of pointing out that they came to power through their own efforts, and stressing the unique nature of the Yugoslav struggle. The Yugoslav concept of People’s Democracy after the war conflicted with that of Stalin particularly over the important aspects of leadership. KPJ members were in no doubt that the Party had a leading role in the wartime struggle, and needed to maintain a leading role also afterwards. The Soviet characterisation of People’s Democracies in the immediate postwar period, however, made clear that these states were not dictatorships of the proletariat. The Yugoslavs disagreed with this, Kardelj arguing that ‘a society in the transitional period between capitalism and socialism cannot be anything but a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’.19 Although the KPJ followed the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and considered the CPSU the leading force within the international communist movement, it did not view its own experience as essentially different from that of the Soviets. The Party was not ready to surrender its own leading role in Yugoslavia to the Soviets, nor to let Stalin dictate all their affairs. Although the KPJ followed the classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as modified by Stalin, this did not mean that they followed the USSR slavishly when setting out to build socialism in this early stage. KPJ members certainly viewed themselves as following the same path to socialism trod by the USSR, and passing through the identified stages of development prescribed through the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, with its Stalinist modifications. At this time, they certainly did not look for any alternative road to socialism. However, they did regard their own wartime experience, with the building of the Land Assemblies, a People’s Liberation Movement headed by the KPJ and the setting up of People’s Committees, as a unique historical experience, set in very different conditions from

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the 1917 October Revolution. In addition, the very fact that the USSR had already experienced a revolution meant that the Yugoslav experience could not be the same. Even though the KPJ adhered to the same ideology and did not question the leading role of the Soviet Union in developing the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, the fact that they viewed their historical experiences to be different necessitated a different approach which accounted for the specific nature of the revolution in Yugoslav society. The first real forewarning of approaching conflict emerged in the early part of 1948, and related to talks between Tito and Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian leader, over plans for a Balkan Federation. At a meeting on 10 February, a Yugoslav delegation led by Kardelj and Bakarić, joined by Đilas who was already in Moscow, met together with the Bulgarians Dimitrov, Kostov and Kolarov. All were reprimanded by Stalin for pushing for a Balkan federation without his approval and knowledge. Stalin also criticised the Yugoslavs for sending troops to Albania. In the end, he demanded, to the surprise of both the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs, that ‘Bulgaria and Yugoslavia should be united, tomorrow if possible!’20 The Soviet leader objected when Kardelj mentioned that a Yugoslav–Albanian federation was already in progress. Stalin insisted on ‘first a federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, then both with Albania’21 and forced Kardelj to sign an agreement promising that the Yugoslavs would consult the USSR on all matters of foreign policy. Over the next few weeks, the tension between Moscow and Belgrade increased gradually. On 1 March, Tito convened a meeting of an extended Politburo.22 Again, federation with Bulgaria was an important issue on the agenda. The Yugoslav Politburo decided to decline Stalin’s ultimatum to unite in federation with the Bulgarians, fearing an ulterior motive. Tito argued to his Politburo that the time was not ripe, and that uniting with Bulgaria at that moment would be like a ‘Trojan horse in our party and to our country’. He argued that the Russians regarded the national question differently from themselves, and that they, the Yugoslavs, were not pieces on a chessboard. In his view, it would be best to see how the whole situation crystallised before agreeing to form a federation with Bulgaria.23 Stalin, not used to his decisions being questioned, appears at this time to have made up his mind that it would be necessary to replace the Yugoslav leadership with a more obedient one. On 27 March, Stalin sent what has been characterised as the first letter in a series of correspondence between him and the KPJ Politburo, which would eventually culminate in the famous Cominform Resolution of 28 June 1948, expelling Yugoslavia and the KPJ from the Cominform.24 In

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this letter, Stalin levelled a number of accusations against the Yugoslavs, among which was that the KPJ was acting like a semi-legal party. He argued that the KPJ Politburo had been co-opted, not elected, and that its decisions were not published in the press. Furthermore, Stalin alluded to Trotskyism, and argued that the KPJ’s stance could not be considered Marxist-Leninist or Bolshevik. He compared the Yugoslavs to the Mensheviks. He also accused the KPJ of having been co-opted by the Popular Front, and of not having its own separate programme. Stalin pointed to the comments in Tito’s speech to the Second Congress of the Popular Front of Yugoslavia, where Tito had asked: ‘Does the Communist Party in Yugoslavia have a programme of its own, one that is different from that of the Popular Front? No, the KPJ does not have a separate programme. The programme of the Popular Front – that is their programme’.25 Tito tried to avoid getting engaged in polemic over ideology with Stalin, even when Stalin continued to press the issue. The Yugoslavs continued to refute each new allegation levelled against them. In a presentation to the KPJ CC on April 12 1948, the first since 1940, Tito made clear that he saw the conflict as one between two states: Comrades, keep in mind that this is not about theoretical discussions, it is not about the mistakes made by the KPJ, about our ostensible ideological deviations. We cannot allow them to push us to become involved in discussions over this … Comrades, this is above all about the relations between two states… It seems to me that they make use of the ideological question to justify the pressure they put on us, on our state… This is what this is all about, Comrades.26 Stalin tried first and foremost to attack the leadership of the KPJ, not Yugoslavia as such. Initially, he tried to attract the support of individual members of the leadership, playing a divide and rule game.27 In his second letter of 4 May, he appealed to the ‘healthy elements’ within the KPJ, urging them to overthrow the existing leadership. Stalin’s big mistake was the ferocity with which he attacked the Yugoslav Partisan struggle, diminishing this achievement, arguing that it was no more special than that of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian or Albanian Communist Parties. According to Stalin, KPJ’s accession to power relied not on the quality of the Yugoslav Partisan struggle, but on the aid they had received from the Red Army at the end of the war.28 Among all Stalin’s accusations, this direct attack on the

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Partisans’ achievements significantly hurt the Yugoslavs’ pride. It was an attack on what, in essence, formed the KPJ’s most favoured source of legitimisation for its regime and for the state. In consequence, Tito was able to rally support on the basis of Stalin’s attack on the country, on the people, and on the experience they had shared during the difficult years of the war. In his response to Stalin’s first letter, Tito pointed out: No matter how much some of us love the USSR, one cannot love one’s own country less, a country that is also building socialism, specifically, the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.29 This made it harder for any ‘healthy elements’ to oppose Tito once he chose not to yield to Stalin’s demands. Although his tactic of splitting the leadership of the KPJ was not particularly successful, it caused two important casualties among the highest echelons of the Party: Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Žujović. The latter was the only one to object openly to Tito’s stand at the KPJ CC Plenum. Instead Žujović proposed that the Yugoslavs take self-criticism. He had also been observed in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador Larentiev, and was suspected of having passed on confidential information about the session with the Politburo held on 1 March. Hebrang’s case appears largely to be linked to longterm disagreements between himself and Tito going back to wartime. Their disagreement appears to have been related to their differences in opinion on the national question, and to Hebrang’s dissatisfaction with Tito’s party line. After Hebrang was removed from the Croatian leadership in 1944, he worked as head of the planning commission in Belgrade. In 1946, he was removed from the Politburo and lost many of his other political tasks. After a letter to Kardelj, in which he had accused Tito of personal animosity,30 Hebrang became isolated from the rest of the leadership. His resistance to the implementation of radical socialist policies in the economy led to accusations that he was following the Soviet strategy which at the time was directed against the People’s Democracies in the region.31 Hebrang was also accused of regularly informing the Soviets on internal party matters.32 According to Ivan Supek, Hebrang did seek some intervention from Stalin in order to change the Party line in Yugoslavia, and perhaps also to change the leadership’.33 The mere suspicion of this had a negative effect on his relationship with Tito. When the dispute with Stalin and the KPJ broke out in 1948, the ‘Hebrang case came to attention again. It is not surprising that Tito would have perceived Hebrang as a possible threat, knowing Stalin’s propensity

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to divide and rule among communist leaderships. Although the links between Hebrang and Žujović were never clear, Tito gave Ranković the task of ‘engineering’ a link between them. Hebrang was then accused of being an Ustaša spy in the KPJ.34 He was never even tried, and he died under mysterious circumstances in prison, probably in 1949.35 There were many other, less prominent but equally tragic, casualties of this process. According to Ivo Banac, 16,288 people were arrested or sentenced on suspicion of being Cominformists.36 Many were sent to an internment camp at Goli Otok, the Yugoslav Gulag on a barren island in the Adriatic, where conditions were horrendous. For many decades, it would be taboo even to mention its name, and Goli Otok became a shameful spot on the communists’ historical record, as did their treatment of Hebrang. The concept of ‘socialism in one country’ assumed a new and greater significance with the Yugoslav–Soviet split. This was not a concept invented by the Yugoslavs; indeed, the words were Stalin’s own. Although the Yugoslavs never promulgated a specific ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’, their insistence on the specific features of their revolutionary experience seems to have made Stalin uneasy, as it (however unintentionally) posed a challenge to the USSR’s role as the only and leading socialist society. Hence, the concept of ‘socialism in one country’ raised crucial questions about revolutionary legitimacy, about the relations between the smaller states and the USSR, and of whether the new smaller ‘People’s Democracies’ would be allowed to decide on their own affairs and development, or remain under Soviet tutelage. For Tito, the question of sovereignty was a vital issue. Although he and the rest of the KPJ had been unquestionably devoted to the USSR up to this point, he was not prepared for the KPJ or Yugoslavia to be ‘swallowed up’ by the Soviet Union. He maintained that in order to avoid the destruction of the friendship with the USSR, the first condition would be absolute respect for the principle of national and state sovereignty. Tito therefore argued to his Central Committee: In our view, small countries like Yugoslavia and others who are travelling on the road to socialism, need for both internal and external reasons, to continue to remain at any given stage independent, sovereign, yet strongly tied to each other through various agreements, and all closely tied to the Soviet Union… The experience of successful revolutionary development in each People’s Democracy needs to be viewed as a continuation and supplement

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to the experience of the Great October Revolution, as something new in revolutionary praxis, but entirely in the spirit of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.37 Although Tito was conscious of the danger of letting the issue become a dispute over ideology, the pressure from Stalin meant that the dispute eventually became an ideological one as well. Stalin’s accusation that the KPJ did not have a programme of its own, but had been absorbed by the Popular Front and by nationalism, led Tito to reveal the Party’s real understanding of its role within the Popular Front: The facts, as the many statements, not just by communists but also by non-communists within the Front, show; firstly, the KPJ is the leading force within the Popular Front: secondly, the Party is not fading into the Front; on the contrary, the Party is elevating the basic level of the masses, politically and ideologically, educating them in the spirit of its politics and Marxism Leninism; thirdly, the Popular Front in Yugoslavia is in practice struggling for socialism, something that would certainly not be possible if a ‘diversified political group’ – bourgeois parties, kulaks, merchants, small factory owners and similar, as it says in the Resolution – really played a serious role within [the Front]. Fourthly, the Party has not taken over the programme from the Front, on the contrary, the Front has received its basic direction and programme from the Party, which is only natural, considering the Party’s leading role within it.38 With this statement, the KPJ leaves behind all previous pretence that the Popular Front was a coalition of equals. The break with Stalin led the KPJ to finally state explicitly the leading role that they already felt they had before this split, but had been careful not to express. The KPJ initially decided to respond to Stalin’s accusations that the Yugoslavs were not Bolshevik enough by taking what it considered a number of corrective measures, hence stressing its revolutionary character more explicitly, becoming ‘more Stalinist than Stalin’. In time the Yugoslav communists also started a process of theo­retical reorientation, leading eventually also to practical changes. The Yugoslav communists needed to reconsider their own perception of the legitimacy of the social order they had established and of their leading role in it.

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The communists’ approach to national relations was conceptualised within the wider framework of their revolutionary strategies and post-revolutionary concerns. The national question was not a side issue, but integral to, and derived from, their revolutionary strategies and their strategies to get into power. It would continue to have an impact on their strategies to stay in power. Concurrently, the complex national relations in Yugoslavia and the competition the KPJ faced from national forces seriously interrupted their wider revolutionary strategies. The Yugoslav case demonstrated the need for socialist revolutionaries to take into consideration the particular historical, social and political circumstances in which they lived and worked. While the ideological aspect was crucial in the Yugoslav communists’ discourse on national relations, the complex and multi-layered nature of interaction between national and supranational ideologies in Yugoslavia remained even more important in forming their policies towards the national question. The struggle for People’s Liberation formed an essential factor in the KPJ’s struggle to achieve a socialist revolution and to attract popular support. It figured as a fundamental element in the founding legitimacy for the Yugoslav communists after the war. Their ability to deal with national conflict – that is their promise of a socialist solution to the national question – thus became a crucial pillar in the legitimisation process of the new regime and state. Paradoxically, the maintenance of this legitimacy became greatly dependent on the KPJ’s ability to keep the Yugoslav peoples ‘happy’ and to fulfil their national aspirations. The KPJ strategies for finding a solution to the national question up to 1948 were deeply influenced by the directives from the Comintern and subject to the changing political needs of the Soviet Union and Stalin. Although under the difficult conditions of the war, and out of sight of the watchful eyes of the Comintern, the KPJ decided to ignore the Comintern’s instructions in some matters pertaining to internal affairs, its leaders nevertheless remained among the most loyal Comintern, and from 1943 Cominform, members until 1948. Their revolutionary vision, while adapted to the local circumstances in Yugoslavia, built on the Soviet experience. The federal model introduced by the KPJ was modelled on the Soviet example. The KPJ was a fully Bolshevised party, organised on the principle of democratic centralism. Although regional and historical differences meant that the Yugoslav communists sometimes chose to solve internal domestic affairs differently from the Soviets and also believed they had experienced their own revolution, they did not have any intention of seeking out a separate road to socialism until after 1948. The change of direction in the early 1950s was, as pointed out by Dennison Rusinow, born of necessity, not choice.

6 TOWARDS SELF-MANAGEMENT SOCIALISM AND YUGOSLAV UNITY, 1948–1958

Tito’s prestige, both at home and abroad, increased tremendously after the Yugoslavs had succeeded in defying Stalin in 1948, overcoming the pressure they were put under by the Cominform during the following years. No longer welcome by their former associates, the Yugoslavs embarked on a journey in new and uncharted territory in their search for an alternative road to a socialist society. In the 1950s, Yugoslavia acquired a new and prestigious position in the world, aligned neither to the East nor to the West. Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved temporarily after Stalin’s death in 1953. Tito welcomed Khrushchev’s attempt at rapprochement and invitation to the Yugoslavs to come back into the fold, but he remained apprehensive about giving up the independence they had achieved after being cast out in 1948. Tito was one of the initiators of the co-operation of non-aligned countries in the second half of the fifties, and in the early 1960s the Yugoslavs took a leading role in initiating the movement, hosting the first official Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Belgrade in 1961. At home, the Yugoslavs initially concentrated on rooting out any real or imagined supporters of Cominform and Stalin (the so-called Ibeovci or Cominformists) but gradually, they also sought to find a new way of consolidating their legitimacy as the leading power in Yugoslav society. Their answer was self-management socialism. The break with Stalin and the ensuing introduction of the doctrine of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia had crucial implications for the

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KPJ’s domestic political strategies, but the underlying aim of creating a socialist society itself did not change. The KPJ’s reliance on internal support increased, along with the need to keep the different national groups satisfied. The national question was not at the top of the agenda of the communist party leadership during the first half of the 1950s, nor was it publicly discussed. The KPJ claimed to have solved the national question in Yugoslavia through the introduction of federalism and national equality, treating it mostly as a matter that could be overcome through ideological indoctrination and the further development of socialism. However, at the end of the decade, the lack of integration and intercultural dialogue between the different republics emerged as an important theme on the political agenda. Building a Yugoslav road to socialism The 1948 split with Stalin and the USSR represented the first major crisis for the KPJ and the new regime, marking the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Party’s search for a solution to the Yugoslav national question. The events that happened over the next decade did not touch directly on the national question, but the theoretical and practical changes to the Yugoslav communist project would be important and far-reaching in the wider discourse of Yugoslav socialist ideology and for the Party’s handling of national relations. The crisis did not change the basic features of the KPJ ‘solution’ to the national question, but the break with Stalin forced the Party leadership to confront aspects of the declared solution which they had previously ignored or refused to address in any detail. The Yugoslavs initially responded to the Soviet–Yugoslav crisis by becoming more Stalinist than Stalin. Until the beginning of 1949, the Yugoslav communists chose a defensive line in this dispute. Despite publishing the Cominform Resolution in Borba, together with the Yugoslav response, they remained cautious in their approach. They refuted each of the accusations levelled against them, but did not attack Stalin; on the contrary, they continued to praise him. The KPJ tended to refer to the dispute as one with Cominform, and not the USSR, and they publicly referred to it not as a dispute over essential issues, but as a misunderstanding. Tito argued that ‘we must prove with deeds what is true and what is false, and not fight with phrases, the lies and slanders directed at us’.1 In this spirit, the Yugoslavs embarked upon a programme of crash collectivisation, with disastrous results. The expulsion of the KPJ from the Cominform isolated the Yugoslavs in the communist world, and Stalin enforced a financial and trade blockade that was devastating to

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Yugoslavia. Once the Yugoslavs realised that the dispute was no misunderstanding, they gradually started to reconsider their stance. They now reproached the Western powers. From 1949, they received financial aid from the US and also some from the UK and France. Later they received military aid too. Following increasingly ferocious behaviour from the Soviet Union and other Cominform countries, Yugoslavia ‘discovered’ and successfully brought their case to the UN. These developments in many ways made Yugoslavia’s sovereignty as a state more secure, although the clashes and provocations on borders with Eastern block countries became regular. In 1949, the Yugoslav communists embarked on an ideological journey, rooted in a critique of ‘Soviet Bureaucratic Socialism’. This eventually led them to develop a Yugoslav variant of socialist discourse. The critique started with the KPJ’s attempt to find a way to explain Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia. The main reason behind the ideological reorientation of Yugoslav socialism was to strengthen Yugoslavia’s position in the context of the rift with Stalin. What first started as a protective mechanism against Soviet accusations of ‘deviation’ soon turned into an offensive against ‘Soviet Bureaucratic Socialism’ and its hegemonism or ‘imperialism’ within the communist world, charging the Soviet Union with ‘the imperialist denial of equality between socialist states’.2 The main criticism levelled against the Soviet Union was that it was acting in an imperialistic manner by denying equality between socialist states. Đilas argued: In socialism there are not and cannot be leading nations and leading states which is in fact occurring today. Only equality of states, peoples and parties can be ‘leading’, only mutual agreement and co-operation can be ‘leading’… only on the basis of complete equality can the working class achieve true unity. Different countries going towards the same goal – socialism and communism – inevitably do this on different roads, at various tempos and with different forms.3 Soon the Yugoslav communists moved from criticising the hegemonic tendencies in the USSR’s external affairs, to assessing critically also the internal logic of the Soviet socialist system, accusing it of excessive bureaucratisation. In this process, the Yugoslavs sought an alternative to the Soviet model they were now criticising, plunging into their old Marxist classics to seek an answer to their new dilemma. Gradually, they started to develop their own kind of socialism. Until 1953, the

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development of novel ideas supporting the new route of development for Yugoslav socialism was restricted to the inner circle of the Party leadership, being a joint project between several of the top leaders with theoretical inclinations. The later testimonies of those involved bear witness to the development of the doctrine of self-management as a process that happened in close co-operation between these men, to the degree that individual authorship was impossible to distinguish.4 The members of this close-knit group who were most involved in this theoretical undertaking were Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Đilas and Boris Kidrič. Also active in the debates were Moša Pijade, Vladimir Bakarić, and to a lesser extent Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo. Tito and Ranković, Kardelj and Đilas were the quartet that still made up the highest echelon of the Party. Edvard Kardelj had always been inclined towards theorising. He was to become the chief ideologue behind the postwar Yugoslav system and theorist on the evolution of the system of self-management. He also became the main exponent of the KPJ’s theoretical conceptualisation of the national questioning Yugoslavia. Kardelj’s long article in Komunist in 1949, entitled ‘On People’s Democracy’ (‘O narodnoj Demokratiji’) was to become a cardinal text, reflecting most closely the official Yugoslav view in the emerging critical re-evaluation of the Soviet Union. Also inclined towards theorising and ideological debates was the Montenegrin Milovan Đilas, who contributed considerably to the critique of the Soviet system. Together with Kardelj and Kidrič, Đilas became an important proponent of the emerging doctrine, first of workers’ self-management, later developed into the more sophisticated doctrine of socialist selfmanagement. Shortly after the Fifth Congress, Đilas slowly started on an extraordinary journey. He had been among the most radical and leftist members of the KPJ, but by 1954, he concluded that ‘the communist party constituted a new class of owners and exploiters’.5 From being a member of the highest echelons of the KPJ leadership, he eventually became the best-known ‘heretic’ within the Yugoslav communist movement. Boris Kidrič was an energetic Slovene who had taken over Hebrang’s post of finance after the latter was purged from the Party. Kidrič worked closely with Đilas and Kardelj, and would become the main proponent of the economic aspect of the new doctrine of socialist self-management and economic issues in general in the early postwar period.6 The old veteran Moša Pijade, a Serb Communist of Jewish origin, with a reputation as a vigorous and sharp polemicist, was particularly active in the 1944–48 period. Pijade concerned himself mainly

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with issues relating to the legal aspect of the Yugoslav system. His role in the development of the doctrine of socialist self-management, however, was more negligible.7 The Croat Vladimir Bakarić, who took over the leadership of the Croatian Communist Party after Hebrang, concerned himself primarily with peasant and agricultural issues, and remained a critical voice preaching caution against peasant collectives. Bakarić would continue to be a formidable figure within the Croatian leadership. His close links to the top leadership meant he held a much more prominent role than the leaders of the other Republics. His contribution to the development of socialist self-management would acquire greater significance in the 1960s. Tito was less driven by theory than the likes of Kardelj and Đilas. He preferred to exercise pragmatic politics while leaving his more theoretically inclined colleagues to engage in conceptualising the new Yugoslav road. Tito nevertheless had a clear sense of the importance of developing a theoretical foundation for the Yugoslav practice. He adopted his colleagues’ ideas, and acknowledged that at least as a theoretical discourse, socialist self-management and decentralisation were necessary to differentiate the Party’s discourse from both Stalinism and from inter-war Yugoslav unitarism. He remained sceptical and adopted the doctrine more by necessity than by conviction. Nevertheless, it was Tito who introduced the Fundamental Law on Management to the Federal Assembly on 26 June 1950. This formed the official basis for the introduction of the doctrine of workers’ self-management. In 1952, Kardelj introduced three guiding principles for how he envisioned the further development of Yugoslav socialism, three principles that were to form the core components of the new socialist self-management system. The first of Kardelj’s principles was the genuine leading role of the working class – based on workers’ economic control through workers’ councils. Furthermore, he proposed this should be accompanied by genuine decentralisation as a guarantee against political monopoly at the centre. This was to be achieved by giving real power to local government organs, with a higher state organ controlled by deputies responsible and responsive to them. Through the implementation of these two principles, Kardelj envisioned that the third principle, ‘a clear and consistent course of socialist democratisation in our entire social life and development’ could be attained.8 The KPJ continued to hold control, and no significant real power at this time was handed over to the factories as the Party liked to claim, but the introduction of self-management would attain an important symbolic role in the Yugoslav variant of socialism.

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The Sixth Congress and the redefinition of the role of the Party Some of the most important formal and symbolic changes related to the development of a new Yugoslav socialist discourse happened at the Sixth Congress in Zagreb in November 1952. At this congress, the KPJ changed its name to Savez komunista Jugoslavije (SKJ) – the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The role of the Party was also redefined. The name change was linked to a larger and more fundamental dilemma faced by the SKJ, as it labelled the Soviet system as undemocratic while retaining a one-party system of its own. This necessitated explaining why the SKJ’s hegemonic role in Yugoslav society was not equally undemocratic. The answer, launched at the Sixth Congress, was to attempt to redefine the leading role of the SKJ to be mainly an educational and guiding one. At the Sixth Congress, the SKJ ceased to describe itself as the vanguard of the working classes (as in the statute of the Fifth Congress in 1948) calling itself instead the most conscious and organised section of the working classes, of the working people. Nevertheless, for the Yugoslav communist leadership, relinquishing the Party’s monopoly was never an option, and the continuing importance of the communists’ leading role in Yugoslav society was clearly expressed by Tito: When we are clear about the fact that the role of the KPJ today is not a commanding one, that it does not interfere in everything like some higher arbiter in the court, who meddles in different problems in social life – scientific, economic, and other [areas], handing its judgement as something irrevocable and flawless, then it is clear that the role of the KPJ remains in one of its most important tasks – in the ideological-educational leadership, in its alertness that our socialist society is developing normally and correctly, that is – the role of the communists remains in the education and preparation of the citizens of our country in the spirit of socialism.9 Tito signalled that the SKJ sought to exercise its leading role in a different manner, relying less on direct state coercion and more on influencing the development of a ‘socialist consciousness’ of its population through the use of ‘education’, propaganda and participation of local communists in all spheres of Yugoslav social and political life. The SKJ encouraged individual communists at the local level to engage in the council committees and self-management bodies, thereby ensuring Party discipline. It was particularly keen to mobilise the younger generation towards more

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active participation in political organisations.10 This active participation of Party members in various organisations was a means of monitoring and controlling the activities within them. Meanwhile security measures introduced in the early postwar years, and after the 1948 Cominform split, when Cominformists were hunted by the secret police (UDBa), were relaxed. However, this did not mean the SKJ had abandoned coercive measures. The secret police continued to exert its control over Yugoslav society, including the SKJ membership itself. Party membership had expanded enormously since the war, and Ranković (the leader of the UDBa) applied the measures he deemed necessary to keep the cadres in place. The Sixth Congress in many ways marked the high point of the liberalisation period in Yugoslavia in the 1950s, and yet at the same time signalled the end of this most vigorous theorising within the SKJ leadership. It was at this congress that some of the ideas on socialist democracy and decentralisation became enshrined into the Party resolution and statute, and where ideas relating to the changing role of the Party were set out in practice. At this point, the Party leadership still appeared highly unified in its ideas and policies. This would soon change, however. Certain forces in the Party were sceptical about the new definition of the role of its organisation and thought the liberalisation process went too fast. Even Tito himself carried considerable reservations about these changes, despite advancing and supporting the new role of the SKJ in his speech to the Sixth Congress.11 Soon afterwards, Tito, in collaboration with Ranković, organised a special Plenum: the Second Plenum at Brioni in 1953. Here measures were introduced which in practice would come to reduce, if not entirely reverse, the effects of the directives of the Sixth Congress, particularly regarding the participation of Party members in organisations on the local level. This attempt to wind back some of the most radical aspects of the new ideas unleashed by Kardelj and Đilas was rooted not only in Tito’s worry about their effect on the Party and the role of the Communist leadership, it was also partly influenced by the death of Stalin in 1953. With the prediction that this would decrease the Soviet security threat to the Yugoslavs, Tito had less reason to take the reforms too far. Neither was he ready to take any measures that would limit the leading role of the SKJ. Although the Yugoslavs had been expelled from the Cominform and had established closer relations to the Western powers, the Yugoslav communist leadership remained apprehensive about the influence of Western ideas and culture on Yugoslav citizens, feeling such ideas could threaten their

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regime. Besides, conflict continued between the Yugoslavs and some of the Western powers over the question of Trieste until 1953.12 However, though pleased with a gradual, if temporary improvement of Soviet– Yugoslav relations, Tito had also discovered that not belonging to either camp gave considerable bargaining power. Yugoslavia therefore kept a keen eye on the development in the Third World, such as Bandung conference in Indonesia, and embarked on strengthening relations with countries outside of the blocs. Together with Kardelj, Milovan Đilas held a central role in drafting the Resolution and Statute from the Sixth Congress, which is closely associated with the ideas of Đilas at the time. Đilas, however, soon came to the conclusion that the proposals for change expressed in the Resolution and Statute of this Congress were not sufficiently far-reaching. His frustration grew when the reforms were wheeled back shortly afterwards. Unhappy about the decisions and the mood of the Brioni Plenum, Đilas published a series of articles in Borba, in which he carried the conclusions of the liberalisation debates well beyond those acceptable to most of his colleagues. He questioned the very need for a leading role for the SKJ, arguing that it should start to wither away immediately. Đilas became increasingly distanced from his formerly close colleagues. The Third Plenum was organised to deal with ‘the case of Comrade Đilas’ from 16–17 January 1954. During this two-day session, with Tito and Kardelj as the main prosecutors, one after another of Đilas’ former colleagues renounced his ‘revisionist’ ideas. At these proceedings, which in an exceptional move were broadcast live, Đilas was stripped of his offices and Central Committee membership, and later, at his own initiative, gave up his Party membership. Following the fall of Ðilas, the enthusiastic debates and theorising that had gone on among the leadership during the years before came to a halt. Among supporters of further liberalisation, Đilas was criticised for leaving the Party leadership, and provoking a considerable setback in the liberalisation process, instead of adjusting his position ever so slightly so that he could have remained a forceful advocate of further liberalisation within the Party. Inter-republican relations and the national question following the Sixth Congress While the Sixth Congress officially endorsed the doctrine of socialist self-management, preaching increased decentralisation, it was paradoxically also the congress where one could trace the roots of the SKJ

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strategy to promote a greater degree of Yugoslav unity. Although interrepublican relations were discussed at the Sixth Congress, the national question was neither mentioned nor viewed as a topic to be addressed explicitly. The party still maintained that this question had been solved, and evidently did not yet see it as an issue of contention. Nevertheless, the Sixth Congress would come to have impact on the SKJ’s national policies and particularly brought to attention their dilemma of promoting Yugoslav unity while also assuring the equality between the different peoples. In the statute to the Sixth Congress, it was stated: SKJ views as unscientific and contrary every tendency that has in mind, or may have in mind to give priority to one nation or one culture over another. All the nations each in their own manner, and in different forms, depending on historical or other circumstances, enrich the general cultural treasury of humanity. With regard to the Peoples of Yugoslavia, their cultural heritages, institutions and cultural workers must strive for the rapprochement between them, because this is the only progressive course, and only such development corresponds to the real tendencies in the economic and democratic social progress in Yugoslavia.13 The Yugoslav leaders thus clearly expressed a preference towards the further rapprochement between the peoples of Yugoslavia but also tried to emphasise that they did not intend that this would happen through any form of forced assimilation. In 1953, a census was held, introducing some new categories and hinting that the SKJ did not necessarily view each of the national cultures as equally enriching ‘the general cultural treasury of humanity’, as they had expressed in the resolution from the Sixth Congress. The category ‘Yugoslav–undetermined’ was introduced, intended as an alternative for the Slav population who did not belong or feel that they belonged to any of the already defined national categories. Also, it provided an alternative for children of mixed marriages. The introduction of the new category particularly affected the Bosnian Muslims.14 While the Muslims had been declared to be one of the three recognised groups to make up the population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and were mentioned by Tito in his 1942 speech as a separate group who would receive some form of self-determination within the new Yugoslavia, the KPJ had not granted the Muslims status as a Constitutive People (narod) in 1945. Instead, the Communists designated the term ‘Muslim’ to be a religious rather than a national denotation.

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Writing about the 1953 census, Moša Pijade offers a revealing account of the official party policy on the Bosnian question: It is evident that, without any doubt, the expression ‘Muslim’ designates the affiliation of a specific Muslim religion, and has nothing to do with the question of nationality. If a ‘Muslim’ by nationality feels like a Serb or a Croat, he can express that and not feel the need to pass over to that religious designation. With the example of the census from 1948, many got confused over that permission [to declare oneself ‘Muslim – undetermined’, since one is a national and the other a religious designation, and particularly confused were those people who had broken off with religion. And indeed, there is no reason for the religious designation ‘Muslim’ to continue to be tied to that of national determination. There are Muslims and peoples of Muslim religious affiliation not only among the Serbs, Croats and Macedonians, and among the ‘undetermined’, but also among the Turks, who are all Muslims, and among the Albanians and the Gypsies.15 As Pijade poined out, in the first postwar census of 1948, Bosnian Muslims had the option of declaring themselves ‘Muslim – undetermined’. This was removed in the 1953 census, leaving the Muslims with only the ‘Yugoslav’ category if they were not inclined to declare themselves Serb or Croat. Pijade also raised another important aspect, which would gain greater significance in the 1960s: whether the term Muslim should be applied only to the Bosnian Muslims, or whether it also included other Slav Muslims, not to mention all the non-Slav Muslims.16 The introduction of the category ‘Yugoslav’ on the census also raised new questions concerning the Yugoslav, that is the South Slav aspect of the SKJ socialist project. The question of the status of the nationalities, particularly the non-Slav groups like Albanians and Hungarians, was not yet part of this discussion. Whether or not these groups could be counted as ‘Yugoslavs’ would be addressed by Vladimir Bakarić some years later during the preparations for the 1963 constitution.17 Some important formal changes that impacted on the Party’s national politics in the 1950s related to the introduction of a new constitutional law in 1953. Kardelj and Pijade, both of whom continued to hold a keen interest in the legal position of the different Yugoslav peoples, headed this work. Although Kardelj thought it was too early to introduce a new constitution so rapidly after the creation of a new Yugoslavia, the new

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law went so far in amending the 1946 constitution that it could be seen as a new constitution in all but name. Among the important changes pertaining to the national question, the right to self-determination was no longer mentioned. The sovereignty of the republics was no longer stated. Rather, sovereignty was ascribed to ‘Peoples equal in rights’, while state authority was vested in ‘the working people’.18 In addition, the Chamber of Nationalities, where the republics and provinces had been directly represented, was scrapped and its functions merged into the National Assembly as a semi-autonomous body. Although the removal of references to formal sovereignty of the republics did not have much practical significance in a system that was still highly centralised, and where this right had been more formal than real, it stood in contrast to the process of liberalisation, decentralisation and de-étatisation that had been the focus of the Sixth Congress. This was also an unsettling development for those who had regarded this chamber as a guarantee for the principle of national equality enshrined in the constitution. The provisions of the new constitutional law led to discussions among constitutional lawyers about the nature of federalism and the role of the republics in Yugoslavia, the first discussions of their kind after World War II. In these discussions, certain differences arose over who was the main bearer of sovereignty and statehood. According to Radomir Lukić, there were two main views about this. One position, articulated by Maks Šnuderl from the University of Ljubljana, held that sovereignty of the republics did not exist. The other position, Lukić argued, had been articulated by Jovan Đorđević, who claimed that some form of republican sovereignty still existed.19 Lukić, whose position was closer to that of Šnuderl, argued that the ‘state-members of the federation [the republics], in view of the fact that they are not sovereign, not even states, maintains that the federation is not some kind of composite state but only a state with a high level of decentralisation’.20 Macedonian and Croatian constitutional lawyers were particularly eager to defend the sovereignty ascribed to the republics by the 1946 constitution, even if these were mostly formal. They also pointed out the limitations to any real federalism in the Yugoslav system, with most of the power concentrated at the central, federal level.21 Evgeni Dimitrov argued that there were some similarities between federative state organisations and a developed, decentralised self-management system in a unitary state. What nevertheless differentiated a federative state organisation from self-management in the ordinary sense of the word was, in Dimitrov’s opinion, the trait of statehood in the constituent units of the federation.22 Despite this lack

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of real federalism, the promises made to the different Yugoslavs of selfdetermination in 1946, and the continuous hammering of the slogan of Brotherhood and Unity had served an important psychological need for many of the Yugoslav peoples. There was no real conclusion to these debates at that time, but they did show how sensitive these issues were. The constitutional debates over the shape of the federal system were to resurface with greater resonance in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the meantime, the main debate over the status of the different Yugoslav peoples and the role of the republics within the Yugoslav federation moved temporarily from the constitutional and political arena to the cultural one. Culture, national policy and Yugoslav unity The shifts in the SKJ’s strategy in the early 1950s were in no way introduced to lessen the control exerted by the Party, nor did they initially commence any de facto lessening of such control. However, the introduction of socialist self-management and the policy changes signalled at the Sixth Congress did imply a more hands-off approach. The SKJ’s move towards promoting primarily an ‘educational’ role and concentrating more on the overarching issues, rather than the details of day-to-day affairs, was particularly noticeable in the cultural sphere where censorship was relaxed considerably. Control over the press was reduced, and it was no longer expected that all cultural production should be based on social realism. Film, art and literature were allowed to be more inventive and less burdened with directives from Agitprop on what topics to address. By the time these changes were implemented, the readership of the Party papers had decreased substantially, due largely, in the words of Carol Lilly, to their dullness and formulaic and programmatic content.23 This diminishing of hands-on control in the cultural sphere, coincided with the initiation of search for a more unified criterion for Yugoslav culture. In the early 1950s, there were only a few unifying institutions or symbols in Yugoslavia. The most important all-Yugoslav institutions were the SKJ itself, the all-Yugoslav Army (JNA), and the People’s Front, whose name had been changed to the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) at its Fourth Congress in February 1953. The undoubtedly leading unifying symbol in the second Yugoslavia was Tito himself. Tito’s role as a symbol of Yugoslav unity could not be underestimated, and would continue until and after his death. After his success in defying Stalin in 1948 and overcoming the pressure the Yugoslavs were put under by the Comintern in the following years, Tito’s prestige

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increased tremendously both at home and abroad. The attempt to introduce a new Yugoslav loyalty and to create a new more unified Yugoslav culture also had an international dimension. With the new prestigious position acquired by Yugoslavia in the world, aligned neither to the East nor to the West, there was an eagerness to present the unity of its citizens, as well as showing the world that being a Yugoslav was something to be proud of. In addition, the threat from the Russians was still useful for purposes of domestic political manipulation.24 Continued reference to the Soviet threat served as a unifying factor in the 1950s. It was at this time a Tito cult started to take shape. Tito’s official birthday, 25 May, was a day that would acquire a great symbolic value in the second Yugoslavia. It was declared the ‘Day of Youth’ after 1953, and every year, the Union of Yugoslav Socialist Youth organised the so-called Tito Baton or Youth Baton, as an annual public celebration of his official birthday. The deliverance of the baton involved the entire country and the final baton was presented to Tito with great ceremony in the Yugoslav National Army Stadium in Belgrade. Thousands of greeting cards and presents were sent from all over the country. Tito was made godfather of every ninth child born to Yugoslav families. According to one Bulgarian historian, ‘the main purpose [of the celebration of Tito’s birthday] was to integrate the Yugoslav nations and nationalities behind the Marshal in order to maintain a sense of unity’.25 For all the SKJ’s talk of Brotherhood and Unity, the actual interaction between republics remained conspicuously low. Literary associations, journals, and other cultural institutions had generally been organised at a regional and not federal level, and they tended to publish work separately. Although many of the topics addressed were similar, they were nevertheless addressed by the cultural workers in each republic rather than through a dialogue between different republics. There was no federal department of culture, nor of education. The responsibility for education lay with the republics and not with the federal government. The SKJ continued to monitor material for education as well as literary works, but the censorship had become less severe. Different schoolbooks continued to be published in respective republics, and cultural interaction remained limited. A few attempts at creating all-Yugoslav cultural institutions emerged already early in the 1950s. The SKJ also sought to create federal publishing houses, a Yugoslav cinema, and an All-Yugoslav Writers’ Union was established.26 The SKJ favoured the principle of Yugoslav Unity, but only expressed in a manner that would not contradict their recognition of the different

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constitutive nations and nationalities within the Yugoslav state. It was on this principle they had fought the war, and it was this principle that formed the core of their approach and their claimed solution to the national question since 1935. Although there was little resistance to the creation of more unity at this time in Yugoslav society, with the memories from the wartime civil war still fresh in the people’s minds, there were nevertheless indications that not all national sensitivities had disappeared or had been addressed by the Party. One early example of worry about centralisation within the cultural sphere was the Resolution on Paper and Printing Houses, passed by the Slovene Writers’ Association in 1950. In this resolution, the Association came out against the establishment of federal publishing houses, which they argued were not truly federal in character since they published only books in Serbian and Croatian language, and not in Macedonian or Slovenian. They also complained that resources, particularly paper which was scarce, was not distributed evenly, that the Serb and Croat cultural areas (Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina) were favoured, and that twice the number of books were printed for these areas than the non-SerboCroatian speaking areas.27 Another example demonstrating that national tension had not entirely subsided, emerged when fragments of Krleža’s diaries from 1946 were published in the Belgrade journal Svedočanstva in 1952, entitled ‘Na grobu Petra Dobrovića. Fragment iz dnevnika 14.III.1946’. In this text, Krleža describes his experience when he arrived at a Belgrade cemetery to visit the grave of his friend Petar Dobrović. Krleža’s article, and particularly his reflections about the Serbian historical figures who were buried in the cemetery, was attacked as antiSerbian in the following issue of Svedočanstvo by Miodrag Janićijević, a young student from Sandžak who initially signed himself Levantinac. The affair thus became known as the ‘Levanter affair’. Krleža’s old colleagues, Marko Ristić and Oskar Davičo, claimed Janićijević’s attack was chauvinistic and defended Krleža’s text.28 In 1950, Krleža had founded and became the head of the Lexicographic Institute of the FNRJ (Leksikografski zavod FNRJ).29 He also started the work of creating a Yugoslav encyclopedia. However, he was criticised for his selection of participants on his projects within the Lexicographic Institute, and on the new encyclopaedia. Some of the members in the Lexicographic Institute were accused of being ‘well-known frankovci [followers of Josip Frank] and clerical-fascistic intellectuals’.30 These examples demonstrated that creating more unity within the cultural sphere was not entirely straightforward, that the communists had not always taken sensitive issues into

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consideration, and that inter-republican cultural co-operation would not happen automatically. After 1953, the SKJ took the first cautious steps aimed at creating a more unified Yugoslav culture and increasing cultural interaction across republican boundaries. One important area where the SKJ attempted to promote Yugoslav unity was the language question. Following a meeting between a number of linguistic experts from Serbia and Croatia held in Novi Sad on the 8–10 December the same year, the participants signed the declaration which has since been referred to as the Novi Sad Declaration. The declaration asserted that Croatian, Serbian, and Montenegrin were one language. Therefore, the written language that had developed around two main centres – Belgrade and Zagreb – was uniform (jedinstven), with two different forms of pronunciation; ijekavski and ekavski. The statement also declared that, with regard to the name of the language, both constituent parts had always to be mentioned in official use of Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. The declaration also held that the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets were equal, as were the two forms of ijekavski and ekavski in speech.31 A proposal for the creation of a Serbo-Croatian dictionary was also launched. The initiative for the Novi Sad conference and for the declaration had come from the Serbian cultural society Matica Srpska, and the Croatian reversal on this issue in 1967 indicates that their support for this idea was less than enthusiastic. The Novi Sad declaration was to gain great importance in later national controversies, and its significance surpassed that of a pure cultural one. In 1954, the Assembly of the Cultural-Educational League of Yugoslavia (Veće kulturno-prosvetnih saveza Jugoslavije) was created. Its purpose was to co-ordinate the work among the various cultural societies from the different republics, and to encourage inter-republic co-operation. Despite the increased SKJ focus on Yugoslav integration, there was one notable case of exception: Macedonia. The Yugoslav communists were not prepared to grant the level of political and economic autonomy that the Macedonians may have wished for after the war, but they actively encouraged and engaged in the development of a new Macedonian national consciousness and culture. This had two main purposes: firstly, it was designed to weaken the links to Bulgaria and Bulgarian consciousness among the Macedonian population in Yugoslavia. Secondly it was a concession to the Macedonians in the hope of strengthening their ties to the other Yugoslav peoples and Yugoslavia, while at the same time lessening fears that belonging to the Yugoslav Federation would lead to a renewed process towards Serbianisation in Macedonia. The encouragement of

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a national culture in itself represented a great paradox since it was not really compatible with the Marxist expectation that socialism would lessen the attachment to national consciousness. In this case, however, pragmatic concerns weighed more heavily. Nonetheless, a project such as the one undertaken by Yugoslav communists in Macedonia had its challenges. It was not enough to create a new future for Macedonian culture; reinterpretation of its past would be necessary too. One of the most important projects undertaken in this process was the creation of a new Macedonian orthography and standardisation of the language. This was no easy task. The Yugoslav communists were careful to ensure that the new language was not based on dialects too close to Bulgarian, while they also met resistance in the attempts to choose the dialects from the north which were the closest to Serbian. Eventually, the Central Macedonian dialect of the Prilep-Bitolj-Kičevo-Titov Veles region was chosen as the basis for the new Macedonian literary language.32 A new alphabet, similar to the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet, was adopted on May 3 1945, and the new orthography on June 7 1946. A Macedonian grammar was published in 1952.33 A three-volume Macedonian dictionary appeared between 1961 and 1966. In addition, two new Macedonian journals appeared in the 1950s.34 The SKJ attempted to encourage the use of the ‘new’ language through its exposure in the Macedonian press and in schools. As Palmer and King point out, Yugoslav linguists went to great efforts to show that the old Macedonian dialects were essentially a separate language and not dialects of Bulgarian. Numerous articles stressing historical differences between the two were published in the newspapers. While not denying that Bulgarian was generally the written language for most literate Macedonians just before World War II, the Yugoslavs attempted to explain this in class terms, since the Bulgarian bourgeoisie was more advanced than the Macedonian.35 After 1945, with the effort by the SKJ to discourage Bulgarian cultural influences, the main exposure to other linguistic and literary influences tended to be from SerboCroatian rather than Bulgarian. This was partly because the communists tended to use Serbo-Croatian widely and, as the Slovenes complained, did not always make the effort of producing translations. The young age of the new Macedonian literary language meant that it took some time before new literature appeared in the new language. In the meantime, Macedonians mainly had access to literature in Serbo-Croatian. Another important challenge in the formation of a Macedonian national consciousness was to make its history ‘acceptable’. This meant disentangling Macedonian history from Bulgarian, while at the same time ensuring

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it was in line with a Marxist historical conception of the world, past and present. This was no easy task for Macedonian historians, since the SKJ set some clear historiographical criteria. However, the Macedonian historians were allowed more leeway than other Yugoslav peoples in dealing with national themes and national figures. The history of the People’s Liberation War and that of revolutionary forces in Macedonia represented a particular challenge. This was the case with VMRO, since it had failed as a revolutionary movement to support the inclusion of Macedonia in a Yugoslav federation. Its key founders were considered Bulgarophiles, and not socialist in orientation. To deal with this problem, Macedonian historians played up the roles of less prominent figures in VMRO who may have had some socialist leanings, and those who were not openly Bulgarophiles, while the roles of the main figures were played down.36 Equally, any role played by the Bulgarians in the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement had to be diminished.37 The history of the socialist movement on the Balkans was a touchy subject, since they had not recognised the existence of a Macedonian nation. While the socialists had interpreted the need for a Macedonian nationality ‘wrongly’, the Party nevertheless stressed that they were to be seen as a progressive force, instrumental in securing the eventual triumph of socialism in Macedonia.38 On a whole, however, the trend in Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s was towards greater unification. As part of the attack on cultural isolationism in Yugoslavia, the tendency to publish separate history and literature books in each republic came under strong criticism. SKJ also attempted to encourage newspapers to devote more space to events taking place in other republics.39 An important measure to promote more interaction between the republics was attempted by the Association of Yugoslav Writers through the arrangement of literary evenings. In 1956, they addressed the theme ‘Literature and Society Today’, where the question to be discussed was ‘how much is there in our literature of the inner national Yugoslav unity, and to what extent is our literature, which permits and preserves the specific forms of its nationalities, universally Yugoslav?’40 The attempt by the Serbian writer Zoran Mišić to define such a Yugoslav criterion prompted reaction from his Slovene colleague Drago Šega shortly afterwards. In the meantime, the SKJ’s attempt to promote Yugoslav unity started to assume the shape of a more integrated Yugoslav culture which was a sensitive issue. Although they had previously been extremely cautious when alluding to such aspirations, by 1955, the SKJ decided an official and organised effort through its introduction of socialist Yugoslavism.

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The introduction of a socialist concept of Yugoslav unity The SKJ were well aware that launching a campaign for Yugoslav unity and the creation of a more integrated Yugoslav culture was a sensitive issue. Although they had previously been extremely cautious when alluding to such aspirations, by 1955, the SKJ decided to officially launch a campaign promoting the creation of a more unified Yugoslav culture. The argument was that the ‘raising of a Yugoslav socialist consciousness’ would complement, but not overrun, existing ‘democratic national consciousness’ or the adherence to individual national cultures. The new thesis on the creation of greater rapprochement between the Yugoslav peoples was inaugurated through the report given by Petar Stambolić at a session held by the Ideological Commission of the CK SKJ, in May 1956,41 and marked a shift in the Yugoslav communist nationality policy. Previously, the leadership had been relying primarily on promoting the principled right to sovereignty and equality between the Yugoslav peoples under KPJ leadership, and this had formed the essence of their Brotherhood and Unity discourse. Now, however, it was attempting to introduce a theoretical justification for the claim to have introduced a socialist ‘solution’ to the national question and the promotion of Yugoslav unity.42 The Party encouraged the establishment of all-Yugoslav cultural and scientific institutions with the prefix ‘Yugoslav’, and encouraged greater unity within the field of linguistics, literature, cinema, and art. While some were inspired by the SKJ’s attempt to promote a more unified Yugoslav culture, others were sceptical about the motives behind this strategy. Criticisms assumed a more vocal form once the attempt to create a more integral Yugoslav culture assumed an official form. The initial objections to the Party’s new policy emerged from Slovenia.43 The Slovenes had long been sceptical of what they perceived as a neglect of Slovene language and culture and an increasing tendency to centralisation within the cultural field. There had been some isolated Slovene criticism against the attempt to create federal film institutions as well as the aforementioned publishing houses. The Slovenes worried that the use of Slovene language and the future of Slovene culture would be neglected in the attempt to create a Yugoslav culture. They also complained about the use of Serbo-Croatian subtitles on Slovenian films shown in Slovenia. According to Aleš Gabrič, translations into Slovene of important documents at the federal level were exceptionally bad, and the Slovenes were frequently asked to send dispatches to the Federal presidency only in Serbo-Croatian, since nobody there knew Slovenian. However, Gabrič also points out, such neglect was not the result of conscious partiality towards the language of the

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majority, rather of general linguistic ignorance.44 Nevertheless, all of this was enough to ignite the national sensitivities of the Slovenes. Though the Macedonians and the Croats were also unhappy with the language policies, they were at this point not ready to back the Slovenes. A critical attitude manifested itself primarily through polemics in Slovene cultural journals; starting with Beseda in the early part of the 1950s, to be followed by Revija 57. The authorities banned both after some time. After the close-down of Revija 57, the figures involved in its production gathered around a new journal, Perspektive, which emerged in the early 1960s. In the mid-1950s, this type of criticism was still considered above all as a sign of Slovene localism, and did not become significant until it started receiving some support from the Slovene Party leadership after 1958. The Mišić–Šega polemic on Jugoslavenstvo Gradually, the debates on Yugoslav cultural rapprochement developed along a Slovene–Serbian axis. The polemic in 1956 between the Serbian writer Zoran Mišić and Slovene writer Drago Šega was the first debate about the creation of a unified criterion for Yugoslav culture to reach a public audience outside Slovenia. In July 1956, Mišić presented an article, ‘Za jedinstveni jugoslovenski kriterijum’ in the Belgrade periodical Delo, where he outlined how he viewed the development of a Yugoslav socialist culture. He asserted that literary works should have a modern theme to meet the Yugoslav criterion. This Yugoslav criterion should then be based on internationalist and universal human values, not regional ones. Furthermore, Mišić pointed out that ‘socialist ideology and morality should represent the only lasting guarantee of Yugoslavism and the only defence against narrowly-republican localist and chauvinist tendencies’. He also encouraged the creation of a unified literary language and a common normative standard.45 These statements led to a fierce reaction from Drago Šega who accused Mišić of presenting a unitarist vision, to reject the existence of individual national cultures and for not recognising the existence of social historical formations such as the Slovenian, Croatian or Macedonian culture in Yugoslavia. Nor did he mention the Slovene or Macedonian language.46 He furthermore argued that Mišić’s Yugoslav criterion was no more internationalist than the republican one, only that it represented a larger region.47 With this, Šega entered into a discussion on the character of Yugoslavism, and opened up the question of whether this was a universal and international concept, or whether it had a more narrow attachment to Yugoslavia as a state. In his view, it was the socialist contents – that is the internationalist aspects

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– that gave Yugoslavism new legitimacy through the socialist revolution. According to Šega, Yugoslavism – which between the wars had been synonymous with the ‘deepest social reaction and national oppression’ – had become a progressive socio-political idea ‘with the victorious socialist revolution’.48 Therefore, he argued, it was: Because of its socialist content and especially because of the battle for socialist democracy … that the idea has today gained a universal, all-human and therefore also not formally Yugoslav meaning and certainly not the narrow, state-fetishist idea that Mišić attributes to it in his article.49 Mišić responded by insisting that he had been misunderstood, but maintained that, for him, Yugoslavism was an ultimate aim, and stood above the trait of any nationality.50 However, he also maintained a Yugoslav aspect to his vision of Yugoslavism by referring to the concept of Brotherhood and Unity.51 This discussion did not entice a public debate in the way another Slovenian–Serbian polemic over a similar theme would do some years later. It did, however, demonstrate the difficulties inherent in attempting to endorse a concept of Yugoslav unity that all could agree on. The Federal and Slovenian Party organisations condemned the polemic, which may have appeared only because it was framed in a literary journal in the context of a discussion on Yugoslav literary interaction. Nonetheless, it would have been difficult for such polemics to have appeared in print without at least the tacit approval of the Party. Kardelj and the conceptualisation of socialist Yugoslavism In 1957, Edvard Kardelj issued a new edition of his 1939 work on the Slovene national question – Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja. In the introduction to the second edition of this book, Kardelj launches a theoretical description of and justification for the SKJ’s new concept of Yugoslavism referred to as ‘socijalistička jugoslovenstvo’ – ‘socialist Yugoslavism’.52 This definition was further incorporated into the SKJ Programme issued at the Party’s Seventh Congress in 1958, and acquired great significance within the Yugoslav discourse on the national question. Both those in favour and opposed to further decentralisation continued eagerly to cite Kardelj for many years to come, and long after the Party leaders, including Kardelj himself had abandoned the principles presented in this work. While the slogan of Brotherhood and Unity had emphasised the common interest between the Yugoslav peoples based on the

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idea of South Slav unity, Kardelj attempted to legitimate Yugoslav unity primarily on a socialist platform. Kardelj’s conceptualisation of socialist Yugoslavism was also based on the wish to promote a unifying Yugoslav loyalty, to promote cooperation between the various peoples and to hinder republican isolationism. Another aim inherent in Kardelj’s work was to offer a Yugoslav theoretical contribution to the wider question of how Marxists should approach the national question. He started by offering a critique of Stalin’s classic definition of the nation, followed by his own additions to this very same characterisation. In Kardelj’s definition: a nation is … a specific people’s community arising on the basis of the social division of labour in the era of capitalism on a compact national territory within the framework of a common language and close ethnic and cultural relationship in general.53 According to Kardelj, the national community arose on the basis of the social division of labour. He expected, ‘as humanity enters a new phase of forces of production, for narrow nationalist interests to recede in the encounter with general humanist interests’ and thus for ‘national-cultural boundaries to fade away in the powerful course of more intensive exchange between different parts of the world’. Therefore, he argued, ‘it is this process of coming together of nations that irrevocably will bring with it an era of social division of labour where humanity will move towards socialism’.54 Kardelj added a new dimension to the Yugoslav party line on the national question by stating that ‘the social division of labour still exists in the period between capitalism and the development of socialism, and consequently, so does the nation as a phenomenon’. Hence, the nation was not ‘just a remnant from the capitalist era; it also continued to play a role in the era of socialism. Nonetheless, in Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja, Kardelj maintained the official line of the SKJ, that the national question had been solved: In principle – as a problem of oppression of the people and of hegemonism – the national question in the new Yugoslavia is solved. The guarantee for this is the federative system and all the constitutional, political and social mechanisms which secure all the peoples of Yugoslavia an equal position and self-determination. Therefore, the Slovene national question, in principle, does no longer exist. After a long period of dependency, Slovenia was granted its own state, a socialist people’s republic within the framework of Yugoslavia.55

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Not only had the national question been solved in principle: additionally, Kardelj stated that the Slovenes, and presumably also the other constitutive peoples, had received their own state by being granted their own republics, thereby satisfying their national aspirations within a Yugoslav framework. In practice, he claimed, the republics had become state-forming entities for the constitutive national groups. Kardelj would come to develop this argument later, building on a lasting belief that if the national groups felt secure about their position within the Yugoslav federation, they would support the Yugoslav socialist project. The question of the interaction between the different national groups within the Yugoslav Socialist Federation was one of the main concerns in Kardelj’s discussion. He brought to attention the question of the future of nations, outlining his conception of how movement towards socialism also entailed expectations of processes of political unification, through what the SKJ leadership referred to as the ‘melting together’ (spajanje) of nations.56 Kardelj argued that the development of a Yugoslav loyalty built on a socialist dimension would not be contrary to adherence to individual national loyalties, nor to international and universal concepts of human development. Kardelj nonetheless expected the attachment to national values to lessen through the building of socialism, but admitted ‘the process of rapprochement and the melting together of nations founded on their voluntary and equal co-operation is not automatically solved through the arrival of socialist forces to power’. Therefore, he admitted as early as 1957 that ‘ideology does not make ruling socialist powers immune from various selfish, hegemonic and similar tendencies’.57 While promoting Yugoslav rapprochement (zbližavanje), Kardelj clearly warned against attempts at forced assimilation (asimilacija) and argued for the rights of nations to independent and equal rights to national development. Pointing out the need to look at the relationship between ‘Yugoslavism’ (Jugoslovenstvo), ‘Slovenianhood’ (Slovenaštvo), ‘Serbianhood’ (Srpstvo), ‘Croatianhood’ (Hrvatstvo), Kardelj made it clear that: One of the starting points for further socialist development in Yugoslavia is the recognition of the individuality and equality of the Yugoslav People. The new socialist Yugoslavia, particularly her ruling socialist power, rejects the use of all means of forceful assimilation of peoples, languages and cultures. The unity between the Yugoslav peoples is possible only on the basis of independent national development and equality between all the peoples of Yugoslavia.

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Though encouraging greater Yugoslav unity, Kardelj was keen to mark that his support for further co-operation between the Yugoslav peoples was not akin to the assimilationist Yugoslavism that King Aleksandar had attempted to introduce during the inter-war period. He therefore made clear that it was not talk of forming a new national identity that would override the already existing national identities: It is not about the skilful melting together of language and culture, nor of the building of a new Yugoslav nation in the classical meaning [of the nation]; rather about the priority of the organisational growth and strengthening of the socialist unity of the working people from all the Yugoslav peoples, about the affirmation of their common interests on the basis of socialist relations. This new type of Yugoslavism does not thwart the free development of national language and culture; on the contrary, it presupposes it. Kardelj and the SKJ were not therefore advocating the replacement of the multitudes of cultures of the different republics and peoples with a Yugoslav culture. Instead, they advocated the development of a Yugoslav culture alongside the different cultures and a closer co-operation between them. Kardelj’s Slovene background could be assumed to have had some impact on his perception of national relations and Yugoslav unity – including sensitivity towards the need to recognise the distinctiveness of different national cultures – and his rejection of an integralist conceptualisation of Yugoslav unity. However, his advocacy of decentralisation was influenced primarily by his Marxism – and the firm belief that the growth in socialist consciousness among the population would lead to a decrease of local particularism and of allegiance to nationalist ideologies, and the belief that this process would ultimately lead to the forming of a Yugoslav culture and would strengthen the allegiance to a Yugoslav identity. It was this socialist element, not the ethnic (the South Slav factor) that Kardelj emphasised in the creation of stronger ties between the Yugoslav peoples. This socialist dimension to the creation of Yugoslav unity is one of the core arguments of Kardelj’s doctrine: There is no doubt that ethnic and cultural kinship between the peoples of Yugoslavia represents a very important factor in their rapprochement. In fact, this factor was already in the past one of the moving forces behind their struggle for their unification. Nevertheless, it is not the decisive essence behind today’s

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Yugoslav people’s community. If this factor had been decisive, then the national question would certainly not have brought the old Yugoslavia to such a sharp internal crisis as it did … Therefore, the strengthening of the Yugoslav people’s community does not depend so much on this or that treatment of ethnic and cultural problems as it does on the common social, material and thus also the political interests of the Yugoslav peoples. In short, the essence of today’s Yugoslav loyalty can only be its socialist interest and socialist consciousness, that is the common social, material and political interests of the working people form all the Yugoslav Peoples that originates on the basis of legal social-economic tendencies which lead to higher forms of international co-operation and unification and which in the future will include ever wider national districts and ever higher numbers of social-economic functions.58 With this statement, Kardelj effectively linked the creation of Yugoslav unity and the development of a Yugoslav consciousness among its people directly to the communist socialist project and regime. However, Kardelj did not define the exact relation between the Yugoslav and the socialist content entailed in the concept socialist Yugoslavism. Nor did he describe exactly how the rapprochement between the different peoples was expected to take place on a more practical level. Instead, socialist Yugoslavism remained a fluid concept whose meaning and conceptualisation would change over time, and whose definition would be changed by the communists and others subject to its rhetorical usefulness (or lack thereof). Socialist Yugoslavism and Serbian hegemonism – new frontlines created The argument developed by Kardelj in Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja was repeated in the Programme of the SKJ, launched at the Seventh Congress in 1958 held in Ljubljana in April 1958. Kardelj’s discourse on socialist Yugoslavism and the encouragement of rapprochement between the national groups became an integral part of the official party line. At this point, the top communist leadership agreed on the decision to promote the creation of a more unified Yugoslav culture, but not on what form of further practical co-operation between the different Yugoslav peoples and republics would be appropriate. Discussions surrounding cultural co-operation between republics demonstrated that the SKJ had not adequately defined the nature of the Yugoslav element in their

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socialist conceptualisation of Yugoslav unity. Kardelj did not really offer any clarity on the issues raised by the Misić–Šega debate. By implying that the new SKJ definition of Yugoslav unity under self-management socialism was not contrary to the development of human society in general, Kardelj at least suggested that there was a wider universal and internationalist dimension attached to this concept. Kardelj’s text was obscure, probably deliberately so, yet sufficiently general for people with widely diverging opinions to be able to find fragments in the text with which they could identify. Within the intelligentsia, there were those who embraced the attempt to create a more unified Yugoslav culture. The attempt to encourage such a rapprochement between the different republics nevertheless met considerable objection from the republics themselves, and it was evident that not everyone supported the new policy. The reactions to the SKJ’s attempt to promote socialist Yugoslavism indicated that some were suspicious that it might signify an attempt to reintroduce some form of ‘Great Serbian hegemony’. Even though the Serbs had also been prevented from emphasising their identity over the Yugoslav one under King Aleksandar, the centralist tendencies associated with integral Yugoslavism were perceived to reflect Serbian interests more than any other. The Communist leaders themselves contributed to strengthening the perception of integral Yugoslavism as akin to inter-war Serbian hegemonism, while concurrently seeking to distinguish their own socialist variant of Yugoslavism from this. However, the continuing tendency to relate the concepts of ‘Great Serbianism’ and ‘bureaucratic centralism’ to integral Yugoslavism, would in time have some unfortunate and unintended consequences. Unfortunately for Kardelj, not everybody would manage to make the distinction between integral Yugoslavism and socialist Yugoslavism. The unitarist association attached to integral Yugoslavism, would inevitably also become associated with socialist Yugoslavism by part of the Party organisation. The fact that the Serbian Party organisation was eager to support this new strategy did not help. The front lines in the discussion over socialist Yugoslavism would stand between a Serbian and Slovenian point of view. In 1957, the Slovene Party leadership decided to protest over what they perceived as attempts at centralisation in the cultural field.59 The role of Boris Kraigher, the leader of the Slovene Party at the time, was significant in the new strategy taken by the Slovene leadership. While this decision was sparked by the publishing of Kardelj’s work, the Slovene leadership’s reaction to it also appears to have left an important imprint on Kardelj’s later reversal on

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some of the ideas he launched in this work, notably with regard to the role played by the republics. The Slovenes were sceptical about some of the tendencies that they saw inherent in Kardelj’s work, but found support in others, and lent their support to Kardelj in the wider struggle within the central leadership which emerged soon thereafter. The Seventh Congress of the SKJ arranged in Ljubljana in 1958 was the first congress since World War II where the national question was an explicit issue on the agenda. Boris Kraigher raised the topic and maintained the official truth that the national question had been solved. He argued that ‘the national question as a question of some non-resolved problems about the formal rights of the Yugoslav Peoples no longer exists, and even less so, as a question of various reactionary fantasies about individual Yugoslav peoples entering into some other state-formations outside the borders of Yugoslavia’.60 Although Kraigher’s speech was in general keeping with the official line as introduced by Kardelj, the worry within the Slovene leadership about the true intentions with the promotion of socialist Yugoslavism also led him to advance some subtle, but important differences from Kardelj’s doctrine. Kraigher argued that Yugoslavia today was ‘not only a federation of sovereign and equal peoples, she had already grown into a unified socialist organism within a framework in which a specific form of Yugoslav, socialist patriotism was developing…’ However, Kraigher warned, ‘this phenomenon has nothing in common with tendencies towards the building of some form of unified Yugoslav nation’.61 This was the first mention of the formation of a unified Yugoslav nation. The formation of a Yugoslav nation never formed part of an official strategy, but Kraigher’s mention and rejection of it suggests at least a fear that this was the real aspiration of some parts of the Party leadership. The Programme launched at the Seventh Congress of the SKJ in 1958 has been viewed as the highpoint of the SKJ’s advocacy of socialist Yugoslavism. While the SKJ continued to promote socialist Yugoslav unity with varying force and vigour after 1958 and well into the 1960s, divergent views within the Party over the meaning of the propagation of ‘socialist Yugoslavism’ became increasingly noticeable. From the 1950s, the Yugoslav communists started to pay more attention to the relations between the different Yugoslav peoples, and also gradually raised the question of creating a Yugoslav culture. Increasingly this would also entail questions about the relationship between the Yugoslav state and the republics. The communist strategies towards the question of national relations emerging in Yugoslavia in the 1950s

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were closely linked to the nascent process of decentralisation and liberalisation that developed in the aftermath of the split with Stalin. On the one hand, changes in the field of national relations were closely linked to institutional and administrative processes which resulted from the SKJ’s introduction of the concept of socialist self-management. These changes were not initially related directly to national relations or greater rights within this field – rather they were linked to the SKJ’s concern of reducing the impact of ‘bureaucratic state centralism’. The doctrine of socialist self-management emerged more by necessity than by conviction. Nevertheless, it would come to form a crucial aspect of the Yugoslav socialist discourse. National policies had played an important role in bringing the SKJ to power, and the promises the Party had made as part of its ‘solution’ to the national question continued to form a strong source of legitimacy after the break with Stalin. The break with Stalin did not lead the SKJ to make fundamental changes in their strategies towards the national question. The, ideological shift that the introduction of selfmanagement entailed (particularly regarding decentralisation) would lead in time to fundamental changes in the SKJ’s strategy on national relations. During this process, the Yugoslav communists had tried to redefine the leading role of the Party as a more ‘educational’ one, necessitating less interference in state administrative affairs, and promoting what they referred to as an ‘elevation of the socialist consciousness of the Yugoslav peoples’. The 1950s also saw the emergence of more deep-seated and principled questions about the relationship and coexistence between the different Yugoslav peoples and about Yugoslav unity. Despite the Party’s continued insistence on having solved the national question in Yugoslavia, the processes which started in the early 1950s triggered important questions about the definition of national relations within the Yugoslav federation and how to encourage interaction between the different peoples and republics. Until the mid-1950s, the communist leadership remained cautious in its references to Yugoslav unity, but after this they felt the time was ripe to encourage closer co-operation between the different Yugoslav peoples, particularly in the cultural field. The introduction of the doctrine of self-management socialism in Yugoslavia paved the way for a renewed discussion around the idea of Yugoslav unity. This was not a new concept, but one that had been interpreted in a variety of forms since the nineteenth century. The communists came up with their own socialist concept of Yugoslav unity, encapsulated in the concept of socialist Yugoslavism. The approach of

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the communist leadership towards the national question in the 1950s centred on the idea that socialist development and the deepening of socialist relations would gradually come to have a more prominent influence in Yugoslav society than national ones. Therefore, their attention was directed to the influence social development would have on national attitudes. Edvard Kardelj was the main official proponent of the attempt to explain theoretically how such processes would happen. The intra-party debates over Yugoslav unity did not really emerge in full force until the late 1950s, but the beginnings of this discussion can be seen much earlier. Kardelj himself raised the question of the internal organisation of Yugoslavia in a paper in 1952, and in the new Constitutional Law of 1953. A recurring theme in most of Kardelj’s work was his warning against bureaucratic centralism. He argued that only the communists had been able to offer a solution to the complicated national question in Yugoslavia, and emphasised the importance of the socialist dimension to this ‘solution’. However, Kardelj also came to the conclusion that the main danger to the revolution, and the socialist project, including their solutions to the national question, would come from inside its own bureaucracy. For this reason he continued to warn against the danger of bureaucratic centralism. He tried to explain these arguments more exhaustively in his work on the Slovene national question in 1957. The promotion of Yugoslav unity in the early 1950s had a socialist basis and was to some extent influenced by a Marxist tendency to favour unifying processes. It was also an attempt to create closer relations between the different Yugoslav peoples based on a wish to promote a type of common Yugoslav patriotism and to counter republican isolationism, all while avoiding being perceived as assimilationists or as stepping too hard on sensitive national toes. The SKJ was careful to point out that it did not intend to repeat the inter-war experience, and ensured that its Yugoslavism was based on socialism. However, regardless of the Party’s assurance that it was not attempting to introduce unitarism through the back door, any attempt to stress the unifying aspect of Brotherhood and Unity too hard had the misfortune of being interpreted as prejudiced against the national and cultural aspirations of certain smaller nations. The emphasis on unity was perceived as more well-tuned to the aspirations and interest of Yugoslavia’s largest national group: the Serbs. Therefore, it was no accident that most arguments over the concept of socialist Yugoslavism were between the small, homogeneous Slovenia and the larger, geographically more dispersed Serbs.

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Although the SKJ was careful not to equate Yugoslavism with nationbuilding, there was a clear wish to promote a common Yugoslav culture and literature, and to have a common linguistic platform. However, the SKJ was not in a position to forget the promise made during the People’s Liberation War to respect the individuality of the different peoples. Not all of these had Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian as their mothertongue. In the process of introducing a more unified Yugoslav criterion the SKJ had to tread a fine balance between the two great ‘dangers’ to the building of a Yugoslav socialist community: ‘national particularism’ and ‘bureaucratic centralism’. This would remain a dilemma throughout the communist period, leading the SKJ leaders to view sometimes the one and sometimes the other as the greater threat to their project. This again influenced whether they favoured further decentralisation or re-centralisation as the best way to protect their socialist project and their leading role therein. The SKJ’s attempt to introduce greater Yugoslav unity raised a number of important questions, all closely related to the dilemma of promoting both unity and diversity. On what was this attempt at Yugoslav rapprochement to be based? What was the nature of the Yugoslav element of such unity? Was it a national or supranational concept, and how did it relate to the universalist and internationalist aspects of Yugoslav socialist discourse? All these important questions would emerge with full force in the next decade.

7 SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVISM BETWEEN UNITY AND DIVERSITY, 1958–1966

After 1958, the Party’s attempt at creating an integral Yugoslav culture came under scrutiny. In 1958 the promotion of socialist Yugoslavism was conceived as a progressive internationalist concept, but by 1966, it was viewed with considerable suspicion, as a centralist concept promoting unity that denied individual republics the right to play a significant role. In addition, attempts to promote Yugoslav unity of this kind were increasingly labelled with a Serbian connotation. Although the SKJ leaders never announced the abandonment of a strategy to create a unified Yugoslav culture through the promotion of socialist Yugoslavism, this strategy was discarded piecemeal during the first half of the 1960s. This gradual abandonment of Yugoslavism became entangled with growing polarisation within the Party leadership, leading to a power struggle between those who favoured decentralisation, de-bureacratisation, and democratisation, and those who favoured centralism, party control and status quo. The Slovenes were the first to articulate resistance to socialist Yugoslavism. Such critique was initially expressed in well-camouflaged language in rather obscure literary journals. However, after 1958, Slovenian opposition to the SKJ’s promotion of Jugoslavenstvo – Yugoslavism, in its new socialist form started to receive backing from the Slovenian republican leadership, notably Boris Kraigher. More importantly, the Slovene suspiciousness towards aspects of socialist

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Yugoslavism coincided with the first signs of cracks in the unity of the upper layers of the leadership, particularly after the 1958 SKJ programme was launched. The emerging struggle within the SKJ leadership would unravel the unity that had been the hallmark of Tito’s party politics. Therefore, the gradual abandonment of the attempt to create a unified Yugoslav culture was of the essence to the SKJ discourse on the national question. Divergences within the SKJ had been present since the mid-1950s over the pace of development of socialist self-management and economic reforms, but were now becoming more perceptible. By 1962 two distinct camps had emerged, each of which was supported by particular economic, social and regional interests. These disagreements would form part of a much deeper internal conflict over different visions of Yugoslavia. This rip in party unity was concealed for the time being, but signalled the start of a fundamental split that would make its mark on the political scene in Yugoslavia throughout the coming decade. In the same vein as the Mišić–Šega polemic in 1956, the lines of disagreement over socialist Yugoslavism would primarily follow Slovenian–Serbian lines for the next few years. Polemic between Dobrica Ćosić and Dušan Pirjevec One of the most well-known and telling examples of debates over the new form of Yugoslavism was the polemic between the Slovene literary critic Dušan Pirjevec and the well-known Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić. This was the first major debate on Yugoslav cultural relations since the SKJ had officially endorsed the doctrine of socialist Yugoslavism. The polemic had originally been printed in the Ljubljana literary journal Naša Sodobnost, and in the Belgrade journal Delo. On 6 December 1961, Borba started to print extracts. The Ćosić–Pirjevec polemic stood out both because of the prominence of its protagonists, and for the public reach of the discussion. That a party paper like Borba was allowed to publish such a candid debate on Yugoslav unity, the role of the republics and the cultural relations between them, is extraordinary. On the other hand, Ćosić and Pirjevec were both prominent party intellectuals with strong ties to the SKJ.1 They represented in many ways two different visions within the Party organisation of the nature of national relations and inter-republican relations in Yugoslavia. It has been suggested that Ćosić and Pirjevec were both acting as public proxies for differing and opposing factions within the SKJ.2 While Pirjevec put emphasis on defending the sovereignty and the rights of the republics, which he saw as sacred ‘ready formed national organisms’, Ćosić viewed socialist

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Yugoslavism as an internationalist concept that would overcome and not strengthen national belonging. According to one Slovene historian, Pirjevec’s argument received support from formidable political figures within the Slovenian party organisation such as Boris Kraigher. Kraigher apparently also made corrections to his texts.3 Ćosić has argued that he replied to Pirjevec because of requests from leading figures within the Serbian party organisation, and was supported by Jovan Veselinov, Ranković and even by Tito himself.4 The starting point to this polemic was an interview given by Dobrica Ćosić in the Zagreb newspaper Telegram in January 1961, where the journalist posed the question, ‘is it still a relevant issue that we are increasingly passive in our inter-republican relations?’ To this, Ćosić responded, ‘It will be a relevant as long as there are republics. And then we are talking about the co-operation between them. Only we may differ in our perception of this co-operation’.5 This statement provoked a strong and emotional response from Dušan Pirjevec, who in his article ‘Izvinite, šta ste rekli?’ (‘Excuse me, what did you say?’) interpreted Ćosić’s statement to mean that the existence of republics as such was to blame for the passive nature of inter-republican relations. Pirjevec construed from Ćosić’s statement that if there were no more republics, there would be no more passivity in inter-republican relations. This would be true, Pirejvec concluded, since ‘without republics, there would be no inter-republican relations, active or passive’.6 According to Pirjevec ‘the republics will remain and retain their natural functions, because they […] remain ready shaped national organisms’. They were, he maintained, ‘as inviolable as the people who built them, and like the blood that had to be spilt to create them in the first place. Therefore it makes no sense to talk of the co-operation between republics, rather of the matter of different national cultures’.7 Since Slovenia was by far the most nationally homogeneous republic, it was easy for Pirjevec to see the republics as the natural framework for national cultures, and to equate republican rights with national rights. This would be more difficult for other groups who inhabited less homogeneous republics. The Serbs particularly (but not exclusively) viewed such equations as threatening, both because a large numbers of Serbs lived outside the borders of the Serbian Republic, and because they viewed the Yugoslav state as an entity that would ensure the unity of the Serbs within one state unit, as well as preventing national animosity of the kind that had destroyed the first Yugoslav state. Whether sovereignty would be vested in the peoples or in the republics became an important

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question. Although Kardelj had argued in Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja that Slovenia was granted its own state, ‘a socialist people’s republic within the framework of Yugoslavia’,8 he did not clarify whether it was Slovenia or the Slovene people who had been granted their own state – a socialist republic. The SKJ remained unwilling to clarify this issue. In his response to Pirjevec, Ćosić tried to clarify his stand on interrepublican relations and insisted that he did indeed support national equality, and was not ignoring the danger of Yugoslav unitarism. Most importantly, Ćosić raised the question about cultural relations in Yugoslavia. In so doing, he also introduced the issue of defining Yugoslav unity into the discussion. Was the People’s Liberation Struggle a struggle only for national state and national culture, or was it simultaneously a struggle for a socialist Yugoslavia, and a socialist, that is, an internationalist culture and civilisation: do we adopt a Marxist or a nationalistic conceptualisation of state and nation: are we for socialist Brotherhood and Unity for the Yugoslav people or – for each to care for oneself: and are we conducting conversations about the national problems of 1931 or 1961?9 Ćosić insisted that one must not lose sight of the fact that the Yugoslav people’s republics were a product of a socialist and not national-bourgeois revolution; product of a unified Yugoslav workers’ movement, and not of separate national movements. Also, he argued that the republics were the ‘product of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and not bourgeois national parties, a product of a united, common liberation struggle of all the Yugoslav peoples for a socialist Yugoslavia’. Ćosić therefore viewed socialist Yugoslavism not as a national but as a socialist, and thus an internationalist concept. He argued that not only was socialist Yugoslavism not a national concept, it was not an assimilationist concept either. Ćosić stated that he did not support a unitarist policy which preached the assimilation of different national cultures into one dominated by the largest nation. He therefore repudiated the use (or misuse) of affinity to socialist Yugoslavism as a cover for Serbian nationalism: The Serbian nation belongs in the category of the so-called ‘nations with historic rights’, which in their political relations with smaller and ethnically related peoples always show a tendency towards

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‘unification’ (ujedinjenje), but unification as assimilation. This fact makes Serbian nationalism within a Yugoslav framework the socially most dangerous form. A frequent form of Serbian nationalism today is that of Yugoslavism: the most tragic consequence of such Yugoslavism is that it comprises real and true Yugoslavism, Yugoslavism as a form of internationalism. The Serbian ‘Yugoslavs’ minimise the difference among the Yugoslav nations. They are for unification; unification for them means establishing the privilege of their language and the assimilation of smaller nations; unification for them is never superseding of their ‘Serbhood’ (Srpstvo).10 The international dimension that Ćosić attached to Yugoslavism was clearly coloured by the SKJ’s own conceptualisation of it as socialist concept. However, while Ćosić clearly relied on Kardelj and Marx to underscore his support for socialist Yugoslavism, his understanding of it was not identical to the official position. Kardelj preached rapprochement between national groups, and expected socialist development to render national affiliation less important, but he did not denounce national identity per se, or the right of the nations to national development. He saw socialist consciousness to develop in addition and parallel to national consciousness. It must be said, however, that the Party refrained from addressing the issue of how this was to happen. And though Kardelj did not (in 1957) allocate the republics an essential role in the further development of socialism, he nevertheless indicated that he saw them as stateforming entities that had settled the aspirations of different Yugoslav peoples. Although Ćosić was adamant in his support for federalism and for unity among all the Yugoslav peoples within a socialist frame, he advocated the need to aim for the superseding of one’s own nationality for the sake of socialist Yugoslavism., In his view, and in the views of the time of many of his Serbian contemporaries who had fought with the Partisans, the Serbs (as the largest nation) carried a special responsibility in this respect. On the other hand, in Ćosić’s mind, the increasing influence of the national bureaucracies had become an obstacle to closer co-operation between the different Yugoslav cultures. In time, this would also lead him to question why the Serbs should strive to supersede their national identity for the sake of a Yugoslav one, if the other peoples were not willing to do the same. He himself would in fact eventually become the articulator of the Serbian nationalism he had described in 1961 as ‘the socially most dangerous form’ within a Yugoslav framework.11

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Pirjevec also used Kardelj and Marx to support his view. Quoting Kardelj’s new definition of the nation in Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja, he argued that the nation and nationality were two categories that continue to exist also in the period when society developed from capitalism to socialism, and that ‘the nation is a specific manifestation of social life.’12 Thus, Pirjevec argued that the nations were over class categories (nadklasne), or even outside of class categories (vanklasne).13 Therefore, in his view, it was not difficult to understand that nationality remained an important element of the human character, and that in an organisational perspective it remained a fundamental part of its existence.14 Pirjevec also argued that Yugoslavism could not be truly internationalist, since internationalism was by definition worldwide. Therefore, there would be no room for a Yugoslav layer between the national and the general.15 Thus, Pirjevec insisted, loyalty to the Yugoslav state could not be based on its representation of internationalism, rather on its promotion of self-management through democratisation and decentralisation. If Yugoslavia was founded on these universal values, then according to Pirjevec, what bound the peoples together, could not ‘adequately be described only by the expression of Yugoslavism’.16 So while Ćosić accused Pirjevec of reducing human personality to its national content, arguing that to Pirjevec, the nation was an aim in itself rather than a means to achieve socialism, Pirjevec for his part accused Ćosić of advocating not the objectively serving interests of the individual over the nation, but rather the interest of larger nations over smaller nations. Although Ćosić and Pirjevec differed in their opinion on the relation of national cultures to Yugoslav culture and how to improve inter-republican cultural relations, they both agreed that there was a problem. They also presented views that were in keeping with the official party line as presented in the SKJ programme of 1958, and within parameters acceptable to the SKJ. The Ćosić–Pirjevec polemic is important with regard to later rhetoric around intra-republican relations and around the concept of Yugoslav unity. Even more explicitly than the Mišić–Šega debate, their exchange raised the question of whether socialist Yugoslavism was a universal concept, or a particularist concept applied only to a specific Yugoslav context and identity. How they understood each other, was equally important to the polemic as what they actually said, was crucial to the polemic. The relationship between Ćosić and Pirjevec was coloured less by ‘brotherly’ faith, than by a deep-seated suspicion of each other’s intentions and motives. The growing conflict within the SKJ as well as the more complex nature of inter-republican relations within

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the Yugoslav Federation make plausible the argument that the Pirjevec– Ćosić polemic had been pushed forward by forces in the Party leadership. Both Ćosić and Pirjevec were well enough connected to probably be aware of the animosity behind the more unitary front presented by the SKJ. The increasing wavering within the inner party circle – which until now had taken all decisions relating to doctrine ­– on the question of promoting a Yugoslav culture through socialist Yugoslavism, and their failure to present an unequivocal ideological stand towards the rest of the Party organisation, would come to have vital significance on the issue of their approach to Yugoslav unity. Kardelj became increasingly identified as the main protector of the republics’ rights to individual cultural and economic development through a lessening of interference from the federal level. But Kardelj was also a clear supporter and even the main advocate of the creation of a Yugoslav consciousness. Although he was careful to emphasise that socialist Yugoslavism was not an assimilationist concept and that the SKJ were not aiming to create a new Yugoslav nation, he nevertheless did his best to convince his readers that the republics did not hold an essential economic role in the life of the Yugoslav state. However, the emerging conflict within the leadership, and Kardelj’s fear that the greatest danger to the achievements of the revolution and to the Yugoslav system would come from the bureaucracy, seem to have convinced him that the role of the republics might have been greater than he had argued in Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja. This change of mind was also influenced by opposition from the republics and from those who supported the continuation of liberalisation and decentralisation. The gradual decision to abandon the creation of a Yugoslav culture would come to have a crucial impact both on the further development of the Yugoslav socialist project and on the national question in Yugoslavia, consequences much more far-reaching than the SKJ leadership may have foreseen. Keeping up appearances: unity and disunity in the leadership The growing disagreement within the senior leadership formed an important backdrop to the development of the Yugoslav system, and had significant consequences for the emerging changes within it, and to the divergence appearing in the political line of the SKJ. The breakdown in unity at the top of the Party hierarchy led on the one hand to a vacuum which gave different regional and local leaders the opportunity to strengthen their own positions and regional power bases. On the other hand the breakdown also made it possible for lower-level party

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functionaries to support those at the top who they felt best represented their interests. With regard to the national question, which was of vital importance in this process, there was a move away from SKJ stress on unity towards an increasing focus by republican leaderships on the individual rights and interests of each republic. Although disagreement within the Party had been brewing under the surface for some years, it became much more explicit during the preparations for the 1963 constitution and the Eighth Congress that would be held during the following year (1964) in Belgrade. In this wider ideological struggle, two broad camps which emerged within the SKJ have commonly been referred to in English literature as ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’.17 These labels were not used in the same sense as in a Western parliamentary system, but referred rather to the positions taken towards specific political issues within the mono-party Yugoslav system. ‘Liberals’ was a label attached to those within the Party who favoured further economic reforms, de-étatisation and decentralisation, giving the republics an increased role in the decision-making process, and those who often gave greater resonance to the individual needs of the federal units to that of the centre. Liberals also tended to favour a general increase in civic liberties and democratisation of Yugoslav society. Those who favoured retaining strong party control through the observance of the principle of democratic centralism, who were sceptical of further economic and political reforms, and emphasised the need of the federation over that of individual republics, were often called ‘Conservatives’. They were generally centralist in orientation. Both groups were heterogeneous, and both represented individuals with diverse interests and emphases. Economic reform and decentralisation The polarisation within the Party emerged initially over the matter of economic reform and of economic relations between the different federal units. In 1961–1962, Yugoslavia was hit by a serious economic recession. This acted as a catalyst to the reform process that would characterise much of the political processes in Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1960s and which would soon come to embrace much larger issues. Not least, it came to impact seriously on inter-republic relations and as a consequence also raise the sensitive national question. A question that would come to dominate much of the discussion was disparity in the economic and social development between the more developed and the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia, a problem which had plagued the Yugoslav federation since its initiation. This constituted a great difficulty

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for a socialist party which had fought for power on the platform of balancing out social and economic inequalities between the different Yugoslav peoples and by pledging to eradicate the exploitation by the more developed regions of less developed areas. The divide followed north–south lines. The north-west, led on by Slovenia and Croatia, but also including Vojvodina and northern Serbia, was fairly developed, while the south-east was less developed. A 1961 classification of areas categorised as underdeveloped regions eligible to apply for federal assistance included all of Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and certain districts in the southern part of Serbia, substantial parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and even some districts of Croatia (Lika, Kordun, Banija and the Dalmatian hinterland).18 For many years, the SKJ had pursued a policy of allocating federal funds to the less developed areas in the expectation that this would help them to catch up with Slovenia and Croatia. The SKJ had attempted to find a way of assisting the more underdeveloped regions since the 1950s, without holding back the economic progress of the more developed northern areas. This was a theme discussed in Kardelj’s Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja. Kardelj insisted that the issue of differences in economic development between the regions in Yugoslavia arose ‘as a consequence of their difficult historical past’, and argued that this is ‘a problem that the Yugoslav people have to solve together’. He saw it as ‘a deep mistake to conduct such policies that would entail holding back the developed regions of Yugoslavia until the less developed regions had caught up’. This would not only lead to ‘discontent among the working masses in the developed part of the country, but also be to the detriment of the development in the less developed regions’. This would therefore, in his opinion, constitute a step backward for all of Yugoslavia. Boris Kraigher also stressed the importance of dealing with the increasing discrepancy in the level of economic development between the republics, in his 1958 speech to the Seventh Congress of the SKJ.19 Despite introducing a number of measures to even out differences throughout the 1950s, by the early 1960s, it was abundantly clear that the SKJ’s economic policies and allocation of funds for the south had not made the less developed regions catch up with the northern republics as expected. Yugoslav economists agreed on this point, but were at odds over how to solve the problem. The discussions among Yugoslav economists over the failure to find a solution to the above dilemma, and the economic recession that hit Yugoslavia in 1961–2 initiated a reassessment of the issues involved in this process. This signalled the start

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of the reform process and the larger issues of discussion that would soon emerge. The process would increasingly acquire an inter-republican dimension. The SKJ’s identification of the republic by national labels, combined with their insistence that the national question in the era of socialism held an economic dimension, contributed to these issues gradually taking on a national dimension. The question of economic reform became caught up with the dispute over centralisation or decentralisation and the pace with which selfmanagement socialism should be progressing. The quest for further decentralisation in the economic sphere had become most strongly identified with Slovenia and Croatia, the main advocates of increased selfmanagement through further decentralisation. The centralist cause was most closely identified with the Serbian party leadership, who favoured retaining the system of central control at the federal level over allocation of funds to the republics. The close identification with these positions to specific republican interests was instrumental in making what could otherwise have remained an economic issue into one which very much came to revolve around inter-republican relations, right at the heart of the SKJ’s claim to have solved the national question. In the early 1960s, both the liberal and the conservative camps began to seek support from different republican leaderships. The leaders at the top of the Party took widely conflicting positions in the debate over economic and social reforms. Their divergence over the further path of Yugoslavia and of socialist self-management was a serious factor in creating the situation in the first place and contributed to the continuing deadlock over reforms. A new generation emerged within the Party ranks, and a whole array of new interests surfaced. These threatened the leading role that the SKJ leadership had held thus far in all matters of ideology. The erosion of Brotherhood and Unity within the Party leadership There were four men whose position was of particular significance at the top of the Party hierarchy when Yugoslavia entered the 1960s. Tito, Kardelj, and Ranković – for the time being – continued to play pivotal roles at the top, as they had done during the previous decade. In addition, the role of Vladimir Bakarić would become increasingly significant. Tito was referred to as Stari (the Old Man­) in these circles, a title indicative of Tito’s role as the patriarch reigning supreme at the top of the hierarchy. Kardelj, Ranković and Bakarić all attempted to obtain the grace and the ear of Stari, and jostled for the position of Tito’s favourite, the one that

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he would listen to the most in determining the next path for Yugoslavia and the Party. This became ever more important since his colleagues also had increasingly different views of what this path should be, and how to best achieve whatever aims they deemed important. Each also sought to protect their own personal interests and those of their protégés and supporters. The one thing they all agreed upon was the fact that safeguarding the heritage of the socialist revolution, the system they had created and the leading role of the SKJ was of paramount importance. But they differed greatly about how to do this. Bakarić and Kardelj both had clear liberal leanings and a keen interest in theoretical and ideological matters. They both played key roles in defining and encouraging reform of the economy and the political system. Ranković on the other hand was more interested in retaining the status quo and in protecting the leading postion the SKJ had established in Yugoslav society during the 1950s. While Ranković sought influence through the Party apparatus, building up a patronage by controlling the security apparatus and the appointment of cadres, Bakarić and Kardelj concentrated on working behind the scenes, trying to push through their ideas and improving the formal legal, institutional and constitutional aspects of the system the communists had created. But the focus and approaches of Bakarić and Kardelj in many aspects also diverged. Kardelj had long since become part of the federal apparatus whose base was in Belgrade, while Bakarić had rejected all offers to leave his powerbase in Croatia. Bakarić, like Kardelj, was a keen theoretician, but possibly more pragmatic and practically orientated than his more pedantic and scholarly Slovene colleague. Savka Dabčević-Kučar suggests that Kardelj was nevertheless more active in his pursuit of Tito’s patronage, while Bakarić’s pursuit of the same was more passive in manner.20 Kardelj had transformed himself into the leading Yugoslav ideologue whose interests primarily lay in how to protect, develop and justify the system of self-management, while ensuring the Party’s continuous leading role in this system, which in many ways he regarded as his creation.21 Bakarić appears to have had a better sense for the practical workings of the system and held an interest in how it could assist in forwarding political aims and strategies that would support the aims of the liberal faction. Thus Bakarić was much more influential than Kardelj in forging a liberal coalition through the building of alliances with other potential supporters of reform. Bakarić held an instrumental role in transferring the discussions of further reform of the self-management system from the narrow ideological circles of the SKJ leadership, to the practical political arena.

