Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in South Asia 9781939131140

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counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in south asia Mumtaz Ahmad, Ehsan Ahrari, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Sumit Ganguly, Nazia Hussain, Thomas H. Johnson, Peter Mandaville, Agnieszka Paczynska, Dietrich Reetz, and Louise I. Shelley

This NBR Monograph is a collection of four issues of the NBR Special Report originally published between November 2009 and February 2010. The NBR Special Report provides access to current research on special topics conducted by the world’s leading experts in Asian affairs. The views expressed in these reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other NBR research associates or institutions that support NBR. The National Bureau of Asian Research is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution dedicated to informing and strengthening policy. NBR conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia. Drawing upon an extensive network of the world’s leading specialists and leveraging the latest technology, NBR bridges the academic, business, and policy arenas. The institution disseminates its research through briefings, publications, conferences, Congressional testimony, and email forums, and by collaborating with leading institutions worldwide. NBR also provides exceptional internship opportunities to graduate and undergraduate students for the purpose of attracting and training the next generation of Asia specialists. NBR was started in 1989 with a major grant from the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. Funding for NBR’s research and publications comes from foundations, corporations, individuals, the U.S. government, and from NBR itself. NBR does not conduct proprietary or classified research. The organization undertakes contract work for government and private-sector organizations only when NBR can maintain the right to publish findings from such work. NBR is a tax-exempt, nonprofit corporation under I.R.C. Sec. 501(c)(3), qualified to receive tax-exempt contributions. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. This monograph may be reproduced for personal use. Otherwise, this monograph may not be reproduced in full without the written permission of NBR. When information from NBR publications is cited or quoted, please cite the author and the National Bureau of Asian Research. © 2012 by The National Bureau of Asian Research.

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counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in south asia TABLE OF CONTENTS

Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan



1

Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan Agnieszka Paczynska

Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan

19 21

Foreword Peter Mandaville

43

Narco-Trafficking in Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Areas and Implications for Security Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain

63

The Dynamics of “Narco-Jihad” in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region Ehsan Ahrari

The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Military Conflict in the Region Vanda Felbab-Brown

Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects

79

Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects Sumit Gnguly

Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia

93 95 123 135

Foreword Peter Mandaville Media-Based Preachers and the Creation of New Muslim Publics in Pakistan Mumtaz Ahmad Muslim Grassroots Leaders in India: National Issues and Local Leadership Dietrich Reetz Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern Afghanistan Thomas H. Johnson

This NBR Monograph is a collection of four issues of the NBR Special Report originally published between November 2009 and February 2010: Agnieszka Paczynska, “Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 19, November 2009. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain, and Ehsan Ahrari, “NarcoJihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 20, December 2009. Sumit Ganguly, “Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 21, December 2009. Mumtaz Ahmad, Dietrich Reetz, and Thomas H. Johnson, “Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 22, February 2010. For more information about these reports and other NBR publications, please visit http://www.nbr.org.

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Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan Agnieszka Paczynska

Originally published as: Agnieszka Paczynska, “Development and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 19, November 2009. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

AGNIESZKA PACZYNSKA is Associate Professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis

and Resolution and Associate Faculty at George Mason University’s Center for Global Studies. She has published articles and book chapters on the relationship between economic and political change and conflict, distributive conflicts, postconflict reconstruction policies, and the relationship between globalization processes and local conflicts, and she is the author of State, Labor, and the Transition to a Market Economy: Egypt, Poland, Mexico and the Czech Republic (2009). Before joining George Mason University, she was a research fellow at the Warsaw School of Economics, the American University in Cairo, and the University of Maryland. She also has worked at the Brookings Institution and Search for Common Ground in Washington, D.C. During 2008–09 she was a Franklin Fellow, working in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State. She monitored the Afghan presidential and provincial council elections in August 2009. She can be reached at .

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper assesses the prospects and challenges for integrating development strategies into counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

MAIN FINDINGS • Many of the challenges that confront post-conflict reconstruction processes similarly confound development strategies in COIN efforts, particularly with regard to satisfying the immediate needs of the population, building government capacity, and involving local communities in the development process. • A successful COIN strategy requires a change in Afghan perceptions of the security situation, the Afghan government, U.S. and NATO/ISAF coalition forces, and the international community. • Deteriorating security is preventing international organizations and NGOs from accessing many areas in Afghanistan, thereby requiring security forces to distribute aid and run development projects. • Corruption is one of the greatest obstacles for development programs in Afghanistan because foreign aid is frequently misused and siphoned off for private gain. • The economic crisis is affecting Pakistan’s political stability, which is already tenuous, at the same time as the Pakistani military is intensifying its fight with militant groups in the tribal areas.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • International organizations involved in the design and implementation of development programs must work with the priorities of local communities on a more sustained and regular basis. • Development strategies must be tailored to the specifics of local needs and circumstances and sensitive to the great variation in geography, economic profile, and security situation among the Afghan provinces and tribal areas of Pakistan. • Steps must be taken by Afghanistan and the international community to combat corruption that currently weakens development strategies and delegitimizes national and local government. • The Pakistani military and civilian agencies may face additional challenges to implementing effective development programs as they do not receive the same support and oversight from the U.S. and NATO/ISAF coalition forces.

T

  his paper examines the challenges of integrating development strategies into counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In these two countries such integration will present some of the same challenges that are often in evidence during the implementation of reconstruction programs in post-conflict countries. At the same time, the continuing active insurgency in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan will present additional difficulties in the design and implementation of development strategies. The differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, mean that the challenges of incorporating development strategies into COIN will be distinct in the two contexts. Most significant, whereas the United States has a large military and civilian presence on the ground in Afghanistan and will be, along with its NATO allies, directly involved in the implementation of COIN strategy in that country, in Pakistan the United States will play only an indirect role, leaving both the military and the civilian components of COIN to the Pakistani government and the Pakistani army. This essay is organized as follows. The first section examines general challenges of integrating development strategies into COIN. Next, the essay focuses on Afghan perceptions of the political situation in their country and the impact of these perceptions on COIN’s success. The third and fourth sections then examine the key challenges of integrating development strategies into COIN in Afghanistan, and in particular highlight the negative impact of corruption on development efforts. The fifth section examines the challenges of integrating development into COIN in Pakistan. The concluding section offers policy recommendations.

General Challenges to Integrating Development Strategies into COIN The war in Afghanistan and the developments in Pakistan are inextricably linked. In both countries, there is currently a new emphasis on the importance of implementing a COIN approach that is population-centric and focused on diplomacy, development, and defense. For this approach to succeed, however, a number of issues will need to be addressed with respect to integrating development strategies into COIN efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Effective integration of development strategies into COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a number of challenges. Although the challenges in the two countries are different, there are a number of key similarities. In fact, some of these challenges are common to most cases of post-conflict reconstruction.

Negotiating Tensions in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Process One of the main challenges concerns resolving the tensions that tend to be present in post-conflict environments. Among the most important of these is the urgency of satisfying the immediate needs of a population that lacks many basic necessities while building local government capacity and legitimacy. The needs and expectations of the population to see quick improvement in living conditions are great. Yet, local government tends to lack the capacity to meet these needs. It is therefore tempting to rely on international donor agencies to quickly deliver the services the public expects. This approach, although likely to improve conditions on the ground because it bypasses local government institutions, may, however, undermine the legitimacy and capacity-building of the local government, which is key to the long-term sustainability of development efforts.

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As this highlights, there is also a tension between what is effective in the short run and what is efficient over the long term. Any post-conflict reconstruction process is a balancing act between providing security, humanitarian relief, and physical infrastructure, on the one hand, and addressing longer-term development objectives, on the other. There is often a tension between the window of opportunity that the end of a conflict provides for implementing political and economic reforms with international donor assistance and the absorptive capacity of the government. The weakness of existing institutions means that the capacity of local government is often limited and, therefore, too much foreign assistance at once may overwhelm the system and not be utilized effectively. Finally, in designing development strategies there is likely to be in particular tension between the need to provide quick impact development projects that can “win the hearts and minds” of the population and the need to craft long-term, sustainable development. In the case of Afghanistan, the tension between the lack of government capacity to deliver services and the need to build that capacity while ensuring that the population’s basic needs are met is likely to loom large. As the following sections of the paper will highlight, however, the continuing insurgency and the difficult security situations in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan mean that the challenges of designing and implementing development programs will be different in those countries than in countries where armed hostilities have ceased. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the insurgency has not yet been defeated. Nonetheless, many of the tensions that post-conflict countries face are likely to be present in both of these countries despite the persistence of conflict; in fact, the tensions may well be felt even more acutely.

Involving Local Communities in Development Projects A key challenge that integrating development strategies into COIN will face in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is how best to involve local communities in the design and implementation of the development projects. The international donor and development community has long recognized that local capacity-building and local ownership of development efforts is key to the successful implementation and sustainability of development programs. This is particularly true of post-conflict reconstruction efforts in which rebuilding of the physical infrastructure is but one component of the task and where reestablishing human capital and restoring destroyed communal relations are also essential to the long-term success of such programs. The same is true in an environment where conflict has not yet ended. Yet translating this knowledge into effective programming in post-conflict reconstruction as well as during COIN operations has frequently not met expectations of the local communities. All too often, reconstruction, reconciliation, and peace-building projects have been designed and implemented by international donors in ways that reflect their priorities, preferences, and values rather than those of the local communities. As a consequence, local communities do not always feel that they have been sufficiently consulted during the process of design and implementation. Without such consultations and community input, many projects, however well-intentioned, remain alien and disconnected from the needs and realities of ordinary people. The perceptions of the Afghan public, which will be examined in detail below, certainly indicate that the manner in which development assistance has been provided, allocated, and utilized has left a majority of Afghans feeling increasingly dissatisfied with the progress the country is making, with the international community that is providing that assistance, and with the Afghan

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government, which is a partner in implementing these development programs. A successful integration of development strategies into COIN will need to address how to change Afghan perceptions. To do so, the way development assistance is provided and how Afghans are brought into the process will require attention.

Changing Afghan Perceptions: A Key Requirement for COIN Success Over the last two years, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly, with rising numbers of coalition and Afghan casualties. The success of COIN strategy in Afghanistan largely depends on changing popular perceptions of the security situation, of the Afghan government; of the United States, NATO, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); and of the international community in general. Changing these increasingly negative perceptions among the Afghan population is necessary because of COIN’s focus on “winning the hearts and minds” of Afghans. In other words, a key to the success of COIN is convincing the public that it will benefit more from supporting the government than from supporting the insurgents, and that it is the government rather than the insurgents that offers hope for a better future. Insurgents are also aware that the perceptions of the Afghan public will affect the course of the conflict and thus exploit and build upon people’s views of the government’s ineffectiveness and low legitimacy. Ensuring delivery of basic services and employment prospects will therefore be crucial to convincing Afghans of the tangible benefits of supporting the government. The decline in goodwill among Afghans toward the international community has been startling. In 2005, 87% of Afghans viewed the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban positively, and only 9% held negative views. By February 2009, positive views had declined to 69% while negative views climbed to 24%. Similarly, Afghan perceptions of the United States have become less favorable, declining from 83% in 2005 to 47% in 2009. Unfavorable views, which in 2005 were held by only 14% of the Afghan public, increased to 52% in 2009.1 Other polls have found even fewer Afghans holding positive views of the performance of the United States.2 These declining positive perceptions of the United States and NATO/ISAF are translating into lack of Afghan support for increasing troop levels. Only 18% would like to see more coalition troops, whereas 44% would like to see a reduction in the troop levels. In particular, civilian casualties resulting from air strikes have generated criticism from Afghans.3 Although positive perceptions of the United States and the international community have declined, this has not, however, translated into an overall increase in Afghan support for the Taliban. Worrisome nonetheless, from the perspective of successfully pursuing COIN, is that changes in the public’s support for the Taliban are not uniformly distributed across the country. Although support for the Taliban has not nationally increased significantly, in the southwestern parts of the country, where the insurgency is strongest, support for the Taliban has been growing.

1 Gary

Langer, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 11, 2009, http://csis.org/ multimedia/audio-afghanistan-where-things-stand.

2 A February 9, 2009, poll by ABC, the BBC, and ARD found that “the number who say the United States has performed well in Afghanistan has”

declined from 68% in 2005 to 32% in 2009. Just 37% of Afghans now say most people in their area support Western forces, compared to 67% in 2006. As well, 25% percent now say that attacks on U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces can be justified, compared to 13% in 2006. See Jill McGivering, “Afghan People ‘Losing Confidence,’” BBC News, February 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7872353.stm.

3 Langer,

“Afghanistan: Where Things Stand.”

DEVELOPMENT AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN u PACZYNSKA

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Increasing the security of the Afghan population, which is at the heart of the COIN strategy, is clearly necessary. Fully 38% of the population reports having direct experience with violence in the previous twelve months. More worrisome for the Afghan government, the United States, and U.S. allies is that, whereas in 2007 only 26% blamed these actors for the violence and 36% saw the Taliban as primarily responsible, in 2009 36% blamed the United States, NATO/ISAF, and the Afghan government for the violence, with blame of the Taliban falling to 27%. Despite this shift in perceptions, 58% see the resurging Taliban as the biggest threat to the country, whereas only 8% pointed to the United States.4 Fewer Afghans today than in the past believe that NATO/ISAF forces are able to provide security: in 2006 67% thought these forces were effective, but that number declined to 42% in 2009. Related to these perceptions of growing insecurity, the percentage of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the next twelve months has declined from 67% in 2005 to 51% in 2009, with less than half expecting that their children’s lives will be better then their own.5 Overall, a growing number of Afghans view their country as heading in the wrong direction. A February 2009 poll found that only 40% saw the country as heading in the right direction, compared to 77% in 2005. On the other hand, belief that the country was heading in the wrong direction increased from 6% in 2005 to 38% in early 2009.6 In mid-summer 2009 the public mood seemed to lift according to one survey, with surging levels of confidence in and optimism for the future.7 The contested August 2009 presidential elections and the charges of massive fraud and vote rigging can be expected to again dampen that optimism. Given that “winning the hearts and minds” of the Afghan population is a key component of COIN strategy, reversing these perceptions will be essential. A number of changes in the U.S. approach can begin to turn perceptions around. The shift toward protecting population centers and ensuring that the military is living closer to—and is thus more visible to—communities, coupled with more restrictive use of air strikes, should assist in lowering civilian casualties, thus removing one of the main sources of Afghans resentment toward the U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces. At the same time, the military’s proximity to the population will facilitate closer communication between NATO/ISAF troops and Afghans. Such proximity will also allow the troops to be more aware of and responsive to the concerns of the local population, thus building trust in the international forces. Changing the manner in which development assistance is delivered, and what sectors of the economy are targeted, can also contribute to shifting these negative perceptions. In particular, greater involvement of local government and local communities in the process of design and implementation of development projects can improve the sense of local ownership of these efforts and facilitate greater buy-in from these communities. Giving local communities greater say over the direction of development strategies will also help change the public perception that international assistance is being wasted, siphoned off for private gain, and focused on inappropriate projects. Placing more emphasis on the development of the agricultural sector, which employs about 80% of Afghans but until now has been largely neglected, could generate much needed employment and improve the living conditions of the population, thus raising people’s expectations for the future. Development strategies will also need to focus more on how to improve local government’s 4 Langer,

“Afghanistan: Where Things Stand.”

5 Ibid.

6

6 McGivering,

“Afghan People ‘Losing Confidence.’”

7 International

Republican Institute. “Afghanistan Public Opinion Survey,” July 16–26, 2009,” available at http://www.iri.org.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

ability to deliver basic services. The lack of basic services is consistently listed as one of the main problems by the Afghan public. Improving service delivery can be expected to shift public views of government effectiveness. Similarly, improving the rule of law and reducing the pervasive corruption will be essential components of changing public perceptions of government’s efficiency and legitimacy.

Key Challenges to Integrating Development Strategies into COIN Efforts in Afghanistan Development Programs Sensitive to Regional Variation An essential element of successful integration of development strategies into COIN efforts is to ensure that development programs are sensitive to the great variation between Afghan provinces. Thus, development strategies will need to be tailored to the particular local conditions and shun a “one size fits all” approach. This, in turn, will require improving the international community’s knowledge of these local conditions. It is very difficult, however, for the international community to access much of the southern and northeastern parts of the country. Large parts of Helmand, for instance, are arid desert. In the northeast, Nuristan and Kunar in particular, there are high mountain ranges. In both regions there are large swaths of territory that have few, if any, roads. The communities that live here often have tenuous connections to even their provincial capitals, much less to the government in Kabul. At the moment, in many of these areas the central Kabul government, for all intents and purposes, does not exist. These areas present particular logistical, tactical, and strategic challenges for integrating development efforts into COIN. The underlying principle of the “clear, hold, build” strategy is that the coalition military forces, once they have cleared an area, begin working to support the local government’s provision of basic services and to launch development programs. The objective of these tactics is to reduce the local community’s support for the Taliban and enhance its commitment to the local and eventually central government. Yet in many areas there is little local government presence for the coalition forces to work with, and often there are no government administrative representatives or police forces. In other areas, where there is such a presence, these institutions are seen by the local population as deeply corrupt and untrustworthy. Thus, it is frequently not just development that needs to be integrated into COIN strategy but broader issues of governance and state-building at the local level.

Deteriorating Security Situation In the last few years, the deteriorating security situation in large parts of the country has meant that both humanitarian assistance and development programs have been more difficult to implement. Various United Nations and international aid agencies have had less access to vulnerable populations, and these organizations’ ability to respond to humanitarian needs in a timely fashion has deteriorated. In particular, the areas in the south, southeast, and northeast where the insurgency is most intense have essentially become “no-go” zones for humanitarian organizations, and development organizations are also virtually absent. According to a UN representative, in 2009 two-thirds of the country had become very difficult to access.8 Most international development NGOs operate only in the most secure locations, most 8 UN

Daily Press Briefing, September 25, 2009.

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notably Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and in the north. In most rural areas, however, there are almost no international aid groups. The inability to access large parts of the country means that there is very little information available to the international donor community about conditions in these regions or about the needs of the population. With the deterioration of the security situation and the consequent withdrawal of development NGOs from most of the country, an increasing percentage of development assistance is channeled through the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). PRTs—introduced by the United States in late 2001 and early 2002 but now also led by other members of NATO/ISAF—are units that include both military and civilian personnel, including subject matter experts in development and diplomacy, charged with leading reconstruction efforts and improving local government capacity. PRTs were first established in Afghanistan and later also used in Iraq to ensure that development efforts could be initiated despite low levels of security. Where they remain, NGOs and aid agencies rely on military convoys for protection when moving around the country. One unintended consequence of these organizations relying on military forces for protection has been that NGOs are no longer seen as neutral actors in the conflict but rather are increasingly viewed by the Taliban as associated with the NATO/ISAF forces and hence as legitimate targets. As attacks on development and aid workers have increased in the last few years, more of these groups have been pushed to withdraw from the most insecure areas, thus further reducing the availability of development aid and programming. At the same time, the growing involvement of the United States and NATO/ISAF military personnel in development work has contributed to rising tensions between the coalition’s military forces and the NGO development community. Many development NGOs argue that the military’s work on development projects blurs the line between civilians and the military, putting civilians at greater risk of violence. Many within the NGO community are equally critical of how the military designs and implements development programs, which they argue reflect the strategic needs of the coalition forces more than the needs of local communities. Thus, some of the challenges of integrating effective development strategies into COIN will be ensuring the return of development NGOs to those areas of the country that they had abandoned because of the lack of security and more effectively mediating the conflicts between the NATO/ ISAF military and these development NGOs. Another challenge will be improving the international community’s ability to assess the situation and conditions on the ground. At this point, neither the international community nor the Afghan national government has access to good data. Without reliable data, however, providing appropriate assistance, whether humanitarian or developmental, will be difficult.

Assessing Progress and Goals of Development Efforts Assessing progress and whether the assistance provided is accomplishing the stated goals is also difficult. Developing a metrics system to better measure whether goals are being accomplished is one way to track the progress of development strategies. Two main challenges will need to be addressed for the metrics to perform their intended function. The first is tracking progress: the metrics will need to be able to measure inputs and outputs as well as outcomes and effects. In other words, the metrics should be able to provide reliable measures of not just how much of a particular road was constructed or how many people were trained but of the impact of that road on key

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components of economic development such as use by farmers to access markets with their produce or whether trainees were able to translate newly acquired skills into employment. The second challenge will be whether the relevant agencies will have the personnel, resources, and skill sets in place to be able to systematically, regularly, and reliably collect the necessary data. Until now, many PRTs did not have sufficient personnel, especially on the civilian side, to track data assessing the progress of the programs that these teams were charged with designing and implementing.

Meeting Expectations of the Afghan Public Another challenge that the effective integration of development strategy into COIN faces is the need to convince members of the Afghan public that their living conditions will change. Though there have been some notable improvements in the last eight years—for instance, in education and health care—poverty, unemployment, and lack of basic services remain pervasive problems in much of the country. Despite some notable achievements in responding to local community needs, improving small-scale, rural infrastructure, and delivering skills training, the National Solidarity Program, created by the Afghan government in 2003, is still in the early stages of development and has been hampered by insufficient funding levels and the deteriorating security situation.9 Recent surveys of the Afghan public indicate that it has little faith that the assistance that has been and is being provided will reach the intended targets. In one recent poll, a staggering 91% of respondents thought that aid was being wasted.10 Furthermore, differences in how local communities and outside aid and development organizations perceive conditions on the ground and how they understand peace and security have contributed to the growing disillusionment and sense of disempowerment of the Afghan population. Without a doubt, the expectations of the Afghan people were high, perhaps unrealistically so, regarding how quickly their lives would begin improving. After eight years of international involvement, however, most Afghans report seeing no improvements in their situation and little impact from foreign assistance. Moreover, often the perception among the population is that the assistance that has been delivered has not focused on the issues of most concern to Afghans but rather has reflected the preferences, values, and interests of the donor countries. From the Afghan perspective, all too often assistance is promised yet is not provided, is focused on projects with superficial impact, or involves too many subcontractors who siphon off much of the aid.11 There are also widespread perceptions of corruption, that little aid actually reaches the people, that local communities are not consulted sufficiently, and that aid is not distributed equitably among the provinces.12 Thus, given these opinions prevalent among the Afghan public, one of the major challenges that the coalition will have to tackle in integrating development strategy into COIN efforts is changing perceptions of foreign assistance among Afghans.

9 The

program was established by the Afghan Ministry of Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development. It gives communities a voice in planning, designing, managing, and monitoring small-scale development and infrastructure projects and is heavily dependent on international donor funds.

10

Yama Torabi and Lorenzo Delesgues, “Afghanistan: Bringing Accountability Back In: From Subjects to Citizens of the State,” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, June 2008.

11

On Afghan perceptions of international aid, see, for example, Antonio Donini, “Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (January 2007): 158–72.

12

Torabi and Delesgues, “Afghanistan: Bringing Accountability Back In.”

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Corruption and Its Negative Impact on Development Strategies in Afghanistan One of the great challenges for effectively incorporating development strategies into the COIN effort is how to deal with the pervasive corruption in Afghanistan. Over the past three decades of war and upheaval, corruption in Afghanistan has worsened significantly. Today, corruption is farreaching, systemic, and deeply entrenched in all levels of the government; often closely connected to broader abuses of power; and appears to occur with at least tacit support of the highest levels of government. In 2007, Afghanistan ranked 172 out of 179 countries on the Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International. In 2008, the country fell to 176 out of 180 countries, followed only by Haiti, Iraq, Burma, and Somalia, and in 2009 it ranked 179, ahead of only Somalia.13 In many provinces, the local governments are so corrupt that the official donor aid is not channeled through the formal state institutions for fear of it being siphoned off for private gain. Bypassing these institutions, however, means that a trade-off is often made between development goals and the objective of constructing legitimate and effective local governance structures. Pervasive corruption thus deepens the tension between the urgency to provide for the population’s basic needs and the need to support government capacity-building. The large inflows of international assistance and the pressure to disburse funds quickly are other sources of corruption. The large number of international donors, inadequate monitoring and reporting structures, and the reliance on subcontractors too often have resulted in the misuse of foreign aid. A recent public opinion survey by USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) found that over 60% of Afghans now believe that there is corruption in aid and 81% believe that only 40% of aid reaches the population.14

Main Causes of Corruption Among the most significant causes of corruption are the weak institutional capacity of public administration, weak legislative and regulatory framework, poor enforcement of laws and regulations, poor and non-merit–based qualifications of public officials, low public servant salaries, and an ineffective system of public scrutiny that is reinforced by a historically predatory relationship between the government and the population. The production and trade of opium further contribute to corruption in Afghanistan, and there is evidence that some government agencies, especially at the provincial and local levels, have been compromised by drug interests. Senior government officials and militia commanders control trade routes yielding millions of dollars. Some public opinion surveys conducted in the last few years indicate that 83% of Afghans now consider corruption to be a greater problem than insecurity, and 50% reported having paid bribes in the previous six months.15 Corruption is perceived to be particularly prevalent in the justice, security, and customs sectors as well as in the delivery of public services. Most Afghans see local authority figures as corrupt and the formal justice system remains illegitimate due to pervasive corruption, deliberate marginalization of various subnational groups, and enduring impunity.

10

13

See the Corruption Perception Indices from Transparency International for 2007, 2008, and 2009, available at http://www.transparency.org/ policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009.

14

“Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan,” U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assessment, March 2009.

15

National Research Center 2008 public opinion survey cited in “Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan”; and Asia Foundation, “A Survey of the Afghan People,” 2008.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Police are likewise perceived to be corrupt and abusive.16 Despite increases in money spent and projects implemented, the government and social institutions are seen as less legitimate and less prepared to meet Afghan needs today and in the future than they were even five years ago.

Attempts to Combat Corruption If measured in terms of outputs, in the past two years the Afghan government took a number of steps aimed at tackling corruption, including signing in 2006 the Afghan compact with international donors (in which the government agreed to intensify the fight against corruption), ratifying the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), and establishing in 2009 the High Office of Monitoring, now called the High Office of Oversight, which is charged with overseeing and orchestrating the national anti-corruption strategy and helping Afghanistan to comply with UNCAC. Before 2007, however, the Afghan government made no attempts to extinguish corruption. Despite this recent flurry of activity, and the removal of some governors and police chiefs for corruption, it still is not clear that the government has the will or ability to actively fight the problem. These high levels of corruption are contributing to the declining legitimacy of the Karzai government. Without an active campaign to address corruption, it will be difficult to effectively incorporate development programs into COIN. In particular, the U.S. government will have a difficult decision to make concerning how development aid will be disbursed and which agencies will be responsible for the design and implementation of development programs. One of the main objectives of integrating development into COIN is to begin improving people’s lives in tangible ways so that they see the benefits of supporting the government. The other main objective is to improve government capacity to deliver basic services to the population. If government agents and institutions, whether at the central or the provincial level, are seen as corrupt and unreliable partners, the temptation is strong to provide development aid outside government channels. Such an approach, though allowing international donors to better oversee how aid is used, also means that the objective of government capacity-building is not achieved and that local institutions that can ensure a sustainable economic development process are not established. Thus, effective incorporation of development efforts within COIN strategy will need to address the problem of pervasive corruption in Afghanistan.

2009 Elections, Corruption, and Governmental Legitimacy Problems The August 2009 presidential and provincial council elections further deepened the crisis of legitimacy facing the Karzai government. Numerous reports of irregularities emerged even prior to the elections. Among the first problems to emerge involved the voter registry, including conflicting numbers of registered voters, with some provinces reporting numbers of registered voters that were higher than the estimated population of these provinces. Other provinces reported higher numbers of registered female than male voters in some of the most conservative areas of the country. Even without accurate population data, such reports raised concerns about the validity and reliability of the registration rolls. Furthermore, there was much anecdotal evidence of registration cards being sold on street corners and of the supposedly indelible ink that was to mark voters’ fingers once they cast their ballots washing off with readily available household chemicals.

16

“Afghans’ Experience of Corruption: A Study across Eight Provinces,” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, December 2007.

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There were other problems as well. In the months before the elections, President Karzai struck deals with many local strongmen and tribal leaders to ensure that they would deliver votes for him. There were also charges by opposition candidates regarding unequal access to the state-run media. Ensuring the full participation of women in the process—whether as candidates, election workers, or voters—also proved difficult. Despite these problems, the scale of voter fraud on election-day still surprised most observers. In early September, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) announced that more than 2,000 complaints had been filed. More than 650 of these complaints the commission deemed serious enough to affect the final result if proven valid. The ECC ordered audits and recounts of votes at 2,500 polling stations. By mid-September, the European Union (EU) announced that it estimated that 1.5 million votes cast, nearly one-fourth of the total, were suspicious, with 1.1 million of those cast for Karzai. After conducting an audit and recount of votes, the ECC rejected numerous ballots as fraudulent, leaving Karzai with less than 50% of the vote and forcing a run-off election between Karzai and Dr. Abdallah Abdallah. The run-off was to be held on November 7. However, a week before the run-off was scheduled to take place, Abdallah announced that he lacked confidence that the Independent Election Commission (IEC) would be able to stage a fraud-free run-off and therefore withdrew from the contest. Within days, the IEC declared Karzai the winner and canceled the run-off election. Although this decision was welcomed by Afghanistan’s international allies, some constitutional scholars raised questions about its legality. Abdallah also called the decision illegal, thus raising questions about whether the Afghan public will see the new government as legitimate. How legitimate this new government is will in turn shape its capacity to be an effective partner with the international community in implementing COIN.

Integrating Development Programs into Pakistan’s COIN Strategies There are differences in the way COIN strategies are pursued in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as how development programs are incorporated within COIN efforts. The primary difference is that whereas in Afghanistan the United States and NATO/ISAF have large numbers of troops on the ground, in Pakistan the implementation of COIN and development strategies in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan will depend on the Pakistani military and civilian agencies. Here the U.S. military will play only an advisory role. The Pakistani government’s sensitivity to the potential political consequences of U.S. military presence in the country was brought to stark relief in spring 2009 when the Pakistani government refused to allow U.S. military helicopters to deliver much needed humanitarian aid to the two million people displaced by the fighting in the Swat Valley. It is not only the U.S. military that does not have a presence on the ground in Pakistan, U.S. government civilian agencies have also taken the light footprint approach in the tribal frontier regions there. Official development aid is channeled through local providers so that credit for programs goes not to the United States but rather to the Pakistani government. Thus, for instance, the United States has a five-year, $750 million program in the FATA that includes aid to combat poppy cultivation, infrastructure development, democracy and governance programs, and education and health programs. This aid is complemented by U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Pakistani army and the Frontier Corps (a federal paramilitary force,

12

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

composed primarily of recruits from the tribal areas and led by Pakistani army officers). However, one would be hard pressed to find the familiar USAID symbol of two hands shaking anywhere in the tribal areas. The lack of U.S. government personnel presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas where the COIN campaign is concentrated presents challenges both for deciding how to allocate resources and for learning about the conditions on the ground as well as the grievances and the needs of the local population. The lack of presence will also affect the U.S. government’s ability to monitor the implementation of development programs. As learned from the experience of reconstruction efforts in Iraq, robust oversight of these efforts is essential. Unlike in Afghanistan, where NATO/ISAF troops will take the lead in pursuing COIN, the Pakistani army will be charged with implementing the strategy in Pakistan. The Pakistani military, however, has historically emphasized a very different approach. Since it began to intervene militarily in the tribal areas in the 2000s, the military has used overwhelming force to dislodge insurgents, destroying housing and infrastructure and displacing large numbers of the civilian population. Following such incursions, the military has tended to strike peace deals with the insurgents, leaving them largely in control of local affairs, as was the case in the Swat Valley. The recent actions of the Pakistani military against the Taliban in the FATA and NWFP indicate that this traditional approach has not changed significantly. The fighting in the Swat Valley in spring 2009 displaced over two million people. Adopting an effective military COIN would thus require a fundamental change in the army’s strategy and a shift of large number of troops to the tribal areas. The Pakistani army has been reluctant to contemplate such a strategy because it continues to view India rather than the Taliban as the primary threat to Pakistani security. Many observers remain skeptical that the Pakistani military has the political will or the capacity to make this transition.17 At the same time, the long-standing lack of trust between the Pakistani military and civilian government will present a challenge to the effective coordination of the two essential components of COIN.

Recognizing Local Conditions for Successful Development Strategies As in Afghanistan, a key to successfully integrating development efforts into COIN strategy in Pakistan will be tailoring development programs to the specific conditions in different areas of the country’s tribal frontier region. The governing structures of the NWFP, the FATA, and Balochistan are very different. These differences mean that in each area the complex coordination between civilian and military personnel and among civilian agencies will also diverge. Development efforts will also need to address the very different sources of grievances in these regions. Although much recent attention has focused on the conflict between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani state, other conflicts, driven by local grievances, have also deepened in the tribal areas in recent years. In the FATA, for instance, local grievances are fueled by the area’s poverty and decades of political repression and marginalization. More than 80% of the population is illiterate, and 60% lives below the poverty line. Stagnation in the FATA extends to the governance structure, which reflects the system British colonial power put in place and in particular to the draconian 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which advocate collective punishment for individual transgressions. 17

Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment,” New America Foundation, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, September 2009.

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In Balochistan, on the other hand, there have been multiple, usually ethnically driven insurgencies since 1948, and the Pakistani army has often used military force to suppress these. More recently, insurgencies have also been driven by political and economic marginalization, and the demands of the Balochis tend to focus on reinstatement of tribal land rights, greater autonomy, and the distribution of natural resources in the area to Balochis. An effective development approach incorporated into COIN strategies will need to be sensitive to these local conflict dynamics and address the local grievances that have both been fueling these conflicts and making populations in the tribal areas willing to tolerate, if not support, the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani government has acknowledged that military actions alone will not guarantee stability in the tribal areas and that more emphasis needs to be placed on development. In the FATA, for instance, the Pakistani government has already adopted a strategy of “dialogue, development, and deterrence.” Effective development and COIN strategy, however, will also require addressing the repressive governance system currently in place.

Importance of Public Perception of the Taliban, Pakistani Military, and United States The conflict between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani military has intensified over the last couple of years. The army has launched offensives against the militants in the tribal regions, including in Bajaru, Mohmand, and most recently in the Swat Valley. The army has also enforced an economic blockade of Waziristan since June 2009. The intensifying conflict between the military and the militants in the tribal areas, as well as the growing threat of terrorism in Pakistan in general, has caused a significant shift in Pakistani public opinion about the militants.18 In a recent survey conducted in all provinces except the FATA, 90% of Pakistanis agreed that religious extremism was a serious problem, and almost as many thought that al Qaeda and Taliban are a serious problem—an increase of 30% as compared to two years ago. These views represent a significant shift in how the Pakistani public views the Taliban and al Qaeda and what the public believes the government response to the groups should be. Whereas two years ago only 28% of the Pakistani public supported military action against extremists, today almost 70% support military action against these groups. At the same time, the percentage of Pakistanis favoring a peace deal with extremists has plummeted from 64% two years ago to 46% today. These shifting views of militants have not, however, led to more positive views of the United States. Over 70% of Pakistanis oppose any U.S. military action in the tribal areas of the country, and an overwhelming and growing majority of Pakistanis (80%) oppose Pakistani cooperation with the United States in the war on terrorism. This, too, represents a sea change in public opinion. Only three years ago, slightly more Pakistanis (46%) supported such cooperation than opposed it (43%).19 This trend underscores what will be one of the key challenges for the United States in supporting development strategies as part of COIN efforts in Pakistan. The deep lack of trust and opposition of most Pakistanis to the direct involvement of the United States in their country means that development projects must continue to be implemented with little U.S. civilian personnel presence on the ground.

14

18

In 2008, on average, Pakistan experienced one suicide attack every five days: 66 attacks in which 965 people were killed. The numbers are much higher if all types of terrorist activity are counted. Many suicide bombers who strike in Afghanistan also travel there from the NWFP and the FATA.

19

International Republican Institute, “Pakistan Public Opinion Survey,” July 15–August 7, 2009, http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/pdfs/2009_ October_1_Survey_of_Pakistan_Public_Opinion_July_15-August_7_2009.pdf.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Effective Development Strategies Effective incorporation of development strategies into COIN in Pakistan will also depend on how the deep economic crisis in Pakistan is tackled. The economy, which in previous years had grown at 6% per annum, slowed to 0.6% in 2008. High population growth rates in Pakistan mean that any level less than 3% growth amounts to a recession. The government’s inability to meet payments to the power companies has resulted in electrical blackouts in many parts of the country, further reducing economic activity. Inflation remains very high. Facing insolvency in the fall of 2008, the Pakistani government was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. IMF loans, however, which are projected at $7.6 billion over two years, came with strict conditions, including deep spending cuts to reduce the budget deficit from 7.3% to 4% of GDP. These belt-tightening measures have already ignited popular protests and have fueled the public’s anger with the government. The economic crisis contributes to the unpopularity of President Zardari, whose approval rating in August 2009 stood at 25%.20 Despite the intensifying conflict between the Pakistani military and the militants in the tribal regions, the Pakistani public views the economy as the major problem facing the country, with more than 70% reporting that their personal economic situation had deteriorated during the past year. Few expect economic conditions to improve in the coming year and more than 80% believe the country is heading in the wrong direction. In this context of deep economic malaise, high inflation, and deep poverty, only 13% of Pakistanis rank terrorism as the most important problem facing the country.21 In other words, the public support for the government is highly dependent on the economic situation, and unless this crisis is addressed, political instability in Pakistan is likely to continue. This instability may in turn affect how effectively the government is able to pursue development strategies in the tribal regions.

Conclusion In November 2009 a number of questions remain about future political and military developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. government’s strategy toward the region is being reassessed. The long-term implications of the contentious and feud-plagued Afghan presidential elections for the legitimacy of the Afghan government remain unclear. It is also not clear how the Pakistani government will address the economic crisis, which is affecting the country’s political stability at a time when the country’s army is also intensifying its fight with militant groups in the tribal areas. What is clear, however, is that the public mood in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is deeply pessimistic about the future and increasingly weary of U.S. involvement in the region. A key to success of a COIN strategy is the war for the hearts and minds of the region’s population. Turning the public’s perceptions will thus be crucially important to the success of U.S. policies in the region. Yet these perceptions are unlikely to change without also concrete improvements in people’s living situation, improved economic growth, better governance, and the rule of law. Incorporating

20

International Republican Institute, “Pakistan Public Opinion Survey.”

21

Ibid.

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development efforts into COIN and ensuring local input into the design and implementation of these efforts is, therefore, a crucial first step to changing how the public in both countries views its own government and the United States. Changing how Afghans, at the government and community level, are involved in the process of designing and implementing development programs will not be easy. Among the issues that the international community needs to address are the following: • how to reconcile what may be divergent priorities of the international community and local community vis-à-vis development • how to ensure that international civilians involved in the design and implementation of development programs have the ability to interface with local communities on a more sustained and regular basis given the security situation • how to ensure that development programs are flexible and responsive to changing local needs, opportunities, and environments • how to ensure that development strategies are tailored to local needs and circumstances and are sensitive to the variation in geography, economic profiles, and security situations among the Afghan provinces • finally, how the pursuit of COIN strategy will be affected by an Afghan government that lacks clear legitimacy in the eyes of many of the country’s citizens, following the problem-plagued 2009 presidential elections In Pakistan, the United States does not have troops on the ground and will continue to largely rely on local partners for implementing development programs. Here the primary challenges will involve issues of oversight and control over COIN and development strategies, which will be resourced with U.S. support but implemented by the Pakistani military and civilian agencies; the ability and the willingness of the Pakistani military to adopt a COIN approach; and the willingness of the Pakistani military and civilian government to coordinate policies. Successful integration of development strategies into COIN will require the international community to work with local communities on the design and implementation of development programs in order to ensure community support as well as the sustainability of the programs. Development programs will need to be tailored to the specifics of local needs and sensitive to the great variation in geography and economic profile in conflict-prone areas within both states. Both the international community and the governments will also need to tackle corruption, which delegitimizes national and local governments and poses challenges to the successful implementation of development programs.

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COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

FOREWORD

W

ith much of the recent discussion about counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan focused on the question of possible shifts in broad U.S. strategy and new troop commitments, other dimensions of the conflict have faded from view. Perhaps chief among these is the role of narcotics trafficking and its impact on the central dynamics that underpin the quagmire in South-Central Asia. The situation that the United States and U.S. international allies face on the ground is driven by factors that far transcend al Qaeda and its regional affiliates. A variety of regional tensions and festering problems—some of which date back decades— converge today on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Narcotics are significant not only as the chief economic driver among this cluster of issues but also precisely because they represent the single issue in which the greatest number of relevant players in the conflict have a direct stake. As Vanda Felbab-Brown points out in her contribution to this report, “a multitude of actors are deeply involved in Afghanistan’s opium poppy production, including the Taliban, all levels of the Afghan government, law enforcement, unofficial power brokers, and tribal elites.” Although opium proceeds may not serve as the Taliban’s single greatest source of income (donations from Islamic charities and private individuals in the Arab Gulf region contribute more to their coffers), narcotics are undoubtedly the economic lynchpin that connects the key players in the region. As Louise Shelley and Nazia Hussain illustrate in their piece, the dynamics in question are by no means confined to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan provides the vast majority of the world’s opium supply as well as now being a major producer of cannabis resin. Global demand dynamics hence exert important pull effects in the immediate region. Likewise, with Russia and Central Asia serving as major through routes for narco-trafficking, this problem also needs to be seen in the context of broader regional factors, with Iran and Turkey also in the mix—a point also made by Ehsan Ahrari in his essay. When it comes to solutions, the analyses in this report illuminate key areas of potential impact. Felbab-Brown, for example, demonstrates that recent declines in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan are a result not so much of local counternarcotics efforts but rather stem from overproduction without commensurate increases in world demand. She also makes the crucial point that alternative agricultural solutions for Afghanistan that also rely on monocropping will likely fail to create the momentum needed for broad-based sustainable economic growth. To invoke the concept of “narco-jihad,” then, is to recognize the seemingly counterintuitive juxtaposition of violence in the name of religious purity fueled in good measure by proceeds from illicit drugs. This NBR Special Report explores various facets of the phenomenon of narcojihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Put together, the three papers that collectively compose this study represent a comprehensive, multi-perspective analysis that will be essential reading for policymakers and analysts of regional and global affairs alike. Peter Mandaville Senior Advisor, Muslim Asia Initiatives The National Bureau of Research Director, Center for Global Studies George Mason University

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the national bureau

of

asian research

The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Military Conflict in the Region Vanda Felbab-Brown Originally published in: Vanda Felbab-Brown, Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain, and Ehsan Ahrari, “Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 20, December 2009. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact . VANDA FELBAB-BROWN is

a Fellow in Foreign Policy and with the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. She is an expert on international and internal conflict issues and their management, including counterinsurgency. Dr. Felbab-Brown focuses particularly on the interaction between illicit economies and military conflict in South Asia, the Andean region, Mexico, and Somalia. She has conducted fieldwork on illicit economies in Afghanistan, India, Burma, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, and Tanzania. Dr. Felbab-Brown is also an Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Prior to assuming her position at the Brookings Institution, she was Assistant Professor at Georgetown University. A frequent commentator in the media, she is the author of many articles on conflict issues as well as the forthcoming book Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, which examines these issues in Colombia, Peru, Afghanistan, Burma, and Northern Ireland. She can be reached at .

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay assesses the nexus between the narcotics economy and violent conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

MAIN FINDINGS • While opium production in Afghanistan declined in 2008–09, it was significantly higher than the estimated total global demand for illicit opiates. Overproduction, not counternarcotics efforts, primarily accounts for the reductions in cultivation and production over the past two years. • Price profitability of opium poppy is not always the most important structural factor driving the narcotics economy in Afghanistan. Insecurity and the lack of infrastructure, value-added chains, assured markets, legal microcredit, land titles, access to land rent, dispute resolution mechanisms, and the rule of law are frequently more important factors than price profitability. • Currently a multitude of actors are involved in Afghanistan’s opium poppy production, including the Taliban, all levels of the Afghan government, law enforcement, unofficial powerbrokers, and tribal elites. • Without a legal alternative economy in place, poppy bans and eradication campaigns have proven economically devastating for the population, socially and politically unsustainable, and counterproductive for the counterinsurgency effort. • Without a reduction in the global demand for illicit opiates, a significant reduction in the opium poppy economy in Afghanistan will shift production elsewhere, including possibly to Burma, Central Asia, or Pakistan.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • An alternative legal economy cannot consist of a monocropping system, such as with wheat. For legal livelihoods to be sustainable and effective in Afghanistan, they need to consist of high-value, labor-intensive, diversified crops, such as fruits and vegetables. • The longer alternative livelihood programs fail to provide economically sufficient replacements for opium poppies, the more problematic it becomes for local elites to endorse eradication and the more the local communities become susceptible to mobilization by the Taliban. • A shift of the opium poppy economy to Pakistan would be highly detrimental to U.S. interests, further destabilizing the Pakistani government, threatening the government’s territorial control and integrity, and fueling militancy by providing Pakistani jihadists and possibly also Baluchi insurgents with significant financial profits and extensive political capital that is currently not available to these groups.

T

 his essay explores the interface of Islamic militancy with opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and draws implications for U.S. national security. It analyzes the evolution of the narcotics economy in the region since the late 1960s and the progressive involvement of various state and nonstate actors in the economy since then, with particular attention to current Islamist jihadi networks in the region. The essay also assesses the effectiveness of various counternarcotics policies, especially since 2001, and evaluates the effectiveness of these policies not only with respect to the narrow goal of narcotics suppression but also with respect to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, state-building, and the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although counternarcotics suppression policies progressively intensified in Afghanistan from 2001–09, they have not resulted in a substantial and sustainable reduction in the cultivation of opium poppies nor have they succeeded in curtailing the Taliban’s drug income. Instead, these policies have strengthened the bond between poppy farmers and the Taliban by alienating farmers from both the Afghan national government and local representatives, with negative repercussions for counterinsurgency efforts, including the diminishment of human intelligence flows on the Taliban and other jihadists. At the same time, efforts to promote alternative livelihoods have been underresourced and cast too narrowly, focusing almost exclusively on relative price ratios of opium to legal crops while largely ignoring the complex and multifaceted drivers of opium poppy cultivation. After decades of cultivation and the collapse of legal economic opportunities, opium is deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of Afghan society and underlies much of the country’s economic and power relations. Many more actors than simply the Taliban participate in the opium economy, and these actors exist at all social levels. The longer alternative livelihoods efforts fail to generate sufficient and sustainable income for poppy farmers, the more problematic and destabilizing it will be for local elites to agree to poppy bans and the greater the political capital that the Taliban will obtain from protecting the poppy fields. An intense eradication campaign under current circumstances will likely make it impossible for the counterinsurgency effort to prevail. Yet, as many other cases of the nexus between drugs and insurgency and terrorism show, through greater resources and improved strategy, counterinsurgent forces can defeat insurgent groups deriving substantial income from drugs. Although the new U.S. counternarcotics strategy appropriately deemphasizes eradication, instead focusing both on interdiction of Taliban-linked traffickers and on alternative livelihoods, this strategy is not free of pitfalls. Its effectiveness with respect to counternarcotics and stabilization will be determined by the actual operationalization of interdiction and alternative livelihoods programs. Without a decrease in the global demand for opiates, a precipitous collapse of the opium poppy economy in Afghanistan will result in the relocation of opium production elsewhere. Should production be relocated on a large scale to Pakistan, especially into the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan-administered Kashmir, or Baluchistan, the consequences for U.S. security interests would be even more severe and dangerous than if large-scale cultivation persists in Afghanistan. In such a case, jihadists targeting the United States and the government of Pakistan will be able to vastly increase their political capital with local populations, thereby enhancing their chances of greatly destabilizing the government of Pakistan and strengthening terrorism activities against the United States.

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The essay proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of the narcotics economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including basic statistics, a brief history of the evolution of this economy in the region, and a survey of the myriad actors involved from the 1970s through the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Second, the essay analyzes the political economy of the drug trade in Afghanistan today and the trade’s structural drivers. Third, the essay provides an overview of the current actors involved in the narcotics economy, from village-level actors to official and unofficial powerbrokers to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups and international smuggling networks. Fourth, the essay assesses the effects and evolution of counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan, from a laissez-faire approach to intensified eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihoods efforts. The essay concludes with an assessment of the narcotics economy and counternarcotics efforts, including the implications of such efforts for stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and regional conflict dynamics.

A Background of the Narcotics Economy in Afghanistan and Its Relationship to Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan Current State of the Drug Economy in Basic Statistics The latest survey of Afghanistan’s opium poppy economy by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicates that cultivation of poppy during the 2008–09 growing season stood at 123,000 hectares (ha) and opium production at 6,900 metric tons (mt).1 While representing a decline from the 2007–08 growing season of 22% and 10% respectively, both numbers still remain very high.2 Indeed, at 6,900 mt, the total production of opium in Afghanistan still significantly surpasses the total global estimated demand for illicit opium. For years, this demand was believed to be at approximately 3,000 mt a year. After several years of opium production in Afghanistan doubly or triply surpassing the estimated total global demand, the UNODC this year increased the total global demand estimate to 5,000 mt. Whether or not the actual level is 3,000 mt or 5,000 mt, however, it is very likely that multi-year overproduction in Afghanistan has resulted in significant stockpiles of either opium or heroin. Though stockpiles are regularly found in Afghanistan and many households hold some stocks of opium as an asset for times of economic stress, it is not clear whether most of the excess opium is held in Afghanistan or outside the country, nor is the size or ownership of the stockpiles known. A further contraction of opium production thus can be anticipated irrespective of counternarcotics efforts. Indeed, most of the decline in poppy cultivation can be attributed to the multi-year overproduction, which has suppressed opium prices in Afghanistan to low levels, rather than to counternarcotics efforts. Moreover, given the unusually high price of wheat in Afghanistan last year, which made it prohibitive for many Afghans to buy enough subsistence cereal even with monocropping opium poppy, some Afghans switched a portion of their land to farm wheat to avoid purchasing wheat on the market.3 The UNODC estimates that 1.6 million Afghans were involved in opium poppy cultivation during the 2008–09 growing period, representing 6.4% of the total population. This number, 1 United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009,” September 2009, http://www.unodc.org/ documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.pdf.

