COVID and Gender in the Middle East 9781477326534

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COVID and Gender in the Middle East

COVID and Gender in the Middle East edited by rita stephan

University of Texas Press

Austin

Copyright ©  by the University of Texas Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First edition,  Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to: Permissions University of Texas Press P.O. Box  Austin, TX - utpress.utexas.edu/rp-form The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z.- (R) (Permanence of Paper).

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Stephan, Rita, editor. | AbiRafeh, Lina, – writer of foreword. Title: COVID and gender in the Middle East / edited by Rita Stephan ; with a foreword by Lina AbiRafeh. Description: First edition. | Austin : University of Texas Press, . | Includes index. Identifiers: LCCN  ISBN ---- (hardback) ISBN ---- (PDF) ISBN ---- (ePub) Subjects: LCSH: COVID- Pandemic, —Social aspects—Middle East. | COVID- Pandemic, —Social aspects—Africa, North. | Women—Middle East—Social conditions. | Women—Africa, North—Social conditions. | Women—Health and hygiene—Middle East. | Women—Health and hygiene—Africa, North. | COVID- Pandemic, —Economic aspects—Middle East. | COVID- Pandemic, — Economic aspects—Africa, North. | Women—Middle East—Economic conditions. | Women—Africa, North—Economic conditions. Classification: LCC RA.C C  | DDC ./—dc/eng/ LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/ doi:./

To the more than  million lives lost due to the coronavirus, politics, and inequalities To the half billion who experienced the fear of being infected with the virus To scientific inquiry, not only to find the medical cure but also to alleviate social and economic hardships To all women, especially Arab women, who matter

Contents

Foreword

The Response to COVID—and to Everything— Is Female xi Lina AbiRafeh

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction

xv xvii Why Is COVID Female?

xxi

Rita Stephan PAR T I. Care and Care Work Spheres

Chapter 1.

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare

3

Valentine M. Moghadam

Chapter 2.

COVID-19: A Threat to Lebanese Women’s Precarious Condition 28 Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss and Jana G. Mourad

Chapter 3.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Women’s Prosperity in the Gulf Countries: Survey Evidence from Bahrain 48 Omar Al-Ubaydli, Deema Almoayyed, and Ghada Abdulla

Chapter 4.

When Inequalities Interconnect: Women Scholars’ Productivity amid the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa 71 Nermin Allam, Gail J. Buttorff, and Marwa Shalaby

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Contents

PAR T II. Social Vulnerabilities

Chapter 5.

The LGBTIQ+ Community’s COVID Dilemma in Lebanon 95 Lina Abou-Habib and Amina Ali

Chapter 6.

The Gendered Impact of the Pandemic on Syrian Refugee Women in Jordan 106 Oroub El-Abed and Nuseibah Shabaitah

Chapter 7.

Violence against Moroccan Women during and after Lockdown 125 Rhizlaine Benachir and Sofia Raïs

Chapter 8.

Gender Dynamics and Distance Education: Toward a Situational-Interactionist Model of the COVID-19 Contingency Effect on Female University Students in Morocco 139 Ilham Sadoqi

PAR T III. A Gender Lens on COVID Impact in the Middle East

and North Africa Chapter 9.

COVID’s Three-Order Impacts on Women’s Lives: A Typology 161 Rita Stephan

Chapter 10.

Women’s Rights and Roles during the COVID-19 Pandemic 172 Salma Al-Shami, Michael Robbins, and Zach Bampton

Chapter 11.

Unmasking Masculinity during COVID in the Middle East and North Africa 191 Merissa Khurma, Youssef Chouhoud, and Rita Stephan

PAR T IV. Feminist Responses

Chapter 12.

COVID-19 and Feminism in the Middle East: Challenges, Initiatives, and Dilemmas 211 Nadje Al-Ali

Contents ix

Chapter 13.

The Power of Bipartisan Mobilization: The Success of Tunisia’s Feminist Movement during the Coronavirus Pandemic 225 Maro Youssef and Sarah Yerkes

Chapter 14.

Harmony of Feminine and Masculine Leadership during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Jordan 236 Mayyada Abu Jaber

Chapter 15.

The Feminist Position: Corona Crisis Management and Its Impact on Palestinian Women 256 Reham Abu Al-Asal, Nabila ESPANIOLY, Samah Salaima, NAHIDA Shehadeh, Shahira Shalabi, and Hana AMOURY

Contributors Index

275 287

FORE WORD

The Response to COVID—and to Everything— Is Female LINA ABIRAFEH

It was impossible to predict how our world would change in March . What began as temporary measures to assess an unusual situation swiftly turned into a global response to an unprecedented pandemic. Everyone continues to be affected by this collective crisis. However, we know from global evidence that the virus and its aftermath affect women and girls more severely. And women and girls who are already marginalized—the elderly, refugees and those who are displaced, those with disabilities, those without insurance, those with compromised immunity, LGBTIQ+ populations—face even greater challenges. I have spent my career as a humanitarian aid worker in insecure environments, supporting women to mitigate risks and access the safety and support that they desire and deserve. Everywhere I have worked—from Afghanistan to Mali to Haiti—women and girls suffer more. It does not matter whether this is due to a conflict, a natural disaster, or an epidemic. In the Arab region, where I spent many years, women were vulnerable before the crisis. And even as the pandemic abates around the world, the crisis for Arab women and girls is just beginning. The Arab region is plagued by a range of socioeconomic instabilities and protracted humanitarian crises, with more than  million people in need of humanitarian assistance (UNICEF ). The pandemic is simply the latest in a series of challenges facing the region. The Arab region also suffers the world’s worst social indicators, with wide gender gaps across health, education, politics, and the economy (UN ESCWA ). All these are exacerbated by instability, crises, and the current pandemic. Nearly  million Arab women are not connected to the internet and do not have access to a mobile phone (GSM Association ). Coupled

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with alarming literacy rates—approximately  percent for women (World Bank )—this means that women are disproportionately unable to access accurate information about the virus to help them prepare, respond, and survive. Intimate partner violence is the most common form of violence against women worldwide. Seeking shelter and safety from an abusive partner, difficult even in normal contexts, was practically impossible with restrictions during the pandemic. From the immediate onset, as the lockdown took effect, reports of domestic abuse rose rapidly, limiting women’s rights to live free from fear and violence and to decide about their bodies and lives. The Arab region was not immune to these risks. Even in so-called normal times, the region deals inadequately with intimate partner violence. It is shrouded in shame and blame, women are silenced and ostracized, services are scant, and legislation fails to protect women or prevent cases. This crisis, combined with the continued conflicts and insecurities plaguing the region, has had a detrimental impact on women’s lives. For too many women in the region, home is not safe—although it should be. “Stay at home” is a message that is both dangerous and naïve. Lockdown  measures have increased the severity of preexisting cases and created new cases. And we know that cases on record are far fewer than cases in reality. The pandemic has increased women’s risk of harm and decreased their access to healthcare, education, and economic opportunity. When children are forced to stay out of school, it is often the girls who never return. These girls are married younger and become mothers sooner. Global statistics have documented the increase in girl-child marriage and in harmful practices such as female genital mutilation as a result of the pandemic. When women are forced out of the workplace, they often never go back. They are the first to be dismissed and the last to be readmitted. The pandemic is expected to result in a loss of . million jobs in the Arab region, approximately , of which are held by women (UN Women and ESCWA ). Arab women were already an underutilized economic force, too often relegated to the informal sector and traditionally feminized work. They have fewer protections and face greater risks in these areas. This will only increase as we transition from the pandemic into productive lives. Women are the world’s caregivers and risk increased exposure to infection in both their personal and professional capacities. Arab women make up the majority of the region’s healthcare practitioners and family caretakers, performing unpaid labor and exposing themselves to infection to care for a

Foreword

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sick child, an elderly family member, or a needy member of the community. Women in the Arab region perform nearly five times as much unpaid care work as men (Ferrant, Pesando and Nowacka ). In every emergency I have worked, women are the ones who know who is in need, what they need, and how to get it to them. They are the world’s social safety net. And the Arab region still clings to its patriarchal views on women, their rights, their roles, and their responsibilities—both inside and outside the home. This creates an artificial juxtaposition between what is valued and what is not. Perhaps this pandemic is an opportunity to lay this trope to rest. Viewing our post-pandemic world through a feminist lens means reframing the way we merge all aspects of our lives to reflect our meaningful, multidimensional realities. This pandemic has forced us to integrate our personal and professional lives in unprecedented ways. But there is a silver lining here. We can build a more honest—and equitable!—life where we respect women’s lives, recognize their leadership, and transform our ecosystems to cultivate stronger societies that can withstand future shocks. Those shocks will inevitably come. Will women once again be denied leadership roles? If so, it will be to the region’s peril. The pandemic teaches us a lesson: ample evidence shows that countries with low cases, low deaths, and strong responses have female leaders. Are any of them Arab countries? Alas, no. If we want to build stronger countries and more robust economies and prevent future crises, we need a feminist response. Women are not an afterthought. And feminism is not an import. It is everywhere in the Arab region. There’s ample evidence for this, too. One thing is clear: Arab women cannot continue to be sidelined. Doing so risks their rights, equality, autonomy, and the well-being of the entire region. Their voices are strong. And they are screaming loudly. Who is listening? The authors of this book demand that we all listen. This book speaks to these challenges—the impact of being both Arab and female in the context of this pandemic. It is a critical contribution to the conversations we have all been having since March : What will our lives look like now? What does this mean for the Arab region? And what does this mean for Arab women? Fueled by the voices of feminist experts—both academics and activists—this book is not just a candid examination of a historic moment. It is a crucial playbook for any future crisis. The bottom line is this: when women lead, we will weather any storm—even this one.

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References Ferrant, Gaëlle, Luca Maria Pesando, and Keiko Nowacka. . “Unpaid Care Work: The Missing Link in the Analysis of Gender Gaps in Labour Outcomes.” OECD Development Centre. https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/Unpaid_care_ work.pdf.GSM Association. . “Connected Women: The Mobile Gender Gap Report .” https://www.gsma.com/r/wp-content/uploads///The-MobileGender-Gap-Report-.pdf. UN ESCWA (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). . “Rethinking Inequality in Arab Countries.” https://archive.unescwa.org/sites /www.unescwa.org/files/uploads/rethinking-inequality-arab-countries-summary -english.pdf. UNICEF. . “Humanitarian Action for Children: Middle East and North Africa Region.” https://www.unicef.org/media//file/-HAC-MENA.pdf. UN Women and ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). . “The Impact of COVID- on Gender Equality in the Arab Region.” https://arabstates.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%Office%Arab% States/Attachments/Publications///Impact%of%COVID%on% gender%equality%-%Policy%Brief.pdf. World Bank. . “Literacy, Adult Female (% of Females Ages  and Above)—Arab World.” “https://data.worldbank.org/indicatorSE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS?+name_desc =false&locations=A&locations+=A&year_high_desc=false.

Acknowledgments

This pandemic has magnified every existing inequality in our society—like systemic racism, gender inequality, and poverty. Melinda Gates

The COVID- pandemic has magnified why partial solutions do not work. More importantly, it has magnified global inequalities, whereby the rich got to live and the poor died serving the rich. While we are all in this storm together, some are holding on to a raft, some sheltering in a large boat, and some safe on shore. This volume would not have been possible without the valued contributions of the authors, who are pioneers in delivering the voices of Arab women, not as victims, but more importantly as caregivers, providers, and heroes. I am also grateful to my dear friend Jim Burr, senior editor at University of Texas Press, and his staff. His encouragement and support are unmatched. Meeting over the years in the book booth at the Middle East Studies Association Conference, we shared our love for books, Texas, and UT-Austin. I want to thank Guita Hourani and her team for assisting with the translation. I also would like to thank the legendary May Rihani for her guidance and Maya Charrad and Maro Youssef for chatting about ideas with me. Finally, I am grateful to my partner, husband, and supporter, Camille; my precious children, Rony and Karla; and my mother, Adele, who have been by my side, lifting me up, helping me out.

Abbreviations

AFTURD AiW ASC ATFD CBJ CDC CLA CNSS COVAX CREDIF CSOs DL EC ECOSOC ERF ESCWA FAR FEMNET FLFP FVVs GCC GDP GNI GoJ HFC

Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement Arab Institute for Women Asylum Seeker Certificates Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates Central Bank of Jordan Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Committee of the Heads of Local Authorities Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale COVID- Vaccines Global Access Centre de Recherches, d’Études, de Documentation, et de l’Information sur la Femme civil society organizations distance learning Emergency Committee Economic and Social Council Economic Research Forum Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia Feminist Alliance for Rights African Women’s Development and Communication Network female labor force participation femmes victims de violence Gulf Cooperation Council Gross Domestic Product Gross National Income government of Jordan High Follow-Up Committee

xviii

Abbreviations

HIV IBVs ILO IMF INGOs IPDF IPV ITS JD JNCW Jossour FFM KAFA LAU LBP LCPS LET LFHLCS MDWs MENA MEPI MHPSS MoI MoL MOSAIC MoU mWh MWPS NAPEVW NGO NIS OECD Oxfam PPP RDD RSS SAC SDGs SIGI

human immunodeficiency virus incentive-based volunteers International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund international nongovernmental organizations Initiatives pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes intimate partner violence informal tented settlement Jordanian dinar Jordan National Commission for Women Association Jossour—Forum des Femmes Marocaines Enough Violence and Exploitation Lebanese American University Lebanese pound Lebanese Center for Policy Studies Ligue des Électrices Tunisiennes Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey migrant domestic workers Middle East and North Africa Middle East Partnership Initiative mental health and psychosocial support Ministry of Interior Ministry of Labor MENA Organization for Services, Advocacy, Integration and Capacity Memorandum of Understanding megawatt hours Migrant Workers Protection Society National Action Plan for the Elimination of Violence against Women nongovernmental organization new Israeli shekels Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Oxford Committee for Famine Relief purchasing power parity random digit dialing Royal Scientific Society structure, agency, and contingency Sustainable Development Goals Sisterhood Is a Global Institute

Abbreviations xix

SIPRI SIT SMEs SOAS SRHR STD SWMENA TED UAE UGTT UNCTAD UN DESA UNDP UNFM UNHCR UNICEF USAID UVE WAV WFP WHO WoL WVS

Stockholm Institute of Peace Research School for Internationial Training small and medium-sized enterprises School of Oriental and African Studies sexual and reproductive health and rights sexually transmitted disease Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa Technology, Entertainment, Design United Arab Emirates Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens UN Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Development Programme Union Nationale des Femmes du Maroc United Nations Human Rights Commissioner United Nations Children’s Fund United States Agency for International Development Urban Verification Exercise Women against Violence World Food Programme World Health Organization World of Letters World Values Survey

INTRODUC TION

Why Is COVID Female? R I TA S T E P H A N

Why is “France Says COVID- Is Definitely Female” (Ledsom ) newsworthy? Does it matter if the term “COVID” is female? Linguistically, nouns and subjects vary in how they are gendered in most languages. L’Académie Française, the Office Québécois de la Langue Française (Quebec Board of the French Language), and the Royal Spanish Academy recommend treating “COVID” as feminine because the original English word—coronavirus disease—is translated to la maladie du coronavirus, which is feminine (Ledsom ). English linguists posit that complex concepts like COVID and government contribute to “a bigger argument about linguistic purism and the practice of gendering in language” (Tavarez ). Adverse events are typically masculine in Arabic and omnipotent events are feminine, so COVID- is masculine as a virus and feminine as a pandemic (Jaeha). One can argue that global responses did not measure up to the complexity of the pandemic regardless of the naming convention. However, COVID- has had a disastrous impact on families, economies, and communities— especially women. COVID and Gender in the Middle East highlights the gendered economic and social impact of the pandemic. Providing a comprehensive account of women as crucial members of society, it does not portray women as passive recipients of governmental assistance or silent victims of the pandemic. Instead, it centers women’s roles in mitigating the first-order (health), second-order (economic), and third-order (social) impacts of the pandemic on women in their social milieus. This volume offers an Arab feminist perspectives on national and localized responses to COVID gender-specific issues such as care responsibilities, gender-based violence (GBV), girls’ education, and displacement vulnerabilities.

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Why Are Women at the Heart of Care and Response? The World Health Organization (WHO) proclaimed that this pandemic is attacking societies at their core. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) assesses that “the COVID- outbreak affects all segments of the population and is particularly detrimental to members of those social groups in the most vulnerable situations, continues to affect populations, including people living in poverty situations, older persons, persons with disabilities, youth, and indigenous peoples” (UN DESA ). UN DESA warns that policies must be implemented to address the social crisis created by the pandemic, including an increase in inequality, exclusion, discrimination, and unemployment. It calls for urgency in creating “comprehensive, universal social protection systems,” best described by the UN secretary-general during the launch of a COVID- Global Humanitarian Response Plan on March , : We must come to the aid of the ultra-vulnerable—millions upon millions of people who are least able to protect themselves. This is a matter of basic human solidarity. It is also crucial for combating the virus. This is the moment to step up for the vulnerable. (UN DESA )

Official responses have considered women as a special category analyzed separately. They have compartmentalized the pandemic’s gender effects in discussions by women or about women. UN Women (a) suggests that the “impacts of crises are never gender-neutral, and COVID- is no exception.” Citing From Insights to Action: Gender Equality in the Wake of COVID-, it claims that “the pandemic will push  million people into extreme poverty by ,  million of whom are women and girls. This will bring the total number of women and girls living on USD . or less, to  million” (UN Women a). UN Women (b) also claims that globally “the COVID- pandemic is not just a health issue. It is a profound shock to our societies and economies, and women are at the heart of care and response efforts underway.” This statement requires a pause to unpack. What does it mean that COVID is not just a health issue? The social shock is real and must be addressed just as seriously as the economic shock. Women are not peripheral to the pandemic. They are not just passive victims. Most countries ignore this UN call for gender equity and inclusion. However, women are not silent about this double victimization by the pandemic and the exclusion. Their

Introduction xxiii

contributions, perspectives, and knowledge must be considered when designing care and response strategies. This volume is yet another place that allows women to claim their space in the solution and impose themselves on or work outside the system. These studies deliver a strong message for decision-makers to take serious measures in the recovery efforts to invest in women and ensure the equal inclusion of their contributions. Further, they stress the need to protect women in informal/insecure labor markets and promote remote modalities for income generation (UN , ). In a nutshell, they see now as the perfect time to bridge the gender divide and overcome gender inequalities. A few scholarly accounts have been emerging with a focus on the global footprint of the coronavirus. They highlight how the pandemic affected vulnerable populations’ access to social services, family dynamics, and psychological and career ramifications. Notably, Bristol University Press released several volumes addressing these topics, including Bringel and Pleyers (), Eccleston-Turner and Wenham (), and Greene (). Likewise, Routledge published important volumes including Bismark et al. (), Gammel and Wang (), and Ryan and Nanda (). Collections focused on pandemic vulnerabilities in ethnic and non-Western contexts or feminist perspectives include Castellanos and Sachs (), Gouws and Ezeobi (), Green and O’Reilly (), and Grugel and Barlow (). While the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remain newsworthy, local voices are almost always absent. This book is the first volume that elevates this critical region to contribute to the global discourse on the pandemic and its mitigation strategies. Several Western-based intergovernmental agencies, think tanks, and higher-education institutions were quick to deliver reports on COVID’s political and economic consequences in MENA. A study by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS ) identifies important themes in evaluating state responses, including “variations in state capacity; the securitization of the pandemic response and the potential for increased repression; the profound challenge to war-torn areas, conflict zones, and refugee concentrations; and the prominence in international relations of soft power, battles over narrative, and non-military interdependencies.” POMEPS’s second report ensures the inclusion of pieces by a number of authors featured in this volume, who address gender as a cross-cutting analytical category. UN Women, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted numerous analyses of COVID-’s impact on women and girls, especially increasing GBV, education, and economic burdens. Yet these two

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bodies of literature do not recognize how women and their organizations have responded to the pandemic or analyze women’s roles within their communities, families, or workplaces.

Organization of the Book COVID and Gender in the Middle East expresses local voices that discuss the pandemic’s first-, second-, and third-order impacts. It provides empirical evidence of the gendered effects in MENA in four areas: care and care work spheres, social vulnerabilities, a gender lens on COVID, and feminist responses. Part I is about care and care work: the one thing that women have to do whether they are capable of doing it or not—care in the home; frontline care; care for children, the ill, and the dying; care in the absence of healthcare (migrant women). With feminist foregrounding, the chapters in this section focus on paid and unpaid care work, traversing women’s care responsibilities between home and the workplace. Moghadam’s “COVID-, Women, and Healthcare” describes how the care burdens of women in the health profession have increased. She discusses the deteriorating conditions in medical work, including low wages, overwork due to the high volume of patients, staffing shortages, and inadequate equipment. She stresses the need to embark on new social and gender contracts to improve the health and well-being of women and their families rather than spending on militarization. Likewise, Skulte-Ouaiss and Mourad, in “COVID-: A Threat to Lebanese Women’s Precarious Condition,” describe the paradox faced by Lebanese women who are highly educated yet held hostage to multilayered patriarchal systems. They analyze how the unprecedented economic meltdown was a compounding factor in negatively affecting women’s lives. Moving to a different sphere of care work, Al-Ubaydli, Almoayyed, and Abdulla examine the wide-ranging socioeconomic effects of COVID- in “The Impact of COVID- on Women’s Prosperity in the Gulf Countries: Survey Evidence from Bahrain.” They study how female nationals have outperformed their male counterparts while migrant workers suffered. This chapter explains COVID within the context of the unique Gulf economies, with a special focus on Bahrain. Offering a perspective on the academic profession, Allam, Buttorff, and Shalaby argue that the pandemic furthered the gender gap in academia with the extra pressure from socially imposed norms and a male-dominated patriarchal workplace. “When Inequalities Interconnect: Women Scholars’ Productivity amid the COVID- Pandemic

Introduction xxv

in the Middle East and North Africa” explores the pandemic’s adverse effect on women academics’ productivity, showing the dual lose-lose burden on research and domestic care. Giving visibility to the neglected third-order impact of COVID, the four chapters in part II address the social vulnerabilities exacerbated by the pandemic. “The LGBTIQ+ Community’s COVID Dilemma in Lebanon” by Abou-Habib and Ali unveils the LGBTIQ+ community’s extreme vulnerabilities and deprivation of social protection due to the compacted impact of COVID, the Lebanese economic fallout, and the Beirut Port blast. Focusing on refugees in Jordan, “The Gendered Impact of the Pandemic on Syrian Refugee Women in Jordan” by El-Abed and Shabaitah explains the pandemic’s magnified effects on the economic, social, legal, temporal, and spatial transitions in the experience of Syrian refugees. Refugee women are forced into early marriages, dropping out of school and assuming new responsibilities as breadwinners. Addressing gender-based violence, Benachir and Raïs in “Violence against Moroccan Women during and after Lockdown” analyze how, despite their best intentions, Moroccan authorities neglected to address domestic violence during the pandemic. Sadoqi examines the fluctuating connections between distance education and gender discourse in “Gender Dynamics and Distance Education: Toward a Situational-Interactionist Model of the COVID- Contingency Effect on Female University Students in Morocco.” By adopting a situational approach, she argues that COVID- has eclipsed gender discourse in state strategies to mitigate its impact on women by focusing on socioeconomic stability rather than human and women’s well-being. Gendered effects are rarely considered in a region where patriarchal structures are strong and war and conflict are prevalent. Part III offers a gendered lens to view the overall impact of the pandemic. Stephan’s “COVID’s Three-Order Impacts on Women’s Health: A Typology” classifies countries into rentier, fragile, and failed states based on their political efficacy and prosperity. She discusses how states responded differently to the pandemic’s health aspects but failed to recognize its gendered social and economic problems. In “Women’s Rights and Roles during the COVID- Pandemic,” Al-Shami, Robbins, and Bampton find that attitudinal changes are happening in the private sphere to acknowledge women’s equal role in critical decisions within the household. However, women face structural barriers to reentry into the workforce and disproportionately bear the brunt of the pandemic’s effect on both monetized and nonmonetized economies. Offering a unique and innovative perspective, Khurma, Chouhoud, and Stephan in “Unmasking Masculinity during COVID in the Middle East and North

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Introduction

Africa” measure masculinity quantitatively, adopting indices developed for respondents in the United States. They find that MENA men are twice as likely to score high on the masculinity index as women and twice as likely as women to express anti-mask attitudes and exercise risky behaviors. Part IV engages feminist initiatives and dilemmas. Its point of departure is the exclusion of women and gender from COVID policy responses. In “COVID- and Feminism in the Middle East: Challenges, Initiatives, and Dilemmas,” Al-Ali addresses the gendered implications of COVID- in MENA, focusing on how the preexisting intersectional inequalities have led to increased risks and vulnerabilities. In “The Power of Bipartisan Mobilization: The Success of Tunisia’s Feminist Movement during the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Youssef and Yerkes argue that the Tunisian government handled some concerns about violence during the pandemic because feminist coalitions, formed before the pandemic, succeeded in elevating the fight against GBV to public policy levels. Abu Jaber’s “Harmony of Feminine and Masculine Leadership during the COVID- Pandemic in Jordan” considers both government and civil society’s socioeconomic and psychosocial support for women during the pandemic. She grounds her findings in an integral and holistic feminine approach to crisis management and feminist leadership. Similar accounts carry the voices of Palestinian feminists in Israel. “The Feminist Position: Corona Crisis Management and Its Impact on Palestinian Women” by Abu Al-Asal et al. discusses the failure of the state and local authorities to respond adequately to the pandemic due to the political exclusion of Palestinians and the limited economic resources allocated to their towns. In the following pages we strive to assert that COVID is indeed female, and so must its solutions be.

Note The views expressed in this introduction are those of the author and do not represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the US Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

References Bismark, Marie, Karen Willis, Sophie Lewis, and Natasha Smallwood. . Experiences of Health Workers in the COVID- Pandemic: In Their Own Words. New York: Routledge.

Introduction xxvii

Bringel, Breno, and Geoffrey Pleyers, eds. . Social Movements and Politics in a Global Pandemic. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Castellanos, Paige, and Carolyn E. Sachs. . Gender, Food and COVID-: Global Stories of Harm and Hope. New York: Routledge. Eccleston-Turner, Mark, and Clare Wenham. . Declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Gammel, Irene, and Jason Wang, eds. . Creative Resilience and COVID-: Figuring the Everyday in a Pandemic. New York: Routledge. Gouws, Amanda, and Olivai Ezeobi. . COVID Diaries: Women’s Experience of the Pandemic. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Stellenbosch University. Green, Fiona, and Andrea O’Reilly. . Mothers, Mothering, and COVID-: Dispatches from the Pandemic. Toronto, Canada: Demeter Press. Greene, Alan. . Emergency Powers in a Time of Pandemic. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Grugel, Jean, and Matt Barlow. . The Gendered Face of COVID-: The Development, Gender and Health Nexus in the Global South. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Hans, Asha, Kalpana Kannabiran, Manoranjan Mohanty, and Pushpendra Mehta. . Migration, Workers, and Fundamental Freedoms: Pandemic Vulnerabilities and States of Exception in India. New York: Routledge. Ledsom, Alex. . “France Says COVID- Is Definitely Female.” Forbes (May ). https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexledsom////france-says-covid--is -definitely-female/?sh=fceddccc. POMEPS (Project on Middle East Political Science). . “The COVID- Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa” (April). https://pomeps.org/wp-content /uploads///POMEPS_Studies__Web.pdf. ———. . “COVID- in the MENA: Two Years On” (June). https://pomeps.org /wp-content/uploads///POMEPS_Studies_.pdf. Ryan, J. Michael, and Serena Nanda. . COVID-: Social Inequalities and Human Possibilities. New York: Routledge. Tavarez, Nicole. .“The Language of COVID-: Masculine or Feminine?” (July ). https://www.altalang.com/beyond-words/languages-gendering-covid-. UN (United Nations). . “Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID- on the Arab Region: An Opportunity to Build Back Better” (July). https://unsdg.un.org/sites /default/files/-/sg_policy_brief_covid-_and_arab_states_english_version _july_.pdf. ———. n.d. “The  Goals.” https://sdgs.un.org/goals. UN DESA (Department of Social and Economic Affairs). . “Everyone Included: Social Impact of COVID-.” https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/every one-included-covid-.html. UN Women. a. “COVID- and Its Economic Toll on Women: The Story behind the Numbers” (September ). https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories ///feature-covid--economic-impacts-on-women. ———. b. “In Focus: Gender Equality Matters in COVID- Response” (March ). https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid --response.

COVID and Gender in the Middle East

PAR T I

Care and Care Work Spheres

CHAPTER 1

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare VA L E N T I N E M . M O G H A DA M

Starting as an outbreak in Wuhan, China, in late , the COVID- virus quickly spread globally, becoming a pandemic. Its worldwide diffusion resulted from aspects of contemporary globalization, such as increased international travel, but also from poverty, social exclusion, unequal healthcare, and under-resourced healthcare systems. Like the economic crises that feminist social scientists have studied, disease outbreaks affect women and men differently, and pandemics make existing social and gender inequalities worse. In the case of COVID-, gendered effects were discussed in terms of job, income, and mobility losses; increased demands on women’s domestic labor and time burdens to homeschool children and care for the sick and elderly; domestic violence spikes as stay-at-home orders expanded; expulsions of refugees or migrants; and vulnerability to the virus in feminized sectors such as healthcare, schooling, the food industry, and other frontline or essential sectors. These impacts extend to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, bearing in mind certain distinctive features: • Healthcare systems in MENA (Arab countries, Iran, Israel, and Turkey) are functional, and some are of excellent quality, but (a) out-of-pocket expenditures are extremely high in most countries, (b) a quality gap exists between the private and public health systems in some countries, and (c) rural populations are often ill-served, while many do not have health insurance. Most of the middle-income countries have seen two decades of deteriorating public health services. • The MENA region is known for very high military spending, with several countries spending more on the military than on healthcare. In – , according to World Bank data, average healthcare spending in Arab

4

Care and Care Work Spheres

•

•

•

•

•

countries as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was . percent, compared to . percent on the military. In contrast, the world average for healthcare expenditure was . percent of GDP and . percent for the military (World Bank a, c). Shocks that predate the pandemic include conflict, harsh economic sanctions, external debt burdens, and the influx of refugees from the internationalized civil conflict in Syria. Conflicts continued despite Security Council Resolution  of July , , and the UN secretary-general’s appeal for a global ceasefire (UNSCR ). Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have numerous migrant workers and expatriate professionals, mainly from south or southeast Asia. Physicians, nurses, and hospital employees in GCC countries are typically expatriate professionals and migrant workers. High costs lead many Gulf citizens to travel abroad for treatment (Alpen Capital ). Jordan and Lebanon, like the GCC countries, employ large numbers of migrant domestic workers (MDWs), many of them women from south or southeast Asia. Domestic workers, whether migrant or native, do not fall under labor law protection. MENA female labor force participation (FLFP) is less than half the global average of  percent: in  it was estimated to be  percent for the Arab region and just  percent for MENA as a whole (World Bank b); college-educated women have the highest rates of employment (and unemployment). Intraregional economic cooperation—which could include trade, labor flows, investments, collaborative research, and development—is weak to nonexistent (Hoekman ).

During the heyday of Third World development, many countries provided free or subsidized healthcare for citizens, especially those in urban areas or employed in the public sector. The “authoritarian bargain” in MENA provided free healthcare and education, an array of subsidies, relatively high wages for manufacturing workers, and guaranteed employment to graduates in return for citizen acquiescence to authoritarian rule (Karshenas ; Karshenas and Moghadam ). The bargain began to fray in the s and had generated numerous protests by the new century. The first multicountry wave erupted in the  Arab Spring uprisings and the second wave in –, with citizens in Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia protesting high unemployment, incompetent or corrupt governance, and poor public services. The health sector, specifically, had been adversely affected by privatization and low government investment.

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare

5

As in other world regions, the health sector in MENA countries employs women as physicians, administrators, nurses, aides, social workers, cooks, and cleaners. Like their male counterparts, women in the health sector have been at risk of infection. However, unlike men, women in the health sector also carry out care work at home: cooking, cleaning, and caring for their children and elderly relatives. As feminist scholars found to be the case with economic crises, the pandemic intensified working women’s “reproductive labor,” compelling some to leave the labor force altogether. This background and the regional features suggest that women experienced the pandemic in different ways across and within countries—by social class, occupation, location, and national origin—and that planning for a post-pandemic era will be necessary. In this chapter I focus on healthcare provisioning and argue that women workers in health and related social sectors should be at the center of such planning. The chapter outlines conditions, similarities, and differences across countries as well as some necessary action. I draw on an array of secondary sources, including data from governments, international organizations, UN agencies, surveys, the Worldometer site (worldometers.info/coronavirus), studies by women’s organizations, press accounts, and academic research on female labor force participation and distribution. For context, I begin with an overview of MENA’s human development and human security landscape. I review data on healthcare provisioning and spending, the contrast with military spending, public opinion on healthcare, and the role and status of healthcare workers. The chapter ends with some suggestions for the post-pandemic future.

Human Development and Healthcare: A Regional Assessment MENA countries differ in their resource base, wealth, and population size; the six GCC members are oil economies and the richest in the region. The World Bank classifies countries by Gross National Income (GNI) and wealth (GDP). Its  classification of MENA countries by GNI per capita was as follows (although by  Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, and Tunisia were downgraded to lower middle income): • • • •

Low income: Yemen Lower middle income: Egypt, Morocco, West Bank and Gaza, Syria, Tunisia Upper middle income: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya High income: Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE)

6

Care and Care Work Spheres

MENA governments improved both healthcare systems and outcomes over the decades, as measured by the number of hospital beds and healthcare workers, infant and child mortality rates, maternal mortality, and life expectancy. Infectious diseases have been successfully tackled (other than in war-torn Yemen), though many countries have seen a rise in noncommunicable diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular problems. Women’s reproductive health improved and fertility rates declined as women’s access to education, contraception, and jobs increased. Such progress was part of state-led social development under the authoritarian bargain. The s shift to privatization and liberalization entailed “cost recovery” and the introduction of “user fees” for many public services, along with wage deterioration. By the early part of the new century, out-of-pocket healthcare expenses were high (see the following discussion), especially in the large non-oil economies. Additionally, shocks began to derail the progress in economic and social development: sanctions, invasions, wars, fiscal crises, and environmental disasters. In Iraq’s case, the punitive sanctions regime of the s destroyed the welfare state, and the  invasion ruined much of the remaining physical and social infrastructure. Between  and  some MENA countries moved down the human development ranking, and others up, as seen in table .. Syria fell from medium human development in  to low human development in  due to the internationalized conflict that began in , while Algeria and Iran moved up to high human development. As in other world regions, MENA countries signed on to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Most directly related to health and women are Goals  (good health and well-being),  (gender equality), and  (clean water and sanitation), but all seventeen SDGs constitute an integrated and holistic, if ambitious, plan for humanity’s advancement, with gender mainstreamed throughout (UN n.d.). Although it is too soon to determine the pandemic’s longer-term financial and societal impacts, some experts fear it may have set back progress toward SDG realization. The pandemic pushed healthcare systems to their limits throughout the world, but some countries were less prepared than others, resulting in overworked and underpaid healthcare workers and high rates of infection and death. As noted earlier, MENA healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP has been lower, and military spending higher, than the world averages. According to the World Bank, the  world average for healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP was . percent; for MENA, it was . percent (World Bank a). Morocco spent . percent of its GDP on healthcare in –, . percent of GDP on education (), and . percent of GDP

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare 7

Table 1.1. Change in MENA Human Development Designations, 2012 and 2018, by Type of MENA Economy 2012

Very High Human Development

High Human Development

Medium Human Development

Low Human Development

Oil economies

Bahrain, Qatar, UAE

Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia

Libya

—

Mixed oil economies

—

Iran, Tunisia

Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Syria

—

Non-oil economies

Israel

Lebanon, Turkey

Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Territories

Yemen

UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait

--

--

--

Iran, Algeria, Tunisia

Iraq, Egypt

--

2018 Oil economies

Mixed oil economies Non-oil economies

Israel

Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan Palestinian Territories

Syria, Sudan, Yemen

Source: Author, from the World Bank and UNDP.

on the military (Belabbes ). Egypt’s healthcare spending, at . percent of GDP, was higher than its military spending but much lower than spending in Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, Tunisia, and especially Jordan. As seen in table ., healthcare spending varies considerably across the region. It is high in Iran, Lebanon, and Jordan, and some healthcare indicators match this spending. The lowest MENA spenders on healthcare were Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, and Yemen. Note that this group includes countries with extremely high levels of military spending. Declining social investments and individual salaries have had at least two effects: significant out-of-pocket expenses and the departure of healthcare workers, especially doctors, for more lucrative positions in other countries. Out-of-pocket health expenditures in non-GCC MENA countries (out of

Table 1.2. Military Social Expenditures, and Healthcare Personnel, 2017–2018, MENA in World-Regional Perspective Military expenditure as % of GDP, 2018

Military expenditure as % of government expenditure, 2018

Health Health workers per expenditure, 1,000 people 2013–2018 as % of GDP, 2017 Physicians Nurses

Education expenditure, as % GDP, 2018

Algeria

5.9

13.8

6.4

1.7

1.5

—

Bahrain

4.0

10.9

4.7

0.9

2.5

2.3

Egypt

1.4

4.1

4.7

0.5

1.9

—

Iran

2.7

15.8

8.7

1.6

2.6

4.0

Iraq

2.7

8.4

4.2

0.7

2.0

—

Israel

4.3

11.1

7.4

4.6

5.7

5.8

Jordan

4.7

15.0

8.1

2.3

2.8

3.6

Kuwait

5.1

11.0

5.3

2.6

7.4

—

Lebanon

5.0

15.6

8.2

2.1

1.7

2.4 (2013)*

Morocco

3.1

10.5

5.2

0.7

1.4

—

Oman

8.2

19.0

3.8

2.4

4.2

4.97 (2013)*

Qatar

—

—

2.6

2.5

7.3

3.6

Saudi Arabia

8.8

24.6

5.2

2.6

5.5

2.9

Syria

—

—

—

1.3

1.5

—

Tunisia

2.1

6.9

7.2

1.3

2.5

6.6 (2015)*

Turkey

2.5

7.1

4.12

1.8

2.7

4.4

UAE

—

—

3.3

2.5

5.7

—

Yemen

—

—

4.2

0.5

0.8

—

World

2.1

6.1

9.9

1.6

3.8

4.9

East Asia & Pacific

1.7

5.4

6.6

1.7

3.4

4.2

Europe & Central Asia

1.7

4.0

9.3

3.4

8.3

5.1

LAC

1.3

4.1

8.0

2.3

5.1

5.3

North America

3.0

8.4

16.6

2.6

14.1

5.0

South Asia

2.5

9.8

3.5

0.8

1.5

2.1

Sub-Saharan Africa

1.1

4.6

5.2

0.2

1.0

4.6

MENA

5.5

16.4

5.7

1.3

2.5

—

Note: Data not available for Libya or Palestine (West Bank & Gaza). *UNESCO Institute of Statistics, http://data.uis.unesco.org/. Note: Data not available for Libya. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, military: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.7; health systems: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.12; education: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.7.

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare

9

total health spending) are very high; in  they ranged from  percent in Jordan to  percent in Egypt and  percent in Morocco and fully  percent in Yemen (Our World in Healthcare n.d.). According to the WHO (, ), global out-of-pocket spending in  was  percent. Citizens pay out-of-pocket for their healthcare because they do not have healthcare insurance, their country has no public healthcare system, or the public system has been so defunded and is in such poor shape that citizens prefer private providers. Low salaries have compelled many physicians to leave their countries. Tunisia’s National Council of the Order of Physicians reports that  percent of its members practice outside their home country. Some  percent of Egyptian physicians practice elsewhere with higher pay, especially in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms (“Out of Place: Doctors in the Middle East” ). Tunisia had the most developed welfare system on the African continent in the s, albeit with clientelist elements (Ben Romdhane ). Investments in public health began to fall behind the expansion of private healthcare, and the welfare system began to fray in the early part of this century. Tunisia has struggled to deliver quality services since the  revolution and subsequent loss of revenue and investments. After  the government sought loans from the IMF and World Bank and in return made cuts in public spending. In  Tunisia’s public debt was €, million ($, million) or . percent of GDP, a . percentage point rise from , when it was . percent of GDP. In  its debt consumed  percent of GDP (Focus Economics n.d.). Nonetheless, Tunisia offered cash transfers to households and enterprises when the pandemic struck in , along with a public information campaign (Krafft, Assaad, and Marouani ; Nasri, Boubaker, and Dhaouadi ). Morocco’s  constitution enshrines the right to healthcare, but less than half the population has health insurance; there also are “problems of low service quality and delays in receiving care” (Jacobs ). In  medical professionals and students staged protests and strikes against privatization. Morocco’s external debt of $ billion consumed  percent of its GDP, and it had a heavy external debt of nearly $ billion at the end of , representing a . percent increase from . Morocco received numerous loans from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, and France, among other entities (Morocco World News a). The Arab Monetary Fund provided a loan worth $ million to Morocco in May , ostensibly to provide financial resources to meet Morocco’s needs in the midst of the global pandemic. There has been much discussion in Morocco regarding the increasing external debt, including a

10

Care and Care Work Spheres

warning from Morocco’s central bank, Bank al-Maghrib (Morocco World News b). Lebanon’s healthcare system is organized along sectarian lines, privatized, and costly. Especially vulnerable are low-income Lebanese citizens, Palestinian refugees, and the more recent Syrian refugees, who increased the population by  percent (Hamadeh et al. ). Recent years have seen a political and fiscal crisis, with middle-class citizens having difficulty making ends meet as salaries were slashed and banks imposed informal capital controls. The coronavirus-induced lockdown compounded these problems (Al-Monitor c). In early June , as cash-strapped Lebanon sought a loan from the International Monetary Fund, the United States proposed punitive measures (“Destroying Lebanon to Save It” ). The country suffered casualties and infrastructural destruction from the August  explosion at the Port of Beirut, from which it has yet to recover. Iranian citizens have enjoyed good healthcare and education mostly at state expense, but US sanctions severely damaged the government’s ability to import needed health equipment. Despite health insurance coverage of –  percent of households (Harris , ) and relatively high healthcare spending, Iran still was hit hard by the pandemic. Yemen, the poorest MENA country and with the worst health infrastructure, has seen its physical and social infrastructure devastated by civil conflict and especially air assaults and port blockades by Saudi Arabia and the UAE since . A  report noted that half of Yemen’s hospitals had closed or were partially functioning and that most healthcare provisioning came from international humanitarian workers such as Doctors without Borders (Strochlic ). Syria, too, has suffered from an internationalized civil conflict, but it has a functioning government, which Yemen does not have, so citizens in areas under Syrian government control can expect access to public health facilities. Still, Syria’s once competent medical and pharmaceutical sectors have been devastated since the onset of war. Elizabeth Hoff, who led the WHO office in Damascus, said in a  interview that the principal obstacles to the recovery of Syria’s medical infrastructure were the continued sanctions that prevent Syria from obtaining critical equipment and supplies to rebuild its healthcare capacity (Klein ). Despite the ongoing war, the Syrian government’s armed forces had suspended conscription by March , , and then announced the demobilization of thousands of reservists on March  to reduce the risk of infection (Sayegh ). With help from the UNDP, young Syrian graduates were putting entrepreneurial and engineering skills to use, to scale up preparedness and readiness to face COVID- (UNDP ). However,

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare 11

just as the Syrian government began the long and arduous reconstruction work, the Donald Trump administration in June  enacted even harsher sanctions, under the so-called Caesar Act. In addition to targeting Syrian officials, it enacted sanctions on foreign persons or companies doing business with the government, specifically in the construction, engineering, energy, and aviation sectors. Targets included anyone providing support for the government’s military operations or those of its main backers, Russia and Iran. Critics argued that the new sanctions, like the ones imposed on Iran, punished civilians more than the governments and would adversely affect Lebanese business with Syria (Al-Monitor a). How does healthcare spending compare with military spending? As noted earlier in this chapter and seen in table ., military spending as a percentage of GDP has been very high in the region as a whole and in certain MENA countries in particular. Between  and , the biggest spenders on military weapons were Saudi Arabia and Oman; Saudi Arabia also spent far more on the military than on healthcare (see figures . and .). Recent data are not available for the UAE, but in , according to the World Bank, military spending consumed   percent of GDP, two to three times more than the UAE spent on health or education. According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report, between  and , the UAE spent . percent of its GDP on health and another . percent on education—compared with   percent on its military (UNDP , table ). Counterintuitively, the poorest country, Yemen, was a major military spender before , as it was a US ally in the “war on terror.” According to the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research, Yemen’s military spending consumed almost  percent of its GDP in -,  percent in , and  percent in  (SIPRI ).

(Low) Satisfaction with Healthcare Table . provides data on the number of health personnel (physicians and nurses) across the region from a comparative perspective. The richer the MENA country, the more doctors and nurses (Israel has the most doctors per , people). In cross-regional terms, MENA fares poorly, especially when compared with Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia and the Pacific. The dearth of health professionals and high out-of-pocket payments may be reasons for the low satisfaction with healthcare in the region. In the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS, –), in response to the question on “Frequency you/your family have gone without needed medication or treatment that you needed” (V), about half

Figure 1.1. Military spending, MENA countries, 2017. Source: World Bank 2020a (data for

2010–2017). Courtesy Liangmou Zhang.

Figure 1.2. Healthcare spending as percentage of GDP, 2017. Source: World Bank 2020b (data for 2010–2017).

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of Moroccans reported “sometimes” or “often” and half “rarely” or “never.” A report on Arab Barometer Wave V healthcare questions found that just   percent of respondents were completely satisfied or satisfied with the healthcare system in their country (Thomas , -). In – satisfaction was highest in Jordan ( percent) and lowest in Lebanon ( percent) and Morocco and Libya (each  percent). At – percent, respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco were least optimistic about their governments’ delivery of healthcare (Thomas , ). Moroccans also appeared to be the most pessimistic about fair access to healthcare. Moroccan responses scored the third highest when asked about corruption in the healthcare industry, at  percent; two-thirds of citizens in Morocco said it was unavoidable to pay rashwa (a tip or bribe) to receive better healthcare services (Thomas , ). Jordanian citizens reported greater satisfaction with their healthcare system. On the same WVS V question mentioned above, a large majority of Jordanians considered themselves to be in good or very good health. In the Arab Barometer’s Wave V survey,  percent reported never going without required medicine or treatment. This may be because of Jordan’s relatively high healthcare spending—fully . percent of GDP in , albeit a dip from the high of  percent in . The influx of some , Syrian refugees, however, likely placed pressure on Jordan’s healthcare infrastructure, especially when the pandemic broke out (see Lupieri ).

The Pandemic Hits the Region Differences across the MENA region in wealth and income, state capacity, population dynamics, and stability and security could help explain how COVID- was experienced and tackled. For example, until recently, the GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, with their oil wealth and absolutist monarchies—were mainly immune to economic and political shocks. Given their wealth and small populations, those countries perform well on health indicators. However, their economies rely on an army of migrant workers who lack many labor rights (and cannot become citizens) and endure cramped housing conditions—with implications for the spread of COVID- in spring and summer of . Indeed, of all Arab countries tracked by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) in the first few months of the pandemic, Saudi Arabia and Qatar had the most COVID- cases, predominantly among migrant

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workers (UN  ESCWA ). Saudi Arabia had many more deaths than Qatar, but by December  most deaths within the GCC were in Oman. In March  all the MENA countries instituted the lockdown measures that countries elsewhere implemented. By July , some had weathered the storm better than others. Unlike in the United States, the wearing of masks became mandatory in Morocco and Tunisia, and both countries accelerated the production of masks (OECD ). Iran was different. According to the University of Oxford’s Government Response Stringency Index time series, Iran had a less stringent and slower response to the pandemic, which is why COVID- spread so widely in the early months (“Iran and COVID-” ). The Arab countries with the most cases and deaths by late July  were Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. Iran and Turkey were badly hit, ranking th and th among countries affected worldwide. ESCWA tracking data showed that, in the first few months of the pandemic, Saudi Arabia and Qatar had the most COVID- cases, predominantly among migrant workers (UN ESCWA  and Worldometer b). Indeed, as the Economist magazine noted in late April , “Qatar has more cases than Ukraine, which is  times more populous” (“COVID in the Camps” ). The virus was spreading fastest among laborers in Qatar, most of them concentrated in a single residential compound in the Industrial Area, home to more than , people. Migrants in Saudi Arabia made up   percent of positive cases in May , “a very high proportion, given that migrants comprise  percent of the Saudi population as a whole” (Babar , ). ESCWA data confirmed the toll in Saudi Arabia: nearly , cases by June , , with , recoveries and  deaths (UN  ESCWA ). GCC governments could carry out free testing for the migrant workers, but they also furloughed or dismissed many. Migrant workers in Kuwait endured calls for their expulsion; those who remained struggled to obtain vaccines (Debre ). Jordan was commended for being the first country in the region to impose a strict lockdown to confront and contain the coronavirus pandemic, with much success—just nine deaths in June  and some eight hundred cases compared to tens of thousands of cases in Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (Al-Monitor b). The number of cases and deaths in Jordan increased, however: nearly , cases and fully , deaths by December  (Worldometer a, b: figures for  and ). That same month, Turkey ranked th in Worldometer’s list of countries with the highest COVID- incidence, although Iran, still at th, had many more deaths per million:  compared to Turkey’s . Other MENA countries with

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare 15

high death rates per million were Iraq (), Jordan (), and Oman () (Worldometer b, figures for ). Many more cases and deaths were reported by May . Of  countries and territories on the Worldometer table, Turkey was number  (with over . million cases and , deaths), Iran  (over . million cases but , deaths), Iraq , and Israel . Also in the top  were Jordan () and UAE (). Lebanon, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia were clustered at  to . Tunisia was number , Palestine and Kuwait  and , Egypt , Bahrain , Qatar and Oman  and , Libya , and Algeria . In contrast, Vietnam—with a population of over  million—was ranked at , with just , total cases and only  deaths (data from worldometers.info in May ). The country’s socialist-inspired public health system had paid off (see Moghadam ). By mid-March , according to the Worldometer table, the United States had the largest number of reported cases in total (over  million) as well as deaths (nearly  million), followed by India and Brazil. In terms of ranking by number of COVID cases, MENA countries that remained in the top fifty affected countries were Turkey, Iran, Israel, Iraq, and Jordan. The number of total deaths was highest in Iran (,), followed by Turkey (,) (Worldometer b).

Women Health Workers: The Toll of Paid and Unpaid Care Work Female labor force participation (FLFP) in MENA is characterized by a steady rise in female shares in many professions since the s, with “feminization” occurring in education, social services, pharmacology, and the law. Educated women make up a sizable proportion of the public-sector labor force, but their marginal position in the private sector reduces their overall labor force shares and participation rates, with a regional average of between  and  percent (depending on the data source). Even before the pandemic, neither social norms nor public policies encouraged women’s full labor incorporation (Karshenas and Moghadam ). The lack of institutional supports for working mothers may be a disincentive for women. School starts at age six in MENA, and public preschool facilities are rare. Although all MENA countries require some degree of paid maternity leave, it remains the employer’s financial responsibility and is of short duration in some countries. In Iran and only four Arab countries—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan—paid maternity leave is covered through the social

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Care and Care Work Spheres

security/social insurance system. However, Tunisian women are fully covered only in the public sector; income replacement in the private sector is  percent; furthermore, maternity leave is longer in the public sector than in the private sector (Moghadam ). Such discrepancy, common to other MENA countries, contributes to the observed wage discrimination against women in the private sector (Tansel, Keskin, and Ozdemir ). Therefore, it is no surprise that MENA women’s labor force participation is generally low, especially among married women with children and those with secondary schooling or less. GCC countries, as a case apart, employ migrant workers as drivers, cooks, cleaners, nannies, and eldercare workers, which facilitates the ability of Gulf women to enter and remain in the workforce. The relatively high FLFP rates in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE (on the order of –  percent) not only are inclusive of both nationals and nonnationals but are also enabled by the army of migrant female domestic workers from countries such as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, who provide cleaning, cooking, and childcare services in households. The workers’ low hourly rates, compared to the market rate for such services in Western countries, allow GCC women nationals to enter and remain in the public-sector jobs in which they are concentrated. Saudi women’s employment rates are the lowest among GCC countries. Around   percent of adult Saudi women held jobs or were actively looking for jobs in late  (Ng ). Yet their unemployment rates are exceedingly high (as high as  percent, compared with just  percent for male unemployment), which suggests the absence of job opportunities for women. Few job-seeking Saudi women are inclined to consider employment in mixed-sex environments, much less domestic labor. Hence the persistence of large numbers of migrant domestic workers as well as expatriate women professionals. During the pandemic, native women employees in GCC countries were largely unaffected, although many migrant workers were dismissed or returned to their home countries. Elsewhere school closures during the pandemic affected MENA women in at least three ways: intensification of the care burden of nurses and other women health workers; loss of jobs for those without permanent contracts, which could include school cooks and cleaners as well as teaching or health assistants; and early retirement or departure from the labor market because of increased care work at home. The urgency of reconciling paid and unpaid work through institutional supports has received scant governmental attention, but working women themselves have long identified it as necessary. In interviews in Jordan in , I found

COVID-19, Women, and Healthcare 17

that women employees stressed the need for institutionalized and affordable “baby care” (Moghadam , ). Similarly, Ilkkaracan () highlights the lack of work-family reconciliation measures as an important part of the explanation for low FLFP in Turkey (and elsewhere), and a UN study (UN Women and UN ESCWA ) links Arab countries’ low FLFP to the highly unequal distribution of unpaid care work at home and the absence of early childhood care and education. These observations are especially pertinent for women health workers with young children, who provided essential services during the pandemic but struggled to balance their paid work and the unpaid care work they carried out at home. MENA women are overrepresented in the healthcare sector, not in leadership positions but mostly as nurses or nurse assistants, although  percent of all physicians are women (Boniol et al. , ). Women health workers risk infection and death, but they also suffer from low funding, mismanagement, authoritarian governance, and the adverse effects of sanctions or conflict in many countries. About   percent of Jordan’s women work in the healthcare sector, primarily as nurses. In Morocco women represent  percent of the total medical workforce and  percent of paramedical personnel, including nurses and technicians (Ennaji , , citing data from the Haut Commissariat au Plan). Fully  percent of Egypt’s nurses are female;  percent of the members of Lebanon’s Order of Nurses are female, tackling not only a public health crisis but also a severe economic crisis (Lebanese American University ). Nurses everywhere have been at risk. Some , nurses were infected with COVID- while working on the frontline in Iran in , and  health workers lost their lives. As many as , nurses and doctors may have left Iran as of February  because of low salaries or late reimbursements (Entekhab ; see also Middle East Eye ). Authoritarian governments did little to alleviate health workers’ burdens. Indeed, Turkish health workers who questioned the government’s figures on infections and deaths were labeled “terrorists” by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (“One Man’s Terrorist” ). According to a  study by the Tunisian women’s policy agency Centre de Recherches, d’Études, de Documentation, et de l’Information sur la Femme (CREDIF),   percent of Tunisia’s medical personnel at the time were women (CREDIF ; see also Moghadam , table ). Feminization of the health sector began in the early s, partly due to the departure of many of Tunisia’s doctors and other medical workers to Europe or GCC countries, but also due to rising university enrollments of young women in medicine, nursing, and medical research. The frontline healthcare workers

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Care and Care Work Spheres

have been visible throughout the pandemic, and healthcare is considered a public good, not a privilege (Aliriza ). However, dissatisfaction has set in due to declining investments in the public health sector. Healthcare workers went on strike in June  to protest cutbacks and reduced salaries and to demand better working conditions (“Tunisian Healthcare Workers Strike to Demand Reforms” ; see also Al-Monitor d). When a young doctor lost his life in a malfunctioning elevator at a regional hospital in early December , the country’s main trade union, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), organized protests (“Outcry after Tunisian Doctor Dies in Hospital Lift Accident” , and personal communication from a UGTT health sector official). It appeared in mid- that Tunisia’s healthcare system and the country’s investments in women medical workers had paid off; as of June , , according to ESCWA’s pandemic tracker, Tunisia had , cases,  recoveries, and  deaths. The prime minister declared that the country had won the battle against COVID- and would reopen by the end of June. Some days later, however, healthcare workers went on strike to protest cutbacks and reduced salaries and to demand better working conditions (“Tunisian Healthcare Workers Strike to Demand Reforms” ; see also Al-Monitor d). Moreover, total cases shot up to nearly , by December, with some , deaths, still far less than Sweden, Portugal, and Belgium, with similar population size, but far more than Cuba (similar population size) as well as Algeria (population  million) (based on data at worldometers .info/coronavirus in December ). Tunisia received its first batch of COVID- vaccines in March  under the COVID- Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative, but a second surge in early May  enveloped the country, with an official record of more than , coronavirus cases and , deaths (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé ; “Tunisia Begins Week of Strict COVID Lockdown” ). Shortly thereafter, the country’s president, Kais Saied, assumed vast executive powers, firing the prime minister and suspending parliament. And yet cases and deaths continued rising; as of mid-March , according to Worldometer data, Tunisia had over a million COVID cases in total, and just over , deaths. The pandemic’s employment effects were different across countries and sectors, but generally worse for women. A  ESCWA policy brief estimated that fully , of some . million jobs potentially lost in the Arab region would be women’s jobs (UN Women and UN ESCWA ). A report by Egypt’s statistical agency, cited in an August  news brief, stated that Egypt’s unemployment rate had risen to a near two-year high, with women’s unemployment rate at .  percent, nearly double that of men’s

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(El Habachi ). Another study found much higher rates in Egypt and especially in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. According to Krafft, Assaad, and Marouani (), women’s unemployment rates in June  were  percent in Jordan,  percent in Morocco,  percent in Tunisia, and  percent in Egypt. Such high unemployment rates are disproportionate to the (low) FLFP rates and represent a reversal of women’s gains in economic participation and empowerment. Apart from their effects on working women, school closures and lockdowns affected the education of an estimated  million children and young people (Sherman ). Distance learning programs posed challenges to low-income households that lacked the necessary digital tools, books, supplies, and adequate space. Without compensatory measures, these realities likely undermined many young people’s preparations for further education or for jobs.

Conclusions When the pandemic struck MENA, international organizations predicted dire outcomes. Human development would decline, especially within workingclass and rural communities and those in the informal sector. Youth unemployment rates—already very high, especially among college-educated young women—would rise. A UN report estimated that fully a quarter of the total Arab population would fall into poverty (UN a). The presence of unequal gender relations and the persistence of male bias and patriarchal norms would result in a greater toll on women: job and income losses, a heavier care burden in the family, social isolation, and the possibility of spikes in domestic violence. This chapter has shown that many of those predictions were realized, with differences across class, occupation, location, and national origin. The available evidence suggests that women in the professions appear not to have lost jobs, although their care burdens increased; those in the private sector—including agriculture, the informal sector, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and migrant workers—were most vulnerable to job and income loss. Medical workers in MENA, including the large percentages of women health workers, performed heroically despite deteriorating conditions and wages. They experienced overwork due to the high volume of patients, staffing shortages, and inadequate equipment. Such workers should be at the center of post-pandemic recovery and resilience plans. Just a few years into the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals, the pandemic inflicted

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massive economic blows throughout the world. Programs for women’s empowerment could suffer, confirming UN deputy secretary-general Amina Mohammad’s warning of September  that “the pandemic could set back women’s rights by decades” (UN b). Several MENA countries are still reeling from various shocks—sanctions, conflict, high unemployment, heavy debt burdens—and will need to craft new strategies for recovery and resilience. Given the many conflicts and rivalries, it is difficult to envisage a region-wide common strategy, so countries will need to design programs and policies independently, with international support. Some have already done so. In May and June of  Tunisia began to meet the goals of its - national development plan, which included the expansion of preschool facilities for both child health and female employment growth (see Moghadam ). Partnerships with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Italian and German governments, and a firm in the industrial zone of Sidi Toumi that mostly employs women broke ground for an early childhood care and education center; equipment and educational materials for kindergartens in twenty-three governorates also were dispatched (UNICEF a, b). In addition, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced in February  that Tunisia was among six African countries to receive the technology needed to produce mRNA vaccines (WHO ). Ennaji () writes of new programs in Morocco that include the expansion of healthcare for all citizens within a five-year time frame, the extension of social welfare to vulnerable groups, and a strategic investment fund worth $. billion to help businesses and individuals recover from the pandemic-induced economic shock. To help Morocco cope, the World Bank agreed to restructure loans. Two key Moroccan social services ministries developed an online marketplace to help women cooperative members sell their products. Former cabinet minister (–) Mohamed Said Saadi stated that “the current crisis is an opportunity to break with the neoliberal trends that have harmed gender equality” (Ennaji , ). In that spirit, I end with some proposals based on this chapter’s observations regarding women, work, family, and care; the high rates of military expenditure compared with expenditure on health; and the plight of migrant workers. Women’s economic empowerment is linked to the improvement of public services. Accordingly, upgrading the social infrastructure—healthcare, education and training, social services—should be an integrated policy domain. The expansion of affordable and quality preschool facilities would incentivize mothers of young children to seek jobs while providing employment opportunities for other women, especially those from lower-income or working-class households; it also would relieve the domestic care burden

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of women health workers. Many MENA countries have a dearth of nurses (see table .), so training more nurses to serve in hospitals and schools at all levels should be a priority. Among other benefits, this would reduce the female unemployment rate while also helping to improve healthcare delivery and outcomes. Where flexible work arrangements are possible, women should be prioritized, given their continued domestic care work. Statutory paid maternity leave should be regarded as both a labor right and an employment incentive, and all countries should ratify International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention  on maternal employment. Labor legislation should extend to domestic workers, whether native or migrant; all MENA countries should ratify ILO Convention  on domestic workers. It is past time to reduce the flow of arms to the Middle East and shift states’ priorities from militarized national security to citizen-centered human security. Reducing the arms flows—which emanate largely from the United States, United Kingdom, and France—could help alleviate tensions and conflicts in the region and enable greater allocation of resources toward the realization of citizens’ health, food, economic, and environmental security—all of which are inscribed in the SDGs. Rather than building more barracks or purchasing more weaponry, investments should prioritize improving or repairing the physical infrastructure such as roads and public transit but also hospitals, schools, and housing. To retain teachers and physicians, salaries should increase. As of March , the only MENA countries to have signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families (, in force since July ) were Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey—not a single GCC country. Given their experience with the pandemic, the GCC countries may decide to reduce their migrant worker population, but of necessity this will occur gradually. In the meantime, migrant workers on fixed-term contracts should enjoy labor rights and be provided with decent accommodations to prevent any future disease spread. GCC states should ratify the migrant worker convention. COVID- has been a shock to various systems: the global economy, national economies, societies, healthcare systems, and individual capacities. At the center of these systems and their intersecting inequalities, women have been affected, and have had to cope, in varied ways. At a time of crisis and transition, states and citizens are faced with difficult choices about recovery and new pathways. This chapter stresses the need to move away from past practices and embark on collective strategies—indeed, new social and gender contracts—to improve the health and well-being of women and their families.

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Notes . On structural adjustments, see Beneria and Feldman  and Elson ; on the  financial crisis, see Walby . . For example, the  annual conference of the Economic Research Forum (ERF), May–June , discussed “SDGs and External Shocks in the MENA Region: From Resilience to Change in the Wake of COVID-.” Special Panel  (May , ), “The Impact of COVID- on Middle Eastern and North African Labor Markets,” included a presentation by Dr. Mahmoud Moheildin of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). . The World Bank’s World Development Indicators database reports Tunisia’s external debt only for , when it was . percent of GDP. A different database shows that Tunisia’s national debt increased from  percent of GDP in  to an estimated  percent in  (Statista ). For a summary of loans from the World Bank to Tunisia, see https://financesapp.worldbank.org/en/countries/Tunisia. . In addition to arms procurements, military spending covers salaries, benefits, and infrastructure of the various armed forces. . See also the Oxford University tracker at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research /research-projects/covid--government-response-tracker. . At the time, Saudi Arabia ranked th out of the  countries (including small islands) tracked by the Worldometer for COVID- incidence, recoveries, and deaths. . By way of comparison, the United States topped the world in the number of cases at the time (and even as of March ). The highest death rates in December  (over , deaths per million) were in Italy, Spain, Peru, and Belgium. Countries that did remarkably well included Cuba, South Korea, and New Zealand. Vietnam’s total population of . million saw only , cases of the virus and just . deaths per million. . Explanations range from the effects of oil economies to institutional specificities. In addition to late and limited industrialization and the continued reliance on hydrocarbons, I have argued that patriarchal family laws limit female labor supply and demand. See Moghadam  (chapter ) and Moghadam  (chapter ). . Krafft, Assaad, and Marouani () explain that their own “broad” definition of unemployment renders higher unemployment rates than the “standard” ILO definition (see fig.  on p.  for the unemployment figures). . This occurred amid a renewed COVID surge and preceded the political disruption of July .

