Cosmological Argument - Spectrum of Opinions

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THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS A Spectrum of Opinion

EDITED BY DONALD R. BURRILL

ANCHOR BOOKS DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC, GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK

1967

DoNALD R. Burum.I. is Ass!}ci,ate PiQfessor of Philoso­ pny at California State College at Los Angeles and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Southern call� fomia. He.is the airt,bor of several attjcles in academic journals i:iJ. PhlloSO.P,ny of Law and Pliilosopp.y of Religion.

The Anchor Books edition is the first publication of The Cosmological 'Arguments

Anchoi' Books edition:: 1967

Li'brary of Congress Catalog Caro Number 67-21703 Copyright © 1'967 by; Donald R. Bum11 All .Rights Rese�� Printed in the Vnited �es of America F.u:st Editk1n

CONTENTS Introduction, by Donald R. Bui:rill

1

_pART L THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

A The Classical View L Plato:, Motion and Change as a Rational Demonstration of God ;2. .Aristotle: Toe Necessary E.ustence-0f a First Mov.er 3. St. Thomas Aqt•imas: God Demonstrated Through His Effects P. T. Geacli's Commentary on Aquinas B. The Classical Critique 1. David Hume's Critique of the Cosmological �ent 2. Immanuel Kant: The lmpOSSI"bility of a Cosmological Proof for God's Existence C. The Contem_pprary Re;joinder I. Paul Edwards: The Cosmological Argument 2. Alvm Plantinga: Necessary Being 3. Terence Penelhum:: Divine Necessity

n. nm TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT A The Classical Vie,v 1. William Paley! The Attributes of Deity from the Appearances of Nature 2. David Hume: Cleanthes' Argume� from Design 3. Iohn Stuart �fill: Marks of Design in Nature B. The Classical Critique 1. Da'vid Hume: Pbilo's Objections to the Arguments from Design

25 25. 35 Sl 57 83 83 91 101 101 125 143

P.",RT

165 165 171 177 185 185"

vi

Con.tents

2. Immanuel Kant: The ImpoSSioility of the Pbysiro-Theological Proof C. The Contemporary Rejoinder 1. A. a Taylor: Nature and Teleology 2. C. J. Ducasse: The Argument from �gn 3. C. D. Broad: _Teleology; Mecbaoisn:t, and Design

199 209 209 233 241

PART -1Il. A_ C:°'"�CLUDING CONTEMPOBARY POSTSCRIPT

A. I. r. C. Sm.art: The :Existence of God B. Richard Taylor: Metaphysics and God C. .Paul Tillich: The Question of God

Z79 297

�lected Biblio&1'llphy

301

25S

1'.HE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The authors of the essays in this anthology are con­ cerned with a common question: Is there :rational evi­ dence for the existence of God? Some cif the selections support the thesis that there is such evidence, others deny it.; but wheth� they affirm or deny this premise, these ''theistic proofs:' continue to evoke philosophical interest for many. The reader will discover that the arguments in this volume provide sufficient divergency of opinion to fos­ ter rousing pbilo�ophius conviciion or strengthen agnosticism. I

It is customary to divide "theistic proofs" into a mimi and a rxf.steriori arguments. The a priori argu­ ments begin ,vith intrinsic autonomous premises and

2

Intro.dl!ctio.11

end, it is SUJ?posed, with the Jo-gically wartant� con­ clusion: "Therefore, God e;,tlst$." The most note­ worthy a , priori fu.rra ]s, of comse, the ontological wrgu.­ ment.1 But t,be essays that follow are occupied witn the a posteriori fonps, an. d specifically with thOS\! tra­ ditionally .characterized as cosmoltJgical. 'J,'he- premises of a posteriori argument-s are derived, i:iot from self-evident or :intrinsic assumptions,. but :rather from hmnan eX,11eri.en,ce; and the conclusions �ed are judged to tonmv rationally from tlia,t ex­ �µce.. These a�e� begip v..ith observable ef­ fects �4 -atteI:!lpt to es�blish µie cause that initiates th� e��ts. To th�ir gosmologic:al form (which is tmly paradigmatic for a posteriori ar.guments), the ar­ guments draw on a fil)ecil)c asp�t of th.e universe and; ·th� wiili reference tq a set of general laws,. proceed to deJ11onsqate the �isreqce of G-od. It is St, Tpqmas Aquio.;i.s (1225�74), briilding in 5l!S:C� fashli:in etL tJJ� pbiip�ophical theology of Im predecessors, who is credited V1ith formulation of the four basic. 9osm0Jogic.al forms.2 He design-ates these forms motion, cause, contmgtncy, and d,esign. They b� with certain '1Jmte facts" about the verse, namely, its· permanence, change. reality, and order, and derive. from these elements eviqence a pos­ teriori for God's existenee.. Let 11 .s look a,t each in: deW}. (1) The argument tliat begins with the indubitability of motion is surely one of the oldest "proofs" in ra­ tional tfu:ology; It first appeats in the tenth book of

um-'

l,For an extensive analysis of the ontqlogic;tl �gomeot, see Alvin Plantinga, ed., The Ontological Argrdnenf, from $L Augustine to Con(e,nporary Philo:;opher$ {_New York, 19-65), :t·Aqainas- a,ctuaily _gives us tlve, but me :fourth "wdy.. is 11ot dearly cosmologk.al .

