Countering Violent Extremism: Making Gender Matter (Rethinking Political Violence) 3030219615, 9783030219611

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RETHINKING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Countering Violent Extremism Making Gender Matter

Elizabeth Pearson · Emily Winterbotham Katherine E. Brown

Rethinking Political Violence Series Editor Roger Mac Ginty School of Government and International Affairs Durham University Durham, UK

This series provides a new space in which to interrogate and challenge much of the conventional wisdom of political violence. International and multidisciplinary in scope, this series explores the causes, types and effects of contemporary violence connecting key debates on terrorism, insurgency, civil war and peace-making. The timely Rethinking Political Violence offers a sustained and refreshing analysis reappraising some of the fundamental questions facing societies in conflict today and understanding attempts to ameliorate the effects of political violence. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14499

Elizabeth Pearson • Emily Winterbotham Katherine E. Brown

Countering Violent Extremism Making Gender Matter

Elizabeth Pearson Hillary Rodham Clinton School of Law and Criminology Swansea University Swansea, UK

Emily Winterbotham The Royal United Services Institute London, UK

Katherine E. Brown University of Birmingham Birmingham, UK

Rethinking Political Violence ISBN 978-3-030-21961-1    ISBN 978-3-030-21962-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Malte Mueller / Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

All too often these days, the inclusion of ‘gender’ with regard to counter-­ terrorism is seen as a ‘box-ticking’ exercise, one that is formulaic and representative of a generic approach to counter-terrorism or preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) meetings or documents. However, it is important to remember that just a few short years ago, this ‘box’ did not even exist and there was little debate within the United Nations (UN)—among states or counter-terrorism and P/CVE experts—on the issue. Prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2242, there was little in the framework adopted by the Council—which provides the legal and policy framework for the work of UN entities and their relationship with governments and civil society—calling on states to integrate the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and counter-terrorism agendas. UNSCR 2242 helped ensure that, on paper, the issue of gender was considered as a cross-cutting issue throughout counter-terrorism and P/CVE efforts. Since 2001, the Security Council has taken an increasingly active role in shaping the domestic and international legal and policy framework on counter-terrorism. It has adopted binding resolutions, developed a robust monitoring mechanism and reflected the geopolitical and operational terrorism and counter-terrorism landscape. As such, the integration of gender into this framework was a key development. It built on the efforts of several states, civil society organisations and experts to ensure the integration of gender into the General Assembly’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism. v

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Why does any of this matter? I have spent well over 15 years working with governments, the UN and civil society actors in many regions to develop policy and programmes focused on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. These have highlighted the important range of roles played by women and girls—perpetrator, ideologue, victim, preventer—and the frequency with which these are overlooked. Analyses about the threat or risk, partners or opponents, successes and failures, will be incomplete if they do not account for the experiences of women and girls, or of gendered dynamics. Lessons are not learned from innovations made by civil society organisations in complex circumstances if women cannot come to the table, and their exclusion from the design and development of measures will lead to uncertain outcomes. So, while gender has often been considered a secondary or peripheral issue in relation to counter-­terrorism or P/CVE, it should be far more central. However, while progress has been made in policy documents (which can be essential to creating the legal and political space to conduct activities), they can be limited in their effectiveness when they don’t reflect a robust evidence base or realities on the ground. This book therefore comes at an important time, when efforts to integrate gender risk stagnation as governments grapple with a global pandemic, overstretched resources and a refocusing of efforts on immediate crises rather than long-­ term strategies. This book makes an important contribution to current debates about gender and CVE by presenting original research on gender and the power dynamics in diverse forms of violent extremism. As the authors conducted research in 2015–2016, Daesh was itself conducting a powerful global recruitment campaign; right-wing populist groups learned lessons and gained momentum. As the current threat landscape continues to evolve, it is therefore critical to better understand the dynamics and perceptions which shape it. Above all, this book’s central thesis is not to argue that gender matters—we know that it does—but to argue why and to evidence how through the concept of gendered radicalisation. This innovative research reflects the views of people most affected by violent extremism and CVE in grassroots communities. This was achieved through focus group and interview research with some 250 participants in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The milieu method adopted by the research teams engaged with communities as knowledgeable in their own right and seeks to learn from their experiences and their beliefs, while acknowledging that communities are not immune

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to false assumptions or misperceptions, and do not always have an inherently fully formed view of radicalisation. But communities are often at the frontline of prevention efforts, and listening to their views is therefore vital. Both terrorism and counter-terrorism may look different as the effects of COVID-19 evolve and as fighters and communities grapple with the evolution of Daesh, returning fighters and rehabilitating communities. Terrorist groups have often proved adept at exploiting conflicts, crises and grievances to embellish their narratives and drum up support. Many of the underlying conditions which create an enabling environment for recruitment may be exacerbated by the global pandemic; the locus of activity may shift. This makes it more urgent that our understanding of the threat and the responses required is informed by closer attention to gendered dynamics and impacts. Ultimately, this book will prove valuable for those who want to better understand how terrorist groups can mobilise recruits, support and resources, whatever the ideology, and ensure we are better positioned to prevent them. Naureen C. Fink is writing in a personal capacity. She is Executive Director at The Soufan Center and was formerly a Senior Policy Adviser at the UK Mission to the United Nations in New York. Naureen has over a decade of experience on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE), including a specialised focus on gender, in think tanks and NGOs, the UN and government.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the work of many people in the creation of this book, based on an original report on the gender dynamics of violent extremism and countering violent extremism (CVE). Firstly, Brett Kubicek and Public Safety Canada, who patiently supported the research and who remain open-minded in attempts to understand the important issues currently at stake. The research also relied on the efforts of independent teams in Canada, France and the Netherlands, as well as the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) researchers in Canada, Germany and the UK. The independent teams included Dr Milena Uhlmann, Ayaan Abukar, Dr Ghayda Hassan, and Rim-Sarah Alouane. Jan Raudszus and Dr Aurélie Sicard also provided invaluable research input and support. The leaders of mosques, community centres—many of whom were promised anonymity and so remain nameless—counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes, the police in Canada and in the UK and women’s groups in all of the countries studied were also of assistance to us. Thanks are also due to Raffaello Pantucci and Dr Andrew Glazzard at RUSI for support in establishing and implementing the research and for their valuable insights into the analysis and writing. Other thanks go to members of the RUSI team who provided support and input into the research at various points, including Ellie Fields, Harriet Allan, Natia Seskuria, Farangiz Atamuradova, Claudia Wallner and Tom Hands. We also want to thank those who gave their time to review and discuss with us the ideas and drafts of this book—Naureen C.  Fink, Dr Nelly Lahoud, Sara Zeiger, Elizabeth Coulter, Dr Élisabeth Marteu, Géraldine Casutt, Dr Jessica White, Jessica Davis, Jan Raudszus, Ashley Mattheis and ix

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Rhydian Morgan. We are hugely grateful to them for showing us what we missed. We also thank the editing team at Palgrave and Professor Roger Mac Ginty for their patience and assistance. Nevertheless, all gaps, errors, inconsistencies or inaccuracies remain ours alone. We know there is always more work to be done. The most important people involved in this research, however, were the people who gave up their time to meet and talk with us, even when they did not believe that any more talking would help. The work is the result of a nine-month research project in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. In this time, we were privileged to hear stories from the lives of more than 250 people across many different communities. Sometimes we heard the same stories, from different people, in different languages. These narratives form the backbone of this book, and frequent citations illustrate the key points and themes. We can only hope we have done justice to the opinions and thoughts expressed by these participants, and they find themselves accurately represented here.

About the Book

This book presents original research on gender and the dynamics of diverse forms of violent extremism and efforts to counter them. Based on focus group and interview research with some 250 participants in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in 2015 and 2016, it offers insights from communities affected by radicalisation and violent extremism. It introduces the concept of gendered radicalisation, exploring how the multiple factors of paths to violent extremist groups—social, local, individual and global—can differ for both men and women, and why. This book also offers a critical analysis of gender and terrorism; a summary of current policy in the five countries of study and some of the core gendered assumptions prevalent in interventions to prevent violent extremism; a comparison of jihadist extremism and the far right; and a chapter of recommendations. This book is of use to academics, policymakers, students and the general reader interested in better understanding a phenomenon defining our times.

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Contents

Part I Theory   1 1 Introduction  3 2 Gender, Violent Extremism and Countering It 27 3 Understanding the Findings: Country Contexts 81 4 The Milieu Approach139 Part II Findings 167 5 Violent Extremism and Gender: Knowledge and Experience169 6 Countering Violent Extremism and Gender: Challenging Assumptions201 7 The Far Right and Gender233 8 Policy Recommendations: Gender-­Mainstreaming CVE281 9 Conclusions: The Future of Gender, Violent Extremism and CVE311 xiii

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Contents

Appendix329 Glossary333 Index335

Abbreviations

AfD Alternative für Deutschland AQ Al-Qaida BF Britain First BH Boko Haram BNP British National Party CSO Civil Society Organisation CT Counter-Terrorism CVE Countering Violent Extremism Daesh Daesh is a term derived from the acronym in Arabic for the Islamic State group, ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wa-ah-Sham, which means the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (post-conflict) DFID UK Department for International Development EC European Commission EDL English Defence League ERG Extremism Risk Guidelines EU European Union FCAS Fragile and Conflict-Affected States FCO UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office FN Front National FTF Foreign Terrorist Fighter GCTF Global Counterterrorism Forum GTI Global Terrorism Index IS Islamic State (Daesh) ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Daesh) ISWAP Islamic State West Africa Province xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

LTTE MENA NAP NGO OSAGI PKK POA PVE P/CVE RAN RN RUSI TOC UN UNCTED UNDP UNESCO UNOCT UNSC UNSCR UNSG USAID VE WOT WPS

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam The Middle East and North Africa National Action Plan Non-governmental Organisation Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women Kurdistan Workers’ Party Plan of Action Preventing Violent Extremism Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Radicalisation Awareness Network Rassemblement National, formerly Front National The Royal United Services Institute Theory of Change United Nations United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution United Nations Secretary-General United States Agency for International Development Violent Extremism War on Terror Women, Peace and Security

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1

Characteristics of the term radicalisation: Muslim focus group participants (frequency of mentions) Fig. 5.2 Perceptions of factors in women’s and girls’ radicalisation to Daesh: Muslim focus group participants (c-coefficient) Fig. 5.3 Perceptions of factors in men’s and boys’ radicalisation to Daesh: Muslim focus group participants (c-coefficient) Fig. 5.4 Definitions of radicalisation and extremism across all groups (frequency of mentions) Fig. 7.1 Perceptions of factors driving far right extremism, Muslim and non-­Muslim focus groups (frequency of mentions)

171 171 172 172 252

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PART I

Theory

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. (UNESCO Constitution (1945)) Violent extremism is an affront to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It undermines peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. No country or region is immune from its impacts. (United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Report of the Secretary-General (2015) (A/70/674))

How to end violent extremism? Ours is seemingly an age of extremism. An age in which an anti-Islam terrorist attack on a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, in which 51 people are to die can be streamed live on social media. In which, despite its apparent decline in Syria and Iraq, the violent jihadist group Daesh can coordinate a series of deadly attacks in churches in Sri Lanka. In which, in the United Kingdom (UK), concrete barriers line some of London’s most famous bridges in case an attacker chooses to drive into pedestrians to make a political point. The term violent extremism might be new, but the phenomenon is not. The question of how to end terrorism and political violence has occupied rulers for centuries. While Daesh is the terrorist organisation dominating western media headlines, modern terrorist actors have been active for © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_1

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more than a hundred years. From the Russian anarchists and revolutionary groups such as Narodnaya Volya to the Irish republican Fenian movement, the far left Red Army Faction or white supremacist Ku Klux Klan, actors have used extremist violence to further political objectives (Laqueur 2004; Silke 2014). Preventing and/or countering violent extremism entails tackling a range of issues and ideologies. It also means a holistic response, not one motivated primarily by headlines, or specific events, as they happen. Ending violent extremism of all kinds is about understanding gender. When Daesh began to recruit women, many in governments were surprised. Historically, women had frequently been left out of the counter-­ terrorism picture, assumed to be passive and peaceful, and only rarely engaged in supporting terrorist groups. But cursory glances at the historical record and contemporary examples show otherwise. Consequently, much of our understanding and policy response have in fact been not an understanding of terrorism, or of how to end it, but an understanding of men’s terrorism. This book asks: what are the gender dynamics of violent extremism, and what are the gender dynamics of countering violent extremism? It offers a new and yet overlooked approach: that of gendered radicalisation, gendered violent extremism and gendered countering violent extremism (CVE) methods to counter them. Gender might begin with women, but it does not end there. It is also about power and identity. Throughout this book we understand gender as contextually dependent beliefs, which determine expectations of men’s and women’s behaviour. This book therefore not only concerns women, it reappraises the gender dynamics of men’s engagement with violent extremism. This book is intended as both a guide to the reader on the current understanding of gender dynamics in violent extremism and countering it and a source of original research. Its authors have worked with policymakers, in the field, and in research on these issues in countries including Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan, as well as the countries discussed here. Most importantly though, this book uses the milieu method (see Chap. 4) to offer insights from communities affected by radicalisation and violent extremism in order to emphasise the importance of a key concept introduced in the text: gendered radicalisation. This book highlights and explores the multiple pathways to violent extremist groups—social, local, individual and global—and how they differ for both men and women, and why. It highlights some of the core gendered assumptions prevalent in interventions to prevent violent extremism. It also explores how much communities want and need those interventions and makes suggestions for how

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to improve policy. This book also offers insight into current definitions of violent extremism, a critical analysis of gender and terrorism, a summary of current policy in the five countries of study, a comparison of jihadist extremism and the far right and a chapter of recommendations. The research presented here matters because CVE matters. That much is clear from conversations with people in communities affected by violent extremism or government policies to counter it. Thinking about CVE and radicalisation means thinking about gender. It is important to make this thinking count, and that is one of this book’s aims.

Countering Violent Extremism and Gender Countering violent extremism is the policy focus of this book because, as the numbers of civil society initiatives to prevent radicalisation proliferate across the globe and CVE becomes the policy option of choice for many governments, it is ever more important to get CVE right. This means seeing and including gender perspectives in all CVE initiatives. In 2015, a new United Nations Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 2242, set out the need for a gendered approach to countering violent extremism interventions. Addressing the political, social and economic drivers of violent extremism was enshrined as one of the four pillars of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. However, it was not until the February 2015 White House CVE Summit, followed by the 2016 UN Secretary-General Plan of Action (POA) on Preventing Violent Extremism that preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) started receiving heightened attention from policymakers and security officials around the world. By this point in time, CVE was already well established in a variety of countries, as a means to use community grassroots initiatives to stop terrorist violence. International recommendations on how to implement CVE came long after local civil society organisations and some governments were already delivering interventions to communities. To confuse matters, the CVE approach has been challenged in recent years with the emergence of a new terminology known as ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ or PVE (as articulated in the 2016 UN Plan of Action cited above). Some development organisations, practitioners and scholars prefer the term ‘preventing violent extremism’, others prefer ‘countering violent extremism’ and yet others use them interchangeably. Within the UN system, for example, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED) and the United Nations Office for

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Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) use the terms CVE and PVE, respectively, despite both agencies sharing a relatively synonymous understanding of the steps necessary to diminish the threat of violent extremism. While initially there was little difference in the objectives and actions on the ground, over time practical differences have emerged. This has led to a situation where some development actors insist on only engaging in PVE, emphasising the broad preventive nature of their work and dismissing CVE as too strongly associated with security-led approaches. In this book, the majority of the cases and examples we use concern CVE; most of those we interviewed and those who participated in our focus groups related to the concept of ‘countering violent extremism’ or ‘counter-terrorism’, so we primarily refer to CVE. However, where there is overlap or non-­differentiation on the part of our sources, we refer to P/CVE; we also discuss PVE in the cases where participants explicitly reference this. We explore the supporting academic literature on CVE and PVE in more detail in Chap. 2. CVE has always been political. The concept of grassroots community engagement to prevent violence emerged during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, when the British first used the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ to describe attempts to win over civilians and curtail support for the insurgency (Dixon 2009; Smith 2001). After 2001 the United States (US) President George W. Bush enshrined the idea of CVE as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach in counter-insurgency tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan. This strategy was widely adopted, including by President Obama and by the British Prime Minister at the time of the 9/11 attacks, Tony Blair (Beng 2006; Kidwai and Kidwai 2010). By the mid-2000s, the rhetoric had shifted from the ‘Global War on Terror’ to talk of a ‘global struggle against violent extremism’, which broadened the concept of CVE beyond the military dimensions of a state’s power. It should be noted, however, that the Trump administration seemingly reversed much of this understanding at least domestically: the 2018 US national counter-­terrorism framework eschews the term CVE, preferring instead to speak about ‘terrorism prevention’ (US Government 2018b). The US, despite increased funding to law enforcement, also seems to have downgraded its commitment to CVE at the policy level (Patel et al. 2018). This is partly due to a domestic backlash against the term CVE, especially among Muslim communities, leading to a need to rebrand or reduce the visibility of this element. In the UK, the Prevent Strategy, introduced in 2006 as one pillar of the counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST is widely acknowledged as the

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first programme to tackle home-grown radicalisation using grassroots soft measures. This too is subject to domestic criticism, with some calling the Prevent brand ‘toxic’ (Halliday and Dodd 2015). Other countries have since followed the UK’s lead. Australia, Canada, EU member states and the EU are among the countries and institutions adopting community approaches to radicalisation, complementing wider counter-­ terrorism measures (Frazer 2015). From its origins as a western approach to primarily jihadist terrorism, countries worldwide, including Muslim majority countries, have developed their own national and regional CVE strategies. There are more than 30 plans in place globally, and numerous more under development; some stand-alone and others linked to a wider counter-terrorism strategy (Feve and Elshimi 2018). The UN Plan of Action has also had a normative influence on the understanding of a ‘whole of society’ approach to countering violent extremism, one that extends beyond national governments and security actors and recognises that local authorities, communities and civil society are critical partners in identifying and addressing underlying factors of violent extremism and crafting more effective and sustainable responses. Donors have increased their investments in CVE. Even though there is an absence of funds for domestic P/CVE efforts in the Trump administration budget, the most recent State Department and USAID budget apportions some $230 million (the highest US figure to date) to international P/CVE efforts (US Government 2018a; Rosand et al. 2018). Meanwhile, by the end of 2017, the EU was funding ongoing projects in CT and P/CVE totalling €274 million—a twofold increase over a two-­ year period. Glazzard and Reed (2018) note that by 2018, there was a changing priority of P/CVE over CT funding. Moreover, CVE became a strategic priority in more than a half-dozen different EU regional and thematic funding instruments.1 The EU is specifically focused on the 1  An estimated 26 per cent of the €478 million budget of the Instrument Contributing to Security and Peace for the period 2014–2020 was earmarked for counter-terrorism and P/ CVE-related actions; the €30.5 billion European Development Fund, which supports the implementation of the EU Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020 and the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015–2020, includes P/CVE as a strategic objective to be implemented through projects contributing to peace and security, and good governance, the rule of law, justice reform, economic integration and resilience; some €10 million was allocated by the EU through its European Neighbourhood Instrument in 2015 to support action on counter-radicalisation and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in its Southern Neighbourhood, including by supporting civil society; and the €1.8 billion EU Emergency

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Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Western Balkans, Turkey, Sahel and the Horn of Africa in its CVE and counter-terrorism programming and has supported over 40 countries in what are labelled high-risk areas. Other donors active in this space, often using a mix of counter-terrorism/ security and development assistance, include Australia (focused primarily on the Asia-Pacific region), Canada (primarily in Africa), Denmark (primarily in MENA), Japan (primarily through its support to UNDP, UNESCO and other UN-led P/CVE actors), the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland (focused on fragile and conflict-­ affected states), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UK, funding a variety of global, regional, national and/or local initiatives, including ones focused on civil society or other local actors (Rosand et  al. 2018). In a database based largely on public information compiled by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), there are currently over 1200 initiatives, in some 100 countries (Rosand et al. 2018). The United Nations’ normative and programmatic role has also expanded in recent years. UNSCR 2242 requires that all interventions incorporate a gendered dimension. Specifically, it advocates the inclusion of the goals of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda into counter-terrorism and CVE approaches, based on: consultation with women; gender-sensitive data collection; and an emphasis on the goals of women’s participation, empowerment and leadership, as consistent with UNSCR 1325 (United Nations 2015, paras. 11–3). UNSCR 2242 offers a gendered path for CVE in a global context. The central underlying idea of P/CVE projects, in contrast to counter-­ terrorism, is that they constitute a preventative and non-coercive ‘soft’ approach, designed to work in partnership with communities to prevent or mitigate violent extremism (Khalil and Zeuthen 2016). Many governments recognise that to counter terrorism and violent extremism effectively requires balancing kinetic and non-kinetic tools involving governments, civil society and the private sector and, perhaps most fundamentally, protecting the basic rights and freedoms of citizens (Albright and Jomaa 2017). In western countries CVE programmes are aimed primarily at two perceived security threats: jihadist, or what is sometimes termed Islamist, extremism and, more recently in most countries, the far right. Countries differ in approach, some aim at preventing violent jihadist extremism, others, such as the UK, address non-violent extremism too.

Trust Fund for Africa includes support for P/CVE activities (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2016).

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Clearly the range and remit of CVE interventions has become vast, making it an ever more important area of study. This is especially vital, given the important critiques of CVE programming, including the ways in which it approaches gender. Increasingly scholars suggest CVE has instrumentalised the Women, Peace and Security agenda, which is intended to assert women’s rights, their participation, empowerment, leadership and their protection towards state-centric goals. Additionally, it has essentialised the women (and men) it encounters and framed women in need of protection from risky men (Ní Aoláin and Huckerby 2018). Violent extremism and radicalisation have proved problematic frameworks for interpreting conflict-related violence and gender and frequently have ignored the interaction between the two. We explore these challenges to CVE in Chap. 2. A second damaging critique is conceptual: if violent extremism is not easily defined, how can CVE programmes hope to tackle it? Third, it is not clear that countering violent extremism initiatives always help, or even ‘do no harm’, a key prerequisite. The field lacks evidence, and evaluation, and it is anyway difficult to prove the efficacy of an intervention aimed at preventing violence, essentially preventing a negative. This book uses a gender framework to contribute to these debates and this discussion. It includes the opinions and perceptions of men and women of a variety of ages in communities partnered or targeted by interventions—depending on your viewpoint—to better understand what violent extremism is, and how to counter it, using a gendered approach. That does not mean this book is just for women, or just discusses women. It is for anyone interested in the challenge of violent extremism. Chapter 2 makes clear that there is much excellent gendered CVE work, which in general terms has often focused on the inclusion of women. It has however in some contexts and in some regards been on ‘auto-pilot’. While a gendered approach is perhaps now assumed in CVE, it cannot be taken for granted and it is often still absent from programming. Gendered CVE that does exist is often ill-evidenced and intuitive. The challenge now is to understand when and how CVE including both gender and women works well, and to improve, evolve and amend those approaches that are less effective, or indeed may cause harm. Radicalisation to a variety of extreme groups is a problem for societies worldwide. If CVE is to continue, and it seems that it is, then it is essential that the gendered dynamics of violent extremism are considered. This should include women, but must not be limited to discussion of women; and it must be less of a ‘tick-­ box’ exercise. It also needs to be based on evidence, which is contextually

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specific, and responsive to local dynamics. This will mean recognition of differences between countries, and approaches, particularly in the Global North and Global South. For instance, our recommendations on countering jihadist extremism are focused on research with Muslim communities living as minorities in Europe and Canada. One would not imagine the findings could be replicated in a Muslim country in the Global South. Even as many of the complaints about CVE were echoed across each of the five countries of this research, it is important to remember, there is no one-size-fits-all approach.

Violent Extremism and Gender As noted, one of the key gendered assumptions of programmes to counter violent extremism is that women are less likely to be involved in violent extremism, either in committing physical violence or in supporting the violence of men. This assumption has proven to be problematic. We know that there is no reason to assume women naturally oppose violent extremism. They have long participated in terrorist-designated organisations, fighting in some, such as the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—some against Daesh—or as ‘Black Widow’ suicide attackers and hostage takers in Chechnya (Alison 2003; Bloom 2011; Cunningham 2003; Jacques and Taylor 2009; Brown 2017; Tuysuz and Watson 2014). Women were an important resource to al-Qaida, even if they were not actively involved in violent jihad (Lahoud 2014; Von Knop 2007). Despite this, research on terrorism still tends to neglect the participation of women in violent groups; this has led to a situation where strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism also neglect women and gender, or engage with women only as non-violent actors (Sjoberg 2013; Tickner 1992; OSCE 2011; Brown 2013, 2020; Winterbotham 2020). Certainly, it is true that men have more often been the perpetrators of physical violence in terrorist and violent extremist organisations (Sjoberg 2013; Sageman 2008; Simcox et al. 2011). However, it is not enough to leave the reasons for this unscrutinised, as this book seeks to explain. Whether a group engages men or women, and in what roles, depends on more than biology alone. It depends on group ideology, culture, local social cultures, individuals and family dynamics. It depends on the expression of local patriarchy. It depends on what is practically possible. Women who could not take leadership roles in groups with highly conservative

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agendas have frequently involved themselves in non-violent, support roles, as spies, sympathisers and, sometimes, ‘dominant forces’, which is to say they provide leadership, ideology, strategy or motivation (Mahan and Griset 2013). Some governments have not prioritised such non-violent action in counter-terrorism, and, where women have not been arrested, their roles are not represented in official data. It is also difficult to access women to learn about what they do, given their minority status in the formal structures and organisational roles of many terrorist groups (Gonzalez-Perez 2008; Cunningham 2003). The emergence of Daesh has drawn attention to women but has not necessarily resulted in a more sophisticated interrogation of the complex function of gender in determining support or action for a group. Therefore, while there is recognition of the need to find out how many women (and men) become involved in a particular activity or have membership of a group (i.e. seeing sex as a variable), there is often less recognition of the need to consider how being men or women (their gender) influences their actions, roles and value to violent extremist groups. Often the debate is stuck on questions of women’s agency, with activists and scholars promoting a move from not seeing women, to assuming they always have agency in movements. Daesh is an interesting case, because thousands of women took part in a migration, or so-called hijrah, to Syria and Iraq. While the majority have travelled from North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East, with 700 from Tunisia alone by 2015, western policymakers have focused on those hundreds who have joined Daesh from Europe, the US, Australia and Canada (Cook and Vale 2018, 2019; Barrett 2015). Once in its so-called Caliphate of global fighters, families and women were expected to contribute to the function of a prototype ‘Islamic State’ (Perešin 2015; Winter 2015; Lehane et al. 2018; Brown 2018). For some in the West, this migration of mainly teenage girls (but also older women) to Daesh was hard to comprehend, and a dominant media narrative therefore suggested these ‘naïve’ ‘jihadi brides’ had been ‘groomed’ by men (Cook and Vale 2018; Rubin and Breeden 2016; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017). In 2019, a lawyer for Safaa Boular, convicted the previous year for her part in an ‘all-women’ Daesh-inspired cell plotting terror attacks in London, successfully argued that she had been groomed by an older male Daesh fighter. Her sentence was reduced (Williams 2019). While lawyers can plead insanity in order to make the best possible argument for the benefit of their clients, it is important that in this case it was accepted by Lord Justice Holroyde that insufficient allowance was given in the original

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ruling for the damaging upbringing and grooming she had undergone— thereby arguably accepting the idea that radicalisation is something that ‘happens to’ women, making in this case, Safaa Boular a passive party in the process. The argument here is not that women can never be ‘groomed’. Grooming is about power, and men in terrorist organisations are often placed in gendered hierarchies that give them power over women. The argument is that we must be better at understanding the ways in which gender and power are entwined. Irrespective of the numbers of women drawn to Daesh in recent years, these women remain largely neglected both programmatically and legislatively, because of a failure to engage with gender in a meaningful way. In particular, infantilised and sexualised views of women in terrorist groups often ignore the complex reasons behind the recruitment of women and girls. This can translate into more lenient and unjust sentencing, and inadequate rehabilitation, disengagement and deradicalisation programmes. This also perpetuates the narrative that women’s primary role in conflict is that of the victim (Henshaw 2017). Moreover, these women have occupied a problematic area in the UN definition of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), which initially emphasised persons who travel to participate in terrorist training and violent acts. In 2017, UNSCR 2396 also noted that women may also have perpetrated terrorist acts and required special consideration in terms of rehabilitation. Still, women have not always been considered extensively in efforts to manage returning FTFs (Cook and Vale 2018; Coolsaet and Renard 2018; Pearson 2019). Underlying assumptions that women are peaceful and lack agency have permeated legal and policy responses including in rehabilitation, reintegration and resocialisation processes. One consequence, for example, has been that while men appear to be automatically investigated upon returning from a conflict zone, the evidential threshold for women returning can be much higher. Up until 2017, in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany there was a clear tendency to give violent extremist women offenders shorter sentences than men (Heinke and Raudszus 2018; Coolsaet and Renard 2018; Pearson 2019). We are not however suggesting that violence and non-violence in extremist groups should be equated in either sentencing or rehabilitation. The case of Shamima Begum, a British teenager who travelled to join Daesh aged 15, is instructive. When a pregnant Begum requested readmission to the UK without any apparent regret for her actions, the British Home Secretary Sajid Javid revoked her citizenship (Swann and Yusuf 2019). Here her radicalisation was

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exceptionalised, apparently for political reasons, and although she was legally a minor when travelling to join Daesh. It is clear that for disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration, a gendered approach is of the utmost importance. Yet, the field has only just begun to grapple with this subject; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives and deradicalisation and disengagement programmes have not tended to overtly focus on women, because they have been aimed at those involved in violence (Brown 2020). Nor has there been much research on gender or women in the full range of ideologies represented in extremism. In a seminal study, Jacques and Taylor (2009) note that women have been present in a variety of roles for various ideologies including European left-wing groups, the LTTE, domestic and international Latin American groups, the IRA, the American right-wing, the Spanish separatists ETA, Palestinian factions, Chechen rebel factions, Irish loyalist groups and jihadists such as al-Qaida. Some of these groups are locally focused, others have a transnational agenda. For the countries of interest in this book it is jihadist groups that are the key government priority, and far right groups a secondary issue, and this fact guides our research. Again, women have been less in evidence in both support and violence for the far right. As with jihadist organisations, far right and nationalist violence is predominantly male, as is the demographic supporting political parties on the broader right, such as populist, antiIslam(ist) and white nationalist parties (Copsey 2010; Goodwin 2013; Treadwell and Garland 2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2016; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Discussion of gender in far right white nationalism has for some time focused on the importance of masculinities in radicalisation. Michael Kimmel has long written of the ways in which men involved in white supremacist groups employ masculinities as a resource, compensating for feelings of emasculation and linked with broad themes such as globalisation, as well as personal grievances (Kimmel 2003, 2007, 2018). In the UK, Goodwin and Ford note the ability of the anti-Islam(ist) street movement the EDL in the UK to attract, “mainly young, working-class and poorly educated men” (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 79). Nationalist groups have also mobilised around conservative gender norms, in particular regarding women’s sexual purity as a matter of racial honour, and extolling the virtues of women as mothers, and reproducers of race (Yuval-Davis 1996; Sarnoff 2012). Gender and the far right is discussed in greater detail in Chap. 7.

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Book Structure This book offers much for those interested in women’s and men’s radicalisation, and in two movements: violent jihadism and the far right. It is based on research in five Muslim-minority countries in the Global North: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. It uses an innovative milieu-based qualitative methodology, with interviews and focus groups conducted in communities that have experienced cases of radicalisation, including those with direct experience of family members travelling to Syria/Iraq to join Daesh. It is supplemented by interviews with professionals and experts engaged in P/CVE within the five countries as well. Conceptually this methodology puts the experiences of people affected by violent extremism and policies to combat this at the heart of the research, and much of what you will read here are transcripts from interviews, in order to convey a sense of the field. However, this book goes beyond these stories, to discuss CVE as it is enacted now, in a post-Daesh world of a rising far right, radical right and right-wing populism. Understanding how to go forward means understanding the past, recent and not-so-recent. This book uses this snapshot in time to make broad recommendations for policy in the future and addressing two ideological movements: violent jihadism and the far right. It draws on themes that were shared across countries; yet it notes differences where they matter, with a comparative approach. More than 250 people contributed to the study, which took place between October 2015 and February 2016. As such, the findings here represent an important moment politically given this was the period immediately preceding several decisive political events globally. These included the British vote to leave the European Union (June 2016); the election of President Trump in the US on a nationalist agenda (November 2016); the success of Marine Le Pen for the Front National (FN, now renamed the Rassemblement National) in the first round of the French presidential elections, leading to a choice between Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron (May 2017); the rising popularity of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands; and the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in Germany, running on an anti-migrant and also anti-Islam platform. This was also a period of ongoing travel to join Daesh of FTFs from Europe and North America.

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Indeed, one reason for the choice of the two ideologies of the far right and violent jihadism for the discussions in this book is their relevance to policy at the current time. We were concerned to understand how current CVE interventions relating to these movements impact communities and how people felt gender was present within them. Inevitably terminology was an important consideration and a key issue within the research itself. Different governments define their priorities using different terminologies. Generally, however, in recent years in Europe and North America, there has been a shift to include narratives about engaging communities as part of broader counter-terrorism efforts. In response to the newest threat posed by (returning) foreign fighters, governments have simultaneously passed new penetrating legislation while imposing additional ‘responsibilities’ on communities in order to maximise their counter-terrorism efforts. Policy documents in the UK, the US, Australia and other liberal democratic societies put communities at the centre of efforts to prevent terrorism. For example, the UK’s latest CONTEST Strategy emphasises the role of communities and civil society organisations in building ‘resilience’ (Home Office 2018). In the US, campaigns such as ‘If you see something, say something’ (the UK’s latest version is, ‘See it. Say it. Sorted.’) and the Empowering Local Partners strategy have placed significant onus on communities’ abilities and duties to thwart terrorism. As Spalek and Weeks (2017) highlight, a cynical way of viewing this shift in the UK context is that the government is realising that “despite fifteen years of adopting increasingly invasive and controversial counter-terrorism laws it has been unable to legislate or police its way out of the problem of Islamist extremism” (p. 992). Many participants challenged the language we used as researchers, feeling it perpetuated assumptions about their communities, which they resisted. In terms of terminology, many Muslims object to use of the term ‘violent Islamism’ in relation to violent extremism and the violent political pursuit of Islam. They do not believe terrorism has anything to do with Islam. Islamist is therefore a sensitive and often misused word. It broadly refers to a vision in which the political and social order runs in accordance with Islamic law. The terms Islamism and Islamist in and of themselves do not denote belief in violence. In this book we prefer the term jihadism as a shortened form of Salafi-jihadism, the violent struggle to impose a form of Islamic Shariah law seen at the time of the Prophet (Wiktorowicz 2006). This term is also problematic, given the word jihad is a Qur’anic concept, denoting simply struggle. This can be a spiritual and personal

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struggle towards better practice of the faith of Islam (the greater jihad) or at times a violent struggle (the lesser jihad). The term is also further differentiated as defensive or offensive (as in self-defence or in defence of others, or aggressive and pre-emptive) when applied to fighting (Lahoud 2014). Additionally, it is worth noting that not all individuals that carry out violent jihad are terrorists or violent extremists. Responding to a call to serve in the military, for example, can be construed as jihad in some contexts (Bonner 2006). Nevertheless, the common understanding of violent jihad is now linked to terrorism and violent extremism—at least in the countries of this study. This book also uses the term Daesh for the group also known as the (so-­called) Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Daesh is a term derived from the acronym for the group in Arabic, ad-Dawla alIslamiyya fi al-Iraq wa-sh-Sham. Considering discussion of radicalisation to the far right within the non-­ Muslim focus groups, it was clear that language was problematic. Chapter 7 addresses the terminology on the far right in greater detail, but suffice it to say here, the term has no clear definition and is used to mean different things by different people. It can describe what is in practice a wide range of beliefs, from proscribed neo-Nazi terrorist groups to political parties with a right-wing and populist but democratic agenda. In this book we work from Mudde’s analysis of the core characteristics of the term, and use ‘far right’ to describe anti-democratic and racist/white supremacist groups. In fact, most focus groups on the issue of the far right did not initially see a connection between extremism, radicalisation and the far right at all; they regarded extremism and radicalisation as issues of jihadism, first and foremost. At times discussion in these groups touched on difficult and contentious issues: immigration, refugees, the building of local mosques. Group members challenged one another when conversation bordered on racist, and at times discussion was emotive. The conversations demonstrated the ways in which whiteness was invisible or ‘transparent’ to participants, as it is broadly in white-dominated societies (Frankenberg 1993; James 2014); racism itself was frequently understood as a problem of ‘others’, in other locations (Mondon and Winter 2020; Memmi 1999). Some conversations demonstrated a lack of awareness of racism as a structural issue, locating it in particular, hateful, male individuals. Racism is, according to Cas Mudde (1995), “…the belief in natural and hereditary differences between races, with the central belief that one race is superior to the others” (p. 211). In the 1960s and through the

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emergence of the black power movement, activists Carmichael and Hamilton introduced a definition of institutional racism that can be understood not as psychology, but “attitudes and practices that led to racist outcomes through unquestioned bureaucratic procedures” and benefiting white people, as a group (Murji 2007, 844). Racism is constituted structurally through systems and institutions, which construct race discursively (Nayak 2006; Mondon and Winter 2020). Race is not simply a question of skin pigmentation (Rutherford 2020). Islamophobia is the term applied to a form of cultural racism—that nonetheless relies on particular assumptions about whiteness—and explicitly targets Islam. In 1997 a Runnymede Trust report offered the first definition of Islamophobia as “the dread or hatred of Islam…and, therefore, [causing one] to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (Abbas et al. 1997, 1). Understanding racism became important in discussion of the far right and informs the discussions in Chap. 7. We found that, as problematic as the language around radicalisation, communities and CVE is, it provided an entry point for unpacking core assumptions evident in both focus group discussion and underlying policy. Muslim community focus groups often suggested that the language used by researchers and in CVE work was off-putting and offensive, and diminished these communities’ concerns about racism and daily violence against them. Meanwhile other grassroots communities, non-Muslim, and mostly all-white, said they struggled to find a language to express their concerns and fears of violence, without being labelled as racist and demonised or dismissed as ignorant. We found that a lot of discussion about the aims of the research and the language both of the research and of wider society was necessary before the core issues could be explored. This book is set out in two parts, the first looking at the background, debates, literature and theory on gender, violent extremism and countering violent extremism and the second setting out the findings. Following this introduction to the book, Chap. 2 begins a more detailed exploration of the role of gender and the work it does in violent extremism and countering it. This chapter critically explores the existing literature and outlines the ways in which violent extremism has been framed as a male phenomenon, and women’s participation has been neglected. This has generated several flawed assumptions regarding women’s roles in CVE. This chapter suggests ways in which security studies might progress, not through the simple addition of women, but via a reframing of the way in which gender is understood to incorporate power dynamics, and men.

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Chapter 3 then introduces the reader to the security challenges of each of the countries that are the subject of in-depth research: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. It explains why these countries matter in a global context and considers the ways in which countries frame their key security challenges, with a focus on gender and extremism in each. In particular, this chapter addresses the ways in which gender is present—or absent—in countries’ policies and interventions. It also considers issues countries face with both jihadism and the far right, where appropriate, and sets out the current responses to the issue of Daesh returnees. This is followed by a chapter on our methodology, the milieu approach. This research understands the milieu as the community most affected by the issues of radicalisation and violent extremism. The approach relies on the idea that knowledge of radicalisation is possessed not just by experts and states, but also by communities with experience of its effects. This approach also engages with the milieu as potentially ‘vulnerable’ not just to radicalisation, whether jihadist or far right, but to the effects of government interventions to counter radicalisation. The milieu method innovated in this research was a response to one of the biggest challenges of conducting research on radicalisation to violent extremism: how to learn about radicalisation in the absence of easy access to radical individuals. The Findings section begins with two chapters on jihadist radicalisation. Chapter 5 explores what participants think violent extremism is, and how gender matters in what causes it. It focuses on radicalisation to the violent jihad and the intersections between multiple layers of factors in recruitment. Communities highlight societal issues of discrimination, alienation and poverty, but also individual factors including belonging and identity. What is new here is that each of these is gendered and different for men and for women, because the communities they live in have different expectations of each. There are complex engagements with gender and agency, empowerment and Islam. Generation gaps are evident in the responses of women to issues such as the burqa or niqab. There are no easy answers here, but one thing is clear: gender is an essential part of understanding violent extremism. Chapter 6 then goes on to focus on participants’ understanding of gender in state and civil society attempts to prevent and counter violent extremism. The chapter begins by examining community understanding of CVE generally, before exploring specific issues such as objectives, delivery and consequences of CVE.  This chapter focuses on the surprising number of shared stories from different cities across all five research

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countries, despite each employing a different approach. It revealed significant challenges to specific CVE focus on Muslim women, and the assumptions that underpin this, assumptions that emphasise: mothers, women’s empowerment; the blanket partnering of ‘Muslim communities’; and the omission of men in positive roles, such as fathers. Chapter 7 moves on to the secondary ideology and movement studied, with an analysis of the gender dynamics of the far right, exploring attitudes to this, the radical right, white supremacy and right-wing populism. It considers the difficulties participants found in defining the far right, or as viewing this as extremism. This chapter explores participants’ views on the factors driving the far right, as well as the ways in which far right messaging is likely to resonate. This chapter draws mostly on focus groups in the UK and Germany and progresses the argument that the gendered work to be done to counter violent extremism is in communities. Given the subject matter, and the dynamic nature of focus group discussion this chapter contains some transcript material that readers may find offensive. We reproduce this in order to explore the ways in which race, immigration and the far right are discussed in communities, in order to understand and ultimately contest far right radicalisation. Chapter 8 then focuses on the policy and programme recommendations that can be drawn both from the findings of our research and from the broader theoretical literature on violent extremism and countering violent extremism. Its core recommendation is that policymakers, donors, programme implementers and other stakeholders employ the framework of gendered radicalisation to improve their preventive efforts. Above all it emphasises that language matters. The way we frame our narratives impacts on the effectiveness of CVE and on the willingness and ability of people, including women, to engage in the field. Finally, Chap. 9 sets out the key arguments presented in this book, focusing on the core need to engage with gender as more than a synonym for women, but as a means of instituting power, if we are to fully understand violent extremism and how to counter it. It advocates approaches that prioritise and listen to the lived experiences of those people affected by both extremism and attempts to prevent it. It also suggests that while jihadist and far right extremisms both pose a threat, they are not the same and require different responses. Additionally, it underlines the key gendered assumptions that often underpin CVE interventions, but that cannot be evidenced. This chapter presents a summary of the findings and makes suggestions for the future of gender in policy to counter violent extremism.

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References Abbas, Tahir, Alex Hall, and Nusrat Shaheen. 1997. Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. The Runnymede Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia. Runnymede Trust. Accessed April 16, 2016. http://www.runnymedetrust. org/companies/17/74/Islamophobia-A-Challenge-for-Us-All.html. Albright, Madeleine, and Mehdi Jomaa. 2017. Liberal Democracy and the Path to Peace and Security, A Report of the Community of Democracies’ Democracy and Security Dialogue. ISS: Brookings Institute. Alison, Miranda. 2003. Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Civil Wars 6 (4): 37–54. Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist party Success. European Journal of Political Research 45: 419–443. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x. Barrett, Richard. 2015. Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq. The Soufan Group. http://soufangroup. com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. Beng, Phar Kim. 2006. The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West Giles Kepel Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2004, 327 Pp. ISBN 0-674-01575-4 (Hardcover), US $23.95. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6 (1): 122–125. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci130. Bloom, Mia. 2011. Bombshells: Women and Terror. Gender Issues 28 (1–2): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12147-011-9098-z. Bonner, Michael. 2006. Jihad in Islamic History. Doctrines and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Brown, Katherine E. 2013. Gender and Counter-radicalisation: Women and Emerging Counter-Terror Measures. In Gender, National Security and Counter-Terrorism, ed. Jayne Huckerby and Margaret L.  Satterthwaite. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. ———. 2017. Gender and Terrorist Movements. 10.1057/978-1-137-51677-0_26. ———. 2018. Gendered Violence in the Making of the Proto-State Islamic State. In Revisiting Gendered States Revisited, ed. S.  Parashar, 174–190. Oxford University Press. ———. 2020. Gender and Anti-radicalisation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. 2018. From Daesh to Diaspora: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State/ICSR. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. http://icsr.info/2018/07/icsrreport-launch-daesh-diaspora-tracing-women-minors-islamic-state/. ———. 2019. From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’ II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the Fall of the Caliphate. CTC Sentinel 12 (6): 30–45.

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Coolsaet, Rik, and Thomas Renard. 2018. Returnees: Who Are They, Why Are They (Not) Coming Back and How Should We Deal with Them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Brussels: Egmont Institute. http://www.egmontinstitute.be/returneesassessing-policies-on-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-belgium-germanyand-the-netherlands/. Copsey, Nigel. 2010. The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality. Faith Matters: Report. http://tees.openrepository.com/tees/handle/10149/116066. Cunningham, Karla J. 2003. Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26 (3): 171–195. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100390211419. Dixon, Paul. 2009. ‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (3): 353–381. https://doi. org/10.1080/01402390902928172. European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. 2016. Overview of the EU’s Policy and Programming on Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (PVE/CVE), http://eplo.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/EPLO-Briefing-Paper-onCVE-Sept-16.pdf. Feve, Sebastian, and Mohammed Elshimi. 2018. Planning for Prevention A Framework to Develop and Evaluate National Action Plans to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism. Global Center on Cooperative Security. https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GC_2018June_NAP.pdf. Ford, Robert, and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2010. Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party. Political Studies 58 (1): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00829.x. ———. 2014. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Frankenberg, Ruth. 1993. White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness. New ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Frazer, Owen. 2015. The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism, 183. Zurich: Center for Security Studies. http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digitallibrary/publications/publication.html/195322. Glazzard, Andrew and Alastair Reed. 2018. Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter-Terrorism, RUSI & ICCT Joint Report. https://icct.nl/publication/global-evaluation-of-the-european-unionengagement-on-counter-terrorism/. Gonzalez-Perez, Margaret. 2008. Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terror Groups. 1st ed. London and New  York: Routledge.

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Goodwin, Matthew. 2013. The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad Challenge. Chatham House: Briefing Paper. http:// www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/ Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf. Halliday, Josh and Vikram Dodd. 2015. UK anti-radicalisation Prevent strategy a ‘toxic brand’, The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/ mar/09/anti-radicalisation-prevent-strategy-a-toxic-brand. Harteveld, Eelco, and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. 2016. Why Women Avoid the Radical Right: Internalized Norms and Party Reputations. British Journal of Political Science (Jan.): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000745. Heinke, Daniel, and Jan Raudszus. 2018. Germany’s Returning Foreign Fighters and What to Do About Them. In Returnees: Who Are They, Why Are They (Not) Coming Back and How Should We Deal with Them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, ed. Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard. Brussels: Egmont Institute. http:// www.egmontinstitute.be/returnees-assessing-policies-on-returning-foreignterrorist-fighters-in-belgium-germany-and-the-netherlands/. Henshaw, Alexis Leanna. 2017. WPS Working Paper Series|Comments Off on Making Violent Women Visible in the WPS Agenda-Alexis Leanna. 2017. ‘Making Violent Women Visible in the WPS Agenda—Alexis Leanna Henshaw (7/2017)’. LSE Women, Peace and Security Blog (blog), July 7. https://blogs. lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/07/07/making-violent-women-visible-in-the-wps-agendaalexis-leanna-henshaw-72017/. Home Office. 2018. Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London: The Home Office. Jacques, Karen, and Paul J. Taylor. 2009. Female Terrorism: A Review. Terrorism and Political Violence 21 (3): 499–515. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09546550902984042. James, Osamudia R. 2014. White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity Formation, SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2235771. Khalil, James, and Martine Zeuthen. 2016. Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation, Whitehall Report 2. London: RUSI. Kidwai, M. Saleem, and M. Saleem Kidwai. 2010. US Policy Towards the Muslim World: Focus on Post 9/11 Period. Lanham, MD: UPA. http://ebookcentral. proquest.com/lib/swansea-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1032129. Kimmel, Michael S. 2003. Globalization and Its Mal(e)Contents: The Gendered Moral and Political Economy of Terrorism. International Sociology 18 (3): 603–620. https://doi.org/10.1177/02685809030183008.

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Kimmel, Michael. 2007. Racism as Adolescent Male Rite of Passage: Ex-Nazis in Scandinavia. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 36 (2): 202–218. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0891241606298825. ———. 2018. Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into—and Out of—Violent Extremism. 1st ed. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Lahoud, Nelly. 2014. The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women From Jihad. Terrorism and Political Violence (Feb.): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.108 0/09546553.2013.772511. Laqueur, Walter. 2004. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New ed. New York: Bloomsbury Continuum. Lehane, Orla, David Mair, Saffron Lee, and Jodie Parker. 2018. Brides, Black Widows and Baby-Makers; or Not: An Analysis of the Portrayal of Women in English-Language Jihadi Magazine Image Content. Critical Studies on Terrorism 0 (0): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2018.1471054. Mahan, Susan G., and Pamala L. Griset. 2013. Terrorism in Perspective. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Memmi, Albert. 1999. Racism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mondon, Aurelien, and Aaron Winter. 2020. Reactionary Democracy. How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream. London, Verso. Mudde, Cas. 1995. Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86). European Journal of Political Research 27: 203–224. Murji, K. 2007. Sociological Engagements: Institutional Racism and Beyond. Sociology 41 (5): 843–855. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038507080440. Nayak, Anoop. 2006. Displaced Masculinities: Chavs, Youth and Class in the Post-­ industrial City. Sociology 40 (5): 813–831. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to—Part I. Just Security, May 1. https://www.justsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/. OSCE. 2011. Women and Terrorist Radicalisation. OSCE. http://polis.osce. org/library/f/4061/3772/OSCE-AUT-RPT-4061-EN-3772. Patel, Fazia, Andrew Lindsay, and Sophia DenUyl. 2018. Countering Violent Extremism in the Trump Era. Brennan Center for Justice, June 15. https:// www.brennancenter.org/analysis/countering-violent-extremism-trump-era. Pearson, Elizabeth. 2019. Shamima Begum: How Europe Toughened Its Stance on Women Returning from Islamic State, February. https://theconversation. com/shamima-begum-how-europe-toughened-its-stance-onwomen-returning-from-islamic-state-112048. Pearson, Elizabeth, and Emily Winterbotham. 2017. Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation. The RUSI Journal 0 (0): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.108 0/03071847.2017.1353251.

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Perešin, Anita. 2015. Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS. Perspectives on Terrorism 9 (3) http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/427. Rosand, Eric, Emily Winterbotham, Michael Jones, and Franziska Praxl-Tabuchi. 2018. A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda. The Prevention Project and RUSI.  London: RUSI. http://organizingagainstve. org/roadmap-progress-state-global-p-cve-agenda/. Rubin, Alissa J., and Aurelien Breeden. 2016. Women’s Emergence as Terrorists in France Points to Shift in ISIS Gender Roles. The New York Times, October. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/world/europe/womens-emergence-as-terrorists-in-france-points-to-shift-in-isis-gender-roles.html. Rutherford, Adam. 2020. How to Argue with a Racist: History, Science, Race and Reality. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. (Orion.). Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 1st ed. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sarnoff, Daniella. 2012. Domesticating Fascism: Family and Gender in French Fascist Leagues. In Women and the Right: Comparisons and Interplay Across Borders, ed. Kathleen M.  Blee and Sandra McGee Deutsch, 163–176. Penn State University Press. http://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/491445. Silke, Andrew. 2014. Terrorism: All That Matters: Book. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Simcox, Robin, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, and Douglas Murray. 2011. Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections. The Centre for Social Cohesion and the Henry Jackson Society. Sjoberg, Laura. 2013. Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War. New York: Columbia University Press. Smith, Simon. 2001. General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda. Intelligence and National Security 16 (3): 60–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306210. Spalek, Basia, and Douglas Weeks. 2017. The Role of Communities in Counterterrorism: Analyzing Policy and Exploring Psychotherapeutic Approaches within Community Settings. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40 (12): 991–1003. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1253985. Swann, Steve, and Hanna Yusuf. 2019. Shamima Begum Was “Groomed”, Says Lawyer, May 31, sec. UK. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48444604. Tickner, J. Ann. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Treadwell, J., and J. Garland. 2011. Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League. British Journal of Criminology 51 (4): 621–634. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azr027. Tuysuz, Gul, and Ivan Watson. 2014. Meet America’s Newest Allies: Syria’s Kurdish Minority. CNN, October 29. https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/ world/us-newest-allies-syrian-kurds/index.html.

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CHAPTER 2

Gender, Violent Extremism and Countering It

This book is concerned with two interrelated areas: the gender dynamics of violent extremism (VE) and countering violent extremism (CVE). How we understand violent extremism determines how we choose to counter it. We know that women have always been involved in violence, including terrorism, albeit at lower rates than men. The lower rate of women’s involvement in terrorism is, we argue, linked to the gender norms of violent extremist groups and to those of the societies to which they belong. Moreover, failure to consider women’s roles as significant is due to gender blindness in policy, practice and academic understanding. This chapter therefore first explores the role of gender in terrorism and violent extremism and how gender dynamics shape both men and women’s involvement in violence. The second part of this chapter further explores the current field of CVE (engaging primarily jihadism), which since 2018 has been experiencing a growth in gender mainstreaming, at least in theory. This development however is relatively new, and this chapter outlines the historic gender blindness of prevention approaches, alongside the origins of current gendered CVE in the War on Terror. This fostered a form of CVE in which women’s inclusion was based on false, reductive or essentialist assumptions. Neoliberal and orientalist thinking have led to P/CVE programmes based on three main assumptions: first, that integrated communities, which often simply mean ‘gender equal’ communities, are more resilient to violent extremism; second, that women, if sufficiently ‘empowered’, become governments’ natural allies in countering violent © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_2

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extremism, given that they are inherently more peaceful and by association, moderate; and, finally, that women possess innate maternal abilities to deradicalise young men. We argue that the field, which is mired in conceptual and practical challenges, is further undermined by these assumptions, and by a failure to be truly gender-responsive in design, implementation or evaluation. A past lack of consideration of women in VE and P/CVE has hindered a comprehensive approach and meant the adverse gendered impacts of P/CVE are not identified or addressed (Brown 2020; Winterbotham 2020). The lack of a holistic ‘gendered’ approach that goes beyond thinking only about women means the complex root causes involved in violent extremism are not accurately identified.

Violent Extremism: Introduction The twenty first century so far has been scarred by terrorism. Considering the annual death rate due to violent extremism and terrorism, the Global Terrorism Index in 2015 noted a ninefold increase from 3329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015, 2). Although since 2015 we have seen a decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks, there were still 25,673 people killed in 2017 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, 2017, 2). The latest Global Terrorism Index (GTI) reported that terrorism directly affected 71 countries in 2018 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2019). Given the global reach, scale and scope of terrorism, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/ CVE) are, or should be, important commitments for every country. The United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy characterises terrorism as “one of the most serious threats to international peace and security”.1 Over time, a growing international consensus has emerged that the most effective strategy for fighting terrorism and violent extremism involves an appropriate balance between kinetic and non-kinetic tools, the inclusion of governments, civil society and the private sector (Albright and Jomaa 2017). The United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism suggests there is now a recognised “need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only ongoing, essential

 As contained in: A/RES/62/272 (2008); A/RES/64/297 (2010); A/RES/66/282 (2012); A/RES/68/276 (2014); A/RES/70/291 (2016), A/RES/72/284 (2018).

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security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism” (para 6). The United Nations is dedicated to P/CVE goals as key peace and security ‘upstream’ efforts, and the UN offers support to member states in implementation. This includes initiatives across a range of sectors, from probation services, national health services, social work, education, to policing, intelligence and military activities. Within this range of activities there has been a notable shift from seeking to prevent and counter violent action to seeking to prevent and counter the violent ideas that appear to underpin such action. This has led to a range of policies and public debates around the phenomenon of ‘radicalisation’, the pathway or process towards extremism (Mandel 2009). Radicalism per se is not a problem, as radical ideas can be a force for good, especially when offered peaceful and constructive outlets (UNDP 2017, 19). Radicalisation towards violent extremism and/or terrorism is the challenge facing policymakers and security officials—and is the concern of the participants in our city-based research. It has been pithily described as, whatever goes on “before the bomb goes off” (Neumann 2008, 4). In essence, radicalisation towards violent extremism can be seen as the process through which the idea of perpetrating violence in support of an extremist or terrorist agenda becomes acceptable, even legitimate and then actionable. (This does not, of course, address the question of whose violence is deemed extremist or terrorist, and some radical movements now regarded as progressive once used violence and were outlawed in their time.) The ambiguity and complexity around radicalisation are also the drivers for this research which, as we outline in this chapter discussing the milieu approach, allow us to identify and access the knowledge and understanding of the communities who are targeted by, affected by and responding to state counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism programmes. Their local, everyday and grounded knowledge is often disregarded in security and academic thinking where they can be dismissed as ‘not experts’. The term radicalisation is burdened with a methodological individualism that prioritises the risk of being drawn into terrorist activity for individuals. It is understood by some as cognitive, others as behavioural (Neumann 2013). Currently the literature identifies over 200 factors in this process, which is also considered non-linear (Vidino 2011). These are often divided into ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors that exist at the micro, macro and meso levels. For instance, Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) suggest factors or drivers that encompass: structural motivators such as “repression, corruption, unemployment, inequality, discrimination”; individual incentives,

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which would include adventure or belonging; and enabling factors, such as friendship groups or access to radical networks or leaders online (p. 9). Thus, there is no ‘profile’ that can be applied in any particular context to identify those ‘already radical’, or ‘at risk’ or ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation. Despite terrorism being seen as mostly men’s prerogative, sex is not a straightforward predictor of radicalisation to violent extremism. While the numbers indicate men are more likely to commit terrorist violence, women are attracted to violent ideologies in large numbers, and their non-­violence cannot be taken for granted (Sjoberg 2013; Cook and Vale 2018). There is also an issue in clearly identifying violent extremism. This is in part due to the historic failure to produce a globally accepted definition of terrorism and, as a consequence, violent extremism. There is no general UN definition on terrorism in part because it is invariably political and because it cannot be framed in a manner that excludes state actions (UNCTED 2005). The 2015 UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2015) sidesteps the definitional challenge, however, and states that “violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief.” This leaves the definition of violent extremism open and allows it to be contextualised by nation states. The advantage is that this promotes local ownership; the disadvantage is that it also creates ambiguity that states have exploited. Additionally, it raises conceptual challenges not only for the field of CVE, as expanded on in the second half of this chapter, but also for comparative research (Striegher 2015; Brown et al. 2019). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2013) defines violent extremism as violently targeting civilians, “as a means of rectifying grievances, real or perceived, which form the basis of increasingly strong exclusive identities”, while USAID (2011) defines it as, “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives” (p. 2). Violent extremism is frequently presented as an authoritarian and/or Utopian ideology, that offers an explanation of current grievances via a Manichean worldview, an alternative vision of the perfect future, and an exciting, often times heroic path towards it. The terms violent extremism and terrorism are often used as synonyms for one another. However, within this research and for the participants contributing to it, violent extremism is not always exceptional; in fact, it is often indistinguishable from other forms of violence and violent crimes,

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because of the motivations and expectations of those perpetrating violence. For instance, far right violent extremism is experienced by Muslim participants as one manifestation of Islamophobia. This is important because this means participants reject the foundational claims for legitimacy made by governments for P/CVE interventions and policies—that VE and terrorism in our times are exceptional, so exceptional measures are needed. To complicate matters further, in some cases, governments and security actors have applied the label violent extremism to criminal gangs, rebel groups and freedom fighters, without due regard to the differences between them. Additionally, some states have used the term violent extremism to narrow the space for civil society action and to clamp down on political opposition by labelling it as ‘extremism’ (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2015, 8; European Commission 2017). However, in general, in contrast to ‘organised crime’, for example, where the violence is justified via a utilitarian logic and profit-seeking agenda, violent extremism constitutes violent action linked to extreme ideas, extreme expectations and extreme associations of belonging. It is inherently ideological. The extremist vision of the ‘perfect’ future is premised on a perfectible humanity. Extremist ideology glorifies the supremacy of one group over others, whether based on religion, class, conviction, race or citizenship. As Hannah Arendt wrote of Eichmann, the Nazi leader in charge of the logistics of transporting European Jews and others to concentration death camps, his crime was rooted in his unwillingness to share the world with others (Mustafa et al. 2013). We see in violent extremism that this unwillingness to share with others manifests in gendered terms, with calls to defend ‘native’ women, or use women’s violence to shame men into action (Lahoud 2017; Yuval-Davis 1996). This matters because many P/CVE efforts are focused on countering a specific ideology or narrative of violent extremist groups, but often miss the wider implications and gendered underpinnings of these. P/CVE interventions point to another shift in policy and strategy vis-­ à-­vis counter-terrorism, namely a concern with the relationship between violent ideas and violent action. Counter-terrorism is primarily focused on ‘action’—that is, terrorist acts, as well as actions that support terrorism. However, not all people who support the ideas of terrorist groups would belong to them or carry out violent terrorist activities. The question then emerges of when, whether and how some adherents to those radical ideas turn to radical action (behaviours). Radicalisation research has not

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concluded that there is an easy correlation between the two. First, even though extremist ideology may be the narrative through which actions are explained, and even through which mundane motives are justified, radical ideology is not necessarily causative of violent action. Second, as we also find in this research, the context in which those radical ideas emerge is as important as whether or not the ideas are inherently violent. Conditions conducive to violent extremism, as identified by the UN (2016), show how a lack of opportunity to address grievances, including the ability to express radical ideas, can themselves foster the shift to violent action. Sex, Gender and Violent Extremism Who does what and why are therefore two important interlinked questions in terrorism research. More often than not the answer is disaggregated by sex—counting the number of men and women. Or more specifically, researchers are counting male and female bodies. Here, we find gender being treated as synonymous with sex, that is to say, an assumed tidy alignment between distinct biological categories and the behaviours, thoughts and positions of men and women in society. As Brown (2020) explores in her book Gender, Religion, Extremism: Finding Women in Anti-Radicalization,2 on which this section draws, this simple linkage, while frequently made, fails empirically and normatively. First, scientific research suggests sex can be a sliding scale. Second, the linkage ‘sex = gender’ is therefore exclusionary, resulting in stigmatisation, discrimination and violence, which masks our analysis of motives and opportunities (aka our agency). This means that an approach reliant on counting men’s and women’s bodies alone does not help us address our ‘who does what and why’ questions. As a result, many researchers use a more complex and nuanced understanding of the ‘who’ part of that question by considering our bodies and our identities. Therefore, for our purposes, the significant term is gender, rather than sex, because we are interested in the ‘how’ as much as the ‘what’. There are three parts to gender: it is constructed, it is structural, and it is performative. These three elements are reflected in a lengthy statement from the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (2001) arguing that gender refers to: 2  See pp. 6–12 of Gender, Religion, Extremism: Finding Women in Anti-Radicalization for a discussion of sex and gender.

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the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes [construct]. They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed, and valued in a woman or a man in a given context [performative]. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities [structural]. (OSAGI 2001)

The constructed element of gender is summarised by Simone De Beauvoir’s (1949) most cited phrase that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”. De Beauvoir here highlights that having a biologically male or female body (sex) alone is not a sufficient condition for being fully considered a ‘woman’ or a ‘man’ in any given society (Haslanger 2017). Womanhood and manhood mean something more than simply having a female or male body. This is not necessarily adhering to a nature/ culture distinction but describes the social significance of bodies (sex) (Zimmerman and West 2016). Gender is therefore situational, and we can think of ourselves as carrying out gender activities that enable us to ‘belong’ to a particular sex category based on socially accepted norms—in other words we ‘do gender’. There is a risk that our audiences don’t recognise our activities as appropriately ‘manly’ or ‘womanly’ and we become judged as deviant (Butler 2006). Gender is therefore not essentially or individually defined, but shaped through our interactions (or performances) with others. This is the ‘performative’ element—whereby our performance creates a series of effects that consolidate the idea or impression of ‘being’ a man or a woman (Big Think 2011). De Beauvoir and other feminists note that the social significance of male and female bodies is one of difference and inequality (Peterson and Runyan 1993; Brown 1988). This is the structural component of gender. UN Women in their definition of gender continue to assert how this learnt aspect (becoming) means in most societies there are differences and inequalities between men and women in control over resources, activities undertaken (and their respective value) and decision-making opportunities. Gender is therefore part of a broader socio-cultural context and a power relation. This means that assumptions about the appropriate behaviours of (sexed) bodies inform most (if not all) social and political

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processes. It means that gender is a chief ‘organising principle’ of politics (Kimmel 2003). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) acknowledges this when it stresses that in utilising a ‘gender approach’ the focus is not on individual women and men but on the system, which determines gender roles/responsibilities, access to and control over resources and decision-making potentials. It means as well that the concerns of women and their security and welfare needs have been downplayed in thinking and actions in global politics, and that their contributions to society and knowledge creation undervalued. Understanding how power works with and through gender and how gender is also shaped by this power (this symbiosis is sometimes turned into shorthand as ‘gendered’) helps us better grapple with socio-political phenomena, as well as the differences between the ways in which men and women behave. Gender difference means not only that certain relationships and opportunities are considered socially acceptable or legitimate (or even natural) for men but not women, and vice versa, but also that particular values, concepts or attitudes become associated with men and women. For example, male leaders are more often described as assertive, whereas women are called bossy; the former have positive connotations, while the latter do not. The implication is that women are not ‘natural’ leaders and that a woman leader will negatively impact on those she leads. Over time, ‘leadership’ and the positive attributes linked to it then become equated with the male-masculine, such that the positive attitudes, behaviours and relationships of men define leadership in a tautological manner. These are stereotypes, but the effect is that even where a woman leads this only becomes possible if she upholds the values, matches the behaviours and attributes of the men around her (Mavin 2008; Due Billing and Alvesson 2000; Charles and Davies 2000). In other words, she is upholding ‘masculine’ behaviours; in doing so she may therefore threaten the masculinity of the men around her. That is, she is threatening their sense of the correct ways of being a man in this world. This introduces us to the related concepts of masculinity and femininity (and in plural form)—terms that express the changeable and complex set of characteristics and behaviours prescribed to a particular sex by society (Peterson and Runyan 1993). Gendered difference is embedded in much of the violent extremist ideology the world is currently grappling with. It is particularly important to recognise explicitly that violence towards women and constructions of gender roles can be central to violent extremist ideologies (Pearson 2016, 2018b). How groups construct norms, including the ways in which they

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produce masculinities, is crucial to understanding violence. This impacts on the likelihood of women’s violence being accepted as legitimate by terrorist groups; the roles imagined for women; on the behaviours normalised for men; and on the treatment of enemy women. Much discussion of current far right and violent jihadist extremism indeed centres on the issue of ‘toxic masculinity’, defined by Kupers (2005) as “the constellation of socially regressive male traits that serve to foster domination, the devaluation of women, homophobia, and wanton violence” (p. 714). Importantly, the UN recognises that a significant indicator of violent jihadist extremism is a willingness to undermine women’s rights and women’s equality. In its fifth review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, undertaken in 2016, the UN General Assembly (2016) noted: …acts of sexual and gender-based violence are known to be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain terrorist groups and are used as an instrument to increase their power through supporting financing and recruitment and through the destruction of communities. (p. 3)

The UNDP, going beyond jihadist violent extremism, argues that despite important differences in ideology, composition and targets, groups and individuals practising violent extremism also share a number of characteristics. These include the systematic discrimination and abuse of women and their subordination through rape, enslavement, abduction, denial of education, forced marriage and sexual trafficking, which has been part of the ideology or practice of several violent extremist groups (UNDP 2016). For instance, in the case of Boko Haram, Ibifuro (2015) notes: Women’s rights, the objectives and achievements of many women’s rights organisations and the physical integrity of women are often the first targets of violent extremists. There is also some research that suggests that violent extremism is a reaction to the promotion of women’s rights and the ending of harmful practices and the prevailing structural and cultural violence against women.