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contre la COVID- dans le cadre de l’initiative COVAX.” http://www.emro.who .int/fr/tun/tunisia-news/la-tunisie-recoit-le-premier-lot-de-vaccins-contre-la -covid--dans-le-cadre-de-linitiative-covax.html. Our World in Healthcare. n.d. “Share of Out-of-Pocket Expenditure on Healthcare, .” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-of-out-of-pocket-expenditure-on -healthcare. “Outcry after Tunisian Doctor Dies in Hospital Lift Accident.” . https://www .barrons .com/ news/ outcry -after-tunisian -doctor-dies -in -hospital -lift -accident -. “Out of Place: Doctors in the Middle East.” . Economist, November . Sayegh, Yezid. . “Relinquishing the Driver’s Seat: Egypt’s Military Has Allowed Civilians to Lead the Coronavirus Response, But Some Things Are Troubling.” Diwan (April ). https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/?utm_source=rssemail&utm _medium=email&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTmpneVlqSXhOamMxTdNMSIsInQ iOiJS RmJpTmpRjZyTdWZmFzThschsSmFcnVUdnNjVnJTkpsYmd CNRWXJZaTJKdWpUODhDZjZJeWZzKzRYRlNlSzhZXClOVNybnIz Un EOFAZzFMUZraNzaXgXCPYxXMkZwTkZiSURtdWZcLNsaFhGTTh vclRLUHVZyJ. Sherman, Brooke. . “Implications of School Closures on MENA Women.” Washington, DC: Wilson Center (October ). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article /implications-school-closures-mena-women?emci=cbda-c-eb-fb -daffc&emdi=ffaaa--eb-fb-daffc&ceid=. SIPRI (Stockholm Institute of Peace Research). . “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, –.” https://www.sipri.org /sites/default/files/Data%for%all%countries%from%%E% %%as%a%share%of%GDP.pdf. Statista. . “Tunisia: National Debt in Relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from  to .” https://www.statista.com/statistics//national-debt-of -tunisia-in-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp. Strochlic, Nina. . “Trapped in a Health Crisis.” National Geographic (): -. Tansel, Aysit, Halil Ibrahim Keskin, and Zeynel Abidin Ozdemir. . “Public-Private Sector Wage Gap by Gender in Egypt: Evidence from Quantile Regression on Panel Data, –.” World Development  (November). https://doi.org/./j .worlddev... Thomas, Kathrin. . “Challenges of Health Care in the Middle East and North Africa.” Arab Barometer Report (August). https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-con tent/uploads/ABV_Health_Report_FINAL_Public-Opinion-.pdf. “Tunisia Begins Week of Strict COVID Lockdown.” . AlJazeera. https://www.al jazeera.com/news////tunisia-begins-week-of-strict-covid-lockdown. “Tunisian Healthcare Workers Strike to Demand Reforms.” . Agence France Presse (June ). https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-/Tunisian -healthcare-workers-strike-demand-reforms.html. UN (United Nations). a. “Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID- on the Arab Region—An Opportunity to Build Back Better” (July). https://unsdg.un.org /resources/ policy -brief -impact -covid - -arab -region -opportunity -build -back -better.

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———. b. “Press Release: Without Action Now, Pandemic Could Set Back Women’s Rights by Decades” (September ). https://www.un.org/press/en/ /dsgsm.doc.htm. ———. n.d. “The  Goals.” https://sdgs.un.org/goals. UNDP (UN Development Programme). . Human Development Report : Statistical Annex. New York: UNDP. https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-develop ment-report-. ———. . “Getting a JumpStart on COVID- in Syria.” https://medium.com /@UNDP/getting-a-jumpstart-on-covid--in-syria-dd. UN ESCWA (UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). . “Prevalence of COVID- in the Arab Region.” https://www.unescwa.org/prevalence -covid--arab-region. UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund). a. “L’éducation préscolaire de qualité: Un engagement conjoint entre La Tunisie, l’Italie et l’UNICEF.” https://www.unicef .org/tunisia/recits/l%C%Aducation-pr%C%Ascolaire-de-qualit%C%A-un -engagement-conjoint-entre-la-tunisie-litalie-et-lunicef. ———. b. “Le partenariat public-privé: Une opportunité pour la petite enfance en Tunisie.” https://www.unicef.org/tunisia/communiqu%C%As-de-presse / le -partenariat -public -priv %C %A -une -opportunit %C %A -pour-la -petite -enfance-en-tunisie. UNSCR (UN Security Council Resolutions). . “Resolution .” http://unscr .com/en/resolutions/. UN Women and UN ESCWA. . “The Impact of COVID- on Gender Equality in the Arab Region.” E/ESCWA//Policy Brief . https://arabstates.unwomen .org/ en/ digital -library/ publications/ / / the -impact -of -covid -on -gender -equality-in-the-arab-region. Walby, Sylvia. . Crisis. London: Sage. WHO (World Health Organization). . Global Spending on Health: A World in Transition. Geneva: World Health Organization. ———. . “WHO Announces First Technology Recipients of mRNA Vaccine Hub with Strong Support from African and European Partners” (February ). https:// www.who.int/news/item/---who-announces-first-technology-recipients -of-mrna-vaccine-hub-with-strong-support-from-african-and-european-partners. World Bank. a. “Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP).” World Health Organization Global Health Expenditure database (apps.who.int/nha/database). https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS. ———. b. “Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of Female Population Ages +.” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS. ———. c. “Military Expenditure (% of GDP).” https://data.worldbank.org/indica tor/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS. Worldometer. a. “Coronavirus: World/Countries/Jordan.” https://www.world ometers.info/coronavirus/country/jordan. ———. b. “COVID- Coronavirus Pandemic.” https://www.worldometers.info /coronavirus.

CHAPTER 2

COVID-19: A Threat to Lebanese Women’s Precarious Condition J E N N I F E R S K U LT E - O UA I S S A N D J A N A G . M O U R A D

Lebanon, a formerly middle-income country, is currently facing multiple crises, only one of which is the COVID- pandemic. It is incapacitated by a political stalemate and a severe economic depression that the World Bank describes as the result of political choice and failing infrastructure across the board (World Bank ). Indeed, even prior to the COVID- pandemic, Lebanon was on the cusp of “failed state” status (Robinson ). Despite their high educational attainments, Lebanese women suffer from some of the lowest rates of female labor force participation in the world (see World Economic Forum ) and a dismal representation in political leadership. This chapter seeks to put Lebanese women’s experiences with the initial COVID--induced lockdown within the wider context of how work was experienced in lockdown globally. The impact of COVID- on men and women has not been uniform. Data on how and when women and men have been affected by state-imposed pandemic lockdown are also uneven. More reliable and detailed data are available for the Global North, and more data are collected on men and women as workers—rather than on noneconomic aspects of their lives. Numerous governments in the Global North have sought to subsidize citizen and permanent resident livelihoods to various degrees during mandated lockdown (for example, Denmark provided monthly stipends to companies that did not lay off workers, among other efforts—see Thompson ). In contrast, governments in the Global South have largely been unable to provide even minimal support for their populations. They lack adequate funds and suffer from corruption and limited administrative capacity (Ortega and Orsini ). The capacity of public health systems has also been tested. Most have been found inadequate, even those previously considered to be well funded and effective (Popic ).

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Interactions involving public health concerns, lockdown, and the resulting slowdown of the global economy have impacted countries differently, with the Global North unsurprisingly doing much better than the Global South on almost every measure. Indeed, innumerable topics on the unprecedented nature of the COVID- pandemic are worthy of research. In this chapter we explore how the initial lockdown in spring  affected Lebanese women. Constrained by high aspirations, a sclerotic system, and multiple, ongoing crises, women’s experiences during the initial lockdown period in  reflect the stark dichotomy of Lebanon today. Drawing on unique survey data from spring , we describe and analyze how the spring lockdown affected women, particularly in relation to work. Our sample, drawn from an online survey, is not representative of women in Lebanon but fills a long-term gap in knowledge about changing aspirations and resistant/resilient economic, social, and political systems through the lens of work during the first pandemic lockdown. We conclude with a discussion of how the COVID- remote work revolution may or may not offer means for educated women in Lebanon to be empowered in a workplace from which they have been mostly excluded to date.

Background There is growing research on the COVID- lockdown and restrictions on work and how men and women have been differently affected by them. However, there is still a striking dearth of data on the work lives of a broad swath of the workforce in the Global South, specifically in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, though international organizations seek to provide general data in some cases (see ILO ). The relative lack of such data was a key instigator of the survey. The secondary impacts of COVID- on the Global South are more damaging than the impacts on the developed world due to the compounding effects of the crisis in the former. Developing countries are especially vulnerable to structural and systemic effects that are often amplified when combined with crises. They have taken lockdown measures hastily and carelessly, often causing substantial damage to livelihoods, especially in the absence of adequate social security, health, and public policy measures (Carmody et al. ). Data from the Global North and the available data from the Global South demonstrate that the COVID- lockdown has disproportionately and negatively affected women (Arab Barometer ; Benassi et al. ). Halawa

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() tries to put a description of the current situation in the MENA region in a broader perspective, noting that the largest casualty of the virus is livelihoods. . . . The pandemic’s effect on livelihoods could last up to a generation, and will have a disproportionate impact on women, notably those who work with flexible schedules owing to family obligations, or have less experience, thus making up a larger number of redundancies.

Significant concurrent economic and political crises have plagued Lebanon since October . Additionally, an eruption of an unprecedented number of simultaneous wildfires that autumn across the country further highlighted the government’s impotence in taking action against unexpected shocks. Mass public protest condemned the explicit acts of corruption by the ruling elite after talks of imposing taxes on free voice applications to raise revenues for the  austerity budget. This tax was the straw that finally broke the Lebanese camel’s back after enduring decades of political oligarchy and patriarchy, economic turmoil, societal drawbacks, and sectarian divides. The uprising reflected citizens’ general discontent regarding existing economic, social, and political affairs as well as the public sector’s inability to deliver even the most basic services to its population. Furthermore, Lebanon’s Beirut Port explosion on August , , added fuel to Lebanon’s fires—literally and figuratively—claiming the lives of over  victims, injuring approximately , others, and leaving nearly , homeless. Economically, the currency has lost more than  percent of its value since  and inflation has been on the rise. Estimates reveal that more than  percent of Lebanon’s population now lives in poverty and that extreme poverty has increased almost threefold, from  percent in  to  percent in  (UN ESCWA ) and  percent in  (Derhally ). While an official unemployment rate is lacking, unemployment has been high and rising for the past few years (Hamadi ). Exacerbating the situation further, the initial COVID- lockdown in April  forced many businesses to shut down and most people to work and study from home. This shift put additional stress on a feeble and costly internet system in a country where public infrastructure belies supposedly middle-income status. Indeed, Lebanon ranks  out of   countries in terms of overall internet quality and access (Economist Intelligence Unit ).

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Methods Our data are based on an online survey, “Working from Home Survey during the COVID- Pandemic,” conducted in April  by the Arab Institute for Women (AiW) and Title IX Office at Lebanese American University (LAU). The survey sought to collect insights on how women managed during the spring  lockdown, particularly relating to working-from-home policies that had been enacted nationally and globally in light of the novel coronavirus pandemic. The survey was circulated through emails to the institute’s contacts and posted to social media platforms and filled out by  respondents. As the “Working from Home Survey” was administered online, it has the strengths and weaknesses of a nonrandomized sample. It was also sent to individuals with a prior interest in and/or contact with the Arab Institute for Women. Hence it is presumably biased toward those who have access to the internet and would access a survey in English. The vast majority of survey respondents, .  percent, were women. Less than  percent were men, and . percent categorized themselves as gender-fluid or nonbinary or preferred not to put a label on their gender. The respondents overwhelmingly (. percent) resided in Lebanon. The data in this chapter pertain only to the female respondents residing in Lebanon ( respondents). Of these respondents,  percent were between  and  years old. About  percent were – years old,  percent were –, almost  percent under , and  percent were over .

Findings How do our survey data compare to global patterns as well as Lebanese realities? To make a meaningful contribution to the literature on work during the initial COVID- lockdown, we organized our analysis along the following lines: living status of respondents, women’s employment, unpaid care work, and work expectations of employees during the pandemic. Throughout, we describe the global context, what our data say, and where gaps in knowledge remain. Living Status of Respondents

When asked about their living arrangements, almost   percent of the women who responded to our survey reported sharing living space with

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either family members or others. More than half the respondents ( percent) reported that their partner or spouse lived with them. Others lived with parents ( percent) and migrant domestic workers ( percent). Another  percent reported residing with their siblings and  percent with a roommate(s) or a flatmate(s). Finally,  percent of respondents stated that they currently have children (defined in the survey as people under eighteen years of age) in their household. To fit this into the Lebanese context, according to the Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey (LFHLCS) –, the average household size in  was ., down from . in  (Lebanese Republic CAS, ILO, and EU , ). The percentage of single-person households has increased to just over  percent, fully half of which are elderly females (p. ). Under half ( percent) of households in Lebanon have a density of less than one person per room in their dwelling (excluding kitchens and bathrooms) (p. ). This means that for more than half of all households, people could not find a room in which to be alone, especially during the COVID- lockdown if they were compelled to work from home. Further exacerbating serious public infrastructure issues in Lebanon and much of the Global South, private space is often limited in the Arab region. The significance given to housing quality in the national urban economy contrasts with the reality of housing in many countries in the developing world. Except for middle- and upper-income classes, most of the world population finds housing to be expensive relative to earnings, posing further challenges to creating an effective work-from-home environment. While Lebanon fares better than others in the Middle East and North Africa region, the country has one of the highest levels of wealth inequality in the world (UNU-WIDER ) and some of the oldest housing stock (Public Works Studio and Habitat International Coalition ). For too many families in Lebanon, adequate housing is not readily accessible and lacks the baseline quality needed for consistently productive remote work. Thus, a global challenge faced by individuals working from home is where to work—especially when other household members are also working from home and/or going to school online (Como, Hambley, and Domene ). When asked where respondents work at home,  percent reported the living room,  percent the bedroom,  percent a dedicated office or space,  percent the kitchen or dining room,  percent the balcony, and  percent the garden. Various respondents commented that it is crucial to have a dedicated private space in which to conduct all work-related tasks for working

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from home to be successful. Most of the respondents seemingly rotated among various places, trying to find space in which to operate. Employed Women Are Still Not the Norm

Over  percent of participants were employed at the time the survey was conducted. This differs markedly from the majority of women in Lebanon,  where the rate of female labor force participation was   percent in  , compared with   percent for their male counterparts (World Bank ). When asked to classify their employment status,   percent of our respondents reported being full-time employees, followed by   percent part-time employees,  percent consultants, and another  percent business owners. Reported salaries ran from less than . million Lebanese pounds (LBP: less than $, at the official exchange rate and unofficially less than half that amount when the survey was conducted in March/April ) per month to over . million LBP per month, with a plurality earning between . and almost  million per month. Such income—aside from household income—contrasts sharply with women’s income in Lebanon as a whole. According to Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWMENA ), in Lebanon,  percent of working women earn less than $ monthly and  percent earn less than $ monthly. . . . Women and men working in the public sector earn similar wages, but women working in the private sector earn substantially less than their male counterparts. This is no small problem, as  percent of all workers are employed in the private sector.

Likewise, among working women with a university degree,  percent earn more than $ per month. Among those who have completed secondary school, only  percent earn that much. Among those with a complementary school education or less, more than three quarters earn $ per month or less.

Of female respondents who were employed at the start of the pandemic,  percent reported working from home from the onset of the pandemic. Yet only  percent stated that their employer enacted working-from-home policies before the pandemic, with  percent actually taking advantage of

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them. This contrasts sharply with the overall population in the country. According to the World Food Programme (, ): The COVID- outbreak and related containment measures have pushed nearly one out of every three Lebanese into unemployment so far, while one in five respondents [of the spring  survey] saw their salary being reduced. . . . Moreover, Lebanese women as well as young adults between – years of age have been particularly affected by reduced salaries.

Kebede, Stave, and Kattaa (, ) provided more data on the dire reality unfolding in Lebanon, estimating that “the unemployment rate is as high as  per cent among the Lebanese men and women.” The situation was still grim for many who remained employed, with incomes being reduced due to layoffs or salary reductions (Kebede, Stave, and Kattaa ). Even before the outbreak of COVID-, indicators show that substantial advancements toward gender equality were inconsistent, leaving significant gender gaps worldwide. Consequently, these residual gaps resulted in women bearing a more considerable portion of job losses during COVID-. While women constitute  percent of employment globally, they accounted for  percent of total job losses caused by the virus. Among other factors, the significant increase in unpaid care—a burden that women and girls disproportionally bear—enhanced these severe implications of COVID- for female labor force participation (Madgavkar et al. ). Estimations of job-loss rates resulting from the COVID- pandemic reveal that women exhibit a job loss rate of . percent relative to . percent for men. Moreover, this . percent of the job loss gap between men and women is attributed to the disproportionate overrepresentation of women in the sectors most severely impacted by the COVID- crisis (Madgavkar et al. ). The decrease in employment sparked by quarantine and social distancing measures in response to COVID- affected sectors with a sizable female participation rate more significantly (Alon et al. ). The ongoing crisis induced by the COVID- pandemic has had a considerable effect on the service sector, which exhibits high female participation rates. Thus, the stark gender divide in the global labor force prior to the pandemic did not diminish during the  lockdown. Employed women were disproportionately affected by the spring lockdown for two key reasons. First, women are overrepresented in service-sector jobs that could not move online and are decimated by the lockdown. Second, women are also overrepresented in jobs deemed “essential,” such as healthcare and K– education. Employed women predominate in our sample, while most women

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remain outside of the labor market for Lebanon at large—whether during the lockdown or in so-called normal times. The Unpaid Care Burden

Unlike previous recessions, social-distancing measures taken to combat the COVID- pandemic resulted in a graver impact on women than men. The shutting down of daycare facilities and schools induced an immense increase in childcare needs, creating adverse effects on employed mothers. In March/April , “ countries imposed countrywide school closures during the pandemic, affecting more than . billion children and youth” (UNICEF a). Based on the distribution of the childcare duties in the bulk of families, this had a higher impact on mothers than on fathers. Unfortunately, these severe economic effects of COVID- for working mothers will likely persist post-pandemic due to the labor market’s tendency to return to the status quo ante. A particularly harried working mother from our survey noted that “I have to assist my children with online classes and homework, especially my youngest son with special needs to avoid any regression and replace—as much as possible—all the specialists who take care of him on a daily basis, including his therapists and special educator at home. So it is very hectic and I end up working long hours, after hours, on weekends, and days off.” Childcare, whether in the form of support for online learning, taking over the role of teacher, or meeting the needs of children too young for school, is only one aspect of the unequal care burden, which has been exacerbated during the pandemic lockdown (Carlson, Petts, and Pepin ). With or without children at home, extra time spent on food preparation, cleaning due to more time spent at home, and emotional care (Alon et al. ; Benassi et al. ; Del Boca et al. ) has been noted in survey data globally (Fontanesi et al. ). The data demonstrate that the situation in the MENA region is even more starkly divided along traditional gender roles, with women overwhelmingly responsible for childcare as well as online or ad hoc education of children (Kebede, Stave, and Kattaa ). The unequal burden of unpaid care work was qualitatively supported by our respondents, many of whom underscored the multiple burdens that women are enduring. One of our respondents stated that there is no work/ family life balance during the COVID- lockdown: [A balance] is impossible to reach within the multi-functions and duties [of] a working mother and father. Being a full-time parent, worker, and teacher;

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[providing] psychosocial support, [doing] household chores, and performing new duties due to the inaccessibility to certain services, such as haircuts, electricians, etc. . . . I am expected to put in a full day’s work while also taking care of and educating a child.

Indeed, a number of female respondents emphasized the increased workload, including housework, childcare, and caring for the sick and/or elderly, along with their professional jobs, with a particular emphasis on caring for children—some with special needs. The lockdown disrupted whatever balance existed between personal life and professional life and further added to the burdens of women’s unpaid care. However, other respondents praised the benefits of working from home for working mothers, with some caveats. “Working from home should be an option provided by employers. I would use this option for a number of days but not always, as working from home all days is not healthy or sustainable for many people,” noted one respondent, while another stressed that “I have worked from home before and it was a favorable experience. The current ‘work at home’ situation, however, cannot fairly be considered work at home. To make working at home successful, children need to be in school or daycare outside the home. And all teleworkers in the house need dedicated workspace with reliable electricity and internet infrastructure. In tiny Beirut flats this is not possible.” Repeatedly, respondents noted that the COVID- lockdown period was not a “normal” work-from-home experience, and that their assessments of whether working from home was beneficial to working mothers or not included a number of factors, none of which could be looked at in isolation. For example, one working mother said that she “generally wouldn’t mind working from home if the children are not around and if the connection is good enough. The nature of the job defines best whether working from home is better or not. My job requires more being present at the workplace and having personal interaction with colleagues.” Another noted that her survey “responses are based on working from home conditions during the coronavirus pandemic, which implies that the kids are at home and I have to homeschool, [while] under normal circumstances, with kids being at school, occasionally working from home is a great advantage.” This viewpoint was also seen globally before and during the pandemic. Mayer () notes that “advocates say remote working encourages work/ life balance and can result in higher productivity and increased employee satisfaction, loyalty and engagement.” To take advantage of remote work/ work from home, people must have jobs that are amenable to not being at a specific worksite. According to the  Global Web Index (Hopkins

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), “ percent of the world’s knowledge workers are able to work from home, but this fluctuates among different markets, increasing to  percent in India and  percent in the UK and falling dramatically to  percent in Japan.” While knowledge workers tend to be predominantly men, sectors described by the Global Web Index as “key to everyday life”—“namely, healthcare, education, and government—are the least likely to permit remote working.” Not surprisingly, these sectors have a higher percentage of female workers. A particularly important aspect of the COVID- pandemic vis-à-vis unequal care burdens has been the dramatically uneven susceptibility of different populations to the illness. In countries such as Lebanon, extended families live together or near each other (in the same apartment/house or the same building). The elderly, disabled, and sick are much more likely to be taken care of at home by family (and foreign domestic workers) than in institutional settings. Over   percent of grandparents lived with at least one grandchild in the MENA region in , whereas less than  percent of grandparents in the Global North lived with any of their grandchildren. This cohabitation, of course, made the COVID- lockdown both more and less challenging, as it seems that grandparents were able to continue to support their working children by providing childcare but did so by putting themselves at greater risk of infection. Data are lacking on the specific experience of grandparents taking care of grandchildren during the COVID- pandemic in Lebanon. It merits further investigation, however, as a gender dynamic is also at play here. Several survey respondents noted that mental health issues were also essential to address when researching working from home during the pandemic lockdown. Many viewed managing mental health in the household as another aspect of unpaid care work. Stress about the pandemic, financial problems, and political instability are critical to highlight in the context of Lebanon (Jaspal, Assi, and Maatouk ). One respondent concluded at the end of the survey that “it is very difficult for parents with young children to work from home. My productivity, sanity, and well-being cannot be compared to those who are not living with young children.” Indeed, some women noted that they had already been battling mental health problems such as depression and anxiety prior to the pandemic; the subsequent pressures of the lockdown only exacerbated these challenges. In fact, one respondent wrote at length: Many people do not live in stable households and their mental health problems might pose a stronger barrier to working productively. As a person who battles depression and anxiety, working from home (particularly back at

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my parents’ house) has made me lose structure and the ability to maintain a routine. My working hours became stretched in order to compensate for my slow progress, which is consequently leading to more exhaustion and stress. The house dynamics are also not helpful as you have to accommodate for everyone around, which is challenging especially in a small house with siblings and parents.

Poor mental health is a significant though understudied problem in Lebanon and the MENA region. The COVID- pandemic is only one stressor among others that seems to be leading to higher rates of depression and anxiety (Salameh et al. ). The comments from our respondents largely reflect women’s concerns globally regarding COVID- lockdown, which will likely remain a challenge when countries transition into post-pandemic life (Kola ). One last component of the unpaid care work debate, particularly for Lebanon, is the outsourcing of previously unpaid care work to live-in paid foreign domestic workers, virtually all of whom are female. Lebanon has long been able to avoid renegotiation of the unequal burden of unpaid care work between men and women by paying foreign women low wages to do what remains seen as “women’s work.” This has allowed Lebanese women to pursue careers and/or more successfully fulfill highly traditional expectations of how wives and mothers should act (ILO ). Most Lebanese men have not taken on more unpaid care work, except in the minority (Salti and Mezher ). With the advent of a severe economic crisis starting in , fewer and fewer Lebanese households have been able to afford foreign domestic workers, whose contracts are denominated in US dollars rather than the local currency, to facilitate the transfer of their wages to their home countries as remittances. Repeatedly, our respondents stressed “and I have nobody to help me at home,” highlighting the new reality of the rare Lebanese home with a foreign domestic worker. To date, few studies exist regarding how households are dealing with the challenge of unpaid care work amid the COVID- pandemic. Our survey nevertheless further confirms the research (for example, UN Women ) that employed Lebanese women seem to be doing more care work than before. Overall, the unpaid care work burden of women in Lebanon—much like women globally—has increased from the start of the pandemic. The strength of preexisting traditional gender roles in a patriarchal context and the continued deterioration of an already ineffective state have left Lebanese society highly reliant on family (and other informal social safety nets) to meet their needs. Women have been and remain the critical component

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of this  family care system—women in Lebanon are the society’s social safety net. Employers Still Expected the Same Results

In terms of work productivity, survey respondents were almost equally divided between those whose productivity remained unchanged ( percent) and those whose productivity was affected ( percent). There was also an almost equal split among the latter group: while  percent reported being less productive,   percent reported more productivity. One respondent commented that “working from home/outside of the regular formal office setting should be a policy adopted by most employers, as productivity increases and distractions from colleagues decreases [sic].” In contrast, other respondents attributed productivity problems to all household members being stuck under the same roof, rendering long hours of uninterrupted work nearly impossible, coupled with weak connectivity and electricity access. The words of one respondent were echoed by others when she noted that “the issue of limited productivity is due to outputs (such as research and writing) that require me to work uninterrupted, but everyone is home so this is impossible.” Although half of respondents were as productive, only   percent reported working an equal number of hours. A slight majority ( percent) reported working more hours, and  percent reported working fewer hours. Respondents explained working more hours because employers and other colleagues assume that they are available at all times to answer their queries and perform tasks, even on holidays and weekends. One woman commented: “Very stressful situation. Way more than working during regular times. Very demanding indeed. Way different than I anticipated.” Another noted that “colleagues do not respect the fact that [if] you are at home, [it] does not mean that you are available to work /.” Nonetheless, even with the challenges described,  percent stated that they would continue working from home if given the opportunity, while  percent preferred going back to their workplaces. Respondents felt that employers should implement and follow a hybrid or a smart working week as the ultimate model. This implies that employees work from home on one or two days of the workweek and physically go to work on the other days, as personal and professional interaction is necessary and irreplaceable. Indeed, one woman wrote that “it would be great to have  to  days a week as smart working,” while another commented that “working from home is a right and a necessity for short periods of time and ‘urgent tasks’ that require long working hours, flexibility, and comfort.” Again, many respondents included

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a variation on the caveat articulated by one respondent: “Other than [for specific reasons, working from home] is burden[some] and not sustainable.” In fact, respondents report that they would only accept hybrid working weeks or working from home if employers are willing to institute policies, benefits, and facilities after the pandemic and if, as one respondent noted, “I had a private working space at home and more cooperation from family members.” Furthermore, another respondent commented, “the willingness to work from home after COVID- depends on the benefits and the tools the employer provides.” They expressed that working from home during a pandemic is not a standard to assess whether working from home is efficient. In normal circumstances, children would be in school or daycare, and employees need speedy internet and consistent electricity. Also, they noted that employees’ stress, related first to the dangers and the fast promulgation of the pandemic and second to the economic and financial crises dominating Lebanon, would ideally be nonexistent. All of these changes to the home environment during the COVID- lockdown cannot be described and analyzed in isolation from the policies (or lack thereof) of government and businesses regarding their responses to the pandemic lockdown. A World Bank study notes that “in high-income countries, it’s  in  jobs that can be done from home while in low-income countries it’s only  in  jobs” (Sanchez et al. ). There seem to be no statistics (official or otherwise) estimating the percentage of the workforce in Lebanon that transitioned to online/remote work during the initial pandemic. However, “a global survey conducted by Gartner, Inc., found that  percent of business organization all over the world mandated or encouraged all their employees to work from home as the virus started to spread at exponential rates. Furthermore, about   percent of the organizations immediately canceled all work-related travel” (Gartner, Inc. n.d.). Globally, for women who had jobs that could be moved online, policies for working from home varied tremendously by country, type of work, and industry. Employers had differing expectations for productivity levels, but it seems that many did not include the impact of school and daycare closures in their calculations. This proved shortsighted as data became available on the care burdens—especially education of children and childcare for the very young—on working mothers in particular (UNICEF b). In our Lebanese sample, some respondents worried that their unpaid care burden might detract from their professional productivity at home. For the Global South economies, the challenges of working from home during a lockdown are multifold. There is the pressing issue of internet connectivity (West ), which is only accessible at a high cost; moreover,

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connectivity remains unreliable, and the quality of telephone communications and power supply is low (Odedra-Straub ). Lebanon faces both high cost and low quality, as previously noted. Some respondents provided anecdotal evidence that employers do not compensate them for internet purchases, and that the weak internet infrastructure is an impediment to optimizing work productivity. Lebanon’s notoriously inadequate electricity infrastructure further compounds this challenge, as emphasized in our survey. One respondent expounded on this: “I have the maximum output of internet allowed by my service provider, and it is still slow because of traffic in the building over the internet that reduces the speed of my connection. At times I have to use [mobile phone service] for work because of internet and electricity problems. My employer does not compensate for data costs despite connecting for work online and by phone.” Moreover, personal computers remain out of reach for most businesses and individuals in the Global South due to their high prices and human capital costs of installment, operation, maintenance, and training. Telecommunications data plans and their associated usage costs in many countries are not affordable for individual users. Many countries in the Global South exhibit operational and legal barriers to internet usage. Some of these barriers include monopolized telecommunications services, taxes imposed on the technology sector, and governmental or civil censorship (West ). Despite all of these challenges, productivity has been the most significant concern for employers during the periodic COVID--induced lockdown over the past year.

Conclusion What was the experience of educated, employed Lebanese women during the initial COVID- lockdown, and how did it compare with the experience of women globally? Acknowledging that our sample was wealthier, more likely to be employed, and more educated than women in general in Lebanon, we were able to paint a picture of a subset of women in Lebanon vis-à-vis employment, unpaid care work, the experience of working from home, and their employers. Throughout, we have sought to describe the global context, how and when the Global North and South are different, and where gaps in knowledge remain. Though the female respondents to our survey (over  percent of whom were employed at the time) are clearly privileged when compared with most women in Lebanon, the respondents still found themselves facing additional

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unpaid care burdens, multiple challenges to productive work from home, and unclear future repercussions of work-from-home dynamics during the lockdown. In other words, the experiences of this subset of women in Lebanon look much like those of women in the Global North, with the key caveat being that women in Lebanon also had to face a disintegrating state, layered crises, and more traditional gender roles at work and in the home. In effect, women in our sample were forced to do more with less. However, most women in Lebanon undoubtedly found themselves in even more difficult circumstances—without the benefits of independent income, employment, and education. While our sample is limited in what it tells us about women in general in Lebanon, it helps to highlight the broad spectrum of women’s experiences, skills, and realities in the country, especially during the early COVID- pandemic period. One aspect that we only touched on is how and when stress—from the pandemic, political instability, economic crisis, personal problems, or work challenges, among others—affects women’s professional and personal lives. Our survey did not ask enough about this important topic to provide data for description and analysis. It is also critical to note that the uniqueness of the COVID- pandemic—and for Lebanon, other ongoing crises—remains an important issue that needs significant attention among scholars and in public policy discussions. These effects will remain in place for a long time to come. We hope that this chapter adds to knowledge about the challenges that employed Lebanese women are facing as a result of the COVID- pandemic as they seek to navigate the increasing existential challenges of economic collapse and political instability, all while negotiating the contradictions of being a professional woman versus traditional wife and mother. The chapter situates employed Lebanese women in a global context as it relates to women’s employment, the unpaid care work burden, and employer expectations during the initial unprecedented pandemic lockdown. In sum, the situation is relatively bleak, even though our data are based on the experience of the lucky few, the minority of Lebanese women who remained employed as of spring . We close this chapter with some questions. What is the prognosis for the sustainability of working-from-home policies, especially as they relate to women? In addition to the push to expand meager family-leave policies in Lebanon, elsewhere in the region, and globally, there are more concerted efforts to dramatically change business as usual to implement actively family-friendly and women-empowering policies (Chopra and Krishnan ). One element of those family-friendly policies is access to work-fromhome for women and others in the workplace (IFC ). As this chapter

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demonstrates, however, women will continue to be at a disadvantage in the workplace without addressing the unequal burden of unpaid care work— even (especially?) when the workplace is in the home. While we hope that such crises will ultimately disrupt the existing gender imbalance in Lebanon—and elsewhere in the Arab region—by fostering a more equitable division of domestic labor, this outcome is far from inevitable. Sadly, the most significant impacts of the COVID- lockdown of spring  as they relate to women and employment may well be twofold: a dramatic expulsion of women from the labor force and further unequal distribution of unpaid care work (Cohen and Hsu ). This phenomenon is occurring in the Global North and the Global South (Stevenson ). With more women employed in the informal economy, especially in the Global South, we lack a complete understanding of the extent of the plummeting numbers of women actively involved in paid labor. Increasing instability and continued economic decline in Lebanon could strengthen voices that champion a “return” to traditional family structures and practices as the only means for security. The need for unpaid care work at home, resistant gender stereotypes, and a shrinking economy that reinforces traditional gender roles could all mean that even fewer women will be formally employed in Lebanon. Finally, economic need will push more women to seek employment in the informal sector, risking fewer protections and greater dangers, as seen elsewhere in contexts of crises and insecurity. The data collected from the survey in spring  support this already depressing picture. The initial COVID-induced lockdown largely exacerbated unequal and unpaid care burdens and highlighted insufficient infrastructure to meet the needs of a profitable work-from-home environment. Furthermore, the unseen burdens of anxiety regarding the pandemic and concomitant economic and political crises seem to weigh heavily on the women who participated in our survey, mirroring women globally. Indeed, as UN secretary-general António Guterres remarked in August , the COVID- pandemic may turn back the clock on women’s empowerment by decades: “without a concerned response, we risk losing a generation or more of gains” (Guterres ). For Lebanese women, their hard-won though small gains could be far too easily lost.

Notes . Title IX is part of American civil rights law. The law protects people from discrimination based on sex in education programs or activities that receive US government

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financial assistance. LAU, as both an American and Lebanese university, is mandated to comply with Title IX. . Percentages do not add up to  percent due to rounding. . These figures refer to the official Lebanese pound (lira) to USD exchange rate. As noted, in March/April , the unofficial (real) rate was much higher, significantly reducing the value of salaries that are paid out in local currency (the majority of salaries). Hard data were difficult to find as of spring  due to a government crackdown on unofficial exchange rate information online, which is telling in and of itself. . Percentages do not add up to  percent due to rounding.

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. “COVID- and Gender Equality: Countering the Regressive Effects.” McKinsey Global Institute. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of -work/covid--and-gender-equality-countering-the-regressive-effects. Mayer, Kathryn. . “Will Remote Work Continue Post-Pandemic?” Human Resource Executive (April). https://hrexecutive.com/will-remote-work-continue -post-pandemic. Milan, Stefania, and Emiliano Treré. . “A Widening Data Divide: COVID- and the Global South.” Data & Policy blog, Medium.com (April ). https://medium.com / data -policy/ a -widening -data -divide -covid - -and -the -global -south -fdc ab. Odedra-Straub, Mayuri. . “E-Commerce and Development: Whose Development?” Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries (): –. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/./j.-..tb.x. Ortega, Francisco, and Michael Orsini. . “Governing COVID- without Government in Brazil: Ignorance, Neoliberal Authoritarianism, and the Collapse of Public Health Leadership.” Global Public Health (): –. doi.org/. /... Popic, Tamara. . “European Health Systems and COVID-: Some Early Lessons.” LSE blog (March ). https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog////european -health-systems-and-covid--some-early-lessons. Public Works Studio and Habitat International Coalition—Housing and Land Rights Network. . “Situation of the Human Right to Adequate Housing in Lebanon, Submission for the Third Cycle Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon.” https:// uprdoc .ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=&file= English Translation. Robinson, Kali. . “Is Lebanon a Failed State? Here’s What the Numbers Say.” Council on Foreign Relations (September ). https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/lebanon -failed-state-heres-what-numbers-say. Salameh, Pascale, Aline Hajj, Danielle A. Badro, Carla Abou Selwan, Randa Aoun, and Hala Sacre. . “Mental Health Outcomes of the COVID- Pandemic and a Collapsing Economy: Perspectives from a Developing Country.” Psychiatry Research (December) :. doi: ./j.psychres... Epub October  , . PMID: ; PMCID: PMC. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov /. Salti, Nisreen, and Nadine Mezher. . “Women on the Verge of an Economic Breakdown: Assessing the Differential Impacts of the Economic Crisis on Women in Lebanon.” Issue Paper (September). https://arabstates.unwomen.org/sites/de fault/files/Field%Office%Arab%States/Attachments/Publications// /Lebanons%Economic%Report%Updated%%FH.pdf. Sanchez, Daniel Garrote, Nicolas Gomez Parra, Caglar Ozden, Bob Rijkers, Mariana Viollaz, and Hernan Winkler. . “Who on Earth Can Work from Home?” World Bank (July). https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle ///Who-on-Earth-Can-Work-from-Home.pdf. Stevenson, Betsy. . “The Initial Impact of COVID- on Labor Market Outcomes across Groups and the Potential for Permanent Scarring.” Hamilton Project Essay : –. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-initial-impact-of-covid--on-labor -market-outcomes-across-groups-and-the-potential-for-permanent-scarring.

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SWMENA (Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa). . “Economic Status—Lebanon.” http://swmena.net/en/report/#:~:text=In%Lebanon%C %%%of%working,and%Beqaa%work%for%pay. Thompson, Derek. . “Denmark’s Idea Could Help the World Avoid a Great Depression.” Atlantic (March ). https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ //denmark-freezing-its-economy-should-us/. UN ESCWA (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). . “Multidimensional Poverty in Lebanon (–).” Policy Brief . https:// www.unescwa .org/ sites/ default/ files/ news/ docs/  - - _multidimentional _poverty_in_lebanon_-policy_brief_-_en.pdf. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). a. “COVID- and Children.” UNICEF Data Hub. https://data.unicef.org/covid--and-children/?utm_source =UNICEF%Data&utm_medium=homepage&utm_campaign=COVID-hub -unicef-data-hero-image. ———. b. “Seven Ways Employers Can Support Working Parents during the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-) Outbreak.” https://www.unicef.org/azerbaijan/-ways -employers-can-support-working-parents-during-coronavirus -disease -covid --outbreak#:~:text=By%giving%working%parents%the,reduce% the%burden%on%children. UNU-WIDER (United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research). . World Income Inequality Database (WIID). https://www .wider.unu.edu/database/wiid. UN Women. . “Gendered Implications of the  Nationwide Total Lockdown.” Gender Alert on COVID- in Lebanon: . https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en /digital-library/publications///gender-alert-on-covid--lebanon. West, Darrell. M. . “Digital Divide: Improving Internet Access in the Developing World through Affordable Services and Diverse Content.” Brookings Institution. https:// www.brookings .edu/ wp -content/ uploads/ / / west _internet -access .pdf. World Bank. . “The Deliberate Depression.” Lebanon Economic Monitor (Fall). https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/publication/lebanon-economic -monitor-fall-. World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations. . “Beirut Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment.” https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/./. World Economic Forum. . “Global Gender Gap Report .” http://www .weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_.pdf. World Food Programme. . “Assessing the Impact of the Economic and COVID- Crises in Lebanon” (June). https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP- /download.

CHAPTER 3

The Impact of COVID-19 on Women’s Prosperity in the Gulf Countries: Survey Evidence from Bahrain O MA R A L - U B AY D L I , D E E MA A L M OAY Y E D , A N D G H A DA A B D U L L A

The COVID- pandemic has spawned a substantial literature evaluating its socioeconomic impact. One of the critical questions it addresses is whether women have fared worse than men in the socioeconomic domain. This chapter seeks to answer this question in the case of the GCC countries, particularly Bahrain. Understanding gender differences is vital in light of the sustainable development agenda, granting women equal rights and equal opportunities to promote economic and social stability. Likewise, economic inclusiveness maximizes a society’s economic potential. The literature on the gender-differentiated impact of the pandemic in Western economies is highly informative, However, the structure of the Gulf economies differs considerably from that of Western economies, most notably in the high levels of public-sector hiring and the dominance of migrant workers in the labor markets. Both phenomena largely result from the abundance of natural resources in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Consequently, gathering and analyzing data on gender equality in the GCC states is essential. Our analysis is based on three complementary forms of data: first, secondary data on the GCC macroeconomy; second, quantitative evidence from an online survey in Bahrain, with comparable data simultaneously gathered in the United Kingdom and United States; and third, qualitative evidence gathered from interviews with key stakeholders in the Bahrain economy. Our main finding is that the GCC labor markets have witnessed a subtle pattern of gender differences in the pandemic’s socioeconomic impact. Whereas women have fared worse than men in Western economies due to a combination of economic and social factors, the GCC countries have experienced a dichotomous impact due to their unique economic circumstances. Women have fared better than men among nationals, whereas

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women have fared equally poorly, or perhaps even worse, among migrant workers. After outlining our methods, we provide a succinct primer on the gender impact of recessions in conventional economies, followed by a description of what makes the GCC economies unique. We then present and analyze data regarding the socioeconomic effect of the pandemic in the GCC countries, especially Bahrain, followed by a series of policy recommendations.

Methods The departure point for understanding the impact of COVID- on women in the GCC was reviewing the literature on traditional and pandemicrelated recessions’ impact on women vis-à-vis men. This literature review revealed that the relevant analyses are generally restricted to conventional economies and may be unsuitable for the GCC, affirming the need for us to gather GCC data. To analyze the GCC, we begin with a search for secondary data relating to the GCC macroeconomy. Faced with limited data, we decided to gather primary data using online surveys in the Kingdom of Bahrain. To benchmark our findings, we contemporaneously conducted parallel surveys in the United Kingdom and United States. Finally, to fill some of the gaps that emerge after analyzing the survey data, we conducted one-to-one interviews with key stakeholders, yielding a mixture of quantitative and qualitative insights.

Background: Recessions in Conventional Economies Recessions before the COVID-19 Pandemic

Recessions tend to have an uneven impact on female and male employment in conventional economies (Alon et al. ; Doepke and Tertilt ). This can be seen by comparing women’s contribution to hours worked with women’s contribution to business-cycle-related volatility in hours worked. This latter figure captures how the hours of work performed in the economy vary when the economy goes through its usual cycle of boom and bust. In the United States, during the period -, women accounted for  percent of total hours worked, compared to  percent for men. However, men’s contribution to business cycle–related volatility in hours worked ( percent) considerably exceeded women’s contribution to hours. If we break down the volatility data by gender and marital status, the

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overcontribution of men to volatility is driven by single rather than married men. In contrast, women’s undercontribution to volatility is driven primarily by married women, though single women also show lower levels of volatility in hours worked than do men. There are two primary reasons for the gender gap in employment volatility (Alon et al. ). First, families actively deploy women’s labor as a countercyclical instrument: married women increase their hours when their spouses suffer a decrease in employment, such as during a recession. However, as the data on single men and women indicate, mutual insurance within households is only part of the story. The second reason is that men tend to work in sectors with strongly procyclical activity levels, such as manufacturing, construction, and transportation. In contrast, women tend to work in sectors that are weakly procyclical or countercyclical, such as education and health. The COVID-19 Recession

Alon et al. () argue that the pandemic recessions are unique in terms of impact on gender employment gaps in two ways. First, the impact on economic activity by sector is different because the primary driver of the recession is a combination of voluntary and mandated social distancing, as opposed to a financial bubble exploding or a sharp rise in global commodity prices, which are typical causes of traditional recessions. In particular, manufacturing—which is a male-dominated industry—is relatively resilient in terms of social distancing. In contrast, many components of education and health services—where women are disproportionately employed—are likely to suffer acute contractions due to social distancing. The second difference is childcare. Despite improvements in female employment and gender equality, women continue to bear a disproportionately high responsibility for rearing children. Pandemics acutely increase the childcare burden, especially for those with young children, because much of the outsourced assistance that households typically procure becomes largely unavailable: schools and daycare facilities are closed and relatives, nannies, babysitters, neighbors, and others all become virtually inaccessible. Consequently, women may have to exit the labor force to provide childcare. Moreover, women are underrepresented in occupations compatible with telecommuting (Alon et al. ). This is further reinforced when governments classify jobs as critical versus noncritical: during lockdowns, authorities grant exemptions to certain occupations that are deemed to be essential to the functioning of the economy, such as refuse collection or police; as a

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corollary, people holding these jobs enjoy higher levels of job security. Generally speaking, women are underrepresented in these critical jobs, exposing them to a higher risk of redundancy. While these channels suggest that the impact on female employment will be greater under a pandemic recession than under a traditional one, it is not clear whether this is enough to overcome the tendency for recessions to be less favorable to men. While the COVID- recession was ongoing in , enough time has passed for an initial comparison with other recent recessions. The data in Alon et al. () confirm the exceptional nature of the COVID- recession on female versus male unemployment: in the preceding five recessions, the rise in male unemployment exceeded the rise in female unemployment by around  percentage point, except for the dot.com recession of , when unemployment increased marginally for both groups. The difference flipped sharply in , however, with female unemployment increasing by . percentage points more than male unemployment.

Distinguishing Characteristics of the Gulf Economies Natural Resource Income and Public-Sector Hiring

Compared to conventional economies, the GCC economies’ most salient distinguishing characteristic is their high levels of hydrocarbon income. The global average levels of oil and gas production in  were  mWh (megawatt hours) and  mWh per capita, respectively. In contrast, the corresponding figures for each of the GCC countries were at least ten times as high and usually even higher (Our World in Data ). For example, Kuwait’s per capita oil production was  mWh, while Qatar’s per capita gas production was  mWh. As a result of these large natural resource endowments, the GCC economies are highly dependent on natural resource income (Cherif and Hasanov ). Hydrocarbon-related activities typically account for around  percent of GDP and over  percent of exports, and both figures considerably exceed those in advanced economies. The abundance of natural resources in the GCC, combined with their being state-owned, leads to a particular pattern of public-sector employment, which has a profound impact on how recessions affect employment. In countries with considerable natural resource endowments, such as Australia and the United States, the resources are owned and extracted by publicly traded companies. The GCC countries’ resources and companies responsible for extracting and selling

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them are almost entirely state-owned, and the revenues accrue wholly to the government. A notable consequence of high natural resource revenues that accrue to the government is high levels of public-sector hiring. Using data from a variety of sources (Gulf Labour Markets and Migration ; Kuwait CSB ; LMRA ; OECD Stat. ), public-sector employment as a percentage of total employment in  was  percent in the OECD,  percent in Bahrain,   percent in Saudi Arabia, and   percent in Kuwait, where the GCC data are only for nationals (migrant workers are analyzed separately below). Note that the figures for public-sector employment as a share of total employment in the GCC countries understate the accurate figures because they exclude the armed forces and police, which are large employers in all these countries. Despite this omission, it is evident that the public sector is a dominant employer in the GCC countries. The reason is that the GCC governments regard public-sector employment as an effective method of creating jobs and ameliorating living standards for nationals (Beblawi ). A related consequence of the GCC countries’ economic structure is that hydrocarbon revenues soared during the high global oil prices of the period -, enabling the GCC governments to maintain low levels of public debt. For example, the GCC countries maintained a debt-to-GDP ratio between  percent (the UAE) and  percent (Bahrain) in the period , whereas the OECD average was   percent (IMF ). These low debt levels afford the GCC governments the option of significantly delaying deep reforms and maintaining existing levels of public-sector hiring via aggressive fiscal stimulus packages. Migrant Workers

A second characteristic of the GCC economies is the significant presence of migrant workers, both as a percentage of the population ( data from Gulf Labour Markets and Migration : Bahrain   percent, Kuwait  percent, Oman  percent, Qatar  percent, Saudi Arabia  percent, UAE   percent) and as a  percentage of the total number of people employed (Bahrain   percent, Kuwait   percent, Oman   percent, Qatar  percent, Saudi Arabia  percent; no data for the UAE). These figures are exceedingly high by international standards. Notably, these expatriates are almost entirely guest workers, meaning that their right to reside in the GCC countries is tied to their having a job (or the head of the household having a job, in the case of spouses

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and children accompanying a migrant worker). Moreover, unlike OECD economies, these expatriates do not have a structured path to permanent residency and/or naturalized citizenship (Al-Ubaydli ), though there have been some recent reforms in this regard that apply to a select group of highly skilled migrants (Al-Ubaydli a). These migrant workers are employed in virtually every sector and perform virtually every job type. They also occupy all rungs in the skill ladder (Al-Ubaydli ). Moreover, for a specific range of job types, especially those for which nationals have a cultural aversion, migrant workers are effectively the only option. These include jobs such as refuse collectors, restaurant waiters, and salon workers. In general, in terms of gender differences, the sectoral distribution of migrant workers by sector in Bahrain follows the pattern shown in the United States (LMRA ), but there are some notable incongruencies due to a combination of structural differences in the economy and to nationals systematically occupying certain sectors and avoiding others, which are left to migrants. For example, this explains the high percentage of male migrant workers working in the construction sector ( percent), and low percentage working in the financial sector ( percent), as well as the high percentage of female migrant workers in leisure and hospitality ( percent) but low percentage (relatively speaking) working in education and health ( percent). From the perspective of this study, the jobs that migrant workers perform also include various forms of domestic services, including domestic helpers, who provide cleaning, meal preparation, and childcare services, and drivers, who transport members of the household and goods. Domestic workers are present in large numbers in the GCC: per , nationals, there are  in Bahrain,  in Kuwait,  in Oman,  in Qatar,  in Saudi Arabia, and  in the UAE (Statista ). The public sector is an exception to the dominance of migrant workers in the labor market in the GCC economies, as nationals represent a majority of employees. The abundance of migrant workers in the GCC economies is due to three properties: small populations, recently established (by international standards) education systems, and ample natural resource endowments (Naufal ). The third condition means that the countries have the capital required to proliferate, while the former two conditions mean that the countries lack the human capital to realize that growth. Thus, the most straightforward way of enabling economic growth was importing migrant workers in large numbers (Al-Ubaydli ). A final difference is that the job-related protections afforded to migrant workers in the GCC countries fall considerably short of those provided for

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nationals. For example, whereas nationals working in the public sector are almost invulnerable to the risk of redundancy, migrant workers in private and public sectors can be dismissed with limited notice and without needing to overcome any significant administrative or legal hurdles (Al-Ubaydli ). Thus, compared to the advanced economies in the OECD, a significant percentage of the labor force of the GCC economies is hired and fired almost at will.

COVID-19 and Women’s Prosperity in the Gulf Economies An Overview of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the Government’s Economic Countermeasures

The GCC countries’ experience with COVID- has followed the same general pattern experienced by most of the world’s countries. The GCC countries’ death rates have been comparable to those in the world (and considerably below those in advanced economies such as the United Kingdom and United States), while cases have been significantly higher. This is likely a reflection of the higher rates of testing: as of April , the UAE (), Bahrain (), Qatar (), Kuwait (), Saudi Arabia (), and Oman () all ranked in the top  countries in the world for tests per capita (Worldometer ). In response to the pandemic, the GCC countries enacted a wide range of social distancing measures in a manner comparable to advanced economies such as the United Kingdom and United States. Presumably due to the lower GCC death rates experienced throughout the winter period, restrictions were considerably stricter in the United Kingdom and United States than in the GCC countries by the end of . However, the GCC countries remained some way from a return to “normal life.” As has been extensively documented, social distancing—be it voluntary or mandated—has had a massive negative effect on economic activity in all countries (Al-Ubaydli b; Baker et al. ; Chen et al. ). In an attempt to cushion the impact, and in line with most other countries, GCC countries implemented a wide range of fiscal and monetary countermeasures (IMF ). These included paying salaries for nationals working in the private sector, boosting unemployment benefits, loan repayment deferrals, waiving of utility bills for individuals and businesses, deferring and/ or waiving government fees and taxes, lowering interest rates, expanding lending facilities to businesses, relaxing financial stability requirements, and so on. Notably, GCC countries varied significantly in the fiscal domain, an area

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with a substantial direct impact on employment. In contrast, the response in the monetary domain has been much more homogeneous due to the fixed exchange rate with the US dollar (except in Kuwait). In particular, the UAE has not offered salary support to the private sector in the manner seen in Bahrain, presumably owing to the low numbers of nationals working in the private sector. In addition to the fiscal and monetary measures, all GCC governments encouraged employers to switch to remote work in the private sector and mandated it in the public sector. In the case of Bahrain, an additional women-specific measure was introduced during March : a royal decree was issued requiring female workers with children to be given priority in remote work (Abdulla et al. ). Beyond the intra-GCC variation, the other notable feature of government responses was in the fiscal domain. Many of the income-support schemes were exclusive to nationals, opening the door for a differential employment impact of the pandemic. Thus, the government paying salaries was restricted to the salaries of Bahraini nationals. In contrast, such conditionality was either absent or limited in the United Kingdom and United States due to the fewer nonnationals in the labor force. GCC Macroeconomic Data

Despite the aggressive fiscal and monetary countermeasures deployed by the GCC governments, each of the six economies was projected to have experienced a sharp contraction in real GDP by the end of  (IMF ), ranging from . percent for Qatar to  percent for Oman and  percent for the GCC as a whole. Broadly speaking, these declines in economic activity are beyond anything experienced in at least the last twenty years and are sure to be reflected in employment too. To the best of our knowledge, among the GCC countries, only Saudi Arabia released official labor market data for  as of early . We were unable to secure an official explanation for this. However, we presume that a partial explanation is that the respective ministries of labor were dedicating their resources to combating the proximate threats caused by the pandemic, so data compilation had a low priority. Official Saudi labor market data (Saudi Arabia GAA ) indicate a dichotomous impact of the COVID- pandemic. During the third quarter of , compared to the third quarter of , a pattern similar to the situation in the United States emerged among non-Saudis: women experienced a considerably larger increase in unemployment ( percent to . percent) than did men (. percent to . percent). In contrast, among Saudi

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nationals, the relative impact is reversed, in line with traditional recessions seen in the United States and other Western economies: female unemployment decreased slightly (. percent to . percent), whereas male unemployment rose by over  percentage points (. percent to . percent). We defer explaining these findings with a comprehensive data selection until later. In the case of Bahrain, to complement the aforementioned insights gained from macroeconomic data, we gathered two additional types of data: quantitative data from an online survey and qualitative data from interviews. We explore each in turn.

Bahrain: Quantitative Survey Evidence The goal of the survey was to analyze the socioeconomic impact of COVID- in Bahrain for nationals and nonnationals. The first group of questions examined employment status: did respondents gain or lose a primary and/or secondary job since the start of the pandemic? And how did hours change for those who retained either a primary or secondary job? The reason for inquiring about secondary jobs is that it has become quite common during the last fifty years for Bahraini nationals to have two sources of income: the first comes from a public-sector job, which they perform from  a.m. to  p.m., and the second from a side job or project in the afternoon and evening. Moreover, we did not explicitly differentiate among regular employment, self-employment, and business ownership. We believed that this differentiation would have adversely affected the participation rate despite the potential yield of a more precise definition. Therefore, while the data measure indirect indicators of the unemployment rate, they are not a direct measure that can be interpreted at face value because the survey did not address diversity in labor force participation. The second group of questions posited a series of socioeconomic challenges that the participants were likely to have encountered due to the pandemic (such as access to food, loss of income, decreased leisure time) and the extent to which they had faced difficulty in dealing with the challenges. Third, we explored how participants changed the time they allocated to a series of nonwork tasks such as sleeping, socializing, childcare, and homeschooling. Fourth, we inquired about the sort of support that the participants deemed most needed (training or information about job opportunities, financial support and loan deferrals, or psychological support). Fifth, we examined how participants dealt with the financial difficulties caused by

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the pandemic, reflecting on their spending habits or seeking financial support from family/friends. Finally, we asked about demographics. We surveyed  Bahrainis who constituted a nationally representative sample, representing each of the targeted demographic groups based on gender and age. Participation among non-Bahrainis was expected to be low based on our experience conducting surveys, except for the Bangladeshi community, which is not discussed in this chapter. To facilitate the interpretation of the differences between Bahrain and advanced economies, we also surveyed residents in the United Kingdom and United States using a nationally representative sample of ,. We distributed the survey between September  and September , , via LimeSurvey, making it accessible via the web and mobile devices. In targeting Bahrainis, we initially sent text messages to a list of people interested in participating in surveys. Subsequently we used our personal and organizational social-media channels. We wrote press releases in the local media to increase awareness of the survey and used paid advertisements to boost social-media participation in the final week. The surveys targeting the UK and US populations were distributed via Prolific, a third party specializing in online survey research. Findings

The data confirm that Bahrainis overall experienced a significant decline in employment, in both primary and secondary jobs. Interestingly, for the youngest age category (– years), both females and males experienced an increase in both primary and secondary employment, whereas females and males in the remaining two age groups lost both primary and secondary jobs. Figure . shows the data for Bahraini nationals, including a nationally representative sample and a breakdown by gender and age group. In terms of the gender differences, in a proportionate sense, females fared better than males in every age bracket and both primary and secondary jobs. For the youth category, women gained jobs at a higher rate; in the middle and older categories, they lost jobs at a lower rate. We analyze the reasons in depth below. The UK and US women fare significantly worse than men across all age categories in primary jobs but sometimes outperformed men in secondary jobs in the United Kingdom. Thus, prima facie, it would appear that Bahraini women have inverted the reversal associated with COVID- employment: women suffered more in terms of employment than men in Western economies, counter to traditional recessions, while Bahraini women have outperformed their male

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Figure 3.1. COVID’s effect on Bahraini employment. Source: Abdulla et al. 2020.

peers in labor markets during the COVID- recession, in line with recessions’ historical trajectories. These data are also nominally consistent with the aggregate labor market data for Saudi Arabia described above (Saudi Arabia GAA ). We briefly investigated the possibility that a change in working hours (and hence earnings) obscures our inference. Examining the data on changes in hours for primary/secondary jobs confirms that Bahraini women still fared better than Bahraini men in the labor market during the pandemic-induced recession. Figure . shows the extent to which Bahrainis experienced various COVID- related difficulties and provides further support for the view that gender differences in Bahrain were the reverse of those in the United Kingdom and United States. Bahraini women reported a more negligible income reduction effect of the pandemic than did Bahraini men for the middle and older age categories, representing the bulk of the labor force. Females between the ages of  and  reported greater loss in income than females in other age groups as well as males between  and . However, all age groups reported relatively

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Figure 3.2. COVID-19 challenges for Bahrainis (Scale 1-5). Source: Abdulla et al. 2020.

equal decrease in the levels of difficulty stemming from decreased leisure time, which we return to later when explaining these results. Women in the United Kingdom suffered more income reductions than men, though the  effects on leisure time were approximately equal by gender, except in the youth category, where women experienced less difficulty than men. Income reduction in the United States was approximately equal by gender, but women in each age category experienced more hardship with decreased leisure time. We next turn to the more detailed data on time use. Figure . shows how the COVID pandemic impacted Bahraini’s time use. In general, gender differences within each age group are quite limited. In comparison to men, women experienced an increase in the time allocated to meal preparation and assisting the elderly; women in the middle age group (–), which contains those most likely to have school-aged children, also experienced an increase in the time allocated to childcare. In the youngest age category (–), which probably consisted of mostly unmarried people, women experienced a significantly higher increase in their time allocations

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Figure 3.3. Bahrainis’ time allocation during COVID. Source: Abdulla et al. 2020.

to childcare and caring for the elderly than men. However, homeschooling time allocations were impacted approximately equally in the younger two age groups (men experienced a slightly higher increase). While all segments experienced a significant decrease in time allocations to social life, the gender difference was negligible. The UK and US data indicate patterns that differ significantly from Bahrain. Meal preparation time allocations did not exhibit a universal gender bias in the United Kingdom, whereas childcare, homeschooling, and elderly care did so for the two groups most likely to have young children (– and –), with women experiencing an increase in time allocation. On the mirror side, women experienced a greater decrease in the time allocated to social life for all age categories than did men. The US data are mainly similar. We next consider the most desired forms of support in tackling the COVID pandemic. Figure . shows the responses for Bahrainis. In each age category, men were more likely to express a desire for job opportunities information, reinforcing the finding that Bahraini men fared worse than Bahraini women in terms of the unemployment effects of the pandemic.

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Figure 3.4. What support Bahrainis most desired. Source: Abdulla et al. 2020.

However, women were much more likely to express a desire for psychological support. Women in the United Kingdom and United States were also more likely to express a desire for psychological support in each age category. However, the desire for information on job opportunities was not uniformly stronger for either gender but depended on the age group. The final collection of survey-related data for Bahrainis is the extent to which the participant was “seeking employment” to deal with the financial challenges caused by COVID-. For the two older age groups, women planned to use this avenue to a lower degree than men (– years: . for women,  for men; +: . for women, . for men), in line with the preceding data on unemployment. Women in the United Kingdom and United States in at least one of the two older age groups expressed a stronger desire to seek employment than men. To effectively synthesize these data, we would ideally have comprehensive data on migrants in Bahrain. However, as explained above, this was only possible for Bangladeshis, an almost exclusively male diaspora in

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Bahrain. Bangladeshis represent the migrant group that has arguably suffered the most serious economic toll in Bahrain (Abdulla et al. ). The employment impact of COVID- reveals that the magnitude of the decline in primary and secondary jobs is considerable in absolute terms ( percentage points for primary jobs for the category – years and   percentage points for the + category), much larger than the corresponding figures for Bahrainis (figure .). The remaining data for Bangladeshis in Bahrain, which we omit in the interests of parsimony (see Abdulla et al. ), paint a picture of considerable economic and psychological distress for the community. By combining these rich data with the structural idiosyncrasies of the GCC economies, we can craft a narrative to explain why the gender differences in the impact of the COVID- recession in Bahrain follow a different pattern than those in the United Kingdom, United States, and other Western economies. Women in Bahrain and the rest of the GCC suffer from the same social norms that have played a role during the COVID- pandemic globally. In particular, they have borne a disproportionate share of the burden of increased household responsibilities, resulting from the inability to procure the market-based provision of childcare, education, and meal preparation, which has led to a significant increase in the psychological distress experienced by women compared to men. However, the unique structure of the Bahraini economy (and the GCC ones more broadly)—most notably the prevalence of public-sector jobs for nationals and the dominant role that migrant workers play in the labor market—has led to a dichotomous socioeconomic impact of the pandemic. Starting with the social and psychological domains, Bahraini women (and affluent expatriate women residing in Bahrain) have had access to lowcost (by international standards) domestic help in the form of live-in housemaids, drivers, and nannies. This assistance has considerably dampened the social and psychological impact of the pandemic on the matriarchs in these households. Whereas UK and US women have in general complained about decreased leisure time, Bahraini men expressed greater challenges associated with decreased leisure time than Bahraini women. Here the unique structure of the economy—specifically the ability to procure domestic assistance at a low cost—has been pivotal in allowing Bahraini women to alleviate some of the pressure that women elsewhere in the world have faced during the pandemic. In contrast, female migrant workers in Bahrain and elsewhere in the GCC have presumably struggled on the social and psychological fronts, a

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point we explore more fully later via interviews. Working as a foreign domestic helper during a pandemic that features tight restrictions on mobility, and the increase of household chores that needed to be performed, led them to higher distress levels. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that most migrant workers in the GCC are not accompanied by their families and live in single-sex communal accommodation provided by their sponsors. Therefore, a traditional family household structure that otherwise exacerbates female-male gender imbalances stemming from social norms about household chores is absent. On the economic front, in stark contrast to their American and British counterparts, Bahraini women (and GCC nationals more generally, as the Saudi data indicate) have outperformed Bahraini men in the labor market, in line with traditional recessions. Here the public sector has played a pivotal role, as it has allowed Bahraini women to work in jobs that are both more likely to be protected than men’s jobs and highly suitable for remote work. These public-sector hiring and living standards are not possible in most countries, with the high per-capita hydrocarbon revenues accruing to the government playing a central role in creating this economic structure. Moreover, Bahraini women’s ability to retain their jobs has been enhanced by the abundance of low-cost domestic assistance from migrant workers and the royal decree that has given working mothers priority status in remote work. However, female nationals’ ability to work disproportionately in the public sector is mirrored by female migrant workers’ disproportionate presence in the sectors that have been highly affected by the pandemic, such as hospitality, entertainment, and personal services. The labor market protections afforded to migrant workers in the GCC are below those given to nationals; most importantly, migrant workers can be easily dismissed. During a pandemic that has created severe cash-flow problems and collapsing demand in sectors dominated by female migrant workers, the result has been a sharp rise in unemployment for female migrant workers. This economic stress surely has a significant direct impact on the psychological well-being of these women, though migrant workers of both genders have faced considerable economic challenges during the pandemic, as the data on Bangladeshi men indicate. To further explore the accuracy of this proposed narrative, we sought to gather data on the experiences of migrant workers. As explained above, this demographic group exhibited a very low propensity to participate in online surveys. Accordingly, we gathered qualitative evidence based on interviews with strategically selected stakeholders in the migrant worker

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community and additional data on women residing in Bahrain regardless of nationality.