2 Ibid. 3 David

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Mansfield, “Sustaining the Decline?: Understanding the Changes in Opium Poppy Cultivation in the 2008/09 Growing Season,” Afghan Drug Interdepartmental Unit of the UK Government, May 2009, ii–iv.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

however—down from 2.4 million, or 9.8% of the population, in the 2007–08 growing period4— vastly underestimates the actual level of employment the opium poppy economy provides and its criticality for the overall economy of Afghanistan. The opium poppy economy is highly laborintensive and provides both on-farm and off-farm income opportunities (such as employment for itinerant laborers during harvesting), thus offering employment opportunities unparalleled in today’s licit and other illicit economies in Afghanistan. The opium poppy economy has multiple and strong spillover effects: income from this economy underlies the important sectors of Afghanistan’s legal GDP, including construction, trade in durables and non-durables, and services, such as roadside restaurants and hotels. Overall, the micro and macroeconomic significance is far greater than the UN estimate of the number of opium households suggests.5 Although the 2009 UNODC survey did not provide an estimate of the size of the overall opium poppy economy as a percentage of GDP, based on previous years it is safe to assume that this economy is still somewhere between one-third and one-half of the overall GDP.6 Such a level of economic dependence on an illicit drug economy is truly unprecedented in the history of modern drug trade since the end of World War II. Also, given that Afghanistan continues to be the thirdpoorest country in the world with a very low human development index, the political implications of such a large illicit economy are inevitably also great. From Afghanistan, opium and, increasingly, refined heroin is trafficked to Western Europe and Russia via Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Given that China is once again becoming a significant consumer of opiates, however, some of Afghanistan’s heroin is likely also sent to China for consumption, despite the fact that Burma continues to be China’s primary supplier. Some of Afghanistan’s heroin is also destined for the United States, but Mexico and Colombia continue to fill most of U.S. heroin demand, despite recent decreases of opium poppy cultivation in Colombia.7 It is at these international traffic and consumer-country distribution stages where the most significant profits from the illicit trade are realized, many times surpassing the profits remaining within Afghanistan.

Overview of the History of the Narcotics Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan Afghanistan first became a significant opium producer in the mid-1950s, after poppy cultivation was banned in neighboring Iran. Initially Iran was Afghanistan’s principal market. But in the mid1970s, when Western demand for heroin greatly expanded, and political instability and a prolonged drought disrupted the flow of drugs from Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle, Afghanistan and Pakistan began to supply large quantities of illicit opiates to the global market.8

4 UNODC,

“Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009.”

5 For

details on its economic significance, see Edouard Martin and Steven Symansky, “Macroeconomic Impact of the Drug Economy and Counter-Narcotics Efforts,” in Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications of Counter-Narcotics Policy, ed. Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, UNODC, and the World Bank, 2006, 25–46, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/publications/ afghanistan_drug_industry.pdf.

6 UNODC,

“Opium Amounts to Half of Afghanistan’s GDP in 2007, Reports UNODC,” November 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ en/press/releases/opium-amounts-to-half-of-afghanistans-gdp-in-2007,-reports-unodc.html.

7 Information

based on author’s interviews with UNODC, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Office of National Drug Control Policy officials. See also U.S. Department of State, “2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/; and United States Government Accounting Office (GAO), “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, But Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance,” October 6, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71. for example, Scott B. MacDonald, “Afghanistan,” in International Handbook on Drug Control, ed. Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), 317; and Linette Albert, “Afghanistan: A Perspective,” in Afghanistan in the 1970s, ed. Louis Dupree and Linette Albert (New York: Praeger, 1974), 257.

8 See,

THE DRUG ECONOMY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN u FELBAB-BROWN

25

Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan’s production of opium surpassed Afghanistan’s, peaking at approximately 900 mt, and for at least brief periods Pakistan was the world’s number one producer of illicit opiates. Pakistan’s history of opium production dates back to the British Raj, when opium was produced legally and sold to opium dens first in Britain and later in China. Unlike post-colonial India, Pakistan was not able to maintain the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) license for legal production of medical opiates, such as morphine, due to the country’s inability to comply with INCB rules, including failure to prevent the illicit trade of opium. As a result and also due to the domestic politics of Pakistan’s president General Zia ul-Haq, who emphasized the Islamization of Pakistan, opium poppy cultivation became illegal in Pakistan in the 1970s. During the nadir of illicit poppy cultivation in Pakistan in the 1980s, opium poppy was grown in the FATA and the NWFP, with agencies such as Bannu, Khyber, and Dir being significant loci of cultivation. Opium poppy cultivation involved entire tribes and represented the bulk of the local economy in many of these highly geographically, politically, and economically isolated places.9 Pakistan was also the locus of heroin production and smuggling, with prominent and official actors, such as Pakistan’s military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), deeply involved in the heroin trade. Despite the ban on opium poppy cultivation, during the area of Zia ulHaq, drug-related corruption in Pakistan reached the highest levels of the government, including Zia’s closest associates, such as General Fazle Haq, the governor of the NWFP.10

Armed Actors’ Involvement in Afghanistan’s Drug Economy until the Fall of the Taliban Soviet occupation of Afghanistan provided a critical impetus for the massive expansion of the Afghan opium economy in the 1980s. Though Soviet forces were able to control the major cities, they never succeeded in controlling the countryside, where they could not distinguish insurgents from the rural population. As a result, Moscow ultimately resorted to a scorched-earth policy of systematically destroying agricultural production and infrastructure in Afghanistan, including orchards and irrigation systems, to drive the population out of the countryside and into the cities.11 Yet, since agriculture represented the predominant segment of the overall economy, the population was not able to cope economically in the cities and instead switched to opium poppy cultivation in the countryside. Unlike cultivation of legal crops, poppy cultivation did not require the same levels of irrigation, fertilizers, and other agricultural inputs. The switch was facilitated by the large Afghan refugee community in Pakistan that was involved in smuggling, including in opiates and by Pashtun tribal networks spanning the border that frequently participated in poppy cultivation on the Pakistani side. Several Afghan mujahideen commanders became early sponsors of the opium poppy economy in Afghanistan. Among the most prominent were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who also controlled several opium refineries in Pakistan, and Mullah Nasim Akhundzada of Helmand’s Musa Qala

Zada Asad and Robert Harris, The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003); and Nigel J. R. Allan, “Opium Production in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” in Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes, ed. Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs, and Kent Mathewson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 133–52.

9 Amir

26

10

Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, revised edition (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), 484–85; and Ikramul Haq, “Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective,” Asian Survey 36, no. 10 (October 1996): 945–63.

11

Mohammad Qasim Yusufi, “Effects of the War on Agriculture,” in The Tragedy of Afghanistan: The Social, Cultural and Political Impact of the Soviet Invasion, ed. Bo Huldt and Erland Jansson (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 212; and J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986).

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district.12 On the Soviet side, Ismat Muslim from Kandahar’s Spin Boldak district came to control cultivation and trafficking in his area. (Although Ismat Muslim was at first one of the anti-Soviet mujahideen, he later switched to the Soviet side.) Sponsorship of the drug economy allowed these commanders to rise to the top of Afghanistan’s powerbrokers. It allowed them to supplement U.S. aid via ISI and Soviet aid with income from drugs, to build strong armies, and to withstand the collapse of U.S. aid at the end of the 1980s. Even more significantly, such sponsorship also allowed mujahideen commanders to develop political capital with the population in the areas they controlled by giving them the ability to deliver economic subsistence during a time of dire economic stress.13 This political capital further contributed to the demise of the traditional khans (tribal notables) and maliks (landowners) in Afghanistan, legitimized the rise of the mujahideen commanders as the new elites, and consolidated their regional and tribal dominance. The Akhundzadas, for example, emerged leaders of Helmand Province, where their dominance still continues today; and Ismat Muslim rose to lead the Achezai tribe.14 During the civil war in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, opium poppy cultivation expanded beyond the southern region. Other warlords, such as Rashid Dostum and Ahmed Shah Massoud in the north and Ismail Khan in the west, also progressively became involved in the illicit economy through taxing opium poppy cultivation (which by then had spread to the entire country), processing, and shipments.15 Throughout the 1990s, opium cultivation in Afghanistan continued to grow, driven by continued insecurity and the resulting failure of the legal economy to recover as well as by drug suppression efforts in Pakistan. Thus, by the time the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in 1994, the opium poppy economy was pervasive and deeply entrenched. Despite the crop’s overwhelming economic significance, the Taliban’s first impulse was to prohibit the opium poppy economy as un-Islamic, as it had done with other social activities. The population in Helmand Province, where the Taliban ban took place in 1995, mobilized behind the Akhundzadas (despite the clan’s own previous experimentation with eradication and bans in the early 1990s to satisfy U.S. demands and obtain financial payoffs). The Taliban faced an acute prospect of losing power even in southern Afghanistan where its ethnic networks among the Ghilzai Pashtun and overall support base were strongest.16 Consequently, by the end of 1995 the Taliban abandoned its ban on opium poppy cultivation, changed its edicts to prohibit only consumption of opium rather than production, and eventually became deeply involved in the drug economy.17 The Taliban taxed both cultivation and trafficking, later eliminating some traffickers and taking over their roles.18 Under Taliban sponsorship of the opium poppy economy in the latter part of the 1990s, Afghanistan overtook Burma as the world’s largest supplier of illicit opiates.19 12

Barnett Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); and Yury Shvedov et al., War in Afghanistan, trans. Natalie Kovalenko (Moscow: Ministry of Defense, Institute of Military History, 1991), 131–32.

13

Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit? Afghanistan’s Drug Economy and Politics since the 1980s,” Conflict, Security, and Development 6, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 127–49.

14

Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, “‘Tribes’ and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980–2005,” Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper, no. 7, September 2006, http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp7.2.pdf.

15

Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan.

16

Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Fighting Force,” in Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 46.

17

Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit?”

18

Jonathan Goodhand, “From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North East Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 19, no. 2 (June 2000): 265–80; and Ahmed Rashid, “Drug the Infidels,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1997.

19

UNODC (presentation to the International Crisis Group on Afghanistan, Brussels, July 5, 2004).

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27

In the 1999–2000 growing season, however, the Taliban reversed several years of its pro-poppy policy and reinstituted a ban on cultivation in the areas it controlled. (The Northern Alliance of Massoud, hunkering down in the Panshir Valley, persisted with opium poppy cultivation during the ban.) The Taliban instituted the ban for several reasons, the most important of which was the desire to obtain international recognition as the governing authority of Afghanistan. Although by then controlling more than 90% of Afghanistan territory, the Taliban government was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Previous interactions with the UNODC led the Taliban to believe that by reducing poppy cultivation the government would acquire international recognition. As a result of the ban, cultivation indeed fell by a remarkable 90% from very high levels. Because the Taliban did not liquidate its opium stocks while the cultivation ban was in place, however, the group also stood to substantially profit from a subsequent rise in opium prices, which by the end of the 1990s had fallen to very low levels.20 The ban also allowed the Taliban to further consolidate control over the opium trade in Afghanistan and eliminate additional traders. Nevertheless, the ban proved economically devastating for the population—all the more so because the Taliban either systematically destroyed or allowed to disintegrate all other vestiges of the legal economy, public administration, and social services. The opium trade was also the only large-scale economic activity in which the Taliban permitted women’s participation.21 Consequently, the economic effects of the ban were devastating for the population, with many households losing 90% of their income and becoming deeply indebted.22 The highly profitable smuggling of licit goods between the UAE, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan continued to thrive under the Taliban’s sponsorship, but this non–labor-intensive economy did not generate sufficient employment to offset the socio-economic effects of the poppy ban. Thus, despite threats of brutal punishment and bribes to the tribes that the Taliban did not fully control, such as in Nangarhar, the population started violating the ban in the spring of 2001, and in September 2001 the Taliban revoked the ban. Inevitably and immediately, cultivation swung back to the early 1990s levels.

The Role of the Narcotics Economy in Afghanistan’s Local Political Economy The structural drivers that enabled the expansion of the opium poppy economy in the 1990s and drove its recovery in 2001–02 persist today. Since the fall of the Taliban, they have been largely neglected in development efforts and not sufficiently addressed. Although price profitability of opium poppy frequently, though not always, significantly surpasses the price profitability of legal crops (often

28

20

Farm gate opium prices jumped from $28 per kilogram in 2000 to $301 per kilogram in 2001. For more information, see “Summary of Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan,” UNODC, September 12, 2005, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan_2005/annex_opiumafghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf, 16; “Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict,” International Crisis Group, Report no. 26, November 26, 2001, http:// www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400495_26112001-2.pdf; LaVerle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, Rex A, Hudson, and Nina A. Kollars, “A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups,” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, May 2002, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf; and Christian Caryl, “The New Silk Road of Death,” Newsweek, September 17, 2001, 24–28.

21

UNODC, “The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,” June 2000.

22

David Mansfield, “What Is Driving Opium Poppy Cultivation? Decision Making amongst Opium Poppy Cultivators in Afghanistan in the 2003/4 Growing Season” (paper presented at the Second Technical Conference on Drug Control Research, UNODC, July 19–21, 2004).

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

by several times), price profitability is only one among a multitude of factors that drive opium poppy cultivation.23 Other structural drivers are often more important than price profitability. The primary structural driver of illicit opium poppy cultivation is the lack of security that prevents the growth of a legal economy. Investors—whether domestic or international—will be highly reluctant to enter an environment where security cannot be assured on a sustained basis. Insecurity, including the fear of Taliban attacks, undermines the use of roads that have been rebuilt since 2001. For example, the ring road that connects Afghanistan’s major cities continues to be threatened by the resurgent Taliban’s attacks. Other actors are equally responsible for the lack of security necessary for economic development, including unofficial militias pervasive along Afghanistan’s roads, and the Afghan National Police (ANP), which frequently acts as a band of thieves in state-provided uniforms. The ANP and unofficial militias, as well as the Taliban, frequently charge exorbitant unofficial tolls at road checkpoints, thus raising the costs of transportation to such a point that many legal crops cease to be profitable, even if transported only to local markets. In the south, where the lack of security is far greater than in the north, the cost of transportation per kilometer can be 70% higher than in the north.24 Overall, the destruction of the basic economic infrastructure, including roads and irrigation systems, and the lack of electrification remain pervasive despite eight years of international recovery efforts and hamper the recovery of a legal economy. Moreover, legal agricultural products today face new international competitors that Afghanistan did not face prior to the Soviet invasion, when the country exported cereals, vegetables, and horticultural products. Afghanistan also lacks processing facilities, undermining the possibilities for the creation of value-added and the preservation of highly spoilable agricultural products. Opium poppy cultivation, conversely, requires minimal inputs in terms of fertilizers and irrigation (even though it benefits from them). Once the resin is collected from the poppy capsule and dried, it also becomes essentially non-perishable, thus avoiding spoilage problems that legal crops face. Moreover, opium traders frequently pick up opium at the farm gate, thus eliminating transportation difficulties and costs for farmers. Critical among the structural factors driving opium poppy cultivation is the lack of a legal microcredit system in Afghanistan. Large segments of the population do not make enough income to withstand the unproductive winter and cover their basic expenses but need to borrow money to secure even basic food consumption (they similarly need to borrow money to invest in any productive assets). For the majority of the population, the only microcredit available is one linked to opium poppy cultivation where creditors lend money against a promised amount of opium poppy.25 Although the government of Afghanistan’s Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) has been successful in delivering legal microcredit, MIFSA still covers only about 8% of the estimated credit need and is available almost exclusively in cities.26

23

David Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality—Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan” (paper presented at the International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing, September 7–12, 2002).

24

Information based on author’s interviews in southern Afghanistan, Spring 2009. See also, David Mansfield, “Water Management, Livestock, and the Opium Economy—Resurgence and Reductions: Explanations for Changing Levels of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor in 2006–07,” Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, May 2008.

25

Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production.”

26

For details, see Christopher Ward, David Mansfield, Peter Oldham, and William Byrd, “Afghanistan: Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production,” World Bank and DFID, February 2008, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/ incentives-opium-prod-red-afghan.pdf.

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29

Since 2001, with ex-warlords capable of dominating the opium poppy economy to a great extent, land concentration has increased, and access to land for many sharecroppers is conditioned on the cultivation of opium poppy. This is especially problematic in Afghanistan, a country with a paucity of arable land, where land intensity problems make it hard to generate even enough subsistence with legal crops. Finally, the lack of the rule of law is another crucial driver of illicit economies in general, including the narcotics economy in Afghanistan. This absence of rule of law should not be understood only as the institutional underdevelopment and pervasive corruption of Afghanistan’s law enforcement, but also as fundamental underprovision of effective and accountable judiciary, such as the lack of functioning courts and dispute resolution mechanisms. Without such mechanisms, legal economies are paralyzed. Unless these various structural drivers are fully addressed, opium poppy will remain a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment.27 Counternarcotics suppression efforts, such as eradication, will not be able to alter the risk ratios to sustain opium poppy reductions without resorting to extensive and prolonged suppression through military force of the social protest such actions will generate. Such an approach, however, would be politically unsustainable internationally and would deliver the Afghan population into the Taliban’s hands.

Current Actors in the Narcotics Economy in Afghanistan and its Structure Given that the illicit narcotics economy represents such a large portion of Afghanistan’s GDP and plays such a significant role in the overall economy, the economy inevitably affects and involves a multitude of actors beyond the Taliban, even though it is this movement’s participation that receives the most attention from the international community.

Actors in Afghan Villages At the village level, the narcotics economy provides livelihoods to rural households, including small opium traders. Its aforementioned spillover effects, such as the expansion of resthouses and restaurants, retail of livestock and both consumer goods and durables, and growth in construction, however, mean that opium production also affects the economy in cities. The management of the opium poppy economy also affects the political capital and survivability of the tribal leadership and district chiefs. On the one hand, the opium economy is frequently the only way for the tribe to maintain subsistence income (as well as any hope of socio-economic improvement), and hence the tribal leadership derives political capital from sponsoring it. On the other hand, the tribal leadership now also faces oversight from governors, the national government in Kabul, and the international community. Since the national government appoints both district chiefs and governors, Kabul exercises substantial control over local level decisionmaking. In order to satisfy governors, Kabul, and the international community, the tribal leadership and district chiefs frequently acquiesce (often in exchange for various payoffs) to eradication or poppy cultivation bans even though their local communities oppose such measures.

27

30

David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Counternarcotics in Afghanistan: The Failure of Success?” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Briefing Paper, December 2008.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

At the same time, because the power of tribal leaders over the local community is limited, they cannot completely ignore the community’s wishes. In counternarcotics efforts, tribal leaders thus need to balance legitimacy with the local population resulting from satisfying their economic needs, such as sponsoring the profitable-yet-illicit economy, against legitimacy with outside actors that accrues from suppressing poppy production. Local leaders thus engage in complex negotiations with both the local community and outside actors to balance the contradictory political imperatives. The longer alternative livelihoods programs fail to provide economically sufficient replacements for opium poppy, the more problematic this balancing act becomes for local elites and the more susceptible local communities become to Taliban mobilization.28 Furthermore, although local police forces and specialized counternarcotics units are tasked with suppressing the drug economy, many do in fact participate in the narcotics trade to a large degree at the village level and higher up the processing chain.

Regional Traffickers and International Smuggling Enterprises Higher up the processing chain, the drug economy also involves regional traffickers with links to international smuggling enterprises. As a result of the way interdiction has been carried out since 2002—targeting small traders at the village level while not systemically removing powerful traffickers with links to the government—the drug industry in Afghanistan exhibits a high degree of vertical integration, with perhaps twenty or so large organizations coalescing around important powerbrokers, both with and without links to the government.29 Many such actors are former warlords who today hold positions in the Afghan national or regional governments and the parliament. They include, for example, President Hamid Karzai’s vice-presidential nominee, Mohammad Fahim, Hazrat Ali, Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan, Jan Mohammad, Gul Agha Shirzai, and Ahmed Wali Karzai, President Karzai’s brother (even though no concrete evidence has ever been provided on Wali to support the extensive allegations).30 Despite complex links to the drug trade, many of these powerbrokers have managed to build sufficient organizational space between them and their drug networks in order to prevent Afghan authorities or the international community from obtaining sufficient evidence about their narcotics activities. Some powerbrokers have even “legitimized” themselves with the international community by conducting poppy eradication and interdiction efforts, frequently outside of the province where they maintain their own drug networks, thus permitting them to maintain drug profits and political capital while undermining political and drug competition. Gul Agha Shirzai and Hazrat Ali provide examples of this strategy: Both at various times have been in charge of counternarcotics in Nangarhar and have carried out large-scale suppression of opium poppy there while protecting their drug networks in Kandahar and Afghanistan’s north respectively.31 Thus, the existing illicit narcotics economy and the way counternarcotics efforts have been conducted each contribute to corruption in Afghanistan. The corruption deeply permeates the 28

Based on author’s fieldwork in Afghanistan during the fall of 2005 and spring of 2009. For more information, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Among Poppy,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 1 (February 2009): 100–14.

29

Adam Pain, “Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor,” AREU, Issue Paper, January 2006, http://www.areu.org.af/?option=com_ docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid=353; and Mark Shaw, “Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications of Counter-Narcotics Policy, ed. Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, UNODC and the World Bank, 2006, 189–214, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/publications/ afghanistan_drug_industry.pdf.

30

James Risen, “Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Afghanistan Heroin Trade,” New York Times, October 4, 2008.

31

Based on author interviews in Afghanistan in fall 2005 and spring 2009. See also Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermine Counterterrorism,” Washington Quarterly 28, no.4 (Fall 2005): 55–72.

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31

political process. Opium poppy is far from the sole source of corruption in Afghanistan, however, nor is this corruption the greatest source of popular disaffection with the national government and its regional representatives. Rather, the disaffection and alienation of the population is as much a reaction to the targeting of the most vulnerable sectors of the society by counternarcotics efforts while rich powerbrokers escape such efforts. A further source of disaffection is the need to pay significant bribes in order to engage in any, not just illicit, economic activity and even to qualify for other routine procedures that should require no payment—such as being rotated out of Afghan National Army (ANA) kandaks (battalions) that are deployed to highly kinetic Helmand after completion of the mandated period.32 Beyond Afghanistan’s borders, only a few top Afghan or Pakistani traffickers are known, and the structure of the industry there does not appear to mimic the “cartelization” of the international drug traffic as witnessed in Latin America since the late 1970s. These known Afghan and Pakistani traffickers include, for example, Bashir Noorzai, Mohammad Essa, Haji Baz Mohammad (all three recently captured and extradited to the United States), and Ibrahim Dawood. Unlike the Latin American drug trade, international drug trafficking from Afghanistan appears to be highly segmented, with a multitude of organizations and actors—including Turkish and Kurdish drug trafficking organizations, the Russian mafia and military, members of Central Asian governments and law enforcement, the Chinese Triads, and Balkan smuggling outfits—having a piece of the trade in their territories, while organized crime groups in Western and Eastern Europe dominate distribution in consumer countries. Despite widespread allegations, there is little evidence beyond tangential associations that either al Qaeda or the Taliban have systematically penetrated, or are deriving extensive profits from, these international smuggling or retail distribution networks.

The Taliban in Afghanistan At the same time, it is clear that the Taliban has once again penetrated the drug economy in Afghanistan.33 After the Taliban was expelled from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 2001–02, the organization was also expelled from the drug economy. Interdiction and eradication efforts undertaken since 2004, however, have enabled the Taliban to insert itself back into the economy by providing protection services to smuggling operations and for drug traffickers targeted by interdiction and by protecting poppy fields threatened with eradication. The Taliban thus provides an enabling environment for the opium poppy trade by limiting the reach of law enforcement and also by preventing alternative livelihoods efforts. For these services, it charges protection fees to farmers and drug traffickers. Despite widespread allegations, however, field research in Afghanistan provides little support for the claim that the Taliban is forcing the rural population to cultivate poppies. Moreover, as the Taliban is a complex amalgam of actors—which includes the core Taliban around Mullah Omar; disgruntled tribes, such as Ghilzai Pashtuns; crime groups; local unemployed men; international jihadists; and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s and Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani’s fighters—the organization’s relationship to the opium poppy economy is highly complex and frequently local-context dependent and varied. Some of the tribes that consider themselves the Taliban, such as around Musa Qala, for example, do so simply because they face eradication of their poppies. At the same time, many local drug

32

32

Author’s interviews with ANA military in Helmand and with shopkeepers in Kandahar, spring 2009.

33

This section draws heavily on author’s forthcoming book, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming 2009). See also Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Among Poppy.”

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

groups choose to call themselves the Taliban to ride the coattails of its success and wrap themselves with greater legitimacy. Estimates vary widely about how much money the Taliban derives from the drug economy: from $70 million a year to $500 million a year.34 Given the complexity of the Afghan drug trade as well as comparisons with other belligerent groups involved in the drug trade in Asia and Latin America, the lower estimates are probably more likely to be accurate. Similarly, estimates vary about the percentage of income that the Taliban derives from the drug economy, ranging from 20% to well over 50%. Once again, it is highly unlikely that the Taliban derives more than half of its income from drugs. Other significant sources of income include taxation of all economic activity in areas where the Taliban has sufficient presence—including government projects, such as those provided through the National Solidarity Program via community development councils; smuggling of legal goods from Pakistan; illicit logging, especially in the east, such as in Kunar Province where the Haqqani networks operate;35 smuggling in gems; illicit trade in wildlife (including ibex, oryx, saker falcons, and snow leopards); and, importantly, fundraising in Pakistan and the larger Middle East.36 Crucially, however, the benefits that the Taliban derives from the drug economy significantly go beyond the financial profits and the resulting simplification of procurement, logistics, and the increased ability to pay fighters wages greater than those supported by local legal markets. Most significantly, the sponsorship of the opium poppy economy provides the Taliban with important political capital, both with the wider rural population dependent on opium poppy cultivation for basic subsistence and with tribal elites and important powerbrokers. This resulting political capital consequently motivates the local population to deny intelligence provision on the Taliban to NATO and Afghan forces and provides the insurgents with both active and passive support. Along with the Taliban’s provision of otherwise-lacking rule of law—or, given its brutality, “rule of order”—and mechanisms for dispute resolution of local conflicts, sponsorship of the opium poppy economy constitutes the most significant part of the Taliban’s political capital. In many ways, the support obtained from the Taliban’s prevention of eradication frequently trumps even its tribally and ethnically based legitimacy, given the complex multilayered fabric of subtribal and clan allegiances and rivalries that go well beyond simplistic divisions of Pashtuns versus nonPashtuns or even Durrani versus Ghilzai Pashtuns.37

Pakistani Taliban On the Pakistan side, there is little evidence that either the Afghan Taliban or the Pakistani Taliban (including Tehrik-i-Taliban and Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Sharia-Mohammadi) has systematically

34

For the top estimates, see Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009). A comprehensive Congressional Research Service (CRS) report in July 2009 put the estimate at about $100 million a year, a number that many drug experts, including this report’s author, find most plausible. For this report, see Christopher M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” CRS, CRS Report for Congress, RL32686, July 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf; and Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 41–83, 111–14.

35

See, for example, C. J. Chivers, “A Blast, an Ambush and a Spring Out of a Taliban Kill Zone,” New York Times, April 20, 2009; and Amber Robinson, “Soldiers Disrupt Timber Smuggling in Afghan Province,” American Forces Press Service, June 8, 2009.

36

Author’s interviews in Afghanistan during the fall of 2005 and spring of 2009. See also, Elizabeth Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” New York Times Magazine, October 22, 2006, 86–99, 173; and Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “For the Taliban, A Crime That Pays,” Newsweek, September 15, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/157549/output/print.

37

This is not to say that this ethnic- and tribal-based legitimacy does not remain important for the Taliban. Passively, the population also tolerates the Taliban simply out of the calculation that in its area the Taliban will prevail in the conflict or physically remain there and that the population would be subject to its retaliation if it supported the counterinsurgents.

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33

penetrated the slightly resurgent opium poppy cultivation in the FATA and NWFP, even though they may have penetrated trafficking in drugs and precursor agents in Pakistan. Given the lack of systematic drug surveys in those areas of Pakistan, the extent of cultivation there is difficult to gauge, but some assessments report a resurgence of cultivation up to 2,000 hectares in recent years. It may well be more, however, considering the lack of economic alternatives in the area, the history of opium poppy cultivation there, and the fact that the level of poppy cultivation in Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control is estimated at 8,000 hectares.38 So far, it appears that the main sources of the Pakistani Taliban’s income include: smuggling in legal goods, charging tolls and protection fees, taxation of all economic activity in the areas they operate (some being highly profitable, such as marble mining), theft and resale of NATO supplies heading to Afghanistan via Pakistan, illicit logging, and fundraising in Pakistan and the Middle East.39 While profits from such a diverse portfolio of activities can equate or even surpass profits from drugs, their main downside from the perspective of the belligerent actors is that these economic activities are not labor-intensive. Consequently, unlike when belligerent groups sponsor the highly labor-intensive cultivation of opium poppy, the jihadi groups in Pakistan cannot present themselves as large-scale providers of employment to the local population.

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan after the Fall of the Taliban and Their Effects Counternarcotics efforts since the fall of the Taliban have neither succeeded in limiting the expansion and consolidation of the narcotics economy in Afghanistan nor prevented its penetration by the Taliban and other actors.40 In fact, elements of the counternarcotics strategy have contributed to Taliban penetration of the narcotics economy and to the cementing of its bond with the broader population.

Laissez-faire, 2001–02 The first counternarcotics policy adopted in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002 was one of laissez-faire. This approach was to a large extent dictated by the small numbers of U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan during that period and the consequent need to rely on local warlords of both the Northern Alliance and the disgruntled tribes in the south—not only for intelligence provision but also for direct military action against the Taliban. Inevitably, many of these warlords, such as Mohammad Fahim, Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Daoud, and Hazrat Ali, were involved in the drug economy (without the economy’s financial and political assets, these leaders would not have risen to their positions of power and been able to support their militias). As the Taliban was expelled from Afghanistan into Pakistan, these warlords were ideally placed to take over the Taliban’s role in the narcotics economy and consolidate their power over it.41

34

38

Author’s interviews with UNODC, Indian, and Pakistani officials in New York, Washington, D.C., and Kashmir, India, during the spring, summer, and fall of 2008.

39

See, for example, Syed Irfan Ashraf, “Militancy and the Black Economy,” Dawn, March 22, 2009; Sabrina Taversine, “Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban,” New York Times, August 29, 2009; and Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business,” New York Times, July 14, 2008.

40

For details, see Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, chap. 5.

41

Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermine Counterterrorism.”

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Compensated Eradication and Interdiction, 2002–03 Meanwhile, under the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Kingdom was charged with being the lead nation on counternarcotics. Concerned that forced eradication without alternative livelihoods would antagonize and further impoverish the Afghan population, the UK chose a two-pronged policy: compensated eradication and the interdiction of traffickers and processing laboratories. Under the compensated eradication scheme, farmers were to be paid between $250–$350 per every jerib (about one-fifth of a hectare) of land eradicated.42 The scheme relied on local powerbrokers to assess the amount of land seeded with opium poppy and the amount eradicated and to dispense compensation. Immediately, however, the scheme was marred by multiple forms of fraud: local elites systematically overestimated both amounts to claim more money, farmers frequently did not eradicate, and the powerbrokers kept the money for themselves instead of distributing it. The amount allocated to the program consequently soon ran out and many farmers who did actually eradicate failed to receive compensation. At the same time, the set compensation level was nowhere close to offsetting the economic losses from eradicating opium poppy. In a classic moral hazard scenario, the north of the country, where poppy planting takes place later in the season than in the south, started cultivating more poppies only to collect greater compensation. Because of these problems, the compensation program was aborted in 2003. Meanwhile, interdiction efforts by the British assistance mission in Afghanistan, undertaken alongside the compensated eradication program, were frustrated by the continuing reliance on local warlords and drug traffickers as intelligence and military assets.

Intensified Forced Eradication, 2004–09 By the end of 2004, it was determined that the warlords rather than the Taliban now represented the greatest threat to the stability of the country; and international pressure continued to build to address the burgeoning opium production. The United States subsequently set up new counternarcotics institutions in Afghanistan (outside of the Ministry of Counternarcotics nurtured by the United Kingdom) in order to greatly increase forced eradication as well as to beef up interdiction.43 Increased interdiction, however, frequently ended up being politically manipulated by local powerbrokers targeting their ethnic and political opposition and eliminating rival drug groups. Interdiction also focused on the lowest-level traders, resulting in a significant vertical integration of the industry and giving rise to demands for Taliban protection services by these traders and higher-level traffickers.44 Although aerial spraying advocated by many in the United States was not undertaken, increased manual eradication—carried out both by national units, such as the Central Poppy Eradication Force and its previous incarnations, and by provincial governors—nonetheless was adopted, nearly generating a provincial revolt in Kandahar in 2004 and major social protest in Nangarhar.45 Because of this frequently violent social protest and the Taliban provision of 42

Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai, “Flowers of Destruction,” Newsweek, July 14, 2003, 29.

43

“Downward Spiral: Banning Opium in Afghanistan and Burma,” Transnational Institute, Briefing Paper, no. 12, June 2005, http://www.tni. org/article/downward-spiral.

44

For details, see Pain, “Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor”; and Shaw, “Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan.”

45

“After Victory, Defeat,” Economist, July 16, 2005.

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35

protection against eradication, eradication mostly resulted in small numbers of hectares being eradicated. The eradication of poppy fields was usually negotiated with local powerbrokers and targeted either damaged crops or crops of the poorest and most vulnerable farmers while rich, influential landowners were able to intimidate or bribe the eradication teams. (Considering that large landowners employ many poor sharecroppers and itinerant workers, even nominally targeting rich landowners also has negative economic effects on the poor segments of the population.) Overall, cultivation continued to increase. Several opium bans and eradication campaigns in Nangarhar Province nonetheless succeeded in driving cultivation there to negligible levels. Because Nangarhar has historically been the second- or third-largest producer of opium in Afghanistan, after Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, these suppression drives carried out by the provincial governor (most recently Gul Agha Shirzai) have been hailed as major successes and a counternarcotics model to be emulated elsewhere in Afghanistan. Yet, these suppression drives have proved economically unsustainable and politically destabilizing. Despites promises, alternative livelihoods have not materialized on any sufficient and extensive level; thus, the economic consequences of the bans have been devastating for many, especially anyone more than 20 km outside of the provincial capital Jalalabad and consequently without access to other forms of employment. Many growers experienced income losses of 90% and became heavily indebted.46 Those unable to repay debts (held in opium in the previously mentioned opium-linked microcredit system) either ended up as indentured labor, escaped to Pakistan where they frequently ended up in the pro-Taliban Deobandi madaris, or were forced to liquidate all of their assets and even resort to selling their daughters. After the first such drive in Nangarhar in 2005, opium production swung back to pre-ban levels by the end of 2007. During 2008 and 2009, Governor Shirzai, motivated by a desire to score points with the international community since he intended to run for president of Afghanistan in 2009, maintained a new ban and eradication by further promises of aid, bribes to tribal elites, and punitive actions against violators, such as imprisonment, and threats that NATO would bomb the houses of those who failed to comply with the ban. But once again the promises of alternative livelihoods have failed to materialize, especially for those further away from Jalalabad, including in the strategically important Khogiani, Achin, and Shinwar districts that sit on the border with Pakistan. Antagonized local tribes stopped providing intelligence on the Taliban to NATO and Afghan forces, and have begun permitting Taliban forces to cross through their districts into Afghanistan,47 even though these tribes have traditionally had antagonistic relationships with the Taliban. In 2009, the narcotics suppression efforts in Nangarhar depressed the overall economy even in Jalalabad, and the city saw a rise of Taliban mobilization and attacks. To summarize, eradication has had the following effects. First, it has not bankrupted the Taliban. In fact, eradication has yet to bankrupt or severely weaken one single belligerent group anywhere the strategy has been tried, including in Colombia after the most extensive and intensive aerial spraying in history, because the belligerents as well as the producers and traffickers can adapt

36

46

David Mansfield, “Pariah or Poverty? The Opium Ban in the Province Nangarhar in 2004/05 Growing Season and Its Impact on Rural Livelihood Strategies.” GTZ, Policy Brief, no. 1, September 2005, http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-FinalCopingReportStudyPAL20.7.p df; and David Mansfield, “Beyond Metrics: Understanding the Nature of Change in the Rural Livelihoods of Opium Growing Households in the 2006–07 Growing Season,” Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit of the UK government, May 2007, http://www.davidmansfield.org/ data/Field_Work/UK/FinalDrivers0607.pdf.

47

Author’s interviews with U.S. military personnel deployed to Nangarhar and political advisers to Kabul, spring 2008 and summer 2009.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

in a variety of ways.48 Indeed, the Taliban reconstituted itself in Pakistan between 2002 and 2004, without access to large profits from drugs, by rebuilding its material base largely from donations in Pakistan and the Middle East and from profits from another illicit economy, the illegal traffic of licit goods between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Given that these and other forms of financing remain accessible to the Taliban, eradication has little chance of limiting the Taliban’s financial income to significantly weaken it militarily. Second, eradication meanwhile strengthens the Taliban physically by driving economic refugees into its hands. Third, eradication alienates the local population from the national government as well as from local tribal elites that agree to eradication. The latter effect might seem quite innocuous but in fact is extremely dangerous and destabilizing, because such alienation undermines local leadership and enables the Taliban to penetrate the community at the village and tribal level. Fourth, eradication not only critically undermines the motivation of the local population to provide intelligence on the Taliban to counterinsurgent forces. Eradication also motivates the population to provide intelligence to the Taliban on counterinsurgent and Afghan security and counternarcotics forces. Finally, local eradicators themselves are in the best position to profit from the drug trade by undermining drug and political rivals alike. Nor should the decrease of opium poppy cultivation in the north of Afghanistan be attributed primarily to effective counternarcotics policies. To a large extent, the success of these so-called poppy-free provinces is ephemeral and driven by market and security conditions outside of the scope of counternarcotics policies.49 Historically, the north of the country served as a sort of pressure valve on narcotics production in the country, with production there increasing only when production in the south and east has been down for some reason. Given the massive multi-year overproduction in the south during the 2000s, a reduction in the north due simply to market correction is to be expected. Further, because of far greater security in the north—although security in the region has been increasingly eroded by a Taliban campaign over the past two years, remobilization of local anti-Taliban militias, and the rise of street crime—legal economic development has taken off significantly more than elsewhere in the country. Especially near major cities in the north located along major trading routes, such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Fayzabad, local markets, particularly agricultural markets, have picked up, and vegetable traders have even begun mimicking opium traders in providing a variety of extension services at the farm, including microcredit, and collecting legal crops at the farm gate.50 Yet even in the north, particularly in areas farther away from major cities, opium has frequently been replaced by marijuana, the cultivation of which has greatly expanded in Afghanistan.51 Increasing insecurity in the north now threatens the legal markets there. Meanwhile, drug trafficking in the region continues unabated.

48

The substantial weakening of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) cannot be attributed to eradication but rather to improved direct Colombian military action against the FARC, including pin-down strategies, as well as to local interdiction efforts that prevent the FARC from moving paste from some of its areas of operation to traffickers. Colombian military efforts have been critically enabled by U.S. training, resource provision, and the U.S. signal intelligence provision to the Colombian military. For more information, see Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, chap. 4; and Vanda Felbab-Brown et al., “Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crops Reduction Components,” USAID, April 2009, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN233.pdf.

49

Mansfield and Pain, “Counternarcotics in Afghanistan: The Failure of Success?”

50

Mansfield, “Beyond Metrics.”

51

Kirk Semple, “Cannabis Replacing Opium Poppies in Afghanistan,” International Herald Tribune, November 4, 2007.

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37

Alternative Livelihoods Efforts to promote alternative livelihoods have been slow to reach the majority of the population and generate sufficient income or employment. To some extent, this slow take-off is inevitable, as rural development is a complex and long-term undertaking. Yet, at least until the announcement of the new U.S. administration strategy in the summer of 2009, many of the previous and existing alternative livelihoods programs were mis-designed and underresourced. 52 Large sums of development money were sunk into quick buy-off projects for the local community through Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)—funds that nonetheless proved unsustainable, such as building schools without having teachers or building clinics without having medical staff.53 Even nominally long-term development projects frequently proved to be short-term cash-forwork programs, such as building roads and cleaning irrigation systems, that neither generated sufficient income nor provided lasting employment. At the same time, large sums of money were given to “white elephant” projects, such as the Kajaki dam, and failed to trickle down to the population while being particularly vulnerable to disruption or capture by the Taliban. Structural drivers of opium poppy were not addressed, agricultural development at the farm level was neglected and underfunded, and alternative livelihoods projects were not located within a broader rural socio-economic development. During 2008–09, alternative development efforts in many parts of the country were essentially collapsed into a crop substitution program in the form of wheat distribution. This program was intensely undertaken in Helmand, sponsored by the province’s governor, Mohammad Gulab Mangal, and widely endorsed by the international community. Subsequently the program spread to other parts of Afghanistan.54 Although it is not possible to comprehensively assess the program because insecurity prevented systematic onsite evaluation of the effort, there are reasons to doubt the program’s effectiveness and sustainability. First of all, one of the important lessons of counternarcotics alternative development efforts throughout the world over the past 40 years is that simplistic crop substitution programs do not work. In Afghanistan itself, previous efforts to replace wheat for opium have failed because of land intensity problems and landholdings per household that are too small to generate even enough subsistence from cereals.55 The 2008–09 wheat distribution campaign was driven mainly by the unusually favorable wheat-to-opium price ratio; however, this ratio is not sustainable, in part because Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Iran dictate Afghan wheat prices. Nor did the wheat distribution program in any way address structural drivers of opium poppy cultivation. Finally, because wheat is far less labor-intensive than opium poppy, farming this crop can employ only about 12% of the people that can be employed in opium poppy cultivation and processing. Consequently, if all poppy cultivators and opium producers in Afghanistan were to switch to wheat, Afghanistan would face a great rise in unemployment on top of the existing unemployment. What Afghanistan needs instead is the development of high-labor-intensive, highvalue crops, such as diversified vegetables and fruits, and the development of assured value-added

38

52

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Pursues a New Way to Rebuild in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 19, 2009.

53

Author’s interviews with members of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and Uruzgan, spring 2009.

54

Author’s interviews with members of PRTs, Counternarcotics Advisory Teams (CNAT), and USAID officials, southern Afghanistan, spring 2009.

55

See, for example, Mansfield, “Sustaining the Decline?”

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

chains located within a broad program of socio-economic rural development. Sufficient and maintained security is an inescapable precondition for such an undertaking.

Assessment of Narcotics Economy on Stability and Regional Conflict Dynamics Given the pervasiveness of the opium poppy economy and its micro- and macroeconomic significance, the political effects of opium production are inevitably large at all levels of society. The narcotics economy is deeply entrenched in Afghanistan and the country’s socio-economic fabric. Consequently, efforts to reduce the economy in a sustainable way compatible with the reduction of violent conflict—both insurgency and social violence—will require improvements in security and sustained economic and institutional development, particularly concerning the rule of law, over an extensive period of time (easily two decades). A critical precondition for the success of counternarcotics policies is the significant reduction of violent conflict. Without security, counternarcotics efforts will not be effective, regardless of whether they emphasize strong-fisted eradication or rural development. Indeed, nowhere in the world have counternarcotics efforts succeeded in reducing cultivation and trafficking without a prior major reduction in conflict—not in Colombia, Peru, Thailand, Lebanon, Burma, or China. At the same time, in all of these countries military forces were able to prevail against insurgents or other opponents involved in the drug trade despite their opponents’ high profits from and undiminished involvement in the drug trade as a result of the intensification of military and other resources devoted to the counterinsurgency campaign and improvements in counterinsurgency strategy. Even in Colombia, where conflict is still ongoing, the FARC has been greatly weakened, despite the fact that coca cultivation persists near record-high levels.56 The fact that the Taliban profits from poppy even at great levels does not by itself prevent its defeat. Efforts to bankrupt the Taliban by eradication, however, will hamper the counterinsurgency campaign unless legal alternatives for the affected population are in place rather than simply promised. The new counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan announced by the current U.S. administration—scaling back eradication and intensifying rural agricultural development and interdiction—well complements the new counterinsurgency focus on protecting the population and separating it from the Taliban through a hearts-and-minds and “stomachs” approach. How the new counternarcotics strategy is in fact operationalized will, however, determine its effectiveness in reducing the opium economy and enhancing counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts. If rural development efforts continue to be limited to the wheat distribution program, and rural diversification and development of value-added chains and secured markets fail to be established, alternative development efforts are unlikely to be effective. Furthermore, a failure to prepare Congress, the U.S. domestic audience, and the broader international community for how long rural development will take and to present realistic timelines will ultimately undermine support for appropriate counternarcotics efforts, even if such efforts are on the right track. Similarly, the NATO effort to interdict Taliban-linked drug traffickers includes potential pitfalls, even though the initiative is far more supportive of the counterinsurgency effort than any possible NATO participation in eradication. First, just like eradication, such interdiction efforts

56

Felbab-Brown et al., “Assessment of the Implementation.”

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39

are unlikely to bankrupt the Taliban or significantly curtail the organization’s drug income. Interdiction efforts have succeeded in limiting the income of belligerents only under the most auspicious circumstances and usually only at localized levels, such as in Peru in the early 1990s or in parts of Colombia today.57 Second, to actually succeed in bringing down entire Taliban-linked drug trafficking networks, the interdiction efforts will require intensive military and intelligence assets, potentially diverting resources from other aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign, such as protecting the population. Moreover, if this approach does indeed result in bringing down entire networks in the drug economy, such an outcome will easily affect thousands of people in particular locales previously dependent on that economy, and these effects will proximate those of eradication. The interdiction efforts will thus clash with the hearts-and-minds approach, undermine local human security, and potentially also conflict with an effort to peel off elements of the Taliban from the insurgents, such as certain tribes. Even if such efforts remain limited to focusing on only certain Taliban-linked traffickers, such as the recently named 50, they will send the message that the best way to be a trafficker in Afghanistan is to be linked with the Afghan government, thus undermining rule of law and statebuilding in Afghanistan in the medium term, even if politically expedient in the short term. It is thus important to combine any selective NATO-led interdiction with carefully sequenced actions against at least some government-linked traffickers. Such interdiction efforts, however, need to be carefully sequenced so as to avoid triggering cartel wars among Afghanistan drug trafficking groups as has occurred in Mexico.58 A precipitous reduction of the illicit economy in Afghanistan without legal alternatives being in place will have vastly destabilizing economic and social consequences beyond the immediate conflict. Although providing livelihoods for a large segment of the population and generating much of the country’s GDP, the illicit narcotics economy also generates negative macroeconomic effects, including augmenting inflation, increasing exchange rate and currency instability as well as real estate speculation, undermining the development of legal export-oriented industries, giving rise to “Dutch disease,” and displacing legal production. Nonetheless, given its size, a rapid reduction in the narcotics economy in Afghanistan will give rise to capital flight, greatly destabilize the currency, and result in a significant contraction of the GDP.59 Such an outcome would negatively affect the rest of the economy in one of the world’s poorest places and thus generate a significant humanitarian crisis.

Destabilizing Prospects of Cultivation Relocation Moreover, unless there is a substantial decline in the global demand for illicit opiates, a significant reduction of the opium production in Afghanistan will simply shift cultivation elsewhere. There are at least three likely recipients of such an outcome, even though opium poppy can be grown in the vast majority of locales in the world. First, opium production could once again expand in Burma, where counternarcotics efforts centered on eradication without alternative livelihoods have economically squeezed former opium

40

57

Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Obama Administration’s New Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Its Promises and Potential Pitfalls,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief, no. 171, September 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/09_afghanistan_ felbabbrown/09_afghanistan_felbabbrown.pdf.

58

Ibid.

59

Symansky, “Macroeconomic Impact of the Drug Economy and Counter-Narcotics Efforts.”

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

poppy farmers. Many have food security for merely eight months a year and avoid famine during the remaining months only because of a UN food distribution program. Though some farmers have switched to other illicit economies prevalent in Burma, including trade in gems, illicit logging, and illicit trade in wildlife, many are forced to rely on foraging in Burma’s forests.60 Given that poppies in the Golden Crescent (Central Asia through Pakistan) have both a greater opium yield and higher alkaloid content than poppies in the Golden Triangle, however, a wholesale shift to Southeast Asia is not probable since traffickers are likely to continue favoring the Crescent’s opium and have deeply established trafficking networks there. Most likely, opium production would disperse partly into Central Asia—such as into Tajikistan, which has already been an important producer61—and most perniciously back to Pakistan. Such a relocation would be highly detrimental to U.S. interests because it would critically undermine the Pakistani state and fuel jihadi insurgency. Such a shift would not only increase profit possibilities for Pakistani belligerents but also provide them with significant political capital through the sponsorship of a labor-intensive economy in the FATA, NWFP, and potentially also Baluchistan— all areas with minimal employment opportunities. Alternative development efforts in Pakistan’s drug producing areas in the 1990s, consisting mainly of small rural infrastructure projects and special economic opportunity zones (similar to the ones for textiles promoted by the current U.S. administration), brought many benefits to both the local economy and the Pakistani state.62 These benefits included better links between isolated areas of Pakistan and the rest of the country and the increased identification of the local populations with Pakistan. Until these development efforts in the 1990s, many in the FATA never identified themselves as Pakistanis and their identification was solely tribal-based, frequently in direct opposition to the Pakistani state. The alternative development efforts in the 1990s also increased the weakening legitimacy of local political elites and pro-Islamabad political agents. These positive political and economic effects frequently proved ephemeral, however, as alternative livelihoods efforts failed to generate sustainable employment, consigning many to continued subsistence agriculture, trucking and smuggling, and migration to other parts of Pakistan, such as Karachi.63 Despite their limited effectiveness, the alternative development efforts were still far less politically destabilizing than previous poppy eradication drives in Pakistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Enforced by military coercion, the eradication efforts proved unsustainable even for the military dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq. The dominant reason for the decline in opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan, however, was not counternarcotics efforts but rather the wholesale shift of cultivation to Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistani trafficking networks frequently remained undiminished by the shift. If opium poppy cultivation were to again shift to Pakistan on a large scale, Pakistan today would find it far more difficult to mount effective counternarcotics measures. Given the hollowing out of the Pakistani state, the multifaceted collapse of the government’s administrative capacity in the FATA and NWFP, and the overall macroeconomic crisis of the country, acutely

60

Author’s fieldwork in poppy areas in the Shan state of Burma during the winter of 2006. See also “Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia,” UNODC, December 2008, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/East_Asia_Opium_report_2008.pdf.