Hardy (2001) argues that violent extremist groups may target women and girl victims for their violent acts, because of the specific emotional and symbolic impact of women as casualties. The British politician Jo Cox (MP) was assassinated not only because of her political views in favour of the UK remaining part of the European Union and because her killer

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identified with Nazism, but also because of her gender (Cobain and Taylor 2016; Krook and Sanín 2020). Additionally, ‘lone actor’ terrorist attacks often have a gendered element. For example, American Elliot Rodger, who killed six people and injured seven in a shooting (known as the Isla Vista shootings) in May 2014, left a 140-page manifesto and a YouTube video explaining his actions as the ‘true alpha male’ taking “pleasure in slaughtering all of you” as a punishment for women not finding him attractive (Rodger cited in Penny 2014). This is an example of the ways in which gendered violent extremist ideas translate into gendered violent extremist action. What becomes important here is that understanding the gender ideologies of the group that is being ‘countered’ is as important to understanding the group as understanding the geopolitical context, the wider ideology or state fragmentation. In jihadist thinking, such as that of alQaida or Daesh, we find particular ideals about masculinity and femininity that support their agendas; but as is evident in the refusal to allow the majority of women to engage in combat, women may also be an underutilised resource in battle, given some certainly support participation (Brown 2020; Pearson 2018a). We see therefore a range of groups appearing to offer women autonomy and empowerment through their propaganda. Rarely, however, do women find an equal range of opportunities or roles within them. Women in Terrorism and Violent Extremism—On the Rise? One of the interesting developments in the who does what and why questions is the almost universal surprise expressed at instances of women’s participation in violent extremism. Some of this ‘surprise’ is that women have accidentally become more visible to policymakers and researchers because of the shift towards a focus on individuals (radicalisation) and a broader range of activities (violent extremism rather than terrorism, even though these terms are often used synonymously). Another reason for policymakers’ recent attention is that Daesh has actively recruited women to join their so-called Caliphate, thereby challenging conventional wisdom about the role and importance of women to violent extremist organisations. The inclusion of women appeared as perhaps the biggest surprise to journalists, policymakers and academics of the emergence of the group. Yet, stories of women have featured in Daesh propaganda aimed at other women. Hayat Boumedienne is one of several French women who was believed to be involved in activity for Daesh in Syria and an interview with

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her was featured in the English language propaganda magazine Dabiq (2015). Daesh appears to have recruited up to 6902 foreign women worldwide to join them in Iraq and Syria (Cook and Vale 2019), making their recruitment of women unprecedented. This figure represented approximately 13 percent of Daesh membership; in contrast, Cunningham’s (2003) study found there was a “low probability that women will be used by Islamist terrorist groups” (p. 182), with Palestinian groups the outliers, while American right-wing nationalist groups saw women’s membership typically around 25 percent (p. 177). Women’s desire for participation in violent extremism is further highlighted through key ‘celebrity’ figures, such as, in the UK, Samantha Lewthwaite or Sally Jones (the so-called White Widows, with Lewthwaite wanted for terrorism offences in Kenya, and Jones killed in an airstrike in the offensive against Daesh) and the ‘Bethnal Green girls’, a group of schoolgirls whose image was published leaving a London airport, bound for the so-called Islamic State. Globally there have been other high-profile cases, such as the three jihadist Kenyan women who in 2016 attacked a police station, or Tashfeen Malik who pledged allegiance to Daesh with her husband and killed 14 people in California in 2015, an act celebrated in Dabiq. As with terrorist men, there is nothing specific that unites the women who participate in terrorist violence; they can be married, single, mothers, childless, wealthy, poor, educated and uneducated, from across the globe and from all religious and ethnic groups. By focusing on particular women as ‘exceptional’, the opportunity to engage more broadly with gender is lost. The focus on individual women reinforces the policy focus on individual paths of radicalisation, treats these women as unusual and means that how gender features more broadly in violent extremist ideology or action is overlooked (Brunner 2007). Also overlooked is the intersection of gendered social and cultural norms and the gendered lives of the women themselves. Additionally, gender is almost always associated with ‘women’, and so how gender factors in men’s radicalisation is also neglected (Pearson 2018a; Kimmel 2018) Another argument that needs acknowledgement is not that we are seeing an actual rise in women’s participation, but a rise in reporting of their engagement. As Cynthia Enloe (Enloe 2001; Cockburn and Enloe 2012) argues in her work on women in war, it is more likely that academics, policymakers and the media alike have failed to see the women operating in violence, because of the narrow definition of terrorism. An obsession with the spectacular and violent components of terrorism obscures the wider roles of women (Brown 2011; Enloe 2001). Indeed, although women

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were involved in some 18% of global suicide attacks in 2017, mainly because of Boko Haram, women’s participation is often in the supporting and non-operational components of violent extremism (Pearson 2018b; Warner and Matfess 2017; Schweitzer et  al. 2017). Such roles include fundraising, logistics and planning, recruitment, propaganda and glorifying activities, cooking and cleaning for fighters and marriage, whether consensual or forced and rape (Eggert 2015; Bloom 2011; Mahan and Griset 2013; Jacques and Taylor 2009). As our focus moves past terrorist attacks and violence to “everything else that happens before the bomb goes off” these roles take on greater importance. One reason for the uncertainty around an actual rise in women’s violence—versus its increased visibility—is that global datasets tend not to record the gender of perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Past gender blindness hampers future risk assessment and makes it hard to determine global trends. However, Europol (2019) noted that across Europe women accounted for some 22 per cent of those arrested on charges relating to jihadist terrorism in 2018, contrasted with 16 per cent in 2017 and 26 per cent in 2016. Those figures exclude the UK and parts of Belgium. As early as 2011 Mia Bloom (2011) noted that between 1985 and 2010, women and girl bombers committed 257 suicide attacks, a quarter of the total recorded. Other data show of some 434 suicide attacks carried out by Boko Haram, 244 were by women (Warner and Matfess 2017, 29), with 469 women and girl attackers recorded in 240 incidents in 2018 (Pearson 2018b). This gives some indication of change, which could be the result of women’s increased terrorist activity, although in the case of West African suicide attacks the question of coercion and a lack of agency remains; or it could be a consequence of expansion to European laws to encompass non-­ violent crime, and ‘extreme belief’, which can criminalise more women. Adding Women and Stirring Despite increased visibility and awareness of women’s participation in violent extremism, their support for violent ideology is still considered ‘exceptional’ (O’Rourke 2009). Mostly it is. Support for Daesh, as for other extreme groups, remains a minority activity for both men and women. However, because gender data are not routinely captured, consideration of women in violent extremism in terrorism research and in policy to counter it only emerges where women are a ‘special factor’ (such as in the case of Daesh). As a result, we see the categories ‘female foreign

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fighters’ or ‘female suicide bombers’ or ‘women and children’ amalgamated and homogenised (Sylvester 1998 cited in Burman 2008), in order to distinguish them from the presumed male ‘foreign fighter’ and ‘suicide bomber’. Moreover, where women are included as a category for analysis, our theories of radicalisation or violent extremism are not altered by or reshaped through that data, but rather marginalised as a new phenomenon, to be studied by women. ‘Women’s radicalisation’ and ‘women’s violent extremism’ are generated as a body of knowledge, rather than used to challenge or refine existing assumptions about the processes of radicalisation (Pearson 2021). Women’s participation in violence is not just exceptionalised; it needs to be ‘additionally explained’ by researchers and policymakers because violent women are still seen as abnormal and to some extent exotic and unnatural. Women who engage in extremist violence are doubly deviant: they first violate social norms of ‘non-violence’, but also essentialist gender norms casting women as pacifist. This presumption of women’s pacifism has generated a series of responses that primarily view women’s involvement in violence as necessarily the result of ‘weak mindedness’ or emotional attachment to violent men, whilst blinding scholars to the emotional attachments necessary to male involvement in violence (Gentry and Sjoberg 2008). The emotional aspect of men’s radicalisation is emphasised by authors including Sageman, who discusses radicalisation with a friendship theory based around the premise of the ‘bunch of guys’ who radicalise together (Sageman 2004). The idea of women being involved in radical groups through family cells, including children, has taken on particular importance in Indonesia where in May 2018, in three interconnected cases, such cells attacked a police station and churches (Beech 2018; BBC News 2018; Satria and Satria 2018). Rather than use gendered insights to reflect on and refine existing literature on kinship and familial networks of terrorism, instead violent events involving women can be used to suggest that women are irrational in their sexualised motives. Mia Bloom (2011), for example, has suggested that women, especially in Palestine, are motivated through sexual violence and honour codes that encourage women to see participation as the ‘only option’ if they are unable to have children, are divorced or are raped. The nuances of women’s political violence are often lost, and their motivations homogenised through an essentialist approach, despite differences of ideology and context. If we see women’s violence as exceptional, we fail to recognise the importance of women’s active military engagement in groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The

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LTTE was active for Tamil independence from Sri Lanka from the 1970s to 2009 and it put gender equality at the heart of its organisational aims. Women’s cadres became an important part of the fighting force (Alison 2003; Gunawardena 2006). In 1991 the group’s first woman suicide attacker, Dhanu, a committed Tamil activist, was able to create headlines for the LTTE worldwide with the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2008). This projection of women’s political power, which had lasting repercussions, is often however explained ‘away’ as ‘personal vendetta’. The alternative gendered explanation is that women having experienced trauma or crisis seek new ways of granting meaning to their lives and worlds. The truth is often that agency can be lacking for both men and women in violent conflict. Sexual violence can impact both. A gendered perspective can and should also be applied to men, but rarely is; men too have often seen considerable violence perpetrated against them or family members by state agents or others and can respond by joining extremist groups. A report by Elworthy and Rifkind (2005), for example, outlines the persistent influence of powerlessness, exclusion, trauma and humiliation, which in many cases can be attributed to predatory and oppressive security sector institutions. Such emotions are gendered, with humiliation having such power through its ability to emasculate (Fattah and Fierke 2009). A gendered approach would acknowledge the role of emotion and trauma in both men’s and women’s radicalisation, yet without relying on gender essentialism. However, this route of analysis is rarely applied; instead this insight about trauma or family networks is not applied to men, leaving theories of (men’s) participation in violent extremism untouched by gender in the mainstream (Pearson 2018b; Kimmel 2018). Parashar (2009) finds that in most analysis “the ‘feminine niche’ that is created wherein women’s participation in traditional male activities is pushed into the realm of ‘personal’ rather than the ‘political’ space raises important questions for further enquiry” (p. 252). Related to ‘women-specific’ explanations, rather than gendered explanations, are explanations rooted in feminist demands for equality. There are two seemingly contradictory but mutually supporting positions. The first is that feminism has led women to act like men and represents a defining feature of contemporary violent extremism (see Jacques and Taylor 2008). The second argument is that the lack of feminism within a particular community is also a cause of women’s participation in violence, because, in this version of the argument, women ironically seek a false

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empowerment and freedom from patriarchy through more patriarchy and violence (Lahoud 2018). For example, Hegghammer cited in Gilsnen (2014) argues that women’s involvement in jihadist violence and militancy is “a process of female emancipation, albeit a very limited (and morbid) one”. This argument is more frequently used in cases where the women are Muslim, than in nationalist white movements. It has featured in national discussions about the necessity for coherent and assertive broad ‘national values’ and the need to uphold and enforce them in multicultural societies. Indeed, participants discuss this in the Findings chapters of this book. In both arguments, women become ‘like men’ as they engage in violent extremism; they sacrifice their femininity for a masculinised identity and sometimes also their lives. Both approaches can represent an erasure of women’s bodies and point to the importance of gender in violent extremism. However, this is not to say that there are no sex differences, and it is important to acknowledge these through a gendered approach. For example, involvement in petty crime is seen as a risk factor in violent extremism, but this is rarely acknowledged as a factor that disproportionately affects men. Women from European and North American countries who participate in violent extremism tend to perform better at school than their male peers (when controlled for class and geographical location). We also find in the research presented in this book that predominantly online recruitment is more likely for women than for men in developed countries. These differences are the consequences of the intersections of gender within cultural and societal norms, with organisational values of violent groups, and the individual lives of women and men, as this research will make clear. In societies that have different expectations of women and men, and in terrorist groups that have clearly defined and binary roles, it is inevitable that men’s and women’s paths to joining radical movements will resemble each other in some respects, and differ in others. The problem therefore with simply ‘adding women’ to the problem of (male) violent extremism is that it either introduces a new category to the field—‘women’s violence’—as discussed above, or it adds a new variable— biological sex—to our theories of violent extremism. However, if sex categories are not predictors of violent extremism, then it is dropped as a consideration in analysis. Women (and therefore sex) are seen as statistically insignificant outliers and removed from data sets. This does not however mean that ‘male’ is accepted as a variable, as it is seen as too broad a category. As decades of research in the social sciences and humanities

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reveal, sex as a variable may add to our knowledge about who or what, but doesn’t help us understand how or why. In contrast, research that takes seriously the social construction of gender can begin to do this. In research on terrorism, this move towards analysing gender is slowly occurring. Gendering Violent Extremists and Extremism As discussed earlier, gender is both an identity category (so an individual can ‘have’, or identify with, a particular gender) and a power relation, in that it has an inescapably normative dimension. Ideas and ideals about gender regulate the relationship between bodies and behaviours. As an identity category, gender should not be seen in simple binary terms (where gender identification is a choice between two options: ‘man’ and ‘woman’) but should be acknowledged as a complex and multidimensional spectrum, influenced by (and influencing) other social markers, such as race, class, sexuality, religion and so on. Gender therefore becomes an organising logic for many social and political phenomena. Not paying attention to gender means we ignore the ways in which social phenomena, including VE, specifically occur, and mistakenly apply theories, variables and findings to both men and women. For example, if we take the commonly held variables of radicalisation these are frequently held to be gender neutral, and do not account for gender difference in experiencing them or in their relative importance (Pearson 2016). A lack of education and employment is often seen as a risk factor, or specifically, economic exclusion and lack of upward mobility, yet this is not considered in gendered terms. Statistical data show a correlation between violence and income inequality (Dixon 2009). However, women’s lack of parity in employment and education is not considered in this research. Relatedly the growth of woman-headed households as men join extremist groups in some contexts, and the additional pressures this places upon women, are often absent in assessing the long-term factors of violent extremism. Motives for joining a group differ over time, with the group’s development, and across contexts. For instance, research on Nigeria suggests a complex picture in men’s and women’s recruitment, with access to Islamic education for women provided by Boko Haram (as narrow as this might be) a driver for women’s participation. Nigeria is a country where women can struggle to attain equal access to state education (Matfess 2017; Nagarajan 2018). Meanwhile, in countries such as Afghanistan, young unemployed men with little prospect of marriage and few sources

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of income have been the greatest boon for VE groups (Barakat et  al. 2008). This is closely linked to economic concerns: young men’s inability to find employment, safe employment or save money impedes their ability to achieve complete manhood within Afghan society. They are unable to contribute to their family and to begin saving money in order to improve their marital prospects. The only way some men perceive of gaining social status in this economic environment may be with the gun (Barakat et al. 2008). Globalisation also produces so-called protest masculinities, some of which may become extreme or violent (Kimmel 2003). Additionally, recent research correlates violent extremism with gender-­ based violence (GBV) against women, suggesting violent extremism is about norms and beliefs about the power relations between women and men. One NGO-led programme in Novi Pazar, Serbia, reports that in their target community, 78 per cent of families with known extremists in the community were also suffering from gender-based violence, with 39 per cent of recorded perpetrators of gender-based violence also showing signs of ‘extremisation’. While searching for violent extremists and when sifting through the referrals of young men, the NGO goes to great lengths to examine their views and attitudes towards women, gender equality and sexual minorities. The organisation has found a 60 per cent increase in the number of positively identified youth at risk of extremist violence in local communities in Serbia when cross-referencing these two databases (RUSI 2021). Similar findings have been noted in Indonesia and Bangladesh. For example, in Bangladesh women pointed to the social control of their behaviour as an indicator of extremism (True 2018). These facts suggest women are often well-positioned to recognise societal changes that lead to violent extremism. However, violence against women is widespread, while violent extremism is not. It is not clear that tackling gender-based violence would inevitably lead to fewer violent extremists, nor does such research prove a causal link between those willing to commit gender-based violence and violent extremism.

Countering Violent Extremism: Introduction The previous section demonstrated the importance of thinking about gender in terrorism and violent extremism, not just to see women, but to better understand how gender shapes both men’s and women’s involvement in violence. Historically, the security field and related institutions have suffered from an insufficient gender focus and have neglected not

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just gender as a construct, but women as a category. This has led to a bias against considering women, even when they have been embedded in terrorist organisations and their supporting movements (OSCE 2011). As a result of the framing of violent extremism as an essentially male problem, women in the countering violent extremism (CVE) realm have either been ignored or, particularly in recent years, seen as an antidote. The growing acknowledgement, in both policymaking and programme implementation, of the need to include women in the field of CVE is to be welcomed. Yet, this chapter argues that, in the absence of an overall gendered approach to understanding terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism, the approach to engaging women in CVE has often been based on false or incomplete assumptions. These have tended to essentialise women as peaceful, for instance, utilising mothers’ supposed innate ability to spot and react to signs of radicalisation in their children. These short-term/ immediate efforts also run the risk of undermining broader efforts towards gender equality and women’s empowerment, which may have correlative impacts on reducing violent extremism, even if in the long term. Such an approach also fails to positively engage gendered CVE and men. This section is structured as follows: firstly, it explores the evolution of the field of CVE, including its roots as a response to the War on Terror. Secondly, it highlights the integration of women and gender into the field at the policy level. Thirdly, it discusses the problematic framing of CVE and gender which have tended towards orientalist and essentialist narratives. Finally, it addresses what gendered approaches have meant in practice in relation to counter-radicalisation or countering violent extremism policies and programmes. The focus is on the West, given the context of this book. Yet, what Romaniuk (2015) calls the ‘globalisation’ of CVE policies means many of the assumptions underpinning CVE in the countries driving the agenda have been transposed elsewhere, including in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), where women’s agency is not a given. The analysis therefore also draws on these contexts. The Origins of Countering Violent Extremism It is not just in the area of gender that CVE programming has been critiqued. Programming broadly has often been criticised for being too assumption-based and under-conceptualised. Globally, CVE has struggled from a lack of coherent strategy and has battled with a definitional and conceptual problem (Berger 2016). In large part, this stems back to the roots of CVE itself. While hearts and minds approaches have been part of

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counter-insurgency for decades, the term Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initially began to circulate in policy circles under the George W. Bush administration, more associated with the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere, than a ‘softer’ approach to countering terrorism. By the mid-2000s, at a moment of crisis for counter-­ terrorism policymaking in the US, there was a shift from the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) to talk of a “global struggle against violent extremism” (Borum 2011). In a May 2005 high-level review of its counter-­ terrorism policy, the Bush administration sought to address the failures of US counter-terrorism overseas by moving away from a focus on al-Qaida leaders and instead shifting towards what senior officials called a ‘strategy against violent extremism’ and to the wider perceived problem of support in Muslim-majority countries for ‘radical Islam’ (Kundnani and Hayes 2018). The ‘strategy against violent extremism’ was seen by some as more favourable than the ‘War on Terror’ since it broadened the concept beyond the military dimension of a state’s power. Implicit in this, however, was that the strategy was targeted at Muslim-majority countries and communities. After Bush, the Obama administration also embraced CVE, particularly programmes promoting outreach to Muslim communities in the US (Lord et  al. 2009). The fact that the field has been criticised for being under-conceptualised is therefore perhaps better understood when it is considered that CVE was intended from the outset to complement military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to ‘win hearts and minds’ and was therefore not based on evidenced need. This weak conceptual basis has led to a lack of clarity about what CVE is and what it is actually countering, which has inevitably become even more pronounced as the field has expanded globally (Berger 2016). CVE has been hampered by the prevailing failure to create a globally accepted definition of either terrorism or violent extremism, as outlined in the previous section. Different countries define violent extremism in different ways. This inevitably impacts on how countries approach what the threat is, and how to counter it. Reflecting this, the 2015 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism left it up to individual states to determine their own definition of violent extremism (for a full discussion of the current debates in the field, see Rosand et al. 2018). CVE programmes have also tended to be wide-ranging in scope, involving a variety of different kinds of interventions. They might include, for instance, community debates on sensitive topics, media messaging, inter-­ faith dialogues, empowerment programmes (particularly of women),

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training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives aimed at individuals deemed to be ‘at risk’ of joining or being attracted to VE groups. Examples include vocational training and mentorship programmes. In practical terms, that means that CVE practitioners have struggled to draw clear boundaries between CVE programmes and those of other well-established fields, such as development and poverty alleviation, peace-building, governance and education (Heydemann 2014; Berger 2016). Despite these challenges, CVE has grown in popularity, in part since it reflects an increasing recognition that military operations, in isolation, do not end terrorist movements and that governments cannot prevent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist organisations or build community resilience to violent extremism on their own (Rosand et  al. 2018). The emergence of Daesh and the congruent rise in the number of young men and women joining the terrorist group and its transnational affiliates, Obama’s hosting of first international White House Summit on CVE and the release of the 2016 UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2015; UN News 2016) have all further heightened the focus of policymakers, security officials and donors on preventing and countering violent extremism, and at the global, regional, national and sub-national levels. One database, which is mapping the CVE landscape, now contains over 1400 projects conducted by around 900 organisations across 100 countries (Rosand et al. 2018). Of these, there are 150 projects globally that target women in their CVE programmes. The vast majority of these include ‘empowerment’ as their key activity.3 Gender and Countering Violent Extremism: An Evolving Field In the policy field, for some years there has been a long-standing commitment to incorporating gender at the highest institutional levels of international security and counter-terrorism. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) launched UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, a ground-­ breaking resolution on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) (United Nations 2000). UNSCR 1325 appealed for the greater participation of women in decision-making in national, regional and international institutions; their greater involvement in peacekeeping, field operations, mission  Unpublished data based on RUSI’s meta-level evaluation of CVE activities worldwide.

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consultation and peace negotiations; increased funding and other support for UN bodies’ gender work; enhanced state commitments to women’s and girl’s human rights and their protection under international law; the introduction of special measures against sexual violence in armed conflict; and a consideration of women’s and girls’ needs in humanitarian, refugee, disarmament and post-conflict settings (United Nations 2000). At the start of the twenty-first century, a platform was therefore launched from which it was possible to imagine radical reform of peace and security governance. For those who had agitated for it, it had finally been agreed that women’s political and economic status was a matter for serious consideration and that addressing chronic gender inequality could indeed lay the foundations for sustainable peace (Kirby and Shepherd 2016). In parallel, the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror also produced a substantial literature on the need to understand counter-terrorism and broader security issues in gendered terms, with a focus specifically on women (see e.g. Kassem 2012; OSCE 2011; Steans 2008; Hunt 2007). In recent years, policymakers have heeded this call and the varied roles of women in CVE have increasingly been recognised (Hedayah 2015). In 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2242 called for the inclusion of women in devising CVE programmes and highlighted gender as a cross-­ cutting issue for counter-terrorism. It emphasised the need for gender-­ sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalisation for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organisations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses. Simultaneously, it reaffirmed commitments to the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women Peace and Security and explicitly linked both the WPS and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agendas to CVE (United Nations 2015). In 2016, the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action (POA) on Preventing Violent Extremism went beyond security-centric measures by introducing systemic, multi-tiered and synchronised steps to pre-­emptively address conditions precipitating radicalisation and violent extremism. Including a pillar dedicated to the role of women and girls, the POA urged member states to systematically include gender perspectives, empower women and women-led organisations and strive for gender equality (UN News 2016). The EU’s Gender Action Plan II (GAP II), covering the period 2016–2020, also advocates the mainstreaming of gender issues, particularly the emancipation, empowerment and equality for women

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(European Commission 2015). Specific CVE plans and programmes at the country level also explicitly include women, although work remains to be done in this area. Women-centric CVE efforts generally seek to empower women and tend to focus around three key areas. This involves, first, an emphasis on mothers and efforts to build their capacity to recognise ‘the signs of’ radicalisation, providing them with skills to influence thinking and behaviour in their children, families and communities. Second, a focus on the economic and social empowerment of women, raising their status and voice in their families and communities so that they have greater capacity to engage in CVE, while also making them more personally resilient to violent extremism. Third, there are efforts to build the capacity of women to actively participate in CVE, peace and security agendas. Finally, though a nascent area, there are (albeit limited) efforts focused on tackling the specific radicalisation of women (Winterbotham 2020). Some of CVE’s recent inclusion of women at the policy level is linked to the evolving security landscape, in particular the emergence of Daesh. The migration of thousands of women to the so-called Caliphate in Syria and Iraq inspired a new wave of research exploring women’s and girls’ motivations for joining the group, generating public awareness that women can also be involved in violent extremism (Cook and Vale 2018; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017; Saltman and Smith 2015; Perešin 2015). At the global programme level, the emergence of Daesh has been one factor in an increasing number of initiatives focusing on women’s capacity to spot and react to extremism in their families or communities, tackling the root causes of violent extremism, including in relation to gender, and taking on a more active role in the community, family and economy (Hedayah 2015). Though the field as a whole has therefore expanded beyond its original scope, the origin of CVE as a tool in the War on Terror has significant implications not only for the field generally, but for the engagement of women in CVE interventions. The justifications used in the War on Terror—that the fight against terrorism was a fight for women’s rights— have been applied to the mobilisation of gender norms in many western and non-western counter-radicalisation/CVE programmes, asserting the protection of peaceful Muslim women from risky Muslim men, and paradoxically empowering women, specifically mothers, with security measures aimed at their communities (Nesiah 2012; Ehrenreich 2005; Hunt 2007). The following section highlights how this has fostered some key

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assumptions, which have permeated approaches aimed at women. These potentially undermine the efficacy of these types of CVE programmes. Countering Violent Extremism and Gender: Securitisation and Orientalism This section firstly explores how the War on Terror and pervasive orientalist and essentialist views of Muslim women have served to undermine women’s inclusion in the field of CVE (Khalid 2017; Sabir 2017). Essentially, it argues that the imposition of gender equality and women’s empowerment through measures to counter extremism has since the War on Terror (WOT) been associated with neo-colonialism seeking to deculturise Muslim demographics. The second part then addresses how CVE programmes tend to both rely on and reproduce essentialist assumptions about women’s passivity and inherent peacefulness. This means that the rationale and understanding (or in the language of CVE programming, ‘theory of change’ or TOC) behind some of these programmes could be flawed. CVE practices and policies are embedded in the wider system of the War on Terror; they are a logical extension of viewing terrorism as a problem of ideology and of failed and flawed individuals and communities. This means these policies cannot escape the feminist critiques of that wider counter-terrorism context. There are two main sets of feminist arguments. First, feminists pointed to the ways in which the WOT instrumentalised women’s rights in order to justify violence. This instrumentalisation is problematic because CVE as part of the WOT, while justified on the grounds of promoting women’s rights, may nevertheless undermine both women’s rights and security (Brown 2020; Ní Aoláin and Huckerby 2018; Huckerby 2020). Second, the narratives associated with counter-terrorism interventions mobilised an agenda that was both orientalist and essentialist, which has significant implications for how CVE has viewed women. Turning to the first, in 2001, both the US and UK administrations strategically framed foreign policy discourse in the run-up to intervention and throughout the War on Terror with human rights goals (Holland 2012). These particularly focused on promoting women’s rights. Laura Bush in her 16 November radio address to the American nation condemned the “severe repression against women in Afghanistan” and declared that the war against terrorism was also a “fight for the rights and dignity of women” (Berry 2003; Shepherd 2006). A few days later, the

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State Department issued a report outlining the discriminatory conditions of women and children under the Taliban (Berry 2003). In the UK, the need to use funding to protect Afghan women also became one of the championing calls of the intervention (McSmith 2001). The international intervention in Afghanistan was visibly accompanied by images such as the liberation of Afghan women from the Taliban, indelibly associating the two ideas in the public imagination. This was problematic. The most obvious issue is that the rhetoric clashed with the reality on the ground (Berry 2003; Ayub and Kouvo 2008). The international intervention in Afghanistan was explicitly not a humanitarian intervention, nor was it driven primarily by human rights concerns. The war instead was a reaction to the events of 9/11, the need to be seen to respond, and the subsequent desire to eliminate safe havens for terrorists in the country. As Berry (2003) aptly sums up, “The expression of concern and support for Afghan women by the Bush administration thus can best be seen as a strategy in the war of words within the ‘war on terror’” (p. 150). The second issue is that the use of women in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was symbolic and applied an orientalist gendered rationale which proposed the liberation of oppressed Muslim women from dangerous Muslim men, through the imposition of western norms. The War on Terror instrumentalised arguments for the empowerment of Afghan women, gender equality and their liberation from the Taliban, to justify the war (Nesiah 2012; Ehrenreich 2005; Hunt 2007). Justifying interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq on the rationale of the liberation of Muslim women not only reflected a lack of critical information about the Taliban and the realities of the US invasion and the allies it chose to support, but promoted a “slippage in ill-informed American minds between the specific repression of Afghan women by the gender repressive policies of the Taliban and the repression of Afghan women by Islam itself” (Berry 2003). Shepherd (2006) therefore argues that representations of Afghan women can be read against the “dominant representations of the US self-­ as-­nation as a marker of US superiority, social advancement and civilization” (p.  21). Perhaps as a result, the US integrated ‘hard’ military initiatives with the ‘soft’ humanitarian approaches the Bush administration had been championing. This became a key component of the dominant understanding of the US as saviour in relation to an oppressive—and ‘evil’—enemy (Puar and Rai 2002). This reflected the neoconservative discourse, which was infused by questions of morality, democracy and

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human rights (McClelland 2011). Though it is debatable how ‘moral’ this new direction actually was, by end of the 1990s, liberal democracy, and what McClelland (2011, 523) terms “neoconservative concerns for human rights and democracy promotion,” had become central to the US foreign policy agenda. The War on Terror relied on an essentialist understanding of women and on stereotypes prevalent in the foreign policy and security realms. These fields have been assumed to be the realm of men and male actors. Many scholars and activists have pointed to the ways in which policy and the existing mainstream literature, implicitly or explicitly, characterise women as more peaceful than men (see for instance Alison 2004; Cohen 2013; MacKenzie 2015; Sjoberg 2015). This essentialist vision of women as more peaceful has been justified on various grounds, including but not limited to, because they are physically weaker, linking motherhood and pacifism and seeing women as naturally more caring than men. While jihadist propaganda visions may also emphasise women’s mothering and care-giving roles, and may seek to strengthen these ideas in their discourses, a CVE approach that replicates this essentialism limits women’s agency and autonomy against all the precepts of UN discourses on women’s rights and equality (Brown 2020). This essentialist reading of women is not, however, unique to the War on Terror. Some feminist scholars in the peace movement, though not denying that women too participated in the creation of a violent and militaristic system, stressed that women, whether by socialisation, by virtue of being mothers and caregivers, or by biology, were more peace-loving than men. Most therefore linked the emancipation of women and the achievement of a peaceful society (Alonso 1995). In the development field, the gender-mainstreaming discourse of the Millennium Development Goals has been criticised for equating gender with women in biological terms and as different from men—“more hard-working, more caring, more responsible” (Cornwall and Rivas 2015, 399). The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), though broadly seen as an improvement (Dhar 2018), still have a tendency to see gender as binary, view women as a group and apply a neoliberal understanding of empowerment, which only marginally connects barriers to women’s empowerment to global inequalities (Bidegain Ponte and Enriquez 2016). The conception of women as more peaceful is also implicit in the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Shepherd (2008) finds that women’s protection is central to the resolution. The discourse of protection relies

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heavily on the concept also of women as ‘natural victims’ (Enloe 2014), whilst placing an additional burden on women to promote and advocate for peace, even whilst having no power in the decisions of war-making (Runyan and Peterson 2013). This understanding has also accompanied efforts to promote women in the CVE field. UNSCR 2242, although explicitly acknowledging women’s active engagement in violent extremism, is heavily influenced by the perception of women as victims who need to be empowered, alongside other vulnerable groups. The 2016 UN Plan of Action also focuses on the need for the protection of women. Meanwhile, since the plan focuses on Islamist extremism, it also presents a racialised view of oppressed Muslim women as those in most need of protection. This view was somewhat corrected in 2017 with the passing of UNSCR 2396 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters. This resolution emphasised that “women and children associated with foreign terrorist fighters returning or relocating to and from conflict may have served in many different roles, including as supporters, facilitators, or perpetrators of terrorist acts, and require special focus when developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies” (UNSCR 2017, clause 31). It is though unsurprising that understandings of women as more peaceful prevail: many women now engaging in CVE activities in developing countries and FCAS have engaged in issues related to development and peace and security for years (Bhulai et  al. 2016). Understandably, they have transferred lessons from these fields to their work in countering violent extremism. These lessons rest on overwhelming quantitative evidence that women’s empowerment and gender equality are associated with peace and stability and correlations exist between gender inequalities and violent conflict (Caprioli 2005; Hudson et  al. 2012; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016 cited in Idris and Abdelaziz 2017). Though these narratives are understood, this book challenges essentialist framings of women. As outlined in the earlier section, women are as capable of violence as men. Women’s engagement in violence should not come as a complete surprise, given it is dependent on context. Sjoberg (2015) argues to the reality, which is that women have engaged in political violence in most if not all conflicts throughout the recorded history of the world. What matters is to take a gendered approach to understanding this context.

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The Rationale Behind Countering Violent Extremism Programmes Engaging Women Given the roots of CVE, it was inevitable that orientalist and essentialist framings would form the basis of western government approaches to CVE involving women, and these framings have been reproduced as CVE has been rolled out globally. Several interlinked assumptions therefore underlie some of the current preventive work focused on working with women. Violent actors in extreme movements have predominantly been men (Bloom 2011; Sjoberg 2013; Kimmel 2018). A key assumption guiding CVE interventions, first, is that women, as innate peace-builders, can positively influence violent men, if empowered to do so (Winterbotham 2018; OSCE 2011; Brown 2013; Winterbotham 2020). Implicit in this are the justifications, stemming from the War on Terror, around the need to protect peaceful Muslim women from risky Muslim men, by empowering women, specifically mothers, with security measures aimed at their communities (Nesiah 2012; Ehrenreich 2005; Hunt 2007). If women are more peaceful, the interlinked assumption is that they are also more moderate. These understandings of women are evident in numerous counterterrorism and CVE programmes in both the West and elsewhere (Huckerby 2011). In Saudi Arabia, women are presented as naturally moderate and seen to have a pacifying influence. For example, Saudi Arabia has assisted beneficiaries (including 31 of 60 Guantanamo returnees) to get married, paying associated wedding costs on the assumption that through marriage, men may become less violent and their wives will have a pacifying, moderating or deradicalising influence (Brown 2013). Marriage is also seen as a core institution that binds individuals to the state and indicates adult behaviour. The inference is that ‘boys’ engage in radical violent behaviour (hot-­headed deviance, etc.) not ‘men’, who control their violent passions, and so marriage is the process of becoming ‘a man’; this reveals how radicalisation is a gendered concept (Brown 2020). As noted above, this ignores significant findings regarding women’s involvement in, and support for, violent extremism (Lahoud 2018; Margolin 2016; Bloom 2011; Mahan and Griset 2013; Jacques and Taylor 2009; Gonzalez-Perez 2008). A one-track approach to gender, seeing women through an essentialist framing and perceiving women only as passive victims or as peaceful allies, wives and mothers, therefore undermines the effectiveness of CVE programmes, particularly in cases of women’s violence. Due to gender stereotyping of ‘men as militants’ and ‘girls as non-violent victims’ most CVE programming has targeted the violence of

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men and boys (Ladbury 2015). Programmes tackling women’s radicalisation specifically are still hard to find (Winterbotham 2020). Themes of protection and women’s vulnerability have been shown to reduce women’s agency and entrench gender-based restrictions placed on women (Puechguirbal 2010). CVE programmes aimed at tackling women’s and girls’ radicalisation can be undermined by passive, negative stereotypes such as the so-called ‘jihadi bride’, a term much loved by some media. For example, in the UK, one response to dissuade women recruits has been an over-dependence on counter-narratives stressing Daesh brutality against women, instead of proper efforts to address the push and pull factors for women (Huckerby 2016). These include the UK government’s failure to prevent, investigate and punish Islamophobic attacks against women and girls (Huckerby 2016; Winterbotham and Pearson 2016). Meanwhile, more broadly, the question of what is moderate, particularly when it comes to religion, is a matter of much debate. Religious communities are ethnically, politically and theologically diverse. It is unclear what ‘moderate religion’ means in practice. Crucially, the politics of labelling an individual or group ‘moderate’ has a tendency to delegitimise these actors and does little to diminish the attraction of more radical alternatives (Elshimi 2017). Focusing on ‘moderate’ voices has resulted in religious conservatism being seen as a slippery slope to violent extremism. In reality, assumed links between conservative ideas, radicalisation and violent extremism have not been supported by the evidence (Crone 2016; Bartlett and Miller 2012). Secondly, women’s agency as mothers is often prioritised above the variety of other roles they play in society. Children are presumed to listen to their mothers because they view them as figures of respect and authority. The assumption is therefore that women can be critical in stopping their children from following a radical path (Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016; Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security 2014). The issue is that this can in some cases entrench stereotypes that prove ultimately disempowering (Winterbotham and Pearson 2016). Women are viewed in relation to male family members namely as mothers, sisters, wives and so on, rather than as individuals with agency and influence (Brown 2013; Huckerby 2011; Giscard d’Estaing 2017). Of course, women exert agency in these family roles and value motherhood, but the danger arises when motherhood is the only active role offered to women. This can also be resisted by women who envisage a more complex active role in society, including in countering radicalisation, as this book finds.

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Brown (2013) highlights that, for example, in Britain, counter-­ radicalisation programmes have been set within the context of wider discourses about deviant youth masculinities, and in particular youthful Muslim masculinities, and organised around two gendered logics of maternalism and paternalism. Many programmes designed to combat Islamist and jihadist extremism have applied what Brown (2013) terms a maternalist logic, that is, an understanding of Muslim women according to “their expected gender and racialized role as mothers” (p.  41). This assumes not only that women are guided by maternal instincts but that they—read Muslim women—are more present in the home and can therefore spot signs of radicalisation in their children. Women, as the primary caregivers, are assumed—particularly with training—to be better than men at detecting the signs of radicalisation in children; and to be positive agents of change, particularly in men and boys (Dufour-Genneson and Alam 2014; Couture 2014a; Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016). This therefore perpetuates the logic of the War on Terror which positioned men as a threat, and not also as potential allies, for instance in fatherhood roles (Winterbotham 2018). It also ignores the role of mothers in perpetuating violent identities whether terrorist or resistance. In Palestine, mothers have passed down stories of heroism and encouraged children to martyr themselves, as one example (Post 2005; Margolin 2016). In Pakistan, Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD, previously known as Lashkar-­e-­Taiba) heavily relied on women’s roles as mothers and wives to encourage their sons to engage in jihad (Haq 2007). A further concern is an overemphasis on women as matriarchs whilst failing to acknowledge the existing structural barriers to some women’s engagement in the public space. Research by Naureen C. Fink, Sara Zeiger and Rafia Bhulai contests the idea that women have a ‘unique’ role in CVE (Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016). De Jonge Oudraat (2016) denotes as fallacy the belief of western policymakers that in many cultures—particularly, Islamic ones—women may not be very visible in the public sphere but remain powerful forces in the domestic sphere. Her research in Nigeria instead reveals that children and husbands can often show disrespect for their mothers and wives even in the domestic space. This is not to say that these women are either incapable or ignorant, rather that they struggle to exercise power in this context. Under those circumstances the survival strategy of many women—particularly mothers—can be denial (de Jonge Oudraat 2016). Focusing on Afghanistan, Ahmadi and Lakhani (2016) argue, “Poor women’s influence within patriarchal communities is not a

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given” (pp.  6–7). Poverty and patriarchy can limit women’s ability to engage effectively in CVE. The authors cite instances of women who had no prior knowledge of male relatives’ decision to join the Taliban, and no access to men’s social realms, obviously limiting their ability to discourage or prevent these men’s radicalisation (Ahmadi and Lakhani 2016). The prevalence of traditional patriarchal norms within families wherever they live, in addition to wider societal patriarchy, can act to limit engagement in CVE (Winterbotham and Pearson 2016). Overemphasising the role of women can also cause the blame for radicalisation of family members to fall solely on mothers (True 2018). Positioning of women as key agents to counter radicalisation seems to shift the state’s responsibility to protect and prevent violent extremism on to the shoulders of women (Giscard d’Estaing 2017). Brown (2020) argues that underpinning the focus on mothers and wives is the notion that perceived poor parenting, including failure to provide a good religious education, or failure to live up to the ideals of a good wife, correlates to radicalisation of sons or husbands (Giscard d’Estaing 2017). The concern is that this translates into: good mothers do not produce radicals, which may put women at risk within their communities and from the government if they fail to be said ‘good mothers’ (Giscard d’Estaing 2017). Yet, in reality, even those in families where women do have relative gender equality, the mothers and fathers of children involved in violent extremist activities can be disillusioned and sceptical of preventive measures. There is strong evidence regarding both the social nature of radicalisation processes and the limitations of parents in preventing radicalisation (Winterbotham and Pearson 2016; Sikkens et  al. 2017). The family is actually a complex site for CVE (and radicalisation). On one hand it is seen as a site for adult moderation of youthful radicalisation and deviant violence, with parents, usually imagined to be mothers, cautioning their children against extremism. Practitioners assert that diverse contexts, including northern Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, have demonstrated the important role of families and social networks in ensuring the success of deradicalisation and disengagement programmes. Families of former violent extremists are, for example, reported to be particularly critical in the rehabilitation process (Hedayah and the Global Center 2014). On the other hand, the family may also affirm extremist ideologies, modes of belonging and behaviours, normalising racism, patriarchy and membership of extremist groups.

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That said, challenging these findings, qualitative empirical research consisting of 21 in-depth interviews with Dutch former radicals and their family members found that neither group recognised the direct influence of parents on radicalisation or deradicalisation (Sikkens et  al. 2017). Research rather tends to emphasise the significance of peers in the radicalisation process. Most individuals who become violent extremists do so after a period of socialisation, whether in a peer group or an organised group (Glazzard et  al. 2015). Those who have violent extremists among their kinship or peer groups are, evidence suggests, most likely to become violent extremists themselves, as radicalisation is fundamentally about who you know (Sageman 2004, 2008; Bakker 2006). The Global Equality Agenda: Empowering Women in Developing Contexts and Integrating Them at Home Overseas interventions that attempt to take a gendered approach to CVE, which are predominantly driven and funded by western policymakers, are based on the assumptions outlined above of women as peaceful, moderate and maternal (Brown et al. 2019). Many of the biases and flawed assumptions that have driven western efforts in engaging women in CVE have therefore been globalised. This reflects the fact that, in part due to the legacy of the War on Terror, CVE interventions are often based on an understanding of the position of Muslim women, which has stemmed from countries such as Iran and Afghanistan and been homogenised and extrapolated to Muslim women globally, irrespective of geopolitical and socio-historical specificities and internal heterogeneity (Rashid 2014). This, combined with the association of women with peace, has led to the empowerment and participation of women or gender equality becoming a necessary part of the prevention of violent extremism. In FCAS, the rationale for this is to empower women who are constrained by conservative societies. In the West, empowerment efforts have become equated with (failed) integration. Turning first to policies and approaches in developing countries and FCAS, policymakers and practitioners have acknowledged that in situations where women’s roles are constrained due to conservative or patriarchal communities or families, the solution is to empower women as part of CVE interventions (Couture 2014b). Shepherd argues this is based on the construction of women abroad as ‘Helpless Victims’. This discourse is “heavily racialized, as the ‘privileged discursive position’ held by ‘the

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nation’ is reinforced by ‘a whole history of global dominance—of imperialism and colonialism” (Tomlinson 1991 cited in Shepherd 2006, 25). Women are thus identified as ‘third world’, “read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimised etc.”(Shepherd 2006, 25). CVE programmes based on promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment overseas have therefore proved increasingly popular responses to countering violent extremism based on the concept that progress on broader gender empowerment indicators can prevent radicalisation to violence, whilst also fulfilling objectives to promote women’s rights and gender equality. This translates in real world applications to the supposition that an increase in women’s empowerment (economically, politically and socially) within their families and communities and gender equality have a positive effect on countering extremism, as in peace-building (Couture 2014b). This has translated into “theories of change that the empowerment of women and closing the gap on gender inequalities will make a positive contribution to countering violent extremism” (Ahmadi and Lakhani 2016, 12). These principles are captured in UNSCR 2242, which encourages UN Member States to increase their funding on Women, Peace and Security and increase international development cooperation in conflict and post-conflict situations for programmes that further gender equality and women’s empowerment (United Nations 2015). The UNDP also actively outlines the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment as vital to efforts in preventing violent extremism (Saeedi and Fransen 2018). Yet, it is important not to conflate contexts, nor to equate the factors of conflict with those of violent extremism, even where these can be hard to distinguish. Correlation does not imply causality (Giscard d’Estaing 2017), and it is not inevitable that broad programmes aimed at empowering women will inevitably increase their ability or willingness to engage in CVE, or will reduce levels of violent extremism in a particular country, at least in the short term. In practice, broader gender equality and empowerment agendas risk being repackaged into short-term, security-focused projects. In some contexts, the strength of gender inequalities may be too great to address within the span of one project life cycle. In places where women’s voices and agency are restricted, short-term efforts to empower women or increase their self-confidence, alongside developing skills to identify the indicators of radicalisation, are likely to have limited impact on countering violent extremism. In some contexts, it may be important before engaging women in CVE to first induce a broader cultural shift

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in local perceptions of gender (RUSI 2017), including masculinities. This is a big, cross-­generational task. It has implications for programming and challenges the contention that focusing solely on women’s empowerment in one project or programme will be enough to mobilise women in preventing violent extremism. Meanwhile, a key lesson learned from STRIVE Horn of Africa, a pilot CVE Project implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) with funding from the EU, was that conflating prevention with gender empowerment diminishes the traction CVE initiatives are liable to generate in conservative societies. As a result, the efficacy of CVE may be diluted in the very areas it is most needed (RUSI 2017). Inadvertently, these programmes could also increase violence in the form of backlash from violent extremist groups. In Nigeria, one area of analysis (that perhaps needs further scholarly attention) suggests that violent extremism is in part a reaction to the promotion of women’s rights and the ending of traditional practices judged harmful. Ibifuro (2015) links this to patriarchy and prevailing structural and cultural violence against women by Nigeria’s Federal Government and security institutions. This does not mean that CVE efforts should not be gender sensitive. Instead, critics suggest that pursuing gender empowerment and equality programmes under a CVE umbrella risks instrumentalising and securitising women’s rights. Whilst acknowledging the broader benefits of gender equality to society in relation to violence, some scholars express fears that gender empowerment risks being seen as a tool for CVE (see Huckerby 2015; de Jonge Oudraat 2016). Huckerby (2015) urges caution in this space and argues it is important that gender empowerment is not seen as a tool for CVE. Conflating empowerment agendas with security-focused ones could be counter-productive and risks undermining both, or could create gendered security harms (Huckerby 2020). Gender equality should be promoted in its own right and women should be empowered to participate fully in society, not be instrumentalised to ‘spy’ on their communities (OSCE 2013). There are subsequent concerns that this could result in women’s rights being compromised or bargained away in order to bring about security gains (Huckerby 2015; OSCE 2013). In the West, CVE efforts targeting gender equality and empowerment appear to be driven by the implicit assumption that the failed assimilation of Muslims and more general failures of multiculturalism contribute to radicalisation, and that gender equality is an important part of integration (Brown 2013; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Winterbotham and Pearson 2016).

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In the Netherlands, Bracke (2011) focuses on CVE programmes which have been linked to initiatives integrating Muslim women through secularisation. These have been criticised for seeking to impose a particular understanding of equality on Dutch Muslim women (Bracke 2011). In relation to the UK history of CVE, Huckerby (2011) has argued that when integration or resilience activities are blurred with counter-terrorism and Muslim communities are only engaged on counter-terrorism issues, women’s insecurity can increase and their willingness to engage with authorities decrease. These effects result in part because women can feel wholly discouraged from accessing all services for fear of exposing themselves and family members to undue scrutiny by security agencies (Huckerby 2016). It is not yet even clear that women’s CVE projects actually work, even in the West. In terms of impact, while women’s community projects implemented in the UK under Prevent pre-2011 brought benefits such as improving access to services, education and the arts, this did not inevitably translate into improving women’s response to terrorism (Huckerby 2011).4 At best, the impact of countering violent extremism programming focused on women’s empowerment was defined therefore as ‘ambiguous’ (Idris and Abdelaziz 2017). What ‘Works’: What Do We Know? As with broader CVE implementation, there is (as yet) no tangible evidence that programmes targeting women have a significant advantage. The lack of systematic evaluations of gender-specific CVE interventions makes it difficult to assess the potential of existing approaches. At the moment, on the ground, gendered CVE generally equates to the inclusion of women. The London think-tank RUSI has been conducting a programme of CVE evaluation, including of those invoking gender, in an ‘Evidence base review of P/CVE interventions’.5 This publication notes that the CVE field suffers from a distinct lack of evaluations, particularly independent reports that are publicly available (Khalil and Zeuthen 2016; Lindekilde 2012). As a result, the field “has been criticized for not sufficiently testing assumptions with systematic and empirically based research” (UNDP 2018, 7). However, evaluations are underway, led by a diverse range of institutions, and that might change. 4 5

 The Prevent strategy was reformulated in 2011 to be more security-focused.  Produced throughout 2020 in a series of thematic publications.

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It is possible that in the future CVE programmes can be proven to produce positive results. Based on the evaluations and literature that exist, RUSI has produced some tentative findings. One is that CVE initiatives are identified to have a greater chance of success if they capitalise on pre-­ existing roles for women in the public space, rather than expecting women to be able to influence power in the domestic sphere. For example, though further evidence is required, a programme in Morocco using murshidat, religious scholars who are women, helped endorse gender equality by in part reinforcing and restructuring the role that women have always fulfilled in mosques and other institutions, but also disrupting the commonly held assumptions about male official religious authority being more legitimate (Couture 2014b; El Haitami 2014; Myers 2018). That said, the impact of this on violent extremism in Morocco is much harder to identify. The evidence does suggest that efforts to challenge men’s control of the security sphere are needed. Efforts to include women at all levels of security policy and programme planning are essential. This includes broadening women’s understanding of what their ‘roles’ are. In Kenya, an independent evaluation of a project focused on improving interaction between women’s networks and the security sector found that evidence of success was in part due to the success in developing women’s understanding that they had the ability to engage in CVE compared to previously, when it was viewed as a man’s role (Abdilatif 2017). As a result, the project contributed to the elimination of stereotyping and misconceptions of women’s roles in CVE.  Meanwhile, the delivery of counter-narratives by women giving lectures in schools on CVE and the dangers of radicalisation was evaluated to have strengthened the use of non-coercive means to delegitimise extremist ideologies, which has been perceived to reduce the number of terrorist group supporters and recruits (Abdilatif 2017). Programmes are more likely to succeed if they are driven by the needs of communities and the women within them. In the Netherlands, inspired by the mothers of radicalised boys and girls who had suspected something was wrong but had not reported this, the mental health service Steunpunt Sabr worked with mothers to develop a mothers-based radicalisation awareness programme, ‘Oumnia Works’; this also engaged the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security and experts in the fields of psychology and theology (De Leede et  al. 2017). Participants of the programme stated that their knowledge on the issue of radicalisation and parenting increased significantly. They claim to be more involved with their communities, better aware of where to turn with their concerns and have more trust in local

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authorities and support facilities (De Leede et al. 2017). The programme is, however, subject to the same criticisms regarding maternalism and essentialist readings of women articulated throughout this chapter. Meanwhile, beneficiary perceptions, whilst important and useful, are insufficient measures of success in relation to tackling violent extremism. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, some positive findings are emerging from UN Women’s programmes aimed at building women’s economic empowerment and increasing their leadership and participation in  local communities, in order to increase social cohesion and challenge extremist ideology and related violence. As a result of the programme support, some 49 per cent of women in programme sites claim they knew what to do to prevent violent extremism in their families compared to 31 per cent in non-programme sites (True 2018, 23). The preliminary evaluation noted a strong positive relationship between women’s self-efficacy or confidence to join CVE initiatives, and reporting concerns about VE and having greater trust in public institutions, suggesting that enhancing women’s knowledge and skills on community actions had an impact on their ability and willingness to engage in CVE efforts (True 2018). There is, however (at the time of writing), no clear evaluation data at the intervention level to be able to assess what types of intervention had more chance of success but clearly these efforts are worth further interrogation. Conceptually, many of these programmes can also be critiqued for seeking to strengthen women’s informal roles, rather than insisting on women’s full and formal participation in the security sector. They therefore fail to reconcile the criticisms of instrumentalisation noted previously. At best therefore, it is possible to say that certain programmes may produce positive results, but evidence is needed. The countries of this research (Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) are among the original contexts in which the global industry and epistemic CVE community have developed—albeit drawing on discourses and experiences grounded in the War on Terror. These countries support CVE worldwide, have initiatives which are considered ‘best practice’ and produce researchers, policymakers and practitioners who train and guide those in this field all over the world. Their collective reach, assumptions and influence are significant.

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Conclusion Understanding the gendered context and the gendered nature of violent extremism is key. This chapter began by examining what violent extremism is, and how CVE has its roots in military counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism—that is, in the hearts and minds operations of the War on Terror. The battlefield of the War on Terror was not purely spatially defined, allowing for the blurring of civilian-military distinctions. Even as CVE became ‘civilianised’ it did not lose the military state security logic. The breadth of CVE activities is in part due to the ambiguity and flexibility open to states because the War on Terror lacked firm definitional foundations, with VE encompassing a range of activities and motivations that destabilised the status quo. In most definitions, what unites ‘violent extremists’ tends to be their willingness to use violence to ensure their vision of the future is realised and as far as possible adhered to in the present, often to the detriment of human rights and the lives of those who do not share it. CVE therefore involves addressing both violent ideas and violent action, which is another reason for the potentially intrusive range of interventions, policies and strategies across all areas of civilian life. At the level of the individual, a causal link between extremist ideas and violent action is not always easy to establish; however, extremist ideas appear to create a permissive discursive space, or milieu, in which violent action occurs. The milieu becomes an important framing for VE, CVE and our research methodology—a concept we address in Chap. 4. These roots and definitional debates help us understand the limitations in CVE regarding women’s participation—limitations derive from military and societal stereotypes about women’s shortcomings in combat. In other words, CVE that addresses women often seeks to ‘educate’ women such that they can stop or report VE or radicalisation of men and boys. It is assumed that VE is a male prerogative. However, these stereotypes of men’s aggression and women’s peaceful nature result in flawed policies, limited interventions and little insight into women’s own motivations and agency. Instead we work in this book with a broader understanding of gender—as performative, constructed and structural. Gender can be thought of as roles, attributes and activities that a society considers appropriate for men and women; it is also however a process of judgement and value about certain forms of masculinities and femininities, with some forms being given more power and value than others. Gender is therefore a chief power organiser of global politics, and along with race and class, we

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can see how the idea of ‘women in CVE’ is a flawed way to investigate and frame the challenges ahead. CVE stemming from particular ideas about gender and VE has an internal logic and coherence—namely state security and a link between ‘ideas and action’. CVE is not static and there have been shifts in understanding and in types of programming as a community of practice grows. Particularly, we are witnessing: an increase in the range of ‘practitioners’ involved in CVE (leading some to complain about a growing ‘CVE industry’); firmer links to upholding human security goals; and security sector reform. However, understanding how these shifts emerge and how different groups and their goals are included in CVE is important in knowing how CVE will adapt to different threats, and also whether it will succeed. The processes of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the nature and success of any reforms, help us understand why the logics of CVE may not be successfully conveyed to or accepted by the communities who are the targets of, and who experience the effects of, CVE. This chapter suggests that current gendered assumptions in the field stem from CVE’s origins in the War on Terror and a prevailing and inherent gender bias in the security field based on essentialist and orientalist understandings of (Muslim) women. Recognition of this history is important as other threats are prioritised, such as that from the far right, considered in Chap. 7. Engaging women in CVE is essential but needs to be handled with sensitivity. Programmes should be based on evidence and an active engagement with what women on the ground want and need. Failing to do this risks undermining the goals of CVE programmes whilst potentially politicising, securitising and hence weakening efforts to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment. As a result, not only might programmes prove insufficient in tackling violent extremism, but they could also result in increasing women’s vulnerability. The framing of CVE as part of the global War on Terror is important when seeking to understand the significance of this five-country research. In these countries, the War on Terror is presented in a global imaginary as ‘outside’ and yet through CVE has resolutely influenced and altered the lives of many ‘at home’. CVE is understood as a specific set of endeavours to address the push and pull factors of violent extremism, through a range of targeted interventions in the home, in schools, in the security sector and across civil society. The depth of its influence on policy, lives and security is significant, and the reach of this field is global. Some of this is because it mirrors the reach and depth of its counterpart, namely violent

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extremism, but it is also because globally, governments and practitioners have attempted to pre-empt and reduce the risks of violence. Like the War on Terror, CVE cannot escape the organising logics of race and gender, resulting in flawed policy and practical outcomes. Focusing on those of gender, this chapter shows how historic false stereotypes about women as weak-minded, weak-bodied and weakly located in societies meant that for many in the security and policy world they were not relevant to the war on terrorism, except as people to liberate from Muslim men. These flawed assumptions meant that women were not ‘seen’ in violent extremism, even when present; they were only incorporated as victims. The emergence of Daesh meant women could no longer be ignored. Still though, the assumption was that they were always seduced, groomed and otherwise victims of men, while the truth is more complex. These gendered assumptions about women also saw masculinities and men’s emotions and their relations with women, as well as other men, overlooked. As gender-blind theories of terrorism (based on a presumed rational male actor) fed into the theories for CVE, these stereotypes and gender logics were replicated. CVE is not static, and over time the community of practitioners and policymakers have had to address gender and women (albeit in these limited ways), but the collective surprise at women’s participation in violent extremism tells us more about our societies than it does about the evolution of terrorism. It is for this reason that this volume focuses on the countries that it does. As exporters of CVE ‘best practice’ a critical self-­ reflection is needed. Drawing on the positives, policymakers and practitioners increasingly do think about gender. Yet, despite the progress outlined, the implementation of gendered CVE can raise both ethical and practical challenges. For instance, women are still mainly instrumental to men’s radical violence with an insufficient focus on the specific radicalisation of women. As a result, there is still a need for better mechanisms and infrastructure for women-specific prevention and deradicalisation programmes. Additionally, many initiatives to engage women fail to properly incorporate a gender perspective, the purpose of this book. Gender is continuously equated with a homogenous group of women, who are portrayed largely as informal agents, associated with civil society, as well as other vulnerable groups who must be both protected and empowered. There is a tension, which is not easily reconciled, between those who welcome efforts to empower women and those resisting the roles simultaneously assigned to women in these narratives as victims and maintainers of peace.

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This can reinforce the dichotomies between masculine, formal, government-­led security and feminine, informal, civil society-led peace. A United Nations Panel on women in CVE in 2014 outlined the need to create political space for women’s engagement; to treat them as leaders; to resist stereotypes of specific roles and identities; to challenge dominant narratives; and to amass more primary data. There were also reminders that women in CVE could challenge not just religious, but nationalist extremism, and in many languages, and that women’s rights should not be securitised and conflated with CVE agendas (Georgetown University 2014; UN Web TV 2014). The opportunity therefore exists to make gendered CVE better. This book, the participants in this research and our accompanying recommendations constitute an attempt to contribute to ongoing work to improve CVE in the way it engages with gender. It should be noted that this chapter has focused on jihadism because it has charted the history of gendered CVE today, which is rooted in countering this ideology. However, CVE is gradually beginning to incorporate ideologies that have tended to be neglected: the far right, leftist groups and some ethno-nationalist causes that had previously been dealt with through a conflict prevention framework. Chapter 7 addresses radical and far right violent extremism and gender, and how to counter them, exploring theory and findings together. The next chapter considers the history of gendered CVE in the countries of research in this book: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. It addresses the current CVE landscape, outlining measures to address both jihadism and the far right in the countries of study.

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Nagarajan, Chitra. 2018. Gender Assessment of Northeast Nigeria. https://www. academia.edu/35870632/Gender_Assessment_of_Northeast_Nigeria. Nesiah, Vasuki. 2012. Feminism as Counter-Terrorism: The Seduction of Power. In Gender, National Security, and Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Perspectives, ed. Margaret L.  Satterthwaite and Jayne Huckerby. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Neumann, Peter R. 2008. Introduction. In Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence—Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, ed. P.R.  Neumann, 3–7. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ Perspectives-on-Radicalisation-Political-Violence.pdf. ———. 2013. The Trouble with Radicalization. International Affairs 89 (4): 873–893. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12049. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to—Part I. Just Security (blog), May 1. https://www. justsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/. Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI). 2001. Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality. See https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet1.pdf. O’Rourke, Lindsey a. 2009. What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism? Security Studies 18 (4): 681–718. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09636410903369084. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 2011. Women and Terrorist radicalisation. OSCE. http://polis.osce.org/ library/f/4061/3772/OSCE-AUT-RPT-4061-EN-3772. ———. 2013. Women and Terrorist Radicalization: Final Report. Vienna, Austria: OSCE-ODIHR. http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99919. Parashar, Swati. 2009. Feminist International Relations and Women Militants: Case Studies from Sri Lanka and Kashmir. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22 (2): 235–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570902877968. Pearson, Elizabeth. 2016. The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad. Policy and Internet 8 (1): 5–33. ———. 2018a. Why Men Fight and Women Do not: Masculinity and Extremist Violence. Debunking Myths on Gender and Extremism. London: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. http://institute.global/insight/co-existence/ why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence. ———. 2018b. Wilayat Shahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the Question of the Female Suicide Bomber. In Boko Haram: Behind the Headlines, ed. Jason Warner and Jacob Zenn. CTC Sentinel. ———. 2021. Inside UK Extremism: Making Radical Men (Working Title). London: Hurst.

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Pearson, Elizabeth, and Emily Winterbotham. 2017. Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation. The RUSI Journal 0 (0): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/03 0.71847.2017.1353251. Penny, Laurie. 2014. Laurie Penny on Elliot Rodger: Mental illness does not excuse violent misogyny. New Statesman. https://www.newstatesman.com/ politics/2014/05/mental-illness-does-not-excuse-violent-misogyny. Perešin, Anita. 2015. Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS. Perspectives on Terrorism 9 (3) http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/427. Peterson, V. Spike, and Anne Sisson Runyan. 1993. Global Gender Issues. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Post, Jerrold M. 2005. When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism. Political Psychology 26 (4): 615–636. Puar, Jasbir K., and Amit S.  Rai. 2002. Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots. Social Text 20 (3): 117–148. https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-20-3_72-117. Puechguirbal, Nadine. 2010. Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents. International Peacekeeping 17 (2): 172–187. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533311003625068. Rashid, Naas. 2014. Giving the Silent Majority a Stronger Voice? Initiatives to Empower Muslim Women as Part of the UK’s “War on Terror”. Ethnic and Racial Studies 37 (4): 589–604. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987 0.2013.816759. Regan, Patrick M., and Aida Paskeviciute. 2003. Women’s Access to Politics and Peaceful States. Journal of Peace Research 40 (3): 287–302. https://doi.org/1 0.1177/0022343303040003003. Romaniuk, Peter. 2015. Does CVE Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism. Global Center on Cooperative Security. https:// www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Does-CVEWork_2015.pdf. Rosand, Eric, Emily Winterbotham, Michael Jones, and Franziska Praxl-Tabuchi. 2018. The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda. The Prevention Project and RUSI. Runyan, A., and V.  Spike Peterson. 2013. Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. RUSI. 2017. Strive Lessons Learned: Horn of Africa—Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism, Final Research Report. London: European Commission. http://ct-morse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/StriveLessons-Learned-Report-Final-Version.pdf. ———. 2021. Draft Meeting Summary Notes, Enhancing Global-Local Cooperation in Multi-Disciplinary PVE/CVE Efforts, September 24–25, 2018, New York. The Prevention Project, the Global Centre for Cooperative Security and RUSI. Sabir, R. 2017. Blurred Lines and False Dichotomies: Integrating Counterinsurgency into the UK’s Domestic ‘war on terror’. Critical Social Policy 37 (2): 202–224.

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Saeedi, Nika, and Rosalie Fransen. 2018. Violent Extremism Reopens the Conversation about Women and Peace. UNDP (blog), March 29. https:// www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2018/violent-extremismreopens-the-conversation-about-women-and-peace.html. Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. ———. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 1st ed. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Saltman, Erin Marie, and Melanie Smith. 2015. “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part” Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. http:// www.strategicdialogue.org/publications/. Satria, Fitriani, and Alif Satria. 2018. The Women Who Seek Meaning in Terrorism. The Jakarta Post, May. https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/ 2018/05/17/the-women-who-seek-meaning-in-terrorism.html. Schweitzer, Yoram, Aviad Mendelboim, and Yotam Rosner. 2017. Suicide Attacks in 2016: The Highest Number of Fatalities. INSS. Shepherd, Laura J. 2006. Veiled References: Constructions of Gender in the Bush Administration Discourse on the Attacks on Afghanistan Post-9/11. International Feminist Journal of Politics 8 (1): 19–41. https://doi. org/10.1080/14616740500415425. ———. 2008. Power and Authority in the Production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. International Studies Quarterly 52 (2): 383–404. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00506.x. Sikkens, Elga, Marion van San, Stijn Sieckelinck, and Micha de Winter. 2017. Parental Influence on Radicalization and De-Radicalization According to the Lived Experiences of Former Extremists and Their Families. Journal for Deradicalization 12 (2017): 192–226. Sjoberg, Laura. 2013. Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 2015. Seeing Sex, Gender, and Sexuality in International Security. International Journal 70 (3): 434–453. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0020702015584590. Steans, Jill. 2008. Telling Stories about Women and Gender in the War on Terror. Global Society 22 (1): 159–176. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13600820701740795. Striegher, Jason-Leigh. 2015. Violent-Extremism: An Examination of a Definitional Dilemma. Australian Security and Intelligence Conference. https://doi.org/10.4225/75/57a945ddd3352. True. 2018. Building an Evidence Base on Empowering Women for Peaceful Communities. Research Note. Monash Gender, Peace and Security Oxfam Bangladesh in Bangladesh and Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in Indonesia Centre: UN Women.

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UN News. 2016. UN Chief Introduces New Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism. UN News, January 15. https://news.un.org/en/story/ 2016/01/520032-un-chief-introduces-new-action-plan-prevent-violentextremism. UN Web TV. 2014. The Role of Women in Countering Violent Extremism—Panel Discussion. http://webtv.un.org/watch/the-role-of-women-in-counteringviolent-extremism-panel-discussion/3862565549001. UN Women. 2001. OSAGI Gender Mainstreaming—Concepts and Definitions. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm. UNCTED. 2005. Frequently Asked Questions about UN Efforts to Combat Terrorism. United Nations. UNDP. 2016. Preventing Violent Extremism Through Inclusive Development and the Promotion of Tolerance and Respect for Diversity. UNDP. http:// www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussion-paper%2D%2D-preventing-violentextremism-through-inclusiv.html. ———. 2017. Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment. New York: United Nations Development Programme. https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDPJourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf. ———. 2018. Improving the Impact of Preventing Violent Extremism Programming. Oslo: United Nations Development Programme. http://www.arabstates. undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/librar y/Dem_Gov/improving-theimpact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html. United Nations. 2000. Resolution 1325 (2000). United Nations Security Council. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674. ———. 2015. UNSCR 2242. S/RES/2242 (2015). http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2242. ———. 2016. Ar/RES/70/291. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review. New York. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/ ares70291. United Nations Security Resolution. n.d. UNSCR 2396, S/RES/2396, 21 December 2017, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/sres23962017. USAID. 2011. The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy. Policy Report. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf. USIP. n.d. What Is U.N.  Security Council Resolution 1325 and Why Is It so Critical Today? United States Institute of Peace. Accessed November 9, 2014. http://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325. Vidino, Lorenzo. 2011. Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

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Warner, Jason, and Hilary Matfess. 2017. Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational and Demographic Characteristics of Boko Haram’s Suicide Bombers. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. CTC. https://ctc.usma.edu/ posts/report-exploding-stereotypes-the-unexpected-operational-anddemographic-characteristics-of-boko-harams-suicide-bombers. Winterbotham, Emily. 2018. Do Mothers Know Best? How Assumptions Harm CVE. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. http://institute.global/insight/ co-existence/do-mothers-know-best-how-assumptions-harm-cve. ———. 2020. What Can Work (and What Has Not Worked) in Women-Centric P/ CVE Initiatives: Assessing the Evidence Base for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, RUSI Occasional Papers, The Prevention Project, Tackling Extremism, Terrorism and Conflict, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/what-can-work-and-whathas-not-worked-women-centric-pcve-initiatives. Winterbotham, Emily, and Elizabeth Pearson. 2016. Different Cities, Shared Stories: A Five-Country Study Challenging Assumptions Around Muslim Women and CVE Interventions. RUSI Journal 161 (5). https://doi.org/1 0.1080/03071847.2016.1253377. Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1996. Women and the Biological Reproduction of “The Nation”. Women’s Studies International Forum 19 (1/2): 17–24. https://doi. org/10.1016/0277-5395(95)00075-5. Zimmerman, D., and C.  West. 2016. Doing Gender. In The Gendered Society Reader, ed. Michael S.  Kimmel and Amy Aronson, 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-gendered-society-reader-9780190260378?cc=us&lang=en.

