Coping with Crisis in African States 9781626374393

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Coping with Crisis in African States

Coping WITH Crisis IN

African States EDITED BY

Peter M. Lewis John W. Harbeson

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2016 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2016 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lewis, Peter, 1957– editor of compilation. | Harbeson, John W. (John Willis), 1938– editor of compilation. Coping with crisis in African states / edited by Peter M. Lewis and John W. Harbeson. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9781626372290 (hardcover : alk. paper) Crisis management in government—Africa—Case studies. | Political stability—Africa—Case studies. JQ1875.A55 C754 2016 960.3/3—dc23 2015026426 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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Contents

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Preface 1 Crisis, Vulnerability, and Response in Africa

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Peter M. Lewis and John W. Harbeson 2 Diagnosing and Managing State Crises

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Peter M. Lewis and John W. Harbeson 3 Algeria: Between Co-optation and Repression

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Miriam R. Lowi 4 Angola: A Rude Awakening

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Susana Moreira 5 The Democratic Republic of Congo:

The Politics of Perpetual Crisis Pierre Englebert

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6 Ghana: Shocks and Adaptation

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Kwaku A. Nuamah 7 Kenya: The Challenges of Democratic State Making

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John W. Harbeson 8 Nigeria: Cycles of Crisis, Sources of Resilience

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Peter M. Lewis 9 South Africa: A Disaster that Refuses to Happen

David Fowkes v

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CONTENTS

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Crisis Management for Strengthening the State John W. Harbeson and Peter M. Lewis

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

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201 205 221 223 235

Preface

THE CONVERSATIONS THAT FIRST INFORMED THIS PROJECT BEGAN

with a query: Which countries in Africa are especially susceptible to crisis, and how can various states effectively manage potentially destabilizing events? In discussion with civilian staff at the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), we quickly realized that the concept of “crisis” was not straightforward and that existing notions of crisis management were equally problematic. When does an adverse event constitute a crisis? How is crisis management shaped by different elements of state capability? To what extent is crisis response structurally determined by resources, location, and institutions, as opposed to contingent political elements that drive various outcomes? As the questions proliferated, it became clear that we required a better conceptual framework for understanding crisis trajectories. By way of empirically grounding the analysis, a series of case studies seemed a good way to proceed. We selected significant cases from across the region— Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—reflecting a range of attributes of state capacity, colonial legacy, resources, cultural background, and political regimes. This variety of illustrative cases offers important insights into the factors that shape crisis management. We acknowledge the support originating from AFRICOM to develop the cases and bring the study to fruition. We are especially appreciative that the funders fully concurred with our requirements for academic independence and confidentiality of sources. In many ways this has proved to be a model of scholarly cooperation with the policy community, answering broad analytic questions while retaining intellectual autonomy. The contributors to this book build on long-standing expertise in their subject countries and equally strong foundations in comparative political vii

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analysis. Special thanks go to Nate Allen, who helped shepherd the final manuscript for the book to completion. We hope that this volume offers new perspectives on the challenges faced by the countries under study, as well as broader insights into the political foundations for responding to adverse shocks in developing states. —P. M. Lewis —J. W. Harbeson

1 Crisis, Vulnerability, and Response in Africa Peter M. Lewis and John W. Harbeson

IN MARCH 2012, SOLDIERS IN MALI REVOLTED AGAINST THE GOVERN-

ment of Amadou Toumani Toure, invoking a worsening security situation in the northern portion of the country where a Tuareg rebellion was gaining ground. The coup ended two decades of civilian rule and plunged the country into a new period of turbulence. While political maneuvers unfolded in Bamako, the capital, Tuareg insurgents were soon eclipsed by a group of Islamist forces, including Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), who established draconian authority over the main northern towns and virtually partitioned the sprawling Sahelian state. At a moment when many international and African commentators were focusing on economic growth, improved governance, and broadening peace in much of the continent, Mali’s coup and civil conflict provided a stark reminder of the fragility of many African states and the susceptibility of countries to sudden destabilizing events—even amid positive conventional indicators of economic performance and governance. These events provide one of the more immediate reminders of the multiple sources of vulnerability that give rise to crises and emergencies in Africa. Wars, political upheaval, social violence, and uneven economic performance pose problems for many African states. Within the past two decades, conflict has taken a burdensome toll of casualties and displacement. More than 3 million people are estimated to have died in the manysided conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1998 to 2003 (Coghlan et al. 2006). More than a million lost their lives in various hostilities in Sudan (US Committee for Refugees 2001). About 800,000 perished in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and nearly half as many in the 1

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extended civil violence in Burundi (Prunier 1995; Lemarchand 2007). Major wars in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda have claimed numerous lives and destabilized various portions of the continent. African conflicts have been shadowed by large-scale movements of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), now numbering more than 10 million (UNHCR 2015). In the wake of conflict, African states have confronted major challenges of rehabilitating shattered lives and societies along with weakened economies. Postconflict governments have sought to institute structures for sustained improvements in governance to strengthen the underlying fabric of their states. Even for countries not overtly embroiled in conflict, violence spurred by ethnic, religious, partisan, or criminal motives have been a common problem. South Africans have had to cope with high levels of crime and recent incidents of xenophobic violence. Nigeria has been affected by hundreds of incidents of varied social violence, including the northern insurgency Boko Haram, with an overall toll exceeding 18,000 (Nigeria Social Violence Project 2015). Mali has contended with al-Qaeda and Tuareg insurgencies, Guinea-Bissau is dominated by narcotics traffickers, and Ghana has had intermittent communal violence in the northern region. Other forms of instability have been equally prevalent. In the early 1990s, numerous governments in Africa faced escalating opposition to autocratic rule. Dozens of regime transitions followed, including many newly democratizing systems such as South Africa, Mali, Ghana, and Mozambique. Shifts in the old regime, however, did not always signal political reform. Many incumbents resisted change or introduced superficial reforms that preserved their power, as in Cameroon, Togo, and Angola, perhaps even weakening the fabric of their states. Several states collapsed into civil conflict, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. In other democratizing regimes, reforms flagged, elements of the old regime returned, or the military again stepped into the political arena. Political changes in the 1990s were preceded by a decade of economic failure and stagnation. The majority of countries in the region showed lagging growth, burdensome debt, and acute fiscal pressures. Unemployment and poverty expanded while public services and government administration declined. Investment diminished, industries withered, and agriculturalists fell back on subsistence strategies. Africa receded to the margins of the global economy as the region’s share of trade and investment declined. Although economic, political, and security trends have significantly improved over the past decade, many hazards remain. South Sudan and the Central African Republic descended into political disarray and communal violence in 2013. Economic shocks in 2008–2009 caused growth to plum-

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met across much of the region, although recovery appeared fairly quickly. Drought in Niger in 2005–2006 and massive flooding in Mozambique several years earlier caused large-scale dislocation and humanitarian needs. Rising insurgencies in West Africa have created several pockets of insecurity in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. Chronic conflict in eastern Congo (then Zaire) and Somalia are further sources of strife. The risk of destabilizing shocks is a recurring problem for governments, neighbors, and international organizations. Crisis is a familiar if indiscriminate term in Africa as in many other settings (see, e.g., Mkandawire 1999; van de Walle 2001; de Waal and Whiteside 2003). Contemporary affairs in the region have frequently been discussed in the language of crisis, yet this characterization is often applied without attention to context, timing, or outcomes. In common usage, a crisis indicates a chronic, deep-seated challenge of security, governance, or economic viability. Security crises such as those in Mali and the DRC are accompanied by large-scale violence and the attendant humanitarian consequences. Political crises such as the Madagascar stalemate of 2007–2008 often lead to breakdown and regime change. Economic crises, such as that in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, result in mass poverty, hardship, fiscal emergencies, declining output, and the dislocation of currencies or firms. Longer-term crises may emerge from climatic events or migration, causing pressures on livelihoods and demographic shifts. These types of emergencies are endemic in many parts of Africa, often creating a focus for regional and international attention whether through peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, economic aid, or political engagement. However, not every adverse event is a catalyst of crisis. While certain shocks may create inflection points that shift the trajectories of states or societies, others are managed or contained within existing institutions and resources. Countries in Africa vary in their susceptibility to crises and their capacities for responding to major shocks. In this book, we assess comparative capabilities for crisis management among African states. When do unexpected events spiral into crisis? Are there institutions and policies that can help to manage adverse shocks? How do crises emerge, and how are they resolved? By improving our understanding of how African states cope with crisis situations, we can better anticipate disruptions and sources of instability across the region. This also sheds light on comparative questions of state capacity, economic flexibility, and social resilience. Collectively, we seek to answer three broad questions: How can we define crisis, especially the relationship between negative shocks and systemic distress? What are the political and economic factors that determine relative responses to shocks, and the range of outcomes from adverse events? Finally, how have different states in Africa answered major challenges, and what can we infer from their experiences? Aiming for con-

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ceptual clarity, we seek analytical conclusions about governance and draw on a careful reading of comparative case experience.

Putting Crisis Management in Perspective By taking up the subject of crises and crisis management, we hope to provide a more complete perspective on adverse events and emergencies in Africa. Clearly, African states and societies cannot be perceived solely or primarily through the lens of crisis management. Central economic and security trends on the continent have improved in recent years, though risks and deep problems persist. Notwithstanding general improvements in economic growth, governance reform, and conflict management, it is evident that multiple challenges to stability and security continue to test the legitimacy and even viability of many states. Violence, political uncertainty, economic shocks, social tensions, environmental problems, or demographic shifts have the potential to continue to foment major crises for African states and for regional clusters of states. The analysis of crises and crisis response is clearly still relevant for policy and analytic domains. These problems have not been randomly or uniformly distributed across the continent. Rather, countries differ in their degree of susceptibility to crisis, their history of insecurity-generating shocks, and their capacities to confront and manage them. In countries with reasonably capable legitimate states, responsive governments, and adequate external support, unwelcome shocks have been managed relatively effectively. In other contexts where state capacities have proven demonstrably weaker, governments have been resistant or unresponsive, external assistance has been hampered by political or geographic factors, and the crises of stability or security have been deeper and more protracted. Unfortunately, the latter circumstances have been more common throughout Africa. Economic development and political reform have been important factors in framing the nature, course, and outcomes of various crises. As a collective project, we examine here the dimensions and trajectories of extended and near-term crises in Africa, gauge comparatively the capabilities that African states have demonstrated for crisis management, and assess the outcomes for ameliorating or deepening degrees of state weakness. Following this introduction, the next chapter defines more extensively what we mean by crises and sets forth a framework for comparing the factors contributing to their occurrence, the nature and sources of crisis management capability, and the variety and significance of the outcomes of these efforts.

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Defining and Managing Crises Crises arise when unresolved shocks pose basic challenges to political, economic, or social equilibrium. There is an essential distinction between shocks and crisis. Shocks are unanticipated adverse events that have potentially destabilizing effects, a jolt to the system that may upset economic performance, political regimes, governing institutions, societal norms, subsistence arrangements, demographic patterns, or provisions for security. Crises develop when existing institutions or governance arrangements cannot effectively manage these challenges, leading to protracted instability or dysfunction. The temporal dimension is also important, as crises often generate some urgency for resolution whether from domestic or external sources. Although a crisis situation may linger, it is rarely sustainable over the long term and, if unattended or managed ineffectively, can trigger largescale insecurity or societal disruption. Crises present the risk of systemic breakdown: a collapse of regime, large-scale conflict, or economic malaise. Crisis management can be regarded as the policies, resources, institutions, and informal arrangements employed by African states (solely or in concert with other countries and organizations) to address adverse conditions as they evolve. Governmental approaches to crisis management reflect different levels of political commitment, mobilization, and capacity. Similarly, there exists a broad spectrum of responses for crisis prevention, control, and amelioration, ranging from adequate resourcing and institutions to manage adverse shocks—which can bolster governments and states—to inadequate capabilities for crisis response that can yield a prospect of worsening state weakness in the face of challenges. Occasionally, political leaders are actively motivated to prevent crises from emerging, and governments may take steps toward preventive action. The development of early warning and analysis can provide some ability to anticipate shocks whether they involve electoral tensions, communal violence, economic imbalances, or even climate trends (Goldstone et al. 2010). With sufficient information, governments have opportunities to forestall or mitigate adverse events. Election reform, local conflict mediation, central bank intervention, and climate risk insurance are diverse tools for managing potential disruptions. In actual practice, preventive action is rarely effective, and early response is often the best course available to governments facing serious adverse events. As the impact is broadcast (e.g., from postelection violence, revenue or trade declines, flooding, or migration), governments have the option, with good information and sufficient institutional capacity, to address problems as they arise and to stem their effects. This can entail efforts at political negotiation, economic stabilization, security intervention,

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or humanitarian relief. Appeals for external assistance are often an important element, although outside involvement commonly involves delays and gaps. Later interventions, while frequently more sporadic and less effective, may be sufficient to contain the effects of shocks before they escalate into systemic problems. Responses to shocks, of course, are neither inevitable nor universal. We note that often governments fail to respond to adverse developments and to disregard, or even aggravate, emerging crises. In many instances, rulers have actively encouraged turmoil to profit politically or economically, effectively prioritizing their own survival in power and economic prerogatives over the public good. A full understanding of comparative crises and the range of response should examine not only forms of management, but also manifestations of deliberate escalation or neglect. In this book, we analyze the varying nature, sources, and dimensions of state vulnerability and capacities to address crises, illustrated in a number of important country cases. In the following section, we consider the types and nature of crises, and the susceptibility to shocks among diverse African states. This is followed by a consideration of salient causal factors in the genesis of crisis in Africa. The framework distinguishes among background factors that are largely immutable, at least in the short to medium term (e.g., history and geography); proximate or medium-term factors (e.g., fiscal capabilities, political parties, and social movements) that define the structure of opportunity, but may change in response to circumstances; and contingent or triggering factors (e.g., leadership and policy choice) that may alter the near-term course of events. We also evaluate the nature and differential impact of shocks, the timing and evolution of crisis conditions, the nature of strategic response and policy choice, and the political and institutional capabilities for managing adverse events.

Forms and Modes of Crisis African states, while exhibiting diverse capabilities and attributes, have contended with many common challenges. The seven cases considered in the book—Algeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—have all been susceptible to large shocks and have experienced potential (or actual) crises. These countries vary substantially in their structure, capacities, and liabilities, ranging from South Africa, generally recognized as among the most capable states on the continent, to the DRC, which has seemingly teetered on the brink of failure for many years. The major issues observed in the chapters range in scope and intensity. Ghana has experienced transitory ethnic violence in the northern areas while Kenya has witnessed sporadic, though highly conse-

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quential, election-related violence. Nigeria contends with chronic electoral violence, insurgencies, and social tensions while large-scale civil conflicts have wracked Algeria, Angola, and the DRC. Not only are the challenges diverse, but states have varied markedly in their degree of vulnerability and in their demonstrated ability to draw on strategies and resources to forestall or ameliorate serious challenges. Crises in Africa can be considered along three broad dimensions: governance, the economy, and security. A crisis of governance reflects the failure of key institutions or a collapse of political order. 1 Governance crises are marked by regime instability, social restiveness, and often violence. This is frequently related to basic failures of government to meet functions of accountability, resource mobilization, or the provision of essential public goods. In some circumstances public institutions do not effectively control the country, and significant groups or areas have been antagonistic to ruling regimes. Crises of governance reflect an inability to sustain legitimate control or to elicit popular investment in the state. To some degree, these problems, and the resulting challenges to ruling regimes, have been associated with contestation concerning the structure of the state itself. Crises of governance are manifest in different ways. Military revolts and coups d’état, chaotic elections, political stalemate among parties or factions, recurring large-scale social violence, and rising insurgencies signal fundamental problems of political order and legitimacy. It can be difficult to distinguish periodic turbulence or political challenges from a more basic governance crisis, which is often a matter of judgment and degree. The main consideration is the relative duration and scope of political dislocation, understood in relation to the capabilities within the system for engagement and resolution. Why is it important to assess such a crisis rather than simply addressing the immediate political challenge? We argue that deeper systemic problems require more extended and comprehensive approaches than alleviating shortterm tensions or resolving transitory disputes. In circumstances of poor governance, an essential social contract is absent. Regimes often fail to establish durable linkages with important portions of society whether ethnic, regional, or religious segments; rural populations; or influential class groups. Many regimes have garnered minimal legitimacy and have sought to maintain control largely through clientelism, institutional manipulation, and coercion (Lemarchand 1972; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Hyden 2012). Limited accountability is often a correlate of weak legitimacy, and not necessarily a function of regime type. Though mechanisms of accountability may be more clearly institutionalized in electoral regimes, it is evident that some governments in nominal democracies may be distant and unresponsive, even as particular nondemocratic rulers may respond relatively effectively to citizens’ needs (Fukuyama 2012; Levitsky and Way 2010).

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Poor governance is often associated with deficient resource mobilization and a resulting failure to deliver essential public goods. Resource mobilization includes both revenue and spending. In states with weak institutions and scant legitimacy, revenue extraction is often quite limited, as governments lack the organization or influence to tax citizens and firms (Ebeke and Ehrhart 2012). In these circumstances, essential revenues may be available primarily from natural resource rents or foreign aid (Brautigam and Knack 2004). On the spending side, wide discretion (often accompanied by patronage, rent distribution, and corruption) has typically led to the diversion or misuse of revenues. A natural consequence has been a failure to provide collective goods in the forms of education, health, infrastructure, policing, and justice. Struggles over political change have prompted crises at various moments in Africa’s contemporary history. Considering the cases included in this study, colonial rule provoked serious conflicts including anticolonial wars in Angola and Algeria and the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya, arising from the failure to address the land tenure crisis arising from settler rule. A comparable set of challenges emerged from the deep-seated structural inequalities and intransigent settler regime in South Africa, leading to decades of contentious politics and armed struggle for an end to apartheid. In Nigeria and the DRC, inadequate preparation, poor institutional design, and weak management of transitions from colonialism led to serious destabilization in the wake of independence. Following the end of colonial rule, the articulation of authoritarian regimes and struggles among political factions led to political violence, coups, or civil conflict in most of the countries considered here. Ghana and Nigeria experienced recurring civil and military cycles while Algeria quickly succumbed to military rule. Nigeria, Angola, the DRC, and Algeria were embroiled in internal wars of varying scope and duration. Kenya and South Africa have experienced recurring violence arising from domestic inequality and social tensions. In the era of political reform and democratization since the end of the Cold War, new sources of tension and instability have appeared, some of which are directly related to the transition process. Algeria and Angola descended into devastating civil conflict following failed transitional elections in 1992. Nigeria and the DRC experienced stalemate among authoritarian incumbents and aspiring civilian politicians in the mid-1990s. In Kenya in the 1990s, and in South Africa for more than fifteen years in the wake of the 1976 Soweto rebellion, social violence expanded under incumbent regimes as pressures for reform gathered. Following many political transitions, democratic development has been hampered by tensions around electoral cycles and competition, accompanied by relative neglect of other dimensions of democracy (including constitutional reform and the rule of law). Serious political tensions and vio-

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lence have surrounded three of Kenya’s four elections since donors compelled the Daniel arap Moi government to hold elections in 1991, before constitutional reform was undertaken to undo the effects of authoritarian rule. Elections without structural change have aggravated governance problems in the DRC, especially since the deeply flawed 2011 poll. Nigeria’s electoral failings have instigated violence in every polling cycle. Unbending authoritarian rule, veto players within the military, and inability to accommodate key challengers have aborted transitions in Algeria and Angola. Moreover, continued pervasive corruption has undermined democratic transitions throughout much of Africa, further exposing weak states to potential political crisis. Economic crises are typically more straightforward in terms of measurement and assessment, yet also varied in their genesis and response. An economic crisis is marked by a sustained failure of growth accompanied by serious macroeconomic imbalances. Key indicators are large dislocations in government finance, the balance of payments, foreign exchange, or monetary stability. Slow growth or contraction of the gross domestic product (GDP; below 2 percent aggregate growth) for two years or longer is a beacon of crisis in an economy. Low growth is usually accompanied by severe fiscal shortfalls, declining public and private sector employment, the compression of imports (leading to shortages of both final consumption goods and industrial inputs), currency depreciation (whether registered officially or through a parallel market), and eroding investment in public services and infrastructure. Economic distress has been a recurring problem in many African states for at least three decades. Adverse shocks can fall along several lines, including trade, investment, or monetary shifts. Trade and financial shocks have triggered crises in many African economies, notably in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A crucial source of vulnerability arises from the structure of these economies that are rooted in agriculture and natural resource exports (Ake 1981; Collier 2003). Abrupt swings in prices for commodities in international markets have rippled throughout many economies, regardless of the content or range of their exports. Revenue downturns—or sharp increases in key import costs, notably energy—provoked fiscal emergencies, shortages of essential goods and inputs, capital droughts in the private sector, and a degeneration of government provisions. Escalating foreign debt obligations were an integral feature of the long economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, resulting in a debt overhang that diminished revenues and forestalled recovery in many countries. Revenue volatility is a special problem for resource exporting countries. Export proceeds are sharply affected by changes in price or quantity of the leading product (whether oil, gas, or minerals). Moreover, governments fail to manage windfall revenues effectively, and ambitious spending

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targets set during growth periods are rarely scaled back during slumps. The consequences of such fiscal myopia are growing deficits and the accumulation of external debt, leading to severe dislocations in revenues and the balance of payments. For many African economies, the prevalence of natural resources has given rise to particular syndromes of monoculture production and economic distortions characterized as a “resource curse” (Ross 1999). Resource exporters are fiscally centralized and highly concentrated on a key revenue source. The advent of export windfalls has the effect of diminishing agriculture and manufacturing activities while the rapid growth of state resources fosters a growing public sector that crowds out local production and services. The problems of enclave economies and resource wealth are salient for most countries in this study; of the seven, only Kenya lacks substantial natural resources. Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and recently Ghana are significant producers of hydrocarbons. The resource syndrome has been evident for all of the mature producers in the group. Ghana is an especially interesting experiment, as it will be one of the first countries potentially exposed to the resource curse after having become a pacesetting African democracy on the foundation of a more balanced economy. In the DRC and South Africa, mineral wealth has significantly shaped their economies, though with very different outcomes. Crises of the economy are influenced not just by economic structure or international economic trends, but crucially by domestic politics and policies. Internal conditions strongly influence the readiness and ability to respond to exogenous shocks and competitive challenges. At the most immediate level, the capability of the peak economic bureaucracy is a crucial factor in tracking and managing key balances and sectoral policies. Bureaucratic and planning capacities, however, are a reflection of the basic incentives of rulers toward effective economic management or discretion and political allocation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; P. M. Lewis 2007). Distributive politics and the nature of regimes have decisive influences on the nature of economic oversight in different states. As the case discussions make clear, the political framing of economic strategy and policy is a leading factor in understanding economic trajectories. Security crises are evident in sustained significant violence in substantial parts of the territory or society. Insurgency, civil war, cross-border conflict, or dispersed communal violence can all be indicators of a security crisis. Different observers look to varying thresholds, though it is possible to operationalize a measure of insecurity by defining thresholds of casualties and displacement (see Sambanis 2002: 238). Security challenges can quickly upset political and social systems, producing broader volatility, as has been evident in Algeria, Nigeria, and the DRC. Large-scale conflict or dispersed violence may be a symptom of political dysfunction, economic

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downturns, or social strains, though these security challenges will also aggravate such problems. There are reciprocal paths of causation. Crises of security are often apparent at the outset; certainly, this was true in 1992 in Algeria and Angola as well as the more recent instances of Mali in 2012 and the Central African Republic in 2013. Many conflict situations, however, emerge from extended chains of events. In the DRC, the spillover of refugees and combatants from Rwanda after 1994 shattered tenuous stability in then Zaire. The entry of troops from several neighboring states served to aggravate strife. Local militias proliferated, leading rapidly to a catastrophic situation of conflict. These events escalated over time into a large-scale conflict, with horrendous consequences for the civilian population. In Nigeria, grievances and tensions in the Niger Delta, and later in several northern states spiraled into insurgency, while long-standing tensions in the central city of Jos and surrounding areas fostered a complex of intercommunal violence. Recent conflict in South Sudan and bordering regions has also been cumulative rather than sudden. Just as the onset, escalation, and scope of violence has followed different paths, governments have had recourse to different responses. In the cases considered here, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria deployed relatively cohesive national armies, although efforts to contain or defeat insurgents required many years of conflict and attrition in the former two cases. The Nigerian armed forces have reflected problems of professionalism and capacity, though they have periodically been able to mount concerted efforts to contain instability. Kenya has also struggled with security forces (especially police) who have been implicated as instigators of abuse as often as sources of a security response. In the DRC, the armed forces under successive regimes were fragmented and ineffectual, leaving much of the response for regional forces and international peacekeepers. Two broad historical shifts—decolonization and the end of the Cold War—have been associated with multiple security crises in Africa. While decolonization was often achieved relatively peacefully in the 1950s and 1960s, the process was blocked in a number of settler states, prompting armed struggles for independence. Among our cases, Algeria, Angola, and South Africa had long insurgencies against settler rule, sometimes with lasting effects on security and stability. Angola endured the most sustained violence, as the anticolonial struggle quickly gave way to a civil war that lasted twenty-seven years, ending only in 2002. Algeria’s revolutionary struggle yielded a stable postindependence regime until the failed political opening of 1992 incited a civil conflict lasting a decade. South Africa has achieved broad stability since the end of apartheid in 1994, though it has been marked by high levels of criminal violence and sporadic xenophobic attacks. A distinct set of conflicts emerged in postcolonial societies affected by polarized social groups and divisive governance (Chazan et al. 1999; Young

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2012). Political turbulence and secessionist pressures erupted immediately after independence in the DRC, while in Nigeria ethnic competition and failed democratic institutions precipitated political collapse and civil war by the end of the 1960s. In Ghana and Kenya, though ethnic and regional rivalries were acute, regimes crafted ethnic bargains and clientelist management that avoided the more severe upheavals of many neighboring states. With the end of superpower competition and the strategic balances that characterized the Cold War, new sources of instability were evident across the continent (Young 1994; Collier and Sambanis 2005). The collapse of the Soviet bloc after 1989 unraveled a set of military, security, and political alliances that had sustained numerous African regimes while Western powers quickly signaled that they were unwilling to continue to subsidize or support authoritarian regimes for ideological advantage. Pressures for political reform, focusing on electoral democracy, rapidly intensified in many countries. The rapid defeat of regimes by insurgents in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Liberia also fostered a spread of weaponry and spillover effects in the region. The new security challenges of the 1990s were manifest in many of the countries treated in this volume. Failed democratization fostered civil war (or new episodes of conflict) in Algeria and Angola, while in the DRC political decay gave way to regime change and conflict in the wake of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda. Nigeria suffered a new predatory episode of military rule, and Kenya’s stalled political transition was punctuated by state-induced ethnic violence in the Rift Valley. Security crises are most often addressed within states, as illustrated here in the cases of Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa. While varying in capacity and efficacy, regimes in these countries deployed national security forces and other conflict management tools to stem ongoing conflicts and insurgencies. In the cases of the DRC and Kenya, international actors played more prominent roles. The United Nations (UN) and a variety of regional actors have been involved in the DRC for more than fifteen years while external powers helped to broker the power-sharing arrangement that curtailed Kenya’s postelection violence in 2008. Regional mediators, influential states, and international organizations frequently play roles in the management of conflict. It is also important to note the role of environmental and demographic factors that are not often recognized to be “crises” as such, but may create conditions that aggravate deeper problems in governance, livelihoods, or stability. Environmental problems of drought, flooding, and erosion— whether emanating from changing weather patterns or population shifts— can instigate subsistence problems that in turn aggravate competition over land and property rights (see, e.g., Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Reuveny 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Migration, including large displacements and refugee flows, can be instrumental in conflict, as seen in the

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DRC. In Kenya, the changing distribution of ethnic groups in response to land and patronage opportunities was an important source of conflict in the 2007–2008 electoral violence. Urbanization and shifting communal groupings can also affect stability and governance.

Crisis Vulnerabilities African countries vary greatly in their susceptibility to shocks and ensuing emergencies. Angola had a devastating civil conflict for more than a quarter-century, and the DRC and Nigeria have been embroiled in a steady stream of crises since independence. Algeria, Ghana, and Kenya have experienced more episodic problems while South Africa has been comparatively well governed for two decades. As we elaborate later in the book, it is essential to distinguish between relatively inflexible background factors, intermediate structural elements, and proximate or triggering variables in the genesis of crisis. Geography, demography, history, and institutions will shape the likelihood of significant shocks, the degree to which shocks may foster broader dislocations, and the capabilities of states and societies in managing such challenges. Here, we briefly discuss the precipitating factors that shape crisis trajectories in the domains of governance, the economy, social accommodation, and security. Security challenges are evident in all of the countries discussed in this study, with a majority experiencing persistent instability that is consonant with crisis. Algeria, Angola, the DRC, and Nigeria have undergone protracted civil conflicts or recurring sectional violence. If we consider South Africa from the 1970s, the country certainly reflected a deepening security crisis following the 1976 Soweto rebellion as resistance to the apartheid regime gathered in strength and militancy, culminating in the 1984–1986 township rebellions. The transition period of the early 1990s was also turbulent, as groups allied to different political tendencies fought in many urban areas. Since the transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa’s security situation has been broadly stable. In Ghana and Kenya, communal violence punctuated the landscape in the 1990s and 2000s, though conflict was largely curtailed in Ghana and contained in Kenya after the violent electoral cycle of 2007–2008. What factors account for the prevalence of security crises in particular states? Obviously, a range of drivers operate at different levels of generality, but legacies and spillovers appear particularly salient in several of these cases. The path-dependent nature of conflict is evident in many countries (not only in Africa), and it is not a tautology to say that historical violence is a reasonable predictor of future violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Certainly, this is seen in Angola, Nigeria, and the DRC, where historical ten-

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sions and conflicts have created turbulence and fed into recurring security problems. The successful management of conflict in northern Ghana can be partly attributed to the fact that it was exceptional and isolated, within a general context of communal stability. In South Africa, by contrast, a long history of inequality and social violence has yielded a troubling legacy. Though there is little antisystem or mobilized group conflict, fragmented societal violence is pervasive, even if policing and state security forces are capable of maintaining a modicum of order at the national level. Bad neighborhoods create significant hazards for clusters of states. Virtually every country in this study has been subject to influences from nearby crisis-prone states. Spillover effects are most visible in the history of the DRC where refugee flows and the incursion of militias have fueled conflict for decades. In addition, the direct intervention of neighboring states (including Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Zimbabwe) and their support for local proxies have been instrumental in conflict dynamics since the 1990s. Angola contended for many years with offensives from South Africa and proxy support from the DRC (formerly Zaire) for rebel groups. More recently in Algeria and Nigeria, trans-Sahelian networks of Islamist militants have been significant in sustaining and expanding insurgencies that began as internal movements. Kenya’s Somali-inhabited northeast region has been vulnerable to fallout from that failed state. As dominant regional states, South Africa and Nigeria have had some role in contributing to the restoration of stability among neighbors—Nigeria through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South Africa in the case of Lesotho. Other countries have far less capacity to influence their environment. The degree of social polarization within states is an important element in governance and security crises. One aspect of the problem is ethnic demography. Both Kenya and Nigeria have relatively concentrated though also contentious ethnic maps since three groups in each country (none of them a national majority) are highly mobilized and engaged in rivalries over power and distribution. In Angola, ideology overlapped with ethnicity as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular pela Libertação de Angola, MPLA) government and its principal opponents drew from different ethnoregional bases. Group distinctions have been central in South Africa, though the defining fault line among black and white identities during the liberation struggle eclipsed many tensions among other ethnicities. The DRC and Ghana are both comparatively fragmented in ethnolinguistic terms, yet with very different trajectories. Among the states considered in this study, Algeria is the most socially cohesive, though different identities among Berbers, Arabs, and several minorities influence politics. While ethnic demography can be consequential, many analysts have focused instead on the degree of fractionalization or tension among groups.

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Early measures of fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997) drew on the number and relative size of groups, though subsequent refinements have focused on measures of social distance or contention (Fearon 2003; Posner 2004b). While a bifurcated map is clearly hazardous, as evident in Rwanda and Burundi, three major groups can be volatile (as seen in Nigeria and Kenya) though not necessarily violent (as seen in Malawi). More fragmented maps can sustain relative peace (Tanzania) or conflict (the DRC). The degree of ethnic fractionalization is one indicator of the hazards of demography as is the history of group relations referenced above. Ethnicity is not the only factor that plays a role in social tensions; regional and class differences can also foster instability. The profound spatial inequalities and neglect of some regions in Nigeria and the DRC are prominent drivers in the governance and security problems of these states. Regionalism is significant in Algeria as well. Deep economic inequalities in South Africa are clearly manifest in populist politics, protest behavior, and xenophobic violence. Kenya too reflects the liabilities of sharp class differentiation and systemic inequality. The realm of social relations reminds us that structure interacts closely with policy. The challenges of managing diversity have been shaped by the degree to which governments were able to furnish public goods or devise inclusive social bargains (Miguel 2004; Lieberman 2009). South Africa’s political settlement of 1994 was instrumental in laying the basis for future stability, even as the failure to make inroads against inequality has threatened the social fabric. In Nigeria, Kenya, the DRC, and Angola, the regime’s discrimination against groups and neglect of regions have been important sources of conflict. Algeria’s blunt exclusion of Islamists from the political sphere in 1992 incited strife. By contrast, Ghanaian regimes have managed to balance appointments and patronage sufficiently to quell rivalries and preserve a degree of inclusion. Political institutions and governing strategies are instrumental in mitigating or aggravating vulnerabilities. The attributes and capabilities of states are pivotal in shaping crisis vulnerabilities as well as response. Broad state capabilities can be assessed in various ways, including specific governance indicators, indexes of public goods, and qualitative evaluations. The cases considered here are anchored by South Africa at the high end of capacity and the DRC at the lower end, with the other cases arrayed along intermediate positions. This type of ranking, however, overlooks the variation of capabilities within states. Algeria and South Africa are largely aligned in overall public goods provision, though sharply divergent in political competition or in rule of law. Kenya and Nigeria reflect uneven capacities, with domains such as macroeconomic management, elections, and security showing a degree of efficacy, while sectoral policy, judicial capacity, and many public functions are quite

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deficient. Angola too has pockets of effectiveness in the petroleum sector and in some urban areas, but deep deficits in developmental capacity and political inclusion. In the most general sense, more capable states such as South Africa (or Botswana) have been less vulnerable to crisis than extremely weak states such as the DRC (or the Central African Republic). But this is hardly a sufficient condition since other weak states including Senegal and Malawi have been less turbulent than stronger neighbors such as Côte d’Ivoire or Zimbabwe. What accounts for the vulnerability of some regimes and resilience in others? We identify three functions that states manage differently: competition, distribution, and violence. Where broad-based pressures for competition have been resisted or foreclosed, there is a greater likelihood that states will experience political or security challenges. This is evident in the cases of Algeria, Angola, the DRC, Kenya, and Nigeria, and substantially contrasted by Ghana since 1992 or South Africa since 1994.2 Electoral politics offer no guarantees against political tensions, but a competitive political sphere furnishes outlets for elite bargaining and popular contention that are largely absent in closed systems. More plural systems also create outlets for addressing the distributive problems that can provoke instability and conflict. Every case in this study is characterized by acute inequalities and uneven growth, though the dispersal of benefits varies among countries. More durable political compacts are evident where governments are able to address major group claims and to achieve sustained growth. Adverse shocks and political turbulence have greater likelihood where distributive claims among salient groups are ignored or suppressed. Apartheid South Africa is the leading example, though pressures can be identified most clearly in Nigeria and Kenya among our sample of states. Finally, the management of violence is a factor that clearly affects crisis vulnerabilities. In this regard, the state should be viewed as a potential source of violence as well as a (potentially) sovereign authority that responds to violence. The escalation or entrenchment of conflict is more likely in instances where state security forces are major instigators, as in the DRC, Nigeria, Algeria, and Angola. State-induced violence evidently polarizes groups or segments and hampers alternative mechanisms of resolution. Moreover, state capabilities for responding to violence and managing conflict will condition the effects of shocks in the security domain. In South Africa and Ghana, a combination of institutional mechanisms and security capabilities has enabled governments to contain potential challenges and conflicts. In Nigeria and the DRC, both bargaining and security mechanisms are limited relative to major challenges, and security problems have consequently escalated. In the economic domain, structural and institutional factors are paramount. Export concentration is a major source of vulnerability, especially in

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economies dominated by natural resources. Trade shocks have been consequential for Algeria, Angola, the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, and to some degree South Africa, all of which have substantial resource components in their economies. More important, however, is the competence and autonomy of the peak economic bureaucracy. Where capable economic managers have held sway for extended periods, as in Ghana, South Africa, and to some degree recently in Angola, Nigeria, and Kenya, countries have been able to navigate economic downturns and fluctuations more successfully. The DRC has had little capacity to manage external shocks while earlier episodes of economic distress in most of the countries in our cluster illustrate the vulnerabilities of weak or politicized economic management.

Organization and Aims of the Study Following two conceptual and synthetic chapters, Chapters 3–9 draw on a set of case studies of crisis management in seven African countries: Algeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. Each case study broadly follows a consistent format in analyzing (1) the contextual features; (2) the nature of a central management crisis faced by the country; (3) the management efforts and strategies employed to address the crisis; and (4) the outcomes of the crisis and any follow-up efforts exerted. In each case, the authors focus on the deployment of capabilities, the activities of the relevant external and internal actors, and the crisis management approach adopted by the respective governments. The analyses each conclude with an assessment of crisis management capabilities of the country, an assessment of the bearing of the outcomes for the strengthening or weakening of the state, and what the outcomes portend for future challenges facing the country. A comparative case study has many advantages along with limitations. Each case in this study is analyzed in depth, with attention to context and the particular features of the country under discussion. A common analytical framework and case structure allow for comparisons or distinctions across the cases. However, the diversity among cases also means that we must treat inferences with caution. Case comparisons can generate useful insights and guide further research, but this approach can provide only limited generalizations. Accordingly, we offer provisional conclusions and recommendations. This introduction has framed the issues in defining, diagnosing, and managing crises in African states. In Chapter 2, we address at greater length the trajectory and causes of crises, ranging from fundamental background factors to immediate triggering causes. We also outline the essential components of crisis management in broad perspective. Our analysis considers the

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relative weight of elite incentives, political and economic capabilities, and international cooperation in responding to adverse events. In the concluding chapter of this book, we summarize the findings of the case studies, consider cross-cutting themes drawn from them, and relate them to the assessment framework set forth in Chapter 2. We offer some policy guidelines for more effective crisis management suggested by these cases. These guidelines center on the anticipation and prevention of crises; better identification of vulnerabilities and strengthening of capabilities for diagnosis and response; and more clearly articulated crisis management strategies and practices, including postcrisis follow-up. Finally, we consider the lessons of crisis management suggested by these studies for the interrelated objectives of overcoming state weakness, advancing democratization, and strengthening economic development in Africa.

Notes 1. Many have written extensively about failures of governance in the context of Africa. See, for example, Hyden and Bratton 1992; van de Walle 2001; Bräutigam and Knack 2004. 2. Ghana’s turbulent civil-military relations and state failure prior to 1981 offer further validation to the idea that limited competition fosters crisis; South Africa under apartheid furnishes a similar lesson.

2 Diagnosing and Managing State Crises Peter M. Lewis and John W. Harbeson

AFRICAN STATES HAVE FACED MULTIPLE CHALLENGES TO THEIR STA-

bility and security. The continent has seen numerous conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, changes of regime, economic downturns, and major problems of health or livelihood. These have regularly been associated with deep-seated crises of governance, social stability, or the economy. This study examines the genesis of crisis and the range of response in Africa. We look at the relation between shocks and crisis, the emergence and progression of crises, various approaches to addressing emergencies, and diverse outcomes from adverse events. The central conclusion is that crises are common though not inevitable in Africa, and that appropriate policy and institutional interventions can be effective in reducing or containing adverse shocks. Better assessments of crisis vulnerability and response can help Africans and international actors to better cope with adverse shocks and incipient crises. Ongoing crises can be addressed through institutional development and political mechanisms for conflict management. In Chapter 1, we outlined the rationale for the project and provided a conceptual frame for analyzing shocks and crises. We also identified indicators in the domains of governance, security, and the economy, and discussed the most relevant sources of vulnerability for states, drawn inductively from the comparison of cases in this study. In this chapter, we discuss the diagnostics of crisis and the leading factors that shape crisis response. We begin by considering the factors that may predispose states to adverse events and affect the evolution of potential crisis. This context is essential for understanding and responding to adverse events. 19

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There is often a great deal of contention and even confusion over the challenges facing African states. In many instances, leaders are slow to acknowledge the emergence of a critical situation, and observers may be unsure of whether circumstances suggest short-term adversity or a deeper systemic problem. The recognition of an emergency is often clouded by denial and scarce information, as authorities frequently seek to stave off criticism. Analysts are sometimes quick to deploy the language of “crisis” or to extrapolate larger and more protracted dislocation from immediate transient problems. Moreover, problems such as conflict or economic downturn are immersed in debates about origins and causation. Some observers attribute these problems to deep foundations such as widespread poverty or colonial legacies, while others point to more immediate causes such as leadership and policy choice. In Chapter 1, we offered criteria for discerning the advent of crisis; here, we focus on an analytic schema for understanding the genesis of crisis. We proceed at three levels of analysis. At the broadest and most basic level, there are inflexible background factors that shape conditions in particular states. These attributes, such as geography and history, may increase the prevalence of certain types of shocks or particular modes of crisis. Zimbabwe’s land inequality and independence struggle, and Rwanda’s ethnic demography and background of social violence, are two examples. However, even in these instances, the course of events in recent decades was hardly inevitable. Background conditions create a basic context that influences the leading structures of state and economy and shapes the assumptions of actors. Two other layers of explanation come into play. An intermediate level of structural factors is clearly important. These elements are relatively fixed and resilient, but more mutable than essential background factors. Regime type, constitutional design, political party competition, patterns of production and subsistence in the economy, aspects of mobility and settlement, and elements of organized violence are all structures that can strongly influence particular paths and capacities. Structures condition the opportunities and incentives for actors and groups, though their effects are probabilistic rather than determining. Structures may also be altered or resisted, even at the margins, allowing space for different choices and trajectories. Finally, proximate triggering factors are often pivotal. Ethnic chauvinist leaders, opportunistic insurgents, capable or inept rulers, entrepreneurial movements or parties, and even fortuitous illness or death might play a role in determining the interplay of choices and the outcomes from a particular shock. The adverse decisions of political challengers such as Andry Raojelina in Madagascar in 2009 and Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville in the mid-1990s—and, of course, the more fortunate choices of Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk in South Africa—shaped

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outcomes in each country. The failure of Nigerian leaders to adjust to exogenous shocks in the early 1980s precipitated crisis, just as the introduction of a competent technocratic team in 2003 set the groundwork for economic resilience. The removals of Charles Taylor in Liberia (2003), Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire (2011), and Haile Mariam Mengistu in Ethiopia (1991) were instrumental in shifting the paths of these states. These different considerations provide the tools for an approach that can be likened to a “nested” analysis of crises (see Lieberman 2005). Immediate shocks and catalysts can be viewed within the context of prevailing structures set against a conditioning background of history and resources. We are not reduced to anodyne generalizations (conflict is a result of poverty) or idiosyncratic explanations (a particular leader’s psychology is the source of the problem), but instead we are able to account for the relative importance of different factors and to assess necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular crisis situation. With a balanced diagnosis of causes and interactions, it is possible to identify more nuanced strategies and tools for effective crisis management. Changes in leadership or policy may indeed be essential for addressing a particular situation, though typically there is need for institutional change, further investments in capacity, and engagement with new coalitions and social bargains. Our discussion of diagnostic approaches is followed by a consideration of crisis response. Why are some shocks rapidly contained while others spiral into crises? What disposes certain countries or regimes to sequential or multiple crises? To what degree is crisis response a domestic prerogative, and when is there a need for concerted international attention? We consider the incentives of leaders and the relative capacities of states as key drivers, and assess their interactions in different settings. We then discuss the sequence of crisis response and different strategic approaches.

Analyzing State Vulnerabilities Background Factors

We suggest, here, a multilayered approach that relates variables and drivers at different levels of generality. The framework moves from macro-level contextual factors, to middle-range structural considerations, to actor-centered strategy and choice. We begin with background factors that are largely inflexible and set general parameters to the emergence of structures and the degrees of freedom for actors. These include elements of geography, demography, and history. Africa’s geographic legacy presents basic dilemmas of wealth accumulation, territorial control, uneven development, and social contention. The

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physical geography of the continent is challenging, with inconsistent rainfall, easily depleted soils, and high burdens of disease and parasites that limit human productivity and animal range (Bloom et al. 1998). The comparatively low ratios of people to land in much of the continent has afforded outlets for subsistence and migration, but also limits to innovation and commerce (Herbst 2000). Just as important as the ecological setting, however, has been the political and economic geography of the continent. With few exceptions, the boundaries fixed in the colonial era have been resilient: they are bolstered by regional norms of sovereignty and by pragmatic recognition of the difficulty of changing borders (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Clapham 1996). The historical pattern of state formation is the basis for a number of challenges confronting contemporary African regimes. In much of the continent, thin population density has fostered myriad problems of asserting territorial control or, as Jeffrey Herbst terms it, “broadcasting power” (2000: 35). Large territories with dispersed rural populations span the Sahelian states, large portions of central Africa, and the Horn of Africa, posing basic issues of monitoring territory, furnishing public goods, and securing legitimacy. In some areas, problems of population concentration create distinct problems of land and resource competition, notably in coastal West Africa and parts of eastern and central Africa (Rwanda and Burundi). The European partition of the continent defined a variety of territories with disparate economic endowments and prospects. Coastal territories had greater international market access than landlocked entities. Some territories encompassed fruitful ecological zones while others were far more limited in arable land or productive capacity. Many countries contained valuable natural resources while others had no such assets. Colonial state formation also distributed populations and resources in ways that were frequently determined by external powers rather than endogenous processes of settlement, bargaining, or contention. Distinct ethnolinguistic groups were clustered within new territories, and homogeneous groups were often subdivided among colonial entities. Communities had differential contact with colonial political and economic structures, and uneven access to resources or opportunities. The problems of postcolonial development and governance have been extensively treated elsewhere (see, e.g., Mamdani 1996; Freund 1998; Young 2012). For the purpose of this study, we note several important background factors that affect the relative vulnerability of African states to destabilizing shocks and crisis. The first arises from aspects of demography, health, and the environment. General population growth rates of about 2.8 percent are comparatively high in Africa, and a number of countries now face unprecedented challenges of urbanization and competition for land. Governments face rising demands for services and employment, especially

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from urban populations that pose a source of social or political unrest (Cohen 2006). Health challenges are particularly acute: the HIV/AIDS pandemic has posed serious problems for many states, particularly in southern and eastern Africa. HIV/AIDS and other diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria have been damaging to the social and economic fabric along with the lives of millions of individuals. A second aspect has to do with the distribution of social groups. Nearly all African states reflect diversity among ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional groups, and social identities figure prominently in political affairs across the region. There are distinctions, however, in the patterns that give rise to accommodation or conflict. Highly concentrated communal maps focused on two or three groups (e.g., Rwanda, Kenya, or Nigeria) foster contentious relations more commonly than fragmented and dispersed arrangements (e.g., Tanzania). Moreover, as emphasized by Daniel Posner (2004a), the relative size of groups is important: groups that constitute a significant portion of the total population are more likely to mobilize for self-interest than small minorities who will likely join in larger coalitions. A third factor is the role of natural resources. In countries that have substantial endowments of solid minerals or petroleum, resource exports have shaped their political economies (Ross 1999). This is evident in the concentration of revenues and associated fiscal centralization. The resulting revenue volatility (arising from price changes in global markets) has pronounced effects on domestic finances and growth. Most of these states reflect variations of a syndrome dubbed the resource curse that encompasses a range of price distortions and policy errors affecting growth and diversification. Resource-rich economies are also vulnerable to instability from political contention over control of the central state, and tensions over the distribution of revenues, especially in resource-producing areas. Regional insurgencies and resource wars have wracked a number of resource-exporting states, including Angola, the DRC, and Nigeria. The environment creates an additional source of vulnerability in the uneven distribution of productive land. Many countries have limited amounts of arable land while a large proportion of farmers have faced tenuous subsistence as smallholders because of their reliance on rain-fed agriculture. Population movements and land policies have created growing pockets of scarcity. Competition between pastoralists and farmers is significant in much of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa while, in agricultural centers, uncertain land rights and political allocation have often sharpened contention (Berry 2002). Many recent conflicts in the region, from Ghana and Nigeria to Rwanda and Kenya, have been driven by tensions over land distribution. Environmental problems such as desertification, erosion, and pollution from extractive industries and urbanization have further undermined eco-

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nomic security for substantial populations. There is strong consensus that climate change has produced effects such as drought and flooding, which increase the precariousness of livelihoods in many parts of the continent (Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). However, the scope of these effects and the mechanisms of transmission have to be delineated more clearly. History forms another enduring legacy that is often consequential for current divisions, alignments, and perceptions in African states. Virtually all countries have struggled to overcome vulnerabilities established by their own histories, before and since independence (Young 1994, 2012). Uneven colonial development created sectional divisions that remain definitive in many contemporary states. European settler regimes fostered systemic inequalities and deficient human development, as is evident in the cases of Algeria, Angola, Kenya, and South Africa. Colonial plunder in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been without parallel in a continent of widespread colonial abuse, leaving few workable institutions or national bonds at independence. The era of decolonization was equally problematic in a number of states. Divisions among nationalist movements have remained significant factors in many countries, including to some degree all of those in this study. The consequences of poorly prepared, poorly designed, and self-interested independence transitions continue to be felt throughout the continent, including notably in Angola, the DRC, and Nigeria. Deep social divisions, political rivalries, weak institutions, and historical turbulence are important predictors of instability in contemporary affairs. Legacies of conflict are especially important in shaping contemporary vulnerabilities and outcomes. In some instances, violence pre-dating the colonial era—usually associated with the slave trade—had enduring effects in displacing populations, sharpening antipathies, and undermining social capital. The violence associated with colonialism, including the nationalist era, also varied markedly among territories and colonizing powers (Mamdani 1996). Among the countries included here, the DRC is probably the most deeply and seriously affected by historical violence and conflict, notably the extraordinary brutality under King Leopold II’s Congo Free State. However, several other countries have also experienced significant violence. Algeria, Angola, and Kenya experienced wrenching anticolonial conflicts. The systemic violence of the apartheid state shaped realities in South Africa for much of the twentieth century, building on three centuries of racial dominance in the region. Ghana and Nigeria, though substantially affected by the transatlantic slave trade (as was Angola), did not experience high degrees of violence in the colonial era and were able to obtain independence through negotiation and protest. In the Ghanaian case, a substantially peaceful history has contributed to stability in the postindependence era.