61

For details on the opium poppy and heroin production and trade in Tajikistan, see Letizia Paoli, Victoria Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 181–200.

62

Asad and Harris, The Politics and Economics of Drug Production.

63

Author’s interviews with former civilian and military officials in the NWFP during the fall of 2008 and spring of 2009.

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41

felt in the FATA and NWFP, the state would find it far more difficult to develop sufficient legal employment opportunities. Because of the continuing geographic, political, and social isolation of these areas, the lack of rule of law, and the paucity of productive assets—both physical resources and human capital— generating employment opportunities in those areas will be highly challenging under the best of circumstances. The current development efforts in the FATA and the NWFP sponsored by the United States thus need to take advantage of the fact that these efforts do not face competition from an entrenched labor-intensive illicit economy (the existing illicit economies in those areas, primarily smuggling, are not labor intensive). At the same time, it is imperative to advance and intensify the current development efforts as much as possible and direct them toward sustainable job creation—not simply temporary employment in short-term, small-scale rural infrastructurebuilding—to prepare for needing to mitigate the social, economic, and political effects of any extensive relocation of opium poppy cultivation to the area in the future. The depletion of the political capital of both Pakistan’s civilian elites and its military during the 1990s and 2000s would also make any forced eradication far more politically costly and difficult to sustain. Considering the belligerency in the regions that would be the most likely recipients of any opium poppy relocation—the FATA, NWFP, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and Baluchistan—forced eradication would greatly fuel militancy and generate far greater negative security externalities than it did in the 1980s and early 1990s when social protest had not congealed into a highly organized form, social networks were not premobilized, and pernicious political entrepreneurs were not ready to capitalize on social discontent. A large-scale shift of opium poppy cultivation to Pakistan in the near- and medium-term would thus further weaken the Pakistani state and undermine its control of, and even reach to, some of the most jihadi-susceptible areas in Pakistan. Such a large-scale shift of cultivation would also likely leak into Baluchistan, where heroin processing facilities and trafficking networks are already extensively present. This shift would thus enable Baluchi nationalists to tap into the drug economy and strengthen the Baluchi insurgency in a multifaceted way, thus further threatening the territorial integrity of Pakistan and diverting the state’s attention from the jihadi threat. Assisting the government of Pakistan today to the greatest extent possible—both in rural development efforts in critical regions and in enhancing the effectiveness of the government’s interdiction and law enforcement capacity—could reduce the possible security and political threats of such a relocation of opium production to Pakistan.

42

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

the national bureau

of

asian research

Narco-Trafficking in PakistanAfghanistan Border Areas and Implications for Security Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain

Originally published in: Vanda Felbab-Brown, Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain, and Ehsan Ahrari, “Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 20, December 2009. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

LOUISE I. SHELLEY is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Center for Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption at George Mason University. She is a leading expert on transnational crime and terrorism with a particular focus on the former Soviet Union. She can be reached at . NAZIA HUSSAIN is a PhD student in Public Policy at George Mason University. She holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Punjab, Lahore, and received an MA in International Relations from Boston University while a Fulbright Scholar. She can be reached at .

43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper explores the global dynamics of the drug trade in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and analyzes the interface of regional actors with key players and networks outside the region.

MAIN FINDINGS • Afghanistan produces 90% of the world’s opium supply, a third of which is transited through Pakistan. Opium is not the only illicit trade in the Pakistan and Afghanistan border regions, however. Afghanistan is now the second-largest cannabis resin producer in the world. There is also significant illicit trade in timber, antiquities, and cigarettes in the border areas. • In addition to southern routes through Pakistan, drug traffickers rely on western routes via Iran and northern routes through the Central Asian states. As Russia became deeply integrated into the global drug market due to inadequate border controls and large-scale migration among the Soviet successor states, routes through Central Asian states have become extremely important in the global drug trade. • The drug trade across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is not only weakening state control but also cementing linkages among drug traffickers throughout the larger region, Taliban, insurgents, and criminal groups. In turn, this nexus of drugs, crime, and insurgents threatens NATO supply routes and offers resistance to ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. This nexus also poses a significant challenge because the networks of the drug trade that support the conflict are not contained within the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • A culture dependent on illicit trade develops along with the societal norms supportive of this criminal activity. This suggests the need for incentives other than legitimate employment to encourage growers and marketers away from the drug business. • Analysts and policymakers should not ignore drug-related activities of the warlords. Drugs and crime are not a peripheral problem to the establishment and maintenance of order. Now that the drug problem has grown significantly, in the future warlords involved with drug trafficking, once they no longer receive support from U.S. and NATO troops, will be less likely to cooperate in fighting terrorists. The warlords’ accommodation is temporary and one of convenience.

T

 he drug trade in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas has important implications for regional and global security that transcend the problem of the sale of drugs as an income source for citizens and conflict. Although the illicit drug trade constitutes a significant portion of Afghanistan’s revenues, its impact is far more than economic. The instability and insurgency funded by the drug trade compound and perpetuate the political instability of Afghanistan, which now dates back 30 years to the time of the Soviet invasion. Similar to the situation in Colombia, the drug trade aggravates the instability of decades of internal conflict. The situation in Afghanistan is even more acute, however. The revenues tied to the drug trade in Afghanistan represent a much greater share of national revenue than in Colombia. Drugs are believed to account for one-third of GNP in Afghanistan—a multiple of the situation in Colombia where, at the height the drug trade, drug production possibly accounted for a maximum of 10% of the economy.1 Moreover, Afghanistan may be unique in that, according to the former finance minister, an estimated 60% of the country’s economy is based on illicit trade.2 Although the drug trade is the largest of the trade in illicit commodities, it is not the sole one. There is also a large illicit trade in antiquities, timber, and cigarettes, the latter being particularly important in funding terrorism.3 The consequences of the drug trade and other forms of illicit trade in Afghanistan are particularly acute. In Afghanistan, in contrast with Pakistan and Colombia, there is no central government that has control over a significant share of national territory. The control of the central government does not extend far beyond Kabul. Throughout the country, local warlords and tribal chiefs control territory at the regional level. Therefore, counter-drug policies established at the national level are very difficult to implement at the local level. Policy focused on stabilizing Afghanistan and removing the support structure for terrorism without also effectively addressing the drug trade is erroneous. A short-term military focus on containing the militant elements in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas that ignores the longterm destabilizing implications of a drug economy in this region is likewise highly problematic. Without containment at the source, drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan flow to Russia, Western Europe, and Asia. The drugs transit through all the bordering countries, increasing addiction among the citizens of neighboring states and aggravating already elevated and destabilizing levels of corruption. The global impact of the drug trade—and its concomittant destabilizing effects—are evident elsewhere, such as on the U.S.-Mexican border and, more recently, in West Africa. What is needed is a cohesive approach to these problems that addresses both the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the spillover effects on Central Asia and Iran as a transit corridor for narco-trafficking to other parts of the world. In this context, the prioritization of counterterrorism over counternarcotics is an erroneous and unsustainable distinction, given that stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier cannot be achieved as long as the drug economy continues to be a central source of funding for terrorists operating in these countries.

Thoumi, “Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582, no. 1 (2002):102–16; and “Afghanistan Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics Policy,” World Bank, November 2, 2006, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK: 146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html.

1 Francisco

2 Author’s

interview with Ashraf Ghani, Dubai, November 2008.

3 Aamir

Latif and Kate Wilson, “The Taliban and Tobacco: Smuggled Cigarettes Give Boost to Pakistani Militants,” Centre for Public Integrity, June 28, 2009, http://www/publicintegrity.org/investigations/tobacco/articles/entry/1442/.

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45

This essay attempts to explore the global dynamics around narco-trafficking in the AfghanistanPakistan border area by analyzing the interface of regional actors with key players and networks outside the region and assessing the implications for U.S. security interests in the region. The first section proceeds with a brief background of how illicit drug-related activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan fits into the broader picture of the global narcotics industry. The second section explains the role of global supply and demand factors and their impact on the regional drug economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the third section identifies key push and pull factors, drivers, and force multipliers within the global narcotics economy. The fourth section of the essay highlights the role key actors, groups, and networks assume in drug trafficking in the region. Lastly, a fifth section assesses the ongoing impact of the global narcotics industry on the conflict in the AfghanistanPakistan region and the prospects for stability, with specific reference to U.S. security interests.

Study of the Afghan-Pakistan Border Area and Research Sources Used The Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is a region of particular security concern. Although under separate governments, the populations on both sides of the border share common armed groups, with tribal linkages that transcend national borders. The loyalties of these groups to clan and tribe are greater than to the nation-state. The border regions of both societies contain impoverished populations and possess poor social indicators, rendering their residents susceptible to the pressures of criminal groups through direct or implied threats of violence. The great wealth acquired by these criminal and insurgent groups through the highly profitable drug trade allows them to exercise inordinate influence over the populations of the border regions. The Pakistan-Afghan border, also known as the Durand Line, is 1,640 miles of difficult terrain spanning the southern deserts of Baluchistan to the northern mountain peaks of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).4 Baluchistan, the largest and least-developed province, incorporates the entire length of Pakistan’s border with Iran. The local insurgency, which aims to control the area’s natural resources, makes Baluchistan a particularly dangerous area in Pakistan.5 The NWFP of Pakistan shares the frontier with Afghanistan.6 The province, which is contiguous with Baluchistan, has a predominantly Pushtun ethnic make-up and is governed according to Islamic precepts combined with tribal traditions.7 The FATA constitutes around 25% of the NWFP but is administered according to legal and administrative systems established in the colonial period.8 Pakistan and Afghanistan are intricately linked through the drug trade; a quarter of the drugs produced in Afghanistan pass easily through Pakistan’s border areas.9 The border has always been a tribal area, over which Pakistan’s central government has had limited control. In particular,

4 “Securing,

Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO-09-263SP, February 2009, 11.

5 Carlotta

Gall, “Another Insurgency Gains in Pakistan,” New York Times, July 11, 2009.

Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorist Risks, Project Air Force (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007).

6 Angel 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2009: Summary Findings (Kabul: UNODC, September 2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.pdf.

9 UN

46

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Waziristan, the NWFP, and the Swat Valley have become increasingly destabilized and fertile territory for drug smuggling. Yet, the illicit drug trade is not confined to Pakistan and Afghanistan—there is a spillover effect on other countries in the region. Over the last decade, drugs have exited Afghanistan via the northern route through Central Asia.10 Given the corruption, extreme poverty, increasing fundamentalism, and existence of some terrorist groups in these countries, the drug trade in Pakistan and Afghanistan presents an even broader security challenge.

Research Sources A variety of sources have been used to inform this essay. The quantitative data provided is largely drawn from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This UN body has highly trained people on the ground and has great access to the regions where cultivation is underway.11 The essay is also informed by newspaper reports, primarily from Western sources. Even though one of the authors is fluent in Urdu and Punjabi, there is an absence of much in-depth coverage in newspapers in these languages. Pakistani newspapers generally report on drug seizures and destruction of drugs, and while Afghan newspapers report with greater in-depth coverage of the situation, not much data proved useful for the essay.12 The authors reviewed numerous analytical reports by experts in the region as well as congressional hearing documents. The essay further draws on one of the authors’ decades of experience studying the drug trade in the former Soviet Union, including field work in the countries close to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and makes use of the extensive materials belonging to the Silk Road Studies project funded by a Swedish center. This project brings together specialists in the region who have extensive language and cultural knowledge of the Silk Road region countries; their research has focused on the drug trade, crime, and criminality.13 In addition, the authors referenced the research of Western scholars and specialists who have more recently focused on the drug trade in Pakistan and Afghanistan,14 and also relied on the insights of scholars of the Pakistan Society of Criminology, who have conducted on-the-ground analyses of the drug trade in the border region and the links between such trade and insurgents.15 Much of the existing analyses reviewed for this study are fragmentary and deliberately selective. Moreover, many of these works do not correctly analyze the challenges of the drug trade due to a limited understanding of the complex tribal relations and the distinct culture and history of the region.

10

Author’s discussions with high-level officials in the Kyrgyz drug control agency, October 2009.

11

The authors, however, exercised caution in relying on the qualitative analyses provided in these sources, due to percieved biases in the data interpretation. For example, the same document attributes both greed and need to the residents of the south as explanations for the growth of poppy cultivation. These two motivations can occur simultaneously, but it is difficult to describe people who the UN has identified as living under one dollar a day as greedy.

12

Reviewed materials include Pahjwok Afghan News, http://www.pajhwok.com; RAWA, http://www.rawa.org; Kabul Weekly, http://www.kw.af/ english/index.php; and Kabul Press, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?rubrique60.

13

For example, the journal China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly has analyzed the drug issue, as have many of the project’s research publications available on the Silk Road Studies website, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/.../CEF_quarterly.htm. One of the authors was in residence at the center when it was located in Uppsala, Sweden.

14

See, for example, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit? Afghanistan’s Drug Economy and Politics since the 1980s,” Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 2, (June 2006): 127–49; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (September 2005): 55–72; Jan Koehler and Christoph Zuercher, “Statebuilding, Conflict and Narcotics in Afghanistan: The View from Below,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (February 2007): 62–74; Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 2009); and publications by Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, http://www.areu.org.af/.

15

See Fasihuddin, ed., Pakistan Journal of Criminology, available at http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com.

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47

Drug-Related Activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Global Narcotics Industry Global Trends in Drug Cultivation, Production, and Trafficking Drug cultivation occurs in many different countries. For example, in 2005, cannabis was identified as growing in 83% of the world’s countries.16 The UNODC World Drug Report 2009 identifies the major producers of opiates in Latin America as Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, although other countries are also involved in growth and trade. Sub-Saharan Africa is more involved in the opium trade, whereas North African countries are major producers of cannabis, with Morocco now being the world’s leading supplier of cannabis resin.17 In Asia, the Golden Triangle (Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) has traditionally been a major supplier of drugs. This region has diversified away from the opium trade: Myanmar and Laos have reported heavy involvement in methamphetamine manufacture, catering to high demand for methamphetamines in South and Southeast Asia.18 Other neighboring countries are involved as precursor chemicals enter from India, China, and Thailand.19 This presents a disturbing picture of world drug production where the region surrounding Afghanistan and Pakistan now trades not only in opium but also in cannabis resin and synthetic drugs. In the past, the raw production of the drugs occurred in the poorest regions of the world, whereas refinement occurred in more developed third world countries before being shipped to markets in the most developed countries.20 There have been certain important changes in this pattern in recent years. Synthetic drugs, requiring more technical capacity, are being produced in wealthy countries as well as in traditional drug cultivation countries such as Myanmar. Processing poppy into heroin is no longer done exclusively in more developed countries as in the past. Instead, very poor countries such as Afghanistan now refine heroin internally, as the recent importation of large quantities of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan reveals. The ability to process chemicals is a new and rapidly acquired capability in Afghanistan—just two years ago the country only exported raw opium.21 Major drug trafficking organizations exist in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, although the mafia in Italy became wealthy after its entry into the international drug trade in the 1960s and 1970s. Drug flows cross multiple continents. For example, one of the most recent trends is the movement of drugs from South America to West Africa before shipment to Europe. This is reflective of the drug traffickers constant search for weak and corrupt states through which they can operate.

Brief Background on Drug Activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan In the last few years the role of the Golden Crescent, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the international drug trade has increased in importance. Even before the recent uptick in

48

16

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009 (New York: United Nations, 2009).

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.

20

Louise Shelley, “The Internationalization of Crime: The Changing Relationship Between Crime and Development,” in Essays on Crime and Development, ed. Uglesa Zvekic (Rome: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 1990), 119–34.

21

“Southern Afghanistan Remains Heartland of Opium Production,” United Nations News Center, June 25, 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/ news/story.asp?NewsID=23026&Cr=drugs&Cr1.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

production, Afghanistan was the largest drug producer in Eurasia.22 As early as 2005, Afghanistan produced 85% of the world’s opium,23 and that figure has now risen to 90%. Pakistan has reported cultivation of opium in border areas, 24 while minor residual amounts are grown in Iran on a non-commercial scale.25 It has also been reported that Afghanistan is now the second-largest cannabis resin producer in the world.26 Although there is no reliable figure available for cannabis cultivation in 2008, it is believed that the extent of cannabis production is approaching the cultivation area of Morocco, the leading producer of cannabis resin. In 2006, Afghanistan produced 1,603 metric tons of cannabis, second only to Moroccon production of 1,915 metric tons.27 Steadily increasing production is due to relatively higher prices for cannabis products as compared to opium.28 The UNODC has identified at least 20 out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan with substantial cannabis production.29 It is difficult to provide exact estimates regarding how much land is dedicated to cultivation of cannabis resin. Unlike the UNODC’s use of advanced satellite technology to measure levels of coca and poppy cultivation, no such methods to locate and survey cannabis cultivation can be used without field research.30 According to reliable estimates, however, the area under cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan was equivalent to 36% of the area under opium poppy cultivation, with an increase in the area cultivated from 30,000 hectares in 2004–05 to 50,000 hectares in 2005–06 and 70,000 hectares in 2006–07.31 In 2008, Afghanistan cultivated 189,000 hectares (one hectare equals 2.5 acres) of opium poppies. The tribal areas of Pakistan reported a steady 2,000 hectares under cultivation over the last five years.32 Despite reports of reduced cultivation, Afghanistan produced high yields of opium. Of approximately 7,700 tons, 60% was reported to have been converted into morphine and heroin within the country and 40% exported as opium.33 The presence of heroin labs in the north facilitates the northern route toward Tajikistan (which shares a porous border of 1,200 km with Afghanistan) and onward toward Kyrgyzstan.34 Though cultivation of opium has remained constant over the past years for Pakistan, the cultivation figures have been reported to be around 2,000 hectares of opium poppy in the border area with Afghanistan.35 Pakistan’s cultivation of opium poppy declined during the 1990s but

22

Erica Marat, “The Impact of Drug Trade and Organized Crime on State Functioning in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 1 (February 2006): 93–123; and Erica Marat, “The State- Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, http:// www.isdp.eu/files/publications/srp/06/em06statecrime.pdf.

23

UNODC, World Drug Report 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005).

24

“Pakistan: Country Profile,” UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country_profile.html.

25

UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Winter Assessment, 2009.

26

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

27

UNODC, World Drug Report 2008 (New York: United Nations, 2008).

28

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

29

Ibid.; and “Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2008,” International Narcotics Control Board, United Nations, February 19, 2009.

30

Matthew C. Dupee, “Afghanistan’s Other Narcotics Nightmare,” World Politics Review, October 1, 2009.

31

UNODC, World Drug Report 2008.

32

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

33

Ibid.

34

Jacob Townsend, “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 1 (February 2006): 69–91; and Marat, “The Impact of Drug Trade.”

35

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS u SHELLEY & HUSSAIN

49

re-emerged in 2001. Cultivation was reported for the first time in Baluchistan in 2003.36 The UNODC reports that since 2005 the Khyber Agency in Pakistan (bordering Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan) in the FATA has harvested the bulk of opium cultivated.37 The area under poppy cultivation in Pakistan during 2007 was around 1.2% of the area cultivated in Afghanistan. Yet cultivation in Pakistan could increase substantially unless there are sustained prevention efforts.38 Currently poppy cultivation is mostly concentrated in the FATA due to ongoing counterterrorism operations, lack of available security forces, and the trend of cultivating poppy in walled compounds to conceal crops from authorities, especially in the region of the Khyber Agency.39

Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan Pakistan shares a 1,600 mile border with Afghanistan through which at least one-third of Afghan drugs are transited. Precursor chemicals used to process opium into heroin are brought in across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.40 Most processing occurs in small, mobile laboratories in the border areas.41 Currently there is limited information on drug trafficking routes of the narcotics leaving Afghanistan. According to the UNODC, drug traffickers rely on three main routes through the region to Western Europe and other destinations. These include western routes via Iran, southern routes through Pakistan, and northern routes through the Central Asian states.42 The route from Afghanistan into the NWFP is used predominantly to transport heroin destined for foreign markets.43 Previously the southern routes were used to transport 90% of the drugs, but more recently the routes through the Central Asian states to Russia and the Caucasus or through the Balkans have become more important and are assuming a significant part of the trade.44 It is estimated that one-third of Afghan opium goes through Iran on the way to Turkey and Europe.45 After the drugs cross the Afghanistan-Baluchistan border, many travel to Turkey and Western Europe via the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan.46 The main ports of Karachi and Port Qasim and smaller fishing ports and open areas of the Makran coast are vulnerable to drug smuggling activities in the Gulf States.47 Pakistan has assumed a major role in the diversification of trafficking routes. Heroin has reportedly been shipped directly (mainly by air) from Pakistan to destinations in China as well as via Dubai.48 According to the UNODC, while the amount of heroin being shipped may be modest,

50

36

“Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan,” UNODC, Pakistan, April 2008.

37

Ibid.

38

Ibid.

39

Ibid.

40

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan’s Narco War: Breaking the Link between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, S. PRT.

41

“Pakistan: Country Profile.”

42

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

43

Ibid.

44

Lecture by Vladimir Fenopetov, former director of UNODC program including the former Soviet Union, on drug routes through the region. See V. Fenopetov, “Afganski opiaty i ikh neagtivnoe vliianie na strany SNG” [Afghan Opiates and Their Negative Influence on the CIS Countries], Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC), Saratov Summer School, May 16, 2006, available at http:/sartraccc.ru.

45

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

it represents emerging trafficking patterns.49 Pakistan is now a stop on the way to Malaysia, from where heroin shipments go to Australia, and is also a conduit along with India for heroin exports to organized crime groups in Ontario and British Columbia in Canada.50 With an estimated $4 billion illicit export value, opium represents around one-third of Afghanistan’s total GDP, if one counts both the country’s illicit and licit economies.51 In many parts of the country, officials charge a tax of one-tenth of the income of opium farmers. This tax is estimated to have generated $50–$70 million in 2008. Furthermore, opium processing and trafficking also potentially raises an additional $200–$400 million.52 According to the UNODC, local strongmen, warlords, drug lords, and insurgents have accrued almost half a billion dollars through so-called tax revenues by obtaining payments from drug farmers, producers, and traffickers.53 The rise of cannabis production in Afghanistan is also having an impact on the regional and global drug trade. With the surge of cannabis resin cultivation in Afghanistan, most cannabis makes its way through Pakistan. Pakistan continues to be an important source according to both annual and individual seizure information.54 In 2007, Southwest Asia reported the second-highest level of cannabis seizures worldwide, representing 22% of the global total. Pakistan reported 8% of the global seizures or 110 metric tons.55 Drug control authorities, however, have considered control over cannabis production, eradication, and seizure a low priority.56 Thus, while the information regarding cannabis production is sketchy, the claim that cannabis is widely grown, freely available, and consumed at comparatively low prices is generally held as a fact.57 Although mostly originating in Afghanistan, the cannabis is processed in the inaccessible areas of Pakistan’s Orakzai and Kurram Agencies and the Tirah area of the Khyber Agency.58 The cannabis subsequently travels through the tribal areas bordering the NWFP in the direction of Baluchistan toward Iran or the Mekran coast.59 Cannabis processed in Afghanistan is trafficked through the Central Asian republics.60

The Impact of Global Supply and Demand on the Regional Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan According to the UNODC, the bulk of all opiates produced in Afghanistan are consumed in Iran, Pakistan, the Central Asian countries, and to some extent India. The most lucrative markets are in Europe.61 The highest concentration of drug abuse relative to the population aged 15–64

49

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

50

Ibid.

51

“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2008,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2008, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/.

52

UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2008 (Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008).

53

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Opium Survey, 2008.

54

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

55

Ibid.

56

“Pakistan: Country Profile.”

57

Ibid.

58

Ibid.

59

Ibid.

60

Ibid.

61

Ibid.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS u SHELLEY & HUSSAIN

51

years is found along the main drug trafficking routes close to Afghanistan. This indicates that rates of consumption and abuse increase with close proximity to the drug trade.62 The Asian markets are larger (around 5 million users) than the markets in West and Central Europe (around 1.4 million users).63 Yet the markets in Russia have also grown enormously, and it is estimated that 5–6 million Russians use illicit drugs. Not all these drugs originate from Afghanistan, however, as synthetic drugs arrive from Europe and Asia and are consumed by the population.64 Drug traffickers now have a large consumer base, reinforcing trafficking patterns through Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian states. India, for example, has the highest rate of opiate use in the subregion, with an estimated 3.2 million users.65 Studies suggest that heroin is also commonly consumed by drug abusers in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.66 Population surveys reveal the following patterns of drug consumption: 1.4% used opiates in Afghanistan in 2005, 2.8% (0.7–1.6 million people) in Iran, and one study estimated 630,000 opiate users in Pakistan, equivalent to 0.7% of those in the 15–64 years age bracket.67 The rise in HIV infection in Pakistan attributed to drug abusers attests to the impact of the growth of the heroin trade.68 Central Asia and the Caucasus sub-region also reported drug consumption levels above the global average, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.69 Turkmenistan has high rates of drug abuse, particularly among urban youth.70 Combined with drug use is the onslaught of the HIV epidemic mainly among opiate-injecting users in the region—particularly in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.71 Western Europe is the target for many traffickers because the mark-up on drugs is so high. Drugs that cost $600 a kilo in Afghanistan retail for $30,000 a kilo in Europe.72 Opiate use is reportedly stable in many Western European countries, with an estimated 3.4–4.0 million opiate users that consume a higher grade of opium.73 Increased consumption levels have been noted in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.74 The suppliers of much of this heroin to Western European markets are Turkish and Balkan organized crime groups, reflecting the role of transit countries in the trafficking of heroin out of Afghanistan.75 Europe is the end destination for much of the Afghan exports; little Afghan heroin is exported to the United States. According to an analyst in

52

62

“Pakistan: Country Profile.”

63

Ibid.

64

Louise I. Shelley and Svante E. Cornell, “The Drug Trade in Russia,” in Russian Business Power: The Role of Russian Business in Foreign and Security Relations, ed. Andreas Wenger, Jeronim Perovic, and Robert W. Orttung (London: Routledge, 2006), 196–216.

65

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

66

Ibid.

67

Ibid.

68

According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Health, despite HIV prevalence in only 0.1% of the adult population, the country faces a concentrated epidemic among injected drug users and has reached 51% in certain urban areas. See “UNGASS Pakistan Report: Progress Report on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS for the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS,” Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Health, Islamabad, 2007, http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/pakistan_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf.

69

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009, 53.

70

Anonymous official Turkmen and U.S. sources.

71

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

72

Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and author’s interview with high-level analysts of a drug control agency, Kyrgyzstan, October 2009.

73

“Pakistan: Country Profile.”

74

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

75

Ionanis Michaletos, “The New International of Organized Crime in the Balkans,” International Analyst Network, May 3, 2009, http://www. analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=2911.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Central Asia, insufficient attention is paid to reducing European demand; instead, much of the blame is placed on the failure of the weak states of Afghanistan and Central Asia to control the drug trade.76 Thus, the global demand in opiates has concomitantly led to the diversification of drug trafficking routes for Afghan opiates. Yet, this diversification is also a reflection of the ability of the traffickers along the drug routes to create a local clientele for the drugs they are transporting. The new drug production and processing areas that are emerging in the Central Asian Republics, when combined with the displacement of trafficking northward from Afghanistan to Russia and the European market, represent a serious development, because this diversification gives the traffickers greater markets and protection against countertrafficking measures.77

Russian and European Demand for Imported Narcotics The high levels of opium production in Afghanistan are not just a function of poverty or insecurity but are also tied to long-standing historical traditions of consumption in other regions. For instance, at the turn of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, morphine, cannabis, and other opiates were freely consumed in Russia’s largest cities, and at that time one million people regularly smoked hashish or opium in Central Asia.78 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has increasingly become integrated into the international drug trade.79 With inadequate border controls and large-scale migration between the Soviet successor states, Russia is now deeply integrated into the global drug market with synthetic drugs imported from Western Europe and Asia and heroin imported from Central Asia.80 This is far from just a transit problem. Russia has one of the world’s fastest-rising drug abuse problem. The youth population is particularly affected. Drugs are so pervasive that there is hardly any Russian city without a drug addiction problem.81 The Russian drug trade is inextricably linked with drug trafficking routes through Central Asian countries that transit a bulk of Afghan opiates. Through the porous borders, opiates from Afghanistan have made their way to Russia and then Europe, worsening drug addiction and risk of HIV on the way.82 According to the UNODC, the bulk of demand for Afghan opiates is found along trafficking routes.83 The lucrative European markets also serve as a factor in pushing opium cultivation figures higher in Afghanistan. European markets serve as a hub of international drug trafficking, providing a market for marijuana, heroin, and synthetic drugs.84

76

This is in some ways analogous to the U.S.-Mexican relationship. See Marat, “The Impact of Drug Trade,” 61.

77

Ibid.

78

Letizia Paoli, “Illegal Drug Trade in Russia,” Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Law, 2001, http://www.mpicc.de/shared/ data/pdf/paoli.pdf.

79

Ibid.

80

Louise Shelley, “The Drug Trade in Contemporary Russia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 1 (February 2006): 15–20.

81

Shelley and Cornell, “The Drug Trade in Russia,” 196–216.

82

See, for example, Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” Problems of Post-Communism 53, no. 4 (July-August 2006): 10–28.

83

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

84

UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.

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53

Key Actors, Groups, and Networks in Regional Drug Trafficking and the Local Narcotics Economy Almost 70% of opium cultivation takes place in Afghanistan’s five provinces bordering Pakistan, creating serious implications for drug production and trafficking networks in Pakistan. 85 The common variables of poor human indicators, weak state control, tribal linkages, and the presence of criminal networks across both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border provide opportune conditions for the opium economy to thrive. The Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and the NWFP that border Afghanistan are the poorest provinces of the country, marked by low literacy levels, poor quality of public services in education, health, rural water supply and sanitation, and major deficits in the availability of infrastructure in the communication and rural development sectors. 86 Conditions on the Afghan side of the border are even worse, with low literacy rates, dire poverty, low life expectancy, and compromised rule of law. 87 Yet while Afghanistan lacks state control on a pervasive basis, the central government in Pakistan exercises control over the country, even if compromised in the aforementioned provinces. The opium economy operates in an environment of insecurity and pervasive risk and provides many rural households with the means to survive under such abysmal conditions.88 There are complex links among the phenomenon of corruption, state officials, local power holders, and insurgents. These relationships coexist with the reality that opium provides the only means of survival for many ordinary people in extremely volatile conditions of insecurity and weak governmental control.89 Local strongmen compete for political and economic domination in regard to the drug trade. For instance, in some districts, farmers were coerced not to cultivate opium poppy, or forced to eradicate their crop completely.90 In other areas, local strongmen used their power to protect opium crops in areas from which they draw their political and military support.91

The History of Afghanistan’s War Economy Understanding the political economy of the opium trade requires a nuanced understanding of the established links among government officials, insurgents, and criminal groups that profit from the narcotics trade. This full understanding is not possible without considering the history of Afghanistan’s war economy that developed during the Soviet occupation. During this time, huge financial and military inflows to assist the mujahideen fueled the expansion of a war economy and produced rentier rebels and a rentier state.92 This laid down the base for production, processing, and trafficking of opium by warlords, who in turn funded

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85

UNODC, “Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan.”

86

See, for example, “Provincial Reforms Program,” Government of the NWFP, Finance Department, http://www.nwfpfinance.gov.pk/wpp_ Buget_analysis.php; and “Pakistan-Balochistan Province: Public Financial Management Assessment,” World Bank, May 2007.

87

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007).

88

David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Evidence from the Field: Understanding Changing Levels of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, November 2007; and UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007.

89

Mansfield and Pain, “Evidence from the Field.”

90

Ibid.

91

Ibid.

92

Jonathan Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (June 2008): 405–23.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

the insurgency and enjoyed untaxed control over resources.93 The next generation of leaders in Afghanistan rose from the ranks of these warlords who were adept at fundraising.94 The lawlessness and corruption of this period led to considerable support for the Taliban by the Pakistani government and the local Afghan population as a means of securing peace.95 A political coalition between the Taliban and the merchant class emerged in the border areas, where trucking and smuggling enterprises were undermined by the chaos of warlord rule.96 Pakistani officials were also allegedly involved with heroin trafficking. By 1984, 70% of the world’s heroin supply was produced in or smuggled through Pakistan, according to European police estimates.97 As the Taliban established their rule over Afghanistan and controlled the means of predation and coercion, they also consolidated the opium economy.98 They allowed local mullahs to collect a 10% agricultural tithe and imposed a 20% zakat (an Islamic levy) on truckloads of opium leaving farms.99 Furthermore, the Taliban taxed road exports and turned the state-run Ariana Airlines into a “narco-terror” charter service that carried Islamic militants, timber, weapons, cash, and heroin to the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan.100 The fall of the Taliban, however, did not result in the dismantling of the coercion networks that had sustained the warlords and made them powerful. Post-Taliban Afghanistan witnessed cooptation of the same warlords and militia leaders into the political milieu, thereby buttressing the familiar power networks. For instance, according to one verified account, it was common knowledge in Kandahar that the major leaders of the province, who provided militias to help the United States fight the Taliban, split the proceeds from taxing the opium trade.101 These power holders not only benefitted from drug profits but also garnered political influence. They controlled drug production by switching it on or off through coercion and made deals with local powerbrokers and traders and promised development assistance.102 Eradication and interdiction also played into the hands of powerful actors who were able to exercise greater control over the opium economy, possibly through management and control of eradication (providing leverage over production), harassment of smaller traders, and seizure of stock, which forced smaller traders out of the market.103 In the eastern provinces, regional strongmen and their enforcement structures were successful in producing overwhelming reductions in cultivation in the span of a year—a disturbing sign of their control over the opium economy. Even their Western supporters had no doubts that these power holders benefited from the opium economy directly or indirectly as political patrons and providers of security.104 For example, in Nangarhar, an analyst working for ISAF (International 93

Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating”; and see also Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit?”

94

Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, August 2009).

95

For a detailed study, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: the Story of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Books, 2001); and Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006).

96

Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating.”

97

Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban.

98

Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating.”

99

Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban.

100

Ibid.

101

Barnett R. Rubin, Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry (New York: New York Center on International Cooperation, 2004).

102

Mansfield and Pain, “Evidence from the Field.”

103

Adam Pain, “Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, January 2006.

104

Jan Koehler, “Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan,” ARC Berlin, Jalalabad, June 2005 (internal document written for Project for Alternative Livelihoods funded by Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ]).

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Security Assistance Force) headquarters in Kabul claimed that the governor supported the production of cultivation until he reduced the cultivation substantially in 2005.105 However, this did not prevent the governor from increasing support for opium processing, thereby profiting financially while retaining his political privileges.106

State-Level Power Holders At the state level, power holders, usually officials or ministers, exercise their control over cultivation and thereby profit generously from the drug trade.107 By reducing cultivation, the leadership is able to win political credit from national and international actors.108 The web of actors, networks, and institutions involved in the opium economy is footloose, and the patterns of corruption can willfully shift across ministries to evade regulatory mechanisms.109

Insurgents, Criminal Groups, and Drug Traffickers Corruption at the state level is one aspect of the political economy of opium, the other is the integral link between the opium economy and the insurgents, criminal groups, and drug traffickers that operate in the lawlessness of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Ethnic linkages between Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, and Baluch Afghans and their counterparts in Central Asia, Pakistan, and Iran provide a basis for the organization and networking fundamental to delivering Afghan opiates to regional markets and hence to international trafficking organizations.110 The lines between criminal groups, traffickers, and insurgents are blurry, especially in the border areas.111 The core Taliban in the south and extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, are reportedly closely tied to crime along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, diversifying into other criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and in some areas human trafficking.112 Major drug traffickers pay money directly to the Taliban leadership, often millions of dollars, in order to earn influence among the top decisionmaking group, the Quetta Shura.113 Traffickers have paid for fighters’ medical expenses, provided Toyota Hilux pickup trucks, and built madaris (Islamic schools) in Pakistan.114 According to some estimates, the Taliban and other extremist groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border earn as much as half a billion dollars annually

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105

Author’s interview with David Connell (an international consultant for ISAF headquarters in Kabul), Ottawa, October 25, 2006.

106

Ibid.

107

See, for example, Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New York Times, July 27, 2008; James Risen and Mark Landler, “Accused of Drug Ties, Afghan Official Worries U.S.,” New York Times, August 26, 2009; and Elizabeth Rubin, “Karzai in His Labyrinth,” New York Times, August 4, 2009.

108

Mansfield and Pain, “Evidence from the Field.”

109

Doris Buddenberg and William Byrd, “Introduction and Overview,” in Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, ed. Doris Buddenberg and William Byrd (Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Bank, 2006), 189–214.

110

Christopher Blanchard , “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, RL32686, June 2009, 29–30.

111

Jacob Townsend, “Upcoming Changes to the Drug Insurgency Nexus in Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor 7, no. 2 (January 23, 2009).

112

Gretchen Peters cites former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) chief of operations Michael Braun, who mentioned heavy involvement of al Qaeda in Afghan opium trafficking. See Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban.

113

There is scant confirmed information on Quetta Shura. The Shura has been described as a grouping of Taliban leadership operating out of the Pakistani city of Quetta that derives funding from the narcotics trade and external donors. The Shura is not considered as the major planner that coordinates other militant groups but is deemed as the first-order threat to U.S. interests in a recent report by General McChrystal. See Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, “Comisaf ’s Initial Assessment,” Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., August 30, 2009; and Peters, Seeds of Terror, 126–28.

114

Peters, Seeds of Terror, 124.

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from drug profits.115 These earnings help pay the Taliban’s operational funding, the salaries of fighters, food, weapons, fuel, and so forth.116 While Taliban insurgents provide protection for opium farmers, they also tax opium yields. In some districts they collect ushr, a 10% Islamic agricultural levy. The Taliban tracks how much farmers and other members of the local community are earning by maintaining informants in each community.117 Each village-level subcommander pays a percentage of the opium proceeds to the district-level military commander, who in turn pays off the district-level Taliban governor.118 A portion of these funds, often in the form of raw or partially refined opium, filters up the Taliban chain of command to the provincial commander, which is then given to the Taliban’s central financial committee.119 It has also been reported that Taliban commanders have run opium refineries in the Pakistan-Iran border regions.120 According to Gretchen Peters, the command and control system for the drug trade, as relates to Taliban and the insurgency, is located in Pakistan.121 Guesthouses in Quetta and Peshawar are reportedly used as meeting points every four to six weeks for drug-related financial transactions. The Taliban’s central financial committee based in Quetta then decides how drug money is to be spent as well as whether subcommanders should rise or drop in the organization’s ranking based on their fundraising ability.122 This command and control system oversees how drug money is filtered into the insurgent hierarchy in the south and southwest, allowing the Quetta Shura to maintain authority over dispersed Taliban commanders.123 Thus, the interplay of insurgents, criminal networks, and local power holders manages to control the opium economy to quite a considerable extent.

The Impact of the Global Narcotics Industry on Regional Stability and Conflict While the dynamics of the opium economy represent a serious threat to regional and global security, so does an incomplete understanding of the complex relationship that links state level corruption, insurgency, and drug profits. Without considering the diverse sources of income from illicit trade, extortion, and protection money, analysts overestimate the impact of drug profits on the insurgency. Understanding the dynamics of drug trafficking requires understanding the forces that affect opium cultivation. The opium economy operates in a high-risk environment, providing access to welfare and security to many in the rural population in regions of the country where there is extreme political 115

Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban.

116

Although Peters asserts that the drug trade pays the bulk of these expenses, others such as Joshua Foust suggest that much funding comes from other sources such as extortion of foreign aid groups, cell phone communications companies following the destruction of cell phone towers, and illicit trade in timber and other items. See Peters, Seeds of Terror, 124; the Registan blog, http://www.registan.net; and Joshua Foust, “Narcotics Trade in Afghanistan” (conference presentation, Redefining Central Asia, Trudeau Centre and Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, October 11, 2009).

117

Peters, Seeds of Terror, 117.

118

Ibid., 123–25.

119

Ibid.

120

Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban.

121

Peters, Seeds of Terror, 123–26.

122

Ibid.

123

Ibid.

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and financial insecurity.124 Opium provides a major source of funds for investment in durable goods, housing, and, less frequently, working capital. The drug economy is linked with the nondrug economy in many ways.125 Rural credit and access to land and water have become strongly linked to poppy production, as factors of production prices are linked to opium prices. Recent estimates by the UNODC show that 14% of the Afghan population is involved in opium cultivation.126 The statistic has been characterized as nothing less than a “social revolution” by critics, with one-seventh of the Afghan population directly involved in production of a cash crop for global market.127 This was not the case a few years ago when drugs were not produced on such a large scale. Yet, according to the UNODC, insecurity rather than poverty drives opium cultivation in the volatile south. Farmers in the south, particularly in Helmand, are prosperous in comparison to poppy-free provinces, and yet these more affluent areas are responsible for the cultivation of 70% of Afghan opium.128 On the contrary, other researchers have produced damning evidence that suggests that farmers associated with poppy cultivation in Helmand subsist on less than a dollar a day while having extremely low literacy rates.129 Furthermore, local strongmen and provincial governors have enjoyed success in preventing farmers from cultivating opium. The ease with which these players control opium cultivation reveals the entrenchment of their control and the integration of corruption into the political economy of opium cultivation.130 Measuring success by determining the extent to which a province is poppy-free based on efforts of a governor or local strongmen, therefore, is a questionable benchmark of success. Furthermore, relying on these players to prevent opium cultivation weakens the central government’s writ because it strengthens the position of the local strongmen by providing them with political clout in Kabul, thereby enhancing their positions as key players who can call the shots. Such reasoning reveals a shallow understanding of a complex problem that threatens the very survival of the state. This reasoning translates into faulty policymaking, thereby entrenching prevalent exploitative patterns that target insecure, poverty-ridden Afghans while rewarding corrupt strongmen. It would seem that these policy responses work at cross purposes to the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of Afghans and thus threaten U.S. security interests, as do the drug profits that fund the insurgents. There are both “soft security” and “hard security” implications for U.S. interests in the region.131 In terms of soft security, the drug trade across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is not only weakening state control further but is also cementing linkages between drug traffickers, criminalized groups, and insurgents. Tribal linkages that exist throughout the region and that are crucial in drug trafficking in and out of Afghanistan through Pakistan and Central Asia weaken the writ of the states while cementing patron-client relationships.

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124

Mansfield and Pain, “Evidence from the Field.”

125

UNDP, Millennium Development Goals: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Kabul: United UNDP, 2005).

126

UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey, 2007.

127

Barnett R. Rubin and Jake Sherman, Counter Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: the False Promise of Crop Eradication (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2008).

128

UNODC, Is Poverty Driving the Afghan Opium Boom? (Vienna: UNODC, 2008).

129

For detailed studies, see Rubin and Sherman, Counter Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan; and Mansfield and Pain, “Evidence from the Field.”

130

For example, Koehler, Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy; and Jan Koehler and Christoph Zeurcher, “Statebuilding, Conflict and Narcotics in Afghanistan: The View from Below,” International Peacekeeping 14, no.1 (January 2007): 62–74.

131

For a useful discussion of hard and soft security in greater Central Asia, see Cornell and Swanstrom, “The Eurasian Drug Trade.”

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Furthermore, the United States and Pakistan are employing tribal lashkars132 in the war against terrorism,133 and juxtaposed with the free flow of drugs, weapons, and foot soldiers, it seems there is little margin for error. Lashkars in the FATA share the same Pashtun ethnicity with Taliban fighters, are often hesitant to fight their kin, and are fiercely independent, answering mainly to elders but rarely to outside authorities.134 These tribal militias respond to local, specific grievances and are uncomfortable with the use of Predator drones by U.S. military operations in the region that go into tribal areas—a policy that is deeply unpopular with the civil society in Pakistan but agreed to by Islamabad.135 Some have warned that employing tribal lashkars to fight in the war against terrorism will push Pakistan’s tribal areas to civil war.136 In terms of hard security, the linkages between drug trafficking, Taliban insurgents, and criminal networks threaten NATO supply routes and offer resistance to ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The networks to transport weapons, drugs, and fighters across the breadth of greater Central Asia are becoming more sophisticated and intransigent. The links between local and transnational networks of armed groups are blurring. For instance, during a raid in Karachi, police arrested members of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi movement (with heroin stashes, suicide vests, and explosives) that was planning attacks on government officials, police, and offices of intelligence agencies in the city.137 According to police investigations, the gang shipped heroin to China, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates and transferred profits to a Taliban commander in Chaman, an area on Pakistan’s southwestern border with Afghanistan.138 Such networks can replicate and collude with other players, thereby making powerful linkages with them in other countries in Central Asia. In particular, via trafficking routes for Afghan opium, such networks can spread to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—both of which house U.S. military bases.

Conclusion First, the concentration on poppy cultivation in southern Afghanistan is not as successful as many suggest. The pronouncements on poppy-free provinces ignore the fact that there is largescale and recent cannibis and hashish cultivation in at least twenty provinces that are considered poppy-free in Afghanistan.139 In a short period, farmers in these areas have become the leading producers of hashish and cannabis in the world.140 This trend suggests two important forces that have not been sufficiently considered. First, Afghan tribal leaders in non-southern regions may have decided to leave the poppy trade only because of the temporary benefits for them. Second, 132

Tribal lashkars are traditional tribal militias that are usually formed for the accomplishment of a specific purpose. They may start out on their own and they may or may not be supplied with rations and ammunition by the government.

133

Muktar A. Khan, “The Role of Tribal Lashkars in Winning Pakistan’s War on Terror,” Terrorism Focus 5, no. 40 (November 26, 2008).

134

Michael Kugelman, “Tread Lightly with Pakistan’s Lashkars,” Asia Times, July 16, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ KG16Df01.html.

135

Ibid.

136

Daud Khattak, “Lashkars to Push Country Towards Civil War,” Daily Times, October 13, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. asp?page=2008\10\13\story_13-10-2008_pg7_41.

137

“Series of Raids by Pakistan Police Foils Attacks,” Associated Press, August 24, 2009.

138

Ibid.

139

UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Winter Assessment, 2009.

140

Kirk Semple, “Cannabis Replacing Opium Poppies in Afghanistan,” New York Times, November 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes. com/2007/11/04/world/asia/04iht-cannabis.1.8176149.html; and Ron Synovitz, “Pressured on Opium Crops, Many Afghan Farmers Switch to Cannabis,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 7, 2009.

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the leaders of regions outside the south are committed to making money through criminal means. This is a trend found in other societies where conflict and drugs have been pervasive for a long time. A culture dependent on illicit trade develops alongside the societal norms supportive of such criminal activity. This suggests that there must be other incentives than legitimate employment to shift growers and marketers out of the drug business. Second, the culture of corruption has been institutionalized. Corruption is so widespread that it has not only been linked to the drug trade but also to the presidential family. In fact, many blame high levels of corruption and the protection of the drug trade on President Karzai’s family, particularly his brother. The accuracy of these charges is not questioned, but the problems of corruption and its destabilizing influence seem to be more entrenched.141 For example, there is enormous corruption tied to the foreign aid process. Reliable information suggests that much of the foreign aid is siphoned off by international aid organizations to pay the Taliban and insurgent groups for protection.142 The protection funds extracted from every major project are allegedly one of the richest sources of funding for Taliban.143 Third, drugs are not the only illicit trade in the Pakistan and Afghanistan border regions. Rarely mentioned is the large-scale illicit trade in timber and antiquities. The deforestation resulting from illegal logging exacerbates the problems of survival farming for a population that is highly dependent on agriculture for its welfare. The former minister of finance, Ashraf Ghani, suggests that total illicit trade accounts for 60% of the Afghan economy.144 The very large trade in illicit cigarettes also funds the insurgency. Though intelligence has yet to be collected on this illict trade, it can be confirmed by the analytical services of the cigarette industry, investigative journalists, and the head of the NWFP police research in Peshawar.145 Fourth, analysts oversimplify the relationship between drugs and violence in the region. Although instability helps explain thriving opium cultivation in the south, it does not explain why there has been a rapid rise in cannabis production in Afghanistan’s relatively peaceful provinces. Moreover, in these provinces there seems to be an inverse relationship between production and violence. For example, in areas where cultivation has decreased—one case in point being Nangarhar, a region deemed poppy-free by UNODC146—there has been more violence. Ironically, the opium economy that existed previously seemed to have a positive effect on local conflicts by easing pressure on local resources and thereby reducing violent competition among inhabitants of the region.147

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141

See, for example, Patrick Cockburn, “Kabul’s New Elite Live High on West’s Largesse,” Independent, May 1, 2009; and Kevin Savage et al., “Corruption Perceptions and Risks in Humanitarian Assistance: An Afghanistan Case Study,” Humanitarian Policy Group, Working Paper, July 2007.

142

It has been reported that the Taliban takes a percentage of billions of dollars in aid from the United States and other international coalition partners that goes to large organizations and their subcontractors for development projects in exchange for protection in remote areas controlled by the insurgency. Richard Holbrooke, U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has noted on the record that drugs accounted for a smaller share of Taliban funding than was previously thought. See Jean Mackenzie, “Funding the Afghan Taliban,” Global Post, August 7, 2009.