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In the jostling for positions which ensued, it was important that none had the outright support of Tito, who wavered for some time between supporting one or other position. At the start of the decade, particularly in 1961–1962, the initiative was in many regards still with the centralist forces in the Party, who were well situated and controlled the real centres of power, including the Party, its policy on cadre appointments and the secret police, all of which was the domain of Ranković and his protégés. Vukmanović-Tempo, who was also well placed within the Party, argues that from what he could observe, ‘Tito was very close to Ranković during the period when he did not sincerely accept the idea of self-management and the democratisation of the Party’.22 Tito’s acceptance of these ideas was indeed a long-term, piecemeal process, and always with a hint of reluctance. With the Đilas case fresh in mind, Kardelj and Bakarić were acutely aware that at the turn of the decade Tito was not entirely convinced of the wisdom of implementing further reforms and devolving the self-management system any further. There was no love lost between Ranković and Kardelj, and their estrangement from each other became increasingly apparent by the late 1950s and early 1960s. While on a common hunting gathering with Party colleagues, Kardelj was wounded. Kardelj’s wife held that this was not an accident, and accused Ranković of being behind an assassination attempt on her husband’s life.23 Ranković himself argued that this was a hunting accident, and that Kardelj was lightly wounded by a stray bullet from Jovan Veselinov.24 Eventually, the whole affair was hushed up and Kardelj was sent to London to convalesce. Although there was never any conclusive evidence, the mere accusation made clear the antagonistic relationship between the two men. The differences in approach between Ranković and Kardelj did not emerge as a result of the national question, but rather from ideological positions relating to the question of decentralisation and democratisation within the Yugoslav socialist system. Their differences would nonetheless affect the national policy of the SKJ and their outlooks on Yugoslav culture and unity. Kardelj and Ranković both favoured Yugoslav unity, but held different visions about what this unity entailed and how it could best be achieved. Their positions were to some extent influenced by their different experiences, background, and outlook on the national question.25 Kardelj’s sensitivity to the interests of different groups, and his belief that cultural autonomy was not enough, may well have been formed by his own Slovene background and experience in Slovenia under the first Yugoslavia. However, it was also strongly influenced by more ideological motives, and his adherence to a modified, Yugoslav version

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of Marxism-Leninism. While Kardelj resolutely belonged to the federal leadership in Belgrade, he also understood the concerns of the Slovenian party organisation from which he had emerged. Ranković’s preference for centralism can equally be seen to have been influenced by his Serbian background as a tailor from Šumadija, and by the Serbian tradition which favoured a strong state. Ranković’s position (which could best be described as neo-Stalinist, with emphasis on a centralised, unified party, based on the principle of democratic centralism) was equally influenced by his long-standing loyalty to the communist party and movement, of which he had been a member since 1928. In May 1962, Tito made an angry speech at a meeting in Split. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo interprets this speech as an indication of Tito’s closeness to Ranković.26 This view concurs largely with the general contemporary interpretation of the Split speech as signalling Tito’s support for the centralist forces, and as a cue for recentralisation in the economy.27 During this meeting Tito directed severe criticism against localism and chauvinism, which he argued arose due to the ‘lack of alertness by communists’ and for ‘material reasons’. Tito also argued that ‘some communists have forgotten the wider interests of the entire community, and see only their most narrow circle, so that it has come to political discontent and inaccuracy in particular republics’. These weaknesses and inaccuracies, Tito argued, ‘are the result of the cultural development in our country’, where ‘people go backwards into their history, which they start to rummage through and forget about the future development of our socialist community as a whole’. Not one of these republics would be anything if we were not all together’, Tito warned,28 calling for unity and suggesting that the process of decentralisation ought to be slowed down. In Tito’s view, the purpose of ‘decentralisation remains to further progress of the creative initiative, to improve management, and not as an open door for each on its own to do what one wants’.29 Svetozar Vukmanović suggests that Tito’s criticism was directed against Kardelj, who was seen as the architect behind decentralisation and the processes against which Tito lashed out.30 Some incidents a few months earlier, in March 1962, at a secret meeting of the Executive Committee of the SKJ, also give indications of Tito’s mood at the time of the meeting in Split. No stenographic reports have emerged from the proceedings of this now notorious but secret session of the executive in March. What does seem clear, from unofficial accounts as well as from later comments by the SKJ leaders themselves, including Tito, is that the meeting was marked by considerable disagreement within

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the highest echelons of the SKJ.31 It seems that the Slovene party leadership held an important role in the drama which unfolded. In April 1962, the Slovene Party leadership was summoned to Belgrade for a reprimand. Boris Kraigher was relocated from Slovenia to the federal leadership in Belgrade in June 1962. Aleš Gabrič argues that, ‘if we add the relocation of Boris Kraigher to Belgrade in 1962, the uncertain future of Edvard Kardelj, and the criticism that was directed towards the leadership in the Slovenian [Communist] Party, one could reach the conclusion that the Slovene side suffered a defeat in this conflict’.32 Although it is hard to know for certain, these incidents could indicate that Tito’s accusations of localism were indeed directed against the Slovenes. What is evident is that Boris Kraigher made his position on the issue of republics and his opinion about the danger of bureaucratic centralism very clear. In a conversation with members of the society of journalists only a few days before his relocation, he argued, ‘we must not liquidate the republics, or the districts’. He also warned against the danger of unitaristic, centralistic tendencies within the Party leadership, but in keeping with the usual communist rhetoric in Yugoslavia at the time, he also added a warning against national chauvinism. Kraigher made a number of statements that must have been highly controversial at the time. He argued that there existed ‘clear tendencies in Serbia, which in the new constitution wished to eliminate Kosmet and Vojvodina’.33 In this interview, Kraigher also criticised the practice within the Party of not discussing some important issues in order to retain status quo, thus probably alluding to the secret March meeting. On a more controversial note, he pointed out that Montenegro and Bosnia should not have been granted the status of republics, but that they ought to have been autonomous provinces. He added that such issues had not entirely been solved. Thus in reality, with this statement, Kraigher opened up again even the territorial, constitutional and formal part of the SKJ solution to the national question. When he listed the nations of Yugoslavia, he only mentioned what he referred to as the ‘four distinctively formed nations of Yugoslavia: the Croats, Slovenians, Serbs and Macedonians’.34 At the time of this interview, Kraigher was still president of the Slovenian SK; three days later, he was relocated to the federal leadership in Belgrade. Whether or not that was a coincidence, the interview would not have been a mitigating factor. Svetozar Vukmanović argues that, at the time, it was ‘an open secret that Kardelj was on his way out’.35 In addition to his conflict with Ranković, Kardelj’s relationship with Tito was showing strain. Partly,

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Tito was not entirely happy with some of Kardelj’s writings, primarily in relation to the preparation of the new constitution, particularly at the time when Tito himself was inclined to support the centralist position in the emerging conflict. For two years Kardelj was excluded from participating in making decisions on important issues. When the Executive Committee (to which he belonged) met, they discussed non-essential matters, while significant decisions were prepared in the Secretariat of the Executive Committee, made up of Tito, Ranković and general Gošnjak.36 In addition to the purely political and ideological motives behind the temporary distance in the relation between Tito and Kardelj, there were also suggestions that more personal motives were involved, relating to animosity between their wives. According to Božo Repe, Kardelj’s wife Pepca, who had made less than flattering comments about Jovanka – Tito’s wife – was banned for eight years from coming anywhere near Tito.37 Savka Dabčević-Kučar alludes to a meeting with Kardelj’s wife Pepca during the Jajce anniversary. Pepca Kardelj complained about how ‘her Edo was in a bad way, how Ranković controlled him, and how Stari did not notice or did not want to see’.38 Kardelj in many ways remained a lonely figure who continued to work eagerly and stubbornly on developing his ideas and on finding ways of convincing Tito of their soundness. The closeness in the ideas of Kardelj to those of Đilas, and indications that relations between Tito and Kardelj were somehow strained temporarily, appear to have made Kardelj genuinely apprehensive about being the next in line to be expelled from the Party leadership. In the end, however, Tito and Kardelj overcame their main differences, and over the next decade Tito would come to rely extensively on Kardelj over constitutional and ideological matters. Svetozar Vukmanović suggests that one reason why Kardelj survived politically in the end was the massive support he received from the Slovenian Party leadership, who threatened to leave if Kardelj was made to go.39 Although the Slovenian leadership put pressure on Kardelj they also realised that he was able to give Slovenian interests a voice in the top leadership, and they feared what would happen if they lost this voice and Ranković’s influence increased. Even though Kardelj undoubtedly belonged to the federal leadership, he was also the bridge between the Slovenian leadership and the federal one. Draža Marković has suggested that the attitude towards Kardelj came thanks to the intervention of some Serbs in the Yugoslav leadership: Koča and Milentije Popović, Dobrivoje Radosavljević (Plavi), Petar Stambolić and Moma Marković.40 These had all grown apprehensive about the conduct of Ranković and his circle. The events in this period certainly appear to

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have had an important influence on Kardelj’s change of thinking with regard to the continuing evolution of the federal system in Yugoslavia. In the preparation of the 1963 constitution, he granted the Republics a much more prominent role than he had suggested in 1957. Despite the temporary strain in their relationship, there were also indications that Kardelj was the man Tito turned to and would rely on when in need of ideological direction. Mika Tripalo refers to an episode when he visited Ranković in connection with a miners’ strike in Trbovlje. Ranković received a phone call in which Tito asked him to calm down the miners. Ranković commented to Tripalo that ‘when something theoretical needs to be explained, then he calls Comrade Bevc [Kardelj], but when we need to get our hands dirty, then you go, Marko [Ranković]!’41 Tito’s reliance on Kardelj’s ideological guidance seems to have increased after ‘the old man’ – correctly or not – started to fear that Ranković’s ambitions could pose a threat to his own position. The struggle between the senior leaders in the 1960s had implications far wider than a simple squabble confined behind closed doors. Indeed, the very decision to keep the disputes a secret had far-reaching consequences, not just for the SKJ, but also for the Yugoslav state and inter-republican relations. The struggle between the leaders and the strategies they advocated also became a battle over which vision of a Yugoslav state would be the victorious one. With the tense atmosphere at the top, Kardelj and Bakarić appear to have made a decision to continue promoting their liberal ideas while keeping a lower profile, rather than risking going into a direct confrontation with Ranković. Bakarić and Kardelj played a very different game from Ranković. They concentrated on working to influence the development of the institutional, legal and constitutional aspects of the Yugoslav system. While important to the legitimacy of the framework of the Yugoslav system, and of the Party’s leading role, the work on institutional and legal issues were not perceived to impinge on the actual locus of power, which was dominated by Ranković and his supporters. For this reason, Bakarić and Kardelj seemed to be more of a nuisance than a risk to these forces. In the long term, avoiding a direct struggle with the power apparatus (whether deliberate or not) gave Bakarić and Kardelj an opportunity to muster support to strengthen their position. In July 1962, the Central Committee of the SKJ met for the Fourth Plenum. During this debate, Tito’s position in the economic debates appears less clear than his speech in Split had suggested. According to Rusinow, Tito’s initial support for centralism resulted from his reaction

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to reports of the economic situation, and his first reaction to the economic crisis had been to blame it on the decentralisation of investment funds, and therefore to opt for rigid re-centralisation. Later, however, he was shown evidence that ‘about 80% of the investment funds remained under the effective but financially irresponsible central control, despite formal decentralisation’.42 By the Fourth Plenum Tito was no longer ready to support the centralist position, but in order to avoid encouraging a rift in the Party, he was unwilling to give his full endorsement to the liberal cause. The conflict therefore remained unresolved. Aleš Gabrič argues that the ‘Conservatives’ set in their forces precisely at the time of the preparation of the 1963 constitution in order to widen their manoeuvring space and to get as many of their ideas through as possible. The ‘Conservatives’ pushed through some changes to the new constitution. The most significant one was the creation of the post of Vice-president of the Republic, a position that was given to Ranković.43 Nevertheless, the new constitution was very much the work of the ‘Liberals’, and it was their ideas that would come to mark the new constitution. The ensuing years would be characterised by an often bitter wrestling match between the liberal and the conservative forces within the Party leadership, with Tito still undecided. The bitterness of the struggle at the top was made worse by the attempt to retain the outward pretence of unity. Tito’s refusal to endorse either position unequivocally was very important, creating the stalemate that characterised party relations at the time. In addition, the ‘Liberals’ may have been more perceptive about the wider political, social and cultural processes that had taken place in Yugoslav society over the period (almost two decades) the SKJ had been in power. These changes meant the emergence of new ideas and demands. The ideas fronted by the ‘Liberals’ therefore carried an appeal for many from the newer generations and for those working within the new institutions created by the self-management system. The ‘Liberals’ also made a few strategic adjustments which would prove fruitful for their purposes. They switched their focus from decentralisation to that of de-étatisation. In this manner, they attempted to take the political dimension out of the debate, in order to prevent every problem related to economic reforms from becoming a battle between those who wished for more centralisation and those who wanted to decentralise the Yugoslav system and decision-making problem. It was also a way of attempting to take focus away from the national question, and to prevent accusations that the ‘Liberals’ were supporting purely republican, and therefore also national, interests. The increasingly strong link of Jugoslavenstvo to the pro-centralist

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position, which again was perceived to be linked to Serbian interests, also contributed to discredit the pro-centralist position among many of the other republics. In this manner, Bakarić and his supporters experienced considerable success in discrediting the pro-centralist position, and gathering support from republics like Macedonia, which for purely economic reasons would have been expected to support centralism. In the end, the leadership struggle involved the greater question of how the SKJ could maintain hegemony. Would it be through Ranković’s methods which focused on control, if necessary by force? Or would it be through devolution of decision-making process in some areas, offering the population of the opportunity for genuine self-management? The latter would also imply an ethnic and geographical shift of power from the federal centre in Belgrade to the republics. For Tito, it eventually became a question of which of the two dangers he feared constituted the greater danger to the Party’s power and his own position: increased centralism and control, or further decentralisation and democratisation. Drafting the 1963 constitution The new constitution introduced in 1963 had been in preparation for some time beforehand, and drafts were presented for discussion during the summer of 1962. The constitution was mainly the work of the liberalminded members of the leadership, and Kardelj and Vladimir Bakarić played a pivotal role. The 1963 constitution reintroduced the republics’ right to self-determination. Kosovo’s status was elevated from oblast to that of pokrajina, hence placing it on equal footing with Vojvodina. The 1963 constitution reinvigorated the role of the Chamber of Nationalities, which had become purely formalistic after being diminished through its merger with the Federal Chamber in the 1953 constitutional law. The 1963 constitution also paved the way for Yugoslavia to become a de facto federal state, and increasingly, the federal framework of the state itself became a topic of discussion. This compelled the SKJ to define this question and the relationship between the different units more clearly. Important changes in the approach to national relations within the Yugoslav Federation are noticeable in the preliminary texts prepared for the 1963 constitution and the Eighth Congress in 1964, and in the language used to describe these relations. In the following years, both Kardelj and Tito would come to emphasise that Yugoslavia was a multinational community founded on co-operation between different peoples within a federal framework. Furthermore, the SKJ would no longer claim in the same assured manner that they had solved the national question.

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The preparation for the 1963 constitution thus reflected the first steps away from SKJ’s official claim to have solved the national question and the first recognition that the national question was still to be reckoned with. Such changes can be seen in Kardelj’s draft of the 1963 constitution, in which he addressed the relationship between the Yugoslav federal state and the republics. In a most explicit manner, Kardelj stated that the ‘Federation of Yugoslav Republics is not a framework for the creation of some new Yugoslav nation’. Instead, he argues: It is a community (zajednica) between free, equal and independent peoples and working peoples, who are united on the basis of common interests and progressive social-economic, political, cultural and spiritual aspirations and development of working people in the era of socialism.44 This definition of the Yugoslav state represents a marked departure from Kardelj’s previous depiction. The new definition to a much larger degree accentuated the federal aspect of the relations between the different Yugoslav peoples. In this respect, Kardelj underlined not only their equality, but also the individuality of the different peoples. Increasingly, with the new constitution the communists would come to refer to Yugoslavia as a ‘social community’ (društvena zajednica), or as a ‘multinational community’ (višenacionalna zajednica). In this manner, they also rejected references to Yugoslavia as a state. This latter point, Rusinow points out, related to the SKJ’s concept of the withering away of the state through the development of self-management.45 This reformulation of the Yugoslav state was important within the Party’s discourse on the national question. The new emphasis would come to the surface unequivocally within Kardelj’s writings in preparation for the Eighth Congress in 1964. In relation to the preparation of the 1963 constitution, the issue arose of what it meant to be a Yugoslav. According to Vladimir Bakarić, the preliminary constitutional discussions revolved around questions as to whether or not an Albanian or an Italian (citizen of Yugoslavia) could be a Yugoslav: The answer of all older Yugoslavs was that they could not. However, the constitution decided that they are. For this reason, the name Yugoslav as a continuation of the old [term], is somehow inadequate because it contains a ‘Slav’ element. And all the members of the national minorities first and foremost objected to the fact

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that they are called national minorities. Because this means that we acknowledge that they are members of the Hungarian or Albanian [communities], and belong to them. But they say: we do not belong there; we belong to this community, so give us an adequate name, a term that will be acceptable. We demand the right to our internal national development, but we are also the members of this community. This is what Yugoslav means. And what we need to do with respect to this is to secure that the belonging to the Yugoslav community is the same for all our nationalities, which entails that in view of Yugoslavia, this is lost as a political problem.46 To be a Yugoslav was thus no longer defined primarily according to the Slav (that is, ethnic) criteria, but increasingly according to a socialist definition – belonging to the Yugoslav community. In a text prepared for a meeting of a working group for the examination of inter-national relations on 11 June, Kardelj produces a surprisingly blunt exposition on the problems which, as he sees it, are facing the SKJ regarding the national question in Yugoslavia.47 Expressing his concern for development within the area of national relations, Kardelj argues: During the last few years under the pressure of factors in our practice, our Party’s policies towards the national question has often been elementally distorted, a reason why, among others, the organisational problems have increased in this area. It seems to me that we cannot go to sleep with the thought that these are secondary problems.48 So, Kardelj admits that the national question is an important issue to which the SKJ has to devote its full attention. He also emphasises the fact that Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and the Party must protect the individuality of each of the peoples. Kardelj argues that communists at the centre must first and foremost secure respect for the national individuality and the equality between the peoples, to oppose all forms of great state chauvinism, hegemony and fettering of independent development of the people.49 The main responsibility for eradication and superseding nationalism, Kardelj therefore places with the leading communist forces within each individual People. The main task for the Yugoslav federal political centre, is seen to be ‘the provision of persistent respect – on the principle of consolidating national relations and national policies – to build favourable conditions for such social processes, particularly for the struggle of socialist forces against the manifestation of reactionary nationalism’.50

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According to Kardelj, in principle the SKJ had always observed such a position. He asserted that the constitutional system had always in principle provided such ‘independence and equality to the peoples’.51 In Kardelj’s opinion, however, the Party had become too passive in its defence of such principles when confronted with an organised obstruction of the Party’s national policies. Kardelj’s target of attack was clearly the pro-centralist wing within the SKJ, and he argued that ‘unitarism is … the greatest danger to socialist progress’. Kardelj alluded to discussions on ‘the justification of the republic generally’, especially to whether they would advance so much that the republics would be made irrelevant. Such discussions, Kardelj highlighted, would, if allowed to develop, come to destroy ‘the feeling of security among the Peoples’.52 This, he characterised as the most important source of stability for the federation in addition to socialism. It is therefore the responsibility of the SKJ to ensure such security through the republics and the federal system.53 He insisted that Yugoslav nations did not differ from other nations in view of their social-historical role and origin. Here one can see a shift in Kardelj’s position. With the increasing identification of Jugoslavenstvo with unitarism, he no longer mentions this word, nor talks of unification through the process of spajanje, indicating a process of melting together into something new. While Kardelj previously had attempted to diminish the role of the republics in the development towards socialism, his writings from this period insist on the individuality of the peoples, emphasising the right of the republics to independent development. He argued that the communists could not allow the actual institution of the federal organisation to be put into doubt, nor the institution on which the stability of the Yugoslav socialist people’s community depended. Therefore, Kardelj pointed out that ‘the ever increasing human rapprochement between the Yugoslav peoples does not depend on the building of a new Yugoslav nation’.54 His emphasis on the need for stability, and the need for institutional measures to secure such stability, was to become, as we will see, an increasing concern. The national question at the Eighth Congress of the SKJ At its Eighth Congress in 1964, the SKJ devoted more attention to the national question than in any of the previous congresses, and for the first time at an SKJ Congress the national question was explicitly discussed. Although Tito followed much of Kardelj’s disposition on the national question (outlined above), it was Tito and not Kardelj who would report

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on the issues central to the new course of the Party on the national question. In his speech to the Eighth Congress, Tito argued that it was necessary to devote a lot of attention to inter-Yugoslav national relations, but that the reason for this was ‘not because the national question for us represents a problem that in principle is not solved’. Nonetheless, for the first time since they came to power, Tito qualified the Yugoslav communists’ claim to have solved the national question in Yugoslavia: For us communists the solution to the national question formed an integral part of our political line, and in this regard, of a definitive decision taken already prior to the war. In addition, the national question was solved by all our peoples in the course of the liberation war, where they solved it through agreement in the most democratic manner, something that is confirmed in our constitution. Now the question concerns the further development of international relations.55 After outlining a short historical overview over how the KPJ/SKJ found a correct solution to the national question based on the victory of ‘MarxistLeninist conception’ and a principle of national equality, Tito turns to the present-day situation, pointing out that: Certain people, even communists…confuse the idea of unity between our peoples with the elimination of nationalities and the creation of something new and artificial; that is a single Yugoslav nation, bearing resemblance to assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, unitarism and hegemony.56 While the SKJ at the Seventh Congress tried to promote socialist Yugoslavism and the creation of a common Yugoslav culture, the Eighth Congress does not mention this. This was not the first time that Tito or Kardelj denied that the SKJ were attempting to build a new Yugoslav nation. In 1964, however, Tito and Kardelj both took the argument much further by redefining the very character of the Yugoslav state. Following the lead of Kardelj’s previous comments, as well as the provisions of the 1963 Constitution, Tito stated that ‘the Yugoslav socialist integration constitutes a new type of social community, where all the nationalities find common interests’.57 At this congress, where Yugoslavia’s international role in the non-aligned movement was granted considerable space, the Yugoslav state was characterised not only as the framework for resolving

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the national conflict among the Yugoslav peoples, but as one that could also serve as a model for other developing countries with a multinational structure. Both Tito and Kardelj therefore referred to Yugoslavia as a new type of ‘multinational social community’. Following Kardelj’s emphasis on the independence of the various peoples and nationalities, Tito argues: To be a persistent internationalist means to be consistently internationalist first and foremost within one’s own country, particularly in a multinational social community as is ours. Internationalism in one’s own country does not mean unification, and does not mean the negation of the national and ethnic groups as subjects of a socialist social community.58 Tito also argued that ‘in the implementation of its national policy in the domain of culture, art, science and education, the SKJ proceeds from the belief in free development in the cultural life, creative work and education of working people and cadres of all the peoples and nationalities’.59 This, he claimed, did not lead to enclosure within national frameworks; rather it freed ‘the natural aspirations of all the Peoples to bind them together and reciprocally enrich each other with a mutual cultural influence’. Therefore: the development of a common Yugoslav culture can be understood as a free and many-sided blooming of the national cultures of all our peoples and nationalities, united in their common interests, common socialist social system, and in this manner, in the common foundation and crucial content of their creative cultural work. Furthermore, Tito argued that there existed ‘a certain wrong perception about the functions of culture and education in the process of rapprochement (zbližavanje) between the peoples and the nationalities’. It is often forgotten, Tito claimed: that the process of binding together [povezivanje] and rapprochement, which originates from the interests and aspirations of the peoples and from the natural cultural and educational activity, does not deny but presupposes the respect of national particularity in the cultural creativity of each People, each of which is enriched through this. The rapprochement between national cultures, which contains various specific elements, is a social and cultural process

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which can only be helped by internationalist tolerance and generosity, since it would undoubtedly be impeded and fettered by nationalistic prejudice, intolerance and narrow-mindedness. This is equally the case for those nationalist perceptions that declares themselves as ‘superiorly’ elevated above national cultures, also in the name of common Yugoslav culture.60 At the Eighth Congress, Tito again provided reassurance that the SKJ was not attempting to create a Yugoslav nation, or a Yugoslav culture based on the negation or assimilation of the already existing national cultures. He warned not only against ‘narrow-minded nationalism,’ but also against nationalism masked as internationalism and supra-national Yugoslavism. At the same time he conveys an impression that he was rather reluctantly and sadly leaving behind the hope of creating of a common Yugoslav culture and identity and that he does not entirely wish to close the door for rapprochement between the different cultures. The Eighth Congress was important on a more general level in marking a great step in the direction of approval of the ideas of the more liberal forces within the Party. It granted official approval to the wide reaching forthcoming reforms and overhaul of the economic and federal system that were to be implemented the following year. In this manner, the Eighth Congress granted its legitimacy to the implementation of such reforms, and indicated that Tito had increasingly decided to place his considerable political influence on the side of the reformers. Although the congress did not mark the final defeat of the ‘centralist-administrative’ forces within the Party, it did mark a considerable strengthening of the liberal forces on the political stage. Of vital importance too was the decision taken at the Eighth Congress to arrange the regional party conferences before the federal ones. Furthermore, the Congress marked a watershed regarding the SKJ’s strategies on the national question as it now for the first time recognised that it had not ‘entirely’ solved the national question. More importantly, the SKJ recognised that the national question was something it must continue to take into consideration, and the Yugoslav nations would not ‘wither away’ any time soon. ‘Liberals’, ‘conservatives’ and economic reforms The overriding question following the Eighth Congress concerned the reform of the economic system, introduced in the hope of levelling out the regional discrepancies between the so-called developed and underdeveloped regions. In 1964, the debates over economic reform entered

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the public realm. In this manner, the liberals managed to gain publicity for ideas which had considerable popular appeal among enterprise managers, and republican and local bureaucracies. These ideas also had support from the Trade Union Federation under the leadership of Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo. The first move in the public direction was made by the SKJ itself, when the issue of economic reform was raised at the Fourth Plenum held in July 1964. At this plenum, those participants with a liberal outlook presented an analysis which had originated among a group of economists from the universities of Zagreb and Belgrade. This group included respectable and later highly noteworthy Croatian economists such as Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Jakov Sirotković and Ivo Perišin. Significantly, the high-ranking leader of the Croatian Communist Party (SKH) Vladimir Bakarić had also had a hand in this analysis. The group also included three Serbs and two Slovenes, but it was undoubtedly influenced by the Croatian point of view.61 In the mid-1960s, one could witness new republican alliances. The conservatives, led on by the Serbian Party leadership, expected to muster support from underdeveloped regions like Macedonia, Montenegro and the province of Kosovo for maintaining a centralist approach which would secure the further channelling of federal funds to projects in these areas. The conservatives were to some extent successful in wooing the Montenegrins, with whom they made an agreement to establish closer inter-republican relations. They also concluded an agreement over the completion of the Belgrade–Bar railway project. In 1964 and 1965, Serbia and Montenegro signed agreements on cultural and economic cooperation.62 At that time, the centralists received some support from Kosovo. However, they were not successful in attracting the support of the Macedonians, who under the leadership of Krste Crvenkovski allied themselves with the Croats and Slovenes and became a significant force within the liberal camp. This development resulted partly from the Croats’ decision to pursue actively the support of the underdeveloped republics through switching their focus from further decentralisation to de-bureaucratisation. When seeking the support of the underdeveloped regions, the liberal cause was assisted by a deep-seated suspicion of Serbia and Serbian motives. As usual, fears, justified or not, of attempts to assert Serbian hegemony aroused the suspicions of the Macedonians. During the constitutional debates following the 1953 Constitutional Law, the Macedonians had also joined forces with the Croats in an attempt to secure the widest possible sphere of autonomy for their republic. The liberal cause was supported by a new coalition between the Slovenes,

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Croats, and Macedonians, with Vojvodina as a more passive partner.63 By 1965, the liberals had managed to push through their reform, entailing an end to the allocation of federal funds to unprofitable enterprises, in this manner making profitability the main criterion. Controversial economic questions soon became intertwined with republican interests, and thus also with national interests. The SKJ’s insistence that a ‘solution’ to the national question was conditional on the eradication of economic inequalities between the Yugoslav peoples also influenced this development. The decentralisation that the self-management system entailed did not always encourage further rapprochement between the republics, nor did it decrease national consciousness. Instead, it often encouraged intra-republican conflicts over the appropriation of funds and investment, first and foremost aimed at protecting interests at the local and regional level. At the same time, in the 1960s, these strategic relations between different republics were becoming much more complex than before, with new alliances being made over both national and economic issues. The reforms that started off as piecemeal adjustments, culminated in a thoroughgoing market reform in 1965. Through this reform, whose chief initiator was Boris Kraigher, considerable responsibility for administration of the economy was transferred from the federal government to the republics. The General Investment Fund, which had allocated funds to the less developed areas of Yugoslavia for numerous years, was abolished in January 1964, as were its local and republican equivalents. Instead, resources were turned over to the central banks.64 In November 1965, the annual social plans were abolished, and the Fund for Development of underdeveloped regions was established, after much delay, in February 1965.65 With this reform the SKJ attempted to end the tendency whereby each republic pursued a policy of selfsufficiency – a tendency that among other things had led to considerable duplication of ports, airlines and other transport services. The reform was launched with much publicity, and the principle of democratic centralism applied once the statute at the Eighth Congress had given instructions to Party members that the consultation period for these issues was over. Nonetheless, the reforms were clearly obstructed by certain parts of the Party apparatus. The centre of resistance was increasingly identified to be the Serbian Party organisation, controlled by Ranković’s close collaborators.66 The intra-party conflict increasingly became obstructive to the political processes and to the attempts to reform the system. Tito made one more attempt at imposing party discipline at the Third Plenum in February 1966, but to no avail. By this time, it became clear that the

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Party could no longer keep up the pretension of unity, and that one could no longer speak of a monolithic party. The Brioni Plenum in 1966 and the purge of Aleksandar Ranković In 1966, the rift between the leading forces in the Party that the SKJ leadership had attempted to conceal since the notorious meeting in 1962 finally came out in the open. The liberal wing eventually managed to persuade Tito that Ranković was a liability, and had to go. This was no easy task for Tito, who saw Ranković as one of his most loyal lieutenants. Ranković’s powerbase was strong enough not just to obstruct the political processes, but also to threaten the authority of Tito and of the SKJ itself. Tito came to the conclusion that he had to do something, and indeed, it was only with Tito’s approval that it would be possible to remove Ranković and his supporters. On June 16 1966, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the SKJ was hastily arranged to form a special commission to investigate the work of the SDB67 (Službe državne bezbednosti), the secret police, which was under the control of Ranković. Krste Crvenkovski led the commission, which also included Đuro Pucar, Blažo Jovanović, Dobrivoje Radosavljević, Miko Tripalo and France Popit. The commission delivered a report on 22 June, which concluded that there were indeed reasons to be critical of the work of the SDB.68 This report would form the basis of the attack on Ranković which came on the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee held on the island of Brioni, 1 July 1966. Ranković has described how he was left in the dark about the purpose of the plenum, and his surprise over this swiftly prepared meeting, which took place under strict security measures. He allegedly received the material with the accusations prepared against him only late in the evening the night before the meeting.69 The reports from the Fourth Plenum stressed the existence of what they termed ‘deviations and anomalisms’ in the state security service.70 In his opening words Tito alluded to the secret extended session of the Executive Committee in 1962, admitting that this session was plagued by problems touching ‘on the relations among our leadership, the relations in our Party and various other anomalies’. He further stated his regret that, due to the aspiration of maintaining the unity of the leadership, they had made a compromise. Despite having identified these problems and anomalies in some detail, the Party had not discussed the issue to its conclusion. This, Tito said, was a mistake.71 Tito thus openly admitted for the first time that for the last ten years, there had not been real unity at the top of the SKJ. He

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stressed that the Party had to take some of the responsibility for having let the security service carry on so long without guidance and control from the Party or its leadership.72 Crvenkovski delivered the Commission’s main indictments against the SDB and Ranković. The closed nature of the organisation, and the lack of control by the representative bodies and their executive organs had made it impossible to obtain a regular and systematic inspection into the work. This meant that individuals had been able to make decisions that did not correspond with the principles of the SKJ and with legal norms. Thus, Crvenkovski pointed out, many problems were solved through personal relations and authority and not through normal legal channels. Further, the Commission’s work was ‘particularly obstructed by the closed and insincere relations between certain accountable functionaries of the state security service’. The Commission found that the working methods and the aims and tasks of the state security service had not been an issue of discussion in one state, representative or party forum in the entire postwar period. The state security apparatus, they concluded, had become more or less the monopoly of a few individuals.73 A similar monopoly existed in the appointment of cadres in the service. The two individuals identified with such monopolistic roles were Aleksandar Ranković and Svetislav Stefanović, who held the position as head of the Security Service.74 This marked the end of Ranković’s reign, and he was subsequently removed from his position as Vice-president of Yugoslavia and organisational secretary of the SKJ. Although Ranković had become unpopular among many within the Party hierarchy, there was also a strong indication that devices to make Tito see that Ranković was a liability were actively encouraged behind the scenes in the SKJ. Bakarić has since been considered a key figure in orchestrating this removal of Ranković from his powerful position. Kardelj also had a hand in preparing the affair, as it seems did Petar Stambolić.75 Ranković had alienated himself from many of his former colleagues in the Party, and had made himself unpopular through the application of intimidation and using his control over the secret police to conduct surveillance into the private lives of these colleagues. Ranković, whom they referred to as a ‘genius of details’, collected intimate information about the private lives of the foremost party leaders.76 The Security Service clearly operated as a force outside the system and the framework of legality, and had accumulated an enormous amount of power. Yet, there is no evidence that Ranković acted in direct opposition to Tito at any point. Charges that he bugged Tito’s bedroom have

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never been substantiated. Later testimonies from those close to Ranković or to the SKJ leadership indicate that Ranković remained loyal to Tito. Ranković’s decision to keep silent about these events until his death is another indication of his loyalty.77 Similarly, later accusations that Ranković was a Serbian nationalist are not entirely convincing. At the Sixth Plenum of the Serbian Central Committee, held in September 1966, considerable criticism was levelled against Ranković for the harsh way in which the SDB had conducted itself against national minorities. Gradually, report of abuses, particularly against the Albanian minority in Kosovo but also against other minorities, emerged. These were widely publicised in the media. However, as Branko Petranović has pointed out, at the Fourth Plenum, Ranković was not attacked on the charges of unitarism, and the questions of abuses in Kosovo were not raised until later.78Although he was the highest Serb representative in the leadership, and surrounded by people (mainly Serbs) who were similarly drawn to centralism and sceptical about decentralisation, Ranković’s motives and concerns appear to be closer to Stalinist than nationalist ideals. However, being the main representative of the largest national group also carried added responsibility in the area of national sensibilities. It was the Yugoslav nationalities – the groups whose ‘home’ was perceived to be outside Yugoslavia – which became the primary target of Ranković’s suspicion and who most directly experienced the abuses of the UDBa and later SDB. Whether or not Ranković’s motives were nationalist or not did not really matter in the aftermath of his dismissal; his reliance on the Serbian network and the position he presented were perceived by most non-Serbs as expressions of Serbian interests, and attempts at establishing Serbian hegemony. While Tito made a point of replacing all the Serb officials who were ousted as a result of the Ranković affair with Serbs, the SKJ also made sure to publicise the revelations of the abuses conducted by the security forces under the influence of Ranković. Tito ensured that the strongest denunciation against such abuses by the security forces and Serbian cadres came from the Serbian Party organisation. This attempt at appeasing national sensitivities followed the Party’s principle of ensuring that each clean up in their own house first, as the SKJ statute from the Eighth Congress pointed out.79 Even if the SKJ engaged the Serbian communists to conduct the criticism against Ranković, the Party could not prevent the Ranković affair from raising the question of national relations and being perceived as a defeat for the Serbs and victory for others. This happened not only because of Ranković’s actual sins, but also because of the way

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his dismissal was presented by the Party, and above all, how the different republics perceived this. This was linked to the tendency among many communists of the period to use the terms unitarism and state centralism interchangeably, and to link both to Ranković, his supporters and the Serbian Party organisation in general. By stressing the unitarist character of Ranković’s abuses, the Party themselves contributed considerably, if unintentionally, to this process. Although the conservative faction was not uniquely a Serbian entity and not all Serb cadres were centralists, the pro-centralist faction was perceived to have its centre in the Serbian Communist Party organisation. By removing Ranković, Tito removed not only the last hindrance against economic reforms, but also the major support for a system emphasising a strong federal centre based on centralised party power. Nevertheless, fear of the ghosts of Stalinism and centralism didn’t disappear entirely among the Yugoslav liberals. Some of their strategies in the following years, particularly the eagerness to reform the SKJ and the federal system, were an attempt to prevent another conservative backlash. The Ranković affair had far greater and more unfortunate consequences for the Yugoslav socialist project, as it served unequivocally to close the door for any further attempt by the SKJ to promote socialist Yugoslavism. The SKJ encouragement of closer cultural rapprochement and promotion of socialist Yugoslavism received most enthusiasm among the Serbs who were more geographically dispersed than many of the other groups. For the representatives of Serbian cultural life and the pro-centralist faction in the Party, the promotion of socialist Yugoslavism had made it more legitimate to express support for Yugoslav rapprochement without being accused of ‘Great Serbianism’. However, the Ranković affair greatly served to de-legitimate this possibility. Many representatives for the non-Serb peoples continued to suspect the attempt to introduce greater unity in the cultural sphere as akin to pre-war unitarism, and viewed the promotion of Yugoslavism – socialist or not – as potentially threatening to the right of the different peoples to individual national development. The result was that promoting socialist Yugoslavism was no longer perceived as a progressive internationalist concept; rather it was viewed with suspicion. More importantly, it was increasingly perceived as being linked to Serbian interests. Another equally vital effect was that the SKJ leadership’s abandonment of its support for Yugoslavism in a socialist and internationalist understanding, led many supporters of Yugoslavism to become disillusioned with the SKJ ‘solution’ to the national question, which increasingly focused on safeguarding the interests and rights of

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each people rather than on creating a common culture and identity. Such a view was most prominently expressed by Dobrica Ćosić, whose disillusionment with the Ranković affair signalled the end of his love affair with the SKJ, and abandonment of his belief that they could provide a solution to the national question in Yugoslavia. The processes that took place in Yugoslavia from 1958 to 1966 were to have a crucial impact on the continuous political and social developments within the Yugoslav state. The change in the SKJ’s approach to the national question; its abandonment of the attempt to create a more unified Yugoslav culture; and the SKJ’s mounting internal struggle and disintegration of unity in the Yugoslav communist leadership all happened concurrently. All three processes were closely linked to each other, as well as to the first steps towards introducing some genuine degree of self-management and reform. Jointly, these processes would substantially come to mark the political processes within the Yugoslav system of self-management in the years to come. During this period the disagreement over the desired form of Yugoslav unity became more apparent. Furthermore, it increasingly became tied to a power struggle within the SKJ. This struggle unfolded at the highest echelons of the Party, but gradually also trickled down to the rest of the Party organisation. It consolidated into a struggle between liberal forces who wished for further reforms and genuine federalism and conservative forces within this same leadership who wished to detain further erosion of party centralism and control and were sceptical about further federalisation and about granting more power to the republics. The SKJ initially attempted to conceal the conflict within the Party and make an outwards pretence of unity despite the fierce jostling for power and for Tito’s favour, which continued with undiminished strength until Aleksandar Ranković was ousted from power in 1966. The decision to not allow debate over controversial issues had serious long-term consequences for the SKJ’s Yugoslav socialist project and for its solution to the national question. So did their decision to contain the debates over Yugoslav unity to the cultural sphere rather than to engage in the political aspect of this debate. In doing so, the debates were not merely over the economy or over how to improve cultural interaction between the Yugoslav republics. Instead, these debates also brought into question the very existence and the essence of postwar Yugoslavia.

8 INSTITUTIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES INTRODUCED IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1964–1971

From 1964–1971, the dynamics of inter-republican relations in Yugoslavia fundamentally changed. Questions over the position and status of the different national groups and republics resurfaced on the political agenda with greater vigour. The federal system underwent substantial changes, and political processes were significantly altered. The importance of the national question in this process is vital. It became, without a doubt, the question which overshadowed Yugoslav political life. Eventually developments from the mid-1960s led to all-encompassing reassessments of the relationship between the Party, state and the nation in Yugoslavia. After the Eighth Congress, Yugoslav politics were dominated by the attempt to introduce substantial economic reforms into the federal system. The dismissal of Ranković removed the obstructions to implementation of the reform programme, but this also led to increasing erosion of any common Yugoslav platform from which to form federal policies. It was not just the state that became federalised, the Party did too. From 1967 to 1971, liberal forces were at the helm in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. Following the fall of Ranković, a dynamic new liberal team took over the republican leadership in Serbia. Liberal forces also dominated in Vojvodina. None of these liberal leaderships governed

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unchallenged. Even if they held the upper hand, they met considerable resistance within their own republican parties, and the struggle between liberals and conservatives continued after the removal of Ranković. The purge of Ranković also brought attention to the question of who would succeed the now ageing Tito. Tito’s concern to protect the SKJ and the Yugoslav system from a ‘new Ranković’ would come to have a decisive impact on his actions and behaviour in the coming years. The lack of an obvious heir-apparent also introduced a new element of uncertainty into Yugoslav society. The constitutional and institutional developments from 1967–1971, played a considerable role in changing the Yugoslav system, and therefore had substantial impact on the SKJ’s approach to the national question. In the mid-1960s, a new and wider spectrum of players emerged on the political stage, albeit within the existing one-party system. The system took on a life of its own, presenting the SKJ leadership, now also less unified, with new challenges. While the SKJ hegemony remained intact, and the Party attempted to present an appearance of unity, such developments led to a breakdown in the monolithic nature of the internal party structure, leading eventually to increased pluralism within this party framework, although along national and republican lines. In the course of the 1960s, the federal aspect of the Yugoslav state became more accentuated, and the role played by the federal units (the Republics and the autonomous provinces) became much more pronounced than in previous years. Reform of Party and state Reforms ensued within the SKJ Party organisation following the ousting of Ranković. These were initiated to prevent others from building a power base like Ranković’s, and also as an effort to push through the reforms that had begun before he was purged. The liberal forces wished to grant a greater role to a broader range of Party members in the development and execution of the Party’s policies. They wanted a more significant role for the regional party organisations in the decision-making process. Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia were the main advocates of such reforms. While there was broad agreement within the SKJ about the need to introduce reforms, there was less concurrence about their purpose. Tito’s main concern appears to have been to protect the system and the Party from further abuse or concentration of power of the sort that Ranković had accumulated. Many liberal reformers wanted more, and were concerned primarily with introducing institutional measures

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that would protect their interests, implying further decentralisation and transfer of influence to the republics. They did not want simply a reconstitution of the power structure of the Party; they wanted a genuine reduction of the power and role of the Party centre.1 This resulted in a tug of war where Tito would allow reform that would improve the efficiency and increase the responsibility of the Party and federal organs, but concurrently sought to ensure that the power remained with the highest leadership. What was referred to as the Todorović Commission was set up in 1966 to lead the work for reforms, and draw up the ‘Draft Thesis on the Reorganisation of the SKJ’.2 The gist of this thesis was that further democratic development of society could not take place unless the role of the Party was also changed. The reforms abolished the SKJ secretariat, and changed the function and composition of the SKJ Executive Committee considerably. The policy-making functions accumulated by the former senior party functionaries staffing the Executive Committee were reversed, and these functionaries excluded. The Executive Committee was reduced in size to 11 members, and turned into a purely administrative and executive organ.3 A 35-member Central Committee Presidency was created and replaced the old Central Committee. In July 1968, a proposal was accepted to expand this presidency from 35 to 50 members. Moreover, it was proposed that the Central Committee Presidency be given a smaller non-political Secretariat. A Party Conference was constituted as a new large party organ.4 It was designated as the highest forum of the Party between Congresses, meeting a minimum of once a year. In effect, Steven L. Burg argues, the Commission simply expanded the size of the existing central organs, changing their names and requiring that they meet less frequently.5 All in all, the reforms weakened the decision-making power of the Party organs at the federal level, without giving any clear idea of what would replace the eroding power of the central party organs. It became increasingly difficult to say where ultimate responsibility rested. The lack of unanimity within the SKJ over the purpose of the reorganisation and the role of the Party at the federal level led to delays in the implementation of reforms. Disagreement over which areas would be subject to joint decision-making between the federal units, contributed to a deadlock in inter-republican relationships. There was also disagreement over the allocation of resources. While the underdeveloped republics wished to ensure the continued allocation of federal resources to their regions, the more developed regions were interested in limiting the transfer of resources out of their republics, wishing instead to maintain

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closer control over the expenditure of these resources themselves. This had considerable influence on the behaviour of the republics in negotiations with each other. The attempt to reform the SKJ raised for discussion the important principle of democratic centralism. Tito insisted that this principle remained relevant, but liberals like Crvenkovski and Tripalo challenged this view. They promoted the right of members of party minorities to continue contesting a case after a decision had gone against them. They also argued that members should have the right to withdraw from executive positions without being sanctioned or discredited by the Party, rather than execute a decision they did not agree with.6 The Croats, particularly Tripalo, also stressed that the role of delegates in federal organisations was to represent the interests of the nominating republic. Representatives at the federal level in effect became the representatives of the republics, and owed their allegiance first and foremost to the republics that had sent them rather than to the central organs where they would serve. This made it less attractive to serve at the federal than on the republican level. It also made the republics reluctant to send the most capable members to serve at the federal level. Another important change introduced in the process of party reform was the shift from proportional representation to a policy of parity based on equal representation of the republics and the provinces.7 In the autumn of 1967, a decision was taken to hold the Republican Party Congresses before rather than after the all-Yugoslav Party Congresses. This definitively ended the era when the republican and local Party organisations simply were the ‘transition belts’ for spreading decisions made by the federal party organs. The balance of power had shifted to the Republics, leaving the centre increasingly impotent. The Ninth Congress, March 1969 The Ninth Congress represented the height of the liberal coalition in Yugoslavia. However, the rise of national tension and the increasing focus on the particular interests within practically every Yugoslav republic contributed to the erosion of the inter-republic alliance between liberal forces. For the first time the republican and provincial Congresses had been held before the federal all-Yugoslav Congress was convened.8 Vukmanović-Tempo was relieved of his position as President for the Syndicate, and at the Ninth Congress, he was not elected to a new position in any other party organ. This signalled the old Montenegrin veteran partisan’s final, if somewhat reluctant, departure from political life. There

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was considerable turnover of cadres at the republican congresses held prior to the Ninth Congress, and a new and younger generation entered the political stage.9 The republics had already worked out their position on important issues prior to the federal Congress, thus making the federal Congress a less significant forum for the adoption of the SKJ’s policy. The statutes and resolutions adopted were to a much larger degree subject to inter-republican bargaining. This made it increasingly difficult to synchronise republican interests with the interests of Yugoslavia as a whole. In 1969–1972, there was a marked shift in the nature of interregional relations, where republican considerations took precedence over all-Yugoslav ones and where inter-republican negotiations became increasingly coloured by suspicion. The most serious attempt to hinder continuing federalisation of the communist party was launched by Tito, who continued to worry that the critique of the security organs had gone too far, and that forces outside the Party were voicing opinions on party affairs. In 1969, just before the Ninth Congress of the SKJ, Tito called some of his closest colleagues to a closed meeting at Brioni, to air his suggestion that a new strong Federal Executive Bureau be formed at the forthcoming Congress.10 The intention was to halt the draining away of power from the federal centre of the all-Yugoslav body. Tito wanted the most influential members of the republican parties to be on the Executive Bureau. Tripalo and Bakarić were proposed as the delegates from the Croatian Party organisation. Being part of this Executive Bureau involved spending considerable time in Belgrade, not an appealing prospect for all prospective members. Some suspected, probably with cause, that this was a ploy to remove them from the republic where they had their powerbase. The decision to create the Bureau was adopted at the Ninth Congress. Stane Kavčič was proposed as the second Slovenian representative to join Kardelj, already in Belgrade, but refused to go. The Croatian representatives Vladimir Bakarić and Mika Tripalo were joined by Stane Dolanc and Edvard Kardelj from Slovenia; from Macedonia by Krste Crvenkovski and Kiro Gligorov; from Montenegro by Veljko Vlahović and Budislav Šoškić; from Serbia by Mijalko Todorović and Miroslav Pečulić; from BiH by Cvijetin Mijatović and Nijaz Dizdarević; and from Vojvodina by Stefan Doronjski and finally from Kosovo by Fadil Hoxha.11 The transfer of Bakarić and Tripalo from Croatia would come to have important consequences in Croatia, although not the ones for which Tito had hoped. Tripalo accepted his position somewhat reluctantly, but retained close relations with the new SKH leadership. Bakarić’s absence from the

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day-to-day affairs in the Croatian Party leadership had greater consequences, and would pave the way for new and eager forces, which would lead Croatia into a most turbulent state in the following two years.12 Parity in cadres policy and the creation of a federal presidency During the eighth session of the presidency of the SKJ in April 1970, the sensitive issue of parity in the appointment of cadres in the federal institutions came up for discussion. This issue, generally discussed behind closed party doors, was an attempt to define the relationship between the federal state organs and the republics, and had a significant impact on the set of constitutional amendments introduced in 1971. The discussions were published in SKJ publications such as Komunist and Borba. During this session, the SKJ leadership described the Yugoslav state as an ‘institutionalised agreement and co-operation between the republics’, where ‘the function of the federal legislation was to confirm the framework that secures the unity of the system’. The area of competency for the federal institutions was limited to securing and developing a unified socio-political system and common market; securing national and republican equality; foreign affairs, a common defence and material means for the funding of the less developed regions. However, the document granted more leverage to the republics themselves, since all decisions need to be taken ‘on the basis of harmonisation (usaglašavanje)’ and based on the full agreement between all the republics. This again needed to be regulated by law and the constitution.13 The concept of harmonisation became important in later rhetoric on how to reach inter-republican agreement within the federation. The SKJ argued that all decisionmaking had to be made on a principle of parity. Thus, the SKJ leadership shifted responsibility to the republics for ensuring that parity would not inhibit already difficult inter-republican consensus even more. In 1971, Tito proposed the creation of a federal state presidency, similar to that of the SKJ Executive Bureau. Such a collective and rotating leadership was established, incorporating three representatives from each republic and two from each province.14 It was intended to serve as ‘an active and integrative factor of stability for the political system’, as a ‘factor for political cohesion in the centre’, and ‘one of the advocates of unity’, an organ that would ‘react quickly to important problems and ease their solution by path of political harmonisation and initiatives’.15 This focus on stability and harmonisation became an increasing concern for Edvard Kardelj and would have great impact on the 1971 constitutional amendments. The proposal for the establishment of a new collective leadership

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was an attempt by Tito (then aged 78) to halt increasing speculation over a Yugoslav succession crisis. Although he was to remain in power another ten years, Tito’s proposals aggravated an already tense situation. He publicly proposed establishing a collective leadership in a speech to the Croatian leadership on 21 September 1970. He suggested that the creation of the new presidency of the state was necessary in order to relieve the central party leadership and the Executive Bureau from involvement in the increasingly heavy load of dealing with day-to-day issues.16 This suggestion therefore entailed a stronger division of power between state and party, to the extent that this was possible in a one-party system. It can be seen as an attempt to ‘depoliticise politics’, allowing the SKJ leadership to retain power while withdrawing the Party’s involvement from everyday discussions. Tito and Kardelj were both increasingly worried that the discussion of almost all issues involving inter-republication relations would bring into question the fundamental relations between republics and national groups. They feared that such a situation may in turn challenge the legitimacy of the SKJ’s solution to the national question as well as their leading role in Yugoslav society. Discussions become public As part of the increasing liberalisation and expansion of organisational life in Yugoslavia, in the late 1960s, debates on important issues in socialist Yugoslavia began to be conducted within the public sphere. New periodicals, newspapers, radio and TV stations emerged. These new media enabled varied opinions on a wide range of issues and interests to be expressed. This press expansion coincided with a change in the manner in which discussions within the SKJ were conducted. Up until this point, most issues had been discussed thoroughly among the central leadership before being released for discussion lower down in the Party. The leadership therefore usually steered discussion of topics in the public arena. All this changed, however, with the increased press freedom: issues which had only been discussed behind closed doors were now being discussed on the pages of the Belgrade and Zagreb dailies, and in numerous new publications. Importantly, many of the protagonists in these polemics used the same style and language they had become accustomed to apply in the discussions behind the scenes. For the public, however, this new style of debate could be alarming. It suggested a situation that was coloured by crisis.17 Releasing drafts of constitutional amendments for public discussion while they were still in the process of being created changed the entire dynamic of the processes.

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The discussions between 1967 and 1972 about the federal system and the national question showed that the SKJ were no longer in full control of the direction of argument. This worried the Party leaders, which was reflected in many of their actions after 1971. Retaining hegemony over the public discourse The liberalisation of Yugoslav society, combined with reorganisation of party and federation in the late 1960s, raised questions about the ideological role of the SKJ in society. When the SKJ set out on the unexplored and experimental road towards self-management socialism at the Sixth Congress in 1952, it had argued that its main purpose was to maintain a leading and guiding role in developing the population’s social consciousness. However, the resolution from the Sixth Congress also guaranteed that ‘every opinion, having as its point of departure the struggle for socialism and democracy … [should] have the right to fulfil itself and to develop’.18 The party therefore declared that without democratic ‘struggle of opinions’ the development of science and culture would be seriously impeded. The Đilas case and the ensuing intra-party squabbling overshadowed these ideals somewhat. The democratisation process which had started at the Eighth Congress in 1964 gave rise to the question of whether the SKJ was prepared to take the consequences of self-management and liberalisation, to open up a wider space for public participation and allow the expression of such ‘struggles of opinion’. The federalisation of Party and state in this period was accompanied by demands for more democratisation from other social forces, ranging from students to cultural and ‘selfmanaging’ organisations. This raised the question of whether Yugoslav society was ‘mature’ enough for a wider spectrum of opinions from those who the Party had presumably ‘educated’ in socialist consciousness, or whether the SKJ leadership would continue to set the cue for all legitimate discussions. Between 1967 and 1972, events suggested that the SKJ was, at least temporarily, inclined to allow debate, which previously would have been inconceivable. On the other hand, there was growing concern among the top leadership, including those who had been pushing for liberalisation for years, about how far such processes could be allowed to go without threatening the Party’s leading role. Tito’s position appeared somewhat ambiguous. On more than one occasion, he admitted that he ‘had never been entirely comfortable with the resolution from the Sixth Congress’.19 He was clearly apprehensive about the prospect of further reducing the

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influence of the Party leadership. During a speech to the cadres in the Party organisation in Kosovo in 1967, Tito made some interesting statements (more remarkable for their bluntness than for their clarity) about his perception of the role and future course of the SKJ. He was adamant that ‘the time for administrative measures was over’.20 However, he also argued that those deviating from the SKJ line would be excluded, even if this was perceived to be an application of administrative measures. He assured his audience that the principle of democratic centralism was still valid, even if it was ‘looked at rather superficially’ in Yugoslavia (kod nas).21 Tito continued to regard the principle of democratic centralism as fundamental to retaining the unity of the SKJ, regardless of all the reforms and events that took place during the next years. The debates that unfolded in all the republics, but above all in Croatia and Serbia between 1967 and 1972 contributed considerably to the change of mind of Tito and Kardelj, with regard to handling the processes the Party had set in motion with their reforms. These events also contributed to the loss of nerve that the leaders demonstrated in handling the situation that followed the Croatian crisis, and contributed both to Tito’s actions against the Serbian liberal leadership in 1972 and to the increasing focus on stability and institutionalisation implemented into the federal system by Kardelj. Constitutional amendments, 1967–1971 The constitutional amendments of 1967–1968 Parallel to economic and party reform, the new liberal-orientated leadership set out to implement a large-scale constitutional overhaul of the Yugoslav federal institutions. Three sets of constitutional amendments were inaugurated between 1967 and 1971, leading to the further federalisation of the Yugoslav constitutional system. Amendments 1–6 were passed on 18 April 1967. Article 1 broadened the competencies of the Chambers of Nationalities, which now became the Federal Chamber’s most powerful component. Amendments 7–19 were passed on 26 December 1968. These enhanced the status of the provinces, leaving them on de facto level with the republics. The Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly was eventually abolished altogether, and its competencies passed to the Chamber of Nationalities, whose role now became completely independent. It was explicitly stated that its deputies had to entirely represent the views of the republican and provincial assemblies that had sent them. The legislative competencies of the republics were greatly enlarged at the expense of the Federal Assembly, and regional

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control in the decision-making process was increased. This made it more important for the government to reach inter-republican agreement on federal policy. In this process, the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija was renamed the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, losing the Serbian ‘Metohija’ designation from its name. Vojvodina and Kosovo were granted equal status to the republics in all but name. The rights that had previously been specifically guaranteed only to the constituent nations of Yugoslavia were now constitutionally extended to embrace also the nationalities.22 Article 7, which granted the Provinces status as constituent nations not just of Serbia, but also of Yugoslavia would come to generate much discussion later.23 The 1968 amendments generated some debate among constitutional lawyers at the Law Faculty in Belgrade, though these debates were much more subdued in their expression than those generated three years later by the 1971 amendments. Partly this related to the fear induced by recent political events and the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia.24 These discussions also took place just two years after the ousting of Ranković, and the national question was still a sensitive issue in Serbia. Discussions revolved around three primary subjects: changes in the structure of the Federal Assembly and the selection system, relations between the federation and the republics, and the position, function and character of autonomy.25 Despite the elevated status granted to the provinces, the debates only raised limited criticism against the increase of autonomy, and this was not expressed in nationalist language. Some participants, like Koča Jončić, defended the new status of the provinces, arguing that the present system was unsatisfactory and that the changes did not appear controversial. Jončić pointed out that the political foundation of the provinces within the federal system could be detected in the period 1935–1940, and reached its mature expression in the new programme adopted by the KPJ on the national question and the political resolution of the fifth Land Conference in 1940. He pointed out that few were aware that for seven or eight months after the liberation of Serbia and the creation of Yugoslavia in 1945, the autonomous provinces were not within the sphere of influence of Serbia.26 Others were more apprehensive about the changes introduced. The critique was primarily levelled at the augmented legislative competencies granted to the republics through increasing the power of the Chamber of Nationalities at the expense of the Federal Assembly. Concern about the ‘territorialisation’ of power was a recurrent theme, most poignantly expressed by Radoslav Stojanović. Stojanović disagreed with Jončić’s

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argument that proposed amendments would constitute an important step towards greater Yugoslav integration. In Stojanović’s view, some general social interests remained within a state, and if these were contrary to the interests of one of its constituent units, then the common interests needed to have priority.27 He agreed that the politics of territorialisation was necessary and most advantageous in the present world. However, he did not believe that a higher degree of political disintegration would lead towards greater social and economic integration. He worried particularly about the effect such territorialisation could have on multinational states. Stojanović warned that ‘a higher degree of territorialisation of power that will come from such proposed constitutional changes, can to a certain degree work towards the political disintegration of Yugoslavia as a state’.28 The 1971 constitutional amendments The amendments to cause the most controversy were the proposed 1971 amendments. Amendments 20–42 were passed on 30 June 1971.29 Fierce inter-republican arguments over some of the proposals emerged, arguments that would raise fundamental questions about the nature of the Yugoslav state and the relationship between peoples, republics and the federal state. These amendments, representing a prelude to the new constitution of 1974, fundamentally changed the nature of the Yugoslav state, and the way in which it was administered. The Republics emerged as the primary bearers of sovereignty, and most of the power became located at that level. Amendment XX, 3 stated: The republics are states based on the sovereignty of the people and on the power of and self-management by the working class and all working people, and are socialist, self-managing democratic communities of the working people and citizens, and of nations and nationalities having equal rights.30 In contrast, Articles 1 and 2 of the 1963 constitution stated: 1

2

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state of voluntarily united and equal peoples and a socialist democratic community based on the powers of the working people and on self-government. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprises the Socialist Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is unified, consisting of the territories of the socialist republics.31

Describing the republics as state-formations represented a major shift in constitutional definition of the role and status held by the republics in Yugoslavia. This redefinition also concerned the question of where sovereignty was based. The vital significance of this shift became apparent in the mounting discussions on national relations in all the republics during the next few years. At the federal level, there remained only a few areas of sovereign decision-making and only the ones that had been confirmed explicitly through the consensus between all the republics and provinces.32 These were laid out in Amendment XXXIII. Paragraph 1 of the article stated: For the purpose of realisation of the responsibilities of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces regarding the performance of the specific functions of the Federation, federal agencies shall, on the basis of stands adjusted with the competent republican and provincial agencies, lay down the basic principles regarding the social plan of Yugoslavia and pass enactments concerning the formation of policy and statutes in the sphere of: • The monetary system and money issue; • The foreign exchange system, external trade and credit relations with other countries; • Tariff and non-tariff protective measures; • Social control of prices of goods and services; • Crediting accelerated development in economically underdeveloped Republics and Autonomous Provinces; • The determination of revenue for the socio-political communities accruing to them from the taxation of the sale of goods and services; • The system, sources and total volume of funds for financing the Federation.33 Decisions taken in all the above areas relied on the reaching of consensus between all the republics and provinces. The need to reach consensus as stated in Article XXXIII on the above areas, de facto granted a veto right not only to the republics but also to the provinces. On

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2 March 1971, after much discussion, the SKJ leadership unanimously accepted the proposed amendments. The Constitutional Commission and its subcommittees had then been working in isolation on Brioni for a month.34 At the end of April, an extended Session of the Presidency of the SKJ was convened. All the important members of the Yugoslav elite were present, at what went down in history as the 17th Session. Tito was determined that agreement should be reached on the draft amendments, so that they could be implemented as soon as possible. In addition, he seems to have been intent on imposing some kind of discipline and unity on the Party leadership, and to force them to overcome the inter-republican and intra-republican squabbling, which was increasingly threatening the stability of the Yugoslav Federation. In an unusual move, no report was published from these proceedings, and only a few, rather vacillating statements were released for the public. The 1971 constitutional amendments were adopted in June of that year. The regional party leaderships reached agreement over the proposals under much pressure from Tito but, clearly, substantial compromises were made. Mika Tripalo suggests that there was considerable disagreement between the Serbian and Croatian leaderships on some aspects of these federal amendments.35 The impression that the Serbian leadership was put under considerable pressure to accept the proposals was also confirmed by one of its leaders, Latinka Perović.36 Some of the other republican leaders demanded that a special session be convened between the Serbs and Croats to sort out their divergences, but Tito was not keen on this idea. He hoped to be able to resolve intra-party conflict behind closed doors for as long as possible.37 In the end, unanimity was achieved, and the amendments released for public discussion. If the leadership hoped this would calm the increasingly tense situation, they were disappointed. The draft amendments continued to be the subject of intense debate, even after they had been approved. This was largely due to the circumstances in which the talks over the amendments were conducted. Just at the time when the Party leadership was attempting to come to agreement on constitutional and organisational changes that would secure better decision-making mechanisms at the federal and republican level, inter-republican tension rose dramatically. The attempt to push through these reforms happened just as the crisis in Croatia was reaching its peak at the end of 1971.38 The different leaderships involved in these inter-republican struggles were at the same time also participating in drafting the constitutional proposals that they

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hoped would improve the very inter-republican squabbles they were involved in. And the members representing the central federal leadership were also involved in finding ways to reduce the tension at the interrepublican level and to secure the continuing leading role of the SKJ in the decision-making process. This would have a crucial impact on the proposals they developed and the changes they introduced into the federal system. Indeed, this could be described as an ‘experiment,’ in which the SKJ leadership’s decisions on the further development of the Yugoslav federal and self-management systems were subject to the influence of the turbulent events that were taking place in Yugoslav society at the time, and were partly a response to these events. Kardelj and the need for stability Tito was not alone in being apprehensive about the challenges to SKJ’s ideological hegemony. The events in the period 1966–1971 served to considerably change Kardelj’s thinking about the direction for a socialist Yugoslavia and for the Party’s national policy. Having been one of the main protagonists of the flexibility of the Yugoslav federal system, his concerns now moved in the direction of introducing systemic and state stability. Kardelj became increasingly concerned about the tendency for discussions of issues related to inter-republican relations and economics to become tied up with national interests. As it became apparent that the SKJ had not managed to create a concept of Yugoslavia on which all could agree, Kardelj worried that the nature of the Yugoslav state constantly came into question in all sort of debates on policy and governance. The events over the next few years convinced him that the introduction of some institutionalising and stabilising measures into the Yugoslav system was necessary. With the introduction of the constitutional proposals, the Yugoslav federal system became a subject of considerable discussion. As early as 1969, Kardelj had pointed to the danger of raising the question of Yugoslavia’s future existence. He identified ‘the feeling of security among the peoples’ as ‘the most important source of stability for the federation in addition to socialism’.39 It was therefore ‘the responsibility of the SKJ to ensure such security to the republics through the federal system’.40 Kardelj acknowledged that the SKJ could no longer regulate national conflict on an adhoc basis, nor pretend that such conflict would some time soon wither away through the development of self-management. The constitutional amendments of 1971 can be seen as a way of creating and institutionalising a system of conflict

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regulation in a multinational state such as Yugoslavia, an attempt to institutionalise mechanisms to prevent every disagreement in federal decision-making from raising fundamental questions on the nature of the state and of national relations. Kardelj was aware of the increased speculation, heard in the debates over the constitutional amendments, that Yugoslavia was becoming a confederation. He avoided addressing this question directly, pointing out instead that in his view the nature of Yugoslav society could be determined by results already achieved in the development of inter-national relations on a self-managing foundation: These relations are already today more progressive and democratic than a federation or confederation … in short, today’s Yugoslavia is no longer a classic federation, nor can it become a classic confederation, but rather a socialist self-managing community of peoples which in essence also represents a vital new category of international relations.41 Kardelj thus portrayed Yugoslavia as a new type of multinational entity and category for regulating conflict between different nations. This new characterisation of Yugoslavia represented an important development in the Yugoslav national discourse. In Kardelj’s presentation of the 1971 constitutional amendments, he argued that the Yugoslav nations were no different from other nations: We maintained with right and still assert that we in Yugoslavia mainly solved the national question in the classical sense of that phenomenon. The Yugoslav peoples have their states, their power, their economic independence, their right to manage the conditions, means and fruits of their work, and they realise their sovereign right firstly through their republics, and – through the federation – only certain of these aspects. Kardelj admitted that there were significantly widespread thoughts ‘that Yugoslav nations are different from other nations; in other words that they are not really and fully nations, but that their consciousness is something in between the process of transformation from provincial to national consciousness’. Kardelj described this view as a ‘source of so-called unitarist Yugoslavism’. This, he warned, was a great error, which could become the source of serious mistakes in national policies.42 Instead, Kardelj confidently asserted:

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The Yugoslav nations are formed and stabilised nations, and not [only] since yesterday, but with long tradition and consolidated consciousness. They act and react like all other nations in the world, and they sense their interests equally to all other nations. Therefore, they will not be able nor prepared to solve their mutual relations in any other way than all other nations.43 In this statement, Kardelj took a great leap away from previous arguments. The new strategy to institutionalise the republics as state-formation entities for the constituent peoples formed an important departure from their original discourse on the national question. What Tito had once referred to as the ‘white lines on the marble pillars’ and as borders that would unite and not divide, were now becoming institutionalised as state-forming borders. The problem was only that, with the possible exception of Slovenia, these borders did not correspond with homogeneous national populations, which according to the constitution also possessed sovereignty. This new national discourse had another and greater consequence. The SKJ tried to introduce stability through the institutionalisation of the republics, but they did not institutionalise a concept of the Yugoslav state itself. The SKJ’s dynamic concept of federalism and theoretically enshrined expectations of the withering away of the state made it difficult, if not impossible, to institutionalise the state at the same time. Indeed, they preferred not to refer to Yugoslavia as a state. Unfortunately, this made it difficult to create and institutionalise a hegemonic concept of Yugoslavia which would not be questioned every time political, economic and social issues were discussed. The SKJ became increasingly vague on the topic of commonality between the people within the Yugoslav community. Kardelj took the view that the only way to prevent a return to ‘bureaucratic centralism,’ which he had identified as one of the key dangers to the Yugoslav system, was to secure the national rights of the different peoples. In his view, this would remove the question of national aspiration from the agenda, securing co-operation on the areas that would be of common interest for all the Yugoslav peoples, and preventing questions from arising around the existence and purpose of Yugoslavia. Kardelj believed that, in this way, the different peoples would continue to find it purposeful to remain within Yugoslavia. However, he did not conceptualise what kind of Yugoslavia this would be, how the different groups would interact, nor where sovereignty would be placed. Although the SKJ talked of national self-determination, the Party leaders institutionalised

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such rights entirely on a republican and territorial basis. In all this, their conceptualisation of Yugoslavia – the framework for their entire socialist project, the framework for their stated solution to the Yugoslav national question – remained a fluid one. Kardelj was keen to point out that the SKJ’s conceptualisation of the Yugoslav Federation was not static, but rather dynamic and evolving. In 1971, he asserted that ‘even if the structure of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in all sorts of things deeply changes and deviates from the legal definition of a classic federation … there is no need to change the name of our federation, or fight about whether it is a federation or a confederation’. Kardelj pointed out that ‘after all, not one state creation remained static, petrified (okamenjen) into some constitutional–legal formula, especially not multinational ones’. In the Yugoslav case, he added, these relations had constantly changed, ever since the creation of AVNOJ, ‘depending on how our society developed’, and it would surely change also in the future. For that reason, ‘the Party had certainly not said its last words about how these relations would change in the future between the Yugoslav peoples’.44 However, it was not only Kardelj or the Party who had opinions on the relations between the Yugoslav peoples. His new characterisation of the federal relations did not take the question of whether Yugoslavia was a federation or in the process of becoming a confederation out of the equation: on the contrary, his vagueness served to raise more debate over this question. Conclusion During the period 1967–1972, the socio-political context in Yugoslavia was characterised by a tremendous level of fluidity, and transformed dramatically. Extensive reforms were implemented in party and state, and Yugoslav society developed into a much more complex one, leading to new societal pressures on the SKJ. All these changes had a great impact on the framing of the solution to the national question. The expression of national tension dramatically rose, not just in Croatia, but also in other parts of Yugoslavia. One of the great abilities of the Yugoslav communist elites had been their capacity to adapt their strategies and system to changing historical and political circumstances, while still maintaining sight of their aims. This became increasingly difficult, and the SKJ was caught by the dilemma inherent in its revolutionary aspirations of remaining in the leading role on the one hand, while projecting a direction and vision that also included the increased democratisation of Yugoslav society. The SKJ attempted to remove itself from the rather

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authoritarian methods of regulating national conflict that had become associated of the Ranković period, but had now to deal with the rise of new, relatively autonomous and often unpredictable social forces which emerged as a result of increased liberalisation, over which the SKJ did not always have full control. This related to the essential question of how much liberalisation the SKJ would and could permit while retaining its hegemonic role in Yugoslav society. The SKJ remained, in the meantime, a hybrid semi-Leninist party. Significantly, some of the senior leaders considered to be on the liberal wing of the political spectrum were, like Tito, not interested in relinquishing the leading role of the Party or its adherence to an organisational principle built on a Leninist hierarchical structure. Both Bakarić and Kardelj can be said to belong to this group, and were both becoming increasingly alarmed about what was happening in Yugoslavia. During a speech to the cadres in Kosovo in 1967, Tito argued, with regard to the SKJ’s handling of national conflict, that ‘it goes without saying that we as communists are immune from chauvinism and other remains from the past’.45 During the next five years, Tito was to learn that this was far from the reality, and that Savka-Dabčević Kučar had been much closer to the truth when she argued three years later that communists were indeed not immune from national sentiment.46