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Structural Factors There is a workable distinction between fundamental structural elements (or background factors) that condition the context of choice and intermediate structural factors that shape opportunities and strategies. We take factors such as the size of the country, resource endowments, and historical legacies to be broad unchanging features in the life of a nation. By comparison, we regard structural features as those aspects of institutions, societal interests, economic output and trade, resource distribution, and ideological framing that are unlikely to change in the near term, and which present significant constraints or inducements for actors. Important structural factors include regime type, constitutional and legal foundations, relative capabilities of the state, composition of the economy, leading groups and coalitions, central organizations and movements, and prevailing ideas or values. Structures are influential, resilient, and often definitive. However, they may sometimes be changed in the medium term and manipulated or eluded in the near term. Intermediate structural effects interact with background factors in shaping crisis vulnerabilities. The character of regimes and political opposition has critically affected their bearing on crisis. The cases in this study portray a broad spectrum from highly constrained regimes with elections in Algeria, Angola, and the DRC, to more open and competitive politics in Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, and with Nigeria occupying a space somewhere in the median zone. Authoritarian legacies are also important in all of the cases. Looking comparatively across these countries, we observe the risks associated with exclusionary political structures. Authoritarian regimes exemplify this most clearly, though strong presidential constitutions and narrowly constituted dominant-party regimes can have adverse effects as well. The political classes dominating public life in the countries of the continent have been an important component of these regimes. In both military and civilian regimes, narrowly constituted elites have governed largely through clientelism and hegemonic institutions. Many elites have perpetuated cultures of impunity through abuses of power, endemic corruption, and politically driven accumulation of resources. Among the countries in this study South Africa’s political class stands as a partial exception to the charge of impunity since both the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and the major opposition parties have maintained relatively greater internal democracy and, thereby, political accountability. In Ghana, interparty competition and credible elections have also induced a measure of restraint on politicians. Overall, however, the behavior of dominant political classes has contributed substantially to the problems of state weakness across the continent. Limited state capabilities have been paralleled by

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scant political legitimacy, inability of state agencies to deliver key services or to competently manage economies, pervasive malfeasance that undermines the capacity of public institutions, internal policy disarray, and incapacity to reach and govern those living within their borders for such purposes as security or tax collection. Elite strategies, state weakness, and lack of accountability have interacted with ethnic, religious, regional, and class antagonisms to generate tensions that often devolve into crises. Ethnic polarization has been a leading factor in many countries of the region, perhaps sharpest in Nigeria, Kenya, and the DRC among the countries in this study. Such sentiments have also been expressed in violent xenophobia against guest workers in South Africa. The rise of radical Islam has deepened religious divides through West Africa, notably in Nigeria, and in Algeria where it has thwarted a democratic political transition. Social divisions have undermined the legitimacy of multiparty elections, deepening insecurity in several countries of the region, notably Algeria, the DRC, Kenya, and Nigeria, among our cases. Attendant violence has risen to the level of alleged crimes against humanity in Kenya, for which two notables are now subject to trial in the International Criminal Court. These vulnerabilities are precipitated not only by ruling regimes but sometimes by weak and divided oppositions that may resort to violence or reckless political agitation. Higher levels of polarization and conflict are likely when significant elite interests, or mobilized popular groups, are systematically precluded from political access or bargaining over resources. This was exemplified in the Algerian crisis of the 1990s, the Angolan civil war, the conflagration in the DRC, the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, and the aftermath of elections in Kenya (2007–2008) and Nigeria (2011). Nigeria also reflects the legacy of exclusion and division in the events leading to civil war in the 1960s. This is a pronounced effect of structural forces, though hardly an iron law of political behavior. In South Africa, for instance, deep inequalities have been offset by inclusive political institutions and, in Ghana, a competitive democratic system has assuaged ethnic contention. Here, as for other lessons in the study, the conclusions point to probabilities arising from certain conditions. In general, party systems and the landscape of social movements are important factors in the structure of politics. Where party competition is relatively transparent and flexible, political systems are subject to fewer dislocations than in systems where party dominance or electoral manipulations constrain representation. Moreover, the range of popular associations and their access to public voice are important factors in the equilibrium of political life. Trade unionists in Nigeria and South Africa are salient actors in the political arena, with the potential to influence policies and public debates. Communal movements in Algeria, the DRC, Kenya, and Nigeria

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have had crucial effects at various junctures. The obvious impact of a broad antiapartheid opposition was decisive in South Africa during the 1980s. The Niger Delta and northern Islamist groups have strongly affected Nigerian trajectories in the 2000s. More inclusive and competitive participatory systems have overall been less vulnerable to violent disruptions or governance crises, as seen in Ghana and South Africa for two decades. We also note the independent effects of institutions. Questions such as inclusion, centralization, and overall constitutional design can be critical in aggravating or alleviating core tensions in the political system. In Algeria, the abrogation of electoral rule abruptly closed the door to opposition forces in 1992 and provoked a cataclysmic civil conflict. Nigeria’s constitutional design had corrosive effects in the 1960s, and the manipulation of institutions by the military in the early 1990s provoked another political crisis. Contentious federalism continues to define politics in Africa’s most populous state. Kenya’s constitution was a focus of intense debate and contention throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and the eventual constitutional reforms of 2011 are widely credited with alleviating many tensions in the political system. Negotiations in South Africa produced a new constitution in 1994 that provided for full political inclusion, nonracial democracy, and effective property rights, thus providing assurances to key groups and interests. Moreover, a pragmatic decision to continue a transparent constitutional reform process after the transition to democracy gave greater credibility to the new compact. Structural problems are also seen acutely in the economic and social realms. Most regimes in the region have had limited effectiveness in overcoming crisis-producing vulnerabilities bequeathed them by their predecessors. Although macroeconomic management has improved markedly, contributing to sustained growth in the 2000s, widespread poverty and sharp inequalities persist across much of the continent (Fosu 2015; African Development Bank 2012). African regimes bear responsibility (along with external donors who have fallen short in honoring financial commitments) for the limited progress in reaching the United Nations–defined Millennium Development Goals, many of which were not achieved by the target date of 2015. These shortcomings in reducing poverty and inequality, promoting education and health care, reducing exposure to HIV/AIDS, promoting gender equity, and advancing environmental sustainability all contribute to crisis vulnerabilities throughout the continent. Distributive issues are paramount in a number of the countries assayed here. Racially marked inequalities define the South African system, and regional disparities are prominent in virtually every other country we discuss in this volume. Pronounced communal competition has been a driver of conflict in Nigeria and Kenya while clearly influencing crises in Angola and the DRC. Social and spatial inequalities are often related to the overall

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structure of the economy, as enclave production and resource exports are often synonymous with the concentration of rents and opportunities in the economy. Centralized states manage the distribution of resource rents to favored constituencies and clients. Moreover, a lack of productive diversification means that there are fewer outlets for agricultural income or formal urban employment. Countries with political devolution and more dynamic economies can be more resilient in the face of shocks and pressures. Issues of distribution as well as communal tension are frequently heightened by trends in migration. Inflows from neighboring states typically place additional burdens on state services while upsetting local communal and economic balances. South Africa has been a magnet for economic and political migrants from Zimbabwe, the DRC, and other countries. The sudden exodus of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to the DRC (then Zaire) in 1994 was a major destabilizing event. Rural to urban migration has been a steady factor in all of the countries considered here, though pronounced in Algeria, Angola, the DRC, and Nigeria, as conflicts have driven people to safer urban centers. These shifts can precipitate serious problems in countries that are unable to manage the needs of new populations or furnish general order. Finally, international structures have been pivotal. Cold War rivalries created many problems of security, governance, and development across Africa, especially as the superpowers pressed for loyalty from rival African leaders as they supported allies (however predatory or repressive) and actively destabilized opponents (Clapham 1996). The severe costs of externally fueled conflict were especially evident in southern Africa. The costs of poor economic management were often obscured by external support and subsidy, creating the basis for deeper crises in the face of the large global shocks of the 1970s. The end of the Cold War removed many of these drivers and constraints, but gave rise to new liabilities from globalization, spread of illicit markets, and pressures for rapid liberalization that often strained local equilibria. However desirable democratization or economic reform might seem, the toll of civil conflict and dislocation in the wake of the Cold War was a powerful reminder that large structural changes in the global realm could be profoundly disruptive for African states. It was not until the new century that global trends seemed to shift in favor of Africa, as commodity prices increased, democratic norms were expanded, international engagement helped to stabilize conflict, and new actors such as China provided resources for growth. Contingent Factors

Finally, we observe that conditional factors of leadership, organizational mobilization, or convergent shocks may precipitate crises. Leaders often

DIAGNOSING AND MANAGING STATE CRISES

29

play crucial roles in influencing the course of adverse events, whether through prompt and flexible response, or conversely through denial, delay, and manipulation of events for political gain. In many instances, leaders can instigate crisis-producing shocks, as seen in several cases examined here. Algerian, Angolan, and Nigerian generals discarded elections in the early 1990s; President Mobutu Sese Seko and regional governors prompted unrest in 1996 through the persecution of minorities in the eastern provinces of then Zaire; and Kenyan candidates were complicit in electoral manipulation and violence in 2007–2008. Slow or inept responses can also be damaging, as seen in the cases of Ghanaian and Nigerian economic management in the early 1990s and in the dilatory responses of South African leaders to the rising HIV/AIDS pandemic. By the same token, the South African government’s assertive response to health issues in the 2000s and prudent economic management in Ghana, Nigeria, and Angola in response to the economic shocks of 2008–2009 were arguably constructive in averting worse outcomes. Similarly, the power-sharing agreement reached in 2008 by President Mwai Kibaki and his challenger, Raila Odinga, served to alleviate tensions and provide a foundation for more orderly elections in 2013. Although leadership can be fortuitous and idiosyncratic, the role of leaders may also be shaped by patterns of recruitment or succession as well as the institutional setting. The possibilities of inaction or purely self-interested behavior are more limited where individuals are constrained by elections, institutions of accountability, and a salient popular voice (Posner and Young 2007). Consequently, it is important to account for this broader organizational context when assessing the likely roles that leaders will play in potential crisis situations. Executives may be accountable to party or security officials. The authority for many state functions (notably economic management, security, and disaster management) is often delegated to specialist agencies and technocrats. Nonetheless, the political incentives for rulers and the role of impulse or miscalculation should always be considered. The mobilization of particular groups and interests is often a powerful catalyst of events in crisis situations. Postelection violence at various moments in Algeria, Angola, the DRC, Kenya, and Nigeria was largely driven by parties and militias that were closely tied to contending electoral groups. There was little spontaneous or organic violence in the upheavals that followed these turbulent polls. In Rwanda and Burundi, the long-standing presence of militant ethnically identified organizations and paramilitaries were instrumental in episodic violence and large-scale conflict culminating in the 1990s. Similarly, groups with communal or local identities can be seen in most of the cases discussed in this volume, including: the Islamist Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) in Algeria; the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União pela Independência Total de

30

COPING WITH CRISIS IN AFRICAN STATES

Angola, UNITA) in Angola; various local militias in the DRC (e.g., in North and South Kivu, Ituri, and Katanga provinces); the Konkomba and Dagomba of northern Ghana; several areas of Nigeria (including the Niger Delta, the central Jos plateau, and northeastern Borno and Yobe states); the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin communities of Kenya; and some localities of South Africa, especially during the volatile transition period of the early 1990s. In some cases, communal mobilization or another form of militancy is established clearly enough to be considered a structure of politics, but in many cases these groupings arise in circumstances of conflict or dislocation. Militias in northern Mali, southern Algeria, and Niger have been fluid yet destabilizing, as have the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the network of militias engaged in petroleum theft in the southern Niger Delta. The presence or appearance of militant parties, communal organizations, and armed groups is often unpredictable and equally pivotal in the course of events that move from shocks to crisis. Institutional factors may also have uncertain effects. Agencies such as electoral commissions, the judiciary, the police, or central banks are usually considered part of the broader institutional landscape with particular orientations and capabilities, yet they can play crucial roles at moments of turbulence. The electoral commissions in Nigeria and Kenya have been a focus of criticism, including allegations of corruption and political manipulation, for their roles in contested elections. By contrast, electoral authorities in Ghana have repeatedly served to quell tensions in moments of a close electoral count. Particular judicial rulings have been provocative in Nigeria and the DRC while police actions in Kenya clearly aggravated postelection violence in 2008. In a case outside of this study Zimbabwe’s central bank helped instigate the country’s economic collapse after 2000, while the counterpart authorities in South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana have played more constructive roles in the past decade. In circumstances of institutional weakness, including failings in peak agencies and systemic problems in fledgling democratic structures, the particular choices and functions of key agencies are influential in shaping events during emergencies. In addition to individual drivers such as leaders, militias, or parts of the state apparatus, crisis situations may be aggravated by converging influences and structural effects. A natural disaster, a weak government response, and a contested election can provide a volatile mix of pressures. Rapid migration from conflict or environmental dislocation can worsen tensions in circumstances of political uncertainty or resource competition. Economic shocks and the ensuing hardships from adjustment or austerity measures can intensify divisions and drive an escalation of conflict; these dynamics have been evident in Rwanda, Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Nigeria. While it is not possible to identify all circumstances in which converging

DIAGNOSING AND MANAGING STATE CRISES

31

risks lead to crises, a degree of foresight is possible. Particular types of triggering events pose greater hazards, including scheduled regime transitions, contentious elections, economic downturns, provocative policies by rulers (e.g., subsidy removals and mass evictions), and conflicts or emergencies in nearby states. When these stresses occur in states with deep social fissures, poor governance, polarized elites, resource syndromes, or a history of violence, the possibilities for a downward spiral of events are accentuated. Although it would be difficult to devise a precise algorithm of crisis trajectories, a probabilistic view of risk is feasible and useful.

Mitigating Crises in Africa? Amidst these diverse vulnerabilities and trajectories, it is appropriate to conclude with an observation of the factors that have served to limit or reduce crisis in Africa. Many of these have been associated with successful progress toward democratization. At least a quarter of the continent’s fiftyfive countries have achieved significant levels of democratization by conventional international measures, including Ghana and South Africa in this study (see Marshall and Gurr 2014).1 Strong constitutional reform has been a factor in some of these cases, including South Africa. Increasing free and fair elections have occurred in other countries, notably Ghana. Noteworthy in this regard have been the in-depth Afrobarometer surveys of public opinion in thirty-five African countries that show substantial majorities supporting democracy, including patience with aspirations not yet achieved (Bratton 2013). Effective elite bargaining seems to have been a factor in mitigating crisis vulnerability in the case of Nigeria and Ghana. Breaking up regional ethnic blocks through measures of devolution to thirty-six states has also mitigated state weakness in Nigeria. Fear of adverse neighborhood effects has appeared to concentrate Ghanaians’ attention on sustaining their democratic progress. Effective conflict resolution has enabled countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia, with intensive UN assistance, not only to end their civil wars but to make substantial if still limited progress toward democratization. Finally, at least some African countries have benefited from brighter economic prospects, at least in the short term. Some rentier economies have benefited from higher export revenues. Growth rates have been stronger for some states as have other economic fundamentals. At this writing, buoyant oil prices have helped to sustain resource-exporting economies. The emergence of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) has led to increasing levels of external investment in several African economies, although long-term balances of advantages and detriments from the forms,

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COPING WITH CRISIS IN AFRICAN STATES

strategies, and foci of these investments are likely to remain indeterminate for some time to come. At a minimum, these manifestations of progress signal that crisis vulnerability in Africa, while endemic, need not be intractable over the long term.

Management of Crises African governments have displayed a range of capabilities in managing shocks to their states, whether these have arisen from economic, demographic, political, or security factors. In some instances, government initiatives have been able to attenuate negative events or trends. In many contexts, however, these problems have seemed to overwhelm public capabilities, or have even been manipulated by leaders for self-serving ends. A crisis emerges when there is an evident lack of capacity or resolve to address adverse circumstances. Though crisis conditions aggravate hardship and uncertainty, they do not necessarily undermine states over the longer term. Properly managed, crises may ultimately give rise to desirable changes such as democratization, economic reform, conflict mitigation, and thereby increased state strength and viability. The effective management of serious shocks requires an ability to anticipate problems, an institutional or political framework for addressing adverse conditions, the ability to mobilize finances and personnel, and the capacity to coordinate among domestic or external actors. In most circumstances, early and prompt action is important for containing distress and averting crisis. Governments need analytical capabilities, appropriate policies and agencies, and access to resources to actively manage potential challenges. These attributes have been lacking for many African governments, thus limiting the possible responses to major problems. Deficiencies in information, institutional capacity, financing, and security capabilities pose serious hindrances for the recognition and attenuation of potential emergencies. An important challenge for crisis management is to identify and bolster core capabilities for addressing economic disruption, political disputes, domestic social tensions, natural disasters, and regional security problems. Another element in crisis response is rooted in political incentives rather than government capabilities. In many instances, shocks degenerate rapidly into crises because leaders neglect economic, political, or social problems for reasons of expediency. Slow responses in Ghana and Nigeria to emerging economic distress in the early 1980s is an important illustration, as is South African leaders’ denial and delay in responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Alternatively, serious disruptions may arise directly from the initiative of government leaders, and can be aggravated by the

DIAGNOSING AND MANAGING STATE CRISES

33

policies or strategies of rulers. Algerian rulers helped to instigate conflict by scrapping elections in 1992 while General Sani Abacha’s policies in the Niger Delta served to escalate tensions in that oil-producing region. Some regimes may even foster or perpetuate crises to eliminate rivals, punish opponents, or claim resources for defense, refugee assistance, or economic support. Arguably, President Mobutu incited unrest in eastern Congo (then Zaire) by revoking citizenship rights for Banyamulenge communities that were seen to be a risk in a context of conflict spillovers from Rwanda. Daniel arap Moi instigated ethnic violence in the Rift Valley during the 1990s in an effort to suppress competing groups and reward coethnics with land. We can broadly categorize crisis situations along two dimensions, one of capacity and another of political commitment. As seen in Figure 2.1, this suggests a 2 x 2 typology. Different crisis scenarios are illustrated in each cell of the figure. In the case of South Africa’s electoral management, there has been relatively high commitment to manage the process and high government capacity to do so. By contrast, South Africa’s generally strong governmental capacity was hampered in the early 2000s by a limited political commitment to addressing the HIV/AIDs emergency. Nigerian leaders had limited appreciation or commitment to containing economic decline in the early 1980s, and a relatively weak economic bureaucracy. Commitments to conflict management in the Niger Delta strengthened in 2009, and the state’s capacity for managing an amnesty program was sufficient to secure a significant abatement of the insurgency. In Ghana, despite limited capacity in the economic bureaucracy, strong commitment allowed for economic stabilization after 1983. In the DRC, a widespread security crisis was long aggravated by low state capacity and little commitment to managing conflict. The exception came in 2013, when a measure of resolve to contain the M23 insurgency in the eastern provinces produced an effective offensive and the end of that local conflict.

Alternative Outcomes and Trajectories Different alignments of commitment and capacity foster divergent outcomes in response to shocks. In some instances, governments have focused on particular challenges, have mobilized to address them, and have adequately coordinated with needed resources and institutions. Two strong examples in Africa include Mozambique’s flood management and Botswana’s economic oversight. In the case of Botswana, the government was committed to effective management of the economy and developed internal capacity from the 1960s (Acemoglu et al 2002). In the case of Mozambique, leaders were concerned about flood relief, but presided over a comparatively weak state. The

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COPING WITH CRISIS IN AFRICAN STATES

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Crisis Management Commitment High

Low

South Africa (HIV/AIDS) (2000–2006); Nigeria (Niger Delta, 1994–2009)

South Africa (elections 1994); Ghana (elections 2000–)

Low

Nigeria (economy 1982–1985); DRC (insurgents 1996–2003)

Ghana (economic policy 1983); DRC (M23 insurgency 2013)

Capacity

High

Note: HIV/AIDS, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome; DRC, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

government of Mozambique was able to leverage international support to develop sufficient capabilities for crisis response. A second scenario is delayed, but concerted, response to emerging shocks and the containment of a crisis. Good illustrations have been the South African response to HIV/AIDS and the Ghanaian management of economic crisis in the 1980s. Initial approaches in both cases were slow and insufficient, but authorities eventually shifted course and attempted to seriously address the problems. A third trajectory is seen in neglect or ineffectual responses to shocks, and a downward spiral into deeper crisis. Examples include Algeria’s elections in 1992 and Nigeria’s approach to worsening conflict in the Niger Delta. In these cases, governments failed to recognize emerging challenges, delayed responding because of political motives or economic constraints, or pursued misguided policies that failed to address the essential problems. The result in each case was a deepening crisis that eventually required new approaches and more concerted efforts. Finally, there are cases where governments have appeared actively to foment crises and largely tolerate (or even fuel) dislocations to benefit politically or economically. War in the DRC from 1996 to 2003 certainly illustrates this dynamic. Angola’s conflict from 1992 to 2002 provides another instance. In each case, leaders on all sides of the conflict perpetuated disorder and directly profited from sustained turmoil.

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35

South Africa clearly anchors the stronger end of the spectrum in terms of state capacity. The DRC is certainly the weakest state in this study. Arrayed between these cases, other countries reflect uneven and disparate capabilities. These varied attributes inevitably influence the range of responses to major security, economic, or political shocks. Not surprisingly then, overall South Africa has demonstrated the greatest resilience and capacity to mobilize needed resources in managing crises, though it has not always exhibited the most agile political responses to them. By sharp contrast, the DRC has been the most lacking of attributes of effective sovereignty, and its weak political structure has greatly hampered its effectiveness in responding to shocks.

Conclusion This comparative study of crisis management in Africa yields conclusions and policy applications for governance, development, and security settings. One of our central observations is that African states reflect multiple sources of vulnerability, leading to frequent crises across the continent. Policies and political commitment are the essential factors in crisis management. Adverse shocks often instigate crisis conditions, and weak capabilities may aggravate these problems, but the trajectory of crisis is crucially influenced by political factors. Consequently, it is important to distinguish levels of political commitment and institutional capacity in managing crises. Situations where there is political commitment for addressing crisis differ fundamentally from those circumstances where political commitment is lacking or even a catalyst of the crisis. Countries with relatively strong capacities in particular areas of crisis management reflect very different options from those with limited capabilities. The crucial constraints in each situation shape available strategies for both local and international actors. If leaders are committed, or at least amenable, to possibilities for constructive management, it is possible to focus on resources or institutional capacity as the binding constraint. These can often be furnished by regional or international actors. When officials are disengaged or actively committed to a harmful course of action, political factors stand as the central constraint. In these circumstances, a dual track of political pressure (domestic, regional, or external) and a measure of capacity building may be feasible. Further, it is important to separate different areas and levels of state capabilities. In the domain of the economy, a few key departments and ministries may be essential to sound macroeconomic management. Politically, central institutions such as the constitution or an independent electoral commission can be pivotal in managing serious division or turbulence.

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These institutional and policy challenges are often less complex than broadbased Security Sector Reform (SSR) or conflict management. In humanitarian and environmental realms, specialized agencies for early warning are often instrumental in anticipating problems while aid coordination mechanisms can quickly mobilize external resources in response to sudden adverse events such as floods or refugee flows. In circumstances where political commitment is lacking, it still may be possible for international actors to work with civil society organizations, with specialized units in some governments, or in sections of the national territory accessible to strategic groups. Health agencies and civil organizations in South Africa welcomed international cooperation even when senior leadership was not focused on effective HIV/AIDS policy. Nigerian and Kenyan anticorruption agencies have actively sought resources and training, though the political environment was not optimal for aggressively stemming corruption. In the DRC and Sudan, external engagement in conflict zones has been possible. For domestic advocates and external actors, it is important to ground approaches in the political realities of the country and to consider the range of available policy and institutional outlets available for addressing crisis situations. Direct intervention or assistance to security agencies can be a counterproductive approach in many situations, or it may be effective only when linked with complementary development initiatives and political engagement. Coordination among defense-related agencies and political, economic, and development counterparts is essential. To encourage more stable settings for crisis management, improved dialogue and policy coordination can be helpful in balancing security-related assistance with political initiatives and development efforts.

Note 1. According to the latest Polity IV data, fourteen African countries rated as democratic, with a score of at least 6. See Marshall and Gurr (2014).

3 Algeria: Between Co-optation and Repression Miriam R. Lowi

WE MAY THINK OF CRISIS AS AN ACUTELY UNSTABLE CONDITION THAT

threatens to seriously disrupt an economic or political system. A crisis may be distinguished from a shock in that the latter reflects an event—and not a condition—that, while short and sharp, is often exogenous in origin. While a shock is, by definition, unanticipated, a crisis may or may not be, even though both are potentially highly disruptive if they are not managed effectively. Moreover, a shock can itself precipitate a crisis if the response to it fails to mitigate its negative effects. A crisis may be resolved in a variety of ways: either by formal institutional means or short-term payoffs, or even by foreign intervention or involvement. The failure to resolve a crisis effectively may result in regime change, protracted political violence and instability, state failure, or foreign intervention. Since its independence in 1962, Algeria has faced two crises of particular note. The first crisis followed the oil shock of 1986, when the price of oil plummeted to $10 per barrel and the government’s revenues declined by 55 percent in value in a single year; as a result, the economy was thrown into disarray. Like other single-resource oil-exporting states, the Algerian government had to drastically adjust its spending patterns and development programs overnight, find ways to ensure macroeconomic stability, and address the severe social effects created by the economic downturn. The second crisis emerged out of the aborted multiparty elections in 1991 and evolved into a civil war that persisted for ten years. Unwilling to accept the imminent victory at the polls of the Islamist party—the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS)1—and its eventual incumbency, the military (which had enjoyed a monopoly of power since independence) annulled the election results, 37

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cancelled the second round of elections, declared a state of emergency, and outlawed the legally constituted FIS. While the first could be categorized, at least initially, as an economic crisis and the second as a security crisis, the two were related and reflected the peculiarities of governance in Algeria: problems with the regime’s response to and management of the first crisis gave way to the military’s cancellation of the 1991 legislative elections and its pursuit of members of the FIS. A misguided response to the first crisis—derivative of weak institutional capacity and political commitment as well as ill-advised hamstrung leadership in an international context of severe capital constraint—paved the way for large-scale riots across the country in 1988. The popular mobilization brought to the fore newly emergent social forces with important demands. In response to the unrest and in the absence of financial resources, President Chadli Benjedid declared, for the first time, a transition to multipartyism and a competitive electoral process; he put a new reformist government in place to lead the transition. As for the second crisis, the outcome—ten years of civil war and, eventually, the resurgence of the state—reflects a variety of factors. While the proximate cause for the outbreak of violence was the military’s annulment of the democratic transition, followed by its severe repression of the presumed victors and their adherents, the onset of civil war derived in essence from the loss of legitimacy of the National Liberation Front (FLN) state, combined with the emergence of (formerly excluded) social forces with important followings. The duration of the violence reflected the changing capabilities—both military (coercive) and financial (material) of the protagonists as well as changes to support for them from the domestic population or the international community. In large measure, these changes stemmed from developments in the external environment that provided for the availability of financial and/or political resources with which to sustain the insurgency on the one hand, or eliminate it on the other. The mitigation of crisis, via the winding down of the violence and concomitant resurgence of the state at the beginning of the new millennium, resulted from changes to the state’s material resources and renewed support for the Algerian regime from the international arena following the inception of the US-initiated “war on terror.” With important financial resources and international backing, the state was able to overwhelm insurgents militarily and co-opt erstwhile support for the insurgency, thereby bringing the latter to heel, for some time, at least (Lowi 2009: 140–144).

Background Located in North Africa and bordering Morocco to the west, Tunisia and Libya to the east, and Mauritania, Niger, and Mali in the south, Algeria is

ALGERIA

39

the second-largest country on the continent in terms of geographic size. Despite a surface area of 2.38 million square kilometers (World Bank 2001), four-fifths of the country is desert and, hence, sparsely populated. Indeed, 91 percent of the total population of Algeria—of 39 million (in 2014)—is concentrated on less than 12 percent of the land area, in the northern portion of the country along the Mediterranean coastline. There, population density is roughly 105 persons per square kilometer, as opposed to 13 per square kilometer over the entire country. The desert begins south of the Saharan Atlas, a chain of mountains that extends from east to west in the north of the country and stretches all the way to the southern borders. It is here that the country’s rich oil and natural gas endowments are found. In 2013, Algeria was reported to be the ninthlargest producer of natural gas in the world and the sixteenth-largest producer of crude oil. On the African continent, however, it is the leading producer of natural gas, with the third-largest reserves of crude after Nigeria and Libya (EIA 2013). The country’s dependence on its hydrocarbon sector is remarkable: in 2013, hydrocarbons accounted for 62 percent of government revenues, 30 percent of GDP, and 98 percent of export earnings (EIA 2013). As elucidated in the rentier state literature, the almost total dependence of economic activity and government revenues on the export of a single high-valued commodity that is subject to exogenous shocks—especially in the form of demand and price volatility—has profound repercussions on the domestic political economy. 2 Abrupt and consequential swings in government revenues have occurred in each decade since the first oil shock of 1973; most recently, the Algerian government experienced a 40 percent drop in revenues with the fall in oil prices in 2009. Nonetheless, efforts to diversify the economy away from oil dependence, by attracting foreign and domestic investment outside the energy sector, have largely failed. (See Table 3.1.) At independence in 1962, Algeria had a population of 10 million. Its population has quadrupled since then, to 39 million in 2014. With a relatively high population growth rate of 3.2 percent in the 1970s, the total population doubled in less than two decades, reaching 20 million by 1980. Since then, more than 70 percent of the population has been aged thirty

Table 3.1 Algeria: Primary Commodity Dependence

Oil/gas as percentage of GDP Oil/gas as percentage of government revenues Oil/gas as percentage of exports

1975

1985

1995

1999

2002

2009

38.0

25.8

30.0

28.0

24.0

30.0

53.8 95.0

57.9 95.0

60.0 97.0

62.0 96.8

62.9 98.0

65.0 91.0

Sources: Algeria: Office National des Statistiques 2014; IMF 2000, 2013, 2014. Note: GDP, gross domestic product.

2013

62.0

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years old or younger. Although the overall population growth rate has declined considerably, the age structure continues to present important challenges: for one, a disproportionately large young population—a “youth bulge”—engenders rapid growth of the labor force (World Bank 2001). Providing gainful employment for the increasing numbers has remained a major challenge for the regime. Select social and economic indicators are provided in Table 3.2. On paper, Algeria fares relatively well in terms of income inequality. In 2002, for example, the ratio of the income of the richest fifth of the population to the poorest fifth was 6, as compared with 30 for Brazil and 15–20 for many African countries. Nonetheless, according to the World Bank, the fraction of the Algerian population living in poverty doubled through the 1990s: while 12.2 percent lived below the poverty line in 1988, 22.6 percent did in 1995; it has hovered between 23 percent and 25 percent since 2000 (World Bank 2011). The population of Algeria is composed almost exclusively (99 percent) of Arabs and Berbers, both of whom are Muslims; all but a tiny minority of the population follow the Sunni tradition. Of the four different Berber communities, the Kabyles, clustered in the northeast around the city of Tizi Ouzou, are the most culturally assertive. For the most part, ethnic fractionalization—while present to a degree—has not played an overwhelming political role in the country’s development, although linguistic fragmentation—most notably, between those who speak French and those who do not—has had divisive social consequences (Lowi 2009: 95–97). Colonized by the French in 1830, Algeria was a settler colony for the better part of 130 years. On the eve of independence in 1962, Europeans constituted 10 percent of the population of the country. They had dominated all domains of the national economy and the political system, encouraged regionalism, and practiced ethnic favoritism. As of the mid-1920s, distinct nationalist movements emerged, with political programs and platforms. Nonetheless, while Algerian nationalism had reflected a fairly diverse political community in the early years, it came to be dominated, as of the late 1950s, by the crudest—most “militarized” and least “democratic”—elements of the movement (Lowi 2009: 63–73). From 1954 until independence in 1962, the Algerian revolution unfolded and faced stiff resistance from the French. Guerrilla tactics of Algerian maquisards provoked brutal counterinsurgency strategies by French forces. The loss of life was enormous; by some estimates, roughly 1 million Algerians died and about 25,000 French (Horne 1977: 538). With the seizure of power in 1962 by the militarized core, and its domination of the political and economic landscape for years to come, the system was one of praetorian and patrimonial authoritarianism: characterized by the systematic silencing of voice, exclusion of important social cate-

Table 3.2 Select Social and Economic Indicators in Algeria 1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Unemployment rate (%) 28.5 Five-year real GDP growth (%) 4.9 Per capita GDP (current $) 354

22.7 7.5 971

16.2 8.7 2,251

16.5 3.9 2,622

19.8 –1.2 2,454

1995

2000

2005

2008

27.9 30.2 0.7 3.4 1,478 1,796

25.4 6.0 3,115

10.0 4.5 4,974

2009

2010

12.5 8.1 3.5 2.2 4,028 4,350

2013 2.7 5,361

Sources: Aissaoui 2001: 10; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, 2011. Note: GDP, gross domestic product.

41

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gories from economic and political resources, and reliance on clientelist ties for the purposes of distribution and on coercion to maintain order. Despite lip service to socialism that combined a powerful state sector, a Soviet-style planned economy, and insistence on austerity for the first fifteen years of independence, the concern for social justice and equality was paper-thin. From the Houari Boumedienne period, beginning in 1965, through Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s current tenure (2014), the military, for all intents and purposes—and despite some changes in window dressing3— retained the upper hand, at times operating in the foreground and at other times in the background. Proximity to the reins of power, and especially to key figures in the military establishment, guaranteed wealth, status, and immunity.4 For decades, the system has been greased by the availability of important revenues in the hands of the state from the export of oil. Oil rents not only funded social and economic development of broad scope, but also purchased loyalty and control. Oil was discovered in Algeria in the final years of the colonial period and, by the end of the 1960s (hence, the early years of state building), it constituted practically the sole source of export revenues and more than 50 percent of total government revenues.5 Nonetheless, because of the deeply dependent nature of oil-based economies subject to the volatility of international demand and international prices, the Algerian economy, along with the political leadership that stood at its helm, fell victim to the “staple trap”: the development constraints that stem from reliance on single-commodity export.6 Distribution, the source of the regime’s legitimacy, itself fell victim to international structural factors. In boom periods, when the regime’s coffers were overflowing, state largesse was noteworthy insofar as the state assumed the most prominent role as chief investor, employer, and provider. True, unpredictable resource windfalls at times encourage short-sighted economic policies that in the long term (or even the medium term) have negative consequences. However, the immediate effect is perceived as overwhelmingly positive: the economy grows, distributive networks are moreor-less well funded, and key social forces are pacified. In bust periods, however, the economy experiences an important downturn and society is subjected to considerable hardship resulting from shortages of various sorts, rising inflation and unemployment, and cutbacks on social welfare and services. In Algeria as elsewhere, severe economic downturns challenge domestic peace. Since 1962, Algeria has faced six shocks with boom effects, in 1973, 1980, 2000, 2007–2008; three mini-booms, in 1990–1991, 2004, 2011; five shocks with bust effects, in 1986, 1999, 2008–2009; and three mini-busts, in 1976, 1991, 2002 (EIA 1970–2007). On the heels of the first major oil price downturn in 1986 and the growth collapse that followed, Algeria experienced its first major political crisis that overwhelmed the domestic

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43

political economy.7 Demonstrations, strikes, and riots became common features of the landscape as of 1986, and symbols of state power were targeted systematically. In October 1988 massive demonstrations broke out in Algiers, with reverberations throughout the country, and persisted for several days. Faced with crowds in the tens of thousands, the military opened fire. Hundreds were killed. Given the leadership structure and the nature of rule, those in power had failed to create institutions to resolve internal conflicts effectively. Repression and co-optation remained their preferred strategies.

Origins of Crises The Economy in the 1980s

The Algerian political economy went into “crisis mode” in the late 1980s and remained so through the 1990s.8 While crisis was precipitated by the 1986 price shock, the groundwork had been laid through a variety of factors related to misguided development strategies, the domination of the oil sector in the economy, and the nature of rule. The latter factors exacerbated the effects of the oil price downturn of 1986. First, the enormous windfalls from the sale of oil in the 1970s and early 1980s had been systematically augmented, for the sake of the country’s industrialization strategy, with massive foreign borrowing. These loans were scheduled to be repaid beginning in the mid-1980s. At that time, however, the international economy entered a recession and oil exporters were hit especially hard. Not only had international borrowing possibilities dried up, but by then the Algerian debt had become quite onerous: the debt service ratio had increased from 33 percent in 1982 to 68 percent in 1986, and reached a whopping 86 percent in 1988, the year of the riots that began the descent into civil war. At the same time, government revenues were at an all-time low: with the international recession and the gradual depletion of oil revenues as of 1982, followed by the 75 percent collapse in oil prices in 1985–1986, Algeria’s external revenues in 1986 declined by more than 50 percent from what they had been in 1981 (Aissaoui 2001: 15; ICG 2001: 7). Furthermore, because the Algerian regime had failed to diversify the economy away from dependence on oil, there were scant possibilities for augmenting the government’s revenue stream even under the best of circumstances. Per capita gross national product (GNP) also suffered: between 1985 and 1994, it declined by roughly 2.5 percent annually, registering a drop of 24 percent in nine years (ICG 2001: 7). The economy had undergone a growth collapse. Additionally, President Benjedid’s particular brand of economic liberalization, initiated in the early 1980s, was fraught with problems. In

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effect, his policies put an end to investment in industry while private sector activity increased only slightly. Despite the lifting of import restrictions, both importation and distribution remained confined to those close to, or a part of, the regime. The state-owned enterprises, which had been a hallmark of President Boumedienne’s development program, were cut down and reconfigured while the many new structures that were created in their place were headed by loyal clients of the regime, with or without the appropriate credentials. State monopolies of yore became private monopolies, or oligopolies, controlled and managed either directly by regime members or by businessmen closely linked, through familial or clientelist ties, to members of the military elite. 9 Furthermore, the new focus on satisfying pent-up demand, following the enforced austerity of the Boumedienne era, gave rise to an obsession with (conspicuous) consumption that relied for its gratification on networking and personal connections. As a result, a fairly extensive parallel economy, replete with underground supply networks, was launched and inequalities intensified while nepotism and corruption flourished—becoming, for all intents and purposes, institutionalized practice (Hachemaoui 2011; Hadjadj 1999: 42– 53; Hidouci 1995: 91). Structural Challenges

The focus on capital-intensive industrial projects, which had been the heart of the oil-driven economic strategy of the Boumedienne era, created among other things insufficient job opportunities. In its wake, a deep recession took hold and persisted for much of the decade of the 1980s. Unemployment, which had been 16.2 percent in 1980, climbed to 20 percent in 1990 and close to 24 percent in 1992 (Aissaoui 2001: 238). Unfortunately, there was no significant government engagement in job-creating activities. It is true that investment in agriculture increased, from 6 percent of total investments in 1977 to 12 percent in the early to mid-1980s; however, this was still far too little given the growth in both population and unemployment. Moreover, the relative neglect, over the years, of agriculture and the rural sector in general—characteristic of many oil-exporting states—had encouraged a persistent out-migration from the countryside, which added to the precariousness of socioeconomic conditions in urban areas. The cities could not successfully absorb the increased numbers; the urban poor and unemployed proliferated and experienced increasing immiseration. Enormous demographic pressures exacerbated socioeconomic conditions. Because of Algeria’s disproportionately large young population, masses of young people were entering the workforce in the 1980s, precisely when the economy was shrinking dramatically; the economy would remain

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moribund for at least ten years. The unemployment rate reached an alarming 28 percent in 1995 and 30 percent in 2000 (Aissaoui 2001: 238; Byrd 2003: 3–4). Political Upheavals

The combination of a growth collapse, a burgeoning labor market but insufficient employment opportunities, and the pervasiveness of corruption and glaring inequalities produced an explosive social situation. As of 1986, antistate activity, in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and riots, was commonplace in the major cities of Algeria. Symbols of the state and its bankrupt development programs were targeted systematically. The unrest culminated in the events of October 5–10, 1988, when massive demonstrations took place, first in Algiers, and to which the regime responded with force killing hundreds of civilians. It was at these demonstrations that the mobilization capacity of Islamists became evident for the first time: followers of Ali Belhadj, imam of the Sunna mosque in Bab el-Oued, a poor neighborhood of Algiers, led a cortege of some 20,000 followers.10 In his efforts to regain control, President Benjedid did a number of things: first, he revised the constitution, extending a transition from the single-party state to a multiparty system in addition to some democratic freedoms, including the right to form political associations.11 Multiparty legislative elections were to be held for the first time in 1990. Second, he installed a new reform-oriented government to oversee the democratic transition and implement changes to the economy and polity with regard to access to power and resources. Nonetheless, the government of Mouloud Hamrouche was not permitted to carry out its mandate and implement the reforms it had elaborated. The reform team was evicted from government in June 1991 and the measures that it had put in place to “dismantle the foundations of the system of monopolies” and implant the rule of law, preserve institutional autonomy, and institutionalize transparent practices were systematically revoked.12 Moreover, the results of the legislative elections of December 1991 were not respected: the victory of the FIS at the polls was annulled and the transition to a multiparty system was cancelled. A state of emergency was declared, the FIS was outlawed, and its leadership and thousands of its members and supporters were rounded up and thrown into detention centers where many were tortured. By late spring of 1992, the country had descended into violence (Lowi 2005). The violence that evolved into civil war engaged the military-backed regime and an array of Islamist groups, some of which had formed in the detention centers or originated from among members or supporters of the FIS. The civil war continued for roughly ten years and resulted in 150,000–200,000 deaths.

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Tracing the Outcomes It was, initially, President Benjedid’s response to the oil price collapse of 1986 that provoked a political crisis. On the one hand, he cut back drastically on a variety of distributive measures. With the severe reductions in imports—as much as 28 percent by value over 1984 levels (EIU 1989– 1990: 45)—society was subjected to massive shortages with essential goods becoming increasingly scarce. But while some suffered tremendously as a result, the parallel economy (which, as noted above, had existed throughout the decade and was connected to the regime and its patronage networks) flourished in the new environment of scarcity, enriching a privileged few. On the other hand, Benjedid responded with harsh repression to the outbreak of protests throughout the country, which at the outset were a reaction to the severe economic constraints amid rampant corruption. In that way, he intensified the opposition to his government and leadership. It took the massive demonstrations in October 1988 and the bloodbath that ensued for the regime to realize that it had to implement significant reforms if it was to regain control. The revision of the constitution, the call for a transition to a multiparty system, and the investiture of a new reform-oriented government were meant to achieve that end and bring stability back to the domestic political economy. That the decisions of the president not only failed to achieve their goals, but even caused the situation to deteriorate substantially—such that a more severe protracted crisis took hold—was a reflection of an indomitable feature of the Algerian political system and institutional environment. The military, in what was a military-backed regime (or rather, a military regime with, since 1999, a civilian as official head of state) would not countenance changes to the rules of the game that could curtail its domination of the domestic political economy. Thus, as soon as the Hamrouche government initiated reforms that were bound to inhibit the political power and economic interests of the military and its close associates, it was prevented from carrying out its mandate and summarily removed from office. Furthermore, the FIS could not be permitted to win the elections and govern the country. It was not so much that religion was part and parcel of the party’s platform, but rather that the party’s program not only would have excluded the military from exercising power, but also would have restricted its burgeoning economic activities. Like the reformers, the FIS opposed, for example, industrial and commercial monopolies; it also advocated the drastic reduction of public sector privileges (Henry and Springborg 2001: 115–116). In short, real transformation of the politicaleconomic system was not acceptable to those who were truly in control and had a lot to lose.

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Recall that following the removal of Benjedid from the presidency in January 1992 and the outlawing of the legally constituted FIS, the leadership of the party was arrested and imprisoned. Thousands of real or suspected members and supporters of the FIS were rounded up and detained, often without charges, and many were tortured. The military’s hijacking of the transition, followed by the ferocious repression it meted out, had two important effects. First, new militants, outraged at the impunity of the powerholders, were radicalized overnight. Second, in the absence of its leadership or any clear directives, the Islamist opposition fractionalized and, in many cases, was drawn to extremist behavior (Lowi 2005). Thus, the response of the military to the election results actually created the conditions for protracted crisis—this time, in the form of civil war. The violence in Algeria persisted over a ten-year period. Like all protracted conflicts, it manifested varying degrees of intensity over time. Two important factors can be identified as responsible for its persistence. First, government strategy, specifically the practice of severe repression, actually extended the duration of conflict rather than reducing or ending it. Not only did the government engage in targeted killings of Islamists and, allegedly, mass terror, but it also created counterinsurgent civilian militias from within the population. Over time, these militias increasingly took matters into their own hands. Many of the estimated 100,000–300,000 civilian militia members were reluctant to see the violence brought to an end; they had come to enjoy some of the perks of the job: power and status, an occupation, and material benefits (Lowi 2005). Second, the microeconomic dimension of the violence—and, specifically, the increasing involvement of both insurgents and incumbents in predation, contraband trade, and other illicit economic activities—encouraged the duration of civil war.13 In effect, the ongoing violence provided a cover for corruption and enrichment. Like those they were meant to combat, government-created civilian militias also developed into mechanisms of predation. In the weakly regulated environment, with a dilapidated economy but a flourishing parallel sector, many sustained themselves through extra-institutional behavior, including various forms of racketeering and organized crime (ICG 2000: 4; Garçon 1998; El Watan 2002). In short, for those who profited from the “war system,” there was little incentive to negotiate an end to conflict. From 1999 onward, the civil war could be characterized as a low-intensity conflict. Responsible for this change were three key developments: one domestic and two international. On the domestic front, a truce had been negotiated at the end of 1997 between the government of President Liamine Zeroual and two important rebel groups. Then, in 1999, President Bouteflika offered a conditional amnesty, through his Concorde Civile, to members of armed Islamist groups. Though the most intransigent groups

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rejected the amnesty, violence subsided significantly. Moreover, favorable international structural forces facilitated an abatement of the violence. First, oil prices surged—from just under $13 per barrel in 1998, to $28.5 per barrel in 2000. As a result, the Algerian government’s total budget revenue and grants reached approximately $21 billion, or double what they had been in 1998 (ACC 2002). In other words, by the end of the decade, the government had more money in its coffers than at any time during the previous years of civil war. This allowed it to devote far more resources to neutralizing the remaining insurgent forces; it did so through the combination of repression and co-optation. Then, following the September 11 attacks, the Bouteflika government managed to earn considerable external support; it did so in large measure by equating, in its public posturing, Islamism with terrorism, and thereby successfully manipulating the West’s fears of an Islamic threat. With greater financial resources than ever before, plus newfound material and ideological support from powerful international actors, the regime was able to orchestrate, if not an end to, at least a substantial winding down of the crisis.

Explaining the Outcomes The emergence of crisis in the late 1980s and its persistence over time can be explained in a variety of ways. First, misguided policies relative to economic development—reflected in the dependence on the oil sector; the focus on heavy industry through the 1970s; the reliance on massive imports; and the failure to diversify, develop industries that would reduce dependence on imports, or even invest in job creation—meant not only that Algeria has suffered from severe economic imbalances, but also that it is exceedingly vulnerable to a decline in the international price of oil. To be sure, the 1986 price shock hit the country especially hard. A healthier and more balanced economy would have been able to avoid a growth collapse of the magnitude that Algeria suffered and address domestic needs. Second, the leadership did not respond to the economic downturn effectively. The failure to quickly implement and maintain in place far-reaching economic reforms subjected the population to tremendous hardships. Third, the very particularities of the institutional structure were, in large measure, responsible for this and other failures. On the one hand, it was not at all uncommon for the policy community to itself be fractured, thus rendering it ineffectual at times (Roberts 2007: 5–10). On the other hand, the Benjedid leadership either alternated in its policy responses among hesitation, submission, and repression, or it was prevented from implementing policies that it saw fit; the military oligopoly, in the shadows, remained the real political force in the country.

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Moreover, weak institutional mechanisms for conflict management were manifested in the enduring preference for the resort to force in the face of civil unrest. It may well be that the most effective policy for offsetting civil unrest and the descent into crisis in the late 1980s would have been via the extension of political resources. Although Benjedid tried that to a degree in his revision of the constitution and transition to a multiparty system, weak institutional capacity ensured that his efforts came to naught. Neither did his constitutional changes include the guarantee of freedom of political expression nor, despite his title, was he the most powerful executive officer in the country; he was indeed subservient to the military oligarchy which eventually forced him out of office. The persistence of crisis can also be explained in a variety of ways. First, the preference of the leadership for the resort to force and repression backfired: rather than neutralize the insurgency, it energized it. Within no time, the insurgency gained adherents and radicalized. Government forces and insurgents competed with each other for status as the inflictor of the greatest harm and producer of the most—or worst—terror. Second, the scarcity of economic resources in this period of negative economic growth meant that the demand for resources was great. However, in a weakly regulated institutional environment, which had characterized Algeria increasingly from the early 1980s, access to resources was possible largely through extra-institutional means. As insurgents, incumbents, and counterinsurgent civilian militias enlarged their clienteles and economic stakes, their material ambitions loomed large. Insurgents focused on looting the state and society for the sake of gaining access to a greater share of the pie; incumbents focused on holding onto power, and the related oil wealth, at all costs; and counterinsurgent civilian militias tended to sustain themselves through various forms of criminality and predation. As long as they were able to enrich themselves, they were motivated for la longue durée (Lowi 2005). The winding down of crisis derived largely from unanticipated events that the regime was able to manipulate to its advantage. Oil prices had increased and government coffers were again quite full. Additionally, support for the regime from the international community was finally forthcoming.14 Itself a victim of “Islamic terror,” the United States government (and its allies) acknowledged the victim status of the Algerian regime; the floodgates of support were opened. Not only had insurgents, through violence and predation, lost whatever legitimacy and backing they may have enjoyed, but the Algerian regime now had the resources to bring them to heel. Nevertheless, the end of crisis has not brought an end to insecurity; indeed, ongoing low-level conflict has persisted, with a new regional dimension and the potential for intensification.

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Comparative Reflections While ongoing crises can be addressed through institutional development and political mechanisms for conflict management, such a direction has been systematically rebuffed by the Algerian power elite. In effect, there are two principal impediments—one structural, the other institutional—to successful crisis management in the Algerian context. It is the combination of, on the one hand, the rentier nature of the Algerian state and economy and, on the other hand, the absence of transparent institutions engaged in the democratic regulation of economic activity and political life that inhibits the implementation of the kinds of policies that could effectively avert crisis. The weakly diversified, externally focused single resourcedependent economy easily falls victim to unanticipated exogenous forces. There simply is no way to protect such an economy in the absence of an ongoing concerted effort, within an institutionalized state, to both diversify that economy away from single-resource dependence and empower productive domestic economic actors. Nonetheless, the impulse to diversify is lacking because those who profit from the status quo do so royally as is the impulse to empower productive actors because, grosso modo, of greed. While in recent years the regime has been offering some financial facilities to young entrepreneurs with ideas for start-ups, the support has been insufficient (Achy 2013: 15). Besides, business elites who have thrived in Algeria and are closely connected to the regime have systematically resisted reforms that would open up the economy to entrepreneurship and competition. There are enormous riches to be had from oil-based development where oil revenues fall into the coffers of a weakly institutionalized and regulated state, especially one such as Algeria where cronyism is rampant and those in power, whether civilians or military personnel, are themselves engaged in lucrative economic activities. No doubt, a weakly institutionalized rentier state does not tend to embrace within its fold those who advocate bold reform; for those who benefit from the status quo, there is simply too much of a personal stake to risk losing through a reformist agenda. The absence of political institutions that are legitimate and meritocratic and that affirm the democratic regulation of economic activity and political life has several important effects. First, with no institution equipped or motivated to elaborate and oversee an appropriate or equitable distribution of the oil rent, the job falls to more or less occult forces: those who not only resist reform, but promote and reinforce the authoritarianism and corruption from which they benefit. Because oversight and accountability—in the bureaucratic, managerial, and financial domains—are lacking, these forces carry out the task of distribution as they please. In the case of Algeria, it is the military, or more exactly, the security services—Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS)—that assume the task of controller

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general and manager. Far from being appropriate or equitable, the decisions they promulgate may be arbitrary and largely self-serving: wealth and privileges remain concentrated within a restricted group of loyal allies and associates. Indeed, fascinating stories abound of corruption and cronyism of startling proportions that implicate the highest echelons of the state in a variety of ways. Among them, consider: the rise and fall of Rafik Khalifa’s empire from 1998 to 2003 (Aubenas 2003; Hachemaoui 2011: 114–121); the construction of the East-West autoroute by the Chinese in the fall of 2009;15 and, most recently, scandals involving Sonatrach, the country’s state-owned oil company. In the latter case, in 2010 the DRS claimed to have uncovered fraudulent practices of company executives for awarding oil and gas contracts (Martinez 2010: 15–16). Reflecting what was likely a crude power struggle at the helm of the regime—or, rather, a sharp reminder to Bouteflika that he was nothing more than the civilian face of the shadow military-security powerholders—the president was forced to dismiss his energy minister and loyal friend.16 Second, as institutional weakness lends power, by default, to occult and/or repressive forces that tend to manage conflict through violence and co-optation, crises are not really resolved; in some cases they are actually teased, while in others they are merely coped with and, more often than not, only temporarily. Indeed, the political crisis in Algeria, following the success of the FIS at the polls in 1991 and the subsequent cancellation of legislative elections, was never properly resolved. Not only did the toll from the ten-year-long civil war range from a staggering 150,000–200,000 dead and more than 8,000 missing, but the scope and extent of massacres and generalized terror were horrendous.17 Furthermore, while most guerrilla fighters were eventually co-opted, manipulated, or killed, the most intransigent of the insurgent groups, the Groupe Salafiste pour le Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), not only refused to put down its arms and accept the amnesty but rather declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004 and has since reinvented itself as a transnational organization with regional aims. Although some have suggested that the GSPC and its more recent incarnation, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) are a creation of, if not closely connected with the DRS (Ammour 2013: 8–10), AQIM has gained for itself broad notoriety across North Africa. Undeterred, it and its offshoots allegedly have been involved in recurrent violent encounters in Algeria and on its borders, at times in collaboration with other Islamist movements. In the aftermath of the third oil shock, when the price of oil increased from $30 per barrel in 2002 to a whopping $147 per barrel in July 2008, before dropping back down to $40 per barrel the end of the year and then steadily increasing to $100 per barrel in June 2011, the Algerian regime found itself remarkably well endowed.18 In 2010, for example, it had $150

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billion in reserves (for a population of less than 35 million). In this environment President Bouteflika who had been put into power by the military in 1999, managed, with the apparent approval of his then patrons, to revise the constitution such that he could run for a third term in office.19 With coffers overflowing and with no other candidate acceptable to the military, he won a third mandate with a handsome margin. Despite abundant financial resources, the regime appears unable to spend efficiently to improve infrastructure, provide services, and enhance the quality of life of the population. Indeed, distribution in a manner that mitigates economic distress and purchases social peace remains in woefully short supply. After all, although official figures suggest that unemployment has been brought down from 31 percent in 2003 to 10 percent since 2010, it was said to be about 21.5 percent (in 2013) among the fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old age group and as much as 30 percent among recent university graduates (Achy 2013: 4). This is particularly noteworthy given the vulnerability and mobilizational capacity of that cohort: both “voice” and “exit” strategies, including recruitment into extra-institutional groups, are especially common among marginalized sixteen- to twenty-five-year-olds.20 Moreover, in 2010, about 25 percent of the population continued to live below the poverty line and, by some estimates, roughly 50 percent of the active population made their living largely via parallel economic activities (Martinez 2010: 30). Furthermore, political unrest has been on the rise. Since 2005, there have been regular demonstrations in oil- and gas-rich regions, which are among the most impoverished of the country. Residents—many of whom are Berbers—have been demanding greater access to the rent, as well as a say in its distribution and utilization (Martinez 2010: 22). According to the Algerian press, the national police documented close to 10,000 protest movements of various sorts across the country in 2010 alone (Hachemaoui 2011: 113). Moreover, between 2005 and 2011 there were monthly reports of operations conducted by militants, initially focused on the Kabylia region—the AQIM stronghold—and then across the country, targeting primarily government forces and installations as well as actual confrontations between AQIM militants and government forces. From 2007 onward, attacks allegedly carried out by AQIM or its offshoots were reported in neighboring countries: in Tunisia (2007), Morocco (2007, 2011), Mauritania (2007–2011), Niger (2009–2011), and Mali (2009–2011). With the start of the conflict in northern Mali at the beginning of 2012, AQIM—including the newly created breakaway group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar—rallied to that region and joined forces with the Islamist insurgency there (Ammour 2013). Then, on January 16, 2013, a spectacular assault on the gas facility at In Amenas in eastern Algeria, for which Belmokhtar claimed responsibility, followed by the sabotage of a principle gas pipeline some days later, suggest that the Algerian state, despite its commitment to a reinforced

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offensive strategy, remains vulnerable to insurgent tactics and at a loss as to how to neutralize them. Since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa in January 2011, demonstrations have continued across Algeria. However, they have neither gained the momentum nor the magnitude of those witnessed elsewhere in the region. That they have not taken on similar proportions is by no means a reflection of relative satisfaction among Algerians, nor is it indicative of the depoliticizing effect of oil on populations, suggested by the rentier state framework.21 Rather, the relative calm can be explained, in part, by the Algerian regime’s trademark response to what it perceived as an imminent crisis. First, it threw money at the people: it increased food subsidies as well as salaries to civil servants, offered young entrepreneurs interest-free loans to establish their businesses, and promised cash transfers to poor families in impoverished zones (Achy 2013, 10). Second, it enhanced the already impressive coercive mechanisms at its disposal. For instance, the huge police presence in the streets and public venues was augmented so as to snuff out any demonstration or break up gatherings of any sort. According to one source, the police force has been expanded significantly in recent years—from 50,000 police officers in the mid-1990s to roughly 200,000 in 2012 (Achy 2013, 12). Moreover, the lifting of the state of emergency in February 2011, which had been in place since January 1992, has in fact strengthened the military’s authority: restrictions on public protests remain, while new rules for the military’s continued involvement in domestic security have been adopted (Agence FrancePresse 2011).