CHAPTER 3

Understanding the Findings: Country Contexts

An Arab man [I know] said that his house was egged; multiple events like this happen. Why are you punishing us, what did we do? We are Canadians… we had nothing to do with the Paris attacks, we have nothing to do with ISIS. Why are you punishing us? —Young woman, Muslim community focus groups, Canada If religious radicalisation is dangerous, political radicalisation is just as dangerous, because it questions everything, including republican values that the French hold dear, regardless of their background, social class or culture. —Young woman, focus group on the far right, France

So far, we have outlined some of the problems of research and theory considering gender and violent extremism (VE), as well as programmes to counter this (CVE). One of the key difficulties with work on gender and violent extremism has been a lack of recognition of gender as an identity category and as a power relation, shaping and regulating people’s behaviours towards one another. In the context of violence and violent groups, analysis of gendered power relations is crucial to understanding how groups behave and why. Gender differences are key, and if they matter in shaping the ways in which violent extremism is expressed, they must be central to strategies to counter this (Pearson 2016; Winterbotham and Pearson 2016; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017). © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_3

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The primary concern of this book is not, however, theory. Violent extremism was not an abstract concept for many of the participants. Across countries, they described abuse, hate crimes and Islamophobia; they had views on migration; they opposed the far right, or they saw clearly the reasons why others support it; they had lost family or community members to Daesh. Participants were also linked. Some Muslim participants had migrated thousands of miles to their new homes, often via several countries. They had relatives and friends across continents. Even without such connections, events in one country could impact people in neighbouring countries, but also thousands of miles away (Jäckle and König 2018). This research sets out to understand more about the dynamics of both VE and CVE through conversations and discussions with people affected by these issues. The five countries selected present something of a common canvas for exploration: all are western, and four are European. All the countries considered here talk to one another; to a certain extent their citizens are also interconnected. Their strategies for policing and terrorism are formed in a relationship of learning from and with one another. All also understand extremism to exist in various forms. For Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, it is Daesh that is the key threat, with the far, radical or extreme right seen as secondary.1 For the UK government, Daesh is again the key security concern, with the far right understood as a ‘growing’ threat (Home Office 2018). France discusses Daesh and inspired ideologies as a threat and in its 2017 Defence and National Security Strategic Review named ‘populism’ as the potential security risk to Europe (French Government 2017). Some countries are relative newcomers to CVE; others have been using programmes to counter violent extremism for more than a decade. The UK’s Prevent Strategy emerged in 2006/2007 in response to the London Transport attacks of July 2005, commonly known as 7/7. This counter-­ radicalisation strategy focused on al-Qaida-inspired violence and has only since 2011 begun to address issues of the far right. The Netherlands too has been working to tackle Islamist extremism for some years through citywide schemes. Germany conversely has many years of experience of dealing with neo-Nazism and the far right. Interventions there were led by local community organisations, and a number of those working in this space later began to address jihadist extremism when this became apparent as a problem. Although Germany has a ‘national strategy’ on paper, in 1

 The distinctions in terminology describing the ‘far right’ are explored in Chap. 7.

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practice German CVE continues to be delivered on an ad hoc basis by independent local organisations (Neumann 2016). Of the five countries, France has been the last to address extremism. With its culture of laïcité, France has perhaps the most deep-rooted challenges to attempts to tackle complex issues involving faith and identity. The concept ensures the distinction of state and religion and the maintenance of a robust secularism that privileges the collective identity of citizens as members of a state above individualism (Troper 1999; Colosimo 2017). Francophone Canada’s Québec region also institutes a version of laïcité. These five countries were selected because they have things in common and also things apart: five different histories, five different demographics, five different threat pictures. The task for the research set out in this book was to understand the gender dynamics of both violent extremism and countering it in these countries. What we found was that in spite of these important differences, many of the participants’ reflections on gender, violent extremism and countering violent extremism shared themes (see Winterbotham and Pearson 2016; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017).

Five Countries: Gender Policy and Practices This chapter introduces the reader to the context of each country and the security landscapes of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. It provides the landscape to comments from focus groups and interviews from all five countries presented in the findings. Although the research was conducted between 2015 and early 2016, this chapter highlights developments up until late 2019/early 2020. This chapter also addresses how countries understand gender and the ways in which it is present—or absent—in their policies and interventions. It is clear that, in policy terms, gender has largely meant ‘women’; second, that the primary focus on Daesh of much gendered (and other) CVE work in Europe means an explicit engagement with Muslim women, with mixed results in terms of community perceptions of the efficacy of programming, as Chaps. 5, 6 and 7 explore. This chapter also considers the ways in which countries address other forms of extremism, including the extreme, radical or far right or white supremacism.

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The Wider European Context Jihadist terrorism has affected Europe for decades, with the 2004 Madrid attacks a turning point. Nesser suggests that prior to this date, jihadists in Europe tended to be North African, and with experience of global conflict theatres, such as Algeria, Chechnya or Afghanistan. After 2004 he suggests two things happened within the global jihad: Europeanisation and juvenilisation. Women had been involved in jihadist support networks through the 1990s and 2000s in Europe too (Nesser 2010). However, the ‘feminisation’ of European jihad, as noted in Chap. 2, came with the emergence of Daesh and its 2014 self-declared ‘Caliphate’. As the physical territory of the ‘Caliphate’ suffered losses from 2016–2017 onwards, increasing numbers of so-called returnees became the primary terrorism threat for countries in the West, creating legal and security challenges for the countries these foreign fighters and their families return to. Additionally, with the loss of the Daesh proto-state, the threat has also shifted, from the Levant and migration there to join the jihad, to countries in the West that are home to radical Islamists and would-be jihadists (Coolsaet and Renard 2018). Returnees were not considered a key security concern during the research period, however, and did not therefore emerge as a significant theme in interviews or focus groups. Another important part of the backdrop to this research was the increasing rise of power for both far right, and also right-wing populist parties opposing immigration, and in particular, government responses to the ‘migration crisis’, an ongoing political and social issue (Deutsche Welle 2019; Vehrkamp 2019; Mudde 2007). The migration movements into Europe and North America, which were a result of the civil war in Syria, among other conflicts, have factored in political propaganda in a wave of anti-immigration and far right sentiment, and right-­wing populism, discussed in greater detail in Chap. 7. Additionally, the emergence of new political parties focusing on opposition to the left, multiculturalism, Islamism and immigration has caused concern that radical and far right policies are no longer limited to the political margins (Minkenberg 2013; van Haute and Pauwels 2017; Tipaldu and Katrin 2018; Miller-Idriss 2017). Meanwhile, the ‘wave’ of right-wing extremism and nationalist populist parties in Europe and the West has also inspired a counter-movement of left-wing and anarchist extremism. Europe meanwhile also continues to be affected by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremism, which far outnumbers any other form of terror attack in the continent (see EUROPOL 2019, 13).

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Governments of the countries researched are not alone in responding to security threats; international institutions have also devised responses that shape the context of our case studies, notably the United Nations, the European Union (EU) and NATO.  For our case studies, the European Union is most significant in shaping policies and responses within four of the countries of study, while the other two more shape their actions overseas. The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the Council of the EU in November 2005, comprises four pillars, Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond, each of which addresses a different dimension of the risk from terrorism. This is the major statement of the EU’s policy and approach. The Strategy aims to reduce terrorism globally, whilst respecting human rights (European Council 2005). In 2017, the European Council drew up a new directive on the issue of foreign fighters, making it a criminal offence to travel to carry out an act of terrorism (European Union 2017). While the directive provides a comprehensive assessment of threats and potential actions to counter Daesh-related terrorism, there is no mention of gender, or of differences in the treatment or activities of men and women, girls and boys. The United Kingdom The UK sees jihadist terrorism as the primary security risk, with the far right secondary. In October 2019 the Metropolitan Police revealed 24 terror plots had been disrupted since March 2017, 16 jihadist plots and eight inspired by extreme right-wing views (Riley 2019). There is ongoing violence in Northern Ireland, as dissident republican groups assert the right to remove the British from the country. The past years have seen a number of terrorist attacks. The jihadist incident with the most fatalities was in 2005, when four suicide attackers killed 52 people on the London Underground and a bus (Kirby 2007). Then in 2013, two men killed an off-duty soldier, Lee Rigby, beheading him in a London street, outside his Woolwich barracks (Doward 2013). In 2017 there were four high-profile events that caused a number of fatalities. On 22 March, claiming support for Daesh, Khalid Masood drove a car at high speed into pedestrians crossing Westminster Bridge, near the Houses of Parliament in London, killing four. Police then shot him. Two months later Salman Abedi, a young British Libyan, carried out a suicide attack at the Manchester Arena, targeting mainly women and children attending a concert by Ariana Grande. Some 22 people died. Just weeks later, a group of three jihadists attacked

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people in London Bridge, South London, killing eight. Police then shot the attackers. In September, a bomb exploded on a tube train at Parson’s Green, injuring 22 (McGuinness 2017). Teenager Ahmed Hassan, who had been fostered in the UK after arriving as a refugee from Iraq was subsequently arrested and jailed for life in 2018 (Cobain 2018). Jihadist Usman Khan then targeted an offender rehabilitation event at London Bridge in October 2019, killing two. The spate of attacks has increased fears around the threat of Daesh to UK citizens at home. Some 900 British people are known to have travelled to Syria and Iraq and potentially gained skills in combat and bomb-­making. Of those, most were men; however, a significant minority (17 per cent) were women (Cook and Vale 2019). A number made media headlines as so-called jihadi brides, in particular three teenagers, labelled ‘the Bethnal Green girls’. Shamima Begum, Amira Abase and Kadiza Sultana followed a fourth young woman from their London secondary school to join Daesh. Other high-profile women migrants to the group include Sally Jones, a white convert to Islam, who took a son to Syria; Grace Dare, a convert from Christianity who had Nigerian parents; teenaged twins Salma and Zahra Halane, who were star students; and ‘Umm Layth’, a teenager from Glasgow who became a prolific recruiter online at the height of the call to hijrah to the so-called Caliphate (Stacey 2017; BBC News 2015c). A number of British women were reportedly among those active for the women’s ‘morality’ police, the al-Khansaa Brigade, notorious for the brutal punishment of women infringing Daesh rules on such things as public dress (Bhutia 2015). The emergence of such women challenged policy conceptions of what it meant to be a ‘jihadi’. Post-Daesh, women are regarded by the British state as a threat. This has led to some discussion of how to deal with returning women affiliated with Daesh. Although two other women were already known to have returned, the British government denied an appeal for return from Shamima Begum, who travelled to join Daesh aged 15, instead revoking her citizenship (Cook and Vale 2019; Yusuf and Swann 2019). To date, only one woman has carried out a violent jihadist attack in the UK, the student Roshonara Choudhry, in an attack predating Daesh. Choudhry, a teenaged student, stabbed and injured her local Member of Parliament Stephen Timms, claiming she supported al-Qaida, and wanted to retaliate against Timms for his voting record on Iraq (Pearson 2016; The Guardian 2010). Despite the fact that from 2001/2002 to 2016/2017, 96 per cent of convictions for terrorism offences were of men, as well as 91 per cent of arrests, more women have been arrested

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post-Daesh. Laws have changed to expand the remit of what constitutes a terrorist or terrorist-related criminal activity, and there is the additional criminalisation of travel to Daesh in Iraq or Syria (as well as travelling abroad to join a terrorist organisation more generally) and support for the group (Simcox et al. 2011; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Allen and Dempsey 2018). In 2017, women made up 15 per cent of all terrorism arrests (Allen and Dempsey 2018). Women have also been arrested and jailed for support of violence, and for involvement in terrorist plots. The case of Safaa Boular was particularly serious; the teenager was arrested along with her sister and mother and convicted of plotting a terrorist attack in central London. This was the first example of an all-women cell in the UK, with a then 15-year-old Boular heavily influenced by a Daesh fighter 17 years her senior, Naweed Hussain (Counter Terrorism Policing 2018). The two met online, while he was fighting for Daesh in the Middle East (Dixon 2018). In 2019, Boular’s lawyer successfully compared her case with child sexual exploitation, arguing she had been groomed by Hussain (Williams 2019). In fact, women have been involved in jihadist movements in the UK for some time. They have been active in non-violent roles in the now-banned al-Muhajiroun, led by the radical preacher Anjem Choudary, as they have in other extreme groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Nawaz 2013; Wiktorowicz 2005). Choudary has been a particularly influential figure, in the UK and beyond. He and other radical preachers were actively recruiting in British mosques and universities in the 1990s and 2000s with relatively few consequences, leading some to label London ‘Londonistan’ (Gove 2007; Thomas 2003; Phillips 2017; Nesser 2016; Foley 2013). This was a period in which a number of ‘radical clerics’ preached in mosques and universities, including Abu Hamza al-Masri, Sheikh al-Feisal, Omar Bakri Mohammed and Abu Qatada (Clutterbuck 2010). Some have since been deported. Choudary, as a leading radical figure during this period, travelled widely, setting up jihadist groups under the ‘4Shariah’ label across Europe. In the UK, al-Muhajiroun has been involved in the institution of so-called Muslim patrols, enforcing Shariah norms. Actors involved in the attack on Lee Rigby in Woolwich and the 2017 murders near to London Bridge were also linked to Choudary’s network. Choudary’s group is said to be connected to up to half of British jihadist terrorist incidents and also lost a number of activists to Daesh when it called for fighters (Eleftheriou-Smith 2015; Pantucci 2015; Weeks 2020). Choudary has also been an important figure online, where he was broadly supportive of an Islamic state, until his

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arrest in 2016 (Dodd 2016; Pearson 2018). Al-Muhajiroun and Choudary ostensibly however support the ‘Covenant of Security’, which prohibits attacks on one’s nation of residence, unless in periods of ‘war’ (Clutterbuck 2010; Weeks 2020). Choudary has publicly condemned, therefore, UK terror attacks and, in a 2016 interview with Pearson, distanced himself from the perpetrators of attacks including Woolwich. As noted previously, the UK has also seen a degree of extreme-right violence, and the far right is identified by the government as a secondary security risk. There are a growing number of white supremacist, neo-Nazi groups in the UK, and other radical right groups who specifically oppose Islam(ism) (Lowles 2018). The British government has proscribed the group National Action over concerns about the threat of violence (Macklin 2018). Other threats come not just from groups, but individuals without affiliation. In 2017, Darren Osborne drove a van from Wales to London to drive into Muslims gathered outside a mosque in Finsbury Park, killing one man and injuring twelve others. He claimed to have been inspired by Tommy Robinson, the founder of the anti-Islam(ist) group the English Defence League and a vocal campaigner against Islam and jihadism (Dearden 2018). The previous year, Thomas Mair, a man with links to neo-Nazi groups, shot, stabbed and killed the MP Jo Cox in cold blood in the street, apparently because of her stance on European unity. He shouted, “Britain First”, as he attacked, the name of a British anti-Islam(ist) group, although he had no proven membership (BBC News 2016a). Such events of terrorism are infrequent, but the police have warned that the risk of far right violence is growing. The domestic intelligence service MI5 now handles threats of far right violence, which are included in the national threat level (Security Service 2019, 2020; Dodd 2019). There is perhaps more widespread support for figures connected to the wider radical right anti-Islam(ist) movement. When the founder of the anti-Islam(ist) English Defence League (EDL), Tommy Robinson, was jailed in 2018 after filming in a court precinct, thousands protested for his release (Diebelius 2018). The EDL street movement was founded in 2009 in response to Islamist demonstrations in Luton by al-Muhajiroun, and in the wake of the demise of the far right British National Party. In 2011, it had an estimated 25–35,000 ‘members’,2 with thousands appearing at protests (Bartlett and Littler 2011). Although linked to football hooligan groups of previous decades, and promoting openly Islamophobic chants and slogans, the EDL now characterises itself as a street protest movement against Islamism, and a ‘human rights organisation’, open to  The EDL had no official membership or membership list.

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ethnic and other minorities, and not promoting violence (EDL 2016; Copsey 2010). The EDL is predominantly male, and women are seen more rarely at street demonstrations (Copsey 2010; Goodwin 2013; Treadwell and Garland 2011; Pilkington 2017). Nonetheless, Pilkington (2017) has noted that women proactively support the EDL and are committed to engagement as a way of expressing agency, and protecting women’s rights. Bartlett and Littler found men and women had different reasons for joining the EDL, with 45 per cent of men citing opposition to Islam, compared with 28 per cent of women (Bartlett and Littler 2011, 6). This contrasts with a study by Spierings and Zaslove of men and women’s support for populist radical right groups in seven European countries, not including the UK, which suggests men’s and women’s reasons are similar, and primarily concern immigration (Spierings and Zaslove 2015). There are a number of other active anti-Islam(ist) and radical right groups in the UK, including the English Volunteer Force, England is Ours, For Britain, ‘Infidels’ groups and Britain First, founded in 2011 and adopting a more Christian and traditional far right stance (Britain First 2015; Allen 2014). Britain First has links both to the racist British National Party (BNP) and Irish Unionist paramilitary organisations (Bienkov 2014). Its tactic of ‘mosque invasion’, now banned, led to members entering mosques and accusing Muslims of sexism, as well as distributing Bibles (Hope Not Hate 2014; Dearden 2014). All these groups are predominantly homosocial; however, women are not just present in these organisations, but also take up important leadership roles. Until 2019, Britain First’s deputy leader was a woman, Jayda Fransen (Fransen 2019). Fransen is popular with Britain First supporters and has incentivised many women to support the group (Pearson 2020). CVE Responses The UK experience of unrest and at times conflict in overseas theatres and in Northern Ireland means that measures to engage with jihadist terrorism were able to draw from an existing CT and counter-insurgency template and legislation, and lessons from past mistakes (Clutterbuck 2010). Some would argue that not all those mistakes have been well learned. In particular, the fundamental logic of counter-insurgency—isolating terrorist or insurgent actors from the support of the communities they represent— was evident in counter-radicalisation efforts after the London Transport attacks of 7/7 (Clutterbuck 2010). The Prevent counter-radicalisation

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strategy remains controversial and unpopular with many British Muslims. A 2015 poll found four in ten held police and MI5 partly responsible for ‘radicalisation’ (Bingham 2015). A report by the Home Affairs Select Committee suggested a new name and ‘rebrand’ were needed for Prevent to function effectively (Home Affairs Select Committee 2016). Its name however remains. The UK has nonetheless paved the way for international CVE policy, to a large extent providing a template for similar strategies in Australia, Canada and the US (Koehler 2016). While other countries have been able to either emulate its methods or avoid them, the UK was a pioneer in its communities-­ based response. Prevent was born under Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2006/2007 in response to the London Transport attacks of July 2005, noted previously (Brighton 2007; HM Government 2009). There are different versions of the strategy for England and Wales, and the devolved government of Scotland.3 It is delivered through the police and local authorities and also many grassroots local organisations, funded to provide workshops. As set out in the previous chapter, the underlying Prevent logic was both racialised and gendered, with (male) jihadist extremism regarded in part as a question of ‘failed multiculturalism’, with integration the antidote. Within weeks of the 2005 attacks, Prime Minister Blair had proposed new anti-terrorism measures, which included “a commission to advise how to better integrate parts of the community ‘presently inadequately integrated’” (BBC News 2005). He subsequently set up this commission, in conjunction with the Home Office and Muslim communities to advise government on how to create “better integration” while remaining “consistent with their own religion and culture” (Blair 2005). The Tory leader and future Prime Minister David Cameron declared in 2007 that the “creed of multiculturalism” had contributed to a “deliberate weakening of our collective identity” (Cameron 2007). Successful integration as a consequence became “an important part of the fight against terrorism by ensuring that radicals do not have the political and moral ammunition to spread their ideologies” (Beutel 2007, 8). The assumption that ‘inadequate integration’ was to blame for the terrorist attacks led to the immediate establishment of the Preventing Extremism Together Project (PET), which focused on various social 3  Given that the research focused on England, reactions and comments to Prevent should not be considered representative of the wider UK.

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integration agenda items, including Muslim youth engagement, imam training and community-police relations, to name a few (Brighton 2007). As a consequence, Prevent programming was initially organised according to British Muslim demographics. In 2011, the new Coalition Government redrafted the policy in response to growing concerns that it had blurred community cohesion work with its security agenda (Meer and Modood 2009; Briggs 2010; Cameron 2011). The new 2011 Prevent also included the far right, in response to criticism that Islamophobia and white supremacism had been ignored by previous government interventions. The UK’s 2018 counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST explicitly acknowledged the far right as a “growing threat”, noting that intelligence services had disrupted four extreme right-wing terror plots in the last year and that the threat from the right-wing has “evolved in recent years and is growing” (Home Office 2018). While Foreign and Commonwealth Office strategies to prevent violent extremism abroad have included a consideration of gender and the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, Home Office strategies on domestic extremism including Prevent have mainly neglected issues of both women and gender (Stone and Parke 2016). The UK government had sought to consult with Muslim women from the outset on the best ways that counter-radicalisation efforts might include them. Prevent sought to engage Muslim women, and “strengthen the role that women can play within their communities. Women can play a vital role in…tackling violent extremism” (DCLG 2008, 9). However, women were cast in effectively essentialist roles, although they did not necessarily contest these, and actively engaged to prevent men’s violence, including travel to Iraq and Syria (Davenport 2016). The specialist project CHANNEL has sought to involve families alongside other agencies in deterring youth identified as ‘at risk’. It uses 22 ‘vulnerability factors’ to identify those most at risk and provide support to prevent further radicalisation (Koehler 2016; Qadir 2016). In 2018, only two of some hundred CHANNEL providers were women. Despite fears about the securitisation of the cohesion agenda, some Muslim women have also seized on such initiatives and taken up the baton in using government funding to lead efforts to stop radicalisation within their communities (Pearson 2020). However, when Prevent came into force, Muslim women in particular had reported unease that workshops to identify radicalisation encouraged them to spy on family members (Kundnani 2009; HM Government 2011)—the perception even if not the outcome

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or intention. In 2015 the government additionally published an extremism strategy and created a statutory Prevent duty for schools and others to report radicalisation (Home Office 2015). Failed integration is seen to stem from an absence of shared values, with the concept of values and shared values linked with the concept of citizenship. Counter-terrorism programmes generally have therefore been imbued with notions of ascribing to the national values of the society in which they are being implemented. In the UK this is captured in the latest iteration of the counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST (Home Office 2018): We believe it is essential to protect the values of our society—the rule of law, individual liberty, democracy, mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs—by tackling extremism in all its forms, including far-right extremism, which causes significant social harm in our communities.

Efforts to tackle far right extremism are led through Channel as well as community organisations. The Home Office in 2019 reported 44 per cent of referrals to Channel for the far right (although referrals are not the same as threats) (Home Office 2019). From 2011, those providing Prevent interventions have been obligated to also evaluate them, and there is now more data on their efficacy, with a commitment to drop those that do not provide value for money (Home Office 2011). Germany Germany has decades of experience of challenging extremism. It has grappled with the aftermath of the Nazi and neo-Nazi past, a wave of leftist violence in the 1970s and 1980s, and more recently, addressed jihadist extremism. Its longest history is in challenging the far right, and Germany is home to a number of explicitly far right political parties such as the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) and numerous banned neo-Nazi groups including Sturm34 and Revolution Chemnitz. Violence has been an issue. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimated that out of 25,250 members of far right extremist groups in Germany in 2017, 12,700 were likely to use violence (Bundesministers des Innern, und für Bau und Heimat 2017). In August 2018, far right groups were among those clashing with police and attacking individuals said to be ‘foreigners’ in riots in Chemnitz and other cities in eastern Germany, following the arrest of an immigrant man after a fatal

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stabbing (France-Presse 2018). Then, in June 2019 a far right activist shot Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politician Walter Lübcke at his home near Kassel in Hesse, reportedly in ‘revenge’ for his support of refugees (Oltermann 2019). In October that year a far right attacker shot and killed two people in Halle, after failing to enter a synagogue, where a mass shooting was planned (Koehler 2019). In February 2020 nine people were killed in another far right shooting, an attack on two shisha bars in Hanau. The gunman also killed his mother and turned the gun on himself (Oltermann and Connolly 2020). A number of other far right plots have been foiled (Ariza 2020). Alongside the violent far right, Germany has in recent years also seen the emergence of a number of new radical right anti-Islam(ist) movements, opposing what they believe is the Islamification of the West. The anti-immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) began as a response to German economic policies concerning the ‘Eurozone’ and later responded to what was termed the ‘migrant crisis’. The AfD was initially likened to a German equivalent of the British anti-European Union party, UKIP. AfD has since moved further to the right and was accused of having close connections with neo-Nazi groups involved in riots in 2018 (Connolly 2018). Indicative of a rising wave of anti-­ immigrant populism, the party, which was involved in numerous controversies, including the launch of a platform to ban minarets and burqas in Germany, entered the national parliament for the first time in 2017 and gained over 10 per cent of the votes in state elections in Bavaria in October 2018 (Connolly and Le Blond 2018). As in other countries, the ideological boundaries and links between the belief-systems of the various far right organisations are at times unclear. Alongside political parties opposing—particularly Muslim—immigration, street movements emerged. Both ‘HoGeSa’ (Hooligans Gegen Salafisten or Hooligans Against Salafists) and Pegida (which stands for Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) have led demonstrations of large groups of predominantly men in protest at Islam (Whelan 2014). Pegida was launched in 2014  in the former East Germany and spread internationally, including to the UK and Netherlands. Group rhetoric has often focused on an increase in jihadist attacks in Germany, as well as the migration crisis that peaked in 2015. These issues have also contributed to social tensions between Muslims and non-­ Muslims. There were complaints of mass sexual assaults against women during New Year’s celebrations in Cologne and elsewhere at the start of 2016 (BBC News 2016b), although many reports were proven to be fake.

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By July 2016, the German Federal Criminal Agency (BKA) reported some 900 sex attacks occurred, with most suspects from North African countries. The BKA also suggested more than half the men allegedly responsible had been resident in Germany less than one year and linked the attacks to the migration period of 2015 (Deutsche Welle 2016). This triggered an upsurge in anti-Muslim sentiment in Germany and an increase in acts of violence motivated by far right ideologies, including attacks on refugee accommodation. Though acts of violence perpetrated by far right extremists decreased by 34 per cent from 2016 to 2017, the number of rightwing extremists reportedly increased significantly in 2019, when German intelligence services suggested numbers active in right-wing networks, including those affiliated with the AfD, had risen above 32,200. The figure for 2018 was 24,100 people (Deutsche Welle 2019). The far right scene in Germany is male-dominated, but women are also active. Some 20 per cent of the membership of German far right parties are women and a third of electoral votes for these parties can be attributed to women. Women also have their own far right groups and have committed violence (Radvan and Altmeier 2014). In the most infamous case, Beate Zschäpe was one of a neo-Nazi gang implicated in the murder of a number of German Turks (Vasagar 2013). Zschäpe, a member of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) group, was sentenced to life in prison in 2018 for, as the state prosecutor puts it, ‘co-piloting’ the Nazi cell’s murders (Oltermann 2018). While increasingly active on the threat from right-wing populist and neo-Nazi groups, the German government’s security priority is countering Daesh, due to the scale and nature of the threat. Some 1300 German nationals travelled to Iraq and Syria to join Daesh, according to data collected by Cook and Vale (2019). Of the total number of Germans who left to join Daesh, 13 per cent were women, while less than 15 per cent of those who returned (53 out of 357 returned individuals) were women (Cook and Vale 2019, 36). The number of individuals travelling peaked in the third quarter of 2013 and again around the time of the proclamation of the ‘Caliphate’ by the Islamic State in June 2014. This was also true of the percentage of women recruits, which increased significantly after the proclamation, from around 15 per cent to 38 per cent in the first year afterwards. Departure rates declined from 2015 onwards from roughly 100 individuals leaving a month at the peak to less than five monthly departures. In 2017, around a third of these people had returned, including many who have undergone military training or participated in armed

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combat (BKA 2015; Heinke 2017). Figures from Cook and Vale in 2019 suggest this is 28 per cent. Though Germany did not experience a large-scale jihadist terrorist attack until December 2016, it was home to several of the 9/11 attackers and witnessed a number of smaller scale attacks (Sirseloudi and Eylers 2018). Daesh military setbacks and the wave of returnees from Syria and Iraq, in combination with the surge in refugees from Syria and other countries in the region, changed the threat picture in Germany significantly (Coolsaet and Renard 2018). Five jihadist terrorist attacks in 2016 and one in 2017, all of which were linked to Daesh, underscored this threat. For example, in the deadliest terrorist attack on German soil in recent years, Anis Amri, a Tunisian asylum seeker, drove a lorry into a packed Christmas market in Berlin in December 2016, leaving 12 dead. Daesh later claimed responsibility (Osborne 2016). Women and girls have also participated in violence. In February 2016, a 15-year-­old girl with links to Daesh stabbed a police officer in Hannover after her attempted journey to Iraq and Syria was cut short in Turkey after her mother tipped off authorities (Reuters 2017). While Anis Amri was not a returned foreign fighter, returnees with a continued commitment to the cause of violent jihad are expected to pose a threat to the German state for the next generation. Studies have shown that only 10 per cent of the foreign fighters that have returned to Germany (around a third of the approximately 1000 individuals) did so because they felt disillusioned and frustrated with their situation, with the majority coming back to Germany for other reasons (Heinke 2017). In 2018, Germany’s then domestic Intelligence Chief Hans-Georg Maassen also warned of the high security risk posed by returned children, indoctrinated in Daesh schools from an early age. Minors have been involved in jihadist attacks in Germany, including the attempted bombing of a Christmas market in Ludwigshafen by a 12-year-old (Siebold and Shalal 2018). The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimated in April 2018 that 25,810 individuals in Germany followed Islamist ideologies, while 760 individuals were classified as ‘Gefährder’, individuals who are considered to be likely to attempt to commit a terrorist attack in the future, a significant increase from 570 individuals in 2017 (Bundesministers des Innern, und für Bau und Heimat 2017). There were a number of significant differences between men and women joining Daesh from Germany. Twice as many of the women (13 per cent) were minors, compared to the men; they were also on average

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younger, with a median age of 23.5 years, compared to 26.5 years for male German foreign fighters (Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Hessisches Informations-und Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremismus (HKE) 2016). While the women were relatively well educated on average, male radicalisation to Daesh was associated with a low educational history and backgrounds of criminality, with around two thirds having been subject to criminal investigations (Heinke 2017). Before their departure, fewer women were employed (54 per cent, compared to 70 per cent of men), which could also partly be explained by the fact that 55 per cent of them already had children at the time of their departure. Women are also more likely to be converts (33 per cent of women versus 17 per cent of men), and to come from families with no background of migration to Germany (Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Hessisches Informationsund Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremismus (HKE) 2016). When it comes to the radicalisation process in Germany, women are reported to have often been victims of Internet propaganda and online recruitment into violent extremist groups, but they are also involved in spreading propaganda themselves. For example, German schoolgirl Linda Wenzel was targeted online by Daesh recruiters when she was 15  years old. She converted to Islam and subsequently travelled to Iraq, married a Daesh fighter from Chechnya and joined the al-Khansaa brigade. A year after her departure, she was arrested by Special Forces in Mosul and has been jailed in Iraq. Another 15-year-old girl, Sarah O. from south Germany, travelled to Syria in 2013 and shared details of her “fairy-tale” life in Syria on her blog A True Heroine, showing off images of her posing with an AK-47, and specifically targeting women to travel to Syria to marry one of the unmarried mujahedeen (Diehl 2015). After her arrest by Turkish authorities, she was deported to Germany in September 2018, together with her three young children (Sandl 2018). It should be noted that violent far left extremism also increased by 6 per cent from 2016 to 2017 with leftist attacks against police increasing by more than 65 per cent, which can be largely attributed to the violent clashes that occurred in July 2017 in Hamburg during the G20 Summit. Around 9000 individuals were in 2017 estimated to be left-wing extremists with a potential for violence (Bundesministers des Innern and für Bau und Heimat 2017).

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CVE Responses In post-war West Germany, de-Nazification programmes were instituted by the Allied forces, in order to deradicalise civilian populations. German civil organisations took on the baton and have a long history of interventions to educate on Nazism and its consequences. There are also restrictions on certain behaviours. Many of the symbols and icons of Nazi ideology, such as the Swastika and Nazi salute, for instance, are illegal in Germany, as part of the penal code (Deutsche Welle 2018). German work to counter the far right has gone on for decades, predating the concept of countering violent extremism, or the War on Terror, and largely been delivered by local institutions working at grassroots with communities (Koehler 2016). A 2017 study of 721 prevention programmes run by the German state and NGOs highlighted that 75 per cent of the studied programmes were focused on right-wing extremism, while 15 per cent dealt with Islamism and 4 per cent with left-wing extremism (Lützinger and Gruber 2017, 20–23). Many of those organisations who began with work on the far right are now active in the delivery of programmes to prevent Islamist and jihadist extremism. The field is in fact experiencing a period of expansion and professionalisation (Uhlmann 2017). For a long time, in the place of a national strategy Germany adopted pre-existing policies for countering right-wing extremism to combat other forms of violent extremism. German CVE provision has been subject to something of a postcode lottery, and ‘fragmented’, despite calls from experts for a unified national approach (Koehler 2016; Neumann 2015; Heinke 2015; Diehl and Ulrich 2015). In 2016, Germany published a new National Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy, which explicitly therefore links the two ideas (extremism and democracy). However, this is not a Federal strategy, it is up to Germany’s institutional regions (Länder) to adopt it or not (Christodoulou and Szakács 2018). Instead, it establishes a network aimed at the cooperation of local, federal and state actors who still have autonomy over interventions (German Federal Government 2016; Heinke 2015). The strategy covers violent extremism motivated by radical Islam, right-wing ideologies, including antisemitism, Islamophobia and homophobia, as well as left-wing ideologies. At the same time, the German government also created a strategic network linking the various areas of action. This was followed by the launch of the National Programme to Prevent Islamist Extremism in March 2017 (European Commission 2016). In line with these changes,

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the German government earmarked €400  million for the period until 2020 for CVE accompanied by programmes to support the promotion of democracy. The National Programme focuses on the locations of prevention-based activities, including in schools and mosques, on the Internet, in prisons and, more broadly, through integration and an expansion of research (Wilfried Martens Centre 2018). The federal German government also has responsibility for measures on foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and for proscription of groups (Ranstorp 2016). State executives can however proscribe groups active in specific states. Local authorities have been involved in different preventative efforts that are implemented at state, federal and local levels to counter radicalisation and focused on engaging vulnerable or ‘at risk’ communities in a number of partnership projects (Butt and Tuck 2014). Though most CVE work used to be delivered by NGOs, over time, those delivered by the police and states or Länder have increased (Ranstorp 2016; Said and Fouad 2018). The 2017 report cited earlier suggested around 47 per cent are delivered by the state and 53 per cent by NGOs (Lützinger and Gruber 2017). In Germany, the federal states (Länder) and municipalities have also traditionally played important roles in CVE, for example through integration and deradicalisation programmes, as well as programmes working with imprisoned Islamists (Coolsaet and Renard 2018). Germany has a number of well-established prevention schemes, conducted through organisations such as Vaja in Bremen, the Violence Prevention Network (VPN) and Hayat. These organisations and programmes often used expertise developed through focus on right-wing extremism and expanded to encompass projects aimed at Islamist and jihadist extremism. At the heart of many of the projects launched by these organisations is an engagement with youth and families. For example, Hayat uses long-­ arm intervention to support family members, particularly parents, in talking to their children about radicalisation, challenging extreme thought processes. The VPN also engages in the CVE field and provides training in the educational system on prevention as well as deradicalisation (Aiello et al. 2018). There are also interventions targeted at young women, for instance, the MAXIMA or WomEX Project. MAXIMA provided education about extremism and recruitment to young women, including spotting the signs of radicalisation among peers. It aimed to demystify extremism and empower young women to critically engage with extreme ideas. WomEX focused more generally on analysing the gender aspects of violent extremism (WomEX n.d.). This project produced case study

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materials about successful interventions, good practice and lessons learned, developed guidelines for deradicalisation and anti-hate crime work with girls/women, acquired ‘deradicalising narratives’ from girls/women who disengaged and cooperated with website tools of deradicalising narratives. The German stance on women returning from Daesh has changed recently. Of the 1050 total FTFs that Raudszus (2020) suggests left for Daesh, some 25 per cent are women, and women account for most of the expected returnees. Prior to 2017, women tended to be seen as more likely to have been coerced into travel, and likely not to face prosecution while male returnees faced automatic criminal investigation (Heinke and Raudszus 2018). The threshold for evidence for women’s participation was also greater (Scherrer 2018). From the end of 2017, and in line with the advice of security experts including Heinke and Raudszus, this changed. Federal judicial authorities announced they would take a tougher stance in order to make the treatment of both men and women returnees more equal (Musawy et  al. 2017). Now, women are considered ‘active supporters’ if they served in the hisbah or religious police, or as propagandists for Daesh (Raudszus 2020). Nonetheless, Germany can be understood as the European country with the most active and arguably liberal approach (Cebrián 2019). In November 2019, in the first such official repatriation, Germany received a woman suspected to have been active for Daesh, Laura H., along with her three children (Deutsche Welle 2019). Other women who returned independently have faced trial for their actions. In April 2019, a woman identified as Jennifer W., who was accused of leaving a Yazidi child outside to die in the 45-degree heat, appeared in court accused of offences including a war crime (Deutsche Welle 2019). Her Iraqi husband has also been tried in Germany for genocide against the Yazidis, following extradition from Greece (Ochab 2019). The Netherlands Historically, the Netherlands has in the 1970s and 1980s experienced Moroccan, Kurdish, Palestinian nationalist and left-wing terrorism. Today, Dutch authorities identify violent jihadism as their greatest security threat (Netherlands Government 2020). Despite this understanding, if the number of people killed or targeted is a measure of the gravity of terrorist acts, terrorism in the 1970s was more serious in the Netherlands than violent jihadist terrorism today. Terrorism, such as Moluccan separatism, was

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linked to Dutch colonial actions in Indonesia and the way the Netherlands managed the decolonisation process. Between 2002 and 2005 a key threat was the Islamist Hofstad group, which has proved significant in developing the Dutch understanding of the security threat they face. Many of the Hofstad group’s supporters were women. Although only composed of around 40 individuals, it was involved in several terrorist plots, including the 2004 murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh by Muhammed Bouyeri (Sageman et al. 2010). The van Gogh murder and subsequent trial gained much publicity and was an important turning point in both influencing and radicalising a significant minority of young Muslims (Bakker 2010). The Hofstad group was networked to a larger circle of criminal actors, some of whom were active in terrorism. While the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service considered the Dutch jihadist scene to be largely inactive in 2010, local groups professionalised and expanded through organisations such as BehindBars, StraatDawah and Sharia4Holland (Basra et al. 2016). Some of the individuals that were involved in the creation of these organisations later travelled to Syria as foreign fighters and at least five of them were involved in terrorist attacks abroad (including suicide attacks in Iraq and Somalia) (Sirseloudi and Eylers 2018). With the departure of over 100 radical young Muslims to fight for jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq in 2013, the threat level of Islamist extremism transformed substantially within a few months (AIVD 2014). By June 2017, no further successful departures were reported (Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2019). However, in August 2018 an Afghan man who had been denied asylum in Germany stabbed two tourists at Amsterdam Central station, in a jihadist attack apparently in revenge for the Netherlands’ radical right actor Geert Wilders (Gant 2019). Then in March 2019 a Dutch jihadist killed four people in a shooting on a tram in Utrecht. He was sentenced to life in prison (Corder 2020). The threat from Daesh had not been forgotten. However, by 2019, the expected large numbers of returnees from Daesh had not yet arrived. Dutch authorities reported that the surviving Dutch jihadists in Iraq and Syria, mainly women and minors, were in refugee camps in the region or in the hands of non-jihadist fighters. Yet, more returnees were expected (EUROPOL 2019). In spite of the small numbers so far, the debate around how to treat them is highly politicised. In mid-2018, 386 criminal investigations related to jihadism were being conducted with around 471 total suspects, some of whom still resided in Syria or Iraq (Coolsaet and

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Renard 2018). A 2019 Terrorist Threat Assessment suggested the situation was unsettled, and there was still a risk of attacks (Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2019). Cook and Vale’s 2019 report on migration to Daesh noted a total of more than 400 individuals from the Netherlands were known to have left for Iraq and Syria (Cook and Vale 2019). Most individuals who left in the first wave of foreign fighters, which predated the 2014 proclamation by Daesh leader al-Baghdadi of the ‘Caliphate’, were men (Bakker and de Bont 2016). This dynamic changed significantly after the proclamation in 2014. Of the total 432 people who left for Iraq and Syria between 2013 and 2019, 105 were women (24 per cent) (Cook and Vale 2019). Around 17 per cent of these women have since returned. Even prior to the emergence of Daesh, the Dutch Intelligence Services noted the impact of the Internet on women’s radicalisation specifically (AIVD 2012). A 2012 report suggested jihadist women in the Netherlands were active recruiters of other women, as well as the targets of online recruitment. Later, some Dutch women were also reported to have helped to facilitate travel for fellow jihadists (AIVD 2017). For example, Laura H. was radicalised by a male jihadist online and left the Netherlands for Syria in 2015 with her baby and toddler to join him. She returned after a year and claimed she did not know what she was getting herself into, warning security services that her husband Ibrahim, the jihadist who had recruited her online, was planning an attack in the Netherlands or another European country (Pieters 2017). Similarly, a girl known as Aicha was radicalised through her social media contact with a Dutch jihadist and travelled to Syria to marry Israfil Yilmaz, a former member of the Dutch military, in 2014. She was later rescued by her mother and brought back (BBC News 2014). The risk associated with the far right meanwhile has changed in the past decade. In 2011, the Netherlands reportedly had a small and insignificant right-wing extremist scene with the Dutch Security Services suggesting as few as 100 supporters for far right movements, with a low risk to the country (Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2011). In a follow-up report on the right-wing extremist threat in the Netherlands in November 2018, the Security Services concluded that right-wing extremism had experienced a revival since 2014/2015. The report attributed this development to “the decline in the neo-Nazi skin-head movement, the rise of ISIS, large-scale migration into Europe, the emergence of the alt-right movement in the US, and the ease with which digital

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communication facilitates mutual contact” (AIVD 2018). Increasing hostility by some towards Islam has led to the establishment of extreme right-­wing groups such as the Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volks Unie, NVU), Demonstrators against Local Authorities (Demonstranten tegen Gemeenten, DTG) and United We Stand Holland (UWS) (AIVD 2018). Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV), which campaigns on a strong counter-­jihad agenda (which is to say that it opposes Islam and Islamism), won 20 seats in the 150 seat parliament in the March 2017 general elections (Henley 2017). Wilders has transnational anti-Islam and counter-jihad connections and has shown support for the English Defence League founder Tommy Robinson in the UK and anti-immigration Rassemblement National leader Marine Le Pen in France. He has also vocally supported US President Donald Trump (Crisp 2019). Activities of these groups include online and offline efforts to disseminate radical right-wing ideology, demonstrations and the ‘occupation’ of buildings with links to Muslim populations, such as mosques and Muslim schools. Discrimination and attacks on Muslims increased in 2015 parallel to the influx of refugees, and dropped significantly in 2016 (Tierolf et  al. 2018). In 2015, the municipality Enschede alone saw several far right motivated incidents. In November, six individuals were arrested during an anti-refugee demonstration for performing Nazi salutes; later that month, 12 pig heads were placed on a space designated for a centre for asylum seekers; then in February 2016, a Dutch man was arrested for throwing a Molotov cocktail at a mosque full of people (Dutch News 2016). In 2017, the Dutch Identitarian Resistance occupied a Muslim secondary school in Amsterdam. In 2017 and 2018 respectively, the al-Soennah mosque in the Hague and a mosque in Amsterdam received threats directed at their worshippers. Nonetheless, and although recognising the possibility for lone actor attacks, the Dutch government assessment of the threat is that “Dutch right-wing extremist groups exist in the margins and are non-­violent. There are currently no inspirational leaders capable of building up large followings” (Netherlands Government 2020). CVE Responses From 2004 onwards, the Dutch government used both a CT and CVE approach to target radicalisation as well as terrorism, adopting a new National Action Plan on Polarization and Radicalization for 2007–2011. This aimed to prevent processes of isolation, polarisation and radicalisation

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and improve the capacity of frontline staff to detect early ‘warning signs’ of radicalisation (Counter Extremism Project 2018). The plan recognised Islamist radicalisation and right-wing extremist radicalisation as the main threats to the Netherlands, and considered integration to be a major stepping-stone to preventing this. It also identified the main threat to stem from youth, mainly young men, but with a growing concern about women (Netherlands Government 2004). Interventions were city-based and focused on combating perceived polarisation, essentially, issues of social cohesion. In 2012 however, a new report suggested Dutch radicalisation was increasingly individualised, with increasing numbers of lone actors, influenced by the Internet (Dechesne and Meines 2012). The Netherlands created a national strategy to counter radicalisation in the wake of the murder of Theo van Gogh, and it identified alienation and a lack of both integration and social cohesion as drivers in violent extremism (Netherlands Government 2004). However, a key characteristic of the Dutch CVE approach is the role of local authorities in incorporating multi-agency cooperation in addressing radicalisation (Koehler 2016). Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht each developed their own municipal schemes (Bakker 2010). Dutch municipalities with high percentages of foreign fighters have pioneered approaches tailored to their local conditions since the beginning of the foreign fighter phenomenon in 2013. These approaches include community engagement, awareness-raising, education and deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives (Gielen 2018). Each larger city in the Netherlands has its own programme designed to suit local conditions. For example, Rotterdam’s anti-­ radicalisation approach covers four core areas of activity: polarisation; prevention initiatives; training professionals in CVE interventions; supporting individualised approaches as well as professional networks. The city’s strategy adopts a multi-agency approach, engaging governmental agencies, religious institutions, community organisations and other municipalities (Strong Cities 2017). Similarly, Utrecht’s approach to P/CVE relies on the cooperation between stakeholders in the fields of law, health, social and civic agencies under the coordination of the municipality. At the core of Utrecht’s approach is the vulnerability of individuals, groups or families (Utrecht 2017). A number of initiatives are additionally either explicitly gendered or focused specifically on the role of women and girls. Such initiatives include Nisa for Nisa, the SIPI DIAMANT method and the Oumnia Works programme run by Steunpunt Sabr. Nisa for Nisa, an Amsterdam-based

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organisation, aims at increasing the resilience of girls from immigrant heritage backgrounds to violent extremism, including through awareness-­ raising sessions on radicalisation and polarisation (NISA 2017). The DIAMANT programme, offered by the Foundation for Intercultural Participation and Integration (SIPI), provides numerous training and education programmes, including training specifically for women and girls. These activities assume that girls radicalise in different ways to boys and therefore need interventions specifically tailored to their needs and vulnerabilities. The current Dutch National Counterterrorism Strategy supports the city-led focus, but also incorporates an evaluation suggesting “a targeted, legitimate and robust approach to extremism and terrorism is best served through centralised coordination on the part of the national government” (Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security 2016). The strategy focuses on five intervention areas: procurement of intelligence about potential threats, prevention and disruption of extremism, protection of people and property from extremist threats, preparation for extremist and terrorist violence, and prosecution in the face of terrorism and extremism. Law enforcement in the Netherlands has also implemented community policing strategies focused on building alliances rather than targeting specific communities. If any of the actors in this network of alliances suggests an individual is at risk, a meeting is set up with police forces and representatives of relevant civil society organisations to assist. The approach is focused on the advancement of individual social, economic and cultural rights (Aiello et  al. 2018). There have also been strategies explicitly aimed at travel of individuals to Syria and Iraq (Coolsaet and Renard 2018). The 2014 Comprehensive Action Programme to Counter Jihadism contains 38 preventive, repressive, security, administrative and legal measures, and included the creation of hotlines for radicalisation, family support, as well as activities for engagement with the Muslim community (Veiligheid 2017). France Of the countries considered here, France has been the most recent newcomer to issues of countering violent extremism, if not also to issues of extremism. France saw a number of Islamist groups, some linked with

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Algeria, active in the 1980s and 1990s, with a series of jihadist bomb attacks in 1995 (Marret 2010). It has also tackled a Corsican separatist terrorist movement, the Corsican National Liberation Front, which after decades of conflict eventually laid down its arms in 2014 (DPA 2019). Basque separatists were also active in France during ETA’s terrorist campaign in Spain, and French law enforcement actively assisted Spain in detaining activists and preventing attack. In recent years, France has experienced a series of deadly jihadist terrorist attacks, including in 2019 the stabbing of four police officers in Paris, the May bombing of a bakery in Lyon by a man pledging allegiance to Daesh, the December 2018 shooting at a Christmas market in Strasbourg, the March 2018 attack in Carcassonne and the July 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice. It was major attacks in Paris in 2015, however, that catalysed France to plan measures to challenge jihadist radicalisation. In January, jihadists carried out an armed assault on the offices of the satirical magazine ‘Charlie Hebdo’, followed by a siege on a Jewish supermarket (BBC News 2015d). The attacks were led by gunman Amédy Coulibaly and brothers Chérif and Saı̄d Kouachi who were ‘raised and radicalised’ in France (Chrisafis 2015). They were also all on the margins of French society (Kepel and Jardin 2017). This prompted then Prime Minister Manuel Valls to talk of a “geographical, social and ethnic apartheid” in France (Irish and Pineau 2015). Then, on 13 November 2015, Daesh organised coordinated attacks on Paris, in which gunmen and suicide attackers killed 130 people and wounded 494 at six different sites. The number killed was almost as great as the 139 people who died as a result of terrorism in France between 1980 and 2006 (Marret 2010). First, attackers targeted the French national sports stadium Stade de France and cafés; then, approximately 20 minutes after the first attack they entered the Bataclan theatre during a rock concert, where they killed some 90 people. Police then stormed the venue, killing three (BBC News 2015b; CNN 2018). The leader was a well-known Belgian foreign fighter, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, and the attack was claimed by Daesh (BBC News 2015b). This event took place in the middle of our research. The leader was not the only attacker with experience of military training in the Middle East. At least eight of the attackers involved in the November violence were found to have returned from travel to Syria and Iraq (Brisard 2015). France has contributed more fighters to Daesh than any other western country, some 1910 so far with as many as 20 per cent of them women (Cook and Vale 2019). In 2016, the French government estimated

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some 30 per cent of all French jihadists were women and girls, considering both children and adults; and 25 per cent of those women and girls were converts. This figure was 20 per cent for men (Khosrokhavar 2016; Pietrasanta 2015, 10). Women were also involved in both the Paris attacks of 2015. The girlfriend of Charlie Hebdo attacker Amédy Coulibaly, Hayat Boumedienne, is one of a number of French women believed to have been involved with Daesh in Syria (Cruickshank 2015). In February 2015, the French Daesh propaganda magazine Dar al-Islam reported she had travelled to join the group and the English-language propaganda magazine Dabiq also featured an interview with her (Dabiq 2015). Then in November 2015, a 26-year-old Frenchwoman, Hasna Aitboulahcen, was killed in a police raid following the Paris attacks (BBC News 2015a). The involvement of these women perhaps reflected a warning from French security officials that March 2015 had for the first time seen more women than men reported to the authorities in connection with radicalisation (Europe Online 2015). The high-profile women who were linked to the Bataclan theatre and Charlie Hebdo attackers were the first of what was to become a seeming succession of women as threat. In September 2016, police arrested three women, one 19, one in her 20s and another in her 30s, all accused of plotting an attack on the Gare de Lyon train station in Paris, with gas canisters found in a car near Notre-Dame (Chassany 2016). There were four women in the cell, Inès Madani, Sarah Hervouët, Ornella Gilligmann and Amel Sakaou, and they were in touch with a male foreign fighter who had joined Daesh and who was key in directing them, Rachid Kassim (Simcox 2018). In April 2019, the youngest of the attackers, Madani, was sentenced to eight years for her role in the plots. The judge noted that she had been recruited by an influential Daesh jihadist Oumar Diaw, but had been active herself in recruiting for the group online (The Journal 2019). In contrast to the profile of jihadist terrorism, the case of the far right in France can seem de-emphasised. The French government has recognised a problem with right-wing populism, rather than the far right per se. Yet French far right groups such as Generation Identity have been influential, fostering identitarian anti-Islam(ist) movements abroad, including in the Netherlands, the UK and Germany (Ramalingam 2014; Whyte 2019). Generation Identity is focused on the ‘remigration’ of nonEuropean immigrants, and while claiming to be non-violent and nonracist have been shown to use violence, and adhere to a white supremacist ideology (Al-Jazeera 2018).

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While women have not traditionally been drawn to the extreme right in France, Marine Le Pen, the woman leader of the Rassemblement National (RN) (the Front National until June 2018 when it was rebranded), appeals to many (Mayer 2013, 2015; Press Association 2018). In particular, women’s rights—and their alleged abuse by Islam—are an important component of recruitment narratives of the now mainstream political party. The Front National has led arguments against immigration and warnings against Islam (Vieten and Poynting 2016; Mayer 2013). In 2017 it was Le Pen who faced would-be President Macron in the second round of the presidential elections (Henley and Malkin 2017). Polls on voting intentions in the May 2019 European Parliamentary elections for the first time put Le Pen’s party just ahead of President Emmanuel Macron’s Republique En Marche (REM) (De Clercq 2018; Reuters 2019b). For some, the French radical right, despite its anti-immigration, anti-gay marriage and anti-EU stance, had arguably entered the mainstream (Shields 2013; Bastow 2018). CVE Responses The French context is different from other parts of Europe due to the concept of laïcité, as previously mentioned. Alouane (2015) notes that the common shared understanding of the aim of laïcité is the “protection of a shared French identity dominant over those of minority groups, especially religious groups. Nevertheless, free religious exercise is guaranteed” (p. 310). In France it is not constitutional to collect data on religious faith, and it can also prove challenging to discuss faith, which means religious discussion is not a keystone of deradicalisation programming (Koehler 2016). The French experience of countering terrorism in Algeria in the 1960s left a mark on its national counter-terrorism thinking, which has been criticised for being repressive, with a reliance on a repressive penal code and ‘hard’ measures such as surveillance, arrest, deportation and prosecution (Hellmuth 2015; Foley 2013; Marret 2010). French counter-­ terrorism measures rely on the cornerstone legislation, the 9 September Act of 1986. A national security plan, ‘Vigipirate’, sets out the response in case of attack, with military forces responsible for bolstering police security in cities. Additionally, police recruited some 200 extra personnel in 2009/2010, to cope with increases in jihadist radicalisation (Marret 2010). Given the numbers of French foreign travellers to join Daesh, in both 2012 and 2014, France chose legislative responses to the issue, with

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new Terrorism Acts (Hellmuth 2015). In 2014, the Interior Ministry also announced a counter-radicalisation policy, which included family support via a hotline, and specialised provision for jihadists in French prisons (French Interior Ministry 2014). The Paris attacks of 2015 forced France to take seriously the threat of jihadist terrorism in a way that it had not before and revise the Vigipirate planning (French Government 2019). Since 2015, more than 240 people have been killed in France by people claiming allegiance to or inspiration from Daesh, prompting France to adopt a variety of pre-emptive and reactive counter-terrorism measures. The apparent challenge to the founding principles of the French Republic, and the apparent ease with which the attacks happened, shocked the French establishment. Following the Bataclan attack, there followed a two-year state of emergency, and an increase in police powers: an enhanced power to carry out identity checks and search the person and their property at will at France’s borders; to conduct raids without a warrant and place people under house arrest; to delay prisoners’ access to a lawyer for up to four hours; to carry a gun even off-duty; and the right to strip citizenship from convicted French terrorists with dual citizenship. In 2015, the French government launched its Stop-­ Djihadisme campaign, which includes online resources to help French citizens identify and report terrorist suspects, as well as educate French citizens on the scale of danger and what to do in the event of an attack. In September 2016, the government opened the first of 12 planned deradicalisation centres in a small town west of Paris. This programme works to rehabilitate individuals believed to be on the path to radicalisation. Among France’s efforts, the government repeatedly extended a national state of emergency, bolstered its counter-terrorism legislation, conducted a series of arrests, approved the creation of a National Guard and began to launch deradicalisation centres around the country (Safdar 2016). A new anti-terrorism law instituted in November 2017 formally ended two years of a state of emergency after the Paris attacks; however, the lack of checks and balances raised concerns with human rights organisations (OHCHR 2017). In essence, France integrated some of the exceptional counterterrorism powers into common law (Osborne 2017). A year later, the French government discussed the imposition of a state of emergency to deal with protests organised by the Gilets jaunes or Yellow Vests. The robust French counter-terrorism approach to jihadists in the 1990s and 2000s, with a reliance on deportation, prompted criticism from the United Nations Committee Against Torture, amongst others, which suggested those removed from France were at risk of abuse abroad (Foley

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2013). The continued rigour of the French CT approach under the state of emergency drew fire from both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International who criticised the new powers, citing the harassment and abuse of Muslims, including warrantless house raids, assault on innocent people, the closure of mosques and house arrests (Safdar 2016; Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). There has also been widespread discussion in past decades of women’s dress, and the wearing of the veil and headscarf in certain public spaces (Helbling 2014; HunterHenin 2012; Zerouala 2014). In 2004 the wearing of the hijab was regulated (prohibited) in schools, alongside other religious clothing including the skullcap and turban (Wyatt 2004; Lyon and Spini 2004). In 2016 the ‘burqini’, clothing designed to protect modesty but permit swimming, was banned by more than a dozen French towns, leading to disturbing and controversial images of male police seemingly forcing a Muslim woman to remove her clothes on the beach (Quinn 2016). Bindner (2018) notes that jihadist groups have sought to mobilise and recruit, based on the perceived injustice of some restrictions to covering. He cites, for instance, the Mujahidin from Sham who in 2013 proclaimed: Following the decision of the French government that prevents our righteous women from wearing the veil as required by Allah’s order, who constantly fights Islam and Muslims, who is present with the Crusaders in Afghanistan, France is today the flagship of disbelief and of Allah’s enemies, in attacking Islamic Mali. We call and incite Muslims worldwide and Muslims who live in France, as a Trojan horse, to accomplish their religious duty and strike French interests, institutions, soldiers as well as civilians on French soil and worldwide. (Memri.Fr 2013)

The mother of the Toulouse jihadist Mohamed Merah, who shot and killed 12 people in March 2012, said he too had justified his beliefs with reference to the injustice of the ‘veil ban’ (BBC News 2013). In 2015, a French government report suggested youth unemployment, decreased paternal authority, a lack of social mobility and the ghettoisation of certain communities had contributed to radicalisation (Pietrasanta 2015, 13). Grassroots organisations have engaged in tackling extremism in France for some years, some led by women. In 2012, when Muslim paratrooper Imad Ibn Ziaten was shot dead by violent jihadists in Toulouse, his mother Latifa responded with work to counter negative perceptions of Islam in France, as well as the violent jihadist message itself (France 24 2018).

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Organisations such as Brigade des Mères were set up by mothers to mobilise other mothers against radicalisation, Islamophobia and racism (Mamans 2016). The foreign fighter issue has been a challenge since 2014 (French Interior Ministry 2014), however, it was not until the attacks of 2015 that the French government implemented the new programme to combat radicalisation (La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme 2015). Helplines to encourage those suspecting support for violent jihad received thousands of emails and calls, many about women (Pietrasanta 2015). The French national structure to prevent radicalisation is devolved to the regional départements and bodies such as the police, although not all regions have an intervention programme in place (Researcher 2018). Following the Charlie Hebdo attack, the French government also began counter-radicalisation campaigns on social media through, for example, the hashtag #stopviolentJihadisme. This hashtag also specifically challenged narratives aimed at women (Ziv 2015). Then in February 2018 the French government launched for the first time a National Action Plan, Prevent to Protect, to tackle radicalisation (French Government 2018). This plan explicitly refers to gender in its measure 41, suggesting it is important to mobilise the women’s rights network and “involve teams of community workers engaged in women’s rights and equality issues, along with their local networks, in measures to prevent radicalisation and monitor radicalised individuals” (French Government 2018, 16). At the time of writing, the plan is not fully implemented across the country; however, there is a statutory requirement for all public institutions to appoint a contact on the issue of radicalisation. Regarding the current situation of Daesh returnees, France has said it is accepting returning militants, including women, on a ‘case by case’ basis, and many women have said they wish to return (Peel et  al. 2019; LCI 2019). In practice, France has been accused of washing its hands of the problem, with some 450 French citizens held in Syria, and 11 men receiving a death penalty in the Iraqi courts from 26 May to 3 June 2019 (Rubin 2019). Most of those who return will face detention and assessment with a likely prison sentence once back in France (Le Point Magazine 2019). Prior to the discovery of the all-woman cell planning an attack in central Paris, the stance on women and Daesh extremism was relatively tolerant, with women generally regarded as victims of men and not responsible for their actions. Following the arrests, however, policymakers began to assert the need to clamp down on women who had supported Daesh and treat—in particular returning—women more punitively in the law (Scherrer 2018).

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Élisabeth Marteu, a French security expert and lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris, told us Notre-Dame was a ‘turning point’ in both policy and law in France, when “…we went from a very essentialised construction of women as victims—to the opposite… ‘they are all guilty and we don’t want to take into account the social aspect of their involvement.’… I think there was a huge trauma, a fear, so they wanted to just avoid another attack.” Numerous French women and their children are currently in camps for Daesh supporters in Syria, without deradicalisation programmes and facing an uncertain future (Bénis et al. 2018). Canada Radicalisation patterns in Canada differ across provinces, regions and cities, and in particular, debate on the issues around radicalisation in Canada has differed in Québec. The majority of Canadian individuals radicalised to violence are from urban areas. The current main terrorist threat to the country, according to the 2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, is related to Daesh and al-Qaida-inspired incidents (Public Safety Canada 2019). In October 2014, lone actors committed two terrorist attacks inspired by radical Islam in Ottawa and Saint-Jeansur-Richelieu, leaving two members of the Canadian Armed Forces dead (LeBlank 2015; Bajekal 2014). Authorities have since disrupted a number of jihadist terrorist plots (Public Safety Canada 2018a). The Canadian government is aware of some 60 Canadians who returned after travelling abroad to engage in terrorist activities with Daesh (known as CETs or Canadian Extremist Travellers), two of whom have been charged since 2017. These individuals are being monitored as they pose a potential risk to the country. Canada does not expect the number to increase, and it notes around 190 people with a link to Canada are still in Syria or Iraq (Public Safety Canada 2019). Unlike in some European countries where individuals were reportedly sometimes radicalised in a matter of days, mobilisation into violent extremist groups appeared to take around one year in Canada (Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2018). Numbers traveling were comparatively low, and Cook and Vale (2019) report some 16 per cent of CETs were women. It was the 2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada which first highlighted women in Daesh, noting the difficulty of knowing what roles they had had with certainty. The government suggested this made it hard to devise appropriate measures on their return (Public Safety Canada

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2018a). The discussion around women returnees is further complicated by their involvement in activities that go beyond stereotypical roles as wives and mothers, for example as members of the women’s police force the al-Khansaa Brigade; additionally many have had children while in Syria or Iraq (Tiflati 2018). Debates about women’s involvement in violent jihad were not new however. As long ago as 2012, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Richard Fadden, emphasised the potential for women in Canada to be recruited into al-Qaida-inspired violence (Canadian Government 2014). Certainly, Canadian women have been arrested in connection with fundraising for other jihadist groups, including al-Shabaab and linked to other al-Qaida-related organisations (Wakefield 2020; Investigative Project on Terrorism 2011). Canadian-Somali communities in particular have lost many young people to violent jihadist movements abroad, primarily al-Shabaab. A 2018 study that looked into radicalisation to violence and mobilisation to engage in terrorist activities in Canada concluded that the vast majority of young people, especially young women, mobilise in groups of two or more. Friendships and romantic relationships are considered to be particularly important in this process. Women were also found to make up 20 per cent of the ‘mobilisers’ in Canada and, of concern for the future, the report found that this percentage is growing over time. The report also found that women themselves were mobilised into a range of roles (Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2018). As in other countries, far right extremism is seen by the Canadian government as a secondary threat (Public Safety Canada 2018b). The threat was underscored by the January 2017 far right-inspired shooting at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Québec City, which killed six and left 19 injured (Public Safety Canada 2018a). Canadian white supremacists have been linked with movements in the US and Europe currently experiencing a resurgence (Parent and Ellis 2014). According to a 2016 study, at least 100 right-wing extremist groups were active in Canada, particularly in Québec, Alberta and British Columbia (Perry and Scrivens 2016). Groups such as Stormfront and the associated Canadian Heritage Alliance represent a message of ‘Canada for Canadians’ and a narrative of disenfranchisement at the hands of minorities (Perry and Scrivens 2016; Canadian Heritage Alliance n.d.). In 2018, Perry noted the most prominent far right groups in Canada are the Sons of Odin, a group that is active in most urban areas with chapters across the country, the Soldiers of Odin and the Three Percenters in Alberta, La Meute (the Wolf Pack) in Québec, Blood and Honour and

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Combat and The Skins in Southwestern Ontario (Gonick and Levy 2018). La Meute, which claims to have 55,000 followers, was initially exclusively devoted to fighting Islam, though the group has now shifted its focus to fighting what they consider to be ‘radical Islam’, apparently for reasons of legitimacy (Goujard 2018). Perry and Scrivens suggest there were hundreds of incidents of right-­ wing extremist violence between the 1980s and 2015 in Canada, and they were widespread. Public Safety Canada reported in 2015 that the far right was the foremost extremist threat faced by Québec (Public Safety Canada 2015). A gender gap has been identified between men’s and women’s support for the Canadian far right, with men more active (Gidengil et  al. 2005). Nonetheless, women mobilise around roles as mothers and activists to promote white supremacist ideology online (Scrivens et al. 2018). It was also a woman activist, Melissa Guille, who reportedly headed the Canadian Heritage Alliance website in 2005, and women are known to be active in groups such as the Creativity Movement (Cunningham 2007; The Creativity Movement 2016). Canadian women have also been active in the alt-right scene transnationally. In 2018, Lauren Southern, who worked for the Canadian far right site, the Rebel Media, was detained in Calais and banned from entering the UK following her racist support for a mission to hinder the rescue of refugees at sea (Oppenheim 2018). More recently the challenge of misogynist, so-called ‘incel’ violence has also emerged. In 2018, Alek Minassian drove a rental van into a crowd on one of Toronto’s busiest streets, killing ten pedestrians and injuring 16, in the deadliest act of mass murder in the city’s history (Williams 2018; Cecco 2019). Minassian was linked to the so-called incel online subculture of men, united by sexual frustration and a hatred of women. While Minassian was not charged with terrorism, another incel who stabbed a woman at a Toronto massage parlour in February 2020 was (Godin 2020). The attacks highlight the evolving nature of terrorism and how it is defined and identified. CVE Responses In November 2015, around the time of the Canadian phase of the research presented in this book, a new Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, was voted into office. His predecessor, Stephen Harper, had faced criticism—and indeed legal action—from Muslim communities over what was often regarded as a punitive and discriminatory counter-terrorism approach (Todd 2015; Siddiqui 2016; Bryden 2015). Trudeau’s government has developed a CVE programme that attempts to respond to critiques from

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Muslim communities regarding the validity of interventions. In 2019, a coda to the Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (Public Safety Canada 2018b) stated: the language used to describe extremism has been undertaken and is ongoing. The Government’s communication of threats must be clear, concise, and cannot be perceived as maligning any groups. As we continue this review, it is apparent that in outlining a threat, it must be clearly linked to an ideology rather than a community.

Canada’s current counter-terrorism strategy, Building Resilience Against Terrorism, was first adopted in 2012 and is the country’s first comprehensive strategy to tackle counter-terrorism (Public Safety Canada 2014). This approach appears to emulate the UK strategy and has four pillars: Prevent, Detect, Deny and Respond (Koehler 2016). As time has progressed, Canada’s response to terrorism has evolved. In May 2016, the previous Harper government’s Anti-Terrorism Act was passed into law to strengthen the ability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to disrupt terrorist threats through preventive arrests and other measures (Hannay 2015). However, parts of this bill have since been repealed and Trudeau’s government has committed to ensure that the CSIS does not infringe on Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Counter Extremism Project 2015). Nonetheless, in Québec, in 2019 the province announced public sector workers would no longer be able to wear religious symbols, including the hijab. In response, Prime Minister Trudeau reportedly said it was unthinkable “that in a free society we would legitimise discrimination against citizens based on their religion” (Reuters 2019a). Alongside its counter-terrorism strategy, Canada also has a Federal Terrorism Response Plan, which provides a guide to an integrated response to terrorist threats, and continues to evolve and adapt to changing threat dynamics (Public Safety Canada 2011). The response plan was initially published in 2011 and last updated in July 2018. It is based on a multi-­ agency approach and elaborates on an operational model for responding to terrorist threats. The plan includes local programming tailored to communities as well as the establishment of the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness aimed at the coordination of CVE efforts on a national level and fosters engagement with local communities. Actors

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ranging from the CSIS to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Immigration, Public Safety Canada (PS), the RCMP and Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) are part of the Canadian security and intelligence community, which is tasked with working together to safeguard the country from national security threats including terrorism. To keep these safeguarding efforts in line with the rights and freedoms of Canadians and strengthen accountability and transparency, the government carried out a series of consultations. For example, feedback from these consultations led to the creation of an expert review body tasked with reviewing national security and intelligence policy as well as a new Intelligence Commissioner, tasked with reviewing activities in this field before their implementation (Goodale 2017). In Canada, as in the UK, CVE is incorporated in the Prevent strand of the national counter-terrorism strategy. This component of the Canadian government’s counter-terrorism strategy understands radicalisation as a process preceding violent extremism “…that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views”, becoming a threat to national security when it leads to the espousal of, or engagement in, violence (Public Safety Canada 2014, 15). The RCMP has a major role in its delivery. On a national level, the RCMP’s activities to counter radicalisation encompass all violent ideologies, including extreme right-wing, far left, single issue groups and religious extremism. Women have been active with the RCMP in CVE for some years through organisations such as the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW) (Community Outreach and Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism 2015). Particular communities within Canada, for example, have addressed particular concerns, such as Somali women focusing on radicalisation to al-Shabaab (CBC 2016). CVE work has, as in all the other countries researched, mainly focused on jihadism, and not the far right. Successful interventions and programmes in the field of far right extremism are often led by law enforcement in Canada. For example, law enforcement agencies in Columbia and Alberta have led the development of multi-stakeholder approaches to addressing hate crimes, engaging closely with the local communities as well as policymakers and victim service providers. Similar attention is given to far right extremism by law enforcement agencies in Québec and Calgary. However, the majority of Canada’s CVE programming is conducted by non-governmental organisations and there have been a variety of approaches.