143

Mackenzie, “Funding the Afghan Taliban.”

144

Author’s conversation with Ashraf Ghani.

145

Author’s discussions with the director of counter-illicit trade of one of the world’s major cigarette companies, fall 2009. For more information on the illicit trade of tobacco, see “Tobacco Underground: The Booming Global Trade in Smuggled Cigarettes,” Center for Public Integrity, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, http://www.publicintegrity.org/projects/entry/887/; and correspondence with the research director of the Pakistani police for the NWFP.

146

Ganesh Sitaraman, “The Land of 10,000 Wars,” New York Times, August 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/17/opinion/17ihtedsitaraman.html?scp=11&sq=Afghanistan%20opium&st=cse.

147

Kristof Gosztonyi and Romin Fararoon, “Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Afghan-Badakhshan, Afghanistan,” Analysis Research Consulting, April 2004, http://www.arc-berlin.com/pdf/Afghanistan.pdf.

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Fifth, the drug related activities of the warlords should not be ignored. Drugs and crime are not a peripheral problem to the establishment and maintenance of order. Now that the drug problem has grown significantly, warlords involved with drug trafficking will be less likely to cooperate with the Afghan state and NATO security forces. Finally, the failure to address the crime-terrorism nexus immediately after 2001 has allowed these relationships to solidify. The insistence until recently that crime and terrorism need to be analyzed separately has not given the U.S. government the tools necessary to pursue valuable strategies. No efforts have been made to engage local researchers—for example in Pakistan, especially in the NWFP—in long-term research relationships that could help explain the dynamics of crime in this region by people steeped in the local culture. Furthermore, the continued analysis of documents and patterns of behavior by terrorism experts who do not understand crime patterns has led to a simplistic and sometimes erroneous understanding of the threat. Terrorism cannot be separated from the issue of an illicit drug economy. The trade in illicit drugs is not pernicious merely because it is illegal—and probably will remain so, given that the legalization of drugs and harmonization of laws to regulate trade in heroin is unlikely in the coming decades in the region or in the markets where such drugs are sold—but also because the drug trade destroys societies and corrupts communities and their values. Drug lords cannot uphold agreements and are at best unreliable partners in counterterrorism operations; there is no honor among thieves. Unlike in legitimate trade, where contracts—formal and informal—are observed, in the illicit narcotics trade partners compete through violence, which is an integral form of competition. By virtue of the corrosive nature and influence of the very substance involved, participants in the drug economy operate with a criminal mentality. Once an environment is saturated by crime, it becomes a petrie dish for terrorism, rather than a stabilizing factor for a society.

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the national bureau

of

asian research

The Dynamics of “Narco-Jihad” in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region Ehsan Ahrari

Originally published in: Vanda Felbab-Brown, Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain, and Ehsan Ahrari, “Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 20, December 2009. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

EHSAN AHRARI is Professor of Security Studies (Counterterrorism) at the Asia-Pacific

Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. He can be reached at . The views expressed herein are strictly those of the author and do not reflect those of the APCSS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. NOTE 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay explores the global dynamics surrounding narco-trafficking in the AfghanistanPakistan border area, and assesses the implications for U.S. security interests in the region.

MAIN FINDINGS • A narco-jihad is being funded by the opium-related system of trade in narcotics in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan the narco-jihad has escalated to intense levels, while in Pakistan the strength of the narco-jihad is still growing. • Afghanistan is the predominant global supplier of opium, and Pakistan is becoming increasingly involved with opium processing. Narco-trade in both Afghanistan and Pakistan interfaces with actors in Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia, which serve as transit routes to the global market. Terrorist groups and transnational drug and crime syndicates are involved in protection, price control, and distribution of opium to regional and global markets. • In Afghanistan, narco-jihad is being sustained by the “iron triangle” of warlords, corrupt government officials, and the Taliban–al Qaeda nexus. In Pakistan, narco-trade is bringing in extensive amounts of laundered money. The Taliban in Pakistan are using these funds to carry out their own version of narco-jihad with an aim to weaken and eventually overthrow the civilian government in Islamabad.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • The opium narco-trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan strengthens the chances of the prolongation of insurgency, as such trade funds a growing narco-jihad in the region. • Narco-trade in Afghanistan functions through a variety of actors, each of whom is as important as the other. The physical removal or significant weakening of one of these actors will weaken the narco-trade, but only temporarily. • Given the regional dynamics of the drug trade, a comprehensive strategy that treats Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater of war holds the most promise for defeating the narco-jihad.

A

“narco-jihad” is being waged in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. The ferocity of this jihad in Afghanistan is quite intense and its strength in Pakistan is also growing. It is being funded by the opium-related system of narco-trade, which in turn increases the chances that the insurgency will be prolonged while also strengthening the major players in the narco-trade system. In the process, narco-jihad ensures that the central government of Afghanistan remains weak. The pervasive nature of narco-jihad poses a challenge to the efforts of the international security assistance force (ISAF), particularly with regard to whether to give priority to dismantling the narco-trade system or to nation-building efforts aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the central government and thereby enhancing governmental legitimacy. In this essay the term “narco-jihad” describes a religion-based justification of the opium trade. Narco-jihad—i.e., jihad that is being funded by the narcotics trade—stems from the fact that the Taliban government in the 1990s imposed a strict ban on the cultivation of hashish because hashish was consumed by Afghans and Muslims. As one Afghan official explained to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, “Opium is permissible because it is consumed by Kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans.”1 Because the opium trade remains a major source of financing for the jihad led by the Taliban and al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) area—and for the “holy” cause of defeating the Western “crusading” forces and returning Afghanistan to an Islamic government—the struggle itself has been characterized as narco-jihad. In particular, this essay explores the global dynamics of narco-trafficking in the AfPak border area, analyzes the interface of regional actors with key players and networks outside the region, and assesses the implications for U.S. security interests in the region. Given the intricate and everwidening scope of the narco-trade, the major underlying question is what are the prospects of defeating the forces of narco-jihad? Toward this end, the essay will first provide explanations that are at the base of narco-jihad in Afghanistan and examine how the current political environment in Pakistan is promoting the narco-jihad in both countries. Second, the essay will identify the actors in Afghanistan that form an “iron triangle” and describe how those actors and other external actors are interacting to promote global narco-trade. Pakistan’s role as an external promoter of narco-trade will also be discussed in that section. The third section will analyze the regional and global force multipliers. Finally, considering the escalating presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, this essay will conclude with an analysis of the implications of narco-jihad and the resulting instability for U.S. security.

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Theaters of Narco-Jihad The Roots of Narco-Jihad in Afghanistan The very term narco-jihad—or any religious rationale for creating “killing fields” in Afghanistan and Pakistan—is inherently anti-Islamic. Considering the radicalized environment of both countries, however, it is not surprising that such a rationale has emerged. Afghanistan, in particular, has not seen peace for several decades. Given the historical legacies of the past, Afghans are disinclined to trust foreigners, especially the British and the Americans; and the Afghans trust Pakistan even less. As fervently religious people, Afghans are likely to lend a sympathetic ear to any rhetoric that is couched in the language of Islam. In this context, the Taliban–al Qaeda nexus

1 Ahmed

Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), chap. 9.

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in Afghanistan characterizes jihad as being waged against the ISAF forces in a way similar to the so-called jihad waged against the Soviets occupying Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Afghans detest the U.S.-led ISAF campaign to “win the hearts and minds” of the Afghans with the same intensity as they did the Soviet Union’s explanation that that the Afghan regime had “invited” Soviet occupation. For many Afghan people, both campaigns are instances of occupation that legitimize the implementation of the jihad. During the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation, mujahideen commanders started taxing the opium crop because the economy had fallen victim to the ravages of war. Increasing competition among the various jihadist groups necessitated the need for independent sources of funding to minimize the reliance on funds controlled by others. Opium cultivation and taxation of the crop emerged as one source. The mujahideen also sought to lessen their dependence on Pakistan—the chief conduit for distributing U.S. assistance in the struggle against Soviet occupation. Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was perceived to have its own strategic priorities and preferred groups for conducting the war.2 Consequently, opium cultivation became increasingly significant for bankrolling the struggle against the Soviet Union. By the mid-1980s, Afghanistan was producing one-third of the world’s opium. Around this time “there was an arms pipeline going in, and a drugs pipeline coming out of Afghanistan.”3 The “Kalashnikov culture,” which systematically destroyed peace and stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan between the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, emerged with a vengeance. After capturing power in 1996, the Taliban were the first to use the opium trade to achieve political and economic ends. Primarily driven by their version of Islamic zeal, they had to justify the use of opium—which from the perspective of traditional Islam is forbidden—for the victory of their version of Islam. Though recognizing the “evil” nature of drugs, the Taliban allowed poppy cultivation. Mullah Omar, Afghanistan’s head of state, periodically expressed his willingness to both the United States and the United Nations to end poppy cultivation if his regime were given international recognition. The most significant aspect of the narco-jihad under the Taliban was when they started collecting 20% of the value of a truckload of opium as zakat (Islamic tax).4 The Taliban continued to use the opium trade as an economic tool in the post-Taliban era. Although narco-trade did not initiate the conflict in Afghanistan, such trade sustains and is sustained by the conflict. Narco-trade has strengthened the capacity of the insurgent movements in both Afghanistan and Pakistan while weakening the internal order and governments of both countries. 5

The Rise of Narco-Jihad in Pakistan The term narco-jihad has a powerful meaning among the Taliban of Pakistan and their fellow radical Islamists. The Pakistani Taliban came into existence as an entity fairly recently (roughly around 2001, although the movement itself has been around since the early 1990s). Other radical a fascinating discussion of this point from the ISI perspective, see Mohammed Yusaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown: Casemate, 2001).

2 For

Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” Journal of Agrarian Change 5, no. 2 (April 2005): 198, http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-opium-economy-2005-afg.pdf.

3 Jonathan 4 Rashid,

Taliban, 118.

a lucid elaboration of this point, see Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30, no. 3 (March 2007): 207–27, http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=239383; and James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 275–301, http://jpr.sagepub. com/cgi/content/abstract/41/3/275.

5 For

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Islamists, however, were nurtured for at least a couple of decades by Pakistan’s ISI as a foreign policy tool against Indian-administered Kashmir. Between 2007 and 2009, this nexus of radicals turned against the Pakistani government, attempting to replace it with an Islamist one. In Pakistan, even though the narco-trade has not yet reached the level that has prevailed in Afghanistan, the capacity of the insurgents to destabilize the government is on the rise. The AfPak border areas—including southern Afghanistan as well as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan—have remained important transit routes for narco-trade. In those regions, and in the contiguous Baluchistan province of Pakistan, the government’s authority to maintain law and order has been steadily eroding, the Pakistani Taliban- and Baluchistan-related insurgencies are escalating, and Pakistan seems to be edging toward becoming another narco-state. The cumulative effect, in the words of Rashid, is that Pakistan is close to the brink, perhaps not to a meltdown of the government, but to a permanent state of anarchy…we can expect a slow, insidious, longburning fuse of fear, terror, and paralysis that the Taliban have lit and that the state is unable, and partly unwilling, to douse. 6

The Nexus between AfPak and Global Narco-Trade Afghanistan’s Predominance as the World’s Opium Supplier The intensification of internal conflict over several decades, in combination with foreign occupation, was the primary driver in the dramatic escalation of Afghanistan’s opium cultivation and production. Prior to the occupation by Soviet forces in 1978, “Afghanistan was self-sufficient in food production. Agriculture produce also accounted for 30% of exports, earning the country $100 million annually in much needed foreign exchange.”7 According to one estimate, at the time of the pro-Communist coup of 1978 “Afghan farmers produced 300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough to satisfy most local and regional demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose products were bound for Western Europe.”8 However, Soviet counterinsurgency operations conducted in the 1980s devastated the rural economy, causing a major decline in food production. Afghanistan now leads the global production of opium. According to the UN’s World Drug Report 2008, the area of Afghanistan under opium poppy cultivation accounted for 82% of the global total and over 92% of the world’s opium production. Afghanistan also had a reported 32% rise in total farm gate value of opium production and a total export value of opiates to neighboring countries around $4 billion in 2007. For the same year, 14% of Afghan households were reported to be involved in the opium trade. Though the total number of provinces involved in the activity dropped in 2007, over two-thirds of the opium poppy cultivation was located in the southern region of the country, with the

6 Ahmed

Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink,” New York Review of Books, June 11, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22730.

7 William

A. Byrd and Bjorn Gildestad, “The Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, June 2001, as cited in Barnett R. Rubin, “Road to the Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center on International Cooperation, October 7, 2004, 2, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/RoadtoRuin.pdf.

8 Christopher

M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, RL32686, June 18, 2009, 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf.

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southern province of Helmand accounting for 53% of total cultivation.9 Moreover, “during the 2006–2007 poppy season, Afghanistan produced a world record opium poppy crop that yielded 8,200 MT of illicit opium—an estimated 93% of the world’s supply.”10 The dramatic growth of opium supplies in Afghanistan since 1978 is certainly a consequence of civil war and rising insurgency there over the past 30 years. In 2008, 98% of the opium cultivation was restricted to Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Farah, and Nimruz, largely because of poor security conditions in these regions. One ray of hope is that the number of Afghan provinces reportedly free of poppies rose from six in 2006 to thirteen in 2007.11 Opium processing used to take place in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Due to increased destruction of laboratories in these countries, however, Afghanistan emerged as an important center for processing as well as for cultivation. In 2009, the knowledge of opium processing had so proliferated in the neighborhoods of Afghanistan that the dismantlement of labs in one or more of the aforementioned countries accelerated processing in another.12 Even though the global consumption of opiates is reported as relatively stable (consumption is stable in Europe but is declining in North America), an expansion in consumption is reported in consumer markets in and bordering Afghanistan, and, to a certain extent, along trafficking routes. In the AfPak border area where opium poppy is grown, “a cultivation increase of about 10% to around 1,700 ha [hectare, which is a unit of area equal to 10,000 square meters] was reported.”13 In other regions of the world, however, such as the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Central Asia, the Caucasus region, and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, a very low level of cultivation is reported.14 The statistics on global opiate seizures also reflect the significance of Afghanistan in the global narco-trade. Areas bordering Afghanistan reported a high level of seizure activity: “South-West Asia, South and Central Asia together accounted for 73% of global opiate seizures in 2006.”15 Iran and Pakistan are the most popular exit points for the bulk of Afghan opiates. For 2006, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates suggest that “53% of all opiates left Afghanistan via Iran, 33% via Pakistan, and 15% via Central Asia (mainly via Tajikistan).”16 For 2007, however, Pakistan and Iran had a role reversal in terms of popularity as exit points. The overall proportion of opiates exiting Pakistan rose slightly to 35%, whereas those exiting Iran fell to 50%.17 Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Balkan countries were exit points for opiates from Afghanistan to Western Europe. Pakistan also served as a direct route to Europe (notably the United Kingdom) and to Europe via the Middle East, East Africa, and West Africa.18

and the following background information were extracted from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2008 (New York: United Nations, 2008).

9 This

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10

Ibid.

11

Ibid., 10–11; and UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, executive summary, 5, http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/ Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf.

12

Ibid.; and “Afghanistan Drug Market,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/drugs-market.htm.

13

UNODC, World Drug Report 2008, 39.

14

Ibid., 37, 39.

15

Ibid., 45.

16

Ibid., 47.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid., 48.

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AfPak and the Global Narco-Trade Nexus If global narco-trade may be envisioned in the form of a series of concentric circles, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran formulate the innermost ring. These countries play a crucial role in opium cultivation and processing. Although Afghanistan is still the epicenter for cultivation, production in Pakistan and Iran is picking up speed following the escalation of military operations in Afghanistan. The level of technology is such that processing is being done increasingly on the back of pickup trucks in order to avoid capture and destruction. The second concentric ring includes Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia as transit routes. A UNODC report from June 2009 states that about 80% of the drugs derived from opium poppy (opium, morphine, and heroin) are smuggled out of Afghanistan through Iran and Pakistan. A 2006 report from the same agency underscores the significance of Iran by stating that 37% of all opiates seized worldwide were seized in that country.19 The third concentric ring involves terrorist organizations in Afghanistan; transnational terrorist entities, such as the Taliban (who is a major force in Afghanistan and Pakistan), al Qaeda (which has a global presence), Hezbollah (which operates in the Middle East, Africa, and South America), and regional and global drug syndicates. These terrorist groups and transnational drug and crime syndicates are also involved regionally and globally in such activities as protection, price control, and distribution. The modus operandi within each concentric ring is that, based on the recognition that the financial stakes involved are escalating by leaps and bounds, the element of mutual support is also rising, and the price of collaboration with law enforcement groups is instant punishment in the form of extermination. This type of behavior has been the sine qua non in traditional narco-trade areas of South America; it is also catching on fast in the AfPak region. The second modus operandi of narco-trade is that mutual support between two or more concentric rings is also mounting, thereby making the job of regional and global law enforcement forces increasingly strenuous. An overview of these activities and linkages is provided in Table 1 below. ta b l e 1 

A micro and macro overview of narco-trade networks

Opium cultivation

Routing and processing

Drug-terrorism nexus • Micro: Within Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia

Afghanistan

19

Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia

• Macro: Regional syndicates or terrorist groups that are steadily developing into global syndicates (Taliban, al Qaida in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa)

Linkages • Within one country: Iron triangle among warlords, insurgents, and corrupt officials • Regional: Transnational terrorist groups such as the Taliban, al Qaida, and drug cartels coordinating activities • Global: Drug cartels and money laundering linkages are hard to track and defeat because of the prevalence of the hawala system and other new techniques that are popping up due to increased globalization

“Triangular Cooperation Fights Transnational Trafficking,” UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/triangular-cooperationfights-transnational-trafficking-.html; and Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” 34.

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Global Demand and International Financing Money laundering is an extremely crucial activity governing the flow of capital, especially profits accrued through narco-trade, across countries and regions. Given the massive size of the narcotics trade in the AfPak region and bordering areas, terrorist groups and narcotic and crime syndicates are evolving new techniques to convert “dirty” money into “white” money. In this regard, it is important to also make brief mention of the hawala system, usually referred to as the informal system of transfer of funds across borders. Even though this is not an illegal way of transferring funds, narcotics traders and terrorists have been using hawala to transfer huge sums of illicit money both trans-nationally and trans-regionally on a daily basis. According to global law enforcement agencies, the issue of money laundering—that is, a multi-stepped process whereby money gained through illicit sources is made to look as if it is earned through legal transactions—is becoming immensely difficult to tackle, due to increasing globalization and the rising tide of global financial arrangements playing a crucial role in daily global trade. Worldwide money laundering operations are so numerous that the UNODC has developed five regional programs to cover the geographical areas of East Asia and the Pacific, East Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and the Balkans. In addition, the UNODC has established joint operations in conjunction with the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).20 Regarding regional cooperation in South and West Asia, the UNODC has persuaded Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran to become part of a trilateral initiative that is focused on strengthening counternarcotics cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and confidence-building among these neighbors.21 As long as narco-trade prospers within Afghanistan, such trade will also widen in scope and intensity in the neighboring countries that serve as transit routes to distant markets. At least one neighbor of Afghanistan—Pakistan—has been showing classical symptoms of a failing state. The jihadists in Pakistan, who are financed by funds from the opium trade, have intensified their attacks on the government while proactively spreading their variant of Islam throughout the NWFP and the FATA and threatening to escalate their presence southward. But this is just the beginning of the ostensibly long limbs of the hydra-like monster that reach into Pakistan in the form of narco-trade and its related financing. It is through the conversion of this drug money into legal money that the Taliban and other Islamists in Pakistan are destabilizing the civilian government. Narcotics from Afghanistan are also reaching East Asia via Central Asian routes, Europe via Turkey and Iran, and even the United States.

Key Actors in Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s Narco-Trade Afghanistan The informal networks and nexuses of actors intermingle in such a way to make the narcotrade in Afghanistan run like a well-oiled machine. Though a variety of actors are involved, each is as important as the other. The most significant categories of actors include farmers; the so-called iron triangle of warlords, insurgents, and corrupt officials; and the regional and global opium

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20

“Annual Report 2009,” UNODC, 2009, 43, 35.

21

“Triangular Cooperation Fights Transnational Trafficking.”

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syndicates. The physical removal or significant weakening of one will only temporarily debilitate the narco-trade. One important feature of this trade is that thus far it has been highly adaptable. Farmers. Afghan farmers participate in the opium trade at the grass-roots level. While an Afghan farmer may be individually weak, collectively farmers are the life blood of narco-trade. According to one report, 80% of Afghans are employed in the agricultural sector, and only 31% of the country’s GDP results from non-opium agriculture. Given that opium cultivation is a source of income in civil war conditions, Afghan farmers will likely cultivate poppy as long as the country is unstable and violent. In particular, the salaam (or crop-for-credit) system has created financial incentives for poor farmers to cultivate opium. Salaam enables the farmers to alleviate misery by receiving cash from creditors for promise of repayment in the future. Most loans taken out under this system must be paid in opium rather than in currency. This system ensures that creditors will inevitably be repaid through the revenues of opium sales. However, farmers remain highly vulnerable to weather conditions, eradication policies, and price fluctuations in their struggle to repay such debts. This system not only guarantees prolonged misery for farmers but also keeps them dependent on opium cultivation until their country becomes a normal, stable place. Opium cultivation also favors the farmers monetarily because “opium is valued at over $4,500 per hectare, as opposed to only $266 for wheat.”22 Thus, despite the fact that Hamid Karzai’s government has outlawed the salaam system, the financial incentives to cultivate opium continue to entice poor farmers. Besides, the absence of effective measures for implementing that law allows the salaam system to remain in operation. The iron triangle of Afghanistan: warlords, insurgents, and corrupt officials. Armed warlords and their fiefdoms have been important players in narco-trade since the beginning of the Afghan struggle in 1979 to overthrow Soviet rule. In the absence of a peacetime economy, taxing the opium trade emerged as an emergency measure during that era. The implementation of opium taxes eventually developed into a trend that all the country’s kingmakers followed in order to maximize their advantage. In the post-Taliban era, the weak central government began to rely on warlords as security guarantors. This created a perception among the Afghan populace that the warlords were either an extension of the legitimate government or were so strong (since their militias were enforcing their rules at the local level) that the central government actually answered to the warlords. Either way, that perception did nothing to augment the legitimacy of the central government. The United States also engaged the warlords to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, these warlords were not disarmed and their fiefdoms, which included many poppy fields, were also left intact. During this period, the Taliban and al Qaeda functionaries also started relying on the narcotrade to finance their insurgency. As the U.S.-led campaign closed most avenues of terrorist financing, the insurgents of South Asia increasingly relied on narco-trade. The corrupt provincial and district officials are also an important part of the iron triangle. These officials not only look the other way regarding opium-related activities, but a large number of them are also actively involved in the opium trade. According to numerous reports, even the

22

Matthew Lacouture, “Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan: Counternarcotics and Counterinsurgency,” International Affairs Review, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/39.

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brother of President Karzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai, is a key player in narcotics trafficking. Hamid Karzai has vehemently denied this charge. This iron triangle operates on the basis of latent mutual support. Moreover, the strength of the triangle is actually reinforced by the lack of systematic evidence that mutual cooperation among these actors is occurring. The warlords and insurgents need money to conduct their respective operations. While the warlords wish to sustain their fiefdoms, the insurgents require funds to conduct terrorist operations against the ISAF and against “traitors and collaborators” (phrases used to describe pro-Western Afghan elements). On the other hand, local officials seek survival and a good life. As long as officials do not attempt to impose law and order or cooperate with the Western security forces in military operations, the warlords and the insurgents will not try to eliminate them. This is the essence of the symbiotic nature of the iron triangle. The strong triangle that exists among the warlords, insurgents, and government officials at all levels allows opium trade-related activities to flourish. The Afghan warlords survive by ensuring that opium cultivation and processing stay alive. The Taliban–al Qaeda groups support and protect these activities because the drug money finances their own narco-jihad. Government officials want to protect the opium industry because doing so is highly profitable for them. As long as narcotrade generates funds and continues to be a major force in the economic activities of the country, the government of Afghanistan will remain ineffective and be deemed illegitimate. The central factor here is that all of the domestic beneficiaries must ensure that narco-trade not only endures but also expands in scope by finding safe transit routes via Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Central Asia, and Africa to reach the far-off markets of Europe and the United States.

Pakistan Pakistan plays a major role in narco-trade as a key processing location and transit route to the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia. Pakistani drug dealers are also quite active on the Arabian Peninsula. Their major allies are Yemeni drug dealers, who are at a major advantage to distribute opium derivates given the Yemeni dealers’ knowledge of the local language and proximity to Saudi Arabia. Indian and U.S. intelligence sources (more frequently Indian intelligence officials) have stated that the Pakistani ISI plays a role in opium trade and, most significantly, money laundering conducted through the hawala system. According to an Indian source, “When one sees that Pakistan as a nation got only 4.5 billion US dollars from IMF, the money which Taliban/ISI axis are controlling in Afghanistan is mind boggling.”23 A Pakistani source states that the amount of black money available related to the drug trade is so enormous that the Pakistani government “provided money laundering schemes to the black economy (although these were termed as good economic measures to dig out black money).”24 The nature of the relationship between the Pakistani drug traffickers may best be described as an extension of the iron triangle relationship beyond the borders of Afghanistan. It is also mutually cooperative in nature and is aimed at sustaining advantages over police and security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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23

“Obama’s Surge in Pakistan/An Indian Looks at the Opium Trade,” Pakistani Spectator blog, February 6, 2009, http://www.pakspectator. com/obamas-surge-in-pakistanan-indian-looks-at-the-opium-trade/.

24

Ikramul Haq, “Drug Trafficking and Black Economy,” Axis of Logic blog, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/printer_27301.shtml.

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Regional and Global Opium Syndicates Regional and global opium syndicates play a crucial role in the transfer of opiates to global markets. Opium syndicates are organizational and extra-organizational arrangements that cover the production of opium derivatives and the distribution of opium to different regions throughout the world. Opium syndicates even work with the lowest-level street peddlers. Because these activities involve huge finances and profits, drug syndicates acquire state of the art means of rule enforcement, usually through a high degree of violence and terror. They co-opt poorly paid law enforcement officials worldwide through generous bribes and assassinate those who resist or betray them. Currently, Afghanistan and Pakistan are experiencing the evolution of drug syndicates.25 Increasingly there is cooperation between drug syndicates and regional syndicates, resulting in trade that is beginning to resemble a drug cartel. A good way to understand the role of the regional and global drug syndicates is to keep in mind the hierarchy of prices provided by Michel Chossudovksy. This hierarchy describes a steady upward move in prices from the farm gate in Afghanistan to the final retail prices paid on the streets of London, Paris, and New York. The final retail price is “80-100 times the price paid to the farmer.”26 As opiate products move from Afghanistan to trans-shipment countries, where they are transported to the consumer nations, higher prices are regularly demanded by Western-organized crime. According to estimates by the UNODC in 2004, 4,100 tons of the opium produced resulted in the production of approximately 410,000 kg of pure heroin. The Afghan farmers’ share of the gross revenue for that amount of heroin was $1.3 billion and the local traffickers’ share was $1.5 billion.27 Given the increased production of opium in Afghanistan in 2008, the current revenues generated from the narco-trade must be significantly greater.

The Role of Global Supply and Demand and Regional and Global Force Multipliers One major focus of security operations in Afghanistan is to lower and ultimately eradicate opium cultivation. However, UNODC officials are of the view that reduction in cultivation is not likely to have a palpable negative effect on the global prices of opiates. Indeed, it appears that in 2009 the Afghan insurgents have reversed their previous policy of escalating production in the highly productive southern provinces of that country and instead are actively discouraging increased production. Their action is based on the expectation that smaller poppy crops will only raise the price of opiates globally.28 A great challenge for global law enforcement agencies is the mounting evidence that countryspecific and regional insurgent groups are steadily learning the modus operandi of drug cartels. There are a number of similarities between these entities. First, both operate under the constant threat of being captured or eradicated by law enforcement forces. Second, both groups attach high value to accessing the latest money laundering techniques to evade capture by international police 25

“Afghanistan Now Has Drug Cartels,” DemocraticUnderground.com, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard. php?az=view_all&address=102x4043117.

26

Michel Chossudovsky, “The Spoils of War: Afghanistan’s Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade,” Global Researcher, Centre for Research on Globalization, May 5, 2005, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=91.

27

Chossudovsky, “The Spoils of War,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=91.

28

Jacob Townsend, “Upcoming Changes to the Drug-Insurgency Nexus in Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor 7, no. 2 (January 23, 2009), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34405&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1.

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forces. Third, these groups have an urgent need for decentralized operations that minimize the debilitating effects of a major drug bust scored by regional and global police authorities. Finally, both entities require a high degree of adaptability—to emerge in a new and unrecognizable form— for survival. Hence, these groups regularly change their names, modus operandi, and, in some instances, even their locations. Since these insurgents look and function like drug cartels, they are likely to become major players in global narco-trade. Presently, there is growing evidence that regional narco-terrorist networks are very much alive. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb is involved in hashish trafficking; the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan are carrying out heroin and opium trade; Hezbollah forces in the Beka Valley of Lebanon are involved in cannabis and heroin trade; the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia is carrying out coca trafficking; and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Europe is involved in heroin trafficking. The U.S. State Department’s International Narcotic Control Strategy of 2009 states that there is “a direct connection between traditional Colombian drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and Middle Eastern money launderers tied to Hezbollah.”29 Given the common ideology shared by al Qaeda and the Taliban, there is a high probability of the integration of narco-networks among South Asia, West Asia, and North Africa. Hezbollah is a Shia organization and al Qaeda is a Sunni-Wahhabi entity. As such, they have acute theological differences and antipathy. Considering the enormity of the financial stakes associated with narco-trade, however, the potential for cooperation between these groups in the near future cannot be ruled out. By the same token, even though there is no current evidence of any collusion between the Middle Eastern, South Asian, and North African insurgents and the major drug cartels of Mexico, the possibility of such collusion over the long term cannot categorically be discounted. The chief driver in the AfPak narco-jihad is the continued success of the insurgents in those countries. In Afghanistan, this narco-jihad cannot be defeated as long as the iron triangle remains intact. In Pakistan, according to all indications, a similar iron triangle exists but in a much more rudimentary form. In that country, the insurgents are definitely receiving help from narco-trade, though to a lesser extent. In both countries, however, the insurgents know how important narcotrade is for their continued effective operations. In discussing the role of regional and global force multipliers, it is necessary to consider the role of Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian drug baron, who is reported to be hiding in Pakistan. Ibrahim’s mega finances generated through the drug trade were frequently mentioned by the Indian media as being responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. The alleged role of Ibrahim in narco-trade and terrorist financing attracted global publicity in December 2008 through the news report that the Russian and Indian intelligence services were cooperating on tracking his activities.30 The reason for Russia’s interest was that Ibrahim’s drug trafficking network might be reaching the Russian markets. If such allegations are indeed true, then Russia should be worried that Ibrahim’s network is financing Muslim secessionists in Chechnya and Muslim republics of the Russian Federation, which Russian security forces are busy fighting.

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29

Cited in Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Defeating Narco-Terrorism,” Huffington Post, March 17, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-rachelehrenfeld/defeating-narco-terrorism_b_175537.html.

30

Myra MacDonald, “Russia Points to Dawood Ibrahim in Mumbai Attacks,” Reuters blog, December 19, 2008, http://blogs.reuters.com/ pakistan/2008/12/19/russia-points-to-dawood-ibrahim-in-mumbai-attacks/.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Implications of Narco-Jihad and Related Instability for U.S. Security Interests Efforts to defeat or eradicate the Taliban–al Qaeda nexus in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region may also be deemed as fighting narco-jihad. Despite the commonality of insurgency and narcotrade in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, these countries face markedly different problems that require different solutions. Although the focus has been on winning the war in Afghanistan, to date there has been no clearcut vision of assigning primacy to eradicating narco-trade in the country. The situation has been further complicated by the dilemma of engaging warlords in Afghanistan—who preside over the domestic narco-trade—in the struggle against terrorist groups. In this context, pursuit of a drug war risks alienating not only the warlords assisting in the counterterrorism operations but also the large percentage of the Afghan population that is economically dependent on the opium trade.31 The current dilemma that the United States faces is in deciding which of the following issues should be assigned the highest priority: fighting the insurgency, eradicating the opium trade, or reducing governmental corruption. 32 From the U.S. point of view, these problems are indeed interlinked. Developing a strategy that is equally focused on all of these problems, however, is well-nigh impossible, and the first and foremost priority has been defeating the insurgency. The opium cultivation problem is not completely being ignored, though, and both the U.S. and British governments committed in August 2009 “to spend millions of dollars over the next two months to try to persuade the Afghan farmers not to plant opium poppy, by far the country’s most profitable cash crop.”33 The best part of the crop substitution policy is that such a strategy also contains a variety of dimensions that, if fully implemented, hold some promise of success. First, crop substitution is aimed at creating a stake for the Afghan farmers in the program, which includes buying vouchers for seeds and fertilizers for about 10% of their value. Second, “cash will be distributed only as credit or for work performed.”34 This will minimize the chances of farmers taking the cash while not abandoning poppy cultivation activities. Third, thousands of U.S. and British forces are clearing the villages in the Helmand region of insurgents, who were forcing or persuading farmers to grow opium by making cash offers, and are staying in those villages to provide security. Fourth, the United States is sending agriculture experts—even though they are slow in arriving— to Afghanistan and is introducing “a micro-finance loan program.” This particular aspect of the current strategy is especially promising. Fifth, as part of this strategy, there are plans to escalate “efforts to interdict drug shipments and destroy stockpiles.”35 The United States is also sending Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents to train “Afghan police in counternarcotics investigations,” and the Department of Justice “is developing a program for Afghan prosecutors.”36 Despite promising aspects, the biggest enemy of this strategy 31

“Bush Administration’s Afghan Dilemma Coming to a Head: Promote Stability and Fight Terror—or Fight Drugs?” StoptheDrugWar.org, January 7, 2005, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/369/dilemma.shtml.

32

It should be noted, however, that there is no paucity of suggested solutions. For a discussion of these, see David Kilcullen, “Crunch Time in Afghanistan-Pakistan,” Small Wars Journal blog, February 5. 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/crunch-time-inafghanistanpaki/.

33

Karen DeYoung, “U.S. and Britain Target Afghan Poppies,” MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32339723/ns/world_news-washington_post/.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

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is the pure and simple opium economy, which promises better wages to farmers. For instance, “the average daily wage for construction work, the United Nations reported, is $3.60. Wheat harvesting earns $4.40, and opium ‘lancing/gum collection’ pays $9.50. Wages in Helmand for lancing, $15 a day, are the highest in the country.”37 A very significant challenge to countering terrorism as well as narco-terrorism in Afghanistan is the apparent reluctance of the Afghan government to act against, or even assist in breaking up, the iron triangle of warlords, insurgents, and corrupt Afghan officials mentioned earlier. Indeed, in many cases the government apparatus in Afghanistan is accused of perpetuating the triangle. In order to succeed in Afghanistan, the United States will need to work with the Afghan government to reinforce efforts to break up this iron triangle along with pursuing counterinsurgency efforts in the region. In Pakistan, the focus has been on capturing or killing the remainder of the al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and fighters. Although there is ample recognition that Pakistan remains a major transit route for the export of opium derivatives, there is a palpable absence of direct and specific policy measures to eradicate narco-trade in that country. It is a well-known fact that Baitullah Mehsud—leader of the Tehrik-e-Tulabai-Pakistan (TTP), who was killed last August in an unmanned predator drone attack—had a multimillion dollar (some even estimate a multi-billion dollar) financial reserve to bankroll his war against the Pakistani government and to support the insurgency-related activities of the Haqqani group, which is sponsoring and supporting the insurgency against the United States and the ISAF forces in Afghanistan.38 Such efforts to eliminate TTP leaders may slow down the pace and narrow the scope of narco-trade in Pakistan. It must be appreciated, however, that Pakistan’s location next to Afghanistan—and, equally importantly, the country’s highly established channels of underworld financial transactions to and from the Persian Gulf region—render Pakistan akin to an impenetrable fort in the war against narco-jihadist forces as well as against drug syndicates with a highly pronounced presence in West Asia and Africa.

Conclusion Narco-jihad in the AfPak region is a mega strategy (or even part of a global grand strategy) of the Islamist forces fighting against, in their perception, the “crusading forces” of the ISAF under the leadership of the “chief infidel,” the United States. As was the case during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the presence of Western forces in Afghanistan—a country whose historical moniker is “graveyard of empires”—provides an ideological advantage to the al Qaeda–Taliban nexus in that country as well as to the TTP and other Islamist forces in Pakistan. Islamist insurgents in both countries perceive that they are fighting a war—in which narco-trade is an important driver—against a superpower that will inevitably meet the fate of other “empires” in that region. These ideological rationales would sound hollow or even vacuous if they were not supported by well-funded and even well-trained insurgent forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The narcojihadists have learned the significance of implementing effective tactics in insurgency operations.

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37

DeYoung, “U.S. and Britain Target Afghan Poppies.”

38

For a background of the group’s activities, see “Themes: Haqqani Network,” Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network.

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They are investing enormous capital to acquire fourth-generation warfare technologies and tactics to employ against well-armed Western forces that have yet to master the operational techniques of counterinsurgency warfare.39 The narco-jihadists of Afghanistan also enjoy the advantage of a highly fertile political arrangement in the iron triangle, of which they are an extremely crucial part. These insurgents are flush with cash and can buy the ever-willing and corrupt officials of that country to leave them alone, provided that these officials are paid well for that favor. The insurgents encounter no competition from the warlords, whose very survival and effectiveness emanates from their ability to preside over large opium crops. Further, although once perceived as part of the solution, Karzai has long remained a major obstacle in endeavors to wage an effective counternarcotics war. At the same time, the chances that current efforts in Afghanistan will succeed in developing a more nuanced strategy for tackling insurgency and narco-terrorism must be approached with guarded optimism. Many things could go wrong, largely because Afghanistan still remains a major epicenter for terrorist forces. Though this description could also be applied to Pakistan, there is, at present, no similarly nuanced strategy for addressing the narco-jihadist problem in that country. The chief advantage of the narco-jihadists is that they have plenty of cash at their disposal to wage a war against the “crusading forces.” Secondly, unlike the United States or other democratic countries whose forces are fighting in Afghanistan, narco-jihadists have no concern about absorbing large casualties. Finally, as reflected in a current sad joke circulating in Afghanistan, although the U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan own wristwatches, it is the Taliban that have time on their side. The greatest concern with regard to Pakistan is that the country not only plays a crucial role as an outpost of narco-trade but also is armed with nuclear weapons. No U.S. government can forget that or can afford to be even slightly cavalier about Pakistan’s security and stability. Defeating the forces of narco-jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be the first crucial step toward an enormously ambitious goal of arresting the growth of global narco-trade and then eventually defeating it. In order to defeat narco-jihad in Afghanistan, the current U.S. administration has adopted a promising multi-faceted strategy toward that country. What is seriously lacking is a similarly comprehensive strategy toward Pakistan. Thus far, the administration’s focus has primarily been on fighting the Islamist insurgents in that country; what is needed is a strategy that also tackles the forces that are sustaining Pakistan’s role as a major outpost for connecting the Afghan narco-trade to West Asia and the markets of Asia, Europe, and Africa.

39

These include heavy use of “improvised explosive devices” (IED) and even suicide bombings. The bottom line explanation of this type of warfare is that it is waged by the weak against a strong opponent. The weak opponent looks for vulnerable points of the strong and develops tactics to attack those weak points in order to gain maximum possible advantage. Even the People’s Republic of China is reportedly using its own version of fourth generation (or even fifth generation warfare) in its “assassin’s mace.” See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of America’s Power,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009), http://www.csbaonline. org/4Publications/PubLibrary/O.20090630.Pentagons_Wasting_/O.20090630.Pentagons_Wasting_.pdf.

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the national bureau

of

asian research

Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects Sumit Ganguly

Originally published as: Sumit Ganguly, “Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 21, December 2009. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

SUMIT GANGULY is Professor of Political Science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore

Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University in Bloomington. A specialist on the contemporary politics of South Asia, he is the author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of twenty books on the region. Dr. Ganguly has previously taught at James Madison College, Michigan State University, Hunter College of the City University of New York, and the University of Texas at Austin. He has also been a fellow and a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., and a visiting fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He can be reached at . NOTE The author would like to thank the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University for its support and hospitality while writing this essay.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report examines the prospects and challenges for effective regional counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia.

MAIN FINDINGS • Two discernable patterns emerge from the cases of terrorism in South Asia. First, these cases all involve indigenous uprisings that turned to the use of terrorism. Second, every case saw external intervention frequently exacerbating the original conflicts, prolonging their duration, and dramatically expanding their scope. • There are few examples of effective regional counterterrorism cooperation in the region. South Asian states have been more prone to use terrorist proxies to achieve foreign and security policy goals rather than evince any willingness to engage in viable counterterrorism cooperation. • Weak regional institutional frameworks, the long history of discord, conflict and distrust among the South Asian states, and organizational weaknesses of counterterrorism capabilities present significant barriers to regional counterterrorism cooperation. • The prospects of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia are distinctly mixed. Though the possibilities for Indo-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation in the foreseeable future are negligible, there are limited prospects for cooperation between Bangladesh and India, Sri Lanka and India, and Nepal and India.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • No South Asian state, of its own accord, can devise a mechanism to overcome the considerable challenges that thwart regional counterterrorism cooperation. External actors such as the U.S. and the EU may be required to play a substantial and sustained role to initiate such a process. • Sustained pressure on Pakistan is needed to shift Islamabad’s policy position regarding the use of jihadi forces against India to attempt to wrest control of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and to exploit existing Hindu-Muslim tensions within Indian society. • There is potential for external actors, such as the U.S. and the EU, to play a role in assisting South Asian states with the functional features of policing and counterterrorism cooperation, such as training, border control management, electronic surveillance, and intelligence-sharing.

S

outh Asia is no stranger to terrorism. In fact, terrorism as a political strategy long predates the creation of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as independent states. This report will briefly outline the history of terrorism in the region, discuss past attempts at counterterrorism cooperation, assess the current prospects, and outline the likely challenges that lie ahead in enhancing such cooperation.

A Historical Overview of Terrorism in South Asia India In the early part of the twentieth century, a segment of the Indian nationalist movement veered toward political extremism and the use of terrorism.1 In the post-colonial era in South Asia, terrorism as a political tactic first re-emerged in the state of West Bengal in the form of the Maoist Naxalite movement. The Naxalites received considerable propaganda support, and possibly material assistance, from the Maoist regime in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which, at the time, was flush with revolutionary fervor and reflexively hostile toward India. The Indian state effectively but ruthlessly crushed this neophyte Maoist terrorist movement.2 Subsequently, the most significant indigenous terrorist movement erupted in the Indian border state of the Punjab in the early 1980s. The origins of this movement were deeply rooted in the exigencies of Indian domestic politics.3 Sensing an opportunity to escalate the conflict, however, Pakistan soon become involved in aiding and abetting the Sikh terrorist movement, thereby dramatically expanding the movement’s scope and duration.4 Also, around this time, India witnessed the rise of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which sought to create an independent state in the country’s northeast.5 Subsequently, in 1989 an ethno-religious insurgency erupted in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), an indigenous organization, was initially at the forefront of this movement.6 Owing to Pakistan’s swift involvement on behalf of the insurgents, however, the movement rapidly adopted terrorism tactics and evolved into a religiously motivated and externally supported extortion racket.7 For a variety of complex reasons India has witnessed a recrudescence of Maoist terrorism. Currently, the country faces a significant resurgent Maoist insurgency that has afflicted as many as fourteen states and 165 districts.8

Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1883–1920, with Special Reference to Surendranath Bannerjea and Lajpat Rai (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967).

1 Daniel 2 Ranjit

Kumar Gupta, The Crimson Agenda: Maoist Protest and Terror (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2004).

3 Robin

Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India: Punjab, Ethnic Conflict and the Test for Indian Federalism (London: Holmes and Meier, 1994).

4 For

evidence, see “Patterns of Global Terrorism: Asian Overview,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 1995, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/PGT_report/1994PGT.html.

5 R.

Upadhyay, “United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)—A Deviated Movement?” South Asia Analysis Group, March 28, 2005, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers14%5Cpaper1307.html.

6 Sumit 7 On

Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Pakistan’s involvement, see Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2009).

Chopra, “Maoist Rebels Spread Across Rural India,” Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 2006; and Sudeep Chakravarti, Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008).

8 Anuj

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Sri Lanka In the early 1980s, the Tamil separatist movement, in the wake of an anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo in 1983, took a turn toward terrorism, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) spearheading the movement.9 In May of 2009, after a brutal and sanguinary civil war that claimed upwards of 90,000 lives, the LTTE suffered a military defeat on the battlefield.10 Despite international public professions of an interest in reconciliation, the Sri Lankan regime adopted a triumphal tone in most domestic pronouncements.11

Pakistan Pakistan-based terrorism has also contributed to two major recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations. The first crisis ensued after the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian parliament. In this attack, two Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, were implicated. Following the attack, India embarked on a massive strategy of coercive diplomacy designed to induce Pakistan to end support for such terrorist organizations.12 Though General Perez Musharraf, under substantial private and public pressure from the United States, made a number of public commitments to terminate the Pakistani security establishment’s links with terrorist groups, in practice his government failed to sever these links. Subsequently, LeT-led attacks on a number of sites across Bombay (Mumbai) on November 26, 2008, contributed to a breakdown of the fledgling but ongoing Indo-Pakistani peace process that had been initiated in 2004.13 More recently, Pakistan, which had long been a sponsor of terrorism, has faced considerable blow-back from several of these terrorist groups, most importantly from elements of the Taliban.14 It is at least ironic that the Taliban, which was spawned under the tutelage of General Naseerullah Babar, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s minister of the interior, has in the last two years directed its ire against the Pakistani state.15

Nepal Terrorism was also one of the chosen tactics of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) during its insurrection in the 1990s. The Nepalese Maoists had ties with their Indian counterparts but did not receive support from the Indian state.16 After eschewing violence, the Maoists joined the electoral process and came to power in 2008, ousting the Nepalese monarchy.17

Bangladesh Bangladesh has witnessed it share of domestic terrorism. The majority of terrorist groups involved in Bangladesh have targeted the country’s dwindling Hindu population, harassed fellow a detailed discussion of the origins of Tamil grievances and the resort to terrorism, see Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

9 For

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10

Matthew Weaver and Gethin Chamberlain, “Sri Lanka Declares End to War with Tamil Tigers,” Guardian, May 19, 2009.

11

Teresita C. Schaffer and Elizabeth Laferriere, “Triumphalism and Uncertainty in Post-Prabhakaran Sri Lanka,” South Asia Monitor, July 1, 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).

12

Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (Winter 2004–2005): 290–324.

13

Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” New York Times, December 7, 2008; and “Difficult to Resume Peace Process with Pak: Pranab,” Indian Express, December 17, 2008.

14

Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur, “South Asian Security after Mumbai,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 15, 2008.

15

Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

16

Michael Hutt, Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

17

Randeep Ramesh, “Former Maoist Guerillas on the Brink of Historic Nepal Election Victory,” Guardian, April 14, 2008.

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Muslims whom they consider to be inadequately devout, and sought to build ties with transnational terrorist organizations. A coalition government under the aegis of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which held power between 2001 and 2006, did little to contain the rise of Islamist terrorism within the state.18 The new Awami League regime of Sheikh Hasina Wajed may adopt a less lenient posture toward these groups.

Afghanistan After witnessing the eventual victory of the Taliban over other indigenous insurgent groups in the civil war that ensued following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan finds itself again in the throes of continuing turmoil and violence. The Taliban, who had been effectively ousted from power in late 2001, have managed to successfully regroup in Pakistan’s western borderlands and are now wreaking havoc against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the country.19 In an effort to end depredations by the Taliban against the fledgling elected government, the current U.S. administration appears poised to adopt a new, broader counterinsurgency strategy.20

Regional Trends in Terrorism With a few exceptions,21 two common patterns are discernible in all the cases of terrorism discussed above. First, these cases all involve indigenous uprisings that resorted to the use of terrorism because, correctly or not, members of these dissatisfied groups perceived that normal politics would not enable them to achieve their ends. Also, in every one of these instances, external intervention and support from interested regional states worsened matters. Foreign involvement usually prolonged the duration and dramatically expanded the scope of the original conflicts. For example, India’s initial support for various Tamil terrorist organizations contributed significantly to these group’s capabilities. Similarly, Pakistan’s unrelenting support for a host of Kashmiri insurgent and terrorist groups has fundamentally transformed the indigenous features of the Kashmir insurgency and rendered it almost intractable. Such support has also, for all practical purposes, blighted any prospect of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, it remains far from clear that the regime of President Asif Ali Zardari exercises any effective control over the Pakistani military and the security and intelligence services. On the contrary, it appears that these entities still have distinct organizational imperatives and political goals that may well be at odds with the professed interests of the Pakistani civilian political leadership in ending support for terrorism.22

Limited Counterterrorism Cooperation The history of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia is quite limited. States in the region have been far more prone to the use of terrorist proxies to achieve foreign and security policy

18

Sumit Ganguly, The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

19

Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2009).

20

Peter Baker and Dexter Filkins, “Obama To Weigh Buildup Option in Afghan War,” New York Times, September 1, 2009.

21

The exceptions are Pakistan and the Taliban as well as the Maoists in Nepal and more recently in India that have not witnessed any formal external support.

22

Jane Perlez and Salman Masood, “Terror Ties Run Deep in Pakistan, Mumbai Case Shows,” New York Times, July 27, 2009; and Frederic Grare, Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).

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goals rather than evince any willingness to engage in viable counterterrorism cooperation. The few examples of cooperation will be discussed below.