Conclusion Since the first major crisis some thirty years ago, the Algerian regime has demonstrated no will to uncover and address the deep causes of crises and conflicts, the sources of popular discontent. This being the case, the regime simply bumps along, doing what it is prepared to do in the face of unrest: typically, it adopts its trademark strategy that consists of co-optation and repression. The result is expedient stopgap solutions that are temporary, unsatisfactory, superficial, and often counterproductive. This persistent feature of crisis management reflects a political and economic elite that shuns genuine reform because it will not countenance a redistribution of power and resources. For Algeria and states that share similarities with it, a number of changes would have to occur for more successful crisis management to be possible. First, there would need to be greater transparency in the conduct of economic activities and political life. Second, the military would have to

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assume its preeminent role as guarantor of the physical security of the state by defending its borders and fighting its wars; it would have to return to the barracks and give up its nonmilitary activities. Third, the economy would have to be diversified so as to reduce the overwhelming dependence on oil and gas. Fourth, both economic and political life would have to be liberalized such that initiatives to engage in growth and development, as well as to grapple with—and find solutions to—domestic constraints could be attracted from all corners of society. With these and other changes in place, there may be a greater chance for Algeria and other African states to effectively address the challenges that they face.

Notes 1. In December 1991, the FIS won 47 percent of the popular vote in the first round of legislative elections; it was poised to win the second round. 2. See, inter alia, Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi and Luciani 1987. 3. Indeed, Algeria has known military presidents, civilian presidents, and even a collective presidency (1992–1994); it has experienced the single party and multipartyism, a socialist economy and a market economy. 4. Consider the following: when Abdelaziz Bouteflika extended a second amnesty, in 2005, to those engaged in the ten-year-long insurgency, he included provisions for the total exoneration of the military and security forces for their activities during the civil war years (Roberts 2007). 5. The first major discovery of oil was made in 1948 in the Sidi Aissa region in the pre-Saharan southeast. By 1958, the country’s main oil field, at Hassi Messaoud in the east central region, came onstream. Gas production began in 1961 at Hassi R’mel, just 500 kilometers south of Algiers. By the late 1990s, natural gas constituted 70 percent of Algeria’s recoverable hydrocarbon reserves, and crude oil 30 percent (Entelis 1999: 13–15). 6. On the staple theory of economic growth, see Watkins (1963), but especially, the works of Canadian economic historian, Harold Innis (1930). Today, the term “resource curse” suggests some of the features of the Innisian “staple trap.” See, inter alia, Ross 1999. 7. While crises had occurred prior to 1986—consider, for example, the coup d’état manquée of 1965—that of 1986 was the first to overwhelm the domestic political economy. 8. While no longer in crisis mode, the period since 2004 can be characterized as one of fairly persistent, albeit muted, insecurity. 9. For an outline of the personal connections between high-ranking military— and civilian—actors and private individuals who control all or a part of the pharmaceutical, foodstuffs, and agricultural products sectors, see Hachemaoui 2011: 130–131. See also Dillman 2000: 95, 149. 10. Through the 1980s, however, underground Islamist movements had been active, engaging in guerrilla activities and targeting the state. See, for example, the Bouyali group (Moussaoui 1994: 1324–1325; Willis 1996: 71–72). 11. One of the stipulations of the new constitution of 1989 was that the armed forces were a strictly military institution, suggesting that (unlike in the past) they were not allowed to interfere in politics or social life.

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12. On the reforms, and their revocation, see Corm 1993; Goumeziane 1994; Hidouci 1995. Note that Hachemaoui (2011: 131–132) refers to June 1991 and the removal of the “reformers” as a defining moment (un moment déterminant) in the process of what he refers to as the “willed institutional weakening of the state” (translation my own). 13. For guerrillas, such activities provided a means to finance the insurgency. Besides, the regime’s adoption in 1994 of a structural adjustment program backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which included the abolition of price controls and liberalization of access to foreign exchange, made it possible for guerillas to get involved in business and trade (Hadjadj 1999: 92–94). 14. Through the mid-1990s, it had been considered a pariah state for having overturned the democratic transition in 1991. 15. An investigation into this project brought to light a system of kickbacks and illegal commissions between the DRS and senior executives in the Ministry of Public Works (Martinez 2010: 15). 16. A second scandal surfaced in February 2013 when the head of Eni, a stateowned Italian hydrocarbon company, was accused of involvement in a massive bribery case to win contracts from Sonatrach (Achy 2013: 5). 17. For details, see www.algeria-watch.org. 18. The price of oil increased from $40 to $70 per barrel in 2009, and from $70 to $90 per barrel in 2010. 19. It is interesting to note that, in his campaign to win a second mandate in 2004, Bouteflika toured the country and extended generous handouts—equivalent to $50–65 million—to every wilaya he visited (Werenfels 2007: 139–140). 20. Self-immolation and clandestine migration have recently become more common graphic forms of “exit” (Achy 2013: 7–10). 21. It is indeed difficult to note the depoliticizing effect of oil—and in a period of high oil prices, no less—in Libya and Bahrain, for example, during the “Arab Spring.” On the depoliticizing effect of oil, see, Beblawi 1987.

4 Angola: A Rude Awakening Susana Moreira

AFTER TWENTY-SEVEN YEARS OF GRUELING CIVIL WAR, ANGOLA WAS

finally on the path to recovery from 2002 to mid-2008. Benefiting from an oil bonanza (Angola surpassed Nigeria as Africa’s largest crude producer) and an investment boom by Western countries and China, Angola became one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. But things took a dramatic turn for the worse in mid-2008 as the global financial crisis began to deepen. Between January and December 2008, oil prices and diamond prices fell 60 percent and 68 percent, respectively. For an economy that was dependent on oil for 97 percent of its export receipts and for 58 percent of its GDP, this unexpected price collapse was a “shock to the system” and the onset of a potentially serious crisis (CEIC 2009). Economic growth was not the only victim of the crisis. Key figures of the Angolan government were pushed aside while the president’s grip on power tightened. Popular discontent brewed as Angolans lost their jobs and inflation rose. The situation was particularly critical in Cabinda and the Lundas, resulting in skirmishes that were rapidly quelled by the government. After trying to stem the crisis on its own for most of 2009, Angola’s government—constrained by mounting debt, weak governance, and institutional capacity—was forced to look for outside help. As it had attempted in other instances where oil prices dropped, Angola appealed to the International Monetary Fund. This time, however, the Angolan government was willing to comply with the IMF’s demands for fiscal transparency and stronger macroeconomic management and, therefore, was able to get a loan. Angola was also able to secure new loans from China, Spain, South Korea, Brazil, Canada, and the United States, mainly thanks to intense lobbying 57

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efforts from President José Eduardo dos Santos. It was also the president who uncharacteristically reached out to creditors and publicly committed to Angola’s debt repayment. This influx of funding combined with an increase in oil prices restored Angola’s economic expansion, albeit at a lower rate than that of previous years. It follows, then, that an improved international context allied with late but effective government crisis management efforts led by an increasingly powerful president were key to economic recovery. By the end of 2010, as international investors’ interest in Angola rekindled, doubts remained whether the government would adequately address the vulnerabilities highlighted by the 2008–2010 crisis: overdependence on oil (and diamonds), poor financial management, weak fiscal transparency, short-termism, corruption, regional development disparities, structural unemployment, growing inequality, and complete dependence on the president as the ultimate decisionmaker. Despite some progress toward economic diversification and better fiscal management in the years that followed, Angola easily fell victim to the 2014 oil production and price collapse and, at the time of writing, crisis is once again plaguing this generation’s “country of the future.”1

Background of the 2008−2010 Crisis Angola shares borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo to the north, Zambia to the east, and Namibia to the south. It has the largest coastal extension in central Africa (over 994 miles) and is the second-largest country in land area (481,354 square miles) after the DRC. Angola’s water supply is one of the highest in Africa,2 and its many rivers provide it with significant hydroelectric resources. With a range of different soil types and climate zones, numerous crops can be grown. Up until 1975, Angola was self-sufficient in all major food crops and a leading exporter of agricultural commodities like coffee, cotton, and sisal. In 2008, however, Angola’s fertile land (57.4 million hectares) was minimally exploited and food was imported. Angola has large deposits of oil, natural gas, diamonds, phosphates, bitumen, iron, copper, magnesium, gold, and decorative rocks like marble. In 2005–2008, oil accounted for more than half of the country’s GDP and approximately 80 percent of government revenue (CEIC 2010). During that time period Angola was vying with Saudi Arabia to become China’s top oil supplier, and it was the seventh-largest supplier to the United States in 2008 (EIA 2015). It was also the world’s fourth-largest producer of diamonds, which represented 95 percent of non-oil exports (CEIC 2010).

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Angola is divided administratively into 18 provinces, 163 municipalities, and 376 communes. The 2014 National Institute of Statistics census estimated the Angolan population at around 24 million (INE 2015). Estimates indicate that 37 percent of Angolans are Ovimbundu, 25 percent M’bundu, and 13 percent Bakongo, and the rest of other local ethnicities, Portuguese, or mestizo (Angola State Department 2009). The displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, especially in the late 1980s, had significant repercussions on ethnic identification, facilitating interaction, and miscegenation. It also promoted the use of the official language, Portuguese, which became the predominant language in Angola. In 2008 about 40 percent of Angolans used languages of the Bantu family like Umbundu and Kimbundu as their first language, and many more used them as a second language (see M. P. Lewis 2009). Nevertheless, these national languages were in decline as the younger urban generations moved toward the exclusive use of Portuguese. According to the preliminary results of the 2014 National Institute of Statistics census, about 62.3 percent of Angolans lived in urban areas (INE 2015). The average population density was 19 inhabitants per square kilometer but, due to the disparity in its spatial distribution, this indicator was as little as 0.97 in the province of Kwando Kubango and as high as 1,763 in Luanda. The disparity between provinces did not stop here. The seven Bengo provinces, including Lunda Norte and Kwanza Norte, produced only 3.66 percent of national income and had an average GDP per capita 76 percent lower than the 2007 national average. In contrast, three coastal provinces—Luanda, Benguela, and Kwanza Sul—generated 90 percent of national income and had a GDP per capita approximately double the 2007 national average. Luanda was the main driver of Angola’s economy and one of the most expensive cities in the world (Hove 2009; Pepitone 2010). A city originally designed for 500,000 inhabitants now had a population several times that, which put severe strains on a limited infrastructure. Most of the 6.5 million Angolans living in Luanda (Government of Angola 2014) chose to endure these conditions because the city offered high salaries (four times the national average), there was relatively low unemployment (17.7 percent versus the national average of 30 percent), and there were positive externalities of being the nation’s capital and administrative and financial center. Migrants have been coming to Luanda since 1627 when it became the administrative center of Portuguese Angola.3 The city flourished in the 1950s and 1960s thanks to Lisbon’s efforts to promote Angola’s development and, thus, placate the emerging separatist political organizations.4 Portugal’s efforts floundered and eventually led to the Angolan War of Independence (1961–1975).

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The anticolonial war was waged by three competing movements: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola, FNLA), the MPLA, and UNITA. In Cabinda, the regionalist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) was additionally active. The FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA fought each other as well as the colonial regime. By the early 1970s, the separatist movements were losing the war. The 1974 coup d’état in Portugal, however, resulted in Angola’s independence, as the new leadership decided to grant independence to Portugal’s foreign provinces. In 1975, the MPLA declared independence and established a Sovietstyle authoritarian one-party state. This regime was dependent on its control of Angolan oil and the support of the Soviet Union and its allies, most prominently Cuba. UNITA, and initially the FNLA as well, fought against the MPLA, supported by diamond revenues and countries like Zaire, China, South Africa, and the United States. By the early 1990s, as the United States and Russia began to draw down their presence following the end of the Cold War, the MPLA finally agreed to negotiate with UNITA. With the encouragement of Portugal, the United States, and Russia, dos Santos (leader of the MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi (head of UNITA) signed a peace agreement in Bicesse, Portugal, in May 1991. The months that followed the Bicesse Accords were filled with hope and enthusiasm. After enduring a war that, directly or indirectly, had resulted in the deaths of approximately 300,000 people (Harding 2002), Angolans actively participated in the campaigns for the September 1992 elections. The MPLA and dos Santos knew that most analysts expected them to lose the elections, following years of failure and abuse by the government. Therefore, they invested in a highly organized and professional campaign that made the most of the MPLA’s control of state funds, the administration, and state-owned media. In contrast, UNITA and Savimbi mounted a highly disorganized campaign. Beyond a vague promise of “rural development,” Savimbi failed to offer Angolans an alternative vision of Angola’s future. Worse, late in the campaign, Savimbi was forced to admit that human rights abuses—including the killing of children—had been carried out at UNITA’s headquarters. These revelations came at a huge cost for UNITA, as many who might otherwise have supported it were scared away. While the campaign was raging on, UNITA and the MPLA stuck to their old belligerent ways. UNITA systematically violated the Bicesse agreement. It maintained control over the diamond regions and did not dissolve its army. It also failed to disarm, handing over only obsolete weaponry. Abusing its position, the government also subverted and bypassed Bicesse and did not fulfill many important obligations related to the police and the military. In fact, the MPLA set up a new elite security

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force that was armed and trained for action against civilians. These unpunished infringements of the agreement fueled mutual distrust and led to rearmament on both sides, with devastating consequences. After a year of peace, Angola finally held elections under UN supervision in late September 1992. The MPLA obtained a clear victory (54 percent of votes) over UNITA (34 percent). Angolans voted overwhelmingly for the “the devil they knew” and for the preferential economic treatment (imported food paid with oil revenues) that they were receiving. In the presidential elections, dos Santos (49.7 percent) recorded a smaller and insufficient victory over Savimbi (40.7 percent).5 The UN labeled the results “generally free and fair,” but Savimbi rejected the results (Messiant 2004). The international community tried to engage Savimbi, but he refused and accused dos Santos of manipulating the results. Savimbi had accepted the terms of the Bicesse agreement only because he was certain he would win the elections. When that did not occur, he was not willing to abdicate his claim to power. As tension between Savimbi and dos Santos grew, the unarmed actors in Angola (civil society, political forces) tried desperately to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute, but they had no influence on either leader. War started again in November 1992. UNITA recognized that it had lost its electoral bid in the urban centers, so it set out to destroy the cities. It also tried to destroy the MPLA administration, which refused to share power and resources with UNITA. In mid-1993 UNITA lost its major supporter, the United States. Frustrated by Savimbi’s unwillingness to compromise, Washington realigned in favor of the “legitimate government.” This opened the way for UN sanctions on UNITA. By late 1993, Savimbi was forced to recognize that UNITA’s early military successes had exhausted its resources and could not bring immediate victory. For long-term survival, he needed to seek a cease-fire on the best terms that he could obtain. Under international pressure, the MPLA and UNITA returned to the negotiating table. For twelve months, amidst violent fighting, representatives from both sides negotiated a compromise. In November 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was signed (although, significantly, not by dos Santos and Savimbi; see Chabal and Birmingham 2002). The Lusaka Protocol was not received as enthusiastically in Angola as the Bicesse Accords. Most Angolans saw the cease-fire as a truce and believed that a return to war was inevitable. As long as dos Santos and Savimbi were alive, they would fight for control of the country. To confirm Angolans’ worries, UNITA delayed disarming in violation of the Lusaka Protocol. Savimbi deemed the protocol unfavorable and hoped to be able to renegotiate it on the basis of UNITA’s military strength. The MPLA also violated the agreement by failing to demobilize its military and reduce its police forces.

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While a fragile peace survived in Angola, dos Santos made the most of the unlimited Western support that he was enjoying. He set out to consolidate his control over the state, the public and private economy, and the media. He began to bypass government ministries and party leaders and to neutralize the unarmed opposition through co-option and repression. He also orchestrated a personality cult that portrayed him as a peacemaker, in stark contrast to Savimbi who was described as a warmonger. To avoid war, in 1997 the MPLA proposed the establishment of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (Governo de Unidade Nacional, GURN). It offered a limited number of posts to members of UNITA who were willing to go to Luanda. Seventy became members of the National Assembly and seven became ministers and vice ministers in a cabinet dominated by sixty MPLA members (Chabal and Birmingham 2002). Any appearance of power sharing was as fictitious as the demilitarization of the UNITA and MPLA armies. In the last weeks of 1998, dos Santos’s forces attacked UNITA. The fighting that ensued was the cruelest yet seen in Angola. After initial military victories by the government and UNITA’s refusal to come to terms, severe sanctions were enforced on UNITA. These made it difficult for UNITA to get supplies, resulting in its adoption of a scorched-earth policy. It tried to starve the cities and refused to allow humanitarian food supplies to be flown in, hoping that world opinion would force the Angolan government to stop a war that was killing civilians or that civilians would rise up in revolt as new waves of displaced persons arrived. As it happened, the world did not force the government back to the negotiating table and civilians did not risk any public protests because they were scared of the president’s elite security forces. On February 22, 2002, government military forces killed Savimbi. Discreet contacts between the MPLA and UNITA followed and, on March 13, the government declared a unilateral cease-fire and introduced a peace plan. The plan called for resolution of outstanding military issues in accordance with the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements, UNITA’s demilitarization and reintegration into political life, and amnesty for all crimes committed during the war. The plan was a surprise to all, including the National Assembly, which was not consulted. Shortly thereafter the Luena Memorandum was signed between the MPLA and UNITA. Once again, it was a pact between the two parties to the exclusion of other political parties and civil society forces. After peace finally returned to Angola, the MPLA further consolidated its hold on power. First, after years of being confined to Luanda and its outskirts, the government successfully extended its reach to all corners of Angola by 2004–2005. Second, despite the fact that the one-party state ended in 1991,6 the MPLA continued to foster the fusion between party

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structures and the state administration, both at the central and regional or local levels. Opposition parties were allowed to operate, but they were completely dependent on the MPLA-controlled government for funding. Many major opposition figures were co-opted by the MPLA and some even joined it. The MPLA also used its strong party discipline to exercise control over the National Assembly, which ended up being neither proactive nor demanding with respect to the government and the president. President dos Santos has been the leader of the MPLA and head of government since 1979, 7 relying on a web of patronage to stay in power. He has clearly been first among equals and his decisions have been unquestionable.8 For sixteen years, dos Santos and National Assembly deputies remained in office without allowing for democratic challenges via elections, despite the fact the president was not technically elected and the constitution limited term mandates to five years.9 The president repeatedly announced new presidential elections (2006, 2007, and 2009), but systematically postponed them. In contrast, there was a peaceful albeit flawed legislative election in September 2008. The MPLA won a landslide victory benefiting from its position as the military victor, as the incumbent, and the recognizable source of easy credits and direct subsidies.10 In contrast, UNITA and the other opposition parties were disorganized, were underfunded, lacked any charismatic leadership, and struggled to rid themselves of the blame for the war. After the resounding electoral victory, there was little reason for the MPLA to involve opposition parties in national governance. As such, President dos Santos dismantled the GURN and instituted an all-MPLA government. The MPLA also bypassed the opposition when designing a new constitution because it had the two-thirds majority required to pass any major changes in legislation. The new constitution was passed in January 2010 and its main provisions clearly favor those in power, particularly dos Santos. To start, the president will not be elected directly by the public or by elected members of the National Assembly, but instead the leading candidate atop the party list of the party that wins a plurality in legislative elections will become president. This all but guaranteed the perpetuation of MPLA rule in the 2012 elections.11 Since dos Santos controls the selection of MPLA candidates, he effectively determines who will be president. The 2010 constitution also allows the president to choose a vice president, as well as to serve two five-year terms. Presidential impeachment by the Supreme and Constitutional Courts is possible, but only under extreme circumstances.12 The constitution keeps the president as the head of state, the holder of executive power, and commander in chief. In addition, it gives the president the power to declare war, marshal law, and a state of emergency, without requiring approval by the National Assembly. The constitu-

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tion also grants the president broad powers to emit laws by decree and veto National Assembly laws. Under the new constitution, the judges to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Court of Audits (responsible for reviewing public expenditures) are selected by and accountable to the president. Funding for the judiciary is also tied to the presidency. Finally, the constitution grants the presidency control over the funding for defense. Both the army and the police are highly politicized and under close presidential guidance. More than ever, juxtaposition of presidential, party, state, and governmental structures was apparent, as was the blurring between the private and public spheres. In the past few years, in addition to receiving part of the oil rent, legally or illegally, the elite have benefited from the opaque (and at times illegal) transfer of state assets (banks, telecommunications, real estate, etc.) to the private sector. This pervasive practice of corruption has bought loyalty or acquiescence of the political elite and their Angolan and foreign associates entirely at the behest of the president. This system of economic co-optation threatens Angola’s long-term development since the wealth acquired is largely spent on luxury consumption or invested abroad. Nevertheless, its impact has not been severe enough to prevent Angola from successfully consolidating its macroeconomic situation. It was able to significantly lower inflation, stabilize the exchange rate, reduce its debt burden, and dramatically increase its foreign reserves.13 The country enjoyed GDP growth rates that were among the highest in the world, and was becoming a favorite destination for foreign direct investment in the mid-2000s. Riding on the cushion of rising oil revenues and access to unconditional oil-backed loans from China, Angola managed to withstand most of the pressures from the international community to adopt more transparent and rule-based procedures to improve governance and wealth distribution. As a result, little of the rents from oil were used for the social sectors, with lower budgetary allocations than in most African countries, or for investment in the war-torn physical infrastructure (Hodges 2003). The distance between haves and have-nots was remarkable in 2008, highlighted by growing social inequality and the fact that at least 68 percent of the country’s population lived in poverty (less than $2 per day), and 26 percent in extreme poverty (less than 70¢ per day).14 The situation was particularly dire in the center-west and south where 92 percent of people were poor versus 49 percent in Luanda (da Rocha 2010). The UN Development Programme (UNDP) 2008 Human Development Index placed Angola 140 out of 175 countries. Angolans’ poverty and high illiteracy, combined with limited access to information, are major barriers for political participation. The country’s legal framework also establishes a number of restrictions on association and

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assembly rights that fuel a widespread culture of fear and intimidation.15 This fear is compounded by Angolans’ desire to maintain peace at all costs, after enduring over forty years of violent conflicts. The development of civil society has lagged, in part, due to the state’s interference. Most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active in Angola depend on the government for funding. These NGOs have become essential to the lives of many Angolans, granting access to services and funds otherwise unavailable to them. This creates clientelistic networks, ensuring patronage to the ruling party. Independent NGOs are weak, fragmented, and limited in visibility, but growing in number. There are severe capacity shortages at these organizations, which partly explain their limited success. Their poor performance also follows their unwillingness to cooperate and inability to communicate effectively with the masses. International NGOs have been working in Angola for many years despite a difficult working environment, oppressively high operating costs, and at times strained government relations. In 2008 and today, the media remains tightly controlled and manipulated.16 The independent media continues to face state interference and often harassment, a problem that has made broadcasters hesitant to voice critical opinions or publish unwelcome news. In addition, independent media outlets have faced limitations due to technical and financial problems. Nevertheless, new avenues of expression like Radio Despertar and social websites like Facebook are popular and attract some unwanted (and, at times, dangerous) attention (de Luanda 2010).

Origins of the 2008−2010 Crisis In the spring of 2008, the head of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) warned that the price of oil could hit $200 per barrel before the year was out (Hotten 2008). Fears over long-term supply, speculative activity, geopolitical tensions, and, most importantly, growing demand from developing countries were exerting upward pressures on oil prices. However, starting in August 2008, oil prices plunged rapidly from their record high of $147 in July as the financial crisis unfolded and global recession loomed (see Figure 4.1) (BBC News 2008). Not only were many operators liquidating their positions in the commodities markets to cover losses but, more importantly, oil demand from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries declined while that of new major importers, China and India, stagnated. In an attempt to curb falling prices and protect the revenue streams of its members, OPEC made several pledges to cut production starting as early as September 2008. In December of the same year, OPEC announced the

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Figure 4.1 Average Prices for OPEC Crude Oil, 2000–2015 (in US dollars per barrel)

Source: OPEC, http://www.opec.org.opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm. Notes: 2015 data refers to the first quarter of 2015. OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

largest output cut in its history (2.2 million barrels per day), bringing the total cuts for the year to 4.2 million—a record in such a short period of time (Mouawad 2008). In January 2009, Angola assumed the presidency of OPEC, only a year after becoming the twelfth fully fledged member of the organization. By then, Angola’s economy had slowed sharply after years of sustained twodigit growth. The country was suffering from its over-reliance on oil and diamond industries for revenue and growth17 and OPEC’s decision to cut production. The diamond industry, Angola’s largest non-oil exporter and a major employer in Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, and Bie, was particularly hit by the crisis as it had already been weakened by a decline in world demand that preceded the banking crisis. The substantial drop in prices, after more than two decades of almost uninterrupted price increases, was too much to bear for many producers who had accumulated a large inventory and took on excessive debt (Werdigier 2009). Many Angolans lost their jobs and many more were at risk of losing theirs. In the years preceding the global economic crisis, the oil and gas sector constituted 55 percent to 60 percent of GDP, 97 percent of export revenues, and was the most important source of government revenues. The govern-

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ment budget and spending rose rapidly in line with oil revenues18 while credit growth averaged 70 percent. After successfully paying off most of its debt by 2006, Angola started to incur new debt, which rose to approximately $14 billion in 2008. Already overextended, Angola was unprepared to deal with the collapse in the price of oil and reduced production that caused the first current account deficit (3.8 percent of GDP) since the end of the war in 2002. The government’s fiscal surplus also rapidly turned into a deficit. The value of the kwanza was destabilized, which threatened to boost inflation.

Tracing the Outcomes of the 2008−2010 Crisis Despite the challenges posed by the unexpected collapse in oil prices and the drying up of international liquidity due to the financial crisis, Angolan and international experts agreed that Angola would do fairly well and even grow by 12 percent in 2009 (Corkin 2009). Angola was believed to be in the strongest economic position that it had ever been. The government was also thought to have enough experience in dealing with oil price collapses and their impact, after surviving the 1997−1999 and 2001−2002 price drops. Either because it was stunned by the dramatic shift in oil price performance or because it believed the price drop was temporary, the Angolan government did not immediately react to the mounting macroeconomic imbalances that closely followed the drop in prices. Angola’s first public attempt to deal with the crisis was in February 2009, when the central bank—National Bank of Angola (BNA)—intervened to support its “hard kwanza policy,” in reaction to the widening spread between the official and parallel exchange rates. The BNA drew heavily on Angola’s foreign currency reserves to artificially maintain the kwanza pegged to the dollar, hoping that this would keep import prices down and, thus, reduce the risk of an uptick in inflation (CEIC 2010). To sterilize excessive liquidity of the kwanza, the BNA then limited credit concession and aggressively raised legal reserve requirements of bank deposits from 15 percent to 20 percent in February 2009, and to 30 percent in April (BNA 2009). The Angolan business community and economists heavily criticized these decisions because they reduce access to credit and are associated with an increase in interest rates, which hampers economic activity particularly in the non-oil economic sectors. In parallel, faced with an increasingly unmanageable fiscal deficit, the government decided to draw down its foreign exchange reserves at the BNA. In just six months, as a result of the government’s efforts to shore up the kwanza and pay up debt, reserves eroded rapidly, decreasing by $6 bil-

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lion (CEIC 2010). To avoid an even faster deterioration of its reserves, the BNA was forced to suspend foreign exchange auctions and sold only limited amounts of dollars at a fixed nominal rate. These measures dramatically reduced access to foreign exchange currencies in Angola. Not having the means to pay for imports impeded multiple transactions, which had a negative impact because Angola does not have the production capacity to meet local demand and, thus, must import goods and services. In May 2009, the government decided to turn to the domestic bond market and issued midterm treasury bonds. These treasury bonds, however, met with limited success and forced the government to look for funding in Angola’s banking system. This further soaked up liquidity from Angola’s economy, making it even harder for local businesses to invest in the country.19 All the while, the government lobbied other governments, expanding existing credit lines or procuring new ones. Key to securing over $3.3 billion was President dos Santos’s uncharacteristic willingness to travel to several countries and also host leaders in Angola in 2009 (dos Santos 2009). The credit lines have a limited, albeit important, impact on the government’s finances since they mainly fund companies operating in Angola.20 By midyear, the government indicated publicly that it was willing to cut expenses to deal with mounting fiscal deficit. In July 2009, the budget was revised by the government and approved at the National Assembly. On the expense side, the new budget included a 16.6 percent cut in expenditures, mostly through a 27 percent cut in capital expenditures. Current expenditures were cut just 9.6 percent in an attempt to mitigate the social impact of a substantial cut in spending. These reductions notwithstanding, the share of wages in the budget increased, following the enrollment of new staff in anticipation of the September 2008 elections. Overall, social sector expenditure in the budget remained over 30 percent, to mitigate popular discontent. The government also secured $1 billion that it considered essential to the success of the 2010 African Cup of Nations (CAN), which it viewed as an “opportunity to showcase Angola to the rest of the world” (McVeigh 2009). In September 2009 it became clear that the government’s piecemeal response to the crisis had failed spectacularly. By prioritizing its own funding needs, instead of the needs of the economy as a whole, the government had adopted policies that led Angola into an unprecedented liquidity crisis. This was exacerbated by the slump in public capital expenditure, coupled with governmental payment arrears that were rapidly expanding and would reach $2.5 billion in September 2009. The government belatedly tried to correct the situation by abandoning the hard kwanza policy and allowing the official exchange rate to depreci-

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ate in October 2009.21 But it was not enough to jump-start the economy. In November, mounting debt and macroeconomic instability forced the government to ask the IMF for help. Until then, Angola was one of few African countries that had never borrowed from the IMF, although it entered into two short-lived periods of IMF-monitored reforms in 1995 and 2000–2001 (Chabal and Vidal 2008). This time, however, Angola was willing to accept the IMF’s many conditions, which President dos Santos had so heavily criticized back in 2002. On November 23, the IMF agreed to help Angola with a standby arrangement (SBA) valued at $1.4 billion. The arrangement’s objectives were twofold: (1) restore macroeconomic balances and rebuild international reserves; and (2) implement structural reforms to foster development of the non-oil sector. As part of the arrangement, measures were implemented to pay the arrears and improve the management of the treasury. This included increased transparency in public finances, from the BNA to Sonangol, the country’s major player in the oil industry and most important source of foreign exchange, revenue, and taxes. Despite the positive developments in the last quarter of 2009 (i.e., rising oil prices and the SBA), Angola ended 2009—dubbed “annus horribilis”—with a growth rate somewhere between –1.9 percent (EIU 2009) and 2.4 percent (IMF 2013a). The kwanza was devalued by 19 percent while inflation remained higher than in previous years (14 percent). While Luanda experienced a slowdown in growth, it was relatively moderate thanks to the numerous construction projects that preceded Pope John Paul’s visit and the CAN (Pullella 2009). The impact of the crisis was much more severe in other regions, particularly those heavily dependent on oil or diamonds. In the Lundas, the loss of jobs due to the drop in diamond prices only added to what was already one of the poorest and most violent socioeconomic environments in Angola.22 After the population began to protest, the government acted swiftly to contain unrest, arresting protesters and using public funds to build up stockpiles of diamonds. Stability was achieved with relative ease, in part due to the fact that only 8 percent of the population resides in the vast diamond territory—making it easier to control (da Rocha 2010). Another region that was particularly affected by the crisis was Cabinda, the country’s top oil producer. Investment dropped and the number of oil workers (mostly foreign) was dramatically reduced, sapping Cabinda’s economy. The unrest that ensued reignited Cabindan aspirations for autonomy, which hinge on Cabindans’ desire to control their oil and its dividends.23 It was in this context that the Togo national team was attacked on its way from the DRC to Cabinda on January 8, 2010. Three people died and Togo pulled out of the CAN (Redvers 2010). In the days following the attack, several Cabindan intellectuals and human rights activists were arrested. Meanwhile, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of

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Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) recanted a written justification for the attacks shortly following its discovery that individuals collaborating with state security forces had carried out the attack. The government disputed the claim and revamped its security presence in Cabinda, which has since stabilized. In the meantime, several key FLEC-FAC figures decided to cooperate with the government, despite the opposition of the FLEC-FAC’s exiled leadership.24 Further proof of the government’s successful co-optation of the FLECFAC was the appointment of Bento Bembe, a FLEC-FAC leader, as Angola’s first minister of human rights. His nomination was one of many changes in the new cabinet appointed by President dos Santos in February 2010. It was dos Santos’s first order of business after seeing his authority legitimized by the January constitution. He wanted to show the international community and Angolans that there were consequences for the spectacular failure to manage the economic crisis in 2008–2009, and also to signal that he was going to be more involved in running the affairs of the state. To facilitate macroeconomic management, the president concentrated all economic policymaking power in a new Ministry of Economic Coordination, headed by the renowned professor of economy, Manuel Nunes Jr. To address the gross mismanagement of Angola’s public funds, the president announced that Angola was going to hire Ernst & Young to help the government carry out a complete overhaul of the way that public money was managed, at both the central and regional levels (Reuters 2010). More importantly, the president launched a zero-tolerance campaign to end widespread corruption and embezzlement. As part of the campaign, dos Santos had his cabinet pass the Public Probity Law (PPL) in February 2010. The law imposes several constraints on officials in an effort to promote transparency. Critics said, in response to the IMF’s demand for transparency, PPL was an innocuous piece of legislation that could not be applied retroactively and that lacked implementation and oversight mechanisms. In the months that followed, Angola’s economy gradually recovered, albeit slowly. Although oil prices stabilized at around $70, the influx of funds was simply not enough to cover the obligations that Angola’s government had assumed during the oil boom. Construction firms, many of which eventually left Angola, were the most affected and also partly to blame after years of systematically overcharging the government.25 Others struggled to make ends meet, either by cutting workers or by receiving payment in kind.26 By July 2010, President dos Santos declared that Angola’s arrears totaled $6.8 billion, a dramatic increase compared to 2008. But the situation was actually worse. According to the finance minister, even after paying firms $1 billion in late payments in 2010, the arrears were $9 billion. The president moved quickly to declare that all debts would be honored.27 Some insiders speculated that his response was unusually public and fast because

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he had been embarrassed by the large discrepancy in numbers.28 Others suggested that he was lobbied by members of his family and the political elite who invested in many of these construction companies.29 There are also some who believed that dos Santos was concerned with the real economic impact of the arrears. By not paying its debts, the government was making it harder (even impossible) for companies to pay for materials, pay their workers, and, in some instances, was forcing them to fire people. This reduced economic activity and negatively impacted growth. Diverting public funds away from investment to pay builders also stunted economic growth. Shortly after admitting to its growing arrears problem, the president ordered the government to revise its budget. The new budget incorporated the arrears that had been artificially suppressed from the original budget and revised Angola’s economic growth down to 4.5 percent (2.2 percent less than initially planned). The budget also indicated that several of the investment projects originally planned for some of the interior provinces would not be made. Furthermore, and in compliance with the IMF request, the government approved the reduction of fuel subsidies to cut costs (by 8 percent). Hastily put together, the revised budget had several discrepancies that raised concern about the government’s commitment to tackling the debt crisis.30 The government silenced many of its critics when it cut fuel subsidies in September 2010 (OJE/Lusa 2010). Many believed that the government would not make the cuts because subsidies are the only direct benefit that Angola’s poor receive from the government. The government, however, felt confident that the population would not rebel. And it did not. Despite increases of 50 percent for gas and 33 percent for diesel, there was little protest.31 This was particularly surprising since Angolans depend on fuel for cooking, energy, and transportation. A similar increase was enough to cause riots in Mozambique around the same time (Mangwiro 2010). But this lack of popular engagement has been persistent throughout the crisis in Angola. With the exception of skirmishes in hot spots like the Lundas and Cabinda, Angolans have stoically endured the negative impacts of the crisis. Public complacency partly explains how President dos Santos has been able to introduce major shifts in policy on a whim. His use of the decree power to reshuffle the cabinet again, in October 2010, showcased such behavior. He dissolved the Ministry of Economic Coordination and divided its purview between three ministries: Planning, Economy, and Finance. The economic minister, although respected overseas, was found to be too academic for Angola.32 Power was placed firmly in the hands of the Economic Commission of the Ministry Council, headed by Carlos Feijó. Feijó was seen as dos Santos’s right-hand man at the time and was responsible for all matters of the state except defense and security, which remained under the command of General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior (Kopelipa). The

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nomination of Abraão Gourgel as economy minister following his miserable failings as head of the BNA suggests that trust may be the main criterion for important cabinet postings.33 In principle, the cabinet shuffle was the president’s way of expressing frustration with a struggling recovery and also a means of anticipating and deflecting criticism on his own leadership. Regardless, it reflected little consideration of long-term impacts. Critics believed it weakened already poorly functioning institutions. Ill-prepared officials lacking information and training often fail to act or, worse, act deviously when dealing with the constant changes of their incumbencies.34 In 2010, the National Assembly approved the establishment of the Strategic Financial Oil Reserve (SFOR). The reserve is under the control of the presidency and funded by the revenues from exporting 100,000 barrels per day of oil. According to the Angolan government, the SFOR was established to “fund investments in basic infrastructures” (Macauhub 2010). For some, the SFOR is proof that Angola is finally putting its oil rents to good use; that is, using its natural resources to improve the quality of life of Angolans. Others are concerned with the lack of information on how the presidency will manage the SFOR and to what extent its performance will be subject to third-party supervision. Fears abound that the reserve could become yet another mechanism for dos Santos to consolidate his control over the country. By the end of 2010, Angola seemed to have weathered the worst of the storm. Debt levels and inflation remained high, but the country’s overall economic performance improved.35 Rising oil prices led to positive GDP growth and expanding foreign exchange reserves.36 As investor interest in Angola rekindled, doubts remained as to whether the new government would adequately address the vulnerabilities highlighted by the 2008–2009 crisis.

Explaining the Outcomes of the 2008−2010 Crisis The collapse of oil prices in the fall of 2008 caught Angola’s leadership off guard. Until then, Angola’s leaders “had managed the oil boom as if there was no tomorrow.”37 This reckless behavior was puzzling because Angola had experienced several oil price collapses over the years. Furthermore, the price increase of 2008 was too fast to be sustainable in the long term. In any event, when prices dropped Angola’s leadership did not have a contingency plan. There was no predesigned coordinated response that combined the expertise of all government institutions or a rainy day fund. Initially, in the absence of a backup plan, Angola’s leadership refrained from reacting to the crisis. They ignored the warning signs and

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instead, focused on ensuring victory in the September 2008 legislative elections. It was only after the elections that Angola’s leaders manifested their concern for the drop in prices. Reaction came months after the kwanza exchange rate became unstable, as the market grew weary of Angola’s future. The government’s initial approach to the crisis (February to October 2009) shows: 1. Crisis management not a priority a. Crisis management was delegated to the BNA, which has a reputation of being institutionally weak and unable to deter misappropriation of funds (including its own).38 Despite donor efforts in capacity building, it has remained short of professional staff capable of collecting data and formulating economic policy. If it had been a priority, the president or one of his advisers would have intervened, as in previous crisis situations. 2. Lack of capacity and unwillingness to adjust to a changing environment a. There was limited understanding of the interdependent nature of the economy. b. There also was poor understanding of the broad impact of policies implemented. c. Faced with dismal results and criticism, the authorities did not alter their approach for months. 3. Tendency for short-term unsustainable solutions a. Nearly all foreign reserves were depleted despite their limited size and the difficulty in replenishing them. b. Although their short-term impact on the government’s liquidity is significant, securing or expanding existing credit lines adds to Angola’s long-term debt and benefits mainly foreign firms operating in Angola. 4. Government interests given top priority a. There is disregard of the non-oil sectors of Angola’s economy. The governing elite does not respond or feel accountable to the nonoil sector because they do not depend on their financial support. As a result, policies do not contemplate the interests of the non-oil sector and are often detrimental; for example, an increase in banking reserves rate reduces credit available to all economic sectors. b. The government ran down foreign reserves with complete disregard for the impact on macroeconomic stability. c. With respect to budget revision, the government did not go as far as it could with the cuts because it wanted to continue to support its

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clientele (through jobs and social spending). It also decided to prioritize the CAN because the leadership’s international image was at stake. As a direct result of Angola’s inadequate piecemeal approach, the crisis deepened. The main issue was lack of liquidity affecting all sectors of the economy and, in particular, the government. Even after appropriating a large share of Angola’s reserves and securing foreign credit lines, the government did not have enough money to honor its commitments. Poor transparency plagued public management for years, and it finally came back to haunt Angola’s leadership. When oil prices radically dropped, it was as if the music had stopped in a game of musical chairs, and the MPLA government did not have a chair to sit in. All the chairs had been stolen by its individual members to secure patronage and build up their individual rainy day funds. The abuse of the elite simply went too far, ultimately overstretching the government’s economic capacity and throwing the economy into a tailspin. Realizing that Angola’s economy was about to endure a rude return to Earth, the president intervened. If he could not find a solution to eliminate the harmful effects of the crisis, his gross mismanagement of Angola’s riches would be exposed. After over thirty years of uninterrupted power, the undisputed leader of Angola would inevitably be held responsible for his abuses and his legacy would be forever tarnished. To stay in power and protect his image, dos Santos directed his representatives to request help from the IMF. The IMF not only offered much needed resources, but also a seal of approval that potentially could help Angola secure other sources of funding. Additionally, the IMF provided outside pressure to improve transparency, which the president ironically championed after realizing his cronies had gone too far. Although the SBA combined with higher oil prices avoided the collapse of Angola’s economy in 2009, President dos Santos was still able to use Angola’s dire straits to justify the hyperpresidentialism of the January 2010 constitution.39 After seeing his powers legitimized by the constitution, dos Santos adopted a hands-on approach to crisis management, which can be characterized by the president’s: 1. Control over Angola’s institutions a. In less than eight months, the president nominated two cabinets. b. Cabinet structure was determined by the president’s evolving tactics. Proof thereof was the establishment, and quick demise, of the Economic Coordination Ministry. c. The National Assembly was ordered by the president to revise the budget (twice in two years).

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d. The Public Probity Law was approved by presidential decree and imposed on all government institutions. 2. Centralization of management a. Decisionmaking power was delegated to the president’s inner circle, which was headed at the time by Carlos Feijó.40 3. Preference for trust over capacity a. Nomination of a failed BNA director as minister of economy reflected that capacity was not as important as trust. b. Hiring Ernst & Young to improve the government’s resource management capacity proved that the president recognized lack of internal capacity and was willing to outsource it (instead of developing it internally). 4. Engagement of the international community a. When faced with the arrears crisis, the president visibly assured other countries that the situation would be regularized. b. There was continuous interaction with the IMF and other governmental institutions. Essential to the success of dos Santos’s crisis management were popular acquiescence and the support of the international community—particularly, the IMF. Despite a somewhat troubled relationship with the Angolan government, the IMF did not hesitate to step in and provide Angola with its largest loan ever to an African country. Moreover, following the signing of the SBA, the IMF has maintained a collaborative relationship with the Angolan government and supported it, despite the government’s failure to fulfill some conditions initially agreed to. Thanks to this flexibility, the IMF has helped improve Angola’s overall macroeconomic stability and fostered more transparent management of Angola’s wealth. Despite the skirmishes in Cabinda and the Lundas—isolated incidents affecting a minority of the population—Angolans have remained passive throughout the crisis. Notwithstanding latent discontent, Angolans have been silent because the civil war remains prominent in people’s minds. There is still fear of the government’s reach, fueled by its remarkable success in containing the disturbances in the provinces. Also Angolans are extremely individualistic and do not want to rely on others (an inheritance of the civil war).41 Furthermore, high levels of illiteracy combined with limited access to independent media facilitate government manipulation. Finally, all income sources have been coming from the state and connected to the political class for years.42 In the end, the 2008–2010 crisis helped solidify President dos Santos’s grasp of power and his legacy as Angola’s greatest leader. It also forced both him and the elite to realize that there must be a limit to their greed.43 The crisis reminded all Angolans of how dependent they are on oil, which

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in part contributed to the expansion of alternative economic activities. Finally, the crisis dented the government’s long-term investment plans, putting at risk the attainment of several of its 2008 campaign promises.

Angola in Fresh Crisis as Oil Prices Crumble Despite efforts to diversify the economy, Angola remains one of the most oil dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, oil accounted for about 98 percent of its export earnings, more than two-thirds of government revenues, and 38 percent of GDP. It is unsurprising, then, that the drop in oil production due to repair and maintenance work in the first semester of 2014, followed by the collapse in the price per barrel of oil from over $100 in the middle of the same year to below $60 in December (see Figure 4.1), triggered a new crisis in Angola. Lower oil production (from 1.76 million barrels per day in 2013 to 1.65 million barrels per day in 2014) combined with tumbling crude prices led to a net oil export revenue plunge of more than 12 percent vis-à-vis 2013, to $24 billion, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA; Duke 2015). The current account surplus that had allowed for the accumulation of a sizable amount of foreign reserves in 2011–2013 was reversed, with net foreign exchange reserves dropping to $22.7 billion in December 2014 from more than $31 billion in 2013, according to central bank data (Lusa 2014, 2015b). In parallel, the government tax revenue dropped by 11 percent primarily due to the 10.6 percent decline in oil taxes (responsible for 73 percent of government revenue in 2014; see Carvalho et al. 2015). Diamond taxes, accounting for 8 percent of government revenue in 2014, also declined by 7 percent following the biggest quarterly decline in rough diamond prices since the second quarter of 2012 (Biesheuvel 2015; Africa 21 2015). This dependence on oil and, to a lesser extent, diamond revenues resulted in the country’s first budget deficit (–4.1 percent of GDP) in five years (Fernandes 2014). The decline in oil export revenues combined with the 2012 law requiring foreign oil companies to pay suppliers and salaries in kwanzas dried up the supply of dollars in some parts of the economy, contributing to the kwanza’s quick depreciation in the last quarter of 2014 (see Figure 4.2). Besides causing a loss of government revenue and the depreciation of the kwanza in the short term, lower oil prices ultimately halted the steady rise in GDP growth rates that Angola had been experiencing since 2009, bringing it down from an estimated 6.8 percent in 2013 to 3.9 percent in 2014 (Carvalho et al. 2015; see Figure 4.3). Despite this deterioration of its macroeconomic fundamentals, at the end of 2014 Angola was in a more comfortable position than during the

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Figure 4.2 US Dollar to Kwanza Monthly Average Exchange Rate, December 2013–2014

Source: http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&toAOA&view=5Y.

Figure 4.3 Angolan Annual GDP Growth, 2009–2014 (percentage)

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post−financial crisis period of 2008–2010. The levels of foreign reserves were capable of covering seven months of imports (up from three months in 2009). Additionally, the inflation rate was at the lower limit of the target band (7.4 percent), which gave Angola some margin to accommodate the kwanza’s depreciation without endangering the central bank’s inflation tar-

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get for the year or requiring Angola to draw on its foreign exchange reserves (as in 2009, when inflation was at 14 percent). The projected additional non-oil tax revenues subsequent to the enactment in July 2014 of tax reforms, plus the significant reduction of subsidies to gasoline in September and December 2014, also gave the Angolan government a little more capacity to absorb the decline in oil tax revenue.44 Furthermore, Angola now had the Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDA), established in 2012, with a capital of $5 billion, which in theory could be used in case of necessity (triggers are not clear). Perhaps, in this context, it is not surprising that the Angolan government did not immediately adjust its behavior and expectations despite the oil price slump (much like in 2009). Rather than opting for budget cuts, the National Assembly approved in early December 2014 an expansionist General State Budget (OGE) of $70 billion. Among other things, the OGE for 2015 contemplated a 20 percent increase in spending and fiscal revenues of $40 billion (60 percent of which are to come from oil revenues, based on an oil price of $81 per barrel) (Gomes 2014). Only a couple of weeks after the OGE was approved, President dos Santos stated in his year-end address on December 29, 2014, that “2015 w[ould] be economically difficult because of significantly low oil prices. . . . Some public expenditures w[ould] be reduced and some projects postponed . . . and a tougher state-budget controls and financial discipline w[ould] have to be enforced to keep stability” (Soque 2014). Angola’s first public attempt to deal with the crisis came just a few days later, on January 13, 2015, when the ruling party MPLA—winner of the 2012 parliamentary elections with 72 percent of the votes—formally initiated the process for the revision of the 2015 OGE (Lusa 2015a). On January 15, President dos Santos removed from office the head of the central bank—Jose de Lima Massano—and nominated Jose Pedro de Morais Jr., former minister of finance (2002) and close ally of General Kopelipa (Simoes 2015). Shortly thereafter, dos Santos issued decrees indicating that Angola had successfully secured $250 million from Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and another $250 million from Gemcorp Capital LLP, both entities with stakes in Angola’s oil and diamond business (McClelland 2015a). Also in January, the president ordered the minister of finance to adopt a series of austerity measures, which included imposing a government workers’ hiring freeze, reducing spending on education, temporarily suspending payments to international contractors, freezing dividend transfers, and imposing import quotas for some consumption goods (Costa 2015). Angola also appears to have adopted measures that significantly reduced access to foreign exchange currencies in the country, starting in January 2015. Although the BNA publicly denies restricting foreign exchange transactions, the local population and the expat community

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observe that most banks are not allowed to carry out foreign exchange transactions and authorize transfers abroad (Ocean Press 2015). While these measures may help stem a decline in foreign exchange reserves similar to what occurred in 2009–2010, it negatively affects struggling companies trying to complete transactions as well as the kwanza. The national currency continued to depreciate sharply, particularly on the black market, where the kwanza depreciated by 80 percent vis-à-vis 2014 to 180 per dollar in February 2015 (McClelland and Soque 2015). On February 3, 2015, as jobs were being shed in key sectors such as oil and construction—Odebrecht alone fired 1,200 people in Benguela (Sul d’Angola 2015)—the Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers, chaired by President dos Santos, analyzed and approved the Draft OGE 2015 Revision (Agência de Notícias Angola Press 2015a). The proposed draft OGE 2015 included a 25 percent cut in expenditures (from $70 billion to $51 billion) as well as cuts in the oil price estimate to $40 per barrel from $80 per barrel, cuts in the budget deficit forecast to 6.8 percent of GDP from 7.6 percent, and cuts in the GDP growth forecast to 6.6 percent from 9.7 percent (McClelland 2015b). A week later, on February 10, President dos Santos somewhat unexpectedly swore in the members of the Council of the Republic, among which were the presidents of all major opposition parties, and invited them to discuss the economy and the Draft State 2015 Budget.45 In this advisory body’s first meeting since the 2012 elections, the president declared that “oil revenues that accounted for 70 percent of the state budget (OGE) in 2014, will only be responsible for an estimated 36.5%. . . . If the situation is not properly controlled and the country adequately managed, it can affect the foundations of our economic and social stability” (Ferreira Santos 2015). After some effervescent debate on the Draft State 2015 Budget at the National Assembly, between opposition leaders and MPLA representatives, the budget was approved on March 19, 2015, with votes from the MPLA and FNLA (154 out of 194 votes) (OJE 2015). In addition to the cuts already mentioned, the budget forecasts net foreign exchanges at $19.2 billion (a significant decline vis-à-vis 2014) and the budget deficit at $25.7 billion. The budget gap is expected to be made up for with internal ($15.4 billion) and external ($10.3 billion) funding sources (Government of Angola 2015). On the expense side, the revised budget includes a 25 percent cut in expenditures vis-à-vis the previous version, mostly through a cut in capital expenditures, similar to the one applied in 2009 when dealing with the crisis. Current expenditures were cut by only 8.4 percent in the revised budget in an attempt to mitigate the social impact. Unlike in 2009, however, the share of wages in the budget did not increase, in part because there was less pressure to create government jobs because the municipal elections, which the constitution had dictated to be held in 2014, were unilaterally postponed

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by President dos Santos to after the 2017 general elections. Somewhat surprisingly, the economic sector’s share of the revised budget’s expenditure declined significantly to just 10.7 percent while public administration and the social sector saw their shares decline to 15.3 percent and 32.5 percent, respectively (Agência de Notícias Angola Press 2015c). Not only was Angola forced to revise its budget as in 2009, but the country is now actively pursuing alternative sources of funding as it did then. The fact that on March 3, 2015, Moody’s Investors Service cut its outlook for Angola’s credit rating to negative, two weeks after Standard & Poor’s lowered the country’s rating to four levels below investment grade, bodes ill for Angola’s desire to secure $10 billion in 2015 for key infrastructure projects such as a new $6 billion oil refinery. Angola may once again experience limited success when turning to the domestic bond market (treasury bonds and Eurobonds) and be forced to look for funding in Angola’s fragile banking system, which is plagued by scandals, had loanto-deposit ratios nearing 100 percent in 2014, and has strong exposure to the oil and construction sectors (Minder 2014). For now though, the country is in talks with BNP Paribas SA and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. to prepare its debut Eurobond, set to raise $1 billion to $1.5 billion (Frommhold 2015). In parallel, Angola is mimicking its 2009 approach and lobbying other governments such as Brazil, Portugal, Spain, and China to expand existing or secure new credit lines. The World Bank is also rumored to be preparing a $500 million loan for Angola—the first of its kind in the country—following the IMF’s February 2015 declaration that it did not see a need to provide Angola with additional financial support (Radio Vaticano 2015). On April 30, 2015, the government announced the third and most significant price increase of gasoline and diesel since September 2014 (Lusa 2015c). Cutting subsidies is consistent with the advice provided by the IMF, but for the Angolan middle class, the price increase is difficult to accept, particularly when inflation is increasing, public services are being cut back, and foreign exchange transfers are being curtailed. An increase in civil servants’ strikes could be expected as a result of this situation but, as of May 2015, strikes and demonstrations had been limited in number and size. Unlike in the 2008–2010 period, the status quo in the Lundas and Cabinda has remained largely unchanged, thanks in large part to the strong presence and oversight of the Angolan government. By early October 2015, Angola was far from getting its economy back on track. Debt levels and inflation continued to rise while the country’s economy stalled. Oil prices remained low and, consequently, the country’s export revenues were also depressed. The kwanza continued its decline visà-vis the dollar while government infrastructure projects were being delayed and programs catering to the poor were cut or postponed. Doubts

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thus remained as to whether the government would be able to successfully minimize the impacts of the crisis in the short term while, at the same time, invest aggressively in the long-needed diversification of Angola’s economy away from oil. It has become quite apparent from the fifteen months since the latest oil price collapse that, despite having survived the 1997−1999, 2001−2002, and 2008−2010 price drops, the Angolan government has yet to develop a consistent, coordinated, unified, and efficient standard response. Even though the Sovereign Wealth Fund has since been created, the opacity with which it is managed and lack of clarity on when it can be used as a rainy day fund have minimized its contribution toward addressing the crisis. As in 2008−2010, President dos Santos adopted a hands-on, if at times erratic, approach to crisis management in early 2015, which can be characterized by: 1. Control over Angola’s institutions a. The head of the central bank was replaced by decree and basically responds to the president. b. The National Assembly was ordered by the president to revise the budget and did so in record time. While the revisions were sold as a means of addressing the revenue shortfall and promote economic diversification, they offered the president and his cronies an opportunity to revise revenue allocation, favoring defense and safety spending to the detriment of economic development and social investments. 2. Centralization of management a. Decisionmaking power remained squarely in the president’s hands, with economic and financial decisions being publicly made by the president who then charges the minister of finance or the head of the central bank with their implementation. b. Activation of the Council of the Republic by the president to secure the appearance at least of multiparty and multisector acquiescence to the president’s already defined revisions to the 2015 OGE. 3. Engagement of international community a. When faced with rapidly declining government revenues, the president engaged traditional partners such as Portugal and Brazil and new partners such as Turkey. b. Continuous interaction with the IMF and other international institutions as part of the implementation of the existing agreement. Unlike the previous crisis President dos Santos was much faster to respond and, up to May 2015, has enjoyed technical support of the IMF and a largely amenable population. With a few exceptions, Angolans have

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remained either too afraid or too individualistic to express the latent discontent. There is also a dependency issue—income sources are tied to the state or political class—and a persistent illiteracy and lack of independent media that facilitates manipulation. However, if the economy continues to deteriorate—in addition to continued depressed oil prices, Angola is dealing with a draught in the south—the situation may change as people become increasingly frustrated with dos Santos’s handling of the crisis.