9 THE NATIONAL QUESTION REVISITED: NATIONAL CONTROVERSIES, 1967–1971

The dismissal of Ranković was to constitute a major watershed in Yugoslav politics, and came to have an enormous impact on the national question in Yugoslavia, as a catalyst for a reassessment of national rights in virtually every republic in Yugoslavia. The response from each republic and province formed part of a larger debate over the future of the Yugoslav state and the emerging crisis in the SKJ’s socialist project. Each would highlight particular dilemmas relating to national and republican relations in Yugoslavia, and to aspects central to the SKJ’s alleged solution to the national question. The debates also reflected the changing dynamics in the broader liberal–conservative power struggle and on the republic’s attitude towards the 1971 constitutional amendments. The level of tension differed from republic to republic, as did the issues of focus. In Croatia and Kosovo, the tension was considerably higher than for example in Macedonia, Montenegro, or Slovenia. Furthermore, the nature of national issues was also widely different in each republic. Some issues were related to particular historical and cultural aspects, while others had a more direct political urgency. The events in Croatia in 1971 came to overshadow the controversies and polemics that emerged in all the other republics, and will therefore be treated in a separate chapter. The Ranković affair changed the dynamics between Serbia and the other republics, resulting in vital consequences for politics within Serbia. The special circumstances relating to Serbia, as the republic towards which all

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the others directed their criticisms, merits separate treatment. The present chapter does not aspire to provide a complete overview over all the aspects of affairs linked to the national question in Yugoslavia, but will provide a brief outline of some central and complex issues and controversies that were associated with this renewed focus on the national question. It will further look at how these issues challenged the legitimacy of the officially sanctioned SKJ ‘solution to the national question’. The Slovenian Road Affair The Slovenes were the group with the best correlation between the nation and the territorial borders of its constituent republic in socialist Yugoslavia. Since the 1950s, they had been at the forefront of the liberal forces and were the champions of increased republican rights and autonomy. Slovenia remained the most developed of Yugoslavia’s republics, followed by Croatia. In 1967, the Slovenian party came under the leadership of liberal Stane Kavčič, who remained in that position until he was ousted with other liberal leaders in 1972. The Slovenians had been stable partners with the Croats and the Macedonians on the side of the liberal forces in the struggle for more decentralisation and republican autonomy. However, after 1969, the Slovenes withdrew from the frontlines of inter-republican conflict, leaving this position to the Croats. The Slovene case aptly illustrates the way difficulties in interrepublican co-operation could develop into national conflict. It also gives a clear picture of how difficult effective decision-making was becoming for the federal organs in view of the enhanced role allocated to the republican leaderships as part of the reform process. The particular issue that came to influence Slovenian attitudes towards the federation and republican inter-relations was the so-called Slovene Road Affair, which broke in July 1969 and provoked a crisis which threatened to bring down the federal government and paralyse inter-republican relations. This case also gave an indication of the mutual distrust and suspicion that coloured the inter-republican decision-making process in Yugoslavia in the ensuing years. The issue sparking the protests in Slovenia in July 1969 was linked to the absence of a Slovene proposal for road construction in two applications for funding submitted by the Federal Executive Council to the World Bank.1 Agreement was reached between the members of the Federal Executive Council to submit an application for three road projects; one in Croatia, one in Slovenia and one in Macedonia.2 The absence of the Slovene proposal in the July submissions sparked a wave of protests

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in Slovenia, with a demand that the decision of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) be reversed and that the Slovenian proposal be included. The Slovenes protested against the Federal Executive Council for what they considered discriminatory conduct against Slovenia in the allocation of inter-republican resources for this requested road-building project. Political functionaries in several communes even suggested publicly that the Slovenes were willing to put forward a question of non-confidence in the Federal Executive Council.3 The Slovenian Republican Executive Council convened a meeting on 31 July to discuss the issue, and called for the Federal Executive Council to reverse its decision since it had not been made in accordance with the commonly agreed procedures for issues affecting the interests of more than one Republic. A few days later, the Slovenian Central Committee met to discuss the matter. In a carefully drafted statement, they suggested ‘the Federal Executive Council once again and argumentatively discuss the project’. Concurrently, while suggesting that the protest against the decision had been ‘justified’, they pointed out that there had been some nationalistic and chauvinistic and other negative tendencies involved.4 This was the first time a Republic had publicly protested against a federal decision, and created shockwaves in Yugoslav society.5 Thus, the emerging Slovenian crisis took on a wider inter-republican dimension. The Slovenian protest received little sympathy from other republics, which instead condemned the Slovenian threats to bring down the federal government. They demanded the Slovenian leadership take action, which the Slovene leaders were reluctant to do. Although the Croatians did not actually condemn the Slovenes, their support was very muted. Somewhat surprisingly, the Macedonians (Slovenia’s close partners in the liberal faction of the Party) were particularly explicit in their criticisms. The Skopje City Committee condemned the events in Slovenia and called for intervention from the Central Party.6 They were particularly critical of the Slovenes for avoiding the ordinary channels for conflict resolution, rather applying public pressure and ultimatums on the federal organs. Eventually, Tito and Kardelj intervened in this delicate affair and used their positions to put pressure on the Slovenian leaders to prevent further escalation. On 7 August, the political leadership and all the republics were convened to discuss the situation. This happened at an extended session of the Executive Bureau of the SKJ at Brioni. The Slovene Mitija Ribičič, and President of the Federal Executive Council, attempted to explain why the Slovenian proposals were absent from the application to the World Bank. The Slovenian project had been submitted to the World

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Bank for funding, but the World Bank had concluded that ‘according to the preparedness of the projects themselves as well as the availability of funding at the time’ only some of the submitted proposals qualified for funding, and the Slovenian project was not among these.7 Instead, these projects were to be considered for the next allocation of funds, originally intended for review by the World Bank in September 1969. Ribičič explained that while the Federal Executive Council attempted to make sure that the projects were ready in time for the September allocation, the World Bank in the meantime sent the Federal Executive Council a letter announcing that the planned inspection by the World Bank’s technical team would occur earlier than first indicated. The preliminary costs for the eight announced sections of road that the Federal Executive Council had submitted were evaluated as too high by the World Bank, which requested the Yugoslav Government to select projects fulfilling the announced limits for expenditure. Again, Ribičič explained, the Slovenian project was eliminated, because it was too expensive and could not meet the new deadline.8 Ribičič assured the Slovenes that the project would be submitted again for the next period, and Slovenia did eventually get its allocation in June 1971.9 The Slovene leadership accepted Ribičič’s explanation, but was critical of the Federal Executive Council for not having provided timely information on its decision-making process during the preparation of proposals. The leadership insisted that had such information been forthcoming, it might have prevented the conflict from escalating as it did. The affair demonstrated the mutual lack of trust between the republican and local organisations and the federal organisation. The protests at the local level in Slovenia only receded after stenographic reports were provided.10 Ribičić also pointed out how difficult the work of the Federal Executive Council had become in recent years due to the increasing pressure from the respective republics to push through their cases. Kardelj held a talk following the Slovenian Road Affair. With reference to the increasing societal and political pressures levelled at the SKJ and the Yugoslav federal government, Kardelj pointed to a more fundamental problem than the Slovenian one. He expressed concern about erosion of the role of the federal party leadership in the decision-making process.11 The difficulty in reaching inter-republican consensus was influenced by the practice whereby republican leaderships (including, but not only, the Slovenian) mobilised public support once they had defined their policies, exerting political pressure on the federal centre in this way. The Slovenian Road Affair demonstrated that the Party leaderships in the

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republics were increasingly caught between the need for co-operation on the federal plan, and the need to respond to their own local parties and ‘self-managing’ organisations and to their republican constituencies. In contrast to the Croats, who took steps to change the rules in order to make it possible to carry out their programme after 1970, the Slovene leadership chose in 1969 to take a step back after its defeat in this crisis. When the Croats later pushed for further reforms, the Slovenes were reluctant to grant their support. This temporary withdrawal by the Slovenes was also significant for another reason. Since the 1950s, many of the most important inter-republican polemics over conceptualisation of national relations – between Ćosić and Pirjevec, between Šega and Mišić and at the top party level even the struggle between Kardelj and Ranković – were conducted on a Slovene–Serb axis. Despite the broad aspect of national tension in 1968–1971, the withdrawal of the Slovenes signalled that the most serious conflicts increasingly revolved around the Serb–Croatian axis. Montenegro: shades of white and green In Montenegro, the elevation of national sentiment in this period was mainly located within the cultural sphere. National sentiment in Montenegro differed from the other Republics due to the peculiar, yet intimate relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. Debates on national relations were dominated by the question of identity and by discussions over the nature of Serb–Montenegrin relations. In addition, but related to these issues, polemics arose over linguistic questions. Historically, there had existed a duality in Montenegrin national identity, originating from two different positions commonly referred to as the Greens (Zelenaši) and the Whites (Bijelaši). These labels originally related to the colours of the paper on which the lists of candidates were printed during the election to the special Great National Assembly in November 1918 that was supposed to decide on the future status of Montenegro.12 The Greens, or Nativists, were opposed to unilateral unification between the Serbs and Montenegrins, whereas the Whites, at times referred to as Serbophiles, were in favour of such unification. While both recognised the close affiliation between the Montenegrins and the Serbs – indeed the vast majority maintained that Montenegrins were Serbs – the Greens also asserted the notion of separate Montenegrin nationhood and were in favour of some form of regional autonomy in the pre-communist period. This notion of a separate Montenegrin identity, but in a more moderate form that asserted that Montenegrins belonged to the Serb branch of the

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South–Slavic tribes,13 had also been strengthened through the communist movement, which had a strong support base in Montenegro. In the late 1930s, the communists arrived at the conclusion that the Montenegrins constituted a separate national group.14 Montenegro also had its own People’s Liberation Committee during the war, and a separate Anti-Fascist Council for Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor (ZAVNOCGiB) had been established in November 1943. AVNOJ’s decision at Jajce to constitute Montenegro as separate federal unit was confirmed at the Second Session of ZAVNOCGiB in Kolašin on 13 July 1944. The influence of Milovan Đilas as the leading Montenegrin within the KPJ was important to the KPJ’s interpretation of the question of Montenegrin nationality in the immediate postwar period. His position stood somewhere between the Nativists and Serbophiles:15 in his view, Montenegrins were Serbs by ethnic origin (narodnosno), but Montenegrins by nationality (nacionalno).16 Đilas argued that the process of nation formation had begun later in Montenegro than in Serbia, and had not yet been completed. He maintained that all the same, Montenegrins represented a fully developed political nation and he viewed the creation of a Montenegrin Republic as the logical expression of Montenegrin nationhood.17 The relationship and development of Montenegrin identity and culture vis-à-vis Serbian identity and culture remained intricate. The granting of a separate Montenegrin Republic, but within a Yugoslav federation, helped ease the tension between the two positions. Srđa Pavlović argues that ‘until the 1990s, conversations about Montenegrin sovereignty, independence and identity outside the Serb national and cultural paradigm were rare’.18 As in the other Republics, discussions on national identity came to the fore primarily after the fall of Ranković. In Montenegro, such discussions revolved around the question of its relation to Serbia and Serbian identity. These discussions on national relations centred primarily on the question of cultural and not political identity. Polemics therefore emerged in the field of language and literature. The Declaration concerning the Characterisation and Status of the Croatian Literary Language An event that would come to have great significance not just in Croatia, but also in Serbia and Montenegro, was the issue, under the influence of Matica Hrvatska, of what is commonly referred to as the Croatian Language Declaration. The issuing of this statement has commonly been viewed as the event that first explicitly brought the national question in Yugoslavia onto the public agenda in the 1960s. The Croatian

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nationalists perceived that their language was under threat from Serbian. On March 17 1967, the Zagreb-based weekly Telegram printed ‘The Declaration concerning the Characterisation and Status of the Croatian Literary Language’, signed by many significant figures in Croatian cultural life, among them the formidable Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža. Notwithstanding his support for this declaration, Krleža later expressed his criticism of the national elation that followed in Croatia. The Declaration condemned the position in the Novi Sad Agreement from 1954, which declared that Serbo-Croatian and Croato-Serbian constituted one unified language with two different forms of pronunciation, and called for the end of the discrimination of the Croatian literary language. The declaration argued for a change in the constitution that would grant recognition to the equality between four literary languages: Slovene, Croatian, Serbian, and Macedonian. It also called for a principle of equality to be used in the application of these four languages in all official matters. The signatories of the Declaration demanded the securing of the use of the Croatian literary language in schools, the press, in official and political documents and on radio and television when it concerned the Croatian population.19 The Croatian Declaration in 1967 opened the door for Montenegro to start its own language debate, in which the Serbophiles and Nativists adopted different positions. Serbophiles supported the official position that Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian was a unified whole, with only small variations. By contrast, the Nativists accepted the existence of a separate Croatian language as well as insisting on the recognition of a Montenegrin language. At the end of January 1971, at their annual meeting held at Budva, the Society for Serbo-Croatian Language and Literature – representing the Serbophile position, issued an announcement published in Borba on 1 February 1971. Soon after, the Association of Writers of Montenegro – representing the Nativist position – published a declaration voicing their disagreement with the pro-Serbian line of the Society’s announcement. In the view of the Society, the Novi Sad Agreement had not exceeded its usefulness, and the Serbophiles declared themselves against the ‘creation’ of new languages, besides the two existing variants of the Serbo-Croatian language, an eastern and a western variant. The Society also argued that no serious scientific arguments about the existence of Montenegrin variants had been produced, and even less so to support the existence of a Montenegrin language.20 In their declaration, the Association of Writers of Montenegro argued that they could not accept the decree of the Novi Sad Agreement.21 The Association argued

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that although Montenegrins had also signed the Novi Sad Agreement, it referred only to Serbs and Croats, and to Belgrade and Zagreb, thus excluding the Montenegrins from the process.22 In this manner, the Association of Writers of Montenegro launched their renunciation of the Novi Sad Agreement before Matica Hrvatska’s formal repudiation of it in April the same year. The Association also asked a question touching on another debate emerging at the same time, relating to the field of literature: We cannot accept the decrees in the Novi Sad Agreement, which imply that Montenegrin writers learnt the literary language in Belgrade or Zagreb, and that they created their work in this literary language. Where then, did Petar I, Petar II Petrović Njegoš, Stjepan Mitrov Ljubiša, Marko Miljanov Popović, Nikola Lopičić, Mirko Banjević, Mihailo Lalić, Radovan Zogović, Janko Đonović, Dušan Kostić and other Montenegrin writers learn to write? Did Montenegrin writers not always speak and write in their own language, which they learnt in their own home, the language which the Montenegrin people created and speak?23 With this, they raised the question of whether the main figures in the Montenegrin canon should be included in the Serbian canon or not, and rejected what they perceived as the appropriation of Montenegrin writers by the Serbs. To which people, they asked, did writers such as Njegoš and Lalić belong? It was necessary to ‘keep in mind the political aspect of this problem’ since: linguistic equality is one of the fundamental elements of national equality. The attempt to negate our linguistic variants and the contestation of the right to the national name of the language that the Montenegrins speak, often results in the negation of Montenegrin literature and nation.24 Despite these discussions over identity, language and literature, national passions were kept relatively at bay in Montenegro. This was also a period of significant expansion in the republic’s cultural infrastructure. In the mid-1970s, the University of Titograd was founded, along with a Montenegrin Academy of Sciences.25 The liberal Serbian leaders Nikezić and Perović also took steps to encourage good relations between the two republics.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina: the question of Muslim identity In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main debates revolved around the position and status of the Muslim population. This question touched on many crucial aspects of the SKJ’s national policies. The discussions in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlighted the status of the other two groups living within the Bosnian Republic, as well as the question of the status of Muslim populations in other parts of Yugoslavia. The discussions were relevant to the larger issue of nationality formation within a socialist state, and to the question of whether sovereignty was based in the republics or in the national groups. The Muslims were not granted status as a constitutive people (narod) in 1945, and the term Muslim was initially designated by the Communists as a religious and not a national denotation. In 1953, the Bosnian Muslims had the choice to declare themselves Serbian, Croatian or ‘Yugoslav – ethnically undetermined’. A separate category of ‘Muslim-ethnic affiliation’ did not appear on the census until 1961. By the 1960s, the SKJ was no longer so sure about the accuracy of its line on the Bosnian Muslim question. There were increasing demands for the distinctiveness of this group to be acknowledged and for its members to be recognised as a national group. During the Fourth Congress of the Central Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina (CK BiH) in 1964, the right of the Muslims to self-determination was conceded,26 while it was not conceded that the Bosnian Muslims were as fully nationally developed as the Serbs and the Croats. In February 1968, the CK BiH finally designated Muslims as a separate and recognised people – that is as the sixth narod of Yugoslavia. The final affirmation of ‘Bosnian Muslim’ as national category was granted with its formal recognition on the census forms in 1971.27 The decision by the Bosnian Party organisation to grant this concession sparked reactions and discussions surrounding the concept of Bosnian Muslim as national as opposed to a religious identity and also raised questions as to the ethno-genesis of this group. The discussions in the late 1960s and early 1970s over the status of the Muslims in Bosnia is particularly demonstrative of the delicacy and complexity, following the fall of Ranković, surrounding the question of whether sovereignty and the right to self-determination rested with the republics or with the peoples. Certain forces within the SKJ were sceptical about the recognition of ‘Muslim’ as a national category, and attempted to restrict the usage of this term to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fierce inter-republican polemics emerged

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over the term ‘Muslim’. Did it refer only to the Bosnian Muslims, or did it also include other Slav Muslim populations? Would the nonSlav Muslim populations like the Albanians and Turks be included in this category?28 Underlying all these issues lay a decade-long debate over the ethno-genesis of the Bosnian Muslims and their relation to the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. Different views were offered concerning their origins. Each view had consequences for how one defined the present status of the Bosnian Muslims and was suited to best fit the interests of those who offered the explanation. The Croats and the Serbs both offered explanations resting on the premise that the Bosnian Muslims were indigenous Slav populations who had converted to Islam.29 The Croatian view held that the Bosnian Muslims were originally Croats who adhered to a religious orientation referred to as Bogomilism, and later converted to Islam after suffering persecution from the Catholic and the Orthodox Church.30 In a more extreme variant, during the rule of the NDH, the Ustaša declared the Muslims as the ‘purest Croats’.31 Though this was not a generally accepted view, in 1968 Većeslav Holjevac referred to Bosnian Muslims as ‘Muslim Croats’ (Hrvata muslimana).32 The Serbian view was that these same Muslims originated from Serbian settlers who converted to Islam under the Ottoman rule. Refuting the Croat claim, the Serb view held that the great majority of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including not only the Bosnian Muslims but also the Croat Catholics, were originally of Serb origin.33 The Muslims themselves offered a variety of theories. These differed about the origin of the population adhering to the Islamic faith, but generally agreed that the Muslims could be identified as a separate ethnic group. Some argued that the Bosnians did not originate from either Croats or Serbs; that in fact they were not Slavic at all, but originated from Ottoman settlers, who adapted the language, and strongly influenced large parts of the indigenous peasant population to convert to Islam.34 In the view of Špiro Kulišić, the study of the origin and ethnic development of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina could not ‘be entirely enlightened if only examined as a problem of Islamisation of one part of the [indigenous] population’, and argued that it was impossible to entirely confirm the prior religious identification of the Islamic population. He questioned the Croat assumption that the Muslims originated from the Bogomil sect in Bosnia. In his view, one needed to study the relationship between settlers and the original population, the ethnic origin of these settlers, and how

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the process of assimilation affected both sides, and how the assimilated population influenced the ethnic development of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.35 Others were more sceptical about this theory about the Turkish origin of the Bosnian Muslims, and claimed that only one per cent of the Muslim population was of Turkish decent.36 Esad Ćimić, whose main concern was promoting a Bosnian-Herzegovinian as opposed to a Muslim identity, argued that until the Turks arrived, one could speak of the division between the three groups only as a confessional/religious one, and not as a national one. In his view, the Turks recruited equally from all three religions. Ćimić added that with the penetration of the young bourgeoisie, two nations (nacije) emerged from the existing religions: the Catholics and the Orthodox. However, due to their privileged position in the outmoded feudal system, the Muslims missed the historical opportunity to form a national consciousness and shape the national community. In a statement that would cause much controversy, Ćimić argued that from that time, ‘the Muslims were up until recently, a hybrid in a national sense’.37 However, he also raised another question important to the present discussion which was controversial at the time: was it possible to form new nations under socialism? Concerning the Bosnian Muslim population, Ćimić came to the conclusion that ‘to create a people (narod), it is already too late, and to create a nation (nacija), it seems – too early’.38 The views of Esad Ćimić, however, far from reflected the official view, and he emerged at the centre of a public controversy in 1971. In 1970 Avdo Humo expressed his scepticism about the use of the term Bosanac (Bosnian): In everyday life: ‘The Muslim masses use the term Bosanac to express their distinctiveness’. However, Humo pointed out, the Croats and Serbs also used this expression in its more adequate usage: ‘in denotation of the territorial and state belonging to the Republic of BiH’, and therefore, this term could not have a different meaning for the Muslims.39 When set in context of his wider argument, one must assume that Humo’s intention with this statement was to argue for the specificity of the Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was adamant that the term Muslim ‘in real conditions and in its social content means something more than a purely religious one’.40 ‘Not to see the truth about the Muslims, not to understand their specificity,’ Humo warned, ‘means to fall into arbitrary and subjective interpretations of national-social relations; to lose balance and to unnecessarily irritate the national feelings of a people and of

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individuals’.41 While the Bosnian Muslims may not be strong enough to build an independent state, Humo suggested they had ‘become strong enough in recent periods to build a socio-political community – Bosnia and Herzegovina – together with the other peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and their national and state aspirations’. Humo’s arguments concerning the territorial aspects of Bosnian belonging, largely reflected the Bosnian party’s position. On Sarajevo Television, in January 1971, Esad Ćimić repeated his argument – more forcefully this time – that ‘the Muslims at this social moment, are a national hybrid’ and that as a sociologist, he could categorically state that they were not a nation. For good measure, he also added that after the war, he had declared himself a Croat and his brother a Serb during the 1953 census. He added, ‘nations are not shirts and one cannot change [nationality] from census to census’. He suggested that many Muslims were choosing to declare themselves Muslims under some duress.42 The introduction of the new national category Muslim introduced at the 1971 census sparked discussion not restricted to Bosnia, but which took on an inter-republican character. The question under discussion was whether the Muslim populations in other Yugoslav republics would also fall into this category, or if it would exclusively relate to the Bosnian Muslims? The Macedonian Central Committee was particularly keen to restrict the category to Bosnia, insisting that the Slav Muslims in Macedonia were primarily Macedonians by nationality. The Macedonians claimed that one could not have two definitions of one’s identity, and that the Slav Muslims in Macedonia, who spoke the language and adhered to the Macedonian culture, were first and foremost Macedonians. Ćimić agreed, arguing that it would be ‘normal that Muslims, or anyone else who lives in Macedonia and speaks Macedonian, who has adopted Macedonian culture, who grew up in a social environment which is eminently permeated with Macedonian nationality, is also a Macedonian’.43 The Kosovo party organisation was closer to the official Bosnian position, and the presidency of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Kosovo argued that ‘Muslim ethnic affiliation cannot be connected with this or that republic or spoken language, because every citizen, without regard to where she or he lives, enjoys the same freedom of expressing her or his national or ethnic affiliation, which cannot be confused with religious affiliation’.44 This debate showed clearly the complexity of the Yugoslav nationalities policy under communism, and also raised the question of sovereignty.

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The communists attempted to retain the middle ground. They did not adopt any of the three theories of the Muslims’ ethno-genesis, nor did they deny them. They rebuffed attempts to limit the category Muslim only to Bosnia and Herzegovina, allowing all Slav Muslims to choose this category. The category of ‘ethnic Muslim’ could therefore be found in every Yugoslav Republic and province.45 However, the complexity of this issue is illustrated by the fact that the categories ‘Albanian’ and ‘Turk’ still remained as designations of nationalities. There were also different ways in which different groups with Islamic faith declared themselves. According to Hugh Poulton, the number of those declaring themselves as Muslims in Macedonia fluctuated considerably, rising dramatically between 1971, when only 1,248 declared themselves Muslims, and 1981 when this category numbered 39,555 people. The latter figure presumably included many who had formerly declared themselves as Turks. Concurrently, Albanians were accused of attempting to assimilate the Slavic Muslim population in Macedonia.46 So, while religious affiliation was recognised as a differentiating mark in some instances, language and ethnic descent weighed stronger in others. In the polemic over such issues, various groups emphasised different criteria, all bearing in mind particular circumstances surrounding the status of their group, or particular nature of national relations within the republic in which they lived. Such discussions were not brought to a conclusion at the time, but resurfaced after the death of Tito and the other original SKJ leaders with more force, and in a much more volatile environment. Macedonia The Macedonians had possibly been granted more concessions towards national self-assertion than any other people (narod) in postwar Yugoslavia. The SKJ had encouraged the creation of a Macedonian language, orthography, literature, as well as a new Macedonian socialistinspired historiography. The Macedonians had also been granted an important concession when they were given permission to separate the Macedonian Orthodox Church from the control of the Serbian Orthodox church on 18 July 1967. The first and perhaps most important step towards this separation had been taken in 1958, with the revival of the ancient archdiocese of Ohrid.47 The federal and Macedonian communist leaderships both played a central role in approving this decision.48 Although Macedonia had been granted republican status, the Republic of Macedonia did not have a homogeneous population. The Macedonians had to deal with demands from the minorities, and were

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clearly affected by the unrest in the neighbouring Kosovo in 1968. At that time, the Macedonian Orthodox Slavs made up 67 per cent of the republic’s population. A large Albanian minority inhabited Macedonia, mainly in the western part of the republic, making up 14.36 per cent of the total population. In addition, there were smaller groups of Serbs (4.88 per cent), Roma (3.59 per cent), Turks (3.42 per cent) and Muslim Slavs (Torbesh) (3.42 per cent).49 The Macedonians did not always act as though the republic was multinational. As the polemic over Muslim nationality shows, they were particularly apprehensive about their own Muslim population. Indeed, the minorities in Macedonia were chronically under-represented in the Macedonian Party and Federal Assembly.50 In the 1950s, an exchange programme between Yugoslavia and Turkey was created, and many Yugoslav citizens of Turkish descent, including many from Macedonia, took up the offer and emigrated to Turkey. It is estimated that 100,000 Turks left Yugoslavia for Turkey. In addition, many Albanians in Macedonia declared themselves as Turks to take advantage of this programme. According to Palmer and King, during the 1953 census, 27,086 persons who declared themselves as Turks, gave Albanian as their native language.51 By far the most important experience of the intensified national tension in Macedonia in 1966–1971 related to the question of the Albanian population in the western part of Macedonia. Communications between the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia became difficult because of the Šar Mountains separating them52 and the SKJ had effectively managed to keep the two populations separated on an administrative level. But when unrest broke out in Kosovo in 1968, it spread to the Albanian population in Macedonia. The Macedonian case demonstrated that economic and national interests were not always congruent in the relationship between the republics. A desire for greater autonomy from the federal level, and from Belgrade, steered Macedonia towards the liberal wing rather than the conservative faction within the Party and state. Nevertheless, the Macedonian party also retained a strong conservative faction. In the late 1960s, Krste Crvenkovski was one of the most influential regional leaders in Yugoslavia, and played a central role in the liberal coalition. According to Bakarić’s later testimony, Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia were the Republics instrumental in removing Ranković from his position.53 Crvenkovski was also leader of the committee that led the investigation into the work of the security forces and presented the report to the Fourth Plenum at Brioni where Ranković was removed from his position.54

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Kosovo The most direct impact of Ranković’s fall on national relations was felt in Kosovo, where his removal sparked a wave of national dissatisfaction that could only be matched in energy by the events in Croatia. This marked an important watershed for asserting national rights among the Albanian population in Kosovo. What ignited the national sensitivities among the Albanian population was above all the revelations about the abuses directed against them by the security forces – the UDBa. Pressure from the UDBa under Ranković’s control was levelled against all the nationalities in Yugoslavia, but the Albanians in Kosovo had suffered particular suspicion. The strained relations between Albania and Yugoslavia resulting from the Yugoslav–Soviet split made the UDBa particularly suspicious of Albanian infiltration into Kosovo and recruitment of agents there. The UDBa treated large parts of the Kosovar Albanian population as a potential threat to Yugoslav security, and suppression by the security forces was particularly harsh towards them. The best-known example was the massive police campaign staged in 1955–56, allegedly to confiscate private firearms all over Kosovo, which was followed by a series of trials in Prizren.55 This was not a good recipe for successful national relations in the province, nor did it inspire feelings of Yugoslav patriotism among the Albanian population. The domination of Serbs and Montenegrins within the communist party organisation and in administrative positions (not to mention the security forces) in Kosovo was less than helpful. In 1956, 23.5 per cent of the Province’s population were Serbs, and Montenegrins made up only 3.9 per cent. Nevertheless, these groups respectively made up 58.3 per cent and 28.3 per cent of the security forces. The Albanians, 64.9 per cent of the population, comprised only 13.3 per cent of the security force.56 The Serbs and Montenegrins also accounted for 50 per cent of the Communist Party membership and 68 per cent of ‘administrative and leading’ positions.57 Concurrently, Kosovo continued to be the least socially and economically developed province in Yugoslavia. Literacy levels remained low well into the 1970s, the social structure highly patriarchal, and many female children were prevented from attending school.58 Most of the industry in Kosovo was in the primary sector, which continued to be mainly a producer of energy and raw material for other more developed regions of Yugoslavia. Unemployment remained high. While living standards improved in Kosovo during the communist period, it continued to lag behind the development in other

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regions. In 1957, the national income per citizen in Kosovo was 42 per cent lower than the Yugoslav average, and in 1962, 33 per cent lower.59 The revelations after Ranković’s dismissal paved the way for significant changes in Kosovo. There was a drastic increase in Albanian cadres within the Kosovo District Committee. Tito visited the Province in March 1967 for the first time in 16 years. During one of his speeches, he recognised that conflicts that had been expressed here had deep roots in the past, saying, ‘we are not talking about years, but decades, even centuries’. Therefore, Tito explained, ‘these contradictions cannot be broken and solved overnight; it is a long process’. He argued: It is futile to talk of equality if in the factory, a Serb is given employment, but an Albanian seeking work is rejected. It is evident that in that case it will lead to bitterness. And conversely, if an Albanian now mounted pressure and sought to be hired and the Serb to be let off, that would also be chauvinism. It is not an easy problem, and it is necessary to approach it very subtly. It is necessary to put in a great effort to train Albanian cadres.60 Following his visit, Tito promised more autonomy and further reform to the Albanians, and after 1967 a number of concessions were granted to Kosovo. The Albanians were officially allowed to display the Albanian flag publicly from 1969, but in practice from 1967. They were also allowed to celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of the death of the great Albanian hero, Skenderbeg.61 In 1968, the SKJ agreed to change the term Šiptar to the politically more acceptable Albanac. Although the former was derived from the Albanian shqiptar, it was perceived to have attained a pejorative connotation when used by Slavs. In 1970, some offshoots of the University of Belgrade were converted into a fully-fledged new university in Priština. Teaching was available in both Albanian and Serbo-Croatian. This led to a flourishing of educational co-operation between Priština and Tirana. Albanian textbooks were imported from Albania, and more than 200 teachers came from Tirana.62 The number of Albanians receiving a higher education rose dramatically in this period, and a new cohort of better educated Albanians emerged. The problem was only that there were few jobs suitable for this group once they graduated. The Albanians in the Kosovar party organisation also benefited from the organisational changes in the SKJ. In November 1968, the Sixth Congress of the SK Srbija authorised the provincial party organisations to pass their own statutes.63 This was progress, even though it still fell short of the Kosovar leaderhip’s

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demand for Kosovo to get its own constitution. The SKJ’s admission that Albanians had suffered widespread persecution by the Serb-dominated UDBa under Ranković, and the fact that this criticism, under pressure from Tito, came directly from the Serbian Party organisation, was intended to appease the feelings of the Albanian population in Kosovo. The promise to repent these mistakes did not, however, strengthen the Kosovar Albanians’ loyalty to the Yugoslav state, and certainly not to the Republic of Serbia. Instead, it had the opposite effect and many Kosovar Albanians became angry. It also increased awareness among the Albanians of how their situation compared to that of the other Yugoslav peoples and nationalities, leading them to make demands for further rights. Just at the time when numerous reforms where being implemented and considerable concessions granted to Kosovo, unrest in the province exploded. In November 1968, massive demonstrations broke out in Priština, where considerable rioting took place in the streets. The violence spread to other cities such as Gnjilane, Uroševac and Podujeva, leaving 37 injured and one dead.64 The unrest further spread to some Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia such as Tetovo and Gostivar. During all these demonstrations, demands were raised for republican status for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. There were also demands to join the Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia to Kosovo, in order to form an Albanian Republic within Yugoslavia. Although ready to concede to constitutional reforms granting the Albanian population in Kosovo more rights and autonomy, the Yugoslav and Serbian leaderships were adamant that it was out of the question to concede the status of Republic to Kosovo. On this question, Tito also made very clear that a Kosovo Republic was off the agenda. Macedonia was also strongly opposed such a move. In 1968, the Serbian Communist leadership acted quickly by employing decisive police action to curb the demonstrations to hinder further escalation of the violence. The new liberal Serbian leadership under Nikezić and Perović, only four days old when violence broke out, attempted to establish some dialogue with the Party leaders in Kosovo in the aftermath of the demonstrations. The relations between the two parties remained polite, but somewhat strained. More importantly, the relations between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo deteriorated following the demonstration. While there had been some disagreement between Albanian and Serbian legal theorists about whether Kosovo’s primary attachment was to the Serbian Republic or to Yugoslavia, the provisions of the 1963 constitution gave the prerogative to form autonomous regions from the federation to the Republics.65 Article 111 of the 1963 Constitution stated:

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A Republic may found autonomous provinces in accordance with the constitution in areas with distinctive national characteristics or in areas with other distinguishing features, on the basis of the expressed will of the population in these areas.66 The same article also stated, ‘in the Socialist Republic of Serbia there are the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina, and Kosovo and Metohija’, hence elevating Kosovo’s status from that of Oblast to Province, putting it on equal footing with Vojvodina.67 While the 1963 constitution may have appeared to put Kosovo under closer Serbian control, the 1968 constitutional amendments reversed any such tendencies. With these amendments, the autonomous provinces attained the status of constituent elements of the federation.68 The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija now became the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. In addition to removing the Serbian Metohija designation from its name, the addition of Socialist to the Provinces also implied that they were independent, self-management entities. This was in keeping with Bakarić’s assertion from 1963, that to be a Yugoslav should no longer be defined primarily according to the Slav criterion but according to a socialist definition, belonging to the Yugoslav community.69 In keeping with this trend, the 1968 constitutional amendments granted greater rights to the nationalities (narodnosti), guaranteeing to them similar rights to those of the constituent Yugoslav peoples (narodi). This was in many ways a compromise response to the Kosovar Party leader’s demand that the Albanians in Kosovo be recognised as a nation rather than a nationality. The 1963 constitution had eliminated the existence of separate provincial delegations to the National Council of the Federal Assembly, but the 1967 and 1968 amendments reinstated such separate presentation for the provinces.70 The 1971 amendments and the 1974 constitution further changed the legal status of Kosovo, granting it de facto equal status to the republics. The Kosovar strategy over the next decade was to emphasise Kosovo’s position as a constitutive part of the Yugoslav Federation. In doing so, it focused on establishing good relations at a Yugoslav level, while minimising the information flow to the republican leadership in Belgrade. This contributed to creating considerable frustration among the Serbian leadership.71 Although Tito granted many enhanced powers and rights for Kosovo as a province, the Kosovar leaders knew that there would be no talk of a Kosovar republic as long as he was alive. Tito nevertheless recognised that the national question in Kosovo still represented a challenge to Yugoslavia. Despite his advanced age and illness at the time,

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he made a four-day tour of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo in October 1979 for talks with the Kosovar leadership. Tito told both the Albanians and the Serbs that ‘Kosovo should become the concern of Yugoslavia as a whole’. He also made an appeal to the Albanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins living in Kosovo to preserve brotherhood and unity. 72 However, in the end, Tito failed to deal effectively with the tension that obviously worried him. Between 1966 and 1972, the national question acquired a new urgency in Yugoslavia and the increase in national tension represented the greatest crisis experienced by the Yugoslav elites since the break with Stalin. The national question affected social life in all the Republics in Yugoslavia to different degrees. Each case also reflected different aspects of the complex inter-national relations in Yugoslavia, and also demonstrated particular dilemmas related to the SKJ’s policies on national relations. The level of national tension was markedly higher in some republics and provinces, above all in Croatia, as the next chapter will show. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that every one of these conflicts and the SKJ’s responses to them would affect all the regions in Yugoslavia, as well as the nature of inter-relations between the different federal units.

10 THE CROATIAN NATIONAL REVIVAL AND YUGOSLAV CRISIS, 1967–1971

Croatia was at the centre of national controversies in Yugoslavia during the period 1967–71, and the events in Croatia shook all Yugoslavia to its roots, leading to the greatest crisis the second Yugoslav state had seen. It also led to a far-reaching reassessment of Croatia’s status within Yugoslavia. Ranković’s fall was perceived by Croats as a triumph for the Croatian view on federal relations and as a confirmation that their perception of having been treated unfairly had been justified. His removal triggered a wave of what was commonly referred to as ‘national euphoria’. Earlier chapters have already illustrated the sensitive nature of the Croatian national question and Croatia’s relation to the Yugoslav state. Although the national issues raised in the other republics were important, nowhere else did they have the power to raise questions about the legitimacy of the continuing existence of the Yugoslav state in the way that they did in Croatia. National discontent in Croatia was characterised by an increased emphasis on seeking legal measures to safeguard Croatian interests visà-vis Yugoslav interests. However, the Croatian campaign was also characterised by the perception of a specifically Serbian threat to Croatian interest. The Croats’ suspicion of the Serbs was shared with other groups in the immediate post-Ranković period, but the Croats also alienated previous supporters by their aggressive pursuit of their own interests, and by the increasing rapprochement of the Croatian Party leadership to nationalist forces in Croatia. So, gradually, Croatia ended up in what

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Tripalo characterised as a 5:1 ratio vis-à-vis other republics,1 referring to an increasing tendency for Croatia to be at odds with the other five republics in the federal decision-making process. The new SKH leadership and the Croatian national question From Bakarić to the Triumvirate The Croat communists brought the question of national relations centre stage between 1967 and 1971, although prior to this they had not been the most vocal about national issues. The Slovenes, not the Croats, had led most inter-republican polemics on national relations. However, after the Slovene Road Affair in 1969 the Slovenes took a step back and left the stage to the Croats.2 The role played by Vladimir Bakarić, is particularly important for understanding the strategies of the Croatian party leadership in this process, and the way these strategies changed at the end of the decade. Bakarić took over the leadership on the KPH from Hebrang in 1944, and was a powerful figure within the Croatian party organisation, and in the SKJ as a whole. He was perceived to be an extremely able politician, described by Dobrica Ćosić as one of a kind in Yugoslav politics.3 Bakarić was a pragmatic, careful, and somewhat elusive figure, who according to Savka Dabčević-Kučar preferred to pull the strings behind the scenes and play the role of director rather than the leading actor on the stage.4 He was a cunning and skilled politician, but not a man for confrontation, particularly in battles that he could not be sure to survive politically. His health was poor, and he tended to withdraw into seclusion for long periods, particularly when the political situation became strained.5 Bakarić followed a moderate line on the national question, being of the view that a nationalist course would not serve Croatia’s interests. Having sided with Tito in the struggle against Hebrang, whom he succeeded as leader, Bakarić was well aware that Tito’s disagreements with Hebrang were largely over KPH’s strategies on national relations in Croatia, including relations to organisations like the HSS, with which the KPH had been competing over who best represented Croatian national interests. Therefore, with the HSS neutralised after the war and the communists in power, Bakarić pursued a different and more careful route than that of Hebrang in the search for what he perceived to be Croatia’s best interests, while simultaneously remaining in Tito’s favour. Bakarić was an advocate of liberal economic policies and together with Kardelj held a key role in developing the doctrine of self-management. But he was also an ardent opponent of expressions of national exclusivism. Bakarić’s approach to the national question was very much a Marxist one. He

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viewed socialist self-management as the best ground on which to build inter-republican relations in Yugoslavia and to maintain good national relations in the 1960s. As a keen theoretician, Bakarić conceptualised the nation from the Marxist perception that ‘the working class had to constitute the hegemonic nation because our strength is not the purpose of our emancipation, the emancipation of Man is’.6 As the coming events would aptly demonstrate, part of the problem for Bakarić and other communists who proceeded from a similar perception, was that they did not see that by 1971, the appeal to national emancipation attracted the support of the masses in a way that the appeal to self-management socialism could never dream of. Bakarić may have eschewed the use of the nationalist card, but this did not mean that he was not concerned with Croatian interests. As an ardent Marxist, yet at the same time a political pragmatist, Bakarić believed the best way to preserve Croatian interests was through securing the economic progress of the republic and of Yugoslavia. He had been instrumental in creating the liberal alliances with other republics which supported what he viewed to be the best economic interests of Croatia. Bakarić concluded in the early 1960s that in the struggle to further develop the self-management doctrine, it would serve Croatia’s interests to shift focus from decentralisation to that of de-étatisation.7 The strategy of attracting support for further liberalisation in the economy through forming new alliances with traditionally centralist republics like Macedonia and Montenegro was at least partly successful in the first half of the 1960s. Even though the liberal bloc – where the Croatian communists had been influential – had managed to push through an economic reform, there was considerable disappointment in Croatia over the effects of the reforms, resulting in growing frustration among some of the leading Croatian communists. In 1967–8, the SKH leadership gradually changed its approach. This coincided with the arrival of new and younger cadres at the head of the Croatian Communist Party. Bakarić continued to play a significant role in Croatian strategies until the end of 1969, but the ideas of Bakarić’s coming-of-age protégés were evident. The new Croatian strategy hoped to achieve not only further decentralisation and de-étatisation but also democratisation of party and polity.8 The SKH leadership proposed a number of new strategies to achieve such aims. Pressing for further constitutional changes was given attention. These were hoped to provide legal guarantees to Croatian interests and to the reforms pushed through by the liberals in a climate still coloured by the uncertain relations between liberal and conservative forces within the Party. One of the main reasons why Bakarić supported these strategies was indeed the fear of

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a return to previous patterns. As part of the aim to secure no return to ‘bureaucratic centralism’ and unitarism, they sought to further reduce the power of the federal centre. The Tenth Session of the CK SKH, 15–17 January 1970 The Tenth Session would have an important role in setting the new course of the SKH leadership. It was at this session that the new leadership consolidated its position in Croatian politics. Bakarić remained an imposing figure in the Croatian party, but it was his younger protégés, Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar who came to the fore in Croatian politics from 1970. Tripalo had been Secretary of the SKH until he accepted his position on the Executive Bureau in Belgrade and Dabčević-Kučar took over as President of the Central Committee of the SKH from Bakarić when he moved to the same Executive Bureau. Together with Pero Pirker, who was Secretary of the SKH Executive Committee, Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo would be referred to as the Croatian liberal-national ‘Triumvirate’. Also attached to this faction within the Executive Committee were Marko Koprtla, another Executive Committee member and responsible for the appointments and promotions of cadres; Ivan Šibl, president for the Veterans’ Organisation; Dragutin Haramija, the Premier (President of the Republican Executive Council); and Srečko Bijelić, president of the Party Conference of Zagreb.9 The new Triumvirate considerably strengthened its position in the SKH at the Tenth Session in 1970 where the leaders presented the new party line, which relied on a co-ordinated advocacy of a strategy described as both socialist and national.10 The greater significance of the Tenth Session was the presentation by Savka Dabčević-Kučar of the SKH’s strategies for the coming two years. As the first republican leadership in socialist Yugoslavia, the SKH took upon itself to analyse what the problems of further development were, and assess how to deal with them. Dabčević-Kučar claimed in her speech that nationalism and unitarism were two sides of the same medal, that as a social phenomenon, nationalism was ‘equally dangerous to socialism regardless of which form it comes in, whether as unitarism or separatism’.11 None of these forms of nationalism, Dabčević-Kučar claimed, was more sympathetic or less dangerous to socialist Yugoslavia. She argued that communists were not immune to national sentiment, and that ‘a-national technocracy or bureaucratism represents a particular form of hidden nationalism’. Communists, as the vanguard of the working class, as Dabčević-Kučar saw it, could not be detached from the sense of belonging to their people (narod).12 Thus she

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stated, ‘the SKH views the problem of nationalism as a lasting phenomenon which one will continue to meet for a long time’.13 Of the two forces of nationalism and unitarism, unitarism represented the most dangerous one, and, ‘although the nationalists are louder, they can easier be controlled’. She argued that the SKH had narrowed the space for the nationalist movement and was cutting off its roots. Croatian nationalism and chauvinism was fed primarily by ‘the open economic questions and conflict situations that emerged from already existing but unresolved problems’. Hence, to combat nationalist forces, the Party needed to ‘more forcefully give their response in public to the open questions which the nationalists misuse and manipulate for the nationalist cause, but which the communists have not answered’.14 The Tenth Session gave a clear indication that the national question was no longer a taboo subject for discussion. By addressing some of the grievances raised by Matica Hrvatska and the Institute for the History of the Croatian Working Movement (IHRP), Savka DabčevićKučar and SKH believed that they could keep national-orientated forces under control. The SKH had, she pointed out, already directed its criticism against organisations that were carrying out nationalist activities, including the two mentioned above, but she also warned against taking this criticism too far.15 The SKH, she argued, must develop Yugoslavism: Not unitarist integral Yugoslavism, but the kind that entails full equality between the nations and nationalities and the full realisation of the self-managing aspirations of the working people. There is no mystical link or some abstract feeling of Yugoslavism from the past that will join together (spajati) the Yugoslav peoples. Rather, what will join them together now and in the future is the economic, social and political interests, and the political progress which each of the Peoples in Yugoslavia and all together built, exactly on the course of self-management socialism.16 Dabčević-Kučar also stressed that independence, sovereignty and progress of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and of the Croatian people were only possible within the framework of a socialist, self-managing Yugoslavia.17 In their new preferred Yugoslav model, the SKH argued for the internal affairs in a republic to be primarily the responsibility of the republican leadership, and not the federal party organs, a responsibility that ought to derive from the maturing process of self-management. To drive this point home, Dabčević-Kučar invoked the KPJ decision to form the Communist Parties for Croatia and Slovenia in 1937 as part

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of their strategy on the national question before the war. The struggle for a socialist Yugoslavia, she maintained, was not led on the basis of ‘suppressing or negating national feeling, but exactly with the full acknowledgment of the right of each nation to equality’.18 The new leadership claimed it would fight both Croatian nationalism and bureaucratic centralism in Belgrade. Bureaucratic centralism was identified as the greater threat, and the leadership made clear its intention of focusing attention on combating this. Ironically, Bakarić, who had always been cautious about pushing the nationalist card, at this point held an instrumental role in formulating the decision of the SKH leadership to concentrate on bureaucratic centralism as the greater danger. This was intimately linked with the still only nascent intra-party struggle in the SKH, and particularly with the denunciation of Miloš Žanko – at the Tenth Session in January 1970. In two series of articles published in Borba in 1969, Žanko had directed considerable criticism against the line of the Croatian party, and particularly its contact with what he perceived as nationalist forces. Žanko also argued that Yugoslav interests needed to come before those of Croatia. At a consultation of the CK SKH on 13 December 1969, Bakarić suggested that Žanko was attacking the SKH leadership for nationalism, but more importantly, that Žanko did this from a unitarist position. According to Bakarić, Žanko was attempting to discredit the leadership with the aim of destroying it and replacing it with a more centralist-orientated leadership.19 Bakarić left it to Dabčević-Kučar to make a move against Žanko at the Tenth Session, eventually leading to his removal. According to Tripalo, the liberal leadership in Croatia allegedly received endorsement from Tito for the removal of Žanko.20 However, a conversation between Tito and Mirko Tepavac in April 1971, just before Tito went to Priština, reveals a different interpretation. According to Tepavac, Tito explained that ‘he did not like what is now happening in Croatia’ and complained that ‘they [the SKH] did not consult me for the Tenth Session either’. Tepavac claimed that Tito had argued: ‘I told them not to persecute Žanko, who had been to see me and let me know about his thoughts, but they went ahead and did it anyhow’.21 Nevertheless, Tito did not reprimand the Croatian leaders afterwards, which seems to have strengthened their confidence in the events that followed. Others were more sceptical, including Kardelj, who expressed discontent with the events at the Tenth Congress.22 With the shift to Belgrade that Tito’s new Executive Bureau entailed, Bakarić would no longer retain the grip he once had in the day-to-day affairs of the SKH. His role in Croatian politics was a marginal one throughout this most tumultuous period of

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contemporary Croatian history. However, Bakarić’s role was not played out, and together with Kardelj, the two veteran proponents of liberalism and self-management in Yugoslav communism, came to the conclusion in 1971 that affairs in Croatia had gone too far, threatening the stability of the Yugoslav state, and that the leadership had to be replaced. Matica Hrvatska challenges the SKH Matica Hrvatska (the Croatian cultural society) was to play a crucial role in the drama that was to unfold. It became an extremely influential focus for the nationalist forces in Croatia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Matica Hrvatska issued a number of publications, outlining the organisation’s perception of Croatia’s national grievances as it saw them, in a language that far surpassed that usual at the time in terms of national rhetoric. Its publication Hrvatski Književni List was banned in 1969, after severe condemnation by the Zagreb City council of the SKH for its nationalist rhetoric. In the meantime, the national-orientated forces continued to expose their views in other publications such as Kritika, Kolo, Vidik and Dubrovnik, as well as student publications such as Studentski list and Hrvatsko sveučilište.23 Hrvatski Tjednik, which appeared in April 1971, emerged as Matica Hrvatska’s main outlet for publicising its ideas, and became one of Croatia’s most popular and controversial weekly publications. Although Hrvatski Tjednik would not raise many eyebrows today, its rhetoric was bold and striking by the standards of 1970s Yugoslavia., The tenth SKH Session was the unintentional inspiration behind Matica Hrvatska’s programme and strategy. On the front page of Hrvatski Tjednik in June 1971, Vlado Gotovac wrote: ‘at this point in history, the programme [of Matica Hrvatska] relies on the destiny of the Tenth Session of the CK SKH’.24 On numerous occasions and in almost all their writings during the next two years, Matica Hrvatska would use the Tenth Session to legitimise its actions. Economic grievances In addition to the cultural sphere, the economic area was the most important focal point for Croatian national grievances. This was not surprising as some of the more prominent members of Matica Hrvatska (Šime Đodan, Hrvoje Šošić and Marko Veselica) were economists who had long participated in discussions on Croatian economic interests in the press.25 There was an increasing perception that Croatia was being economically exploited, and particular criticism was directed against the federal Belgrade-based banks, which had accumulated considerable power through the reformers’ decision to grant them the responsibility over the

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federal reserves in earlier stages of the reform. An issue that would become a focal point for the national movement’s grievances was the allocation of foreign currency earnings. This had been an area of controversy ever since the economic reforms of 1965, but any comprehensible search for solutions to this area had been postponed. The SKH leadership had been at the front of the struggle to push through reforms that would rectify some of Croatia’s grievances, but had not succeeded on the foreign currency issue, where they found little support from the other republics or from the federal leadership.26 This was an important issue for the Croats, whose tourism industry was rapidly expanding in this period. The big federal banks, the largest with a base in Belgrade, retained most of the foreign currency. The exporting and tourism enterprises were allowed only an average of 7 per cent of its hard currency earnings, and the rest had to be sold for the unconvertible dinar to the specially authorised banks.27 The Croats perceived that the large Belgrade trade corporations, which were increasingly expanding into the Croatian tourist industry, were draining their income. The Croats therefore demanded that each republic be allowed to control its own foreign currencies, and insisted that clean accounts (čisti računi) be introduced to reveal exactly how much each republic had contributed to the federal exchequer, and compare how much they were granted in return. In addition to the tourism industry, the foreign currency issue was also a concern with regard to the rapidly growing number of Croatian Gastarbeitere working in Western Europe. Among the Yugoslav groups, Croatia had the highest percentage of these workers, who were earning a substantial part of Croatia’s foreign currency. To add to the tension, the nationalists complained about the influx of Serbs following the departure of these Croats, arguing that they were being demographically displaced.28 Matica Hrvatska: between culture and politics Although the culture sphere had been the main arena for Matica Hrvatska until the mid-1960s, they manoeuvred far into the political sphere in the early 1970s. Bakarić expressed a fear as early as 1969 that the national-orientated forces were trying to found a new political party on the organisation of Matica Hrvatska.29 Similar accusations were expressed more explicitly by the SKH Zagreb City Conference, controlled by the conservative wing of the SKH. The first accusation came in July 1969, just prior to the banning of Hrvatski književni list. The City Conference argued that ‘the editorial board of Hrvatski književni list has formulated a political programme that is directly contrary to the policy of the League of Communists, and that is at variance with the basic interests of the Croatian nation and of all the

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nations of Yugoslavia’.30 The second accusation came when Đodan and Veselica were expelled from the Party in 1971. Veselica was explicitly accused of having attempted to move Matica Hrvatska from the cultural sphere to encompass economic, political and cadre aspects.31 Tito issued similar warnings to the SKH leadership in his speech of 4 July the same year. However, the Triumvirate turned a deaf ear to such warnings. Matica Hrvatska clearly acted well outside the norms for a cultural society. In fact, their methods for building support were much more akin to the KPJ’s inter-war methods of gaining influence by infiltrating existing organisations and by attempting to influence liberal members of the SKH in order to gain support. Many of Matica Hrvatska’s members were also Party members, and thus acquainted with such methods. Matica Hrvatska launched its new programme and activities at its annual assembly in November 1970, using the Tenth Session of the SKH as its cue. In a more active and systematic manner than previously, members of Matica Hrvatska started addressing in its publications many themes from Croatian history, as well as questions relating to Croatian culture, economics, language and political life. They worked for the revival of the Stjepan Radić cult, to restore the reputation of Hebrang, and they wanted to return the Republic Square (Trg Republike) to its previous name Jelačić Square, named after the Croatian Ban. All these issues were discussed in different editions of Hrvatski Tjednik during the late summer and autumn of 1971. In general, the SKJ tolerated dissent, as long as it was not organised. However, Matica Hrvatska promoted political aims that, albeit operating within the framework of socialist Yugoslavia, essentially challenged the hegemonic position of the SKJ and their conceptualisation of Yugoslavia and of their declared solution to the national question. Matica Hrvatska also worked actively to set up new branches all around Croatia. The membership of Matica Hrvatska soared from 2,323 members in 30 branches in November 1970, to 41,000 members in 55 branches at the end of 1971.32 In its programme and in statements in Hrvatski Tjednik, Matica Hrvatska also made politics and economics its concern. In his manifesto printed on the front page of his publication, Vlado Gotovac, editor of Hrvatski Tjednik admitted that Matica Hrvatska carried political aspirations, stating that ‘although Matica Hrvatska is not a centre of power, rather an assembly point for the energy of our culture … Matica Hrvatska cannot build its programme without politics’.33 In the same manifesto, Gotovac argued that Matica Hrvatska in principle was concerned with political mistakes in culture. Matica Hrvatska also made its influence felt in some of the self-managing enterprises. According to an investigatory commission

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set up the following year, Matica Hrvatska insisted on ‘ethnic head-counts’ of employees to determine whether non-Croats were over-represented, and demanding adjustments to the ethnic composition of managerial, administrative and other personnel. The expansion of Matica Hrvatska led to the emergence of new figures as well as changes in the structure and operation of its central leadership. In addition to Vlado Gotovac, Šime Đodan, Hrvoje Šošić and Marko Veselica, Dr Franjo Tuđman, a former general and at that time, historian at the Institut za Hrvatski Radnički Pokret (IHRP) would come to figure prominently in the emerging polemics. The IHRP was, as Dabčević-Kučar had pointed out in her speech to the Tenth Session of the SKH, another centre of nationalist-orientated forces. Tuđman published a series of articles on the commemoration of ZAVNOH, in which he questioned the founding legitimacy of the communist Yugoslav state and Croatia’s position within it. He also challenged some of the official historiographical versions of the People’s Liberation Struggle and of the nature of Croatia’s sovereignty within the new Yugoslavia.34 Challenge to the SKH’s hegemonic position in Croatian society Struggle over support from the masses By early 1971, the results of the SKH’s new strategies since the Tenth Session were becoming increasingly apparent. With the new constitutional amendments under discussion, the SKH viewed the Yugoslav federal decentralisation process to be proceeding in the right direction, as far as Croatian interestes were concerned. The leadership had also succeeded in mobilising the Croatian masses with their attention to the national question. The SKH continued to hold control over the more moderate press and mass media in Croatia, such as Vjesnik and RTV Zagreb, and were thus able to steer the media to give the reports a slant that favoured their position. The facts that they allowed to be published were highly selective.35 With this new popularity, the Triumvirate’s members were becoming more self-confident. As they gained new friends in this process, however, they alienated former allies in the other republics. Liberal colleagues, with whom they had fought a common struggle for many years, were becoming alarmed at the behaviour of the Croat leaders. The Triumvirate’s tolerant attitude towards Matica Hrvatska and its refusal to impose sanctions on its many violations of accepted codes of behaviour in socialist Yugoslavia deeply worried many of the members of the SKH. Although they attempted to hide it from the public and the rest of the SKJ, the Executive Committee of the SKH became increasingly split over the new direction the leadership pursued. With

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the split within the Executive Committee of the SKH and the uncompromising attitude demonstrated by the Triumvirate, they put themselves in a precarious position, even taking their enormous popularity into account. The Triumvirate tolerance of Matica Hrvatska raised the question of the extent to which forces outside the control of the communist party would be allowed to express their opinions and to criticise the ruling elites. If the Party was to adhere to its own advocacy of greater democratisation, it could not stop excesses by Matica Hrvatska without repercussions for the SKH and its leadership as well. On the other hand, if the SKH did not stand up to Matica, it risked loosing its leading position to forces whose allegiance was not primarily to the communist party and cause. The SKH strategies relied on a belief that they would be able to control the nationalists and gain support from addressing their grievances. They also believed that they would be able to steer them in the direction of further self-management. Directing attention to the national question and Croatian interests made the Triumvirate immensely popular, but it concurrently left them very vulnerable to pressure by Matica Hrvatska who increasingly directed more demands at them, which often went further than those acceptable to the SKH leadership. By drawing closer to Matica Hrvatska, while at the same time making uncompromising demands for reform, the SKH alienated itself from the other republican leaderships. The increasing isolation of the Croatian leaders made them more reliant on the Croatian masses. However, they would soon discover that appealing to the masses brought in a new dimension that was more complicated than they may have anticipated, since their dependence on appealing to national, as opposed to socialist, aspirations and demands also grew. This brought the SKH leaders into competition with Matica Hrvatska. The SKH was tied by party directives and rules, in a manner that Matica Hrvatska was not, even if Matica Hrvatska had its own directives and rules. In addition, this strategy also involved what Rusinow terms the ‘homogenisation of Croatia’, which implied mobilising non-communists and silencing dissenters. Although this homogenisation alluded to political and not national homogenisation, the undertaking of such a task in a republic where the national question was a key concern, constituted a particularly sensitive enterprise, as events later demonstrated. The students’ movement and the takeover at Zagreb University On the 4 April 1971, for the first time since their coming to power, the communists experienced a real challenge to the hegemony of one of their organisations, when the nationalists – in what appeared to be a

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well-planned takeover – toppled the existing leadership of the Croatian and Zagreb student organisations. This came some months after the controversial election of Ivan Zvonimir Čičak as the first student prorector at Zagreb University in December 1970. His election was controversial not only because Čičak represented forces outside the SKH, but also because he openly flaunted his religious adherence to the Catholic Church and represented what was considered a nationalist position.36 After some weeks of confusion over the legality of the April takeover of the student organisations by forces outside the Party, the new leader of the Zagreb Student Federation (Dražen Budiša) and the new leader of the Croatian Student Federation, Ante Paradžik, were recognised.37 The original leadership had its base well placed within the communist party organisation. By allowing it to be ousted, and not contesting the take-over by the national-orientated forces, which had strong ties to Matica Hrvatska, the SKH leaders in reality gave legitimacy to these nationalist forces and signalled to Matica Hrvatska that they would not clamp down on national excesses. This unwillingness or inability to challenge the actions of the new student leadership, signalled the beginning of a process whereby the SKH increasingly painted themselves into a corner. During the following months, events would show that the SKH had taken the challenges posed to their position in Croatian society by Matica Hrvatska far too lightly. It would come to discover that the Party could not control these forces as well as they had imagined. Matica Hrvatska’s threat to the SKH’s leading position in Croatia All these events and the actions of Matica Hrvatska must have been worrying to those who still wanted to safeguard the Partisan legacy, and whose primary aim still remained creating a socialist society. Jill Irvine points to some of the similarities in the strategies of the liberal SKH Triumvirate and those of the KPH under Hebrang at the end of WWII. She argues that the Triumvirate attempted to re-appropriate the federal state-building strand that the KPH had adopted during 1943–4, and that they ‘began to embrace a vision for ordering the state that was similar to the one endorsed by Hebrang during the war, and they emphasised that the roots of this vision were to be found in the Partisan struggle’.38 However, though there were many references to the Croatian strategies from this period, and the Croatian communists in both cases were attempting to negotiate a wider space of manoeuvring within their territory, there were also some significant differences between both the circumstances within which they operated and the manner in

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which they acted. In 1944, all the strategies on the national questions were designed ultimately with the purpose of improving the position of the KPH and the KPJ vis-à-vis a HSS, who on a national-liberal base had attracted the support of the overwhelming part of moderate Croats before the war. In 1971, the situation was considerably different. For the SKH to co-operate so closely with Matica Hrvatska in 1971 served not to weaken the Matica Hrvatska’s influence. Rather it opened up a space for Matica Hrvatska to operate, weakening the legitimacy of communist rule and diminishing the Party’s leading position. The SKH leadership was far more blasé about the possible challenge that Matica Hrvatska could pose for their position than the KPH leadership had been in 1944 about possible challenges from the HSS. The KPH had been allowed to exist and operate with the main aim of increasing the manoeuvring space of the communist movement in Croatia within a wider struggle for creating a new socialist Yugoslavia. In 1971, the SKH, which was much less independent than the KPH had been during the war, was already in a leading position within Croatia. The SKH only sought to improve its position within the already existing Yugoslav federal framework. At this time, it was Matica Hrvatska which sought to expand its manoeuvring space at the cost of the SKH. Matica Hrvatska followed similar methods to the KPH in attempting to infiltrate the communist party and influence the allegiance of members who belonged to both the SKH and Matica Hrvatska. Allegedly, Matica Hrvatska imposed strict discipline on its members and organisations and began to oppose the right of the communist SKH leadership to contact Party members working within Matica’s organisations without consulting with the central Matica Hrvatska leadership first.39 Indeed, Bakarić’s warnings from 1970 concerning the danger that the Matica Hrvatska were attempting to create a ‘parallel Central Committee’ seemed ominous. The SKH leaders had not been very willing to take such warning signs seriously. Amendments, sovereignty and national rights The Serbian question in Croatia In the SKH failure to hinder the expression of national sentiment and the increasing focus on the homogenisation of Croatia, a dilemma that was potentially much graver and more delicate came to attention. The Socialist Republic of Croatia was not a homogeneous republic. The Triumvirate’s appeal to the Croatian masses may have won them supporters among these Croatian masses, but the SKH leadership’s toleration of Matica Hrvatska’s nationalist rhetoric had an alarming effect on

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the Serbs in Croatia. The Serbs made up around 12 per cent of the population in Croatia. Their position was a sensitive issue, as witnessed by the discussions around the creation of republican units and setting of borders in 1944.40 The national revival, in combination with the proposals for the 1971 constitutional amendments which came under public discussion during the autumn that year, brought to attention the question of their status within the Croatian Republic. Since the Croatian nationalists saw Serbian influence as the main threat to Croatian interests, it was inevitable that the question surrounding the substantial Serbian population in Croatia would emerge as an issue. It was also to be expected that the Serbs in Croatia would react to the many provocations they perceived from the Croatian nationalists. Prosvjeta – the Serbian cultural society in Croatia – was created in 1944 as a gesture to the Serb minority in Croatia. In 1971, its importance came to the fore. Like its Croatian counterpart, Prosvjeta also came to house the more nationalistic-minded forces on the Serbian side. A complicating factor was the fact that some Serbian intellectuals had started to direct their attention towards the situation of Serbs outside Serbia proper and were now putting the Serbs in Croatia under pressure. The front page of the March/April 1971 edition of Prosvjeta reproduced a speech given by Moša Pijade at the third Session of ZAVNOH in 1944.41 Pijade, who was particularly preoccupied with the status of the Serbs in Croatia,42 was making it clear that ‘the Serbs in Croatia are not a national minority’, because they were part of a larger Serbian People. In this speech Pijade also made clear that within each of the Yugoslav republics, members of other peoples were equal in status to and carried the same rights as the constituent nations within that republic. The publication of this speech in Prosvjeta in 1971 again brought to attention the question the status of the Serbs in Croatia, and also raised the question of rights of the peoples versus those of the republics. Dabčević-Kučar had outlined the SKH leadership’s position on the status of the Serbs shortly before. In the January 1971 issue of VUS, she had assured the Serbs that they were not to be treated as a minority: The isolated contentions that the Serbs in Croatia should seek their statehood in the Socialist Republic of Serbia are unacceptable both due to their political content and possible contrary effects on our course. The Serbs in Croatia are not a national minority but a people (narod), even if they number a smaller part of the population. They are building their statehood only in the Socialist Republic of Croatia.43

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In an interview in Komunist in February, Dabčević-Kučar went on to say: ‘the Serbs in Croatia form a constituent part of the statehood (državnost) of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The Serbs in Croatia are not only a constituent part, but they also form the requirement for our success in widening and enriching the equality on the Yugoslav level’.44 Concurrently she warned repeatedly against those who were ‘actively trying to create conflict between the Serbs and Croats in Croatia by stirring up the Serb population in Croatia’. She also supported the calls to introduce proportionality in the appointment of cadres and in public employment. Even if Dabčević-Kučar conceded that it was necessary to rectify the imbalance that had occurred with regard to the over-representation of Serbs in the Party and in many public services, later polemics over the proposed amendments to the Croatian constitution made it evident that the Croatian nationalists did not share the Party’s point of view about the constitutional position of the Serbs in Croatia. Controversies over amendments to the Croatian constitution When the proposals for the federal amendments to the Yugoslav constitution had been adopted in the summer of 1971, a discussion over amendments to the Croatian Republican Constitution ensued in Croatia. These proposals were to cause substantial controversy and were discussed at length in Hrvatski Tjednik. This newspaper quoted the proposals for the first three amendments to the Croatian constitution which were released by the SKH for public discussion: The Croatian People, in harmony with their historical aspirations, in the common struggle with the Serbian People and the nationalities in Croatia, and together with other Peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, built their own national State during the People’s Liberation war and Socialist Revolution, the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and – proceeding from the right to self-determination, including also the right to secession – with the free expression of its own will, and in order to protect its national independence and freedom, and to build a socialist society and comprehensive social and national development, conscious that the further strengthening of brotherhood and unity between the Peoples and nationalities in Yugoslavia was in their common interests, voluntarily united with the other Peoples and nationalities in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.   The Socialist Republic of Croatia is the sovereign national state of the Croatian People, the state of the Serbian People in Croatia

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and the state of the nationalities that live in it, founded on the sovereignty of the People and on the authority and self-management of the Working Class and all working people, and socialist Self-managing democratic community of working people and citizens and equal Peoples and nationalities.   The hymn of the Socialist Republic of Croatia is ‘Lijepa naša Domovino’ (‘Our beautiful homeland’).45 Commenting on the proposals for amendments quoted, Matica Hrvatska pointed to the decisions taken at the third Session of ZAVNOH as constituting the founding legitimacy of contemporary Croatian statehood.46 In Hrvatski Tjednik, Matica Hrvatska proceeded from the perception that Amendment 1 was fundamental, because it ‘defines constitutionally Croatian sovereignty, and with it also the Croatian State, its foundation, position and meaning’. However, it claimed that the very first sentence shows, ‘at best, inadmissible political oblivion or ignorance’ since the Croatian people ‘did not only have historical aspirations, they also had a state’. Furthermore, ‘The Croatian state was centuries old, and did not come into being with the People’s Liberation Struggle’. However, attaining sovereignty was, for Matica Hrvatska, a vital principle and rationale behind the Partisan struggle, and it was from this struggle, they argued, that socialist Croatian statehood emerged. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRH), Matica Hrvatska argued, could not therefore revoke the real centuries-long Croatian state continuity. On the contrary, ‘it can only affirm it, as the historical right of the Croatian nation to their free state individuality’. So while the People’s Liberation Struggle and the socialist revolution gave the state a different class foundation, character and perspective, it did not, Matica Hrvatska made clear, build it ab novo.47 More serious still was Matica Hrvatska’s second objection to the wording of the Amendment. This was that Amendment 1 was entirely mistaken when it talked of unification (ujedinjenje), which it was claimed is always a constitutional principle of a unitarist state. Instead, it would be better to talk of association (udruženje), which is the constitutional decree of a federal state. Matica Hrvatska argued that the Croatian people received its sovereign national state first, and only then associated with the other peoples in Yugoslavia.48 With this statement, Hrvatski Tjednik fundamentally challenged the founding legitimacy of the second Yugoslav state. This challenged the SKJ’s conceptualisation of the basis on which Croatia, as well as other republics, entered into a joint community. ‘Croatia’, claimed Matica Hrvatska, ‘is not a federation’.

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If the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian people, then it is one, indivisible, inalienable and imperishable. And in that case, the Socialist Republic of Croatia cannot at the same time be the national Croatian state and the state of the Serbian nation and the state of all the other peoples that inhabit it. Matica Hrvatska made it clear that it ‘resolutely supports the position that the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the unique state of the Croatian people and that Croatian sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable and imperishable’.49 So while the Matica pressured for increased federal autonomy, sovereignty and statehood for the different republics in the Yugoslav federation, it was ardently against applying a federal principle to national relations within Croatia. Matica Hrvatska suggested that the first constitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia from 1947 was much more clear and correct with regard to these questions. Hrvatski Tjednik reiterated clause 1 from 1947 which stated that the People’s Republic of Croatia was ‘the national state of a republican form, built by the Croatian people in their liberation struggle in the brotherly unity with the Serbs in Croatia and in the joined struggle with all the Peoples of Yugoslavia’. Therefore, Hrvatski Tjednik insisted, ‘the Croatian people on the basis of its own free will chose to unite, on the principle of equality with the other peoples of Yugoslavia, in the common federal state of the FNRJ’.50 It is important that Matica Hrvatska tried to put emphasis on the SKJ’s appeals to the different peoples in the name of national self-determination and on the promise of granting such self-determination, while they played down the socialist aspect. At the same time, they stressed the renewal of Croatian statehood to be founded in the common People’s Liberation War as an attempt to legitimise their aspirations. In a series of articles in Hrvatski Tjednik commemorating the third Session of ZAVNOH, Franjo Tuđman attempted to emphasise the significance of the Croatian contribution to the people’s liberation war. On the one hand, this was an attempt to counter the impression which many Croats felt was unjustified: that they had not contributed enough to the Partisan struggle. Furthermore, Tuđman’s argument accentuated the fact that the Croats had been fighting primarily for the right to selfdetermination and the continuation of their statehood within a Yugoslav framework.51 Therefore, through their discussion on the constitutional amendments, Hrvatski Tjednik and Tuđman were claiming implicitly that the promises of ZAVNOH had not been upheld, but had been counteracted through the centralisation process that ensued within the Party.

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Hrvatski Tjednik also explicitly accused by name such high-ranking members of the SKH as Vladimir Bakarić and Jakov Blažević of working against the decisions taken by ZAVNOH under Hebrang.52 The front page of issue 15 of Hrvatski Tjednik carried quotes from these two men which were claimed to go against the decisions of the third Session of ZAVNOH, whose Article 1 secured ‘the unification of all the Croatian lands and the rejuvenation of the Croatian State’.53 The Party reacted strongly to these insinuations by banning the issue that carried this article, an action thoroughly covered in the following issue. In the 24 September 1971 issue of Hrvatski Tjednik, Matica Hrvatska issued its own proposed wording for Amendment 1 to the Croatian constitution on the front page: SR Croatia is the national state of the Croatian People. National sovereignty – one, indivisible, inalienable and imperishable – belongs in SR Croatia to the Croatian People, and it realises it through its representatives and by direct expression of its will.   SR Croatia is a self-managing community of working people led by the working class. The self-managing rights of the working people are founded on the principle of disposal of one’s own conditions, resources, and product of one’s own labour and the political power of the working class.   SR Croatia is a democratic system where citizens have equal rights. Citizens of SR Croatia are equal in rights and duties, regardless of nationality, race, religion, or conviction. Citizens’ Rights in SR Croatia are inviolable, inalienable and imperishable.   The Principles of SR Croatia are: Freedom, social justice, equality, brotherhood and unity and solidarity.   The national anthem of SR Croatia is ‘Lijepa naša domovino’ – ‘Our Beautiful Homeland’. The official language in SR Croatia is Croatian. The Capital of SR Croatia is Zagreb.   Through its struggle for national liberation and socialist revolution, the Croatian People, in its unified struggle with the Serbs in Croatia and members of other peoples who live together with them in a common Croatian homeland (domovina), and with the other Yugoslav peoples, achieved its right to self-determination including also the right to secession, and founded its national state, which is the continuation of century-old constitutional-legal tradition of the Croatian state and homeland. Proceeding from its right to self-determination including also the right to secession, the

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Croatian people, to secure its right to national independence, the building of a socialist society and the multifaceted national development, on a voluntary basis associated with the other peoples in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.54 Matica Hrvatska emphasised that Croatian sovereignty was indivisible, as well as arguing that the Croatian association with the other Yugoslav people was done on a voluntary basis. While the original draft amendments were retained, Matica Hrvatska’s proposals and its emphasis on Croatia being a national state for the Croatian people had far-reaching consequences, not only for its impact on the already exhilarated Croatian public opinion. It also triggered polemics over the question of where sovereignty lay in the Yugoslav Federation. Implicitly, Matica Hrvatska’s statements come dangerously near to what Milan Mišković described as ‘the negation of the heritage from the People’s Liberation Struggle and the postwar construction [of socialism] in Croatia’.55 While they may have been popular among some, these proposals went too far to be considered for passing by the SKH. Matica Hrvatska tried to moderate them to some extent in the 5 November issue of Hrvatski Tjednik, proposing that there should be an explicit mention in Article 3 that SR Croatia was also the homeland for the Serbs and all members of other peoples and nationalities living in SR Croatia. Matica Hrvatska changed the order of the fundamental principles, setting ‘SR Croatia is the sovereign national state of the Croatian People’ as Article 2.56 These proposals were too little too late to make much difference, and in the end the SKH’s original proposals were adopted. If Matica Hrvatska’s contributions to the constitutional debate were worrying for the communists, the fact that the society did not restrict recruitment of new members to SR Croatia was even more disturbing. In the autumn, Matica Hrvatska branches were set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to mobilise Croats in Bosnia and Vojvodina. Some participants at Matica and student meetings also started to seek enlargement of Croatian territories at the expense of Herzegovina and Montenegro.57 While adamant that Croatia was not federal in nature, they were nevertheless challenging the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. With this, Matica Hrvatska was once again pushing the limits far beyond what was acceptable for the SKH leadership. If the SKH had ever had any control over Matica Hrvatska or the students, they had it no longer.