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Conclusion This chapter is an introduction to the ways in which violent extremism and countering it have been understood by governments and policy in regions of our research. It is intended as a background to better understanding the experiences related to us by the focus group participants and interviewees. In particular, what is presented here enables the reader to see the research as a snapshot of a moment in time. It is clear that in late 2015 and early 2016, some countries in Europe were processing difficult and violent events, especially the coordinated attacks on Paris. While these attacks took place in France, the men involved were linked to Daesh in Syria and Iraq, raising the prospect of the threat of violence from foreign terrorist fighter returnees. The consequences of the attacks in terms of discussion about Daesh, about Islam and about Muslims could be felt not just in France, but also around the world. Women were also part of the networks carrying out this violence, and it is clear that each of the countries studied here has gradually come to the conclusion that women too can pose a threat, whatever ideology they support. Mostly, the countries here consider Daesh and the far right the two key security risks, and they are the focus of countering violent extremism efforts. However, there are no clear parallels in how countries choose to deal with these two issues. As is clear from France and Germany, there is a certain degree of voter support for parties that embody at least some of the values of radical right populist, if not far right, ideology: opposition to migration, nationalism, a robust definition of the boundaries of identity, often framed in religious or cultural terms. While the type of violence associated with the radical right tends to be less organised and militant than the far right, there is a potential threat to democracy, nonetheless. In each of the countries considered, CVE is still a relatively new response and lacks long-term evaluations. Each of the countries here has used community engagement in conjunction with the law and with political attempts to direct national discourse. They have different histories, they have different populations, and they have different approaches. Yet they are linked through either geographic proximity, through international alliances, and to some degree through shared cultures. The UK, Canada and France have national CVE strategies, even while much counter-radicalisation work is conducted by NGOs. The Netherlands runs CVE according to a city-approach and Germany’s national strategy is no more than a form of guidance for regions

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and the NGOs operating on CVE within them. Each of the countries has tended to formulate gender only in terms of women, and they have come belatedly to this, and mainly through the visibility of women supporting Daesh, at which point the extremism of women and girls could no longer be ignored. There is more complex work going on to consider gender, masculinities and power dynamics through experienced intervention providers in each country. However, much of this is not led by government and comes from grassroots practitioners, some of whom are deeply emotionally invested in this cause.

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The Journal. 2019. France Jails “jihadist” Woman (22) Accused over Foiled 2016 Terror Attack in Paris. The Journal. Accessed May 5. https://www. thejournal.ie/france-jails-jihadist-woman-accused-over-foiled-terror-attack-inparis-4590216-Apr2019/. Thomas, Dominique. 2003. Le Londonistan: La Voix du djihad. Paris: Michalon. Tierolf, Bas, Maaike van Kapel, Lisanne Drost, and Willem Wagenaar. 2018. Summary of the Seventh Report on Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Netherlands in 2017. https://www.annefrank.org/ en/topics/research/monitor-racism-and-extremism/. Tiflati, Hicham. 2018. The Way Out: Radicalization to Rehabilitation: How Does Canada Prepare for ISIS Returnees? CBC Canada, January. https://www.cbc. ca/cbcdocspov/features/radicalization-to-rehabilitation-how-doescanada-prepare-for-isis-returnees. Tipaldu, Sofia, and Uba Katrin. 2018. Golden Dawn: How the Greek Far Right Wrote the Playbook Others Now Use to Go Mainstream. The Conversation, August. https://theconversation.com/golden-dawn-how-the-greek-farright-wrote-the-playbook-others-now-use-to-go-mainstream-100987. Todd, Douglas. 2015. Muslim Group Sues Stephen Harper: A Background Story | Vancouver Sun. Vancouver Sun, May. https://vancouversun.com/news/ staff-blogs/muslim-group-sues-stephen-harper-a-background-story. Treadwell, J., and J. Garland. 2011. Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League. British Journal of Criminology 51 (4): 621–634. Troper, Michel. 1999. French Secularism, or Laicite Symposium  – State and Federal Religious Liberty Legislation: Is It Necessary  – Symposium  – A Roundtable on Constitutionalism, Constitutional Rights &(and) Changing Civil Society: Universal Rights and Cultural Pluralism. Cardozo Law Review 21: 1267–1284. Uhlmann, Milena. 2017. Evaluation of the Advice Centre on Radicalisation. Research Report 31. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. https://www. bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb31evaluation-beratungsstelle-radikalisierung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=16. Vasagar, Jeevan. 2013. German Neo-Nazi Trial Gives Insight into Secret Life of Beate Zschäpe. The Daily Telegraph, August 24, sec. World. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/10263998/German-neoNazi-trial-gives-insight-into-secret-life-of-Beate-Zschape.html. Vehrkamp, Robert. 2019. Studie  – Ablehnung von Parteien prägt Wahlentscheidungen der Europäer. Bertelsman Foundation. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/themen/aktuelle-meldungen/2019/april/ ablehnung-von-parteien-praegt-wahlentscheidungen-der-europaeer/. Veiligheid, Ministerie van Justitie en. 2017. Evaluation of the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism – Rapport –

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CHAPTER 4

The Milieu Approach

This research sought to answer two key research questions: what are the gender dynamics of violent extremism (VE) and what are the gender dynamics of countering violent extremism (CVE) through engagement with two ideologies, violent jihadism and the far right. We were also concerned to explore the question of the degree to which CVE programmes partnering women in the Muslim communities they are intended to help were either wanted or needed. It aimed, as a result, to shed light on their likely chances of success. The response to these research issues was to innovate a methodology based on engagement with a ‘milieu’. This method aims to establish the context in which radicalisation takes place and to understand, as far as possible, the possible contributing factors (structural, social, organisational and personal) impacting on the path to an extreme group. Derived from a concept devised by Malthaner and Waldmann, this research understands the milieu as the community most affected by the issues of radicalisation and violent extremism. However, it engages with the milieu as potentially ‘vulnerable’ not simply to radicalisation, but to the effects of government interventions to counter radicalisation. The milieu approach prioritises grassroots men and women and their views and experiences. It uses the concept of the milieu as the broader social environment of shared practices; in CVE terms, this is the community regarded as vulnerable to radicalisation.

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The fieldwork explored men’s and women’s roles in radicalisation and counter-­ radicalisation in five contexts: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, enabling a comparative analysis. Reflecting the security priorities of the countries concerned, in order to investigate and understand their impacts, this book focuses primarily on Daesh-inspired extremism, with radicalisation to far right movements a secondary study. This book maps the gender dynamics of men and boys, girls and women who join radical movements and also provides recommendations on how to work more successfully with women, and wider communities, to counter violent extremism. This chapter sets out in detail what is meant by the milieu and the theory from which the method emerged. The milieu approach innovated in this research was a response to one of the biggest challenges of conducting research on radicalisation to violent extremism: how to understand radicalisation in individuals in the absence of easy access. In response, we developed an analytical framework that takes into consideration the importance of context, through focus groups and the creation of a discursive space for those who can feel targeted by government interventions and Islamophobic discourses. This chapter also sets out some of the ethical difficulties in conducting this research, not all of which were successfully resolved in the course of the four-month fieldwork period. It is a reflective chapter, engaging with the difficulties of the research terrain, and as such it requires both sensitivity and honesty of approach. It also offers insights into the methods not just of research but of CVE itself. This chapter begins by setting out the task of the research, which presented the difficulty of selecting ‘communities’ of participation. This chapter therefore continues with an exploration of how community is understood in VE and CVE. Engaging with the idea of community and what it means in such research was essential to conducting the fieldwork, yet it presents a number of challenges in relation to work with often marginalised communities. Finally, this chapter details the research methods, including how and where the research was conducted, although the precise locations are not named. Most importantly, this chapter addresses the ethical problems arising in such a project: how to interrogate CVE practices perceived as negative without reproducing their logic; how to seek to offer space for critical voices from marginalised communities, while being outside those communities and in a position of power in relation to them.

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The Milieu and Why It Matters Chapter 2 traced the development of CVE as a social phenomenon, a grassroots approach aimed at the ‘hearts and minds’ of communities. The question of what constitutes community in CVE has long been contentious. Given the primary focus of CVE on Muslims, and with its roots in the War on Terror, many Muslims have contested their construction by governments as a ‘suspect community’ and in gendered terms, as previously outlined (Bartlett and Birdwell 2010; Breen-Smyth 2014; Awan 2012; Kundnani 2014; Rashid 2014). In particular, there has been a great deal of antagonism to and suspicion of CVE in the UK, where the first national CVE programme Prevent was instituted in 2006/2007  in the wake of suicide attacks on London’s transport system, in which 56 people were killed. These attacks, on 7 July 2005, are known as 7/7. Tensions between the desire to police communities according to faith and ethnicity, and the desire to protect communities, have however been apparent in many more countries implementing CVE programmes. These programmes have often fractured the bonds of trust between citizen and state (Innes et al. 2017; Stolle and Hooghe 2003; Godefroidt and Langer 2017). In research on violent extremism, the term milieu is used to describe the broadest communities from which violent actors emerge. ‘Pyramid’ models of radicalisation propose that the path towards carrying out an act of violence is one that takes a potential radical into ever smaller communities of activism. The ‘terrorist community’ is tiny. Very few people are terrorist actors. However, the terrorist support network is larger. It includes people with roles that do not involve carrying out the final attack. And those people are drawn from a yet wider community of those who do not actively support terrorism, but who might have sympathies for its causes or its actors. At the base of the pyramid is broad society, with its many diverse views. For Malthaner and Waldmann (2014) the ‘radical milieu’ constitutes the ‘social setting’ of radicalisation. It is the radical milieu “which shares their perspective and objectives, approves of certain forms of violence, and (at least to a certain extent) supports the violent group morally and logistically” (Malthaner and Waldmann 2014, 979). This radical milieu is drawn from a wider social movement. Many authors have considered terrorism as the product of a subsection of a wider social movement. Porta and Diani (2005) and Porta and Haupt (2012), for instance, have pioneered study of the ways in which violent groups are able to frame particular messages to resonate with opinions

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widely shared within a social movement. Terrorist actors then become gradually more isolated from the wider movement, to take an ultimately violent path. Researchers of Islamist and jihadist extremism have employed social movement approaches to consider the ways in which activists in radical organisations such as al-Muhajiroun and al-Qaida present new solutions to shared problems and grievances (Wiktorowicz 2005; Smelser 2010). Their skill is in framing their ideologies to resonate with the views of a wider shared community, yet presenting a radical alternative. As radicalisation is seen as an inherently social process (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Borum 2012), the ability of a radical group to reach out to wide pools of potentially aggrieved like minds is important. In some communities that have been the object of shared oppression, for instance, in Palestine, there has often been broad support for and indeed pride in violent actors, regarded as a collective resistance (Post 2005; Crenshaw 2009; Laqueur 2004). Such links have been studied in the Basque region, the home of ETA, and in Northern Ireland (Burton and Sluka, and Zuleika cited in Malthaner and Waldmann 2014, 980; Bew et al. 2009). These are regions in which there is a deep collective attachment to the idea of freedom, and this does not belong to violent actors alone. It should be said that there are also many peace activists within these communities who are not committed to violence. However, scholars of terrorism have noted the links between shared socio-economic grievance or oppression in wider populations and support or sympathy for minority terrorist actors, or aspects of their belief (see Club de Madrid 2005; Neumann 2009; Crenshaw 2009). They also note that recruitment is sometimes a case of finding groups of like minds with shared experiences—in the case of jihadist groups, this has happened in the past in mosques or in universities (Quilliam 2010; Neumann 2008; Rogers and Neumann 2007). For far right recruiters, the military has been an important location for mobilisation efforts, as a site within which the importance of nationalist values is a given (Davey 2017). Authors also note the importance of shared cultures and meaning within radical groups and the communities they seek to mobilise (Busher 2013; Pilkington 2016; Kimmel 2018; Wiktorowicz 2005). While Malthaner and Waldmann (2014) use the term radical milieu to denote a wider group that is supportive of the violence of mobilised terrorist actors, the term milieu as used in this book should not be understood as such. Sociologists use the term milieu to describe communities of shared practice and with shared symbolic meanings. This is a dynamic social field and

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it influences the formation of tastes, opinions and routine practices (Durkheim 1951; Bourdieu 1985). The relationship between the terrorist group, radical milieu and social milieu are marked by clear boundaries: the terrorist actor uses violence; the radical milieu might support the use of violence; the social milieu does not support the use of violence, but constitutes the wider community from which the radical might emerge (Malthaner and Waldmann 2014). From the perspective of the CVE programme, it is this broader social milieu that is the desired zone of engagement. However, identifying who constitutes this milieu is problematic. Governments seeking to counter radical and violent jihadism have frequently targeted CVE programmes in a simplistic way. The logic of CVE has tended towards racialised approaches and assumptions: that home-grown radicalisation was likely to be associated with Muslims, and therefore with—immigrant heritage—Muslim communities. Groups such as al-Qaida have indeed operated according to a similar logic, explicitly setting out, for instance, to propagandise to Muslims living in the West. From a simply numerical perspective, those involved in violent jihadist plots have more often come from Muslim families with an immigrant background (Sageman 2004; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Cook and Vale 2018; Nesser 2014). However, this is not exclusively the case by any means. High numbers of, often white, converts have travelled to join Daesh, for instance, as noted in the previous chapter. CVE efforts in the West, however, became focused on particular Muslim communities, who in turn contested the need for such a response, given the securitising and alienating effects that this had on them (Kundnani 2014; Croft 2012), and the emergence of violent actors from other backgrounds.

The Gendered Milieu CVE programmes have also demonstrated a pernicious gendered logic, given the perceived reliance on mothers to essentially inform on sons. In the UK, where the first national prevention scheme was implemented, many British Muslims responded by challenging the expectation that they would provide information on suspicious activities within communities to both CVE practitioners and police (Brown 2008, 2013). These concerns did not prevent the adoption of CVE and this logic as a concept by other western countries affected by al-Qaida-inspired violence, nor did they hamper the dominance of the Prevent strategy as the key approach to CVE within the UK’s counter-terrorism CONTEST strategy.

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CVE is predicated upon the engagement or partnership at a grassroots level with communities understood to be vulnerable to particular harmful practices. As Chap. 2 made clear, in the CVE context ‘Muslim mothers’ can frequently represent an identity that governments regard as valid recipients of engagement. While this logic is a feature of work to counter violent extremism, it is no more than an extension of a pre-existing logic already operational within the criminal justice system. The CVE concept is rooted not only in the War on Terror but in the British context, and within this context, the police and Home Office have repeatedly attempted to construct community as a notional ally, with security becoming an explicit responsibility not just of institutions but of citizens (Prior et al. 2006). It is clear then that the use of gender in CVE can and has proved divisive. Muslim communities are separated into those who are willing to cooperate in CVE, and those who are a risk. The concept of risk further separates Muslim men from Muslim women. Muslim women are separated into those who are mothers and those who are not. Muslim people can face a succession of binary choices in the CVE space; one of the reasons for this is that CVE has dealt with people in terms of their sex, rather than gender. Indeed, our attempts to organise focus groups according to sex, mirroring CVE practice and adopting what we believed to be cultural sensitivity were often rejected, with participants insisting such segregation was unnecessary and unwanted. This research was however about understanding gender dynamics, which is different from seeking to find out what men or women are doing, although it incorporates this. The choice to work with gender in three constituent parts—performative, constructed and structural—is a choice to see relationships between men and women, within communities, and with society more broadly. It was a choice based on the belief that we can only understand VE and CVE if we look at the interactions and interplay between the local and the societal; the individual and the collective. We were interested in finding out how people in the communities of research understood the appropriate roles and activities for men and women, as constituents of a collective. We were also interested in how people understood their identities, which are often hybrid. This term represents the complex ways in which post-global people can belong to a variety of different groups. Identity is intersectional and represents a crossroads of often competing and complex histories, rights and interests, for instance, black-woman-American-feminist. In terms of methodology we therefore took an intersectional and

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feminist approach. A feminist approach to research begins with the explicit recognition of women’s experiences (Kronsell 2005, 280). It asserts the importance of new forms of knowledge, created from the position ‘as a woman’, and how this results in a distinct epistemological and also political standpoint (Harding and Smith 1988). This also necessitates a focus on the everyday, the ordinary and mundane, as a site of meaning and politicisation for women. The intersectional aspect of the research enabled the possibility of the project to also act to empower not just women, but other marginalised groups and identities, who feel there is no space for them to speak.

The Problem of Community The foregoing sections suggest an ontological problem for CVE policy and practitioners, as well as for researchers. In either preventing extremism, or in researching it, how can the relevant communities be identified? As noted, some governments with national P/CVE frameworks have frequently resorted to straightforward logics of race and faith in identifying communities to pilot P/CVE programmes focused on jihadism, ignoring the complexities of actual recruitment, which suggest a far less straightforward relationship between growing up in a Muslim community and joining a jihadist group (Bartoszewicz 2013; Karagiannis 2012; Schuurman et al. 2016; Uhlmann 2008). Additionally, if CVE aimed at resisting violent Islamism and jihadism is often focused on Muslim communities, the same cannot be said of efforts to counter the far right. Indeed, it is not possible to follow the same logic: CVE efforts to engage ‘Muslim communities’ require an assumption of those communities as distinct from non-Muslim society, to some degree homogenous and self-regulating. Such efforts are predicated on assumptions of Muslim difference and ‘vulnerability’ to Islamist and jihadist extremism while prioritising the need for Muslim assimilation. A parallel CVE logic in a western context is impossible when considering the far right, white supremacism, neo-Nazis or radical right anti-­Islam(ist) movements such as the English Defence League (EDL). ‘Whiteness’ itself is rarely interrogated, yet it too is socially constructed (Frankenberg 1993; Gear Rich 2010; James 2014). However, without analysis of whiteness as identity, of differences in the construction of particular forms of whiteness, and without making whiteness visible as race, the logics of CVE

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programmes, which are often predicated on interrogations of what it means to be Muslim, fall down. The inapplicability of CVE initiatives to counter the far right, according to the same logic of ‘community’ used for countering jihadism, raised questions for both our research methods and CVE as a project itself. While the term ‘whiteness’ and ‘white communities’ are just as socially constructed as the term ‘Muslim’ and ‘Muslim communities’, the assumption in UK and European security politics is that ‘white’ is the default. This means that ‘white communities’ are defined differently, according to class or geography. Our research project nonetheless needed to engage with communities, in order to conduct interviews designed to understand both VE and CVE. In research on CVE we set out, first and foremost, to talk to communities likely to have knowledge. However, we deliberately engaged with communities of faith and race as sites of expertise and subjectivity, not simply as ‘target populations’, as often constructed in government interventions. This was a particularly precarious terrain to navigate. It involved an active engagement with the contentious nature of CVE work aimed specifically at violent jihadism, as outlined in Chap. 2; yet in order to investigate the effects of CVE work, it was necessary to engage with the same populations who are also the subject of interventions. While the notion of ‘community’ was central to the research, as it is to the concept of CVE itself, engagement with ‘communities’ was not unproblematic. We risked as researchers, reproducing the damaging agendas of CVE itself. Our initial approaches to potential focus group participants often met with criticism of these agendas and critiques of the ways in which governments framed Muslim communities in extractive terms, with an expectation of compliance. Indeed, the notion of community, which informed our fundamental decisions about how and where to begin the research, who to approach and how to begin, is itself highly contested. The problematisation of ideas of community as homogenous, linked to neighbourhood and geo-location is in part a product of the increasing individualisation of society, due to the impacts of globalisation (Albrow et al. 1994; Spalek 2008; Beck et al. 1994). Community means different things to different people. We are all part of diverse communities, some of which may exist in offline spaces, others only virtually. Community is contested, and it is exploited. Community is however fundamental to the logic of CVE programming (Pearson 2020). In particular, CVE tackles radicalisation as a social problem, associated with a lack of community or social cohesion. The roots of

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counter-­ radicalisation in the UK have been identified with the social context of those radicalised and another policy concept, social cohesion. Forrest and Kearns (2001) suggest that it is social cohesion that holds societies together and that violence between communities is the result of an absence of cohesion. More community produces more security (Crawford 1997 cited in Spalek 2008, 93). Where there is little social cohesion there is, “social disorder and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme social inequality, low levels of social interaction between and within communities and low levels of place attachment” (Forrest and Kearns 2001, 2128). Cohesion is about micro-level communication and cooperation and focused on everyday interaction, normally at the neighbourhood level (Forrest and Kearns 2001). However, radicalisation and violence as well as globalisation and the Internet have problematised the meaning of community. Community is no longer simply associated with the physical spaces in which people live. What is instead suggested is the importance of community as a milieu, a means of sharing practices, symbolic meaning and values, around collective identities (Spalek 2008). Castells (2009, xxvi) suggests ‘resistance’ identities are one of three forms of collective identity, the others being ‘legitimising’ and ‘project’. Authors engaging with the ways in which CVE projects have affected Muslim communities propose ways in which counter-radicalisation strategies produce ‘legitimising’ identities. Spalek (2008) notes that: …the concept of ‘community’ itself is not neutral, but rather the ways in which it is constituted by government institutions and practices suggest that it is an ideologically loaded term, a form of nation building, underpinned by a particular viewpoint about the kinds of identities that should be legitimised within society. (p. 91)

Otherwise said, institutional approaches seeking to counter what they perceive to be radical voices may also act to discourage the organic presentation of legitimate resistant voices, critiquing and challenging interventions. The effect of CVE therefore can be to enable sections of communities in expressing particular ‘legitimised’ identities, rather than whole communities expressing a broad range of opinion, some of which seeks to challenge authority (Spalek 2008; Prior et al. 2006). Additionally, for those seeking the ‘causes’ of violent extremism, there is little compelling evidence to justify the broad community-based

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approaches that CVE has often relied on, targeting large populations of immigrant heritage Muslims. Klausen (2019) emphasises that while radicalisation is indeed both a social and collective enterprise, the ‘communities’ of radical activism are often composed of clusters of young people living in the same physical space, with offline contact to radical recruiters. These clusters can interconnect across the global arena via contacts in the virtual space. However, it is the offline activity and social network that enable activism including protest, meeting groups and, eventually, violence (Hussain and Saltman 2014; Klausen 2019). Radicalisation is thus a product of offline geo-local dynamics, involving specific radical actors embedded within an ideological community. The wider ‘Muslim community’ is often ignorant of the radical activities in their midst, or has only limited social contact with the activism. Klausen (2019) recommends that governments “target the hubs” and engage not in CVE, but in counter-­ terrorism, as VE is not “a social problem”. Nonetheless, as the research underpinning this book found, wider communities did indeed have knowledge of radicalisation; they described the impacts on their lives of both state interventions broadly associating Muslim demographics with radicalisation and of Daesh recruitment on neighbourhood spaces and those trying to live peaceably within them.

Researching the Far Right: Communities and Radicalisation Violent jihadism is not the only threat to face western countries, as previous chapters have made clear. Governments are increasingly seeking to counter far right radicalisation, as well as violent jihadist extremism. This is further explored in Chap. 7. Additionally, some scholars have suggested a ‘reciprocal’ relationship between incidents of jihadist violence and activity on the far right, with actors engaged in a cycle of spiralling extremism. Berger notes the ways in which attacks by both sides bolster ‘us’ and ‘them’ narratives of incompatibility (Berger 2017). One of the key considerations of the research then was to engage with the broader societal dynamics of extremism. Although the findings do not ultimately evidence a reciprocity, this nonetheless provided a compelling framing device, and a reason to research the gender dynamics of movements thought to relate to one another: the violent jihad and the far right. The research however does not equate the two movements and makes no assumptions of parity of threat, of scale; or of equity in the violence used, or the methods engaged.

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How to conduct research on far right radicalisation however posed fresh problems regarding both ethics and the identification of communities of interest. While counter-radicalisation strategies focused on violent jihadists who have targeted broad communities of faith, a parallel logic breaks down when dealing with extremism which is linked to a racist fringe movement emergent from the majority ethnic group—white people. Muslim communities taking part in focus groups all felt engaged in debates around the violent jihad, often because they felt obligated to take a position. Or else they felt targeted, either by Islamophobia related to jihadist attacks, or by the media, or by government interventions, or by the public holding them to account. White communities however did not have the same relationship to far right violence. As discussed in Chap. 7, it appeared much easier to feel racism or extremism had little to do with them and to question the basis for the research. This is perhaps a function of the degree to which white privilege allowed communities to ignore extremisms within and to presume extremism is a problem that belonged to the ‘Other’. White privilege is structural, and it is historic; as this research makes clear, not all white people experience whiteness in the same way, or with the same advantages. Yet, as McIntosh (1988) describes, white privilege is nonetheless “an invisible package of unearned assets..” benefitting white people, who largely “remain oblivious” (p. 2). Indeed, while CVE aimed at jihadism engages Muslim communities, western governments do not employ a parallel approach to counter the far right; white communities in these countries are generally the majority demographic, and the scale is therefore vast and apparently impractical. This would also require institutional self-reflection. Additionally, there are problems of identifying what might constitute ‘extremist’ belief where the far right is concerned, although it should be noted that this problem is also relevant to jihadist extremism as well. For instance, some of the views expressed by actors widely regarded as far right are prevalent in the mainstream. In December 2017, President Donald Trump’s retweeted Islamophobic video content and tweets by Jayda Fransen, then Deputy Leader of the UK anti-Muslim group Britain First, causing outrage in the UK media. His retweeting of her material occurred after she had been arrested for a speech she made at a rally in Belfast a few months earlier. On the one hand Twitter removed Fransen from its platform and criticism was levelled at the American president, suggesting that such far right views are not tolerated. On the other hand, that an American president might retweet Britain First suggests that racism has remained

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embedded in ‘mainstream’ systems of power, and indeed normalised (Mondon and Winter 2020). It should be noted that President Trump and Jayda Fransen reject accusations of racism, as do many on the radical right, seeing this instead as a form of censorship. Ethically, there was also the additional problem of researcher positionality. While the position of the white, non-Muslim and middleclass identites of the core research team (Pearson and Winterbotham) was engaged with by Muslim focus group participants, through some contestation of the research focus, its methods and its questions, there was no explicit recognition of the problems of researcher positionality in the non-­Muslim focus groups. This is due to the frequent transparency of whiteness as a race (Frankenberg 1993). Nonetheless, the shared whiteness of participants and researchers in discussion of the far right may have acted to enable particular forms of discourse. This is discussed in more detail in Chap. 7, which focuses on the far right. Here, transcript excerpts evidence the difficulties for participants in non-Muslim focus groups in discussion of race. Conversation was uncomfortable for some participants, as it raised participant fears around immigration and extremism; discussion at times prompted at times racist views, although all participants asserted themselves as anti-racist. Here the milieu method, which concentrated on community recognition and empowerment, would require a strong normative framework, in order to be replicated in CVE practices themselves.

The Milieu Methodology Given the complexities of the terrain outlined, the intention was to innovate a qualitative methodology that created political space for participants to express their agency and expertise in this field. This is innovative because communities in the CVE space tend to complain of being objectified. It also fulfilled a number of research needs. Firstly, the method had to enable the collection of original data on radicalisation to VE, and strategies to counter this (CVE).1 Recognising the diverse ways in which community is constituted, the project evolved from the current literature on radicalisation and prioritised access to people in three forms of community: the physical neighbourhood in which radicalisation occurs; 1  The research was funded by the Kanishka Programme, part of Public Safety Canada. The research team had freedom in how to respond to the call—to explore the gender dynamics of VE and CVE—in terms of ideologies, location and research methods, and in all findings.

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the social milieu of radicalisation; and ‘communities of religion’, which is to say, Muslim communities. Where governments have focused interventions on communities of religion, communities have often challenged this framing of themselves. However, it was important for the research to reproduce the logic of government in this regard, in order to test its efficacy. In practice, in the research on violent jihadism, these communities mostly overlapped. Although no interviews were ultimately conducted with those who had been recruited or radicalised, almost half of the focus groups on radicalisation to violent jihadism included interviewees who had information based on actual knowledge of youth radicalisation (this was primarily personal but also included second-hand and anecdotal experience). The research is therefore based on the understanding that focus group participants were able to relay information about potential grievances or incentives underlying radicalisation; also that in some cases, participants were able to produce knowledge of radicalisation based on their lived experiences and events affecting friends, colleagues and family members. Second, therefore, the methodology had to allow for the contestation of Muslim communities as ‘suspect communities’. The milieu method constituted a response to initial interactions with community members on the subject of the research project, which they challenged. Potential focus group respondents, for instance, frequently suggested they were tired of the subject of extremism, and also sceptical of any benefits of participation. A key feature of the approach was the active acknowledgement of power differentials between researcher, state and the communities of interest. A number of researchers, of different identities, led focus groups across countries. It was particularly important that where research teams were non-­Muslim and white, and focus groups were not, trust was built through conversation with participants about the framing and conduct of the research (Bourke 2014). This involved the active creation of the focus group as a space for communities to express resistance to CVE practices themselves, should they want to; almost uniformly, they did. Indeed, in the UK and German contexts, participants explicitly asked prior to participation if we as researchers would ‘allow’ participants to challenge state approaches, dominant narratives and our own research logics. In a number of cases the—voluntary—participation in focus groups rested upon the guarantee of freedom to anonymously speak out against state, institutional and media practices. Those making this request also expressed anger over the continued association of Islam with extremism, and the need to conduct more

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research on this issue. The method evolved therefore explicitly set out to enable the expression of such ‘resistance identities’ and create a discursive space in which participants felt free to express a range of views, some of which were likely to challenge the right of the state to intervene in issues of Islam, but also challenged the research project itself. Indeed, access to participants proved challenging. This was partly due to concerns regarding our intentions, difficulties of bridging language gaps and the impact of events during the research. These included the 2015 Paris attacks, which caused a number of Muslim focus group participants to withdraw. Muslim participants interviewed faced verbal and physical assaults in the wake of the attacks—not only in France but elsewhere, including during our research in Canada, which made them more reluctant to engage in the research itself. The milieu method aimed not to further marginalise participants (hooks 1990). It invoked but subverted the ‘pyramid’ model of radicalisation, which posits that groups of violent extremists emerge from broader communities of support. Indeed, the research engaged with communities within which ‘radical’ actors had at one point been embedded; yet it represented an opportunity for people to express the ways in which radicalisation ‘from within’ their community represented an external and disruptive force. Participants described how radicalisation had torn neighbourhoods apart and forced them to confront what ‘community’ actually signified, given perceptions that young people had actively abandoned this, without raising suspicion in their parents, family or wider social networks. The aim was to understand more about VE and CVE from the perspective of those most affected by it. However, the research did more than this: it also constituted an attempt to create a space for communities to speak back to those whose job is to implement CVE.  It was also important that we collectively—non-Muslim and white researchers, as well as Muslim members of the research teams—actively listened to people who told us they were resistant to the research. To many participants, the project represented a problematically straightforward reproduction of the same contested logics of the CVE strategies we were interrogating. People invited to participate, because they were Muslim, often told us we were guilty of the usual assumptions: that Muslim communities have the answers, and are somehow ‘closer’ to the problem of Daesh or al-Qaida than others, even as young people from white non-Muslim backgrounds were travelling to Iraq and Syria to join Daesh, albeit in fewer numbers. They were understandably tired of this.

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Method, Methodology and Limitations Where Muslim communities were concerned, the authors took care not to further alienate already marginalised people, already suffering both research fatigue and frustration with the constant association of Islam with extremism (Clark 2008; Bailey 2015). As outlined, how to understand the meaning of community and its relationship with both VE and projects aimed at countering VE and in all the countries of research was key. Perhaps the most obvious starting place for research into gender and radicalisation is to interview people who have joined Islamist groups espousing violence, either al-Qaida-related or—given the 2015–2016 timeframe of this research—Daesh. Interviews were the initial aim of the project. We reached out to key actors engaged in both prevention and deradicalisation work in each of the countries of focus, in order to access people prevented from travel, being deradicalised, or, for instance, in the UK, who were working with the CHANNEL project. This proved unsuccessful due to the four-month time frame of the fieldwork phase of the project. For those working in interventions, trust with participants is key. CVE actors were naturally hesitant to permit our access to young ‘radicalised’ people, in case the research disturbed the relationship they themselves had carefully built. Instead we conducted interviews with the intervention providers themselves to gain expert insights from their experiences. However, through these initial approaches, we were also able to access people one step removed from radicalisation. For instance, in Germany we conducted interviews with the mothers of young men who had been prevented from travel to Daesh. In the Netherlands, the researcher also conducted interviews with the families of some of those who had successfully travelled. However, perhaps the richest source of information was from the communities that existed around some radicalised young people and their families. They were a source of not just opinion, but experience. Daesh had touched their lives in many different ways, and their personal stories of the impact of Daesh were an important aspect of the research. We accessed those people through approaches to community centres, to mosques, to NGOs; in some cases these were cold approaches, in others they were based on recommendations. In the case of the Netherlands, the researcher had good contacts within Muslim communities and had little difficulty in drawing groups together for discussion. In this book we describe the groups aimed at exploring jihadist VE and CVE as Muslim focus groups,

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because all who participated were Muslims, in contrast to the groups convened for study of the far right. There were difficulties in attaining the same levels of data and the same quality of data when researching the far right. We took the decision to approach ‘communities of geography’, specifically communities constituted by people living in locations where there had been issues with the far right. In the UK, focus group research was carried out in areas where the British National Party (BNP), which has a racist and anti-immigrant agenda predicated on preserving ‘British identity’, had succeeded in electing local councillors. In Germany, focus groups were conducted with people in locations that had witnessed either neo-Nazi activism or protests against immigration, or against local Muslim communities. In one case this included an arson attack on a mosque. In Canada, research was conducted with a member of a far right extremist group. The study is missing data on the far right from the Netherlands due to difficulties in gathering focus groups to discuss the subject. Given the comparative lack of data therefore when contrasted with the research on violent jihadism, the findings on the far right are confined to one chapter, Chap. 7, rather than throughout this book. The focus groups on the far right were predominantly white, although not exclusively so. None included Muslim participants, and for that reason we describe these groups as non-Muslim focus groups. From them we wanted to better understand the ways in which far right narratives operated and resonated in their location, and the gender dynamics in operation. We also wished to learn from any personal experiences of radicalisation participants had. The focus groups on the far right were therefore conducted with grassroots communities, rather than the families of radical actors, or radical actors themselves; there is an exception however, the one white supremacist case study in Canada, noted above. We accept that the categories ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ focus groups risk reproduction of state narratives, and potentially reify identities understood as relevant to CVE. However, the focus groups in practice enabled the contestation of those narratives. Focus groups addressed a range of issues raised by participants themselves, and mainly relating to their local neighbourhoods. While discussion centred on violent extremism, how to counter this and the gender dynamics inherent in that, participants were free to take the discussion in different directions. This meant that conversation turned to issues they associated with violent extremism, including integration, grooming gangs, the role (or lack) of the English language in migrant

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communities and jihadist terrorism, amongst others. The subjects discussed gave insights into the situation in each of the four countries of study, and subsequent events including the rise of the AfD in Germany, Brexit in the UK, the change of government and election of Trudeau in Canada and the eventual Presidential challenge of Marine Le Pen in France. Qualitative fieldwork was undertaken between October 2015 and January 2016 inclusively, in ten cities in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, enabling a comparative analysis. The majority of the interviews took place within focus groups, but a number of elite interviews with those working in CVE and prevention delivery, and experts in the field such as police, journalists, youth leaders or analysts, were also conducted. Seven researchers were involved and worked in teams of two in all groups but Germany, where one person conducted focus groups and interviews. Separate teams undertook research in France, the Netherlands and Québec; all received the same training. An initial training session was held in London with a subsequent session for the Québec researcher in Canada, in order to ensure standardised question formats, and internal consistency, despite the diverse contexts. Interviews followed a semi-structured format, in which a set of fixed and open-ended questions were put to participants. The importance of a consistent methodology was stressed, with emphasis on uniform sampling methods, an area frequently critiqued in studies of violent extremism (Dolnik 2013; Neumann and Kleinmann 2013). The research fieldwork followed qualitative methods consistent with the inclusive aims of the innovative milieu framework: the focus group and semistructured interview. The majority of the research was conducted through anonymous focus groups lasting no more than two hours, with on average six to eight participants, and in a setting familiar to the group, such as a mosque meeting room or local community centre. Opinion was canvassed through 41 anonymous focus groups and a number of individual interviews. We included more than 217 people in focus groups: men, women and youths aged 16 and over, for reasons of consent. Focus groups were not always consistent in size. The smallest group had only 2 participants, and the largest 20. Sometimes people who had not said they would participate asked to join in; at other times people who had committed to attend did not. Focus groups were largest in Canada, and smallest in Germany. The research intended to explore people’s experiences of extremism in relation to the communities that they inhabit. It represented an attempt to situate observations grounded in real world experiences. It was therefore

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anticipated that there might be different knowledge levels in groups. In order to elicit the most relevant answers, the intention was to engage primarily with those who had no specialist/professional knowledge of radicalisation but might realistically be (or had been) the subject of CVE projects. Some participants in focus groups within Muslim communities had direct experience of radicalisation, others did not. Some had attended CVE interventions in their local community, others knew about CVE through others, or the media. Even where participants had not themselves experienced CVE interventions, their contribution was not purely ‘theoretical’—all participants were affected by discourses surrounding extremism and terrorism, now a part of their everyday life, and therefore have useful opinions on what is likely to work (or not). Indeed, half of the Muslim focus groups (some 13 groups) included participants with some experience in their family or community of radicalisation. The focus group method has a number of advantages. First, it facilitates a naturalistic environment within which to create discussion within a social group, and reveal its dynamics (Grudens-Schuck et al. 2004). Second, it permits a general ‘texture’ of group opinion and feeling to be measured (Wilkinson 1998, 187). Third, and given the contested subject of the research, it was important to enable the creation of a discursive space in which participants might feel empowered and enabled to share and direct opinion collectively, and this is a noted benefit of focus group discussion (Ivanoff and Hultberg 2006; Montell 1999). In particular, Montell (1999) notes that the focus group is the ideal setting for interrogation of sensitive themes, including gender: Focus groups provide the opportunity for studying issues of gender and sexuality with a more egalitarian relationship between the researcher and the research subjects, and consciousness-raising and empowering interaction between participants. Rather than exploiting participants…group interviews can provide support…and meet some of their needs. (p. 67)

These advantages were key to the research, providing a positive incentive for the expression of frustration with government approaches, with policy and with the topic of Islam, of Daesh, of the far right and extremism in general. Participants indeed frequently told researchers that there should be more such opportunities for guided discussion. Another aim was to conduct research in homogenous focus groups, with men, women, different age groups and separate religious groups interviewed separately. This approach was based on the literature, which

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suggests homogeneity of groups enables participants to address issues as freely as possible, and for a degree of group consensus to be generated (Grudens-Schuck et al. 2004; Krüger and Casey 2000; Frey and Fontana 1991). We used stratified sampling therefore to identify focus group participants according to agreed key criteria, specifically: gender (man/ woman), age (young teen to 20s, middle aged 30s–40s–50s, old 60s–70s) and religion/ethnicity. Though gatekeepers (e.g. mosques, community groups, women’s groups) were primarily used to identify participants, all were selected on their willingness to participate and engage in the subject area. In all focus groups participants had a range of backgrounds. We do not here however note the particular faith or creed of participants, their ethnic heritage or race. We do note where Muslim participants self-­ described as reverts or converts. As noted, some participants openly resisted these divisions, and research teams accommodated their requests to reconfigure groups as they preferred. This led to a small number (10 per cent of the total) of mixed sex Muslim focus groups, men and women. Additionally, some participants spoke to us in individual interviews. We also spoke individually to the families of four young people specifically affected by jihadist radicalisation. In Germany, two mothers of convert sons talked about preventing their children from joining Daesh. In the Netherlands the researcher spoke to the mother of a convert teenage girl who did travel to Syria, and the family of a Muslim-­ heritage young man, killed after joining Daesh. These accounts provided direct information on how young people radicalise. “Research fatigue” (Clark 2008, 955–959), and frustration with continued focus on issues of extremism, led to a difficulty in attracting participants. The aims of the research were therefore clearly explained, along with benefits to participants and protections afforded them. It was hoped this would facilitate open conversation and enable a participant-led approach in which they were free to emphasise any alternate priorities. Refreshments were provided in some groups, and in one group participants requested and were given restaurant vouchers for their participation. Each focus group discussion began with the same question: “what is your understanding of the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’?” The answers to this question were important as they allowed participants to express their attitudes towards radicalisation and violent extremism as concepts, which informed and directed subsequent discussion. This also set a baseline to establish that participants were—or were not—referencing the same thing when they discussed ‘violent extremism’ and CVE.  It also revealed baseline attitudes towards CVE, willingness to engage in it and its

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likely effectiveness. Each discussion also ended with a question on what was needed and an invitation to each participant to sum up their thoughts. A full list of research questions is available in the Appendix. One researcher led the discussion while the second took notes, which were then transcribed, coded line by line for key themes, with particular emphasis on gender, and analysed using the ATLAS.ti qualitative research programme. In Germany, where a single researcher led discussion, focus groups were recorded with consent, and later transcribed, and the files deleted. The responses of the participants could be classified in four ways, each having a different relationship with radicalisation, and providing different evidence. We interviewed participants with direct engagement with radical movements (one in Canada previously involved in Daesh and one in Canada involved in a white supremacist group); participants who knew someone who had been radicalised/recruited; participants who had heard of someone (second-­hand source or informed opinion, for instance, expert opinion) who had been radicalised/recruited; and other participants who had no personal knowledge (that is to say, knowledge obtained from the media, word of mouth or hearsay) of radicalisation/recruitment. In half of the focus groups, at least one participant knew someone who had been radicalised. Most other focus group participants were familiar with the surrounding issues, but did not personally know people involved in extremism. Given the central objectives relating to the research areas to understand the gender dynamics of roles and recruitment to radical movements, it was important to include men in discussion. While the research question was primarily aimed at gaining insights into CVE engagement with women, women are not separate from communities, workplaces, families, friends, partners and children. It was therefore important to include men, as their relationship with women involved in CVE potentially impacts upon its success, particularly in conservative communities (Ruxton 2004). Our methodology allowed for conservatism in Muslim community focus groups, but did not always encounter it and adapted to participant needs. Needless to say, the research participants express a range of opinions, a range of demographics and a range of roles. None should be read as ‘speaking for’ any group in its entirety. It should also be noted that a longer period of field research would have yielded more interviews and perhaps different results. The research limitations and ethics are laid out in further detail in the Appendix, but it is important to note that we set out to conduct more focus groups, particularly in white communities where the far right had at times been an issue. Ideally, those interviewed would have been selected to

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represent a full range of age and gender profiles and ethnic backgrounds. While the research set out to speak to more non-­Muslim focus groups to discuss far right activities in their communities, in practice more Muslim groups consented to contribute; all groups talked primarily about fears of jihadist radicalisation, even where the aim was to explore the far right. It should be noted, however, that despite these limitations, the research team noted saturation in findings in the demographics studied.

Conclusion The research underpinning this book engaged with two key questions: what are the gender dynamics of violent extremism and of efforts to counter it? It also explored how much communities wanted and needed CVE. It explored those questions in a relatively limited nine-month timeframe. Yet the research produced some definitive thematic findings, expressed across the five countries included, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (England only). In order to engage with participants, we adopted an innovative milieu approach. This enabled grassroots work with people likely to have an opinion about CVE and VE, and it enabled this work in a way that sought to empower participants in discussion. The aim here was to permit particularly Muslim community focus groups to contest their positioning in relation to violent extremism, if they so desired. This approach followed literature on extremism, social cohesion and the milieu linking radicalisation to communities. However, it permitted a subversion of the positioning of Muslim communities as ‘vulnerable’ to Daesh, and cast them as local ‘experts’, with knowledge of their own social networks and local areas. Most importantly, we wanted to listen to communities through the research, given that the research teams were predominantly not from the communities and do not speak for them.2 If this research showed one thing, it is that the loss of community or family members to violent groups has a huge impact, causing pain, depression and trauma, often to a wide circle. This and other findings are most obvious in transcript material and therefore we have chosen to rely on transcript excerpts in the findings section. The inclusion of transcript is also consistent with the project aim to listen to, and also give voice to participants. 2  In the Dutch context the lead researcher was Muslim and was able to mobilise her local connections in focus group research.

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Additionally, again mirroring but subverting CVE logics, the project’s aim of researching attitudes to CVE in relation to white nationalist extremism and the far right, as well as the gender dynamics of this, met with obstacles. The challenge in this research was to define the communities of interest and to persuade them that research on the far right might be of relevance to them, as even when participants lived in areas where there had been arson attacks against mosques or frequent anti-Muslim demonstration this relevance was not necessarily clear. The two strands of the research—violent jihad and the far right—did not follow equivalent methodological paths, and this in itself says something about the challenges of working to counter far right extremism. The key advantages of the milieu approach and the research method however are threefold. First, we did not focus on one community or ideology, which allowed for a more complex holistic appraisal of extremism as a societal phenomenon, and attitudes towards it. As a result, themes and trends, as well as differences, can be identified across communities and countries. Nor did the research seek to engage any particular group, but to investigate social understandings of violence and extremism, and how to counter this across communities. Second, it was the intention to enable communities frequently marginalised by discourse on the subject of VE. We wanted to give a voice to communities in a field where (predominantly) male community leaders and experts are often the go-to figures. This way the research avoids merely replicating existing research and policy (funding) agendas. Thirdly, through discussion of the role of women and gender in CVE with both sexes, the research recognises that gender is not only ‘about women’ but also that men have a role to play in supporting women and communities in any gendered CVE capacity. However, by attempting to gather women-only focus groups, the research created the possibility of enabling women to identify ways in which their roles can be strengthened in CVE. Finally, because we did not exclusively adhere to predefined communities of faith, under-represented groups were incorporated, notably converts. This allowed for a more nuanced approach to assumptions about what constitutes ‘communities’ and improves understanding of the relationship between ‘community level’ milieu and individual radicalisation. Because the research was concerned with gathering people’s thoughts on their daily lives, it is also able to reveal practical meaningful opportunities to improve CVE and public understanding of extremism. Furthermore, research at this level highlights the indirect and secondary-order effects of

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CVE and extremism debates and policies on human security. While the original research questions were aimed at gathering insight into the influence of women in countering violent extremism, responses from research participants presented various challenges to the basic research questions, and the assumptions inherent in CVE. This enabled the research to challenge the existing assumptions around a unique role for women in CVE programming and to allow the space for new ideas to develop, and old as yet unheeded complaints to re-emerge. Finally, in the interests of clarity, and as noted previously, we inelegantly refer to participants throughout the findings sections as Muslims and non-Muslims, as this reflects focus group organisation. We recognise that these labels in no way describe the complexity of the identities, backgrounds and experiences of those people we spoke to.

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Law & Society Review 51 (June): 252–281. https://doi.org/10.1111/ lasr.12267. Ivanoff, Synneve Dahlin, and John Hultberg. 2006. Understanding the Multiple Realities of Everyday Life: Basic Assumptions in Focus-Group Methodology. Scandinavian Journal of Occupational Therapy 13 (2): 125–132. https://doi. org/10.1080/11038120600691082. James, Osamudia R. 2014. White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity Formation. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=2235771. Karagiannis, Emmanuel. 2012. European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization. Politics, Religion & Ideology 13 (1): 99–113. https://doi. org/10.1080/21567689.2012.659495. Kimmel, Michael. 2018. Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into—and Out Of—Violent Extremism. 1st ed. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Klausen, Jytte. 2019. Neighbourhood Effects—How jihadist Recruitment Really Works. In jihadist Terror: New Threats, New Responses, ed. Anthony Richards, Devorah Margolin, and Nicolò Scremin. London: Bloomsbury/I.B. Tauris. Kronsell, Annica. 2005. Gendered Practices in Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity. International Feminist Journal of Politics 7 (2): 280–298. https:// doi.org/10.1080/14616740500065170. Krüger, Richard A., and Mary Anne Casey. 2000. Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research: Amazon.Co.Uk: Richard A. Krueger, Mary Anne Casey: 978-1-41-296947-5: Books. SAGE Publications. Kundnani, Arun. 2014. The Muslims Are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. London and New York: Verso Books. Laqueur, Walter. 2004. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New ed. New York: Bloomsbury Continuum. Malthaner, Stefan, and Peter Waldmann. 2014. The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37 (12): 979–998. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1057610X.2014.962441. McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. 2008. Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (3): 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367. McIntosh, P. 1988. White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies. https:// nationalseedproject.org/images/documents/White_Privilege_and_Male_ Privilege_Personal_Account-Peggy_McIntosh.pdf. Mondon, Aurelien, and Aaron Winter. 2020. Reactionary Democracy. How Racism and the Populist far Right became Mainstream. London: Verso. Montell, Frances. 1999. Focus Group Interviews: A New Feminist Method. NWSA Journal 11 (1): 44–71. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4316628.

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Nesser, Petter. 2014. Toward an Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat: A Chronology of jihadist Terrorism in Europe 2008–2013. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37 (5): 440–456. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014. Neumann, P. 2008. Chapter Two: Recruitment Grounds, The Adelphi Papers 48 (399): 21–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/05679320802686809. Neumann, Peter R. 2009. Old and New Terrorism. 1st ed. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press. Neumann, Peter, and Scott Kleinmann. 2013. How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research? Democracy and Security 9 (4): 360–382. https://doi.org/10.108 0/17419166.2013.802984. Pearson, E. 2020. Between Protection and Participation: Affect, Countering Violent Extremism and the Possibility for Agency. In UNSCR 20 Years On: New Directions in Women Peace and Security, ed. Paul Kirby, Laura J. Shepherd, and Soumita Basu. Bristol University Press. Pilkington, Hilary. 2016. Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League. Manchester University Press. http://www.oapen.org/ search?identifier=607920. Porta, Donatella Della, and Mario Diani. 2005. Social Movements: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Porta, Donatella Della, and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt. 2012. Patterns of Radicalization in Political Activism: An Introduction. Social Science History 36 (3): 311–320. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23258102. Post, Jerrold M. 2005. When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism. Political Psychology 26 (4): 615–636. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3792578. Prior, D., Spalek Basia, K. Farrow, and M. Barnes. 2006. Can Anti-Social Behaviour Interventions Help to Contribute to Civil Renewal? In Re-Energizing Citizenship—Strategies for Civil Renewal, ed. T.  Brannan, G.  Stoker, and P.  John, 91–111. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://www.palgrave.com/ gb/book/9780230500419. Quilliam. 2010. Quilliam Briefing Paper: The Threat of Radicalisation on British University Campuses. Quilliam. Rashid, Naaz. 2014. Giving the Silent Majority a Stronger Voice? Initiatives to Empower Muslim Women as Part of the UK’s “War on Terror”. Ethnic and Racial Studies 37 (4): 589–604. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987 0.2013.816759. Rogers, Brooke, and Peter R. Neumann. 2007. Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe. Commissioned by Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. http://ec.europa.eu/home-af fairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_ radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf.

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PART II

Findings

CHAPTER 5

Violent Extremism and Gender: Knowledge and Experience

It was one of the core research aims to find out more about the gender dynamics of radicalisation to violent extremism. Although we already know a lot about how violent extremism works, much of this is missing a gender analysis, or focuses only on ‘women’. For instance, we know that radicalisation is primarily a social process, driven by factors including socio-economic grievances, alienation, identity and a search for belonging. These were outlined in Chap. 2 in discussion of understandings of the push and pull factors now linked with theories of radicalisation in European countries to jihadist groups. We also know that gender is part of the ideologies of particular groups, and those ideologies can dictate what roles men and women take in groups, and whether they are fighters or not. When we went into communities to talk about violent extremism, we met people who had been directly affected and who could tell us more about the ways in which grievances were experienced, identity formed and the pressures that came from wider society and from communities themselves. This chapter outlines how all of these are gendered. The milieu approach discussed in the previous chapter produces a framework for the production of knowledge through the communities engaged. This chapter focuses on the knowledge that participants generated on gender and violent extremism, what they think it is, and what causes it. We discuss findings on the far right in Chap. 7. However, one of the findings here is that the majority of participants equated violent extremism with violent jihadist groups rather than the far right; the focus © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_5

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of this chapter follows their agenda. This finding is challenging given it potentially reinforces policy perceptions and public attention of the ‘Islamist threat’, despite growing awareness of the threat posed by the far right. Another point of note is that, in the Netherlands, four of five focus groups included participants with personal knowledge of local radicalisation, either of neighbours, acquaintances or, in one case, a brother. This chapter presents both perceptions of radicalisation to jihadist groups and also reveals the knowledge possessed by Muslim communities with experience of the aftermath of radicalisation to Daesh.

What Is Violent Extremism? Definitions matter, because they shape our common understanding of the issues, and of the perceived threats. The UK’s lead Commissioner for Counter-Extremism (CCE), Sara Khan, in 2018 argued that while academics and experts may disagree over the details of what extremism is, “we all know it when we see it” (Commission on Countering Extremism 2018). This common-sense definition, based on an unspoken consensus, implies particular in-groups (we) and out-groups (those with different ideals), as understood by social identity theory (Tajfel 1979). Simultaneously it suggests the term ‘extremism’ enjoys a degree of elasticity such that its potential breadth is boundless. Extremism, more than radicalisation and terrorism, becomes a ‘plastic concept’. Given the free nature of focus group discussion, participants at times elected to discuss ‘extremism’. However, the research here attempted to focus the groups on the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’ as the former had at the time greater policy relevance, and latter a more closed accepted definition. The first task for focus group leaders across countries was to elicit participant understandings of these terms. In most focus groups, people took time to thoughtfully consider the differences, concluding ‘radicalisation’ was usually a process, ‘extremism’ the end result, which is consistent with the literature. Participants often associated extremism with violence (‘violent extremism’), although again there was no consensus on whether violence had to be involved. Violence in the form of terrorist attack was however frequently mentioned, as was the term ‘terrorism’. In total 66 different factors in both jihadist and far right radicalisation were identified by groups and coded. Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the relative incidence. Furthermore, Figs. 5.1 and 5.4 show absolute frequencies of particular codes, and Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 show correlations of

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Radicalisation: Characteristics Taboo topic Global phenomenon Street Radicalization Process Islam always Blamed Black/White Thinking Western/Foreign Influence Brainwashing Any Ideology 0

5

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Fig. 5.1  Characteristics of the term radicalisation: Muslim focus group participants (frequency of mentions)

Daesh: factors in women’s and girls' radicalisation Discrimination Internet Traditional Gender Norms Youth Wrong Interpretation Islam Belonging & Identity Social Status Marriage Grooming/Exploitation 0

0.02

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Fig. 5.2  Perceptions of factors in women’s and girls’ radicalisation to Daesh: Muslim focus group participants (c-coefficient)

codes for key factors that Muslim focus group participants associated with Daesh-related radicalisation (women’s then men’s). Figure 5.4 shows definitions of radicalisation and extremism across all focus groups. The c-coefficient shows the strength of the relation between two codes in

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Daesh: factors in men’s and boy’s radicalisation Family Emotion Status Belonging & Identity Mosques/Preachers Backlash vs West: Ideology/Politics Internet Youth Wrong Interpretation Islam 0

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Fig. 5.3  Perceptions of factors in men’s and boys’ radicalisation to Daesh: Muslim focus group participants (c-coefficient)

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Definitions of Radicalisation & Extremism

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16 5

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Radicalization

11 3

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Fig. 5.4  Definitions of radicalisation and extremism across all groups (frequency of mentions)

ATLAS.ti, with 0 indicating that they never occur together and 1 that they always occur together. In line with these findings, participants in Muslim focus groups believed that radicalisation as a process was something that could be observed and was intrinsically linked to behaviours. In some cases, this belief was based on personal experience with radicalisation. In the Netherlands, the mother of a teenage convert woman who had travelled to Syria noted she had observed a number of changes that she felt indicated a problem, although

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it had been unclear how to challenge this, “Her clothing changed. First, a headscarf, then long dresses and suddenly the niqab … She withdrew to her room, took down her rapper posters, threw out the hip-hop CDs.” Similar observations were made by the mothers of two young men in Germany, both of whom were prevented from travel to Syria in two separate cases, after the women made contact with the police. One noted: He was evangelising the whole time … You could see that he was extreme. He always wore jogging bottoms, then he began wearing ‘Islamic’ clothes. He liked Islamic State … I also had other people telling me what was happening. The neighbours … had been complaining about [his] music, this really loud rap. Now, it was nasheeds [Islamic musical chants, used by Daesh as propaganda]. Also … he was posting things on Facebook, WhatsApp … Many people unfriended or blocked him—they just didn’t want to see it. —[Middle-aged non-Muslim woman, mother of a convert radical, Germany]

Such ‘indicators’ of radicalisation, reported by participants, largely coincide with those documented in the academic literature on radicalisation. They include a new interest in political events and foreign affairs; conversation justifying Daesh activity; attempts to ‘convert’ family members; attempts to censor the ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour of family members; voluntary isolation; changes to clothing and appearance, including the wearing of gloves, or the niqab, or growing of a beard; changes to friendship circles, with new ‘radical’ friends/boyfriend/girlfriend; posting political and religious material on social media; stopping hobbies and habits seen as un-Islamic, such as listening to modern music; disengaging from contact with the opposite sex; expressions of homophobia and antisemitism; and attendance of mosques with a reputation for radical and controversial positions on Islam. Family members agreed these signs may be present without any interest in Daesh (the ‘false positive’) and increased religiosity should not be seen as radicalisation. Nonetheless, they felt there were signs, and something could have been done, although for all interviewees, the path to resolving these issues was unclear. Indicators of radicalisation were therefore not to be relied upon as clear signs of a Daesh-related problem. Participants also suggested the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’ were problematic and were regarded as ‘short-cuts’ to marginalising a narrow targeted group of behaviours and persons. For instance,

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one young Muslim woman from Canada believed radicalisation was used to target youth and said of Daesh, “…radicalisation is looking for young people, by definition.” This perception was typical across groups. It revealed participants held radicalisation to be a question of youth, and intergenerational differences, but also implied that government focus on Islam and Islamist-inspired extremism in youth was problematic. Indeed, while all of our participant groups felt the terms terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation could in theory apply to any type of ideology or belief, they argued that in the contemporary political climate they were generally referring to Daesh and jihadist extremism. Focus groups across all countries reported similar definitions of these two terms, radicalisation and extremism, which they felt had become more widespread since 9/11. The globalisation of the discourses of radicalisation and extremism is hardly a surprising finding. However, what is interesting is how this had permeated everyday as well as elite discourses, and that this was consistent across diverse groups of language, class, geography, threat perceptions and gender. Extremist—mmm—for me, to be honest, for me, I see only one thing… Today it’s… a bearded man with a Kalashnikov in his hands. —[Young Muslim man, France] Objectively I know ‘Violent Extremism’ could include anyone, but I am aware through media and conversations that whenever it comes up—even I would pause and hope the word ‘Islam’ doesn’t come after that. I know that this is what is associated with it. —[Young Muslim woman, Canada]

However, some participants raised the question of extremism in relation to the targeting of Muslim communities not simply by Daesh, but by Islamophobes. A small number of Canadian Muslim women interviewed in the week after the November 2015 Paris attacks identified extremism as  Islamophobic violence, abuse and hatred directed against them on a routine basis. These women had little knowledge of radicalisation from official sources, such as government or NGOs, and framed their definitions according to their own experiences. In fact, the majority of Muslim women participants described experiences of some form of public Islamophobic aggression, particularly after attacks by Daesh-inspired actors in Europe. They reported being variously assaulted, verbally abused,

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followed, chased, threatened and having their scarves pulled, always by men. Many were nervous of travel on their own, and one Canadian woman described how she walked close to the wall in the underground system, for fear of being pushed under a train. Focus groups thus contested definitions of extremism associated only with Daesh activity and problematised the ways in which labels of ‘vulnerability’ apply to Muslim communities. For these women, the vulnerability was produced through everyday engagement with others in the public sphere, Islamophobia and discourses linking Islam to Daesh. While focus group leaders did not pose questions on the media, participants emphasised media responsibility in producing discourses around Islam and Daesh and at times conversation repeatedly returned to this theme. Participants across countries suggested the media repeatedly framed the terms ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’ in association with Muslims, and that this selectivity was unfair and disproportionate: At the moment, you do hear it a lot in the media. Extremists, that they straightaway associate with Muslims and Islam. What am I supposed to think about that? —[Young Muslim man, Germany] And I think it’s because of the media as well, what frustrates me is that before 9/11 you have never heard in the media the terms like fundamentalist, jihadist. —[Young Muslim woman, England] …look at the groups who are against the arrival of refugees. They set fire to everything, they terrorise the whole village… Do you hear someone from the media say that they are radicalised? No. But if a Muslim boy does some-­ thing then he is immediately ‘radicalised’. —[Middle-aged Muslim man, the Netherlands]

These findings are not surprising as they are consistent with research that points to perceptions within Muslim communities of the creation of a ‘suspect community’ and to Islamophobia in the media and public discourse (Awan 2012; Spalek and McDonald 2010; Mcdonald 2011). What is more unexpected is that focus groups in all countries strongly expressed resentment on this theme, even where CVE programmes have not broadly targeted Muslim populations, as had happened with the UK Prevent

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programme. Communities believed that the practices that constituted P/ CVE initiatives and policies unjustly targeted Muslim communities as particularly and uniquely vulnerable to radicalisation.1 This finding is developed further in the next chapter where we discuss community and expert ideas about gender and CVE. The coding process of data from interviews and focus groups also identified a wide range of factors, characteristics and indicators linked by Muslim focus group participants to the processes of radicalisation and violent extremism (see Figs. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). These ranged from ‘brainwashing’ to ‘wrong interpretations of Islam’, from ‘family’ to ‘global phenomena’. The range of features of radicalisation identified to some degree reflects understandings held by professional and research communities. This chapter unpacks these in more detail and groups them in line with the push and pull factors of the drivers of violent extremism identified in Chap. 2 and the milieu approach adopted.

Individual Factors Research with both those with direct experience of radicalisation, and within broader milieus, supported the importance to radicalisation of the search for identity among young people who did not feel that they belonged in their society or country. The mother of a convert deterred from travelling to join Daesh from Germany reflected on the role of identity in her son’s radicalisation, saying, “he tried lots of things—like Buddhism. He was just looking for something … a path of some kind.” Other family members of young people who had joined or attempted to join Daesh offered similar reflections, consistent with the substantial research showing many join terrorist groups as part of a search for meaning (Crenshaw 1983). A number of studies associate ‘identity crisis’ with ‘vulnerability’ to radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Wiktorowicz 2005; Choudhury 2007; King and Mohamed 2011). For instance, in a study of more than 2000 foreign fighters in al-Qaida-linked movements, Colonel John M Venhaus (2010) of the US Army concluded, “they all were looking for something … [T]hey want to understand who they are, why they matter, and what their role in the world should be” (p.  8).

1  The term PVE had little resonance with focus group participants and the terms CVE and PVE were generally avoided during discussion.

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Nonetheless, this can be said of many people, old and young, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who do not join radical groups. Participants with first-hand experience of radicalisation (‘expert participants’) believed grievances became active in catalysing radicalisation when combined with both gendered and racial discrimination and inadequate coping mechanisms. In the Netherlands, for instance, the family of a boy radicalised and later killed in Syria believed a key factor driving him to Daesh was his failure to win an internship, while friends from non-­Muslim backgrounds had succeeded. The mother of a Muslim convert in Germany who had tried to leave for Iraq/Syria meanwhile described how her son had been attacked because he was mixed race, that he was “treated differently by police” who had blamed him for the minor criminal offences of his friends. She believed this was important in his radicalisation.

Societal/Cultural Factors ‘Expert’ participants in focus groups and in interviews, who had first-hand knowledge of the issues, suggested individual triggers and the quest for identity did not happen in isolation. Rather they are embedded within broader contexts, in which gender norms matter in determining responses to—highly gendered—Daesh propaganda. Participants reflected on the ways in which the Daesh ‘Caliphate’ represented a space in which a minority of young women might feel accepted became a significant pull factor, when considered against a background of societal discrimination. Muslim women participants also described perceived injustice as a factor in the radicalisation of young women in particular. Community members described their experiences of public Islamophobia, linked to women’s dress and appearance. Most Muslim women participants chose to wear the hijab, and the ability to wear whatever Islamic dress they wanted was important to them. A lack of societal acceptance of clothing choices, including the hijab, niqab or traditional long black robes, was strongly associated with feelings of exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination, and as possible push factors to Daesh. A mother in the Netherlands whose daughter had left to join Daesh described how she believed a key factor in her radicalisation was her daughter’s emotional response to a college refusal of a study application, due to her wearing the niqab. “That really felt like rejection,” she said. Participants described a milieu in which they

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believed Daesh messages addressing issues of women’s marginalisation in the West had a chance of resonating. This finding was particularly marked in France, Germany and the Netherlands, where there have been restrictions on the wearing of the headscarf in certain public positions and locations, arguably constraining women’s ability to exercise full citizenship. Women in the UK and Canada, which did not have clothing bans at the time, were, however, also affected by Islamophobic debates around clothing. These women also suggested Islamophobia meant it was hard for young women to fulfil their societal role, and they linked this with susceptibility to Daesh messaging. As an older Muslim woman in Canada described it, “Our girls are educated, but also religious. They learn to be doctors, nurses, everything—then people say ‘no job’ because of their appearance and wearing the hijab. So, what [do they have] left?” Some women, even though they opposed Daesh, described empathy for others who had travelled to join the group. They linked this to emotional responses to feelings of exclusion in the West, in large part due to discrimination over appearance. This issue did not uniquely affect women. Male participants also described feelings of estrangement from societies where women who wore the hijab or niqab faced discrimination, because they had empathy with their women friends or relatives. These perceptions again suggest the gendered ways in which Daesh messaging may resonate in communities on this issue. However, tensions within Muslim communities also produced discrimination and a sense of non-belonging, as suggested by the ‘generation gap’ noted across focus groups with Muslim women. One German woman, a participant in her mid-20s with no personal experience of radicalisation, described her own struggle with her family, over their rejection of her decision to cover her face, and wear long black clothing. She felt that other young women facing similar pressure, but without her resilience, might look to Daesh for confirmation of their beliefs: I’ve been wearing the headscarf for almost three years now. And I had months where I had no contact with my family because they didn’t accept it. And … many people, particularly young people, just aren’t capable of taking on this struggle. That’s why they just give up and cut contact with their families, because they just don’t try to understand you … so the girls separate themselves and find someone on the Internet who motivates them … and then one night they just disappear, in the middle of the night, and then two weeks later you find out that they’re in Syria. —[Young Muslim woman, Germany]

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A generational division emerged strongly in Germany, the Netherlands and France, with some older Muslim women, including those who wear the headscarf, suggesting the burqa and the niqab were potential indicators of women’s radicalisation. In Germany, one woman wearing the hijab stated, “It’s mostly people who wear the niqab [who are radicalised].” Other older Muslim women believed clothing such as the burqa was an indicator not of piety, but something more sinister, given it is not demanded in Islam. As one French woman said, “[A] person whose body is covered from top to bottom. This is extreme Islam … a radical interpretation.” Such views may reflect a simple generation gap, but they may also reflect the dominant narratives of the countries in which they lived, where the burqa was frequently discussed as a sign of extremism. This finding was of interest, as the academic literature notes a rejection of the norms of parents and other older members of Muslim communities as a factor in radicalisation (Rogers and Neumann 2007). It also indicates the ways in which pressure over women’s expression of faith can come not just from (Islamophobic) outsiders, but also from other women within wider Muslim communities. This insight was familiar to professionals working with young recruits to Daesh. One German deradicalisation professional interviewed described how she had heard many stories from radicalised young women who told how their family’s rejection of their pious clothing was a factor in the radicalisation process. In one case, she provided anecdotal evidence of a girl from a Muslim family whose father referred to her friends who wore the burqa as “your terrorist girlfriends”. This had caused a rift between parent and child that contributed to her gradual radicalisation and active support of Daesh. Additionally, ‘failed integration’, which can be understood as an incomplete and unsuccessful sense of belonging was associated with radicalisation by participants. This topic was discussed most prominently with Muslim Canadian focus group participants. They frequently considered Canada a more equal and integrated society where everyone was a migrant, in contrast with European experiences of immigration. They therefore believed a failure to integrate was likely to be more associated with radicalisation in Europe, and recognising the issue as more of a problem there.