Conclusion Crises always offer an opportunity to gain something. In this case, Angola’s 2008–2010 crisis as well as the still-developing 2014−2015 crisis offer a glimpse into one of the most opaque regimes in Africa. What was and is being observed allows some general conclusions on Angola’s relative ability to manage crises: 1. Anticipating crisis: Angola needs to increase its crisis forecasting capacity, one of the basic steps to successfully mitigating crisis. The 2008– 2010 and 2014−2015 crises could have been minimized if the Angolan government had anticipated a potential unexpected decline in oil prices and developed a consistent, coordinated, unified, and efficient standard response. 2. Incentives for addressing crises: Angolan leaders come together only under the leadership of the president when the survival of the regime is at stake. They live in a cocoon of privilege and wealth, unaware of (and unconcerned with) the problems affecting the majority. It is only when these problems threaten regime survival, or the status quo, that they act or respond. Ideally, as a result of the latest crises, Angolan leaders will learn that detachment jeopardizes their own survival. Otherwise, such deep seeded structural problems will fester rather than disappear with time. 3. Capacities for management: Overall Angola’s management capacity is limited because a. There are no well-organized crisis management programs. b. “There is a severe lack of capacity in the Angolan government.”46 c. Government institutions are not efficient. They also do not cooperate and are often bypassed by the president and his inner circle. d. Decisionmaking power is heavily concentrated in a small group of people (the president and his closest aides). e. Preference is given to solutions that offer large up-front returns to the elite (even if their long-term impact is negative). f. Limited access to information of all kinds—economic, financial, and demographic data—makes it difficult to assess the resources

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available and the full implications of the challenge(s) at hand. g. Corruption is pervasive. 4. Successful versus unsuccessful management: Success in crisis management lies exclusively in the president’s decision to put his weight behind the solution of the problem. The president agglutinates all trends, regularizes all contradictions, and is the unifying force capable of mobilizing all existing resources to handle a crisis. This inordinate dependence on a single person makes Angola particularly vulnerable. What will happen when José Eduardo dos Santos is no longer in power? Will there be another person with enough charisma and political clout to control the web of political, economic, and military power that he has so carefully developed and maintained? In the end, despite its many shortcomings, Angola’s leadership was able to successfully overcome the 2008–2010 crisis and is actively dealing with the still evolving 2014–2015 crisis. If it uses these two wake-up calls in less than a decade as a warning and actively addresses its limitations and those of its economy (diversify away from oil), the leadership will be better prepared to deal with future problems. If it chooses to ignore the lessons it has learned and reverts to its old behavior patterns of not aggressively promoting economic diversification and improving the business environment (Angola ranked 181 out of 189 in the World Bank’s Doing Business [2015c] report), the leadership may be risking its long-term hold of power. First, international donors may not be as willing or able to come to Angola’s aid in the future. Second, youth-led protests in Luanda in 2013 and 2014 seem to indicate that the population is growing tired of the government’s economic and political abuses. Finally, there is no guarantee that the government will be able to count on the leadership of dos Santos in the next crisis and, in his absence, the current limited institutional capacity may prove insufficient in preventing an economic and social debacle.

Notes 1. In 1941 Stefan Zweig wrote Brazil: Land of the Future, where he described Brazil’s many riches that had yet to be explored. The title of Zweig’s book rapidly became a catchphrase and to this day is used to describe Brazil. I believe it also applies to Angola because its many riches hold the promise of a much better future for its people. 2. According to Earthtrends, Angola’s total internal renewable water resources per capita in 2001 were 2.3 times higher than the average per capita for sub-Saharan Africa. See Earthtrends 2003. 3. The only exception was when the Dutch ruled Luanda from 1640 to 1648 at a time when Portugal was coming out of 60 years of Spanish rule and still did not have the ability to project power independently.

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4. Luanda’s population grew 152 percent between 1940 and 1950, while the frontier regions saw a loss of population between 16 and 22 percent in the same period. See Galvão and Selvagem, 1952, p. 212. 5. The threshold to win the elections was 51 percent. 6. In 1990, the MPLA abolished the one-party system and rejected MarxismLeninism. In May 1991, the National Assembly passed Law 12/91, defining Angola as a “democratic state based on the rule of law” with a multiparty system. 7. After the death of Angola’s first president, Agostinho Neto, on September 10, 1979, the MPLA elected José Eduardo dos Santos as its president on September 20, 1979. He was then appointed by the MPLA as president of Angola and commander in chief of the armed forces on September 21. He was also elected president of the People’s Assembly on November 9, 1980. He has retained all of these posts except the presidency of the National Assembly for over thirty years. 8. Symbolic of the president’s dominance over the government and his party is his cabinet meeting room where he sits on top of a platform, looking down on the cabinet members. 9. In the 1992 presidential elections, dos Santos won the election against his main rival, Jonas Savimbi (49.5 percent versus 40.7 percent) but, since no candidate achieved the required 50 percent of the votes, a second round of voting was called. Savimbi quit, alleging voting fraud, so UN and other foreign observers declared the election inconclusive (UN 2000). 10. According to Bertelsmann Stiftung (2009), BTI 2010: Angola Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, http://www.bti2010.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html: The county’s second legislative elections were held on 5–6 September 2008, giving the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular pela Libertação de Angola, MPLA) a massive majority (81.64 percent), which corresponds to 191 seats in the National Assembly. The second-place party was National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with 10.39 percent and 16 seats. A total of 7,213,281 individuals voted, or 87.36 percent of the electorate registered in 2006–2007. 11. After a number of delays, parliamentary elections were held in August 2012. The MPLA’s 72 percent of the vote marked a notable decline from its 82 percent showing in 2008, though the party maintained its overwhelming dominance in the National Assembly, garnering 175 of 220 seats (Sousa 2012). 12. The president can be impeached by the Supreme or Constitutional Court only if a two-thirds majority of the parliament has taken the initiative to remove the president and if either the Constitutional Court finds the president to be significantly disabled to serve or the Supreme Court finds the president has committed a serious crime or acted gravely against the constitutional principles. 13. According to the Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica (CEIC 2009), for virtually all of the 1990s, the exchange rate was substantially overvalued, with the parallel market premium reaching levels well above 1,000 percent at times. Since 2000, the parallel market premium has generally remained below 1 percent, and the kwanza held its value against the dollar until 2009. During the 1980s and 1990s, Angola suffered a series of hyperinflationary episodes. Annual inflation reached 3,000 percent in 1995 and spiked to 12,034 percent in July 1996. By 2008, it was 15 percent and falling. 14. In 2008, Angola’s Gini coefficient was 58.6, a level comparable to those of India and Brazil (da Rocha 2010).

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15. These include provisions allowing police to intervene and terminate a previously authorized protest if acts or statements tarnish the honor of the Angolan government or top public officials, especially the president. 16. Journalists are often given cars at the time of elections by the MPLA. One journalist had already amassed five cars. Reporter, interviewed by the author, Luanda, September 27, 2010. 17. According to the CEIC, the oil sector grew 12.4 percent between 2000 and 2008 and 16.8 percent between 2004 and 2008. The expansion of the diamond sector was also significant, at 12.8 percent, between 2000 and 2008. In contrast, manufacturing and agriculture made only small contributions to Angola’s economic growth, at 0.74 percent and 0.16 percent, respectively, in 2008 (CEIC 2009). 18. According to the CEIC, public investment per capita increased from $21 per capita in 2000 to $665 in 2008 (CEIC 2009). 19. According to the CEIC the Angolan financial system owed the government $3.3 billion in 2008 (CEIC 2010). By the end of 2009, the situation had dramatically reversed. The government then owed $5 billion to the financial system (its position had deteriorated by $8.3 billion). 20. In 2009, Spain alone provided $600 million in construction aid. Canada’s Export Development Bank signed an agreement with Angola’s Banco de Poupança e Crédito for $1 billion to finance government infrastructure projects and $16 million for private enterprise projects. Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social in turn disbursed $1.5 billion to fund the purchase of Brazilian construction equipment in Angola in the first five months of 2009 and also offered $250 million to fund projects in Angola. See Corkin 2009. 21. According to the CEIC, there was a 27 percent spread between the official and parallel exchange rates in September 2009 (CEIC 2010). 22. According to Rafael Marques Morais (2011), violations of civil and human rights are particularly severe in the diamond-rich areas of the Lunda provinces. Private security companies, which effectively control the territory on behalf of the diamond industry, have established practices that include humiliation, torture, sexual abuse, and, in some cases, assassination to keep workers in line. 23. The Democratic Republic of Congo separates Cabinda from Angola’s mainland. Home to around,688,300 people (2014 census), Cabinda is largely jungle and has been a part of Angola since an invasion in 1975, a year after Angola’s independence in 1974. Cabindan separatists dispute the annexation and have fought for independence for over three decades (Mabeko-Tali 2014). 24. They signed a Memorandum of Understanding that provided an amnesty for all combatants, an immediate cease-fire, the reduction of Angolan troop numbers in the province, and the recognition that Cabinda and Angola were “a united and indivisible nation.” See IRIN News 2010. 25. Brazil’s Odebrecht, the largest builder in Angola, halved its 27,000 workforce, according to the country’s largest union, Central Geral de Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola (CGSILA) (Almeida 2010b). Camargo Correia, another Brazilian firm, is reported to have abandoned its operations in the country. Chinese have also been negatively impacted—one of the Chinese firms was owed $400 million. Representative of the diplomatic corps, interviewed by the author, Luanda, September 28, 2010. See also Almeida 2010. 26. According to an interviewee, firms working close to the quarry, for example, were given the right to mine it for stones as a form of payment. Representative of the diplomatic corps, interviewed by the author, Luanda, September 28, 2010. 27. President dos Santos declared that Angola planned to pay small- and medium-sized building firms in full by September 2010. Large builders would

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receive 40 percent of what they were owed in 2010 and the rest in one or two years, after the debt is revised to avoid overcharging (Saraiva 2010). 28. Member of the diplomatic corps, interviewed by the author, Luanda, September 27, 2010. 29. Member of the diplomatic corps, interviewed by the author, Luanda, October 4, 2010. 30. An Angolan journalist showed me the revised budget and highlighted some of these discrepancies. One of the most striking was that several government departments that had been eliminated in early 2010 were still included in the budget to the tune of several million dollars. Furthermore, as there have been no reports on implementation of the budgets since 2007, there remains room for “massaging the numbers.” Personal interview, Luanda, September 28, 2010. 31. The day before the price change, a text message was circulating to call people to action. The government intercepted it rather early on. Member of international diplomatic corps, interviewed by the author, Luanda, October 7, 2010. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Swedish political scientist, interviewed by the author, Luanda, October 6, 2010. 35. In 2010, the budget deficit was equivalent to 4.8 percent of GDP. The public debt grew to $34.2 billion, or 42.3 percent of GDP. Inflation ended the year at 15.31 percent, 2 percent higher than expected by Luanda. Angola’s GDP grew 4.5 percent according to Angola’s government and 2.5 percent according to the IMF. See Casalinho and Santos 2011. 36. The foreign exchange reserves grew 40 percent from January to December 2010, reaching $16.8 million (Casalinho 2011). 37. Representative of an International Organization, interviewed by the author, Luanda, September 28, 2010. See Casalinho and Santos 2011. 38. Angolan anticorruption advocate, interviewed by the author, Washington, DC, March 23, 2015. 39. An Angolan law professor used the term “hyperpresidentialism” to describe Angola’s current regime. Compared to other presidential systems like those of the United States and Brazil, Angola’s system concentrates many more powers in the president. Angolan law professor, interviewed by the author, Luanda, September 30, 2010. 40. Carlos Feijo was dismissed in 2012. See Voz da América 2012. 41. A good example is the fact that Angolans have installed individual generators and water tanks in their apartments instead of cooperating to obtain larger and more efficient systems to supply the buildings they live in. This creates structural damages to the buildings in addition to escalating the costs. 42. “We all come to the state in search of money, but we forget that we are the ones that give money to the state.” Angolan economist, interviewed by the author, Luanda, October 1, 2010. 43. “The situation is complex because the elite is completely detached from society. They got so wealthy that the people was [sic] left behind.” Member of the international diplomatic corps interview, October 7, 2010. 44. The corporate income tax rate has been reduced from 35 percent to 30 percent while the minimum monthly income exempted from the personal income tax has been increased from 25,000 to 34,450 kwanza. At the same time, the tax base has been expanded by closing loopholes. See IMF 2014b; Macauhub 2014. 45. The members who were sworn in include Manuel Domingos Vicente, vice president; Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, president of the National

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Assembly; Rui Constantino da Cruz Ferreira, president of the Constitutional Court; João Maria Moreira de Sousa, attorney general; Roberto de Almeida, vice president of the MPLA; Isaias Samakuva, president of UNITA; Abel Chivukuvuku, president of Convergência Ampla da Salvação de Angola–Coligação Eleitoral (CASA-CE); Eduardo Kuangana, president of Partido de Renovação Social (PRS); Lucas Ngonda, president of the FNLA; Reverend Augusto Chipesse; Reverend Wanani Nunes Garcia; and Pedro Jose Van-Dunem. See Agência de Notícias Angola Press 2015b. 46. Representative of an international organization, interviewed by the author, Luanda, October 1, 2010.

5 The Democratic Republic of Congo: The Politics of Perpetual Crisis Pierre Englebert

ALTHOUGH IT FORMALLY REACHED POSTCONFLICT STATUS IN 2006,

the Democratic Republic of Congo has remained mired in multiple and often violent crises. First and foremost, it continues to experience serious unresolved conflict, particularly in North and South Kivu as well as in parts of Orientale and Katanga provinces, but also sporadically in the west. For all practical purposes and despite significant progress since 2012, as of the end of 2014 the Congolese government still does not have effective control of the east where it remains but one of a multitude of domestic and international violent actors behaving as “roving” and would-be “stationary bandits” (Olson 1993) and living off the looting and pillaging of local resources and communities. Second, despite recent commodity-induced growth, averaging 6.2 percent per year between 2003 and 2013 (EIU 2014), poverty remains widespread and inequality may even have increased. Evidence of material improvements remains limited beyond the privileged circles of those within or associated to power.1 Third, despite almost obsessive donor efforts, the quality of Congolese governance remains weak. Secrecy, duplicity, and even “masquerade” are its hallmarks (Trefon 2011; see also Stearns 2011: 282–283), and personalism prevails. Significant decisionmaking is centralized in tight-knit and largely unaccountable circles around President Joseph Kabila, where family members and fellow Katangese figure prominently. Parliament has willingly surrendered much of its countervailing powers, partly in exchange for material favors, and the bureaucracy is dysfunctional (Trefon 2010) with chaotically implemented decentralization reforms. Most observers agree that corruption has significantly worsened, despite some improvements in the first year of the Augustin Matata 89

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Ponyo (hereafter Matata) government, and might be reaching criminal proportions in some circles. And repression and intimidation too often characterize relations with opponents and human rights activists. Despite having won two successive elections in 2006 and 2011, the Kabila regime also continues to suffer from a crisis of legitimacy. This crisis is partly due to the largely fraudulent manner in which it won the 2011 elections,2 and to its failure to deliver on any significant electoral pledges. After his 2006 victory, Kabila launched the cinq chantiers (five work areas) campaign, with priority investments in infrastructure, health and education, water and electricity, housing, and employment. Of these, roads have made the most visible progress, albeit largely thanks to Chinese investments. Moreover, the continued violence in the east, partly the Congolese military’s own doing, has led to an erosion of support for the regime in that previously highly favorable region. After polling 94.6 percent and 77.7 percent in North and South Kivu in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections, Kabila eked out 44.7 percent and 38.8 percent, respectively, in 2011. In 2014, after continued violence by rebel groups around the Beni area in North Kivu, local citizens tore down Kabila’s statue. Meanwhile, the regional environment remains difficult. Foreign armed groups from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi continue to operate on Congolese territory. Albeit improved, relations with Rwanda are distrustful. And although a patron of the Congolese regime, Angola has taken on a more confrontational approach with the DRC since about 2010, in part over a dispute on control of oil reserves off the countries’ respective coasts, which led to the expulsion of many Congolese from Angola in 2013. This chapter is organized as follows. After offering an overview of the DRC’s security crisis, I identify four essential (but not necessarily exhaustive) causes of insecurity; namely, poverty and inequality, corrupt governance, co-optation politics, and the state’s democratic deficit. I then discuss the problematic modes of crisis management favored by the Kabila regime: repression, co-optation, and delegation. I keep the historical context to a minimum because background and historical information can be found in many other publications (e.g., Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Prunier 2008; Reyntjens 2009). Yet it bears stressing that, historically, crisis is a largely default position for the Congolese people and government. Thus, for all the attention it gets, the current political environment is not a historical outlier. Significant violence has prevailed in the east since 1993. And the country has known multiple crises before that. It was born in violence as its military mutinied shortly after independence in 1960. A few days later, the Katanga province seceded, followed in short order by what was then South Kasai. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in early 1961. Rebellions spread throughout the Kwilu region of Bandundu province from 1963 onward while the east, from

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Orientale to Katanga, was taken over by insurgents at one time or another between 1963 and 1967. The rule of Mobutu Sese Seko (hereafter Mobutu), which began with a coup in November 1965, is occasionally seen as having had at least an early phase of stability and state ascendancy until the mid1970s (Young and Turner 1985). Yet it was also plagued with crises and violence. Copper prices crashed around 1973 bringing about fiscal crisis, only to be compounded with the irresponsible economic policies of Zaireanization (the private redistribution of the assets of foreigners). The economy never recovered (real GDP declined steadily from the mid-1970s to 2002). In addition, there were insurgencies in Katanga on two occasions in the 1980s, repressed with foreign intervention (a pattern of delegation that still has currency). Finally, the Mobutu regime suffered a long and chaotic agony from 1990 onward with several episodes of lootings by the military, killings of students and demonstrators, and the simultaneous appointment of several competing governments and national assemblies. The point of this brief overview is that it is not particularly useful to think of the Congolese state as a stable and capable instrument of security and collective action in need of restoration. Historically, it has been more the object and producer of crises than an agent in their resolution.3

Security Crises in the Postconflict Era: A Maze of Actors Although the DRC has been caught up in a complex security crisis since 1993 when instances of intercommunal violence unfolded in the Kivus, in this chapter I focus on the postconflict period, which began after the 2006 elections (for the earlier period, see Englebert 2006). While insecurity has been most acute in the east of the country, recurrent crises have also developed in the west which, while less intense, are ripe with insights on the limitations of the state-building strategies of the Kabila regime. Despite the country’s postconflict status, the DRC’s east (North Kivu, South Kivu, and parts of Maniema, Katanga, and Orientale provinces) has been characterized by a multitude of decentralized rebellions, armed insurgencies and militias with ill-identified motives apart from access to public employment (military or civilian), recognition or diversion of communal land rights, mineral resources trafficking, defense of local communities and ethnic groups, hostility to the state or to foreigners, or spillover from neighboring conflicts. Many of these groups come and go, merge and dissolve, and even ally with others and then fight them.4 Most of them have no more than a couple of hundred fighters (see Table 5.1). There are significant UN Organization Stabilization Missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and government troop deployments in the region, and some military progress has been achieved in the wake of a 2012 military

92 Table 5.1 Main Active Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo Estimated Forces Name

Early 2012

On the government’s side Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) 144,000–159,000 Including integrated insurgent groups, of which: Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) 340 Mai-Mai Kapopo 100c Mai-Mai Kifuafua 300 Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) 5,500d Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO) 4,000f Republican Guard (under direct control of Joseph Kabila) 10,000–15,000 UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) 16,000 Of which Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) 0 Insurgents M23 (April 2012 spin-off from CNDP) Allied Democratic Forces (of Uganda, in Orientale and N. Kivu) Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (N. and S. Kivu) Rassemblement pour Unité et Démocratie (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda, FDLR; splinter) Forces Nationales de Libération (of Burundi, in S. Kivu) Lord’s Resistance Army (of Uganda, in Orientale province) Mai-Mai Yakutumba (S. Kivu, Fizi) Mai-Mai Sheka/Nduma Defence for Congo (N. Kivu, Nyanga, anti-FDLR) Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (Hunde, anti-Tutsi, N. Kivu) Mai-Mai Simba (mostly Maniema) Local Defense Forces Busumba (Hutu, N. Kivu) Mai-Mai Mongol (N. Kivu) Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix-LaFontaine (Nande, N. Kivu) Mai-Mai Raia Mutomboki (S. Kivu, anti-FDLR) Mai-Mai Bede (S. Kivu) Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga (Katanga)/Kata Katanga Forces de Défense du Congo (N. Kivu) Mai-Mai Hilaire (est. 2012, Nande FARDC defectors, M23 ally) Forces de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI; Ngiti/Lendu, anti-UPC) Mai-Mai Morgan (Haut-Uélé, Ituri) Nyatura (Hutu, PARECO spin-off, anti-Tutsi)

Early 2014a

140,000b n.a. n.a. deserted (?) 3,500e about 3,000g 8,000–10,000h

19,000 3,000

0

1,445i

1,000

1,200–1,500j

3,000–4,300

1,500jk

0

300–500

350–600

300j

200–700 300–400

60–90j 500lm

132

up to 1,000ln

250–600 200–300 30–50 30p

1,000–2,000o 300l 50 disbanded?

up to 500 200 200 0 300–400

500–600q 742j ? 300–500r 150–300q

0

280qs

at least 500 250 700–850t

300–500j 250q 550–700q

Sources: ISS Military Balance 2011; United Nations 2011. Notes: a. Some figures in this column are from mid-2013. b. Berghezan 2014.

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Table 5.1 continued c. Originally about 540, but many of these rapidly deserted. d. From Stearns 2012b: 41. The World Bank notes that 6,000 Mai-Mai and people from other groups were also integrated at the time (World Bank 2009a). e. After M23 desertions. f. Original number of integrated PARECO (Stearns 2012b: 41). PARECO was originally constituted of Hutu, Hunde, and Nande, all united against the CNDP. Some of its Hunde and Nande components defected to form Nyatura. g. After Nyatura desertions. h. Berghezan 2014: 15. i. This is the number of M23 troops in Uganda, according to the Ugandan government, who crossed in November 2013 under the leadership of Sultani Makenga (United Nations 2014: 9). Originally, there were 1,500–2,500 troops in April, but then recruits of “800 to 1,500” in May and June (Stearns 2012a: 52); thus, the number peaks at around 2,500–3,500. j. United Nations 2014. k. Rwanda says 4,000 troops. l. Berghezan 2013. m. Yakutumba himself claims 10,000 troops. See Berghezan 2013. n. Enough Project estimates 150–180 men. (Enough Project, Armed Actors table, August 2013). o. Possibly defeated by FARDC-FIB in March 2014. p. Figure from UN (2014) might not cover entire group. Largely Hutu group, from N. Kivu. Most were integrated in FARDC. “Congo Siasa” reported 500–1,500 men as of June 2010 (Congo Siasa 2010). q. Enough Project 2013; MONUSCO, miscellaneous weekly email reports from Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) division of MONUSCO (MONUSCO 2015). List not exhaustive (Berghezan 2013 lists another forty-six smaller groups, not including Orientale and Katanga, without troop numbers). r. Author’s estimate. s. Might have surrendered with the M23. t. Inferred from August 2013 Enough Project data (Enough Project, Armed Actors table, August 2013). which notes that 150 splintered from Nyatura in the spring of 2013 to form Nyatura Noheri. Nyatura is made up of 2011 FARDC deserters from PARECO.

reorganization and the deployment in 2013 of the 3,000-strong UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which was authorized by the Security Council to carry out targeted offensive operations in support of the Congolese army or unilaterally to neutralize or disarm rebel and foreign-armed groups. Nevertheless, a military solution to this crisis has remained elusive. The number of internally displaced people rose from 1.8 million in 2011 to 2.7 million as of November 2014 (more than at the beginning of the transition), with the largest concentrations in North Kivu (861,287), South Kivu (618,326), Katanga (582,747), and Orientale (467,515) (UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs 2014). Although there is an abundance of intercommunal conflict within the region, particularly in the Kivus, the presence of foreign armed groups has been at the core of local violence since 1994. The Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), sometimes called Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FOCA), historically has been the largest and most problematic of these groups, although it has been on a steady decline since

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2009. It finds its origins in the troops and militias of Rwanda’s Habyarimana regime that escaped to Congo in the wake of its defeat by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994 (see Prunier 2009). While the FDLR troop strength was estimated at some 40,000 after the Rwandan genocide, it numbered a mere 1,500 in 2014, most of which operated in North Kivu. The FDLR troops live with their civilian relatives and Rwandan refugees (numbering up to 10,000) from which they recruit most of their members, and have become a hybrid group with significant Congolese membership. They finance their operations by looting, by trading commercial products in the mining areas where they deploy, and by taxing local economic activity (United Nations 2011), and they control a few miles of rural border area with Uganda where they smuggle goods and people. The FDLR have been the target of systematic UN efforts at demobilization and repatriation, and of successive military campaigns by the Congolese and Rwandan government and by MONUSCO, acting jointly or individually. This partly accounts for the dwindling numbers of FDLR troops and for the 2014 demobilization of a few hundred of them who were relocated to camps outside Kisangani in Orientale province. Their top civilian leadership was also decimated when the French and German governments arrested their representatives in 2011. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has constituted the second-largest foreign group of the post-transition era, with up to 1,500 fighters in Orientale and North Kivu. ADF is an Islamist Ugandan movement that was established in 1995 with help from Mobutu and the Sudanese government to undermine the Museveni regime. The ADF was pushed out of Ugandan territory by the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) over the years. It also recruits in the DRC and enjoys some support from the local Nande population. There was a resurgence of ADF activity in 2013 (possibly as a result of connections with al-Shabab or because members were encouraged by some sidelined Congolese politicians in the region), but it has no known operation on Ugandan soil. The ADF survived through alliances with local chiefs (most of whom were terrorized into compliance), networks of businesses that give it resources, and some gold mining and exploitation of timber (United Nations 2014: 23). ADF troops successfully resisted multiple attempts to dislodge them until they endured significant military defeats in 2014 at the hands of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and FIB and were pushed out of their stronghold in Beni territory (North Kivu). Several hundred ADF troops were killed in combat, with the remaining ones flushed out into the Virunga National Park. However, violent attacks against civilian populations around Beni in late 2014 were attributed to the ADF, suggesting that claims of its defeat had been exaggerated. Burundi’s Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), formerly Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), a largely Hutu insurgency, is

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the third most active foreign group, operating in South Kivu (Ruzizi and Fizi territories). After an attempt to participate in Burundi’s civilian politics, the FNL accused the ruling party of electoral fraud in 2010, pulled out, and crossed into Congolese territory. It is not engaged in conflict with local populations and actually collaborates with the local Mai-Mai Yakutumba (see Mai-Mai below). FNL forces are estimated at a few hundred, and are involved in the gold trade. Finally, Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has terrorized local populations since about 2008 in Orientale province. By 2014, however, the LRA had become little more than a small gang of vagrant bandits with no more than 100 elements in the DRC and probably another 200 in the Central African Republic. Joseph Kony, the LRA’s International Criminal Court−indicted leader, was rumored to be back in Sudan in 2014 where he benefited from support. The LRA is the target of a Regional Task Force composed of 2,000 troops from Uganda, 500 from South Sudan, 350 from the Central African Republic, and 500 FARDC, with training support from the United States (United Nations 2014: 28). In addition to these foreign groups, there is a plethora of Congolese armed insurgencies and militias whose existence and status generally tend to be more fluid and less permanent. Many of them are referred to as “MaiMai,” a name that dates back to 1960s insurgencies and originally connoted the alleged magic powers of concoctions that their fighters use for protection. In practice, any Congolese self-defense group, militia, or criminal gang in the east tends to be called Mai-Mai, usually followed by the name of its leader. They might fight government troops or collaborate with them as a function of local dynamics and of the ethnic identity of the government officers. Several have been integrated into the national army over the years (see below and Table 5.1). The main ones that still operated independently as of 2014 include: • Mai-Mai Yakutumba (aka Forces Armées Alléluia), a 500-strong Bembe militia in the Fizi territory of South Kivu whose members live off the exploitation of gold mines, taxation of gold diggers and of boat traffic on Lake Tanganyika, piracy on the lake, theft of cattle, and local contributions by Fizi businesses and citizens; • Mai-Mai Sheka (aka Nduma Defence for Congo), a majority Nyanga group out of Walikale in North Kivu, which might have up to 1,000 members and was created in 2009 by a minerals trader involved in artisanal tin ore production and taxation of local populations; the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), of “General” Janvier (Janvier Buingo Karairi), possibly the strongest Mai-Mai group in North Kivu with up to 2,000 troops mostly deployed in Masisi but also in Walikale, is largely Hunde, and administers its territory like a quasi-state (including

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handing out tax receipts and delivering hunting licenses) while frequently collaborating with the FDLR (its members see Congolese Tutsi, rather than Rwandan Hutu, as their main enemy); the Union des Patriotes Résistants Congolais–LaFontaine, whose 500 fighters are active in the Lubero territory of North Kivu and engaged in gold trading, elephant poaching, and coffee smuggling to Uganda; and • Mai-Mai Raia Mutomboki, a 700-strong anti-FDLR group in the Shabunda territory of South Kivu, which collaborates with the Congolese army’s operations against the FDLR (see United Nations 2011: 53–58, 59– 62, 75). There are many more groups (see Table 5.1), perhaps several dozen, some as small as twenty to thirty individuals. All are engaged in on-and-off violence and all find ways to survive through forced taxation of local populations and commerce, control of mines or other natural resources, and smuggling with neighboring countries. Many collaborate with other groups, including with the national army from whom they usually purchase their weapons, other equipment, and uniforms. Beyond foreign forces and local militias, it is not possible to make sense of the violence in eastern Congo without coming to grips with the role of the Congolese military, the FARDC. And it is not possible to understand the FARDC unless one thinks of it as a largely unhinged and autonomous armed group that often operates like local insurgents and militias and historically has been more likely to collaborate with those groups than to fight them and to oppress local populations than to protect them. Although about half of its estimated 140,000 personnel are deployed in the east, they had never defeated any of the local insurgents in battle until the 2013 victory over the M23, for which credit is also due to MONUSCO’s FIB. More often, FARDC soldiers, poorly trained and irregularly paid, engage in looting and other forms of violence, including rape, against civilian populations. In the words of Séverine Autesserre who has spent extensive time in the east, the FARDC “relentlessly commit horrific violations of human rights” (2010: 203). Two other international observers concur: “The FARDC is often the single greatest threat to the Congolese and routinely terrorises civilians, extorting protection money, looting villages, raping and killing civilians” (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 6). There is also ample evidence that FARDC troops, including some of its top officers, are involved in criminal mining activities, including smuggling with Rwanda. They also regularly sell their weapons and equipment to local rebels. Ninety-five percent of the weapons used by the FDLR, the group that ostensibly justifies the deployment of the FARDC in the east, are said to come from the FARDC (United Nations 2011: 41). Despite more than ten years of donor efforts

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in Security Sector Reform, the FARDC remains a principal factor of instability. The FARDC’s unreliability comes in no small part from its diverse nature, which results from the integration of many other groups in its ranks over the years. To begin, it was established after the takeover by Kabila’s father (Laurent-Désiré Kabila) who blended the remnants of Mobutu’s Forces Armées Zairoises with his own liberation troops, including the famous Kadogo child soldiers. Other groups that helped out during the war, such as the Katangese Tigers, also found a home in this ragtag military. As part of the peace agreement that led to the 2003–2006 transition, soldiers from the rebel groups of Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) and Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) were also integrated. Few of these groups have proved reliable, however, and their diversity has precluded any effective centralized command. The policy of integrating rebels, opponents, and other violent troublemakers into the FARDC continued unabated at least until 2011. In the transition and early post-transition period, formal blending of rebels took place with donor assistance through a process known as brassage (brewing). In later years, a simpler method of making entire groups of rebels official units of the FARDC—known as mixage—became prevalent. In the east, battalions of mixage-integrated former rebels and Mai-Mai perform much of the FARDC operations. First among them is the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), integrated in 2009. The CNDP is a largely Tutsi group active mostly in the Rutshuru and Masisi regions of North Kivu and in some parts of South Kivu. It is a spin-off of the RCD-Goma, created after the elections of 2006 when some Kivu Tutsi assessed that their representation in the postconflict government was unsatisfactory and their integration in the FARDC left them and their civilian kin too vulnerable. The CNDP is often perceived as the agent of Rwandan interests in the region. Although it officially disbanded and joined the FARDC in 2009, its leadership continued to exploit some mines in the east and remained in control of its battalions (refusing to redeploy away from the Kivus). The CNDP was also involved in smuggling and illegal taxation, ran its own parallel police, and redistributed land away from autochthonous groups in the areas it controls. Until 2012 its leader was Bosco Ntaganda, an FARDC general and deputy commander of the operations against the FDLR, who is now in detention at the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes.5 Although up to 6,000 CNDP had joined the FARDC in 2009, about 1,700 of them remained unintegrated in three “hidden” battalions in charge of Ntaganda’s protection (United Nations 2011: 83). In 2011, some 2,000 CNDP troops defected under Ntaganda’s leadership to create the M23, a new rebellion whose ranks soon swelled to 3,500. This rebellion (see more

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below) was defeated in 2013, but the majority of CNDP troops remained loyal to the FARDC through this episode and did not defect. The Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO) was integrated at the same time as the CNDP. Paradoxically, PARECO was created in 2007 as an anti-CNDP organization within local Hutu, Hunde, and Nande communities. Once in the FARDC, however, its members collaborated with the CNDP in their pursuit of material benefits. However, many non-Hutu members of PARECO defected from the FARDC soon after their integration (e.g., the APCLS and the Coalition des Patriotes Résistants CongolaisLaFontaine). The latest round of mixage, which took place in 2011, brought in the Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF), a group of Banyamulenge (South Kivu Tutsi) from Minembwe; Mai-Mai Kapopo, an ethnically mixed group; and Mai-Mai Kifuafua, a Tembo group from North Kivu. In the west, the post-transition period saw the rise of incidents of political violence, all of which seemed linked to a deep discontent at the government and at living conditions. In 2007 and 2008, the Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) movement launched insurrections in Bas-Congo, which were violently repressed at the cost of several hundred human lives (MONUC 2008). In October 2009, after a number of months of rising tensions between two local communities over fishing rights, a group of Enyele insurgents attacked the city of Dongo in Equateur province and killed up to 500 civilians of a different ethnic subgroup. Then, they launched attacks on and briefly captured the cities of Gemena and Mbandaka. The group eventually was defeated by FARDC battalions aided by MONUSCO, which pushed its members back to their village where some 150 of them were killed. In November 2010, there was an attack against FARDC soldiers and the headquarters of Kabila’s party in Kikwit (Bandundu province). Credit for this operation was later claimed by the Armée de Résistance Populaire (ARP) of Faustin Munene, a former general in the FARDC, who then escaped to Congo-Brazzaville. Although the ARP does not appear to have any standing troops, it also claimed responsibility for an attack on Kabila’s residence in Kinshasa in February 2011 and for smaller attacks on government targets in Equateur in October 2011 (United Nations 2011: 71). There was also a rise in violent incidents in Katanga starting in 2011. Lubumbashi Airport was seized for a few hours on February 4, 2011, by alleged Katangese Tigers who raised a Katanga flag. In June, a group of Tigers attacked and looted an ammunition depot in Lubumbashi. In September, an “armed commando team of eight men” raided Lubumbashi’s Kasapa prison and liberated some 967 prisoners, including feared former Mai-Mai rebel Gédéon (whose real name is Kyungu Mutanga), who then began recruiting again in North Katanga (United Nations 2011: 77; see also ICG 2006). Gédéon and his men spread terror through the Manono and Pweto districts of northern Katanga from 2012 onwards, burning villages

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where FARDC had stationed and killing chiefs suspected of government allegiance. Gédéon and his troops also appear to be behind Kata Katanga (“cut off Katanga”), an allegedly secessionist insurgency that began in 2013. Their main attack took place on March 23 when some 300 insurgents entered Lubumbashi and rallied downtown by the statue of secessionist leader Moise Tshombe before being pushed back by the presidential guard. There were subsequent skirmishes between Kata Katanga and the FARDC outside of Lubumbashi, along the road to Kolwezi (close to some of the main copper mines) and further north into 2014. Despite the secessionist overtones, Kata Katanga is not a genuine secessionist movement. Rather, it appears to be connected to the increased sense of vulnerability of northern Katanga (mostly Balubakat) elites who saw their relative position in the regime eroded in the aftermath of the 2011 elections. These include former chief of police John Numbi, former central bank governor Jean-Claude Masangu, and the speaker of the Katanga provincial assembly, Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza. The same people, particularly Numbi, are believed to be behind the alleged coup attempt that took place on December 29, 2013, in Kinshasa when rebels briefly attacked the headquarters of the Radio-Télévision Nationale Congolaise (managing to get on the air for a moment), Ndjili International Airport, and the Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp. By midday, the Republican Guard had defeated them at a cost of at least 100 deaths. The rebels claimed allegiance to Pastor Paul-Joseph Mukungubila Mutombo (aka Gidéon Mukungubila—unrelated to Gédéon), and his “Church of the Lord Jesus Christ,” but it might have been a smokescreen. Simultaneous attacks were launched in Lubumbashi and Kindu, displaying a surprising level of coordination (Africa Confidential 2014).

The DRC’s Fertile Soil for Crises The DRC suffers from several structural features that underwrite the country’s repetitive crises. While they do not constitute direct causes, they generate the conditions that make polarization, breakdown, and conflict more likely. Poverty and Inequality

There is no doubt that poverty, deprivation, and the evidence of broad economic inequalities feed recurrent bouts of violence. For sure, the DRC has witnessed some significant growth in the postconflict era (above 6 percent a year since 2006) and there are visible improvements in infrastructure and construction in the main cities. Inflation has remained mostly in the single

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digits, the franc has stabilized (at about 925 francs to the dollar), and the country earned some $12 billion of debt relief in 2010. More noteworthy, mineral exploitation and exports have surged once again after years in the doldrums. Copper output reached almost 1 million tons in 2013, an all-time record compared with 99,000 tons in 2006, while cobalt went from about 15,000 to near 90,000 tons over the same period (EIU 2014: 7). Yet little of this new wealth seems to circulate and poverty remains prevalent, with the consequence that inequality is perceived as increasing and popular resentment is permanently simmering. According to the World Bank (2015b), 64 percent of Congolese lived below the poverty line as of 2012, a terrible indictment on fifty years of sovereignty and development objectives. Only 22 percent of them had access to drinkable water and fewer than 10 percent to electricity. Fifteen percent of Congolese children die before the age of five years old (Herdeschee et al. 2012). Misery is visible everywhere and is particularly widespread outside Kinshasa. Thus, despite the promises of its cinq chantiers program, which was replaced after 2011 with a new and equally vague “Revolution in Modernity” slogan, the Kabila administration has largely failed to significantly improve the lot of grassroots Congolese and an undercurrent of anger feeds occasional explosions of violence and remains available for political mobilization. A resident of Goma captures the cynicism of the population toward Kabila’s economic policies: “My personal knowledge of the [cinq chantiers] is based on hear-say. That’s why I have dubbed them the five songs. . . . The five projects are not working. It’s rather demagoguery fabricated to deceive us and to make us believe that roads are paved in DRC” (Feeley and Choukry 2012, 16). As a National Democratic Institute (NDI) report, based on focus groups around the country, makes clear: Congolese are extremely unhappy with the current state of their country. When asked their perceptions of the DRC today, nearly all participants— male and female, in rural and urban settings alike—express negative views. They feel that the country is barely functioning and are frustrated by a lack of development and poor quality of life. Their awareness of the DRC’s great economic potential compounds this frustration into outrage that average citizens do not benefit from its natural wealth. When asked if the DRC was moving in a positive or negative direction, nearly all participants respond that the country is moving in the wrong direction. (Feeley and Choukry 2012: 9)

In Bas-Congo, the BDK insurrections, while also vested in a broader autonomist and messianic message, derived from perceptions of the “economic exploitation” of the province by the central government and of “unwarranted economic decline and marginalization” (Tull 2010: 649). In Equateur, the violence of 2009 had its roots in local struggles over fishing ponds, which suggest the precariousness of life and reliance on an economy

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of subsistence. Access to resources in the DRC might be a matter of criminal accumulation for top elites, but it is usually little more than a question of survival for everybody else. In Kikwit, the violence of 2010 was linked to fears of economic invasion by outsiders, to the unemployment and failed reinsertion of demobilized soldiers, and to the frustrations of local populations at the few benefits the region has derived from having provided two successive prime ministers to the national government.6 The roots of violence are more complex in the east but, there too, material deprivation and the difficulties to just eke out a living are important contributors. As has been well documented (Autesserre 2010; Vlassenroot 2012, 2013), access to land is one of the main causes of intercommunal polarization and is indicative of the lack of alternative economic opportunities. Poverty and inequality also have indirect crisis-inducing effects. In the DRC’s highly heterogeneous ethnolinguistic environment, poverty induces reliance on one’s kin and mutual distrust among identity groups. Access to land and to other state-controlled resources is a familiar trigger of these conflicts, which share the language of autochthony (“sons of the soil” against “foreigners”) as a common denominator (see Boas and Dunn 2013). Poverty and a general sense of alienation from economic opportunities are the deep causes of these identity conflicts, which local and national politicians do not hesitate to instrumentalize. Corrupt Governance

As the NDI report makes clear, the Congolese are well aware of the responsibility of their leadership for their crisis-ridden lives: “When asked who is responsible for the problems in their country, Congolese most often say ‘the authorities,’ ‘the leaders’ or ‘the government.’ They feel that their leaders do not have the interests of the Congolese people at heart and lack the political will to help the DRC improve” (Feeley and Choukry 2012: 9). At the core of this political failure lies corruption. The Congolese rightly believe “that . . . corruption among political leaders is the reason that the country’s problems and, specifically, the basic needs of people, remain unaddressed” (Feeley and Choukry 2012: 10). And indeed, even by African standards, the DRC’s corruption is in a league of its own. It perverts the social fabric of life, undermines the development of social capital, fosters alienation and despair, and ends up directly and indirectly contributing to underdevelopment, crises, and violence. The regime, particularly the president’s entourage, has developed a tremendous propensity for corruption and shattered expectations that electoral democracy might reform the worst excesses of the Mobutu regime. The end of transition, the apparent stabilization of the political system, and the passing of certain laws have encouraged the return of foreign operators

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and thus increased the appetite of state agents for getting their share of this new activity, with the result that corruption has increased and property rights have paradoxically become less stable. Not surprisingly, as of 2014, the DRC was ranked 184 out of 189 countries on the World Bank’s Doing Business index, which measures ease of business operations, including red tape, corruption, and degree of contractual commitment.7 Flawed governance is particularly salient in the areas of mining and public finance. In the mining sector, the Congolese government actors are in the habit of selling mining rights to relatively unknown foreign companies, some of which are registered in the British Virgin Islands with hidden ownership structures, at a significant loss to the state. These companies, which are not known to be actually involved in mining, then subsequently resell these rights to larger legitimate mining companies at great benefit to themselves and their owners. The Africa Progress Panel estimated the losses from such practices at about $1.36 billion in 2010–2012 (APC 2013: 55–58, 100–106). Earlier, British member of parliament, Eric Joyce, had identified a loss of $5.5 billion over 2008–2011 from similar deals.8 Global Witness (2014) revealed that in 2012 the Congolese government purchased oil rights from Nessergy, a company owned by President Kabila’s friend Dan Gertler, to which it had sold these rights in 2006. The 2012 contract was not published, despite commitments by the Congolese government to do so. Global Witness suggested that the rights were sold to Nessergy for $500,000 in 2006 and that they were bought back in 2012 for at least $150 million or 300 times the initial amount (for further details, see Englebert 2014). In addition, some 40 percent of tax revenue actually recovered from mining companies never reaches the treasury (see EITI 2013). Outside of the mining sector, there is also a broad tendency for state agents to use their public authority to extract resources from citizens without transferring them to the treasury in their entirety. First, there is the widespread practice of off-budget financing by some government services, agencies, and public enterprises that keep the revenues they collect for their own functioning costs. Second, there is a tendency for those collecting revenue to retain some of it for their personal needs. A 2013 report on taxation at Kinshasa’s central market showed actual revenue to the treasury of $280,000 out of $600,000 collected (according to receipts) and $2.1 million in estimated revenue (ODEP 2013). In a 2007 paper, A. Batamba Balembu estimated the loss from such corrupt practices at 55 percent of potential budget revenue (quoted in Tedika 2012: 304). Third, some state agents also privately extract resources from citizens, without any tax justification, simply because positions of authority are understood as opportunities for private appropriation. For example, public school teachers and university professors might demand payments for grades, municipal employees might not deliver birth certificates without a bribe, judges might rule in favor of the

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best-paying party, and police might stand at intersections preying on drivers. These are not isolated instances of corruption, but the manifestations of a broad nationwide system of resource extraction with each actor along the way expected to return a share of his or her earnings to the person above in the hierarchy of a system the Congolese refer to as rapportage (Baaz and Olson 2011). Thus, the entire state apparatus is constructed and understood as an enterprise of extraction, not as a tool of public policy or collective action. This system produces significant demand for participation and deep grievances from those left out. There is no sanction for any of these abuses. A regime of impunity has developed that reaches down from the top spheres of the state to its lowest ranks. The examples from the top incite everyone to grab what they can while they can. In the words of an economic journalist, “Corruption is massive, massive.”9 While the government pays lip service to donor transparency requirements, it falls short of its promises of accountability toward the Congolese people. When Kabila declared his assets in early 2012, as required by the constitution for a president starting a new term in office, he did so in a sealed envelope to parliament. As then speaker of parliament, Olivier Kamitatu, declared in 2003 on a similar occasion, “It is not about making [Kabila’s] wealth known to all, but rather a matter of honor to have the information in place should need of disclosure arise” (IRIN News 2003). Some suspect the envelopes were empty. No information on Kabila’s assets (or those of his sister Jaynet and brother Zoe, both members of parliament) has ever been publicly released. Violence as a Means of Access to Co-optation

Another particularly insidious root of crises lies in the rewards that the Congolese political system, like many other postconflict states (Mehler and Tull 2005), provide to those responsible for political violence. Because of the absence of credible representative institutions and the stalled progress of decentralization reforms, there are few ways for communities or local elites to participate in the system. In this context, having an armed group can be a way to speak out and to protect one’s interests. Many Mai-Mai militias follow this logic, as do the Tutsi-inspired insurgencies. As a western military attaché suggests, “People think that by firing their gun they can get attention.”10 And they are often right. As discussed above, co-optation of sympathizers and opponents alike is an essential foundation of the Congolese regime and a common tool of conflict management. The irony is that causing sufficient violent disturbance will usually guarantee a group or its leaders to be invited (back) to the table in one form or another. For most rebel groups and militias, this means integration into the FARDC. For local elites

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and politicians, it might mean a government portfolio or some high-ranking administrative or military position. There is little doubt that this has been the strategy of many Mai-Mai groups, even if their origin might be found in self-defense motives. Once in existence, they tend to be willing to disband only in exchange for some form of integration or other demobilization benefit. In the west too, such motives are apparent. General Munene, who fought alongside Kabila’s father in the 1996 war and subsequently served in several positions before finding himself unemployed, claimed in November 2010 that he was behind the events in his region of Kikwit before going into hiding.11 Few observers doubted that he was hoping to capitalize on this alleged association to then negotiate his surrender (a strategy undermined by his subsequent arrest by Congo-Brazzaville authorities). And some of the politicians behind the rise of Kata Katanga in 2013 and the alleged coup attempt in December of that year had recently been dismissed by Kabila and might have sought to retain or regain political significance. Flawed Elections as a Source of Crisis

Elections are a major source of political instability and violence in the DRC. This is so, to some degree, because a lot is at stake. But it is even more so because elections in the DRC end up frustrating the democratic aspirations of many Congolese. In 2006 and 2007, there were street battles between Kabila’s troops and that of his main challenger Jean-Pierre Bemba until the latter escaped the country in April 2007. In 2011, the electoral period was also mired in violence. The Kabila regime did what it could to limit electoral competition and win itself a second term. The appointment of Mulunda Ngoi, a northern Katangese politician known for his bullying ways, to head the National Independent Electoral Commission in November 2010 was the first salvo. Then came a hurried constitutional revision in early 2011 that changed the polls from a two-round majority to a singleround first-past-the-post system. Anticipating challenges to his then almost certain victory (further aided by confusion over the voter registries), Kabila also stacked the Constitutional Court, the arbitrator of election disputes, with political clients. In the weeks preceding the elections, there were numerous instances of attacks against both opposition and ruling party offices. Altogether, according to a MONUSCO report, “At least 33 people were killed, including 22 by gunshot, as well as at least 83 others injured, including 61 by gunshot, between 26 November and 25 December 2011 by members of the defense and security forces” and “at least 16 people remain unaccounted for” (UNJHRO 2012: 4). In this context, it is no wonder that Kabila’s eventual victory, with an alleged 48 percent of the votes, was widely decried by international and domestic observers. Yet as expected, the Constitutional Court validated it.

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At the time of this writing in late 2015, it is not yet entirely clear whether Kabila will try to run again in 2016, in violation of the 2006 constitution. If he were to run, however, as many believe, it would almost certainly trigger significant violence as large segments of the population, particularly in Kinshasa, would oppose such a move. It is probably in anticipation of strong resistance that he reshuffled the military hierarchy and reinforced the positions of loyal officers in 2014 (Africa Confidential 2014). The tendency of the regime to put a lock on the electoral process is compounded by the strategy of some opponents who see, in elections that they cannot win, an opportunity to foment trouble so as to delegitimize the process and its outcome (Collier 2009). There is little doubt that such crisis stoking was at least in part the strategy of the main opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, who declared himself the winner in 2011 before the elections even took place. While the Kabila regime might have escaped the 2011 electoral crisis with a victory and altogether limited condemnation, such hijacking of the electoral process contributes to widespread sentiments of alienation and results in a system devoid of peaceful mechanisms for the expression of grievances, forcing the latter into other spheres of public life, including that of political violence. Thus, the practice of electoral democracy Congolesestyle produces as much if not more ground for crisis than it does legitimation of the regime. Interestingly, one way the regime seeks to deal with this lack of legitimacy is by co-opting some members of the opposition, as happened in the December 2014 Government of National Cohesion that saw the entry into the cabinet of six prominent opponents. As discussed below, however, the logic of co-optation itself contains the seeds of potential future violence and promotes further corruption and misgovernance, all of which contribute to the widespread sense of political alienation of the Congolese.