Bahrain: Qualitative Interview Results To fill gaps that emerged after analyzing the survey data, we conducted indepth interviews with representatives from two civil society organizations: the Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS), a local nongovernmental organization focused on supporting expatriate workers in Bahrain, and Shamsaha, a victims’ crisis advocacy organization for women who have experienced domestic or sexual violence in Bahrain. Though not generalizable, these interviews provide scholars and policymakers with valuable insights regarding the complexities of the socioeconomic impact of COVID-. The two sets of interviews yielded insights consistent with the narrative above: migrant women in Bahrain experienced considerable economic pain due to the pandemic. Their overrepresentation in service-sector jobs where work all but ceased (salons, shisha cafés, hotels, restaurants, and hourly waged house cleaning) was a major reason for this hardship. Beyond the sector-wide impact of the pandemic, the interviews also indicated an increase in the incidence of the nonpayment of wages to migrant workers, which has been a chronic problem in the GCC countries (Al-Ubaydli ). With revenues declining in many businesses, some decided to delay or cease paying wages to migrant workers, possibly with a promise of subsequently settling the debt once the economic situation improves. The result was increased economic insecurity and psychological stress for the affected migrant workers. As summarized by MWPS, “the issues faced by migrant workers have been a problem for a long time, but what COVID- did was show us these issues clearly and make it clear that these cannot be repeated in the future” (MWPS interview, ). Consequently, during the second quarter of , both MWPS and Shamsaha noticed a substantial increase in the volume of calls being received from the migrant community requesting assistance in the form of food and cash handouts. While neither organization documented the exact number of calls, both stressed that the volume of calls exceeded what their organizations could handle. Within the three months of March to May , Shamsaha received “thousands and thousands—eight, nine, ten thousand—of calls [from women] requesting food and economic support” because they had lost their jobs. These women worked primarily in the aforementioned service jobs and

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were frequently seeking urgent food support. While unable to help all callers, Shamsaha provided food and economic support to approximately , women during this time. Meanwhile, MWPS reported supporting approximately , migrants who urgently needed food and economic support after losing their jobs or wages. According to MWPS, migrant workers were hurt significantly in the first few months of the crisis: “[we] noticed stages in the pandemic, and the first stage was very tight; they couldn’t even afford food, so they needed help even with food.” Notably, female migrant workers represented approximately  percent of those supported, despite constituting only  percent of employed migrant workers in Bahrain. Migrant workers in Bahrain enjoyed a broad range of official support from the government, including waiving healthcare costs for expatriates and overlooking workers’ “undocumented” status at health centers, free healthcare, food distributions, increased awareness campaigns, free vaccinations, and several other initiatives. However, they did not receive rent support or other financial support like Bahraini nationals. Thus, MWPS and Shamsaha could not keep up with the rising demand for their services. Beyond the economic impact, migrant workers reported to MWPS challenges associated with travel and mental health. Many said that they wanted to return home when the pandemic broke out but were unable to do so for several reasons. The disruption to flights early in the pandemic meant that many homeward routes were canceled. Where and when appropriate flights were available, migrant workers lacked the funds to depart from Bahrain. Others were missing proper documentation, as sponsors in the GCC sometimes held on to their employees’ passports and ID cards (Al-Ubaydli ). The pandemic also made housing more precarious for some migrant workers. MWPS reported that overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions raised the risk of contracting COVID- and exacerbating mental health issues. Moreover, in several GCC countries, a sharp increase in xenophobic and racist behavior often targeted migrant workers, leading to further stigmatization and social isolation of migrants. However, detailed data on these challenges, including breakdowns by gender, were not available. Domestic helpers sometimes experienced increased risks of contracting COVID-: they became the direct point-of-contact with food delivery drivers and other visitors in some households, possibly even caring for family members who tested positive for COVID- and are isolating in their rooms. MWPS also cited cases of families failing to provide domestic

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workers with the proper protective equipment, leading to elevated health risks. Beyond these health challenges, overwork and physical abuse led many workers to abscond. Rising rates of domestic violence against women during lockdowns were also a concern in Bahrain as in all countries (Sharma and Borah ). Without official data, the discussions with MWPS and Shamsaha indicated an alarming rise in domestic violence. Shamsaha’s reports of domestic violence cases increased by an average of  percent in March . The increase in reported domestic violence cases between March and May  averaged around   percent compared to pre-pandemic numbers. These rises are broadly in line with what has been reported in other countries. Note that these data include Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis, so the problem is not exclusive to migrant workers. While Shamsaha did not formally analyze the increase, the organization speculates that COVID--related factors played a central role: decreased economic resources, decreased mobility (and hence ability to escape abusive living conditions), and deteriorating mental health among households. Shamsaha also noted cases in which men were borderline abusive before the pandemic but enacted their potential abusive behavior due to these added stress factors such as COVID-induced lost jobs and economic hardship. There’s also a sort of narrative consideration when men who are already sort of borderline abusive—if they face any sort of economic constraints that [lead] them to feel maybe even further emasculated, they will take that out on their partner—one who’s around them—perhaps being physically abusive for the first time.

Further evidence of the role of economic factors came in the form of an uptick in the number of women calling Shamsaha’s hotline requesting direct cash support. Shamsaha indicated that reports of domestic violence retreated to slightly above their usual levels in June . It is very difficult to determine the causes of this decline, since a variety of important factors changed during this period: lockdowns were alleviated; the adverse economic impact began to decline; and people began to adjust their living styles to the “new normal.” Bahraini women living in intergenerational homes or of lower socioeconomic backgrounds suffered as well. Those living in intergenerational homes were more afraid of going to work due to fears of contracting and transferring the virus to elderly members of their family. Further, the interviewees reported that the burden of childcare and household maintenance

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fell primarily on women during this period. With the overall decrease in household funds, the women of these households were often those that suffered the most to fill those gaps and keep the household running. Young Bahraini women from lower socioeconomic backgrounds suffered more than their male counterparts in their schoolwork and school performance due to the increased household burdens that fell on them due to the lockdown. Their school performance, attendance, and concentration in virtual classrooms were lower than those of young men. Finally, we note that the interviews with MWPS and Shamsaha raise important points worth exploring in the future, especially once more systematic data are collected.

Summary and Conclusions Adopting a mixed-methods approach, we conducted a literature review, quantitative secondary data analysis, and quantitative and qualitative primary data collection and analysis. This approach allowed us to investigate the differential impact of the COVID- pandemic on Bahraini men and women in a comparative fashion. By examining the economic activity and gender literature, we learned that in conventional economies men have traditionally fared worse than women during recessions due to sectoral differences in the gender-based distribution of jobs: men tended to work in areas that suffer the most significant contractions during recessions. However, the COVID- pandemic has led to an atypical configuration of economic contractions: sectors such as manufacturing have been relatively resilient, whereas sectors such as hospitality and personal services have seen sharp declines. In most economies, this has led to higher rates of job losses among women than among men. These labor-market gender disparities have been exacerbated by social norms. The inability to outsource the market services traditionally assigned to women in the household—such as childcare, education, cleaning, or meal preparation—has created extreme pressure on women’s time. For some women, these responsibilities were impossible to reconcile with formal employment, especially when remote work was not available, accentuating the divergent impact on female and male unemployment. In principle, much of this analysis does not apply to the Gulf countries due to the unique structure of their economies: the importance of natural resources and the abundance of migrant workers imply distinct impacts of recessions. The limited secondary data available indicate that at first sight females have fared better than males among nationals, whereas the pattern

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observed in Western economies has appeared among migrant workers (women faring worse than men). Primary data from Bahrain affirm the dichotomous impact on women’s prosperity. Female nationals experienced fewer pressures than their counterparts in other countries because of the abundance of public-sector jobs and the ability to procure low-cost domestic help during the pandemic. However, female migrant workers suffered considerable economic and psychological distress due to the same economic factors that have played a role in Western countries, compounded by the low levels of job security that all migrant workers suffer from in the Gulf states. The crisis is still unfolding, so many of our findings may attenuate or even reverse over time. As such, our policy recommendations are speculative and liable to revision. Our analysis is based on limited quantitative and qualitative primary data gathered by the research team, using surveys and interviews. While secondary data also contribute to the analysis, the lack of publicly available data has impeded our ability to thoroughly analyze the gender effects of COVID. We therefore urge GCC policymakers to allocate greater adequate resources to compiling detailed and high-frequency socioeconomic statistics disaggregated by gender. While evidence of a significant gender difference in the impact of the COVID- pandemic exists, the average gender difference is insignificant in relation to the overall average impact. In other words, while men may have performed differently than women in some settings or locales, both genders have experienced great suffering. Accordingly, most policy resources should focus on helping society in general, rather than targeting either gender in particular.

Note For a comprehensive description and analysis of the survey, see Abdulla et  al. ().

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Country.” https://www.statista.com/statistics//gcc-number-of-domestic -workers-by-country. Al-Ubaydli, Omar. . “The Economics of Migrant Workers in the GCC.” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Issue Paper . https://agsiw.org/wp-content /uploads///Ubaydli_ONLINE_edits.pdf. ———. a. “COVID- and the Case for Naturalizing Highly-Skilled Expatriates in the GCC.” TRENDS Research Discussion Paper. TRENDS Research & Advisory. Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. https://trendsresearch.org/product/covid- -and-the-case-for-naturalizing-highly-skilled-expatriates-in-the-gcc. ———. b. “Understanding How the Coronavirus Affects the Global Economy: A Guide for Non-Economists.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper No.  (April ). https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de///MPRA _paper_.pdf. Worldometer. . “COVID- Coronavirus Pandemic.” https://www.worldometers .info/coronavirus.

CHAPTER 4

When Inequalities Interconnect: Women Scholars’ Productivity amid the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa N E R M I N A L L A M , G A I L J . B U T TO R F F , A N D MA R WA S H A L A BY

I feel that the last year is almost a dead year in terms of writing and I’m worried that I have nothing new to say. Interview with a Lebanon-based associate professor, February 2, 2021

How did the COVID- pandemic impact women academics in the Middle East and North Africa? Early research on the pandemic suggests that the health crisis adversely affected women in academia worldwide. Women across disciplines and academic institutions reported decreased research productivity and journal submissions and a disproportionate increase in service work and domestic care (Deryugina, Shurchkov, and Stearns ; Flaherty ; Kim and Patterson ; Kramer ). Early evidence heralded the effects of the pandemic on women’s personal and professional lives within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, we continue to learn more about the pandemic’s gendered effects on academia in and outside the MENA region. We argue in this chapter that the pandemic will exacerbate the gender disparities in academic institutions and among women academics, especially given the preexisting gender gap in academia, as evidenced in extant work on the region (Eleraqi and Salahuddin ; Karam and Afiouni ). Women represent most university students in the MENA region but remain significantly underrepresented in faculty and leadership ranks. Women academics in Arab universities constitute roughly one-third of faculty (Karam and Afiouni ) but are concentrated in lower-ranked positions and hold less than  percent of university leadership positions (Eleraqi and Salahuddin ). As in other regions, patriarchal norms and “male measures” of

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success pervade and shape academia in MENA. Academic mothers encounter a complex web of gendered laws, rules, and social norms that frame what successful academics and good mothers are. The COVID- pandemic will only exacerbate these deep-rooted inequalities. Our aim in this chapter is to shed preliminary light on the differential impact of the COVID- pandemic on MENA academics. The analysis highlights the short-term and long-term effects of the ongoing health crisis on the existing gender gap in MENA’s academia. We rely on qualitative interviews with women scholars in the MENA region combined with data we collected in a  survey to offer insights into the gendered impact of the pandemic on scholars’ research productivity and career paths. We find significant gender variations in research productivity during the pandemic. Women are spending significantly more time on online teaching, service, and care responsibilities while devoting fewer hours to research. These findings have important implications that higher-education institutions should take seriously when evaluating promotion and tenure post-COVID.

Enduring Inequalities in Academia: A Comparative Perspective The long-standing presence of male academics established gendered norms and expectations that continue to shape the academic milieu (Jakubiec ). Research over the past few decades reveals the myriad manifestations of such imbalances in Western contexts. Extant work finds that women encounter bias in their teaching evaluations (Chávez and Mitchell ; Mitchell and Martin ) and carry an uneven load of service and “institutional housekeeping” (Bird, Litt, and Wang ). Furthermore, women tend to have lower research productivity (Teele and Thelen ) and fewer journal submissions (Djupe, Smith, and Sokhey ; Dolan and Lawless ), books (Mathews and Andersen ), citations (Aksnes et al. ; Dion, Sumner, and Mitchell ), and networking opportunities compared to men (Barnes and Beaulieu ; Mitchell and Hesli ). Consequently, women are more likely to leave their academic positions (Dryfhout and Estes ) and face increased challenges in obtaining secure academic positions as well as tenure and promotion (Hesli, Lee, and Mitchell ). These issues are further complicated for faculty mothers, who are more likely to take a “second shift” to keep up with family responsibilities (Sallee, Ward, and Wolf-Wendel ). Women tend to do more housework and childcare than men (Baker ; Nakhaie ), which has a double negative effect on their research productivity, networking opportunities, earnings, and tenure and promotion (Lutter and Schröder ). Mothers in

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academia oftentimes experience a “motherhood penalty,” wherein childbearing is associated with a decline in publication outputs (Wolf-Wendel and Ward ) and a delay in career advancements (Jakubiec ; Sanders, Willemsen, and Millar ). The idea of choice, scholars argue, is an “illusion” for many academic mothers, who struggle to meet both professional expectations of what it means to be a successful academic and societal norms of what it means to be a good mother (Wolf-Wendel and Ward ). For example, research examining the status of women academics in Nordic universities suggests that while family-friendly policies are important, societal expectations around motherhood play a significant role in women’s career advancement (Mayer and Tikka ). Academic practices and university restructuring policies also affect the gender gap and influence women’s access to maternity policies (Baker ). Women and men in academia generally agree that women carry out more childcare work; however, some women hesitate to take advantage of flexible family-friendly policies because doing so can reflect a lack of professionalism in academic circles (Sallee, Ward, and Wolf-Wendel ). In addressing the academic gender gap, researchers advocate for gender-equity policies that consider not only professional but also “familial” outcomes such as childbirth, marriage, and divorce (Mason and Goulden ).

Challenges Facing Women Scholars in MENA’s Academic Institutions Most research on the status of women academics and their research productivity has focused on Western contexts; thus, we know relatively little about these issues in non-Western contexts, such as MENA. The region witnessed significant educational advancements over the past few decades, with substantively narrowed or even reversed gender gaps in educational attainment (World Economic Forum ). Women now outpace men in educational performance and attainment in most MENA countries yet remain sidelined from institutions of higher education (Rahbari ) and leadership positions within these institutions (Karam and Afiouni ). Wide variations exist throughout the region regarding the representation of female faculty. In Yemen, for instance, women constitute less than  percent of faculty compared to  percent in Iran (Rahbari ) and almost one-third in the rest of the Arab world (Karam and Afiouni ). The United Arab Emirates has nine female ministers but only one female university president out of more than eighty public and private universities (Eleraqi and Salahuddin ). As elsewhere, academia in MENA is gendered and male dominated.

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MENA academia is “an almost entirely man-molded, man-minded, and man-oriented institution and place” (Sabour , ). Consequently, women face horizontal segregation as they are pushed into particular disciplines and institutions as well as vertical segregation: women tend to be concentrated in less prestigious, nonstable faculty positions (such as nontenured or entry-level positions) that rely heavily on teaching and less on research (Karam and Afiouni ; Sabour ). Women are also woefully underrepresented in leadership positions. Less than  percent of Arab university presidents are women, compared to  percent of presidents in the United States and  percent among the top  colleges worldwide (Eleraqi and Salahuddin ). In Oman and Saudi Arabia—the leaders among Arab countries in terms of women in education leadership—women constitute  percent of university presidents. A central challenge that women face in higher education in MENA is balancing work, domestic, and childcare responsibilities (Al-Ali ; Boutkhil ). As the ones primarily responsible for childcare and housework—less than one-third of men reported ever engaging in “domestic work” (UN  ESCWA )—women academics have less time for research and networking, which frequently occur outside of business hours (Dajani ). Hence women are less likely to be promoted. The balancing act can leave women in academia feeling inadequate and frustrated (von AlbertiAlhtaybat and Aazam , ). These expectations are a double-edged sword: because women are expected to balance their “double role of being a leader and being a parent,” women are not seen as “good workers” or ideal leaders (von Alberti-Alhtaybat and Aazam , ), which further disadvantages them in employment and promotion. Gender stereotypes are an additional hurdle to women academics and their career advancement. Women in the region encounter a complex web of laws, rules, and social norms (Alsubaie and Jones ) that influence their career trajectories and opportunities for advancement. A number of women academics during interviews report being referred to as “Miss” or “Mrs.” rather than “Dr.” and being paid less than men, including men without similar qualifications or experience. Women are frequently excluded from decision-making at all levels. In some cases, female faculty members are not invited to meetings; in others, they may technically have a seat at the table but are neither heard nor consulted (Al-Ali ; von AlbertiAlhtaybat and Aazam ). These biased assumptions and social norms imbue perceptions of good leaders, resulting in women’s expertise and leadership capabilities being underestimated or discounted in academia (Alsubaie and Jones ; Eleraqi and Salahuddin ; von Alberti-Alhtaybat and Aazam ). A

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female faculty member recounted her conversation with the administration in which an official emphasized the need for “more [nationals] in the political science department because it’s a sensitive department.” He explained how her position does not count because “[you] are a woman. We need a man” (interview with a Gulf-based instructor, June , ). The result is that the gender disparities only widen up the career ladder. Some female faculty members are made to feel further underqualified in climbing the academic ladder without degrees from the United States or United Kingdom, which are seen as more prestigious than degrees from the region (von Alberti-Alhtaybat and Aazam , ). The lack of networking and mentoring opportunities is another challenge faced by women academics in the region (Abalkhail ). Social norms and cultural constraints make networking difficult by denying women access to informal and formal events like dinners with visiting scholars and conferences, especially those abroad (Dajani ). Moreover, when allocating scarce resources, whether for research, travel, or professional development, men are prioritized (Al-Ali ), leaving many women to fund their own research and further complicating the teaching-research-family balancing act (Boutkhil , ).

COVID-19 Impact on MENA’s Academic Institutions and Research: A Gendered Perspective The pandemic had a negative impact on academic institutions and scholars worldwide. Universities announced budget cuts, furloughs, and hiring freezes to mitigate some of the consequences of the pandemic. The abrupt shift in instruction modes, advising and mentoring, collaborative work, fieldwork plans, and research dissemination following the mandated lockdowns substantially affected scholars’ productivity. Academic parents, especially women with young children, reported a disproportionate increase in childcare and decreased research productivity (Breuning et al. ; Deryugina, Shurchkov, and Stearns ; Myers et al. ; Shalaby, Allam, and Buttorff a; Shalaby, Buttorff, and Allam ). Early evidence from journal submissions data, social media discussions (Kim and Patterson ), and accounts of women’s lived experiences (Fazackerley ; Lyttelton, Zang, and Musick ) all suggest that the pandemic’s effects are heterogeneous and gendered. While overall manuscript submissions at Elsevier journals increased between February and May , women were significantly penalized, with the average increase in submissions by junior men about twice that by junior women in the social sciences (Squazzoni et al. ).

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Academic institutions and scholars in MENA also encountered substantial challenges. Prior to the pandemic, academic institutions across the region struggled with scarce economic and teaching resources, mediocre research budgets, and wide-ranging restrictions on foreign funding, especially after . COVID- hit after a turbulent decade following the Arab uprisings that resulted in myriad socioeconomic and political challenges and waves of conflict, displacement, and civil unrest. Recent international and regional reports reveal the compound effect of the pandemic on MENA institutions: the further diminishing of research funding (Swan and Abd Al-Galil ), research accessibility (Buttorff, Shalaby, and Allam ; Allam, Buttorff, and Shalaby ), and quality of instruction (Abdel-Tawwab ; Lassoued, Alhendawi, and Bashitialshaaer ). Moreover, the pandemic laid bare the realities that working women face. Ample research documents the pandemic’s adverse effects on women’s lives across MENA (Khamis and Campbell ; Phelps ) and in conflict-ridden settings (Daibes ; Halawa ). Early evidence has also demonstrated that women academics with caregiving responsibilities have borne the brunt of the pandemic (Krafft ). More work is needed to understand the pandemic’s short-term and long-term effects on women academics in MENA. To bridge this critical gap, we present comparative evidence of the pandemic’s effect on scholars’ research productivity and the challenges facing women scholars in MENA. The next section outlines the global trends and patterns based on results from our survey, followed by a detailed analysis, based on qualitative interviews, of the pandemic’s impact on women scholars across the MENA region. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the long-term effects of the pandemic and ways to mitigate its adverse effects on women’s careers.

Data and Methodology We fielded an online survey from June  to July , , which was shared with academics and researchers working at regional and international institutions through academic LISTSERVs, personal networks, and various social media platforms. A total of  researchers and academics at institutions in  countries in North and South America, Europe, Africa, and MENA responded to the survey. Of these respondents, . percent identified as women, nearly half of whom reported (.  percent) being parents or guardians of children

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under the age of eighteen. Nearly  percent of respondents hold tenuretrack positions (assistant, associate, full professor, or equivalent). We used two questions from the online survey to measure research productivity: () Compared to before the outbreak of COVID- and subsequent closure of university campuses, has the number of hours you devote to research increased, decreased, or stayed the same? and () Compared to before the outbreak of COVID- and subsequent closure of university campuses, has your ability to complete and/or submit work for publication increased, decreased, or stayed the same? We also included questions to capture different factors that may impact productivity, such as time spent on nonresearch/service activities, online instruction, and childcare and domestic responsibilities. To further explore the pandemic’s effect on female academics, we carried out fifteen semistructured interviews with female faculty and graduate students from the social sciences and humanities before and after the administration of the survey, seven of whom are based in the United States and eight in MENA. These qualitative interviews helped identify the most important challenges facing women faculty members. In the next section, we provide an overview of the gendered effects of the pandemic on women’s productivity in academia worldwide, before diving deeper into its impact on women in MENA academia.

Gender Inequity in Academia: A Comparative Perspective In this section we present the descriptive data for measures of scholars’ research productivity, teaching, and service to highlight disparities around the globe. Figure . shows how scholars perceived the effects of COVID- on their research, teaching, and service. The productivity of both men and women in academia significantly decreased during the pandemic (figure .A). While similar proportions of men and women reported a decrease in the number of hours spent on research, a greater proportion of women reported fewer hours devoted to research than men (. vs. . percent). About  percent of men noted that time spent on research stayed the same, compared to only . percent for women. Figure .B shows that both men and women reported decreased ability to submit or complete work for publication. We saw no substantial gender difference, with . and . percent of men and women, respectively, reporting a decrease in their ability. For respondents who taught during the pandemic, we asked how the transition to online classes impacted their

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Figure 4.1. COVID-19 impact on research productivity, service, and teaching by gender. Source: Shalaby, Allam, and Buttorff 2021b.

time devoted to teaching: . percent of women and . percent of men reported spending more time on online instruction during the early months of the pandemic (figure .C). Few respondents (less than  percent) reported that the time they spent on teaching decreased. Respondents also reported whether their non-research-related workload had increased, decreased, or stayed the same as before the outbreak (figure .D). As expected, both men and women reported an increase. However, women were more likely to see their service workloads increase relative to men: . percent of women reported an increase in their responsibilities compared to only . percent of men. Furthermore, only  percent of women reported that their workload remained similar, in contrast to . percent of men. Our results are consistent with previous research showing that female faculty members, especially women of color, are shouldering a disproportionate share of service and mentoring (Mitchell and Hesli ). Finally, the survey asked respondents about time spent on childcare, homeschooling, and housework. While both women and men with children under eighteen reported similar amounts of time spent helping their children with homeschooling, women, on average, reported spending eight more hours per week on childcare (forty-two vs. thirty-four hours for men). Nearly  percent of women reported more than forty hours per week on

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childcare outside of homeschooling, compared to only . percent of men. Moreover, women with and without young children also reported spending more hours per week on housework. In the next section we explore the pandemic’s gendered impact within MENA. Given the relatively small subsample of MENA academics—only thirty respondents, almost two-thirds of whom are women, work at universities in the region—we complement our survey results with interview data from women academics based in the region. The discussion highlights the compounded effects of the pandemic on scholarly productivity and underscores the pervading effects of gender and parenting on their work. Gender and Scholarly Productivity during COVID-19 in MENA

The overwhelming majority of interviewees in MENA reported decreased hours devoted to research since the outbreak of COVID- and the concomitant lockdowns and university closures. Interviewees described the past year as “a dead year in terms of writing,” expressed their anxiety over having “nothing new to say” (interview with a Lebanon-based associate professor, February , ), and shared how they had “moved away from research” since the start of the pandemic (interview with a Kuwait-based assistant professor, January , ). A majority of survey respondents based in MENA also reported decreased time devoted to research. Although a lower proportion of respondents working in MENA said the hours devoted to research decreased compared to respondents working elsewhere (. vs. . percent), we see a significant gender gap: . percent of women in the region reported decreased hours devoted to research compared to . percent of men. By contrast, we see the reverse for scholars’ ability to complete or submit work for publication: . percent of women reported decreased ability compared to . percent of men. Respondents who reported decreased hours devoted to research and/or ability to complete work for publication were asked which factors negatively impacted their productivity (figure .). The increase in domestic and childcare responsibilities and online instruction were among such factors. “I am more distracted/have difficulty concentrating” was by far the most common response, both in MENA and elsewhere. In addition, . percent of women and . percent of men reported that emotional and physiological stress negatively impacted their productivity, around  percentage points lower than among scholars at non-MENA institutions. A female professor who was finishing her term as chair of the department at the time of the survey remarked how the “stress and worry of living in a pandemic with no end in sight weighs heavily on me emotionally and psychologically, which I believe

Figure 4.2. COVID-19 impact on productivity, teaching, and service in MENA by gen-

der. Source: Shalaby, Allam, and Buttorff 2021b.

Figure 4.3. COVID-19 impact on research productivity by gender in MENA. Source: Shalaby, Allam, and Buttorff 2021b.

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will affect my research productivity even though I will no longer have the heavy administrative load.” In our interviews we further probed the factors affecting women’s research productivity. Participants identified the burden of teaching, service workload, and domestic and family care as the primary reasons affecting their productivity and distracting them from their research. The following discussion examines these factors in detail and traces the gendered processes that enable them. Women Scholars and Teaching in the MENA Region

With the outbreak of COVID-, many universities suspended in-person classes and transitioned to online teaching. The vast majority of survey respondents in MENA reported increased time spent on teaching following this transition, with . and . percent of men and women, respectively, reporting an increase. Further examination, however, reveals gendered effects. When asked how the pandemic had negatively affected their research productivity,  percent of women said their productivity suffered because of time spent on online instruction, double the percentage of men at MENA institutions (figure .). One woman academic based in MENA responded to the online survey, stating that “teaching online takes huge amounts of time and sitting and reading computer screens all day is exhausting.” Online teaching, as other respondents described, “has taken over [their] life” and takes “twice as much time.” One interviewee explained that teaching decreased women’s productivity due to differences in teaching approaches. She observed that her approach during the pandemic differed from that of her male colleagues. Sharing her approach to teaching, she emphasized that the way we teach also during the pandemic is very different. It’s double labor, for sure. And I can see it clearly, because, when I did try to share these ideas of using the mental health poll and, for example, asking the students to write poetry about COVID or about how they’re feeling, the male professors kind of just started laughing and saying, “Let’s just get through the actual material, there is no need for all this extra work.” (interview with a Kuwait-based assistant professor, January , )

Her male colleagues ridiculed her care-based approach to teaching during the pandemic, viewing it as an extra and unnecessary burden. Another interviewee noted how this student-centered care approach to teaching resulted in different experiences among professors. She described how her

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male colleague preferred the online teaching model: “They are happy with this online teaching, they come to the office in the morning [on] campus, they can sit and work and think” (interview with a Lebanon-based assistant professor, January , ). Students’ expectations of female professors, she added, further compounded the gendered effects of online teaching. She described how students expected women professors to provide emotional support and also be “more understanding” in terms of school and course work. While she frequently found herself chasing students to submit their course work, her male colleagues did not experience the same problem. She felt that “when the professor is a female, they [students] find it easier to get away with things.” Scholars based outside the MENA region reported similar gendered expectations, where students resorted to women faculty for emotional support and women academics spent more time supporting students. MENA respondents also lamented the lack of institutional support during the transition to online classes. One interviewee described the transition as “terrible” because the administration “suddenly made a switch. . . . It was a Sunday, they [the administration] said: ‘Oh, don’t show up Monday, please teach online’” (interview with a Lebanon-based associate professor, February , ). While nearly three-quarters of men (. percent) based at MENA institutions agreed or strongly agreed that their university provided them and their students with adequate resources to administer online instruction, only . percent of women felt similarly. This -point gender gap in respondents’ assessment of institutional support was, in part, attributable to the additional emotional labor that many female professors took on. For example, one respondent based in Lebanon discussed the gendered impact of teaching during the pandemic: The emotional toll fell mainly on women faculty so I was doing hours of talking to students who are not feeling well, who are too scared, who are not submitting. . . . [Students] felt that they could call you on zoom and cry . . . there was a lot of emotional labor that was, you know, all of [a] sudden [and that] we found ourselves doing. (interview with a Lebanon-based assistant professor, January , )

Women Scholars and Service in MENA’s Academic Institutions

Among scholars based at institutions in MENA,   percent of men and . percent of women reported that their nonresearch workload increased after the outbreak of COVID-. While over a quarter of women and

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one-fifth of men reported that their workload stayed the same, no respondents said that their workload decreased (figure .). In some cases, faculty without young children were asked to do more service because they were perceived to have fewer demands on their time and more flexible schedules. The same pattern was observed in our interviews with women as well as single academics in Western-based institutions. For one professor in MENA, her single, childless status meant, according to her colleagues, that she should be doing more service: I always, always get this question of “Why don’t you stand up more? Why don’t you take more administrative duties?” It’s like my job is my only love life or my only life. . . . I noticed this with myself and other single academics from other institutions, we have the same issues, we get asked to be on so many committees. (interview with a Kuwait-based assistant professor, January , )

With the outbreak of COVID-, as an interviewee described, women continued to carry the burden of service; “they are the ones [who] read and write [reports] and [who] lift up” (interview with a Lebanon-based associate professor, February , ). Reflecting on her experience, she explained her decision to refrain from further service work because it is often undervalued within the department and the university at large. Her “enthusiasm for the service work,” she reported, “was ridiculed by my male colleagues.” However, the decision to participate in or refrain from committee work and in-service work is not easy. By saying no, women risk being further alienated from their institutions’ decision-making processes and leadership positions. The same expectations, however, do not apply to men, because leadership positions are traditionally viewed as masculine. Women are thus expected to do more than men to move up the leadership ranks. Interviews with women in academia highlight the negative impact of service work on women’s academic careers. One respondent noted, “I have colleagues who are assistant professors. [They are] women [who] have been here for a long time and have not produced a lot of research but have served the institution so much and now they’re up for tenure and they don’t have a good or strong enough file and they are scared that it will be used against them” (interview with a Lebanon-based assistant professor, January , ). Another respondent echoed how women’s service work ultimately undermines their careers: “Service is part of the promotion file, but nobody will promote you based on service” (interview with a Lebanon-based associate professor, February , ). Unfortunately, she added, “female

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colleagues who published average books and average articles” but do “excessive service” do not get promoted.

The Burden of Care among Women Academics in MENA In line with global trends, COVID- has exacerbated the gender gap in academia and adversely affected the productivity of women academics in MENA. Studies report that the closure of schools and childcare providers magnified the dual burden of academic and family life for scholars with young children. While both men and women with children experienced an increase in time dedicated to childcare, recent work has shown that women reported disproportionately higher increases in childcare and decreases in time dedicated to research (Deryugina, Shurchkov, and Stearns ). Many women academics with children openly expressed the muddle of balancing their academic responsibilities and increased family demands, including homeschooling, fulltime childcare, and unpaid care work for elderly or sick family members. In our survey, nearly three-fifths of women based at universities in the MENA region attributed decreased research productivity to increased domestic responsibilities, compared to only a quarter of men (figure .). More women (. percent) than men ( percent) indicated that childcare and homeschool responsibilities were a reason for decreased productivity since the outbreak of COVID-. According to one respondent, the gendered burden of care is apparent: The thing is, the division of labor in our culture is not possible. In my case, though, my husband is very understanding—he prepares the food for himself, he does everything for himself—but not taking care of the child. You do it. You do it, and we don’t complain. Usually, here in the Middle East, we do not. Usually, we take it on ourselves, and we take responsibilities because we want to show that we are good, so you end up taking more responsibilities, and that’s how things go. (interview with an Egypt-based researcher, June , )

Another interviewee noted how childcare takes “a different kind of energy, mental energy, than to cook and wash the dishes while listening to a podcast” (interview with a Qatar-based assistant professor, May , ). Other interviewees agreed that relegating childcare to women during the lockdown disadvantaged women and put a disproportionate burden on

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their time and energy, even when their partners stepped up to help with chores. As childcare centers were gradually reopening in June , many interviewees initially were not prepared to send their young kids to daycare facilities. One interviewee who decided to send her toddler to childcare early in the pandemic described herself as “probably lacking maternal instincts” (interview with a UAE-based adjunct professor, June , ). Her description conveys pressures stemming from balancing academic expectations and socially imposed norms around motherhood. A justified focus on career could thus be viewed, or in this case internalized, as “lacking maternal instincts.” Another interviewee explained how pressures to be a good mother and a successful academic result in carrying an intense and constant feeling of guilt. She traced the intense feeling of guilt among some academic mothers to the effects of gender socialization in many societies, explaining: We, as women, are socialized into shame and guilt, ever since we were young girls, whether we’re in the Arab world or here [in the United States] . . . and so, you end up carrying all that guilt inside of you. If you put yourself first then you’re selfish. . . . So there are always these choices that they put you in and then you end up feeling guilty about everything you do, as a woman. (interview with a US-based PhD candidate, January , )

For many, this dual burden is lose-lose. Women feel pressure from socially imposed norms but also pressure from a male-dominated, patriarchal workplace. One respondent noted that “people downplay childcare responsibilities, people dismiss it, people think [that] I’m making excuses, people don’t take me seriously” (interview with a Qatar-based assistant professor, May , ). She also recalled how her chair was disappointed when she refused to chair a panel following the move to online learning: We have these online seminars because all of our seminars are now online, and the person who chairs these panels, he sent an email to me and two other colleagues and asked: Can you please start chairing these panels? I told him, it’s very difficult for me to chair a panel from my house, my child is up, and he’s screaming and he’s playing. . . . The impression I got is that I shouldn’t have [said] this, but I said it anyway.

The dilemma of trying to maintain an active research agenda while bearing the brunt of care left many of our interviewees feeling emotionally and physically drained.

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While our discussion largely focused on childcare, the category of family and care work is much broader. Indeed, among MENA respondents, .  percent of women provided direct care for another person at higher risk for COVID- infection due to preexisting health conditions, age, or being immunocompromised, compared to only . percent of men. Many universities, including those in MENA, do not recognize that care work takes many forms. For example, according to one scholar, her university’s health insurance plan is “very gendered.” The plan, she noted, “doesn’t consider same sex marriage, doesn’t consider single moms, the definition of family is very heteronormative” (interview with a Lebanon-based associate professor, February , ). Restricted definitions of family and care have dire implications at times of crisis. Another respondent detailed the narrow understanding of family care: I had a male academic much older than me, and he once asked me flat out, “Why do you need to teach summers? It’s not like you need all this money, and I [the male professor] have kids, I need to put them in schools, but you don’t really need to, why would you do this to yourself?” . . . I responded with, “I do have my parents who are still alive, they need me to support them, and family comes in different ways.” (interview with a Kuwait-based assistant professor, January , )

This analysis thus offers preliminary evidence on the differential effects of the pandemic on women academics in MENA. Women’s stories and voices are invaluable to design gender-sensitive solutions and policies that successfully mitigate the short- and long-term effects of the pandemic on women.

Looking Ahead: Countering the Effects of COVID-19 In many ways, the experiences of women academics in MENA during the pandemic mirror those of their colleagues worldwide. Women saw their research productivity decline and their teaching and service workloads increase, all while trying to balance increased demands on their time at home. Looking ahead,   percent of men and .  percent of women from MENA institutions agreed that women will be worse off than men in academia post-pandemic. Despite apparent agreement that women academics will be worse off, men were significantly less likely to believe that more men than women will be published in top journals in their field over

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the next few years—only   percent of men compared to two-thirds of women. Post-pandemic, even tougher challenges likely await women scholars in MENA given the poor status of academic institutions in parts of the region and the prevailing gendered structures. First, while it is not clear how universities will restructure their operations, restructuring will likely vary according to funding, immigration, and employment frameworks. An adjunct professor based in Qatar anticipated that universities might “sack full-time faculty and keep the adjunct. For fulltime faculty, the university pays the cost of sponsorship, healthcare, education, as well as additional perks for the faculty and their dependents.” She described the gendered division in her department, where most full-time faculty are men and adjuncts are exclusively women. This division is fundamentally dictated by immigration and employment frameworks and, in some cases, reflects cultural and gender norms. For example, many universities in the UAE do not sponsor adjuncts’ visas, and women working in the UAE could not sponsor their husbands until  (Nammour ). Adjuncts thus tend to be women who are sponsored on their husband’s or father’s visa. Consequently, their job security and stability during and after COVID are contingent not only on their universities’ restructuring policies but also on their family sponsor visa and their father or spouse’s work situation. Second, more than three-quarters of respondents in MENA believed that faculty would have heavier teaching loads, either online or in person. One of our survey respondents described the looming possibility of “an increase in teaching load that will transform research universities to teaching universities.” Supporting and mentoring more students inside and outside the classroom will further affect women’s productivity, especially since the literature confirms that the burden of service work and emotional labor tends to fall on women. Third, among MENA academics who responded to the survey, . percent said COVID- financially impacted their institution. Thus, researchers face mounting challenges with looming cuts to already low research and travel budgets. A survey respondent explained that “[f]or scholars based in the Middle East region, research and funding were already a challenge, and with the effects of COVID on universities, it will become even more challenging to be able to travel for conferences or to get grants for research.” In some universities, researchers struggled to access essential services and research tools pre-pandemic; the new financial strains will only exacerbate these challenging conditions. For example, in Iraq, researchers lack laboratories, equipment, and access to scholarship, particularly in Arabic (Al-Ali

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). According to one interviewee, professors were dealing with difficult circumstances in Lebanon, including universities refusing to adjust salaries after the currency collapse and disrupted semesters because of the uprising, all which affected scholars’ productivity even before the outbreak of COVID- (interview with a Lebanon-based assistant professor, January , ). Since the pandemic further strained some universities’ finances and resources, women will find it harder to recover their research productivity, especially in the absence of research resources and opportunities. Finally, the pandemic’s consequences for women’s productivity will adversely affect their career advancement and promotion. A female respondent based in Qatar expressed such concerns in the survey’s open-ended question, stating that she was “[v]ery concerned that universities will make budget cuts on faculty who were ‘less productive’ during the pandemic without thought to why this might be the case.” An interviewee echoed the concern about the differential impact of the pandemic on productivity and underscored the importance of a nuanced, gender-sensitive understanding of the pandemic’s varied impacts: Immediately the comments started, because those men, they are either single or they don’t take care of childcare, so they’re like, “Oh, now you have more free time, you should clear any backlog.” . . . I remember saying, and I’m the only woman in the meeting: “What, how, and in what time frame am I supposed to finish the backlog?” (interview with a Qatar-based assistant professor, May , )

She explained how her male colleagues’ views were grounded in their “different positionality.” They did not “have to take care of a child,” so childcare did not “drain” their time, while it completely occupied all her time. Notwithstanding the early adverse gendered effects of the pandemic in academia and the anticipated long-term impact on women scholars, the pandemic presents an opportunity for universities in MENA to address structural inequalities and adopt gender-sensitive policies. For this to happen, women must be included at all levels of discussions so that their voices are heard in their institutions’ COVID- policy responses. Gender equality indicators should be included in universities’ global ranking. Evaluation and promotion committees should also adopt a holistic approach, acknowledging that women faced an exceptional set of challenges during the pandemic. The continued absence of women and their voices from decision-making will result in academic careers becoming further untenable for many women and lead ultimately to a loss of talent at regional universities. Addressing the

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gender effects of COVID- in academia by including women in decisionmaking promises to usher in a new direction in universities and sends a crucial message to societies in the region. It will contribute to and inform societal debates around the pandemic and its gendered effects on women’s personal and professional lives.

Note Our survey relied on a sample of convenience, so it is possible that unmeasured attributes differentiate our sample from the general population; for example, those who were more adversely affected by the pandemic may have been more likely to respond.

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Khaleej Times (July ). https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/dubai/yes-women-can -sponsor-husbands-for-work-in-uae. Phelps, Courtney. . “Rapid Gender Analysis Middle East and North Africa Region.” Care (April ). https://careevaluations.org/wp-content/uploads/Regional -Rapid-Gender-Analysis_MENA_-April-_FINAL.pdf. Rahbari, Ladan. . “Women in Higher Education and Academia in Iran.” Sociology and Anthropology (): –. Sabour, M’hammed. . “Women in the Moroccan Academic Field: Respectability and Power.” Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies (): –. Sallee, Margaret, Kelly Ward, and Lisa Wolf-Wendel. . “Can Anyone Have It All? Gendered Views on Parenting and Academic Careers.” Innovative Higher Education (): –. Sanders, Karin, Tineke M. Willemsen, and Carla C.J.M. Millar. . “Views from above the Glass Ceiling: Does the Academic Environment Influence Women Professors’ Careers and Experiences?” Sex Roles (): –. Shalaby, Marwa, Nermin Allam, and Gail J. Buttorff. a. “Leveling the Field: Gender Inequity in Academia during COVID-.” PS: Political Science & Politics (): -. doi:./S. ———. b. “Replication Data for: Leveling the Field: Gender Inequity in Academia during COVID.” Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/./DVN/YRSZNE. Shalaby, Marwa, Gail Buttorff, and Nermin Allam. . “Gender, COVID and Faculty Service.” Inside Higher Ed. https://www.insidehighered.com/advice// //increasingly-disproportionate-service-burden-female-faculty-bear-will-have. Squazzoni, Flaminio, Giangiacomo Bravo, Francisco Grimaldo, Daniel García-Costa, Mike Farjam, and Bahar Mehmani. . “Gender Gap in Journal Submissions and Peer Review during the First Wave of the COVID- Pandemic: A Study on  Elsevier Journals.” PLOS ONE (): –. https://doi.org/./journal.pone .. Swan, Melanie, and Tarek Abd Al-Galil. . “Health and Economic Crises Threaten Arab Funding for Research.” Al-Fanar Media (July ). https://www.al-fanarmedia .org///health-and-economic-crises-threaten-arab-funding-for-research. Teele, Dawn L., and Kathleen Thelen. . “Gender in the Journals: Publication Patterns in Political Science.” PS: Political Science & Politics (): –. UN ESCWA (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). . “The Impact of COVID- on Gender Equality in the Arab Region.” Policy Brief . https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/-_gpid_pb _eng_apr.pdf. von Alberti-Alhtaybat, Larrisa, and Salwa Aazam. . “Female Leadership in the Middle Eastern Higher Education.” Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences (): –. Wolf-Wendel, Lisa Ellen, and Kelly Ward. . “Academic Life and Motherhood: Variations by Institutional Type.” Higher Education : –. World Economic Forum. . “The Global Gender Gap Report, .” Geneva: World  Economic Forum. http://www.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap _Report_.pdf.

PAR T II

Social Vulnerabilities

CHAPTER 5

The LGBTIQ+ Community’s COVID Dilemma in Lebanon LINA ABOU-HABIB AND AMINA ALI

In May  queer stand-up comedian Shaden Fakih was summoned for questioning by the Lebanese government’s Cyber-Crime Bureau (a branch of the Internal Security Forces) for comments she made on social media. She had committed the unspeakable crime of expressing resentment at having to explain to the police that she had left her house to buy tampons. Shaden objected to sharing information about her period with the police. This post caused the ire of the Cyber-Crime Bureau.

Prologue On Tuesday, August , , at precisely : p.m., the city of Beirut was shaken by what became known as the Beirut Port blast. It was the third most potent nonnuclear explosion worldwide, taking the lives of more than  citizens and residents while more than , others were maimed and hurt. The exposition hit Beirut at a time when it was ravaged by the pandemic, when the situation with vaccines was uncertain, and when every single ad hoc policy or measure taken by the government to thwart the spread of the disease was irrational, poorly informed, and oblivious of the disproportionate gendered impact of the pandemic. Amid this chaos, feminist activists mobilized to address the needs of the most vulnerable and the most affected: women and girls, migrant and refugee women, women with disabilities, queer women, and sex workers. This chapter explores some facets of feminist mobilizing in Lebanon, which is still ongoing. More specifically, we examine how intersectional feminists turned anger into activism (as did Calderaro and Lépinard  in examining French and Swiss women’s activism). Focusing on the queer community,

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we highlight how harshly members have been affected by the combination of shocks that prevailed in Lebanon. These experiences added to the perennial rejection, racism, exclusion, stigmatization, and outright violence that these communities face daily. We have relied on our extensive network and direct connections with active civil society organizations in Lebanon. We have reviewed their literature as well as spoken with their leaders as part of our preparation.

When the Pandemic Hit Lebanon In early , when the news of the pandemic started to filter through the media in Lebanon, the first reaction of the minister of public health was that “there is no need to panic” (Lazkani ). This understatement—that citizens and residents of Lebanon should not panic—masks the inability of the Lebanese government to deal with the spread of the virus. When hard evidence started to reveal the increase in cases of COVID-, the same minister refused to order the temporary closure of the airport for “political reasons” that have not yet been divulged. In the absence of any reasonable measures to curtail the rapid spread of the diseases, positive cases increased exponentially throughout the country. The public healthcare system, with its resources already siphoned off in favor of a private health system cartel, was flooded. Frontline workers, mainly poorly paid female workers (staff nurses, practical nurses, helpers, orderlies, cleaning personnel, and others), bore the brunt of lifesaving care work. The media and the public glorified their role by referring to them as “heroes” and “angels.” However, no efforts were made to recognize their labor and provide them with proper working conditions. When some nurses requested housing near the Rafic Hariri Public Hospital, a famous TV media figure shamed them as thinking of themselves at a time when there was a shortage of resources (Ghaddar ). The government’s denial narrative was soon to be replaced by self-praise and self-gratification. The health minister and the prime minister bragged how the world was watching them in awe as they have succeeded in conquering the pandemic. The data indicating a different trend were immaterial while the minister of public health continued to celebrate his imaginary successes by performing the traditional dabkeh dance in his native region in Baalbek (MEMO ). There was hardly any analysis of how the pandemic impacted the compounded economic crisis, and policies to mitigate the long-term impact of this complex situation are yet to materialize. Information, data, testimonials,

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and calls for action began to emerge from various feminist and human rights civil society organizations. KAFA (Enough Violence and Exploitation), a nongovernmental organization working on gender-based violence, monitored the calls received through its hotline and noted a regular increase in the number of women and girls reporting recurrent incidents of domestic violence (KAFA ). They lobbied the internal security forces to reactivate their GBV hotlines to save women’s lives and succeeded in convincing judges to deliver verdicts on Skype while many religious courts handling personal status laws were not operational. The inertia of what is primarily a patriarchal, conservative, and sectarian regime in Lebanon heightened the level of harm and vulnerability of all women and girls. Given the relative void, most people had to fend for themselves. The following section highlights how these mobilizations took place, their impact, and the lessons we continue to learn from this grotesque situation where duty-bearers fail and rights-holders act collectively.

The Queer Community’s Struggle The situation and position of the queer community in Lebanon is a case of multilayered discrimination and oppression. Until recently, small parts of Beirut were still considered safe havens and hubs of queer life in the city. This limited safety zone was almost destroyed in August , forcing the community into destitution, homelessness, and vulnerability to all forms of violence and abuse. Loss of Life and Livelihood

Lebanon’s penal code continues to criminalize homosexuality through the shameful article , which punishes “unnatural intercourse” with up to one year in prison. This law is key to understanding the main impediment to the queer community seeking services during the pandemic. Dating back to the late days of the French Mandate, Lebanon’s penal code bans all sexual relations contrary to the laws of nature, without mentioning homosexuality, and has been used to detain and prosecute essentially gay men and trans women. Members of the LGBTIQ+ community tend to hold low-income jobs in the informal sector, retail, service industries, and the gig economy. Hence, they are not engaged in work that may be performed remotely, thus finding themselves out of work during the pandemic. Many queer people

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have found themselves on the frontlines of systemic discrimination, with COVID- proving to be an ideal environment for breeding—or bringing back to the surface—various forms of social violence and ostracization. As a result of their targeted economic exclusion, many queer folks do not have access to healthcare or the National Social Security Fund. Those who rely on mental health and hormonal treatment have lost access to those services during the pandemic, with no replacement provided by the state (Salem and Shaaban ). According to queer activists, members of the LGBTIQ+ community were the first to be laid off during the pandemic and have seen their contractual agreements broken and violated without compensation (Samneh and Maydaa ). Loss of hard-earned jobs coupled with the absence of any reemployment opportunities due to stigma and discrimination, especially when gender expressions are not conforming, accelerated their fall into unemployment and homelessness and grappling with long-term mental health issues with limited access to care and resources. As such, the pandemic exacerbated the economic vulnerability of members of the queer community, which was already grappling with discrimination and marginalization due to their gender expression and sexual orientation. In employment they experience sexual harassment, blackmailing, and underpayment. Before the pandemic, queer advocacy organizations and community centers served as lifelines. After being overwhelmed by the economic crisis, the pandemic suffocated them, and the August  blast destroyed them. Hence the usual safe spaces and coping strategies were no longer available to those who need them most and have no other recourse or alternatives. In our discussion with the leaders of the Marsa Center for Sexual Health, they reported that the constituency of the organization suffered tremendously during the pandemic, notably from the following problems, emergencies, and obstacles: • Shortage of food items, medicines, hygiene products, and materials for prevention and precaution from sexually transmitted diseases; • Lack of facilities for STD (sexually transmitted disease) testing, thus increasing the risk of unsafe sex and infections; • Forced relocalization in toxic and abusive households after having left violent, intolerant, and conservative families outside Beirut; • A notable rise in intimate partner abuse with no recourse for help or support of any kind, especially because the queer community cannot get help from the Internal Security Forces and is not protected under the law to protect family members from domestic violence;

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• No alternative functioning and safe system to turn to for protection from harassment and abuse experienced in confinement or even in the public domain.

Indeed, as indicated earlier, members of the queer community in Lebanon (citizens, residents, migrants, and refugees) count on the support of civil society organizations to sustain their day-to-day life, give them access to essential services, and provide safe spaces to meet and socialize. Because of the shutdown of civil society–led services due to the pandemic, an entire community found itself deprived of health services, small cash assistance, psychosocial and mental health support, food items, and transportation fees as well as safe spaces. The closure of these centers meant that members of the queer community lost much of their livelihood. Indeed, safe and queerinclusive spaces were closed down, taking away the solidarity networks and support systems that the community could access. Much of the funding from international projects was diverted to urgently support gaps in government assistance and provide the needed housing assistance, food parcels, medication, and sanitary kits. The queer community was not considered to be a priority, either by international aid or by the local government. The dysfunctional state institutions and services are known to be overtly homophobic and transphobic. Family and Housing Insecurity

Members of the queer community are often shunned in social settings (such as families and religious settings) that usually and traditionally provide political connections and facilitate access to social services, especially in times of crisis. Such patriarchal family-based communities are often sites of violence and oppression for queer folks, who are rejected, subjected to violence, or forced to leave. According to Salem and Shaaban (), returning to their parents’ home is not an option for most trans women, as many have fled extreme violence and torture, even before the pandemic (Younes ). Others resorted to quarantining with each other, while some were left couch-surfing from one friend’s house to the next, inadvertently undermining social-distancing practices (El Ammar ). Confined in their houses, many had to deal with microaggressions targeting their nonconforming sexuality, behaviors, and beliefs. To help out, some organizations sought funding and contributions to provide direct humanitarian assistance targeting queer folks who no longer have income or cannot afford rent, food, and medical allowances. An

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example is MOSAIC (MENA Organization for Services, Advocacy, Integration and Capacity), which provides social and psychological support to the most marginalized communities. Its program manager, Rabal Maatouk, confirmed that new requests for residential and financial support have increased. He noted that the organization has recorded a significant increase in the number of Lebanese calling them recently, in addition to the Syrians, Iraqis, and Egyptians who typically reach out for help. Grassroots efforts to crowdfund and create housing coops were also thwarted by near-impossible bureaucratic mechanisms, such as obtaining a signed lease for the property in question from a municipality that only operates according to an unapologetically conservative and sectarian mindset and system of beliefs. Additionally, according to confidential testimonials, the security risk to the safety of trans women inhabiting apartments is high. They are vulnerable to sporadic crackdowns from state security actors under the guise of the same morality clauses used to persecute queer bodies. Some accusations include misconstruing their shelters as brothels and stereotyping trans women as sex workers (Younes ). By definition, at least in the MENA region, international relief targets heteronormative family units, de facto excluding the queer community. On April , , the Lebanese minister of social affairs announced an economic relief plan (yet to materialize) that channels aid via municipalities and “mukhtars” (local officials) who are highly manipulated by political and sectarian parties, depending on their geographical locations, reinforcing the patronage networks from which the queer community is excluded and shunned. Mental Health Problems

The loss of safe homes is particularly damaging to the mental health of queer folks because many have nowhere else to go. Additionally, the queer folks we interviewed noted that many LGBTIQ+ persons might lack access to “traditional” channels of dealing with trauma, such as MHPSS (mental health and psychosocial support) services, family support (in many cases, they are not accepted by those families), and support from faith-based outlets due to discrimination. A representative of an LGBTIQ+ organization reported that it received an increased number of calls from LGBTIQ+ people expressing suicidal thoughts following the explosion and after living in a lockdown for months. Because many trans women continue to face difficulty leaving their homes to access services due to transphobia/homophobia, they expressed the need for in-home MHPSS services.

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Loss of Shelter and Housing Discrimination

Housing discrimination resulting from racism, transphobia, homophobia, and lack of documentation limits shelter options for displaced members of the queer community. The risk of eviction and the rate of homelessness is now higher than it was before the blast, particularly for the LGBTIQ+ community, disproportionately impacting trans people. LGBTIQ+ persons, especially trans women displaced by the explosion, are among the worst positioned to find housing due to discrimination and homophobia. For instance: • A female NGO worker for an LGBTIQ+ organization noted that many LGBTIQ+ persons living in the Mar Mikhael/Gemmayze area had lost their homes; sixty-one LGBTIQ+ individuals registered with their organization needed shelter. Further, to find housing, trans women often need to conceal and misrepresent their gender identity to be accepted by landlords. • After convincing their landlords, trans people then need to ensure their safety among their neighbors. One trans woman said, “I live in Sin El Fil now. They look at me like I’m a bitch.” Another trans woman noted that “other areas are not safe for trans people. . . . There are so many people that discriminate.” While housing and shelter are always challenging for many LGBTIQ+ people, particularly trans people, the explosion has made finding an affordable home in a safe area even more difficult.

With few housing options available, trans women who lost their homes have opted to move in with other trans people. According to an NGO worker, conditions in these homes are often overcrowded, and the people living there are particularly vulnerable to abuse by authorities, who may target vulnerable LGBTIQ+ persons.

Inclusive and Feminist Civil Society Mobilization Many of the relief aid programs provided by different NGOs or the public sector were not tailored for or inclusive of the queer community, especially those who face threatening risks because of their inevitable visibility, such as trans individuals. For instance, trans women face complex challenges asking for food or money due to the stigma and discrimination to which the society subjects them (UN Women et al. ).

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In talking about this particular problem, Milad Abu-Joudeh, a university professor and psychotherapist at Marsa Sexual Health Center, confirmed to Daraj media that the people who are suffering the most as a result of the pandemic are those who were facing vulnerable conditions and discriminatory practices from the beginning, namely, the queer community. Most of them lacked suitable residence as well as a stable and safe job or were infected with HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) (El Ammar ). AbuJoudeh added that special care must be given to young people who are still at a stage of discovering their sexual identities. Marsa for Sexual Health

Marsa is a ten-year-old Lebanon-based organization catering to the needs of the queer community, especially concerning sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). With the beginning of COVID-, the organization had to shut down, at least temporarily, upon the advice of its medical staff. As the organization serves people with HIV who are considered to be at high risk of contracting COVID, Marsa had no choice but to freeze its work within its premises in Beirut. Services were transferred online, especially in terms of information sharing and awareness-raising. Social media became the tool and conduit for communication in simple vernacular Arabic. At the onset of the pandemic, the association operated online to respond to the concerns and requests for information by folks with HIV who had no access to information on the necessary precautionary measures and support. Marsa processed information from legitimate sources, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), turned it into simple messages, and disseminated it via social media to curtail panic and counter misinformation. As with other groups, Marsa monitored increased abuse against members of the LGBTIQ+ community who were staying with their parents, thus increasing the need for mental health support. Marsa redesigned its mental health services to go online. As the regional representative of M-Coalition (AFE ), Marsa secured an emergency grant to fund the most vulnerable groups (sex workers and the queer community). Needs shot up exponentially after the added trauma caused by the August  explosion and its disproportionate impact on the queer community and sex workers. Marsa and other civil society organizations working with the community led a coordinated effort, which included raising emergency funds from various sources to be disbursed immediately to cover food, health services, rent, sanitary kits, and immediate cash assistance.

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Haven for Artists

Haven for Artists is a one of a kind queer organization that works on artivism in Lebanon and the region. As a relatively small and young organization, like many similar groups, it had to deal with an unprecedented financial crisis, a crippling global pandemic, and the world’s largest nonnuclear explosion on August . With no backup from the state, Haven for Artists () notes that marginalized communities were the first ones to suffer from this multidimensional crisis. The art and cultural scene was heavily impacted by the many compounded crises gripping the county. Art demand decreased, and many cultural spaces closed due to either the blast or the financial situation. Many artists lost sources of income during the lockdown as they attempted to cope with their added anxieties and traumatic communal losses. Haven for Artists combined these efforts to support the artistic and cultural scene during the crises and address the rising needs of marginalized community members. It rallied the support of its network of artists, activists, collaborators, and donors. Despite the crisis, Haven released the movie Courage, which tackles identity, freedom, and queer being in the Middle East and engaged in an extensive period of relief activities, including collecting and distributing $, to more than  persons in need (mainly LGBTIQ+ individuals, migrant workers, and single mothers and their families) and creating the Yalla Care coalition, which groups LGBTIQ+ organizations in Lebanon in response to the community’s needs. Helem’s Social Center

Helem is probably the first nongovernmental organization in Lebanon to work on LGBTIQ+ issues in research, activism, communication, and service to the community. It had already started a full-fledged emergency relief program targeting the queer community suffering from the pandemic’s impact when its premises were destroyed during the August  explosion. Despite the challenges, Helem immediately mobilized and raised resources from the international community and through crowdfunding. Helem’s executive director told us that, in addition to continuing to rebuild the center in Mar Mikhael (a safe space for the queer community), Helem mobilized immediately to provide funds and followed up to rebuild the households of community members affected by the blast, along with providing furniture, household items, food supplies, and medicines. Helem secured COVID hygiene kits for the community using its connections and resources and raised

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$, in immediate cash relief to help queer individuals in distress. More importantly, Helem raised more than $, for emergency and sustainable mental health support programs for community members affected by the blast, pandemic lockdowns, and the overall series of unfortunate events of . Despite the crisis, the organization tripled the number of caseworkers, services, and capacity to process case management for individuals, including emergency intervention. Through its contacts, it was able to secure job placement for more than forty individuals who needed employment in the wake of the blast. As well as providing free access to medical evaluation, testing, and medication in collaboration with the American University of Beirut’s Medical Center and other clinics, Helem’s primary concern was to secure vaccination for the queer community.

Where Do We Go from Here? In facing these multiple crises that hit Lebanon in a relatively short period, the Lebanese regime’s only response was to step up oppressive measures against activists as well as reinforce its conspiracy narrative. The past years have provided a textbook example of the way multiple layers of oppression operate and further exacerbate and amplify vulnerabilities. We have sufficient qualitative and quantitative evidence of how queer lives were broken and damaged while at the same time still not warranting attention. Simultaneously, we have also witnessed extraordinary mobilization, commitment, courage, and action by community-based feminist groups whose resources are usually modest and do not rely on state support. Some of these groups are not even allowed to have a proper official registration because of the regime’s discriminatory laws and practices. The point of this chapter is to recognize, visualize, and document the knowledge, stories, and narrative of this feminist mobilization to address extreme vulnerabilities during this extraordinary crisis. In the midst of this vibrant mobilization and the drive to act immediately to save lives, we may be missing the critical effort of beginning to write our collective feminist history and capturing the voices of the most vulnerable as well as those who gave their time, effort, well-being, creativity, and empathy to make sure that the most vulnerable do not fall through the cracks.

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References AFE (Arab Foundation for Freedoms & Equality). . “M-Coalition.” https:// afemena.org/m_coalition. El Ammar, Maya. . “Quarantine’s Impact on LGBT and Transgender People.” Daraj (April ). https://daraj.com/en/. Calderaro, Charlène, and Éléonore Lépinard. . “Intersectionality as a New Feeling Rule for Young Feminists: Race and Feminist Relations in France and Switzerland.” European Journal of Women’s Studies (): –. Ghaddar, Hanin. . “Coronavirus: Iran’s Kiss of Death to the Lebanese.” Alarabiya News (May ). https://english.alarabiya.net/views/news/middle-east/// /Coronavirus-Iran-s-Kiss-of-Death-to-the-Lebanese-. Harb, Ali. . “‘This Revolution Has Raised the Bar’: How Lebanon’s Protests Have Created a Surprising Space for LGBT Rights.” Time (November ). https://time .com//lgbt-issues-lebanon-protests. Haven for Artists. . “Campaigns.” https://havenforartists.org/project-type /campaign. KAFA. . “The Toll of Coronavirus on Domestic Workers in Lebanon: from Isolation to Confinement.” https://kafa.org.lb/en/node/. Lazkani, Souad. . “Lebanon Now Needs a New Law to Get the Already Ordered Vaccine.” The (January ). https://www.the.com/lebanon-needs-new-law -vaccine. Lewis, Emily. . “Coronavirus: Lebanon’s LGBT+ Community Is Locked Down and Unprotected.” New Arab (April ). https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english /indepth////coronavirus-lebanons-lgbt-community-is-locked-down-and -unprotected. MEMO (Middle East Monitor). . “Lebanon Health Minister Celebrated as Coronavirus Cases Rise.” Middle East Monitor (June ). https://www.middleeastmonitor .com/-lebanon-health-minister-celebrated-as-coronavirus-cases-rise. Salem, Mona, and Zeina Shaaban. . “Queers in Quarantine: Between Pandemics and Social Violence in Lebanon.” https://www.fes-lebanon.org/fileadmin/user _upload/ documents/ covid -/ Queers _in _Quarantine _ _ _Between _Pandemics _and_Social_Violence_in_Lebanon.pdf. Samneh, Bechara, and Dr. Charbel Maydaa. . “In Lebanon, COVID- and LGBTQ: Struggle Magnified.” Fanack (November ). https://fanack.com/social -justice-en/covid--and-lgbtiq-struggle-magnified~. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). . “Gender Alert on COVID- Lebanon” (No. , May ). https://lebanon.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/gender %alert%on%covidlebanon%issue%%english.pdf. UN Women, CARE, UN  ESCWA, ABAAD, and UNFPA. . “A Rapid Gender Analysis of the August  Beirut Port Explosion: An Intersectional Examination” (October). https://www.care-international.org/files/files/Rapid_Gender_Analysis _August_Beirut_Port_Explosion_October().pdf. Younes, Rasha. . “In Lebanon’s COVID-, Aid the Vulnerable, Including LGBT People.” Human Rights Watch (October ). https://www.hrw.org/news// //lebanons-covid--aid-vulnerable-including-lgbt-people.