Organisational (Mechanisms) Focus group participants with experience of radicalisation noted the impact of Daesh recruitment strategies and differences in incentives for young men and women. In the Netherlands, four of five focus groups

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included participants with personal knowledge of local radicalisation, either of neighbours, acquaintances or, in one case, a brother. Several focus groups of both men and women in France and the Netherlands specifically cited cases in which money was offered by recruiters to young men. Additionally, they associated financial incentives with increased male status and noted this as an important factor in men’s radicalisation. It is not known whether money was also offered to women who had been radicalised, as this was not mentioned. The implicit link between men and money reflects a societal expectation of the man as breadwinner. When understood in the context of the gendered effects of Islamophobia and discrimination, participants believed this Daesh tactic had great success with young men struggling to find work. A Dutch male participant provided anecdotal knowledge of how this was evidenced in his local area: There were two youngsters from this neighbourhood. One gets to work, the other doesn’t. The reason is appearance. Pakistani clothing with a beard. As soon as you walk around like that you don’t have a job. One boy left because that happened, I have money for you in Syria, he was told. —[Middle-aged Muslim man, the Netherlands]

This anecdotal evidence, if accurate, suggests the importance of financial independence and employment as a source of status, for young men, and the exploitation of this by Daesh. It also links an inability to access that status with Islamophobia, linked to the expression of faith and culture, in this case “Pakistani clothing” and a beard. Other research suggests that financial rewards and payment are used to recruit to extremist groups in other country contexts. This example confirms theories of radicalisation and conflict that focus on income inequality and lack of mobility (e.g. see UNDP 2016). However, promised or actual income appears as a ‘force multiplier’ for other factors, such as status and identity. A second gendered mechanism building upon social and cultural features of radicalisation are social networks. Social networks and groups, whether online or offline, were highlighted as pivotal to radicalisation by all participants. One middle-aged German mother explained of her son, “[he] became radicalised through contacts with friends.” Meanwhile in the Netherlands, a middle-aged father whose son had been killed in Syria blamed the “wrong friends”, as well as “discrimination” and “the Internet” for his child’s radicalisation. Dutch focus groups had more of what we characterise as ‘expert’ participants—with direct experience of

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radicalisation—than any other country. These focus groups strongly emphasised the role of friendship circles, and participants described how groups of friends became interested in Daesh together and encouraged one another. In one case, a local group of male youth had disappeared to join Daesh as a group. One Dutch participant who had experienced radicalisation in his community recounted how “mixing with the wrong friend is often the inducement. It is just like with the Mafia. The [radicalised] boys that I know were first in the coffeeshop [together]… This has nothing to do with Islam.” This insight is consistent with Sageman’s ‘Bunch of Guys’ theory of radicalisation to al-Qaida, which theorises the adoption of ideology after the creation of groups of like-minds, rather than vice versa (Sageman 2004). This also coheres with Klausen’s (2019) suggestion of a degree of ‘social contagion’ in radicalisation to Daesh, with ‘clusters’ of friends radicalising together. The importance of male kinship was also emphasised by a male German expert working with mothers of sons radicalised to Daesh. He linked the appeal of this ‘brotherhood’ of fighters with the absence of fathers, and issues of masculinity. Daesh propagates hyper-masculine norms as those with the highest status, with strict division between men and women’s roles, and limited freedoms for women. Men are promoted as ‘warrior’ prototypes, women’s protectors and the head of the household, while the ideal woman is elevated as an ideologically committed wife and mother, reliant on her husband (Lahoud 2014, 2017; Pearson 2018a, b). While seeking not to blame mothers parenting alone, the German expert suggested that the impact of stress on single-mother families, combined with issues of status and masculinity for young men, had led to an interest in Daesh among youth he worked with: …the most important thing is that we very often see that fathers are not there … This means the mother is overburdened—and there’s more conflict than if two parents are there. The father becomes this ideal figure … And that fits in really well with this idea of the Ummah [global Muslim community] … the authority figure of God, the beloved brethren, the fact that there is no mother figure in this system. Mostly, the father is there, somewhere, and that’s what we try to do—make contact with him. This is very much to do with masculinity—violence, brotherhood, power. —[Male CVE expert, Germany]

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Significantly, expert focus group participants who had personal experience of the effects of Daesh radicalisation on family members felt that Daesh provided young people with a social network or group that had previously been missing. One middle-aged man taking part in a focus group in Germany suggested that the notion of brotherhood was entwined with theological arguments around masculinity and the path to martyrdom as a warrior, “Then, of course, the other thing that’s promised … is paradise. This makes them feel they are part of this brotherhood around them, this society.” The importance is that Daesh presents a group that unifies a number of gendered push-and-pull factors, combining status, violence, high-status masculinities and theology in a deliberately attractive package.

Ideological Factors Although participants broadly suggested that radicalisation was a process that was linked with behaviours, and could therefore be observed, a theme across focus groups was the importance of ideology, and the ability of young people to hide their beliefs. One young male participant in Canada described how an acquaintance supported Daesh, but was adept at keeping this secret from his parents and other adults: You could never guess he supports ISIS, he jokes around, speaks to his parents, he goes outside, plays football, everything that normal people do. He is a human being like others—but he supports ISIS and has decided that ISIS is right. —[Young Muslim man, Canada]

The participant emphasised that ‘indicators’ and ‘signs of radicalisation’ were not always obvious and could not be relied upon. Not only does this suggest a sense of ‘unknowing’, but it also communicates a hyper-­vigilance. Hyper-vigilance towards subterfuge and enemies ‘within’ has been familiar in times of prevalent discourses of existential threat, such the Cold War period. National hyper-vigilance was demanded to prevent Soviet or communist spies, and later a fear of anarchist cells. A lack of knowing is also reflected in contemporary P/CVE communications campaigns, which ask for public cooperation but rarely precisely define what it is that might be ‘out of place’. Instead, reporting mechanisms for suspicious activities (such as hotlines) rely on generalised but ultimately objectless suspicion (Vaughan-Williams 2008). In the UK, the Netherlands and other

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countries, constant messaging on public transport reminds travellers to be ‘on alert’ and to participate in the constant surveillance of others, rendering all citizens responsible for both their and state security. The logic presented to travellers (and citizens) is that it is ‘better to be safe than sorry’ and authorities will evaluate any information in relation to risk of radicalisation. This logic of ‘knowing while not knowing’ is only possible because the ‘signs’ of terrorism and radicalisation are not only vague but also that the idea of violent extremists hiding in plain sight has been normalised, and become common-sense knowledge. One ‘sign’ of radicalisation that was repeatedly questioned, was apparel or behaviour denoting more fundamentalist religious belief. This distancing by participants is not a rejection of the significance of the religious narrative propagated by Daesh, but rather a rejection of the additional obligations placed on Muslims to be accountable and responsible for the behaviour of a minority. This refusal challenges both the ‘responsibilising’ logic that Daesh establishes through its interpretation of jihad, and that logic in countering-violent extremism agendas through an implied ‘guilt by association’. With regards to the latter challenge, this is important because the burdens and duties associated with CVE-orientated responsibilisation fall disproportionately on Muslim communities, who also feel the negative effects of wider hyper-vigilance more than other communities. Muslim participants broadly and across countries agreed that those attracted to Daesh ideology were actually likely to lack religious knowledge: Most of them … are basic Muslims, they know little about Islam. But when you encounter the wrong people who try and make you believe all kinds of things, you [just] believe it. —[Young Muslim woman, the Netherlands]

Two German mothers of converts who eventually reported their sons to the police described the speed with which their sons adopted extreme belief and could not be deterred: He was like—Teflon. You’d try to argue with him, and none of it would get through. He was impervious. …This was the absolute truth suddenly. My son was similar. It was really hard. I did try to talk about things with him. I first had to deal with his statements for myself, I just couldn’t understand it. He was against homosexuality, the topic of Jews, respectively Israel, Gaza. I told him, this is politics, we should discuss it politically. All his arguments were based on his faith. —[Middle-aged women, two mothers of convert male youth, Germany]

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The accelerated pace of radicalisation is supported by other research into the social media accounts of women who had left for Syria and Iraq that reveals that women were not only rejecting the culture and foreign policy of the West, but also actively embracing a new Islamic vision for society. These women felt they were migrating to an area where they could live “honourably under the law of Shariah” (Hoyle et al. 2015, 12). The combination of politics and piety in these narratives and understandings of radicalisation cannot be ignored. What is important is not that ‘Islam’ or religious belief per se is a root cause but the contextualising of that belief within a particular world view (the righteous against evil) becomes problematic. Moreover the contextualising of that belief within the Manichean world view was found to focus on different gendered ideas, for women the alignment of their private lives (marriage, piety) with their public lives (Shariah; purdah), while for men, ideas about retributive justice (anger at Gaza) and affronts to their masculinity (homosexuality) were more important. Therefore, when talking about men who joined Daesh, it was the false conflation with religion and politics that was problematic in the eyes of participants, whereas for women who joined, the problem was a lack of knowledge and being ‘brainwashed’. Some Muslim participants felt conversion was a key factor in radicalisation. One German focus group participant in her 20s said, “The biggest proportion, in my opinion, is people, new, either they’re newcomers to Islam—new Muslims, born Muslim but they’ve just started practising, or people who’ve recently converted.” A German participant in his 40s agreed, telling us, “It’s when people get into a new religion, come to it afresh and convert … mostly, unfortunately—it’s us, the ones who are already Muslim, and who appreciate Islam and how it is, but these converts unfortunately, new ones, they get the wrong idea.” Such perceptions of converts as more susceptible to radicalisation because they want to ‘outbid’ other Muslims (Bloom 2007; Kydd and Walter 2006), or lack ‘deep’ knowledge of lived ‘real’ Islam, are only superficially accurate. This linkage around conversion in both the minds of participants and past research is also gendered. This is partly because there is a higher percentage of women converts than men converts in Daesh, making it easier to associate conversion with ignorance, perhaps because of negative stereotypes about women’s and girls’ agency. Therefore, in the minds of many of our participants, women and girls are ‘brainwashed’ or seduced by ‘dangerous others’ (radical Muslim men), rather than seeking religious knowledge. Additionally, this direct association between converts and

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radicalisation shows a lack of understanding of the conversion process, of the experience and religiosity of converts and of their diverse motivations (Bartoszewicz 2013). In an interesting analysis of the conversion theme, the male German expert cited earlier in relation to converts noted, “Every recruit to Daesh is in a way ‘new to Islam’, we can think of them all as converts, even where they have a Muslim family background.” This idea allows for radicalisation as a form of conversion, albeit a problematic one, and helps us better understand the distancing moves that participants made that “this is not Islam”.

The Gendered Milieu: A Combined Approach to Understanding Recruitment A key finding of this research is the importance of gender dynamics within the broader social milieu surrounding any ‘radical milieu’. This follows the works of critical geographers such as Brand and Sara Fregonese (2016) who write about the ‘radical city’. However, we reflect on the specific gender dimensions of the broader social milieu that is not addressed in their works. Consistently across countries, participants described highly gendered norms regulating both public and private life in ways that shaped the possibilities for men’s and women’s radical action, and the spaces in which this might occur. These behaviours intersected with the different expectations of the milieu for men and women. This was relevant to the discussion of ‘enabling factors’, such as radical preachers, mosques or networks with extremist associations. Norms were consistent between expert and non-expert focus group participants (those with first-hand experience of the issues and those who did not) and across countries. One of the most frequently asserted views was that radical recruitment of young people was predominantly face-to-face for men and boys and online for women and girls. Expert focus group participants with first-hand experience gave accounts of the online radicalisation of young women and offline radicalisation of young men from their milieu. Those without direct experience, who speculated on the possibilities for radicalisation, concurred; they also described a lack in Muslim women’s access to public space, and across regional contexts.

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Public Space First-hand information received from focus groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands revealed that differences between men’s and women’s radicalisation were particularly apparent in public spaces, such as on city streets, where men appeared more vulnerable to street recruiters. This was not a feature of responses from the UK or Canada. A young Dutch Muslim woman explained, “What I noticed on the street was that youngsters were radicalising right under my nose.” A German Muslim mother meanwhile described her alarm when her teenage son was approached in the street by a stranger: He asked my son if he was a Muslim and he said yes, if he knew a surah [Qur’anic chapter], and he didn’t. So he said, ‘come with me … you’re Muslim, you need to know’. And got him to go with him. Fifteen years old. Last year that was, and his friends went along too … And my other son who’s ten has also been approached on the street in the same way! —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, Germany]

Another German Muslim focus group described how their local mosque had been targeted by radical preachers who waited almost on the doorstep until prayers ended, then approached teenage men as they exited the building. This participant was personally approached in 2013 when in his late teens. He said: They [recruiters] had …Islamic arguments that were such simple arguments. Mostly not learned though—they had the wrong facts. So they just showed you one side of a really complex situation, and said, you have to see it all like this. —[Young Muslim man, Germany]

This young man struggled with, and then eventually rejected his new ideas, due to the intervention of his imam. The mosque eventually also banned street preachers from its immediate environs, and after a while recruiters left the mosque alone. This was a familiar situation to German professionals working in CVE, who also described frequent occurrences of city street radicalisation of young men. In another German Muslim focus group, participants also described how their local mosque had been targeted by radical preachers who approached men and boys on the street outside. Although women

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and girls also attend this mosque, cultural expectations meant they did not travel there alone and were not unaccompanied in public space. This meant recruiters left them alone. There was therefore consensus between professional, expert and focus group participants about the role of ‘traditional’ cultural gender roles. Focus group participants speculated that traditional norms limiting women’s access to public space could actually protect women from radicalisation. Young Muslim women were less likely to be permitted the freedoms, frequently reframed as ‘dangers’, which young men enjoyed. One mother in the Netherlands said: Because [women] are not as active in the mosque and one expects a different sort of lifestyle and behaviour, they are at home more. Boys are allowed more. Also, from Islam and culture the boys have more rights … That has now protected the women against radicalisation because they cannot move easily. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, the Netherlands]

Indeed, in France a Muslim woman participant living in a banlieue (inner-­ city suburb) described what she perceived as public gender segregation outside working hours, “The banlieues are completely male-dominated after six pm, there are no girls outside. So it is really hard to radicalise them.” What is interesting in this commentary is the presumption that girls are protected from radicalisation in the home. In fact, in the UK, the 22 Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG) used within Prevent to determine vulnerability to radicalisation suggest familial or friendship connections with those already radicalised is a high-risk factor. Clearly this might not preclude the home as a setting of radicalisation. The home is also an environment in which Internet recruitment can take place, examined below. The discussion however offers an insight into the different enabling factors of radicalisation, and the relationship of those factors with the local function of gender norms, and the ways in which that limits or enables access to public space and potential radical contacts. Private Space Focus group participants and professional experts alike suggested that cultural norms seeking to protect young women by preventing them from being in public alone, or too late at night, also put them at risk in other ways. Specifically, they suggested young women were also ‘vulnerable’ to

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radicalisation in the private rather than public space. Their ‘spaces of vulnerability’ were simply relocated from the street, to the home. A German professional working with families to stop both young men and women joining Daesh noted the role of home access to the Internet in the radicalisation of a number of young women with whom she had had contact. She explained that once recruited online, women and girls were then more able to successfully recruit other women online too, as they knew what worked. She suggested that young women were adept in a highly gendered ‘snowball’ recruitment process, as they tended to have large social networks, and spent a lot of time online engaged in social activities. Additionally, she told us that Daesh had explicitly set out to foster online romantic relationships with young women, which meant that ‘grooming’ narratives did apply to women more than to men. This finding is consistent with a number of online studies (Conway 2019; Edwards 2017; Huey 2015; Huey and Witmer 2016). The finding also contextualises community beliefs about the dominant role of the Internet in radicalisation for young women. While focus group participants generally emphasised the role of the Internet as relevant to both men’s and women’s radicalisation, there appeared to be important gender differences, due to both cultural norms and differences between men’s and women’s Internet use, and use of public space. Indeed, a number of participants reported direct knowledge of cases of radicalisation both online and offline, through men proposing marriage. This was evidenced in accounts from expert participants with first-hand knowledge in two focus groups. In France, one woman explained how Daesh had reached out to recruit her via Facebook, attempts which she had resisted. A young woman in Canada described how she on the other hand had been drawn into jihadist extremism via the Internet. Now deradicalised, she explained the ease and appeal of online radicalisation: The Internet is like a drug, or alcohol. It has good aspects, but the harmful side is too big … There are … some websites, where, for example, I can write anything I want, and it will be spread. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, Germany]

In the case of young women, as mentioned before, online social networks appeared to be the primary location of radicalisation. The importance of the online space was identified by focus group participants with direct

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first-hand experience, and by professionals. However, where cultural norms did more easily facilitate women’s access to public spaces, they could also be recruited offline via the same mechanisms as young men. This was relevant in the case of a young Dutch Muslim woman convert who had travelled to Syria to join Daesh. Unrestricted by the cultural gender norms governing Muslim women peers, she was introduced to Islam at work, via another white woman convert. The young woman’s mother described how this contact and interest in Islam eventually progressed to attendance at a radical mosque. However, the actual recruitment to Daesh took place online, via a young male contact. In another Dutch case, a Muslim focus group discussed their concerns over the ongoing radicalisation of a young girl known to several of them. They identified three relevant factors: offline contacts at a radical mosque; Facebook; and a group of radical friends abroad, contacted online. This case illustrates the ways in which a number of complex factors apparently combined to produce the end result: the girl’s travel to join Daesh. These accounts, of course, do not serve to deny the targeting of young men online, which has also been widespread. However, the research suggested women’s offline radicalisation was more of a challenge for Daesh; additionally, there were no first-hand focus-group accounts of men’s online radicalisation. The Internet was however broadly noted as a factor in men’s and boy’s radicalisation (see Fig. 5.3).

Gendered Community Knowledge Focus group participants tended to think in gendered terms about the factors for men’s and women’s radicalisation, revealing social norms circulating in their communities. For instance, participants tended to blame young men for their radicalisation and to excuse young women, who they believed had been exploited. In focus group discussion, women’s and girls’ radicalisation was perceived to be driven by factors related to grooming and/or exploitation, the lure of marriage and the desire to achieve social status through association with a jihadist. Men’s radicalisation was linked most frequently with a misinterpretation of Islam, radical mosques or preachers, emotion (anger and hot-­headedness explicitly) and a backlash against western foreign policy. Participants noted only one of these factors, the misinterpretation of Islam, in women’s and girls’ radicalisation (see Fig. 5.2). Research suggests political motivations are actually common to both men and women (Sjoberg 2013; Gentry and Sjoberg 2007).

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The community responses, however, demonstrate the ways in which community norms framed participants’ perceptions of men and women’s behaviour, and in gendered ways. These gender narratives constitute an important context to the later findings and in particular the ways in which community, family and friends are likely to respond to initial signs of radicalisation in young women and men, as well as any gendered CVE interventions. Agency, Marriage and Grooming Marriage was, on aggregate, the second-highest cited factor participants understood as driving radicalisation for women and girls. Many participants across countries identified naivety as the key factor in drawing young women into Daesh, through a promise of marriage. This view is hardly surprising, given the much-publicised media reporting on so-called jihadi brides. Many of the research participants—both with first-hand experience of radicalisation and recruitment and without—felt the ‘grooming’ narrative best described this situation. These responses appeared to reflect the ways in which social norms were gendered, within Muslim communities, the media and wider society. The majority of research participants therefore accepted the link between the radical Islamism of Daesh and the submission of women to men, and expressed doubts about women’s agency or political commitment to the group as an important factor in their radicalisation. They felt that joining Daesh was not a choice women would make if they had total freedom and access to, as they suggested, ‘the facts’. In the UK, the term often used to describe women’s radicalisation, particularly by middle-aged and older Muslim men and women, was ‘brainwashing’. Brainwashing is a theory that is now discredited in the literature relating to terrorism, given it denies individual agency and rational political commitment to a cause (Victoroff 2005; Silke 1998; Horgan 2008). The perception that young women had less agency than young men in the radicalisation ‘process’ was associated with the belief that they are less ‘streetwise’, potentially less educated on the issues surrounding radicalisation and therefore less able to critically engage with Daesh narratives. This reflected the perception expressed across the focus groups and across countries, that cultural norms affect young men and women in different ways. Many described the impact of rigidly patriarchal values they believed inherent in some pockets of Muslim communities on lowering both

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women’s esteem, and therefore their resilience to recruitment by Daesh. As one Muslim woman in her 30s said: Well, if someone is oppressed? Or looked down on, or a housewife, and somebody comes online and talks nicely, respects you, compliments you— women are more likely to respond to that. Young ladies going to Syria to be wives—they’re all being played. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, England]

Another woman in France described the experience of an acquaintance: She fell in love with a convert Frenchman and wanted to marry him, but her parents said no. So she ran away …and they got married. The man went to Syria and she followed him. She was a very pretty girl, but she did not see it herself …she never looked you in the eye. Very insecure. So she fell for it. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, France]

This account provides factual information on the events of this radicalisation (a young woman following a man to Syria, in order to marry); it also conveys an interpretation that presents a potential gender bias (assumption of insecurity and lack of agency in the young woman), which the participant employs to rationalise the event. She understands this case according to expectations of women’s behaviour. The suggestion that women lacked agency and would only join Daesh if they were ‘played’ or ‘falling for it’ was frequently repeated, and revealed an implicit assumption—or report of—women’s passivity, and to some degree immaturity, in radicalisation processes. Although there are undoubtedly cases where the grooming narrative does fit, particularly online and of young women under the age of 16, other young women have greater agency, and their exploitation cannot necessarily be assumed. Additionally, it is possible that young women are both emotionally naïve but politically conscious, and that their grooming and agency is complex. The views of focus group participants of women radicals as straightforwardly ‘vulnerable’, ‘naïve’ or ‘groomed’ however challenge evidence that women who join Daesh do actively support its principles, including violence, even as many women returning now deny this (Brown and Morgan 2019). This finding also suggests that communities may find women’s radicalisation less easy to spot, where it contradicts community norms about how women should behave (Huey and Witmer 2016; Winter 2015). That is to say, if communities do not expect to see something, they may

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not see it. In this case, while radicalisation might be seen as a result of intergenerational conflict, it is also placed and deflected by that same dynamic. In other words, it is somehow anticipated that a teenager might defy her parents and marry someone her parents don’t like, and so the same justifications that most parents use to explain their children’s deviant behaviour (she’s just being immature, she’s just trying to prove us wrong, she’s just being a rebel) are the same reasons they didn’t “see” the process of radicalisation going on. Thus, men and boys were ascribed agency in their radicalisation process and criticised for making the wrong choices, while more allowances were made for women and girls, and men again blamed. Men’s radicalisation was more frequently linked with discrimination in the workplace or by authorities. It was not perceived as grooming, and was seen as more ‘political’, even when research participants associated the support of men and boys radicalised to Daesh with Islamophobia and emotional responses, such as anger and frustration. This again suggests that community understandings of men’s and women’s roles differed. Any CVE involving these communities needs to engage with these gendered expectations in order to effectively counter both men’s and women’s radicalisation. Status and the Pull Factor of Daesh While women joining Daesh were generally perceived as ‘naïve’, participants at other times also emphasised the rationality of their decision to travel to Syria and Iraq, linking it to resistance to western secular norms. Younger research participants in particular emphasised that women might agree with the principles of Daesh and reject western values, such as feminism, gender equality and consumerism. This led at times to contradictory views in focus groups regarding women’s agency itself. Perhaps surprisingly, participants believed it was more important for women to gain status through joining Daesh, than for men. This finding came from focus groups, individual interviews and professionals working in the field. Women’s joining Daesh as a means of attaining status was seen to have a dual function: it could constitute a rejection of traditional family gender norms (which serve to constrain girls) and a bid for independence and a new identity; alternatively, it could act as a rejection of western norms and a family perceived as not religious enough. The subject came up most frequently in France and the Netherlands, where research participants were more likely to reflect on the restrictions

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of movement and behaviour of women and girls at home. Women in France suggested power could be gained by association with the violent jihad itself, which gave women a perceived position of influence; or from association with male actors in that struggle, who can be regarded as ‘heroes’. A middle-aged Dutch Muslim woman offered a similar reflection, “Girls are extra protected,” she said. “This subordinated position … contributes to their radicalisation. Because they don’t mean much at home, they want to be somewhere else where they play an important part, they think.” This perception fed into the stories of participants with firsthand experience of radicalisation. Another Dutch Muslim woman again used a similar understanding of the highly gendered nature of community roles to rationalise the actions of young women she knew who had joined Daesh: Within radical groups women have a different role. They get—according to them—more recognition and are seen as important for the group. So that also plays a part in radicalisation. … the motive for those who want to participate is the longing for recognition and a more important position. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, the Netherlands]

This offers a valuable insight again into the ways in which Daesh messaging around women’s recruitment and narratives of status might resonate. This also offers insight into the importance of how particular drivers of radicalisation are gendered. Here status is a driver for both men and women, but how status is operationalised or manifested in the process differs along gender lines. This in no way suggests that Daesh actually empowers women; Daesh restricts the public dress and movement of women, denies them rights to travel without men and controls their sexual and private lives (Lahoud 2018). However, it does suggest that elements of Daesh messaging claiming it represents a site of potential self-realisation and status for a young Muslimah had a chance of resonance.

Conclusion: Building Gendered Theories of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism The findings show that researchers and experts, policymakers and analysts have a lot to learn from local communities. Furthermore, local community knowledge is grounded in the everyday, and in the everyday gender becomes a key factor. However, the communities we engaged with were

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also informed by the wider media, expert, policy and research communities’ understandings of radicalisation and terrorism. In particular, sources of community knowledge were diverse: personal first-hand experience and some anecdotal and second-hand experience; but also, the media, as well as ‘trained personnel’ including imams, youth workers, police or civil society practitioners. What we find then is community knowledge helps us build upon our theories of violent extremism and radicalisation, rather than inventing a theory, or presenting a paradigm shift. The production of knowledge about radicalisation and violent extremism is therefore an important consideration. Participants identified social processes, including discrimination, alienation and socio-economic concerns, and also individual factors, such as belonging and identity and suggested these affected both men and women. However, what was clear was that the specific impacts were highly gendered. This creates significant differences in radicalisation mechanisms for men and for women, and therefore a gendered risk. Communities also suggested ways in which men and women’s resilience might differ and offered insights into the assumptions that guided their own responses to the signs of radicalisation: a perception of young men as ‘hot-headed’ led groups to blame them, while expectations of the relative innocence, naïveté or innate goodness of young Muslim women resulted in the blame for their radicalisation being placed on others. It is also possible that counter-­terrorism narratives have additionally reinforced gender stereotypes, such as the notion of the groomed and naïve ‘jihadi bride’. Participants also demonstrated a complex understanding of agency. Women were at times ascribed less agency (and therefore less blame). At the same time, young women research participants emphasised the significance of young Muslim women deliberately seeking to challenge both traditional and western-imposed gender norms, by seeking a new identity for themselves, and the ways in which Daesh might be perceived as an opportunity for this. Young women in groups expressed an identity that was often deeply pious. They described how exclusion by wider society because of this could be an important factor in radicalisation, particularly legislation banning the veil or headscarf. However, it is important to note that these young women also suggested that a lack of acceptance from within Muslim communities was significant. Participants felt both kinds of exclusion might enable women to find a sense of belonging and empowerment within Daesh, whatever the harsh realities for women within this group. These insights suggest ways in which Daesh messaging may be

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likely to resonate within milieus and the importance of state action. It was in those countries where full or partial hijab, burqa and veil bans have been enforced that this pushback was particularly emphasised by young pious women. Nonetheless, the effects were broadly felt in the UK, where no such bans are in place. The contradictions and ambiguities expressed by research participants reflect the need to avoid generalisations or oversimplified explanations. Political commitment and an emotional pull to Daesh are not mutually exclusive, for either young men or women. Nor should emotional factors, such as men’s anger, or women’s desire for love or marriage, imply that recruits’ actions are not rational, or feed ‘brainwashing’ explanations. The complex engagement of women (and men) with hybrid identities, and the different expectations of women in different domains, does not lend itself to easy conclusions about the reasons for women’s or men’s radicalisation. However, the layers of family, community and societal responses to increased religiosity clearly impact on feelings of belonging, civic inclusion and, in some cases, alienation. Issues of women’s access to full citizenship—that is the ability to wear what they wanted—were connected with travel to Syria and Iraq. Daesh has proved able to exploit these issues through varying recruitment mechanisms. As violent Salafi-jihadist doctrine does not allow for a public role for women, or for contact between the sexes, radicalisation may take place more frequently online for women rather than men, although peer groups are vital for both genders. These differences also reflect the daily realities for some young Muslim men and women. Participants with first-hand knowledge reported that recruiters are frequently from the same backgrounds as those they are targeting and understand the arguments that are most likely to appeal. Thus, CVE programmes must take account of the physical, cultural and practical factors affecting Muslim men and women. This might mean that online grooming narratives apply more often to young women, although this does not negate their agency. Gender restrictions do not prevent the radicalisation of women, but instead relocate their spaces of vulnerability. Overall the findings on violent extremism show that while communities’ perceptions often match the narratives of experts and the media on these issues, and show a high degree of uniformity across the countries, the importance of contextualisation and the everyday is highlighted. The milieu, as a gendered dynamic site, helps offset concerns about ‘false positives’, shows the interaction between the individual, local and global

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conditions, in such a way to generate meaningful (albeit fuzzy) generalisations. The idea of the milieu further enables us to move beyond radicalisation models that are dependent upon static social-settings or structures through which people move in particular ways (e.g. poverty or political grievances). Instead, we conceive of individuals as travelling through fluid gendered social and cultural processes. Social processes relate to the dynamic nature of social relationships which tend to be short-lived and characterised by change as social ties constantly form, reform and lapse with changes to employment, sexual partners, residence and leisure styles resulting in groups with constantly changing structures. These are our immediate everyday settings and reflect participants’ concerns with change in friendship groups, clothing and behaviours. Cultural processes refer to the continual creation and transmission of cultural resources (e.g. ideas and meanings) within and between groups that allow behaviours to become socially meaningful. Here we can connect how the participants’ awareness of extremists frames their grievances and understandings through a particular ideology, religious knowledge (or lack thereof). This allows for a framing of terrorists as having moved outside the participants’ milieu as they no longer share the same cultural resources to understand the world.

References Awan, Imran. 2012. “I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist”: How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a “Suspect” Community. Politics & Policy 40 (6): 1158–1185. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00397.x. Bartoszewicz, Monika G. 2013. Controversies of Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam. Perspectives on Terrorism 7 (3): 17–29. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26296937. Bloom, Mia. 2007. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Brand, Ralf, and Sara Fregonese. 2016. The Radicals’ City: Urban Environment, Polarisation, Cohesion. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315553658. Brown, K.E. and Morgan, R. 2019. Refusing to Repatriate “ISIS Brides” Is a Terrible Idea From Any Perspective. The New Republic. https://newrepublic. com/article/153184/refusing-repatriate-isis-brides-terrible-idea-perspective. Choudhury, Tufyal. 2007. The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a Study in Progress). Department for Communities and Local Government. h t t p s : / / w w w. c o u n t e r e x t r e m i s m . o r g / r e s o u r c e s / d e t a i l s / i d / 3 4 / the-role-of-muslim-identity-politics-in-radicalisation.

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Commission on Countering Extremism. 2018. People Know Extremism When They See It—And They Want It to Stop. Lead Commissioner Sara Updates at #cojituk on How the @CommissionCE Study Will Help Everyone Do This.Pic. Twitter.Com/GkXQSJBUr3’. Tweet. @CommissionCE (blog), September 12. https://twitter.com/CommissionCE/status/1039795739424157696. Conway, Maura. 2019. Similarities and Differences Between Online Terrorism and Online Child Sexual Abuse and Their Implications. Presentation at European Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) Advisory Network Conference, ‘Terrorism Evolving: Insights from Research.’ Europol, The Hague. Crenshaw, Martha, ed. 1983. Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence. Middletown, CT and Scranton, PA: Wesleyan. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2010. Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (9): 797–814. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423. Edwards, Susan. 2017. Cyber-Grooming Young Women for Terrorist Activity: Dominant And Subjugated Explanatory Narratives. In Cybercrime, Organised Crime, and Societal Responses, ed. E.  Viano, 23–47. Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-319-44501-4_2. Gentry, Caron E., and Laura Sjoberg. 2007. Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics. 1st ed. New York: Zed Books. Horgan, J. 2008. From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (1): 80–94. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002716208317539. Hoyle, Carolyn, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett. 2015. Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. http://www. strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF. Huey, Laura. 2015. Exploring Women’s Participation in Online Radical Milieus. In Kanishka Symposium. London: Public Safety Canada. Huey, Laura, and Eric Witmer. 2016. #IS_Fangirl: Exploring a New Role for Women in Terrorism. Journal of Terrorism Research 7 (1): 1. https://doi. org/10.15664/jtr.1211. King, Michael, and Ali Mohamed. 2011. Youth Radicalization: Somali Identity and Support for Al-Shabaab in the U.K., the U.S., and Canada. Canadian Friends of Somalia Report. Ottowa, ON. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect. org/bitstream/handle/10625/47622/IDL-47622.pdf. Klausen, Jytte. 2019. Neighbourhood Effects—How jihadist Recruitment Really Works. In jihadist Terror: New Threats, New Responses, ed. Anthony Richards, Devorah Margolin, and Nicolò Scremin. London: Bloomsbury/I.B. Tauris. Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F.  Walter. 2006. The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security 31 (1): 49–80. https://doi.org/10.1162/ isec.2006.31.1.49.

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Lahoud, Nelly. 2014. The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad. Terrorism and Political Violence, August (Feb.): 1–23. https://doi. org/10.1080/09546553.2013.772511. ———. 2017. Can Women Be Soldiers of the Islamic State? Survival 59 (1): 61–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282675. ———. 2018. Empowerment or Subjugation: An Analysis of ISIL’s Gendered Messaging. UN Women. Mcdonald, Laura Zahra. 2011. Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and Its Implications for Security. Religion, State and Society 39 (2–3): 177–189. https://doi.org/10.1080/0963749 4.2011.584712. Pearson, Elizabeth. 2018a. Online as the New Frontline: Affect, Gender, and ISIS—Take-Down on Social Media. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 0 (0): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1352280. ———. 2018b. Wilayat Shahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the Question of the Female Suicide Bomber. In Boko Haram: Behind the Headlines, ed. Jason Warner and Jacob Zenn. CTC Sentinel. Rogers, Brooke, and Peter R.  Neumann. 2007. Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe. Commissioned by Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. http://ec.europa.eu/home-af fairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_ radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf. Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Silke, Andrew. 1998. Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research. Psychology, Crime & Law 4 (1): 51–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10683169808401747. Sjoberg, Laura. 2013. Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War. New York: Columbia University Press. Spalek, Basia, and Laura Zahra McDonald. 2010. Terror Crime Prevention: Constructing Muslim Practices and Beliefs as “Anti-Social” and “Extreme” Through CONTEST 2. Social Policy and Society 9 (1): 123–132. https://doi. org/10.1017/S147474640999025X. Tajfel, Henri, ed. 1979. Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. London and New York: Academic. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2016. Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity: A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and Violent Extremism. New  York. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ librar ypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussionpaper%2D%2D-preventing-violent-extremism-through-inclusiv.html.

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Vaughan-Williams, N. 2008. Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen–Detective and the War on Terror. Space and Polity 12 (1): 63–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562570801969457. Venhaus, Colonel John M. ‘Matt’. 2010. Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda. Special Report. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2010/05/why-youth-join-al-qaeda. Victoroff, J. 2005. The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 3–42. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272040. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2005. Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Winter, Charlie. 2015. Women of the Islamic State. The Quilliam Foundation. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/women-of-the-islamic-state3.pdf.

CHAPTER 6

Countering Violent Extremism and Gender: Challenging Assumptions

This chapter focuses on gender in participants’ understandings of state and civil society attempts to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/ CVE), rather than on the causes of violent extremism (VE). The focus groups and interviews offer community evaluations of programmes and general policies and show how wider public debate and perceptions influence the reception of CVE. This chapter begins by examining community understanding of CVE generally, before focusing on specific issues such as objectives, delivery and the consequences of CVE. Broadly, discussion was led by participants and in a number of directions, including the media, parenting, women’s roles; it rarely specifically focused on particular programmes or initiatives, even where participants had taken part in P/CVE workshops or training sessions locally.

Community Understanding Across the focus groups with Muslim participants, there was a considerable lack of trust in CVE initiatives. This attitude was clearly influenced by their understanding, outlined in the previous chapter, that ‘violent extremism’ is code or a shortcut for discussing violence and terrorism by Muslims only. However, it must also be said that CVE activities informed and fed into their understanding of violent extremism and terrorism as a Muslim phenomenon, and therefore there was a ‘chicken-and-egg’ quality to these debates. Unpacking this further we find that discourses about violent © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_6

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extremism and CVE are not only symbiotic but sedimented. That is, new iterations of violence or state responses to that violence become scaffolded upon and are interpreted in light of prior understandings. Much like an arms race, this sedimented and co-dependent relationship has become a spiral of distrust. Additionally, this is influenced by broader (negative) contacts with state institutions that are not explicitly linked to countering violent extremism, and with the media. Trust is an essential component of social capital that generates social cohesion, discussed in Chap. 4. It can foster government efficacy by increasing cooperative values linking citizens to public agencies (Hardin 2002). Trust is understood as a bond, or a set of relationships equivalent to those based on mutual expectations: they derive from past and present behaviour with an understanding of future actions (Elster 2007). Trust reduces future complexity, uncertainty and anxiety by ‘pruning’ expectations around the future (Luhmann 2017). Anxiety, fear and uncertainty have negative effects on trust and generate social dislocation. Given that an essential component of terrorism is the generation of fear and terror, this becomes highly significant for this research (Huddy et al. 2005, 2013; Pugh et al. 2003; Treisman 2011; Richards 2014). Lack of trust is therefore also significant. Rawls (2009) argues that “distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid” (p.  6). In other words, trust is what enables us to move from isolated self-interested ‘states-of-nature’ towards a collective and functional community and society. This makes trust essential for governance and for generating security. Stolle and Hooghe (2003) argue that “governments can realise their capacity to generate trust only if citizens consider the state itself to be trustworthy” (p. 34). Maxwell (2010) finds that migrants to the UK have more positive trust in government than those born in the UK, and Muslims have more positive trust in government than Christians. Our findings suggest that the areas of VE and CVE might be the exceptions to that study. This confirms findings by Murray et  al. (2015) that lack of confidence (trust) in police was highest among Muslims in the UK and even higher in areas that had been identified as ‘hot spots’ for terrorism. There are repeated claims that lack of trust in police and local institutions hinders the effectiveness of CVE by reducing the willingness of individuals to report information (Schanzer et  al. 2016). Double-hatting (creating a dual purpose for) other police activities (such as community events) for intelligence gathering efforts, failing to look at the serious public safety

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concerns of Muslim communities (such as not taking hate crime seriously) and using spies or ‘agent provocateurs’ were seen to further undermine trust in policing and within communities. Innes et  al. (2017) however challenge these claims about trust, or the lack of it, by reconsidering CVE actions as ‘disruption’ rather than prevention activities. They find that specific CVE activities and the police officers involved are viewed as trustworthy by the communities engaged (Innes et al. 2017). Here, specific local experiences of CVE actions, and individual trust in particular officers, offset generalised suspicion and malaise around CVE. This is an instance of micro-level trust creation, in spite of macro-level issues. The interesting component of our research is that few of the participants we met had been directly involved in CVE actions/programmes. This meant that, in the main, they had not been able to really reflect on whether the reputation of CVE matched actual practices. Nor did this necessarily interest them. Another area of research on trust and counter-terrorism is in deradicalisation, where building trust, human dignity and equality provide the conceptual basis for the reform of terrorists (Council of Europe 2016). In fieldwork in high-security prisons involving terrorist offenders, trust enabled closer relationships with prisoners and therefore a higher quality of information and intelligence gathering (Williams 2017). As noted in Chap. 4, there is also a general linking of CVE to general distrust through the emergence of ‘suspect communities’ by such policies, as seen in the work of McCulloch and Wilson (2015), Mythen and Walklate (2016) and Sentas (2014). However, how CVE impacts on trust (and vice versa) is not investigated in these works and is seen as a second-order effect or consequence of the general discourse on counter-radicalisation. There is also some work on the effects of terrorism and violent extremism and fear of terrorism on trust (Godefroidt and Langer 2017; Huddy et al. 2013; Locicero and Sinclair 2010; Wollebæk et al. 2012). Godefroidt and Langer (2017) in their multilevel regression analysis on trust and terrorism in 46 countries concluded that: in democratic countries faced with relatively few terror attacks, a new threat dynamic seems to have been generated where the risk of attacks has become a primary topic for journalists and government officials; causing people’s fears to damage the societal fabric of countries above and beyond terrorism itself. (p. 1)

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Huddy et al.’s (2005) research suggests that the more widespread fear and anxiety following a terrorist attack, the more this undermines trust. As Geys and Qari (2017) summarise: “Greater fear and anxiety brought about by terrorist events thus not only induces inflated estimates of future similar events occurring (i.e. people fear new attacks), but also make individuals’ preoccupation with this possibility particularly salient (i.e. people worry about future attacks)” (p.  292). However, their study concludes that the effect of terrorism on social trust is short-lived, with limited impacts on established social attitudes (Geys and Qari 2017). We find, that the effect of the VE-CVE cycle on trust is potentially more significant than studies which only focus on terrorism or solely on CVE indicate. Feelings about CVE are entwined with relationships with other institutions, which can also impact levels of trust between people and the state.

Lack of Trust Muslim focus group participants across countries conveyed scepticism and despondency regarding the concept of CVE, existing approaches and any prospect of future success. Radicalisation and extremism were perceived to be such overwhelming issues that Muslim participants struggled to see ways in which they could be countered. It should be noted that aside from the UK where Prevent and specific programmes were named, and in other countries where some participants had been involved in CVE programmes, broadly speaking, research participants did not have a clear understanding of their government’s CVE approach or activities. In France, or with the parents of radicalised children in the Netherlands, research participants had experienced counter-extremism mechanisms from a counter-­terrorism perspective. In Canada, a number of participants had undergone CVE training sessions. However, aside from in the UK, research participants therefore reacted more to the concept of CVE than to specific government policies or interventions. The co-dependent element of CVE and VE understanding was evident in the way in which attitudes to CVE were shaped by specific events. This was most evident in France, recovering from the November 2015 Paris attacks at the time of the research. French groups recorded the strongest sense of helplessness, and in both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. As one young Muslim man summed up on CVE, “I mean, really, if there

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are such tools, they are not really working at all, it is really getting worse.” Another young non-Muslim woman declared CVE a “useless tool that costs taxpayers a lot”. Another young Muslim man in a French focus group ridiculed awareness-raising attempts by the French government such as posters bearing the words “Allo Terrorisme” that outline how to report suspicious activity, declaring these “ridiculous” and adding, “the problems are deeper I think.” Participants drew their understanding of CVE from events and awareness of programming, but also from the cumulative effects of CVE and VE.  This was keenly felt among youth. Those in their 20s, next followed by teenagers, were a key demographic exhibiting scepticism. Both young men and women expressed similar scepticism, especially associating CVE with Islamophobia. Worryingly, it is this ‘youth group’ that is both the most ‘vulnerable’ in terms of radicalisation,1 yet also the most suspicious of any form of CVE. They were also fatalistic about the existence of terrorism. As one young Muslim man in the UK said, “I don’t think it is possible to counter terrorism at all. If you stop ISIS, then another group will emerge. There will always be terrorism. To suggest false solutions, for me, it’s becoming ridiculous.” There was lethargy and ambivalence more broadly in youth responses. This group is the so-called post-9/11 generation, a generation that has grown up without memory of al-Qaida’s attack on the twin towers, yet scarred by the negative narratives surrounding Muslims and Islam. For them, 9/11 is not emotionally shocking, but a fact of life. Issues of Muslim identity and feelings of ‘otherness’ have reportedly been exacerbated since 9/11, in part due to the corresponding rise in Islamophobia and discriminatory behaviour since these attacks (Feldman and Littler 2014; Byers and Jones 2007; Tellmama 2018). As mentioned in the previous chapter, most groups made clear that they perceived that the media plays a role in influencing perceptions about violent extremism and CVE.  Many young Muslims perceive the media to be biased against Islam, homogenising Muslims and either implicitly or explicitly encouraging distorted, generalised views of Islam: It is all about how people are brought up. Terrorism is used in conjunction with Islam, which it wasn’t before 9/11. I was born before that time. People 1  Based on figures of those who have attempted or successfully travelled to Daesh or who have been prosecuted for terrorism-related offences.

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born after 9/11 believe the idea that Islam is terrorism. People see it on TV, the media portrays Islam as terrorism then people believe them. —[Young Muslim man, England]

Prior research demonstrates how the media frames Islam and Muslims in negative ways (Saeed 2016). What our research shows is the impact and effect this has on young Muslims across Europe and Canada in relation to CVE. Many young Muslims in our focus groups felt they needed to justify themselves after attacks, to be able to speak authoritatively on Islam and act as ambassadors for all Muslims. This echoes other research on Muslim university student identities. Students felt they had become ‘professionally Muslim’, but also that their other student activism was always viewed through a ‘Muslim first’ lens by others (Brown and Saeed 2014). This context means even well-intentioned governmental attempts to improve issues around extremism or integration can perpetuate harmful views. The impact of the negative mainstream discourse on Muslims and Islam, combined with the strong perception that CVE only targets Muslims, clearly serves to undermine the impact and efficacy of current programming in any context.

CVE Targets As noted in Chap. 2, CVE can typically range from broad inoculation efforts, for example, attempts to build community resilience and cohesion via leadership training or sporting events, to more focused endeavours that seek to build the awareness and capabilities of specific individuals within those communities (and elsewhere). This might include training for key workers to ‘spot the signs of radicalisation’ or workshops with young people and mothers to give them knowledge to challenge extremist narratives. In our research, participants discussed different types of activities and who they were aimed at: Muslim communities, Muslim women and Muslim men. Terrorism studies have invested much research in identifying the perceived beneficiaries and perceived targets of CVE and analysing the effects. In particular, as discussed in Chap. 4, there is the discussion of ‘suspect communities’. This concept emerged originally in relation to state policing of Catholic dissidents and wider Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, but has been reapplied to Muslim communities across Europe. The concept now relates to the perception that Muslim communities are potentially dangerous due to the risk of jihadist

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radicalisation and therefore the legitimate focus of security measures. This has emerged through the instrumentalisation of ‘community policing’ for security and counter-terrorism agendas over the public safety and crime concerns of the communities involved (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). Minority communities discuss in much research how they feel ‘surveilled’ rather than ‘served’ by policing and that this perception has increased since 2001. Poynting and Mason (2008) further note how the public feels legitimised to show suspicion and hate towards the ‘suspect community’ as they perceive the state authorities to have the same stance. Poynting and Perry (2007) term this as “permission to hate”, based on a study of Canada and Australia (p. 158). Consequently, fear of this ‘suspicious’ social group heightens and therefore facilitates the deterioration of community relations in society. Evidence suggests this seems to have occurred at an alarming rate in the UK and in the Netherlands (van Meeteren and van Oostendorp 2018).

The Validity of ‘Muslim Communities’ Approaches More generally, the majority of all Muslim focus groups, irrespective of age and gender, also expressed hostility to the perception they should be targeted by CVE programming, and regarded as a ‘vulnerable’ community. One young Muslim man in Canada outlined this, “They do not have an approach. They do not try to understand; they have a policy of always targeting people. Apart from targeting them, they make them guilty of things that they have not done.” Meanwhile, young Muslim men attending a focus group in the UK discussed how CVE represented an excuse to ‘clamp down’ on Muslims, linking it to the existence of facilities such as Guantanamo, and structural racism. One said, “We need to think about the approach, which is individual, and should not start with Muslims. It is racist to focus on Muslim families.” Instead, many Muslim participants advocated shared social responsibility, not confined to Muslim communities. This sentiment frequently led to frustration with the research question on the relevance of women to CVE, and resistance to it, as captured by a Muslim young woman in Canada: “How relevant are women in CVE?” It doesn’t fall on the shoulders of women; it falls on the shoulders of all people, all across the spectrum of societies, communities and governments; all kinds of agencies; it is never a gendered thing; it is a collective problem/issue outside of the Muslim community. —[Young Muslim woman, Canada]

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The rise of Daesh at the time of the research had also had an impact on resistance to CVE in Muslim communities. References by focus group leaders or others to Daesh as ‘Islamic State’ or ‘ISIS’ in English-speaking countries were frequently met with hostility. All Muslim research participants strongly rejected the association of Islam and extremism with what Daesh was doing, as did many non-Muslims. All communities struggled with the knowledge that the most visible form of contemporary terrorism and extremism was—rightly or wrongly—perceived as Daesh and alQaida. Muslims interviewed did not accept the CVE logic of safeguarding Muslim communities because Daesh was explicitly targeting Muslim youth. That said, they also cited ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ interpretations of Islam as key factors in radicalisation; and additionally, the majority of participants had either directly or indirectly experienced some form of radicalisation—a fact that needs to be recognised. There was a degree of incoherence to feelings about CVE and the recognition that education might counter Daesh. There is therefore a need to rethink engagement with Muslim communities, particularly with young Muslims. Despite the widespread suspicion regarding CVE, most research participants also acknowledged the need to at least try to confront the challenge extremism presents and did engage with the core research question. A second component of this type of engagement was a reification of ‘Muslim community’ as a category for state policy. Participants talked about ‘the Muslim community’ widely rather than talking about ‘Muslim communities’. There was an underlying assumption within around the commonality of belief, behaviour and belonging of ‘Muslims’, regardless of the fact that participants had lived experiences of difference and diversity.

Muslim Women: Their Special Role in CVE Research also suggested a growing inapplicability of assumptions about traditional gender dynamics in Muslim families. Many Muslim women participants had jobs, as well as having a family. While they recognised and valued their role as primary caregivers, they highlighted the limitations to this. Some Muslim women research participants questioned why mothers should play a different role to men in CVE, and why the onus of responsibility of countering radicalisation should be put on them. As one young Muslim woman in Canada queried, “Why is it only the mother’s role to pick up on these signs? It takes two to parent.” The view was echoed

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widely, by men as well as women participating in the research, and shared by young people, who frequently described close relationships with fathers as well as mothers: I don’t like the idea, that concept of ‘women and countering violence’… Because we have to do this as a group of people—together as a community, not just putting this all onto the woman. You shouldn’t put all of the importance on the woman; only if you have the mother and father together in strength and unity will it work. —[Conversation, young Muslim women, Canada]

Even those mothers who believed they were close to their children admitted that modern technology made it increasingly difficult to monitor their children’s activities and interactions. The fact that mothers were extremely busy also limited their ability to do so. In the words of mothers in the Netherlands and the UK: Poverty sometimes plays a part. Mothers are tired and therefore not involved. If you have problems, then you don’t pay attention to what your child is doing behind its PC. And this is a process that can go very fast. —[Middle-­aged Muslim woman, the Netherlands] They [mothers] don’t even know what is associated with radicalisation, extremism or anything like that. On a regular day, you wake up in the morning, you’re sorting your kids out, you are cleaning and cooking. You do not have time to look at the news or what is going on, and I think that is common to a lot of women. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, England]

There was also a sense that CVE interventions engaging women specifically were unfair, as they abdicated the government of their responsibility in preventing extremism and could instil a sense that Muslim women were to blame. This discussion came from a Canadian focus group, and women who did not have children: Why do Muslim women have to do this, why do they have to stop violent extremism? Why not control all these men and stop them from blowing themselves up. It is none of our business. Why can’t you, the government, do it? Why are you asking us?

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I agree, I think if we only focus on mums, we are putting them in a role; we are saying that it is only the mother’s role to pick up on these signs. —[Young Muslim women’s discussion, Canada]

This abdication of responsibility was perceived by some as a way of ‘letting government off the hook’. Significantly, an emphasis on Muslim women as the core actors in counter-radicalisation was also frequently rejected. As one young Muslim father in Germany said, “Separating women and men [in CVE]—I don’t find it really appropriate. Because it’s a problem that affects both sexes and also states need to be involved.” The assignment of ownership and responsibility to Muslim women, or as it is sometimes referred to, the responsibilisation of Muslim women in particular reflects a wider responsibilisation of society through public messaging—“See it. Say it. Sorted.” in the UK, for example, and similar schemes across Europe and Canada (Henderson 2019; Ragazzi 2016; McDonald et al. 2009). Many Muslim participants advocated shared social responsibility, not confined to Muslim communities. The research question about Muslim women’s role in CVE was additionally problematic because it was perceived as permitting the government to deflect attention away from more pressing issues in Muslim communities, such as violence against Muslim women, as one of the above-cited participants from Canada made clear, “I don’t think it’s a relevant question…But please teach us how to protect ourselves from white men who attack us and from husbands who are abusing us.” The vast majority of women reported experiences of abuse of some form by non-Muslims, but this was most reported in groups in Canada, where research took place in the week after the Paris attacks. Many women were also nervous of lone travel, and men expressed anxiety over the safety of women relatives. As noted in the previous chapter, for these women extremism was experienced primarily as Islamophobia from non-Muslim others. The ‘maternalist logic’ of CVE that specifically engages women in order to identify and prevent male threat was also criticised by some participants for failing to challenge negative gender dynamics, and re-entrenching stereotypical ideas of women. Some participants felt portrayals of women as more caring by nature, of their specific role in childcare needed to be challenged within communities, not further supported. This view did not always come from women. A number of men had considered the issues, “I am reading a lot of books on patriarchy and the idea of having to selectively

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pick on women to have a key role to make things better; it is bad.” This comment came from a Canadian man in his 20s but was indicative of a theme in comments from men across regional contexts. Muslim women in all country groups resisted their portrayal as oppressed, yet here too there was inevitably complexity. Many women expressed frustration at traditional patriarchal norms within their communities, in addition to wider societal patriarchy. Even where resisted, and where women had equal relationships in their own homes, many participants felt that if the primary objective of CVE was genuinely to tackle radicalisation, women and mothers were not necessarily the best family members to achieve this. This was due to understandings of traditional norms in families. As this Canadian woman in her 60s explained, “the dads are stricter than the mum. More listen to the dad than to the mum.” In the words of one Muslim woman from the Netherlands, “If children radicalise they [mothers] can see it quicker I think, but boys don’t take their mother very seriously. They are afraid of the man in the family.” The challenge for CVE here is to work with communities, yet not further entrench existing inequalities. Some of the views challenging women’s authority and influence came from men. Clearly it is important for government policy, committed to gender equality, not to endorse situations in which women are oppressed. However, what is of note is that some women suggested they would struggle to gain support in any CVE responsibility from male family members. They suggested any specific intervention by women in the home risks family tension, as men challenge authority expressed by women. Listening to the variety of experiences of women in groups emphasised the difficulties of blanket approaches in CVE, or assumptions about ‘Muslim communities’ as a homogenous group. Men’s views on the need to change this dynamic differed. Focus group members suggested that, working to change this or not, engaging women because of assumed gender dynamics in families meant recognising the ways in which those gender dynamics might act to negate women’s power in the home. However, programmes aimed at ‘Muslim women’s empowerment’ were not routinely regarded as the answer. Participants suggested that masculine norms would also need to change, with masculinities and gender relations at the least discussed. These issues are addressed later in this chapter. This is important as shifts on gender rights and roles for women clearly necessitate shifts for men.

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More significantly, some men interviewed in both Muslim and non-­ Muslim communities admitted the wider influence of patriarchy. As one Muslim man from France expressed, “Because in the religion, in Islam, a woman has no say in what the husband decides, so it is quite hard for a woman to take action, you know.” A view commonly expressed among both Muslim—and non-Muslim men—was that women were good at engaging in dialogue, but this skill does not equate to influence. A nonMuslim man in Germany suggested, despite great social change, “Men don’t listen to women all that much, even today.” The fact that some younger men in all countries highlighted this suggests that even among the younger generation there exists a challenge to women’s equality and empowerment, and a power imbalance in the home that does not favour women’s power and participation, without a great deal of support. Non-Muslim and Muslim women in all countries echoed this and acknowledged that they felt their voices and opinions were often challenged. A young Muslim woman in the UK stated: If I suddenly see a girl or woman speak her mind or mention something about what is happening with ISIS, or Syria, or Palestine, or Yemen, or Somalia—then more eyes are going to be on her and more people will be questioning her. She will get more hate and hassle because she’s a woman. —[Young Muslim woman, England]

This perception was most frequently expressed by younger Muslim women from their teens into their 30s, who identified a link between local cultural norms and women’s disempowerment. We pick up the theme of women’s empowerment later in this chapter.

The Mother Paradox Putting the onus of CVE on women was also perceived to risk securitising the role of mothers, a risk well-documented in the literature (Brown 2008; Huckerby 2015; Croft 2012; Rashid 2014). A small number of participants highlighted that mothers would inevitably prioritise the actual family dynamic over a potential security threat and that for some Muslim participants the risk that reporting children might pose to family stability was a greater threat than radicalisation itself. Instead, it was felt family stability was needed to stop radicalisation, and engagement aimed at encouraging mothers to report crime could backfire. A Muslim father in Germany explained:

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If you’re looking at the mother-son relationship, what [CVE] does is take something positive and make it negative…if mothers…go to the police, and say “my son has these tendencies, maybe he’ll go to ISIS or something like that,” that will just destroy the whole family! Then what they achieve is the opposite of what they want. Because then the son is just going to leave the family, and live somewhere else, where he can’t be controlled …It’s actually counter-productive. —[Young Muslim father, Germany]

The implication is that broad engagement with women centred on issues such as ‘spotting the signs of radicalisation’ could be counter-productive. These Dutch parents agreed that women’s strength was her compassion, but this meant mothers frequently acted to protect children in order to preserve the family: What mothers of youngsters who are about to radicalise are doing is suddenly act very sweet towards the children. They cook extra food, make nice things etc. They are all of a sudden going to give a lot of attention, a little bit on the extreme side to compensate, a lot of phoning, entering into conversation while before they didn’t do that. —[Young Muslim woman, the Netherlands] Which mother would actually be prepared to go to the police and say, yeah, I’m worried my son might end up being radical? I don’t know…When would the mother actually go to the police, at what stage? —[Young Muslim man, Germany]

Men and women pointed to the fact that reporting your own child would amount to a complete breakdown of trust and pointed to parents’ moral struggles in this area. Muslim mothers interviewed in Canada, who in this case were part of a Somali-heritage focus group, also felt strongly about this, as one explained: If my child does something let’s say parents have a dilemma. Say he has a gun if I call the police they don’t deal with it in the way that makes me happy, maybe he is sent to jail…but you think ‘my son will be destroyed’— so then you don’t ask for help and say he’s innocent. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, Canada]

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Fears for sons expressed in this group included violence and sexual violence against young men in jail. These were factors deterring mothers from speaking up. An additional complexity for Muslim women interviewed in the Netherlands was the particular ‘shame factor’ involved in reporting children, as immigrant women. In effect, these participants outlined how the core assumption of engaging women in CVE—that they are the primary caregivers, with an influential relationship with children—was also the reason that this strategy was unlikely to work. Women’s strength was their weakness in the CVE context. The same relationship that justified the maternal logic of CVE would also deter mothers from going to the police, other officials or support groups, a key aim of many CVE programmes. This is consistent with Awan and Guru’s (2017) research, which also shows how Muslim families are uncertain about whether parents would report their fears about their children’s potential radicalisation to local authorities or the police. However, it should be noted that a parallel conversation and reasoning were evident in non-Muslim, as well as Muslim groups, around lack of trust in the police. In fact all parents, across religions, race, age and gender, doubted their own ability, should it come to it, to inform on their children. Scepticism about mothers’ roles in CVE was not simply based on the mother paradox or awareness of cultural and patriarchal assumptions. Often participants emphasised that, whatever influence women wield, the reasons behind young men or women travelling to Syria were not ones that mothers—or indeed fathers—could expect to impact. This was corroborated by those with personal experience of radicalisation. In the Netherlands, the sister of a young Muslim killed in a drone strike fighting for Daesh in Syria told interviewers her family had been powerless: Nobody could stop my brother. It was going on for a while already. But it went very fast…He would have found a way to leave. No matter what. My brother wanted it very much. Nobody could do anything. You could talk with him for hours. And when he sees images from Syria and Iraq on TV everything starts all over again. It was very difficult. —[Young Muslim woman, the Netherlands]

A minority of participants also highlighted that some mothers might have views that others deem ‘extreme’. No assumptions should therefore be made that mothers would always agree with the government, or would

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‘naturally’ want to counter radicalisation. A younger Muslim woman from Canada pointed out, “It depends on the ideas that people have. For example, a woman who is homophobic will not show the child that it is good to see two men together … So it depends on the person, [no matter] whether it is a woman or a man.” This is an important, if minority, position within the groups, because it demonstrates recognition of women’s potential political agency in Daesh radicalisation and challenges pacifist assumptions about women that have tended to dominate CVE and PVE policies and practices (Brown 2020).

Men Matter Too In contrast to deradicalisation work, where men remain the focus, it is clear that CVE appears to engage with women in families more than men. One of the clearest research findings from all countries, but particularly in France and the Netherlands, was that participants desire engagement in CVE programming with fathers as an explicit demographic, as suggested in the previous section. Women said this was important in helping mothers. A mother in a Dutch Muslim focus group pointed out that, “Men have little involvement in the upbringing at home. Only one in five is really involved [she estimates]. That has to improve. So that they can support the women and don’t just leave the upbringing to the mothers.” Other mothers suggested women were often explicitly blamed if children joined Daesh, and that a focus on fathers would help prevent this. While some men and women highlighted specific skill-sets belonging to fathers, the primary belief driving the request for a focus on fathers was predominantly that parenthood is a joint responsibility. Therefore, both parents need to be engaged in CVE, each with their own role. This was a view expressed equally by men and women, by parents and non-parents and was particularly emphasised by young people in their 20s and teenagers, both Muslim and non-Muslim. In practical terms, this was driven by the acknowledgement of the different visibility of Muslim men and women in the public realm, particularly in relation to mosque attendance. In some families, women expected fathers to exercise authority and possess knowledge. One older Canadian Muslim woman described how she told her children to go to their father for information since he is “more knowledgeable”. In the words of one Muslim mother in a UK focus group, “I know women are quite weak…Like you mentioned [to another woman participant] you didn’t know about ISIS. I think it is more relevant

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to engage men.” There was some evidence of a generation gap in views, across groups. Men interviewed in all countries clearly also said they wanted to be engaged in CVE. Being considered as fathers had the advantage of counteracting negative stereotypical representations of Muslim men as potential jihadists, replacing them with positive masculinities, images of male carers and role models in the domestic setting. A higher incidence of male radicalisation meant many Muslim participants felt presenting fathers as role models was particularly desirable, especially for sons. The discussion on parenting reflects older debates in criminology about poor parenting leading to social ills—such as gangs and delinquency. This taps into a ‘troubled family’ discourse which places families as ‘in need’ of state support, intrusion and intervention. Families are told they need to follow expert advice in parenting to ‘spot the signs’ and are presented with the notion that there is a single set of guidelines or advice to follow— whereas experts themselves acknowledge that there is no single ‘best practice’ in relation to family relationships or behaviours to prevent violent extremism (Sikkens et  al. 2017). Overall, the participants appear to be challenging the CVE burden being placed on women, but in two contradictory ways—on the one hand they note how [Muslim] women have jobs and careers and cannot be stereotyped as submissive, but on the other hand they suggest women are also lacking power and authority in the home on some matters such as politics and religion. It is of course, given the diversity of Muslim communities’ experiences, entirely possible for both positions to be true.

CVE Objectives This section considers the ways in which participants understood and reflected on the broad goals of CVE programming. In order to better understand the findings, we now incorporate some relevant remarks from participants in non-Muslim as well as Muslim focus groups, and across countries. Inconsistencies are evident here in participant accounts. This is perhaps to be expected due to the diversity of focus groups and the fact that participants were in a sense working out what they thought about issues, during discussions.

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Empowerment Though not a dominant response, for some women, across country contexts, ‘empowerment’ discourses constituted a threat to their faith and culture, and for that reason were met with suspicion. Women also suggested that ‘empowerment’ classes should not be for Muslim women explicitly, but women broadly. Women were particularly alert to attempts by outsiders and government to ‘correct’ Muslim women, and to ‘save’ them from Islam. One white German convert mother who wore the hijab questioned the end CVE goal of ‘empowerment’. Was the aim for women to abandon the hijab, she asked: Obviously, you want women to be strong and independent and choose their own path in life, but then you have to accept which path they choose. It’s not that you can say you empower women, if you then want them to take away their strength to be good Muslims…To empower them more just to be great go-go dancers, that’s not right. [laughs] It’s not logical. But it has to be up to them to choose how they live, and give them the power to do that. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, Germany]

The issue of both the headscarf (hijab) and veil (niqab) was again a sensitive one in the empowerment debate. Women felt a tension between the vision of ‘empowerment’ and their own commitment to their faith. The debate made some women angry: Muslim women are not ok with the white feminist agenda, with the idea that Muslim women who have cloths on their heads can’t help themselves; “we must save them”. No, Muslim women actually want to cover up and no one is forcing us. If you want to take off the hijab, you can take it off, but the narrative is that Muslim women want to be saved. It’s ‘white saviours’—we want none of that. —[Young Muslim woman, Canada]

Again, Muslim men were aware of the debates and the activities around women’s empowerment, and were suspicious of them, as this young Canadian man expressed, “Usually, the ‘empowerment’ I see these days is that women are ‘empowered’…in a way that brings them out of their culture. This is abuse by people that are trying to empower them.” This highlights how suspicion and distrust in the state undermine activities that

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may support and strengthen women’s (and indeed men’s) capacity and resilience. Activities affecting women’s behaviour also had effects on men. Overall this raises important questions about reinforcing power inequalities in communities or trying to subvert them in order to achieve particular security-focused outcomes. This also risks ‘Muslim culture’ being identified as a reason for violent extremism, while ignoring the presence of VE in other communities. Indeed, we have seen the unhelpful linking of other harmful socio-cultural practices to terrorism, such as female genital mutilation and forced marriage. This securitises cultural debates, without necessarily reducing the incidences of these practices (or violent extremism) and without necessarily providing support for women who are victims of them. This ‘say-do’ gap over women’s rights in terrorism discourse is noted by researchers across the world (see the work of authors including Huckerby (2015), Brown (2020), Basu et  al. (2020) and Sjoberg and Preet (2011)). The specific components of CVE that engage with empowerment narratives in various forms are discussed below—national values, integration, language and specific discussions on gender equality. National Values It is worth drawing here on the focus groups conducted with people who were not Muslims. Opinions on national values were divided according to demographics with important differences noted between Muslim and non-Muslim focus groups, different ages and gender. All groups discussed national values in the context of wider discussions about the nature of extremism and its relationship with broader society. However, the function of the term ‘national values’ had very different meanings to Muslims and non-Muslims, unsurprisingly perhaps. Canadian-ness is very broad. Very open and not necessarily based on where you come from, what you look like or what your religion is—it is a sense of belonging that is very thick… Canadian values are very loose, but this has been changing. —[Young Muslim man, Canada] You spoke of the values of the Republic, what they embody in their minds? Nothing. Freedom? What freedom are we talking about when we have discrimination in our societies, not cultural, not racial but social. —[Young Muslim woman, France]

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Giving money to improve Muslim people’s English—I think they should instead come to these communities and talk to us. I don’t know anything about British values—I don’t think there are British values—there are English values, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, human values. There was a Scottish paper saying, “we support Scotland and any team that plays against England”. We appreciate what this country has done for us. But the myth of “they have something because we don’t” is growing stronger and stronger. —[Middle-aged non-Muslim woman, England]

Women across groups were the most active promoters of the need for assertive iteration of national values. While discussion of national values reassured participants in non-Muslim focus groups, it prompted anxiety among Muslim participants. Non-Muslim focus groups most frequently felt national values were threatened and that these national values made them feel secure. For Muslim groups issues such as freedom of speech and gender equality do not necessarily mean anything positive, or worse, as the discussion in previous sections demonstrate, are perceived as being used to undermine them. National values were perceived as being most under threat in the UK non-Muslim focus groups. Meanwhile, research participants in France most frequently discussed the need to actively explain national values. Older age groups across countries frequently stated that they felt national values were threatened, with the 60s age group having the strongest correlation with the perception that national values were at risk. This correlates to later findings regarding voting patterns in, for example, the Brexit referendum. Where national values were undefined, the phrase became code for assumptions of difference and non-integration, regardless of the empirical evidence. In this way language expressing racial discrimination and Islamophobia were able to enter and at times, permeate discussion, even as participants avowed dislike for hate. ‘National values’ became an empty container into which fears can be poured. The linkage enables (or reflects) how CVE can contribute to the construction of terrorism as a societal threat that is greater than the existential or physical threat that violent attacks actually cause. National Language In the UK, 2011 census data note some 22 per cent of Muslim women are unable to speak English well or not at all (compared with 10 per cent of Muslim men) and this figure has been a subject of government concern,

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prompting a call from David Cameron for women to learn English, and education programmes (Cacciottolo 2016). This call prompted debate elsewhere, including Canada, even though in that country, all but 5 per cent of the Muslim population is able to hold a conversation in one of the two official languages (Hamdani 2015, 16). In our focus groups, ability to speak the official national language was identified as a key component of integration, particularly across groups in the UK and to a lesser extent Germany, in both Muslim and non-Muslim groups. In Muslim focus groups, including a limited number of women in Canada, women specifically criticised other Muslim women for failing to learn the national language. Education is a compulsory thing, even the English language; it has to be taught for mothers who have not been brought up here. When I came here my oldest son was four years old, I used to watch children’s programmes in English to learn with him the language, and this gave me fluency. Teaching language is very important for communication. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, England] I think mothers nowadays have to be well-informed and know English because they cannot communicate well with their children who have been born or raised here, who go to English schools. If your kid comes home with some idea and you don’t know how to deal with it, this is a problem. —[Young Muslim woman, England] When they come here and can’t speak German that confuses children who go to a German school. They come home from school and it’s all different—that can damage them psychologically. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, Germany]

This is a highly gendered discourse as there is an assumption within the participant groups that men had higher rates of literacy in official languages and rarely discussed men’s fluency. This discussion also shows the importance of voluntarism in CVE. Where policies are mandatory, compelled or coerced, then they can undermine the wider objectives they try to achieve. This is affirmed in deradicalisation programmes where rates of recidivism are lower if participation is voluntary and not linked to early release (RAN 2019).