Regional Cooperation between India and Sri Lanka India ended its covert support for the LTTE and other Tamil terrorist organizations in the aftermath of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. Indeed, India deployed the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce the accord and help disarm the LTTE. Due to the LTTE’s unwillingness to adhere to the terms of the accord, however, the IPKF’s role quickly metamorphosed from being a neutral peacekeeping entity to being a peace enforcement organization. Over the next two years the IPKF battled the LTTE in an effort to protect the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and to restore some semblance of political order in the country. At the instance of the then president Ranasinghe Premadasa, India withdrew the IPKF in September 1989.23 Subsequent to the withdrawal of the IPKF, India has shown scant interest in supporting any terrorist group within Sri Lanka or elsewhere. Indeed, despite considerable pressure from various political quarters in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government steadfastly refused to be drawn into the final stage of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009 on behalf of the LTTE when the LTTE was faced with imminent military annihilation at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces.24

Regional Cooperation between Bhutan and India One of the few other actual instances of meaningful counterterrorism cooperation involved the willingness of the Bhutanese regime to act against ULFA sanctuaries in Bhutan. For several years the ULFA had exploited a porous border between India and Bhutan to establish sanctuaries in Bhutan and obtain food supplies. Under some pressure from the government of India and also concerned about the disruptive potential of the ULFA to Bhutan’s stability, in late 2003 the Royal Bhutanese Army embarked on an operation to oust ULFA terrorists from the country’s soil. Simultaneously, the army arrested a number of Bhutanese for aiding the ULFA under the aegis of the country’s National Security Act.25

Regional Cooperation between Bangladesh and India One or two other examples of counterterrorism cooperation can be cited. During much of the past decade India complained vigorously about the ULFA’s ability to find sanctuaries in neighboring Bangladesh. New Delhi also expressed growing concern about the growth of radical Islamist movements within Bangladesh, some of which had a distinctly anti-Indian tenor in rhetoric and orientation. Indo-Bangladeshi relations were especially strained because of the Indian belief that the coalition regime of (former prime minister Khaleda Zia had little interest in reining in the activities of various extremist Islamist organizations and, worse still, tacitly supported their activities.26 Since the emergence of a new Awami League regime in Bangladesh, following the

84

23

For a discussion of the IPKF imbroglio, see Major-General Ashok K. Mehta, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka,” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009).

24

“Turmoil over Lanka, but Govt Sticks to Its Stand,” Times of India, February 19, 2009.

25

Praveen Swami, “The View from New Delhi,” Frontline, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=20040116005101500. htm&date=fl2101/&prd=fline&; and Subrata Nagchoudhury, “Bhutan Targets ‘Friends’ of ULFA,” Indian Express, December 23, 2003.

26

On Indian views, see Hiranmay Karlekar, Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006).

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party’s dramatic victory in the December 2008 elections, India and Bangladesh have actually held a joint counterterrorism exercise in February 2009.27

The Prospects and Limits of Counterterrorism Cooperation As the discussion so far suggests, based on past experience the prospects of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia are distinctly mixed. Pakistan, one of the principal states in the region, and especially the vast Pakistani military and security establishment, has an ambivalent attitude toward counterterrorism. Faced with considerable U.S. diplomatic pressure and substantial economic inducements, the country and its security apparatus made a reluctant and partial commitment to counterterrorism in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11.28 The Pakistan state has since offered the United States some invaluable intelligence and also turned over a handful of key individuals connected to al Qaeda. That said, Islamabad has pursued an equivocal strategy toward India and the Taliban. Bluntly stated, there is no evidence that Pakistan has abandoned its commitment to use jihadi forces against India in its attempts to wrest control of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and to exploit existing Hindu-Muslim tensions within Indian society.29 Given this state of affairs, despite the stated interest in jointly combating terrorism, the prospects and possibilities of Indo-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation remain negligible in the foreseeable future.30 Even though the prospects of Indo-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation remain dim, it is possible to visualize greater cooperation between and among the other states of South Asia. Specifically, given India’s disastrous experience with the LTTE, it is all but certain that New Delhi will not again countenance support for any violent extremist movement in Sri Lanka. Owing to the country’s substantial Tamil population, the Indian government will keep a watchful eye on political developments within Sri Lanka and will probably use diplomatic leverage to ensure that the rights of the Sri Lankan Tamil community are not completely disregarded in the wake of the Sri Lankan military victory against the LTTE. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that under the Awami League regime in Dhaka, India and Bangladesh will make steady if modest progress on counterterrorism cooperation. The dramatic growth of radical and violent Islamist organizations within Bangladesh over the past decade remains a concern across the political spectrum in India.31 Within Bangladesh, elements of civil society and segments of the political elite also have been concerned about the growing influence and strength of these groups. Consequently, the possibilities for meaningful joint action in curbing the activities of indigenous organizations such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh while simultaneously denying ULFA terrorists, most notably the group’s leadership, safe havens within Bangladesh should be seriously considered.

27

“Bangladesh, India to Conduct Joint Military Training Exercise in Assam,” India Defence, January 14, 2009, http://www.india-defence.com/ reports-4149.

28

C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004).

29

Sumit Ganguly, “Delhi’s Three Fatal Flaws,” Newsweek International, December 8, 2008.

30

Rama Lakshmi, “India, Pakistan to Share Intelligence,” Washington Post, July 17, 2009.

31

Sumit Ganguly, The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

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There is also the limited possibility of counterterrorism cooperation between Nepal and India to deal with the resurgent Indian Naxalite movement.32 Such cooperation would entail denying the Maoists safe havens in either country, intelligence-sharing, and better management and surveillance of a highly porous border. The prospects of such cooperation are limited, however, because of political uncertainty within Nepal, the likely ambivalence of the Maoist regime in Nepal about actions against Maoist guerillas in a neighboring country, and the structural weaknesses of Nepal’s coercive institutions.

Challenges to Effective Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation The possibilities for bilateral counterterrorism cooperation are obviously limited for the reasons that have been discussed. Might a regional approach to counterterrorism cooperation fare better? What possible institutional mechanisms exist to facilitate such cooperation? What are the principal barriers to such cooperation? At least three possible barriers to regional counterterrorism cooperation can be identified. They can be classified as institutional, normative, and organizational hurdles. First, South Asia is a region with thin institutional frameworks. With the exception of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there is no other viable region-wide architecture for dealing with common regional problems and issues. Yet SAARC is institutionally hamstrung from undertaking the task of multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. The association’s charter formally prohibits the discussion of “bilateral and contentious” issues, and so tackling the vexed question of regional counterterrorism cooperation is not entirely within its purview. At best, under the terms of an existing agreement, the regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1987), the member states are formally committed to deal with hijacking as a criminal offense. Given existing political conditions in the region and the fraught state of Indo-Pakistani relations, though, it is unlikely that this convention could be meaningfully expanded to encompass genuine counterterrorism cooperation. Such cooperation would involve intelligence-sharing on various terrorist organizations, efforts to actively suppress terrorist activities on national soil, and above all eschewing the use of terrorism groups and tactics as a instrument of state policy. Second, the normative climate of regional cooperation, whether under the aegis of SAARC or otherwise, does not inspire confidence in the ability and willingness of the region’s leaders to forge a multilateral mechanism for dealing with counterterrorism. Some states within the region, most notably Pakistan, have yet to entirely eschew their ties with various terrorist organizations. Others, such as Bangladesh, have a long history of granting considerable leeway to terrorist organizations operating from their soil. Consequently, until all states in the region demonstrate a firm and unequivocal willingness to distance themselves from all terrorist organizations, the prospects for counterterrorism cooperation will continue to be hobbled. In this context it should be underscored that reaching a free-trade agreement, a relatively benign and mostly functional subject, within the SAARC framework proved to be a substantial endeavor, and the full implementation of the agreement’s terms and conditions may still be in abeyance.33

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32

Jennifer Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009).

33

Dilip K. Das, South Asian Free Trade Agreement: Prospects for Shallow Regional Integration, Working Paper, no.143 (Perth: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2007).

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The long history of discord and conflict, and the concomitant distrust, among the states of South Asia has inhibited the development of certain routine habits of cooperation despite the material benefits that such cooperation could contribute.34 Third, the organizational weaknesses that exist are considerable. Even if all states in the region were to commit themselves to counterterrorism cooperation, it is not self-evident that they possess the requisite forensic, intelligence, and coercive capabilities and requisite legal frameworks to implement such a strategy. For example, in the aftermath of the Bombay/Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, the organizational and physical limitations of India’s counterterrorism capabilities were laid bare. Consequently, India has now decided to locate units of the elite National Security Guards in all four major metropolitan centers (Bombay/Mumbai, New Delhi, Calcutta, and Madras/Chennai), to pass new and more stringent legislation to prosecute terrorists, and to create a nationwide national investigative agency.35 Given that India had possessed such anemic capabilities prior to the extraordinary series of terrorist attacks in Bombay/Mumbai, it is not unreasonable to conclude that none of the other, smaller states in the region have the requisite organizational and physical infrastructure to tackle terrorist groups on a war footing.

The Future of Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation What then might be done to address the problems of terrorism that have wracked the region? The task ahead will not be either easy or swift. The barriers to counterterrorism cooperation that exist at regional, national, and local levels are substantial and cannot be quickly surmounted. That said, some preliminary strategies and possible policies to promote regional counterterrorism can be outlined. At the outset, it must be stated that no nation in South Asia can of its own accord devise a mechanism to overcome the problems of collective action that need to be solved to move toward a viable regional counterterrorism strategy. Consequently, it may be more conducive if external actors, such as the United States or the European Union, were to initiate key elements or serve as the catalysts of a viable regional counterterrorism strategy, and for states in the region to respond to such efforts.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Shift in Pakistan In pursuit of such a strategy, a significant policy shift within Pakistan is required. The first and most difficult task is to induce Pakistan to end its support for terrorism, whether in Afghanistan or Kashmir. For far too long, Pakistani elites, both civilian and military, have equivocated about their involvement with and support for terrorism. Unless Pakistan abandons the support of various terrorist organizations, no progress will be made on regional counterterrorism cooperation, and terrorist groups will continue to thrive and wreak havoc in the region and beyond. The principal state in the region, India, which has been the main target and victim of Pakistan-based terrorism, will prove unwilling to participate in any regional arrangement until the question of Pakistan’s culpability is forthrightly addressed.36 Unfortunately, due to its strategic location athwart 34

For a discussion of the conundrum of cooperation in international politics and possible solutions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

35

For the detailed critique of India’s counterterrorism capabilities, see Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009).

36

Ashley J. Tellis, “Lessons from the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, Part II,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2009.

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Afghanistan, Pakistan has been able to avoid significant censure or sustained pressure to end its support for terrorism. The only possible means to accomplish this end involves sustained dialogue with Pakistan and unrelenting pressure from the United States and EU. The United States, in particular, because of its deep engagement with Pakistan and current donor status, is especially well-positioned to influence the country. In the absence of U.S. leadership in this arena, any effort on the part of the EU is unlikely to succeed. Concerted action on the part of both the United States and the EU, however, may well make the Pakistani leadership realize that it cannot indefinitely support terrorism and continue its dalliance with various jihadi organizations. To bring about this policy shift Pakistani civilian and particularly military elites must be persuaded to see reason on two critical issues. First, Pakistan’s resort to the use of jihadi terrorism has not induced India to make any concessions on the long-standing Kashmir dispute. On the contrary, this approach has actually had the effect of solidifying the Indian position against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. More to the point, with India’s growing economic prowess and increasing military might, the domestic salience of the Kashmir question will inevitably decline.37 Second, Pakistani elites will also need to be convinced that the country faces a genuine problem of destabilization from within if the government persists in the flawed belief that the risks of using jihadi forces are both controllable and calculable. The siege at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad in July 2007, the Pakistani Taliban’s likely assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December of the same year, and Pakistan’s eventual attempts to clear the Swat Valley of the Taliban infestation in July 2009 should all give the leadership, both civilian and military, pause about the wisdom of the country’s continuing involvement with terrorism.38

Enhance Security Infrastructure Capabilities Apart from attempting to bring about this difficult policy shift, a host of other steps can be taken to encourage and promote counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia. As the tragedy of the Bombay/Mumbai attacks showed, police forces in India were hopelessly outgunned, lacked adequate physical protection, and possessed limited electronic surveillance capabilities. These problems exist across India but vary considerably across states because of the structure of Indian federalism.39 Police forces in the poorer and badly governed Indian states are in considerably worse shape than those of Bombay/Mumbai in the relatively prosperous state of Maharashtra. Matters, of course, are considerably worse in most other South Asian states. Lawlessness is pervasive in Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. In all three of these states, judicial procedures to varying degrees are partisan, slothful, and inept. Ironically, Sri Lanka, which had limited counterterrorism capabilities but a modicum of judicial independence, is now witnessing a steady erosion of judicial probity. Worse still, the passage of draconian anti-terrorism legislation may actually produce perverse consequences and lead to a squelching of press freedoms and personal liberties.40

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37

Sumit Ganguly, “Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July–­­August 2006): 45–57.

38

On the Lal Masjid episode, see Manjeet Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan at Islamabad’s Red Mosque,” in Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Places, ed. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). On Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, see Salman Masood and Carlotta Gall, “Bhutto Assassination Ignites Disarray,” New York Times, December 28, 2009. On the attempts to rout the Taliban from the Swat Valley, see Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Landowners Still in Exile from Unstable Pakistan Area,” New York Times, July 28, 2009.

39

Under India’s constitutional dispensation, law and order issues are state subjects. The national government can only intervene either at the explicit request of state authorities or if it believes that law and order has collapsed in a particular state. See Arvind Verma, The Evolving Nature of Policing in India (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2010).

40

Lydia Polgreen, “Sri Lankan Editor Lauded by Obama Is Sentenced to 20 Years for Articles on Army,” New York Times, September 1, 2009.

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Consequently, one of the most important tasks facing national and state governments across South Asia is to improve the physical capabilities of their police forces. In the absence of such improvements, police simply will not be able to cope with the sophisticated weaponry that many terrorist organizations have acquired. Improving the capabilities of police forces across the region constitutes a vital component in enhancing counterterrorism. That alone will not suffice, however. Due to rampant political interference, inadequate training, and limited pay and perquisites, police forces to varying degrees across South Asia lack professionalism and competence. The citizens of most South Asian countries view the police with a mixture of suspicion and disdain, and repose little faith in the ability of the police to even address matters of everyday crime. Consequently, all governments in the region must be encouraged and even helped to improve the training of their police.

Create Joint South Asian Counterterrorism and Policy Centers There is little question that some governments will view any proposal for joint training of police personnel with suspicion. Such hesitation should not, however, lead potential donor nations to necessarily abandon the prospect of creating such an appropriate institutional training apparatus. In this context, SAARC may be able to play a useful role. Policing in and of itself is not a political subject. Indeed, the proposal could emphasize the functional features of policing and counterterrorism cooperation to help allay the misgivings that no doubt will be expressed from various capitals. Emphasizing the growing dangers of terrorism that confront every state in the region, albeit to varying degrees, should convince national leaders to set aside their innate prejudices toward such multilateral cooperation. Consequently, under the aegis of SAARC, a training academy could be set up with foreign assistance, to train a cadre of police officers in counterterrorism. The creation of such a joint counterterrorism and policing center could also initiate certain habits of cooperation amongst the member states. Officers trained at the same center would develop formal and, more importantly, informal ties with each other. These links could be put to use when any member country faces a particular crisis. Such a proposition is far from chimerical. Even in the deeply troubled and fraught Indo-Pakistani relationship, there is evidence of tacit cooperation between military leaders in the midst of a war to limit the scope of conflict. Such cooperation was possible because of ties between senior military commanders harking back to their common military training during the British colonial era.41

Limit Cross-border Small Arms Transfers Another functional step that states in the region might consider is to work in concert to limit the clandestine transfer of small arms across national borders. Terrorist organizations have been able to thrive because they have managed to smuggle large quantities of small arms across porous national borders.42 These borders are porous because of terrain, poor management, and, on occasion, the cupidity of inadequately paid border personnel. Once again, this constitutes another arena where functional cooperation might be encouraged and supported.

41

Sumit Ganguly, “Discord and Collaboration in Indo-Pakistani Relations,” in Interpreting World Politics: Essays for A.P. Rana, ed. Kanti P. Bajpai and H.C. Shukul, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).

42

“Arms Trafficking in South Asia: Poor Border Management Turns Bangladesh Transit Route,” Daily Star, December 11, 2007.

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Both the United States and the EU have considerable experience in border control and management. They also have extensive experience in methods of detecting illegal transshipments of small arms. Accordingly, customs and border protection officials from these states can offer invaluable advice, training, and even equipment to improve the border management skills and capabilities of regional personnel.

Improve Intelligence Cooperation Finally, as relevant individuals and organizations in the region develop a degree of trust with each other through a series of iterative contacts, they can tackle the acutely sensitive issue of intelligence cooperation. Thus far, routine and meaningful intelligence-sharing among the states of the region has been extremely limited. The timely sharing of information about potential terrorist plans and actions is critical to the success of region-wide counterterrorism efforts.

Conclusion This analysis shows that terrorism—whether based on Marxist and Maoist notions of class struggle or on the basis of religious dogma—stalks much of South Asia. Despite recent successes against the LTTE, and to a considerably lesser degree the Taliban, the problem of terrorism will persist in the region. Given the persistence of the problem it is in the common interest of all the South Asian states to visualize possible pathways of cooperation. Obviously, short of drastic changes in the national priorities and goals of some states, most notably Pakistan, counterterrorism cooperation in the region will not make dramatic progress. In this context, it needs to be forthrightly stated that the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir constitutes a critical barrier to promoting meaningful counterterrorism cooperation between these two warring parties. This deeply troubling issue cannot be glossed over. In the interim, however, there is little reason to believe that limited, incremental steps cannot be taken to steadily address the issue, especially among the other states of the region. Such steps, once initiated, can also serve as a foundation for broader cooperation, as individuals and organizations develop greater familiarity and trust among one another. It should also be underscored that the states of the region, because of the limited level of prior cooperative ventures, may not be inclined to undertake these efforts of their own accord. Accordingly, external actors with economic, diplomatic and strategic clout may need to provide the necessary catalytic mechanisms to prompt the movement toward cooperation. Such efforts may initially involve the convening of a major conference to discuss common terrorist threats and possible means and strategies for countering them. Such a meeting could then be held on an annual basis, thereby providing some ongoing momentum toward the institutionalization of cooperation. Having initiated this process, the external actors could then simply assume a lowered profile, standing ready to provide advice, information, and material assistance as needed and desired. The steps that have been sketched out do not constitute a panacea for addressing the conundrum of promoting multilateral counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia. Instead, they constitute a set of initial measures designed to initiate a process that may provide the basis for more robust, organized, and institutionalized mechanisms in the future.

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FOREWORD

D

espite considerable chatter in recent years about the globalization of religious authority in the Muslim world and the importance of transnational networks, public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2006 suggest that the vast majority of Muslims worldwide, including 46% in Pakistan, turn first and foremost to local religious leaders for guidance in matters relating to Islam. This would suggest that in trying to understand “who speaks for Islam” in any particular setting, we would do well to pay close attention to the voices shaping the immediate environments inhabited by Muslims. This NBR Special Report, “Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia,” explores the changing dynamics of religious order in three key national settings: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The authors of the three studies that comprise this report are all noted experts on their respective countries, having spent considerable time on the ground observing first hand the production and circulation of religious knowledge at the popular level. Reading across the three cases, several key themes of crosscutting significance seem to emerge. First is the fact that because the nations in question are all ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, deeply embedded sectarian differences and social segmentation has ensued, as Dietrich Reetz points out, such that effective national religious leaderships or state-controlled religion have never emerged (despite the best efforts of certain countries, such as Pakistan). Second, as in much of the Muslim world today, in South Asia the emergence of a wide range of new, nontraditional voices of religious authority is occurring. Where the production of religious knowledge was once the sole preserve of classically trained religious scholars (ulema), there is now a new generation of lay preachers—whose educational backgrounds are often in the medical and scientific fields—rising to the fore. The Mumbai-based preacher Zakir Naik, phenomenally popular in recent years, is a clear case in point. Third, and related to this last point, has been the important role played by new media. The Internet is certainly important here, but in the context of South Asia, satellite television and mobile phone messaging (SMS) have been the main drivers. This use of new media, it is important to note, is by no means confined to the new class of religious voices. More traditional religious scholars have also been quick to seize on the potential of the new tools to reach ever wider audiences. Finally, and here we come squarely to the realm of politics, it is clear that local or provincial religious leaders—and especially some of the traditional pirs, or classical scholars, of the Sufi orders—serve as important interlocutors between society and the state. Here they can have an impact on both formal politics, as in the case of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the Pakistani political party affiliated with Deobandi scholars, and informally as regional kingmakers or in alliance with tribal leaders, as in the case of some of the madrasah-based networks in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Unique in coverage, this Special Report represents the first systematic inventorying of contemporary religious leadership in South Asia. This report is essential reading for anyone wanting to understand how religious opinion and world-views are shaped in the region today. Peter Mandaville Senior Advisor, Muslim Asia Initiatives The National Bureau of Asian Research Director, Center for Global Studies George Mason University

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the national bureau

of

asian research

Media-Based Preachers and the Creation of New Muslim Publics in Pakistan Mumtaz Ahmad

Originally published in: Mumtaz Ahmad, Dietrich Reetz, and Thomas H. Johnson, “Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 22, February 2010. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

MUMTAZ AHMAD is a Professor in Hampton University’s Department of Political Science. His main areas of academic interest are the comparative politics of South Asia and the Middle East, Islamic political thought and institutions, and the comparative politics of contemporary Islamic revivalism. He can be reached at . NOTE  The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor John L. Esposito of Georgetown University, Professor Tamara Sonn of the College of William and Mary, and Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari of Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad (IIU-I), for their valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay. The author also acknowledges with thanks the research assistance provided by Muhammad Umer Quddafi, Research Associate at the Iqbal International Institute for Research & Dialogue, IIU-I.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines four emerging popular Muslim religious leaders in Pakistan, their use of new media, and their impact on traditional religious authority.

MAIN FINDINGS • Pakistan’s emerging religious authorities use their familiarity with modern disciplines, in addition to their knowledge of traditional sources of Islamic scholarship, to reach a wider audience and to distinguish themselves from the traditionally educated ulema. • The so-called media revolution in Pakistan has enabled nontraditional Islamic religious leaders to reach audiences throughout Pakistan and abroad, especially in the major urban centers. • Though Pakistan’s emerging religious leaders are non-political in their television broadcasts, they are trying to create a Muslim public of their own and to influence Pakistani Muslims’ perspective on Islam. • Nontraditional Islamic religious leaders have been quite successful in establishing a considerable following among the Pakistani communities abroad, especially in Europe and North America, due to the transmission of broadcasts through satellite and cable channels and frequent visits abroad.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • As the Pakistani government and other powerful social institutions have formally renounced jihad as a principal instrument of foreign policy, nontraditional Islamic religious leaders have been tolerated, and also in many ways promoted, by the state. • In some instances, the emergence of new Islamic religious authorities and the use of new electronic media have allowed Pakistanis to engage in free and uninhibited debate on sensitive religious and socio-political issues. • Pakistan’s new popular Islamic religious leaders have been able to spread their influence to groups previously alienated by more traditional religious authorities, particularly the middle classes and educated women.

T

 his essay will examine the ideas of four Pakistani Islamic scholars who have extensively used the electronic media to disseminate their ideas during the past two decades: Javed Ahmad Ghamidi of Al-Mawarid, Farhat Hashmi of Al-Huda, Israr Ahmad of Tanzime-Islami, and Tahirul Qadri of Tehrik Minhaj-ul-Quran. It is difficult to describe these scholars in conventional categories of modern Muslim religio-intellectual thought, given the nuances and interpenetrative dimensions of their ideas and their tendencies to frequently cross ideological boundaries. Generally speaking, however, one can describe Ghamidi as a neo-Islamic liberal, Hashmi as a Salafi, Ahmad as an Islamist-revivalist, and Qadri as a populist-revivalist.1 Although all four of these scholars started their dawa (call to Islam) activities by traditional means—writing pamphlets and books, organizing groups of followers and disciples, addressing small and large gatherings, conducting study circles around the country, and establishing schools, madaris (Islamic schools, plural of madrasah), and Islamic study centers—during the past two decades, their primary medium for propagating their messages and ideas at the popular level has been electronic technology (cassettes, videos, CDs, DVDs, and television channels). Israr Ahmad, Farhat Hashmi, and Tahirul Qadri have their own sophisticated audio and video recording, production, and marketing facilities and are regularly aired on religious channels. Javed Ahmad Ghamidi appears both on regular government and on independent channels, especially on the religious programs of the GEO and ARY channels. Since moving to Canada, Hashmi has been less visible on religious channels, although her cassettes, CDs, and DVDs are widely available in Pakistan and are most popular in the religious gatherings of upper- and middle-class urban women. Qadri has also moved to Canada from where his lectures and sermons are daily broadcast on QTV, a channel that is available on cable and satellite in most Muslim countries and the West. With the exception of Qadri, none of these scholars have received traditional Islamic education in the madrasah system: Ghamidi received a BA (Honors) degree in English from Government College in Lahore, Ahmad is a graduate of King Edward Medical College in Lahore (although he practiced medicine only for a short while), and Farhat Hashmi received her PhD in Islamic Studies from Glasgow University in Scotland. Qadri, after pursuing madrasah education and having served as a khatib (preacher) in a mosque in Lahore, obtained MA, LLB, and PhD degrees in Islamic Studies from the University of Punjab. In addition to claims of religious authority based on their knowledge of traditional sources of Islamic scholarship, all four of these scholars highlight, directly or indirectly, their access to and familiarity with modern disciplines to reach a wider audience and to distinguish themselves from the traditionally educated ulema. With the exception of Ghamidi, all others possess considerable facility with the English language and deliver their lectures in English before mixed audiences. Qadri is the only one among them who speaks Urdu, English, and Arabic with equal facility. In addition to their regular and extensive audience in Pakistan, Ahmad, Qadri, and Hashmi have all been quite successful in establishing a considerable following among Pakistani communities abroad, especially in Europe and North America, owing to the transmission of their broadcasts through satellite and cable channels and their frequent visits abroad. Ahmad has been a pioneer in this regard: he has been visiting North America since the mid-1970s and was the first to establish the North American branches of his three organizations (Markazi Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Quran, Tanzeem-e-Islami, and Tahreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan). Ahmad also has a large number of admirers and followers among the Pakistani communities in the Gulf region. 1 These

categories will be defined later in the sections devoted to individual scholars-preachers.

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Qadri, a scholar of Brelvi persuasion, has a “natural” constituency among the Pakistanis in Britain who have migrated mostly from the rural areas of Punjab and Azad Kashmir. Qadri’s more than 70 lectures in English on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government’s television channel during 1992–93 on different aspects of Islam, the basic teachings of the Quran, and the life and mission of the Prophet have earned him a great deal of popularity in the Gulf region as well. He also has a sizeable following among Pakistanis in Scandinavian countries.2 Hashmi reached Pakistani and Indian Muslim women in the West first through her cassettes and CDs during the 1990s and then through her Quran study circles organized around her lectures and videos. She has recently built a huge Al-Huda complex near Toronto to teach Muslim women from all over North America courses of various durations in Quranic and Islamic Studies. Ghamidi has rarely, if ever, traveled to the West, although his television appearances on different Islamic programs on the GEO, PTV, and AAJ channels are watched with interest by educated Pakistanis in Western countries. A few of his young followers who came to the United States for higher Islamic studies in recent years seem to have moved away from their mentor’s ideas.

Javed Ahmad Ghamidi Ghamidi’s understanding of the message of the Quran is heavily influenced by Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, Maulana Hamiduddin Farahi, and Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, in that order. Ghamidi is arguably one of the most prominent nontraditionalist Islamic scholars today in Pakistan. In the broader categories of contemporary Islamic intellectual-ideological thought, he can be described as a “neo-Islamic liberal.” Neo-Islamic liberalism is meant here as an intellectual trend that seeks to interpret Islamic texts in their historical context, and makes a clear distinction between the eternal/universal theologicalmoral teachings of the Quran, on the one hand, and the historically specific socio-institutional and legal injunctions that are amenable to changes in accordance with the new circumstances, on the other. Neo-Islamic liberalism also differentiates between the literal hadith (narrative) and the sunnah (teachings and way of living) of the Prophet, looks with askance at the historical institutional forms of Islam, does not regard the theological and legal formulations of early and medieval Islamic scholars as sacrosanct, and opens the “doors of ijtihad” (independent reasoning). Where neo-Islamic liberalism differs from earlier Islamic liberalism/modernism is in its primary reliance on, and inspiration from, the Quran and the sunnah, rather than on modern Western intellectual and social thought.

Religious Education and Influence Born in 1951 in a rural Punjab family, Ghamidi initially pursued a modern education, obtaining a BA (Honors) degree in English from the elite Government College in Lahore in 1972.3 Alongside his modern education, Ghamidi received private tutoring in Arabic, Persian, and the Quranic exegesis in his hometown. After acquiring some degree of proficiency in Arabic, Ghamidi 2 In

2008 an affiliate group of Qadri’s Tehrik Minhaj-ul-Quran in Norway was awarded the prestigious “Oslo Award” both for its efforts toward building bridges between different religious and ethnic communities and for serving the cause of peace in the world.

3 This

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author first met Ghamidi in 1974 in Lahore. Even at this young age of 23, Ghamidi had acquired considerable reputation as an enlightened and thoughtful Islamic scholar among a sizeable group of college students in Lahore and had started mentoring them in Islamic sciences. Interestingly, by 1974 his young disciples had already started calling him as “Allama” (the great scholar), an honorific title usually reserved for very senior scholars, such as Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the great poet-philosopher of the subcontinent.

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embarked, single-mindedly, on a path of carefully structured reading of the classical and medieval Islamic exegetical hadith and juristic texts on his own. An extremely disciplined and avid reader with a well-conceived plan to educate himself in Islamic religious literature, Ghamidi soon came under the influence of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami and one of the most important systematic thinkers and ideologues of Islamic revivalism in the twentieth century. At the same time, Ghamidi started attending dars-e-Quran (Quranic studies) sessions conducted by Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi. Islahi was one of the few prominent ulema who had joined the Jamaat-e-Islami in the early 1940s but left in 1957 due to differences with Maulana Maududi over Jamaat’s decision to participate in electoral politics. Through Maulana Islahi, Ghamidi was introduced to the Quranic exegesis methodology of Maulana Hamiduddin Farahi, one of the most original commentators of the Quran in the early decades of the twentieth century, who based his commentary on the idea of a structural and textual coherence in the Quran. By the time Ghamidi came under the influence of Maulana Maududi in the early 1970s, he had already acquired a reputation as an Islamic scholar in his own right in Lahore. Although he had joined the Jamaat in 1974 as a rukn (full member), for all practical purposes he remained an outsider as far as the Jamaat’s party discipline and strict adherence to its ideological positions were concerned.4 Throughout his association with the Jamaat as a member, the rank and file of the party continued to harbor serious doubts about his loyalty to the ideas and programs of the Jamaat and generally considered him as an Islamic snob. Nevertheless, Ghamidi’s association with the Jamaat and Maulana Maududi for about eight or nine years during the 1970s left an important mark in the formative phase of his religio-intellectual career. He learned from Maududi—as well as from Islahi—to take a more systematic view of the Quranic message, identifying coherent thematic structures in individual suras (chapters of the Quran) and interpreting individual ayats (verses) of the Quran not in isolation but within the totality of the Quranic message and world-view. Although Ghamidi and his associates have long repudiated the core ideas of Maulana Maududi, especially the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state as the primary objective of Islamic dawa, the way these scholars articulate their arguments, build internally coherent and systematic structures of thought, and use instrumental rationality is clearly evocative of Maududi’s writings.

Modern Media and Religious Authority Ghamdi’s audience and readership consists mainly of educated, urban-based middle-class men between the ages of 20–35. Many of his close associates and disciples as well as followers have come to him through some previous religious experiences or affiliations. Like Ghamidi, many of his associates were initially influenced by the writings of Maulana Maududi and, in some cases, were regular members (rukn) of the Jamaat. Farooq Khan of Mardan (North-West Frontier Province, NWFP), for example, who is one of Ghamidi’s most prominent disciples and popular interpreters, was a member of the shura (consultative council) of the NWFP Jamaat. Ghamidi’s television audience, however, is more diverse: it includes not only modern educated youth but also lay Islamic intellectuals and professionals who are aware of the contemporary Islamic controversies as well as the issues related to the relevance of Islamic laws in the modern 4 Many

senior Jamaat members resented both Ghamidi’s occasional disagreements with Maulana Maududi on some religious interpretations as well as claims attributed to Ghamidi that Maududi sought his opinion when faced with some difficult issues of theology and law.

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context. Dissatisfied with the ideas and positions of both the traditional ulema and the Westerneducated secular-liberal elite, this religiously oriented audience finds Ghamidi’s interventions and ideas fresh, creative, sensible, moderate, and relevant. Ghamidi is extremely articulate in presenting his point of view. When making an argument, he relies not only on the Quran and the sunnah of the Prophet, but also on rational reasoning, although one has to accept some of his fundamental premises about human nature and social relations in order to agree with his argument. He is a media personality par excellence: sharp, to the point, succinct, confident, very comfortable in front of the camera, and clearly exuding religious authority. He is usually very persuasive when interviewed by one of his followers or disciples—Khurshid Ahmad Nadeem, for example. Ghamidi is also very convincing when he is delivering straight lectures on television. However, when confronted with critical questioning and alternative views, Ghamidi’s response usually becomes polemical and falls back on an “if you believe this then you will also have to believe that …” type of reasoning. In recent debates and panel discussions on television, Ghamidi has displayed a tendency to compensate reasoned argument with rhetorical and pedantic flourish. His chaste and rather Persianized Urdu limits his accessibility to an educated audience and readership only. In many ways, Ghamidi represents a liberal or neo-traditionalist response to both the traditionalist ulema as well as the politicized Islamist elements of the Jamaat-e-Islami. His television persona grew rapidly during the Musharraf years in Pakistan, when the state apparatus and allied media channels were pushing forcefully a project of “liberal Islam” and “enlightened moderation.”5 Ghamidi made his appearance on a number of television channels espousing a more liberal interpretation of the Quran and sunnah. He has clearly become the leading “critical traditionalist” scholar in Pakistan who is keen on promoting a middle or moderate path toward religion—one that engages seriously with the Quran and sunnah but clearly is dismissive of much of the Islamic discursive tradition, particularly medieval Islamic interpretive tradition and jurisprudence. Ghamidi has been on various Pakistani television channels on numerous occasions and has a program named after him on the most popular private channel GEO. He provides his views on a variety of religious topics as well as on what Islam says (according to him) on a variety of social, cultural, and political issues. His eloquence in Urdu (he refuses to speak in English) and mastery of Urdu and Arabic have captured the admiration of a section of the upper- and middle-classes inclined toward their Islamic heritage but alienated from extremist interpretations of the religion.

Socio-Political Influence of Ghamidi’s Religious Authority Ghamidi gained particular prominence through his views about the hudood laws (Islamic criminal punishments) and jihad during the Musharraf government. With regard to hudood punishments, and in particular with regard to the punishment for rape and adultery (zina), Ghamidi’s perspective marked a noted challenge to the conventional-traditionalist approach to such questions and gave him a unique voice in the seemingly never-ending “hudood debate” in the country. The controversy reignited during 2006 when the Musharraf government, pressured by women’s rights groups, presented the Protection of Women Bill in the parliament to amend 5 It

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should be pointed out that even before appearing on different television programs, Ghamidi had been able to attract a sizeable following among the educated people through his publications and lectures.

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certain provisions of the Hudood Ordinance issued during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime that were seen as particularly discriminatory and unfair. The incessant discussions and debates that followed the introduction of the bill brought Ghamidi into the electronic limelight as never before. The ulema and the Jamaat-e-Islami, both inside parliament and on the streets, vehemently opposed the proposed amendments, contending that they would open the floodgates to licentiousness and adultery in the country. In fact, these groups referred to the bill as “the protection of zina bill.” For several months during the period the controversial bill was under parliament’s advisement, all major television channels devoted considerable air time to the discussion of the issue and it appeared that, for the first time, the electronic media was willing to engage in a free and uninhibited Islamic debate on a sensitive issue. Ghamidi’s was one of the few voices from the religious sector on television to support the amendments proposed in the bill. In the face of the fierce opposition from the ulema and the Jamaat, Ghamidi was intrepid, very articulate in exposing the discriminatory aspects of the original legislation, and quite persuasive in arguing that these provisions have no basis in the teachings of the Quran and sunnah. In a few televised debates and panel discussions, Ghamidi’s performance was far superior to that of his antagonists among the ulema. Ghamidi argued that the Hudood Ordinance was not the shariah (Islamic law) per se but a man-made law that misinterpreted the shariah intent on the basis of certain opinions of some medieval Muslim jurists, and that the views of these jurists should not be considered sacrosanct. His easy access to and facility with the two basic sources of Islamic law (the Quran and sunnah) afforded him the ability to challenge the ulema on their own turf. Most of these televised debates were quite heated and lively. A few, in fact, turned ugly: in one program Ghamidi was subjected to quite rude and somewhat threatening remarks by one of the panelists associated with the Jamaat. The ulema openly accused him of serving the whims of the Musharraf regime and the regime’s cause of “enlightened moderation.” At the end, Ghamidi played a very significant role in educating public opinion on the hudood issue and prepared the popular ground for the passage of the bill. Another critical issue on which Ghamidi has leaned toward a more liberal position is that of the penal code of Islam as understood by the traditional ulema and the Islamists. The question of punishments for theft, murder, adultery, apostasy, and blasphemy according to shariah assumed especially new significance after the introduction of the Hudood Ordinance by the government of General Zia. The ulema and the Islamists enthusiastically endorsed the new legislation while the secularists, liberals, and women’s groups vehemently opposed it, both on humanitarian and Islamic religious grounds. Ghamidi was of the opinion that the penal code as formulated by the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence does not reflect the true intent of the Quran and the sunnah of the Prophet. He categorically rejected the idea of capital punishment for either apostasy or blasphemy, and said that the death penalty in Islam is allowed only for murder and for “spreading fitna [mischief].”6 His main contention is that the specific punishments mentioned in the Quran for adultery, qazaf (false accusation of adultery), and theft are “the maximum punishments” that are to be administered only in exceptional cases of extreme severity of crimes and definitive culpability of the criminal. In most other cases, an Islamic state is free to propose less severe punishments and in no way is obliged to literally apply the specified Quranic punishments. defines fitna as encompassing a wide range of criminal activities in an Islamic state, such as creating disorder in society, rebellion against the state, treason, terrorism, and so forth.

6 Ghamidi

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As expected, in the wake of the blasphemy laws introduced by the Zia regime, the death fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and later the Danish cartoon controversy, Ghamidi’s views on Islamic punishments were received with utmost scorn by the ulema and the Islamists, especially when he shared these views with a wider audience on his television programs. On jihad and militancy in general, Ghamidi has also taken a position that has pitted him against the ulema, in particular, the more politicized among them. His perspectives on the illegitimacy of Muslim jihads in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, and so forth have caused uproar in religious circles. His views on jihad also angered many in the general public who had come to believe, under the influence of the militant ulema and the jihadi groups, that a perpetual jihad against the traditional “enemies of Muslims,” notably Indian Hindus, Israeli Jews, and more recently, the Christian West, was a religious obligation. Ghamidi began with the typical traditional jurists’ position—one taken by Maulana Maududi during the first uprising in Kashmir in 1948—that there was no such thing as “private jihad” and that only a legitimate Islamic government is authorized to declare jihad. Hence, the declaration of jihad by private individuals and by the so-called jihadi groups against the Indian forces in Kashmir or against the NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan was not legitimate from an Islamic standpoint. He was also emphatic on the notion of defensive jihad—that jihad is obligatory only when an Islamic state is unjustly attacked by a foreign country. Lately, Ghamidi and his disciples have taken a more “consequentionalist” position in this regard, arguing in effect that the consequences of the armed struggle by jihadi groups— Kashmiri separatists against India, Hamas against the Israel,7 the Taliban against the U.S. and NATO forces, Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and Chechen Muslim separatists against Russia—have been devastating for Muslims all over the world. These jihadi groups have caused more death and destruction for Muslims and, given the current power configuration, have no reasonable prospects of success. Ghamidi’s views on war and peace parallel those of the Indian Muslim scholar Maulana Wahiuddin Khan, who rejects the idea of jihad as fighting and believes in the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence. Public opinion since early 2009 has clearly turned against private jihadi groups, especially those groups who are engaged in suicide attacks in urban centers and are fighting against Pakistani forces. The success of the Pakistan military operations in Swat and Dir in the NWFP against the Pakistani Taliban led by Maulana Sufi Muhammad and Maulana Fazlullah was a clear indication of a significant shift in public opinion about the militants. This was not the case, however, even as recently as the end of 2008. There was still a great deal of popular sympathy for jihadi groups and the Taliban, especially among those in the religious sector, who were motivated more by anti-American sentiments than by any endorsement of Taliban ideology. That Ghamidi took the position that he did on opposing the so-called jihadi activism, militancy, and the Taliban, and that he did so at a time when such an action was not popular, speaks of his willingness to take risks for his views. 8 It is easy to discern, however, why the state and media apparatus in Pakistan found the views of Ghamidi highly useful in attempting to curtail the jihadi culture that the state itself had encouraged one of Ghamidi’s close associates, and a member of the editorial board of his monthly Urdu-language journal Ishraq, published an article arguing that Jews have a stronger moral and religious claim over the custody of Jerusalem than Muslims and the Palestinians. Maulana Waheeduddin of India, a fellow traveler with Ghamidi, has also expressed similar views on Jerusalem on several occasions.

7 Interestingly,

8 In

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mid-November 2009, Ghamidi received death threats—believed to be from the Pakistani Taliban—and had to leave the country with his family at a short notice.

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up until September 11 and in supporting the subsequent turnaround in Pakistan foreign policy visà-vis the Taliban and anti-Indian militancy in Kashmir. In order to discredit the ideology of jihad and extremism, the media and state institutions deployed Ghamidi very strategically to counter so-called extremist Islam. Ghamidi clearly has a strong command of the traditional sciences of the Quran (as well as of hermeneutics) and of hadith, and these have clearly been useful in confronting the traditionally trained ulema in Pakistan.

Tahirul Qadri It is rare these days not to see Tahirul Qadri on any of the three religious channels during one of their 24-hour broadcasts. His live and recorded lectures and sermons have become a permanent feature of QTV and are widely watched throughout Pakistan and by Pakistani communities abroad. Ideologically, Qadri can be placed in what we have called “Islamic populist revivalism.” Islamic populist revivalism is a new phenomenon that borrows heavily from the Islamists’ terminology and rhetoric—tehreek (movement), dawa (call), nizam-e-hayat (system of life), Islami inqilab (Islamic revolution)—but without the arduous burden of their ideas. Unlike the “original” Islamist-revivalism of Maulana Maududi, for example, Islamic populist revivalism is less concerned with the socio-economic and political aspects of Islam and, instead, relies heavily on Barelvi devotionalism for its appeal. Because of its organic links with popular Islamic beliefs and practices, the appeal of Islamic populist revivalism, unlike that of Islamists, is not confined to the educated urban classes of Pakistani society and is more widespread among the vernacular educated classes of small market towns.

Religious Education and Influence Qadri (born in 1951) comes from a modest family background in Jhang (Southern Punjab), where he also completed his secondary school education from a private school. In 1963 he went to Saudi Arabia and studied the Arabic language and hadith with Maulana Zia-ud-Din Madani and Alawi al-Malik. Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, he completed his dars-e-nizami (the curriculum taught in madaris) from Jamia Qutbia Madrasa, Jhang, and continued his advanced religious education at Madrasa Anwar-ul-Uloom in Multan, a renowned Barelvi madrasah in Southern Punjab. In 1972 he completed his MA in Islamic Studies at the University of Punjab and later obtained his PhD from the same university, writing his dissertation on “Punishments in Islam: Their Classification and Philosophy.” Earlier, he also earned a law degree from Law College, Lahore. Qadri’s religious ideas owe a great deal to the work of Burhan Ahmad Farooqi, an Aligarhtrained philosopher and a rarely acknowledged genius in the history of modern Muslim intellectual thought. Dr. Farooqi, probably the only Muslim follower of American pragmatism, was an ardent critic of the idealism of Islamic revivalists, such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Maududi, and argued that the ultimate test of the veracity of an idea should be its positive results in practical life. Qadri quotes Farooqi extensively in his writings and acknowledges the intellectual debt that he owes to the latter’s ideas. Another unacknowledged influence on Dr. Qadri has been Fazlur Rahman Ansari, a Barelvi preacher and founder of Al-Markaz al-Islami Karachi, who was able to cultivate a large following in several African countries and the West Indies islands as a result of his frequent dawa trips abroad.

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For a while after completing his PhD, Qadri served as a lecturer in Islamic Studies at Law College, Lahore. It was during this time that he was introduced to the family of Nawaz Sharif, the twice former prime minister of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was so impressed with Qadri’s oratorical skills and Islamic scholarship that he persuaded him to leave the Law College and accept the position of khatib (the person who delivers the sermon during Friday prayers) at the Jamia Mosque in Model Town, Lahore. At the request of Qadri, Sharif, who was at that time the chief minister of Punjab, allotted him a substantial tract of prized land in Lahore to build an institution of higher Islamic learning that would integrate the teaching of traditional Islamic sciences with modern disciplines. Qadri soon developed some differences with the Sharif family, but by that time he had become a well-known Islamic scholar and preacher in his own right and no longer required the family’s patronage.9

Modern Media and Religious Authority Qadri’s religious career received an unexpected boost in the mid-1980s when a popular PTV program Fahm-e-Quran (Understanding the Quran) by Israr Ahmad was taken off the air by the government of Zia-ul-Haq as a result of certain disrespectful remarks Ahmad made concerning the national anthem, national flag, and the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The PTV program on the Quran was so popular, however, that the government wanted to re-start it soon after Ahmad was fired. This time it was Qadri who was brought in by the Zia government to give nationally televised lectures on the understanding of the Quran. Qadri’s Fahm-e-Quran program on the national television network was even more popular than that of Ahmad. Qadri, unlike Ahmad, was young, charming, more lucid and articulate, and spoke in popular idioms, illustrating his points through analogies from everyday life. In addition, having gone through both traditional and modern Islamic education, Qadri was able to attract a wider audience than any other contemporary Islamic scholar. Since then, Qadri’s media career has been unprecedented in the modern religious history of Pakistan. His publication business, Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications based in Lahore, in September 2008 listed 1,034 VCDs and DVDs of his lectures, sermons, and interviews in Urdu, Punjabi, English, and Arabic and recorded in Pakistan, India, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Syria, South Korea, Taiwan, Denmark, Norway, Greece, South Africa, Holland, the UK, Italy, France, Germany, the United States, and Canada.10 Most of these lectures are repeatedly broadcast on popular Islamic channels such as QTV, ARY, PTV Prime, Roshni, Labbaik, and Indus. QTV has been broadcasting Qadri’s talks regularly on an almost daily basis since the channel’s inception. There are more than 150 outlets in Pakistan where the cassettes, VCDs, and DVDs of Qadri’s lectures are available for sale and rent. Most of them are also available on the Minhajul Quran website. Besides these electronic products, Qadri has written more than 350 pamphlets and books in Urdu, English, and Arabic on various aspects of Islam. Qadri, a Barelvi alim (singular of ulema) by training and family background is, unlike most of his fellow Barelvis, quite tolerant and accommodative of other school’s doctrines and practices. He is one of the few Barelvis who allows his followers to pray behind a Deobandi imam. His relatively tolerant views on Deobandis have caused a great deal of resentment against him by his fellow Barelvi ulema, who are also critical of his liberal views on the role and status of women. Also, 9 There

are conflicting reports as to how and why the close relationship between Qadri and the Sharif family fell apart; it is generally believed that Qadri asked Sharif for a huge amount of government funds to build his Minhaj University, which Sharif declined.

10

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This list only includes the lectures and sermons that are available on CDs and DVDs; other lectures that were recoded on cassettes or were transcribed from notes number around 6,000.

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among the Sunni ulema, he enjoys the closest relationship with the Shia community.11 In fact, the vice-chairman of Qadri’s (now almost defunct) political party, Pakistan Awami Tehreek, is a prominent Shia leader Agha Murtaza Poya. Qadri is also a practicing Sufi and many of his broadcasts and lectures emphasize the central role of Sufism in cultivating true Islamic spirituality. Qadri rejects, nonetheless, the Sufi practices that conflict with shariah norms. His detractors, however, have recently taken him to task for his alleged claims that he talks to the Prophet Muhammad and receives direct instructions from the Prophet as to how to conduct his religious and political activities.12

Socio-Political Influence of Qadri’s Religious Authority Qadri has been quite vocal in his criticism of the Wahhabi doctrines and has delivered a series of lectures highlighting their extremist nature. He considers the Wahhabis and their fellow travelers (Salafis) as the prototypes of Khawarij (Kharajites) who “are willing to engage in senseless violence” in the name of their “fanatical” beliefs and ideas.13 It is in this context that his views on militancy and terrorism should be seen. Qadri regards militant groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban as an outgrowth of the type of religious extremism propounded by the Wahhabi doctrines. Qadri was one of the few religious leaders in Pakistan who unequivocally condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and challenged the Islamic legitimacy of those who approved the use of violence for advancing religious or political goals. In several of his lectures and sermons in Pakistan as well as in Western countries, he condemned terrorism in “all its forms,” declared al Qaeda a “lethal threat to Islam and Muslims,” and denounced the use of violence as antithetical to the message of peace in Islam.14 Qadri was also quite vocal about his opposition to the religious policies of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, although he was equally critical of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Qadri’s clearest statement against terrorism and suicide bombing came on December 5, 2009, during a televised press conference from Canada in which he explained his position on the basis of extensive references from the Quran, hadith, and juristic literature.15 Qadri stated that “Islam does not permit, under any circumstances, the massacre of innocent citizens, terrorist explosions and suicide bombings.” Elaborating on his fatwa (religious edict), Qadri said: The continuous carnage and slaughtering of people, suicide bombings against innocent and peaceful communities, explosions at mosques, shrines, educational institutions and businesses; the destruction of government institutions, buildings, trade centers; attacks on defense training centers, embassies, transports systems and other institutions of civil society; all these

11

Qadri’s recent series of lectures on QTV extolling the virtues and religious and spiritual status of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the most revered figure in Shia eschatology, was unprecedented in the recent history of Sunni Islam.