“Crisis? What Crisis?”12 Government Responses Congolese crises are rarely averted and hardly ever resolved. Ongoing protracted crises characterize Congolese governance. The modes of crisis response favored by the government contribute to this outcome: repression, co-optation, and delegation to others. Policy analysis and solution of the root problems, on the other hand, are largely absent. Repression

The government’s default attitude toward crises is to resort to repression and to interpret challenges as conspiracies. The half-hearted search for a military solution to the conflict in the east, which has characterized the past

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decade or so, proceeds from this bias and has contributed to the continuation of the conflict as have military and police operations against the BDK in Bas-Congo, Enyele in Equateur, and other occasional insurgents in the west. In Bas-Congo, it is estimated that several hundred BDK militants and sympathizers were killed in the wake of government repression in 2007 and 2008 (MONUC 2008). In the Enyele and Kikwit incidents, the government used significant force (including the feared Cobras, its Rapid Intervention Police), which displaced thousands of civilians, to respond to violent movements that were largely the outcome of misery and social dislocation. In Kinshasa, more than 100 people died at the hands of government forces during the December 2013 alleged coup attempt, although the plotters reportedly were armed with only knives and spears. And in Lubumbashi, thirty-five Kata Katanga insurgents were killed by the presidential guard and the couple of hundred who sought refuge at the MONUSCO base were fired at inside the base. Yet it is in the east, where repression would make the most sense given the military nature of the challenges, that the government historically has been most lukewarm at taking swift action when challenged. To some extent, this weakness results from the apparent benefits that many politicians and military brass derive from the conflict itself (United Nations 2011, 2014), and from the weak capacity of the security apparatus against more serious armed opponents. Although there was a surge in military actions by the FARDC during 2013 and 2014, it derived largely from FIB support and might have been short-lived. The assassination in January 2014 of Colonel Mamadou Moustafa Ndala (who had led to assault against the M23), probably at the hands of another FARDC faction, contributed to stalling the momentum. Repression is also the preferred tool for nonviolent situations. Peaceful but demanding criticism of the government by the few independent journalists and human rights activists has resulted in several political assassinations since 2006, including those of journalist Serge Masheshe in 2008 and human rights activist Floribert Chebeya in 2010. The latter might have been in the process of uncovering drug-smuggling criminal networks within the military and the regime. 13 And in the 2011 elections, the government used violence to silence the democratic expression of political preferences, referring to opponents and human rights activists as unpatriotic. In addition to the several dozen casualties at the hands of government security forces, MONUSCO also documented the arrest of at least 265 civilians, most of whom have been detained illegally and/or arbitrarily, mainly due to their real or alleged affiliation to a political opposition party or for coming from Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi’s home province

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or to other provinces where he enjoys significant support. These human rights violations were attributed mainly to elements of the Garde républicaine . . . , officers of the National Congolese Police . . . and its specialized units, such as the Légion Nationale d’intervention . . . , the criminal investigation brigade and the Groupe Mobile d’Intervention . . . , and to a lesser extent, to soldiers from the FARDC. Moreover, agents of the National Intelligence Agency . . . were also allegedly responsible for several cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention. (UNJHRO 2012: 4)

Somewhat ironically, repression is also the way in which the Congolese government deals with accusations of repression. In October 2014, it expelled Scott Campbell, director of the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) in Kinshasa, after its office published a report that documented Congolese police abuses of civilians during a crackdown on gangs. The use of repression by the Kabila government not only stifles the legitimate expression of opinions, but also creates a cycle of frustration and a premium on violence that feed rather than solve crises. Hence, with this response as with the others below, the government addresses crises in a manner that reproduces them. Co-optation

A second level of crisis management consists of the incorporation of the troublemakers into the regime. Co-optation is the foundation of the brassage and mixage of military units with former rebels. Politicians like Mbusa Nyamwisi, who was minister until 2011, and military commanders like General Padiri (whose real name is Joseph David Karendo Bulenda) were once rebels and Mai-Mai. Before defecting with the M23, Ntaganda was both a general in the FARDC and leader of the CNDP. Co-optation is also the life of the political system. The Majorité Présidentielle coalition is built around the purchase of votes and support by the Kabila regime, and the inclusion of six opposition leaders in the government in December 2014 was seen as an attempt by Kabila to buy some support for his likely forthcoming efforts to stay in power past his constitutional term (Congo Siasa 2014). While co-optation is in and of itself a universal element in state-building strategies, it is plagued in the DRC with problems that undermine its supposed benefits. First, it yields a plethoric and highly ineffective army with little or no centralized command as well as a government that lacks cohesion and capacity. As the Wikipedia entry on the FARDC somewhat helplessly notes, “Below the Chief of Staff, the current organization of the FARDC is not fully clear.”14 It is largely because of its co-optation functions that the Congolese military has remained resilient to almost a decade of SSR efforts by donors; continues to number some 140,000; and is top-

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heavy with 25 percent officers, 37 percent petty officers, and 38 percent troops (Berghezan 2014: 15). Despite these numbers, the FARDC has only one military success in its record—the defeat of the M23—and it came with considerable support of UN troops. Thierry Nlandu’s observation about Congo’s police, that it is a “heterogeneous force made up of former officers from various backgrounds” and “a non-professional atypical police force,” equally applies to the FARDC (Nlandu 2012: 3). There is significant competition and jealousy among the different integrated groups with each one suspecting the others of receiving preferential treatment. Moreover, coopted actors often fail to renounce their earlier goals or alliances. CNDP troops, for example, refused to deploy in areas outside the North Kivu districts where the majority of the DRC’s Tutsi live. The CNDP essentially was an autonomous regional force within the FARDC. Many Mai-Mai groups also benefit from the support of former Mai-Mai officers in the FARDC, and they are more likely to engage in commercial deals with these segments of the FARDC than to fight them (for the case of Mai-Mai Yakutumba, see United Nations 2011: 55). Second, co-optation has historically promoted the multiplication of rebel groups seeking to be co-opted (Mehler and Tull 2005). There were at least as many armed groups in the east in 2014 as there were at the beginning of the postconflict period in 2006 and, possibly, more than during the war of 1998–2002. Many of the current groups are actually splinters of previous ones, often composed of individuals who were not satisfied with the terms of integration of their peers. Others are new groups that have arisen to capitalize on opportunities for integration. Thus, solving conflict by cooptation encourages the multiplication of violent actors and reproduces conflict. Third, and most importantly, whether because of bad faith, limited resources, or plain incompetence, the government rarely lives up to its cooptation promises (particularly financial ones or those that require significant policy initiatives), with the result that co-opted elites often subsequently defect (e.g., Nkunda, Munene, Ntaganda, numerous PARECO fighters). This leads to an endless cycle of conflict, and defeats the nationbuilding potential of co-optation. It is partly such broken promises in terms of promotions, pay, and assignments that led to the defection and insurrection of 2000 CNDP troops in April 2012, including Ntaganda himself, who then set up the M23.15 In the 2009 agreement that resulted in the integration of the CNDP, Ntaganda had been promised protection from an International Criminal Court indictment in exchange for joining the military and becoming a supporter of the regime. The Kabila government officially declared that it wanted peace ahead of justice. In the wake of the messy 2011 elections, however, Kabila became increasingly sensitive to donor demands to bring Ntaganda to justice. After public calls for his arrest from Belgian and

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US officials were not forcefully dismissed by the Kabila government in March 2012, Ntaganda perceived the shifting winds and launched his new insurrection. It failed in part because Rwanda stayed on the sidelines, loyal troops appeared to stand their ground, and the FIB helped defeat them. But the M23’s failure does not hide the fact that the Congolese government incorporates rebels by making promises that it cannot keep and, thereby, sows the seeds of future crises in its ranks. Nevertheless, the M23 defection might have represented something of a turning point for the Congolese government because it painfully illustrated the flawed nature of co-optation strategies. It seemed to have exasperated Kabila and partly contributed to a more forceful military response than usual and the eventual military defeat of the M23 at the hands of a FARDC-FIB coalition. In the process, it might have spelled the doom of significant future integration of rebels. (The 1,000 or so M23 insurgents who escaped to Uganda have not been reintegrated into the military. They were offered amnesty in exchange for return and demobilization but, here too, the government failed to deliver on this promise and they stayed in Uganda). It should also be noted that potential defectors themselves have shown waning enthusiasm for insurgency as a means to protect their interests and improve their integration, possibly because of the government’s limited ability to deliver on its promises. This is particularly true of the Tutsi populations of the east. In this respect, it is worth noting the dwindling size of Tutsi-led insurgencies over the years. The RCD-Goma probably had between 20,000 and 30,000 troops; the CNDP around 5,500; and the M23 peaked at 3,500 after heavy forced recruitment, but averaged around 2,000 and ended up badly divided. The likelihood of another such insurgency in the near future seems low. Delegation

The final government approach to crisis (often simultaneously with the other two) is to let others deal with it. Congolese forces are typically slow and ineffective, and more likely to harass civilians than to engage in combat. Many mixed units are unreliable. The government generally lacks capacity for troop projection across the country. The upper echelons of the hierarchy are criminalized. In 2009 General Numbi, former FARDC chief of staff, seized drugs at Kinshasa airports, which later disappeared. In 2010 Colonel Makenga, commander in South Kivu, was caught trying to smuggle coltan into Rwanda. Chief of staff, General Gabriel Amisi Kumba (alias “Tango 4”), was sacked after the fall of Goma to the M23 in 2012 on suspicion of selling weapons to rebels. There is only limited evidence of genuine efforts at capacity building. In the 2013 budget, defense, order, and public security (including police and the administration of justice) accounted for

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16 percent of spending (still a significant improvement over 5.5 percent in 2010).16 Hence, the government often has little choice but to delegate. MONUSCO is the partner of choice for delegation of crisis management. It is usually MONUSCO that transports Congolese troops when they deploy, and its contingents provide what little security there is in the east. The Kimia II operation against the FDLR in 2010 took place jointly between MONUSCO and FARDC, for example, as have all operations invoving the FIB since 2013 (mainly against the M23, ADF, and FDLR). Although the government has repeatedly demanded that the UN phase down its presence (and it has been doing so), Kabila reiterated in his State of the Nation speech in December 2014 that the DRC continued to need MONUSCO. Delegation might be useful for the Congolese government, but it is not always a good deal for the DRC. Following government pressure, the UN agreed in 2010 to change its mission to one of stabilization rather than overall peacekeeping (hence, the change of acronym from MONUC to MONUSCO). In this new arrangement, MONUSCO (and other UN donors) are responsible for the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy while the government manages the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC. The point of stabilization is to go beyond peacekeeping by providing security, yet also dedicating more resources to state reconstruction, reintegration of combatants, and ending sexual violence. A 2011 report by the Refugee Studies Center suggests that stabilization showed the limits of delegation because of the narrow technical approach of the international community while local political processes go unaddressed: “Stabilisation, reduced to its technical dimensions, is both the result of, and further contributes to, the international community’s disengagement from the thorny political issues at the core of the DRC’s instability and is a testament to the international community’s waning leverage in the country” (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 20). In this respect, delegation is also diversion or deception, as the government distributes duties to MONUSCO while retaining political control over local dynamics. These practices echo Theodore Trefon’s notion of “masquerade,” according to which Congolese rulers play a game of mystification toward donors (Trefon 2011). Since 2009, Rwanda has been the other main partner in delegation in the east, albeit more ambiguously. In a historical deal, Kabila agreed then to let Rwandan troops enter the DRC and directly engage the FDLR in combat in Operation Umoja Wetu that year. In this event, the Congolese government essentially acknowledged that the FDLR was a greater problem for the Rwandan government than for itself, and allowed the Rwandans to take care of it in the hope that it might also lead to a strengthening of government control over the area. The operation managed to inflict significant

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loses to the FDLR, but many of the troops avoided combat and relocated deeper into Congolese territory. However, by 2014 their number had dwindled to a mere estimated 1,500, a far cry from the 40,000 after the Rwandan genocide of 1994. This decline can be credited in part to these joint operations with Rwanda and shows some benefits of delegation. Finally, the government has delegated the management of some crises to the specific groups that identify as their victims or targets. To some extent, the integration of Tutsi into the FARDC followed by the appointment of their leadership to command positions in the operations against the FDLR (as was the case with the Amani Leo and Amani Kamilifu Operations under effective CNDP command) constitute a delegation of the FDLR problem to Kivu’s Tutsi populations. As a result, before the M23 desertion, no fewer than 36 percent of the command positions in the FARDC in North Kivu were occupied by Tutsi. Of the 48 percent staffed by “government officers,” another 60 percent actually belonged to former RCD-Goma insurgents, also largely Tutsi (United Nations 2014). Thus, altogether former CNDP and RCD officers controlled some 64 percent of FARDC command positions in North Kivu, suggesting the extent to which this province was beyond government control and the degree to which the Congolese state had delegated its authority to a group that lay at the core of both the 1996 and 1998 wars. All of these partnerships are subject to erosion, however, with negative consequences for security provision, and are somewhat antithetical to state and capacity building. Further shrinking of UN forces, anticipated in the coming years, might jeopardize the government’s capacity to respond to crises. Domestic problems in Rwanda (which refuses to negotiate with the FDLR and is heading toward potentially controversial elections in 2016) might hamper fragile opportunities for cooperation with Kigali. Yet it is unclear whether the government has the wherewithal to go it alone more often.

Can the DRC Escape Its Crisis Trap? Why are Congolese authorities unable or unwilling to develop appropriate public policies to manage and solve their crises? To some extent, former Belgian foreign minister Karel De Gucht was right when he lamented that there is a lack of statesmanship in the DRC (BBC News 2004). Indeed, one sees little true courageous leadership, little genuine resolve at reform and progress, and particularly little concern from most elites for their fellow Congolese. Yet this is not the result of any human flaw, for there actually is no shortage of quality individuals and human capital in the DRC. Instead, the lack of proper leadership seems to result from a failure of collective

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action—the structure of incentives and constraints of public life promote personalized, prebendal, and predatory behavior. To survive politically, one must dedicate time and resources to other things than policy analysis and planning. What matters is to take care of clients and potential enemies; to look after one’s family, kin, and village; and to sabotage the rise of potential rivals. The lack of strong capable institutions of governance is largely responsible for this system and finds its own origins in colonization and decolonization. Power has never been exercised in the DRC along a system of checks and balances and with collective welfare as a goal. Governance has always been personalized and extractive, with the state an institutional facade of a predatory scam, imposed on society and living off it rather than for it. This system has set the Congolese against each other in the competitive pursuit of access to state power: they all embrace the state as the ultimate path to survival and accumulation, but they reject each other and each other’s rights in the process. Thus, there is virtually no instance of endogenous institutions that build on local initiatives. Even when it comes to state reconstruction by or with donors, exogenous superimposed solutions are favored (de Herdt 2010). Such bias prevents the appropriation of institutions by the Congolese and their stability, both of which are necessary for the difficult task of policymaking. Moreover, the availability of massive amounts of natural resources and the control of their appropriation by the state further worsen governance as they increase the economic returns from the private capture of public institutions. Rather than developing stable property rights, for example, Congolese authorites find it in their interest to keep them weak so as to endlessly create opportunities for negotiation and extraction without having to provide any public service. Finally, external actors hardly facilitate crisis resolution. By exonerating the state of its weaknesses, MONUSCO has to some extent undermined the very reconstruction of the state that it was supposed to support since 2000. Similarly bilateral actors are often torn between their roles as suppliers of aid and facilitators of peace and development, and their roles as representatives of their national corporations in the race for the DRC’s mineral resources. Thus, there is a low level of trust from the Congolese for donors, particularly Anglo-Saxon ones who are also believed to be pro-Rwanda. This limits, in turn, the policy capacity of donors themselves. In the end, while the Congolese case teaches us little about successful crisis management in Africa, it does offer a cautionary tale about the conditions that aggravate crises. Particularly crucial in the DRC is the role of the state itself in the creation of crises, for the Congolese government is directly or indirectly responsible for the state of the economy, the low quality of governance, the propensity for co-optation, and the attempts at con-

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fiscating the democratic process. It is also directly responsible for failing to develop credible responses to crises. Possibly as important is the extent to which not solving a crisis often is an optimal outcome for a government whose members benefit from instrumentalizing disorder and keeping things off balance (Chabal and Daloz 1999). As long as conflict goes on, the government will find in it an excuse for not developing the country and a legitimation for resorting to violence. Such an assessment must, however, be tempered by the fact that, ceteris paribus, the Kabila regime would probably prefer to exercise its hegemony over the entire territory and population and to tame all nonstate and foreign armed groups and opponents. Its instrumentalization of crises is a coping strategy, a means to maximize power while in a chaotic situation. But it is probably not the government’s ultimate goal. It is likely that the regime will continue to seek to consolidate central state authority, if only to facilitate Kabila’s remaining in office beyond 2016. As I have made clear in this chapter, such consolidation is unlikely to come from the solution of any of the DRC’s underlying crises. Rather, it might depend on the continued availability of material resources from the ongoing commodity boom (which showed signs of vacillating in 2014) to facilitate patronage, and on the systematic use of repression that the government has amply displayed these past few years. While some degree of pacification could indeed derive from such a strategy, it would be more akin to a forceful lid on Congolese society than to genuine crisis resolution.

Notes This chapter focuses on political and security crises, and does not directly address broader categories such as economic or public health crises. 1. There are some regional variations in this respect, with Katanga showing greater economic progress than the rest of the country. In Kinshasa, a construction boom and Chinese-funded and -managed road improvements offer visual signs of a recovery. 2. See the statements from the Carter Center (2011) and the European Union (2011), as well as UNJHRO (2012). The elections did not bolster the legitimacy of the main opposition party, the Union Démocratique pour le Progrès Social (UDPS) whose leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, claimed victory before the polls were even held. 3. See the aptly titled article by Thomas Fessy, “DR Congo: Celebrating 50 Years of Chaos” (Fessy 2010). 4. For an excellent attempt at tracing the evolution of these groups over time, see Vogul n.d. 5. Laurent Nkunda had been the CNDP’s leader from 2006 to 2009. 6. Miscellaneous and anonymous interviews, Kinshasa, November 2010 with International NGO director, Congolese military officer, and Western diplomats. 7. See World Bank 2014.

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8. “Congo Shell Companies Reported to Serious Fraud Office,” Eric Joyce, November 24, 2011, http://ericjoyce.co.uk/2011/11/congo-fire-sale-4/. 9. Anonymous, interviewed by the author, Kinshasa, November 15, 2010. 10. Western military attaché, interviewed by the author, Kinshasa, May 18, 2011. 11. See La Tempête des Tropiques, November 18, 2010. 12. Title of Supertramp album, A&M Records, 1975. 13. Several anonymous sources (including MONUSCO political affairs personnel), interviewed by the author, Kinshasa, November 2010. 14. Wikipedia, “Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo. 15. M23 refers to March 23, the date of the 2009 agreement that saw the integration of CNDP into the FARDC and which the rebels claimed had not been properly implemented. 16. Government of DRC, Ministère du Budget, “Etas de suave budgétaire mensuel 2013,” http://www.budget.gouv.cd/execution/exercice-2013/situation-mensuelle -2013/.

6 Ghana: Shocks and Adaptation Kwaku A. Nuamah

GHANA HAS FACED SEVERAL CHALLENGES IN ITS NEARLY SIX DECADES

of existence, but few have come close to posing a major threat to the full integrity and survival of the state. The main sources of risks have been political conflict, economic shock, and ethnic conflict. While each of these challenges has exposed the fragility of the state’s crisis management apparatus, and raised questions about the legitimacy of individual governments, none has escalated to a point of becoming a major crisis.

Political Upheavals Political upheavals have been a potential source of threats to the Ghanaian state since independence. At their core is a normative vacuum, coupled with “political habits of endemic distrust between state and society” that began in the 1950s when a radical-moderate split in the nationalist movement created a “heritage of split ideology” (Boahen 1996: 95–96). Subsequent competition between the radicals represented by the socialist Convention People’s Party (CPP) and its followers and the moderates represented by the liberal parties of United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) tradition has led to coups, bitterly contested elections, acts of civil disobedience, and political executions. The first coup (1966), which toppled the CPP, led to a repudiation of Nkrumah’s brand of socialism and a brief period of pro-UGCC dominance (first under the National Liberation Council 1 and later, the United Party government of Kofi Busia). But three subsequent coups (the Kutu Acheampong115

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led coup that brought the National Redemption Council to power in 19722, and the two Jerry Rawlings-led coups that produced the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council government in 1979, and the Provisional National Defence Council government in 1981) and national elections in 1979 (won by Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party) installed left-leaning governments that attempted to reconstitute and restore the CPP agenda. Severe economic difficulties, however, derailed these efforts. By the mid-1980s, when a financial crisis forced the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) to abandon its socialist policies in favor of IMF and World Bank−sponsored reforms, the lines between the two traditions had become blurred (Nugent 1995). However, the patterns have generally resurfaced in the Fourth Republic, with the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and several Nkrumahist parties to the left of the pro-UGCC and liberal New Patriotic Party (NPP). Elites on either side disagree on the basic tenets of the Ghanaian social contract, particularly as it pertains to redistributive functions of the state. The result, as noted by Naomi Chazan (1983: 15), is the failure to agree on a “central normative set of codes” for political discourse and national development. Ancillary to this normative vacuum is the problem of weak institutionalization of good governance practices, including the routine tasks of elite recruitment and power transition management. In the past, this institutionalization deficit opened the doors to coup makers who exploited the weak political system and poor economic performance, which is usually also present, to seize power from civilians. The effects of weak institutionalization have also been present in Ghana’s experiments with democracy since 1992, particularly in the area of election management where inadequate civic education, poor election security procedures, and inadequate attention to election dispute resolution turns every contest into a potential crisis.3

Economic Collapse Ghana has also been challenged by severe economic crises that combined with political upheaval (particularly from 1975 to 1992) to bring the state to the edge of collapse. The decline, which was steepest from 1975–1983, was caused largely by a collapse of the cocoa industry, poor economic management by several governments, and weak investment flows (FrimpongAnsah 1991: 145). The origins of the cocoa industry’s collapse has been traced to producer frustration caused by declining real producer prices in the 1960s,4 a general lack of incentives for agricultural production in the 1970s, and a severe drought and bush fires that ravaged the countryside first in 1978– 1979 and again in 1982–1983 (Boafo-Arthur 1993: 47). The cumulative

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effect was a decline in cocoa production from 403,000 tons in 1970 to 179,000 tons in 1983 (Kusi 1991). The 1982–1983 drought also contributed to the crisis by affecting food production as well as the generation of hydroelectric power with dire consequences for industrial production (BoafoArthur 1993: 48). Economic mismanagement included a failed import-substitution industrialization and reallocation of resources from productive sectors to unproductive state-owned enterprises under Kwame Nkrumah and other CPP-tradition governments;5 Ignatius Kutu Acheampong’s disastrous debt repudiation and foreign business nationalization efforts; and Jerry John Rawlings’s early endeavors to delink the Ghanaian economy from global markets.6 These problems were compounded by chronic political instability, which led to policy discontinuities with adverse effects on planning and development, and the impact of a mass exodus of professionals in the 1980s.

Ethnic Conflict Ethnopolitical conflict, particularly in northern Ghana, has also posed a challenge to the state. Recent conflicts include clashes over land ownership and chieftaincy rights between the Konkomba and the Nanumba in Nanumba District, particularly in 1981 and 1994–1996; the Gonja and the Nawuri in the Kpandai area in 1981; the Konkomba and the Mossi in the Guerin in 1992; and the Konkomba (supported by the Nawuri) and Gonjas in the East Gonja District in 1992 (Bogner 2000). Outside of the Northern region, there have been ethnic clashes in places such as the Volta region (Alavanyo-Nkonya dispute) and Upper West regions (Bawku). Though these conflicts are largely limited in scope and as such do not pose a major threat to the state, there has been a tendency to politicize the analysis of their causes and management efforts to the detriment of peaceful resolution efforts.

Difficult Foreign Relations Ghana has also faced a series of challenges in relations with its neighbors; notably, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Nigeria. The rocky relations are framed by irredentist potential among peoples split by the western boundary (with Côte d’Ivoire) and the eastern boundary (with Togo).7 Nkrumah’s support for anticolonial forces in these countries, and later for insurgents seeking to overthrow postcolonial governments, helped fuel the conflicts (Shahid 1991; 5).8 The overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 only marginally improved relations with neighbors and they deteriorated even further when the Busia govern-

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ment expelled some 1 million nationals of Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso (Aluko 1977: 76). Under Rawlings, relations with Nigeria remained largely cordial even after Lagos expelled over a million Ghanaians in 1983. Conflict, however, emerged in Ghana’s relations with Burkina Faso (over the overthrow and assassination of Rawlings’s good friend Thomas Sankara in 1987), Gambia (over the murder of some forty Ghanaian fishermen in that country), and Togo (over Ghana’s support for Togolese opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio). Post-Rawlings governments have generally maintained cordial relations with Ghana’s neighbors despite several irritants. Tensions have arisen, for instance, in relations with Burkina Faso over that country’s role in a Volta Dam water spillage that caused floods in northern Ghana and activities of Burkinabe Fulani herdsmen in northern Ghana. More recently, relations with Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have been tested by reports of harassment of Ghanaian truckers in Nigeria (and Ghana’s retaliation) and disputed ownership of some of Ghana’s recent oil discoveries, respectively.

Tracing the Outcomes Outcomes of the various challenges have been diverse, ranging from the insignificant to major and near-catastrophic events. But none of these challenges has been insurmountable. Outcomes of Political Turmoil

Political turmoil in Ghana has led to several coups and bitterly contested elections. The coups represented an attempt to not only resolve basic questions about economic and political direction of the country, but also questions regarding the role of the military itself in the country’s leadership. In the mid-1970s, General Acheampong attempted to resolve the matter by proposing a power-sharing arrangement between civilians and the military. The proposal, known as Union Government (or UNIGOV), was rejected by civic leaders, professional associations, and politicians. Acheampong’s attempts to rig a referendum called to settle the matter were foiled when the electoral commissioner, I. K. Aban, fled the country rather than give in to pressures from the government. The ensuing chaos heightened tensions and threatened to escalate but a major crisis was averted, ironically, through the 1978 palace coup led by General Fred Kwasi Akuffo, who was himself removed from power a few months later (on June 4, 1979) by Rawlings in a bloody coup. A previous coup attempt (in May 1979) had landed Rawlings in court, giving him a platform to assail the corrupt military government and to present himself as

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a reformer. The Rawlings trial was held against the backdrop of severe economic hardship, political campaigning for the 1979 elections, and the announced exit of the military from politics. The June 4 coup, therefore, capped a period of intense political drama, severe economic need, and apprehension about the direction of the country. Rawlings added to this unsettling environment by executing several former military Heads of State, including General Acheampong, General Akuffo, and General Akwasi Afrifa, a key architect of the 1996 coup that toppled Nkrumah, and later, head of state of Ghana under the National Liberation Council, as well as the first chairman of the Presidential Commission when Kofi Busia took office as prime minister in 1969. General Afrifa had reentered politics and won a Parliamentary seat on the ticket of the United National Convention in the June 1979 national elections. However, he was executed by Rawlings before he could take his seat in Parliament. Weak institutionalization of good governance has led to several contested elections in the Fourth Republic. The absence of strong election norms allows incumbent parties to abuse the election process, delegitimizing outcomes in the eyes of the opposition and increasing the risk of postelection violence. In 1992, for instance, the PNDC, which appeared reluctant to restore constitutional rule,9 attempted to manipulate the process with oppressive laws10 and control of relevant transition bodies.11 The opposition parties objected and alleged fraud in the presidential polls. The conflict, which appeared set to escalate when the New Patriotic Party boycotted the parliamentary elections in protest, was contained and eventually resolved through negotiations at the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). The situation was less tense in 2008, but nonetheless significant in Ghana’s political history. A highly ethicized political campaign,12 sporadic acts of violence, and uncertainty regarding the NPP’s willingness to hand over power after failing to secure an outright win in the polls produced tension. Uncertainty surrounding the role and intent of former president Rawlings, who had begun issuing threats to the NPP,13 added to the tense situation. Matters nearly came to a head after the runoff when the NPP, which was trailing the NDC by 23,055 votes, alleged that the NDC was importing foreigners to vote in a make-up election organized for the Tain constituency in the Brong-Ahafo region, where the voting had to be rescheduled for administrative and security reasons. The NPP went on to boycott the Tain vote when it failed to secure a court order to postpone it (Gyimah-Boadi, 2010: 4). Outcomes of Economic Crisis

The economic crisis caused a sharp decline in production and overall economic output throughout the 1970s, leading to a near collapse of the state in

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the early 1980s. This was the cumulative effect of three decades of poor management and political instability that prevented consistency in efforts to halt the decline. J. H. Frimpong-Ansah (1992) argues that the National Liberation Council government’s policies were most promising, but were short-lived and incomplete. Kofi Busia’s United Party government attempted IMF-sponsored reforms, but was removed from office when the policies offended the “urbanized predatory coalition” (Frimpong-Ansah 1992: 146). Acheampong, on the other hand, had early success on the back of a policy of self-sufficiency, but this was brief and eventually derailed by a lack of foreign investment and growing domestic pressures. The net effect was nearly complete collapse of the Ghanaian economy. Commenting on the situation, Paul Nugent suggests that, by the end of the 1970s, “state entrepreneurship in the fields of agriculture and industry proved to be a monumental failure, in terms of both crude profitability and the volume of goods produced” (Nugent 1995: 26). A similar assessment is returned by Frimpong-Ansah who notes that “urban wage-earner elements, including the armed forces, had become destitute and militant; the dependent farmers had fallen prey to the state, like other farmers; the industrialists faced losses and disintegration at a time of economic distortions when only informal markets survived. The state had become wholly illegitimate” (1992: 146). The economic outlook for Ghana by the end of its second decade of postcolonial statehood was indeed very dim and the state of economic relations well-captured in Naomi Chazan’s portrayal of a “survival economy,” under which “the substance of political economy considerations moved from industrialization to rural development, from growth to averting total collapse, from production of surplus to maintaining minimum food supplies” (1983: 2). It was against this backdrop that Jerry (John) Rawlings retook control in December 1981. Rawlings (and his PNDC government) initially made matters worse by re-introducing some of the failed socialist remedies, including nationalization of private businesses, restrictions on foreign interests in the economy, 14 propping up of state-owned industries, and enhanced economic cooperation with the socialist bloc. However, he turned westward to the Bretton Woods institutions when it became clear (by 1983) that support from his socialist allies was insufficient to prevent complete collapse.15 The turnabout led to a revolt by the left wing of the PNDC coalition.16 After seizing on a failed coup attempt to expel the rebellious left from the coalition, Rawlings launched what would become a successful recovery program with the support of the IMF and World Bank. The program was implemented in two phases. Phase 1 (the stabilization phase) covered 1983–1986 and targeted declining industrial and export commodity production. Phase 2 (the structural adjustment and development phase) covered the period from 1987 to 1989 and focused on economic growth and development, particularly in the

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service sector (Boafo-Arthur 1993: 49). It required the government to implement a series of tough reform steps, including labor retrenchment, withdrawal of subsidies from key sectors of the economy, trade liberalization, and currency devaluation. Outcomes of Ethnic Conflicts

The government’s management of ethnic conflict has been relatively ineffective and even counterproductive in a few cases. The general tendency has been to resort to coercive incentives to contain escalation while options for mediation, often led by prominent chiefs and other eminent persons recruited by the government, are explored. However, many of these interventions fail to achieve expected outcomes. Typically, the mediation segment, which often lags behind the coercive action, is downgraded as soon as the conflict is contained, leaving the root causes of the conflict unresolved and festering until the next round of fighting. In cases where chieftaincy rights is the underlying issue (e.g., the Konkonba-Nanumba and Konkomba–Gonja conflicts), the government has delegated resolution of the conflict to the National House of Chiefs, a body that is ill equipped to handle disputes involving petitioners without a paramountcy. In the 1994–1996 Konkomba wars, for instance, the Konkombas were expected to channel their grievances through the same Nanumba, Gonja, and Dagomba overlords they were fighting since they had no paramountcy and, therefore, had no representation at the decisionmaking levels of the National House of Chiefs. This was clearly unacceptable to the Konkombas who chose to bypass the House and send their grievances directly to the presidency. This breach of protocol became an important part of the overlords’ grievances as the conflict escalated. The government’s handling of ethnic conflict also is often politicized. Though this is hardly a new phenomenon, politicization has had a particularly negative effect on the credibility of the state in the Fourth Republic. The state’s ability to be a peacemaker is therefore an open question, which does not bode well for the security of conflict-prone communities in the country. In spite of the state’s weak approach to management, ethnic conflicts have not affected national security as might have been expected. This is because the conflicts so far have largely been localized affairs without a national character. Outcomes of Difficult Foreign Relations

The management of conflicts in Ghana’s relations with its neighbors has been mostly positive, particular in the post-Rawlings years. This reflects the successful use of bilateral negotiations as well as international mediation by government. For instance, crisis was averted over the murder of the Ghanaian

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fishermen because the John Kuffour’s New Patriotic Party government pursued bilateral negotiation and requested international mediation (by the UN as well as ECOWAS) when negotiations failed to achieve meaningful results.17 The John Atta-Mills (National Democratic Party) administration, for its part, resorted to bilateral negotiation to manage the oil discovery dispute with Côte d’Ivoire and the Volta Dam water spillage problem with Burkina Faso. The trucker harassment problem with Nigeria was also resolved through bilateral negotiation (after retaliation from Ghana). Reliance on negotiation has not always been the fastest means to resolve disputes, nor does it always produce the desired outcomes for Ghana. However, it has played an important role in preventing unnecessary escalations that can turn minor irritants in relations with neighbors into major crises that can endanger national security.

Explaining the Outcomes What factors and circumstances help explain why none of the several challenges faced by Ghana have escalated into a major crisis so far? Political Upheavals

In the case of political upheavals, several factors immediately come to mind. They include growing competency of (and faith in) the country’s Electoral Commission,18 enhanced participation of the media and civil society organizations in the political process,19 and the decision by political party leaders to establish the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) in March 1994. The IPAC became an important venue for addressing problems and for building consensus on electoral issues such as the need to review the voters register, use of photo ID cards to minimize impersonation, use of transparent ballot boxes, and use of party agents to observe the registration and polling processes (Agyeman-Duah 2005: 13–14). The Electoral Commission facilitated the IPAC’s work by arbitrating on issues to which the parties could not agree.20 The decision to establish the IPAC was an unusually bright moment in a political history largely devoid of creative institution building. And yet the IPAC came out of a spirit of compromise, which is very Ghanaian, and is probably the best explanation for why Ghana has avoided a major crisis in spite of its poor conflict management institution building. What, then, explains this desire among elites to compromise in the interest of peace? To Emmanuel Kwaku Debra, there appears to be emerging consensus among Ghana elites that the country must avoid the fate of

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war-torn neighbors such as Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. This, in his view, explains why the NPP accepted the results of the 1992 elections even though they complained about them being rigged in the interest of peace.21 Baffour Agyeman-Duah, on the other hand, attributes the spirit of compromise to Ghanaians’ “aversion to violent confrontation with authority” (2005: 11). However, this does not fully explain why incumbent governments and their followers (e.g., the NDC in 1992 and the NPP in 2008) are also willing to compromise. It has been suggested that the NDC’s postelection behavior (particularly in 1992, when it made major concessions in the IPAC meetings) might have been driven by the regime’s quest for legitimacy through the elections.22 But the fact that an incumbent party saw compromising as an essential part of its quest for legitimacy points to the value of a compromising spirit in Ghanaian political culture. The NPP’s decision to concede in 2008 has similarly been attributed to effective advocacy by party moderates23 as well as to the impact of external mediation led by Nigeria and ECOWAS.24 These explanations are not mutually exclusive with the compromise thesis because paying heed to moderates and agreeing to mediation are themselves quite demonstrative of a compromising stance. Economic Collapse

What factors explain the success of the economic recovery program in Ghana? An easy answer is the pragmatism and leadership of Rawlings who, when faced with the stark reality of impending collapse, was able to turn against his base and embrace the West. This was a risky move on the part of the government, considering that experiments with IMF stabilization programs had contributed to the coup against Busia in 1971 (Libby 1976: 49). The same pro-CPP leftist elements (in and out of the military) that attacked Busia’s reform efforts also went after Rawlings. The irony, of course, is that until the U-turn, the leftists (including the June Fourth Movement, People’s Revolutionary League, and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards) counted Rawlings among their numbers and may even have considered him a “revolutionary” hero who was going to restore the Nkrumahist “political kingdom.”25 Even though they felt betrayed by Rawlings’s move to the West, it was the radical left’s inability to secure assistance from the communist world or to offer any better alternatives to the IMF−World Bank program that convinced Rawlings to make the move. The final internal obstacle to the reform program was removed in June 1983 when Rawlings exploited a revolt (and coup attempt) by leaders of the June Fourth Movement of the left to purge the radicals from his government (Shillington 1992: 104–106). There were other problems ahead (notably, mass discontent over the removal of subsides, layoffs, and general belt-tightening caused by the adjustment experience) but, under Rawlings’s

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stern leadership, Ghana endured these hardships and ultimately reaped the benefits of reform and growth. Ethnic Conflicts

With respect to ethnic conflict, the government’s poor management record has as much to do with the heavy emphasis placed on containment (to the detriment of resolution) as it does the politicized conflict analysis prevalent in the country’s social discourse. Government’s delegation of conflicts with chieftaincy components to the National House of Chiefs, which is ill equipped to resolve conflicts involving tribes without paramountcies, has been particularly troubling. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the fact that most of the clashes occur away from the main political and economic centers of the nation helps to limit their ability to pose a major threat to the nation as a whole. The Konkomba-Nanumba and Konkomba-Dagomba conflicts, for instance, were very much local or regional affairs even though they had a national following. More recently, investments in a national peace architecture26 (established with the support of development partners, especially the United Nations Development Programme27) has greatly improved the country’s ability to manage conflict both at the national and regional levels. Difficult Foreign Relations

Management of conflicts in Ghana’s relations with its neighbors, on the other hand, has been largely positive, particularly in the post-Rawlings years. The rocky nature of relations with neighboring states such as Togo and Burkina Faso reflects inadequate institutionalization of foreign policy making. This weakness allowed charismatic leaders such as Nkrumah and Rawlings to substitute their personal preferences for national interest. Nkrumah’s personal frustration with leaders unwilling to follow his lead on Pan African unity, for example, led to a policy of noncooperation with their countries often over the objections of his foreign policy team. Kwesi Armah, Ghana’s high commissioner to Britain and minister of foreign trade in Nkrumah’s last government, for instance, reports the foreign policy team’s objection to the decision to host “freedom fighters” such as S. G. Ikoku from Nigeria, T. R. Makonenn from Ethiopia, Harry Basner from South Africa, Habib Ntiang from Senegal, Djibo Bakari from Niger, and the king of Sanwi (2004: 16–17). Similarly, it was Rawlings’s personal dislike for Presidents Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso, instead of Ghana’s national interest, which dictated Ghana’s foreign policy with those countries. This personality-dependent model of foreign policy making

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explains much of the unnecessary friction and conflict with Ghana’s neighboring states under Nkrumah and Rawlings. Outside of the Nkrumah and the Rawlings years, Ghana has generally had a rather muted foreign policy. This muted foreign policy has been attributed to the downturn in economic fortunes after Nkrumah (Boafo-Arthur 1993: 135). This, however, fails to explain why Rawlings was able to pursue an active foreign policy even in times of economic crisis. An alternative explanation is that leaders such as Hilla Limann, John Kuffour, and John Atta-Mills are more even keeled in their approaches to foreign policy because they defer more to foreign policy professionals. For these nonactivist leaders, the preferred approach to managing challenges in Ghana’s relations with neighbors has been dialogue and a resort to international mediation.28

Conclusion How has Ghana been able to avoid a major crisis given its numerous challenges? In the area of political upheavals, several intervening factors contributed to the successful management of potential crises. First, the provisions in the 1992 constitution to bar chiefs from participating in politics helps insulate traditional authorities from the unpleasant aspects of retail politics, preserving their dignity and enabling them to play constructive roles as mediators in political and ethnic conflicts. The constitutional ban also prevents communal conflict by ensuring that chiefs do not divide their communities by endorsing particular political parties or individual candidates against the wishes of a segment of their subjects. This is particularly relevant when one considers the fact that a large portion of Ghanaians vote in their hometowns (instead of their place of abode), putting traditional leaders in a position to cause mischief if they so desire. Second, the political parties’ decision to establish the IPAC after the 1992 elections became a watershed moment in Ghana’s political history. The IPAC has been the primary forum for negotiation over election laws and procedures. Its conflict prevention value therefore cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the IPAC meets only during the election season. For the IPAC to have a maximum impact on election conflict prevention, there is a need to expand its scope and mission to cover all issues pertaining to political party development and democracy in the country. Third, elite consensus regarding the undesirability of civil war, such as in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, has also contributed to preserving peace. This consensus (be it the result of enlightened self-interest or patriotic responsibility), has fed nicely into the Ghanaian norm of compromise, which Agyeman-Duah (1995: 11) refers to as “the fama-Nyame” or “leave it to God” syndrome. Compromise by elites in both incumbent and oppo-

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sition parties at several key points in the democratization process has helped reduce conflict. Fourth, the institutionalization of elections has also contributed to the reduction of conflict. Part of the reason why elites are willing to compromise has to do with the fact that elections are fast becoming routine and expected in Ghana. Losing parties now do not have to take a zero-sum view of political contests because of the certainty of future opportunities to win power. Fifth, Ghanaians have also avoided major crises by not rushing into a review of the 1992 constitution, which contains several clauses deemed offensive to many. Notable are the indemnity clauses that excused human rights violations and other political crimes committed by Rawlings who ruled the country for nearly twenty years. Even though popular sentiment, particularly in the NPP’s Akan stronghold, has always favored a review (ostensibly to allow for the prosecution of Rawlings), elites on both sides managed to contain the issue until recently. Because Rawlings remains popular among major segments of the population, a decision to put him on trial is likely to provoke conflict in the country. The decision to not pursue the repeal of the indemnity clauses (particularly when the NPP came to power in 2000–2008), likely contributed to peace. Sixth, the relative professionalization of Ghana’s Electoral Commission has also contributed to peace in the country. Though the commission has many shortcomings, it has done a good job of managing elections in the country. Governments from both sides have helped build the commission’s credibility by not interfering too much in its work. The EC can become even more useful to Ghana if its conflict management capacity is reinforced. Seventh, establishing a National Peace Architecture has greatly enhanced the country’s conflict management capacity though improved early warning systems and coordinated efforts at containment and resolution. In the area of economic challenges, major crises were avoided largely through the effective leadership of Rawlings who decided to implement IMF and World Bank−sponsored economic reforms. The reforms were unpopular with part of his governing coalition. However, Rawlings did not waver and, as a result, Ghana’s economy went from definite collapse in 1983 to becoming one of the most dynamic economies in West Africa. In the area of ethnic conflict management, the policy of containment has not led to resolution of conflicts, but it has had an impact on preventing them from spreading to other parts of the country. The security measures (e.g., imposition of a state of emergency and media blackouts) that accompany containment have also helped prevent sensationalization of conflict by the media. So, even though government policy hampers resolution in the long term, the short-term gains are visible.

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In the areas of difficult foreign relations, Ghana has avoided major crises by choosing pragmatism over activism in its relations with neighbors. In so doing, recent governments have learned from the problems of the Nkrumah and Rawlings activist years. While this pragmatic approach has sometimes meant stubborn noninterference (including not commenting on rigged elections in Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Nigeria), it has allowed Ghana to maintain peaceful relations with neighbors. Additionally, the use of active problem-solving techniques (e.g., negotiation and resort to mediation) has helped Ghana resolve difficulties in its relations with neighbors when they have arisen. Anticipating Crises

Going forward, what are the risks that Ghana still faces and how can they be avoided? There are several areas that need attention if Ghana is to avoid major crises in the future. The most pressing of these is effective management of the oil discovery to avoid a resource crisis. Even before the first barrel of oil was pumped, there were signs that avoiding conflict over the oil will be a huge challenge. First, there was the question of how to deal with competing claims to parts of the discovery by Côte d’Ivoire, then the people of the Western region who lay claim to the oil even though it is offshore and called for a special compensation package to the tune of 10 percent of oil revenues. Though these issues appear to have been resolved (the Ivorian challenges were settled through negotiation while the Western region citizens’ demands were rejected by parliament), they are likely to feature prominently in future security concerns. The Ivorian challenge, for example, underscores the little known fact that a significant portion of the oil discovery lies outside Ghana’s exclusive economic zone and is subject to contestation by Côte d’Ivoire.29 The challenge is likely to reemerge as more oil is discovered or as a result of a new government coming to power in that country. The Western region citizens’ claim, for its part, may have been quashed by parliament for now, but the politics surrounding the claim and its resolution (including reports of an election campaign pledge made by Vice President John Mahama that the NDC government would allow the 10 percent oil revenue demand to stand), is likely to remain an important source of controversy. Parliament’s decision not to grant the request was based on fears that it might encourage citizens of other resource-rich regions, such as Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, and the Eastern region, to make similar claims. However valid that position may be, grievances over the perception of unfair treatment remain in the Western region where vast mineral deposits

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have brought little development. Additionally, the arrival of oil is driving up the cost of living for ordinary people. Any unresolved grievances over perceived mistreatment by government makes the Western region a potential hotspot, particularly if the government is seen to be misusing the oil monies, or using them for development but in other regions such as Accra, where locals have also taken to demanding ownership of land taken from them in the 1950s through eminent domain laws. Besides oil, Ghana faces other challenges that can lead to crises in the coming years. The issue of electoral security, in particular, deserves special attention since elections are likely to become even more contentious now that the oil revenue has raised the political and economic costs of losing power.30 The current system of allowing district chief executives to chair district electoral commissions (thereby giving them oversight of election security) even when they are candidates in the elections is incongruous. It is unfair to opposition parties and undermines voter confidence in election security, and it can encourage disgruntled persons to resort to self-help measures to resolve election disputes. There are a host of other issues that, if untended, will create political conflicts and damage the legitimacy of the state with enormous security implications. These include the politicization of ethnic conflict, chieftaincy disputes, and recruitment into the country’s security agencies. Other challenges include a youth bulge that will become increasingly destabilizing without a meaningful national youth policy, and the potential for a refugee crisis from the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Tending to these potential problems and other issues should enable Ghana to continue enjoying relative peace in a troubled West African subregion in the years to come.

Notes 1. The National Liberation Council (NLC), in particular, wasted no time in repudiating Nkrumah’s political ideology and calling his stewardship of the economy into question. A favorite target was Nkrumahism, his catch-all political philosophy, which Chazan credits with describing “in rhetorically glorious detail, a picture of the future emanating from the creation of a meaningful African socialism” (1983: 120). 2. The National Redemption Council was reorganized into the Supreme Military Council in October 1975. Acheampong (now promoted to general) retained his leadership position after the reorganization but was deposed on July 5, 1978, in a palace coup by his compatriot and chief of defence staff, Lt. General Fred Kwasi Akuffo. Akuffo led the reconstituted SMC (commonly called SMC II) until June 4, 1979, when he was deposed in the first Rawlings coup. 3. Dr. Emmanuel Kwaku Debra, head of the Political Science Department at the University of Ghana, interviewed by the author, Legon, Ghana. November 25, 2010.

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4. J. H. Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 131–132) traces producer frustration even further back to 1955 and argues that the decline in real producer prices has affected producer investment in traditional planting from 1963 onward. 5. Newman K. Kusi (1991: 188–189) notes that subsidies to state-owned enterprises accounted for up to 9 percent of government expenditure by the late 1980s, even though they were largely unproductive. 6. James C. W. Ahiakpor (1985: 543) argues that Rawlings’s early radical socialist stance, which considered the “existing neo-colonial relations between Ghana and imperialist west” as the source of the country’s problems, fueled much of the AFRC’s harassment of foreign businesses and contributed to the financial and economic crisis. 7. The Aowin, Nzima, and Sanwi (in the west) have relatives in Côte d’Ivoire while the Ewes (in the east) have kinsmen in Togo. 8. Olajide Aluko (1977: 75) also notes Nkrumah’s support for political dissidents, including S. G. Ikogu, leader of the Action Group of Nigeria, who was given political asylum in Accra even though he was wanted in Nigeria for treason. Nkrumah also trained insurgents and other political activists from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Côte d’Ivoire. 9. Baffour Agyeman-Duah (2005: 8), for instance, notes that the PNDC had no immediate intention of restoring constitutional rule and contemplated a system of “politics without parties.” 10. PNDC Law 281, for instance, restricted parties from accepting big donations, from adopting the name and symbols of any previous political party, and from campaigning prior to being registered. Agyeman-Duah (2005: 8–9) also notes that, once registered, parties had only sixty days to meet Electoral Commission conditions regarding the establishment of offices at the national, regional, and district levels; provision of the names and titles of officers at all levels to the commission; declaration of assets, expenditures, and audited accounts. 11. Agyeman-Duah (2005: 9) observes that the National Commission on Democracy (which supervised the transition process), the Constituent Assembly (which reviewed and adopted the proposed constitution), and the Interim National Electoral Commission consisted of known sympathizers and partisans of the PNDC. 12. Henry Kwasi Prempeh (Ghanaian legal scholar and associate professor of law at Seton Hall University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey). Interviewed by author, Accra, Ghana. November 28, 2010) points to the ethnic nature of political commentary on pro-NDC radio gold. Similarly, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (2010: 4) reports that the NPP focused on regions dominated by the Akans, particularly the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and Eastern regions, while the NDC concentrated its efforts in the non-Akan areas, particularly Volta, Upper West, Upper East, and Northern regions, but also among the non-Akan migrant communities within the NPP’s Akan stronghold (Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). 13. According to Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Rawlings was particularly strident in his attacks on the NPP during the period leading to the runoff, when he urged NDC supporters to resist NPP efforts to rig the elections (Gyimah-Boadi 2010). 14. The Banking Act of 1970, for instance, was reformed to bar foreign banks from retail banking. 15. Paul Nugent (1995: 92) and Kevin Shillington (1992: 99) report that a PNDC delegation led by Chris Atim was sent to Libya (in February 1982) and later (in April) to Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union in search of financial support, but returned mostly empty-handed. See also, Emmanuel Hansen (1991).

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16. Donald Iain Ray (1986: 63) notes that Rawlings tried to prevent the rebellion from the left by comparing the Economic Recovery Program to Lenin’s New Economic Policy and Mao’s National Democratic Phase, both of which “recognized the role of capitalist reconstruction under socialist direction in building the socialist state.” 17. Dr. Linda Darkwa, research fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) at the University of Ghana, Legon. Interviewed by the author, Legon, Ghana, November 25, 2010. 18. In his keynote address to the International Conference on Preventing Electoral Violence, held in Accra in March 2010, for example, Vice President John Dramani Mahama singled out trust in the Electoral Commission as a major reason for Ghana’s political stability. Commenting further on the outcome of the conduct of elections in the country, he noted that “trust and faith in the electoral results that come out are because of the confidence that various political parties have in the Electoral Commission being non-partisan.” See Jendayi E. Frazer and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (2011: 81). 19. Key organizations driving this progress include the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CCD-Ghana) and the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), who train and deploy election observers as well as organize forums for aspring members of parliament to interact with voters. Frazer and Gyimah-Boadi (2011: 78). 20. Agyeman-Duah (2005: 14) reports that Electoral Commission’s arbitration resolved an impasse over extending the registration period and the minority parties’ demand for same-day presidential and parliamentary elections. 21. Debra interview, Legon, Ghana, November 25, 2010. 22. Debra interview, Legon, Ghana. November 25, 2010. Also, Donald Rothchild (1995: 49–65) expertly outlines the PNDC’s quest for legitimacy through the elections. 23. Gyimah-Boadi (2010), p. 5. 24. According to Darkwa, the intervention of ECOWAS Commission president Mohamed Ibn Chambas and former Nigerian president Abdulsalami Abubakar helped ensure that Akuffo Addo conceded. Darkwa interview, Legon, Ghana. November 25, 2010. 25. Kevin Shillington (1992: 84) discusses the role these and other left-leaning groups played in legitimizing the 1981 Rawlings coup. Of particular interest is the role played by the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, a group affiliated with the People’s National Party of Dr. Hilla Limann, who Rawlings had deposed. See Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (London: Macmillan, 1992). 26. Ghana’s National Peace Architecture is made up of the following: a National Peace Council (NPC), composed of a select group of eminent persons with a responsibility to promote peace at all levels of government; Regional Peace Advisory Councils (RPACs), charged with resolving all interdistrict conflicts or conflicts that arise among groups inhabiting more than one district; and District Peace Advisory Councils (DPACs), charged with promoting peace at the district level. The National Peace Architecture also includes a peacebuilding support unit, which is based at the offices of the Ministry of the Interior in Accra. The peacebuilding support unit handles coordination and liaison functions across the country. See Ministry of the Interior, “National Architecture for Peace in Ghana,” Accra, Ghana, 2006.

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27. Dr. Ozonia, Director for Conflict Prevention and Recovery in the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Interviewed by author, New York, April 23, 2013. 28. Darkwa interview, Legon, Ghana, November 25, 2010. 29. Darkwa interview, Legon, Ghana, November 25, 2010. 30. H. K. Prempeh, interview, Accra, Ghana, November 28, 2010.

7 Kenya: The Challenges of Democratic State Making John W. Harbeson

THE MOST SERIOUS STATE-THREATENING CRISES MAY SIMMER JUST

below the surface of a country’s politics for a long time before incidents provoke their volcanic eruption. So it has been with Kenya. The widespread perception that the 2007 national elections had been stolen by the ruling regime, a perception shared by domestic and international observers, provoked some of the most serious violence in the country’s history. More than a thousand Kenyans were killed and estimates of the number of persons internally displaced as a result of the violence ranged as high as 600,000. Comprehensive inquiries into the causes of the violence exposed deep longstanding grievances and flawed governmental capacity to anticipate and address their violent expression.1

Crisis Background Fraudulent conduct of the 2007 elections at the vote-counting stage exposed deep fault lines in the structure of the Kenyan polity that began to surface publicly with the country’s first two multiparty elections in three decades, in 1992 and 1997. These, too, were marred by significant violence. The defining elements of the crisis have been untrammeled uses of executive power, exercised in authoritarian ways, that have perpetrated colonial precedents corrupting the government itself as well as land tenure relations throughout the country and, thereby, the very fabric of Kenya society. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation project (KNDR) led by Kofi Annan reported concerns that the processes for 133

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accommodating the tens of thousands of internally displaced persons may not have been impartial and that momentum to complete the process may have diminished. Background Factors

Kenya’s 224,000 square miles approximate the US states of Arizona and Nevada combined, encompassing a population estimated at over 45 million in 2014, roughly that of California and Nevada combined. Population densities vary dramatically, but annual population growth rates currently at 2.1 percent, combined with 75 percent of the population employed in rural areas according to the most recent 2007 estimates, spell ever higher person to land ratios in a country with substantial but still finite high-quality agricultural land. Severely corrupted and insecure land tenure relations have increased these demographic pressures that, in turn, have deepened ethnic tensions violently expressed in the aftermath of deeply flawed elections in 1992, 1997, and especially 2007.2 To date Kenya has satisfactorily withstood, but nevertheless has been significantly stressed by, ethnically based tensions in its neighborhoods. Somali-dominated northeastern Kenya as well as the country as a whole have been affected by fallout from the collapsed Somali state, including the inflationary effects of pirate loot in Nairobi and other cities, and more recently confrontations with al-Shabaab, some concentrated in relatively remote long marginalized areas of the country. Tensions among pastoral communities in southern Ethiopia, and between them and the Ethiopian government, have spilled over into northern Kenya. Kenya shares a northwestern border with southern Sudan, giving the government of Kenya a reason for its active role in seeking peaceful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that resulted in an independent southern Sudan in mid-2011. Kenya was heavily invested in amelioration of the genocidal violence that racked Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s and retains a clear interest in both countries’ postconflict stability. To a substantial extent, the contours and fault lines of Kenyan politics, including the present crisis, have always followed those of its geography. The great Rift Valley establishes a large zone where Kalenjin and other semipastoral communities have dominated the landscape; where Kenya’s second president, Daniel arap Moi, built his political power base; and where infusions have occurred predominantly of Kikuyu from the highlands to the east and, to a lesser extent, Kisii and others in the west as well as in coastal areas. These infusions have created long-simmering crises over land rights and ethnic identity that were violently ignited by flawed elections since 1992. Relatively greater exposure to Arab and Indian cultural influences have contributed to setting coastal Kenya apart, resulting in some-

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what of a penchant among its smaller ethnic communities for making common cause politically with those of the Rift Valley versus the larger communities of the highlands to the east and west of the Rift Valley. At the same time, these tensions have exposed a previously overlooked fault line dating from colonial times when the coast of Kenya was a British protectorate in contrast to the colony that was the remainder of Kenya. Socioeconomic Framework

While Kenya remains a poor country, terming it a “developing” country is no euphemism. The country ranked 147 out of 187, according to the 2014 UN Human Development Report. An earlier September 2010 report credited Kenya with significant progress in meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals. Its achievements at the halfway point of the fifteen-year project included reducing the percentage of the population below the poverty line; progress toward full primary school enrollment by 2015, with comparable increases in primary school completion rates from 68 to 83 percent; decreased infant mortality rates from 77 per 1,000 to 52 per 1,000; reduced HIV prevalence rates from 13 to 7.5 percent; marked improvement in malaria prevention and control; and increased access to safe drinking water from 60 to 83 percent. These trends were supported by a healthy GDP growth rate of 5.1 percent by 2013. Poverty, inequality, and shortfalls in meeting some Millennium Development Goals have enlarged the stakes in what has long been substantially a winner-take-all political competition. These economic woes have sharpened and deepened long-standing ethnic tensions and growing class stratification more than the overall economic progress that would appear to bridge and ameliorate these divides. In 2009, 26 percent of Kenyans were unable to meet minimum daily nutritional requirements, the vast majority of whom, as of 2012, live in rural areas that have been deeply affected by decades of executive branch corruption of land tenure relations (World Bank 2015). Maternal mortality rates have actually increased substantially over the past decade. Kenya’s Gini coefficient stands at 44.5, signifying one of the higher levels of inequality in sub-Saharan Africa and the world (Society for International Development, n.d.). As of 2012, the richest 10 percent of participants claimed 38 percent of household income while the poorest 10 percent were left with 2 percent, 43.4 percent living below the poverty line (Central Intelligence Agency 2015). Kenya’s sharp socioeconomic inequalities have visible spatial dimensions that correspond, generally, to provincially based ethnic spheres of influence. Particularly with respect to long-standing land grievances, these differences have found expression in the violence attending three of the past four elections. Table 7.1 captures some of these spatially grounded

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Table 7.1 Spatial Inequalities in Nairobi Province

Province Central Coast Eastern Nairobi North Eastern Nyanza Rift Valley Western Urban Rural

High Potential Land (percentage) 69 5 5

97 18 90

Source: World Bank 2009b.