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Integration and Women Participants in all focus groups—Muslim and non-Muslim—believed in the need for better integration of Muslim women into western society in order to tackle radicalisation. Broadly, they also supported the notion of empowerment, if this was to better influence their children. However, this empowerment was preferred when it meant practical and material support rather than cultural or ideological, as indicated in previous sections. There was a widespread perception that integration might prevent radicalisation. As one Muslim mother in Germany said, “So if this mother or woman is educated, is integrated, or just isn’t cut off from wider society, then something like this [radicalisation] just shouldn’t be able to happen.” Muslim women and teenagers regarded women’s full access to the public realm as evidence of good integration. This included employment, social spaces and mosques. The perception that many Muslim women had limited engagement in the public sphere was believed to also limit their understanding of their country of residence, and their ability to engage in CVE. In particular, women’s less frequent mosque participation was highlighted as a factor in their restricted access to information. This was a strong observation among Muslim men and women in the UK, but was also referred to in other countries. The focus on mosques to disseminate information about extremism likely has a far more limited impact on women than men in areas where women’s access to mosque is poor. This additionally means that where CVE efforts are focused on mosques, they will not be able to engage with women easily. This was the perception in groups. Despite criticising existing CVE efforts that focused on women as mothers, Muslim focus group participants did feel that mothers have a wider responsibility in CVE. Youth participants emphasised their need for mothers as people to share their views with, perhaps representing a gendered assumption about mothers’ roles. A young Muslim man from Canada highlighted the need for women to understand their country of residence and engage proactively in the public sphere in order to be able to educate their children. He stated, “Mothers educate children. So, if she [sic] does not take care of this, the child is lost. If the mother also frequents the outside world and she knows Islam, but also Canada, then the child won’t have any problem.” The anger expressed in Muslim focus groups around CVE programmes’ emphasis on women’s empowerment as mothers contrasted therefore with the ways in which both Muslim women

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and men talked of the importance of the mother in Muslim families. The problem was arguably not the CVE intervention itself, but also the intention and identity of the actor delivering the intervention, and its power relation to the community. This raises the relevance of questions of trust, highlighted at the start of this chapter. In a number of focus groups with Muslim women, first-generation immigrant mothers were singled out as having an even greater gap between them and their children due to language barriers and their failure to integrate into western societies. One male Muslim youth in a UK focus group referred to this as a “back home mentality”. Similarly, an older Muslim mother in the UK said, “Where I live, mums are fully uneducated. They come from villages, they don’t know English—they can’t write or read it. The dad is always at work, sons are on the streets—this is what I see daily. Girls are out all the time.” These participants and others linked the failure of these women to integrate into society to radicalisation. ‘Failed integration’ was one of the most frequent explanations for radicalisation among non-Muslim focus groups, despite a lack of clear academic evidence on the issue, but a lot of government discussion of this in the European countries studied (France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK). Attempts to categorise extremism cannot ignore the fact that individuals involved in extremist behaviour have varied widely in age, socio-economic status, literacy levels, occupation and past criminal records (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Yet focus groups often gave rise to expression of divisions within communities, whether divisions of age and generation gaps, or in relationships to immigration, belonging and citizenship. These divisions sometimes led to responsibilisation directed at particular others, albeit sharing the same faith. The participants’ understandings show the challenges with CVE and radicalisation research that is focused primarily on dissuading individuals, rather than macro-level change. Here individuals are trying to reconcile what is demonstrated at the structural level (large gaps in wealth or access to political power which do result in higher rates of terrorism) with a CVE language that tends to address the individual.

CVE Delivery Good practice suggests that CVE is most effective when those who deliver and design CVE are trusted and acting in the best interests of the communities they engage with. Although third parties, such as charities, think

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tanks and local civil society organisations often deliver and work with government CVE programmes, CVE is mostly seen as a state-led and state-­ run endeavour (see Pearson 2020 for a discussion of an exception to this in women’s participation). This state-centrism in CVE creates a number of challenges given the perception of a hostile environment created by public discourses on Violent Extremism that are believed to be supported by governments and state actors. Specifically, police forces across the countries were identified as problematic actors in CVE, and governments as pushing ulterior agendas. Police In the UK, recent statistics suggest trust in the police in the 16–24 age range is high: 77 per cent for Asian youth, 77 per cent for white and 68 per cent for black Britons (UK Government 2018). Nonetheless, Muslim communities’ confidence in the police has often been shaken, across all the countries studied, due to fears of racial profiling (Ontario Human Rights Commission 2017; Codaccioni 2018; Pieters 2017). The police came under particular attack from a number of research participants across Muslim focus groups and their role in CVE delivery was challenged. There was no articulation of a desired role for the police in CVE, whether in countries where police already deliver the majority of interventions or not. Participants had concerns due to both past negative experience with the police and apprehension about the possible negative consequences of any reports of radicalisation made to them. In our focus groups, young people least trusted them, with teenagers in particular recording negative experiences and a lack of respect for the police. Given the perception of radicalisation as a youth problem, this is of concern. Conversely, research participants in their 60s were more likely to express positive views. They were also the age demographic most likely to express the view that mothers should monitor their children in order to report radicalisation. This view declined with younger participants. A key reason for lack of trust within Muslim communities was the failure of police to protect young people, or to adequately respond to reported cases of radicalisation. Negative experiences have had consequences for people’s willingness to engage the police in the future, particularly where people had reported extremism, and felt they had fulfilled all that could have been asked of them, but the police had failed to address these issues appropriately. Dutch focus groups had experienced

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the greatest loss of youth from their communities to Daesh and were the most cynical and despondent regarding police ability to support them: I know a few boys, boys from the street, coffee shop and all of a sudden, they were gone. Some parents went to the police for help, but nothing happened. Nobody helped them. A couple of parents themselves went along to the police stations to report that those children are leaving. Why is nothing being done? —[Comments from older Muslim men in the same group discussion, the Netherlands] Many of the parents report it, but little is done with the report. We also try to report those kinds of signals but that is also not picked up very well. I think it is the worst for the parents. Children do something that they believe in themselves, but the parents feel powerless. —[Young Muslim woman, the Netherlands]

In one interview, regarding the case of the youth from the Netherlands who had been killed in Syria, his father asserted that he had contacted the authorities regarding his fears for his son. He felt let down: I warned the authorities, police and municipality. I asked for help. My boy was radicalising, it was no secret. They didn’t do anything. One day the police came home and asked if he wanted to give up his passport. He didn’t want to do that and provided the excuse that he needs his passport to identify himself in the street, because he didn’t have an ID [card]. The police bought it and walked away. The next day [my son] came home from the hairdresser’s shaved and without a beard. I knew he was planning something. —[Middle-aged Muslim man, the Netherlands]

As discussed earlier in relation to mothers, parents also acknowledged the negative repercussions of engaging the police, in terms of losing the trust of their children. In the case of ‘Lotte’ (a pseudonym), a young convert girl radicalised to Daesh in the Netherlands, her mother had gone to the police. However, when later confronted with the reality of reporting her daughter, she backed down. This might be difficult for others to understand, yet the episode reveals the complexity and conflicting emotions facing mothers of recruits to Daesh: I phoned the police to ask for help. The response was, she is 18. She is allowed to travel alone. Shortly after, two police officers stood in front of my

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door, “We are planning to arrest your daughter to research whether she wants to join a terrorist organisation.” What do you have to do as a mother? Immediately deny. —[Lotte’s mother, the Netherlands]

There was therefore a clear trust gap between communities and the police, which constituted an obstacle to CVE aimed at encouraging the reporting of radicalisation. This was worst in those cases in the Netherlands where people had in fact reported concerns and yet received no help. In the UK, this trust gap was also historic. The legacy of ‘Project Champion’, the installation of hundreds of surveillance cameras in two predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods in Birmingham in 2010 had had a long-term impact. This conversation is between two British Muslim women: Yes, these programmes for me are a little bit scary. I felt a bit scared because you can be judged when you have not done anything, under Prevent. It makes us paranoid. …You have to remember when they had a camera in local places to make sure that there is no extremism. Why do that? If you do not want people to think that Muslims are targeted, then why put that into people’s head? You feel like you are monitored more. —[Middle-aged Muslim women, England]

Here we see how behaviours that in themselves are not ‘risky’ or extreme become viewed as such, when combined with particular socio-­ demographic and geographic identities. The particular example of Project Champion has been widely criticised both in the internal police review that was conducted as a result of the public outcry and by local government officials who also felt misled about the purpose of the cameras (Isakjee and Allen 2013; Brown 2020). Government As outlined in the introduction to this section, attitudes of Muslim research participants to their government were mainly sceptical on the subject of CVE. In countries with long-term CVE programmes, such as the UK, this was due to negative experiences and the continued belief, despite many changes to policy, that these policies and approaches were still alienating Muslim communities. There was a broad demand for greater sensitivity, as one young Muslim man in the UK said:

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You have got credible organisations…doing good work and even they have been called spies and agents of the government and this can destroy the trust in community. The government is using the same terminology as the media. They need to be sensitive towards the community they are introducing Prevent to. —[Young Muslim man, England]

Politicians and the government were widely perceived as at best ineffective. Antipathy to CVE projects has long been noted in research with Muslim communities and the findings here are no different. Again, younger age groups were the most hostile, particularly those in their 20s and 30s, expressing feelings that politicians broadly were Islamophobic.

Conclusion Muslim focus group participants here revealed their understanding of CVE as highly gendered. They see CVE as implementing gendered policy objectives and practices; often they believe this implementation takes place regardless of the views of its ‘partner’, Muslim communities and without sensitivity to the milieu. The knowledge generated by communities about CVE helps us evaluate the degree to which CVE is both effective and accountable. We see gender being mobilised in CVE in ways consistent with the literature: first, Muslim women’s roles are assumed, and they are seen as available to be utilised by the state (even when the women are located in the private sphere); second, CVE practices were understood to attempt to undermine existing patriarchal structures in the home, but not to the benefit of women; and third, CVE is clearly both personal, in targeting families and women’s role within them, and political, in its broader objectives. This chapter has set out some of the key problems with CVE interventions targeting women in Muslim communities, focusing on the surprising number of shared stories from different cities across all five research countries, despite each employing a different CVE approach. The findings are not straightforward. There are clear tensions in responses, which are frequently contradictory. Narratives of empowerment to western ideals were resisted; and yet some focus group participants suggested it was the ‘unintegrated other’, the ‘back home’ immigrants within their own community who perhaps constitute the biggest vulnerability, and

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who needed both integration and empowerment. Fathers’ engagement was sought; yet even working women suggested mothers had most contact with children. Participants sought to distance themselves from issues of extremism, while also expressing anxiety over them, and frequently describing first-hand personal knowledge of them. Such complex feelings are generated by CVE, by government responses to terror, by society, the media and from within communities themselves and require greater understanding. Further research is needed to explore these tensions particularly in the post-Daesh context, in which there is ambivalence regarding CVE and resistance to this, even where its aims are acknowledged as potentially beneficial. CVE interventions are in their infancy. Future programmes should constantly reflect on the relevance of the ‘maternalist logic’, and the applicability of engaging particularly mothers as allies. Understanding the gender dynamics of countering extremism entails shifting the focus from what the state thinks women can give and do, and instead listening to women and men’s contributions in reshaping the ongoing effects of the discourse of the War on Terror, and their own futures. While women and men recognise that mothers have an important role in families, and women want support to influence CVE in the public space, there was much suspicion over current interventions. This chapter began with a discussion of the importance of trust in relations between citizen and state. The findings outline the ways in which trust is often absent in community engagement regarding CVE. A key perception among Muslim participants is that CVE blanket targets them. This is resented and potentially undermines positive gendered CVE work. In countries such as the UK and the Netherlands, with over a decade of history of CVE programmes, scepticism among Muslims was highest. The tentative conclusion formed here is that opposition to the role of women was, in fact, a reflection of resistance to CVE in any form. Further research is required, specifically focused on comparing groups which have received CVE programming with those that haven’t. This would provide further validation. However, it seems not that work with Muslim women—and men—is not wanted, or needed; simply that it needs to engage women in ways they desire, and on their terms. These themes are continued in the next chapter, in which trust with institutions is also a key issue. This chapter considers factors driving the far right, radical right and right-wing populism.

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CHAPTER 7

The Far Right and Gender

So far this book has primarily dealt with countering violent extremism and gender as it relates to the issue of jihadist extremism. There are two key reasons for this: first, policymakers in western contexts are focused on violent jihadist extremism as the main security threat. The UK’s counter-­ terrorism strategy CONTEST, the French Defence and National Security Strategic Review, Canada’s 2017 Public Report on the Public Threat to Canada, Germany’s Verfassungsschutzbericht 2017 and the Netherlands’ National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016–2020 all name Islamist, jihadist or ‘Islamic’ (a term used in France) terrorism as the key priority. Second, violent Islamist and jihadist actors have ensured they maintain this risk level. They have carried out successful attacks on western targets, such as the coordinated attacks of 13 November 2015  in Paris; they have also travelled in large numbers to join Daesh, and some 5000 men and women have emigrated from Europe to Syria and Iraq. Finally, there remains the possibility of violence due to the return of at least some of those actors. They have both participated in and been exposed to systemised violence and brutality and this implies a significant potential risk on reintegration into their country of origin, should it accept them. However, in theory at least, the concept of violent extremism and strategies to counter or prevent it (P/CVE) applies to all ideologies, jihadist, religious, ethno-political, far left, environmental and far right. While Salafi-jihadism is prioritised in Europe and the countries studied in this research, the regional police organisation EUROPOL stated in its 2019 © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_7

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report that ethno-nationalist and separatist violence is the key terrorist threat in Europe as a whole (EUROPOL 2019, 7). Nor is Islamist or jihadist violent extremism the biggest threat in many countries, particularly when fatalities or violent incidents are considered. For instance, Freilich et al. (2014) noted that the United States (US) Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) recorded more than 370 homicide incidents by far right supporters in the US between 1990 and 2010, with approximately 35 per cent of these lone actor attacks (p. 376). Since then concern about attacks has grown. US government data additionally show fatalities from far right attacks exceeded those caused by jihadist extremists in ten years between September 2001 and 2016 (US Government Accountability Office 2017, 4). In August 2017, the murder of a counterdemonstrator at a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, US, and the attack in London on the Finsbury Park Mosque, which killed one person, began to draw increased western attention to violence by the far right. Since then other high-profile attacks include the murder of 51 worshipers at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019, the shooting of two people in an attack on a synagogue in Halle, Germany, on 9 October 2019 and the murder of nine people in another attack in Germany in February 2020, this time at a shisha bar in Hanau. Far right or—in these contexts—ultra-nationalist violence is also a security issue in India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Greece, Hungry and Ukraine. As far right attacks attract attention, so too does violence by the far left. Globally, CVE is not simply a question of violent jihadism. Most importantly for this study, far right and nationalist violence is predominantly male; so too is the demographic supporting political parties on the broader right, populist, radical right and anti-Islam(ist) and white nationalist parties (Copsey 2010; Goodwin 2013; Treadwell and Garland 2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Gender in academic discussion of white nationalism can differ from that on the jihad, as many authors emphasise the importance of masculinities in radicalisation to the far right. Policy and mainstream discourse increasingly frame the far right within a discourse of ‘toxic masculinity’, which can oversimplify debate (Pearson 2019b). Michael Kimmel has documented how men involved in white supremacist groups can use them as a resource, compensating for feelings of emasculation. This connects into wider themes such as globalisation, as well as personal grievances (Kimmel 2003, 2007, 2018). Nationalist groups have also mobilised around conservative gender norms, in particular regarding

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women’s sexual purity as a matter of racial honour, and extolling the virtues of women as mothers and reproducers of the race (Yuval-Davis 1996; Sarnoff 2012). The five countries studied in this book are each aware that extremism comes in many forms. For Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, it is the far or extreme right that is identified to be the secondary threat to national security. In the UK, the far right is recognised as a ‘growing’ threat, while terrorism related to Northern Ireland remains a ‘serious’ risk to national security (Home Office 2018, 19). Canada has suggested extreme right activists are a key threat, predominantly online (Goodale 2017). The Netherlands has for some time noted the significance of the far right as a growing problem (Netherlands Government 2016). Our study is however missing data on the far right from the Netherlands due to difficulties in gathering focus groups to discuss the subject. It is not the intention of this book to further reify associations of (violent) extremism with Islamism or Islam. The findings already presented challenge assertions of a necessary connection between the two. Chapters 5 and 6 explored Muslim communities’ responses in each of the countries studied to the persistent framing of Islam through a security lens and subjected this framing to critique. Nor is the book an exhaustive study of violent extremism per se, considering a multiplicity of ideologies. The research that formed the basis of this book was initially predicated on state risk perceptions, and the idea of a possible reciprocal connection between two particular ideologies and their activities: jihadism and the far right. The far right however became a secondary aspect of the research due to the methodological difficulties outlined in Chap. 4. This chapter begins with a brief consideration of the theory underlying any research on the far right, more frequently now the umbrella term used by some analysts and the media to address underlying nationalist, xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiment and activism in Europe and beyond. This chapter addresses the problem of discerning where the boundary lies for policymakers interested in countering the far right, given the lack of theoretical agreement on what the far right is, how it might be subdivided or how it differs from legitimate right-wing politics, particularly in an age of radical right populism (Mudde 2007). This chapter then presents the findings from focus groups with non-Muslim participants, in areas with past issues of far right activism. These evidence the prevalence of fears about the risks of immigration to gender equality in community groups who say they oppose the far right, and the possibility of resonance therefore of far right ideas. At the heart of these fears are insecurities generated

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through everyday encounters with ‘others’ and the perceived failure of institutional responses to this. This chapter therefore contributes to the key argument of this book, that the work to be done to counter violent extremism is in communities. This must involve both listening to fears and responding to them in ways that satisfy communities, yet robustly challenge racism. That task therefore requires clear moral leadership. This chapter also emphasises the need for CVE to take an intersectional approach to gender, engaging in gendered work with not just women, but also men, and considering race, faith and class.

Defining the Far Right Terminology is one of the key difficulties for understanding and indeed preventing current activism on the far right (Gattinara 2016; Mudde 1995, 2007). White supremacist, anti-government, anti-immigrant and anti-globalisation protests and politics in Europe and the Americas are often spoken of under the umbrella term ‘the far right’. Both journalists and academics often use terms such as ‘far’, ‘extreme’ or ‘alt’ right interchangeably. It is almost impossible to speak of a ‘far right’, because the term represents a diverse landscape, populated by multiple heterogeneous actors, ideas and social movements. The far right scene is often understood as neo-Nazi or white supremacist in ideology, although not all supporters are ‘biological’ racists. To some degree the difficulty in creating definitional boundaries within the far right movement—if this can even be said to exist—genuinely represents the actual fluidity of actors, who shift between diverse views and groups (Goodwin 2013). Additionally there is disagreement about the existence of a ‘new’ far right, and whether anti-­ Islam(ist) groups represent an evolution of the ‘old’ racist far right, or are new because they are focused on cultural difference. Mudde (2007) distinguishes the far (or extreme) right from radical right populism. There are five core features of the far right: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, an anti-democratic stance and belief in the need for a strong state (Mudde 1996). The far right is therefore understood as inherently undemocratic, its supporters upholding ideologies of white supremacy. Radical right populism meanwhile encompasses three important belief systems: nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007). Nativism represents state preference of particular groups identified by citizenship, or through race; authoritarianism concerns a preference for anti-­democratic, militarist state tendencies; populism describes how ‘ordinary’ people of any ideology identify as ‘pure’ and ‘real’, in contrast to ‘corrupt elites’.

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In this book we use the term far right with an understanding that it describes anti-democratic and racist/white supremacist groups which Mudde characterises as the extreme right. We prefer the term far right, as the label extreme is increasingly amorphous, as discussed in Chap. 5. We use the term right-wing populism to describe groups or parties that Mudde classifies as radical right populists. These groups do not explicitly mobilise around anti-democratic or white supremacist ideologies, even as whiteness is incorporated into their value systems; this term would therefore incorporate radical right movements that oppose Islam(ism) but do not openly support racial supremacy, such as the EDL in the UK. During the research itself we used the term far right, as it had the greatest audience recognition; however, we deliberately left the term open as we wanted to establish how focus group participants understood this. We were interested in fact in wider issues, of the radical right (opposed to Islam and Islamism specifically), the alt-right and the attraction of right-wing (radical right) populism and responses to the politics of Geert Wilders or Marine Le Pen, for instance. This is discussed below.

Gender, Women and the ‘Old’ Far Right It is the importance of the biological reproduction of race that has made gender, and particularly women, so important within what can be thought of as ‘traditional’ far right racist groups. Study of gender, fascism and the far right has grown in the past three decades, although primary source research remains scant and limited to particular contexts. For instance, Kathleen Blee has written extensively on women in neo-Nazi groups in America (see Blee 1996 and Blee and Deutsch 2012), and there is much literature on Germany. Other countries remain under-researched (Blee and Creasap 2010; Blee and Linden 2012). Feminist authors have explored both extreme ideologies and nationalist violence and have shown nationalist beliefs and actions depend on strongly contrasting gender roles. Men’s roles are read as protective towards the physically weaker women and children (Peterson 1994). Men and women are related to one another not just through a ‘protector/protected’ relationship, but through the importance of their shared origins, a mythical ‘Homeland’, defined through understandings of shared blood and kinship (Pin-fat and Stern 2005; McClintock 1991 cited in Nagel 1998). Nativist nationalist ideologies tend to position men and women differently in relation to the public space of the Homeland, with women’s domestic roles prioritised (Elshtain 1987). Fascist groups have focused on women’s reproductive capacity and fertility, in order not to be ‘out-bred’ (Félix 2015), a role that continues with

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the white supremacist idea of the ‘great replacement’ of the white race by immigrant populations in Europe. However, within this framework, authors note that motherhood is far from a secondary role. Fascist groups have valued mothers as an active constituency, and women responded by mobilising around the idea of maternalism as a role endowing status (Sarnoff 2012; Seghal 2012). Durham (1998) emphasises that fascism should not be seen as exclusive to men, nor as entirely misogynist. Instead, fascist movements and parties can exhibit a tension between the ideological place for women, and their actual presence within the group (Durham 1998). Of particular importance is the task of perpetuating the biological nation, by producing children. Motherhood is framed as an acceptable role through which women can access political participation in both fascist and nationalist groups. This emphasis on motherhood is evidenced in work on women and the far right from a variety of global contexts. In their work on the American far right, Blee and Creasap (2010) note that women can willingly adopt a subordinate place in the gender hierarchy. Scrivens (2018) has explored how in the Canadian women’s forum of the neo-Nazi Internet site Stormfront women define their own roles through a shared sisterhood. For them, motherhood is not a support role, but a primary mode of activism. Mattheis (2018) has parallel findings in her work on far right libertarian groups. Yuval-Davis et  al. (2005) also emphasise women’s symbolic importance to nationalist groups. Women become emblems of ethnic or national difference. Also, women must actively support group ideology, and men’s violent struggle. As such, nationalist groups have operated according to a form of honour code, with women’s moral conduct and purity important to the group, but vulnerable to enemy men. Women’s moral status becomes a signifier of in-­ group dominance (Nagel 1998). Nationalist groups more broadly have tended to act with hostility to any blurring of the boundaries between men’s and women’s roles, seeing conservative norms as fundamental to ideology.

Gender and the ‘New’ Far Right Discussion of a ‘new’ far right dates back to the 1990s. Bjørgo (1995) identified the growth of a ‘new’ fascism in a fresh fascination with ideas of “people, blood and soil” (p.  2). Griffin (1991) too saw the 1990s as a period in which fascism was resurgent, noting a new “…militarism, racism,

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charismatic leadership, populist nationalism, fears that the nation or civilization as a whole was being undermined by the forces of decadence, deep anxiety about the modern age and longings for a new era to begin” (p. 6). Griffin sees fascism as a “palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism”, centred on a mythic nativist discourse. At the centre of this vision of nation is a frequently racially defined claim to the rights of citizenship, and the exclusion of racial ‘others’. This is again predicated upon the division of roles for men and for women. The ideologies of many of the new ultra-nationalist groups transnationally echo those of twentieth-century fascism, both in gendered terms and more broadly. Racially motivated ultra-nationalism can feed conspiracy theories about the role of powerful elites (frequently identified by extremists as Cultural Marxists, Jews and Liberals), understood to run society, often through secret clubs, for their own interests and not for the greater good. Such beliefs provide justification for a persecution or victimisation complex, or the belief in a race war. In Greece the group Golden Dawn represents an ultra-nationalist political party seeking national rebirth through a chosen racial group (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). Members have been involved in anti-immigrant violence and vigilante actions. Activists are predominantly male, and they adhere to an ideology in which women’s role as mothers is key (Ellinas 2013; Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2017). They are one of a number of political parties, grassroots movements and Internet cultures that represent an evolution of the ‘old’ far right. The Rassemblement National in France regards gender difference as ‘essential’, natural and God-given, and the Movement for a Better Hungary, also known as Jobbik, believe women have a traditional yet important role (Félix 2015; Lesselier 1991). While Ignazi (1992) has described fascism as the ‘only’ ideology of right-wing extremism, a number of authors suggest the current global situation regarding the radical, extreme or far right is more complex. The variety of actors is increasing, with the so-called counter-jihad, opposing Islam and Islamism, ‘alt-right’, identitarian and ‘incel’ movements (which stands for ‘involuntarily celibate’ men) (Nagle 2016) just a few of the new additions, sharing some overlaps with the wider existing scene. Groups are constantly evolving. To some degree, authors suggest it is appropriate to think of a separation of groups as ‘old’ and ‘new’, although this is contested by some scholars as well as participants in movements themselves (Busher 2015; Pilkington 2016). ‘Old’ groups are generally seen to have an explicitly fascist, racist or neo-Nazi ideology. ‘New’ groups have

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emerged to specifically counter ‘new’ perceived threats such as Islam and Islamism; they mobilise using the Internet; or they identify as identitarian (EUROPOL 2018). Gattinara (2016), in an overview of the literature, noted the far right shifting to target groups that are ‘culturally’ incompatible, including Muslims. For Gattinara this is merely a narrative turningpoint from assertions of racial inferiority. Changes to the gendered strategies and values outlined in the previous section have however been one factor in the emergence of discussion of a ‘new’ far right. Considering gender in group ideologies reveals key differences however between ‘old’ and ‘new’ right-wing movements (Pilkington 2016, 2017; Busher 2015; Pearson 2020). New movements, identified as the ‘radical right’, focus on opposition to Islam and Islamism and mobilise around the promotion of gender equality and human rights, not the restriction of women in domestic roles (Pilkington 2016). Supporters of the early transnational counter-jihad were part of a loose, post-9/11, movement based on the key criterion of opposition to the perceived Islamisation of the West, and all that entailed for non-Muslim women (Meleagrou-Hitchens 2013). Their first formal global event was the 2007 Copenhagen conference ‘The UK and Scandinavia Counter-Jihad Summit’, with the theme, ‘Stop the Islamization of Denmark (SIAD)’. Since then women have adopted leadership roles in a number of emergent movements, discussed below. Both ‘old’ and ‘new’ far right groups however propagate hateful and harmful racist rhetoric. Gender, the Far Right and Mainstreaming In Canada, France, Germany and the UK, we talked to non-Muslim focus groups about extremism, to understand the far right. Many noted the prevalence of the far right. But others talked more about what is better understood as the radical right (anti-Islam(ist) sentiment) and right-wing populism. There are a variety of new modern movements that sit somewhere between definitions of far right and right-wing populism, in part because of their gendered stance. For instance, Richard Spencer is acknowledged as the father of the socalled alt-right, a movement which developed from the online space, where many American libertarians support it (SPLCenter 2018). Spencer coined the term the ‘alternative right’ in 2008 and in 2010 mobilised around it on issues of the ‘preservation’ of ‘western civilisation’ (again, against Muslim and non-­white others) and white identity (SPLCenter n.d.). Followers are typical of the lack of ideological purity of much of the

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‘new’ right, in that they move between opposition of the EU, Islam, feminism, globalisation, Zionism and immigrants, while accepting as leaders individuals who might represent aspects of what they oppose (Berger 2018). This is a radical new movement, young, net-based and pushing back against many of the fundamental aspects of the American constitution and of modern life. Yet this is also a movement in which there have been high-profile women leaders, such as Canadian Lauren Southern and the British Tara McCarthy. While supporting patriarchal gender norms and resisting feminism through what Mattheis (2018) terms an ‘alt-maternalism’, these women—whose status is a direct result of their benefits from feminism— also struggle with the pushback and abuse they receive for their high profile from men within the movement. In video interviews, they attest to the tensions between the ideals they espouse and the paradox of their being visible, unmarried and childless, and at the forefront of the movement (Mattheis 2018). The alt-right is also opposed to multiculturalism, racial equality, political correctness and the free press. Here it differs from many groups which use the counter-jihad banner. Instead Hawley (2017) writes: The Alt-Right is not just radical because it is racist—racism can be found in the ranks of many political ideologies. The Alt-Right’s radicalism is also apparent in the degree to which it rejects other basic American values. Because it rejects both liberty and equality as ideals, it is difficult to compare the Alt-Right to most mainstream political movements.

It is a new phenomenon, he suggests, because of its net-savviness and its ideological incoherence with the old white supremacism of the past. Its main propaganda outlet, the Daily Stormer, highlights issues of race, gender and multiculturalism and seeks to challenge equality across each of these terrains. Posts are virulently anti-Semitic, anti-feminist and anti-­ liberal. Some authors hold the alt-right to be no more than a small group, similar to the 969 Movement in Myanmar (Burmese Buddhists), or Blood and Honour in the UK. However, the transnational popularity of the altright online through memes and blogs leads others to describe it as a movement, and one that is growing in popularity. Other movements are growing in its wake with a transnational identitarian scene evident in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and beyond. This movement is white supremacist in nature, anti-liberal, and asserts the importance of an ethno-nationalist and biological foundation to western culture (Generation Identity 2018).

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Still other small groups are emerging which prove hard to categorise and combine elements of both the old and the new. For instance, the American group the ‘Proud Boys’ was recently classified as an ‘extreme’ group by the FBI (Proud Boys USA 2018; Wilson 2018). It describes its members as “western chauvinists” defined as “noun: 1. a person displaying aggressive or exaggerated patriotism” (Proud Boys USA 2018). The group is open to all races, and all faiths, but only to men although women can join their ‘girls’ group. Gender politics and opposition to feminism are a keystone of the movement, which states, “we long for the days when ‘girls were girls and men were men’.” While espousing ‘openness’ and an opposition to racism, the group is also opposed to immigration and again regards western culture as superior, and at threat from outsider ‘others’. Perhaps crucially, the boundaries between the alt-right, radical right anti-Islamism and counter-jihad and a more mainstream right-wing populism are more blurred than ever (Berger 2018). Populism is ‘contagious’, forcing more mainstream parties to make a rhetorical shift to meet populist opponents, in order to compete (Pappas 2016). Political scientists have long been charting the emergence of populist and radical right parties across Europe and note that, like the far or extreme right, they predominantly appeal to men (Mudde 2007; Givens 2004). Again, like the far right, which has campaigned on the narrative of the rape of non-Muslim women by Muslim men, right-wing populist groups also often focus on issues around women’s bodies—opposing abortion for instance (Givens 2004). Authors suggest women may be deterred from voting for right-­ wing populist groups due to: their sometimes violent image; women’s absence from the core demographic supporting such groups, for example, blue-collar workers; and the importance of feelings of masculine insecurity to male voters choosing populism as a reassertion of men’s rights (Mayer 2013; Betz 1994 cited in Givens 2004, 33; Kimmel 2003; Ford and Goodwin 2014). However, with a new generation of radical women leaders, the situation may well be changing, as in France under Marine Le Pen (Mayer 2013). Since the research period covered by this book in 2015–2016, there has been a rise of right-wing populist power in Europe, in America and in India and Brazil. In what was widely regarded as a vote for the populist right, Donald Trump was elected to the role of President of the US in November 2016. Trump has a broad support base and appeals not just to many Republicans, but also to many of those active in the alt-right, far right and radical right or counter-jihad (Berger 2018; Pearson 2019). In

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May 2017 voters in French presidential elections were faced with a choice between Marine Le Pen of the Front National, now the Rassemblement National, standing on an anti-immigration platform which also challenged the possibility of Islamic integration with French cultural values, and Emmanuel Macron, an independent centrist candidate who would go on to become President (Chrisafis 2017). In April 2018 Hungary swore in new President Viktor Orban, following a campaign focused on a nationalist agenda and the issue of Muslim immigration (Ahmed 2018). Orban has openly praised parties on the far right, such as Golden Dawn in Greece, which mobilises around an explicitly xenophobic agenda and has entered the mainstream in Greek politics and parliament (Tipaldu and Katrin 2018). In June 2018, Italy swore in a new prime minister with an explicitly right-wing populist agenda, firmly aimed at reducing immigration and opposed to the European Union (CNN 2018). The role of the Internet and influence of potential antagonistic state actors such as Russia are also seen as a factor in the ‘populist moment’. Brubaker (2017) suggests that the ‘populist moment’ western democracies are experiencing is not simply a vertical question of the people versus an out-of-touch elite. More importantly, the moment is horizontal, leveraging issues of ‘insider’-‘outsider’ politics, amidst a perfect storm of political events constructed in both media and policy as ‘crises’, from the migration crisis to financial crises, the refugee crisis to ‘terrorism as crisis’ (Brubaker 2017). At the policy level, conversations about far right extremism increasingly touch on the growth of right-wing populism, and like ‘extremism’, the term ‘populism’ is frequently used pejoratively. The effect of this is to delegitimise those supportive of populist groups, and the issues they address. The range of groups considered to cross the cordon sanitaire is growing. The UK’s anti-EU party UKIP, for instance, is discussed in a 2016 report on the state of the far right in Britain after the Brexit vote, and the ‘mainstreaming’ of extremist ideas (Feldman and Stocker 2016). Some people consider right-wing populism as the thin end of a far right wedge. Participants in this research were aware of this and it framed their responses. Increasingly the lines between ‘extreme’ ideology and mainstream belief are blurred. This is perhaps most evident in the gendered components of the populist agenda, which focuses on immigration as a specific threat to gender equality as well as women’s sexual security, both through risk to ‘in-group’ women and ‘other’ women, who are oppressed by ‘their’ men (Meret and Siim 2013, 79). These arguments rely on racialised

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stereotypes and the hypersexuality of ‘other’ men (Amar 2011; Puar and Rai 2002; Mattheis 2018). They are demonstrated with preoccupations over, for instance, the veil and hijab, female genital mutilation (FGM), grooming scandals, crimes of rape, clashes of gender norms between refugees and citizen populations (Mayer 2013; Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). Right-wing populist groups place liberal values in a position of tension with traditions of multiculturalism, and as Akkerman and Hagelund (2007) note, in a number of European countries the triumph of liberal values leaves little room for immigrant culture.

Drivers of Radicalisation to the Far Right Before we turn to the findings of the focus groups, it is worth considering the literature on far right radicalisation. The term radicalisation is more common in terrorism studies than fascism studies, and there is a larger literature within terrorism studies on radicalisation to violent Islamism; however, the term is becoming applied more often to the radical or far right. Studies of both movements focus on radicalisation not simply as a process, but one with an ‘end-point’ representative of transformation. Authors, as outlined in Chap. 2, suggest a number of factors of radicalisation, including relative deprivation, youth, discrimination, the appeal of extreme ideology and a false understanding of Islam. While Islamist and jihadist radicals are presented as essentially ideological, far right radicalisation is frequently depicted as the open expression of hate, mindless stupidity, ignorance, racism or anger (see, for instance, Pai and Zephaniah 2016). This is in part because, in contrast to Islamist-jihadist VE, far right VE is not always governed by a coherent and sustained campaign of terror or a single ideology. The majority of far right VE is categorised as ‘high-­ frequency lower level acts of violence’, essentially criminality encompassing physical assault and intimidation, as well as racial, religious or politically motivated murders (Goodwin and Briggs 2012; Ramalingam 2014). People associated with the English Defence League, Polish neo-Nazis and Blood and Honour are known to have deliberately used violence against immigrant targets (Counter-Extremism Project n.d.; BBC News 2018; Melnychenko 2019). However, due to the nature of this type of violence (low impact and disjointed), and the impacts of institutional bias and racism, far right VE has not historically triggered the same political and media responses as jihadist VE in a western context.

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This is also because of the ways in which race functions around discourses of radicalisation. Whiteness itself is embedded into the structures of discussions about racialised violence and violent extremism. Just as gender is not simply about women, nor is race only about those who are not white, even while whiteness within majority white demographics is often invisible. Gender dynamics affect everyone; so too do dynamics of race, and in different ways. As Frankenberg (1993, 1) has noted, “…white people and people of color live racially structured lives…White people are ‘raced’, just as men are ‘gendered’.” In her tract on the American experience of the ‘diversity rationale’, ‘White Like Me’, Osamudia James (2014) describes the ways in which race and colour are often elided, the white experience held as normative and ‘transparent’. White identity, unlike black identity, is the ‘standard’ and, because of its power, can be taken for granted and rendered invisible. In particular, as discussed in Chap. 2, the Orientalism and racism of the War on Terror have had raced implications for the application of the term radicalisation to the far right. This has various further implications. In particular, as discussed in Chap. 1, the concept of radicalisation is politicised and accused of targeting particular communities. A simple transposition of CVE responses from jihadism to the far right risks transposing the same set of problems, and targeting particular marginalised groups of men, this time, white and working class, although white supremacy is seen across classes (Amar 2011; Busher 2015; Pearson 2019). Some authors nonetheless draw parallels between the violent far right and other forms of terrorism. Blee has been a proponent of the inclusion of extreme right violence as ‘terrorism’, not crime (Blee 2008). Indeed, also arguing for inclusion, authors note that not only incidents of ‘domestic terrorism’, many of which are right-­ wing, constitute the majority of global terror events, but that the extreme right has much in common with the defining transnational feature of ‘new’ terrorist groups. Goodwin (2013), for example, has explored the transnational nature of linked-in ‘defence’ movements, arising from shared political issues across western countries. Europol recognises extreme right defence groups as a threat that transcends borders (EUROPOL 2018). Additionally, populist leadership figures from a President such as Donald Trump, to Tommy Robinson, who founded the English Defence League, have a broad appeal across borders. Robinson has support in the UK where he is based, in the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders has been active in his defence, and in the US, where he has been invited to speak (Wired UK 2018; Evening Standard 2018).

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The academic literature has drawn parallels between factors of radicalisation towards both the violent jihad and counter-jihad (van der Valk 2013). Themes of social exclusion, difficulties at home, mistrust of authority and a need for belonging are as evident in accounts of pathways to both counter-jihad and far right groups as they are in those who join jihadist movements (van der Valk 2013). There are also issues for both of masculinities threatened by the social norm changes of globalisation and the need to reassert a robust ‘manhood’ (Popovski and Aslam 2012; Kimmel 2003; Connell 1991). For Busher, the EDL, for example, is “a vehicle through which activists can express an array of grievances” (Busher 2013, 80). Parallel themes can be identified in analysing pathways towards far right groups. For example, Croft suggests three mirrored themes: the need for narratives framed to resonate with the grievances of particular groups; the need for unifying practices; and the leaders or groups organising action (Croft 2011). Croft frames the comparison through a focus on individuals who mobilised to violent attack, for example, Anders Breivik, David Copeland, Timothy McVeigh, and asserts an explicit comparison between violent jihad and the extreme right, with a reminder that terrorism existed before violent jihadism. Nonetheless, care must be taken not to produce easy comparisons. Research by Pearson (2020) in the UK context notes that there are important gendered differences between different far or radical right groups, as well as differences between the far right and jihadism. These differences regard the possibility for women’s activism, and in which roles, as well as the variety of roles men occupy in relation to women in groups. Both the far right and jihadist groups however emerge as broadly patriarchal. We now turn to the findings on the far right, gender, VE and CVE. Focus groups on the far right began with a question on participant understandings of the terms extremism and radicalisation, as with Muslim focus groups discussing VE towards the jihad. For more on the methodology, see Chap. 4.

Findings Defining Extremism: Participant Understandings of the Far Right The ways in which people define and understand far right extremism impact on the likely success of measures aimed at working with communities to prevent it. Mirroring debate in the literature, non-Muslim focus

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group participants in different countries frequently had different conceptions of what constituted the far right. Participants used the terms ‘far’ and ‘extreme’ right interchangeably and to describe a range of groups. German respondents used the terms rechtsextrem and rechtsradikal to describe neo-­ Nazi groups (die Nationalistische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), for instance), but also in discussion of more mainstream parties and street movements mobilising politically around issues of migration and Islam (Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Pegida, HoGeSa). In France similarly, discussion around the far right focused on the now mainstream political party the Front National, which rebranded as Rassemblement National some two years after the research. However, across both Muslim and non-­ Muslim focus groups, a greater part of the conversation suggested societal and, in particular, institutionalised racism was the key issue for participants. In the UK, non-Muslim focus group discussions suggested the explicitly racist British National Party and also the anti-Islam(ist) and radical right mainly working-class white street movement the EDL were seen as the biggest problems. Canadian focus groups did not however name a specific ‘problem’ party or ‘problem group’. The Canadian research team conducted one interview with a supporter of a far right underground movement, and he suggested the far right was active in Canada and mobilising around issues of migration, the ‘fall of Europe’ and threats to women, all of which will be discussed in the following sections. As noted in Chap. 4, for non-Muslim—mainly white—communities in the UK and Canada, the lack of participant association of far right activity with the concepts of extremism and radicalisation posed a core difficulty for interviewers seeking to elicit ideas on how best to counter the far right. In Canada, interviewers did not raise the issue of the far right when participants spoke only about jihadist terrorism. This meant that two Canadian non-Muslim focus group discussions did not succeed in diverting from the subject of Islamism at all and findings represented here are therefore relatively sparse. As with focus groups in Muslim communities, all sessions with non-­ Muslim focus groups seeking to discuss VE to the far right and how to counter it began with questions on participant understandings of the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. All groups primarily linked the term radicalisation to Daesh and for three reasons: recent attacks by Daesh; the high-profile media association of Daesh with radicalisation; the association of particular forms of violence with terrorism. In the UK and Canada, responses in the non-Muslim focus groups suggested that, even

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in areas where there had been a high level of far right activity, or where nativist or ultra-nationalist parties had had success at the polls, it was difficult for people to frame activity on the far right as ‘extremism’. Conversation around extremism repeatedly centred on violent jihad, requiring interviewer/researcher intervention to direct discussion back to the topic of the far right. However, in Germany and France, participants did spontaneously discuss the far right as an instance of extremism. In one German focus group, a middle-aged non-Muslim woman suggested that the far right, far left and Daesh were instances of a cyclical “historical phenomenon”. German youth in the same location also responded to the question of what constituted extremism with the terms ‘exclusion’ and ‘racism’. In Germany in particular, non-Muslim focus group participants were acutely conscious of far right activities in their areas and beyond. For many, these were of greater concern than Daesh or the violent jihad, despite a media focus on jihadist extremism: From the numbers I’d say the right-wing is a bigger problem at the moment in Germany than Islam. [Laughs] I mean I don’t know that many attacks here by Islamists. But there are 1000s of attacks by the right on asylum homes. —[Young non-Muslim woman, Germany] You get more and more right-wing demonstrations, for example, against the refugees. Like there has been some violence against the police… and there was a fight with the police just three months ago in [another nearby city suburb]. —[Young non-Muslim woman, Germany]

Participants generally feared violence might escalate: So I would say—with this influx of refugees, there is definitely a radicalisation on the far right. More than 600 attacks on refugee homes, arson, etc.— that is ‘radicalisation’… and soon that might go beyond radicalisation to something more. —[Older non-Muslim man, Germany]

Reference to an “influx of refugees” has clear resonance with far right narratives, as well as serving as a rationale here for far right views. In France, although focus groups with non-Muslim participants independently raised the question of the far right, it was still the issue of violent jihad that dominated discussion of ‘extremism’. The following extract from a discussion is typical of the ways in which the two themes emerged

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and were typically gendered, with an expectation of male participation in far right activism. Researchers asked, what constitutes extremism? A: Marine Le Pen and those crazy Front National types. Also, people who’ve become Nazis. Creepy. B: I think of the news and Paris attacks. Jihadists… C: It’s terrible. It comes from this belief “life is hard” [la vie est dure]. Politics… some guys will do disgusting things because of politics. D: Guys who leave for Syria, attacks, people who got radicalised, that’s what I think about.

Indeed, with each fresh Daesh-inspired attack, all participants described a further entrenchment of associations of jihadism and Daesh with terrorism. This was recognised in all communities. All focus groups—Muslim and non-Muslim—recognised that the association had become automatic, and some described the ways in which that might be harmful. Nonetheless, they found these associations difficult to resist. A young non-Muslim woman participant in Canada admitted, “When we talk about radicalisation, I have just the Islamic State in my head.” In France, Daesh attacks were understood to feed support for the far right. One young non-Muslim man said, “…these attacks give people an excuse to say, ‘look at these people who lived in France and destroyed the country’ and as a consequence, it gives [Islam] a bad image and they find an excuse to vote Front National.” Participants made connections between terrorist attacks and wider public changes of attitude towards extremism. Participants in non-Muslim focus groups also believed particular violent tactics could be described as radicalisation, terrorism and extremism, others not. Respondents explicitly associated radicalisation with bombs or large-scale or multiple casualty attacks, likely to feature in the media. The far right, while perceived as an issue, posed a different sort of problem that they did not identify as extremism or terrorism, at this time. This view is seen in the remarks of another young French focus group participant who explained of the far right, “These people are not really radicalised. The extreme right-­wing is more like an ideology, there are no terrorist attacks involved, they just have disgusting ideas.” Here the participant emphasises the ideology of the far right, but until he sees a particular type of violence, this does not count as either terrorism or extremism. The majority of participants in non-Muslim focus groups across the board also appeared broadly ignorant of local authority, NGO, police

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attempts or other institutional attempts to address the far right. The exception to this were focus groups conducted in Germany. Youth participants referenced a series of interventions under the ‘Schulen Ohne Rassismus/Schools Without Racism’ scheme, which saw participating schools commit to encouraging pupils to combat racism and discrimination. For instance, schools had banned the Thor Steinar clothing brand, which has been popular with neo-Nazis. Schools also displayed a plaque to signal membership of the scheme (Schulen Ohne Rassismus 2018). However, some participants believed this scheme had little practical impact. Drivers of the Far Right Another feature of group discussion of the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ was not just a conceptual distinction between jihadist and far right activities, but also a perception of the two movements as manifestations of different drivers or factors and impulses. Mirroring the literature on radicalisation to far right violence, which Goodwin and Briggs (2012) suggest is underdeveloped when contrasted with work on Islamist radicalisation, participants suggested far right activism is motivated by more emotional factors, such as anger and ignorance, and racism, which unlike radicalisation is not seen as a process. Predominantly, and in line with findings of male dominance in the far right in the literature (Ellinas 2013; Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2017; Pilkington 2017; Kimmel 2018), participants also associated far right extremism with men. Some participants suggested the expression of anger, fear and insecurity in violence were explicitly white male responses to a failure to cope with difficult emotions, although they agreed that women were capable of “psychological support” for the far right. Examples focus groups produced of how women might be involved included non-violent activities such as “producing fliers”. Some participants suggested far right extremism results from less rational drivers than jihadist extremism. Participants frequently associated the far right with simple white male criminality. In contrast with the French discussion cited earlier as an example, participants broadly felt the far right lacked ideology, and its violence was more ‘everyday’. The infrequent yet visibly more sophisticated tactics of jihadist violence in terms of planning and weapons used (bombs, gun attacks) gave it a higher profile and importance than the more mundane violence of the far right, participants suggested. One older man in a UK non-Muslim focus group referred to the anti-Islam(ist) radical right movement the EDL as ‘football hooligans’.

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Others agreed. In fact, there is a subgroup within the EDL who did enter the movement through hooliganism (Pilkington 2016). However, the logical consequence was to de-emphasise or to some degree normalise the risk from the far right. Participants in the UK context in fact did agree, saying “we don’t take them seriously.” To some extent participants believed the far right simply represented something ‘natural’, albeit negative. A French male focus group participant in his 20s, for instance, said, “Être raciste c’est dans la nature humaine/Racism is part of human nature.” Another woman participant at a German focus group said she believed the far right came from, “…a great deal of insecurity. And that makes people fearful, and that turns into anger and hatred, hostility to other people.” For others, racism was about a lack of contact with or exposure to immigrants, and participants assumed that greater opportunities for interaction would act to improve understanding between groups. Discussion of anger, stupidity and criminality in the far right was linked here to white masculinity, without explicit reference to ‘whiteness’. This understanding of the far right as reactive, inherently less ideologically sophisticated, as “ignorant” or “disgusting”, to borrow phrases from participants and more akin to a normalised criminality or hooliganism than jihadist extremism were views also shared by the Muslim focus group participants, when the issue of the far right came up. Again the discussions did not explicitly centre on whiteness, or maleness, and participants discussed racist far right activism with both these attributes apparently assumed. Nor were discussions usually framed within organisational or structural understanding of white male power or privilege. As shown in Fig. 7.1, across all focus groups therefore data reflected the belief that motivations to the far right were far more likely to be seen as expressions of stupidity, lack of education, racism and criminality: I honestly think that if someone isn’t educated… these people are wrong in the head. They see dark skin. It’s just racism. And hate, they’d hate disabled people, ugly people, but that’s more in the East [of Germany]… They think people are taking their jobs—they’re ignorant and uncultured—they need to move their arses and just find work. —[Middle-aged Muslim woman, Focus Group, Germany]

These perceptions are also clearly raced and classed. As Ramalingam (2014, 8) points out “the assumption that far-right extremism is simply a normal male youth issue” had until recently been made by many states. In

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Far Right Extremism 12 13 14

Immigration and Foreigners

17 18 19 19 20

Individual Character/Stupidity Mentally Ill Identity, Belonging

24 Racism and Islamophobia 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

32 35

Fig. 7.1  Perceptions of factors driving far right extremism, Muslim and nonMuslim focus groups (frequency of mentions)

the UK context, racism has also been institutionally understood as a concern of particular ‘bigots’, rather than structurally constructed (Burnett 2017). In the focus groups, similarly, while jihadist violence was understood as systemic, ideological and structural—unacceptable—white male anger was regarded as individual, personal and outside of structural power hierarchies and practices. Participants located what they understood as non-white political violence in organisations and collectives, while white political violence was individualised through reference to particular manifestations of emotion. There was no understanding of white masculine anger as structurally located, as being related to expectations of masculinities, situated within hierarchies of power in which white men have an expectation of privilege (Kimmel 2013). A US study of race and racism in white participant groups also had similar findings, as Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000) noted, “Whites primarily think that racism is a belief that a few individuals hold and which might lead them to discriminate against some people” (p. 66). In effect, the phenomenon of white racism is individualised; meanwhile, white anger is normalised and non-white anger exceptionalised. Such framings are consistent with perceptions of white race as ‘transparent’ (James 2014; Gear Rich 2010; Frankenberg 1993). In our focus groups, however, white participants at times shared the same ideas as participants of colour about the origins of far right racism.

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The participant understandings of far right activism also echo media discourses, which consistently explain far right violence as individual rather than structural and systemic, linked to personal problems, or mental health issues, for instance (Abbas 2017; Awan and Zempi 2015; Meier 2020). These focus group understandings, wherever they come from, have clear implications for any community-based efforts to counter the far right, in terms of both who is likely to be seen as taking the lead (criminality suggesting a matter for the police) and how (more straightforwardly punitive approaches which are not focused on ideological counter-narratives). Participants in both Muslim and non-Muslim focus groups also differentiated between jihadism and the far right in terms of age demographics. While participants believed ‘youth’ was a factor in radicalisation to Daesh, older age was more often associated with the far right. This is to some degree consistent with the literature, although youth is also a target demographic for some far right groups (Abbas 2017; Basu cited in Fisher 2019). Participants suggested older people had failed to move with changing times, with the implication that their beliefs were in tension with modern norms and practices of, for instance, multiculturalism or diversity. This is interesting as it ignores the influence of the older generation of jihadists in radicalising youth—such as through grooming or as charismatic preachers, or through inspirational jihadist action of the past (such as joining groups fighting in the Balkans in the 1990s). In particular, participants across groups discussed the potentially radicalising impacts of global change on older white men. In the German context, participants also explicitly associated far right extremism with radical social change affecting the former East Germany since reunification. In line with academic work on masculinities, globalisation and extremism (Kimmel 2003, 2007; Connell 2004), participants believed far right activism was linked to—still—ongoing difficulties adapting to the post-communist era, the effects of globalisation and the ensuing changes to male status and employment: in essence, although not explicitly expressed as such, emasculation. One German mother in her 30s came from East Saxony in the former East Germany; she linked the far right to poverty and fear of change. Other German participants who came from the former East believed men were particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of broader social change, including the effects of competition for employment. Another woman suggested of her home town:

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For every eight men there, there are two women… [because] women have mostly moved away… They do their studies, get a good education… And these men simply stay behind, and you get more right-wing extremism… They stick around in these god-forsaken little villages, they’re not happy… by 4 pm they’ve opened the first beer… They write graffiti on bus-stops and somehow they’re just—apart from others. But that’s up to each one of them. They could leave. —[Middle-aged non-Muslim woman, Germany]

The importance of male status in radicalisation to the right was also discussed in France, by a minority of women. Echoing a debate from Muslim focus groups, one non-Muslim French focus group participant said, “We need to restore the place of the family, but be careful not to forget an important element, the father. Because in the name of a whole bunch of concepts, equality, etc., we have relegated the men, we have excluded them from society, excluded from their place in the family.” The discussion did not excuse men from violent responses to this exclusion, but suggested that building male resilience was an area where work to counter extremism could be fruitful. The restoration of the family noted here is a particularly interesting theme in the light of subsequent movements within the far right that have explicitly mobilised around visions of the traditional nuclear family. Such groups suggest feminism has contributed to male disposability; they therefore oppose—perceptions of a liberal white—feminism. Movements incorporating these views include the alt-right broadly, the so-called manosphere, or so-called incels and the Proud Boys specifically. The ‘restoration of the family’ narrative is also both classed and raced; maternalism has been weaponised in the context of the US, for instance, to assert middle-class norms, which rely on racial hierarchies. Neither poor nor black women have historically been able to ‘stay at home’ and perform idealised maternalist roles (Michel 2012; Mattheis 2018). It should be said that all non-Muslim focus groups expressed hostility to the far right and to racism, and felt that any form of normalisation of the issues that the far right represented, opposition to Islam for instance, was morally wrong. However, mostly they did not see these issues as within the purview of CVE, because they were not regarded as violent extremism. Germany was the exception to this case. However, in a number of non-Muslim focus groups, people also discussed fears around immigration and ‘political correctness’ on this issue. There were tensions between socially acceptable and unacceptable discourse and, at times, arguments between participants on issues of immigration and nationality,

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and what constituted acceptable speech. People wanted to oppose racism, particularly in the context of the discussion; and at the same time some participants did suggest particular aspects of multiculturalism gave other cultures too great a prominence. Participants did not regard such discussion as far right, or as extreme, or racist, although they at times expressed some uneasiness at pursuing these arguments; this appeared mainly for fear of being judged. However, the prevalence of such themes suggests they reflect broader societal views. Indeed, non-Muslim focus groups wanted more space to openly discuss their fears about, for instance, the dangers of immigration, and without stigma. There were clear tensions therefore between people’s expressed opposition to the far right and to right-wing populism, and their expressed feelings about change in their communities, around which there was ambivalence, and sometimes fear. There was tension between people’s aspirations to participate in open and inclusive dialogue on sensitive issues; their fears of being stigmatised as racist; and the ways in which that dialogue might potentially exclude particular groups. Frequently people decided what counted as ‘extreme’ based not on the content of an argument, but on who was producing it. AfD demonstrators in Germany were regarded as extreme, even as focus group participants raised their own fears around the impact of Islam on German society. In the UK focus groups, the EDL was highly stigmatised, but participants also discussed the ways in which immigration had ‘gone too far’. This tension between perceptions of self and of others presents difficulties for work countering far right extremism. It was clear that participants, who said they opposed racism, nonetheless had at least some understanding for aspects of the arguments mobilising groups they viewed as extreme. There are three aspects to this. First, the attraction of any extreme group is that it mobilises around themes that have wide resonance with broad populations. Second, as Bailey and Edwards suggest, Islamophobia and racism are not the preserve of extreme groups, but affect society broadly; to focus CVE on particular sections of society does not necessarily tackle the problem (Bailey and Edwards 2017). Third, the ideologies of groups designated extreme may not differ vastly from mainstream views, and the designation extreme can be linked to actions or individuals. Indeed, mobilising under particular labels and banners, going to far right demonstrations and becoming active on these issues represented a firm boundary for participants between what was acceptable and what was not. Participant discussions therefore evidenced assertions made by Mondon

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and Winter (2020), Memmi (1999) and others: firstly, that racism is the property of ‘others’; and second, that it is not understood as a property of structures, but of individuals (Burnett 2017). Their own definition of racism was located in particular behaviours understood as far right, rather than beliefs. Right-Wing Populism and Far Right Mainstreaming Participants reported shifts in the perception of far right extremism, and the location and frequency with which it was encountered. In Germany, the far right was highly stigmatised and not socially acceptable. In one German location with a very active past neo-Nazi movement, residents felt they continued to be stigmatised by the area’s reputation. One middle-­ aged woman participant said, “When people ask where are you from, and hear you say you’re from here they’re like, ‘aha, okay, I see’ [pulls face] that’s what people do…They don’t say anything specific about the [far] right, but they’re funny about it.” Nonetheless, participants in French and German focus groups suggested the stigma of the far right was increasingly being eroded. Some participants in France and Germany expressed fears that this meant far right extremism was, as the literature suggests, being mainstreamed into the everyday (Minkenberg 2013; Haute and Pauwels 2017). This view was particularly prevalent in French non-­Muslim focus group discussions, as expressed by these women in their 20s, who explained what they felt about the word, extremism: A: For me, well honestly, it makes me think of trivialisation of…of… of extremist comments, extreme right-wing comments, racist comments that are now completely part of everyday conversation. That’s why…well, where it is extreme, it’s where you can find violence that is silenced, violence that the media do not relay, violence against people who are different, who are assaulted because they wear a headscarf, a man assaulted because he is black, hearing in the street “dirty bougnoule”1 …. But this kind of extremism is not visible. We do not hear about it and we have the feeling that everybody accepts it, nobody is outraged. France is going backwards, and that’s such a shame. B: There is not one week when I don’t hear someone making racist comments, acquaintances, people I meet… Before, I feel like racism was prohibited. Today, it feels like racism is trivialised.

1

 A derogatory term of abuse used against people of colour.

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C: Yes, totally. And I repeat it again, that political extremism is trivialised. We don’t reject these kind of ideas anymore. —[Young non-Muslim women, France]

Their concerns were not just that racism was normalised, but even institutionalised, with local mayors and police mentioned as leaders likely to sympathise with racist sentiments. As noted in Chap. 3, France has yet to initiate any programme to counter the far right. One non-Muslim woman participant suggested this was a mistake, as she believed Islamist and jihadist extremism was rooted in broader societal tensions, including the increased mainstream popularity of the party that was then still called the Front National: I don’t have the feeling that there is any action taken, any campaigns to stem other forms of extremist violence. We forget that there is a relation of correlation. If in a society we are facing a rise of extremist thoughts, it is not on one side only, there are multiple extremisms and unfortunately, we only focus on one. —[Young non-Muslim woman, France]

The gradual move of the far right to the mainstream meant some participants did not think these views could—or should—be ‘countered’. As one young non-Muslim man outlined, “The extreme right-wing should not exist, but we have freedom of expression in France.” If an ‘extreme’ view is expressed through participation in democratic process, people felt it was difficult and unethical to ban it or designate it extreme. Instead, persuasive argument was required, they believed. There was also discussion around language in German non-Muslim focus groups, with these women in their 50s and 60s noting a merging of discourse between neo-Nazi and more mainstreamed radical right and anti-Islam(ist) groups. The group was attempting to define extremism: A: …extremism—I think it shows up in the language. It’s frightening. At these Pegida events, the kind of words people are using—and slogans… B: Like… “sadly, the ovens have been demolished”—that was in Poland. A: That is tasteless. B: I find that so awful and frightening. A: It’s disgusting B: It’s reported to police—but nothing is ever done about it. Facilitator: Was that coming from Pegida? Or is that more neo-Nazis [as this seems extreme] A: They’re sometimes similar.

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C: That’s not what we’re supposed to think, because the Pegida movement says they’re fairly clearly differentiated from Nazis. But in practice, the choice of words, the language they’re using, is very ambiguous in the same direction. —[Middle-aged and older non-Muslim women, Germany]

The women were concerned that the German police were failing to tackle increasing instances of extremism and that such language was not adequately dealt with. Participants suggested that the progress of offensive and previously marginal discourses to a more mainstream, if radical, political arena posed a problem for those seeking to eradicate extremism. This poses two challenges. First, when extreme discourse is repeated by legitimate actors, it is legitimised, perhaps to the extent that it can no longer be deemed extreme, and tackled with measures designed to counter a minority ideology or belief system. Second, participants still mainly see a spectrum of far right activism, with, for instance, Nazism distinguished from street movements such as Pegida. Even as focus groups suggested these movements shared language, they also clearly believed some forms of extremism to be more of a threat than others. This suggests a need for multiple strategies to engage a range of different groups, with differing ideologies and behaviours, and public perceptions. Migrant/Refugee Crisis, Gender and the State The above sections show gender featuring in non-Muslim focus group discussion in relation to far right extremism as a predominantly male domain. Drivers to the far right were also linked to men’s inability to deal with difficult emotions. However, in discussion of the refugee crisis, gender took a more prominent role in discussion and was linked to women’s security. Brubaker (2017) suggests the framing of the refugee crisis and symbolic presentation of immigrants as threat has been a key factor in the ‘populist moment’. The issue has been most prevalent in Germany and Hungary, countries which also accepted the most migrants from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In Germany in 2015/2016, the period in which research took place, Chancellor Angela Merkel endorsed an ‘open door’ policy to welcome and accommodate refugees from Syria. In July 2018 this policy was reversed (France 24 2018). Significantly, it was in German focus groups with non-Muslim participants that the impact of this policy

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was most discussed. Focus group participants responded to local events within their communities, yet framed within the context of the national discourse. German respondents expressed fears over the impact of the open door policy on numerous aspects of their lives: on their security, including gendered security; on changes to local space and their relationship to that space; and on the German constitution, particularly its commitment to gender equality. Most participants drew on examples from their local area and shared first-hand experiences. In one German focus group a young woman described how local people had mobilised to deal with apparent instances of street harassment of local women by men attending a mosque. After weeks of what she felt was inadequate police intervention, local nonMuslims carried out an arson attack on the mosque. The teenager did not justify the attack, but she rationalised it and said she understood it: People did have some sympathy for the attack. There are quite a lot of far right. Like I say—there was a demo against this new mosque. I get that… [because] it did get much more difficult for women and girls round here… you couldn’t go five metres round that mosque without being chatted up, just these men coming up to you. I think it’s because their women, mothers and sisters, at home, they have these headscarves, they are veiled, so they’re not used to women who aren’t like that. I was a bit scared once, someone grabbed me. […] they wanted me to go off with them, but then a police car drove by. And they saw it, so that was really good. Lots of women round here went to the police to complain about it, we went down there en masse… but the police said, we can’t really do anything about it. —[Young non-­Muslim woman, Germany]

For this teenager there were three stages to her response: first, a personal experience of insecurity, which local people dealt with through an official process, approaching the police; second, frustration when people felt that police did not take this seriously, and did not prioritise women’s security; third, incorporation of a prevalent discourse during the field research period, the immigrant molestation of German women. The New Year 2016 reports of mass molestation across Germany and other parts of Europe, some of which later turned out to be fake, caused a great deal of insecurity, which emerged in non-­Muslim focus groups, particularly given reports of a lack of police action (Noack 2016; Agerholm 2017). While

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focus groups took place before the term ‘fake news’ became widespread, both younger and older German participants described the influence of social media and videos around sexual attacks on women by foreign men. Participants of all ages were sometimes unable to easily distinguish truth from propaganda. One young white male (teenage) German participant told the researcher as he showed her a video, “I saw this in Facebook—a girl was taken and abducted by refugees and raped for days and they weren’t prosecuted because they were refugees.” The youth group leader present in the focus group corrected him, telling him this was fake; however, adult research participants in the same area also referenced this video, noting that they were unsure if it was a hoax or not. Even when other participants informed them it was a hoax, question marks over its authenticity remained. Its very existence had raised concerns that could not easily be allayed. When ‘fake news’ had what we might now call ‘truthiness’, it was not easily forgotten or dismissed. In part this willingness to believe appeared to be linked to existing perceptions of Islam, which understood Muslims in ways that made such stories appear both possible and plausible. Non-Muslim focus groups consistently expressed concerns that gender equality was not inherent in Islam, and less likely to be found in Muslim communities. Only one non-­ Muslim participant explicitly suggested Islam encouraged respect for women, and the majority of non-Muslim participants believed Muslim women had more traditional roles or were ‘oppressed.’ (It should be stated that Muslim women’s focus groups rejected the idea of ‘oppression’, even where they complained about patriarchal Islamo-cultural restrictions affecting women.) These views were also articulated in the interview with the one member of a far right movement, carried out in Canada (Box 7.1). What is also of note in this interview are the ways in which an extreme identity is constructed through intersections between white, anti-Muslim, and Québécois masculinities. In non-Muslim focus groups cultural restrictions were identified by various participants as restricting the access of Muslim women to the public sphere. This criticism was most pronounced in Germany, where research participants were also most likely to express concerns around the threat of Islam to gender equality. This led participants to broadly support government interventions to support and empower women in Muslim communities. In the non-Muslim German focus groups, reports around attacks by immigrants on German women, whether accurate or not, also raised questions about how much value the state was placing on important aspects of

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Box 7.1  Case Study: Supporter of a Far Right Group, Canada. Male, Middle Age

The activist is asked if he feels women have a role in countering radicalisation: A: It depends on the country. If you go to Muslim countries, women are subjects, so their role is limited. We cannot ask them to stand up… because they are stoned. Anyway, they are brainwashed since childhood… The woman has no right to speak. That’s how they live. She has no major role to play there… it would take a change of ideology, of religion, because the religion, the veiled woman-… […] But I think any mother, even if she was born in Saudi Arabia, wouldn’t want her son to blow himself up. But with indoctrination, brainwashing— that’s how martyrdom occurs. […] Anyway, this is about men telling women what to do—“submission”. [Submission is the literal meaning of the word ‘Islam’.] Q: In Québec, does gender equality make radicalisation less likely? A: For the time being, yes. But if we continue to allow Muslims to come here, and they have five children per family when we have one, mathematically speaking, we will be in deficit. Q: Will [we lose] gender equality in Québec? A: Absolutely. If you look at Belgium or France… how women are losing their position. In European countries, some women… cannot dress how they want. From [just] 8 per cent of the population, look at how Muslims create disorder. From 10 per cent, they begin to carry out attacks. In France, they are only 8.9 per cent and there are already attacks. [These figures are not corroborated.]

He is asked about changes in Canadian policy to immigration: A: The Conservatives were a little stricter in accepting immigrants, which was good. For Trudeau [elected Canadian Prime Minster in 2015] the first thing is to stop the strikes in Iraq. The second thing is hosting 25,000 Syrian immigrants. Among them are supporters of radical Islam and this is very worrying. Trudeau is a sell-out. […] Because he wants the Muslim vote… it’s ‘political correctness’. Q: Can you define this concept? (continued)

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Box 7.1  (continued) A: It is about looking good at all costs… I am a bit pessimistic; we will lose a lot of freedom. Perhaps there will be some pockets of resistance. But it will probably end in violence, like Europe…I’m afraid that my grandchildren will live under Shariah and suffer under it. We will have no choice but to surrender [to Islam]… A flock of ‘sheep people’ will be ruled by wolves… If we had our country [sovereign Québec], we would have kept our national identity. Québec is a distinct society, with a sense of stronger sense of belonging than the rest of Canada. Unless we get up one day and say that Québec is our home, there is no real hope.

national identity such as gender equality. German focus groups framed the attacks in the context of past violent Nazi dictatorship, expressing fears around the loss of national rights. This focus group discussion between older men shows a particular concern about gender rights in the context of the protection of the constitution: A: The German constitution is eroded, and when movements spring up that fight against that, you shouldn’t be surprised—if there is Pegida in Dresden or other cities… We are confronted with Islam everywhere you go. …In my part of town, we have Islamic groups, they’ve got two entrances! One for women, one for men! But in our basic constitution, it says that women and men are equal! When that sort of thing goes on, then do you really have to wonder why people are radicalising. B: Yes you get the impression that the freedom of religion is being more taken into consideration than say, the fundamental laws of this country. —[Older non-Muslim men, Germany]

Older participants in non-Muslim focus groups across countries frequently stated that they felt national values were threatened, with the 60s age group most strongly correlating with the perception that national values were at risk. The older male participants in the above group cited other instances of events they believed demonstrated the prioritisation of migrant rights at the cost of women’s rights. These included references to reports of: sexual assaults carried out by migrant Muslim men in public swimming facilities and training sessions to educate them on women’s rights to swim unmolested; reports of women teachers facing abuse from male migrant parents used to a culture of ‘machismo’; and Muslim men being permitted

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not to shake hands with women in the workplace. There was also a general lack of certainty about the truth of such reports and narratives. Again, all participants said they opposed the far right, yet they also suggested, through reference to these stories, that they understood at least some of the motivations for those who supported it. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the nation state has historically mobilised around and in protection of women’s sanctity, and against enemy others who pose a threat to women’s security, or are framed as such (Yuval-Davis 1996; Nagel 1998). Perceived lack of state action in response to threats to women appeared to shake participants’ faith in the state and the contract it has with citizens. Indeed, this is evident in the propaganda of groups such as the UK’s Britain First, or far right libertarian groups who see themselves as guardians of the nation, in the absence of a strong or reliable state. Alienation from the State Participant discourses around immigration showed the horizontal anxiety around immigrant ‘others’ was linked closely to their vertical relationship with the state, to use Brubaker’s (2017) directional analysis. Conversation about immigration and discussion about institutional injustices were entwined. As with the previous example, feelings of resentment were linked not solely to individual incidents of violence or harassment, but to the sense that police and other authorities dealt with this in ways that disadvantaged non-migrants. In one German focus group, teenagers at a youth club said they were familiar with local far right extremists, who they condemned as “drunk men in bars”. However, a discussion about what these men believed quickly led the youth to express their own perceptions of migrant advantage, and a broad injustice, associated explicitly with Chancellor Merkel. In this conversation with the youth focus group about who far right extremists are, all the participants are teenagers and B is the only woman: A: They do things against foreigners. They talk about the refugees taking our jobs, but they can’t get jobs. B: And that it’s not just jobs, it’s money, that they get a lot more money than Germans. C: A friend of my mum’s, they were in the supermarket… and there were refugees with two full trolleys, and they got to the till and didn’t have to pay they just said they don’t have to pay—she saw it—

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D: They just go straight through. C: Merkelzeit [Merkel time] that’s what it is. A: Merkelzeug [Merkel stuff]. C: It’s Merkel. A: And Footlocker too—for families—for schoolkids and we don’t have any money—so they just get the money—I feel it’s really unfair. C: You see people, they have these bracelet things that they get free food in shops and just go through. D: It’s not good—we want to help people, but it’s going too far if they just get lots of stuff—it’s Merkelzeit [all laugh]. C: You see these problems because of all these refugees, Angela Merkel gives a lot of social money to help them—people think, this is my country, and we have to pay for these people, and they don’t like it. —[Young non-Muslim men and woman, Germany]

The youths however talked of migrants in otherwise positive terms, and the group expressed sympathy for the situation facing refugees, many of whom had settled in the area. Their local secondary school had set up a class for refugees. The youth club itself had worked with Romany young men, and refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq, although the presence of different groups of young men in the small shared space had resulted in tensions, the youth club leader said. The teenagers noted with satisfaction the success of an anti-Nazi sticker campaign in their area, and they disliked the suburb’s association with the Nazi group, the NPD. However, teenagers at the same time discussed changes to their neighbourhood and education that they felt put them at a disadvantage and again demonstrated, they felt, that their safety and education were not a priority to the state. The first issue was around safety, with one participant telling the group his father had given him an (illegal) telescopic baton (Totschläger) for self-­ defence, after being attacked by a group of ‘foreign’ men. The boy’s emphasis was not on the attack itself, but on the inaction of the police: A: I was attacked. I turned around and saw loads of foreigners. And they hit me. They grabbed me, and I called the police—and I was the one who got the complaint [legal notice]! B: If you hit them that always happens—they hit you, you get punished—I don’t know why it happens, I didn’t write the law—but it means you can’t even defend yourself. Facilitator: So, you think the police are unfair? B: They [foreigners] never get the punishment. Facilitator: Would you go to the police again?