CHAPTER 6

The Gendered Impact of the Pandemic on Syrian Refugee Women in Jordan O R O U B E L - A B E D A N D N U S E I B A H S H A B A I TA H

Syrian refugee women have been through several life shocks, including forced migration from Syria and numerous displacements within Jordan. Unable to secure decent livelihoods for their families, they have lost family members, social status, and dismissal of their life plan. Throughout these displacements and transitions, refugee women endured unbearable social, emotional, and economic difficulties. The COVID- outbreak was another shock that inflicted vulnerability on the lives of Syrian refugee women in Jordan. In this chapter we argue that the COVID- pandemic challenges are gendered and have pressured Syrian refugee women to shape new norms and agency to resist the additional vulnerability created by the pandemic’s lockdown. After reviewing Jordan’s governing policies toward Syrian refugees, especially during the pandemic, this chapter analyzes the transitions that Syrian women have endured in their life trajectories as displaced individuals and their coping mechanisms during challenging times. Building on Schlossberg’s () theory of multiple transitions, this chapter examines the impact of multiple simultaneous transitions that make coping especially difficult for the vulnerable Syrian refugee women. We study the consequences of the multilayered transitions and shocks for refugee women, including the migratory transition that changed their status from citizens to refugees. The social transition pushed many young women into early marriage to escape the socioeconomic burdens in the household and cultural obligations toward the women in the community. Finally, the economic transitions forced women to drop out of school, become the primary breadwinners for their large families, and assume new responsibilities due to dire living conditions. We explore how Syrian women managed the vulnerability in their lives as they tried to cope with another transition due

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to the COVID emergency lockdown. The added frustration resulted in an increase in domestic violence due to economic volatility and emotional instability. Isolation increased the risk of vulnerability for refugee women.

Governance of Syrian Refugees Jordan today hosts ,, Syrian refugees, of which , are registered with the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner (UNHCR). About  percent of refugees live in the cities of Amman, Mafraq, and Irbid, and about  percent live in the three refugee camps established within the Mafraq-Azraq governorates in the north:  percent (,) in Zaatari,  percent (,) in Azraq, and  percent (,) in Emirati (UNHCR b). As a nonsignatory state of the  Refugee Convention, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UNHCR to provide protection and assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR ). The MoU gives UNHCR the right to determine the refugee status of asylum seekers and defines refugees on the basic grounds that led to persecution, without restricting the definition to any time or geographic limitations but adopting the  Refugee Convention Protocol (UNHCR -). The MoU also permits funding to empower local systems and ensure the protection of the dignity and welfare of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians impacted by the Syrian crisis. Jordan developed a strategy for collective action and led a paradigm shift from a humanitarian-emergency appeal to a development plan with a resilience-focused approach (Jordan Ministry of Planning ). After having restricted Syrian refugees from many professional industries (including the domains of construction, services, and agriculture), the strategy shifted to bring refugees into the local social fabric. To expand employment and livelihood opportunities for Syrians in camps and urban settings, the Ministry of Labor issued them work permits, and UNHCR paid the fees for , permits issued between  and  (Jordanian Ministry of Labour ). Nevertheless, professional Syrians remained excluded from the professional market.

Methodology To analyze the trajectories of national and refugee youth in Amman, we conducted in-person interviews with Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian refugees, highlighting the experiences of fifty Syrian refugee women. We

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gained access to Syrian refugees living in Jordan through earlier contacts established in – to conduct previous research on the challenges and opportunities for Syrian refugees due to the lockdown of COVID- in . We then asked about the effects of COVID- on women’s lives in fifty phone interviews, covering different cities in Jordan. We interviewed women aged between sixteen and fifty-five years, including wives, widows, single mothers, adolescent girls, and young, newly wedded girls. Respondents lived in urban settings, rural areas, and refugee camps in the northeast of Jordan. The material we collected was based on designed semistructured questionnaires and sought to find out how refugee women understand their roles in Jordan as a way to unpack their rite of passage from one role to another, the constraints of each phase and the options they perceive, and their ability to negotiate uncertainties and constraints during their protracted displacement. We highlighted the diversity within Jordan’s refugee population and the impact of lockdown on increasing their risks and vulnerability. During the data collection, especially the phone interviews, we paid special attention to how we discussed some sensitive themes such as domestic violence. We ensured women safe space to share socially stigmatized information (and women are often very discreet), providing different settings and building trust. “Much of the violence against women, especially rape and wife-beating, goes under- and un-reported due to the social stigma attached to the victims and their families” (Agarwal , ).

Lockdown/Closure and Impact On March , , the government of Jordan imposed a series of preemptive restrictions as a state of emergency was declared to limit the spread of COVID-. For almost two months, the lockdown only permitted people to be mobile within the limited proximity of their homes to run errands and buy basic needs of food and medicine. The Jordanian economy was undergoing sluggish growth and a high unemployment rate of   percent (World Bank ). The unexpected shock of the COVID- lockdown further slowed economic growth, producing stagnation (Durable Solutions Platform ). The refugee influx for the last nine years has magnified Jordan’s financial burdens, despite the strategic and comprehensive humanitarian response plan. The numbers of people infected increased when the restrictions were eased, and most sectors resumed work

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gradually. As the numbers of infections increased, many workers were again sent home. Nanthini and Nair () argue that “although the virus infects people regardless of gender, its impacts are nonetheless gendered.” Our findings suggest that the pandemic lockdown has augmented the disadvantages for vulnerable women even further. The lockdown affected Syrian refugee women’s financial security, limiting their work opportunities and potential career progression. Meanwhile, it increased their household roles and vulnerability and the burden of unpaid work, risk of domestic violence, economic insecurity, and unequal distribution of household domestic and care work.

Transitions in the Life of Syrian Women The migratory trajectory for Syrian women has exposed them to several transitions, starting from their displacement from Syria to Jordan. The transition of roles was dictated by their new living conditions; the transition triggered by the shock of the pandemic has limited their opportunities. The context of transition—whether caused by displacement, shifting household roles, or new economic roles—includes the setting in which the transition takes place and the extent to which transition alters an individual’s daily life. Schlossberg (cited in Evans, Forney, and Guido-DiBrito ) defines transition as any event or nonevent that results in changed relationships, routines, assumptions, and roles. The effectiveness in coping with transition depends on the person’s resources in these areas. “Individuals have both assets and liabilities as they encounter transitions. Assets may outweigh liabilities, making adjustment relatively easy or liabilities may outweigh assets, making the transition more difficult to manage” (Evans, Forney, and Guido-DiBrito ). Consider, for instance, Alia’s struggle as she searches to define her new life: I became depressed for years after we were forced to leave Syria. I could not accept how the Jordanian people around me were blaming them for not helping us in our crisis. I could not attend my lectures at the university. (Alia, Syrian, twenty-seven, Amman, February )

The experience of forced migration created a status of uncertainty. Positioning the refugees at a disjuncture between their expectations about exile and its realities altered their experience of time and space (El-Shaarawi

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). The future became particularly uncertain, and life experience became unstable, as Nancy explains: I knew the country [Jordan] well, but it wasn’t home. I still can’t accept it. In Syria I had my friends and my outings; my situation there was completely different than in Jordan. I feel like I am wasting my time and my future, [and] this affects me psychologically. I try my best in order to survive. (Nancy, female, twenty-six, East Amman [her mother is Jordanian, and she used to visit Jordan occasionally prior to the crisis], December )

As El-Shaarawi () notes, those “living in transit” may experience exile as a kind of in-between transit state, even when displacement spans years. The refugees find themselves “in a climate of change and transition—both personally, spatially and culturally” (Lammers , ). The strange circumstances created by COVID- have been an added challenge in coping with the transition. Women refugees experienced two transitions at a time: a transition of place caused by the displacement and a transition in social status: We heard that the situation in Jordan was good, so we came and I was sixteen at the time when I got married. I hadn’t thought of marriage before, I wasn’t very aware, I didn’t have any ideas on the topic. When I got married, I was told that we will stay here [in Jordan] six months and then go back to Syria; I didn’t know that my family would return and that I would stay. I was sad when they left. (Fatin, female, twenty-five, Al-Jeezeh, ITS [informal tented settlement])

These stories demonstrate the meaning of “protracted uncertainty” when “living in transition” (Brun , ), a phrase coined by Horst and Grabska () to describe long-term uncertainty. However, the transition of displacement puts refugees in limbo in terms of their legal status and provisional residence, awaiting the day to settle through either return or resettlement. It has impelled uncertain temporality. This uncertainty, a significant experience in displacement, is reflected in the continuous search for stability. I was too young at that time, around ten, but I have never felt at home either here in Jordan or in Syria. I feel no belonging to Syria despite having lived there and for sure not here [in Jordan]. (Alia, female, twenty, East Amman ITS, February )

Like Alia, Fatin lives in an informal tented settlement (ITS) and has been migrating in search of work and safety for her children. Her move started

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from her town in southern Syria to the border; then she went to the unofficial Jordanian-Syrian border. She entered Jordan, staying in Zaatari refugee camp for few months, then moved out to Jordan Valley to work in agriculture; and moved back to Mafraq city, working and living on the same agricultural land. Then, a few months later, she moved to an ITS close to the Central Vegetable Market in the heart of East Amman. After the municipality destroyed their shacks with all their belongings and ordered them to move away from the center, she and her family are now in another ITS with a small Syrian community, working in agriculture and industry. The “protracted uncertainty” and “living in transition” (Schlossberg ) do not reveal the profound challenges that Syrian women face, such as obtaining the legal right to work, living close to the source of their livelihood; finding possible venues to eke out a living; or settling and ensuring regular income. This legal, temporal, and spatial transition in the experience of refugees has created distress in their everyday lives (El-Shaarawi ; Lubkemann ); caused severe destruction in familial relations; and inflicted a sense of social separation from their homes, severing childhood and family ties (Monsutti , ). The label “refugee” for the people in countries neighboring Palestine has been a pejorative one. It has been conflated with the identity of the Palestinian refugees, who have had to live in refugee camps established for them since their mass exodus in . The image of people receiving humanitarian assistance has marked the memory of defeat, loss, and hunger: “the processes of institutional action and programme delivery that reinforce a disaggregated model of identity” (Zetter , ), emphasizing the powerlessness of the refugees. A good number of Syrian refugees shied away from the imposed labels. They opted not to register with the UN, were adamant about being out of camps, and insisted on managing their lives without humanitarian aid. There is the shock where whenever I mention that I am Syrian, people ask me when I came to Jordan. I tell them that I have been here forever. There are stereotypes associated with Syrians that came after the war. Stereotypes regarding the way they speak, a lot of people make fun of refugees not knowing that I am Syrian, and that is kind of annoying. The stereotype is basically that Syrians are outsiders, but why? The situation is a mess, I am Jordanian of Syrian origin and if somebody asks me, I say I am Jordanian but I have a Syrian citizenship. (Salma, female, eighteen, Amman, February )

As refugees, and as part of the Jordan Response Plan, Syrians undergo severe scrutiny. They are required to register with the Ministry of Interior

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(MoI), obtain the MoI card (an ID for residency in Jordan), and get the UNHCR’s Asylum Seeker Certificate (ASC), while those without an MoI card must undergo an Urban Verification Exercise (UVE). However, COVID slowed down the process for obtaining or renewing the UNHCR certificate and MoI card, leaving many newborns without registration and denying them services and humanitarian assistance. The UNHCR registration is renewed yearly after a face-to-face interview with the entire refugee family, but was conducted through remote modalities during the pandemic. The distribution of remotely renewed Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASC) at UNHCR’s registration centres in February reached a total of , families. As a result, some , refugees were able to renew their ASCs and collect them from the Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Azraq registration centres. The show rate for the ASCs’ delivery process increased to  percent. UNHCR registration teams across Jordan, having adapted to the ongoing COVID- situation, continue to renew ASCs and add newborn babies to existing cases through remote modalities, allowing refugees to continue having access to critical services. (UNHCR a)

Registering and abiding by the conditionalities of the host state and the UNHCR are part of the slow process of accepting the transition and the new status of being refugees in the host country. This legal status could offer new opportunities to broaden and diversify their social networks beyond narrow kinship and neighborhood ties. It may even be conceived as a necessary stage in their existence, a rite of passage (Monsutti , ) to new experiences. However, as many were unable to secure decent livelihoods, they endured multiple additional transitions that furthered Syrian refugee women’s vulnerability, including early marriage, dropping out of school, unemployment, domestic violence, and mental health issues. Early Marriage

Typically, migration has a fundamental impact on marriage by delaying it (Grabska, De Regt, and Del Franco ), but the Syrian refugees experienced the opposite. A rapid  percent increase in early marriage cases was reported in , with , marriages (Dilwani ). The main factors that pushed young girls into early marriage were related to their geographic location and the culture and customs dominant there, their socioeconomic situation, and broken family structures (UNICEF b). Child marriage became a solution to alleviate the economic burden on families and provide

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financial stability and security. The difficult socioeconomic conditions of the Syrian refugees forced them to resort to “negative coping strategies to survive, such as child labour and child marriage” (Hutchinson ), as Salma explains: Gender impacts my life; sometimes I feel that it does impact it negatively. Here in this university, there are a lot of situations where people will say, “It is because you are a girl,” even for very ordinary things. Something like “You are a girl, why would you want to work? You will get married soon. . . . Even at work, the idea that if you are a girl why should you work, certain things do have an impact, maybe the salaries for women are less, this is bothersome.” (Salma, female, eighteen, Amman, February )

Grabska, De Regt, and Del Franco () posit that many families in the Arab culture believe in the notion of Sutrah: the social protection and preservation of the honor of the family through the honor of the bride. Sutrah is a rising concern in refugee camps, as the safety of women is constantly targeted. Fatin’s narrative of her experience in the informal tented settlements and why her family forced her to marry at thirteen confirms this concern: We came to Jordan when I was in seventh grade and I didn’t go to school here. We don’t have girls in the family that continue their education past that age. We can’t go out and study, you know the family fears for us, because of rape and such issues. This is the Bedouin mentality. (Fatin, female, twentyfive, Al-Jeezeh ITS, November )

The pandemic and the dire living conditions inflicted by the lockdown and mobility restrictions worsened the protracted refugee educational experience. The girls’ negative protective coping strategy through early marriage, which has been rising in prevalence among Syrians, created significant gendered risks, such as harassment and sexual violence. Child marriage (marriage under eighteen years of age) is widely considered a form of gender-based violence (GBV), with enormous implications for the realization of the sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHRs) of the girl (Huchinson ). School Dropouts

In the  donors conference, Jordan agreed to increase the number of double-shift schools for Syrians to , but only , out of a potential

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, school-aged Syrian refugee children were enrolled in formal education by  (UNHCR a). Almost half ( percent) of the children were out of school due to administrative hurdles, including lacking identity documents to register (UNICEF b). In addition,  percent were involved in child labor,   percent were unable to afford costs associated with schooling,  percent lived too far from the school, and  percent were constantly moving (Younes ). Human Rights Watch () reports that Syrian children’s enrollment begins to drop at age twelve. The pandemic had significant gendered repercussions that may set back gender equality progress by decades (Topping ). As the Jordanian government put protective measures in place to limit the spread of the virus and the education shifted to being online, a new transition was presented to the Syrian refugee girls: the competition with their siblings for the only device at home to pursue their education or to drop out and get married. Dropping out often appeared to be an easy option to address more severe livelihood matters. The Jordan Education Sector Working Group mapped out an education response to COVID- for Syrian refugee camps: Activities ranged from offering distance learning covering non-formal education, remedial education, and learning support services and more, using diverse modalities such as WhatsApp, SMS, Zoom, Facebook Live and Facebook closed groups, YouTube videos, and even printed workbooks, to the most vulnerable with limited access to hardware, all the way to UNICEF providing financial, in-kind, and technical support to the MoE. (Batshon and Shahzadah )

According to the UNICEF (a) report on school dropouts, Syrian children also drop out because of violence and insecurity. The gender patterns are reflected in the reasons for dropping out of school: boys have to look for work while girls between the ages of fifteen and nineteen drop out of school to get married, as Saraa explains: My parents didn’t help me. They told me, “It is OK. Tawjihi [a certificate of secondary education exam, which determines whether students can continue to university and what subjects they may study] is like any other class.” And even if I passed Tawjihi, I wasn’t going to go to university. Why should I study? I knew that my family wasn’t going to let me study in the university. They couldn’t afford [it] and they wouldn’t allow me. In our family—the girl doesn’t go out of the house although we live here, but the girl doesn’t go out

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of the house. She doesn’t go out and come back by herself. (Saraa, female, twenty-three, Amman, February )

Employment Challenges

In  the government of Jordan provided incentives for Syrian refugees to work by allowing them entry to some jobs. In line with Jordan’s growth agenda, the Ministry of Labour eased the issuance of work permits and waived fees for Syrian refugees to work in three specific sectors (ILO ). Refugees experienced greater flexibility, especially those living in camps. They were given the right to work outside their residential areas, and access jobs in the open sectors throughout the country, provided they returned monthly to the camp. This increased mobility was crucial to camp refugees and helped meet work-permit benchmarks. However, working conditions were too restrictive. Employers also dictated working hours and exploited workers. Moreover, the work permits targeted unskilled-nonprofessional refugees, limiting non-Jordanians’ access to professional jobs. Syrians were only allowed to work in the construction, service, and agriculture sectors (ILO , in Husseini ). Subsequently, most educated and professional Syrian refugees were not allowed to work in their professional posts. This may have pushed many to seek informal work, despite its risks. Coping with the restricted working situation, many Syrian women pursued informal work from home as self-employed caterers, using their social networks to market and sell their products, an arrangement that guaranteed their safety. They faced many impediments in seeking economic opportunities outside these informal jobs, including unsafe transportation, lack of childcare, discriminatory gender norms, and rigid labor conditions. The lockdown also impacted this market, as Massa explains: “I used to make JD [Jordanian dinars] in monthly income from food orders before the COVID- lockdown, at least JD per day” (Massa, female, thirty-seven, Irbid villages in El Abed and Shabaitah, September ). Further, “catering orders have decreased quite a lot after the pandemic and completely stopped during the lockdown” (Rania, female, thirty-seven, Irbid villages, August ). When “almost  percent of non–public sector workers are in the informal market and have no social benefits” (Zeitoun ), a good portion of refugees are particularly vulnerable. The majority worked as wage laborers

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without contracts or any social protections. In some cases, refugees were never paid their wages, and others were made to work in closed factories during the lockdown with little pay. Workers reported numerous violations in various sectors, including services, restaurants, daily work, manufacturing, irregular work, and transportation (Tamkeen ). Riyam reports: “The pay rate decreased, they had us working for fewer hours and fewer days; I work as a volunteer with an NGO in data management” (Riyam, female, twenty-five, Amman [works as a volunteer though she has a master’s degree], February ). The lockdown’s impact on work opportunities varied among the Syrian refugees. Those without work contracts, social protection, or secured monthly payment were the most vulnerable. Many were unable to make any money, buy food, or pay rent for several months. Whether in urban settings or camps, working in the private sector or working from home, the challenges and the risks were just too high. Before the pandemic I was capable of providing for myself and my children. Now there is no work in cleaning houses or attending organizations’ sessions to earn transportation fees. It’s only the vouchers of the WFP [World Food Programme] and I collect dry bread and sell it. We have no assistance or food packages; the only thing is a little help from the neighbors. (Feryal, female, fifty-five, Mafraq, August )

Those who worked in industries adversely affected by the pandemic stopped having any income. They even lost out on the   percent salary (Kebede et al. ) guaranteed by the government from the private sector because they did not have yearly contracts. Jordanian informal workers received emergency pensions from social security funds, but refugees depended on the UNHCR and WFP for any cash assistance. Women who barely received assistance (whether in the form of cash or food vouchers) could meet basic household needs. However, without reliable income or the ability to save, women spoke about living in fear of “shocks” or even everyday lifecycle events such as the cost of pregnancy or feeding a baby. These stresses, uncertainties, and fears were even more significant for women who were not registered with UNHCR. Before the pandemic my husband could do some work like collecting scraps and selling them. But now he is not working and we rely % on the food vouchers; sometimes we sell them for the rent. There are months when we

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use the vouchers to pay the rent, and other months to buy food. The rent is  JDs, vouchers are  JDs. We have been using the vouchers for two months straight to pay the rent. (Rawan, female, twenty-three, Amman, February ) Our financial situation is very bad, because my husband’s work is very limited nowadays, and he doesn’t get paid the same, and we don’t have any other income, which makes it hard for us to pay the rent. We use the food vouchers to cover the rent instead of buying food. (Fatima, female, forty-two, Ma’an City, August )

However, those who were able to work at half capacity, especially with the private sector, managed their work from home and sustained their income. Likewise, those who worked with international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) either as official workers or as incentive-based volunteers (IBVs) received their payment despite the lockdown. The pandemic didn’t affect my livelihood, since I was working online, selling systems; the lockdown hasn’t affected the work or the income, and it remained the same. Our conditions were stable, and the family business was working. One of our issues is that our customers couldn’t pay on time. (Aisha, female, twenty-seven, Amman, August )

Some even benefited from the lockdown and made use of the opportunity: I have a sewing machine and whenever I receive[d] orders, additional income came throughout the different pandemic phases. I was asked to sew face masks, I made fifty face-masks, but if you ask me to say a specific income each month it would be  JDs. (Hamra, female, fifty-five, Mafraq, August )

Overall, the COVID- outbreak gendered the workload. It added pressure on women, who had to become the breadwinners while coping with many circumstances that rendered their employment insecure. Insecurity included exploitation in working hours, poor working conditions and payments, underemployment, and discrimination. As wage workers, refugee women were also left without social protection. Many were concentrated in the informal sector, including domestic work, working for family members, and seasonal agricultural workers. In addition to the gender wage gap

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and lack of advancement opportunities, the overrepresentation of women in vulnerable jobs also heightened their susceptibility to poverty and violence. Domestic Violence

Curfews, lockdowns, and quarantines increased cases of domestic violence. Without sufficient consideration for the safety of women and girls in abusive homes, they were forced to remain with their abusers. The imposed quarantine measures and the accompanying social distancing, curfews, and economic hardships negatively impacted daily wage workers and small business owners who lost their jobs or went bankrupt. Women found excuses for men’s increasing frustration: I believe that my husband is under more pressure, having to provide for our family, although the lockdown and the circumstances are difficult for everyone, even children. (Rawan, female, twenty-three, Amman, February )

During the quarantine, Jordan witnessed two disturbing incidents in one week: the killing of a thirty-year-old woman on April , , and a husband wounding his wife while arguing, according to the Arab Women Organization, or AWO (). Despite the increase in domestic violence, the numbers of women who called were few. Their abusers lived with them at home, and there was no way for them to speak freely on the phone with AWO case managers. Domestic violence was thus an indirect impact of COVID-. With the combination of increased tension, stress, and confinement conditions in the household during times of crisis, rates of domestic violence also increased (Nanthini and Nair , ). Moreover, “In the case of COVID-, the complex irony is that the very measures meant to protect the vast majority of the population—shelter-in-place and lockdown orders—endanger women and girls by trapping them with abusers (Guidorzi , ). Ironically, rape cases increased by . percent in  ( cases reported), compared with , where  cases were reported (Public Security Directorate ). The detrimental impacts of GBV are significant transitions in the life course of women: they can be life-changing and long-term, causing forced pregnancy, physical injuries, mental health issues, and even death. The World Health Organization (WHO ) warns that one in three girls and women will experience physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner or sexual violence by a nonpartner within their lifetime. This figure is a static

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average, though, and therefore does not capture repetitions of violence that women and girls experience or geographical variances in GBV prevalence among refugee communities. Mental Health

Our research showed that about  percent of refugees we interviewed experienced some degree of quarantine-related anxiety. Older women who lacked social and financial support experienced significantly higher degrees of quarantine-related anxiety. Being locked up at our houses has deeply affected our psychological wellbeing, it is so hard on the kids too, with all of the pressure, and it’s really hard for all of my family. (Rawan, female, twenty-three, Amman, February )

Several socioeconomic factors mediate the relationship between gender and anxiety, of which the most essential is social support. “As half of the survivors reported psychological and emotional abuse, COVID- situation increased uncertainty on future, daily routine and personal space— especially for overcrowded households—as well as the financial pressure which increased family tensions” (Reliefweb ). Researchers posit that having an extensive social network during quarantine decreases the degree of anxiety (Massad et al. , ). Due to the widespread violence against women and girls and lack of access to psychosocial support and counseling, refugees experienced increased depression and trauma. Along with the stigma associated with becoming a victim, women lacked the financial independence to report crimes or seek help. Furthermore, they faced safety hurdles, as the law forgives rapists who marry their victims. Unable to cope, many have attempted to commit suicide. Suicide cases increased by  percent between  and  (Public Security Directorate ). Women accounted for  percent of the suicides and about  percent of the attempted suicides (Al-Ghad ). Suicide was particularly prevalent among refugees. There have been many suicides in the camp, every week there’s a suicide attempt or case, because of the hard circumstances in Azraq Camp, and we’re living in a prison. (Randa, female, forty-seven, Azraq ITS, August )

The pandemic intensified the anxiety, fear, loneliness, and uncertainty for female refugees who were already suffering the trauma of fleeing war

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and conflict (Júnior et al. ). Nevertheless, conversations about mental health remain stigmatized, and access to mental health professionals continues to be limited, particularly in refugee camps (Dash ).

Reflections and Conclusion The refugee crisis has put added pressure on women, who in many cases have had to become breadwinners while coping with many circumstances that rendered their lives insecure. This has entailed early marriage and dropping out of school; exploitation in term of working hours, payment, and poor working conditions; and discrimination in available job opportunities. The limited work sectors open to non-Jordanians, per the Jordan Compact , limited the chances for refugee women seeking work. Being wage workers, as a result, has rendered these refugee working women vulnerable and denied them social protection. The COVID- pandemic has magnified the negative impact of the economic, social, legal, temporal, and spatial transitions in the experience of Syrian refugees. Several roles have been analyzed in this chapter, exploring the multilayered and multidimensional transitions and shocks for Syrian refugee women. We have examined the transition from citizenship to becoming refugees and the effect of such labeling on these women. We explored further transitions in roles, such as early marriages resulting from socioeconomic burdens. This transition is often intertwined with dropping out of school and assuming new responsibilities. Economic roles as breadwinners have presented challenging conditions under COVID, leaving women with significant uncertainty and financial precariousness. In turn, as men were out of work with no income, the impact of their frustrations on married life was equally alarming. In the realm of vulnerability and uncertainty, domestic violence and mental health concerns stand out as life shocks with significant repercussions on refugees’ economic volatility and emotional instability. Because many women work in informal-sector jobs, the economic lockdowns have exaggerated their insecurities. In light of existing inequalities, the specific impacts of COVID- have exacerbated women’s already existing vulnerabilities (Nanthini and Nair , ). These critical situations in the lives of Syrian refugee women have made it necessary for them to deal with the transition by making effective changes in relationships, routines, assumptions, and roles to cope with reality.

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Note Several aspects of the MoU relate to already signed agreements and conventions, but it is not legally binding as an agreement by itself.

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CHAPTER 7

Violence against Moroccan Women during and after Lockdown R H I Z L A I N E B E N AC H I R A N D S O F I A R A Ï S

While still a minor, a young girl was married, divorced, and remarried. She tried to flee after being physically assaulted by her second husband but was arrested by the police for violating the travel ban during the lockdown. She showed them the beatings and injuries on her body to escape arrest, but they asked her for proof to arrest her husband. As her husband changed the locks on the door, she could not enter his house and did not know that she had the right to do so. She did not have the money to pay the costs of the medical certificate and could not obtain it because of COVID. The judge released the husband for lack of evidence. Upon his release, he physically abused her in public. Miraculously, she learned about IPDF, which managed to send her back to her family. IPDF (Initiatives pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes) on Facebook, 2020

Before the COVID- crisis, violence against women was already alarming in Morocco. According to the Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development’s second national survey on the prevalence of violence against women in Morocco, rates of violence against women were at .  percent nationwide in  (Kasraoui ). Political crises and socioeconomic instability aggravated the gender inequalities created by the social and cultural structures and systems—and the COVID- crisis brought in a new state of affairs. When the Moroccan government issued a state of health emergency and enforced home confinement, women and children’s exposure to violence intensified (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé ).

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Most violence against women cases are perpetrated by family members, and, in times of crisis, the number of cases increases drastically. The lockdown imposed by this pandemic forced vulnerable people to share tight spaces with their aggressors, who enjoyed greater freedom to act and move. Ever since Morocco imposed a strict lockdown on March , , abused women have called women’s associations’ hotlines two to three times more than before to report physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse, mainly by husbands and partners. Furthermore, the government’s restrictions on the movement made it extremely difficult for women trapped with an aggressor to leave their homes. Without an official authorizing document, an abused woman could not take refuge at a friend’s home or a shelter, let alone file a complaint in court. Women were unable to buy credit for their mobile phones, call a hotline, or hear the voice of close family and friends. The pandemic also limited police intervention and access to the justice system, making reporting more complex, and leaving aggressors without punishment (Borba Telles et al. ).

Morocco Declares a State of Emergency As a practical measure, the state of emergency restricted public freedoms and increased policing powers and authority to curb the spread of the coronavirus. Morocco declared a state health emergency by a decree-law on March , , per article  of the constitution that allows the government to issue decrees during the recess of parliamentary sessions (CMS ). The law was ratified on April , . Article  of the constitution requires public authorities to ensure the safety and security of the population, while the last paragraph of article  guarantees freedom of movement “in accordance with the law.” According to the first article, a state health emergency is declared whenever the life or safety of persons is endangered as a result of the spread of contagious or epidemic diseases and when necessity requires taking emergency measures to fight such diseases and stop their spread in order to prevent the risks that may result from them.

During the period of the state of emergency, the government could take all the necessary measures required by that state, by means of decrees, by regulatory and administrative decisions, or by circulars and notices, with a

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view to ensuring immediate and urgent intervention in order to prevent the epidemic development of the disease. (article )

Failure to follow these rules is punishable by one to three months of imprisonment and/or a fine of  to , dirhams ($–$). A second decree, issued on March , , specifies instructions to mitigate the spread of COVID- (CMS ). It empowers governors and health authorities, all within the limits of their own powers, to make any decision or to dictate any prescription required by the declared state health emergency. These authorities can prohibit persons from leaving their place of residence except in the following cases of absolute necessity: • • • •

moving from home to the workplace, including vital public services, travel for the purchase of necessities, travel for healthcare, travel for compelling family reasons to assist persons in difficult situations or need of assistance.

The authorities can also prohibit any congregation, gathering, or assembly of a group of persons. Finally, during the lockdown they can close businesses and other establishments open to the public. Under these decrees, governors enjoyed broad powers to implement all the necessary measures for the maintenance of public health order, whether these measures are of a provisional, preventive, or protective nature; or may impose a voluntary or compulsory quarantine, impose temporary measures for people to stay at home, limit their movement, prohibit their gatherings, prescribe the closure of premises open to the public or enact any other administrative police measure. (article  of Decree -–, as cited in CMS )

By enforcing a state health emergency, families were confined to their often small and crowded apartments. Staying in a small space without leaving resulted in friction and disputes, leading to psychological, physical, and even sexual violence. Moreover, since travel needed prior permission from authorities, victims of violence frequently gave up on leaving their homes to seek help for fear of being caught by the authorities or fined. Many governors took various measures without issuing public notices. Hence their constituents only found out about these restrictions when the media reported them or when local police fined someone who violated these restrictions unknowingly.

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Law 103.13 on Violence against Women In August  Morocco issued Law ., which defines violence against women as “any physical or moral act or omission thereof based on gender discrimination that results in physical, psychological, sexual, or economic harm to a woman” (Morocco World News ). It created the National Commission for the Care of Women Victims of Violence on September , , and the regional commissions at the end of . Law . provided both penal and procedural provisions to protect women from violence. The penal provisions included strict sanctions on sexual harassment and kidnapping, newly recognized offenses such as the expulsion of women from the matrimonial home, and new protective measures. As for procedural provisions, the law provided closed hearings in sensitive cases like sexual assault, created a civil panel composed of associations, and offered protection to victims during the preliminary investigation. The law recommended creating protection cells in hospitals and police offices and special committees to assist the women and provide them with support mechanisms. Because the law and commissions were established shortly before the state health emergency was introduced, they did not have a chance to operate properly during lockdown despite the state health emergency decree’s guarantees that “the restrictive measures to be taken do not prevent the guarantee of the continuity of vital services.” Protecting women from violence was not considered a vital service. Activists identified numerous shortcomings in the operation of the law. First, the protective measures it provides are not adequate and lack any financial support for women victims of violence (femmes victims de violence: FVVs). Second, it does not take into account marital rape, sextortion, or violence against women with disabilities. Third, as evidenced in the application of the law, FVVs must provide evidence of domestic violence. If a woman loses evidence or fails to produce it, perpetrators are set free. Thus, women’s inability to obtain a medical certificate or file complaints has caused them to remain silent or not follow up with their cases. Fourth, judgments against domestic violence aggressors remain lenient in many cases: women are pressured to return to their homes and stay with their abusive spouses. Fifth, the law is silent on providing FVVs shelter if they wish to leave their home but have nowhere to go. Finally, if the husband fails to pay child support, the burden is on the mother to file a complaint and track her ex-husband’s address, while the father’s approval is still needed to change the children’s school after the mother has moved out.

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Method Using semistructured individual interviews, this study assesses the implementation and effectiveness of Law . during the state of emergency and the lockdown decree. This included several versions of the questionnaire, each targeting different actors, such as social workers from civil society, heads of women’s protection units in hospitals and courts, officials from the National Council for Human Rights and regional councils for human rights, and officials from the Entraide Nationale (equivalent to Health and Human Services). We conducted fourteen telephone and three physical interviews in Arabic and French with seven associations from urban and rural regions of Morocco, two women’s networks, and five institutional leaders. The questionnaire focused on the forms of violence that women suffered during the period of confinement, profiles of FVVs and perpetrators of violence, triggers of violence, FVVs’ needs, institutional actors’ strategies, coordination with commissions and entities, mechanisms for the protection of FVVs, and the effectiveness of Law ., including any reform proposals. Taking Law . as a guiding format, we evaluated illustrative cases analyzing forms of violence (physical, psychological, sexual, and economic), their elements (triggers and profiles of victims and perpetrators), and responses to violence (by government and civil society).

Forms of Violence Physical, sexual, psychological, and economic violence against women increased during the pandemic. According to a study by the Ennakhil Association in October , in the Marrakech-Safi region, violence against women was  percent physical,  percent psychological, and  percent sexual, as illustrated in the following accounts of these cases and women’s associations’ responses. Physical Abuse

Survey results demonstrated that—despite the increased physical abuse— women could not leave their husbands because they did not have proper travel authorization or a place to go. Most were afraid of catching COVID- if they left the house or being fined by the police. Ironically, many associations reported a high number of women being evicted from their homes by

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their husbands. Other types of physical violence involved in-laws abusing young brides, brothers forcing their sisters to assume all responsibilities for household chores, and adolescents abusing their elderly parents. It should also be noted that women (especially those working in the informal sector) who were supporting their families financially after their husbands became unemployed were more vulnerable to physical violence after losing their jobs (and their vulnerability increased with the husbands’ use of tobacco, alcohol, or drugs). Sexual Violence

Civil society has noted several cases of incest, rape, sexual harassment, and cyber sexual harassment. The data collected indicate that sexual violence reported by women is carried out on a massive scale among married couples ( percent). According to the same study, sexual forms of violence included adultery, marital rape, perverse sexual practices, “extreme practices” (sadistic sexual acts), and sexual violence and harassment between family members. Unmarried young women did not, in most cases, dare to report violence committed by their partners or family members because being in illegal or socially illegitimate relationships deprived them of the right to report the violence. Economic Violence

Economic violence has particularly affected women working in the informal sector. Unfortunately, the majority of these women were not able to benefit from the financial assistance provided by the government during lockdown (femmes-mulets, poor female-headed households with children, women farmers, and domestic workers), because this aid was given exclusively to male heads of household who were formally employed or registered with the government. Women abandoned by their husbands, those married to ineligible drug addicts, and those whose husbands refused to share the assistance with them were penalized. Furthermore, because courts were closed during the lockdown period, some ex-husbands (due to job loss or to take advantage of the closure of the courts) stopped paying alimony. While in confinement, divorced mothers had to search for alternative solutions alone or with the help of women’s associations, which reported an explosion in requests for assistance related to alimony. Many women were also not eligible for financial aid for those working in the semiformal sector (such as sales clerks,

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hairdressers, and waitresses), but were not registered with the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS: National Social Security Fund) and did not have a medical assistance plan for the economically deprived. According to the Ennakhil Association study, husbands often used violence to manipulate their wives, who were economically dependent on them. They deprived them of food and medicine, refused to pay child support, stole their savings to contribute to household expenses, and took away any financial aid granted by the government. Other forms of economic violence included suspension of work without compensation. Economic violence was perpetrated by () the employer, () the government, and () spouses and ex-husbands. Employers required to declare their employees to the CNSS have taken advantage of the lockdown to dismiss them, particularly factory workers. Not knowing their rights, many women did not realize that they were not registered at the CNSS and therefore not eligible to receive financial aid until their application was rejected. Psychological Abuse

During the lockdown period, psychological violence skyrocketed. This was caused by the husband’s sudden loss of employment, which created stressful situations within the family, and by women’s frustration with having to manage distance learning imposed by the government and their household chores without any support. The associations found that most women who called from their homes were terrified. During the phone conversations or WhatsApp group chats, they were afraid of being caught by their husbands while talking to social workers. In some cases, the associations lost contact with women who had been victims of violence because the husbands changed their telephone numbers. Several suicide attempts were also reported. The same study cites additional forms of psychological violence, including threats to evict women from their homes or prohibit their return, openly holding telephone conversations with mistresses, threats of divorce, pressure on the women to give up their rights, restrictions on movement, prohibiting women from leaving home, denial of access to the phone and computer, and isolation from friends and family.

Elements of Violence All associations noted an increase in the rate of violence, which has doubled or even tripled in some regions during the lockdown. Some regions

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witnessed an increase in telephone calls since the end of the confinement because the FVVs could finally contact the associations. An association received  files in just one month, all related to divorce, conditional return to the home, or requests for Chikak (divorce on the grounds of marital discord). According to the report from the Marrakech-Safi region (based on the statistics of eight listening centers), calls increased by   percent compared to . Some associations foresee an additional increase in complaints after the end of the health crisis. Triggers of Violence

The survey revealed numerous triggers for violence against women, but most prevalent was the husband being forced to spend his time with his family in confined spaces after being used to leaving the house for work or spending time in coffee shops with other men. Other triggers were associated with the psychological pressure on parents and children, which resulted in many children dropping out of school. A third trigger was the stress due to threats of dismissal or sudden loss of employment. Related triggers were associated with the difficult economic conditions due to the loss of income of one or more family members and sometimes even hunger because of lack of means to provide necessities. A fourth trigger was the increase in housework for women, who also had to manage the remote schooling of children. Finally, travel and movement restrictions had significant negative psychological effects on girls and women. Profiles of Victims and Perpetrators

Women victims were of all ages, but many were illiterate or had a maximum primary or intermediate level of education. Most were working in the informal sector (femmes-mulets, factory workers, farmers, waitresses in cafes and bars, sex workers, and traffic light hawkers). Victims also included single mothers who were evicted for not paying rent or became pregnant before the lockdown but were rejected by their families. Most of the women were housewives who were economically dependent on their spouses or had an unemployed spouse. A significant number of victims were underage women from rural areas who received marriage promises or dropped out of school and fled from their parents’ house. Some victims were forced into underage marriages, and others were taken as housemaids. Finally, women with disabilities or mothers of children with disabilities (such as autism, anxiety, or depression) suffered doubly within their families. Women workers

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dismissed or deceived by their employers were left without social or medical protection. The top perpetrators were husbands (and partners like fiancés). Second came employers. Then fathers, in-laws, police, landlords, and, to a lesser extent, ex-husbands, brothers, sons, and even neighbors. In general, men considered themselves heads of the family or exercised control over family members’ freedom.

Civil Society Strategies Women’s associations worked remotely, preparing lists of hotline numbers posted in police stations, at hospitals, at pharmacies, and via social-media networks, especially on Facebook and WhatsApp groups. Some associations contacted their beneficiaries to notify them of their services and respond to their messages on social-media networks. Others launched media campaigns through national press and television channels. Most associations— depending on their means and capabilities—ensured continuing services by forwarding calls to their mobile phones and remained reachable twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week. A social worker even volunteered to confine herself to the association’s premises to ensure welcoming women who visited the center, helping them fill out forms, and referring them to the proper help in case of emergency. The associations received calls from all over Morocco. Some associations solicited the help of young women who distribute food aid to discreetly investigate the cases and needs of FVVs and provide information. Most associations found it difficult to manage cases discovered at the very beginning of the lockdown until the Public Prosecutor’s Office issued the communiqué of April , , which reminded all prosecutors to handle cases of violence with “firmness and harshness” and provided digital methods to file complaints with email addresses, online platforms, and fax numbers.

Government Responses In addition to issuing the communiqué, the Presidency of the Public Prosecutor’s Office also published directories with the telephone numbers and email addresses of all the courts and prosecutors in the country (Présidence du Ministère Publique ). The president of the Union Nationale des Femmes du Maroc (UNFM:

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National Union of Moroccan Women), Princess Lalla Meryem, launched a listening and support platform, Kolona Maak (Arabic for “we are all with you”), in partnership with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Solidarity, Social Development, Equality, and the Family, the General Directorate for National Security, the Presidency of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Royal Gendarmerie, the Office of Professional Training and Work Promotion, Poste Maroc, and the National Agency for Promotion of Employment and Skills. This platform was created to collect complaints remotely related to violence against women during the quarantine and provide the necessary listening, escorting, assistance, and support to the FVVs. This platform is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, through a direct telephone line (). It is a free application downloadable on smartphones to report any abuse or violence that women and girls suffer and refer them to a competent security or judicial authority, particularly in urgent intervention cases (AllAfrica Global Media ). The Presidency of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in partnership with UN Women, produced a video to raise awareness about violence against women and girls during the COVID- crisis and to provide information on remote judicial services available to FVVs. The Ministry of Solidarity, Women, the Family, and Social Development also published an awareness-raising video with the steps to follow to benefit from government financial aid (Ministry of Economic, Finance, and Administrative Reform ).

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Government Responses Associations played a significant role in holding accountable governmental services that were supposed to help FVVs. Numerous shortfalls were identified with the government’s responses. The first was the lack of responsiveness and flexibility on the part of the gendarmerie and the police, who could not take action without the approval of their superiors. Second, the hotline service was limited to guidance without following up on complaints filed by FVVs during the lockdown. Third, there was a three-month delay in launching the Kolona Maak media campaign, exposing that violence against women was considered a low priority. Fourth, no accommodations were provided to FVVs. With their already saturated centers and their limited capacities, the associations lamented being the only refuge to accommodate FVVs during this period. Finally, authorities failed to take responsive measures for reporting and raising awareness. Associations felt that awareness campaigns could have been conducted in the neighborhoods, particularly in grocery stores and pharmacies.

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On the institutional level, this survey evaluated the work of the various ministries. The Ministry of Justice suspended all nonessential cases during the lockdown period instead of proposing alternative sentencing solutions. Requests for protection from FVVs without a medical certificate were not taken into account, and the aggressors were often released. Women from rural areas, where there are no courts, did not receive any assistance. Civil society could only provide psychological assistance until a statement of alternative sentencing against aggressors was issued by public authorities to protect the victims. In addition, the platform required sending a written complaint by fax. However, many of the complainants were illiterate women from disadvantaged and rural areas, and the complaints often did not lead to a follow-up. By focusing solely on patients with coronavirus, the Ministry of Health indirectly endangered the lives of many women who had succumbed to serious or chronic diseases (which have been ignored in emergencies, including surgical operations and childbirth). Women who did not have an identity card were denied medical care. One of the associations estimates that the number of women who died during confinement due to chronic diseases, complications, or medical ignorance was higher than the number of patients who died due to COVID-. Likewise, Entraide Nationale’s reception centers received only homeless people during the lockdown, and some even stopped receiving FVVs because of the health crisis. Women became victims of institutional violence by being discriminated against and excluded from the government aid program directly and indirectly. Civil society organizations reported that most women they accompanied to apply for financial assistance failed to receive it. Women were more likely than men to work in the informal sector, which placed them at greater risk of economic, psychological, and physical violence. Regime d’Assistance Medicale (RAMED: Medicaid) cards assigned to a household are usually issued in the husband’s name. Single women living alone have to prove that their father has died, while divorced women and widows have to prove that they are divorced or widowed. People who are neither registered with the CNSS nor hold a RAMED card could in some cases apply to benefit from COVID- public assistance allowances. However, most associations were disappointed with the large number of women who were unable to obtain assistance. Admittedly, the whole world was not ready for this pandemic. Nevertheless, most associations deplore the strategies implemented, which unfortunately have not been effective in protecting FVVs.

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Authorities’ Attitudes toward Women

When women were expelled from their households or were in a state of emergency, shelters for FVVs were full, so the judicial police resorted to verbally threating the abusive spouses instead of implementing due process. Often, police officers accompanied the women who had been expelled from their homes and subjected to violence to convince the husband to sign a report in which he would vow to stop the aggression. Unable or unwilling to address their needs, institutional actors referred FVVs to associations for help. Some FVVs were lucky, as some associations managed to mobilize their members and volunteers to rent apartments, but others had no choice but to spend the night outside in bus stations or on the streets. Furthermore, institutional actors lacked a gender approach or focus. Many women complained to the associations about the poor quality of services they received from institutional actors, including the discriminatory attitudes of some police officers and doctors (particularly toward women with disabilities). Their lack of training in this regard was reflected in mediocre skills in listening and assisting, lacking the operational means to function effectively. Nevertheless, there have been exceptions. Women shared their good experiences particularly in the Meknes region. The king’s prosecutor was reachable and available for Zoom meetings with members of civil society when needed. A police officer in Casablanca provided temporary accommodation for an FVV in a hotel.

Conclusion Morocco is making serious attempts to improve human rights, as confirmed by the adoption of the July  constitution. The country has enshrined the supremacy of the international conventions ratified through national legislation and affirmed its commitment to harmonizing these laws with these provisions and conventions. Although still insufficient and not meeting all of civil society’s demands, Law . is a positive development and a great achievement. Nevertheless, women’s associations continue to work diligently to ensure that the law is implemented effectively. This process will allow them to identify its limitations, analyze them, question the parties concerned about these shortcomings, and demand improvement or recasting of the law itself if necessary. Given the COVID- crisis, Morocco, like many countries, declared a public health emergency and a lockdown of the entire country, followed

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by a gradual and sometimes partial relaxation of the confinement. As an unprecedented situation, the pandemic has had severe economic, social, political, and health consequences, creating a catastrophic impact on all classes of society. However, in any crisis, women are the most affected and suffer the most brutal consequences. Most of the victims who suffered from the pandemic in Morocco were women of all ages. Because of its commitment to women’s rights, the Association Jossour— Forum des Femmes Marocaines (Jossour FFM)—recognizes that COVID- has had a harsh impact on women, especially those living in a precarious and vulnerable situation. Their fragile circumstances have worsened. The violence against them, in many forms, has increased during the lockdown but received little attention. For this reason, Jossour FFM drafted the report on violence against women at the time of lockdown, calling it a public health emergency. This study shows that the victims have suffered physical violence and reveals the weakness of remedies or protection of domestic violence victims, which is even nonexistent in some regions. The appropriate infrastructure to protect these victims is either unfamiliar to them or remote. In addition, during the lockdown, women could not move without permission from the local authorities. The telephone numbers made available to them to report this violence and receive support and aid were of no use because their abuser controlled their ability to seek help. Despite the measures taken by the government to offer assistance to families during the lockdown, women suffered economic violence. Several women were deprived of financial aid because it is often granted to heads of household, who by tradition are males. This situation has revealed the increasingly precarious situation in which these women have found themselves, lacking adequate measures to prevent and protect them from this violence. This chapter highlights the various situations in which women experienced violence in Morocco during this health crisis, enabling us to measure and evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of Law . in combating violence against women, even during the coronavirus crisis, through various mechanisms of prevention, protection, follow-up, and support.

Notes This chapter was produced by Jossour Forum des Femmes Marocaines, which is solely responsible for its content. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State, the United States government, or the University of Maryland.

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. Per article , “the walis of regions and the governors of prefectures and provinces take . . . all enforcement measures necessary to maintain public health order in the context of the declared state of emergency.” . The hamalates (carriers), nicknamed femmes-mulets (mule women), carry goods on their backs.

References AllAfrica Global Media. . “Les mesures prises par le Maroc pour lutter contre le Covid- déclinées devant l’ESCWA.” https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE %CA&sid=sitemap&v=.&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName =anon%Efae. Borba Telles, Lisieux E. de, Alexandre M. Valença, Alcina J. S. Barros, and Antônio Geraldo da Silva. . “Domestic Violence in the COVID- Pandemic: A Forensic Psychiatric Perspective.” Brazilian Journal of Psychiatry () (May–June). https:// www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S-&script=sci_arttext. CMS. . “Morocco: State Health Emergency.” Francis Lefebvre Maroc (April ). https://cms.law/en/mar/news-information/morocco-state-health-emergency. IPDF (Initiative pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes). . https://www .facebook .com/ IPDF -initiative -pour -la -protection -des -droits -des -femmes -. Kasraoui, Safaa. . “New Survey Shows High Rates of Violence against Women in Morocco.” Morocco World News (May ). https://www.moroccoworldnews.com ////survey-high-rates-violence-women-morocco. Ministry of Economic, Finance, and Administrative Reform (Morocco). . “Temporary Support Measures for Families Working in the Informal Economy Who Are Affected by the Repercussions of the Corona Pandemic” (in Arabic, March ). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sTPJcejfg. Morocco World News. . “Unofficial Translation of Morocco’s Law - on Elimination of Violence against Women.” https://www.moroccoworldnews.com ////unenglish-translation-of-moroccos-law---on-elimination -of-violence-against-women. Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. . “Levels of Domestic Violence Increase Globally, Including in the Region, as COVID- Pandemic Escalates.” http://www .emro.who.int/fr/violence-injuries-disabilities/violence-news/levels-of-domestic -violence-increase-as-COVID--pandemic-escalates.html. Présidence du Ministère Publique (Morocco). . “The Electronic Platform to Receive Complaints of Violence against Women” (in Arabic). https://vcfemme .pmp.ma.

CHAPTER 8

Gender Dynamics and Distance Education: Toward a Situational-Interactionist Model of the COVID-19 Contingency Effect on Female University Students in Morocco ILHAM SADOQI

On March , , the World Health Organization classified the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (COVID-) as a deadly infectious disease, causing an unprecedented impact on global society. To flatten the curves of its transmissibility, the Moroccan government adopted measures including a massive scale of closure, social distancing, distance education, and extensive financial efforts to help the vulnerable population with mitigation procedures in health, the economy, and education, according to the Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP b). The COVID- pandemic has produced the most profound disruption of education systems in history, affecting approximately . billion students in over  countries due to closures of schools that affect   percent of the world’s student population, up to  percent in low-income and lowermiddle-income countries (UN a; UNESCO , ). Governments and stakeholders responded swiftly to diverse delivery channels and digital tools like mass-media-based teaching and guided education to continue the schooling of enrolled students (UNICEF , ). However, the inequitable distribution of technology to access distance education has laid bare the “lack of preparedness and low resilience systems” (UNICEF , ) to facilitate the successful and safe use of technology for learning and ensure student’s independent pedagogy. During this largest disruption of education in human history, the efficiency of responses to school closure varied according to the countries’ pre-COVID human development index (UN a, ), leaving about  percent of children in primary education from low human development countries out of school, compared with just  percent in high human development countries. The pandemic has aggravated the

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preexisting education disparities, making young students vulnerable because of poverty, gender, migration, forcible displacement, or disabilities unable to continue their learning process (UN a, , ). Similarly, the educational apparatus in Morocco has revealed logistical and pedagogical constraints related to social exclusion, including the availability of didactical tools, technologies, and pedagogies of remote or distance learning (DL) and communication between school and students (HCP b, ). In response to the pandemic, the shift to DL has been a means to sustain the continuity of the learning process. This chapter investigates the impact of this paradigm shift on female university students from a gender perspective and their perceptions of learning experience during the COVID- condition. Through such a situational approach, the gender factor is not deployed as a seamless and superseding category of interpretation but is imbued with structural conditions, discourses of power, and the potentials/ constraints of the pandemic contingency and agency politics.

Conceptualizing Distance Education, Gender, and Contingency Distance learning is a dynamic concept with manifold meanings. Some define it as electronically delivered instruction via multimedia or virtual platforms (Smart and Cappel ) in different temporalities, either synchronically or asynchronically (Tanner, Noser, and Totaro ). Others see it as a flexible and convenient tool for students (Song et al. ) or personalized and self-organized learning with the ability to tailor the learning experience according to students’ organization of time, content, and pace (Olojo, Adewumi, and Ajisola ). Challenges to the DL process are communicational because of the difficulty of interacting socially and supporting students effectively (Muilenburg and Berge ; Mullen and TallentRunnels ). Furthermore, the technical limitations of this pedagogical approach make online learning unpredictable and its outcomes contingent on unplanned pedagogies (Almaiah, Al-Khasawneh, and Althunibat ; Irawan, Dwisona, and Lestari ). To understand the interaction of learning and identity characteristics, some studies point to the impact of gender differences between male and female students on their perception of DL and subsequently on the learning outcomes (Johnson ; Kay ). This chapter brings to the fore distance education as a category of analysis to study how gender is constructed in various areas and situations of acting and interacting. To examine the mechanisms that produce and reproduce gender relations in the lifeworld of female students, I build a case

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for the value of gender in the examination of sociocultural discourse. Beyond a mere focus on the pedagogical realities of DL, I stress the contingent discursive articulations of gender dynamics in students’ life experience under COVID- by investigating female youths’ perception of the social constructions of discriminatory discourses against women. I analyze their perceptual representation of individual subjectivity, social mobility, freedom of action, the degree of involvement in the private space of the family and in public space, the discourse of violence, and the role that gender plays in enhancing or impeding their agency. By viewing contingency as a framework, I explore the interaction of personal, situational, and environmental variables vis-à-vis the dynamics of gender relations under COVID-. The pandemic is considered an “event” in the Deleuzian sense of time, which refers to the forces of “signs,” “acts,” and “structure” in their relationships (Deleuze ). I borrow Dewey’s () understanding of contingency as “indeterminate” events in a world that is “not fully complete and orderly.” Likewise, Jain (, ) describes it as “a space . . . of possibility.” Using contingency as an approach to read gender dynamics in Morocco, and how different social and political actors deploy gender discourse, draws attention to the diversity of narratives. In fact, in this “relational dynamic” permeating practices in everyday life, the agency of institutions and individuals and competing actors in society is in some ways subjected to the contingency of historical circumstances, institutional arrangements, and cultural forces (Foucault ). On this reckoning, COVID event could be perceived and lived as an opportunity or as a crisis that brings about a new human experience in the form of an open space of possibility where a distinct reality could emerge (Jain , ). The potential power of coronavirus events to craft change in the existing order depends on students’ conditions and the margin of action by which their choices and decisions are expressed. This chapter pinpoints how the uncertainty of the pandemic affects the students learning and their psycho-cognitive situation, family relationships, and interactions with the outside real and virtual worlds.

Methodology Viewing the pandemic as a contingency that impacts the cultural, socioeconomic, and political stakes informing the gender dynamics of DL, I specifically ask how female students perceived DL during the virus outbreak and whether it reshaped their representation vis-à-vis in-person education.

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I also examine the impact of the pandemic conjuncture on gender relations in the private and the public sphere and to what extent COVID- has enhanced or shaken their cognitive assumptions, cultural constructs, and socioeconomic and political structures of gender social roles. Did the pandemic challenge discourses of violence among female youth? Has contingent pandemic reality affected students’ agency, mobility in social space, and ability to bring about change in the context of coronavirus? I did quantitative and qualitative fieldwork in six public universities in three regions of Morocco (Rabat, Tangier, and Marakkesh). I also launched a qualitative exploratory study during and after the April–June  lockdown, conducting twelve online semistructured interviews with female university students aged nineteen to thirty from Mohammed V University in Rabat, majoring in engineering, humanities, and economics. This phase was essential to explore the research questions, test their validity, and refine the perspective through which understanding gender dynamics becomes contextual and temporal rather than only structural. Considering the pandemic contingency and conjuncture as a historic event is helpful to examine students’ cognitive assimilation to their lifeworld and delimits the spectrum of their ability to negotiate social constraints in the process of affirming their subjectivity and agency. On this basis, I administered a survey between March and April  in six universities by distributing a standardized, electronic, self-administered data-collection sheet to female students aged eighteen to thirty-three. The selection considered educational criteria such as open and limited access to institutions, vocational and nonvocational tracks, disciplines, degree level, and geographical location. I ensured sufficient external diversity and internal homogeneity criteria based on gender choice and the pedagogy of DL. Among  participants,  respondents completed the survey successfully. About  percent of respondents were between eighteen and twenty-four, and   percent were twenty-five to thirty-three. The majority,   percent, were single; only  percent were married. In terms of location,  percent lived in urban areas, while  percent lived in semi-urban areas and  percent in rural areas. Due to the virus outbreak, the majority,  percent, lived with their parents;  percent lived with relatives; and only  percent lived alone. In terms of income,   percent were economically dependent on their family, only  percent had a scholarship,  percent had part-time jobs,  percent had full-time jobs, while just over  percent received social assistance. As for academic tracks,  percent enrolled in nonvocational training and  percent in vocational studies; at least  percent pursued master’s programs. Disciplines included diverse engineering streams, education

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sciences, economics and management, humanities, and law. These sampling factors help elucidate the divergences and similarities in the attitudes and perceptions of distance learning as a pedagogy of contingency and as a lifeworld experience.

Female Youth Perceptions of COVID-19 The perception of the pandemic is informed by the students’ subjectivity. As a heterogeneous group in terms of attitudes, behaviors, views, or aspirations, as Bourdieu () stipulates, youths’ perception of their subjectivity emanates from multidimensional, plural, and context-bound criteria, including education, geography, affiliations, and gender. Most female university students reported being strongly or moderately impacted by the pandemic ( percent and  percent, respectively). This self-perception goes in tandem with the HCP statistics agency’s study on the pandemic’s effects and unpredictability. The pandemic has reshaped students’ cognitive and emotional state:  percent expressed openly regressive feelings of boredom and stress,  percent experienced loneliness and anxiety, yet  percent maintained a hopeful and calm state of mind. Respondents affirmed that their desperate feelings emanated from the challenging pedagogical shift to DL and the urgent need for adaptability to ensure the continuity of the learning process. Learners’ regular and continuous involvement in distance education has protected them from the dramatic psychological effect experienced by most women without educational concerns, especially during the lockdown (HCP a). Learners’ perceptions instantiated the global psychological mood, but without lapsing into “coronaphobia” (Naguy, Moodliar-Rensburg, and Alamiri ) or an apocalyptic portrayal of “worldwide panic, horror, and dismay” (El Maarouf, Belghazi, and El Maarouf et al. ). These cognitive assumptions of the pandemic avoid excessive emotional involvement:  percent of these female students viewed the COVID- experience as an opportunity to adapt to uncertain and unexpected events;  percent saw it as a chance to develop personal skills, like time management and independence. About  percent enrolled in online courses to enhance their crossdisciplinary knowledge, and  percent considered this an opportunity to strengthen family bonds. Only  percent lost their purpose in life and got depressed by an apocalyptic vision. These findings contradict women’s perceptions in other studies of human catastrophe and psychological breakdown. HCP (, ) reported that  percent of women suffered anxiety,

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and   percent experienced fear. Most respondents had a pragmatic outlook, reversing the crisis into an opportunity to develop their social and life skills. Their gender identity as women seems to have been superseded by their academic identity, spending most of their time learning rather than socializing. Learners’ investment in personal development activities mitigated the pandemic’s psychological impact. Thus, reactions to the virus seem to be situation-bound, which signifies how the open and unpredictable possibilities are informed by interpersonal, socioeconomic, cultural, and educational environmental determinants as well as by individuals’ choices.

Distance Learning: Beyond “Educational Habitus” It is undeniable that the continuity of education in precarious times is not merely a pedagogical concern. The shift toward remote education has reshaped the learning process, pedagogical choices, and learning outcomes. Kidman and Chang () discuss “crisis education” in uncertain times as a vital tool to raise awareness, circulate valid information, and combat misinformation without abandoning basic pedagogical tasks of addressing students’ knowledge, skills, and dispositions. DL emerged as a rescue strategy rather than as a pedagogical choice in the vortex of the virus outbreak. Being compulsory and imposed by the authorities (Gonçalves, Sousa, and Santos Pereira ), such pedagogy has faced logistical and human challenges. Before the pandemic, remote education was not institutionalized in the educational sphere. However, it attracted the attention of the learning and teaching community due to the rising interest in global digitalization and the new information age. After the lockdown, the sudden shift to distance learning called all actors in the educational industry, decision-makers, and teaching and learning communities to synchronize with this contingency, manage the constraints of the pandemic, and seize the opportunity to upgrade the educational system. Nevertheless, attaining this goal was contingent on finding the proper means. At least  percent of the respondents confirmed that COVID- affected their studies significantly:   percent had never studied before in online synchronic or nonsynchronic mode. The impact varied according to external and internal factors, including technical and logistical affordability, students’ receptivity, teachers’ involvement, and realized outcomes. This sudden exposure to DL impacted students’ access and capacity to assimilate and

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adopt distance technologies. In this regard,  percent of respondents found the learning experience satisfactory, confirming that DL substituted conventional on-site learning by being an adaptable and time-saving method. Nonetheless,  percent attributed their dissatisfaction to various technical, pedagogical, human, management, and social challenges. About  percent of responses underlined the lack of direct human interaction between students and professors, and  percent emphasized the students’ difficulty in managing time, information, and homework. In terms of the e-courses,   percent criticized the suitability of their design and the need to master online teaching technology to achieve good learning outcomes, especially for practical activities in vocational studies. Significantly, logistical factors remained quite significant:  percent were stressed by the difficulty of using and adapting to different online platforms, whereas  percent cited the cost of access to the internet as a serious issue that aggravated family expenses. In terms of personal skills, learning alone was a challenging new experience requiring independence for  percent of respondents. This shows that most students did not develop essential “soft skills” of independence, organization, and adaptation to render the learning experience a chance for personal growth. In terms of space,  percent considered the lack of a private space for learning decisive for the success of this new learning model. In sum, female students moderately accepted DL during the period when schools were closed. Despite the challenges posed by DL, most respondents (  percent) viewed their learning experience a means to develop their skills and independence. Psychologically,   percent of them considered DL a means to enhance public speaking and fight their shyness. From a socioeconomic perspective, more than half of respondents and interviewees ( percent) reported that DL saved money and time, as they cut back on their accommodations, food, clothing, transportation, and paperwork expenses. Switching to online classes was socially beneficial to rebuild family bonds for  percent, especially since  percent regarded their home environment as less stressful during lockdown than before. It is noteworthy that female university students’ experience of remote education is not a unilateral or exclusivist process. The panoply of opportunities that DL offers in terms of socioeconomic gains, learning skills, and time-management abilities is boundless, despite the pedagogical and logistical limitations and psychological confusion produced by the pandemic. Only half the students ( percent) expressed a desire to go back to in-person classes (as a pedagogical experience). The majority ( percent) were eager to go back to everyday school life (as a social experience), and

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 percent yearned to resume independent action, free movement, and traveling. About   percent expressed their desire to regain the personal privacy of campus life, and  percent viewed going back to in-person education as symbolizing a return to life. Although the in-person learning mode was considered the most desirable learning style,  percent believed that blended or hybrid learning was desirable.

Mobility in the Public Sphere The relationship between gender and freedom of movement is an intricate one. Access to the public sphere constitutes a site of struggle in maledominated societies, where access depends on women’s ability to negotiate the structural frontiers of society, economy, and polity. Studies highlighting the feminization of the public sphere have attributed this evolution in Moroccan gender discourse to diverse factors. Feminist activism and writings have paved the ground for an epistemological shift in the apprehension of gender roles and the social architecture of the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of economy and political power (Mernissi ; Sadiqi and Ennaji ). Remarkably, the interplay of power and gender dynamics discloses how the private space of the family turns into a locus of power struggle between social forces. Because of the barriers of the sociocultural frontiers between the private and the public sphere, gaining access to the public sphere turns into a challenging enterprise (Graiouid ). The pandemic significantly affected female youths’ freedom to move in and outside the family space during and after the lockdown. At least  percent of female students endured restrictions on their mobility and travel options. About   percent of respondents attributed this situation to studies and homework load and  percent to being introverted, while  percent felt that public spaces were not available or open to women and girls in their city or village. In contrast,   percent viewed the university as a space of freedom compared to the home as a space of confinement. Only  percent had to negotiate with their family to leave the house or receive friends. The pandemic intensified restrictions on female university students in public spaces. Respondents did not report any family restrictions on leaving the house. For  percent of these young women, the family was portrayed as the protector from sexual harassment in public spaces. Almost one-third wanted to go out in small groups or with family members, while  percent

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avoided going out alone. Interestingly, safety concerns conditioned . percent of women’s perception of freedom to access public spaces. Public spaces are governed by dominant social rules of space and mobility, in which women are still perceived as belonging in the private space of the family. Access to this sphere of economic, social, political, and cultural activities is open to them only in spaces that abide by strict regulations, like schools and clubs. In this regard, the family’s impact seems ineffective without a legal, social, and cultural support system.