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From ‘Croatian Spring’ to autumn Escalation of intra-party struggle within the SKH By mid-1971, the SKH could no longer conceal the disagreement over strategy between two groups within its Executive Committee. The split within the Croatian Executive Committee had deepened in parallel with a considerable step-up in Matica’s activities in the spring of 1971. By the autumn the same year, a fierce internal struggle between two increasingly identifiable factions developed. Tito’s role in this struggle was of paramount importance, since his support was critical to both sides. At the 17th Session of the SKJ in April 1971, when Tito demanded that the republican leaders reach a consensus over the 1971 Amendments, the SKH tried to hide from the delegates (and Tito himself) the split that was obviously apparent in their own leadership. Dabčević-Kučar later argues that the SKH strategy was to try to contain the situation in the Party, without any purges, until the majority of members could be won over by argument. She claims the SKH needed to use this time to work speedily to recruit new Party members who were devoted to the Prolječari (those who were supporting the ‘Croatian Spring’).58 While the Triumvirate had come away from the 17th Session relatively unharmed, Tito expected the leadership in Croatia to work to calm down the situation and mood in Croatia, to contribute to the improvement of the dialogue between the different republics and to reinstate enough stability to render the federal government capable of functioning again. They were also expected to deal decisively with the nationalist forces in Croatia, in other words, to clean up their own house. While the SKH leadership made some gestures on paper and in speeches to the decisions of the 17th Session, in practice they cannot be said to have followed the strategy Tito expected. This could be witnessed at the 20th Session of the SKH convened in May to discuss the decisions of 17th Session of the SKJ. The 20th Session aptly demonstrated the divergence within the Croatian leadership, and demonstrated that the Triumvirate’s rhetoric and actions were not the same. Although national excesses were harshly condemned, and some members demanded an effective purge of all nationalist forces, the SKH ruling leadership was very reluctant to take any real action against Matica Hrvatska and other nationalist strongholds. Instead, Dabčević-Kučar praised the SKH’s achievements so far and sought to defend further pursuit of the leadership’s new strategies. Rather than try to impose the greater control of the SKH over Croatian society, as had been agreed at Brioni, Dabčević-Kučar appealed for the masses to stand up for their demands against the federal centre.59 The conflict between the two factions within the Executive Committee of the SKH continued to escalate. During the

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summer of 1971, the anti-nationalist faction was gaining in numbers and strength. Although the ruling group with Dabčević-Kučar at the head may have been numerically smaller, it was driving the decision-making process. It had the media on its side, and oversaw the appointments of cadres to party positions. It was able to oversee recruitment of new members, which it screened to ensure their ‘suitability’. Its control over the media made it extremely difficult for the anti-nationalist faction to express its views publicly, particularly without being labelled as ‘unitarist’. In addition, with the pro-nationalist faction’s effective control over the cadre policy of the Party, it was difficult for this faction to get its views through to members of the Party organisation. Most importantly, if not paradoxically in light of the quest of the Triumvirate to loosen the principle of democratic centralism, the principle of party discipline still remained a strong factor within the Croatian Executive Committee. Therefore, despite their internal disagreements, the members of the Executive Committee attempted to retain an outward pretence of unity. During the summer of 1971, the anti-nationalist faction came to the conclusion that it was time to take firmer action against the expression of nationalism in Croatia. With the support of Bakarić, still in Belgrade, there were calls for the convening of a special SKH consultation to try to tackle the problems before the Party. A series of consultative meetings were held in Zagreb between 22 and 26 June in what was referred to as ‘Vila Weiss’. According to Dabčević-Kučar, these meetings became the battlefield for more or less openly conducted fights between the leaders.60 Around this time too, the anti-nationalists decided it was necessary to solicit Tito’s support. Tito’s approach to the SKH leadership and the crisis in Croatia Tito had to take some responsibility for the crisis that developed in Croatia and particularly for his lack of decisiveness at crucial points in its progress. However, there were a number of considerations, both internal and external, that may have accounted for his decisions. He was clearly deeply concerned about the national mood not just in Croatia, but in the rest of Yugoslavia too. Tito expressed his anger about the developments in Croatia at a closed meeting arranged for the republican leadership in Zagreb on 4 July 1971. He issued a strongly worded reprimand and a warning to the Croatian leadership in which he claimed to have received worrying information about the situation in Croatia from a number of sources. He argued that nationalism was the greatest problem in Croatia, and that although spiralling nationalism was a growing problem in all

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the republics, it was worst in Croatia. He also argued that the relations between Serbs and Croats were not good, and that due to the unrest, Serbs in some villages were standing vigil and were arming themselves. In Tito’s opinion, pro-Ustaša and pro-Četnik elements were now gathering. He asked the SKH leaders if they wanted a repeat of 1941, adding that that would be a catastrophe. He also severely criticised ethnic head-counting in factories, and warned the leadership that ‘nationalists are taking everything away from you’, arguing that the SKH leaders had tolerated the transformation of Matica Hrvatska to such a degree that, ‘it has become stronger than you’.61 He demanded immediate action to prohibit political activity by both Matica Hrvatska and Prosvjeta. He asked if the SKH leaders had considered that, if there is unrest, ‘others will immediately be present’(referring to a possible Soviet threat). The recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia gave Tito cause for genuine concern that the Soviets would consider invading Yugoslavia if the SKJ could not demonstrate the ability to keep control over the situation. He therefore attempted to encourage the Croatian republican leaders to step down and attempt some consensus with the rest of the Yugoslav leaders, adding, ‘I would rather restore order with our Army than allow others to do so’.62 This was a clear warning message for the Triumvirate. In late July, the Zagreb City Conference yielded to the pressure from the anti-nationalist faction in the SKH Executive Committee and excluded from the Party the two prominent and controversial figures from Matica Hrvatska, Šime Đodan and Marko Veselica. This led to protests from the student organisations: In our view [Veselica and Đodan] were unjustifiably accused of chauvinism and nationalism. Not one of their public remarks/declarations and scientific discussions, which they published, did in our mind give justification for such actions. We hold Dr. Šime Đodan and Dr. Marko Veselica to be uncompromising fighters for selfmanagement socialist development, and we are therefore rejecting the accusations levelled against their persons and the correctness (ispravnosti) of their political course.63 While the anti-nationalist faction in the SKH Executive Committee may have viewed the exclusion of Veselica and Đodan as a small victory and a step in the right direction, they were soon dealt a blow by the person on whom they most relied, Tito himself. Tito visited Croatia again in September as a part of a country-wide tour to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Yugoslav revolution. Rusinow tells how, at a reception

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in Zagreb at the end of the visit where large crowds had greeted him, Tito proposed a toast seeming to give support to the Triumvirate: Tito argued that the reception reminded him of the partisan spirit of the wartime Popular Liberation struggle and the first postwar years … and that nowhere he had found evidence of national deviations in the enthusiasm he had met. Therefore, he concluded that the reports of ‘nationalist excesses’ dominating the Croatian atmosphere were exaggerated. He also reported that he was pleased with what he had seen and with whom he had spoken.64 This toast disappointed the majority faction in the SKH Executive Committee, who had expected Tito to support removal of the present Croatian leadership. However, while Dabčević-Kučar and her colleagues emerged as the victors of this battle, they were increasingly trapped in a no-win situation. On the one hand, the leadership had lost control over Matica Hrvatska, which continued to step up its activities putting increasing pressure on the SKH. On the other hand, they could no longer hope to come to an agreement with the opposing faction in the Executive Committee. The two factions were too far apart, and to back down would be an admission by the Triumvirate that they had miscalculated their analysis concerning the national question in Croatia as well as the strength and influence of the nationalist forces. More importantly, if they had tried to work out something with the majority faction in the leadership, they would lose all the support they had so far received from the Croatian people. Until November, there was a stalemate, with the Triumvirate in the driving seat and the anti-nationalist faction unable to do anything to change the situation without Tito’s support. At the 22nd session scheduled for the SKH Central Committee on 5 November, the majority faction again attempted to put pressure on the Triumvirate and come to a compromise. Again, their strategy failed. A number of members of the Executive Committee criticised parts of the introductory presentation to be held by Dabčević-Kučar, whose draft they received the evening before the session. Bakarić also reacted to its wording on the idea of the ‘Mass Movement’. The Executive Committee agreed to tone down references to the ‘Mass Movement’ and adopt the Action Programme (which they had drafted in a meeting on 2 August) and was highly critical of Matica Hrvatska and nationalism. However events proceeded rather differently at the meeting. Dabčević-Kučar’s presentation – a three-hour long speech – was what the Executive Committee had

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agreed on before the session. The entire speech, in which she recognised and approved ‘the mass national movement’, was adopted at the end of the session. The Programme from August on the other hand was not on the agenda. With the outcome of this session, Bakarić threw his forces in with the anti-nationalist faction in the Executive Committee and they decided to make one more attempt to approach Tito. Dušan Dragosavac thus met with Tito in mid-November ‘in the name of the majority in the SKH Executive Committee’ to inform him on the situation in Croatia.65 Tito had come to his own conclusions along similar lines, and was now preparing to address the situation. The end of the Croatian Mass Movement Student strikes In the meantime, the student leadership, who appeared extremely well informed about what happened within the SKH, and already seemed to know that Tito would take action against the SKH leadership, decided to organise a strike.66 Although it seems that Tito had already made his decision that something had to be done before the strikes started, the students’ action did little to persuade him otherwise. Rusinow suggests that the strike had been planned to take place after the holidays, in January, but Tito’s expected crackdown on the SKH leadership led to the strike being arranged a month earlier than originally planned.67 In his speech at the twenty-first Session of the SKJ Presidency, Tito claimed it was not entirely clear why the students hurried with this action, why a strike was arranged just at the time of the great celebration of the Yugoslav peoples’ revolution.68 In this way, they intended to show their support for the Triumvirate and to demonstrate that there was no popular base of support for the majority faction dominated by conservative forces. At a meeting on 18 November, the student movement with Budiša as its spokesperson expressed its support for the Triumvirate, ‘consistent fighters for the interests of the Croatian nation and all that is progressive in Croatia’. The students argued that a dirty game was being played behind the scenes ‘in order to divide them from the Croatian people’. At the same time, however, Budiša also warned the Triumvirate ‘insofar as the responsible functionaries […] do not understand or do not see through the game, it can happen that they will lose the confidence of the nation’. In their protest against the majority faction’s attempt to topple liberal leadership, the student movement at this point also attacked individual members directly by name, including Bakarić. At this meeting, Budiša among other things also called for a separate membership for Croatia in

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the UN, for the elimination in Croatian schools of all other language study than the study of Croatian and the formation of a separate Croatian army based in Croatia.69 On 22 November, between 2,000 and 3,000 Croatian students at Zagreb University voted for the resolution to initiate a strike, and the following day, 23 November, all institutions of higher education in Croatia went on strike. The students justified the strikes primarily on the grounds of demands for reforms of the foreign trade system, arguing that they would continue to strike ‘until the competent organs come up with more radical solutions to the foreign trade system, which will enable the Croatian working class to solve existential life problems’.70 The leaders of the student strike, with Budiša and Paradžik at the forefront, made a declaration listing their position and demands.71 They also issued further demands of a more radical nature. They requested affirmation for Croatian as the official language in Croatia, asking that it be designated as the language of command in the army in Croatia; they wanted Croats in the army to have a home base in Croatia, and for the Yugoslav Admiralty to be moved to Split.72 The Triumvirate tried to discourage the strike. Tripalo, Haramija, and Dabčević-Kučar all appealed to them, but with little success. Speaking at Radio-Televizija Zagreb on 28 November, Dabčević-Kučar pointed out that ‘regardless of the positive motives and aspirations of the vast majority [of the students] … it is obvious that in their action there are also present some elements who not only have nothing in common with our political platform and management, but who are directly hostile to us’.73 Although the reason the students gave for initiating the strike was to support the Triumvirate, it became increasingly clear that the Triumvirate could no longer control the masses and that its appeals to the students had little effect. These events, together with secret footage from mass meetings, finally convinced Tito to take action. He had considered sending in the army, but eventually chose instead to depose the Croatian Party leadership. The purge of the SKH leadership at the 21st Session of the SKJ presidency at Karađorđevo While the student strikes were continuing, Tito convened a joint meeting at Karađorđevo in Vojvodina between an extended party presidency of the SKJ and the presidency of the SKH on 1 December 1971. The Croatian leaders and Tito held conversations that lasted for over 20 hours during the first day.74 Tito mostly listened and let the Croatian delegates speak. The following day, the rest of the presidency convened for a meeting that had already been planned, but the attention was almost exclusively on

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discussion of the Croatian crisis. Tito severely reprimanded the Croatian leadership, publicly this time. His opening speech at the session was broadcast live in order to restrict opportunities for the Triumvirate to deviate from his demands. He argued that the roots of the student strikes were not from yesterday, and reprimanded the Croatian leaders for not doing enough to contain the situation and the nationalist forces. He added that it was ‘fortunate that the working class in Croatia was conscious enough’ not to join, since the ones who had organised the strike had attempted to pull them into the strike, too. He considered the actions of certain elements in Croatia counter-revolutionary.75 Tito further insisted that ‘anti-socialist and anti-self-management elements’ had penetrated into the press, particularly that of Matica Hrvatska, but also Vjesnik. He was also convinced that there existed a so-called ‘revolutionary committee of fifty’ – of a contra-revolutionary nature – who stood for the direction of all these activities, and whose organiser, Tito insisted, was Matica Hrvatska. He expressed his scepticism against the idea of a national movement, a Mass Movement.76 Tito also argued that until the amendments [had been adopted] he had long been talking about the need to solve the foreign currency and foreign trade issues and the banking system: When we adopted the amendments, wherein a manner to solve those problems has been overlooked, we also have to deal with them accordingly. In other words, we need to solve them in forums and not on the streets. Now it depends on us whether this will proceed quickly or slowly. I am for a quicker resolution because with it we can reach some agreement. However, I told the others [the Croat delegation on the previous day] that even after the adoption of the amendments, they continued to take them further, outside, letting hostile elements adopt them as their parola and to drag the students along with them … I underlined that we will not allow different constitutional problems to be solved on the streets.77 Tito made it irrevocably clear that he did not stand behind the policies of the Croatian leadership, nor would he stand for it ‘should a similar policy come to pass in other republics’.78 With the live broadcasts of the speech and its later printing in the press, it was clear that Tito no longer had confidence in the Croatian leadership. At Kardelj’s suggestion, the material from the meeting was distributed to the entire membership of the SKH to ensure that, this time, the Triumvirate could not restrict the access to such documents.79 Tito demanded that the Croatian leadership

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put their house in order and re-establish conformity with the Party line. While his opening speech set out Tito’s criticism against the Croatian leadership, his closing speech laid the ground for the new direction in which he intended to take the SKJ in the aftermath of the Croatian crisis. Tito focused on the lack of ideological guidance by the Party and the lack of attention paid to ‘Marxist instruction’. He not only suggested that the Croatian leaders held responsibility for the events in Croatia, but argued that although the events in Croatia were the most dramatic, there were problems and deviations in the other republics too. He referred to a great ideological crisis in Croatia, and argued that for a long time, in different papers, various types of articles of a ‘revisionist orientation, negating Marxism, Marxist science etc.’ had appeared.80 He also complained about the lack of Marxist instruction in the schools and universities. While some last activities to avoid the unavoidable were attempted in the ensuing week, the members of the Triumvirate, under pressure, handed their resignations at the following session of the SKH Central Committee on 12 December. In contrast to the ousting of Đilas and Ranković, this time the resignations of the Croatian leaders were not followed by party denunciations. There were some initial mass demonstrations against the resignations of the Croatian leaders, lasting for several nights the first week, but the situation soon came under control, and the Mass Movement in Croatia collapsed surprisingly quickly, even for members of the SKH majority faction.81 The threat of military action in the case that resignations from the Triumvirate and its supporters were not carried out, may have been one contributing factor to the lack of resistance. Another factor, as Burg points out, was the effectiveness still demonstrated by the old tool of party discipline. Just as the majority had followed the leadership for so long, he argues, these ex-leaders faithfully adhered to the new course chartered by the group now in control of the Croatian Party.82 While the collapse of the Croatian Mass Movement may have happened quickly and without too much drama, the wide-ranging disciplinary action that was to follow was certainly dramatic. It would also have a serious impact on Croatia and its relationship with Yugoslavia for the next two decades. The new leadership excluded 741 people from the Party. Another 131 functionaries were removed from their Party positions, and 280 members were put under pressure to resign but retained their Party membership.83 Many of the more prominent former leaders were given long prison sentences. Among those were Marko Veselica, Šime Đodan, Hrvoje Šoškič, Vlado Gotovac, Franjo Tuđman and Ivan Zvonimir Čičak. Around two or three thousand people were imprisoned

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for political reasons in Croatia following the fall of the Triumvirate. Matica Hrvatska was closed down, and most of its publications were put out of circulation. The directors of the major newspapers and publications in Croatia were replaced.84 The purging of the protagonists from the Croatian Mass Movement left deep wounds in Croatian society. The notorious ‘Croatian silence’ that ensued, lasted until the Yugoslav state started to disintegrate in the late 1980s. Many of the Croatian demands were later granted, and although Tito restored discipline within the Party organisation, the SKJ leadership did not re-centralise the state as many had feared. But although many of the demands of the Croatian Mass Movement were granted, large parts of the Croatian public became disillusioned with the Yugoslav socialist project and its ability to endorse Croatian national aspirations and interests. Although national sentiment and tension had been on the rise in all the Yugoslav republics since Ranković’s fall in 1966, nowhere had their expression and impact on the rest of the federation been as dramatic as in Croatia. These events demonstrated the challenges met by the communists and their self-management socialist approach to inter-national and inter-republican relations within the Yugoslav Socialist Federation, and posed questions to their ability to regulate national conflict. The events in Croatia also raised critical questions relating to the further stability and legitimacy of the socialist Yugoslav state, and demonstrated vulnerabilities inherent in some of the measures developed by the communists for inter-republican co-operation. Even more importantly, the events in Croatia raised serious doubts about the existence of any will to co-operate among the republics. The crisis in Croatia brought to attention some more wide-ranging issues that would affect not just Croatia but the rest of Yugoslavia. It demonstrated clearly that the Yugoslav national question had not been solved or diminished, and confirmed that the development of self-management socialism was itself no guarantee for peaceful national relations. The events in Croatia showed that communists were not immune to national pressures. The decision by the Croatian leadership to appeal to the Croatian masses placed them in a position were they were forced to compete with Matica Hrvatska and others over this support from the Croatian public. This made them increasingly reliant on the support from within their on republic. By focusing on the national aspect, and on the Croatian aspect, the SKH leaders also came in a position where they had to be seen to apply continuous pressure towards the federal level, to press through Croatian demands and the demands identified by the nationalists. This also forced the SKH leadership to focus a

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large proportion of its energy upon maintaining hegemony in the face of these challengers in Croatia. This brought them into conflict with the other republican leaderships and with the federal leadership. The Croatian crisis showed that the communists’ rhetoric could be used effectively against them. Through the use of rhetoric designed by the communists, the nationalist forces were able to grant legitimacy to ideas that were often contradictory to those of the communist movement. Ivan Perić argues that the actions and the views expressed by the SKH leadership on critical issues ‘opened a space for opposition forces to build their own platform, and give that platform a false socialist and self-managing façade’.85 By referring to the SKH’s own formulations at the Tenth Congress, Matica Hrvatska was able to manoeuvre into the SKH’s turf, and challenge its position as the force that best looked after Croatia’s (national) interests. By allowing this, these forces were able to challenge some fundamental aspects of the communists’ founding legitimacy and their national policies as they emerged after the war. The nationalists were rather successfully able to make references to the communists’ own rhetoric during the war period, when their main aim was to recruit members to the Partisan movement, and to point to the Party’s founding decision on Croatian sovereignty and national rights as expressed through ZAVNOH. In doing so, Matica Hrvatska focused primarily on the struggle of people’s liberation and played down the aspect of socialist revolution.86 At the same time, it was critical of some aspect of ZAVNOH’s decisions, and challenged the KPJ/ SKJ’s historiography on these events. Implicitly, this critique also challenged the founding legitimacy of the communist regime and its ‘solution’ to the Yugoslav national question. Such moves were indeed worrying to the SKJ, and related to the Party’s need to retain hegemony over the public discourse and rhetoric. This was of paramount significance to the communists because it allowed them to set the agenda for how historical events could be interpreted in Yugoslav historiography, and prevented others from using these events to promote other agendas that may be damaging to the socialist cause. Significantly, however, during the Croatian crisis, Matica Hrvatska and other forces were able to raise questions about where sovereignty should lie within the Yugoslav federation. The SKJ had brought attention to the issue itself by allocating sovereignty to the republics as well as the peoples and the ‘working people’ of Yugoslavia. But these discussions were taken to new and unprecedented levels during the polemics in Hrvatski Tjednik. This question of where sovereignty should rest would become a vital issue also in the wider Yugoslav debates over the significance of the constitutional amendments.

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Although the Croatian Triumvirate focused primarily on the situation in Croatia, in a multinational federal context, the actions of the Croatian leaders involved potential repercussions that went far beyond the Croatian context. Focusing on the national interests of one national group within a multinational state, and within a federal republic that was also home to a large minority, was a sensitive and potentially risky strategy bound to create conflict. The Croats alienated other national groups who were increasingly disturbed by the display of national sentiment. They also alienated the large Serbian population in Croatia, and created uncertainty about the position of the Serbs in Croatia. Claiming that the increasing focus on Croatian culture posed a threat to the cultural rights of the Serbs in Croatia, some members of Prosvjeta therefore responded with equally exclusive cultural and sometimes political demands.87 It also led Prosvjeta to warn that the notion put forward by Hrvatski Tjednik that sovereignty in Croatia should reside exclusively with the Croatian nation could lead to the dangerous conclusion ‘that Serbs could only realise their statehood in Serbia’.88 Matica Hrvatska’s attempt to expand its organisation into Bosnia-Herzegovina and the demands made by some Croatian nationalists that intruded on the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Montenegro also had an alarming effect on members of that republic as well as on the federal communist leadership. The steps taken by Tito to deal with the Croatian crisis would equally have far-reaching consequences not just in Croatia, but for the entire Yugoslav state and system. The crisis in Croatia demonstrated that the situation had reached a stage where ordinary federal mechanisms for inter-republican interaction and conflict regulation could no longer deal with it effectively. Eventually Tito resorted to the application of extraordinary and extra-systemic measures to bring the situation under control. While demonstrating that he did indeed have the power to halt such events, the intra-party struggle in the SKH and the paralysis of interrepublican relations at the federal level made it clear that only Tito had this authority. He alone could take the actions deemed necessary to safeguard the revolution and pull Yugoslavia out of the most serious crisis it had seen thus far. By now though, Tito was 79 years old. It was inevitable that people would start to imagine what would happen when he was no longer there. The peace Tito had managed to restore in Croatia came at a huge cost. Many Croats found their faith in Yugoslavia waning, and the energy that had marked the events of 1971 transformed into longterm disillusionment. The feeling of inertia that ensued in Croatia was as damaging to Yugoslavia as the events of 1971 had been.

11 SERBIA AFTER RANKOVIĆ: ‘LIBERALS’, INTELLECTUALS AND THE ‘SERBIAN QUESTION’

The events that unfolded in Yugoslavia in the tumultuous period from Ranković’s fall in 1966 until the end of the Yugoslav and Croatian crisis in 1972 made considerable impact in Serbia. Above all, these events affected Serbia’s relation to the other republics, as well as the relationship between the three composite parts of the Republic of Serbia. It marked the start of serious reassessment of how the Serbs perceived themselves and their own role in Yugoslavia. In this manner, the events in this period came to have a profound impact on the thinking of many of Serbia’s foremost intellectuals. More than anything, attitudes towards Yugoslavia and the Communist regime and their professed solution to the national question started to change fundamentally. The political and intellectual landscape in Serbia at the time was multifaceted. At the political level, the Serbian Party leadership would pass into the hands of liberal forces as it had done in Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. The Serbian Liberals would, as elsewhere, not rule unchallenged by more conservative voices. The Liberal leadership in Serbia was instructed by Tito to keep a close eye on the activities of the Serbian intelligentsia, which despite its relative marginality he regarded with deep suspicion. His main targets were the so-called Praxisovci (members of the Praxis group), the members of the Law Faculty – both associated with the Belgrade University, – as well as the intellectual circle around Dobrica Ćosić, who focused their attention on the conditions for the Serbian nation within Yugoslavia. Despite Tito’s

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mistrust, activities in Serbia in this period did not threaten Yugoslavia and the position of the SKJ in the way that the crisis in Croatia did. The expression of national sentiment in Serbia at this particular moment was to a large degree, though not exclusively, a response to the expression of national discontent in other republics. Unlike the Croatian leadership, the Serbian Liberals chose not to associate with the nationalist intellectuals,1 They were caught though between the intelligentsia – most of whom held a different vision of Serbia’s interests – and Tito’s demand for the Serbian leadership to take action against these forces. The Serbian Liberal leadership Ranković had been the highest-ranking Serb in the communist leadership, as well as the main proponent for a centralist position in the Party. With his removal a centralist position that had been attractive to many Serbs was irretrievably discredited. More importantly it signalled the irrevocable end to the SKJ struggle for a unified and universal Yugoslav culture. With Rankovic’s removal, a reconstituted Serbian Party organisation was granted the responsibility of ‘cleaning up its own house’. The link between power abuse by the security forces under Ranković and their conduct towards the nationalities received much broader attention at the Sixth Session of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party (CK SK Srbija) in September 1966 than it had at the Fourth Plenum of Brioni. The Sixth Session has been described as a ‘massive mea culpa by the Serbian Party’.2 The Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party issued a condemnation of the illegal and discriminatory practices under Ranković.3 Vela Deva, President of the Regional Committee for Kosovo and Metohija4 reported that the evaluation from the recent period pointed to the fact that the highest levels of the UDBa, from the federal to the regional level, demonstrated a deep mistrust against national minorities in the country.5 In Kosovo, such distrust was levelled particularly against the Albanian population. The new Serbian Liberal leadership, fronted by Latinka Perović and Marko Nikezić, only came into power in 1968, where they remained leaders until Tito purged them in October 1972. Latinka Perović became Secretary of the Serbian Executive Committee in 1968. Marko Nikezić had served a long career in the diplomatic services before he became Yugoslav foreign secretary in 1966. He took over as President of the Serbian Central Committee from Petar Stambolić in 1968, allegedly according to Stambolić’s own request.6 Tito may well have been involved too. Nikezić and Perović came into office after the student protests (see p. 268), and

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Tito had been less than impressed with the SKS’s handling of the situation. Paradoxically, in the nationalist fervour and the anti-Serbian tone of most of the other nationalist movements, the new Serbian leadership was among the most liberal and anti-nationalist of them all. It was in favour of decentralisation and modernisation, while concurrently pursuing co-operation, not confrontation, with the other republican leaderships. Although Perović and Nikezić had not worked together before, they held similar visions for the direction in which to take Serbia.7 Nikezić’s outlook was cosmopolitan and unconventional following his many years in the diplomatic service. Mirko Tepavac, a long-time friend and colleague of Nikezić, described him as ‘truly an aristocrat in the Yugoslav communist movement, in the finest sense of that word’.8 Nikezić later described himself as a man with a temperament more like that of a parliamentarian than that of a revolutionary.9 Perović was more familiar with the political conditions in Serbia, and according to Mirko Tepavac had a better sense for organisation and action.10 She had great capacity for work and the patience to attend the long meetings and sessions that communist bureaucracy demanded in a manner that Nikezić did not. When asked whether he believed in self-management, Nikezić responded that he was, from the beginning, sceptical about the doctrine. Later he remarked he did not believe so much that it was unrealistic, but that it was ‘anti-modern and in opposition to contemporary development, modern organisation and stimulation’.11 According to Mirko Tepavac ‘the Liberals never declared, nor exhaustively formulated a programme of change which they practically took on’. This did not mean that they lacked plans and ideas. ‘They did not see their undertaking as a movement, or as a complete change of direction even less so as an organised opposition to the ruling course’, even if, Tepavac points out, in some manner they were in fact that.12 According to Đukić, five fundamental political directions could be detected in the programme of the Serbian Liberals: Firstly, there was an orientation towards a market economy. Secondly, they aspired to create a modern Serbia. Thirdly, they wanted to ‘free Serbia from the ballast of Yugoslavism and to turn [attention] to itself’. Fourthly, they favoured the employment of experts and capable cadres. This latter aspect led some to label them ‘technocrats’. Fifth and finally, they followed a strategy of co-operation and not confrontation with the other republics.13 The strategies of the Serbian Liberals on the national question significantly and radically differed from what had gone before. They related it to the question of economic development, and linked it to the issue of modernisation.

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Their main contention was that through creating a modern Serbia, the national question would not have the same urgency. More importantly, in contrast to the growing attention directed by certain Serbian intellectuals with a more traditional national outlook towards the Serbs outside Serbia, the Liberals chose to keep their attention mainly on Serbia as a republic and not the Serbian people. According to Latinka Perović, the Liberals held the view that Serbia identified itself too closely with Yugoslavia, which led everybody else to turn against it. Therefore, ‘we wanted to free ourselves from the stamp of unitarism and centralism’: From that grew the idea about the recognition of [Serbia’s] own interests. The idea was to build bridges with all the republics, always through dialogue and not confrontation; afterwards modernisation and intensive development of Serbia proper; close collaboration with Vojvodina and Montenegro; democratisation of political life.14 Nikezić also viewed it necessary for the Serbian Party organisation to distance itself from a centralist position: Liberation from compulsory uniformity, dependency and centralism is a complex change, and not always painless, but is nevertheless in the interest of all the peoples [of Yugoslavia]. This change is necessary for the Serbian people, no less than it is for the other peoples, because Serbia has no more use for a strong centralised power than any of the other peoples in Yugoslavia.15 Another reason for the Serbian leadership to remove itself from centralism was to avoid confrontation with the other republics. Nikezić stated that there was ‘a tendency to extend the authority of the federal institutions in a particular manner with regard to Serbia and Belgrade’.16 Part of the Serbian Liberals’ strategy of ‘freeing Serbia from the ballast of Yugoslavism’ thus entailed a rejection of playing the part of defender of Yugoslavia in conflicts between the Republics and in any crisis met by Yugoslavia. Nikezić argued: If Yugoslavia is necessary, then it is necessary for everybody, not just the Serbs. We cannot expect unity in the country if there remains a belief among the Serbs that they are the pillar of Yugoslavia, that [Yugoslavia] relies on them and that it is the others

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who are problematic. Then the conclusion reached by the other nations must be that in this Yugoslavia nobody was completely at home, and only the Serbs really felt at home.17 Perović held a similar view. She argued at the Congress of Cultural Action in October 1971 that Yugoslavia was no end in itself, but rather the best means to two aims: socialism and the national development for each people. This was in fact very close to Kardelj’s viewpoint. She argued that the belief that national claims should yield to socialist ones was hypocritical and that subordinating national culture to a non-national principle such as socialism always really meant subordinating one national culture to another.18 As priority in the search for dialogue with other federal units, the Liberals stated their aim first of all to establish good relations to Vojvodina and Montenegro. They appear to have succeeded with this. The relationship between the Serbian and Vojvodinan leaderships were close and amicable. Nikezić’s close colleague and friend Mirko Tepavac, was president for the Party Committee for Vojvodina from 1967 until 1969. Mirko Čandanović took over the leadership in Vojvodina when Tepavac succeeded Nikezić as foreign secretary, and relations remained good.19 The leadership of the Party Committee in Vojvodina was removed together with the Serbian leaders. The relationship with Kosovo was more difficult and ambiguous. The demonstrations in Kosovo emerged only four days after Nikezić took over the Serbian Presidency, so he had to deal with this problem immediately. Nikezić did approve the deployment of decisive police action to curb the demonstrations and wanted to make sure the demonstrations did not enter the Party offices, yet he was also willing to try to establish some dialogue with Kosovo. He was adamant that ‘border changes would not be considered, but all other matters were open for discussion’.20 Although they did not agree on all issues, the Serbian leadership attempted to establish working relations with the Croats. They supported the decentralisation process inherent in the constitutional amendments, though perhaps somehow more carefully and reservedly than the Croats. They supported the Croatian demand for čisti računi – clear accounts. According to Latinka Perović the Serbian leadership sought to build co-operation with the Croatian leaders directly to try to determine what they could agree on and what was not acceptable. She suggests that Tito was sceptical of this process, since if Republics could negotiate between themselves, he would not be needed as arbiter. Perović argues that the leadership was aware of the danger this entailed, and therefore tried to protect themselves.21

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As part of the strategy to focus on Serbia first while establishing good relations with the other federal units, Nikezić refused the idea that the Serbian Party leadership should, or indeed could, act as the guardians of the interests of Serbs living in other republics. He therefore made clear to the Serbs in Bosnia that ‘your interests you can only build in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is where your leadership is’.22 In this way, Nikezić neutralised fears that Serbia would seek to represent Serbs in Bosnia, and ‘recognised the legitimacy of Bosnia-Herzegovina and removed the fear from Serbian aspirations in this area’.23 Like the liberal leaderships in the other republics where the Serbian Liberals held power, they did not govern unchallenged. The Serbian Liberals did not manage or attempt to control the Party organisation and could not prevent more conservative forces from expressing their views to the rest of the Serbian Party organisation. In contrast to the Croatian leadership, the Serbian Liberals did not seek support from the masses or from forces outside the Party organisation. Instead they sought to reform the system from the inside. The approach, with its strict focus on inner Serbia, was not to everyone’s taste, and their view was the exception rather than the norm in Serbian political and intellectual circles, especially their strict focus on inner Serbia. Serbian intellectuals and the abondonment of Yugoslavism The Serbian intelligentsia included a diverse range of protagonists, most of whom belonged to one of two broad orientations. One Tito referred to as ‘ultra-leftist intellectuals’ with a base at the Philosophical Faculty at Belgrade University were associated with the Praxis group. The other orientation consisted of a diverse group which increasingly questioned the position of Serbia and Serbs within Yugoslavia, focusing on Serbian national interests. Student demonstrations 1968 The activities of the Praxis group attracted Tito’s attention and suspicion at the time of the student demonstrations in Belgrade.24 The activity of the students and the Praxis group were non-national in character but, in Tito’s mind, both potentially threatened the leading role of the SKJ in Yugoslav society. In June 1968, students at Belgrade University launched a week-long strike. They occupied the university buildings and set up strike committees. Before long, unrest spread to the universities of Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana. These strikes, clearly inspired by the student movements in Czechoslovakia and France, were the first largescale public display of protest against the policies of the Communist

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Party. There is no doubt that the SKJ leadership was significantly shaken by the student demonstrations, and it was the first real test of how the SKJ handled its encouragement for greater popular participation in the political process in Yugoslavia. In its first phase, the strike followed the pattern of other university strikes in Europe, with students protesting on the streets, and getting into violent confrontations with the police. This soon receded, and instead the SKJ leadership entered a form of dialogue with the students, attempting to win them over ‘by persuasion and manipulation and not through power’.25 This happened partly due to the fear of alienating the student generation of the Party, but also because the communists were eager to prevent workers being dragged into the strike. Despite their deep worry about the protests, the Serbian Party leadership eventually chose not to go in with massive coercion, even if this was considered by a few nervous members of its Party group, and they managed to solve this crisis before it escalated into something larger.26 Tito himself intervened. On 9 June, he made a televised appeal directly to the students. By granting some of their demands, he tried to steer the student movement into channels acceptable to the regime.27 He expressed sympathy for their demands, which were phrased in rhetoric that much resembled the SKJ’s own, and his speech was received with great enthusiasm. Latinka Perović points out that appealing directly to the students strengthened Tito’s personal authority.28 The SKJ successfully managed to neutralise the student movement at this time, but such political mobilisation of protest came as a shock to the communist leaders. Though Tito handled the students rather gently at the height of the demonstrations, these events had impact on his developing perception of threats against the SKJ’s hegemony. Tito soon took a tougher line against dissent emanating from the universities, but appeared more fearful of the Praxis group than he did of the student movement. He did not wait long in declaring the Praxis Marxists as those morally responsible for the student demonstrations. The Praxis group Although the Praxis group, like the students, did not articulate nationalist aspirations, they played a distinct role in the greater drama that unfolded in Yugoslavia. This small group of intellectuals composed mostly of philosophers and sociologists, with its main bases in Zagreb and Belgrade, had limited direct political influence in Yugoslav society. They did nevertheless represent the most important cross-Yugoslav source of intellectual, yet Marxist, critique emanating within the Yugoslav system.

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The members of the Praxis group were convinced Marxists with a humanist outlook, many with close ties to the Partisan movement and to the Party hierarchy. Most of them supported the communists’ actions during the People’s Liberation Struggle in 1941–1945, the regime’s break with Stalin in 1948, and the policy of self-management. Their main criticism was directed against what they perceived as the failure of the communist elites to live up to the ideals of their own theory of selfmanagement socialism. Praxis Marxism constituted what Gerson S. Sher describes as ‘Marxist heretics in a socialist country whose hallmark has been the rejection of Marxist dogma’.29 The Praxis philosophers rejected the orthodox understanding of dialectical materialism and the idea that people were merely objects of the laws of this dialectic process. Rather, they insisted, that man becomes the constituting subject of human reality through Praxis, activity by which man transforms and creates his world and himself.30 The Praxis group was sceptical about the decentralisation process and the economic liberalisation policy that the SKJ pursued in the 1960s, and were sometimes accused of being centralist and unitarist. Praxis Marxists were critical of what they perceived as the halting of self-management at the republican level, which in their view, created new bureaucracies at the republican level rather than allowing for real selfmanagement. They were also critical of nationalism, which they viewed primarily as a question subjected to economic relations, and interpreted it in class terms. They portrayed the republican bureaucracies as new types of national bourgeoisies. The growing expression of nationalism in Yugoslavia was seen to embody ‘the same ideological fiction as its classic predecessors in representing the territorial consolidation of state power as the liberation of the nation’.31 However, as Audrey H. Budding aptly observes, at no point did the Praxis group offer a theoretical alternative to the ruling ideology’s approach to national problems.32 Nor did the Praxis group ever challenge the one-party system in Yugoslavia, nor proposed the introduction of a multi-party system. Nevertheless, Tito expressed almost obsessive, irrational resentment particularly belonging to the Praxis group, against members of the Faculty of Philosophy at Belgrade University. This was largely based on the implicit challenge their ideas posed for the leading role of the Party. By rejecting the existence of objective laws of historical development, the Praxis group also implicitly rejected the need for a special role of the SKJ interpreting such laws. After the student protests of 1968, Tito feared a spread of the Praxis group’s ideas through the student movement, especially as he blamed them for the student demonstrations. Sher suggests that

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one possible reason the Praxis group survived the original attack in 1968 was because they had protectors within the SKJ.33 Otherwise, ‘it would be difficult to account for the fact that Tito’s demands went unheeded for so long’.34 It was the ‘Mass Movement’ in Croatia that came under the strongest attack from the Praxis group. In the end, however, such critique did not grant them any favours with Tito and the other leaders. Another obvious reason for the delay in removing the Praxis group was its international prestige. Praxis was good marketing for Yugoslavia’s ‘soft’ communism. Many of the intellectuals had excellent international connections, and to remove them would damage Yugoslavia’s reputation. When Tito decided to clean up the Yugoslav house after 1972, the Praxis group was among the forces that came to communist attention. In 1975, the Praxis journal was closed down for good. Serbian intellectuals and the Serbian question Other, more traditionally minded Serbian intellectuals turned their focus increasingly towards Serbia, viewing with anxiety the decentralisation process within the federation and the growth of national sentiment in the other republics. They also displayed an increased obsession with the situation for Serbs outside Serbia proper. An important manifestation of the changing attitude among Serb intellectuals towards the regime’s national policies came in the language debates. These events also made the regime brand many of the protagonists as ‘nationalists’. At the Annual Convention of the Association of Writers of Serbia, on 19 March 1967, 42 writers signed a document entitled Predlog za razmišljanje (‘Proposal for Consideration’). This was intended as a response to the ‘Declaration concerning the Characterisation and Status of the Croatian Literary Language, issued by Matica Hrvatska on 15 March, as a critique of the Novi Sad declaration’. Half of the signatories were members of the Party. The main proponents behind this proposal were Antonije Isaković – member of the Serbian Central Committee, and Borislav Mihajilović-Mihiz, both well-known literary figures in Serbia.35 While the proposal accepted the demands of the Croats, they argued that ‘on this basis, without regard to the historical and scientific aspects, they should consider not only the Novi Sad, but also the Vienna Agreement from 1850 to be annulled’.36 Further, if one were to follow the Croat suggestion, the proposal made a demand for the introduction of Cyrillic in the local broadcasting of Belgrade Radio-Television, and for the station to stop playing the role of a central Yugoslav broadcaster. Although the sarcastic tone in the Proposal led some to suggest that it was meant as ‘black humour’,37 the

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document had a serious edge. One example was the claim that if Croatian and Serbian were to constitute two separate languages, then the right to independent development of national language and culture through educational and other institutions must be constitutionally guaranteed to both Serbs in Croatia and Croats in Serbia. The signatories objected to what they perceived as a Croatian attempt to link the language question to that of statehood – in the Yugoslav case, republican statehood – and in this way territorialise the right to use of language. The proposal was quickly condemned by that Serbian Party Leadership, as was the original Croatian Declaration. When called to account by the Belgrade City Committee, which had been charged with dealing with the affair, many supporters withdrew their signatures. One excuse used by the protagonists was that they perceived the SKJ had accepted the Croatian declaration, since the opposite had not been notified by the Party.38 Antonije Isaković was forced to resign from the Party for having signed the proposal.39 Borislav Mihajilović-Mihiz had to leave his position in the publishing house Prosveta. Many of the signatories were frequenters at Simina 9a, an intellectual circle of self-defined non-conformists, who regularly met to debate many of the important cultural and philosophical questions.40 This diverse group represented a broad spectrum of ideas, and Praxisovci, like Mihajlo Marković and Ljubomir Tadić also belonged to this circle. What its members had in common was a perception that socialist Yugoslavism had become corrupted. They saw the leadership’s abandonment of the attempt to create a unified, universalist Yugoslav culture as a betrayal. The wholehearted devotion to socialist Yugoslavism and identification with Yugoslavia formerly demonstrated by many Serb intellectuals faded considerably after the Ranković affair. The increasing condemnation of ‘unitarist Yugoslavism’ as an expression of ‘Great Serbian hegemonism’ combined with the rise of nationalism in other republics, which tended to be anti-Serbian in its tone, contributed to this process. So did the decentralisation of the state along republican lines. The most influential member of the Simina 9a circle, and among Serbian intellectuals in general, was indisputably Dobrica Ćosić. In the late 1960s, Ćosić was respected and provided a bridge between different orientations within the Serbian intelligentsia,. Interestingly, Ćosić rejected the Writers’ Association proposal on the grounds that it represented Serbian provincialism while he supported humanistic internationalism and socialist Yugoslavism.41 At the time of the proposal, in contrast to many of the other Siminiovci, Ćosić was still part of the SKJ establishment. He had close ties to the regime, and had ‘been allowed to

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visit Goli Otok in 1951.42 He had accompanied Tito on his yacht ‘Galeb’ for a celebrated tour to eight African states in 1961. Ćosić had been harbouring serious doubts since the ousting of Ranković in 1966,43 and claims he sent a letter of protest to Tito shortly afterwards.44 For him, Ranković‘s removal demonstrated the final abandonment of creating an integral Yugoslav unified identity and fait accompli of republican decentralisation and state confederalisation. In the autumn of 1967, Ćosić gave a lecture at the Kolarac People’s University, entitled ‘How we create ourselves’ (‘Kako da stvaramo sebe’).45 This signalled the beginning of Ćosić’s preoccupation with the Serbian question and it was here he first articulated his thesis on the internal split of the Serbian nation. Referring to two strands of Serbian cultural development in the nineteenth century, Ćosić argued that ‘persistent divisions between the two Serbias – antitheses – the people, the bourgeoisie, peasant, or urban, national, European – divided Serbian culture’.46 In 1968, he ended his love affair with the Party, and abandoned his conviction that the socialist revolution and the SKJ professed solution to the national question would be in the interest of the Serbian nation. The public transformation of Ćosić’s position took place at the Fourteenth Session of the Serbian Central Committee in May 1968. At this session, Dobrica Ćosić and well-known Serbian historian Jovan Marjanović were accused of nationalism after delivering their speeches. Both had drawn attention to the Serbs living outside Serbia proper. Ćosić argued that ‘from the creation of the Republic of Serbia until today, the leading political forums have in their entirety and historically, conducted a democratic and internationalist policy towards the national minorities and ethnic groups on their territory’. He implied that democratic and internationalist policies had been conducted since 1945, implicitly challenging the official view that this was not the case during the Ranković period.47 In Ćosić’s view, the concept of Srbijanstvo deserved particular attention. He saw this as representing a very narrow view of Serbian culture, restricted to the Republic of Serbia, and argued that it was ‘in essence a primitive, anachronistic political mentality … the complex of a national and state-building mythology … ignorance for the Serbs who do not live in the Republic of Serbia … and lack of respect for the differences within the Serbian People, which had continued and developed under differing social and cultural circumstances’.48 This view was in direct contrast to that of the Serbian liberal leadership under Perović and Nikezić, whose focus was precisely on the Serbian republic rather than on Serbs living elsewhere. During his 1968 speech,

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Ćosić raised the question of Kosovo, and argued it was ‘impossible not to see how much a conviction had grown in Serbia concerning the strained relations between the Albanians49 and Serbs, about the feeling of threat amongst the Serbs and Montenegrins’.50 Ćosić condemned the Party for failing to challenge the policies of the Provincial Committee for Kosovo and Metohija,51 and criticised this committee for not fighting Albanian chauvinism and irredentism as the intentions of the Fourth Plenum had directed.52 In the name of Marxism, Ćosić made himself the champion of the rights of the individual, arguing that nationality had taken first place in social relations in Kosovo and that formal national equality had taken precedence over the equality of citizens and people (ljudi). Ćosić furthermore expressed his opposition to policies to increase employment of Albanians in the Province, and was equally critical about Vojvodina, warning against placing too much emphasis on autonomy. He argued that present political tendencies did not encourage rapprochement between different peoples. Rather, relations were dominated by segregation; nobody mentioned Hungarian nationalism and segregation.53 In Ćosić’s opinion, the political position that was taken towards the ‘national complex of Serbia’, in other words against the national minorities in Serbia and in Yugoslavia, meant politically to take a position towards the old, tragic, unsolved ‘eastern’, that is the ‘Balkan question’. The essence of the Balkan question was still alive, and unsolved.54 He warned: If Yugoslavia’s traditional – that is, nationalistic-étatist policies and particularistic orientations – endure and prevail, if democratic forces of socialism do not win the final victory over bureaucratic and petty bourgeois forces and elements, then in the Serbian people, the old historical aim and national ideal – the unification of the Serbian people in a unified state – could be inflamed again. To foresee the consequences of such processes, no political imagination is needed.55 This ominous warning did not please the Party, and following his speech, Ćosić was publicly condemned (along with Marjanović) at the Fourteenth Session of the Central Committee of SKS. Shortly after this, he resigned.56 The Fourteenth Session thus marked the end of Ćosić’s engagement within the SKJ. He continued to be a subject of controversy in the Yugoslav and Serbian cultural sphere however – primarily through his election as president of the Serbian Literary Cooperative, Srpska knjiženva zadruga (SKZ). Ćosić’s presidency of this old Serbian

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publishing house lasted from 1969 to 1972, during which time he transformed it into ‘a nucleus gathering intellectuals of different political orientations around the Serbian Question in Yugoslavia’.57 Many of these individuals would in the mid-1980s become regulars at the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU). Albeit popular, the SKZ was never near achieving the same role as Matica Hrvatska did in Croatia, and never acquired the shape of a mass organisation. The SKZ organised a series of literary evenings (besede) in an effort to recruit new members, mainly from outside Belgrade.58 However, its Serbian platform, and even more the manner in which the SKZ functioned as a forum for expression for Ćosić, was enough to make it appear threatening to Tito who saw it as a force that ought to be neutralised. The Law Faculty debates on the federal amendments Another group of Serbian intellectuals who made their voice heard and raised Tito’s suspicion was the members of the Belgrade Law Faculty. They focused their attention on the controversial debate over the constitutional reforms in 1971, printed in the May/June issue of their periodical Anali pravnog fakulteta. This issue of the journal was banned, indicating the authorities’ concern over the discussions it contained.59 The Law Faculty debates took place at the height of the ‘national euphoria’ in Croatia, and focused particularly on crisis. The discussions added an interesting perspective on how such objections were formulated in Serbia. Most of the participants were sceptical, if not downright opposed to, the proposed amendments, and expressed worries about the implications they might have on inter-republican relations in Yugoslavia and even for the purpose and very existence of the Yugoslav federal system. The participants considered Yugoslavia to be a state in crisis, and were particularly anxious about the introduction of a right of veto for the republics and provinces believing that it signified the birth of a confederate Yugoslavia. The majority expressed deep worry over this development, and a wish for Yugoslavia to remain a federation. According to Kosta Čavoški, ‘constitutionality (ustavnost) in Yugoslavia had become compromised’.60 He disagreed with arguments fronted by the leadership (primarily Kardelj) that the frequent changes in the constitution were an expression of stability. Čavoški argued that it was evident that the constitutional system was not stable, nor lasting, since it relied on temporary arrangements of forces which often and quickly changed, in a way that ruined any form of security, continuity and authority.61 One objection levelled by the participants

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was that the process of decentralisation was not consistent.62 This process, they argued, was implemented on a territorial basis, even though the SKJ attempted to legitimise it through referring to national rights. Some participants expressed a feeling that the SKJ leadership had given up its Yugoslav project. Jovan Đorđević, who participated in this debate, pointed out that the timing for introducing constitutional changes was a political situation marked by crisis, not only for the federation but also for the political system. He maintained that they had arrived at ‘a crisis for one concept of unity, which in Yugoslavia was founded on a revolutionary ideology and on a unified government and policy’. This concept of Yugoslavia ‘was accompanied by the promise by the socialist forces that it would lead towards greater integration and lay the foundation for real unity in a community which from the start was much more complex and difficult than what we imagined’.63 Đorđević acknowledged that ‘starting with the Soviet Union, the nation became the framework for developing socialism in almost the entire world, and that … [socialists] were forced within the framework of the nation, to solve their fundamental problems of existence and development of socialism’.64 However, in a nationally complex society where great differences between the nations existed, Đorđević pointed out that such processes led to the relative ‘explosion’ of the national question. In Yugoslavia, he argued, the national question was not solved entirely, even with the revolution. ‘This became evident not only with regard to the question of so-called equality and inter-national relations, but also with regard to the expression of national identity’. Đorđević argued that they had all deceived themselves into believing that ‘one unified concept of the union (zajednica) and of Yugoslavia existed’ and that ‘this was characteristic of the Serbs and the Serbian people particularly, who were burdened with the legacy of Yugoslavism and unity’. This union ‘did not mean the same for everybody. A common concept of the union [Yugoslavia] did not exist, nor could it exist, nor does it exist today’.65 Here Đorđević touched on the very heart of the dilemmas faced by the SKJ when approaching the national question and the challenges in finding an agreed form of Yugoslav unity. Andrija Gams expressed his apprehension, describing the proposed amendments as ‘an historical injustice’; that is, historically entirely inadequate; politically unbalanced and representing the result of certain situations of political crisis; ideologically confusing; and scientifically unfounded. Gams’ mention of historical injustice referred to what he conceived as the rejection of Yugoslavism believing this could lead

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to a ‘very tragic historical situation’.66 In his opinion, the experiment with the withering away of the state had been greatly detrimental to Yugoslavia: facts and practice had shown that the state was necessary and remained a necessity.67 All the participants in the 1971 debate at the Law Faculty thus expressed uneasiness with what they perceived as the SKJ’s abandonment of socialist Yugoslavism combined with apprehension over the proposed new constitutional amendments and the direction in which these would take the Yugoslav federation. Mihailo Đurić’s speech was particularly controversial, taking the argument far beyond what was acceptable at the time. He stated that ‘the proposed constitutional amendments fundamentally changed the character of the state community of the Yugoslav Peoples as it had been up to that point’. More precisely, the proposed changes ‘would in fact signify the rejection of the very idea of [the existence of] such a state community’. Yugoslavia was, in Đurić’s opinion, already more or less a mere ‘geographical phenomenon’.68 Here Đurić pointed to the territorialisation that he saw inherent in the constitutional amendments, and he warned that he would not be ready to defend at any price that which it was not possible to save. He suggested that the process induced by the constitutional amendments ‘returned them far back, into the past, to questions [that concerned] our fathers and grandfathers, questions that no longer exist and that cannot be ours’.69 While other participants also raised concerns over the development of the of Yugoslav federal system, Đurić’s argument became controversial because of his suggestion that the Serbs in view of such crisis should look after their own interests first. Rather than discuss the amendments, he refused the proposals altogether, arguing that a different, more serious and accountable solution must be found.70 If not, the Serbs were forced to organise themselves within the confines of a national and state principle: We must be conscious about our historical responsibility to the people to which we belong, and then we must be aware that to the Serbian people at this moment, the question concerning their identity and integrity is of uttermost importance, as is the question concerning their political and constitutional-legal unity.71 Đurić argued that the reason the present situation in Serbia was not good was ‘not only because Serbia so mercilessly and unjustly had been accused of centralism and unitarism in previous periods’, centralism, he added, had not in any way favoured the Serbian people, rather it had ‘also in part been

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established to prevent the asking of the question of responsibility for the genocide that had been conducted against the Serbian people [in 1945]’.72 Đurić ventured even further into the territory of taboo themes by raising the question of the boundaries of the republics. He argued that it was ‘obvious that the borders of SR Serbia were not national boundaries, nor the historical boundaries of the Serbian people’. He added that all the borders in Yugoslavia had a conditional significance; they were more administrative than political in character. If they were taken to be the borders of national states, it would become obvious that they were inappropriate, arbitrary, and untenable.73 This comment touched at the very foundation of the postwar settlement and creation of the Yugoslav state. Đurić pointed out that (with the possible exception of Slovenia) not one of the Yugoslav republics was homogeneous, and the Serbs had the worst fit of all with more than 40 per cent living outside Serbia proper. He asked: ‘in a moment when the Serbian people are led by force of circumstances to the point where they must establish their own national state’ could they ‘be indifferent to its many parts outside the existing borders of SR Serbia?’74 Đurić argued that in the present conditions, it was not difficult to see that the Serbian people found themselves in an unequal position with the other peoples in Yugoslavia. He complained that the Serbs were not allowed to assert their cultural rights or national identity in the other republics where they lived, and that they had no constitutional guarantees in SR Croatia or SR Macedonia. The proposed constitutional amendments would further damage such rights.75 He claimed that a supranational Yugoslavia implied not only that a multitude of peoples lived in this country, but also that these peoples were mixed, entangled and connected by destiny. Precisely because the Serbian people were dispersed throughout many of Yugoslavia’s parts, they had, in Đurić’s view, always had a greater interest in Yugoslavia than the other peoples had.76 Concurrently, he suggested that the Serbs had dedicated themselves to Yugoslavia to their own detriment, and that they had rejected the London pact and thus given up the possibility of creating a Great Serbia in favour of creating a common union with the other Yugoslav peoples.77 Now they must turn to their own interests. Such statements did not go down well with the SKJ leadership, nor with the Liberal Serbian leadership of the day. Like the members of Matica Hrvatska, Đurić’s comments questioned the very legitimacy of the founding myth of the second Yugoslavia and the constitutional settlement that the Party had introduced to solve the national question after the war. Another critic, Stevan Đorđević, tackled an even more sensitive issue – why was Tito

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made a constitutional exemption in amendments, which granted him lifelong presidency? These statements appeared to have passed without any reprimand initially, but Tito did not forget, and Đurić was arrested in June 1972. He received a two-year sentence, of which he would serve nine months.78 The Law Faculty debates raised a lot of genuine and valid concerns that many Serbs had with the constitutional amendments. To some extent they were raised somewhat prematurely and Đurić certainly took his argument further than what was acceptable at the time. The main focus of the debates was nevertheless about the amendments and the future legal position of Serbia and its provinces in Yugoslavia, and not about the legacy of the Communist project.79 Similar concerns to those of Đurić and the other discussants would be raised in a much more volatile climate in the 1980s. In the 1980s, such debates eventually came to pose questions around the origins and legitimacy of the socialist Yugoslav state, and came to question the legacy of the Communists’ socialist solution to the national question. The political and intellectual landscape in Serbia was in flux from when the Serbian Liberals came to power in 1967 until they were removed in 1971. The Liberals opposed centralism, sought to modernise Serbia, focused attention on the Republic of Serbia rather than all Serbs in Yugoslavia, and sought to avoid confrontation with Serbia’s neighbours. They were not in power long enough to realise their visions. The Liberals’ support for decentralisation and narrow focus on Serbia proper was not supported by the Serbian intelligentsia. Both Praxis members and nationalists had a tendency to identify nationalism with the activity of the other nations, like Croatia and Kosovo, but did not link this to Serbia in the same way. They viewed the new constitutional arrangement and decentralisation as detrimental to Serbia. The Serbian liberals supported decentralisation, but were also put under considerable pressure by Tito and Kardelj to accept the new constitutional arrangement. The acceptance of the new constitutional measures and the Liberals’ narrow focus on Serbia Proper was not supported by the Serbian intelligentsia. The Serbian Liberals’ decision not to engage with the likes of Ćosić played a crucial role in preventing the Serbian national question from becoming more significant in this period. It was therefore a paradox that one of the accusations against the Liberals in 1972 was that they were not doing enough to keep forums such as SKZ under stricter control.80 Whatever the Serbian leaders thought about Ćosić’s election to the presidency of SKZ, they were not willing to actively block his re-election to this post. Nor were they keen on banning publications. The Liberals

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came under pressure both from domestic intellectuals of different orientations, and from Tito, who thought that the Serbian leaders did not do enough about groups like the professors at the Law Faculty and Tito’s other source of nuisance and pet hate-object; the ‘Humanist Marxists’ at Belgrade University.81 In 1972, Tito decided to remove the Serbian Liberal leaders from power, and to confront the other forces that he found threatening. The removal of the Serbian Liberal leadership According to Latinka Perović, the Serbian leaders sensed that they were the next in line already at Karađorđevo.82 Speaking at Karađorđevo, Tito argued that there was a serious ideological crisis in the SKJ, one that had roots further back than the preparations for the constitutional amendments. In Tito’s opinion, it was the failure to understand the different ‘anti-socialist forces, various anti-Marxist phenomena, articles and discussions’ that led to the crisis. ‘In front of our noses, they held different kinds of symposiums, who knows what kind; like the ones at Korčula, Novi Sad etc’.83 Now the time had come to do something about it. Through his public statements, Tito put pressure on the Serbian leadership to take assertive action against such forces. The Serbian leaders refused to assume this role. At a meeting with the Serbian Party activists on 5 December, Latinka Perović stated that the SKS and the SR Serbia sought no special rights, nor wished to take upon themselves any special obligations in Yugoslavia.84 Concurrently, both Perović and Nikezić pointed out that Serbia and each of the republican leaderships now had to ‘clean up their own house’.85 Tito had set his mind on removing the Serbian Liberals, but this proved more difficult than removing the Croatian leaders the previous year. As Tito himself would admit, he could not fault the Serbian leadership with conducting a differential line on essential questions such as ‘the struggle for self-management, the struggle against nationalism, the implementation of the “Workers’ amendments” and so forth’.86 Instead he resorted to ‘divide and rule’. Divisions within the Serbian Party were latent, but intensified considerably during the summer of 1972 as a result of Tito’s meddling. The latent conflict was partly a clash between liberal and conservative forces, and also carried a strong generational dimension.87 Perović and Nikezić had always had the support of veterans Dobrivoje Radosavljević and Koča Popović. Petar Stambolić was also generally sympathetic to the Liberals, and had actively encouraged their candidature to the leadership at the Sixth Session of the CK

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SKS in 1968. Less enthusiastic was Draža Marković, who temporarily fell out with Stambolić over this issue. In 1972 Draža Marković was put under particular pressure from Tito, and was the one to take the lead in reprimanding the Liberals. Stevan Doronjski had since 1968 refused to sit in the SKS CK Secretariat with the young new cadres. Equally sceptical were Miloš Minić, and Nikola Ljubičić who also avoided dealings with them.88 In 1972, Perović and Nikezić had strong support in the Central Committee, but the highest representatives in the Serbian Party organisation, including Marković, Stambolić, Minić, Doronjski and Ljubičić all united behind Tito. None of these Partisan-generation cadres would have considered defying Stari once he had made up his mind, and all were of the view, formulated by Draža Marković that the words of the President of the Republic (Tito) had to be respected.89 Most of the older Serbian cadres agreed with Tito and Kardelj’s assessment that democratisation had gone too far. They viewed the behaviour of Perović and Nikezić as too independent. They were sceptical about Nikezić’s expression of doubt in the concept of socialist self-management, and to Perović’s emphasis on democratisation. Most of the elders, including Stambolić also disagreed with the Liberals’ attitude towards the Croatian colleagues. It seems strange that Tito was so set on removing the Liberal forces in Serbia, as they had been rather effective in stemming nationalist tides and neutralising the national forces which existed in Serbia. The Liberals’ reluctance to take direct action against certain groups in Serbian society, identified by Tito as particularly dangerous, appears to have been one reason for his resentment. Tito held a meeting with the Serbian leadership in April 1972. He was angry and sharp, demanding that the Serbian leaders take assertive action against these groups. According to Latinka Perović’s account, ‘Tito read from his little orange notebook, the names of people who attacked him, and whom we tolerated. He mentioned Dobrica Ćosić, a group of professors and many other intellectuals in Serbia’. He told the Serbian leaders to go into concrete action, arguing that by doing so, they would also help the other Republics.90 Tito seems to have judged the renewed refusal by the Serbian Liberals to take assertive action as a form of insult to his personal integrity. Their refusal to play the role of defender of Yugoslavia in the crisis was another decisive factor in the removal of the Serbian Liberals. Nikezić and Perović have both indicated that they conceived Tito’s behaviour as an attempt to use the Serbian leadership as a convenient

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scapegoat when unpopular decisions had to be executed, decisions that in their mind ought to befall the federal leadership. The Serbian leadership had refused to assume the role of special responsibility for Yugoslavia. Nikezić argued that Tito had the opportunity to carry out many purges with his own hands, but instead asked others to carry out such actions, becoming angry when this mechanism did not work.91 Perović also suggested that Tito liked to play the role of arbiter in conflicts between the Serbs and Croats, which he had sometimes helped create in the first place.92 Bora Pavlović, who was secretary of the Belgrade Committee of CK Srbija, has pointed to some additional reasons why Tito found the policies of the Serbian Liberals threatening. Particularly important, he claims, was the Serbian Liberals’ drive towards modernisation which highlighted the question of the legitimacy of power relations in Yugoslavia. Pavlović argued that a modern orientation required that Yugoslavia could not ‘permanently remain an improvised society in which institutions will formally exist, but where decisions are made somewhere else’. Indirectly, Pavlović pointed out, ‘this also poses a question concerning the performance of the functions of President of the republic and Party’.93 Pavlović therefore suggests that Tito perceived the Serbian Liberals’ political direction as inherent criticism of his role as President. However, the Liberals never directly threatened or questioned Tito’s role. One other reason that has often been suggested is that the Serbian Liberals were the victims of the purge in Croatia, and by Tito’s need to appear even-handed. Although such considerations in all likelihood informed Tito’s assessment on how to create stability in Yugoslavia, there is little evidence that this was his primary motive for removing the Serbian Liberals. Nor was there any evidence that Tito’s handling of this issue was motivated by an anti-Serbian attitude. Tito made his own accusations against the Serbian leaders during a meeting with the political leadership of the SKS on 9 October, and applied direct pressure on the Liberals to resign. He argued that the Central Committee of the SKS was on a collision course with the other republics, and complained that they put more weight on the amendments that talked of independence, sovereignty of the republics and their position in the federation, even if the ‘Workers’ amendments were more popular’. He accused the Serbian Liberal leadership of ‘permitting nationalistic and other phenomena in the press, popular publications and publishing activities’ – a clear reference to Cosić and other members of the SKS. He also charged the Serbian Liberals with ‘tolerating ultra-leftists’.94 There was a

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clear link between the removal of the Serbian Liberal leadership and the Praxis professors at Belgrade University. Sher suggests that Nikezić in particular was reputed to have been lenient on the Belgrade Praxisovci.95 The move against the Serbian leaders came in October 1972. It formed part of a much broader and fundamental shift in the direction of the SKJ, one that was to acquire vital consequences for the entire future of Yugoslav society, Party, and state. As such, it would have huge and lasting impact on the Party’s strategies on national relations.

12 A RECONSIDERATION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE, 1971–1980

The events in Croatia in 1971, combined with the heightened national tension in the other republics from 1966, constituted the greatest crisis to date for the Yugoslav socialist project. The years from 1972–1980 saw a response to a crisis in the Yugoslav socialist project as articulated by the SKJ revolutionary leaders. The developments in Croatia led Tito to intervene and impose Party control, conducting a massive purge of cadres, republican leaderships, and other groups that had played a part in the events in 1971. This intervention related to the question of Tito’s succession and desire to secure the revolutionary legacy of the Communist Party. It was also coloured by concern about Yugoslavia’s reputation abroad. With the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in mind, Tito was anxious to avoid a similar intervention in Yugoslavia after the Croatian Spring. To keep up an appearance of Yugoslav stability and reputation was also important for the continuing reception of foreign funding. In the 1970s, the Yugoslav economy entered a serious recession, with increased oil prices worldwide and a huge growth in the country’s debt. Until after Tito’s death, the foreign loans nevertheless concealed the full scale of this crisis for the majority of the country’s citizens. After 1972, the tension that had been so evident over the preceding years receded. Yugoslav citizens were still able to travel abroad both for recreation and work purposes. At home, freedom to speak one’s mind was considerably restricted, there was tighter Party control over the media, and censorship of public debate increased.

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After 1972, the old veterans of the Revolution Tito, Kardelj and Bakarić, sought to reinstate order in Yugoslavia and introduce some stability into the federal system. They sought to regulate national conflict rather than solve the national question, and this would have a long-term effect on Yugoslav politics. Kardelj and Bakarić both supported Tito’s attempt to secure Party unity and control, but they also wished to prevent a reversion to state centralism. This time, therefore, Party unity was not followed by re-centralisation – the competencies of the state level were reduced. Self-management was, according to the new Party rhetoric, put back on track but without national distortions. According to Kardelj, a return to centralism could only be avoided by granting autonomous roles for the republics in decision-making processes and by allowing pluralism of views. Tito’s intervention to reassert the leading role of the SKJ The first months after the purge of the Croatian leadership saw only small consequences of the dramatic events that had taken place, and a period of relative tranquillity ensued. The second Conference of the SKJ was convened in Belgrade on 25–27 January 1972. The most significant changes at this conference were the reduction of the Executive Bureau, and the qualitative change in its membership.1 Many of the demands from the Croatian leadership and ‘Mass Movement’ were paradoxically granted shortly following Tito’s curbing of events in the Republic. The foreign currency retention quotas were tripled only a few weeks after the resignation of Tripalo and Dabčević-Kučar. However, the removal of the Croatian Triumvirate was only the first step to be followed by a wideranging purge of the Party and other organisations later in the year. The new strategy of the SKJ consisted of a recentralisation of the Party, linked with a further decentralisation of the state. After two years of trying to reconcile the contradictions inherent in their approach, a more restricted form of self-management at the state level was institutionalised in the new constitution. Renewed emphasis on Party unity was realised through a massive purge of forces considered sympathetic to further Party federalisation or an enhanced role for the republics. The rationale for this shift was explained by Tito himself in some interviews in Vjesnik and Borba on 8 October, and most notoriously, in a memorandum, commonly referred to as the Letter, published on 18 October. In September 1972, Tito and Stane Dolanc, on behalf of the Executive Bureau, presented the Letter, signalling a return to a more authoritarian position within the SKJ Party organisation and the start of

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massive purges in all Party organisations. The Letter was not submitted to a full Presidium until after it had been sent out for discussion to all the Party organisations on 2 October. In this manner, Tito and the Executive Bureau bypassed standard procedures and presented a set of principles for all members to follow. These called for closer scrutiny of the performance of members of the Party, and the expulsion of members who failed to adhere to policy. Tito again emphasised, this time more assertively, the importance of strengthening the application of the principle of democratic centralism in all Party work, with emphasis on the centralism part of this principle. The Executive Bureau stressed the responsibility of regional leaderships for implementing Party policies and reaching consensus. Therefore, Tito argued, ‘the equal participation of all the Leagues of Communists of the Republics and Provinces in the construction of joint policy also means their equal responsibility for the implementation in practice of decisions adopted by democratic means, their equal responsibility for the results of the policy of the SKJ.2 Tito further emphasised the need to ensure appropriate ideological education to its members.3 In order to regain the SKJ’s control over political and economic affairs in Yugoslavia, Party members were expected to engage more directly in the activities of the various organs of self-management, state organs, and socio-political organisation. In interviews distributed in Vjesnik and Borba on 8 October 1972 Tito pointed out that, although the Party organisation in the Republics must take into consideration specific conditions in each Republic, the ideological and political direction had to be the same for the entire country. ‘On the basis of our unified ideological direction, this means that the programme for ideological and political action cannot allow protest against the unity of our socialist community; a society which moves in the direction of communism’. Tito argued: Nationalism is at its foundation a class [phenomenon], and we are talking about a struggle between class opponents. Nationalism and socialism cannot go together. They are two contradictory issues. The communists’ primary task was now ‘to put into effect, with no diversion, the amendments which have been adopted and with which national rights are also fulfilled’.4 This he argued would strengthen society and act as a force of cohesion. Then, Tito stated, ‘our country will appear as a solid creation both towards the world and internally’.5 Tito was also concerned about Yugoslavia’s international reputation, partly due

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to economic reasons. Yugoslavia was still dependent on foreign investment, and the appearance of stability was vital if this was to continue. There was also the threat of Soviet meddling after the Prague Spring. Domestic reasons were by far the most important, however. Tito argued that the Party must immediately adopt concrete measures against every individual who would oppose the new direction, and further that ‘already from the start, I was against the decentralisation of the SKJ. The SKJ is not any kind of federation it is a unified Party’.6 The central message in Tito’s new directives was the re-assertion of a leading role in Yugoslav society by a unified, disciplined, and thoroughly purged Party organisation. The Letter was published in the press on 18 October 1972. At the end of this month, Perović and Nikezić finally resigned from their positions after considerable objections from the Serbian Central Committee. Mirko Tepavac resigned his position as Foreign Secretary which he had inherited from Nikezić.7 The old Party and Partisan veteran Koča Popović, who had started to harbour doubts about the new direction of the SKJ and who was close to Perović and Nikezić, also resigned. The Party leadership in Vojvodina, with its close ties to the Serbian Party, was subjected to a purge, along with its colleagues in Belgrade. The Liberal leader of the Party in Slovenia, Stane Kavčič, and Macedonian Party leader Slavko Milosavleski were ‘relieved’ from their posts, as was Krste Crvenkovski. Party members with Liberal leanings were generally purged in all the republics. The Party purge was deep, and also affected the media and economic sector. After the Letter, Tito finally made real his threat of removing the Praxis Humanist professors from the universities in a quest to have ‘Marx return to the university’.8 They were not removed because of nationalism, which they had vigorously opposed and criticised for years. Paradoxically, the removal of the nationalist threat to the SKJ’s hegemonic position, also appears to have removed any usefulness the Praxis group may have had in Yugoslavia during the years of national upheaval. Eight professors at the Faculty of Philosophy at Belgrade University were found lacking in the new moral-political suitability criteria, and forced to resign from their posts. In 1972, Mihailo Đurić was expelled from the University and sentenced to two years in prison for his role in the Law Faculty debates in 1971. The SKJ introduced new university legislation, which made all outside representatives on faculty councils subject to direct government appointment, making it easier to expel university professors whose activities the Party found to be threatening their ‘social interest’.9 The press was put under stronger restrictions and the SKJ generally took a harder and more

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uncompromising line towards dissent against the ideology of the League of Communists. After 1972, so-called ‘Marxist Centres’ were created by each of the republican central committees to oversee all social research, to check that it followed the new Party line and applied appropriate ideological language. These applied strict censorship and had great power over the contents of manuscripts published in Yugoslavia in the 1970s. The new line emphasised the Party’s return to self-management socialism. In the same way as the removal of the leadership in Croatia stifled public debate and enthusiasm for the Yugoslav project, the silencing of genuine dissent against the constitutional amendments in Serbia, combined with the removal of the Serbian Liberals had a disillusioning effect in Serbia. The Serbian Liberals represented the one voice that had articulated support for decentralisation and tried to convince the public that such decentralisation was indeed in Serbia’s interest. By silencing both those who were at least reservedly in favour of the proposed federal changes, while concurrently closing any channels for those voicing concerns with the proposed amendments, the Serbs were left with a feeling that these proposals were creating a situation that was against their interests. Even worse, some forces now came to question whether the Yugoslav project was in their interest – and no constitutional concessions could make up for the disappointment experienced in Croatia following Tito’s intervention. Other republics, like Bosnia and Herzegovina where there had been considerable worry over the events in the preceding years, did appreciate (to some extent at least) the return to calm and order. Generally, however, his intervention had a stifling effect on political life in Yugoslavia. Tito’s role in changing the SKJ’s strategies at this time was essential. With his intervention in 1972, Tito clearly acted with what the Party leaders referred to as ‘administrative measures’. The fact that the Letter was delivered to the Presidency only after its distribution to all Party organisations was not only a breach of the principle of democratic centralism, it was also a sign that he did not have the full support of a majority in the Party. Rusinow refers to Tito’s actions as a virtual coup d’état.10 Importantly, while his long-time lieutenants Kardelj and Bakarić agreed about the need to strengthen the leading role of the SKJ, they did not agree about how this role should be exercised. They did not reject the principles of the Sixth Congress as Tito did, and they continued to be ardent supporters of self-management. The constitutional exercise that followed Tito’s intervention can be seen partly as an attempt to ensure that these principles would not be lost.

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The 1974 Constitution In the lull that ensued in Yugoslav political life during the two years after Tito’s purges, the preparation for a new constitution attracted considerable attention. The proposal for the new constitution was presented to the Federal Assembly in July 1972 and a draft was released for discussion and adopted in June 1973. The Constitution was ratified in February 1974, after approval from the Federal Assembly and each of the Republican Assemblies. In addition to the Federal Constitution, each republic adopted republican constitutions. For the first time, the provinces also received their own constitutions. With its 10 guiding principles, 406 articles and a lengthy introduction, the Yugoslav constitution was a gigantic and very detailed piece of work, and at the time, officially the world’s longest constitution. It represented the end of an era in the history of the Yugoslav federal state as established through the Second Session of AVNOJ in 1943, and at the same time, signalled the creation of a significantly modified Yugoslav federal system. The 1974 constitution institutionalised the systemic changes introduced through the 1971 amendments and Tito’s new political line since 1972. It was highly influenced by the particular events of the recent years, and therefore also reflected lessons learnt from these events. The 1974 constitution formed part of the ambition of the old leaders of the revolution to put Yugoslavia back on track after years of turbulence. This was also the rationale behind Kardelj’s design of a complicated system based on a new concept, associated labour, which would restrict self–management to a tighter Party framework and stricter communist definition. This new concept was built on the Workers’ amendments from 1971, amendments 21–23, where each work unit, entitled a Basic Organisation of Associated Labour (Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada – OOUR), was autonomous. The principles of this system were encapsulated in the Law on Associated Labour (Zakon o udruženom radu – ZUR) of 1976, a text even more elaborate than the 1974 constitution. It was motivated by an attempt to prevent Party power becoming concentrated among the regional leaderships. In practice, however, certain aspects of the new constitution contributed to making the republics and provinces the main actors in the decision-making process. The new constitutional provisions attempted to stem the power that had accumulated within the banks by making them subject to OOURs. Kardelj introduced an extremely intricate system for political representation incorporated in what was referred to as the ‘delegate system’. In short, this system incorporated multiple indirect elections, where the

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population was only allowed to choose at the lowest level. The population was divided into three categories: the working class, the working people and citizens.11 According to such categories and the intricate system created, they were able to elect candidates to the local, provincial, and republican assemblies. These assemblies then elected representatives to the Federal Assembly, who were bound to represent their local, regional, or provincial assemblies’ interests. These measures were all designed to strengthen the role of the SKJ and to ensure that its leading role would not be threatened by the other potential forces outside the Party, or by disintegration of the Party unity along republican lines. In practice, however, Kardelj’s new self-management designs were largely too intricate and confusing for most Yugoslavs, whether or not they were communists. Article 333 of the 1974 constitution proclaimed Josip Tito Broz ‘President of the Republic for an unlimited term of office’. Article 335 further stated ‘the President of the Republic shall be president of the presidency of the SFRY’.12 The state Presidency was reduced in size to eight members, one from each republic and province. The constitution stated that the President of the SKJ (Tito) would be an ex officio member of the state presidency. While the constitution provided Tito with the position of President of the Republic for life, it also contained provisions to prevent any other single person from assuming such a role. Therefore, it did not provide guidance on the election of a President of the Republic after Tito – at that time in his mid-80s. Instead, the presidency was equipped to act without the President of the Republic. In this manner, Article 321 of the Constitution provided for a rotating presidency based on the idea of parity, to replace Tito after his death.13 Simultaneously, the old revolutionary leaders, and particularly Kardelj, were concerned that even a suspicion that the SKJ was attempting to recentralise the Yugoslav state would lead to continuing instability, and potentially renewed national discontent. Therefore, in order to come to terms with the tension between the need for ensuring Party unity while allowing for national diversity, the 1974 constitution further institutionalised the decentralised state structure that had been initiated in the constitutional amendments since 1968. The role of the federal centre remained minimal and functioned mostly as an arena for agreement between the republics. The competences of the executive and legislative organs at the federal level were still limited to the areas listed by Amendment 33 from 1971. These included (most importantly) securing a common market and area for economic development and a common defence policy.

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Agreement for these was needed from all the federal units. The Yugoslav state thus increasingly became institutionalised as a multinational entity based upon the co-operation between the different republics. Article 1 of the 1974 constitution stated: The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united peoples and their socialist republics and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the power of and selfmanagement by the working class and all working people. It is simultaneously a socialist, self-management democratic community of working people and citizens and of nations and nationalities having equal rights.14 Article 3 further stated: The socialist republics are states based on the sovereignty of the people and the power of and self-management by the working class and all working people. They are socialist, self-managing democratic communities of working people and citizens and of nations and nationalities having equal rights.15 The recognition of the republics as state entities, as allocated by the 1971 amendments, was institutionalised in the new constitution. No sovereignty was designated with the Yugoslav state itself. Rather, the republics were described as states based on the sovereignty of the people. However, the dual connotation inherent in the word narod served to create confusion, and the constitution did not specify whether it alluded to each national group or to the people in the sense of the population that live within the borders of each republic. A problem was that the units were organised entirely on a territorial basis, while the sovereignty was assigned both to the people and to the republics. Further, there was confusion about whether the nationalities were also ascribed sovereignty and the right to self-determination and secession. The 1974 constitution fundamentally changed the character of the Yugoslav federal system and the relations between the Republics and provinces. Its passing nevertheless proceeded without the voicing of the objections that had surrounded the 1971 amendments. Primarily, this could be attributed to the effects of Tito’s actions in 1972. This action succeeded in silencing any objections

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or genuine reservations that might have been held against aspects of the new constitutional arrangement. The lack of discussion nevertheless had more complex causes than Tito’s silencing of the debate. The provisions of the constitution affected both inter- and intra-republican dynamics. The liberal forces lost power in most republics, but their demands were nevertheless to a great degree enacted, so Tito’s housecleaning was no unadulterated victory for the conservative forces. The leaderships in Croatia and Slovenia, despite disillusionment with Tito’s actions, mainly succeeded in consolidating internal calm after the turmoil of the early 70s. Attention largely turned towards defending republican affairs and interests. In Serbia the situation was different. And it would be the provisions that concerned the internal relation between Serbia and its provinces that would cause most conflict. With the provisions granted to the provinces through the 1974 constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina started to act more independently from Belgrade. The Kosovar Albanian position within the Yugoslav federal framework had gradually improved since 1968. With this, hopes also grew that Kosovo would achieve full republican status. Under the leadership of Stevan Doronjski (Vojvodina Serb) Vojvodina too sought to expand its sphere of influence.16 The Serbian leadership, on the other hand, grew increasingly uneasy with the autonomy granted to the provinces, and with the effects of the post-1974 constitutional arrangement on the internal relations within their republic. After Tito ousted the Liberals in 1972, the Serbian Party organisation came under the auspices of Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić, who would remain the grandees of the Serbian Party leadership for the next decade.17 Draža Marković had proved useful in Tito’s putsch against Nikezić and Perović. However, Tito was apprehensive about Marković too. Ironically Tito had – according to Slavoljub Đukić – attempted, in spring 1971, to persuade Nikezić to remove Marković from the position as President for the Serbian Skupština. Tito’s motivation was Marković’s critical attitude to the 1971 constitutional amendments.18 The same Draža Marković would be the one to sign the 1974 Constitution. After 1974, Marković would become the voice lamenting the effects of the constitutional amendments on internal affairs in Serbia. In his view, the increasing republican focus on territory after the 1974 constitution, was a factor that made it doubly difficult for the Serbian leadership, due to the fact that the Serbian population was more spread than other Yugoslav peoples.19 However, Marković did not reject or seek to overturn the Constitution, nor did he reject the ideas of Kardelj, or the principles on which the constitution were based. Although Marković had disagreed

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with Kardelj on many issues, he and Stambolić both commanded a good and friendly relation to Kardelj, and had great respect for his work. The Serbian leaders sought the arbitration from Kardelj firstly, and not from Tito in their attempt to address the conflict between Belgrade and the two provinces, whose leaderships – in the eyes of the Serbian leaders – were acting increasingly on their own initiative. It is important to keep in mind that Kardelj’s position was not anti-Serbian, but fearful of centralism.20 According to Marković, they conducted a series of talks with Kardelj from 1975–1977.21 Marković argues that Kardelj had considerable understanding of the Serbian position, but was apprehensive about involvement in this very sensitive issue. He proposed that the Serbian leaders and those of the provinces attempt to solve it internally. According to Marković, Kardelj’s primary concern was to find an end to the crisis in inter-republican relations. He thus advised the Serbian leaders to be patient, hoping that greater economic integration would result from the new federal provisions. He also appeared confident, according to Markovic’s statement, that a solution to the intra-republican relations in Serbia would be found later. However, neither Kardelj nor Tito addressed this extremely sensitive issue when it emerged. Marković points to the fact that Kardelj was already seriously ill with cancer at this point as one factor for his non-intervention. It has been suggested that Tito, also not in the best of health, had asked him to be careful about meddling in this affair. Efforts at dialogue with the provinces came to little. Thus, in 1977, the Serbian leadership decided to express its main concerns in an official critique of the workings of the 1974 constitution. This happened in what has been referred to as the Blue Book (plava knjiga – an internal document produced by constitutional experts for the Serbian state presidency, but never formally discussed or made public).22 The report’s main concern was the relationship and the lack of unity between the three components of SR Serbia – Serbia proper, and the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. It pointed out the difficulties in passing laws applying to the entire republic.23 The report also recommended that on issues of common interests, consensus should be reached based on debate between all three parts. It complained that while the provincial representative took part in the governance of Serbia proper, the republican representatives did not take part in that of the provinces.24 Ivan Stambolić, nephew of Petar Stambolić, then leader of the Serbian Party organisation, later argued that the main aim behind the launch of the Blue Book, was not to suggest changes in the 1974 Constitution, but rather to illustrate some of the challenges the new provisions created for the relations between

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inner Serbia and the provinces.25 Stambolić pointed to the fact that a number of the new constitutional provisions were open for considerable interpretation, and that a workable solution could only be made through consensus and negotiation.26 According to Ivan Stambolić, the Blue Book remained the subject of controversy between Serbia and its provinces throughout 1977 and 1978.27 Belgrade’s attempt to secure greater control over all-Serbian affairs was (unsurprisingly) resisted by the provinces. The Kosovar leadership referred to the book as ‘a blueprint for Serbian nationalism’, and ‘an attempt to return to the times of Ranković’.28 The Serbian leaders met little support from the other republics, who saw the initiative as an attempt to recentralise the federation. Although other republics dismissed these issues as internal Serbian affairs, the post-1974 constitutional disputes in Serbia also had a Yugoslav dimension. In the words of Ivan Stambolić, the provinces closed themselves off from their home republic, and turned towards other republics and the world.29 Draža Marković pointed out that, in 1975, irritation grew within the Serbian leadership over what in their perception constituted an increasing tendency by the Kosovar leadership to identify with Yugoslavia, while ignoring or even by-passing the Serbian republican level.30 The same was the case with Vojvodina. In doing so, Stevan Doronjski (Vojvodina) and Fadil Hoxha (Kosovo) sought support at the federal level. Here they found sympathetic listeners, since some federal representatives from other republics were keen to diminish the influence of Marković and Stambolić, while concurrently ensuring that no changes were made to the decentralised state model. This pattern would repeat itself in the turbulent 1980s. Most shocking to the initiators of the Blue Book, was the opposition they met from within Serbia itself. According to Draža Marković, Stevan Doronjski and Fadil Hoxha sought an alternative Serbian leadership, less intent on diminishing the role of the provinces. They had their eyes on Miloš Minić.31 Minić had received legendary status within the SKJ for his role as main prosecutor against Draža Mihailović after World War II. In 1963, Minić had supported a centralist Serbian initiative which argued for a different internal organisation of Serbia: a division into a number of regions where Kosovo and Vojvodina would constitute one such region.32 By 1970, Minić had changed his tune. Former centralist sins were forgotten as he created a reputation as a true Yugoslav and protector of the rights of the provinces. His relation to Petar Stambolić and Marković was highly antagonistic. All three were described by Ćosić as ‘interested in power only for the sake of power’.33 Nevertheless, Minić appears to have

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enjoyed a better reputation than his two opponents among the public. This was partly due to his perceived conduct during the Belgrade student demonstrations of 1968.34 Minić chose to concentrate his attention at the Yugoslav federal level rather than to compete with Stambolić and Marković for power at the republican level.35 At the federal level, he gradually built up a support base. Most importantly, he was considered a favourite of Tito, being a minister of foreign affairs after Tepavac. Tito’s impression of Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić remained, at best, lukewarm.36 In 1977–8, Minić’s defence of the Provinces effectively killed off any possibility of the affair of the Blue Book going any further. At the time there were also considerable rumours in the corridors of power that Tito envisioned Minić as the future representative of Serbia, in the highest Party functions.37 Whether or not this was the case, Tito was reluctant to intervene. Concerning the relations between inner Serbia and the provinces, Tito attempted to bury the conflict. Ivan Stambolić perceived Tito to be more sympathetic to the position of the provinces, but he nevertheless viewed Tito’s position to have been a neutral one, primarily interested in laying the issue to rest amicably.38 While Tito may have succeeded in defusing open conflict between Serbia and its provinces, neither their mutual distrust nor the discussion over their relations and status would go away. Nor would this be the last of the conflict involving Stambolić, Marković and Minić. A new round would start at the Twelfth Congress in 1982. In the 1970s, Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković could be more appropriately described as recentralists than as Serbian nationalists. Indeed, the 1980s Serbian intelligentsia of a national persuasion would label them traitors to the Serbian nation. Furthermore, their attitude was more dogmatic than conservative. Stambolić had until 1972 been sympathetic to the Liberal cause. Marković’s position leaned further towards conservativism than Stambolić, but he was not a centralist in the sense that Ranković had been. Despite apprehensions about the consequences of decentralisation for Serbia, he was not opposed to self-management, and his relationship with Kardelj was much closer than that with Tito. Both Stambolić and Marković were keen to avoid confrontation with the other republics. They thought nevertheless that Serbia had been poorly served by the 1974 Constitution. They were frustrated with being ‘caught’ between a struggle where they were losing out to increasing pressure from the other republics and its provinces for more decentralisation, and the accusations of Great Serbian hegemonism when raising the issue.