12

Qadri is reported to have once claimed that he could write the name of Prophet Muhammad with his pointer fingers on the surface of the moon. It is also reported on his website that while he was giving a lecture on the life of the Prophet, the clouds formed the shape of the Arabic letters spelling the name of the Prophet Muhammad.

13

Pakistan Awami Tehreek (Lahore: Minhajul Quran, 2008), 7­–9.

14

Ibid., 7–9.

15

See Tahir-ul-Qadri, “‘Terrorism and Suicide Attacks’ the Video Press Conference of Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri,” Press Conference, December 5, 2009, available from the Minhaj-ul-Quran International website, http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/9385/’Terrorism-and-Suicide-Attacks’the-Press-Conference-of-Dr.-Tahir-ul-Qadri.htm. The press conference was carried live on some channels. Qadri stated that a detailed version of his position will be available in a soon-to-be-published book of about 200 pages.

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acts are grave violations of human rights and constitute kufr, disbelief, under Islamic law.16

Describing the background of his edict, he said “a terrible wave of terrorism” has maligned Pakistan in particular and Muslim and non-Muslim nations in general for several years now. To remain silent on the issue on the part of Islamic scholars, he stated, is tantamount to “a tacit approval of such atrocities.” Qadri appealed to all Muslim scholars, intellectuals, and opinionmakers not to concentrate on who these terrorists are, who is behind them, and why they are committing these acts. “Whatever justifications they may give for their actions, they act against the teachings of Islam…They are in clear contravention of what Islam stands for. Their each action is premised on bringing harm to Islam and to the whole of humankind.”17 He said that the Pakistani nation is in a “state of war” and that the entire nation should stand behind the armed forces that are fighting a war for the protection of the innocent citizens and securing national defense by eradicating terrorism. Qadri denounced those who commit these atrocities in the name of jihad, and claimed that “perpetrating terrorism against innocent citizens, massacres of humankind, suicide bombings, the destruction of national assets and property can, in no way, be considered jihad according to Islamic law; it amounts to an ‘act of kufr.”18 Qadri argued that Islamic teachings do not allow any group of people to take up arms to wage war against the state and challenge its writ: “This is sheer mischief-mongering and civil war. Islamic law regards it rebellion and insurgency.” He said that even if Muslims are persecuted at the hands of foreign (non-Muslim powers), and the Muslim government take no action over such persecution, “even then no individual or group of individuals is allowed to take the law into their own hands.” Instead, only democratic means of protest and peaceful ways of conflict resolution should be adopted. Another unique contribution to contemporary Islamic discourse has been Qadri’s efforts to promote inter-sectarian and inter-faith understanding and harmony. In the current Pakistani religio-political context wherein sectarian violence, especially between Shias and Sunnis, has been quite widespread and rampant, and non-Muslim minorities have often been subjected to discrimination and hostility, Qadri has been incessantly trying to build bridges between different sects and faiths. His outreach efforts to the Deobandis and goodwill gestures toward Shias have been viewed as welcome developments in a usually charged sectarian environment of Pakistan. Equally important have been Qadri’s goodwill gestures toward Pakistan’s Christian minority. Qadri is the only religious leader in Pakistan who has initiated serious efforts toward reaching out to the Christian community and sharing its concerns. He is a founding chairman of a MuslimChristian dialogue forum that facilitates regular contacts between the two communities and organizes discussions on matters of mutual concerns.19 Qadri’s Minhajul Quran is the only Islamic group in Pakistan that organizes Christmas celebrations, inviting Pakistani Christians of various denominations to a grand Christmas party.20

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16

Qadri, “Terrorism and Suicide Attacks.”

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.

19

During the 2002 general elections, Qadri was elected a member of the National Assembly from a constituency in Lahore where a large number of voters are Christian.

20

During Christmas 2008, for example, Minhajul Quran, Lahore, arranged an ostentatious Christmas party for the Christian community. The only problem was that the chief guest, a senior U.S. Consulate official in Lahore, turned out to be Jewish.

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Israr Ahmad In terms of religious and political ideas, Israr Ahmad is arguably the most radical among the media-based preachers included in this study. An articulate and forceful speaker and polemicist, Ahmad has influenced a sizable number of educated Muslims in Pakistan as well as Pakistani Muslim communities in the Gulf and the West. Ahmad represents what can be described as “Islamist-revivalism.” Islamist-revivalism refers to a broad spectrum of movements launched in the twentieth century—Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and the Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia—that regard Islam as “a complete way of life” and seek to capture political power, either through the democratic process or through revolutionary means in order to implement Islam in its entirety through state power. What differentiates Dr. Ahmad’s revivalist movement from that of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, for example, is his categorical rejection of democratic and electoral means to create an ideal Islamic society and state. In addition, while mainstream Islamists are focused primarily on the efforts to establish Islamic states in Muslim societies, Ahmad considers Islam’s world dominance—not only as a faith but also as a political power—as the sine qua non of Islamic obligation.

Religious Education and Influence Born in Eastern Punjab, British India, in 1932 in a middle-class family, Ahmad was active even during his high school years in the student wing of the Muslim League movement for the establishment of Pakistan. His family migrated to Pakistan after the Partition in 1947, where Ahmad came under the influence of Maulana Maududi and his mission of establishing an Islamic state in Pakistan. During his student days at King Edward Medical College in Lahore, Ahmad joined the Islami Jamiyat-e-Talaba, the student organization primarily inspired and encouraged by the Jamaat-e-Islami, and was elected as its nazim-e-ala (president) in 1952. Upon graduation from medical college in 1954, he joined the Jamaat as a rukun (full member) and was later elected as an amir (president) of the Jamaat of Sahiwal district as well as a member of its central consultative council (majlis-e-shura). Ahmad, although fully committed to the Jamaat’s mission of transforming Pakistani society and the state along the prophetic model, nevertheless developed serious differences with the Jamaat leadership on the issue of participating in electoral politics. Ahmad’s position was that there was no Islamic justification for participating in a system of politics that was corrupt, degenerate, and un-Islamic to its roots, and that by contesting elections under these conditions the Jamaat could not escape the evils associated with modern politics.21 In 1957, Ahmad resigned from membership of the Jamaat-e-Islami and launched his own Quranic studies circle in his hometown of Sahiwal in Punjab. In 1965 he obtained an MA degree in Islamic Studies from Karachi University, thus strengthening his formal credentials as an Islamic scholar. He discontinued his medical practice in 1971 to devote himself full time to Islamic work, focusing exclusively on the teachings and exegesis of the Quran. In 1972 he established Markazi Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Quran (Central Association of the Servants of the Quran) in Lahore to promote the teachings of the Quran through courses offered by its two

21

Ahmad later described his differences with the leadership of the Jamaat-e-Islami in his book. See Israr Ahmad, Tehreek-e-Jamaat-e-Islami: Eik Tehqiqi Mutalia [The Jamaat-e-Islami Movement: A Critical Study] (Lahore: Darul Ashaatul Islamia, 1966).

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affiliated institutions, the Quran Academy and the Quran College, as well as through lectures, study circles, and publications. In 1975, Israr Ahmad assembled a group of his followers, mainly cultivated through the work of the association, and announced the launch of Tanzeem-e-Islami (Islamic Organization) to establish “an Islamic order” and to “work toward the implementation of the Quranic teachings in all walks of life.” Tanzeem-e-Islami was followed by the launch of Tehreek-e-Khilafat (the Caliphate Movement) in 1991 with the objective of bringing about an Islamic revolution by a “disciplined force” that will culminate in the establishment of global caliphate.22 In his formative years, Ahmad was profoundly influenced by the inspirational poetry of Muhammad Iqbal and his strong emotional longing for Islamic renaissance. It was also during this period that he started reading Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s early writings, especially those published during 1910–20, calling upon Indian Muslims to join his short-lived organization Hizbullah (Party of God) and to work toward the establishment of a caliphate or hakumat-eillahiya (divine government). Azad’s impact on Ahmad is evident not only in the latter’s rhetorical style in his writings and speeches but also in his close textual reading of the Quran. Much of Ahmad’s understanding of the Quran seems to have been influenced by Azad’s celebrated exegesis of the opening chapter (al fateha) of the Quran. Ahmad was also greatly influenced by Maulana Hamiduddin Farahi and Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi’s methodology of Quranic exegesis, which emphasizes the internal coherence of the Quran. The most important influence in terms of Ahmad’s religious and ideological thinking, however, has been that of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. Notwithstanding his later differences with Maulana Maududi and his disassociation with the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1957, Ahmad continues to echo Maulana Maududi’s ideas and his signature phrases—“ihya-e-deen” (revival of religion), “dawat-edeen” (call to religion), “iqamat-e-deen” (establishment of religion), “ghalba-e-deen” (domination of religion), and “Islami inqilab” (Islamic revolution). Such ambivalence testifies to a common refrain among the former Jamaat-e-Islami members: “While I have got out of the Jamaat, the Jamaat has not got out of me.” Long after leaving the Jamaat and denouncing Maulana Maududi’s “acquiescence” with “degenerate modern politics,” Ahmad continued to pay tribute to Maududi as “the greatest political thinker among the Muslims of our times.” It was from Maulana Maududi that Ahmad received so much of his ideological energy and stimulus for Islamic revolution that formed the raison d’etre of his Tanzeem-e-Islami and Tehreek-e-Khilafat. It is no wonder that many of his critics dismiss him as an offshoot of the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Modern Media and Religious Authority Ahmad’s religious work until the late 1970s remained mostly confined to the traditional methods of Islamic preaching, that is, Friday prayer sermons, lecture tours, study circles, and pamphleteering. It was only after the 1977 military coup that Ahmad found an opening in public television in the wake of Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization program. The popular protest movement organized in 1977 by the religious and centrist political parties under the name of Nizam-eMustafa (the system of Prophet Muhammad) against the secular-oriented government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had already created a groundswell for Islamization that the military regime found convenient for its own legitimacy.

22

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Ahmad relinquished the leadership of Tanzeem-e-Islami in 2002 and handed it over to his son, Hafiz Akif Saeed.

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Ahmad, on the special instructions of General Zia, was thus given a prominent spot on the Pakistan Television (PTV) network to deliver lectures on the teachings of the Quran. His program “Al-Kitab” (the book) was followed by several other programs such as “Alif Lam Meem,” “Rasoole-Kamil,” “Ummul Kitab,” and “the most popular of all religious programs in the history of Pakistan Television, ‘Al-Huda’ (the guidance).” His television lectures focused mainly on the need for the revitalization of faith through the study of, and reflections on, the Quran. More significantly, however, Ahmad’s political message, especially his criticism of modern democracy and the electoral system, and his view that the head of an Islamic state can reject the majority decisions of an elected assembly (majlis-e-shura) and make decisions based on his own judgment, was precisely what the military doctors had ordered. Ahmad soon developed a devoted audience among a section of the educated middle-classes, especially in Punjab and urban Sindh, but his stint with the PTV was cut short, reportedly due to his controversial remarks about the role of women in Islamic society. However, the preexisting network of Quranic studies centers that he had organized during the 1970s continued to sustain Ahmad in the public religious sphere. Denied access to national television, Ahmad now disseminated his message through the mass production of tapes and video cassettes. The “cassette revolution” launched by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979 was also taking root in Pakistan, where pre-recorded religious sermons and lectures were becoming as popular as qawwalis (devotional songs) and film songs. The cassettes of Ahmad’s Friday sermons and lectures organized by the Tanzeem-e-Islami were aggressively promoted by his followers and were widely available in Pakistan and other countries with sizeable Pakistani immigrant populations. During the 1980s, Ahmad spent most of his time in organizing his dawa work in North America and elsewhere among expatriate Pakistani communities. But the real boom in Ahmad’s career as a media-based preacher came after the privatization of the electronic media at the end of the 1990s, with the introduction of cable, dish, and satellite-based communication facilities, and the subsequent proliferation of private television channels, including those exclusively devoted to religious programming. Ahmad was one of the earliest among the Pakistani religious figures to take advantage of these new avenues of Islamic dawa. New in the field of religious broadcasting and short of material to fill in a full day of air time, both the QTV and Peace TV were glad to give Ahmad considerable air time, broadcasting his pre-recorded sermons and lectures sometimes in three different time slots a day. Unlike Qadri, Ghamidi, and Hashmi, Ahmad’s reputation as a competent Quranic scholar did not originate with his media exposure. Long before his television programs, he had been able to develop a constituency of devoted followers among a section of the educated middle-class through his organizations, publications, and Quranic studies circles throughout the country. His religious influence and authority undoubtedly received a considerable boost from his daily appearance on the television screen but was not entirely dependent on the media. What television did give him, however, was a wider audience, name and face recognition, and the kind of credibility that, in a cultural context such as that of Pakistani society, comes with media endorsement.

Socio-Political Influence of Ahmad’s Religious Authority Ahmad’s ideas about Islamic revolution, the methodology of Islamic change, and the Islamic obligation to establish a world-wide caliphate as the ultimate goal of the prophetic mission were quite well-known even before his regular appearance on religious channels. The electronic media,

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however, helped him greatly in disseminating his ideas to a wider circle of audience accessible through cable networks. Surprisingly, despite his more than two decades of media exposure his constituency has remained largely amorphous and has not helped him in recruiting new members for his two organizations, Tanzeem-e-Islami and Tehreek-e-Khilafat. Both groups have remained largely confined to the original disciples and followers that he assembled in the 1970s from among the disgruntled elements of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Ahmad seemed to be making some headway in the 1980s among the business community in Karachi, especially among the Delhi-Punjabi Saudagran (a merchant community of migrants from Delhi), but this too has reached a stalemate since the 1990s. He has gained some new admirers in the urban areas of Punjab who are impressed mainly with the way he explains the teachings of the Quran but are not necessarily interested in his views about Islamic revolution and a caliphate. Ahmad begins with the fundamental premises that constitute the core of Maulana Maududi’s ideology: Islam is a complete way of life that must be implemented in all aspects of human activities; Islam does not recognize the separation of state and religion; and it is the fundamental obligation of all Muslims to strive toward the establishment of an Islamic state in the form of a caliphate and then try to spread the religious and political domination of Islam throughout the world. Yet, whereas Maududi for all practical purposes accepted, or indulged, the idea of Muslim nation-states—in some way tied to each other despite their diverse entities—Ahmad, in line with the ideology of Hizb-ut-Tehreer, considers the establishment of a single caliphate incorporating the entire Islamic world as a fundamental Islamic obligation. Also, unlike Ahmad who regards democracy, its philosophical underpinnings of popular sovereignty, and its institutional structures as “un-Islamic,” “evil,” and “degenerate,” Maududi opted for the electoral process and democratic politics as “the only legitimate means” to bring about the desired Islamic change. Ahmad is even critical of the demand for the enforcement of shariah by the religious political parties and considers such demands as futile because the “the blessings of even the best of Shariah laws will not be evident” unless “the entire system is changed radically.”23 This radical change “can only be achieved by launching a mass movement and by staking and sacrificing all that the aspirants of Islamic revival have got at their disposal.”24 Words such as “revolution,” “resistance” and “radical change” were part of Ahmad’s religious discourse in the 1970s, but they were used more as rhetorical devices than as core concepts of a coherent ideology. What transformed these concepts from their use as figures of speech to a more substantive commitment in a literal sense was the impact of the Iranian revolution in 1979, which demonstrated the efficacy of popular forces in overthrowing an oppressive regime. Although clearly not a fan of Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideas and doctrines, Ahmad nevertheless admired the Iranian leader’s methodology of revolution and ability to mobilize the masses for Islamic change. Another important factor that contributed considerably toward radicalizing Ahmad’s religious discourse was his exposure to the ideas of Hizb-ut-Tehreer during frequent overseas travels in the late 1970s and 1980s. His launching of Tehreek-e-Khilafat in 1991 was the culmination of his extended discussions with the ideologues and activists of Hizb-ut-Tehreer in Britain and the United States, although he said he disapproved of the use of violence to bring about an Islamic revolution.

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23

Israr Ahmad, Khilafah in Pakistan: What, Why and How? (Lahore: Maktaba Markazi Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Quran, 2001), 4.

24

Ibid., 5.

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It is not clear from Ahmad’s writings and lectures, however, how this mass movement will transform itself into an established political power if the movement neither participates in electoral politics nor believes in violent revolution.25 What Ahmad is quite clear about, however, is his vision of the caliphate system that will be established after the Islamic revolution. According to Ahmad, the caliph will be elected by the people but will be given “wide administrative powers.” There will be a majlis-e-shura to advise him in legislative and administrative affairs but the caliph will have the veto power to override its decisions. Only Muslims men “whose character is above board” will be eligible to take part in the process of legislation; in other words, non-Muslims and women will have no voice in the affairs of the state. Neither will non-Muslims be permitted to “take part in the highest level of policy making” for the simple reason that the “topmost priority of an Islamic state, whenever it is established, will be to extend the Islamic Order to other countries,” and since nonMuslims “do not share this vision with Muslims, they cannot be entrusted to devise, plan, and execute this policy.”26 Interest will be abolished completely from financial transactions, and zakat (alms giving) will be collected compulsorily by the state. Non-Muslims will be required to pay a corresponding tax. “Intermixing of sexes will be prohibited and in principle separate areas of activity will be determined for men and women.” In addition, “for the protection of chastity and honor” and for “the sake of purity of eyes and heart,” Islamic restrictions regarding “concealment and veil will be strictly implemented.”27 The caliphate will also implement “harsh penal laws” as provided by shariah. The most important task of the caliphate, however, will be to extend the religious and political boundaries of Islam, eventually encompassing the entire world. It is precisely this millennial idea of the prospective world domination of Islam that seems to capture the imagination of many among Ahmad’s television audience and seems to reverberate with their views on the role of Islam in the current world politics. Ahmad seems to enrapture his viewers and audience with references from the hadith literature that purportedly describe five phases of history from the time of the Prophet to doomsday. According to a tradition of the Prophet frequently quoted by Ahmad, these include the period of the life of the Prophet, followed by the caliphate of the “rightly guided caliphs,” followed by the reign of oppressive monarchies, then the period of enslavement of Muslims, and finally once again the establishment of the caliphate on the pattern of the Prophet. Like some of the Christian end-of-time preachers, Ahmad firmly believes that the third world war will soon break out to pave the way for the fulfillment of the prophecies mentioned in the hadith literature. “The first Caliphate will be established in Pakistan and Afghanistan [at the end of this war] ….The [Muslim] armies will march from this [caliphate] under the leadership of [Imam] Mahdi. Then Hazrat Isa (Jesus) will appear, and that will be the end of the Christian religion.” The beginning of the third Christian millennium, according to Ahmad, marks the beginning of Islamic revival and the end of Christianity. “The global domination of Islam is bound to come,” Dr. Ahmad has declared, because it is in the “divine scheme for the ascendancy and revival of Islam.”28

25

Although both Ahmad’s Tehreek-e-Khilafat and Hizb-ut-Tehreer share the idea of the establishment of Khilafah as the ultimate political goal of Islam, there hasn’t been any formal cooperation between the two movements. According to Ahmad, he does not endorse Hizb-utTehreer’s methods of armed struggle and coup d’etat.

26

Ahmad, Khilafah in Pakistan, 6, 26.

27

Ibid., 8.

28

Ibid., 29–30.

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It is not that Ahmad is stating something here that is not shared by mainstream and orthodox Islamic scholars. But what remains an essentially eschatological part of Islamic theology, however, has become, in the case of Ahmad, a political platform and has assumed a new significance in the current debate popularized by the late Harvard professor Samuel Huntington’s notion of the inevitability of the “clash of civilizations.”29 Interestingly, Ahmad’s views about the Christians and Jews are not significantly different from Huntington’s views about Muslims—that is, both Christians and Jews are enemies of Islam, and the main goal of the West is to destroy Islamic civilization and to replace it with its “satanic civilization.”30 The current domination of the Muslim world by the United States, according to Ahmad, is a “form of divine punishment” because Muslims have strayed away from the path of Islam and have become disunited. Both in his Friday sermons and in his television broadcasts, Ahmad lashes out heavily against Jews and calls them “agents of Satan” who have “gripped the gullible Christians in their hands (mutthi mein).” His weekly publication Nida-e-Khilafat (The Call of Caliphate) and his Friday sermons are the main outlets for his political views, although his television broadcasts are also full of oblique—and sometimes not so oblique—references to current world politics, especially the nefarious role of the West in the Muslim world. Despite the fact that Ahmad’s religio-political organizations have never been among the more popular religious groups in Pakistan, his impact on the nature and direction of Islamic discourse in contemporary Pakistan has been considerable—due largely to his access to electronic media over a period of more than two decades. There is no doubt that his popular programs such as Al-Kitab and Al-Huda on the national television network created a new interest among educated Muslims in studying the Quran, rather than merely reciting it, and in reflecting on its meaning. This direct contact of educated Muslims with the Quran—that is, contact independent of the ulema’s guidance—has been a singular contribution of Ahmad. Unlike the madrasah-educated ulema whose Friday sermons do not usually follow a thematic sequence and jump from topic to topic, Ahmad introduced a more coherent and systematic study of the Quranic themes in his sermons and broadcasts. Although Ahmad has never been associated with any of the so-called jihadi organizations, his impact on the radicalization of religio-political discourse in Pakistan in recent years has been enormous. Much of what is being discussed in the Pakistani media today in terms of conspiracy theories—especially those that employ religious idioms—owes to Ahmad’s ideas on how the troika of Christian-Jewish-Hindu forces has been up in arms to destroy Islam and Muslims. He was an ardent supporter of the Taliban regime in Kabul and has wholeheartedly endorsed the resistance against the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. Unlike many ulema and Islamic groups, however, Ahmad describes the Taliban resistance against the United States as a “war of national liberation” rather than “ jihad fi sabilillah” (jihad for the sake of Allah). Consistent with his position on the current conflict in Afghanistan, Ahmad expressed similar views about the Palestinian, Chechen, and Kashmiri resistance movements, declaring them as legitimate movements of national liberation but not jihad in strictly Islamic legal terms.

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29

In a two-day meeting held with Ahmad in Lahore in 2003 along with a group of American academicians, this author sought some clarifications from Ahmad as to how this world domination of Islam would be achieved. Ahmad’s response was that the Islamic state, once it is established and has acquired the necessary material and military strength, will send an ultimatum to all the non-Muslim nations of the world either to accept the message of Islam or to get ready to be “exterminated.”

30

Israr Ahmad, sermon, June 25, 2009.

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Farhat Hashmi The rise to prominence of Farhat Hashmi as a religious scholar should be seen within the context of the larger trend toward Salafi religious orientation in Pakistani society since the early 1980s. Her singular contribution, however, has been to bring middle-class, urban-based Muslim women into the fold of traditional Islamic practices, rituals, and modes of dress. Salafi religious orientation derives inspiration from the puritanical ideas of the eighteenth century Saudi Arabian reformer Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, relies primarily on the literal meanings of Quranic and hadith texts, and emphasizes the legal-formal structures of religion.

Religious Education and Influence Hashmi (born in 1952) comes from a middle-class family in Sargodha (Punjab). Her father, Hakim Abdur Rahman Hashmi, who practiced herbal medicine, was a prominent leader and amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Sargodha. Having been raised in a family wherein Maulana Maududi’s political interpretation of Islam was considered the only valid ideology, Farhat Hashmi showed, quite early on, a considerable independence of mind. Although she was immensely impressed and influenced by Maulana Maududi’s famous commentary of the Quran, Tafhim-ul-Qur’an, she soon embarked on her own path of Islamic dawa, emphasizing puritanical practices that focused on individual self-purification rather than on the reform of social and political institutions. Hashmi received her MA in Arabic from Punjab University and was married shortly afterwards to Idrees Zubair, an Islamic studies teacher of Ahl-e-Hadith persuasion at the International Islamic University, Islamabad (IIU-I). Both husband and wife later went to the University of Glasgow in Scotland from where they received their PhD degrees with specialization in hadith literature.31 Following their return to Pakistan, both taught at the IIU-I. It was during this period that Hashmi started her Quranic studies sessions for women in Islamabad. Her interpretations of the Quranic teachings were interspersed with extensive references to the hadith literature and to examples from the lives of the Prophet and his companions, mostly emphasizing the proper observations of rituals for moral and spiritual enrichment, especially those relevant to the role of Muslim women in an ideal Islamic society. Soon, the cassettes of her lectures in these sessions became immensely popular among the educated upper- and middle-class women of Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi. Hashmi resigned from her teaching position at the IIU-I and devoted herself full-time to a lecturing circuit around the major cities of the country. Hashmi’s early and most devoted constituency consisted mainly of what is popularly known as “baigmaat” (literally, wives or ladies) of Islamabad, which refers to the wives of senior government bureaucrats living in posh sectors of Islamabad in large government-provided houses with government-paid support staff.32 For most of these women, initially at least, Hashmi’s Quranic

31

Hashmi’s feelings toward her Western education, and especially toward her PhD from Glasgow, however, remain ambivalent: sometimes she mentions her advanced degree in Islamic studies from a foreign university as evidence of her academic credentials; at other times, she refers to her doctorate degree merely as “kaghaz ka TukRa” (a piece of paper) that she was required to acquire as a formality. Interestingly, however, her advanced degree in Islamic studies from a Western university is one more reason for the ulema to reject the legitimacy of her Islamic credentials. In a publication compiled by an anonymous Deobandi scholar, Hashmi was chastised by several ulema for pursuing her higher Islamic education under the supervision of “Christian and Jewish teachers,” whose sole aim is to “defame and distort” Islam. See Mufti Abu Sufwan, Maghrabi Jiddat Pasandi aur Al-Huda International: Maqasid, Azaim, Andeshey [Western Modernism and Al-Huda International: Objectives, Ambitions, Apprehensions] (Karachi: Jamhoor Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat, 2003), 41–42.

32

The English-language Daily Times described Hashmi as “rich man’s [sic] preacher” in an editorial. This observation may be true of her followers in Islamabad and Karachi but not necessarily in other cities and towns in Pakistan, where she has attracted a considerable following among middle- and lower-middle class educated women. See “Editorial—‘Pakistani Factor’ in Canada Terrorism,” Daily Times, June 5, 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\06\05\story_5-6-2006_pg3_1.

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studies sessions were more of a social pastime and a pious distraction from Islamabad’s bureaucratic bickerings, cultural barrenness, and social boredom. These Islamic sessions soon picked up their own momentum, however, and Hashmi became an Islamic celebrity and the talk of the town in a city that had never accorded any recognition to a woman for her Islamic scholarship and piety. What made Hashmi most acceptable to the upper- and middle-class women in the major urban centers in Pakistan was the fact that her Islamic message neither disturbed their high-class lifestyles in any way nor made any excessive demands that they could not accommodate in their existing routines. Among the early admirers of Hashmi’s Islamic piety and scholarship was the wife of the then president of Pakistan Farroq Leghari, who invited Hashmi for regular weekly dars-e-Quran sessions in the President House to address an audience consisting of wives of cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats. This official patronage at the highest level further boosted the Islamic credentials and popularity of Hashmi. In fact, it was President Leghari who granted Hashmi prized land in Islamabad to build a huge Islamic educational complex for women, Al-Huda.33 These AlHuda schools were later added in Lahore, Karachi, and other cities of Pakistan where hundreds of young school and college girls as well as professional women and housewives were taught courses on Islam of various durations based on the curriculum Hashmi prescribed. In a typical lecture or dars, Hashmi selects a particular chapter or section of the Quran, explains the meanings of the Quranic verses, enunciates their relevance to the current un-Islamic practices, and guides her audience on how to apply these teachings of the Quran in everyday life. In view of the fact that her primary audience is women, she often talks about the role of the family in Islam, answers questions on how to raise children in an Islamic environment, discusses the rights of women guaranteed by Islam—and insists that women must demand and assert these rights—and tells inspiring stories from the life of the Prophet and his companions. In most of her lectures, the emphasis remains on how to live a life of piety, how to cultivate love and consciousness of God, how to be kind and charitable to others, and how to fulfill religious obligations with utmost devotion, sincerity, and solemnity. Hashmi’s appeal to her constituency is also based in the simplicity of her message as well as her excellent command of Urdu, English, and Arabic. She is a superb speaker with ready wit and an extraordinary ability to recall appropriate references from the Quran and hadith to substantiate her arguments. When her lectures are being video-recorded for television broadcasts, she is fully covered from the face downward, only showing her eyes, although many women attending her lectures do not observe traditional hijab (the Islamic practice of head-covering). There is no doubt that Hashmi has single-handedly transformed the nature of middle-class Pakistani Muslim women’s engagement with Islam. She has popularized the idea—initially among upper- and middle-class Pakistani women but later among other educated women as well—that there is a need for women to educate themselves directly and without male intermediaries on the Quran and hadith. Trained in Western academia in Islamic studies, Hashmi has combined typical Muslim religious authority figure pedagogy with a modern, Western educational approach to captivate large numbers of Pakistani Muslim women, both within Pakistan and abroad. Hashmi’s famous mode of transmitting her knowledge of the Quran and hadith is the dars format, a gathering of women to learn and gain greater understanding of Islam. Initially, beginning

33

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These Al-Huda institutions have become a permanent feature in many other cities in Pakistan where female Islamic teachers trained by Hashmi teach courses on Islam to women of diverse socio-economic backgrounds. According to a newspaper report, more than 10,000 students had graduated from these Al-Huda schools by 2006 (Daily Times, Lahore, June 5, 2006). Hashmi’s recorded lectures and television broadcasts form an important part of instructional material in these courses. As a nonprofit charitable institution, Al-Huda enjoys a taxexempt status from the government of Pakistan.

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in the early 1990s, Hashmi’s religious discourses took place in nothing less than five star hotels in the major cities, principally Karachi. Her lectures and instructional sessions were recorded and widely distributed, particularly overseas to expatriate Pakistani women in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Today, in an overwhelming majority of Pakistani Muslim women’s religious gatherings in North America, Hashmi’s recorded lectures and Quranic lessons have become a regular feature. Hashmi’s voice and standing as a female religious authority have earned her an unprecedented legitimacy and popularity among women in Pakistan and abroad. Within Pakistan, Hashmi presents a significant challenge to the hegemony of a more liberal disposition among middle- and upper-class women, as well as to the more conventional secular women’s movements that emerged during Zia ul Haq’s regime in the 1980s to oppose his Islamization measures. The stories of the “born again” Islamic experience of erstwhile liberal or secular women as a result of attending Hashmi’s lectures are quite widespread in Islamabad. Her impact has been most visible on young college students who have started observing hijab—in many cases with niqab (covering of the face)—and have brought in strict Islamic religiosity to their families, often quarrelling with their parents and siblings for not offering their regular prayers and observing other Islamic rituals.34 Interestingly, although she represents a more orthodox and more puritanical Salafi view of Islam, the traditional ulema have also been displeased with her efforts to link Muslim women to the original sources of Islam. First, the very idea of a woman preacher without the “proper guidance” of a traditionally trained alim is an anathema to most ulema. Second, both the Deobandi and Barelvi ulema disapprove of her attempts to interpret shariah norms without the mediation of classical jurists. Third, even though Hashmi’s efforts are devoted to the reawakening of Islamic consciousness among women, that these women are leaving their homes to attend lectures and participate in (and conduct) Islamic discourses independent of the supervision of the traditional male religious authorities, is something that the ulema cannot easily accept. Hashmi’s Islamic approach is a neo-traditionalist, semi-literalist one, but it is seemingly nonpolitical. Her students are not encouraged to become involved in politics or to transform society either through the political process or through state institutions. Instead, the approach is similar to that of the Tablighi Jamaat. The objective is not simply to create more pious Muslim women but to create women who are more knowledgeable as well. The rigorous curriculum and unique pedagogical method of Hashmi has empowered numerous Pakistani Muslim women who, prior to their engagement with her ideas, had little knowledge of the traditional sources of their religion, namely, the Quran and the sunnah/hadith. The confidence that Hashmi’s teachings have instilled in these women in asserting traditional Islamic values cannot be underestimated. Hashmi’s objective, therefore, is not to mobilize Muslim women’s participation in politics in order to influence the political landscape of the society or to directly challenge the secularliberal women activist groups; rather, her objective is to challenge the secular-liberal norms that characterize the upper-class society as a whole. Hashmi’s “movement” is trying to shift the terrain of the culture to one that reflects traditional Islamic values, but with the cultural revolution being led by Muslim women asserting their Islamic identity. It is interesting to note here that in the case of Hashmi and hundreds of female teachers trained by her the task of preaching private morality 34

An interesting but anecdotal piece of evidence about the impact of Hashmi’s Islamic training on these young girls is reported to be a relatively higher divorce rate among them. It is said that, having gone through a strict Salafi-type Islamic training, these girls become excessively religiously demanding toward their husbands and in-laws and, more importantly, tend to assert their Islam-sanctioned rights to the annoyance of their husbands.

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and a private role for Muslim women, ironically, required a very visible, public role for them in television programs, seminars, study circles, and schools. That the apparent contradiction between the traditionally assigned private role of women, on the one hand, and the “public” engagement to display this private role on television and DVDs, on the other, is likely to produce a different kind of subjectivity that has not been appreciated by these protagonists.35 Hashmi has often been described by her followers as totally non-political. It is true that she never discusses politics, either domestic or international, in her lectures and broadcasts. However, to the extent that preparing the cultural terrain for a renewed Islamic piety among an important segment of society is likely to produce some noticeable political consequences in the medium and long term, Hashmi’s presence and teachings could be termed “political” in a broader sense. The very notion of Islamic public normativity couched in terms of personal piety and private morality—and not in terms of the establishment of an Islamic state—is a major political shift in Islamic discourse in Pakistan.36 However, Hashmi’s main task is to rigorously educate Muslim women in their religion, and to have them in turn educate others and shift the religious-ideological discursive landscape in a more conservative direction.

Conclusion Despite important differences in their theological and ideological orientations and approaches to Islamic renewal, some common features can be identified in all four scholars discussed in this essay. First, all of these tele-preachers are non-political, at least in their television broadcasts. Although Qadri was active in Pakistani politics in the 1990s, founded a political party of his own (Pakistan Awami Tahreek), and participated in national elections, and Ahmad founded Tahreek-eKhilafat, a political movement to re-establish the caliphate, both scholars never discuss politics or their political views during their television appearances. Both state-run and private channels that air Qadri’s and Ahmad’s broadcasts do not want to alienate their audiences by allowing political controversies in “religious” programs. Second, with the exception of Qadri, none of these scholars is a traditionally trained alim; in fact, all tend to highlight their modern educational credentials to reach a wider audience. Third, none of them enjoy any goodwill or following among the traditional ulema. In general, the ulema regard them as rivals who are trying to subvert traditional sources of religious authority and create separate religious enclaves of their own. Fourth, with the exception of Ghamidi, all have a considerable following among Pakistani expatriate communities in the West and the Gulf region. Finally, only Ahmad among them has strong anti-West and anti-U.S. views, although he rarely expresses these views—at least not directly—in television lectures and broadcasts on QTV. Both Hashmi and Ghamidi, in their own ways, illustrate the alienation of the middle-classes in Pakistan. Hashmi speaks to the female segment of these classes that not only seems to have become frustrated with the secularization that has accompanied the processes of modernization in Pakistan, and the concomitant secular-liberalism that has infected the middle- and upperclasses, but also feels a sense of guilt for having supposedly abandoned Islam in the process of acquiring material goods and middle-class comforts. Ghamidi, on the other hand, mainly

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35

Karin Willeemse, “‘In My Father’s House’—Gender, Islam and the Construction of a Gendered Public Sphere in Darfur, Sudan,” Journal for Islamic Studies 27 (2007): 73–115.

36

Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007), 303.

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speaks to those who are tired of the jihadi rhetoric and who have been searching for a moderate voice for Islam in Pakistan. The media revolution in Pakistan has enabled individuals like Ahmad, Ghamidi, Hashmi, and Qadri to reach audiences throughout Pakistan and abroad, especially in the major urban centers. Hashmi’s lectures on CDs, DVDs, and television have attracted the attention of many women, and her influence has now spread beyond a certain elite strata of Pakistani society to the lower middle-classes as well. Her Quranic study circles and courses have produced qualified and competent students who are now running their own courses and training programs, mainly (though not exclusively) as part of Hashmi’s Al-Huda International Foundation. Similarly,. Qadri’s and Ahmad’s religious programs are watched by hundreds of thousands of Muslims in Pakistan and abroad every day on QTV, Peace TV, and Noor TV, as well as on DVDs. Although Ghamidi’s outreach is not as extensive as that of the other three, his frequent appearances on the state-run and other channels have enabled him to create a constituency of his own among the educated sectors of society. All four scholars discussed here are trying to create a “Muslim public” of their own and to influence the perspectives of Pakistani Muslims on Islam, particularly those who have limited knowledge of the original Islamic sources. As Peter Mandeville has shown, the “circulation and inflections of Islamic authority” tend to create a range of “Muslim public spheres” in which multiple understandings of Islam are “advanced and debated by new audiences.”37 While the older forms of Muslim publics emphasized spatial and physical dimensions, the newer forms are creating communities of discourse with global connections through the use of the air waves and electronic devices.38 These developments have two important consequences for the reconfiguration of both religious authority and religious discourse: the emergence of new Islamic voices in the media undermines the monopoly of the self-ascribed, traditional religious authorities (ulema and Sufis) as well as that of the Islamists on defining Islamic normativity;39 and the fundamentally “contested” and “fractious” nature of the public sphere undercuts the hegemony of the dominant discourse.40 As Schulz has noted, there is an obvious paradox here: the more the Islamic publics are created through media-based preachers, the more Islamic scholarly consensus is undermined. In other words, while the new processes for the production of Islamic normativity engendered by the electronic media tend to strengthen “Muslims’ possibilities to speak in [emphasis added] public,” they, at the same time, “weaken their capacities to speak as the [emphasis added] public.”41 It will be interesting to examine here the interpretive techniques and ideological arguments used by the four scholars to create new Muslim publics. Ghamidi, as opposed to Ahmad, Qadri, and Hashmi, clearly employs a more nuanced contextual hermeneutical approach in his understanding of the Quran and sunnah and, therefore, offers a more liberal Islamic product to influential sections of Pakistanis, who either have been alienated from the orthodox, conservative, or extremist variants of Islam, or who have tended to gravitate toward a secular outlook. In that sense, both Hashmi and Ghamidi tend to speak to the same class of audience with similar ideological predicaments, Ghamidi steering them with his intellectualism toward a more historicized-liberal interpretation 37

Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 303.

38

Abdulkader Tayob, “Muslim Publics: Contents and Discontents,” Journal for Islamic Studies 27 (2007): 6.

39

Amanmdo Salvator and Dale E. Eickelman, eds., Public Islam and the Common Good (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

40

D.E. Schulz, “Evoking Moral Community, Fragmenting Muslim Discourse,” Journal for Islamic Studies 27 (2007): 39–53.

41

Ibid., 39.

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of Islam and Hashmi, through her Salafi-puritanical orientation, trying to relink them to Islam as it was practiced by the Prophet and his companions. Qadri is a popular preacher and his audience is more diverse and his appeal is more widespread than that of the others. Ahmad mostly preaches to those who are already his followers and who want to learn more from their “amir.” His audience, outside the circle of the members and sympathizers of his own organization, Tanzeem-e-Islami, is quite limited. In part, this is because he is usually monotonous, tense, tedious, painfully repetitive, and eerily frightening. In addition, the latent political undertones of his sermons with extremist implications also tend to alienate a good number of TV audiences. Ghamidi is a powerful voice in making a convincing case for the illegitimacy of militant and the so-called jihadi groups; however, the reach of his message still remains limited to a certain small class of the Pakistani intelligentsia. Hashmi has had far more success simply because her message has resonated with traditional understandings of Islam and because of her unique and eloquent pedagogical style. She has also facilitated access to Islamic knowledge to an audience hitherto not targeted by religious scholars: women. This is her main innovation, and the reason why her teachings have spread so rapidly. The female alim in Pakistan is an anomaly, and the importance of women finally having another woman, rather than a man, to listen to on matters of religion cannot be overemphasized. Whereas women in Pakistan had already become quite active in various spheres of life (education, medicine, civil service, professions, and entrepreneurship) in recent years, there was still a vacuum for a women’s leadership in the religious sector that Hashmi seems to have filled successfully. Preachers such as Hashmi and Ghamidi, and the media mechanisms through which their voices reach the Pakistani public, continue the trend toward the displacement of religious authority away from the traditional ulema. Ghamidi, in particular, makes it a point to involve himself in incessant debates with such ulema to prove their inadequacy in providing proper Islamic guidance. Both Qadri and Ahmad are careful in their references to the ulema and generally refrain from directly challenging the latter’s religious authority. Nevertheless, the very fact that their religious discourse is independent of the mediating role of the ulema and that they have built religiously based constituencies of their own—a new Muslim public—that pays scant respect to the views of the madrasah-trained ulema is not an insignificant development for traditional Islamic authorities. Hashmi, in contrast, does not shy away from directly challenging the monopoly of the ulema on religious discourse and criticizing them for “making religion a hardship rather than a blessing for the people.”42 What is more interesting to note with regard to the electronic media and religious preaching is the systematic linkage between economics, technology, and ideology. The neo-liberal economic policies of the Musharraf regime initiated a process of deregulation and privatization of all major sectors of the economy in Pakistan, including the communication media, which for the first time in the country’s history brought forth a number of privately owned television channels and radio stations. The opening of the airways to the private sector in the framework of a broader privatization drive helped both the modern and traditional sectors.

42

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It is not surprising, therefore, that the ulema, especially of Deobandi persuasion, have lashed out heavily against Hashmi for (1) daring (jurat) to interpret the Quran without the guidance of the ulema, (2) creating doubts (shak-o-shubhat) about the Islamic scholarship of the ulema, and (3) rejecting—or at least evidencing skepticism about—the juristic literature and edicts. See Sufwan, Jiddat Pasandi, 47, 101.

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Thus, along with the channels dedicated exclusively to news, entertainment, movies, music, and soap operas, there also emerged private channels (QTV, Peace TV, Noor TV, and Labbaik TV) that broadcast religious programs continuously. This was precisely the same period that witnessed the widespread use of satellite-based communication, dish networks, and cable-relayed transmission technologies throughout Pakistan. The neo-liberal economic policies, imposed by the World Bank and the IMF as part of the conditionality for economic assistance, that called for a free market of goods (and ideas) thus created an environment conducive to the multiplicity of political and ideological voices in the privatized media. There was a market for religious broadcasts, the technology was available, and religious leaders were waiting in the wings to take full advantage in order to advance their ideological objectives. It is important to note here that televised and CD- or DVD-based speeches are not only a form of religious preaching but a commercial enterprise as well. Hundreds of thousands of cassettes, CDs, and DVDs of these and other popular preachers (for example, Zakir Naik of India, Murtaza Malik of Pakistan, Maulana Dilawar Saeedi of Bangladesh, and Maulana Tariq Jamil of Tablighi Jamaat) are being mass-produced, marketed, and sold in stores and online throughout the subcontinent and abroad. Benedict Anderson describes the critical role of what he calls “print-capitalism” in the construction of the idea of nation as an imagined community in the early modern period.43 One can argue, following Anderson, that the onset of “media-capitalism” is similarly playing a critical role in creating new religious communities, imagined or palpable. The privatization wave under the neo-liberal economic policies has opened the door to the possibility of a fundamental change in the way radio and television have become a vehicle not only for the Islamization of society but also for the accommodation of diverse voices within the Islamic religious discourse. In the past, one had to travel to special religious gatherings to listen to the lectures and sermons of prominent religious scholars. Today, people can listen to—and watch— most religious scholars through television and recorded devices right in the comfort of their homes and in the company of their entire families. This has been an especially unique experience for women, who rarely had the opportunity of attending religious gatherings held in public places. Thus, much of the newly visible religiosity among women in Pakistan, as elsewhere in Muslim societies, can be attributed to this easy accessibility that television, CDs, and DVDs provide to religious education. One is tempted also to point out here that only about three decades ago, an overwhelming majority of religious scholars considered the modern communication technology, especially cinema and television, as one of the worst effects of Western inroads in Islamic societies.44 Some Deobandi ulema were even against using loudspeakers for purposes of saying adhan (call for prayer) and delivering the Friday khutba (sermon). The impact of the medium itself on the message is difficult to determine in the case of the tele-preachers discussed in this essay, especially in light of Marshall McLuhan’s famous epithet that “the medium is the message”—that is, the communication technology of the electronic media per se determines the nature and the content of the message. Robert McChesney has applied the Marxist notion of “relative autonomy” in this respect, arguing that communication technologies 43

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006), 37–46.

44

In a survey of the ulema and religious leaders conducted by the present author in the fall of 1975, almost 100% of the respondents disapproved of watching television and went as far as to say that “one should not even watch religious programs that are broadcast on TV for a short time since these programs are then followed by songs and dance by the Benjamin Sisters [a popular duo on Pakistan Television network in the 1970s].”

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have important social effects of their own that are not “reducible to political and economic analysis.”45 As we have shown in our analyses in previous pages, theoretical insights from both Anderson and McChesney are quite significant in understanding the dynamics between the rise of communication technology and the nature of Islamic discourse. Lastly, it is important to examine the role of the state in not only spearheading the media-based careers of some of these actors but also determining the particular brand of Islamic discourse to be propagated, depending on the political and ideological needs of the state at a given time. Interestingly, it was General Zia who had brought in Ahmad for regular religious broadcasts on national television in the early 1980s, and it was Zia again who replaced him with a Barelvi scholar, Qadri. There are two important points to note here: first, the role of the state in launching the religious careers of both scholars on the national television network; and, second, the timing and the choice of a religious scholar of a particular doctrinal persuasion. In the earlier phase of the Zia regime, Ahmad was deemed more useful given the prevailing popular religious mood that resonated with the revivalist slogan of nizam-e-Mustafa popularized by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Later, in the mid-1980s, when General Zia was trying to consolidate his political power by cultivating a popular religious constituency, and no longer needed the support of the revivalists— who were increasingly seen by the military regime as a threat to its power and legitimacy—Qadri, a populist Barelvi scholar and preacher, came to be viewed as a better choice. His non-political, devotional, and Sufi-oriented Islam was seen as a potent antidote to the Jamaat-e-Islami’s Islam that was heavily laden with difficult political demands. The same can be said about Ghamidi, who was given extensive air time by the state-run television network and by other channels to help the government of General Musharraf in promoting “enlightened moderation” and challenging the Islamic legitimacy of militancy and jihadi ideology. As the Pakistani state and other powerful social institutions (such as the media) have formally renounced jihad as a principal instrument of foreign policy since at least 2002, Ghamidi, Qadri, and Hashmi have not only been tolerated but have also been promoted. A voice such as Ghamidi’s, for example, would have been intolerable during the 1980s and 1990s, which were the prime years of jihadi ideology.46 Ghamidi’s views have been meant to legitimate the turnaround in Pakistan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis foreign and domestic jihadis the Pakistani state has nurtured for the past two decades. It is clear, therefore, that the state in Pakistan, constrained in its ideological options in the context of a semi-hegemonic discourse of political and jihadi Islam, was able to use the neo-liberal economy of privatization of media and free market of ideas to create space for alternative Islamic discourses to challenge the dominance of political Islam. This is not to suggest, however, that these scholars modified their original religious views to suit the demand of the state but, rather, that the state found their views commensurate with its own ideological and political imperatives and was ingenious enough to obtain their services. Obvious in all three cases is that the role of the state was crucial in disseminating a particular

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45

Robert McChesney, “The Political Economy of Global Communication,” in Capitalism and the Information Age: The Political Economy of Global Communication Revolution, ed. Robert W. McChesney, Ellen Meiksins Wood, and John Bellamy Foster (Landon: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 7.

46

In fact, according to Salim Safi, a prominent Pakistani journalist, Ghamidi received threats not only from the jihadi groups in the 1980s and 1990s for his criticism of the jihadi culture as against the teachings of Islam but also from the “government agencies” that were promoting this culture. See, Salim Safi, Afghanistan: Amrika, Taliban, Usama aur Pakistan ki Deeni Jamaaton ka Kirdar [Afghanistan: America, Taliban, Usama and the Role of Pakistan’s Religious Parties] (Lahore: Danish Sara, 2002), 340.

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version of Islam—through carefully selected religious scholars—that suited the government’s ideological interests at a given time. The rising or falling of stars among popular religious preachers in Pakistan during any given period is not, therefore, necessarily due to the given proclivities of their ideas, or societal trends, but to the exigencies of the policy shifts of the state in one direction or the other.

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the national bureau

of

asian research

Muslim Grassroots Leaders in India: National Issues and Local Leadership Dietrich Reetz

Originally published in: Mumtaz Ahmad, Dietrich Reetz, and Thomas H. Johnson, “Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 22, February 2010. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

DIETRICH REETZ is a Senior Research Fellow at the Zentrum Moderner Orient and Senior Lecturer of Political Science at the Free University Berlin. He has also been a principle investigator for political science and South Asia at the Graduate School of Muslim Cultures and Societies at Free University since 2008. Dr. Reetz has been involved in a number of projects focused on South Asian Islam, including “Bridging the gap: Blending Islamic and secular education in new school projects in India and Pakistan” (2006–07), “The role of South Asian Islam in the Islamic World” (2004–05), and “The Islamic missionary movement of the Tablighi Jama‘at in India and Pakistan and its vision of society” (2001–03). He is the author of Islam in the Public Sphere: Religious Groups in India, 1900–1947 (2006). He can be reached at .