Space, Gender Roles, and Domestic Chores Family space had its own power dynamics during the pandemic. About   percent of female students perceived this private sphere as a space of family reunion. About  percent felt that home was an opportunity to live together during the lockdown. This space became the epitome of a place of inner peace for  percent of respondents and a place of self-discovery for  percent. Negative views of the family as a lonely, closed, and isolated place were limited to  percent who experienced relational or psychological issues, including a generation gap, miscommunication, and boredom. Family space proved to be inclusive of female students and a safe haven from the discriminatory machine of socialization for two reasons. First, educated young women tend to be more in control of their communication and interaction and to have life and career prospects broader than in previous generations. Second, modern nuclear families with higher income tend to invest in their children’s education. Thus, to young women, the family symbolizes a source of safety and social security. With family care come chores. Domestic work became inextricably linked to the social norms and gender roles within the space of the family during the pandemic. To examine gender dynamics within the family, this study investigated the high frequency of female university students’ involvement in domestic chores during the pandemic. Almost   percent of respondents did chores frequently, whereas only  percent rarely or never did any housework. Moreover, more than  percent of female university students cooked for their families and washed the dishes,  percent cleaned,  percent did the laundry,  percent were in charge of serving other family members, and  percent did the shopping for the family. The type and frequency of these chores emphasize persisting alignment with the traditional and patriarchal distribution of domestic gender roles. Housework turns

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into a deterministic pedagogy of domestication that university female students could not escape. This chapter examines female university students’ awareness of the social power interplay in the private space of their families. Most respondents,   percent, considered housework to be a free-time activity. This claim of the voluntary nature of housework can be misleading: an example of social automation of normalized compulsory action. However, onethird of them reported doing chores to earn their parents’ blessing and  percent did them to be left alone in peace. Only  percent did not do any domestic work. A minority (  percent) stated that their families shared chores between female and male children and parents. Indeed, the assignment of housework revealed a degree of commitment to an equal assumption of gender roles. The HCP and United Nations for Women confirm in a joint study released in February  that compulsory housework has accelerated girls’ inability to pursue DL and dropping out of school. The UN report reveals that  percent of girls in low-income countries suffer from exacerbating disparities in learning opportunities (UN a, ). Young female students’ involvement in domestic chores reflects difficulty in escaping the patriarchal machinery despite justifications relating chores to personal preference.

Violence and Gender Dynamics The proliferation of violence in the private space has become a central concern for national and international decision-makers. During the virus outbreak,  percent of respondents were in a situation of violence as victims or witnesses. About  percent of violent cases occurred on the street and  percent in a “closed” public space such as a café, restaurant, supermarket, or club. And . percent experienced violence in the family space. The results for female university students nuance this evidence of the exponentially increasing violence against females during COVID-. According to a UN report, such rampant violence deepened women’s social stress and was coupled with restricted movement and social isolation measures. Women had to stay with their abusers without access to support (UN b). Female students endured multifaceted violence. In the public sphere outside the family, sexual violence and harassment were more common ( percent). Almost  percent experienced verbal violence,  percent experienced psychological violence, . percent experienced physical violence, and another . percent experienced cyber violence.

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In the private sphere, the most ubiquitous form of violence was psychological. Almost  percent reported attitudes of silence, indifference, threat, neglect, restrained movement, and deprivation. About  percent experienced verbal violence, including name-calling, insulting, and nagging, while almost  percent experienced physical violence. At least . percent of the respondents reported experiencing sexual violence in the family space and another .  percent experienced cyber violence. The prevalence of sexual harassment in public spaces and psychological violence in the private space illustrates that the power interplay aligns with the dominant perception of gender dynamics in each space. The family operating as a protective apparatus seems to utilize physically invisible yet repressive forms of suppression to socialize, educate, and negotiate social limits. In a similar vein, the prevalence of sexual harassment in public places suggests that social norms still tolerate physical abuse against the female body the moment women transgress the frontiers of their assumed natural space of family and home. In response to violence, only  percent of respondents resorted to communication strategies rather than physical reactions. At least   percent rejected violence verbally, about   percent showed indifference,  percent started a dialogue about it, and  percent called a hotline to get advice and support from associations. Almost onethird ( percent) reported calling security forces, while  percent preferred to escape and run away. When asked about instigating factors of violence, over half the respondents (  percent) felt that society was responsible, mentioning factors such as social norms and cultural stereotypes that inform laws, and public policies as shown in figure .. To sum up, respondents’ perceptions reveal a general awareness of the environmental and contextual factors legitimating violence in the private and public spheres. Gender-based violence is a result of interaction between individual and environmental determinants.

Female Youth Agency and Learning The dynamics of youth agency in times of crisis are heavily influenced by youths’ perception of their subjectivity. The participation of young women in executing and managing family responsibilities does not exclusively indicate subordination or gender discrimination. It can be the epitome of social action and personal agency. Findings in this study suggest that female respondents were not kept out of the decision-making process inside their families during the pandemic. Instead, their agency was inextricably related

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Figure 8.1. Female youths’ perception of causes of violence. Source: Ilham Sadoqi,

Online survey of 106 female students, ages eighteen to thirty-three, in six Moroccan universities (March–April 2021).

to their youth. Their evolutionary trajectories inform the way they construct their discourses and actions toward their family, society, the street, the state, and the Other. In this respect, agency is tightly linked to the concept of structure and social, economic, political, and cultural forces and apparatuses (White and Wyn ). Sociologically speaking, agency is construed as the capacity of individuals to act by choice independently of the factors of influence that limit their decisions, such as gender, religion, customs, ethnicity, and the economy (Barker ). As the realities of the pandemic bring to light, Moroccan youth are seeking to express their voices and aspirations to overcome the pandemic’s constraints and gender-based social restrictions. At the family level, almost two-thirds of respondents ( percent) took on teaching a family member and helping with homework as an educational mission. The experience of DL has allowed them to enact their academic agency as supervisors, teachers, or coaches. Importantly, their action was not compulsory:  percent expressed their willingness, happiness, and eagerness to accomplish these tasks regularly. In his triple typology of individual-proxy-collective agency, Hewson () emphasizes three properties that produce agency: goal-oriented “intentionality,” the “power” of abilities and resources, and rationality to guide action. On this conceptual basis, I found that students assumed various

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family responsibilities, such as setting and supervising a hygiene plan for a younger family member and guiding the family’s food choices (  percent each), administering medication to a family member ( percent), and budgeting and managing family expenses ( percent). These involvements illustrate the agentic properties of female university students, including intentionality, cognitive and academic resources, and rational action to reach satisfying school outcomes. The opportunity to be full-time distance learners has indeed accentuated family-based peer-learning and empowered youth to play new roles. Acting by choice has been an unpredictable outcome in response to COVID-. Moreover, almost  percent of participants reported providing psychological support to friends. This empathic power has driven them to mobilize help on social media for those in a precarious situation and increase awareness about measures to mitigate the impact of COVID. Concerning individual agency,  percent of respondents took extra online courses to enrich their knowledge, and   percent participated in academic activities online (like webinars, workshops, and conferences). As for collective agency,  percent of female students organized or participated in student activism to defend equitable and proper educational rights after turning to virtual teaching. They advocated for adequate representation to influence institutional decision-making options, procedures, and implementation. Female youth political agency was at the heart of the learning process design. Distance education has permitted young female agents to seek social change and participate via cyber-activism to lobby for their interests within the limited public space of the university. As explained by an interviewee, this agentive potential reveals youths’ longing for a voice and change through individual and collective action despite authoritarian constraints and “multifaceted discrimination” in public spaces (Sadoqi , ). The opportunities to take action and effect change as collective agents are intertwined with youths’ ability to negotiate and influence power dynamics in different spaces of action. Moroccan female students display a strong willingness for change, which is undercut by social norms and structure. Implications and Prospects

This chapter lays out the impact of the COVID- pandemic on gender dynamics, focusing on female university students in Morocco. Through a situational and interactionist reading, the study highlights how gender dynamics are influenced contextually by varied intersections with and between structural systems instituting the private and public sphere and contingency

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and agency. In particular, the chapter shows how gender dynamics are informed by three determinants: societal, structural, relational, and individual factors; COVID- as a contingent factor that shaped determinate possibilities; and agency. Gender dynamics is the locus of the interplay of an assumingly public institutional fabric organizing state and society, family as a private institution reinterpreting the normative system, and the individual. Female youths’ interaction with these systems results in a double position: compliance and agency. While they strategically comply with hegemonic beliefs, norms, and laws when they adhere to some dominant domestic roles, they demonstrate independent apprehension of their reality when their representation of COVID- escapes the general apocalyptic view in society. Hence, understanding the position of their subjectivity requires a consciousness of the power of agency and the potential of contingency to possibly introduce, trigger, or exercise change within the existing structures. Moreover, students’ perception of DL following the shift toward remote education is conditioned by the socioeconomic situation and psycho-ontological pandemic state and the nature of their pedagogical involvement. Their desire for in-person or blended classes affirms the need for a new pedagogical epistemology moving from learning knowledge to participative pedagogy and from design to practice. Besides, students’ perception of the pandemic is experience-bound. It is less apocalyptic and more pragmatic. The main focus is on how to use opportunities to develop their skills. Furthermore, female students’ freedom to occupy public spaces is determined by social rules of space and mobility, in which women are still perceived to belong in the private space of the family. Access to the public sphere of economic, social, political, and cultural activity is available to them only in closed spaces with strict access regulations, like schools and clubs. The family’s impact seems ineffective without a legal, social, and cultural support system. The case of domestic chores reveals female youths’ recognition of discrimination and abiding by its normative rules. Despite their critique of the institutional and normative patriarchal machinery defining social and domestic roles within the space of the family, they remain manifestly compliant with its compulsory order. In addition, female students show a nuanced apprehension of violence. Societal factors of social norms, laws, and public policies are deemed central in constructing the discourses of violence. Violence as a social habit has resulted from a historical legacy of patriarchy, misogynistic assumptions of femininity versus masculinity, and failure of civic and institutional forces to enact a culture respectful of women’s rights and assert its social

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legitimacy. Nevertheless, female youths’ affirmation of the prevalence of violence goes along with a willingness to take action against it, at least at the individual level. Finally, the question of agency is central to understanding gender dynamics. Moroccan female students display a strong willingness to take action mainly as individual agents rather than collective agents for change because they are debilitated by social norms and sociocultural, political, and economic structures. This agentive potential is intertwined with youths’ ability to negotiate and influence power dynamics in different spaces of action. To trace this interconnectedness of individual, interpersonal, institutional, normative, and contingency levels in gender dynamics, I use the following representation based on Urie Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory () for human development (Bronfenbrenner ). In Bronfenbrenner’s socioecological model (Burns, Warmbold-Brann, and Zaslofsky ), individual development unfolds in an interconnected set of environments involving psychological, cultural, social, economic, and political elements (Bronfenbrenner ). On this ground, the meaning the individual conveys to the world is a product of experience in a complex system of relationships affected by multiple levels of surrounding environments (Bronfenbrenner , ). The model in figure . adapts and complements the original one by highlighting the relationships of individual, interpersonal, relational, and normative determinants, adding two important elements: contingency and agency. The two concepts are central in approaching and analyzing the results of the study. The contingency exemplified by the coronavirus pandemic constitutes an event that escapes human control but influences all human-environmental systems and the individual at the center. Our understanding tries to balance between the effects of structural and contingent elements on female students and the power of students’ agency and ability to act at different levels. The examination of the impact of the coronavirus on gender dynamics leads us to reflect upon turning the contingency of COVID- into a chance to reform and upgrade systems and opportunities for female youth. Educationally speaking, it would be a pragmatic and strategic undertaking to focus on effective pedagogy that is student-centered and hybrid in mode, enhancing the mastery of life and personal skills. This would be a pedagogy of participation based on need mapping and choice. Freedom could be a guiding principle to diversify methodology and enhance students’ agency. A post-pandemic pedagogy should seize the chance to promote mass literacy and life learning as a means to enhance participatory citizenship. Socially

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Figure 8.2. Representation of a situational/interactionist model of structure, agency, and contingency (SIMSAC) for gender dynamics. Source: Ilham Sadoqi, Online survey of 106 female students, ages eighteen to thirty-three, in six Moroccan universities (March–April 2021).

speaking, there is an urgent need to empower individuals and increase collective agency. First, making a civic code book available to all citizens to help them test new ways of living together would require a media-based and legal support system to build a new vision of a democratic, egalitarian society. Second, gender awareness has proved ineffective so far without a state politics of citizenry inclusion, one enforced not through gender-biased

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positive discrimination but by empowering the population to reverse the cultural rejection of women’s integration and subsequent discourses of violence, and ultimately by raising the idea of collective well-being. Future research on gender and well being may produce scholarship with an inclusivist, developmental approach and ideally may better diagnose the constraints to and possibilities for male/female coexistence in an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual recognition.

Note Bronfenbrenner’s model constitutes layers of environment or interrelated systems known as a microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, and macrosystem. The microsystem is the innermost level of activities and interaction patterns in the person’s immediate surroundings. The mesosystem involves the connections between systems like parent relationships with school life. The exosystem includes social settings such as work policies that affect families. The macrosystem is the outermost level, which consists of values, laws, customs, and resources (Bronfenbrenner ).

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of Instructors’ Demands and Support in Online and Traditional Classrooms.” Internet and Higher Education (): -. doi:./j.iheduc.... https://www .researchgate.net/publication/_Student_outcomes_and_perceptions_of _instructors’_demands_and_support_in_online_and_traditional_classrooms. Naguy, Ahmed, Seshni Moodliar-Rensburg, and Bibi Alamiri. . “Coronaphobia and Chronophobia: A Psychiatric Perspective.” Asian Journal of Psychiatry. https:// doi.org/./j.ajp... Olojo, Oludare Jethro, Moradeke Grace Adewumi, and Kolawole Thomas Ajisola. . “E-Learning and Its Effects on Teaching and Learning in a Global Age.” International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences (): –. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/E-learning-and-its-Effects-on-Teaching -and-Learning-Jethro-Grace/ccecdecdfdebecebbb. Sadiqi, Fatima, and Moha Ennaji. . “The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco.” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies (): –. https://doi.org/./mew..... Sadoqi, Ilham. . “Youth in the Margin in Morocco: A Qualitative Approach to the Perception of Subjectivity and Agency Politics.” SHS Web Conferences . https:// doi.org/./shsconf/. Smart, Karl L., and James J. Cappel. . “Students’ Perceptions of Online Learning: A Comparative Study.” Journal of Information Technology Education : –. http://www.jite.org/documents/Vol/vp-Smart.pdf. Song, Liyan, Ernise S. Singleton, Janette R. Hill, and Myung Hwa. . “Improving Online Learning: Student Perceptions of Useful and Challenging Characteristics.” Internet and Higher Education (): –. https://www.sciencedirect.com/ science /article/abs/pii/S?via%Dihub. Tanner, John R., Thomas C. Noser, and Michael W. Totaro. . “Business Faculty and Undergraduate Students’ Perceptions of Online Learning: A Comparative Study.” Journal of Information Systems Education (): –. Telquel. . “À Tanger, d’inquiètantes affiches blâment les tenues des femmes, comparées à de la marchandise” (March ). https://telquel.ma////dans-les -rues-de-tanger-dinquietantes-affiches-blament-les-tenues-des-femmes-comparees -a-de-la-marchandise_. UN (United Nations). a. “Policy Brief: Education during COVID- and Beyond.” https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites// //sg_policy_brief_covid-_and_education_august_.pdf. ———. b. “Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID- on Women.” https://www.un .org/ sexualviolenceinconflict/ wp -content/ uploads/ / / report/ policy -brief -the -impact -of -covid - -on -women/ policy -brief -the -impact -of -covid - -on -women-en-.pdf. UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). . “COVID- Educational Disruption and Response.” http://www.iiep.unesco.org /en/covid--educational-disruption-and-response-. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). . “Promising Practices for Equitable Remote Learning: Emerging Lessons from COVID- Education Responses in  Countries.” UNICEF Office of Research—Innocenti, October . https://

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www.unicef-irc.org/publications/-promising-practices-for-equitable-remote -learning-emerging-lessons-from-covid.html. White, Rob, and Johanna Wyn. . “Youth Agency and Social Context.” Journal of Sociology (): –. doi:./. https://journals.sagepub .com/doi/./.

PAR T III

A Gender Lens on COVID Impact in the Middle East and North Africa

CHAPTER 9

COVID’s Three-Order Impacts on Women’s Lives: A Typology R I TA S T E P H A N

The COVID- pandemic has exposed fault lines in public health systems in the Middle East, where public health institutions vary widely. Atlantic Council, July 13, 2020

Most Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries concurrently mandated strong COVID- measures in March  but incrementally reopened their economies a few months later. Countries’ ability to endure the economic costs of shuttering their economies affected their likelihood of reimposing the strictest closures (Dyer, Schaider, and Letzkus ). As the outbreaks of COVID- reemerged in the spring of , the health systems in many MENA countries were stretched beyond capacity, notwithstanding “regional disparities in terms of access to healthcare, and the shortage of medical professionals” (Abouzzohour ). According to the Oxford COVID- Government Response Tracker (University of Oxford ), by January , , the entire world experienced absolute stringency measures, including school closures, remote work, and travel bans. The Gulf countries eased their stringent measures by January , , while most countries in North Africa and the Levant fluctuated between strict and relaxed measures. Most countries reduced their restrictions by January  due to the greater availability of vaccines and mitigation measures. Looking at MENA state responses to the COVID pandemic from a sociological perspective rather than public health perspective, patterns emerge. Many Gulf states offered high-quality health and social care to their citizens but not to foreign workers. Some reported luxurious treatment of COVID patients being placed in five-star hotels to quarantine (Alarabiya News ). Alternatively, countries like Lebanon offered health services only

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to those who could afford them. In contrast, war-torn countries without a functioning health system failed to offer an adequate official response to the pandemic. The crisis revealed immediate and longer-term public health tracking, delivery, and readiness patterns. In this chapter I argue that governments’ readiness to deliver responses to COVID’s first-order, second-order, and third-order impacts was determined by their political efficacy (defined below) and prosperity as rentier, fragile, or failed states. The three types of governance adopted by the states responded in a strikingly different manner to the pandemic’s first-order impact, health. Rentier states’ second-order response depended on their ability to sustain their economies and deliver welfare services during the shutdown. Fragile states struggled, while failed states remained unresponsive. Almost none of the MENA states had a strategic response to COVID’s third-order impact (social), regardless of their political efficacy and prosperity.

The Three Types of States Three categories of governance (rentier, fragile, and failed) emerge in evaluating how MENA states managed the pandemic. I constructed these based on the political efficacy and prosperity of each state (as shown in figure .): state legitimacy index (Global Economy ) and purchasing power parity (PPP) scores (World Bank ). Ten years after the Arab Spring, one wonders whether the governments are attuned to public opinions and respond to their demands and whether individual citizens can effect social and political change. This is political efficacy, defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Craig and Maggiotto ). Conceptually, this definition contains two rather distinct components: political effectiveness and system responsiveness, which I measure using the legitimacy index (Global Economy ): The State legitimacy index considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The indicator looks at the population’s level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies.

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Figure 9.1. State legitimacy index and PPP score (1–10). Source: Global Economy 2021

and World Bank 2020.

Prosperity reflects the resources that a state puts in its citizens’ hands and can dedicate to social and public services. Using purchasing power parity (PPP), I measure prosperity (normalized here between  and  to match the range and direction of the legitimacy index; higher numbers indicate higher legitimacy and greater PPP). Within these two axes—prosperity and legitimacy—MENA countries fall into the following three categories: • Rentier states are resource-rich states and enjoy a relatively elevated degree of political efficacy. • Fragile states, on average, have limited/restricted economic resources (for example, Tunisia) or restricted/low political efficacy (freedom of expression: for example, Iran), but not both. • Failed states are those experiencing conflict or governed by an illegitimate or unresponsive government. They tend to be resource-restricted and lack political efficacy.

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COVID’s Health (First-Order) Impact on Women Globally, sex-disaggregated data suggest that fewer women than men are contracting or dying from the virus. The average ratio of contraction is :: on average, men constitute two-thirds of COVID-related deaths compared to women (. percent and . percent, respectively) (from Worldometer : data from December ). Likewise, men are less likely to receive the vaccine or undergo a COVID test (Sex, Gender and COVID- Project ). Medical research proliferated in countries with advanced public health systems. However, reliable data are lacking in most Arab countries for many reasons. First, numerous countries do not publicly report comprehensive and disaggregated epidemiological data on COVID-. Second, due to competing political, economic, and security priorities, many countries in MENA are notorious for their long-standing underinvestment and undervaluation of routine capturing of data. Third, governmental expenditure on health services is limited, and the available digital technologies are underutilized (Wehbe et al. ). Confirmed COVID death rates in the rentier states were as low as  among the population of . million in Qatar. On average, fragile states manifested their limited capacity to “identify virus cases across the population, to impose and enforce lockdowns in a sustainable way, to acquire testing and medical supplies, and to keep people fed and healthy during an economic freeze” (POMEPS , ). Confirmed COVID cases (figure .) and death rates reported in these states were high due to the government’s fragility. Death rates were low in the failed states due to limited global interaction, poor reporting among the affected population, inadequate testing and tracking, and impoverished public health measures due to lack of resources and political disorder. Who would believe that only , people died from COVID in Egypt, a country with a population of over  million? The division between these three clusters is evident in handling the vaccine as well. The vaccine story in rentier, fragile, and failed states follows a pattern similar to the pattern for the share of people who received the COVID vaccine. As of December  rentier states were offering the vaccine at impressively high rates, with over  percent of the population vaccinated in UAE and ambitious rates in Qatar ( percent), Kuwait ( percent), Bahrain (  percent), Saudi Arabia (  percent), and Israel (). Fragile states have managed to vaccinate - percent of their population (Turkey at  percent, Iran at  percent, Morocco at  percent, Tunisia at  percent, Jordan at  percent, and Lebanon at  percent), whereas less

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Figure 9.2. Confirmed COVID cases as of December 7, 2021. Source: Rita Stephan, data from Johns Hopkins University and Medicine 2021.

than  percent have received the vaccine in the failed states due to their lack of access, tracking, or plans to vaccinate their populace: Egypt at  percent, Algeria at  percent, Iraq at  percent, Libya at  percent, Syria at  percent, and Sudan at  percent—no data were reported for Palestine or Yemen (John Hopkins University and Medicine ). Unsurprisingly, sex-segregated data are absent in most failed and some rentier states but measured in fragile states, where a discussion about government performance is possible. Women’s global infection rate was  percent on average in June . This rate was  percent globally by December . Percentages of confirmed cases among MENA women range were higher than the global average in June but continued at consistent rates, ranging from  percent in Iran and Iraq to  percent in Tunisia. Shockingly, Lebanese women were more likely to die from COVID than women around the globe. At least  percent of Lebanese women with confirmed cases are dying of COVID (Sex, Gender and COVID Project ). In rentier states that report sex-segregated data, the rates are typically very low, possibly due to the social seclusion of women (Bahrain  percent, Oman  percent, Qatar  percent, and Saudi Arabia  percent). These findings do not consider unusual cases or individuals with special needs. As health budgets and resources are dealing with COVID, at least  million individuals with disabilities in the Arab region are at risk of suffering disproportionately. Women living with disabilities face an even

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higher risk of violence than other women (UN , ). However, other female-specific life and health conditions, such as pregnancies and maternity, receive insufficient reproductive health services due to the limited access to health resources. These safety risks have increased women’s vulnerability in many countries.

COVID’s Economic (Second-Order) Impact on Women Taking COVID’s health effects at face value “oversimplifies the biological, behavioral, and social and systemic factors that may cause differences to emerge with regard to how women and men experience both the disease and its consequences” (Gausman and Langer , ). As countries are gearing up to return to pre-pandemic life, McKinsey and Oxford Economics estimate that women might take two full years to recover in advanced economies (Ellingrud and Segel ). By the time schools resumed,  percent of the . million people who exited the workforce in the United States were women. Women accounted for all net job losses by the end of  (Ellingrud and Segel ). The UN reports that MENA countries witnessed the world’s only increase in extreme poverty since the spread of COVID. MENA women are expected to lose , jobs (UN , -) and to fall into poverty more than men. Given women’s higher proportional involvement in informal and insecure labor (constituting . percent of workers) and their limited access to or control of financial resources, the pandemic has furthered economic gender inequalities. Because MENA women tend to spend . times more than men in unpaid work, the highest ratio globally, and have critical barriers to information, services, and decision-making, women heavily assume the impact of COVID. Deeply entrenched gender roles in the region have led to an even heavier double-burden of work on women to serve as caregivers for households. Just one-tenth to one-third of men in the region have participated in domestic work. Given that many women work in manufacturing and service industries, women will be most affected by the repercussions of the pandemic. They may either lose their jobs or be forced to accept unfair work conditions. During outbreaks, women’s access to information and ability to seek services are severely constrained, primarily because the bulk of communication is conducted through online platforms and cell-phone messaging. Nearly half of the women in the Arab region are not connected to the internet or

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lack access to a mobile phone (AbiRafeh ). Despite monumental progress in girls’ education, persisting illiteracy rates, especially among older women and women in rural settings and conflict-ridden countries, affect their ability to access comprehensive information about the crisis regarding prevention, response, and seeking help. Despite the lack of sex-disaggregated data on the economic fallout caused by the coronavirus on families and women, the outlook was not similar across the region. In the rentier states, first-time female job seekers (Chartounie and Pankratova ), young women (Levi ), and noncitizen migrant female workers were affected the most. Healthcare was not the only malfunctioning and underfunded system in the fragile states. Many states lacked the welfare ability to offer fair wages, social security, or unemployment benefits. Of course, women constituted the most vulnerable populations, especially those employed without contracts (Kokas et al. ). The failed states experienced an overall freefall of the economy, with governments struggling to secure necessities and probably secretly hoping for long-lasting effects of the prolonged lockdown in diffusing their citizens’ discontent with their policies. Women, of course, endured a heavy economic burden in these countries. For instance, Algerian women suffer from multilevel disparities and face significant obstacles in obtaining employment (Abouzzohour and Ben Mimoune ). Before COVID, and in addition to social and cultural barriers regarding women’s traditional gender roles, barriers to women’s participation in the workforce included lack of a safe working environment, antiharassment laws, affordable and reliable childcare, and safe transportation. Khurma () argues that any post-COVID policy should include women in the decision-making process, involve the private sector, and facilitate women’s reentry into the workforce with family-friendly policies and safe work environments.

COVID’s Social (Third-Order) Impact on Women Before COVID- struck and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, women had made substantial strides in rights and representation in many MENA countries (Stephan and Charrad ). However, attitudes and behaviors changed as the pandemic kicked in. “Confinement, loss of income, isolation and psychosocial needs” increased, topped by “unpaid work” and “care” that women provided in the family. Additionally, gender-based violence spiked after the pandemic, which  percent of MENA women already experienced

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(UN , ). Moreover, school closures increased the rate of girls’ dropping out, marrying early, and assuming extra care responsibilities. Simultaneously, numerous social welfare programs such as old-age pensions, health insurance, disability, maternity, and sick leave have been eliminated or seriously affected (Stephan ). Economic deprivation, psychosocial stress, and containment led to substantial increases in domestic violence. However, the pandemic made it difficult for domestic violence survivors to seek and receive help due to movement restrictions and the limited availability of services (Stephan ). Many Arab countries lacked the necessary services for survivors of domestic violence, such as shelters and hotlines, prior to the spread of the pandemic. While a few countries in the world issued policies and measures to mitigate the social impact of the pandemic, community initiatives and women’s organizations were better at providing alternative healthcare, economic inclusiveness, and violence interventions. As for mitigating third-order impact, rentier states issued military responses to the pandemic that implemented harsh and dismissive policies (for example, Israel). Failed states loosely enforced lockdown measures but without attention to social or economic effects (for example, Syrian refugees). Finally, fragile states struggled to balance health safety and economic hardship, failing to address social problems (for example, Lebanon and Tunisia). One factor that differentiates fragile states from the other two types is the presence of civil society organizations and women’s organizations. Though lockdowns and shrinking resources restricted them, these organizations—especially the wellestablished ones—succeeded in mitigating the third-order impact of the pandemic where states failed to do so. Numerous local and international women’s organizations have been begging for prioritizing the prevention and response to violence against women and girls, involving women in leadership and decision-making on COVID response, engaging men and boys in dialogue to change social norms and strengthen engagement in caregiving roles, increasing investment in mental health and psychosocial services, and collecting robust genderdisaggregated data on the impact of COVID- (for example, ESCWA and the UN Regional Issue-Based Coalition for Gender Justice and Equality: UN Women—Arab States ; UNFPA ).

Conclusion Social policies were indirectly differentiated by states’ political efficacy and prosperity. Despite their fragility, states with greater freedom of expression

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allowed civil society to intervene and help assist in second-order and thirdorder impacts, whereas rentier and failed states might have saved women’s lives but did not protect them economically and socially. Overall, none of the MENA states’ responses to COVID were gender-centered. States’ attention to gender did not increase with the increased capacity of the state: conflict zones did not have a worse impact on women and COVID than safe zones in failed states. The increased securitization of the pandemic response and the increased repression of movements and rights did not consider gender either, thus leading to the deterioration of women’s rights overall. A new narrative in international and local politics is needed in considering how the narrative changes when women are involved. Any post-COVID remedies and policies must be planned through a gender lens, but not without women present at the decision-making table.

Note The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent the views of and should not be attributed to the US government, the United States Department of State, or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

References AbiRafeh, Lina. . “For Arab Women and Girls, the Crisis Is Just Beginning.” AlJazeera (May ). https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions////for-arab-women -and-girls-the-crisis-is-just-beginning. Abouzzohour, Yasmina. . “One Year of COVID- in the Middle East and North Africa: The Fate of the ‘Best Performers.’” Brookings (March ). https://www .brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos////one-year-of-covid--in-the -middle-east-and-north-africa-the-fate-of-the-best-performers. Abouzzohour, Yasmina, and Nejla Ben Mimoune. . “Order from Chaos: Algeria Must Prioritize Economic Change amidst COVID- and Political Crisis.” Brookings (December ). https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos// //algeria-must-prioritize-economic-change-amidst-covid--and-political-crisis. Alarabiya News. . “Saudi Arabia Quarantines Thousands in Hotels.” https://english .alarabiya.net/coronavirus////Gulf-countries-convert-event-centers-hotels -into-coronavirus-medical-facilities. Chartounie, Carole, and Katerina Pankratova. . “How the Coronavirus Pandemic Affects Saudi Women.” World Bank blogs (July ). https://blogs.worldbank.org /arabvoices/how-coronavirus-pandemic-affects-saudi-women. Craig, Stephen C., and Michael A. Maggiotto. . “Measuring Political Efficacy.” Political Methodology (): -. http://www.jstor.org/stable/.

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Dyer, Paul, Isaac Schaider, and Andrew Letzkus. . “Infographic: The Stringency of Middle East and North Africa’s COVID- Response.” Brookings (January ). https:// www.brookings .edu/ interactives/ infographic -the -stringency -of -middle -east-and-north-africas-covid--response. Ellingrud, Kweilin, and Liz Hilton Segel. . “COVID- Has Driven Millions of Women Out of the Workforce: Here’s How to Help Them Come Back.” Fortune Magazine (February ). https://fortune.com////covid--women-work force-unemployment-gender-gap-recovery. Gausman, Jewel, and Ana Langer. . “Sex and Gender Disparities in the COVID- Pandemic.” Journal of Women’s Health (): –. DOI: ./jwh... Global Economy. . “State Legitimacy Index—Country Rankings.” https://www .theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/state_legitimacy_index. Johns Hopkins University and Medicine. . “Data Notes: By Region.” https:// coronavirus.jhu.edu/region. Khurma, Merrisa. . “Women, Work and COVID- in MENA: Towards an Action Agenda.” Wilson Center (October ). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post /women-work-and-covid--mena-towards-action-agenda. Kokas, Deeksha, Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, Abdel Rahmen El Lahga, and Vibhuti Mendiratta. . “How COVID- Is Impacting Tunisian Households.” World Bank blogs (December ). https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/how-covid- -impacting-tunisian-households. Levi, Gali. . “Israel’s COVID- Era Labor Market: Three Main Challenges Facing Women.” Wilson Center (November ). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post /israels-covid--era-labor-market-three-main-challenges-facing-women. POMEPS (Project on Middle East Political Science). . “The COVID- Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa” (April). https://pomeps.org/wp-content /uploads///POMEPS_Studies__Web.pdf. Sex, Gender and COVID- Project. . “Dataset.” https://globalhealth.org/the -sex-gender-and-covid--project/dataset. ———. . “Tracking Differences in COVID Infection, Illness and Death among Women and Men and Producing the World’s Largest Analysis of Sex and Gender in National COVID- Health Policies.” https://globalhealth.org/the-sex-gender -and-covid--project. Rita Stephan. . “Health, Economic and Social Gender Impacts.” POMEPS Studies —COVID- in the MENA: Two Years On. https://pomeps.org/health-economic -and-social-gender-impacts. Stephan, Rita, and Mounira M. Charrad. . Women Rising: In and beyond the Arab Spring. New York: New York University Press. UN (United Nations). . “Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID- on the Arab Region an Opportunity to Build Back Better.” UN Sustainable Development Group (July). https://unsdg.un.org/resources/policy-brief-impact-covid--arab-region -opportunity-build-back-better. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). . “COVID-: A Gender Lens.” https://www.unfpa.org/resources/covid--gender-lens. University of Oxford. . “COVID- Government Response Tracker.” https://www .bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/oxford-covid--government-response -tracker.

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UN Women—Arab States. . “Violence against Women and Girls and COVID in the Arab Region.” https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications ///violence-against-women-and-girls-and-covid--in-the-arab-region. Wehbe, Sarah, Sasha A. Fahme, Anthony Rizk, Ghina R. Mumtaz, Jocelyn DeJong, and Abla M. Sibai. . “COVID- in the Middle East and North Africa Region: An Urgent Call for Reliable, Disaggregated and Openly Shared Data.” BMJ Global Health : e. https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh///e.full.pdf. World Bank. . “GDP per Capita PPP (Current International $).” International Comparison Program, World Development Indicators database, Eurostat-OECD PPP Programme. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD. Worldometer. . “Age, Sex, Existing Conditions of COVID- Cases and Deaths” (May ). https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/coronavirus-age-sex-demo graphics.

CHAPTER 10

Women’s Rights and Roles during the COVID-19 Pandemic S A L MA A L - S H A M I , M I C H A E L R O B B I N S , A N D Z AC H B A M P TO N

Evidence from around the world indicates that the COVID- pandemic has had disproportionate effects on men and women. Although it has represented a tragedy for all, women’s level of suffering appears to have been greater due to increasing domestic responsibilities and loss of employment as well as limited access to health services and personal safety. The status of women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) before the pandemic makes these issues of concern. Women’s labor force participation rates were among the lowest in the world, while legal restrictions and societal norms in many countries limited women’s roles in the public sphere. Within this context, the challenges resulting from COVID represent a setback for MENA women. The status of women in MENA is not as simple as often assumed. Results from Arab Barometer surveys demonstrate that views about women in society prior to the outbreak of COVID- could broadly fall into two categories: differences between equal rights and equal roles. Across several areas, including public and private, people in MENA agreed that women should have equal rights. It appears that campaigns by women’s rights activists and changes to legal frameworks have yielded tangible results in the belief that women and men should enjoy equal rights. However, most MENA societies disagree on the degree to which women should play equal roles. Even if women had earned equal rights in the public and private spheres before COVID, a belief persisted that men should continue to enjoy outsized roles both at home and in the outside world relative to women. COVID struck MENA at this challenging time as women continued to fight for equality. Data from the sixth wave, collected during the pandemic in –, suggest that retrenchment of women’s gains is already

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underway. These material and political imbalances may be exacerbated by attitudinal barriers that may prove equally difficult to overcome in a postpandemic world. Arab Barometer results confirm that women have suffered significantly from the COVID beyond the direct effects of the virus itself, which is in line with global findings. Relative to men, women are more likely to have lost employment or had an interruption to their work over the course of the pandemic, which is likely to set back ongoing efforts to increase women’s labor force participation rates. Women are also doing more work around the home in most countries, with increased responsibilities resulting from the end of in-person education for children. Substantial percentages of self-reported housewives also affirm that they have faced an increased burden in their domestic responsibilities. Additionally, women’s health and well-being have been affected because of COVID. High  percentages of citizens say that gender-based violence (GBV) has increased since the pandemic, likely due to women and their abusers being trapped together for more time in the same house or area. Yet there are tentative signs of hope. Even as women’s domestic roles became more entrenched, a small but discernible shift can be seen in several countries toward giving women an equal say in key household decisions, including family finances. It appears that women may have begun redefining the power dynamic within the home to begin playing an increased role. If this continues after COVID, it could represent a shift in the gender dynamics that could benefit women’s roles. These findings are based on the results of nationally representative surveys conducted by Arab Barometer, a nonpartisan network of research institutions across MENA and the United States. The surveys for the fifth wave (–) were conducted in person in twelve countries. The surveys included nationals ages eighteen and above in each country using area probability samples, including a complex design and clustering. The interview lasted approximately forty-five minutes and was conducted in the respondent’s place of residence. In most countries, the sample size was approximately ,, yielding a margin of error of ± percentage points. In one country, Kuwait, the sample size was only ,, resulting in a margin of error of ± percentage points. Meanwhile, the sixth wave was conducted in seven countries by mobile phone due to health considerations related to the COVID pandemic. In six of the seven countries, the sample was drawn through random digit dialing (RDD), meaning that mobile phone numbers were randomly selected for contact. The sample in Lebanon was based on a recontact approach based

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on mobile numbers that had been recorded in face-to-face interviews by the local partner over the past eighteen months. Since phone interviews necessitate a shorter survey instrument, Arab Barometer’s sixth wave was fielded in three separate parts. Each survey included approximately , nationals ages eighteen and above and lasted approximately twenty minutes, yielding a margin of error of approximately ± percentage points.

Global Trends in COVID-19’s Gendered Effects Recent scholarship on COVID- organizes the challenges facing women into three categories: larger shares of care work compared to men, more limited access to health services, and increased risks of GBV at home. Women’s pre-pandemic rights-based gains are at risk of being erased by the pandemic’s outsized effects on women compared to men, though these consequences are in line with prior studies on epidemics. Research on the Ebola and Zika crises indicates that mass diseases exacerbate inequalities in the system, often overlooked in subsequent government responses (Davies and Bennett ). In these cases, countries experiencing epidemics have relied upon women to serve as “shock absorbers” in the home to fend off further disruptions to the formal economy (Smith ). In particular, the  Ebola outbreak in West Africa points toward the vulnerability of women in developing countries: women with less education in vulnerable sectors are more likely to quit work or be fired and more expected to return home and support their families (Korkoyah and Wreh ). Globally, COVID- has pushed many women out of their jobs and back into the home. Nearly  percent of women worldwide work in sectors that have been hit hard by the pandemic, such as hospitality, retail, and paid care work (Lavietes ). Unemployment has risen for both men and women, sometimes more for men, but more women dropped out of the workforce completely (Zarrilli and Luomaranta ) according to UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development). A McKinsey Global Institute report measuring job loss in France, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and the United States estimates that  percent of women’s job loss is related to economic causes. At the same time, the remainder can be attributed to the increasing demand for care at home (Madgavkar et al. ). Similarly, research from the World Bank predicts that COVID- will cause millions to leave school, and some will never return (Azevedo et al. ). According to a UNICEF report,  million girls worldwide could be at higher risk for child marriage over the next decade due to the pandemic

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and subsequent school closures, economic shocks, and “disruptions to programmes and services” (UNICEF ). At home, women assume traditional roles that are a part of the “care economy,” which operates alongside the formal and informal economy and includes tasks like “raising children, cooking, cleaning, fetching water and firewood, caring for elderly relatives, shopping, household management,” and emotional and logistical work necessary to keep the family unit stable (Power , ). According to the OECD, women’s share of the care economy before COVID was, on average, nearly triple men’s share (Moreira da Silva ). Global survey results show that the number of hours women spend working at home has increased significantly with families staying home, even when compared to men’s increases (Azcona, Bhatt, and Love ; UN Women ). The global return of women to the home could retrench traditional societal expectations and undermine future progress in this area. Measurements of the care economy during COVID- underscore the need to grapple with gender inequality in the formal, informal, and care sectors. A spillover effect of women returning and staying home has increased their risk of experiencing GBV. Government-instituted lockdowns and curfews have forced women and girls to stay home, putting them in direct, prolonged contact with their abusers (Vaeza ). GBV tends to increase during crises and can be attributed to a panoply of causes: economic vulnerability, increased alcohol consumption, psychological stresses, and lack of women’s autonomy (Mittal and Singh ). Some researchers and organizations have described the sharp increase of GBV as the “shadow pandemic,” because it is attributable to COVID- and the difficulty in combating it (Williams and Pontalti ). Protocols meant to keep the virus at bay—social distancing, mobility restrictions, reduced occupancy, redeployment of medical staff and resources—limit the ability of women to report rising GBV cases (Erskine ). Organizations may also face critical shortages in funds, staff, or resources due to the ongoing effects of the pandemic. NGOs and women’s rights organizations have reported higher numbers of calls and reports in the MENA region, where GBV is already a widespread problem (Amnesty International ). Organizations in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan could not provide total care to those in need due to COVID-related restrictions (Chebaro ; Oxfam ; Zarrug ). Rates of GBV may fall as economies reopen; however, a way to grapple with the aftermath of GBV is missing from national and international recovery plans. Pre-pandemic circumstances specific to MENA suggest that these three trends (increased care work, limited access to health services, and increased

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risks of GBV at home) pose greater threats to women than to men even after the pandemic has ended. Against the backdrop of extreme inequality, wherein   percent control more than   percent of the wealth and corruption is rampant (Assouad ), low female labor force participation— between  and   percent in most MENA countries—sets up a system where women start from behind (Danon and Collins ). “Restrictive social norms and legal frameworks” in the Middle East specifically amplify these effects in a region that has already demonstrated high gender inequality pre-COVID (OECD ). Taken together, the potential for COVID- to strike a severe blow to women’s rights and roles is high. Modest gains made in employment and social rights may disappear after the pandemic without proactive public and private responses.

The Status of Women before COVID Arab Barometer has been asking questions about the role of women in society for more than a decade. Its fifth wave was fielded in –, providing insight into the state of societal attitudes toward women shortly before the outbreak of the pandemic. The results suggest that women had made significant societal gains in equal rights but less so in terms of support for equal roles. Women in the Public Sphere

Within the public sphere, Arab Barometer asked whether a woman is permitted to become head of government in a Muslim majority country. Across eleven of twelve countries surveyed, half, or more, agreed or strongly agreed that women have this right. Levels of agreement were highest in Lebanon ( percent), followed by Morocco ( percent), Iraq ( percent), and Tunisia ( percent). Only in Algeria did fewer than half ( percent) agree, while support was relatively low in Yemen ( percent) as well as Kuwait and Sudan ( percent each). Unsurprisingly, women were significantly more likely to say that they should enjoy this fundamental right than were men, with considerable differences observed in Kuwait (+ points), Sudan (+ points), Morocco (+  points), and Yemen (+ points). Interestingly, substantive differences by gender were found in all twelve countries except Iraq (where the difference was only  points). Notably, fewer than half of men in Libya (  percent), Yemen (  percent), Kuwait (  percent), Sudan (  percent), and Algeria (  percent) said women should have this right. By

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comparison, more than six in ten women agreed in all countries except Algeria ( percent). Like gender, education reveals noticeable differences in some countries, although views vary relatively little by age. Among those who have a university degree, support for women being heads of government tended to be higher than for those with a secondary degree or less. These countries include Egypt (+ points), Morocco (+ points), Kuwait (+ points), and Tunisia (+ points). Meanwhile, youths eighteen to twenty-nine were as likely as those over thirty to say that women have the right to be head of government. Of the twelve countries surveyed, only in Egypt (+ points), Morocco (+ points), and Yemen (+ points) did the difference exceed  points. As a result, views on women’s rights in many MENA countries are not expected to shift dramatically over time as the new generation comes of age. Despite the majority saying that women have the right to serve as head of the government, most citizens do not believe that a woman would be as effective in this role as a man. In eleven of twelve countries surveyed, half or more agreed that men are better at political leadership than women, including  percent or more in nine countries. This view was most strongly held in Sudan ( percent), Kuwait ( percent), and Jordan ( percent), while least widespread in Tunisia ( percent), Lebanon ( percent), and Morocco ( percent). As before, women are more confident in their abilities than are men. The size of the gap is largest in Kuwait (+ points), Egypt (+ points), Yemen (+ points), and Libya (+ points). Nevertheless, at least half of women in ten of twelve countries surveyed held the belief that men make better political leaders, including at least two-thirds in Sudan ( percent), Jordan ( percent), Iraq ( percent), and Kuwait ( percent). Meanwhile, there are slight but consistent differences by age: younger citizens (eighteen to twenty-nine) were somewhat less likely to believe women are not as capable in political leadership. However, in most countries, the gap was  points or less, with no consistent differences by levels of education. Women in the Private Sphere

Citizens across many MENA countries are also in explicit agreement that women’s rights extend to the private sphere. When asked if men and women should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce, at least half in eleven of twelve countries surveyed agreed, including more than threequarters in Lebanon ( percent), Iraq ( percent), Tunisia ( percent) Jordan ( percent), and Palestine ( percent). Only in Sudan ( percent) did a minority hold this perspective.

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Unsurprisingly, women were again far more likely to say that they should have equal rights than were men. At least three-quarters of women in all but two countries said that they should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce. By comparison, only in Lebanon ( percent), Iraq ( percent), and Tunisia ( percent) do roughly three-quarters or more of men say the same. Views toward women’s right to have an equal say in making the decision to divorce showed no consistent differences by age or level of education. At the same time, the vast majority of citizens said that men and women should have equal rights to a university education. Across all twelve countries surveyed, a third or fewer agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that a university education is more important for men than for women. Those living in Palestine ( percent), Morocco ( percent), Libya ( percent), and Lebanon ( percent) had particularly low levels of agreement. Demographic differences on this question of higher education are found as well. In almost all countries, men were significantly more likely to say that a university education is more important for men than for women: Libya (+ points), Yemen (+ points), Jordan (+ points), Sudan (+ points), and Egypt (+ points). However, in this case, the level of education also has explanatory power. Those who have a secondary degree or less were significantly more likely to say university education is more important for men than for women compared with those with a university degree. Significant gaps existed in Egypt ( points), Sudan ( points), Yemen ( points), Tunisia ( points), and Iraq ( points). Nevertheless, in no case did men or those with a secondary degree or above believe that university education is more important for men than for women. Although citizens largely agreed that women should enjoy equal rights in the private sphere, they were less sure about their roles. When asked if husbands should have the final say in all family decisions, half or more in eleven countries agreed. More than two-thirds held this view in Sudan ( percent), Algeria ( percent), Iraq ( percent), and Egypt ( percent). Meanwhile, only in Morocco did fewer than half say that men should have the final say over decisions within the household. There are dramatic splits by gender on this issue. About six in ten men or more said that men in all countries should have the final say, while at most half of women say the same in eight of twelve countries. Men in Kuwait were  points more likely to hold this view, with significant differences in Libya (+ points), Morocco (+ points), Jordan (+ points), Egypt (+ points), and Lebanon (+ points).

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Perhaps surprisingly, in most countries, younger citizens (eighteen to twenty-nine) were about as likely as older citizens to say that men should have the final say. The key exception was Morocco, where youth are  points less likely to hold this view. Meanwhile, in half of the countries surveyed, those who have a secondary degree or less were also more likely to hold this view than those with a university degree or above, including in Tunisia (+ points), Morocco (+ points), Jordan (+ points), Iraq (+ points), Egypt (+ points), and Kuwait (+ points). These results demonstrate that women had made substantial strides in popular attitudes before COVID- struck. Across several areas in both the public and private spheres, majorities of citizens believed that women should have rights equal to men’s. These findings imply widespread agreement that women’s rights are guaranteed. According to these findings, even if the members of the public agree that women should have equal rights, they believe that women are not as capable as men and therefore should not play the same role in society. Views of women as less able to contribute equally to both the public and private spheres persist. These attitudes indicate that a greater focus must target changing hearts and minds on the issue of women’s roles in society.

Women’s Status during COVID Results from Arab Barometer surveys conducted during the COVID- pandemic suggest significant negative externalities for women’s status but offer some hope for improvements. The pre-pandemic incongruity between acknowledged equality in rights but prescribed inequity in roles stands to become further misaligned, particularly by calcifying women’s domestic responsibilities simultaneously as women suffer setbacks in the labor market. Despite this incongruity, increased home responsibilities have been accompanied by an acknowledgment that women should have equality in household decision-making rights. Paradoxically, data from Arab Barometer’s sixth wave suggest that the pandemic may reinforce gender roles while increasing support for women having an equal role in key decisions within the household. Yet this gain should not be overstated: while attitudinal changes are happening in the private sphere, women will continue to contend with structural barriers to reentry into the workforce as sluggish economies crawl to reach the anemic pre-pandemic job market prevalent in most MENA countries. In the meanwhile, and in line with global trends, women in MENA

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are disproportionately bearing the brunt of the pandemic’s effect on both monetized and nonmonetized economies. General Concern over COVID-19

Concern over the spread of the coronavirus has preoccupied citizens in MENA throughout the pandemic. Gender gaps in degree of concern are notable. Concern peaked across all countries in October , where majorities of citizens in Lebanon ( percent), Tunisia ( percent), Morocco ( percent), Libya ( percent), Algeria ( percent), and Jordan ( percent) reported being very or somewhat concerned about the virus’s spread. Concern remained equally high by March–April , as it was months earlier in Lebanon ( percent) and Libya ( percent) and rose in Jordan to  percent. In contrast, though still pervasive in at least half of the population, concern declined by  points in Tunisia ( percent) and Morocco ( percent) and by  points in Algeria ( percent). Despite differing trends in Libya, Jordan, and Tunisia, significant gender gaps persisted, with women being more concerned over COVID than men. In Libya, where concern stayed high throughout, there was a -point gender gap in October  ( percent of women versus  percent of men) and a -point gender gap in March–April  ( percent of women versus  percent of men). Similarly, the difference between men and women remains consistent in the only surveyed country to witness an increase in concern: in Jordan, there was a -point gap in October  ( percent of women versus  percent of men) and a -point gap in March–April  ( percent of women versus  percent of men). In contrast, Tunisia’s overall decrease in concern appears to be driven primarily by men, as the gender gap increased from  points in October  ( percent of women versus  percent of men) to  points in March–April  ( percent of women versus  percent of men). Differences between men and women on the degree of and reason for concern over COVID are pervasive. Pluralities (from  percent in Morocco to  percent in Algeria) to outright majorities ( percent in Jordan and   percent in Lebanon) of citizens in all surveyed countries except Libya ( percent) in March–April  indicated that the death or illness of a family member fueled their concern. Women in Jordan ( percent) were more likely than men ( percent) to choose this reason. Similarly, while a lower share of Tunisians overall expressed this fear of having a family member fall ill or pass away (  percent), an even wider -point gender gap persists ( percent of women versus  percent of men). This substantial gender

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difference persists in Morocco (+ points for women), Iraq (+ points), and Algeria (+ points). One explanation for these gendered differences in the overall degree of and reason for concern is that COVID has increased pressure on home responsibilities, including caring for members of the family who become ill—a task often left to women—or managing the fallout of those taken by the virus. Notably, COVID has also increased stressors on other aspects of life, including employment and health. Though not explicitly selected as the reasons that explain why women are most concerned about the spread of the virus, data evidencing the pandemic’s outsized effects on women in these two areas provide a further rationale for why women are more concerned than men. More specifically, three trends (increased care work, limited access to health services, and increased risks of GBV at home) exemplify how the pandemic affected women disproportionately in MENA countries. Problems in Paid and Unpaid Work

The pandemic relegated activities that formerly took place in public to private homes. This shift has affected women’s lives both outside and inside the home. The professional careers of women, who already participated in the labor force at much lower rates than men in MENA, were impacted more than those of men. Women also had to shoulder an increased range of caretaking responsibilities at home—such as children’s education and caring for the sick when healthcare systems are overwhelmed—as lockdowns and closures forced other household members to stay home. Arab Barometer’s sixth wave in March and April of  reveals the extent of gender disparities in workforce participation and the extent to which the pandemic exacerbated this disparity. Staggeringly high rates of citizens reported that their employment status was not affected by COVID- because they did not previously work. Tunisia ( percent) and Jordan ( percent) bookended the spectrum of shares of citizens who fit into this category: Lebanon ( percent), Iraq ( percent), Libya ( percent), and Morocco (  percent). These shares in each country include those who are unemployed, retired, of working age but not in the labor force, and not of working age. Across all countries, women are much more likely than men to be in this category: the gender gap is as wide as  points in Libya ( percent of women versus  percent of men) and  points in Jordan ( percent of women versus  percent of men), and only narrows to  and  percentage points in Morocco and Tunisia, respectively.

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Simultaneously, the small minorities of women employed before the pandemic are relatively less likely to have escaped the havoc it wreaked on the job market, particularly in one respect: having to work from home. With few exceptions, gender differences do not pervade pandemic-induced permanent job loss or temporary interruption across countries. Among those employed before the pandemic in Tunisia, where overall permanent job loss is at  percent,  percent of women compared to  percent of men permanently lost jobs. There is an -point gap ( percent of women versus   percent of men) among the   percent reporting temporary job interruptions in Algeria. Notably, in this category the trend among employed citizens is reversed in both Lebanon and Jordan: more men (+  percent Lebanon, + percent Jordan) than women report having suffered temporary interruptions. Across surveyed countries, the  percentages of citizens who were employed before the pandemic and reported having to work from home are in the single digits in Jordan, Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia. They constitute minority shares in Libya (  percent), Morocco (  percent), and Lebanon ( percent). In all but Algeria and Iraq, employed women are at least twice as likely as employed men to report that the spread of the coronavirus caused them to work from home. Differences surpass  points in Lebanon (+ points), Morocco (+ points), and Libya (+ points), and minor differences exist in Tunisia (+ points) and Jordan (+ points). The pandemic’s disproportionate effect on women does not stop at the monetized economy: its effects on the so-called care economy also have been pronounced. Just as employed women report having to work more from home, self-identified housewives report having to work more at home. Majorities of housewives in Jordan ( percent), Lebanon ( percent), and Libya ( percent) in March–April  said that the amount of housework they have had to do has increased since the beginning of the pandemic, while significant minorities in Tunisia ( percent) and Iraq ( percent) reported the same. Half of the women in Algeria and Morocco said that the amount of housework has stayed the same. This is likely because nearly half of all citizens in these two countries ( and  percent, respectively) reported not having a job before the pandemic, potentially making the homeward shift of activities during the pandemic less drastic. As schools closed and learning went remote, overseeing children’s education was an activity that added to work around the home. Most citizens in MENA point to the gravity of two challenges caused by the pandemic: the disruption of children’s education and the increased cost of living. Across the board, men are more likely to say the cost of living, whereas women are more

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likely to say the disruption in education. Women in Morocco and Jordan are  points more likely to say that children’s education was the biggest challenge caused by COVID-, with significant differences in Iraq (  points) and Tunisia ( points). Commensurately, Moroccan and Jordanian women are significantly more likely to suggest that the education system should be the government’s top spending priority in the coming fiscal year. As private homes became the epicenter of life during the pandemic, these findings suggest that employed and unemployed women alike in MENA have borne the brunt of the economic disruption. Reversion to the prepandemic status quo, where labor market participation already was unequal between men and women and nonmonetized work was shouldered mainly by women, is simultaneously neither the bar to set nor a goal guaranteed to be achieved. Women face both attitudinal and structural barriers to (re)entry into the workforce, although at least one finding is encouraging: although women are bound to housework, attitudes about the rights accompanying that responsibility have begun to shift slightly. COVID-Era Attitudinal and Structural Barriers to (Re)entry into the Workforce

The belief that “taking care of the home and children is a women’s primary responsibility” is held by at least half of citizens in all but one country surveyed in Arab Barometer’s sixth wave. Only in Lebanon do a minority of citizens ( percent) hold this view. Notably, in three countries where majorities hold this view—Jordan ( percent), Iraq ( percent), and Algeria ( percent)—there are no substantial gendered differences: similar majorities of both men and women share this view. One exception to this pattern is Libya: while  percent strongly agree or agree with the statement, there is a -point gap between men ( percent) and women ( percent). This finding emerges against a backdrop in which the newly formed UN-sponsored transitional government included for the first time five female cabinet members ( percent of the positions). Despite falling short of the  percent quota promised, this is nonetheless recordshattering (Poletti ). Libya aside, one potential legacy of the COVID-era shift to the home is that the more women stay home, the more this view that they “belong there” becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Heightening this attitudinal barrier are the accompanying structural barriers, which are recognized by the public in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Except for Lebanon ( percent), large shares of citizens—from   percent in Iraq to   percent in Tunisia and

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Algeria—across the remaining surveyed countries acknowledge that lack of transportation keeps women from entering the job market. Majorities— ranging from  percent in Lebanon to  percent in Morocco—also agree that low wages pose a barrier. But citizens coalesce most forcefully in their agreement that the lack of childcare options poses a barrier to a great or medium extent. This belief is held by as many as  percent of citizens in Jordan;  percent each in Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq;  percent in Algeria;  percent in Lebanon; and  percent in Libya. Notably, direct policy interventions could easily take down such structural barriers. Perhaps the most significant barrier to women’s entry into the labor force does not fall neatly into an attitudinal or a structural barrier but in some ways epitomizes both: the view that men are given priority for employment. Arab publics differ on the extent to which this phenomenon presents a challenge to women, with the share of those who agree much closer to the  percent mark, which stands in contrast to the overwhelming majorities agreeing on the structural barriers discussed above. Algeria, where  percent of citizens agree that the preference given to men in employment keeps women out, represents the median country. Just under half of citizens in Libya ( percent), Morocco ( percent), and Lebanon ( percent) view men’s preferential access to jobs as a barrier, and over half of the citizens in Iraq ( percent), Tunisia ( percent), and Jordan ( percent) agree. Notably, men and women are about equally likely to hold this view in all countries surveyed. Additionally, there are few differences by other demographic factors, suggesting that this perception is prevalent throughout society. The job preference given to men forces women to stay home, which could reinforce traditional gender roles. Arab Barometer results suggest, however, that perceptions of women’s roles within the household may have changed somewhat over the course of the pandemic. Arab Barometer asked citizens in both July–October of  and March–April of  if they agreed that “a man should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.” Except for Jordan, the share of citizens who agreed with this statement decreased over time in all countries surveyed in both years: the share plummeted most drastically by  points in Libya ( percent in  to  percent in ); by  points in Tunisia ( to  percent) and Morocco ( to  percent); by  points in Algeria ( to  percent); and by  points in Lebanon ( to  percent). Not only did shares drop, but by April  less than half of citizens in each of the six surveyed countries agreed with the statement, whereas majorities in three of the six (Algeria, Libya, and Morocco) had agreed with it less than a year earlier in . Furthermore, gender gaps in views on family decision-making rights have narrowed and in some cases no longer exist. In Algeria (+ points)

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and Morocco (+ points) women were initially more likely to agree with the statement than men, but in  the gender gap fell to under  percent in each country. Similarly, a -point gender gap narrowed to  points in Tunisia; and a -point difference narrowed to  in Lebanon, with shares of both men and women being less likely to agree that family-related decisions lay squarely with men. Only in Libya did this trend not hold. While a step in the right direction, the recognition of women’s right to an equal say in household decision-making is necessary but not sufficient to overcome the aforementioned structural barriers to increasing the opportunities for women to work outside the house. If employment is foundational for economic independence, it is also directly correlated with the attainment of other rights. COVID-’s challenge to women’s material well-being has reverberations in other vital areas—one of which is health. Increasing Rates of GBV

The pandemic created a health crisis within a health crisis around the world that is specific to women: the alarming increase in gender-based violence (GBV). Where aid organizations and healthcare professionals have issued reports and warnings about gender-based violence on the rise, Arab Barometer’s public opinion surveys in  confirm that this perception is held broadly across MENA societies. Despite being less accepted in Lebanon (  percent), Libya (  percent), and Jordan (  percent), significant minorities in Algeria and Morocco ( percent each) and an outright majority in Tunisia ( percent) believe that abuse or violence against women in their countries has increased since the beginning of the pandemic. Women are more likely than their male counterparts to report this increase in Tunisia (+ points), Morocco (+ points), and Algeria (+ points). The increased prevalence of GBV will not necessarily subside once the pandemic has passed. While pandemic-related restrictions on movement will loosen, thereby mitigating forced contact between abusers and the women they abuse, lack of financial independence has always been one of the risk factors keeping women trapped in situations that endanger their health. This risk factor will remain long after the pandemic has passed as long as structural and attitudinal barriers to women entering the workforce persist. Furthermore, if economies are slow to recover, unemployment will supplant lockdowns as the factor keeping abusers in increased contact with the women they abuse. The proportion of women in the at-risk category of GBV could potentially grow if economies are slow to resume because both men and women will continue to face joblessness, albeit for potentially different reasons.

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The COVID pandemic and the GBV “shadow pandemic” have accompanied other threats to women’s health, particularly their mental health. Across MENA, less than   percent said that physical arguments have increased between family members. However, between one-fifth and onethird of citizens in Morocco (  percent), Algeria (  percent), Libya ( percent), Tunisia ( percent), and Jordan ( percent) suggest that verbal arguments between family members have increased. While the surveys show that the biggest challenge posed by COVID is its adverse effect on their psycho-emotional state (nafsiyah)—as low as  percent in Tunisia to  percent in Jordan and a more sizable  percent in Morocco—women are  points more likely than men to say so. The pandemic’s challenges to citizens’ physical and mental health have affected the public’s assessments of the healthcare systems. Citizens’ satisfaction with healthcare systems fell drastically between October  and March–April : by  points in Algeria ( percent in  versus  percent in ) and  points in Jordan ( percent in  versus  percent in ), with a less sizable but significant dip in Morocco ( percent in  versus  percent in ). Despite rising  percentage points in Lebanon, just  percent were satisfied with the healthcare system in April  and just  percent in Libya. Hence citizens are calling on their governments to prioritize healthcare spending. Only in Jordan do citizens rank healthcare ( percent) second to education ( percent) as what they believe the government’s top spending priority should be. In Lebanon   percent say that healthcare should be the government’s number one priority, followed by   percent in Morocco,  percent in Tunisia,  percent in Algeria, and  percent in Libya. Women are significantly more likely than men to say that they want increased spending on health in these last three countries, with gaps as wide as  points in Libya ( percent of women versus  percent of men),  points in Tunisia ( percent of women versus  percent of men), and  points in Algeria ( percent of women versus  percent of men). GBV and mental health are formally recognized as health matters by international health organizations, yet they are often relegated to the margins of what is popularly understood to fall under the umbrella of “healthcare” in many MENA countries. The coronavirus itself has heightened citizens’ awareness of the need to address shortcomings in healthcare systems across the region. Given this intense desire to strengthen healthcare systems overall, this might also be an opportune moment for governments to expand healthcare—both infrastructurally and in awareness campaigns—to include both GBV and mental health.

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Conclusion COVID has represented a significant challenge for all of MENA and in particular for women living in the region. By most measures, women are more concerned about COVID and have also experienced greater relative effects in both monetized and nonmonetized labor. Ousters from the workforce may set back small but meaningful recent gains in women’s employment and negatively impact views of their ability to participate in it. As economic conditions recover, women might return to the workforce, but gender-sensitive approaches to remove structural barriers are needed to deconstruct attitudinal barriers and position women to regain pre-pandemic advances. Important changes under way may benefit women in the longer term, particularly with respect to nonmonetized work. Before the pandemic, most citizens believed that women should have equal rights but were less convinced that they should play the same roles. Small but discernible shifts in views of women playing equal roles to men in household decision-making, for example, have occurred during the pandemic, thereby offering some hope for women’s equality. Nevertheless, the challenges will be long-lasting in other areas. Evidence suggests that violence against women has increased, with significant effects on women’s mental conditions. These challenges will prove challenging to tackle and require significant investment in healthcare and care for women who have suffered from violence. Governments and the international community should focus strongly on these areas in helping women to recover from the COVID pandemic in MENA.