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A: No B: I have nothing to do with them. C: If someone attacked me, I would sort it out myself. A: Yes! —[Young non-Muslim men, Germany]

These examples fed into a theme of injustice and lack of trust in the system. The youth leader suggested things were changing in the area. Although the neo-Nazi groups the area was infamous for had mainly left, there were new civilian vigilante groups, apparently to protect people from immigrant violence. Pegida had demonstrated locally. He said he had noticed youth turning to violence to solve arguments for themselves.2 The theme of self-mobilisation in the perceived absence of a distant and disinterested state was evident across workshops. While this chapter has focused on Germany, other country focus groups expressed a lack of trust in the police and alienation from institutional power. Indeed, the stories of German women’s insecurity had an impact beyond German borders. In the UK, one man in his 60s suggested mobilisation away from democratic politics was inevitable, “…when you look at groups like the EDL, …their publicity, look at Tommy Robinson, girls being trafficked, girls being attacked in Germany—they are pushing at an open door. They exploit all this.” This mobilisation is triangular, representing, as Brubaker (2017) suggests, a failed vertical relationship with the state, as well as a dysfunctional horizontal relationship with the immigrant other. Other country focus groups expressed a lack of trust in the police and alienation from institutional power. In the UK, participants expressed a lack of confidence in authorities to address concerns. This woman in her 60s described her relationship with the police: Last year, a gang of youths ran into a cousin’s house and my partner tried to get him out, but I was terrified as he could have had a knife… 18 others outside were trying to kick his head in, so we shut the door, terrified, called the police, “where are you!”, three times! It took 15 mins [for them to arrive], longest 15 mins in my life… I’m 69, we are all no spring chickens, and I know it could have been worse, but I felt a little let down, and when they came they just marched the lad off, pushed us aside. —[Older non-Muslim woman, England] 2  “Lieber geschlagen als geredet,” he suggested (they would rather fight it out than talk it out).

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Participants described experiences that they felt demonstrated an abnegation of the state in its duties towards them and also institutional bias towards immigrants, and against them. As one non-Muslim woman in the UK said, “I have a list of things people say about the fact that ‘we are second-class citizens’. This is the fuel that enables people to join right-­ wing extremism. They are listened to [immigrants], but we are not, so the only way is to channel themselves into a white extremist group.” Again there was a lack of engagement with structural inequalities, and a focus on the individual and local. The theme was of injustice, with a sense that people could understand the rise of the far right, even while they repeatedly said they opposed this. Examples given were personal and centred on local interactions: Some people are given more priority over others. For example, I work with young people, who live in hostels. We are building a block [and]… we hear that we are allocating it to young people from Syria. We have brand new properties. What we should do is move our young people out of temporary accommodation to a good house, and let the others live in those hostels. You are making our own people feel horrible, as they do not have proper accommodation. We prioritise the group who come in over our own people. —[Middle-aged non-Muslim woman, England] I was trying to get my son in school, and people who were taking up spaces in schools were eastern European. It is not a racist view—but it’s about not having the knowledge about what entitlements these people have. —[Middle-­aged non-Muslim woman, England] My husband was recently in a local suburb and he said he couldn’t have asked anyone for the time, because they were all foreigners. You know. I’m not against that—but then you also just don’t feel comfortable. In these parts of town. —[Middle-aged non-Muslim woman, Germany] Like you see these Turkish women who just don’t care, this woman playing her music really loud in the train—we don’t do that. —[Young non-Muslim man, Germany]

The emphasis was on perceptions of minor even trivial differences of culture, evident in everyday experiences, and framed through a process of othering; these produced feelings of dislocation, resentment, powerlessness and injustice. Some people challenged these emotions in themselves; others did not. Through these discussions, participants revealed perceptions of rights and rewards, linked to understandings of what constitutes

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citizenship. There was also a tendency to focus on perceptions of migrant ‘advantage’, with a lack of consideration of the challenges and disadvantages that immigration to the UK brought, including xenophobia and structural racism. Some discussions clearly raised uncomfortable issues and some participants voiced denials of racism, aware that their views were, at the least, contentious. Most participants appeared satisfied that an outward contestation of being anti-racist would qualify them as such, no matter what they said within the context of the focus group. Again, there was little discussion of whiteness or the ways in which racism is constituted through institutions or structures. Non-Muslim focus group discussions in the UK favoured the robust assertion of national values. They also referenced wider discourses to bolster their views. British non-Muslims repeated government messages apparently aimed at British Muslims. Assertions by David Cameron, prime minister in 2015–2016, on the need for Muslim women’s language learning were referenced by a number of UK focus groups. When combined with everyday experiences, and perceptions of the ‘otherness’ of immigrants, these messages fed a broader belief system about the legitimacy of the state and its ability and desire to fulfil its obligations to its citizens, narrowly defined. These micro-events, and the discourses surrounding them, challenged the resilience of communities and their cohesion. Again, the sense was of the appeal of right-wing populism as both a vertical and horizontal moment. There is also a sense in which participants appear willing to echo past state representations of the far right as driven by hatred, emotional factors and ignorance, as this allows for an individualised response to the issue. When the far right is about particular people, it becomes less about collective responsibility, in this case, participant responsibility. When the far right is however understood as being a product of—white—collective and structural advantages, then countering it is a problem for all white people; narratives aimed at addressing anti-immigrant sentiment become a problem for all of white society. When the far right is seen as a product of structural conditions of inequality and prejudice, then again everyone must confront their own place within these structures. This might reveal that whatever the ways in which states can disadvantage or discriminate on the basis of class or gender or physical ability, race is an important axis of state discrimination. This recognition could puncture perceptions of the ‘second-class’ citizenship of white people, as expressed in some of the focus groups. Alternatively, the narrative of white privilege is rejected as

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‘imposed’, and taking little account of the lived experiences of those for whom issues of class are perceived as a key challenge. Censorship and Injustice Narratives and perceptions of injustice also fed into perceptions that the state was acting to restrict the articulation of feelings and fears that were not ‘politically correct’. Some participants in non-Muslim focus groups, primarily in Germany and the UK, complained that free expression risked accusations of racism. This conversation is between older mixed gender participants in a British focus group and demonstrates apprehension around others’ designation of their views as valid, or not. A is the only woman speaking here: A: If you aren’t happy, then leave, if I go to Australia where my grandson is, and I don’t like it I can return but I know some people can’t. B: If you were on Facebook and said that you would be crucified as racist. A: But I’m not, just being honest. C: It’s freedom of speech. Interviewer: Do you worry about losing freedom of speech? A: Well we have [lost it], but I’ve just told you, you couldn’t say that as it comes out the wrong way. B: Not that you couldn’t, but you would have to be prepared for a lot of criticism. C: It’s a hot-bed because people seem to be sitting around waiting to be offended, every little thing anyone says about something. If you say you don’t like someone, and he happens to be black you are a racist. No—I just don’t like him. —[Older non-Muslim men and woman, England]

Similar arguments around the perceived loss of free speech are frequently articulated in radical right populist groups. For instance, the 2018 arrest of English anti-Islam activist Tommy Robinson was critiqued by his supporters as a straightforward clamp-down on free speech (Serhan 2018). Here media and governmental institutions are blamed, and the responsibility for racism relocated into elite actors, rather than those expressing contentious and racist views. Participants welcomed the research opportunity to express views and share discussions in which they felt they were not judged, given the nature of focus group methodology. While factual inaccuracies were challenged

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in focus groups, people described the act of speaking freely and being listened to as empowering. This empowerment is however potentially problematic; it can come at a cost, considering the beliefs raised at times towards other groups and identities who were the focus of discussion. The difficulty in enabling wider social discussion of issues including multiculturalism or immigration is that in the absence of leadership, space is made to express racism. The key issue is in dialogue: listening to people, and acknowledging their experiences and views, yet exploring the issues raised within an anti-racism framework. The purpose of the focus groups was to elicit discussion in order to understand participant viewpoints, rather than to ‘educate’. However, it was clear that participants defined racism as something individual, located in particular angry criminal males, and without a consideration of how whiteness constructs racist practices structurally. A challenge is to discuss issues raised in ways that allow participant experiences to count, yet within dialogic anti-racist frameworks.

Conclusion The findings presented here represent a snapshot of views from non-­ Muslim, mainly white participants across four countries in late 2015 and early 2016. The bulk of the interviews referenced were conducted in Germany and the UK. This period largely predated the recent prevalent and mainstream concerns around fake news, right-wing populism, the rise of the far right and opposition to immigration. Fears around Islam as a threat to gender equality, the impacts of globalisation and the injustice and inefficiency of the state and its curtailing of free speech are all evident here. To some degree the findings here presage scholars who now note the mainstreaming of the far right. These findings are not definitive. The focus groups were not with people who had been identified (either self-­identified or by others) to support extremism; they were with people living in areas in which there had been issues with far right extremism, and whose lives had been touched by it. The discussions are therefore not able to credibly reveal the drivers of far right extremism. Instead, the findings provide some context, particularly on those far right themes that resonate more widely. The findings also highlight the challenges of broad community work and CVE to counter the far right and a rise of far right populism. The first key challenge is in the definition and understanding of the far right. Participants in all countries but Germany tended towards a

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perception of the far right as something that did not count as extremism or radicalisation. These were terms associated with Islamism, jihadists, Daesh, terrorism and, as one participant put it, “bombs going off”. For most people in UK focus groups, the far right appeared either broadly criminal in nature, unsophisticated and a problem associated with drunk and dissatisfied men. This made countering the right appear as a non-issue, or a wider social issue, or an issue of criminality and general police work rather than counter-radicalisation. Or, as in the French focus groups, the far right was now regarded as part of the mainstream political scene, and so work to counter it had to take place within a mainstream political discourse. The option to ‘counter’ the far right as marginal, as extraordinary, or extreme no longer existed. Certainly, participants in France appeared to believe censorship was not an option, so prevalent and mainstream were far right views, they said. Such perceptions are indicative of the ways in which race and whiteness frame perceptions of racism, and have shaped the vocabulary used to discuss terrorism (Ramalingam 2014; Mondon and Winter 2020). Participants did not view or understand racism or far right extremism as structural, or organised. The challenge is partly therefore one of education, which needs to work on providing knowledge on the ways in which whiteness is race, and in which racism is structural. This is important, as some discussion clearly at the least borders racist expression, although all of the participants express a commitment to anti-racist sentiments, which is positive. But another challenge is one of tactic. A strategy designed to counter anti-Muslim sentiment as extremism suggests work more targeted at marginal views. However, some of the core tenets of far right discourse are no longer marginal, according to participants. Additionally, the act of censorship is resisted; when people discuss state injustice, a lack of free speech is a theme. This is then entwined in feelings and beliefs about what migrants represent and indeed deserve. These feelings and beliefs are based in personal experience, but also in wider discourse, news and fake news, and framed by perceptions of broader institutions. They are also themes in far right rhetoric. Additionally if there are issues at the community level that people believe matter and are being ignored, it is also important to support them and work with them to address these issues—not simply ignore them and tell people they must change their views. People’s views were rooted in their lives and experiences, and attempts should be made to understand these.

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Findings also show that gender is an important aspect of non-Muslim community understandings of the far right, what it is and who is involved. This frames understandings of which institutions might tackle the far right and how. First, and in line with both government approaches and the literature, participants see issues of far right extremism as issues of ‘problem men’ and ignore the presence and support of women in these groups. It is also clear that gendered narratives feature in people’s ideas of Islam as a threat, immigrants as a threat and also far right views. It is positive when communities support gender equality. What is more problematic is when perceptions of threat are inflamed by false reports and state inaction and become the drivers of mobilisation outside of state frameworks, for instance, as in one case described here, vigilante actions. At that point, gender becomes active in discourses in ways familiar within nationalist and far right movements, which privilege women’s insecurity and ‘honour’ (Nagel 1998; Yuval-­Davis 2006). Here gender is used to construct a particular national identity, locating power and privilege in white—male— structures and institutions. This also enables an approach which fails to recognise the pernicious effects of whiteness in those structures and permits the relocation of racism into angry, criminal—othered—men. Conversely, issues of jihadist extremism are collectivised, and a whole religion can be held responsible for the actions of a few. The broader difficulty is in managing people’s insecurity, trust and fear. People understandably express fear over actual abuses of women; however, disproportionate fear rooted in beliefs fostered through fake news or wider bias can form the basis of far right mobilisation. The arguments of the member of the far right group interviewed in Canada and the fears of ordinary people—who say they are opposed to the far right—in focus groups are not so dissimilar. The difference, for the focus group participants, is in what actions people take to deal with the threats they perceive, the trust in institutions to deal with this and the attitude to violence. Some far right beliefs enjoy growing mainstream appeal within populist parties. This makes countering such movements difficult. It is easy to convince people to oppose a neo-Nazi agenda. However, many neo-Nazis now support mainstream leadership figures such as the US President Donald Trump. The lines between legitimate discourse and far right discourse are blurring. In the additional absence of a clear community of engagement, this makes countering the far right much more difficult than countering the violent jihad.

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CHAPTER 8

Policy Recommendations: Gender-­ Mainstreaming CVE

Improving Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts is a more important task than ever. CVE is becoming the policy option of choice for many governments, to resolve what they consider to be one of the gravest threats to global security and order. There are increasing numbers of NGOs and civil society groups involved in CVE delivery. It is clear from the Findings chapters that understandings of both violent extremism and how to counter it could improve. One key way is to acknowledge gender in all aspects of CVE. This shift towards gender mainstreaming is beginning to happen. We published the initial findings of the research presented in this book in papers in 2016 and 2017 and were subsequently invited to discuss the findings in countries including the UK, Denmark, Norway and the US and at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2017 in Bucharest. These papers, some told us, broke new ground in advocating a gendered approach as the most meaningful path to understanding how violent extremism (VE) and countering violent extremism work, in a field that mainly saw gender as a synonym for women. Subsequently, and particularly in 2018 and 2019, there has been a significant increase in policy attention to gender and counter-terrorism and CVE more specifically. This includes a range of reports, seminars and guidelines at the international level by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), UN Women and UNDP, the European Union Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in addition to a range of policy-focused papers by think tanks and research © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_8

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centres. However, as Rachel Schmidt (2018) has found, “even though gender is really pushed in terms of policy and CVE policy … it’s not something being addressed on the ground” (p. 26). Our recommendations aim to further the implementation of gender-mainstreaming and gender-sensitive approaches in practice. Gender-mainstreaming and gender-sensitive approaches have been recommended since the 1985 Nairobi World Conference on Women. This was established as a strategy in international gender equality policy through the Beijing Platform for Action, adopted at the 1995 Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing, and subsequently adopted as a tool to promote gender equality at all levels, including through the WPS agenda in the field of counter-terrorism (CT). The countries of this study, as members of the UN, have international legal obligations to uphold the essential and indivisible principles of human rights, including the rights of women. The Council of Europe has defined gender mainstreaming as “The (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making” (Council of Europe 1998). As Brown et al. (2019) identify in their PVE recommendations report, gender mainstreaming requires three main practical commitments: • Integration of gender equality in interventions in general. • Targeting specific groups or issues through special interventions. • Dialogue with partners on gender-sensitive issues and aspects. From our findings and therefore in relation to the arguments we present in this work, it is important to note that we are not advocating that the goals of CVE at a policy or strategy level should be directly transposed to those of gender equality. Like a number of the participants in our research, we are critical of the instrumentalisation of women’s equality, women’s empowerment and women’s rights for the purposes of CVE, especially where that has disproportionate negative effects on minority and marginalised communities (including the women of those communities). However, fully recognising and responding to the needs, security and equality goals of women as they understand and define them, at every level of CVE (design, implementation and evaluation), are essential for CVE to work.

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This chapter considers how policymakers, practitioners and donors in relation to CVE occurring in Europe and North America can apply our findings. Clearly some of the general principles can also be applied elsewhere, in a culturally appropriate manner. Others are more context-­ specific. There are two key elements to our recommendations: first, those deriving from our research method (the milieu approach), which is itself a process of gender-mainstreaming CVE, given its broad inclusion of men, and discussion of the gendered impacts on women and men of counter-­ radicalisation issues; and second, the recommendations which derive from the results of engaging with the milieu approach. This chapter begins by highlighting existing policy recommendations and guidance on matters of gender, to show how our work builds on these, and where our data challenge or complement this agenda.

Existing Policy Recommendations and Guidance Existing literature derived from policymakers, practitioners and academics makes a number of recommendations for tackling women’s engagement in violent extremism and on promoting the role of women in CVE. Before setting out our recommendations, this section presents and engages with key recommendations from a number of wide-ranging reports and studies (Chowdhury Fink et  al. 2016; Zeiger and Alonso 2019; OSCE 2019; Brown et al. 2019). This allows us to discuss recommendations that follow on from, are complementary to or are implied by our data but may not explicitly be raised by our data. Monitor and Build Evidence on Gender in VE and CVE Given the rhetorical importance of women’s rights to the War on Terror, and the importance of evidence-based policy, it is surprising to note that to date there has been insufficient monitoring of gender in counter-­ terrorism or countering violent extremism policies and programmes. That said, many CVE projects have weak monitoring and evaluation systems and there is a woeful lack of evidence-sharing regarding the impact of programmes and projects overall. As a result, programmes may not only prove to be insufficient in tackling violent extremism, but they might also increase women’s vulnerability, given that gender-sensitive indicators are not systematically included in the design of policies and programmes, nor are they included in the recording of VE and its harms either (Cook and

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Vale 2019). This limits our ability to design programmes that consider women as participants, and limits understanding of the impact of CT or CVE on women, thereby reducing opportunities to mitigate negative gendered security harms that may result from policies or programmes. The literature therefore recommends—and we would agree—that policymakers, donors and implementers working on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism track gender consistently (GCTF 2015; OSCE 2013; Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016). GCTF’s good practice guidance highlights that sex-disaggregated analysis and data on relevant communities, tools and outcomes can be used to better inform CVE initiatives and avoid unintended impacts that can undermine relationships of trust in communities, such as ensuring that CVE does not contribute to an increase in human rights violations, including gender-based violence (GCTF 2019). Policy recommendations also advocate including women and girls in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies, laws, procedures, programmes and practices related to CVE. This will not only improve programmes but also include an understanding of how violent extremism and counter-terrorism affect women and girls differently (GCTF 2019). More generally, experts and authors agree that policies and programmes should be properly evaluated to ensure that the quality of activities is upheld and that they are based on evidence (De Leede et al. 2017). In particular, there is a gap in establishing evidence on the causal relationship between gender inequality and violent extremism, including how gender norms contribute to further violent extremism on a structural level and how gendered rigidities lead a person to become a violent extremist on an individual level. Therefore, it is recommended that further evidence and research are required in  local contexts to explore how gender dynamics play a role in both VE and CVE. Our data reflect less explicitly on the efficacy of CVE in relation to gender-sensitive outcomes and monitoring. In part, this is because the participants were not all direct beneficiaries of CVE interventions, and were not practitioners. However, without evidence, it is not possible to counter the participants’ doubt or scepticism (evident in all countries and across all focus groups) regarding the efficacy and desirability of CVE. In an age of ‘fake news’, practitioners are surely disarmed without this vital information. Overall, therefore, the findings of our work complement and support those advocating for better evaluation and monitoring of CVE, and for the inclusion of gender-sensitive data at all stages of research design.

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Engaging Women in CVE Spearheaded by general insights from the Women, Peace and Security agenda, gender experts emphasise the need for donors and policymakers to increase the participation of women at all levels and to mainstream gender in the security bodies and other public authorities involved in CVE (De Leede et al. 2017). Another element of women’s engagement is highlighted by the OSCE (2019) report on gender and CVE for law enforcement, which emphasises the importance of having women involved in CVE as practitioners and security personnel and for those people to be appropriately trained. To avoid instrumentalising and essentialising women and exposing them to harm, a participant-led approach should be adopted when engaging women on security-related issues. This requires promoting dialogue and the participation of women and women’s organisations in discussions about CVE policies and strategies and seeking their input into the design of CVE programmes from the outset (OSCE 2013; GCTF 2015). Overall, the literature recommendations appear to prefer engaging women’s groups and women-led civil society organisations that are already on the frontlines of much of this activity. Women’s organisations operating on the ground and at the grassroots are identified to have the relevant contacts with local communities and the understanding of local grievances that are driving violent extremism (De Leede et al. 2017). For example, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) recommends empowering women in civil society working in the field of women’s and human rights, especially women’s organisations, and prioritising engagement at the grassroots level with women in civil society (De Leede et al. 2017). It is, however, recommended that engagement is sensitive to the security and reputational risks involved in engaging on security issues (Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016). Experts acknowledge that women’s organisations may be reluctant to accept funding specified as CVE or counter-terrorism, aware this may compromise their independence or jeopardise their security (Ladbury 2015), and they recommend that this consideration is taken into account in policymakers’, donors’ and implementers’ efforts to engage with women’s organisations. At the same time, there are—perhaps somewhat contradictory— repeated calls to better engage women at the community and grassroots levels as sources of influence within families and communities. One independent paper for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) recommends informing and empowering women and girls so they

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have the skills to mobilise against violent jihadist narratives and organise for peace. This is based on the understanding that women in grassroots communities are closest to the violence and to the recruitment activities of jihadist groups. However, because of their own lack of organisational experience, these women often need ‘capacity-building support’ to plan the contribution they can make to CVE (Ladbury 2015). The recommendations from these reports do not entirely confront the challenge that women may face in certain contexts where they lack power and even access to the public realm, a situation noted by the participants in this research. This can limit their ability to participate effectively in CVE efforts and even restrict the availability of women willing to engage. Recommendations therefore focus on building the capacity of women and girls to contribute to CVE efforts in a manner tailored to the local context (GCTF 2019; De Leede et al. 2017). This includes the recommendation that CVE programmes recognise that the role of women in CVE and CT is related to the role that women play in their communities, including participation in public spaces, politics, education and other related areas (Zeiger and Alonso 2019). There is therefore a tension at times between the possible constraints that exist in the current roles that women play— which may limit their ability to engage in CVE—and broader aspirations to ensure women are engaged. In all activities it is therefore important to avoid gender misconceptions and stereotypes (GCTF 2019), which can ignore women’s capabilities to contribute to CVE in a range of areas including as policy shapers, educators, community members and activists (De Leede 2019). A United Nations panel on women in CVE in 2014 outlined the need to create political space for women’s engagement; to treat them as leaders; and to resist stereotypes of specific roles and identities (Dufour-Genneson and Alam 2014; UN Web TV 2014). Work still needs to be done. Addressing gender misconceptions in CVE also requires better understanding of the role of masculinities and men qua men in CVE, and experts highlight the need to engage men in CVE activities to ensure a broad dialogue and participation around these issues (GCTF 2019; Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016). Experts, however, urge caution in protecting and bolstering women’s rights as a transactional or instrumental response to violent extremism— rather than as part of countries’ international human rights, including women’s rights and obligations (Huckerby 2020). Women’s empowerment is often (inaccurately) associated with secularism and western values (De Leede 2019). Meanwhile, there are also reminders that women’s

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rights should not be securitised and conflated with CVE agendas (DufourGenneson and Alam 2014; UN Web TV 2014; Huckerby 2020). Although this is not easily reconciled, given an emphasis of the principle of ‘do no harm’ within international aid policy, some experts recommend that western donors and policymakers recognise that emphasising women’s rights in the framework of western feminisms can be perceived in some contexts as an imposed foreign agenda and therefore potentially counter-­productive to locally-based efforts to increase women’s participation in society (Zeiger and Alonso 2019; Brown et al. 2019). Our data confirm the need for a participant-led approach, which, when working with Muslim women, must not seek to interfere with the practice of their faith. There is also a need to introduce discussions about women’s empowerment and equality through dialogue with participants. This may mean not ‘siloing’ discussions of gender into particular days or events, but being open for discussion of gender across all elements of the CVE process and activities. We discuss this particular issue in more detail later in this chapter. Tackling Women’s Radicalisation and Deradicalisation Much of the literature argues that current strategies and programmes fail to fully acknowledge and therefore address women’s involvement in violent extremism. Due to gender stereotyping of ‘men as militants’ and ‘girls as non-violent victims’, most CVE programming regards men and boys as the key risk (Ladbury 2015). Women and girls tend to be little served by programmes either with a prevention objective (such as employment programmes) or in deradicalisation programmes, which often focus on fighters (Ladbury 2015). There is therefore a need for better mechanisms and infrastructure for women-specific prevention and deradicalisation programmes (De Leede et  al. 2017; Winterbotham 2020). There is also a need to detail the ways in which gender operates in the ideologies and activities of violent groups, in order to assess the types of risks women and girls or men and boys might pose. The point with regard to women and girls is not that they should be targeted in CVE programming, but rather how any initiative to include them should be developed. Design needs to be informed by a locally specific and sociologically informed understanding of the ways in which women and girls are associated with an extreme movement (Ladbury 2015). This includes recognising the different roles that women can play

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in terrorism and counter-terrorism including as actors in terrorist groups; victims of terrorism; supporters of terrorist ideas; active players in their communities against terrorism; passive or active influencers in their families (Zeiger and Alonso 2019). It is therefore often recommended that CVE and deradicalisation and disengagement programmes target populations most ‘at risk’: including potential fighter-recruits as well as a wider population that sympathises with a jihadist movement, and may harbour and support active members, although not necessarily joining the group (including women and girls) (Ladbury 2015). Instead, the authors recommend that specific programmes focused on women might be needed but these need to be based on local context and on evidence that gender dynamics are playing an important role in radicalisation factors (Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016). This requires that programmers take greater efforts to explore the factors specific to women’s—and men’s—radicalisation. Where identified, for example, in relation to Daesh’s highly gendered recruitment narratives, it is recommended that programmes target women-specific push-and-pull factors (GCTF 2019). RAN therefore recommends addressing women-specific vulnerabilities in radicalisation such as enabling factors including the impact on women of their attire and discrimination, or the role of the Internet in women’s and girls’ radicalisation (GCTF 2019). Given the success of Daesh recruitment, this includes the recommendation that alternative narratives against Daesh may need to take on a gender dimension (Chowdhury Fink et al. 2016), and an increase in campaigns or initiatives addressing the radicalisation of women and girls directly (Saltman and Frenett 2016), in particular online (Gaps 2018; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017; Pearson 2016). This also suggests taking seriously the impact of governments’ failed efforts to prevent, investigate and punish Islamophobic attacks against women and girls (Brown et  al. 2019; Huckerby 2016). It is recommended that caution be exercised here: first, that this does not in practice amount to viewing women as a homogenous group. Instead, counter-radicalisation approaches need to reflect the reality that women have different socio-demographic profiles, background stories and, similarly to men, a range of motivations for joining Daesh (De Leede et al. 2017). This was a key finding in our research, and a point actively and repeatedly made by participants: people are not all the same, and people who are Muslim are not all the same. And second, RAN recommends that Islamic values need to be considered in countering the Daesh

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narrative that western feminism is imperialist and doesn’t consider Muslim women and their faith (GCTF 2019). Our findings reveal the importance of being mindful of the wider context in which women are engaged. While this book does not present data on women’s radicalisation to the far right, it is also important to detail the ways in which women in far right extremism might have different experiences and different pathways into and out of radicalisation, to women in violent jihadist movements (RAN 2019). When it comes to the deradicalisation of women, this is an area that has had limited attention until recently. Instead, deradicalisation programmes have tended to focus on fighters (Ladbury 2015). Despite the attention on women due to Daesh, experts advise that it is important to ensure that perpetrators who are women and girls are not sensationalised in the media. Terrorist organisations are recognising that women perpetrators draw higher media attention. Media training is advised. From a legal perspective, a recent multi-contributor publication encouraged NATO countries and partners to adopt legal frameworks that recognise gender differences in returning FTFs, especially women or girl returnees, terrorist prisoners or family members, whilst ensuring that women are embedded in strategies for disengagement, deradicalisation and reintegration including incorporating where possible relatives who are women and girls (Zeiger and Alonso 2019; RAN 2019). Our data do not particularly engage with the issue of deradicalisation; although the participants had many views on how someone becomes radicalised, they had fewer ideas about the process of leaving a radical or violent extremist group. This is because the reasons for joining a group are not necessarily the same reasons for remaining in the group, and don’t necessarily connect to the reasons for leaving a group. Given that our research was conducted in 2015 and 2016, a period of Daesh recruitment, and was explicitly around the gender dynamics of VE and CVE, the focus was on people joining groups and not on the reasons for leaving them. This represents a limitation of the research questions and the focus of our work: the questions we asked did not lend themselves to unpacking these issues, and additionally very few of our participants had direct interactions with individuals who had been, but were no longer, radicalised or members of violent extremist groups.

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CVE Recommendations from the Field Here we set out the key summary of recommendations, before moving to a more detailed exploration of the main lessons drawn from the research. This exploration is organised in two sections, as noted: first, lessons deriving from the milieu approach, itself a process of gender-mainstreaming CVE; and second, the lessons which derive from the Findings chapters.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Use a definition of gender that isn’t just about women, but about power, about men. 2. Take everything you know about VE and CVE and ask, what are the differences for women, for men, based on the evidence? 3. The milieu approach matters, because it is gendered. 4. Co-create knowledge and learn with communities—they know things too. 5. Test your gendered assumptions—do they fit, do they work? 6. Monitor, evaluate and gather gendered data. 7. Listen actively, even if you do not like what you hear. Respond. 8. Recognise that gendered approaches reveal differences between VE for men and women, and understand why (culture, norms, faith, ideology, etc., are all gendered) 9. Recognise that not all women are mothers or victims and not all men are risks. 10. Disaggregate. See the diversity in communities and between women. 11. Differentiate. Far right and jihadist extremism are not the same. Don’t expect the same solutions to work. 12. Families can only do so much. Peers are an important group to work with. 13. Not all radicalisation is about youth, particularly in the far right. 14. Focus on communities of need, not faith. 15. Educate. Issues of structural racism and how they factor in what constitutes far right terrorism and extremism require more educative work. But this can only work within a listening framework, genuine dialogue and the building of trust.

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Understanding Radicalisation 1. Policymakers and programme designers should adopt a gendered approach to radicalisation, which recognises that gender matters throughout the radicalisation process. 2. Research from a gender perspective is needed on commonly held variables of radicalisation, to identify when and why men’s and women’s radicalisation differs. 3. Research is required to understand how violent extremist groups use gender in their recruitment processes and how gender discrimination and inequality contributes to women’s and men’s radicalisation. 4. Policymakers and academics need to explore, acknowledge and include the role of emotion (love, anger, depression) and resilience in all violent extremism, without relying on gender essentialism. 5. Gender stereotyped narratives should not be further supported by government security policies or by programme implementers. Narratives must be based on evidence.

Designing and Implementing CVE 6. Practitioners and programme designers should consider the milieu methodology as an approach and framework for CVE. 7. CVE policies need to be shaped according to ‘communities of need’ and not targeted at ‘religious communities’. 8. Research and needs assessments including from a gender perspective would help understand the complex range of risk factors, including gender-specific factors, that exist within a country and identify those individuals and groups who need assistance. 9. Actively listen to communities to allow them to form their own self-identification(s) and needs analysis as an essential part of CVE. 10. Gender empowerment and equality should not be seen as a tool for CVE but pursued in their own right. 11. Specific skills-based and capacity-building projects designed to build women’s capacity to engage in CVE need to be targeted at women who are likely to have an influence.

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Jihadist Violent Extremism-Specific Recommendations 12. CVE in western countries must seriously consider the negative impacts of hate crime and Islamophobia. 13. Future programmes should avoid focusing on women as ‘mothers only’ and, instead, promote diverse women’s roles, as leaders or active citizens. 14. CVE efforts should strengthen positive social networks, including those between men and women. 15. Media training led by terrorism experts is key to combating sensationalism and misrepresentation of jihadist Violent Extremism in the press. 16. The importance of the Internet in relation to women’s radicalisation to Daesh needs to be analysed in detail.

Far Right Extremism-Specific Recommendations 17. Educate. Few participants understood structural racism. Many understood racism as located in particular actors and behaviours. Terrorism, extremism and radicalisation were not terms routinely associated with the far right. 18. Do not patronise. Telling people what to think will not work. 19. Far right extremism should be addressed from a gendered and milieu-informed perspective. 20. Recognise that far right protest is dominated by men, but women are also active on the scene and can also oppose western liberal feminism as part of the ideology. 21. Recognise that some of the core narratives of the far right are likely to resonate with wider communities, even as they oppose racism. 22. Work with communities of need, which may be broad. 23. Avoid government discourse to counter Islamism that can be adopted as part of far or radical right narratives, for instance, the need for Muslims to integrate, to speak English. If this cannot be avoided, acknowledge the consequences of such choices. 24. Build trust. Understand the role of state rhetoric in far right radicalisation and right-wing populism. Right-wing populism is not simply about horizontal relationships with immigrants or racialised others; it is about trust in states and vertical relationships with institutions.

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25. In particular, state inaction to protect women’s rights and gender equality, including sexual abuse, is a key recruitment narrative; this means specific instances of injustice are likely to provide rallying points. 26. Governments should resist focusing on ‘national values’—which can become codes for differences and non-integration—in preventive efforts. 27. Media training led by terrorism experts is key to combating polarisation narratives in the press whilst maintaining independence and authenticity. 28. The boundaries between the far right, radical right, populist leaders and legitimate concerns of grassroots communities can be unclear. Action to tackle the far right is unlikely to work in the absence of broader efforts at social cohesion, including tackling hate crime and Islamophobia, and a wider lack of trust in key state actors. 29. Everyday experiences are the keystones of people’s responses to ideology: they speak from what they see and know. Many people feel not only that they lack a voice, but that their experiences are denied. Telling people what to say and think, without acknowledging the reasons for their views is unlikely to dissuade them from a far right or radical right path. 30. Work with tech companies to ensure fake news and propaganda is removed or flagged as such.

The Milieu Approach to CVE: Lessons An unintended outcome of this project was that during the process of conducting our studies, we realised we were engaging in what is known as ‘action research’. That is, the processes of the milieu approach themselves mapped onto what our participants and practitioners recommend as ‘good practice’ in CVE. Inadvertently it transpired that the milieu approach is not only an approach to research, but also potentially an initial approach to CVE within communities. The approach we adopted allowed participants to shape the terms of the engagement (they identified ways in which radicalisation differed for men and women, and constituted a gendered process, for instance), it entered into a dialogue with them that enabled discussion of assumptions and stereotypes (extremism stories were not just about women’s victimhood or violent jihadism), and it attempted to respond to participants’ concerns (through providing feedback to and

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engagement with other actors in the CVE field). In relation to the last point, clearly as researchers we could not implement their recommendations and suggestions, but we have actively promoted their agendas through this work and other engagement with practitioners and policymakers. Moreover, we found that the process itself contributed to enhanced engagement, knowledge and reflection on VE among our participants. In communities where VE had occurred, communities had knowledge and wanted to engage with CVE efforts, but often felt existing processes alienated them. The milieu approach as a process overcame this. We acknowledge that the idea of the milieu approach as action research needs to be investigated and demonstrated through additional studies, since we have not yet been able to carry out follow-up work to see if participants’ views have changed over time, nor have we explored whether participants ultimately felt participation had benefited them. We acknowledge this as a failing in our research design, and also a limitation of the time-span of the project. Therefore, our first recommendation is for practitioners and programme designers in particular to consider our methodology as an approach and framework for CVE, which can then be adapted to the particular circumstances and the communities with which they are working (see Winterbotham and Pearson 2020). There are three key elements of the milieu approach: the co-creation of knowledge; critical engagement with assumptions and core categories; and active listening. Co-creating Knowledge Our participants began to co-create knowledge about radicalisation and CVE in the process of engaging with us. It was the communities that framed their engagement with our work and shaped who ‘they are’ in the process of both the research and CVE. This means a key lesson for CVE is shaping policy according to ‘communities of need’. The research process and the findings suggest that CVE programmes work best when they are targeted at individuals or groups of individuals within communities identified to be most at risk of VE, and that vulnerability and resilience factors are often highly localised. Yet many CVE efforts to engage ‘Muslim communities’ work from an underpinning assumption of those communities as distinct from ‘wider society’ (understood by participants as ‘non-­ Muslim’) and to some degree are seen as homogeneous and flat—that is without consideration of internal differences in age, ethnicity, class, religiosity, political and social concerns and different levels of security, and of

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course without consideration of gender variation within that. Our research process challenges and works outside of efforts that are predicated on assumptions of Muslim difference and ‘vulnerability’ to jihadist extremism. We found that not only there is little compelling evidence to justify these broad community-based approaches (although, mindful of the findings of others in this area, we accept this might be the result of the lack of publicly available monitoring and evaluation data). People across countries in our research expressed frustration at the ways in which Muslims were repeatedly framed by governments in extractive terms, with an expectation of compliance with little benefit to the communities themselves. Allowing communities to form their own self-identification(s) and needs analysis is an essential part of CVE. In fact, when considering the far right, white supremacism, neo-Nazis or anti-Islam(ist) and radical right populist movements such as the English Defence League (EDL) or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the inapplicability of blanket CVE approaches becomes clear. The parallel logic is hard to uphold, given the white majorities of countries such as Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.  Reflecting this, as outlined throughout this book, we struggled to get participants, even in research sites selected due to issues with far right extremism, to engage in any serious way with the subject. Instead, they expressed the view that extremism and therefore efforts to counter it had little to do with them. Extremism was about Islamism, and violent jihad, they believed. Policymakers, donors and practitioners therefore need to ensure that CVE—particularly in western contexts where far right extremism is a growing threat—visibly moves beyond targeting communities of faith, towards targeting milieus where radicalisation has happened and that discourse on VE is not confined to any one ideology. Though this has improved significantly in recent years—and it should be noted that Germany, for example, has a history of targeting the far right—CVE is still predominantly associated with violent jihadist extremism. Practitioners should conduct research and needs assessments at the start of projects to understand gender in the complex range of possible risk factors that exist within a local area and to identify those individuals and groups who need assistance irrespective of the type of extremist ideology they adhere to. The literature suggests that social exclusion, difficulties at home, mistrust of authority and a need for belonging are as evident in accounts of pathways to far right groups as they are in those who join violent jihadist movements. It is equally important to maintain focus on

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this in relation to far right extremism, and indeed any other emergent extremism. Visible government-led or -financed CVE efforts in this space need to acknowledge that it is not only Muslim communities that are susceptible to radicalisation. However, this is not to suggest an artificial attempt to make these threats appear equal. People are alert to government attempts to socially manipulate events, and lack of trust in institutions including police and government was evident in focus groups. Tackling the far right should not become a pawn to win trust with Muslim communities, who have been wrongly targeted in the past; it must constitute a response to specific societal problems. The types of threats posed, the methods used, the degrees of violence, the ages involved, the locations, the resonances with wider society, the prevalence—these are not the same in the far right and violent jihad. They do not have the same degree of embeddedness in society. An appropriate response matters; not a politicised one. These threats do not even uniformly share gender norms (Pearson 2020), even though there are some shared features. Different types of threat require different responses. The milieu methodology also enabled participants to shape and craft knowledge of radicalisation as a process. Participants identified that radicalisation is a complex, non-linear, idiosyncratic process and that this is as true for women as it is for men. Yet participants’ understanding of gender also limited their understanding of radicalisation. We found that community norms on gender frame perceptions of men’s and women’s behaviour, including in relation to radicalisation. These gender narratives mean that family and friends may find women’s radicalisation less easy to spot. Community views reflected in this research and framing women radicals as ‘vulnerable’, ‘naïve’ or ‘groomed’ are only part of the story; such views contradict evidence that women who join Daesh have actively supported its principles, including violence. This is an aspect of support for Daesh that many women trying to return to their countries of origin from Iraq and Syria now deny. It is important to work with communities’ perceptions and assumptions, as well as their knowledge, if CVE is to succeed. We interviewed only one far right extremist, in Canada. Most of our work on the far right was with focus groups, carried out in places that had had problems with the far right in the past. Participants reiterated the point that the far right is hardly associated with extremism but more with criminality. Focus group participants said that they opposed the far right. But at times their discussions touched on feelings of injustice, fears about

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Muslim men, fears of being ‘second-class citizens’ or being labelled racist—these are all themes in far and radical right movements. At times conversations were difficult, and racist views expressed, despite expressions by participants that they were anti-racism. This was consistent with research showing that racism is rarely owned, and often located in the ‘other’ (Memmi 1999). It is clear that what matters in framing people’s attitudes to immigrant others, and to their own identity, is their relationship with their environment, with people within it, but also with the state, with police and with the discourses they hear from the government. Government must take responsibility and acknowledge the role it plays in managing the future of both the far right and right-wing populism. Once far right views are in the political centre, as the French focus groups suggested, it is difficult to deny them, or to manage them as extremism, which is by definition, a minority affair. Challenging far right recruitment and radicalisation additionally necessitates good education; there was little understanding of the structural constitution of racism in non-Muslim focus groups, and this enabled participants to locate the issues elsewhere. However, it was clear that participants also sought people who would listen; nobody was likely to change opinions based on their experiences, because external intervention providers told them such views were unacceptable or ‘wrong’. Their experiences mattered. Critical Engagement with Assumptions and Core Categories The second advantage of the milieu approach was that while our research began with our participants’ understanding, it did not end there. It also showed how and where community narratives and framings could be critically engaged and challenged, to further CVE. Our research showed that by allowing a process of co-production of knowledge, underlying assumptions about core categories (such as radicalisation and gender norms) were critiqued. This critique allowed us to engage in culturally appropriate ways to foster discussion with our participants. One finding and recommendation that emerged from this was a question mark over the boundaries and concerns of CVE. Some of the ambiguity about CVE itself and how participants engage with it is that CVE covers such a diverse range of policies, programmes, initiatives, debates and outcomes. Among the women we engaged with, there were many who were critical about how their role in CVE was imagined by practitioners and policymakers, and they questioned what the desired outcomes of

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CVE should be. Participants in our research, for example, questioned why efforts were being made to engage them in the security field, a realm they identified to lie within the control of the government. Additionally, as we discuss further below, Muslim women questioned the lives that governments imagine they live—as domestic housewives and mothers. Second, they questioned the focus on CVE at the expense of their security. For example, they realised that when integration activities and policies are blurred with counter-terrorism, and Muslim communities are engaged primarily on counter-terrorism issues, this can increase women’s insecurity and limit their autonomy. This occurs first because as communities come under increased scrutiny and surveillance in the name of CVE, women’s insecurities are marginalised as a community concern, and silenced by the new security concerns of men; and second, because there appears to be a correlation with an increase in religiously motivated hate crime targeting women as CVE and counter-terrorism debates focus on Muslim communities. Because women are often visibly Muslim in their appearance (wearing the hijab and other forms of Islamic dress), any conflation of integration efforts with those of counter-terrorism can, and does, as demonstrated visibly in our research in Canada in the wake of the 2015 attacks in Paris, increase women’s vulnerability in the public sphere. In particular, participants raised questions about the purpose of CVE in relation to women’s empowerment. Participants were not blind to the unequal way in which empowerment narratives are used in CVE to target Muslim communities, whilst ignoring the inequalities that women in other communities face. Additionally, the understanding of empowerment used in CVE is premised on particular ideals of the autonomous liberal rational man; but the methods of CVE and deradicalisation work rely on a more limited and constrained set of aspirations—the governable individual (Brown 2020). This mismatch between rhetoric (empowerment), its unequal deployment in CVE across Europe and North America and the limited goals of CVE is likely to undermine CVE practices and processes. The participants questioned the institutional knowledge of their lives, that shaped the empowerment narrative. The empowerment narrative argues that women lack empowerment in their communities and therefore seek it through VE—but this, as our participants highlight, ignores the wider structural conditions that limit women’s agency in North America and Europe that cannot be ascribed to ‘cultural norms’. This is not to deny that there is a connection between women’s advancement in society

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and violent extremism, but that the mechanism and relationship between women’s equality and a reduction in VE is less clear than some policymakers and practitioners assert. Therefore, we found that there is a need to address violence against women, including at the hands of violent extremist groups, and to seek opportunities for gender empowerment, but this does not always have to be accomplished under the banner of CVE.  Gender empowerment and equality should not be seen as a tool for CVE but pursued in their own right. This includes the need to avoid the linking of other harmful socio-­ cultural practices to terrorism, such as ‘female genital mutilation’ (FGM) and forced marriage. This securitises cultural debates in western and non-­ western contexts, without necessarily reducing the incidences of these practices (or violent extremism) and without necessarily supporting women who are victims of them. Active Listening An important component of the milieu approach was to listen to and take seriously a diverse range of participants—and not to assume only particular groups hold knowledge about CVE and VE (this is connected to our first component). CVE programming that is not responsive to what communities want and need will not work—therefore, active listening is needed from the outset in order to determine what outputs, outcomes and activities will work within a community. It is worth re-emphasising that if women are disempowered at home or in the community, they are not easily able to engage in the public space or participate in programming. In particularly male-dominated societies, women’s voices may still not be listened to either by their husbands or by their children, even when they have participated in CVE programming. Though women participants in our research did not express significant concerns about being disempowered, many suggested that children would pay little attention to them or suggested that their husbands had access to more information on security issues in any case. There is a need to recognise how gender dynamics in western societies might act to negate women’s power in the home and also in the public realm. Active listening through the milieu approach, in order to identify community CVE goals requires gender-sensitive engagement. This means not assuming that women will participate in particular ways, or that the outcomes of their participation are guaranteed. Indeed, if women’s general

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security concerns are being marginalised within a community (e.g. about domestic violence or unemployment) then there is little to indicate that their concerns about VE will be acted upon within that community. A gender focus in CVE programming at the outset of programme design, including in any context analysis and needs assessment, should help identify existing power dynamics, identify gender relations and facilitate the identification of positive ways of engaging sensitively with women in a range of different contexts. The milieu approach permits stakeholders interested in CVE to allow local groups, including women’s groups, to determine if and how they participate in CVE efforts. Building women’s skills—for example in dialogue or public speaking—does not equate with influence. Specific skills-based and capacity-building projects designed to build women’s capacity to engage in CVE need to be targeted at women who are likely to have an influence. ‘Ordinary’ women we engaged with throughout our research wondered why they would have any specific skills or ability to engage in radicalisation and suggested that they had greater priorities and demands on their time in any case. In other words, women’s priorities for enhancing their security may not focus on VE and would suggest to stakeholders that there are other policy areas to address first before engaging in CVE work. We discuss this more below. What the participants felt about engaging with, and responding to CVE and VE significantly depended upon their wider context and government interactions. The milieu approach encourages participants and practitioners to reflect on how interventions and engagement connects to a whole-of-society approach to CVE.  This raises challenges about the boundaries of CVE, and risks of the securitisation and instrumentalisation of other areas of social policy—such as healthcare, education and community development. A significant part of this research showed how communities and individuals themselves determined the acceptable boundaries of CVE—and that these were necessarily different for far right and violent jihadist extremism, as well as for the different communities. Therefore, for CVE to work in these North American and European contexts it must seriously consider wider issues such as Islamophobia, which may be more important to specific communities themselves and needs to be taken seriously. This affects how Muslim communities respond to government policies and programmes. The research confirmed previous work showing that who is implementing an intervention is as important as what that intervention is. CVE interventions also need to be delivered by trusted sources. Good practice

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suggests that CVE is most effective when those who deliver and design CVE are trusted as acting in the best interests of the communities they engage with. It is likely that those who are trusted are not situated in the security sector. For example, the research revealed a lack of trust in the police within communities, due to their failure to protect young people, or to adequately respond to reported cases of radicalisation. However, what the issues are and how communities engage will vary; issues such as hate crime and Islamophobia were important to Muslim participants; meanwhile issues such as immigration were important to non-Muslims interviewed. It is important for policymakers and implementers to take seriously concerns from communities, whether on the threat of hate crime or Islamophobia or on feeling that ‘national values’ are at risk. This does not, however, mean focusing on national values in preventive efforts since, as noted earlier, national values are actually undefined and can therefore be codes for assumptions of difference and non-integration. Instead, CVE work involves listening to communities’ fears and responding to them visibly and vocally, in ways that satisfy communities but conform to principles of anti-racism, social cohesion and tolerance. Robust active listening does not mean losing sight of these core values. One way of responding to this is to adopt a participatory approach to CVE programmes—such as the milieu approach. This entails getting communities themselves to identify the challenges, define the indicators of violent extremism, outline the outcomes they would like to see and participate in monitoring and evaluation. This could help ease some of the fatigue and resistance from communities to engaging in CVE policies and programmes. In relation to listening and far right violent extremism, there is a need for education. Participants presented a clear picture of some of the challenges faced, and attractions of far right rhetoric; they also evidenced a lack of awareness of structural racism and the ways in which white male power is routinely and institutionally privileged. The research period represents an interesting moment in time, just before a wave of electoral support for right-wing populist leaders transnationally. The countries researched were at different stages in this journey. Germany was responding to the so-called migrant crisis, which had not touched the other countries of research in the same way. Germany also had a history of challenging the far right. France was grappling with the steady move of the formerly far right Front National to the political centre. All participants were reflecting on events not just in their own country but globally. What was

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clear across countries was that perceptions of Islam were combining with other factors to produce uncertainty: media reports of incidents—some real, some not—combined with people’s understanding of what citizenship means and what states owe citizens, alongside people’s everyday experiences, to produce particular views, and in gendered terms. Nationalist expectations of state protection of citizens and women—cornerstones of state identity-building for centuries—mattered in shaping feelings about immigration in non-Muslim focus groups. Perhaps most importantly, people’s local space was crucial in determining their feelings about change, whether this was about feeling unsafe in the street, or feeling disorientated by changes in people or places. This enabled participants to neglect the ways in which local events are part of wider structural power dynamics. Many of the insecurities participants reported have a rational basis—and some resonate with far right rhetoric. It is important to work at the local level to understand the factors mobilising right-wing populism, and not to dismiss the feelings people have with regard to changes in their local space. These changes matter. It is within these local areas that work needs to be done to ensure the cordon sanitaire between the far right and mainstream politics remains.

Findings on Ve and Cve: Lessons This section of the recommendations now turns to specific lessons implicated by the research Findings chapters. Gendered Radicalisation Adopting a gendered approach to radicalisation would work to challenge stereotypes and assumptions regarding the role of men and women in radicalisation. This includes taking seriously the role of emotion and of resilience, which came up frequently in accounts of paths into Daesh, in both men’s and women’s radicalisation processes. Because gender is almost always associated with women in theory and policy on VE and CVE, how gender factors in men’s radicalisation is neglected (Pearson 2016), including how violent extremist groups employ masculinities. This narrow reading of gender blinds practitioners and scholars to the emotional attachments necessary to men’s involvement in and recruitment to violence. For example, proving one’s masculinity can play a central role in recruitment and needs to be understood in counter-radicalisation approaches. It is also important that men too are recognised to be victims of violence committed by violent groups, state agents or others, and can

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respond by radicalising. Sexual and gender-based violence can impact both women and men. The truth is also that agency can be lacking for both women and men in violent conflict. The Findings supported the importance of the search for identity in the radicalisation process to jihadist violent extremism. Young people described ambivalent feelings about modern society and the nation state, and their roles or agency within it. Older people who had seen first-­hand how youth join Daesh reported the same. In our research, grievances appear to become ‘active’ in catalysing radicalisation (to Daesh) when combined with both personal discrimination and inadequate coping mechanisms. Young men appear to lack coping mechanisms and resilience; for young women self-esteem was indicated, alongside feelings of anger and powerlessness at restrictions in the West on the expression of their faith, whether from within their community or in wider society. Policymakers and academics therefore need to explore, acknowledge and include the role of emotion and trauma in violent extremism, without relying on gender essentialism. In regard to the rise of the far right, radical right and right-wing populist politics, emotion and gender also have a part to play. Participants understood far right activism as an almost inevitable aspect of white male criminality. They did not recognise this as socially constructed, or part of structural power dynamics. Participants also described their own affective relationships with their surroundings. Emotional attachments to place, to nation and to community mattered to people; when these were disrupted, people felt insecure. They also felt pain and at times anger. It is important to acknowledge the ways in which emotion is active in shaping political opinions and to recognise that counter-narratives, utilising intellectual arguments or telling people that they are simply wrong, are unlikely to work and may have an emotional effect that produces the opposite of the desired result. Education here is vital, and it must work with communities, as well as challenging them. Diversity of Women in VE and CVE: Not Only Victims and Mothers While it is important not to overestimate women’s roles in violent groups—particularly homosocial movements such as jihadist groups or the far right—it is equally important not to assume women are always victims. Though grooming narratives can be relevant to recruitment, particularly in the case of minors, to use only a grooming lens to understand women’s radicalisation is an over-simplification; it can lead to policy responses

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fixated on women’s vulnerability and men’s guilt, and unable to see alternatives. Because of such fixations, rarely have CVE programmes focused specifically on reducing women’s recruitment (Winterbotham 2020). This is not to say that grooming does not happen, and this was clearly reflected in our interviews with participants. Grooming is about power, and men in terrorist organisations are often placed in gendered hierarchies that give them power over women. However, we heard accounts of women ‘grooming’ women, which countered the expected pattern of recruitment. We need therefore to be better at understanding the ways in which gender and power are entwined, whilst acknowledging that flawed counter-terrorism narratives can additionally reinforce gender stereotypes, such as the notion of the—naïve—‘jihadi bride’. To fully understand violent extremism and violent extremist groups in order to counter them, it is important to focus on exploring and understanding the broader supportive roles people, particularly women, play in terrorist groups. Their roles were outlined in Chap. 2 and include fundraising, logistics and planning, recruitment, propaganda and glorifying activities, cooking and cleaning for fighters and marrying them. They also however have included violence. Commonly held variables of radicalisation, such as economic or education factors, which have historically been explored from a male perspective, need to be reconsidered from a gender perspective and further research on the relationship to, and role of gender conducted in this area. For example, greater research is needed on women’s lack of parity in employment and education and how this impacts on women’s engagement in violent extremism. The fact that women’s inability to exercise their full citizenship including their ability to work if they chose to wear the hijab, for example, was identified to be a concern for Muslim participants, particularly in countries where there is a ban on certain types of dress in the public sphere. Participants in our research could understand why some women felt that the so-called Caliphate was seen as a space in which pious young women might feel accepted, even if the reality itself was very different. Our research also revealed that highly gendered norms and expectations regulate both public and private life in ways that shape the possibilities for men’s and women’s radical action, and the spaces in which this might occur. For example, our research found that women might be more vulnerable in the online ‘private space’. Face-to-face radicalisation may disproportionately affect men. Recruiters are frequently from the same backgrounds as those they are targeting and understand the arguments and tactics that are most likely to appeal. How violent groups construct norms is crucial to understanding their violence, yet how gender features

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in violent extremist ideology or action is often overlooked. Policymakers and practitioners therefore need to ensure they take a gendered approach to counter the recruitment and ideologies of violent extremist groups since, as noted above, these are fundamentally gendered. These differences are likely to be highly localised and contextually specific. In particular, more research is required to understand how violent extremist groups use gender in their recruitment processes and how gender discrimination and inequality contributes to women’s or men’s radicalisation. We recommend CVE programmes avoid stereotypes and reductive approaches. Ensuring that all projects are designed from a gender perspective, based on evidence, should help to identify any gender-specific factors of all types of radicalisation in order to improve intervention designs. The role of the Internet in relation to women’s radicalisation to Daesh needs to be considered further given the growing body of evidence regarding the potential for women’s greater vulnerability online, in relation to jihadist violent extremism particularly. Narratives supporting ideas that women are always peaceful or moderate should not be further supported by government security policies or by programme implementers. Such assertions risk reproducing assumptions that can undermine security efforts. A myopic focus on women as vulnerable or brainwashed could mean failing to address the very real political, social or religious grievances behind women’s radicalisation processes. Mothers are clearly important both in Muslim and non-Muslim families, and motherhood is also framed as an acceptable role through which women can access political participation in both jihadist and far right groups. The ‘maternalist logic’ of CVE, which prioritises engagement with women as mothers in order to identify and prevent male threat, was therefore criticised in our research. This is a narrow understanding of motherhood that fails to challenge negative gender dynamics and re-entrenches stereotypical ideas of women including orientalist assumptions of women’s roles in society. Future programmes should assess the relevance of the ‘maternalist logic’ Brown (2013) notes as underpinning CVE. The maternalist logic needs to be contextualised and not presumed. Mothers in our research were often perplexed when asked about what roles they should play. Though willing to help tackle extremism and to protect their children, they more frequently pointed to the numerous demands on their time that already existed, asked about the role of fathers—some of whom were identified by both mothers and children to have more influence—and questioned whether governments were trying to absolve their own responsibility in this area.

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Programmes focused on working with mothers within CVE have revealed some positive impacts, particularly in relation to mothers’ confidence in their ability to discuss and address radicalisation issues with their children, and to access support from within the community, including with local police, when concerns arise (Winterbotham 2020). Further evidence is, however, required to assess whether this has actually increased mothers’ ability to observe signs of radicalisation and to intervene appropriately. Independent evaluations focused on demonstrating impact specific to security goals are recommended, as well as appropriate buy-in from communities, to ensure women do not feel an extra ‘security’ burden; as our participants articulated, “why women, why us?” We recommend focus on supporting women-led civil society organisations. Meanwhile, it is important to combat negative stereotypes about men, and make space for positive masculinities in a security context. The higher incidence of male radicalisation to Daesh meant many Muslim participants felt a role for fathers as role models including as carers was particularly desirable, especially for sons. Parenthood is a joint responsibility. CVE in families should consider how both parents could work together to counter violent extremism, including providing fathers with tools in preventive efforts. Policymakers and CSOs working in this space need to consider the growing body of evidence, which emphasises the social nature of radicalisation and the greater influence of peer groups, and be sympathetic to the reality that, irrespective of capacity-building or training, mothers and parents more generally may have severe limitations in preventing radicalisation not least due to the numerous other pressing concerns that they have. CVE efforts should therefore look to strengthen the positive social and peer networks available to those who may be vulnerable to violent extremism through, for example, group activities in high-risk areas. Differentiate Between Different Forms of VE If CVE aimed at resisting violent jihadism is often focused on Muslim communities, the same logic cannot be said to apply to efforts to counter the far right. However, it is noted that the emphasis on CVE tackling the far right is shifting in European countries, in light of the growing threat. We recommend that governments and particularly the media continue to acknowledge that terrorism comes in many forms and ideologies, and new movements emerge at different times. Far right violence is also associated with ideology, not just criminality, and needs to be addressed as such. In

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France, focus group participants expressed views that the far right was part of human nature, or that racism had been mainstreamed. Participants elsewhere and in communities where the far right had been an issue sometimes framed this as criminality, rather than extremism, or violent extremism. As discussed in the previous chapter, this perception has clear implications for CVE to counter the far right, both in terms of scope, (whether it fits the CVE paradigm), delivery (criminality suggesting this would fall to the police), and methods (more straightforwardly punitive approaches versus counter-narratives). The ways in which people define and understand far right extremism impact on the likely success of measures aimed at working with communities to prevent it. Role of the Media Daesh has demonstrated sophisticated media capabilities and dissemination of slick digital content to accelerate recruitment. The far right are also proving increasingly adept at using online content to recruit and radicalise. Our research focus groups made clear the importance of media narratives on the formation of opinion on extremism. The media can, inadvertently, strengthen the narratives of violent extremist groups. The responsibility of the media in producing discourses around Islam and Daesh was a subject that arose organically as part of this research. Many young Muslims in our study perceive the media to be biased against Islam, homogenising Muslims and either implicitly or explicitly encouraging distorted, generalised views of their faith. At the same time, how the media treats individuals engaged in violent extremism can significantly influence public opinion. This is particularly the case with women violent extremists. For example, media attention on the case of Shamima Begum in the UK entrenched the public, and possibly political, viewpoint that Begum was ‘exceptional’ and that ‘extraordinary’ measures should be taken against her, including the deprivation of British citizenship. Training of journalists, led by terrorism experts is key to combating sensationalism and polarisation whilst maintaining independence and authenticity. This includes ensuring that media narratives do not obscure reality: the ‘jihadi bride’ is a powerful image but not necessarily a true one.

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Conclusions These recommendations are drawn from our methodology, the milieu approach, the research presented here, our knowledge of the field, and the existing literature on best practice in CVE. Some re-emphasise existing expert advice. They are not always straightforward, nor are they easy to implement. However, even where CVE is difficult to do well, we should not give up. Gendered CVE is rife with tensions and contradictions, some of which, we have shown, can be harmful, or can be perceived as harmful to communities. The aim of CVE is to do no harm and reduce risk, and we believe that the three areas suggested here—the co-creation of knowledge; critical engagement with assumptions; active listening—in conjunction with evidence-­ based strategies to understand radicalisation as gendered, provide a good basis for improved engagement with communities and more effective outcomes. We build on these recommendations and the arguments made in the book in the final concluding chapter.

References Brown, Katherine E. 2013. Gender and Counter-Radicalisation: Women and Emerging Counter-Terror Measures. In Gender, National Security and Counter-Terrorism, ed. Jayne Huckerby and Margaret L. Satterthwaite. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. ———. 2020. Gender, Religion and Extremism: Finding Women in AntiRadicalisation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brown, Katherine E., Jayne Huckerby, and Laura Shepherd. 2019. Gender Mainstreaming Principles, Dimensions and Priorities for PVE. New  York: UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/ 2019/09/gender-mainstreaming-principles-dimensions-and-prioritiesfor-pve. Chowdhury Fink, Naureen, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bhulai, ed. 2016. A Man’s World: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Hedayah and the Global Centre on Cooperative Security. http:// www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_ FULL.pdf. Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. 2019. From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’ II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the Fall of the Caliphate. CTC Sentinel 12 (6): 30–45. Council of Europe. 1998. What is Gender Mainstreaming? https://www.coe.int/ en/web/genderequality/what-is-gender-mainstreaming. De Leede, Seran. 2019. Women and Women’s Organisation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. In NATO Science for Peace and Security

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Series—E: Human and Societal Dynamics volume 144, ed. Sara Zeiger, Rogelio Alonso, José Herrera, and Lilah El Sayed. De Leede, Seran, Renate Haupfleisch, Katja Korolkova, and Monika Natter. 2017. Radicalisation and Violent Extremism—Focus on Women: How Women Become Radicalised and How to Empower Them to Prevent Radicalisation, STUDY, December. Amsterdam: IOS Press. Dufour-Genneson, Ségolène, and Mayesha Alam. 2014. Women and Countering Violent Extremism. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/women-and-counteringviolent-extremism/. GAPS. 2018. Prioritise Peace—Challenging Approaches to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism from a Women, Peace and Security Perspective. GAPS, April. GCTF. 2015. Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism. https://www.thegctf.org/Por tals/1/Documents/Framework%20 Documents/A/GCTF-Good-Practices-on-Women-and-CVE.pdf. ———. 2019. Good Practices on Women in Violent Extremism. Huckerby, Jayne. 2016. Women, Gender, and the U.K. Government’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Efforts: Looking Back and Forward. In A Man’s World: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, ed. Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bhulai. Hedayah and the Global Centre on Cooperative Security. ———. 2020. In Harm’s Way: Gender and Human Rights in National Security. Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 27 (1): 179–202. Ladbury, Sarah. 2015. Women and Extremism: The Association of Women and Girls with jihadi Groups and Implications for Programming. Independent Paper Prepared for the Department of International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 January. Memmi, Albert. 1999. Racism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 2013. Women and Terrorist Radicalization: Final Report. Vienna, Austria: OSCEODIHR. http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99919. ———. 2019. Understanding the Role of Gender in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism Good Practices for Law Enforcement. Vienna: OSCE. https://www.osce.org/secretariat/420563 ?download=true. Pearson, Elizabeth. 2016. The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad. Policy and Internet 8 (1): 5–33. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.101. ———. 2020. Gendered Reflections? Extremism in the UK’s Radical Right and al-Muhajiroun Networks. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/1057610X.2020.1759270.

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Pearson, Elizabeth, and Emily Winterbotham. 2017. Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation. The RUSI Journal 162 (3): 60–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03071847.2017.1353251. RAN. 2019. Ex Post Paper: Gender and EXIT Work. RAN EXIT Working Group. Saltman, Erin Marie, and Ross Frenett. 2016. Female Radicalization to ISIS and the Role of Women in CVE. In A Man’s World: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, ed. Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bhulai. Hedayah and the Global Centre on Cooperative Security. Schmidt, R. 2018. Duped: Why Gender Stereotypes Are Leading to Inadequate Deradicalization and Disengagement Strategies. TSAS Working Paper 18-07. Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society. UN Web TV. 2014. Panel Discussion on “The Role of Women in Countering Violent Extremism”, 27 October. Organized by the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. http://webtv.un.org/search/therole-of-women-in-countering-violent-extremism-panel-discussion/ 3862565549001/?term=2014%20Gender%20Equality%20and%20the%20 Empowerment%20of%20Women.&sort=date&page=132. Winterbotham, Emily. 2020. What Can Work (and What Has Not Worked) in Women-Centric P/CVE Initiatives: Assessing the Evidence Base for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, RUSI Occasional Papers, The Prevention Project, Tackling Extremism, Terrorism and Conflict, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/what-canwork-and-what-has-not-worked-women-centric-pcve-initiatives Winterbotham, Emily, and Elizabeth Pearson. 2020. The Radical Milieu: A Methodological Approach to Conducting Research on Violent Extremism. Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network. https://doi.org/10.37805/ rve2020.4. Zeiger, Sara, and Rogelio Alonso. 2019. An Overview of Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. In NATO Science for Peace and Security Series—E: Human and Societal Dynamics Volume 144, ed. Sara Zeiger, Rogelio Alonso, José Herrera, and Lilah El Sayed. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusions: The Future of Gender, Violent Extremism and CVE

This book is the result of engagement with people affected by violent extremism and strategies to counter violent extremism in different ways, and in different countries. Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK each have different histories. They have different immigration patterns, different ways of governing and different strategies on the prevention of terrorism, an issue which has affected each country in specific ways. This research was about talking to people in these countries—more than 250 people in total—to see what problems were shared and which were unique. It was a project aimed at better understanding the gender dynamics of radicalisation, and how to counter it. It did not engage only with women, because gender is also about men. Gender is too often read as a synonym for women, and this study set out to take a different approach, using an innovative milieu methodology and exploring two ideologies, the far right and jihadist extremism. The authors have sought to make clear that the current state of play for gender and the field of security studies, IR and policy on terrorism has probably never been better. Where once scholars struggled to have calls for gender taken seriously, institutions from the United Nations (UN) to the European Union (EU) alongside many nation states call for gender mainstreaming as a routine part of policy. This is positive. So too are efforts to empower women, to increase their capacity to access the public sphere, and to improve their quality of life, consistent with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Women are still too frequently the targets of © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8_9

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extremist violence. Empowerment can help women learn how to face the challenges of violence, and how to seek the help to stop it. However, we are now at a crucial moment: the point where gender is taken for granted in terms of inclusion in security is the point where gendered policy should be further honed. It is not enough to routinely ‘do’ gender, although this matters; what is important is to attend to the nuance of policy so that it is implemented in ways that reduce the risks of harm, to men, to women and to communities. Following the critique of others (Ní Aoláin and Huckerby 2018), we argue that ‘gender-lite’ approaches are insufficient. This is crucial, because if we don’t understand how gender factors in violent extremism, it is going to be difficult to effectively counter it. It is therefore also clear that, although it is in many cases being done well, by committed and caring people, gendered CVE could be done better. Communities told us this was the case. For instance, the findings presented here make clear that it is not enough for ‘gendered CVE’ to rely on women alone, and nor should it. Instead, policy on radicalisation and terrorism should consider the specific effects on women and men, and the specific threats posed by them. There are other criticisms that were outlined: the securitisation of women, the assumption of risk around men. Noting the potential negative consequences of gendered CVE is not a reason to abandon it, however. It is a reason to commit to better, more thoughtful strategy, based on evidence and consultation with the communities being partnered. There are limits to our research, and our recommendations, as the data and focus of this work are Europe and North America. This means that the findings (such as those regarding mothers) may not directly translate to other contexts (e.g. in communities where a significant percentage of women do not have paid employment). Yet the principle of not reinforcing gender stereotypes and working in line with international human rights and women’s rights obligations is an important component of CVE (Brown et al. 2019; Brown 2020; Huckerby 2020). The other limit of our research and recommendations is that the data were gathered before there was significant consideration of the future lives of men and women who travelled to Iraq and Syria in order to join or fight for groups designated by the UN as terrorist organisations (not just Daesh). Our focus was therefore not on de-radicalisation and EXIT work per se, which has its own challenges. However, our research still has implications for these cognate areas of intervention. In particular, our research methodology (the milieu approach) required listening to communities and suggests that understanding their perspectives better can help prepare communities for the

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return of those who travelled overseas, just as it helps create better CVE programming. Reintegration is known to be extremely difficult for men and women where they have left their communities to participate in terrorism. Women face additional stigmatisation from their communities for having transgressed twice (violating gender norms on prohibition of violence and social norms on the prohibition of violence) (Eggert 2020; RAN 2019; Brown et al. 2019). On this theme, this final chapter sets out some of the key concerns and questions raised through the book, and what areas future work might look at. We have already made a number of recommendations in the preceding chapter. Now, we set out the key arguments made in these pages, based on the fieldwork conducted, and the reported experiences of the participants to this study. There are four key arguments. The first is clear—that gender matters and that it is not just about women, but an intersectional approach. This means seeing the ways and layers in which power operates in the factors of violent extremism, and in the societies in which it occurs. This must include consideration of gender in the personal, social, ideological and organisational and the intersections between them. Linked to this, we must act to disrupt the inevitability of a maternalist logic in CVE.  The second is that we must listen to local communities because local knowledge is key. This argument relates to the innovative methodology employed, and the insistence upon a milieu-driven approach, not one that stigmatises communities. The milieu approach instead seeks to recognise the ways in which their knowledge is formed, and sees them as vulnerable not just to Daesh, but interventions to counter it. Third, different extreme ideologies, in different populations, present different issues. Obviously, this means they require different responses. Yet too often the discussion about jihadist extremism is equated to questions about tackling the far right, and vice versa. The simple difficulty of identifying and accessing the research communities relevant to each of the movements addressed here demonstrates in itself one key way in which they differ. Fourth, evidence matters. We need gendered evidence to tell us when CVE works and when it doesn’t. And if this evidence comes from consultation with communities, we need not just to listen but also to act.