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines recent trends in the evolution of traditional and nontraditional forms of Muslim leadership and association in India marked by wide diversity and a notable absence of national leaders.

MAIN FINDINGS • Traditional and historical Muslim networks in India, such as the Sunni madrasah traditions of the Deobandis and Barelwis, some reforming sects (Ahmadiyya), Shia groups, and modern Muslim schools, have adopted new leadership formats. These include utilizing new forms of communication, pursing non-religious agendas focused on education and development, and networking traditional religious schools with secular and female education. • Religious mobilization follows the north-south divide in Indian society. Although the historical Muslim networks are centered in north India, many groups in the south and east Indian states pursue their own local agendas. • The modernization of Muslim leadership has led to new bodies and institutions that are separate from established sectarian religious associations. These modern organizations can be divided into those related to religious issues and those related to the welfare of the community. Caste and class factors continue to exert an important impact here. • Religious activism among Indian Muslims is focused on two major sets of issues: (1) securing religious lifestyles in matters of law, family, and gender segregation and (2) raising the social, economic, and educational standards of the Indian Muslim community, which is perceived as backward and neglected.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • India needs to address the issues of social and political marginalization that Muslims face in Indian society. Social and political rights, primarily the affordable access to quality education and employment, are key. • Muslim leaders in India should be given a full chance to participate in public life. They should be encouraged to become part of mainstream society and invited to assume social and political responsibilities, as well as act in a transparent and public manner. • Indian public institutions need to reverse the trend of viewing Muslims as a potential threat and security risk. Occasional discrimination of Muslim citizens must be checked more resolutely. State attempts to regulate religious institutions (e.g., madaris, law boards, and shrines) have produced little result apart from a growing sense of alienation among Muslim activists.

A

lthough media-savvy preachers of Islam such as Zakir Naik (born in 1965) from Mumbai have attracted the attention of the mainstream media in India and in the West, their growing popularity is no immediate reflection of current Muslim grassroots leadership in India. Because India’s Muslim population remains strongly divided along social, cultural, linguistic, sectarian, and geographic lines, Muslim activists in India cannot easily speak for the Indian Muslim community at large. This essay will begin with an introduction to the historical context of Muslim India from which current popular leaders emerged. Three subsequent sections will discuss traditional, local, and modern leadership, which are three categories into which Islam in India can be conditionally divided, keeping in mind that these areas also overlap. A final section on Zakir Naik examines important new trends in media and social and political activism that are emerging across India’s Muslim leadership

Historical Formation of Popular Muslim Leadership After the Indian subcontinent was divided in 1947 as a result of the Pakistani independence movement, Islamic groups and Muslim leaders who remained in India faced a fundamental dilemma. In order to gain legitimacy with the Indian government and their major ally, the Indian National Congress, the remaining Indian Muslim groups and leaders needed to renounce politics. They wanted to distance themselves from the nightmare legacy of partition that had rendered millions victim to communal rioting in the process of the population transfers between the young states of India and Pakistan. Yet partition had created a paradox for Muslim leadership in South Asia: the centers of Islamic learning, theological guidance, and culture and tradition remained in India and were largely absent from the new Muslim state of Pakistan. This inherent contradiction shaped the emergence of Muslim leadership in India and also affected the emergence of new popular Muslim leaders and their grassroots politics today in several ways. First, although no national Muslim political party has established itself in the electoral system of India, the Muslim vote as a potential constituency continues to influence a substantial number of seats in parliament.1 Second, Muslim religious leaders remained devoted to the traditional conditions and forms of the practice of Islam while demonstrating little to no political ambition of their own. Third, national issues of Muslim politics have been taken up more by mainstream political parties than by religious organizations. The Congress Party and regional parties became prime movers in the public arena to articulate the concerns of Indian Muslims, joined by a number of clerics and public Muslim intellectuals, many of whom claimed the newly emerging constituency of “secular Muslims.” The emergence of Muslim leadership in independent India can be roughly divided into three phases. During the first phase, immediately after partition, Indian Muslims had to grapple with the fact that despite the emergence of Pakistan as a state of Muslim majority provinces, in the independent state of India the issue of Muslim minority rights remained unresolved politically, socially, and culturally. Muslims retained a significant share in India’s population (13.4% in 2001),2 1 According

to a 1993 study, Muslims constitute more than 50% in ten constituencies for the federal parliament and a decisive 30%–40% in another ten. Omar Khalidi, “Muslims in Indian Political Process: Group Goals and Alternative Strategies,” Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 1/2 (January 2–9, 1993): 43–47, 49–54.

2 For

the population figures, see the official website of the Census of India, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, 2001, http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx.

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and exerted influence in a number of regions. At approximately 150 million people, India’s Muslim population is on par with that of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Yet, the Indian Muslim community also remained deeply divided, with the vast majority living in the Gangetic plains of north India, the historical areas of Muslim civilization in the subcontinent, and a small but very active and much more developed minority residing in the southern states, where Dravidian languages and cultures dominated. During this first phase, Indian Muslim leaders deliberately renounced political ambitions and focused on rebuilding the religious and cultural identity of the community. A second phase was introduced by socio-economic and political changes that arrived with the modernization processes of the 1970s, triggering the emergence of radical politics and regional, cultural, and ethnic conflict. Religious actors and groups with Hindu, Sikh, and also Muslim backgrounds became part of the identity politics of a new generation of mainly student activists. In the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim groups in India shared in the rising religious consciousness across the Muslim world and expanded religious institutions at a significant pace, not lagging much behind Pakistan or Bangladesh, albeit with very little political drive. Globalization and development marked the third phase of the leaders’ evolving emergence. In this phase, Muslim activism in India intensely refocused on the status and development of the Indian Muslim community, especially general education, the schooling of girls, and professional, technical, and computer education. At the same time, leadership initiatives largely remained in the hands of upper-class and upper-caste Ashraf Muslims. The Muslim community was seen as lagging behind other communities in India and as not equally sharing in the fruits of the continuous development upsurge since the 1990s. This was most recently confirmed by the 2006 Sachar Committee formed by the Indian government.3 Muslim groups and leaders felt the need and desire to network globally much more intensely than before. Using the new opportunities their global cooperation related not only to religious issues but also reflected social, cultural, and political concerns. As demonstrated by the Deobandis or Tablighis, the historical centers of religious Muslim networks in India regained some of their significance in the process. Their followers were joined by diverse activists from across India, some of whom followed a more local orientation while others were more modernist.

Traditional Muslim Networks and New Leadership Formats With the absence of a recognized national Muslim leadership, most religious-minded Indian Muslims continue to look for guidance to their local imams. Those include their elders in mosques, madaris (plural of madrasah, or Islamic school), and religious associations. These activists should be considered when looking for new trends in Muslim grassroots politics. Though still strongly divided by old sectarian differences, these local leaders adapt their modes of operation to new trends of communication. And they pay much more attention than previously to non-religious issues such as general education and development aimed at the social status of the Muslim community. They thus encourage networks of interrelated institutions that link the traditional religious associations 3 Rajindar

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Sachar et al., “Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India: A Report,” Government of India, New Delhi, November 2006, http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/newsite/sachar/sachar_comm.pdf; and “Summarised Sachar Report on Status of Indian Muslims,” Milli Gazette, December 14, 2006, http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/2006/200612141_Sachar_Report_Status_ Indian_Muslims.htm. The committee studied quota demands for Muslims in general and for Dalit (low-class) Muslims in particular, on which no agreement could be achieved. The committee confirmed a less than average performance of Muslims in literacy and educational achievements; lower Muslim representation among the professional and managerial classes; less availability of loans; less educational, rural, and urban civic infrastructure; and fewer income and state service opportunities for Muslims.

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with madaris, modern Muslim schools with a secular curriculum, and madaris for girls with other modern girls’ schools. These schools are operated through Muslim NGOs that have expanded all over India. Often these institutions are cross-linked and coordinated by activists who bridge the religious and the secular realms effortlessly, as they are also engaged in business with, invest in, or direct some of the new Muslim media. Over the years many centers of religious learning have built impressive websites containing a large amount of information. A prominent example is the traditional seminary of Deoband featuring information regarding curriculum, the history of the seminary, magazines in Urdu (Darul Ulum) and Arabic (al-Dai), ordering information for their books in Urdu and English, an online service for religious verdicts (fatawa), and a photo gallery.4 The other orthodox seminary of North India, Nadwatul Ulama, has taken a similar approach in its website, which also provides easy connections with the seminary’s many Indian branches.5 The Deobandi-dominated association of Islamic clerics, Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH), has modernized its web presentation, which introduces the association’s social and religious projects.6 Adherents of the Barelwi tradition of Sufi-oriented Islam, although their institutions and associations are less organized, use modern media to connect to each other. Internet blogs such as Sunni News not only help to circulate news and theological concepts but also promote sectarian debate.7 The youthful missionary movement of this tradition, Sunni Dawat-e Islami, 8 which formed after the model of the Tablighi Jamaat, also possesses a modern web presence, offering podcasts, an e-journal, and e-books. In the Indian context, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (founded in 1973) acquired importance as a reference institution, and more so with a freshly renovated website.9 Run by religious scholars (ulema), the board’s decisions have a fatwa-like status, as it tries to reconcile different Sunni legal opinions. The board’s members also intervene in the making and reformation of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) on issues of marriage or divorce, sometimes causing much public controversy. MPL evolved under British rule when the courts started to make a selective reference to Islamic law while hearing civil cases involving Muslims and promoting legistlation on its partial application. Today, the board is an interface of religious scholars with the Indian state and public Muslim intellectuals in legal matters arising from the dictates of Islam. The group’s chairman has often been vocal in public Indian discourse. Repeatedly the chairman has come from the Nadwa school; the previous chair was the famous Sayyid Ali Hasan Nadwi. The current chairman is Syed Mohammad Rabe Hasani.10 But the board’s authority is not unchallenged, as dissenting scholars with a Shia background and women activists formed rival boards. In addition, individual scholars attract public attention through their participation in religious and political debates. Among the Deobandis, Maulana Nadeem ul-Wajidi is a typical example. A graduate of the Darul Ulum Deoband, he is a member of the working committee of the seminary’s alumni association. He is also president of the provincial organization of Deobandi ulema for

4 For

information on the Deoband, see the Deoband seminary’s website at http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/.

5 For

information on Nadwatul Ulama and its branches, see the seminary’s official website at http://nadwatululama.org/.

6 For

the official website of the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, see http://jamiatulama.org/.

7 See,

for example, the internet blog Sunni News at http://sunninews.wordpress.com/.

8 For

the official website of the Sunni Dawat-e Islami movement, see http://www.sunnidawateislami.net.

9 For

the official website of the All India Muslim Law Board, see http://www.aimplboard.org/.

10

“Presidents,” All India Muslim Personal Law Board, http://www.aimplboard.org/president4.html.

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the province of Uttar Pradesh. Additionally, Maulana Nadeem ul-Wajidi runs his own online Deobandi madrasah, Darul Ulum Online11 and takes part in public debate through articles in Urdu language newspapers. On the Barelwi side he is matched by scholars such as Maulana Muhammad Nasir Misbahi12 and Allama Yasin Akhtar Nisbahi, owner of the Barelwi publishing house Darul Qalam.13 A vocal spokesman for religious Shia believers is Maulana Kalbe Sadiq, India’s best-known Shia Muslim scholar and vice president of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board.14 The Madani family represents another prominent example of individual activism in the Islamic field. It is closely associated with the Deoband seminary, and the JUH. The family operates at the intersection of Muslim religious scholarship and party politics. Its members have struck various alliances with the Congress Party, the Samajwadi Party of Uttar Pradesh, the competing Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD).15

Local Muslim Initiatives and Leadership in the South and East Indian States Historically the structure of religious debate and activism among Indian Muslims is dominated by the traditional sects of the Deobandis, Barelwis, Ahl-i Hadith (Salafi), Shia, and dissenting groups such as the Ahmadiyya. Yet recently, a growing number of local initiatives have transcended the demarcations of sectarian affiliations in India. This development is often connected with education and development projects to benefit local Muslim communities. More typically those projects are found in the southern Indian states (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) or on the east coast (Assam), outside the historical heartlands of Indian Islam in the North Indian United Provinces and Bihar.

Assam A typical example of this locally rooted activism is Badruddin Ajmal (born in 1955), a merchant of Arabian scents, hailing from Assam. He is a graduate of the Deoband seminary and helped modernize some of the seminary’s departments; for example, he was instrumental in introducing and expanding the teaching of English-language and computer skills there. In Hojai, Assam, Ajmal runs a welfare foundation and trust locally known for a state of the art charitable hospital (the Haji Abdul Majid Memorial Hospital and Research Center).16 He also established and directed Markazul-Maarif (Center of Knowledge) in 1982,17 a successful NGO in the education sector operating in Assam, and a training institute for madrasah graduates, Markazul Maarif Education and Research Centre (MMERC), in 1994, which was founded in New Delhi and later shifted to Mumbai.18 In

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11

For the official website of Darul Ulum Online, see http://darululum.org/.

12

See, for example, the Urdu-language newspaper articles documented on New Age Islam, a U.S.-based Internet portal devoted to Islam in South Asia, available at http://newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1653.

13

Yoginder Sikand, “Dar ul-Qalam: A Barelvi Publishing House with a Difference,” February 19, 2009, available at Sunni News blog, http:// sunninews.wordpress.com/2009/02/19/darul-qalam-of-allama-yasin-akhtar-misbahi-sb/.

14

Yoginder Sikand, “Interview with Maulana Kalbe Sadiq,” September 21, 2006, available at Muslim Unity blog, http://smma59.wordpress. com/2006/09/21/659/.

15

Alka Pande, “Muslims on Mind, SP Takes in Madani Son, Kalyan’s Waits,” Indian Express, March 3, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/muslims-on-mind-sp-takes-in-madani-son-kal/430086/.

16

For the official website of the Ajmal Foundation, see http://ajmalfoundation.org/.

17

For the official website of Markaz-ul-Maarif, see http://www.markazulmaarif.org/.

18

For an introduction to Markazul Maarif Education and Research Centre, see http://www.markazulmaarif.org/mmerc.asp.

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2006, Ajmal founded a local Muslim party, the Assam United Democratic Front, which surprised observers by immediately winning eight seats. According to Ajmal, his party was placed second in an additional twelve seats and third in another eleven.19

Kerala Similar local initiatives have been established in Kerala. This southwestern state is known for its high literacy, an influential but moderate Communist movement, and a strong Christian minority influence. It also has a close-knit Muslim community of the so-called Moplahs who can be traced all the way back to the advent of Islam on Indian soil. In Kerala, local branches of allIndia associations have gone their own way by resolutely introducing quality education not only on Islam but also on general subjects. These groups are active in interfaith dialogue and social rehabilitation. In the 1980s, factions of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) took turns in participating in alternating coalition politics of the state. They later reunited and two candidates from the Kerala IUML were elected in the 2009 federal elections.20

Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh The IUML also has influence in the southeastern state of Tamil Nadu.21 In this state, Muslim groups and institutions have revived in a major way that is strongly marked by local Tamil culture and ethno-nationalism. Another distinct local center of Islamic tradition and activism is Hyderabad, once the capital of the famed principality of the Nizam of Hyderabad and today part of Andhra Pradesh.22 In both Tamil Nadu and Hyderabad a number of small militant groups emerged in the past that either were quickly dispersed or were suppressed by the state security forces. In both states, Muslim NGOs significantly increased their involvement in the education of local Muslims. In the local politics of Hyderabad, the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen continues to play an important role for Muslim mobilization.23 The articulate barrister Asaduddin Owaisi retained the party seat in the Federal Parliament (Lok Sabha) in 2009. Although sometimes dubbed Islamist, this party is more moderate and locally oriented in character.24

Jammu and Kashmir The northern state of Jammu and Kashmir presents a special case as it has been contested between India and Pakistan since the time of partition. Since 1990 particularly, the Kashmir valley has been marked by an insurgency that has been fuelled partly by Pakistan-based groups and government agencies. The Indian-controlled part of the state has a Muslim majority of 67% that has tended to favor either the Congress Party or one of the local Muslim parties.25 Despite the many years of conflict, Muslim politics have developed in full diversity. The most well-known party is the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference—currently led by Omar 19

Kashif ul-Huda, “AUDF Is for Hindu-Muslim Unity: Badruddin Ajmal,” Indian Muslims blog, May 14, 2006, http://www.indianmuslims. info/news/2006/may/14/indian_muslim/audf_is_for_hindu_muslim_unity_badruddin_ajmal.html.

20

For the detailed election results, see Kerala Watch News Portal website, http://www.keralawatch.com/election2009/?p=12099.

21

For the official website of the Tamil Nadu State Indian Union Muslim League, see http://www.muslimleaguetn.com/history.asp.

22

For information on Islamic influence in Hyderabad, see “Hyderabad Muslims,” Hindu, April 27, 2003, reproduced on the Left~Write blog, http://leftwrite.wordpress.com/2007/02/11/hyderabad-muslims/.

23

For the official website of the All India Majlis-e-Iteehadul Muslimeen, see http://www.aimim.in/.

24

“Hyderabad Muslims.”

25

This percentage is calculated on the basis of the 2001 district census for India. See Census of India, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/Basic_Data_Sheet.aspx.

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Abdullah, who is also the present chief minister—which is leading a coalition government with the Congress Party.26 The main ideological and political support for the insurgency came from the state unit of the Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Party), which, although autonomous, is greatly influenced by its Pakistan-based sister party. The JI is a member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference that unites 26 organizations favoring either independence or at least strong autonomy for the state. Although Muslim leaders from Kashmir have little impact on politics elsewhere in India, the conflict in itself has often served to polarize Muslim activists across the country and to motivate militant and radical elements. Currently the conflict level seems low, partly because the present leadership in Pakistan is carefully trying to disengage from it.

Modernizing Muslim Leadership The modernization of Muslim leadership was primarily driven by lay Muslims and the demands of development. It was also fuelled by public discontent with a continuing concentration of leadership in the hands of “Ashraf” Muslims representing upper class and caste strata. Changes took shape through the formation of new bodies and institutions. They were different in maintaining a separate identity from both the established sectarian religious associations and the mainstream political parties that had previously been the main outlets for Muslim public opinion. In practice, however, a number of links exist. Broadly speaking, these modern organizations can be divided in two categories: those related to religious issues and those related to community welfare and social rights. Most of these new institutions are NGOs—part of the sprawling civil society market in India. Nowadays it is an important career opportunity for Indian Muslims to become involved in Muslim NGOs. Many Muslim graduates, not only of religious schools but also of secular schools, opt to start new NGOs only to create jobs for themselves.

Modern Muslim Religious Institutions In the area of religious institutions, there are a number of Muslim think-tanks and NGOs that currently exert a significant influence on religious debate and mobilization. A representative example is the Institute of Objective Studies (IOS) in Delhi, directed by Mohammed Manzoor Alam.27 The institute appears close to the Jamaat-i Islami-i Hind (JIH) and its modernizing aspirations. In religious matters, the IOS follows the orthodoxy of Deoband and the JIH. The IOS has also become a recognized player in the academic field, attracting professors from public universities28 and circulating its own academic journals.29 Through a variety of interlinked institutions, IOS exerts a wide influence on religious-minded Muslim intellectuals. The group’s chairman, Manzoor Alam, is also the general secretary of the All India Milli Council (Delhi), which promotes public initiatives in the area of Muslim personal law and tries also to reconcile different sectarian approaches.30 Ideologically these institutions follow the Islamization of knowledge initiative. The IOS is listed as

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26

“Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir,” Jammu and Kashmir: Government and Administration webpage, http://jammukashmir.nic.in/ govt/welcome.html.

27

For the official website of the Institute of Objective Studies, see http://www.iosworld.org/.

28

For information on the structure of Institute of Objective Studies, see http://www.iosworld.org/str.htm#Governing%20Structure.

29

See, for example, the Journal of Objective Studies and the Religion and Law Review at http://www.iosworld.org/journalpage3.htm.

30

For the website of the All India Milli Council, see http://www.aimcnd.org.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

the Indian affiliation of the International Institutes of Islamic Thought, which are part of the same network as the Islamic Universities of Pakistan and Malaysia.31 The Milli Council, in turn, is in close contact with the All India Muslim Personal Law Board.

Modern Muslim Community Welfare Institutions Those institutions related to the welfare of the community are typically training centers or private schools with government-recognized degree courses in all levels of education: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Lately many religious associations and madaris have created such educational facilities. According to inquiries in Deoband town, out of one thousand girls attending a girls’ madrasah—a new rising phenomenon in itself—“at least 40 per cent want to work….Many girls from madrasas go on to join colleges and institutes run by madrasa alumni in cities such as Meerut, Muzaffarnagar and Aligarh.”32 Another interesting example is the secular school established at the Jamia Mosque in Bangalore.33 The so-called high tech madrasah Jamiatul Hidaya, 34 which is named after its founder Maulana Shah Hidayat Ali Mojaddidi, established full-fledged public education courses for secondary and technical education in addition to religious courses. 35 The All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (AIMMM) must also be mentioned here. The AIMMM is a coordination council where public intellectuals and Muslim clerics sit together to discuss Muslim issues. Although in itself the council does not have a great impact on the Muslim masses, the AIMMM has nevertheless helped coordinate and articulate public Muslim aspirations in India to a notable degree. The council’s national president is currently Zafarul-Islam Khan, 36 a Muslim intellectual who combines his activities in the media business through the community newspaper Milli Gazette37 with public activism and charity toward the Muslim community through his registered trust, the Charity Alliance.38 Being the son of Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (discussed below), Khan passed through traditional madrasah education (Nadwa) and secular schooling (he possesses a PhD from Manchester University).

Muslim Secularism in India Over the years Muslim activists who would identify themselves as secular or secularists have also been significantly articulate in the public arena. This approach is based on the Indian interpretation of secularism in the tradition of Gandhi. It is based on the separation of state and religion while showing each religion equal respect and protection. For secular Muslims, matters of faith are private. A prime example of such an activist is Asghar Ali Engineer (born in 1939), founder and director of the Mumbai Center for the Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS). He is a Bohra Ismaili and received religious training from his father who was a cleric. As a public 31

For the website of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, see http://iiit.org/AboutUs/OfficesAffiliates/India/tabid/100/Default.aspx.

32

“Students at Seminary Set a New Course,” Indian Express, May 13, 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/students-at-seminary-set-anew-course/308737/2.

33

Azmathulla Shariff, “Bangalore Jama Masjid: In a Dynamic Mode,” Islamic Voice, April 2001, http://www.islamicvoice.com/april.2001/ initiative.htm.

34

For more information on Jamiatul Hidaya, see http://www.jameatulhidaya.org/.

35

“Jameatull Hidaya, Jaipur Creates a History in the Madrasa Reform,” Skull Caps: On Mauzis, Madrasas and Mindsets blog, March 10, 2007, http://madrasa.wordpress.com/2007/03/10/jameatul-hidaya-jaipur-creates-a-history-in-the-madrasa-reform/.

36

For a list of office bearers of the Majlis, see http://www.mushawarat.com/officeBearers.asp.

37

For more information on the Milli Gazette, see http://www.milligazette.com/.

38

For more information on the Charity Alliance, see http://www.charityalliance.in/.

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intellectual, Engineer writes extensively on the civil, economic, and social rights of the Muslim community from a center-left perspective.39 An equally well-known and vocal representative of this group is Mushirul Hasan (born in 1949), 40 an outstanding, widely published historian and former vice chancellor of Jamia Millia University. Politically Hasan is associated with the Muslim voice in the Congress Party. The social concerns of mainly low-class Muslims are championed by the secular and left-leaning group All India Backward Muslim Morcha (AIBMM). This organization aspires to represent Muslims who are descended from Hindu converts standing outside the caste system as so-called outcasts or Dalits.41

Zakir Naik: A New Trend in India’s Muslim Leadership The rising fame of Zakir Naik, mentioned in the beginning of this essay, exemplifies several elements of the new trends in popular Muslim leadership. Naik draws largely on the newfound religiosity among the rising middle classes of urban India, indicating both the potential but also the limits of his appeal. Though this phenomenon of religious resurgence may be of recent origin among Muslims, it is not confined to them. Similar middle-class religiosity helped the ascent of the Hindunationalist forces of the BJP in the 1990s. Naik’s success points to the importance of new formats and media in pursuing religious propagation. His organization, the Islamic Research Foundation (IRF), represents the type of missionary (dawa) activism that reflects the growing importance of competition and of market forces in the religious field.42 His theological trajectory is prototypical for other new Islamic preachers: He went from being a former follower of popular Islam with Sufi roots when he was a student of Ahmed Deedat, who hailed from a Barelwi background, to a very activist reformist position that some described as Islamist and others as Salafi. Naik’s project in many ways is a media ministry. The new media formats are very much connected with the global communication revolution in the wake of globalization. He has refined media techniques such as the production and dissemination of CDs, video courses, and in 2006 a television channel, Peace TV, in addition to conventional print propaganda. Zakir Naik’s project is also a personal ministry, however, where his own religious persona becomes the main focus of his preaching. This format was also adopted by Wahiduddin Khan (born in 1925) who preaches a non-sectarian combination of Islamic scholarship, Sufi traditions, and New Age influences, especially by networking through his journal Al Risala.43 Khan enthusiastically embraced the new media and lectures live on Internet TV in English and Urdu.44 Several clerics and preachers—Sufi and reformist alike—have followed this model, for instance the school and Sufi order of Hazrat Inam Hasan Gudri Shah Baba V in Ajmer.45

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39

For more information on the Mumbai Center for the Study of Society and Secularism, see http://www.csss-isla.com/.

40

For biographical information about Mushirul Hasan, see http://jmi.nic.in/mushirulhasan.htm.

41

Yoginder Sikand, Islam, Caste, and Dalit-Muslim Relations in India (New Delhi: Global Media, 2007).

42

For more information about the Islamic Research Foundation, see http://www.irf.net/.

43

For more information on the journal Al Risala, see http://www.alrisala.org/.

44

See, for example, the lectures by Wahiduddin Khan on August 22, 2009, on the “Principle of Islam,” UStream TV, http://www.ustream.tv/ channel/22nd-august-09--saturday, and on August 23, 2009, on “Ramadan—Month of Study of Quran,” UStream TV, http://www.ustream. tv/channel/23rd-august-09--sunday-urdu.

45

For more details on this Sufi order, see the Sufi-Mystic.net website, http://www.sufi-mystic.net/index2.htm.

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Naik’s project is also a global ministry. Like Naik, many Indian Muslim groups and leaders develop expanding networks through diaspora connections and websites. This particularly applies to the United Kingdom and the United States but also to other parts of the world where the Indian Muslim diaspora is strong, such as South Africa and Mauritius.46 Yet Naik’s impact is inflated and distorted by the same media that has helped him to rise. Naik’s authority is hotly contested in India, to the extent that traditional groups have released fatwas targeting his arguments and technique of debate as un-Islamic. The unanimity with which this critique was voiced from the Deobandi, Barelwi, and Ahl-i Hadith perspectives reflects not only the aspect of competition between Naik and the more traditional groups. It also demonstrates the limits of Naik’s religious authority, which remains confined to particular sections of Muslim society with a modernist educational background.47 Although Zakir Naik brought the use of these formats to certain perfection, he was by no means the first or only one in South Asian Islam going in this direction. The sect of the Ahmadiyya, seen as heretical by most mainstream Muslims, first started a television channel for its followers in 1994.48 Relayed over the Internet, the channel allowed the sect’s followers to receive messages irrespective of repressions and restrictions it faced in many countries. Many groups have established dedicated channels at YouTube, introducing video activism as a tool for Muslim mobilization. Ahl-i Hadith scholars from India established a missionary center in Saudi Arabia, the Jeddah Dawah Center (JDC), 49 which runs an Internet television channel on YouTube, Noor TV.50 Among the Tablighi Jamaat, the Deobandi-dominated missionary movement that originally was hostile to media coverage, young lay preachers have became enthusiastic video activists, though less in India and more often in Great Britain and Pakistan.51 Barelwi activists also have started a dedicated Sunni channel on YouTube devoted to refuting sectarian opponents.52 Competition in the faith market has become tough and tight. But as with all media revolutions, the resulting impact is not uniform. In some cases new media has exacerbated ideological and sectarian tension—for example, when Ahl-i Hadith preachers use their YouTube channel to vehemently attack the Tablighi Jamaat and its literature. In other cases, however, as with grassroots video activists of the Tablighi Jamaat, new media has increased knowledge and transparency and has led to some form of democratization. The same applies to the website revolution among Islamic groups. For some groups, greater use of the Internet has increased the potential to attack adversaries, while others feel compelled to take a more pragmatic and open approach. 46

See, for example, the U.S.-based Internet portals Indian Muslims, http://www.indianmuslims.info/, and New Age Islam, http://newageislam. net. The latter started in the United States but has now transferred to India. New Age Islam’s organizers describe themselves as “a group of Muslims, South Asian, but based mostly in the Middle East and North America, concerned at the present state of affairs in which the very word Muslim has become synonymous with terrorism, backwardness and ignorance.” For more information, see “About Us in a Nutshell,” New Age Islam website, http://newageislam.net/NewAgeIslamAboutUs.aspx.

47

Maulana Dr. Yasin Ali Usmani, “Dr. Zakir Nayak’s Peace TV Spreading Disaffection Towards the Prophet (pbuh),” New Age Islam blog, August 14, 2009, http://newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1643; “Storm over Fatwa Against Scholar Zakir Naik,” Hasnain’s Life blog, December 8, 2008, http://hasnain.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/storm-over-fatwa-against-scholar-zakir-naik/; “Debate between Jamshed Iqbal and Ali Sina” Sunni News blog, April 14, 2009, http://sunninews.wordpress.com/category/zakir-naik/; and “Surah Al-Faathihah - Revealed To Our Prophet? Or Composed By Hindu Priests?” SalafiTalk.net, July 14, 2007, http://www.salafitalk.net/st/ viewmessages.cfm?Forum=8&Topic=5130.

48

The Ahmadi television channel is available at MTA International, http://www.mta.tv/.

49

For more information on the Jeddah Dawah Center, see http://www.jdci.org.

50

For the dedicated channel of the Jeddah Dawah Center on YouTube, see http://www.youtube.com/user/NNoorTV. YouTube blocked the earlier version of NoorTV.

51

See, for example, the channel of YouTube user Munimmiah786, who apparently is a Tabligh activist, at http://www.youtube.com/user/ munimmiah786.

52

For the Barelwi channel, see “Exposing Nifaq (hypocracy),” available at http://www.youtube.com/user/ExposingNifaq.

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Implications for the Intersection of Religion and Politics Currently no charismatic national Muslim leaders on a popular level are visible in India. Despite the media-based fame of preachers such as Zakir Naik, Muslim leadership and religious authority in India are still essentially local, whether conservative or progressive, reformist or Sufi, political or social and cultural. Given the diversity and fragmentation of Indian Muslims, this is not likely to change anytime soon. At the same time, the choice of ministries has dramatically increased. Traditional Muslim networks have used the opportunities provided by the media and globalization age to revive their hold on their adherents. But so too have new activists managed to establish themselves successfully in the Islamic field. More than anything else, Islamic action and debate in India are framed by the social and economic condition of the Muslim community. Muslim clerics and intellectuals increasingly go public with their positions and demands. The lines of distinction between religious, social, and political activism have grown more blurred than before. Muslims are availing of the public and democratic space in India not only to secure and defend their rights but also to propagate their views in all their diversity. Although the main national political parties will not likely be replaced in the representation of Muslim interests, on a local and regional level Muslim leaders will increasingly act independently. They will thus strengthen communal politics but also contribute to empowering marginalized sections of society. It will depend on the major political parties how well this potential for mobilization is successfully integrated into the mainstream.

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the national bureau

of

asian research

Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern Afghanistan Thomas H. Johnson Originally published in: Mumtaz Ahmad, Dietrich Reetz, and Thomas H. Johnson, “Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 22, February 2010. © 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact .

THOMAS H. JOHNSON is

a faculty member of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School as well as the Director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. For two decades, Professor Johnson has conducted research and written on Afghanistan and South Asia. NOTE  The views expressed in this essay should not be construed as an official position or policy of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or Naval Postgraduate School. This article would have been virtually impossible to complete had it not been for the generous data supplied to the author by a colleague and Kandahar City resident under the pseudonym Conrad Jennings. His data, based on observations and interviews conducted over the last three years in Loy Kandahar, complemented much of the author’s own data gathered in Kandahar and Helmand in August–September 2008 and May–June 2009. The author would also like to thank Matthew Dearing, Matthew Dupee, M. Chris Mason, Wali Ahmed Shaaker, Ahmad Waheed, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines the social and political roles of religious figures in southern Afghanistan in an attempt to develop a more nuanced understanding of the present insurgency.

MAIN FINDINGS • Islamic groups and Afghan mullahs play a critical role in politics in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban, Deobandis, Sufis, and Tablighi Jamaat are the most important religious groups and influences in southern Afghanistan. • Religion and politics are blurred as religious authorities frequently shift between religious and political roles. The West has had a tendency to misunderstand the relevance and implications of these roles. • Jihad is an important feature of Islamic life in southern Afghanistan. Large numbers of southern insurgents are waging jihad for the implementation of sharia (Islamic law). Several predominant religious figures and influences tend to advocate jihad. The West has underestimated the role of jihad in the present Taliban movement. • The ulema council in southern Afghanistan represents a sector of the clergy that has remained relatively un-radicalized by war. Insurgents and jihadists have frequently assassinated members of this council because it offers legitimate opposition to the Taliban’s radicalization of young madrasah students and unemployed villagers. • The political activities of two Islamic groups that represent a large number of rural and poor Afghans are misunderstood. Some Sufi groups in Kandahar have allied with insurgents since 2003 and have promoted rural resistance to secular authority. The Tablighi Jamaat, though avowedly apolitical and detached from the insurgency, has a relationship with the mujahedeen who regularly attend this group’s meetings.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • Political and military strategies aimed at countering the Taliban insurgency while ignoring the Taliban jihad are ill-founded and will probably not succeed. • Currently there is very little contact between NATO or ISAF and the ulema of southern Afghanistan. Rather than stereotype all religious leaders and institutions as militant fundamentalist, policies that incorporate certain religious groups into civil society should be considered. • There is a critical need to fix the corrupt justice system in Afghanistan. A central component of the Taliban’s strategy to win the trust and confidence of the Afghan population is based on the role of Taliban mullahs as arbitrators of individual and community disputes. This “shadow” justice system is proving very popular.

The more we stress Islam as a unit of analysis, the more we face the dangers of abstraction and unwarranted generalization. Islam keeps us mired in debates about normativity, where an emphasis on Muslims allows us to appreciate the dynamic nature of Islam as a lived experience.1

R

eligious authorities play a critical role in the present conflict in Afghanistan.2 Consider, for example, the fact that virtually all Taliban leaders, from the senior regional leadership down to subcommanders at the district level, are mullahs3 (religious leaders).4 Indeed it is reasonable to argue that the present conflict in Afghanistan represents a classic insurgency wrapped in the religious narratives of jihad.5 Although a broad majority of the foot soldiers in this insurgency might be “accidental guerrillas,”6 the leaders are for the most part committed Afghan religious figures.7 Hence, to understand this conflict and its nuances, it is important to attempt to understand the religious figures and phenomena in Afghanistan as well as their societal roles.8 The role of religious figures in insurgencies and jihads has been a mainstay of Afghanistan’s history. David Edwards argues that Afghan religious personalities are central to the moral authority as well as to the “contradictions” of Afghan society. These contradictions together with the “artificiality of the Afghan nation-state” reflect critical, historical components of the “deep structure” of Afghan conflict.9 Regimes ranging from Hamid Karzai’s to the era of Amanullah Khan (1919–29) have been existentially threatened by, and have had difficulties in subduing, rural religious conservative insurgencies. This has especially been the case when Afghan state authority has been perceived to challenge or offend traditional Islamic values. The national political dominance in Afghan politics of organized religious groups compared to dynastic monarchical groups, however, is a rather new phenomenon.10 Historically, the degree of regime success in subduing an Afghan insurgency has largely been a function of the extent to which the regime is viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the population. Critical here is the fact that since the time of the Achaemenids and the Parthians history has demonstrated that the legitimacy of Afghan governance is derived from two immutable sources: dynastic sources, usually in the 1 Peter

Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007), 20.

2 Unless

otherwise specified, the term “religious figures of authority” extends to include the Taliban as well as other figures who would not necessarily identify themselves as such or who work together with the government.

3 Author’s

interview with senior State Department and Department of Defense analysts and officials, Washington, D.C., March 2009. It should be noted, however, that there are many cases where a Taliban commander will adopt (or be given) the title “mullah”—still implicitly suggesting the importance of religious figures in this insurgency/jihad.

4 Traditionally

mullahs have served as village spiritual advisors as well as elementary teachers and are paid by donations from the community, often supplementing their income through farming or a trade. Mullahs vary considerably by educational background from being illiterate to having some madrassah (Islamic school) education. a discussion of Taliban narratives, see Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (September 2007): 317–44.

5 For

“accidental guerrillas,” see David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Kilcullen argues that an accidental guerrilla is an individual motivated to fight due to an encroachment on the local social network or way of life.

6 On

7 Some

observers argue that the social changes made during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan war are what gave power to religious leaders and village mullahs. See, for example, Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the PakistanAfghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 70. It is also important to note that millions of Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad and were indoctrinated by Islamist mullahs in these camps. Many of these refugees eventually returned to Afghanistan as committed Islamists.

8 See

generally, Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

9 David 10

Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1–32.

William Maley, “Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban,” in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 8. Until the rise of the Taliban mullahs, overt religious figures never held political power nationally in Afghanistan.

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form of monarchies and tribal patriarchies, and religious sources.11 This problem of legitimacy is especially acute at the local and village level of rural Pashtun society, for whom dynastic and religious authority has been paramount for over a thousand years.12 The objective of this essay is to briefly address issues of Islam, politics, and the dynamics of religious authority in southern Afghanistan—the traditional spiritual center of the country and a significant focus of Taliban insurgent activity.13 In doing so, this essay will examine the following topics: the cultural and religious mores and tropes of Loy Kandahar, the ulema shura14 of southern Afghanistan, the role that the Afghan media plays in legitimizing figures of religious authority and how certain religious figures manipulate this media attention, the Taliban’s strategic use of symbols and the media to gain legitimacy, and the Tablighi Jamaat and Sufis in southern Afghanistan. These extremely complex topics will be addressed using anecdotal experience and evidence, interviews conducted in the region over the last few years, and other data gathered, in part, in greater southern Afghanistan. The fundamental question that this paper seeks to address is that of Islam’s public persona: who speaks for Islam in Afghanistan? The extent of the historical and cultural tradition of these religious figures’ political involvement is then examined, for where there is religious influence there is also bound to be some element of power play. Subsidiary questions look into what the sources of these religious figures’ influence are, how these sources are changing, and what the fundamental factors of this influence are—i.e. the base societal conditions in southern Afghanistan and how they shape the way religious figures can operate. Southern Afghanistan is an interesting case study in part because so little has been written on the exact dynamics of the interaction between religion and politics, even for a group as prominent as the Taliban. The area of “greater Kandahar” remains the spiritual and strategic heart of the present conflict, and as such an increased understanding of the religious dimension can help prevent mistakes borne of ignorance and impoverished assumptions. There is no doubt that religious figures have, are, and will continue to play a central role in militant mobilizations in Afghanistan. Understanding such mobilizations is ultimately the goal of this essay.

Cultural and Religious Influences in Southern Afghanistan Nearly all Afghans are Muslim, with Islam serving as a common frame of reference and key cognitive driver for the vast majority of the population. Undoubtedly, Islam is the only characteristic that nearly all Afghans have in common. Yet popular Islamic ideas and beliefs are rooted in a mix of culture, self-interpreted religious views, tribal values, money, influence, and personal connections. Although religion has clearly helped to shape Afghan values systems and codes of behavior for generations, it would nevertheless be wrong to infer that this fact results in unanimity of opinion concerning all things Muslim. Islam is not a monolithic entity in Afghanistan just as

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11

On Afghan governance during this period, see Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

12

See Thomas H. Johnson and W. Chris Mason, “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template,” Military Review (November–December 2009): 4–5; and Dupree, Afghanistan. For an excellent review of political legitimacy in Afghanistan, see Thomas Barfield, “Problems of Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies 37 (2004): 263–69; and Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics) (forthcoming, 2010).

13

It is important to note that the terms “Taliban” and “Talib” are not used here as a blanket term for anyone opposed to the Afghan government but rather as a term meaning religious students educated in madaris (Islamic schools, plural of madrasah).

14

Ulema is a collective term for doctors of Islamic sciences and graduates of Islamic studies or private studies with an alim (one who possesses the quality of lim or knowledge of Islamic law, theology, and traditions). A shura is a council or consultative body.

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Christianity is not a monolithic entity in the United States or Europe. Afghan Islam encompasses a wide range of opinions—including reformists, foreign-educated progressives, ascetics, radicals, Salafists, Deobandis, Talibs, and conservative judicial scholars, among others. All of these can be pro-government or anti-government (and sometimes both), West-loving or West-hating; there is no uniformity of opinion. Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that all southern political, economic, and social behavior is driven merely by religious dynamics. A variety of intervening variables such as the urban-rural divide, geography, culture, and quams15 and affinity groups are also important influences that must be recognized.16 These intervening variables of influence will be the next topic of assessment and discussion.

Rural Population Distribution The most important and relevant division within southern Afghan society, the divide between urban and rural populations, is often glossed over by Western analysts. Cleavages between the urban and rural populations of Loy (Greater) Kandahar17 have long been a driving force of southern politics, social interactions, and conflicts as well as aspects of Islamic practice. Population statistics dating back to 2004 (the best and most recent data available) demonstrate that only 12% of southern Afghans belong to urban communities in Loy Kandahar; rural society makes up 88% of the population (see Figure 1). When you look outside Kandahar Province, the figures become even starker with only 5%, 2%, and 4% for the residents of Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul provinces respectively living in urban environments. The south is primarily a rural environ and this fact is important when we consider the role religious figures play in southern Afghanistan. There is no question that urban and rural Afghanistan have distinct cultures.18 These cultures in turn play a significant role in determining how a particular person or group of people will behave and respond to certain types of authority figures—be they religious or political, or conservative, moderate, or radical. Attempts to modernize the south (and the never-ending conflict between the traditional and the modern) are central concerns of the area’s ideological battleground. Attempts to institute modern political or social agendas have not necessarily been met with enthusiasm in Loy Kandahar. Consider, for example, how the south responded to the recent “democratic” elections held in Afghanistan. While the vast majority of Afghan provinces had registered voter turnout rates for the 2005 provincial elections of 60%–70%, the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul had rates of 25.3%, 36.8%, 23.4%, and 20% respectively.19 Interviews conducted this past summer among village elders and leaders in Kandahari districts suggest that there was little interest in the 2009 presidential election or local provincial and district elections in the south.20 In fact, it was further posited during these interviews that the Taliban were not overly interested in attempting to disrupt these elections because of the apparent apathy of the Kandaharis toward

15

Quams refers to a communal group whose sociological basis may vary; it may be a clan—in tribal zones—a village, an ethnic group, an extended family, or a professional group.

16

Roy, Islam and Resistance, 242.

17

Loy Kandahar refers to the geographical area encompassing Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces.

18

Roy, Islam and Resistance, 10–29.

19

Sean M. Maloney, “A Violent Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province 2003–07,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 205.

20

Personal interviews of district and village elders, Kandahar City, May–June 2009.

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f i g u r e 1 

Population distribution in Southern Afghanistan Uruzgan

Kandahar

Rural

2%

Urban 35%

98%

65%

Helmand

Zabul 4%

5%

95%

96%

s o u r c e Afghanistan Central Statistics Office, 2004.

them.21 Though the day of what would ultimately turn out to be a blatantly corrupt election did see a spike in insurgent activities, it was not as intense as the Americans or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expected. The village continues to be a pivotal and defining institution of life in southern Afghanistan, and many villagers view Kandahar City with suspicion and disdain. For a society that—at least on one level—is as traditional as Afghanistan, the concern of much of the southern rural population is that Kandahar City is a source of corruption and iniquity. Indeed, the Taliban regularly play on this belief and consider the city as the area where infidels live. Further, the Taliban use this justification to legitimize their attacks in the city.22

Geography The effect of Afghanistan’s geography is often underestimated as a factor that influences social behavior. In southern Afghanistan, the distances involved, high levels of insecurity, and the sometimes difficult terrain between villages have helped give rise to the “one-family-one-mosque” phenomenon, which is discussed below. In addition, isolated and fairly inaccessible locations are prevalent in the south, helping to create a culture of “traveling mullahs” who satisfy the need for figures of authority—sometimes simply to mediate local disputes. Many of these mullahs also

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21

Personal interviews with district and village elders, Kandahar City, May–June 2009.

22

Personal interview with Kandahari citizen, Kandahar City, September 2008. This same interviewee told the story of a friend who was apprehended by Taliban. This person told his abductors that he was a nurse—not a government employee or official—and served all people. The Taliban replied that they had “permission” and a duty to kill all “Muslim infidels” (but not their women and children) who live in Kandahar City.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

help to solidify the Taliban narrative through preaching and, indeed, encouraging and prompting individuals to join the insurgency against Kabul and the “infidels.” The geography of irrigated lands of southern Afghanistan especially around Kandahar City has also played a role in defining certain social norms and influences. As Thomas Barfield has suggested “these rich irrigated lands…[supported] a hierarchical political system that required large agricultural surpluses to sustain them. It supported an elite of landowners whose tribal followers had in many cases been reduced to their economic clients.”23 This factor has significantly influenced the agrarian economy of southern Afghanistan as well as the development of important landowner families in the politics and social structure of the region, such as the Durrani Mohammadzais and Popalzais. Kandahar’s typography also influences the security situation in the province. The southern half of Kandahar is dominated by sparsely inhabited deserts and a porous border with Pakistan, accented by the large border-crossing at Spin Boldak, where both licit and illicit goods transit through every day. The northern portion of Kandahar consists of wadis (dry riverbeds) and hilly terrain and lacks reliable roadways, making the region ideal for guerilla activity and the use of improvised explosive devices. Furthermore, the rocky, inhospitable terrain of western Uruzgan Province, which borders northern Kandahar, has provided a necessary refuge for the training, resting, and cycling of Taliban foot soldiers into the southern Afghanistan provinces.

Pashtun Society and Culture Pashtun society and culture is the dominant influence in southern Afghanistan, not least because Pashtuns make up the vast majority of the population and because the south has been historically the heartland of Pashtun influence in Afghanistan as a whole. Exact demographic statistics are impossible to come by, and the last accurate census was conducted decades ago, but it is safe to assume that at least 85% of the population in southern Afghanistan is ethnically Pashtun. At the expense of overgeneralizing, Pashtuns tend to be pragmatic individuals who usually come to recognize early in their lives the core importance of their religion and relations with religious authorities.24 Village mullahs, whose role in rural communities has evolved over the centuries, are complemented by religious figures such as sayyeds. The family lineage of sayyeds is traced to the lineage of the Prophet, qazis, or religious law experts/shariah judges—either mawlawi, who teach at a higher level in religious schools (madaris) or pirs, who teach at Sufi madaris or at collective prayer sites where Sufis congregate. Depending on a particular situation, people will be more or less tempered by their interactions with and the roles of local religious figures, resulting in one of the reasons that the religious makeup and identity of many southern Pashtuns is so difficult to define. For a traditional religious elder—a mullah or mawlawi, for instance—mediation and conflict resolution is an essential part of his mandate and identity, but this role also forms part of the basis of that same identity and authority. Both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan as well as in the border areas, religious elders have played this role since the early nineteenth century. Sana Haroon, for example, explores the little-understood traditional role of the rural mullah as the Pashtun equivalent of the circuitriding judge in nineteenth century America, serving as an impartial arbiter of disputes between 23

Thomas J. Barfield, “Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organizations for Times of War and Peace” (paper presented as part of the Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series entitled “Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: Transactions and Identities,” Yale University, New Haven, February 2007), 3.

24

Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 70–97.

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clans (khels).25 Even in a jirga (a village council that has legislative and judicial authority for the tribal community) the authority of the elder mullah in convoking religious legitimacy over the proceedings is greater than many appreciate, especially in the form of mediation. The implications of this authority for the present insurgency in Afghanistan are significant, and the Taliban are well aware of this and use it to their advantage.26 Nevertheless, in deference to the implicit implications of the role of the rural mullah, religious authority only extends as far as the people let it. The idea of near-total subservience to figures of religious authority has little basis in fact in Afghanistan. A good example of this that is little understood in the West is the obscure phenomenon of “onefamily-one-mosque” that is especially prominent in southern rural areas.

Family Culture Loy Kandahari villages will often consist entirely of members of a single extended family (kahol) or clan (khel). Where different families or groups coexist in one area, there will often be one mosque for each of the individual families. Though particularly prominent in the south, this has been observed in communities from Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan to Farah Province in the southwest.27 Although this phenomenon is also witnessed in the Afghan environs of rich or wealthy landowners who are known to construct mosques to help improve their public standing, one would expect it to be rarer in poverty-stricken rural areas. The one-mosque-one-family concept promotes religious dynamics that are highly personal and relatively immune to rhetoric and manipulation by outside forces, and it is often difficult for mass movements and popular uprisings to significantly penetrate these mosques. For example, a prominent family will not only be responsible for physically building the mosque but also for the selection of the mosque’s mullah. During a recent research trip in southern Afghanistan, the author inquired to a prominent landowner, who had built a new mosque for his family in the village of Deh-e Bagh in the Dand District of Kandahar Province, as to what would happen if the mullah of the mosque started preaching in a way inconsistent with his family’s beliefs or political orientations. The elder responded that “this would never happen because I hired the mullah and I would fire him if such preaching occurred. He works for me and will follow my instructions concerning such matters.” While the one-family-one-mosque concept has a tendency to insulate people from certain aspects of political Islam, the concept of jihad has the opposite effect.28 Historically, the connection between Islam and jihad has been extremely important for Kandahar with disenfranchised Afghans responding to the unifying call of jihad as a reaction to perceived corruption, government failure, and outside interference.29 In fact, jihad has traditionally represented a kind of public sphere of Kandahari Islam, where religious authority figures can command more immediate support and obedience of the public. The call of “Islam under threat” is an extremely powerful incentive for public and communal action and historically has been a consistent motivator and force for Kandaharis to stand behind.