Note Full details about the surveys and the methodology are available at www.arabbarometer.org.

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www.planusa.org/report/a-snapshot-of-the-impacts-of-covid--on-women-and -girls-rights-and-sexual-and-reproductive-health. Assouad, Lydia. . “Inequality and Its Discontents in the Middle East.” Carnegie Middle East Center (March ). https://carnegie-mec.org////inequality -and-its-discontents-in-middle-east-pub-. Azcona, Ginette, Antra Bhatt, and Kaitlin Love. . “The COVID- Pandemic Has Increased the Care Burden, But by How Much?” UN Women (December ). https:// data.unwomen.org/features/covid--pandemic-has-increased-care-burden-how -much-. Azevedo, Joao Pedro, Amer Hasan, Diana Goldemberg, Syedah Aroob Iqbal, and Koen Geven. . “Simulating the Potential Impacts of COVID- School Closures on Schooling and Learning Outcomes: A Set of Global Estimates.” World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle//. Chebaro, Abir. . “The Gendered Dimension of COVID- in Lebanon.” Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (May ). https://www .aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/policy_briefs/-/_gender _dimension_of_covid_.pdf. Danon, Zoe, and Sarah R. Collins. . “Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress.” Women in the Middle East and North Africa (December ). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R.pdf. Dasgupta, Aisha, Vladimíra Kantorová, and Philipp Ueffing. . “The Impact of the COVID- Crisis on Meeting Needs for Family Planning: A Global Scenario by Contraceptive Methods Used.” Gates Open Research  (November ). https://doi .org/./gatesopenres... Davies, Sara E., and Belinda Bennett. . “A Gendered Human Rights Analysis of Ebola and Zika: Locating Gender in Global Health Emergencies.” International Affairs (): –. https://doi.org/./-.. Erskine, Dorcas. . “Not Just Hotlines and Mobile Phones: GBV Service Provision during COVID-.” UNICEF (May ). https://www.unicef.org/media//file /GBV%Service%Provision%During%COVID-.pdf. Goyal, Manu, Pratibha Singh, Kuldeep Singh, Shashank Shekhar, Neha Agrawal, and Sanjeev Misra. . “The Effect of the COVID- Pandemic on Maternal Health Due to Delay in Seeking Health Care: Experience from a Tertiary Center.” International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics (): –. https://doi.org/. /ijgo.. Korkoyah, Dala T., and Francis F. Wreh.  “Ebola Impact Revealed An Assessment of the Differing Impact of the Outbreak on Women and Men in Liberia.” Oxfam (July). https://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/human-rights-documents -online/ ebola -impact -revealed -an -assessment -of -the -differing -impact -of -the -outbreak-on-women-and-men-in-liberia;hrdhrd. Kotlar, Bethany, Emily Gerson, Sophia Petrillo, Ana Langer, and Henning Tiemeier. . “The Impact of the COVID- Pandemic on Maternal and Perinatal Health: A Scoping Review.” Reproductive Health (January ). https://doi.org/. /s---. Lavietes, Matthew. . “COVID- Could Wipe Out Gains in Equality for Women at Work.” World Economic Forum (June ). https://www.weforum.org/agenda/ //u-n-warns-covid--could-wipe-out-gains-in-equality-for-women-at-work.

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Levine, Madison, Niccolo Meriggi, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, and Maarten Voors. . “How COVID- Is Making Gender Inequality Worse in Low-Income Countries—and What to Do about It.” Yale Insights (March ). https://insights.som.yale .edu/insights/how-covid--is-making-gender-inequality-worse-in-low-income -countries-and-what-to-do. Lungumbu, Sandrine, and Amelia Butterly. . “Coronavirus and Gender: More Chores for Women Set Back Gains in Equality.” BBC News (November ). https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-. Madgavkar, Anu, Olivia White, Mekala Krishnan, Deepa Mahajan, and Xavier Azcue. . “COVID- and Gender Equality: Countering the Regressive Effects.” McKinsey Global Institute (July ). https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights /future-of-work/covid--and-gender-equality-countering-the-regressive-effects. Mittal, Shalini, and Tushar Singh. . “Gender-Based Violence during COVID- Pandemic: A Mini-Review.” Frontiers in Global Women’s Health (September ). https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/./fgwh../full. Moreira da Silva, Jorge. . “Why You Should Care about Unpaid Care Work.” Development Matters blog (March ). https://oecd-development-matters.org/ ///why-you-should-care-about-unpaid-care-work. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). . “COVID- Crisis in the MENA Region: Impact on Gender Equality and Policy Responses” (June ). https://doi.org/./eecdf-en. Oxfam. . “Gender Analysis of the COVID- Pandemic in Iraq” (June). https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-gender-analysis-covid--iraq --en.pdf. Poletti, Arianna. . “Libya: Who Are the Five Influential Women Ministers in the New Government?” Africa Report (March ). https://www.theafricareport.com/ /libya-who-are-the-five-influential-women-ministers-in-the-new-government. Power, Kate. . “The COVID- Pandemic Has Increased the Care Burden of Women and Families.” Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy () (December ): –. https://doi.org/./... Riley, Taylor, Elizabeth Sully, Zara Ahmed, and Ann Biddlecom. . “Estimates of the Potential Impact of the COVID- Pandemic on Sexual and Reproductive Health In Low- and Middle-Income Countries.” International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health  (April): –. https://doi.org/./e. Smith, Julia. . “Overcoming the ‘Tyranny of the Urgent’: Integrating Gender into Disease Outbreak Preparedness and Response.” Gender & Development () (May ): –. https://doi.org/./... UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). . “COVID-: A Threat to Progress against Child Marriage” (March ). https://data.unicef.org/resources/covid--a -threat-to-progress-against-child-marriage. UN Women. . “Whose Time To Care? Unpaid Care and Domestic Work during COVID-” (November ). https://data.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/inline -files/Whose-time-to-care-brief_.pdf. Vaeza, Maria-Noel. . “Addressing the Impact of the COVID- Pandemic on Violence against Women and Girls.” UN Women, United Nations (November ). https://www.un.org/en/addressing-impact-covid--pandemic-violence-against -women-and-girls.

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Williams, Timothy P., and Kirsten Pontalti. . “Child Protection Learning Brief #.” UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/media//file/Gender-Based-Violence-in -Emergencies-CP-Learning-Brief-Aug-.pdf. Zarrilli, Simonetta, and Henri Luomaranta. . “Gender and Unemployment: Lessons from the COVID- Pandemic.” UNCTAD (April ). https://unctad.org /news/gender-and-unemployment-lessons-covid--pandemic. Zarrug, Eiman. . “Life under Lockdown: Part .” Exposure (March ). https:// oxfaminjordan.exposure.co/life-under-lockdown-part-i.

CHAPTER 11

Unmasking Masculinity during COVID in the Middle East and North Africa M E R I S S A K H U R MA , YO U S S E F C H O U H O U D , A N D R I TA S T E P H A N

“Real men don’t wear masks,” reported Independent Magazine (Petter ). Several news outlets documented that—despite having higher death rates from contracting COVID-—men were less likely to wear masks out of pride, confidence, prejudice, and, most importantly, masculinity (Duarte ). In this chapter we explore how masculinity influenced men and women’s attitudes toward wearing masks, as a form of prevention and protection in response to the COVID- pandemic. Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) men are stereotyped as strongly expressing masculinity. We were curious to know whether Arab men were more likely than Arab women to be opposed to wearing a mask. Further, we wanted to know whether masculinity and mask-wearing vary by education levels, national origin, or age. We view this study as groundbreaking in several ways. First, it is the first study to attempt to quantitatively measure masculinity using indices developed for respondents in the United States, as discussed later. Second, it examines masculinity across gender, regardless of the assigned sex. Third, it explores the efficacy of online and social media platforms in delivering an analysis of attitudes in MENA. As gendered subjects, Arab men are often portrayed as “violent and misogynistic,” overemphasizing their masculinity and sexualized power. Recent findings have analyzed masculinity in MENA as being constituted at the intersection of local, national, and global understandings of modernity and modern subjectivity (Jacob ). Others have painted a nuanced picture of emergent masculinities that intersect education, technology, globalization, and modern social structures (Inhorn ). We set out to first define masculinity in MENA as discussed in the literature on gender identity in the region and hence lay out the current research

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on how masculinity played out during the COVID- pandemic. Zooming in on the MENA region, we discuss men, masks, and COVID- as reported in the regional media and present our online survey of masculinity and the novel coronavirus. While our data and findings have some limitations, they offer a window into where men and women in the region stand on masculinity and how these views affect their attitudes toward mask-wearing. Finally, our lessons learned from the online survey and the literature review on masculinity in MENA inform our policy recommendations to governments and health-focused research institutes in the region.

Defining Masculinity in MENA Gender studies in MENA have primarily focused on women and their historic and evolving roles in private and public spheres. While this body of literature has included men’s presence (Sinclair-Webb and Ghoussoub , ) and the power they yield in these two spheres, men’s “gendered identifications were rarely investigated” directly (Ghannam ). To date, masculinity studies in MENA remain a relatively new yet growing field that seeks to understand better the “interplay” of a myriad of local and regional social, cultural, religious, economic, and political forces and systems in which masculinity is produced, amplified, or shifting (Ghannam ). As this body of work expands further to illuminate the nuances of masculinity in MENA societies, it is worth noting that our definition of masculinity in MENA in this chapter is in line with widely recognized traits comparable to Western literature’s definition of masculinity. These traits include and are not limited to “toughness,” “engaging in risky behavior,” “being protective” of weak family members (mainly female), and independence/self-reliance. These traits are not defined or discussed in negative or positive terms but rather are regarded as characteristics of masculinity in the regional context as portrayed in the media, TV, and film or as communicated and understood in the sociocultural discourse. As Hasso () posits, masculinities are “achieved in context and often have to be proven through behavior” and are “structured by social institutions and cultural discourse.” The masculinity traits already mentioned are captured by Mahadeen (, ) in her semantic analysis of masculinity in the Arabic language. She argues that in contrast to the Arabic words rujula (manliness) and dhukura (maleness), the word marjala (masculinization) offers the best interpretation of masculinity in the Arab region. Marjala “incorporates bodily, affective, socially constituted, symbolic, and performative dimensions of

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masculinity” that also include the positive aspects of hegemonic masculinity such as “bravery, protection of the weak, and generosity” (Mahadeen , ). In this case, protection of the weak includes not only women, although they are generally regarded as the weaker and more fragile sex. Highlighting these aspects of masculinity is crucial to understanding its complexity in the MENA region, particularly because scholarly research and media reporting on the topic have often reinforced the notion that Middle Eastern men are aggressive and prone to violence, due to notions of toughness or risky behavior associated with hegemonic masculinity. As Amar () writes, such portrayals give carte blanche to political and economic systems and institutions to use repressive policies to address the unruly male (Amar , ). Further, as noted in the UN Women’s study on men (UN Women ), these widely embraced masculinity traits or masculinities in MENA produce additional social pressure on men in the region, as the vast majority of them strive to realize the provider model of manhood, amid deplorable economic conditions and astronomically high unemployment rates. Varied manifestations of masculinity in MENA society are not confined to men. Women in the region often view their roles and those of men through the prism of Mahadeen’s marjala. According to UN Women (), a majority of men interviewed in Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and Palestine “support mostly inequitable views when it comes to women’s roles” such as caring for the household, a notion that about half of or more women across the four countries also support. This finding further reinforces the “provider” or “protector” role that stems from the conventional understanding of masculinity in the region that both men and women share. Addressing masculinity in MENA is vital to avoid casting it as the sole “source of evil,” particularly regarding the myriad gender-based challenges the region faces, including inequality in the workplace and gender-based domestic violence. However, these traits (toughness, engaging in risky behavior, and self-reliance) remain at the core of Middle Eastern masculinity or marjala. In this chapter we focus on marjala to understand the difference between men and women’s attitudes and behaviors toward mask-wearing during the COVID- pandemic.

Masculinity and COVID-19 Various studies, primarily in the United States and Europe, have examined men’s general health practices and how those played out specifically during

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this global pandemic. In July  the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published a study (Griffith et al. ) highlighting the need to understand better why (according to local, national, and global sexdisaggregated data) “more men than women have died of COVID- in  of  countries,” thereby “shining a spotlight on the neglect of men’s health.” While the study acknowledges biological factors in understanding these data (from differences in immune systems to hormonal and genetic ones), it argues that “psychological, social, and behavioral components” are critical in analyzing and tracking “COVID- progression” (Griffith et al. ). This finding suggests that masculinity, a social and behavioral attribute, can predict the likelihood of contracting COVID-. Palmer and Peterson () coin the term “Toxic Mask-ulinity” to describe the correlation between men’s health and undertaking risky behaviors. Referencing masculine traits defined above, such as toughness and self-reliance and thus not asking for help, their essay echoes other studies’ findings that men enact these traits. They downplay the severity of the disease, delay seeking help if symptoms appear, and neglect to follow guidelines and policies by health officials on protection and prevention, including social distancing, mask-wearing, and/or handwashing (Palmer and Peterson , ). Griffith et al. () point to polls in the “first wave” of the pandemic, illustrating, for example, that “fewer men than women have reported that they have been avoiding large public gatherings or avoiding close physical contact with others.” Thus, by adopting masculine behaviors such as taking risks and masking their weaknesses, men increase their exposure to COVID-. Several US-based surveys show the correlations of masculinity, masculine norms, and mask-wearing. “Sexism, [as] a component of masculine belief systems, predicts lower levels of concern about the coronavirus, lower levels of engagement in precautionary behaviors, lower levels of support for state and local pandemic policies, and ultimately higher levels of COVID- sickness” (Reny , ). Likewise, Palmer and Peterson (, ) find that identifying with masculinity traits “has a significant influence on affective responses toward mask wearing.” The survey findings expressly note that “masculine toughness is consistently related to higher negative feelings and lower positive feelings about mask wearing.” In their analysis of gender differences in intentions to wear a “face covering” or a mask, Capraro and Barcelo () found that men were less likely than women to want to wear a face-covering when given the option. Men also were likely to believe that they would be seriously affected by the coronavirus but more likely to feel shame, weakness, and stigma for wearing a mask (Capraro and Barcelo ). However, Howard () notes that the correlation between gender

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and mask-wearing was not statistically significant. Furthermore, men perceived the mask as infringing on their independence, whereas women perceived it as uncomfortable (Howard ). Likewise, Ruxton and Burrell () reinforce the links between risky health behavior and masculinity but also shed light on how “masculinist perspectives” had an impact on government responses to the pandemic, “encouraging dismissiveness based on notions of being ‘too tough’ to need to worry about it and the use of warlike rhetoric in framing [it].” These studies underline the importance of considering psychological and sociocultural factors in understanding gender differences in health practices, particularly as the global community continues to grapple with the effects of the COVID- pandemic. In the absence of equitable access to vaccinations, it is clear that mask-wearing, social distancing, and other health practices were essential to protecting oneself and limiting the spread of the virus, thereby reinforcing the need for more sex-desegregated data in this regard. This research has informed our online survey on gender and COVID- in the MENA region, and allowed us to explore the impact, if any, of masculinity on mask-wearing.

Masks, Men, and COVID-19 With a few Middle East–focused studies or surveys on the topic of men, masculinity, and the novel virus, some regional media outlets reported on gender differences in health behaviors, given emerging data on higher fatality rates among men worldwide. Other news outlets sought to examine this link locally through an investigative lens. UK-based Sara Kayat () asks whether COVID- is a “sexist” disease, as she delves into various health studies that look at men’s risky behavior concerning their health. Akin to other reports in Western media, she explains that this behavior is due to a “perceived ‘femininity’ of health concerns” and viewing risk-taking as a “masculine trait” enacted by most men. A UAE-focused news report noted how the “name-and-shame gallery published by the UAE government” reveals that “most violators” of maskwearing “are men with only a handful of women shown to be in the wrong,” even as the fine for failing to wear a mask in public is , Dh (dirhams), the equivalent of $. The article asks, “Why do men want to flout the norm?” (Chaudhary ). It attempts to answer this question, noting that the mask may be “interpreted in the ‘toxic masculinity’ context as an emasculating symbol,” making men in the UAE “appear less macho” (Chaudhary ).

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While this news article notes that a quick reading of the names of those fined showcases this gendered outcome in mask-wearing, it does not seem that the data on fines, whether regarding mask-wearing or other COVID- protective policies, are sex-disaggregated or presented as such. As mentioned earlier, other articles conducted research online, lacking the local investigative reporting angle on the link between gender and COVID- in the region. Instead, they were limited to reporting on studies conducted in the United States and/or Europe, akin to the two discussed earlier (Egyptian Today ). The paucity of information or lack of studies on these correlations is a data point in itself. The absence of this topic in the public discourse in the region, which “is still regarded as one of the seats of patriarchy” (Sinclair-Webb and Ghoussoub ), is worth analyzing. That is why we set out to examine these attitudes in the MENA region through an online survey.

Methodology Given the constraints of the spread of COVID-, the difficulty of traveling to the Middle East to conduct research, and the rising efficacy of online research, we relied on administering the masculinity and gender survey using Google Forms and disseminating the link on various social media platforms to our professional and personal networks. Online surveys permit researchers to efficiently collect large amounts of data within relatively short time frames from hard-to-reach populations. They are also convenient, giving respondents the ability to answer at their leisure, and allow for a diverse set of questions without the need for advanced technology. We paid particular attention to the design and implementation of the survey to ensure that the wording of all questions was clear in Arabic, and that they were precise and asked consistently of all respondents. Of course, we also paid close attention to ethical concerns that could have arisen (Regmi et al. ). Using our Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn profiles, the survey was open for two weeks between February  and , . We also used targeted solicitation by reaching influencers from our networks in countries like Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. We ensured that we have some representation from each country. Respondents who identify as Palestinians were captured regardless of whether they lived in the West Bank, Gaza, Israel, or the diaspora. Our network consists primarily of professional circles such as personal contacts from the Wilson Center, Middle East Partnership Initiative, Association of Middle Eastern Women Studies, and other similar

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professional networks. Therefore the data collected are skewed heavily toward college-educated respondents and those pursuing professional careers. While the survey showed some striking results, we also learned anecdotally from those who did not take the survey. Male colleagues and friends who contacted us directly explaining their reasons for not taking or distributing the survey had issues with the concept of gender and the accuracy of science. Issues with gender as a concept reflected inclusivity beyond the comfort level of some, as explained by a colleague to us in a message: “Happy to, but would you consider editing the title? Al Nawe Al Ijtimaii [gender], it sounds like alternative phrasing for LGBTQ. And you don’t need to mention that detail in the title. Can just be a survey about COVID?” (Facebook message, February , ). A more striking response came from a dental hygienist in Lebanon who declined to take the survey or share it: Sorry for not contributing, to tell you the truth I’m fed up with all what is related to corona bullshit, this amplification of this so-called pandemic is making me crazy, I am not willing to help spreading this crazy amplified terror by sharing statistics on a disease living with us since ever, damn Bill Gates and the WHO and all suspicious vaccines they are trying to promote! Once the CEO of Pfizer takes it and stops giving stupid arguments why he’s not vaccinated . . . I’ll reconsider . . . they are leading the world to an evil new concept by amplifying their PCR cycle tests and promoting for some .% rate of mortality, far below than any normal pneumonia ratio, take care, dear.

We are also cognizant of this study’s limitations. First, the data collected are not generalizable because the study relied on convenience sampling rather than a representative random sample. Second, the masculinity index was not statistically significant and we limited the number of questions to fifteen to increase the response rate, which touched some topics only on the surface. Third, respondents specifically reported their marital status and sex in the same question, as shown below. This questionnaire omitted sexual orientation and sexuality, assuming that respondents would identify with heterosexual gender roles of single, married, or other. Though a limitation in the study as discussed, this approach allowed us to explore whether marital status impacted men and women’s attitudes toward masculinity and maskwearing. Finally, we had some questions about the directions of responses but could not follow up with respondents, as we did not ask for identifying information. The final tally registered  total respondents:  men and  women.

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The majority of respondents lived in MENA;  percent reported living in the United States, Canada, or Europe. We purged those from the analysis and opted to focus on MENA residents. The largest pool of respondents was from Tunisia (  percent), followed by Jordan (  percent) and Morocco (  percent). About   percent reported originating from Palestine, and  percent reporting living there. Although we did not design the survey to be representative of the MENA region’s opinion as a whole, education is particularly skewed and deserves comment. Among our sample,   percent of respondents have terminal bachelor’s degrees, while an additional  percent have at least a master’s degree. A sample with  percent college graduates would dramatically overshoot the population mean of just about any meaningful geographic area. However, this proportion is all the more exceptional, as mentioned above, especially for a region that falls below the world average of gross enrollment in tertiary education at about  percent.

Masculinity Index Guided by Caparo and Barcelo’s () and Howard’s () surveys, we constructed an index to capture the extent to which respondents held masculine views of a man’s role in society or the household. The following statements were used to build the index: . When the going gets tough, men should get tough. . I think a young man should try to be physically tough, even if he’s not big. . Men should get up to investigate if there is a strange noise in the house at night. . It is important for a man to take risks, even if he might get hurt. . A man must be able to make his own way in the world.

For all but the last statement, men were significantly more likely than women to hold masculine viewpoints in our survey. Additionally, women were significantly more likely to disagree with all statements, and the proportion of men agreeing with all statements was more than double that of women. This general trend is reflected in the overall Masculinity Index (alpha = .) too, with men registering  percentage points higher than women, on average. For ease of interpretation, the indices and individual variables in the following analyses are all rescaled from  to . Figure . demonstrates this gender divide in perceptions of masculinity, even when controlling for marital status, age, education, and region of

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Figure 11.1. Masculinity Index—demographic determinants [Min = 0; Max = 1] (ordinary least squares, 95% confidence interval). Source: Khurma, Stephan, and Chouhoud 2022.

origin. While these findings are expected, we are able to verify that this Masculinity Index is valid when applied to the Middle Eastern population. Further studies should consider testing its applicability. Masculinity and the Mask

Turning to COVID--related beliefs and behaviors, we first explored antimask attitudes by asking whether respondents agreed with each of the following items: . . . .

Wearing a mask is not always needed in public. Wearing a mask is shameful. Wearing a mask is a sign of weakness. Pressure to wear a mask can be exaggerated.

Subsequent factor analysis revealed two discrete dispositions. Items  and  constitute what we dub “Soft Anti-Mask” attitudes, while we coded items  and  as “Hard Anti-Mask” attitudes. Essentially, Soft Anti-Maskers did

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not feel that wearing the mask in public is always needed. They also felt that there is excessive pressure to wear the mask by some people who are overcautious. Alternatively, Hard Anti-Maskers associated feelings of shame and weakness with wearing the mask. Given that these sentiments may be driven by people’s understanding of COVID- more generally, we also asked respondents to rate their knowledge of how to prevent the spread of the novel virus and, separately, their perceived risk of catching COVID- (both on a scale from  to ). As with the Masculinity Index, a clear divide exists between men and women. For each item, women were significantly less likely than men to express an Anti-Mask attitude. This divergence is more pronounced when considered dichotomously, and tallying the proportion of the sample expressing any Soft or, separately, any Hard Anti-Mask sentiment. Across both these metrics, the ratio of men to women is more than :. Next we explored whether the Masculinity Index had any influence on attitudes toward wearing a mask to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus. We wanted to compare our findings to those who found that a sex-based divide exists in mask-wearing. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Palmer and Peterson () argue that men were more likely to resist wearing masks, finding that identification with masculinity norms has a significant influence on affective responses toward mask-wearing. This finding was confirmed in non-Western settings as well. A quota sample of , adults in Hong Kong in , for example, found that male adults had a lower frequency of using face masks during the pandemic, even when taking care of sick members of the family (Lee et al. ). Figure . plots the predicted probability of holding any Soft/Hard AntiMask attitudes as a function of separate attitudes and beliefs as well as demographics. While women are more than  percent less likely to hold Soft Anti-Mask attitudes compared to men, masculinity does not appear to factor into this divide in the least. Curiously, in terms of Soft Anti-Mask attitudes, knowledge of how COVID- spreads and the perceived level of personal risk of catching the disease pull respondents in opposing directions. Going from the lowest to the highest level of self-reported knowledge reduces the likelihood that respondents express Soft Anti-Mask attitudes by  percent. Likewise, moving from the lowest to the highest estimate of perceived personal risk of catching the novel virus,  percent were more likely to believe that they did not always need masks in public and/or that the pressure to wear masks was exaggerated. Hence, perceived knowledge of the virus and perceived risks of catching the virus were both directly related to Soft Anti-Mask attitudes. Interestingly, respondents in the Levant were less likely than respondents

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Figure 11.2. Predicted probability of holding Soft and Hard Anti-Mask attitudes (95%

confidence interval). Source: Khurma, Stephan, and Chouhoud (2022).

in North Africa to hold these attitudes. Unfortunately, the limitation of this study did not allow us to follow up with respondents to learn the reasons for this divergence. The drivers of Hard Anti-Mask attitudes were less evident than with the Soft variety. Turning again to the predicted probability of holding such sentiments in figure ., gender is the only predictor worth highlighting. The multivariate analysis reinforces the summary means comparisons for the individual items above, with women remaining significantly less likely than men to express Hard Anti-Mask attitudes, even when controlling for potentially relevant factors. The general blunting of these other factors in this model is likely due to less variation in the dependent variable. In other words, while   percent of the sample expressed at least one Soft AntiMask attitude, that tally fell to  percent when it came to Hard Anti-Mask sentiments. Masculinity and Risk

Of course, what matters during a pandemic is not simply people’s beliefs per se but rather their enacting of those beliefs in behavior. To that end, we

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Figure 11.3. Predicted probability of consistently safe interactions (95% confidence

interval). Source: Khurma, Stephan, and Chouhoud (2022).

also gauged whether respondents practiced risky behavior when interacting with others. Specifically, we asked whether they avoided the following scenarios: . Hug a friend I see in the street. . Kiss a friend I see in the street. . Shake the hands of people I know.

Across the whole sample,   percent of respondents were consistently safe in their interactions (they avoided each of the risky behaviors listed above). Figure . models the predicted probability of falling into this category. The plot once again evidences a gender divide, with women about   percent more likely to consistently err on the side of caution in their interactions. Another demographic divergence also stands out. All age groups are significantly more likely than those eighteen to twenty-five years old to avoid risky behaviors (cohorts between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-nine are  percent more likely, those between forty and fifty-nine are  percent more likely, and those who are sixty and older are almost  percent more likely).

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Percentage (Consistent State Interactions)

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Masculinity Index

Figure 11.4. Marginal effect of MI on consistent safe interactions, men versus women.

Source: Khurma, Stephan, and Chouhoud (2022).

Perhaps the most notable finding in figure . is the statistically and substantively significant impact of the Masculinity Index. Those who are highest on the scale are  percent less likely to safely interact with others compared to those at the lowest end of the scale. More significantly, the impact of the Masculinity Index is not uniform across the sample. Figure . compares the marginal effect of these views between men and women. This plot demonstrates that at lower levels of the Masculinity Index men and women are statistically indistinguishable in their likelihood to be consistently safe in their interactions. Men diverge from women only at higher levels of masculinity. Specifically, men lowest on the Masculinity Index are about  percent likely to avoid all risky behavior, whereas their counterparts at the highest level of the scale are only about  percent likely to do so. Women, however, are consistently around  percent likely to maintain safe interactions at all levels of the index.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations The masculinity and COVID- discussion is an essential and often missing link in the pandemic’s narrative on gender in the MENA region. It is

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the sparsity of the Middle Eastern masculinity literature and the limited data on gender differences in health behaviors during the pandemic in the region that propelled us to examine the masculinity link in the MENA region. While constrained by various limitations, our groundbreaking online survey that tackled COVID- and gender in the Middle East and North Africa provided important insights into the impact of masculinity on maskwearing. Akin to other surveys conducted in the United States and elsewhere, our data analysis reveals that women were significantly less likely than men to express an Anti-Mask attitude. In this chapter we have attempted to measure masculinity quantitatively, using indices developed for respondents in the United States. We found that men were twice as likely to score high on the masculinity index as women. In analyzing the impact of masculinity on safeguarding against COVID, we demonstrated that men and women with a lower Masculinity Index were statistically indistinguishable in their likelihood to be consistently safe in their interactions. Second, we sorted risky attitudes between Soft Anti-Masking and Hard Anti-Masking attitudes. We showed that Soft AntiMaskers did not feel that wearing the mask in public is always needed but thought that the pressure to wear a mask is exaggerated. Alternatively, Hard Anti-Maskers associated feelings of shame and weakness with wearing the mask. Finally, in an environment with limited mobility, this study verified that quantitative research is possible online and in a complete virtual setting, but not without limitations. Nonetheless, social media–based research is a field that could have endless possibilities. The paucity of research on the links of health behaviors during the COVID- pandemic, gender, and masculinity in the MENA region is a key driver behind this chapter and the online survey designed to explore any correlations. While this is a modest attempt to capture the whole picture in the region regarding the impact of masculine traits on protective and preventive behaviors related to the pandemic (mask-wearing, social distancing, and so forth), the findings and observations allow us to prescribe a few policy recommendations for various entities in the region to consider, especially as COVID- rates continue to rise, albeit in varying degrees, across the MENA region. First, in recording COVID- infection rates, fatality rates, and response to treatment, it is important to ensure that all data are sex desegregated and to make these data public and accessible to researchers. Studying the data may help governments and health officials present more informed health policies and regulations. Such data are instrumental in drafting health messages to local populations. As the aforementioned Gulf News report noted

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in the discussion of non-mask-wearing fines, “if men are told that the mask is an extension of their image of a provider and protector of their family,” two key masculine traits, they may likely be “more responsible and compliant” in regard to mask-wearing and other recommended behaviors to prevent or protect from COVID-. This brings us to the second policy recommendation: to customize health messages through the gender prism, as needed. While this seems farfetched in the absence of extensive data on masculinity traits and their impact on health behaviors in MENA, gendered messaging serves to shed light on an often-ignored yet simple approach. As strict lockdowns are imposed in some countries and noncompliance fines are proving insufficient to control the spread of the virus, a masculinity-focused policy might be worth considering. Third, gendered attitudes toward mask-wearing as a form of health behavior during this pandemic, as revealed by various US studies and our online survey, make critical the need to better understand health behaviors in the MENA region through a gender lens. Studies comparing men’s and women’s general health behaviors in the region are unfortunately scarce. Such information is vital in addressing illness and disease in a region that suffers from inadequate public health services. Investing in scientific studies that look at differences, if any, in men’s and women’s health behaviors is crucial for governments, the private health sector, or international healthfocused organizations to undertake in the Middle East and North Africa.

Note The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not represent the views of and should not be attributed to the US government, the United States Department of State, or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

References Amar, Paul. . “Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of ‘Men in Crisis,’ Industries of Gender in Revolution.” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies (): –. Capraro, Valerio, and Hélène Barcelo. . “The Effect of Messaging and Gender on Intentions to Wear a Face Covering to Slow Down COVID- Transmission.” PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/./osf.io/tgvz.

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Chaudhary, Suchitra Bajpai. . “COVID-: Why Do Men Not Like Wearing Face Masks?” Gulf News (September ). https://gulfnews.com/uae/health/covid--why -do-men-not-like-wearing-face-masks-.. Duarte, Fernando. . “Coronavirus Face Masks: Why Men Are Less Likely to Wear Masks.” BBC World Service (July ) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-. Egyptian Today. . “‘Incompatible with Masculinity’: Studies Reveal the Reasons for Men’s Reluctance to Wear Masks” (in Arabic, October ). https://www .almasryalyoum.com/news/details/. Ghannam, Farha. . “Essential Readings: Masculinity in the Middle East.” Jadaliyya (October ). https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/. Griffith, Derek M., Garima Sharma, Christopher S. Holliday, Okechuku K. Enyia, Matthew Valliere, Andrea R. Semlow, Elizabeth C. Stewart, and Roger Scott Blumenthal. . “Men and COVID-: A Biopsychosocial Approach to Understanding Sex Differences in Mortality and Recommendations for Practice and Policy Interventions.” Preventive Chronic Disease :. https://www.cdc.gov/pcd /issues//_.htm. Hasso, Frances S. . “Decolonizing Middle East Men and Masculinities Scholarship: An Axiomatic Approach.” Jadaliyya (October ). https://www.jadaliyya.com /Details//Decolonizing-Middle-East-Men-and-Masculinities-Scholarship -An-Axiomatic-Approach. Howard, Matt C. . “Gender, Face Mask Perceptions, and Face Mask Wearing: Are Men Being Dangerous during the COVID- Pandemic?” Personality and Individual Differences :. https://doi.org/./j.paid... Inhorn, Marcia. . The New Arab Man: Emergent Masculinities, Technologies, and Islam in the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jacob, Wilson Chacko. . Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, –. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kayat, Sara. . “Doctor’s Note: Why Are More Men Dying from Coronavirus?” Aljazeera (April ). https://www.aljazeera.com/features////doctors-note-why -are-more-men-dying-from-coronavirus. Khurma, Merissa, Rita Stephan, and Youssef Chouhoud. . “Attitudes towards Mask Wearing in MENA: The Impact of Gender and Education.” Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/attitudes-towards-mask-wearing-mena -impact-gender-and-education. Lee, Linda Yin-King, Evangeline Pui-wah Lam, Chiu-kiu Chan, Sum-yi Chan, Man-ki Chiu, Wing-hei Chong, Kin-wai Chu, Man-sze Hon, Lok-ki Kwan, Kit-lam Tsang, Siu-lai Tsoi, and Chung-wai Wu. . “Practice and Technique of Using Face Mask amongst Adults in the Community: A Cross-Sectional Descriptive Study.” BMC Public Health : . https://doi.org/./s---. Mahadeen, Ebtihal. . “Arabizing ‘Masculinity.’” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies (): –. https://doi.org/./-. Palmer, Carl, and Rolfe Peterson. . “Toxic Mask-ulinity: The Link between Masculine Toughness and Affective Reactions to Mask Wearing in the COVID- Era.” Politics & Gender : –. DOI../SX. https://www .cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/toxic-maskulinity-the -link -between -masculine -toughness -and -affective -reactions -to -mask -wearing -in-the-covid-era/DADCDDCFCE.

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Petter, Olivia. . “‘Real Men Don’t Wear Masks’: The Link between Masculinity and Face Coverings.” Independent (October ). https://www.independent.co .uk/life-style/face-masks-men-masculinity-coronavirus-lockdown-boris-johnson -b.html. Regmi, Pramod R., Elizabeth Waithaka, Anjana Paudyal, Padam Simkhada, and Edwin van Teijlingen. . “Guide to the Design and Application of Online Questionnaire Surveys.” Nepal Journal of Epidemiology (): –. https://doi.org /./nje.vi.. Reny, Tyler T. . “Masculine Norms and Infectious Disease: The Case of COVID-.” Politics & Gender (): –. doi:./SX. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/masculine -norms-and-infectious-disease-the-case-of-covid/DAEFFCCD ADBEE. Ruxton, Sandy, and Stephen Burrell. . “Masculinities and COVID-: Making the Connections.” Promundo. https://promundoglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/ //BLS_PRO_Masculinities_COVID_WEB_..pdf. Sinclair-Webb, Emma, and Mai Ghoussoub. . Imagined Masculinities: Male Identity and Culture in the Modern Middle East. London: Saqi Books. UN Women. . “Understanding Masculinity: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey—Middle East and North Africa (Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Palestine).” https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications ///understanding-masculinities-results-from-the-images-in-the-middle-east -and-north-africa.

PAR T IV

Feminist Responses

CHAPTER 12

COVID-19 and Feminism in the Middle East: Challenges, Initiatives, and Dilemmas NADJE AL-ALI

No one can predict the long-term implications and consequences of a pandemic that has so far led to the deaths of millions of people and debilitated those who got infected, some temporarily and some suffering long-term effects. Yet it is apparent that the pandemic has overstretched healthcare systems in many countries and devastated economies globally. Crucially, we already know that COVID- is accentuating and heightening preexisting inequalities, forms of exclusion, and poverty while also increasing risks and vulnerabilities linked to war, displacement, and various forms of preexisting marginalization. While much of the focus so far has been on the original epicenters of the outbreak (first China; then Europe, the United States, and Brazil; and later India), we know that many people in the Global South will bear the long-term effects in even more horrific ways. Countries in the Global South, including the Middle East, were already struggling in terms of economic disparities and inadequate infrastructures (such as limited access to healthcare, clean water, and electricity) as well as large-scale unemployment and uneven access to education. Previously existing poverty is predicted to increase substantially as a direct impact of the pandemic, particularly as a result of lockdowns, potentially leading to unprecedented famines, illness, and hardship. There are indications that one of the worst aspects of the impact of COVID- in the Global South will be a food crisis, doubling the number of people directly facing shortages to  million (WFP ). Famines and malnutrition might eventually kill more people in the Global South than the actual virus itself. Lockdowns, in turn, might exacerbate food crises and famines in terms of their impacts not only on local economies but on schools (which have often been providing nutritious meals at least once a day to millions of children) closed in countries that imposed

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full or partial lockdowns. Meanwhile, the very idea of lockdowns highlights huge disparities. As a widely quoted tweet by an Indian doctor states: “social distancing is a privilege: you need running water, space in your house, and the means to afford not going out to earn money” (Horn ). Privileges do not occur either for people living in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey; shanty towns in South Africa; favelas in Brazil; and informal settlements in Kenya, Peru, Mexico, and Pakistan, to name just a few.

The Global Crisis of Social Reproduction The COVID- pandemic is gendered in its consequences and experiences. Although men appear to be much more vulnerable to losing their lives to the virus (in some contexts,  percent of those dying from the virus are men: Polglase, Mezzofiore, and Foster ), women are disproportionately affected by its political, economic, and social repercussions. Women across the Global South (as well as the Global North) are overrepresented in health services on the frontline, and in casual employment they are most likely to be hit hard by economic downturns. As the feminist economist Alessandra Mezzadri () argues convincingly, we are currently experiencing a reproductive crisis like no other before, which is showing us the value of care as well as “the stark ‘care inequalities’ experienced by different communities and individuals across the globe.” Mezzadri stresses the centrality of lifemaking activities for the working of capitalism and production, drawing on the work of Tithi Bhattacharya, the coauthor of Feminism for the  Percent: A Manifesto, who states in an interview: Those activities and institutions that are involved in this process of lifemaking we call social reproduction work and social reproduction institutions. But social reproduction is also a framework. It is a lens through which to look at the world around us and try to understand it. It allows us to locate the source of wealth in our society, which is both human life and human labor. (Jaffe )

Women who provide most of the unpaid care work within families are experiencing a sharp increase in their care burden. At the same time, women are disproportionately represented in the public sector and in informal economies, which have been shrinking during lockdowns. The pandemic threatens to create long-term gaps in terms of girls’ education as well as women’s participation in formal paid labor, which in turn

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risks strengthening traditional patriarchal gender norms and the division of labor within the household and the economy. Those women who still have jobs tend to do even more housework than before. Feeling overburdened, stressed, less independent, and at the same time lonely and missing support networks of friends and extended families, has been a common thread for women during the pandemic. We are also witnessing an unprecedented increase in domestic violence globally. “Stress, alcohol consumption, and financial difficulties are all considered triggers for violence in the home, and the quarantine measures being imposed around the world will increase all three” (Lewis ). Her assessment resonates with feminist campaigners and activists, who report significant increases in domestic violence.

The Pandemic of Gender-Based Violence Accounts of increases in domestic and intimate partner violence have been reported by feminist activists in all regions of the Global South, but have also undoubtedly been an issue in the Global North. According to a report on the impact of the COVID- on women in Africa, published by the Brookings Institution, Google searches for domestic violence indicate a spike in the number of people searching for help dealing with domestic violence and sexual harassment since the start of the pandemic (Chuku, Mukaso, and Yenice ). Likewise, from March  to , , alone in Turkey, twenty-one women were killed according to the Turkish feminist organization We Will Stop Femicide. Selin Nakipoglu, a lawyer and activist with the TCK  Women’s Platform, an umbrella group for feminist and LGBTIQ+ organizations in Turkey, states: “Sixty percent of femicides are a result of domestic violence.” This resonates with a police report that “. [percent] of femicides in Turkey took place in apartments or housing complexes” (Ünker and Bellut ). The Lebanese feminist researcher and activist Lina Abou-Habib, after participating in an online discussion with feminists from the Middle East and North Africa, reports: According to all the narratives exchanged by feminist activists, cases of domestic violence have indeed shot up exponentially during the lockdown with the added complications related to the difficulties women are facing when trying to reach out for help, either from friends and family or from helplines and law enforcement. The lockdown has meant that friends and family are unable to provide solace or safety and authorities are simply . . . unavailable. In any case, and as indicated by many feminist activists, “our systems are

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broken, ineffectual and often deplorable to start with . . . they cannot withstand this shock and they will not prioritise the provision of safety and safe haven for women victims of violence.” (Abou-Habib b)

Legal mechanisms for protection have become even less available in many Middle Eastern countries than they were before, at a time when many victims of domestic violence are retreating into silence out of fear of being stigmatized. A Libyan lawyer, for example, reported four wives killed by their spouses during lockdown (Tarzi ). Tribal law and tribal arbitration are gaining ground in Libya as well as in Iraq, another country already devastated by sanctions, war, invasion, and political conflict. According to Rasha Khalil, a lawyer and project manager at the Baghdad Women’s Association: “COVID- has strengthened the rule of tribal laws, in which the best representation a woman has is her father—who unquestionably kowtows to tribal norms” (Tarzi ). Most legal proceedings and lawsuits have been postponed. Many women turn to tribal chiefs for guidance due to the lack of digital access to the law, which often results in being forced to stay in abusive marriages or to sacrifice their rights to custody or maintenance (Tarzi ). However limited and problematic national courts might be, at least they include investigations, arrest, and medical examinations, while tribal arbitrations tend to be biased toward men and regularly grant impunity to male perpetrators of violence.

Vulnerable Communities Gender-based violence (GBV), including intimate partner violence (IPV), against marginalized women tends to be even higher. Globally, women with disabilities are two to four times more likely to experience IPV than women without disabilities (Care and UN Women , ). Although not directly challenging common culturalist and racist explanations of increased levels of GBV in indigenous, ethnic minority, and refugee communities, the report stresses the overall vulnerability experienced by these communities due to limited access to economic, legal, social, and political rights and resources. Without wanting to justify GBV in any way, it should be noted that the experiences of injustice and exploitation at the hands of state and nonstate actors and institutions historically and cross-culturally have tended to contribute to men lashing out and becoming more likely perpetrators of violence against women. Homes are often not safe for women or girls but are

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also frequently unsafe for LGBTIQ+ people who are forced to stay in closer proximity to potentially homophobic and transphobic family members. The death of the Egyptian queer social activist Sarah Hegazi in June  reminds us of the extreme challenges faced by LGBTIQ+ people and activists in the Middle East. Hegazi chose suicide in exile in Canada after she had been arrested and tortured in Egypt for raising a rainbow flag during a live concert by the Lebanese indie band Mashrou’ Leila in . Following the news of her death, the group’s lead singer, Hamed Sinno, wrote on Facebook: “We are born into trauma, and we carry it with us wherever we go. . . . That is what trauma does to the body. That is what hate does to the body” (Berger ). The arrests and persecution of LGBTIQ+ persons have continued in Egypt, where people are being arrested even during the COVID- curfew. Not only in Egypt, but in other countries in the region, LGBTIQ+ people have been made more vulnerable as a result of the pandemic. They often lack the family support and connections (wasta) that are crucial in times of crisis. In Lebanon, faced with its worst economic crisis since the end of the civil war in , the lockdown has made an already dire economic situation devastating for many. Due to social stigma and violence by security forces, many transgender people have historically relied on delivery services that have become much less accessible due to the lockdown. LGBTIQ+ organizations and activists are less able to provide support and resources, due to both the extreme economic crisis and the lockdown (Younes ). Female domestic workers are another group particularly vulnerable to the consequences of the pandemic. Many countries in the Middle East have continued to use an extremely exploitative sponsorship system, called kafala, that ties workers’ visas to their employers. Activists advocating for the rights of domestic workers in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon and the Gulf states, have long pointed to the abuses and exploitation that the system facilitates. According to Heba Morayef, Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa regional director: “The kafala system has always been a form of imprisonment in the home for migrant domestic workers. While staying at home will help prevent the spread of COVID-, it increases the risk of exploitation and other forms of abuse suffered by live-in migrant domestic workers at the hands of their employers” (Amnesty International ). During lockdown, workers have been forced into longer hours and more intense labor, including obsessive demands to clean and disinfect homes while facing xenophobia when venturing outside (Chulov ). “Exploitative working conditions, the threat of violence, and living under lockdown

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can also have a devastating impact on the mental health of domestic workers, many of whom are far removed from their own homes and families,” as Amnesty International () warns. In Lebanon, which already faced an economic meltdown prior to the COVID- pandemic, many domestic workers have not been paid their salaries. At the beginning of June , thirty-seven Ethiopian women were forced to sleep on the street outside their consulate for days after their employers left them there. Due to the economic crisis, the women had not been paid for months; some employers had not even returned their passports to them or allowed them to take a change of clothes (Rose ). The BBC reported later in June that over one hundred Ethiopian female domestic workers were “dumped” by their employers in front of the Ethiopian embassy (BBC ). Lebanon, just like Iraq and Turkey, is also home to a large number of refugees from Syria, who are part of another group of particularly vulnerable populations. For example, Lebanon has not proactively tested the more than . million Syrian refugees for COVID-. Those refugees who exhibit symptoms might avoid being tested, as more than  percent lack residence papers or have outdated papers and want to escape deportation to Syria (Refugee International ). Of the estimated , Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, a quarter live in nineteen overcrowded refugee camps, while in Gaza  percent of the approximately  million people are refugees (Rothchild ), with extremely limited access to healthcare in general and to COVID- testing and treatment in particular. Preventing the spread of COVID- has been a priority for volunteers in refugee camps across the Global South. War and conflict further worsen the challenges and risks factors faced by displaced people, as we have seen in Syria and Yemen, for example, with “  attacks on hospitals in Syria in over a year and constant attacks on health facilities and medical personnel in Yemen” (Abi Rafeh ). The more than  million internally displaced people in Syria experience not only targeted attacks on health infrastructure but also severely restricted humanitarian aid, which is making the diagnosis of the coronavirus and adequate treatment for those infected nigh impossible (Refugee International ). Women’s sexual and reproductive healthcare, including maternal health, is severely interrupted or even eliminated altogether (Refugee International ). At the same time, forced migrant women are particularly vulnerable to intimate partner violence. The circumstances linked to the pandemic increase the possibility of being trapped in abusive relations or exploitative situations. Women are also experiencing high levels of sexual violence in refugee camp settings. Closure of services and far more limited access to

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NGOs and charities during the pandemic have exacerbated precarious and dangerous living conditions.

Authoritarian and Nationalist Politics At the same time that the pandemic is highlighting intersectional gendered vulnerabilities, patriarchal violence, and toxic forms of masculinity, it has also exacerbated the growth of authoritarian politics, at state and substate levels, increasingly linked with nationalist rhetoric and policies. We have seen increases of repressive and hypermasculinist backlashes by populist political leaders and right-wing constituencies globally. State-led enforcement of lockdowns has been pursued through emergency powers, providing opportunities for stricter authoritarian rule, arbitrary arrests, and/or brutal crackdowns, predominantly against marginalized minorities, including in Egypt, India, Kenya, the Philippines, Uganda, Cambodia, and Paraguay (Skinner ). The government of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt has been using the pandemic to try to tighten his ever-increasing authoritarian grip on the country, while denying the extent of the pandemic. Human rights activists and the medical union have reported that doctors and journalists who question the government figures and narratives have been arrested. Doctors have also reported that managers in government-run hospitals have threatened to report staff to the security authorities or fire them if they speak out (Raghavan ). In highly militarized Israel, the Israel Security Agency (known as Shin Bet or Shabak) was initially authorized to use its advanced surveillance methods for contact tracing (Rothchild ). Challenged by Palestinian and Israeli human and civil rights groups, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled by the end of April  against the use of counterterrorism surveillance for coronavirus-positive people (Rothchild ). Referring to “failing, discriminatory, authoritarian, inept and corrupt systems and states in the MENA region,” Abou-Habib (a) sums up the situation eloquently. State authorities in the region, in her assessment, “have responded to the pandemic with militarization, heightened oppression and control over people’s liberties, mobility, and freedom of expression while at the same time refraining from providing any significant form of social protection or support at least to those hit hardest by the pandemic” (AbouHabib a). In some contexts, the pandemic initially provided relief for governments that had been under pressure by local populations opposing government policies and actions.

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Lebanon and Iraq are cases in point: before the outbreak of the pandemic, both countries experienced widespread protests against state authoritarianism, unemployment and economic crises, pervasive incompetence by government ministries and officials, corruption, and sectarianism. The first weeks of lockdown and social distancing measures led to the sudden halt of all street protests. We even saw some people in Lebanon who had previously protested against the government and the military now asking for more direct state and military intervention in the fight against COVID-. Yet protesters started to mobilize again several months into the pandemic in Beirut and Tripoli, the main sites of previous protests. Hardship and despair have grown tremendously in a context where the devastation linked to the pandemic is underlined by a severe preexisting economic crisis.

Feminist Initiatives Feminist organizations and activists, who have frequently been at the center of antiauthoritarian and anticorruption movements in the Global South, have also been at the forefront in challenging the gender-blindness of many government interventions and responses to the pandemic. At the same time, they have been stepping in to provide information, support, resources, and services. Feminist activists across the globe had to adjust to new realities and think creatively about how to continue their previous initiatives and programs, while also having to come up with strategies to deal with the pandemic. This has been particularly challenging given the limited access to the internet, proper work and living spaces, and privacy (Abou-Habib b). Sharing of information was particularly urgent in the first phases of the pandemic. Activists in the Sudan engaged in a “Sudan against Corona” campaign, making masks, donating needed supplies, distributing posters with essential information, and raising awareness about the virus via social media (Forsyth ). Meanwhile, the regional African feminist advocacy platform FEMNET (African Women’s Development and Communication Network) has invited African women to share lockdown concerns on Twitter using the hashtag #inclusivelockdown, which has triggered an ongoing media discussion that focuses in particular on the challenges faced by women with disabilities (Horn ). One of the most widely circulated feminist interventions was initiated by women from the Global South in collaboration with women from marginalized communities in the Global North, which has been put together

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by  the Feminist Alliance for Rights (FAR). The statement, also known as the “Feminist COVID- Policy,” was endorsed by more than , individuals and women’s networks and organizations from more than  countries. It highlights the importance of a human rights and intersectional approach “to ensure that everyone has access to necessary information, support systems and resources during the current crisis” (FAR ). The recommended policies address nine key areas of focus: food security, healthcare, education, social inequality, water and sanitation, economic inequality, violence against women and intimate partner violence, access to information, and abuse of power. The most recent version of the policy stresses principles of equality and nondiscrimination: “centering the most marginalized people, including but not limited to women, children, elderly, people with disabilities, people with compromised health, rural people, unhoused people, institutionalized people, LGBT+ people, refugees, migrants, indigenous peoples, stateless people, human rights defenders, and people in conflict and war zones” (FAR ). The revised statement denotes a shift from the emphasis on women to a more intersectional emphasis on vulnerable communities. Feminists in the Middle East have been challenged to react to the recent health crisis in the context of their preexisting struggles with authoritarian and corrupt states, political repression, war and conflict, large-scale displacement, and settler colonialism. Access to information has been key here as well, especially given that nearly half of the  million women in Arabmajority countries are not connected to the internet and have no access to a mobile phone (Abi Rafeh ). In addition, with a relatively low literacy rate of  percent of women and  percent of men, women “are disproportionately unable to access accurate information about the virus to help them prepare, respond and survive” (Abi Rafeh ). Several initiatives across the region aim to educate and inform women about COVID-. In Iraq, for example, a platform of feminist organizations called She Is a Revolution declared in a statement their intention to work to maintain public health and support education, thereby reducing the risks of this pandemic. The platform has launched several initiatives to address the impact of COVID- on women and girls in Iraq, with a specific focus on the effects of the domestic quarantine on women and girls (She Is a Revolution ). The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights has launched a gender tracker to monitor the impact of the COVID- epidemic on women and other vulnerable social groups, hoping to counter the gender-blindness of public policies and wider measures.

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Feminist Visions and Dilemmas Complicating feminist initiatives in relation to the COVID- pandemic in countries of the Middle East (with parallels elsewhere in the Global South) is the tension between state-led feminist initiatives, often referred to as state feminism, and independent feminist organizations and initiatives. Calls for increased centralized government interventions and in some cases even calls for the military to get involved to tackle COVID- are clearly problematic in contexts where governments and militaries have been part of the problem in terms of maintaining or even exacerbating structural inequalities, different forms of injustice, and violence. Women in many countries in the Global South but also in some countries in the Global North (most prominently the United States) have not been able to rely on the state and state-related institutions, like the police and the judiciary, to protect them from gender-based and sexual violence, allow them access to resources, and provide security and protection. In contrast, government-related institutions, the military, and substate militias have been controlling women’s bodies, mobility, dress codes, personal relations, and sexuality, reinforcing patriarchal heteronormative gender regimes, toxic masculinities, and authoritarian politics, whether religious or secular. The Lebanese feminist academic Carmen Geha () argues: Lebanon’s version of state feminism is like some sort of breakfast club; seeking funds from donors, and holding events with no real impact on structural obstacles against gender equality as well as on legislation, policy, or implementation. State feminism at the center renders the voices of feminist collectives, activists, and NGOs secondary or silent because the state—which we mistrust—is responsible for responding to and framing the impact of COVID- on women’s lives.

One question that feminists throughout the Global South have to ask themselves is how much their advocacy and strategies should focus on criticizing the consistently gender-blind policies, interventions, and relief programs of governments and whether their strategy should be to influence governments by trying to get involved without being coopted by them. In some contexts, collaborations and joint initiatives might be possible and even effective, whether they are strategic temporary alliances or more lasting ones. But joint ventures with authoritarian regimes in other contexts might not only mean having to cross red lines, but could also lead to the

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further discrediting of feminist activists and organizations who are already often under pressure and under attack for either being coopted by authoritarian states or supposedly importing Western alien ideas and concepts. That is a common strategy to discredit feminist activists in many parts of the Global South. In contexts of authoritarian repressive regimes (such as Iraq and Egypt) or severely incompetent and corrupt regimes (like Lebanon), for example, should feminist activists be involved in decision-making processes and demand seats at the table, or should they try to stay far away from the tables associated with corruption, repression, and securitization of bodies and sexualities? In my view, in the context of these specific countries, working around instead of with governments might be the wiser approach. However, in general, I would like to stress that these are difficult and complex decisions that need to be made on a case-by-case basis and cannot be categorically assessed, especially not from the outside, without knowing the complex internal local and national dynamics, pressures, and challenges. Some feminist activists and researchers have commented that the conditions of the pandemic might have a silver lining in terms of the opportunities it might open up. Abou-Habib (a) puts it the following way: However, I would like to think that some of its effects are positive and to a large extent irreversible. The abysmal failure of our states to protect women and curb gender-based violence can no longer be hidden or excused. Violence against women and girls can no longer be ignored and is already fully recognized as a pandemic in its own right and the [COVID-] pandemic has probably shown us the human cost of failing to recognize and address this pandemic [of violence against women and girls]. Unequal gender relations within families and the burden of care work carried by women and girls have finally entered the realm of social and public debates. Several feminist organisations are already working toward public policies, which are not only aware of the opportunity cost of care work but which also seek to distribute that cost. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the silencing and invisibilising of queer people, sex workers, and other groups is no longer possible. What the crisis has showed us is that feminist organizing is not only live and kicking but also creative and resilient and saves lives.

Abou-Habib’s assessment might appear overly optimistic, given the long history of missed opportunities and the tendency to marginalize women and gender issues, as well as LGBTIQ+ communities, not only in the Global South but more broadly in the context of economic and political crises.

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Of course, there is a risk that the exact opposite of what Abou-Habib predicts might happen: gender-based claims and injustices might be yet again pushed to the side and into the eternal waiting rooms of what is always presented to us as “priorities” and “wider issues.” Feminists will be particularly challenged not to be marginalized or, worse, be threatened by the rightwing populism and militant ethnonationalism that seem to have been exacerbated by the pandemic and might increase as part of the backlash against growing global antiracist mobilization. Throughout the Middle East, demands by protesters during the revolutionary demonstrations preceding the pandemic are resurfacing, now with even greater force and justification: “These are the demands for human rights, universal health care, proper compensation for all forms and kinds of work, equality in practice and in the law and, at the heart of it all, an end to state impunity, corruption and oppression” (Abou-Habib a). More than ever, feminists in the Global North will have to be vigilant that the feminism they promote, advocate for, and enact responds to global inequalities, is antiracist to its bones, and respects and accepts mobilization and leadership by activists from the Global South, without either essentializing or reifying differences.

Note An earlier version of this chapter was published as “COVID- and Feminism in the Global South: Challenges, Initiatives and Dilemmas.” European Journal of Women’s Studies () (): –, DOI:./. Reprinted with permission from the author.

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Polglase, Katie, Gianluca Mezzofiore, and Max Foster. . “Here’s Why the Coronavirus May Be Killing More Men Than Women: The US Should Take Note.” CNN (March ). https://edition.cnn.com////health/coronavirus-gender -mortality-intl/index.html. Raghavan, Sudarsan. . “Egypt Thought It Dodged the Worst of the Pandemic: But Now Hospitals Are Being Overwhelmed.” Washington Post (June ). https://www .washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-thought-it-dodged-the-worst-of -the-pandemic-but-now-hospitals-are-being-overwhelmed////be -afc-ea-b-aae_story.html?-fbclid=IwARPeLtNEXFuuiGTZO huYlWYTXNKHbdIgYHMVqR_aSTRYHaAzevTg. Refugee International. . “Gender Matters: COVID-’s Outsized Impact on Displaced Women and Girls” (May ). https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports ////gender-matters-covid-s-outsized-impact-on-displaced-women-and -girls. Rose, Sunniva. . “Ethiopian Domestic Workers Abandoned on Beirut Street by Employers.” National World (June ). https://www.thenational.ae/world /mena/ethiopian-domestic-workers-abandoned-on-beirut-street-by-employers- .?fbclid=IwARNXSjMzxwHpEwVljmYOtAoraeYIXiZFgIYrnGEEH FNKv-BYSBaHuw. Rothchild, Alice. . “Who Matters? Pandemic in a Time of Structural Violence.” Mondoweiss (May ). https://mondoweiss.net///who-matters-pandemic-in -a-time-of-structural-violence. She Is a Revolution. . “The Remarkable Contributions of Girls and Women during the COVID- Pandemic.” Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative (ICSSI, March ). https://www.iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/. Skinner, Chloe. . “COVID- and New Struggles over Gender and Social Justice.” Institute of Development Studies (June ). https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions /covid--and-new-struggles-over-gender-and-social-justice/?fbclid=IwARBoe WURCkWDjLHtKym_xqaxbSYLNkIRcXDstOmQ-AVPdBaWnM. Tarzi, Nazli. . “As Family Courts Close, Women Struggle to Access Justice during Middle East Lockdowns” (June ). https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/society ////middle-east-lockdowns-leave-women-unable-to-access-justice. Ünker, Pelin, and Daniel Bellut. . “Domestic Violence Rises in Turkey during COVID- Pandemic.” Deutsche Welle (DW, April ). https://www.dw.com/en /domestic-violence-rises-in-turkey-during-covid--pandemic/a-. WFP (World Food Programme). . “COVID- Will Double Number of People Facing Food Crises Unless Swift Action Is Taken” (April ). https://www.wfp .org/news/covid--will-double-number-people-facing-food-crises-unless-swift -action-taken. Younes, Rasha. . “In Lebanon’s COVID-, Aid the Vulnerable, Including LGBT People.” Human Rights Watch (April ). www.hrw.org/news////lebanons -covid--aid-vulnerable-including-lgbt-people.

CHAPTER 13

The Power of Bipartisan Mobilization: The Success of Tunisia’s Feminist Movement during the Coronavirus Pandemic MA R O YO U S S E F A N D S A R A H Y E R K E S

COVID- or the coronavirus pandemic has had dramatic consequences for people worldwide far beyond the direct medical effects. Scholars and activists warned about the spike in gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against women, particularly during the coronavirus lockdown, and forecast the pandemic’s negative impact on women in the Global North and South (Cagle ; UNAIDS ). Calls to GBV hotlines increased fivefold in some countries as intimate partner violence increased while in quarantine (UN Women a). In Tunisia, a country deeply divided along ideological lines, the government swiftly responded to increased concerns for women’s safety during the pandemic. Tunisia has fared relatively well during the COVID- pandemic: , reported deaths and , reported cases as of March , —, cases per , people compared to , cases per , people in the United States (WHO ). Yet the pandemic has exacerbated preexisting inequalities, including gender inequality. Tunisia is puzzling because it has made progressive gender reform despite deep ideological divisions at the political and civil society levels. Secularists and Islamists disagree on Tunisia’s identity, as they demonstrated during the highly controversial constitutional drafting process and in the final text of the constitution, which claims that Tunisia is both a Muslim country and a civil state. Yet Islamist-secularist transitional governments have demonstrated their commitment to gender equality by passing remarkable legislation since , including Organic Law No.  on combating GBV in . Similarly, secularist feminists are deeply suspicious of Islamist feminists and see an Islamist threat to take over society and curtail women’s rights. Yet they work together on some issues, including GBV, as we demonstrate in this chapter.

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Despite passing progressive GBV legislation, the state has yet to implement all the reforms (Yerkes and Youssef ). Like women across the region and arguably worldwide, Tunisian women GBV victims remain vulnerable and unable to find justice. Though GBV was already a problem pre-pandemic, Tunisians saw a fivefold increase in reported GBV incidents in the first three months of the COVID- pandemic (March–June , ) (UN Women b). Women’s rights organizations have been vocal about the gendered impact of COVID-. Mass feminist mobilization has captured national and international attention, including the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). Feminist activism has also led to the state’s creation of a new domestic violence shelter and a / crisis hotline in partnership with the UN (AlSultany ; UNDP a; UN Women b). Given the government’s positive response, despite deep political and ideological divides, this chapter asks why the state responded to gender-based violence (GBV) concerns during the coronavirus pandemic in Tunisia, despite ideological and political divisions. We argue that the state addressed some concerns about violence during the pandemic because combating GBV has bipartisan support in Tunisia. Tunisian Islamist and secularist women’s rights organizations succeeded in building a bipartisan coalition of support on this issue because they worked either together in a shortlived coalition or in tandem with similar goals over the past decade during the democratic transition in Tunisia. As a result, the government could undertake reforms to address increased violence against women during the pandemic without much resistance, despite the ongoing political gridlock in Tunisia. Feminist mobilization around violence against women predated the pandemic by thirty years, attesting to activist commitment and experience combating GBV in Tunisia. Before the pandemic, women’s organizations lobbied the state, pushing the government to pass progressive gender legislation during the democratic transition ( to ). Following the revolution, approximately  new Islamist and secularist women’s organizations emerged (Ben Amara and Mathlouthi ). While the women’s movement remained divided along ideological lines, women’s rights organizations, including the secularist Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD) and Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFTURD), Ligue des Électrices Tunisiennes (LET), Beity, Aswat Nissa, and Islamist Tounissiet, all lobbied political parties, provided input on drafts of gender-related legislation, and used foreign donor assistance to work on violence against women. LET and Tounissiet also formed a coalition that transcended their ideological differences and lobbied to end

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violence against women. Their separate and joint policy demands helped secure bipartisan support to end violence against women (Arfaoui and Moghadam ; De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri, and Ward ; Scheiterbauer ; Tchaïcha and Arfaoui ; Youssef, Aissa, and Abdou ). This study has implications beyond Tunisia. We demonstrate that broadbased coalitions effectively garner political and societal support around an issue that lacked bipartisan support in the past. We also provide an example of a positive relationship between civil society and the state during democratization that can increase human rights and women’s rights, particularly in this case. The analysis proceeds with a discussion of our theoretical framework and methodology. In the findings section, we discuss feminist mobilization around GBV in pre-pandemic Tunisia to show that feminists have extensive experience advocating the elimination of violence. We then discuss feminist mobilization around violence during the pandemic. Finally, we highlight the government’s response to feminist demands during the pandemic. We conclude by providing policy recommendations for all major stakeholders in Tunisia.