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Unity and diversity in Yugoslavia 1974–1980 Yugoslav cohesion, nationalism and Yugoslavism in the 1970s Following the events of the 1970s, the SKJ came to the conclusion that Yugoslav nations were no different from other nations. Few, if any, expected attachment to individual national cultures and identities to disappear. At the Tenth Congress in 1974, the Party pointed out their disagreement with the notion that ‘interests of the working class were a-national’, but simultaneously stated their opposition to ‘tendencies which negated the connection and unity of interests of the working class of one nation with the interests of the working class from another nation in the Yugoslav Socialist Community’.39 With his own inventive, if somehow paradoxical logic, Tito argued that ‘under socialist self-management relations, the interest of the working class who had fought for the position of ruling class in the nation, had become the interests of the nation, and the interests of the nation had become the interests of the class’.40 While Tito and Kardelj both focused on the creation of lasting stability in inter-republican relations and consensus between the Yugoslav peoples, the question of Yugoslav unity remained sensitive. The constitutional changes introduced since the late 1960s transformed not only the Yugoslav federal system but also the concept of Yugoslav unity. In many ways, as Jovan Đorđević lamented, it signalled the change from one sense of unity, towards a new type of interrelation between the Yugoslav peoples. In the 1970s, commonality became linked to the co-operation between national blocs, based on Tito and Kardelj’s contention that if the nations felt secure, the fear of assimilation would subside leading to better Yugoslav cohesion. At the Tenth Congress, Tito argued that it was necessary to strengthen ‘socialist solidarity’, mutual support and assistance between the nations and nationalities. This, he pointed out, was the precondition for further strengthening of brotherhood and unity, a term he used with increased frequency in this period. Furthermore, Tito argued, self-management socialism was the precondition for creating equality between the peoples and nationalities. In a multinational state, Tito warned not even self-management could be fully created without national equality. By the 1970s, socialist Yugoslavism was no longer a favoured term. Although the SKJ continued to promote Brotherhood and Unity, ‘Yugoslav socialist patriotism,’ ‘commonality’ (zajedništvo), and ‘socialist solidarity’, these calls for Yugoslav unity were

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more general in character and not accompanied by an organised attempt to create an integral Yugoslav culture or identity of the kind endeavoured in the 1950s. Yugoslav culture was seen as complementary to national cultures, rather than as something that would replace them. Jugoslavenstvo became a synonym for unitarism, associated with the form of integral Yugoslavism Kardelj had been so keen to distance it from, and not with a positive progressive image. There was no longer a contradiction between having an attachment to a national identity while still identifying oneself also as a Yugoslav. In fact, there was no consensus if identifying oneself primarily as a Yugoslav was necessarily something progressive. In 1970, it was suggested that the category ‘Yugoslav, undeclared’ should be removed from the census scheduled for the following year, but in the end, it was retained. In the 1971 census, only 320,853 people – 1.6 per cent of the population, declared themselves to be Yugoslavs. The census from 1981 showed a marked increase in those who declared themselves Yugoslavs, to 1,209,045 people, making up 5.4 per cent of the population (see Table 12.1).41 While some took this increase to be a sign of deeper Yugoslav integration, others were more sceptical of such assertions. Dušan Bilandžić, at that time member of the Croatian Central Committee, referred to these numbers as a ‘statistical invention’.42 In Bilandžić’s opinion, attachment to national identities had not subsided. Instead, he argued, in a society where the smallest national manifestation in political life was a criminal offence, and nationalism was treated as the greatest threat to the social system, this form of social consciousness existed in covert conditions.43 In an article in Vjesnik in 1982 that provoked considerable controversy, Bilandžić rejected the notion that a Yugoslav nation was in the making, and accused Yugoslavs who had recently converted of ‘anti-federalist’ motives expressed in admiration of centralised administration.44 Now, there were few indications that the Communist Party itself aspired to create a Yugoslav nation at this point, or had any expectations that this would happen. However, Bilandžić argued that Yugoslavs were less integrated than the survey results suggested. He pointed to a tendency whereby groups in all regions, but particularly Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo migrated to their ‘home’ communities.45 Predictably, the suggestions that centralist motives were behind the increase in those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs, provoked reactions, including accusations against Bilandžić of Croatian nationalism.46 Although Bilandžić admitted the difficulty in measuring public manifestations of national consciousness, he pointed to a number of sociological and demographic surveys to back up his claim

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Table 12.1  Yugoslav population according to nationality47 Ethnic affiliation

Census year

Total population

Structure in percentage

Montenegrins

1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981

513,832 508,843 579,023 4,239,798 4,526,782 4,428.005 1,045,527 1,194,784 1,339,729 972,954 1,729,932 1,999,597 1,589,197 1,678,032 1,753,554 7,806,195 8,143,246 8,140,452 914,731 1,309,523 1,730,364 504,369 477,374 426,866 317,124 320,853 1,209,045

2.8 2.5 2.6 23.2 22.1 19.7 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.3 8.4 8.9 8.6 8.2 7.8 42.1 39.7 36.3 4.9 6.4 7.7 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.6 5.4

Croats Macedonians Muslims Slovenes Serbs Albanians Hungarians Yugoslavs

that national consciousness was still very much present in Yugoslav society after 1971.48 One important indicator of the degree of national consciousness, he argued, was the level of religiosity in society, and pointed to one sociological survey showing a rise of religiosity among citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. Another important indicator was the decline in economic integration. Bilandžić argued that while the purpose of the ZURs was to create more organic integration among the working people of Yugoslavia, the resulting integration from these new self-management organs was in fact minimal. In the period 1970–78 inter-republican/provincial trade decreased from 40 per cent to under 32

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per cent, and until 1980, to 22.2 per cent.49 As we have seen, the expectations of economic integration was also one reason why Kardelj hoped the problems experienced in Serbia would sort themselves out without the leadership intervening to open up this particular can of worms. Another possible explanation for the increase of Yugoslavs was mixed marriages Indications of problems of Yugoslav integration and sensitivity over the question of Yugoslav commonality could be found in other areas too. Education, research, culture, and media were still organised at republican level. Inter-republic cooperation and integration within these fields were even weaker than they had been during the SKJ’s offensive to improve such relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Republican leaderships funded several projects, focusing on areas of republican interests. The work on the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia – originally initiated under the editorship of Krleža in the 1950s – had begun in 1975. Negotiations over the project continued until 1979. The first volume appeared in 1980, but immediately its entry on ‘Albanians’ and ‘Albanian–Yugoslav relations’ proved controversial. Other entries, including that of ‘Montenegro’, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’ and not least ‘Yugoslavia’ continued to cause debate throughout the 1980s and eventually the project was discontinued in 1991.50 A number of all-Yugoslav projects including History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia, and the History of the Communist Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia ran into serious problems in the 1970s. The History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia particularly demonstrated the difficulty in getting historians from different Yugoslav regions to agree on a common approach to many issues in the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia, and to the interpretation of the formation of the Yugoslav state. This even meant that they did not mark the 50th anniversary of the collapse of Austria-Hungary.51 The first volume of History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia in what was intended to be a four-volume series was published in 1953, and the second volume did not appear until 1960. An anticipated third volume never appeared. In the meantime Vladimir Dedijer, who had been Tito’s biographer, together with Ivan Božić, Sima Ćirković and Milorad Ekmečić, launched their alternative publication, History of Yugoslavia (Istorija Jugoslavije). It was the section on the nineteenth century by the Serbian historian Milorad Ekmečić from the University of Sarajevo that would cause the greatest controversy.52 Particularly contentious was his thesis that Serbs, Croats and Muslims had divided themselves into nations on a religious rather than a linguistic basis.53 In his view, religion was to blame for the failure of the construction of an integrated Yugoslav identity between the Serbs,

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Croats, and Muslims on a secular basis. The Catholic Church in particular was portrayed as the villain who hindered Yugoslav unity. Ekmečić was also criticised for his favourable portrayal of Serbian language reformer Vuk Karadžić (1787–1864) who had favoured a language-based definition of Serbs, which would include all those who used the Štokavian dialect. Ekmečić was also accused of integral Yugoslavist tendencies. He argued that the ‘failure of this agrarian society to build a secularised idea such as language (the only possible democratic conception of society) into the foundation of the nation meant that the subsequent South Slavic history would be marked by this failure’.54 These are only a few examples demonstrating the complexity and sensitivity attached to any discussion of Yugoslav history and Yugoslav unity in the 1970s. However, the real breakdown of consensus and discussion on controversies in Yugoslav history, and particularly over the Party-sanctioned version of it, would not emerge until some years after Tito’s death. Tito’s new line since 1972 signified a temporary silencing of opinions and of discussions on important topics, rather than the absence of such issues. In the meantime, the issue of greatest concern to both Tito and Kardelj was securing the legacy of their Yugoslav and socialist project and to secure the continuing leading role of the Party. From ‘harmonisation’of views to pluralism of interests Although the 1974 constitution and the Law on Associated Labour of 1976 were passed, not all their provisions came into effect. The proposed changes not only radically altered the Yugoslav self-management system, but also introduced an entire new vocabulary (which appeared more confusing than enlightening for most Yugoslavs). In 1977 and 1978, Kardelj and Tito respectively made their last attempt at implementing the reforms that they had projected with the 1974 constitution, but which proved complicated to activate, and which many political leaders hoped would not really be put into effect. In 1977, Kardelj issued his last large work on the self-management system in Yugoslavia, entitled The Directions of Development of the Political System of Socialist Selfmanagement.55 This work was an attempt to impose some theoretical rationalisation to the Yugoslav political system since the 1974 constitution, but by this time Kardelj’s intellectual exercises had become too complicated and for many, too theoretical, for the handling of real political problems. This work did, however, present one important new development in Kardelj’s thinking, with regard to the national question and the management of national conflict. By this time, Kardelj had come to

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believe that conflict would continue to play an important role in Yugoslav society. Such conflicts stemmed in Kardelj’s opinion from the emergence of political pluralism in the self-management system. Kardelj’s recognition of conflict as an important and lasting aspect of the self-management system and the existence of pluralism of views, constituted an important break with past rhetoric and understanding. Kardelj’s thesis must also be seen in an international context, as an attempt to define the Yugoslav political system as a new type of democratic system for regulating national and other conflict in a multinational, socialist context.56 In this work, he went to great lengths to define the Yugoslav ‘solution’ as different both from Western bourgeois democratic pluralism but also different from state-socialist regimes. The new development in Kardelj’s thinking on conflict and pluralism redefined the role of the federal system in regulation of national conflict and other types of conflict. Since the SKJ came to power, they had insisted that national conflict, like other conflict, would diminish as socialism was built. Kardelj’s thesis in 1977 finally took the continuance of conflict into equation, and attempted to make provisions to institutionalise mechanisms into the system designed to make decisions made on the basis of pluralisms of sometimes conflicting views. Since 1970, the stress in SKJ rhetoric had been on the need for harmonisation in inter-republican relations. However, in 1977, Kardelj insinuated that: self-management democracy is not a system founded on ideal harmony, on the contrary, it is formed on the struggle of opinions and criticism of practice and often even on direct confrontation between partial interests, confrontations between particular where decisions have to be reached by majority vote, and not through negotiation or self-managing agreement.57 This would thus imply that the postwar Yugoslav federal system constituted not so much a solution to national conflict, as an advanced system for regulating such conflict in a socialist multinational state. However, not everybody in the SKJ was equally at ease with the notion of pluralism and the emphasis on conflict which they had attempted to play down since 1972. At the 11th SKJ Congress held in Belgrade in June 1978 the aspect of pluralism in Kardelj’s thesis was played down.58 Instead, focus on harmonisation and on achieving consensus in the decision-making process was promoted. There was a clear tension between the concepts of democratic centralism and pluralism, and the SKJ leadership struggled to find a balance between the two.

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Tito launched his own initiative in November 1978 when, in a speech to the Eighth Congress of the Trade Union, he introduced the idea of establishing a collective leadership in all institutions of the political system.59 His main motive appears to have been linked to the concern of making arrangements for the succession after his death. Bakarić also pointed to another motive, and argued that Tito was keen to secure the relations between the national groups in Yugoslavia.60 One rationale behind Tito’s introduction of a rotating collective leadership seems to have been to prevent one regional leadership from dominating the decision-making process. Though not all aspects were implemented by the time Kardelj and Tito passed away, the initiatives they had taken since 1972 to secure their legacy considerably weakened the competences of the Yugoslav Federation and the federal organs and made effective decision-making difficult. Both initiatives built upon the assumption that communist leaders and members would behave according to the guidelines Tito and Kardelj had recommended, and that regional leaderships would be able to reach and interested in reaching consensus. However, many of the changes introduced were to a large extent forced upon a reluctant Party membership by leaders now at the end of their careers and lives. Tito and Kardelj at this point both failed to take into account some often expressed concerns with the implemented changes, and neither of the two men lived long enough to straighten out any of the issues that became subject to differences in views. In the 1970s, the Party leaders who had set out to create a new, socialist Yugoslavia attempted to make some final adjustments to secure the legacy of their socialist project and of multinational Yugoslavia. They sought to ensure the continuing leading role of the SKJ. To do so, they wanted to introduce stability into a political system that had undergone tremendous change since the 1960s. Tito’s answer after 1971 was continued federalisation, less democracy and increased manifestation of Party authority. This strategy may have been temporarily effective, but the long-term effects on the legitimacy of the socialist project and indeed the Yugoslav state were disastrous. The 1974 constitution, Kardelj’s massive re-organisation of the self-management system and the provisions for a collective rotating leadership had profound consequences after he and Tito had passed away. When the Yugoslav system and unity was tested in ways not predicted by its leaders, only a few years later, these leaders were no longer there to guide the country through the crisis. Instead, it was left in the hands of a collective leadership whose ability to deal with these new challenges in an effective manner had been weakened considerably.

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Although the combination of Tito’s intervention in 1972 and the provisions of the 1974 constitutional changes introduced some temporary calm in Yugoslavia during the last years of Kardelj and Tito, none of these measures had the long-term stabilising effect on Yugoslavia they had hoped for. Nor did the new Party line ‘solve’ the national question in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, there was increasing recognition of the fact that national conflict had not been eradicated with socialist revolution or self-management socialism. Even the dogmatic Stipe Šuvar admitted that it was ‘an illusion to expect that the national question can be solved once and for all’.61 Nevertheless, the official Party line was maintained until after the Twelfth Congress in 1982, that the national question had mainly been solved.62 In the decentralising process that had evolved in Yugoslavia since the mid-1960s, there had been growing focus on the individual interests of each of the peoples, rather than on common unity. This made it more difficult to find a common principle on which to base belonging or loyalty to Yugoslavia. By the mid-1970s, not even the Serbs, who had long been accused of promoting Yugoslavism to further their own aims, were willing to ‘defend Yugoslavia’. The unfortunate fact was that in Yugoslavia after 1972 there were few alternative concepts for promoting any common Yugoslav interests or sense of belonging acceptable to everybody, untainted by associations with unitarism and ‘great-state hegemony’. Nor were there any alternatives for advocating policies for inter-national or inter-republican cooperation that were not based on a republican-territorial principle. The 1974 constitution and Tito and Kardelj’s provisions for the post-Tito era could not provide the glue to encourage cohesion between the Yugoslav peoples beyond that of mere inter-republican negotiations. Even though the 1974 constitution did grant many of the demands put forward by the Croatian leadership in 1971, these concessions could not overcome the deep feeling of disappointment in Croatia after Tito’s intervention which had been much more severe in Croatia than in other republics. While Tito’s actions might have succeeded in ‘silencing’ the Croats, it did not infuse them with much enthusiasm for the further development of the Yugoslav project. Many interpreted Tito’s intervention as a defeat to the ideals put forward by the Yugoslav Communists. Equally, after the purges in 1972, and particularly with the Đurić case in mind, the Serbs were more careful to express dissatisfaction with the 1974 constitution while Tito and Kardelj were still alive. However, the silencing of many genuine concerns about aspects of the new constitution had consequences for post-Tito Yugoslavia.

13 YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO

In May 1980, Tito passed away only a few weeks before his 88th birthday. Edvard Kardelj had died of illness the previous year, and Vladimir Bakarić passed away in 1983. During the last years of their lives, Tito, Kardelj and Bakarić sought to secure the legacy of the socialist Yugoslavia they had spent a lifetime building. Instead, the 1980s saw party unity fragment, their claimed solution to the national question unravel, and the delegitimation of their Yugoslav socialist project. These processes eventually led to the dissolution of the League of Communists, accompanied by the disintegration of the Yugoslav state and a brutal war. The unravelling of the SKJ ‘solution’ to the national question in the 1980s was influenced by a number of interconnecting factors. The new SKJ leadership was soon tested by new challenges to the Yugoslav political system which, by the mid-1980s, had blended into a most unfortunate and explosive mix. The post-Tito Yugoslav leaders were immediately faced with an emerging economic crisis, followed by a deep political crisis. As debate around the roots of the economic problems grew, the question of the political system and self-management system and the communist leadership’s ability to handle this crisis came into focus. The eruption of riots in Kosovo in 1981, less than a year after Tito’s death sent shockwaves through Yugoslav society and entirely changed the dynamics of national relations. The events in Kosovo opened the door for renewed discussion about the constitutional framework of Yugoslavia, and particularly about the internal relations between Belgrade and the two provinces in Serbia. Internal divergences over the federal design of the state and over how to deal with the growing economic and systemic

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crises became unfathomable. This happened at a time when state-socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union suffered broader crises of legitimacy. The SKJ’s inability to deal with the crisis seriously shook public confidence, opening the door to outside critiques from domestic sources; and the legitimacy of the SKJ and its claimed solution to the national question was called into question. The deepest critique of Tito and the socialist solution to the national question emerged in Serbia. Slovenia and Serbia were again at the front of debates on federal and national relations, and will be granted particular attention. The development of Serbia’s and Slovenia’s positions on the national questions must, however be examined within a broader Yugoslav context. As we have seen in previous chapters, the solution which the SKJ claimed to have developed to address the national question relied on a common acceptance of the key cornerstones introduced in 1945. The socialist solution to the Yugoslav national question carried both a practical and an ideological component. The federal system, based on the principle of national equality and decision-making on a consensual principle constituted a key aspect of the practical component to this claimed solution. Ideologically, the socialist solution to the national question was closely linked to the self-management system, and thus also dependent on its performance. Such performance still relied on some adherence to the principle of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’. Both components deeply depended on Party unity. Above all, the socialist solution to the Yugoslav national question remained closely linked to the preservation of the hegemonic role of the SKJ as the vanguard of Yugoslav society. Each of these components came under pressure in the 1980s. The main focus of this chapter rests upon the factors that served to erode the legitimacy of the SKJ approach to the national question together with the leading role of the Party that had formulated it. The Yugoslav leaders and the national question 1980–1986 The emergence of the national question at the centre of the political stage was a consequence of a broader process that gradually led to the delegitimation of the Yugoslav socialist project, to which the communists’ solution to national question was intimately tied. Though increased party discipline and censorship imposed after 1972 had largely served to stifle debates on national relations, it had not taken the national question out of Yugoslav politics. Initially, the collective leadership focused its attention on preserving the system designed by Tito and his confidants, encapsulated in the slogan; ‘After Tito – Tito!’ As Ivan Stambolić pointed out,

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however, there was no consensus among the leaders on ‘whose Tito’ the future vision would be built.1 Tito’s position had changed, over the years and with these changes in strategy, so the Yugoslav federal system also changed.2 In the sensitive post-Tito environment, the new leaders focused on presenting a front of unity and had no wish to open up the Pandora’s box that the national question presented in the Yugoslav context. Thus the SKJ leaders officially attempted primarily to contain the national question, and to avoid engagement with this sensitive issue. The official postTito SKJ rhetoric on the national question was characterised by the dual concern of preserving the SKJ’s leading role in Yugoslav society, while concurrently safeguarding the system from domination of one national group and from what in Yugoslav socialist rhetoric was called bureaucratic centralism. Again, communist leaders in each republic and province were expected to keep their respective potential nationalist forces under control. However, as Stambolić admitted, often ‘the members of the SKJ had too narrow a view of the phenomenon of nationalism’, interpreting it almost exclusively as a political question. Therefore, he added, ‘their engagement with nationalists and with nationalist phenomena were often more declamatory or administrative than real’.3 Furthermore, there was a tendency among party leaders to see the SKJ solution to the national question and the regulation of national conflict as essentially parts of the self-management system. This meant that reforms that would touch at the practical and ideological framework of the self-management system had the potential to reopen the national question. The political leadership thus remained reluctant to touch the ideological foundation of the political system and the self-management system which to some extent restricted the SKJ’s room for manoeuvre, to tackle the challenges it met. Communist leadership, economic debates, political challenges and Kosovo After Tito’s death, three issues came to dominate the debates in Yugoslavia: • the emergence of an economic crisis; • debate over the political system – including a renewed debate on the constitutional system • Kosovo and the positions of the two provinces within the Republic of Serbia.

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All three issues were intimately intertwined with the SKJ’s approach to the national question. Debates on the workings of the political system which emerged soon after Tito’s death had roots which preceded the economic crisis. But economic problems were the catalyst that forced the SKJ to face the post-Tito challenges. The severe financial crisis that hit Yugoslavia in the 1980s impeded the SKJ’s handling of national relations, impacted on its legitimacy as the leading power and contributed to the fragmentation of the party along regional lines. The Yugoslav economy had started to show signs of recession in the 1970s, in the wake of a global financial crisis. In 1979, an ailing Tito had expressed his deep concern at the state of the Yugoslav economy and the development of the economic and social system.4 However, he also insisted on keeping the developing crisis out of the public eye, based mainly on political considerations. In 1975, Yugoslavia’s foreign debt had stood at $6.5 million, but by 1980, this had grown to $20 million.5 Debt and inflation continued to grow through the 1980s. By 1986, inflation had risen to over 80 per cent.6 While the international economic crisis may have initiated the Yugoslav economic problems, the lack of a concerted handling of this crisis in Yugoslavia would compound them. When the financial crisis hit, the leadership appeared paralysed. Thus, ‘instead of the vanguard ambushing the crisis, the crisis ambushed the vanguard’.7 As the scale of the crisis became more apparent, SKJ leaders could no longer conceal it from the Yugoslav public. From 1982, prices rose and government subsidies disappeared. Unemployment skyrocketed to drastic levels, a disaster for an economy adhering to a socialist principle. The Belgrade media’s exposure of the economic problems had a significant role in pressuring the SKJ to change its tune. The weekly magazine NIN carried a number of articles exposing the gravity of a crisis the consequences of which most Yugoslavs by now were experiencing.8 The crisis was augmented by a deepening conflict within the party itself over how to deal with the new situation. By the 1980s, the republics were largely in charge of their own financial affairs. All major decision-making required inter-regional consensus by a collective leadership, based on the dual principle of a rotation of elected officials, combined with representation on an equal footing of all the constituent republics as well as the two autonomous provinces. This gave the republics and the provinces de facto veto right over federal policy. This principle of consensus proved ever more elusive once Tito was gone. Differences crystallised between the federal level and the Republics, and between the Federal Executive Committee (FEC), having to deal with the crisis, and the party leadership, whose

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main purpose was to preserve the self-management system and its ideological framework.9 The FEC had lost much of its power since 1969, but had nonetheless retained an important broker-role in negotiations among the federal units. Once Tito was gone, however, it became very difficult for the FEC to compel republics to implement the reforms and initiatives proposed by the council. When the financial crisis hit, the federal leadership had no overview of the borrowings of separate republics, as they did not bother reporting this to the federal level.10 This made it difficult for the federal government to make a proper assessment of the country’s debt, or find a concerted way of addressing the crisis. The federal government’s attempts to gain control over the economy and impose austerity measures were met with considerable defiance, both from the Party elders and from the republican delegates of the Federal Assembly.11 The party leaders’ opposition was largely motivated by ideological considerations, as they feared that introduction of market reform would be a step in the direction of dismantling the self-management system or admitting that it could not deal with the crisis. The seeming inability of the SKJ leaders to deal with the crisis seriously shook public confidence in the Party. This led the SKJ to immerse itself in a large-scale self-criticism exercise. A commission, established under the auspices of Slovene Sergej Kraigher, was set up to deal with the growing economic crisis, without tampering with the fundamental principles of the political system.12 Over 300 economic and social science experts from all over Yugoslavia were engaged by the commission to find a way out of the economic crisis.13 The outcome was a programme for economic stabilisation, published in two stages over the course of a year, from June 1982 to June 1983.14 The main recommendations of the Kraigher commission included: • increased reliance on the action of market forces in place of economic plans to regulate the economy; • establishment of a compulsory domestic market in convertible currency, movement towards the convertibility of the dinar; • a realistic exchange rate and real interest rates. Domestically, it included greater integration of the regional economies and tougher action against inefficient and unprofitable enterprises and strict limitations on further international borrowings.15 The Kraigher commission remained largely concerned with preserving the ideological framework, and never advocated any far-reaching reforms that would challenge the self-management system. Indeed, the proposed measures

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were never implemented in the manner intended.16 The republican leaders were again unable to synchronise their positions, and the federal government once more proved powerless to compel the republics to adhere to its recommendations and those of the Kraigher commission. The financial crisis became entwined with a wider struggle for power, influence and resources among the republican leaderships, and between the regions and the federal centre. The political and economic interests of the developed and underdeveloped republics and provinces continued to diverge. Republics and communes frequently acted out of regional and localised short-term interests, and were often unwilling to compromise on long-term common policy. In the 1980s, the battles within the party organisation formed around two different lines of division, discussed below. The liberal–conservative dichotomy Liberals tended to favour market reform, whereas conservatives favoured social distribution to even out regional differences. Economic reformers tended to prevail in the most developed republics, with Slovenia and Croatia at the forefront, while the less developed republics and provinces tended to favour social distribution. The economic gap widened between the more developed northern republics, which continued to enjoy higher standards of living, and the underdeveloped southern regions, where the standard of living declined. This made a common strategy increasingly unlikely, since most initiatives would meet resistance from one or more republican and provincial leadership. The liberal–conservative divide also expressed itself politically, between those who favoured the use of more repressive methods to maintain party control, and those who did not. The battle between centrifugal and centripetal forces within the party organisation Decentralists, who wished for status quo or further federalisation of Yugoslavia, found themselves increasingly at loggerheads with Recentralists, who pressured for increased power to be allocated to the federal level, and for a constitutional review.17 As debate around the roots of the economic problems grew, the question of the entire self-management system and its ability to deal with the crisis came into focus. The constitutional question and the territorial arrangement of the Yugoslav socialist federation became a key issue, which would impact deeply on the dividing lines within the party leadership. The division between the centrifugal and centripetal forces within the SKJ, and on the dynamic.

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The 1981 Kosovo crisis In the period from 11 March to 3 April 1981, demonstrations and riots took place in Kosovo. They started among the students at Priština University, ostensibly sparked by despondency over conditions and student provisions.18 Soon the unrest also spread to the streets and two subsequent waves of rioting followed on March 26 and April 1–2.19 These were more serious, and spread to a number of other Kosovo towns. On March 26, a strike broke out in Podujevo in support of the students, at which 35 people were reported injured and 21 arrested.20 Slogans appeared demanding republican status for Kosovo.21 These riots dumbfounded the newly installed leaders who had been focusing on federal and financial issues and were unsure how to react.22 At first they denied the gravity of the situation, and restricted media coverage of the events. On April 7, LCY CC Presidium member Stane Dolanc held a press conference, giving the SKJ leadership’s first account of the events. He admitted that the situation was grave. While placing the blame chiefly at the door of external ‘enemies’ out to ‘destabilise Yugoslavia’, he added ‘we would be politically blind and deaf if we reduced everything to external factors.’23 It was not so much the riots themselves, but the excessively harsh reaction from the Yugoslav leaders – combined with a rising focus on the issue in the Belgrade media – that put Kosovo high on the political agenda for the rest of the decade. Army troops and police from other parts of Yugoslavia were brought in and a full-scale state of emergency was introduced to the province.24 Students and other protesters were arrested on a massive scale. Rather than calm the situation, the student reaction to the manhandling of their fellows triggered new protests with demands for their release. The authorities’ response did little to defuse the situation. No attempt was made to address or dissect the different concerns and grievances presented. Instead, the protesters were uniformly labelled counter-revolutionaries. Attacks from the Albanian Communist Party by way of three provocative editorials in the Tirana daily Zëri i Popullit did not help. The Tirana editorials condemned the brutality with which the riots were crushed, and fully supported the demands of the demonstrators, including the call for a republican status for Kosovo.25 They argued that the Yugoslav claim to have solved the national question was done at the expense of the Albanian nationality. The main attack was directed against the Belgrade officials.26 Dealing with the unrest put the Kosovar leaders in a difficult position. Kosovar Albanian leaders followed the usual party procedure of ‘cleaning up one’s own house’, and declared the riots ‘counter-revolutionary’.

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Local Kosovar Albanians accused them of being Serbian lackeys and traitors. Soon many of the provincial leaders, including Mahomoud Bakali, were themselves removed in a process of ‘differentiation’. The decision to label all expressions of Kosovar republican aspirations as counterrevolutionary, did considerable harm. It left no room for any discussion of grievances raised, or of the Kosovar Albanians’ view of their place in Yugoslavia. During the demonstrations, one of the grievances articulated by the protesters was the feeling that Kosovar Albanians were not considered equal to other Yugoslavs.27 Over the next years, thousands of young Kosovar Albanians were arrested and the province remained in an almost permanent state of emergency. Thousands were stripped of their Party membership. This harshness towards an entire generation of young Kosovar Albanians led to deepen the feeling of injustice, and to a radicalisation of these young people. The continuation of disturbances deepened antagonism between different ethnic groups. Many of Kosovo’s Serbs and Montenegrins reported that they felt pressured to leave.28 The reasons for the subsequent emigration (and the scale too) became the subject of considerable controversy in the coming years.29 The Serbian position was that Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins had come under great pressure to leave since 1968, when the Kosovar Albanians had gained increased influence over the provincial institutions. The Kosovar Albanians on their hand argued that the emigration primarily had economic and social reasons.30 All in all, the events in Kosovo made a disturbing, and often confusing impression on the Yugoslav public. This confusion and fear were later aggravated, as Kosovo became an issue for a series of articles and commentaries in the Belgrade press.31 Unfortunately, discussions soon moved into the sphere of national hysteria, especially as it became obsession number one on the part of the Serbian nationalist intelligentsia.32 Disunity within the SKJ leadership The inability of the SKJ leaders to broach a concerted approach to the economic crisis and the situation in Kosovo forced them to take a new look at the political system as well.33 Increasingly, all three issues (economic, political crises and Kosovo) led to greater disparity within the SKJ leadership. Politically-inspired conflicts concerned the working of the self-management system and of the political organs, and thus the very mechanism that prevented party elites from different republics from finding a common approach to the mounting problems. From the very start, however, the attempt to deal with the political crisis became entangled with the constitutional question and thus once again concerned the

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very form of the federation. Intra-party battles were mainly concerned with two related issues: Serbian pressure to revise the 1974 constitutional arrangement, and the question of the constituent role of the provinces within Yugoslavia (especially the relationship between Serbia and its two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo). Dissatisfaction among the Serbian leaders with the interpretation of the post-1974 constitutional provisions had roots going back before Tito’s death.34 Initiatives to review the working of the federal arrangement suggested by Serbian representatives, was initially met with little enthusiasm among the other republics. The 1981 riots in Kosovo opened the door to raise the status of Serbia’s provinces once more. It also resulted in the long simmering conflict between Belgrade and the two provincial leaderships coming out in the open. On an all-Yugoslav level, it served to politicise conflicts further, and to make the constitutional question a primary focus. Since the federal system was a central part of the SKJ solution to the national question, this again served to place the national question right at the centre of conflicts. In the months after the riots, the Serbian leaders pushed for further housecleaning within the Kosovar leadership. In late 1981, the SKJ Central Committee granted the Serbian Central Committee the go-ahead to conduct a political analysis reviewing the position of the provinces within the republic in light of the 1974 Constitution.35 At this time the Serbian party did not ask for changes in the constitution, but focused on the interpretation of the 1974 Constitution and called for ‘ways in which to create unity so that SR Serbia could be constituted as a state and a self-managing social unit’.36 Tihomir Vlaškalić argued that Serbia was the only Yugoslav republic not constituted as a state entity. In his view, the autonomous provinces had not only affirmed their positions as constituent parts of the Yugoslav federation, but had gone further than the provisions of the 1974 constitution. The Provinces were treated as more or less equal to the Republics, and had a tendency to close themselves off from their home Republic, Serbia. This did not happen only within the state structures, but also, Vlaškalić argued, at the party level, and in other organisations, where the provinces acted as though they had the same status as equivalent organisations in the republics.37 Kosovo and Vojvodina predictably resisted the Serbian pressures to recentralise the republic, and the Serbian party leaders came into confrontation with both provincial leaderships. The leaders in Vojvodina, mostly ethnic Serbs, also guarded its autonomy against what it perceived as an increasing threat from Belgrade. Even though the Kosovo question certainly added a strong ethnic dimension, the leadership conflict remained mainly political in nature.

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The other republican leaderships were wary of provoking a conflict with the Serbian leaders over Kosovo and preferred to treat it as an internal Serbian matter.38 According to Raif Dizdarević, the Serbian leadership conducted a kind of headcount and assessment in the months after the Kosovo riots, to determine the attitude towards Kosovo.39 Seen through the lenses of the Serbian leadership, he argues, two camps crystallised: one insufficiently committed to what the Serbian leadership considered it should be upholding. To this group belonged, allegedly Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the two autonomous provinces. The other group, which included Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia, was considered to be committed to, or at least showing an understanding attitude for, the Serbian views.40 The Serbian leaders also had to tread carefully. They were afraid of being branded nationalists by the other Yugoslav leaders41 but they also depended on attracting support from the other leaders in the collective Federal Presidency and from the provinces themselves for any review of the constitutional arrangement. The Serbian Party strategy on Kosovo thus concentrated on gaining support to bring the constitutional question onto the agenda, and in this manner reintegrating the provinces under closer Belgrade control. The continuing focus on Kosovo in the Belgrade press, and the sense of emergency that was created, (possible because of the liberal attitude of the Serbian leaders) was not entirely to the disadvantage to the Serbian leadership. The Twelfth Congress The Twelfth Congress in 1982 was the last congress dominated by the old guard. Expectations that the Party would find a way to deal with the growing economic and political issues and the Kosovo question at this congress were high. The Kraigher report had been tailored as the SKJ official ‘solution’ to the economic crisis, and was to be presented at the Twelfth Congress. Expectations were not met, and the congress failed to come up with a strategy for tackling the growing problems facing the leadership. Instead, the Twelfth Congress was portrayed as one of ‘unity and continuity’.42 President of the SKJ Central Committee Dušan Dragosavac presented the SKJ stand on the national question. While acknowledging that Kosovo represented a challenge, he continued in his opening address at the congress to chant the SKJ mantra that the national question had mainly been solved.43 He conceded, nonetheless, that ‘the problem of further advancement of national affirmation, national equality and coexistence continued to be a relevant question

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in Yugoslavia’.44 Dragosavac viewed regulation of national conflict as closely tied to the performance of the self-management system, which he argued formed ‘the foundation also for the advancement of national and inter-national relations’. He was convinced that the development of socialist self-management would ‘narrow the window for tendencies of antagonistic opposition among the peoples, nationalities, republics and provinces, within each of these and within the federation’.45 While Dragosavac’s views may well not have been universally accepted among party leaders, they nevertheless reflected the overall reluctance among the party leaders to make changes to the self-management system, which was seen as essentially embodying the practical and ideological framework of the SKJ solution to the national question. Their reluctance to face head-on the redundancy of the self-management system in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, however, contributed to increased tension in inter-republican and -national relations. In the end, the Twelfth Congress was a lost opportunity for the SKJ to take the initiative in dealing with the problems that now faced the country. The SKJ continued to make an outward appearance of consensus and unity, but behind the scenes, things were less amicable. The all-Yugoslav dimension of the conflict between Serbia and the provinces was expressed by a boycott hindering the selection of Draža Marković as the Serbian candidate to the Yugoslav CC Presidency at its first session immediately following the Twelfth Congress. In a secret vote among the delegates, Marković fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority to get elected. The boycott was believed to be the product of an organised initiative within the Yugoslav party organisation.46 Dušan Dragosavac, seen to have held a key role in the event, was supported by the delegates from the provinces, and in all likelihood the Croatian delegates, together with some Serbian delegates.47 Once the result of the vote became clear, Dragosavac asked for the Serbian delegation to choose a new candidate for its position on the Presidency,48 which caused a strong reaction from the Serbian leadership and threatened to create a real split in the Party itself. Petar Stambolić took to the stage in an unprecedented move, and accused the other delegates of acting against Serbia, characterising the boycott of Marković as a ‘flagrant meddling in internal Serbian affairs’.49 Facing the possibility of a Serbian walkout, the delegation that had just voted against him, encouraged Marković to stand again for election. He received the necessary majority, and continued until 1984, when he was sidelined by Ivan Stambolić with the help of then retired uncle Petar Stambolić.

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Tito’s old favourite Miloš Minić was not standing for election, but his support for the provinces, and his reluctance to press for recentralisation nonetheless made him a more favourable candidate among the other delegates. Raif Dizdarević denies Stambolić’s claim that the other republics/provinces aimed to interfere in Serbian affairs, but does underline that it was an opportunity to remove the powerful Marković who was deeply disliked by many of the other leaders.50 Shortly after the Twelfth Congress, Marković and Petar Stambolić took action to remove Minić. Minić sought a resolution to the conflict in the Yugoslav federal CC, where he could count on the support of the provinces and other republican leaders, even some within the Serbian Party. However, Minić’s proposed resolution did not receive support from the Serbian leadership or from the federal party organisation. The federal leaders preferred to leave it for the Serbian leaders to sort it out themselves. Slovenian Mitja Ribičič, who took over the role of President of the Yugoslav CC presidium, suggested that further talks be held in Serbia, and pointed out ‘only the Serbian comrades can solve this issue, rather than involving all of Yugoslavia’.51 Eventually, a compromise was reached, with the intervention of Nikola Ljubičić, President of the Presidency of Serbia, from 1982.52 This meant that Minić had to retire, but retained his position at the federal level until his term was up.53 This case signalled a new trend, which saw the removal of figures who could align with members of other republican leaderships and in the Serbian case, who were not seen to support the dominant position on recentralisation and Kosovo. Leadership relations and political reforms following the Twelfth Congress Lack of unity within the party could not be concealed long, and came to full and open expression at the Tenth Session of the SKJ Central Committee in October 1983.54 During this session, the SKJ acknowledged that attempts to implement the stabilisation programme had given rise to ‘sharp conflict on the ideological and political level’ within the party and that these had resulted in ‘problems, delays and resistance, wavering and inconsistency’.55 In 1983, a working group of the Federal Social Council for Questions of the Social Order was set up to discuss political reform. The initiative to review the workings of the political system was presented by Serbian political theorist Najdan Pašić, member of the SKJ Central Committee, who also headed the constitutional review committee.56 The Council itself was chaired by Tihomir Vlaškalić, and therefore both it and the Pašić group were commonly referred to as the

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Vlaškalić Commission.57 During a series of plenums convened in 1984, the party failed to agree on a common resolution on how to deal with the Yugoslav political and economic crises. Instead, a draft resolution was released for broader discussion by the full membership of the SKJ.58 The critique of the federalisation of the system was also mirrored in the responses from academics who were invited to participate in the debates over the political system. Over the next years, endless debates on the workings of the self-managing and political system took place.59 Many debates were now also printed in the Yugoslav press. One influential response was Jovan Mirić’s book, Sistem i Kriza, (1984). Mirić argued that the problem did not rest with the interpretation of the 1974 constitution, but with the constitution itself, as it had deviated far from the principles of the original AVNOJ decision.60 Post-1974, Mirić claimed, sovereignty rested entirely with the autonomous units and was channelled to the federation only through these units.61 He criticised the veto right held by the federal units and rejected much of Kardelj’s post-1971 thesis on the national question in Yugoslavia.62 Mirić’s arguments found some support among the Serbian leadership who were the most eager to reform the constitutional order, favouring some degree of recentralisation. At the Fourteenth Session of the SKJ CC in 1984, Draža Marković criticised the principle of consensus.63 At the Eighteenth Session of the SK Srbije, in 1984, the Serbian Party organisation issued a comprehensive four-part draft programme for reform, arguing for a stronger federal government, greater autonomy for economic enterprises, and democratisation of the electoral system. They wanted to be able to channel funds to Kosovo directly from Belgrade, and not through the fund for underdeveloped provinces. They also wanted to deprive republican leaderships of the power to select their representatives in the SKJ CC.64 Even though reaching consensus had become increasingly difficult for party representatives, it remained a key aspect of national equality. Any attempt to change this principle was bound to be met with resistance. The Serbian proposals were condemned by the provinces, which complained that they had not properly been consulted in the creation of the draft programme.65 A summary and analysis of the results of the public discussions on political reform were presented to the Yugoslav Central Committee, at its Sixteenth Session in March 1985.66 No concrete solutions to the crisis materialised. Neither the Kraigher nor the Vlaškalić Commission reaped much success, and their recommendations were never properly implemented. By 1986, it was clear that the endless attempts at reforming the

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political system and dealing with the economy had reached stalemate. Under pressure from the IMF, most regional leaderships moved towards accepting some measures which would grant the federal centre more leverage in dealing with the economic crisis. An agreement to put the constitutional question on the agenda now emerged. Overall, belief that the SKJ would be able to deal with the crisis waned, and conviction that the answer lay with the self-management system disappeared. Since the SKJ itself had gone to great lengths to link its claimed solution to the national question with self-management socialism under its unified party leadership, this had serious implications. So too did the vanishing unity among the Communist leaders. By the mid-1980s, one could no longer speak of a common strategy towards the national question, which instead became a central issue among an increasingly divisive leadership. Democratisation, nation, activism and dissent – challenges to the SKJ solution to the national question The erosion of the socialist solution to the national question happened through a dynamic process, involving both pressures from intellectuals and civil society and the new responses within the Party itself. A generation shift within the regional party leaderships took place in the spring of 1986. In Slovenia, Milan Kučan took over the leadership in April, signalling the return of liberal politics to the Republic. In Kosovo, Azem Vllasi took over the leadership-chair in May. Ivan Stambolić welcomed Vllasi’s candidacy, describing the new Kosovar leaders as young Yugoslavorientated figures with whom they could negotiate.67 In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević succeeded Ivan Stambolić as leader of the Serbian Party organisation in May, on the latter’s recommendation, but soon came to challenge his mentor. There were changes too in the factionalised Croatian party.68 Stipe Šuvar and Mika Špiljak, who now rose to prominence hardly merited the label of reform-oriented politicians, and Šuvar particularly, was seen as one of the most doctrinaire figures within the SKJ. Continuing internal conflicts between dogmatists and pragmatists bedevilled the Croatian party for several years. The Party’s inability to deal with the challenges facing Yugoslavia after Tito’s death opened the door for outside forces seeking a role in providing responses to the mounting crisis in Yugoslav society. The greatest opposition engagement emerged in Ljubljana and Belgrade where in both cases the initial focus rested on democratisation, greater freedom of expression and reduction of regime repression in the cultural sphere. In each case, the national question soon

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became a central theme, and in time, parts of each respective republican intelligentsia articulated alternative national discourses. How these processes developed and how the SKJ leaders’ responded to these challenges are fundamental to an understanding of the way the SKJ’s professed solution to the national question in Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1980s. Leadership responses to oppositional dissent differed from republic to republic. In Croatia, freedom of debate was restricted due to the firm line taken by the Croatian Communist leadership. Ivo Banac has referred to this period ‘as the age of unbridled sectarianism without genuine belief, administered by an alliance of dogmatists and opportunists’.69 National and other opposition forces in Croatia were not eradicated, but silenced, a silence that lasted until 1989. After Tito’s death, Croatian leaders launched a new round of action against the protagonists from 1971, many whom had meanwhile been released. Marko Veselica, Vlado Gotovac and Franjo Tuđman were again imprisoned in 1980 and 1981.70 While a broad range of popular and democratic interests developed in Slovenia, similar activities in Croatia were largely subverted by the regime, which became increasingly alienated from society.71 This left the Slovenes once more alone to fight for interests that were also supported in Croatia. The Croatian leaders had gained a reputation as the best watchdogs of so-called subversive activities within the cultural and intellectual sphere, not just in Croatia but in all of Yugoslavia. Most notorious was the 1984 Bijela Knjiga (the White Book), the brainchild of Stipe Šuvar. This was a long and meticulous list of all the literary works that he considered subversive and dubious. Most of the authors listed were members of the Belgrade intelligentsia. The Bijela Knjiga created considerable controversy, and provoked the Serbian intelligentsia already deeply engaged in criticising the SKJ leadership. The conservative leadership in Bosnia also kept a close eye on activity that could potentially upset the balance between the peoples not only in Bosnia, but also in Yugoslavia generally. In Kosovo, strict repression following the 1981 riots, ‘differentiation’ and the labelling of all expression of opposition as counter-revolutionary or Albanian irredentism, largely restricted any form of public or even inner-party debate. The Serbian question – rejection of the SKJ solution to the Yugoslav national question Belgrade soon became the epicentre for intellectual dissent against the regime. As the regime attempted to uphold the slogan ‘After Tito –Tito!’, Serbian intellectuals gradually chiselled away at Tito’s reputation and

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started to question the legacy and legitimacy of the socialist regime’s solution to the national question.There was an extensive revisionism of history, with an outpouring of new historical, literary and essayist work addressing taboo issues from the Tito period. Committees purportedly aimed at promoting and protecting freedom of expression were formed, and there was protest against regime censorship of artistic expression. From the mid-80s, activity increasingly focused on fighting the cause of Kosovar Serbs. The critique emanating from Belgrade expressed a sceptical attitude vis-à-vis ‘excess’ federalism and national egoism of other nations. The Belgrade intellectuals directed much of their critique against their own leadership, whom they came to regard as betraying the national interests of Serbia. It was the contemporary crisis in Yugoslav society and politics after Tito’s death that led a number of Serbian intellectuals to re-examine the historical and ideological underpinnings of the Yugoslav system and state, and ultimately to challenge official party historiography.72 With this, the very legitimacy of the state founded by the Yugoslav communists came under scrutiny. Such historical revisionism posed a serious challenge to the Party, as it questioned its right to rule and ability to deal with the present-day crisis. It was, somewhat surprisingly, Tito’s old biographer Vladimir Dedijer who unleashed this revisionist wave, with his three-volume Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broz Tita (New contributions to the biography of Josip Broz Tito), published from 1981. Ivo Banac describes the work as an ‘ungraceful book, a cabbage head on a makeshift body, full of unrelated provocations’.73 He criticised Dedijer for taking deliberate delight in revealing unsavoury facts.74 Dedijer was also criticised by former colleagues for misusing and holding back sources, and not being truthful about the purpose of his project.75 Although Dedijer claimed to have obtained Tito’s approval for the book, Tito would certainly not have approved of the version whose first volume emerged in 198176 and which opened the door to a full-scale reappraisal of the wartime events and their complexities. Tito’s heroic image was knocked down, and many details were revealed that undermined the official World War II myth of a heroic and straightforward war for national liberation.77 There were revelations about the Partisans’ engagement with the Četniks, including transcripts of their talks with Draža Mihailović.78 Furthermore, by pointing to the fact that Tito had fought with the AustroHungarian army against Serbia, Dedijer indirectly opened the door for accusations that Tito was anti-Serbian.79 Dedijer’s book opened the floodgates to conspiracy theories about Tito, the Comintern, the War and

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the Communists’ alleged anti-Serbian attitude. Many of these theories presented the view that the KPJ’s ‘solution’ to the national question had been built on a policy that cast the Serbs in the role of oppressors and hegemonists and that it sought to weaken Serbia in order to appease the other nations. No less controversial was the 1983 publication by jurists Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški: Stranački pluralizam ili monizam. This directly questioned the foundation of SKJ rule. The authors criticised the SKJ’s rise to power in the aftermath of the war and their exclusion of other parties. They argued that the Communists substituted make-believe republican pluralism – based on equally undemocratic federalisation80 – for real democracy. Revisionism also took place within the cultural field. A stream of literary works produced from 1981–1984 raised controversial themes from the Communist period, arguing that Serbia had received a bad deal in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Among these were Gojko Đogo’s ‘Vunena Vremena’ – woolly times – alluding to Tito as the ‘Rat from Dedinje’, Antonije Isaković’s ‘Tren II’ – ‘Flash II’ – touching on the sensitive topic of Goli Otok; Jovan Radulović’s ‘Pigeon hole’ – Golubnjača, a play set in Dalmatia dealing with communal violence in WWII; Dušan Jovanović’s ‘Karamazovi’ – the Karamazovs – a play set in anti-Cominformist purges, to mention a few.81 The 1980s signalled the return of Dobrica Ćosić to the public scene. He now perpetuated the thesis that became his mantra – that Serbia had been seduced by Tito and his comrades, and that the Serbs had sacrificed their own happiness for the sake of the other Yugoslav nations.82 At the heart of this critique was Ćosić’s disappointment with the Titoist regime’s failure to fulfil its promise to solve the national question. Having once been a warm defender of socialist Yugoslavism, Ćosić now came to the conclusion that this solution had done harm to Serbia and that the Communists and Tito had ‘duped’ the Serbs.83 He further argued that the Serbs had posed as the primary defenders of Yugoslavia while the other peoples had pursued their own national and egocentric interests. Ćosić came to the conclusion that the communists had betrayed Serbia and created an anti-Serbian regime. Not only had the SKJ succeeded in convincing the Serbian Communists to sacrifice their own interests; in the process, this had created a divided and even fratricidal Serbia.84 The need to overcome this split and to unite the Serbian nation under a new unified vision thus became the most important aim.85 Ćosić came to identify Tito and Kardelj as essentially anti-Serbian, even Serbophobic, and Bolshevism as an anti-Serbian ideological movement.86

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Ćosić‘s thesis on the Serbian question and the ills experienced by Serbia in socialist Yugoslavia was very influential on other scholars and writers in Serbia and in formulating the new Serbian nationalist discourse of the 1980s.87 Ćosić’s interpretation of events was personal and contextspecific. He felt the need to explain his own move from regime-friendly supporter of Yugoslavism to this later position,88 and argued that he had also been ‘duped’.89 Ćosić thus generalised from his personal experience to make a more universal claim that cast Serbia in the role of willing victims who had fooled themselves. This thesis was deeply at odds with the concept of brotherhood and unity, and was bound to bring Serbia into conflict with the other Yugoslav peoples. A string of cultural committees were set up in the 1980s, functioning as engines for dissent against the policies of the SKJ.90 In 1980, Dobrica Ćosić and Ljubomir Tadić, attempted to establish the bimonthly magazine Javnost.91 Branded as an attempt to build an opposition platform, the authorities quashed Javnost before it ever reached the public.92 Over the next years, a stream of petitions and informal gatherings were arranged, with the Serbian Writers’ Association playing a central role. Ćosić was keen to get support from likeminded colleagues in other republics and made an effort to make his initiatives Yugoslav in orientation.93 In 1982, the Committee for the Protection of Artistic Freedom was established, with the less obvious involvement of Ćosić.94 The activity of the Committee focused on protecting the rights of all Yugoslav peoples who were persecuted according to the notorious paragraph 133 of the Yugoslav constitution which defined the crime of verbalni delikt.95 The most influential initiative was the Committee for the Defence of the Freedom of Thought and Expression established in 1984, following the trials of the so-called Belgrade six. The trial in Belgrade happened following a police raid of a private apartment where the ‘flying university’ had arranged a talk by Milovan Đilas.96 In Sarajevo, Vojislav Šešelj was arrested, charged with spreading hostile propaganda, and sentenced by a Sarajevo court to eight years’ imprisonment.97 The authorities’ handling of these cases caused reaction among intellectuals in different republics. This, according to Tomaž Mastnak represented virtually the last common cause, which brought to the fore a truly pan-Yugoslav opposition.98 The Committee for the Defence of the Freedom of Thought and Expression wrote letters and appeals on behalf of figures from different republics and provinces.99 Again, Ćosić tried to make this into an all-Yugoslav initiative, and gather support from Croatia and Slovenia through his colleagues Rudi Supek (Croatia), and Taras Kermauner (Slovenia). He failed. The

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Slovenes instead chose to set up their own committee. The Committee for the Defence of the Freedom of Thought and Expression thus became largely a Serbian affair failing to attract the support of intellectuals from other republics. The reluctance of non-Serb intellectuals to engage in common activities initiated by the Serbian intellectuals could to a large extent be contributed to the increasing preoccupation of the latter with the Serbian question and Kosovo. In Belgrade, the Committee attracted the support of the entire spectrum of the Serbian critical intelligentsia. Many of the Serbian intellectuals involved were also members of The Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU). From the mid-1980s, one could see a growing politicisation of the Academy’s activities, culminating in the creation of a working group to write what would become the later infamous draft Serbian Memorandum.100 Kosovo and the Serbian question Kosovo, a taboo issue since Ćosić’s speech in 1968, was now put back on the agenda, and gradually became the new cause célèbre for many intellectuals, including those with a previously anti-nationalist, humanist orientation. The immediate cause was the emigration of Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins following the outbreak of unrest in the province. The Serbian Orthodox Church was among first to take up this question. It portrayed contemporary emigration in Kosovo as the latest step in a long history of victimisation of Serbs in Kosovo, linking it to other Serbian historical traumas, including World War I, the Serbian retreat through Albania in 1915, and the Ustaša atrocities against Serbs during World War II.101 Over the next few years, accusations of ‘genocide’ and references to Nazism grew more frequent in discussions over Kosovo. Discussions were progressively less about the actual events taking place, but were instead elevated to a quasi-spiritual, highly politicised discussion about Serbia’s past, future, and very existence. This portrayal of the Serbian people as a ‘chosen people’, persecuted and victimised over the centuries, was the central theme of a controversial work on Kosovo written by historian Dimitrije Bogdanović, and published in 1986 by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art. The most important aspect of Bogdanović’s book was its concern with linking historical precedents to contemporary tensions in Kosovo.102 Bogdanović pointed out that ‘Kosovo is not some imaginary legend of the past, but a real historical destiny that continues today’.103 Like Ćosić, Bogdanović now placed emphasis upon the need for Serbian unity.104 He argued that the Yugoslav Communists had – building

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on Comintern policy – nurtured anti-Serbian attitudes during the inter-war period, and that the Yugoslav federal arrangement was based on an exaggerated claim of inter-war Serbian hegemony.105 Hysteria was raised to new levels after the Martinović case broke in May 1985. This bizarre case came to symbolise the historical continuity between past and present suffering of the Serbian nation. Stories alleging the impalement of Đordje Martinović, a Kosovar Serb farmer,by Albanians started to circulate in the Belgrade press. Martinović had been brought to hospital in Kosovo with injuries caused by the forceful insertion of a glass bottle in his rectum.106 He claimed two Albanians had tied and drugged him before assaulting him with the bottle. Under interrogation he allegedly confessed that he had injured himself in an act of sexual self-stimulation, though he subsequently denied this and reiterated his original story.107 Medical examination and subsequent reports differed in interpretation, and no conclusion was reached, leading to the speculation that Kosovo authorities had covered up the affair.108 Allusions were made to Ottoman impalement of Christians. Martinović was declared a Serbian martyr and depicted in a number of artworks, including Mica Popović’s painting ‘May 1, 1985’.109 Ćosić also involved himself in the Martinović case,110 which moved from being an exceptional and rather sordid affair, to become depicted as a reflection of the general situation in Kosovo. In this manner the case served to further aggravate the tension and fear over events in Kosovo. In October 1985, Kosovar Serb activists presented a ‘Petition of the 2016’, a list of grievances signed by over 2000 Kosovar Serbs.111 This served as the foundation for a petition in January 1986, signed by a broad array of well-known Serbian intellectuals, and claiming that over 200,000 Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins had been forced to leave and to sell or give up their homes, that nuns and old women had been systematically raped, and that holy places had been desecrated.112 With this petition, some of the most prominent Serbian intellectuals put their weight behind extreme, nationalistic claims. Explicit links were forged between Belgrade intelligentsia and Kosovar Serb activists, marking a shift towards more active political involvement on the part of the critical intelligentsia113 which did not go unnoticed by the Serbian party leadership. The Serbian Memorandum The entry of the Serbian intellectuals into the political realm became complete when the Draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), better known simply as ‘the Memorandum’, came into existence by a joint effort by a number of Serbian academics

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and intellectuals.114 The draft document was leaked to the Serbian press in September 1986, sending shockwaves through the Yugoslav elites.115 The incomplete Memorandum was not a completed piece of work, and not formally published.116 Finished or not, the contents leaked to the press were never in fact rejected by the authors.117 The first part of the draft Memorandum, ‘The Crisis in Yugoslav Economy and Society’, contained an economic critique tracing the beginnings of decentralisation back to the 1960s and arguing that the country was experiencing ‘a moral crisis, which is seriously eroding Yugoslav society’.118 The confederalist tendencies in the constitution of 1974 were identified as the source of Yugoslavia’s growing difficulties.119 The authors claimed that the undeclared goal of the SKJ leadership was the strengthening and preservation of polycentrism and for the republican and provincial leaders to retain the monopoly of power in society. This goal, they argued, stemmed from a ‘symbiosis of nationalism, separatism and lust for power’.120 The idea of self-management had been replaced by the idea of decentralisation, leading to the establishment of regional centres of alienated powers.121 Thus, the authors argued, ‘decentralisation had degenerated into disintegration along territorial lines, creating eight separate economies’.122 The second part of the Memorandum was concerned more specifically with ‘the status of Serbia and the Serbian nation’. The less scholarly tone picked up the nationalist discourse that had been growing among parts of the Belgrade intelligentsia.123 It portrayed the Serbs as victims, arguing that there was ‘a desire to put Serbia into an inferior position and in this manner weaken its political influence’. But the worst misfortune of all, the writers argued, was ‘that the Serbian people do not have their own state, as do all the other nations’. The ideological platform which had led to Serbia’s economic subordination and its politically inferior status, could be traced to the ‘dominance of Slovenes and Croats in the KPJ’s Central Committee before World War II’. This, they argued, and had been cemented by the long years of collaboration between Tito and Kardelj, the two most eminent political figures in postwar Yugoslavia, who had enjoyed ‘inviolable authority in the centres of power’. Thus, they reasoned, ‘there can be no doubt that Slovenia and Croatia had entrenched their political and economic domination, thanks to which they are achieving their national agendas and economic aspirations’.124 In addition to addressing the Kosovo question, the Memorandum added a new issue to the agenda: the question of the Serbian population in Croatia, who they argued had been ‘subjected to a subtle but effective policy of assimilation’.125 A component part of this policy

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was the ‘prohibition of all Serbian associations and cultural institutions in Croatia’, cutting the Serbian population off culturally from their co-nationals in Serbia.126 They added: ‘except for the time under the Independent State of Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia have never before been as jeopardised as they are today’. If solutions are not found, they warned, ‘the consequences might well be disastrous, not only for Croatia, but for the whole of Yugoslavia’.127 The draft Memorandum was a sensitive document for the Serbian Party leadership, since Ivan Stambolić had initially agreed to allow SANU to produce a study of the social problems in Serbia.128 Nevertheless, he and the leadership came out strongly against the leaked draft Memorandum, describing it as an attempt by its writers to pull the ‘AVNOJ cornerstone from underneath Yugoslavia’. Stambolić criticised the negative attitude of the Memorandum’s writers towards other Yugoslav peoples, reminding them that Yugoslavia was a multinational society, built on the co-operation between all its peoples.129 Stambolić demanded that SANU stop its work immediately and repudiate the ideas expressed in the draft. The SANU authors refused, and the entire affair turned out to be a public fiasco for the leadership. Milošević was more careful to express public condemnation of the Memorandum. In closed party circles he expressed a more critical view of the draft Memorandum.130 Ultimately, the Memorandum was more a culmination of the views developed by Serbian nationalist intellectuals since the death of Tito than a fully fledged national programme as was often alleged after Milošević ascended to power. The authors themselves claimed that the document was intended for the authorities, and not for public distribution.131 The activities of the Serbian intellectuals were important not only because they questioned and rejected the socialist solution to the Yugoslav national question, but also because they came to portray the Serbian national question as the key political issue with an even higher priority than democratisation. The new discourse was notable for tackling sensitive issues in an antagonistic manner that served to exclude dialogue with the other Yugoslav peoples. The effect of this on the Serbian Party was a split over how to respond to the pressure mounted from both the intelligentsia and the activists. Slovenia – new social movements In Slovenia, criticism of the socialist regime emanated from two different sources. One was the democratically oriented, alternative youth movement linked to the Mladina magazine.132 The second was the more

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traditional and nation-oriented circle of intellectuals formed around the literary journal Nova Revija, established in 1981. The ‘alternative movement’ was a broad, pluralist movement which had grown from an initially marginal youth subculture.133 This happened as intellectuals and the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (Zveza socialistov Mladine Slovienije – ZSMS) decided to back the protagonists from the punk scene when the authorities attempted to repress its activities.134 The support of the official Communist youth movement was vital, as was the transformation in 1982 of its weekly magazine Mladina into a forum for the promotion of democratic transformation through political criticism. Mladina soon became the most influential political magazine not just in Slovenia, but in Yugoslavia.135 The democratic opposition in Slovenia was thus a pluralist grassroots movement that both emerged from, and created, a new civil society discourse and sought to shape a new democratic process. Although, as Tomaž Mastnak points out, there was a clearly Yugoslav dimension to its activities,136 the alternative movement was also a specifically Slovenian phenomenon with no comparable match in any of the other republics. The Slovenian alternative movement questioned Tito’s legacy, and sought to expose political conflicts within Yugoslav society, primarily through avant-garde cultural expression. They proposed the abolishment of the annual youth relay (Štafeta) celebrating Tito’s official birthday on May 25, which had continued even after his death.137 Tito was the main symbol of unity – so critique of the Tito cult could be seen as questioning Yugoslav unity – increasingly perceived among Slovenes as negative pressure from outside, fearing it would steer them in a centralist and unitarist direction. The Slovene opposition particularly singled out the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as a symbol of negative unitarism. JNA members were horrified when jokes were cracked at their expense. The alternative movement petitioned for a civil option to military service and for Slovenes to be able to serve in Slovenia using their own language. The movement’s main critique was directed at Yugoslav institutions and protagonists, not at the Slovenian leadership, like in Serbia. The leadership’s handling of the Slovene opposition protagonists was therefore relatively soft. The second centre of regime critique was the critical intelligentsia, especially the figures around the journal Nova Revija. The journal appeared shortly after the banned Serbian journal Javnost. Although its objectives were similar, its more narrow Slovenian focus meant its publication was allowed. Like their Belgrade colleagues, the Slovene intellectuals focused both on democratisation and on the national question,

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and the latter was a more compelling issue for the Nova Revija intellectuals than for the alternative movement. The Slovenes were less preoccupied than the Serbian intelligentsia with the revision of history. A third influential group was the Slovene Writers’ Association.138 This group emphasised the language and education question, and launched a campaign against the federal proposal for a common core curriculum for all Yugoslav secondary schools in 1982.139 The Association became preoccupied with reorienting Slovenia away from the Balkans and towards ‘Central Europe’ (an emerging concept for many Eastern bloc countries).140 Slovene–Serbian intellectual relations The Slovene and Serbian intellectuals had a tradition going back to the 1950s of engaging each other in political discussion. Despite their longtime disputes over what kind of Yugoslavia they favoured, many of the intellectuals in Ljubljana and Belgrade had enjoyed personal friendships. In the 1980s, these relations soured rapidly. From the mid-1980s, Slovene and Serbian intellectuals came to fight out what was referred to as the ‘dialogue of the deaf’.141 As letters between these former friends were published in the press, their antagonism became public, and contributed to an overall breakdown in Serbian–Slovenian relations that spilled out into the political sphere.142 The effort by Ćosić and his likeminded fellows to engage the support of Slovene colleagues for their initiatives met with reluctance in Ljubljana. The activities of the Slovene intellectuals now became increasingly oriented towards Slovenia, and their engagement with all-Yugoslav issues waned. This offended the Belgrade intellectuals. Their divergent objectives, the increasingly nationalistic tone of activities in Belgrade and especially the obsession of their Serbian colleagues with the Kosovo question served to create a wedge between Ljubljana and Belgrade. The Serbian and Slovene intellectuals made one last effort at dialogue, as Ćosić, Ljubomir Tadić and Mihailo Marković met with Taras Kermauner, Niko Grafenauer, Spomenka Hribar and the other editors of Nova Revija at the Café Mrak in Ljubljana in 1985. The meeting did little to improve relations. Instead, the parties parted ways to engage in establishing their respective positions on the state of the relations between their nations and the Yugoslav Federation. The Slovene intellectual circle around the Nova Revija stated their position on the Slovene national question in a collection of articles, under the title ‘Prispevki za slovenski nacionalni program’ – Contributions to the Slovene National Programme. This collection of articles was written in

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1986, concurrent with the Memorandum, but was not printed until early 1987, when it appeared in a special edition of Nova Revija, issue 57.143 ‘Contributions to the Slovene National Programme’ cannot be seen as a direct response to the Memorandum as is sometimes claimed. Instead, both documents can be seen as (nationalist) articulations of respective positions on the relationship between their nations vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. The authors of ‘Contributions to the Slovene National Programme’ emphasised the principled Slovene right to sovereignty, whether within a reconstituted and more confederalised Yugoslavia, or even independent from Yugoslavia, if Slovenian rights to sovereignty were not respected. Even if the authors focused on the principled rights to sovereignty and secession, rather than on the exercise of such rights, this was the first explicit mention by Slovenes of the secessionist issue.144 The nature and focus of political and intellectual engagement in the Serbian and Slovenian capitals reflected the different (and often opposite) interests held by these republics. Slovenes tended to judge republican self-determination and national rights as a key aspect of democratisation and favoured increased rights and prerogatives for the federal units to pursue their aims free from interference. The Serbian position, on the other hand, was that decentralisation of the state was the key problem, and republican isolationism made a functioning economy and common market impossible. Frustrated over the power and autonomy accumulated by the provinces, the Serbs pushed for ‘Serbian statehood’ on a par with the other republics and accompanied by the internal consolidation of Belgrade’s jurisdiction over the provinces. Concurrently the Serbs argued for some degree of recentralisation of Yugoslavia, with more extended cultural rights for Serbs outside of SR Serbia. The Serbian intelligentsia had an ambiguous attitude towards Yugoslavia, which despite the growth of nationalism, still appeared as the best vehicle for keeping all Serbs in one state. The rise of Milošević and the Yugoslav national question The legitimacy of the SKJ (or the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) and its professed solution to the national question was under scrutiny well before Milošević came to power. Milošević’s rise to power and subsequent politics nevertheless contributed to significantly sharpen the crisis and change the dynamics of Yugoslav national politics. The changes in Serbia’s approach to the Yugoslav and Serbian national questions were linked to a larger power struggle within the Serbian party organisation. This struggle culminated in the ousting of Ivan Stambolić and the

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moderate faction in the Serbian leadership, and the ascent of Slobodan Milošević to power in a virtual coup d’état, following the Eighth Session of the Serbian Central Committee on 23–4 September 1987. Ivan Stambolić had largely focused on achieving reforms at the constitutional level, taking a cautious approach to appease leaders from the other republics. Serbia’s liberal leaders were accused by the Serbian intelligentsia of having failed the interests of the Serbian nation and Kosovar Serbs. Some even suggested that the Serbian leaders were complicit in the ‘genocide’ of the Kosovar Serbs for not paying more attention to their fate.145 In an attempt to counter this hostility, Stambolić travelled to Kosovo on 6 April 1986, to prevent the Kosovar Serbs from coming to Belgrade to protest, as they threatened.146 In the first direct contact with the protestors, he told them in an address at Kosovo Polje that Kosovo’s problems should be solved in Kosovo, nowhere else.147 He warned the activists against exploitation by Serbian nationalists. The more the Kosovo Serbs suffered, the better for the [nationalist] cause, Stambolić added.148 But even though Stambolić assured them that the time had come for action, not talk,149 little action ensued. Stambolić followed a line over Kosovo still building on dialogue with Prishtina, that sought to address the concerns of all sides. He remained wary of engaging too closely with the Kosovar Serb activists.150 Even though there had been considerable consensus within the Serbian party organisation on the pursuit of Stambolić’s constitutional line, some cadres were growing impatient with a perceived lack of progress on both the constitutional question and Kosovo. Divergences of opinion developed within the Party over how to deal with the activist-intellectual threat. These differences were rooted in a strategic struggle among a new generation of ambitious cadres positioning themselves for political influence. Milošević’s initial power base lay in the Belgrade City Committee, where he was leader from 1984 to 86, and which was closely associated with the University Committee formed around Milošević’s wife, Mirjana (Mira) Marković. This circle consisted of figures with a rather doctrinaire Marxist outlook, referred to as ‘self-professed Titoists who challenged a relaxed approach to ideology’.151 These now encouraged the ambitious Milošević to challenge the reformist liberals in the leadership. Slobodan Milošević’s climb to power was facilitated by his connections to powerful people in the Party organisation. His wife was the niece of Draža Marković, and the daughter of Moma Marković, yet another influential politician of the older generation. Milošević and Marković had close ties to Ivan Stambolić, nephew of Petar Stambolić, another of

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the grand figures in the Serbian party apparatus.152 Milošević followed Ivan Stambolić up the ladder to power as his protégé, and benefited from Stambolić’s policy of placing loyal people in key positions. This helped Milošević obtain the position as leader of the Serbian Party in May 1986 when Stambolić took over the position of president of the Serbian state presidency. Milošević, who now had the power to appoint cadres, employed a similar strategy to build up his own entourage of supporters, which he subsequently used to outvote Stambolić. Milošević also maintained good contact with the older partisan cadres, whom he consciously courted.153 Milošević’s well-articulated and educated manner, and his apparent Titoism appealed to them. Milošević also built up support within the press, which he would subsequently use to consolidate his position. Milošević broke with the gradualist approach taken by Stambolić when he decided to take on the cause of the Kosovar activists, on the occasion of a visit to the province in April 1987. Before this, Milošević had displayed little interest in Kosovo.154 According to Stambolić, Milošević came back from Kosovo a changed man, moved by the events of the moment.155 Attending a meeting at Kosovo Polje, Milošević faced a large crowd of angry Serbs and Montenegrins who tried to force their way into a closed meeting. When the police blocked their way, using batons to keep them back, some Serbs started to throw stones conveniently placed in a truck nearby at the police. Milošević went outside to address the protesters, uttered his now legendary words: ‘Nobody has the right to beat you’. He invited as many as possible into the meeting, which lasted to dawn, so their grievances could be heard. His promises to take on their cause earned the support of the Kosovar Serbs. Milošević, like Stambolić, distinguished between intellectuals and activists, and encouraged the activists to ‘differentiate between the forces of socialism, brotherhood and unity, and those of separatist nationalism and conservativism’.156 His embrace of the Kosovar Serb cause could be seen as a quest to reclaim the Party’s initiative from the intellectuals, as the advocate of their cause. After this visit, Milošević pulled all strings to arrange a session of the CK SKJ (or the Central Committee of the SKJ) to discuss the party’s Kosovo policy.157 Stambolić and another of his protégés Dragiša Pavlović (who took over as leader of Belgrade City Committee after Milošević) discouraged such a course.158 They were anxious about alienating other regional leaders, whose support was needed for a constitutional review. They were also concerned about further radicalising the Kosovar Serbs.159 The intra-party disagreement was primarily about the speed of the implementation of previously agreed policies.160

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Nevertheless, at Kosovo Polje, Milošević broke with one of the key principles in SKJ national policy when he appeared on Yugoslav-wide TV to express support of the nationalist cause of one of Yugoslavia’s peoples, and equally failed to condemn all nationalist expression as equally bad. Milošević also broke with the deliberate obscurantist rhetoric that communists normally used when they had to address matters relating to the national question. The differences between the factions came to full expression following a tragic incident that occurred at the Paraćin barracks in Serbia on September 3, when a young soldier from Kosovo, Aziz Kelmendi, killed four of his fellow soldiers, and wounded another six. The dead and wounded were from different parts of Yugoslavia and of differing ethnic backgrounds.161 The event was widely publicised in Belgrade, and spun as yet another case of Albanian hostility towards Serbs and Yugoslavia.162 This case directly precipitated an attack from Milošević against Dragiša Pavlović. Pavlović condemned the press coverage of the Paraćin case and cautioned the media to take a more guarded approach to the recent problems in ‘the southern province’.163 Pavlović made a thinly veiled condemnation of the press and ‘certain leaders’’ engagement with Kosovo, pointing the finger at Milošević and Politika Ekspres164 and arguing that their approach led to more conflict. Milošević and his supporters used the occasion to strike against Pavlović and the liberal wing of the Serbian leadership.165 An article attacking Pavlović appeared in Politika Ekspres, already under Milošević’s control, on 14 September.166 Pavlović was accused of having acted against the Titoist spirit by criticising party policy in the press. The meeting convened in the Serbian Party Presidency on 17 September to discuss the ‘case of Dragiša Pavlović’, was a carefully, if somewhat hastily, orchestrated affair organised by Milošević and one of his henchmen, Borisav Jović.167 Pavlović was accused of holding unacceptable viewpoints and acting without the approval of those above him in the Party – thus breaking party rules.168 Jović pointed out that had the provincial leaderships properly understood the situation, they would have voted against the motion to get rid of Pavlović.169 However, seeing the affair as an internal Serbian matter, they refrained from voting. The Eighth Session of the SK Serbia CK took place a week later, and both Pavlović and Stambolić came under attack by Milošević and his supporters.170 Paradoxically, many of the other Yugoslav leaders at this time tended to view Stambolić as potentially the more ‘nationalist’ one. His liberal policies towards the nationalist intelligentsia and initial approval of

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SANU’s work on the Memorandum was not forgotten. Stipe Šuvar has stated that even if Milošević was not viewed ‘as a good communist’, at this point, they believed, ‘at least he was not a nationalist’.171 Stambolić had long worked for a review of the constitutional arrangement, and his position was well known. Milošević had for his part shown little interest in the constitutional question in Serbia. Šuvar and the other leaders soon came to change their view, and also became the targets of Milošević’s new politics. One view put forward has been the differences between the two factions within the Serbian leadership on Kosovo and the national question were negligible and that the Eighth Session could be viewed as just another routine power struggle in Communist politics and that this should be seen as analytically separate from subsequent later building of national platform.172 However, though the struggle was chiefly over power, there were significant divergences in methodology and approach between the two camps on Kosovo. And it is difficult to keep the Kosovo question apart from the larger internal power struggle within the Serbian party leadership, since it played a key role in the struggle that occurred. The purge of the moderates at the Eighth Session was primarily about power, but it also signalled the start of a line where all those considered ‘soft on Kosovo’, who did not support the new more confrontational approach, were removed. Ivan Stambolić has insinuated that the timing of both the Memorandum and the Eighth Congress was suspicious, and coincided with times when the Serbian leadership had actually achieved progress in achieving its aims. He pointed out that they had succeeded in getting the constitutional question on the agenda, and that relations with the Albanian leadership under Vllasi, were improving.173 Neither the intellectual opposition nor the ideologically conservative forces within the Serbian party were interested in leaving the Kosovo and Serbian question alone, though. With his conduct at Kosovo Polje in 1987, Milošević clearly broke with the SKJ principle that all expressions of nationalism were inherently bad, and that SKJ leaders should refrain from taking on the cause of one Yugoslav nation. He embraced the cause of the Kosovar Serbs and adopted a style of politics and rhetoric that presented a fundamental break with the rules on which Yugoslav national politics was built. These developments directly broke the consensus principle upon which Yugoslav national politics relied. While insisting on safeguarding Tito’s legacy, in the quest to retain unity and the Party’s hegemonic role, Milošević chose to sacrifice one of the key legitimising sources of Tito’s Yugoslavia: national equality and the party’s professed solution to the national question. He

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thus made a substantial contribution to the delegitimation of the underlying principles of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Milošević outlined a new political line only in the first part of 1988, when he consolidated his power. He begain implementing the new line in the summer of 1988. His new policies appear to have been adapted to the fast evolving political landscape at the time, a process to which he contributed much. 1988–1990: The end of party unity and of the Titoist solution to the Yugoslav national question From 1988 to the Fourteenth SKJ Congress in January 1990, strenuous Yugoslav party elite relations deteriorated further in a rapidly evolving political environment. The federal Party and government stood paralysed, unable to take any form of concerted action or play the role of arbiter. Raif Dizdarević, the President of the Yugoslav Presidency in 1988–9, describes the situation in the following way: The workings of the State Presidency and the Party leadership, under pressure from the crisis within the country were being taken over by the collisions between sectional interests and political conflicts which we were being forced to deal with. Preoccupied with a multitude of often dramatised details, it was as though we could not see the far-reaching dangers that lay in wait for us in the crisis we were living through, as though the sense of strategic assessment and commitment was being lost, along with the capacity to forecast how things would be in a year or so.174 The drama referred to involved the implementation of a new phase in the politics of Milošević, the ‘anti-bureaucratic’ rallies all over Yugoslavia, and the ousting of the leaderships in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo. Slovenia’s relations with the Yugoslav Federation were also becoming more strained. By early 1989, the threat of the dismantling of the federal leadership became a real possibility. The thawing of the Cold War and changing international climate called into question the leading role of the SKJ in Yugoslavia, and a process of political pluralisation took place in some of the Yugoslav republics. Still, the main challenge came from within Yugoslavia. It was clear that it had become impossible for the the SKJ and federal government, thoroughly disunited, to take joint strategic decisions on a common approach about the national question in Yugoslavia. Instead, all the basic parameters of the socialist approach to the national question eroded.

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Slovenia – democratisation, national sovereignty and conflict with the JNA From 1988, the Slovenian leadership came into growing conflict with the federal government over economic reform and over its approach to the domestic opposition. With Croatia’s continuing low-key engagement, Slovenia increasingly stood alone as defender of decentralisation. At the end of 1987, the Slovenian leadership refused to give its consent to the draft resolution on economic policy for 1988, thereby in effect blocking the adoption of the budget.175 Back in 1984, the Slovenes had objected to the ‘unacceptability of approaches that used the economic crisis to put forward centralist-unitarist solutions.’176 The other federal units showed little understanding for Slovenia’s position, viewing the Slovenes as selfish and arrogant. In 1988, the Slovenes came into serious conflict with the Army leadership, which criticised what it considered the Slovenian leaders’ soft line on the opposition, accusing them of mounting an antiYugoslav campaign. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) had largely become a separate institution in the Yugoslav system and society. Rooted in the Partisan Movement, it was primarily concerned with defending the revolution and the Yugoslavia created through the wartime struggle. The JNA was closely tied to the Party. During internal party conflicts, it acted in accordance with Tito’s line. With Tito gone and the Party fragmenting amidst economic and political crisis, the JNA saw itself as defender of Yugoslav unity and was sceptical of the demands for reform and democratisation now emanating most strongly from Slovenia. Its inclination leaned towards centralism, which in time saw the army gravitating towards the Serbian position. The JNA viewed the developments in Slovenia as an attack on Yugoslavia, even as counter-revolutionary. Relations between the JNA and the Slovenian leaders deteriorated, when – in the aftermath of an extraordinary session in the Federal Military Council of the JNA held in Belgrade on March 25 1988 – the Slovene leaders alleged that they had been targeted in an attempted military coup. The day following this session, the Slovenian Minister for Internal Affairs, Tomaž Ertl, was approached by General Svetozar Višnjić, who had allegedly been tasked with finding out how the Slovenian political leadership would react to the potential arrest of some Slovene intellectuals – would they be able to contain possible demonstrations?177 The alarm bells rang among the Slovenian leaders: Ertl immediately referred the matter to Kučan and Dolanc, who refused to discuss the issue directly with representatives of the Army, pointing out that the Army had no power to take such a political initiative on its own.178 In an unusual move, the

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Military Council had made its conclusions public on 28 March when the Military Council stated that in Slovenia open attacks on the Army were being made by enemies engaged in special war against Yugoslavia.179 The concept of special war was increasingly used by the JNA at this stage, referring to strategies against perceived internal enemies. In a successful quest to prevent the adoption of the draft document labelling Slovenia and its leadership as counter-revolutionary, Kučan made an impassionate speech at a closed session of the SKJ Presidium on March 29, in which the Slovenes particularly directed attention to the question of what legal provisions and powers the Military Council had to discuss such matters and make political assessments without the knowledge of the Party Presidium.180 It was the minutes of Kučan’s speech from this meeting which were subsequently leaked, and reiterated in Mladina, that precipitated the Mladina affair which broke on 31 May, when journalist Janez Janša, along with two editors of Mladina (David Tasić and Franci Zavrl) were arrested after a copy of Kučan’s speech had been found in Janša’s desk. Army sergeant Ivan Borštner was also arrested, accused of stealing a military document pertaining to the case. The court case against Janša and the others changed the mood in Slovenia considerably.181 The Slovenes were deeply offended that the trial was being conducted in Serbo-Croatian rather than Slovene as stipulated in the constitution. An independent Committee for the Protection of Human Rights of Slovenia was established in Ljubljana and gathered more than 100,000 signatures on its protest petitions.182 The Mladina affair and responses to it brought a closer convergence between party and opposition in Slovenia, bringing the cause of democratisation closer to the question of national sovereignty.183 This connection proved detrimental to Slovenia’s communication at the Yugoslav level and had the effect of isolating the Slovenian leaders. Tomaž Mastnak argues that Slovenia could not be blamed for failure to democratise Yugoslav centre, yet did not contribute to democratic development in other parts of Yugoslavia.184 Milošević’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ and leadership reactions National relations deteriorated rapidly from the summer of 1988, when Milošević launched a campaign to establish control over Serbia with the provinces and, subsequently, to get the federation to agree to a programme of reform that would in practice impose a more centralised federal model. The methods employed to achieve this, and his approach to the other Yugoslav leaders represented a clear break with previous

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consensus politics. The timing was linked to the drawing up of amendments to Yugoslav and respective republican constitutions, all provoking considerable controversy and animosity. In an interview in the Belgrade weekly, NIN, Milošević outlined some aspects of his new approach.185 He openly assumed the mantle as leader of the Serbian nation, discarded the Brotherhood and Unity jargon, advocating instead the need for sloga (unanimity) among the Serbs.186 He appealed directly to emotions, and channelled all the frustration built up in the preceding years over Kosovo and Serbia’s position within Yugoslavia into advocating a ‘strong Serbia in a strong Yugoslavia’. Milošević legitimised his endorsement of the Serbian national cause by arguing that ‘not every struggle for economic, social and political and cultural interests of one’s people … is nationalism’, characterising it instead as patriotism.187 Milošević made clear his intent to push for constitutional reform, stating that ‘the Serbs are probably the only people in the world that accepts without physical coercion to live in three separate states’.188 Milošević’s rhetoric, emphasising need for action and positive change appeared at a time when the SKJ was losing its legitimacy as the ruling power.189 Milošević ’s presentation of himself as the ‘new Tito’ appealed therefore to many ordinary Serbs. However, his politics and abrasive style were bound to throw the Serbian leadership into conflict with the rest of Yugoslavia. On June 11 1988 a draft for a new Serbian constitution was presented. The draft proposed that all key state functions be brought under republican control190 and it sought to roll back the autonomy of the provinces.191 Milošević now broadened his tactic of ‘anti-bureaucratic’ meetings to pressure provincial elites.192 Starting with Novi Sad in July 1988, a string of rallies were held all over Serbia, including Vojvodina and Kosovo, and spreading to Montenegro. The protests displayed a mixture of social and political slogans, many of which were explicitly Serbian nationalist and anti-Albanian in tone. Pictures of Milošević were carried, and the rallies, which were overtly in support of his politics, were made much of by the Belgrade press. Milošević quickly saw the potential in using street politics for tactical reasons. Named figures in the Party who did not agree with his politics were subject to deliberate intimidation and smear campaigns. They were branded as ‘bureaucrats’ and condemned as being out of touch with the People. The Serbian leadership denied any involvement in orchestrating these meetings. Miroslav Šolević, leader of the Kosovo Committee for the protection of Serbs and Montenegrins that staged most of the rallies, argued that they were spontaneous.193 Few people, either inside or out of the Communist leadership believed this.