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25

Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2007).

26

The author is indebted to M. Chris Mason for bringing this interesting point to his attention.

27

Based on the author’s discussions with and empirical observations of Conrad Jennings. The author also observed this phenomena first-hand in villages in Kandahar’s Dand District in June 2009.

28

It seems reasonable to assume that “privatizing” mosques significantly dampens the collective Islam, where the mosque serves as the meeting place for social events or for the rallying of its members to combat an injustice or perceived threat. See Roy, Islam and Resistance, 31.

29

See Barbara D. Metcalf, “‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council, http://essays. ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm, 1–8.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Everyday Islamic Traditions Islam, of course, is not just about following rules. The core of Islam—as with most religions—is the provision of principles for living a moral life, and the regular daily cycle of prayers can remind the faithful of these values. It is for this reason that Kandaharis will often make reference to the idea of living a more moral life, even if they do not necessarily always follow it to its conclusion. A sampling of the key dimensions of southern Afghanistan’s Islamic traditions is presented below. Namaz. Islam affects the everyday life of a southern Afghan in a variety of ways. The five daily prayers, namaz,30 for the most part, are integrated into the rhythm of the Afghan day. It is not seen as an interruption to stop what one is doing to pray. A corollary example of this is the use of a patu (patkai) on which to pray. A woolen blanket used during the day (especially during the winter) as a wrap-around cloak is taken off, put on the floor, and prayers are made there. The patu is a good indication and reflective of the effortless ubiquity of Islam in the daily life of Afghans. Zakat. Another Islamic concept that demands mention is zakat (alms for the poor). Zakat is followed and often employed by the Taliban as a motivating force to encourage villagers to contribute funds or assets to their cause. Sharia courts. Yet another extremely important dynamic are sharia (Islamic law) courts that represent a popular alternative to government legal institutions, which have been marred by years of corruption and inefficient legal processes. In numerous areas, especially in the rural southern Pashtun hinterlands, the Taliban are perceived as not only doing a better job of governance— via “shadow” provincial and district governments—and providing justice than Kabul; the Taliban are also seen as more legitimate than the distant and unpopular leadership in Kabul.31 Throughout southern Afghanistan, the Taliban have established parallel government systems including provincial and district level administrators, police chiefs, and judges; just how effective or widespread these informal power structures are is difficult to assess.32 But one element of the Taliban’s shadow government that has been particularly popular throughout Loy Kandahar is the alternative judicial system. Today, faced with a choice between a protracted case before an inscrutable system of state justice, in which he who can pay the highest bribes to the most people over the longest period of time invariably wins, the Pashtuns are instead turning in droves to the rapid, transparent justice of the mullahs of the Taliban. Justice and, particularly, mediation are indeed a traditional part of the mullahs’ role in the community and the Taliban have masterfully played on this reality.33 Madrasah. The institution of the madrasah, too, is an important feature of the day-to-day landscape of southern Afghanistan. The role that madaris have played in the political life of southern Afghanistan has fluctuated over the years and, since the 1980s, permanently changed in character—endowing the religious clergy with political power and influence. This culminated in the “clerical revolution” (with popular backing) of the Taliban in 1994. According to Olivier Roy, 30

At dawn (fajr), at noon (dhuhr), in the afternoon (asr), at sunset (maghrib), and at nightfall (ishaa).

31

This was a common theme among the 60 or so village elders, tribal leaders, and even some Afghan government leaders interviewed by the author in various locations in Afghanistan, August–September, 2008 and May–June 2009. It is important to note, however, that the desire of locals for Taliban court systems because of corruption and inefficiency of the government’s system. In rural communities most of the legal matters relating to land and crime would never have been legislated by the government (even in the 1970s) and as such that people go to the Taliban courts is not so surprising. For a recent discussion of the Taliban court systems, see “Afghanistan: In Search of Justice,” National Public Radio, webpage, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98121740.

32

“Taliban Shadow Gov’t Pervades Afghanistan,” CBS News, December 27, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/27/world/ main4687823_page2.shtml.

33

For an important scholarly statement and analysis of the impact of culture on Afghan law, see Thomas Barfield, “Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan,” Maine Law Review 60, no. 2 (2008): 358–73.

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the Afghan Taliban is the only contemporary Islamic movement whose basis is a network of rural madaris, effectively tapping the well of rural southern Afghan conservatism and puritanism.34 The full history of this change is beyond the scope of this short essay, but the profound effect this had on communities should not be underestimated.

Jihad and a History of Conflict As suggested above, jihad is another important feature of Islamic life in southern Afghanistan. In many respects waging jihad has become a cornerstone of Islamic identity for many southern Afghans, as they have assumed the struggle for the predominance of God’s will, both within oneself and between other people. Though this will be explored more fully in later sections of this paper, it is very important to understand that a large number of southern insurgents are fighting in support of jihad and the implementation of sharia among other religious and ideological positions. In contrast with the sheer numbers who volunteered for jihad in the 1980s, however, the calls of mullah networks are perhaps a less important influence in the present conflict than the chronic unemployment and social stagnation as of 2009. In the 1980s social structures were more active and influential, creating a framework for recruitment. And while this is not necessarily the case today, it would nevertheless be imprudent to discount the importance of jihad in southern religious life. This is especially true when assessing the motivations of the local as well as regional leaders of the Taliban. There are a variety of other factors that influence the politics and relations of Afghans in the south. Conflict itself is an important factor that since the early 1970s has had a preeminent influence on southern society. Over 30 years of conflict have given the people of the south a somewhat unpredictable nature—in part stemming from a desire for self-preservation—that sometimes can work in opposition to core cultural and societal values of Islam or Pashtunwali (the unwritten Pashtun tribal code). In the wartime atmosphere of Kandahar, Helmand, or Zabul, there is a strong feeling of polarization, that others “are either with us or against us.” This applies across the spectrum of the population’s relations with the government, tribal elders, businessmen, and the Taliban, as well as to the foreign forces operating in the south.35 One of the very significant consequences of the Afghan’s anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and 1980s was the destruction of the Pashtun temporal maliks36 and khans and their replacement by Islamist mullahs as power brokers. This became even more important when Pakistan helped push the Taliban into Afghanistan in the 1990s.37 Pakistan purposefully deconstructed the traditional tribal order in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in an effort to promote radical Islamist mullahs who could recruit for the Afghan mujahideen in their conflict against the Soviet occupiers.38

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34

Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn, 204.

35

Personal interviews with district and village elders, Kandahar City, May–June 2009.

36

The British first introduced the maliki system, which Pakistan retained. This system was aimed at creating reliable local elite whose loyalty could be rewarded by the state through special status, financial benefits, and official recognition of influence over the tribes. It was intended to provide a single spokesman for a khel with whom the British administration could deal in an attempt to replicate the Sandeman system among the egalitarian Pashtun.

37

Ahmed Rashid delves into the evolution of Pakistan’s support for radical Islamists and the Taliban as part of a comprehensive Afghan strategy. See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 2001), 183–89.

38

Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 67.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

Political and Economic Elites Islam should not be seen as the only influence on the lives of southern Afghans. In Kandahar City the top class of businessmen or political leadership are not necessarily the most principled group, nor are they especially religious. Money, narcotics, and influence are important factors for this group, and religion has a more limited impact on their lives as compared to other segments of society. In fact, to understand Kandahari society one needs to understand the three secular layers of influence in Kandahar: family, khel, and tribal interests; licit business relationships; and illicit business relationships. For example, today Kandahari political, economic, and social dynamics cannot be fully understood without considering the tribal relations and competitions between, for example, the Popolzai, Barakzai, Noorzai, Alikozai, and Achakzai tribal entities and respective leaders such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, Mohammad Shah, Amir Lalai, Gul Agha Sherzai, Khalid Pashtun, Tor Jan, Aref Noorzai, Haji Safullah, Haji Mirwais Noorzai, Karimullah Naqib, Haji Agha Lalai Dastageri, Khan Mohammad, Talih Agha Karimullah, Haji Kareem Khan, and Abdul Razziq. In addition, the explicit business enterprises of leading Kandahari powerbrokers such as Ahmed Wali Karzai and Razia Agha Sherzai, as well as his brother Gul Agha Sherzai, who is a former governor of Kandahar and powerbroker extraordinaire, and their patrons are of similar importance. Finally, the milieu of contracts emanating from the ISAF’s presence in southern Afghanistan and who gets what from whom are critical in mapping the Kandahari power elite. These political and financial elites of course do not hesitate to seem more or less religious as the situation demands. Religious figures thus may not have specific temporal power; however, they often prove instrumental in certain transactions that would otherwise be problematic.

Religion and Authority in Southern Afghanistan [We should regard] as political all actors and activities involved in the establishment, maintenance or contestation of particular visions of public morality (“the good”) and of social order.39 Both mullahs and formally trained Islamic legal scholars, alim (singular of ulema), are significant and influential religious figures in southern Afghanistan. While village mullahs have ideally studied Islamic traditions (hadith) and Islamic law (fiqh), their actual formal education will vary from basically none to significant madrasah training. All mullahs, however, will lead mosque prayer sessions and conduct religious rituals such as birth rites, marriage, and funeral services at the village level. They are basically “ritual practitioners,” in the words of Oliver Roy.40 Mullahs have traditionally served as spiritual advisors to village elders, jurgas, and shuras and, for the most part, have been inconsequential to village politics. It has also been suggested that mullahs serve as the custodians of the principals of pashtunwali and “use their religious authority to pass binding judgments rooted in [pashtunwali] in the area of the tribal jirga.”41 This is an important social dynamic in southern Pashtun Afghanistan.

39

Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 6.

40

Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 28.

41

Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 68.

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Historically the vast majority of mullahs have rarely been militant. A mullah’s basic legitimacy customarily has come from his application of sharia and defense of the Islamic community.42 The role of the mullah has changed drastically with the rise of the Taliban, however. Though they were once primarily apolitical, serving the role of a glorified notary public, mullahs are now the leading political and ideological figures and voices of the Afghan insurgency. The present role of many mullahs in providing narratives and information to the village population has become a critical source of their influence and is the subject of the next section of this paper.

The Roles and Authority of Mullahs in Southern Afghanistan Who controls the flow of information is vitally important in southern Afghanistan, and the control of religious information is intimately influenced by language and the relative lack of education realized in the southern Pashtun areas. Most of the population does not understand Arabic. This results in the Muslim faithful being almost entirely dependent on the local mullah to teach and interpret the words and lessons of the Koran. In many instances, especially in the rural southern hinterland, the mullah himself has no in-depth knowledge of Arabic and thus will rely on local traditions and oral narratives in his religious teachings and lessons. This interpretive duty results in considerable power for the mullahs. The control of information also has an impact on the role of religious figures as mediators; they are seen as being both impartial and possessing a broader perspective as well as possessing pertinent legal expertise that allows them to pass judgment on certain issues. For example, the institution of the “Friday sermon,” a speech to the gathered faithful, which often touches on political issues (remember that there is considerably less distinction between politics and religion when compared with much Western religious thought). In many respects this sermon is an extension of their authority. Mullahs now regularly pass judgment on local political or governmental personalities as well as critique political and social situations. Mullahs gain some of this authority through the receipt of foreign aid, much in the form of zakat, particularly from Middle Eastern and South Asian sources. Some of this aid, distributed through mosques, is most certainly aimed at strengthening the authority of the religious figures. Mullahs have become a focal point of resource distribution, and as such their authority has been strengthened.

Ulema Council This religious interpretation of the rebellion was promoted by the ulema and the mullahs, a group strongly united in their struggle against the communist authorities, who had proclaimed a jihad against the regime. Represented everywhere in the country, they constituted an informal but efficient network for the transmission of information, as the rebellion of 1929 had already shown. In instances where the uprising was coordinated, for example in Logar [sic] or in Ghazni, the ulema played the leading role. In most insurrections the sermons of the mullahs were crucial: the people often assembled at the mosque before marching on the government command post. In the mosques, the habitual scene for discussion among the villagers, the mullah would use his influence to put forward a religious exegesis of resistance to authority, and his intervention often served to convince the hesitant by removing their doubts as 42

146

Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 3, 29.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH ASIA

to the illegitimacy of the authorities….With the proclamation of jihad by the ulema the rebellion took on a universal nature.43 The social and political role of mullahs and ulema has been crucial throughout the past 40 years of Afghan history. Looking back even further to the past two centuries, and including the Pakistani border areas, a trend of increased influence is evident, legitimized by a wide variety of dynamics. In Kandahar, mullah networks and the ulema council44 operate side by side as of 2009, but broadly speaking they are ideologically opposed to each other. The legitimacy of both these groups is drawn from a variety of sources, but three factors are worth considering here: tribes, age, and wealth. Regardless of what members of ulema may say in interviews, the tribe that someone comes from is an important factor in the level of respect for that person—even before graduating from a madrasah.45 Similarly, age is important only in that it takes time for an alim to mature as a figure and gain respect in society. Shia ulema tend to be younger, and a younger, more active member of the Shia clergy can advance and make a name for himself—within reason. It is doubtful, however, that Afghanistan, outside of the Hazarajat, will ever be fertile ground for the Shia.46 Thus, ulema in Afghanistan tend to be older members of society. Wealth—of paramount importance to the non-religious or tribal oligarchy—is relatively unimportant for the ulema and mullah network. Popular opinion, as well as a whole host of folklore and proverbs, considers mullahs as de facto poor. The image of the mullah asking for money from the rich man is a common stereotype in Kandahari society. In many respects, however, this is a self-created narrative. In fact, grants of land and financial contributions to the mosques, and the establishment of madaris connected to the mosques, have served to make the mullahs among the wealthiest men in some rural areas in terms of total assets.47 In Kandahar, aside from the significant role that the religious clergy took post-1994, there was no ulema council in the form that currently exists. The traditional role of the religious clergy was to assist in religious administrative duties (all the traditional aspects that we commonly associate with the clergy), to serve as part of the Haj and Awqaf ministry, and to serve in the Ministry of Justice. The ulema council in the south (with Kandahar as the focal point) represents a sector of the religious clergy that has remained relatively unradicalized by war. For example, consider Haji Mahmoud (originally from the Khakrez District of Kandahar Province).48 He is a writer, poet, and member of the ulema council and views his role as being quite simple: encouraging those who wish for a continuation of the conflict to start interacting with society in a more peaceful manner.49 Members of the ulema council claim a salary of around $200 each month. Aside from their general duties, one of their main activities seems to be producing a government-funded magazine— Islami Diwa—each month. The current head of Kandahar’s ulema council is Mawlawi Sayyed Mohammad Hanafi (Alizai by tribe and originally from Helmand Province). He was selected and 43

Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 106–7.

44

See the appendix for the text of the Ulema Shura Declaration, Kabul, March 19, 2009. One of the author’s interviewees suggested that a number of the members in the ulema council were only elders. Author’s interview, Kandahar City, September 2008.

45

Based on numerous personal interviews, Kandahar City, August and September 2008.

46

This is not to suggest that Shia do not exist in the south. There are important pockets of Shia Pashtuns in the Loy Kandahar, but their societal and political importance is slight.

47

The author is indebted to M. Chris Mason for this point.

48

Haji Mahmoud served as a minister of parliament in Kabul during the reign of Zahir Shah.

49

Interview of Haji Mahmoud by Conrad Jennings.

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appointed to that position by Asadullah Khaled, the former governor of Kandahar—a fact that helps illustrate one aspect of the relatively unclear relationship between the Afghan government and the ulema in Kandahar. The council consists of approximately 60 or 70 clerics from within the city and 5 or 6 from every district in the province, leading to a total of 140 or 150 mullahs and mawlawis who participate in the council. Some of the clergy in the city occasionally offer advice or counsel to the Afghan government (to the governor, for example), and there is even the possibility of outreach to Kabul via the central ulema council there and its head, Shinwari Saheb (Borhanullah Shinwari, former Afghan attorney general). The council’s political “face” also extends as far as appearances in the local media: members write articles for newspapers and magazines, speak regularly on radio programs, and are quite frequently invited as guests onto local television stations. Interactions of the Afghan domestic security apparatus—for example, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)—with the ulema in Kandahar are clouded in secrecy, and it is difficult to determine the nature of explicit relationships with any degree of certainty. It is relatively clear though that government agencies are at the very least attempting to use the ulema as their eyes and ears in the districts. With tens of thousands of agents around the country, the ulema and mullah networks around the province would be a ripe resource for domestic security services, but it is highly likely that there are a significant number of paid informants among the ulema. Some members of the religious clergy—certain prominent families within the city, for example— use religious legitimacy as a way to enhance their personal status and business interests. This can be purely an issue of status (for example, being called into advise the governor on a regular basis) or can be financial (i.e., receiving more contracts from foreign militaries for construction projects or private and convoy security duties). There is, however, very little contact between NATO/ISAF and the ulema of southern Afghanistan. In some ways, this is regrettable: Lack of familiarity, not knowing how to engage, and political sensitivities in donor home countries can partly explain the lack of engagement from the side of the international community. Further, stereotyping of religious leaders and institutions as militant fundamentalists—often equated with the Taliban and radical madrasas—makes it difficult politically to include religious actors and institutions as partners in civil society. Within the Afghan government and the international community, many seem to be having concerns about making religious actors more powerful by granting them formal authority and recognition.50

Assassinations and the Impact of Conflict Afghan ulema in southern Afghanistan have been targeted by members of the insurgency on a regular basis since 2001. Approximately 24 members of the official ulema council have been killed since 2001, along with dozens of mullahs and other religious figures, including Mawlawi Mohammad Rasoul (killed outside the Qadiri Mosque in Kandahar City), Qari Ahmadullah (killed in his home on March 1, 2009), Mawlawi Abdul Qayyum (shot outside the Red Mosque in Kandahar City), and most well-known Mawlawi Fayyaz, the first president of the ulema council

50

148

Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman, and Kanishka Nawabi, “The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Sayedabad and Kunduz,” Cooperation for Peace and Unity, July 2007, 8, http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/Kunduz%20 and%20Sayedabad%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.

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and son of Mawlawi Darab Akhundzada.51 Mawlawi Fayyaz famously stripped Mullah Omar of his legendary Amir ul-Mumineen (commander of the believers or faithful) status during a public sermon (although it is debatable whether Fayyaz actually had the religious authority to do so) and survived numerous attempts against his life before insurgent gunmen eventually succeeded in murdering him. Afghan ulema are probably targeted because they offer a legitimate opposition to the radical mobilizations and motivations offered by the Taliban to young madrasah students and the unemployed. This is not to suggest that the insurgency is only primarily motivated by ideology or religion. Many ulema council members are actively and deliberately provocative. They write articles, make pronouncements, and issue statements arguing, for example, that suicide bombing is an illegitimate form of jihad. It is important to recognize that Afghanistan, and especially southern Afghanistan, is a region where conflict and war have been staples of daily life for over 30 years. This changes a society. Money (and the resultant status it brings) becomes one of the most important assets—people have less opportunity to exercise the luxury of having principles. It is clear that Islam throughout Afghanistan is radicalized and further politicized by conflict.52 This has resulted in less room for nuance in argumentation or for an intellectually formulated opinion, and this ultimately works against the members of the ulema council. At the same time, conflict also has a tendency to reinforce the need for figures of authority like the mullahs within society.

Media and Religious Authority While new arenas of religious discourse have certainly been created, this does not necessarily mean that the messages, values and norms communicated within these spaces are also new. It can be argued that in many cases traditional forms of authority and articulation work very well in new media spaces, and indeed, have used these spaces to reach out to an expanded audience base.53 Southern Afghanistan is commonly viewed as a provincial backwater, a place where new trends are rare and where ancient and fixed ideas hold sway. The Taliban are supposedly a symptom of this alleged cultural and social malaise; frequently, however, the Taliban are portrayed as being the innovators and consumers of techniques and technologies of the mass media and communication.54 In fact, this apparent paradox does not exist outside Western analyses of structures of religious authority and their means of communication. The religious clergy are probably the leading authority and experts on nuanced communications in southern Afghanistan. For example, the clergy utilizes locally effective media, from radio to print, to transmit culturally appropriate and resonant messages to a local audience. Likewise, the Taliban in general are extremely effective communicators and run a viable, influential information campaign through

51

Bashir Ahmad Nadem , “Religious Scholar Shot Dead in Kandahar,” Pajhwok Afghan News, January 6, 2009, http://www.pajhwok.com/ viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=67799; Bashir Ahmad Nazim, “Religious Scholar, Four Guards Killed in Kandahar,” Pajhwok Afghan News, March 1, 2009, http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=70485; and A. Jamali, “Taliban Forces Are Now Attacking Sunni Leaders in Afghanistan,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 2, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30481.

52

For general information about the influence of conflict on Islam in Afghanistan, see Roy, Islam and Resistance.

53

Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 323.

54

“Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no. 158, July 24, 2008.

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the south of the country. Nothing that NATO or ISAF produces approaches this level of effectiveness or sophistication.55 This effective use of the media in turn strengthens the authority of the communicator. As suggested above, information is one of the most important currencies in southern Afghanistan, and a prominent voice is crucial to establishing oneself as someone who possesses such information, which is exactly the reason why the ulema shura devotes so much time to communication work. The Taliban rightly see the continuation of this work as threatening to the transmission of their messages and thus attempt to stop the work of the ulema through a strategy of assassinations. The use of media by religious figures of authority is simultaneously targeted and diffuse.56 Television is one such method, with mullahs and mawlawis frequently being interviewed in the studio or via telephone and consulted as experts. The Taliban manufacture DVDs and video clips suitable for viewing on mobile phones that are distributed to the target audience as well as to Afghan and foreign media outlets.57 The author, for example, witnessed Taliban videos and musical propaganda being downloaded from one person’s cell phone to another through the use of Bluetooth technologies in Kandahar City in June 2009. Radio is employed to similar effect. Newspapers (or publications of a similar style with similar means of distribution) are published by most religious figures of authority. Indeed, newspapers have traditionally been used by political parties and religiously inclined groupings to publically express their views; this practice continues to this day, in Kandahar, Kabul, and throughout the country. As suggested above, the ulema in Kandahar publish a monthly magazine. The Internet is also used by various groups, although with a higher variance of success. Websites in Afghanistan tend to be less sophisticated than those set up by religious groups in other countries, such as Pakistan and Iran. It is perhaps understandable that Afghanistan should be somewhat behind on this, but the form is not particularly important, as the target audience, for the most part, is not Afghan. This is particularly true of the websites of the Afghan Taliban, which are not used as tools of radicalization for an Afghan target audience. Instead, these websites primarily target an international audience.

Asif Mohseni and Religious Media The former mujahedeen commander and highly respected Shia religious scholar Asif Mohseni (his name is usually prefixed by either Ayatollah or Sheikh) is a good example of a highly engaged and sometimes pioneering member of Afghanistan’s religious clergy who is presently proactively influencing various segments of the Afghan population through the innovative use of religious media. It is instructive to identify and compare the strategies he employs “for Afghanistan’s future” with those employed to supposedly similar effect by the Taliban. This case study is not cited with specific reference to southern Afghanistan but, rather, to compare and contrast the use of media

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55

NATO has the technological capabilities but does not have the requisite linguistic and communicative expertise the Taliban have, which reaches more than just the urban areas. Although NATO can reach an urban audience, it has much more difficulty reaching the majority rural population, over which the Taliban have a virtual monopoly of influence.

56

The use of mass media by South Asian religious figures is not a new phenomenon. Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 68, for example, describes how Pashtun religious figures in what was then India (now the tribal areas of Pakistan) were impressed in the early years of the twentieth century by techniques employed by the Jamaat-i Mujahidin: “Association with the Jamaat-i Mujahidin also heightened the profile of the mullas who had hitherto never used sophisticated methods of self-projection like printing presses. Impressed by the methods…such as posting proclamations of jihad on trees through Mardan, the Haji Turangzai acquired his own printing press in 1916.”

57

The methods the various groups employ often overlap. Media outlets nominally aligned with the Afghan government and the broad goals of the United States and international administration often rebroadcast these propaganda clips because they are not able to generate enough original content and are thus forced to dance to the Taliban’s tune.

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employed by the Taliban, and possibly to illustrate a model for a different kind of engagement with figures of religious authority. That is, Mohseni’s vision of influence through the media offers an example that other religious figures will probably emulate in the future. The 76-year old Mohseni, originally from Kandahar, led the Shia party Harakat-i-Islami during the 1980s against the Soviets, although he did not take a position in the mujahedeen government that formed in 1992 after the fall of Najibullah. He participated at the Bonn conference in 2001 and was a strong advocate for Shia interests to be reflected in the Afghan constitution. Mohseni receives extensive funding directly from Iran, although the exact amounts are disputed. This funding has been instrumental in the two projects that he has been busy with over the past two years—a new mega-madrasah in Kabul and a television station of his own entitled Tamadon (civilization).58 Mohseni’s madrasah, reportedly built at a cost of at least $5 million and half-funded by Iran, is located in west Kabul and the campus would not look out of place in a considerably more technologically developed and modernized city such as Islamabad or Tehran: It’s a sweeping co-ed campus, with lecture halls, science labs, and internet cafés. When the madrassa opens fully this year, the curriculum will consist of half Islamic study, half science, math and computer classes. This is, Mohseini [sic] says with a certain gruffness, “a radical break” from traditional syllabi.59

Tamadon, launched in 2007, was marketed as an Islamic television channel that could function in opposition to some of the more liberal stations operating out of Kabul (such as Tolo or Aina). We are backward in all aspects. Economically, we are in the 16th or 17th century, but our televisions air ten times sexier films (than Western countries),” said Mohseini [sic]. “This is a scandal and shame for us. We have a thousand calamities and should not be diverted,” Mohseini told Reuters. 60

Tamadon is staffed by competent graduates of a training program partially conducted in Iran (either independently or on secondment to Iranian media outlets). With good equipment and training, Mohseni and his staff are well on their way to achieving a level of influence across Afghanistan that would not otherwise have been possible.

Prominent Islamic Groups and Influences in Southern Afghanistan Just as the distinctions between the religious and the political61 are blurred in Pashtun and Afghan culture, so do the spheres and figures of authority frequently shift from the religious to the political (and back again). These dynamics are influenced by the respective experiences and historical roles that these figures played during the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad and the ensuing civil war. Yet it is important to recognize that certain sectors of the population and influence groups prominent in other parts of the country were entirely absent in the major southern Afghan politico-religious debates of the past 30 years. For example, the Afghan Islamists of the 1970s

58

Nushin Arbabzadah, “Afghanistan’s Turbulent Cleric,” Guardian, April 18, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/18/ afghanistan-shia-law-women. Mohseni also spreads his messages through a program on the Afghan television channel Ariana, which is even accessible to (and popular with) Afghans living in the United States and the West.

59

Jack Fairweather, “Modernizing Madrassas,” Washington Post, web log, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/ islamsadvance/2008/02/modernizing_madrassas.html.

60

“Afghan Cleric Launching New TV Station,” Reuters, February 8, 2007, http://blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/afghan-cleric-launching-new-tv-station.

61

For more on this distinction, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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and their ideological discussions at Kabul University62 (and later in Peshawar during the 1980s)— Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Ahmad Shah Massoud— were not very important or influential for the Talibs of the south.63 Ultimately, many of these key players and parties of the anti-Soviet jihad had little influence in critical events of the region. It was the polarization of the parties along ethnic, tribal, and geographic lines that would eventually help shape the politics and narratives of the rest of the country.64

Deobandism Deobandism is one of the principal Islamic philosophical influences in southern Afghanistan and a prominent force in Afghan political Islam. In theory, the Deobandi school of Islam shares many of the same beliefs as Sufism65; however, the two schools are not in concert on the means of achieving their similar objectives to remove corruption and materialism from Islam. Whereas Sufism was a reaction to conditions under the Umayyad Caliphate—the second of the four Islamic caliphates after the death of Mohammad—Deobandism arose as a reaction to the British colonialism in India. The two key founders of Deobandism were Hazrat Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautavi and Hazrat Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi, who founded the Dar ulUlum madrasah in Deoband, India, in the mid-nineteenth century that has shaped resistance tropes in the subcontinent ever since. There are thousands of Deoband madaris in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A paradox between Deobandism and Sufism is that many Deobandis are also members of Sufi brotherhoods. The teachings of Deobandism focus on strict adherence to Islamic ethical codes and the independence of Muslim lands. Attacks on Muslim lands are considered attacks on Islam and worthy of jihad.66 According to Deobandism, a Muslim’s first obligation is to his faith and then to his country. Yet Deobandism does not recognize national boundaries per se but rather holds the boundaries of the greater Islamic community (or ummah) paramount. Muslims have an obligation and duty to wage jihad in defense of Muslims anywhere they are threatened. Deobandism falls under the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam and shares much in common with the teachings of many great Islamic reformers, such as Mawdudi in Pakistan, Sayyed Qutb in Egypt, and Ibn Taymiyyah, who all advocated Islamic statehood following the principles of sharia, though they differed on the means acceptable to bring this about.67 Deobandism does not focus on mysticism and asceticism in the way that Sufism does but does encourage pious practice and is a major faith throughout South Asia. Rather than representing discrete and opposing religious worldviews, however, it is perhaps more accurate to say that these schools represent different modalities for gaining and engaging religious knowledge: one more scriptural, the other more emotive.

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62

Much of this movement owed its organization and ideology to the influence of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin) and had as its chief ideologues Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, Rabbani, Sayyid Musa Tawana, and others who studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo and later taught on the faculty of theology at Kabul University.

63

Other anti-Soviet jihadi Peshawar party political leaders such as Yunus Khalis and Mohammad Nabi Mohammdi had considerable influence over the Taliban in the south, particularly in Kandahar, during this time period. Many of the Taliban core from Kandahar fought under the command of Nabi Mohammdi’s local factions, including Mullah Omar. Khalis even helped radical elements in the eastern Afghanistan rise to power, including Jalaluddin Haqqani who single handedly destroyed the Zadran’s malik system after he ran Mohammad Omar Babrakzai out of Paktia, the most powerful Zadran malik during the 1980s. Mohammadi’s faction helped spread the rise of madaris in southern Afghanistan and attracted many Talibs from Kandahar such as Mullah Omar.

64

For more on the polarization, see Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” 206.

65

“The Deoband School drew heavily on the Sufi tradition of Afghanistan and was highly orthodox in its interpretation of Islam.” Peter Marsden, Taliban: War, Religion, and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zed Books, 1998), 79.

66

Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 50–51.

67

Ibid. 51.

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Deobandis are comfortable with Sufism as expressed through pious and devotional practices but take issue with the social structure of Sufism as manifested by the tariqat (brotherhoods). The Afghan constitution of 1931 guaranteed the right of the ulema to attend private religious schools, most of which were Deobandi, and until the Soviet invasion in 1979 the majority of the Afghan ulema were educated in these madaris.68

Tablighi Jamaat Faizani probably enjoyed his greatest support among military officers. He used the traditional Zikr circle as an avenue not just for spiritual enlightenment but also for political organizing. In tapping into the officer corps in this way, Faizani was following a longstanding tradition of Sufi association with the military, a tradition that went back at least to the turn of the century and that had periodically generated considerable paranoia within the government.69 The involvement of religious groups in political activities is probably one of the most misunderstood and yet crucial elements in recent Afghan history. In light of this, it is instructive to briefly examine the activities of groups like the Tablighi Jamaat and Sufis. Secretive by nature, these groups represent large numbers of Afghans, yet they remain relatively less understood (and almost completely undocumented), and their role in Afghan society underappreciated. Part of the explanation for this relates to the urban-rural divide in Afghan society. Most of the members of Sufi societies as well as the Tablighi Jamaat are rural and poor and not members of the urban elite.70 This is an important reason why these groups are misunderstood by both outsiders and fellow Afghans. Tablighi Jamaat was founded in the late 1920s by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi, himself a prominent member and advocate of the revivalist conservative Deoband tradition. Present members are committed to dawa or “the call.” Many of their activities are dedicated to persuading and proselytizing others to join them in either conversion, or simply just reforming and becoming a “proper Muslim.” To pursue this goal, the Tablighi Jamaat has established missionaries throughout the world.71 The organization holds meetings throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan and has a proclivity for meeting in large regional centers. The annual Lahore meeting seems to be the biggest in the two countries, with hundreds of thousands of attendees. At these events the discussion revolves around religious subjects, with members of the Tablighi Jamaat projecting an avowedly apolitical stance, refusing even to talk about the situation in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. At a meeting in Kabul, however, a colleague witnessed a full lineup of almost every single significant mid-level mujahedeen commander from Nangarhar Province sitting in a circle together and discussing different interpretations of a certain hadith.72 So although politics is apparently absent from

68

Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 50.

69

David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 230.

70

Much of the Afghan urban elite identify with the more ideologically purist Hizb-e Islami.

71

For an introduction to the Tablighi Jamaat and some of the suspicion this group has generated in the West, see Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.,” New York Times, July 14, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/14/national/14ISLA. html?pagewanted=1.

72

Observation of Conrad Jennings, summer 2007.

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the surface of such meetings, there is—in Afghanistan at least—some amount of networking happening at Tablighi Jamaat meetings and events. The Tablighi Jamaat’s explicit relationship with members of the insurgency is distant and seemingly detached, and despite certain ideological similarities by virtue of their shared idolization of the culture of the village, there are no strong ties with the Taliban. A number of Kandaharis have suggested to the author that they do not like the Tablighi because “many come from Pakistan” or because they are not Kandahari and they project themselves as knowing Islam better than Kandaharis do. In fact, it was suggested that Tablighi were not welcomed in local mosques and had been even asked to leave.73 Some Western scholars have argued that the Tablighi Jamaat networks are used by al Qaeda to radicalize vulnerable sectors of society,74 and U.S., British, Pakistani, and Afghan governments have monitored these networks closely.75

Sufis The role of Sufism (Islamic mysticism, tasawwuf) in Afghanistan is similarly misunderstood.76 The so-called mystical side of Islam, Sufism, focuses on the personal relationship between the believer and God, with the believer seeking to individualize that connection through prayer, training, and discipline (marifa). The modalities of the transmission of religious knowledge and the nature of the piri-muridi (master-student relationship) tradition in Sufism are little understood but seemingly have important implications for the Afghan insurgency. Mullah-led militant mobilizations connected closely to Pashtun cultural mores and fraternity have a long history on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. The piri-murdi system represents a basic reformist ideology and a mode of knowledge transmission where a teacher is inherent in the knowledge. Thus, mullahs who learn from the same teacher, or from teachers who had a common master, share the same ideology. This system has served as a kind of social institution and network that past jihadist movements in South Asia, such as the Hindustani fanatics Akhund Ghaffur, Mullah Najmuddin of Hadda, and the Faqir of Ipi, have exploited.77 The Sufi mullahs and their murids (committed) and talibs operate a complex and mutually supportive network of insurgent religious authority. Their information operations—carried out through mosque, madrasah, and langarkhana (a place where food is prepared and distributed to the poor) via pedagogy78—have, as suggested above, underpinned past insurgencies and jihads and presumably have helped to frame the discourse of the present Taliban jihad and insurgency. An understanding of this process is a vital starting point for any campaign to combat it. Sufism and the majority of Afghan ulema look at Islam from two different perspectives. The ulema focus primarily on the orderly interpretation of Islamic law and doctrine, whereas the Sufis focus on the love of God through asceticism and ritual practice.79 This division in the interpretation

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73

Personal interviews, Kandahar City, August 2008.

74

John Walker Lindh of “American Taliban” fame was allegedly indoctrinated by Tablighi Jamaat before joining the Afghan Taliban. The UK cricket team coach murdered by assassins is thought to have been killed by Tablighi Jamaat operatives.

75

Paul Lewis, “Inside the Islamic Group Accused by MI5 and FBI,” Guardian, August 19, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/ aug/19/religion.terrorism.

76

For overviews of Sufi history and philosophy, see Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism (New York: New York University Press, 1989); Annnemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); and J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders of Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

77

For more history on this topic, see Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 33–64.

78

Tariaq is the Sufi method of instruction.

79

For general information on this distinction, see Haroon, Frontier of Faith.

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of Islam through the eyes of the ulema and the Sufis became increasingly important again during the twentieth century, particularly during the formation of the Afghan state and during the antiSoviet jihad. John Esposito describes the rise of Sufism in this way: Reacting with disdain and dismay to the worldly seductions of imperial Islam, they were motivated by a desire to return to what they regarded as the purity and simplicity of the Prophet’s time and driven by a deep devotional love of God that culminated in a quest for a direct, personal experience of the presence of God in this life. 80

Sufism affects rural Muslims in southern Afghanistan in a variety of ways. For example, the prevalence of ziarats (shrines) built over the graves of alleged holy men and women can be found throughout the south, and many venerate them. In the absence of real medicine or doctors, villagers place their faith in a culture of miracles and signs instead—here Sufi mysticism plays a role. A nuanced understanding of the interplay between the religious and the political phenomena in southern Afghanistan should include an appreciation of the importance of these beliefs to the vast majority of people.81 This also has implications for understanding aspects of the Taliban. A recent article published on the BBC’s news with the headline “Can Sufi Islam Counter the Taliban?” described the experiences of visiting a Sufi shrine in Pakistan and talking to various experts and locals about the alleged relationship between the Taliban and Sufism.82 After the explosion at the tomb of Rahman Baba, the much-loved Pashtu Sufi poet, there were many more articles to this effect.83 Is Sufism a force, these articles asked, which can stand up against radicalism and so-called Talibanism? In the West, this has been a seductive idea for scholars and think-tanks, many of whom are familiar only with the tamer variants of Sufism. The increasing number of attacks targeting Sufi shrines throughout South Asia is of particular concern. Groups operating in the Khyber Agency of the FATA, as well as in the Swat Valley, have repeatedly attacked Sufi shrines and targeted Sufi pirs for assassination over the last two years. The shrine of Bahadur Baba, located in hills near Nowshera, east of Peshawar, was rocketed by militants in March—almost exactly one year after militants destroyed the 400-year-old shrine of Abu Saeed Baba, also near Peshawar.84 The attacks have been attributed to Lashkar-i-Islam, a militant group based in Khyber and led by their charismatic and vehemently anti-Sufi commander, Mangal Bagh. Demonstrations protesting the destruction of Sufi shrines have created widespread distaste for local militant factions such as Lashkar-i-Islam, prompting some Sufi elders such as Pir Samiullah to form tribal militias. Samiullah’s militia attacked Pakistani Taliban forces in the Swat Valley last year, killing approximately one hundred militants. Samiullah was killed by militants linked to the Taliban last December, who later exhumed and hanged his corpse in Mingora, the provincial capital. The bloody clashes between Samiullah’s forces and Mullah Fazlullah’s Taliban fighters in the Matta area of Swat have left hundreds dead since December.85 80

William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 101.

81

Many rural Pashtuns, particularly in the Katawaz, are very superstitious. The Islam of swaths of rural Afghanistan has more in common with mysticism than is commonly supposed. The role of djins, for example, is akin to that of evil spirits. This aspect of Sufism—the fear of rural peasants of the frightening mystical powers of the Sufis—is much more powerful than the adherence to Sufi beliefs, which is negligible.

82

Barbara Plett, “Can Sufi Islam Counter the Taleban?” BBC News, February 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7896943.stm.

83

Ghulam Dastageer, “Militants Blow Up Rehman Baba’s Shrine,” International News, March 26, 2009, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_ detail.asp?Id=20760.

84

Tom Hussain, “Pakistani Taliban Target Sufi Shrines,” National, March 10, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/ article?AID=/20090310/FOREIGN/157439541/1002.

85

The author would like to thank Matthew Dupee for contributing to this analysis.

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The RAND Corporation published a study in 2003 that advocated encouraging “the elements within the Islamic mix that are most compatible with global peace and the international community and that are friendly to democracy and modernity.”86 This study was widely rumored to be the public face of a U.S. intelligence community plan to “engage with Sufis” around the world as a strategy against Islamic radicalism. Such discussions fail to properly assess the realities of Sufism as experienced on the ground in southern Afghanistan and approach the matter as if religious practices in Afghanistan are similar to those in Pakistan. The two most important Sufi orders in Afghanistan—the Qadiri and Naqshbandi—are organized into brotherhoods. Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani heads the Qadiri order, which consists primarily of Pashtuns of southern and eastern Afghanistan.87 The Naqshbandi order of southern and northern Afghanistan is lead by the Mujaddidi family (Sebghatullah Mujaddidi).88 Additionally, the analysis of Sufism’s main ideas and practices in these discussions is derived from a reading of classical texts (mainly poetry), which, while important, fails to give a proper picture of the way Sufism interacts and has created religious networks. Recognizing the importance of Sufism in Afghanistan, the Taliban have attempted to manipulate certain Sufi customs and traditions. Some Taliban have even sought to identify themselves as part of the Sufi tradition.89 This is similar to the dynamic that Bernt Glatzer describes of the “southern Pashtun tribesman seeking political leadership beyond his village” through the manipulation of “networks based on locality, economy, sectarianism, Sufi orders, religious schools, political and religious parties and so on.”90 Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani has stated that “a majority of Taliban are Sufis, mostly followers of the Qadiri and Naqshbandi movements.”91 Some analysts have even alleged that Mullah Mohammad Omar, the nominal leader of the movement, is a member and local leader of the Naqshbandi order. Although many experts intensely dispute this contentious claim, Gailani states “Mullah Omar was raised as a Sufi before later embracing the more sever Wahhabi-inspired Islam.”92 Even a brief examination of the Taliban’s current propaganda output on its website, Al-Emarah, emphasizes that Taliban poetry and songs published in Pashtu rely strongly on the imagery, style, and forms used by the well-known classical Pashtun Sufi poets. Further, the biographies of jihadi “martyrs” posted on the website and in Taliban magazines call to mind the Sufi hagiographic traditions. Similarly, the authority of Mullah Omar’s leadership rests in part on his risky but brilliant propaganda move in 1996 of taking the khirqa (a garment that Afghans believe to be the Prophet Mohammed’s cloak) out of Kandahar’s royal mausoleum for the first time in 60 years and displaying it in a public rally

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86

Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003).

87

Gailani ancestor Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani founded the Qadiri order.

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The Naqshbandi order formed the base of the Jebhe-yi Nejat party at the time of the Soviet invasion. The Qadiri brotherhood formed the base of the Mahaz-i Melli party. The Naqasbandi order originated in Bukhara during the fourteenth century.

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Interviews by Conrad Jennings in Kandahar City in 2007–08, however, suggested that the Taliban banned some Sufi activities in Kandahar during their rule (1996–2001). These interviewees suggested that the Taliban opposed Sufi groups. They argued that there was a huge contradiction between Taliban and the Sufis and that they did not like each other. These interviewees also mentioned that the Taliban did not respect the Sufi shrines and mistrusted the pirs as well.

90

Bernt Glatzer, “Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?” in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn, 177–78.

91

Farangis Najibullah, “Can Sufis Bring Peace to Afghanistan?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 5, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/ Can_Sufis_Bring_Peace_to_Afghanistan/1503303.html. This article goes on to state that “One prominent Taliban figure, Abdul Hakim Mujahed … says that the Taliban ‘consist of people from various backgrounds,’ and that while some ‘oppose’ Sufis, others have ‘great respect’ for them and are even followers.”

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Najibullah, “Can Sufis Bring Peace to Afghanistan?”

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as a way to identify himself with the Prophet.93 Mysticism similar to that practiced by Sufis has long surrounded Mullah Omar. Omar reportedly started the Taliban after a dream in which Allah came to him in the shape of a man, asking him to lead the faithful. The khirqa, for example, is believed by many Pashtuns to contain supernatural and mystical powers. This action in part represented Omar’s absolute faith in his perceived divine right to rule and gave him legitimacy in his role as leader of the Afghan people ordained by Allah. After Omar showed the cloak of the Prophet Mohammad to those present and received general acceptance by public, he invited the people to accept him as their leader by raising hands.94 Whereas Omar had been a relative nonentity before this piece of religious theater, the audacious stunt catapulted him to a level of mystical power. Soon afterward, Omar was named Amir ul-Mumineen, “commander of the faithful”—not just of the Afghans but of all Muslims. He was given this title by almost 1,500 mullahs and religious scholars who were present in Kandahar. As in Iraq, Sufi groups in Kandahar have allied themselves with the insurgency since 2003. A significant proportion of the rank-and-file members of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan (and increasingly in Pakistan) believe in the local traditions and customs that are identified as Sufi.95 Analyses of who the Taliban are and what they stand for have yet to convincingly offer an account of the movement’s popular appeal, and fail to account for apparent Sufi aspects of the movement. It seems clear that the tradition of Sufism, rather than the practice (as associated with dervishes, for example), has been important in shaping the structure of rural resistance to secular authority. The full extent of Sufi contributions, however, to the networks that make up the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan has not been properly explored, and there is not place here for a full discussion. It should be noted, though, that this is an important cultural feature that should not be underestimated.

Conclusion The lack of strategic innovation on the side of the international coalition is striking, and the difficulties in Afghanistan are in large part due to an intellectual failure to understand the country’s social and political dynamics.96 The international community and, in particular, the U.S. and NATO forces have failed to thoroughly or systematically understand the religious foundations of the Taliban insurgency and jihad. Indeed, a rigorous and methodical examination of the Islamic realities of southern Afghanistan is potentially the most important arrow missing in the foreign forces’ quiver. Although this lack of understanding has direct implications for U.S. and NATO kinetic military operations, it is even more important to the information operations. A counterinsurgency is first and foremost an information war. One critical reason why the U.S. and NATO forces are not winning in Afghanistan is because they misunderstand certain components of the information

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The cloak had been folded and padlocked in a series of chests in a crypt in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar; “myth had it that the padlocks to the crypt could be opened only when touched by a true Amir ul-Mumineen, a king of the Muslims.” Joseph A. Raelin, “The Myth of Charismatic Leaders,” BNET, March 2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0MNT/is_3_57/ai_98901483. For a discussion of this incident, see Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism, 20.

94

Author’s interview of an eyewitness to Mullah Omar’s donning of the khirqa, Kandahar City, September 2008.

95

Based on numerous interviews of Kandahris by Conrad Jennings, 2006–09.

96

Giles Dorronsoro, “Running Out of Time: Arguments for a New Strategy in Afghanistan,” Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS), University of Ottawa, CIPS Working Paper, no. 3, July 2009.

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battlespace—most importantly those that involve religious dynamics. How can the United States and NATO protect the people of Afghanistan—the central tenet of successful counterinsurgency— if they do not understand the fundamental religious and societal drivers of the Afghan people? Although this essay has merely scratched the surface of these extremely complex issues, it leaves no question that Islam and Islamic religious figures continue to play a critical role in the everyday life and politics of southern Afghanistan. Today, Sufism and Deobandism work together with traditional tribal mores in shaping the cognitive structures of southern Afghans. These beliefs, for the most part, influence the populations’ social, political, and economic interactions. Both government and Taliban insurgent leadership have attempted to both shape and act in accordance with these normative structures, as well as to develop narratives to achieve the support and acquiescence of the southern, mostly rural Pashtun population. Ultimately, however, the ongoing conditions of the conflict environment that grips Afghanistan will most certainly influence and mix with these beliefs and narratives to alter the fabric of Afghan society and thus will be the final determinant as to the future path of Afghanistan.

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APPENDIX: TEXT OF ULEMA SHURA DECLARATION, KABUL, MARCH 19, 2009 97 The National Council of Ulema in its regular session held from March 15–19, 2009, participated in by religious scholars from across Afghanistan passed the following Resolution after a thorough discussion of the current situation: • The Council denounces any action that further aggravates the pains and the sufferings of the people and funnels disunity among the people of Afghanistan. Thus, the Council calls upon all those involved to prefer the national interests and Islamic values over their personal interests. • To ensure a full security as a key element in the country’s progress, the Council unanimously decided that the traditional Loy Jirga (Grand Assembly) be convened, where people from all circles including religious scholars, intellectuals, tribal leaders, Jihadi and political figures and representatives from both Houses of the Parliament, the Taliban and Hiz e Islami (Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party) and from the OIC and the United Nations are represented. • The Council finds as “reasonable” to obtain the agreement and endorsement of the neighboring countries and other relevant authorities on convening the Loy Jirga. We appreciate the interest already expressed by the new U.S. administration, Canada and France. For the anti-government forces to participate with confidence in the Loy Jirga, we suggest that their names be removed from the blacklist and that the United Nations guarantee their safety. • The Council unanimously decided that the lead role in negotiating with the Taliban be given to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud. Saudi Arabia is where the Holy Kabbah is located and is where the great Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (PBUH) is laid; it is where Quran was revealed by Allah and where angels have moved in and out. We are proud of the holy land and therefore, call upon the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to kindly accept our request of helping relieve our pains. • The Council calls upon the Taliban to allow the closed madrassas and schools to reopen for the Muslim children of Afghanistan. Children are involved neither in war nor in politics. Let them learn to move out of obscurity into the light. Closing down schools is a grave hostility against the Muslim people of Afghanistan. It is against the Holy Quran order that has allowed education. We are hoping for a positive response as this is the voice of the Council of Ulema, Ministry of Education and the entire nation. • The Council calls upon all the Ulema (religious scholars) to remain vigilant as they have always been against malign intentions and actions by those who seek to take advantage of an opportunity. As several times reminded in the past, the Council once again urges the media to avoid preaching and airing prohibited and hypocrite anti-Islam programs and immoral scenes and movies. This is the duty of the government to urgently avoid if such programs are aired. With respect, Afghanistan National Council of Ulema

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Obtained by the author from Conrad Jennings, who received this document from Kandahari religious elders in March 2009, Kandahar City.

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