Methodology We draw on ethnographic methods and content analysis to examine women’s activism and the government’s response to GBV concerns in Tunisia. One of the authors conducted dozens of in-person observations and semistructured interviews with Islamist and secularist women’s rights activists, state officials, and foreign donors before the pandemic in  and  in Tunisia and Washington, DC. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, English, and French. All quotations in this chapter are translated into English. We drew on interviews to establish pre-pandemic levels of cooperation. We conducted content analysis of primary sources on the pandemic in Tunisia to understand feminist mobilization and state and donor responses to GBV spikes during the pandemic. We analyzed official government statements, global COVID- figures, UN public statements and reports on the coronavirus, and statements and interviews by Tunisian women’s rights organizations since the pandemic outbreak in Arabic and English. The data revealed that there is ongoing feminist mobilization during the pandemic. Furthermore, the data showed that the state and donors responded to feminist demands to address GBV during the pandemic in Tunisia.

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GBV Feminist Mobilization in Pre-Pandemic Tunisia Tunisian feminists have regarded violence against women as a social problem since the early s. Secularist women’s rights organizations conducted studies, signed petitions, formed coalitions, and set up hotlines and listening centers in the s (Arfaoui ; Arfaoui and Moghadam ). However, violence continued to increase despite feminist initiatives. According to a  survey conducted by the Tunisian National Office of Family and Population, at least  percent of women ages eighteen to sixty-four in Tunisia experienced one or more forms of violence (Arfaoui and Moghadam ). Starting in , secularist feminists formed a broad-based GBV coalition, according to LET founder Salwa*: LET and other women’s associations created a coalition in  in large regions across Tunisia to respond to women’s demands on issues like genderbased violence. Then after the project evolved, we went to members of parliament with these demands. UNDP sponsored the events, and Peruvian and Colombian experts on development helped us develop a strategy.

The secularist coalition responded to GBV cases by adopting a mix of strategies that often resulted in justice for the victim. For example, members circulated Facebook petitions and carried banners that said “state sponsored crimes” and “state sponsored violence” in  following the rape of Meriem Ben Mohamed by two police officers (Arfaoui and Moghadam ). Feminists demonstrated in the streets again in  and circulated Facebook petitions when the two officers and Meriem appealed their seven-year prison sentence. Meriem appealed the ruling, and a Tunis court doubled the officers’ sentence, up to fifteen years. The nature of violence as a nonpartisan issue led to joint Islamistsecularist efforts following the revolution. Tounissiet vice-president Yasmin* explained that once the participants discussed their differences and knew one another after the revolution, they realized their differences were insignificant. She explained that their collective identity as women and feminists and common grievance against gender-based violence helped them recognize their similarities: “There aren’t disagreements in women’s civil society; for example, we cooperate on the antiviolence law.” Starting in , secularist and Islamist women’s organizations organized a sixteen-day GBV campaign. They used the slogan “Behind every abused woman, there is a law” (Arfaoui and Moghadam ). LET and Tounissiet

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also formed one short-term Islamist-secularist GBV coalition. According to respondents, LET and Tounissiet briefly worked together on a Europeanfunded project to combat violence in , but their coalition dissolved within a year. Despite the coalition’s collapse, the organizations continued to engage the state on violence separately but in very similar ways. Both organizations continued to draw on foreign donor resources, work with the Ministry of Women and Ministry of Health, and lobby secularist and Islamist politicians on eliminating violence. Their separate efforts continued to reinforce the message that violence impacts the lives of all women. In addition to working together, feminists also partnered with the state to provide social services and GBV awareness. In  Tunisia adopted the National Action Plan for the Elimination of Violence against Women (NAPEVW), which requires the state to disseminate information, set up free hotlines, and increase access to comprehensive care for GBV survivors, according to respondents. Starting in , Tounissiet partnered with CREDIF, a feminist state research institution, to raise awareness about GBV under the NAPEVW. Two Tounissiet members, Khedija* and Hafidha*, explained that Tounissiet partnered with the Tunisian state to develop studies on violence and launch awareness campaigns. We worked with CREDIF several times, particularly on eliminating violence. Most of the time, it was awareness campaigns. This included handing out brochures in the streets. We talked about how it relates to the youth [young men], cultural influences. . . . You stop people in the street and separate them from others and speak to them. You listen to victims, and you advise them. These are the things we participated in. As for big events, we sometimes held conferences or workshops.

Islamist and secularist women activists worked with the Ministry of Women on the  GBV law and ensured that the state included the concept of political violence in Organic Law No. . According to respondents at the Ministry of Women and in parliament, activists provided input on several versions of the draft law that the Ministry of Women drafted. Activists also served as expert witnesses on gender-based political violence before several parliamentary committees tasked with evaluating the draft law, and lobbied individual parliamentarians and parties on passing the law. They also briefed foreign donors and implementers, including the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam), that had the political capital to pressure the state to recognize political violence as a form of GBV, according to feminists and foreign donor respondents.

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But GBV cases continued to climb even before the pandemic, due mainly to the lack of implementation of the  law and lack of increased public awareness, according to respondents. For example, marital rape reporting increased from , cases to , cases annually between  and  (Frawous ). While an increase in reporting could be a positive side effect of increased awareness after Organic Law No.  passed, the alarming numbers indicate that marital rape could have increased, given the overall rise in violence and women. Feminists continued to engage the state on GBV due to the lack of implementation of Organic Law No. . One of the authors attended a GBV conference in  where LET invited other secularist feminists, Oxfam, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Women representatives to celebrate their collaboration and stress the importance of implementing the  law. They expressed their concerns about the lack of progress. Their ongoing efforts prepared them to engage on GBV once the pandemic reached Tunisia.

GBV Feminist Mobilization and Government Response during the Pandemic On March , , the Tunisian government swiftly implemented a severe lockdown following the first cases of COVID- in Tunisia. The Tunisian government closed mosques and all nonessential businesses such as restaurants, sealed land and air borders, and implemented a twelve-hour daily curfew in response to the global pandemic (Reuters ). While these measures effectively kept Tunisia’s COVID- cases down, violence against women increased fivefold during the lockdown (EuroMedRights ). Tunisians reported forty acts of violence in one week in March , compared to seven during the same period the previous year (UN Women b). Between March and May , government GBV hotlines received over , complaints, , of which occurred during the first month of the lockdown (UN Women b). A Tunis domestic violence shelter received  women weekly during the lockdown, a fourfold increase compared to the number before the lockdown (Frawous ). Finally, like abortion, access to birth control is essential during a lockdown in a country where at least  percent of women experience intimate partner violence. Still, women lost access to birth control during COVID-, as hospitals prioritized COVID- concerns and could not see patients seeking birth control (AlSultany ; UN Women ). The increase in violence during the pandemic lockdown was not surprising to Islamist or secularist feminists because similar GBV

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spikes occurred during holidays, when women are often forced to spend more time with their romantic partners at home; hospitals, shelters, and police stations either close early or operate at low capacity (EuroMedRights ; Frawous ). Despite these trends, the prime minister and president were initially silent on violence against women during the pandemic. They failed to take proactive steps to protect vulnerable women when implementing the lockdown. Secularist and Islamist feminists vocally criticized the Tunisian government for refusing to take GBV seriously and ignoring the UN’s urge to protect women during COVID- (UNDP b). According to activists, they also criticized the Ministry of Interior and the police’s refusal to take women’s complaints seriously by pressuring them to return home when they file a domestic violence complaint (Frawous ). This indicates a more significant problem, where the authorities have failed to effectively implement the progressive  GBV law due to a lack of political will or societal readiness for reform. Women’s organizations condemned the Ministry of Justice’s halt in prosecution and review of GBV court cases during the pandemic. Finally, feminists were critical of the Ministry of Health’s inability to provide violence survivors with birth control or access to -hour shelters. In response to feminist mobilization, the Tunisian government has implemented some reforms to address the GBV pandemic during COVID-. The Ministry of Women opened a new GBV shelter in April , specifically to address COVID- concerns, with the assistance of the UN Population Fund (Bajec ). The new center provides victims with the option to self-quarantine for fourteen days before moving to a traditional shelter (UNDP a). The High Judicial Council urged family judges to take all necessary measures to protect victims, guarantee their access to justice, and tackle violence against women and children as two highly vulnerable populations during pandemics (Yerkes and Youssef ). Tunisia has taken additional significant measures to address violence during the pandemic, including creating a free psychological support phone service for victims and extending the national domestic violence hotline hours to / (UNDP a). The Ministry of Women is also working with UN Women to raise awareness about GBV during the pandemic. The ministry is creating two new videos and radio programming on GBV prevention, masculine behavior during confinement, and increased services available to women victims during the pandemic (UNDP a). While significant work still remains to be done, the government’s decision to address some GBV concerns during the pandemic reflects the impact of feminist mobilization around violence, especially during democratization.

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GBV statistics were scarce in Tunisia before the revolution. The state often released GBV statistics once a decade at most (Arfaoui and Moghadam ). While violence has spiked since the revolution, data availability has significantly improved, thanks to increased transparency and civil society efforts. CSOs (civil society organizations) have acted as watchdogs, gathering and publishing data themselves or pushing government agencies to publish official data. Many of the pandemic data are based on CSO reporting. Women’s organizations conduct their research and publish their findings in several languages through their reporting, donor reporting, op-eds, and research studies. Tunisian civil society regularly works with international partners, including the UN and Western human rights organizations, to raise awareness about their activities and the challenges women face during the pandemic. According to the organization’s Facebook account, LET is working with its European partners to raise awareness about the issue through virtual events (LET ). Finally, the state has directly addressed some of their concerns, highlighting their impact on policy outcomes—a vital feature of a robust civil society. The success of women’s rights organizations during the pandemic is even more impressive when compared to the challenges facing other marginalized groups. For example, LGBTIQ+ rights groups in Tunisia have not been successful in pushing the public or state to engage on their issues during the pandemic. Violence against LGBTIQ+ rights activists increased during the pandemic. The Tunisian Association for Justice and Equality (Damj) noted that it received five times as many calls for legal help with arrests of LGBTIQ+ people in  as in  (Younes ). Rania Amdouni, a member of Damj, was arrested in February  after going to a police station to complain about the harassment she received as a prominent LGBTIQ+ rights activist (Amnesty International ). Her arrest sparked public outcry and protests, but the LGBTIQ+ rights community has not managed to attract the sort of cross-partisan coalition of support that women’s rights groups have achieved.

Conclusion and Recommendations During the COVID- pandemic, Tunisia took some promising steps toward addressing increased violence against women because of the work CSOs had done since the s and during the first decade of the democratic transition in building a bipartisan coalition of support on this issue. Groups from across the political spectrum worked together in a short-lived

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coalition or in tandem with similar goals during the democratic transition in Tunisia, building political and social support that paid off when the crisis hit Tunisia. On October , , the Tunisian government instituted a second nationwide lockdown and curfew as the country faced a second, much more severe wave of COVID- cases following the summer reopening. While the achievements of women’s organizations, such as working with the government to establish a new shelter and a / hotline, are impressive, they are insufficient to protect women as they once again enter an incredibly vulnerable period. Women’s organizations should continue to be vigilant and aggressive in pursuing further steps, such as the universal implementation of the GBV legislation, and work to educate the public about the rights afforded to women as well as they can within the restrictive environment. Women’s rights groups could be more effective if they approach the Tunisian government as a united front, pushing the president and prime minister to work with them as advocates for better protection for women. To assist these efforts, the international community should recognize that combating GBV is a humanitarian consequence of the COVID- pandemic and should be treated as such. Using humanitarian funds to support existing shelters, develop additional awareness campaigns in the media, and increase access for women to safe havens would help address this impact of the COVID- pandemic. Our aim is not to offer a total model that explains all the reasons behind GBV-related reform during the pandemic in Tunisia, as there are several possible explanations. However, as a tactic and a strategy, we show how coalition work and making an issue bipartisan can be an asset for CSOs operating in polarized contexts. In that particular case, coalition work and bipartisan support can help CSOs come together and influence policy. The COVID- pandemic will not be the last crisis that Tunisia (or the world) faces. So the lessons of CSOs in Tunisia are essential for civil society in other polarized contexts. CSOs can garner broad support for their causes if they frame issues as bipartisan—particularly GBV, which does not discriminate between women based on their political leanings. CSOs can prioritize consensus-building as a way to achieve their current and future goals. As the Tunisian case shows, Islamist and secularist women’s organizations were most effective when they mobilized around GBV. Mass feminist mobilization helped translate the issue into a bipartisan one that impacts all Tunisians and helps them gain political support. Perhaps a divided women’s movement could continue to adopt this strategy and secure additional rights for women in the future, leading to a stronger movement in Tunisia.

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Notes An earlier version of this chapter was published as “The Power of Bipartisan Mobilization: The Success of Tunisia’s Feminist Movement during the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Middle East Law and Governance (October ). DOI:./. Reprinted with permission from the authors. Asterisks indicate pseudonyms for the women interviewed to protect them. All quotations are from these interviews, unless otherwise noted.

References AlSultany, Hanaa. . “The League of Women Voters (LET): The National Strategy during the Coronavirus Pandemic Harmed Women and These Are Our Recommendations” (in Arabic). Mosaique FM. http://tn.tn/ar/article/r-bt-ln-khb-t-str -tgy-ldol-zmn-koron-adrt-b-lns-ohthh-tosy-tn-. Amnesty International. . “Tunisia: Release Prominent LGBTI Rights Activist Jailed for Insulting Police” (March ). https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news ///tunisia-release-prominent-lgbti-activist-jailed-for-insulting-police. Arfaoui, Khedija. . “The Development of the Feminist Movement in Tunisia: s–s.” International Journal of the Humanities (): –. Arfaoui, Khedija, and Valentine M. Moghadam. . “Violence against Women and Tunisian Feminism: Advocacy, Policy, and Politics in an Arab Context.” Current Sociology (): –. Bajec, Alessandra. . “‘Violence Is a Virus’: Tunisia Opens New Women’s Shelter as Domestic Abuse Surges during Lockdown.” New Arab (April ). https://english .alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth////tunisia-opens-new-womens-shelter-as -lockdown-violence-surges. Ben Amara, Saraa, and Ibtissem Mathlouthi. . Étude sur les associations oeuvrant our l’égalité des chances entre les femmes et les hommes en Tunisie. Tunis: CREDIF. Cagle, Tess. . “Domestic Violence Statistics Are Surging during the COVID- Pandemic.” Nautilus. https://coronavirus.nautil.us/domestic-violence-statistics. De Silva de Alwis, Rangita, Anware Mnasri, and Estee Ward. . “Women and the  Making of the Tunisian Constitution.” Berkeley Journal of International Law : . EuroMedRights. . “Tunisia: Pandemic Increases Violence against Women.” EuroMed Rights (June ). https://euromedrights.org/publication/tunisia-pandemic -increases-violence-against-women. Frawous, Yosra. . “Fakhfakh Left Out Victims of Violence from His Statements Despite His Knowledge of the Numbers” (in Arabic). Mosaïque FM (April ). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=arqkUMnakY&feature=youtu.be&fbclid= IwARCSRtzkQOsLoFpohHjQjircCHHOFykby_AIoQKAQVuPnTw. LET (Ligue des Électrices Tunisiennes). . https://www.facebook.com/LigueDes ElectricesTunisiennes. Reuters. . “Tunisia Imposes -Hour Daily Curfew to Counter Coronavirus” (March ). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-tunisia-curfew /tunisia-imposes--hour-daily-curfew-to-counter-coronavirus-idUSKBNH.

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Scheiterbauer, Tanja. . “Women’s Rights in the Aftermath of Tunisia’s Revolution: New Options and Constraints for Women’s Activism in Processes of Transition.” In Negotiating Normativity, ed. Nikita Dhawan, Elizabeth Fink, Johanna Leinius, and Rirhandu Mageza-Barthel, –. New York: Springer. Skocpol, Theda. . States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Tchaïcha, Jane, and Khedija Arfaoui. . The Tunisian Women’s Rights Movement: From Nascent Activism to Influential Power-Broking. Philadelphia: Routledge. UNAIDS. . “Gender-Based Violence and COVID-—‘ When We Are Silent, We Allow These Crimes to Multiply ’ ” (May ). https://www.unaids.org/en/resources /presscentre/featurestories//may/_gender-based-violencecovid. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). a. “COVID- Global Gender Response Tracker.” https://data.undp.org/gendertracker. ———. b. “COVID-: UNDP Urges Swift Action to Address Violence against Women and Girls during Pandemic.” United Nations Development Programme (May ). https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/news/ / COVID _UNDP _urges _swift _action _to _address _violence _against _women _and_girls_during_pandemic.html. UN Women. . “Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country.” https://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/vawprevalence_matrix _june.pdf. ———. a. “Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the Secretary-General.” https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital -library/ publications/ / / a - - -sg -report -ending -violence -against -women-and-girls. ———. b. “Press Release: Gender-Responsive Measures to Combat COVID- Urgently Needed to Preserve and Advance Tunisia’s Progress on Women’s Rights, Warns UN Women.” United Nations (UN) Women. https://arabstates.unwomen .org/ en/ news/ stories/ / / press -release -tunisia -urgent -need -for -gender -responsive-measures-to-combat-covid-. WHO (World Health Organization). . “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-) Dashboard.” https://covid.who.int. Yerkes, Sarah, and Maro Youssef. . “Coronavirus Reveals Tunisia’s Revolutionary Gains Only Exist on Paper.” New Arab (June ). https://english.alaraby.co.uk /english/comment////coronavirus-reveals-tunisias-revolutionary-gains -only-exist-on-paper. Younes, Rasha. . “Kill Them, They’re Sodomites: Police Violence against LGBT People in Tunisia.” Nawatt (December ). https://nawaat.org////kill-them -theyre-sodomites-police-violence-against-lgbt-people-in-tunisia. Youssef, Maro, Meriem Aissa, and Suzie Abdou. . “Women’s Rights Have Improved in North Africa, But the Struggle Continues.” OpenDemocracy (January  ). https:// www.opendemocracy.net/ en/ north -africa -west -asia/ womens -rights -have - improved -in -north -africa -but -the -struggle -continues/ ?utm _source = feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%A+opendemocracy+ %openDemocracy%.

CHAPTER 14

Harmony of Feminine and Masculine Leadership during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Jordan MAY YA DA A B U J A B E R

The novel coronavirus pandemic shocked the world in  and had an unprecedented impact on the global community throughout , into , and beyond. Its impact varied from one country to another, as leaders across the world responded differently in mitigating the challenges associated with COVID-. The diverse leadership practices and decisions in each country led to vastly different outcomes for overall mortality rates and economic livelihood. They also impacted women’s well-being, as some leadership and policy choices limited women’s roles in society and others had an empowerment effect that will last for generations. Political leaders play an important role in mitigating the challenges associated with the ongoing COVID- pandemic. I argue that successful mitigation is achieved by using a combination of formal (governmental) and informal (civil society) interventions as well as applying a balance of feminine and masculine leadership traits. A masculine style tends to be assertive, task-based, and risk-taking. In contrast, a feminine style is relationship-oriented, coping-centered, and focused on being efficient in solving problems. Understanding outcomes of feminine and masculine leadership practices is essential in evaluating how to create responses and policies that best incorporate the whole of society, especially considering the impact of policies on women. In this chapter I investigate the response to the pandemic, considering feminine and masculine approaches to leadership. This is a situational experiment in which the correlational research on two variables (feminine and masculine traits) was passively observed and measured. I use the feminine and masculine traits as a guiding framework to assess how the behaviors and approaches of the respective leaders fit into masculine and

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feminine traits. With a focus on Jordan, I discuss the challenges women faced during the two polarized responses—the initial strict lockdown and the recent opening. Then I consider both the government’s and civil society’s responses in providing women with socioeconomic and psychosocial support during the pandemic. Next I analyze the role of media in minimizing women’s role during the pandemic and civil society efforts to counter the media response. Finally, rooted in feminist psychology, I consider whether Jordan’s pandemic response and leadership practices were based on feminine or masculine leadership approaches and how each approach manifests in mitigating the pandemic’s impact on women. The Jordanian government responded swiftly to the first case of COVID-, initially controlling the pandemic and earning global praise. A royal decree was issued in March , directing the government to implement martial law to combat the pandemic. This meant that all other laws were suspended, giving authorities the power to take necessary action during a time of emergency. Jordan’s initial three-week lockdown was followed by a month-long curfew that the Jordanian Armed Forces and police enforced. In response to the massive economic challenges that stemmed from the prolonged lockdown, significant restrictions were removed in September , and the pandemic began to spread more rapidly across the kingdom. Both the pandemic and the lockdown had a significant impact on women in Jordan. The pandemic affected women at greater rates than men, as they make up most frontline healthcare professionals, putting their lives at risk. Likewise, the prolonged lockdown meant that many businesses began to struggle, and women were more likely to lose their jobs than men. Furthermore, school closures caused women to take on an increased unpaid care burden to fulfill their roles as their families’ caregivers. To further exacerbate the problem, women flooded the informal sector, which constitutes half of the labor force. This sector was not accounted for in the social protection systems that the government issued. The combination of economic and social stresses brought on by the pandemic, and restrictions on movement, dramatically increased the number of women and girls facing abuse in Jordan. Moreover, during this challenging situation, civil society organizations were sidelined from participating in activities due to complete lockdowns. The challenges that women endured during the COVID- crisis were universal and not unique to Jordan. By contrasting the role that government policies played in erasing gender gains in Jordan with best practices from the Jordanian civil society in minimizing the impact of the pandemic on women, I hope to advance the cause of women’s empowerment globally.

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A Note on Feminine Leadership Feminist psychologists categorize masculine and feminine qualities, behavioral expectations, gendered personalities, and leadership traits (Bem ). The inventory includes qualities that are stereotypically associated with men and qualities that are stereotypically associated with women (Donnelly and Twenge ). Other scholars break down leadership traits further to include desirable masculinity, desirable femininity, undesirable masculinity, and undesirable femininity (Ricciardelli and Williams ). All genders possess feminine and masculine traits, although cultural change and environment do affect individual personalities (Donnelly and Twenge ; Twenge ). Examples of masculine and feminine traits include the schema shown in table .. Natural feminine traits in leadership are important in a crisis such as the COVID- pandemic. The leaders who responded with undesirable masculine traits approached the virus as a moving target and seemed to feel the need to appear superior and dominant in the face of the pandemic, as though fighting a war. This masculine leadership approach proved ineffective in managing the pandemic. Alternatively, natural feminine leadership traits prevailed in crisis management. During the height of the crisis, women made up a majority of essential frontline workers. They adopted the mindset that the crisis could be solved through collective action, empathy, responsibility, and love. Feminine leadership characteristics prioritized preventive measures grounded in the collective interest during the pandemic. Women leaders Table 14.1. Examples of Masculine and Feminine Traits Desirable

Undesirable

Masculinity

Firm, confident, competitive, casual, forceful, skilled in business, strong, carefree, outspoken, and pleasure-seeking

Bossy, noisy, show-off, aggressive, sarcastic, mischievous, feels superior, boastful, rude, and sees self as running the show

Femininity

Loves children, patient, appreciative, sensitive, grateful, responsible, emotional, devoted, loyal, gentle, collaborative, and empathetic

Dependent, needs approval, nervous, timid, self-critical, weak, bashful, shy, anxious, and a worrier

Source : Ricciardelli and Williams 1995, 644–645.

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showed how desirable feminine traits naturally send the messages of empathy and communal support during the pandemic. Empathy was necessary to get citizens to accept challenging and burdensome restrictions for the good of all. Yet the experience of the women leaders’ pandemic response showed that desirable feminine traits would not have been sufficient to flatten the curve during this pandemic if not coupled with desirable masculine traits of assertiveness, responsibility, focus, logic, and direction. Countries such as Bhutan, Thailand, and Vietnam have low deaths but are led by men who exhibit a balance of feminine and masculine traits. Therefore, the problem cannot be assumed to be the absence or presence of women in leadership, but rather a contextual absence of the “natural feminine traits,” thereby creating a lopsided leadership approach to the COVID- crisis. The sharp rise in coronavirus deaths in the Middle East region has continued, only flattening with large numbers of cases and deaths per thousand. Qatar and Kuwait had an initial spike of coronavirus deaths but flattened their number fairly early and consistently managed the pandemic. Both countries show a different trend than others in the region, even in the Gulf. While the leaders in these countries are both males, the ministers of health in both countries are women (Khurma ). While these two countries’ leaders may have practiced undesirable masculine traits, the desirable feminine traits helped the country flatten its curve. Qatar responded quickly to the COVID- crisis and secured the health of both citizens and noncitizens (who make up . percent of the population). The residents trusted the government completely and remained supportive of its difficult decisions during the pandemic. Qatar’s leadership showed desirable feminine traits of care and honesty as well as desirable masculine traits of firmness and confidence, ensuring the harmony required between traits to overcome the crisis (Red Velvet Lawyer ). Cases started in March in Jordan with a low and slow increase in numbers of COVID- deaths until September , when deaths rose sharply and continued to increase in . Yet Jordan’s case remains unique, as the following discussion shows.

The Jordanian Government’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic The government of Jordan (GoJ) employed divergent strategies throughout the initial and later phases of the COVID- pandemic. When the first case of COVID- was discovered, the government’s quick and brave response

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was commended globally: the spread of the virus was controlled, and coronavirus hotspots across the country were identified and contained. The first case of COVID- in Jordan was reported on March , : a young man who had been to Italy for vacation. The man was taken to the hospital, isolated, and treated. During the following week, the confirmed cases of COVID- began to rise among foreign tourists entering the country. A Jordanian man and his daughter who arrived from Spain in midMarch for her wedding both had the virus. The wedding, held in Irbid (a governorate in the north of Jordan), hosted  guests and resulted in a spike in Jordan’s cases. This event in northern Jordan, coupled with growing global cases, led the Jordanian government to respond quickly and systematically. A national response team was formed and led by the prime minister and the National Centre for Security and Crisis Management (Jordan Times a), travel was restricted, and social distancing was mandated, among other measures deemed necessary. The GoJ sent flights to retrieve Jordanian nationals living in China and requested that all Jordanians living abroad return home within a window of ten days. All arrivals to Jordan were quarantined and isolated in hotels on the Dead Sea and in Amman. Many of the returnees were Jordanian students studying in universities abroad. In addition to bringing home its citizens, the GoJ quarantined over , visitors from abroad in five-star hotels, and also in Amman and at the Dead Sea. The swift containment response was met with much public support and gratitude. In fact, the Jordanian Army handed roses to quarantined citizens and visitors upon their release during the pandemic’s early days (Singh ). The number of coronavirus cases began to increase in March , and the GoJ declared a state of emergency on March . Jordan activated defense law under article  in the Jordan constitution, which states that “upon a decision and a Royal Decree, a National Defense Law shall be passed in case of emergency that would threaten the national security or public safety in all parts of the Kingdom or in a region due to war, disturbances, armed internal strife, public disasters or the spread of a pest or epidemic” (Roya News ). The GoJ took action to put Jordan under lockdown for three weeks, followed by months of imposing a strict curfew. The Jordanian Armed Forces and the police were deployed in the kingdom to enforce this curfew. Powered by the defense law, Jordan enforced a complete lockdown on March , . This first lockdown lasted four days (Hivos and IRCKHF , ). People were forbidden to leave their homes. The GoJ utilized the

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armed forces to distribute bread and other necessities to the people in need, showing signs of care and support. Driving cars was forbidden, and as many as , people were arrested for being on the roads without a permit. The increase of COVID- cases in Irbid forced the government to seal off the northern governorates from the southern ones. All twelve governorates were locked in, and an additional six hundred people were arrested for breaking the law. This lockdown was followed by a partial lockdown for six weeks, which included a ban on the use of cars as well as closure of nurseries, educational institutions, and nonessential goods and services (Hivos and IRCKHF , ). King Abdullah of Jordan addressed the nation on March  compassionately, praising the people’s response to the lockdown: “My brothers and sisters, my family, my people, and my source of fortitude, each and every one of you is a soldier of this nation, each in your own post” (Royal Hashemite Court ). The king’s comments revealed the collaborative and compassionate leadership approach in Jordan during the early stages of the pandemic, showing desirable feminine traits. Jordan’s coronavirus numbers remained as low as nine to fifteen cases a day from March  to August , so the GoJ believed that it had contained the pandemic. Reflecting on this period, the minister of health explained that Jordan pursued an aggressive lockdown because the government was trying to buy time to work on the health infrastructure, which was poorly equipped to handle a national health crisis. The minister and his team worked for several months, without taking any time off or even going back home to their families, in order to secure ventilators and beds and even renovate sections in hospitals to accommodate COVID patients. He also mentioned that the GoJ had made agreements to ensure that the vaccine would be available in Jordan by the end of  (Jaber ). The government assumed that the lockdown, curfews, and other forcible measures would control the virus in what it called a crisis adjustment (Singh ). In the early stages of the pandemic, the GoJ succeeded in controlling its health impact. While other countries in the region were getting their first wave of the pandemic, Jordan had completely flattened its curve. This achievement gained the attention of international news: Jordan received much publicity for its early success in managing the pandemic (Ward ). The GoJ and the Jordanian people were proud of their success. Each evening, the minister of health and the minister of state for information affairs would give a press briefing on the state of the pandemic. Jordanians looked forward to the evening briefings to monitor the pandemic and commend

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themselves on being a COVID-free country. The minister of health, a seasoned medical doctor and heart surgeon, gained the country’s confidence and popularity because of his transparency and caring tone. He manifested a desirable feminine trait that resonated well with Jordanians. Given the economic distress that Jordan experienced due to the continued lockdown, the government began to distribute cash to the underprivileged. Public-sector employees received their full salaries. Several defense orders were released early in the pandemic to urge the private sector to pay  percent of their salaries to the employees working from home for sectors that had not been affected by the pandemic, and at least  percent of their salaries to employees in sectors that the government identified as having suffered most during the crisis (Embassy b). Under Defense Law , companies and factories had to obtain government approval before reducing workers’ salaries or terminating their contracts (Kebede et al. , ). Two funds were established to support enterprises at risk. The Himmat Watan Fund (Nations Efforts) was established to help the Ministry of Health track the pandemic and help marginalized and underprivileged communities that lost their income during the crisis (Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom a). In addition, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) established a fund for low-interest loans for businesses with the stipulation that companies that accessed these loans were restricted from firing workers for the duration of the loan. The Ministry of Labor (MoL) put measures in place to protect workers’ health and labor rights. This included establishing a hotline to receive reports of labor rights violations and COVID- safety measures. Under the lockdown, workers and employers were granted temporary permits to go to their offices to ensure that all wages were paid on time (Kebede et al. ). Several months into the pandemic, the government allocated funds from social security to pay for the daily-wage workers’ salaries, taking funds from the maternity social security allocation. During this first wave of the coronavirus pandemic, Jordan’s approach was preventive: the country was fortifying itself to prepare for a second or third wave of the pandemic. The approach used to manage the crisis was a blend of masculine and feminine traits, and the Jordanian people were entirely in compliance with the government’s orders. During this time,   percent of citizens trusted measures imposed by the government, and  percent were satisfied with the government, while their trust in the government’s economic decisions was at   percent (Roya News ). That trust dissipated soon afterward, however, as economic activities declined due to domestic lockdown. While Jordan successfully managed coronavirus in the early stages of the

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pandemic, it could not sustain long-term lockdowns and curfews, given the severe socioeconomic impact of the strict measures and the country’s longterm economic challenges. Before the pandemic, Jordan was already facing economic difficulties due to a decade of the mass refugee crisis, creating exogenous shock and instability in the region. Also, Jordan’s economy is predominantly service industry–driven, making it especially vulnerable to pandemic restrictions (Singh ). The prolonged lockdown only exacerbated the economic crisis. The GoJ decided to open up all businesses and removed previous restrictions on movement in September . Jordan experienced a significant increase in coronavirus cases after the country opened back up (Ben Mimoune ). Prime minister Omar Razzaz and his cabinet resigned in October, and a new prime minister, Bishar Al-Khawawneh, and cabinet were appointed. The new prime minister’s approach to the pandemic was laissez-faire. This was in response to the demands of the people, who were now fatigued with the multiple restrictions and lockdowns imposed since the onset of the pandemic as well as the downturn in an already fragile economy. The government wanted to reopen to strike a balance between the health and economic dimensions. The GoJ eliminated the Friday mandatory comprehensive curfew in January , removed required quarantines for those entering the country, opened all sectors, and started to reopen schools (OSAC ). This was in response to pressure from the private sector and activists calling on government to remove all restrictions. Among these movements was the “Toward a Safe Return to Our Schools” campaign spearheaded by civil society organizations, including women’s rights organizations, which felt that the prolonged closure had negatively affected women’s employment in Jordan. In the middle of a COVID- spike, two million children went back to school. The campaign called on the government and the House of Representatives to immediately move to the gradual and safe return to schools, considering all international health reports confirming that children under the age of twelve have a minimal infection rate and a minimal ability to transmit infection. To top it all, Jordan held its parliamentary elections on November , , in the midst of spiking COVID- numbers. When the election was first announced in July , the kingdom had only , active COVID cases. A day before the elections, the active case numbers reached ,, but the government was reluctant to retreat from its decision (Kao and Karmel ). Election turnout was only  percent, and the election was rated among the least democratic in Jordan’s recent history (votes ). The government was faced with an insoluble dilemma, between allowing

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businesses to impose a curfew as usual or enforce a complete lockdown (Kao and Karmel ). The GoJ’s laissez-faire approach had led to an out-of-control rise in COVID cases by early , reaching thousands of cases and tens of deaths per day. A year into the pandemic, Jordan had recorded its highest daily COVID- rates, with a seven-day average in the third week of March reaching , cases. In a country of  million people, as of March , , Jordan had recorded , cases and , deaths. This rampant outbreak badly taxed the health system, with hospitals and intensive-care units reaching full occupancy. This situation was aggravated by the slow rollout of the vaccine, as Jordan struggled with the global race for acquiring the vaccination and the hesitancy of many Jordanians to get vaccinated. In the midst of all this, nine COVID- patients died at the Al-Salt Government Hospital when officials ignored the depleted oxygen supplies and respirators for over two hours, leading to a nationwide outcry, demonstrations, and international humiliation (Arab News ). The protesters broke COVID- curfews, demanding the ending of martial law (Arab News ), but the government responded with tear gas to break up protests. Jordan had two polarized responses to the COVID- pandemic. It first adopted a desirable feminine approach, where the leadership, army, and government ministers were empathetic and transparent. They worked collaboratively and gained the trust of the people. They also utilized desirable masculine traits of confidence, being firm and direct, and taking strong measures to counter the pandemic. They achieved a harmony of desirable feminine and masculine leadership during the first wave of the COVID- pandemic in Jordan. During the second wave of the pandemic, beginning in the fall of , undesirable masculine traits of superiority, dominance, and control prevailed. Strict government rules were enforced on civil society organizations, halting all their activities. This was coupled with undesirable feminine traits of anxiety, weakness, and the feeling of being powerless and a victim of the world pandemic. The prime minister ended all restrictions, except for martial law, in an act of helplessness. The response coupled undesirable masculine and undesirable feminine traits, resulting in confusion and a state of chaos.

The Impact of the Pandemic on Women in Jordan The ongoing COVID- pandemic exposed preexisting gender inequalities and socioeconomic vulnerabilities in Jordanian society. Before the

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pandemic, Jordanian women already had some of the lowest female labor force participation rates globally, standing at around .  percent,   percent lower than that of the average Middle Eastern country (Kasoolu et al. ,  ). With the onset of the pandemic, Jordanian women suffered severe economic losses, as they made up most informal sector workers. While  percent of the informal sector workers lost their jobs,  percent of those employed in the formal sector remained employed (UN Women b). There is a shortage of sex-disaggregated data related to the informal sector, and the available data do not show whether or not women kept their jobs. Women manage over  percent of individual home-based businesses; .  percent of women work in conventional low-paid jobs with limited income; and women head   percent of families (Amawi ). Due to the lockdown, many female-headed families lost their whole or partial income source, faced food insecurity, and could not pay their rent (Hivos and IRCKHF ). Still, women’s household and childcare duties increased under the pandemic (Hivos and IRCKHF ; Kebede et al. ). The partial lockdown led to an increase in unpaid care work for women. Since the onset of the pandemic, women in Jordan have stepped up in their roles as nurses, media reporters, factory workers, and politicians to become the first-line defense during these difficult times. In Jordan,  percent of frontline workers in the health sector and  percent of pharmacists are women (Abu Jaber ). However, despite their critical role on the frontlines, women had little influence on the National Centre for Security and Crisis Management decision-making to combat the virus through policymaking. Jordan faced additional setbacks in terms of whatever little had been previously achieved regarding gender equality in economic participation. Being in lockdown, Jordan saw an increase in domestic violence but at the same time a total closure of shelters and social services for women. Protection services units at the Public Security Department were overwhelmed by the health crisis, while civil services organizations were forbidden to provide services due to the lockdown, leaving women with few options. UN Women and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) issued a policy brief, noting that less funding was allocated to sexual and reproductive health services, especially those that address gender-based violence (Hivos and IRCKHF , ). Working women “who lost their jobs and have no source of income find it difficult to leave an abusive and thereby domestic violence becomes the manifestation of unequal gender relations and an expression of power and control” (Hivos and IRCKHF , ). UNICEF () reports that lockdowns “not only increase gender-based

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violence and violence against children but also reduce victims’ help-seeking behavior from family, friends and NGOs and government institutions.” This was true in Jordan. Sisterhood Is a Global Institute (SIGI), a local nonprofit organization that deals with domestic violence cases, reported receiving  cases from March  through May , equivalent to the number for the entire year in  (Kharoufeh ). Other organizations claimed a  percent decrease in reported domestic violence cases against women in the first two weeks of the lockdown. Reasons such as “proximity with the perpetrator, lack of access to a private cell-phone, and limited knowledge in hotline numbers and trust in online services” all contributed to the decreasing reports (UNFP , ). As a result of the lockdown, vital social support and related networks essential for coping with violence closed, such as Women and Girls Safe Spaces (UNFP ). During the lockdown, at a crucial time when they were most needed, the GoJ halted the activities of civil society and women/human rights organizations, including the Jordan National Commission for Women (JNCW). The JNCW, a quasi-governmental organization, is considered the central entity for the government and all official bodies regarding all women’s issues. This closure created a lacuna in female leadership and reduced the much-needed feminine approach to leadership. As Jordan entered the second year of the coronavirus pandemic, the government leaders were relying exclusively on masculine traits in their pandemic response. The GoJ utilized the masculine traits of assertiveness, discipline, and protection to combat the health crisis. However, its responses abandoned the initial feminine traits of compassion, humility, and empathy needed to solve the social problems associated with the pandemic. Although some feminine traits were manifested by the army, especially during the pandemic’s early stages, the dominant traits have always been masculine. With more feminine leadership and traits, Jordan could have taken measures to mitigate the impact of lost wages, the nonformal sector loss of jobs and livelihood, and, more importantly, the conditions of children, the elderly, and particularly women. Indeed, Jordan could have preempted the spike in domestic violence that occurred one month into the quarantine if feminine traits had been put to service.

Recognizing the Role of Women in Jordan’s Coronavirus Response The absence of feminine leadership and female representation in decisionmaking during COVID- is not unique to Jordan. Except for the select

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countries mentioned earlier, women’s voices and their contributions in responding to the COVID- pandemic were not heard or felt. To counter this social exclusion, World of Letters (WoL), a social enterprise I founded in  to work toward gender equity in Jordan and across the MENA region, launched a campaign featuring women during the COVID- era in Jordan. Twice per week WoL featured women who played an essential role in combating the pandemic and supporting the economy on our social media accounts. The women we featured included factory workers who made masks and protective gear, doctors who helped a virus-infected pregnant woman give birth, nurses who cared for the hundreds of cases, and journalists who ensured the critical flow of information during the crisis. We showcased that all of these women were on the front lines of the response, yet few made it to the frontline media coverage. With the support of a grant from the US government–funded Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), WoL partnered with Women as Partners in Progress, a network of civil society organizations and leaders in Jordan focused on gender equality. Adopting a feminine approach to tackle the pandemic, we used this moment to recognize and value women’s role in the economy proactively. The network was deeply concerned about setbacks in gender equality in Jordan and wanted to elevate women’s stories. We produced numerous materials to highlight Jordanian women’s role in combating COVID-. Moreover, WoL helped publicize eight articles and images profiling women working in several sectors such as medical care, media, microbiology laboratories, education, and factories. One woman profiled was Dr. Nesreen Al-Hmoud, director of the Biosafety Centre at the Royal Scientific Society (RSS), the largest applied research institution in Jordan and a regional leader for science and technology. Al-Hmoud has been working on a regional study of bat-borne zoonotic disease emergence in Western Asia since  and played an important role in enhancing understanding of disease investigations such as coronaviruses (RSS ). We created images featuring Superwoman cloaked in Jordan’s flag, standing proudly alongside other Jordanians, saluting women on the frontlines who are combating the virus, including doctors, medical technicians, nurses, army pilots, scientists, and law enforcement agents. The Women as Partners in Progress network ran the media campaign in two of the country’s leading newspapers, in a social-media campaign on Facebook and Twitter, and through online news sites. Our work received recognition in a Center for Strategic and International Studies report about elevating women peace-builders during the pandemic (Abdullah and Yayboke ). Our campaign also created a counter-visual to highlight Jordanian female

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Figure 14.1. A social media activist’s political advertisement featured six male political figures titled the “Jordanian Heroes” to show their appreciation for Jordan’s leaders during the pandemic. Reprinted with permission from the artist, Replay Media, 2020.

ministers’ contributions to combating COVID-. We presented women as Jordanian heroes alongside their male colleagues. More specifically, we countered a social media political advertisement titled the “Jordanian Heroes” (figure .) that featured six male political figures with another that showed appreciation for Jordan’s women leaders (World of Letters ). While incredibly proud of Jordan’s commendable response in the early days of the pandemic, this ad neglected three female cabinet members whose decision-making during the crisis was critical for the successful response. Hala Zawati, the minister of energy and natural resources, ensured that Jordan’s reserve gasoline and diesel were sufficient to last during the lockdown. Yasera Ghosheh, the minister of social development, activated community-based organizations’ networks to distribute bread, vegetables, fruits, and other necessities to the governorates amid the chaos. Finally, Majd Shoukeh, the minister of tourism, launched a program to encourage domestic tourism in Jordan (Jordan Times b). Although these deliverables were crucial to Jordan’s successful handling of the crisis, none of these female ministers received public recognition even remotely equivalent to the attention given to their male counterparts. Therefore, we elevated their important roles through social media, showcasing women as “Heroes of Jordan” (figure .) to counter the image used to promote male ministers on social media platforms. These images countered the masculine narrative and provided an alternative to scenes that the Jordanian television and mass media were perpetuating.

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Figure 14.2. Using social media, World of Letters showcased women as “Heroes of Jordan” in a fashion similar to the image used to promote male ministers. Reprinted with permission from World of Letters, 2018.

As a Women as Partners in Progress partner, we realized the importance of using this moment in history to showcase that women ministers also played an essential role during the pandemic and will continue to do so once the pandemic has ended (World of Letters, ).

The Civil Society Response As women were facing increased unemployment, added unpaid care work, and rising domestic violence rates, civil society organizations were sidelined and prohibited from conducting any activities to fight the social effects of COVID. Defying the lockdown, we began finding ways to create solutions to support women by elevating women’s roles in the media, providing peer support and mentoring, guiding work to support the global health effort, and leveraging collective action. Women Supporting Women

JoWomenomics, another local nonprofit organization I founded that focuses on women’s employment empowerment in Jordan, has remained active during the early stages of the pandemic through today. JoWomenomics trained

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and employed  women distributed in five governorates in : Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Balqa, and Madaba. JoWomenomics surveyed  community members in the five governorates in April  to find out the community’s perception regarding women’s role in the economy and society during the pandemic. The results showed that .  percent believe that women are the most vulnerable in the labor market. Unemployment data for the fourth quarter of  showed that while unemployment for males increased .  percentage points, unemployment for females increased . percentage points, reaching . percent; men’s was only . percent (RoyaNews ). Many employed Jordanian women eventually lost their jobs due to COVID-. To support women in the economy, JoWomenomics created WhatsApp groups that host  previous female participants in our employment programs at factories and in retail sales to mentor women during this challenging season for work-life. Given the crisis, JoWomenomics anticipated that women would be staying at home and that the gender dynamics would change. After the first month, we surveyed the WhatsApp community, keeping answers anonymous. We asked women four questions: . Have the household chores increased during the COVID- crisis? . Are you suffering negative economic consequences during the COVID- crisis? . Are you experiencing any domestic verbal violence during the COVID- crisis? . Are you experiencing any domestic physical violence during the COVID- crisis?

Of the  members in the WhatsApp group,  answered the questions (almost  percent). At least  percent of the women felt that their household chores had increased. Some of them even stated that their brothers and fathers continuously asked them to do their chores, and  percent felt that the COVID- crisis had a negative financial impact on them. While the WhatsApp group of women did not lose their jobs (many were paid fully from a government subsidy or partially by the factories), many reported that their husbands were the ones who lost their jobs. Almost  percent of respondents were verbally abused, and . percent reported being physically abused. A shadow pandemic emerged, with domestic violence increasing drastically as the pandemic progressed. Given that all shelters were closed, and the Family Protection Services at the Public Security Department

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became overwhelmed with the health crisis, these women had few options except to endure the abuse. JoWomenomics connected with an international nonprofit organization focused on domestic abuse to offer mentoring and one-on-one counseling for the women. The WhatsApp group became a refuge for the women, as they jointly created a support group to help one another. Alexander and Welzel (, ) assert that “women’s emancipative beliefs translate easier into public action when an overall emancipative climate encourages such action,” meaning that only by the collective power of women can we truly emancipate women. The civil society approach taken here in dealing with the pandemic was a feminine approach. In the absence of other safety structures, women empathize with one another and collaborate to find support. The WhatsApp group became a refuge for the women; they jointly created a support group to utilize the desirable feminine leadership traits of collaboration and empathy. Inspired by these women’s fellowship, JoWomenomics created an awareness video about the importance of women’s economic participation. The video featured a narrative by the Ifta Religious Department representative Mufti Hassan Abu Arqoub and communities in Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Balqa, and Madaba, where we had employed and surveyed women. The video received more than , views and reached , people and , impressions (JoWomenomics ). Women in the Economy Combating COVID-19

Having worked previously with the Nourseen garment factory in a remote area in the north, JoWomenomics got an early warning of the COVID economic challenges. The owner, a Jordanian who had worked in southeast Asian factories, secured a deal in the Chinese garment industry market in . Unlike all other factories that had come to a standstill, Nourseen was still operating. The Nourseen factory’s primary market was China. At the onset of the pandemic in late , the Chinese company requested that the factory switch from producing cloth to producing protective gear (masks). Nourseen began exporting masks to China at the end of . The factory succeeded in obtaining the Ministry of Health’s approval to produce masks for the local market in early . The women we had trained and employed earlier in  remained in their jobs during the pandemic. JoWomenomics featured Randa, one of the women trained and employed at Nourseen, as a success story. An article was published in a Jordanian daily newspaper (Al Rai ), then a social media campaign followed.

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Randa gave us a complete description of her situation as a mother and a wife, balancing her commitment to her job, helping her country, and caring for her family. The article also received international media attention for featuring women’s contributions during the early onset of the pandemic (Barkawi ). At JoWomenomics we approached our work supporting women by providing avenues for collaboration through the WhatsApp groups and creating opportunities for women to stay employed at the Nourseen factory through a feminist economics lens. That is, we considered the ways the lockdowns would impact women differently than men and how the pandemic would impact women’s employment opportunities outside of the home and their additional care burdens inside the home. We approached the situation with the explicit purpose of improving women’s conditions. From this approach, we were able to work collaboratively with the private sector, the public, and the government to find common solutions to support women.

Conclusion As this chapter has shown, Jordanian leadership employed divergent strategies throughout the initial and later waves of the COVID- pandemic. It relied on different aspects of masculine and feminine leadership traits in its decision-making. At the start of the pandemic, King Abdullah promoted compassion and empathy and called on the collaborative nature of Jordanians to counter the pandemic. Male leaders within the GoJ responded swiftly to the pandemic and communicated clearly, exemplifying masculine leadership traits. However, they failed to recognize women’s vital role in countering the pandemic and how it would impact women differently from men, exacerbating gender inequalities. The masculine approach to tackling the pandemic treated it as a health crisis only and ignored the calamity of its broader socioeconomic effects, while the feminine approach to the pandemic was more holistic, keeping in mind its socioeconomic and political aspects. The feminine approach was briefly exercised, with the king’s initial remarks, but it was immediately dismissed and forgotten in the execution of the GoJ’s practices. While Jordan successfully contained the coronavirus in the pandemic’s first wave, it failed to control the pandemic beyond that stage, opting instead to act indecisively (an undesirable feminine trait), while remaining entrenched in undesirable masculine traits, such as the use of force and

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aggression during the outbreak of riots. Amid the massive ongoing spread of COVID, a return to harmony between the more desirable feminine and masculine leadership responses is vital. Taking what we have learned during the pandemic in Jordan and examining global leaders’ responses, we see that a monogendered leadership approach to curbing national and global crises such as the COVID- pandemic was not ideal in dealing with the crisis. Whether in the form of women placed in critical positions of leadership or male leaders expressing the desirable feminine traits of empathy, care, and nurture, a balanced leadership approach, or a balance of both genders at the helm of authority, is crucial in crises such as this pandemic. This balance is essential to deal with dire situations that touch on the community’s mental, physical, and physiological well-being and the economy.

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Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan, Washington, DC. a. “Himmat Watan Fund Launches Official Website to Streamline Donations to COVID- Response” (April ). https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/himmat-watan-fund -launches-official-website-streamline-donations-covid--response. ———. b. “Prime Minister Razzaz Issues Defence Order No. , ” (April ). https:// www.jordantimes .com/ news/ local/ pm -issues -defence -order -no - -stipulating-labour-rights-under-defence-law. Hivos and IRCKHF (Information and Research Center, King Hussein Foundation). . “COVID- and the Double Burden on Women in Jordan.” Haqqi. http:// haqqi.info/en/haqqi/research/covid--and-double-burden-women-jordan. Jaber, Saad. . “Women’s Roles during COVID-.” Presented at the Women as Partners in Progress conference “Women as a Shaping History during COVID-,” Jordan, November . Jordan Times. a. “Razzaz Announces Activation of Defence Law Following Royal Decree” (March ). http://jordantimes.com/news/local/razzaz-announces -activation-defence-law-following-royal-decree. ———. b. “Shweikeh Reviews Measures to Revive Tourism Sector at G Virtual Meeting” (October ). https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/shweikeh -reviews-measures-revive-tourism-sector-g-virtual-meeting. JoWomenomics. . “Community Awareness Program—Feminist Economics as a National Priority.” YouTube (in Arabic, April ). https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=MOrdVALJZk. Kao, Kristen, and E. J. Karmel. . “The Pandemic Compromised Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections.” Washington Post (November ). https://www.washingtonpost.com /politics////pandemic-compromised-jordans-parliamentary-elections. Kasoolu, Semiray, Ricardo Hausmann, Tim O’Brien, and Miguel Angel Santos. . “Female Labor in Jordan: A Systematic Approach to the Exclusion Puzzle.” Center for International Development, Harvard University (October). https://growthlab .cid.harvard.edu/ files/ growthlab/ files/  - -cid -wp - -female -labor-jordan .pdf. Kebede, Tewodros Aragie, Svein Erik Stave, Maha Kattaa, and Michaela Prokop. . “Impact of the COVID- Pandemic on Enterprises in Jordan.” International Labour Organization, Fafo, and UNDP (June ). https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp/groups /public/—arabstates/—ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_.pdf. Kharoufeh, Dalia. . “VIDEO: Gender-Based Violence in Jordan: The Alternate Pandemic.” Roya News (February ). https://en.royanews.tv/news/ /VIDEO—Gender-based-violence-in-Jordan—the-alternate-pandemic. Khurma, Merissa. . “Women Leaders Needed at the High Table during COVID- and Beyond.” Wilson Center (June ). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/women -leaders-needed-high-table-during-covid--and-beyond. OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council). . “Health Alert: Jordan, Easing of COVID- Restrictions” (January ). https://www.osac.gov/Country/Jordan /Content/Detail/Report/bdf-a-a-be-aacdefe. Al Rai. . “Jordanian Women Work in Factories to Protect Jordan and the World” (in Arabic, March ). http://alrai.com/article/. Red Velvet Lawyer. . “Qatar Flattening the Curve through Testing, Quarantine, Travel Limitation, and Social Distancing” (March ). http://the-red-velvet-lawyer .blogspot.com//.

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Reliefweb. .“COVID- and Women’s Economic Empowerment: Policy Recommendations for Strengthening Jordan’s Recovery—Jordan” (September ). https:// reliefweb.int/ report/ jordan/ covid - -and -women -s -economic -empowerment -policy-recommendations-strengthening-jordan. Ricciardelli, Lina A., and Robert J. Williams. . “Desirable and Undesirable Gender Traits in Three Behavioral Domains.” Sex Roles – (November): –. https:// link.springer.com/article/./BF. Royal Hashemite Court. . Twitter (in Arabic, March ). https://twitter.com /RHCJO/status/?ref_src=twsrc%Etfw%Ctwcamp%Etweet embed %Ctwterm %E & ref _url = https %A %F %Froyal central.co.uk%Feast%Fjordan%Fking-abdullah-addresses-jordan-over-covid --%F. Roya News. . “% of Jordanians Are Satisfied with the Government’s Measures to Confront Corona (Opinion Poll)” (in Arabic, July ). https://royanews.tv/news . ———. . “Statistics: Unemployed Rate during the Fourth Quarter of ” (in Arabic, March ). https://bit.ly/tZDTfn. RSS (Royal Scientific Society). . “Factsheet: Biosafety and Biosecurity Centre.” https:// www.rss .jo/ wp -content/ uploads/ / / FACTSHEET _BioSafety _Bio SecurityCentre_Nov.pdf. Singh, Manjari. . “Jordan after COVID-: From Crisis Adjustment to Crisis Management.” Washington Institute (April ). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org /policy-analysis/jordan-after-covid--crisis-adjustment-crisis-management. Twenge, Jean M. . “Changes in Masculine and Feminine Traits over Time: A Metaanalysis.” Sex Roles  (March): –. https://link.springer.com/article/. /BF. UNFP (United Nations Population Fund). . “COVID-: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Times of Crisis—Jordan Brief.” Reliefweb (April). https:// jordan.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/COVID-%SRHR%Jordan %Brief%-April.pdf. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). . “Global Status Report on Preventing Violence against Children .” https://www.unicef.org/media//file/Global -status-report-on-preventing-violence-against-children-.pdf. UN Women. a. “COVID- and Its Economic Toll on Women: The Story behind the Numbers” (September ). https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/ //feature-covid--economic-impacts-on-women. ———. b. “Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID- on Vulnerable Women in Jordan.” Reliefweb (April). https://jordan.unwomen.org/en/digital -library/publications/rapid-assessment-of-the-impact-of-covid-on-vulnerable -women-in-jordan. Ward, Alex. . “Vietnam, Slovenia, and  Other Overlooked Coronavirus Success Stories.” Vox (May ). https://www.vox.com/////coronavirus -vietnam-slovenia-jordan-iceland-greece. “What Is the ‘National Defence Law’ That Jordan Will Likely Pass to Fight Corona?” . Roya News (March ). https://en.royanews.tv/news//What-is-the— National-Defence-Law—that-Jordan-will-likely-pass-to-fight-corona. World of Letters, . “Communication, Advocacy and Leadership: Women as Partners in Progress” (in Arabic). https://wpp.worldofletters.net/ar/Home.

CHAPTER 15

The Feminist Position: Corona Crisis Management and Its Impact on Palestinian Women R E H A M A B U A L - A S A L , N A B I L A E S PA N I O LY , S A MA H S A L A I MA , N A H I DA   S H E H A D E H , S H A H I R A S H A L A B I , A N D H A N A A M O U RY

On March , , the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus a global epidemic. With the high number of citizens contracting the virus, a complete shutdown was announced across Israel on March , , and lasted for two months. During this period, precautionary measures were taken, such as closing borders, preventing people from leaving their homes, and digitally tracking people living with the virus. These events coincided with the political deadlock that prevailed in the country after holding three parliamentary elections within less than a year but without any conclusive results, preventing the two main competing parties from forming a coalition government. The advent of the corona crisis pushed the parties to reach an agreement on April , , establishing a national emergency government under the pretext of confronting the pandemic. The coronavirus crisis exposed the failure of the right-wing neoliberal policies that led to the deterioration of the health, welfare, and education systems, and highlighted the systematic discriminatory policies toward the Palestinians as a national minority and Palestinian women in particular. Palestinians living inside Israel suffer from poverty and discrimination in all walks of life, and these discriminatory practices were exacerbated in this crisis at multiple levels. This chapter was written as an evaluative report at the beginning of the second wave of the coronavirus. We examine the prevailing dynamics in the policies adopted in the face of the corona crisis and its crucial impact on Palestinian women on two levels: first, the policies of the state’s ministries and institutions; and second, the policies and practices of local Palestinian political leaders, institutions, and actors. On the one hand, this chapter presents a holistic feminist analysis and critique of the crisis to elicit lessons

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learned. These lessons emphasize the need to support a national feminist agenda and to include women in managing ongoing and future crises and emergencies. On the other hand, we aim to hold accountable local, regional, and national government stakeholders who have deliberately or inadvertently failed to deal with the crisis.

Military Rhetoric and Practices The rhetoric, strategies, and practices adopted by the Israeli government reflect the overwhelming military mentality in the country. From the beginning, the government treated the pandemic as an enemy against which a war must be won, rather than a health crisis with social, economic, and psychological consequences. Benjamin Netanyahu called for an emergency government to save the people and the state by applying the term “on the stretcher,” a military term that refers to casualties being transported for medical treatment. Netanyahu used this military rhetoric to urge forming a government of national unity. In a speech on March , , after the announcement of the lockdown, Netanyahu addressed the state’s citizens, saying, “Every citizen of this country is a warrior in this war against the coronavirus” and describing the medical staff as “heroes on the frontlines.” Other officials have repeated these terms, while many ministries treated the pandemic information as “military secrets.” Likewise, Naftali Bennett, the head of the right-wing party, used this term to highlight Netanyahu’s failure to manage the crisis and save the Jewish people. Such rhetoric was not limited to politicians but also used by the media covering the news of the pandemic and others. For example, we heard some artists say, “War cannot be won without art.” This language later spread among the local Arab media. By using familiar military rhetoric, the government aimed to intimidate people and paralyze the voices of criticism. This rhetoric reflected the military policies and strategies adopted to resolve the crisis. The system developed to deal with the crisis borrowed its names and structure from the military establishment by setting “war rooms.” Army officers were also invited to take decision-making and crisis-management positions. Army units and elements were used to enforce the lockdowns in various cities, manage coronavirus hotels, and distribute supplies to the needy. Using the army was particularly problematic for the Arab society. The army, the police, and the Israel Security Agency (Shabak) are institutions with a confrontational and

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threatening relationship to Arabs. In the Palestinians’ collective memory, they represent oppression. In light of this reality, for army units to enter Arab cities and towns and the local councils to cooperate with these units was problematic, leading to awkward political consequences. In addition, Shabak was given the authority to invade people’s privacy, monitor their mobile phones, and participate in acquiring necessary medical equipment from countries with which Israel does not have any official relations. For most Israelis, the tyranny of military rhetoric and practices in dealing with the coronavirus crisis was not a problem. On the contrary, they considered it a natural extension of protection. However, the Palestinian society, which has suffered from Shabak’s persecutions, dealt with this military rhetoric with sarcasm. Many felt that the pandemic was exploited to promote political projects that have reinforced the security mentality governing the state’s relationship with Arab society over the years. Racism and systematic discrimination policies have cast their shadows over the Palestinian society in the coronavirus crisis more than ever. They showed that Arab-serving institutions, such as local councils and educational institutions, lack the readiness to deal with emergencies. For instance, the Ministry of Education decided to adopt a distance learning system in schools and reduce the number of students in classrooms; however, it was impossible to apply this system in Arab towns. Data from the Knesset Committee on the Rights of the Child show that , students lacked access to computers or the internet, most of them Arab and economically vulnerable. Moreover, many Arab schools could not reduce the number of students or adopt distance learning, as they suffered from overcrowding and limited access to resources. Degrees of discrimination were even more striking in villages in the Negev that were not officially recognized. Thousands of students suffered from massive overcrowding in classrooms, continuous water cuts in schools, and scorching heat. Half the students were unable to reach their school because of the lack of adequate transportation. During the pandemic, only   percent were enrolled in distance learning because of the lack of internet connections and computers. The marginalizing policies sparked many protests against the governmentinduced labor struggles for workers, social workers, nurses, and laboratory workers. Protesters gathered daily in front of Netanyahu’s house in the Balfour area in Jerusalem. However, most focused on Netanyahu’s leadership and not governmental policies. Not sufficiently politicized, protesters did not understand the different relationships and intersections between the occupation and the state’s military structure or its impact on society in all levels, aspects, and times. This intersection explains Palestinians’ reluctance

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to participate in these protests and frustration due to their inability to influence their discourse.

Promoting Gender Inequality in the Media Palestinian citizens of Israel depend on a private for-profit media network that includes radio and TV stations, news sites, and newspapers. Alternatively, the official government-sponsored media include a radio and a TV channel that broadcasts in Arabic. In preparation for the lockdown, and during the first wave, the Hebrew media controlled all contents, methods, and frequency of information delivered to the Arab community. This control delayed the Arab media’s access to information and forced them to copy the contents from the Hebrew media. The majority of the Arab public considers the official Hebrew channels a primary source of information due to the poor professional performance of the Arabic-language media. As a result, the Arab community watched the prime minister’s evening performances daily and ignored the Arab media. Within a few weeks, many began to criticize the marginalization, lack of readiness, and inappropriateness of the Ministry of Health’s awareness efforts in Arabic. Instead, leaflets borrowed from the Jordanian Ministry of Health, the Palestinian Authority, and even Gulf states started appearing in Arab towns. The pictures showed veiled women with full black robes and men with the white dishdasha while knowing that members of the Palestinian community inside the state do not wear this type of clothing, and that this is a strange stereotype far from the minds of the local community. Many criticized the Ministry of Health’s dismal budgets allocated for awareness and instructions in Arabic and the lack of cooperation of the Arab media. Consequently, a budget was allocated for advertising in Arabic, and government websites were translated to Arabic, particularly those of the Ministry of Health. With a few women among its ranks, the Arab Emergency Committee worked in parallel with the official Israeli media to keep pace with the efforts to combat the spread of coronavirus in the Arab society. It issued information obtained from governmental agencies and delivered them to the Arab community. However, its goal to overcome the continuous delays in disseminating data and instructions in Arabic was characterized by a robust male-dominated discourse and mechanisms. The official media campaign of the Ministry of Health began in Arabic, with short films on the precautions needed to prevent the spread of the

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pandemic. Grape Leaves, the most famous pandemic film, represented the traditional lens through which Israeli institutions viewed Arab women. The film provoked resentments among women’s rights associations for stereotyping Arab women as homemakers and mothers who spend most of their time cooking and socializing with their neighbors while rolling grape leaves. Furthermore, the film encouraged women to remain in their homes during Ramadan by appealing to their need to be “virtuous,” caring for their family’s safety and pleasing their husbands. In the wake of criticism from women activists, the ministry was forced to suspend the film. The other film, which featured a wedding celebration, was filled with poor acting, exaggeration, and culturally insensitive scenes, especially toward Bedouin women and their wedding traditions. Along with its media department and supporters, the Ministry of Health was not alone in pushing women back into their kitchens during the pandemic. Most Arab media did too, including radio stations (Voice of Israel, Voice of the People, and Voice of Shams), private satellite channels (Hala, Bukra, Bayit, and Mussawat), and websites (national and regional). They all projected traditional gender roles for women and men during coronavirus days, as women went back to cooking, cleaning, and teaching the kids, especially with the distance learning system. Satirical and funny programs pictured the women working from home as if they were not working, as if they were mere housewives “acting” like they did the work remotely. Men were also mocked for being domesticated. As for the news, analytical programs and discussions on serious and critical topics were limited. Only a few experts were invited for interviews on Arabic and Hebrew channels. Likewise, very few local female public health experts were invited to talk about the coronavirus, although many female doctors and nurses were involved in fighting the pandemic. It is worth mentioning that some media tried to increase the number of women among the speakers. Despite the increase of murder rates in Arab towns and cities and the violence against women during the lockdown, it was challenging to push women’s issues onto the press agenda, as the press was busy with coronavirus news. However, women’s associations prepared position papers on social welfare readiness and the importance of women’s participation in the Corona Cabinet. These associations also discussed several issues with government offices, including the impact of coronavirus on women, especially regarding their work environment, unemployment, health, violence against women, murders, cyber demonstrations against murder, and other issues. However, none of these activities captured the attention of journalists. Instead, they were lost in the momentum of coronavirus news and its political

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fluctuations, the formation of the government, and other issues. The public was told that there was currently no time for discussing gender issues or the feminist discourse. Even when an analyst or a speaker was featured to discuss women’s issues, it was a man’s voice. For instance, when covering female social workers’ struggles, men were constantly invited to talk about the female workers’ demands, although women represent  percent of the workers in this field. In another example, the media quoted Arab male nurses working in various hospitals, knowing that most nurses are women. Not to mention the teachers’ union strike, which was dealt with exclusively by men. The only struggle where women were featured was the daycare strikes, as there are no men in this profession yet in the Arab society. The local Arab media have failed in three main areas. First, they limited the representation of Arab women speakers and journalists. Second, they presented women in a stereotypical manner and even as inferior, through male coverage of all public, mental, and community health issues that promotes gender-stereotyped social roles and does not challenge them. Third, they treated feminist issues as minor and unimportant or separate from what was happening during the coronavirus crisis. Conversely, some feminists conducted effective, activist, and entrepreneurial media monitoring. When needed, they held the media outlets accountable or provided guidance. Feminists can undoubtedly intensify their efforts in this role, however.