Poverty Rate 31 59 50 22 74 47 49 53

Unemployment Rate 10 17 9 21 40 7 13 12

High School Enrollment (percentage)

Land Inequality (Gini coefficient)

Land Inequality Change

Consumption Gains (percentage) 1997–2006

30 11 15 38

0.744 0.865 0.731 0.993

36.4 73.1 21.6 31.1

3.2 –2.2 15.1 45.1

19 18 13

0.815 0.870 0.769

71.8 35.4 32.7

31.5 4.0 10.5 23.8 1.5

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inequalities. Noteworthy in these data are sharp provincial differences in: (1) availability of high-quality land in rural areas where a majority of Kenyans still seek their livelihoods; (2) poverty rates; (3) unemployment rates; (4) secondary school enrollment rates; and (5) per capital consumption gains over a recent ten-year period. The city and province of Nairobi are roughly coextensive, their statistics in this table emblematic of sharp and growing urban-rural economic divides. Gini indexes of land inequality attest to extraordinary and rapidly growing inequalities across provincial and, by extension to some extent, also across ethnic lines. Finally, the limited availability of data on North Eastern province and its singular poverty, economic distress, and marginalization has an obvious and troubling influence on the country’s relations with the neighboring failed Somali state. Historical and Structural Dimensions

The principal tectonic drivers of the crisis of the Kenyan state that erupted in the aftermath of the 2007 elections have been present almost since the country’s founding as a British colony more than a century ago. Fundamentally, they have been patterns of unrestricted executive power that have corrupted the government and Kenyan society at large, notably with respect to land tenure relations. These practices have been accompanied by indifference to the views and interests of ordinary Kenyans concerning socioeconomic and political development of the country. The reform agenda instituted with the assistance of Annan and his team following the 2007 elections has constituted the country’s first comprehensive surgery on these long-standing causes of the crisis. British colonial rule instituted unchecked executive power in the person of the colonial governor. By statute, colonial governors retained this unrestrained power over all land within the colony, notwithstanding areas held in trust for individual ethnic communities. Thus, beyond their alienation of millions of acres of land from the patrimonies of African peoples for the use of thousands of European settler farmers, the very fact of unchecked colonial executive power over land introduced high levels of insecurity in land tenure practices that formed the core of social structure in African communities. Upholding of the colonial regime’s own rules and regulations at the end of the day rested on the discretion of the governor. Application of the British practice of indirect rule, ostensibly intended to reinforce traditional societies and their leadership structures, proved precisely counterproductive (Hodgkin 1957).3 Traditional leadership cadres were seen by African peoples as serving two masters. Formalized territorial boundaries for African ethnic communities corrupted Kikuyu land tenure systems premised on territorial expansion, exacerbated privatization of

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landholdings, and crystallized polarization between the landed and the landless, not least because of correlations between appointed African chiefs perceived to be aligned with the colonial government and de facto land ownership. To these trends, the colonial government officially turned a blind eye. The result was the Mau Mau Emergency of the 1950s, a violent Kikuyu uprising seeking both the reunification of a polarized Kikuyu society and the termination of the colonial rule that caused disarray by undermining traditional land tenure rules. Thousands of Africans were killed or maimed in what was in essence a civil war within Kikuyu society, requiring a substantial British military force to quell it. During the emergency, the colonial government and a more moderate segment of the European settler community conceived the idea of consolidating land fragments in Kikuyulan resulting from inheritance practices into contiguous units and then registering them with individual freehold titles. They did so in the belief that this would crystallize the evolution of private Kikuyu land tenure and end land tenure insecurity. At the same time, the East African Royal Commission recommended that racial and ethnic spheres of influence in land be abolished to create a single market in privately owned land that would allow anyone to purchase land anywhere in the colony, ethnic identity notwithstanding. The Swynnerton Plan established development loans for Kikuyu farmers against the security of their now freehold land titles and lifted a ban on African coffee growing. One effect of the program was to create an internal diaspora in which Kikuyu purchased urban as well as rural land within the once colonially protected spheres of influence of other peoples. A second effect was to boost the economic productivity of the colony for years to come, lifting Kenya above the economies of many other newly independent African countries. In addition, the colonial government and its cooperating segment of the European settler community hoped that these policies would fashion a multiracial alliance of property-owning farmers that would forestall independence under African majority rule. Believing the European settler farmers to be essential to Kenya’s economic health and future political stability, the British government allowed European settlers largely to dictate the terms on which Kenya would receive independence. These terms included upholding the sanctity of private property rights, especially in land; a program to buy out European settler farmers allowing them to recover their capital prior to independence; subdivision of these lands into plots intended for landless and unemployed Africans; and constitutional provisions hemming in African majority rule. These constitutional provisions included a bicameral parliament, an independent Central Land Board to manage all land matters, and a majimbo (federal structure) decentralizing many governmental powers to regions. Majimbo was intended to benefit European settlers and small ethnic com-

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munities fearful of the dominance of the large Kikuyu and Luo communities in an anticipated postindependence ruling by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party led by Jomo Kenyatta. Jomo Kenyatta’s KANU won large enough majorities in the first election to enable his government to amend the independence constitution. It abolished the Central Land Board, the second house of parliament, and majimbo. As it abolished majimbo, it also engineered the voluntary incorporation into KANU of the opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU’s leaders, including future president Moi, were awarded senior posts in the cabinet at the cost of the departure and alienation of Vice President Oginga Odinga and most of the Luo community for more than three decades until Odinga’s son, Raila, joined the present Mwai Kibaki government for a time. The KANU government embraced the imposed requirement of respect for private property rights as its own. It sustained extension of a single market in land, presaging the demise of colonially established ethnic spheres of influence, by promoting extension of land consolidation and individual title registration throughout the country. In recentralizing power in the hands of the central government, the Jomo Kenyatta government and its successors unilaterally restored, retained, and extended the executive authority once vested in colonial governors, notwithstanding laws on the books purporting to block such accretions of executive power. In a word, the Kenyatta and Moi administrations embraced private landholding sans the legal protections in which it is ensconced in democratic polities. On the surface, in its early years, Kenya was widely regarded as a model of successful postindependence development along with Côte d’Ivoire because of its market-oriented economy, including in land; Jomo Kenyatta’s rapprochement with the remaining European community; the country’s above average economic performance and its attractiveness for investment; and the country’s reputation. As a de facto but not de jure single-party state, the country acquired a reputation for political tolerance, moderation, and stability in a continent dominated by more radical politics and considerable political instability. Increasingly, however, authoritarian rule, endemic corruption, and increasingly explicit ethnic tension intersected in the later years of the Jomo Kenyatta administration and that of successor Moi to cause state decay. Opportunities for dispensing land as patronage diminished, which was one factor leading to Kenya’s becoming a de jure one-party state and to increasingly repressive authoritarian rule under Moi. Instigated at the top in both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, land tenure corruption spread throughout Kenya’s economy and society. Land commissioners, local governments, and parastatal corporations replicated what the presidential regimes started. Land tenure corruption not only drew in politicians at local as well as

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national levels, but also civil servants, parastatal corporations, business and professional people of all kinds, and religious institutions. Overall, the Ndungu Commission (2004) found that the Kenyatta and especially the Moi regimes had issued over 200,000 illegal titles since independence. Increasingly authoritarian rule, and its corrupt application in the area of land policy and practice, illuminated an undermining and weakening of the state itself. In ignoring its own rules mandating order and transparency in land transactions, the Jomo Kenyatta and Moi regimes undermined trust between rulers and the ruled. Indeed, these regimes lost control of the corruption of land practices they had initiated as, like a virulent cancer, these practices replicated themselves at local levels and in the corporate sector. And the regimes deepened interethnic tension by extending legal and illegal markets into areas of the country where trust lands intended to protect the integrity of individual ethnic communities were nominally still in place. Moi’s brutal repression of civil society’s protest against authoritarian rule and these abuses gained his regime notoriety for its flagrant abuse of basic human rights, which prompted the Paris Club to demand that Moi amend the constitution to allow multiparty competition beginning with the 1992 elections. The Paris Club’s choice not to demand comprehensive constitutional reform prior to the first competitive elections in three decades launched the country on a two-decade struggle for reform. Demands for long-term constitutional and socioeconomic reform jostled with short-term electoral imperatives for attention of both the regime and opposition parties. Overall, short-term electoral priorities prevailed, a consequence of which was the violent expression of long-term land and other grievances in the 1992 and 1997 elections that foretold that of 2007, which resulted in the present comprehensive reform agenda.4

Dimensions of the Crisis and Current Status Crisis Amelioration Terms

A crisis that the country could not take in its stride, yet which it appeared unable to resolve on its own, required extensive mediation by former UN Secretary-General Annan and African Union leaders to forge terms for restoring peace and political stability. The terms included a power-sharing agreement between the ruling and principal opposition parties and measures to end the violence; minister to the victims of the violence, including the hundreds of thousands displaced from their homes and lands; and ameliorate long-term underlying causes of the crisis. Among those underlying causes were: (1) overdue constitutional reform; (2) profoundly corrupted

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land tenure relations that worked serious injustices over many decades; (3) persistent inequalities; (4) unemployment, especially among youth; (5) fractured national cohesion; and (6) serious deficits in transparency and accountability.5 Status of Agreement Implementation

The agreement held together for over five years until the next election in 2013 that elevated Uhuru Kenyatta, son of founding president Jomo Kenyatta, to the presidency. The results of the 2013 election were disputed in court, but the election itself and its aftermath were relative peaceful, notwithstanding many unmet objectives of the accord fashioned by Annan.6 Difficulties notwithstanding, the principals in the power-sharing agreement, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, appeared to establish a viable working relationship. The high levels of postelection violence began to recede at least to precrisis levels. Importantly, visible measures to minister to the victims of the violence have been taken, but have remained incompletely formulated and implemented. The KNDR, led by Annan, has taken note of concerns that ethnic bias has crept into assistance to tens of thousands of IDPs and that momentum for completing the process has noticeably diminished. The Kenyan government has taken two important steps to address the deeper structural factors underlying the 2007 postelection violence: (1) adoption by referendum in August 2010 of a new constitution which, most importantly, trims and checks executive power and significantly decentralizes political power to more local levels; and (2) formulation and parliamentary approval, in mid-2009, of the country’s first postindependence comprehensive land policy designed to achieve “efficient, sustainable, and equitable use of land,”7 which responds to issues bedeviling the country since its founding as a colony that have been substantially suppressed and exacerbated since its independence. The tasks of implementing both have barely begun as of this writing in December 2014, and they are numerous, complex, wide-ranging, and politically challenging. Moreover, the equally difficult underlying challenges of prioritizing implementation of the constitution and the land policy and establishing acceptable processes for doing so appear to remain unrecognized and unaddressed. On the broader issue of the well-being of the Kenya economy, World Bank analyses of socioeconomic problems underlying and exacerbating the crisis have balanced acknowledgment of significant government initiatives and achievements with portrayals of all that still remains to be done (World Bank 2009). The Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (KCIC) and civil society groups have made noteworthy efforts to promote greater interethnic comity, and monitoring reports suggest that progress has

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been made but how much long-term progress in this area is in the offing remains to be seen.8 Finally, on overcoming corruption and achieving transparency and accountability, Kenya presents a mixed picture. Yet even a mixed picture represents a degree of progress and a basis for cautious optimism. On the one hand, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) has been active in investigating corruption and promoting codes of ethics. Parliamentary committees have been increasingly aggressive in discovering high-level corruption, leading to the suspension or resignation of several ministers. On the other hand, overshadowing these initiatives are lingering questions about the ultimate disposition of International Criminal Court trials of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto, linked to the broader question of whether or not Kenya will be found in compliance with the court’s requirement that the government cooperate fully with its investigations. Opinion polls concerning the appropriateness and the wisdom of the trials have fluctuated substantially since Annan’s original list of six individuals went to the court when Kenya appeared unable or unwilling to hold trials for these and others implicated in the 2007–2008 postelection violence. The International Criminal Court’s involvement represents an indictment of the government’s incapacity to take this action itself, and there has been considerable discussion concerning what impact the court indictments might have regarding Kenya’s future capacity to contain such violence and prosecute it where it occurs. Moreover, the focus to date has been on high-level central government figures largely to the exclusion of lower-level corruption. Further, the disarray of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (TJRC) and its much-edited final report has made it appear problematic at best that Kenya will ever be able to bring to justice past high-level corruption or to make whole its victims. Beyond controversy surrounding the TJRC’s chair, who initially resigned, the commission’s two-year mandate and its resources were clearly inadequate for it to pursue injustices brought about by corruption extending back at least as far as independence nearly a half-century ago. The merits of provisions in the enabling legislation that allow for amnesty grants have also been controversial. Additionally, the underlying causes of the violence unleashed by electoral controversy over three of five Kenyan multiparty elections in the country’s democratic era (1992, 1997, and 2007–2008) have been overlaid with new fissures arising from Kenya’s joining the multinational campaign against al-Shabaab in Somalia, which provoked the brutal Westgate Mall counterattack, notable attacks in Kenya’s coastal and northeastern regions, and others. At this writing, the Kenyan government continued to struggle to find an appropriate and effective response to these attacks. An Institute for

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Security Studies report warned that mass arrests and armed attacks on insurgents may have been counterproductive, inflaming previously lesshostile relations with the county’s Islamic community (Institute for Security Studies 2014). At the same time, corruption and other weaknesses in Kenya’s domestic security forces have been exposed anew.

Crisis Management Themes in Comprehensive State Reform Crisis management is a predictable and underexplored dimension of movements for democratic state reform such as Kenya has experienced over the two decades since 1991. From this experience many themes, lessons, and guidelines may be discerned, but three especially stand out. Anticipation

A central theme of the Waki Commission inquiry into the causes of the 2007 postelection violence was that Kenya’s police and security forces did not anticipate and were inadequately prepared for the violence that arose (Waki Commission 2008). The absence of significant violence accompanying the 2002 elections appeared to have diminished memories of the violence accompanying the preceding two elections. This failure has been recognized since 2007 and some efforts have been under way to repair these deficiencies. The efforts of the Interim Electoral Commission helped to ensure that the 2010 plebiscite on the new constitution would be essentially free of violence. But responsibility for failure to anticipate the state-threatening violence following the 2007 elections is to be more broadly shared because of its deeper causes. Particularly within Kenyan civil society, there has been at least post hoc recognition that it has been unwise to proceed with initial competitive national elections after long periods of authoritarianism before first seeking consensus on comprehensive constitutional reform. (Harbeson 1997). Early on in sub-Saharan Africa’s democratic third wave, it became clear that those countries that followed this precept have, on balance, been among the stronger democratic performers (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Capacities for Management

In the aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence, a substantial network of NGOs have devoted themselves from different perspectives to the tasks of discerning and undertaking amelioration of the factors producing that crisis and to establishing mechanisms for preventing its recurrence in the future.

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Particularly noteworthy has been the peace hotline established by PeaceNet with the collaboration of KCIC to identify hot spots and deploy teams to address their sources before they result in violent conflict. The government’s police forces have collaborated by inserting additional personnel where needed. With some justice, these groups claim an important contribution to the violence-free plebiscite on the new constitution. These capacities and initiatives in civil society, however, are clearly insufficient by themselves. Moreover, since the 2013 elections, the Uhuru Kenyatta government has signaled its intent to restrict the independence of civil society organizations and, thus, their peacemaking as well as advocacy capacity. In addition, the relatively new land reform policy and constitution bestow a large number of mandates on parliament and institutions it has already created, such as KACC and TJRC, to bring the resources of the government to bear on the underlying causes of the crisis discussed above. To date, however, a large-scale management problem has remained substantially unrecognized, let alone unaddressed. There has been no prioritization of tasks, and no procedures and processes for discharging these mandates to address the underlying causes of the crisis have yet been formulated, negotiated, or tested. The fundamentally political nature of these tasks (by which I mean consultations leading to consensus building on how to discharge these tasks) has yet to begin. Neither has there been any apparent public recognition that skills appropriate to these tasks are required and need to be cultivated. Thus, the danger is real that the momentum to attack these problems fueled by the passage of the new constitution and the new land policy will dissipate and metastasize into cynicism and renewed alienation. Crisis Management Incentives

The magnitude of Kenya’s 2007 postelection crisis in and of itself may have supplied the most powerful and all-inclusive incentive to forestall its repetition. If, however, there is a more widespread sense than at any point since Kenya’s independence that practices contributing to the crisis must be called out and discarded and that more receptivity to new thinking must be cultivated, it would seem that catalytic action with a view toward setting reform in motion is also equally indispensable. Incentives themselves must be converted to action in ways that key actors demonstrate and are seen to demonstrate. Risk, courage, determination, and trial and error are all essential ingredients in these initiatives. To date, it is not clear to what extent, if any, elite incentives have been converted into active initiatives to promote reform. The key questions are where and from whom this catalytic action might emerge, and what initiatives will catch on and become self-sustaining. For Kenya, powerful external actors have supplied the main catalytic action to

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date: the Paris Club in 1991; an influential ambassador here and there; Annan and his team; and, perhaps, Luis Moreno Ocampo and the International Criminal Court. But the key questions are: Who and what will supply the indispensable domestic catalysis? Will it be energized parliamentary committees holding the executive branch to account? Or model new county governments? More brilliant new jurists in the mode of new chief justice, Willy Mutunga? Continuation and further strengthening of Kenya’s freewheeling print and electronic media? Civil society initiatives? Visionary and accomplished ministers? Yet elusive glitch-free elections technology that consequently is corruption free? More likely, some combination thereof will occur—if Kenya is fortunate.

Conclusion Kenya’s state-threatened postelection crisis in 2007, long in the making and presaged earlier in the country’s new democratic era, has turned negative energy into critically important positive achievements in the form of the country’s first new postindependence constitution, its first comprehensive land policy, and a wide array of initiatives in both government and civil society to repair the corruption of the public and private sector alike. But sooner or later, the constitutional moment will arrive at a critical juncture with many alternative trajectories, depending on the extent to which these forward-looking initiatives are widely perceived to be taking root or not. Whether and to what extent a stable and enduring democratic state will emerge is likely to be substantially a function of how nascent democratic processes are utilized to anticipate and address hurdles and obstacles contained in the parliamentary mandates, of how skillfully strategies and processes for implementing the many new constitutional and land reform mandates are formulated and activated, and of how much good fortune shines on the country in the form of visionary and skillful catalytic actors and actions to show the way on these implementation agendas.

Notes 1. See Waki Commission 2008. For an account of the country’s sometimes violent struggle for constitutional reform, see Mutua 2008. The crisis in land tenure relations is documented in great detail in Ndungu Commission 2004. Recent accounts of the country’s socioeconomic condition include: UN Development Programme–Kenya 2010; United Kingdom Department of International Development n.d.; World Bank 2009, 2008. 2. Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence Report (Waki Commission), Nairobi, 2008.

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3. Thomas Lionel Hodgkin’s Nationalism in Colonial Africa is a classic and authoritative assessment of colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa. See Hodgkin 1957. 4. The 2002 elections were largely violence free primarily because President Daniel arap Moi opted not to seek a third term, thereby making victory by an opposition coalition a virtual certainty and generating widespread anticipation of the reforms that were to be instituted only after the 2007 elections. 5. These terms for the resolution of the crisis and monitoring of progress in their implementation are part of the KNDR Monitoring Project, www.dialogue kenya.org. In addition, accounts of progress in resolving the Kenya crisis are based on interviews, obtained on condition of non-atribution obtained in Kenya from October 22 through November 6, 2010. 6. A United States Institute of Peace report concludes that “narratives of fear and memory were the dominant explanation for why the country averted mass violence” (United States Institute of Peace 2014: 3). 7. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands, Sessional Paper No. 3, National Land Policy. 2009. Incorporated in legislation passed by Parliament in August 2009. 8. http://www.cohesion.or.ke/departments/reconciliation-integration-department .html.

8 Nigeria: Cycles of Crisis, Sources of Resilience Peter M. Lewis

NIGERIA IS AFRICA’S MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY. IT IS ALSO AMONG

the continent’s most diverse populations, with more than 250 ethnic and language groups and nearly even religious balance among Christians and Muslims. For more than three decades, the country has been the largest producer of crude oil in Africa, and it is an increasingly important supplier of natural gas. In many respects, Nigeria forms the economic, political, and security anchor of West Africa. Since independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has experienced four prominent crises. The first crisis centered on the combined failure of parliamentary democracy and national unity in the mid-1960s. Political breakdown and communal tensions gave way to an extended era of military rule, accompanied by a devastating civil war (1967–1970) that claimed at least a million lives. The second crisis was prompted by the collapse of the oil boom. The boom era of the 1970s fostered a transformation of Nigeria’s political economy, creating extensive distortions and volatility. Sustained economic distress arose from the collapse of oil prices beginning in 1981 and the protracted stagnation that ensued. The third crisis focused on the failed political transition and autocratic rule of the 1990s. Weak institutions and the fragmentation of elites created conditions for deteriorating governance under a series of increasingly predatory military regimes. The fourth crisis centered on the escalating Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and the contentious 2015 elections. These recent challenges, partially resolved at this writing, reflect problems of power sharing and inclusion under electoral rule.

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Since the transition to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced the longest continuous period of electoral civilian government since independence, spanning five elections and a change of administration in a context of civic space and independent media. Nonetheless, democratization has been an unsettled process, marked by political turbulence, economic fluctuations, and widespread social violence. Flawed elections and the extension of control by a dominant political party undermined accountability and popular representation. The oil-based economy, characterized by deep inequalities, extensive poverty, and little flexibility, has been susceptible to external shocks and domestic stresses. Nigeria’s diverse social landscape has been shaken by more than 2,500 incidents of communal violence across the country, in which at least 35,000 people have died (Nigeria Social Violence Project 2015). Nigeria’s challenges are often framed in terms of crisis, suggesting that these various stresses produce serious threats to national stability. Many of these adverse events, however, have been contained or managed, though not without lingering problems or recurring unrest. Elite bargaining, institutional change, civic organization, and fortuitous resources provide elements of resilience. Nonetheless, Nigeria remains a crisis-prone country and it is possible to envision scenarios in which modest shocks could escalate into major national disruptions. Given the country’s chronic problems of governance, the challenges of political contention, economic decline, and communal conflict often threaten to deteriorate into systemic problems.

Nigeria’s Four Crises A crisis is an ongoing set of circumstances that ultimately threatens political, economic, social, or security aspects of the status quo. At its essence, a crisis is unsustainable: adverse conditions must either be resolved, or serious disruption of the prevailing order will result. A crisis is not synonymous with a shock, which is a temporary, unanticipated event that creates special problems or challenges. Crisis conditions are both deeper, affecting the structural foundations of the system, and longer-lasting than the reverberation of a temporary shock. Shocks may easily spiral into crises if they are not effectively managed. Examples include controversial elections, commodity price changes, localized communal violence, and natural disasters. While this case focuses on central challenges for Nigeria in the period since the 1999 inauguration of the Fourth Republic, the historical background of major crises provides context for analyzing current problems and the prospects for crisis management. In this section, I look at critical junctures in the Nigerian experience as a prelude to current challenges.

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Nigeria’s first postindependence crisis resulted from a combined breakdown of democratic politics and national unity in 1966–1967, when two coups and a civil war convulsed the country in the space of eighteen months. The federal parliamentary system inherited at independence proved to be unworkable, and national institutions could not accommodate deepseated ethnic and regional divisions (Diamond 1988). The country’s three largest minorities formed political majorities in each of three regions: Hausa-Fulani elites controlled the leading party and government machinery of the Northern region, Yoruba leaders dominated the Western region, and Igbos were preeminent in the Eastern region. These political structures focused the contention of the principal ethnoregional groups. Each of the three leading parties sought to preserve dominance of their home region while also attempting inroads into neighboring areas (Sklar 1963). The Hausa-Fulani−led Northern People’s Congress gained control of the legislature and the federal government through its population margin and disciplined political organization. A string of events led to political confrontation and social polarization. A contested census, a political emergency in the Western region, growing evidence of governmental corruption, labor unrest, and ethnic violence among the Tiv in the Middle Belt created political turbulence during the first civilian term. The 1964–1965 elections arrayed a coalition of the leading southern parties against a northern-led alliance (Diamond 1988). The polls were marred by extensive irregularities, a partial opposition boycott, and widespread violence. In the wake of the elections, the armed forces ousted the civilian regime in a violent coup at the beginning of 1966. Leading northern and western politicians were killed in the revolt. The new junta, led by a group of Igbo officers, took steps to replace federalism with a unitary state. The coup stoked communal resentments, prompting a countercoup in July 1966 that eliminated the eastern coup leaders and brought forward a Middle Belt Christian, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, to head the new regime. Gowon sought to restore federalism with a more fragmented state map (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981). The political violence of 1965 and 1966 provoked ethnic and regional tensions that ultimately threatened the cohesion of the Nigerian nation. The July 1966 coup was accompanied by anti-Igbo pogroms in the north, killing thousands and provoking an exodus to the eastern Igbo heartland. Violence against Igbo military officers also splintered the military, and Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu led the Eastern region in an attempted secession struggle as the Republic of Biafra. Over a thirty-month civil war, at least a million Nigerians died, mainly Igbo civilians afflicted by starvation and disease under a federal blockade of the region. The 1966–1967 crises had multiple causes (Dudley 1982). The ethnic and regional map traced by British colonialism merged unfavorably with

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the parliamentary institutions of the new republic. Ethnic agendas among leading politicians aggravated this contention. The instability fostered by military intervention intensified perceptions of threat among major communal groups. Despite Gowon’s efforts to shore up federalism and avoid conflict, the forces and passions that had been set in motion drove the country toward a national rupture. Ultimately, the federal forces prevailed and Gowon’s government pursued a policy of national reconciliation after the war, aided considerably by the arrival of abundant oil revenues. The oil boom that began in the early 1970s transformed the national economy while creating the foundations for Nigeria’s second major crisis, a prolonged economic downturn beginning in 1981. Oil production expanded rapidly after the cessation of hostilities in 1970, and the major price hikes of 1973 fostered explosive growth in export revenues (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981). Nigeria’s economy tripled in size between 1973 and 1978 while government spending grew even more rapidly. Changes in prices and factors fostered a relative decline in non-oil productive sectors, leading to an export monoculture based on petroleum. Nigeria quickly developed a rentier state, deriving more than 80 percent of government income and over 95 percent of foreign exchange from crude oil receipts (Joseph 1978). Fueled by oil revenues and ambitious development plans, the government dramatically expanded ownership and control throughout the economy, which increased outlets for patronage along with liabilities of corruption. Large spending programs were outlined in social services, infrastructure, and an array of industrial enterprises under state ownership (Williams and Turner 1978). Many of these programs were misconceived and costly, absorbing large flows of revenue while yielding few returns. The rapid expansion of fiscal commitments was extremely problematic, as the government lacked flexibility in regulating expenditure or increasing revenue in response to volatile oil prices. While authorities initially took on modest foreign debt in the late 1970s, public and private borrowing was spurred by ambitious expenditure plans and revenue fluctuations (Forrest 1995). External obligations accumulated rapidly, totaling some $14 billion by 1982, equivalent to more than 100 percent of annual export revenue. Oil prices peaked at $40 in 1980 and then declined sharply. Nigeria’s export income was halved in 1981 and 1982 while debt commitments continued to mount. The crisis arose during the Second Republic, and civilian politicians had little ability to rein in spending, especially as the election cycle drew near (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985). The growing fiscal emergency and the collapse of public services were important factors in the 1983 coup that brought General Muhammadu Buhari to power. Although the military regime projected an image of greater fiscal discipline, Buhari’s efforts to impose austerity and tighten administrative controls on the economy fos-

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tered only continued decline. The economy contracted at an average rate of nearly 2 percent from 1981 to 1987 (Biersteker and Lewis 1997). Unemployment and poverty increased, manufacturing collapsed, and public services continued to deteriorate. Nigeria’s economic crisis paralleled the distress in other African economies and reflected the particular dilemmas of oil-exporting states. The crisis arose from structural problems related to the growth of oil exports, an overextended state with limited capacity, inconsistent macroeconomic management, and slow responses to emerging problems in the 1980s. The slow pace and uneven course of economic reform contributed to two decades of economic stagnation. General Ibrahim Babangida, after ousting Buhari in 1985, embarked on efforts to stabilize the economy and adjust the framework for growth. While Babangida showed some initial capability in managing economic reform, he ultimately fostered a major political crisis by failing to see through a promised democratic transition program. The political impasse of 1993 set in motion a series of events that polarized national politics and opened the way for the corrupt autocracy of General Sani Abacha (P. M. Lewis 1994). Throughout the decade, governance deteriorated under successive rulers who suppressed dissent, undermined public institutions, and plundered state resources (Osaghae 1998). Predatory rule extended the malaise in the economy, aggravated tensions among key ethnic and regional groups, and threatened to spark major political strife. Like most of his military predecessors, Babangida pledged a return to democratic rule. He followed a measured pace, however, and postponed a political transition several times on various pretexts. A failed coup attempt in 1990 pushed the regime in a more authoritarian direction, accompanied by increasing evidence of corruption. Changes in federal boundaries and the party system further extended the transition program. Presidential elections were eventually held on June 12, 1993, and featured a prominent Yoruba Muslim business magnate, M. K. O. Abiola, and a northern notable, Bashir Tofa. In polls that were widely perceived as orderly, fair, and credible, Abiola reportedly won with 58 percent of the vote (P. M. Lewis 1994). Babangida, however, set aside the results, citing irregularities and judicial challenges (mounted principally by figures close to the regime). The annulment of the June 12 elections provoked an extended political crisis (P. M. Lewis 1994). Abiola’s Yoruba base was outraged by their perceived exclusion from politics by a northern Muslim regime. Democratic activists were further angered by the revocation of a transparent and legitimate poll, and further delays in the promised transition to civilian rule. Domestic protests and international censure prompted Babangida to leave office, turning government over to a caretaker civilian committee with little authority or mandate. Within weeks, General Abacha, the nom-

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inal defense minister, shouldered aside the civilians and imposed a new autocracy. Abacha’s rule was the most repressive and predatory era that Nigerians had yet experienced. He confronted southwestern democracy advocates and other dissident elements, employing mass arrests, targeted political killings, and widespread intimidation. Abacha and his family also plundered the national treasury with abandon, moving huge sums offshore and accumulating over $5 billion in his short time in office (P. M. Lewis 1996; Osaghae 1998). By diverting state resources and restricting funds to sectors he considered politically troublesome (including higher education and health services), Abacha aggravated the degeneration of core institutions and programs. He sought to regularize his rule through a contrived “transition” to democracy in which he hand-picked the parties that quickly selected him as a universal “consensus” candidate. Abacha died suddenly in June 1998, officially of a heart attack, and was quickly replaced by the ruling military council. General Abulsalami Abubakar, a professional officer with reform inclinations, administered a ten-month transition to the civilian Fourth Republic. The extended political crisis of the 1990s reflected the growing fragmentation and disaffection of Nigerian elites, especially the divide among factions in the northwest and southern groups that were increasingly resentful of their marginality in political and patronage networks. The tensions among civilian and military elites paralleled these sectional rivalries (Osaghae 1998). Moreover, deteriorating institutions came into play as a catalyst of instability and worsening governance. The absence of restraints on executive power allowed rulers to pursue increasingly self-interested and arbitrary strategies of control. The Fourth Republic has been the most enduring regime since Nigeria’s independence, marking four presidential administrations and five election cycles. Notwithstanding its resilience, electoral government has manifested basic problems of performance and accountability. Electoral misconduct, pervasive corruption, poor performance on public goods and the economy, and tensions in the party system have created major stresses on the regime. The establishment of a dominant party system under the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) seriously constrained political competition. Ultimately, strains within the dominant party and failures of governance fostered a contentious pivotal election in 2015. The PDP brought together diverse ethnic, religious, and regional interests, using elite power sharing and patronage to secure hegemony. A zoning arrangement anchored the party, providing for alternation of power among politicians from the country’s six informal geopolitical zones. Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian, was the first PDP president in the Fourth Republic, representing a

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power shift from the northern states to the southwest. This was intended to amend the 1993 transition annulment that had denied the Yoruba candidate (Abiola) the presidency as well as to offset perceived political dominance by northern elites. Fragmentation among party elites, and the polarization of the electorate, disrupted the political settlement. Toward the end of Obasanjo’s constitutionally limited second term, his political circle agitated for an extension of his tenure. When this was rebuffed by the legislature, Obasanjo selected a ticket for the 2007 presidential elections headed by an unassuming northern governor, Umaru Yar’Adua, from a prominent Katsina political family. His running mate was Goodluck Jonathan, from the ethnic Ijaw group in the southern coastal Niger Delta. The 2007 elections were marked by disorganization, fraud, and violence. The PDP slate was awarded a landslide by the government-appointed electoral commission, though even the winning presidential candidate acknowledged the flawed process and promised reforms. President Yar’Adua soon succumbed to health issues, with frequent trips abroad for health care, leading to an extended stay in a Saudi Arabian hospital beginning in November 2009. While his inner circle insisted on Yar’Adua’s fitness to govern in absentia, Vice President Jonathan attained a Senate measure allowing him to govern in an acting capacity. When Yar’Adua died in May 2010, a constitutional succession followed. The handover to President Jonathan interrupted the zoning provisions of the party establishment, which assumed two four-year terms for a northern president. When Jonathan ran for election in 2011, a breach among party elites was apparent. The divide among the electorate was further reflected in popular support for Buhari, the former military ruler who was a perennial opposition candidate. Buhari’s loss in 2011 was trailed by unprecedented violence in northern cities (P. M. Lewis 2011). These tensions framed the 2015 election, in which the incumbent president Jonathan opted for yet another term, challenged again by Buhari at the helm of a newly united opposition party, the All Progressives Congress. The elections played out against a backdrop of voter polarization, contentious rhetoric, and the aggressive Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern states. Boko Haram emerged as a dissident neo-Salafist sect in the early 2000s, centered in the northeastern city of Maiduguri. Initially focused on preaching the formation of autonomous settlements, the group set themselves against the northern political and religious establishment, critiquing both the secular state and the political sharia codes introduced by northern populist governors. The sect briefly reached accommodation with some local politicians, but soon fell out with authorities and staged increasingly provocative acts of defiance and militancy. In July 2009, government secu-

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rity forces launched an assault on the group that killed at least 700 members and supporters across several states. Among the dead was Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s leader, who was clearly the victim of an extrajudicial killing. After a year of regrouping, Boko Haram emerged under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau and launched a campaign of terrorist actions directed at government offices, security forces, churches, transport facilities, and selected international targets. Within three years, the group had organized an insurgency with the capacity to hold territory and occupy large sections of the northeast. Jonathan’s government declared a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May 2013, but the military campaign proved ineffectual. Militants shifted from towns to rural areas, and quickly adapted to the tactics of an overextended and poorly motivated army. Within the armed forces, corruption and mismanagement held up payrolls and supplies, leaving units in the field to cope as best they could. The insurgents ran rampant throughout the northeast through 2014, carrying out acts of terror such as the mass abduction of 276 schoolgirls from the village of Chibok in April. By midyear, the insurgents controlled an area equivalent to the size of Belgium and declared a local caliphate in alliance with the Middle Eastern group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). More than 15,000 had died in the unrest, constituting the largest conflict in Africa at that moment, and a clear existential threat to the Nigerian state. Framed by the insurgency, deep divisions among voters, and questions about the integrity of elections, the 2015 polls raised essential challenges for national stability and the viability of electoral rule. There was a profound sense of relief when federal and state races were by and large orderly and peaceful, and the presidential poll yielded a decisive result in the first round. With the 2015 election, the country experienced its first electoral turnover as incumbent president Jonathan conceded to opposition candidate Buhari, who won by 54 percent to 45 percent of the vote. A number of factors contributed to this outcome, including a newly unified opposition, a splintered ruling party, a more capable independent election administration, and the role of voters and civil society in enforcing election procedures. This watershed event averted a more enduring crisis of security and political stability. Nigeria’s major crises have fostered perennial challenges of governance. The events of the 1960s deeply imbued concerns for managing diversity and distributional pressures. The economic downturn of the 1980s highlighted the need for improved economic management and structural changes in the country’s political economy. The political decay of the 1990s drove efforts toward workable formulas of democratic rule and the revival of institutions. The security and electoral crises of the 2010s jeopardized the continuation of civil rule and patterns of political inclusion. Each of

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these agendas must also contend with the prevailing incentives facing Nigerian elites, which focus on the distribution of state-mediated rents and the competition among communal and factional groups.

Historical Background Nigeria comprises an area of 356,667 square miles, located at the Bight of Benin on coastal West Africa. The country includes a coastal zone of forests and mangroves, a central savannah zone, and a northern area on the edge of the Sahelian region that is semi-arid. The population is estimated at 175 million people, including at least 250 distinct ethnic and language groups. Approximately a quarter of the population is Hausa-Fulani, a predominantly Muslim conglomeration concentrated in the northwest of the country. About a fifth of the population is Yoruba, who adhere about 55 percent to Christianity and 45 percent to Islam and occupy the southwestern states. The Igbo, who are almost entirely Christian, are prevalent in the southeastern states, representing about 18 percent of the population. In the Niger Delta, the Ijaw are the largest minority, perhaps 8 percent of the national population. Other significant groups include the Tiv in the Middle Belt, the Nupe and Kanuri in the north, and the Edo in the midwest. Nigeria was colonized by Britain in various phases during the latter half of the nineteenth century (Crowder 1968). Northern Nigeria encompassed the Islamic emirates created in the early nineteenth century by the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio and much of the historic Kanem-Bornu empire. The southern region expanded from the Niger Coast Protectorate to include central and coastal parts of the country apart from Lagos. The northern and southern protectorates were merged with the Colony of Lagos in 1914 to form a single colonial territory. Northern Nigeria was governed under a separate mandate from the south under Lord Frederick Lugard’s doctrine of indirect rule, which provided for the continued authority of traditional rulers and the status of Islamic legal and religious institutions (Coleman 1958). The southern areas were opened to missionary activity, fostering Christianity throughout the southeast, many central portions of the country, and much of the southwest. Among southern Nigerians, the presence of major administrative and commercial centers also encouraged education, commerce, and a professional class. Following World War II, colonial authorities organized Nigeria as a federal system of three regions that framed the organization of the state at independence. A parliamentary system based on British institutions was introduced in the years leading to independence. In the 1950s, Nigerian nationalism was largely advanced through peaceful protest and elite negoti-

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ations with the colonial power. The nationalist movement was divided among different ethnic and regional organizations that formed the basis for political parties in the transitional election of 1959 and the postindependent First Republic (Sklar 1963). Since independence, four issues have dominated politics and development in Nigeria. The first of these is the nature of political regimes and efforts to establish stable democratic rule. The parliamentary First Republic failed amidst communal contention and institutional failure. A series of military regimes followed under Iguiyi Ironsi (1966), Gowon (1966), Murtala Muhammed (hereafter Murtala; 1975), and Obasanjo (1976). The MurtalaObasanjo regime was in fact a continuous government, as Obasanjo retained the policies of his senior colleague who was assassinated in a failed coup. The regime handed power in 1979 to the civilian Second Republic, modeled on US-style presidential institutions. That regime also broke down amidst massive corruption, political misconduct, and economic crisis. Military governments ruled almost continuously under Buhari (1983– 1985), Babangida (1985–1993), Abacha (1993–1998), and Abubakar (1998– 1999). Abubakar supervised the transition to the civilian Fourth Republic (the Third Republic being the abortive regime under Babangida). Nigeria’s political turbulence has been marked by recurring failure among democratic and military regimes. The current Fourth Republic represents the longestserving civilian system in the nation’s history. The character of the Nigerian state forms a second central theme. The design of institutions—especially the reconfiguration of federal arrangements—is crucial. In the wake of the second coup and the civil war, Nigerian elites have sought to craft solutions to the problems of regionalism and ethnic polarization (Suberu 2001). The creation of numerous states has been employed to break up ethnic blocks and provide greater representation to minorities. Revenue allocation formulas have also been adjusted to address distributional pressures. Electoral laws restrict the formation of ethnically based parties. State capacity is a parallel concern. The Nigerian state is both expansive and relatively weak. The growth of government functions and the resulting strains on state capabilities pose an essential tension in governance. Acute deficiencies of revenue mobilization, public services, and overall administration have hampered the basic delivery of public goods. Dilemmas of state capacity figure prominently in crisis management. A third factor is the changing nature of the political economy. The oil boom transformed Nigeria from a relatively diversified economy, based on a variety of agricultural and mineral exports, to a monoculture centered on crude oil (Joseph 1978; Watts 1987). These changing revenue foundations fundamentally altered the nature of economic strategy and the relations

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between state and society. The petroleum windfall prompted an ambitious program of state-led capitalist development and social provisions, largely out of step with government capabilities in administering such programs. The massive revenues accruing directly to the state also increased the discretion of political leaders over the allocation of resources. The discretionary control of revenues broadened the ability of rulers to employ patronage as a basis for political support. The rentier state had limited accountability to citizens, however, and became a focus of struggles over distribution among diverse groups and factions. Access to state resources quickly emerged as the central purpose of politics among military and civilian elites (Joseph 1987). Moreover, the volatility of rent-based income was a serious liability, especially as rulers built up fiscal commitments and expectations of patronage. The fourth defining element in Nigeria’s postindependence politics is the nature of communal competition and identity. From the outset, Nigeria’s ethnic geography has drawn the leading minorities into contention over control of the state and access to resources (Joseph 1987). Emerging identities among Niger Delta minorities and Islamist elements in the northern states have also influenced the patterns of communal politics. Communal identities suffuse civil-military relations, politics in electoral regimes, and contention over federal institutions and resource distribution. The most evident challenge of competitive communalism is the propensity for political instability and violence. The civil war formed a pivotal event that foreclosed the possibility of secession and drove the search for accommodation among Nigeria’s diverse communities. A second decisive event was the rebellion of the ’Yan Tatsine (Maitatsine) in the north during the early 1980s (Lubeck 1985). This millenarian Islamist movement confronted both secular authorities and mainstream Muslim communities, and military action against the sect cost perhaps 10,000 lives. Since the transition to democratic rule in 1999, recurring social violence has been a major feature of the political landscape. Several thousand people have died in major strife among religious, ethnic, or economic groups in Jos, across Plateau State, and in Kaduna. Insurgency has traversed much of the Niger Delta. Smaller eruptions have shaken urban centers and many other areas throughout the country.

Foundations and Drivers Turning to the central issues under the civilian Fourth Republic, we can trace the relation between underlying structural trends and evolving challenges. The most pressing questions are linked to a troubled democratization process, widespread political and communal violence, and pressing

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issues of economic reform and management. The important background issues are related to the structure of the economy, along with demographic and environmental factors. Structurally, issues of poverty and inequality form an enduring source of Nigeria’s turbulence. The oil economy has not fostered broadly based economic activity, and the rentier nature of resource wealth has created sharp inequalities. Nigeria’s poverty rate has doubled since 1980, and it is estimated that as much as 63 percent of the population lives below the World Bank’s poverty margin of $1.25 a day; perhaps 80 percent of the population is estimated to subsist on $2 a day or less (World Bank 2013). Like many developing countries, Nigeria has a young age profile. About half the population is younger than eighteen years old, and fully 43 percent are younger than fifteen years old. According to estimates from the World Bank, about half those between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five years old are unemployed.1 Consequently, youth unemployment is at critical levels, considerably higher than the already high national jobless rate of 25 percent. While urbanization has advanced rapidly in Nigeria, more than half the labor force remains in agriculture, which is overwhelmingly carried out by smallholders using rain-fed techniques (Treichel 2010). Climate change therefore presents a further structural issue, as problems of desertification and erosion have degraded existing land or diminished its availability. Many of the recent waves of violence, especially in the Middle Belt and in parts of the Niger Delta, reflect land scarcity as an important precipitating factor. The more immediate tensions are seen in the political domain. Nigeria’s 1999 transition to democracy, though in many ways long overdue, was hastily arranged by the military with little consultation or coordination among civilian political groups. The new regime was inaugurated in an uncertain institutional setting with a new constitution, embryonic party structures, and core institutions—including the legislature and election administration—reflecting limited capabilities (P. M. Lewis 2007). The uncertainty surrounding elections and other institutional rules fostered contention among the political class and various social groups. Elections have proven to be volatile, and the four-year election cycle has driven important trends in violence, fiscal pressures, and communal identities. Social violence is a major source of shocks and uncertainty. Democratization lifted repression and opened considerable political space, but political contention has also fueled anxiety about influence and claims on resources. Uncertainty over institutions has provoked social mobilization and accentuated communal identities. Ethnic, religious, and regional networks have become more assertive, and politicians frequently have invoked communal appeals (Suberu 2001; Ukiwo 2003). At the popular level, the formation of numerous militias and vigilante groups, usually on an ethnic

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basis, has aggravated tensions in many localities. Chronic flash points, such as the city of Jos reflect deep-seated strife, while insurgency in the Niger Delta and the growth of Boko Haram in the northern states pose leading challenges to security. The troubled economy presents the third leading dilemma. Oil prices were depressed through the late 1990s and military rulers left the new government with a depleted treasury. The new Obasanjo administration was preoccupied with political and security issues during the first civilian term, leaving economic policy adrift. Although an IMF standby arrangement was negotiated in 2000, implementation was lax and a new cycle of political spending was evident in the 2003 election. Foreign debt totaling some $36 billion (including $18 billion in arrears) was deadweight on the budget and an impediment to economic recovery. The new administration declared debt relief to be a priority for the new democracy, but initially made little headway with creditors. Major problems of infrastructure and investment in productive activities also hampered economic dynamism.

Tracing the Outcomes Nigeria’s democratization process has followed contradictory paths. The repression and corruption of military regimes during the 1990s strengthened democratic aspirations among Nigerians. Since the transition to constitutional rule in 1999, a substantial (though not universal) domain of political and civic rights has been established. Multiple parties contest elections, and in 2015 there was a peaceful electoral turnover from the ruling party to an opposition challenger. Open speech, association, and political organization are widely practiced. The media is diverse, vibrant, and mostly independent of official control. A large number of civic, religious, and cultural associations function in communities and on the national plane. In many parts of the country, especially key urban areas, features of democracy are in evidence. However, the quality of democracy has been severely compromised, with many democratic practices lacking substance. Nigerians do not generally believe that the Fourth Republic has delivered accountable or effective governance (Alemika and Lewis 2005). Elections, a crucial element in democratic governance, have been especially problematic. The transitional elections of 1999 were marked by administrative problems and widespread misconduct. Domestic and international observers, emphasizing the urgency of a transfer to civilian rule, nonetheless accepted the results. Obasanjo, long retired from the military and running as a civilian, won a decisive majority on the PDP ticket while the party also gained a majority of governorships and legislative seats.

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Expectations for improvement were not realized, as the 2003 elections reflected greater disarray, fraud, and violence. The incumbent president returned with a greater majority and the ruling PDP expanded its control of state and federal offices. Political militias played especially threatening roles in the Niger Delta, the southeastern states, and parts of the northwest. Reports by the media and numerous observers raised questions about the credibility of many polls at the state and national levels. The elections of 2007 revealed further degeneration in the electoral process (P. M. Lewis 2011). The Independent National Election Commission (INEC), under its chairman Maurice Iwu, administered elections that were chaotic, widely fraudulent, and marred by scattered violence. The activities of the electoral commission aligned closely with the interests of the presidency and the ruling party in screening candidates and defining procedures. Large areas of the country saw flagrant malpractices at polling places and in the counting process. Results were announced by INEC in a summary form that prevented review. More than 300 people died during the election period, and the results were not considered credible by most observers or the media. In the aftermath of the elections, public surveys revealed declining confidence in the quality of elections and their value as a mechanism of voter choice (Afrobarometer 2009). Flawed elections diminished competition and facilitated the expansion of political control by the ruling PDP. The PDP was established during the 1998 transition by a group of thirty-four notables and veteran politicians. The association quickly emerged as the most ethnically diverse and organizationally sophisticated of the parties. The main competitors had more limited geographic appeal and fewer organizational resources. The All People’s Party, renamed the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), made considerable inroads in the northern states. The Alliance for Democracy, renamed the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), gained popularity in the southwest, backed by Yoruba elites and prodemocracy activists who had championed the June 12 election results. Over the course of four elections from 1999, the PDP moved to consolidate a dominant-party system. The ruling establishment expanded control of national and state offices through faulty elections that furnished few opportunities for opposition gains. The PDP prevailed largely through the advantages of incumbency, its attraction as a central source of patronage, and the party’s machinery for capturing elections. While the party served as a resilient arena for mediating the distribution of petroleum rents, it did not identify a clear policy agenda. The same may be said of the leading opposition groups. Apart from differences in elite background and regional support, the leading parties reflected modest distinctions in programs, policies, and ideology. Party dominance and uncompetitive elections created serious problems of accountability and legitimacy. Citizen confidence in leading institutions

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and the overall quality of democracy has plummeted since the initial euphoria of the political transition (Alemika and Lewis 2005). Key political controversies underscore the problems of legitimate governance. A prominent episode was the acrimonious 2006 campaign for the extension of President Obasanjo’s tenure in office. In advance of the 2007 electoral cycle, supporters around the presidency pressed for a constitutional amendment to lift the two-term limit on presidential office, which would allow Obasanjo to seek a third term. Payments between $390,000 and $1.6 million were reportedly offered to legislators to approve the amendment (Reuters 2006). In surveys, more than 85 percent of the public opposed term extension, and the media reflected broad disapproval (Afrobarometer 2006). Ultimately, legislators disregarded the inducements and voided the proposal amid popular acclaim. Yet the legislature has hardly been a paragon of principle. Major controversies have swirled over the extravagant claims on resources by members of the National Assembly, along with questions about the integrity and diligence of members. In negotiations with the executive, legislators have steadily won increases in their compensation and allowances as well as institutional funds for the assembly. The 469 members of the assembly currently claim about $1.5 million each in annual salary, allowances, and special allocations, making them the highest-compensated legislators in Africa by a large margin (Barkan 2009). Yet the passage of bills has declined in recent years, and the legislature has been shaken by interminable scandals involving misconduct by various House and Senate leaders as well as abuses of committee power. The legislature is held in low esteem by most Nigerians. The succession dispute of 2010 was a further source of political turbulence. Yar’Adua, a little-known northern governor, was endorsed by Obasanjo as the PDP’s 2007 nominee for president and won a landslide of 70 percent that was widely questioned by observers and the opposition. A central problem in the vetting process was the inattention to Yar’Adua’s ill health. While president, Yar’Adua made several overseas trips for medical treatment, including an extended stay in Saudi Arabia beginning in November 2009. A vacuum of executive authority soon developed as the president was unavailable for official duties, and his family and aides would not allow access to him or information on his condition. The Senate passed a compromise resolution February 2010 naming Vice President Jonathan as acting president with a thin constitutional rationale. President Yar’Adua died in May, opening the way to a constitutional succession. The political limbo of early 2010, and the efforts of Yar’Adua’s inner circle to wield influence, underscored institutional problems and the personalization of power in the Nigerian system. On assuming executive office, President Jonathan emphasized the need for electoral reform, resolution of conflict in the Niger Delta, and rehabilitation of infrastructure, notably the electricity network. This agenda was

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welcomed by many as a pragmatic effort toward needed political and economic change. Early steps included the appointment of a new INEC chairman, the respected academic Attahiru Jega, along with special advisers for the Niger Delta and the power sector. The 2011 elections reflected much better organization and integrity, notwithstanding patchy malpractices and problems. Despite better administration, however, the elections also proved highly polarizing, as northern voters resented the candidacy of a southern Christian and instead gravitated toward the challenger, General Buhari. In the wake of a declared victory for the incumbent Jonathan, unrest erupted across several northern states, with more than 800 fatalities (Human Rights Watch 2011). A dramatic rise in social and political violence has shadowed the Fourth Republic. Since 1999, at least 35,000 people have died in more than 2,600 incidents across the country (Nigeria Social Violence Project 2015). A high level of recurring violence presents major challenges to security and human rights. Strife is not concentrated along a single fault line or set of identities. The country has been shaken by large incidents in the cities of Kaduna, Jos, Kano, and Maiduguri, along with incidents in many other urban areas and major clashes in rural Plateau and Benue States. Some incidents have an ethnic or regional character while others mobilize religious identities. A number of conflicts have been fought between so-called indigenes and settlers over land or political representation. Many clashes have been motivated by political rivalries. In the Niger Delta, community grievances and economic agendas often predominate. Islamist ideologies and regional tensions have animated the Boko Haram insurgency. In short, the era of democratization has been turbulent, though it has not animated a consistent set of cleavages that threaten national stability. The most problematic clusters of violence have been located in the Niger Delta, the Middle Belt zone around Jos, and the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern states. The Niger Delta, the region of Nigeria’s oil production, was affected by a widening insurgency beginning in the late 1990s. The conflict originated with local grievances over unequal development, political marginality, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses (Okonta and Douglas 2003). In recent years, economic agendas have arisen as oil smuggling and abductions have furnished revenues for militant groups. The organization and weaponry of the insurgent group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), increased substantially after 2006. At the height of the insurgency in 2008, nearly half of Nigeria’s oil production was shut down by insecurity and damage to oil infrastructure. In May 2009 a military offensive against key militant camps dislodged a large portion of MEND’s forces, and several commanders responded to government offers of an amnesty. By 2010, more than 26,000 militants had

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entered demobilization programs (IRIN 2011). Militant activity in the Niger Delta has continued, however, and a string of bombings and attacks on oil facilities underscore continued restiveness among communities and youth in the region. The tenuous nature of the amnesty points to a need for consistent approaches to conflict resolution and development. Conditions in Jos have seriously deteriorated in recent years, with communal and economic groups battling in the city and surrounding areas. Several thousand people have died in attacks that are often horrific in their scale and brutality. While sometimes cast as a religious conflict, in fact the turbulence in Jos centers on contention among groups who claim to be indigenes of the area—principally Berom who are also Christian—and the settlers (many of whom are Muslim Hausa-Fulani) who compete for economic opportunity, land, and representation. In this instance, religion, ethnicity, residence, and economic claims have overlapped to produce a festering problem of strife. Local politicians and military units have reportedly aggravated insecurity in the area (Krause 2011). Confrontations between state security forces and various Islamist groups in the northern states present another source of violence. The sects Boko Haram and Kala Kato (the latter linked to earlier ’Yan Tatsine groups) focused on challenges to the state and the local Muslim establishment in the early 2000s. Small clusters of so-called Taleban, thought to be offshoots of the early Boko Haram group, attacked police stations and seized weapons in 2002 and 2003. Though styled after foreign militants, these segments appeared to be from relatively elite families and largely domestic in their focus. Military and police units suppressed Boko Haram and Kala Kato in 2009 actions in Maiduguri, Bauchi, and other locales. Boko Haram’s leader, Yusuf, was evidently the victim of an extrajudicial killing. Within a year of regrouping, Boko Haram launched a new campaign of terrorist actions and sporadic attacks. The government made little headway against the resilient armed movement, which secured control of numerous towns and villages in the northeastern states. The Jonathan administration declared a state of emergency in May 2013, yet this only prompted a more violent phase of the conflict. The armed forces, hampered by corruption and weak leadership, were ineffective against an increasingly aggressive insurgency. By the middle of 2014, Boko Haram militants had occupied territory across three northeastern states and declared a caliphate in the area. The abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls underscored the lack of security arising from the conflict. On the economic front, contrary trends are evident. Economic management has varied substantially, though fortuitous external resources have been helpful in stabilizing the economy through 2014. During the first presidential term beginning in 1999, economic policy lacked clear direction. Efforts were made to improve public procurement and consolidate the

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banking system, but macroeconomic management was inconsistent and senior officials did not pursue a concerted agenda. This shifted dramatically in 2003 with President Obasanjo’s second term, when a group of reform-minded technocrats were brought into key ministries, departments, and the central bank. Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala worked with several other senior officials to advance a comprehensive reform program addressing macroeconomic policy, sectoral needs, popular welfare, and institutional change. The reform team was able to conclude a novel arrangement with the IMF that allowed for certification of the government’s economic program and related negotiations to cancel portions of external debt. A package agreed with the Paris Club of official creditors enabled Nigeria to retire 85 percent of its foreign debt at a twothirds discount from nominal value. Not long after the 2005 debt package, key reformers were moved aside or departed from government and the reform team ceased to operate as a cohesive group. Fiscal and contracting oversight was loosened in advance of the 2007 elections, though President Yar’Adua looked for capable appointments in key economic posts. The uncertainty of Yar’Adua’s role, however, was reflected in economic management during his administration. President Jonathan reappointed Finance Minister Okonjo-Iweala in his 2011 cabinet, in an effort to invoke the reformist profile of earlier administrations. The macroeconomic stance was consistent in Jonathan’s term, though formal policies were considerably undermined by massive financial diversions through the national petroleum corporation and associated oil accounts. Despite the vagaries of economic policy, the Nigerian economy benefited from 2001 to 2014 from high oil prices. After a decade-long slump, prices appreciated regularly after 2000, peaking at $147 per barrel in July 2008. The global economic downturn of 2008–2009 sent prices plummeting, though rates increased substantially within a year and Nigeria’s rising production (an outcome of the Niger Delta amnesty program) bolstered revenues. Nigeria entered the downturn with unprecedented foreign reserves of $63 billion and an additional $20 billion in the provisional Excess Crude Account (ECA) (World Bank 2013: 11–12). The government subsequently depleted the ECA and reduced foreign reserves by nearly half, yet buoyant revenues and low debt aided economic stability. Under the Jonathan administration, mismanagement of public finance and a subsequent drop in petroleum prices in 2014 posed major issues for economic performance, and a fundamental challenge for the new Buhari administration. The more basic structural problems of the economy are related to diversification, poverty, and infrastructure. Institutional change is also a central concern. These issues will clearly take longer to address, and will require effective focus from political leaders.