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Raif Dizdarević – then Yugoslav State President – states that he ‘received information from the federal state security forces complete with the recording of a telephone conversation between a member of the seniormost forum of the Serbian communists and the Committee’s ringleader Miroslav Šolević, conveying to the latter a message from Slobodan Milošević with details of what should be done’.194 Later published transcripts from intercepted telegrams and phone calls by the security forces also show that Šolević‘s organisation of meetings in Montenegro in the autumn 1988 were far from spontaneous.195 Milošević showed no interest in co-operating with other republican leaders, nor with the federal leadership. Rallies were frequently organised alongside leadership meetings, so that presence of the crowds would be used as a way of threatening the federal leadership. State Presidency appeals to Milošević to instruct the activists to refrain from assembling were, according to Dizdarević, ignored or circumvented.196 Milošević used these rallies to remove the leaders first in Vojvodina, through the so-called Yogurt revolution 5 October 1988, and subsequently in Montenegro, where pressure was levelled constantly at the leadership after a failed putsch in October, until the Montenegrin leadership bowed under the pressure of a newly organised campaign against them on 10–11 January 1989. The greatest purge was conducted against Kosovo. This began on 17 November 1988 when Kaquasha Jashari was removed from post as chairperson of the Kosovar Party organisation, and her predecessor Azem Vllasi was ousted from the federal presidency.197 Their enforced resignation triggered peaceful protests among the Kosovar Albanians. The protesters also opposed the proposed constitutional changes to the Serbian constitution, which they viewed to threaten their autonomy. The restraint of the protests saved Kosovo from a strong-armed crackdown by the police, and a declaration of a state of emergency was deferred. Milošević responded by organising a giant rally at Ušće, Belgrade, where allegedly one million people came to hail Milošević and demand action in Kosovo. Milošević turned his focus to the federal leadership before launching a fresh attack on Kosovo in February 1989. The toppling of the Montenegrin leadership dumbfounded the federal party and state leaders who started to fear for their own safety. They demonstrated an inability to defend the existing constitutional order. At a December 1988 stocktaking convened to review the situation in the country, one of the few things these leaders were able to agree on, was that unity was a thing of the past. The ideological and political unity of

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the SKJ was at its lowest at any time since World War II198 In January 1989, Stipe Šuvar (who had criticised Milošević’s use of street politics and opposed his crusade to change the inter-republican balance) came under intense attack from Serbia. At a plenary session held by the District Committee of Vojvodina in January, a motion was presented for Šuvar’s early resignation from his post as President of the Presidium.199 The new Vojvodinan leadership were now given the task of requesting that an extraordinary SKJ Congress be held. Concerned that the SKJ Central Committee session scheduled for 30 January would be used to topple the federal leadership, and seeing the disintegration of the Yugoslav state as a real risk, the Federal Presidency temporarily took a more decisive approach.200 It withstood the pressure to have Šuvar removed, and he served out his term. He did not, however, speak out explicitly against Milošević, as he had promised to do.201 Even if his dogmatic Marxist politics did not appeal to many within the factionalised Croatian leadership, the Serbian attacks persuaded the Croats to elect Šuvar as the Croatian representative to the Yugoslav state presidency in May 1989.202 The request for an extraordinary Congress was granted, though it was agreed it should only be extraordinary in terms of timing, not content and procedures. This would be the Fourteenth Congress, the last ever SKJ Congress, held in January 1990. But already in early 1989, it was clear that the federal party leadership had lost its ability to restore order to the Yugoslav system. This became painfully evident when things peaked in Kosovo shortly thereafter, with the unanimous adoption of the amendments to the Serbian constitution by the Serbian Constitutional Commission on 22 February. While Borisav Jović assured the provinces that they would not lose their autonomy, a last-minute amendment was added, and accepted by the parliament – stripping the very same provinces of veto power over any future constitutional changes to the Serbian constitution.203 A hunger strike had been started on 20 February among the miners at Trepča in Kosovo – demanding that Serbia abandon the constitutional changes perceived to be hostile to autonomy of the provinces.204 Protesters in Priština and around 1500 miners deep down in the Stari Trg mine demanded the resignations of three puppet leaders installed by Milošević: Husamedin Azemi (head of the Priština Party), Ali Shukrija (member of the federal SKJ CK) and Rahman Morina (former police chief – now president of the Kosovo party presidium). Once more, the federal leadership demonstrated that its fear of Milošević was greater than its willingness to defend one of its federal units from a flagrant violation of the

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constitution. Šuvar and Dizdarević both visited the province, but failed to see how the Serbian constitutional changes would influence Kosovo’s autonomy. After eight days the miners emerged from the pits after being assured that Morina, Shukrija and Azemi would resign. However, these resignations were subsequently suspended after the federal presidency, under the threat of huge crowds outside the Škupština, succumbed to Milošević’s pressure.205 Many of the republican leaders had harboured hopes that if Milošević got his way in Kosovo and Vojvodina, he would leave the rest of them alone. His move on Montenegro, a republic outside Serbia, and the February actions in Kosovo convinced them otherwise. The Slovenian alternative movement organised a public protest in support of the striking miners, held in the ‘Cankarjev Dom’ in Ljubljana on February 28, 1989. The Slovenian leaders, including Kučan, joined the protesters. In March, a state of emergency was officially declared allowing for a full crackdown in Kosovo. The vote approving the state of emergency in Kosovo had been held without Slovene representation, as Stane Dolanc was in Japan for the emperor’s funeral.206 Considerable brutality was used against the Albanian protesters, resulting in a number of casualties. Their leaders were rounded up and imprisoned. Azem Vllasi was expelled from the SKJ CK and put on trial for having organised counter-revolutionary demonstrations. He was acquitted in April 1990. On 24 March, the deputies of the provincial parliaments voted under pressure to approve the amendments.207 The provinces’ veto power was revoked, signalling the de facto stripping of their autonomy. Both provinces retained their seats in the federal presidency, though, giving Milošević extra leverage. The Slovene leaders now refused to see the affair in Kosovo as an internal Serbian affair, arguing that it had wider Yugoslav repercussions. At this point they also received tacit support from Croatia. The Slovene reactions to the affair in Kosovo caused outrage in Serbia, and led to the launch of a full-fledged anti-Slovenian campaign, including a boycott of all Slovenian goods to Serbia. Transformation of Yugoslav politics and end of SKJ hegemony From March 1989, the dynamics of Yugoslav politics changed once more. In April, Yugoslavia gained a new prime minister when the Croat Ante Marković was selected over the Serbian candidate, Borisav Jović. Together with the new federal president (the Slovene Janez Drnovšek) Marković attempted to save the Yugoslav Federation through drastic

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economic reform. Having consolidated control over the provinces and secured the support of the new Montenegrin leaders, Milošević had considerable leverage in the Federation. With four votes in the rotating federal system, he was able to put pressure on the other four – Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.208 He now set out to enhance his position at the federal level and to push reforms in the direction of recentralisation of the Federation. At the same time, Milošević was devoting his attention to the Serbs outside Serbia. His attempts at recentralisation met with resistance in Slovenia and Croatia. The second half of 1989 was coloured by bitter conflict between the Slovenian and Serbian concepts of federation. The two republican leaderships fought for support from the other republics which affected Yugoslav relations as whole. Proposals for changes to the constitutional system presented by the Constitutional Commission in 1987 had constituted a compromise of minimal change that Slovenia and Croatia had tactically decided to accept (though not without protest, especially in Slovenia). The constitutional proposals meant that the sovereignty status of the provinces should not be touched, but also entailed greater centralisation of certain spheres, including a unified legal system, telecommunication, postal services and railroads.209 Reforms to unify economic policies recommended by the IMF were also introduced. By 1989, the political situation had changed considerably. The constitutional debates soon got caught up in the confrontational political situation. Events were also affected by the increasing demise of communist power in Eastern Europe. There were increasing demands for political pluralisation and much debate about whether the principle of sovereignty rested with nations or with the republics. The anti-bureaucratic putsches in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro alarmed the other republican leaders, especially in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where attempts were made at rattling their substantial Serbian populations. Pressure had intensified by summer 1989, when the Serbian leaders set their sights on Knin and Banja Luka. One attempt by Šolević’s Kosovo Committee to organise a rally in Jajce, Bosnia, was averted in autumn 1988, but only because the Serbian leadership had made a deal which would grant it the three votes from the Bosnian party representatives in the Presidency. This would give the Serbian Party a majority in that body.210 Revelations in Bosnia in the autumn 1987 that Agrokomerc, a giant food-processing firm, had issued up to $400 million in worthless promissory notes to 63 Yugoslav banks,211 weakened the Bosnian party organisation at a particularly inopportune moment. The

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Agrokomerc scandal started a domino effect of investigation, leading to allegations of nepotism, corruption, and scandals that went all the way to the top of the leadership.212 Sensationalist reports in the Belgrade press compounded the problems for the Bosnian leadership, which nevertheless remained unified for a substantial period after the rise of nationalist politics in Serbia. Eventually, however, the mix of economic problems, destabilisation of the political system and delegitimation of the party leaders, combined with the rise of nationalist politics in other republics, broke the monolithic unity among Bosnian leaders. Macedonia also had a substantial Albanian population, and the Macedonian leaders were initially sympathetic to the Serbian position. They were however fearful of a possible destabilisation of Yugoslavia and also grew more apprehensive as considerable pressure was brought upon them to support a number of Serbian initiatives. Wary of previous Serbian aspirations in Macedonia, the introduction of a law that would allow Serbs barred after World War II by Tito from returning to Macedonia, reclaiming their interwar land in Macedonia, did not help.213 The events in Kosovo also provoked reaction in Croatia. Persistent divisions between the orthodox and the pragmatic/reformist factions within the Croatian party organisation, and the sensitivity of the national question in Croatia, complicated the response of the Croatian leadership. Generally, Croatian leaders supported Ante Markovic’s reformist but proYugoslav line, and remained reluctant to play the nationalist card, despite the rising nationalist tide in most of the Yugoslav republics. They chose the strategy of ‘silent Croatia’ to avoid getting dragged into the conflict. After March 1989, Serbian ‘anti-bureaucratic’ activities increasingly extended their focus to Croatia and Bosnia, accompanied by increased negative Serbian press coverage on Croatia. In addition to revoking the provinces’ autonomy, the amendments to the Serbian constitution in March 1989 shifted the principle of sovereignty from the republic to the people.214 By using the ambiguity in the 1974 Constitution about where sovereignty rested, Milošević now was able to claim the right to represent Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was to become very significant during the subsequent break-up of Yugoslavia. The attempt to unsettle national relations in Croatia did not receive much initial support among the majority of the republic’s Serb population, who were mainly well integrated. The exceptions were the Serb strongholds in Knin and Eastern Slavonia. When the 600th commemoration of the battle at Kosovo Polje was made into a triumphal celebration of Milošević’s new power on 28 June 1989, the Serbs in Knin,

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under the initiative of Jovan Raškovic, staged their own celebration of the Kosovo battle.215 Milosevic’s address at Kosovo Polje on this occasion was alarming to many Yugoslavs: not only was it portrayed as the rebirth of Serbian greatness and victory over the Kosovar Albanians; it also included the warning: ‘We are again engaged in battles and quarrels. These are not armed battles, but these cannot be ruled out yet’.216 The Knin Serbs argued that the Serbs in Croatia were being assimilated and demanded a purge of the Croatian Communist Party, including many of its Serbian members.217 Reactions to events happened late in Croatia but swiftly, changing the political environment almost overnight. The strict line pursued by the Croatian leaders for most of the decade, had largely alienated the leaders from its own population.218 They had played themselves out on the sideline as the demand for political pluralisation gained momentum in late 1989, leaving the door open for more exclusivist nationalist forces like Tuđman’s HDZ, which came to power in the first Croatian elections in April 1990. From the summer of 1989, the Serbian–Slovenian leadership conflict increasingly played out in public over the federal constitution. Serbia presented a model that would grant greater power to the centre, and which favoured a majority principle. The Serbian leadership favoured reorganisation of the Federal Chamber in the National Assembly on a one-man-onevote principle, as well as replacement of consensual decision-making on major political and economic questions with majority decision-making.219 Abandonment of the consensus principle would have represented a major break with the existing system, and was opposed by Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia.220 A majority would allow for a change in the Party statute, and in effect eliminate the confederal elements of the political structure. It would also have rendered it possible to impose the decisions of the majority, based on the principle of democratic centralism.221 This would have enabled the majority at the Congress to control all-Yugoslav institutions including the army and the secret police.222 Slovenia, especially, strongly opposed the move to a majority principle. It pushed instead for deepening the confederal element. Slovenian proposals for amendments to the republic’s constitution stressed the question of Slovenian statehood, sovereignty and Slovenia’s rights vis-à-vis the Federation. Moša Pijade’s assertion from 1945, that Slovenia’s right to self-determination had already been used when it became a part of the Yugoslav Federation after World War II, were refuted. The proposal that the Slovenian republican state organs independently of the federal Yugoslav organs could declare a state of emergency, caused considerable

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controversy. The Slovenes faced resistance both from the army and the federal leadership, but the amendments were adopted in September 1989. The Serbs strongly opposed this move, and tried to organise a large rally in Ljubljana (the so-called ‘Meeting of Truth’) but Kučan banned it.223 The Slovenes toyed for a while with the idea of asymmetric federation which would have allowed Slovenia considerable flexibility in how to organise itself and allowed it to co-operate as much or little with the other units as it desired. This model presumed that some units could be oneparty, while those that wanted further democratisation could pursue this. In the second half of 1989, Slovenia and Croatia moved towards a proper confederation, and political pluralisation.224 Multi-party political systems were legalised at the end of the year in both republics, and elections were scheduled for April 1990. The Fourteenth Congress and the end of the SKJ The Fourteenth Congress was the last one held by the SKJ, in effect signalling the dissolution of the Party as an all-Yugoslav organisation. The Slovenian and Croatian parties feared that the convocation of an extraordinary congress could be a prelude to the invocation of special measures both within the Party and within the Yugoslav state as a whole, and therefore resisted. Bosnia-Herzegovina also expressed little enthusiasm for the Congress, which had originally been scheduled for December 1989, but was postponed to January 1990. It was supposed to tackle three issues: reform of the constitutional system, economic reform, and transformation of the SKJ.225 Borisav Jović explains in his diary the Serbian strategy at the congress: to ensure that the Slovenes remain isolated, and to prevent Croatia, Macedonia, and possibly Bosnia-Herzegovina from joining them. He also argues that the Serbian Party’s aim was to maintain the integrity of the SKJ based on the principle of democratic centralism, and to enlist the support of the army. Furthermore, Jović points out, it should appear that the Serbian delegation was not the one to put pressure on the Slovenes and potential partners, so as not to put the Croats and Macedonians off. Instead, he stated, the JNA had agreed to take on the leading role.226 All the Slovenian proposals were outvoted, leaving the Slovenes in an untenable situation, so they decided to stage a walkout. The Croatian delegations followed, and the Congress was temporarily suspended – for good as it turned out. The Fourteenth Congress in effect signalled the end of the SKJ and of its socialist solution to the Yugoslav national question, even if its fragmentation had been a fact already much earlier. In

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the course of the following year, a process of political pluralisation took place in all the republics, but there was no common political pluralisation at a Yugoslav level. After the disintegration of the SKJ, other republics followed Croatia and Slovenia and staged multiparty elections in the course of 1990. Even Milošević, whose power base had centred on the Party organisation, had to concede to a multiparty system. Milošević took firm control over all the state assets, army resources and media. He effectively appropriated the existing Party organisation, to win an easy victory over other emerging forces, and managed to rebuff demands for democratisation with the argument that settling Serbia’s national question ought to take precedence. An entry from 13 October 1989 in Borisav Jović’s diary gives a clear illustration of Milošević’s thinking: ‘our strategy needs to be to secure, not only by words, but also in practice, full democracy for the Serbian intelligentsia in a non-party pluralism. So that they do not attack us too strongly.227 Since Milošević had adopted a platform that the Serbian intelligentsia had (to a large degree) developed, it became almost impossible for them to oppose him with an alternative political programme. With the death of the SKJ, its socialist approach to the national question and the socialist project to which it was attached was no more. The second Yugoslav state outlived the SKJ for over a year, before its violent disintegration, followed by a sequel of devastating wars. Efforts were made by a weakened federal leadership under Ante Marković to save the Yugoslav state after the SKJ’s collapse. By this time, however, the parameters on which the state and coexistence were founded had fundamentally changed, and the disintegration had progressed too far. Brotherhood and unity and the willingness to live in a common/joint community had given way to aggression and antagonism. Conclusion The SKJ approach to the Yugoslav national question in the 1980s differed significantly from that of previous decades. The collective SKJ leadership that took over after Tito did not seek to stake out a new direction in the party’s strategies towards the national question. Instead it focused attention on preserving the ideological parameters of the existing system, securing the legacy of Tito and his confidants. However, the SKJ leaders were soon tested by new challenges to the Yugoslav political system that defied the standard formulations on the national question from the 1970s, and left the new leaders on the defensive. Kosovo constituted the first

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real test of how the leadership would handle the national question and removed any pretence that it had been solved in Yugoslavia. The failure of the SKJ leadership to deal effectively with the Kosovo question as well as the economic and political crisis created considerable instability. It aggravated tension between the republics and made relations between the federal organs and the republics more difficult. The SKJ’s inability to deal with the crisis opened the door to challenges to the legitimacy of the SKJ’s dominant role in Yugoslav society, and consequently also of the legacy of Tito and Kardelj’s professed ‘solution’ to the Yugoslav national question. The SKJ approach to the national question in the 1980s, became largely an exercise to fend off challenges to the legitimacy of the SKJ and socialist solution they had introduced to the Yugoslav national question in 1945. The SKJ approach to the national question in the 1980s was characterised by a process of fragmentation, which parallelled fragmentation of the SKJ itself. The Party became increasingly federalised along similar lines as the state, leaving a federal centre with little power to tackle the many challenges met by Yugoslavia in the 1980s. This breakdown of Party unity, visible already in the early 1980s, made it almost impossible to delineate a consistent strategy towards the national question. Instead the legitimacy of the socialist solution to the Yugoslav national question, as formulated by the SKJ, became a topic for political argument. As the decade progressed, one could therefore no longer talk of a coherent SKJ strategy towards the national question. The Yugoslav national question became superseded by individual national questions, of which the Serbian emerged as pre-eminent. A federal state model, founded upon the principle of consensual decision-making made on the principle of national equality, formed the basis for the practical aspect of the SKJ’s claimed solution to the national question. However, the evolving model of federalism developed by the old Yugoslav leaders left behind a federal system that was not to the equal liking of all the Yugoslav leaderships. In the 1980s, the doors soon opened to a new struggle over federalism, which lasted throughout the decade. The dynamic nature of Yugoslav federalism had taught republican and provincial leaderships that the shape of the federal system was not written in stone. After Tito’s death, each republican and provincial leadership attempted to protect what they had gained within the Yugoslav Federation, and as far as possible retain and enhance their position both vis-à-vis the other entities and against interference from the federal level. The main contention stood between the Serbian model – based on a

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recentralisation of the Federation and the Slovenian one which favoured deepening of federalism and autonomy. The greatest crisis concerned the internal relations in the Republic of Serbia – between the Serbian aspirations to reintegrate its provinces under greater Belgrade control – and Kosovar Albanian aspirations to republican status. The wider process of erosion of power among the state-socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also impacted on affairs in Yugoslavia. The thawing of the Cold War made Yugoslavia’s strategic role less important than it had been under Tito, as well as affecting the Party’s role more generally. But the breakdown in party legitimacy in Yugoslavia in the 1980s was context-specific and largely linked implicitly or explicitly to the specific development and dynamic of Yugoslav politics and the overall malaise of the Yugoslav political system. The erosion of the SKJ approach to the national question was dependent on human factors as well as systemic ones. These included the reactions and conduct of the political leaders who took over in Yugoslavia after Tito, as well as on individuals and movements outside the party who formulated new discourses and criticised the regime. Many of Tito’s successors were loyalists, dogmatic and uninspiring figures who had come to power following Tito’s tightening reign in the early 1970s. Still, their understanding of the world, of Yugoslav politics as well as their actions (or lack of them) addressing the issues that challenged Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, played a key role in the events that unfolded and the processes that took place. Brotherhood and unity depended on a measure of willingness for commonality and coexistence, and some agreement over the rules on which these should be based. Discussions over such parameters were not new to the Yugoslav system, but in the context of the eroding party and federal unity of the 1980s the willingness to co-operate for a common future was increasingly elusive. In 1987, the rules for common engagement were broken. A common approach to the national question started to fragment along with Party unity long before Milošević came to power in 1987, but his approach had particularly destructive impact on cohesion. Even if most of the republican leaderships grew increasingly concerned with protecting their own interests, up to 1987 they had all adhered to some shared principles when engaging with the national question. Regardless of other differences, they all adhered to the principle of keeping their own republics clean by keeping domestic nationalist forces at bay. With Milošević’s ascent to power, this changed. Milošević’s actions broke with the rules of rotation on which all the

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post-Tito Yugoslav institutions were based.228 Most of his actions were outside the normal institutional channels, relying on a highly personalised, populist style of politics. This upset the balance of power on which the delicate national relations in Yugoslavia had been based, and broke with the most sacred principle of Yugoslav national relations: national equality. Equally, the failure of the federal presidency to take action against Milošević’s putsch against the leaderships in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro did a great deal of harm to the principles on which the KPJ/SKJ had arranged national relations after World War II. The fragmentation of the commonly agreed national policy, and the inability of the federal leaders to protect the constitutional arrangement on which it had been built, created fear and instability, forcing the leaders to turn their attention towards internal consolidation, and securing their interests vis-à-vis the other units.

Conclusion THE LEGACY OF THE SKJ ‘SOCIALIST SOLUTION’ TO THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL QUESTION

When the League of Communists of Yugoslavia collapsed in 1990, followed two years later by the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav state, the national question was again a central issue in Yugoslav politics. From its inception in 1919, the Yugoslav Communists’ approach to the national question had held a vital part in the formulation of its politics and ideas. It had been vital in bringing the KPJ to power during World War II, and had continued to play a key role in sustaining its power after the war. The KPJ/SKJ’s strategies towards the national question were closely linked to the wider project to create, build and then sustain a socialist society. The national question was also central to the Yugoslav Communist leadership strategies. The KPJ/SKJ postwar project was simultaneously Yugoslav and socialist in nature. As a socialist project, the ultimate aim was to ensure the continuing leading role that the Communist Party had obtained through the wartime struggle; a precondition judged as essential by the communists for the creation of a socialist society. The socialist aspect of the project emphasised the need for party and class unity, and the Party was initially subjected to a large degree of centralism. However, the revolutionary legacy of the KPJ/SKJ was rooted not only in its introduction of a socialist system; equally it was rooted in the communists’ promise of a qualitatively different Yugoslavia; one in which internal relations were peaceful, while the national aspirations of the various different Yugoslav

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peoples would be met. So the communist project was also a Yugoslav project, based within the framework of a Yugoslav state, intent on securing some form of Yugoslav stability. The leading position of the KPJ depended on the ability to endow the concept of Yugoslavia with a new meaning and substance, and the state with a new structure, different from the pre-existing one. These measures together constituted the essence of what the SKJ referred to as their solution to the national question. The Yugoslav Communists’ strategies towards the national question underwent considerable changes from 1935 until the SKJ collapsed as a unified Yugoslav party organisation in 1990. During the entire postwar period, the Party’s strategies and ideological direction were subject to needs to adjust to political events and societal pressures, and evolved through a dynamic and interrelating course of political and ideological processes. These processes resulted in changes not only in the SKJ’s rhetoric on the national question, but also in the institutional framework of the Yugoslav state and the role of the Republics within a Yugoslav community. The ideological rationale for all these changes also altered over the years. This final chapter will firstly provide an overview over the main features and changes in the strategies of the KPJ/SKJ towards the Yugoslav national question. Secondly, it will offer some conclusions on the legacy of the SKJ’s approach to the national question. The development of the SKJ’s discourse on the Yugoslav national question from 1935 From 1935 to 1945, the KPJ strategies for finding a solution to the national question and for achieving socialist revolution remained closely intertwined. From 1935, the KPJ made a commitment to pursue a ‘socialist solution’ to the national question in Yugoslavia on an allYugoslav line within a federal framework. The Communists’ strategies towards the national question were influenced by their attempt to attract mass support to their socialist revolutionary cause. Following the usual Marxist-Leninist logic of outbidding nationalist competitors by offering wide-ranging promises of national self-determination to attract support, the KPJ agreed on recognising the existence of multiple national groups and conceding the right of these groups to self-determination within a Yugoslav socialist framework. Up to 1948, the Yugoslav Communists’ strategies for finding a solution to the national question were influenced by the directives from the Comintern/Cominform and subject to the changing political needs of the

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Soviet Union and Stalin. Their initial federal structure and party organisation was modelled on the Soviet example, and equally countered with a highly centralised Bolshevik party. One fundamental difference was that the Yugoslav Communists placed greater stress on national equality, and their decision to avoid the domination of one national group. The promise of formal national equality and national self-determination was a crucial aspect of their ‘solution’ to the national question, but so was the advocacy of a common Yugoslav line. The all-Yugoslav principle and promise of multinationalism was what set the communist movement apart from other political forces in wartime Yugoslavia. Concurrently, and often with considerable ruthlessness, the SKJ ensured that its new leading role would not be challenged by other political forces – inside or outside the Partisan Movement. During the first decade in power, the Yugoslav Communists pursued a vaguely defined strategy towards Yugoslav integration, in which the epic myths of the common wartime struggle for national liberation played a considerable role. Emphasis was on the unifying aspect, where the KPJ tried to promote unity built on the recognition of diversity. The main slogan to encapsulate this strategy was Brotherhood and Unity. Although not always explicitly expressed, there was an expectation that attachment to national cultures would subside through building of socialism, and state federalism was countered by party centralism. A tendency towards unification was inherently viewed as positive, though the KPJ remained somewhat ambiguous on how to achieve such unity. The Communists did not initially address the question of what it meant to be a Yugoslav and how one could reconcile one’s national identity with a Yugoslav one. Did solving the national question mean only ensuring peaceful relations between the different Yugoslav peoples, or did it also presuppose the expectation of some form of unification between them? Was Yugoslavia just the framework for regulating national relations, or did it presuppose some form of commonality? And if so, would such commonality be based primarily on a socialist principle, or on one of common South Slav kinship? The communist leaders did not always offer clarity on these issues and many of the measures they introduced raised new questions and dilemmas. Socialist Yugoslavism, integral federalism, attempts at unification and rapprochement The 1948 Soviet–Yugoslav split led to an ideological redirection that did not initially touch directly on the national question, but the theoretical

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and practical changes that followed came to have significant impact on Yugoslav national policy. The introduction of the doctrine of selfmanagement socialism in Yugoslavia paved the way for a renewed discussion around the idea of Yugoslav unity. The 1950s were the only decade in which the Party actively and openly pursued a strategy to form a unified Yugoslav culture and identity on the principle of integration.1 The Party leaders realised by this time that national equality did not necessarily ensure greater integration between the different peoples, and became aware of the lack of inter-republican communication. The promotion of Yugoslav unity in the early 1950s was an attempt to create closer relations between the different Yugoslav peoples based on a wish to promote a type of common Yugoslav patriotism and to counter republican isolationism, while avoiding being perceived as assimilationists or stepping too hard on sensitive national toes. They encouraged the creation of literature, art and film that could proudly front Yugoslavia to the world. In this spirit, the Communists sought not only to encourage the production of new and ideologically suitable Yugoslav cultural works, but also to incorporate the acceptable parts of previous national cultures and adapt them into the postwar discourse. The first major change in the SKJ’s discourse on the national question came with the official launch to create a more unified socialist culture in 1955. While Brotherhood and Unity to a large extent was rooted in a sense of common interests among the different South Slav peoples, and entailed a strong South Slav factor, the new doctrine of socialist Yugoslavism built mainly on an attempt to justify Yugoslav unity on a socialist principle. This was an attempt to introduce a theoretical justification for the claim to have introduced a ‘socialist solution’ to the national question and the promotion of Yugoslav unity. In the second edition of his cardinal work Razvoj Slovenačkog Nacionalnog Pitanja launched in 1957, Kardelj emphasised the difference between the SKJ’s socialist concept of Yugoslav unity, and the inter-war concept of Yugoslav unity, based on assimilation, referred to as ‘integral Yugoslavism’.2 In principle, the new Yugoslav culture was conceived as an overarching supranational culture, which would respect and also incorporate parts of the existing national cultures. However, Kardelj expected rapprochement and even merging between the Yugoslav peoples to develop through the strengthening of socialism in Yugoslavia. While he would eventually be seen as the defender of the Republics, at this point neither Kardelj nor his colleagues placed great emphasis on their importance.

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Meanwhile, the SKJ’s attempt to raise the question of increasing Yugoslav rapprochement brought to light the fact that not all Party leaders and intellectuals were agreed about what kind of Yugoslav unity they envisioned. The Slovene–Serbian polemics over interrepublican cultural co-operation and socialist Yugoslavism clearly demonstrated that even when approaching the issue from a Marxist position, the conclusions arrived at would not necessarily be the same. Instead of creating closer co-operation between the Yugoslav peoples, the communist attempt to introduce socialist Yugoslavism unleashed numerous questions about what sort of coexistence there should be between the different nations and nationalities and demonstrated the lack of inter-republican cultural interaction. The attempt to promote socialist Yugoslavism was therefore short-lived. The abandonment of the attempt to create an integrated Yugoslav identity and unity was a piecemeal process, and resulted partly from the pragmatic observation that support for the strategy was very limited among many of the non-Serbian national groups. Many non-Serbs (and in particular the Slovenes) viewed the promotion of Yugoslavism – socialist or not – as potentially threatening to the right of the different peoples to individual national development. Socialist Yugoslavism received the strongest support among Serbs, which again resulted in increased scepticism from the other groups. For the representatives of Serbian cultural life and of the Party, Yugoslavism emerged as cohesive force that could help Yugoslavia overcome national divisions, by the creation of a new socialist consciousness. The promotion of socialist Yugoslavism made it more legitimate for them to express support for Yugoslav rapprochement without being accused of ‘Great Serbianism’. Therefore, it was no accident that most polemics over the concept of socialist Yugoslavism stood between the small, homogeneous Slovenia and the larger, geographically more dispersed Serbs. The indication that both protagonists in the debate between Dobrica Ćosić and Dušan Pirjevec in 1961 acted as proxies for respective Serbian and Slovenian party leadership positions, also reflected the divergent perceptions of Yugoslav unity among the Party leadership. Yugoslav federal development indicated a movement towards the Slovenian perception of Yugoslav unity. The abandonment of socialist Yugoslavism and disagreement over the purpose and form of Yugoslav unity, was rooted in deeper concerns about the ideological direction of the party. Although the tendency in the 1950s was towards more unity in Yugoslav culture, the break with

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Stalin in 1948 also signalled a contrasting development whereby the Yugoslav Communists gradually moved away from party centralism. The introduction of self-management, had gradually led to disagreement among the top leadership over the further political and ideological direction of the party, and this also affected their approach to the national question. This was tied to a power struggle emerging between liberal forces, who wished for further reforms and genuine federalism, and conservative forces within this same leadership who wished to detain further erosion of party centralism and control, and who were sceptical about further federalisation and to granting more power to the republics. Through this power-struggle within the leadership, socialist Yugoslavism eventually, to some extent unintentionally, became linked to the support for centralism and accusations of unitarism, and increasingly to Serbian interests. Therefore, it became more difficult for the Communist leaders to promote this kind of Yugoslav unity based on further integration. The main battle stood between Edvard Kardelj who now emerged as the chief ideologue and spokesman on the national question and the development of the federal system, and Tito’s heir-apparent, the powerful chief of the secret police and highest-ranking Serb among the leadership, Aleksandar Ranković. For Tito, it also eventually became a question of which of the two dangers he feared constituted the greater danger to the Party’s power and his own position: increased centralism and control, or further decentralisation and democratisation. Tito remained on the fence for some time, adding to the insecurity about what direction the development of the Yugoslav system would take. Eventually, he came down on the side of the reformers. The debates on socialist Yugoslavism in the late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrated not only the different visions held by the Yugoslav peoples on the desired form of unity and commonality, but also pointed to the greater Marxist theoretical weakness in explaining the continuous role of the nation as a political force within ‘societies on the road to socialism’. In various speeches between 1962 and 1964, Kardelj and Tito insisted that socialist Yugoslavism was a form of loyalty to self-management socialism, and not an attempt to create a new nation. However by insisting that socialist Yugoslavism was only an expression of the socialist dimension of the Yugoslav project, they inherently also linked continuing legitimacy of Yugoslav unity and even the Yugoslav state to their socialist project.

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Federalisation of the Federation, abandonment of Yugoslavism and breakdown in Yugoslav party unity Although the tension between liberal and conservative forces continued throughout the 1960s, there was also a tendency towards liberalisation in Yugoslav society. A great reform process was set in motion within the economy and the federal system. National and inter-republican relations increasingly became coloured by competition over economic and other resources, and by mutual suspicions of the others’ intentions. The communists approach to the national question and to politics in general in the 1960s was coloured by an experimental edge, rooted in the need for the party leaders to square the often-contradictory project of promoting self-management socialism while still maintaining political control in Yugoslav society. Important changes to the Yugoslav Communists’ approach to the national question, ideological as well as practical, emerged in the 1960s. The SKJ ability to keep the Party unified and set the course for ideological development weakened, as a new and younger generation emerged on the political stage. New, wider, and more differentiated interests were expressed, though still within the limits of the existing one-party system. The new constitution introduced in 1963 paved the way for Yugoslavia to become a de facto federal state, and the federal framework of the state itself became a topic of discussion. Focus moved to the rights and interests of each people, rather than common Yugoslav interests. This compelled the communist leaders to address the relationship between the different units more clearly. The question of what it meant to be a Yugoslav was no longer defined primarily according to the Slav criterion, but increasingly according to a socialist definition – belonging to the Yugoslav community. In this manner, it also became more inclusive for the non-Slav nationalities. What it meant to belong to the Yugoslav community continued to remain an elusive question, and thus left the door open for new discussions on this topic a few years later. The Eighth Congress in 1964 represented a crucial turning point in the communist strategy towards the national question and marked a departure in the SKJ’s policy to promote a common Yugoslav culture based on any concept of ‘melting together’ (spajanje). This event signalled a step in direction of the liberals who now received support from Tito. The communist leaders officially admitted for the first time that they had not ‘entirely’ solved the national question, though they maintained that it had ‘in principle’ been solved.3 Tito also made the leadership’s most explicit attempt to refute the suggestions that the Party aimed at the creation a

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new Yugoslav nation. Now, the Yugoslav state was characterised not only as the framework for resolving the national conflict among the Yugoslav peoples, but as a new type of ‘multinational social community’ that could also serve as a model for developing countries with a multinational structure. The concept of socialist Yugoslavism was not mentioned during this congress. The dismissal of Ranković in 1966 sparked a reassessment of national rights in virtually every republic in Yugoslavia, peaking with the crisis referred to as the Croatian Mass Movement in 1971. It also set the cue for a still nascent articulation of the so-called Serbian question within Yugoslavia. The Ranković case and the leadership’s handling of it had the misfortune that his position became identified, not only with one favouring political centralism based on a strong party and strong state, and ‘bureaucratic centralism,’ but also with ‘unitarism’. In addition, Tito suggested, this position was linked to a principle of assimilation. The SKJ’s accusations of unitarism against Ranković, contributed greatly to de-legitimising any further attempt to advocate Yugoslav unity or rapprochement on a basis that did not originate from the explicit recognition of the national individuality of each people. The Ranković case thus helped consolidate the association of Yugoslavism, socialist or not, to Serbian interests, and consequently gave growing disputes a national character as well. The response from each republic and province to the fall of Ranković formed part of a larger debate over the future of the Yugoslav state and the SKJ’s socialist project. Each would highlight particular dilemmas relating to national and republican interrelations in Yugoslavia and to aspects central to the SKJ’s alleged solution to the national question. The debates also reflected on the changing dynamics in the broader liberal–conservative power struggle and on the republics’ attitude towards the 1971 constitutional amendments. The intensity of conflict and the nature of issues causing tension differed from republic to republic, as did the issues of focus. In Kosovo, Ranković’s removal sparked a wave of national dissatisfaction and the start of a process to assert national rights among the Albanian population in Kosovo. What ignited national sensitivities were above all the revelations about the abuses directed against the Albanian population by the security forces (UDBa) which had been under Ranković’s control. The SKJ’s admission of such abuses, and the fact that condemnation of it – under pressure from Tito – came directly from the Serbian Party organisation, was intended to appease the feelings of the Kosovar-Albanian population.

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Instead, it had the opposite effect. It also increased awareness among the Albanians of how their situation compared to that of the other Yugoslav peoples and nationalities, leading them to make demands for further rights. Many of these were granted, but that of republican status was rejected. While debates over unity and diversity had primarily been conducted along a Slovene–Serbian axis in the 1950s and first half of 1960s, Croatia would emerge at the centre of the national controversies in Yugoslavia in the period 1967–1971. The events in Croatia in 1971 led to the greatest crisis the second Yugoslav state had seen thus far. It also led to a far-reaching reassessment of Croatia’s status within Yugoslavia. The Croatian national question and Croatia’s relation to the Yugoslav state had potential to raise questions about the continuing existence of the Yugoslav state in a manner that the events in no other republic would do. National discontent in Croatia was characterised by an increased emphasis on seeking legal measures to safeguard Croatian interests visà-vis Yugoslav interests. The Yugoslav and Croatian crisis in 1971 for the first time raised serious doubts about the will to co-operate among the republics. However, even if the boundaries for how far demands for reforms could go and what could be publicly expressed were tested to the limit, none of the discussions questioned the existence of socialist Yugoslavia or explicitly challenged its legitimacy. Even the Croatian Mass Movement tried to negotiate the widest possible space of manoeuvre for Croatia and their organisation within the framework of socialist Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Croatian Triumvirate’s loss of control over the Croatian Mass Movement seriously shook the SKJ leadership, and led it to take action. Tito’s intervention in 1971–2 removed from office not only the Croatian and Serbian republican leaderships, but also all the liberal forces that had supported this process. It did not, however, halt the constitutional decentralisation that had started in the 1960s. Decentralisation of the federal system was thus accompanied by a more authoritarian party policy, where the Party assumed a stronger role in dictating how its national policy should be interpreted. Tighter party control over the media and press was instated, and censorship became stifling on public debate. Tito’s response was to a large extent a pragmatic, if not always rational response to curb the gradual loss of control that the party had suffered since the mid-1960s. To some degree, it related to the question of his succession and of how to secure the revolutionary legacy of the Communist Party.

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Further federalisation and retreat from democratisation The events in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s led the SKJ reluctantly to admit that the Yugoslav national question as they had formulated it had not entirely been ‘solved’. The great overhaul of the federal system that had taken place from 1968–1971, culminated in the constitution of 1974. It was highly influenced by the particular events of the recent years, and therefore also reflected lessons learnt from these events. In this way, the 1974 constitution was also an attempt to overcome the tension between the need for ensuring party unity while allowing for national diversity. Kardelj, in particular, was concerned that even a suspicion that the SKJ was attempting to recentralise the Yugoslav state would lead to continuing instability, and potentially renewed national discontent. With the changes introduced in the 1970s, the SKJ attempted to do what they had not done at the initiation of the new Yugoslav state: create a system of national conflict regulation that presupposed the continuing existence of nations and of national conflict. Since the Communists came to power, they had insisted that national conflict, as other conflict, would diminish as socialism was built. The 1971 crisis showed clearly that this was not the case, and it became increasingly difficult for the Communists to continue to argue so. Now they recognised that national conflict might continue to exist also in the time of building socialism. Rather than being a clear new strategy towards the national question, the policy during the years from 1972–1980 was a response to a crisis in the Yugoslav socialist project as articulated by the SKJ revolutionary leaders. Tito’s intervention had a stifling effect on political life in Yugoslavia. The late 1970s were influenced by increased oppression and a retreat from the attempt to reform and ‘democratise’ Yugoslav society to the extent that was possible in a one-party system. Imposing stricter censorship did not take the national question out of the equation; it merely served to silence expressions of opposition to the Party line and concerns over the new federal arrangement. In Croatia, the constitutional concessions were not enough to quell the disappointment experienced following Tito’s intervention, and by the time of Tito’s death the atmosphere there was largely one of apathy and suppression. After the events in 1971, the new Croatian leaders to a large degree withdrew publicly. This had some important implications for Yugoslav relations, as it left the Slovenes to front the reformist position by themselves. The silencing of genuine dissent against the constitutional amendments in Serbia, combined with the removal of the Serbian liberals, had a similarly disillusioning effect in Serbia.

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With the institutionalisation of the provisions granted to the provinces in the 1974 constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina started to act more independently from Belgrade. The Serbian leadership grew increasingly uneasy with the effects of the post-1974 constitutional arrangement. In Draža Marković‘s view, the shift to a republican focus made it doubly difficult for the Serbian leadership, since the Serbian population was more spread out than other Yugoslav peoples.4 The Serbian leadership’s official critique of the workings of the 1974 constitution, presented in the 1977 Blue Book, was rebuffed by Tito, and never reached public discussion. This critique re-emerged after Tito’s death, and came to colour much of the debate in the 1980s. The Serbian leaders met little support from the other republics, which perceived the initiative as an attempt to recentralise the federation. Efforts at dialogue with the provinces were attempted, with little result. However, by silencing those who were at least reservedly in favour of the proposed federal changes (the Serbian Liberals), while concurrently closing any channels for those voicing concerns with the proposed amendments, the Serbs were left with a feeling that these proposals created a situation against their interests. What was worse, some forces now came to question whether the Yugoslav project would benefit them at all. The late 1970s can in many ways be seen as lost opportunity to secure the future of Yugoslavia. It became largely an exercise to secure the legacy of the SKJ, Tito and the socialist experiment, rather than providing for renewal and the future of the Yugoslav peoples. The 1980s: fragmentation and delegitimation of the socialist solution to national question The last ten years of Yugoslav communist rule cannot really be described as a new phase in their strategies towards the national question. The new collective leadership that took over after Tito’s death had no desire to rock the blueprint left by Tito and Kardelj. It continued to see the selfmanagement system as the answer to all of Yugoslavia’s challenges, and discussions continued to be conducted within this paradigm at least until the middle of the 1980s. This was also the case as far as strategy towards the national question was concerned, as they viewed the regulation of national conflict as intimately tied to the self-management system. The energies of party leaders went into defending the status quo and rebuffing critique from forces outside the Party that sought to challenge the legitimacy of their solution to the national question. The death of Tito, the economic and political crises, and the unrest in Kosovo in 1981 were

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major catalysts for the process that led to the delegitimation of the SKJ socialist solution to the national question in the 1980s. Malfunctioning institutions, lacking cultural unity, lack of federal consensus and incentives to foster inter-republican cooperation at the domestic level, and the breakdown of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union all played a crucial role in the gradual erosion of SKJ legitimacy and the fragmentation of its approach to the national question during the second half of the decade. The rise of Slobodan Milošević to power in Serbia nevertheless had a particularly adverse impact on the breakdown of the principle on which Yugoslav national relations were based. The anti-bureaucratic revolutions in the late 1980s created considerable fear and uncertainty. There was also an increase in national antagonism, and a complete alteration of federal relations, including the revoking of autonomy of the two Serbian provinces. The breakdown in inter-republican communication, and the inability of the federal authorities to deal with the crisis, led in January 1990 to the dissolution of the SKJ as a unified Yugoslav party. The legacy of Titoist Yugoslavia The second part of this chapter attempts to draw some conclusions on the legacy of the socialist Yugoslav experiment. Given that this book focuses on the particular theme of the Yugoslav Communists’ approach to the national question and the period when the Yugoslav Communists came to and held power, this work cannot aspire to offer an overall explanation of Yugoslavia’s demise. Yugoslavia’s disintegration had a complex range of sources, and even more explanations have been offered, only some of which have been covered in this book.5 The scope of this conclusion limits itself to offer some perspectives on the SKJ approach to the Yugoslav national question that I believe are important for understanding the historical legacy of the socialist Yugoslav experiment. I would like to make clear that I neither see the collapse of the second Yugoslav state as inevitable, nor seek to blame the SKJ leadership or its approach to the national question for it. Rather, I believe that understanding the rationale behind the approach and policies for dealing with the national question can contribute to enhance our understanding of the legacy of the socialist Yugoslav system and state, and its impact on the agonising and longlasting Yugoslav disintegration.

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National conflict regulation in a socialist society – ideology, politics and legitimation The ideological dimension is key to understanding the development of Yugoslav discourse on the national question. This dimension primarily offers insight into the communists’ thinking on the matter, and why they introduced the measures and changes they did, what effect it had and also why their socialist project became vulnerable. The study of the Yugoslav communist movement’s approach to the national question cannot be conceptualised without an awareness of the Communists’ particular ideological conceptualisation of the nation and of national conflict. Nor can it be detached from their Marxist understanding of historical development or from their wider revolutionary and post-revolutionary aims. The Yugoslav communists’ approach to the national question was an integrated part of its wider project to create a socialist society, a political project ideologically rooted in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. The communists’ engagement with the national question grew primarily from the need to find a practical approach for dealing with the existence of multiple national groups and potential or real national conflict within a multinational state. The political, historical and cultural context in Yugoslavia and the complex national composition of the population were crucial in forming the Yugoslav communists’ approach to the national question before, during and after the war. So was the fact that a number of the groups within Yugoslavia already had well-developed national ideologies, and that the communists had to compete with other political forces for support. To detract support from national forces the Yugoslav communists followed the Leninist dictum, promising the right to national self-determination, including the right to secession. And in much the same way as the national question had impacted on the communists’ strategies for getting into power, national ideology and the need to deal with national relations became an ongoing disrupting element to the Communists’ Marxist discourse, and their quest to secure their leading position in Yugoslav society. The claim to have solved the national question and the federal system introduced as the practical measure to do so, became key pillars of the SKJ’s legitimacy strategies, and to a large extent served to structure the legitimation processes of the regime. The wartime Partisans’ struggle for socialist revolution and national liberation, served as the founding myth for the new Yugoslavia, and the legitimacy of the state was rooted in this event. The introduction of a specifically socialist ‘solution’ to the national question meant that the multinational project and the legitimacy

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of the state remained parts of the political processes and closely tied to the regime that had introduced it. The SKJ’s leading role came to depend considerably on its ability to ‘keep the nations happy’ at the same time as keeping national forces in check. A number of scholars have favoured an explanation of the profound and rapid demise of communist rule in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in terms of a severe legitimation crisis.6 The demise of communist power experienced in Yugoslavia in the 1980s shared many features with the processes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, even if its unique brand of socialism set Yugoslavia apart from these state-socialist regimes. From 1986, the political processes in Yugoslavia were clearly influenced by the wider erosion of communist legitimacy and power in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, the dynamic of the delegitimation process was largely rooted in domestic conditions specific to the Yugoslav context. There are diverse viewpoints on the role of the national question in the demise of communism. Referring to the Soviet case, Mark Beissinger argues that nationalism is often portrayed as merely a consequence of the communist demise, not as an autonomous or contributing factor within the process.7 Even though context and sequence of events were different, this also held true in the case of Yugoslavia. Nationalism was not merely a by-product of the demise of communist power in the late 1980s; rather, the national question played a significant role in structuring the processes that led to the delegitimation of communist power suffered in Yugoslavia.8 Nor can the nationalism that emerged following the demise of communism be seen as re-emergence of pre-revolutionary national discourses, as some claim, and the communist approach to the development of national relations during the socialist period cannot be seen as inconsequential. Throughout its time in power, the SKJ attempted to appropriate the aspirations of different national ideologies into its own discourse at the same time as keeping a strict line against non-communist nationalist expression. In this manner, others were prevented from using nationalist ideology to challenge the Party’s dominant position. However, the communist elites also needed the assistance of intellectuals in a more positive capacity, in building up a positive image of the socialist Yugoslav state and upholding the socialist regime’s legitimacy.9 In Yugoslavia, there was an attempt in the 1950s to encourage established and new cultural workers to participate in a joint effort to create a vibrant new Yugoslav culture. Intellectual engagement in Yugoslavia

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was shaped by the specific dynamics of Yugoslav inter-national and inter-republican relations. Most of the intellectuals in Yugoslavia were products of the postwar socialist project, and acted within the confines of the Titoist discourse. They supported Yugoslav unity and the postwar promise of a solution to the national question. However the institutionalisation of national identity within the federal socialist system, tended to reinforce the identification with national discourses, rather than weaken them. The organisation of cultural institutions and education mainly on a republican level, combined with the regime’s failure to create a viable overarching Yugoslavist discourse, served to strengthen the intellectuals’ concern primarily with the interests of their own nations. The focus of intellectuals was often on the degree to which the new regime had succeeded in fulfilling respective national aspirations within the Yugoslav system, and their responses were also coloured by this dimension. This was also the case for Serbian intellectuals, even when they favoured a Yugoslavist integrationalist discourse. Intellectuals were frequently used as proxies to set out the positions of specific party elites in the battles between centralist and decentralist forces over the direction of the Yugoslav system, adding to the complexity and political flair of such debates. At different stages in the evolution of Yugoslav national policy and federal development, some intellectuals grew disillusioned, not because they opposed the ideals of the revolution, but because they came to view specific aspects of federal and political development as corruption of the revolutionary ideals, particularly those that pertained to their own nation’s aspirations. This led these intellectuals to fight for national rights and to extend their nations’ influence, but within the confines of the Yugoslav socialist system. Their activity was commonly responses to specific stages of federal developments in Yugoslavia. In all cases, the intellectuals operated within the framework of the socialist system, and articulated their views within the specific political and structural context of the Yugoslav system and socialist project. The events in Croatia in 1971 were largely an attempt to push through greater national autonomy within the socialist system, not to overthrow it. As Jill Irvine points out, they placed their attempts at reform firmly within the framework of the national liberation war.10 After the harsh reaction against those involved in these events, where Croatian communist leaders lost control over a multifaceted national movement, the Croats by and large became convinced that their aspirations would not be met within a socialist Yugoslavia.

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The build-up of national discourses that came to dominate postcommunist politics, and which contributed to the demise of Yugoslavia, were specific interpretations and responses to the contemporary Yugoslav crisis of the 1980s. This is not to say that historical memory is not important, and memories of World War II atrocities were certainly used by political elites in order to promote new nationalist discourses in both Croatia and Serbia. However, there was nothing inevitable about the manner in which intellectual elites responded to the Yugoslav crisis, or the national discourses that they developed, even though, as Nick Miller argues, intellectuals created images of their national communities that were useful for political elites.11 Responses by figures like Ćosić were a very specific reading of the ills of Yugoslavia, and of Serbia’s position within it, much influenced by his personal journey from establishment regime intellectual to defining himself as opposition. However, Ćosić always remained a socialist, despite his critique of Tito. The way in which the political elites of the late 1980s responded to the articulation of new national discourses was not a given. Communist elites in different republics responded in various ways, depending on the particular dynamics of political and national relations, but also on the intra-party dynamics. By 1986, the communist leaderships both in Serbia and in Slovenia assessed that it would be more dangerous to ignore the popular and intellectual challenges to its party’s power, than to co-opt or embrace these forces. In Serbia, Kosovo had led the national question to overshadow the democratic one, and by 1986, the Serbian Party concluded that the greatest danger to its leading position came from the Serbian national-orientated intelligentsia, who were making moves to establish closer contact with grassroots movement forces in Kosovo. Milošević soon discovered the usefulness of using the masses to put pressures on federal leadership in order to push for his goal of more centralised federation, but his co-option of the Serbian national cause was primarily to hinder a popular reaction against the Party’s leading role. Milošević’s taking up of the ideas of nationalist intelligentsia gave these forces little room for manoeuvre as opposition against the Serbian communists when the Party organisation was transformed into the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) following the demise of the SKJ in 1990. Whereas the Serbian national question and Kosovo came to overshadow the democratic question, in Slovenia there was a greater tendency to view republican self-determination and national rights as a key aspect of democratisation. While older intellectuals engaged with the national

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question, the backbone of the democratic opposition in Slovenia was a younger grassroots movement that sought to create a new pluralist civil society discourse. Its main critique was directed at Yugoslav institutions and protagonists, not at the Slovenian leadership. The Slovenian leadership found it was better to embrace popular forces than to become the target of their frustration. The Party and the opposition in Slovenia converged following the Mladina affair in 1988, bringing the cause of democratisation closer to the question of national sovereignty. While Kučan accepted the transition to democratic multiparty rule in 1990, however, Milošević took a more autocratic path. Furthermore, Slovenia did not have a sizeable diaspora in other parts of Yugoslavia. In Croatia there was hardly any rapport between party elites and intellectuals, or the public. The lack of Croatian response in the 1980s was rooted in the events of 1971, and the nationalist discourse that emerged in 1990 was to a large extent a rejection of the Yugoslav idea. The SKJ and federalism: institutions, republics, nations, peoples Among many of the analyses that focus on the legacy of the socialist experience and system to explain the breakdown of the Yugoslav state, the structural dimension is often highlighted.12 The Yugoslav federal system was hotly debated by scholars, politicians and intellectuals in Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s, and was central to intra-Party power– struggles in the late 1980s. By this time, the political and economic pillars of this system were in crisis, and its ideological foundation had come under scrutiny. Like many other writers, I view the structural and constitutional aspect of the Yugoslav ‘solution’ to the national question as an important legacy of the Yugoslav socialist project. Some aspects of Yugoslav federal development clearly contributed to the political crisis and to making the break-up of the state itself more complex. However, I believe that one should be careful not to make either the federal system or the 1974 Constitution the culprit of Yugoslavia’s demise. Institutions themselves do not carry significance if detached from the political processes that mould them, or the humans who shape the politics. The federal framework emerged during World War II, and the second Yugoslav state was born amidst a violent civil war and large-scale national conflict. The Yugoslav federal state structure and system was introduced to accommodate the complex multinational composition in the Yugoslav territories, without compromising the leading position the communists had acquired in the course of the war. Decisions on what shape the new

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federation should take, how many republics it should have, where the borders should go, and the status granted to different groups, were taken by the inner circle of the party leadership and were often subject to wider political considerations. These included late wartime developments, perceived political reliability of particular groups, and the international context, including talk of a Balkan Federation in the early postwar years. The Yugoslav federal system as the practical embodiment of the SKJ solution to the national question came to perform a vital role in upholding the regime’s legitimacy. The introduction of a new socialist and federal system, and granting of formal self-determination to different groups was initially seen as sufficient to ‘solve the national question’. The federal structures and republican borders were however not perceived by the communist leaders to hold much importance, and were supposed to hold only an administrative function, counter-balanced by a highly centralised party organisation. The introduction of the self-management socialist doctrine grew from a pragmatic and very real necessity to ensure the survival of the Yugoslav regime and its leaders, and to grant a new source of legitimacy to their socialist project following the Soviet–Yugoslav split. It predicated that over time, the Yugoslavs had to introduce some degree of genuine reforms to the system and deepen federalism. In this manner, the institutions that had not originally been intended to have real meaning gained a crucial role in Yugoslav politics. The Yugoslav communists unintentionally contributed to this in two ways. The first was by retaining a rather ambiguous use of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘republic’ – using them interchangeably. This made it hard to see where sovereignty was based and who possessed the right to self-determination. Secondly, the communist leaders failed to institutionalise a widely accepted perception of Yugoslav federalism and commonality, retaining instead a fluid conceptualisation of federation. Though the communist leaders talked of national self-determination, the federal units were organised on a territorial basis, and sovereignty was assigned on a dual and often ambiguous principle to the peoples and to the republics. Moreover, the dual connotation inherent in the word narod as nation and people served to create confusion. The tendency of the communist leaders to equate the use of the term narod and republic was rooted in the very idea on which the Yugoslav federal system was founded, where each of the republics (with the exception of BosniaHerzegovina) was also designated as the home republic where each constituent Yugoslav nation exercised its right to self-determination.13 Each of these republics, with the exception of Slovenia, had mixed

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populations. The two largest nations, Croatia and Serbia, both had a sizeable population of their people outside the home republics.14 The importance of where, and with whom, sovereignty was based, deepened with the constitutional debates from 1967–1971 that culminated in the 1974 Constitution, and with the further federalisation of the state. Decentralisation occurred on a republican – that is a territorial – principle. Nevertheless, it was justified in the name of national rights. The 1974 constitution described the republics as ‘states based on the sovereignty of the people and on the power of and self-management by the working class and all working people.’15 It did not specify whether it alluded to the people in the sense of the population that lived within the borders of each republic or as national group. No sovereignty was designated with the Yugoslav state itself, and Yugoslavia was vaguely described as ‘nor a federation, nor a confederation’. The federal decentralisation resulting from the 1967–1971 constitutional overhaul was combined with tightened post-1971 Party control. So while the decision-making process was decentralised and the power of the federal centre was weakened, the Party’s role in interpreting how the concept of sovereignty should be understood grew. Both processes led to an interpretation that strengthened the territorial interpretation of sovereignty. Tito’s stress on the importance of class over nation at the Tenth Congress in 1974 contributed to decrease emphasis on the peoples and nations, and increased stress on republican sovereignty. So did the redesign of the federal system as a consociational arrangement that was based on a consensual decision-making principle between republican and provincial elite representatives. Commonality increasingly became linked to the co-operation between republican/provincial blocs, and was based on Kardelj’s contention – supported by Tito – that if the nations felt secure, the fear of assimilation would subside and this would lead to better Yugoslav cohesion. Tito’s design of a collective leadership based on a republican principle also added to strengthen the territorial interpretation of sovereignty and national equality within the Yugoslav federal system. The dissatisfaction that emerged in Serbia after 1974 with the constitution was largely linked to the effects of this shift. In addition to general dissatisfaction with increased territorialisation of the sovereignty principle the Serbian leaders were unhappy about the elevation of the status of the two provinces in Serbia – Vojvodina and Kosovo – leaving them de facto on level with the republics. The question of where sovereignty was based gained great significance in the latter half of the 1980s. In 1989–1991 focus shifted from

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theoretical discussions related to whether the republics had exercised their right to self-determination when entering the Yugoslav federation, as claimed by Moša Pijade in 1945, to how this right could be exercised, and whether it was the nations, the working people, or the inhabitants of specific republics who possessed this right. The ambiguity over the sovereignty principle in Yugoslav federalism contributed primarily to instilling fear in the populations that found themselves as minorities in the republics where they lived, and in making the break-up more difficult when it happened. The increased importance of the sovereignty question in the late 1980s was closely linked to fading legitimacy of the SKJ and its socialist project. While the federal system was a strong source of legitimation for the communist leaders, it became vulnerable precisely for performing this role once the regime’s legitimacy came into question. One important reason for this resulted from the SKJ’s failing ability to institutionalise a commonly accepted perception of Yugoslav federalism and a concept of Yugoslavia – separate from its own regime and its role as the leading power in Yugoslav society. Although an inter-republican system for conflict regulation became more institutionalised through the 1974 constitutional arrangement, and the republican borders took on a state-like character, the SKJ’s conceptualisation of Yugoslavia – both in a symbolic sense and as a state concept remained rather fluid. Ian Lustick argues that in discussions of legitimation processes, ‘the basic boundaries of the “given territory” have almost irrevocably been excluded from the discussion’. The giveness of such borders, he argues, is almost always taken for granted:16 unless the border of the state is accepted as an immutable given, we can expect that different groups within the state will align their own perceptions of the proper border in light of the implications different borders, or different principles of inclusion and exclusion may have for their chances to achieve and/or maintain power.17 In the Yugoslav case, the territorial boundaries of the republics were closely tied to the AVNOJ legacy; the People’s Liberation Struggle and the Party’s socialist solution to the national question. Discussions regarding the shape and boundaries of the federal units as grounded in the AVNOJ declaration and 1946 Constitution remained an absolute taboo. Discussion on relations between federal units within Yugoslavia, however became an issue of great debate. After the introduction of the self-management system, discussions over the federal system became

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caught up in power struggles between centralist and decentralist forces within the SKJ over where the locus of decision-making ought to lie – at the central level, or with the republics. The form and shape of Yugoslav federalism thus remained on the political agenda. This tendency was enhanced by the failed SKJ campaign to introduce socialist Yugoslavism. It also contributed to the difficulty in institutionalising a concept of Yugoslav unity that all the different groups could agree on. The Yugoslav federal system underwent considerable change during the communist period, subject largely to ideological and political considerations. The communist leaders highlighted that the Yugoslav concept of federation was dynamic in nature. In this spirit they frequently adapted the constitution to implement or to justify political changes that were moulded within the wider socialist project. New constitutions were introduced in 1946, 1953 (Constitutional Law), 1963, and 1974. Three more sets of constitutional amendments were passed between 1967 and 1971. The Constitution functioned both as a pragmatic tool to account for the great (and mainly unforeseen) changes in Yugoslav society, and to grant ideological legitimacy for the often experimental policies implemented by the communists. This dynamism and the extreme pace at which changes were introduced into the Yugoslav constitutional framework contributed to create uncertainty about the nature of the federal system. More importantly, the changes introduced contributed to a transformation of the nature and dynamics of inter-national and inter-republican relations. Yugoslav federal relations remained bargaining chips in the Party’s negotiations with republics and national groups as they struggled to reach consensus and retain their leading role in Yugoslav society. The failure to agree on a common understanding of what Yugoslavia represented did not cause the disintegration of the state. Rather, it contributed to raising the question of the communists’ postwar territorial arrangement once the Party’s legitimacy faded. Even if the Communist leaders did their best to keep questions of their 1945 settlement out of bounds, the federal debates in Croatia in 1971 and in Serbia in the 1980s, showed that the giveness of the boundaries created in 1945 could not be taken for granted. Audrey H. Budding has pointed out that in Yugoslavia, borders fixed after the First and Second World War were not internalised in the same manner as in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.18 In the Yugoslav case, she argues, it remained possible for nationalist forces to view alternative aspirations to the AVNOJ settlement ‘as deferred rather than rejected’.19 Though Matica Hrvatska did not challenge the AVNOJ settlement during the discussions on the Croatian

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constitutional amendments in 1971, they did insist that the legacy of Croatian State Rights was centuries-old, and that the Constitution of SR Croatia could only affirm the historic right of the Croatian nation to their free, state individuality.20 Matica Hrvatska viewed these Croatian State Rights as more fundamental than those granted through the Socialist Revolution. In Serbia the question of the rights and status of the two provinces within SR Serbia became particularly contentious in the 1970s and 1980s. The Kosovar-Albanian aspiration for republican status and the Serbian goal to reintegrate the provinces under Belgrade control indicate that neither saw the federal provisions from 1974 as set in stone. The 1980s saw growing disagreement among the communist elites over the federal principle: Serbia wanted to change the 1974 arrangement while Croatia, Slovenia, and the provinces emerged as defenders of the constitution. Serbian political elites and intellectuals wanted, on the one hand, to secure the ‘statehood’ of SR Serbia in a similar fashion to the other republics. They sought the reintegration of the provinces (with large national minorities) under Belgrade control. In this respect, the aims of the Serbian leaders were similar to those of other Republics. However, parts of the Belgrade intelligentsia and political elites also cast their view on the position of the Serbs living in the other republics, claiming that members of the Serbian nation should have guaranteed national rights no matter where they lived. This created a certain ambiguity and contradiction about their relation to Yugoslavia. Milošević took measures to change the federal balance, and his ‘anti-bureaucratic revolutions’ upset the basic principle of equality that Yugoslav federal relations were built on. Serbia, now supported by the provinces and Montenegro, became the main advocators of a more centralised federal government, and were opposed only in earnest by Slovenia.21 Milošević’s actions were perceived as a quest for a centralised state, and were seen as threat to the sovereignty of the other republics. The conceptualisation of the federal system as the practical embodiment of the Yugoslav socialist solution to the national question, and federal systemic crisis in the 1980s contributed to the delegitimation of the Yugoslav state concept. Although the Yugoslav state remained the framework for the Yugoslav socialist project, the emphasis in the doctrine of self-management on the withering away of the state resulted in reduced emphasis on the role of the state in Yugoslav federal discourse. This tendency made it virtually impossible for the regime to institutionalise a concept of Yugoslav unity distinct from its socialist project. The

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communist leaders never really envisioned a scenario in which the SKJ would not be the leading power. It was not the multinational federal arrangement as such that was the problem, but rather the manner in which it became linked to the ideological project of the SKJ and became a key pillar of its legitimacy. However, this is not to imply that the federal systemic crisis caused Yugoslavia’s demise. It was just one of a complex range of sources contributing to Yugoslavia’s disintegration. It was only after 1990–91, after the SKJ stopped functioning as a unified party, and after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that the existence of the state truly came onto the agenda. Up to this point, struggles revolved around where power should be based within the federal system, and what kind of federation one favoured. Most of the factors that directly affected the state break-up of the Federation occurred after the period discussed, and cannot be addressed here. 1990 signalled the end of the Party, and thus also of the federal system as an upholder of its legitimacy. Political and intellectual agency: Tito and Kardelj While the ideological, federal and constitutional aspects of the SKJ ‘solution’ to the national question institutional are important, none of these would mean anything were it not for the people who shaped the system and attempted to implement their visions. Although many members of the Yugoslav communist movement left their mark on the SKJ ‘solution’ to the national question, Tito and Kardelj remained, as Marko Nikezić pointed out, the two constants in the history of the Communist Party.22 It was these two who came under the strongest attack from the Serbian intelligentsia in the 1980s. More than any, these two men would shape the KPJ/SKJ’s ideological and practical approach towards the national question. In different ways, and by differing means, Tito and Kardelj sought to protect the legacy of the People’s Liberation Struggle and the Socialist Revolution. They worked closely together, despite holding differing views, and playing different roles. Their relation was a complex one. Kardelj remained in Tito’s shadow, but his role in the Yugoslav postwar project remained at least as important as Tito’s. Whereas Tito was the undoubted leader of the party, he came to rely on Kardelj for the theoretical and ideological endorsement of their regime. In addition, it was Kardelj who took upon himself the main responsibility for the project of building socialism in Yugoslavia. Kardelj advocated the withering away of the state, but also held a key role in developing the Party’s new definition of what Yugoslavia was. Tito was the one to take action in each

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crisis met by the Yugoslav socialist leadership, but Kardelj tried to make sure that the SKJ did not fall into an entirely arbitrary role. At each such juncture, Kardelj introduced important new adjustments into Yugoslav self-management doctrine and in the direction of the party and state. By nature, Tito was more inclined towards centralism, but (somewhat reluctantly) decided to endorse self-management and to support reform of the Yugoslav system, including decentralisation and de-bureaucratisation. He continued to express scepticism against the reformulation of the SKJ’s role at the Sixth Congress in 1952, and at various times in the 1960s and 1970s, pointed out that democratic centralism should remain an important principle in the SKJ’s decision-making process. Together with Vladimir Bakarić, Edvard Kardelj remained at the front in pushing for further party and federal reforms after the ousting of Ranković in 1966. Both men found the events in Croatia in 1971 deeply worrying, and helped convince Tito about the need for action in Croatia in 1971. Kardelj was, however, not entirely unsympathetic to many of the requests forwarded by the Croatian leadership in 1971, many of which were later granted. Kardelj had been supported in the struggle with Ranković by the younger generation of liberal-minded politicians. Many of these younger cadres expressed greater disappointment with Kardelj than with Tito following the 1971 events, because they expected more from him (as he, along with Bakarić, had been the main advocate of reform).23 Kardelj expressed apprehension about, and sometimes limited tolerance for, the ideas and actions of the new young leaders, especially in cases where they saw them as threatening to Party unity. While they respected him, these younger politicians did not see Kardelj as their figure of inspiration. His ideas were considered good in theory but too theoretical to be really useful. Tito’s intervention in 1971–72 was not ‘revolutionary’ so much as an attempt to ‘restore order’ by older methods: the intervention made by Tito, could only have been Tito’s. The very fact that he felt forced to intervene showed clearly that the ordinary inter-republican mechanisms were not able to deal with a crisis of this type. Although Tito supported Kardelj’s reformist path, the two men held different views on the purpose of the Yugoslav state and on Yugoslav unity. Tito believed that party unity was the main guarantee for the success of the Yugoslav socialist project. He held particular pride in the SKJ’s ‘solution’ unifying all the Yugoslav peoples into a Yugoslav state, harbouring perhaps still a secret dream of succeeding in creating a Yugoslav consciousness. Having succeeded in uniting the Yugoslav

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Peoples in a common state remained for Tito one of his greatest achievements, and one for which he wanted to be remembered. This made him more apprehensive than Kardelj and Bakarić of the prospects of the ‘withering away of the state’. Tito never really seems to have endorsed Kardelj’s view that Yugoslavia only had the right to life in its capacity of ensuring the advancement of socialism and as long as the different peoples endorsed it. Tito was also concerned with how Yugoslavia – and his position – were perceived abroad, and keen to uphold his role as the leader of the non-aligned movement. His relation to the USSR remained ambiguous; he was keen to retain Yugoslavia’s independence from Moscow, while at the same time seeking occasional rapprochement. Like Kardelj, Tito was concerned for the Party to retain its leading role in Yugoslav society, believing that no one person could take over the role that he maintained since coming to power in 1945. His solution was the creation of a rotating collective leadership, based on consensus decision-making. Through the political and ideological processes that had taken place since the SKJ came to power, Yugoslavia had fundamentally changed. This ‘qualitatively’ different Yugoslavia demanded qualitatively different responses from the SKJ. Through his intervention in the 1970s, Tito removed many of the most able politicians in Yugoslavia, as well as anybody else whose visions differed from those held by the old revolutionary elite who had been in power since 1945. The leaders who replaced them, and who remained in power after the deaths of Kardelj and Tito, were in general less visionary and politically talented than their predecessors, commanding only a modest degree of support from the public. Ultimately, as the leaders of the communist movement had aptly demonstrated, any system is only as successful as the talent and vision of its leaders. As we have seen, the legacy of Tito and Kardelj and their approach to the national question came under criticism in the 1980s. This was not necessarily a bad sign in itself – in fact one could instead question if the post-Tito policy of ‘After Tito – Tito!’ was a healthy approach, or rather a sign of stagnation. More problematic, viewed in context of 1980s Yugoslavia, was the fact that the post-Tito critique (which emerged mainly from the Belgrade intelligentsia) formed part of a Serbian nationalist discourse, and accused both Tito and Kardelj of having created antiSerbian policies. Their Slovene and Croat origins became highlighted, combined with accusations that they led an anti-Serbian approach to the national question. The fact that Serbia was the only republic with

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autonomous provinces that had also acquired greater powers was particularly frustrating for the Serbian leaders and intellectuals. In a somewhat far-fetched analysis, the authors of the Serbian draft Memorandum, attempted to portray the ‘confederalisation’ of the Yugoslav state as a conscious strategy pursued by the Yugoslav leaders as far back as the inter-war period.24 Pointing to the Comintern’s interwar strategy of co-operating with national movements, they charged that: it was in this spirit that Sperans [Kardelj] formulated and gave the theoretical elaboration to the programme for dealing with the national question in his book The Evolution of the Slovene National Question, which largely served as the ideological model for Yugoslavia’s evolution in the direction of a confederation of sovereign republics and provinces, culminating in the 1974 Constitution.25 Even though the reforms advocated by Kardelj led to decentralisation of the Yugoslav state in the 1960s and 1970s, and he would eventually advocate greater sovereignty for each of the Yugoslav peoples, the argument that Kardelj advocated a confederation as early as 1939, when the first edition of his book was published, is highly dubious. Even after his second and updated print of this book in 1957, Kardelj remained vague and sceptical about the role of the republics. It was only after Kardelj’s conflict with Ranković – and after the strategy of creating a more integrated Yugoslav culture based on the principle of socalist Yugoslavism had failed – that Kardelj came to emphasise the role and rights of the Republics. In time, he became convinced that the future of Yugoslavia depended on the SKJ’s ability to ensure a feeling of security among the different peoples so that their sovereignty would not be threatened by a conservative, ‘bureaucratic–centralist’ backlash after Tito’s death. Kardelj believed that a sure way to prevent this was by decentralisation of the state, but on a republican basis. His liberalism and Rankovic’s centralism were surely influenced by their (respectively) Slovene and Serbian backgrounds. Similarly, their positions held the support of respective republican leaderships who saw them as at least potentially the best protectors of their regional interests within the top leadership. This did not mean, however, that Kardelj was anti-Serbian any more than Ranković was a Serbian nationalist. Tito, Kardelj and even Ranković – when still in power – saw themselves above all as socialist revolutionaries who in differing manners attempted to preserve the role the SKJ

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had obtained through the war and their own positions. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Serbian leaders by and large supported Kardelj’s policies as much as the other republican leaderships. When the Serbian leaders were unhappy with the workings of the 1974 Constitution, it was Kardelj they approached first. Many of the concerns raised by the Serbian leaders in the late 1970s about the workings of the 1974 constitution were genuine and legitimate ones that would have deserved more attention. Tito and Kardelj’s failure to deal with the Serbian concerns in the late 1970s were not so much coloured by anti-Serbianism as they were by old age and – as it turned out – the misguided belief that the last batch of changes to the self-management system would iron out these challenges. In the same way that the communist leadership’s promise to find a solution to the national question through the creation of Brotherhood and Unity had been instrumental in attracting support for their project, their perceived failure to have solved the national question also had consequences. It opened up a space for challenges to the Titoist solution to the national question, once Tito himself and the legitimacy of Communist rule more generally came under criticism in the 1980s. The new communist leaders who came to power after Tito’s and Kardelj’s death showed little interest in changing the Titoist/Kardeljist approach to the national question. Instead they concentrated on preserving the status quo, as well as securing the position of their own federal unit versus the others. What was lacking was a unifying figure of the kind that Tito had been, and after his death, the federal leadership had great problems in commanding support from various republican leaders in times of trouble. The communist leaders’ inability to the deal with the growing crisis in Yugoslav society resulted in a loss of trust. A generation shift in 1986 nevertheless brought some new leaders to power. No one leader would make as strong an impact as Slobodan Milošević, hailed by some as a new Tito. Initially a conservative self-professed guardian of Tito’s legacy, Milošević would, more than anyone else, come to break with all the main parameters of Tito and Kardelj’s solution to the national question. Even though the rise of Milošević was only one factor in the demise of Yugoslavia, his politics contributed in an unprecedented manner to the change in dynamics of Yugoslav inter-republican relations. Milošević’s quest to reshape Yugoslavia, along with his methods, alienated other republican leaders and heightened antagonism. The responses, and the inability of republican and federal leaders to take action against Milošević, and the adaption of national discourses by other leaders also contributed to the demise of Yugoslav coexistence.

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The antagonistic intra-party politics in the last tense months of 1989 formed part of a down-spiralling struggle to define the battlefield over the further direction of a faltering state at the time when the SKJ itself was losing its hegemonic position in Yugoslav society. The demise of the SKJ in early 1990 did not only mark the demise of the SKJ and their specific solution to the national question. It also marked the wrap-up of Milošević’s campaign to establish Serbian control over the provinces and a majority in the federal organs that would have allowed him to implement constitutional reform to create a more centralised federation. While he succeeded in the first aim, he failed in pushing through centralisation of the federation itself, as this was an unacceptable arrangement to other republics, especially Croatia and Slovenia. The Slovene and Croatian walkout indicated the end of the established, if poorly functioning federal mechanisms for party and inter-republican co-operation on which the Yugoslav system had been based. It also marked the start of a new and more volatile phase in Yugoslav politics, which would lead to the breakup of the Yugoslav state and the commencement of the violent wars of the 1990s.26

NOTES

Introduction 1 2 3

Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Narodi Jugoslavije nisu doblili dekretom svoje nacionalno oslobođenje’, in Izbor iz djela, vol. 3 Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1982), 145. The Muslims were later recognised as a sixth narod. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the home republic to three groups: Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Arend Lijphart first developed the theory of consociationalism to explain the qualitatively different political systems of the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium, but his theories were soon expanded and adjusted to study elite co-operation and the regulation of ethnic and national conflict in deeply divided societies. See The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, and Democracy in Plural Societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Considerable criticism has since been levelled at the original theories on consociationalism which have been seen as more suitable for studying stable democracies in Western Europe than deeply divided societies, especially outside Western Europe. Consociationalism has also been criticised for focusing too much on the institutional aspect and not enough on issues going beyond this aspect. Furthermore, consociational institutions have also been criticised for promoting sectarianism and for entrenching existing identities. Since then, other works on ethnic conflict regulation have emerged which have attempted to address some of the issues that have not been tackled adequately in the theory of consociationalism. Donald Horowitz’s monumental work Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 2nd ed, 2000) stands out among these. Writing about the Third World, he argued that ethnicity has generally had a less urgent character in the West than in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. His focus, however, is primarily on the ethnic aspect. For a typology of different strategies of conflict regulation, see McGarry and O’Leary: The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). None of these works, however, address the aspect of ideology, and in general they

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia are focused on the comparative aspect and do not always take into account the specific historical context and political cultures in specific countries. Though I do not mean to suggest that they were nationalists. ‘Большая Российская энциклопедия’, Russ Portal Company Ltd, 2001. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991, 7. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991, 7. Jørgensen, Marianne Winter and Phillips, Louise (ed), Diskursanalyse Som Teori og Metode. Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 1999, 167. I do not, however, mean to imply that the Marxists did not have an approach towards the nation that is not coherent with their overall understanding of social and historical development. Despite the lack of a coherent work by Marx to address the national question, I follow the view that the nation was conceived within the framework of their wider conception of historical and social processes. For more on these issues, see Nimni, Ephraim, Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical origins of a political crisis. London and Concord, Mass: Pluto Press, 1991; Szporluk, Roman, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991; and Pelczynski, Z.A, The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s political philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. See for instance Lewis, Paul G. (ed), Eastern Europe: Political crisis and Legitimation. London: Croom Helm, 1984; Rigby, T.H and Fehér, F. (eds), Political legitimation in Communist States. London: Macmillan, 1982; Holmes, Leslie, The End of Communist Power: Anti-corruption campaigns and legitimation crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993; Holmes, Leslie, Post-communism: An introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997; Fehér, F., Heller, A. and György, M., Dictatorship over Needs. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983; Di Palma, G., ‘Legitimacy from the top to civil society: Politicocultural change in Eastern Europe’, World Politics, 44 (1): 49–80, 1991. Lustick, Ian, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza. New York: Cornell University Press, 1993, 38. Ibid., 37. Ibid. According to Lustick, these facets of institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation processes ‘can be located in relation to one another if the continuous aspects of institution-building, including gradually increasing propensities to expect norms, rules, and boundaries to be adhered to and symbols to be honoured, are understood to surround two distinct thresholds. These thresholds mark discontinuities in the process of institutionalisation, dividing it into three stages. Movement from one stage to another entails a shift in order of magnitude of political conflict that would surround efforts to change a particular institution along a salient dimension.’ It is no coincidence that the cultural sphere became such an important arena for intellectual articulation in many states with a communist regime. Tito came to power in 1937, but his position was not secured until 1939. See chapter 2 for a discussion on this issue.