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Argument 1: Gender Matters One of the core points of this book is to outline not just that gender matters in radicalisation thinking—for many this is a given—but some of the precise details of how. The institutional requirement for gender mainstreaming that we outlined at the start of this book can only be a positive. However, what this often translates to is a tick-box engagement with gender: an audit of how many women took part in any given series of seminars; a woman at the head of an initiative; a woman’s name on a report. This is not engagement with gender. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the emergence of Daesh was that its call to men and women finally meant that policymakers could no longer afford to ignore gender. A report from Cook and Vale (2018) was ground-breaking because, for the first time, it presented an account of the scale of women’s and girls’ support for and involvement in Daesh. That governments had to engage with women as a result of the ways in which Daesh recruited and propagandised to men and women alike is important. Engagement with women is not only on the basis of their potential radicalisation, but also because women’s security is negatively affected by VE groups. As UN Under-Secretary-General and UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (2018) stated, “Terrorists and violent extremists have increasingly targeted women and women’s rights as a tactic of terrorism,” and there is “deep concern that acts of sexual and gender-based violence are known to be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain terrorist groups and are used as an instrument to increase their power through supporting financing and recruitment and through the destruction of communities”. Furthermore, states must engage with women and gender mainstreaming because agreed-to international human rights obligations, as identified in the Women, Peace and Security agenda, require states to ensure women’s meaningful participation. The Plan of Action (UNSC 2016), like the Reference Guide to National Action Plans, has strong connections to the Women, Peace and Security agenda that is expressed in UNSCR 1325. The Plan of Action draws on the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s (2015) report to the Security Council, which noted that a commitment to women’s peace and security (our emphasis):

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is not just a principled endeavor; there is an underlying uncompromising rationale in pursuing gender mainstreaming across our prevention work, and it is quite simply that this leads to stronger analysis of the root causes of conflict in societies, and thus to better informed and better designed prevention and mediation efforts. (p. 10)

Thinking about gender must also include thinking about men and the differences in power relations within groups. Violent extremist groups also mobilise particular violent masculinities often in response to real, or perceived, violations of women’s honour and women’s security by state actors, or apparently sanctioned by state actors. In Chaps. 1, 2 and 7, we outlined the ways in which different ideologies have different gendered beliefs. Gender ideals are also embedded into the ‘end state’ of VE groups. Some far right groups share with jihadist organisations a traditional and conservative view of gender relations, with women’s natural place secured through caring roles in the home and family, and men acting as the providers and protectors. The performative and structural conditions of gender imagined here are of unequal gender hierarchies that support other racialised hierarchies of extremist groups. This helps us clarify VE groups’ ideas of belonging. If we fail to understand the ways in which ideologies position men and women, and the roles they are meant to adopt, we fail to understand the potential of a group for violence and who might take part in that violence. This clearly matters when thinking about security threats, also prevention, prosecution and policy. It was clear in Chap. 7 that gender both constructed and enabled particular forms of far right discourse, as well as racism. In the Findings chapters, when people talked to us about how young people had joined Daesh, a picture emerged of overlaying factors: individual, local, familial, public, private, virtual, national, societal, cultural, global, religious. Each reflected the constructed element of gender. Each layer was evident in the stories of the participants, which related to a bigger picture than their lives alone. When a young woman wearing a long black dress and niqab sits in front of you in a focus group and describes why she can understand that, for other young women, Daesh might represent a Utopian state, where she could imagine feeling free—even as she denounces it—she is telling you more than what she feels about Daesh. She is describing her relationship as a woman with the state; with Islam; with her body; and with her fellow citizens. It is impossible for such responses to be divorced from bodies, from gender. When a group of

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women in Canada describe being spat at and abused in the street, their hijabs pulled, following the 2015 attacks in Paris, they are describing a gendered response to a series of events in which gender plays a crucial part. When men claiming to represent Islam blow up bombs in cities thousands of miles away, women trying to live their lives as Muslims are affected, because they are women and more visibly obvious as targets. The research uncovered many factors of radicalisation that are familiar to the existing literature, and some that were not. Participants attested to the diversity of their communities through what they told us about intergenerational difficulties, difficulties within families and between siblings. This should not surprise us. Our focus groups revealed real differences for men and women, boys and girls, in the practical mechanisms of radicalisation to jihadist groups. They described issues concerning the different access of young men and women to public spaces. Such stories also came from professionals. They described how Internet radicalisation was, in their experience in CVE, a more prevalent aspect of women’s radicalisation, while face-to-face contacts affected recruitment more in men and boys. National debates on the headscarf and veil, as suggested above, particularly alienate young Muslim women. Part of the allure of Daesh for young women may have been the prospect of full citizenship and a feeling that this would never be a possibility for them in the West. If such complex dynamics are not recognised, it is hard for CVE to move beyond simplistic applications of gender. If the sum total of work on gender is to generate ‘women’s radicalisation’ and ‘women’s violent extremism’ as discrete bodies of knowledge owned by feminist scholars, rather than used to challenge or refine existing assumptions in the ‘malestream’ about the processes of radicalisation, this raises questions about how gender is actually applied in academia as well as CVE. Women in our study wanted more complexity from governments in how they are engaged, whilst also seeing that some of the ways in which policies are implemented do have value. Take for instance the idea of the ‘maternalist’ logic in CVE. Yes, it is true that women who were mothers embraced their roles as such; but they did not want to be reduced to only that role. Muslim and non-Muslim women alike had diverse roles, many inevitably had jobs; some young women were students; some women had grandchildren, as well as children; some were single parents and sole providers for their families. While focus group participants broadly welcomed help and support to counter violent extremism, there were also reservations about the ways in which gender was instrumentalised in current approaches.

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Participants did not need to have heard the phrase ‘maternalist logic’ to feel that this was how governments sought to engage them, and to resist this; not because being mothers did not matter, but because they did not trust the government framings within CVE of that role. This meant there were also significant challenges to the specific focus on women in CVE, particularly Muslim women, even where help to counter radicalisation was needed and sought. Many Muslims suggested that women’s empowerment was counter-productive if it asked them to prioritise state security over family life, or if it cast them as oppressed by Islam, and in need of modernisation, or somehow ‘responsible’ for the radicalisation of their children. Women and men, however, did recognise that in practical terms, mothers had an important role to play in families, and also supported women’s ability to influence CVE in the public space, as leaders, teachers and workers. Women in the focus groups took their role in families seriously, and they wanted support, training, facilities, funding, resources. They wanted this from the government and from their own communities and the men within them. However, women’s influence within families was recognised as sometimes limited. This was due both to sexism and patriarchy, and to other strong influences on young people, such as peers and social media (in relation to men and women). Men we spoke to also wanted and needed to be engaged in CVE as positive role models, such as fathers. Participants gave no clear direction for the optimal location of delivery of CVE strategy. Families clearly matter, but so too do communities. Young people are the main demographic of concern, and peer groups are a key influence. Muslim communities are targeted by Daesh recruiters, but so too are converts from outside those communities. There is no easy way to reach all the locations. Particular demographics within Muslim communities—women who do not speak the national language or have limited access to the public sphere—are framed as ‘hard to reach’ and singled out as a problem, despite the lack of evidence to support this. Communities, particularly in countries with long-standing CVE programmes, such as the UK, felt they had spoken endlessly about why they did not wholeheartedly support intervention strategies. Many people were resistant to our attempts to discuss this once again. What was the point of talking about this, many said, if it would not result in change?

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Argument 2: Local Knowledge and Ownership of P/CVE Is Key This research was driven by the goal of accumulating the expertise of people in communities affected by P/CVE and VE, and learning from their perspectives on the relationship between gender, violent extremism and radicalisation, and women’s roles in countering it. We were interested not just in how needed CVE programmes engaging women were, but how wanted. In speaking to participants in focus groups we frequently heard the same stories, in different locations and in different languages. The world today is a small place, and events in one country, such as Daesh attacks in Paris, had global consequences. These were political and also personal. For example, after the Bataclan assault on Paris by Daesh in November 2015, we heard as described above about subsequent Islamophobic assaults on Muslim women going about their daily lives in Toronto in Canada. We spoke to Muslim communities; we talked also to those in areas that have been affected by the far right, now and also in the past. In many cases we gained insights from what we termed ‘community experts’—people who had direct experiences of radicalisation—personally, in their families, or in the neighbourhood. No one interviewed was isolated from the violence and insecurity stemming from Daesh-related terrorism and the new wave of the far right and also right-wing populism seen across Europe, America and beyond. All were affected by the global context that was the backdrop to this nine-month study. Some participants had lived in a number of different countries, they had relatives across the globe, they understood and were touched by issues beyond their immediate borders. They were ‘diverse’ in many meanings of the word and expressed a range of opinions. None should be read as ‘speaking for’ any group in its entirety. Their perspectives were based on experience, but also particular understandings of complex issues. Sometimes participants contradicted professional expert opinion. That in itself is significant. How people interpret issues of radicalisation and extremism in their own communities and how they believe it should be countered impact on the efficacy of any intervention. These voices matter. Indeed, all communities described the disempowering effects of not being listened to. For Muslim communities this was focused on a perception of constant and long-term blame for a problem that they feel has nothing to do with them. For non-Muslim communities this centred on feelings that their views were marginal, and political correctness prevented

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debate. In this age of apparent polarisation and online incivility, all focus groups expressed a desire for genuine dialogue, within communities, between communities and in the national space. All felt the topic of radicalisation was a taboo one, that was not talked about enough, but that was of concern. As Chap. 6 explored, this was also a question of trust: trust in the media, in government, in the police and in other communities. Trust is vital to social cohesion, and social cohesion to the prevention of violence. Communities suggested that when they are repeatedly not listened to, they lose trust. It is imperative for state institutions and the media to gain trust with the public, not to lose it. What local communities know is important in understanding how violent extremism takes place, and in how it is countered. The point of the milieu approach was to enable and empower local communities to speak and to emphasise the forms of knowledge they produce. This research was aimed not at imposing our views upon communities, but in going into their local spaces, meeting on their terms and listening to what they had to say and the emotions that came with that. It was also about permitting them to shape the discussion to their own agendas. Listening to participants’ stories in Muslim community focus groups made clear that in half the groups participants described personal experience of radicalisation. This was not always a distant issue. It was a problem that had featured in their lives. While it is important to look to expert studies to gain information, we need to recognise that much of the expertise needed to combat violent extremism resides within communities themselves. This is not to push the responsibility for countering extremism onto them, but to acknowledge their power and authority in diagnosing the issues and to some extent in recognising which solutions might work, and which would not. What they described was a complex interaction of Islamo-cultural norms with the norms of the ‘mainstream’ secular society. Addressing gender, they discussed the sometimes differing expectations within communities for women and men. As in any community, there were differences of approach. Groups were not homogenous, and opinion often divided according to age, or to religiosity or to gender itself. People expressed a diverse range of opinion, yet it was possible nonetheless to see themes. One such theme concerned the role of communities in protecting young women. As a result, women’s support for Daesh was framed differently from that of young men. If young women were sheltered, and young men were not, women who had travelled to join Daesh received sympathy, their

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actions were excused and their behaviour blamed on young men. These attitudes are important, because they are the foundations for CVE interventions. Much of what we found in relation to Muslim focus group buy-in to CVE intervention chimed with past research: while nobody supported Daesh, groups had other priorities, and for them the subject of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism had become simply another stick with which to beat and rebuke Muslim populations. This was clear across countries, no matter the level or length of time CVE programmes had been running. Too often we found that Muslim communities felt less like partners in countering violent extremism programmes and more like ‘targets’. When combined with perceptions of Islamophobia in the media and wider society, it was often hard for Muslims we spoke to to believe in CVE programming, even when it was needed. For almost everyone in this research, the labels ‘extremist’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalisation’ were most often associated with Daesh and therefore—Islam. For Muslim participants this felt personal; they described negative encounters with non-Muslims, with governments and with other Muslims, as a result of Daesh attacks and subsequent media coverage of them. These impacts were gendered. While Muslim women were often the victims of violence, this also made men angry and afraid. The differing effects of violence on men and women were not isolated from one another and had impacts on both. This meant that there was frequent resistance to CVE interventions across countries within Muslim focus groups, who felt that government prioritisation of jihadism had led to a policy blindness to other extreme movements. Their frustration with a lack of engagement with the far right coincided with a period in which far right activity was increasing. The research was designed to explore issues of gender in radicalisation and extremism broadly; it was designed to be responsive. The vast majority of research groups, however, focused, for example, on Daesh extremism rather than the far right, even where the right was an issue in their area. Radicalisation and extremism are clearly divisive terms with a particular connotation, jihadist terrorism. The media is strongly felt to perpetuate this. This is a source of frustration, anger and anxiety to many Muslims in all countries, as they feel very strongly that Daesh and other jihadist groups have nothing to do with them. What this highlights is the importance of not only listening to communities but of including them as equal participants in the design, implementation and evaluation of CVE programming and policy. As

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discussed in the previous chapter, our argument is that for CVE to be effective, a locally grounded theory of change is needed to ensure that communities have a clear sense of the objectives and outcomes of any policy and intervention. This is important at two levels. First, engaging civil society as equal partners helps reduce the risks of securitisation and resistance. Second, by promoting women’s—and men’s—participation from the ground up, in the design, implementation and evaluation of CVE programming, a second order benefit is that this process helps to realise the overall aim of a peaceful, non-violent and inclusive society. Such has admittedly been the approach in some places and some organisations. However, people need not just to be partnered, but to feel partnered.

Argument 3: Different Problems Require Different Approaches So far we have focused on the majority research, which was with Muslim focus groups. This study also included discussion of the far right. One argument evolving from our conversations is that government engagement to prevent the far right cannot simply be a reactive response to past overemphasis on Muslim populations through CVE interventions addressing al-Qaida, Daesh or other forms of jihadist violence. Nor can it be a move cynically aimed at appeasing frustrated Muslim communities. This book has focused on jihadism, because that was the key discussion topic of participants, and—a fact that is linked of course—the key concern of governments in the countries studied. The post-9/11 landscape saw a shift in focus that was almost blind to any form of violent extremism not linked to the jihad. In the UK, as government interest in Islamism grew, the study of violence by other groups was deprioritised (Kundnani 2012). Not only have policymakers often ignored political violence associated with neoNazi groups, white supremacists or the far right, but so too have academics and analysts of terrorism. The co-existence of different ‘threats’ does not fit with security studies paradigms such as Rapoport’s (2004) ‘Waves theory’. This suggests four consecutive historical waves of terrorist violence, none of which are associated with the ‘right’, and the last and current of which is ‘religious’. Nor is it consistent with those approaches that suggest the emergence of a ‘new’ terrorism in the 1990s and particularly after 9/11. This suggested global spectacle, weapons of mass destruction and transnational networks of jihadist actors were the new paradigm. Language is key. How people frame issues matters in terms of trying to counter them. If participants regard terrorism and extremism as inextricably

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linked to bombs and gun attacks, as they suggested in the findings here, they will inevitably not see activities that do not reach this level of violence as violent extremism, or as a priority problem. Additionally, there is now a tension in addressing the far right. While many participants during this research understood far right extremism as a concern, what constitutes far right extremism in the age of radical right-wing populism is far less clear. Some French participants suggested extremism was something equivalent to racism, and that this was human nature, and that political groups such as Rassemblement National had a right to a voice and to participate in democratic processes. Certainly, between the period in which the research was conducted (October 2015–February 2016) and the time of writing in early 2020, the situation is more complex. A groundswell of global rightwing populism has seen presidents elected on what might ten years ago have appeared an extreme agenda: the problem of radical right-wing populism is not the problem of extremism, especially in terms of numbers. Talking to participants for this research revealed the ways in which both populist and elements of far right narratives might resonate. The scale of radical right populism however suggests counter-­extremism policies aimed at a tiny minority are inappropriate to this challenge. Additionally, the distinctions between legitimate right-wing populist expression and the far right are increasingly less easy to identify. There needs to be a deeper engagement with the issues underlying support for populist leaders on the right, and the key motivating issues: immigration, terrorism and sovereignty, not just the expression and symptoms of these issues. Negative feelings such as exclusion, fear and tension were increasing between communities at the time of our research, and threatening their interactions with each other, even as they expressed a desire for increased dialogue. Community resilience is being tested by one difficult event after another, leading to feelings of insecurity in all countries in which the research took place. This is a key issue of concern. It impacts on attitudes to CVE and discourses on national values. However, while non-Muslim focus groups felt emboldened by robust national discourse on values such as gender equality, and counter-radicalisation programming, Muslim focus groups often felt frustrated and threatened by this. Some people within both the core communities of our research at times shared a sense of alienation from wider society: Muslims due to Islamophobia, particularly due to the perception this has been institutionalised in the media, police or government; some non-Muslims due to a feeling that society was changing

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into something they did not recognise, and which was not willing to listen to them, or worse, dismissed their fears. Many Muslim participants expressed a desire for more equity in discussion about Daesh and jihadist radicalisation and the far right. However, the two ideologies, while posing their own risks, are not the same, and should not be played against each other. The two types of extremism were also not framed by focus group participants in the same terms. The far right was downplayed, its violence perceived by non-Muslim focus groups as more criminal and everyday, its motivations viewed as less complex. Its threat was not existential. It was seen less as a risk to a way of life in Europe, more as the most extreme manifestation of that way of life, unlike Daesh. The ways in which these views are consistent with a disregard for the structural origins of the far right and racism were outlined in Chap. 7. However, the threat of far right violence affected Muslim lives, and to a large degree. The far right also thrives on gendered narratives, such as the protection of women from predatory ‘foreign’ men; and on failures of the police to act when women report assault. It also acts to fill a very real gap in governance, and to protect—it asserts—marginalised white communities. We found some of the narratives of the far right reflected in the concerns of non-Muslim focus group participants who nonetheless said that they opposed far right parties and views. There was a lack of awareness of the nature of structural racism. This enabled participants to describe a situation in which they felt debate around the future of national values, of freedoms of speech, rights and gender equality was impossible because of fears of being labelled racist and unwanted political correctness. Their views should be heeded as scholars suggest the far right is being mainstreamed and parties in Europe gain votes through opposing Islam. The far right looks to pose an increasing threat to civil society and democracy. Yet, there is no clear ‘vulnerable community’ for recruitment, and accordingly this means a key difference in the implementation of CVE on this issue, and its surrounding rhetoric. Here the issue is rather of broad education on the topics of gender, and race, and how gender and race inequalities are entwined, alongside genuine dialogue about local change. This differentiation raises three important questions. The first is whether or not the terms radicalisation or violent extremism remain useful as the phenomena and experiences they try to capture are too broad and diverse to be held in these conceptual containers. While VE may describe a generalised sense of Utopian totalitarianism, an unwillingness to share

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the world with others, that could be ascribed to both the far right and jihadists, the process, the drivers and the conditions conducive to each are different—and perhaps too different to be bound together through the term radicalisation. The conceptual elasticity of radicalisation and violent extremism may be useful for general discussions but, at the level of implementation, policy application and everyday lives, can hinder outcomes. The second question relates to the importance of the milieu approach: to understand VE we must examine more than just violent extremist groups themselves, but also those most affected by them (whether as victims or as potential recruits, or simply living in the same spaces). The third question raised is that if policymakers and practitioners apply homogenised and overly generalised assumptions about radicalising processes and the form and function of VE to all types of VE, then CVE processes will be inevitably limited because communities will be engaged with only on already scripted and predetermined lines. This also means that the efficacy of programmes and interventions is limited by the misapplication of a theory of change (radicalisation itself) designed for one distinct problem to another. Our discussions also showed the difficulties of drawing boundaries around those who were ‘vulnerable’ to which kinds of radicalisation. In non-Muslim focus groups, it became difficult to identify the point at which conversation about the problem of racism was itself becoming racist. Participants defined racism and far right activism in terms of behaviours (attending a far right demonstration, for instance) and personalities (the ‘angry white man’), rather than views. In all the countries of focus, participants talked about the issue of converts. Daesh radicalisation in a western context involves increased numbers of converts, disproportionately affecting women’s radicalisation. Convert radicalisation is slipping through the net due to a perception that the communities ‘vulnerable’ to Daesh are immigrant populations of long-standing Muslim heritage, and the wider appeal of Daesh neglected. This has particular implications for government interventions, with a need to broaden the understanding of who constitutes a potential Daesh recruit. It is vital that the concept of convert or revert is understood well—it is as complex and diverse a process as radicalisation—and the vulnerabilities it produces to extremism differ for each convert (based on the motive, process and post-conversion experiences). One of the challenges is a lack of insight into conversion and post-conversion experiences for Muslim women and men, and therefore understanding their experiences as well as vulnerabilities needs further research. Conversion should however not be securitised.

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Argument 4: Evidence and Evaluation Make Good Policy CVE policies and programmes often fail to sufficiently include the perspectives of communities and to evaluate the impact of interventions on them. Evidence is also still lacking regarding the causal relationship between gender inequality and violent extremism, including how gender norms contribute to further violent extremism on a structural level and how ideological gender rigidities lead a person to become a violent extremist on an individual level. Integrating gendered CVE efforts with women’s empowerment programming is thus a critical area of practice that should be explored further, including through evaluation. While gender equality has been enshrined in international and national level policies this has not effectively translated into CVE interventions. The role of women in CVE is relatively recent and, as such, there are actually comparatively few women-centric CVE programmes (Winterbotham 2020). Moreover, interventions aiming to tackle issues of emasculation, humiliation and what is labelled ‘toxic masculinity’ are practically nonexistent. The norm still appears to be ‘gender-blind’ programmes. As a result, there are correspondingly few evaluations, compounded by an industry reluctance to make such evaluations public (Idris and Abdelaziz 2017). The lack of systematic evaluations of gender-specific CVE interventions, and generally in the field, makes it therefore difficult to assess the potential of existing approaches. Many policy discussions and programmes concerning women’s roles in preventive efforts fail to listen to the voices of women on the frontlines and are often based on misguided notions of women’s power in many societies. Yet, the experience of various women in CVE programmes and the perceptions of women and men in this study confirm that women can and do play a significant role in CVE—but they need to be supported in appropriate ways. Again, this is about listening. Many initiatives are based on assumptions about the ability of women to influence young people. These assumptions posit the role of women as caretakers and key figures in families, as well as society at large, in upholding values. Women are still often viewed in their relation to their male family members namely as mothers, sisters, wives and so on, rather than as individuals with agency and influence in diverse roles; though it is important not to ignore that women can feel agency within family roles too. These assumptions have made it difficult to go deeper in understanding the dynamics both of

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violent extremism and of how to increase the effect of CVE programming generally and those including women specifically. RUSI has worked on a series of publications exploring the evidence base for P/CVE, and as noted in Chap. 2, has already identified some findings. A key finding is that CVE initiatives will have a greater chance of success if they work with women’s pre-existing roles in the public sphere, rather than prioritising influence in the domestic sphere. The first paper highlights concerns that women-centric programmes can politicise, securitise and weaken efforts to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment, if not properly evaluated (Winterbotham 2020). Challenging gender assumptions and basing our CVE interventions on evidence would ensure a more constructive role for women and men in CVE.  Sex-­ disaggregated analysis and data on relevant communities, tools and outcomes would help to properly evaluate the impact of these efforts and other CVE efforts to mitigate against the potential threats to women. Overall, a gendered approach to CVE can improve the design approaches to programmes so that they are more likely to be effective towards women involved in violent extremism and can learn how to better engage both men and women in efforts to counter it. These four arguments—that gender matters, that listening matters, that different problems require different approaches and that evaluation matters—are not easy to put into practice. They require work, and they require leadership. Some of the recommendations identified in this book are additionally in tension with others. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. But if CVE matters—and we believe that it does—then it is worth taking the time to incorporate gender in the ways we discuss, and to research and implement policy and programmes in this space. This will help mitigate and reduce the serious gendered risks and harms that can arise with programming. The authors know and indeed have worked with many committed and engaged women and men in this space, across a variety of country contexts, in the Global North and Global South. It is clear that there is a broad wealth of expertise and of knowledge in this space. We must continue to share this knowledge, and to support one another to develop our understanding of violent extremism, to improve countering and prevention policies, and make better intervention efforts, many of which are implemented by NGOs. We end this book with a hope: that this study contributes to a future with less violent extremism, one in which a nuanced engagement with gender is routinely included, at the centre rather than the margins, of research, policy and practice; that communities

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are listened to with efforts made to understand their complexities; and that future researchers on the topic of gender, violent extremism and countering it will hear fewer concerns, and more voices saying things have changed, and for the better.

References Brown, Katherine. 2020. Gender, Religion and Extremism: Finding Women in Anti-Radicalisation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Brown, Katherine E., Jayne Huckerby, and Laura Shepherd. 2019. Gender Mainstreaming Principles, Dimensions and Priorities for PVE. New York: UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/ 09/gender-mainstreaming-principles-dimensions-and-priorities-for-pve. Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. 2018. From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State/ICSR. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. http://icsr.info/2018/07/ icsr-report-launch-daesh-diaspora-tracing-women-minors-islamic-state/. Eggert, J. 2020. Gender, Deradicalisation and Disengagement. In Routledge Handbook of Deradicalization and Disengagement, ed. Stig Jarle Hansen and Stian Lid, 67–80. Abingdon: Routledge. Idris, Iffat, and Ayat Abdelaziz. 2017. Women and Countering Violent Extremism. Helpdesk Research Report. GSDRC. Ki-moon, Ban. 2015. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations and Conflict Prevention: A Collective Recommitment. S/2015/730. UNSC. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SGReportPrevention-S2015730_Eng.pdf. Kundnani, Arun. 2012. Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe. The Hague: ICCT. https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCTKundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf. Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile. 2018. Remarks of United Nations Under-Secretary-­ General and Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, at the Side Event on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Advancing Women’s Leadership and Participation. UN Women, UN Global Counter-­ Terrorism Strategy: Advancing Women’s Leadership and Participation, March 12. http://www.unwomen.org/news/stories/2018/3/speech-ed-csw62side-event-on-the-un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to—Part I. Just Security. May 1. https://www.justsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/. RAN. 2019. Ex Post Paper: Gender and EXIT Work. RAN EXIT Working Group. Rapoport, D. 2004. The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. A. K. Cronin and J. M. Lodes, 46–73. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

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UNSC. 2016. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 1 July 2016 70/291. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/291. Winterbotham, Emily. 2020. What Can Work (and What Has Not Worked) in Women-Centric P/CVE Initiatives: Assessing the Evidence Base for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, RUSI Occasional Papers, The Prevention Project, Tackling Extremism, Terrorism and Conflict, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/what-canwork-and-what-has-not-worked-women-centric-pcve-initiatives

Appendix

Research Questions Posed Each focus group session on countering violent extremism began with the same initial question—what do you understand of the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’? Focus group discussion was free ranging, with facilitation. Additional questions asked included:

1. What influence do women have in countering violent extremism? (a) In communities and in families (b) What is the role for men in CVE and in supporting women in CVE? (c) How are women and men differently affected by counter-­ extremism policies? (d) What would encourage women’s engagement in counter-­ extremism programmes? (e) How wanted and needed are CVE programmes targeting women in the communities they are intended to help? (f) How do social media and the Internet contribute to radicalisation? 2. What factors see women and men join the movements considered?

We did not distinguish between CVE and PVE in discussion, but left participants to discuss policy and practices broadly. © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pearson et al., Countering Violent Extremism, Rethinking Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8

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Interviews with those with direct experience of radicalisation included the following questions: . How are women being recruited to violent extremist groups? 1 2. What are the insights of family/friends and community into radicalisation of women? 3. Is there a difference between the mechanisms of women’s radicalisation compared to men? 4. Why are women recruited, by whom and into what roles? 5. What role does social media/the Internet play in recruitment? 6. Why do women join groups, what are their motivations?

Research Participants: Sought Groups Research focus groups encompassed: 1. Families of those with current/past involvement in violent jihadist networks. 2. Men and women in Muslim communities. 3. Men and women in communities that have experienced far right extremism. 4. Experts including police, counter-radicalisation officials, academics, NGO workers and counsellors. Some initial approaches to communities were made via established groups and contacts, counter-extremism workers, NGOs and government officials, as well as RUSI partners and contacts. In other contexts direct approaches were made to mosques, to shuras, community groups and youth centres. This yielded a great deal of success, with many people keen to share their opinions on the issues at stake. No young people under the age of 16 participated in the research.

Research Limitations 1. Original intentions had been to conduct more focus groups, and many more in communities where the far right has at times been an issue. As stated, access to people was difficult due to sensitive

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events—such as the Paris attacks—that took place during the fieldwork, and also due to the fact that gatekeepers and police did not understand the application of the milieu logic to ‘white communities’, where there had been an issue in the past with the far right. This meant that engagement with these groups depended predominantly on direct contact and was more difficult. “What do we have to do with the extreme right?” was a common question when attempting to undertake this research. The same question was also posed by Muslim communities with regard to Daesh. However, Muslim communities conversely are used to being engaged on issues of extremism, although this also meant they suffered research fatigue. They also appeared keen to demonstrate that they oppose extremism, recognising that it is associated by others with them. Therefore, while the research set out to speak to more non-­Muslim groups to discuss far right activities in their communities, in practice more Muslim groups consented to contribute. 2. Inevitably terminology was a key issue within the research. Many participants challenged the language we used as researchers, feeling it perpetuated assumptions about their communities, which they resisted. We acknowledge their concerns with language in the report, while at times retaining terms such as ‘Islamism’, which was resisted, for practical reasons such as coherency with papers or policies cited. Muslim communities found that language used by researchers and in CVE work diminished these communities’ concerns of daily violence against them. 3. Due to limitations of time, only one interview was conducted with a member of an extreme group, and this was a man who supported the far right in Canada. Stormfront was approached, but requested payment for interviews, which was declined. Therefore the findings on radicalisation are based on focus group experiences, on the experiences of families of those who had either gone to join Daesh, or been deterred from this, and from a limited number of expert interviews. 4. Ideally the project would have engaged in repeat focus groups with women across a number of locations, using those who attended focus groups to disseminate structured surveys to access a broader section of women/men (snowball sampling).

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5. Some focus groups were mixed sex, at the request of participants. Such requests were respected, but this means that research outcomes may have been affected. In mixed groups women tended to be more dominant speakers. We have no way of knowing how this otherwise influenced the content of participation contribution. 6. Some focus groups with Muslim communities included participants who were non-Muslims, however they were a small minority and their contribution progressed discussion.

Ethical Considerations Anonymity is granted to all participants, including experts, unless they asked to be named. At the outset of all sessions the research was explained and contact details given. The risk of trauma either to interviewees, or the researchers, through issues raised in research was anticipated and appropriately mitigated. RUSI places particular importance on maintaining appropriate ethical standards with regard to undertaking research, particularly where human subjects are interviewed on sensitive matters. Specifically, RUSI and its researchers adhere to the Framework for Research Ethics provided by the Economic and Social Research Council.1 In addition, the RUSI team has reviewed the relevant section of the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans and in particular note the importance placed on consent, privacy and confidentiality in Chaps. 3 and 5.

1  ESRC Framework for Research Ethics (FRE) 2010 (Updated September 2012) http:// www.esrc.ac.UK/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx.

Glossary

Alt-Right  a far right movement with a strong online support base, emergent in the US Caliphate  an Islamic state governed according to Shariah law and ruled by a Caliph, or spiritual leader Community  can be defined in numerous ways, for example, according to geography, religion or identity Counter-jihad  describes a new wave of radical right activism motivated by the belief that Islam and Muslims pose a threat to the West. The threat is variously perceived as to resources, to identity and as existential Daesh  a violent-Salafi-jihadist group, previously holding territory under a proclaimed ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria, adhering to an apocalyptic, millenarian vision Deradicalisation  a reduction in extremist thinking and/or behaviour of an individual Disengagement  behavioural deradicalisation, involving the abandonment of violence but not necessarily of extremist beliefs Extremism  an ideology that opposes a society’s core values and principles, adhered to by a minority. Usually understood as opposing democracy or the rule of law Far Right  is an umbrella term often used to describe non-mainstream groups with a range of ideologies, from white supremacist, to violent

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neo-Nazis, to organisations opposing Islam and Islamism or the perceived Islamisation of Europe. We understand the far right as a label that can be applied to groups mobilising around ideologies that are fundamentally undemocratic and racist. Gender  an understanding of the roles and norms associated with masculinities and femininities as malleable, socially constructed and dependent on context Islamism  the literalist practice of Islam according to a revolutionary political ideology Islamophobia  unfounded hostility to Islam and Muslims and its consequences; this includes violence, as well as discrimination, fear and abuse of Muslims Jihadism  see entry for violent jihad Niqab  a face covering worn by some Muslim women Radical Right  groups or movements that specifically focus on opposition to Islam or Islamism Radicalisation  usually used to describe a process towards extremism, an increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments and/or behaviour of individuals and/or groups of individuals Salafi  Salaf meaning ‘predecessor’ in Arabic, Salafi Muslims adhere to a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an. Wiktorowicz identifies three strands of Salafi thought, only one of which—a minority—advocates violence Surah  a chapter of the Qur’an Terrorism  there is no globally accepted definition of ‘terrorism’. It is generally understood as politically motivated violence against non-­ military targets, or the threat of such, where the target of that violence is less important than the audience and the message Violent jihad  used here as the Islamic ‘lesser jihad’, specifically the ‘violent struggle for Islam’, based on violent interpretations of fundamentalist Salafi beliefs Violent radicalisation  radicalisation that includes a willingness to support or engage in violent acts

Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 7/7, 82, 89, 141 9/11, 6, 47, 50, 95, 174, 175, 205, 206, 321 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 5 2015 UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, 30 2016 UN Secretary-General Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, 46 2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 111 A Abaaoud, Abdelhamid, 105 Abedi, Salman, 85 Abu Hamza al-Masri, 87 Abu Qatada, 87 Afghanistan, 4, 6, 42, 45, 49, 50, 55, 57, 84, 109, 258, 264

Afghan society, 43 Afghan women, 50 Agency, 6, 11, 12, 18, 32, 38, 40, 44, 51, 54, 58, 60, 63, 89, 91, 103, 115, 150, 184, 190–192, 194, 195, 202, 207, 215, 298, 303, 325 Aicha, 101 Aitboulahcen, Hasna, 106 Akkerman, Tjitske, 244 Alberta, 112, 115 Algeria, 84, 104, 107 Al-Khansaa Brigade, 86, 96, 112 Al-Muhajiroun, 87, 88, 142 al-Qaida (AQ), 10, 13, 36, 45, 82, 86, 111, 112, 142, 143, 152, 153, 176, 181, 208, 321 al-Shabaab, 112, 115 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), party, 14, 93, 94, 155, 247, 255, 295

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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Alternative right, 101, 113, 236, 237, 239–242, 254 American far right, 238 American nation, 49 American right-wing, 13 Amnesty International, 109 Amri, Anis, 95 Anti-EU, 107, 243 Anti-feminist, 241 Anti-gay marriage, 107 Anti-globalisation, 236 Anti-government, 236 Anti-immigrant, 93, 235, 236, 239, 267 Anti-immigration, 84, 107, 243 Anti-Islam(ist), 13 Anti-liberal, 241 Anti-migrant, 14 Antisemitism, 97, 173, 241 Anti-Terrorism Act, 114 Arendt, Hannah, 31 Assimilation, 59 Australia, 7, 8, 11, 15, 90 B Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 101 Bangladesh, 43, 62 Banlieue, 187 Basque region, 142 Basque separatists, 105 Bataclan theatre, 105, 106 Begum, Shamima, 12, 86, 307 BehindBars, 100 Belgian foreign fighter, 105 Belgium, 12, 38, 261 Berlin, 95 Bethnal Green girls, 37, 86 Black Widow, 10 Blair, Tony (Prime Minister), 6, 90 Blood and Honour in the UK, 241 Bloom, Mia, 10, 38, 39, 53, 184

Boko Haram (BH), 35, 38, 42 Boular, Safaa, 11, 12, 87 Boumedienne, Hayat, 36, 106 Bouyeri, Muhammad, 100 Brainwashing, 176, 190, 195, 261 Brigade des Mères, 110 Britain First (BF), 88, 89, 149, 263 British Columbia, 112 British National Party (BNP), 88, 89, 154, 247 British Prime Minister, 6 Brown, K. E., 10, 11, 13, 28, 30, 32, 36, 37, 49, 51, 53–57, 59, 143, 191, 206, 212, 215, 218, 225, 282, 283, 287, 288, 298, 312, 313 Burqa, 18, 93, 179, 195 Bush, George W. (President), 6, 45, 50 Bush, Laura, 49 C California, 37 Caliphate, 11, 36, 48, 84, 86, 94, 101, 177, 304 Cameron, David (Prime Minister), 90, 91, 220, 267 Canada, vi, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 62, 66, 82, 83, 90, 111–115, 140, 152, 154, 155, 158, 159, 174, 178, 179, 182, 186, 188, 204, 206–210, 213, 215, 217, 218, 220, 221, 233, 235, 240, 247, 249, 260, 261, 271, 295, 296, 298, 311, 316, 318, 331 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), 115 Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, 114 Canada for Canadians, 112

 INDEX 

Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 114 Canadian Armed Forces dead, 111 Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW), 115 Canadian Heritage Alliance, 112, 113 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 111, 112, 114, 115 Canadian-Somali communities, 112 CHANNEL, 91, 153 Charlottesville, 234 Chechnya, 10, 13, 84, 96 Choudary, Anjem, 87, 88 Choudhry, Roshonara, 86 Christmas market, 95, 105 Coalition Government, 91 Cohesion, 91, 147, 206, 267 Colonialism, 58 Columbia, 112, 115 Commissioner for Counter-Extremism (CCE), 170 Community resilience, 46, 206, 322 Conflict, vii, 12, 40, 47, 52, 58, 66, 84, 89, 105, 147, 180, 181, 192, 303, 315 CONTEST Strategy, 15 Convert, 86, 96, 106, 143, 157, 160, 172, 173, 176, 177, 183–185, 189, 191, 217, 224, 317, 324 Corsican National Liberation Front, 105 Coulibaly, Amédy, 105, 106 Counter-jihad, 102, 239–242, 246 Counter-narratives, 54, 61, 253, 303 Counter-terrorism (CT), v–vii, 4, 6–8, 7n1, 10, 11, 15, 28, 29, 31, 45–47, 49, 53, 60, 63, 89, 91, 92, 102, 107–109, 113–115, 148, 194, 203–205, 207, 233, 281–286, 288, 298, 304 Cox, Jo, 35, 88 Creativity Movement, 113

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Crime, 30, 31, 38, 41, 82, 99, 115, 203, 207, 212, 244, 245, 292, 293, 298, 301 Criminal justice, 144 D Dabiq, 37, 106 Daesh, vi, vii, 3, 4, 10–14, 16, 18, 36–38, 46, 48, 54, 65, 82–87, 94–96, 99–101, 105–108, 110, 111, 116, 117, 143, 148, 152, 153, 156–159, 170–185, 188–195, 205, 205n1, 208, 212–215, 224, 233, 247–249, 253, 270, 288, 289, 292, 296, 302, 303, 305–307, 312–321, 323, 324, 331 Dar al Islam, 106 Dare, Grace, 86 De Beauvoir, Simone, 33 Defence and National Security Strategic Review, 82, 233 Democracy, 50, 51, 92, 97, 98, 116, 243, 323 De-Nazification, 97 Denmark, 8, 281 De-radicalisation, 12, 13, 56, 57, 65, 98, 99, 103, 107, 108, 111, 153, 179, 203, 215, 220, 287–289, 298, 312 Dhanu, 40 Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 112 Disarmament, 47 Disengagement, 12, 13, 56, 103, 288, 289 Domestic terrorism, 245 Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), 101–102 Dutch Identitarian Resistance, 102

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INDEX

Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 100 Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, 61, 104 E East Germany, 93, 253 Education, 29, 35, 42, 46, 56, 60, 98, 103, 104, 208, 220, 251, 254, 264, 270, 286, 297, 300, 301, 303, 304, 323 Election of President Trump, 14 Emancipation, 41, 47, 51 Emasculation, 13, 234, 253, 325 Emotion, 40, 65, 189, 224, 250, 252, 258, 266, 291, 302, 303, 319 Empowerment, 8, 9, 18, 19, 27, 36, 41, 44–53, 57–60, 62, 64, 65, 150, 156, 194, 211, 212, 217–218, 221, 226, 227, 269, 282, 286, 287, 291, 298, 299, 312, 317, 325, 326 England, 89, 90, 90n3, 159, 175, 191, 206, 209, 212, 219, 220, 225, 226, 265, 266, 268 English Defence League (EDL), 13, 88, 88n2, 89, 102, 145, 237, 244–247, 250, 251, 255, 265, 295 English Volunteer Force, 89 Enschede, 102 Equality, 35, 40, 47, 51, 57–60, 110, 203, 212, 241, 254, 282, 287, 291, 299 Essentialism, 27, 39, 40, 44, 49, 51–53, 62, 64, 91, 291, 303 ETA, 13, 105, 142 Ethno-nationalism, 66, 84, 234, 241 Europe, 10, 14, 15, 38, 41, 56, 82–85, 87–89, 99, 101, 107, 111, 112, 116, 146, 169, 174, 179, 206, 210, 222, 233–236, 238, 242, 244, 247, 259, 283, 298, 300, 312, 318, 323

European Council, 85 European laws, 38 European Parliamentary elections, 107 European Union (June 2016), 14 Gender Action Plan II (GAP II), 47 EUROPOL, 84, 100, 233, 234, 240, 244, 245 Evaluations, 9, 28, 46n3, 60–62, 104, 116, 201, 282–284, 295, 301, 320, 321, 325–327 Extremism, v, 5–13, 27–66, 82, 140, 170, 204, 233, 289, 311, 329 violent, 3–19, 27–66, 81–83, 91, 96–98, 103, 104, 111, 115, 116, 139–141, 144, 147, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 161, 169–196, 201–227, 233–271, 281, 283–287, 289, 291, 292, 299, 301–307, 311–327, 329, 330 Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), 234 F Facebook, 173, 188, 189, 260 Fadden, Richard, 112 Fake news, 260, 269–271, 284, 293 Family, 10, 11, 14, 39, 40, 43, 48, 54, 56–58, 60, 62, 82, 84, 91, 96, 98, 103, 104, 108, 143, 151–154, 156–159, 173, 176–179, 181, 182, 185, 188, 190, 192, 195, 207, 208, 211–216, 222, 226, 227, 254, 285, 288–290, 296, 305, 306, 315–318, 325, 329–331 Far right, 5, 8, 13–19, 31, 35, 64, 66, 82–85, 88, 89, 91–94, 97, 101, 102, 106, 112, 113, 115, 116, 139, 140, 145, 146, 148–150, 154, 156, 158–160, 169, 170, 227, 233–271, 289, 292–293, 295–297, 300–307, 311, 313, 315, 318, 320–324, 330, 331

 INDEX 

Far right recruiters, 142 Fascism, 237–239, 244 Fathers, 19, 56, 179–181, 209, 210, 212–216, 224, 227, 240, 254, 264, 305, 306, 317 FBI, 242 Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 92 Al-Feisal, Sheikh, 87 Female foreign fighters, 38 Female recruitment, 12, 42, 54, 94, 193, 304 Female suicide attackers, 38, 40 Feminism, 33, 40, 49, 51, 145, 192, 217, 237, 241, 242, 254, 287, 289, 292, 316 Fieldwork, 140, 155, 203, 313, 331 Finsbury Park, 88 Focus group, vi, 6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 83, 84, 116, 140, 144, 146, 149–160, 159n3, 170, 172, 174–182, 176n1, 184–192, 201, 204, 206–209, 211, 213, 215, 216, 218–223, 226, 235, 237, 240, 244, 246–260, 262, 263, 265, 267–271, 284, 296, 297, 302, 307, 315–324, 329–332 Football hooligans, 88, 250 Forced marriage, 35, 218, 299 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 91 Foreign policy, 49, 51, 184, 189 Foreign terrorist fighter (FTFs), vii, 7n1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 31, 38, 39, 52, 84, 85, 87, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 110, 116, 169, 176, 181, 287, 289, 304 Foundation for Intercultural Participation and Integration (SIPI), 104 Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), 8, 44, 52, 57 France, vi, 14, 18, 62, 66, 82, 83, 102, 104–111, 116, 140, 152,

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155, 159, 174, 178–180, 186–188, 191–193, 204, 215, 218, 219, 222, 233, 239–242, 247–249, 254, 256–258, 270, 295, 301, 311 Francophone, 83 Fransen, Jayda, 89, 149 French Presidential elections, 14, 243 Front National (FN), 14, 107, 243, 247, 257 G Gandhi, Rajiv (Indian Prime Minister), 40 Gare de Lyon, 106 Geert Wilders Freedom Party (PVV), 102 Gefährder, 95 Gender-based violence (GBV), 35, 43, 284, 303, 314 Gender blindness, 27, 38 CVE, 9, 27, 60, 65, 66, 308, 312, 325 dynamics, 4, 19, 27, 83, 139, 140, 144, 148, 150n2, 154, 158–160, 169, 185, 208, 210, 211, 227, 245, 284, 288, 289, 299, 305, 311 equality, 40, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 52, 56–59, 61, 64, 192, 211, 218, 219, 235, 240, 243, 259, 260, 262, 269, 271, 282, 293, 322, 323, 325, 326 inequality, 47, 58, 284, 325 norms, 13, 27, 39, 48, 177, 187, 189, 192, 194, 234, 241, 244, 284, 296, 297, 313, 325 radicalisation, 4, 19, 302–303 German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 95

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INDEX

Germany, vi, 12, 14, 18, 19, 62, 66, 82, 83, 92–96, 100, 106, 116, 140, 153–155, 157–159, 173, 175–179, 181–183, 186, 188, 210, 212, 213, 217, 220–222, 233–235, 237, 240, 241, 248, 250, 251, 254–256, 258–260, 262, 264–266, 268, 269, 295, 301, 311 Globalisation, 13, 43, 44, 146, 147, 174, 234, 241, 246, 253, 269 Global North, 10, 14 Global South, 10, 326 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 28 Global War on Terror (GWOT), see War on Terror Golden Dawn, 239, 243 Governance, 7n1, 46, 47, 202, 323 Grande, Ariana, 85 Greece, 99, 234, 239, 243 Grooming, 11, 12, 65, 87, 154, 188–192, 194, 195, 244, 253, 296, 303, 304 G20 Summit, 96 Guantanamo, 53, 207 H Hagelund, Anniken, 244 Halane, Salma, 86 Halane, Zahra, 86 Hamburg, 96 Hannover, 95 Harper, Stephen, 113, 114 Hassan, Ahmed, 86 Hayat, 98 Headscarf, 109, 173, 178, 179, 194, 217, 256, 259, 316 Hearts and minds, 6, 44, 45, 63, 141 Hervouët, Sarah, 106 Hijab, 109, 114, 177–179, 195, 217, 244, 298, 304, 316

Hijrah, 86 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 87 Hofstad group, 100 HoGeSa (Hooligans Gegen Salafisten or Hooligans Against Salafists), 93, 247 Home Affairs Select Committee, 90 Home Office, 15, 82, 90–92, 144, 235 Honour, 13, 39, 235, 238, 271, 315 Huckerby, Jayne, 9, 49, 53, 54, 59, 60, 212, 218, 288, 312 Humanitarian, 47, 50 Human rights, 47, 49–51, 63, 85, 88, 108, 240, 282, 284–286, 312, 314 Human Rights Watch, 109 Humiliation, 40, 325 Hungary, 243, 258 Hussain, Naweed, 87 I Identitarian, 106, 239–241 Ideology, 14, 31, 93, 148, 182–185, 221, 238, 240, 241, 244, 252, 253, 313 Immigration, 16, 19, 84, 89, 92, 93, 103, 106, 107, 115, 143, 148, 150, 154, 179, 214, 222, 226, 235, 238, 241–244, 251, 254, 255, 258–260, 263, 265–267, 269, 271, 292, 297, 301, 302, 311, 322, 324 Imperialism, 58 Incel, 113, 239 Indonesia, 4, 39, 43, 62, 100 Infidels, 89 Interior Ministry, 108 International law, 47 International security, 46 IRA, 13

 INDEX 

Iraq, 3, 6, 11, 14, 37, 45, 48, 50, 86, 87, 91, 94–96, 100, 101, 104, 105, 111, 112, 116, 152, 177, 184, 192, 195, 214, 233, 258, 264, 296, 312 Irish loyalist groups, 13, 89 Islam, 15–18, 45, 50, 86, 88, 89, 93, 96, 97, 102, 107, 109, 111, 113, 116, 151–153, 156, 173–176, 179, 181, 183–185, 187, 189, 205, 206, 208, 217, 221, 235, 237, 239–241, 244, 247–249, 254, 255, 260–262, 269, 271, 302, 307, 315–317, 320, 323 Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City, 112 Islamic law, 15 See also Shariah Islamic State, see Daesh Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), see Daesh Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL), see Daesh Islamification, 93 Islamism, 8, 15, 16, 18, 35, 52, 55, 82, 84, 85, 88, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 102, 104–106, 142, 145, 149, 151, 153, 155, 159, 169, 170, 174, 190, 233–235, 237, 239, 240, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250, 257, 270, 271, 292, 295, 303, 305, 320, 321, 323, 331 Islamist, 8, 15, 18, 35, 41, 52, 55, 82, 84, 85, 88, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 104–106, 142, 145, 148, 149, 153, 155, 159, 169, 170, 174, 233, 234, 244, 248, 250, 257, 271, 295, 303, 305, 321, 323 violent, 15, 145, 244 Islamophobia, 17, 31, 82, 91, 97, 110, 149, 174, 175, 177, 178,

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180, 192, 205, 210, 219, 255, 292, 293, 300, 301, 320, 322 J Javid, Sajid, 12 Jihad, 3, 7, 8, 10, 13–16, 18, 27, 35–38, 51, 55, 66, 82, 84–90, 95, 99–101, 104–112, 115, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 154, 157, 160, 169, 175, 188, 189, 193, 206, 216, 233–235, 244, 246, 248, 250–253, 270, 271, 286, 288–290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 300, 303, 311, 313, 315, 320, 321, 324 Jihadi brides, 11, 54, 86, 190, 194, 304, 307 Jones, Sally, 37, 86 K Kassim, Rachid, 106 Kenyan, 37 Khan, Sara, 170 Kouachi, Chérif, 105 Kouachi, Saı̄d, 105 Ku Klux Klan, 4 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 10 L Lahoud, Nelly, 10, 16, 31, 41, 53, 181, 193 Laïcité, 83, 107 La Meute, 112, 113 Le Pen, Marine, 14, 102, 107, 155, 237, 242, 243, 249 Levant, 84 Lewthwaite, Samantha, 37 Liberal democratic, 15

342 

INDEX

Liberals, 15, 51, 99, 239, 241, 244, 254, 292, 298 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 10, 13, 39, 40 Londonistan, 87 London Transport attacks, 82, 89, 90, 141 Lone actors, 102, 103, 234 Ludwigshafen, 95 Luton, 88 M Macron, Emmanuel (President), 14, 107, 243 Madani, Inès, 106 Mair, Thomas, 88 Malayan Emergency, 6 Malik, Tashfeen, 37 Malthaner, Stefan, 139, 141–143 Manchester Arena, 85 Marriage, 35, 38, 42, 53, 107, 184, 188–192, 195, 218, 299 Masculinities, 13, 34–36, 43, 55, 63, 117, 181, 182, 184, 211, 234, 246, 251–253, 302, 315 Masood, Khalid, 85 Mass sexual assaults, 93, 259 Maternalist logic, 210, 313, 316, 317 Matriarchs, 55 MAXIMA, 98 McCarthy, Tara, 241 Media, 3, 11, 37, 45, 54, 86, 101, 110, 149, 151, 156, 158, 173–175, 184, 190, 194, 195, 201, 202, 205, 206, 226, 227, 235, 243, 244, 247–249, 253, 256, 260, 268, 289, 292, 293, 302, 307, 317, 319, 320, 322 Merah, Mohamed, 109 Merkel, Angela (Chancellor), 258, 263, 264 Middle East, 8, 11, 56, 87, 105

Migrants, 86, 154, 179, 202, 258–264, 267, 270 crisis, 93, 301 Migration, 11, 48, 82, 84, 93, 94, 96, 101, 116, 243, 247 crisis, 93, 301 Milieu, 18, 29, 63, 139–161, 169, 176, 177, 185–189, 195, 196, 226, 283, 290–297, 299–301, 311, 312, 319, 324 Milieu approach, 14, 18, 29, 139–161, 169, 176, 283, 290, 293–294, 297, 299–301, 312, 319, 324 Militancy, 41 Millennium Development Goals, 51 Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 114 Minors, 13, 95, 100, 177, 266, 303 Moderate, 28, 53, 54, 57, 115, 305 Mohammed, Omar Bakri, 87 Morocco, 61, 99 Mosques, 3, 16, 61, 87–89, 98, 102, 109, 142, 153–155, 157, 160, 173, 185–187, 189, 215, 221, 259, 330 Mosul, 96 Mothers, 13, 19, 37, 44, 48, 51, 53–56, 61, 87, 93, 95, 101, 109, 110, 112, 113, 143, 144, 153, 157, 172, 173, 176, 177, 180, 181, 183, 186, 187, 189, 206, 208–215, 217, 220–225, 227, 235, 238, 239, 253, 259, 261, 290, 298, 303–306, 312, 316, 317, 325 motherhood, 51, 54, 238, 305 Mujahidin, 109 Multi-agency, 103, 114 Multiculturalism, 59, 84, 90, 241, 244, 253, 255, 269 Murshidat, 61 Myanmar (Burmese Buddhists), 234, 241

 INDEX 

N National Action, 88 National Action Plan on Polarisation and Radicalisation for 2007–2011, 102 National Action Plan, “Prevent to Protect,” 110 National Counterterrorism Strategy, 104, 233 Nationalism, 13, 116, 234, 236, 239 Nationalist, 13, 14, 37, 41, 66, 84, 99, 142, 160, 234, 235, 237, 238, 243, 271, 302 Die Nationalistische Partei Deutschlands, 247 National Socialist Underground (NSU), 94 National Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy, 97 National values, 41, 218–219, 262, 267, 293, 301, 322, 323 Nativism, 236 Nazi ideology, 97 Neo-colonialism, 49 Neoconservative, 50, 51 Neoliberal, 27, 51 Neo-Nazis, 16, 82, 88, 92–94, 101, 145, 154, 236–239, 244, 247, 250, 256, 257, 265, 271, 295, 303, 321 Netherlands, the, vi, 8, 12, 14, 18, 60–62, 66, 82, 83, 93, 99–104, 106, 116, 140, 153–155, 157, 159, 172, 175, 177–180, 182, 186, 187, 192, 193, 204, 207, 209, 211, 213–215, 222, 224, 225, 227, 233, 235, 241, 245, 295, 311 New Year 2016, 259 Nigeria, 4, 42, 55, 59 Niqab, 18, 173, 177–179, 217, 315 Nisa for Nisa, 103

343

Non-governmental organisation (NGOs), vii, 43, 97, 98, 115–117, 153, 174, 249, 281, 326, 330 North Africa, 11, 84, 94 North America, 14, 15, 41, 84, 283, 298, 300, 312 Northern Ireland, 85, 89, 142, 206, 235 Notre Dame, 106, 111 O Obama (President), 6, 45, 46 Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, 32 Online Internet propaganda, 96 radicalisation, 185, 188, 189 recruitment, 41, 96, 101 relationships, 188 social networks, 188 Orban, Viktor (President), 243 Organised crime, 31 Orientalist, 27, 44, 49, 50, 53, 64, 305 Osborne, Darren, 88 Ottawa, 111 Oumnia Works, 61, 103 P Palestine, 13, 39, 55, 99, 142, 212 Paris, 105, 106, 108, 110, 116, 233, 298, 316, 318 attacks, 106, 108, 152, 174, 204, 210, 331 Parson’s Green, 86 Patriarchy, 10, 41, 56, 59, 210–212

344 

INDEX

Peace activists, 142 agenda, v, 48, 51, 285, 314 negotiations, 47 Peacebuilding, 8n1 Peacekeeping, 46 Pegida, 93, 247, 257, 258, 262, 265 Pilkington, Hilary, 89, 142, 239, 240, 250, 251 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 28, 45 Political correctness, 241, 254, 268, 318, 323 Populism, vi, 13, 14, 16, 19, 35, 82, 84, 89, 93, 94, 106, 116, 227, 234–237, 239, 240, 242–244, 255–258, 267–269, 271, 292, 293, 295, 297, 301–303, 318, 322 Post-communist, 253 Post-conflict settings, 47 Post 9/11 generation, 205 Power, vi, 4, 6, 12, 17, 19, 33–35, 40, 42, 43, 45, 52, 55, 63, 81, 84, 108, 109, 117, 140, 150, 151, 181, 193, 211, 212, 216–218, 222, 242, 245, 251, 252, 265, 271, 286, 290, 299–304, 313–315, 325 Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), v, 5, 6, 30, 46, 47, 58, 59, 176n1, 215, 282, 329 Prevent strategy, 6, 60n4, 82, 143 Project Champion, 225 Propaganda, 36–38, 51, 84, 96, 106, 173, 177, 241, 260, 293, 304 Proud Boys, 242, 254 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 111, 114 Pyramid models, 141, 152

Q Québec, 83, 112–115, 155 Quranic, 15, 186 R Racism, 16, 17, 56, 110, 149, 207, 236, 238, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250–252, 254–257, 267–271, 290, 292, 297, 301, 315, 322–324 Radical, 18, 29–32, 39, 41, 47, 53, 54, 56, 57, 65, 82–84, 87, 90, 140–143, 147, 148, 152, 154, 158, 173, 185–187, 189, 191, 193, 213, 239, 241, 242, 244, 258, 296 Islam, 97, 111, 113 milieu, 141–143, 185 preachers, 87, 185, 186 recruiters, 148 right, 14, 19, 88, 89, 93, 100, 107, 116, 145, 227, 234–237, 240, 242, 246, 247, 250, 257, 268, 292, 293, 295, 297, 303, 322, 323 Radicalisation enabling factors, 30, 185, 187, 288 home-grown, 7, 143 push and pull factors, 29, 54, 64, 169, 176, 177, 182, 192–193, 288 youth, 151, 174, 223, 253 Rassemblement National (RN), 14, 107, 239, 243, 247, 322 The Rebel Media, 113 Recruiter, 86, 96, 101, 142, 148, 180, 186, 187, 195, 304, 317 Red Army Faction, 4 Refugee, 16, 47, 86, 93–95, 100, 102, 113, 175, 244, 248, 258–264 crisis, 243, 258–263 Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), 115

 INDEX 

Rehabilitation, 12, 13, 52, 56 Religion, 31, 32, 42, 54, 83, 90, 114, 151, 157, 184, 214, 216, 218, 261, 262, 271 Religious conservatism, 54 Republican groups, 85 Research fatigue, 153, 157, 331 Resilience, 7n1, 15, 46, 60, 103, 178, 191, 194, 206, 218, 254, 267, 291, 294, 302, 303, 322 Resocialisation, 12 Returnees, 18, 99, 100 Rigby, Lee, 85, 87 Risk, vi, 29, 30, 33, 38, 41–44, 46, 56, 58, 59, 64, 65, 82, 85, 88, 91, 95, 98, 101, 104, 108, 111, 116, 144, 154, 183, 187, 194, 203, 206, 211, 212, 218, 219, 233, 235, 243, 245, 251, 262, 285, 287, 288, 290, 291, 294, 295, 300, 301, 305, 308, 312, 321, 323, 326, 332 Robinson, Tommy, 88, 102, 245, 265, 268 Rotterdam, 103 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 114, 115 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 8, 43, 46n3, 59–61, 326, 330, 332 Russia, 243 S Sageman, Marc, 10, 39, 57, 100, 143, 181 Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, 111 Sakaou, Amel, 106 Salafi-jihadism, 233 See also Jihadism Sarah O., 96 Saudi Arabia, 8, 53, 261

345

Scotland, 90 Secularisation, 60 Security agenda, 8, 48, 51, 91, 285, 311, 314 field, 43, 64, 298 Security Council Resolution 1325, 8, 46, 47, 91, 314 Security Service MI5, 88, 100, 101 Serbia, 43 Sexual violence, 39, 40, 47, 214 Sharia4Holland, 100 Shariah, 15, 184 SIPI DIAMANT, 103 Sjoberg, Laura, 10, 30, 39, 51–53, 189, 218 Social cohesion, 62, 103, 146, 147, 159, 202, 293, 301, 319 networks, 56, 148, 152, 159, 180, 182, 188, 292 Sons of Odin, 112 Southeast Asia, 56 Southern, Lauren, 113, 241 Spain, 105 Spencer, Richard, 240 Sri Lanka, 3, 10, 40, 234 State Department, 7, 50 State of emergency, 108, 109 Steunpunt Sabr, 61, 103 Stormfront, 112, 238, 331 StraatDawah, 100 STRIVE Horn of Africa, 59 Sturm34, 92 Suicide attack, 10, 38, 40, 85, 100, 105, 141 Suspect communities, 141, 151, 175, 203, 206, 207 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 47, 51 Swastika, 97 Sweden, 8

346 

INDEX

Syria, 3, 11, 14, 36, 37, 48, 84, 86, 87, 91, 94–96, 100, 101, 104–106, 110–112, 116, 152, 157, 172, 173, 177, 178, 180, 184, 189, 191, 192, 195, 212, 214, 224, 233, 258, 266, 296, 312 T Taliban, 50, 56 Tamil, 40 Terrorism, v–vii, 3–7, 10, 15, 16, 27–32, 36–39, 42–45, 48, 49, 60, 65, 82, 84–90, 99, 100, 102, 104–108, 113–115, 141, 142, 155, 156, 170, 174, 175, 183, 190, 194, 201–206, 208, 218, 219, 222, 233, 235, 243, 245–247, 249, 270, 288, 290, 292, 293, 299, 307, 311–314, 318, 320–322 Terrorism studies, 206, 244 Terrorist attacks, 3, 28, 36, 38, 85, 87, 90, 95, 100, 105, 111, 170, 204, 249 community, 141 network, 141 violence, 5, 30, 37, 104, 321 Terrorist Threat Assessment, 101 Theology, 61, 182 Theory of change (TOC), 49, 321, 324 Toxic masculinity, 35, 234, 325 Trafficking, 35 Trauma, 40, 111, 159, 303, 332 Trudeau, Justin (Prime Minister), 113, 114, 155 Trump administration, 6, 7

Tunisia, 11, 95 Twitter, 149 U UK and Scandinavia Counter-Jihad Summit, 240 UK Department for International Development (DFID), 30, 285 UKIP, 93, 243 Ultra-nationalist, 234, 239, 248 Umm Layth, 86 U.N. General Assembly, v, 35 U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, v, 28, 35 Un-Islamic, 173 United Kingdom (UK), vi, 6–8, 12–15, 18, 19, 35, 37, 38, 49, 50, 54, 55, 60, 62, 66, 82, 83, 85–89, 93, 102, 106, 113–116, 140, 141, 143, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153–155, 159, 170, 175, 178, 182, 186, 187, 190, 195, 202, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210, 212, 215, 219–223, 225, 227, 233, 235, 237, 240, 241, 243, 245–247, 250–252, 255, 263, 265–270, 281, 295, 307, 311, 317, 321 United Nations (UN), v, vi, 5, 8, 12, 29, 30, 32, 35, 46, 47, 51, 58, 85, 282, 311, 312 panel, 66, 286 United Nations Committee Against Torture, 108 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), 30, 281 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 8, 29, 35, 58, 60, 180, 281

 INDEX 

United Nations Office for Counter-­ Terrorism (UNOCT), 5 United Nations Plan of Action (POA), v, 5, 7, 28, 30, 45, 47, 52 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women Peace and Security, 46, 47, 314 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242, 5, 8, 47, 52, 58 United Nations Women, 33, 62, 281 United States (US/USA), 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 45, 49–51, 90, 101, 102, 112, 234, 237, 242, 245, 252, 254, 271, 281, 318 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 7, 30 United We Stand Holland (UWS) (AIVD 2018), 102 Utrecht, 100, 103 V Valls, M. (Prime Minister), 105 van Gogh, Theo, 100, 103 Veil, 109, 194, 195, 217, 244, 316 Victim, vi, 12, 35, 52, 53, 65, 96, 110, 111, 115, 218, 287, 288, 290, 299, 302–306, 320, 324 Vigipirate, 107, 108 Violence Prevention Network (VPN), 98 Violent jihadist extremism, 35, 148, 233, 300 Vulnerability, 18, 30, 52, 65, 98, 139, 144, 159, 176, 186, 187, 191, 205, 207, 238, 253, 296, 304–306, 313, 323, 324

347

W Waldmann, Peter, 139, 141–143 Wales, 88, 90 War on Terror (WOT), 6, 27, 44, 45, 47–51, 53, 55, 57, 62–65, 97, 141, 227, 245, 283 in Afghanistan and Iraq, 45 Wenzel, Linda, 96 The West, 11, 44, 53, 57, 59, 60, 84, 93, 143, 178, 184, 240, 303, 316 West Africa, 38 Western countries, 8, 105, 143, 148, 245, 292 culture, 241, 242 democracies, 243 foreign policy, 189 West Germany, 97 Westminster Bridge, 85 White House Summit, 5, 46 White nationalism, 13, 160, 234 White supremacist, 4, 13, 16, 88, 106, 112, 113, 154, 158, 234, 236–238, 241, 321 White Widows, 37 Wilders, Geert, 14, 100, 102, 237, 245 Women empowerment, 8, 9, 19, 41, 44, 47–52, 57–60, 62, 64, 194, 211, 212, 217, 221, 282, 286, 287, 298, 312, 317, 325, 326 radicalisation, 12, 14, 37, 39, 40, 47, 48, 54, 56, 65, 98, 101, 115, 140, 171, 174, 177, 179, 185–192, 194, 195, 213, 221, 222, 249, 287–289, 291, 292, 296, 302, 303, 305, 316, 318, 324 rights, 9, 35, 48, 49, 51, 58, 59, 66, 89, 107, 110, 218, 262, 282, 283, 286, 287, 293, 312, 314 violent extremism, 39, 316

348 

INDEX

Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, v, 8, 9, 51, 282, 285, 311, 314 Woolwich, 85, 87, 88 X Xenophobia, 235, 243

Y Yilmaz, Israfil, 101 Youth group, 205, 260 YouTube, 36 Z Zionism, 241 Zschäpe, Beate, 94