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Explaining the Outcomes When considering the problems of crisis management in Nigeria, we regularly encounter paradoxes in the motives of elites, the role of institutions, the patterns of the economy, and the dynamics of civil society. Much analysis of Nigeria uses the language of crisis to describe the country’s multiple and profound challenges. Political brinkmanship, unanticipated violence, and economic hardships regularly occupy the concerns of Nigerians and outside observers. While these myriad pressures have the potential to foment new crises, the most acute challenges have been provisionally managed or contained, though not without serious lingering issues. Elite bargaining, institutional change, a diverse and resilient civic domain, and fortuitous external conditions have enabled political leaders to weather the greatest stresses and shocks of the past decade. How do we account for the common tendencies of confrontation as well as accommodation? The strategies and incentives of elites are essential. Nigerian elites have been motivated for decades by competitive communalism, defining interests along sectional lines and forming coalitions primarily among their ethnic, regional, or religious group. Sectional groups often construe resources and power as zero-sum pursuits, and they employ patron-client networks to build solidarity and apportion benefits. Since the advent of the oil boom, competitive communalism has centered on the distribution of state-mediated rents (Joseph 1987; P. M. Lewis 2007). Distributional politics focus on the economic benefits of public office. The contention among diverse sectional interests is shifting and uncertain. These same features, however, have also drawn Nigerian elites toward bargaining relations that afford broader access to rents and influence. Accommodation among different segments and factions is often preferable to a more confrontational stance that may result in exclusion and conflict. Expedient relations among groups promise greater opportunities for sharing rents and consolidating stable political control. The leading parties in the Fourth Republic are relatively inclusive, as political leadership has coalesced around a multiethnic elite cartel that is flexible though also limited in scope. Another paradox is played out at the level of institutions. The dysfunctional character of the Nigerian state and the deep problems of governance have been widely analyzed. Institutional weakness undermines political and economic performance while also hampering effective responses to shocks and emerging problems. For instance, flawed elections emerge directly from problems of capacity and integrity in the election administration, the political parties, and the security agencies. In the wake of contested polls, resolution is hindered by deficiencies in the judiciary and election authorities. The same can be said of economic stagnation: peak economic agencies

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have not framed effective polices or adequately monitored performance, and they are slow to take up adjustment measures in response to shocks. So too with conflict, institutional uncertainty fuels communal tensions and political agencies cannot intervene promptly to assuage violence. Nigeria has reflected considerable institutional flexibility, however, in managing some core distributional issues. The changing design of federalism has arguably furnished a major outlet for accommodation and mitigation of sectional tensions. The proliferation of states, though controversial for both political and budgetary reasons, has dispersed representation and created broader outlets for distribution. Boundary changes have been closely followed by adjustment in revenue allocation, as formulas are revised almost annually. Constitutional changes in 1999 have also opened political and legal space while affording some flexibility in the exercise of state and local authority. Although Nigeria’s federal compact remains imperfect and contentious, institutional changes have continually shifted the bargaining arena for elites as well as some political outlets for popular groups. The popular initiative by northern governors to expand sharia law is an example of the flexibility of the federal structure as is the increase of revenue allocations to the Niger Delta states. Innovation has been a source of stabilization as well as turbulence. Mismanagement of state resources has been a central basis of dissension and developmental failure in Nigeria. At the same time, Nigeria’s rentier political economy shapes channels of redistribution and political cohesion. Resource windfalls have bolstered the ability of political leaders and sectional elites to address popular demands, although this is managed through piecemeal clientelist relations rather than broad provision of public goods. Since the transition to the Fourth Republic, abundant new revenues have flowed to the central state. Much of the recent windfall has been characteristically siphoned by political elites or squandered in misdirected spending. However, a combination of high revenues and reduced debt has furnished political largesse that may stabilize the system of rent distribution. Policy change is an important corollary to this process. Improvements in economic programs and institutions have enabled Nigerian governments to weather the difficulties of adverse events and the continued dissipation of resources to political networks. The significant episode of technocratic management, however short-lived, unquestionably placed the country on an improved economic footing. Public finances were stabilized, inflation was moderate, the balance of payments improved, external debt was dramatically reduced, and Nigeria’s overall trade and investment profiles were enhanced. The rapid growth of cellular communications and rationalization in the banking and finance sectors also fostered diversification and eco-

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nomic expansion. The buffer of large reserves proved invaluable in the face of economic shocks. The efforts of the past decade can be considered a situation of “partial reform,” but even politically constrained half-measures have improved the overall performance of the economy (van de Walle 2001). Finally, it is important to note the important role of civic groupings, networks, and organizations in Nigeria. This is an essential source of resilience as well as an area of tension and periodic conflict. The sources and trajectories of social violence have been described earlier. Here, it is important to call attention to the role of a broad and diverse civil society in channeling interests, constraining authority, and mediating divisions. Religious communities and associations are trying to mitigate conflict in such flash points as Kaduna and Jos, with some degree of success. Labor, religious, and professional groups are monitoring elections and trying to hold officials accountable for democratic procedure. Watchdog groups are assessing government performance or exposing problems of official corruption. Various associations are furnishing opportunities for the expression of grievances and aspirations. Nigeria’s distinctively independent civil society is offering outlets for participation, dissent, and negotiation. While elite politics are hardly inclusive of popular interests and agendas, the civic domain is creating a measure of flexibility and accommodation in the political system.

Conclusion Crises emerge when significant shocks or stresses cannot be effectively contained, raising essential challenges to the political, economic, or social equilibrium. A crisis does not inevitably lead to negative outcomes: political upheavals may result in democratization, and economic dislocations sometimes yield reform. In most instances, however, crises are marked by extended uncertainty, hardship, or violence. Nigeria’s experience highlights several important factors in the evolution of crises. Elite incentives shape the emergence of systemic problems and the response to major shocks. Institutional resilience shapes the efficacy of crisis management. State resources are a central determinant of government choice and leverage. External conditions and fortuitous circumstances also influence the impact of shocks and efforts at mitigation. Communal and factional division among Nigerian elites has spurred contentious politics, and such tensions have also hindered decisive responses to national challenges. Confronted by political and economic uncertainties, political leaders have adopted short time horizons. Elite strategies have commonly focused on near-term political maneuvering and

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rent distribution, largely precluding agendas of investment or institution building. In this context, responses to political or economic turbulence tend to be reactive and ad hoc, as reflected in flawed elections or the uneven amnesty initiative in the Niger Delta. Mechanisms of political representation and conflict resolution are especially lacking. The rentier state has given rise to structural burdens along with a degree of resilience. The political economy is organized around a centralized revenue base, pervasive rent seeking, and profound inequalities. These features have produced economic instability, long periods of slow growth, rigidities in production, deep-seated poverty, and volatile distributional politics. At the same time, the fluid arena of elite bargaining and the federal institutions have allowed for the management of many stresses and demands. For all of the dysfunction and conflict inherent in Nigeria’s national landscape, abundant rents and clientelist politics have enabled a tenuous management of democratic tensions. Yet these mechanisms are provisional and fragile. In the current conjuncture, it is possible to identify alternate paths in Nigerian affairs over the next several years. One path is relatively durable, though marked by turbulence, while the other is more volatile and uncertain. If the executive and the ruling party are able to accommodate marginal reforms in the political arena and in core economic policies, a more stable prospect is likely. In the wake of the peaceful electoral turnover of 2015, the fledgling democratic system could gain stability and legitimacy, while expanding economic opportunities assuage some popular pressures and tensions. A reasonable comparison can be drawn with the dilemmas faced by Mexico in the 1990s, when economic crisis and political stresses impelled the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to implement electoral reform on the heels of economic stabilization. Self-interest could motivate similar measures in Nigeria, though these motives would contend with the powerful interests around the dominant party and state largesse. A reform scenario cannot rule out sporadic violence, political misconduct, and economic travails, but the trends would improve and the most acute problems would recede. The alternative scenario is a continuation of the prevailing political and economic cartel, bolstered by export resources and policy improvisation. Elite fissures and popular restiveness could create serious problems of governability. Communal violence could persist, militant activity escalate, political disputes proliferate, and paralysis at the center aggravate problems of instability and economic strain. Without significant improvement in governance at the center—yet to be seen in the new Buhari presidency—the prevailing trends of sectional violence, political drift, and economic stagnation will threaten new shocks to the system. Considered within the context of the cases in this study, Nigeria reveals several distinctive characteristics. As a petro-state, Nigeria has a more fluid

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and porous elite cartel than the oligarchic control discussed in the Angolan and Algerian cases. Also, Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has not recently suffered the civil wars of these other oil states, or the violent fragmentation seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Social conflict is quite prevalent, however, calling to mind a more severe version of the Kenyan strife and a congenital problem on the scale of South Africa’s criminal violence. Nigeria’s economic problems, and the inconsistent responses to shocks and structural problems, are very much in line with the other resource-exporting states discussed in this volume. In the domain of politics, however, the troubled circumstances of Nigeria’s civilian regime are perhaps closest in character to the Kenyan experience, although the particular institutions and political groupings are different. Ghana and South Africa reflect much healthier democratic regimes while Algeria, Angola, and the DRC have not seriously progressed toward democratic rule. From a policy standpoint, the most promising channels of crisis management reside in strengthening Nigerian institutions and bolstering mechanisms for democratic accommodation. Improvements in election administration, party organization, and the efficacy of the legislature are prominent issues. Greater transparency in government functions and fiscal management are also pressing concerns. Security sector reform remains an urgent priority. Protections and encouragement for Nigeria’s vibrant civil society can strengthen an essential foundation of democratic resilience. Support for mechanisms of conflict management, at both state and civic levels, is important. Moreover, policy toward Nigeria should be led by political initiative rather than by security cooperation and include a wide scope of engagement across the political spectrum and civil society. Interventions in the domains of security, economic policy, and social relations carry considerable risk of being counterproductive if they are narrowly targeted or poorly informed. The approaches most likely to yield positive outcomes should emphasize the engagement of elites as well as civic actors, with a focus on leveraging efforts toward democratic development, social accommodation, and economic change.

Note 1. World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report, No. 1. Abuja, May 2013.

9 South Africa: A Disaster that Refuses to Happen David Fowkes

“THE WORST, LIKE THE BEST, NEVER HAPPENS IN SOUTH AFRICA,”

Jan Smuts is rumored to have said, and his judgment still makes sense (du Toit and Kotzé 2010: 3). So much is wrong, and yet much is right; the gloomiest predictions keep missing the mark. In this chapter, I try to make sense of South Africa’s capacity to handle sudden shocks as well as the deep structural problems that make all those morbid prognostications sound appropriate. In the new South Africa, crises have not turned into disasters. Here, I examine three of these crises: the recall of Thabo Mbeki and accession of Jacob Zuma to the presidency, the outbreaks of xenophobic violence in May 2008, and the murder of Eugene Terre’blanche in April 2010. I explain how each of these events played out in noncatastrophic ways, partly thanks to serendipitous factors, partly for structural reasons (e.g., functioning state institutions, or the long-run decline of radicalism), and partly because of adequate levels of leadership. I conclude that South Africa is capable of passing stress tests. The deep structural problems, like unemployment, inequality, and HIV/AIDS, cannot be called crises because their consequences are clearly anticipated. Nonetheless, these slow-burning emergencies have a self-evident human cost and are also long-run threats to South Africa’s political equilibrium. Whether one looks to other African countries, or to similarly unequal Latin American states, or to European states that suffered comparable levels of deprivation in the 1930s, the lessons of history are unsettling. These problems cannot be solved quickly: the real question is how deadly they are to the political order and coherence needed to solve them at all. I 171

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examine South Africa’s success in achieving a medium-term equilibrium where discontent can be managed while long-run solutions are played out. This is South Africa’s greatest challenge. My conclusion is that the ruling African National Congress is a big part of the solution, but also the biggest danger, and counsel optimism because there are balancing forces constraining its worse nature.

Background South Africa has long been a disaster that refuses to happen. If a crisis is an unexpected, serious, and negative shock to the system, this is a striking case of the exact opposite: the oft-predicted, over-determined systemic catastrophe persistently refusing to materialize. In this chapter, I try to explain why South Africa has been able to get through its crises and manage its deep contradictions. At the start of the twentieth century, there was no country called South Africa, and the area that would become that country was embroiled in conflict. The South African War of 1899–1902, fought between the Dutchspeaking inhabitants of the two Boer republics (the Afrikaners) and the British Empire, which already controlled the Cape and Natal colonies, was the longest and most expensive war Britain fought in the hundred years between 1815 and 1914. Victory brought London the dilemma of reconciling these two groups of whites, a feat it accomplished in large part by sacrificing the interests of its black subjects (Marx 1998). This exclusion of black people was the original sin of South Africa.1 The white approach to blacks was shaped by three competing considerations: the demand for labor, for land, and for security (Welsh 2010: 29). Blacks were forced off the great bulk of good land so that whites could have it and so that blacks would have to sell their labor. But whites also feared the creation of an urban black population, which would be able to mobilize effectively and therefore wield political power. The contradiction was that the labor and land policies drove urbanization, thereby imperiling security. Apartheid’s architects attempted some novel fixes, like establishing separate homelands for black people, but these were miserable failures. South Africa’s black population grew steadily larger, more urban, and more dissatisfied. Apartheid was fundamentally unsustainable. The miracle of 1994 was that so many years of oppression, culminating in the strife-torn 1980s, could come to an end with such a soft landing. Though the much-anticipated civil war never materialized, it is easy to forget today just how bloody and halting the transition really was: thousands of people died—12,281 between 1991 and 1994—and the negotiations fell apart on several occasions (Welsh 2010: 401). Even though the price paid in

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the end was higher than the world usually remembers, it was much lower than most forecasts. So why did the miracle happen? The literature on the transition emphasizes a mix of contingent and structural factors. South Africa was lucky to have superb leaders—an honor roll headlined, of course, by Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk. But there were also more fundamental forces at work. The core constituency of apartheid had long been worse-off whites—disproportionately Afrikaners—who feared competition from blacks. But the second half of the twentieth century was kind to Afrikaners who became steadily more prosperous and urbanized and, consequently, disinclined to fight. The balance of forces in the country similarly weighed against the alternatives. Black leaders knew the apartheid state was too strong to be overthrown, and white leaders knew demographics and time were against them. Finally, the collapse of the Berlin Wall shifted the ANC’s worldview much closer to something whites could accept. So, there was a negotiated settlement instead of a revolution. The ANC’s accession to government contained a paradox, acknowledged by central ANC figures like Mbeki: it was a triumph, but it was also cruelly disempowering (Gevisser 2007: 658). South Africa’s new rulers inherited the strongest state in Africa, with a modern economy (the world’s twenty-fourth largest) and a powerful military. And yet the economy was in poor health, resources for fighting poverty were unexpectedly scarce, and there was a large and complicated bureaucracy to master with few skilled people. The story of South Africa after apartheid is chiefly about this paradox. Observers should be struck both by the frailty of the triumphs and by the slightness of the disasters.

Structural Vulnerabilities Unemployment in South Africa is shockingly high; it actually increased after apartheid, owing to “perfect storm” conditions in the labor market (Banerjee et al. 2006: 4). Three factors shaped this outcome: (1) a shrinking demand for labor, particularly in the mining and agricultural sectors; (2) skills-based changes in the labor market, reducing the demand for the kind of labor that South Africa has in abundance; and (3) entry into the workforce of large numbers of less-skilled people, particularly women. Unemployment rates rose steadily until about 2001, peaking at over 25 percent (narrowly defined) or 33 percent (broadly defined), then fell until 2008 (to 23 percent narrowly, or 27 percent broadly), and rose again with the onset of the global recession (24 percent; 30 percent).2 Job losses during the recession were among the highest in the Group of 20 (G-20), even though South Africa suffered no banking crisis (IMF 2010: 5). South African unemployment is dangerous not only because the numbers are so high, but

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also because the unemployed are disproportionately young and black. White unemployment at the end of 2009 was 4.9 percent; black unemployment was 28.6 percent. For young black people, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years old, unemployment is 53.8 percent; for young whites, it is 14.5 percent.3 These figures imply that South Africa remains a society of rich whites and poor blacks, but that inference is faulty. South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world and the worse-off part of the population is almost entirely black, but the richest class is now racially diverse—by 2000, there were about as many blacks as whites among the richest 20 percent of South Africans.4 The black middle class now numbers approximately 6 million people.5 South Africa’s inequality figures persist despite substantial redistribution—more than in any other developing country for which we have data (Seekings 2002: 4–8).6 This redistribution is accomplished via an efficient and progressive tax system; substantial social grants, especially noncontributory old age pensions, reaching 13 million people; free or subsidized social services (principally health and education); and public works programs (Gumede 2009: 111). The overall effect is disappointing, however, for two main reasons. First, the quality of government services is low, so the poor do not reap anything like the cash value of the expenditures incurred in their name. Education outcomes, for instance, remain desperately weak and inferior to those of peer countries, despite large investments. Second, inequality has remained high because growth has not been very high and, more critically, it has not created large numbers of jobs for the worse-off. The ineffectiveness of redistribution is also visible in land reform. At the end of apartheid, whites owned 87 percent of arable land in South Africa. The incoming government aimed to redistribute 30 percent of this land by 2014, via a willing buyer, willing seller approach. This goal is now universally acknowledged to be unobtainable, and only about 5 percent of the land has actually been redistributed. Worse, the responsible minister, Gugile Nkwinti, declared in March 2010 that 90 percent of this redistributed land is unproductive, and that the government intends to implement a “use it or lose it” rule for the beneficiaries of redistribution (Mail and Guardian 2010). Land is an emotive and dangerous issue, but alarm should be tempered by the fact that agriculture provides only 3 percent of GDP in South Africa (and 5 percent of jobs).7 South Africa’s crime rates remain among the highest in the world. It has one of the ten most murderous societies on Earth, although the murder rate has declined steadily since 1994 (from 66.9 murders per 100,000 to 34.1).8 Crime rates generally rose until 2002, and then slowly returned to 1994 levels, for reasons that remain obscure. The South African Police Service has seen its budget more than doubled in the past ten years, and its

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manpower expanded by 44 percent; nonetheless, it remains one of the least trusted government agencies (Gould, Burger, and Newham n.d.). Wealthier people prefer to use private security—in fact, they prefer to use private alternatives to most government services such as health and education. Private security guards outnumber police personnel in South Africa by a ratio of 3:2. South Africa is also one of the countries most severely affected by HIV/AIDS, with about 11 percent of its population living with HIV. Between 1997 and 2006, the overall death rate increased 91 percent; the rate for those aged twenty-five to forty-nine years old jumped an extraordinary 170 percent (Avert.org 2010). The growth rate of the pandemic was extremely high in the 1990s, but it has now leveled off. The government response to the HIV crisis was appallingly bad in the Mbeki years, chiefly because of the president’s mysterious enthusiasm for the view that HIV does not cause AIDS. One consequence was that the government was slow to roll out antiretroviral (ARV) treatment in state hospitals, a policy decision that Harvard researchers have estimated cost 330,000 lives (Chigwedere 2008: 410–415). With government finally becoming part of the solution, South Africa has since launched the world’s largest ARV program. The AIDS pandemic is even more destructive than the basic prevalence and death rates suggest because it disproportionately kills breadwinners and homemakers. What are we to make of the South African state? State strength is one of the key variables for predicting how crises will unfold. In an African perspective, this state looks good. South Africa comes in at fourth in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, after two islands and Botswana (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014). Even skeptics must concede that this is an organization capable of bringing off a successful soccer World Cup, a feat that could be performed by no other state in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa has quality infrastructure and many effective institutions. The state’s monopoly on violence is complete, at least in a political sense (crime aside). Its finances are quite substantial because the economy is large and the tax collection service is effective. But the performance of large parts of the state is nonetheless disappointing. It is hard to measure the quality of stateness in a comprehensive and consistent way, but a rough indication can be grasped from auditing results. For the 2011–2012 financial year, 7 of 38 national government departments received qualified audits. At the provincial level, 37 out of 95 departments received a negative report, and just 3 obtained an unqualified audit with no matters outstanding (Auditor General South Africa 2013). At the lowest level of governance, the state is at its weakest. Around half of South Africa’s municipalities received unsatisfactory audit results. The national government describes half of municipalities as vulnerable, the majority of which

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are located in the provinces that contained the old Bantustans.9 The poorest South Africans, those who need the state most, also experience it at its worst. The state, then, is quite a good Leviathan but not much of a social worker.

Crises The most prominent crisis in South Africa after the end of apartheid was the lengthy saga that opened with President Mbeki firing his deputy, Zuma, for alleged corruption, and ended with Mbeki being recalled from the presidency by his own party. Kgalema Motlanthe stepped in as a caretaker for the last few months of Mbeki’s term, before Zuma became president following victory in the 2009 elections. Zuma’s rise to power was possible because Mbeki had become extremely unpopular within the ANC and the broader governing alliance (comprising the ANC, the South African Communist Party [SACP], and the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU], the major trade union organization). This had stylistic and substantive causes. Mbeki’s famous aloofness, and his centralizing tendencies, alienated and excluded large parts of the ANC. The ANC Youth League fancied itself as a kingmaker, and threw itself into the fight with raucous enthusiasm. The left—COSATU and the SACP—had long resented Mbeki for imposing economic policies that they considered unacceptably neoliberal. Zuma harnessed these forces, and they took him to the presidency. The crisis was severe because it occurred at the highest level of government, because it split the dominant party, and because it made the courts (which do not stand on unshakable political ground) a major theater of conflict. The saga commenced when Mbeki fired Zuma after Zuma’s friend and adviser, Schabir Shaik, was found to have violated the Corruption Act by making payments to Zuma.10 Two weeks later, on June 14, 2005, Mbeki released Zuma from his duties as deputy president of the republic. In July came the first signal that the ANC and Mbeki were not of one mind; at the ANC’s National General Council, Zuma was voted another term as deputy president of the ANC. But six months after that, Zuma plunged even more deeply into trouble when he was accused of rape. At this point, confronted with two extremely serious criminal charges, he seemed finished. Yet good news was just around the corner. In May 2006, Zuma was acquitted of the rape charges. The judge lambasted him for poor judgment—having unprotected sex with someone he knew was HIV-positive and then, as Zuma notoriously told the court, taking a shower as a protective measure—but cleared him of criminal wrongdoing. Zuma’s supporters were jubilant. Four months later, they had another reason to celebrate: tired of the state’s request for more and more delays, the judge in Zuma’s corruption case

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struck the case from the roll. It was not the end of the matter, but it was a boost for Zuma’s comeback. The truly decisive event took place over a year later, in December 2007, when the ANC met for its national conference in Polokwane, capital of Limpopo province. In what was likely a major miscalculation, Mbeki decided to run for a third term as ANC president, even though he was not eligible for a third term as president of South Africa. He met with hostility from the assembled delegates, many of whom sang songs hostile to Mbeki or made the gesture used in soccer to signal a change of player. In the election, Mbeki was soundly defeated: Zuma became ANC president. Perhaps another candidate would have defeated Zuma but, given a choice between more Mbeki and Zuma, the ANC was clear. But then, just days after his election, Zuma was recharged with corruption. A dangerous possibility loomed: what would happen if a judge sent the president of the ANC to jail? The question went unanswered. On September 12, 2008, Judge Chris Nicholson of the High Court declared the charges against Zuma unlawful for procedural reasons and added, dramatically, that there was evidence of political interference, ultimately by Mbeki, with the aim of using the judicial system for political ends.11 Mbeki’s many foes seized on this point and a special meeting of the ANC National Executive, after fourteen hours of debate, voted to recall Mbeki. It was just seven months before his term was scheduled to expire. Mbeki accepted the news with the same poker-faced dignity displayed at Polokwane. Within two weeks of the Nicholson judgement, South Africa had a new president. It was an ugly and unsettling outcome, but also a long way from the worst-case scenario: South Africa got out of the frying pan without quite landing in the fire. The battle between Zuma and Mbeki was bitter, but never bloody; ultimately, Mbeki just surrendered. Furthermore, the deep tension between the will of the people being defeated by the courts— which still were disproportionately white—was never tested to the breaking point: in fact, the judicial system ruled in favor of Zuma several times, with white judges delivering two of the most favorable verdicts. Ultimately, the acting director of public prosecutions dropped the fraud charges after Zuma became president, so he never had to face a verdict that he could not appeal. Finally, the broader concern, that Zuma’s accession marked the arrival of the populists and radicals in power, was quickly diluted. Zuma may have relied on the loudest and angriest groups to achieve his political comeback, but in power he was not merely their loyal agent. Actually, Zuma was careful to reassure the markets, appointing respected figures to the treasury and the central bank, and making trips abroad to soothe investors’ ruffled sentiments. His tenure since has been marked by faction management and indecision, as his method of agreeing with everyone hits declining returns and, in this, we may well

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locate the seeds of a new crisis. But this particular historic earthquake killed no one. It is also worth discussing some less-elevated, but more murderous, crises that have struck South Africa in recent years. One important case is the outbreak of xenophobic violence that occurred in May 2008, and spread quickly around Gauteng, as well as flaring up in Cape Town and Mpumalanga. The attacks were aimed at migrants from other African countries and sixty-two people were killed in brutal fashion, most of them foreigners. Thousands of others fled—20,000 people in Gauteng alone had to be provided with shelter. The necessary cause of the attacks was poverty: the victims and perpetrators alike were from the bottom section of the socioeconomic pyramid. Worse-off black South Africans resent the competition they face from foreigners, especially for jobs, services, and housing. Hostility to poor foreigners has been evident since at least 1994, and surveys have shown that large majorities favor sharply restricting, or completely stopping, immigration into South Africa (Hadland 2008). The government response was moderately effective in the short term. The police reacted immediately but, as the attacks spread, they were unable to control all affected areas. The army was ordered to deploy ten days after the first deaths, and ANC members were also sent to the violent areas. The crisis itself lasted under two weeks, although the plight of those who fled into temporary camps persisted. The humanitarian response was generous, but chaotic, so it was not completely satisfactory. The attacks were the greatest political violence seen in South Africa since the end of apartheid, and the spectacle of mob brutality horrified South Africans. President Mbeki was harshly criticized for taking over a week to make a statement about the attacks and, then, for leaving the country to attend a conference in Japan before the crisis was resolved. The failures in political leadership, plus the lack of experience in handling emergencies on such a scale, both for civil society and for government, were the main reasons why the response was not more effective (Igglesden, Monson, and Polson 2009). It is unpleasant, but necessary, to add that the impact of this crisis was limited because its victims were so marginal. It did not cut to the heart of South Africa’s race or class divides. The conditions for a new outbreak of xenophobic violence have not abated and there have been further incidences of conflict—and a great many rumors of impending attacks—since 2008, although none of these have produced deaths. It is likely that more attacks will occur, though the authorities are now more vigilant so there probably will not be a fullfledged repeat of May 2008. Earlier this year, for instance, the military was deployed preemptively in parts of the Western Cape where xenophobic violence was anticipated. In another case, in Kya Sands near Johannesburg, sixteen people, most of them foreigners, were assaulted in what seemed to

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be a xenophobic attack. Large numbers of police, as well as soldiers, were quickly deployed to the scene and ten arrests were made. There is evidence that some foreigners in South Africa have left on their own accord, out of fear. The International Organization for Migration reported in July 2010 that unusually large numbers of Zimbabweans were crossing the border from South Africa with large quantities of possessions, out of fear that xenophobic attacks would follow the World Cup (International Organization for Migration 2010). South Africa came within range of another crisis in April 2010 when Terre’blanche, a far-right Afrikaner leader who had been prominent in the 1980s and early 1990s, was murdered on his farm, allegedly by some black employees. The murder came during a period of heightened racial tensions after ANC Youth League leader, Julius Malema, had been convicted of hate speech by the Equality Court, for singing a struggle song with the lyrics “kill the farmer, kill the boer.” On April 2, Malema made a visit to Zimbabwe, and was greeted at the airport with the song. This incident was widely reported, especially because Zimbabwe is a potent symbol of hostility to whites (particularly, white farmers). Terre’blanche was killed the next day. The government responded quickly to head off a white extremist reaction, with President Zuma appearing on television to appeal for calm and a collection of senior black policeman and politicians visiting Terre’blanche’s family to pay their respects. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Terre’blanche’s old political organization, initially threatened that his death would be avenged, but later retracted the statement. Ultimately, no crisis came of the murder. This happened for two reasons. First, the government reaction was effective. Second, Terre’blanche had never commanded that much support and, in any event, was well past the peak of his powers. The far right that he represented is not about to mobilize.

Conclusion South Africa is an example of dominant-party democracy. The ANC has won every national election since the advent of majority rule, sometimes with a two-thirds majority of the vote, and looks in no danger of losing office. There are advantages and disadvantages in dominant-party democracy. The most stable form of government, in the long term, is evidently competitive multiparty democracy. Getting there, however, would be a painful process for South Africa, and almost certainly would be accompanied by violence, voter intimidation, and other forms of dirty politics. In the meantime, South Africa will reap some benefits from having a ruling party that does not fear imminent defeat. There will be less temptation to politicize South Africa’s stark inequalities, especially emotive race disparities.

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After all, Robert Mugabe embarked on his farm seizure policy only when his power was threatened, after twenty years of accommodating white dominance in agriculture. Unthreatened power allows the ANC to enjoy a more balanced diet of economic and political logic. The record so far is fairly heartening: ANC governments have delivered responsible economic management, paying down debt, keeping spending under control, guarding against inflation, and generally respecting property rights. South Africa has experienced its longest period of sustained growth under ANC rule, which few would have predicted in 1994, let alone earlier. There are three more good things about the ANC. First, it is also to be credited for its internal democracy, which ensures that South Africa is not about to succumb to one-man rule. It is the oldest political party in Africa—founded in 1912—and it is still a long way from being merely a weak personal vehicle. Again, the comparison with Zimbabwe is instructive: Mugabe has controlled the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (later Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front, ZANUPF) since 1975,12 and has ruled Zimbabwe for thirty years. The ANC has had thirteen presidents since 1912, and three since it took power in 1994; South Africa has had four presidents in sixteen years. Some of the voices heard in the ANC say startling things, but pluralism is itself valuable, as the Zimbabwean case so neatly illustrates. Second, the ANC has legitimacy. This is a party that consistently exposes itself to the judgment of the voters, and keeps on winning. The caveat is that the ANC wins partly by default because there is no challenger capable of attracting black voters, which produces voter apathy. In the 2009 elections, for the first time, more people abstained from voting than voted for the ANC. We also see service delivery protests, often marked by civil disobedience, in areas that nonetheless consistently elect ANC candidates. But these are marginal objections: the ANC has a sizable reserve of legitimacy. Third, the ANC has resisted ethnic fractionalization among the black majority of the South African population. The accusation that the party is dominated by a Xhosa mafia has abated now that Zuma, a Zulu, is president and ethnic parties like the Inkatha Freedom Party are in decline. Given the death toll of black-on-black violence during the transition, and with an eye on the dangers of ethnic animosities north of the border, this is no small accomplishment. Against this must be set the dangers that the ANC, with all its power, poses to South Africa. There are huge concerns, from insiders and outsiders, that the ANC is losing its way—that it has become a party full of predators bent on looting the state, and equipped with a discourse of inequality and racial oppression to ensure that they get away with it. It is quite hard to quantify how much of this is Afro-pessimism and how much

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is well founded. Transparency International ranks South Africa sixty-seventh in its Corruption Perception Index. (Transparency International 2014). Controversies over mining licenses, however, have stoked fears that the grabbing hand of the state is loose in the market (South Africa has slipped in the Fraser Institute’s Survey of Mining Companies from forty-ninth place to sixty-first, out of seventy-two; see McMahon and Cervantes 2010).13 The debate over nationalization of the mines, originally pushed by the ANC Youth League and more recently by the populist Economic Freedom Fighters, exacerbates this pessimism. The ANC’s power is not balanced by an electoral rival, but a balance of power nonetheless prevails in South Africa. This balance is provided by four kinds of actors: (1) civil society, including the media; (2) market participants, both local and foreign; (3) separate powers in government, especially the courts; and, (4) at the furthest remove, foreigners. The battle against apartheid was marked by extensive civil society mobilization, and the tradition of an active civil society has not perished with its main enemy: South Africa is generously provided with dynamic and committed civil society organizations, and it has skilled people who want to the country to do well. A good example of civil society activism is the Treatment Action Campaign that pressured the Mbeki government, via litigation and demonstrations, to acknowledge the link between HIV and AIDS and to provide ARVs. The media are free and report extensively, and critically, on the government.14 South Africa’s economic strength has everything to do with a developed private sector, which benefits the ANC three times over. It is a major employer, it pays large amounts of tax, and it provides a place for politicians to go outside government. This is especially useful because it lowers the stakes of political battles: life outside the corridors of power is not ignominious squalor. The ANC has long aimed to encourage foreign investors, partly because it looks to them for growth—an expectation that has been mainly disappointed—but also because it needs their savings to fund investment. South Africa has low savings rates, so the government must look abroad for funds. The ANC understands its choices as: pleasing foreigners enough to sell bonds or ignoring foreigners and cutting back on spending. It prefers the former, and has made a significant effort to earn favorable credit ratings. South Africa’s constitution is one of the jewels of its transition. Unlike the ANC, it commands the support of majorities of South Africans from each race group.15 The constitution is also the core of the bargain that ended apartheid because it provides guarantees for all parties and a Constitutional Court to enforce them. South Africa never devised a consociational system, with power shared among different race groups (much to the annoyance of de Klerk), but individuals do at least have rights and a means to get them

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enforced so they are not wholly at the mercy of the ANC-controlled branches of government. The South African judiciary is substantively independent; a 2003 study of most-developed country legal systems ranked South Africa ninth for independence, ahead of all but two European countries (Feld and Voigt 2003: 525).16 Thus far, the Constitutional Court has proved adept at negotiating a path between discharging its responsibility to uphold the constitution and avoiding an out-and-out fight with the ANC. The last and lightest part of the balance is foreign governments, organizations, and civil society. South Africa is a prominent country and very much on the radar screens of other governments. Foreigners played a significant role in the fight against apartheid through sanctions and other forms of political pressure. We also know that foreign involvement was important in achieving an emergency settlement after the Kenyan election crisis of 2007 and in lobbying for peaceful acceptance of the Ghanaian knife-edge election results in 2008. A crisis in South Africa would attract tremendous foreign attention. This would be effective in part because South Africa’s leaders like their world standing—their membership in the G-20, their place at Davos, their prestige at hosting a successful World Cup, their mention when reform of the UN Security Council is mooted. They care, if not unreservedly, about what foreigners say. My foregoing analysis should make clear that South Africa is reasonably good at responding to crises. The state, with the support of civil society, is too strong to be overwhelmed by an emergency, although it is not so capable that responses will be optimal. South Africa is a nation beset by dangerous contradictions, however, and these are capable of setting off a crisis in slow motion. This would tear society apart, prompt capital and skills flight, substantially reduce the state’s capacity, and reduce living standards across the board. There is a possible world in which South Africa goes over this cliff—but, for the time being, it is some way from the edge and cognizant of the danger.

Notes 1. The black-white dichotomy obscures the complexity of South Africa’s racial landscape, which also features a large Indian population as well as the so-called colored people—a mixed-race, Afrikaans-speaking group principally resident in the Western Cape. The South African population is about 79 percent black, 9.6 percent white, 8.9 percent colored, and 2.5 percent Indian. Statistics South Africa 2012. 2. Calculating unemployment figures in South Africa is somewhat difficult, particularly because many people are too discouraged to seek work and are therefore omitted from the normal International Labour Organization definition of “unemployment.” To solve this problem, two unemployment figures are usually reported—one for the narrow definition of unemployment, and one for a broader definition that includes discouraged individuals.

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3. This data is drawn from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010. The OECD data is drawn from Stats SA sources. 4. This point is made forcefully by Nattrass and Seekings 2005. The statistic is from p. 306. 5. The Economist 2010. This figure is calculated from the number of black individuals earning over 100,000 rands ($14,000) per year—about 1.9 million individuals—plus their families. 6. There are about three times as many people receiving social grants as there are people paying income tax. 7. See OECD 2010: 9. These are 2009 data. 8. This is still extremely high. The United States, itself a high-murder society, averages about 5 homicides per 100,000 people. Canada has less than 2. 9. See Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009: 55. The municipal results are for the 2007/2008 financial year. 10. While serving as deputy president, Jacob Zuma had received large loans and gifts from Schabir Shaik. The two had been friends for years, but Shaik also ran a business that bid for government contracts, so his generosity was not selfevidently altruistic. 11. These observations earned Judge Chris Nicholson some harsh words from the Supreme Court of Appeal, which heard the case on appeal and found that the judge had expressed opinions irrelevant to the legal matters before him—but by then it was too late for Thabo Mbeki. 12. The party became ZANU-PF after Joshua Nkomo’s Ndebele constituency was brutalized by the North Korean−trained Fifth Brigade until he capitulated and agreed to merge his party with Robert Mugabe’s. The death toll exceeded 3,000. The operation, known as the Gukurahundi, Shona for “the rain which washes away the chaff,” probably counts as genocide. 13. The index tries to measure the favorableness of the mining policy environment. It treats US states and Canadian provinces as separate cases, but outside North America each country counts as one case. 14. Media freedom is threatened by the proposed Media Tribunal, but this ANC policy is likely to prove an object lesson in the system of defenses against the party’s abuses: it has been challenged by civil society at home and abroad, and almost certainly would not survive a challenge in the Constitutional Court—if it is ever enforced without major modifications. 15. This point has been acknowledged by ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe, among others. 16. South Africa was behind only Austria and Switzerland of the European countries.

10 Crisis Management for Strengthening the State John W. Harbeson and Peter M. Lewis

THE END OF THE COLD WAR COINCIDED WITH NUMEROUS DISRUP-

tions and challenges across Africa. A decade of economic distress throughout the region, accompanied by donor-induced austerity, continued through much of the 1990s. As superpower balances collapsed, a wave of regime change traversed the continent—sometimes yielding democratization, other times stasis or instability. The new international context also gave rise to security problems from insurgencies, rebellions, and state failure. Pandemics and climatic change emerged as major dilemmas for many governments and global actors. While economic, governance, and security conditions have significantly improved during the 2000s, much vulnerability remains as witnessed in recent turmoil in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Nigeria. In this book, we focused on dimensions of crisis management in African states. Countries in the region are frequently subject to adverse shocks in areas of governance, security, or the economy, with potentially great ramifications for stability and popular welfare. These shocks often give rise to full-blown crises that pose fundamental challenges for political and social orders. In other instances, governments are able to forestall or mitigate the effects of unanticipated adverse events, to restore a legitimate order, or to pursue needed reforms. The factors that precipitate crises and facilitate effective response are of interest not only for African leaders and citizens, but also an array of observers and practitioners. In the chapters of this book, we examined the extent to which governments have recognized emerging crises and mobilized institutions, linkages, and available resources to address them. Through comparative analysis and 185

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case studies, we explored the divergent manner in which governments in seven African countries have managed a variety of shocks that carried the potential to descend into systemic crises. We also considered the incentives and capabilities that account for variations in crisis management. The study outlines alternative strategies to manage adverse events and gauges varying outcomes. In this concluding chapter, we summarize the findings from the cases and consider their implications for policy. We also consider how these experiences reflect evolving perspectives on the state, governance, and crisis management in developing countries. We look at both implicit and explicit approaches to adverse events, suggesting policy recommendations for managing African crisis situations. We are especially concerned with the effects of crisis management on state construction and democratization. The authors of the cases discussed potential or actual crises in the African states of Algeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. In some instances (e.g., the Great Lakes conflict beginning in 1994), these events have formed important crossroads, shaping the political and economic development trajectories of these countries. In others (e.g., South Africa’s economic and social tensions), official responses have mitigated serious shocks without incurring disruption of political or social orders. Since the literature on development and security in Africa in the post-independence era often focuses on structural dimensions and paths of crisis,1 we chose to give more attention to contingent sources of change. Many assessments of state strength and governmental quality focus on categorical judgments of relative capacity, rather than exploring alternative strategies and incentives among regimes in responding to adverse circumstances. Ghana’s economic recovery in the 1980s, Mozambique’s flood response in the 1990s, and South Africa’s prevarication over the rapidly spreading HIV/AIDS pandemic in the mid-1990s and early 2000s each provide a vivid illustration of strategic directions and policy choices that did not reflect general state capabilities at the time. Put simply, Ghana and Mozambique overperformed while South Africa significantly underperformed. The reasons had to do with elite incentives and political strategies in response to serious shocks. This book aims at a better understanding of these flexible dimensions of crisis management.

Shocks, Crises, and Sequences We proceeded from a basic distinction between shocks and crisis. Adverse shocks routinely affect countries in Africa (as in all other parts of the world), creating challenges for governments in fashioning appropriate and effective responses. Shocks are transmitted through a range of effects,

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including trade or financial downturns, contentious elections, regional rebellions or insurgencies, conflict spillovers from neighbors, pandemics, rapid demographic shifts, and extreme weather events. When adverse shocks are not sufficiently addressed, or are manipulated for political or economic gain, the effects are likely to spread and intensify into more chronic and deep-seated challenges. The results are seen in unconstitutional regime changes, governmental paralysis, protracted economic dislocation and stagnation, a rise in social violence, the advent of war, large-scale migration or displacement, and health or humanitarian emergencies. Crisis management poses challenges in limiting the extent, duration, and proximity of such shocks. Government response can influence whether adverse events are contained, instigate a downward spiral, or produce an intractable predicament. While crisis situations vary considerably, they reflect causal processes and sequences that are often reproduced in diverse circumstances. In the first instance, a disruptive event occurs, usually without clear warning. The global economic downturn of 2008–2009 (affecting a range of countries, notably Angola among our cases), post-election violence in Kenya in 2007– 2008, and the mass migration of displaced persons from Rwanda into eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1994 are such pivotal events. Each of these disruptions, though in some respects foreseeable, was certainly unanticipated by domestic authorities and international observers. In consequence, governments and external actors face choices about how to respond, and their strategies in this period often are decisive for the course of events. In Angola, elements in the economic bureaucracy responded relatively promptly in 2009 to severe trade and revenue shocks, and worked with multilateral financial institutions to help stabilize the economy. In Kenya, violence quickly spread and escalated, although outside powers (including the United States) engaged politically with key protagonists and the main adversaries concluded a power-sharing arrangement that stemmed conflict. By contrast, the government of Zaire largely relinquished humanitarian response in the eastern region to international agencies, and then manipulated local communal tensions that ultimately sparked a regional rebellion, which deposed the Mobutu Sese Seko regime and opened the way to more than a decade of multifaceted violent conflict. These responses can be arrayed along a spectrum from comparatively anticipatory and prompt (Angola), through delay and partial remediation (Kenya), to neglect and exacerbation (DRC). The varying approaches reflect the proximity of shocks and the incentives of elites. In the case of Angola, the abrupt downturn in revenues created a salient challenge to the regime’s postwar legitimating project as well as the immediate economic gains of key officials. Moreover, an element of economic pragmatism held a place in the strategies of Angolan leaders, including the relative insulation

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of the state petroleum company in the 1980s, the abandonment of MarxismLeninism in 1991, and a degree of technocratic oversight of the booming peacetime economy of the 2000s. In consequence, officials were responsive to signs of economic dislocation and willing to engage in a stabilization program. The divergent case of Kenya illustrates political and communal polarization in the 2007 elections with substantial culpability of politicians in the violence that followed in the wake of the polls. Rival candidates and their partisans were embroiled in a wave of violence (aggravated by the response of state security forces) until the spreading conflict undermined national stability to a degree that prompted engagement by regional groups and other external actors. A gathering existential threat increased the willingness of national politicians to accept mediation and to conclude a political bargain. In the case of Mobutu’s Zaire, the ruler maintained only partial territorial control and sought alliances with regional groups and external actors to bolster his resources and local networks. Ultimately, the efforts to preserve a narrow coalition as the basis of dominance were unsuccessful as contending forces gained momentum in the Kivu provinces, regional dissension spread, and state security forces collapsed. The ruler’s efforts to deploy the crisis to his advantage were self-defeating.

Managing Risks and Addressing Crises Effective crisis management requires some ability to anticipate hazards as the basis for timely response. This obviously is difficult to achieve since shocks are by nature unanticipated events that are destabilizing precisely because of their unpredictability. While early warning frameworks and related analysis can often signal heightened threats, such efforts rarely forecast the timing of adverse events (Schmeidl and Jenkins 1998, 479; Goldstone 2010).2 Prediction is not an insurmountable problem, however, as we can reasonably identify circumstances that are likely to produce negative shocks. By considering the probability of adverse events, it is possible to develop forward-looking policies and strategies. Certain junctures in politics, economic affairs, or conflict situations clearly convey important risks. Political transitions, electoral cycles, and conflict settlements are uncertain moments that threaten to redistribute power or resources in ways that can provoke destabilizing responses from elements invested in the status quo. Similarly, economic shocks, usually emanating from external sources, may create distributive conflicts or defensive reactions from elites. Among the cases covered here, elections have been disruptive in Algeria (1991), Angola (1992), Kenya (2007), and Nigeria (1993, 2007, and 2011). The most hazardous moments arise from transitional elections that feature a

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change of regime or promise a significant turnover of incumbents, especially in circumstances where electoral fraud and malpractices are common. Elections in highly polarized ethnic or regional settings are precarious, as seen in Côte d’Ivoire as well as in Kenya and Nigeria. Risky elections can be anticipated, allowing for local administrative and security precautions, bargaining among key rivals, civic mobilization, or political engagement by regional or bilateral actors. These efforts may not prevent electoral instability, though experience over the past two decades provides some important lessons about the initiatives and timing that can furnish effective response. Electoral contention can be assuaged by improvements in election management, consultations between competing groups, the utilization of local brokers or interlocutors, and regional or bilateral mediation. Similarly, transitional settlements in conflict situations can be derailed by spoilers or frustrated by coordination failures. Perhaps the most memorable case is Rwanda, where the Arusha agreements were scuttled by the killing of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents and the instigation of a campaign of genocide. Among our cases, the failure of the Angolan transitional elections in 1992, which provoked the deadliest phase in ultimately a twenty-seven-year-long conflict, is another powerful illustration. In Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta region, an amnesty program produced a respite in conflict, though efforts at stability were weakened by the failure to implement political reform along with a lack of developmental policies for the region. The key lessons here are to be attentive to spoiler problems in the near term and to find better ways to manage defectors from a settlement process. In the medium term, the challenge is to furnish economic and political reforms that can complement the pact to end hostilities. In the economic domain, effective response is possible even if precise forecasting is difficult. Economic reform programs create distributive challenges or disruptions to livelihoods that are rarely destabilizing in the near term, but may be a source of turbulence in the medium term. Zimbabwe’s entry into an Economic Structural Adjustment Program was a prelude to political tensions and further disruptions in the early 2000s. Protests in response to Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Program in the late 1980s increased pressure on the military regime, which responded with repressive measures and delays in a planned political transition program. Compensatory measures in the form of safety nets and better sequencing can reduce the possibilities of large-scale disruptions arising from economic policy change. Global economic shocks clearly transmit large imminent risks to African economies, calling for prudent responses from both governments and donors. In 1982, the developing country debt crisis provoked widespread economic failure across the region, which was aggravated by lagging responses from African regimes and extensive austerity measures imposed by multilateral financial institutions (Gibbon et al. 1992). The

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global economic downturn in 2008–2009 also transmitted large shocks that required prompt responses to avoid another sustained collapse similar to the crisis of the 1980s. Fortunately in the latter case, most African governments recognized the risks early and took countercyclical measures while multilateral institutions quickly provided bridge financing with low conditionality. Two key differences were the improvements in the general macroeconomic policy framework in most African countries in the 2000s and the widespread effectiveness of senior economic officials in responding to the more recent shocks. Overall policy direction and the caliber of economic oversight are strong predictors of relative responses to economic shocks.

Capacities for Crisis Management Institutions, resources, and international linkages influence the trajectory of adverse events. Effective state structures and policy instruments, revenues and fiscal space, and the nature of outside intercession will condition the response to various emergencies. Several attributes of state institutions shape crisis management. Bureaucratic capabilities facilitate the collection of information, the framing of policy responses, and the possibilities for implementation across government (P. M. Lewis 2007). Legal frameworks determine crucial dimensions of citizen rights and political representation. Peak agencies of economic management frame the mobilization of resources. The size and professionalism of police and military forces foster differential responses to security challenges. These institutional capabilities typically fall under the rubric of “governance,” and are often decisive in the management of critical shocks. It is important to recognize that institutional capabilities are not uniform across domains of government, and that some agencies or functions will be more effective than others. States commonly reflect uneven capabilities, as pockets of efficacy are juxtaposed with institutional weakness. Regardless of specific capacities, state responses are often ineffective when they are one-dimensional and not supported by complementary resources. For instance, Algeria and Nigeria, both petroleum states with substantial domestic security forces, looked primarily to domestic security responses in addressing their respective insurgencies. The results were not propitious: civil conflict intensified in Algeria, and militancy in Nigeria worsened for several years before an amnesty yielded short-term stabilization. The situation in Nigeria then morphed into criminalization and a wider illicit oil trade. The Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria illustrates even more powerfully the pitfalls of purely military approach to insurgency, especially if it is poorly managed. More effective response is possible when a broader array of institutions and interests are involved. In Ghana, reliance on domestic security responses as well as political engagement and

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initiatives by local NGOs helped to mitigate the Dagomba-Konkomba violence of the 1990s. Democratization during this period had mixed effects, creating tensions around distribution and representation while also offering political outlets for resolution. Although the case discussion provides a critical assessment of state management of the northern violence, from a comparative vantage Ghanaian authorities arguably brought multiple institutions to bear on the conflict and were successful in containing instability. Resource mobilization is another essential factor in crisis management. South Africa, with a comparatively effective tax regime and capable economic bureaucracy, has had sufficient fiscal space to address major challenges such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and redistributive cash transfer programs, once political leaders focused on these policy priorities. Angola’s strong finances also enabled some resilience in the face of the economic downturn of 2009. By contrast, the government in Kinshasa, depleted by endemic corruption and mismanagement, had no ability to respond to the sudden massive influx of refugees into eastern Congo in the mid-1990s. Similarly, Nigeria’s government has been unable to effectively marshal resources for development in the Niger Delta and the northern states or for concerted security responses toward regional insurgencies. Strategic engagement with external actors and resources can facilitate responses to incipient crises. In South Africa, initial neglect and poorly conceived responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic contributed to a public health emergency. Democratic pressures helped to shift government priorities so that the capacities of the national health infrastructure, assisted by external resources, bolstered an assertive response in the mid-2000s. When political strife in Kenya was aggravated by domestic political rivalries, ethnic mobilization, and ineffective security response, the engagement of regional mediators and bilateral involvement from the United States helped to broker a power-sharing arrangement that stemmed the emergency. In Angola, domestic agencies of economic management were bolstered by cooperation with multilateral financial institutions. Finally, a number of crises emerge in African states where capabilities are minimal or levels of fragmentation so great that coherent response by domestic authorities are largely precluded. The DRC exemplifies these circumstances. External involvement in the DRC over the past two decades has been radically contradictory, as foreign incursions and proxy forces have often been catalysts of violence while UN peacekeeping forces and international mediation of the political process have been instrumental at times in achieving a modicum of stability.