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16 The SKJ leadership temporarily lost partial control over the direction of such discussions in the period 1967–1971, but tightened their censorship again after 1972. 17 Until archival material from this period is available, it is difficult for historians to given a full picture of Milošević’s intentions and strategies in his ascent to power. 18 Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar, Revolucija koja teče: memoari. 4 vols. Beograd: Komunist, 1971, and Memoari 1966–1969 – Neslaganja. Vols. I–II. Beograd, Naprijed, Zagreb: Narodna Knjiga, 1985. 19 Dedijer, Vladimir, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita Vols. 1–3. Beograd: Rad, 1984, and Đilas, Milovan, Tito – The story from the inside. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981. 20 Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953. 21 In the foreword of this diary, Ranković’s family also point to a rather curious conflict with Dobrica Ćosić, who they claim held a copy of the manuscript but denied knowledge of it, and who they also claim later published excerpts from it as part of his own work. See Ranković, Aleksandar, Dnevničke zabeleške. Beograd: Jugoslovenska knjiga, 2001. 22 Edvard Kardelj’s reminiscences from 1933–1957 were, however, published in 1980. Boj za priznanje in neodvisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944–1957: Spomini. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1980. 1  The search for revolutionary responses to the national question in Yugoslavia 1918–1936 1 Vuchinich, Wayne S., ‘Nationalism and Communism’, Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty years of socialist experience. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 238. 2 See Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (eds) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, ‘Rezolucija balkanske komunističke federacije’, Beograd: Rad, 1988, 233–4. 3 Vuchinich, ‘Nationalism and Communism’, 238. 4 Other groups were not mentioned at all. 5 Đilas, Aleksa, The Contested Country: Yugoslav unity and communist revolution 1919–1953. London: Harvard University Press, 1991, 61. 6 Lukač, Dušan, Radnički pokret u Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918– 1941. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1972, 19–20. 7 Vuchinich, 238. 8 Lukač, Radnički pokret u Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918–1941, 23. 9 Ibid. 10 Korač and the group around him were branded ‘Ministerialists’ because shortly after unification they took ministerial posts in the cabinet. This created a split in the party between those in the cabinet and the rest of the party. 11 Banac, Ivan, The National Question: Origins, history, politics 4th ed. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1994, 335. 12 Cecarec added that, if so, ‘the problem of a monarchy versus a republic, and even centralism versus a federation would have been solved in one stroke in

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia favour of a centralist republic’. Quote from Banac, The National Question, 335. Irvine, Jill, The Croat National Question: Partisan politics in the formation of the Yugoslav socialist state. Bolder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, 59. Lukač, Radnički pokret u Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918–1941, 22 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, history, politics, 337. Despite being supranational, however, narodno jedinstvo was not universalist like Marxism. It addressed a specific regional question and not human existence as such. It seems that the tendency to view the national question as the historical task of the bourgeoisie also became accepted among the non-Serb sections of the party. See Banac, 336. Đilas, The Contested Country, 12. The number of members in 1920 is quoted by Đilas as 65,000. By 1924, this figure had been reduced to under 1000 – see Đilas, The Contested Country, 63–4. For the law, see Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (ed) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, Zakon o zaštiti javne bezbednositi i poretka u državi, 246–8. Lukač, Radnički pokret u Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918–1941, 81. Ibid., 82–4. Ibid., 86. Ibid., 82–4. Klemenčič was expelled from the KPJ by the Comintern in 1924. Ibid., 86. Italics added. Marković, Sima, ‘Nacionalne pitanje u svetlosti marksizma’, in Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (ed) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 257–60. Shoup, Paul, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968, 25. It must, however, be pointed out that although Marković assigned the Yugoslav national question to the bourgeois arena, he did not refute the view that the national question could only really be ‘solved’ by socialism. Only in very specific circumstances, which he believed existed in Yugoslavia, could it be assigned to the bourgeois arena. This view was also closely related to Marković’s doubts that a socialist revolution was imminent in Yugoslavia. He therefore saw it as the KPJ’s task to attempt to reduce national antagonism within the framework of the existing – that is capitalist – society. Marković, Sima, ‘Nacionalne pitanje u svetlosti marksizma’, in Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (ed) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 257. Ibid., 258. Marković attempted to demonstrate that at the time of unification these three peoples were forming nations. Ibid., 257–60. His definition of autonomy remained rather vague, being non-national and non-territorial. Marković’s position regarding the national question theoretically resembled that of Rosa Luxemburg, insofar as he insisted that the national question and the class one should remain separate, and that the national question should be solved in the bourgeois arena.

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29 Lukač, Dusan, Radnički pokret u Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918– 1941, 164. 30 Ibid., 166. 31 Party of the Working People of Yugoslavia; the official wing of the KPJ, controlled by the leftists. 32 Ibid., 166–71. 33 However, Života Milojković, another important figure of the rightist faction, did not support Marković’s new-found recognition of the separate national identity of the various groups, and continued to support centralism and unitarism. 34 ‘III Zemaljska Konferencija KPJ, Rezolucija o nacionalnom pitanju’, in Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (ed) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 265. 35 III Kongres KPJ, in Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (ed) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 270–2. For the Comintern resolution, see same book, ‘Peti kongres Kominterne – Rezolucija o nacionlanom pitanjima u srednoj Evropi i na Balkanu’, 268–70. 36 Abbreviation for Red Peasant International, an international peasants’ organization formed by the Communist International in October 1923. 37 Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism, 58. 38 IV Kongres KPJ in Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (ed) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 274 ff. 39 Đilas, Aleksa, The Contested Country, 80. 40 The HRSS changed its name to the HSS in 1925 when its leaders were released from jail and joined the ruling bloc. 41 Ibid., 96. 42 See Milovan Đilas, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, for a biographical account of KPJ cadres’ encounters with Ustaša supporters in prison during the 1930s. 43 Phyllis Auty also points to his non-Yugoslav origin as a source of distrust from the Yugoslav cadres. Gorkić was brought up in Bosnia, but his father was of Czech origin. See Milovan Đilas for a subjective characterisation of Gorkić. Auty Phyllis, Tito: A biography. London: Longman, 1970. 44 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Pokrajinskom komitetu KPJ za Sloveniju’, Radnička klasa i Savez komunista Jugoslavije1926–1977, Izbor iz djela, Knjiga 2. Sarajevo: 1980, 54. 45 Kardelj, Edvard, Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja. Naša založba: Ljubljana, 1939. 2  Towards Yugoslav federal unity under Comintern influence 1 See McDermott, Kevin and Agnew, Jeremy (eds), The Comintern – A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996, chapter 4, 120–57 for a discussion on the reasons behind the shift in Comintern strategy at this time. 2 In Yugoslavia, as in many other East European countries, the word narod had a double connotation. In Serbian and Croatian, the word narod can mean ‘people’ in a popular sense, or can refer to a nation or national group.

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia The Yugoslav communists tended to use the word in the sense of ‘popular’ or ‘people’s’ – a term that also had a class dimension to it – and often used the word nacija when referring to national groups or the national question specifically. However, often the communist leaders were deliberately obscure in their use of the terms. Dimitrov, Georgi, ‘The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International’, Dimitrov’s address to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, 1935. In McDermott, and Agnew (eds), The Comintern, 242. McDermott and Agnew (eds), The Comintern, 126 Lukač, Dušan. Radnički pokret Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918–1941. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1972, 290. Jelić, Ivan, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945. Zagreb: Globus, 43. From around 1937, the reference to self-determination and secession began to disappear from the KPJ’s documents and statements, though they never explicitly or officially abandoned these principles. Lukač, Radnički pokret Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918–1941, 297. Ibid. Pešic, Desanka, Jugoslovenski Komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (1919–1935), Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1983, 273. Ibid., 275. Lukač, Radnički, 293. Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953, 107. Ibid. Lukač, Radnički, 297. After the April 1936 session, arranged by a section of the KPJ Central Committee without Comintern approval, or the knowledge of the KPJ secretary Gorkić, the Comintern decided to discipline the Yugoslavs for being insubordinate once again. The Central Committee was dissolved. See Auty, Phyllis, Tito: A biography, London: Longman, 2000, 108. See also Lukač, Radnički, 300 for a discussion on the April 1936 session. Dedijer, Tito, 108. He was in this period also responsible for organising the recruitment and the despatch of volunteers to fight against Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Auty, Tito, 77. Ibid., 87. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. and Lazic, Branko M. (eds) The Comintern: Historical Highlights – Essays, Recollections, Documents. New York, London: Praeger, 1969, 152–5. The Comintern had threatened the Yugoslavs – whose constant obstinacy posed a great annoyance to the Comintern and Stalin – with the same fate that had met the Polish Communist Party, which had been dissolved. Banac, Ivo, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, 65–6 See also Banac 66–70 for further discussion of the power struggle within the prison. For an autobiographical account, see Đilas, Milovan, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. He is believed to be behind a vicious attack on the life of Andrija Hebrang. See Auty, Tito: A biography, 122.

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24 Morača, Bilandžić, Stojanovic (ed), Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije – Kratak pregled. Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1976, 80. 25 Banac, With Stalin against Tito, 66. Ivo Banac provides a useful table placing significant party cadres the on the political spectrum 1933–1939. 26 Drachkovitch and Lazic (eds), 187. 27 Đilas, Milovan, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 184. Đilas infers that this denotation – vahabitski – suggestive of their radicalism and extremism – was a result of the sharp humour of Moša Pijade. See also Supek, Krunski svjedok protiv Hebranga. Chicago: Markaton, 1983. This fictional documentary of the Hebrang case provides a detailed, though fictional account of the events in the Srijemska Mitrovica prison. 28 Đilas, Aleksa, Hronologija života i rada Milovana Đilasa. Beograd: ‘Rad’, 2006, 5. 29 Đilas, Milovan, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 261. 30 Auty, 134. Dr Ribar lost both his sons, both active in the Partisan struggle, during World War II. 31 Banac, 68. Andrija Žaja who had formed part of the temporary leadership was dismissed and replaced by Rade Končar as leader of the KPH in 1940. 32 Matvejević, Predrag, Razgovori s Krležom, 6th ed. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1982, 193. 33 Tito, ‘Stanje u Partiji’, Izbor iz djela, 112. Written probably June/July 1939, published in Proleter, Broj 1–2, Jan–Feb 1940. 34 Lukač, Radnički pokret Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 1918–1941, 295. 35 The decision to form separate party branches in Slovenia and Croatia had been taken already in 1934, but did not materialise until 1937, when Tito organised this during one of his trips to Yugoslavia. See Pešic, Desanka, Jugoslovenski Komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (1919–1935), Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1983, 265. 36 Tito, ‘Stanje u Partiji’, Izbor iz djela, 112. 37 Ibid. 38 Kardelj, Edvard, Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja. Naša založba: Ljubljana, 1939. 39 Tomasevich, Jozo, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: 1941–1945 the Chetniks. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975, 25. 40 Banac, Ivo (ed) The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949. London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 115. 41 McDermott and Agnew (eds) The Comintern, 193. 42 For more on Krleža and the conflict in 1939, see, Lasić, Stanko, Krleža: Kronologija Života i Rada. Zagreb: Grafički Zavod Hrvatske, 1982; Lasić, Stanko, Sukob na književnoj ljevici 1928–1952, Zagreb: Liber, 1970; and Matvejević, Predrag, Razgovori s Krležom,6th ed. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1982. 43 Krleža, quoted from Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968, 43. 44 Supek, Ivan, Krivovjernik na ljevici, Zagreb: Globus, 1992, 52. In this journal, a number of leftist intellectuals from Krleža’s circle were allowed to publish their articles, surrounding a variety of philosophical, cultural and scientific issues, ranging from Marxist historiography and dialectical

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materialism, to modern physics and Freudianism. 45 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Iz izvještaja o organizacionom pitanju na petoj konferenciji KPJ, 1940. Godine’, Izbor iz djela, Tom III – Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija, 131. 46 Đilas, Milovan, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 286 47 The district party organisation for Kosovo and Metohija had until this time been within the jurisdiction of the regional party for Montenegro, but after the Fifth Conference it was placed under the direct responsibility of the CK KPJ. Bosić, Milovan, Istorijski izvori o Petoj zemaljskog konferenciji KPJ. Zagreb: IHRPH, 1972, 304. 48 Morača, Bilandžić, Stojanović (ed), Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije – Kratak pregled. Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1976, 89. 3  People’s Liberation Struggle and building of a new Yugoslavia 1941–1945 1 Strugar, Vlado. Jugoslavija 1941–1945. Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, znantsveni tisk, 1980, 18. 2 Although narod in Serbo-Croatian can mean both People and Nation, Narodnooslobodilačka borba has in this work been translated as People’s Liberation Struggle and not National Liberation Struggle. While it referred to the national liberation of each people, the struggle was waged on a common Yugoslav platform, and referred to the struggle for liberation for all the peoples. 3 Tito Josip Broz, ‘Politički izvještaj CK KPJ’, Peti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1948, 84. 4 Popular has been used to translate narodno. This word can in Serbian/ Croatian mean both ‘national’ and ‘people’s’. When popular has been employed in this text, it alludes to the meaning ‘people’s’ since Tito refers to all the different nationalities in Yugoslavia. 5 Tito, ‘Politički izvještaj CK KPJ’, 96. 6 The most likely date for the May consultation according to Ivan Jelić was 4 May. In an article in Danas (16 July 1985), Jelić highlights the lack of primary documentation having survived from this consultation. In addition to a few bibliographical accounts, only two primary documents appear to exist: one named ‘The Consultation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’ (Savjetovanje komunističke partije Jugoslavije), published in Proleter, the publishing organ of the CC of the KPJ, in June 1941 (this version is available in Tito, Josip Broz, Izbor Iz djela, Tom II – Radnička klasa i Savez komunista Jugoslavije); the second is the authentic report sent by Tito to the executive committee of the Comintern under the name ‘About the situation and events in Yugoslavia’ (‘O položaju i događajima u Jugoslaviji’) in May/ June 1941 (Danas, no. 178, 16 July 1985, 13–15, ‘Majsko savjetovanje 1941 – Rješenje historiografske dileme’). 7 Morača, Bilandžić Stojanovic (ed.), Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije – Kratak pregled, Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1976, 102. 8 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Savjetovanje komunističke partije Jugoslavije’, Izbor Iz djela, Tom II – Radnička klasa i Savez komunista Jugoslavije, 144.

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9 Banac, Ivo, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, 84. 10 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Savjetovanje komunističke partije Jugoslavije’, 144. 11 Đilas, Milovan, Memoir of a Revolutionary, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973, 388. Indeed he continues, ‘there were no such parties any longer’. One must, however, keep in mind that Đilas was among the most radical leftists and also the most optimistic members of the leadership in his faith that the war would soon be over, and in the revolutionary potential presented by the new situation. 12 See Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, 80 for a figure over the position of individual members within the KPJ over strategies 1941–1944. 13 Morača, Bilandžić Stojanovic (ed.), Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, 105. 14 Ibid., 103. 15 Ibid., 106. 16 Geršković, Leon, ‘Karakter i struktura narodnooslobodilačkog odbora’, in Put nove Jugoslavije – zbirka članaka o narodnooslobodilačkom pokretu. Beograd: Izdanje glavnog odbora USAOS-a, 1945, 142. 17 Petranović, Branko, ‘Narodnooslobodilački odbori kao organi revolucionarno-demokratske samouprave’, in Istoriografija i revolucija, 312. See also Geršković, Leon, ‘Karakter i struktura narodnooslobodilačkog odbora’, 142–4. 18 Belgrade was particularly badly hit by the bombing campaigns at the beginning of the war. 19 Petranović, Branko, ‘O levim skretanjima KPJ krajem 1941. i u prvoj polovini 1942. godine’, Zbornik za Istoriju, Matica Srpska, no. 4, 1971, 39–80. 20 For a discussion on this issue, see Petranović’s article, cited above. 21 Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, 81. 22 Đilas, Milovan, Wartime, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, chapter 10. 23 Ibid. 24 Auty, Phyllis, Tito: A biography, London: Longman, 2000, 172. 25 Đilas, Milovan, Memoir of a Revolutionary, 389. 26 Petranović, Branko, ‘O levim skretanjima KPJ krajem 1941’, 45. 27 Stalin, J., ‘Speech on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the October Revolution’, 44–5. 28 Although they continued to encourage the Partisans to fight, the Russians also indicated their support for Mihailović. The Russians omitted to broadcast or pass on the KPJ’s reports pointing out the Četniks’ lack of willingness to attack the Germans, or their gradual collaboration with both the Italians and the Germans in their fight against the Partisans. Supplies promised from the Soviet Union to the Partisans never arrived and, in the initial years, the Partisans were left much to their own devices. 29 Đilas, Milovan, Wartime, 354. 30 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Nacionalno pitanje u svjetlosti narodnooslobodilačke borbe’ (Proleter, Decembar 1942. god. # 16, Godine XVII), in Izbor iz djela, Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija, vol. III, 72. 31 Ibid. How this happened will be discussed further in the following chapter.

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32 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Bratstvo i jedinstvo je preduslov za jednu snažnu Jugoslaviju’, Bela Crkva 7 jula 1945, Izbor iz djela, vol. I, 93. 33 Banac, Ivo, With Stalin against Tito, 99 34 See Petranović, Branko, Istoriografija i revolucija. Beograd: Prosveta, 1984, 536. 35 Đilas, Milovan, Wartime, 354. 36 Ibid, 348. 37 Jelić, Ivan, Hrvatska u ratu i revoluciji 1941–1945, Zagreb: IHRPH, 60. 38 Bakarić, Vladimir, ‘Razvoj narodnog ustanka u Hrvatskoj i aktivnost KPH’, in Društvene klase, nacija i socijalizam, 70. 39 Jelić, Ivan, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945, Zagreb: Globus, 274. 40 Supek, Ivan, Krivovjernik na ljevici, Zagreb: Globus, 1992, 99. 41 In the late summer of 1943, the Partisan Headquarters in Croatia received a radiogram from several leaders of the HSS, offering its collaboration and presenting the Partisans with their conditions for doing so. Hebrang, Kardelj and Đilas inspected the proposals together, and deemed them acceptable ‘on condition that the “Radić Brothers Brigade” be subject to the orders of the [KPJ] high command and that it not be exempted from fighting against the Home Guards.’ It was decided that Milovan Đilas would go to Slavonia to discuss the proposals in more details. The representatives of the HSS, however, changed their minds, and failed to show up at the agreed meeting. Djilas. Milovan, Wartime, 318 42 The JNOF was set up following the Third Session of ZAVNOH. Its aims included to further the decisions of this session, as well as to separate the political and social tasks of the People’s Liberation Movement. An important reason for the set up of such a front was to accommodate the task of dealing with the HSS, and to define its role within the People’s Liberation Movement. Following the decisions at this session, the JNOF were to launch a direct attack on the Maček wing of the HSS, but only to attack this part of the leadership. 43 Quote from Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, 91. 44 Jelić, Ivan, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945, 279. 45 Bakarić, Vladimir, Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukciji, vol. II, 318. The view that Hebrang overestimated the importance of the HSS and that he wanted to make them an equal partner of the KPH at the second session of ZAVNOH at Plaški has been expressed in Dragan, Kljakić, Dosije Hebrang, Belgrade, 1983, 154–5; and by Ivan Supek, Krunski svjedok protiv Hebranga, Zagreb: Globus, 1992, albeit from very different perspectives. For more discussion on this issue, see also Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, 90, footnotes. 46 Bakarić, Vladimir, Socijalistički samoupravni sistem…, vol II, 318. 47 Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945, 278. 48 Ibid. 49 Bakarić, Vladimir, Socijalistički samoupravni sistem…, vol II, 318. 50 Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945, 279. 51 Đilas, Milovan, Wartime, 317. 52 Ibid., 315.

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53 In the course of 1943, Tito, the Supreme Staff and the Partisan units in Bosnia were facing two massive German-led offensives against them; Operation Weiss and Operation Schwarz, both which inflicted heavy losses and considerable damage for the Partisan Movement. Although the Croatian Partisans were also engaged in their own battles, Tito was not satisfied with the performance of the Croatian Headquarters in terms of relieving the pressure, and in August 1943, Ivan Rukavina, the commander of the Croatian Partisan forces was replaced quietly with Ivan Gošnjak. 54 Sirotković, Hodimir (ed), ZAVNOH: Zbornik dokumenata, 1943, Zagreb: IHRPH, 1964, 96. 55 Ed. Sirotković, ZAVNOH: Zbornik dokumenata, 1944, Zagreb: IHRPH, 1970, 607. 56 Quote from Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945, 312. 57 Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, 96 . 58 Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945, 313. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 314 62 A lot of controversy has since surrounded the reasons for the dismissal of Andrija Hebrang as leader of the KPH, as well as the role he played during the war in Croatia. This controversy has been coloured by the largely unsubstantiated charges made against him later, when Hebrang was accused by the KPJ leadership of being a Cominformist. These charges accused him of having made a deal with the Ustaša when he was released from their imprisonment in August 1942. Any discussion of the issue became a virtual taboo during the Communist period, but it was raised again in 1971, during what has been referred to as Maspok, or the Croatian Spring. 63 Đilas, Wartime, 354. 4  ‘White lines on marble pillars’: republics, autonomous provinces and borders 1 Mønnesland, Svein, Før Jugoslavia og etter, 4th ed., Oslo: Sypress Forlag, 1999, 25. 2 Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946, 1. 3 It is important that only the South Slav nationalities were granted this sovereignty. 4 Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946. 5 Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, Nacrt ustava Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije, December 1945. 6 Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, AVNOJ 1944/19, Pismo M. Pijade – E. Kardelju, April 1944. For a discussion of the matter, see also Fisher, J., Gabrič, A., Gibianskii, L., Klein, P., eds., Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War. Ljubljana: Inštitut za zgodovino Ljubljana/University of Toronto, 2004, 430. 7 Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946.

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8 Ibid. 9 Banac, Ivo, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, 104. 10 Petranović, Branko, ‘Istoriografski Fragmenti’, in Istoriografija i revolucija, Beograd: Prosveta, 1984, 503. 11 Pleterski, Janko, Nacije, Jugoslavija, revolucija. Beograd: Izdavački Centar Komunist, 1985, 474. 12 See Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, Nacrt Ustava Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije, December 1945; Pismo M. Pijade – E. Kardelju, April 1944; ‘Projekt Zakona o ustrojstvu i poslovanju AVNOJ-a i nacionalnih veća federalnih država u sastavu DFJ’ od 9 aprila 1944 (br. 18429/XI 1–10), ‘Projekt Zakona o ustrojstvu i poslovanjunarodne vlade DFJ i izvršnih odbora veća federalnih država u sastavu DFJ’ od aprila 1944 (br. 18447) XI, 1–42. 13 Petranović, Branko, Istoriografija i revolucija, 506. 14 Pleterski, Janko, Nacije, Jugoslavija, revolucija, 476. 15 Ibid., 474. 16 Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, Pijade’s ‘Declaracija o narodnoj vlasti’. Italics added. A reworked version later emerged under the title ‘Declaracija o osnovnim pravima nacija i građana DFJ’. This document was envisioned as a temporary solution until a constitution could be written. In 1945, a draft constitutional document emerged under the title ‘Nacrt ustava federativne narodne republike Jugoslavije’. (For the latter, see Moša Pijade, Govori i članci 1941–1947.) 17 Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, ‘Declaracija o narodnoj vlasti’, April 1944. 18 Ibid. 19 He has not included the Bosnian Muslims among these groups. 20 Petranović, Branko, Istoriografija i Revolucija, 506. 21 Pešic, Desanka, Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (1919 –1935), Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1983, 275. 22 Petranović, Branko, Istoriografija i revolucija, 543. 23 Srijem is the Croatian denotation, Srem the Serbian one. Since its Area Committee was attached to the KPH Commission for Slavonia during the war, I will use Srijem. 24 Petranović, Branko, ‘Osnivački kongres komunističke partije Srbije’, in Istoriografija i Revolucija, 384. One must also remember that Vojvodina had its own Area Committee already represented at the Fifth Land Conference in Zagreb in October 1940. 25 Petranović, Branko, Istoriografija i revolucija, 544. 26 Petranović, Branko, ‘Osnivački kongres komunističke partije Srbije’, in Istoriografija i Revolucija, 384. 27 The Main Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Struggle in Vojvodina (Glavni Štab NOV I POJ za Vojvodinu) was formed in July 1943. 28 Pleterski, Janko, Nacije, Jugoslavija, revolucija, 510. 29 Tito, ‘Značaj odluka Avnoj-a za dalji razvoj naše borbe i stvaranje federativne državne zajednice’, in Izbor iz djela, tom III – Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija, 81–2.

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30 Banac, Ivo, With Stalin Against Tito, 102. Both Petranović and Pleterski present a similar view. 31 Petranović, Branko, ‘Osnivački kongres komunističke partije Srbije’, in Istoriografija i Revolucija, 385–6. 32 Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A short history, London: Pan Books, 2002, 302. 33 They were later told by the CK KPJ to change the name back. The CK KPJ argued that the name Dukagjin also included territories [in Albania] that fell outside the former Yugoslav borders. ‘Pismo CK KPJ oblasnom komitetu KPJ za Kosovo i Metohiju’, in Đaković, S., Sukobi na Kosovu, Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1984, 405. 34 Pavle Jovićević, Sekretar PK KPJ za Kosmet, ‘Izveštaj PK za Kosovo i Dukađin od 31. januara 1944. godine centralnom komitetu KPJ o vojnopolitičkoj situaciji i o stanju i rad u organizacije u oblasti’, in Đaković, Sukobi na Kosovu, 402. 35 Ibid., 402. 36 ‘Pismo CK KPJ oblasnom komitetu KPJ za Kosovo i Metohiju’, in Đaković, Sukobi na Kosovu, 406. 37 Ibid., 405. 38 Ibid., 390. 39 The Second League of Prizren was also engaged in a campaign to expel Montenegrins and Serbs in Kosovo. They were also involved in collaboration with the Germans and the Italians. 40 Although the Yugoslavs claimed he was murdered by Albanian extremists in Kosovo, recent information suggests that he might have been killed by a member of the KPJ. The most likely reason was his intimacy with the Albanian leadership. 41 Nijaz Dizdarević, interview in NIN, 29 January 1989, 20–1. 42 ‘Pismo centralnog komiteta KPJ centralnom komitetu KP Albanije’, Đaković, Sukobi na Kosovu, 396. 43 Petranović, Branko, Istorijografija i revolucija, 541. 44 In April 1986, the Group of Fighters from the Brigade for Kosovo and Metohija in Belgrade issued a statement in which they demanded among other things, that the Bujan Resolution be revoked because of its separatist character. See Đaković, Sukobi na Kosovu for the entire text: ‘Šta su borci NOR-a sa Kosova koji žive u Beogradu rekli na svom skupu održanom 25 aprila 1986. godine’, 447. 45 See Banac, Ivo, With Stalin Against Tito, 100, footnotes, for the census in the region. 46 Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, AVNOJ 1944/19, Pismo M. Pijade – E. Kardelju, April 1944. 47 Petranović, Branko, Istorijografija i revolucija, 548. 48 Ibid. 49 Arhiv CK SKJ AVNOJ –1945/2, Presedništvo antifašističko veća nardodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavia. ‘Instrukcije AVNOJ-a o podeli Sandžaka, 21. Februara 1945’. 50 Ibid. 51 According to Milovan Đilas, ‘this plan implied autonomy under the Republic of Serbia.’ Đilas, M., Wartime, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977,

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62 63 6 4 65

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Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia 356. He further added ‘Autonomy under either Croatia or Serbia would have encouraged further strife and deprived the Muslims of their individuality’. Petranović, Branko, Istorijografija i revolucija, 537. Đilas, Milovan, Wartime, 356. The specific issues related to the recognition of Bosnian Muslim as a distinct national category will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 10. A Comintern decision late in 1941 ruled that the jurisdiction in Macedonia was to lie with the Yugoslavs. Palmer, Stephen E. Jr and King, Robert R., Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1971, 64. Ibid. Tito, letter to D. Radosavljević, quoted from Palmer and King, 76. CK KPM statement, quoted from Palmer and King, 79. Shoup, Paul, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 90. In the 1980s, numerous historical works from Serbia started to revise Serbia’s role in Titoist Yugoslavia, putting forward arguments to the effect that the Serbs were the ‘losers’ in Titoist Yugoslavia and that their sphere of influence was drastically reduced within the postwar arrangement. See chapter 12 for more on these discussions. Pijade is here referring to the six recognised federal units which he mentions two paragraphs up in the same document: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arhiv Jugoslavijie, Moša Pijade, Fond 570, AVNOJ 1944/19, Pismo M. Pijade – E. Kardelju, April 1944. Ibid. See Pijade, Moša, Izabrani spisi, tom I, knjiga 3, Beograd: Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, 1965, 195–8, for more on his view on the position of Serbs in Croatia. See discussion on borders below for more on Pijade’s (rejected) suggestions on a Serbian autonomous region in Croatia. Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Granice federalnih jedinica u federativnoj Jugoslaviji nisu granice razdvajanja, nego granice spajanja’, in Izbor iz djela, tom III – Nacionalno Pitanje i revolucija, 21 May 1945, 90. Dedijer,Vladimir, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, Vols. 1–3. Belgrade: ‘Rad’, 1984, 903. Đilas, Milovan, Rise and Fall, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, 99–100. 5  Introducing a socialist solution to the national question

1 Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: Glavni procesi. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978, 101, and Morača, Bilandžić, Stojanovic (ed.). Istorija saveza komunista Jugoslavije – kratak pregled. Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1976, 167–8. 2 Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974. London: C. Hurst and Co. for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, 22, n.38. 3 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Zadaci narodnog fronta’, Govor na prvom kongresu NFJ, Beograd, 7 augusta 1945, Izbor iz djela, 200.

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4 Đilas, Milovan, Rise and Fall, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 136. 5 Tito,’O čemu je specifičnost oslobodilačke borbe i revolucionarnog preobražaja nove Jugoslavije’, 1946, Izbor iz djela, 99. 6 ‘Yugoslavism’ refers to the term Jugoslavenstvo/Jugoslovenstvo in its Croatian/Serbian version. According to Ivo Banac (interview, May 2005), the term came into use as early as the 1860s, employed frequently in a variety of different meanings by different figures. ‘Yugoslavism’ is frequently used in English, also by writers from the former Yugoslavia, to denote a range of different versions of Yugoslav unity. For a recent example of this, see the book Yugoslavism: Histories of a failed idea 1918–1992, edited by Dejan Đokić, University of Wisconsin Press, 2003. ‘Socialist Yugoslavism’ refers to the communists’ reconceptualisation of the term Jugoslavenstvo, whereby they granted it a socialist connotation. This term, and new connotations attached to it will be discussed in greater detail later in the work. 7 Pesić, Vesna, Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996, vi. 8 Gabrič, Aleš, in Fisher, J., Gabrič, A., Gibianskii, L. and Klein, P. (eds) Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War, Ljubljana: Inštitut za Zgodovino Ljubljana/ University of Toronto, 2004. 433. 9 Wachtel, Andrew, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia. Standford CA: Standford University Press, 1998, 140. 10 Tito, ‘Granice federalnih jedinica u federativnoj Jugoslaviji nisu granice razdvajana, nego granice spajanja’, Zagreb 21, Maja 1945, Izbor iz djela, 91. Tito obviously mentions the Croats here because he was addressing a Croatian audience. 11 Đilas, Milovan, ‘O nacionalnoj istoriji kao vaspitnom predmetu’, Komunist, 1949, 67. 12 See Lilly, Carol S., Power and Persuation: Ideology and rhetoric in communist Yugoslavia 1944–1953, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001. 13 Đukić, Slavoljub, Čovek u svom vremenu: Razgovori sa Dobricem Ćosićem, Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1989, 31. 14 Ibid. 15 Đilas, Milovan, ‘O nacionalnoj istoriji kao vaspitnom predmetu’, Komunist, 1949, 64. 16 Wachtel, Andrew Baruch, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 136–7. See Wachtel for more details on the KPJ’s educational policies in the immediate postwar years. 17 For a comprehensive overview over past and recent research on Soviet– Yugoslav relations, see Gibianskii, Leonid, ‘The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav clash: Historiographic versions and new archival sources’, in Fisher, Gabrič, Gibianskii, and Klein (eds), 49–70. 18 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Sednica CK KP Jugoslavije’, in Dedijer, Vladimir (ed), Dokumenti 1948 (3 vols), Belgrade: ‘Rad’, 1979, 192. 19 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘O narodnoj demokratiji’, in Izbor iz djela, vol III, 27. 20 Đilas, Milovan, Rise and Fall, 168. 21 Ibid., 166.

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22 In addition to Tito, Đilas, Kardelj and Ranković, who were the only regular members of the Politburo, this meeting also included Moša Pijade, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Boris Kidrič, Sreten Žujović, Ivan Gošnjak Blagoje Nešković, Krsto Popivoda, Vladimir Bakarić and Miluntije Popović. 23 Tito, ‘Sednica CK KP Jugoslavije’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 193. 24 28th June, Vidovdan, was a date of great symbolic value in Yugoslavia. It was the date of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, and it was also the day when the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been murdered by the shot that signified the start of World War I in 1914. 25 Stalin, Josef, ‘First Letter’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 205. Note Gibianskii’s convincing argument that new archival material suggests these accusations were mainly levelled at the Yugoslav after, and as a consequence of, the dispute rather than being a cause. For a comprehensive overview over past and recent research on Soviet–Yugoslav relations, see Gibianskii, Leonid, ‘The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav clash: Historiographic versions and new archival sources’, in Fisher, Gabrič, Gibianskii, and Klein (eds), 57. 26 ‘CK KP Jugoslavije – Plenarna sednica’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 227. 27 Stalin, J., ‘First Letter’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 205. In this letter to the Yugoslavs, Stalin points out the ‘four dubious Marxist types of Đilas, Ranković, Svetmanović-Tempo and Kidrič’, distinguishing them from Tito and Kardelj to whom he addresses the letter. 28 Stalin, J., ‘Second Letter’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 281. The leaderships of those other Parties, Stalin argued, ‘were far more modest, and did not scream about their achievements. And [the KPJ’s achievement] was less of a merit than the struggle of the French and Italian Communists’. 29 Tito, ‘CK KP Jugoslavije’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 239. 30 Đilas, Milovan. Vlast i Pobuna, Beograd: Književne Novine, 1991, 85–6. Also cited in Banac, Ivo, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism, 113. 31 See Banac, Ivo, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism, 110–12 for more on Hebrang’s economic policies. 32 Dedijer, Vladimir. Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, Vol. 3 Belgrade: ‘Rad’, 1984, 197 33 Supek, Ivan, Krivovjernik na ljevici, 123. 34 Banac, Ivo, With Stalin against Tito – Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, 119. 35 There is a great lack of clarity about what actually happened to Hebrang, and his case would become a historical taboo during the communist period. It would however surface again in the 1970s and 1980s nationality debates. It is not within the scope of this discussion to go into any further detail on the controversies on this case. For more on Hebrang, see Supek, Ivan, Krivovjernik na ljevici, and Krunski svjedok protiv Hebranga, See also Banac, With Stalin against Tito. 36 Banac’s numbers build on the estimates of the Montenegrin professor and Communist Radovan Radonjić. For further discussion on the estimates of suspected and convicted Cominformists, see Banac, With Stalin against Tito, London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, Part II – ‘The

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healthy forces’, chapter 4; ‘Numbers and footholds’. According to Banac, the Montenegrins stood out among the national groups. There were also many Cominformists within the army. 37 Tito, ‘CK KP Jugoslavije’, in Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, 315–16. 3 8 Ibid. 6  Self-management socialism and Yugoslav unity 1 Tito, Speech of October 15, 1948, Govori i članci, 22. 2 Đilas, Milovan, article in Komunist, 1949, 7. 3 Ðilas, Milovan, Komunist, no. 5, quoted in Johnson, A. Ross, The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav case, 1945–1953. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1972, 82. 4 See Đilas, Milovan, Rise and Fall. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, 268–9 for a vivid description of this process. 5 Ðilas, Milovan, The New Class: An analysis of the communist system, London: Atlantic Pressbook – Thame & Hudson, 1957, 39. 6 Kidrič died of leukaemia in 1953. 7 Pijade died in 1957. 8 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘O osnovama našeg socijalističkog demokratizma’, 1952, in Izbor iz djela, III, 83. 9 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Borba komunista Jugoslavije za socijalističku demokratiju’, Iz Referata na VI Kongresu KPJ, 84. 10 Arhiv Republike Slovenije, AS 1529, Kraigher, Boris 30/17, ‘Gradivo osebna zbirka Borisa Kraigherja – Diskusija na III. plenumu CK ZKS’, 26 December 1955. 11 Tito would later come to express his uneasiness with the outcome of the Sixth Congress quite explicitly in 1970, when the crisis in Croatia was building up, and in its aftermath in 1971. He then argued that ‘I was rather discontent with the Sixth Congress’, ‘I did not like it, but I let it go ahead.’ ‘That was the first step towards the gradual inactivity of the League of Communists’. Josip Broz Tito, ‘Radničku Klasu ne možemo odvajati po republikama, ona je jugoslovenska’, Borba 20 December 1971. Izbor iz djela, Samoupravljanje, Vol IV, 376. 12 Morača, Bilandžić, Stojanovic (ed.), Istorija saveza komunista Jugoslavije – kratak pregled. Beograd: ‘Rad’, 1976, 225. 13 ‘Resolucija VI kongresa KPJ o zadacima i ulozi Saveza komunista Jugoslavije’, VI kongres KPJ /Saveza komunista Jugoslavije/ Borba komunista za socijalističku demokratiju, 283. 14 In Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 180, Sabrina Ramet argues ‘It has since been established that the vast majority of those who did declare themselves “Yugoslav – ethnically undetermined”, were Bosnian Muslims’, 180. 15 Pijade, Moša, ‘O popisu stanovištva’, Borba 18/1953, 20, 2 (21 January 1953) in Isaković, Alija (ed) ‘O Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, Zagreb: Globus, 1990, 147. 16 See chapter 10 for further discussion on the Muslim question in the 1960s and 1970s.

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17 Bakarić, Vladimir, ‘O odnosu KP(SK) Hrvatske prema nacionalnom pitanju i inteligenciji’, in Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukcija, Izbor iz djela, I Kolo, vol 1, Zagreb: Informator, 1983, 628. See chapter 7 for more about this issue. 18 The Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, translated from Serbo-Croatian by Ljotić, Borivoje P, Beograd: Union of Jurists’ Association of Yugoslavia, 1960, 43. 19 Lukić, Radomir, ‘Suvremenost u FNRJ i savezni ustavni zakon’, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu, 1953, broj 2, 145. 20 Ibid., 147. 21 Shoup, Paul, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1968, 192. 22 Dimitrov, Evgeni, ‘Karakter federativnih odnosa u našoj zemlji’, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu, 278. 23 Lilly, Carol S., Power and Persuasion: Ideology and rhetoric in communist Yugoslavia 1944–1953. Colorado: Westview Press, 2001, 207–8. 24 Petranovič, Branko and Zečević, Momčilo (eds) Jugoslavia 1918/1988 – Tematska zbirka dokumenata, ‘Rezolucija Balkanske Komunističke Federacije’, Beograd: Rad, 1988, 300. 25 Grigorov Dimitar, Violetov, Druže Tito, mi ti se Kunemo: Ritual and political power in Yugoslavia: Tito’s birthday celebrations, 1945–1987, University of Sofia, available at www.cliohres.net/books/3/Grigorov.pdf 26 Krleža held the post of the president of the Yugoslav writers’ union between 1958 and 1961. Ivo Andrić also held this position. 27 See Fisher, J., Gabrič, A., Gibianskii, L., Klein, P., eds., Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War, Ljubljana: Inštitut za zgodovino Ljubljana/University of Toronto, 2004, 438,. for more on this resolution. 28 For more on the so-called ‘Levanter affair’, see Lasić, Stanko, ‘Krležologija ili povijest kritičke misli o Miroslavu Krležu’, Knjiga 4, Stvaranje kulta 1945–1963, Zagreb: Globus 1989–93; Lasić, Stanko, Krleža – Kronologija života i rada, Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1982, and Visković, Velimir, ‘Krležine poslijeratne polemike’. Republika: časopis za književnost, Zagreb: 1998, br. 5–6, 123–9. 29 In 1962 it changed its name to the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute (Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod). See Lasić, Stanko, Krleža – Kronologijaživota i rada, 353–4. 30 Visković, Velimir, ‘Krležine poslijeratne polemike’. Republika: časopis za književnos, 124. 31 Pravopis Hrvatskosrpskoga Književnog Jezika, Zagreb/Novi Sad: Matica Hrvatska/Matica Srpska, 1960, 7. 32 Palmer, Stephen E. Jr. and King, Robert R, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1971, 154–5. Poulton, Hugh, Who are the Macedonians? 2nd edition, London: Hurst & Company, 2000, and Troebst, Stefan, ‘Yugoslav Macedonia’ in Bokovoy, M., Irvine, J., Lilly, C., State–Society Relations in Yugoslavia 1945–1992, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997, also provide good analyses of the Macedonian national question since 1945. 33 Poulton, Hugh, Who are the Macedonians? 117.

Notes 3 4 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 4 4 45 46 4 7 48 49 50 5 1 52

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5 4 55 56

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Palmer and King,Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, 156. Ibid., 155. Ibid., 162. Ibid., 161. Ibid., 163. Shoup, Paul, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, 193. Gabrič, Aleš, in Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War, 444. Gabrič, Aleš, Socialistična Kulturna Revolucija: Slovenska kulturna politika 1953–1962. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba, 1995, 318. This new strategy complemented, rather than replaced Brotherhood and Unity, which remained a slogan throughout the rule of the SKJ. See Gabrič, Aleš, Socialistična kulturna revolucija, and Gabrič, Aleš in Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War, 403–48, for more on Slovene cultural politics in the 1950s. Gabrič, in Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War, 438. Mišić, Zoran,’Za jedinstveni jugoslovenski kriterijum’, Delo, no. 7, 807. Šega, Drago, Glosa: Kriterij in resničnost. Naša sodobnost, no. 10, 1956, 959, available at www.dlib.si Ibid., 960. Ibid. Ibid. Mišić, Zoran,’Oko jedinstvenog jugoslovenskog kriterijuma’, Delo, no. 12, 1688. Ibid., 1689. As Audrey Budding points out, the concept in its socialist connotation had come into use before this, notably in an article by Dobrica Ćosić – ’Za Jugoslavenstvo nacionalnih kultura’ as early as 1952. (See Budding, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question 1961–1991, 55.) The concept was also discussed in the above-mentioned 1956 polemic between the Serbian writer Zoran Mišić and the Slovene writer Drago Šega. Nevertheless, Edvard Kardelj’s 1957 Razvoj Slovenačkog Nacionalnog Pitanja was important in granting the term the officially sanctioned definition and it was at this point that it entered into the official SKJ terminology. Kardelj, Edvard, Razvoj Slovenačkog Nacionalnog Pitanja, 3rd edition, Beograd: Izdavački Centar Komunist, 1988, 80. Stalin had argued that ‘A nation is an historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a common culture’. Stalin, J., Marxism and the National Question, Moscow, 1953. Kardelj, Razvoj, 41. Kardelj, Razvoj, 34–5. The use of the term spajanje in Serbian and Croatian indicates a process whereby two or more entities join together to become one new, but transformed, entity. While it does not indicate a process of assimilation of certain entities into a dominant one (then the word stapanje would be used), it does indicate the creation of something new and different based on the equal contribution of all the original entities. However, the use of this term could also indicate that the Yugoslav national groups were expected – through this

396

5 7 58 59 60

61

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia process of joining or melting together – to become something different and assume a new identity. Kardelj, Razvoj, 44. Kardelj, Razvoj, 45–6. Gabrič, Aleš, in Jugoslavija v hladni vojni/Yugoslavia in the Cold War, 447. Kraigher, Boris, Archiv Republike Slovenije (ARS), AS 1529, 30/17, ‘Gradivo osebna zbirka Borisa Kraigherja’, ‘diskusija B. Kraigherja na VII. kongresu ZK Jugoslavije’, Ljubljana 22–26, 1958, 1. The very fact that Kraigher felt it necessary to bring up the question of state formations outside Yugoslavia ought in itself to have been worrying to the Yugoslav communist leaders. Kraigher, Boris, ARS, AS 1529, 30/17, ‘Gradivo osebna zbirka Borisa Kraigherja’, ‘diskusija B. Kraigherja na VII. kongresu ZK Jugoslavije’, Ljubljana 22–26, 1958, 2. 7  Socialist Yugoslavism between unity and diversity 1958–1966

1 Ćosić was a member of the Serbian Academy of Arts – in the literary section – and the most high profile Serbian writer. He was on good terms with the party leaders, and accompanied Tito on a long and highly profiled trip on the yacht Galeb in 1961. Pirjevec was a research associate of the Slovene Academy of Arts and a member of the editorial board of the Slovenian journal Naša Sodobnost. 2 Budding, Audrey H., ‘From dissidents to presidents: Dobrica Ćosić and Vojislav Koštunica compared’, Contemporary European History, 13: 2 (2004), 2. 3 Gabrič, Aleš., Socialistična kulturna revolucija: Slovenska kulturna politika 1953–1962, Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba, 1995, 322. 4 Ćosić, Dobrica, Piščevi Zapisi (1951–1968), 2nd edition, Beograd: Filip Višnić, 2001, 126–35. 5 Ćosić, Dobrica, ‘O savremenom nesavremenom nacionalizmu’, Borba, Dec 6, 1961, 7. 6 Pirjevec, Dušan, ‘Izvinite, šta ste rekli?’ Borba, Dec 6, 1961, 6. 7 Ibid. 8 Kardelj, Edvard, Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja, 3rd edition, Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1988, 34–5 (hereafter referred to as Razvoj…). 9 Ćosić, Dobrica, ‘O savremenom’, Borba, Dec 6, 1961, 7. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Pirjevec, Dušan, ‘Slovenstvo, jugoslovenstvo i socijalizam’, Borba, Dec 14, 1961, 6. 13 Ibid., 7. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 For employment of these labels see Ramet, Sabrina Petra, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962–1991, 2nd edition, Bloomington:

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25 2 6 27 2 8 29 30 31

32

33 3 4 35 36

3 7 38 39

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Indiana University Press, 1992, 83; and Rusinow, Dennison. The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974, London: C. Hurst and Co., Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, 112. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 119. Kraigher, Boris, Archiv Republike Slovenije (ARS), AS 1529, 30/17, Gradivo osebna zbirka Borisa Kraigherja, ‘diskusija B. Kraigherja na VII. kongresu ZK Jugoslavije’, Ljubljana 22–26, 1958. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka,‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol 2, 806. Which in a strict sense, it was not, although he did emerge as its main protector and developer of its ideological raison d’être. Vučinić, Milan (ed), Šta posle svega kaže Tempo, Novi Sad: Prometej, 1997, 103. Although Tito’s doubts about self-management went further back, it can be assumed that Tempo is referring specifically to the period 1961–1962. See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 90. Ranković, Aleksandar, Dnevničke zabeleške, Belgrade: Jugoslovenska knjiga, 2001, 155. Ranković himself was not present during the hunt, but Pepa Kardelj accused him of being the mastermind behind the alleged assasination attempt. This is of course only one side of the struggle, which clearly also had overtones of a power struggle, and even a succession struggle. Vučinić, Šta Posle Svega Kaže Tempo, 103. See for example Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: glavni procesi. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978, 294; and Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment, 120–1. Tito, Govor na Narodnom Mitingu u Splitu, Beograd: Kultura, 1962, 23. Ibid., 24–5. Vučinić, Šta Posle Svega Kaže Tempo, 103. Paul Shoup argues that according to rumours, Macedonians and Serbs faced each other at gunpoint, while the Slovenes threatened to leave the federation. Tito later expressed his regret at having concealed the disagreements at the meeting. Gabrič, Socialistična kulturna revolucija, 347. However, Gabrič adds that such a conclusion is too simplistic. ‘It concerns the area of responsibility held by the federation, the republics and the communes … It was precisely during the preparations to the ratification of the new constitution that centralistic forces started their offensive’. Kraigher, Boris, ARS, AS 1529, 26–7. Kosmet referred to ‘Kosovo and Metohija’ – at the time still a common denomination. After 1968 only Kosovo was used in official party terminology. Ibid. Vučinić, Šta Posle Svega Kaže Tempo, 103. Repe, Božo., Rdeča Slovenija: tokovi in obrazi iz obdobja socializma. Ljubljana: Sophia, 2003, 250. The same suggestion has also been made by Dobrica Ćosić, in his diaries from this period. See Ćosić, Dobrica., Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968), 2nd edition, Beograd: Filip Višnić, 2001. Repe, Božo, Rdeča Slovenija, 249. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol 2, 806. Vučinić, Šta Posle Svega Kaže Tempo, 103.

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40 Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije – optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića. Belgrade: Beseda, 1990, 71. Momo Marković was the brother of later Serbian KPJ leader Draža Marković. He was also the father of Mirjana Marković, the wife of Slobodan Milošević. 41 Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, Zagreb: Globus, 1989, 70. 42 Rusinow, The Yugoslav experiment, 123. 43 Ibid., 156. 44 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Federacija i republike – o prednacrtu Ustava’, SSRNJ, 20 September 1962, Izbor iz djela, vol IV, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 321. 45 Rusinow, The Yugoslav experiment, 150. 46 Bakarić, Vladimir, ‘O odnosu KP(SK) Hrvatske prema nacionalnom pitanju i inteligenciji’, in Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena Reprodukcija, Izbor iz djela, I kolo, vol 1. Zagreb: Informator, 1983, 628. 47 Edvard Kardelj, ‘Kulturna i ekonomska pitanja međunacionalnih odnosa’, (June 11, 1964) Izbor iz djela, vol. IV, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 328–52. According to Mika Tripalo, considerable revisions were made to Kardelj’s report to the Eighth Congress in comparison to this text which the delegates had been handed at an earlier congressional session. Some paragraphs and pages were omitted and others added. This happened, Tripalo argues, in order to mitigate the differences among the inner circle of the party leadership with regards to the developments of self-management and international relations. While the report to the Eighth Congress focuses more on economics, this original text conveys clearly the developments in Kardelj’s thinking on federal and national relations. 48 Edvard Kardelj, Kulturna i ekonomska pitanja međunacionalnih odnosa, Izbor iz djela, vol IV, 328. 49 Kardelj, Kulturna … Izbor iz djela, vol IV, 328. 50 Ibid., vol IV, 329, italics added. 51 Ibid., 329. 52 Ibid., 330. 53 Ibid., 332. 54 Ibid. 55 Tito, Josip Broz, in Osmi Kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1964, 36. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., italics added. 58 Ibid., 37. 59 In this context, Tito refers to the constitutive Peoples (narodi) and the Nationalities (narodnosti) of the Yugoslav federation. 60 Tito, in Osmi Kongres, 37–8. 61 Other participants in the group included R. Lang, D. Gorupić and D. Vojnić from Croatia, T. Vlaškalić, M. Samardžija and D. Korać from Serbia and Mara Bešter and Fabijančič from Slovenia. Their thesis had initially been presented at a meeting between different economists held in Zagreb in January 1963, and their study – referred to as the White Book – presented a point of view that would come to lay the foundation for the liberal analysis on the Yugoslav economic situation. See Dabčević-Kučar, Savka,

Notes

6 2 63 64 6 5 66

67 68 6 9 70 71 7 2 73 74 75 76 77 7 8 79

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‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, Vol 1, Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997, 58, and Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 123–4, for a discussion on this topic. Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism, 88. Ibid., 89. Ibid., 84. Detailed accounts of the economic reforms can be found in Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment and Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment, 176. It is important, however, to point out that not all Serb Communists were resistant to or obstructing reforms. Politicians like Milentije Popović and Todorović were clearly and openly in favour of reform. Those who were pro-reform tended, however to be placed within the federal bureaucracy rather than within the Serbian Party bureaucracy, which was under the control of the Ranković wing. The UDBa was renamed in November 1964 to the SDB (Službe državne bezbednosti). Many continued to use the term UDBa long after it was renamed. Crvenovski, Krste, ‘Izvještaj komisije izvršnog komiteta centralnog komiteta saveza komunista Jugoslavije’, in Četvrti plenum Centralnog Komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1966, 13. Ranković, Aleksandar, Dnevničke zabeleške, 44–5. Četvrti plenum Centralnog Komiteta Saveza komunista Jugosavije, 7. Tito, in Četvrti plenum Centralnog Komiteta Saveza komunista Jugosavije, 8 Ibid. Crvenovski, Krste, in Četvrti Plenum, 14–15. Ibid., 20. Stefanović was also dismissed from his position. For Bakarić’s perceived role, see Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 159. Vukmanović-Tempo also suggests that Bakarić played a crucial role in this process. See Vučinić, Šta posle svega kaže Tempo, 104. Petranović, Branko, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988, Treća knjiga, Beograd: Nolit, 1988, 387. Ranković did allegedly keep a diary, one that has been printed posthumously by his wife and son. See Ranković, Aleksandar, Dnevničke Zabeleške. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988, Treća knjiga, 388. Tito, Osmi kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. 8  Institutional, constitutional and ideological changes introduced in Yugoslavia 1964–1971

1 Tripalo argues that this was the aim of M. Todorović and M. Pečuljić. Tripalo, Mika, Hrvatsko proljeće, Zagreb: Globus, 1989, 83. 2 The Commission was led by Mijalko Todorović, who replaced Ranković as Secretary of the Federal Central Committee, hence its name. 3 Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974, London: C. Hurst and Co., for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, 198. The 11 members of the Executive Committee would include the secretaries of each of the six republican executive committees as ex officio members.

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4 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 198. 5 Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political decision making since 1966. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, 63. 6 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 221. 7 Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion, 64. 8 The first ever conference for the Jugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA), which had recently gained representation in the Party presidency, was also held prior to the Ninth Congress. 9 According to Rusinow, 90% of the new delegates, and as many as 97.8% in the Macedonian case had never before attended a Party Congress. 69% of those approved were new. 60% were under 40, and 15% under 30 years of age. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 256. 10 Present were Kardelj, Todorović, Vlahović, Mijatović, Crvenkovski, Bakarić and Tripalo, and Tito himself. Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 109. 11 Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 109–10. 12 Bakarić continued to live in Zagreb even after he started working in Belgrade. Bakarić had several times previously rejected offers of federal positions. 13 ‘Osma sednica Presedništva SKJ’, Komunist, # 684, April 30, 1970, 9. Italics added. 14 The original proposal suggested two representatives from each Republic and one from each province. The Bosnian leadership objected, however, since they needed to ensure the representation of all three of its constituted national groups. The number was reduced to one from each Republic and province in the 1974 Constitution, due to the inefficiency of such a large body. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 285. 15 Kardelj’s speech to the 16th Session of the Party presidium, quoted from Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 207. 16 Tito, Josip Broz., Izbor iz djela: Nacionalne pitanje i revolucija, vol III, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1982. 17 See for example the debates from the Law Faculty in Belgrade in 1971, where the theme of crisis runs through most of the contributions. Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu, 19/1971, Broj 3. 18 ‘Rezolucija VI kongresa KPJ o zadacima i ulozi Saveza komunista Jugoslavije’, in VI Konges KPJ – Borba komunista Jugoslavije za socijalistićke demokratiju, Beograd: Kultura, 1952, 284. 19 Tito, ‘Radničku klasu ne možemo odvajati po republikama, ona je jugoslovenska’, Borba, Dec. 20 1971. Izbor iz djela, Samoupravljanje, vol IV, 376. 20 Tito, Izbor iz djela, vol III, 309. 21 Ibid., 308. 22 See Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ – glavni procesi, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978, 330–1 for a discussion on the 1967–68 constitutional amendments. 23 Ustavni amandmani. Službeni list SFRJ, br. 55. godina XXIV, Beograd, December 1968. 24 See introduction by Đorđević, Jovan, to Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu jul-desembar 1968, ‘O predlozima za izmenu nekih odredaba ustava SFRJ i tezama za izborni sistem’ Diskuzija. Beograd: Izdanje centra za dokumentaciju i publikacije pravnog fakulteta, 1968, 487.

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25 Đorđević, Jovan, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu jul-desembar 1968, 488. 26 Jončić, Koča, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu jul-desembar 1968, 500–1. 27 Stojanović, Radoslav, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu jul-desembar 1968, 506. 28 Ibid., 508. 29 Đurović, Dragoljub (ed), Ustavni amandmani XX–XLII, Novi Sad: Prosveta, 1971. 30 Ibid., 6. 31 The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Beograd: Union of Jurists’ Association of Yugoslavia, 1963. Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution stated: ‘The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal Peoples’ state, republican in form, a community of Peoples equal in rights, who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right to separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state’. In the 1953 Constitutional Law, sovereignty was again placed exclusively with the People. Article 1 thus reads: ‘The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is a socialist democratic federal state of sovereign Peoples equal in rights’. 32 Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ, 378. These built on the areas agreed upon at the Eighth Session of the SKJ Presidency in April 1970. 33 See Đurović (ed), Ustavni amandmani XX–XLII, 46. 34 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 283. 35 Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 110. 36 Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga: Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991, 189–94. 37 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 289. 38 See chapter 10 for more on the Croatian crisis. 39 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Kulturna i economska pitanja međunacionalnih odnosa’, 1964, Izbor iz djela, vol IV, 330. Italics added. 40 Ibid., 332. 41 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘ Jugoslavija – socialistička’, Izbor iz djela, vol IV, 375. 42 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Ustavni amandmani’, Izbor iz djela, vol IV, 379. 43 Kardelj, Edvard, Ibid. 44 Kardelj, Edvard, Ibid., 381. 45 Tito, Izbor iz djela, knjiga 4, 308. 46 Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘Bratstvo i jedinstvo na elementima onoga što nas spaja u samoupravnomsocijalizmu’, ‘71: Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, 2.sv. Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997, 6–7. 9  The national questions revisited: national controversies 1967–1971 1 For details on the Slovene Road Affair, see Božo Repe, ‘Liberalizem v Sloveniji’, Borec, 44, 9–10, 1992; Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political decision making since 1966, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, 89–100; Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: Glavni procesi, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978, 360–1; Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism

402

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 5 16 17 18 19 20 2 1 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia in Yugoslavia 1962–1991, 2nd edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 94–7. See also Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga – Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991, for the viewpoint of the Serbian leadership on this affair. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 95. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, 89. Ibid., 90. Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ, 360. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, 93. Ibid., 95–6. Note that the Macedonians were also among the candidates for such a loan. Ibid., 96. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 96. This was stated by the President of the Slovenian Communist Party, France Popit. See Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, 97. Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Socialistička samoupravna zajednica ravnopravnih naroda’, in Izbor iz Dela, Nacija i međunacionalni odnosi, knjiga IV, 356. Banac, Ivo, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, history, politics, 4th edition. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994, 285. See Banac, Ivo, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav communism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, 105. The fact that Montenegro had its own delegates and a separate area committee present at the Fifth Land Conference in 1940 is one indication of such recognition. Banac, With Stalin Against Tito,105. Nikčević, Vojislav, Crnogorski Jezik – Geneza, tipologija, razvoj, strukturne osobine, funkcije, Cetinje: Matica Crnogorska, 1997, 533. Đilas, Milovan, ‘O Crnogorskom pitanju’, in Članci 1941–1946, Belgrade: Kultura, 1947, 200. Pavlović, Srđa, ‘Who are Montenegrins? Statehood, identity and civic society,’ in Bieber, Florian (ed), Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003, 94. ‘Declaracija o nazivu I položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika’, Telegram, 17 March 1967, in Declaracija o nazivu I položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika 1967–1997, Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1997. ‘Saopćenje uprave udruženja književnika Crne Gore o jeziku’, Kritika, 4 (March/April 1971), # 16, 378. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 378–9. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 212. Ibid., 179. Ibid. For more discussion on this issue, see Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 176–86. See Redžić, Enver, ‘Društveno-istorijski aspect nacionalnog opredeljivanja Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine’ (1961) in Isaković, Alija (ed), O

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‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, Zagreb: Globus, 1990, 149–57, for a discussion of some historiographic aspects surrounding the Serbian and Croatian explanations of ethno-genesis of the Bosnian Muslims. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 178. Redžić, Enver, ‘Društveno-istorijski aspect’ (1961), in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 150. Holjevac, Većeslav, ‘Hrvati izvan domovine’, in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 177. Redžić, Enver, ‘Društveno-istorijski aspect’ (1961), in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 150. Such views were forwarded by, for example, Špiro Kulišić. Kulišić, Špiro, ‘Razmatranja o porijeklu Muslimana u Bosni I Hercegovini’ (1953), in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 135. Ćimić, Esad, ‘Nacija u svjetlu sociološke analize’ (1969), in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 195. Ibid., 193. Ibid., 197. Humo, Avdo, ‘Muslimani u Jugoslaviji’ (1968) in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 181. Ibid. Ibid., 180. Ćimić, Esad, conversation with Milan Mitić at Mosaik, TV-Sarajevo January 20, 1971. Reproduced in Isaković, O ‘Nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana, 231–2. Not long after this controversy, Ćimić moved to Zagreb. Ibid. Quoted from Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 182. See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 181, for distribution of ethnic Muslims per federal unit. Poulton, Hugh, Who are the Macedonians? 2nd edition, London: Hurst & Company, 2000, 124–5. Ibid., 118. The Macedonian Orthodox Church was self-proclaimed as autocephalous, but its autocephaly was not officially recognised by other Orthodox churches. Poulton, Hugh, Who are the Macedonians? 122. See Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? 121–6, on this issue. See also Palmer, Stephen E. Jr. and King, Robert R., Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1971, chapter 10. Palmer and King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, 178. Ibid., 175. Ibid., chapter 9, 153–74, for a discussion on Macedonian culture after World War II. For more on the issue, see chapter 8 of this book. See also the item ‘Izvještaj komisije izvršnog komiteta centralnog komiteta saveza komunista Jugoslavije’ by Krste Crvenovski in Četvrti Plenum Centralnog Komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1966. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise, London: Routledge, 27.

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5 6 Horvat, Branko, Kosovsko Pitanje, Zagreb: Globus, 1988, 62. 57 Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A short history, London: Pan Books, 2002, 323. 58 The official illiteracy rate among Albanians in Kosovo was 36% in 1971, according to Ramet (Nationalism and Federalism, 189). Ramet suggests that the actual levels of illiteracy were probably even higher. 59 Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ, 333. 60 Tito, Izbor iz djela, vol 4, 302–11. 61 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 189. 62 Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo, 323. Malcolm also points to the relatively relaxed atmosphere in Albanian–Yugoslav relations at the time. 63 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 190. 64 Ibid., 191. 65 Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo, 316. 66 The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Union of Jurist’s Association of Yugoslavia, Beograd, 1963), 45. 67 Ibid. 68 Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ, 330. 69 Bakarić, Vladimir, ‘O odnosu KP(SK) Hrvatske prema nacionalnom pitanju i inteligenciji’, in Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukcija, vol 1, 628. 70 Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ, 333. 71 See chapters 12 and 13 of this book. 72 RFE-RL RAD Background Report/236 (Yugoslavia) ‘A Yugoslav TroubleSpot by Stanković, Slobodan’ 25 October 1979. http://fa.osaarchivum.org/ background-reports?col=8&id=34099 10  The Croatian national revival and crisis 1 Tripalo, Mika, Hrvatsko proljeće, Zagreb: Globus, 129. 2 See chapter 9 for more on the Slovenian Road Affair. 3 Đukić, Slavoljub, Čovek u Svom Vremenu: Razgovori sa Dobricom Ćosićem. Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1989, 152. 4 Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997, vol 2, 795. 5 Such descriptions are conveyed both by Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo, who worked closely with Bakarić for many years. See Dabčević-Kučar, ‘71Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol 2, and Tripalo, Hrvatski proljeće. Rusinow also provides a similar description of Bakarić. See Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974, London: C. Hurst & Co for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977. 6 Koprivnjak, Vjekoslav, ‘Od Marxa prema oslobođenju čovjeka’, Danas, January 18, 1983. 7 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 209. 8 Democratisation of party and state was of course an inherent part of the strategy towards de-étatisation, but it was now made a more explicit aim. 9 Dabčević-Kučar, ‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol 2, 636. See also Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 293. 10 Tenth Session of CK SKH, in January 1970.

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11 Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘Bratstvo i jedinstvo na elementima onoga što nas spaja u samoupravnomsocijalizmu’, Izlaganje dr. Savke Dabčević-Kučar o aktuelnim političkim pitanjima, in X sjednica CK SKH, 7. 12 Ibid., 6–7. Simultaneously, Dabčević-Kučar argued, communists are also fighters for the national freedom of all the other peoples. 13 Ibid., 16. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., 15. 16 Ibid., 14. 17 Ibid., 12. 18 Ibid., 8. Dabčević-Kučar implicitly draws a link between the aspirations of the KPH under Hebrang and the contemporary leadership. However, the KPH’s role was very different and as the war came to an end, the roles and autonomy of both the Croatian and Slovenian Communist Parties were considerably restricted in the process of party centralisation. 19 Bakarić, Vladimir, ‘S komunistima Jugoslavije rješavati teškoće a ne stvarati opoziciono raspoloženje’ – Riječ Dra. V. Bakarića na savjetovanju u CK SK Hrvatske 13. XII 1969 – Printed as appendix to X sjednica CK SKH (10th Session of CK SKH, 108–9), Zagreb: Vjesnik, January 1970. 20 Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 115. 21 Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac, Sećanja i komentari, Beograd: Radio B52, 1998, 227. 22 Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 115. 23 Perić, Ivan, Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam, Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1976, 20. 24 Gotovac, Vlado, ‘Letak za Maticu Hrvatsku’, Hrvatski Tjednik, # 8, April 4, 1971, 1. 25 One of the more notable economic polemics had taken place between Šime Đodan and the Croatian conservative Stipe Šuvar in 1969. See Đodan, Šime, ‘Gdje dr. Stipe Šuvar “prolazi” nacionalizam a gdje ga ne vidi’, Kolo, # 7 (3), (March 1969), 246–54. 26 Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija SFRJ, 335. 27 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 209. 28 See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 103–4, for a discussion on the demographic issue. 29 Bakarić, Vladimir, ‘Unitarizam kao ideologija i ocjena nacionalizma u Hrvatskoj’, X sjednica CK SKH, 109. 30 Quote from Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 108. 31 Hrvatski Tjednik, #17, 5. 32 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 293. 33 Gotovac, Vlado, ‘Letak za Maticu Hrvatsku’, Hrvatski Tjednik # 8, April 4, 1971, 1; adding that ‘at this point in history, the programme relies on the destiny of the Tenth Session of the CK SKH’. 34 See Hrvatski Tjednik, # 15, July 23 1971; HT # 16, July 30, HT # 17, August 13. 35 Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political decision making since 1966, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, 125–6. See also Perić, Ivan, Ideje ‘Masovne Pokreta’ u Hrvatskoj,

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36 3 7 38 3 9 40 41 42 43 44 4 5 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 5 3 54 55 5 6 57 5 8 59 60 61

62 63 64

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia Zagreb: Centar za aktuelni politički studiji, 1974, for the role of the media during the Croatian crisis. See VUS, # 978, January 27, 1971, 16–17. In a later article in VUS, Čičak refers to himself as a ‘Catholic-Titoist’ (VUS # 1019, November 1971, 24.) See VUS # 989, April 14, 1971, 3–15 for a description of events. Irvine, Jill, The Croat National Question: Partisan politics in the formation of the Yugoslav socialist state, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, 258. Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 122. See chapter 4 Prosvjeta, March/April 1971,1–2. For Pijade’s original speech, see Pijade, Moša, Govori i Članci 1941–1947. It was also Pijade who suggested to Tito, most unsuccessfully, the creation of a Serbian autonomous area in Croatia. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘Hrvatska politička scena’, VUS # 981, 17 January 1971, 10–11. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘Samoupravljanje – uvjet nacionalne ravnopravnosti’, Komunist, 18 February, 1971. Hrvatski Tjednik, 10 September, 1971, # 21, 1. Ibid. Ibid., 3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See Hrvatski Tjednik, # 15, July 23, 1971, 12–14, for Tuđman’s argument on these issues. They did not of course mention the names of Bakarić and Blažević, but referred to citations they had made. Hrvatski Tjednik # 6, 30 July 1971, 1. Ibid., #23, 24 August, 1971, 1. Mišković, Milan, ‘Neophodna svjesna akcija komunista’, Četvrta sjednica Konferencije SKH, Komunist, Beograd 15.VII 1971, 6. Hrvatski Tjednik, # 29, November 5, 1971, 12. See Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 305, and Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 124–7. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, knjiga 2, 635. Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion, 135. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ‘71- Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, knjiga 2, 634. Tito’s speech was reiterated in SKH CK, Izvještaj o stanju u savezu komunista Hrvatske u odnosu na prodor nacionalizma u njegove redove. (Izvještaj je usvojen na 28.sjednici Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske 8. Svibnja, 1972.godine.) Zagreb: Informativna služba SKH CK, 1972, 82–8. VUS, # 1045, 10 May, 1972. See also Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 161, and Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, 141–2. Zaključci, V., ‘sjednice predsjedništva SS Splita’, Hrvatski Tjednik, #16, 30 July, 1971. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 301.

Notes 6 5 66 67 68 6 9 70 71 7 2 73 74 7 5 76 77 78 79 8 0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

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SKH CK, Izvještaj o stanju u Savezu komunista Hrvatske 1972, 105–6. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 306. Ibid. Pišković, Milan (ed) Sječa Hrvatske u Karađorđevu 1971, 21. sjednica (autorizirani zapisnik), Zagreb: Meditor, 1994. Tito referred to Revolution day, 29 November. Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 149. VUS, #1023, 8 December 1971, 21–4. The declaration is recapitulated in Hrvatski Tjednik, #32, 26 November, 1971, 3. Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 149. VUS, #1023, 8 December 1971, 21–4. See Pišković, Sječa Hrvatske u Karađorđevu 1971 for stenographic notes from this meeting. Tito, in Pišković, Sječa Hrvatske u Karađorđevu 1971, 211. Ibid., 212. Ibid., 214. Ibid., 214–15. Tito, ‘Završna riječ na XXI sjednici Presjedništva SKJ’, Borba, December 5, 1971, from Izbor iz djela: nacionalne pitanje in revolucija, knjiga 3, 427. Ibid. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 309. Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 157. SKH CK, Izvještaj o stanju u Savezu komunista Hrvatske, 157. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 131. Perić, Ivan, Ideje ‘Masovnog Pokreta’, 132. As the KPJ had done to some extent at the time for tactical reasons. Prosvjeta, #608–609, 10 July 1971, 1. Ćosić’s comments were reiterated in Prosvjeta, #604–605, March/April 1971, 3. 11  Serbia after Ranković: ‘Liberals’ and nationalist intellectuals

1 At the same time, they did not actively pursue such forces to the degree demanded by Tito. 2 Budding, Audrey Helfant, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question 1961–1991, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Harvard, 84. 3 Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962–1991, 2nd edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 189. 4 ‘Metohija’ was still part of the official name at the time. 5 Mišović, Mišo, Ko Je Tražio Republiku – Kosovo 1945–1985, Beograd: Prosveta, 1987, 66. It should be added that Deva was removed a few years later ostensibly because of his hard hand approach and constant criticism of great Serbian hegemony, to make the way for the younger Mahmut Bakalli. Deva was reinstated once Bakalli fell from grace after the student demonstrations in Priština in 1981. See Stankovic, Slobodan ‘Kosovo Party Leader replaced’, in RFE-RL Background Report/129 (Yugoslavia) 11 May 1981. 6 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1990.

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7 Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga – Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972, 77. 8 Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac: Sećanja i komentari, Beograd: Radio B92, 1998, 72. 9 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 323. 10 Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac, 70. 11 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 27. 12 Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac, 67. Perović herself points out that she and Nikezić never talked about a programme as such, but that in all specific [action], it came into expression. See Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga, 77. 13 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 25. 14 Ibid. 15 Izlaganje Marka Nikezića, presjednika CK SKS sa treće konferencije SK Srbije, Komunist, March 18, 1971, 7 16 Izlaganje Marka Nikezića, Komunist, March 18, 1971 7 17 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 28. 18 Perović, Latinka, Politika, 30 October, 1971. 19 Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac, 61. 20 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 129. 21 Interview with Latinka Perović, December 1998 22 Nikezić, Marko, quoted in Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 26. 23 Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 26. This assurance was important in view of the increasing attention paid by Serbian and Croatian nationalist forces to the respective Serbian and Croatian populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 24 Although some important members of the Praxis group were based in Belgrade, its board and main base had originated and were placed in Zagreb. These two cities remained the main centres for the activities of the Praxis group, with a few members spread also to other cities in Yugoslavia. 25 Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974, London: C. Hurst and Co., Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, 236. 26 One figure who was credited with stopping this, but who had also been very close to sending in the troops, was Miloš Minić. This would later be pointed out by his opponents in the Serbian party organisation. 27 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 235. 28 Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga, 58. 29 Sher, Gerson S., Praxis: Marxist criticism and dissent in socialist Yugoslavia, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1977, xi. 30 It is not within the scope of this analysis to go into detail about the theoretical and philosophical positions of Praxis members or the group as such. See Sher’s book on Praxis (cited above) for more on the topic. The Humanist Marxists became a more coherent group in the early 1960s, and their journal Praxis came into circulation in 1964. Its international edition came into print the following year. They also started the Korčula summer school in 1963. 31 Sher, Gerson S., Praxis, 182. 32 Budding, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 158.

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33 Both Kardelj and Bakarić expressed concern about the activities of Praxis. However, as Bakarić admitted in an attack on the Praxis group in 1966, the Croatian Party had also continued to sponsor the journal Praxis, and other activities. Another significant Party figure sceptical about the activities of Praxis was Mika Tripalo. 34 Sher, Gerson S., Praxis, 214. 35 Many of the signatories of this proposal, would come to constitute the core of the nationalist coalition within the Serbian intelligentsia in the 1980s. 36 The text of the proposal was published in Borba on April 2, 1967. 37 See Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists: Culture, politics, and nationalism in a Serbian intellectual circle, 1944–1991, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007, 135. 38 Ibid., 133. 39 Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political decision making since 1966, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, 69. 40 See chapter 5. At the time, Simina 9a was not known to the public, as its mention was not publicised until 1974. For an account of the evolution of Simina 9a, see Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists. 41 Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists, 137. 42 The circumstances surrounding the visit are somewhat unclear. Ćosić himself claimed he went for purely literary purposes. However, he was still closely connected to the highest party figures, and with the taboo surrounding Goli Otok, it is unlikely that he would have been allowed to visit the place to write about it. 43 A point stressed by Ćosić himself on a number of occasions. See Stvarno i moguće: Članci i ogledi, 2nd edition, Ljubljana-Zagreb: Cankarjeva založba 1988; Piščevi Zapisi (1951–1968), 2nd edition, Belgrade: Filip Višnić, 2001; Kosovo, Belgrade: Novosti, 2004 (all by Dobrica Ćosić). See also, Đukić, Slavoljub, Čovek u svom Vremenu: Razgovori sa Dobricem Ćosićem, Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1989. 44 The alleged letter is reiterated in Ćosić, Piščevi Zapisi, 252–4. Its date is June 28 1966. For details on the change in Ćosić’s thinking and direction, see Đukić, Čovek u svom vremenu, Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists: Culture, politics, and nationalism in a Serbian intellectual circle, 1944–1991 for more on this issue. and Budding, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question 1961–1991, chapter 3, 164–6. See also Ćosić’s own writings in Piščevi Zapisi 1951–1968 for his own view. 45 It appeared in a selection of Ćosić’s writings in the 1980s: ‘Kako da stvaramo sebe’, in Stvarno i Moguće. 46 Ćosić, Dobrica, ‘Kako da stvaramo sebe’, in Stvarno i Moguće. The two strands he refers to are those of Vuk Karadžić and Dositej Obradović. 47 Ćosić, Dobrica, ‘Kritika vladajuće koncepcije o nacionalnoj politici’, 14 Sednica CK SK Srbije, May 29, 1968, in Kosovo, 13. 48 Ibid. 49 Ćosić uses the politically loaded term Šiptar, and not the officially approved Albanac. 50 Ćosić, ‘Kritika vladajuće…’, in Kosovo, 15.

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51 A few months later, in December 1968, The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was renamed the Socialist Autonomous Province Kosovo, hence losing the Serbian designation Metohija from its name. 52 Ćosić, ‘Kritika vladajuće…’, in Kosovo, 15. 53 Ibid., 17. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., 18. 56 Ćosić, Kosovo, 24. 57 Budding, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 195. Budding adds that many of the people who in 1986 produced the Serbian Academy’s Memorandum were on Zadruga’s Board. 58 Ibid., 198–9. Though under consideration, the Zadruga board did, however, decide against the arrangement of a Beseda in Kosovo in 1971. See the same book, 193–203, for a more detailed overview of the Zadruga’s origin and activities. 59 These discussions were printed in Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu, 19/1971, Broj 3. This issue was banned but was later reissued in 1990 in a facsimile edition. 60 Čavoški, Kosta, ‘Ustavnost i pravo veta’, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu, 19/1971, # 3 (from now on, referred to as Anali), 222. 61 Ibid. 62 See, for example, Simović, Vojislav, Anali, 241. 63 Đorđević, Jovan, Anali, 211. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., 212. 66 Gams, Andrija, Anali, 234. 67 Ibid., 237. 68 Đurić, Mihailo, Anali, 231. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., 233. 71 Ibid., 232. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid., 232–3. 76 Ibid., 233. 77 Ibid. 78 See Đukić, Slavojub, slom srpskih Liberala, 144–5. According to Đukić, it remained unclear who had been behind this action; the ‘Liberals’ or the ‘Conservatives’ in the Serbian Party. Other members of the Law faculty were also later subjected to reprimands from the Party, after they had signed a petition against his sentencing. 79 One can see some echo of thoughts expressed by Dobrica Ćosić in the speech by Đurić. Đurić was a member of the SKZ as well as a frequenter at Simina 9a. There was considerable overlapping of memberships between others who partook in the Law debates, the Praxis group, and Simina 9a. 80 See chapter 12 for further discussion of this matter. 81 Tito’s view came to clear expression in his speech at the Twenty-first

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8 4 85 86

8 7 88 89 9 0 91 92 93

9 4 95

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Session of the SKJ Presidency at Karađorđevo, when he ousted the Croatian leadership. Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga – Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972, 340. Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Završna riječ druga Tita na XXI sjednici Predsjedništva SKJ’, Komunist, December 9, 1971, 5. Tito was referring to the Korčula Summer Schools held by the Praxis group, and to the symposium on ‘Federalism and the national question’, held in Novi Sad on March 26–28, 1971. Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga, 330. See extracts from their speeches to the Serbian Active, December 5, 1971, in Komunist, December 9, 1971, 8. Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Komunisti moraju uvijek otklanjati izvorišta koja pothranjuju nacionalizam i hegemonizam’. Speech to the leaderships of the sociopolitical activists in SR Serbia, Borba, October 18, 1972, in Izbor iz djela, vol III, Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija, 464–71. A factor pointed out by Latinka Perović – see Zatvaranje kruga, 72–7. The Liberals retained the support of Dobrivoje Radosavljević and Koča Popović. Popović left the political stage at this time. Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije – optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića, Belgrade: Beseda, 1990. Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga, 367. Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1990, 321. Interview with Latinka Perović, December 1998. This role of Tito as arbiter is also a theme in her book Zatvaranje kruga about these events. Đukić, Slom srpskih Liberala, 241–2. Pavlović in fact held an ideological orientation that was far more conservative than that of Perović and Nikezić. Nevertheless, they worked well together, and according to Đukić, ‘Pavlović felt himself a part of Nikezić’s team’. He was also purged together with them in 1972. Perović, Latinka, in Đukić, Slom srpskih liberala, p. 25 Sher, Gerson S., Praxis: Marxist criticism and dissent in socialist Yugoslavia, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1977, 226. 12  A reconsideration of the purpose of the Yugoslav state

1 Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974, London: C. Hurst and Co., for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, 313. 2 Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political decision making since 1966, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, 171. 3 Tito, Josip Broz, ‘Mi prihvatamo pozitivne tekovine prošlosti ali obacujemo ono što je negativno’. Interview in Vjesnik, October 8, 1972, from Izbor iz djela, vol III, Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija, 461–3. 4 Tito, Josip Broz, interview in Vjesnik, October 8, 1972, Izbor iz djela, vol III, Nacionalno pitanje i revolucija, 462. Italics added. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 463.

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7 Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac: sećanja i komentari, Beograd: Radio B92, 1998, 235–6. See Nenadović, 225–50 for documents, notes and citations on these isues, including Tepavac’s letter of resignation. 8 Sher, Gerson S., Praxis, 223. 9 See Sher, Praxis, 226–32 for details on this case. 10 Rusinow, in The Yugoslav Experiment, 326, argues that it was a ‘Titoist coup d’état against some central elements of what the Western world calls Titoism’. 11 Dimitrijević, Vojin, ‘The 1974 Constitution as a factor in the collapse of Yugoslavia or as a sign of decaying totalitarianism’, in Popov, Nebojša, (ed) The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and catharsis, Budapest: CEU Press, 2000, 404. 12 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Press and Cultural Centre, New York, 1976, 139. 13 Article 221 was amended after Tito’s death to abolish the position of the president of the Party. See Dimitrijević, in Popov, The Road to War in Serbia, 411. 14 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, New York: Yugoslav Press and Cultural Centre, 1976, 28. Italics added. 15 Ibid. 16 Doronjski had refused to have anything to do with the liberal Vojvodinan leadership under Tepavac. 17 Even though technically, the successor of Nikezić was the rather more anonymous but loyal Tihomir Vlaškalić. 18 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa: borbe ze vlast u Srbiji posle Josipa Broza, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1990, 29. 19 Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije: Optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića, Belgrade: Beseda, 1990, 47. However, their focus remained mainly on intrarepublican affairs. 20 Even if Kardelj was accused of being anti-Serbian by Serbian nationalist forces in the following decade. 21 Marković argues this point in his diary notes. See Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije, 47. 22 The full name of the document is: ‘Socijalistička republika Srbija i autonomne pokraine u njenom sastavu – ustavni položaj i praksa’. The text from Plava knjiga can be found in Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije, 125–74. 23 Marković, Draža, ‘Plava knjiga’ in Đekić, Upotreba Srbije, 125–74. 24 Ibid. 25 Stambolič, Ivan, Put u Bespuće: Odgovori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana Inića, Radio B92, 1995, 56. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 66. 28 Jović, Dejan, Yugoslavia: A state that withered away, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009, 175. 29 Stambolič, Ivan, Put u Bespuće, 76. 30 Đekić, Upotreba Srbije, 47. 31 Ibid.