The Performance of Politicians and Exclusion of Women’s Bodies The Arab society formed the Emergency Committee (EC) at the beginning of the coronavirus crisis, as a part of the High Follow-Up Committee (HFC) and the Committee of the Heads of Local Authorities (CLA), in response to the Israeli state’s blatant failures in dealing with the Arab society. The EC consisted of professionals who represented the HFC and CLA and those engaging parliamentary leadership. Initially, the EC did not invite any women’s associations to join, but they imposed themselves. The EC pressured the various ministries by submitting documents that highlighted the emergency needs of the Palestinian society in the face of the coronavirus crisis, especially in small Arab towns and cities, where humanitarian assistance for families was urgently needed. In parallel, Knesset members worked on lobbying and advocating for rapid screening centers and the Red Star of David services, which were absent in Arab towns. The members also demanded the translation of health materials and directives into Arabic. However, all these services were

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delayed in reaching Arab cities and towns. Since the end of the first lockdown, a disconnect between the Knesset members and the HFC and CLA, and among municipalities, council presidents, and civil society institutions, has been apparent. The Emergency Committee’s mass organization was unprecedented, according to women members. Their response to the crisis was striking, revealing expertise and many local competencies, manifesting the ability to work in partnership, and responding effectively to the needs of the Arab community with outstanding professionalism. With the expertise of its professionals, the EC managed to draw the attention of the politicians to these needs and coordinate with them. In their turn, Knesset members of the joint list followed the committee’s recommendations and succeeded, despite the resistance of the various ministries, to secure the required services. Despite their eagerness to be featured in the media, EC members worked diligently to meet the needs of the Arab community. Local Arab authorities, which were the first responders to work directly with the various ministries, did not coordinate in their fight against the spread of the virus. The pandemic spread quickly again in the Arab society in a second wave due to the popularity of weddings. Some heads of local authorities dealt with the crisis on an individual basis and used the pandemic to increase their visibility and highlight their achievements. Other local heads were reckless in dealing with the coronavirus and did not comply with the preventive instructions. Still others declared their town to be a “red” city, marking their failure as a disgrace instead of working on building a solid and comprehensive plan. Some denied the existence of the pandemic, questioned the available data, or tried to appeal the lockdown decision and challenge it in court. Thus, the heads of local authorities failed in managing this crisis and missed an opportunity to build a civil plan, use the ECs to promote social solidarity, revive popular action within Arab towns and cities, or promote individual and collective initiatives. All these social groups and civil institutions could have helped meet the needs of vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the sick, and battered women. This action could have contributed vitally to reaching herd immunity and strengthening social solidarity.

Alternative Feminist Approaches to Crisis Management In the beginning of the pandemic, women’s associations were excluded from the High Follow-Up Committee and the Committee of Heads of Local Authorities. Some of these associations decided to take the initiative and raise women’s issues at the HFC and CLA, considering the urgency of the matter.

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When women activists verified that the reports prepared by these committees did not mention women and their needs, they escalated their claim. They succeeded in placing the director of one association as a permanent participant in the EC. This action brought women and the committee closer, which, according to the women’s associations, made it possible to integrate women’s issues and visions into the agenda for dealing with the crisis. For example, after raising the issue of increased violence against women during the quarantine, the EC and some of the heads of councils announced the resuming of hotlines for battered women. The associations’ demands for the return of female social workers and counselors to work raised the status of women as vital workers in municipalities and local councils. Other associations decided to work with women directly instead of engaging with official institutions. They continued their work without contacting any authorities. Part of this trend was due to these associations’ prior involvement in extensive direct work with women, according to their directors. They also felt alienated from official institutions and bodies. Several associations expressed their firm position on boycotting the HFC because of its past and repeated attitudes that demeaned women. They also did not trust Knesset members and their ability to advance women’s issues. Alternatively, some feminists expressed reservations about HFC’s reliance on the Islamic movement to distribute supplies and establish emergency lines. Instead, they urged the EC to establish its special programs that feature the committee’s inclusivity, where all parties and political frameworks function to ensure reaching all segments of the society. This crisis revealed the severe deficiency in the leadership of the Palestinian society in dealing with emergencies. This lack of organization led to the dispersal of efforts and some unpleasant phenomena of competitions and duels in distributing supplies. It also revealed the absence of an Arab center to manage the crises after the closure of Al-Mubadara, an initiative that was established after the war on Lebanon in  to manage the war’s impact on the Palestinian society in the north. Al-Mubadara included many institutions of the Arab civil society and aspired to ensure that the movements, activities, support, and aid during emergencies represented all bodies and individuals rather than being allocated clandestinely.

Increased Violence against Women and Authorities’ Failure to Manage the Crisis During emergency periods, the state is usually responsible for its citizens in general and marginalized groups in particular. However, during the first

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wave of the coronavirus crisis, the state blatantly neglected the battered women and their needs without providing them any care or protection. The incompetent ministries did not even issue any instructions to deal with this category of people. Though a total lockdown was imposed and people were required to stay home, the Ministry of Labor and Welfare did not consider the risks of domestic violence during the lockdown. Keeping battered women and their abusers present in one space increased pressures and tensions inside the homes. Since the onset of coronavirus, women’s associations have warned of the consequences of the crisis and the lockdown of women in dangerous circumstances. Women’s associations reported a  percent increase in the number of calls placed to hotlines since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic. For example, the Women against Violence Association (WAV) reported that the number of emergency calls received between March and June  was  and increased to  for the same period in . Many other associations reported similar numbers. Eight Arab women were killed in the first two months of , two of them by their husbands at home. Neither the local political leaders nor the media cared about these crimes. The police and other incompetent authorities refrained from engaging in the societal debate because they were occupied with mitigating the spread of the pandemic. Violence against women with disabilities significantly increased. According to hotline intake records, the closing of facilities for persons with disabilities and their return to their homes exposed them to increased and brutal violence. The crisis made women’s lives with their abusers more dangerous. Violence against women in the pandemic exhibited higher cruelty and additional cases that would not have occurred in normal times. The associations monitored this danger even during screening and guidance sessions. Many women were subjected to threats and violence when reporting violence, and sometimes the calls were cut off. The associations advocated developing policies to protect women who were vulnerable to violence inside their homes as well as in the shelters. Battered women went through extreme difficulties inside these shelters; once they entered quarantine, they lost their privacy, which had significant psychological repercussions for them. In addition, women with disabilities who were in facilities before the coronavirus crisis were forced to return home, putting them in dangerous situations. Women’s associations petitioned to provide women with safety measures and alternative care. They demanded that all shelters follow instructions to protect women living in them, take necessary measures to curb the spread of the virus, and test all women before their admission. At the beginning of the crisis, Israeli ministries did not have plans to deal with the coronavirus

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in women’s shelters (such as finding practical procedures for quarantining yet seeing their children, which usually takes place in the contact centers of the social services). Women’s associations have played a central role in raising these issues at local and national governmental levels since the beginning of the crisis. After two months of persistent pressure, the Ministry of Labor and Social Services opened an additional shelter that became full as soon as it opened. Then it approved the establishment of two additional shelters (which have been granted official approval to start preparing for their opening: one of the shelters will be within the Arab community and will host Arab and Jewish women). In parallel, women’s associations highlighted the negative impact of coronavirus on women and the tremendous pressures they face within their homes that are often never mentioned. The presence of children at home, the replacement of school attendance with distance learning, and working from home have created many tasks and burdens borne mainly by women. Mothers found themselves assuming multiple responsibilities, causing them physical and psychological exhaustion. The majority of Arab women live in harsh residential conditions and overcrowded houses with a lack of privacy, which indirectly creates a tense and suffocating atmosphere. Working with Israeli Associations and alongside Israeli Ministries

At the beginning of the crisis, Arab and Jewish women’s associations established the Women’s Headquarters to put women and their needs on the state agenda and pressure government ministries to pay attention to their issues. A cross-sector roundtable was established through this partnership, including women activists from civil society organizations and representatives from ministries, which continues to meet regularly. The members prepared reports monitoring women’s needs and submitted recommendations that resulted in securing a “hotel” for women who needed an environment other than the existing shelters, and succeeded in getting additional accommodation for battered women approved. By partnering with Jewish women activists, Arab women’s associations worked faster than when organizing on their own. They succeeded in pressuring the government on additional issues, including women’s employment, establishing gender specialist teams, petitioning other ministries, and working with local Arab councils. Incentives to Develop New Services and Partnerships

Coronavirus was a fast-moving factor in many associations’ attempts to develop new services and modern ways of communicating with battered

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women. The associations reported accelerating the development of communicating mechanisms such as a mobile phone line that allows the possibility of a chat (written communication) through applications like WhatsApp. The crisis has shown the vitality of this service for some women, particularly young women, in creating a safe way to report violence and receive assistance without getting noticed. Field activists distributed food packages to families in distress, meeting a gap left after the distribution by EC committees, which helped some families and neglected others, and exchanged political favors for humanitarian support. Fortunately, field activists who entered homes to deliver the food packages discovered such cases of violence where women could not file reports due to lack of access to communication networks, the internet, or information. A women’s association contributed by adding a leaflet about managing crises and ideas to stimulate children, along with motivating materials such as games, books, and resources, to the food packages. This drew attention to the psychological and social implications of the crisis, which also must be addressed and mitigated with increased support. Some women’s groups also made sure that the packages included items for women’s hygiene needs. Women’s associations also coordinated at the regional level. Using meeting platforms like Zoom, they restored communication between associations and their counterparts in the Arab world. They participated in the Salma Regional Network and connected with Palestinian women’s associations in the West Bank and Gaza. They formed a coalition with the Fada organization and launched the “We are your voice” campaign that brought together twenty-one associations to end violence against women. Obtaining funding for activities was challenging and inconsistent across the board. Some associations aligned coronavirus-related activities with their organizational priorities and allocated special budgets to meet the emerging needs. Others struggled to secure external support funds before, during, and after the coronavirus. Most external support focused mainly on relief and distribution of food packages rather than channeling the funds for long-term sustainable projects. Moreover, women’s associations lacked the professional standards needed to compete for grants provided by the state and local authorities. For example, the required minimum annual income is above most women’s associations’ income (the fixed amount of NIS [new Israeli shekels] , is equivalent to $,). Other associations that depend on local councils for funding faced difficulties in obtaining their annual funds.

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The Judicial System Implications for Arab Women With the beginning of the pandemic, the courts stopped operation as a preventive measure to curb the spread of the virus. These measures were further complemented by the minister of justice’s declaration of a state of emergency in the judicial system. Many saw this decision as an attempt by Amir Ohana, the minister of justice, who is firmly linked to Benjamin Netanyahu, to disrupt and stall the prime minister’s trial. Except for the Supreme Court, all facilities were closed. The regulatory, religious, and labor courts and the procedural departments all stopped operating. The emergency order did require keeping a skeleton crew to ensure the courts’ logistical operation. However, all previously scheduled hearings were postponed, and only urgent cases were granted a hearing. The disruption of the courts had devastating consequences for personal status cases. There was difficulty implementing the court’s decisions to enforce visitations and communication between women and their children in the Family Association Centers because these centers were closed. Courts issued instructions allowing visitations to take place via the internet. However, this solution did not meet the children’s and parents’ emotional needs in these difficult circumstances. Alimony also faced obstacles that resulted from the crisis. The National Insurance Corporation was late in implementing court decisions on alimony, jeopardizing divorced mothers’ abilities to meet basic requirements and worsening their economic situation. Practically, the judicial system was not equipped to operate in emergencies. The impact of this problem was compounded because this system is linked to other key organizations and systems such as social services offices and public transportation. Volunteers who used to escort women to court stopped this service because of the lockdown, making it more difficult for these women to reach the court. All protection systems were suspended during the pandemic. Even restraining orders that previously kept aggressive men away from women became difficult for courts to issue. In a nutshell, a lack of access to courts became a significant problem that women faced in this period. In domestic violence cases, men usually leave the house and stay with relatives or acquaintances. During the lockdown, it became complicated to arrange an alternative place for these men. Paradoxically, the legal mechanism to address women’s needs during the pandemic was not available or effective, producing a sharp increase in violence against women. Furthermore, women postponed initiating long legal cases (such as divorce and

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alimony claims) during the lockdown and only reported physical and economic violence.

Marginalizing and Neglecting Women’s Health The pandemic has deepened the existing health gaps in Arab society and exposed inefficient health services. It revealed delays in providing health services and the health differences between the Arab community and the rest of the country. Additionally, the militarization of the pandemic furthered the marginalization of vulnerable groups, especially when considering the multiple intersections of nation, economy, gender, and geography. For instance, these intersections severely impacted Bedouin women living in polygamous relationships and “unrecognized villages” in the Negev. They suffered several levels of marginalization that placed them in some of the most dangerous conditions in dealing with the virus. The health crisis has furthered the isolation of women in the Negev and deepened their marginalization. Exclusion policies have an additional dimension in the Negev in terms of blatant discrimination, especially in unrecognized villages that lack infrastructures such as electricity, water, essential health services, educational agendas, social welfare frameworks, transportation, and internet networks. Since the coronavirus outbreak, not a single casualty has been recorded in these villages for the simple reason that no screening center has been set up: the centers have been limited to established villages only. These villages have been disconnected from the outside world because of the lockdown, even denying women the essential services provided by women’s associations that are active in their regions. Association-sponsored projects that had created small profits for women and combated their illiteracy were discontinued. However, women’s associations kept trying to communicate with women within the available means to spread awareness and basic health guidelines and distribute masks. These attempts remained limited, as it was impossible to reach all remote areas and villages. Women live under harsh conditions in these villages and are deprived of their most basic rights. Women’s associations are trying to remotely communicate with these women to provide them with minimal connection with the outside world, grant them some essential services such as follow-up with the National Insurance Corporation on employment and unemployment issues, and hire lawyers. Unfortunately, these services are not sufficient to meet their multiple needs. As a result, women’s associations issued warnings about the

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harm that women and children suffer in these circumstances. When they provided guidance to the heads of local councils on the gender impact of the coronavirus, they were not taken seriously. Even worse, women’s voices were excluded, their demands were marginalized, and they were not involved in making contributions at the municipal level.

The Role of Arab Women Health Professionals in Decision-Making Under the military management of this crisis, it was easy to marginalize women in general and Palestinian women in particular. This marginalization was reflected in the absence of women and Arabs in the ECs, which provoked the criticism of women’s associations. Locally, the health committee that emanated from the HFC included seven men and only one woman. This committee assessed the gaps in health services and rights, prepared proposals to address existing needs, and lobbied the Ministry of Health with the assistance of Arab Knesset members and the joint list. This coordination between the professionals and the politicians succeeded in pressuring the government to pay attention to the Palestinian community. As a result, the Ministry of Health provided essential health services such as establishing rapid testing centers, publishing information and explanatory brochures in Arabic, offering the first-aid services of Red Star of David in Arab towns, and providing test kits. This committee also succeeded in addressing other previously marginalized issues, such as mental health and Arab women’s health. The pandemic has shown more than ever the lack of preparedness of Arab politicians and associations to work on women’s health. In this aspect, the presence of only one woman in the EC made politicians in the Knesset rely on her for advice. Although her specialty is in general health, she was marginalized within the committee. The male doctors, all of whom are hospital directors, sometimes expressed their disapproval of the female EC member and had difficulty adjusting to working with a woman. This difficulty, she surmises, might be due to these male doctors’ inexperience working with female colleagues.

Arab Women’s Health before and during the Coronavirus Crisis Research shows that the overall well-being of Arab women is poor compared to Jewish women and Arab men. Arab women are one and a half times

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more likely to suffer from chronic diseases, such as diabetes, hypertension, obesity, depression, postpartum depression, and stress. These health gaps between Arab and Jewish communities are not a simple coincidence but the product of a systematic and successive policy of discrimination and neglect of health in the Arab community. The most recent data published by Physicians for Human Rights blatantly refers to the gaps in the health services and the health status of the Arab community. Data show that Arab children’s death rate is . per thousand, more than double the rate in Jewish society (. per thousand). Likewise, the mortality rate in the Arab society (. for men and . for women) is very high compared to the Jewish community (. for men and . for women). It also shows that the rate of patients with diabetes is  percent among Arab men and . percent among Arab women, compared to . percent among Jewish men and . percent among Jewish women. The percentage of people with diabetes who die from it is at  percent in the Arab society, which is more than twice as high as in the Jewish community ( percent) (Janko ). The report further unveils the accumulated gaps in the health system’s infrastructure that place Arab towns at a disadvantage. Additionally, it shows how the privatization policy adopted in the health system has weakened public health services, reduced the workforce in the suburbs, and disincentivized investment in infrastructure and public transportation. The high poverty rates compound these factors in the Arab society, limiting access to supplemental and special insurance that would otherwise provide highquality health services. Consequently, Palestinian women feared that this situation would lead to a serious problem, but the first wave passed without any complications. The coronavirus cases among Arab and Jewish women and men were almost identical (the  percentage of infections was higher among women only in the Negev, which seems to be due to harsh living conditions, where water is not constantly accessible to unrecognized villages). However, these statistics began to change in the second wave with the spread of the virus in Arab society, but gender-disaggregated data were not available to analyze the different effects of the disease on women and men. In terms of reproductive health, all women were affected at the beginning of the crisis as family planning, fertility, and pregnancy clinics suspended their work in hospitals once a state of emergency was declared. These closings jeopardized the reproductive health of many women and put their lives at risk. For instance, delays in providing abortion resulted in medical decisions that were not compatible with women’s desire to continue or terminate their pregnancy. Sudden interruptions in fertility treatments

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negatively affected the chances of pregnancy. A single day of delay in accessing these facilities can deprive a woman of receiving these treatments. It was only after the female physicians’ movement and the political pressure on the Ministry of Health that family planning and fertility clinics resumed their work. With the spread of coronavirus in the Arab society, additional units opened to receive COVID- patients in Arab hospitals. Most of these hospitals are concentrated in Nazareth and received large budgets at the expense of closing certain sections. For instance, Nazareth English Hospital closed its women’s treatment unit to replace it with a new section for COVID patients. This action not only deprived women of immediate access to healthcare but had serious permanent consequences.

Arab Women Medical Workers Arab medical workers represent about   percent of the overall number working in the public health system. Arab women working in this field are present at all levels as doctors, nurses, and laboratory staff and can be found in various departments, hospitals, and clinics. Since the beginning of the pandemic, Arab women have held high administrative positions. Dr. Khetham Hussein from Rameh, for example, heads the infection control service at Rambam Hospital and directs the COVID- response division at the hospital. Likewise, Dr. Hiba Zayyad, head of the infectious diseases control unit at Poriya Medical Center, directly supervises the treatment of coronavirus patients, along with hundreds of physicians and medical employees in public hospitals and clinics. Several videos have emerged on social media featuring medical workers, almost half of whom are women, and criticizing Netanyahu’s incitement of racist sentiments toward Arab medical workers. These videos transmitted a professional and distinguished message through media campaigns organized by Israeli civil society organizations (for example, Initiatives of Ibrahim, Sekwe, and Jafaat Habiba). The messages highlighted Arab medical workers’ contributions to fighting the pandemic despite suffering from Netanyahu’s policies and the racism of his political representatives. A noteworthy phenomenon in this context is the Medical Union strike to improve the poor working conditions of Arab colleagues. Numerous nurses and laboratory workers were unified and successful in exposing the effects of privatization on the health sector and its workers, but their long strike did not receive public attention or proper media coverage.

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Arab Women’s Employment and Economic Conditions under COVID Fragile employment rates of Arab women were severely affected by the pandemic. Reaching  percent in the last quarter of , these rates were still about half of the Jewish women’s employment rate of  percent (Center for Research and Information ). After improving the rate of integration of women in the workforce in recent years, this crisis sharply undermined what has been achieved to date. From the preliminary data in the first months of the crisis, it became clear that the proportion of Arab women who lost their jobs was much higher than that of Arab men. The impact of the coronavirus crisis on women’s employment was much greater than on the rest of the population, and many women will not return to work after the crisis ends and life goes back to normal. Many Arab women work in low-income jobs that have suffered the greatest declines and do not require extensive vocational qualifications, such as sales and services. Most likely, women’s economic situation will sharply deteriorate, and their families will enter a life of poverty. According to the initial estimates of employment offices, the  percentage of unemployed women varies between  and  percent. For example, , people have been dismissed or sent on unpaid leave in Tayibe, including , women. Although half of those dismissed were women, the  percentage of female workers in that city is much lower than that of men (Expert Teams ). Furthermore, according to the estimates of the employment offices, about  percent of Arab women work in the informal sector (also known as the black market). Since the beginning of the crisis, their suspension from work has not been reported, so they do not receive any unemployment benefits or compensation from the state. Moreover, it is important to mention that women entrepreneurs have been severely affected, even though they represent a small segment of Arab society. Those who are still at the startup phase are burdened with bank loans and multiple expenses. Similarly, some home-based women-run businesses were not entitled to any exemptions and did not receive assistance like other small businesses. All these factors threaten many women-run startups with closure. Young Arab women ages eighteen to twenty were also affected economically by the pandemic. They were the first to be dismissed or put on unpaid leave. However, they were not eligible to receive any unemployment benefits because of their age, as the law only grants these benefits to people twenty years old and over. In contrast, young Jewish women receive benefits as

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members of the army at this age. Many young Arab women work to support themselves and cover their university expenses, which increases the difficulties of continuing their education. In the long run, there is a serious fear that Arab women will not return to work as employees or entrepreneurs, and that they will not be integrated into other domains of society, because they missed out on having proper vocational qualifications. This will expose Arab women to exploitation and make them succumb to unfair working conditions, for there are no other options. The majority of these women work in the local market and acquiesce to employers who will try to reduce their losses during the pandemic at the women’s expense. The coronavirus crisis constitutes a severe blow to the Arab community, where nearly half of the families live below the poverty line. With the increasing number of unemployed women, this crisis is likely to deepen their poverty and increase their risk of resorting to the black market or involvement in criminal gangs that already control the Arab street.

Notes This chapter is part of the framework of the Feminist Action Project—Between Professionalism and Politics, between Feminism and Patriotism. It reflects the work of six women’s associations (Al-Swar Arab feminist movement, Zahra Association for the Advancement of Women’s Status, Kayan Feminist Organization, Women against Violence, Al-Tufula Nazareth Nursery Organization [Pedagogical and Multipurpose Women Center], and Yes for Arab Women) in collaboration with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and with support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. This chapter reflects only the views of these associations. . The term in Hebrew is Mitakhat Lalounka. . During this speech, Netanyahu described the pioneers who established the state of Israel: although they faced many diseases and hardships, they did not despair. In order to ensure the establishment of a national unity government under his leadership, he used biblical stories from thousands of years ago, when the Jews faced an enemy who besieged the walls of Jerusalem, caused discord between brothers, and destroyed everything. . A new poll for the Israeli Channel  on June , , shows that Jazb Yamina would get twenty-three seats, compared to the Likud party losing twenty-six seats in the event of parliamentary elections today. . The state refuses to recognize thirty-six Arab villages in the Negev as part of its discriminatory policies and its attempts to uproot the owners from their lands. As a result, these villages are deprived of their basic needs such as water, electricity, schools, and various educational frameworks. . Interview with Amal Al-Nassra from Sidra Association.

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. Dr. Nihaya Daoud, a public health specialist, is the only woman from the EC of the HFC who has been relied upon to write on this topic. She indicates that an expanded committee has emerged from the mini-committee and currently includes more than forty women and men.

References Center for Research and Information. . “The Impact of the Corona Crisis on Work and Businesses in the Arab World” (in Hebrew, May ). https://fs.knesset.gov.il /globaldocs/MMM/bb--ea--dafa/_bb--ea --dafa__.pdf. Expert Teams. . “The Impact of the Corona Crisis on the Employment of Arab and Jewish Devout Women” (in Hebrew, May). https://www.crisis-experts.org.il /experts/women. Janko, Adir. . “Life Expectancy in Arab Society Is Lower, Infant Mortality Is Much Higher” (in Hebrew). Ynet (October ). https://www.ynet.co.il/article/SkzlziLD.

Contributors

Ghada Abdulla is an associate researcher at the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (Derasat). Her research focus is on the economics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with a specific emphasis on education, gender, and the environment. She coauthored the  Bahrain Human Development Report and is a member of a research team funded by the United Nations Development Programme that has been studying the socioeconomic impact of the COVID- pandemic in Bahrain. Abdulla holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and finance from the University of York (UK) and a master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Oroub El-Abed is a senior researcher and coinvestigator with the Centre for Lebanese Studies in Amman, Jordan, in the project studying “Trajectories of Education and Employment of Refugees and Locals” in Jordan and Lebanon in the midst of protracted displacement. Until recently a British Academy– sponsored postdoctoral fellow conducting research on cultural development among marginalized communities in the south, El-Abed completed her PhD in Political Economy of Development Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Her research has been focused on refugees and vulnerable minorities in the Middle East. She has consulted for several UN and international NGOs and published articles in the area of development (education and employment) and forced migration in the Middle East. She also published a study on the socioeconomic community development surrounding neolithic sites in Jordan () and is currently working on articles on the refugees in Jordan. She is the author of Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since  ().

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Lina AbiRafeh is a global women’s rights expert, author, and humanitarian aid worker with decades of experience worldwide. She served as the executive director of the Arab Institute for Women at the Lebanese American University from  to . AbiRafeh spent over twenty years in development and humanitarian contexts. Her expertise is in ending violence against women, summarized by her TED (Technology, Entertainment, Design) talk and various presentations and publications. She completed her doctoral work at the London School of Economics and published Gender and International Aid in Afghanistan: The Politics and Effects of Intervention () based on her research. She speaks and publishes frequently, with appearances on global stages and media outlets such as CNN, France, BBC, and Good Morning America. AbiRafeh addresses a range of women’s rights issues, including advocating for a feminist response to the COVID- pandemic and its impact on Arab women and girls. She serves on the boards of numerous global women’s rights organizations and has received awards and recognitions for her work, including the Gender Equality Top , as well as fellowships with Women inPower and Vital Voices for outstanding women leaders. AbiRafeh was recognized by the Women’s Media Center as one of their Progressive Women’s Voices for  and is featured in their database of experts. Lina Abou-Habib is the senior gender advisor at the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship at the American University of Beirut. She is also the chair of the Collective for Research and Training for Development—Action and serves as a board member for Gender at Work as well as the MENA strategic advisor for the Global Fund for Women. She is a member of the editorial board of the Gender and Development journal published by Oxfam. Abou-Habib is the director of the Asfari Institute at the American University of Beirut. She was previously the executive director of the Women’s Learning Partnership and before that the director of the Collective for Research and Training–Action. She has led in designing and managing programs in the Middle East and North Africa on issues related to gender and citizenship, economy, trade and gender, and leadership. She has considerable experience in qualitative research, gender analysis, and training/facilitation. As a global gender consultant, Abou-Habib has worked in most countries of the MENA region, in West Africa, and in the Caucasus. Reham Abu Al-Asal is a social worker, feminist researcher, and the president of the Council of Working and Volunteer Women in the Nazareth District. She is a representative of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality party and has published several research papers on Palestinian women’s issues, in-

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cluding “The Study of Polygamy: Discourse and Practice in the Palestinian Society,” issued by the Action Committee for Equality in Personal Status Issues. Mayyada Abu Jaber has over twenty years of experience in leading strategy, organizational development, and international development. She is the founder and chief executive officer of World of Letters (WoL), a social enterprise in the Middle East and North Africa dedicated to bridging the economic, social, and opportunity divide. Abu Jaber founded JoWomenomics as an independent nonprofit organization to foster mindset change toward greater economic participation for women. Earlier in her career, she founded Jordan Education for Employment and served as an educational consultant at the office of Queen Rania Abdullah II. As a result of her work, President Bill Clinton invited her to share her expertise at the Clinton Global Initiative in . She is also a Brookings Institution Global Scholar for Leaders in Girls’ Education. Abu Jaber was recognized by the World Bank as an inspirational leader in the Middle East and North Africa in . She is part of the UNHarmony for Nature Earth Jurisprudence group, serves on the Arab Network for Environmental Ethics board, and is the vice-chair of the Center for Environmental Ethics and Law. Nadje Al-Ali is the director of the Center for Middle East Studies at Brown University, where she is also Robert Family Professor of International Studies and professor of anthropology and Middle East Studies. Her main research interests revolve around feminist activism and gendered mobilization, mainly with reference to Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Kurdish political movement. Her publications include What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq (, coauthored with Nicola Pratt); Women and War in the Middle East: Transnational Perspectives (, coedited with Nicola Pratt); Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from  to the Present (); and Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East (). We Are Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War (, coedited with Deborah Al-Najjar) won the  Arab-American book prize for nonfiction, and she recently published Gender, Governance and Islam (, coedited with Deniz Kandiyoti and Kathyryn Spellman Poots). Professor Al-Ali is on the advisory board of Kohl: A Journal of Body and Gender Research and has been involved in several feminist organizations and campaigns transnationally. Amina Ali received a bachelor’s degree in Political Studies and Women and Gender Studies at American University of Beirut. She is currently working with Nazra for Feminist Studies as a media officer and is a columnist at

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American University of Beirut’s independent student newspaper Watchdogs Gazette. Her writings explore how history has manifested and intertwined with identity, gender, and struggle across the different Palestinian subcommunities both in Palestine and in exile. Ali is currently set to pursue her MA in global media and communications at SOAS. Nermin Allam is an assistant professor of politics at Rutgers University– Newark. She previously held a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada postdoctoral fellowship at Princeton University. Her research interests include social movements theories, gender politics, Middle Eastern and North African studies, and political Islam. She is the author of Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the  Arab Uprisings (). Deema Almoayyed is a research associate at the United Nations Development Programme Bahrain, where she is studying the social and economic impact of COVID- on Bahrain. She previously worked as a research professional in the Gulf area, where she collaborated with several prominent semigovernmental organizations on projects assessing the impact of development programs targeting women, students, farmers, and other segments of Bahraini society. She is a Fulbright scholar and holds an MA in International Development from the University of Denver, where she was granted a fellowship with the Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy, and a social enterprise fellowship with the Barton Institute for Community Action. Her research concentrations include climate change and development as well as gender and development. Hana Amoury has been an activist for two decades in struggles against the establishment of the separation wall in the West Bank, for housing and land in Jaffa, and, most recently, against crime and weapons proliferation in Palestinian society. She volunteered and worked for Sadaka Reut, a nonprofit organization that promotes partnership between Palestinians and Jews toward a shared equal and just society. Recently, Amoury has worked at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung as a project manager, guiding the foundation’s strategy to advance Palestinian society in Israel. She is also an advisor for the newly established foundation Disrupt. Zach Bampton is a graduate of Princeton University with a bachelor’s degree in politics. He is a – fellow at the Center for Arabic Studies Abroad in Amman, Jordan.

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Rhizlaine Benachir is a consulting expert with over twenty years of experience in the field of the promotion of equality and women’s rights in Morocco. She was an associate in the Moroccan cabinet for Cap Humain Consulting. Her past professional and civil society experience includes her role as special assistant to the director of the Moroccan Social Development Agency, the head of the Human Resources Social Development Agency, and the head of the Department of International Cooperation. Benachir served on the Municipal Council of the District of Souissi/Rabat from June  to June . She was also responsible for the organization of the committee for the establishment of national structures of the Association Jossour—Forum des Femmes Marocaines (FFM) with ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) status. Benachir was a member of the supervisory committee for the implementation of the civic platform to promote the culture of Human Rights, CCDH (Commission des Citoyens pour les Droits de l’Homme). She has direct, hands-on experience with the implementation of the  Moroccan Constitutional Reforms. Gail J. Buttorff is an instructional assistant professor and the director of the Survey Research Institute at the University of Houston’s Hobby School of Public Affairs. Her research focuses on elections and gender and public policy in the Middle East and Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Her work has been published in academic journals such as Electoral Studies, Journal of Theoretical Politics, and Journal of Arabian Studies. She is the author of Authoritarian Elections and Opposition Groups in the Arab World (). She holds a PhD and MA in political science from the University of Iowa and a BA from New York University. Youssef Chouhoud is an assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University. His research in the United States, Europe, and Middle East models support for core democratic norms, with a focus on political tolerance. Prior to joining CNU, Chouhoud was a provost’s fellow at the University of Southern California, where he received his PhD. Nabila Espanioly is a Palestinian psychologist, feminist, and peace activist. She founded the Pedagogical Center and Multipurpose Women’s Centre in Nazareth (Al-Tufula) in  and has since served as its director. She has an MA in psychology from Bamberg University, Germany, and a BA in social work from Haifa University. Espanioly has extensive experience in early childhood development and women’s empowerment. She has written and edited several books and articles on early childhood care and development and

280

Contributors

women’s rights. She lectures around the world on early childhood education, Palestinian women in Israel, violence against women, sex education, women in the media, and women’s political participation. In , she received the Drum Major for Justice Award from Martin Luther King III. She also received the  international Aachen Peace Prize; was nominated among the , women for the Nobel Peace Prize in ; and was named as one of the   people in the world who inspire youth and girls in . Espanioly was also named as one of the ten women of the year by Lady Globes Journal. She is a founding member and chair of several organizations, including the Mossawa Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, Deir Yasseen Remembered, the Shatil organization, the New Israel Fund, the Feminist Center in Haifa, Women in Black, the Coalition of Women and Peace, Engendering the Peace Process, the Organization of Arab Workers in Mental Health, the Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education, the Women against Violence organization, the Al-Badil Coalition against Femicide, the Masira Foundation for Special Needs, the Coalition for Personal Status Law, and the Alternative Coalition . Merissa Khurma is the program director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center. She has leadership experience working in a range of development projects in the Middle East that focused on workforce development, the Syrian refugee crisis, education, youth, gender development, and governance. Khurma served as director of the Office of Jordan’s Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein (–) and as press attaché and director of the Information Bureau at the Embassy of Jordan in Washington, DC (–). She is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Leadership. She is coauthor of Ready for Work: An Analysis of Workforce Asymmetries in the Middle East and North Africa () and editor of Enheduanna: Voices of Women from MENA (). Khurma has a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, an MS in international security and foreign policy from Georgetown University, and a BA in political science from McGill University. Valentine M. Moghadam is professor of sociology and international affairs at Northeastern University, Boston. Born in Tehran, she received her higher education in Canada and the United States. In addition to her academic career, Moghadam has been coordinator of the Research Program on Women and Development at the United Nation University World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) (Helsinki, –) and a section chief for gender equality and development at UNESCO’s Social and Human Sciences Sector (Paris, –). Among her many publications are

Contributors

281

Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (); Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks (), which won the American Political Science Association’s Victoria Schuck award for best book on women and politics for ; and Globalization and Social Movements: The Populist Challenge and Democratic Alternatives (). Her seven edited books include Empowering Women after the Arab Spring (, with Marwa Shalaby) and After the Arab Uprisings: Progress and Stagnation in the Middle East and North Africa (, with Shamiran Mako). Jana G. Mourad is an economist trained in development studies. Until August , she was a Gender Studies research specialist at the Arab Institute for Women (AiW) at Lebanese American University, where she participated in various research projects promoting the rights of women and minority groups and advancing gender equality in Lebanon and the region. Prior to joining the AiW, Mourad was a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), where her work focused on conducting policy-oriented research that aims to develop concrete and pragmatic tools to guide the work of national and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in Lebanon and the region. She was also a researcher at the American University of Beirut, where she primarily served on the team organizing and leading projects with UNDP and UNHCR. Mourad holds a master’s degree in economics from the American University in Beirut as well as a BA in economics from Lebanese American University. She is currently pursuing her second master’s degree in economic behavior and governance at the University of Kassel in Germany. Sofia Raïs is an environmental activist and the cofounder and former president of the Green Challenge association. She founded CSO Consulting, capitalizing on her extensive experience in research, strategy, organizational capacity development, project identification, design and implementation, fundraising, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, and capacity building. With a focus on the nonprofit sector, Raïs is a human rights expert, experienced in working with rural communities throughout Morocco and in the implementation of large-scale projects on access to justice and legal aid, child marriage, migration, women’s rights, and economic empowerment. She holds an MBA and a bachelor’s degree in operations management and information systems from the University of Central Oklahoma. She is a lecturer on human rights at the Faculty of Law, University of Hassan II of Casablanca Michael Robbins is director of the Arab Barometer. He has been a part of the project since its inception and has served as director since . He was

282

Contributors

previously a research associate at the Pew Research Center and a research fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Michigan. Ilham Sadoqi is an associate professor of cultural studies at Mohammed V University in Rabat, where she has been chair of the department of languages and human sciences at the Higher National School of Arts and Crafts since . She holds a PhD in cultural studies from the Cultural and Development Program at Mohammed V University. Sadoqi served as an affiliated associate professor of gender studies at Mundiapolis International University in Casablanca (–), where she taught courses on women, society, and politics in North Africa and the Middle East in the joint Franco-Moroccan political science master program with Science-Po-Bordeaux University. She is an alumna of the American Political Science Association MENA program on the potentials and constraints of democratization in the MENA region (–). She has been the co-academic director for the SIT (School for International Training) Study Abroad program in Morocco on Human Rights and Multiculturalism. Her writings focus on state legitimacy, protest movement culture, youth, and culture in migration. Her current research interests include youth agency, gender, COVID- contingency, and interculturality. She is also an artist and has participated in several art exhibitions in Morocco. Her last art exhibition was on the idea of “rebirth.” Samah Saleimah is the founder and director of Na’am Arab Women in the Center, a nonprofit organization that promotes women’s rights and combats violence against women in Israel. Previously, she managed the Center for Arab girls in Ramla, the community center in Lod, and the community center in the Issawiya neighborhood of Jerusalem. Saleimah has a BSW and an MSW in social work, both from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in the social policy and administration track, with a specialization in gender studies. She is a graduate of the Mandel School for Educational Leadership and a researcher and activist in gender education, social entrepreneurship, and minority relationships. She is the author of numerous articles in Hebrew, Arabic, and English. Nuseibah Shabaitah is a community researcher at the Center for Lebanese Studies based in Amman, Jordan. She graduated with a BA in social work from the University of Jordan and a diploma in fine arts. She has worked in women protection and empowerment programs in psychosocial support with several international nonprofit organizations at Syrian refugee camps for four

Contributors

283

years, where she offered support for women and girls exposed to genderbased violence. She also worked as a visual arts teacher at one of the leading schools in Jordan and received the Distinguished Teacher Award in May  from Cairo Amman Bank Gallery based on her students’ artwork. She is also a freelance artist and has participated in several group art exhibitions at galleries in Amman. She was trained to include art therapy exercises in her sessions and trained with an art therapist in sessions with orphans and caregivers funded by the Al-Aman Fund. Shahira Shalabi is an activist who became the first Arab woman deputy mayor of Haifa. Marwa Shalaby is an assistant professor in Gender and Women’s Studies and political science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Her research areas are legislative politics, research methodology, and gender politics. Her work focuses primarily on the intersection of authoritarianism and women in power. She currently serves on the editorial boards of Politics and Gender and the Review of Economics and Political Science. Salma Al-Shami is the director of research at Arab Barometer. She has more than ten years of experience in designing and conducting mixed-method research projects throughout the region, including in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, and Turkey. Prior to joining Arab Barometer, she served as the chief data analyst on a study of Iraqi IDPs, a collaborative project between the International Organization for Migration and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. She serves as an adjunct lecturer in Georgetown’s Global Human Development Program and as a consultant for the World Bank. Nahda Shehadeh is the chair of WAVO’s board of directors and one of its founders. With a master’s degree in international law from the Taras Shevchenko-National University of Kyiv, she is a lawyer specializing in personal status. Shehadeh was a member of the Kufr Yasif Local Council between the years  and . A social, political, and feminist activist, she was one of the founders and the secretary of the Association of High Education Institutions and Universities in Russia and the ex-USSR Graduates and a participant in the Working Group for Equality and Personal Status Issues. Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss is the founding director of the Title IX Office at Lebanese American University (LAU) and the university’s gender expert, with a

284

Contributors

focus on working with the Middle East Peace Initiative—Tomorrow’s Leaders program. At Lebanese American University since , she has been an assistant professor of political science/international affairs and then institutional development officer with the Office of the Provost, as well as a research fellow with the Institute for Migration Studies. Her research has focused on the topics of women and security as well as the politics of migration and the complexities of multiple citizenships. In partnership with the Arab Institute for Women, Skulte-Ouaiss is working on developing the university’s capacity to more fully support equality, diversity, and inclusion. Prior to entering academia, Skulte-Ouaiss conducted research on international development and was engaged in higher education reform in Washington, DC. Rita Stephan is a research fellow at the Moise A. Khayrallah Center for Lebanese Diaspora Studies at North Carolina State University and the Chief for the Continuing Education and Training Division in the Office of Knowledge Management at the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau in the US Department of State. Previously, she served as the Regional Coordinator for Religious and Ethnic Minorities at USAID. From  to , she served in the State Department as the director of the Middle East Partnership Initiative in the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau’s Office of Assistance Coordination, as well as the founder and deputy director of data analytics in the executive secretary’s office. She was the MENA survey statistician at the Population Division of the US Census Bureau from  and . Her academic publications focus on women’s movements in the Middle East and the Middle Eastern community in the US Census. She has published Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab Spring (, coedited with Mounira M. Charrad) and numerous articles on gender, women’s rights, and Arab Americans in the census. Omar Al-Ubaydli is the director of research at Derasat, Bahrain. He is also an affiliated associate professor of economics at George Mason University; an affiliated senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center; an adjunct visiting professor at the King Fahad University of Petroleum and Minerals; a nonresident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, DC; and a nonresident fellow at Trends, United Arab Emirates. His research interests include political economy, experimental economics, and the economics of the GCC countries. Al-Ubaydli previously served as a member of the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Joint Advisory Board of Economists and as a visiting professor of economics at the University of Chicago. He regularly publishes his research in international peer-reviewed academic journals. His mainstream media articles appear in Arabic and English-language blogs and newspapers such as

Contributors

285

Al-Hayat, the National, Forbes Opinion, and US News. Al-Ubaydli earned his BA in economics from the University of Cambridge and his MA and PhD in economics from the University of Chicago. Sarah Yerkes is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a globally recognized expert on North Africa. She has published numerous book chapters, reports, articles, and op-eds on the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on state-society relations and governance. She has been a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow and has taught in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Yerkes is a former member of the State Department’s policy planning staff, where she focused on North Africa. She was previously a foreign affairs officer in the State Department’s Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs. Yerkes also served as a geopolitical research analyst for the US military’s Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J) at the Pentagon, advising the Joint Staff leadership on foreign policy and national security issues. Maro Youssef is a National Science Foundation (NSF) Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the department of sociology at the University of Southern California. She holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Texas at Austin. She previously served as a US diplomat, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa. Her specialization is in gender politics, social movements, democratization, and the Middle East and North Africa.

Index

Abdullah II, king of Jordan, ,  Abou-Habib, Lina, xxv, , –, –,  abuse, xii, , , , , , , . See also domestic violence; GenderBased Violence; harassment abusive households, , , , , , ,  of domestic workers, ,  of Jordanian women, , – of Moroccan women, –, ,  of Palestinian women in Israel, – of queer community in Lebanon, –, ,  of Syrian refugee women in Jordan, ,  of Tunisian women, – academia, xiii, xxiv–xxv, – women in, as faculty members, –, –,  women in, as students, xxv, –,  Académie Française, xxi African Development Bank,  African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET),  AFTURD. See Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFTURD)

agriculture, , , ,  Algeria, –, , , , , , –, – Al-Ali, Nadje, xxvi, –,  Al Rai,  Amnesty International, , –,  anti-mask attitudes. See masking Arab(s), xi, xiii, xxvii, , –, , , –, , –, , –, , , –, , – community, in Israel, , , , ,  local councils, , , ,  towns and cities, – university presidents,  women, xi–xiii, xv, –, , , –, –, , – Arab Barometer, , , , –, , , , – Arab Emergency Committee,  Arab Monetary Fund,  Arab Spring, , , ,  Arab Women Organization (AWO),  armies. See military Article ,  ASCs (Asylum Seeker Certificates),  Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFTURD),  Association Jossour—Forum des Femmes Marocaines. See Jossour FFM

288

Index

Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD),  Aswat Nissa,  asylum seekers,  ATFD. See Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates Atlantic Council,  authoritarianism, , , , , , , , – awareness campaigns, , , , ,  Baghdad Women’s Association,  Bahrain, xxiv, , –, –, –, –, – women in, –, , –, – battered women. See abuse; domestic violence; Gender-Based Violence; harassment; violence: against women and girls Bedouins, , ,  Beirut, , , , –, , ,  Port blast, xxv, , , , , – Beity (political party),  Bennett, Naftali,  Biosafety Centre at the Royal Scientific Society (RSS), ,  birth control, – Caesar Act,  Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS), , ,  caregivers, xii, xv, , , ,  domestic, xxv, –,  care work, , , , –, , , –, , , , , , –, –, , , , , , , , , . See also childcare; daycare facilities burden of, xxiv, , –, , , , –, , , ,  early childhood, , ,  medical, ,  responsibilities of, xxi, xxiv, ,  unpaid, xii–xiii, xxiv, , , , , –, –, , , , , 

CBJ (Central Bank of Jordan),  CDC. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention cell phones. See mobile phones Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), ,  Centre de Recherches, d’Études, de Documentation, et de l’Information sur la Femme (CREDIF), ,  Chikak (divorce on the grounds of marital discord),  childcare, , –, , , , –, , –, –, –, , , , , . See also daycare facilities burden of, ,  nannies, , ,  child marriage, xii, xxv, , –, , , ,  civil disobedience,  CNSS (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale), ,  conflict zones, xxiii, ,  construction industry, , , , ,  Convention  on Domestic Workers,  Corona Cabinet,  corruption, , , , , , –, – COVID impact first-order, xxi, ,  second-order, xxi, , , – socioeconomic, xxiv, –, , , , , ,  third-order, xxi, xxiv–xxv, , – COVID waves. See pandemic waves CREDIF. See Centre de Recherches, d’Études, de Documentation, et de l’Information sur la Femme Cyber-Crime Bureau,  Daraj Media,  daycare facilities, –, , , ,  debt, , , –, ,  democratization, ,  depression, –, , , , , , 

Index 289

dhukura (maleness),  disabilities, xi, xxii, , , , , , , , , –,  women with, , , , , , ,  discrimination, xxii, , –, –, , , , , , , –, , , , , ,  dishdasha,  displacement, xxi, , , –, ,  large-scale,  protracted, ,  distance learning, xvii, xxv, , , , –, , , , , ,  online classes, , , –, –, , , , , , – online teaching, , –, ,  divorce. See Chikak DL. See distance learning doctors. See healthcare: physicians; healthcare: frontline workers Doctors without Borders,  domestic violence, xxv, –, –, , , , , , , , , . See also abuse; Gender-Based Violence rates of, , ,  risks of, ,  shelters, ,  spikes in, , , , , , ,  domestic workers, , , , , , , , –, ,  female, , – foreign, – dropouts, school. See schools: dropouts from economic crisis, v, xxv, , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , ,  economic growth, ,  economies, xi, xxi–xxii, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , . See also agriculture; healthcare;

hospitality sector; private sector; public sector; retail sector advanced, , , ,  conventional, , ,  gig,  global, , , , – informal, xii, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  oil, , ,  online, ,  Western, , –, ,  education, xi–xii, xxiii, , , , –, , , –, , –, , , , , , , , –, , –, , , , , , –, , , . See also academia; distance learning; girls: education of; pedagogy; schools children’s, , , – disparities in, , ,  higher, –,  institutions, xxiii, –, ,  systems, , , , ,  Egypt, , –, –, –, , , – , –, , , , ,  Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights,  elderly, xi, xiii, , , , , , ,  care of, , , , –, ,  Emergency Committee (EC), , –, ,  emotional labor, ,  employment, , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  female, , , , , , , , –, –, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  public sector, , , –, , –,  secondary, –,  Ennakhil Association, ,  Enough Violence and Exploitation. See KAFA Entraide Nationale, ,  Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 

290

Index

ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia), xi–xii, –, –, , , ,  Ethiopian women,  European Investment Bank,  Facebook, , , –, , , ,  faculty, female. See academia: female faculty members FAR. See Feminist Alliance for Rights female genital mutilation, xii female labor force participation (FLFP), –, –, , , –, ,  femininity, , ,  feminist(s), xiii, xxiii–xxiv, xxvi, , , , , , –, –, , ,  mobilization of, , , , , –, ,  organizations, , , , –, –, –, ,  scholars, , , –,  Feminist Alliance for Rights (FAR),  Feminist COVID- Policy,  femmes-mulets, ,  femmes victimes de violence. See FVVs FEMNET. See African Women’s Development and Communication Network flattening the curve, , ,  FLFP. See female labor force participation FVVs (femmes victimes de violence), –, – Gaza, , , ,  GBV. See Gender-Based Violence GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), –, , , –, , –, , , , ,  economies, xxiv, –, –,  governments, , , ,  GDP (Gross Domestic Product), –, –, –,  Geha, Carmen, 

gender, , , , –, , , , , –, , , –, , –, –, , , , ,  discourse, xxv, xxiv, , , ,  disparities, , , , ,  equality, xxii, , , , , , , , , , , , ,  gap, xxiv, , –, , , , –,  norms, , ,  relations, , –, ,  roles, , , –, –, –, , , ,  stereotypes, ,  Gender-Based Violence (GBV), xxi, xxiii, xxv–xxvi, , , –, , , –, , –, , , –, . See also abuse; domestic violence; violence: against women legislation on, ,  in pre-pandemic Tunisia,  girls, xi, xiii, , , –, , , , – education of, xxi, ,  globalization, ,  Global North, –, , –, –, , , ,  Global South, –, , –, , –, , , – Global Web Index, – Google,  government of Jordan (GoJ). See Jordanian government Grape Leaves (film),  Gross Domestic Product. See GDP Gulf Cooperation Council. See GCC Gulf Labour Markets and Migration,  Gulf News,  harassment, , , ,  cyber,  sexual, , , , , –,  Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP), , –, ,  Haven for Artists,  HCP. See Haut Commissariat au Plan Health and Human Services, 

Index 291

healthcare, xi, xxiv, –, , , , , , , , , , –, , , –, , , , , –. See also mental health; public health; reproductive health access, xii, , , , , ,  budgets, –, –, –, , , , ,  crisis, , –, , , , , , , –, –, ,  frontline workers, xxiv, , , , , , –, , ,  infrastructure, , ,  insurance, , –, ,  nurses, –, , , –, , , , , , –,  out-of-pocket expenses, , , , ,  physicians, –, –, , , , , , , , , ,  policy,  services, , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , – systems, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , – women’s, xxv, , , ,  Hegazi, Sarah,  Helem, – High Follow-Up Committee (HFC), –,  Himmat Watan Fund,  HIV (human immunodeficiency virus),  homophobia, – hospitality sector, , , ,  hotlines, , , , , , , –, , , , , – GBV, , ,  housework/chores, , –, , –, –, –, –, , ,  as a dual burden, , , , ,  Human Development Index (HDI),  Human Development Report,  human immunodeficiency virus. See HIV

humanitarian assistance, xi, , –, ,  human rights, , , , , , , , ,  activists, ,  Human Rights Watch,  ILO. See International Labour Organization IMF. See International Monetary Fund inequalities, xxii–xxiv, xxvi, , , , , , , , , –, –,  gender, xv, xxiii, , , , , , ,  informal tented settlement (ITT), ,  Initiatives pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes. See IPDF insecurity, , , ,  economic, ,  instability, , –,  economic, xi,  emotional, ,  internally displaced people,  Internal Security Forces, , – International Labour Organization (ILO), , , , ,  International Monetary Fund (IMF), , , , – internet, xi, –, , –, , , , –, , – IPDF (Initiatives pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes),  IPV. See violence: intimate partner Iran, –, –, –, , , – Iraq, –, –, , , , , –, –, , , , –,  Islamism, –,  Israel, xxvi, , , –, , –, , , , –, ,  Ministry of Education,  Ministry of Health, –, ,  Security Agency (Shabak), , – Supreme Court,  “unrecognized villages” in, , 

292 Index

Jaeha, xxi Jewish communities,  Jewish women, , ,  JNCW (Jordan National Commission for Women),  job security, , , ,  Johns Hopkins University,  Jordan, xxv–xxvi, –, –, –, , –, , , –, , , , –. See also Jordanian government Armed Forces, ,  Ministry of Health, , , ,  Ministry of Interior,  Ministry of Labor, , ,  Ministry of Social Development,  National Centre for Security and Crisis Management, ,  National Commission for Women (JNCW),  National Defense Law, ,  Response Plan, xxii, ,  Jordanian government (Government of Jordan, GoJ), , –, , –, , ,  Jordan Times, ,  Jossour FFM (Association Jossour— Forum des Femmes Marocaines),  JoWomenomics, – judicial system, , , , , , ,  courts, , –, , , ,  KAFA,  kafala (sponsorship system for domestic workers),  Knesset, , –,  Kolona Maak,  Kuwait, , –, –, , –, , , –,  labor, , , , , , , –, , , . See also work force, , , , , –, , , ,  laws, , 

markets, xxiii, , , , , , , –, , ,  rights, , ,  LAU. See Lebanese American University law enforcement. See judiciary; police leadership traits feminine, –, , , , – feminine and masculine, xxvi, , –, ,  masculine, –, –, –, , , – Lebanese American University (LAU), , ,  Lebanon, xxv, –, –, –, , , –, –, , , –, , –, , , , , –, –, , , , , –, , –,  Minister of Public Health,  Minister of Social Affairs,  Order of Nurses,  women in, xxiv, –, , , –,  LET. See Ligue des Électrices Tunisiennes LGBTIQ+ community, xi, xxv, –, –, , , , , , . See also homophobia; queer community; transgender community LGBTIQ+ organizations, –, , ,  Libya, , –, , , , , –, –, ,  Ligue des Électrices Tunisiennes (LET), , –,  LinkedIn,  lockdowns, xii, xxv, , , , –, –, –, , , , , , , –, , –, , –, –, –, , , –, , , –, –, –, , –, , , – and confinement, , , , –, , , , , ,  and curfews, , , , , , , –, –

Index 293

manufacturing, , , , ,  marginalization, , , , – marjala (masculinization), – Marsa Sexual Health Center, ,  masculinity, xxi, xxvi, , , –, –, , , . See also dhukura (maleness); gender; marjala (masculinization); patriarchy; rujula (manliness) and male domination, xxiv, , , ,  toxic, ,  Masculinity Index, xxvi, –, – masculinization. See marjala Mashrou’ Leila,  masking, , , , –, –, – anti-mask attitudes, including hard vs. soft, xxvi, , –,  media, , , , , , , , , , , , , , –,  Arab, , , , – campaigns, –, , ,  Hebrew,  social, , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , . See also Facebook Medicaid. See RAMED (Regime d’Assistance Medicale) MENA Organization for Services, Advocacy, Integration and Capacity (MOSAIC),  mental health, –, –, , –, , , , , –, , , ,  anxiety, –, , , , , ,  stress, xxiii, , –, , , –, , , , , , –, , , , , , , ,  suicide, , , ,  support. See support systems trauma, , –, ,  Meryem, Princess Lalla,  migrant(s), –, , ,  as domestic workers (MDWs), , , , 

forced, , , ,  women as, xxiv, , , –, , , ,  workers, xxiv, , –, , –, –, –, –,  Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS), – militarization, xxiv, , ,  military, xxii, –, –, , , , , –,  armed forces, , , , , – armies, , , –, , , –,  expenditures, , –, –,  security forces, ,  mobile phones, xi, , , , , , –, , ,  Moghadam, Valentine, , –, , –,  Moroccan Law, ,  ., –, – Article ,  Article ,  Article ,  Morocco, xxv, –, –, , –, –, –, –, –, , , –, ,  Ministry of Family Solidarity Equality and Social Development, ,  Ministry of Justice,  Public Prosecutor’s Office, – MOSAIC. See MENA Organization for Services, Advocacy, Integration and Capacity mothers/motherhood, xii, , , , , , , , , ,  and maternity leave, –,  motherhood penalty,  single, , ,  Al-Mubadara,  mukhtars,  nafsiyah (pscyho-emotional state),  National Action Plan for the Elimination of Violence against Women (NAPEVW), 

294

Index

National Council for Human Rights,  National Insurance Corporation, – National Social Security Fund. See Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) National Union of Moroccan Women. See UNFM (Union Nationale des Femmes du Maroc) neoliberal policy, ,  Netanyahu, Benjamin, –, ,   Refugee Convention,  nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), , , , , –, , , ,  Nourseen factory, – nurses. See healthcare: nurses; healthcare: frontline workers OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), xxiii, , –, – Office Québécois de la Langue Française, xxi Oman, –, , –, –, ,  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. See OECD Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. See World Health Organization (WHO) Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief), , – Oxford Committee for Famine Relief. See Oxfam Oxford COVID- Government Response Tracker. See Oxford’s Government Response Stringency Index time Oxford’s Government Response Stringency Index, ,  Palestine, , , , , –, , , , , –, ,  Palestinian refugees, , ,  women in, xxvi, , , – pandemic waves first, , , , –, , , , , 

second, , , , , , ,  parliamentary elections, , ,  patriarchy, xiii, xxiv, xxv, , , , , , , , , –, , , , ,  patronage networks,  pedagogy, –, , – physicians. See healthcare: physicians Physicians for Human Rights,  police, , , , –, –, , , , , –, , , ,  POMEPS. See Project on Middle East Political Science poverty, xxii, , , , , , , , , , – PPP (purchasing power parity), – privacy/private spaces, xxiii, , –, , , , –, , , –, , ,  private sector, –, , , –, –, , –,  private sphere. See public vs. private sphere privatization, , , , – productivity, xxv, –, –,  research, , –, –, –, , , ,  Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS),  protests, , , , , , , , – psycho-emotional state. See nafsiyah public health, , , , –, ,  services, , ,  system, , , , , , , , , , ,  tracking, ,  public policy, , , , , , ,  public sector, , –, , , –, , , , ,  public services, , , , ,  public vs. private spheres, , –, , , , –,  Qatar, , –, –, –, –, –, , –, 

Index 295

quarantine, , –, , , , , , , , , , , – Quebec Board of the French Language, xxi queer community, , –, , . See also LGBTIQ+ community; transgender community queer bodies,  queer organizations, ,  queer spaces,  women in,  racism, , , , ,  RAMED (Regime d’Assistance Medicale),  rape, , , –, . See also violence: sexual marital, , , . See also domestic violence; violence: intimate partner Razzaz, Omar,  Red Star of David services, ,  refugee(s), xi, xxv, –, , –, –,  camps, –, , –, , ,  women, xxv, , –, , , – Refugee Convention Protocol,  Refugee International, ,  Regime d’Assistance Medicale (RAMED),  remote education. See distance learning remote work. See work: from home reproductive health, xix, , , , , –, , , , . See also birth control retail sector, , ,  Royal Spanish Academy, xxi rujula,  ruling elite,  safe spaces, –, , ,  safety zones, ,  Saied, Kais,  Salma Regional Network,  sanitary kits, , 

Saudi Arabia, , –, –, –, , –, , , – schools, xii, , , –, , , , , , , , –, , –, , , , , , , ,  closures of, , , , , , , , ,  dropouts from, xxv, , –, , , ,  SDG. See sustainable development goals sectarianism, , , , ,  secularist women’s organizations, – Security Council Resolution,  sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHRs), ,  sexually transmitted diseases (STDs),  sex workers, , , , ,  Shabak (Israel Security Agency), , – shadow pandemic, , ,  Shamsaha, – She Is a Revolution (platform of feminist organizations),  shelters, xii, –, , , , , , –, , , , – Sinno, Hamed,  El-Sisi, Abdel Fattah,  Sisterhood Is a Global Institute (SIGI),  social distancing, –, , , , , , , , –, , , ,  social media. See media: social social networks, , ,  social norms, xxiv, , –, , , –, , , , –, ,  social security, , , , , ,  social services, xxiii, , , , , , ,  social stigmas, , , , , , , ,  social workers, , , , , , ,  SRHRs. See sexual and reproductive health and rights state legitimacy index, –

296

Index

states, rentier vs. fragile vs. failed, xxv, , –, – states of emergency, , , , , , ,  status of women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWMENA), ,  STDs (sexually transmitted diseases),  stigmas. See social stigmas strategic humanitarian development response plan. See Jordan Response Plan Sudan, , , –,  support systems, , , , ,  psychological, , , , ,  social, , ,  surveys, , , , , –, , , –, –,  data, , , , , , ,  online, , , –, –, , –, , , , , –, – Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), , ,  SWMENA. See Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa Syria, –, –, , , , –, ,  government of, – professional refugees from,  refugees from, xxv, , , –, –, , ,  women in, , , ,  women refugees from, , ,  Tawjihi,  TCK  Women’s Platform,  television, , , , ,  Tounissiet, , – transgender community, –. See also LGBTIQ+ community; queer community transgender women, , – Tunisia, xxvi, –, –, –, –, , –, , , – government, xxvi, –,  High Judicial Council, 

Ministry of Health, – Ministry of Interior,  Ministry of Justice,  Ministry of Women, – National Development Plan,  National Office of Family and Population,  Organic Law No. , , – Turkey, , –, –, , , , –,  TV. See television UAE, , –, –, , –, –, , , , ,  UGTT (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens),  UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), xxiii, , –, , ,  unemployment, xxii, , , –, , , , , , , –, –, , –, , , , –, –, , –, , –, , , , –, –, , ,  UNESCO, ,  UNFM (Union Nationale des Femmes du Maroc), – UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), , ,  UNHCR. See United Nations: Human Rights Commissioner UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), xi, , , , , , , –,  Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),  Union Nationale des Femmes du Maroc (UNFM),  United Arab Emirates. See UAE United Kingdom, , –, –, –,  United Nations Children’s Fund. See UNICEF Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), xxii

Index 297

High Commissioner for Refugees. See United Nations: Human Rights Commissioner Human Rights Commissioner (UNHCR), , , ,  Population Fund. See UNFPA secretary-general of, xxii, ,  UN Women, xii, xxii–xxiii, –, , , , , , , , , –, –,  United States, xxvi, , –, , –, , –, –, –, , , , –, , , , , , , ,  universities. See academia University of Oxford’s Government Response Stringency Index time,  vaccines, , , , , –, , ,  mRNA,  violence, , , –, , , , ,  against women and girls, xii, , , , –, –, , , , , , , , , , –, , –, – discourses of, –, ,  economic, –, ,  intimate partner (IPV), xii, –, , , ,  physical, , , , –,  psychological, , –, , , – sexual, , , , –, –, –, ,  verbal, –,  victims of, –, , , ,  wasta,  WAV (Women against Violence Association (WAV),  welfare, , , , , , –, , , , 

West Bank, , , ,  We Will Stop Femicide. See Turkish feminist organization WFP. See World Food Programme WhatsApp, , , , –,  WHO. See World Health Organization WoL (World of Letters), – women. See also academia: women in, as faculty members; academia: women in, as students; disabilities: women with; gender; healthcare: women’s; migrant(s): women as; refugee(s): women as; violence: against women and girls as breadwinners, xii, xxv, , ,  empowerment of, , ,  as leaders, –,  safety of, , ,  Women against Violence Association (WAV),  Women as Partners in Progress, ,  women’s organizations, , , – , , , , , , , – Islamist,  women’s rights, xii, xxv, , , , , , ,  work, , –, , –, , , –, –, , –, , –, , , , , , , , –, –, –, , –, , , ,  feminized, xii,  from home/remote, , –, , –, –, –, , , , –, , , , ,  workforce, xxv, –, , , –, , , , , , , ,  work/life balance,  workplaces, xii, xxiv, , , , –, , ,  World Bank, xii, –, –, –, , , , , , –, 

298

Index

World Economic Forum, ,  World Food Programme (WFP), , ,  World Health Organization (WHO), xxii, –, , , , , , , , ,  World of Letters. See WoL Worldometer, , –, , , , 

World Values Survey (WVS), ,  Wuhan, China,  WVS. See World Values Survey Yemen, –, , , –, ,  YouTube, ,  Zaatari Refugee Camp, , 