lnJroiiuct,ion

3

Plato 's La,ws. That account, how�ver, is extremely sjmpfistic. The entire argument ta.ms on t'h-e motion of anlrna ted objects. An maimate, object is. 5elf-movfug, while all i,aanimate object moves ,owy wlten moved by some animate source. The Sophists, Pl�to's intellectual adversaries, bad assumed- ih� livin_g -things spring ·from we inanimate, and that 1Jlllffet is the. incipient �oj]nd of everything else.3 Plato rejects ;SUch a concwtio� arguing. instead that inanimate things are never (logi­ cally or clutrnologi.cally) prior to animate objects, be;. cause the- inanimate is always dependent 11po.n. a spon­ taneous or mtex:na]Iy initiated source for its movement. It cannot move itselt4 Aceo.rdingly, tbeosource of mo­ tion can be ofily ·that which bas the power of motion within itself. This .P)a'to .conceived as "mind' ot "soul" -ihe singuJar .eI:emept that e-µsts prior 1o and causes mo�·ement in all inanimate objects. That .ii, the extent of Plato's argrrp1eiit, and it alone cc;,nstita.tes bis theo­ Jqgical case -for "soul" as the source- af motion. The rernaIoder of the discussion is spent de,nonstrat:ing, at 1�t to fris· own satisfactio� that ''soul'1 is Soul (God 01 Gods.) because the magni.tnde of �tion in the uni­ verse necessitates a $oul of cosmic _proportions. Si.Ii.ce Plato's m::gument also lends it.Self to teleological con­ sideratibn, wliicb will be investigated in due colll'$6, we neea not pursi::Je it:furthec here. Aristotle, wh.o undoubtedly prodn� the most in­ 1 ·

teresting theologi� arguments in Greek philosophy, accepts tlie Platonic ,dictum that motion is evidence for

·G.oo,.

but be dQes not accept the additional doctrine

a Se� Plato's PJuieilrus. An a:wiment that Waller Kaufmann tlgl;ttl.y :iDaiotaios is l!l!;Sed on lhe bi4den, premise, ihat rest ia mtural and ,motion .ii. tto:naroial (bne mJglir- s,i.y transnatural). Critial :rather than of .natural

·order. In th.; words of Aquinas, ''This everyone un­ derstands to be,God:' To this initial explanatio.n, however, the contempo­ }"afj. apo1'ogist adds two qualifying principles. F� the COI)�pt of cosmological motion is never limited to local motion. That is, motion is- not Iestricted to se. qnenfial places o.r spaces, but is defined metaphysically as any form 9f c:tiange. This is the proce,s� of moving Irom one "State of being to, another {from potency to acl;, as the Scholastics.. would. have it); for example, the change .of child into man or of water into steam. 1n other woros, tl,!e chat!ge. that comes about is not to be int.;rpreted as a causal chain of ev�ts, on. the order of falling dominoes, but is envisioned as a com­ plex connection between various states of being, pre­ servt;d and supported by a primp, metaphysical slate .of Being; The second qualifying principle follows logically from the :liIBt, i:tame1y, if motion is 1101 to be. restrict.ed to particwar objects moving from one point :in space and time to another, ,tben imistence up.on temporal sequence :bas no part.icuia.c signili.oance ;i.nd may very ·wen be misleading. Prime" Mover 'is :not only tb.e initial member in a tempoxal series, but, more. significantly, tbe highest metaphysical on:ler. of Being to whic1i. all other changing agents are subordinate. P. T. Geach sug,,aests that tlle prop�r analogue for Prime Mover is more correctly a "minstrel as the source of ml!Sic" than it is, a ''b1acksurith as -tli.e. source of a: sboe." The nUill­ ber of moving �nts that are in,terj�ted between the unmoved :first .mover and {)resent motion is hrelevant. 'I'hei;efore, the issue of infinite series is q'uite ;beside

6

Introduction

the point, since tbe fust mover is not limiled to tb3 sole task qf activatit\g -�h�nomena � temporal s • .