Incentives for Addressing Crises Some minimum thresholds of state capabilities or fiscal reserves may be necessary for crisis management, but they are rarely sufficient for effective

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results. Elite incentives shape crisis response among African governments. The cases in this book reflect a range of regimes, political structures, and governing strategies that influence the reaction to adverse events. Ruling compacts, the foundations of political control, and the position of ruling groups affect the willingness and capacity to manage significant shocks. Leaders in some settings have a degree of accountability to citizens that can impel more timely or effective responses while others may be more responsive to narrow regime constituencies, prompting denial of emerging problems or delayed reaction to gathering threats. Some rulers may utilize economic or security disruptions as opportunities to penalize opponents or bolster their factional control, leading to neglect and a downward spiral of crisis. Among the cases considered here, the better-functioning democratic regimes have been able to address serious problems and contain potentially destabilizing events. In South Africa, the government lagged in responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but was swayed by activism, information, and other public pressure to improve the delivery of medication and services. The South African government also has pragmatically managed the economy, quelled xenophobic violence, and attempted to address problems of equity, poverty, and infrastructure. Despite issues of capacity, policy choice, and self-interest among leaders, the regime in South Africa displays a degree of accountability to the mass public that is absent in many other contexts. Ghana presents a somewhat different scenario, with an authoritarian regime in the 1980s inclined toward reform that was succeeded in the 1990s by a nascent democracy in a relatively successful context of rights and competition. Leaders were able to manage communal violence sufficiently to avoid chronic disruptions while sustaining economic stability and improved performance. In these cases, leaders in different institutional contexts have recognized a measure of accountability to citizens, prompting policy responses to emerging problems and predicaments. Different sets of interests and incentives are evident in the petro-states of Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria, where centralized fiscal control and strategies of elite rent distribution drive government strategies. Each of these states has been susceptible to economic crises, contention from a lack of political inclusion, and conflicts arising from political rivalries and regional inequality. Over time, elites in all three of the petro-states have gravitated toward macroeconomic stabilization as a means of regime stability, though they remain buffeted by political and security problems. In Kenya, a country without significant extractive industries, communal elites deploy patronage and political maneuver in the competition over resources, and this has engendered economic stagnation, political dissension, and social violence. Countervailing influences can be seen in a growing middle class and a legacy of economic expansion that have fostered considerable commitment

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to political accommodation in the interest of stability. In the DRC, natural resource wealth has framed a system of narrowly constructed clientelist politics organized around the person of the president and his inner circle. These structural features of the regime allow for limited reach, minimal legitimacy, and fragmentary control of national territory. In response to economic, political, and security upheavals, leaders have sought to maintain the architecture of political control as weak capacities have fostered nearpermanent crises across the Congolese state.

Alternative Paths of Crisis Management The variety of strategic responses to adverse shocks has produced a range of outcomes and legacies. Somewhat surprisingly, in the time frame covered here, South Africa and Angola (despite very different histories) reflect comparative successes in macroeconomic management. In each instance, post-transition or postconflict regimes were committed to economic stabilization as part of a governing strategy. In the wake of democratization in South Africa, the new ANC government, confronted by a depleted treasury and dysfunctional state sector inherited from the apartheid regime, prioritized fiscal and monetary stability. The senior economic bureaucracy was capable, well informed, and alert to challenges. More than a decade later in Angola, peak decisionmakers were responsive to major shocks and comparatively prompt in undertaking stabilization measures, fostering resilience in a resource-dependent economy. Kenya and Ghana embody cases where leaders responded to deteriorating security conditions with reasonable effect, despite lingering challenges and unresolved dimensions of conflict. Incipient crises were not avoided in Kenya’s 2007–2008 election violence or Ghana’s northern communal conflicts in the 1990s, but authorities relied on state security, political engagement, and mediation to stem violence and produce workable settlements. Kenyan leaders were engaged in mobilizing communal identities, and therefore entangled in political violence, though the rapid escalation of strife in 2008 prompted responses from domestic elites and international actors that drove incentives for a political bargain. In Ghana, President Jerry John Rawlings’s agenda of political reform, including the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992, encouraged measures for stability, leading the government to quell or resolve intercommunal violence in the northern region.3 Governing strategies and elements of the dominant coalition in each country were responsive to emerging dilemmas and willing to engage in remediation. Ruling groups reacted much differently in Algeria and Nigeria, where political polarization and exclusion fostered respective crises of security

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and governance. In the early 1990s, the Algerian regime repudiated the results of elections in which the Islamist Front Islamique de Salut claimed victory, sparking a civil war that raged for a decade with a toll of more than 100,000 deaths. Not long after the Algerian elections, the military regime in Nigeria annulled elections in 1993, creating the basis for political turbulence, popular protest, and a new round of military repression lasting through the decade. Both crises were direct outcomes of the ruling strategies of military incumbents who were determined to control the terms of political transition and to protect their own perquisites in leading petrostates. The case of the DRC embodies circumstances in which ruling strategies, extreme political fragmentation, and minimal state capacities converged in a protracted crisis of security and governance. Mobutu’s political dominance rested on the management of clientelist networks and regional nodes of control. Already in retreat from Kinshasa in the early 1990s, the regime ruled mainly from the far northern town of Gbadolite by the time the Rwandan conflict sent nearly a million refugees into Congolese territory. The government’s inability to manage the displaced population, and intervention from neighboring countries, facilitated insurgency from the east that led to the victory of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s forces. The new leadership, however, proved no better at bargaining with regions and local networks, and the proliferation of militias across the country fostered rising instability and conflict. In the wake of Kabila’s assassination in 1999, a full-blown regional war erupted in which perhaps 3 million died of disease, starvation, and violence. Central authorities were enmeshed in the conflict through links with militias as well as a poorly organized and fragmentary national army. The many-sided crisis in the DRC was perhaps overdetermined by political incentives, state weakness, foreign maneuvers, and dilatory global response.

Legacies of Crisis The longer-term effects of crises and crisis management also show different paths. Adverse events may impel leaders to pursue reforms; to work toward political inclusion, reconciliation, or conflict prevention; or to shift ruling strategies and institutions. Alternatively, crises may create tipping points that foster protracted instability and hardship. These different legacies are evident in the cases discussed in this project. Comparatively speaking, the instances of successful economic oversight established important foundations for stability and a legitimating project for the regime. By preventing severe economic dislocation in the early years of postconflict development, South African and Angolan leaders arguably bolstered their credibility at

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important crossroads. In the instance of South Africa, economic stabilization provided fiscal space for the government to implement income support programs that contributed to stability, even as deep inequalities and disparities in social provisions have persisted. In the conflict cases of Kenya and Ghana, government approaches to security challenges—notwithstanding problems and inconsistencies—have mitigated a spiral of conflict. For Kenya, the violence following the 2007 elections spurred a power-sharing agreement among political rivals, constitutional reform that afforded devolution to regions and counties, and moderate approaches in the 2013 elections that yielded a peaceful poll. While issues of accountability, land rights, and displacement persist, many observers agree that Kenyan leaders and civic forces sought to pull back from the polarization and violence that marred the preceding elections. In Ghana, a relatively restrained security response, continued engagement by NGOs, and ongoing democratic reforms have helped to mute dissension and conflict among northern groups. Here too, land issues and questions of accountability linger, though the acute strife of the 1990s has not resurfaced to date. Algeria and Nigeria face more problematic legacies. There has been no accountability for state abuses during the Algerian conflict of the 1990s, though the regime was able to defeat Islamist forces and to reestablish a form of electoral continuity in the wake of the conflict. Militants continue to operate in southern Algeria while security in the populous northern coastal zone has been restored. Algeria faces continued problems of political succession, legitimacy, and inclusion that could foster instability in the future. In Nigeria, the death of the dictator Sani Abacha was an opening for political transition and a degree of reconciliation. The military rapidly inaugurated electoral rule and the new civilian government sought the recovery of stolen funds as well as convening a truth and reconciliation process. These initiatives, while helpful, were ultimately insufficient to produce legitimate governance. Political exclusion, fraudulent elections, and government malfeasance have undermined stability, leading to widespread social violence and two regional insurgencies. Nigeria continues to grapple with fundamental challenges of security and political stability. The legacy of conflict in the DRC has been a lingering trail of instability and state weakness, contained by international intercession and regional bargaining. While UN mediation and peacekeeping efforts have substantially reduced conflict and stabilized much of the country, continued insecurity in the east and intermittent provocations in other areas signal the tenuous basis of control by authorities in the capital and the many unresolved local and regional issues that have prompted conflict. The regime in Kinshasa has not pursued serious reform of public institutions in any realm while the legacy of violence and displacement continues to foster fragmen-

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tation and dissension. Though the DRC is considerably more stable than a decade ago, it is a country at high risk of renewed crisis in political, security, and economic affairs.

Lessons and Policy Implications This analysis of the conditions, paths, and varying approaches to crisis management in Africa offers insights for policy. These observations and prescriptions are directed especially toward international actors, whether regional intermediaries such as the African Union, international organizations such as the United Nations, multilateral institutions, or bilateral actors. The insights gained from this selection of seven regional cases furnish important guidelines for understanding and addressing emergencies on the continent. 1. Early warning efforts are indispensable. Recognizing that predictive efforts are often imprecise and inaccurate, the attempt to forecast adverse events and ensuing crises can be an integral part of effective response. Even though country specifics and conjunctural factors are not known with clarity, it is possible to anticipate common shocks and hazardous circumstances. Elections in conditions of political transition and polarization, conflict settlements with spoiler problems, and spillovers from neighboring strife are all moments in which conditions may rapidly deteriorate. Medium-term consequences may flow from rising insurgencies or broad economic disruptions. The emergence of leaders or social forces with a strong sectional agenda or polarizing ideology is also a charged circumstance. The use of broad indicators may be a blunt tool but, used in conjunction with careful situation reports, it is possible to gauge heightened risks for many countries. This enables outside intermediaries to engage various actors in a vulnerable country and to anticipate the need for addressing a deteriorating scenario. 2. Prompt response is an essential part of containing crises. In the best circumstances, institutional preparation and forecasting will enable various actors to manage shocks in a timely way and avoid a descent into national emergency or crisis. While preventive action may be of limited effect, quick deployment of diplomatic and political engagement, financial resources, and in some instances military forces can often contain the malign effects of adverse shocks. This might seem evident, though the 1994 cataclysm in Rwanda (where UN peacekeepers were actually withdrawn after violence erupted), the protracted brutality in the DRC from 1998 to 2003, and the rapid deterioration of conditions in Mali in 2012 all reflect failures of domestic and international response to emerging crises. These

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dilatory responses or retreats can be contrasted with quicker response by the regional ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to the Liberian state collapse in 1990, regional and bilateral mediation in Kenya in 2008, and fast disbursements (with low conditions) by multilateral financial institutions in response to the global economic downturn of 2009. While none of these programs was optimal, they all served to arrest deteriorating conditions and laid the groundwork for political or economic recovery. Even a partial inadequate response may serve to contain incipient crises while neglect or delay will almost certainly contribute to a worsening trend. 3. External initiatives should lead with political and diplomatic engagement. As noted throughout this study, crisis situations are frequently aggravated by domestic leaders who are unwilling or incapable of addressing adverse conditions. In some instances (e.g., Kenya and Algeria), this reflects polarization or contention among factions; in others (e.g., the DRC and Angola), it is mainly a consequence of ruling strategies by elite groups. Engagement by external actors can be effective in pressuring local decisionmakers, providing policy guidance, or furnishing collective goods for conflict management. Regional mediators, influential bilateral partners, or international organizations can potentially play this role. External leverage can often strengthen or elicit commitment from leaders. Regardless of relative capacity, states are indispensable agents in conflict management, and military or technical approaches will be ineffective without sufficient political backing. These realities speak to the importance of leading an external initiative with sustained political efforts and diplomacy. This primary level of engagement is always necessary, and sometimes it is sufficient to mitigate and contain emergencies. 4. Domestic incentives for crisis management should be fostered. Outside intercession frequently seeks to shift the incentives of domestic actors toward the alleviation of incipient crisis. Political pressure (and guarantees) may produce a political bargain, as in Kenya. Financial resources can provide the wherewithal for economic stabilization and essential reform, as in Angola. Advocacy and targeted resources can shift direction or raise policy priorities, as occurred with HIV/AIDS in South Africa. In the DRC, a large UN peacekeeping force, sustained outside mediation among factions, and implicit assurances for the regime led to a broad settlement that substantially reduced violence and created groundwork for stabilization. In each of these situations, domestic actors could not break away from inimical goals or resolve coordination problems without external intercession. The effort to shift incentives is often a critical element in achieving progress in a crisis situation. 5. Initiatives from outside the continent should harmonize with regional initiatives and resources wherever possible. Bilateral actors can bring substantial resources and influence to bear while multilateral financial institu-

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tions and the UN system are often pivotal in responding to emergencies. Such influences, however, can be leveraged by coordinating with regional or subregional actors and institutions. Eminent persons groups, individual mediators, regional compacts, and peacekeeping forces have all played important roles in containing and managing political or security crises in Africa. Moreover, regional initiatives, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the accompanying peer review mechanism, have helped to shift norms and policy ideas across much of the continent. Working with such continental groups can provide information, enhance legitimacy, and bolster commitment among key actors in adverse situations. The growing initiative and capacity of regional organizations also increase the opportunities for, and gains from, coordination. 6. The development of local capabilities is a crucial element in strengthening crisis management. Comprehensive state building is obviously a large historical process, but it is possible to focus on particular capabilities and resources in helping governments to better manage crises. Macroeconomic management, better forecasting tools, institutions of mediation and conflict resolution, and key legal or policy reforms can help to manage shocks. In some instances, the development of military and intelligence capabilities will be an appropriate component in enabling more effective responses to security challenges. Security Sector Reform, including programs to improve professionalism and respect for human rights, is a pressing need in most countries. In many states, however, there are more salient concerns such as election administration, improvement of forecasting and informational capabilities, disaster response institutions, regional development initiatives, and local government reforms. The political and administrative context is often more important for responding to adverse events than agencies of security, even in some conflict situations. The Niger Delta illustrates the importance of development and political priorities, and in Ghana the complementary role of civic organizations and military intercession helped to contain violence in the north. 7. Civil society and nonstate actors are integral resources in crisis management. Nongovernmental organizations and local associations provide a variety of roles that can be essential in managing emergencies, whether in the domain of security, development, or political contention. Civic and community organizations are closest to their constituencies and are uniquely positioned to access local knowledge and networks. Consequently, this stratum of nonstate actors can be an important source of information, policy advice, and implementation for significant initiatives. At a minimum, NGOs and community-based organizations are a crucial adjunct to state agencies and international organizations. They often hold the key to managing conflict, furnishing local services, legitimating programs, or fostering political accommodation. State institutions as well as interna-

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tional actors can draw on the myriad resources afforded by these associations. In many instances, efforts to strengthen civil society will yield dividends in fostering shock absorbers that can palliate tensions, minimize shocks, or otherwise enable more effective responses to conflict or political dislocation. In this book, we sought to explain the emergence, duration, responses, and outcomes of crisis in African states. We defined the nature of crisis, and distinguished systemic dislocations from more transient shocks. In seven national case studies, we explored crisis vulnerabilities as well as the incentives and state capabilities that affect the paths of crisis. The comparative chapters situate adverse events and emergencies in the broader context of state formation, security, and political contention in Africa. We also sought to draw lessons from the cases as a general guide to policy. In Africa, as in other regions, adverse shocks are inevitable and commonplace. Sub-Saharan Africa has often experienced crises arising from negative shocks; and, in some areas, the continent seems especially susceptible to the spiral of crisis. Such spirals are not inevitable, however, and there are different capabilities within states and across countries that can shape crisis response. This comparative study seeks a better understanding of the conditions of crisis in Africa as well as the possibilities and opportunities for more effective and lasting responses. Africa’s trajectory over the past decade suggests that processes of learning, institutional development, and international coordination have borne fruit in reducing vulnerabilities and stemming crises in much of the region. We hope that these observations can contribute to future stability, political inclusion, and better livelihoods across the continent.

Notes 1. For comprehensive reviews of this literature as it pertains to Africa, see Hyden 2012 and Young 2012. 2. For example, only a little less than half of the countries in the top decile of risk end up experiencing a war, regime crisis, or genocide or politicide within ten years in a model developed for the Political Instability Task Force, one of the most successful attempts to forecast political instability to date. See Goldstone et al. 2010: 198. 3. Indeed, there is a striking contrast between Ghana’s conflict management in 1994–1995 and the concurrent government-instigated communal violence in the Rift Valley of Kenya, each prompted by different governing strategies among the Jerry Rawlings and Daniel arap Moi regimes.

Acronyms

ACN ADF ANC ANPP APCLS AQIM ARV AWB BDK BNA BRICS CAN CASA-CE

CEIC CNDP COSATU CPP DRC DRS ECA ECOMOG ECOWAS

Action Congress of Nigeria Allied Democratic Forces African National Congress All Nigerian People’s Party Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain al-Qaeda in the Maghreb antiretroviral Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) Bundu Dia Kongo National Bank of Angola Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa African Cup of Nations Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola–Coligação Eleitoral (Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola– Electoral Coalition) Centro de Estudos e Investigacao Cientifica Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple Congress of South African Trade Unions Convention People’s Party Democratic Republic of Congo Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité Excess Crude Account ECOWAS Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States 201

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ACRONYMS

EIA FARDC FDLR FIBUN FIS FLEC FLEC-FAC FLN FNL FNLA FOCA FRF FSDA GDP GNP GSPC G-20 GURN HIV/AIDS IDPs IMF INEC IPAC ISIS KACC KADU KANU KCIC KNDR LRA MEND MLC MONUSCO MPLA NDC NDI

US Energy Information Administration Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda Force Intervention Brigade Front Islamique de Salut Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda) Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda– Armed Forces of Cabinda National Liberation Front Forces Nationales de Libération National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola) Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund gross domestic product gross national product Groupe Salafiste pour le Prédication et le Combat Group of 20 Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (Governo de Unidade Nacional) human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome internally displaced persons International Monetary Fund Independent National Election Commission Inter-Party Advisory Committee Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission Kenya African Democratic Union Kenya African National Union Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation project Lord’s Resistance Army Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Mouvement de Libération du Congo UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular pela Libertação de Angola) National Democratic Congress National Democratic Institute

ACRONYMS

NGO NLC NPP OECD OGE OPEC PALIPEHUTU PARECO PDP PNDC PPL PRS RCD-Goma SACP SBA SFOR SSR TJRC UDPS UGCC UN UNDP UNHCR UNIGOV UNITA UNJHRO UP UPDF ZANU ZANU-PF

203

nongovernmental organization National Liberation Council New Patriotic Party Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development General State Budget Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu Patriotes Résistants Congolais People’s Democratic Party Provisional National Defence Council Public Probity Law Partido de Renovação Social (Social Renewal Party) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie South African Communist Party standby arrangement (IMF) Strategic Financial Oil Reserve Security Sector Reform Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya Union Démocratique pour le Progrès Social United Gold Coast Convention United Nations UN Development Programme UN High Commissioner for Refugees Union Government National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União pela Independência Total de Angola) UN Joint Human Rights Office United Party Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces Zimbabwe African National Union Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front

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The Contributors

Pierre Englebert is H. Russell Smith professor of international relations at Pomona College. David Fowkes is senior economist at South African Reserve Bank. John W. Harbeson is professor of political science emeritus at the City College of New York and professorial lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Peter M. Lewis is associate professor and director of African Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Miriam R. Lowi is professor of political science at the College of New Jersey. Susana Moreira serves as sub-Saharan Africa analyst for Freedom in the World. Kwaku A. Nuamah is senior research fellow at the Center for Conflict Resolution, Salisbury University, and lecturer at American University School of International Service.

221

Index

Abacha, Sani, 151–152, 156, 195 Aban, I. K., 118 Abiola, M. K. O., 151 Abubakar, Abulsalami, 152, 156 Acheampong, Ignatius Kutu, 117, 118– 119, 120 ACN. See Action Congress of Nigeria Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), 160 ADF. See Allied Democratic Forces African Cup of Nations (CAN), 68, 69, 74 African National Congress (ANC), 173, 180–182 African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), 176 African Union, 196 AFRICOM. See US Africa Command Afrifa, Akwasi, 119 Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB), 179 Afrikaners, 172–173, 179, 182 Afrobarometer surveys, 31 Agyeman-Duah, Baffour, 123, 129nn9– 11 Ahiakpor, James C. W., 129n6 Akuffo, Fred Kwasi, 118–119, 128n2 Algeria: 1980’s economy, 43–44; 2009 and 2010 oil price increases, 55n18; anticolonial wars in, 8; Bouteflika’s handouts, 55n19; class inequality, 15; corruption scandals, 55nn15–16; demographics of, 40; depoliticizing effect of oil in, 55n21; elite groups,

50–51, 53; explanation of crisis outcomes in, 48–49; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; failed democratization in, 12; GDP, 39, 39tab, 41tab; historical background of, 38–43; impediments to crisis management in, 50–53; military retention of power, 8, 54n3, 194; oil sector, 37–43, 39tab, 45, 48, 50–53, 54n5, 54nn7–11; political crisis outcome, 46–48; population exit from, 55n20; primary commodity dependence, 39tab; security crisis in, 10–13; select social and economic indicators in, 41tab; social polarization, 14–15; staple theory applied to, 42, 54n6; structural challenges, 44–45; World Bank and, 40, 41tab, 80, 125, 140 All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), 159–160 Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), 92tab, 95, 98 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 92tab, 94 Almeida, Roberto de, 86n45 Aluko, Olajide, 129n8 ANC. See African National Congress ANCYL. See African National Congress Youth League Angola: 2008-2010 crisis background, 10–13, 58–65; 2008-2010 crisis

223

224

INDEX

origins, 65–67; 2008-2010 crisis outcomes, 67–72; 2008-2010 crisis outcomes explained, 72–76; 2010 foreign exchange reserves, 86n36; anticolonial wars in, 8, 60; budget discrepancies, 86n30; catchphrase for, 83n1; class inequality, 15, 64–65; democratization process, 2, 12; diamond industry, 57–60, 66, 69, 76, 78, 85n17, 85n22; dollar to kwanza exchange rate, 77fig, 84n13; elite groups, 60–64, 73–75, 82, 86n43; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; forms and modes of crisis in, 6–13; GDP, 9–10, 57–59, 64–67, 72, 76–77, 77fig, 79, 86n35; Gini coefficient of, 84n14; “hyperpresidentialism” in, 74, 86n39; IMF and, 57, 71; oil sector, 58, 62, 64–67, 76–82, 85n17; social polarization, 14–15, 86n43; water supply, 58, 83n2, 86n41 Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDA), 78 Annan, Kofi, 133–135, 141–142 ANPP. See All Nigerian People’s Party Ansar Dine, 1 Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment, 175 Aowin, 129n7 Apartheid, South African, 172 APCLS. See Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain AQIM. See al-Qaeda in Maghreb Arab Spring uprisings, 53, 55n21 Arabs, 14, 40, 134 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Ghana, 116 Armée de Résistance Populaire (ARP), 98 ARP. See Armée de Résistance Populaire ARV. See Antiretroviral treatment Ashanti, 127, 129n12 Atim, Chris, 129n15 Atta-Mills, John, 122, 125 AWB. See Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging

Babangida, Ibrahim, 151, 156 Bakari, Djibo, 124 Balance of payments, 9–10 Banco de Poupança e Crédito, Angola, 85n20

Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social, Brazil, 85n20 Banking Act (1970), Ghana, 129n14 Basner, Harry, 124 BDK movement. See Bundu Dia Kongo movement Belgian colonial rule, 108–109, 111 Belhadj, Ali, 45 Belmokhtar, Mokhtar, 52 Bembe, Bento, 70, 95 Beni territory, 94 Benjedid, Chadli, 38, 43, 45–49 Berbers, 14, 40 Berom community, 163 Bicesse Accords (1991), 60–61 BNA. See National Bank of Angola BNP Paribas SA, 80 Boko Haram, 2, 147, 153–154, 159, 190– 191; human rights abuses animating, 162–163 Boumedienne, Houari, 42, 44 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 42, 51–52, 54n4, 55n19; manipulating Western fear factor, 47–48 Brazil: Angola and, 57, 80, 81; catchphrase for, 83n1; investments in African economies, 31; Odebrecht S. A., 79, 85n25 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), 31 Brazil: Land of the Future (Zweig), 83n1 BRICS. See Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa British colonial rule, 137–138, 155–156 Brong Ahafo, 127, 129n12 Buhari, Muhammadu, 150–156, 162, 164, 168 Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) movement, 98 Burkina Faso, 117, 118, 122 Burundi, fractionalization in, 14–15 Busia, Kofi, 115, 117, 119–120, 123 Cabinda, Angola, 69–70, 85nn23–24 Caliphate, Boko Haram’s, 154 Cameroon, 2, 129n7 Campaore, Blaise, 124 CAN. See African Cup of Nations Canada, 57 Cape colony, 172 CAR. See Central African Republic CASA-CE. See Convergência Ampla da

INDEX

Salvação de Angola–Coligação Eleitoral CEIC. See Centro de Estudos e Investigacao Cientifica Central African Republic (CAR): communal violence in, 2–3; security crisis in, 10–13 Central Geral de Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola (CGSILA), 85nn25 Centro de Estudos e Investigacao Cientifica (CEIC), 58, 67–68 84n13, 85n21, 85nn18–19 CGSILA. See Central Geral de Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola Chazan, Naomi, 116, 120, 128n1 Chibok schoolgirl abduction, 154, 163 China: Algeria and, 51; Angola and, 57– 58, 64, 65, 80, 85n25; DRC and, 90, 113n1; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd., 80; investments in African economies, 31, 57; providing resources for growth, 28; Saudi Arabia as top oil supplier, 58 Chipesse, Augusto, 86n45 Chivukuvuku, Abel, 86n45 Church of the Lord Jesus Christ, DRC, 99 Cinq chantiers (five work areas), 90, 100 Class inequality, 8, 15, 64–65 Clientelism, 7, 12, 25, 42, 44, 49, 166; NGOs and, 65; organized around president, 193–194 Climatic events, longer-term crises from, 3 CNDP. See Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple Cocoa industry collapse, 116–117 Cold War: regime changes following, 8; security crises at end of, 11–13; superpower rivalries, 28, 60, 185 Colonialism: in Algeria, 8; in Angola, 8, 60; Belgian, 108–109, 111; British, 137–138, 155–156; French, 40, 94; German, 94; in Nigeria, 8; security crises after, 11–13; in South Africa, 172 Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence Report (Waki Commission), Kenya, 143, 145n1

225

Competition distribution, 16 Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), 34fig, 92tab, 93tab, 96, 97, 106–111 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 176 Convention People’s Party (CPP), 115– 116 Convergência Ampla da Salvação de Angola–Coligação Eleitoral (CASACE), 86n45 Correia, Camargo, 85nn25 COSATU. See Congress of South African Trade Unions Côte d’Ivoire, 117, 122, 125, 127, 129n7 CPP. See Convention People’s Party Crisis: common meaning of, 3; defining, 5–6; forms and modes of, 6–13; of governance, 7–9; legacies of, 194– 196; vulnerabilities, 13–17. See also Genesis, of crisis Crisis management: alternative outcomes and trajectories, 32–35, 34fig, 193– 194, 199n3; capacities for, 190–191; dimensions of, 34fig; early warning frameworks, 188–190, 199n2; gauging, 4; incentives for, 191–193; policy implications for, 196–199; shocks, crises, and sequences, 186– 187. See also Incentives, for crisis management Cuba, 60, 129n15 Dagomba-Konkomba, 121, 190–191 De Gucht, Karel, 111 De Klerk, F. W., 173 Debra, Emmanuel Kwaku, 122–123, 128n3 Decolonization, 11–13 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): class inequality, 15; clientelist politics, 193–194; displacement and migration in, 12–13; elite groups, 99, 101–104, 108, 111; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; failed democratization in, 12; forms and modes of crisis in, 6–13; GDP, 91; incentives for crisis management, 111–112; Kabila, Joseph, Republican Guard, 92tab, 99; legacies of crisis, 195–196; mineral wealth of, 10;

226

INDEX

mired in multiple crises, 89–91; postcolonial rule violence, 8; security crises, 10–13, 91–99; separates Cabinda from Angola’s mainland, 85nn23–24; social polarization, 14– 15; spillover effects, 13–14; World Bank and, 100. See also Zaire Democratization, 2, 8–9; Afrobarometer surveys showing, 31; commodity prices and global trends impacting, 28; failed, 12; Ghana’s experiments with, 116; in Kenya, 143–145; in Nigeria, 147–148, 157–164; number of African countries rated democratic, 36n1; post-Cold War, 12, 28; social divisions and multiparty elections, 26–27; South African example of, 179–182 Demographic problems, 12–13; causing longer-term crises, 3; youth bulge, 40, 128 Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS), 50–53 Diamond industry, 57–60, 66, 69, 76, 78, 85n17, 85n22 Dias dos Santos, Fernando da Piedade, 86n45 Dispersal of benefits, 16 District Peace Advisory Councils (DPACs), 130n26 Domestic incentives, 197 Dongo, DRC, 98 Dos Santos, José Eduardo, 58, 60–63, 68–83, 84n7, 84n9, 85n27 DPACs. See District Peace Advisory Councils DRC. See Democratic Republic of Congo DRS. See Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité Dutch colonial rule, 172–173, 179, 182 Early warning efforts, 196 East African Royal Commission in Kenya, 138 Eastern Europe, 129n15 ECA. See Excess Crude Account ECOMOG. See ECOWAS Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 14

Economic crisis, 3; economic downturn of 2009, 197; key indicators of, 9–10; vulnerability factors, 16–17 Economic Structural Adjustment Program, Zimbabwe, 189 ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 197 Edo community, 155 Elite groups, 197; Algeria’s, 50–51, 53; Angola’s, 60–64, 73–75, 82, 86n43; bargaining to mitigate crisis vulnerability, 31; clientelist politics of, 7, 12, 25, 42–44, 49, 65, 166, 193– 194; DRC’s, 99, 101–104, 108, 111; electoral politics and, 16; Ghana’s, willing to compromise, 116–117, 125–126; incentives of, 18, 187–188, 192–193; Kenya’s, 144–145; in legacy of exclusion, 26; Nigeria’s fragmented, 147, 149, 152–157, 160, 163, 165–169 Enclave economies, 10 Environmental problems, 12–13, 162– 163 Ethiopia, 21, 124, 134; spread of weaponry in, 12 Ethnic fractionalization, 14–15 Eurobond, 80 Ewes, 129n7 Excess Crude Account (ECA), 164 Export Development Bank, Canada, 85n20 External initiatives: harmonized with regional initiatives, 197–198; leading with political and diplomatic engagement, 197 fama-Nyame (“leave it to God” syndrome), 125 FARDC. See Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo FBN. See Force Intervention Brigade FDLR. See Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda Feijó, Carlos, 71, 86n40 Ferreira, Rui Constantino da Cruz, 86n45 FIBUN. See Force Intervention Brigade FIS. See Front Islamique de Salut

INDEX

FLEC. See Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda FLEC-FAC. See Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda FLN. See National Liberation Front FNL. See Forces Nationales de Libération FNLA. See National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola) FOCA. See Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi Fodio, Uthman dan, 155 Force Intervention Brigade (FIBUN), 92tab, 93–96, 93tab, 109–110 Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), 92tab, 93tab, 94–99, 103, 106, 108– 111, 114n14 Forces Armées Zairoises, DRC, 97 Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FOCA), 93 Forces de Défense du Congo, 92tab Forces de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri, 92tab Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), 92tab, 93–97, 110–111 Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), 60, 79, 86n45, 92tab, 94–95 Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF), 92tab, 93tab, 98 Fractionalization, 14–15 Freedom fighters, 124 French colonial rule, 40, 94 FRF. See Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes Frimpong-Ansah, J. H., 120, 129n4 Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), 60 Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC), 69–70, 85nn23–24 Front Islamique de Salut (FIS), 29, 37– 38, 45–47, 51, 54n1, 194 FSDA. See Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund G-20. See Group of 20 Garcia, Wanani Nunes, 86n45

227

Gbadolite, 194 GDP. See Gross domestic product Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga, 92tab Gemcorp Capital LLP, 78 General State Budget (OGE), 78–79, 81 Genesis, of crisis, 6, 9, 13, 19–20; analyzing state vulnerabilities, 21–24; contingent factors, 28–31; factors mitigating, 31–32; structural factors, 25–28. See also Crisis Genocide, 189n2; in Rwanda, 1, 12, 94, 111, 189; in South Africa, 183n12 German colonial rule, 94 Ghana: class inequality, 15; cocoa industry collapse, 116–117; communal violence in, 2; Côte d’Ivoire and, 117, 122; difficult foreign relations, 117–118; difficult foreign relations outcomes, 121–122; economic collapse, 116–117; economic crisis outcomes, 119–121; economic recovery success, 123–124; elite groups, 116–117, 125–126; ethnic competition managed in, 12; ethnic conflict, 117; ethnic conflict management, 124; ethnic conflict outcomes, 121; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; forms and modes of crisis in, 6–13; future security challenges, 195; heritage of split ideology in, 115–116; IMF and, 120, 129n14; limited competition fostering crisis in, 18n2; managing potentially major crises, 125–127; mitigation of Dagomba-Konkomba, 190–191; personality-dependent foreign policy, 124–125; political turmoil outcomes, 118–119; recurring civil and military cycles in, 8; risks still facing, 127–128; security conditions, 193; social polarization, 14–15; spirit of compromise in, 122– 123; World Bank and, 116, 120–123, 126 Gidéon Mukungubila. See Mutombo, Paul-Joseph Mukungubila Gini coefficient: Angola’s, 84n14; Kenya’s, 135 Gnassingbe, Eyadema, 124 GNP. See Gross national product Gonja community, 121

228

INDEX

Gourgel, Abraão, 71 Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), 62, 63 Gowon, Yakubu, 149–150, 156 Gross domestic product (GDP): Algeria’s, 39, 39tab, 41tab; Angola’s, 9–10, 57–59, 64–67, 72, 76–77, 77fig, 79, 86n35; contraction of, 9–10, 77fig; DRC’s, 91; Kenya’s, 135; South African, from agriculture, 135 Gross national product (GNP), 43 Group of 20 (G-20), 173, 182 Groupe Salafiste pour le Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), 51 Guinea-Bissau, 2 Gukurahundi Shona, 183n12 GURN. See Government of National Unity and Reconciliation Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, 129n12, 129n13 Habyarimana regime, 94 Hassi Messaoud oil field, Algeria, 54n5 Hassi R’mel oil field, Algeria, 54n5 Hausa-Fulani, 149, 155, 163 Hélder Vieira Dias, Manuel, Júnior (“Kopelipa”), 71, 78 HIV/AIDS pandemic: antiretroviral treatment, 175; in comparative dimensions of crisis management, 34fig; delay in responding to, 23, 29, 32–33, 171; Kenya, 135; as South Africa’s slow-burning emergency, 34, 36, 171, 175, 191–192 Hutu insurgency, 92tab, 93tab, 94–98 Hyperpresidentialism, 74, 86n39

ICC. See International Criminal Court IDPs. See Internally displaced persons Igbo community, 149, 155 Ijaw community, 153, 155 Ikoku, S. G., 124, 129n8 IMF. See International Monetary Fund Incentives, for crisis management: in Angola, 82; bureaucratic and planning capabilities reflect, 10, 17– 18, 20–21, 29; coercive, 121; in DRC, 111–112; external initiatives, 197– 198; Ghana’s cocoa industry collapse versus, 116–117; in Kenya, 144–145;

political, 32, 47. See also Crisis management Independent National Election Commission (INEC), 160, 162 India: Angola and, 65; cultural influences in Kenya, 134; Gini coefficient, 84n14; Indian population in South Africa, 182n1; investments in African economies, 31 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd., 80 INEC. See Independent National Election Commission Inkatha Freedom Party, 180 Institute for Security Studies, Kenya, 142–143 Institutional Revolutionary Party, Mexico, 168 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 2, 141. See also Refugees International Criminal Court (ICC), 26, 95, 97, 108, 142, 145 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 125; Angola’s loan from, 57, 71; Ghana’s loan from, 120, 129n14; standby arrangement of, 69, 74–75 Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), 119, 122–123 IPAC. See Inter-Party Advisory Committee Ironsi, Iguiyi, 156 ISIS. See Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Islam: Arab cultural influences in Kenya, 134; terrorism incorrectly equated with, 47–49 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 154 Islamist militants, 1, 14–15; opposing government corruption, 45, 47–48; religious divides deepened by, 26–27, 29–30, 37–38 Jega, Attahiru, 162 John Paul (pope), 69 Jonathan, Goodluck, 153, 154, 161–162, 164 Jos, Nigeria, 159, 162, 163 Judiciary independence, 182, 183n16

Kabila, Joseph, 89, 91, 97–98, 100, 103– 113, 194; cinq chantiers campaign, 90; Republican Guard, 92tab, 99

INDEX

Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 194 Kabylia region, Algeria, 40, 52 KACC. See Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission KADU. See Kenya African Democratic Union Kaduna, Nigeria, 162 Kala Kato, 163 Kalenjin, 134 Kanem-Bornu empire, 155 Kano, Nigeria, 162 KANU. See Kenya African National Union Kanuri community, 155 Kasapa prison, Lubumbashi, DRC, 98 Kata Katanga, 92tab, 99, 104, 106 Katsina, 153 KCIC. See Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission Kenya: background of crisis factors, 133–135; class inequality, 8, 15; crisis amelioration terms, 140–143; crisis management incentives, 144–145; crisis management themes in comprehensive state reform, 143– 145; displacement and migration as instrumental in conflict, 12–13; elite groups, 144–145; ethnic competition managed in, 12; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; forms and modes of crisis in, 6–13; GDP, 135; Gini coefficient, 135; historical and structural dimensions of crisis in, 137–140; incentives for crisis management, 144–145; KNDR, 133– 135, 141, 146n5; lack of substantial natural resources, 10; Mau Mau emergency, 8; security crisis in, 10– 13, 193; social polarization, 14–15; socioeconomic framework, 135–137, 136tab; spatial inequalities in Nairobi Province, 136tab; state-induced ethnic violence in Rift Valley, 12; status of agreement implementation, 141–143; World Bank and, 141 Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), 139 Kenya African National Union (KANU), 139 Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), 142

229

Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (KCIC), 141–142 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation project (KNDR), 133– 135, 141, 146n5 Kenyatta, Jomo, 139–141 Kenyatta, Uhuru, 141, 142, 144 Kibaki, Mwai, 139, 141 Kikuyu, 134, 138–139 Kisii, 134 KNDR. See Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation project Konkomba wars, Ghana (1994-1996), 121 Kony, Joseph, 95 Kopelipa. See Hélder Vieira Dias, Manuel, Júnior Kuangana, Eduardo, 86n45 Kuffour, John, 122, 125 Kusi, Newman K., 129n5 Lagos, 118, 155 Lenin’s New Economic Policy, 130n16 Liberia, 2, 12 Libya, 37 Limann, Hilla, 125, 130n25 Local capabilities, development of, 198 Local Defense Forces Busumba, 92tab Longer-term crises, 3 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 92tab, 95 Low to high dimensions of crisis management, 34fig LRA. See Lord’s Resistance Army Luanda, Angola, 59–60, 62, 64, 69, 83, 84n4 Lugard, Frederick, 155 Lumumba, Patrice, 90 Luo community, 139 Lusaka Protocol (1994), 61, 62

M23 insurgency, 34fig, 92tab, 93tab, 96, 97, 106–111, 114n14 Madagascar, 3 Mahama, John Dramani, 127, 130n18 Maiduguri, Nigeria, 153, 162, 163 Mai-Mai (Congolese armed insurgents and militias), 95 Mai-Mai Bede, 92tab Mai-Mai Hilaire, 92tab Mai-Mai Kapopo, 92tab, 98

230

INDEX

Mai-Mai Kifuafua, 92tab, 98 Mai-Mai Mongol, 92tab Mai-Mai Morgan, 92tab Mai-Mai people, World Bank on, 93tab Mai-Mai Raia Mutomboki, 92tab, 96 Mai-Mai Sheka/Nduma Defense for Congo, 92tab, 95–96 Mai-Mai Simba, 92tab Mai-Mai Yakutumba, 92tab, 93tab, 95, 108 Majimbo (federal structure), 138–139 Makonenn, T. R., 124 Malaria, 23, 135 Malawi, 14–15 Malema, Julius, 179 Mali, 38; AQIM in, 52; democratization process, 2; militias destabilizing, 30; security crisis in, 10–13; Tuareg rebellion in, 1 Mandela, Nelson, 173 Mao’s National Democratic Phase, 130n16 Masquisards (Algerian resistance fighters), 40 Massano, Jose de Lima, 78 Mau Mau emergency, 8, 138 Mauritania, 38, 52 Mbeki, Thabo, 171, 175, 176–179 Media, South African, 181, 183n13, 183n16 MEND. See Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Mexico, Institutional Revolutionary Party, 168 Middle class, 192–193m 183n5 Migration: displacement and, 12–13; longer-term crises from, 3 Mixage (making groups of rebels into army units), 97 MLC. See Mouvement de Libération du Congo Mobutu regime, 90, 187, 194 Moi, Daniel arap, 134, 139–140, 146n4, 199n3 Monetary stability, 9–10 MONUSCO. See UN Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo Morais, Jose Pedro de, Júnior, 78 Morais, Rafael Marques, 85n22 Moreira de Sousa, João Maria, 86n45

Morocco, 38, 52 Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), 97 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 162–163 Mozambique, 186; democratization process, 2; flood management, 3, 33– 34 MPLA. See Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Mugabe, Robert, 180, 183n12 Muhammed, Murtala, 156 Mukungubila, Gidéon. See Mutombo, Paul-Joseph Mukungubila Munene, Faustin, 98 Murtala. See Muhammed, Murtala Mutombo, Paul-Joseph Mukungubila (aka Gidéon Mukungubila), 98 Mutunga, Willy, 145

Nande community, 94 Nanumba community, 121 Natal colony, 172 National Bank of Angola (BNA), 67 National Democratic Congress (NDC), 116, 119, 123, 127, 129nn12–13 National Democratic Institute (NDI), 100 National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola)(FNLA), 60, 79, 86n45, 92tab National Liberation Council (NLC), 128n1 National Liberation Front (FLN), 38 National Peace Architecture, Ghana, 126, 130n26 National Peace Council (NPC), 130n26 National Redemption Council, 116 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 60–63, 84n10 NDC. See National Democratic Congress NDI. See National Democratic Institute New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 198 New Patriotic Party (NPP), 116, 122, 129nn12–13 Ngonda, Lucas, 86n45 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations Nicholson, Chris, 183n11 Niger, 118, 124, 129n7; AQIM in, 52;

INDEX

drought conditions, 3; militias destabilizing, 30, 160–162 Niger Coast Protectorate, 155 Niger Delta, 11, 27, 30, 33, 34fig, 38; increased revenue allocations to, 166; key lessons from, 189, 198; MEND, 162–163; militant activity, 153, 163 Nigeria: Boko Haram in, 2; class inequality, 15; democratization problems, 147–148, 157–164; elite groups, 147, 149, 152–157, 160, 163, 165–169; ethnic competition and civil war, 12; evolution of crisis factors, 167–169; explaining crisis management in, 165–167; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; forms and modes of crisis in, 6–13; foundations and drivers of crisis, 157–159; four prominent crises of, 147–155; Ghana and, 117; historical background of, 155–157; legacies of crisis, 195; military rule in, 12; recurring civil and military cycles in, 8; security crisis in, 10–13; social polarization, 14–15; World Bank and, 158 Nkomo, Joshua, 183n12 Nkrumah, Kwame, 115–117, 119, 123– 127, 128n1, 130n25; Aluko on, 129n8 Nkwinti, Gugile, 174 NLC. See National Liberation Council Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 198–199; clientelism and, 65 Nonstate actors, 198–199 Northern People’s Congress, Nigeria, 149 NPC. See National Peace Council NPP. See New Patriotic Party Ntaganda, Bosco, 97–98, 107–109 Ntiang, Habib, 124 Nugent, Paul, 120, 129n15 Nunes, Manuel, Jr., 70 Nupe community, 155 Nyatura, 92tab, 93tab Nyatura Noheri, 93tab Nzima, 129n7 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 152–153, 156, 159, 161, 164 Ocampo, Luis Moreno, 145 Odebrecht S. A., 79, 85n25 Odinga, Oginga, 139, 141 Odinga, Raila, 139

231

OECD. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OGE. See General State Budget Oil/gas: Algerian, 37–43, 39tab, 45, 48, 50–53, 54n5, 54nn7–11, 55n18, 55n21, 190; Angolan, 58, 62, 64–67, 76–82, 85n17; depoliticizing effect of, 55n21; Nigerian, 150, 159, 164, 190; Strategic Financial Oil Reserve, 72 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka, 149 Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, 164 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 65–67 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 65–67

PALIPEHUTU. See Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu PARECO. See Patriotes Résistants Congolais Paris Club, 140, 145, 164 Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), 94–95 Partido de Renovação Social (PRS), 86n45 Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO), 92tab, 93tab, 98, 108 PDP. See People’s Democratic Party People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 152– 153, 159–164 PNDC. See Provisional National Defence Council Political crisis, defined, 3 Political Instability Task Force, 199n2 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 14, 60–63, 74, 78– 79, 84nn6–11 Portugal, 59–60, 80, 81, 83n3 PPL. See Public Probity Law Prempeh, Henry Kwasi, 129n12 Presidentialism: authoritarian legacies of, 25; clientelism and, 193–194 Prompt response, 196–197 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), 116–121, 129nn9–11 PRS. See Partido de Renovação Social Public Probity Law (PPL), 70 al-Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM), 1, 51–52

232

INDEX

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma), 97 Rassemblement pour Unité et Démocratie, 92tab Rawlings, Jerry John, 116–127, 128n3, 130n25, 193, 199n3; Ahiakpor on, 129n6; Gyimah-Boadi on, 129n13; Ray on, 130n16 Ray, Donald Iain, 130n16 RCD-Goma. See Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie Refugees: assistance to, 33, 36, 191, 194; displacement and migration as instrumental in conflict, 12–13; FDLR troops recruiting from Rwandan, 94; large-scale movements of, 2; as potential crisis, 128; spillover effects from, 11, 13–14; UNHCR, 2 Regional Peace Advisory Councils (RPACs), 130n26 Republic of Biafra, 149 Republican Guard, DRC, 92tab, 99 Resource curse, 10, 54n6 Resource mobilization, 8 Revenue volatility, 9–10 RPACs. See Regional Peace Advisory Councils Russia, 31 Ruto, William, 142 Rwanda: failed democratization in, 12; FDLR, 92tab, 93–97, 110–111; fractionalization in, 14–15; genocide in, 1, 12, 94, 111, 189 Rwandan Patriotic Front, 94

SACP. See South African Communist Party Sahelian state, 1, 14 Samakuva, Isaias, 86n45 Sankara, Thomas, 118 Sanwi, 124, 129n7 Saudi Arabia, 58, 153, 161 Savimbi, Jonas, 60–62, 84n9 Security crises, 3; factors contributing to, 13–17; from social polarization, 14– 15; as sustained significant violence, 10–13; violence as crisis vulnerability, 16. See also specific country Security Sector Reform (SSR), 36, 97, 198 Seko, Mobutu Sese. See Mobutu regime

SFOR. See Strategic Financial Oil Reserve al Shabaab, 134, 142 Shaik, Schabir, 176, 183n10 Sharia law, 166 Shekau, Abubakar, 154 Shillington, Kevin, 129n15 Sidi Aissa region, Algeria, 54n5 Sierra Leone, 2 SMC. See Supreme Military Council Smuts, Jan, 171 Somalia: chronic conflict in, 3; democratization process, 2; spread of weaponry in, 12 Sonatrach, 51 South Africa: first crisis, 175–178; second crisis, 178–179; black middle class, 183n5; class inequality, 15; controversy over mining licenses, 181, 183n13; crime levels in, 2; democratization process, 179–182; as disaster that refuses to happen, 171– 172; factors contributing to security crisis, 13–17; forms and modes of crisis in, 6–13; GDP, 135; genocide, 183n12; HIV/AIDS in, 34, 34fig, 36, 171, 175, 191–192; investments in African economies, 31; judiciary independence, 182, 183n16; media in, 181, 183n13, 183n16; mineral wealth and economic outcome, 10; racial landscape, 182n1; recurring violence from domestic inequality, 8; security crises of criminal violence, 11–13; social grants versus paying income tax, 183n6; social polarization, 14– 15; structural inequalities and intransigent settler regime in, 8; structural vulnerabilities, 173–176; Zimbabwe compared to, 180 South African Communist Party (SACP), 176 South African Police Service, 174–175 South African War (1899-1902), 172 South Korea, 57 South Sudan, 134; communal violence in, 2–3; security crisis in, 10–13 Sovereign Wealth Fund, Angola, 81 Soviet Union, 129n15 Soweto rebellion (1976), 8 Spain, 57, 80 Spillover effects, 11, 13–14

INDEX

SSR. See Security Sector Reform Standby arrangement (SBA), 69, 74–75 Staple theory, 42, 54n6 Strategic Financial Oil Reserve (SFOR), 72 Structural Adjustment Program, Nigeria, 189–190 Sunnis, 40, 45 Supreme Military Council (SMC), 128n2 Taleban, 163 Tanzania, 14–15 Terre’blanche, Eugene, 171, 179 Tiv community, 149, 155 TJRC. See Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya Tofa, Bashir, 151 Togo, 2, 117, 118 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (TJRC), 142 Tshisekedi, Etienne, 106–107, 113n2 Tuberculosis, 23 Tunisia, 38, 52 Turkey, 81 Tutsi populations, 92tab, 96–98, 103, 108–109, 111.

UDPS. See Union Démocratique pour le Progrès Social Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF), 94 UGCC. See United Gold Coast Convention UN. See United Nations UN Development Programme (UNDP), 64 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2 UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), 104, 107, 113n2 UN Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), 91, 92tab, 93tab, 94, 96, 98, 112 UNDP. See UN Development Programme UNHCR. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNIGOV. See Union Government

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Union Démocratique pour le Progrès Social (UDPS), 113n2 Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix-LaFontaine, 92tab, 96 Union Government (UNIGOV), 118 UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), 115–116 United Nations (UN), 12, 196; Development Programme, 64; High Commissioner for Refugees, 2; Millennium Development Goals, 135–137, 136tab; MONUSCO, 91, 92tab, 93tab, 94, 96, 98, 112 United Party (UP)(Ghana), 115, 120 United States (US), 57; Angola’s oil export to, 58; kwanza to dollar monthly average exchange rate, 77fig, 84n13; manipulated by fear of “Islamic terror,” 47–49; war on terror, 38 UNJHRO. See UN Joint Human Rights Office UP. See United Party UPDF. See Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces Urbanization: environmental impact of, 23–24; Frimpong-Ansah on urban wage-earners, 120; governmental challenges from, 22; Jos, Nigeria, 159, 162, 163; Jos’s deterioration, 163; Kikuyu’s purchases, 138; language of choice impacted by, 59; as major factor in crisis potential, 28, 44; in Nigeria, 158, 159; shifting communal groupings, 13; social and political unrest from, 22–23; of South African blacks, 172–173; spatial inequalities in Nairobi Province, 136tab; UNITA’s campaign to destroy cities, 61–62 US. See United States US Africa Command (AFRICOM), vii US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 76 Van-Dunem, Pedro Jose, 86n45 Vicente, Manuel Domingos, 86n45 Violence, as crisis vulnerability, 16–17, 18n2 Virunga National Park, 94

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INDEX

Volta Dam spillage, 118, 122

Waki Commission, 143, 145n1 War on terror, 38 Water resources: Angola’s abundant, 58, 83n2, 86n41; Ghana’s Volta Dam spillage, 118, 122; Kabila’s cinq chantiers campaign, 90, 100; Kenya’s, 135 Westgate Mall terrorist attack, Kenya, 142 World Bank: Algeria and, 40, 41tab, 80, 125, 140; DRC and, 100; Ghana and, 116, 120–123, 126; Kenya and, 141; on Mai-Mai people, 93tab; Nigeria and, 158 World Cup (soccer), 179 Xhosa mafia, 180

Yakutumba, 93tab ’Yan Tatsine groups, 157, 163 Yar’Adua, Umaru, 153, 161, 164

Yoruba, 148, 151, 152–153 Youth bulge, 40, 128 Yusuf, Mohammed, 154, 163

Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), 3, 11, 14, 28–29, 33, 60, 187–188 Zaire-anization (private redistribution of foreigners’ assets), 91 ZANU. See Zimbabwe African National Union ZANU-PF. See Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front Zeroual, Liamine, 47 Zimbabwe, 3, 180, 189 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 180 Zimbabwe African National Union– Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 180 Zulu, 180 Zuma, Jacob, 171, 176–180, 183n10 Zweig, Stefan, 83n1

About the Book

ALTHOUGH LARGE-SCALE CONFLICTS, POLITICAL UPHEAVALS, AND

social violence are common problems throughout Africa, individual countries vary greatly in both their susceptibility to these crises and their capacities for responding effectively. What accounts for this variance? How do crises emerge, and how are they resolved? When are unexpected events most likely to spiral into crisis? Are there institutions and policies that can help to manage adverse shocks? The authors of Coping with Crisis in African States assess the capability for crisis management in countries across the continent, shedding new light on the sources of instability in the region, as well as on comparative questions of state capacity and resilience. Peter M. Lewis is associate professor and director of the African Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. John W. Harbeson is emeritus professor of political science at the City University of New York Graduate Center and the City College of New York.

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