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32 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 18. According to Petar Stambolić’s testimony, the initative was led by A Ranković, Jovan Veselinov, Krcyn Penezić and Miloš Minić. 33 Đukić, Slavoljub, Slom srpskih Liberala, 157. 34 See chapter 11 of this book. 35 The highest position obtained by Minić in Serbia was, according to Đukić, president of the Skupština of Serbia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 17. 36 A point made by Marković himself. See Đekić, Upotreba Srbije. Even in the 1970s, Stambolić and Marković had a reputation as dogmatic, and were not particularly popular among other republican leaders, nor among the Serbian population. Slavoljub Đukić argues that ‘Tito could not stand Stambolić and Marković’. Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 23. He further adds (16) that ‘Tito saw Minić as useful to limit the influence of Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković’. 37 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 23. 38 Stambolič, Ivan, Put u bespuće, 67. 39 Tito, Referat Josipa Broza Tita, ‘Borba za dalji razvoj socijalističkog samoupravljanja u našoj zemlji i uloga Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije’, Deseti Kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 27 maja 1974, 48. 40 Tito, Referat Josipa Broza Tita, Deseti Kongres, 48–9. 41 Bilandžić, Dušan, Jugoslavija poslije Tita (1980–1985), Zagreb: Globus, 1986, 135. 42 Ibid. 43 Bilandžić, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 137. 44 Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962–1991, 2nd edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 53. 45 Bilandžić, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 137. 46 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 53. 47 Translated from Bilandžić, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 135. 48 Bilandžić, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 137. 49 Ibid., 139. 50 See Dragović-Soso, Jasna, ‘Saviours of the Nation’: Serbia’s intellectual opposition and the revival of nationalism, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2002, 72–7, for a discussion over some of the most controversial entries. 51 Vucinich, Wayne S. (ed) Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty years of socialist experiment, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969, 281. 52 Božić, Ivan, Ćirković, Sima, Ekmečić, Milorad and Dedijer, Vladimir, Istorija Jugoslavije, Beograd: Prosveta,1972. For more on this controversy, see Budding, Audrey Helfant, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question 1961–1991, 235–9, and Banac, Ivo, ‘Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia’, in American Historical Review, 1084–104. 53 Budding, Audrey H., Serb Intellectuals, 237. 54 Quoted from Banac, Ivo, ‘Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia’. 55 Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja.

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56 In reality thus an attempt to avoid real democratisation of the Yugoslav system and to legitimise the continuing leading role of the SKJ in Yugoslav society. 57 Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja’, Komunist 1977, Izbor iz djela, no. III, 398. 58 See Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion, chapter VI, for a detailed discussion of these changes. See also Bilandžić, Dušan, Jugoslavija poslije Tita (1980–1985), Zagreb: Globus, 1986, for more on these issues. 59 Bilandžić, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 13. 60 Ibid., 30. 61 Šuvar, Stipe, Nacionalno i nacionalističko: Eseji i polemički prilozi, Split: Marksistički Centar, 1974, 212. 62 Dragosavac, Dušan, Aktualni aspeckti nacionalnog pitanja u Jugoslaviji, Zagreb: Globus, 1984. 13  Yugoslavia after Tito 1 Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće: Odgovori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana Inića, Belgrade: Radio B92, 1995, 110. 2 As the leaderships became entangled in yet another struggle between liberal and conservative forces, and between those wishing for recentralisation and for further federalisation, different phases of Tito’s leadership appealed to various republican leaderships. In Serbia there was a tendency to look back to the pre-1966 arrangement. Croats and Slovenes and Kosovar Albanians on the other hand, were keen to preserve or even expand on the autonomy they had achieved through the 1974 Constitution. 3 Stambolić, Put u bespuće, 81. The Serbian party leaders were of course no strangers to these tendencies themselves. 4 See Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, 2009, 5–12. Here, Dizdarević refers to conversations that he and Branko Mikulić had with Tito in the Bosnian town of Bugojno in November 1979. 5 Lewis, Flora, ‘Reassembling Yugoslavia’, Foreign Policy 98, (Spring 1995), 141; and Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia’. Soviet Studies, 38, no. 2, April, 1986, 173. 6 Politika, 17 May, 1985; NIN, 19 May, 1985, 14–15. 7 Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the break-up 1980–92. London: Verso, 1993, 99. 8 These reports started to appear as early as 1981, but their scope and depth increased in 1982 and 1983. 9 For more on these conflicts see Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia’; Jović, Dejan, Yugoslavia: A state that withered away, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009, chapters 4 and 5. See also Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito, chapter III, for an inside account of the positions taken by different figures and republics within the leadership. Dizdarević has been considered as a representative of the more dogmatic and conservative Tito-loyal Bosnian leaders. 10 According to NIN, by 12 October 1980, 16: ‘only one of the republics had drawn up a basic document for its development for the following period.

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12 13

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17 18 1 9 20 2 1 22

23

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And how is it possible to make a plan for the country when one does not know what each republic and province is planning, and also when one does not know the plans for associated labour?’ See also Lewis, Flora, ‘Reassembling Yugoslavia’, 140–1. The President of the FEC – that is the Prime Minister – often received pressure from their own republican party organisation (who had nominated them and whom they were ultimately dependent upon) and were unable to push through necessary reforms to handle the Yugoslav economic crisis. Kraigher and other prominent members of the commission, like Macedonian Kiro Gligorov, had been involved in the market liberalisation reform process in 1965, cut short due to the Ranković case in 1966. Pirjevec, Jože, Jugoslavija 1918–1992: Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije. Koper: Založba Lipa, 1995, 364; Repe, Božo, Rdeča Slovenija: Tokovi in obrazi iz obdobja socializma, Ljubljana: Sophia, 2003, 156. Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia’, 196. Burg, Steven L. ‘Political structures’, in Rusinow, Dennison (ed), Yugoslavia: A fractured federalism, Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1988, 11. Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia’. The SKJ Central Committee and the federal parliament officially adopted the stabilisation programme in July 1983, and a government commission was established under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister to implement it. See Ramet, Sabrina, Balkan Babel: Politics, culture and religion in Yugoslavia, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992, 10–11, for more on these divisions. The student mass in Prishtina had increased massively throughout the 1970s, and the university was struggling to handle the new influx of students. The Economist, April 11, 1981. Patrick Moore,‘The Kosovo Events in Perspective’, RFE-RL, Background Report/117 (Yugoslavia), 28 April, 1981. Horvat, Branko, Kosovsko Pitanje. Zagreb: Globus, 1988, 140–3. This was admitted by the SKJ leaders. See Stambolić, Ivan, Put u Bespuće, and RFE-RL, Background Reports 11 March to 27 April. It should be mentioned that there had been minor episodes in the late 1970s, but none that sparked the crisis as the 1981 riots did. Patrick Moore, ‘The Kosovo Events in Perspective’. RFE-RL, Background Report/117 (Yugoslavia), 28 April 1981. The SKJ initially pointed to the involvement of Cominform and ‘pro-fascist forces in Europe’ to explain the events, though they specifically refrained from pointing the finger at Albania. RFE-RL, Background Report 117 (Yugoslavia) 28 April 1981. A curfew was declared for Priština, Podujevo, Lipljani, Vucitrn, and Glogovac; and Kosovo was placed off limits to foreign journalists. Louis Zanga, ‘Tirana charges Belgrade over the Kosovo Crisis’, RFE-RL, Background Report /101 (Albania) 13 April 1981. The RFE-RL report adds that ‘the attack has very strong anti-Serbian overtones’. The World Today, vol. 37, no. 11 (November 1981), 425. The editorials pointed to Belgrade’s misinformation about the Kosovo situation,

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30

3 1 32 33 34 35 3 6 37 38 39

40 4 1 42 43

4 4 45 46

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia the poverty, misery and political repression of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia, and the Serbian tutelage of Kosovo as causes of the conflict. Horvat, Branko, Kosovsko pitanje, 140–3. Bracewell, Wendy, ‘Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism, 6 (4), 2000, 563–90. Marina Blagojević points to the fact that figures have often been used to support arguments by both sides, subjected to different interpretation and used to prove opposite points. See Blagojević, ‘The migration of Serbs from Kosovo during the 1970s and 1980s’, in Popov, Nebojša (ed), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and catharsis, Budapest: CEU Press, 2000, 214. See, for example, Dragović-Soso, Jasna, Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s intellectual opposition and the revival of nationalism. London: Hurst & Co, 2002; Horvat, Branko, Kosovsko pitanje; Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia; Blagojević, Marina, ‘The migration of Serbs from Kosovo during the 1970s and 1980s’. Raif Dizdarević also stressed the economic dimension, and even Slobodan Milošević pointed to both factors in his speeches. Milošević, Slobodan, Godine raspleta, Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1989 (for example ‘Jedinstvo i odlučnost rešavaju Kosovo’, 158–61). Many of these were printed in the Serbian weekly magazine, NIN. See discussion below. Even though, until 1983, they denied that such a crisis existed. See chapter 11 of this book. Bilandžić, Dušan, Jugoslavija poslije Tita (1980–1985). Zagreb: Globus, 1986, 84. Ibid. Ibid., 83–4. In fact, after 1981, the Yugoslav Party Presidency did not discuss the Kosovo question until 1986. Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, 81. Dizdarević was at the time Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 1982–83 he took over the Chairmanship of the Federal Assembly. Dizdarević, From the Death of Tito, 81. Dizdarević also alleges that anger was directed at the BiH leadership for not speaking out about Kosovo. Stambolić, Ivan. Put u bespuće, 83. Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa: Borbe za vlast u Srbiji posle Josipa Broza. Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1992, 31. Dragosavac, Dušan, Aktualni aspekti nacionalnog pitanja u Jugoslaviji, Zagreb: Globus, 1984, 47. Dragosavac was a Serb from the Croatian Party delegation. He was also leader of the preparatory committee for the Twelfth Congress, and Speaker of the Federal Assembly. Dragosavac, Dušan, Aktualni aspekti nacionalnog, 47. Ibid. It is therefore, Dragosavac stated, ‘a necessary condition to successfully defeat greater-state bureaucraticsm on the one hand, and national narrow-minded isolation on the other hand’. According to Đukić, this included, among others, a change in the rule of voting, allowing for the ballot to select the members of the Presidency of the Yugoslav CC secretly. See Đukić, Slavoljub. Kako se dogodio vođa, 32.

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47 Đukić, Slavoljub. Kako se dogodio vođa, 32–3. Draža Marković also points the finger at the Bosnian delegates, and to Branko Mikulić, as well as some members of the JNA as protagonists that were against him. See Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije: Optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića, Belgrade: Beseda 1990, 52. 48 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 34. 49 Ibid., 40. 50 Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito, 117. During a meeting organised the following day, Dragosavac and Minić once again came under attack from the Serbian party leaders, this time also from Marković himself. 51 Quoted from Đukić, Kako se dogodio vođa, 40. 52 Despite Minić’s hope of Ljubičić’s support, the latter was realistic enough to see that Minić would lose the battle against the two grandees of the Serbian party organisation. Ljubičić had before this served as Defence Minister, a role he would again take on later in the decade. Ljubičić again played the role of opportunistic kingmaker in Serbian intra-party struggles, first by supporting Ivan Stambolić against Draža Marković, and in 1987, he gave his support to Milošević’s putsch against Ivan Stambolić. See Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 49–54. 53 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 52. 54 Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia’, 182–3. 55 Ibid., 183. 56 Höpken, Wolfgang, in Ramet, Pedro (ed), Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Boulder, Col0rado: Westview Press, 1985, 38. 57 A public draft of its deliberations was prepared by a group chaired by Josip Vrhovec, and has therefore also sometimes been referred to as the ‘Vrhovec commission’. 58 Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia’, 192. 59 Some of these will be discussed below. 60 Mirić, Jovan, Sistem i kriza, Zagreb: Centra za kulturnu djelatnost, 1984. Mirić was a Serb from Croatia , and political scientist based in Zagreb. 61 Mirić, Jovan, Sistem i kriza, 15–32. 62 Ibid., 24 and 84–90. 63 Höpken, Wolfgang, in Ramet, Pedro (ed), Yugoslavia in the 1980s, 39. 64 Ramet, Sabrina Petra, Balkan Babel: Politics, culture and religion in Yugoslavia, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992, 14–15. 65 Höpken, Wolfgang, in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, 40. 66 Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict’, 184. 67 Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće, 168–9. 68 The old guard, including Dušan Dragosavac, Jure Bilić and Milutin Baltić were removed. Two other prominent members of the Croatian organisation, Milka Planinc (who had served as Yugoslav Prime Minister since 1982) and Josip Vrhovec also failed to obtain the offices they had sought. Meier, Viktor, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise. London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 36. 69 Banac, Ivo, ‘Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia’, in American Historical Review, 97, no. 4 (October 1992), 1084–104: University of Chicago Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2165494

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70 In 1983, 210 people were accused of political offences in Croatia. RFE Research RAD Background Report/194 (Yugoslavia), Antić, Zdenko, ‘Crisis and dissent in Yugoslavia’, 23 October, 1984. 71 Mirjana Kasapović points out that that those political forces that had cut all ties to the regime emerged victorious in the first pluralist elections. See Kasapović, ‘The political environment’, in Seroka, Jim and Vukašin, Pavlović (eds), The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The failure of democratic transformation, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992, 29. 72 Only a few examples can be mentioned here. For more on the historical aspect, see Banac, Ivo, ‘Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia’, and Dragović-Soso, Jasna. Saviours of the Nation. The latter also discusses the literary aspect. See also Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists: Culture, politics, and nationalism in a Serbian intellectual circle, 1944–1991, Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2007; also Wachtel, Andrew Baruch, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. 73 Banac, Ivo, ‘Historiography’, 1084–104, and 1093. 74 In Saviours of the Nation, 78, Jasna Dragović-Soso suggests that Dedijer’s project was not intentionally a revisionist work and argues that the project to update the biography had initially been approved by Tito. 75 Among those who criticised Dedijer’s work were Svetozar VukmanovicTempo and Vladimir Bakaric – though Dedijer initially branded Bakaric his supporter of his work. See RFE Research RAD Background Report/327 (Yugoslavia), Stanković, Slobodan, ‘Vukmanovic censures Dedijer over Tito’s Biography’, 2 December 1981; RFE Research RAD Background Report/309 (Yugoslavia), Stanković, Slobodan, ‘Tito and his Personality Cult reduced to human proportions’, 11 November 1981; RFE Research RAD Background Report/97 (Yugoslavia); Antić, Zdenko ‘Dedijer-Bakaric Controversy over Tito’s biography’, 22 April 1982. 76 For Dedijer’s claim, see RFE Research RAD Background Report/309 (Yugoslavia), Stanković, Slobodan, ‘Tito and his Personality Cult reduced to human proportions’, 11 November, 1981. 77 Dedijer’s work provoked considerable controversy, and at times rather strange accusations and counter-accusations of both contents and of Dedijer’s persona. Dedijer himself made some rather odd accusations, stating among other things that the critique was launched by figures close to Aleksandar Ranković. The work was also accused of being both anti-Djilas and pro-Djilas. For more, see RFE Research RAD Background Report/309 (Yugoslavia), 11 November 1981. 78 Dedijer, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. Belgrade: ‘Rad’, 1981, vol 1, 303–11. He also revealed that they had viewed the Četniks as their main opponents, and that fighting against them was as important a part of the KPJ strategy as fighting the Nazis. Novi Prilozi, vol 2, 805. 79 Dedijer, Vladimir, Novi Prilozi, see vol 1, chapter 3, and vol 2, 246. 80 Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoski, Stranački pluralizam ili monizam – Posleratna opozicija obnova i zatiranje. Beograd: Privredno-pravni priručnik, 117.

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81 See also Dragović-Soso, Jasna, Saviours of the Nation; Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists, chapter 8; Wachtel, Andrew, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation. 82 Many of Ćosić’s formulations appeared in a 1983 collection of essays: Stvarno i Moguće: Članci i ogledi, 2nd edition, Ljubljana-Zagreb: Cankarjeva založba, 1988. This publication was branded the ‘bible of Serbian nationalism’ – see Đukić, Slavoljub, Lovljenje vetra, 124. 83 Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists, 325. 84 Ćosić, Dobrica, ‘Kako da stvaramo sebe’, in Stvarno i moguće – članci i ogledi, 2nd edition. Ljubljana-Zagreb: Cankarjeva založba, 1988. 85 Đukić, Slavoljub, Čovek u svom vremenu: Razgovori sa Dobricem Ćosićem, Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1989, 307. 86 Ibid. See also Miller, Nick, The Nonconformists, 320–26 for further discussion. 87 This influence has among others, been admitted by Kosta Čavoski. See also Miller, The Nonconformists, 320. The influence of his visions are also visible in the Draft Memorandum, and in Milošević’s statements after 1988. 88 Miller, The Nonconformists, 295. 89 Ibid., 325. 90 The most comprehensive accounts of the establishment and works of these committees can be found in Miller, The Nonconformists, as well as in Dragović-Soso, Jasna, Saviours of the Nation and Đukić, Slavoljub, Čovek u svom vremenu. 91 On the editorial board were: Editor Ljubomir Tadić, Zoran Đinđić, Svetozar Stojanović, Nebojša Popov, Dušan Bošković, Zoran Gavrilović, Lazar Trifunović and Vojislav Stojanović. (See Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, 124.) Ćosić has since stated that he had originally wished to establish Javnost as a Samizdat publication in 1979, but that he postponed it for respect for Tito, whose health was at that time already seriously failing. Since the establishment of a critical publication just before the death of Tito would not have been judged to be in good taste, it is a more plausible explanation that Ćosić waited until after the death of Tito not so much out of respect, but rather due to fear of how authorities and the public would react. 92 RFE Research RAD Background Report/32 (Yugoslavia) Stankovic, Slobodan, ‘Tito’s successors tightening the screws: Belgrade Professors harried’, 5 February 1981. 93 He also attempted to draw together a broad spectrum of intellectual talents in Serbia, and included figures with various ideological orientations. See Miller, The Nonconformists, 242. 94 Miller, The Nonconformists, 245. The initiative followed the so-called Gojko Đogo case. Đogo was indicted following the publishing of his collection of poems, Vunena Vremena – Woolly Times, after which he was accused of having written seditious poems against Tito. For more on this case, see Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation; Miller, The Nonconformists, chapter 8; and Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation. 95 This paragraph was used broadly by the party elites against all forms of expression of what they deemed hostile enemy propaganda which was perceived as critique or threats against the ruling order.

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96 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 57–9. The 28 present were all arrested, but subsequently set free. One was later found dead, ostensibly by suicide, but suspected to have been killed by the police. Six were rearrested and charged with counter-revolutionary activity. See Miller, The Nonconformists, 256. 97 RFE-RL Research Background Report/194 (Yugoslavia), 23 October 1984, Antić Zdenko, ‘Crisis and Dissent in Yugoslavia’. Šešelj had suggested ‘the de-Titoisation of the whole system, the introduction of a multiparty system, and the reform of the federal structures.’ Šešelj had also argued that the Republic of Montenegro should be included into Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina should be divided between Serbia and Croatia on the basis of a census of the population; the concept of a separate ‘Moslem nation’ should be quashed. 98 Mastnak, Tomaž, in Benderly, Jill and Kraft, Evan (eds), Independent Slovenia: Origins, movements, prospects, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, 98. Many of the figures involved in this cause also belonged to the Yugoslav Writers’ Association, the first all-Yugoslav organisation in which consensus broke down. 99 Including Adem Demaci, Kosovar Albanian activists after 1981 and Alija Izetbegovic. See Miller, The Nonconformists, 258–60 . 100 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 61. See below for more on the Memorandum. 101 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 126. Draogvić-Soso further points to an open letter sent in February 1982, by a group of priests to the Patriarch, demanding that the Church break its silence and take action to prevent the ‘extinction’ of the Serbian people in the province. The letter pointed to the events in Kosovo as a ‘planned premeditated genocide carried out against the Serbian people in the region. 102 Bogdanović, Dimitrije, Knjiga o Kosovu, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1985. 103 Ibid., 286. 104 Bogdanović’s book was also highly political in the sense that it sought to counter claims from Kosovar Albanian scholars concerning Serbian suppression of Albanians in the interwar period and under Ranković. It posed questions about the justification of granting autonomy to Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1945 alluding to Albanian and Hungarian collaboration during World War II, and to ‘genocide’ against Serbs. It thus became a contribution in the futile debate over ‘who were the greater victim’ and ‘who had suffered the most’. 105 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 130; Bogdanović, Knjiga o Kosovu, 265–76. 106 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 132. 107 Bracewell, Wendy, ‘Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian nationalism’. 108 A view still reiterated in certain circles in Serbia. See Zoran Pavic, in Lekić, Slaviša and Pavić, Zoran (eds), VIII Sedninca CK SK Srbije: Nulta tačka ‘narodnog pokreta’. Belgrade: Službeni Glasnik, Statusteam, 2007. 109 See Miller, The Nonconformists. May 1 was the date when the alleged assault took place. 110 Bracewell, Wendy, ‘Rape in Kosovo’, 586.

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111 Lekić, Bojana, Pavić, Zoran and Lekić, Slaviša (eds), Kako se događao Narod (I), Antibirokratska Revolucija (1987–1989), Beograd: Službeni Glasnik, Statusteam, 2009, 21. The text can be found in the same work, 193–4. Miroslav Šolević, one of the Kosovar leaders, argues that another 40,000 subsequently signed the petition (see page 168). 112 Text can be found in Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 49–52. 113 Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 3. 114 A 16-member Committee was appointed to oversee the work of the Memorandum, under the leadership of Antonije Isaković who was in charge of the day-to-day business of the Committee and working group. When the synopsis and structure of the draft Memorandum had been decided upon, other members and academics were invited to meetings for further input and feedback. Dobrica Ćosić, Jovan Đorđević and Ljubomir Tadić were among those who participated at these sessions. 115 Excerpts and comments appeared in Večernje novosti, 24 September 1986 116 The text appeared in print in its entirety in 1989, when Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić published a book under the title The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to criticisms. Belgrade: Kultura, 1995, 12–15. 117 Mihailović, Kosta, and Krestić, Vasilije, The Memorandum. 118 Ibid., 112. 119 Ibid., 104. 120 Ibid., 131. 121 Ibid., 116. 122 Ibid., 97. 123 Ibid., 15. Only the contents of the first section were in fact approved by the SANU committee before the draft was leaked. 124 Ibid., 22. 125 Ibid., 131. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid., 133. 128 Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće, 118–19. 129 Ibid., 119–20. 130 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 118–20; Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito, 247. 131 Mihailović, Kosta, and Krestić, Vasilije, The Memorandum, 5. 132 Who were not, Tomaž Mastnak points out, dissenters in the traditional Eastern European tradition. 133 Including feminists, antimilitarists, environmentalists, gay rights activists, human rights activists, and later joined by journalists, sociologists, philosophers, and a number of civil society initiatives. 134 See Mastnak, ‘From social movements to national sovereignty’, in Benderly and Kraft (eds), Independent Slovenia: Origins, movements, prospects, 1996, 94. See also Tomc, Gregor, ‘The politics of punk’, 113–34 in the same book, for more on the significance of the punk movement in Slovenia in the early 1980s. 135 Mastnak, ‘From social movements to national sovereignty’, 95. 136 Ibid.

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137 A stunt by Neue Slowenische Kunst who designed a poster for the event caused a huge scandal. Their design was thought to depict the spirit of the Štafeta, and was endorsed by the event’s organisational committee. However, it turned out to be a reinterpretation of an old Nazi poster. 138 See Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, chapter 4, for an overview over the Slovene opposition, and its interaction with the Serbian critical intelligentsia in Serbia. 139 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 166. 140 See Rupel, Dimitrij, ‘Slovenia’s shift from the Balkans to Central Europe’, in Benderly and Kraft (eds), Independent Slovenia: Origins, movements, prospects, for a discussion of this transition. 141 Miller, The Nonconformists, 313. 142 For two excellent discussions on these debates, see Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, chapter 4, and Miller, The Nonconformists, chapter 10. 143 ‘Prispevki za slovenski nacionalni program’: ‘Contributions to the Slovene National Programme’, Nova Revija, issue 57, 1987. The issue is available in Slovene online at www.slovenskapomlad.si/1?id=21. No authorative translation has been made into English. 144 See Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation and Jović, Yugoslavia: A state that withered away for a presentation of the main arguments in ‘Contributions to the Slovene National Programme’. 145 See the Petition by Belgrade intellectuals to Assembly of SFRJ and Assembly of SR Serbia 21 January 1986. Text reiterated in Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 49–52. 146 As they had threatened following the arrest of one of the noisier Kosovar Serbs, Kosta Bulatovic 147 Stambolić, Ivan, Rasprave o SR Srbiji 1979–1987. Zagreb: Globus, 1988, 163. 148 Ibid., 163–5. 149 Ibid., 164. 150 Technically, also the responsibility of the Kosovo Provincial party organisation. 151 Vladisavljević, Nebojša, ‘Milošević’s ascent’, in Pavlović, A., Jović, B. and Petrovic, M. (eds), Slobodan Milošević: put ka vlasti – Osma sednica CK SKS, Belgrade and Stirling: Institut za savremenu istoriju, University of Stirling Press, 189. 152 For more on these relations, see Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa. 153 Ivan Stambolić (Put u bespuće, 147) points to how Milošević visited them, remembered birthdays, and reminded them of the days when they were young and strong. 154 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 122, and Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće. The same was the case as far as the constitutional question was concerned initially. 155 Đukić, Kako se dogodio vođa, and Stambolić, Put u Bespuće. Adem Vllasi, however, suggests that Milošević probably knew about the events beforehand. See Lekić, Bojana, Pavić, Zoran and Lekić, Slaviša (eds), Kako se Događao Narod (I), Antibirokratska Revolucija (1987–1989), 181. 156 Milošević, Slobodan, Godina raspleta, Beograd: Beogradski izdavačkografički zavod, 1989, 145.

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157 Vladisavljević, Nebojša, ‘Milošević’s ascent’, in Pavlović, Jović and Petrovic (eds), Slobodan Milošević, 186. 158 Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće. Animosity existed between Milošević and Pavlović – both of whom fought for the support of Stambolić. According to Stambolić, Milošević was jealous of Pavlović and tried to pressure Stambolić to get rid of him. Milošević had attempted to block Pavlović’s election to Belgrade City Committee office. 159 Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće, 167–70. 160 Vladisavljević, Nebojša, ‘Milošević’s ascent’, 187. 161 Two were ethnic Muslims, one a Croat and one a self-declared Yugoslav from Belgrade. Jović, Dejan, Yugoslavia: A state that withered away, 263. 162 Following this incident, considerable hostility was levelled against Albanian businesses in Serbia and Kelmendi’s family suffered harassment. Politika’s editor, Zivorad Minović, had expressed considerable excitement over this case at the time. Believing initially that four Serbs had been killed, Minovic spoke to the journalist Slavoljub Đukić seeing it as an excellent publicity case. See Đukić, Kako se dogodio vođa, 149. 163 Notes from press conference, in Lekić, Slaviša and Pavić, Zoran (ed), VIII sedninca CK SK Srbije: Nulta tačka ‘narodnog pokreta’, Belgrade: Službeni Glasnik, Statusteam, 2007. Pavlović summoned the the press to his office following a number of attacks against Albanian businesses in Belgrade. 164 Đukić, Slavoljub, Kako se dogodio vođa, 152. 165 Jović, Borisav, Politički lavirint devedesetih: Intervju britanskoj televiziji BBC, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik, 2010, 21. Jović points to how he and Milošević decided to get rid of Pavlović. Their strategies included seeking support from Nikola Ljubičić and Petar Gračanin, as well as consulting other members of the leadership on a one-to-one basis, to assess how much support there was for their actions. 166 Meeting at Milošević’s house in Pozarevac, on 13 September, with editors of Politika Ekspres, to attack Pavlović in the press. The statement was drafted by Mira Markovic and Zivorad Minovic, but signed by the Ekspres journalist Dragoljub Milanović. See Đukić, Kako se dogodio vođa’, 44. The text can be found in the same publication, 138–9. 167 Milošević and his supporters now used the student affair where they alleged that Pavlović had downplayed this satirical attack on Tito. For the discussion at the meeting, see ‘Documenti’, in Lekić and Pavić (eds), VIII Sedninca CK SK Srbije: Nulta tačka ‘narodnog pokreta’, 140–55. See also Đukić, Kako se dogodio vođa, 152. 168 The matter of discussion was turned from Pavlović to plots of abuse of power by Stambolić, pointing to a letter sent by Stambolić to the Belgrade City Committee, defending Pavlović. Milošević described this as an improper effort to threaten a body to which Stambolić did not belong. The text from the Eighth Session is reiterated in ‘Documenti’, in Lekić and Pavić (eds), VIII sedninca CK SK Srbije, 156–9. See especially Dušan Čkrebić, who Stambolić accused of bullying tactics (page 183). 169 Jović, Borisav, Politički lavirint devedesetih, 23. Of the 20 members in the Serbian Presidency, eleven voted in favour, five against and four abstained

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from voting to accuse Pavlović of opposing Party unity and the principle of democratic centralism. 170 The Serbian Central Committee voted 8 against and 18 abstentions to fire Pavlović and five others. Pavlović and his supporters were purged and Stambolić was removed from the office as state president a month later, on 27 December 1987. 171 Interview with the author, Zagreb, May 2001. 172 Vladisavljević, in Pavlović, Jović, and Petrovic, M. (eds), Slobodan Milošević. 173 Stambolić, Ivan, Put u bespuće, 89–90; 168–9. 174 Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, 189. 175 Ibid., 185. 176 Höpken, Wolfgang, in Ramet, Pedro (ed), Yugoslavia in the 1980s, 41 Ramet, Sabrina, Balkan Babel, 17. They also expressed considerable distrust in the Mikulić governement’s economic policy. 177 Meier, Viktor, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise, 63, and Dizdarević, Raif, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, 260. Dizdarević tries to refute the allegations that this constituted an attempt at a military coup. 178 Meier, Viktor, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise. 179 Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 141 and 154. 180 Dizdarević, From the Death of Tito, 260–1; Meier, Viktor, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise, 62–5; and Magaš, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 140–4. It should also be noted that Dizdarević took the side of the Army, and that Meier – at the time a journalist – came under attack and attention from Defence Minister Kadijević who argued that Meier ‘had done everything he could to ensure that the alleged military putsch received the most inflammatory coverage in the German press’, Dizdarević, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, 263. Meier has later concluded that ‘it seems that the army leaders did not actually intend to carry out a military putsch as such’ but that they ‘did hope to carry out a kind of political or institutional putsch, i.e, an intervention under the state of emergency, on which the highest political leadership of the Party was supposed to confer legitimation and which could then be carried out by the army, by force if necessary’, Meier, Yugoslavia, 65. 181 Ivan Borštner received a four-year prison sentence, Jansa and Zavrl 18 months, and Tasic five months. All received lenient treatment according to Yugoslav standards at the time. 182 Ramet, Sabrina, ‘The Road to Slovenian Independence’ (Europe–Asia Studies, 45, no. 5, 1993, 870). This also formed the basis of subsequent multi-party politics in Slovenia. 183 Mastnak, ‘From social movements to national sovereignty’, 106. 184 Ibid. 185 Though one should of course keep in mind that what Milošević expressed was not always reflected in his actions. He tended to keep his cards close to his chest. 186 Milošević, Slobodan, Godina raspleta, interview, NIN, 233 Milošević argued that such sloga had always been the weakness in Serbia, that the Serbs had lacked such harmony where all others had possessed it. He stated

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that ‘our destiny, our future depends our unanimity, and that sloga only depends on us’. 187 Milošević, Slobodan, Godina raspleta, 218. A similar argument can also be found in Milošević’s June 1988 interview in NIN, reiterated in the same collection, 220–42. 188 Milošević, Slobodan, Godina raspleta, 234. 189 Milošević, Slobodan, Godina raspleta, interview, NIN, 220–42. 190 Meier, Viktor, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise, 73. 191 Even though, somewhat surprisingly, the Kosovar and Vojvodinan deputies in the constitutional commission had accepted this proposal, getting this draft approved by provincial leaderships would be a different matter. 192 The expression had been coined already at the Ninth Session of the SKS in January 1988. See Milošević, Godina raspleta, 193–7. 193 Lekić, Pavić and Lekić (eds) Kako se Događao Narod (I), 163. 194 Dizdarević, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, 208. 195 See documents on the Akcija ‘Radak’ in Montenegro, in Lekić, Pavić and Lekić (eds) Kako se Događao Narod (I), Antibirokratska Revolucija (1987– 1989), 197–213. 196 Dizdarević, From the Death of Tito, 208. 197 Ibid., 381. 198 Ibid., 299–300. 199 Ibid., 333–6. Various Serbian representatives again made this demand at the 30 January session of the CC. This was interpreted as an attack on the federal leadership, and not simply as a personal dispute between Milošević and Šuvar. 200 Dizdarević (From the Death of Tito, 330) explicitly articulated the reality that Yugoslavia could disintegrate already at a session of the state presidency on January 13. ‘In my view’, he stated, ‘the spectre of dissolution is hanging over the country’. Dizdarević was told by General Kadejević that he had reliable information that in some factories, there were preparations to bring the workers onto the streets when the plenum was in session. See Ramet, Sabrina, The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and legitimation, 1918–2005, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, 354. 201 This left him with the legacy of having ‘chickened out’ of a last ditch attempt at stopping Milosevic. Had Šuvar gone ahead and specifically attacked Milosević by name, it would probably have meant the end of Šuvar’s career, something he was not prepared for at the time. (Author’s interview with Šuvar, Zagreb, May 2000.) See also RFE interview 27.02.2008 – ‘Stipe Šuvar: Moji obračuni s njima’, available online at www.slobodnaevropa. org/content/article/1045346.html 202 Meier, Yugoslavia: A history of its demise, 122, and RFE interview 27.02.2008. 203 Meier, Yugoslavia, 86. 204 Demanded resignation of Kole Siroka, Rahman Morina, Husamedin Azemi. 205 See Meier, Yugoslavia, 84–100, for more on these events. 206 Dolanc later stated that he would have approved in any case. This caused outrage in Slovenia. See Meier, Yugoslavia, 110. 207 After visits from the police the evening before. See Ramet, Sabrina, The Three Yugoslavias, 353 .

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2 08 Banac, Ivo, Razpad Jugoslavije, Zagreb: Durieux, 2001, 121. 209 Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962–1991, 2nd edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 219. 210 Miroslav Šolević, in Lekić, Pavić and Lekić, (eds), Kako se Događao Narod (I), 172. See also Gagnon, Valère Philip, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004, 78. Gagnon points to the fact that the mere threat of exporting the rallies to Bosnia seemed to have been enough to ensure the Bosnian votes. 211 Time Magazine, 27 September 1987, ‘Yugoslavia: All the Party Chief’s Men’, available online at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965639,00. html 212 One of the involved was the brother of Hamdija Pozderac, Yugoslavia’s Vice President, and allegations were also made implicating Hamdija himself – though his involvement was never proved. Nevertheless, Hamdija Pozderac who had been scheduled to begin a one-year mandate as Bosnia’s President abruptly resigned. There were also hints that Prime Minister Branko Mikulic was implicated in the affair. A number of Bosnian leaders were ‘retired’ or forced to resign. Forty-four members of the Central Committee of BiH and six members of the Presidency were charged, resulting in changes to one third of the members. For more on the Agrocomerc scandal, see Andjelić, Neven. Bosnia-Herzegovina: The end of a legacy, London: Routledge, 2003, chapter 2, 56–69. 213 This law was primarily designed to allow for the resettlement of Serbs to Kosovo, but also affected Macedonia. 214 Bennett, Christopher, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, course and consequences, London: Hurst & Co, 1995, 115. 215 Rašković founded the Serb Democratic Party – SDS – on 17 February 1990. 216 Govor Slobodana Miloševića (Gazimestan 28 jun ‘89). In Lekić, Pavić and Lekić, Slaviša (eds), Kako se Događao Narod (I), 163 and 255. 217 Jović, Dejan, Yugoslavia: A state that withered away, 341. 218 Kasapović, Mirjana, The Political Environment, 33–41. 219 Ibid., 26. 220 Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 222. 221 Jović, Dejan, Yugoslavia: A state that withered away, 333. 222 Ibid. 223 Bennett, Christopher, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 107. 224 Ramet, Sabrina, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 223. 225 Ramet, Sabrina, Three Yugoslavias, 340. 226 Jović, Borisav, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika, Belgrade: Politika, 1995, 88. 227 Ibid., 61. 228 Author’s interview with Ivo Banac, May 2001. 14  Conclusion: The legacy of the SKJ ‘socialist solution’ to the Yugoslav national question 1 I do not, however, agree with those who see this as an attempt to forge a Yugoslav national identity.

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2 Kardelj, Edvard, Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja, 2nd edition, Beograd: Izdavački Centar Komunist, 1957. 3 Tito, Josip Broz, in Osmi Kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1964, 36. 4 Đekić, Mirko, Upotreba Srbije: Optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića. Belgrade: Beseda, 1990, 47. However, their focus remained mainly on intrarepublican affairs. 5 The two best and most comprehensive contributions to provide an overview of the many different explanations that have emerged so far, are Jasna Dragovic-Soso’s introduction to Cohen, J. Lenard and Dragovic-Soso, Jasna (eds) State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New perspectives in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Purdue University Press, 2008, and Ramet, Sabrina, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly debates about the Yugoslav breakup and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 6 Allcock, John, Explaining Yugoslavia, London: Hurst & Co, 2000; Beissinger, Mark R., ‘Nationalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union’, Contemporary European History, 18, 3, 2009, 331–47; Bokovoy, Melissa, Irvine, Jill and Lilly, Carol (eds), State–Society Relations in Yugoslavia 1945–1992, London: Macmillan Press, 1997; Bunce, Valerie, Subversive Institutions: The design and the destruction of socialism and the state, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Holmes, Leslie, The End of Communist Power: Anti-corruption campaigns and legitimation crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993; Lewis, Paul (ed), Eastern Europe: Political crisis and legitimation, London: Croom Helm, 1984; Rigby, T. H. and Fehér, F. (eds), Political Legitimation in Communist States, London: Macmillan Press, 1982. 7 Beissinger, Mark R., ‘Nationalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union’. 8 This does not however mean that I see the national question, or nationalism, to be the cause behind the collapse of communist power. 9 An excellent study on the role of intellectuals in upholding a socialist regime’s legitimacy can be found in Katherine Verdery’s examination of the Romanian case in Verdery, Katherine, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and cultural politics in Ceausescu’s Romania, Berkeley: University of California Press,1991. 10 Irvine, Jill, in Cohen, J. Lenard and Dragović-Soso, Jasna (ed) State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New perspectives in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, 171 11 Miller, Nick, in Cohen, J. Lenard and Dragović-Soso, Jasna (ed) State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New perspectives in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008. 12 The institutional aspect has been highlighted in highly diverse explanations by, among others, Valerie Bunce, Stephen L. Burg, Robert Hayden, Sabrina Ramet. Weight on the institutional dimension is often also found among regional political scientists and legal scientists. For one example, see Vojin Dimitrijevic. 13 As pointed out by Audrey Budding, the Communist leaders, including most prominently chief ideologue Edvard Kardelj, often used the term odnosno

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15

16 1 7 18

1 9 20 21 2 2 23 24 2 5 26

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia when referring to this issue – ‘the nations, that is (odnosno) the republics’. See Budding, Audrey H., ‘Nation, People/Republic: Self-determination in Socialist Yugoslavia’, in Cohen, J. Lenard and Dragović-Soso, Jasna (eds) State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe. According to Audrey Budding (‘Nation, People/Republic’, 98), 20% of the Croatian community lived outside the republican borders, (primarily in Bosnia and in Vojvodina), and 12% of the population in Croatia were Serbs. Meanwhile, 30% of the Serbian community lived outside Serbia (in Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro) and Serbia had two autonomous provinces, The Republics were, furthermore, ‘socialist, self-managing democratic communities of the working people and citizens, and of nations and nationalities having equal rights.’ See Đurović, Dragoljub (ed), Ustavni amandmani XX-XLII, Novi Sad: Prosveta, 1971, 6. Lustick, Ian, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank / Gaza, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, 3. Ibid., 38–9. Budding, Audrey H., ‘Nation, People/Republic’, 111. Instead, she argues, the continuing existence of a Yugoslav state after World War II allowed competing Serbian and Croatian maximalist nationalist programmes to pass through the twentieth century without confronting the political and institutional reality of international borders. Budding, ‘Nation, People/Republic’, 111. Hrvatski Tjednik, September 10, 1971, # 21, 1–3. Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia all tacitly supported Slovenia, though the latter two came under considerable pressure from Serbia. Đukić, Slavojub, Slom srpskih Liberala, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1990, 215. See for example comments by Savka Davkević-Kučar, Mika Tripalo (who were among those most critical of Kardelj’s role in these events) and Latinka Perović. Mihailović, Kosta, and Krestić, Vasilije, The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to criticisms, Belgrade: Kultura, 106. Ibid. These wars, and many of the factors that contributed to actual state collapse, including but not limited to the increasingly important role of the Yugoslav army as well as the international dimension, happened only after January 1990. They thus remain outside the scope of this analysis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival resources

Arhiv Republike Slovenije (ARS)   Fond AS 15211  Kardelj Edvard-Krištof 1910–1979   Fond AS 1529  Kraigher Boris 1914–1967 Arhiv Jugoslavije - Moša Pijade, Fond 570   Arhiv CK SKJ,    Fond AVNOJ-a, 1944   Arhiv CK SKJ    Fond AVNOJ-a -1945 OSA / Collections / RFE/RL Research Background Reports, Yugoslavia fond: HU OSA 300-8-3 http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports

Official documents

The Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Belgrade: 1946. The Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, translated from Serbo-Croatian by Ljotić, Borivoje P., Beograd: Union of Jurists’ Association of Yugoslavia, 1960. The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Institute of Comparative Law: Collection of Yugoslav Laws, edited by Blagojevic, by Borislav T., Belgrade: Servis saveza udruzenja pravnika Jugoslavije, 1963. The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Ustav Socialisticke Republike Jugoslavije, Constitutional Amendments, The Secretariat of Information for the Federal Executive Council for Information in Belgrade, Novi Sad: Prosveta, 1969. The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974, Belgrade: Secretariat for the Federal Executive Council of Information in Belgrade; English edition, NY: Cross-Cultural Communications, 1976. On the Principle of the Preliminary Draft of the New Constitution of Socialist Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Kultura, 1962 (Kardelj, Edvard). Ustavni amandmani XX-XLII, Novi Sad: Prosveta, 1971 (Đurović, Dragoljub). Peti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1948.

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Šesti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Saveza komunista Jugoslavije – Borba komunista za socijalističku demokratiju, Beograd: Kultura, 1952. Sedmi kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1957. Osmi kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1964. Deveti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Kultura, 1969. Deseti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Kultura, 1974. Jedanaesti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1978. Dvanaesti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Referat, resolucije, statut SKJ, zavrsna rec: dokumenti usvojeni na Dvanaestom kongresu SKJ 26–29 juna 1982, Beograd: Izdavački Centar, 1982. Četvrti plenum CK Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd: Komunist, 1966. Sedmi plenum CK SK Hrvatske: O međunacionalnim odnosima, Zagreb: Vjesnik, April 1967. Deseti Sjednica CK SKH, Zagreb: Vjesnik, January 1970.

Collections of speeches, documents and biographic material by leading figures

Bakarić, Vladimir, Izbor iz radova: Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukcija, vols 1–4, Zagreb: Informator, 1983. Ćosić, Dobrica, Kosovo, Beograd: Novosti, 2004. Ćosić, Dobrica, Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968), 2nd edition, Beograd: Filip Višnić, 2001. Dabčević-Kučar, Savka, ’71: Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, 2.sv, Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997. Dedijer, Vladimir, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, vols 1–3, Belgrade: ‘Rad’, 1984. Dedijer, Vladimir (ed), Dokumenti 1948, 3 vols, Belgrade: ‘Rad’, 1979. Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953. Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito Speaks: His self-portrait and struggle with Stalin. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953. Đilas, Milovan, Članci 1941–1946, Beograd: Kultura, 1947. Đilas, Milovan, Memoir of a Revolutionary. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. Đilas, Milovan, Rise and Fall. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. Đilas, Milovan, Tito: The story from the inside, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981. Đilas, Milovan, Vlast i pobuna. Beograd: Književne Novine, 1991. Dragosavac, Dušan, Aktualni aspekti nacionalnog pitanja u Jugoslaviji, Zagreb: Globus, 1984. Gotovac, Vlado, Moj slučaj, Ljubljana / Zagreb: Cankarjeva Založba, 1989. Isaković, Alija (ed), O ‘nacionaliziranju’ Muslimana. Zagreb: Globus, 1990. Kardelj, Edvard, Boj za priznaje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije – Spomini 1944– 1957, 2nd edition, Ljubljana: Prešernova družba v Ljubljani, 1984. Kardelj, Edvard’ Izbor iz djela, vols 1–7. Kardelj, Edvard, ‘Pravci razvoja politckog sistema socialistickog samoupravljanja’. Izdavacki Centar, Komunist, Belgrade, 1977.

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Kardelj, Edvard, Osnovi Uzroci i Pravci Ustavnih Promena, Beograd: Komunist, 1973. Kardelj, Edvard, Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja, 3rd edition, Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1988. Kardelj, Edvard, Socialist Democracy, Belgrade: Komunist, 1952. Kardelj, Edvard, The New Yugoslavia Federal Assembly: Organs, work methods, procedure, Beograd: Komunist, 1974. Milošević, Slobodan, Godina raspleta, Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1989. Nenadović, Aleksandar, Mirko Tepavac: Sećanja i komentari, Beograd: Radio B92, 1998. Perović, Latinka, Zatvaranje kruga: Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991. Pijade, Moša, Izabrani Spisi, vols 1–2, Beograd: Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, 1965. Sirotković, Hodimir (ed), ZAVNOH: Zbornik dokumenata 1944, Zagreb: 1970. Stambolić, Ivan, Put u Bespuće: Odgovori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana Inića, Radio B92, 1995. Stambolić, Ivan, Rasprave o SR Srbiji, 1979–1987, Zagreb: Globus, 1988. Tito, Josip Broz, Govor na narodnom mitingu u Splitu. Beograd: Kultura, 1962. Tito, Josip Broz, Izgradnja nove Jugoslavije, vol II, knijga prva, Beograd: Kultura, 1948. Tito, Josip Broz, Izbor iz djela, vols 1–5, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1982. Vučinić, Milan (ed), Šta posle svega Kaže Tempo: Razgovarao Milan Vučinić, Novi Sad: Prometej, 1997. Vukmanović, Svetozar Tempo, Memoari 1966–1969 – Neslaganja, vols I–II, Beograd, Naprijed, Zagreb: Narodna knjiga, 1985. Vukmanović, Svetozar Tempo, Revolucija koja teče: Memoari, 4 vols. Beograd: Komunist, 1971.

Semi-official and non-official documents

Anali pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, Broj 2 & 3/4, Beograd: Izdanje centra za dokumentaciju i publikacije pravnog fakulteta, 1953. Anali pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu jul-desembar 1968, ‘O predlozima za izmenu nekih odredaba ustava SFRJ i tezama za izborni sistem’, Diskuzija, Beograd: Izdanje centra za dokumentaciju i publikacije pravnog fakulteta, 1968. Anali pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, Reprint zabranjenog broja 3 za 1971, godinu. Beograd: Izdanje centra za dokumentaciju i publikacije pravnog fakulteta, Maj–jun, 1971. Declaracija o nazivu I položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika 1967–1997, Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1997. Federalizam i nacionalnog pitanje: Zbirka radova, Beograd: Savez udruženja za političke nauke Jugoslavije, 1971. ‘Nedelja marksistički rasprava ‘82’: Razvoj međunacionalnih odnosa, Beograd: Komunist, 1983. Osnivački kongres Komunističke Partije Srbije: Zbornik radova. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenik i nastavna sredstva, 1988.

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Politička Situacija Međunacionalni odnosi u savremenoj fazi socijalističoj razvitka i zadaci Saveza komunista Srbije: Diskusioni politološki seminar 11, 12, 13 januara 1969. Beograd: Institut za političke studije fakulteta političkih nauka, 1969. Pišković, Milan (ed), Sječa Hrvatske u Karađorđevu 1971: 21. Sjednica (autorizirani zapisnik) Zagreb: Meditor, 1994. Pravopis hrvatskosrpskoga književnog jezika (Matica Hrvatska/Matica Srpska, Zagreb/Novi Sad, 1960).

Periodicals

Anali pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, Beograd Borec, Ljubljana Delo, Beograd Naša Sobodnost, Ljubljana Naše Teme, Zagreb Prosvjeta, Banja Luka Praxis, Zagreb Istorijski Glasnik, Beograd Jugoslovenski Istorijski časopis, Beograd Komunist, Beograd Kritika, Zagreb

Newspapers and magazines

Borba, Belgrade Danas, Zagreb NIN, Beograd Hrvatski Tjednik, Zagreb Vijesnik u Sriedu, Zagreb Globus,Zagreb Vjesnik, Zagreb Poltika, Beograd

Other periodicals consulted

Balkan Forum Beogradski Krug/Belgrade Circle Communist and Post-Communist Studies Ethnic and Racial StudiesEast European Quarterly East European Politics and Societies East European Reporter Foreign Affairs Internasjonal Politikk International Affairs International Political Science Review New Left Review Praxis International Problems of Communism Publius

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Barrett, Michèle, The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. Bennett, Christopher. Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, course and consequences. London: Hurst & Company, 1995. Bieber, Florian (ed), Montenegro in Transition: Problems of identity and statehood. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003. Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: Glavni procesi, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978. Bilandžić, Dušan, Jugoslavija poslije Tita (1980–1985), Zagreb: Globus, 1986. Bogdanović, Dimitrije, Knjiga o Kosovu, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti,1985. Bokovoy, Melissa, Irvine, Jill and Lilly, Carol (eds), State–Society Relations in Yugoslavia 1945–1992. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997. Bosić, Milovan, ‘Istorijski izvori o petoj zemaljskoj konferenciji KPJ. Zagreb’: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske, 1972. Bottomore, Tom (ed), A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991. Bracewell, Wendy, ‘Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism, 6, no. 4, 2000, 563–90. Budding, Audrey H., Serb Intellectuals and the National Question 1961–1991, PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1998. Bunce Valerie, Subversive Institutions: The design and the destruction of socialism and the state, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Burg, Steven L., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political decision making since 1966, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983. Burg, Steven L., ‘Decision-making in Yugoslavia’, Problems of Communism, Mar–Apr, 1980. Burg, Steven L., ‘Elite conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia’. Soviet Studies, 38, no. 2, April, 1986, 170–93. Burg, Steven L., ‘Why Yugoslavia fell apart’. Current History, 92, no. 557, Nov, 1993. Carter, April, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The changing role of the Party, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,1982. Carter, F.W. and Norris, H.T. (eds), The Changing Shape of the Balkans, London: UCL Press, 1996. Cassese, Antonio, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Cenčić, Vjenceslav, Titova Poslednja Ispovijest, Beograd: Grafas Orfelin EWM, 2001. Christman, Henry M. (ed), The Essential Tito, Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1971. Clissold, Stephen, Đilas: The progress of a revolutionary. London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd, 1983. Cohen, Lenard, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s disintegration and Balkan politics in transition. Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1995. Cohen, Lenard, Regime Transition in a Disintegrating Yugoslavia: The Law of Rule vs the Rule of Law, pamphlet, 1992.

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INDEX

Agitprop (Department for Agitation and Propaganda) 123, 124 Agrokomerc scandal 341, 342 Albania 96–101, 225, 274 Aleksandar I, King 31, 32, 56, 155, 157 Anali pravnog fakulteta (journal) 275 Andersen, Benedict 6 ASNOM (Macedonian Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation) 107 Assembly of the Cultural-Educational League of Yugoslavia 147 assimilation 154, 155, 296, 325, 343 Associated Labour 289, 300 Austro-Hungarian Empire 17, 20, 21 AVNOJ (Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia) 60, 66, 71–4, 83, 92, 93 Bajić, Branko 94 Bakarić, Vladimir: aim for stability 285; attempt to keep in favour of Tito 234; bureaucratic centralism as danger 238; control of historiography 13; death 305; discredit of pro-centralism 180; and drafting of constitution 142, 180, 181; on HSS 76, 78; and leadership crisis SKJ 289; leadership KPH 234; loss of importance 239; Marxist approach to national question 235; on Matica Hrvatska 241, 245; and Ranković 190, 226, 235; reform policies 172–3; and self-management 137, 173 Balkan federation, proposed: abandoned 101; Comintern 20, 29; KPJ 9, 97; Macedonia 104; Serbia 22; and Stalin 127 Banac, Ivo 23, 130, 319, 320, 391n6 Beissinger, Mark 362

Belgrade University 48, 263, 268, 270, 280, 285, 287 Beseda (journal) 151 Bilandžić, Dušan 298–9 Blue book, The 293, 294–6 Bogdanov, Vaso 54 Bogdanović, Dimitrije 323 Bogomilism 222 Bolshevism: as anti-Serbian 321; and national question 2; and KPJ 19, 38, 110, 128, 131, 351; and Peoples’ Liberation Movement 82–5; and SSDP 22; Tito 45, 49, 50, 53 Borba 134, 140, 164, 219, 238, 286, 287 borders 8, 31, 110–14, 135 Bosnia and Herzegovina 52, 88, 101, 103–4, 141–2, 221–5, 342 Božić, Ivan 300 Brioni Plenum 189–92 ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ 1, 122, 123, 144, 152, 297, 306 Budding, Audrey H. 270, 369 Bujan Resolution 99–100 Bulgarian Communist Party 74, 104, 106, 108, 127 bureaucratic centralism: Kardelj 160, 210; Kraigher 176; and Serbian hegemony 157; and SKH 238; and SKJ 159, 161, 307 Burg, Steven L. 259 Cecarec, August 22 censorship: after 1972 281; and control of debate 11, 13–14; Javnost 322; relaxation of 144, 201; and Simina 9a 123; of social research 288; and student protests 311

448

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

census: (1948) 142; (1953) 141, 142, 224, 226; (1961) 104, 221, 298t; (1971) 221, 224, 298, 299t; (1981) 298, 299t Chamber of Nationalities 143, 180, 203, 204 Churchill, Winston 83 Ciliga, Ante 28 Cirković, Sima 300 Cominform Resolution (1948) 127, 134 Cominformists (Ibeovci) 130, 133 Comintern (Communist International) 30–6, 37–57; as increasingly militant 30; and KPJ 29; and national question 27; official aim 19; and Popular Front 37, 38–9, 40, 43; purges 46–7; response to Non-Aggression pact 53; revolutionary aims 32; ruling re Macedonia 105; WWII 69–71; and Yugoslav Communist Party 20 Communist Party, as illegal 17 Communist Party of Croatia see KPH Communist Party of Macedonia see KPM Communist Party of Slovenia see KPS ‘Conservatives’ 179, 186–9 Constitution (1946) 88, 89, 91 Constitution (1963) 180–3 Constitution (1974) 290–4, 313 constitutional amendments 203–8 Constitutional law (1953) 142, 187 CPSU (Communist Party of Soviet Union) 126 Croat Social Democrats 21 Croatian: constitutional amendments 247–51, 285, 289; creation of parliament 42; crisis 207; demand for regional reforms 196; economic decentralisation 172; economic grievances 240–2; hope for federal constitution 31; and Kosovo crisis 342; and national revolutionaries 40; nationalism 25, 50, 52, 239; new leadership 235, 236; as one people 20–2; People’s Liberation Movement 75–82; perceived Serbian threat 233; separate party organisation 51; Serb population 245; Serbian question 245–7; student strikes 256–7; ‘triumvirate’ 236; Croatian Language Declaration 218–20 Croatian Peasant Party see HSS Croatian Radical Peasant Party see HRSS Croatia-Slavonia 52 Crvenkovski, Krste 187, 189, 190, 226, 287

Cvetković, Dragiša 52 Cvijić, Đuro 28 Czechoslovakia 3, 204, 254, 269 Čavoški, Kosta 275, 321 Četnik Movement 63, 68, 80, 253, 320 Čičak, Ivan Zvonimir 243 Ćimić, Esad 223, 224 Čižinski, Josip see Gorkić, Milan Čolaković, R. 103, 104 Ćosić, Dobrica: on Bakarić 234; as intellectual 123, 124, 272–4, 322, 328; and Pirjevec 164–9; and SKJ 193; and Tito 263, 281, 282, 295, 321 Dabčević-Kučar, Savka: on Bakarić 234; on IHRP 242; on Kardelj 173, 177; reassurance to Serbs in Croatia 246; resignation 286; on SKH 252, 253; Triumvirate 236–8, 255, 257 Dalmatia 52, 76 Dedijer, Vladimir 12, 299, 320 de-étatisation 143, 170, 179, 235 Delo (periodical) 151–2, 164 Demitrović, Juraj 21 Democratic Centralism: and consensus 343; KPJ 57, 132; Ranković 175; SKJ 188, 198, 203, 287, 289, 302, 372 Deva, Vela 264 DFJ (Democratic Federative Yugoslavia) 91 Didarević, Nijaz 99 Dimitrov, Evgeni 143 Dimitrov, Georgi 39, 47, 69, 127 Dizdarević, Raif 314, 316, 334, 338 Djordjevic, Stevan 279 Dolanc, Stane 286, 311, 335 Dolomite agreement (1943) 74 Doronjski, Stevan 281, 293 Dragosavac, Dušan 256, 314–15 Đilas, Aleksa 24, 31 Đilas, Milovan: on borders 111; on Bosnia and Herzegovina 103; critic of Yugoslav system 12; on Croatia 80; doctrine of self-management 136; on formation of provisional government 73; and Hebrang 81, 82; on history 124; on internationalism 122; as Montenegrin in KPJ 218; and Montenegro uprising 68–9; Partisan detachment 65; Resolution of Sixth Congress 140; on revolution 64; on revolutionary aims of KPJ 117; on socialism as goal 135; stripped of office 140; support for Tito 48, 54

Index

449

Đodan, Šime 254 Đorđević, Jovan 143, 276, 297 Đukić, Slavoljub 262, 293 Đurić, Mihailo 277–8, 279, 288

HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) challenge to KPH and KPJ 52, 76; fragmentation 63; popularity 32, 50, 51, 75–9 Humo, Avdo 223, 224

economic reform 170–2, 186–9, 341 Ekmečić, Milorad 299, 300–1 Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia, The 300 Ertl, Tomaž 335

IHRP (Institute for the History of the Croatian Working Movement) 237, 242 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 318, 341 Independent Croatian State see NDH inflation 308 Institute for the History of the Croatian Working Movement see IHRP integration, economic 299–300 intelligentsia 124, 323–6, 328–9 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation see IMRO International Communist Movement 7, 20, 69 International Monetary Fund see IMF Irvine, Jill 244 Isaković, Antonije 272 isolation 134 Italy 73, 107

FEC (Federal Executive Committee) 308, 309 Filipović, Filip 22 foreign currency earnings 240, 286 Fourteenth Congress 344–5 Fund for Development 188 Fundamental Law on Management 137 Gabrič, Aleš 120, 150, 176, 179 Gams, Andrija 276 General Investment Fund 188 Geršković, Leon 65 GNOOV (Main Peoples’ Liberation Committee for Vojvodina) 92 Gorkić, Milan (Josip Čižinski) 33, 43–4, 46, 50 Gotovac, Vlado 239, 242, 319 ‘Great Serbian hegemony’ : KPJ 70, 106, 109; Ranković 192, 272; Tito on 33; WWII 75; Yugoslavia linked with 32, 157 Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, The 5 harmonisation 200, 301, 302 Hebrang, Andrija: accusation of spying 130; conflict with Tito 81; leader KPH 76–7; as nationalist 80; Popular Front doctrine 64; removal as leader KPH 82; removal from Croatian leadership 129; strategy re HSS 77, 78, 79; supporter of Miletić 47 History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia, The 299 History of Yugoslavia (Dedijer, Božić, Ćirković and Ekmečić) 300 Holjevac, Većeslav 222 Hoxha, Enhver 99 Hoxha, Fadil 199, 295 HRSS (Croatian Radical Peasant Party) 25, 26, 29 Hrvatski Tjednik (weekly newspaper) 239, 241–2, 247–51

Jashari, Kaquasha 338 Javnost (magazine) 322, 327 Jelić, Ivan 79, 384n6 JNA 144, 327, 335–6, 344 JNOF (United Front for Peoples’ Liberation) 77, 83, 117 Jončić, Koča 204 Jović, Borislav 332, 339, 344, 345 Jugoslavenstvo 154, 163, 168, 179, 183, 298 Karađorđevo 257, 280 Karadžić, Vuk 301 Kardelj, Edvard: 1974 constitution 391; agreement to consult USSR on foreign policy 127; aim for stability 286; anticentralism 293; constitutional law 1953 142; control of historiography 13; death 305; definition of nation 168; definition Yugoslav state 181; development Yugoslav socialism 137; doctrine of self-management 136; drafting of Constitution (1963) 180; exclusion from decision making 177; and Hebrang 81–2; importance to Slovenian party organisation 34, 177; imprisonment 48; inter-republican relations 200, 201; on KPS 51; and

450

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

leadership crisis SKJ 289; MarxistLeninism 175; Partisan detachment 65; reform policies 172–3; on regional economic development 171; and Slovene Road Affair 215, 216; on Slovenia 33, 166; socialist ideology 11; and Socialist Yugoslavism 152–60, 169; and sovereignty 89; stance on decentralisation 174, 175; state stability 208–12; support for Tito 34, 48; on Tito/Stalin power struggle 125; on unitarism 183; writing on selfmanagement 301–2 Kardelj, Pepca 177, 297 Kavčič, Stane 214 Khrushchev, Nikita 133 Kidrič, Boris 64, 91, 136 Klemenčič, Lovro 26 Književne Sveske see Literary Notebooks Komunist (newspaper) 11, 117, 136, 246 Končar, Rade 94 Korač, Vitomir 21 Kosovo, aim of Republican status 293; Albanian population 75, 96–101, 190, 227, 229, 293, 311–12, 343; Albanians offered reform 228; autonomy 96; constitution (1963) 230; crisis (1981) 311–12; decision to attach to Serbia 101; demands for republican status rejected by Tito 229; domination of Serbs and Montenegrins in administration 227; improvement in education of Albanians 228; renamed Kosovo 204, 230; Ranković’s fall 227; against recentralisation 313; riots (1981) 305; and Serbia 323–6; state of emergency 311; Tito’s response to unrest 230, 231; as undeveloped 227; unrest (1968) 226, 229 Koštunica, Vojislav 321 KPH (Communist Party of Croatia) 51–3, 55, 75–82 KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) (later SKJ – League of Communists of Yugoslavia): all-Yugoslav identity 61; on autonomy of Sandžak 102; Balkan federation 97; centralisation 72, 83, 90; change of name to SKJ 138; Communists in exile 25; consolidation 55–7, 82; creation of new Yugoslavia 8; criticism of Bujan Resolution 100;; factional conflict 24–30; federalism 29, 37; ideology 119–25; as illegal

(1920) 25; increasing militancy 30, 32; isolation 32; lack of strategy on national question 18–19; leadership 46–9; leading role 116–19; leading role Peoples’ Liberation Movement 66; legitimisation of Communist regime 115; and Macedonian identity 104, 108; membership 65, 116; national liberation 63; on national question 2, 10, 119–25, 238; new leadership via Comintern 30; origins 17; Party organisations 55; and Popular Front 39–44; pragmatism 103, 106, 109, 111; radical left victory 29; revolutionary aims 49, 67; role redefined 138–44; and socialist path 126; unification 2, 44–9; unitarism and centralism 23; KPM (Communist Party of Macedonia) 74, 106–7 KPS (Communist Party of Slovenia) 51, 65 Kraigher, Boris 157–8, 163, 165, 171, 176, 188 Kraigher commission 309, 314, 317 Kraigher, Sergej 309 Kresintern 29 Krleža, Miroslav 49, 53, 54, 146, 219, 300 Kučan, Milan 225, 318, 336, 344 Kulišić, Špiro 222 KUNMZ (Communist University for the National Minorities) 48 Lakuš, Filip 79 Land Assemblies 72–3, 90 Land Conference KPJ (1924) 28 Land Conference KPJ (1922) 25 Law for the Protection of the State (1921) 17, 25 League of Communists of Croatia see SKH League of Communists of Yugoslavia see SKJ League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia see ZSMS Lenin, Vladimir 6, 7 Leninism 83, 88 Letter, The 285, 286, 287, 288, 289 ‘Levanter affair’ 146 ‘Liberals’ 179, 186–9, 195–8, 280–2, 289 Lijphart, Arend 377n3 Lilly, Carol 144 Literary Notebooks (Književne Sveske) 54 Ljubičić, Nikola 281, 316

Index Lukač, Dušan 21 Lukić, Radomir 143 Lustick, Ian S. 8, 9, 368 Macedonia 104–8; Albanian population 226; Bulgarian cultural influence 147–8; critical of Slovenian Road Affair 215; culture 147–8, 225; defection of communist party to Bulgaria 105; demand for regional reforms 196; liberals 187; minorities 226; national identity 107–8; and national revolutionaries 40; new literary language 148; orthodox Slav population 226; and Serbia 342; support for Partisan movement 107 Macedonian Orthodox Church 225 Maček, Vladko 32, 43, 52, 63, 77, 78, 79 Magovac, Božidar 78, 79 Main People’s Liberation Council for Vojvodina (GNOOV) 95, 96 Marjanović, Jovan 273 Marković, Ante 340, 342, 345 Marković, Draža: as against consensus 317; and Kardelj 177, 293, 294, 295, 296; removal of Minić 316; and Serbia 294, 295, 315; and Tito 281 Marković, Mirjana Mira 330 Marković, Sima 26, 27–8, 29 Marković, Svetozar 94 Martinović, Đordje 324 Marxism: economics 28; historical materialism 19, 34; and internationalism 6; and national question 3; national question 5, 6; and public discourse 14; universalism 23 ‘Marxist Centres’ 289 Marxist-Leninism 5, 27, 30, 120, 126, 127 Maspok 252, 387n62 Mastnak, Tomaž 322, 327, 336 Matica Hrvatska: as anti-socialist 258; closure 259; Croatian Language Declaration 218, 220, 271; on Croatian sovereignty 248–51; economist members 240; increase in membership 241; loss of control 255; as political 241; and SKH 237, 239, 244–5; SKH tolerance of 244; triumvirate tolerance of 243 Matica Srpska 147 ‘Meeting of Truth’ 344 Mihailović, Draža 63, 71, 295, 320 Mihajilovic-Mihiz, Borislav 124, 272

451

Miletić, Petko 46 Miller, Nick 364 Milosavleski, Slavko 288 Milošević, Slobodan: attempt to gain control over Serbia 336–40; control state assets 345; lack of documentation 12; media control 345; and nationalism 332; recentralisation 341; Serbs in Croatia 326, 342; and Stambolić 318; support for Kosovar Serbs 333 Milutinović, Ivan 69, 81, 98 Minić, Miloš 295–6, 281, 316 ‘Ministerialists’ 379n10 Minovic, Zivorad 423n161 Mirić, Jovan 317 Mišić, Zoran 149, 151–2 Mladina (magazine) 326, 327, 336 Montenegro: agreement on cooperation 187; federal unit 218; Greens (Nativists) 217, 219; identity 217–18; language debate 219–20; and national revolutionaries 40; Partisan uprising 68–9; and relationship with Serbia 217; and Sandzak 102; Whites (Serbophiles) 217, 219 multinationalism 40, 180 Muslim identity 221–5 narod (nation) 292, 381n2 narodno jedinstvo (national oneness) 20–3, 24, 26, 29–30 Naša Sodobnost (journal) 164 National Assembly 143 national question 87–93, 115–32; and class 27, 28; Croatia 260; definition 5; discussion SKJ Congress 183–6; Đorđević 276; importance to SKJ 182; Kardelj definition 153; KPJ/ SKJ 15, 39; Marxism 34, 35, 153; and Milošević 329–34; post Tito 306–10; revolutionary aims 18, 29, 30; SKJ 307–8, 313, 314, 318–23; socialist solution 7–8; and South Slav Social Democratic parties 21; Stalin definition 34; Tito 33; National Question in the Light of Marxism, The (S. Marković) 27 NDH (Independent Croatian State) 67, 75, 76, 121, 222 New contributions to the biography of Josip Broz Tito (Dedijer) 320 NFJ (Popular Front of Yugoslavia) 83, 66, 117

452

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

Nikezić, Marko: ideology 264–6, 273; and Kosovo riots 267; liberalism 268, 280, 281, 282, 293; and Montenegro 220; resignation 288; and Tito 371 NIN (magazine) 308, 337 Ninth Congress 198–200 NKOJ (Peoples’ Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia) 91, 92 Non-Aggression Pact (1939) 53, 55, 63 Non-Aligned Movement 133, 184 NOP see Peoples’ Liberation Movement Nova Jugoslavija (journal) 95, 102 Nova Revija (journal)327, 328, 329 Novaković, Kosta 26 Novi Sad Agreement (1954) 147, 219, 271 Obznana (Pronouncement) 17, 25 Orthodox church 101, 223 Osvobodilna Fronta 74 OOUR – Osnovna organizacija udruženomg rada (Basic Organisation of Associated LAbour) 290 Palmer, Stephen E. Jr and King, Robert R. 105, 148, 226 Paradžik, Ante 244, 257 Parović, Blagoje 42 Partisan Movement 65, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79 partition 59, 61, 67, 70 Party of the Working People of Yugoslavia see PWPY Pašić, Najdan 316 Pavle, Prince 52, 56 Pavelić, Ante 63 Pavlović, Bora 282, 283, 288 Pavlović, Dragiša 331, 332 Pavlović, Srđa 218 Pecat (journal) 54 Pelagićists 22 Peoples’ Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia see NKOJ Peoples’ Liberation Front 79 Peoples’ Liberation Movement (NOP) 60–85; all-Yugoslav identity 61; AVNOJ 71–4; Bolshevism 82–5; centralisation 71, 73, 90; Comintern 69–71; national question 67, 74–5; ‘Period of Leftist Errors’ 68; revolutionary aims 61–2 Peoples’ Liberation Movement (NOP) 66 Peoples’ Liberation Struggle (NOB) 47, 63, 106

Perović, Latinka: acceptance of amendment 207; and Liberals 264, 266, 280, 281, 288, 293; removal 288; Serbian leader 265, 267; on Tito 269, 281 Perspektive (journal) 151 Pesić, Vesna 119 Petar, King 63, 64, 73, 74, 83 ‘Petition of the 2016’ 324 Petranović, Branko 94, 191 Pijade, Moša 343; on autonomy 93, 108–9; on 1953 census 142; on Constitutional law (1953) 142; doctrine of selfmanagement 136, 137; on national question 91–3; and Serbs in Croatia 111, 246; and Slovenia 343; and sovereignty 89; supporter of Miletić 47 Pirjevec, Dušan 164–9 Pirker, Pero 236 PKSH (Partia Komuniste e Shqipërisë) 96, 97, 99, 311 Politburo 68, 73 Politika Ekspres 332 Popović, Koča 280 Popović, Miladin 96, 97, 98, 99 Popular Front: abandoned 55; introduction 37, 38–9; KPH 52–4; KPJ 39–44, 47–9, 49–50, 128, 131 Popular Front of Yugoslavia see NFJ Poulton, Hugh 225 Praxis (journal) 271, 288 Praxisovci 263, 268–71, 272, 283 Prishtina University 311 Prosvjeta 246 PWPY (Party of the Working People of Yugoslavia) 28, 52 Radić, Stjepan 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 79 Radničke novine (newspaper) 21 Radosavljević, Dobrivoje 80 Ranković, Aleksandar: and economic reforms 188; effects of removal 191–2; head of secret police 139, 189–90; and Hebrang 81; support for Tito 48; neo-Stalinism 175; and persecution of Albanians 229; pragmatism 103; relationship with Tito 174, 175; removal 189–92, 273; and security forces 12, 264; Serbian uprising 65; and SKJ strength 173; stance on decentralisation 174, 175; as threat to Tito 178; Vice-president of Republic 179 Raškovic, Jovan 343

Index Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja (Kardelj) 34, 51 Red Army 126 ‘Red Terror’ (‘Period of the leftist errors’) 68 Repe, Božo 177 Revija 57 (journal) 151 Ribar, Dr Ivan 48, 91 Ribar, Ivo Lola 47, 48, 49, 54 Ribičič, Mitija 215, 216 Richtmann, Zvonimir 54 Ristić, Marko 54 Rusinow, Dennison 178, 254, 256, 289 Sandžak 90, 93, 101–3 SANU (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences) 275, 323, 324, 326 SAWPY (Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia) (formerly People’s Front) 144 SDB (secret police, formerly UDBa) 189, 191 ‘Second Imperialist War, The’ see World War II Second Kosovo People’s Liberation Brigade 101 self-determination 2, 7, 18, 30, 40 self-management socialism 133–61; Bakarić 173, 234–5; Constitution (1974) 291, 300; Constitutional Amendement (1971) 205; Croatia 247, 260; Đilas 136; Dragosavac 315; and economic crisis 310; Draža Marković, 295; and federalism 143; Kardelj 11, 173, 289, 290, 300–3; KPJ 133; Nikezić 265, 284; Pirjevec 168; Praxis group 270; Serbian leadership 283; SKH 237, 238; SKJ 144, 157, 181, 193, 202, 208, 282, 289, 297, 307, 312, 318; theoreticians 136–7; Tito 174, 258, 296; and unity 159 Serbia 263–80; agreement on cooperation 187; autonomous provinces 108–10; and centralism 172, 267; Četnik Movement 63; constitutional amendments 207; culture 273; effect of constitution (1974) 292–6; and federal state 88; German hostility 67; intelligentsia 263–4, 268–80, 329; Kosovar Serbs 323; Liberal leadership 195, 264–8; Liberals 263, 267, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283; persecution of minorities 264; national question 204, 265, 271–80; nationalism 166–7, 279;

453

new constitution 337; as one people 20–2; relationship with Croatia 267, 325; and Srijem 94; state of emergency 338; student strikes 268–9; Tito’s image after his death 319–23; WWII 109 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences see SANU Serbian League of Communists (SKS – Savez komunista Srbije) 192 Serbian Memorandum 324–6 Serbian Orthodox Church 323 Sher, Gerson S. 270, 283 Simina 9a 124, 272 Siminiovci 124 Sistem i Kriza (Mirić) 317 Sixth Congress 138–44, 289 Skenderbeg 228 SKH (Savez komunista Hrvatske - League of Communists of Croatia): challenge to position in Croatia 242–3; CK SKH 236–9; Croatian nationalism and bureaucratic centralism 238; internal struggle 251–3; leadership crisis 312–14; leadership purge 257–60; loss of control 251; national question 242; tolerance of Matica Hrvatska 254 SKJ (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) (formerly KPJ): attempts at all-Yugoslav culture 145; centralism 174; change of name from KPJ 138; Conservatives 170; dissent against 322; dissolution 344–5; end of power 340–5; ideological role 202–3; importance 144; intervention of Tito 286–9; leadership division 163–4; leadership struggles 169–70, 172–80; legitimising strategies 8–10; Liberals 170; loss of unity 339; loss of power 337; Marxist-Leninism 7; national question 170; organisational changes 228; purge of leadership 287; recentralisation 286; reform 197–8; and solution to national question 1; state stability 210 SKS (Savez komunista Srbije – League of Communists of Serbia) 265, 274, 280–1, 282 Slavonia 94 Slobodni Dom (journal) 78, 79 Slovene Road Affair 214–17, 234 Slovenia 214–17, 326–8; Communist Party 45, 48; conflict with federal government 335–6; culture 150; demand for regional reforms 196;

454

Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia

economic decentralisation 172; establishment of Regional Committee 33; identity 20–2; intelligentsia 328–9; liberation front 74; Marxist analysis 34; and national revolutionaries 40; opposition to Jugoslavenstvo 163; opposition to majority principle 343; protest at federal decision 215; separate party organisation 51; unease at Serbian domination in Yugoslavia 24 Socialist Alliance of Working People of Kosovo 224 South Slav unitarism 21, 22, 24, 152 sovereignty: Constitution (1946) 89; Mirić 317; and republics 143, 165, 205–6, 291; Serbian 110, 342; Slovene 329; and Tito 130 ‘Soviet Bureaucratic Socialism’ 135 Soviet Union: attack WWII 69; and Comintern 19; disintegration 3; German attack 65; and Peoples’ Liberation Struggle 69–71; split with Yugoslavia 125–6, 132; and Versailles group 41 Srbijanstvo 273 Srijem (Srem) 94, 95 Srijemska Mitrovica 46, 47 Sporazum (1939) 52 SRPJ(k) Socijalistička radnička partija Jugoslavije (komunista) The Socialist Workers’ Party of Yugoslavia (Communist) 2, 17, 22 SSDP (Serbian Social Democratic Party) 21, 22 Stalin, Joseph: critical of Balkan federation talks 127; death 133; decision to replace leadership KPJ 127–9; on KPJ 116; meeting with Churchill 83; and Non-Aggression Pact 53; and Popular Front 39; purges 46–7, 49; split with KPJ 131; strategic Western alliances 69–71; wish to control satellite states 125–6 Stalinism 53–4 Stambolić, Ivan 294, 295, 296, 306, 318, 326, 329–33 Stambolić, Petar 150, 280, 281, 293, 295, 296, 315, 316 Stefanović, Svetislav 190 Stojadinović, Milan 43, 52 Stojanović, Radoslav 204, 205 Stojnić, Velimir 99 Stranački pluralizam ili monizam (Koštunica and Čavoški) 321 Students’ Movement 243–4

Supek, Ivan 77, 129 Šatarov, Metodi 105 Šega, Drago 151–2 Šešelj, Vojislav 322 Šnuderl, Maks 143 Šolević, Miroslav 337 Špiljak, Mika 318 Šubašić, Ban Ivan 52, 83 Šuvar, Stipe 303, 318, 333, 339 Tadić, Ljubomir 322 TAH (Telegrafska Agencija Hrvatske) 81 Telegram (newspaper) 165, 219 ‘Tempo’ see Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar Tenth Congress 238, 261, 297, 367 Tepavac, Mirko 238, 265, 288 Third World 140, 377n3 Tito, Josep Broz: aim for stability 285, 297; and Albanian Communist Party 99; Balkan federation 97, 127; biography 12; on borders 110–11; and Croatian leadership 257–9; call for centralism 175; Central Committee KPJ 33; and centralism 178, 179; chairman, General Headquarters of the Peoples’ Partisan Detachment 65; on chauvinism 212; on communication 43; on communist take over 64–5; Constitution (1974) and unlimited presidency 291; constitutional amendments 207; control of historiography 13; criticism of Hebrang 81; on Croatian nationalism 253; death 305; on Draža Marković 292; as against federation with Bulgarians 127; General Secretary, Politburo 56; and Hebrang 80; and HSS 78; ideological disagreement with Stalin 128–9; importance 144–5; imprisonment 45; inter-republican relations 201; on KPJ and Popular Front 131; leadership KPJ 37–8, 46, 47; on Macedonian autonomy 105–7; and Minić 295; and monarchism 83; and Montenegro uprising 69; on national question 1, 118, 121, 183–4; national unity 296; on nationalism 186; on new Yugoslavia 118; Non-Aligned Movement 133; and party organisation 55; patronage sought 172–4; on political activity by Matica Hrvatska and Prosvjeta 254; on Peoples’ Liberation Partisan Units 61–2; on Popular Front 117; pragmatism 64, 137; and Praxis group 270–1; reforms 197; relationship

Index with Kardelj 176–8; reorganisation KPJ 44, 49–51; rise to power 45; on role of KPJ 138; on role of SKJ 203; self-determination 72; Serbian uprising 65; and SKH 251, 252; and SKH crisis 253–6; on SKJ crisis 285, 286, 287, 288, 289; and Slovene Road Affair 215; slowing down of reforms 139, 140; and sovereignty 130; and student strikes 256, 268–9; succession 196, 201, 303; on triumvirate 254; Soviet Union 373; visit to Kosovo 1967 228; on Vojvodina 95; WWII and social revolution 55; on Yugoslavian culture 185; on Yugoslav unity 122 Todorović Commission 197 Tripalo Mika 178, 198, 207, 234, 236, 238, 282, 286 Triple Entente 20 Triumvirate 236, 241, 243–4, 252–9, 286 Tuđman, Dr Franjo 242, 319 Twelfth Congress 296, 314–16 UDBa (later SDB) 139, 191, 227 UN (United Nations) 135 Unification Conference 20 Union of Yugoslav Socialist Youth 145 unitarism: and Jugoslavenstvo 183; KPJ abandonment of principle 29–30; KPJ support 18, 20, 23, 24, 26; and Ranković 192 United Front for Peoples’ Liberation see JNOF United Opposition 43, 44, 52 unity, as socialist concept 150–61; as changing concept 297–301; Ćosić on 166; Kardelj on 152–6; Mišić /Sega debate 151–2; and Serbia 156–61 USSR see Soviet Union Ustaša Movement 32, 59, 63, 75, 109, 121, 222 Užice Republic 68, 80 Vardar Macedonia105 VASNOS (Great Anti-fascist Assembly of People’s Liberation in Serbia) 96 Versailles, Treaty of 41 Veselica, Marko 241, 254, 319 Veselinov, Jovan 96, 165 Vienna Agreement (1850) 271 ‘Vila Weiss’ 253 Višnjić, Svetozar 335 Vjesnik (newspaper) 79, 258, 285, 286,

455

298 Vlaškalić, Tihomir 316 ‘Vlaškalić Commission’ 316, 317 Vllasi, Azem 318, 338, 340 VMRO 106, 149 Vojvodina 88, 92, 93–6, 204, 293, 295, 313 Vujačić, Marko 91 Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar (‘Tempo’): and Bujan Resolution 100; historian 12; on Kardelj 176, 177; Kosovo 97; Partisan Movement 65, 106–7; relieved of position 198; on Tito’s relationship with Ranković 174, 175; and Trade Union federation 187 VUS (Vjesnik u srijedu - journal) 246 Wachtel, Andrew 121, 125 ‘Wahabites’ 48 Wartime (Đilas) 103 White Book, The (Šuvar) 319 World Bank 214, 215, 216 World War I 45 World War II (‘The Second Imperialist War’): destruction of state 9; KPJ 47, 55, 56, 60, 69–75, 295; Macedonia 342; persecution of minorities 109, 323, 364; Tito 320 Yalta Conference 83 Yogurt revolution 338 Yugoslav Communist Movement 34 Yugoslavism 163–93, 297–8, 304; constitution (1963) 180–3; economic reform 170–2, 186–9; as linked to Serbian interests 192; and selfmanagement socialism 237; SKJ leadership 172–80; and solution to national question 1, 119 Zagreb intellectual circle, purge 53–5 Zagreb University 243–4 ZAVNOCGiB (Land Anti-Fascist Council of People’s liberation of Montenegro) 218 ZAVNOH (Land Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Croatia) 64, 72–3, 77–8, 80–2, 242, 246, 248–50, 261 Zëri i Popullit (newspaper) 311 ZSMS (League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia) 327 ZUR 290, 299 Žanko, Miloš 238 Žujović, Sreten 129